

CHAPTER V

COSTS IN A COLLEGIATE UNIVERSITY

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357. We described in Chapter I how the collegiate university came into being as the result of an historical evolution. But it can also be viewed as a particular response to the needs of a large organization. The requirement laid on any such organization, which demands both the main energies of its members and the exercise of individual responsibility and judgement by them, is to provide an environment in which the members, of their own volition, become thoroughly involved in its purposes. When this is secured, it makes for high morale, and it is common experience that better work is then done. It is true that the purposes of a university are not the same as those of industry or commerce and that the kind and degree of organization that suits a university is different. But the problem of creating a right environment is common to all large organizations. An important part of the solution lies in breaking the large organization into manageable units with as much devolution of responsibility and power to act as is consistent with the success of the whole. The college system at Oxford gives an answer in terms of life in a university.

358. The system has advantages for the academic and social lives of the members of the University, and it will be clear from the whole of our Report that the Commission has no doubt that it should be retained. As is generally known, and this was stressed by a number of our witnesses,

many other universities are seeking to secure some or all of these advantages: it would be foolish to abandon something which is valuable in itself and has set the pattern for numerous experiments by others.

359. The original intentions of the founders of the colleges, which they expressed in the constitutions they gave them, are still realized in a close interweaving of academic and social life; so that it is difficult fully to participate in the one set of activities while contracting out of the other. This remains true even though most fellows of colleges are married and live outside the college, and most students spend some part of their residence in lodgings. For the fellows the unity of college life finds expression at the Common Table, in the Common Room, and at the meetings of the governing body and its committees. Ideally, and to a large extent in practice, every student knows at least one fellow of his college well, and every fellow knows some students well. All share a life which extends at any rate to the library, the dining hall, and the several Common Rooms. Most undergraduates gain a sense of 'belonging' from college life, since its many activities are on a scale small enough to give each of them a personality and some degree of status. The undergraduate can choose, apart from his studies, how much or how little he will participate in the wider life of the University. There is no central Students' Union, and membership of all university clubs is optional.

360. The college system is expensive, and there has been some criticism of it from this point of view. We have now to consider, within the limits of the information available, how far and in what respects the colleges, in their essential functions of the decentralization of academic life and the devolution of its responsibilities, make the costs of Oxford greater than those of almost all other British universities. We have also to inquire whether these costs associated with college life are all proper because necessary to it; or whether some are not necessary consequences of the college system and should therefore be eliminated or diminished. In particular we have to examine the complex structure of emoluments and allowances received by the fellows of colleges.

361. We attempted to make comparisons with other British universities, though it should be clear from what we have said elsewhere that, except for Cambridge, they are all organized in such a different way that we were not able to compare like with like. None the less we have sought to make judgements about the extravagance or economy with which Oxford spends its income both on those activities which are common to all universities and on those which are more or less peculiar to itself. It will be seen from Table I that Oxford is more expensive than most British universities.

Table I. *Income and expenditure in 1963-4 (1963 for colleges)*

	Oxford University and colleges combined (expressed in £'000)	Comparison with other universities (expressed in £ per student)		
		Oxford	All universities in Great Britain except Oxford, Cambridge, East Anglia, and York	Oxford's share
INCOME				
Endowments	5,894	858	52	808
Grants:				
Exchequer	4,922	373	90.7	(- 248)
Local authorities	—	—	2.5	
Private for research	1,182	120	94	28
Student fees (including board and lodging fees and dues—see note below)	1,088	112	75	47
Other income	185	21	38	(- 17)
	5,069	2,977	2,825	2,937
Unspent income carried forward	(- 202)			
	£'000			
EXPENDITURE				
Departmental maintenance:				
Teaching and research staff	3,467	320	262	28
Libraries	256	5	28	28
Other expenses	1,875	209	209	10
General educational expenditure	348	30	27	22
	5,884	791	518	82
Maintenance of premises (including special expenditure met from the Historic Buildings Appeal)	1,247	119	100	30
Administration	609	68	57	12
Miscellaneous expenses	197	44	31	12
	4,932	431	380	48
Contribution from charges made for board and lodging—see note below	(- 162)	(- 20)	—	(- 98)
	4,770	411	380	25
	£'000	2,273	2,025	2,08
NOTE				
Board and lodging fees	975			
Dues and establishment charges	662			
Income for conferences, etc.	1,852			
Less: Cost of supplies, wages, and other expenses directly associated with board and lodging (see para. 251)	1,268			
Contribution to maintenance of college premises, administration, etc.	284			
	£'000			

362. The same table also shows that the extra academic costs incurred at Oxford are financed from its endowment income. But it should be observed that roughly half of this endowment income is used to make up for the lower level of public grants which Oxford receives as compared with other

universities, that is, half its endowment income is used to meet academic costs which would otherwise fall on the public purse (see para. 366 below). It is the use to which Oxford puts the other half of its endowment income that we now examine.

363. It might be argued that educational institutions which have incomes from endowment or from current benefactions should be free to use these at discretion to supplement those activities which can be financed from public grants. This argument was disposed of by the Royal Commission of 1922, a principal purpose of which was to examine Oxford's case for such grants, and which laid it down that before they would be made it must be established that proper use was being made of existing income. We do not think that it would be seriously maintained today either that charitable foundations should enjoy unfettered discretion or that bodies which received public money should not be accountable for the whole of their income: nor do we think that the University or the colleges would wish to maintain such propositions. But the converse of these propositions, though unexceptionable, does not get us very far. It is clear that benefactions will not be made if their only result is that public money is diminished *pro tanto*. Further, the possession of endowment income enables universities and similar bodies to enjoy a freedom of experiment which can only be beneficial to the whole community. Though, of course, we would not argue that the State never makes funds available for experiment, it has to observe some sort of parity in dealing with similar institutions which have the same purposes. The problem then is the extent to which this freedom can be made compatible with a proper degree of accountability.

364. The University Grants Committee, in its Report on University Development 1957-62 (Cmd. 2267, 1964), dealt in paras. 368-72 with the question of buildings paid for partly by benefactions and partly by grant. It quoted with approval a passage from the Rucker Report, which said that the gifts received by universities were invaluable 'not only because they enable the universities to accomplish more than they could if they depended wholly on public funds, but more particularly as a proof of public confidence in the work which the universities are doing in advancing scientific knowledge and providing the trained manpower on which the country's future depends. If such gifts are to be encouraged, universities must have a reasonable degree of freedom to spend them in the way which they consider most useful.' The Report (of the University Grants Committee) went on to deal with the problem of building and concluded—'We feel, as Sir Arthur Rucker did, that the universities must have a reasonable degree of freedom in the spending of the funds they collect; yet, where public funds are also involved, it is our responsibility to ensure that the standards involved are not more lavish than those normally acceptable for grant.'

365. It may often be possible with capital expenditure to distinguish between that which is met from private or from public funds. But it is rarely possible to make the same distinction in the case of expenditure of income. Unless a source of income is rigidly tied to a particular form of expenditure which does not need to be supplemented from any other source, economy or extravagance on any object must release funds for other uses or claim funds from them. It follows that in university expenditure public funds are almost always involved, so that the freedom given in the first part of the sentence we have quoted is much circumscribed by the remainder. The interpretation which we place on the whole passage, and by which we are guided in what follows, is that the University and the colleges should be free to use endowments and benefactions on activities which they are prepared to defend publicly as furthering their academic purposes but that private funds should not be used to set standards which are unreasonably lavish or extravagant. We do not, however, advocate uniformity, and think that it would hamper the development of universities and discourage benefactions if any attempt were made to establish it.

366. Oxford has a higher income available for academic purposes than the established civic universities (Table I). The main source of this difference arises from Oxford's level of endowment income per student. In 1963-4 it was £209 a year greater than the average endowment income of the other universities. Oxford's fees for tuition and other academic purposes, now largely paid by local education authorities, were also higher than in other universities by £47 per student. But as against this last figure the other universities received £148 more per student in direct grants from the Exchequer and local authorities than did Oxford. It follows from this that Oxford spent £101 per student out of its endowment income to make up the deficiency, as compared with other universities, in financial assistance from public authorities; this is about 48 per cent. of the amount by which Oxford's endowment income exceeded that of other universities. This is only another way of saying that the higher costs of Oxford, which are made possible by its endowments, use up little more than half of the income derived from them, the remainder, as we have said in para. 362 above, being used in relief of the taxpayer.

367. We now turn to the expenditure as shown in Table I. Oxford spends £98 more per student. 'Departmental maintenance' is the heading used by the University Grants Committee to group the costs of the basic academic life of a university. The main components of the extra expenditure at Oxford are £28 per student for academic staff and £35 per student for libraries. The amount spent on academic staff has already been discussed in Chapter IV, and we return to it later in this chapter (see paras. 392 ff. below). So far as libraries are concerned, we do not consider that Oxford is spending enough on them, and we can only conclude that other

universities are even worse off in this respect than Oxford. We wholly support the use of endowments for this purpose. Under the heading 'General educational expenditure' the Oxford figure is £12 more per student. This includes such items as scholarships, prizes, publications, and examinations. It is almost certain that Oxford's higher level of expense here is mostly on scholarships, about which we have made recommendations in Chapter III. The outlay under these two broad headings of academic expense accounts for £85 per student or all but one-seventh of the difference between the expenditure of Oxford and that of other universities.

368. The remaining expenses shown in Table I relate at Oxford not only to expenditure on strictly academic purposes but also in part to the provision of board and lodging which is not reflected in the figures for the other universities. In consequence the Oxford costs per student for these items are not closely comparable with those for the other universities. We had expected to find that, despite the measure of rating relief which the college buildings have enjoyed, the regular outgoings in respect of Oxford's premises, notably repair and heating, would be relatively high, and that decentralization and the necessity for dealing not only with the affairs of the University proper but also with those of each separate college would make administration more expensive. On the whole we are surprised that in terms of net cost per student the excess for this group of expenditure as compared with the other universities was not more than the £13 per head which the Table shows.

369. At Oxford there is a further main head of expenditure which arises in connexion with the board and lodging of students, the 'housekeeping' activities of colleges as we shall call them for convenience. These costs form an important item of the expenses of students everywhere, but comparisons are not easy to make. Students at most universities have some choice about where and how they will eat, and whether they will choose lodgings or live in colleges or hostels. Oxford presents additional difficulties in the making of comparisons both because a college and a hostel are not the same thing and because the great bulk of Oxford undergraduates spend two years in college; all are required to spend at least one year, and often two, living in college. We have investigated at length the possibility of comparisons, but for reasons which we shall explain we are not able to make any final judgement on the financial aspects of Oxford's practice. Our main recommendations are therefore concerned with a thorough reform of the system of college accounts. Until this first step has been taken, it will not be possible to take the further measures to which we refer later in this chapter.

370. The root of the difficulty lies in the fact that colleges' educational, social, and housekeeping functions are organically related and hence that

there is a large element of what economists call joint costs. The establishment, that is in business terms the central overheads, has to be maintained even if there are considerable variations in the stress laid on this or that element. In these circumstances, allocations of costs must be to a great extent arbitrary, and useful comparisons can be drawn only if bases of allocation, albeit conventional, are first laid down and then applied uniformly and consistently throughout the colleges. Because these are absent, the information at present available from the colleges' accounts does not provide sufficient data for reliable assessment and comparison of the costs of housekeeping regarded as a separate function.

371. The amounts of income and expenditure which appear to be specifically attributable to housekeeping at Oxford in the calendar year 1963 are given in the note at the foot of Table I. This shows that total receipts from board and lodging fees and from dues and establishment charges amounted to £1,637,000. We estimate that this sum represents about £280 per head for the year from students living in and about £80 for those living out. The colleges as a whole also received £195,000 from conferences and other visitors. Against this total income of £1,832,000, the identifiable amounts spent on board and lodging came to £1,568,000, made up as follows:

Provision of food (including kitchen wages)	£
Wages (other than kitchen)	835,000
Other expenses, including laundry, cleaning, repairs and removal of furniture, cutlery, crockery, linen, etc.	490,000
	<u>221,000</u>
Total	<u>£1,568,000</u>

There was thus a surplus of £264,000 of allocable income over allocable expenditure, and this has been carried in the main table as the contribution available for meeting the overhead costs of the general maintenance of the colleges.

372. We have estimated that the average of the receipts for students living in is £280 a year. The figures for board and lodging in halls of residence at Durham, Manchester, and Bristol range from £140 to £172 per head. But for the reasons given in para. 369 above we do not think that useful comparisons can be made. It is, however, evident to us that the college accounts need to be reformed on lines which will provide better information on housekeeping in future. It is not that there is any reluctance to disclose the facts, but until the colleges' accounts are reformed Oxford will not be in a position to assess criticisms of its housekeeping activities, and say whether it should refute them confidently or accept them with a determination to remove grounds for complaint in the future. We are, however, in a position to make some observations of a general kind

and also recommendations about the direction in which we think changes should be made.

373. The two principal criticisms which have been made of Oxford are that the amenities of student life are excessive as compared with those of other universities, and that the 'housekeeping' of the colleges is not as economical and efficient as it should be. The first of these was well put to us by Lord James of Rusholme, Vice-Chancellor of York University (*Written Evidence*, Part IV, p. 99), in reply to our request for his views. He said: '... the fact that some of the colleges are wealthy institutions, and that others which are not are nevertheless very attractive to donors, compared with non-Oxbridge institutions, leads to what can only be described as a dual standard of living between Oxbridge and other universities. This is very clearly shown in actual buildings. New college buildings are put up at costs which are far in excess of anything which the University Grants Committee could or should allow. . . . Nor is this impression of extravagance limited to actual buildings. The price of meals in colleges, or the retention of scoots [i.e. college servants] to wait in hall, are minor matters. Less trivial is the provision of two rooms per student compared with the single Study Bedroom Unit of the University Grants Committee.'

374. Lord James implies that colleges use their endowments to provide an unduly high standard of living for students, particularly in the style of residential accommodation. The latter point can be dealt with at once. Both as regards rooms, and as regards the general cost of operating many of the colleges, some costs are and will continue to be imposed on Oxford by the character of the buildings it has inherited. It is unfortunately true, in Oxford as elsewhere, that many buildings of historic and architectural importance combine the disadvantages of being expensive to maintain and uncomfortable to inhabit.

375. Many Oxford students do still live in two-room sets. The college buildings which house them were almost all built when it was the rule for undergraduates to have two or three rooms. Because of pressure of numbers in the last twenty years the colleges have converted many of these sets for use by more than one student. But there are limits to what can be done with old buildings, and many of the rooms are so arranged that a two-room set cannot be converted to two bed-sitting rooms.

376. In addition to this work of conversion, a considerable amount of new building to accommodate students has been carried out in Oxford during the past decade. We have obtained figures from all colleges about the conversions and new building during this period, and the main results of this inquiry are shown in Table 28. Since 1955 1,405 bed-sitting rooms

were provided by conversion or new building, as against only 199 two-room sets; and 49 of the latter were provided primarily for postgraduates. Generally speaking, therefore, Lord James's observations have substance in so far as they apply to Oxford's inheritance, but they are misdirected in relation to the practice of recent years.

377. He also raised, however, the question of new building which is carried out at a cost greater than would be approved by the University Grants Committee when public funds are involved. We believe that in most, though not in all, cases the new undergraduate bed-sitting rooms have been more expensive than would be permitted by UGC standards. But, as we have already noted, the University Grants Committee considers that, when new building is entirely financed by benefaction or endowment, its own standards need not be applied. We do not wish to argue that this would justify extravagance in accommodation or standards of construction. But we do not think that in fact any college has been unduly lavish in post-war building or conversion. The higher levels of cost have been partly imposed by the need to harmonize with existing buildings of architectural merit, and there have been occasions when the wishes of benefactors have had to be taken into account. The costs have also been increased because of the desire of colleges to build so as to minimize maintenance and running expenses.

378. We think, from our own observation, that the provision of meals for undergraduates is generally not luxurious or extravagant, and there are regular representations from Junior Common Rooms to this effect. But in the course of our inquiries into matters connected with college house-keeping, we received information which indicated that there are important differences between colleges in the costs of catering.

379. We now turn to the form in which college accounts are kept. The present form was prescribed by the 1922 Commissioners. We have conducted a thorough investigation, and are most grateful for the unstinted assistance and access to documents which we have received from a number of college bursars. The accounts in their present form contain too much detail, and are confused by the large number of separate accounts and by the complexity of transfers between them. Many of these accounts are necessary for the internal purposes of the colleges (we ourselves refer in para. 406 below to a tuition fund), but we are clear that improvements can be made, and that the accounts can be summarized and presented in a more significant form. We are therefore recommending an entirely *new form* in which the college accounts should be presented to the University, and we have included in the Statutory Appendix a statute giving effect to our recommendation.

380. From the standpoint of Oxford as a whole the college accounts are at present unsatisfactory in the following respects:

- (a) They cover a financial year different from that of the University, and they are ill adapted to the preparation of a combined financial statement of the University and colleges, which is needed for the information of the public and to enable comparisons to be made between the financial operations of Oxford and of other British universities.
- (b) Although they show the increase or diminution of the accumulated balances in various accounts resulting from the year's transactions, they do not at present give a clear indication of the extent to which a college is succeeding or failing to pay its way. This is because payments made from revenue balances and charged against the revenue for the year may include expenditure which should properly be charged over a longer period. Conversely colleges do not follow a consistent practice of providing each year for the amortization or renewal of assets which remain useful for more than one year and will consequently have to be renewed at irregular intervals.
- (c) The college accounts do not sufficiently distinguish the financial results of carrying out the respective functions, of 'Education and Research' and 'Housekeeping'. It is therefore not possible to see from the accounts the extent to which either of these activities is being financed by the other or from endowment income.

381. We therefore recommend:

- (a) that colleges should change their financial year to coincide with that of the University, making up accounts in the existing form for a period of seven months to 31 July 1967, and thereafter annual accounts to 31 July in the new form;
- (b) that the accounts presented by each college to the University should in future consist of three main statements:
 - (i) a consolidated revenue statement showing under a few main heads the income of the year from all sources, the current expenses properly chargeable against that income, and the resultant surplus or deficit;
 - (ii) a summary of all other money transactions affecting the accumulated balances during the year;
 - (iii) a statement of the net assets (other than property and securities of capital and trust funds) by which these balances were represented at the end of the year;

and that the consolidated revenue statement should be supported by four additional statements, the first showing the computation of the statutory endowment income (see para. 659 below) and the college contribution, and the other three the allocation of income and

expenditure and the resultant surplus or deficit as between 'Endowment', 'Education and Research', and 'Housekeeping' respectively;

- (c) that college auditors should report to the University on these statements.

382. The form and content of the recommended statements, and the matters on which the auditors should report, are set out in the draft statute. The specimen statements in the Schedule to the draft show the heads under which it is intended that the amounts should be classified and indicate how most of the items should be allocated to 'Endowment', 'Education and Research', or 'Housekeeping' as the case may be. For the purpose of these allocations, the head and fellows and the accommodation which they occupy, the Common Table and college entertainments, and the chapel are all regarded as being wholly in the category of 'Education and Research'. College officers should also be placed in this category, with the exception only of any who are wholly concerned with 'Housekeeping', and of Bursars to the extent that their remuneration and office expenses relate to 'Housekeeping' or 'Endowment'.

383. While the Common Table and college entertainments are regarded as an expense of 'Education and Research', the cost of providing these and other meals supplied without charge, e.g. tenants' lunches, forms part of the expenses in the 'Housekeeping' account. The latter must therefore be reimbursed by including as its income appropriate charges to 'Education and Research' or 'Endowment' as the case may be. If the accounts are to give a true and fair view, it is important that the amounts of these charges should be calculated realistically with due regard not only to the direct costs of the food and service provided but also to all the overhead expenses associated with the catering function. For this and the purposes of efficient management it is clearly desirable that, when colleges have adapted themselves and become accustomed to the new form of accounts, they should then in their own interests take steps to sub-divide their 'Housekeeping' income and expenditure between 'Catering' and 'Lodging' in such a way that both sub-divisions become significant trading accounts; the present form of Catering Account does not, and does not purport to, perform that function.

384. A special problem of allocation arises on the expense of maintaining the fabric and exterior of college buildings and keeping up the gardens and grounds. This is an expense which may vary greatly between one college and another, and will be regarded by many colleges as being to some extent a proper charge on their endowment income. For that reason the Schedule to the draft statute provides for all expenditure on college premises to be shown as a charge in the first instance against 'Endowment', but thereafter provides for an appropriate contribution towards this expenditure from 'Education and Research' and 'Housekeeping'. We propose that, as

regards the maintenance of the fabric and exterior and of the gardens and grounds, this contribution should be based on a standard formula related to the number of persons resident in the college (see next paragraph). It is our intention that the amount of this standard element of the contribution should be about the same as the expenditure under this head which might reasonably be expected to fall on a college accommodating that number of residents in buildings and grounds which do not demand exceptional expenditure on their upkeep. The remaining element of the contribution to 'Endowment', relating to all other expenditures on college premises including rates and insurance, should be such an amount as will meet the actual expenditure incurred under these other heads.

385. We suggest that the standard part of the contribution should be fixed on the basis that for each college the amount should be one-quarter of such proportion of the combined gross rateable value of all the colleges as the number of members occupying rooms of their own in the college bears to the aggregate number of such persons in all the colleges. It would, however, be unnecessarily complicated if all the variable elements in this formula were revised annually. We think it will be sufficient if the College Accounts Committee (see para. 388 below) settles the 'combined gross rateable value of all the colleges' and 'the aggregate number of such persons in all the colleges' for periods of, say, three or five years at a time; the standard contribution for each college would thus vary within each period only according to the number of its members occupying rooms of their own.

386. For a few heads of expenditure the process of allocation will involve apportionment, notably the contribution from 'Education and Research' and 'Housekeeping' towards the expenses of college premises. We propose that this contribution should be apportioned between the two on the basis of the floor space within the buildings used, on the one hand, for the accommodation of the head and fellows and for the library, lecture rooms, etc., and, on the other hand, for catering and for the lodging of those in *status pupillari*. Floor space which is used in part in connexion with the latter purpose but in part also in connexion with other activities, notably the accommodation of bursars and their staff, and the use of hall for lectures as well as meals, will need to be brought into account in proportion to a broad estimate of the time for which the accommodation is occupied for the respective uses. Much of what is at present included under the heading 'Maintenance of establishment in college' can be directly allocated, but in the absence of more accurate costings we contemplate that, in so far as their components cannot be so allocated, heads of expenditure which are common to two or more of the three sections—'Endowment', 'Education and Research', and 'Housekeeping'—should be apportioned on the basis of floor space or time as may be appropriate.

387. A different aspect of apportionment is that of relating income and expenditure to the years in which the benefit arises. This is fundamental to the preparation of accounts which will give a true view of financial results. In relation to income, for example, full credit ought not to be taken for grants received for specific purposes unless the full amount of the corresponding expenditure has been incurred; to the extent that the corresponding expenditure has not yet been incurred, the appropriate part of the grant should be carried forward as a liability in the statement of year-end balances, so that it can be brought into income later when the related expenditure arises. Conversely, where expenditure has been incurred which is recoverable out of grants or other income yet to be received, credit should be taken for the amount so recoverable, and this amount included as an asset, in the form of income receivable or of expenditure carried forward, in the statement of year-end balances. Similar considerations arise in regard to the provision out of income for the amortization or renewal of assets of impermanent value and for the accumulation of funds to meet major expenditure which recurs only at infrequent intervals. Provisions for amortization and renewals are needed for such outlays as expenditure on leaseholds with less than, say, fifty years remaining to expiry or the erection of relatively shortlived buildings, and on furniture, plant, and equipment; but the way in which colleges at present recoup from their revenue expenditure on such assets does not appear always to be governed by a considered policy of spreading the necessary charges against revenue on a consistent basis over the period of years for which the expenditure continues to be useful. It is not contemplated that similar provisions should be made for freehold buildings of long life, but, with the substantial exhaustion of the funds raised from the Historic Buildings Appeal and the expectation of a period of relief from major repairs, we recommend that all colleges should adopt a consistent practice of accumulating by regular annual charges against income a special fund of appropriate size to take the future impact of periodical major repairs to the fabric of college buildings. The requisite annual contributions to such a fund should be deducted in arriving at the surplus or deficit for the year on revenue account; any expenditure on major repairs would not then be so deducted but would be met out of the accumulated balance of the fund. The amount of these regular contributions would require careful estimation and would need to be kept under review; the important thing is that they should be determined on a realistic and consistent basis and should not represent a mere putting aside of income in amounts which are likely to depend upon what can be afforded.

388. We recommend the establishment of a statutory joint committee of the Hebdomadal Council and the Council of the Colleges, to be called the College Accounts Committee, consisting (apart from the Vice-Chancellor as *ex officio* chairman) of three members of Council, of whom one should

be the Vice-Chairman of the Chest Committee of Council, and three members appointed by the Council of the Colleges. Its first task, working with the University Chest and the Estates Bursars' and Domestic Bursars' Committees, will be to carry out a considerable amount of detailed investigation and explanation which will be needed before 31 July 1967 when the new system will take effect. To aid it in its task, we recommend that the committee should employ our own advisers, Messrs. Price Waterhouse & Co., as consultant accountants. The second task of the committee will be to ensure the smooth working of the new system when it is in operation. We therefore recommend that the College Accounts Committee should be charged with the general administration of the college accounts statute, and should have power to decide all matters of dispute, either generally or in relation to individual colleges, arising from it; it should report on the operation of the statute not less than once every five years. The Secretary of the Chest will act as the committee's agent, receiving and studying the accounts of the colleges and bringing to the attention of the committee such matters as he thinks may require its consideration.

389. One of the most important consequences of the adoption of the new form of college accounts will be the isolation in a single account of the income and expenditure of each college on its housekeeping activities. This will in future make it possible to compare the costs incurred by colleges on housekeeping, as we found ourselves unable to do. It will almost certainly then be seen that some colleges are using part of their endowment income to subsidize their housekeeping activities. We recommend that, where this is so, all colleges should take steps to cut down, and if possible eliminate, the deficit arising on their housekeeping account.

390. We do not think that this should be done by having differences of any size in the charges made by colleges for board and lodging. At the present time there are only small variations in these charges, if dues and establishment charges are added to those made for board and lodging. We think that this trend of the past few years is right, and recommend that colleges should make similar charges for board and lodging. But there is no doubt that the standards of service provided and the efficiency of domestic management vary widely between colleges, and it is difficult to believe that the best practices of each are always known to, or fully considered by, the others. We turn in the next paragraph to the second point. On the first, there can be no justification for high costs which are incurred by having standards markedly out of line with those provided by the colleges in general. We therefore recommend that all colleges should work towards the provision of similar standards of board and lodging. We do, however, recognize that there may be some ineradicable differences in the housekeeping costs incurred by those colleges with mainly new buildings which are economical to service and those colleges with a preponderance of old buildings which are not.

391. In carrying out these recommendations, colleges will in future need to be much more collectively self-conscious about the need for economy in domestic matters than they have been. In the past the Domestic Bursars' Committee has been little more than a post office for the clearing of information between colleges. In the future we recommend that it should actively concern itself with ensuring that colleges are run efficiently and with due regard to economy, and that it should make an annual report on these matters to the Council of the Colleges. The Domestic Bursars' Committee will soon discover where useful work can be done, and we give no more than three examples of areas where it appears to us that action is long overdue:

- (a) Little progress has been made with the detailed analysis of the domestic costs in many colleges. Considerable benefits would flow from the wider application of methods in use in the most efficiently run colleges.
- (b) There are very nearly forty separate college kitchens in Oxford of varying degrees of efficiency. The appointment of an expert catering adviser, who would serve all the colleges along the lines which the Royal Commission of 1922 recommended, would be of great advantage.
- (c) There has hitherto been very little co-operation between the colleges in the field of bulk purchases. Considerable economies could be achieved in the purchase of a large range of supplies if the colleges formed a single purchasing organization in association with the University.

392. We now turn to the question of the cost of the academic staff, which we deferred (para. 367 above). The figure per student in Table I was £390, which represented a total expenditure of £3,497,000 for the University Grants Committee year 1963-4 (1963 for colleges). We did not know in detail how this figure was made up, and therefore made our own inquiry about emoluments. We obtained full information for 1964-5; most of our findings have already been published (*Gazette*, vol. xcv, p. 1077; see also Tables 334-51). This was the first time that such full information had been published, and so far as we know it is more extensive than that available for any other British university, so that the obscurity about Oxford salaries and allowances, which has been the subject of some adverse comment, is now removed.

393. As against the 1963-4 total of £3,497,000 on which Table I was based, the 1964-5 total shown in Table J is £3,234,000. The following are the respects in which these totals differ in their composition:

- (a) They relate to different years, so that the numbers and age-composition may differ: Table I (1963-4) does not take full account of the

Table J. Sources of emoluments of academic staff at Oxford, 1964-5 (estimated)

OXFORD	£
Emolument	Total amount
University stipend	2,102,000
College fellowship stipend	751,000
College lectureship stipend or retaining fee	41,000
Total salary	2,874,000
Supervision and other teaching for the University	36,000
College housing benefits	133,000
Other college benefits	13,000
Regular emoluments	3,056,000
University examining	35,000
University offices	7,000
College offices	31,000
College piece-rate teaching	105,000
Total emoluments	3,234,000

Sources: Table 134

supplementation of all academic salaries with effect from 1 April 1964, which followed from the recommendations of the National Incomes Commission. As this affected all universities, comparisons are not invalidated by it.

- (b) Table I includes the employer's contribution to the Federated Superannuation System for Universities (FSSU); Table J does not.
- (c) Table I does not include housing benefits paid otherwise than in cash; Table J makes some allowance for these.
- (d) Table I includes the cost of the Common Table; Table J does not.
- (e) Table J includes payments to examiners, but in Table I these appear under the heading 'General educational expenditure' and not as payments to teaching and research staff.
- (f) Table I includes all payments for teaching; Table J includes payments to the full-time academic staff only.
- (g) Table I includes employers' National Insurance contributions, and child allowances; Table J does not.

These are minor differences and the two sets of figures can be reconciled (see *Statistical Appendix*, Part V, para. 531). We are satisfied that the figures are comparable, and that the comments we now make relate to a statistical picture which is substantially accurate.

394. Table J shows that the total salary bill was £2,874,000. But this includes the salaries of staff paid on clinical medical scales which are different, both at Oxford and nationally, from those for other academic staff, and these have to be deducted from the total before comparisons with other universities can be made. The resultant figure for Oxford is about £2,756,000. Had the average salary for Oxford non-clinical staff been the same as the national average, the bill would have been about £2,397,000. The average salary in Oxford was therefore about 15 per cent. above the national average salary. But our investigations showed that the Oxford staff is, on average, considerably older than those at other universities. This is partly because other universities are expanding more rapidly than Oxford and taking on younger staff, and partly because there is no comparable grade elsewhere, except at Cambridge, to the Oxford fellow-lecturer, and it is the policy of Oxford to make this post attractive over a whole career. If allowance is made for the difference in the age-structure, the estimated salary bill of £2,397,000, calculated on the basis given above, would be increased to £2,636,000. This is about 4 per cent. less than the total amount of £2,756,000 actually paid in salaries at Oxford, and appears to be within a range of difference from the national pattern adjusted for age that can be found at other university institutions outside Oxford and Cambridge.*

395. We have already argued that in an international university there should be a higher than average proportion of senior appointments and that the salaries of the academic staff should be somewhat higher than the national average. In the light of these considerations, we regard as on the low side the 4 per cent. by which the average salary at Oxford, when adjusted for age, exceeds the national average (see paras. 430 ff. below). This is quite apart from the question of whether British universities are generally able to pay salaries high enough to make their posts reasonably comparable with other careers. In the Civil Service, for example, the grade of Principal is now usually reached just before the age of 30, and the salary scale is £2,225 to £3,107, in nine increments, while the Assistant Secretary moves from £3,500 to £4,500.

396. But in addition to salaries there are certain other emoluments at Oxford. Table J shows the total emoluments payable to be about £3,234,000.

* For instance, at one of the larger colleges of the University of London the figure is 3 per cent.

But when the emoluments of staff on clinical medical scales are excluded, this figure is reduced to £3,113,000, which is 18 per cent. higher than the figure we gave as the salary bill based on national salaries applied to the Oxford age-distribution. We have not been able to adjust the figure for other universities to take account of additional emoluments received there because no information is available about them. All we can say with certainty therefore is that total emoluments at Oxford exceed what would be paid on average to staff of comparable ages elsewhere by something between 4 per cent. and 18 per cent. But it seems likely that the difference is nearer the upper than the lower ends of this range. These additional emoluments paid in Oxford arise partly because of the way Oxford arranges its examining and teaching and partly because of allowances associated with the collegiate system. We now proceed to discuss the main items in turn and to state our views and recommendations.

397. We take first payments made by the University. These are payments for examining, payments of university officers, and payments for the supervision of postgraduates. We recommend in Chapter IV (para. 252) that it should be a duty of all holders of university posts to take part in university examining when invited. At present internal examining is paid for in Oxford, as it is at Cambridge and London, though not we believe at other universities. The total amount paid in Oxford is moderate, about 1 per cent. of all emoluments, but it is unequally distributed between individuals and over their careers. In almost all other universities examinations are conducted by the staff of the department: at Oxford they are conducted by limited panels of examiners nominated for the purpose. The burden on boards of examiners is heavy, especially in the larger Honour Schools, and the bulk of the work takes place in vacations. The normal term-time duties of teaching, lecturing, and administration are therefore little affected.

398. In most cases each script is read by at least two examiners and there is usually a *trise esse* examination, either for all candidates or in cases of doubt. We do not think it unreasonable that work which falls heavily on selected individuals and which occurs mainly out of term should be paid for. From an administrative point of view it would be difficult to spread an inherently erratic load with even an approximation to fairness over the whole staff. We therefore consider that the present practice should continue. We are not, however, convinced that the present methods of determining the remuneration of examiners are necessarily right. The General Board recently reviewed the system, but we think that it should be one of the tasks of its Committee on Undergraduate Studies to keep it under review, with the object of ensuring that the present quality of examining is combined with the maximum economy of time and effort consistent with this.

399. The amounts paid to university officers are at present very small, and if the recommendations which we make elsewhere are accepted, will be increased. The tenor of these recommendations is that there should be a small number of high academic officials whose university responsibilities will take up the whole of their time or a substantial part of it, the leading example being the Vice-Chancellor. They should be released from other duties to the extent required, and the University should determine appropriate total salaries for them. The salaries which they would ordinarily draw from other sources should be reduced proportionately to the reduction in time and duties, the sums saved being available to pay for substitutes.

400. The payment made by the University for the supervision of post-graduates is a part of the whole system of payment for teaching at piece-rates which has for a long time been a feature of the collegiate system. At present payments for supervision are paid out of the fees paid by the students to the University. The time spent on supervision is not reckoned as part of the normal teaching duties of any member of the staff of Oxford. We have recommended in Chapter IV that the supervision of postgraduates should in future be counted as part of the ordinary duties of holders of all permanent university appointments, professors, readers, and fellow-lecturers. They will, therefore, no longer receive payments for supervision. There will, however, be cases where it is desirable to appoint a supervisor who does not hold a university post, and we think that the General Board should be enabled to make payments either to colleges or to individuals on the advice of the faculty board concerned. These should be at the same rates as those recommended for undergraduate tutorials in paras. 405 and 408 below.

401. The piece-rate teaching of undergraduates arises because colleges find it necessary to provide tutorial or other instruction in addition to that which is provided by their own fellows or lecturers as part of their ordinary duties. The gaps occur for specialized topics, for subjects where the teaching strength of a college is weak or non-existent, or where it is temporarily inadequate because of illness, sabbatical or other leave, or similar circumstances. The teaching is paid for at rates recommended by the Senior Tutors' Committee and accepted as standard by the colleges. The payments are usually retained by the recipient and are thus an addition to his ordinary emoluments. Their incidence is erratic. Fellows in some colleges have limits imposed upon the hours that they may teach, while others can undertake as much teaching as they wish. Some fellows are fully occupied by the normal requirements of their colleges, while others do not find themselves in this position. Some colleges make it their practice to employ lecturers with regular stipends for almost all subjects where they need to supplement their tutorial staff, while others pay small retaining fees and piece-rate payments for actual teaching. Some details

of the distribution of piece-work are given in *Statistical Appendix*, Part V, paras. 526-8.

402. The classes of recipient may be distinguished as follows:

- (a) Tutorial fellows of undergraduate colleges.
- (b) Holders of university posts who are not tutorial fellows but who either hold fellowships or are entitled to hold them under recent legislation. These will include some fellows of graduate colleges and those holding or entitled to hold fellowships at one of the new societies.
- (c) Fellows of colleges, excluding holders of junior research fellowships, who do not fall into category (a) or (b).
- (d) College lecturers, who may be paid a fixed salary or paid at piece-rates, either with or without retaining fees. There are few people who are only in this category; most college lecturers are also in one of the others.
- (e) Persons holding junior university appointments which do not carry entitlement to a fellowship, such as departmental demonstrators or departmental research assistants.
- (f) Others: postgraduate students, those engaged in post-doctoral research, holders of junior research fellowships, and persons with no current university status, who may or may not hold Oxford degrees.

403. The piece-rate system has developed because of the anxiety of colleges to see that their undergraduates are properly taught. It has the great advantage that it provides the flexibility which is always present when requirements run with, rather than against, the forces of self-interest; in plain language, it is easier to get someone to do extra work when he is paid for it. Nevertheless we have serious misgivings about the way that the system has developed.

404. First, we think that full-time salaries should be designed to cover the normal teaching required from the recipients and that they should not be encouraged to over-teach by the inducement of piece-rates. Second, for reasons which we have explained in Chapter IV, we are anxious to diminish the heavy teaching load carried by many tutorial fellows. Third, we do not think that colleges should accept undergraduates where they cannot at least make regular arrangements for their tuition, and we think that each undergraduate should receive some of his teaching from at least one fellow in his college. And, finally, we think that it is difficult to defend a system in which the burdens and benefits fall very unevenly on people who occupy similar positions. We therefore recommend that steps should be taken to eliminate payments at piece-rates for all members of the University in classes (a), (b), (c), and (d) of para. 402 above. In the case of college lecturers in category (d), non-stipendiary lecturers paid at

piece-rates present a special difficulty. We recommend that they should be transferred to stipendiary scales; where the lecturers are also fellows of another college, their total salary should not exceed the joint maximum. Since most fellows are on age-scales, while most college lecturers are on fixed salaries, this will entail consultation between colleges: this is already common practice in a number of instances.

405. When colleges need to supplement their teaching resources otherwise than through stipendiary lecturers, we think that this should be done as much as possible by exchanges. Where this cannot be done, but tutors are able to accept teaching from other colleges within their permitted maximum, payment should go to their colleges. Piece-rate teaching has had the very great advantage to the colleges that it has been relatively cheap. In 1965 eight tutorials, a term's teaching, cost £14 for one pupil and £17. 10s. for a pair. These sums are a much smaller proportion of the tuition fees paid to the colleges than used to be the case.* This very low rate of pay for out-of-college teaching has, in part, come from a reluctance to raise too rapidly payments made directly to individuals. Under our proposals, however, all payments for piece-work teaching done by fellow-lecturers will go to their colleges, not directly to the individuals who do the teaching. With such transfer payments, we think it desirable that they should reflect more closely the actual cost of providing teaching in a way that present rates clearly do not. We therefore recommend that all payments for teaching done at piece-work rates by those in classes (a)-(d) be made to the college and not to the individual, at the following rates per term, on the assumption that each tutorial or class lasts for one hour:

Weekly tutorials (one or two persons)	£25
Weekly small classes (three-six persons)	£30
Weekly large classes (over six persons)	£35

406. This change will have important consequences. It will exert pressure on colleges to bring up their staff:student ratios to an appropriate level by diminishing the temptation to rely too heavily on piece-rate teaching. The actual amount of such teaching should, in any case, fall as a result of our recommendation on this subject in para. 235 above. It is true that some colleges have, in the past, been forced to look on their tuition funds as virtually the only source of stipends for their fellows, but our recommendations about the college contributions scheme are designed to provide them with an endowment income. The single most important consequence of this change will be, however, the opportunity to create substantial tuition funds at the new societies, Linacre, St. Cross, and Iffley. We recommend that all payments from other colleges to these new

* Piece-work rates before 1936 were £6 per term for single tutorials and £8 for a pair. The average tuition fee paid by undergraduates to their colleges was £10 per term. The tuition fee has now risen to £40 per term, but piece-work rates are only £14 for a term's tutorial for one pupil and £17. 10s. for a pair.

societies in respect of piece-rate teaching be paid into a tuition fund. We doubt, however, whether this will be sufficient to enable these societies to recompense their fellows for the loss of the payments they now receive from postgraduate supervision and piece-rate teaching—let alone to offer combined salaries in line with those of other colleges. We therefore recommend that the University should, for the time being, pay £5,000 a year into the tuition fund of each of these societies out of the money it saves by no longer having to pay for supervision done by holders of permanent university appointments. We make no recommendation about the use of this fund, but express the hope that it will be used in its entirety to provide salaries for the fellows. All might receive a standard sum in addition to their university salaries; those fellows who are willing and able to provide tutorial teaching might receive an additional payment from the fund. It will be the responsibility of the new societies to administer these tuition funds, making payments related to the normal amount of teaching expected from the fellows and regularly reviewing the amount of teaching that they do, as is the custom in the 'traditional' colleges.

407. We recognize the value, both to the University and to themselves, of the specialized undergraduate teaching given by those fellows of All Souls, Nuffield, and St. Antony's Colleges who do not hold university posts. We think it desirable that these fellows should be able to do some undergraduate teaching. This work will be at piece-rates and we think that payments should be made to the college and not to the individual. Whatever adjustment in salary the colleges may think desirable for these fellows, their total salary should fall within the joint maximum observed by all colleges.

408. In the remaining cases, (e) and (f) above, we think that there is no objection to piece-rate payments to individuals and that they should continue. It is clearly in everyone's interests that those who have not yet secured permanent university appointments should have an opportunity to gain experience in this form of teaching. In Oxford only a relatively small amount of teaching is done by those in this position, but it is valuable in that it provides a useful element of flexibility. We think that they should be allowed to do piece-rate teaching and be paid for it up to a maximum load specified by the appropriate authority. Payment for this teaching given by these 'apprentice' academics, should, however, continue to be more or less at current rates. We therefore recommend that, when there is direct payment to individuals in categories (e) and (f) above, the following rates per term for piece-rate teaching should apply, on the assumption that each tutorial or class lasts for one hour:

Weekly tutorials (one or two persons)	£16
Weekly small classes (three-six persons)	£20
Weekly large classes (over six persons)	£24

It is clear that persons who do not receive regular salaries for teaching from the University or the colleges, but who are qualified to assist, have to be paid sums of this order if their services are to be secured.

409. We are conscious that these proposals will involve some hardship for fellow-lecturers, since the restrictions will reduce the opportunities of those who in the past have sought substantial amounts of piece-rate teaching. There will also be a period during which colleges will have difficulty in making satisfactory arrangements for the teaching of some of their undergraduates. Our proposals must be considered together with those which we make for restricting the amount of tutorial teaching given to each undergraduate, with those for limiting the total teaching load on the staff of Oxford, and that for bringing up the staff:student ratio to the national average. But there should be a transitional period during which the consequences which will result from our recommendations can be worked out in detail. We recommend that the General Board and the Council of the Colleges, advised by the Senior Tutors' Committee, should every year review the progress which has been made towards carrying out these recommendations, with the expectation that the new arrangements should be in force within three years.

410. Our inquiries lead us to think that these recommendations will cause little difficulty to some colleges, which have already moved in the directions proposed, but that they will require considerable adjustment in others. In the first place the number of tutorials should be reduced to one a week, and where necessary arrangements made to substitute regular salaries for piece-rate payment for lecturers who are not tutorial fellows of the college concerned. It will also be necessary, as soon as it is financially practicable, for each college to ensure that it has at least one fellow in any subject in which the college proposes to continue to admit an appreciable number of undergraduates. Meanwhile the tutorial fellows of all colleges should negotiate such exchanges with their colleagues as seem expedient in the light of our recommendations in Chapter IV. We do not think that the Senior Tutors' Committee should entertain complaints of difficulty in implementing our recommendations for at least two years, and that any complaints then made should be accompanied by a progress statement. We recommend that power of dispensation should lie in the Council of the Colleges, acting with the concurrence of the General Board, but we do not expect that the use of this will be necessary.

411. There remain for consideration those payments or allowances to college fellows which originate in the corporate and residential character of college life. Of these the largest is college housing benefits, which amount to rather more than 4 per cent. of total emoluments. But an average figure is not a representative one; these benefits are received only

by those who draw at least part of their salaries from colleges, and among the colleges practice varies widely (see Table 349).

412. The provision of free accommodation for fellows is as old as the Oxford colleges. It has always been treated as part of the emoluments of college fellows. Until the second half of the last century fellows had to be in orders and they vacated their fellowships on marriage. The reforms of Royal Commissions led to changes in statutes which allowed them to be laymen and to obtain permission to marry, but married fellows had to have a home outside the college. For some time this was widely regarded as a change for the worse: if a fellow chose to marry, he retained his college rooms and, in accordance with the college statutes, might be required to reside in them during term. It was between 1918 and 1945 that it became accepted first as inevitable and then as normal that most fellows would marry and live out. The married fellow was expected nevertheless to fulfil the multifarious duties of collegiate society, using his house, in part, as an extension of the college premises. The consequence was a discrepancy in real income between those who lived in college rent-free and those who had to live in their own houses.

413. This situation was made worse by the rapid development of the city. Well before 1939 Oxford had ceased to be a small county town with a great university in its midst. It had become an industrial centre, and since 1945 it has been a town of high wages, high employment, and rapid expansion in the numbers of those wishing to live in or near the city. The resulting scarcity of houses and the rise in rents has been much more marked than in almost any other city outside London. It was in these conditions that colleges came to adopt a wide variety of housing benefits in order to recruit and retain staff of high calibre. They were also anxious to make it possible for married fellows to live close enough to their colleges to enable them to continue to take their full part in the activities of the college without a financial sacrifice which would, in the end, have made Oxford uncompetitive.

414. We consider that it would be beneficial to all universities if the staff were enabled to live near their work, but we think it essential in a collegiate university. It is, however, our view that, although housing benefits at Oxford are the outcome of defensive actions by colleges struggling to preserve their way of life, they are now too haphazard, with the disparities in amount and method of assistance, between and within colleges, too great. Details of these arrangements were obtained for the first time by the Commission and were published in *Gazette*, vol. xcv, p. 1095 (see also Table 349). Neither University nor colleges have previously had the opportunity to see what has in fact been happening, and we believe that it will be generally desired that the whole system be placed on an orderly and defensible footing.

415. We begin with the position of fellows living in college. The advantages of having some fellows living in are great, and indeed necessary for the full life of the college. They inevitably bear a heavier responsibility than do those fellows who live out, and at least during term they are never wholly off duty. The sitting-room of the fellow who lives in may have to serve as the office in which he performs many of his duties. It is as if a doctor had to use his living-room as a surgery at any hour between breakfast and bedtime. There must therefore be a financial inducement for fellows to live in college: but we think that the difference between their position and that of fellows living out should not be so great as to set up renewed pressures to narrow the gap between them. It has also become customary to provide for fellows living in a variety of free services which at one time were paid for. We do not suggest that a fellow living in should pay the full costs involved, but we think that he should pay something. We recommend that all fellows living in college except those mentioned below should have their salaries reduced by a minimum of £200 a year in respect of their occupancy of their college rooms. Until comparatively recently fellows were expected to decorate and furnish their own rooms, but most colleges now pay for this and we think the practice a reasonable one. We exclude from this recommendation the holders of certain college offices, which we discuss in para. 427 below, and also the holders of junior research fellowships. The monetary value of the latter has always been adjusted to take account of the free provision of rooms and service and we see no objection to the continuance of something well understood by all these concerned.

416. We recommend that the Domestic Bursars' Committee, under the guidance of the Council of the Colleges, should exercise a general supervision over the application of this recommendation, and that the minimum reduction which we have recommended should be reconsidered from time to time in the light of movements in prices and incomes.

417. We now deal with the particular case of heads of colleges. Most of them are expected to live within the curtilage of the college, and we think it desirable that they should continue to do so because of the official and representational character of their position. Most of the houses are large, many have extensive gardens, and the occupants are expected to entertain members of the college and visitors who may come to it or to the University. For these reasons, it has become customary for the college to provide for its head a house free of charge and also to give allowances for heating, service, and entertainment.

418. We have concluded that it is impracticable to treat these offices in the way recommended for the great majority of the academic staff. The holders have generally no option but to live in the particular house provided, and

we have no changes to recommend except that their salaries should not exceed the maximum of the Oxford professorial salary, which is at present £4,100. Some colleges do not at present provide houses within the college, and in these cases, or if a college should think fit to elect a head who wishes to live out, we recommend that an entertainment allowance should be paid and that he should receive the same housing benefit as the fellows of his college. In these cases, however, the restriction on the salary proposed above should be waived.

419. The housing benefits at present paid to fellows living out take a number of forms. Sometimes they are called 'marriage allowances'. Almost all colleges pay some form of housing allowance designed to counterbalance the advantage derived from free rooms by those who live in. Many colleges also own houses in Oxford, either because these happened to be part of their properties, or because they were bought deliberately in recent years to meet the housing shortage. These are often occupied by fellows on beneficial terms, and sometimes there are special terms as regards tenant's repairs.

420. It is advantageous to the whole University that colleges should own houses in Oxford and that these should be used to make it possible for fellows to live near their colleges. We do not wish to make any recommendation which would lead the colleges to dispose of the houses they now own. Although we attach great importance to uniform standards, there are two difficulties about some of these houses. First, those in very central positions, including those in college cartilages, would, at least in some cases, involve charges in the open market too great for college fellows: and second, the houses vary in size, some of them being larger than a fellow would choose to occupy. We recommend that, though there should be some discretion to allow for the above factors, as a minimum every fellow occupying a college house should have his salary reduced by a sum not less than the gross rateable value. As we have said, some colleges carry out both landlord's and tenant's repairs and practice varies about the charge for the latter. We recommend that where colleges carry out tenant's repairs for their fellows, a reasonable charge should be made.

421. As there are not nearly enough houses to go round, it is reasonable that colleges should give some other form of help to fellows not living in college houses. We leave it to the colleges to decide the classes of fellows who should be helped. At present assistance is usually in the form of a housing allowance, designed as some compensation in place of the free rooms for unmarried fellows. The rates for this are not uniform. We think that fellows who do not own their houses and wish to buy them should be given some assistance to do so. This is in accordance with government policy on housing, and is the practice with many industrial firms, who find

it advantageous to help employees to find houses within reasonable distance of their jobs. In present conditions of housing shortage, indeed, many firms could not get key personnel at all in some areas unless they were prepared to help with housing problems. We recommend therefore that colleges should be ready either to make loans to their fellows who wish to buy houses, or, if they do not wish to tie their endowments in this way, to give some contribution to fellows in the form of help with interest charges.

422. There will remain fellows who have already bought their houses, and those who do not wish to buy or cannot find suitable houses to buy. It would be unfair to give special treatment to those in college houses or loans to those buying houses while doing nothing for others. We recommend therefore that housing allowances should be continued for these persons, but that the aim should be to standardize these at a moderate figure, which we do not think should exceed £200 a year. This figure should form a guide to colleges in arriving at the benefits to be given to those in college houses, after allowing for the special factors mentioned above, and to those who are being helped to buy houses. Since the justification for housing benefits lies in the needs of colleges to have their fellows within reach, we do not think that any benefits should be given to fellows who live outside a convenient range, which we recommend should be within four miles of Carfax.

423. It is usual, when proposing changes which will actually worsen the position of those who have been acting in good faith, to preserve vested interests and apply changed conditions only to new cases. We have considered this carefully but have concluded that existing disparities and the scale of some of the benefits now paid are too great. But we do not think that it is reasonable or necessary to make the changes we recommend immediately and to inflict hardships which a prudent man could not have foreseen. We recommend that colleges should immediately review their existing arrangements in the light of the practice recommended above, and that there should be a transitional period of not more than five years during which this should be brought into force, though we do not think that the whole of this time would generally be needed. It should be remembered by all concerned that academic salaries have been increased recently to take account of the general rise in living costs, an important element in which has been the increase in the cost of buying or renting houses.

424. We also recommend that the Estates Bursars' Committee, under the guidance of the Council of the Colleges, should become a regular centre for the collection and exchange of information about college practice, and should be charged with the duty of reporting on progress made towards the application of common rules. We repeat our conviction that the

present position has arisen because of almost inco-ordinated defensive actions by individual colleges, and that the practices now least defensible would not have come into being if there had been adequate consultation. Our recommendation about the monetary value of housing benefits is made at end-1965 prices, and here as elsewhere, supervisory bodies should reconsider recommendations made in money terms as meaning in real terms at end-1965 prices.

425. The Common Table goes back to the earliest days of colleges, and for many centuries it has been an important part of college life as the occasion when the fellows of a college meet together. The cost of the Common Table is not included in the total emoluments shown in Table J, but, according to college accounts, it was £57,000 in 1963. All fellows of a college, and usually certain other persons such as stipendiary lecturers, are entitled to dine at the Common Table free of charge. Other persons who help the college in such ways as occasional teaching may be given free dining-rights on one or more nights in the week. We consider that the Common Table is an integral part of college life and should remain. But we have had evidence that in some cases the concept of the Common Table had been enlarged to cover lunch and even breakfast as well as dinner. We think that this approaches too nearly to an income subsidy and recommend that in future the Common Table should be held to include only one free meal a day, either lunch or dinner but not both, and in no case breakfast. It ought perhaps to be made clear that the expression 'nuts and wine' sometimes used in referring to the style of life at Oxford is misleading if taken to mean that these are free, since dessert and wine are in fact paid for by those who take them. Guests are also paid for by their hosts.

426. The total sum included under 'Other college benefits' in Table J is £13,000. We understand that this is made up almost entirely of payments under two heads. The first head is that a small number of colleges pay all or some part of the contribution to the Federated Superannuation System for Universities which is normally paid by the employee. The normal practice is that he pays 5 per cent. of salary, the employer adding 10 per cent. We do not see any good reason for departing from the common practice of British universities and recommend that this anomaly should cease. The second head is the cost of the contribution which a considerable number of colleges pay for their fellows, and sometimes for their families, to the British United Provident Association, which gives assistance towards the cost of private treatment in hospitals and nursing homes. Many organizations find that it is worth their while to provide medical care in one form or another to members of their staffs. We consider that colleges should be free to pay the premiums for members of their staffs if they wish to do so, but we do not think that the arguments are convincing for families and recommend that contributions in respect of families should in

future be paid by the fellow concerned. One further point arises under 'Other college benefits'. A small number of colleges make additional payments to some of their tutorial fellows for exercising tutorial responsibility (see Table 348). We think that the exercise of such responsibility forms part of the ordinary duties of a fellow-lecturer and therefore recommend that the payment of this allowance should cease.

427. The amount shown in Table J for 'College offices' relates to what is only part-time work done by fellows mainly occupied in teaching or research (see Table 350). In general the sums paid are modest and do not appear to have increased much in recent years. The offices are distributed unevenly both by persons and over time. The work is usually administrative; the most common offices are those of Senior Tutor and Dean. Colleges could not be run unless their fellows were willing to carry these responsibilities. We think that the existing payments are proper and reasonable; and we see no reason why, in the case of offices like that of Dean which require the holder to live within the college, this payment should not take the form, in whole or in part, of the provision of free rooms. We do not think that it is likely that colleges will multiply offices as a means of increasing the emoluments of their fellows.

428. This completes our review of existing emoluments and there now remains for consideration the question of what in future should be the general level of stipends in Oxford. In para. 394 above we explained that, on an age-weighted basis, Oxford salaries are now on average 4 per cent. higher than the average for all universities. Taking total emoluments into account (para. 396), however, this differential rises to a level which we were unable to define exactly, because of lack of information about other universities, but which we stated to be nearer 18 per cent. than 4 per cent.

429. We have considered the emoluments additional to salary in paras. 397-427 above, and have made a number of recommendations. Their effect will be to eliminate all those payments which, having grown up haphazardly within the collegiate system, are for the performance of academic duties that ought to be covered by a normal salary. There will in future be only three kinds of additional emolument. Firstly, there will be payments made to the holders of university and college offices. These are largely administrative in character and such payments would normally be charged to Administration in other universities. Secondly, there will be payments for university examining which in those other universities where the practice exists are not treated as part of expenditure on salaries. Thirdly, there will be housing benefits, which will be considerably restricted in their scope by our recommendations. In their future form, they will in our view be not so much an addition to salaries as an allowance off-setting the extra cost entailed in playing a full part in college life. We

think that these three payments are justifiable on their own individual grounds and that consideration of a proper level of salaries can be divorced from them.

430. We have already stated our view (para. 395 above) that academic salaries are too low in this country, and our recommendations about Oxford should be taken in this context. There are two main reasons why the salary structure of Oxford cannot be assimilated to that which exists in other British universities, with the exception of Cambridge. The first, as we have made clear earlier in the report, is that the collegiate system involves a staff structure different from that found elsewhere, so that salary scales based on a hierarchy of assistant lecturers, lecturers, readers, and professors are not appropriate to it. The second, and to this we attach the greater importance, is that Oxford is an international university with a higher than average concentration of talent, and that it is reasonable that this should be reflected in a higher than average salary, age for age, than is to be found in British universities taken as a whole.

431. We therefore recommend that Oxford's average salary, weighted for age, should be 10 per cent. higher than the average salary, weighted for age, for all British universities. The distribution of the differential in salaries will be largely shaped by our recommendations on other matters. Some of it will be absorbed by the conversion of payments for piece-rate teaching to salary; some by the increasing capacity of the poorer colleges, aided by the new contributions scheme, to pay adequate salaries to their fellows; and some will be available for raising the present joint maximum salary for fellow-lecturers.

432. The detailed implementation of our recommendation entails considerable internal and external discussion. We hope that this will be conducted without delay so that colleges may make their arrangements about salaries well before the end of the grace period that we have recommended for housing benefits. We therefore recommend that the Hebdomadal Council and the Council of the Colleges should be jointly responsible for ensuring that our recommendations about salaries and allowances are implemented. When the interim period is over, Oxford will have a salary structure suited to its own needs and circumstances, but which is also definitively related to that of other British universities.

433. Our proposal for a fixed differential of 10 per cent. on salaries has to be taken with our recommendations about additional emoluments. It will then be seen that, in future, there will be a fall in the differential which results from a comparison of total emoluments (see para. 396 above). It is also of importance that our recommended differential is derived from the comparison of the average of Oxford salaries weighted for age, and

a similar average for all posts elsewhere. Oxford salaries are tied to age-scales; even at the top of the salary scale, a fellow-lecturer will always have a substantial financial incentive to accept a chair elsewhere. We believe that this balance is right, that senior posts in other universities should be financially attractive to fellow-lecturers; but equally that a man who chooses to remain at Oxford should not be expected to make too large a sacrifice.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

(63) Colleges should change their financial year to coincide with that of the University, making up accounts in the existing form for a period of seven months to 31 July 1967 and thereafter annual accounts to 31 July in the new form given in the draft statute in the Statutory Appendix (para. 381).

(64) The accounts presented by each college to the University should in future consist of three main statements:

- (i) a consolidated revenue statement showing under a few main heads the income of the year from all sources, the current expenses properly chargeable against that income, and the resultant surplus or deficit;
- (ii) a summary of all other money transactions affecting the accumulated balances during the year;
- (iii) a statement of the net assets (other than property and securities of capital and trust funds) by which these balances were represented at the end of the year;

and the consolidated revenue statement should be supported by four additional statements, the first showing the computation of the statutory endowment income and the college contribution, and the other three the allocation of income and expenditure and the resultant surplus or deficit as between 'Endowment', 'Education and Research', and 'Housekeeping' respectively (para. 381).

(65) College auditors should report to the University on these statements (para. 381).

(66) All colleges should adopt a consistent practice of accumulating by regular annual charges against income a special fund of appropriate size to take the future impact of periodical major repairs to the fabric of college buildings (para. 387).

(67) A statutory joint committee of the Hebdomadal Council and the Council of the Colleges should be established, to be called the College Accounts Committee, consisting (apart from the Vice-Chancellor as *ex officio* chairman) of three members of Council, of whom one should be the Vice-Chairman of the Chest Committee of Council, and three members appointed by the Council of the Colleges; it should be charged with the

general administration of the college accounts statute, and should have power to decide all matters of dispute, either generally or in relation to individual colleges, arising from it; it should report on the operation of the statute not less than once every five years; and it should employ Messrs. Price Waterhouse & Co. as consultant accountants (para. 388).

(68) Where colleges are using part of their endowment income to subsidize their housekeeping activities, they should take steps to cut down, and if possible eliminate, the deficit arising on their housekeeping account (para. 389).

(69) All colleges should work towards the provision of similar standards of board and lodging, and charges for these should also be similar (para. 390).

(70) The Domestic Bursars' Committee should in the future actively concern itself with ensuring that colleges are run efficiently and with due regard to economy, and it should make an annual report on these matters to the Council of the Colleges (para. 391).

(71) Steps should be taken to eliminate payments at piece-rates for all fellows (other than junior research fellows) and college lecturers; non-stipendiary college lecturers now paid at piece-rates should be transferred to stipendiary scales; and if the lecturers are fellows of another college, their total salary should not exceed the joint maximum (para. 404).

(72) All payments for teaching done at piece-work rates by those covered in recommendation (71) should be made to the college and not to the individual, at the following rates per term, on the assumption that each tutorial or class lasts for one hour:

Weekly tutorials (one or two persons)	£25
Weekly small classes (three-six persons)	£30
Weekly large classes (over six persons)	£35

(para. 405).

(73) All payments from other colleges to Linsacre, St. Cross, and Iffley Colleges in respect of piece-rate teaching should be paid into a tuition fund; and the University should, for the time being, pay £5,000 a year into the tuition fund of each of these societies (para. 406).

(74) For junior research fellows and for those who are not fellows or lecturers of colleges the following rates per term for piece-rate teaching should apply, on the assumption that each tutorial or class lasts for one hour:

Weekly tutorials (one or two persons)	£16
Weekly small classes (three-six persons)	£20
Weekly large classes (over six persons)	£24

(para. 408).

(75) The General Board and the Council of the Colleges, advised by the Senior Tutors' Committee, should every year review the progress which has been made towards carrying out recommendations (71)-(74), with the expectation that the new arrangements should be in force within three years (para. 409); after that date, if it be necessary, the Council of the Colleges, acting with the concurrence of the General Board, should have power of dispensation (para. 410).

(76) All fellows living in college (other than the holders of certain college offices and junior research fellowships) should have their salaries reduced by a minimum of £200 a year in respect of their occupancy of their college rooms (para. 415); the Domestic Bursars' Committee, under the guidance of the Council of the Colleges, should exercise a general supervision over the application of this recommendation; and the minimum reduction should be reconsidered from time to time in the light of movements in prices and incomes (para. 416).

(77) The salary of the head of a college living within the curtilage of the college should not exceed the maximum of the Oxford professorial salary, but his other emoluments should be at the discretion of the college; the housing benefits of the head of a college living outside the curtilage of the college should be the same as those received by fellows of the college, but his salary and other emoluments should be at the discretion of the college (para. 418).

(78) Every fellow occupying a college house should, as a minimum, have his salary reduced by a sum not less than the gross rateable value; where colleges carry out tenant's repairs for their fellows, a reasonable charge should be made (para. 420).

(79) Colleges should be ready either to make loans to their fellows who wish to buy houses, or, if they do not wish to tie their endowments in this way, to give some contribution to fellows in the form of help with interest charges (para. 421).

(80) Housing allowances should be continued for fellows not covered by recommendations (76), (78), or (79), but the aim should be to standardise these at a moderate figure which should not exceed £200 a year; this figure should form a guide to colleges in arriving at the benefits to be given under recommendations (78) and (79) (para. 422).

(81) Housing benefits should not be given to fellows who live more than four miles from Carfax (para. 422).

(82) Colleges should immediately review their existing arrangements for housing benefits in the light of the practice recommended above, and there should be a transitional period of not more than five years during which this should be brought into force (para. 423).

(83) The Estates Bursars' Committee, under the guidance of the Council of the Colleges, should become a regular centre for the collection and exchange of information about college practice on housing benefits, and should be charged with the duty of reporting on progress made towards the application of common rules (para. 424).

(84) The Common Table should be held to include only one free meal a day, either lunch or dinner but not both, and in no case breakfast (para. 425).

(85) Those colleges who pay all or some part of the contributions to the Federated Superannuation System for Universities normally paid by the employee should cease to do so (para. 426).

(86) Contributions to the British United Provident Association in respect of fellows' families should in future be paid by the fellows concerned (para. 426).

(87) Additional payments for exercising tutorial responsibility should cease (para. 426).

(88) Oxford's average salary, weighted for age, should be 10 per cent. higher than the average salary, weighted for age, for all British universities (para. 431).

(89) The Hebdomadal Council and the Council of the Colleges should be jointly responsible for ensuring that our recommendations about salaries and allowances are implemented (para. 432).

CHAPTER VI

PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF OXFORD

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434. We now address ourselves to the nature and structure of the government of Oxford and then to the processes by which decisions should be reached and action taken. The task is to achieve a satisfactory compromise between academic freedom and administrative efficiency, that is, to preserve the essentials of a democratic structure while establishing an administrative organization which will enable the University not only to carry out agreed policies but also to give proper and considered responses to external demands.

435. The present structure in Oxford is so unlike that of all other British universities except Cambridge that it seems desirable first to set out the main differences. The typical structure of government in most British universities is described in a summary form in Appendix Four of the Robbins Report (Part I, Section 3, pp. 17-41), from which the following account is drawn. The main organs consist of a Court, a Council, and

a Senate. The Court, which has a large majority of lay members nominated by various external organizations, is the supreme body. But it meets only once or twice a year to receive reports and review accounts, and its powers, though great, are used only in unusual circumstances. The Council, which also has a substantial majority of lay members, elected by the Court or nominated, for instance, by local authorities, is responsible for financial matters and for general policy. The Senate is responsible for academic matters, and usually consists of the whole body of professors, a small number of other staff, often elected, and a few administrators. Under the Senate come the faculties, the constitution of which varies but in which professors generally hold the power. Below, or possibly co-extensive with, faculties are departments, with a good deal of authority exercised by the head, who is usually a professor.

436. At Oxford, as at Cambridge, there is nothing to correspond to a Court; final authority, subject to the very general authority of the Acts of Parliament and of the Privy Council, which has to approve some changes in statutes, rests in practice with the whole body of the academic staff, which in Oxford is called Congregation. This body meets fortnightly during term, and a large part of university business has to be approved by it. The functions of the Council in civic universities are discharged in Oxford by the Hebdomadal Council, which consists entirely of academics, the majority of whom are elected by Congregation. The functions of a Senate in other universities largely fall in Oxford to the General Board of the Faculties, but no professors sit on the General Board *ex officio* and nearly all its members are elected by the faculties, which consist of nearly the whole teaching staff. The faculty boards are bodies elected by the faculty; normally half of them, the 'official members', are elected by the whole faculty from the professors and statutory readers; the other half is elected from the whole faculty by all those who compose it other than those who are qualified to be 'official members'. Thus membership of a faculty board is not *ex officio* conferred on a professor, and he does not have a vote in the election of half the members of the board.

437. At Oxford there are no lay members in Congregation, and there are no lay members of the Hebdomadal Council. The majority both of Council and of the General Board consists of members elected, in the one case by Congregation as a whole and in the other by the same people grouped in faculties. It will be seen that the position of a professor at Oxford is more like that of an ordinary member of a faculty, and carries less authority than do professorships in other British universities except Cambridge. The science side is necessarily organized on a departmental basis because of the needs of laboratories, but even there, and to a much greater extent on the arts side, much of the power resides in the faculties. In a real sense, therefore, the University is controlled by the whole academic staff. They

directly elect to the main administrative bodies, and the authority of those bodies is delegated from the sovereign assembly, Congregation, which also retains a right of review which can be exercised with great freedom. This democratic structure, though it has its roots in the long history of the University, is closely related to the autonomy of the colleges.

438. The question must now be asked, why should Oxford be organized in a way so different from nearly all other universities? Any answer, to be defensible, must be on wider grounds than merely stating that the arrangements are closely bound up with the college system. The answer has to be given within the context of that balance between academic freedom and administrative efficiency which will best ensure excellence in teaching and research within the particular conditions of a collegiate university.

439. We have already referred to the freedom enjoyed by the academic staff of Oxford in the organization of their work, both in research and in teaching. Working within this wide degree of freedom entails a high sense of personal responsibility for teaching and scholarship. This is most likely to be found when the members of an academic community take the preponderant part in reaching the decisions about the way in which their responsibilities should be discharged. This we regard as an important element in academic freedom.

440. Nowadays, however, the size of universities, the complexity of their organization, and the pace of development are such that they cannot be efficiently run without a good deal of administrative machinery. Negotiations must constantly be undertaken with other authorities. Policy decisions have continually to be made which determine the balance of effort and the use of resources. But these negotiations decide the conditions in which individuals will feel themselves to be either encouraged or restricted. It is not therefore tenable to hold that in an academic community administrative questions can be settled purely on grounds of objectively determinable efficiency. To maintain the morale of a university, the most important element in its success is that the staff should be informed about, and assent to, the main decisions of policy, and should have the means of making its voice felt in these, and in lesser matters, where it cares sufficiently deeply to do so. We believe that this requires that the business, as well as the more strictly academic, structure of government should be democratic.

441. It is therefore our view that there are positive and major advantages in retaining the general democratic nature of Oxford, apart from the fact that it would be difficult to abandon it without a radical change in the college system. In the last resort we rest on the view that the nature of teaching and research is such that both will be better done if those engaged on these

activities feel that they can be fully associated with the determination of university policy if they wish to be. We do not pretend that everyone in an academic community is passionately concerned with every aspect of university policy or that the place would run at all if they were. But we think that even those with little interest in policy or administration are more likely to feel that sense of personal commitment to which we attach so much importance if they know that they could make their voices felt if they so wished. We believe, as the Robbins Committee appears to do in para. 687 of its Report, that it is good to allow 'the virtues of academic self-government to be widely diffused', and we have not been persuaded that democratic government within a university must necessarily be either slow or inefficient.

442. But the more widely diffused these virtues of academic self-government, the more necessary it is to ensure that there is a competent and responsible administrative organization, so that decisions can be taken and the main purposes of the University achieved. The extent to which this has been secured within the existing system at Oxford has now to be described.

443. It is broadly true to say that over the forty years since the last Royal Commission the main statutes governing the constitution of the central government of the University have not been changed in essentials. It is equally clear that, because of developing internal and external pressures arising from large and rapid changes, the actual practice and behaviour of the central machine has been profoundly modified, particularly in the last twenty years. We therefore devoted a great deal of effort to discovering how the central machinery by which Oxford is governed actually works at the present time.

444. We have first, however, to outline the legal position as established by the statutes, and then to indicate the main internal and external pressures to which it has been subjected. We come finally to describe the principal changes in the practice of the central machine of government which have been made in response to the demands of the times.

445. Originally the sovereign body of Oxford was Convocation. It alone had the power to determine the policy of the University as it voted on the statutes and decrees put before it. Convocation was composed of all Masters of Arts of the University whose names were on the books. But in the nineteenth century, as a result of reforms imposed by Royal Commission, Congregation, the assembly of those Masters of Arts working in Oxford, was split off from Convocation and most of the sovereign legislative powers were transferred to it. The important powers of Convocation in the last forty years have been few. There is the power to decide when Congregation has voted in favour of a statute or decree with preamble but has failed

to produce a majority of two-thirds or greater. There is the power to elect the Chancellor. Convocation is also the body which elects the Professor of Poetry and gives approval to the granting of Degrees by Diploma and Honorary Degrees. But in general, apart from the case where a majority of two-thirds or over cannot be found in Congregation for a statute or decree with preamble, the effective sovereignty of Oxford no longer rests with Convocation.

446. For many years now the sovereign body of the University has been Congregation. It alone can give legal force to the acts of the University. Therefore by statute the democratic voice of Congregation, in effect the teaching and research staff, is decisive in the affairs of the University as it accepts or rejects by voting on the legislative proposals put before it in the form of statutes or decrees.

447. Congregation has in addition two other important powers. Any six members can put forward a resolution either calling upon any body of the University established by statute to exercise the powers conferred on it or proposing that amendments be introduced in the statutes (Statt. Tit. X, Sect. 1, § 8, cl. 2—*Statute*, 1965, p. 304). If such a resolution is carried in Congregation, then Council must put forward legislation to give effect to it, provided that the resolution has been carried with not less than forty in favour.

448. The second power is that of asking questions in Congregation. Any two members of Congregation may ask at a meeting of Congregation in full term a question relating to any matter which is within the jurisdiction of Council or of any other committee or body in the University of which the election of one or more members has been made or approved by Congregation (*ibid.*, § 9—p. 305). Written notice of the question signed by the two members must be sent to the Registrar not less than ten days before it is to be asked, and, unless the question appears to the Vice-Chancellor to be inadmissible in substance or in form, it is published by the Registrar in the *Gazette* not less than five days before it is to be asked.

449. The pre-eminent administrative body of the University is the Hebdomadal Council. By statute it alone can propose legislation, whether by statute or decree, to Congregation. But Council is not by statute a body capable of decision by itself. Its duty is to consider, discuss, and formulate legislative proposals to be placed before Congregation. It is in no sense a governing Council the decisions of which are effective.

450. The powers of Council are further limited by the fact that the other two central bodies in the University are not subordinate to it. Its control over all legislative proposals gives it a power to check the Chest or the

General Board: but it requires their concurrence if it is to take action in the relevant fields. On matters affecting the finances of the University, Council according to statute is not free to move without the concurrence of the Chest, which thus has in effect a veto. Special constitutional procedures are provided for the Vice-Chancellor to resolve a deadlock, when one occurs. In matters affecting the academic life of the University, the relation of Council to the General Board is similar.

451. Council, the Chest, and the General Board are the central bodies of the administration of the University, and it therefore follows that the central machinery is loosely knitted together, mainly by the power which Council alone enjoys of putting proposals for legislation to Congregation and by the right of the Vice-Chancellor to be chairman *ex officio* of these bodies. Each of these bodies by statute enjoys considerable independence of the others.

452. The relations of the General Board with the faculty boards follow a similar pattern. The General Board is a clearing-house and a centre of co-ordination for proposals coming up from faculty boards and affecting more than the proposing board. It does not in general conceive itself to be in a clear position of authority in relation to the faculty boards: it rather presides over the regulation and co-ordination of their decentralized activities and initiatives. Its power to co-ordinate lies partly in its ability to put forward proposals for legislation to Council or to refuse to do so, but mainly in its control over the financial resources available to each board.

453. These central committees are manned by ordinary teaching members of the academic staff, carrying out the duties imposed by membership as an addition to their normal academic tasks. The business of the officials—the Registrar, the Secretary of the Chest, the Secretary of Faculties, the University Surveyor, and their subordinates—is to prepare agenda and minutes of meetings, and to present matters for decision in a form which enables the members of the committees to deal with them. The Secretary of the Chest and the University Surveyor are not under the Registrar and, while this is not true of the Secretary of Faculties, it equally would not be correct to think of him as a subordinate in the normal sense of the term. But in the 1930's a statutory change of importance was made regarding the officials of the University. A clause was introduced into the statute governing the activities of the Registrar that he, under the direction of the Vice-Chancellor, is responsible for communications which express the general policy of the University and for the conduct of correspondence with public bodies (Statt. Tit. XVII, Sect. VIII, cl. 9—*Statuta*, 1965, p. 370). This, in effect, gave to the Registrar and through him to Council and the Vice-Chancellor, whose servant he is, a monopoly of the power to deal with the external world and so commit the University. In the sphere of external

relations this is the lever of co-ordination, analogous to the monopoly held by Council in the proposal of legislation to Congregation on internal affairs.

454. The academic executive officers of the University are the Vice-Chancellor and Proctors. Their offices go back to the early constitution of the medieval University. At this point it is not necessary to describe the powers and functions of the Proctors or the Assessor. These academic officials, whose period of office lasts one year, serve of right on all the main committees and bodies of the University and in fact attend most of them. The method of their election, by colleges in rotation, secures that here too the voice of the general electorate is effective, distributed over time.

455. By statute the Vice-Chancellor is unquestionably the chief executive officer of the University. He is also chairman of Council and chairman *ex officio* of the other central bodies. Through his position on these and other committees the Vice-Chancellor is well-placed to co-ordinate the activities of Oxford. The Vice-Chancellor is chosen by the Chancellor in accordance with the conventions of rotation among heads of colleges that have been laid down, the limitations on age that have been introduced, and the willingness of eligible individuals to serve.

456. The chief officials of the University are nominated: the Registrar by Council, the Secretary of the Chest by the Curators of the Chest, the Secretary of Faculties by the General Board after consultation with the Registrar, and the University Surveyor by the Committee for Works subject to the approval of Council and the Curators of the Chest. But in all four cases the nomination is subject to the approval of Congregation, so that in principle Congregation by its vote can exercise a veto.

457. With this constitution the central machinery of government in Oxford has in recent years had to deal with steadily mounting pressures from outside. These pressures in the main result from the existence of many other universities in Britain, a considerable number of which are, or are going to be, of comparable size and have attained high distinction in their academic life, and from the dependence of Oxford, like other British universities, for its resources on large grants from public funds. In addition, public interest has increased in the whole subject of higher education. As Sir Philip Morris observed (*Written Evidence*, Part IV, p. 135): 'The country has accepted, or has gone a long way towards accepting, the need for a comprehensive system of higher education.' Acceptance by this University of its role within a national system of higher education requires on the one hand a willingness to define clearly its own academic policies and lines of development, and on the other, co-operation with universities in the United Kingdom in fields where joint planning and action are desirable on educational or economic grounds.

458. Oxford has difficulty in participating fully in the activities of university associations. There is the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, which is increasingly being called upon to co-operate with the University Grants Committee and the Government in matters affecting higher education generally. Then there are the Association of Commonwealth Universities and the European Rectors Conference. Here it is not simply a matter of representatives of Oxford attending meetings, but of taking the active part which is expected of Oxford in the whole proceedings of these bodies. We have received evidence on this subject from Dr. J. F. Foster, the Secretary of the Association of Commonwealth Universities. He wrote (*Written Evidence*, Part IV, p. 70) that 'the affairs of these organizations tend to be handled by councils elected for a period of years and composed of executive heads of universities in different countries, and from this point of view it is unfortunate that the changing tenure of the Vice-Chancellorship in certain of the leading United Kingdom universities seems to have the result that the heads of those universities rarely appear as members of the executive bodies controlling the policy of these international academic organizations'.

459. There is the most important matter of the preparation of quinquennial estimates for current and capital purposes. There is also the increased need for continuous and forward looking co-operation in planning and action with the City of Oxford (see para. 89 above). The demands from the University Grants Committee and the Government for statistical information steadily grow. An increasing number of students of affairs wish to collate replies from Oxford with information from other universities. Lastly, the Registrar has referred (*Written Evidence*, Part IX, p. 2) to the increase in the number of visits by distinguished foreigners sponsored by government agencies, for all of whom suitable entertainment must be supplied.

460. These illustrations sufficiently indicate the external pressures and demands which have been bearing on Oxford and its central administration. We are not suggesting that Oxford alone among British universities has had this experience. Our purpose is to render intelligible the changes in the practical working of the constitution of Oxford which have occurred, so as to provide a basis for assessing the extent to which these changes have enabled the central machinery successfully to bear the new burdens placed upon it. The same considerations apply in relation to the internal pressures which have built up within Oxford, the subject to which we now turn.

461. The most prominent of these have been the increase in the size of the University and the growth of the large departments of the natural sciences and Engineering (see Chapter II). Colleges have expanded their numbers of undergraduates and built accommodation to house them. Postgraduate

studies have been developing fast, and making corresponding demands on the organization of the University. The need has grown to establish priorities for buildings and the allocation of capital. The scale of these changes has been so great as to make a qualitative difference to the task of administration, but the statutory form of the system has remained essentially unchanged.

462. To sum up, when the last Royal Commission reported in 1922, there was relatively little university business; by far the greatest part of what had to be decided and done was carried out in the colleges. The main bodies of the central administration of the University, and, for that matter, the other committees of the University, each operated within its own sphere as laid down by statute and were to a very great extent independent of each other. Such co-ordination as there was was supplied by the Vice-Chancellor, who took the chair at the main committees, by the need to go through Council when legislation in Congregation was required, and by the need to apply to the Chest when new money was wanted. The general administrative structure of Oxford was such that there was no one body which felt the responsibility for making sense of the affairs of the University.

463. The story of the years since 1945 has been of continuous efforts, without basically changing the constitution, to find the means by which the University could effectively respond to the growing internal and external pressures upon it to decide and act. The body which throughout has taken the active lead in this effort has been the Hebdomadal Council, and it will be convenient, therefore, in attempting to trace the modifications in the practice of conducting the affairs of the University, to take first the changes in the responsibilities and activities of Council and in its relations to the other main bodies in the central administration. After that we shall consider the evolution of the Vice-Chancellorship and of the responsibilities of the chief officials of the University. Because the constitution has largely remained unchanged, many of the procedures which have evolved to enable the University to meet the new demands could only be understood by ascertaining the everyday practice of the administration. This practice was described to us in hearings with representatives of the Hebdomadal Council, and, as there is no other source for an authoritative account of the present working of the system, their evidence is quoted extensively. We are deeply indebted to the Vice-Chancellor and his colleagues on the Hebdomadal Council for the clarity and patience with which they described present practice. We also acknowledge our gratitude to the representatives of the General Board and of the Chest for the help they gave us.

464. Council now acts on the assumption that it is the chief administrative body of the University, and it wishes this to be recognized. It told us

(*Written Evidence*, Part XII, p. 2) that 'it considers it essential that it should be recognized that Council is the chief administrative body of the University and the body responsible for the formulation and co-ordination of university policy and that, though it is answerable to Congregation, the initiative and leadership in matters of university policy rest with it, in association of course with the General Board and the Curators of the Chest'. This statement is the culmination of a quiet revolution. Where previously there had been no body with general responsibility for the policy and administration of Oxford, there now exists such a body demanding to be recognized for what it is, but within the limits of the old constitutional framework: hence the clause 'in association of course with the General Board and the Curators of the Chest'. What does this mean in practice? First of all, the old notion of independent bodies each with its own business has gone. Council now is actively interested in everything that goes on in Oxford and, if it thinks fit, will take anything up and consider it. This was made plain by the remark of the Vice-Chancellor (*Oral Evidence*, Part 77, p. 54): 'I would have said that when it comes to considering matters in the University, Council has concurrent power with every other body in the University and it can consider anything of current interest.' Secondly, Council does not merely take up and consider anything which it wishes, but it sets itself, where action is needed, to decide or get decisions taken elsewhere among the bodies and committees of the University. It exercises leadership over the full range of university activities.

465. These are changes of the first magnitude. They show the extent to which Council has been forced to become a busy, active, initiating and deciding body. How far this process has gone was described when Council gave oral evidence to the Commission (*Oral Evidence*, Part 77, p. 40):

THE CHAIRMAN: When we were talking about Council as the chief administrative body, you made some remarks in elaborating what you thought this notion entailed, and said that you thought that it entailed that Council should be able to consider anything, then you went on to say 'and decide'. . . . That, therefore, the implication is that if Council is this chief administrative body, then it has this continuous responsibility for considering whatever in the University ought to be watched and considered, and it cannot stand aside and let things be if this would be a bad thing to do. Does that correspond to the thoughts which were in your mind, or would you want to differ from it, or qualify it, or correct it in any way? . . .

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: I would agree that that is what I had in mind. I feel, in an odd way, that a great number of the members of the University think the same, because one finds they say, 'Is Council doing anything about so-and-so?' and if one replies to that, 'It is a General Board matter', they do not regard that as a satisfactory answer.

They do expect some body—and they assume it is Council—to be agitating about this and wondering about it in some way. So I would have said Yes to your question.

Are you going to say anything about my having said 'decided', or not?

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. I am now taking that sentence. The point which is in my mind about the use of the word 'decide' is this; that it is a question of emphasis or of the changes which practice and pressures have brought about, but I suppose that if one took the original statutes, one would have to say that the weight of decision rested with Congregation and Congregation alone, because the words which are used about Council confine themselves to deliberation, consideration on the one hand and proposing legislation on the other. There is no hint of decision in that original Laudian statute. . . .

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: When I said 'decide' I meant that I do not think Council can ever just ignore any of the things that come up. It has to decide what it would like to see done. It might not do it itself. Its decision may be that it should be brought to the attention of somebody else whose primary job it is, and they should be told that Council would like to see this matter settled or dealt with, or explained. However, it is my view that when these things come before Council, it is expected that Council shall form a view on them and take some decision which may not be deciding it itself, but merely deciding that it ought to be dealt with, and quite often saying what it thinks would be the right decision. Sometimes it is entitled to take it itself, and at other times it is better that the matter should be put before these other bodies, saying 'In Council's view this would be the line in which this thing should probably go. What do you think?' 'Decision' is rather a broad expression, but it does imply not shrugging it off, and that one has to take some responsibility for all these things. This situation has grown up to be so and it is implied in what we have described ourselves as being now. This is my view on it. When I said those things, I said I would tell you how I think the thing is now: others who have worked in it might not take that view at all. I go on to add that I believe this is a necessary and desirable situation myself. . . .

At this point the other members of the Hebdomadal Council who were present expressed themselves as being in general agreement with the Vice-Chancellor's opinion.

THE CHAIRMAN: If I may just labour the point for one moment, I think it is of importance because one of the impressions which was given to us in some of the external evidence which we have received, was that the characteristic of the central machinery of Oxford was such that there was no place where decision took place; . . .

[What you have just said] would mean, would it not, that someone looking at us from the outside, who said, 'There is no body which is competent to decide or to arrange for decision in the central machinery of Oxford', might be right if they were simply reading the Latin statute, but would be wrong, on your view, if they were interpreting the practice of the University as it has grown up, and as it now exists.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: Yes, but they would notice that we felt obliged to get the advice of some of the other bodies before we decided and that we might defer to their view on some questions.

. . . The reason why they are wrong is also understandable because, of course, if the Commission was not sitting and asking these questions, the inclination of most members of Council would be not to say very much about the position that they think they occupy. . . . We do not speak very much about the working constitution here, or rather we have not done so until recently and, therefore, it is understandable why people outside might not know all this.

466. But if Council exercises this general interest and initiative and takes decisions or moves to get them taken by the relevant bodies, a question arises about the evolution of practice in the relations of Council to Congregation. According to the statutes Council does not decide: it makes proposals on which Congregation legislates. However, since the time of the last Royal Commission, Council has in fact begun to decide and act on a number of matters of great importance to the University without going to Congregation at all. The Registrar, in the course of a memorandum on 'The Hebdomadal Council *de jure* and *de facto*', which had been seen by Council and to which Council had not objected, told us (*Written Evidence*, Part II, p. 2) that 'the most important of the powers exercised by Council without the direct and formal sanction of Congregation, largely perhaps because they represent developments since the Royal Commission of 1922, are:

- (a) the preparation and submission of the quinquennial application to the University Grants Committee (on which a great deal of preliminary work has already been done by the General Board and the Chest);
- (b) the preparation and submission of the major building programme, which is now divorced from the quinquennial application, and of individual building projects involving capital grants;
- (c) negotiations with the University Grants Committee arising out of (a) and (b), on academic salaries and other matters;
- (d) discussions and negotiations with local authorities on town planning etc.;
- (e) control of the salaries, wages, and conditions of employment of most non-academic staff;
- (f) consultation with colleges on matters of common concern to the

University and colleges, and on occasion on matters which are formally of concern only to the colleges but which may affect "Oxford" from the public relations point of view;

(g) certain special, and undefined, responsibilities in regard to professorships.'

467. There was discussion on this issue when Council gave oral evidence. Obviously, if some matters are decided by Council outright while other matters go to Congregation, the sovereign power to decide is no longer exclusively held by Congregation but is shared between Congregation and Council. This was made clear in replies given by the Vice-Chancellor to the Commission (*Oral Evidence*, Part 77, p. 13):

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: It is true to say that policy decisions are taken by the central government and are put into effect sometimes by the decision to put it into a letter, and so forth, and on other occasions they are legalized. If a man were to study the contents, he would say, 'It seems a very extraordinary thing, but how do you distinguish in Oxford between legislation and administration?' You would reply: 'Legislation means policy decisions, administration means otherwise', and he would catch you out at once. So the safest thing to say is that some of these decisions are legalized and others issue forth in other ways. Looking at the central government of the country, one sees that things are done in this way there too: sometimes they are done by Acts of Parliament, sometimes by statutory instrument, and sometimes by saying, 'The Government has decided . . .'

468. In short, present practice so far as the relations of Council and Congregation are concerned is that there is a large field of affairs in which the decisions of Council are not put to Congregation, and another large field of affairs where they are put in order that, as the Vice-Chancellor said to us, they may be legalized. Where statutes or decrees exist which require, expressly or by implication, certain matters to go to Congregation, the decisions of Council are so put. When it is a matter of amending statutes or decrees, the proposed alterations must also be the subject of legislation by Congregation. For the rest Council does not feel under an obligation to get its decisions legalized in Congregation; but in its discretion it may decide, and sometimes does decide, that it would be desirable or prudent to get authorization from Congregation. Sir Maurice Bowra, giving oral evidence on behalf of Council, put this very clearly (*Oral Evidence*, Part 77, p. 11):

Council, outside Congregation, deals with everything in the world which is not thought of in advance, which has not been covered by statutes in the past, notably external relations, but a great deal more, and a great deal of internal stuff such as building. I think the vital distinction here is between what is laid down as having to go to Congregation, and that we know. The whole of the rest is, I think, Council's

administrative business, and whether Council chooses to act on it is entirely its concern.

469. The changed position of Council as the chief administrative body also affects its relations with the other main bodies of the central administration. The General Board and the Curators of the Chest are no longer in practice independent bodies. The meaning of this became clear during our discussion (*Oral Evidence*, Part 77, p. 45):

MR. STEVEN WATSON: . . . On the other hand, I think [that it has been] emphasized that these other bodies were not subordinate in the sense of being creatures of the Hebdomadal Council, but that they had a life of their own. It was the job of the Hebdomadal Council to control bodies which had some sort of independence. . . . The General Board quite clearly has this life of its own, because it has a statute which gives it responsibility for overseeing all the academic life of the University. It is not set up by Council. It is set up by an act of the sovereign power creating it, and giving it these jobs to do. But I take it that the view is that the General Board should, like all other bodies—though it is perhaps the most important of all these other bodies—come under the control of the Hebdomadal Council.

If I understood the exposition this morning, the way in which Council would control the General Board would be through three methods. The first is by retaining with Council the exclusive right to propose legislation in Congregation. . . . The other methods by which Council would control the General Board, if I understand it aright, are by the interlocking of membership; people being on both bodies enabling the General Board to know what Council's general line is. Finally, there is something which I think the Warden of Wadham said, and which has emerged again this afternoon, which is that ultimately, in a sense, Council can do anything anyway. There is nothing to stop it taking up a subject in which the General Board is very interested, perhaps as a method of spurring the General Board into action, or controlling something which the General Board has started to do.

If I am right, the position between the General Board and Council reflects the difficulty of combining this independent life with control by the Hebdomadal Council so that you do not either kill the initiative of the General Board, nor do you let it become headstrong and get out of control. . . .

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: The use of the word 'control' to describe the relationship between the Council and the General Board is very difficult for me to get used to, because one hardly ever thinks of it like that. The methods of control are there. I may be wrong about this, but I suppose Council's position in relation to approving the quinquennial application is quite an important control over what the General Board

might like to see done in future policy, for example. Most of these financial things have to come up and get Council's approval. We have the last word on that. We really have got quite a bit of control. . . .

470. The process of change has gone even further in the relation of Council to the Chest. Responsibility and decision in matters of financial policy have been transferred from the Chest to Council. In the document which the Registrar submitted to us (*Written Evidence*, Part II, p. 3), it is said that Council and the Chest were originally virtually independent bodies operating in parallel in different fields. It goes on to say 'It is now accepted that financial and building policies are the responsibility of Council.' Mr. H. H. Keen's memorandum (*Written Evidence*, Part IX, p. 3) makes the same point.

471. This is in sharp contrast to the earlier position (*Oral Evidence*, Part 77, p. 58):

SIR MAURICE BOWRA: [The Chest] was a totally independent body, and it used to turn down Council decisions on matters of policy, and not on financial issues at all. If it did not like a thing it said: 'Nasty new reform—out! . . .

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: There has been a change too generally in people's view, in that money is supposed to be the servant and not the master. It is probably a mistake to think this, but this is how people look at things now, and how Government policy influenced our views in the war and afterwards. I dare say now the view is taken that Council must think about the financial implications also, and that to say: 'This would be a good thing to do', and then send it on to someone else who says, 'No, there is no money for that' or 'There is money, but we are not going to waste it on that' is not a good way to carry on. . . .

MR. SHOCK: . . . Would it be unfair to say that really what has happened in the last ten years is that the money has become more than ever the master, and that Council has taken the view that it was much too important a matter to be left to the Chest alone?

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: I think that it ought not to be dealt with by two bodies. If that is so, the body that decides to take hold of this small amount of money is the top body, but it ought not to be dealt with by two bodies.

472. A further radical change is that Council exerts leadership in the main bodies of the central administration, and also in other committees which lie outside the central machinery but are important, by securing the presence of its own members on them. There is a small group in the membership of Council, consisting of people experienced in university affairs, who share this task between them. They are linked together by the

common bond of involvement in the decisions of Council, and they constitute the political organization of the central administration, effectively maintaining the position of Council as the chief administrative body.

473. An exposition of this system of overlapping membership and of its contribution to the political control not only of the central machinery of the University but also of the wider administration was given by the Vice-Chancellor, again when giving evidence on behalf of Council (*Oval Evidence*, Part 77, p. 27):

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: . . . I am jumping about a bit, but you did mention one interesting point, that of overlapping membership. Whichever way you do it, whether by Congregation delegating, or by Council delegating, or by a mixture—in fact, we have a mixture at the moment—it can only be worked by overlapping membership among certain central bodies. The only way in which Council can carry out its function is to know that a certain number of people are on all these bodies. No matter how we did the delegation, the only way in which we could successfully carry out what I am going to call co-operation—because co-ordination is a bit more severe—between these bodies would be to have people going to the meetings and saying what they think is the way the policy should be going. Otherwise, you are having to write to the various bodies. If you delegate them from Council, it looks jolly good on paper—they are all coming down from this body—but unless there is overlapping membership, they all develop autonomy of their own in ignorance of what is going on. Therefore, I think this overlapping membership takes the place of the party system. . . . You have to have leadership in these bodies, and you can get it from a group of people who are on several of them, and they must be on Council. They are involved in what is going on, and they are very often chairmen of important committees, either as Pro-Vice-Chancellors, or not. . . . The question is where you can stop and say, 'It is not necessary to have the overlapping membership to that extent.' I think that this provides such political organization as we have got, and the common bond that all these people have is that they are implicated in the decisions. That is what makes them stick together. They have been in it in the past or are going to be in it, and this gives them this kind of link. One of them will be very much concerned with the General Board, and others in some committees that are going on. In this way they can act. They have not all the knowledge that is needed, but they are needed to do this work. If you have made a system which looked a good deal tidier, by delegating from Council over a wide field, you still have to deal with half a dozen bodies. Then there are other bodies like Boards of Electors to professorships, which meet very seldom. You have to be sure that one at least of these people, and at present it is the Vice-Chancellor, is there. It goes round in that way. This is the thing which brings in such political organization as we have got.

474. In these ways Council has been able to achieve a great deal of what is implied by the notion of being the chief administrative body. But of course, if it is really to be the chief administrative body of Oxford, then the question arises about the position of Council in relation to the colleges and how far there have been changes in practice here too. We were told by Council that there had been a major change in willingness to co-operate, in joint working and in the general sense that Oxford, University and colleges together, is one. The evidence given by Mr. Norrington on behalf of Council is to the point (*Oral Evidence*, Part 78, p. 19):

MR. NORRINGTON: If I might say something, there has been, I would have thought, a great change in one part of this field, which may make it easier for what you are really asking about, namely, how the University and the colleges, in so far as they are distinct internally, can speak about it. I should have thought that the colleges had advanced very rapidly towards an effective spirit of co-operation in many matters in the last few years. . . . I think that the colleges have—I do not know what it is due to—much more of a feeling of being friendly competitors rather than just competitors or solo performers than they used to have. I believe this will make it very much easier in the future to speak with confidence, and even if there is no precise method of consultation between the colleges it will be much easier to speak with confidence about what the colleges would or would not take or swallow.

There have been one or two important matters in front of us lately, as we all know, which involve the University and the colleges simultaneously, such as the non-fellow problem, which is perhaps the most obvious one, and the question of college contribution. So that I would have thought that as the necessity for distinguishing the University and the colleges as bodies with different interests has grown, and therefore the necessity for finding out if they agree about a thing has grown, so in a way the remedy has grown up a little bit with it, so far as the colleges are concerned. I would have thought that the colleges have, within the last few years, realized much more than they ever used to that they depend upon the University, and I would hope also that the University, in so far as it is anything different, knows that without the colleges it would lose the feature which makes Oxford (and Cambridge) peculiar and which perhaps makes them to that extent a better or a very good variant of the normal university pattern. . . .

These remarks were reinforced by Sir Maurice Bowra as the discussion with Council proceeded (*Oral Evidence*, Part 78, p. 20):

SIR MAURICE BOWRA: I would agree with a lot of that. I think the colleges now look to the University for a lead, which they never did before. That is the first point. The second is that the University thinks it is its job to aid the colleges, which it never did before. It looks at C.U.F. payments, services rendered, and so on. There have been a whole series

of actions done by the University to help colleges. This is a totally new situation, and I think the President of Trinity has said very rightly that the colleges can now meet together without feeling that they have no right to say anything. They can say things because they feel the University is behind them. . . . I think the whole situation has changed in the last ten years. . . . The University is now regarded as the central office, to take the lead in a great many matters, e.g., the proposal to change the method of appointment of C.U.F. lecturers, and consultation with the colleges. It is a joint operation. There is the way in which the University approached the richer colleges on help for the new ones. That is a lead from the University, if ever there was one.

475. Methods of joint working between Council and the University on the one hand and the colleges on the other have developed informally. This is clear in the case of the Senior Tutors' Committee, which is an inter-collegiate body which, in addition to its ordinary business, from time to time considers and replies to inquiries from the University, the Department of Education and Science, or the University Grants Committee on behalf of all the colleges. It behaves in effect both as a committee of the colleges and also as an advisory committee to Council.

476. Consultation between Council and the colleges has been extended, both by correspondence and by meetings, to allow Council to sound the opinion of the colleges (*Oral Evidence*, Part 78, p. 22):

THE CHAIRMAN: . . . When we come to the future, . . . it might be reasonable to assume that if there have been [many occasions in the past when it was necessary to find and determine the view of Oxford] they will not be fewer in the future, because given the way the society of institutions and Congregation has come into being, this sort of dialogue between us and them and the University Grants Committee will grow more frequent.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: So that the question of the appropriate means by which the views of the colleges and the views of the University may be brought into substantial identity, so that either the practice or the policy of Oxford can be stated, is an important preoccupation.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: Yes, very.

477. This change in relationship between Council and the colleges has not been given any institutional form. The constitutional framework remains unaltered and the new patterns of co-operation in policy and action depend for their existence and success on the will to make them work rather than

on any administrative or constitutional basis. The Vice-Chancellor drew our attention to this fact (*Oral Evidence*, Part 78, p. 21):

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: I think we are in a state of transition about all this. There is no doubt about it. In fact I do not think this thing, as it stands at the moment, would work if the spirit slumped just a short bit. At the moment, and for the last six years or so, there has been a feeling that we must work together. The work of the Commission has caused a lot of this to happen. All groups of colleges are meeting, and they have got used to the idea of sending one man off from the college to a meeting of the group. He says: 'I will not be back. I will not be able to tell you what I am going to say, because I do not know. I am going to a meeting of the group, and then I will go on.' This is all based on a spirit which is around at the moment, but it will have to be institutionalized in some way. . . .

Then a little later he said (*Oral Evidence*, Part 78, p. 27):

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: . . . What we have not had to grasp properly yet is the problem of what you do one day when you have to say something on behalf of the University and the colleges and there is not unanimity among the colleges. We have not decided what we are going to do then and what the machinery is. I do not think we have yet got a way in which on some occasion we say: 'Well, this has been gone into very thoroughly and we do not agree, and this is what is going to be said.' As far as I know, there is not a body . . . which exists which could give the answer. I do not know what the body is. Actions have been taken by the Hebdomadal Council which affected the colleges without consulting them—one is the setting up of the Franks Commission—but I do not think we can regard this as a way in which these things can be done. Nevertheless, there is I think no institution or an arrangement among us all by which it would be agreed that such-and-such a collection of bodies, after a vote has been taken, should say, 'The majority opinion prevails.' An odd thing is that I do not think that there has been an important occasion when we have been worried about that yet.

478. One of the tests by which these changes in practice can be judged is the extent to which they enable Council as the chief administrative body of the University to find and declare the mind of Oxford to external authorities. When asked about this, the Vice-Chancellor replied on his own behalf (*Oral Evidence*, Part 77, p. 44):

I would say that I can, as effectively as any other Vice-Chancellor can speak for his own university.

and on behalf of Council as the chief administrative body:

It can speak, I would say, as effectively as anybody can speak for

a university. I want to say that, because I do not think it is as easy to speak for a university as it is for a business, such as an insurance company or something like that. You cannot always speak perhaps quite so definitely or give answers that are quite so precise as you might give if you were speaking on behalf of another form of activity. Granted the type of thing we are dealing with, a collection of human beings of an individualistic kind, I would say yes, it can speak for the University. . . . some of the people who comment upon us from outside are probably people who are used to running a different kind of show. If they have dealings with the Government, say, when they go along to talk to a government department about something, they can speak more clearly about where their organization stands, and how they feel about it than we can. I am not sure how easy it is for the Chairman of the F.B.I.—I think it has a different name now—to go along and say what the F.B.I. thinks, but he may feel somehow that he can go along and speak much more definitely than we can. Their subject matter is different and the organization is different. I bring that example in, but it does not destroy at all what I am saying. It is harder for us to do.

Forty years ago it would have been impossible for the Vice-Chancellor to give an answer of this kind. This is one measure of the success which has attended the efforts of Council to give unity to the administration of the University and to enable it to take decisions and to formulate policies.

479. The general process of adaptation is also visible in the changing practice of the General Board which has begun to move towards a position in which it will on occasion itself determine academic policy. This emerged in the oral evidence of the General Board (*Oral Evidence*, Part 81, p. 22):

MR. BAMBOROUGH: . . . You may say to me: Do I think the General Board, whatever it looks like, has got to assume a more active part in formulating academic policy? The answer to that is Yes.

The difficulties which hamper the General Board in adopting this more active role were outlined by the President of Trinity:

MR. NORRINGTON: I think that the General Board has the power to take the initiative, as things now are, even as so constituted in membership, but I do not think that it has done it as much as it could have. I think that this is a very general feeling in the University and on the General Board. Perhaps it goes up and down. I do not think anybody blames the General Board for this: well, it would not be true to say that nobody does, that would be far from true. But the people who know a bit about it would say, I think, that in the first place it is clogged with a great deal of matter. It is all important matter. If you are going to change the set books for the Final Honour School in Spanish, this is an important academic matter, but it is a thing of which it would not,

I think, be treacherous to say that no member of the General Board other than the person representing the Faculty of Modern Languages, will look at on the agenda. It may be partly because they have not got the prestige of Council, because they do not put forward legislation, and because the Vice-Chancellor is not there.

I would say, frankly, that I do not think that the General Board has always, or indeed often, managed somehow or other to get a feeling of being a body of wise men. I think it is a body of men who are wise, as wise as you would expect, but it is true that it has not been seen to take as much initiative as it might have nor managed somehow or other to get a feeling of being a deliberative body which forms policies successfully and well. It has tried to do this very hard, and I would think it has done it better recently. It will always be liable to rise to the occasion of there being important matters on which clearly Council will entirely rely on the General Board. I do not want to go on about this. I just wanted to say that I personally admit this.

480. This account of present practice in the central administration of the University would not be complete without reference to the Building and Development Committee. This is a relatively small joint committee of Council, the General Board, and the Chest. Because it is the place where the capital building programme of the University is first put together, its business lies at the point where academic policies and desires meet the problems of scarcity, that is, money and sites. The fact that it is a joint committee of the three constitutionally independent central bodies of the University has made it a major means for co-ordinating and unifying policy on matters of urgent importance. Inevitably it has become a committee dealing with priorities and proposing solutions to the parent bodies (*Oral Evidence*, Part 79, p. 17):

THE CHAIRMAN: [Would you say that in the Building and Development Committee] a small number of experienced representatives of the bodies which have most responsibility for the general administration of the University meet together in a situation in which the most acute scarcities and, therefore, the most acute priorities meet, and that they therefore find themselves in this relatively small circle talking with each other and coming, in the language which I used earlier, to form a pattern of development for the University which they propose to the larger and authoritative bodies: that this really means—whatever word we care to use—that there is here an informal planning body without which it would be very difficult for the larger and responsible bodies of the University properly to discharge their function?

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: Yes, I agree with that. The great thing about it is that of course it is representative. I was interested that Lord Murray said this. The other idea is to have a dozen brooders over the

whole thing, looking around: people who are not members of Council or the General Board. This is no good in my opinion. They must be representatives of the chief bodies—and Lord Murray said that they should be representative. So that it is because of the representative nature of it that they should come from these chief bodies; that they should, to a very large extent, be the chief people on the chief bodies, and that it should be small. It is necessary to have such a body. If there was only Council and the General Board in existence, it should be joint representation of both of those.

48r. In consequence of all these changes in practice there has been a corresponding development in the responsibilities of the Vice-Chancellor and of the senior officials, especially the Registrar. The Vice-Chancellorship has ceased to be a part-time job undertaken by the head of a college (*Oral Evidence*, Part 79, p. 28):

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: . . . In my short experience the Vice-Chancellorship is a full-time preoccupation for the holder of the office. I am, in effect, seconded to the University by Exeter College for two years, and I carry out no college duties at all. I think I may be the first Vice-Chancellor who has behaved in this way, but that is the position.

Having said that, I would like to say one or two other things. The first is that when I say that the Vice-Chancellorship is a full-time preoccupation for the holder of the office, I do not mean that every minute of every day is taken up with business, with things you have to do. There is time to brood: there is time to do nothing, but in my experience there is not time to be preoccupied with another post. It also follows from what I have said that the Vice-Chancellorship is not more than a full-time preoccupation for one man. I see evidence which suggests that there is work for four or five men which one man is trying to do. If the Vice-Chancellor does what he must, and also what it is very desirable he should do, that adds up in my experience, quite shortly, to a full-time preoccupation. If he tries to do what he may do, or what he is authorized to do, that would be three or four men's work, and in practice these things which he may do are done for him by Pro-Vice-Chancellors and others who take on regular pieces of the administration. . . .

And it is important to note that it is full-time even for the present Vice-Chancellor, who brings to the office great experience of university affairs (*Oral Evidence*, Part 79, p. 31):

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: . . . If I may speak personally, I have been on the Hebdomadal Council for about eighteen years, so I am used to a great deal of the stuff that is passing by. I can look at the papers each day as they are brought in, and see what is going on. Then I can ring up, if I want to. I am in touch with most of the people who are chairmen.

I know what the state of the game is. The Registrar is also in touch with the officials on that side who can say what it is like. Very occasionally I might be advised to turn up at something I had not been attending, in order to help.

SIR ROBERT HALL: The fact that you have been on Council for eighteen years obviously makes the whole thing enormously quicker, does it not?

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: Yes. It means that you know all the other members of the Hebdomadal Council. As it happens, in my case, I am senior to all of them except one. That does make a difference to the actual taking up of the reins at the beginning. It is not easy, but in fact there are some things which you know that you would not have known if you were quite new to it.

482. Even so, the Vice-Chancellor has come to find it necessary to ask a team of experienced colleagues to take charge for him of major fields of activity. These are the people to whom we referred earlier as those who by overlapping membership exercise leadership on behalf of Council in other important bodies and committees of the University. At the same time they serve as the deputies and assistants to the Vice-Chancellor. So we find him saying with reference to his duties (*Oral Evidence*, Part 79, p. 29):

... I will start by saying what I do not do. I do not have anything to do with the committees that deal with the medical side of the University. The President of Trinity does all that. I do not do any of the educational bodies, the bodies concerned with Education with a capital 'E'. The Principal of St. Edmund Hall, as Pro-Vice-Chancellor, does that. There is a large amount of financial business at which the Provost of Oriel takes the chair. I have delegated to the Rector of Lincoln the Ashmolean world, and to the Principal of Lady Margaret Hall the Extra-mural world and the Taylorian world, and so on.

In effect this means that there is an inner group under the Vice-Chancellor, doing his work for him by delegation. They are the means by which the leadership of the Vice-Chancellor and Council is given to the bodies on which they serve. If difficulties arise, this is the group with whose members the Vice-Chancellor said he would get in touch, and he went on (*Oral Evidence*, Part 79, p. 32):

Certainly in my case I rely very much indeed on it, because there are six Pro-Vice-Chancellors instead of four and each one has been given a slab of work. The Principal of Linacre House in addition, has his slab of work with the General Board, so that I rely on them very much.

483. If the Vice-Chancellorship has developed and grown in this way, how does the Vice-Chancellor stand in relation to Council? Does he administer

the University on his own authority, or does he do so as at once giving leadership to and receiving authorization from Council? The present Vice-Chancellor is in no doubt on this (*Oval Evidence*, Part 79, p. 50):

I think that you get your powers from being chairman. As most of us know, almost all that any wise man wants can be got from the use of the power of chairman. I should also mention that you are a chairman who conducts the business of the meeting. You are not just chairman with an official conducting the business. You do it, which though more arduous, gives you more control over what is going on. I think like all chairmen, you want to get a decision, or not—whatever it is. You have a view about where you want to be at the end of the meeting. This comes from chairmanship. I think that you feel you have failed somehow if you have not been able to get there. As you say, you may have to push it. You know more than almost all the other members of Council present about what is involved. Like, I think, quite a number of chairmen you do not necessarily tell all. I do not mean you suppress the truth in any way.

484. To sum up, it is clear that this evolution in practice has enabled the Vice-Chancellor now to speak for Oxford in a way that would have been impossible earlier (*Oval Evidence*, Part 79, p. 41):

MR. STEVEN WATSON: . . . On the whole, you do not find much difficulty, in day-to-day inquiries that come from the outside world, in replying on behalf of the University? . . .

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: No I do not think you do . . . I think it is true to say that there would be quite a number of members of Congregation who would think that our system of government is such that if you had sent an answer to an outside body, and it was published and they did not like it, they could say to you: 'What authority did you have to send this? You should have gone to Congregation about this.' . . .

THE CHAIRMAN: This is an absolutely fundamental point, because if the people you are referring to not only might say that, but could enforce it. . . .

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: They could put up a resolution, yes. . . .

THE CHAIRMAN: This does not mean that you cannot go to Congregation on major and particular issues, or that you should not—that is a separate question—but if everything which committed the University by correspondence or by negotiation had to be sealed and stamped by Congregation, this would bring the whole administration to an absolute halt.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Therefore, this is not reality.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: No. Because it is impossible, it is not done.

485. The same pressures have also modified and enlarged the position of the Registrar. Because of the limited tenure of the Vice-Chancellorship, the Registrar as the senior official has become the element of continuity in the system, a fact which has important consequences. First of all, he is the man who is worth seeing by members of the University who want advice on how to set about or how to get on with projects which they wish to advance. So we find the Vice-Chancellor saying (*Oral Evidence*, Part 79, p. 36):

... This gets us on to the fact that the Vice-Chancellor here is not the continuity man and people very rightly go in to see the Registrar. Even if the Vice-Chancellor was the continuity man, then the great question would arise about whether such people should go to see him first, or whether they ought to work away somewhere else before. The short answer is that in my view nobody, such as a science professor, would think of calling on the Vice-Chancellor to discuss a project of that importance.

486. In the view of the present Vice-Chancellor a great part of the relations of the Registrar to the Vice-Chancellor are of the kind natural to the Secretary of the Cabinet; but on the other side the advisory and initiating activities of the Registrar are more like those of a Permanent Secretary, and these last in the view of the Vice-Chancellor have developed very much. Unless both a continuous initiative and continuity came from the Registrar and the other senior officials, the central administrative system would not work (*Oral Evidence*, Part 79, p. 60):

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: ... Under the present régime most of the initiative for conducting the business and bringing it up and dealing with it at this stage comes from the Registrar, so we are working together, but the Registrar has a very great say on the order in which you are going to see these things through, though I might occasionally have a view. This arises from the fact that the Registrar is the head of a machine which is getting it ready and bringing it up. We both know what the time-table is on which we have got to proceed. The advisory-initiative side is very much developed, and is essential. ... In fact, in the way in which we work it we have continuity in the whole conduct of the policy right through. It is not provided by the Vice-Chancellor: it is provided by the chief officials. This continuity occurs in the General Board just as much as in Council, and so forth. We are sometimes criticized for not having continuity. I think we must ask ourselves whether we have the continuity in the right place, and enough of it, and so forth, but we have it on the basis of the officials.

Because of this enhancement of the position of the Registrar he has

become the responsible adviser of the Vice-Chancellor and of Council (*Oral Evidence*, Part 79, p. 62):

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: [The Registrar] is known to be a continuing adviser. This is certainly true and it is known to be so. I think it should be so, because we could not work our present rotating system without it.

SIR MAURICE BOWRA: I think this is entirely true, but I think it is very recent. The Registrar used not to say anything unless asked. I asked him dates, and that sort of thing. I did an enormous amount of fixing beforehand. I was very, very careful about that. I think there has been a considerable change. At first some of the older people were not quite happy. They thought that the Registrar was trying to boss us. They are now used to it, and they welcome it, because they think this is a perfectly sensible way to do things. The Registrar has not got a vote, but he supplies information, and so on. It has been a change. I would like to underline that, because the practice varies from what it was ten years ago.

487. This then is the evolution in practice of the responsibilities and activities of the Registrar. He has come to be acknowledged as the senior university official. Of the other senior officials, the Secretary of Faculties comes under him by statute, but the Secretary of the Chest and the University Surveyor do not. This is a reflexion of the statutory position of the bodies served by these officials and by whom they are nominated. Co-ordination at the official level is secured by goodwill and consultation.

488. All these changes in practice have been sufficient to enable the central machinery of the administration to continue to function, and, more than that, to reduce or to eliminate some earlier weaknesses. Lord Murray of Newhaven confirmed this belief (*Oral Evidence*, Part 29, p. 4):

. . . I would say straightaway that over the ten years I was on the University Grants Committee the picture changed quite a bit. If I were asked on my experience of the last years of my tenure of office, or even what I have read about what has been happening more recently, I would say that the situation has changed very much for the better. The criticisms I would make of the relationship between the University Grants Committee and Oxford are criticisms from my early years rather than my later ones; I would like to make that pretty clear, because I think it has some relevance to what I would like to say later. . . .

489. Nevertheless, it is impossible to avoid the impression that the effort of adaptation which Oxford has made, with very considerable success, has rested too much on the energy of one body, Council, and on the devotion of the small inner group from whom the Vice-Chancellor himself has often been chosen. Within the framework of the existing constitution it has

been possible to accomplish marvels: it has been possible, not always but often, to make the central administration of Oxford produce results and produce them on time, not because of the system of administration but in spite of it. An unreasonable strain has been placed upon the very small number of men and women at the centre of the administration of the University. Inevitably, therefore, there remain large questions of how Oxford may best organize itself to face the problems of the future, and of whether the contrast between existing practice and the formal constitution is not so great as to be a source of instability.

490. These questions were touched on at the end of the oral evidence given by the Hebdomadal Council (*Oral Evidence*, Part 96, p. 38):

THE CHAIRMAN: . . . The root issue here is whether there is any reason for going on with what appear to be rather attenuated fragments of an older system which means that the University does not have, officially, a unitary administration. I think that any commission, either internal or external, which sits on this matter would tend to come to the view of the Royal Commission of 1922. I have not really heard arguments which would lead me to believe that that Commission was wrong. Would any member of Council wish to take that view?

SIR MAURICE BOWRA: I very much agree with you. I will say quite clearly that I have thought that for some years and the fact that it works at all is a miracle of good temper, goodwill and all that. I think that legally it could go rather nasty if things went wrong.

THE CHAIRMAN: I feel that one of the problems we are confronted with is that through the very great efforts of a relatively small body of people in the University over the last ten years, it has been possible to make the University, as a whole, and its central machinery do almost anything. It has achieved quite remarkable successes but I think it has done it in spite of the organization rather than because of it.

If one is confronted with the need of looking at the organization for what it is and we consider the difference between statute and practice, then, you see, these questions do come up. We, I suppose, in the end, have to try to find an unambiguous recommendation. Therefore, I am pressing this point because if it was seriously thought that a unified administration, or a clear relationship, for example, between Council and the Chest and the General Board was undesirable, we ought to be told.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: I think you will find that there is a body of opinion which is against centralization and against saying that so-and-so is top and that the others come underneath. You will find that is just a fact of our community here.

THE CHAIRMAN: We appreciate that.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: When we think of what we are going to try and do we have to bear that in mind. But that is a fact. I have been trying today—and also when I came with the Chest—to make it clear that people do think in this way. Perhaps not everybody has worked it out so clearly as they should. As for the rest, I would have thought that we would be content for the Commission to decide on this matter and make the recommendation that they think fit.

THE CHAIRMAN: But it is proper, is it not, for us to inquire whether Council has any suggestion, advice or opinion which it would wish to offer?

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: Yes. I was thinking that if in due course you recommended something and said 'We were glad to find the Hebdomadal Council agreed' on this suggestion, I would feel a bit awkward. Therefore, I hope you will not press us to say we agree with what you said. But you did ask us just now whether anybody disagreed and not a soul said anything. As you know, this is very often the other side of being overlapping members of various bodies: you have a lot of loyalties.

But your analysis of the situation struck me as very clear, if I may say so, and certainly pointing in one direction.

THE CHAIRMAN: We will leave it at that.

CHAPTER VII

FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF OXFORD

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491. Some of our Oxford witnesses had the feeling that 'administration' is something apart from the true interest of the scholar: they regarded it as an evil, a necessary evil no doubt, but one which should not be put in the forefront of a university discussion. Yet from the returns made to us by 97 per cent. of the members of the teaching and research staff it is clear that such witnesses spend a considerable part of their time in administrative work. Rather like Maria Theresa,* they may lament it but they take it on. Its effectiveness should therefore concern them. The problems of administration are of course basic to the provision of facilities for teaching and research: moreover the nature of their solution affects the character of the work which is done and the spirit in which those doing it can live together. A refusal in the universities to give rational discussion of their administration a high priority must result either in tyranny mitigated by muddle or in time-wasting reduplication of effort.

492. The position and tenure of the Vice-Chancellor is of central importance in any such discussion. In the Robbins Report (para. 676) the reason is convincingly stated. 'This leads us to the position of the vice-chancellor or principal. His is a role which, probably fortunately, is seldom precisely spelt out in written constitutions. Yet it would be difficult to overstate its importance, particularly in a period of expansion, which calls for imagination and continuous initiative. There is a grave danger that the needs of expansion and the increasingly complex relations between institutions of higher education and government will impose upon the heads of universities a quite insupportable burden, unless steps are taken to relieve them. There are certain duties of which the vice-chancellor cannot divest himself. He is at once a member of the governing body and chairman of the main academic councils. He must therefore be at the centre of all discussions involving broad questions of internal policy or relations with the outside world. He must represent his institution in all formal or informal relations with the University Grants Committee; he must be present at meetings of the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals; he must keep in touch with potential benefactors, and he must be aware, in general, of developments in the various branches of learning.' This summary is fully illustrated in Part I of Appendix Four of the Robbins Report. The most important services of a Vice-Chancellor, in brief, appear to be those of holding the university together and of giving its mind clear expression.

* 'Elle pleure mais elle prend toujours', said Frederic II with reference to the partition of Poland.

493. Much evidence was offered to us that Oxford had failed to achieve such clear expression. As a result, the rest of the educational world was poorer for lack of Oxford's contribution. Oxford itself was poorer, in a more material way, by failures on occasion to win public money from the University Grants Committee. Lord Heyworth took, as an instance, a lack of decision in the Oxford building programmes: 'Of course, you suffered from that, because every now and then in the University Grants Committee programme for building, which is a very large one, some of the universities could not take up for some reason some of the money we offered to them, and they would say: "Look, we will have to put this back for a year or two", and £50,000 might become loose, and the University Grants Committee just had to run round to the people who were ready with something, and Oxford on two occasions, I think, were not ready with anything. They could have had the money, because we felt they deserved it' (*Oral Evidence*, Part 5, p. 3). In later evidence Lord Murray of Newhaven confirmed that this statement was perfectly fair (*Oral Evidence*, Part 29, p. 19).^{*} Sir Philip Morris, in particular, urged upon us (*Written Evidence*, Part IV, p. 137) the need for a principal academic officer or Vice-Chancellor of long tenure and experience who would act both as a pivot to bring the parts of the academic administration into unity in the formulation of policy, and as an effective channel of communication to the outside world. Witnesses putting forward this argument were also careful to emphasize that a 'permanent' Vice-Chancellor could function only if all the organs of university government were so arranged that proper consultation took place and he regularly received adequate information and advice. His own experience of how the system worked led Dr. T. S. R. Boase (*Written Evidence*, Part IV, p. 15) to advocate a 'permanent' Vice-Chancellorship.

494. On the other hand, we had witnesses who were hostile to a 'permanent' Vice-Chancellorship because they believed this reduced what was called 'grass roots initiative'. The Vice-Chancellor, giving evidence on behalf of the Hebdomadal Council (*Oral Evidence*, Part 77, pp. 17 ff.), discussed the importance of enabling those who taught in it to take part in shaping the purposes for which the University exists: in a further statement on behalf of Council he said (*Oral Evidence*, Part 80, p. 12): 'I do not mean that if it is asked to say how certain types of studies should be organized, or what should be done about technology, that we should not give an answer, but I think some of the most important questions academically are questions about studies, ideas about academic matters, and these can come better from the academic people themselves, as they do it within their own subjects, and across the subject. . . . This is the great contribution of ideas, which is the most important thing of all.' The representatives of the Association of University Teachers told us (*Oral Evidence*, Part 16, p. 31) that the

^{*} Though (see para. 488 above) Lord Murray stressed that the situation had improved during the ten years he was on the University Grants Committee.

benefit of a hierarchical system was purchased at a cost 'so high that you would not be advised to buy that particular advantage'. College replies to our questionnaire (see *Written Evidence*, Part XIII) were generally against a long-term Vice-Chancellorship, on the ground that it must destroy the traditional republic of equals.

495. We do not find ourselves, however, faced with a simple choice between 'efficiency' and 'democracy' in the formulation of a desirable university government. On close examination neither of the so-called alternative systems of organization lives up to its reputation. Sir Eric Ashby speaking on behalf of the University of Cambridge (*Oral Evidence*, Part 13, pp. 6 and 11) told us that in academic matters the simpler structure of a long-term Vice-Chancellor and a Senate of perhaps seventy professors and other university teachers is not so efficient—measuring efficiency in terms of achieving long-term aims as well as in speed of movement—as has been sometimes claimed. There is evidence, looking at the alternative, that the democratic structure often means confusion from which no general will ever emerges, with the result that great decisions are taken without forethought, almost by chance or at best by the pressure of a group, and that the end of this is general frustration rather than useful freedom.

496. We think it important in the first place that 'the mind of Oxford' should be clearly expressed, that there should be a point at which the main decisions are taken and publicized, that planning ahead should be possible, and that those concerned should accept the responsibility for implementing a coherent policy. If therefore a democratic academic structure is to work well, there must be a smaller body or clearly interrelated smaller bodies which can guide and lead. Unless such elementary points of efficient administration can be secured, we do not believe that the standing of Oxford among the universities of the country or of the world can be maintained. But it is equally important in our view to see that the 'mind' which is to be expressed shall be that of Oxford as a whole: it is no good having a spokesman unless he is well briefed. This is not easy when many who have the laudable desire to maintain their rights as full members of the academic society have the equally praiseworthy wish to pursue their studies without being bothered with the politics of the community. But we think it important that individual initiative, which is at present threatened with being smothered by the increasing mass of detail, should be allowed to flourish in a changing environment.

497. Our proposals for administrative reform are drawn up with these two requirements in mind. We found that the two objectives drew us along the same path. Nor have we found that the present practice of Oxford administration is diametrically opposed to our proposals. The first essential is to delimit and to define authorities in the constitutional body.

498. At the outset we should make clear that we accept the proposition that the Vice-Chancellor must, as the Robbins Committee says (see para. 492 above), be the spokesman for the whole academic community. We accept also that ultimate sovereignty for Oxford, subject to the control of Parliament and the Privy Council, should reside in the 1,600 members of Congregation. We have already explained in Chapter VI (para. 445) how nineteenth-century Commissions transferred most of the sovereign legislative powers from Convocation to Congregation, the assembly of Masters of Arts working in Oxford. We believe that the time has now come to complete the work of earlier Commissions in this respect. We therefore recommend that all the powers of Convocation should be abolished with the single exception of its power to elect the Chancellor. In this act, which concerns high ceremonial honour, we think it fitting that, in addition to Congregation, the whole body of those who have received a full Oxford education, whether living inside or outside the walls, should have the opportunity to express their view. But the operation of Convocation as a court of appeal against a majority of less than two-thirds of Congregation seems to us indefensible, both in theory and in recent practice. Nor is it sensible that it should continue to perform its other and lesser functions.

499. While ultimate sovereignty should remain with the large and increasing body of resident masters, Congregation, it is equally clear that the details of policy cannot be decided there. So long as there is doubt about what matters should go before this ultimate authority, so long will the control of policy be spasmodic, and, given the small attendances now habitual, subject to the organization of pressure groups. To the proper working of Congregation we return later.

PART I. THE HEBDOMADAL COUNCIL AS THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE BODY

500. We begin our survey of the future administration of Oxford with an examination of the proper place and functions of the Hebdomadal Council. It might be thought that we should have begun with the Vice-Chancellor, but we decided against this course because we are convinced by the arguments against a 'permanent' Vice-Chancellor. To appoint a 'permanent' Vice-Chancellor would in our opinion be a move towards a division between the administration and the administered which Oxford has hitherto avoided; it would also hinder that academic equality in initiative which we wish to revitalize. But while we reject the proposal, we are conscious that the evil which it was intended to remedy is real. We could not propose any scheme which did not promise to give results in continuity and decisiveness broadly as effective as those to be got from the presence of a 'permanent' Vice-Chancellor. We believe that such results can be achieved, and that the first step is to define the position of the Hebdomadal Council.

501. The present Hebdomadal Council asked us (*Written Evidence*, Part XII, p. 2) to make it clear beyond question 'that Council is the chief administrative body of the University and the body responsible for the formulation and co-ordination of university policy and that, though it is answerable to Congregation, the initiative and leadership in matters of university policy rest with it, in association of course with the General Board and the Curators of the Chest'. In their oral evidence the representatives of Council reiterated this necessity (*Oral Evidence*, Part 77, p. 3) and went on to discuss some of the obscurities involved in the ways in which it is 'answerable to Congregation', in its 'association with the General Board and the Curators of the Chest', and in the meaning of the word 'administrative'.

502. It is our view that Council must be the chief administrative body of the University. It must, in taking this responsibility, provide an element of continuity which would otherwise be hazarded by changes in the tenure of the Vice-Chancellorship. But if Council is to perform this key function, its powers must be clearly defined by statute and its mode of operation set out. It is useless to establish what is meant to be the chief administrative body and then to set up under separate authority other bodies with administrative functions exercising conflicting jurisdictions, or even worse, instructed by the sovereign body how to behave in some detail. There is a call for recognizing by statute a small number of committees or other bodies which carry out functions of great importance, but all such statutes should be of a general kind and should be so drafted that the position of Council is unchallenged.

503. In calling Council 'the chief administrative body', we would follow the present Vice-Chancellor's definition of 'administrative' (*Oral Evidence*, Part 77, p. 11), that is, a body in which policy is decided and from which the execution of that policy is controlled. Council must be the centre at which ideas about the general structure and intention of the University are discussed and settled. It must execute such decisions or cause them to be executed. It must speak through the Vice-Chancellor to the outside world. It must commit the whole body when it so decides and so speaks. It has ultimate responsibility for the whole of Oxford. It should be stressed that by Oxford we mean the whole community, colleges as well as University. Council has never been able, formally, in the past to speak for the whole academic community. It is our purpose that in future, after proper consultation and a decision in Council, the constitutional right of the Vice-Chancellor to speak for Oxford as a whole should be undoubted. The colleges are part of a federal union and not simply of a confederation. They cannot nullify the actions of the central authority without reducing the University and themselves to impotence in a world increasingly impatient of such behaviour.

504. We attach importance not only to the method of electing Council but also to the improvements in the machinery for consultation with other bodies, particularly with the colleges, which we discuss later. It is obvious also that in acting as 'the chief administrative body' what is not done in Council is as important as what is done. For if Council tries to do everything itself, to interfere with subordinate bodies for fear they may make errors, it will be incapable of providing the main framework of operations or of dealing properly with the great topics which come to it for decision. In other words, the practice of devolution is vital to the working of the chief body concerned with general policy. But while co-ordination is essential, we wish to abolish the notion that Council must seek the concurrence of subordinate bodies in the sense that there is a veto built into the administrative machinery. The chief administrative body must decide, and its decision must stand unless that decision is, on a matter of high importance and subject to conditions we outline below, negated on appeal to the sovereign body, Congregation. On this we say more when describing the relations between Council and the General Board and between Council and the colleges. But we wish in our draft statute for Council (see *Statutory Appendix*) to do away with the situation in which the view of Council about what matters should be put to Congregation has been determined partly by a purely formal requirement that any detail, however trivial, involving a statute must have statutory procedure applied, and partly by the self-protective sense of members of Council often apprehensive of the feelings of particular interests (see Chapter VI). In place of this shadowy—but large—discretion of Council, we recommend that the Hebdomadal Council should be established as the chief administrative body, which rules and governs under the clear mandate of the academic community.

505. We believe that the present size of Council 'is about right'. Its membership should be large enough to act as a microcosm of the whole body of Congregation. This we think can be adequately secured with about twenty-four members. The suggestion was put to us (for example, by Lord Heyworth—*Oral Evidence*, Part 5, p. 19; Lord Robbins—*Written Evidence*, Part XI, p. 178; and Sir Philip Morris—*Oral Evidence*, Part 2, p. 21) that there should be representatives from outside the University among the membership, both because there should be disinterested persons to participate in the responsibility for spending so much public money, and because the experience of suitable members from outside would help the University to take an objective view of its own performance. These are important points, but we think that Council in Oxford is much more active in the conduct of affairs than it can be in universities where much of the administration is in the hands of a 'permanent' Vice-Chancellor, and where the average membership of Council is about forty, two-thirds or more being lay members. It must be remembered that Council in Oxford meets

weekly in term and on certain occasions in vacation. While we propose changes in organization, these will not diminish the load on members of Council, and we do not see how the kind of person who could make a real contribution to Oxford could be expected to find the time required unless he happened to live here. Fortunately, the composition of the academic body at Oxford is always such that it contains a number of persons with wide experience and in constant touch with sources of opinion outside, and through such things as the Visiting Fellowships at Nuffield College regular contact is maintained with leaders in politics, in industry, and in the trade unions. In addition, we think it an important duty of the Vice-Chancellor to keep in continuous touch with what is thought and felt about Oxford beyond the confines of the University. As we have said in Chapter V, we fully agree with the view that universities must be seen to be using their funds properly and well: but we think that there is weight in the argument put to us by Council (*Oval Evidence*, Part 80, p. 38) that the University itself must take this responsibility. The democratic structure itself probably ensures that the conduct of business is carried on more in the public view than elsewhere, and our own proposals are designed to remove any real elements of the 'obscurity' alleged against Oxford in the Robbins Report (para. 687). For these reasons we do not propose the addition of lay members to Council, though we think that great benefit has been obtained in the past, and should continue to be got in the future, from the help of outside experts on some committees, for example on investment policy.

506. The possible exception to this is the right of the Chancellor to preside over Council; we assume that he would normally be content to work through the Vice-Chancellor rather than to attend Council himself. Nevertheless the examples of the Duke of Wellington and of Lord Curzon show that in a potentially explosive situation the Chancellor's titular position can be used to force the University to face the realities of the situation as he sees it from his uncommitted yet affectionate position.

507. We recommend that, as at present, eighteen of the twenty-four Oxford members of Council should be elected by the whole membership of Congregation. As our purpose is to set up a body which views university policy as a whole and plans the general shape of the future, it would be wrong to have a membership elected by constituencies shaped by interests. It must be left to the vigilance of Congregation, without which no scheme for democratic control has any hope, to see that the eighteen elected members do cover, though not in any proportional way, the main experience and interests of the community. But while we want the knowledge of needs and activities to be present, we want the members to act as representatives and not as delegates.

508. To be certain that Council can have continuity, which is essential for efficiency, we recommend that the members should, as at present, be

elected for six years on a system by which one-third of the seats come up for election every alternate year. Members must regard their duties as having a prior claim on their time and attention, and we recommend that they should be entitled to some relief from their other activities, if this is needed. But while continuity is important, so also is provision for change and the infusion of fresh blood. We therefore recommend that no person should be permitted to continue to serve as an elected member of Council after having served as a member (whether elected or *ex officio*) for twelve consecutive years; and no person who has served as a member for twelve consecutive years should be eligible to become an elected member until after a lapse of at least two years since the end of his period of twelve consecutive years of service. We recommend also that the present rule by which a member loses his seat if he fails to attend at least eighteen meetings in the year should continue in force, but with the proviso that it shall be in the discretion of Council to waive this rule when it feels that the experience a member gains during his absence is calculated to increase his usefulness to Council.

509. In addition to these eighteen elected members, we recommend that there should be certain *ex officio* members. Our reason is not that we in any way relax our desire to avoid representing interests, but that we believe that an *ex officio* membership is necessary for the co-ordination of the administrative machinery upon which Council's work as the chief organ depends. We therefore recommend that there should be six *ex officio* members: (i) the Vice-Chancellor; (ii) the Vice-Chancellor-designate on designation (see para. 541 below); (iii) the Vice-Chairman of the General Board; (iv) the Vice-Chairman of the Council of the Colleges (for this body see paras. 605 ff. below); (v) and (vi) the two Proctors for the year.* We prefer to co-ordinate by putting a member, such as the Vice-Chairman elected by the General Board, on to Council of right rather than to allow Council to nominate the Vice-Chairman of the General Board; the latter would seem to us to diminish the standing of the General Board. We are certain that it is necessary to provide for this overlap of persons; nor, if the electorate wanted it, should a further overlap of the membership of Council and of the General Board be absolutely prohibited. But we are strongly of the opinion that it is desirable to reduce the amount of overlapping in university bodies, which is one of the most striking features of the present system (Chapter VI). Such a reduction will not damage the working of the system provided first that the powers and relationships of the various boards are unmistakably stated, second that subordinate boards are allowed freedom to act without reference upwards within such clear powers, and third that the structure of service given to all boards by officials is improved. Our proposals to meet all three requirements will appear below. For the present

* See below (para. 637) for the abolition of the Assessor and the incorporation of the women's colleges and the graduate colleges and societies into a revised proctorial cycle.

it is enough to note that we do require the basic minimum of personal co-ordination implied in a small *ex officio* representation on Council.

510. Council must be large (twenty-four plus the Chancellor) in order to be sensitive to the currents of thought in the University. At first sight this would seem to meet the test of 'democracy' but to fail to meet the test of 'efficiency'. The large Council must have its necessary complement: a small General Purposes Committee the members of which are drawn from Council but are also leading members of the chief administrative bodies of the University. It should number not more than seven or eight: the Vice-Chancellor should be in the chair. It should be advisory, not executive. Its purpose is not to take decisions or to act, but to give the Vice-Chancellor a small, intimate, and informal body on which responsible and experienced men can discuss with him and with each other the problems before the University and argue out the directions in which to look for answers. Such a committee must exist if the large Council is to succeed in its essential work, the taking of large decisions on general policy in a coherent manner.

511. In practice over the last few years, as the Vice-Chancellor told us (*Oral Evidence*, Part 77, p. 27), there has come into existence an unofficial group of men of experience who have sat on the most important committees, have been on terms of particular confidence with one another, and have acted as an embryonic cabinet. We think that 'efficiency' and 'democracy' will both be served by bringing this body into the open, registering its membership, and making clear its functions. Such a General Purposes Committee will need to look ahead as well as to look around. We accept, nevertheless, the argument of the Vice-Chancellor, that a body of men brooding over policy but, as individuals, without executive responsibility, in a university as in national government, is likely to be ineffective or unrealistic (*Oral Evidence*, Part 79, p. 17). So this key committee must be drawn from those members of Council who hold important posts in the administrative machine.

512. We have said that the committee must be small to be effective. This body as it advises Council, is more likely to give continuity and direction to the University than any one man could do. But it must work under the chairmanship of the Vice-Chancellor of the day. We therefore recommend that there should be a General Purposes Committee of Council, and that the names of the members should be published in the *Gazette*, consisting of: (i) the Vice-Chancellor; (ii) the Vice-Chancellor-designate;* (iii) the Vice-Chairman of the General Board; (iv) the Vice-Chairman of the Council of the Colleges; (v), (vi), and (vii) three members of Council

* When there may be no Vice-Chancellor-designate (see para. 546 below), Council should elect one of its members to serve on the General Purposes Committee until such time as there is a Vice-Chancellor-designate.

appointed by the Vice-Chancellor. It is necessary that these last members should be appointed from Council by the Vice-Chancellor so that he can bring on to the committee men to whom he has delegated important areas of his administrative duty. We should expect, therefore, two to be Pro-Vice-Chancellors, one of whom no doubt would be the Pro-Vice-Chancellor specializing in the financial business of the central administration; but we would hope that the third would be one of the younger members of Council, because we should be sorry to see youth unrepresented on this committee, and also because the service would be an invaluable experience for a junior man.

513. Service on this committee would be arduous and must be given priority by its members. Apart from their regular duties in committee, the members would need to be available to all members of the University who desired to consult them about their ideas and plans. We are clear that members of the General Purposes Committee will have to be seconded from their regular duties for a part of their time. We do not wish to prescribe how much time, but rely on a convention being built up in colleges and departments to deal with the matter.

514. We should emphasize again that this General Purposes Committee is not envisaged as an action committee. Its business is to provide continuity in the discussion of policy, even with a changing Vice-Chancellor. Its members may belong to other committees which have power to act, but *qua* members of this body they are advisory only. For example, the power to decide urgent business when Council could not meet would lie not with the General Purposes Committee but with the Vice-Chancellor; he would probably feel it convenient to talk with members of the committee who were available, but the responsibility to Council, to the University, and to the public would be his and his alone.

515. Thus led and thus chosen, it is our belief that Council should be capable of solving the problems posed in para. 687 of the Robbins Report, provided that our other recommendations to the same end are also adopted. But it must be emphasized once more that a prerequisite of the ability to make good decisions on general policy and to exercise an effective control over their execution is to relinquish subordinate activity. In the recent past Council, in the praiseworthy desire to make an illogical constitution work, has developed activities on all fronts without economy of effort. It has not hesitated, for instance, to set up a committee to investigate in detail the need for reform in the supervision of postgraduates, though the Committee for Advanced Studies, under the General Board, had an obvious responsibility in this field (see discussion of this in *Oral Evidence*, Part 43, p. 8, and Part 77, p. 49). In other examples brought to our attention, Council has concerned itself in remedying deficiencies in the academic field, often working

by means of a joint committee with the General Board. Examples can be found in *Oral Evidence*, Part 77, p. 55, and Part 81, p. 4.

516. Our witnesses defended this. They also defended Council's receiving vast quantities of explanatory paper in order that it might at all times be aware of the back history and the practical operation of decisions which it might have to make. The defence did not carry conviction. It suggested to us that Council had been behaving like shock troops rushing from emergency to emergency. We want a Council which is more like a headquarters in general control of operations. The shock-troop approach must be wasteful of academic man-hours; it reduces the sense of responsibility in subordinate bodies; in the sea of paper the experienced man can no doubt navigate, but even he must have his capacity for clear-headed thought diminished.

517. Our view is, therefore, that Council in future should be in general charge of the administration, but should not normally concern itself with its detailed execution. It should receive from its subordinate bodies the summarized points which are necessary to make a decision on major principles. It should either decide and act, or, having made the principle clear, remit the actual decision to the subordinate bodies. It should leave the implementation of such general principles to the appropriate subordinate authority. This will, we hope, be made the easier when new statutes or decrees have more exactly defined the scope of such other bodies. The General Board, for example, must be left to decide the points of purely academic policy, provided it does so within the pattern for the University laid down by Council. Subordinate bodies should be allowed to learn from their own mistakes. Council should avoid the temptation to do things just because it believes it can do them better than other bodies; only so can it be free to do its proper work.

518. It follows from the concept of a chief administrative body that Council retains an over-riding control. It has the duty to interfere when there has been a real breakdown in administration; but even then it should not try to do the work, but only to repair the organization. Again it must check any body which has gone *ultra vires* or which, in the elaboration of a plan, in fact succeeds in altering the direction which Council has decided. But it must be careful, in its enthusiasm to keep its supporters on the right path, not to stray itself from the high ground from which it takes its general view. Nor, in its anxiety to prevent the intent of a statute being altered in the application, should it try to see all the papers of all the bodies all the time. Officials (see paras. 551 ff. below) should be used to prevent infractions of principle and, through the Registrar, to advise Council if things go wrong.

519. Similarly, Council must remain responsible for the exposition of the considered view of Oxford to the outside world if Oxford is to avoid the charge of speaking with too many discordant voices; but it should not therefore feel that it must be kept informed in detail, and hour by hour, of what is being done. It should once again rely upon the vigilance and good sense of its officials.

520. We emphasize these points because they are, in our view, essential if the system of academics governing themselves is to survive in modern conditions. Academic part-time service in running the University requires more rules of conduct to be successful than a bureaucratic system. Academic manpower is too valuable to waste on doing things twice over at different levels. What the Robbins Committee said (para. 676) of the Vice-Chancellor—'if he is to discharge such functions efficiently, he must not be overloaded with the detail of day-to-day administration'—applies also to the other academics in a university which wishes to spread responsibility widely.

521. It follows from these considerations that Council, while continuing to use its committees to get its work into shape for final decision, should take care that such committees do not overlap the work of regular subordinate bodies set up for regular purposes. Council supplied us with a list of its present committees—there were thirty-one: sixteen standing committees (including standing joint committees), seven consultative and advisory committees, and eight *ad hoc* committees. It is of great importance that Council should regularly go through the list of its own committees and eliminate all those which have become redundant or which trespass on the proper activities of other bodies. Further we recommend that Council should publish in the *Gazette* at the beginning of each Michaelmas Term, the list of its committees, their chairmen, and all their members so that all members of the University may be assisted in any approach they may wish to make to Council.

522. We recognize that in the machinery of government, as well as Council, the subordinate bodies, and their committees, there must be provision for joint committees between Council and other bodies; an example would be the Committee on Estimates and the Quinquennial Application (see paras. 619 ff. below) on which representatives from the General Board should sit with representatives from Council, because of the need to make plans for priorities in expenditure in which academic and general policies are simultaneously involved. We hope that Council, in considering other joint committees for *ad hoc* purposes, will always proceed from the assumption that no such committee should be appointed if the job can be done by Council fixing the general intent and leaving a subordinate body to work out details.

PART II. COUNCIL AND CONGREGATION

523. We have made it clear that Congregation should elect eighteen of the twenty-four members of Council. We think that, having done so, it should be content, in normal circumstances, to trust its representatives to run the administration of the University. We were given the impression by some witnesses that they felt there could not be too many checks upon the administration. We reject this argument. We propose that the operation of the sovereign power of Congregation should fall under six main heads: to elect members of Council and other main administrative bodies, to make, amend, or repeal statutes, to debate resolutions submitted by Council, to debate resolutions submitted from the floor, to ask questions, and to resolve disputes between major bodies of the administration.

524. *First*, Congregation should, as we have recommended in para. 507 above, elect eighteen of the twenty-four Oxford members of the Hebdomadal Council. This will give Congregation a decisive influence on the membership of the most important body of the University. It should also make other elections where, from the importance of the administrative bodies concerned, it seems desirable that the supreme authority should be directly represented.

525. *Second*, we recommend that Congregation alone should have the power to make statutes or to amend or repeal them. We also propose that in future the statutes of the University should deal only with matters of fundamental importance. In the past it has been almost a matter of custom which matters involved statutory action and which did not. As a result of this and of a clutter of rules and precedents about decrees, Congregation has been consulted about detail on which it was incompetent to pronounce, while its control over the fundamental issues has been obscured. The recent reform by which the business of Congregation is arranged under two heads, the one to be taken as agreed unless notice of objection has been given—the other comprising more important matters for possible debate, has certainly been useful. But we do not think this radical enough. It still leaves Congregation nominally responsible for business which should be dealt with by administrative bodies.

526. Statutes in future should deal with such matters as the establishment and terms of reference of Council, and of those subordinate bodies in university administration important enough to need statutory recognition, and thus a guarantee of their separate existence through an expression of the will of the whole University. Statutes will also be needed for the establishment of new societies and to deal with major questions of academic policy (e.g. the changing of the pattern of the Public Examinations, but not an examination syllabus). The general pattern of salary arrangements

would similarly need to be in statutory form. Statutes on these and similar matters would provide the general framework of university government and lay down its most important institutions. We give in the Statutory Appendix drafts of the statutes needed to establish the main administrative organs to which Congregation should assign the conduct of policy. In the future it should, by comparison with the corpus of statutes then in being, be possible to know which new matters merited statutory treatment and which should be regulated by a decree of Council without reference to Congregation. But with this as guidance it must be left to Council to decide whether a statute is required on any matter or not. It may be objected that this is to give a dangerous discretion to Council: what is to prevent an abuse of power by which Council would settle, without reference to Congregation, constitutional issues affecting the whole pattern of the life of the University? The answer is not only that the members of Council are elected and may be disciplined by the ballot box, but also that, if an issue of this sort did arise, there would be an emergency power of protest in the 'twenty-man resolution' in Congregation to which we shall come shortly (see para. 532 below).

527. Statutes then should be acts of Congregation which are concerned with the structure of Oxford. It follows from what has been said above that the translation of this structure into coherent provisions should not be the business of Congregation itself. The statutes we propose allow for power to issue rules and orders for the purposes set out in them. This delegated power would be exercised by Council in the issue of decrees. We reserve the use of the name 'Decree' for such rules issued by Council because of its obligation to administer in detail matters into which the 1,600 members of Congregation could not usefully enter. With the consent of Council, other bodies, such as the General Board and the faculty boards, would have power, on their own responsibility and without reference to Council, to use delegated power and to make 'Regulations'. Such decrees and regulations should be made and amended without reference back to Congregation. Only thus, we believe, can responsibility be properly fixed, and the machine given flexibility and speed of action. We therefore recommend that Council should be authorized by statute to make, amend, and repeal decrees, and to authorize other bodies to make, amend, and repeal regulations, giving detailed effect to the provisions of the statutes, provided that all such decrees and regulations are without force until published in the *Gazette*. We attach particular importance to this provision; it ensures effective communication with the democracy and safeguards the power to protest.

528. Day-to-day control will be exercised by the vigilance of the officials (see paras. 551 ff. below). Secretaries of committees will be charged with advising the members on procedure and with bringing to the attention of

the Registrar, and through him, if necessary, of the Vice-Chancellor, all decisions which they think go beyond the competence of the bodies concerned. The Vice-Chancellor then has responsibility before the whole academic body. This is not an empty phrase since, as we have said, decrees and regulations will have no effect until published in the *Gazette*. Any twenty members of Congregation could then demand a debate on any decree or order; and, though, as is set out in para. 532 below, we do not intend that any resolution passed in Congregation condemning an order should have mandatory force, it would obviously bring the whole matter sharply to Council's attention. In this way we believe that abuse of power can be prevented while giving to the administrative bodies the power of decision which the University needs.

529. An important aspect of the process of statutory enactment in Congregation is that Council should retain its initiative and the coherence of its policy. Council therefore should retain the exclusive power to propose statutes to Congregation. It would continue to act as agent for bodies such as the General Board when their work required any statutory change. Congregation could of course reject the statute. Congregation could also offer amendments to a statute: in this case Council would be free either to accept the amendment or to withdraw the measure for reconsideration. But Congregation's power in this respect is only to accept, to negative, or to suggest. It cannot push a form of statute, or an alteration in a statute, upon an unwilling Council and ask for it to be administered. We further recommend that no vote against a proposal of Council should be effective unless those voting against the proposal are in the majority and number at least seventy-five. This is not only a defensive mechanism against small pressure groups, but also a means of making the system more truly democratic. When an issue is important enough to be brought before Congregation and the considered plan of Council meets resistance, it is necessary that at least a quorum of the ordinary members of the University should hear the arguments and deliver a verdict. Experience in the last half century shows how difficult it has been to get any but partisans to attend Congregation. Votes have been small and the University has rarely spoken in any real sense (see list of votes in the seven years 1958-64 given in *Written Evidence*, Part XII, p. 5). In part this has been because many of the issues presented to Congregation have been either unsuitably complicated or trivial. But there seems to us to be a need to make sure that it is the University, and not just an interested section, which has power to halt Council's schemes. On the other hand, there is no need to require a minimum number of votes for an affirmation of what Council has maturely considered: here absence of opposition betokens assent. We also recommend that the veto of the Proctors in Congregation should be dropped; the notion that these officers should have the power to block—even temporarily—the plans of Council and to prevent their being put to Congregation

seems to us to be outdated and unnecessary. There is, however, a clear case for retaining the power of the Vice-Chancellor, or his deputy, to veto a statute—though in practice we think 'withdraw' would be more accurate; points may be made in debate which would make it desirable for Council to reconsider the matter before a vote is taken, or a technical error may be noticed at the last moment. In short, we recommend that Council alone should have the power to put legislation to Congregation. Congregation should have the power, provided those voting against the proposal of Council are in the majority and number at least seventy-five, to reject or amend a statute: Council should have the power either to accept the amendment or to treat the passing of the amendment as equivalent to the rejection of the statute.

530. *The third power of Congregation* is to debate resolutions submitted by Council. We recommend that, in order to test opinion in Congregation, Council may submit resolutions at any time, and should always do so in Michaelmas Term in connexion with a statement by the Vice-Chancellor on the general progress of the University. This is part of our programme to improve the system of communications in the University and to make democracy more effective through information. We appreciate the great improvements which Council has already brought in over the last two years by way of explanatory memoranda, reports, and so on (see *Oval Evidence*, Part 76, p. 26), but we wish to go still further in relation to the debates of Congregation. For example, the quinquennial application to the University Grants Committee, which is the master-plan which governs the life of the University, is prepared by Council in co-operation with the appropriate bodies in the University. It is then submitted by Council. Congregation as such is not involved, though every member of Congregation receives a copy of the application which has been made. We believe that the submission of the application should entail the necessity for Council to explain the broad lines of the plan to Congregation, and that there should then be a debate upon it. Congregation would be invited to pass a resolution approving the course charted for the future, with the opportunity to move amendments deploring the whole or parts of the plan. The passage of such hostile amendments would, on the principles already stated, not hold up the application but would influence the future thinking of Council. The object would be to involve Congregation in the activities of the administration and to reassure Council that its policies were in general understood and approved. A similar stated occasion for debate on a resolution should occur in the other years of the quinquennium. We consider therefore that the Vice-Chancellor should make a statement at the beginning of each academic year, reviewing progress, giving information on policy about future developments, and inviting Congregation to express its approval of the lines being followed. The change involved here is from the retrospective reports contained in speeches from the Vice-Chancellor

to an announcement of future intentions with the opportunity for debate and an expression of opinion.

531. In addition to such resolutions on stated occasions, we expect that Council would wish, and we believe it should be free, to move resolutions in Congregation as a preliminary to legislation, and sometimes, if in doubt, simply to test opinion; it might also desire to take the views of Congregation on long-term policy. A vote, though it would not be mandatory, could not fail to warn or to encourage Council.

532. *The fourth head* concerns resolutions moved not by Council, but from the floor. At present any six members of Congregation who give notice can initiate a debate on a resolution. If this resolution is carried, and has at least forty votes recorded in its favour, it becomes mandatory upon Council to introduce legislation in the sense resolved. Though, for reasons given already, we would remove the mandatory provision (see the Vice-Chancellor's opinion, *Oral Evidence*, Part 101, p. 7), we think that Congregation, as the supreme source of authority, must retain the right to express its opinion upon any subject of general interest in the running of the University. Moreover, as we have indicated several times in our argument, this power to move a resolution from the floor is the sanction to inhibit abuse of power in a system of delegated responsibility. We recommend that the moving of resolutions from the floor on matters concerning the policy or the administration of the University should be continued. They should be refused by the Vice-Chancellor if they deal with particular colleges or particular persons. The number of those required to launch such a debate should be raised from six to twenty.

533. *Fifthly*, the present system of questions (see *Statut. Tit. X, Sect. 1, § 9—Statuta, 1965, p. 305*) should remain in operation. It should be open, that is, for any two members of Congregation to submit questions to the Vice-Chancellor which at the next, or next but one, meeting of Congregation should receive an answer. We consider this power to ask questions is a spur, if such were needed, to encourage Council to keep Congregation adequately informed through the *Gazette* and by the moving of general resolutions in Congregation. The present discretion of the Vice-Chancellor to refuse to receive a question if it appears to him 'to be inadmissible in substance or in form' should also be continued. The sanction against an abuse of the Vice-Chancellor's discretion would be a twenty-member resolution condemning his conduct in office.

534. *The sixth heading* under which the revised powers of Congregation fall is the resolving of disputes among the major bodies in the administration. We propose that the General Board, the Council of the Colleges, and a

small number of other bodies should be established by statute in Congregation. We propose that their powers should be clearly defined and that Council should control them but should not do their work for them. We must face the possibility of deadlock in which Council ordered such a body to do something which it regarded as *ultra vires*: in the case of the General Board or the Council of the Colleges we should consider also the possibility of a major difference about policy in which the subordinate body felt a conscientious if not a constitutional repugnance to the instructions of Council. For most of such disputes within the administration we are content that the authority of Council should prevail. A deep-felt grievance would no doubt be ventilated in elections and by a twenty-man resolution from the floor. But we regard the province of the General Board and the historic rights of the colleges as so important that we believe a special procedure must be devised to meet the possibility of their having a disagreement with Council which does not yield to the normal methods of discussion and persuasion. We should expect that as a rule the disagreement would be resolved by special joint conference under the chairmanship of the Vice-Chancellor, but we must provide for the exceptional and intractable case. We therefore recommend that for the General Board and for the Council of the Colleges, and for them alone, there should be the right to require Council to put a point of difference to Congregation and that it should be decided there by vote. This decision in Congregation would be mandatory. It is essential therefore that the issue should be presented by Council, after consultation with the General Board or Council of the Colleges, in a form which permits only of a clear decision between alternatives, and amendments in Congregation should not be admissible. It is our hope that this provision would not, in fact, be required, but it is to be written into the constitution to make provision for a deadlock, should it arise.

535. We have drawn up the foregoing scheme because we are anxious to save Congregation from going the way in which Convocation has gone in the last century. We see signs, both in recent flurries of activity and in the more usual periods of quiescence, of Congregation ceasing to be a dignified or useful part of the present constitution. If things are left to go on as at present there must be a tendency to circumvent it on the issues of importance: its size prevents coherence, though it is an ideal theatre for the sort of controversy which attracts public attention detrimental to Oxford's reputation as a centre of learning and instruction. Yet Congregation, unrestricted as to membership among the teachers and researchers working in Oxford, seems to us to be the foundation upon which one of Oxford's qualities depends—the idea of a republic of equals, the spread of initiative and responsibility over all who teach or research. Our solution can be summed up as being a definition of the areas in which Congregation is competent to speak with cogency, sacrificing the trivial to retain the essential.

We believe it will mean a resurgence of the power of Congregation. Equally it will establish an administration which can meet the problems which increasingly press upon the University.

536. We think it essential that the new lines of demarcation between Council and Congregation (or put from another aspect, between statutes, decrees, and regulations) should be put into effect as quickly as possible. Until this reform has been effected, the other changes we propose for administration in the following pages cannot operate effectively. It is clear that, although the University has been increasing its ability to cope with the modern world (see Chapter VI) and a period of short resources, it has not been doing so quickly enough. If change must wait upon the revision of all the present statutes, it is likely to be too long delayed. We therefore propose a method by which the new system can be brought into speedy operation but which will yet allow for careful consideration to be given to the proper form for the laws of the University. In the Statutory Appendix we submit drafts of the new statutes needed for Congregation, the Hebdomadal Council, the General Board, and certain other matters. To these drafts we have appended a list of existing statutes obviously fundamental to the life of the University which do not appear to need drastic revision. We recommend that the University should adopt the statutes in the Appendix as its only statutes (in the new definition) for the time being, and that those of the present statutes which are not made obsolete by our recommendations should be deemed to have become decrees (also in the new definition) of the Hebdomadal Council. In consequence they would remain operative, but could be revised or abolished by an administrative act of Council. It may well be that in its perusal of these 'decrees' Council would find that we had failed to include in the statutory list some which were important enough to be restored to the class of statutes: these it would then bring to Congregation for enactment. The advantage of this proposal is that it enables the new system of administration to begin operating soon but allows, at the same time, for a considered perusal of existing legislation.

537. Two other matters of detail need to be mentioned. First, there will have to be a special class of statutes dealing with amendments of trusts. These are not concerned with the structure of Oxford, and so do not come within our new definition of statutes; but it would require an Act of Parliament to enable the University to amend trusts other than by statute in Congregation. Second, there is the question of the provision for the granting of degrees. The decision to confer a Degree by Diploma or an Honorary Degree, in as much as it is a public declaration of the judgement of the whole University, should take place in Congregation. It should be conferred by a Special Act of Congregation. Ordinary degrees also should be conferred by Congregation, and no longer by the Ancient House of Congregation.

PART III. COUNCIL AND THE VICE-CHANCELLOR

538. It will be clear from our earlier paragraphs, that Council, as the chief administrative body, should both interpret the feelings of Congregation and, with the help of its General Purposes Committee, act as the leader of university opinion. The key figure in its work, as administrator, planner, and spokesman, must be the Vice-Chancellor.

539. We have already said that we felt the force of the arguments which we have heard for a 'permanent' Vice-Chancellor. We believe nevertheless that we can meet these critics as effectively by the reformed administration we propose as by giving the Vice-Chancellor tenure to retirement. We have also considered the solution put to us by Mr. B. B. Lloyd, of a Vice-Chancellor with short tenure and a Principal with a longer term of appointment (*Written Evidence*, Part IV, p. 117). We believe we can secure the continuity in planning and policy by means more consonant with the principles of Oxford life. Incidentally, in our proposals we have also had to face the problem of how the Vice-Chancellor's burden could be made bearable (see quotation from the Robbins Report in para. 492 above). Though we have rejected the idea of a life-tenure for the Vice-Chancellor, we are agreed, and in this we have the supporting views of the majority of colleges replying to our questionnaire (see *Written Evidence*, Part XIII), that the present term of two years is too short. The question is how long should it be?

540. The weight of evidence we received suggested that the term must be long enough to enable a man to use the instrument we have designed for him. But it must not be so long that he becomes remote from the interests of academic life: nor that, with his nominees on the General Purposes Committee, he becomes fixed in his ideas. Here the problem is to balance continuity in policy against the need, experienced by the best of organizations, for periodic rejuvenation. A man must feel the encouragement of bringing at least some of his plans to fruition. But the tenure should not be so long that there would be nothing for him but retirement when he ceased to be Vice-Chancellor; that would put too heavy a premium on age. We have reached the conclusion that the minimum period for the tenure of the Vice-Chancellorship is four years. We realize that the complete withdrawal of the man selected for such a period involves heavy sacrifice on the part of the college or department from which he comes, but we believe that this is a sacrifice which Oxford should make to preserve its democratic and collegiate structure. We should also make it clear that we do not believe that a period of four years would be enough to secure continuity of policy and its execution without the reinforcement of the Vice-Chancellor by the clear definition of Council as in general charge of a reformed administration of Oxford. Equally important is the role of its

General Purposes Committee, the enlarged responsibilities of the Registrar and the chief officials, and the provision we make for the selection and training in advance of the Vice-Chancellor-designate. But we believe that such reinforcement is adequate in our plan. We can therefore achieve our aim of keeping the tenure of the Vice-Chancellor to the minimum. We recommend that the tenure of the Vice-Chancellorship should be four years.

541. We recommend further that the Vice-Chancellor's successor should be designated at least two years before the end of the reigning Vice-Chancellor's term of office. The Vice-Chancellor-designate would serve *ex officio* on Council and on the General Purposes Committee of Council. His early designation would ensure that continuity of experience necessary for the central administration of the University.

542. We also recommend that no one having served as Vice-Chancellor for a four-year term should be re-eligible, except in emergency as provided for in para. 546 below. We do not consider that it is necessary to provide for the removal of a Vice-Chancellor who became incapable of acting. We rely upon the General Purposes Committee to tell a stricken Vice-Chancellor when it was necessary for him to retire or to approach the Chancellor in an extreme case. We also recommend that the Vice-Chancellorship should be regarded as a full-time job with his whole salary paid by the University. It may be difficult, but it would certainly be necessary, to provide him with an official house if he has no suitable lodgings which could be used for university purposes. He must be completely free from all other duties, and his previous salary should be used to pay for those who would be performing those duties in his stead.

543. The field of candidates for the Vice-Chancellorship should be widened: we have noticed that there is support for this from the colleges (see *Written Evidence*, Part XIII). It should no longer be confined to heads of colleges. Nor should there be any conventional system of rotation as at present. We therefore recommend that any member of Congregation should be eligible for selection as Vice-Chancellor provided that he would not be over the age of 61 at the time when he would enter office as Vice-Chancellor.

544. The Vice-Chancellor should be chosen by those who have personal experience of the work of Council: the choice should be approved by the whole academic community, for this is the most important of all the elections which the University will make. Paradoxically, at present it is the one choice in which the University has no voice, for it allows seniority and the judgement of other bodies, looking for other qualities, to govern the destiny of the second office in the University. One method we have

considered would be to let Council choose a man, or two men, and give Congregation a veto or the right to opt for one of the two. Another method would be to require the General Purposes Committee to put forward names for Council's judgement with a final approval by Congregation. The difficulty we see in the first of these is that members of Council might become too concerned about the problems of the succession and eye one another as rivals rather than colleagues. To think of a college governing body compelled to elect a new head every four years is not an encouraging comparison. An additional objection to the second suggestion is that it might lead to the creation of too tight a 'magic ring', since nearly half the membership of the General Purposes Committee will have been nominated by the Vice-Chancellor.

545. We have come to the conclusion that there should be a special nominating committee to designate the incoming Vice-Chancellor. The reigning Vice-Chancellor should be its chairman. We are clear that Council should be represented on it: its members have the experience of the central administration necessary to measure the capacities of a candidate against the requirements of the job. But we also think it wise that the wider opinion of the University and colleges should be represented. We therefore recommend that, under the Vice-Chancellor, the committee should be composed of six representatives of Council and the six most recent ex-Proprietors who are still members of Congregation. The ex-Proprietors would represent the voice of Congregation and the colleges. We recommend that this nominating committee should submit a name to Council which should make the formal submission to the Chancellor, and that the Chancellor should then send this, 'his', nomination, to Congregation. We think it is enough that Congregation should then approve the nomination. We also recommend that the Vice-Chancellor-designate should be nominated in the same way. In an exceptional situation it should be possible, for Congregation, as Convocation did in 1839 and 1844, to debate approval or disapproval of a Chancellor's nomination, such a debate being purely negative in that no alternative candidate could be put forward and the rejection of the name contained in the Chancellor's message could only result in the Chancellor's having to consult Council and decide what should be done. This would, of course, be unlikely ever to arise. A legal opinion in 1844 was that Convocation had no right to reject the nomination: the vote nevertheless was taken—882 for acceptance, 183 against. This was under the old constitution: we recommend that for the future Congregation's powers should be made clear.

546. We have said that the Vice-Chancellor-designate must be chosen at least two years before he takes office as Vice-Chancellor. We do not know what the University will find to be the best practice. It may be that a convention of appointing three or four years before the due date will become

established; or the minimum we have recommended may become standard. In any case there is the possibility of the Vice-Chancellor dying or becoming incapacitated in mid-term. We have not made special provision for this happening but assume that the University would call on some experienced person such as an ex-Vice-Chancellor to meet the emergency, while a designate successor was being trained.

547. We have already quoted the passage in the Robbins Report (see para. 492 above; see also Appendix Four, Part I, of the Robbins Report) which emphasizes the multifarious and arduous duties of a Vice-Chancellor; that description applies to Oxford as to all universities. Despite the difficulties, if the Vice-Chancellor cannot represent Oxford effectively, it is likely to suffer in competition with other institutions of higher learning. One of our main purposes in recommending changes in the administration is to secure that the Vice-Chancellor will not be so over-burdened with detail that he cannot give sufficient time and effort to important matters.

548. The Vice-Chancellor should be involved in all discussions of broad policy both inside Oxford and with the University Grants Committee. He must therefore be the *ex officio* chairman of all the major bodies (e.g. the General Board and the Council of the Colleges) as well as of the committees of Council, and must have the right to take the chair at any meeting of any university committee. He should have his hand on the main administrative bodies of the University and his eye on the rest. His presence is required at some of the grand ceremonial functions of the University. He should play a full part on the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals in a way which has unfortunately been impossible in the past. He should participate in the academic discussions of the Commonwealth, of Europe, and of the English-speaking world. Fund-raising from private sources should take up more of his time in the future than in the past. He must have time to talk with the world of Whitehall and that of business. Equally he should be available for informal discussion when his academic colleagues need his assistance. The problem is clearly how to enable him to find time for all this and yet to be able to mature his own ideas.

549. Some part of the way that he can be relieved has already been indicated in our exposition of the idea of a General Purposes Committee of Council (manned in part by nominees of the Vice-Chancellor) the members of which can carry part of his burden. He may obtain further relief by acting upon the maxim that he ought not to attend committees where a deputy can deal with the routine work in the chair. In general, the Vice-Chancellor should attend the committees of which he is *ex officio* chairman only when a topic of major importance is likely to need his authority to direct the discussion, or when something has gone seriously wrong and he must put it right. Part of the purpose of having his Pro-Vice-Chancellors on the

General Purposes Committee is to relieve him of business. The Pro-Vice-Chancellors should regard their work as a major and prior claim on their time. They must be in a position to act effectively as deputies for the Vice-Chancellor.

550. We assume that in all future arrangements the Vice-Chancellor will be provided with rooms and appropriate personal and secretarial assistance. The structure of service by university officials must also be strengthened. For upon this depends the ability of the Vice-Chancellor to make himself felt, his capacity to think ahead and to give a lead without having continually to submerge himself in paper or exhaust himself at meetings.

PART IV. THE OFFICIAL SERVICE

551. We have been given a vivid picture by Sir Douglas Veale (*Written Evidence*, Part XI, p. 200) and by Sir Foliott Sandford (*Written Evidence*, Part IX, p. 1) of the way in which the present official services have developed out of the primitive state of thirty years ago; we have been impressed by the improvements they have brought to the conduct of affairs, in conditions which have usually been unfavourable to any coherent consideration of simple administrative principles. We believe that the old unreflective Oxford fear of an efficient official service is ridiculous. The value of an efficient civil service in a university is that it makes it possible, even with a complicated structure, to practise democratic control by academics of the policies that shape their environment.

552. This principle is clearly illustrated by the argument about devolution. If we desire to let scholars make decisions in the fields of policy which most closely concern their working lives, we must give subordinate committees powers to act within those policies. But if these bodies, acting freely, are to keep in any sort of relation to one another, as they must, then there must be an over-all pattern of organization, and there must also be methods of checking the temptation to go *ultra vires*. This should be done by the full use of officials advising the committees, these officials belonging to one central organization so that information passes quickly within it. It is easier to keep two committees in step when each is served by a competent official than by multiplying academic 'overlappers', and it conserves academic time. But it in no way diminishes the power of the academics to control policy, provided that the scope and competence of each committee is clearly defined and the membership has a reasonable continuity. These are platitudes, but in Oxford they have often been disregarded.

553. Officials, of the sort we are discussing, should do more than the basic secretarial duties of keeping the minutes and helping to form an agenda. They should be expected to inform and to advise in the course of the

meetings they attend. But they should not vote: nor is the responsibility for decision theirs. We are also certain that some of the business which at present goes for decision to committees should not go there at all. We would think it proper for committees to decide what rules they want to have, for instance, for sabbatical leave or for the payment of non-academic staff; but we think that the decision of where a particular case fits under such schemes should not go to a committee but should be decided by officials. In case of doubt, the official would be expected to consult the chairman of his committee, who, unless the case falls outside the rules, should decide, reporting his decision, if of sufficient importance, at the next meeting of the committee. The secretary of a committee, supported by his chairman, can usually deal with most of the detail, thereby saving academics from acting as clerks; they waste less time because at their meetings they can address themselves to the important points.

554. We recommend that under the Vice-Chancellor as head of the administration there should be a single secretariat responsible for supplying the administrative services required by the central administration of the University. This secretariat should be under one man, directly responsible under the Vice-Chancellor for the efficient organization and running of these services. All other officials of the central secretariat would be under him as their head: existing exceptions to this principle should be removed. The senior officials in charge of the main departments of the central administration would continue to be responsible for providing the services required and would receive instructions in the normal way from the committees and the chairmen they serve. They would be responsible for keeping the head of the administrative services informed and would report to him whenever it seemed likely that difficulties or inconsistencies in the central administration would occur. The operation of a united service on these lines is essential to provide continuity and coherence in the working out of policy and to ensure its orderly execution. The importance of securing continuity of this kind through officials has already been recognized in the University, as practice has evolved beyond the written constitution. The Vice-Chancellor, speaking on behalf of Council, told us (*Oral Evidence*, Part 79, p. 60): 'In the way in which we work it we have continuity in the whole conduct of the policy right through. It is not provided by the Vice-Chancellor: it is provided by the chief officials.'

555. At present the Registrar is, under the Vice-Chancellor, the senior official. Our recommendation is that he should become the head of a unified secretariat. We have therefore considered whether it is appropriate that he should continue to be called the Registrar. The evolution of his responsibilities and duties have already made the title something of a misnomer. But the Vice-Chancellor told us that both in Oxford and in the university world people knew what the Registrar did and that he thought it 'better

to have a man whom you call Registrar and allow to behave like a Principal' (*Oral Evidence*, Part 79, p. 64). On the whole we think it unnecessary to change the title, provided that it is clearly understood that it is retained for historic reasons and does not indicate the scope or responsibilities of the office.

556. As the senior university official and head of the secretariat, the Registrar has important duties. Working under and with the Vice-Chancellor he is his confidential adviser: in this capacity he can exercise initiative. The Vice-Chancellor, speaking for Council, told us (*Oral Evidence*, Part 79, p. 60): 'Under the present régime most of the initiative for conducting the business and bringing it up and dealing with it at this stage comes from the Registrar. . . . This arises from the fact that the Registrar is head of the machine which is getting it ready and bringing it up. . . . The advisory-initiative side is very much developed, and is essential.' He is the secretary of Council, but he has also become its continuing adviser, expected to offer an opinion or to make a suggestion, though not to decide or vote. He has also come to be recognized as the regular adviser of people in the University holding responsible academic positions: they have come to turn to him first on their problems (*Oral Evidence*, Part 79, pp. 59-65). The Registrar has, of course, many other duties, but it is in these ways that, to use the words of the Vice-Chancellor quoted in the preceding paragraph, he behaves as a Principal. We recommend that such behaviour should be recognized as proper to the post of the Registrar in Oxford, and should be expected of its holder. We also recommend that similar behaviour should be expected of the other officials of this unified secretariat: they should become advisers of the chairmen of the committees they serve; they should exercise initiative, working with their chairmen, in the preparation and conduct of business; they should act as advisers, free to speak and suggest, but not to vote, on the committees.

557. We further recommend that under the Registrar there should be four senior officials at the head of the main divisions of the work. These should be:

- (i) The Secretary for Administration, his duties being to be the record keeper, to see to establishment questions, and to provide a secretary for the Council of the Colleges as well as to organize the secretarial services of subordinate committees.
- (ii) The Secretary of Faculties serving the General Board and, through junior secretaries, co-ordinating the activities of academic boards and committees. He should also provide a secretary for the Senior Tutors' Committee.
- (iii) The Secretary of the Chest Committee of Council (for this see paras. 623 ff. below), doing the work in the accounting and financial field which he does at present for the Chest, but working, as at the

moment he does not, to the Registrar. He should be prepared to provide, if requested, a secretary for the Bursars' Committees. He should also be the accounting officer for the whole service, and in that capacity have direct access to the Vice-Chancellor.

- (iv) The Surveyor to the University, whose work we would not wish to change, but whom we would also bring under the Registrar.

558. We think that there should be a Deputy Registrar so that, if the Registrar is incapacitated or dies, there is someone who can take over his duties immediately. In a comparatively small organization such as the central secretariat, there is no need to appoint a person simply as Deputy Registrar. It is sufficient if the Vice-Chancellor appoints one of the four senior officials as also Deputy Registrar. But it is important that this should be done regularly and formally, so that everyone knows who takes over in case of emergency. We so recommend.

559. The Registrar and the four senior officials should be regarded as professorial status and therefore entitled to professorial fellowships in colleges. We recommend that they should all be appointed by the Hebdomadal Council, after consultation with the General Board in the case of the Secretary of Faculties. We recommend that the appointment of other administrative officers in the central secretariat should be approved by the Vice-Chancellor. We expect that there will be a number of senior officials, in addition to the five already provided for, who can perform their duties with maximum efficiency only if they have the contacts with university life which are derived from membership of a college governing body. We recommend that the Hebdomadal Council and the Council of the Colleges should consider cases on their merits and agree which of the officials should, in the interest of the service, be recommended for election to a college.

560. We now refer to two posts immediately below the heads of the main departments. Council told us, while our inquiry was proceeding, that it intended to appoint an Information Officer. This officer should be placed under the Secretary for Administration. Another new post, that of Chief Statistical Officer, is needed, and he would also serve under the Secretary for Administration.

561. There are at present university officers serving committees which supervise important activities: Bodley's Librarian, the Secretary of the Bodleian Library, the Keeper and the Secretary of the Ashmolean Museum, the Secretary to the Delegates for Extra-mural Studies, the Secretary to the Appointments Committee, the Secretary to the Delegates of Lodgings, and the administrative officers in various departments and institutions. We recommend that Council should examine these administrative arrangements. It is obvious that the work done by these officers differs in kind.

That of Bodley's Librarian is both academic and administrative while that of the Secretary to the Delegacy for Lodgings is administrative. In the first type of case it is important that there should be close liaison between the officers and the central secretariat and, if it does not already exist, Council should make provision for it. In cases of the second type it is the business of Council to bring them within the central secretariat. It should not allow separate administrations to proliferate.

562. Effective thought about academic policy, as the Robbins Report pointed out (para. 805 and Appendix Four, Part II), is possible only if there is adequate knowledge of the statistical facts. If Oxford is to apply to the University Grants Committee with cogent support for its requests, if it is to answer inquiries made by public authorities, if it is to judge the consequences of its own policies, a regular service of statistical information is indispensable. We have ourselves found that, in order to make judgements about what was going on or should be going on, we needed information which simply was not available. We have had to collect this information for ourselves; it is summarized in our Statistical Appendix.

563. In the past a considerable amount of statistical information has indeed been assembled. But it has been done unsystematically and unprofessionally. Unless there are accurate and accepted definitions of terms used (e.g. 'in residence') the information which emerges is difficult to use. To take a typical example, in *Gazette*, vol. xcv, p. 267, the figure given as the number of students in residence in Michaelmas Term 1963 was greater than the number given on p. 269 as the number that had been in residence at any time in the academic year 1963-4. It is impossible to expect all colleges and university bodies to co-operate in producing information until they are given expert guidance. Energy put into the collection of information of doubtful value is being used badly.

564. Only if statistical information on such subjects as students and staff, emoluments, the pattern of teaching, and the nature of applications for admission are regularly collected by the University, will it be able to make forecasts for its own purposes. It will also be able to meet the regular or exceptional demands of the University Grants Committee and other bodies without a flurried inquiry having to be specially undertaken. This will mean that the colleges should submit information in a standard form or allow the central statistical office to collect it. University examining boards will also have to make their reports in an agreed form. The bodies who have to produce this information will find they are more than repaid for their labour when they need the statistical service as consumers.

565. We are content to make the case for a university statistical office under a qualified official in terms of its utility to the university administration and

to the colleges. It will be for this officer to ensure that figures supplied by Oxford can be compared with those supplied by other universities. The constant need 'to except Oxford and Cambridge from general statements about British universities' was one of the criticisms made in para. 637 of the Robbins Report. Sometimes this exclusion is right; we have no desire to change Oxford's system of democratic government, for instance, in order to make general statements about university government easier. But on such matters as statistics, Oxford should conform whenever it reasonably can. We therefore recommend that a Chief Statistical Officer be appointed to the department of the Secretary for Administration, with the duty, under the Registrar and Council, of setting up a comprehensive statistical service; and that he be given such powers, in co-operation with bodies such as the Admissions Office, to institute surveys, or to prescribe the form in which information is provided, as may be necessary to provide a service which is efficient in itself and is an effective instrument of university policy.

PART V. THE MAIN ACADEMIC BODIES OF THE UNIVERSITY

566. The new structure of official organization and the creation of a statistical service are intended to make possible the government of the University by the teaching masters. The administrative pattern will remain government by committees composed largely of men who have a full-time job elsewhere. It follows that the committees should always be kept small, that duplication must be eliminated, paper circulation kept to a minimum, and overlapping of membership reduced. These virtuous resolves are difficult to fulfil in administrative work concerning things purely academic.

567. The key point to get right, and it has been wrong in the past, is the General Board. We have been impressed by the weight of evidence which we have received (see, for example, the evidence of recent Proctors and Assessors—Miss Banister, Miss Kemp, Mr. Lloyd, Dr. McLeod, and Dr. Whitman—*Written Evidence*, Part IX; and the replies from the board itself, referred to below) to the effect that the General Board, as it now functions, is overloaded with matters of detail, is not regarded by the University or by its own members as taking the position which it ought to do, and does not give a clear lead in matters where it should be its duty to do so. In some cases Council has found it expedient to take the lead, although the matters were obviously in the province of the board (see para. 517 above), and we cannot escape the conclusion that this was because Council had doubts about the effectiveness of the board.

568. In its own evidence (*Written Evidence*, Part I, p. 12) the board told us that it did not consider it to be its function to tell faculty boards 'to do things they are not doing, or to stop doing things they are doing, or, to ask them to account for their activities within the spheres which are statutorily

delegated to them'. It argued that this was partly because of 'the volume and complexity of the matters brought before it by faculty boards' and also that shortage of funds prevented it thinking about 'the deliberate stimulation of particular lines of development'. In its evidence on constitutional matters (*Written Evidence*, Part XII, p. 22), the General Board showed that it thought of itself either as considering matters brought up to it from faculty boards, or as passing on to them questions raised 'from outside the University', and thus exercising little independent initiative.

569. We recommend that under Council the General Board should be the chief academic administrative body of the University, independent in that it has charge of academic activities inside Oxford but dependent upon Council for the general framework within which it operates. It is also for Council to weigh academic with financial and other proposals and to present them to the University Grants Committee and to the outside world. The General Board will send to Council its proposals for a major change in direction or for a major new departure as these arise. As a regular link it will have its Vice-Chairman, freely chosen by itself, who will sit *ex officio* not only on Council but also on the General Purposes Committee of Council; other members may, of course, be elected to Council. The other link is the Vice-Chancellor himself, *ex officio* Chairman of the General Board. We should expect him to attend the General Board on all important occasions. But we regard the Vice-Chairman of the General Board as the second academic official of the University. We are clear that his should be a full-time post and that it should be adequately remunerated by the University; we recommend accordingly. Apart from his immediate duties as Vice-Chairman and as a member of Council and of its General Purposes Committee, it will be his business, working closely with the Secretary of Faculties as his adviser, to give a lead in the organization of the academic life of the University, just as the Vice-Chancellor, working with the Registrar, does in its general business. He must be chairman of all the main committees of the board, and he must be continuously available for advice and consultation to the chairmen of the faculty boards and the heads of departments and institutions. If on matters of importance the General Board is unable to agree with Council, it will be able in the last resort to insist that Council asks Congregation to decide between them (see para. 534 above).

570. We do not believe that the General Board can ever fulfil its proper duty if it is a battleground for conflicting interests. It must have initiative and be capable of planning ahead with the skill of men who understand the points of view of sectional groups but are not committed to them. This at once raises the question of its size. To formulate policies it should be small, for only thus can it become an effective partnership of minds. But it also must possess the confidence of the whole range of academic interests, which

suggests a large and comprehensive board. Congregation has recently—and in our view mistakenly (such a move was also condemned in advance by the Royal Commission of 1922—para. 70)—moved in the direction of a larger board because it has wanted to put more representatives of interests on it. We feel that the arguments in favour of a small gathering of wise men are more powerful than those for making certain that every interest is represented—which is not the same thing as being heard. The present General Board, when it has to make its division of money among the clamant customers, which involves having a picture of the needs of the whole, does in fact remit this task to a small committee, and it rarely upsets the decisions of these 'wise men'. But there is a practical limit to the diminution of its numbers. Much of its work must be done in committees. Even though these committees, as will appear later, should in our view be manned in part by selected persons not members of the board itself, there must be members of the General Board on them to co-ordinate the work. The smaller the board, the greater the strain of committee work upon its members, until the point is reached at which they have very nearly become full-time administrators.

571. Bearing all these factors in mind, we recommend that the General Board should consist of the Vice-Chancellor, one Proctor nominated by the Vice-Chancellor, ten elected members, and up to two co-opted members. This should give sufficient breadth of interest and yet enable the board to develop a sense of unity. All the members of the General Board except the Vice-Chancellor, the Proctor, and the two co-opted members should be elected, and the appointments by Council and the Chest, and the *ex officio* membership of the second Proctor and of the next or last Vice-Chancellor should cease. The co-ordination which this was designed to effect will, under our scheme, be better achieved by a clear definition of functions, by the advice from the official side of the Secretary of Faculties, and most of all by the strengthened position of the Vice-Chairman.

572. We propose below (paras. 585 ff.) a new organization of the academic life of the University by faculty boards and sub-faculty boards. The feature of this plan for the present purpose is that it divides studies into five big faculties. We recommend that each of these five new faculties should elect two members to the General Board. On balance, we believe it will be best to have the election by members of Congregation divided into constituencies corresponding to membership of these faculties: it does not matter that this will give a few people plural votes. We considered having only five members of the General Board elected in this direct way and having the other five indirectly elected either by allowing the new faculty boards each to nominate one member or by making their chairmen members *ex officio*. Though this would increase the co-ordination between the General Board and the new faculty boards, we have, after some hesitation, rejected it on

two grounds, first that it would put too much work on the five who had this double membership, and second that it would tend to suggest once more the representation of interests. Co-ordination can be better secured by inviting chairmen or other members of faculty boards to attend meetings of the General Board or of its committees, or by making them members of its committees, whenever appropriate. Indeed, we consider that direct dialogue of this kind, supplemented by informal discussions with the Vice-Chairman of the General Board, should become normal practice; as a means of communication, it is not only quicker and less tedious than the exchange of memoranda—it is much more effective.

573. We also considered the possibility of having five members elected by the faculties and the other five by Congregation at large; but this we rejected because, though we do not want representation of interests, it is clearly necessary to ensure that the General Board adequately reflects the range of studies of the University. This is one of the reasons why we are recommending that the board should be allowed to co-opt up to two members; it could happen that the General Board found itself with a gap in the experience and knowledge possessed by its members too wide to be conveniently filled by *ad hoc* consultation. The other reason for this recommendation is that circumstances could arise in which none of the ten elected members was suitable or willing to take on the much larger and quite different job of being Vice-Chairman; we think it important that the General Board should be able to choose the man it considers best fitted, so that we would allow the General Board to choose its Vice-Chairman from outside its elected members if it wished. These are, however, the only reasons for the recommendation. It is designed to enable the General Board to strengthen itself if it feels the need; it is not designed to enable the influence of Council on the board to be *de facto* increased by the establishment of a tradition that the co-opted places are always filled by nominees of the Vice-Chancellor.

574. We also recommend that the elected members of the General Board should hold their seats for four years, but that there should be biennial elections with half the seats coming up at each election, so that in the first setting-up of the board half the members would hold office for two years only; the co-opted members should hold their seats for such periods as the board determines; members should be eligible to serve, whether as elected or co-opted or a combination of the two, for up to eight continuous years, after which they should cease to be eligible until two years have elapsed; and they should have such relief as they may need from their normal duties. We also recommend that the Vice-Chairman be elected every other year (after the elections to the General Board), but should be re-eligible for the office without limitation so long as he continues to be a member—elected or co-opted—of the board. Further, in view of his other

ex officio functions and his need to be kept in touch not only with other administrative bodies but also with current opinion by being available to anyone who wants to approach him on academic matters, we recommend that the Vice-Chairman should be provided with an office and relieved of all his ordinary academic duties.

575. The General Board would naturally set up such committees as it felt necessary. But we think that there are six committees which it must have for the proper execution of its duties. Some of these should be committees in which non-members of the General Board would play a large part and on which General Board members might be a minority—though there should never be less than two members from the General Board and the committees would be under the board's control. These committees should be authorized to co-opt temporary members *ad hoc* in the course of their work, and should feel that it was a part of their duty to interview other persons concerned with a topic which might be under discussion. Direct dialogue might save a great deal of time at present spent in paper-work. We recommend, then, and have made the necessary provision in the draft General Board statute in the Statutory Appendix, that there should be six statutory committees of the General Board, namely:

- (i) the Finance and Appointments Committee;
- (ii) the Committee on Research;
- (iii) the Committee on Undergraduate Studies;
- (iv) the Committee on Postgraduate Studies;
- (v) the Committee on Libraries;
- (vi) the Committee on Extra-mural Activities.

576. *The Finance and Appointments Committee.* The functions of this committee would include those of the present Finance Committee of the General Board in drawing up the annual budget of the General Board and in subsequently allocating the sum made available to the General Board by the Committee on Estimates and the Quinquennial Application (see paras. 619-21 below). This work will, however, be heavier than before in that we recommend in para. 580 below that the Bodleian Library, the Ashmolean Museum, and the Taylor Institution should in future be financed through the General Board. The committee would also be responsible for all the other financial and staffing problems of the academic scene. Its membership should be exclusively from members of the General Board.

577. *The Committee on Research.* This committee would exist to facilitate the advancement of knowledge. It would distribute money allocated to research by the Estimates and Quinquennial Application Committee, making grants and providing other assistance as means allowed. It would deal with applications for help from the Trustees of the Higher Studies Fund. It would be the place where general questions of the balance of

research activities in the University would be discussed, and would encourage new subjects of interest, while discouraging lines that had become obsolescent. The committee would be the proper place for the consideration in their academic context of 'take-overs' of research units, and it would be the body authorizing university support for major applications for funds from research councils and other grant-giving bodies (see para. 290 above). It would also take ultimate responsibility for the annual report on the research activities of the University (see para. 292 above).

578. *The Committee on Undergraduate Studies.* This has no counterpart at present. But it seems to us necessary that the General Board should have such a committee in which the issues of the kind raised in the Kneale Report would be under continuous review. It would also have responsibility for all questions involving examination standards and the appointment of examiners for first degrees. It would work closely with the Council of the Colleges and the Senior Tutors' Committee. Problems of discipline in examinations would, however, remain with the Proctors, and the appointment of individual examiners would remain with the present nominating committees.

579. *The Committee on Postgraduate Studies.* This committee would have all the work of the present Committee for Advanced Studies, and would deal with questions such as those raised by the expansion of postgraduate numbers and the reform of supervision. Instructions would be framed and issued in the form of regulations for all the faculty boards and sub-faculty boards to observe. This committee would also be concerned with the outlines of an admissions policy, and would discuss policy in which the colleges and the Senior Tutors' Committee would be involved.

580. *The Committee on Libraries.* We have had overwhelming evidence of the need to look at the library provision as a whole (see, for example, *Written Evidence*, Part II, p. 49; Part IV, pp. 144 and 178; Part XI, pp. 72, 90, and 117; and Part XIV, p. 34; and *Oral Evidence*, Parts 52, 69, and 83). It seems to us ridiculous that library problems should be separated from those of academic policy generally. The General Board is clearly the body which should take over responsibility for this indispensable part of learning. We recommend therefore that the system by which the Bodleian, the Ashmolean, and the Taylorian have been Direct-Grant departments should be ended. The Ashmolean and Taylorian are not simply or even primarily libraries; they are academic institutions and so should be financed through the General Board. What we say in the remainder of this section applies only to their libraries. Their needs and those of other libraries would be co-ordinated by the Committee on Libraries, and then considered along with the claims of other academic activities by the Finance and Appointments Committee of the General Board and by the joint committee of

Council and the General Board on Estimates and the Quinquennial Application to which we refer in paras. 619-21 below. We recommend that the total block grant for libraries should be allocated between the libraries by the General Board on the advice of its Finance and Appointments Committee after it has received the estimates of the Committee on Libraries. If the university grant to colleges for improving libraries continues to be made (see paras. 681 and 691 below), it too should be handled by the Committee on Libraries, because its purpose is to lighten the strain on the central libraries.

581. While we accept the case for considering libraries as an integral part of academic life, we think library problems need review as a whole rather than as at present under the curious system by which faculty and departmental libraries, the Bodleian, the Taylorian, the Ashmolean, and college libraries all go their separate ways. We were nevertheless impressed by the argument of witnesses (e.g. by the Visitors of the Ashmolean and by the Curators of the Taylorian—*Oval Evidence*, Parts 71 and 72) that some of them by their special nature gain from local control. An even more important point concerns the Bodleian. The Bodleian has two aspects. On the one hand it is a centre for the studies of dons, postgraduates, and, increasingly, of undergraduates. In this respect it is but one, though the greatest, of the library facilities for study in the University. In its other aspect it is a great national, and indeed international, institution, privileged under the State's copyright laws, opening its doors to all who come in the disciplined pursuit of knowledge. We shall have more to say of the consequences of this fact when we come to deal with the position of the Bodleian Curators as a body (see para. 631 below). But it must be taken into account when considering the scope of the proposed Committee on Libraries.

582. We wish to retain the powers of local self-government in the Bodleian and the other libraries of the University, and in the college libraries. Representatives of all the various groups of libraries should sit together on the Committee on Libraries, which would enable the complex to be co-ordinated, the purposes of the different libraries defined, information to be shared, plans for staff-training drawn up, and arrangements made for common tasks, e.g. the preparation of union catalogues. They would sit under the chairmanship of the Vice-Chairman of the General Board, and at least two other members of the General Board would also be members.

583. *The Committee on Extra-mural Activities.* This body would not replace the Extra-mural Delegacy, which would remain a joint committee of the University and outside interests, planning the development of adult education. The new committee is needed because it will do work of importance which is at present neglected at some cost both to the reputation of the

University and to the detriment of the service to the public. The extra-mural activities of the General Board are, and we think should be, limited. The committee can, however, have on it members representing the Extra-mural Delegacy, the Institute of Education, and the Department of Social and Administrative Studies. But the General Board, through this committee, must concern itself with the standards of work and the sorts of courses which are given the label of Oxford: it should not permit anything to be called an Oxford course in which the appropriate faculty is not prepared to show interest or in which the standards of work do not satisfy the experts in the University. Equally the General Board, and hence this committee, should be consulted by Council, when there is any question of allowing a new centre of study or a new form of certificated course to come into existence on the fringe of university work.

584. With this committee the General Board would be in a better position to assist Council to maintain standards and avoid unnecessary reduplication in a field of university extension which is likely to become more important in the future. Co-operation with the Workers' Educational Association is of long-standing; we think it is time that the relations between its work and that of the Extra-mural Delegacy are examined. There are the proposals, now under discussion, of the *ad hoc* Committee of Council, the General Board, and the Delegates for the Department and Institute of Education (the "Turpin Committee") for the award of a degree (the 'B.Ed.') to selected students from the teacher-training colleges which are constituent members of the Institute of Education. Association with research establishments like those at Harwell and Culham has begun, and Council should strengthen its relations with outside bodies of this sort. Further, we recommend that it should investigate ways in which the staff of Oxford and the staff of our neighbours the Oxford College of Technology can be of assistance to each other (see Mr. Howard Buckley—*Written Evidence*, Part IV, p. 25). We think that the academic implications of these new departures and developments should be discussed, in the first instance, by the proposed Committee on Extra-mural Activities.

585. The General Board must make a determined effort to get matters of detail pushed down for settlement by its committees. In this respect the General Board, like Council, must deny itself the luxury of doing the work for which it has agents. Only thus can it see over the top of the piles of paper and look at those general topics, present and future, which ought to be its principal concern. The same applies to the General Board's relations with the faculty boards. The General Board, and its committees, must in future, as now, supervise the more detailed work of the faculty boards. But as things are at present, the General Board cannot, as was emphasized in our discussions with its representatives, devolve work with confidence, because its communications with bodies below it are confused. It is administratively

impossible for the General Board to supervise seventeen or more faculty boards. It can only hope to have effective relations with some half-dozen. There is a further argument for the reduction in the number of faculty boards. The present divisions correspond roughly to the undergraduate Honour Schools, but not to the interests of postgraduate research nor to the fields of knowledge as advance and interpretation proceed. It may be remembered that as early as 1909 Lord Curzon, as Chancellor, called the attention of the University to this (*Principles and Methods of University Reform*, particularly p. 127).

586. The new Faculty Board of Mathematics, however, in its evidence to us (see *Written Evidence*, Part X, p. 18, and *Oral Evidence*, Part 47) made a convincing case for the gains in vitality which the faculty found when it separated from the Faculty of Physical Sciences and set up one of its own: its greatest gain was in bringing control nearer to those actually engaged in teaching and research in the subject. If this line of development were followed, it would increase the number of faculties until the General Board lost all pretence of control.

587. The scheme we propose takes account of both arguments. It is a generally accepted principle of administrative organization that a superior body cannot effectively supervise more than five to eight subordinate bodies. When their numbers go beyond this range, consultation and discussion become difficult or impossible, relations distant and formalized, and paperwork greatly increases. We are convinced that this principle must be applied to the bodies under the General Board; indeed it must apply generally to the administrative organization of the academic life of the University.

588. We recommend that the academic activities of Oxford should be divided into five new faculties, namely:

- (i) Theology, Philosophy, History, and Music;
- (ii) Languages and Literature, including Philology;
- (iii) Social Studies, including Law;
- (iv) Physical Sciences, including Mathematics and Geology;
- (v) Biological Sciences, including Medicine.

These divisions are not immutable; they are intended to reflect natural overlappings of interest and so to afford a reasonable basis from which to start. Any such system, and this is also true of the existing far more numerous faculties, contains an element of arbitrariness; and we can see that there may be differences of opinion over the faculty to which certain subjects, e.g. Geography, should most appropriately be allocated. We leave it to the General Board, after appropriate consultation, to allocate subjects the destination of which is not immediately obvious. We have also considered the position of subjects which fall outside the existing faculties and are generally supervised by special committees. The evidence we received

from the Committee for the History and Philosophy of Science, the Committee for Comparative Philology, the Delegates for the Department and for the Institute of Education, Professor C. F. C. Hawkes, and Dr. E. T. Hall (*Written Evidence*, Part VI, p. 27; Part X, pp. 11 and 13; and Part XI, p. 55; and *Oral Evidence*, Parts 33, 49, and 54) has led us to the conclusion that these special committees are a bad solution: their voices are inevitably drowned by the more powerful voices of the faculty boards. Moreover, it is impossible for the General Board to be in effective contact with a number of special committees as well as the faculty boards. We therefore recommend that every subject studied at Oxford should be brought under one or other of the five faculties. It will be for the General Board to make the appropriate allocation. It will also be the responsibility of the General Board to adjust the faculty structure when the development of subjects in the University makes this expedient.

589. We recommend that each of these faculties should have a faculty board normally consisting of the chairman of each of the sub-faculty boards within the faculty (see para. 591 below) and an equal number of persons elected by the faculty as a whole. In the case of the faculty boards, unlike that of the General Board, we consider that the need for formal and close liaison, and indeed for some representation of interests, is strong, and this we secure by the *ex officio* membership of the chairmen of the sub-faculty boards; and we recommend that they should hold office as chairmen for two years. But we do not want the faculty boards simply to become battlegrounds of conflicting interests, so that there should be an equal number of persons elected by the faculty as a whole. However, to prevent the numerically stronger sub-faculties from being able to secure a disproportionate share of these places, we recommend that at elections where there is more than one vacancy to be filled the electors should have one vote fewer than the number of vacancies. The chairmen elected by each of the five faculty boards will hold positions of responsibility. We therefore think that they should be given some relief from their other duties.

590. These faculty boards should take a view of the large field of academic activity which they represent. They will be charged with the making and renewing of permanent appointments, with the general supervision of studies and examinations in their faculty, with the maintenance of standards, with the general development of undergraduate and postgraduate studies, and the encouragement of research and the provision of facilities for it. They should pay particular attention to the development of new subjects. They will have to draw up the needs of the faculty in an order of priority for submission to the General Board. The board of a faculty would be small enough, sixteen at the maximum, to develop a collective unity: we would expect the board to do a good deal of its business by direct consultation of those concerned; consultation of this kind, combined with the *ex officio*

membership of the chairmen of the sub-faculty boards, seems to us to make it unnecessary for the faculty boards to have power to co-opt. The faculty boards would not be responsible for the distribution of money: that would be done, as we have said in para. 576 above, by the committees of Council and the General Board. Each board would on its own responsibility translate the decisions of the General Board into regulations applicable to the conditions of its faculty. They would be effective on publication in the *Gazette*: we have already explained in para. 528 above the methods by which this power may be kept *intra vires*.

591. We further recommend that sub-faculty boards should be set up under the faculty boards. The same principle of effective administrative organization should be applied as in the case of the faculty boards, and the sub-faculty boards must not exceed eight in number. It will be the task of the General Board, in consultation with each faculty board, to set up by regulation the requisite sub-faculty boards within this range. The fact that they are set up by regulation will enable the General Board to make changes when expedient as new subjects grow or old ones decay. On the whole we do not think it will prove difficult to set up under the faculty boards appropriate sub-faculty boards of the right number. Each subject falling within the field of a faculty should be brought under a sub-faculty board. We give to the important matter of Clinical Medicine and the Teaching Hospital separate consideration (para. 596). It is these sub-faculty boards which will allow decisions to be made by the teachers and research workers in fields small enough for all to know each other: this is what the members of the existing Faculty Board of Mathematics found so desirable.

592. Our next recommendation, therefore, is that each faculty board should draw up lists of those in the faculty working in the fields covered by each sub-faculty board, those on each list forming the sub-faculty of the related board. We do not think it matters if there is a certain amount of overlapping in the membership of sub-faculties. We also recommend that sub-faculty boards should normally consist of six members where the number in the sub-faculty is less than twenty, eight where it is between twenty and forty, and ten where it is over forty; and that half the members should be 'official' members elected by the whole sub-faculty from among the readers and professors, and the other half 'ordinary' members elected from the whole sub-faculty by those members of the sub-faculty not qualified to be official members. We see no need for co-opted members; any interest or specialism not represented on the board could be consulted, when the need arose, by inviting those concerned to meet the board or to send representatives to attend meetings of the board.

593. In Oxford there are departments in Science but not in Arts. We recommend that formal departmental committees should be set up in all scientific

departments. Such committees already exist in many laboratories, but their formalization would remove the possibility of unfair or dictatorial action by professors. Their existence would reduce the administrative burden on the professors in charge of departments (the Schedule B professors) and would facilitate the transfer of administrative control to another member of the department when this is desired (see para. 311 above). They should not deal with day-to-day administration, but through them general policy should be evolved and determined on the teaching of undergraduates, postgraduate studies, junior appointments, building, and the allocation of resources and facilities.

594. The members of the departmental committees should number six or eight, as preferred—professors and readers sitting as 'official' members. If the number of those qualified to be official members exceed three (or four), one place should be kept for the titular head of the department, who would normally act as chairman, and the remainder should be filled by election by the professors, readers, and lecturers in the department. The three (or four) 'ordinary' members should be elected by the lecturers from among their own number. Provision should be made for a biennial change in membership.

595. We now turn to the Faculty of Biological Sciences. Here there is at present a large number of small departments and some large ones. Each on the preceding recommendation will have its departmental committee, and because of their large number it is logical that sub-faculties should be formed of groups of departments. A difficulty arises, however, because of arbitrary divisions between overlapping subjects. An alternative and possibly preferable arrangement would be to divide the biological workers according to the level of organization at which they worked: molecular, cellular, multicellular, behavioural, ecological, and so on. This may well prove to be ultimately the most satisfactory division, but at this stage of development it would be extremely difficult to mould into an effective administrative body. We suggest, therefore, that for the time being the departmental committees of the biological departments should be allowed by the General Board to have the responsibilities, and discharge the functions, of a sub-faculty board. The representation of these bodies on the faculty board would, however, need to be different from that provided for the other sub-faculties. It would, in our view, not be desirable that the chairman of the departmental committee should be *ex officio* its representative on the faculty board because the faculty board would then consist of departmental heads. We propose therefore, that, in addition to representatives of the Sub-faculty Board of Clinical Medicine, the Faculty Board of Biological Sciences should consist of one elected representative of each of the constituent departmental committees drawn alternately from the official and elected members.

596. We have considered at length how best to integrate Clinical Medicine into the administrative organization under the General Board. We have debated whether Clinical Medicine should be regarded as a faculty by itself or as a sub-faculty of the Faculty of Biological Sciences. In any case we are clear that in the system of organization which we propose the existing Faculty Board of Medicine and the Nuffield Committee for the Advancement of Medicine, with their dubious interrelationship, should disappear. The body which deals with Clinical Medicine is, in certain ways, different from other academic administrative bodies at Oxford, for it is involved in complex relations with the Board of Governors of the United Oxford Hospitals and the Oxford Regional Hospital Board and has to administer the large Nuffield Benefaction. On the other hand, it seems to us of the greatest importance for the health and continuing development of Clinical Medicine in all its aspects that the teaching and research staff of the hospital should live and work in the closest relationship with the staff of the departments engaged in the basic biological sciences and that this should be reflected in academic organization. We recommend, therefore, that a special Sub-Faculty Board of Clinical Medicine be constituted under the Faculty Board of Biological Sciences. It would take over the powers and responsibilities of the present Nuffield Committee for the Advancement of Medicine and some of those of the Faculty Board of Medicine. But it would be a sub-faculty board with certain differences from the others.

597. In the first place, the Vice-Chancellor should continue to be its *ex officio* chairman: this is because of the importance of the external relations involved and their political content. We suppose that the Vice-Chancellor would continue to ask one of those near him in the central administration normally to take the chair for him and to serve as the sub-faculty board's *ex officio* representative on the faculty board. Second, the sub-faculty board should be a little larger and differently constituted from other sub-faculty boards. Apart from the chairman, we think the board should be composed as follows: the Regius Professor of Medicine *ex officio*, a member appointed by the Board of Governors of the United Oxford Hospitals, a member appointed by the Oxford Regional Hospital Board, the Director of Clinical Studies, the Director of Postgraduate Medical Studies, three members elected by the Professors of Clinical Medicine including the Director of the Nuffield Institute for Medical Research, two members appointed by the Medical Staff Council of the United Oxford Hospitals, two members appointed by the Faculty Board of Biological Sciences, and two members elected by the Sub-faculty of Clinical Medicine. This Sub-faculty Board of Clinical Medicine will submit recommendations as needful to the faculty board, but in this special case among the sub-faculty boards, we consider that in the event of a disagreement between the two bodies which cannot be resolved by conference, the faculty board should be obliged to transmit the recommendation of the sub-faculty board, with its own proposed action,

to the General Board for decision. We expect this procedure to be used only in exceptional cases, and we further provide against the likelihood of such cases by suggesting that for business of the Sub-faculty Board of Clinical Medicine two members of that sub-faculty shall always be members of the Faculty Board of Biological Sciences. One of them should be elected for this purpose by the clinical professors including the Director of the Nuffield Institute for Medical Research: the other should be elected by the Sub-faculty of Clinical Medicine.

598. We should expect meetings of the sub-faculties to take place in the way that meetings of faculties and sub-faculties do now. We should also expect a meeting of the whole faculty to take place if there was a need for it. We believe that in the democracy of Oxford such meetings serve a valuable purpose, enabling issues to be debated by those concerned with a subject, and suggestions put forward to the appropriate board.

599. An important function of the sub-faculty board will be the care of postgraduates. For this work each sub-faculty board should therefore set up a small committee, or, if it suits its circumstances better, designate one member to take special responsibility for it. This committee, or the designated member, should scrutinize applications from postgraduates and whenever possible interview candidates to decide their fitness to undertake research. But beyond that it should keep the progress of postgraduates under review, considering reports of supervisors and complaints by the students. It should appoint supervisors. The chairman of this committee, or the designated member, should represent the sub-faculty on the Committee on Postgraduates of the faculty board.

600. The Committees on Postgraduates of faculty boards would, therefore, be composed of these representatives of the sub-faculty boards sitting under the chairmanship of a member of the faculty board. The Committees on Postgraduates would keep the postgraduate work of the faculty under review and make proposals to the faculty board, but more particularly would deal with those cases where a proposed subject of research crosses divisions between the sub-faculties. The committee would also be responsible for ensuring comparability of standards in advanced degrees. To this end, all applications to supplicate for advanced degrees should be considered by the faculty boards rather than the sub-faculty boards (see para. 262 above). We thus recommend that each sub-faculty board should appoint a Committee on Postgraduates, and that the name of the chairman of the committee of each sub-faculty board, or of the member primarily responsible for postgraduates, should be published, and it should be made known where he will be at certain hours so that those who wish to see him know where and when to go.

601. All the work of the faculty boards and of their sub-faculty boards is of course subject to the supervision and control of the General Board. The administrative pattern must be as clear as the devolution of duties. The structure of faculty boards and sub-faculty boards under the General Board which we have recommended adds an extra tier to the existing administrative system. But we are convinced that it is necessary if the academic activities of the University are to receive adequate administrative support. Nor do we believe that it will lead to more time being spent on committees. On the contrary, we are certain that less time will be spent, and the time spent used for better purpose, than under the present system. As we have explained, it should be the business of the General Board to devolve and to delegate to the faculty boards to the greatest extent possible. Upon its success in so doing rests the chance of the board doing its own job well. The same applies to the faculty boards in relation to the sub-faculty boards. They in turn should devolve and delegate all they can. In general, it is for the senior body to frame policy and make rules within which the subordinate body can get on with its work and take decisions, referring upwards only those things which take it outside its frame of reference or raise peculiar difficulty. Each sub-faculty board should have the power to make regulations applicable within its field on its own authority. Like other regulations they will be published in the *Gazette*.

602. The reason for adding this extra tier is that, at present, neither the General Board nor the faculty boards can perform their functions adequately. On the one hand, the General Board is in direct contact with seventeen faculty boards and several special subject committees. Dealing with the various communications from these bodies consumes time which could be better spent on more general matters; but, more importantly, the General Board has to undertake the task of co-ordinating the needs and views of seventeen bodies. When priorities have to be considered, the board is faced with seventeen well-documented lists of urgent needs; when a general question has been referred to the faculty boards, the board is faced with seventeen replies. On the other hand, the faculty boards have to combine the general oversight of what is in many cases a wide field with the detailed administration of it. In our view, the academic activities of the University will benefit if relief is given to both sides.

603. Under our recommendations, the General Board will have to deal with only five boards—and will be relieved of much detailed work which will in future be done either by the faculty boards or by the sub-faculty boards without their needing to refer upwards for approval. In this way, it will have a less blurred view of, and a more effective control over, the whole academic scene. It, and its committees, can discover what the faculties are doing and what their needs are. The faculty boards will be responsible for co-ordinating and planning over large areas. They will draw up lists in

priority order of the capital and recurrent needs of their constituents; they will be able to see where reduction in activities would be appropriate. They will know, in a way in which the General Board could not, whether some of their sub-faculties are labouring under seriously greater strains than others; whether some are setting a lower standard for the admission of postgraduates than others; whether some are providing courses, course work, and supervision more energetically than others; whether some are providing 'easier options' than others; and so forth.

604. The sub-faculty boards, however, will be in charge of the day-to-day administration of their subjects; and this will be better done because done by those directly concerned with it. A sub-faculty board will have the responsibility jointly with a college of setting up the committee which nominates fellow-lecturers to faculty boards for appointment when a post has been allocated by the General Board. The same machinery will be applicable to reappointments. Sub-faculty boards will keep faculty boards informed of their needs, look after the syllabuses of the examinations of the sub-faculty, arrange the lectures and other forms of teaching, and admit postgraduates. They will also appoint the supervisors and the examiners for postgraduates.

PART VI. THE COUNCIL OF THE COLLEGES

605. The Hebdomadal Council, as the chief administrative body and spokesman for Oxford, depends very much upon the energy of the General Board. The General Board must transmit ideas upwards and carry decisions downwards. But when Council speaks for Oxford it must speak for the colleges as part of the University. Nothing has done more to give Oxford a reputation for incompetence and obscurity than Council's hesitations and reservations when the colleges are involved. Unless Council can commit the colleges when it makes a statement of policy to the University Grants Committee or a government department, or speak for them when it consults with other universities, it cannot speak with the necessary authority.

606. Whatever administrative problems they may cause, we have no doubt that the colleges are one of the important elements in making Oxford a leading place of education. Since the 1922 Commission many developments have been working to undermine them: chief among these are the expansion of knowledge, the increased dependence on public funds, and the pressure of demand on university space. But in every field except the constitutional one, colleges have devised expedients or compromises which have brought them into the new world without losing what was most valuable in their traditional position. The one exception, if it continued, might prove fatal.

607. At present, Council, faced with a problem concerning the colleges as a whole, sends out some thirty or so letters requesting the views of the colleges severally. Each college replies without *formal consultation* with any other. Council has then more than thirty replies of various tones, and it is impossible for any one respondent to take account of arguments put forward by any other. They may often cancel one another. Thus, in contrast to an opinion from the General Board, which speaks for all the faculty boards, Council does not receive a collective opinion from the colleges because there is no machinery for formulating one. If Council has to take a decision, the Vice-Chancellor, speaking for the University, has often to commit the colleges to a line which may affect them all. It is clear to us from discussing this question with Council and with all the colleges that in this lies a great danger to the survival of the colleges. They are in danger of becoming no more than endowed halls of residence unless they can see that their collective point of view has force in shaping university policy. For in any event university policy, agreed with governments, will impose a shape on the colleges.

608. We wish to see that the college point of view is expressed as a whole; it should be positive and creative and not, as too often now, a belated and sluggish response to some outside stimulus. We wish also to give force to the Vice-Chancellor and Council when they speak for Oxford.

609. We propose to achieve this double purpose through the creation of a Council of the Colleges, which like all other bodies should report to the Hebdomadal Council on matters of university concern. It need not meet regularly: the frequency of meetings should be determined by the business to be transacted. But it must have a regular framework. Each college recognized by statute of the University should be entitled to send one member, not necessarily the same each time but chosen according to the business which is to come forward. The three nascent societies should have the right to have a representative attending the Council but without a vote. Our reason for this limitation in the case of the new societies is rooted in our wish to make the Council of the Colleges a powerful and distinct influence in university affairs. The three new societies are still under the suzerainty of the Hebdomadal Council. To speak with complete independence they must become full colleges, and be recognized as such in the statutes. The Council of the Colleges would consult with the Permanent Private Halls on such points as it thought desirable. The Vice-Chancellor should be the *ex officio* chairman of the Council of the Colleges, but it should elect its own vice-chairman. This vice-chairman, as we have indicated in paras. 509 and 512 above, would *ex officio* be entitled to a seat on the Hebdomadal Council and its General Purposes Committee; since he would owe his position to the free choice of all the colleges and not to nomination from above, he would carry the college point of view right into the centre

of the administration. The Council of the Colleges would also have an official secretary, supplied by the Secretary for Administration, to act both as record keeper and as administrative adviser (see para. 557 above).

610. The Council of the Colleges would normally meet on the summons of the Vice-Chancellor: it should also meet when any three colleges request the secretary to summon it. Something very like a meeting of this Council took place when the Vice-Chancellor consulted the colleges over the new admissions system. There is not only a need to formalize that aspect of the matter but also a need to enable colleges to come regularly into consultation when they themselves wish to raise some important issue of policy. It seems probable that this Council of the Colleges would, in course of time, find it convenient to appoint a steering committee from its midst. This, however, is better left to be decided in the light of experience. The Council of the Colleges must work as any other democratic body does; in the last resort and after due consultation, it must be bound to decisions by a majority vote.

611. When we took evidence from Council on the relations between Council and the colleges, the Vice-Chancellor said that we were in a state of transition about all this. 'In fact I do not think this thing . . . would work if the spirit slumped just a short bit. At the moment, and for the last six years or so, there has been a feeling that we must work together. . . . This is all based on a spirit which is around at the moment, but it will have to be institutionalized in some way' (*Oral Evidence*, Part 78, p. 21). And Mr. F. M. H. Markham, speaking as a representative of a group of colleges, told us: 'I should now say that I, and my college, I think, would be wholly in agreement with the idea of a congregation of colleges with the power to commit by majority, and that this would be formalized. I was rather assuming that when colleges all came together they did observe the majority view. This is, in fact, what happened in the meetings on admissions. If this was formalized and if it was recognized that Council would consult this body and get a firm majority decision, I am sure we would welcome that' (*Oral Evidence*, Part 82, pp. 15-16).

612. The existence of the Council of the Colleges will not prevent the Hebdomadal Council from communicating simultaneously with the several colleges. The Hebdomadal Council's letters will continue to be discussed in each college's own governing body. But it will then be possible for the colleges to pool their wisdom or to exchange their arguments. And the Hebdomadal Council should expect the reply to its important questions to come from the one strong voice of the Council of the Colleges.

613. The Council of the Colleges, for example, will want to make its view clear on the setting up of new colleges. The present position is a good example of the weakness of the colleges while they remain without co-ordination. The Hebdomadal Council decides that a new college is needed,

and the discussion in Congregation is necessarily not a close argument. Yet it is the colleges, through the contributions system, who are most likely in the end to foot a great many of the bills. It would thus be better that colleges should be involved in this planning from its inception. Similarly, the Council of the Colleges would need to discuss the allocation of fellowships to those entitled to them and, in particular, the distribution among the colleges of new fellow-lecturerships as they become available. It is difficult to see how this can be achieved unless the colleges as a whole prepare a workable scheme which will operate fairly among them all. The working and revision of the college contributions system, about which we have had to consult the colleges in groups, would be another obvious interest of the Council. We may also cite, as an example of its operation, the question of admissions. This is traditionally a college province. Yet under the pressure of events a scheme for the whole University has been agreed. We would expect a continuing dialogue between the Hebdomadal Council and the Council of the Colleges on the working of Oxford's part in the Universities Central Council on Admissions. The whole future of postgraduate studies is another topic of equal concern to the University and to the colleges, and one where colleges singly are of less weight than collectively.

614. We therefore recommend, and have made provision in the Statutory Appendix, that a Council of the Colleges be set up, consisting of the Vice-Chancellor as chairman *ex officio* and one representative of each of the full colleges. Linacre, St. Cross, and Iffley Colleges should each be entitled to send one representative who would have the right to speak but not to vote until such time as these societies came to be recommended by the Council of the Colleges for statutory recognition as full colleges. We also recommend that the Council should have a secretary provided by the Secretary for Administration.

615. In various places throughout this report, we have indicated tasks which require inter-college co-operation; for example, the questions of the size and number of colleges (Chapter II and Chapter IV), the numbers of undergraduates—over-all and in particular subjects (Chapter II), admissions procedures (Chapter III), a reduction in the number of tutorials (Chapter IV), specialization by colleges in the smaller undergraduate Schools (Chapter IV) and in fields of postgraduate studies (Chapter IV), joining with the University in the appointment of fellow-lecturers (Chapter IV), and agreeing common standards of physical amenities (Chapter V). Discussion and, where necessary, decision, can effectively take place only through formalized co-operation between the colleges themselves on the one hand and between the University and the colleges on the other.

616. Our proposals will not diminish the importance of the Senior Tutors' Committee, the Estates Bursars' Committee, or the Domestic Bursars'

Committee. We have been impressed by evidence showing how these bodies have evolved into organs of inter-college co-operation. They cannot do the work which we indicate for the Council of the Colleges because their view is, rightly, specialized. These specialist committees would be strengthened by having the Council of the Colleges above and behind them. The Senior Tutors' Committee would be in communication with the General Board as it is now, but on an issue of principle for the life of the colleges it could refer for guidance to the Council.

617. We have said that the Council of the Colleges should be set up by statute, and that, like all university bodies, it should come under the general control of the Hebdomadal Council. We would extend to it the right which we have so far given only to the General Board of all other bodies: in the event of the Council of the Colleges finding itself unable to agree with Council on a major issue, then it should be able in the last resort to require Council to submit the issue to Congregation whose decision would be binding on them both (see para. 534 above).

618. We realize, from discussion with our witnesses, that there is a fear lest college co-ordination might produce uniformity where there is at present variety: this is mistaken. Circumstances now and in the future will force Oxford to act with decision or be subject to direction. Only the production of a workable scheme of co-operation can prevent piece-meal change destroying the basis of the Oxford democracy; within a defensible framework variety may flourish. Whether it does in fact flourish will depend upon the spirit which animates the members of the Council of the Colleges and its parent bodies.

PART VII. THE UNIVERSITY'S 'BUSINESS' COMMITTEES

619. At present the Quinquennial Application, which is designed to set the programme of academic development, is drawn up by special *ad hoc* committees of Council and the General Board; the annual distribution of available money between the General Board and the other spending authorities is done by the Estimates Committee—a committee of Council which contains representatives of the General Board and the Chest. Since the money available is always less than was requested in the Quinquennial Application, the annual budgeting inevitably involves a recasting of the priorities in the Application; and new demands are always arising which were not foreseen when the Application was drawn up. We consider that the procedures for drawing up the Quinquennial Application and the annual budgets should no longer be separated, but that both should become the responsibility of one body on which the General Board, with its concern for all academic matters, should be strongly represented. This Committee on Estimates and the Quinquennial Application will receive from the General Board its bid

for academic expenditure prepared by its Finance and Appointments Committee. These estimates will be considered together with those from Council for the needs of the remaining Direct-Grant departments and other central purposes. Negotiations with the University Grants Committee will be carried out by Council. The Committee on Estimates and the Quinquennial Application will review previous decisions in the light of the grant actually made available, but the detailed distribution of the money for academic purposes would remain the responsibility of the General Board.

620. This Committee on Estimates and the Quinquennial Application will deal with the capital programme as well as with the annual expenditure. It will receive from Council and from the General Board the plans for academic development which require capital expenditure on buildings. It will refer to the new Sites and Buildings Committee (see para. 629 below) not the question of priorities, which will be decided on academic grounds, but the practical question of how such buildings can be provided. Armed with this information and advice from the Sites and Buildings Committee, it will advise Council on the negotiations with the University Grants Committee. It will review the capital programme in the light of the grant received: for a grant which is less than that applied for may well involve a reconsideration of priorities and not just a modification of the agreed programme. In such reconsideration, the advice of the Sites and Buildings Committee on practical possibilities will again be needed.

621. We therefore recommend that a statutory joint committee on Estimates and the Quinquennial Application be set up, consisting of the Vice-Chancellor and six members appointed from Council and the General Board in equal numbers, the vice-chairman being appointed by the Vice-Chancellor from the General Purposes Committee, to deal with forward budgeting, the principal annual allocations (for the further sub-division of these allocations see para. 576 above), and with the capital programme. In this, and in all cases of committees formed jointly by Council and another body or other bodies, the committee would report to all its parent bodies, except of course on those matters it was charged to deal with on its own responsibility; but in the event of a disagreement between Council and another body over a recommendation, it must be the will of Council that prevails, unless the other body is the General Board or the Council of the Colleges and it feels strongly enough to require the matter to be put to Congregation under the procedure set out in para. 534 above.

622. It has been explained to us by the Curators of the University Chest and by Council (see *Oral Evidence*, Parts 77 and 89, and Chapter VI, para. 41) that a revolution has been quietly effected in the last thirty years so that the functions of the Curators no longer resemble those which, by tradition, they had possessed. Financial policy is now firmly with Council. In

advertising for a new Secretary of the Chest, it was explicitly stated that 'the Curators of the University Chest are in charge of the financial administration, though not of the financial policy, of the University' (see *Oral Evidence*, Part 89, p. 15). But the constitutional superstructure has not been correspondingly revised. Even in its work as a watchdog on financial questions, we have been told (by the Curators of the Chest—*Written Evidence*, Part XII, p. 43) that Council has been able to proceed along a line of policy involving important financial issues without the Chest being consulted or able to issue warnings. It seems to us nonsensical to have a body of special Curators who have little influence, or to wish for a veto to be lodged with a committee which can be by-passed; but still worse (see para. 502 above) to have a body which actually can effectively veto a decision of the chief administrative body.

623. We therefore recommend that the Curators of the Chest should be replaced by 'The Chest Committee of Council' with a vice-chairman appointed by the Vice-Chancellor from the General Purposes Committee. Co-optation of members of the University who are not members of Council but have a taste for financial work should be permitted, though care should be taken to keep the committee small enough to be efficient. The election of members by Congregation would obviously disappear. We recommend that the Chest Committee of Council should consist of not more than ten members, the vice-chairman, and the Vice-Chancellor.

624. This Chest Committee of Council would take on the work of the present Curators plus that done at present by the Financial Questions Committee of Council. Some of its members would be among those appointed to the new Committee on Estimates and the Quinquennial Application. The Chest Committee would keep Council aware of the financial aspects of policy at all stages of planning. We have already recommended (in para. 557 above) that the secretary be one of the five principal officials of the University and that he should, as accounting officer of the University, have direct access to the Vice-Chancellor.

625. The Chest Committee should have at least three sub-committees. One would be for the discussion in detail of general policy: a second would be a committee on estates: a third would be a committee on investment policy. We do not contemplate a committee for accounting. We believe that all regular accounting work should be done by officials, as in any business organization. The officials should report in cases of difficulty only to the Vice-Chairman of the Chest Committee. The committee itself would, in normal circumstances, see only the annual accounts and estimates.

626. The Chest Committee would, however, be responsible for seeing that the accounts, and the summary of them (see para. 642 below) are prepared

on time. We understand that the submission of the University's accounts to the University Grants Committee has been late in the past, and that this has been due to delays in the production of accounts by some departments. It is unreasonable that inadequacy in the accounting arrangements of a few departments should delay the completion of the accounts for the University, and hence the consolidated accounts for all universities in the country. We therefore recommend that departments should be required to keep their accounts in a form approved by the Chest Committee of Council, and to produce their year-end accounts by a date fixed by this committee; and that the Chest Office should have power to take over the accounts of any department which does not fulfil its obligations. The adoption of this recommendation would make it unnecessary to pursue at the present time the question of the centralizing of all departmental accounting. The present Curators of the Chest (*Written Evidence*, Part XII, p. 40) were in favour of this centralization, but we can see advantages in preserving local autonomy which can take account of local requirements. We appreciate, however, that the potentialities of mechanized accounting cannot be realized in full while much of the University's accounting is done outside the central offices; this is a matter which the Chest Committee will have to keep under review.

627. We have given consideration to the arguments for having persons from outside the University on the Chest Committee. We hope that the present practice by which the Curators of the University Chest have as one of their members an outside expert of standing will be continued under the new arrangements for the Chest Committee. We are sure that outside help should be obtained by co-opting one or two eminent persons on to the sub-committees.

628. We have no doubt, after discussing the work of the Building and Development Committee with Council (see *Oral Evidence*, Part 79, pp. 2 ff.), that it has, in present practice, become the most important planning body in the University. It has been so because, in the weakness or absence of academic planning arrangements, a body of efficient men, drawn from Council, the General Board, and the Chest, and looking at sites and practical possibilities, has inevitably formed views on the proper academic priorities.

629. Though formally reporting to its parent bodies, the success with which the Building and Development Committee has planned in advance has in reality meant that it could draw them along its chosen path. We think the University is deeply in its debt, but we are troubled about the relationship of academic policy and ways and means which has resulted. We recommend that the Building and Development Committee should be reconstituted as the 'Sites and Buildings Committee'; it would consist of the Vice-

Chancellor, three members appointed from Council, and three members appointed from the General Board—the vice-chairman being appointed by the Vice-Chancellor from the Chest Committee. As both the parent bodies of this joint committee (see para. 621 above for what we mean by 'joint') will, under our earlier proposals, have opportunity to give proper consideration to the academic needs of Oxford, the Sites and Buildings Committee will not be taking the most important decisions. It is important that resources should be assessed after, and not before, the University has decided what it wants to do. But the work of the joint committee in grappling with the possible means of doing what is desirable, and in reporting modifications which it discovers must be made, will remain of great importance.

630. We have been impressed by the achievement of the Committee for Works. It has supervised the construction of new buildings and the alteration of older ones, bringing the needs of the eventual consumer into touch with those doing the job, and fitting amendments which become necessary in the course of operations into the framework of general building policy. This is laborious. We do not consider that this committee need be established by statute; instead the Committee for Works should be continued in existence by decree of Council. We believe that this should be another 'joint' committee of Council and the General Board. But it should be as small in numbers as it is frequent in meeting. We suggest three members from Council and two members from the General Board and one or two co-opted members. We hope it would continue its predecessor's practice of being flexible in procedure, and interviewing interested parties as necessary from day to day. It should not only deal with the minor works programme but decide upon it. It should be encouraged to make even greater use of the services of its official, the Surveyor, leaving to him the decision of problems which turn upon the application of the rules of the committee to particular cases.

PART VIII. OTHER BODIES AND COMMITTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY

631. We have advanced in para. 581 above the argument that the Bodleian will always have a double significance as a part of the library service of the University and as an international institution. This must be marked by a special statute defining the position of the curators. We recommend that one curator should be elected by each of the five faculty boards and five by Congregation at large. The *ex officio* membership of the Vice-Chancellor, Proctors, and Assessor, the appointments by Council, and the elections by the professional electoral groups should be terminated. But we recommend that the Curators should co-opt two or at most three persons of national and international eminence in the scholarly world who have experience of great libraries in other places. We also believe that the curators should ensure that the senior staff of the Bodleian always includes one or two

members with experience of the most modern techniques of managing a large library. While, in their university aspect, the curators are agents under the control of the General Board, we would safeguard their freedom in their international aspect by giving the Chairman of the Curatores, freely elected by them, the right of direct access to the Vice-Chancellor. We do not propose to give the Bodleian Curators the right of appeal to Congregation in case of a dispute, as we have done for the General Board and the Council of the Colleges. This is because, if the dispute was internal, the will of the General Board should prevail. But if the Bodleian felt its other, or international, duty was being frustrated by university policy, it would not be logical to give it an appeal to yet another university body. The only solution is to approach the Vice-Chancellor who, though the servant of the University, is also by his office a responsible member of the international community of learned men and institutions. We therefore recommend that the Curatores of the Bodleian Library should remain a statutory body; that one curator should be elected by each of the five faculty boards and five should be elected by Congregation; that two or three outside experts should always be co-opted; and that the chairman should have the right of direct access to the Vice-Chancellor.

632. We are clear that the University Press is of sufficient importance to merit statutory recognition, and we have therefore reproduced the present statute in the Statutory Appendix. We are doubtful, however, of the wisdom of retaining the present peculiar way in which the delegates are composed—the Vice-Chancellor, the Proctors, and the Assessor, with five ordinary delegates appointed by the Vice-Chancellor and Proctors for seven years at a time and five perpetual delegates appointed by the ordinary delegates from among their own number without limit on tenure though subject to an age-limit of 75; nor are we sure that the present *de facto* independent status of the Press is necessarily right. We realize that there are serious problems here: the Press is manifestly not a normal university department—it is a big business. We therefore took the view that we had neither capacity nor time to investigate its methods of work or its relations, financial and otherwise, with the University. We recommend that Council should institute a full-scale inquiry into the status, functions, and workings of the University Press; and consider whether the Press should make a larger contribution to the support of research in the University.

633. We cannot usefully make detailed recommendations about all the other bodies and committees which at present exist in the University. We have already proposed that such bodies as are not given a statutory basis in the scheme we have drawn up should be regarded as having their origins in administrative decree of Council. They could then be confirmed, reformed, or abolished by Council as it worked the new system of government. We recommend that Council, and where appropriate the General

Board, should forthwith institute a review of all such other bodies to decide which of them are necessary and which could appropriately have their work absorbed by the main boards or committees of the University.

634. There should be devolution of responsibility and delegation of the power to act. There must be a clear pattern of administration so that it is known which bodies are superior and which are inferior and to whom the inferior bodies report. The extent of the powers and responsibilities of each body, whether in the formulation of policy or its execution, has to be clearly laid down. Such a system makes devolution and delegation easy. An inferior body receives its policy from the superior body and can then be told to do its work and decide within the limits of the policy laid down, only reporting back in cases of real doubt or difficulty. In this way the bodies of the administration largely consume their own smoke. There is probably a number of cases where officials should replace committees with a consequent saving of academic time. We suspect, for instance, that there is no case for keeping the Curators of the Examination Schools as an elected body, but that an official should be nominated by the General Board, answerable to its Committees on Undergraduate and Postgraduate Studies.

635. We have said that those responsible for the review should give work to officials rather than committees whenever the job to be done makes this possible. It should be easy for the secretary of a committee, exercising discretion under the authority of the chairman, to deal with a quantity of routine work: it should be practicable for the chairman himself to do more, reporting his actions to the committee for information. We think too that the size of committees should be reviewed. Every committee should be as small as is consistent with the proper discharge of its duties: otherwise it wastes academic time. The Committee for Archaeology, a small but important subject, consists of twenty-five members. The constitution of the committee is explicable if everyone who expressed an interest was put on it, but it does not represent a method of administration, and again it makes for the waste of academic time.

636. We hope that, if Council foresees difficulty in conducting such a review, it will not hesitate to call in external advisers. This is essentially an organization and methods problem and not intractable, given the knowledge that flows from experience and resolute common sense.

PART IX. THE PROCTORS AND THE UNDERGRADUATES

637. We wish the traditional office of the Proctors to continue with its present duties. These are in two parts. The Proctors have disciplinary powers: they also take part in the central administration of the University as representatives elected by the men's colleges under a system which

ensures that each has its turn. The careers of many ex-Proctors indicate that this has been a useful method of detecting those with a flair for university administration. Our proposals do not alter the Proctors' right to attend the central committees of the University: the abolition of their veto is balanced by enabling Council to withdraw legislation on which it has second thoughts. But consideration of the administrative and the disciplinary purposes of the Proctors' office leaves us unconvinced that the women's colleges, the graduate colleges, and the three new societies should have special provision made for them, as has latterly been done by appointing the Assessor. On the contrary, the integration of these groups into the University implies parity of treatment; two Proctors are sufficient for all the purposes which they serve. We recommend therefore that all colleges, including the women's and the graduate colleges and the three new societies, should be incorporated into a new cycle, which should be so arranged as to bring the men's colleges and the new entrants to the scheme into a convenient partnership (see Statutory Appendix). We have also indicated (see para. 578 above) that the Proctors should continue to administer justice in any allegation of malpractice in the conduct of examinations. They would, of course, raise any general issue which arose out of such judicial cases with the Committee on Undergraduate Studies, or the Committee on Postgraduate Studies, as the case might be, of the General Board.

638. At present no one can be elected a Proctor unless he has completed the fourth, but not reached the seventeenth, year from his taking the M.A. degree. Our recommendation in the preceding paragraph will lengthen the proctorial cycle to seventeen years so that a widening of this range might be thought necessary. However, we consider that a rule based on standing is out-dated: it was based on the assumptions that every candidate for the proctorship would have taken his first degree at Oxford and that he would have proceeded to his M.A. as soon as he was qualified to do so. Today, war service or work in other occupations often means that the M.A. is taken late; and frequently non-Oxford graduates are appointed to posts in Oxford and so receive an Oxford M.A. only on taking up their appointment. We think that the intention of the rule can now be better achieved by a rule based on age. We therefore recommend that candidates for the proctorship should have exceeded the age of 29 but not have exceeded the age of 46 on the day on which they would take up office.

639. We hope that one result of the Report of the Committee on the Disciplinary Powers of the Vice-Chancellor and Proctors (the 'Williams Committee'—Supplement* No. 2 to *Gazette*, vol. xcvi) will be the more effectual ventilation of grievances of the student body. We are convinced that for such communication as well as for a channel by which undergraduates or postgraduates may make suggestions about the syllabus or general university conditions, the Proctors should be the recognized agents.

They would refer points to the appropriate university bodies and act as spokesmen to the students to give a reply from such bodies. They should take care, however, not to destroy the established system by which any college governing body keeps in close touch with the members of its Junior Common Room and Middle Common Room.

PART X. INFORMATION SERVICES

640. Oxford publishes a great deal of information about itself, but this is not always in a readily available and easily assimilable form. The *Statuta et Decreta Universitatis Oxoniensis*, the *Examination Statutes*, the *Oxford University Gazette*, the *Oxford University Calendar*, and the university and college accounts, for example, contain a mass of information; but they are not the simplest of documents to read even when an inquirer has access to them. Furthermore, some information is not published at all, and we have ourselves found it necessary on a number of points, e.g. about staff numbers and college emoluments, to initiate investigations of a kind which have never previously been conducted.

641. We think Oxford has suffered from a failure to ensure that adequate, and accurate, information is freely available. Some action on this has already been taken; we referred in Chapter III to what has been done to overcome the widespread ignorance of Oxford and its courses among school teachers and potential undergraduates, and to the value of the statistics now made available by the Oxford Colleges Admissions Office. We suggested in para. 202 above that more should be done to make known the nature and extent of the facilities for postgraduate study; in para. 292 we recommended that annual reports of work published should be produced on a university and faculty basis; in para. 381 we recommended a new form of college accounts; in para. 530 we recommended that there should be an annual statement on the progress of the University; and in paras. 562-5 we recommended that a Chief Statistical Officer should be appointed with the duty of setting up a comprehensive statistical service for Oxford. We have two further specific proposals to make; they concern information about the finances of Oxford.

642. The University publishes in the *Gazette* an annual consolidated balance sheet and revenue account; it also publishes full accounts running to some 280 pages. The first is too short and the second too long. What is needed is a summary designed to give any interested inquirer a picture of what the University is doing. Such a summary should include, besides a consolidated balance sheet and revenue account, information about the Trusts Pool and the individual trusts, building transactions, and the expenditure of the various spending authorities within the University; it might also usefully contain some statistical information about staff and students.

The Curators of the University Chest told us (*Oral Evidence*, Part 89, p. 20) that they are already planning to produce such a summary shortly. We recommend that the Hebdomadal Council, through the Chest Committee of Council (see para. 626 above), should make the form of the summary a matter of regular review, because this is a matter of how Oxford presents itself to the world. It is important that the published summary should either show the same figures as appear for Oxford in the consolidated summary for all universities published by the University Grants Committee or else give a clear statement of how the differences arise; it is at present difficult or impossible to tell from the University's published accounts how the figures about Oxford in the University Grants Committee accounts are reached. This obscurity is unnecessary.

643. The new form of college accounts we have recommended in Chapter V will enable the financial transactions of the colleges to be shown clearly and in a form that enables them to be readily combined with those of the University. Oxford's accounts can then be easily and accurately compared with those of other universities. And we do not think this comparison should be left to people outside Oxford; we recommend that the Hebdomadal Council should produce comparative figures each year. This will enable Oxford regularly to see for itself the items on which it is spending more than other universities and to consider whether there are any savings which could reasonably be made.

644. Regular publication of information is not alone sufficient; it will help only those who wish to ask a question that has been anticipated and who read the published material. Oxford must be ready to supply information that has not been asked for before, to ensure that it is available where needed, and to correct so far as possible misconceptions and mis-statements about Oxford whenever they are detected. In this connexion we welcome the proposed appointment of an Information Officer to which we referred to in para. 560 above. Such an official, in consultation with the other officials and backed by an efficient statistical service, should be able to do most of what is necessary in the way of supplying adequate factual information. On the other hand, he can deal with the aims and policies of Oxford only if they are formulated and deliberately communicated to him by those responsible. This means that decisions on what can and should be released for information, and on the timing of these releases, must become a regular part of the activities of the central bodies of the University and of the colleges.

645. Oxford is now in a world that believes that the only reason for withholding information is that it is discreditable. It is also in a competitive world. Lord Heyworth said (*Oral Evidence*, Part 5, p. 7) that 'redbrick has been bearing the brunt, the big burden, of the expansion programme and will be continuing to do so over the years that lie ahead, and yet they have

to meet some new competition now from the new universities which have glamour, which they have not, and they are going to need a lot of help over this period. One way to give them help is to take off some of the cream from the people who they think are getting too much. I think that would be disastrous. I think Oxford is a place that spends its money well. Dealing with it on that basis, it costs more to maintain a student at Oxford, college and university fees taken together, than it does in other places, but that is beside the point, so long as we can prove that Oxford is doing something that is better; in other words, is giving full value for money. Those pressures are going to increase all the time, and that is why I want you to go on moving ahead and give as many sound answers as there possibly can be to meet this point. Oxford cannot expect to be able to progress as it would wish unless it is able and eager to explain, and where necessary to justify, what it is doing.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

(90) All the powers of Convocation should be abolished with the single exception of its power to elect the Chancellor (para. 498).

(91) The Hebdomadal Council should be established by statute as the chief administrative body of the University (para. 504).

(92) The Hebdomadal Council should consist of:

- (i) the Chancellor,
- (ii) the Vice-Chancellor,
- (iii) the Vice-Chancellor-designate,
- (iv) the Vice-Chairman of the General Board,
- (v) the Vice-Chairman of the Council of the Colleges,
- (vi)-(vii) the Proctors,
- (viii)-(xxv) eighteen members of Congregation elected by Congregation, for six years at a time,

and the members should be entitled to some relief from their other activities if this is needed (paras. 506-9).

(93) No person should be permitted to serve as an elected member of Council after having served as a member (whether elected or *ex officio*) for twelve consecutive years; and no person who has served as a member for such a period should be eligible to become an elected member until after a lapse of at least two years since the end of that period (para. 508).

(94) The present rule by which a member of Council loses his seat if he fails to attend at least eighteen meetings in the year should continue in force, but with the proviso that it shall be in the discretion of Council to waive this rule when it feels that the experience a member gains during his absence is calculated to increase his usefulness to Council (para. 508).

(95) There should be a General Purposes Committee of Council consisting of:

- (i) the Vice-Chancellor,

- (ii) the Vice-Chancellor-designate, or if there be no Vice-Chancellor-designate a member of Council appointed by Council,
 - (iii) the Vice-Chairman of the General Board,
 - (iv) the Vice-Chairman of the Council of the Colleges,
 - (v)-(vii) three members of Council appointed by the Vice-Chancellor,
- and the names of the members of the committee should be published in the *Gazette* (para. 512).
- (96) Council should publish in the *Gazette* at the beginning of each Michaelmas Term the list of its committees, their chairmen, and all their members (para. 521).
- (97) Congregation alone should have the power to make statutes or to amend or repeal them (para. 525).
- (98) Council should be authorized by statute to make, amend, and repeal decrees, and to authorize other bodies to make, amend, and repeal regulations, giving detailed effect to the provisions of the statutes, provided that all such decrees and regulations are without force until published in the *Gazette* (para. 527).
- (99) Council alone should have the power to put legislation to Congregation (para. 529).
- (100) Congregation should have the power, provided those voting against the proposal of Council are in the majority and number at least seventy-five, to reject or amend a statute, Council having the power either to accept the amendment or to treat the passing of the amendment as equivalent to the rejection of the statute (para. 529).
- (101) The veto of the Proctors in Congregation should be dropped (para. 529).
- (102) In order to test opinion in Congregation, Council may submit resolutions at any time, and should always do so in Michaelmas Term in connexion with a statement by the Vice-Chancellor on the general progress of the University (para. 530).
- (103) The moving of resolutions from the floor on matters concerning the policy or the administration of the University should be continued, but the number of those required to launch such a debate should be raised from six to twenty (para. 532).
- (104) For the General Board and for the Council of the Colleges, and for them alone, there should be the right to require Council to put a point of difference to Congregation, and it should be decided there by vote (para. 534).

- (105) The University should adopt the statutes in the Statutory Appendix as its only statutes for the time being, and those of the present statutes which are not made obsolete by our recommendations should be deemed to have become decrees of Council (para. 536).
- (106) The Vice-Chancellor should hold office for four years (para. 540), and should not be re-eligible except in emergency (para. 542).
- (107) The Vice-Chancellorship should be regarded as a full-time job with his whole salary paid by the University (para. 542).
- (108) The successor to the Vice-Chancellor should be designated at least two years before the end of the term of office of the reigning Vice-Chancellor (para. 541).
- (109) Any member of Congregation should be eligible for selection as Vice-Chancellor, provided that he would not be over the age of 61 at the time when he would enter office as Vice-Chancellor (para. 543).
- (110) There should be a special Nominating Committee, under the chairmanship of the Vice-Chancellor, to designate the incoming Vice-Chancellor, the committee being composed of six representatives of Council and the six most recent ex-Proctors who are still members of Congregation (para. 545).
- (111) The Nominating Committee to designate the incoming Vice-Chancellor should submit a name to Council which should make the formal submission to the Chancellor, and the Chancellor should then send the nomination to Congregation for approval (para. 545).
- (112) The Vice-Chancellor-designate should be nominated in the same way as the Vice-Chancellor (para. 545).
- (113) Congregation should have the power to reject a nomination made by the Chancellor (para. 545).
- (114) Under the Vice-Chancellor as head of the administration there should be a single secretariat responsible for supplying the administrative services required by the central administration of the University (paras. 554 and 561).
- (115) The secretariat should be under one man, the Registrar, recognized as head of the administrative services and responsible under the Vice-Chancellor for the efficient organization and running of these services (paras. 554 and 555).
- (116) The Registrar and the other officials should be expected to act as advisers to the committees they serve and to their chairmen (para. 556).

(117) Under the Registrar there should be four senior officials at the head of the main divisions of the secretariat:

- (i) the Secretary for Administration,
- (ii) the Secretary of Faculties,
- (iii) the Secretary of the Chest Committee of Council,
- (iv) the Surveyor to the University (para. 557).

(118) One of the four senior officials of the secretariat should also be appointed as Deputy Registrar by the Vice-Chancellor (para. 558).

(119) The Registrar and the four senior officials should be appointed by Council (after consultation with the General Board in the case of the Secretary of Faculties); the appointment of other officials in the secretariat should be approved by the Vice-Chancellor (para. 559).

(120) Council and the Council of the Colleges should agree which of the officials, in addition to the five senior officials, should, in the interest of the service, be entitled to fellowships in colleges (para. 559).

(121) Council should examine the present administrative arrangements under which certain bodies are served by officers who are not members of the central secretariat (para. 561).

(122) A Chief Statistical Officer should be appointed to the department of the Secretary for Administration with the duty, under the Registrar and Council, of setting up a comprehensive statistical service; and he should be given such powers as may be necessary to provide a service which is efficient in itself and is an effective instrument of university policy (para. 565).

(123) Under Council the General Board should be the chief academic administrative body of the University, independent in that it has charge of academic activities inside Oxford but dependent upon Council for the general framework within which it operates (para. 569).

(124) The Vice-Chairmanship of the General Board should be regarded as a full-time post; it should carry with it an adequate salary and an office (paras. 569 and 574).

(125) The Vice-Chairman of the General Board should be elected by the members of the General Board every other year after the elections to the General Board, but should be re-eligible for the office without limitation so long as he continues to be a member of the board (para. 574).

(126) The General Board should consist of the Vice-Chancellor, one Proctor nominated by the Vice-Chancellor, ten elected members, and up to two co-opted members (para. 571).

(127) Each of the five new faculties should elect two members to the General Board (para. 572).

(128) Elected members of the General Board should hold their seats for four years and co-opted members for such periods as the board determines; members should be eligible to serve for up to eight continuous years, after which they should cease to be eligible until two years have elapsed; and they should have such relief as they may need from their normal duties (para. 574).

(129) There should be six statutory committees of the General Board:

- (i) the Finance and Appointments Committee,
- (ii) the Committee on Research,
- (iii) the Committee on Undergraduate Studies,
- (iv) the Committee on Postgraduate Studies,
- (v) the Committee on Libraries,
- (vi) the Committee on Extra-mural Activities (para. 575).

(130) The system by which the Bodleian, the Ashmolean, and the Taylorian have been Direct Grant Departments should be ended, and they should be financed through the General Board (para. 580).

(131) The total block grant for libraries should be allocated between the libraries by the General Board on the advice of its Finance and Appointments Committee after it has received the estimates of its Committee on Libraries (para. 580).

(132) Council should investigate ways in which the staff of the University and the staff of the Oxford College of Technology can be of assistance to each other (para. 584).

(133) The academic activities of Oxford should be divided into five faculties:

- (i) Theology, Philosophy, History, and Music,
- (ii) Languages and Literature, including Philology,
- (iii) Social Studies, including Law,
- (iv) Physical Sciences, including Mathematics and Geology,
- (v) Biological Sciences, including Medicine,

and every subject studied at Oxford should be brought under one or other of these five faculties (para. 588).

(134) Each of the five faculties should have a faculty board normally consisting of the chairman of each of the sub-faculty boards within the faculty and an equal number of persons elected by the faculty as a whole; at elections where there is more than one vacancy to be filled the electors should have one vote fewer than the number of vacancies (para. 589).

(135) Sub-faculty boards not exceeding eight in number should be set up under each faculty board (para. 591).

(136) Each faculty board should draw up lists of those in the faculty working in the fields covered by each sub-faculty board, those on each list forming the sub-faculty (para. 592).

(137) Sub-faculty boards should normally consist of six members where the number in the sub-faculty is less than twenty, eight where it is between twenty and forty, and ten where it is over forty, half being 'official' members elected by the whole sub-faculty from among the readers and professors, and half being 'ordinary' members elected from the whole sub-faculty by those members of the sub-faculty not qualified to be official members (para. 592).

(138) Chairmen of sub-faculty boards should hold office for two years (para. 589).

(139) Formal departmental committees should be set up in all scientific departments (para. 593); they should consist of six or eight members—half the places being filled by professors and readers (para. 594).

(140) A special Sub-faculty Board of Clinical Medicine should be constituted under the Faculty Board of Biological Sciences (para. 596).

(141) Each sub-faculty board should appoint either a committee or an individual to take responsibility for the care of postgraduates; and the chairmen of these committees, or the designated individuals, should form, under a chairman appointed by the faculty board, a Committee on Postgraduates for each faculty board (para. 600).

(142) The names of the chairmen of each of these Committees on Postgraduates of the sub-faculty boards and of the designated individuals should be published, and it should be made known where he will be at certain hours (para. 600).

(143) A Council of the Colleges should be set up consisting of the Vice-Chancellor as chairman *ex officio* and one representative of each of the full colleges; Lincoln, St. Cross, and Illey Colleges should each be entitled to send one representative who would have the right to speak but not to vote; the Council should have a secretary provided by the Secretary for Administration (para. 614).

(144) A Committee on Estimates and the Quinquennial Application should be set up consisting of the Vice-Chancellor and six members appointed from Council and the General Board in equal numbers, the vice-chairman being appointed by the Vice-Chancellor from the General Purposes Committee, to deal with forward budgeting, the principal annual allocations, and the capital programme (para. 621).

(145) A Chest Committee of Council, consisting of the Vice-Chancellor, a vice-chairman appointed by the Vice-Chancellor from the General

Purposes Committee, and not more than ten other members appointed by Council, should replace the Curators of the Chest (para. 623).

(146) Departments should be required to keep their accounts in a form approved by, and to produce their year-end accounts by a date fixed by, the Chest Committee of Council; and the Chest Office should have the power to take over the accounts of any department which does not fulfil its obligations (para. 626).

(147) The Building and Development Committee should be reconstituted as the Sites and Buildings Committee consisting of the Vice-Chancellor and six members appointed from Council and the General Board in equal numbers, the vice-chairman being appointed by the Vice-Chancellor from the Chest Committee of Council (para. 629).

(148) The Curators of the Bodleian Library should remain a statutory body; one curator should be elected by each of the five faculty boards and five should be elected by Congregation; two or three outside experts should always be co-opted; and the chairman should have the right of direct access to the Vice-Chancellor (para. 631).

(149) Council should institute a full-scale inquiry into the status, functions, and workings of the University Press (para. 632).

(150) Council, and where appropriate the General Board, should forthwith institute a review of all bodies not given a statutory basis in our scheme to decide which of them are necessary and which could appropriately have their work absorbed by the main boards or committees of the University (para. 633).

(151) All colleges, including the women's and the graduate colleges and the three new societies, should be incorporated into a new proctorial cycle so arranged as to bring the men's colleges and the new entrants to the scheme into a convenient partnership, the office of Assessor being abolished (para. 637).

(152) Candidates for the proctorship should have exceeded the age of 29 but not have exceeded the age of 46 on the day on which they would take up office (para. 638).

(153) Council should publish an annual summary of the University's accounts (para. 642); and should arrange for annual Oxford accounts to be drawn up in a form which permits comparison with those of other universities (para. 643).

CHAPTER VIII

FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY AND THE COLLEGES

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PART I. THE CONTRIBUTIONS SYSTEM

646. The present system of college contributions dates from the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge Act, 1877 (see Mr. H. H. Keen—*Written Evidence*, Part II, p. 20) and has remained substantially unchanged until the present day. The aim of the scheme was to secure an income for an inadequately endowed University from the colleges, which were relatively wealthy. The Royal Commission of 1871 calculated that in 1870-1 the total income of the University had been £48,589, while that of the colleges had been £397,015.

647. The statute of 1882 introduced a graduated contribution scale, with a top charge of 35 per cent. on net revenue over £20,000. Net revenue was arrived at by taking the gross income received from property, investments, and trusts, together with the rateable value of part of the college buildings, and deducting from it certain charges, the most important of which were rates, taxes, the management, repair, and improvement of properties, the repair of college buildings, the interest and repayment of capital in respect of loans, and pre-1877 statutory charges which had from time to time been laid on certain colleges for the maintenance of particular professorships, etc. The statute further provided that college contributions should be paid into the Common University Fund, where it would be available for university purposes (see *Statt. Tit. XIX, § 16—Statuta, 1965, p. 415*). The

Commissioners of 1922 recommended no substantial changes in what they regarded as a well-tried system.

648. Since 1945, the financial relationship of the University on the one hand and the colleges on the other has changed. By the early 1950's the University had become the rich partner; by 1962-3, 73 per cent. of the total income of Oxford (excluding board and lodging fees) was university income, and over 75 per cent. of the University's income came from the University Grants Committee and other government bodies such as the Research Councils. While the income of the University was rising rapidly as the result of government grants, the colleges were meeting considerable financial difficulties. Their external incomes throughout the 1940's had been held back by rent controls and by the limitations which then prevented investment in equities and largely confined the colleges to the holding of gilt-edged stock. It was in the light of this situation that the contributions statute was revised in 1959.

649. It was expected that this revision would reduce the income of the Common University Fund, which had been £102,000 in 1959, to about £75,000; it fell, in the event, to £42,000 in 1960. The reason for this was a defect in the statute, which allowed colleges to deduct the cost of work done under the Historic Buildings Appeal Fund but did not require them to bring in the grants from the fund as income; and the yield was further reduced by the fact that many colleges were heavily engaged in repairing and improving college buildings out of their own funds and spending heavily on their estates.

650. Recently, however, the attitude of Oxford towards college contributions has been changing. On 4 February 1965 the Vice-Chancellor wrote to the colleges asking them, pending a revision of the contributions statute, if they would voluntarily take a number of steps to increase the amount paid in contributions, in particular by refraining from deducting expenditure covered by the Historic Buildings Appeal Fund. The colleges responded to his request. The contribution to the Common University Fund in respect of 1964 rose by £95,000 over the previous year.

651. But the reasons behind the Vice-Chancellor's approach to the colleges lay not so much in dissatisfaction with the contributions statute itself, as with the desire to give greater effect to a general change of view about the purpose that ought to be served by a contributions scheme. The original aim, signified by the creation of the Common University Fund, had been that of giving financial aid to the University. But the Vice-Chancellor's letter of 4 February 1965 stated that 'the Common University Fund, into which college contributions are paid, has acquired an importance much greater than is apparent from its income in relation to general university

income. For it is the only source of income from which the University is free to give assistance to poorer colleges. Unless such assistance can be given on a substantial scale their position, now difficult, will inevitably become worse'. It is clear from evidence to us that there is now a unanimous view that the contributions system should be used for the purpose of providing aid for the poorer colleges. The first steps were taken in 1963: income grants of £2,000 a year began to be paid to the five women's colleges and to the four poorest men's colleges. In 1964, these grants were doubled for the women's colleges, and the payment began of annual capital grants out of the Common University Fund to the same nine colleges with the aim of building up their endowments. However, these capital grants were modest—£6,000 a year to the three poorest colleges, and £3,000 a year to the other six. A year later, the Vice-Chancellor's letter made it clear that any increase in the income of the Common University Fund resulting from his initiative would be allocated to the enlargement of capital grants to the poorer colleges, and this has in fact been done.

652. Why is such aid needed? The possession of an adequate endowment income by a college is no longer a luxury but a necessity. Without it a college is unable to carry out such essential academic tasks as the election of sufficient fellows for its teaching needs or the provision of an adequate library. Endowment income has become an assumed element in the financing of colleges. It contributes to some of the expenditure, such as that on salaries, which is met in other universities wholly by public money (see para. 362 above) and also makes possible development such as the provision of living accommodation which the University Grants Committee cannot see its way to meet. The average amount received from endowment income by the colleges in 1964 was about £210 per student. The whole financial structure of Oxford is geared to the receipt by the colleges of endowment income of this order just as, on a larger scale, the financial structure of the University, and indeed of all universities in this country, is dependent upon the receipt of income from the University Grants Committee. It therefore follows that a college with an inadequate endowment income is forced to operate on a different basis from that of the other members of the system. Hitherto it has been the weakness of the collegiate system in Oxford that a number of the colleges have been insufficiently endowed to achieve the level of financial security necessary for the unfettered and unharassed performance of their academic tasks. The very considerable achievements of such colleges have too often been at the expense of their fellows.

653. We think it important that the poorer colleges should be aided by means of a contributions scheme, financed by the richer colleges, rather than by direct financial aid from the University. Elsewhere in the report

we have emphasized the academic case for a large degree of college independence. Any considerable and direct flow of money from the University Grants Committee, through the University, to the colleges would inevitably erode much of that independence and create a new and different relationship between the University and the colleges. More damaging, there would be a tendency for two classes of college to emerge, the members of one directly dependent on subvention from the University, the members of the other still able to cover their needs from their endowment and fee incomes. There is, however, a more positive reason why the colleges should, through a contributions system, take on a collective responsibility for the financial aid of those colleges that are poorly endowed. Without such aid and co-operation, the collegiate system as a whole will fail to develop as it should, and no college, however wealthy, will in the end be unaffected. That this justification for assistance to the poorer colleges has been so widely accepted is a part of one of the most notable changes of opinion that has occurred in Oxford in recent years.

654. In their evidence, the Hebdomadal Council, the Curators of the Chest, and the colleges (*Written Evidence*, Part XII, pp. 18 and 44, and Part XIII) all condemned the existing contributions statute—Stat. TER. XIX, § 15 (*Statute*, 1965, p. 403). For this reason we do not propose to discuss its imperfection in detail. Council's evidence may be taken as indicative of general opinion: 'Council does not consider the present system of college contributions satisfactory. It does not provide an equitable pattern of contributions from the various colleges and manifestly does not yet produce a sum which would make a real difference to the poorer colleges. The annual total of contributions cannot be predicted with any confidence and is liable to fluctuate, so that effective planning of the use of the Common University Fund is hampered. The system is complicated and difficult to administer.' For the present, the worst features of the statute have been eliminated by the voluntary agreement of the colleges, following on the Vice-Chancellor's letter. But the statute itself remains unamended, and almost all the evidence before us was strongly in favour of a new statute which would be both fair and relatively simple in its operation.

655. A scheme which superficially appears to have much to commend it would end the need for a contributions system by pooling the endowments of all colleges with a division of the resulting income according to some automatic measure or the assessed needs of the colleges. This would bring the advantages of large-scale investment, and would do away at once with the contrast between richer and poorer colleges. We have, however, rejected this solution for we see no reason why all colleges should have identical resources. Provided these are adequate for all, we see no objection to some having more than others. Such a system would, moreover, greatly detract from the feeling of independence in each college; it would remove

any incentive on a college to increase its income by its own efforts; and would make difficult or impossible the adjustment of investments according to the particular needs of colleges for immediate income, capital appreciation, or the 'borrowing' of capital for building. It would also tend to impose an undesirable uniformity on the colleges and would remove, or at any rate reduce, the opportunities for colleges to experiment and innovate.

656. We are therefore in favour of a new contributions scheme which gives first priority to building up the endowment of the poorer colleges to the point at which they become economically viable and independent. The extension of income grants would do nothing to achieve this aim. The receiving colleges would come to depend on the grants, which would therefore have to be continued in perpetuity. The scheme which we propose aims first at giving to each college whose statutory endowment income (see para. 659 below) is at present less than £40,000 a year such a sum as would, on reasonable assumptions, be sufficient to bring its annual income up to that figure if the whole sum was invested and the present investments remained invested. On this basis, the thirteen recipient colleges in 1964 would have been Exeter, Hertford, Keble, Lady Margaret Hall, Pembroke, St. Anne's, St. Catherine's, St. Edmund Hall, St. Hilda's, St. Hugh's, St. Peter's, Somerville, and Worcester. Secondly, we propose that the newly founded societies (Linacre College, St. Cross College, and Ifley College) should also receive financial assistance from the contributions scheme. As with the existing colleges, the long-term aim should be to provide them with an adequate endowment, but their immediate needs are so pressing and their income from fees so comparatively small that, for the first few years at least, income rather than capital payments should be made to them. This should enable them to get off to a reasonable start. To do more would, in any case, greatly delay the achievement of the aim we have laid down as having the first priority—creating a reasonable endowment income for the poorer existing colleges.

657. It should be possible for these two long-term aims—the building-up of the endowment incomes of both the colleges and of the new societies—to be achieved within the next twenty years. We do not think that there is any need for prophecy about the uses to which a contributions system might then be made to serve, but we feel certain that new needs will arise and that they will have to be met. There will, for example, be the need to provide a capital endowment for the new colleges which, in our view, are likely to be needed before the end of the twenty-year period (see paras. 115-16 above). But there will no doubt be other developments, and colleges with substantial incomes from endowment must always expect to make such contributions as they can properly be asked to make out of their revenues' (Royal Commission of 1922, para. 234).

658. Having considered the evidence put before us on the form of a new contributions statute, we conclude that it should meet, as far as possible, five main requirements:

- (a) that the product of the contributions system should be at least £300,000 in respect of the college incomes for 1967-8, which is the sum which we think necessary to meet the needs outlined above;
- (b) that this sum should be raised in a way which would spread the burden as fairly as possible between the contributing colleges;
- (c) that the top rate of contribution should not be so high as to act as a brake on the expansion of the income of the richer colleges;
- (d) that the scheme should reduce to a minimum the opportunities for evading contribution;
- (e) that there should be provision for review of the scheme at stated intervals.

659. There are a number of methods by which contributions could be assessed. They could be calculated from:

- (a) the capital value of the revenue-producing assets of each college at specified times;
- (b) total income;
- (c) gross endowment income;
- (d) net endowment income, i.e. gross endowment income less the expenses actually incurred in earning it;
- (e) gross endowment income less certain 'conventional' or 'notional' expenses, i.e. a 'statutory' endowment income.

By 'endowment' income we mean the total 'investment' income of a college: the present exemption of interest on certain special funds seems to us wholly unreasonable.

660. Scheme (a) would have a number of obvious advantages, but they are not, in our opinion, sufficient to outweigh the difficulties inherent in such an immense task of valuation.

661. Scheme (b) has certain attractions; superficially it is simple to operate, and it would give a low top rate of contribution. In practice, however, it might be difficult to prevent colleges from netting-off certain items of income against certain items of expenditure. Furthermore, it is wrong in principle. Income from fees, the only other major source of college income apart from endowment income, is directly related to certain items of expenditure; the difference in the 'wealth' of colleges is reflected in the size of the endowment income.

662. Scheme (c) has the benefit of simplicity. It would also give low top rates of contribution and make forward calculation of the product an easier

matter. But it suffers from the objection that some types of income are necessarily subject to charges which other types of income are not: the gap between gross and net incomes from investment in securities is very small, while with urban housing it may be considerable. The adoption of such a scheme would therefore be unfair as between colleges, and might also lead to undesirable distortions of investment policy.

663. Scheme (d) would be, in essence, an overhauled version of the present statute. It would necessarily be complicated if true net incomes were to be the basis of assessment, and the complications would certainly grow through time as claims for new deductions were established. Experience has also shown that it makes the detection of evasion very difficult, e.g. in distinguishing between the repair and improvement of property, unless an elaborate system of investigation is established. There is the further objection to a net endowment system that it requires high rates of contribution.

664. Scheme (e) meets our requirements more satisfactorily than the other four. Unlike (c), it pays due regard to the ability of each college to pay from its particular variety of sources of income. Unlike (d), it eliminates almost all possibility of evasion. It makes it possible to achieve a product of £300,000 while setting a top rate of contribution of 25 per cent., which we regard as a satisfactory level.

665. We therefore recommend the adoption of the new college contributions statute given in the Statutory Appendix. We do not propose to discuss it in detail here. The key features of the scheme are two. The first is that it aims to produce £300,000 a year immediately. The second is that, leaving aside a small number of deductions, it takes the total gross endowment income of each college as the base on which contribution is assessed. All trust income, therefore, is included, whether it arises from internal or from external trusts, except where the trust deed provides that it has to be applied for purposes external to the college. The deductions which will be allowed from gross endowment income to produce the statutory endowment income on which the contribution will be assessed, are as follows:

- (a) A standard or conventional deduction of 20 per cent. from the gross income derived from agricultural land, and from any non-agricultural property let upon such terms that the tenant is not responsible for any structural repairs. We asked several organizations concerned with the management of property on a large scale what a reasonable deduction would be, and we appreciate that 20 per cent. is too high for some types of property and too low for others. However, we attach importance to keeping the allowable deductions as few and as simple as possible, and we have no doubt that our recommendation is a reasonable one;

- (b) sums paid by the college as rent for leasehold properties or as amortization of a lease premium;
- (c) mortgage interest;
- (d) such deductions as may be allowed by the College Contributions Committee (see para. 677 below) in respect of exceptional obligations; an example of this would be the statutory obligations of Christ Church, from its foundation, in connexion with the maintenance of the Cathedral in the college.

666. Apart from one or two special cases that may arise under (d), these deductions are confined to external expenditure. To have included internal expenditure on a conventional basis would have given rise to considerable difficulty in the assessment of each individual college. The difficulties could no doubt have been overcome, but we are agreed that to allow deductions for internal expenditure would not provide benefits sufficient to outweigh the disadvantage of the higher rates of contribution which they would necessitate. The central feature of our scheme is that it must provide a stated sum (£300,000 a year at the outset); the contribution rates must therefore be adjusted accordingly. Not to allow deductions for internal expenditure will give rise to some slight degree of inequity; but, since all colleges have buildings to maintain, the difference which such a deduction would make to the contribution actually paid by an individual college is diminished.

667. All colleges will be brought into the scheme either as receivers or contributors. The border-line for contributions will be a statutory endowment income of £40,000, which is also the statutory endowment income that the scheme is designed to provide for each of the poorer colleges. The contribution will be levied on the statutory endowment income at the following rates:

£	%
0-40,000	50%
40,001-50,000	5
50,001-75,000	10
75,001-100,000	15
100,001-150,000	20
150,001 and over	25

Table K gives an approximate calculation of the contribution which each college would have been called upon to make in respect of its income for 1964.

668. We also recommend that all colleges should be brought into the scheme on the same lines. We see no reason for a continuation of the 'graduated entry' arrangements made with the women's colleges, St. Peter's, and St. Catherine's under which they are liable to pay only a proportion of any assessed contribution during their first ten years as full

colleges. Under our recommendations they will be receivers rather than payers, but if they were to receive such munificent benefactions that they moved into the 'paying' range, we see no reason why they should not pay. Similarly, we see no reason for the continuation of the special arrangements which the University made in 1963 with Nuffield and St. Antony's by which, roughly speaking, these two colleges pay contributions on only two-fifths of the income on which they would have been assessed if they had come into the scheme on the same basis as the other colleges. The proportion of two-fifths was adopted because, on the basis of the Synopsis of College Accounts for 1961, the aggregate endowment income of all colleges for 1961 covered two-fifths of their total expenditure—the other three-fifths being covered mainly by internal income (see *Written Evidence*, Part XIV, p. 19, where Nuffield and St. Antony's set out in detail the history and nature of the present arrangements). However, it does not make good sense to us to continue to base a formula for these two colleges alone on an average of all colleges, when the proportion of internal to external income varies greatly between the colleges; and when in any case most of the internal income derived from fees and charges is obtainable only at the cost of a corresponding outlay on the provision of tuition and services.

669. For the future, it is desirable that one contributions system be applied to all. When we talked to the Vice-Chancellor and members of Council (*Oral Evidence*, Part 103, p. 49), they indicated that they would hope and expect any new contributions scheme to apply to all colleges without exceptions. The distinction between graduate and other colleges is becoming harder to draw in view of the fact that other colleges are admitting greater numbers of postgraduates and have set themselves to increase the amount of instruction, care, and facilities given to them; and we have recommended (Chapter IV) that they should do still more. We are aware of the desire of Nuffield and St. Antony's to provide facilities of a high standard for their postgraduates; but there can be no reason why the contributions system should be adjusted so as to make it easier for them alone to have such a choice. We are also aware that Nuffield and St. Antony's are both doing work and providing facilities that might otherwise be the responsibility of the University; but this we consider is irrelevant to the college contributions issue. If the University agrees that programmes of research for which it would normally take responsibility should be undertaken by a college, the University should meet its share of the cost by a specific payment to the college and not by way of an automatic and unquantified offset against college contributions designed to assist the poorer colleges.

670. We recommend that the whole sum raised by contributions should be made available for aid to the poorer colleges and the new societies, and that the aid to them now provided by the University should cease. The

effects of these recommendations on the University are further discussed in paras. 693-4 below. The capital grants being made to the poorer colleges in 1965-6 are £9,000 each to Keble and Somerville, £12,000 each to Hertford, Lady Margaret Hall, St. Edmund Hall, and St. Hugh's, and £20,000 each to St. Anne's, St. Hilda's, and St. Peter's. We recommend that the principal object of the new contributions system should be to bring the statutory endowment income of all colleges up to £40,000 a year. To qualify for a grant a college will need to have had an average annual statutory endowment income of less than £40,000 in 1965 and 1966. Four more colleges may, therefore, come to be added to the list, Exeter, Pembroke, St. Catherine's, and Worcester.

671. For the purposes of distribution, the grouping already used, which has been accepted by Congregation, is rather rough and ready, the colleges being grouped in income brackets below £12,000 a year, between £12,000 and £20,000, and above £20,000. It would be easy to devise a formula which would make distribution exactly proportionate to the difference between the present income of each college and the target income of £40,000 a year. But this would give the appearance of a greater precision to the scheme than we think is justified, since the fortunes of individual colleges will inevitably differ over the whole period, and we attach great importance to the machinery for regular review which we recommend in para. 677 below. We therefore think that some formula like the one already adopted, putting the colleges into groups and giving members of each group the same amount, will be sufficient, as long as it is understood that the distribution will be adjusted at regular intervals with the object of securing that all colleges reach their targets at roughly the same time. We recommend accordingly that the initial basis of distribution should be in the proportions of 1, 2, 3, and 5 parts to colleges whose present statutory endowment incomes fall in the groups (a) between £30,000 and £40,000, (b) between £20,000 and £30,000, (c) between £12,000 and £20,000, (d) below £12,000.

672. We recommend that the grants should be used entirely for endowment, that is to say, that they should not be used either for income or for building. But it would not be possible to ensure that this was done without a much more detailed control of the finances of the recipient colleges than we think is necessary or desirable. Further, we do not think it is possible for colleges so to plan their finance that they never have temporary deficits on their whole operations, nor to make plans for new buildings in such a way that they are certain before the buildings are started that no part of the cost will fall on endowments. We recommend therefore that the object of the distribution scheme should be to provide each college with such a sum as would bring its statutory endowment income in the average of the two years 1965 and 1966 to an annual income of £40,000, assuming

simple interest at 6 per cent. Thus each beneficiary will know in advance exactly how much it is going to get, but it will not know exactly how long it will be before it reaches the total, since this will depend on the income arising from the contributions statute: nor exactly what its endowment income will be at the time it has received the full amount, since this will depend on its own investment policy, on the benefactions it has received, and whether it has made any savings on its annual operations.

673. We recommend that colleges should not have the grant withdrawn if their incomes reach £40,000 before they have received the total sum due to them, nor should they receive extra grants if, having received all that is due to them, they fail to reach that figure. That is to say, they should not suffer from good management or good fortune, or gain from bad management or misfortune, during the period. But we do recommend that there should be the following safeguards:

- (a) The College Contributions Committee (see para. 677 below) should have power to call for any information it wishes from colleges, and should have the duty of reporting on any college which appears to be defeating the objects of the scheme by consistently running down its endowments, whether from these grants or from any other source. It would be open to all recipients to discuss with the committee temporary deficits, the finance for building schemes, and matters of this kind.
- (b) As soon as the statutory endowment income of any of the recipient colleges reaches the figure of £40,000, it should begin to pay contribution under the statute, though it would at the same time continue to receive the balance of the grant originally determined for it.
- (c) Any recipient receiving a very large benefaction which will add to its endowment income should, at the discretion of the Hebdomadal Council and the Council of the Colleges, lose all further claims to grants.

674. As regards income grants, we recommend that *Linaere*, *St. Cross*, and *Iffley* Colleges should each receive annual income grants of £20,000 a year for the next five years and that their position should then be reviewed. We also recommend that the present income grants of £4,000 a year to each of the women's colleges and of £2,000 a year to *Hertford*, *Keble*, *St. Edmund Hall*, and *St. Peter's* should be continued but should be reduced by one-tenth during each of the first five years of the scheme and then reviewed. During this time the other income of all these colleges will rise much faster than the fall which this will bring about, and it should be an object of the whole scheme to do away with income grants altogether.

675. It is likely that more foundations will be added to the list of full colleges in the future. We see clear that they ought to benefit from the

scheme in the same way as existing colleges, and should have the right to have their statutory endowment income brought up to £40,000 a year and to be considered for income grants. But it would seriously delay reaching the target for existing colleges if their shares of the money available for distribution had to be significantly reduced to provide shares for new entrants to bring their statutory endowment incomes up to £40,000 a year within the same period as existing colleges. Thus while new entrants should have the same ultimate rights as the initial entrants, the precise terms under which they are brought into the scheme should be settled by negotiation at the time of their entrance.

676. If our recommendations are adopted and the income from the new contributions statute reaches the total of £300,000, it will be seen that the income grants to the new colleges and to the existing recipients will amount to £88,000, leaving a sum of about £210,000 for distribution. On the formula recommended in para. 671 above, this would be distributed as follows:

	Each	Total
	£	£
Exeter, Pembroke, St. Catherine's,		
Worcester	6,000	24,000
Keele, Seneville	12,000	24,000
Hertford, Lady Margaret Hall,		
St. Edmund Hall, St. Hugh's	18,000	72,000
St. Anne's, St. Hilda's, St. Peter's	30,000	90,000
Total		<u>£210,000</u>

But clearly the amounts to be distributed in each year will depend on the proceeds of the new contributions statute, and we recommend that the College Contributions Committee (see next paragraph) should propose to the Hebdomadal Council each year, in the form of draft decrees, the exact amounts to be distributed, using our recommendations until such time as they have made new ones which have been adopted by Council as a result of their regular reviews.

677. We also recommend that responsibility for the management of the scheme, including the settlement of all disputes, be placed upon a statutory committee, to be called the College Contributions Committee. The committee should consist of the Vice-Chancellor and six other members, three appointed by the Hebdomadal Council and three by the Council of the Colleges. The Vice-Chancellor would be *ex officio* chairman, but as the committee would need to meet regularly to deal with the ordinary management of the scheme, he would normally appoint a deputy. A serious defect in the contributions scheme in the past has been the absence of machinery for the regular review of its working. We therefore recommend that this committee should review and report to its parent bodies on the operation of the scheme; this would be done at intervals not greater than five years.

We should expect the Vice-Chancellor to take the chair on the occasion of these reviews.

678. We recommended in Chapter V (para. 381) that the colleges, which now keep their accounts on the basis of the calendar year, should adopt the same financial year as the University, which, like all other universities in this country, follows the University Grants Committee's year of 1 August-31 July. This means that there will be a transitional period for which neither the present nor our proposed contributions statute, both of which are geared to the assessment of a full year's income, are suitable. We therefore recommend that, in respect of the period 1 January-31 July 1967, the colleges should each pay seven-twelfths of the contribution they paid in respect of 1966. The first year of the new system will be 1 August 1967-31 July 1968.

PART II. OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY AND THE COLLEGES

679. It has been part of our aim in making our recommendations about college contributions to simplify the financial arrangements between the University and the colleges. The present arrangements are briefly described in the following paragraphs. We must first explain, however, the distinction between the University General Fund, which is the University's basic income and expenditure account, and the Common University Fund into which college contributions are put. The income of the Common University Fund, except in so far as it is used for general university expenditure, is not included with the other income of the University either in the published accounts or in the returns to the University Grants Committee.

Payments by the University to the colleges

680. *Payments 'for services rendered'*. In 1956-7 a scheme was introduced under which the University began to make 'a contribution towards the cost of maintenance of college buildings from whose use the University derives advantage'. It was designed to cover the kind of accommodation that in other universities would have to be provided by the university, for example, lecture and seminar rooms. The annual expenditure by the colleges on the rates, insurance, and repair of this accommodation was estimated at £60,000, and this sum was divided between the colleges according to their rateable values. The long-drawn-out litigation over rateable values delayed a final settlement of the amount of payment, and the situation was further complicated by the Historic Buildings Appeal. In 1963-4 it was agreed that the money should be divided equally between the colleges. The amount so divided now stands at £80,000, and each college therefore receives £2,580 from the University General Fund.

681. *Library Grants.* The University pays to each college out of the University General Fund a grant amounting to one-half of the expenditure of the college from its own funds on the purchase of books or 30s. per undergraduate, whichever is the less. These grants were paid for the first time in 1959-60; they amounted to £9,400 in 1964-5.

682. *Loans to colleges.* Colleges can apply for assistance towards the cost of new buildings. This assistance, which is given either from the Common University Fund or from the Capital Development Fund, takes the form either of loans of up to £35,000 at 2 per cent. interest or of grants to cover the difference between 2 per cent. and the actual rate of interest on a loan (up to £35,000) raised from outside sources. At present some £216,000 is on loan from the Common University Fund, some £1,800 a year is being given as grants towards interest payments, and assistance with some £101,000 of further work has been promised to the end of 1966-7.

683. *Payments to the poorer colleges.*

(a) From the University General Fund:

- (i) Since 1962-3, £2,000 has been paid to each of the women's colleges as a contribution towards the emoluments of the head of the college.
- (ii) Since 1964-5, £2,000 has also been paid to each of the women's colleges for general educational purposes.

(b) From the Common University Fund:

- (i) Since 1963-4, £2,000 a year has been paid to Hertford, Keble, St. Edmund Hall, and St. Peter's for 'the purposes mentioned in *Statute Tit. XIX, § 16, cl. 3 (3) (ii)*' (*Statute, 1965, p. 416*), i.e. for general educational purposes. These grants have so far been authorized only for five years.
- (ii) Since 1963-4, £3,000 a year each has been paid to Hertford, Keble, Lady Margaret Hall, St. Edmund Hall, St. Hugh's, and Somerville, and £6,000 each to St. Anne's, St. Hilda's, and St. Peter's, also 'for the purposes mentioned in *Statute Tit. XIX, § 16, cl. 3 (3) (ii)*', but on the understanding that these sums will be treated as grants for the enlargement of the permanent endowment of the college. These grants also have so far been authorized for only five years.
- (iii) For 1965-6, in addition to the grants in (ii) above, £6,000 each has been paid to Keble and Somerville, £9,000 each to Hertford, Lady Margaret Hall, St. Edmund Hall, and St. Hugh's and £14,000 each to St. Anne's, St. Hilda's, and St. Peter's. These additional grants were made for one year only, on the grounds that there were problems about the basis of the distribution to poorer colleges which required careful examination before a decision was

taken about the distribution of the surplus arising from the contributions payable in respect of 1965.

684. *Payments to Linacre College.* Linacre College is technically a department of the University, and in 1964-5 it received from the University General Fund a grant of £7,700. In addition, certain items like rates and major repairs amounting to £7,300 were met from the University General Fund, so that the total of the grant and expenses was £15,000.

685. *Indirect assistance.*

- (a) Practically all tutorial fellows of colleges also hold a university post, just as a great many holders of university posts also hold tutorial fellowships. The point to be noted here is that £45,000 a year is taken from the Common University Fund towards the salaries of the 'CUF lecturers' (see Chapter IV); there were 310 of these in 1964-5, and the total cost of them was £415,000. Originally all CUF lecturers were paid wholly from this fund—hence their name.
- (b) The cost of supplementing certain pensions of those who retired before 1 August 1953 is met out of the Common University Fund. £2,000 was spent in this way in 1964-5.

Payments by the colleges to the University

686. *College contributions.* The present system has been described in Part I above. The result of the system in respect of 1964 was that the thirty-one colleges had a total countable income of £2,497,000; and allowable deductions came to £1,631,000. The total net revenue was thus £866,000; and the trust income excluded for assessment at special rates came to £255,000. Ten colleges were assessed at nil, three at less than £1,000 (total paid—£2,000), eleven at between £1,000 and £10,000 (total paid—£45,000), four at between £10,000 and £20,000 (total paid—£65,000), and three at over £20,000 (total paid—£103,000)—see Table K. The total paid by the colleges was thus £215,000; of this, £38,000 was covered by the 'statutory payments' (see next paragraph) and the remaining £177,000 was paid into the Common University Fund.

687. *Statutory payments.* Certain colleges have been charged at different times with contributing to the University towards the cost of certain posts. These contributions, which came to £38,000 in 1964-5, are payable to the University General Fund, but are counted as offsets against the college contribution payable. The payments therefore have no effect on the college, as its liability is limited to the amount it must pay by way of contribution; nor do they have any effect on the total amount received by the University; they affect only the university pocket into which the money is paid; the University General Fund gains at the expense of the Common University Fund.

688. *'Voluntary donations for university purposes.'* Any college may, with the consent of the Hebdomadal Council, make donations to the University for any purpose it chooses, and these donations are deductible in arriving at the college's net revenue. They do not count as offsets, like the statutory payments, so that, though the Common University Fund will be losing contributions at up to 35 per cent. on these donations, there is a net gain to the University from them. The amount involved is, however, not large; it was £4,000 in 1964-5.

689. *Other donations.* A college can make a donation to the University without asking for it to be regarded as a 'voluntary donation'. This does not happen frequently, but recently All Souls, Christ Church, St. John's, Merton, Brasenose, Corpus, Jesus, Lincoln, New, Queen's, Trinity, and University Colleges have offered between them £41,000 towards the cost of the founding of St. Cross and Iffley Colleges, and the first four colleges have also offered to pay between them £18,000 a year for ten years towards their running expenses. These contributions are, however, being made in anticipation of a revision of the college contributions statute, and if a revised statute providing for a higher level of contribution is approved, the colleges have reserved the right to reduce their contributions.

690. For the future we recommend that the payments 'for services rendered' should be continued at their present level, since the colleges do provide extensive facilities which the University would otherwise be required to build and maintain.

691. The case for the continuation of the library grants is not clear to us. This question, however, is tied up with the whole question of the co-ordination of the library provision of Oxford, and we therefore recommend that it should be remitted to the General Board's new Committee on Libraries (see para. 580 above).

692. The provision of loans to colleges is more difficult. The system by which loans have been made to colleges has undoubtedly been of the greatest assistance to them, but we do not wish to see college contributions diverted from their primary purpose of building up the endowment of the poorer colleges (see also para. 694 below), and we think the University's own building needs are likely to be such as to make it unreasonable for any part of its Capital Development Fund to be used in the future for college buildings. We therefore recommend that the existing part of the accumulated balance in the Common University Fund, which was built up out of college contributions in past years, now earmarked for loans to colleges, should continue to be used for this purpose, but that no further college contributions should be added to it.

693. It is now possible to calculate the effect upon the University of the changes we recommend in regard to the payments from the University to poorer colleges and the expenditure on general university purposes now met out of college contributions. Our recommendations in Part I (see especially para. 670) were that college contributions should in future be applied solely to the poorer colleges, including Linacre, St. Cross, and Ifley Colleges. This would mean that the University General Fund would have to meet the following expenditure now met from college contributions:

(a) contribution to salaries of CUF lecturers	£
	45,000
(b) supplementation of certain positions	2,000
(c) statutory payments towards the cost of certain posts	38,000
	<u>£85,000</u>

On the other hand, our recommendations would also mean that the University General Fund would be saved:

(i) payments to women's colleges	£
	20,000
(ii) payments to Linacre College	15,000
(iii) the savings on vacancies in professorships and statutory readerships (which now have to be paid into the Common University Fund). The amount varies, but in 1964-5 it was about	6,000
	<u>£41,000</u>

The net loss to the University General Fund would thus be about £44,000 a year.*

694. We attach the greatest importance to this assumption by the colleges of a collective responsibility for the poorer colleges, and we would regard it as diminishing this sense of responsibility if any part of the college contributions was taken for any other purpose. For the University, there is the very great advantage that it will be released from a burden, as regards both the existing poorer colleges and any further colleges that are founded in the future, which might have grown very heavy in years to come. We therefore recommend that the University should meet this £44,000 loss from other sources. It represents about 0.75 per cent. of the University's total expenditure, so that the University could easily make the necessary savings if it regarded the solution of the problem of the 'poor colleges' having priority. Otherwise, university dues might be raised from £4. 15s. a term to £6 or £6. 10s. a term.

* This calculation is over-simplified in that it takes no account of the effect on the University of our recommendations for changes in the fellow-lecturer system and for the introduction of payments for the chairmen and members of certain committees. The money saved by the University through no longer having to pay supervision fees to those holding permanent university appointments would naturally fall to be considered in that context. We have therefore in the calculation taken no account of the grants of £5,000 a year each we recommend in Chapter V should be paid by the University to Linacre, St. Cross, and Ifley Colleges out of this saving.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

(154) The new college contributions statute given in the Statutory Appendix should be adopted (para. 665).

(155) The special arrangements for the assessment of the contributions from the women's colleges, St. Peter's, St. Catherine's, Nuffield, and St. Antony's should be ended (para. 668).

(156) The whole sum raised by contributions should be made available for aid to the poorer colleges and the new societies, and the aid to them now provided by the University should cease (para. 670).

(157) The principal object of the new contributions system should be to bring the statutory endowment income of all colleges up to £40,000 a year (para. 670).

(158) Each college whose average annual statutory endowment income for 1965 and 1966 was less than £40,000 should be entitled to receive a capital sum sufficient to produce at 6 per cent. the difference between its average statutory endowment income and £40,000 (paras. 670 and 672).

(159) The sum available each year after paying the grants under recommendations (163) and (164) should be divided among the colleges qualified under recommendation (158); initially the sum should be divided on the basis of their average annual statutory endowment income for 1965 and 1966 as follows:

- (a) to those with an income of between £30,000 and £40,000—one part each;
- (b) to those with an income of between £20,000 and £30,000—two parts each;
- (c) to those with an income of between £12,000 and £20,000—three parts each;
- (d) to those with an income of less than £12,000—five parts each (para. 671).

(160) Grants made under recommendation (159) should be used entirely for endowment (para. 672).

(161) A college should not lose its right to grants under recommendation (159) if its statutory endowment income reaches £40,000 a year before it has received the whole of the sum due to it under recommendation (158) (unless it has received benefactions from other sources which in the opinion of the Hebdomadal Council and the Council of the Colleges are of a size sufficient to make it unreasonable for further grants to be made to it) but it should begin to pay contribution under the statute as soon as its statutory endowment income passes £40,000 a year (para. 673).

(162) A college should not be entitled to additional grants under recommendation (159) if its statutory endowment income is still below £40,000 a year after it has received the whole of the sum due to it under recommendation (158) (para. 673).

(163) For five years grants of £20,000 a year each for income purposes should be made to Linacre, St. Cross, and Ifley Colleges; their position should then be reviewed (para. 674).

(164) For five years the present grants for income purposes of £4,000 a year to each of the women's colleges and of £2,000 a year to Hertford, Keble, St. Edmund Hall, and St. Peter's should be continued, but they should be reduced by one-tenth during each year and then reviewed (para. 674).

(165) A statutory committee should be established, to be called the College Contributions Committee, consisting of the Vice-Chancellor, three members appointed by the Hebdomadal Council, and three members appointed by the Council of the Colleges, to conduct the working of the scheme, to settle all disputes, and to review and report on the whole contributions system at intervals not greater than five years; it should inquire into, and make recommendations about, the method of levying contributions and the objects and method of distributing the product; and it should report on any college which appears to be defeating the object of recommendation (160) (paras. 673, 676, and 677).

(166) The colleges should each pay in respect of the period 1 January-31 July 1967 seven-twelfths of the contribution they paid in respect of 1966 (para. 678).

(167) Payments by the University to the colleges 'for services rendered' should be continued at their present level (para. 690).

(168) The question of the continuation of the grants for college libraries should be remitted to the General Board's new Committee on Libraries (para. 691).

(169) The existing part of the accumulated balance in the Common University Fund now earmarked for loans to colleges should continue to be used for this purpose, but no further college contributions should be added to it (para. 692).

(170) The University should find the difference between the amount now paid into the University General Fund from college contributions and the amount now paid out of the University General Fund to poorer colleges, if necessary by an increase in university dues (para. 694).

