Black Candidates Facing White Electorates:
Racial Campaign Strategies in United States Senate Elections

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Table of Contents

Ch

1. Introduction……...5

2. The Deracialised Campaign Model…….16

3. Three Alternative Models of Racial Campaign Strategies……..22

4. The Symbolic-Historic Campaign Model:
   Edward Brooke and the 1966 Massachusetts Senate Election……. 34

5. The Symbolic-Historic Campaign Model:
   Michael Steele and the 2006 Maryland Senate Election……..48

6. The Crusade Campaign Model:
   Harvey Gantt and the 1990 North Carolina Senate Election……60

7. The Crusade Campaign Model:
   Carol Moseley Braun and the 1992 Illinois Senate Election……75

8. The Situationally Racialised Campaign Model:
   Harold Ford Jr and the 2006 Tennessee Senate Election……..…89

9. Conclusion…….…….108

Appendix A – List of Interviewees…….. 112
Appendix B – Racial Composition of Electorates……..……...114
Appendix C – Coding Scheme for Racial Content……..115

Bibliography…….120

Ch 1 – Introduction

Black electoral politics has undergone a profound transformation in the half century since African Americans statutorily secured equal voting rights with whites.[1] Once confined to a small number of exceptional cases, the population of black elected officials has multiplied dramatically. The genre which studies black politics has, likewise, vigorously proliferated, producing an abundance of scholarship on minority voter mobilisation,[2] voters' racial attitudes,[3] black substantive and descriptive representation,[4] racial districting,[5] and urban racial politics more generally.[6] In spite of these contributions, major theoretical deficiencies persist. In particular, the focus on majority-black jurisdictions has inhibited the study of black candidates operating in majority-white political contexts. The dominant model used to explain racial campaign strategies in these electoral environments is unsatisfying, premised on excessively narrow theoretical assumptions. Its underlying hypothesis, that successful black candidates discard their racial identity in order to win white votes, is not substantiated empirically. As a result, scholars still do not understand the role of race when black candidates face white electorates.

This thesis is an attempt to advance the scholarship through a major theoretical reconceptualisation of racial campaign strategies underpinned by original empirical research. I argue that the dominant model, known as the 'deracialised' campaign model, should be rejected. Empirically, my research throws many of the assumptions of the deracialised model into doubt. Instead, I propose three alternative models which describe the racial campaign strategies of black candidates facing majority-white electorates. The first model (the 'symbolic-historic' campaign model) maintains that in racially tolerant campaign contexts, black candidates can appeal to whites on the basis of the symbolic and historic significance of their election as a person of colour. The second model (the 'crusade' campaign

[1] For a state-by-state analysis of black voting rights in the South since the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, see the chapters in Davidson & Grofman (1994).
[2] E.g., Barreto et al (2004), Herron & Sekhon (2005), Washington (2006), Bedolla & Michelson (2012)
[3] E.g., Sniderman & Piazza (1993), Payne et al (2010), Piston (2010), Tesler (2013)
[4] E.g., Swain (1993), Cameron et al (1996), Mansbridge (1999), Dovi (2002), Tate (2003), James (2011), Davis et al (2011), Juenke & Preuhs (2012)
[5] E.g., Bullock (1987), Guinier (1991), Welch (1990), Swain (1993), Ingalls & Moore (1995), Cameron et al (1996), Canon, Shousen, & Sellers (1996)
[6] E.g., Fenno (2003), Cohen (2010), Perry (2013)

model) suggests that in racially hostile environments, black candidates can refer to their racial identity as a means to invite white support by establishing a symbolic contrast against their racially intolerant opponent. The third model (the 'situationally racialised' campaign model) argues that some black candidates will not appeal to whites on the basis of their black racial identity but will attempt to defy negative racial stereotypes about blacks by juxtaposing themselves against those stereotypes and by embracing symbols of white racial solidarity. In all three models, I argue that black candidates directly appeal to black voters on the basis of acknowledging their 'linked fate', which refers to the degree to which African Americans believe that their own self-interests are linked to the interests of their race.[7] In sum, this thesis argues that black candidates do not need to discard their racial identity in order to win white votes.

In this thesis, I substantiate the three models empirically with five detailed case studies of campaigns run by African American candidates in majority-white election environments. These case studies are a robust set of counterexamples which contest the central conclusion of the 'deracialised' campaign model. By showing that black candidates do not need to discard their racial identity in order to be electorally successful, they suggest that the deracialised campaign model needs substantial -- and possibly total -- revision.

I have limited my cases to black candidates running for the US Senate. There are several reasons why it is useful to focus on campaigns for this particular institution. The Senate has an abnormally low proportion of elected black representation compared to state legislatures and the US House of Representatives.[8] The overrepresentation of white voters by the Senate's unique electoral configuration is well-established.[9] Furthermore, because African Americans do not compose a

[7] Dawson, 1994, 736.
[8] The number popularly elected black senators serving in the Senate has never exceeded n=1, yet the number of African American state legislators has increased dramatically since the civil rights era. In the South, for example, black state legislators increased from n=3 in 1965 to n=320 in 2010. Today, the presence of African Americans in state legislatures across the country is largely reflective of their proportion in the state's population (r=0.96) (Donovan et al., 2012, 169-170).
[9] See Stephens (1996), Lee & Oppenheimer (1999), Griffin (2006), Malhotra & Raso (2007), Johnson, Oppenheimer, & Selin (2012).

majority population in any state,[10] the path to black senatorial representation necessitates that blacks seek the support of a substantial proportion of white voters.

Individual Senate campaigns are also likely to offer a particularly abundant supply of primary and secondary sources. Senate campaigns are high resource and high information campaigns, generating a substantial amount of campaign literature and paid political advertising.[11] They also receive more citizen and press attention than US House elections[12] and state legislative elections.[13] Because Senate elections have direct national implications, unlike gubernatorial elections, they tend to receive both national and local media coverage.[14] While party affiliation is a relevant factor in Senate campaigns, they are more candidate-centred than state legislative and US House elections.[15]

Among the studies of black candidates in majority-white jurisdictions, this thesis is the first to focus exclusively on black legislative candidates.[16] Limiting the study to campaigns for the same type of office, I argue, provides an essential control. Political scientists have long-argued that senatorial and gubernatorial elections are not viewed equally by the electorate. Joseph Schlesinger found that senators tend to accumulate electoral support with increasing years of service whereas governors tend to accumulate grievances.[17] Barbara Hinckley found that incumbency has a stronger electoral benefit for senators than for governors.[18] Raphael Sonenshein posits that whites will be more inclined to vote for a black legislative candidate than a black candidate for an executive office, such as governor or mayor, because of white apprehensions about awarding an African American the powers of patronage associated with executive office.[19] Until empirical research has addressed this hypothesis, I suggest that it is best to avoid cross-office comparisons.

[10] The state with largest black population is Mississippi, which is 36.2% African American, according to the 2010 US Census.
[11] Westlye, 1991, 17.
[12] Sellers, 2002.
[13] Glaser, 1996, Ch 2.
[14] Westlye, 1991, Ch 3.
[15] Ibid., Ch 1.
[16] cf. Perry (1996), Reeves (1997), Gillespie (2010), Nordin (2012), Perry (2014)
[17] Schlesinger, 1966, 68-69.
[18] Hinckley, 1970.
[19] Sonenshein, 1990, 229.

While the focus on Senate elections helps to control for office type, it also allows for variation in the political and cultural context. My sample includes elections in two southern states, one Midwestern state, one mid-Atlantic state, and one northeastern state. No black candidate has run for the Senate in a western state. I agree with Alan Ware that given the diversity of political and social practices in America, there is no 'typical' state.[20] A case-study approach takes this substantial contextual variation seriously. As I will demonstrate later, the racialised context of a campaign has important bearing on the form of racial strategy a candidate adopts. In addition to variation across cases, by focusing on Senate elections, I also find significant variation within cases because the large states in which most African Americans live are politically and culturally heterogeneous.[21]

It is important to clarify that I have not attempted to create a random or representative sample. Only nineteen African Americans have been nominated by the Democrats or Republicans to run for the Senate, and only four of these have been successfully elected.[22] It was not until 1990 that the Democrats even nominated an African American to run for the Senate. Due to the still-small population of potential cases, a large-N quantitative study was not possible or appropriate.[23] My sample is intended to include cases that are both empirically varied and theoretically challenging.[24]

I chose my cases to maximise theoretical leverage after applying several constraints. First, I eliminated those races in which the African American candidate had no realistic path to victory. None of my candidates received less than 44% of the vote, and all of them had a reasonable chance of defeating their white opponent. Even though they did not all win, Robert Smith includes all five of my candidates in his list of 'serious' black Senate candidates.[25] Second, I selected cases which differ sharply in terms of context, producing a most-different case design. Third, in a number of these cases,

[20] Ware, 1985, Ch 1.
[21] Johnson, Oppenheimer, & Selin, 2012.
[22] While other African Americans have served in the Senate, only four (Edward Brooke, Carol Moseley Braun, Barack Obama, Cory Booker) have been popularly elected to their posts. Two (Hiram Revels, Blanche Bruce) were appointed by scalawags in the Mississippi state legislature during Reconstruction. The others (Roland Burris, Mo Cowan, Tim Scott) were appointed by governors to fill vacated Senate seats following the resignation of another senator.
[23] For the potential pitfalls of randomisation in small populations, see Geddes (1990). For caution against the gratuitous expansion of sample size, see Collier, Mahoney, & Seawright (2004).
[24] See Fenno (1978, 254)'s practical discussion of creating a sample which demonstrates 'variety' but makes no claim to be 'representative'.
[25] Smith, 2009.

candidates have been misidentified by other scholars as running 'deracialised' campaigns.[26] Therefore, my analysis is in part a direct engagement with existing scholarship while also breaking new ground.

The first case is the 1966 Massachusetts senatorial campaign between Edward Brooke and Endicott Peabody. Scholars have long credited the victory of Brooke, America's first popularly elected black senator, to a deracialised campaign strategy in which both the candidate and electorate ignored racial matters.[27] However, through an in-depth analysis of internal polling reports, I have found that a proportion of the white electorate cited Brooke's race as the reason *for* supporting his candidacy. As internal campaign memos and my interviews with Senator Brooke and his campaign staff also suggest, the campaign was not unmindful of white desires to 'do the right thing' by electing a black candidate. Content analysis of campaign rhetoric has further strengthened this finding.

The second case is the 2006 Maryland senatorial campaign between Lieutenant Governor Michael Steele and US Representative Ben Cardin. Steele was the best-performing black Republican to stand for the Senate since Edward Brooke. Like Brooke, Steele possessed a strong racial identity which he discussed openly on the campaign trail. Through his campaign discourse and advertising output, Steele made the symbolic-historic status of his candidacy highly salient, and he attempted to appeal to voters on this basis. While Steele's appeals to African Americans have received extensive treatment in Tyson King-Meadows's work,[28] few commentators have considered Steele's racialised appeals to white voters. By triangulating content analysis of interviews, campaign advertisements, and newspaper reports, I found that some of Steele's racial appeals were in fact directed to white voters. Steele's racial authenticity was not only a subject of concern for blacks but also for some whites. Therefore, I argue that Steele's racial campaign strategy followed the symbolic-historic model.

[26] For Brooke, see Sonenshein (1990), Jeffries (1999), Nordin (2012). For Gantt, see Wilson (1993), Perry (1996), Prysby (1996), Gomolin et al (2007), Hajnal (2008). For Braun, see Tate (1997), Nordin (2012). For Ford, see Westen (2007), Smith (2009), Persons (2009), Gillespie (2010b).
[27] For this view see Sonenshein (1990), Jeffries (1999), Nordin (2012). Although 'deracialisation' as a theoretical construct had not yet been developed, Hartshorn (1973)'s assertion that Brooke ran a colour-blind campaign can be considered in the same category these other works.
[28] King-Meadows 2009, 2010.

The third case is the 1990 North Carolina senatorial campaign between Senator Jesse Helms and Harvey Gantt. Gantt, the former mayor of Charlotte, was the first black Democrat nominated to run for the Senate in US history. Unlike Brooke and Steele who faced liberal pro-civil rights opponents, Gantt's opponent held racially intolerant positions and engaged in racially antagonistic campaigning tactics.[29] Helms had begun his career supporting pro-segregation candidates and continued to oppose full racial equality throughout his life. The Gantt campaign, in my view, has been wrongly cast as 'deracialised'.[30] Gantt and his close advisors admit in interviews that they viewed Helms's racial intolerance as a useful juxtaposition. Gantt's campaign advertisements and rhetoric portrayed Helms as a bigot and a villain, while also highlighting Gantt's capacity to 'make history' and represent change. Gantt's campaign, I argue, fits the crusade model, presenting a contrast between 'Old South' racism and 'New South' racial tolerance.

Two years later, Illinois Democrat Carol Moseley Braun became the first and only black woman elected to the Senate. In spite of the historic significance of her election, Braun's campaign has been woefully understudied.[31] This is not surprising since it is very difficult to argue that Braun ran a 'deracialised' campaign. Her campaign adverts, for instance, explicitly mention her historic status. Simultaneously, campaign adverts and newspaper reports show that Braun's opponent Richard Williamson used racially charged attacks against her. Rather than ignore their racial content, Braun publicly denounced Williamson and the attacks as racist. The Braun campaign fits the crusade model rather than the symbolic-historic model because Braun's opponent was racially hostile and her response to his attacks was explicitly oppositional.

My final case is the 2006 Tennessee senatorial campaign between US Representative Harold Ford Jr and former mayor of Chattanooga Bob Corker. The Ford-Corker race presents the strongest *prima facie* evidence of a deracialised election strategy. Even when racially offensive attacks were made against him, Ford refused to condemn the attacks as racist or even acknowledge their racial content. In

[29] Based on analysis of the Jesse Helms folder in the Philip and Rosamund Davies US Elections Archive, Rothermere American Institute: Oxford University.
[30] See Wilson (1993), Perry (1996), Prysby (1996), Gomolin et al (2007), Hajnal (2008).
[31] The exceptions are Oden (1996), Tate (1997), Nordin (2012, 126-142).

spite of this apparent evidence of deracialisation, the Ford campaign shows the limits of the deracialised campaign model. It is first inappropriate to say that Ford's appeals to whites were 'deracialised'. In many cases, Ford's putatively 'deracialised' appeals were in fact highly racial. Ford implicitly acknowledged racial stereotypes through his attempts to juxtapose himself against them and to associate himself with symbols of white racial solidarity. Additionally, while the deracialised campaign model maintains that black candidates avoid racial appeals to blacks, I have uncovered a substantial amount of evidence to support the view that Ford made direct appeals to blacks on the basis of their shared racial identity. Therefore, I argue, Ford's campaign should be described as following the 'situationally racialised' model because of the divergent racial appeals he made to black and white audiences.

My case studies are based on extensive, original empirical research drawn from a collection of primary and secondary sources. In the summer of 2013, I organised two-months of field-work in five American states and Washington, DC to collect the original data which has been the lifeblood of this research project.

While in the United States, I conducted fifty interviews with Senate candidates and campaign staff. I was able to interview three of the candidates personally: Senator Edward Brooke, Senator Carol Moseley Braun, and Lieutenant Governor Michael Steele. In the cases of Gantt and Ford, while I was not able to interview the candidates directly, I did interview their campaign managers and other senior staff. These interviews served three important functions. First, they helped me to fill informational gaps which arose through my reading of secondary accounts of the campaigns and candidates. Second, the interviews helped me to establish the strategic intention of their message. Third, my interviewees offered interpretive insights regarding political culture and context which were critical to identifying both implicit and explicit racial cues. Where possible and appropriate, I have attributed quotations directly. Where anonymisation is necessary, I have given each interviewee a unique identifier, which consists of the initials of the candidate followed by a number. For example, 'HF4' refers to a particular interviewee from the Harold Ford campaign, whereas 'HF5' refers to a different interviewee from Ford's campaign.

Although useful for the aforementioned reasons, interview-based research can suffer from inaccurate reporting and exaggeration, as Oisín Tansey has rightly warned.[32] Therefore, it was important to supplement my research with other primary sources, including internal memoranda, internal and public opinion surveys, participant-observation studies,[33] autobiographies,[34] and interview transcripts.[35] Other primary sources include over 100 television advertisements, 50 printed leaflets, and 240 newspaper articles, which I manually coded for their racial content.

The sources were acquired primarily from archival collections at the Memphis Public Library, the Nashville Public Library, the Harold Washington Library in Chicago, the University of Chicago, the Chicago History Museum, the Library of Congress, Boston University, the John F Kennedy Presidential Library, the University of Oklahoma, and the Rothermere American Institute in Oxford University. Other pieces were acquired from individual collectors whom I met on my travels and from internet sources, including Youtube and the cache of now-defunct campaign websites.

In addition to rectifying a major shortcoming in the scholarly literature, I believe that this thesis studies a topic that deserves serious attention in its own right. Majority-white jurisdictions are increasingly important for the advancement of black elected representation for several reasons. First, the number of possible majority-black House districts has likely reached its ceiling,[36] as Carol Swain predicted twenty years ago.[37] Today, of the 27 majority-black House districts, only one (TN-09) is not represented by an African American. An increase in black representation will need to come from black electoral participation in non-majority-black areas. Second, most of America's highest elected offices (e.g., senator, governor, president) are chosen from majority-white jurisdictions. Therefore, if blacks aspire to occupy the highest political offices, they must be prepared to compete in majority-white election contexts. Finally, over 70% of African Americans live in majority-white House

[32] Tansey, 2007.
[33] For Brooke, see Hartshorn (1973). For Gantt, see Bollinger (1997). For Braun, see Harris (1999). For Ford, see Bakke (nd).
[34] Brooke (1966 & 2007), Ford (2010).
[35] For Brooke, see Hartshorn (1973). For Gantt, see Varley (1992).
[36] James, 2010.
[37] Swain, 1995, Ch 1.

districts,[38] with roughly only one third of blacks being represented by an African American in either chamber of Congress.[39] The view that majority-black districts guarantee sufficient representation for African Americans is misplaced.

I adopt the convention of using 'race' to refer to the following categories: black, white, Hispanic, Asian, and Native American.[40] Race itself is a social construct, and it therefore defies objective specification. Lawrence Bobo and Cybelle Fox define racial categories as 'historically contingent social constructions' whose 'distinctions or categorizations will vary in configuration and salience over time'.[41] In this thesis, I consider all of my candidates to be African American because they identify as such. Where possible, self-identification is the preferred mechanism to classify a person's race. While not denying the reality of physical differences, Bobo and Fox are careful to clarify that such differences are not enough objectively to constitute a racial category. Bobo and Fox hold that neither 'physical or biological markers…give ethnoracial categories their *social significance'* [emphasis added].[42]

Although the elected representation of other ethnic minority groups is a matter worthy of scholarly investigation, I have limited my inquiry to black representation. The black-white paradigm retains special relevance for several reasons. First, blacks and whites possess a unique historical relationship. As Michael Dawson explains, the key to African American social identity is rooted in the origins of slavery.[43] The slave history differentiates blacks from other groups such as Asian and Hispanic Americans who root their experience in a narrative of migration.[44] Second, African Americans continue to have clearly identifiable interests distinct from whites on a range of issues, including incarceration, education, unemployment, health, and wealth, as Desmond King and Rogers Smith powerfully showcase.[45] Third, black identity remains strong and politically relevant across class, gender, and age categories. Blacks' ideological coherence is stronger than any other racial group.

[38] Hajnal, 2009.
[39] Tate, 2003, Ch 1.
[40] See, for example, Cohen (2010).
[41] Bobo & Fox, 2003, 319.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Dawson, 1994, Ch 1.
[44] Boss, 2011.
[45] King & Smith, 2011.

Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders argue that the black-white political divide is 'without peer…Differences as drastic as these simply have no counterpart in studies of public opinion'.[46] Finally, due to the history of legally enforced segregation and enduring *de facto* segregation, blacks continue to be socially and politically isolated.[47]

While scholars should expect more black candidates to compete in non-traditional electoral arenas, including in majority-white environments, it should not be taken for granted that black descriptive representation is set to increase inexorably. In the Senate's one-hundred-year history as a popularly elected chamber,[48] only four African Americans have been elected. Only two blacks, Douglas Wilder and Deval Patrick, have ever been elected governor. The poverty of research on this topic has meant that commentators both inside and outside of the academy are failing to comprehend the nature of the new black politics. Many commentators, for example, were caught unable to explain the racial dimensions of Barack Obama's victory in the Iowa caucuses in January 2008, an election in which only 4% of the participants were African American.[49] As more black politicians compete for higher political offices, scholars need appropriately sophisticated models to assess the racial strategies deployed by candidates in these campaign environments. I hope that this text will go some way to providing the theoretical toolkit.

As a brief overview, the second chapter sets out the 'deracialised' campaign model and identifies its major shortcomings. The third chapter proposes three alternative models and establishes my methodological approach. In the proceeding chapters, I apply the models to each of my case studies. Chapters 4 and 5 explore the campaigns of Edward Brooke and Michael Steele respectively. I argue that both are paradigmatic examples of the symbolic-historic campaign model. Chapters 6 and 7 respectively analyse the crusade campaigns of Harvey Gantt and Carol Moseley Braun. Chapter 8 is a case study of Harold Ford's situationally racialised campaign in Tennessee in 2006. Finally, I

[46] Kinder & Sanders, 1996, 27.
[47] White, Laird, & Allen, forthcoming, 6-7.
[48] Before the ratification of the 17th Amendment in 1913, senators were appointed by state legislatures.
[49] Iowa Democratic Caucus Exit Poll, Edison/Mitofsky, January 2008.

conclude by summarising the findings, acknowledging the limits of my conclusions, and raising potential avenues for further scholarly exploration.

Ch 2 – The Deracialised Campaign Model

Most scholarship[50] on black electoral politics has presented two models of black candidacy: the 'racialised' campaign model[51] in majority-black constituencies and the 'deracialised' campaign model[52] in majority-white constituencies. Huey Perry described these two models as the 'twin pillars' of black electoral politics.[53] The majority-black racialised campaign is associated with black 'militancy' and anti-white rhetoric.[54] In contrast, the key features of the deracialised model include the offer of a 'race-neutral' policy programme,[55] the adoption of a 'non-threatening' political style,[56] and the avoidance of racial discourse in appeals to both black and white voters.[57] The model's central hypothesis is that white voters will not support a black candidate who overtly identifies with his or her black racial identity. In this chapter, I will argue that the deracialised model is theoretically unpersuasive. It relies on an excessively narrow conceptualisation of black-white voting patterns, and it crucially underestimates the inescapable presence of race in American politics.

In order to understand the model's theoretical assumptions, historical contextualisation is required. The concept of 'deracialisation' was first articulated in 1977 by the Columbia University political scientist Charles Hamilton. In his commentary, Hamilton proposed that the Democrats adopt a racially transcendent issue agenda and avoid racial language in their campaign discourse.[58] Hamilton's article was prompted by a request from the Democratic National Committee in 1976 in the context of the party's concerns over 'white backlash' to Democrats' racial equality legislation. A number of scholars have wrongly asserted that Hamilton's article was written to advise African American candidates on how they can win white support.[59] In fact, the piece was directed to *white* candidates who were

[50] E.g., Pettigrew & Alston (1988), Sonenshein (1990), Sigelman et al (1995), Canon et al (1996), Jeffries (1999), Smith (2009), Gillespie (2010b, 2012), Nordin (2012)
[51] For characteristic applications of the 'racialised' model, see Carton (1984), Swain (1995, Ch 3), Tate (2003), Fenno (1978, Ch 3; 2003).
[52] For characteristic applications of the 'deracialised' model, see Sonenshein (1990), Prysby (1996), Gillespie (2012).
[53] Perry, 1996a, xii.
[54] Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 1997, 483.
[55] Wilson, 1990.
[56] McCormick & Jones, 1993.
[57] Ibid., 76.
[58] Hamilton, 1977.
[59] E.g., Perry (1996a), Albritton et al (1996), Gillespie (2012)

worried that the Democrats had lost the support of racially intolerant white voters to Republicans.[60] This is a crucially important point. While it is reasonable to expect, as Hamilton did, that the role of race might be minimised in a mono-racial campaign between two white candidates, it is not obvious that race can equally be ignored in a biracial campaign in which a black candidate faces a white opponent. The scholars who later appropriated Hamilton's concept of deracialisation for black electoral politics overlooked this crucial distinction.

It was not until the 1990s that the concept of deracialisation was applied to an electoral model specifically for black politicians. On 7 November 1989, multiple African Americans were elected to major offices in non-majority-black jurisdictions.[61] Dubbed 'Black Tuesday',[62] this event served as a catalyst for intensified academic attention to the campaigns of black candidates facing white electorates. Influential contributions from this period include Georgia Persons's edited volume *Dilemmas of Black Politics*,[63] Huey Perry's edited volume *Race, Politics, and Governance in the United States*,[64] and several journal articles.[65] Empirically informed by the 'Black Tuesday' campaigns and others, these works endeavoured to set out the features of a deracialised campaign model for black candidates in majority-white jurisdictions.

In this context, they argued that a deracialised strategy was necessary to overcome white voters' reluctance to support a black office-seeker. Huey Perry predicted that if a black candidate failed to follow the deracialised strategy, then he or she would receive no more than 20% of the white vote.[66] Joseph McCormick and Charles Jones defined the deracialised campaign strategy as '[c]onducting a campaign in a stylistic fashion that defuses the polarizing effects of race by avoiding explicit reference to race-specific issues, while at the same time emphasizing those issues that are perceived as racially transcendent, thus mobilizing a broad segment of the electorate for the purposes of capturing

[60] Orey & Ricks, 2007, 326.
[61] Most significantly, Douglas Wilder was elected governor of Virginia. A number of mayors were also elected, including Norman Rice in Seattle, David Dinkins in New York, John Daniels in New Haven, and Chester Jenkins in Durham.
[62] McCormick, 1989.
[63] Persons, 1993.
[64] Perry, 1996.
[65] E.g., Sonenshein (1990), Strickland & Whicker (1992), Jeffries (1999)
[66] Perry, 1996b, 4.

or maintaining public office'.[67] They added that the strategy was 'needed to enhance effectively the likelihood of white electoral support in predominantly white political jurisdictions'.[68]

While there is no single expression of the deracialised campaign model, there are several generally agreed-upon features. Specifically, the deracialised model addresses three aspects of a political campaign: political style, mobilisation tactics, and issue agenda. First, the model holds that a black candidate must have a 'non-threatening',[69] 'mainstream'[70] political style. Second, it asserts that black candidates avoid the subject of race in campaign discourse, including when addressing black audiences.[71] Third, the model contends that the black candidate will focus on non-racial issues, avoiding policy matters which contain either implicit or explicit racial content.[72]

The first component of the deracialised campaign strategy is stylistic. Proponents of the deracialised model argue that black candidates facing white electorates must project a 'non-threatening' political style.[73] Ruth Strickland and Marcia Whicker argue that deracialised black candidates will adopt 'a quiet, conciliatory style' when they campaign.[74] They suggest that when a black candidate discusses controversial political issues, he or she must do so in 'a mild and reassuring tone'.[75] The idea of needing to adopt a 'non-threatening' political style, however, is problematic. I argue that it unfairly privileges white cultural norms as 'mainstream' against deviant black behaviour. It also relies on an objectionable stereotype of blacks as violent or intimidating. Third, it bears an unwelcome resemblance to the image of the shuffling, deferential black man which was adopted as a form of self-defence against lynching.[76] The deracialised campaign model's proponents do not supply evidence for these assumptions about black candidates. They simply take the racist stereotypes as self-evident.

[67] McCormick & Jones, 1993, 76.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Wilson, 1993, 176.
[71] Strickland & Whicker, 1992, 209.
[72] Wilson, 1990.
[73] McCormick & Jones, 1993, 76.
[74] Strickland & Whicker, 1992, 208.
[75] Ibid., 209.
[76] Williamson, 1997.

The second aspect of the deracialised campaign model relates to mobilisation tactics. Andrew Hacker argues that 'most black voters support the black candidate and most whites rally behind the white'.[77] Adopting this perspective, Strickland and Whicker argue that black candidates facing white electorates must do their utmost 'to distract voters from the issue of race'.[78] The deracialised model holds that black candidates will not mention race in the campaign, even when challenged to do so by supporters, their opponent, or the media. In short, racial appeals will not be made by the black candidate to either white or black voters.

This component of the model relies on an impoverished and highly deterministic conception of black-white voting behaviour. Ecological evidence has existed since Edward Brooke's election as Massachusetts attorney general in 1962 that a black candidate can command a majority of the white vote.[79] The model discounts the possibility that racially liberal whites might be convinced to vote for a black candidate on the basis of the candidate's black racial identity. While Franklin Gilliam observed that conservative white Democrats' political participation declined after the election of a black mayor, he detected no evidence of decline among liberal white Democrats.[80] This suggests that whites respond differently to black candidates and not necessarily in a negative fashion. I have found that the symbolic significance of a candidate's minority status is a powerful motivator for some white voters. Some black candidates in majority-white election environments have constructed a racialised election strategy to meet these aspirations.

The model's flawed assumption about white unwillingness to vote for black candidates is mirrored by the model's equally problematic assumption that black voters will support black candidates unthinkingly. Strickland and Whicker argue, 'Blacks are noticeably more supportive of black candidates than are whites'.[81] Therefore, as McCormick and Jones argue, black candidates can easily

[77] Hacker, 2003, 233.
[78] Strickland & Whicker, 1992, 209.
[79] There is also ecological evidence from the nineteenth century of black candidates winning a majority of white support. In 1866, African Americans Edward Walker and Charles Mitchell were both elected to the Massachusetts state legislature from overwhelmingly majority-white districts.
[80] Gilliam, 1996.
[81] Strickland & Whicker, 1992, 205.

'avoid employing direct racial appeals in organizing the black community'.[82] This view patronisingly assumes that black candidates can take the support of the black electorate for granted. Yet, in a number of significant campaigns, black voters have supported a white candidate over an African American. For example, Atlanta mayor Andrew Young failed to receive a majority of the black vote when he faced Zell Miller in the 1990 Georgia Democratic primary for governor.[83] Three quarters of African Americans backed Jewish congressman Ben Cardin over Michael Steele in the 2006 Maryland senatorial election. Andra Gillespie and Emma Tolbert found that white voters were more likely than black voters to support their new black congressman Artur Davis after redistricting.[84] I argue that appeals to black voters can be extremely important in closely fought campaigns. When African Americans count for a substantial proportion of the electorate, their level of turnout can prove decisive to the result. Therefore, the model fails to take seriously direct racial appeals to black voters.

The third component of the deracialised campaign model refers to the candidate's issue agenda. Proponents argue that black candidates should avoid explicitly racial issues. McCormick argues that '[t]he essence of this political strategy is that its proponents [i.e. black candidates] would seek to deemphasize those issues that may be viewed in explicitly racial terms'.[85] Additionally, William Wilson argues that blacks should also avoid issues with implicit racial content by adopting a 'race-neutral' policy programme.[86] Yet, as the work of Desmond King and Rogers Smith demonstrates, racial inequalities are still pervasive in most aspects of American life.[87] It is, thus, questionable that any major policy concern can be said to be truly 'race-neutral', particularly when articulated by a black candidate. Therefore, the notion that any black candidate in a majority-white campaign context can be said to be 'deracialised' is unconvincing. In biracial contests, race is inherently a factor. Race is present not just in people's ultimate voting decisions but is embedded in the campaign battle itself.

[82] McCormick & Jones, 1993, 76.
[83] Pierannuzi & Hutcheson, 1996.
[84] Gillespie & Tolbert, 2010.
[85] McCormick, 1989, 7.
[86] Wilson, 1990.
[87] King & Smith, 2011.

Several scholars have been highly critical of the deracialised electoral strategy from a normative perspective.[88] While Perry believes in the accuracy of the model, he admits that it is controversial because it assumes that blacks, the victims of racial oppression, must make themselves acceptable to whites, the perpetrators of racial oppression, in order to be politically successful.[89] Zaphon Wilson forwards the very problematic idea that deracialisation is an effort by black politicians to offer a 'more mainstream' appeal,[90] which I argue privileges white politics as 'mainstream'. As Cathy Cohen has written, black efforts to fit into 'mainstream' society usually involve adherence to dominant white norms which facilitate inaccurate, incomplete, and unfair pathologies about black culture and society.[91]

The deracialised model, conceived on a defective reading of Charles Hamilton's 1977 advice to white politicians, does not capture the complexities of black-white political relations nor does it fully acknowledge the inescapable presence of race when black candidates compete in majority-white contexts. In the next chapter, I offer three alternatives to the deracialised campaign model. In addition to rectifying the problematic assumptions of the deracialised model, they also take context and agency more seriously by acknowledging the possibility of differential appeals within varying racial settings.

[88] Smith, 1990.
[89] Perry, 1996b.
[90] Wilson, 1993, 176.
[91] Cohen, 2010, Ch 1.

Ch 3 - Three Alternative Models of Racial Campaign Strategies

Due to its unconvincing theoretical foundations, the deracialised campaign model should be replaced. In this chapter, I offer three alternative models of black candidacy in majority-white election environments. I will first summarise each model and then explain the methodological approach that I used to identify which model applied to each of my five case studies. I intend to falsify the deracialised campaign model's basic hypothesis that black candidates must discard their racial identity in order to be electorally successful in majority-white election environments. I argue that deracialisation is not always essential, possible, or desirable for African American candidates when facing majority-white electorates.

Three Alternative Models

Symbolic-Historic Campaign Model

The first model is the 'symbolic-historic' campaign model. It refers to campaigns in racially tolerant environments in which a black candidate invites white support on the basis of his or her racial identity. For some whites, the desire to 'make history' or demonstrate their racial tolerance by electing an African American to office is an important and potentially decisive factor in their decision to support a black candidate. Furthermore, the election of an African American to major office can be seen as representing 'change' and a fundamentally new form of leadership. In this model, candidates speak openly about their racial identity, include racialised issues in their policy agenda, and mobilise some white supporters on the basis of 'making history', 'representing change', or 'doing the right thing'.

This model runs contrary to the common assumption that whites react negatively to a black candidate who speaks about race. Nearly all commentators assume that an African American candidate will be received hostilely by white voters. Charlton McIlwain and Stephen Caliendo admit that they 'take it

for granted' that alerting voters to a black candidate's race primes negative racial attitudes.[92] Very few commentators have considered the possibility that white voters might be *more* favourable to a black candidate *because* he or she is black.[93]

It is important to clarify that the symbolic-historic campaign model is not tokenism. I take it for granted that black candidates must meet the minimum qualifications for office which white candidates must also satisfy. Alongside their substantive qualifications, however, black candidates can fulfil a meaningful symbolic role. Richard Fenno suggests that on a symbolic level most African American politicians provide 'something less than substantive representation and something more than descriptive representation'.[94] When they run for an office which has never been occupied by an African American before, as Dennis Nordin rightly observes, they inescapably fill the role of being one of 'the pioneering members of their race'.[95]

Crusade Campaign Model

The second model is the 'crusade' campaign model. This model takes seriously enduring racial hostilities in American society. Unlike the symbolic-historic campaign, the crusade campaign operates within a racially antagonistic electoral setting. In many parts of the United States, racial hostility towards blacks is an enduring reality. In some campaigns, white candidates attempt to prime racial hostility for electoral advantage. 'Priming' in this context refers to the ways in which stimuli, such as racial cues in advertisements, can make latent racial attitudes and beliefs more accessible. An antagonistic press can also amplify the opponent's criticisms. Similar to the symbolic-historic candidacy, 'crusade' candidates speak openly about their racial identity and include racialised issues in their policy agenda. The model is distinct from the symbolic-historic model because appeals to whites involve a sharply defined contrast between themselves and their racially intolerant opponent. By being obliged to choose between two racially polarised candidates, whites are invited to indicate on which side of the racial battleground they wish to take their stand.

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[92] McIlwain & Caliendo, 2011, Ch 4.
[93] McIlwain & Caliendo (2011) consider this possibility, but they dismiss it as a post-Obama effect.
[94] Fenno, 2003, 35.
[95] Nordin, 2012, 109.

This model runs contrary to the assumption that an opponent's priming of negative racial stereotypes will be harmful to the black candidate. Ruth Strickland and Marcia Whicker contend that whites vote according to their racial prejudices, which are inherently anti-black, when they perceive a 'racial threat'. Therefore, it is to the advantage of white candidates to raise the spectre of blacks taking political, social, or economic power away from whites.[96] Nordin suggests that the white candidate controls the presence of racial stereotypes in the campaign, with potentially devastating consequences for the black candidate.[97] However, I argue that racial hostility does not necessarily damage the black candidate. In one experiment, McIlwain and Caliendo exposed a sample of over one-hundred white respondents to contrasting adverts in biracial contests between white and black candidates. They found that if a respondent felt that race had been used unfairly against the black candidate by his or her white opponent, then the respondent was more inclined to support the black candidate.[98] This suggests that under some circumstances, a racially hostile white opponent can be to the electoral benefit of a black candidate.

Situationally Racialised Campaign Model

The third model is the 'situationally racialised' campaign model. It refers to the strategy of deploying divergent (and mutually incompatible) racial appeals depending on the race of the intended audience. Specifically, black candidates attempt to raise the salience of the feeling of linked fate among blacks while they emphasise to white voters their differences from 'traditional' black politicians. Additionally, candidates in this model promote symbols of *white* racial solidarity to white audiences. Politicians who follow this model walk a delicate tightrope between the need to show racial solidarity to black constituents while affirming their sympathetic disposition to white racial prejudices.

I contend that appeals which appear to be 'race-neutral' can contain implicit racial content. Andra Gillespie argues that 'deracialised' black politicians often juxtapose themselves against negative stereotypes of African Americans in order to prove to whites that they are not like 'other' black

[96] Strickland & Whicker, 1992.
[97] Nordin, 2012, Ch 4.
[98] McIlwain & Caliendo, 2011.

politicians.[99] I argue that, in doing so, they are often guilty of amplifying the negative anti-black stereotypes. For example, a black candidate who does not want to be vulnerable to stereotypes about blacks and criminality might adopt an extremely hard-line approach to criminal justice. Yet, in doing so, he or she implicitly concedes to the view that most black politicians are 'soft' on crime.

Furthermore, black candidates can appeal to whites on the basis of white racial solidarity. I agree with Deborah Schildkraut that the political implications of white racial group solidarity are poorly understood.[100] I posit that some black candidates might embrace symbols of white racial solidarity, such as the Confederate flag, or predominantly white issue positions, such as opposition to integration or affirmative action, in order to appeal to white voters. Rather than see these as 'race-neutral' appeals, however, I argue that we should instead see them as racially conscious.

The situationally racialised model involves making appeals to blacks and whites which are often at odds. For example, before a white audience, the black candidate might argue that the symbolic-historic significance of his or her candidacy is irrelevant, but to an African American audience he or she might call on them to help make history. I argue that the deployment of divergent and mutually incompatible racial appeals is made possible by the lack of shared associational life between whites and blacks in America. Michael Dawson argues persuasively that segregation and inequality have entrenched a racialised public sphere. African Americans have developed a 'black counter-public', which includes black churches, black press and radio, and black social and community organisations.[101] In other words, whites do not attend black churches;[102] they do not read or listen to the black media;[103] and they do not live with blacks.[104] Black candidates can plausibly make appeals to blacks which are at odds with the racial content of their appeals to whites because, as James Glaser also argues, 'whites simply do not hear the…message directed towards blacks'.[105]

[99] Gillespie, 2012.
[100] Schildkraut, 2013, 21.
[101] Dawson, 2001, 27.
[102] Harris, 1999.
[103] Glaser, 1996, 7.
[104] Cohen, 2010, Ch 6.
[105] Glaser, 1996, 77.

This model possesses a superficial resemblance to Sekou Franklin's concept of 'situational deracialisation' in that it admits the possibility of divergent racial appeals.[106] However, it differs profoundly in that Franklin preserves the deracialised strategy in majority-white contexts, while my model rejects it outright. In my view, the 'deracialised' approach is fundamentally unrealistic due to the enduring racial inequalities and latent racial tensions in American society. I agree with Michael Clemons that 'race will become a factor whenever black candidates run for office'.[107]

Black Voter Mobilisation

In all three models, I argue that black candidates appeal to black voters on the basis of their linked fate. As developed by Dawson, linked fate refers to the degree to which African Americans believe that their own self-interests are linked to the interests of their race.[108] In politics, linked fate manifests itself when black voters perceive that a black politician can credibly act as a representative of their community. In his study of black members of the House of Representatives, Fenno describes the sense of linked fate as being achieved when black constituents believe that their representative's 'achievements, his inclusion, his influence is also their achievement, their inclusion, their influence…He is a symbol of their aspirations, their struggles, and their progress'.[109] US Representative Louis Stokes captured these sentiments when he stated, 'When I vote my conscience as a black man, I vote right for my district'.[110]

In order to make a credible claim to linked fate, a politician's skin colour is insufficient. As one black preacher told his congregation in the 2006 Maryland senatorial contest, 'Everyone who's your color is not your kind…All your skinfolk is not your kinfolk'.[111] Using data from the 1996 National Black Election Study, Jas Sullivan found that African Americans' evaluations of black politicians varied according to their perception of the politicians' attitudes and beliefs about black identity.[112] Black

[106] Franklin, 2010, 215.
[107] Clemons, 1998, 224.
[108] Dawson, 1994, 736.
[109] Fenno, 2003, 141.
[110] Louis Stokes, quoted in Fenno (2003:36).
[111] Delman Coates, quoted in 'Politics from the pulpits', *Washington Times*, 6 November 2006.
[112] Sullivan, 2009.

candidates, therefore, must demonstrate their 'authentic' connection with the black community through signals other than skin colour, such as cultural references,[113] family,[114] linguistic conventions,[115] and church attendance.[116]

Methodology

In order to determine which model applied to each of my case studies, I gathered evidence of the presence or absence of the aforementioned characteristics through multiple public and non-public sources. I then analysed their content and interpreted the ways in which each candidate's appeals aligned with my models. In addition, I studied the biographies of each candidate and the nature of their interaction with their opponent. I did this in order to establish the candidate's racial identity and the racialised context of the campaign environment.

Establish Racial Identity

Before studying the racial appeals made by the candidates, it was first important to establish their racial identity. Racial identity implies a consciousness of the self belonging within a certain group.[117] Identifying a person's racial identity is necessarily a highly interpretive exercise, and I relied primarily on the candidate's own self-identification and personal biography. I found that all of the candidates in my five cases possessed a strongly-held black racial identity.

I devised three indicators of black racial identity. The first indicator was racial upbringing. Childhood socialisation plays a very important role in identity formation.[118] I reasoned that a person who grew up primarily in the black community and who had little interaction with whites was likely to perceive himself or herself as having been a member of the black community from a young age.

A second indicator was education. Due to the history of legal segregation and continued *de facto* housing segregation, most black children are educated with other black children at their local state

[113] Cohen, 2010, 210.
[114] Gillespie, 2009, 35.
[115] Cohen, 2010, 210.
[116] Dawson (1994, Ch 1-3), Harris (1999).
[117] Boss, 2011.
[118] Demo & Hughes, 1990, 365.

school.[119] Furthermore, the presence of majority-black educational associations, such as black fraternities and sororities, and historically black universities enable African Americans to preserve their linkages with the black community in higher education.[120] A high level of education by no means implies separation from black racial identity. Dawson found that better educated blacks expressed a *stronger* sense of racial solidarity in surveys than blacks with a lower educational level.[121]

The third indicator is associational life. I reasoned that a person who socialised with other African Americans was likely to feel some sense of connection with the black community. I designated membership in a black social or political organisation, such as the NAACP, as an indication of a person's sense of racial solidarity. I also saw membership of a black church, the strongest associational institution in the black community,[122] as a particularly powerful indicator. Although the definition of 'the black church' is contested, I use it to mean the imprecisely defined network of predominantly black Christian congregations led by African American ministers. Eric Lincoln and Lawrence Mamiya call the black church 'the cultural womb of the black community',[123] and Melissa Harris-Lacewell writes that 'one attends a black church both to worship God and to be with other black people'.[124]

The extent to which class is an indicator of black racial identity is contested. Although I had originally considered including a working-class background as an indicator of black racial identity, I ultimately rejected it. It is true that most blacks are working-class.[125] However, it is not the case that membership in the middle-class signals a loss of solidaristic ties with other, less affluent blacks. As National Black Election Studies data demonstrate, sentiments of racial solidarity are remarkably strong among African Americans regardless of socioeconomic status.[126] Middle-class blacks maintain ties to their racial community through a number of means. In some cases, their physical presence in predominantly black communities is retained through activities as mundane as going to a black

[119] *E Pluribus Separation*, Civil Rights Project, 9.
[120] Sidanius et al, 2004.
[121] Dawson, 1994, 138.
[122] See Lincoln & Mamiya (1990), Harris (1999), Harris-Lacewell (2004).
[123] Lincoln & Mamiya, 1990.
[124] Harris-Lacewell, 2004, 8.
[125] Dawson, 1994, Ch 2.
[126] Ibid.

barbershop or a black church.[127] Their continued experience of racial discrimination also contributes to the sense that their fate is tied to the fate of other blacks.

Identify Racialised Appeals

In order to establish the ways in which a black candidate navigated race in their election campaign, I first I analysed the content of the candidate's public discourse, including publicly recorded speeches, press conferences, printed and televised advertisements, and other campaign ephemera. Stylistically, I identified allusions to the candidate's racial identity and symbolic-historic status, such as appeals to 'make history', 'do the right thing', or 'make us proud'. In addition to explicit references to their race, I also identified implicit references, such as the use of the first-person plural when referring to the black community. When addressing black audiences, I also searched for the use of linguistic conventions which would signal membership in the community.

To understand the strategic intention of the public discourse, I analysed non-public content, such as interviews, autobiographies, and internal memoranda. I was interested in how the candidates and their senior staff interpreted the racial content of their public comments. I also wanted to see whether they strategically downplayed or emphasised certain racialised issues or characteristics.

In addition to verbal presentation, I analysed the organisational setting of the campaign, relations with the black and white media, and the location of campaign events. I studied the candidates' volunteer networks, their office locations, and their get-out-the-vote operations. I also searched for campaign activities within the black 'counter-public' sphere.

Finally, I dissected the issue agendas of the candidates. The deracialised campaign model holds that African American candidates will avoid discussion of issues with implicit or explicit racial content. I found that in several cases black candidates were not only willing to address policies with an implicitly racial content, but they also addressed explicitly racial policy concerns. Far from avoiding these policies because of their race, for some black politicians, their racial status provided an opportunity to discuss these issues credibly with both black and white voters.

[127] Harris-Lacewell, 2004, 9.

Analyse Interaction with Opponent


It was also important for me to establish whether the candidate faced a racially hostile or tolerant opponent. For moral or strategic reasons, some white candidates did not attempt to raise the saliency of race. Others, however, attempted to prime negative racial attitudes and hostilities against their black opponents. In order to identify racial priming, I measured the frequency of racial stereotypes, racial cues, and racially sensitive policy issues in white candidates' advertising output. I will briefly define each set. I generated these sets based on racial primes which are well-established elsewhere in the black electoral politics literature.[128] Appendix C contains a full detailed presentation of the coding scheme, and the case study chapters will bring out more fully how racial priming manifested in practice.

The first set was racial stereotypes. Although racial stereotypes can feature in campaigns between two white candidates,[129] I agree with Georgia Persons that black candidates are 'uniquely vulnerable' to the use of racial stereotypes and racist symbolism by white opponents.[130] Kathleen Hall Jamieson asserts that adverts tend to 'traffic in stereotypes', but I found a clear difference across my cases in the presence of *racial* stereotypes in campaign adverts.[131] I identified seven racial stereotypes commonly used against black candidates: corrupt,[132] having a dysfunctional family,[133] uppity/fancy,[134] lazy,[135] liberal,[136] sexually deviant/threatening,[137] and untrustworthy.[138] Based on a relatively small sample and only for descriptive purposes, Figure 3.1 shows the presence of these stereotypes in white candidates' advertising across my five case studies.

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[128] For an overview, see Sniderman & Piazza (1993, Ch 4). For applications, see Mendelberg (2001), Valentino, Hutchings, & White (2002), Calendio, McIlwain, & Karjala (2003), Gomolin et al (2007), White (2007), Payne et al (2010), McIlwain & Caliendo (2011).
[129] Mendelberg, 2001.
[130] Persons, 2009.
[131] Jamieson, 1992, 64.
[132] Gillespie, 2012, 10.
[133] Cohen, 2010, Ch 3.
[134] Gillespie, 2012, 10.
[135] Tate (1997), McIlwain & Caliendo (2011, Ch 6), Gillespie (2012).
[136] Swain (1995, Ch 10), Gay (2000), McIlwain & Caliendo (2011).
[137] Sniderman & Piazza (1993, Ch 4), Williamson (1997), Cohen (2010, Ch 3), McIlwain & Caliendo (2011, 11), Gillespie (2012).
[138] McIlwain & Caliendo, 2011.

Figure 3.1 - Negative racial stereotypes in white opponents' advertisements




N=65, (Peabody, n=6; Cardin, n=6; Helms, n=12; Williamson, n=9; Corker, n=32)

The second set was racial cues. In this context, a cue refers to a concept that is not ostensibly racial but which in practice promotes negative racial associations. These cues included the use of exclusive language,[139] the use of extreme language,[140] references to machine politics,[141] the aligning of the black candidate with a majority-black jurisdiction in the state,[142] and the association of the black candidate with other black politicians.[143] Figure 3.2 shows the frequency of racial cues in my sample of white opponents' advertisements.

[139] Kinder & Sears (1981), Tesler (2013, 110).
[140] Gomolin et al (2007), McIlwain & Caliendo (2011, 1).
[141] Westen (2007, Ch 10).
[142] Bakke, nd, Ch 27.
[143] McIlwain & Caliendo, 2011.

Figure 3.2 - Racial cues in white candidates' advertisements




N=65, (Peabody, n=6; Cardin, n=6; Helms, n=12; Williamson, n=9; Corker, n=32)

The third set was racialised policy issues. I first searched for explicitly racial policies such as busing, affirmative action, minority quotas, federal aid to blacks, and enforced residential integration. I found almost no instances of these issues, except in Jesse Helms's advertisements. I then searched for policies which are not ostensibly racial but carry strong racial connotations when associated with a black candidate. These issues included crime,[144] the death penalty,[145] drugs, [146] gun control,[147] taxes,[148] and welfare.[149] Figure 3.3 demonstrates the frequency in which these issues appeared across my sample of white opponents' advertisements.

[144] Hurwitz & Peffley (1997, 2005).
[145] Williams, 2012, 107.
[146] Alexander & Gyamerah, 1997.
[147] McIlwain & Caliendo, 2011, 24.
[148] Sniderman & Piazza, 1993, Ch 4.
[149] Peffley et al (1997), Gilliam (1999), Valentino, Hutchings, & White (2002).

Figure 3.3 – Implicitly racialised policy issues in white opponents' advertisements



N=65, (Peabody, n=6; Cardin, n=6; Helms, n=12; Williamson, n=9; Corker, n=32)

These indices were important because they helped in the classification of each campaign according to the most appropriate model. The symbolic-historic model presumes a racially tolerant opponent, whereas the crusade campaign model demands a racially hostile opponent. The situationally racialised model can operate in either racialised context. When racial hostility exists, the racial content of the black candidate's response to these attacks will help to indicate the racial model designation. In the chapters to follow, I will demonstrate these designations in practice.

Ch 4 – The Symbolic-Historic Campaign Model: Edward Brooke and the 1966 Massachusetts Senate Election

The election of Edward Brooke to the US Senate in 1966 was the first time that an African American was popularly elected to the country's most powerful legislative chamber.[150] The historic importance of Brooke's 'desegregation' of the Senate has rightly been noted, but scholars have crucially misinterpreted the way in which race featured in the campaign. In particular, commentators have classified the Brooke campaign as 'deracialised',[151] failing to acknowledge Brooke's capacity to capitalise on liberal, white desires to elect an African American in order to demonstrate the country's racial progress. Judson Jeffries wrongly argues that Brooke was successful because he minimised the role of race in his campaign, distanced himself from the civil rights movement, and focused exclusively on issues that 'transcend' race.[152] A closer examination reveals that Brooke freely acknowledged the symbolic significance of his candidacy and supported the Johnson civil rights agenda openly. Internal polls and contemporary interviews with voters demonstrate that Brooke's race was a motivating factor in achieving some level of his white support. An accomplished lawyer and popular attorney general, Brooke's candidacy was far from 'merely' symbolic. Yet, as far as racial appeals and racial voting manifested itself in the contest, Brooke's campaign followed the symbolic-historic campaign model rather than the deracialised model.

Sources

This chapter draws from interviews which I conducted with Senator Edward Brooke, key members of his campaign staff, and Brooke's opponent in the state Republican convention. In addition, I make extensive use of primary materials drawn from several archives: Senator Brooke's official papers held in the Library of Congress and his personal papers at Boston University, as well as Governor Endicott Peabody's papers held at the JFK Presidential Library. From these repositories, I have focused my attention on the content of internal campaign memos and internal polling reports. In addition, several

[150] The first black senators, Hiram Revels and Blanche Bruce, were appointed by 'scalawags' in the Mississippi state legislature during Reconstruction.
[151] E.g., Sonsenshein (1990), Jeffries (1999), Nordin (2012, 113-126)
[152] Jeffries, 1999.

first-hand accounts of the 1966 election, including Brooke's own autobiography,[153] Elinor Hartshorn's PhD thesis,[154] and an analysis published by Brooke's pollsters,[155] have proved to be invaluable sources of primary material.

Edward Brooke

Edward W Brooke III was born in Washington, DC in 1919. His father was an attorney reviewer in the Veterans Administration. Brooke's grandfather (and namesake) is believed to have been born a slave on the Brooke plantation in Fredericksburg, Virginia.[156] After emancipation, he worked on the Pennsylvania Railroad.[157]

The third Edward W Brooke was raised in a middle-class, black neighbourhood in segregated Washington. Although Brooke broadly describes his upbringing as happy and comfortable, Brooke's early life was not 'race blind', contrary to Elinor Hartshorn's claims.[158] Brooke acknowledges that he has 'known racial prejudice'[159] and that as a child, 'My parents taught me that racial prejudice is a sin'.[160] John Henry Cutler is more precise in acknowledging the tensions between Brooke's class proximity to 'mainstream' American society and his simultaneous racial segregation from it. For example, the Brookes were denied entry to Washington theatres, but the family would occasionally venture up to New York City where they could enjoy such middle-class luxuries.[161]

Brooke attended the all-black Dunbar High School, which was considered one of the best state schools for black children in the country. Dunbar admitted the surrounding area's top 10% of black pupils.[162] After Dunbar, Brooke attended Howard University, sometimes known as the 'black Harvard'. Brooke joined Alpha Phi Alpha, the oldest black fraternity in the country. He served as

[153] Brooke, 2007.
[154] Hartshorn, 1973.
[155] Becker & Heaton, 1967.
[156] Brooke, 2007, Ch 1.
[157] Cutler, 1972, Ch 2.
[158] Hartshorn, 1973.
[159] Brooke, 2007, 2.
[160] Ibid., 9.
[161] Interview with Edward Brooke.
[162] Cutler, 1972, Ch 2.

chapter president, became a national officer, and in later life contributed over $100,000 to the organisation.[163] Brooke credits this group with being a source of early political training.[164]

Until he was in his mid-twenties, Brooke admits 'rarely dealing with whites'.[165] It was not until after his wartime service in the segregated US Army that Brooke first spent time in a majority-white environment.[166] Brooke opted to study at Boston University School of Law, funded by the GI Bill. In Brooke's year of 300 students, seven were black. Brooke recalls, 'it was still the first time I had come face to face with integration. I mean, everything else I had done in my lifetime had been segregated'.[167]

Brooke lived in Roxbury, known as 'Boston's Harlem'.[168] In my interview with Brooke, he explained, 'I don't remember ever having opportunities to live elsewhere. I lived in the black community even when I came back from the war'.[169] In Roxbury, at the encouragement of his friends, Brooke twice ran for the Massachusetts House of Representatives, losing both times. Because the residents of Washington, DC had no right to vote until the 1960s, Brooke confesses that upon his arrival in Massachusetts, 'I did not even know if I was a Republican or a Democrat'.[170] When he ran for the first time in 1950, Brooke filed in both the Republican and Democratic primaries, which was not unusual at a time when 'cross-filing' was still legal.[171] Brooke performed better in the Republican primary, and his performance appears to have settled the matter of his partisan affiliation. When he ran for the state assembly again two years later, he filed only as a Republican and won the primary.

In my interview with him, Brooke reflected on why he decided to remain within the generally liberal and racially tolerant Massachusetts Republican party: 'I just felt that they better represented what I felt, not just on civil rights but on a myriad of foreign and domestic policies. And I was comfortable

[163] Based on cuttings from the Brooke Archive at the Howard Gottlieb Archival Research Center: Boston University.
[164] Brooke, 2007, Ch 1.
[165] Ibid., 4.
[166] Cutler, 1972, Ch 2.
[167] Interview with Brooke.
[168] Cutler, 1972, ix.
[169] Interview with Brooke.
[170] Brooke, 2007, 52.
[171] Cutler, 1972, Ch 4.

with them more so than the corrupt Democrats'. He clarifies, however, 'I was never comfortable with the national Republican Party -- nor were they really ever comfortable with me. I was a loner in the Senate, a loner in my own party, and to some degree in my own race'.[172]

After a decade as a volunteer party activist, in 1960 Brooke was nominated by the Republicans to stand for Secretary of the Commonwealth, a constitutional executive position with responsibility for the conduct of elections.[173] Although exceeding expectations, Brooke lost to Democrat Kevin White, who would later become mayor of Boston. Two years later, Brooke was elected Massachusetts attorney general, marking the first time an African American was elected to state-wide office since Reconstruction. In 1964, Brooke was decisively re-elected, receiving more votes than any other Republican candidate had hitherto received in Massachusetts.[174] Although Democrat Lyndon Johnson won the state that year with 76.2% of the vote, opinion polls found that 64% of Johnson supporters had a positive opinion of Brooke.[175]

By the mid-1960s, Brooke was a well-established politician who was regarded highly by blacks and whites alike. Although his early life had been spent almost exclusively within the black community, Brooke had managed to break into majority-white state politics in an unprecedented way. While Brooke had not limited himself to exclusively black politics, I argue that he remained proud of his black racial identity and cognisant of the need to represent the issues and aspirations of that community. As an elected official, Brooke was conscious of his status as the nation's only black senator. Brooke explains, 'I was viewed by millions of black Americans, in every state, as "their" senator'.[176] He recalls that as he was being sworn in as senator in January 1967, he thought to himself, 'Would I let my race down and prove the bigots right?'.[177]

[172] Interview with Brooke.
[173] Hartshorn, 1973, 40.
[174] 797,510 votes
[175] 'Massachusetts Voters Appraise Candidates and Issues', Opinion Research Corporation, October 1964, Brooke Archive: Library of Congress.
[176] Brooke, 2007, 153.
[177] Ibid., 146.

The 1966 Senate Campaign

On 29 December 1965, seventy-three-year-old Republican Senator Leverett Saltonstall announced that he would not stand for re-election. The following day, Brooke announced he would seek the Republican Party's nomination for the US Senate. Although initially it seemed that Brooke might face a primary challenge from Republican Governor John Volpe, over the next few weeks the liberal to moderate party establishment consolidated around Brooke. Conservatives, who were not numerous within the Massachusetts Republican Party, stood protest candidate J Alan MacKay whom Brooke overwhelmingly defeated at the state party convention in June 1966.

Endicott Peabody

In the general election, Brooke's Democratic opponent was former governor Endicott 'Chub' Peabody. Peabody had received the endorsement of the Democratic Party convention in June 1966 and defeated Boston mayor John Collins in the September Democratic primary. Peabody was a liberal, Harvard-educated lawyer who descended from an old Massachusetts family. He was a direct descendent of John Endicott, one of the founders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.[178] Both his father and grandfather had been Episcopal bishops.

On civil rights, the Peabody family had a strong record of racial tolerance. His mother Mary was a civil rights activist who had been arrested during a sit-in in a segregated Florida restaurant in 1964. When the governor was told of his mother's arrest, he responded with admiration for her 'courage, sincerity, and determination'.[179] On implicitly racialised matters, such as crime, Peabody's positions were equally or more liberal than those of Brooke. For instance, Peabody was opposed to the death penalty, and according to Raphael Sonenshein, Peabody's record on 'law and order' matters was viewed as more permissive than that of Brooke.[180]

[178] 'Endicott Peabody, 77, dies', *New York Times*, 4 December 1997.
[179] Endicott Peabody, quoted in Ibid.
[180] Sonenshein, 1990, 230.

Racialised Campaign Context

Brooke's campaign operated in a largely racially tolerant setting. According to campaign staff, explicit racial prejudice was a rare occurrence. Brooke himself contends that he does not recall much racism on the campaign trail: 'I shook mostly white hands, looked into mostly white faces, and with very few exceptions, saw no anger in their eyes'.[181] It is unlikely that racial prejudice was *absent* in the election, but I argue that negative racial voting (i.e. voting *against* Brooke because he was black) manifested itself less strongly than positive racial voting (i.e. voting *for* Brooke because he was black).

The lack of racial hostility might seem surprising given Americans' racial attitudes during the 1960s. A Harris poll from October 1965 found that white Americans continued to have deep-seated racial prejudices. This was true even outside of the South. 54% of non-Southerners agreed with the statement 'Negroes tend to have less ambition'; 48% agreed that 'Negroes have looser morals'; and 36% agreed that 'Negroes have less native intelligence'.[182] The poll also found that 82% of Americans outside of the South objected 'to a close friend or relative marrying a Negro'. In spite of these feelings, Brooke's marriage to an Italian woman rarely was mentioned by his opponents or the press in a negative fashion.[183] Peabody, who had very tolerant racial views, was not likely to raise the matter, and it seems that even the voters rarely mentioned it. One member of Brooke's campaign staff says that because of Remigia Brooke's 'colour and features, you could think she was black'. He adds, 'She was more of an ethnic oddity than Brooke was'.[184]

Some in Brooke's campaign have argued that Massachusetts was exceptional in its high level of racial tolerance.[185] Stephen Herbits, for instance, argues that 'Massachusetts, being one of the most progressive states in the country, was very keen on the idea of electing an African American'.[186]

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[181] Brooke, 2007, 139.
[182] *Washington Post*, 28 October 1965.
[183] An exception occurred when Brooke first ran for attorney general in 1962. His Democratic opponent Francis Kelly said in an interview with radio host Jerry Willams, 'Jerry, you know, if I were not a gentleman, I'd say that my opponent is a Negro man who has a white wife'.
[184] EB4.
[185] EB2.
[186] Interview with Stephen Herbits.

Opinion Research Corporation's polls support the view that Massachusetts was exceptionally racially tolerant (see Figure 4.1). In August 1966, 22% of Massachusetts voters felt that the federal government was doing 'too little' to 'help Negroes gain equal civil rights', whereas nationally that figure was at only 5%. There appears to be a sense among Massachusetts dwellers that their state was more enlightened than other states. The *North Adams Transcript*, a newspaper based in the Berkshires of western Massachusetts, argued that to reject Brooke on the basis of his race 'would dump Massachusetts to the level of such benighted states as Georgia and Alabama'.[187] In sum, compared to the 41% of the American public who felt that the federal government was doing too much to help African Americans, Massachusetts manifestly displayed an above-average level of racial tolerance.

Figure 4.1 – Massachusetts and American attitudes on federal racial equality initiatives, 1966

In your view, is the federal government doing too much or too little to help Negroes gain equal rights? (Autumn 1966)

	Too little	About the right amount	Too much	(N)
Massachusetts	22%	42%	23%	976
USA	5%	29%	41%	1093

Source: Opinion Research Corporation

Symbolic-Historic Campaign Model

Although Brooke's campaign model did not follow those of other contemporary black politicians who ran in majority-black districts, like Adam Clayton Powell, Dennis Nordin is incorrect to say that both Brooke and his electorate 'overlooked' the racial significance of his candidacy.[188] Brooke, I argue, possessed a sophisticated racial identity and acknowledged the symbolic-historic significance of his election. Furthermore, Brooke publicly identified racial inequalities and offered robust policy prescriptions to overcome them. Finally, Brooke's potential to be the first black man popularly elected to the Senate strengthened his own campaign operation by providing him with a national platform and attracting highly talented staff.

[187] 'Backlash cutting of Brooke would give state black eye', *North Adams Transcript*, 18 October 1966, 6.
[188] Nordin, 2012, 114.

White Racial Appeal

In contrast with the view that white voters 'overlooked' race, my research suggests that liberal whites were motivated to vote 'proudly' for an African American candidate. Brooke's field director Carmen Durso believes that Brooke's support for civil rights policies was popular with many Massachusetts whites.[189] Internal strategy documents from the Peabody campaign reveal that the Democrats recognised that the Republicans had much to gain from the 'dazzling' Brooke, who as a 'Negro Republican Senator from Massachusetts would be a stunning asset for the Republicans'.[190] More generally, Brooke campaign staff believe that in 1966 white liberals in Massachusetts were 'ready' to elect a black man.[191] A senior member of the Brooke team recalls that not only was Brooke a very good candidate with a good track record, but also he 'made people feel good. You could say, "Gee, I'm doing the right thing. I'm voting for a black man".'[192]

Evidently aware of this potential source of support in the electorate, Campaign Consultants Inc, whom Brooke hired in March 1966, devised the slogan 'Proudly for Brooke: A Creative Republican', which appeared on over 20,000 bumper stickers and pins during the 1966 election.[193] The decision to select this slogan, which Brooke supported, caused some controversy within his campaign team. Brooke's close advisor William Cowin recalls that for some in the campaign, 'The message was vote proudly for [Brooke] because [he's] a black man. Do this. You can feel good. You can feel good as a white to vote for a black man'. Cowin notes that others in the campaign thought that the slogan was racist, but 'the attorney general didn't see that at all…the General wanted it and we went with it'.[194]


One of those who disapproved of the slogan was Brooke's campaign manager Al Gammal, who sent a memo to Brooke urging the candidate to abandon it: 'I do not like the word "proudly," and certainly not in this context. It has a highly negative implication. You can be proud of someone for a number of reasons, none of which qualify him for the office he is seeking…If the salient implication, and it may

[189] Interview with Carmen Durso.
[190] 'Endicott Peabody – A Post-Primary Assessment', Memo from Peabody Archive: JFK Presidential Library.
[191] Interview with Durso.
[192] EB3.
[193] Hartshorn, 1973, Ch 6.
[194] Interview with William Cowin.

be taken that way, is that we are proud of you because you are a Negro from Massachusetts, then I resent it and so will the people, and for that matter, so ought you".'[195] Brooke evidently did not agree. Gammal repeated his dismay in an interview: 'I was violently opposed to it. Proud of what? That Ed was a Negro? The immediate thing you think of is race'.[196]

In spite of this opposition, I argue that in some cases the 'proudly for Brooke' message drew racially liberal citizens to vote for Brooke. Brooke's internal polling firm Opinion Research Corporation conducted interviews with voters in October 1966 asking them to state succinctly why they were voting for Brooke. The transcribed interviews have been recorded and are held in the Brooke archive in the Library of Congress. I have coded 93 responses into 10 categories: anti-Peabody, character, leadership, name recognition, party loyalty, past performance or experience, policy, race, self-presentation, or no reason. The most common reason people cited was their approval of the job he had done as attorney general (one third of responses). Race was the fourth most common response, with 8.6% of the sample. The results of my original analysis are displayed in Figure 4.2 followed by a selection of the responses filed in the 'race' category.

Figure 4.2 - Reasons for supporting Brooke, October 1966



n=93
Source: Opinion Research Corporation, 'The Massachusetts Public Appraises Edward W Brooke', Brooke Archive, Library of Congress

[195] Memorandum, Al Gammal to Edward Brooke, Box 621, Brook Archive: Library of Congress.
[196] Al Gammal, quoted in Hartshorn (1973, 175).

> 'It would be nice to show that Massachusetts people aren't against the colored if they are industrious'.[197]
>
> 'I think we should have a Negro representing us, and he's done a good job as attorney general'.[198]
>
> 'I think he is colored and we need someone to help the colored as well as the whites, and I respect him very much'.[199]
>
> '[I l]ike what he's been doing. He's magnetic. Feather in our cap to send a Negro to Washington'.[200]
>
> 'It is a step forward because of his race, and it is about time a step forward was taken. I like the way he handles himself'.[201]

From this, I conclude that positive racial voting was an important – though far from exclusive -- factor in Brooke's support among white voters. In fact, after I presented these figures to Brooke's researcher Stephen Herbits, he suggested that the symbolic-historic appeal may have been even stronger than the chart suggests: 'I have a feeling that the strong measure of "past performance" was less the reason people supported him than the granting of permission for people to support him for other reasons, an important one being race. The "permission" factor is critical in American politics and I believe it was in play here. Hence, while the chart is accurate, I think it understates the support for him because of race'.[202]

African American Voter Mobilisation

Although they composed only 2.2% of the state's electorate (see Appendix B), it is clear that Brooke was strongly embraced by African American voters. Brooke writes that when he ran for the Massachusetts House of Representatives, he was viewed by the blacks of Roxbury as 'one of their own'.[203] By 1966, Carmen Durso, Brooke's field director, explains that Brooke 'was a hero to young black people', who saw him as a positive role model.[204] An essay written by a young black student in 1965 captures these sentiments. She writes, 'The man I admire above all is others is Edward Brooke

[197] Opinion Research Corporation, 'The Massachusetts Public Appraises Edward W Brooke', Boston, October 1966, A1, Brooke Archive: Library of Congress.
[198] Ibid., A3.
[199] Ibid., A5.
[200] Ibid., B1.
[201] Ibid., C1.
[202] Correspondence with Herbits.
[203] Brooke, 2007, 54.
[204] Interview with Durso.

of Massachusetts, the Negro attorney-general of that state…I admire this man not only because he is a Negro and I am a Negro, but because he is showing Americans what a Negro can do when he is given the opportunity and seizes it…I know that he is an inspiration to me and other Negro teenagers at a time when we need it so desperately'.[205]

Hartshorn rightly contends that in the 1966 election 'the Blacks claimed Brooke as one of their own and supported him'.[206] According to precinct-level voting data, large numbers of African American voters crossed party lines to vote for Brooke. While nationally Republican candidates only received 17% of the black vote in 1966, Brooke won 82.4% of the vote in Boston's 27 majority-black precincts. Although Massachusetts blacks were more favourable to the Republican Party than African Americans elsewhere in the country, Brooke's result was unusually high even in Massachusetts. In comparison white Republican John Volpe, who successfully ran for governor that year, won only 39% of the vote in the same black precincts in Boston.[207]

Policy Agenda & Racialised Discourse

Among the key features of the 'deracialised' campaign model are a focus on 'racially transcendent' issues[208] and the offer of a 'race-neutral'[209] policy programme. It is often asserted that Brooke was largely quiet on the matter of civil rights during his campaign. Jeffries, for example, claims that Brooke 'distanced' himself from the civil rights movement.[210] Nordin argues that Brooke excused himself from civil rights matters prior to his election to the Senate.[211]

These assessments, I argue, are far from accurate. Brooke articulated clear racial policies in the midst of the campaign, discussing the matter in speeches and in a lengthy research document entitled,

[205] Donna Woods, 'A Man Among Men', *Miller Musings*, 1965, 49, Brooke Archive: Library of Congress.
[206] Hartshorn, 1973, 207.
[207] Clarence Townes, 'The Friendship of Black Citizens and Other Americans', Minorities Division, Republican National Committee, 1969, 1.
[208] McCormick & Jones, 1993, 76.
[209] Wilson, 1990.
[210] Jeffries, 1999, 585.
[211] Nordin, 2012, 114.

'Negroes and the Open Society'.[212] In his book *The Challenge of Change* published in the early stages of the 1966 campaign, Brooke diagnosed racial inequality as America's 'most urgent and dramatic domestic problem'.[213] He believed that '[r]acial inequality permeates every aspect of our national life'[214] and argued that America's 20 million non-whites were treated as second-class citizens.[215] As one of Brooke's campaign team rebuffs, 'Everybody knew he was for civil rights. There was no question'.[216] According to a civil rights lawyer in the period, Brooke 'hasn't fudged on a single [civil rights] issue, not one'.[217] Contrary to the expectations of the 'deracialised' campaign model, Brooke condemned America's racial inequalities in explicit terms.

The notion that Brooke was 'colour-blind' in his policy prescriptions is also inaccurate. Brooke argued in his August 1966 statement on civil rights that 'Discrimination is a system that will yield only to a coordinated, comprehensive, strategic attack'.[218] For Brooke, it was crucial that the government take action to support civil rights. While Brooke strongly supported the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act,[219] he argued that legal equality was insufficient. In his view, the civil rights struggle demanded equality in jobs, education, skills, health, and cultural development. Brooke explained that '[e]ven with all the freedom in the world, the great majority of Negroes would be woefully ill-equipped to make a reasonably equal life for themselves in America's competitive society'.[220] Brooke supported race-conscious remedies, such as the withdrawal of funds from schools which failed to integrate and the use of federal loans to accelerate housing integration, in spite of over 60% of the Massachusetts electorate opposing this position according to Brooke's internal polls.[221]

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[212] These statements received wide coverage. Stephen Herbits emphasises, 'every paper and every speech was given wide distribution to the media…[We] made sure what he said was distributed as widely as the media and technology of 1966 permitted'. (Correspondence with Herbits)
[213] Brooke, 1966, 148.
[214] Ibid., 158.
[215] Ibid., 148.
[216] EB1.
[217] James Perry, 'Running Brooke: He May Become a Senate Leader', *National Observer*, 19 September 1966.
[218] Edward Brooke, 'A Statement on Negroes and the Open Society', 2 August 1966, Brooke Archive: Library of Congress.
[219] Brooke, 1966, 152.
[220] Ibid.
[221] Opinion Research Corporation, September 1966 poll, Brooke Archive: Library of Congress.

In his attempt to portray Brooke as a 'deracialised' candidate, Jeffries inaccurately argues that Brooke avoided issues with strong implicit racial content such as welfare and poverty. However, Brooke addressed both welfare and anti-poverty programmes in his public comments throughout the senatorial campaign. Indeed, the *Worcester Telegram* called Brooke a 'Great Society Republican'.[222] In fact, Brooke argued that the Johnson Administration's anti-poverty programmes had not been sufficiently radical. In September 1966, Brooke gave a speech to the Massachusetts Association of Relief Officers calling for a more aggressive programme to tackle poverty, including the establishment of metropolitan job councils to implement anti-poverty programmes, increased social security benefits for the elderly, and special training centres for the underprivileged. In an interview with me, Brooke reflects, 'we made some progress under Johnson's Great Society, but indeed I think we could have done much more'.[223]

Result

In the end Brooke swept the state, winning 341 of Massachusetts's 351 towns and 60.7% of the vote. He outperformed both John and Ted Kennedy who had received 51.1% and 55.4% respectively when they first ran for the Senate. Brooke's election to the Senate was a major historical feat, which has been repeated by only three other African Americans.[224] It is evident that the racial dimensions of his campaign merit serious attention, and this chapter has been in part an effort to dispel assumptions that Brooke was a colour-blind candidate who ran a deracialised campaign. While Brooke did not emphasise racial issues to the same extent as other black politicians of the period, he did not ignore them, publicly identifying racial injustice and proposing race-conscious policies to address inequality at both legal and societal levels. It is also evident that for some white voters, supporting a black candidate as a matter of pride was a powerful motivation. This chapter has also attempted to integrate the viewpoints of both the campaign team and voters, identifying tensions within both groups. Far from running a campaign devoid of racial content, by inviting Massachusetts residents to vote

[222] Edward McHugh, 'Where Brooke and the GOP Differ', *Worcester Telegram,* October 1966.
[223] Interview with Brooke.
[224] The only other African Americans who have been elected by popular vote to the US Senate are Carol Moseley Braun (1992), Barack Obama (2004), and Cory Booker (2013).

‘proudly for Brooke’, I conclude that Brooke’s campaign is a paradigmatic example of the symbolic-historic campaign model.

Ch 5 – The Symbolic-Historic Campaign Model: Michael Steele and the 2006 Maryland Senate Election

Michael Steele was the best-performing black Republican candidate for the US Senate since Edward Brooke. His campaign, however, has received very little scholarly attention, with the notable exception of the chapters by Tyson King-Meadows.[225] King-Meadows argues that Steele was a race-conscious candidate who consistently addressed black empowerment and racial inequalities in his campaign discourse.[226] King-Meadows also holds that Steele engaged with traditional agents of black voter mobilisation, such as the black church and black political leaders. As a result, King-Meadows concludes, 'Steele did not run a deracialized campaign'.[227]

Although a welcome contribution for its willingness to deviate from the deracialised campaign model, the analysis is incomplete, focusing almost exclusively on Steele's racial appeals to Maryland's substantial black electorate.[228] While much of Steele's symbolic-historic language was aimed towards African Americans, King-Meadows has overlooked the extent to which Steele's racial status was relevant to white voters as well. Through content analysis of newspaper reports and Steele's speeches as well as interviews with Steele and his campaign team, I contend that the Republican candidate deployed racialised discourse when addressing predominantly white audiences. Steele's symbolic-historic racial status was undoubtedly a characteristic used to invite African American support, but it also facilitated Steele's appeals to white voters. Specifically, by occupying the unusual status as a black Republican, Steele could credibly argue to Maryland's Democratic-leaning electorate that he would represent a 'different' kind of Republican senator and a fundamentally new style of leadership.

Sources

This chapter draws on several sets of primary sources. First, I interviewed key figures from the Steele campaign, including Michael Steele, his campaign manager, his communications director, and a field

[225] King-Meadows, 2009 & 2010.
[226] King-Meadows, 2010, 242.
[227] King-Meadows, 2009, 27.
[228] In 2006, 29.1% of Maryland residents were black, nearly 2.5 times the national average.

organiser. I also interviewed a member of the Democratic campaign who was tasked with outreach to the African American community. The second set of sources is televised campaign adverts which I located online, nine from the Steele campaign and six from the Cardin campaign. The third set of sources is fifty-three newspaper articles, which have been sourced predominantly from the *Baltimore Sun*, *Washington Post*, and *Washington Times.* I also included a small sample of articles from the Baltimore *Jewish Times* and the Baltimore *Afro-American.*

Michael Steele

Michael Steele was born in 1958 and raised by his adoptive mother, Maebell Turner, in the majority-black[229] Pepworth area of Washington, DC.[230] Turner left school at ten to work in the tobacco fields of Orangeburg, South Carolina,[231] later moving to Washington where she worked for forty-five years as a laundress.[232] Steele's father was an alcoholic whom he describes as 'very abusive' and died in 1962 when Steele was four years old.[233]

Steele's first political activity was as a volunteer for Marion Barry, an African American city councillor who in 1978 challenged Washington's incumbent mayor Walter Washington.[234] Due to the district's overwhelmingly Democratic electorate, participation in a Democratic primary was one of the few expressions of competitive politics in the city. Steele explains, 'I didn't grow up in the GOP like a lot of people did. I grew up as a self-identified Republican in a Democrat environment. So, my political skills weren't honed by Republicans; it was honed by Democrats'.[235]


Although black support for Republicans declined precipitously over Steele's childhood (see Figure 5.1), he aligns his support for the party with his racial identity: 'I did a little research, got to study party politics and what that meant, and I got to realise, heck, I have a home in the Republican Party. This is where African Americans are from politically. It's where we really got our first foothold in

[229] Paul Abowd, 'Petworth's changing demographics lead to challenges', *Washington Post*, 2 July 2012.
[230] Jill Lawrence, 'Black Senate candidates seek votes across party lines', *USA Today*, 6 October 2006.
[231] Michael Steele, *Q&A*, CSPAN, 22 February 2005.
[232] Michael Steele, 2004 RNC Convention Speech.
[233] Steele, CSPAN, 2005.
[234] Interview with Michael Steele, 4 September 2013.
[235] Ibid.

American political life'.[236] In the decades following the Civil War, African Americans strongly supported the Republican Party as the 'party of Lincoln', the first Republican president. However, as Robert Vann famously said, African Americans had already 'turned the picture of Lincoln to the wall' long before Steele affiliated to the party.[237] Steele acknowledges that 'as a young African American, [I was] making a very contrarian type of decision',[238] aware that 'you're the only brother on the block who's a Republican'.[239]

After a successful career as an international lawyer and chairperson of the Maryland Republican Party, in 2002 Steele was invited by gubernatorial candidate Bob Erlich to run as Erlich's lieutenant governor. When asked why he was chosen to be on the ticket, Steele replies, 'I think partly because I was black, to be honest', before adding that his demonstrated skills as a communicator and political strategist were crucial factors as well.[240] Erlich and Steele's victory was the first time Republicans had won a gubernatorial election in Maryland since Spiro Agnew in 1966.

Figure 5.1 – African American support (%) for Republicans, 1958-2006



Sources: 'The Friendship of Black Citizens and Other Americans' (1952-68), New York Times *national exit polls (1972-2006)*

[236] Steele, CSPAN, 2005.
[237] Robert Vann, quoted in Buni, 1974, 194.
[238] Interview with Steele.
[239] Steele, CSPAN, 2005.
[240] Interview with Steele.

Two years later, Steele was invited to address the Republican national convention. His speech was highly racially conscious, with Steele acknowledging the historic role of Republicans in advancing the cause of black civil rights. Steele pointed out that he had 'made history' himself as being 'the first African-American ever elected to a statewide office in the great state of Maryland'.[241] The speech raised Steele's national profile[242] and the following year, he was encouraged by senior Republican officials to run for the US Senate.[243]

The 2006 Senate Contest

In March 2005, Democratic Senator Paul Sarbanes announced his intention not to run for re-election. Kweisi Mfume, former president of the NAACP and a ten-year former US representative, declared his candidacy three days later. However, the state Democratic establishment did not support Mfume's candidacy. According to one journalist, the Democratic Party leadership 'scoured the field for a viable alternative to Mfume'.[244] Eventually, after five weeks, Ben Cardin a Jewish US representative from Baltimore announced his candidacy.

Mfume's candidacy had been in part motivated by disenchantment among Maryland African Americans who felt that the state Democratic Party had consistently overlooked black elected officials for selection to prominent office. African Americans composed about 40% of Maryland's Democrats,[245] yet none had been nominated for major state-wide office. When Mfume announced his candidacy, he acknowledged these sentiments stating, 'It's time for the Democratic Party to make a bold statement in a blue state where blacks have always been willing to support white Democrats for office'.[246]

[241] Steele, 2004 RNC Convention Speech.
[242] Interview with Steele.
[243] David Nitkin, 'GOP makes push to get Steele into Senate race', *Baltimore Sun*, 9 May 2005.
[244] Lee Hockstader, 'The Kweisi Problem', *Washington Post*, 11 June 2006.
[245] 'Boxing's King throws jabs for Steele', *Washington Times*, 17 October 2006.
[246] Kweisi Mfume, quoted in 'Blacks deserve something in return from Maryland Democrats', *USA Today*, 14 March 2005.

In the Democratic primary in September 2006, Cardin defeated Mfume by only 43.8% to 40.4%, in spite of having spent $2.9 million compared to $300,000 spent by Mfume.[247] Mfume outperformed Cardin in Maryland's majority-black jurisdictions, winning nearly 70% of the vote in Prince George's County and 64% in Baltimore.[248] Strategically, the Republicans hoped that the Democratic primary campaign would be racially polarising.[249] If Cardin won the nomination but offended black voters in the process, they would be easier for Steele to court. Mfume's ultimate decision to endorse Cardin was crucial for the Democrats in mitigating some of these resentments.[250]

Ben Cardin

By 2006, Ben Cardin had served forty years in elected office, two decades in the Maryland House of Delegates and two decades in the US House of Representatives. His father, uncle, and grandfather had all been members of the state assembly.[251] Cardin's district, which was safely Democratic, included a large proportion of African Americans in the city of Baltimore and Jewish voters in the Baltimore suburbs. Cardin was on the centre-left of the Democratic Party, with a left-right NOMINATE score of -0.31 over his House career.[252] Significantly, he voted against the Iraq War and was best known for his advocacy for universal health care.[253] For his civil rights record as a US representative, Cardin received a 96% rating from the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. In his final four terms, Cardin's voting record perfectly aligned with the LCCR's recommendations, suggesting very strong support for racial equality initiatives.[254]

[247] 'Cardin, Steele issue challenges for debates', *Washington Times*, 21 September 2006.
[248] Ann Marimow, 'Mfume endorses Cardin but adds caveat', *Washington Post*, 28 September 2006.
[249] Interviews with MS3, MS5.
[250] 'Mfume says Dems fall short on diversity', *Afro-American*, 28 October 2006.
[251] Katherine Shaver, 'A Sense of Service Sustained by Family, Faith', *Washington Post*, 25 October 2006.
[252] Based on NOMINATE scores from 100th to 109th Congress. Range from -1 (most liberal) to +1 (most conservative).
[253] Interview with Jayson Williams.
[254] Based on Leadership Conference on Civil Rights voting records, 1987-2006, available at www.civilrights.org/advocacy/voting.

Deracialisation as an opposition tactic

The Steele-Cardin campaign operated in an unusual racial context. According to my measures of racial hostility, the campaign context was racially tolerant. Cardin's advertising output demonstrates no signs of racial hostility, registering 0% in my indices of racial cues, racial stereotypes, and racialised policy issues. Additionally, the newspaper articles in my sample include a low incidence of racial cues and stereotypes and a high incidence of articles which positively mention the historic significance of Steele's candidacy. Nonetheless, members of the Steele campaign express the view that the Democrats unfairly used race in the election. When I asked whether Democrats used race against him, Steele replied, 'Oh my gosh yes. Oh yes, Lord'.[255] Race was undoubtedly a factor in the election, but I argue that commentators[256] have insufficiently explained the Democrats' and Republicans' racial strategies.

Unique among my cases, I contend that the Cardin campaign attempted to disconnect Steele from his racial status while simultaneously Steele attempted to raise the salience of its symbolic-historic significance. An internal Democratic poll in spring 2006 showed that up to 44% of black Marylanders were prepared to support Steele.[257] Polling consultant Cornell Belcher warned in an internal memorandum to the Maryland Democratic Party and the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 'Democrats must be aggressive…Steele is a unique challenge'. Belcher recommended, 'A persuasion campaign should start as soon as possible to discredit Steele as a viable candidate for the [black] community…Connecting Steele to National Republicans…can turn Steele into a typical Republican in the eyes of voters, as opposed to an African American candidate'.[258]

In short, the Democratic strategy was to deracialise Steele by negating his black racial authenticity through his partisan affiliation. Douglas Heye, Steele's communications director, holds that 'one of the [Democrats'] goals was to turn Michael Steele into a Republican candidate as opposed to an

[255] Interview with Steele.
[256] E.g., Kristen Wyatt, 'Obama campaigns for Cardin Maryland race', *Washington Post*, 27 September 2006
[257] n=489 black likely voters
[258] Cornell Belcher, quoted in 'Democrats plan race-based campaign against black candidate in Maryland', *New York Sun*, 13 April 2006.

African American one. That was pretty explosive'.[259] Cardin deployed prominent black leaders to support the deracialisation of Michael Steele. At a Cardin campaign event in Baltimore, Elijah Cummings a black US representative told the crowd, 'We do not know who Michael Steele is, and we do not know what he stands for', distancing Steele from the black community.[260] Cardin also enlisted Barack Obama, America's only black senator at the time, to campaign on his behalf. Obama told reporters, 'Cardin has a longer track record of working on behalf of the African-American community in Maryland, much longer than Mr Steele does'.[261] A member of Cardin's campaign who was responsible for outreach to the African American community described these actors to me as 'validators'. He added, 'That was our biggest help, that we had [support] both from our elected leaders that were African American and ministers'.[262]

Cardin was aided by other actors within the black community, such as the black press and the black church. Black newspapers, as St Clair Drake and Horace Cayton argued in their classic *Black Metropolis*, have 'the dual function of reporting news and stimulating racial solidarity'.[263] It is, therefore, notable that the Baltimore *Afro-American*, the state's largest black newspaper, did not mention Steele's race at all in its editorial endorsing Cardin.[264] At a church service attended by Cardin, Rev Benjamin Coates compared Michael Steele to Barabbas, the thief who was pardoned instead of Jesus. He told a congregation of roughly 1,500, 'I can just see Barabbas well dressed, well groomed, holding a puppy', an obvious reference to Steele who had broadcast a campaign advert holding a puppy. Coates warned his congregation in Prince George's County, 'Everyone who's your color is not your kind'.[265] The message was clear: Steele is not authentically black.

Cardin's attempt to deracialise Steele was aimed not only at African American voters. I contend that Cardin also relied on black politicians to discourage liberal whites from voting for Steele for symbolic reasons. For example, Mfume's endorsement of Cardin was made to a crowd which according to the

[259] Interview with Heye.
[260] Elijah Cummings, quoted in Matthew Mosk, 'Black Officials Proclaim Support for Cardin', *Washington Post*, 20 September 2006
[261] Barack Obama, quoted in 'Cardin enlists help of Obama', *Washington Times*, 25 September 2006.
[262] Interview with Jayson Williams.
[263] Drake & Cayton, 1945, 411.
[264] 'Benjamin L Cardin', *Afro-American*, 28 October 2006.
[265] Delman Coates, quoted in 'Politics from the pulpits', *Washington Times*, 6 November 2006.

Washington Post was 'mostly white'.[266] When Cardin campaigned with Obama, their joint appearances were not limited to majority-black areas. For example, Obama addressed a predominantly white audience at the University of Maryland, but he still emphasised that Cardin was a stronger advocate for the black community.[267] Black politicians, I argue, were giving liberal whites permission not to see Steele as a racially symbolic candidate.

Symbolic-Historic Campaign

Michael Steele, I argue, had a strong personal sense of the symbolic-historic status of his candidacy which he communicated to both black and white voters. Steele explains that during the Democratic primary both he and Kweisi Mfume agreed that it was important for Maryland to elect a black senator: 'So Kweisi and I figured all that out. You know, this is a win-win for us. If you get the nomination and you have two African Americans running for the Senate, we know a black man is going to be a senator...And we didn't care which one because that was what was important for our community to have happen. That was important for this state, given its racial history'.[268] Steele is sharply critical of Barack Obama's decision to campaign against him. Steele reflects, 'you sit there scratching your head thinking, "Dude do you not get the significance? This is not about Republican versus Democrat. This is about sending a black man to the Senate," and that was what it was for a lot of Marylanders'.[269]

White mobilisation

In terms of voter mobilisation, style, and issue-agenda, Steele's appeals to whites were not 'deracialised'. I argue that Steele's racial status was deployed as a way to invite racially liberal whites to consider voting for him in spite of his Republican affiliation. In 2006, Republicans were not popular, particularly in Maryland where there were nearly twice as many registered Democrats as Republicans.[270] George Bush's approval rating was only 31% in the state.[271] If white voters perceived

[266] Kristen Wyatt, 'Obama campaigns for Cardin Maryland race', *Washington Post*, 27 September 2006.
[267] 'Cardin enlists help of Obama', *Washington Times*, 25 September 2006.
[268] Interview with Steele.
[269] Ibid.
[270] In 2006, there were approximately 1.7 million registered Democrats and 900,000 registered Republicans.

Steele as a generic Republican candidate, Cardin would win on partisan lines. However, if some white liberals viewed Steele as a symbolically significant candidate, regardless of his partisan affiliation, I argue that Cardin's path to victory would be less straightforward.

Michael Leavitt, Steele's campaign manager, explains that Steele's race afforded the campaign a unique opportunity to signal that he would be different from a conventional Republican. Leavitt states that Steele 'was a different type of a person, and he'd be a different type of a senator…I mean just the visual of that [i.e. being an African American candidate] is that you're different. We wanted to be different'.[272] It was particularly important that this difference was signalled by the candidate's race. The 2006 midterms were the first major elections since Hurricane Katrina. Blacks and liberal whites perceived Republican animosity to African Americans as a contributing factor to the federal government's catastrophically inept response.[273] Steele could credibly discourage these views in a way in which a white Republican candidate would not have been able to do.

Steele also promoted his symbolic-historic racial status in order to offer voters the opportunity to support a candidate who represented 'change' and symbolically a new type of leadership. In an advert broadcast in late September, Steele concludes his pitch by saying, 'Want more of the same? I'm not you're candidate. But if you're ready for change, then I'm your man'.[274] Steele also used language which directly alluded to his symbolic status. He told *USA Today*, 'I represent something different and [Cardin] doesn't'.[275] Steele wished to communicate to whites that a vote for him carried a symbolic significance, whereas a vote for Cardin did not.

Stylistically, Steele did not adjust his campaign style or discourse when addressing white audiences. King-Meadows rightly points out that Steele used black colloquialisms in front of black audiences,[276] but I note that Steele also used this familiar, racialised language before white audiences as well. For example, he told a predominantly white Republican rally that he was confident that Maryland voters

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[271] SurveyUSA poll conducted for WMAR-TV Baltimore, April 2006. N=600 adults.
[272] Interview with Michael Leavitt.
[273] White et al, 2007, 531.
[274] Qutoed in 'Democrats dismiss Steele's puppy commercial', *Washington Post*, 27 September 2006.
[275] Michael Steele, quoted in 'Black Senate candidates seek votes across party lines', *USA Today*, 27 September 2006.
[276] King-Meadows, 2010, 251.

'will send a little brother from Prince George's County to Washington to shake things up'.[277] Prince George's County was 65% African American, with the largest black middle-class in the country.[278] So, the reference to the county and to himself as 'a little brother' was not a deracialised comment.

Finally, Steele's issue agenda contained racialised policies even when presented to white audiences. Douglas Heye confirms, 'At a fundraiser in Annapolis [a majority-white city] or somewhere, he would still talk about inner-city schools and doing those things [to help the African American community]'.[279] As Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley show, the term 'inner-city' is strongly associated by whites with African Americans;[280] so, Steele's policy discussions about 'inner-city' matters were recognisably racial references. Additionally, Steele raised explicitly racial issues before majority-white audiences. On the national television programme *Meet the Press*, one of his highest-profile interviews of the campaign, he unequivocally stated, 'I strongly support affirmative action'.[281] When communicating to white voters, Steele's appeals were not deracialised; they were consistent with the symbolic-historic campaign model.

Black mobilisation

Steele's appeals to African Americans have been the subject of detailed comment by King-Meadows.[282] King-Meadows identifies the salient features of Steele's racialised strategy as the exploitation of black dissatisfaction about the Maryland Democratic Party, his contestation of expectations about how he should campaign, and his willingness to 'exploit Black preferences for descriptive representation and for making history'.[283] These claims are accurate, but I propose reconceptualising them in terms of black voter mobilisation, campaign style, and racialised issue agenda.

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[277] Michael Steele, quoted in 'Obama campaigns for Cardin MD race', *Washington Post*, 27 September 2006.
[278] 'Steele gains support beneath the surface in Prince George's', *Washington Times*, 1 November 2006.
[279] Interview with Heye.
[280] Hurwitz & Peffley (2005, 103) found that the median white guessed that 60% of inner-city residents are black when the figure is in fact closer to 20%.
[281] Michael Steele, quoted in 'Debate puts Steele on defense', *Washington Post*, 30 October 2006.
[282] King-Meadows 2009, 2010.
[283] King-Meadows, 2010, 249.

First, Steele engaged in traditional forms of black voter mobilisation. He sought and secured endorsements from black elected officials, religious leaders, and other prominent members of the community. Endorsements are particularly important in black politics. One black member of Congress told Richard Fenno, 'When you have the ministers and the black elected officials, you have the black community'.[284] About 30 black pastors, including those from large churches such as Bishop Harry Jackson of the 3,000-member Hope Christian Church, endorsed Steele. Additionally, Steele received endorsements from black Democratic elected officials, such as the former executive of Prince George's County Wayne Curry, five out of nine county councillors, and Eugene Grant,[285] mayor of Seat Pleasant, a town which was 96.7% black.[286] Curry argued that Steele's candidacy presented an 'enormously historic' opportunity for blacks, hoping that it might end 'this sort of vice grip by Democrats who feel entitled to black votes regardless of how they treat black voters'.[287]

In addition to securing the endorsements of leaders in the black community, Steele mobilised voters by his presence in traditional centres of black associational life. His first campaign event after winning the Republican nomination was a visit to a black barbershop in the majority-black section of Park Heights, Baltimore.[288] Steele campaigned in black churches, before black civic groups such as the NAACP,[289] and in historically-black colleges.[290] On the Sunday before the election, for example, Steele attended four services at black churches in the predominantly black Prince George's and Montgomery counties.[291]

Finally, Steele presented a race-conscious policy agenda. He regularly spoke about racial inequalities before African American audiences. At a forum sponsored by the NAACP of Charles County, Steele told the audience that the first feature people noticed about him when he walked into a room was that

[284] Quoted in Fenno, 1978, 124.
[285] Eugene Grant, quoted in 'Black Senate candidates seek votes across party lines', *USA Today*, 6 October 2006.
[286] 2000 US Census.
[287] Wayne Curry, quoted in 'Curry, key Democrats back Steele', *Washington Times,* 30 October 2006.
[288] Jon Ward, 'Steele, Cardin Opening Shots', *Washington Times*, 14 September 2006.
[289] Michael Steele, quoted in 'Steele hits Cardin for paying lip service to black voters', *Washington Times*, 28 October 2006.
[290] Interview with Michael Leavitt
[291] Ovetta Wiggins & Hamil Harris, 'Candidates hit the pews in Maryland homestretch', *Washington Post*, 6 November 2006.

he was black.[292] Steele also emphasised his presence in the black community, telling a reporter at a campaign event in his hometown of Largo, which is 92.7% African American, that he knew the issues that mattered to 'my neighbors…They're talking about the fact that cars are getting jacked in this neighborhood'.[293] Additionally, Steele addressed racialised policy concerns such as urban living standards and poverty. One senior Steele campaign official recalls Steele regularly 'talking about poverty, eliminating poverty, talking about inner-city schools and cleaning up inner-city neighbourhoods'.[294] In sum, King-Meadows is correct to conclude that when operating within the black community, Steele did *not* follow the deracialised campaign model.

Result

2006 was a disastrous election year for Republicans, who lost control of both the House and the Senate. In spite of this national context, Steele managed to secure 44.2% of the vote in a state where registered Democrats outnumber Republicans by nearly two to one. African Americans composed 23% of the electorate, and Steele won 25% of their support.[295] Significantly, Steele received 50% of the white vote compared to Cardin's 48%. In contrast, in a less auspicious national context for Democrats two years earlier, Republican senatorial candidate EJ Pipkin, who was white, won only 7% of the black vote and 44% support from white voters.[296]

Steele's candidacy has important yet underappreciated implications for Republican politics. With a racialised issue agenda, black Republicans may be able to make substantial inroads into traditionally Democratic territory by attracting *both* a substantial number of blacks and racially liberal whites. However, Democrats can minimise the effectiveness of these appeals by diminishing the black Republican's credible claim to black racial authenticity. While Steele's campaign followed the symbolic-historic campaign model, his opponent's counterstrategy of deracialisation proved to be more effective.

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[292] Michael Steele, quoted in 'Cardin skips debate in Charles County', *Washington Post*, 26 October 2006.
[293] Michael Steele, quoted in 'Steele tries to defy history in Maryland contest', msnbc.com, 17 October 2006.
[294] MS5.
[295] 2006 CNN exit poll.
[296] 2004 and 2006 CNN exit polls.

Ch 6 – The Crusade Campaign Model: Harvey Gantt and the 1990 North Carolina Senate Election

The fundamental assumption of the deracialised model is that white racial hostility causes black candidates to forsake their racial identity when facing a majority-white electorate. Based on this assumption, the circumstances of Harvey Gantt's 1990 campaign for the Senate ought to imply a very strong case for the deracialised campaign model. Gantt operated in a highly racially hostile context, standing in a Southern state against an incumbent senator considered to be an 'unabashed white racist'.[297] Accordingly, scholars have argued that Gantt followed the deracialised campaign model.[298] Zaphon Wilson claims that 'Gantt shied away from racial problems' and projected the view that 'race was an issue that had been resolved and was not an important part of the overall problem'.[299] Agreeing with this perspective, Zoltan Hajnal writes, 'Harvey Gantt tried hard to run a nonthreatening, deracialized contest'.[300]

In this chapter, I will argue that Gantt did not run a deracialised campaign. Contrary to the deracialised model, Gantt did not avoid racial discourse nor did he adopt a 'race-neutral' policy programme. Gantt's racially symbolic candidacy attracted the support of racially tolerant whites. Based on public opinion research, I find that Gantt's racial status encouraged more voters to support him than to oppose him. However, because he was situated in a racially hostile election environment, Gantt's racial strategy was adversarial. Specifically, he presented a symbolic contrast between Gantt as the embodiment of New South racial tolerance and his opponent Jesse Helms as the embodiment of Old South racial intolerance. A vote for Gantt was not only a vote to affirm America's racial progress, but it was also a vote against a regressive view of race relations. Rather than reflect the deracialised model, I argue that Gantt followed the crusade model of black candidacy.

[297] David Broder, *Washington Post*, 29 August 2001.
[298] E.g., Wilson (1993), Prysby (1996), Clemons (1998), Gillespie (2010)
[299] Wilson, 1993, 179.
[300] Hajnal, 2008, 53.

Sources

For this case study, I have relied on a rich collection of primary sources. Using the Google News Archive, I generated a sample of forty newspaper articles from the day after Gantt won the Democratic nomination in June 1990 until election day in November. This sample is drawn primarily from three newspapers located in different parts of the state: the *Times-News* located in Henderson County in the mountainous west, the *Star-News* based in New Hanover County on the Atlantic Coast, and *The Dispatch* published in Davidson County in central North Carolina.

Using the archives at the Political Communication Center at the University of Oklahoma, I created a random sample of fifteen television adverts produced by both candidates. I also purchased a collection of twenty-five Gantt and Helms leaflets from a collector on the internet. I analysed and manually coded these communications for their racial content, which I use to establish the racial context of the campaign environment as well as the Helms and Gantt campaigns' racial messages.

In addition, I interviewed key members of the Gantt campaign, including campaign manager Mel Watt and deputy campaign manager Mac McCorkle. I also interviewed members of Gantt's fundraising team, the head of his opposition research department, a field director, and the campaign's press secretary. Gantt's own reflections are brought out through comments he made to Pamela Varley for her 1992 case study of the campaign.[301]

Harvey Gantt

Harvey Gantt was born in 1943 in segregated public housing in Charleston, South Carolina. His father, who had an eighth grade education, worked as a drycleaner and a shipyard mechanic in Charleston harbour.[302] Gantt attended segregated schools.[303] As a high school student in the early 1960s, Gantt helped to organise a sit-in protesting segregated lunch counters at Charleston eateries,

[301] Varley, 1992.
[302] Hunter Kome, 'Harvey Gantt', *The Dispatch*, 23 October 1990.
[303] Ibid.

where he was arrested.[304] He later asked the lawyer who represented him to help him gain access to the all-white Clemson University.[305] Under the protection of a court order and state troopers, Gantt was admitted to Clemson in January 1963. Gantt graduated with a degree in architecture and then studied at MIT, where he received a master's degree in urban planning.

Gantt made his political career in Charlotte to which he moved in 1968 to set up an architectural practice. According to Michael Clemons, Gantt's political mentor was Fred Alexander, Charlotte's first black city councillor, whose seat Gantt filled in 1974.[306] Gantt stood four times for mayor of Charlotte. In his first mayoral campaign in 1979, Gantt failed to secure the Democratic nomination. His fortunes improved four years later when he won the Democratic nomination and was elected the city's first black mayor. At the time, Charlotte was slightly less than one-third black (see Appendix B). Gantt won 98% of the vote in predominantly black precincts and 40% of the vote in predominantly white precincts.[307] He was re-elected in 1985 before narrowly losing office in 1987.

The 1990 US Senate Campaign

After losing the mayoralty, Gantt returned to his architectural practice. Zaphon Wilson argues that the election of Douglas Wilder as America's first black governor in 1989 encouraged Gantt to run for Senate.[308] Wilson contends that Gantt saw the Wilder campaign as an exemplar of the deracialised model, which he then applied to his effort in North Carolina.[309] However, I believe Wilson has inaccurately tied these two campaigns together. In an interview, Mel Watt told me that Gantt made his decision to run 'probably in 1988', a year before Wilder was elected governor.[310] Additionally, Wilson's contention that Gantt's racial strategy was 'no different' from the Wilder campaign is far from accurate.[311] Watt dismisses this claim, stating that as campaign manager he did 'not worry about

[304] Powell, 2006, 45.
[305] Kome, 'Harvey Gantt', *The Dispatch*, 23 October 1990.
[306] Clemons, 1998.
[307] Ibid., 232.
[308] Wilson, 1993, 176.
[309] Ibid.
[310] Interview with Mel Watt.
[311] Ibid.

just because somebody black had won in another state that it would necessarily apply in our state'.[312] Georgia Persons, furthermore, has highlighted that the Gantt campaign's issue agenda was much more liberal than the Wilder campaign's policy priorities.[313]

Gantt publicly declared his candidacy in January 1990 and won a divided Democratic primary in May with 37.5% of the vote. Because Gantt fell 2.5 percentage points short of the 40% threshold needed to win the nomination, he faced rural district attorney Mike Easley in a run-off the following month. Defying the expectation that white voters would rally behind Easley,[314] Gantt won with 57% of the vote, becoming the first African American ever nominated in any state to run for the Senate as a Democrat.[315]

Opponent: Jesse Helms

Harvey Gantt's opponent, three-term incumbent Senator Jesse Helms, was the most racially hostile of the white opponents across my five case studies. I agree with Dennis Nordin's assessment that in no post-civil rights era campaign has a white candidate relied more directly on the 'race card' than Jesse Helms did against Harvey Gantt.[316]

Helms feared black empowerment. As a young adult, he supported literacy tests and opposed black enfranchisement.[317] As a commentator for North Carolina's second largest television station from 1960 until he was elected to the Senate in 1972, Helms publicly promoted his racially hostile positions. He declared, 'it is not overstating the case to say that the Civil Rights Bill is the single most dangerous piece of legislation ever introduced in the Congress'.[318] Helms was also a critic of Martin Luther King, warning viewers that King was backed by communists.[319]

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[312] Ibid.
[313] Persons, 1993, 4.
[314] Keech & Sistrom, 1994.
[315] Michael Oreskes, 'Feinstein Wins Primary Race in California', *New York Times*, 6 June 1990.
[316] Nordin, 2012, 111.
[317] Letter from Jesse Helms to H A Dart, 14 March 1966, Jesse Helms Center. Quoted in Thrift (2005, 324).
[318] Jesse Helms, Viewpoint 814, 13 March 1964, Jesse Helms Center. Quoted in Packer (2012, Ch 6).
[319] Bollinger, 1990, 33.

Helms did not modify his views after entering the Senate in 1973. He was the leading opponent of affirmative action, efforts to strengthen black civil rights and voting rights, and the creation of the Martin Luther King federal holiday. Tom Packer describes Helms as 'unrepentant' and 'unusually consistent' in his opposition to civil rights legislation.[320] Rob Christensen and Jack Fleer call Helms an 'unreconstructed foe of civil rights'.[321] Never willing to conceal his racial views, when Helms announced his retirement in 2001, David Broder of the *Washington Post* wrote, 'What really sets Jesse Helms apart is that he is the last prominent unabashed white racist politician in this country'.[322]

Racialised Campaign Context

Racial hostility was an inescapable background factor in the political culture of North Carolina.[323] Unlike the Brooke-Peabody and Steele-Cardin campaigns, Gantt's opponent was willing to prime these latent racial hostilities. William Link argues that race 'played a central role in the campaign strategy'.[324] Years later, Helms's campaign strategist Carter Wrenn was forthright in an interview: 'Don't let anybody kid you. The definitive issue of that campaign was race, from start to finish'.[325] In this section, I will demonstrate that Helms primed latent racial hostilities through the deployment of racial cues, racial stereotypes, and racialised policy issues in his campaign advertising

Racial Cues

Based on my analysis of his campaign adverts, Jesse Helms deployed three racial cues. First, Helms depicted Gantt with controversial black figures such as Jesse Jackson, which Gantt's campaign operatives believe was a visual cue to imply that Gantt would favour black interests.[326] Second, in three-quarters of sampled adverts, Helms primed the image of the threatening black man by using extreme language to describe Gantt. Third, in a quarter of sampled adverts, Helms portrayed Gantt as

[320] Packer, 2012, 197.
[321] Christensen & Fleer, 1999, 81.
[322] David Broder, *Washington Post*, 29 August 2001.
[323] See Bass & DeVries (1976, 221), Thompson (1986), Keech & Sistrom (1994), Packer (2012).
[324] Link, 2008, 378.
[325] Carter Wrenn, quoted in Link (2008, Ch 10).
[326] Varley, 1992, 30.

an outsider by using exclusive language. Because the racial dimension of this cue is not immediately obvious, it merits further attention.

Specifically, Helms frequently deployed an in-state/out-of-state narrative to frame Gantt as outside of the mainstream. The adverts argued that Helms represented 'North Carolina values' whereas Gantt did not. Typical of these attacks, one Helms radio advert warned that 'extreme liberal special interests' were financing the Gantt campaign. The narrator declares, 'Go home. We don't want your values, your ads, or your advice on how we should vote in North Carolina'.[327] While ostensibly an ideological critique, the adverts, I argue, contained a racial dimension. Strickland and Whicker observe that black candidates are particularly susceptible to the technique of defining an opponent as 'an extremist whose beliefs are outside the mainstream of American political culture'.[328] In this context, McIlwain and Caliendo are correct to say that Helms's exclusive language promoted the idea that 'Gantt is too black for North Carolina'.[329] Letetia Daniels Jackson, an African American woman who organised the Gantt campaign's field operation in Charlotte, agrees. In an interview, she explained to me, 'There was definitely a racial undertone to that…Those were all code words for you better look out. These black people are going to take over…They don't have any morals. They don't think what we think. They don't have family values. You know those were all code words to say that black people are barbaric'.[330]

If Gantt's campaign followed the deracialised model, we would expect Gantt to ignore the racial content of the messages; however, Gantt's response was defiant. Rather than distance himself from his black racial identity, Gantt attempted to position African Americans within the political mainstream. Gantt confidently told a predominantly-black NAACP luncheon at Lenoir-Rhyne College in western North Carolina, 'I know *we* represent North Carolina values' [emphasis added].[331]

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[327] Quoted in Link (2008, Ch 10).
[328] Strickland & Whicker, 1992, 205.
[329] McIlwain & Caliendo, 2000, 10.
[330] Interview with Letetia Daniels Jackson.
[331] 'Gantt fund-raising up', *Star-News*, 27 October 1990.


Racial Stereotypes

Helms also primed negative racial stereotypes in his adverts, with over 90% of sampled adverts applying the liberal label to Gantt. Additionally, in one quarter of sampled adverts, Helms implied that Harvey Gantt could not be trusted, priming the stereotype of the untrustworthy black man. Some of Helms's adverts charged that Gantt was secretly advertising on 'all-black radio stations', with Gantt promising 'more welfare spending and more quotas for minorities'.[332] Visually, many of Helms's adverts depicted Gantt looking off camera in a suspicious way (see Figure 6.1). I agree with McIlwain and Caliendo that these adverts promoted the stereotyped image of the black man being up to no good, alluding to some form of criminality or impropriety.[333]

Racialised Policy Issues

Finally, Helms forwarded a highly racialised issue agenda. He regularly featured policies in his adverts which contained strong implicitly racial content, such as crime, drugs, and the death penalty. One television advert condemned Gantt for opposing the death penalty for 'drug kingpins, rapists, and

Figure 6.1 – 'Harvey denies', Helms campaign television advert



Source: Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

[332] Quoted in Link (2008, 375).
[333] McIlwain & Caliendo, 2002, 10.

police killers'. McCorkle agrees that these attacks were racially tinged: 'Helms was reaching there. It certainly was coded. I don't think anybody questions it'.[334] Gantt however did not retreat from his positions stating, 'I believe that fighting crime is more than simply saying, I support the death penalty. I can't support the death penalty'.[335] This defiant strategy appears to have been effective because in spite of the death penalty being supported by a majority of the North Carolina electorate, more voters believed that Gantt would do a better job on law-and-order issues than Helms (36% to 31%).[336]

Unlike my other cases, Jesse Helms was uniquely comfortable with referencing explicitly racial policies in his attacks against Gantt. Tali Mendelberg argues that a widely-held 'norm of equality' prevents explicitly racial attacks in American politics, but the Gantt-Helms campaign suggests that Mendelberg's confidence in the constraining strength of the norm is overstated.[337] Helms's attacks centred on claims that Gantt supported affirmative action, including racial quotas, to promote undeserving African Americans. Gantt was accused of having enriched himself through minority preference programmes.[338] In late October, Helms released an advert which claimed that Gantt had 'become a millionaire' by using his 'minority status'.[339] Letetia Daniels Jackson believes that the notion of a rich black man was antithetical to some old southern mores: 'It was an underlying current that this black man is elitist…He's used his blackness to get rich. It's sort of like, be careful if you let this happen. You're going to let the floodgates in. These black people are going to take everything that you have'.[340]

Along this theme, undoubtedly the most famous advert of the campaign was the so-called 'White Hands' television advert. The advert features the hands of a white man who angrily crumples up a letter from a potential employer. The narrator explains, 'You needed that job. You were the best qualified, but they had to give it to a minority because of a racial quota'. The advert then claims that Gantt favoured legislation to impose racial quotas in employment. The 'quota bill' to which the advert

[334] Interview with Mac McCorkle.
[335] Gantt, quoted in Varley, 1992, 17.
[336] 'Poll: Support for Gantt, Helms even', *The Times-News*, 22 September 1990.
[337] Mendelberg, 2001, Ch 1.
[338] Link, 2008, 377.
[339] Ibid.
[340] Interview with Jackson

refers was the 1990 Civil Rights Act, which made it easier for plaintiffs to sue employers whose hiring practices disparately impacted ethnic minorities.[341] It is widely believed that the advert was aimed to prime white fears that blacks were going to take their jobs.[342] Gantt campaign worker Monty Hagler remembers being spat on by a white voter while canvassing in Jackson County, where African Americans compose only 1.7% of the county's population. The voter told him, 'I've seen that ad about Harvey Gantt taking jobs from white people'.[343]

The Crusade Campaign: Old South/New South Symbolic Contrast

According to William Link, in the Gantt-Helms contest, 'the race issue rarely left the minds of the electorate'.[344] He is correct, but the role of race has been widely misinterpreted. Many commentators hold that Helms's intense priming of latent racial hostilities made Helms a particularly challenging opponent for Gantt.[345] However, I argue that Helms's racial intolerance provided a useful foil for the Gantt campaign, allowing them to forward a crusade narrative which presented Gantt as a representative of New South racial tolerance battling against Jesse Helms's Old South racist politics. Gantt explained in an interview that Helms 'was the kind of opponent I'd love to have…I thought for us to have any kind of chance, we had to have a candidate whose views were solidly on the other side – and who could even be perceived as a villain maybe'.[346] Mel Watt echoes this perspective in an interview with me, 'this was not a symbolic run, but I don't think it was all necessarily about winning or losing either. This was a time in history. It was time to do this. And this seemed to us to be the right opponent'.[347] Far from being a debilitating factor, I argue that Helms's racism strengthened Gantt's racial appeal with some white voters.

[341] King & Smith, 2011, 129.
[342] Jamieson, 1992.
[343] Interview with Monty Hagler.
[344] Link, 2008, 365.
[345] E.g., Jamieson (1992), Strickland & Whicker (1992)
[346] Gantt quoted in Varley (1992, 8).
[347] Interview with Watt.

White supporter mobilisation

In contrast to the deracialised model, Gantt's symbolic status as an African American candidate and the potential of being the first popularly elected black senator from the South were themes which I argue were promoted by the Gantt campaign to white audiences. One Gantt campaign operative acknowledged in an interview, 'The historical significance was not lost on the campaign',[348] and on the campaign trail, Gantt alluded to the symbolic-historic significance of his candidacy. At a rally in the majority-white Alamance County, Gantt told supporters, 'I am convinced that North Carolina, with the nation and the world watching, will make us all feel proud'.[349] Gantt's words resemble those of Edward Brooke, whose slogan 'Proudly for Brooke' encouraged the support of racially liberal whites.

Gantt's symbolic appeal was intensified by the contrast drawn against Jesse Helms. Gantt portrayed Helms as a character with antediluvian views on race. He called Helms 'the last of a dying breed' in Southern politics[350] and declared, 'Mr Helms is irrelevant for the times we live in'.[351] Unprompted, in an interview, one of Gantt's (white) researchers described the campaign to me as a crusade. He said, 'It really had a crusade feel to it because you had an African American man running against, you know, a Southern icon who[m] many people would recognise as a holdover from the Jim Crow, pre-Civil Rights Act era: Old South versus New South'.[352] Gantt himself described the campaign in this way. He told reporters, 'We want people to get excited about this election. We want them to be driven crazy by the notion that they can make a difference. We want a crusade'.[353]

This narrative was further promoted by the state press. The front page of the election day edition of the *Times-News* captured the symbolic racial juxtaposition which the Gantt campaign had encouraged. Reporter Matthew Davis wrote, 'the polls suggest that Mr Gantt, a black liberal, has a good shot at unseating Republican incumbent Sen Helms, a white conservative, to become the first black senator

[348] HG3.
[349] 'An Underdog Forces Helms into a Surprisingly Tight Race', *New York Times*, 31 October 1990.
[350] 'Helms vs Gantt: A state divided', *The Times-News*, 11 November 1990, 5C.
[351] 'Gantt ready for Helms Campaign', *The Times-News*, 16 June 1990.
[352] HG3.
[353] 'Unseating Helms: Rival Charts His Uphill Climb', *New York Times*, 16 July 1990.

from the South since Reconstruction'. Davis speculated that North Carolina was 'poised to make history' in what he called 'a referendum on the future'.[354]

Racialised Discourse and Style

Characterised by self-referential racial discourse, Gantt's political style was far from 'deracialised', I argue. Zaphon Wilson erroneously claims that 'Gantt shied away from racial problems' and projected the view that 'race was an issue that had been resolved and was not an important part of the overall problem'.[355] My analysis of the content of Gantt's public speeches leads me to draw a very different conclusion. Rather than pretending that racism was a 'resolved' matter, Gantt pointed to Helms's racism as a serious problem while making reference to his own status as a black man. Gantt told a crowd, 'In Jesse's vision of America, I would have never had a chance to attend Clemson University and run against Jesse for the US Senate. In his vision of America, I wouldn't even have been allowed to vote'.[356]

In order to justify their claim that the Gantt campaign was 'deracialised', some commentators assert that Gantt did not respond to the racial attacks against him. Due to their extremely superficial use of primary sources, Gomolin et al argue that Gantt's failure to criticise Helms for racism was 'a costly mistake'.[357] This is not accurate. The Gantt campaign did respond directly to the racial nature of Helms's criticisms. Watt states, 'You know, if we thought it was racist, we would say it was racist'.[358] Gantt addressed the racial criticisms in a television advert. He looked directly at the camera and said, 'Jesse Helms is running another smear campaign, charging me with using my race for financial advantage, charging me with requiring gay teachers in schools. Those ads are lies and Jesse Helms knows it'.[359] When Helms sent out fundraising letters depicting Gantt with black politicians, Gantt

[354] Matthew Davis, 'US Senate campaign in last sweep', *The Times-News*, 6 November 1990.
[355] Wilson, 1993, 179.
[356] 'A knock-down, drag-out campaign', *Gastonia Gazette*, 2 September 1990.
[357] Gomolin et al, 2007, 18.
[358] Interview with Watt.
[359] Quoted in Varley, 1992, 37.

told reporters that some of the letters 'have certainly been clearly racist'.[360] Gantt continued, 'We've called it what it is. It's racism'.[361]

Racialised issue agenda

Finally, I argue that Gantt did not have a 'deracialised' issue agenda. Wilson argues that Gantt presented 'a strong appeal to non-racial issues'.[362] This is incorrect. While it is true that Gantt's top policy priorities – education and the environment – were not heavily racialised, they formed part of an overtly liberal policy programme. Albritton et al claim that 'race-neutral' campaigns involve 'conservative appeals to whites',[363] but Gantt's appeals were unashamedly liberal. Deputy campaign manager Mac McCorkle described Gantt as a 'full-throated' liberal,[364] and this perception was widely shared in the press. Davidson County *Dispatch* journalist Hunter Kome wrote that Gantt was 'running as an avowed liberal'.[365] On the final weekend of the campaign, Gantt defiantly told 700 supporters at a Mecklenburg County rally, 'If being a liberal means you care about people, you can call me a liberal'.[366]

Gantt's unashamedly liberal policy positioning was strategic. Watt explains that the campaign believed it was very important for Gantt to take a consistent policy line. Even though most North Carolinians disagreed with Helms's policy positions, they still marked him highly for integrity because of his consistency.[367] Watt recalls,

> We understood that on the substantive issues, if [Helms] could do it on the conservative side, we could do it on the liberal side because people admired somebody who would tell them where they stood on the issues…So, that freed us up to be on the left or on whatever positions

[360] 'Helms: Fund-raising letters not racist", *Wilmington Morning Star*, 27 August 1990.
[361] 'Helms denies racist claims', *Spartanburg Herald-Journal*, 27 August 1990.
[362] Wilson, 1993, 190.
[363] Albritton et al, 1996.
[364] McCorkle, 1991, 24.
[365] Hunter Kome, 'Harvey Gantt', *The Dispatch*, 23 October 1990, 10.
[366] 'Gantt, Helms supporters clash at campaign rally', *The Dispatch*, 3 November 1990.
[367] Watt in Varley (1992, 16).

> Harvey had strong opinions about -- just as free as Helms had been in expressing his opinions…We were trying to be Harvey Gantt on one side and Jesse Helms on the other side.[368]

By identifying as a liberal, Gantt violated a core feature of the deracialised campaign model, but from the perspective of his campaign strategists, it was necessary for drawing the strategic contrast with Helms.

Black Mobilisation

As his near-unanimous support from African Americans during his mayoral campaigns already demonstrated, the black community held a strong sense of linked fate with the political success of Harvey Gantt. McCorkle remembers that for African Americans, 'Harvey's race was so historic, and Helms was so hated in the black community'.[369] Contrary to the deracialised model, I argue that Gantt made racialised appeals directly to black voters.

Importantly, Gantt operated within the traditional organisational auspices of the black community, such as the black church and black media. Rob Christensen reported in the Raleigh *News and Observer*, 'Mr Gantt has plugged into a network of black churches which traditionally have played an important political role'.[370] Black radio was also used by the Gantt campaign to communicate with black voters. In one advert, two African Americans recall a nightmare of waking up to find that Helms had won the election by one vote. Gantt's adverts on black radio were deliberately designed to increase black turnout. One media consultant explains, 'You can hit a lot harder on [black] radio because the other side has more difficulty keeping track of what you're saying'.[371]

There are signs that Gantt's candidacy did encourage higher levels of black participation. Black voter registration in 1990 dramatically outpaced white registration. From April 1990, the month before the Democratic primary, to October, the month before the general election, black voter registration

[368] Interview with Watt.
[369] Interview with McCorkle.
[370] Rob Christensen, 'Gantt is hopeful in final days', *Raleigh News and Observer*, 5 May 1990.
[371] Quoted in Glaser (1996, 7).

increased by 10.6%, double the rate of white registration.[372] In comparison, during the equivalent period before the 1986 mid-term elections, black voter registration only increased by 2.0%.[373]

Result

In the end Jesse Helms defeated Gantt with 52.6% to Gantt's 47.4% of the vote. Gantt won 37% of the white vote and 95% of the black vote. Gomolin et al argue that Gantt failed to unseat Helms because he was unable to garner 40% of the white vote.[374] It is true that Gantt would have won if he had received three percentage points more of the white vote, but he would also have won if African Americans had composed 22% of voters, which was their proportion in the overall population. As it turned out, blacks were 19% of voters, an increase of three percentage points from the last mid-term elections but insufficient to bring Gantt to victory.[375]

Katherine Tate extravagantly concludes that Gantt lost due to racism. She credits Helms's victory to a strategy of 'waging a racially charged media campaign that effectively mobilized conservative white voters'.[376] Strickland and Whicker agree, pointing to an exit poll in which ten percent of North Carolina voters stated race as the biggest factor in their decision.[377] Half of these voters were black, and the other half were white.

Strickland and Whicker fail to consider seriously the implications of these data. First, since blacks are a much smaller proportion of the overall electorate, the poll indicates that blacks were much more likely to vote on the basis of race than whites were. Only 6% of whites cited race as the most important issue, compared to 26% of African Americans. Second, Strickland and Whicker assume that the whites voting on the basis of race were driven by anti-black racism. They do not consider the possibility that at least some of these voters were motivated because they wanted to send an African American to the Senate. According to Varley, Gantt's internal polls showed that approximately 25%

[372] Link, 2008, Ch 10.
[373] Prysby, 1996, 42.
[374] Gomolin et al, 2007.
[375] Varley, 1992.
[376] Tate, 1997, 267.
[377] Stickland & Whicker, 1992.

of white voters indicated that Gantt's race made them *more* likely to vote for him.[378] Given this proportion of white racial support and overwhelmingly positive support from African Americans, I suggest that on balance, Gantt's racial status was a net electoral advantage.

In this chapter, I have demonstrated that Harvey Gantt's senatorial campaign against Jesse Helms did not follow the deracialised campaign model. I have established that Gantt possessed a strong black identity, which he did not discard during the campaign. Gantt faced a racially hostile opponent who primed latent racial hostilities in the election environment, but Gantt's campaign responded to these attacks by promoting a narrative which symbolically contrasted Gantt's 'New South' racial progressivism against Helms's 'Old South' racial intolerance. This 'crusade' motif was used to invite the support of racially liberal whites and to motivate greater turnout among African Americans.

[378] Varley, 1992.

Ch 7 – The Crusade Campaign Model: Carol Moseley Braun and the 1992 Illinois Senate Election

Carol Moseley Braun is the only black woman ever to have served in the US Senate. In spite of her unique historical status and the unlikely circumstances of her election, her successful senatorial campaign in 1992 has been woefully understudied. Both Dennis Nordin[379] and Katherine Tate[380] attempt, unsuccessfully, to situate Braun's candidacy within the deracialised campaign model. Roger Oden acknowledges that the deracialised campaign model is an ill-fit for her campaign, yet he is inconsistent in his assessment of Braun's racial strategy. At one point, Oden appears to recognise that Braun's race was relevant to voters, noting that after her nomination 'the populace felt the possibility that history could be made'.[381] Yet, later in his chapter, he argues that Braun's race was an irrelevant factor except to Chicago blacks.[382] Ultimately, in failing to provide a convincing account of Braun's racial appeal, the existing scholarship demonstrates the limitations of the theoretical toolkit which has hitherto been used to study black candidates who operate in majority-white election contexts.

In this chapter, I argue that Braun's campaign followed the crusade campaign model. Contrary to the deracialised model, Braun freely acknowledged her symbolic-historic status when she communicated to both white and black audiences. The aspiration to increase descriptive representation in the Senate was a major campaign theme, which I argue invited the support of white voters. Unlike in the symbolic-historic campaign model, however, Braun operated in a racially hostile campaign environment. Specifically, her opponent Rich Williamson primed implicit racial cues and stereotypes in his attacks against Braun. Rather than ignoring the implicit racial content of these attacks, as the deracialised model would suggest, Braun publicly condemned them in explicit racial terms. Symbolically, Braun portrayed Williamson as a personification of the white, male establishment whom she and her supporters aimed to defeat.

[379] Nordin, 2012, 126-142.
[380] Tate, 1997.
[381] Oden, 1996, 52.
[382] Ibid., 57.

Sources

This case study draws on two weeks of fieldwork in Chicago and Washington in the summer of 2013. While in America, I conducted interviews with Senator Braun, as well as significant figures from her campaign including her political director, communications director, finance director, field director, and research director. I also interviewed a left-wing Chicago activist and two journalists who covered the campaign.

While in Chicago, I accessed primary documents from three archives: the Harold Washington Archive at the Harold Washington Memorial Library, the papers of the Hyde Park Historical Society at the University of Chicago, and the papers of Leon Despres at the Chicago History Museum. Regrettably, Senator Braun's papers were unavailable, as they had not yet been processed by the Chicago History Museum.

I also analysed and manually coded a sample of forty-six newspaper articles which discuss the campaign between Braun's nomination in March 1992 and her general election victory in November. The articles are primarily from a collection of original newspaper clippings held at the Harold Washington Library. Although the newspapers are from the Chicago area, they are a diverse sample of the region's press, representing a range of political and ethnic perspectives. The sample includes the city's two largest newspapers the *Chicago Tribune* and the *Chicago Sun-Times*, two business newspapers, the city's largest black newspaper, a Jewish newspaper, and the city's main LGBT newspaper. Additionally, I generated a sample of sixteen Williamson and Braun television adverts from the Political Communication Center of the University of Oklahoma. After manually coding and analysing their content, I used the adverts to help establish the racial context of the campaign and to identify the candidates' racialised messaging.

Finally, I benefited from the first-hand accounts of the campaign given in the autobiography of Braun's Democratic primary opponent Senator Alan Dixon[383] and in a participant-observation study of Chicago black politics, written by Frederick Harris.[384]

Carol Moseley Braun

Carol Moseley Braun's life demonstrates strong social rootedness in Chicago's African American community, while also the maintenance of political linkages to the city's mostly white, anti-machine liberals. These twin connections, I argue, were vital in the advancement of Braun's political career through her election to the US Senate.

Born in 1947, Carol Moseley was the daughter of a police officer in the Chicago police force, Joseph Moseley.[385] Significantly, in municipal politics the Moseley family supported the 'independents' who opposed, above all, the political machine of Mayor Richard Daley. Joseph Moseley, for example, worked alongside independent alderman Leon Despres in unionising the city's prison guards in spite of Daley-machine opposition.[386]

In addition to inheriting her parents' anti-machine politics, Braun was instilled with a strong sense of her black racial identity. Her maternal grandparents had been supporters of the black nationalist Marcus Garvey, 'race men, as they were called at the time', Braun explains.[387] In an article for the black magazine *Ebony*, Braun writes that her parents 'raised us in a world that did not acknowledge or legitimize racism. Ethnic pride was part and parcel of this world'.[388]

As a child, Braun lived in the Chatham area of Chicago's South Side, which she describes as a 'middle-class black neighbourhood' which integrated 'relatively peacefully'.[389] However, other areas in the South Side, such as Gage Park, were plagued by racial tensions in the 1960s. The community

[383] Dixon, 2013.
[384] Harris, 1999.
[385] Gutgold, 2006, Ch 5.
[386] Gretchen Reynolds, 'Behind the Braun Phenomenon', *Chicago*, October 1992.
[387] Carol Moseley Braun, 'Between WEB Du Bois and BT Washington', *Ebony*, November 1995.
[388] Ibid.
[389] Correspondence with Carol Moseley Braun.

was chosen by Martin Luther King Jr as the stage for civil rights protests against housing discrimination, and Braun marched with King on two occasions.[390] She also engaged in protests as a student, refusing to leave an all-white café until she was served and going to an all-white beach where stones were thrown at her.[391] Although she never joined the Black Panthers, as a young woman, Braun volunteered at the Panthers' free breakfast programme[392] which distributed meals to two-hundred of the city's children every day.[393]

Braun graduated from the prestigious University of Chicago Law School in 1972 and settled in Hyde Park, the South Side's liberal,[394] multiracial enclave near the university.[395] After working in the US attorney's office, in 1978 Braun was encouraged by anti-machine liberals, feminists, and environmentalists to run for the Illinois House of Representatives.[396] Successfully succeeding the liberal independent Robert Mann, Braun describes the district as a mix of University of Chicago intelligentsia, working-class whites, and poor and middle-class African Americans.[397] Leon Despres described the area as 'the closest we have in Chicago to a large, stable interracial community'.[398]

After Harold Washington was elected Chicago's first black mayor in 1983, he designated Braun as his floor leader in the state assembly.[399] Washington's support was not unconditional, however. In 1986, Braun had begun to call on Chicago black leaders to support her candidacy for lieutenant governor, but this effort was blocked by Washington.[400] A journalist from the *Chicago Sun-Times* speculates that Washington 'didn't want Carol elevated to a perch from which she could challenge him for mayor'.[401]

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[390] Reynolds, 'Behind the Braun Phenomenon', *Chicago*, October 1992.
[391] Ibid.
[392] Interview with Carol Moseley Braun.
[393] Witt, 2007, 35.
[394] 'Alderman looks back on his long political career', *Hyde Park Herald* , 18 May 1994.
[395] Leon Despres, 'What's past is prologue: a view of the history of Hyde Park', Hyde Park Historical Society Archive: University of Chicago.
[396] 'Robert Mann: Former legislator was staunch liberal', *Chicago Tribune*, 31 March 2008.
[397] Interview with Braun
[398] Despres, 'On the democratization of the Democratic Party', 7 June 1969, Despres papers: Chicago History Museum.
[399] Interview with Braun.
[400] Ibid.
[401] CMB8.

However, shortly before his death, at the encouragement of South Side alderman Bobby Rush,[402] Washington agreed to support Braun for the position of Cook County Recorder of Deeds.[403] Journalist Andy Shaw explains, 'His blessing for such an obscure job was probably enough to ward off competition'.[404] The following year, in 1988, Braun was successfully elected to the post which had a budget of $8 million and 300 employees.[405] A source close to Braun speculates that she ran for Recorder of Deeds with the long-term plan to run for mayor of Chicago.[406]

The 1992 Campaign

In October 1991, Illinois's two-term Democratic Senator Alan Dixon made the fateful decision to vote for the nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court.[407] Dixon, a self-described 'moderate', had already angered liberals by his support for anti-abortion legislation and financial deregulation.[408] Thomas had been accused of sexually harassing a former colleague, Anita Hill who was an African American woman. Hill's treatment by an all-white, all-male Senate Judiciary Committee angered liberals, who felt that as a woman of colour she had not been taken seriously.[409] Soon after Thomas's confirmation, female members of the Illinois Democratic State Central Committee stated that they would not support Dixon's renomination for a third term the following year.[410]

Braun was soon recruited to challenge Dixon by the same Hyde Park liberals who had encouraged her to run for the Illinois House of Representatives in 1978. Dennis Nordin suggests that Braun's race was inconsequential in her recruitment,[411] but I argue that it was an essential factor. According to Wayne D'Orio, at least two (white) women were also considered as potential challengers to Dixon,[412] but Braun's race was an important distinguishing factor. Braun's political advisor Steve Cobble recalls,

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[402] Interview with Braun
[403] Reynolds, 'Behind the Braun Phenomenon', *Chicago*, October 1992.
[404] Correspondence with Andy Shaw.
[405] Tate, 1997.
[406] CMB12.
[407] Dixon, 2013, 302.
[408] Kenney & Hartley, 2012, Ch 18.
[409] Vavrus, 1998, 221-223.
[410] Dixon, 2013, Ch 5.
[411] Nordin, 2012, 128.
[412] D'Orio, 2004, 12.

'the women that were helping to engineer this were smart enough to realise that a credible black, woman feminist had a much better chance against two white men than a white [female challenger]. Carol could win a primary based on being a positive black woman who was credible, whereas a white woman probably would not have gotten over the top'.[413]

In the primary, Braun was aided by the entry of a white lawyer named Al Hofeld, who challenged Dixon on charges of corruption.[414] Braun's communications advisor Alton Miller, who had worked as Harold Washington's speechwriter, believed that the three-way split made it possible for Braun to win. He explains, 'We were convinced that we were watching a replay of what happened with Harold Washington'.[415] In 1983, Washington had defeated the incumbent mayor of Chicago Jane Byrne in a divided three-way Democratic primary, securing 37% of the vote against Byrne's 33% and challenger Richard Daley's 30%. Not dissimilarly, Braun won the Democratic senatorial primary with 39% of the vote, with Dixon securing 35% and Hofeld winning 27%.

Opponent: Richard Williamson

Braun's general election opponent, Richard Williamson, was described as 'the quintessential Reagan-era man'.[416] Williamson had served in several positions in the Reagan administration, overseeing Reagan's 'new federalism' policy which aimed to reduce the size of the federal government by cutting federal spending on domestic programmes and encouraging states to pay for the services themselves.[417] Over the twelve years of Reagan and Bush, Illinois lost $8 billion in federal spending on public services and investment in education, employment, health care, and infrastructure.[418] Williamson also served the administration as a diplomat before leaving to work in the private sector.

[413] Interview with Steve Cobble.
[414] TV advert, quoted in Tate (1997, 271).
[415] Interview with Alton Miller
[416] David Moberg, 'He's Rich and He's Proud', *Chicago Reader*, 30 October 1992.
[417] Ibid.
[418] Ibid.

Regarded as an awkward and uncharismatic campaigner, Andy Shaw characterises Williamson as a candidate 'with a great résumé but limited political skills'.[419]

Crusade Campaign Model

Braun's campaign fits the crusade campaign model for three reasons. First, she did not avoid race in her campaign discourse before white audiences. Second, she reacted to her opponent's implicitly racially hostile attacks in explicitly racial terms, symbolically drawing a contrast between her historic status as a black, female candidate and his status as a member of the white, male establishment. Third, Braun made strong appeals to African Americans on the basis of their linked fate and organised the black community through traditional avenues such as the black church.

Symbolic-Historic Appeal to Whites

While the deracialised campaign model would suggest that Braun downplayed the symbolic-historic significance of her candidacy, her approach was the opposite. As one senior Braun advisor put it, descriptive representation was a 'central theme' of the campaign.[420] Shortly after being nominated, Braun said in a *New York Times* interview that voters backed her because they saw the Senate as full of 'just garden-variety politicians making bad speeches…Women were asking, "Where are the women?" Minorities said, "Where are the minorities?" Working people said, "Who are these millionaires? These aren't regular Joes".'[421] The *Southtown Economist* reports that when Braun won the Democratic nomination, she was 'swamped by a tidal wave of interest in her candidacy and the possibility that she would "make history" as the first black woman elected to the Senate'.[422] A senior member of the Braun campaign reiterates, 'It was an opportunity to make history…the first Democratic African American senator and first African American woman'.[423]

Tate and Nordin have argued that Braun's symbolic status was only made with reference to her gender. Tate, for example, argues that by focusing on gender rather than race, Braun successfully

[419] Correspondence with Andy Shaw.
[420] CMB11.
[421] Braun, quoted in 'Woman in the news, storming the Senate club', *New York Times*, 19 March 1992.
[422] 'Braun for US Senate', *Southtown Economist*, 26 October 1992.
[423] CMB12.

developed a 'racially neutral campaign'.[424] Nordin asserts that to Illinois voters Braun was seen more 'as a female office seeker than as an African American'.[425] However, I argue that Braun's race and gender cannot be separated nearly as easily as Tate and Nordin imply. As a black woman, Braun occupied a distinct status. Women were not ignorant of her race; blacks were not ignorant of her gender. I agree with Oden that 1992 was 'a year in which voters put a high priority on change and diversity'.[426] While gender representation was clearly a major theme, racial diversity was not inconsistent with these sentiments.

The deracialised model also states that black candidates will forward a race-neutral policy agenda, taking conservative policy positions in order to avoid alienating whites.[427] However, Braun did not retreat from her liberal positions or avoid issues with racialised content, such as drugs, crime, and gun control. For example, Braun maintained her position that cannabis should be decriminalised[428] in spite of Williamson's attacks that Braun was 'recklessly liberal' on drug policy.[429] Nordin incorrectly claims that Braun rarely spoke about race explicitly, fearing white backlash.[430] In some cases, Braun justified her policy positions with reference to explicit racial inequalities. For example, Braun stated that she opposed the death penalty because she believed that it was disproportionately used against ethnic minorities.[431] A senior member of the campaign team reflects, 'Here's the thing about Carol – despite the dysfunction of the campaign and the imperfect nature of it, she's an incredibly smart woman who knows what she believes, has clear positions on issues, and she's not a vessel…She was very clear about what she believed'.[432]

Symbolic Contrast in Racialised Campaign Context


Although Illinois was not a southern state and had a long history of black political participation, I contend that Braun operated within a racially hostile campaign context. Williamson primed racial

[424] Tate, 1997, 276.
[425] Nordin, 2012, 128.
[426] Oden, 1996, 52.
[427] Wilson, 1990.
[428] Frank James, 'Large gap separates Williamson and Braun on crime', *Chicago Tribune*, 19 October 1992.
[429] 'Williamson hits Braun as soft on porn, drugs', *Chicago Sun-Times*, 27 October 1992.
[430] Nordin, 2012, 131.
[431] James, 'Large gap separates Williamson and Braun on crime', *Chicago Tribune*, 19 October 1992.
[432] CMB10.

stereotypes and cues, while also forwarding an issue agenda in which racialised issues such as welfare, drugs, and tax increases featured prominently. Consequently, even right-leaning newspapers in the state argued that the Williamson campaign had been racially divisive.[433]

Williamson deployed a number of racial cues in his adverts against Braun. He used exclusive language to promote the idea that Braun was an outsider. According to the *Chicago Sun-Times*, Williamson's campaign distributed campaign literature which suggested that 'Braun doesn't share American values'.[434] In public statements, Williamson accused Braun of being far 'out of the mainstream'.[435] He also used extreme language to describe Braun and her positions. In campaign advertising, he condemned Braun for holding 'reckless' positions (see Figure 7.1) on child porn, taxes, murder, and drugs.[436] Williamson told reporters in the Republican-leaning collar counties outside Chicago that Braun and her supporters were 'radically reckless liberals'.[437]

Figure 7.1 – 'Reckless', Williamson television advert



Source: Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

[433] E.g., 'Braun for Senate – with reservations', *Crain's Chicago Business*, 19 October 1992; 'Braun for US Senate', *Southtown Economist*, 26 October 1992.
[434] Steve Neal, 'Why Voters Don't Trust Williamson', *Chicago Sun-Times*, 12 October 1992.
[435] Quoted in Gutgold, 2006, 144.
[436] Basil Talbott, 'Williamson hits Braun as soft on porn, drugs', *Chicago Sun-Times*, 27 October 1992.
[437] Williamson, quoted in 'Senate Rivals Work Strongholds', *Chicago Sun-Times*, 2 November 1992.

Braun responded defiantly telling a gathering at Du Page College in the collar counties, 'My opponent calls me reckless. Didn't they call Anita Hill that? Reckless? Excuse me'.[438] By comparing herself to Anita Hill, I argue that Braun forwarded the crusade campaign narrative which aligned Williamson to the same insensitive white, male establishment who had motivated her to run for the Senate in the first place.


A scandal which emerged near the end of the campaign offers a case study of how both candidates reacted to a set of circumstances in which a racial stereotype (corruption) was combined powerfully with a racialised policy issue (welfare). Williamson, I argue, reacted in a racially hostile fashion through the use of implicitly racial criticisms in advertisements and public rhetoric. Rather than ignore the racial content of her opponent's attacks, however, Braun addressed them directly.

On 28 September, WMAQ-Channel 5 revealed that Braun's mother Edna Moseley had not disclosed to the Illinois Department of Public Aid her receipt of $28,750 from the sale of timber rights on a family farm in Alabama.[439] Moseley lived in a nursing home and was funded by Medicaid, America's means-tested public health insurance. While the proceeds of the windfall would normally be expected to contribute to the costs of her care, Moseley distributed the money to her surviving children, including $10,000 to Braun. Braun claimed that the money was a legitimate repayment for a loan.

Regardless of the legal technicalities, the episode was manipulated by the Williamson campaign for political advantage. When WMAQ-Channel 5 first broke the story, the Williamson campaign received a cash injection of $240,000 from the National Republican Senate Campaign Committee (NRSCC).[440] Williamson then regularly broadcast adverts questioning Braun's ethics (see Figure 7.2). Although he did not evoke race explicitly, Williamson's attacks were hard-hitting. In public comments, Williamson accused Braun of criminal activity and cheating the welfare system for her own gain. He told a gathering in St Charles, a majority-white town in the collar counties, 'She was a cheat. She tried

[438] Braun, quoted in Ibid.
[439] Thomas Hardy & Steve Johnson, 'Senate foes don't let up on attacks', *Chicago Tribune*, 2 November 1992.
[440] Basil Talbott, 'Braun, Wiliamson facing critical test', *Chicago Sun-Times*, 11 October 1992.

Figure 7.2 – 'Ethics Revised', Williamson television advert



Source: Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

to defraud the people'.[441] Williamson was eventually censured by Conduct, a group which monitors campaigns for racial divisiveness.[442]

Due to the highly racialised associations of welfare and corruption, I contend that Williamson's attacks were racially hostile. Tate believes that the Medicaid scandal was 'potentially devastating' because it served to invoke racial stereotypes of African Americans as underserving recipients of welfare.[443] A senior member of the Braun team agrees, 'it fits into the stereotype almost of the welfare queen that African Americans are tarred with by a white establishment'.[444]

While the deracialised model would imply that Braun ignore the implicit racial content of Williamson's charge, she took the opposite tack. At a press conference, Braun stated that Williamson had 'attempted to peddle racism'[445] and was 'trying to frighten people with the image of a bomb-throwing welfare mother running for the Senate'.[446] According to one senior campaign official,

[441] Williamson, quoted in 'Williamson calls rival a cheat', *Chicago Tribune,* 1 November 1992.
[442] Basil Talbott, 'Braun, Williamson slug it out', *Chicago Sun-Times,* 1 November 1992.
[443] Tate, 1997, 243.
[444] CMB11.
[445] Braun, quoted in 'Braun takes heat on funds', *Chicago Sun-Times,* 1 October 1992.
[446] Braun, quoted in Gutgold (2006, 144).

Braun's decision to describe the Medicaid attacks as racist was 'heatedly debated' by her advisors.[447] Braun, herself, contends that she had no qualms about the strategy,[448] and her research director Ira Cohen agrees, stating, 'in my own judgement, there's no question that she should have responded in that vein'.[449]

While residents were not impressed with Braun's handling of her mother's finances, I posit that Braun's decision to identify the racial content of Williamson's attacks was important in retaining her support from liberal white voters. By portraying Williamson as a racially hostile personification of the white, male establishment, Braun made it difficult for voters to switch their support to him. At a focus group conducted during the campaign, a 52-year-old white travel agent from northern Chicago captured these sentiments. She stated, 'I am for Carol Moseley Braun. Even though I don't agree with what she did, blacks and women are grossly underrepresented in Congress'.[450] Cohen argues that Braun's response rendered Williamson's attack ineffective: 'In the end, I think it was counterproductive for him. In the end, I think it boomeranged in the campaign'.[451]

Black Voter Mobilisation

While the deracialised campaign model holds that black candidates avoid making public appeals to African Americans on the basis of race, my analysis of the content of Braun's speeches before black audiences suggests that Braun's candidacy promoted strong feelings of linked fate with the African American community. In some instances, these sentiments of linked fate were unambiguous. At one of Jesse Jackson's Operation PUSH gatherings, a speaker declared, 'You're not sending Carol Moseley Braun to the US Senate. You're sending yourself'.[452]

Braun's rootedness in the black church was a major theme promoted in the black community. One of her final campaign stops was at her own church, Vernon Park Church of God, where she was joined

[447] CMB6.
[448] Interview with Braun.
[449] Interview with Ira Cohen.
[450] Eleanor Murray, quoted in 'Panel pines for third choice', *Chicago Sun-Times*, 13 October 1992.
[451] Interview with Cohen.
[452] Quoted in 'I feel duped', *New City*, 2 October 1992.

by America's first black governor, Douglas Wilder.[453] Religion has historically helped to frame political narratives for African Americans. At one campaign event Braun was likened to the biblical character Esther, protecting 'her people' from catastrophe.[454] Black churches were a major mobilising vehicle for Braun's campaign, not only for votes but also for volunteers. In his participant-observation study of the Braun campaign's organisation in the black church, Frederick Harris concluded that the black church provided psychological resources for political action, engendering feelings of group efficacy.[455] His work echoed Steven Peterson's findings that activity in church-centred activities have a 'spillover effect' into secular forms of political participation.[456] Braun clearly appreciated this reality telling a gathering of black ministers, 'The church is the single most important institution we have'.[457]

Braun's lifelong residence on the South Side was the strongest signal of her linked fate with the black community. At a gathering of black ministers, Rev Willie Barrow, Jesse Jackson's 1984 presidential campaign manager, situated Braun firmly within the community. She stated that Braun 'lives on our side – don't live in the suburbs. She lives right here on the South Side with a black child'.[458] In his study, Harris records black leaders telling other African Americans to 'support our very own'.[459] Braun, in turn, highlighted her connection to the black community by using the first-person plural when addressing black audiences and speaking about 'coming home' when at events where the attendees were mostly black.[460]

Result

On 3 November 1992, Carol Moseley Braun was elected the first – and to date only – black female senator. She defeated Williamson with 53.3% of the vote to his 43.1%. Unsurprisingly, Braun received 95% of the black vote, and in some majority-black Chicago precincts her support was over 99%. This was consistent with results shown by Harold Washington in 1983 and 1987, as well as

[453] Harris, 1999, 25.
[454] Quoted in Ibid.
[455] Harris, 1999, Ch 3.
[456] Peterson, 1992.
[457] Braun, quoted in Harris (1999, 21)
[458] Barrow, quoted in Harris (1999, 23)
[459] Quoted in Harris (1999, 13).
[460] Reynolds, 'Behind the Braun Phenomenon', *Chicago*, October 1992.

Jesse Jackson in 1988.[461] However, Braun's victory extended far beyond the black community. Nearly 75% of Braun's support came from white voters,[462] and she out-polled Williamson (49% to 46%) in the twenty-eight Illinois counties with virtually no (<1%) ethnic minorities.[463] Braun performed strongly downstate, defeating Williamson by a 2:1 margin. She also outpolled presidential candidate Bill Clinton by 177,776 votes.[464]

Carol Moseley Braun's historic campaign for the US Senate deserves greater attention from political scientists than it has hitherto received. For the field of black electoral studies, this campaign is especially important because it presents a potentially devastating challenge to the dominant theoretical assumption that black candidates must discard their racial identity in order to secure white votes. Braun's candidacy also shows that the assumption that black candidates will be subjected to negative backlash from white voters' if they accuse their white opponents of racism may be greatly overstated. Most importantly, Braun demonstrates that black candidates can confront racially hostile opponents within majority-white electoral contexts and emerge victorious.

[461] Oden, 1996, 53.
[462] Mark Brown, 'Braun runs strong among white voters', *Chicago Sun-Times*, 4 November 1992.
[463] Oden, 1996, 55.
[464] 'The Senate Race', *Chicago Tribune*, 5 November 1992.

Ch 8 – The Situationally Racialised Campaign Model: Harold Ford Jr and the 2006 Tennessee Senate Election

Harold Ford Jr's 2006 senatorial campaign appears to be a strong *prima facie* case of the deracialised campaign model. Robert Smith argues that Ford 'ran a textbook deracialized campaign',[465] and in many ways Ford's campaign ostensibly shares the characteristics of the deracialised model. In his public discourse, Ford avoided allusions to his race and to the symbolic-historic significance of his candidacy. His campaign style was described as 'polite and humble, almost deferential'.[466] On policy, Ford avoided associations with the liberal label by positioning himself on the centre-right of the Democratic Party. Even when his opponent primed racial hostilities through the use of racial cues and stereotypes in campaign advertisements, Ford declined to acknowledge their racial content, let alone condemn them as racist.

In spite of these appearances, Ford's campaign was not 'deracialised' for two reasons. First, commentators who identify the campaign as 'deracialised' overlook its operation within the African American community.[467] I argue that Ford's campaign style, mobilisation tactics, and issue agenda were consistent with the racialised appeals to 'linked fate' adopted by other black politicians when organising the African American community. Second, I contend that Ford's appeals to whites were not consistently 'race-neutral'. Ford's message and campaign style often involved signalling to whites that he was not like other black politicians. Ford also symbolically reassured them that he would not challenge their bonds of white racial solidarity. Ford's ostensibly 'deracialised' appeals did not ignore race but in fact were highly conscious of it. In this chapter, I will argue that Ford followed the situationally racialised campaign model because he adopted divergent (and mutually incompatible) racial appeals contingent on the race of his audience.

[465] Smith, 2009, 5.
[466] Bakke, nd, 6.
[467] E.g., Westen (2007), Smith (2009), Middleton & Franklin (2009), Persons (2009), Gillespie (2010b)

Sources

This case study draws on an extensive set of primary sources. I spent three weeks in Tennessee and Washington in the summer of 2013 interviewing associates of the Ford family, Ford's congressional staff, and members the senatorial campaign team. While I was not able to interview Ford personally, I interviewed many other senior campaign figures, including both of his campaign managers, the head of his finance department, his chief pollster, his personal aide, and field directors. I interviewed other relevant actors, including the head of the Tennessee Democratic Party, constituency office staff, and long-time friends and advisors. I have attempted to bring out Ford's own reflections on the campaign through his extensive comments in his 2010 autobiography.[468]

Additionally, I created a sample of 94 newspaper articles which covered the campaign from Ford's nomination in August 2006 until his defeat in November. Using the microfilm rolls in the Nashville Public Library and the Memphis Public Library, I read and manually coded all articles which discussed the campaign during the general election period in Tennessee's two major newspapers, the Nashville *Tennessean* and the Memphis *Commercial Appeal*. In order to include an eastern Tennessee perspective, I subsequently analysed and coded every edition of the *Elizabethton Star,* available in PDF form online,[469] over the same period.

My third set of primary sources was television advertisements and printed literature from both campaigns and the Republican and Democratic parties. I reviewed and coded 27 television adverts, most of which were available on Youtube and the internet cache of the former campaign websites. In addition, I analysed and coded 21 printed leaflets and direct mail pieces.[470]

Harold Ford Jr

Harold Ford Jr's life is characterised by the persistent maintenance of ties to the black community while operating primarily in majority-white contexts. David Sutphen, who first met Ford at a minority

[468] Ford, 2010.
[469] http://www.starhq.com
[470] My thanks to Ford's campaign manager, Jim Hester, who gave me his collection of Ford/Democrat and Corker/Republican direct mails.

affairs programme at law school and later served as Ford's chief of staff, explains, 'we were both equally comfortable in the kind of African American milieu, so to speak…as we were hanging out at a bar on campus. And that kind of ability to navigate both worlds was a strong dimension of our friendship and bond'.[471] Ford's ability to navigate both majority-white and majority-black worlds, I argue, was also a key feature of his campaign for the Senate.

Harold Ford Jr was born in 1970 in Memphis, Tennessee to a politically active family. Ford explains, 'In a lot of ways, politics was – and remains – a part of my genetic makeup'.[472] His grandfather, Newton John 'NJ' Ford, stood in 1965 for the Tennessee House of Representatives. Although he was unsuccessful, seven of his twelve children were elected to public office (see Figure 8.1).

Figure 8.1 - Members of Harold Ford Jr's family who held political office

Name	Relationship	Office	Years
Harold Ford Sr	Father	Tennessee House of Representatives	1970-1974
		US House of Representatives	1975-1997
John Ford	Uncle	Memphis City Council	1971-1979
		Tennessee Senate	1975-2005
		Shelby County General Session Court	1992-1996
James Ford	Uncle	Memphis City Council	1979-1993
		Shelby County Board of Commissioners	1994-2001
Emmitt Ford	Uncle	Tennessee House of Representatives	1974-1981
Joe Ford	Uncle	Memphis City Council	1994-1999
		Shelby County Board of Commissioners	2002-2009
		Mayor of Shelby County	2009-2010
Edmund Ford	Uncle	Memphis City Council	1999-2007
Ophelia Ford	Aunt	Tennessee Senate	2005-
Edmund Ford Jr	Cousin	Memphis City Council	2007-
Justin Ford	Cousin	Shelby County Board of Commissioners	2010-

Sources: Ford (2010), Bakke (nd, Ch 4), HF3, HF5

When Ford was four years old, his father Harold Ford Sr was very narrowly elected to the US House of Representatives, becoming Tennessee's first black member of Congress since Reconstruction. Ford Sr was also the first African American elected to represent a majority-white US House district;

[471] Interview with David Sutphen.
[472] Ford, 2010, 1.

although, the district was 48% black and would soon become majority-black.[473] Richard Fenno classifies Ford Sr as the last member of the 'pioneer cohort' of black US representatives, first elected after the enfranchisement of black populations throughout the South in the 1960s and 1970s.[474]

Ford Jr received an elite education, enrolled at St Albans Preparatory School in Washington where he was educated alongside sons of prominent politicians, including the sons of Ted Kennedy, George H W Bush, and John D Rockefeller IV.[475] After St Albans, Ford attended the University of Pennsylvania, an Ivy League university. Although educated in primarily white environments, Ford maintained his links with the black community. For example at Penn, Ford was member of the Black Student League and founded a monthly black newspaper called *Vision*.[476] Ford graduated in 1992 and then attended University of Michigan Law School.

Within months of graduating law school in 1996, Ford was elected to his retiring father's seat in the US House of Representatives. According to his colleagues, Ford spent at least four years preparing to run for statewide office.[477] With virtually no opposition from within his party after declaring his candidacy for the Senate in May 2005, Ford spent the first year of the Senate campaign as the presumptive party nominee while the Republicans were embattled in a rancorous three-way primary. In August 2006, the Republicans selected Bob Corker, a millionaire property developer who had served one term as mayor of Chattanooga from 2001 until 2005.

Situationally Racialised Campaign Model

The situationally racialised campaign model assumes that a black candidate will make race-based appeals to both white and black audiences, but the content of the appeals will be different. It is distinct from the tactic of 'situational deracialization' described by Sekou Franklin[478] because the situationally racialised model does not accept that appeals to white voters are consistently 'race-neutral' or

[473] Tate, 2003, 55.
[474] Fenno, 2003, 115.
[475] Ford, 2010, Ch 2.
[476] Ibid., 64.
[477] HF12, HF16.
[478] Franklin, 2010.

'deracialised'. In some instances, I argue, black candidates may make appeals to whites on the basis of white racial solidarity.

In the remainder of the chapter, I will demonstrate that Ford pursued the situationally racialised model. I will first establish that Ford strategically avoided allusions to the symbolic-historic status of his candidacy before white audiences. I will then show that Ford's symbolic language before white audiences was not consistently race-neutral. Finally, I will demonstrate that Ford deployed a racial strategy within the black community which was contradictory to the racial messages he promoted among whites.

Distance from Symbolic-Historic Status

In spite of more than half of the total African American population living in the states of the former Confederacy,[479] no African American has been popularly elected to the US Senate from the South. Harold Ford was the most likely candidate to reach this historic milestone since Harvey Gantt challenged Jesse Helms in North Carolina. Unlike Gantt, however, Ford did not allude to this fact when facing the white electorate. Specifically, I argue that there are three ways in which Ford distanced himself from his symbolic-historic racial status.

First, Ford simply dismissed the notion that his campaign was historic. When asked how he would feel to be listed as the first black senator from Tennessee, Ford replied, 'The only thing I want to be listed as is a senator from the state of Tennessee'.[480] Gomolin et al have attempted to argue that Ford promoted the symbolic-historic significance of his candidacy by running as a 'New South' candidate.[481] However, there is little evidence to support this assertion. The term 'New South' was not used by any of the seventeen people I interviewed from the Ford campaign. I also did not detect a single use of the phrase 'New South' in any of the 94 newspaper articles I analysed for this campaign. In contrast, the phrase 'New South' appeared in 7.7% of the articles in my Gantt-Helms newspaper sample. Also, significantly, the symbolic-historic significance of his campaign was infrequently


[479] 53.8% of African Americans (2010 Census).
[480] Harold Ford, quoted in 'Senate election seen as gauge of racial attitude', *Tennessean*, 5 November 2006.
[481] Gomolin et al, 2010.

mentioned by the state press. When both of Tennessee's major newspapers endorsed Harold Ford, neither of them mentioned his race.[482] Similarly, when the *Tennessean* ran a two-page biographical profile of Ford, the article did not mention Ford's race once.[483]

Ford's issue agenda was a second way in which he attempted to distance himself from his black racial identity before white audiences. Since the residents of majority-black House seats tend to be more left-wing than the residents of the state overall, Johnson et al posit that black US representatives struggle to position themselves ideologically for a statewide candidacy.[484] This was not the case for Ford. Over the course of his career, particularly during the years in which his colleagues state that he was preparing to run for the Senate,[485] Ford adopted policy positions which placed him on the right of the Congressional Black Caucus, as evidenced by his increasingly positive score on the first dimension of the NOMINATE scale (see Figure 8.2). Significantly, Ford joined the conservative 'Blue Dog' caucus and in 2002 challenged Nancy Pelosi for the leadership of the House Democratic Caucus from the right. Although the challenge was quixotic, Jonathan Darman argues that Ford 'lay the groundwork' for a statewide run by 'establishing himself as a conservative alternative to the party's leadership'.[486] Because the Congressional Black Caucus decided to endorse Pelosi over Ford, the move, I argue, further facilitated the symbolic contrast which Ford drew between himself and 'traditional' black leaders.

[482] 'Ford for US Senate', *Tennessean*, 15 October 2006; 'For the Senate: Harold Ford Jr', *Commercial Appeal* , 22 October 2006.
[483] Bill Theobald, 'Memphians have Ford's ear but he misses votes in House', *Tennessean*, 15 October 2006.
[484] Johnson, Selin, & Oppenheimer, 2012.
[485] HF12.
[486] Jonathan Darman, 'Tennessee's Harold Ford Jr's Path to Power', *Newsweek*, 30 October 2006.

Figure 6.2 – First-dimension NOMINATE scores in 105th-109th Congress (1997-2007)




Source: DW-Nominate, first dimension

The third way in which Ford distanced himself from his racial identity was his decision not to charge his opponent Bob Corker with racism, in spite of the heavy use of hostile racial cues and stereotypes in Republican advertisements (see Figures 8.3 and 8.4). Corker further promoted these racial themes in his public discourse. For example, the Corker campaign used exclusive language to imply that Ford did not hold 'Tennessee values'. Several adverts stated that Corker was 'a real Tennessean', while Ford was not.[487] In an interview on the PBS Newshour shortly before election day, Corker told a reporter, 'I don't think there's any question. I mean, you know, he does not -- he is not of Tennessee'.[488] Ford's communication advisor interprets these statements as implying 'that an African American by culture could not be a "real Tennessean". That presumption, of course, was racist'.[489]


[487] 'Corker, Ford agree: Ad goes too far', *Commercial Appeal*, 14 October 2006.
[488] Bob Corker, quoted in 'Fight to Finish in Tennessee Senate Race', PBS Newshour, 1 November 2006.
[489] HF10.

Figure 8.3 - Racial cues in Corker/Republican campaign advertisements



n=32

Figure 8.4 – Racial stereotypes in Corker/Republican advertisements



n=32

Corker also made frequent reference to the fact that Ford was from Memphis, where the majority of the state's black population lives. In his speeches, Corker and his surrogates warned that the people of Tennessee did not want 'a Memphis congressman representing us in the US Senate'.[490] While Ford acknowledges in his autobiography that he believed the contrast between Memphis and the rest of Tennessee was a racial cue,[491] during the campaign he never publicly identified the racial content of the association.

The most sensational racialised charge against Ford insinuated that he had engaged in inappropriate sexual relations with a white woman. In an advert released by the Republican National Committee, a blonde woman who did not appear to be wearing any clothes smiles and claims, 'I met Harold at the Playboy party', before winking at the camera and cooing, 'Harold, call me'. The 'Call Me' advert has assumed a status of notoriety only rivalled by Jesse Helms's 'White Hands' and George H Bush's 'Willie Horton' adverts in the cast of disgracefully racist advertising in recent American politics.

The advert was a reference to accusations that Ford attended a Super Bowl party in Jacksonville, Florida in February 2005 which had been sponsored by Playboy.[492] The advert's potency would have been particularly strong in the South where historically, Joel Williamson explains, 'white people were murderously sensitive to the character of attentions that a black man might pay a white woman'.[493] A commentator in the *Chattanooga Times Free Press* argued that the advert illustrated the Republicans' 'ready willingness to trade on sex, race, and the Old South taboo against interracial relations and miscegenation to attack Mr Ford'.[494]

While the advert was widely interpreted by the press as a racially hostile attack, Ford refused to acknowledge, let alone condemn, the advert's racial content. In an interview with *Washington Post* reporter David Espo, Ford 'repeatedly' declined to say whether he thought the advert was racist. Ford

[490] Ford, 2010, 220.
[491] Ibid., Ch 9.
[492] Colby Sledge, 'Cooper calls on Corker to force GOP to pull ad', *Tennessean*, 23 October 2006.
[493] Williamson, 1997, 1228.
[494] 'Republicans Still Run Dirty Ad', *Chattanooga Times Free Press*, 28 October 2006.

Figure 8.5 – 'Call Me', Republican National Committee television advert



Source: Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1smE1Es-8QA

stated, 'You have to ask them [Republicans] about race. I don't focus on those things'.[495] When asked to comment on the Call Me advert at another meeting with reporters, Ford merely responded, 'I was there. I like football, and I like girls'.[496] Ford's campaign manager Jim Hester suggests that the racial image Ford had cultivated made it impossible for him to condemn the advert's racial content. Hester explains, 'I don't know what you could do against it. I think the decision to not be the black candidate meant not calling out the race card. I think he did a really good job not doing that. Even with Call Me. He said, I don't think that was a racial ad. I don't know what he personally thought, but publicly he just dismissed it'.[497]

Ford's public reaction in 2006 was very different from the position he took in his 2010 autobiography. In the autobiography, Ford accused the Republicans of attempting to 'launch an all-out assault with race being the organizing and consistent theme'.[498] He writes that the Call Me advert 'reminded people I was black',[499] and he explicitly identifies it as playing on race. I argue that the disparity in his

[495] Ford, quoted in 'GOP consultant cuts ties with Mal-Mart', *Washington Post*, 27 October 2006.
[496] Ford, quoted in 'I was there, Ford says of Playboy party', *Tennessean*, 25 October 2006.
[497] Interview with Jim Hester.
[498] Ford, 2010, 221.
[499] Ibid., 223.

reaction suggests that Ford during the campaign deliberately avoided identifying the racial content of the advert for strategic reasons.

Appeals to white racial solidarity

Many commentators have argued that Ford's disavowal of liberal policy positions, his refusal to identify the racial content of the Republicans' attacks, and his reluctance to acknowledge the symbolic significance of his candidacy demonstrate that, at least among whites, Ford followed the deracialised campaign model. The view is problematic because it ignores the racial content of appeals that Ford made to whites on the basis of white racial solidarity. Ford knew that the Tennessee electorate was not truly 'race blind'. He reflects, 'From the outset of the campaign, I knew that race would be an issue. It was on the minds of everyone who thought about me, the Senate, and Tennessee'.[500] While downplaying his own symbolic-historic status as a black candidate, I argue that at multiple intervals in the campaign Ford symbolically signalled to whites that he would not challenge the basis of their bonds of racial solidarity.

The most powerful way in which Ford signalled his acceptance of white racial solidarity was through his active association with whites who flew the Confederate flag. The Confederate flag, sometimes known as the Rebel flag, is an exclusively white emblem. Although James Glaser notes that many white southerners claim that the flag is merely a symbol of their regional history,[501] I argue that the circumstances of the revived usage of the flag in the mid-twentieth century unmistakably link it to white racial solidarity, premised on anti-black white supremacy. As Wallace Best points out, after the Civil War, the flag was not widely flown until the 1950s, the same time that the civil rights movement was underway.[502] This is not coincidence. For example, the flag was not flown over the Georgia statehouse until 1956, two years after *Brown v Board of Education.*[503] Alabama did not fly the Confederate flag over its public buildings until 1963, after Governor George Wallace clashed with the

[500] Ibid., 194.
[501] Glaser, 1996, 65.
[502] Best, 2001, 14.
[503] Martinez, 2008, 201.

federal government over integration.[504] It is a symbol not only of the nineteenth-century Confederacy but also of twentieth-century segregation and white attempts to block black racial equality.


In two separate incidents, Ford quite publicly accepted whites' use of the Confederate flag as a legitimate expression of their racial solidarity. The first incident occurred while Ford and two colleagues were driving through the town of Jackson, equidistant between Nashville and Memphis. Ford insisted on visiting the 'Little Rebel Bar', an eatery with a large Confederate flag painted onto its outside wall and another large Confederate flag above the establishment (see Figure 8.6). John Freeman, Ford's driver and aide, recalls the incident in a first-hand account:

> We would take a short-cut through Jackson on several occasions. We would make comments and laugh about a hole-in-the-wall dive bar, which had a huge metal Rebel flag on the outside of it. We were driving by, and I made some joke about it as we were driving past. [Ford]'s like, "I want to go in." I laughed and kept driving. [Ford said,] "Seriously really I want to go in there." I said, "Harold, there are a bunch of pick-up trucks with rebel flags and gun racks on the trucks. I really don't think we are going to be welcomed there." He said, "I want to go. I want to go." It was amazing. We pulled up, and it was redneck heaven in that parking lot: bumper stickers with Jesus loves you, NRA, and all that stuff. We walked through the front door. It was NASCAR everywhere...One of the waitresses came up said 'Oh my god. It's Harold Ford Jr. I love you'. She came up and gave him a big hug. Well, what the hell, we must have stepped into the twilight zone…We were there for 2 hours.[505]

Another incident occurred in March 2006 at the annual Mule Day parade in Columbia, central Tennessee. According to a senior Ford campaign official, Ford decided to approach the Sons of Confederate Veterans float. The men, whom one campaign official describes as 'ex-KKK', were dressed in Confederate Army regalia and wore Confederate flag insignia.[506] Ford was nonplussed and

[504] Thornton, 1996, 236.
[505] Interview with John Freeman.
[506] HF6.

Figure 8.6 – The Little Rebel Bar and Grill



Source: Google Maps

effusive. Jon Meacham of *Newsweek* reports, 'Ford worked the Confederate caucus with hugs and high-fives'.[507] Showing his comfort with the men, Ford apparently, engaged them in a discussion about soy bean prices.[508] On election day, Jim Hester recalls, the wife of one of the men rang the campaign headquarters to tell them that her husband would be voting for Ford.[509]

The events are not anomalous. Ford regularly retold the stories in his 'stump speeches' to white audiences.[510] A journalist from the *Tennessean* reports, 'Ford himself subtly acknowledges bridging a racial divide when he tells the story in campaign speeches and interviews of his visit to the Little Rebel Café in Jackson'.[511] Significantly, Ford returned to the Little Rebel for a public appearance, posing in front of the Rebel flag for reporters (see Figure 8.7).

[507] John Meacham, 'The Editor's Desk', *Newsweek*, 13 March 2010.
[508] HF6.
[509] Interview with Hester.
[510] HF10.
[511] Bonna de la Cruz, 'Election seen as gauge of racial attitude', *Tennessean*, 8 November 2006.

Figure 8.7 – Harold Ford Jr, standing outside the Little Rebel bar



Source: 'Harold Ford Jr', Salon.com, 9 July 2012

According to the deracialised model, Ford's acceptance of symbols of the former Confederacy is interpreted as a 'race-neutral' act, but I contend that this improperly privileges white racial culture as 'race-neutral'. In contrast, I argue that in these instances Ford was making a highly racialised appeal. By, literally, embracing those wearing Confederate insignia, Ford signalled to whites that he would not challenge their bonds of white racial solidarity.

Racialised appeals to African Americans

While Ford's appeals to whites have been the subject of extensive scholarly interest,[512] with the exception of Sekou Franklin,[513] commentators have neglected to study the Ford campaign's attempts to appeal to black voters. Unlike in his campaign appearances before white audiences, before African Americans Ford emphasised the symbolic significance of his candidacy and promoted his biographical linkages with the black community. Furthermore, analysis of Ford's campaign literature suggests that Ford adjusted his right-leaning issue agenda when appealing to black voters.

[512] E.g., Brodnitz (2006), Westen (2007, 244-246), Middleton & Franklin (2009), Gillespie (2010b)
[513] Franklin, 2010.

First, Ford actively signalled linkages with the African American community through both his discourse and in campaign advertising. In campaign literature distributed in the black community,[514] Ford was visually associated with other African Americans. For example, in Figure 8.8, Ford is pictured holding a black child. On the opposite side, six African Americans are depicted wading through water in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. This imagery had particular resonance in the black community. As White et al have shown, African Americans were much more likely than whites to attribute the slow response of the federal government to racial discrimination. 70.7% of African Americans believed that the response would have been faster if the victims were white, whereas only 17.9% of whites agreed.[515] The leaflet's caption reads, 'It's time we did more to secure our families and our community', which I suggest is a reference to the African American community. One African American resident in Nashville recalled to me that the leaflet made Ford seem more racially radical than he actually was.[516] This image contrasts strongly with the visual of a white supporter called 'Earl Miller' promoting Ford in Franklin County, which is over 90% white (Figure 8.9).[517]


Figure 8.8 – Hurricane Katrina leaflet (both sides), Tennessee Democratic Party



Source: Jim Hester

[514] HF3.
[515] White et al, 2007, 531.
[516] HF3.
[517] 2000 US Census.

Figure 8.9 – Earl Miller mailer (front), Tennessee Democratic Party



Source: Jim Hester

Second, Ford promoted the symbolic-historic significance of his candidacy when appearing before black audiences. Ford twice invited Barack Obama, the country's only black US senator, to join him at campaign events in predominantly African American settings. At one event at Mt Zion Baptist Church in Nashville, Obama told the majority-black audience, 'I know that all of you are going to work the next couple of days to make sure it [i.e. Ford's election] happens, because I'm feeling lonely in Washington…I need my dear friend to join me'.[518] By stating that he was feeling lonely in Washington, Obama was unmistakably alluding to his and Ford's unique racial status. Ford's surrogates actively promoted Ford as a symbol of change. At a Ford campaign event in Nashville, Bishop George Price told the African American audience, 'Tennessee has the ability to change the status of this nation…There's a train coming, and you don't need no ticket. Just get out and vote'.[519]

[518] Barack Obama, quoted in 'Sen Obama stumps for Ford in Tennessee', *Washington Post*, 6 November 2006.
[519] George Price, quoted in 'Advocates hope Ford spurs voter turnout', *Tennessean*, 31 October 2006.

Third, the Ford campaign relied on traditional means of mobilising the black vote, especially the black church. Mark Brown, chair of the Tennessee Democratic Party, explained, 'African American churches are a major part of the social structure of African American communities here in Tennessee. It is a very important avenue of communication'.[520] The week before the election, a Ford rally was held at Temple of Deliverance Church of God in Christ, Memphis's largest Pentecostal church. A reporter for the *Commercial Appeal* describes the scene as reminiscent of 'a revival of sorts…The party faithful swayed, sang, waved signs, and chanted "Harold Ford".' Nearly 4,000 attended.[521] Charles Robert Bone, Ford's finance director, explains that while the black church was usually supportive of Democratic candidates, there was a special attachment to Ford. Bone explains, 'certainly he was able to draw on the same people who would help others but they did it with a different level of passion and excitement and dedication than had it been for somebody else'.[522]


Furthermore, the Ford campaign generated a distinct organisational structure within the black community. In majority-black Memphis, the campaign organised itself autonomously from the campaign apparatus in the rest of the state, with Ford's father Harold Ford Sr given charge. Ford Jr's statewide campaign manager Beecher Frasier explains, 'the Memphis campaign was a campaign within itself. Harold Ford Sr took care of that. I didn't even touch that because I was called Mr Invasive in that regard…what was done in Shelby County [i.e. Memphis] could not be done [elsewhere in the state]'.[523] A Ford advisor, who has been involved in Memphis politics for four decades, described to me the difference in approach. He explained, 'separate get-out-the-vote strategies in the white and black communities [were] clear by-products of segregation but also connected to culture. In the black community, there are parades, shopping center blitzes, block parties, ballots pushed at the polls, busses going up and down the streets to pick up voters – activities that

[520] Mark Brown, quoted in 'Some think Ford's run will spur bigger black turnout', *Tennessean*, 31 October 2006.
[521] Halimah Abdullah, 'Exchanging Jabs', *Commercial Appeal*, 2 November 2006.
[522] Interview with Charles Robert Bone.
[523] Interview with Beecher Frasier.

whites seem to find intrusive. Over the years, Harold Ford Sr acquired the reputation as someone who could get out the black vote better than anyone else'.[524]

Finally, Ford's issue agenda in the black community differed from the one promoted to white voters. Franklin is accurate in his assessment that 'in African American communities, [Ford] presented himself as a race-conscious candidate and a defender of social welfare'.[525] In the Hurricane Katrina leaflet targeted to black voters, Ford's listed priorities include traditional liberal Democratic policies of affordable healthcare, protecting Social Security, better jobs and higher wages, and improving education. In the Earl Miller leaflet, targeted to white voters, Ford's five policy priorities were slightly modified (see Figure 8.10). Although it included many of the same themes as the Katrina leaflet, new qualifying remarks had been added. In the Miller leaflet, Ford promises to 'put values back in the classroom'. On employment, he promises to 'reward hard work'. An additional commitment to securing America's borders and restricting amnesty for illegal immigrants appears exclusively on the Earl Miller leaflet.

Figure 8.10 – Ford's issue priorities: Earl Miller leaflet (left), Hurricane Katrina leaflet (right)



Source: Jim Hester

Result

Ford narrowly lost, receiving 48.0% of the vote to Bob Corker's 50.7%, the best result a black senatorial candidate has ever achieved in the South. In effect, there were two paths to victory which

[524] HF10.
[525] Franklin, 2010, 222.

Ford narrowly missed (see Figure 8.11). Had Ford increased his support among non-blacks[526] from 41% to 43%, he would have won. However, Ford could have won the election by increasing black turnout as a share of voters from 13% to 15.5%. Ford walked a narrow tightrope between the two communities, but he ultimately fell short in both.

Figure 8.11 – Ford victory: alternative scenarios

	Black turnout	Ford black support	Non-black turnout	Ford non-black support	**FORD**	**CORKER**	Winner
2006 ACTUAL	13.0%	95.0%	87.0%	41.0%	48.0%	50.7%	Corker
Ford wins: black turnout	15.5%	95.0%	84.5%	41.0%	49.4%	49.3%	Ford
Ford wins: white votes	13.0%	95.0%	87.0%	43.0%	49.8%	48.9%	Ford

Constant: Third-party candidates receive 1.3% of the vote
Source: Based on data from 2006 CNN Exit Poll

Harold Ford Jr's candidacy has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention in large part due to the racialised tactics of his opponent, especially the famous 'Call Me' advert. Focus on the Republicans' racial messaging, however, has led to a distorted perception of Ford's campaign. By presenting Ford as a passive victim of white racism, scholars have failed to acknowledge the extent to which Ford himself recognised and deployed powerful symbols of white racial solidarity. Additionally, Ford's extremely divergent self-presentation in the African American community has been almost entirely overlooked. By drawing attention to the situationally contingent nature of Ford's racial appeals, I hope that this chapter has gone some way in reorienting the scholarship of the 2006 Tennessee Senate race from interest in the Republicans' racialised campaign to Ford's own.

[526] This figure includes the 2% of voters in Tennessee who identified as Latino or Asian.

Ch 9 – Conclusion

Georgia Persons predicted in 1993, 'Deracialization will likely become the preponderant pattern of black electoral politics'.[527] In the two decades since she made her prediction, few scholars challenged her claim.[528] This thesis, however, represents a major theoretical reconceptualisation. It has attempted to reorient black electoral studies away from the deracialised campaign model by falsifying its basic hypothesis. Concurrently, the thesis advances the scholarship through the presentation of new theoretical models which take seriously differing racial contexts, candidate agency, and varieties of black-white political relations. As more black politicians compete in majority-white jurisdictions, scholars need to be equipped with appropriately sophisticated models to assess the racial strategies deployed by the candidates in these contexts. This thesis has endeavoured to provide the necessary theoretical toolkit.

Empirically, this thesis breaks new ground in several ways. It is the first work which has exclusively studied black candidates for the US Senate. I have studied the Senate campaigns in unprecedented depth, with original interviews, internal campaign documents, and analysis of public speech, advertising, and media. In addition, the research has shown the value of allowing the main actors to speak and the importance of situating them in their appropriate contexts.

My case studies reveal at least three strategic approaches (see Figure 9.1). In some cases, the historic and symbolic significance of electing an African American to office was a powerful motivator for white voters. In other cases, the emblematic contrast of racial tolerance and racial hostility motivated white voters to rally behind an African American candidate to reject an opponent's racial intolerance. In still another instance, a black candidate facing white audiences avoided reference to his own racial status while also signalling his acceptance of symbols of white racial solidarity. Further investigation may uncover still other approaches because of the diversity of circumstances in which black candidates compete.

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[527] Persons, 1993, 10.

[528] Perry (2014) perhaps comes closest when he argues that deracialisation is not a *necessary* condition of running in majority-white jurisdiction.

Figure 9.1 – Summary of case studies

	Black Racial Appeal	White Racial Appeal		Racialised Campaign Context		
Candidate	**Linked fate**	**Symbolic/ historic status**	**White solidarity**	**Racially hostile opponent**	**Explicit response to racial hostility**	**CAMPAIGN TYPE**
Edward Brooke	Yes	Yes	No	No	N/A	Symbolic-Historic
Michael Steele	Yes	Yes	No	No	N/A	Symbolic-Historic
Harvey Gantt	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Crusade
Carol M Braun	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Crusade
Harold Ford	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Situationally Racialised

The findings give cause to revisit central assumptions about black-white political relations. First, I have shown that scholars have been too circumscribed in their assessment of black-white voting patterns. While race is not an irrelevant consideration, the assumption that racial voting implies that whites vote for white candidates and blacks vote for black candidates is far too deterministic. The election of an African American can be a powerful motivator for some white voters. Scholars have failed to address the extent to which voters of all races actively seek to promote candidates who increase descriptive representation.

The thesis also gives cause to re-evaluate the effect of racially hostile attacks against a black candidate. Although racial priming in advertising has received a great deal of scholarly attention in recent years,[529] commentators have too often portrayed the black candidate as a passive victim who can only be rescued by an electorate which is fair-minded enough to ignore the racial attack.[530] This view problematically removes strategic agency from black candidates. I have shown that black candidates can manipulate racist images to advance their own campaign while diminishing the standing of their opponent.

Furthermore, I have challenged the notion that black candidates can make truly 'deracialised' appeals when operating in majority-white election environments. The deracialised model crucially underestimates the inescapable presence of race in American society and politics. Fundamentally, black candidates do not operate in 'race-neutral' contexts. The enduring racial inequalities in American society affect white perceptions and expectations of black candidates in the political sphere. I encourage future scholars to avoid privileging white social and political activity as 'mainstream' and

[529] See Jamieson (1993), Mendelberg (2001), Brodnitz (2006), Westen (2007), McIlwain & Caliendo (2011).
[530] See, especially, Sigelman et al (1995, 26).

devoid of racial content. Appeals to bonds of white racial solidarity or in reaction to whites' stereotyped images of African Americans are not 'deracialised' but are racially conscious.

Limits of time and expense mean that there are always avenues for future research. Methodologically, focus groups would be an excellent way to help add more precision to identifying racial cues and to situate them in different political-cultural contexts. Experiments testing voters' reactions to racial priming and to racially symbolic language also add credibility to the analysis of the strength of their strategic deployment.[531]

The models should be applied to other settings, including cities, other statewide offices, and seats in other legislatures, such as the House of Representatives. Additionally, while the cases cover a critical period of black electoral politics (the post-civil rights period), the most recent period of black politics (the post-Obama period), has not yet been studied. It might be the case that the symbolic importance of electing blacks to high office has diminished since Barack Obama was elected president, and this hypothesis deserves further attention.

Furthermore, while the models have deliberately focused on black-white relations, the racial strategies of other ethnic minority candidates, especially Hispanics and Asians, deserve further attention. Future researchers might wish to consider incorporating these other groups into the analysis, while taking care to identify differences in political culture between ethnic groups. In addition, the intersection of race and gender in majority-white contexts is a subject which is regrettably understudied. For instance, very little attention has been given to the fact that there has never been a black woman elected governor of any state or that there has never been a Latina elected to the Senate. This stands in sharp contrast to the House of Representatives, where women of colour have been more proportionately represented than white women.[532]

Finally, the findings of this thesis have serious implications for the practice of black electoral politics. Robert Smith argued that the participation of 'deracialised' black candidates in majority-white jurisdictions is 'a sign of growth and development in American politics', but he added, 'it also may

[531] See Sniderman & Piazza (1993), Caliendo, McIlwain, & Karjala (2003).
[532] Tate, 2003, 60-65.

mean the continued decay of black politics'.[533] This thesis concludes less pessimistically. The role of race in such campaigns settings is fundamentally more complex and varied than the deracialised model supposes. Rather than implying the decay of black politics, the successful participation of black candidates in majority-white electoral environments indicates its enduring vitality.

[533] Smith, 2009, 5.

Appendix A – List of Interviewees

Ch 4: Edward Brooke – 1966 Massachusetts Senate Election

Name	Position
Edward Brooke	Candidate
Carmen Durso	Field Director
Sally Saltonstall Willis	Youth Director
Bill Cowin	Personal Aide
J Alan MacKay	Opponent (GOP Convention)
Joe McMahon	Field Assistant
Stephen Herbits	Researcher

Special thanks to Joe Gammal for introducing me to his father Al Gammal, Edward Brooke's campaign manager, and for sharing Al Gammal's collection of memorabilia from the campaign.

I am grateful to Stephen Herbits for his comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

Ch 5: Michael Steele – 2006 Maryland Senate Election

Name	Position
Michael Steele	Candidate
Michael Leavitt	Campaign Manager
Douglas Heye	Communications Director
John Stapleton	Youth Director
Jayson Williams	African American Outreach Co-ordinator (Cardin)

Ch 6: Harvey Gantt – 1990 North Carolina Senate Election

Name	Position
Mel Watt	Campaign Manager
Mac McCorkle	Deputy Campaign Manager
David Wofford	Communications Director
Monty Hagler	Finance Director
Martha Elder Khanna	Deputy Finance Director
Letetia Daniels Jackson	Field Director, Mecklenberg County
Will Polk	Youth Director

Ch 7: Carol Moseley Braun – 1992 Illinois Senate Election

Name	Position
Carol Moseley Braun	Candidate
Steve Cobble	Political Director
Ira Cohen	Director of Research
John Rogers	Director of Finance
Heather Booth	Field Director
Alton Miller	Communications Director (Primary)
David Eichenbaum	Communications Director (General Election)
Karen Yarbrough	Cook County Recorder of Deeds
Jim Charlton	Political activist
Hope Daniels	Journalist
Andy Shaw	Journalist

Ch 8: Harold Ford Jr - 2006 Tennessee Senate Election

Name	Position
Beecher Frasier	Campaign Manager (General Election)
Jim Hester	Campaign Manager (Primary)
Charles Robert Bone	Co-Director of Finance
Jay Lindy	Co-Director of Finance
Liz Lowery	Fundraising Director
Pete Brodnitz	Chief Polling Consultant
John Bakke	Communications Advisor
Chip Forrester	Chair of Tennessee Democratic Party
Mark Schuermann	Chief of Staff
David Sutphen	Chief of Staff
Sherman Greer	Legislative Assistant
Bobby White	Legislative Assistant
Nichole Francis	Legislative Assistant
Don Majors	Legislative Assistant, Office of US Rep Jim Cooper
John Freeman	Personal Aide & Field Assistant
Andrew Patrick	Field Assistant

I am grateful to three academics in Tennessee who met with me to discuss the Corker-Ford campaign: Bruce Oppenheimer (Vanderbilt), Marcus Pohlman (Rhodes), Sekou Franklin (Middle Tennessee State University).

My thanks to John Bakke for his comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

Appendix B – Racial Composition of Electorates

Based on most recent census data available before date of election

Pre-Senate Electorate

Candidate	Office	Constituency	White	Black	Latino	Asian	Other
Edward Brooke	Attorney General	Massachusetts	97.6	2.2	N/A	0.2	0.0
Harvey Gantt	Mayor	Charlotte, NC	66.9	31	1.1	0.8	0.2
Carol M Braun	Recorder of Deeds	Cook County, IL	57.1	25.5	13.6	3.6	0.2
Michael Steele	Lt Governor	Maryland	62.1	28.8	4.3	4.5	0.3
Harold Ford Jr	US Representative	TN-09	29.1	66.2	2.8	1.2	0.7

Senate Electorate

Candidate	State	White	Black	Latino	Asian	Other
Edward Brooke	Massachusetts	97.6	2.2	N/A	0.2	0.0
Harvey Gantt	North Carolina	75.0	22.0	1.2	0.8	1.7
Carol M Braun	Illinois	74.8	14.6	7.9	2.4	0.2
Michael Steele	Maryland	62.1	28.8	4.3	4.5	0.3
Harold Ford Jr	Tennessee	79.2	16.4	2.2	1.0	1.2

Appendix C – Coding scheme for racial content

Racial Stereotypes

Racial stereotype	Identifying phrases	Newspaper article example	White opponent advert example
Corrupt	➢ accused/arrested ➢ corruption/ corrupt ➢ criminality/ criminal ➢ cronyism ➢ ethical failings/ shortcomings/ indiscretions/ lapses ➢ felon ➢ fraud ➢ law-breaking/ law violation ➢ nepotism ➢ patronage ➢ scandal ➢ under investigation	'Richard Williamson spent Sunday blasting his Democratic opponent Carol Moseley Braun for what he called a litany of ethical lapses, patronage, cronyism, and corruption'. Source: 'Williamson hits Braun's ethics', *Chicago Tribune*, 5 October 1992	'Ford gave campaign funds to the legal fund of a nightclub owner accused of manslaughter…but was forced to pay it back because he violated election laws'. Source: 'It's about protecting our shared Tennessee values', Tennessee Republican Party direct mail
Dysfunctional family	➢ affair ➢ divorced ➢ family in disarray ➢ immoral lifestyle ➢ lacks 'family values' ➢ lack of parental involvement/ monitoring of children ➢ single-parent	'…the young black liberal from a family that seems always ready to stretch the bounds of propriety…' Source: 'My return to balance', *New York Times*, 24 September 2006	Accuses Gantt of lacking family values because he wants girls to have abortions 'without their mother or father knowing' Source: 'How extremely liberal is Harvey Gantt?', Helms campaign leaflet
Fancy/uppity	➢ elitist ➢ expensive tastes ➢ extravagant ➢ fancy ➢ lavish ➢ living it up ➢ references luxury items ➢ slick	'Jesse Helms is accusing Democrat Harvey Gantt, who is black, of using government for personal gain…"It made Mr. Gantt a millionaire," Helms said." No wonder he has a swimming pool in his back yard and a tennis court. He made that off of a deception".' Source: 'Those last-minute shockers', *Associated Press*, 4 November 1990	'Harold Ford has taken 69 junkets paid for by private interests to places like Florida and the Virgin Islands…Ford spent over $2,500 of campaign funds for an Armani suit'. Source: 'It's about protecting our shared Tennessee values', Tennessee Republican Party direct mail
Lazy	➢ didn't earn/didn't work for what he/she	'His daddy handed him his seat in Congress…the narrator says'.	'Does it matter that he didn't show up for work? Yeah, it matters to us'

	has ➢ doesn't show up for work ➢ hand-out ➢ lazy ➢ undeserving ➢ work-shy	Source: 'Corker, Ford agree: Ad goes too far', *Commercial Appeal*, 14 October 2006	Source: 'Does it matter', Republican National Committee direct mail
Liberal	➢ communist ➢ liberal ➢ left-wing ➢ leftist ➢ Marxist ➢ socialist	'Mr. Williamson, a lawyer, has painted Ms. Braun as a tax-and-spend liberal with what he has called "reckless" ideas like universal health care'. Source: 'Senate race tightens amid dispute over ethics', *New York Times*, 29 October 1992	'Her liberal agenda would hurt working men and women' Source: 'Violence', Williamson campaign TV advert
Sexually deviant/ threatening	➢ flirtatious ➢ loose morals ➢ predatory ➢ promiscuous ➢ reports sexual history ➢ sex/sexual	'A blond party girl coos that she met Harold at a Playboy party'. Source: 'Corker: Anti-Ford ad tacky', *Tennessean*, 21 October 2006	[image of white woman] 'The murder was one of the most notorious in the city's history – she was raped, strangled, and left to bake in the trunk of her car…Why would Harold Ford Jr want to put this notorious murderer back on Tennessee streets?' Source: 'Harold Ford Jr: Weak on crime, easy on criminals', Tennessee Republican Party direct mail
Untrustworthy	➢ can't be trusted ➢ fooling people/ tricking people ➢ imposter ➢ liar/lied ➢ misleading ➢ pretending to be something he/she is not ➢ questions honesty ➢ secretive ➢ shady/shifty ➢ something to hide ➢ untruthful ➢ up to no good	' "The liberal newspapers don't tell you about Harvey Gantt's secret campaign running radio ads that play only on black radio stations," a Helms radio ad says…The insinuation is clear – blacks are up to something in secret, so it can't be good for whites'. Source: 'Inescapable fact: racism is playing a role', *The Dispatch*, 3 November 1990	'It seems Harvey Gantt is running <u>two</u> campaigns – a public campaign and a secret campaign' Source: 'Fundraising', Helms campaign TV advert

Racial Cues

Racial cue	Identifying phrases	Newspaper example	White opponent advert example
Exclusive language	➢ doesn't share our values/concerns ➢ doesn't understand us/our values ➢ not from here ➢ not one of us ➢ out of the mainstream ➢ un-American	'Republican Bob Corker tells Tennesseans that Ford is not one of us – he's from DC and doesn't share Tennessee values'. Source: 'VU prof sees racial code in canceled [sic] ad: Corker team says idea is ridiculous', *Tennessean*, 26 October 2006	'Harvey Gantt: extreme liberal values, Jesse Helms: North Carolina values' Source: 'Death penalty', Helms campaign TV advert
Extreme language	➢ extremely/extreme ➢ radical ➢ reckless ➢ too [characteristic]	'And taking a page from the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee playbook, Williamson called Braun recklessly liberal for what he said were her predilections to higher taxes, big government, and a softness on crime'. Source: 'In final hours candidates print to the finish', *Chicago Tribune*, 1 November 1992	'Harvey Gantt is asking you and me to approve of some pretty awful things…That's too liberal. Harvey Gantt is asking us to approve some pretty extreme views to vote for him'. Source: 'Awful things', Helms campaign TV advert
Reference to machine politics	➢ Political machine/machine politics	'Corker has accused Ford's prominent Memphis political family of running machine-style politics in winning numerous local elections and seats in Congress and the state legislature'. Source: 'Senate hopefuls spar on war', *Tennessean*, 11 October 2006	'Carol Moseley Braun is just another machine politician'. Source: 'Ethics revised', Williamson campaign TV advert
Reference to majority-black jurisdiction	➢ Brooke – Roxbury ➢ Steele – Prince George's County ➢ Gantt – N/A ➢ Braun – South Side ➢ Ford - Memphis	'Ford inoculated himself against charges that he was an unwelcome, out-of-touch liberal from Memphis'. Source: 'The GOP gets nervous in Tennessee', *Time*, 20 October 2006	'The Fords of Memphis…a family dynasty failing to protect our Tennessee values'. Source: 'Dynasty, political machine', Tennessee Republican Party direct mail
Reference to black politician/ black leader	➢ Name of a black politician, celebrity, or leader	'Helms compared recent statements by Gantt to those made by supporters of [black] Washington mayor Marion Barry, convicted recently of a misdemeanour drug charge'.	Braun is condemned for sponsoring a resolution in the state legislature honouring Gus Savage, black US representative known for anti-Semitic comments

		Source: 'Helms: fund-raising letters not racist', *Wilmington Morning Star*, 27 August 1990.	Source: 'Resolution', Williamson campaign advert

Racialised policies

Implicitly racialised policy	Newspaper article example	White opponent advert example
Crime	'[Peabody] did not shirk from needling his opponent Republican Atty General Edward W Brooke, particularly over the loss of some of the Crime Commission cases'. Source: 'Brooke, Peabody more alike than not', *Boston Herald*, 6 November 1966	'Harold Ford, Jr's idea of protecting our children: Letting criminals out of prison early'. Source: 'The Harold Ford Jr Plan for Improving Education', Tennessee Republican Party direct mail
Death penalty	'The challenge for Mr. Gantt is to steer the debate away from emotional issues like the death penalty, which he opposes and which is often used to drive a wedge between conservative Democrats and their party'. Source: 'In North Carolina's Senate race, a divisive TV fight over values', *New York Times*, 23 September 1990	Black background, image of Braun, with red letters underneath which say 'Opposes death penalty' Source: 'Violence', Williamson campaign TV advert
Drugs	'Rich Williamson on Thursday introduced marijuana as an issue in his U.S. Senate campaign against Carol Moseley Braun, criticizing the Democratic nominee as being soft on crime because she supports decriminalization of the popular illegal drug'. Source: 'Williamson rips Braun on marijuanna', *Chicago Tribune*, 19 June 1992	'Drugs a menace to our society and our children', but Harvey Gantt opposes the death penalty for drug traffickers. 'Harvey Gantt is too liberal'. Source: 'Drug comparison', Helms campaign TV advert
Guns	'Daniel Wilson stood toe to toe with Gantt and asked him why he supported gun registration and a waiting period for ownership'. Source: 'Harvey Gantt: Former Charlotte mayor refuses to run campaign in predictable fashion', *The Dispatch*, 23 October 1990	A man ironically states, 'Ford is right. I do have too many guns'. *Source:* 'Call Me', Republican National Committee TV advert
Taxes	' "There is not a doubt that if Congressman Ford goes to the US Senate he will cast his vote with Ted Kennedy and Hillary Clinton for a Democratic agenda to raise taxes and	'Carol Moseley Braun voted to raise your taxes 11 times' Source: 'No tax', Williamson campaign TV advert

	waken national security," [Corker press secretary] Womack said'. Source: Ex-VA governor stumps for Ford, *Tennessean*, 2 October 2006	
Welfare	'The message, as absorbed by some white voters, would be along the lines that blacks are always leaching on white taxpayers for welfare and foodstamps'. Source: 'Braun still has big lead despite tarnished image', *Northwest Side Press*, 14 October 1992	'Braun denies wrongdoing in Medicaid flap [but] $28,750 question hounds Braun'. Source: 'Ethics revised', Williamson campaign TV advert

Explicit racial references

Reference	Identifying phrases	Newspaper article example	Black candidate advertisement example
Black racial identity	➢ African American ➢ black ➢ candidate of colour ➢ minority/ethnic minority ➢ race ➢ Negro	'…a crowd of several hundred at the University of Maryland in the home county of the Republican candidate, Lt. Gov. Michael Steele, who is black'. Source: 'Obama campaigns for Cardin in Maryland race', *Washington Post*, 27 September 2006	'Jesse Helms is running another smear campaign, charging me with using my race for financial advantage, charging me with requiring gay teachers in schools. Those ads are lies and Jesse Helms knows it'. Source: 'Smear', Gantt campaign TV advert
Symbolic-historic status	➢ descriptive representation ➢ do the right thing ➢ historic ➢ make history ➢ make us proud ➢ symbol of change ➢ the first… ➢ unprecedented candidacy	'Ed Brooke would be a Negro senator. The first Negro senator since Reconstruction'. Source: 'Running Brooke: He may become a Senate leader', *National Observer*, 19 September 1966	'…the first African American woman to be elected to county office…' Source: 'Bio', Braun campaign TV advert
Explicitly racial policies	➢ affirmative action ➢ black history commemoration ➢ busing ➢ civil rights ➢ federal aid to blacks ➢ integration/ segregation ➢ racial representation ➢ racial quotas	'Helms…shook a victorious fist when [Senator Bob] Dole praised his being the 34th vote needed to uphold President George Bush's veto of the Civil Rights Bill'. Source: 'Helms castigates Gantt about advertisements', *Times-News*, 4 November 1990	'I lived in a segregated society'. Source: 'Assignment EWB', Brooke campaign TV advert

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