

PLATO'S LYSIS

Introduction, revised text and commentary by

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Vol. I

Introduction, text and apparatus.

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Published works to which I am indebted are also, I hope, acknowledged in their places or in the bibliography. In the philosophical side of the work I am especially conscious of my debts to the writings of von Arnim and of Mr. R. Robinson; on the linguistic side to many previous editions of other works of Plato and especially to Professor Dodds' recent "Gorgias".

The right references on several non-philosophical points in the commentary have been provided by my much-pestered colleagues; but beyond the references I have tried to keep the decisions my own, and probably have made mistakes as a result.

Much of this thesis has been written in Howard Place, Edinburgh, where in 1830 Lewis Campbell was born; but the genius loci has long since fled; R. L. Stevenson was also born in Howard Place, but across the road the "Daily Mail" is now printed. Absit omen!

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No Platonic dialogue is without its hard core of philosophical argument; and this in the "Lysis" is the second part of the dialogue, from 212a to the end. But the "Lysis" opens with an unusually elaborate and particularly charming dramatic introduction. This is worth consideration for its own sake.

Care must be taken when we try to assess the importance of the dramatic introductions to Plato's dialogues. Plato sometimes virtually dispenses with any introduction (and not only in later works; neither the "Gorgias" nor the "Meno" make much concession to scene-setting); and even where there is a dramatic setting of some complexity, the strictly philosophical arguments of the dialogue remain theoretical and self-contained, and draw nothing of importance from the envisaged circumstances of their utterance. What then was Plato trying to add in the dialogues where he provided dramatic introductions? The "Lysis" poses this question very sharply, since its introductory sections approach almost half the total length of the work (nine pages, 203 to 211, out of a total of twenty one).

The dramatic introductions are too often thought of as the main source of the literary appeal of Plato's works. But their literary appeal is not conferred by the dramatic introductions alone. The "Gorgias" is a literary masterpiece by virtue of the brilliance with which its characters are portrayed solely through their contributions to the philosophical debate. Where Plato wished to sugar the philosophical pill, he did not need to rely only on dramatic interludes. In the "Lysis", however, it has to be admitted that much of the philosophical section of the dialogue has a degree of aridity for which it may be part of the purpose of the introduction to compensate. One of the results of using boy interlocutors was to throw the steering of the discussion even more than usual into the hands of Socrates. Plato may have desired this in order to be able to show Socrates proceeding unimpeded with a close and novel chain of argument. No strenuous objections are raised by Lysis or Menexenus; they do not even venture to claim not to understand Socrates, in the way that for instance Meno does.

The dramatic interest of the second half of the dialogue is therefore slight, since the boys say little more than "yes" or "no". We are told ^{once} ~~and~~ that Lysis was vehement, ~~and~~ that he was reluctant, in saying "yes"; more perhaps was not to be expected from boys of his age. This dramatic disadvantage in the choice of characters, however, was offset by the delightful picture of the young boys which could be given in the introduction, especially of Lysis in the separate discussion Socrates has with him to "humble" him. Plato perhaps saw in the use of boy characters the dramatic means to achieve this double purpose of an uninterrupted exposition by Socrates preceded by particularly charming opening scenes in the palaestra. The introductory sections of the "Lysis" thus perhaps contribute more than usual to the total dramatic appeal of the dialogue.

But would Plato have felt that the "Lysis" required an especially strong injection of dramatic appeal? It is certainly true that if he intended his earlier dialogues to attract readers who were not yet greatly interested in philosophy, he may have thought that the rigorous argument of the "Lysis" was in more danger of repelling them than some of the other short dialogues. On the other hand he might have been able to rely on friendship being perhaps a more attractive topic than *σωφροσύνη* or *δουλοτης*. The length and elaborateness of the setting of the "Lysis" are probably due to other than simply literary or publicising motives.

We must recall that part of the lengthy introduction to the "Lysis" is in fact a miniature dialogue within the dialogue; Socrates complies with Hippothales' request in no merely perfunctory manner, and his conversation with Lysis (207-210) is quite long enough to contain echoes of central Socratic tenets stressing the importance of knowledge. + A discussion within a discussion is of course not without parallel in Plato's

+ Compare the valuable use Mr. J. P. Gould makes of this section of the "Lysis" in his book "Plato's Ethics", pp. 26-7 and 48-9.

works; the famous digression in the "Theaetetus" (172-177) goes off at a tangent from the main topic; more like this section of the "Lysis" is perhaps Socrates' initial discussion of "Sophists" with Hippocrates in the "Protagoras" (311-314). An obvious suggestion in all such places is that the topic of secondary discussion may after all have a bearing on the main philosophical question of the dialogue, even though Plato does not specifically underline this.

Two places have been suggested at which what Socrates says to Lysis might possibly be linked to points occurring in the later discussion of friendship. One is at 210d¹, where Socrates says to Lysis 'Εάν μὲν

ἄρα σοφός γένῃ, ὃ καὶ πάντες σοὶ φίλοι καὶ πάντες σοὶ οἰκετοὶ ἔσονται. This coupling of the terms φίλοι and οἰκετοὶ at first sight suggests Socrates' later attempt to define τὸ φίλον as τὸ οἰκετόν (221e-222d); but on inspection of the context it is clear that οἰκετοὶ throughout 210c-d means "members of the family", whereas in the later passage Socrates confesses himself puzzled about the meaning of οἰκετός, and clearly could get no help from the restricted sense he had used earlier. + Socrates' later rather puzzling introduction of an unclear notion of οἰκειότης can hardly be said to be prepared for by his mention of ordinary family relationships to Lysis.

A more significant connection between the introductory and the later discussions is seen by those who suggest that Socrates first proves to Lysis that friendship is based on "utility", and that this is then an underlying premise of the whole of the subsequent discussion. As a first objection to this, we must remember that Plato is normally conscientious or even insistent in calling attention to his procedure at points where he makes use of earlier conclusions - not least in the "Lysis" (e.g. at 220c, 222b-d). At 214e, for instance, where the "utilitarian" view of friendship may perhaps seem especially prominent, if Plato thought of himself as relying on the earlier discussion for this point, we would have expected a

+ See commentary at 210d¹⁻³.

specific reference. But more radically, though some connections are occasionally suggested between goodness and utility, it is doubtful how far Plato can really have wished to commit himself to a "utilitarian" viewpoint; the puzzles of the main discussion will be examined later; but even in the little conversation with Lysis, how seriously has the alleged "utilitarianism" to be taken? Is it not mainly intended as an "improving" paradox to correct Lysis' false impressions of friendship? "You will only win friends if you acquire knowledge", says Socrates, "since only then will you be useful to them;" but is it really true that Lysis' parents do not love him because he is still useless to them? Is it really true that the Persian King will yield his empire to Lysis, however wise he becomes? We must be careful not to over-interpret this kind of passage. That Socrates wished very seriously to emphasise the value of knowledge we can believe; that he was also putting forward a serious theory of utility as the basis of friendship is doubtful. Xenophon protested vigorously against opponents who criticised Socrates for such a view; + we can allow Socrates to have meant that knowledge will bring friends without making him say that friendship is wholly based on utility.

The idea of a close formal connection between the introductory discussion with Lysis and the philosophical material of the later part of the dialogue must be abandoned. The later discussion would lose nothing of its force if it stood alone without more introduction than Socrates' speech at 211d-e. What other motives then can Plato have had for writing the "baby dialogue" of 207-210?

Socrates' elementary but delightful demonstration of "how to talk to" Lysis is a most endearing picture of Socrates as a man and as a teacher. Surely this is exactly what Plato meant it to be. The religious charge against Socrates was trumped-up nonsense, a powerful weapon used for political ends; but the charge of "corrupting the youth" probably represented something many Athenians believed of Socrates. It need not refer

+ at Mem. I ii, 52-55, quoted in commentary on 210c5-d8.

solely to his association with Critias and Alcibiades. Plato clearly wished to answer this charge along with the other charges against Socrates; he repeatedly depicts Socrates befriending and advising young men - Hippocrates in the "Protagoras", Hippothales here in the "Lysis". In the "Laches" Socrates is consulted on the education of younger boys; in his first discussion with Lysis alone we have a unique demonstration of Socrates' own approach to a boy who is evidently still very young - about twelve years old? + The importance of careful handling of a lively young boy is stressed at Rep. VI, 494b-d; ~~xx~~ here we see how Socrates turned his skill to this use. Perhaps few philosophers would have Socrates' patience in this task.

But is Socrates' only concern with the "beloved" and not with the "lover"? The demonstration with Lysis is said to be a pattern for Hippothales to follow. Is this all we are meant to learn of Socrates' attitude to his "one positive skill", that in τὸ ἐρωτικόν? Perhaps not. Hippothales hears not only the demonstration lesson with Lysis, but we are reminded that he is still listening at the end of the main discussion of friendship at 222b². What has this been intended to convey to him?

Here again it seems probable that Plato is speaking in Socrates' defence, on a different and more scandalous undertone of the charge of "corruption of the youth". Plato and Xenophon make no attempt to hide Socrates' claim to "erotic" knowledge; nor in the "Socratic" works is that explained away in terms of the sublimation of ἔρωσς taught by Diotima. ++ The claim to be τὸ ἐρωτικόν σόφον must be one which the historical Socrates was well known to have made; if so, his opponents can hardly not have intended to refer to this in framing their charge of διαφθορά τῶν νέων. We could infer this with high probability from the

+ Lysis certainly, and Menexenus too in view of 207e¹-2, cannot be as old as for instance Charmides; considering how elementary Socrates makes his first talk to Lysis, we have to assume he realised that much of the rest of the dialogue was above the heads of the two boys, even the eristical Menexenus; this perhaps is what is implied at 223a¹. But Charmides, and Cleinias in the "Euthydemus", follow much more of what Socrates says without any of the concessions made to Lysis.

++ This is surely Plato's own conception arising out of the Theory of Forms.

speech given to Alcibiades in the "Symposium"; brilliantly funny as it is, this must also be a denial by Plato of one of the most sinister impressions his opponents tried to spread about Socrates. Much in Xenophon is about Socrates and ἔρωϛ; much of it no doubt is there because of intrinsic interest, but it seems likely also to have some connection with the charges Xenophon is answering. This charge is not answered in the "Apology"; but this in court was perhaps the best way of dealing with what was no doubt implied rather than specified by the accusers.

In the "Lysis" Socrates is depicted as amused by, but sympathetic to, the adolescent "lover" Hippothales, whose "calf-love"*for the boy Lysis is causing much amusement to his friends. This first awakening, or premature imitation, of the passion of his elders in Hippothales has been hailed by many interpreters as the key to the whole dialogue; Pohlenz at one time put the "Lysis" between the "Phaedrus" and "Symposium" as an intermediate step in the Platonic theory of ἔρωϛ. + This however flies directly in the face of the greater part of the text; those looking for Socrates' pronouncements on ἔρωϛ, once the introduction is over - indeed from 206c onwards with the exception of one remark at 210e - have to wait until 222a before the context of ἔρωϛ is recalled. Some of the general remarks on friendship, it is true, might be applied to ἔρωϛ; some of them are repeated at points in the "Symposium" and "Phaedrus". But φιλία is not only wider than, but also essentially a different phenomenon from ἔρωϛ. Wilamowitz remarked "Freundschaft und Liebe sind für griechisches Empfinden zwei grundverschiedene Seelenstimmungen und Beziehungen zwischen Menschen." ++ The two most considerable differences are perhaps firstly, that friendship for the Greeks was not necessarily based on passion, nor even on affection; it was often for the Greeks a matter of mutual service or common interests; secondly, simply

+ In "Aus Platos Werdezeit", 1913: but reviewing Wilamowitz's "Platon" in G.G.A. 1921 Pohlenz abandoned this.

++ Platon², Vol. II p. 68.

* see comm. at 203 a!

that friendship (and $\phi\iota\lambda\iota\alpha$) is mutual and a two-way relationship between two persons who must both contribute whatever feelings or actions the particular friendship requires. Ἔρως on the other hand, much more perhaps than "love" in English, denotes a single passion, the desire of one person for another regardless of whether that desire is reciprocated. Hippothales' ἔρως is ἔρως even though Lysis does not return it, whereas if it were a matter of friendship, it would end when it ceased to be mutual. At Laws 837a⁸ we find Plato saying $\text{ὅταν δὲ ἑκάτερον (scil. τὸ φίλον) γίγνηται σφοδρὸν, ἔρωτα ἐκονομάζομεν}$; this certainly means that violent affection is called ἔρως , and could also mean that reciprocal ἔρως was a strong form of friendship; but it does not mean that unreciprocated ἔρως is friendship, nor even that all friendship is based on stronger or weaker forms of affection. A moment's thought about many of the arguments of the "Lysis" will serve to point the difference between ἔρως and $\phi\iota\lambda\iota\alpha$; how could the question of whether the good are selfsufficient have any bearing on their possible ἔρως for each other? how could the assistance the doctor can afford the sick man lead to a matter of ἔρως ? But it is most significant of all that Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics VIII and IX treats ἔρως merely as an unreliable basis of $\phi\iota\lambda\iota\alpha$ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ (1157a⁶ sq.); this is in part due to his classifying the relationship of husband and wife elsewhere, but mainly because ἔρως is hardly part of the subject of $\phi\iota\lambda\iota\alpha$.

In the dramatic setting of the "Lysis" the question of friendship is first made to arise from Socrates' analysis of Lysis' usefulness to other people; then the larger discussion takes its cue from the avowal of Lysis and his boy-comrade Menexenus that they are friends (207c⁸⁻⁹ recalled at 212a¹⁻⁶). But where does the lurking Hippothales fit into Socrates' plans? Why does Socrates choose to talk of $\phi\iota\lambda\iota\alpha$, not of ἔρως ? The whole origin of the meeting was Hippothales' ἔρως ; is some consideration of his problems not still due to him?

Here Plato's motive of defending Socrates surely becomes plain. Socrates is consulted by a young man on the subject of ἔρως ; he steers the conversation

round to a discussion of φίλτα. First, indeed, he demonstrates to the "lover" how to talk to the "beloved"; this turns out to be a miniature catechising of Lysis intended to make him realise that he must learn his lessons in order to be useful to other people; otherwise he will have no friends. Hippothales is upset by this; Lysis, he almost bursts out, will have a "friend" in him. But this is exactly what Socrates wishes to prevent Lysis from thinking; the boy has been "puffed up" by the attentions of lovers; he must be "humbled" and prevented from expecting these attentions undeservedly. (And no doubt also he must be gently made to wonder what "use" these lovers can see in him, if friendship is based on use.) This is certainly not what Hippothales had hoped for. Worse still, the discussion proceeds on the topic of friendship, and only mentions unrequited love in passing (212b); there then follows much about the friendship of the good or of equals, the pursuit of health and wisdom. Only towards the end (222a) does Socrates suddenly apply his present argument to the situation around him, to overjoy Hippothales by observing that on this theory true lovers will meet with the friendship of their beloved. But even this is double-edged; where a mutual friendship cannot be established there can have been no true love, may well be Socrates' implication. Certainly it looks as if what Socrates intends is to recommend Hippothales to think about friendship, to try to be useful to Lysis by urging him to learn his lessons, to hope to establish mutual affection, but not to expect any return of the more desperate excesses of his passion. Even his poems are not appreciated, it would seem. +

This then is Plato's point in showing us the elaborate picture of the youthful lover and the boy who is the object of his passion. If Socrates' claim to "erotic" knowledge had a deeper significance than this (namely that he tried to find out about youthful passions in order to use gentle means of directing them to higher ends), we are not shown it here. The

+ If Madvig's conjecture at 221d⁶ is right - as surely it must be.

elaborate analogy between erotic passion and the pursuit of the highest ideals, so brilliantly sketched in Plato's later works, is not even hinted at here. $\phi\iota\lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha$ is a safer, more worthwhile relationship than $\xi\rho\omega\varsigma$; this is the advice we are meant to note Socrates giving. (That $\phi\iota\lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha$ is in some way analogous to the pursuit of the good may well be one of Socrates' points, but this will be discussed later. In the main discussion when Socrates mentions $\xi\rho\omega\varsigma$ it is a general description of hunger and thirst (221b); Hippothales' kind of $\xi\rho\omega\varsigma$ gets almost no mention.)

These conclusions will be disappointing to admirers of Plato's later work. They perhaps need only be reminded that in the "Republic" physical $\xi\rho\omega\varsigma$ is $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\pi\omicron\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha$, in the "Laws" legislation is made to prevent it. The "Lysis" and the speech of Alcibiades in the "Symposium" are meant to convince us that Socrates too believed this and tried to advise young men of this too.

The length and elaboration of the dramatic setting of the "Lysis" is designed to defend Socrates on the charge against him that was perhaps less obviously false; we are meant to see that his aim was precisely the opposite of $\delta\iota\alpha\phi\theta\acute{\omicron}\rho\acute{\alpha}$ τῶν νέων.

Note on the characters
and dramatic date of the dialogue

The appearance of Lysis' family in a near-contemporary monumental record (see note on 204e⁸) is an additional ground for doubting whether we need ever believe that Plato's characters were imaginary. Nothing ^{documentary} is known about the other characters of the dialogue, ~~except that~~ ^{but} Ctesippus reappears, still eristical, in the "Euthydemus", Menexenus now a little older and grown out of philosophy, in the short work named after him; ^{* But they} ~~they~~ ^{are} ~~and~~ ^{possibly} Hippothales no less, ~~may well have been~~ ^{were} persons known to Socrates in real life.

The dramatic dates of Plato's dialogues, however, are (despite Taylor's efforts) impossible to establish even where some clues are available. + Nothing in the "Lysis" helps us; probably this is a question which never occurred to Plato and need not trouble us either.

+ See now Dodds, Gorgias, p. 17-18.

* and both of them were at the prison on the day of Socrates' death.

Τί ἐστὶν τὸ φίλον;

1. The meanings of the words φιλεῖν, φίλος and φιλία.
2. Critical analysis of the "Lysis" as a search for definition.

Since the main philosophical question of the "Lysis" asks τί ἔστιν τὸ φίλον; and since the discussion which attempts to answer this question is carried on with remarkably frequent use of the word φίλος itself, it is necessary to attend very carefully to the meanings and uses of this word. φίλος is puzzling to the lexicographer, let alone to the philosopher; so are several other of the words naming concepts about which Plato asked τί ἔστιν; questions, though interpreters all too seldom discuss these puzzles. The English reader certainly must tackle the lexicography before he can begin the philosophy of Plato's τί ἔστιν; questions, if only because the texts are in Greek; but with the "Lysis" at least, it will become clear that what can be learnt from lexicography affects not merely the translation, but the whole philosophical interpretation of the dialogue.

I shall attempt to distinguish not merely what might be described as variations in the strength and weakness of the force of φίλος, but also what are its quite separate senses, logically distinct and not reducible to a common "root" meaning. Systematic explanation of the origins or relationships of the various senses of φίλος may perhaps be possible (I shall make a very few comments on this, though not as a philologist); + but it is impossible to invent any

+ What I shall principally attempt to do is to classify the meanings of φίλος as it occurs in classical Greek literature; I should willingly hand over the problems of the history of the word to those who have the requisite philological training. Nor am I attempting to discuss all the shades and overtones of the various senses of the word; for tragedy in particular this would be

single "basic meaning" of φίλος, which can be substituted for it in all its uses. The urge to find single "basic meanings", though pedagogically helpful, has often led not only to insensitivity to the range of a word's force, but also, worse still, with words like φίλος, to a failure to distinguish quite dissimilar senses of a word.

I. φιλεῖν

It will be useful to begin by examining the verb φιλεῖν:-

- (a) with persons as object; "to have affection for, like". It can denote
1. strong affection;

cf. Achilles of Briseis, Il.IX 341,
 ὅς τις ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐχέφρων
 τὴν αὐτοῦ φιλέει καὶ κήδεσται, ὡς καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν
 ἐκ θυμοῦ φίλεον, δουρικτητὴν περ ἑοῦσαν,
 and in tragedy φιλεῖν τέκνα, ἄνδρα,
 Eur. Her. 280, Tro. 668 and very frequently.
 In Homer it appears occasionally in erotic contexts; e.g. Od. XVIII 325; compare the Homeric sense of φιλότης.
 2. but later it is distinguished from passionate desire; (see on φίλια, p. 23.)

cf. Xen. Hiero 11.11, ὥστε οὐ μόνον φίλοιο ἀν
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔρω, and Plato, Laws 837a⁸⁻⁹.
 3. it need often mean little more than "to favour", "be on the side of", e.g. in political contexts in the orators.
 4. in a number of passages in Homer it means "to entertain" or "treat as a friend"; cf. Il.XIV, 491, ἐφίλει καὶ κτήσιν ὄπασσεν, and Il.VI 14, Od. I 123; and compare also Theognis 101 and 113, where in 101 φιλεῖν means "make a friend of".

an enormous task. On the other hand I hope to provide a pigeon-hole for every occurrence of the word; I hope I have not overlooked any sense which seems to require a separate parallel (as opposed to a subordinate) classification. Liddell and Scott is somewhat confused on φίλος; Ellendt's "Lexicon Sophocleum" on the other hand among the individual lexica is conspicuously good. Even so, I am much indebted to Liddell and Scott, and it contains much information which I shall omit here.

5. it also means "to kiss" (not necessarily erotically; as a greeting, Hdt. I 134.)
- (b) with things as object; "to be fond of, practise or pursue" certain kinds of indulgence, behaviour or activity;

1. δαίμωνων τέρψιας Pind. Pyth. 9. 9, ποτον Eur. Cycl. 529, ἀβροσύναν, Sappho 58 L.-P., 1.25.
2. σχέτλια ἔργα Od. XIV 83, δόλους τ' ἀπάτας τε πολυ-πλοκίας τ' ἐφίλησαν, Theognis 67. τὰ δίκαια φιλεῖντας, Theognis 385, 739. αἰσχροκέρδειαν φιλεῖ, Soph. Ant. 1056, οὐ ... δεῖ τὸ κερδαίνειν φιλεῖν Soph. Ant. 312, τὰ δίκαια φιλεῖν Soph. Ant. 1059.

In these examples φιλεῖν means not merely "to like", but "to do, make a practice of" these kinds of activity or behaviour.

3. with infinitive; the meaning here varies, cf.:-
 ὃν ἀφαρμάζειν φιλεῖ
 ὀφθαλμὸς ἄνθος, Soph. Trach. 548-9;
 here φιλεῖ means "delights in";
 ἐφ' οἷς γὰρ μὴ φρονῶ σιγᾶν φιλῶ,

Soph. O.T. 569, meaning "I prefer to";

φιλεῖ δ' ὁ θυμὸς ἡρῆσθαι κλοπεύς,
 Soph. Ant. 493, indicates no pleasure, but means "is usually caught out".

the impersonal φιλεῖ, in οἷα φιλεῖ γίνεσθαι, etc., means simply "as usually happens".

- (c) to give general approval to classes or types of persons or things;

οὐ φιλέω μέγαν στρατηγὸν οὐδέ
 διαπεπλιγμένον
 οὐδέ βοστρύχοισι γὰρρον οὐδ'
 ὑπεξυρημένον.
 ἀλλὰ μοι σμικρὸς τις εἶη

Archilochus fr. 60 D.

πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω,
 ἐκῶν ὅστις ἔρδη μηδὲν αἰσχρον.

Simonides fr. 4 D, 19-20.

(Here notice Plato's quotation of this phrase at Prot. 335d⁸-e¹, δεῖ μὲν ἐγωγέ σου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἀγαμαί, ἀτὰρ καὶ νόν καὶ ἐπαίνῳ καὶ φιλῶ - before the occurrence of the poem of Simonides, but obviously with it in mind. Even here ἐπαίνῳ καὶ φιλῶ indicates Socrates' general approval of Hipponicus' love of wisdom.)

οὐδ' αὖ τοιαύτην γλώσσαν ἐν κακοῖς φιλῶ,
 Soph. Ajax 1118.

σφαλερὰ δ' οὐ φιλῶ στρατηγῶν κράτη,
 Eur. (?) Rhesus 132.

(But Teleclides fr. 1.6, φιλοῖεν τὰς λευκοτάτας μάζας follows a personification of the μάζαι.)

- (d) Possibly we should distinguish a special sense of φιλω with certain particular things as object, "to attach great emotional value to"; probably an occasional transference from sense (a) of persons;

βίσιον ζῆν, φάσ, Soph. O.T. 612, OC. 995,
Eur. Her. 90.

But φιλω τὰς ἐλπίδας, Eur. Her. 91, is used in sense (b), or perhaps (c); and ζῆν φιλω is likewise itself perhaps nearer (c).

- [[e]] φιλω is not said of what we would call "liking" for particular objects; "I like that statue" would be ἀρέσκει μοι τόδε τὸ ἄγαλμα or ἤδομαι τῷδε τῷ ἀγάλματι. If φιλω τόδε τὸ ἄγαλμα occurred, it would probably imply devotion to the figure represented. This is perhaps the most marked point of difference between φιλεῖν and our uses of "to like".

II. φίλος.

The connection between φιλεῖν and φίλος is strongest in the case of the passive use of φίλος.

1. φίλος (passive)

The uses of this sense of φίλος can be classified in categories parallel to the uses of φιλεῖν; in fact φίλος (passive) could often be replaced without change of meaning by φιλούμενος.

- (a) of persons, "dear", "held in affection";

ὦ φίλα γυναικῶν Eur. Alc. 460.

κατ'δε φίλω Il. VII 279;

very common in this sense throughout Homer and tragedy of friends and family; also e.g.

Il. XX 347 φίλος ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν,
"favoured by the gods".

The vocative is common; note especially Plato Symp. 199c³ and 201c⁸, where Socrates begins the discussion with ὦ φίλε Ἀγάθων and ends with ὦ φιλούμενε Ἀγάθων; for the latter compare Theocr. III 3, Τίτυρ', ἐμὶν τὸ καλὸν πεφιλημένε.

Certain tragic periphrases show the same sense of φίλος, e.g.

Ἔκτορος φίλον κῆρα, Eur. Tro. 661.

ὦ φίλον πρόσπτυγμ' ἔμον, Eur. Or. 1049.

(Orestes of Electra.)

- (b) of things; "practised", "pursued", "indulged in", of kinds of activity:

1. αἰεὶ δ' ἡμῖν δαίς τε φίλη κίθαρις τε

χοροὶ τε

εἵματα τ' ἐξημοιβὰ λοστράτε θερμὰ

καὶ εὐναί,

Odyssey VIII 248-9.

2. αἰεὶ γάρ τοι ἔρις τε φίλη πόλεμοί τε
μάχαι τε, Il. V 891.

..... ἀπατάων
μύθων τε κλοπίων, οἳ τοι πεδόθεν φίλοι εἰσίν,
Od. XIII 294-5.

3. We can see in some cases of 2:-

e.g. αἰεὶ τοι τὰ κάκ' ἐστὶ φίλα φρεσὶ
μαντεύεσθαι Il. I 107:-

the growth of the frequent use of φίλον ἐστὶ
(μοι) and infinitive, meaning "it pleases me
to do", "I like" or "I approve of, doing";
this sometimes expresses little more than
acquiescence.

- (c) This last sense (b.3), is very close to a sense
parallel to sense (c) of φιλεῖν; here φίλον
is used of "what is approved of, pursued as a
general aim";

ὄττι καλόν, φίλον ἐστὶ, τὸ δ' οὐ
καλόν οὐ φίλον ἐστίν,
Theognis 17.

"Honour is precious"; see Dodds on Bacchae
877-81.

οἷσιν δ' ὄσιον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον
φίλον ἐν βιότῳ Euripides El. 1351-2.

Here "those who in their life pursue holiness
and uprightness" are opposed to the μυσάροι,
the "defiled, impious"; there is a clear
implication that τὸ δίκαιον is to be
practised, not merely "loved".

2. Still of general qualities but meaning "valued"
rather than "approved" are:-

ἀ νεότας μοι φίλον αἰεὶ, τὸ δὲ
γῆρας ἄχθος, Eur. Her. 637-8.

ἀλλά τε γὰρ ἐν κακοῖς σὺν τ'
εὐτυχίαις φίλον, Eur. Ion. 481-2.

Notice also Eur. Or. 229-30, φίλον τοι τῷ
νοσοῦντι δεμνιον ἀνταρὸν ὄν τὸ κτῆμ', ἀναγκαῖον
δ' ὄμως. "The sick man prefers his bed, which though
not pleasant is necessary".

3. τὸ φίλον occurs occasionally as an abstract noun;
τόλμα ξείνος ἐπὶ ξένας,
ὦ τλάμων, ὅτι καὶ πόλις
τέτροφεν ἄφιλον ἀποστυγεῖν,
καὶ τὸ φίλον σέβεσθαι,

Sophocles O.C. 184-7,

where the chorus recommend Oedipus not to
enter the sacred grove, but to respect the
religious scruples of the Athenians.

Campbell and Jebb stress the "settled"
attitude indicated by τέτροφεν; but in
themselves ἄφιλον and φίλον probably
imply settled general disapproval and
approval rather than merely "dislike" or even
"love"; compare 1. above.

τάμᾱ γὰρ σπεύδεις φίλα, Eur. Her. 1409
 τὸ τῆς θεοῦ φίλον ἐξευπορήσων,
 Eur. I.A. 747

refer simply "the course of action I approve",
 "the will of the goddess", and are close to
 φίλον ἔστι μοι with infinitive (b.3).

- (d) φίλος (passive) in tragedy is fairly frequent of
particular objects in a very strong sense,
 probably representing a transference from
 sense (a) of persons (just as in English
 "beloved" of objects is a very strong term,
 where not ironic or conventional); φίλος said
 of things implies that the speaker has a
 reason for strong emotional attachment to them.

Hecuba refers to Ἐκτὸς φίλον σάκος,
 Eur. Tro. 1222;

Philoctetes to his τόξον φίλον and even to
 its φίλη νευρά, Soph. Phil. 1128, 1004.

φίλη πάτρις, φίλαι θῆβαι. Eur. Tro. 458, H. F. 1281.
 φίλαισιν ὑποδοχαῖς δόμων, Eur. I.A. 1229.

φίλον τὸ φέγγος τοῦτο τοῦ θεοῦ,
 Eur. Alc. 722, (cf. φιλεῖν
 (d).), cf. Her. 563-4.

φίλας εὐφρόνας ἢ τῶν ἐν εὐνῇ
 φιλτάτων ἀνσπασμάτων
 Eur. Hec. 828-9 (slightly doubtful sense?)

φίλον ὕπνου θέλητρον Eur. Or. 211,
 said by Orestes in illness.

- [[e]] Precisely as φιλῶ is not said of "liking"
 particular objects, so φίλος (passive) does
 not occur in a weak sense of particular things.
 Contexts where "beloved", "emotionally prized"
 seems inappropriate of objects will be found
 to indicate general "approval" of objects of
 a certain type.

At this point before considering the second main
 sense of φίλος it may be as well to comment on the
 Homeric use of φίλος frequently to mean no more than
 "one's own", especially of parts of the body. The
 scholiast on Iliad I 569 comments φίλον δὲ τὸ ἰδόν,
 and Kretschmer + suggested that φίλος was in origin
 a possessive adjective. It is possible to conjecture
 how this might underlie the meanings of φιλεῖν and

+ in Indog. Forsch. 1927 pp. 267-72, "Glotta",
 1930, pp. 238-9. Cf. Buck "Selected Indo-European
 Synonyms, p. 1110.

φίλος (passive) so far described; but it is more important to notice how far the development and ramification of the meanings of the words has proceeded in the classical period. It would seldom be very successful to try to render φίλος (passive) in classical contexts as (e.g.) "valued as though one's own", and despite their occasional echoes of Homeric usage it is perhaps doubtful whether even the tragedians can have been strongly conscious of any "possessive" sense clinging to most of their uses of φίλος. Attention to etymological origins might here mislead us.

Philology however perhaps gives us a useful clue to the origin of the second main sense of φίλος, that in which it means "a friend".

2. φίλος ("a friend")

On grounds of logic and of usage, and perhaps also of etymology, this sense must be kept quite separate from sense 1., φίλος (passive). + φιλούμενος cannot be substituted for this sense; when Xenophon says (at Mem. II 4) πάντων κτημάτων κρείτιστον φίλος σώφης και ἀγαθός, he does not intend to say "the best of all possessions is a man who is liked (or 'a man one likes') who is unflinching and good". Friendship is a mutual and reciprocal (or at least symmetrical) relationship. The Oxford English Dictionary quotes Johnson for definition of "friend"; "one joined to another in mutual benevolence and intimacy". If A and B are friends then A is B's friend and B is A's friend; if A is a friend of B then it follows that B is a friend

+ Liddell and Scott confuse these senses and treat them as one.

of A. + If friendship is based on affection or service then that affection or service must be reciprocal. This was equally true in Greece, and the common sense of φίλος which is correctly rendered as "a friend" is thus neither passive nor active but both together, or rather, indicates a relationship which in logic is symmetrical and in practice must be mutual.

It would be possible to conjecture that this sense of φίλος may perhaps have been more directly derived from the old "possessive" sense of φίλος than was the passive sense. Persons who were "one's own", φίλοι, were no doubt principally family and kin, but also one's friends; and they no doubt were prepared to call one "their own", φίλος. ++ (But this kind of metaphorical "possession" of persons is of course reciprocal, which the possession of property is not.) This relatively direct derivation of φίλος ("a friend") from a possessive adjective might help to show why the link between φίλος ("a friend") and the verb φιλεῖν seems in ordinary Greek to be much looser than might have been expected; φιλεῖν and φίλος (passive) perhaps represent a different and more complex line of development of the original possessive force. I repeat that I am not a philologist, but this account seems better than deriving φίλος ("a friend") from φίλος (passive), as Liddell and Scott ^{seem to} do; it is very striking to contrast the parallelism already noted between φίλος (passive) and φιλεῖν with the surprising

+ except in certain abnormal idioms - see below p. 26.

++ See Dirlmeier, "φίλος and φιλέω", Diss. Munich 1931.

fact that Xenophon discusses φίλοι ("friends") at length in Mem. II 4-6 without using the verb φιλεῖν except once in an erotic context. * (It will become clear that this is not due to any idiosyncrasy of Xenophon's outlook.)

It would be an enormous task to review all that could be said on Greek views of friendship; ** but for our present lexicographical purpose the main point has already been made, that this sense of φίλος is for the most part correctly rendered in English as "a friend" in the most common, that is to say the mutual and reciprocal, sense of the word.

A few typical Greek comments on friendship from non-philosophical writers will perhaps emphasise ordinary Greek attitudes;—

1. One of the most notorious Greek views is expressed by Theognis at 869-872;

Ἐν μοι ἔπειτα πέποι μέγας οὐρανὸς αἰνὸς ὑπερθεῖν...
εἰ μὴ ἐγὼ τοῖσιν μὲν ἐπαρκέσω οἷός με φιλεῖσθαι,
τοῖ δ' ἄχοροισι ζῆν' ἔμ'· καὶ μέγα πῆμ' ἔσομαι.
(the contrast with οἱ ἐχθροί shows that οἷός με φιλεῖσθαι here by poetic usage means "my friends", cf. Theognis 101-4, where φιλεῖσθαι means "to make a φίλος of", 113. +)
2. The emphasis on mutual service as the basis of friendship is strong in Xenophon as well as Theognis; e.g.:— κολλάκις δ' ἀπὸ αὐτοῦ τις ἢ οὐκ ἐξεργάσατο ἢ οὐκ εἶδεν ἢ οὐκ ἤκουσεν ἢ οὐκ διήκουσε, ταῦτα δὲ φίλος πρὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐξήρασεν, Xen. Mem. II 4, 7.
3. Affection or emotion between friends (as opposed to family) tends to be in the background; Aristotle's observation about ordinary language τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τὰγαθὰ εὖνους λέγουσιν.... εὖνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντικειρονθόσι φιλίαν εἶναι, (E.N. 1155b 32), shows that the ordinary word for the attitude of mind of one friend to another is εὖνοια; this is confirmed by Euripides, Ion 730-732; Plato Prot. 337b¹; Menander Dyscolos 720.

+ This sense of φιλεῖν (a. 4 above) is poetic and comparatively rare. Etymologically it should perhaps be explained as showing the influence of φίλος ("a friend") on φιλεῖν rather than vice versa.

* II 6, 28: and even there it probably only means 'to be affectionate.'

** For such a review see Dirlmeier's dissertation (p. 17. n.), which has an enormous collection of references.

Two other meanings of the reciprocal sense of φίλος must be mentioned:-

1. In Homer and tragedy φίλος is very often equivalent to συγγενής (indeed this may be etymologically a more basic sense; see p. 17 above). This leads to involved play on the word φίλος in many passages in tragedy; e.g. Soph. Ant. 517-522;

Ἄντ. ἀδελφός ἔλατο.

Κρ. οὐτοὶ ποθ' οὐχθρός, οὐδ'
ὅταν θάνῃ, φίλος,

(cf. Robert, Oidipus II 121 n. 11.)

Eur. Phoen. 1446,
φίλος γὰρ ἔχθρος ἐγένετ', ἀλλ'
ὅμως φίλος.

Aesch. Agam. 1272 φίλων ὑπ' ἐχθρῶν,
"by my own people who became my enemies",
see Fraenkel.

In all these cases the implied opposition between ἔχθρος and φίλος is played on at the same time as the sense of φίλος meaning "a kinsman".

2. φίλος meaning "an ally" is of course also reciprocal in sense, cf. Xen. Hell. VI 5.48.

A final observation on φίλος ("a friend") must be that since only persons can be friends, in this sense of the word the neuter is unusual; except e.g.:-

πάν γὰρ ἐν φίλον τόδε Eur. Or. 1192, which means "all of us here are in league together."

φίλα ἂν τέμοις, Eur. Her. 301, "found a friendship".

3. φίλος (active)

Friendship must always be mutual, and in Greece was largely based on service, on the giving of active help by men to one another; it results therefore naturally enough that there are cases where the title of φίλος, "a friend", is conferred or denied by one party to another according to whether the second is actively meeting the obligations of friendship. This leads to not infrequent occurrences of the term φίλος of persons where the emphasis is on their active participation in friendship; and so there comes eventually to be a sense of φίλος which it is simplest

to describe as active, meaning "friendly", "well-disposed to", "favourable to". This sense is neither infrequent nor chiefly poetical, as Liddell and Scott suggest; but it is important to notice that it occurs mostly in places where the larger context is in any case one of friendship between men in its full two-way sense, and where the meaning "friendly" is being used to focus special attention on one part of the implied two-way relationship. Logically φίλος (active) must be treated as a separate sense, but etymologically perhaps it represents a special sense of φίλος ("a friend") where there is a particular limited emphasis. However in a few cases it has to be treated as a separate sense even on linguistic grounds.

- (a) 1. The growth of the active sense must have occurred in contexts such as Lysias XIII 92,
 εἰ τοίνυν τι ἐκαίνοι ἀγαθὸν τὴν πόλιν
 ἢ τὸ κληθὸς τὸ ὑμέτερον φανεροὶ εἶσι
 πεποιηκότες, ἀνάγκη ὑμᾶς εἶσσι πάντας
 ἐκαίνοις φίλους καὶ ἐκτιθεῖσιν εἶναι
 ("and so you must avenge them");
 active benefit has been done by one party,
 so the other must be φίλοι to them and return
 the service.

Compare:- Soph. Ant. 543,

λόγοις δ' ἐγὼ φιλοῦσαν οὐ στέργω φίλην,
 "I do not like a 'friend' whose friendship is
 shown only in words."

- Eur. Or. 424,

ἀληθῆς ἐς φίλους φίλος, "truly a friend
towards your friends"; also Soph. Ant. 99,
 Eur. I. T. 609,

τοῖς φίλοις τ' ὀρθῶς φίλη, "towards her
 friends a friend rightly so called", see
 Campbell on Ant. 99, Wilamowitz on Eur. Her. 56.
 In all these cases φίλος means "a true friend
 because an active friend".

2. The developed active sense is seen in:-

.... βροτοῖσιν δὲ καθέστηκεν νόμος

μισεῖν τὸ σεμνὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ πᾶσιν φίλον,

Eur. Hipp. 91-93.

"Men are bound to hate unfriendliness."

γυναῖκες ἀνδρῶν, ἤξέν; οὐ παίδων φίλοι,
Eur. El. 265, "Women love their
husbands, not their children" (said
by Electra of Clytemnestra).

φίλους γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἐρασταῖς,
Plato, Symp. 183c4, said by Pausanias,
is a euphemism for χαρίζεσθαι.

δοκεῖ τις τῶν θεῶν φίλος ἡμῶν νυνδὴ γεγονέναι
Phileb. 25b11, means "a god has
assisted our argument".

Much rarer than φίλος (active) of relations
between persons is its very occasional use of a person's
inclination towards something impersonal; this of
course goes right outside any possible context of
mutual friendship; it is obviously felt as equivalent
to φίλων and occurs with the same kind of objects
as follow φιλεῖν.

(b) ἦν φίλος δορῖ, Eur. Hel. 1263, means "he was
fond of fighting".

ἀναιδέα φίλος, Eur. Tro. 788-9, "given to
shamelessness".

οἱ μουσικῆς φίλοι Eur. fr. 580 Nauck², is
reminiscent of the secondary use of "friends
of the arts, etc." in English.

(φίλος τε καὶ συγγενῆς ἀληθείας, δικαιοσύνης κτλ.
Plato Rep. 487a⁴⁻⁵, is obviously metaphorical.)

φίλοι τῶν εἰδῶν, Plato Soph. 248a⁴, are the
supporters of a philosophical doctrine;
(but Eudoxus was said to be not merely φίλος τῆς
ἡδονῆς, "overfond of pleasure", but genuinely
filled with philosophical conviction, Ar. E. N.
1172 b 17.)

This final sense of φίλος (active) is however
very uncommon indeed.

This concludes the review of the senses of φιλεῖν
and φίλος; it only remains to state that certain
related uses are conspicuously absent from Greek prose
usage (outside the "Lysis" and Aristotle, E. E. VII
and E. N. VIII-IX). These are:-

φιλεῖν (b) (c) and (d), of impersonal objects,
except (c.3), φιλεῖν and infinitive.

all senses of φίλος (passive) except ὡ φίλε
and φίλον ἐστί (μοι) and infinitive.

It will be seen to follow that φιλεῖν and φίλος in prose are always to do with

- (i) affection (or "support") for persons (φιλεῖν)
- (ii) friendship between persons (φίλος)

except for weak impersonal uses to do with

- (i) the habitual occurrence of certain events
- (ii) the approval of particular courses of action.

The strong senses of "love of" certain objects and pursuit or approval of general ideals are confined to poetic diction. + (But see below on φίλο-compounds.)

φιλία. (in Homer φιλότης; ++ but see below.)

A very brief note on the noun φιλία should perhaps be added. This is the noun from φίλος ("a friend"), and not from the verb φιλεῖν (which is φίλησις, first in Aristotle E. N.) It follows that φιλία is almost always used of a mutual relationship, either "friendship" between men or "alliance" between cities. Liddell and Scott misleadingly talk of "the objective genitive" after φιλία; but at Thuc. I 91, διὰ φιλίαν αὐτοῦ means "because of friendship with (not for) him", as is proved by Democritus fr. 98, ἐνός φίλην ξυνετοῦ κρέσσων ἀξυνέτων πόων, which can only mean "friendship with one wise man is better than with many fools". The exception proves the rule

+ A footnote on a purely grammatical point can be added here; the examples cited show that φίλος in all senses can be followed by either the genitive or the dative; for additional evidence of φίλος (passive) and gen. see Soph. El. 1145-6.

++ On φιλότης see Page on Sappho fr. 1, 19.

at Plato Rep. 581a, where ἡδονὴν καὶ φιλίαν τοῦ κέρδους are attributed to the part of the soul which Plato wishes to call τὸ φιλοκερδές.

A very few cases of an active sense of φιλία occur, but, like many cases of φίλος (active), in passages where the meaning is "the affection shown by a partner in a friendship", in a context involving mutual affection; see Plato Phaedr. 255e¹⁻², where the beloved is becoming infected with the emotion of his lover; κατὰ ταῦτ' αὖ ποθεῖ καὶ ποθεῖται, εἶδωλον ἔρωτος ἀντέρωτα ἔχων* καλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ οἴεται οὐκ ἔρωτα ἀλλὰ φιλίαν εἶναι. + (This quotation incidentally helps to show that the Homeric sense of φιλότης meaning "sexual passion" is not present in the later term φιλία.)

φιλο - σοφος, - σοφειν etc.

Compound words beginning φιλο- are of course very common throughout Greek literature, and indicate general pursuit of kinds of object; compare φιλεῖν (b) and (c). These compounds thus admit to prose usage a sense of φιλεῖν otherwise absent; this perhaps makes the absence of the simple verb even more remarkable.

The bearing of this linguistic enquiry into φίλος, φιλεῖν and related words will, I hope, be obvious from almost any page of the philosophical analysis of the

+ One might contrast passages where ἔρωσ, normally quite clearly a one-way passion, is coupled with mutual relationships; ἐκπλήττονται φιλίᾳ τε καὶ οἰκειότητι καὶ ἔρωτι, Symp. 192bc, where ἔρωσ felt by both sides is meant.

"Lysis" or of the commentary. It will suffice to say here that in the "Lysis" Plato extends the usage of φίλος and φιλεῖν far beyond what was normal in Greek prose, for purposes of philosophical innovation as well as merely for linguistic expression; he seems to establish links between φίλος ("a friend") and other senses of φιλεῖν and φίλος which outside philosophy were surprisingly distinct and separate. I must repeat once again that we must not let etymologising presuppositions obscure our view of actual usage; nor must we be so easily seduced by philosophical innovations that we do not see them for the innovations that they are. A final assessment of these innovations must be delayed until the dialogue has been analysed.

2. Critical analysis of the "Lysis" as a search for definition

It will be necessary to summarise the dialogue in some detail and to analyse it from what might seem to many interpreters of Plato an unsympathetic point of view. I hope it will be shown that Aristotle read the dialogue from this point of view and was much influenced by Plato's suggestions; I hope it will not seem that this point of view amounts to anything other than taking seriously what Plato said. I hope finally that it will begin to seem likely that this is how Plato meant what he said to be taken.

Consideration of historical rather than interpretative questions will be deferred till the final conclusions (many secondary historical questions are treated only in the commentary, principally for the sake of keeping the thread of thought clear throughout the introduction. For instance, to cite the views of Plato's predecessors on a given point often only distracts attention from what Plato himself said; even if he used earlier views he often re-interpreted them in his own way.)

Finally a warning should be given that the analysis of the dialogue concerns itself much more with the form than with the substance of the argument. Consideration of whether Plato may have placed more weight on certain of his suggestions or refutations than on others, or what his strongest interests were in writing the "Lysis" apart from that in definition, is deferred to the concluding section.

The direct discussion of friendship opens with the surprisingly slick and bewildering argument with Menexenus. Commentators have described this as Plato at his most 'eristic' and 'antilogical', and have even assumed it to have no other purpose than to parody contemporary sophists and to show the futility of their contentious argumentation. It is true that when all seems futile Socrates suggests that the method of enquiry may have been wrong, and Lysis is made to agree. The caricaturing of sophistic arguments is an unmistakable element in the intention of the "Euthydemus"; but even there some of the sophistic paradoxes held up to ridicule are ones later taken up by Plato very seriously (for example those about false statement); and here in the "Lysis" one lesson which could be learnt from these paradoxes about who is φίλος would have a very important application to the rest of the dialogue.

The revisers of the Jowett translation try to help out the difficulty of translating this passage by noting: "The Greek word φίλος is used both in the active sense of 'friend' and in the passive sense of 'dear'". This is not particularly helpful: a clearly active sense of 'friend' in English (as opposed to 'friendly') seems rare; it occurs in phrases such as "friends of the Lake District" or "friends of humanity"; but on the other hand a phrase such as "He is no friend of mine" would seem to introduce a passive sense of "friend"*. In fact the English word "friend", though not as freely ambiguous as φίλος, has various idiomatic uses which can be confusing. (We have seen that it is not in its normal use either active or passive.)

However so far as concerns the Greek of this passage, we have already examined the ambiguities of φίλος in Greek, and certainly found a passive sense and noted a common active implication. These two senses of φίλος may be what make Menexenus agree so easily with Socrates' leading questions at 212a⁸-b⁵; if one man likes another then one is actively φίλος and the

* The same sentiment, however, could be expressed by "I am no friend of his" where 'friend' might be active.

.2.

and the other passively φίλος so both are φίλος. The active-passive ambiguity is certainly responsible for some of the trouble in this argument, as has been noticed by many interpreters.

Von Arnim⁺ on the other hand saw that if this ambiguity was the only one involved then the refutations put up by Socrates at 212b⁵-d³, 213b²⁻⁴ and 213b⁷-c⁵ need not have been accepted by Menexenus. If at 212a⁸-b⁵ Menexenus accepted Socrates' suggestion because he saw that φίλος could have either an active or passive sense, then at (for example) 213a⁶-b² he would have seen that the result obtained exclusively from the passive use of φίλος = φιλούμενος has nothing odd about it, any more than the similar result obtained exclusively from the active sense in 213b⁷-c⁴, and he would not have given in to Socrates' suggestion that here was πολλή ἀλογία. If this were all that Plato was playing on in this passage his antilogicality would be as transparent as the worst examples of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, and Menexenus would be unduly a man of straw.

Von Arnim suggested that in addition to the ambiguity between active and passive senses of the adjective φίλος, there was a wider and a narrower sense of the verb φιλεῖν which caused confusion throughout the dialogue. In its wider sense φιλεῖν could have a neuter object, in its narrower sense it had a personal object. With this distinction of the senses of φιλεῖν goes a distinction in the senses of φίλος, according to whether it is being used in discussion of the relation between two persons or between a person and a thing. This means, von Arnim suggested, that Plato should have discussed these two different levels of friendship separately, and not in the same passage talked of the relationship between men at 212a⁸-d³ and between men and things at 212d⁴-213a³. This last point at least may be sound; the relationship of the φιλόσοφος to σοφία could be expected to be different

⁺ Platos Jugenddialoge p. 41, sq.

from the relation between two men who are φίλος. But Plato in fact produces one of his refutations by considering both the philosopher's love of wisdom and the love of parents for a child too young to love them back, either of which provides an equally good case of τὸ φιλοῦμενον being φίλον without being φιλοῦν (212d⁵-213a⁵). In discussing the normal Greek usage of φιλεῖν above we attempted to make some distinctions in meaning according to application to personal or impersonal objects, but these will be more important in the later parts of the dialogue than here.

Von Arnim however was not entirely wrong in diagnosing trouble here of which neuters are one of the symptoms, as we shall see. The other ambiguity besides that of the active and passive senses of φίλος which causes the antilogicality of this passage is due to the third sense of φίλος noted above, the reciprocal sense of "friend". Von Arnim saw this, and perhaps should have seen that these ambiguities in φίλος alone would explain this set of paradoxes, without recourse to the ambiguities of φιλεῖν. It was correct, however, to point out that three and not merely two senses of φίλος must be involved.

The adjective φίλος, besides marking either the agent or the object in a case where a person likes a thing or another person, can denote a participant in a reciprocal relationship of friendship such that if A is a φίλος of B then B is a φίλος of A+. That is to say φίλος can sometimes be translated "friendly towards" or "liking", sometimes "dear to" or "liked", but most commonly means "a friend of" or "friendly with" in the most ordinary sense of mutual goodwill. Jowett's revisers should have consulted the Oxford English Dictionary on the word 'friend', where the article opens by quoting

+ "Participant in a reciprocal relationship" is terminology of the same level as "agent" and "object"; but included in this reciprocal relationship is, in purely logical terms, a "symmetrical" relationship. Even if no theory of reciprocity whether of service or affection were being put forward to explain friendship the logical force of symmetry normally implied in 'friend' and in the corresponding sense of φίλος would remain and would have to be accounted for in any other explanation.

.3A.

Johnson's first meaning: "One joined to another in mutual benevolence and intimacy". This is either both active and passive, or neither. If I am a friend of his then he is a friend of mine and we are friends; in the additional English idiom I am "friends with" him and vice-versa. Some other senses of "friend" in English were noted earlier, but this ~~at least~~ logically symmetrical sense is the most usual. Similarly φίλος in Greek has an equivalent sense implying symmetry: and it is this sense which Plato plays on in order to produce the denials that one-sided relationships can involve φίλος at 212b⁵-d³, 213b²⁻⁴, and 213b⁷-c⁵.

The first part of the argument, at 212a⁶-d⁴, is built up to prove that the relation between φίλοι is reciprocal (perhaps indeed Menexenus is taken in at 212b²⁻³ precisely because he assumes a symmetry in the relation Socrates wishes to describe; he jumps from mention of one man liking another to the assumption that both are friends, as though at this point ἐπεὶ οὖν τις τινα φιλεῖ (212a⁸) meant "when one man is friends with another".) The subsequent destruction of this explanation of φίλος ^{as denoting a} ~~in terms of~~ symmetrical relations has to be done by the introduction of a one-way relationship. The most obvious one-way relationships ^{of liking} ~~clearly~~ are cases of liking impersonal things which cannot reciprocate the liking; among the most common of these cases are those where in Greek the agent can be described as e.g. φιλοῦνος, and the thing, here οἶνος, as φίλος in the passive sense. (Use of the verb φιλεῖν with an impersonal object was subject to certain restrictions as seen before; so in 212d⁸ φιλοῦσι ταῦτα would sound a little unusual if it had not been prepared for by φίλωνοι etc.) But this is where confusion due to neuters creeps in. Normally the occurrence of φίλον in the neuter will be a case of the passive sense, since impersonal things are not normally said to be friends or to display active liking. But the neuter is also used in Greek for generalisation, and is much in evidence in this use here. So at 212d⁴ the result of the previous establishment of the symmetrical implication

of φίλος is rephrased in the neuter preparatory to refutation: οὐκ ἄρα
 ἐστὶν φίλον τῷ φιλοῦντι οὐδὲν μὴ οὐκ ἂν φιλοῦν. *This is meant to sound implausible, which it*
tempts the reader to think of φίλον = φιλούμενον, which is the sense to
 be emphasised in the following examples (though the example of babies which do
 not yet love their parents of course owes nothing to the use of the neuter
 noun παιδίον.) On the other hand at 212e⁶ we have τὸ φιλούμενον ἔρα
 τῷ φιλοῦντι φίλον ἐστίν, *which sounds plausible enough* in the neuter, but at 213a⁴⁻⁵ this is stated
 in the masculine, οὐκ ἄρα ὁ φιλῶν φίλος..... ἀλλ' ὁ φιλούμενος,
 and so a suggestion of the normal masculine sense of reciprocated friendship is
 introduced again, and the paradox πολλοὶ,..... ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων μισοῦνται
 is rejected because φίλος in the sense of "friend" does not allow this.
 This is then generalised as ἀδύνατον..... τῷ ἐχθρῷ φίλον εἶναι,
 which is indeed ἀδύνατον when the reciprocal sense of φίλος is in mind
 but not where φίλον = φιλούμενον and τῷ ἐχθρῷ φίλον = ὕπο
 τοῦ μισουμένου φιλούμενον.

The argument so far has shown that to be φιλῶν τε καὶ φιλούμενος
 is not, as at first appeared, a necessary condition for having the adjective
 φίλος applied to one, since it also has the one-way sense = φιλούμενος;
 and then that to be φιλούμενος is not a sufficient condition of being
 φίλος in its full sense of "friend". Socrates now tries the other one-way
 sense and performs exactly the same manoeuvre. At 213b⁵⁻⁶ τὸ φιλοῦν ἂν
 εἶη φίλον τοῦ φιλουμένου is taken to be the remaining alternative; this
 is again rejected because it would seem to lead to the possibility of being
 the friend of an enemy.

in manuscript
 (This time the paradox is not even put into the masculine but kept in
 the neuter). So that to be φιλῶν is shown to be not a sufficient
 condition of being φίλος in its full sense, and the disastrous-seeming
 summing-up is done at 213c⁵. τί οὖν δὴ χρησώμεθα εἰ μήτε οἱ φιλοῦντες
 φίλοι ἔσονται μήτε οἱ φιλούμενοι μήτε οἱ φιλοῦντές τε καὶ φιλούμενοι;

What has happened is "antilogical" in the extreme. In fact all the suggested definitions of $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ are correct for one or other of its senses, but each is rejected by being opposed to one of the other senses, two as insufficient for the symmetrical sense, the symmetrical sense as not necessary for the others. So that no positive result has been achieved, and the enquiry is apparently abandoned as misguided: $\omicron\acute{\upsilon}\kappa \acute{\omicron}\rho\theta\omega\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\xi\eta\tau\omicron\upsilon\mu\epsilon\nu$. What was Plato trying to show by this? The neat arrangement of these "antilogies" into a refutation of all the senses of $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ might seem to be deliberate and artificial. Perhaps Plato, not having any terminology for "ambiguity" or "symmetrical relationships" or "sufficient conditions", contrived this exposition of paradoxes precisely as his best means of displaying what nowadays can be stated in the conscious and semi-technical terminology now used to discuss logical relations. The construction of this passage might seem to suggest that its writer had sufficient control over the paradoxes to be able to use them when and how he liked, and if need be to invent some new ones using the ambiguities he saw lurking in the other paradoxes. We should perhaps not judge Plato's "consciousness" of logical points too strictly by whether he has words to refer to them.*

On the other hand if Plato was fully aware of all the ambiguities in $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ we should expect him to observe them very carefully and avoid any confusion in the rest of the dialogue.

It will perhaps be simplest to state now without discussion that he does not appear to do this; the possibility that in the rest of the dialogue though aware of the ambiguities he thought them unimportant or unnecessary to comment on must be discussed later, but for the moment it will be most convenient to discuss solely in view of the passage in hand whether Plato may conceivably after all not have seen the ambiguities apparently displayed so unmistakeably.

* For an excellent discussion of this see R. Robinson, "Plato's Consciousness of Fallacy", *Mind* 1942.

.6.

Plato's summing-up ruling out all suggestions is in one sense justified. None of the three suggestions provides an exact equivalent for the word $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ in all its senses. So that if Socrates here is being represented as looking not for a partial but for a single complete and exact synonym by way of a definition of $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ he can be excused for being dissatisfied with all the candidates. Whatever the consciousness behind it, this is the point which is cardinal to the construction of this passage, and provides the means of passing from consideration of one suggestion to the next, and the excuse for the aporia in which the passage concludes. The possibility that any of the suggestions may illuminate $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ in part though not completely is never mentioned; the discussion is apparently written off as a total failure.

Is this dissatisfaction sophisticated and ironical on Plato's part? This may have seemed to him the neatest way available with his vocabulary of showing that $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ is not a simple word but has more than one sense, and so cannot be given a single synonym. This may ^{have} ^{Plato's} ⁱⁿ ~~been~~ ^{the} ^{point} ^{of} rejecting suggestions which ^{which he} have a value ^(by Plato) well realised of providing definitions of different single senses. On the other hand, if we have any grounds to suspect that Plato was not completely clear about what he had done in this passage, we are bound to notice other places where he is searching for nothing but single exact equivalents by way of definitions. For instance, this is consciously his aim in the opening discussions of the 'Meno' and the 'Theaetetus', where collections of cases of the definienda $\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\eta}$ and $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\mu\eta$ are rejected because they do not illustrate what $\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\eta}$ or $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\mu\eta$ itself is, or why the cases are what they are. In these dialogues the definienda are taken to have one meaning in many cases; if this is correct then Plato is right to concentrate attention on this meaning in itself. Would he in the 'Lysis' have maintained that to list the various senses of $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ does not explain what $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ itself really means, what the uniting sense is behind the other three? This demand for a uniting basic meaning is mistaken in the case of $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$, which has various logically distinct senses

.7.

linked in a more complicated way, not as cases derived from a single root sense. Concentration on the basic meaning of the verb φιλεῖν might be more in point, once φίλος had been established as meaning either φιλῶν or φιλούμενος or φιλῶν τε καὶ φιλούμενος; in φιλεῖν (as indeed in ἀρετῇ or ἐπιστήμη) a different kind of ambiguity might arise over the force of the word in different contexts; but over φίλος definition without recognition of the ambiguity is impossible, unless a word with an exactly similar set of logically distinct senses can be found; otherwise separate equivalents for the active passive and symmetrical senses will have to be found. Plato however may have been holding to his belief that three definitions are not as good as one; this is consciously stated in later dialogues in perhaps more appropriate applications, but may be in Plato's mind here too.

However even if the search in definition for a single root meaning rather than many instances is a slightly later stage in Plato's thought, two *other* more general tendencies evident in Plato's earlier 'definition-hunting' dialogues may have misled him. These tendencies, like the notion of definition just mentioned, have been discussed by Mr. R. Robinson in his articles in Mind 1941 and 1942. Firstly, Plato often appears to argue fallaciously from "All x is y" to "All y is x"; this apparent fallacy can however be made into a correct inference if we understand "x is y" in Plato to be a statement of identity or equivalence, which must often be what Plato took it to be, if his arguments are to be thought correct+. Plato very frequently is thinking in terms of equivalences and identifications when in search of definitions, and sometimes where he is aware that two concepts are not equivalent but are related only by class inclusion he is careful to point this out *as though it seemed universal.* It is perhaps just possible that his tendency to think in

+ Mind 1942 pp. 98 and 100.

.8.

terms of strict equivalence misled him into not seeing the difficulties of defining $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ in terms of equivalence.

The second tendency which may have misled Plato here is one which might seem surprising in a philosopher of Plato's stature, but which is less surprising in a philosopher of Plato's day; Mr. Robinson has argued that Plato was often unconscious of ambiguities in the words he wished to define. This is perhaps especially true in the early dialogues. If Plato when he wrote the "Lysis" was not aware from other examples that a word could have separate senses linked in as complex a way as the senses of $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$, then it would hardly be surprising if he did not see the value in his own analysis of $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ but thought his method of enquiry must have been misguided. Attempts at definition are frequently over-simple at all stages in philosophy. Plato had perhaps not realised that the words interesting to philosophers seldom have synonyms; it would be unhelpful or uninteresting if they had; nor had he realised that a word may, without there being any uncertainty about its correct uses, or ~~apparent~~ ^{due to vagueness,} snares in its definition, have several distinct meanings or senses, perhaps related but not interchangeable.

If we are to take this passage at its face-value, it will confirm the presence of the tendencies detected by Mr. Robinson in the early dialogues. Plato was often unconscious of ambiguity in his definienda, and thought that 'what is x?' had one answer only; that "x is y" was made to seem an implausible answer if it could be said also that "x is z"; that if x is both y and z then there must be a better answer again. It would therefore be possible to believe that Plato intended exactly what he said in this passage in refuting all suggestions about the meaning of $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$; he may not have seen any use in these suggestions as definitions of different senses of $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$. We must examine the rest of the dialogue in the hope of discovering whether he was clearly conscious of the differences of sense before we can settle or suggest a settlement of our problems about this passage.

213d-216b

213d-214c

Lysis is suspicious of the method of enquiry which has been used in 212b-213d and blurts out that it must have been wrong; this delights Socrates, who resumes the conversation now with Lysis, and suggests another approach by way of noting the words of the poets. Men are made friends by God, who brings together like to like. Socrates here still has his first question in mind; how does one man become the friend of another? The answer of the poets is confirmed by the writings of the philosophers, who confirm that there is a necessary attraction between like and like. The philosophers probably used this attraction as an element in cosmology; cf. Ar. ^{ΕΕ} 1235a⁷; Plato uses it here as an explanation of friendship in its ordinary sense, that is to say, between men. Friendship between men who are alike is first taken to mean that good men will be the friends of other good men and bad men friends of bad men. But this is then seen to be only half true: bad men cannot be friends with each other because they will do each other wrong, which is clearly impossible between friends: *ἴδιον ὄντας*

ὅς καὶ ἴδιούμενοι ἴδύνατόν που φίλους εἶναι.

So, in this way, like cannot be friends with like, and the poets and philosophers who said so were wrong. But the poets and philosophers are excused, because they cannot have meant to include bad men as likes, since a bad man has no stability of character so is not even consistently like himself, let alone like anyone else. So the poets must have meant that only the good could be friends, while a bad man could not be friends with either a good or a bad man.

214e-215c

Socrates has a quarrel even with this reading of the "likeness" explanation. What could one man do for another who is like him except what the second man is already able to do for himself? And if one man cannot help another, what reason will they have for welcoming each other's company?

And if they do not welcome each other how will they be friends? *τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα πῶς ἂν ἔπι ἀλλήλων ἀγαπήθῃ, μηδεμίαν ἐπιουσίαν ἀλλήλοις ἔχοντα; ... ὃ δὲ μὴ ἀγαπήτω, πῶς φίλον; οὐδ' αὖτως. Ἀλλὰ δὲ ὁ μὲν ὁμοίος τῷ ὁμοίῳ οὐ φίλος.*

So friendship will not result from likeness, and if it is true that good men are friends it must be because of their goodness, not because of their likeness./

But this in fact will not do either; good men (are because of their goodness, self-sufficient, so will want nothing and welcome nothing; so good men will not need each other, so will not value each other and so will not be friends.

... μήτε ἀπέντες ποθεινοὶ ἀλλήλοις ... μήτε παρόντες χρείαν αὐτῶν ἔχουσι. τοὺς δὲ ποιόσονται ἢ μηχανῆ περι πολλοῦ ποιέσθαι ἀλλήλους, οὐδέποτε. φίλοι δέ γε οὐκ ἂν εἶεν μὴ περι πολλοῦ ποιούμενοι ἑαυτοῦς.

15c-216b

Socrates now suggests that they have gone off the track by starting from completely the wrong supposition. They thought like was the friend of like; but it ~~is~~ ^{may} also ~~said~~ ^{be} that like is like's own greatest enemy; the poets have said this, and Socrates has heard it developed by a skilful and impressive arguer. It is really opposites who are friends. Members of the same trade are jealous rivals, but the poor man needs the help of the rich man, the weak the help of the strong man, the sick man the help of the doctor and the

ignorant the help of the expert. τὸν γὰρ πόνητα τῷ πλουσίῳ ἀναγκάσθαι φίλον εἶναι.. τῆς ἐπικουρίας ἕνεκα ... καὶ πάντα δὴ τὸν μὴ εἰδῶτα ἀγαπᾶν τὸν εἰδῶτα καὶ φιλεῖν.

This can be extended as a wide general principle; dry desires wet, cold hot, empty fullness, and so ~~so~~ ^{on}; opposite is nourished by opposite, whereas like gets nothing out of like: τροφήν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ.

τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου οὐδὲν ἂν ἀπολαῦσαι.
But there are some opposites who cannot conceivably be friends; the experts in paradox-hunting will swiftly point out that friends and enemies are opposites but not friends, and that oppositeness does not make good men the friends of bad men. So that oppositeness is not better than likeness as an explanation of how friendship comes about.

By way of general comment on this argument we may perhaps first notice that the discussion is still *dialectic* and leads to no positive conclusion. The principle of likeness as a bond of friendship is considered in two instances only, friendship between bad men and friendship between good men, but it is apparently taken that these instances together provide a complete examination, since when about to refute the principle in one instance Socrates suggests that the general statement is only half true; εὖ λέγουσιν ... ἴσως τὸ ἡμισυ αὐτοῦ. The second half of the principle, friendship between ^eman alike in being good, is given a double examination; first a general refutation of likeness as a bond of friendship is presented. This of course could have been put earlier and rendered/

rendered unnecessary the consideration of particular instances; but Plato also takes into account an alternative interpretation of the statement that like is friend of like which might allow this to be true without the friendship being based on the mere fact of likeness, but rather on the quality in respect of which there is likeness. The bad cannot be the friends of the bad at all, neither because of likeness nor because of badness. The good cannot be the friends of the good because of likeness, because likeness does not provide a bond of friendship; may they not however be friends because of the goodness which they both have? This is refuted separately. The objection that, even if it were not refuted, likeness would be a misleading way of stating this explanation of friendship, has been removed by the sophistic denial that any but the good are truly alike. The statement that like are friends of like has therefore been given in some respects a generous variety of interpretation before refutation; to us it seems surprising that only two respects of likeness are considered as instances; but the instances are refuted separately as well as the general principle. The refutations of these instances will turn out to have been important in themselves as showing respectively that good men are not friends of good men and bad men not friends of bad men, as well as because of their use in refuting the general statement about likeness between friends.

The refutation of the principle of oppositeness is much less complete. Many cases of oppositeness are suggested to back up the principle; these are not refuted in themselves, but the principle is taken to be refuted by the citation of a number of counterexamples. These counterexamples will validly refute a principle that all opposites are friends, though not a principle that all friends are opposites, since they do not show that no opposites are friends but only that some are not. That is to say, Plato has shown that oppositeness is not a sufficient condition of friendship but not that it may not be a necessary condition of friendship. Since he takes his argument to have shown the suggestion of oppositeness to be valueless, we can infer that he was looking at least for a sufficient condition of friendship. By contrast, when discussing likeness, Plato seems to have taken trouble to show that likeness was a sufficient condition for inferring the absence of friendship, which would be a refutation whether he was proposing likeness as a sufficient or merely as a necessary condition of friendship. Most probably Plato was looking, as he often/

often was elsewhere, for a condition of friendship both necessary and sufficient, which could be stated in terms of a principle "All friends are x and all x's are friends", which would also give him a definition in terms of equivalence. A search for this kind of condition or definition of friendship is much more difficult to satisfy than a search for either merely a sufficient or merely a necessary condition. If this is the object of enquiry then elenchus or refutation of all positive suggestions is made very much easier. Is Plato's hunt for equivalences merely a device to make the construction of his elenchus easier? Surely Plato must have realised the unlikelihood of obtaining equivalences, and the usefulness of finding various contributory though not completely binding conditions? Or does he mean to reject altogether anything but a definition in terms of equivalence because of a ^{consciously} sincerely held ideal view of definition? We might today concede that there was some force in both these suggestions of likeness and oppositeness as elements contributing to friendships, though we might hold neither element to be either necessary or sufficient; have we witnessed here Plato's way of showing just this, that neither theory is complete in itself but that both are useful? Many modern interpreters would be quite sure Plato was aiming to show this; but if we attend carefully to Plato's actual methods of argument, and imagine the state of thinking about definition before Aristotle, it is far from impossible to think that Plato wished to be taken as meaning just what he said; he may even have seen the demand for definition in terms of equivalence as an advance in precision of thought due to himself or to Socrates.

Some further more straightforward but ~~perhaps~~ not less necessary comments require to be made on this part of the argument. The question *ὅστινα τρόπον γίνεται φίλος ἑτέρου ἑτέρου,* posed by Socrates at 212a, had been postponed in favour of another (*πότερος ποτέρου φίλος γίνεται, ὁ φιλῶν τῷ φιλούμενῳ, etc. at 212 b*) which was not successfully answered; but now the original question is taken up again. The answers suggested to the question how men become friends are in terms of the qualities or characteristics men have; they share likeness in being good or bad, oppositeness in being rich or poor, wise or ignorant. These qualities are assessed according to the attraction they have, especially their attraction on grounds of usefulness to a friend. Plato does not devote any time to explaining how friends meet, how long they must know each other; there/

there is a brief mention at 214a of the notion that it is God who brings them together, but this is not discussed. Xenophon on friendship discusses in detail the services friends can do each other in order to maintain their friendship; Plato appears often to be thinking in terms of friends doing each other services, but does not discuss ^{what *these* are,} the services ^{themselves,} merely the qualities which will lead men to do the services. *πονηρία* will lead to active disservice (*ἀδικία*) and make friendship impossible; *ὁμοιότης* will lead to inability to do each other necessary as opposed to superfluous services; *ἐναντιότης* will make mutual service unnecessary altogether. *ἐναντιότης* will sometimes make service possible; a rich man can help a poor man, a doctor a sick man; and the attraction that the pairs of opposite elements have for each other in general is explained on the ground that each represents *τὸ ἄλλο* for the other. In other cases *ἐναντιότης* will mean that men have qualities incompatible with each other, temperance being incompatible with profligacy, goodness with badness. Here, however, these incompatibilities are not apparently connected with absence of mutual service, but ^{directly} due to the reciprocal unattractiveness of these qualities. ^{The emphasis is entirely on qualities on the kind of men who will attract each other.}

A second point to notice about the substance as against the method of this argument is that there is very little deviation from discussion about friendship in its normal sense between man and man. The principle of likeness may have been taken over from cosmology, and some of the examples of the attraction of opposites perhaps have a medical origin; but the application seems to be principally to persons as friends. Furthermore by friendship here is meant for the most part a reciprocal or mutual attachment. Pairs of *πονηροί* will wrong each other, each becoming *ἔχθρῶν καὶ ἀδικούμενοι*, which will make friendship impossible. So it must be the good who are *ὅμοιοι ἀλλήλοις καὶ φίλοι*.

But men who cannot do each other services will not be friends, and it is this ^{dependence} that rules out the good. And in general the suggestions of *ὁμοιότης* ^{or *ἐναντιότης*} ^{seem meant to} will explain reciprocal attachments; if both men are alike in having the quality which creates friendship, each will have the same reason for attachment to the other. Similarly each of a pair of opposites will find the attraction of oppositeness in the other. But a few of the cases cited to support oppositeness do not seem to allow for reciprocation of attachment; where one party requires the assistance of the other, a motive for friendship is clear on one side but not on the other; why will the rich man feel any attachment to the poor man, the wise/

wise to the ignorant? Here the explanation of one side of the attachment is not in oppositeness but in superiority, and this is not a symmetrical relation and so does not explain a reciprocal friendship, unless as a reason why a poor man, for instance, should attempt to strike up a friendship with a rich man based on some other factor that will provide a reciprocal attachment. Questions at this level are raised by Aristotle, whereas Plato admittedly was not working out these problems in such detail even if they had occurred to him; but for our purpose an examination of Plato's argument which asks some of Aristotle's questions will be handy for defining certain aspects of Plato's approach to his broader questions. On the evidence of this passage by itself, Plato's occasional use of illustrations not taken from friendship between men, or not explaining reciprocity, hardly allows us to reach any conclusions about whether or not he was conscious of any problems these examples must raise, or whether if conscious of them he thought these problems important or unimportant; but we can perhaps safely diagnose Plato's main concern here as being with persons as friends, with reciprocated friendship between men. This concern becomes much less clear, if it does not quite drop₂ out, in most of the rest of the dialogue.

216c-218c.

Socrates returns to the fray and at once makes a new suggestion, which Menexenus invites him to explain: but now Socrates confesses to being perplexed himself, and jestingly refers to the proverb ὅτι καλὸν φίλον ἐστὶ. τὸ φίλον is always slipping from our grasp; it must be something smooth and lithe, like the body of a beautiful boy: so perhaps it is τὸ καλὸν itself. And perhaps this may be borne out by the answer Socrates is just suggesting on his latest hunch - ἀλομαντευόμενος - because it is precisely τὸ καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν that he now sees as the object that is φίλον.

So far the exploration of the possibility of friendship has concentrated ^{mainly} on the relations between members of one or other of two classes of men, the good and the bad. All the possible combinations of men of these two kinds - good and good, good and bad, bad and bad - have been found neither to explain friendship nor even to allow it to be possible. So if there is to be any friendship anywhere, it must involve men outside these two classes. Socrates suggests that there is a third class, the neither good nor bad, or intermediate. There can be no friendship including a bad man; nor can like be friends with like; so the intermediate cannot be friends with the bad nor with another intermediate; therefore if friendship is to exist anywhere it must be between the intermediate and the good; τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἄρα τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν μόνῳ μόνον συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι φίλον - Ἀνάγκη, ὡς ἔοικεν.

Socrates then looks for examples to substantiate this position reached so far only by elimination. It is at this point that the dialogue takes a new

* This is not proved here and has not been proved earlier; previously it was found that there would be no friendship between bad men or between a good man and a bad man, but it was not specifically concluded that a bad man could have no friends at all.

turn. The examples given of a relationship between the intermediate and the good are the desire of the body for medical skill when threatened by sickness, and the desire of the man who is ignorant but not stupid for wisdom. No healthy man will be the friend of a doctor, since he will have no need of him; only the sick man will welcome medical aid (ἰατρικὴν ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν). The body itself is neither good nor bad, but when threatened by the evil of sickness it desires the good in the shape of medical skill. A careful explanation is given of how the bad can threaten and be present to the intermediate without making the intermediate bad itself; since if the sick body were already bad it would not be able to desire the good: we have seen that good and bad cannot be friends. The example of love of wisdom (φιλοσοφία) works in the same way. A man who is already wise will not love wisdom any more than will a man who has been made bad already by stupidity. But a man who is ignorant but not corrupted by senselessness will pursue the good in the form of wisdom. So in both soul and body and everywhere else, the intermediate ^{is} ~~is the friend of~~ the good when threatened by the bad. καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ πανταχοῦ τὸ μῆτε ἀγαθὸν μῆτε κακὸν διὰ κακοῦ παρουσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλον εἶναι.

There are two new factors in this latest turn of the discussion. One is ~~that~~ extension of the scope of the discussion beyond friendship between men to all forms of desire for the good. At 217 a⁶ the concern is with friendship between a man and a doctor; this is put more generally later in terms of the desire of body for medical skill. The pursuit of wisdom is nowhere presented in terms of friendship with wise men; perhaps it should be taken to include this, but the object of attraction is presented as the abstract σοφία itself.

With this extension of scope the second new factor in the turn of the dialogue is closely connected. We noted that up to 216 b the main discussion, besides having friendship between men principally in mind, had usually provided

.3.

explanations of friendship which allowed for reciprocation of attachment between friends. From now on, however, the pursuit of the good by the intermediate is discussed only as a one-way attachment. Explanation is clear of why the intermediate should pursue the good, but there is no discussion of the motive the good might have for maintaining friendship with the intermediate. It would often in the very generalised contexts now discussed be odd to speak of the good as capable of feelings of attachment, when "the good" in question is *ἰατρικὴ* or *σοφία*, an abstract concept; but neither is any explanation clear for concrete situations of why the doctor or the wise man should wish to engage in friendship with the sick man or the ignorant man. Motives of pure benevolence are perhaps not excluded by Plato, but to infer their introduction here would be a little inconsistent with the restricted approach by which the earlier discussion considers only utilitarian motives. (Benevolence would never be extended by Plato's good man to a bad man, and presumably would be withheld as superfluous from another good man!) Without going considerably beyond what is actually said in this passage, we cannot regard Plato as here being concerned with reciprocation of attachment; it is simpler to say that he is here focusing his attention on one-way attachments. We have noted too that the objects of these attachments are not restricted to men, but include "the good" in all its forms.

The solution reached by Socrates at 218 b is phrased in almost the same way as previous suggested solutions: *τὸ μήτε κακὸν μήτε ἀγαθόν.... τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλον*: and looks as if it were meant to provide the same sort of answer as the earlier suggestions attempted to supply to the original question *πῶς γίνεται φίλος ἕτερος ἑτέρου*; "How does one man become another's friend?" At least it is presented as an answer to the more direct question Socrates now seems to have in mind, the outright *τί ἔστιν τὸ φίλον*; (218 b7). But we must assess the effectiveness of the solution by reference to the arguments

used to support it, and we have seen that here this solution is first suggested by a process of elimination, and then supported by a limited kind of example.

If τὸ μήτε κακὸν μήτε ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλον

merely means "the intermediate pursues the good", then support for this has been provided; but if a solution to the question about mutual friendship is

intended the problem of reciprocation of attachment is left open. On the other

hand, τὸ μήτε κακὸν μήτε ἀγαθὸν..... τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλον

out of context could equally well mean "the intermediate participates in friendship with the good", but this would be more than had been proved here.

So either the original question about mutual friendship has not been completely answered, or the answer has not been completely proved. Has the more direct

question, τί ἔστιν τὸ φίλον been more adequately dealt with? We can

at least be sure Plato intended to answer this here. But ^{again} the adequacy of the

answer depends on the meaning of the question. If the question is to be

interpreted as meaning "What is the relationship which constitutes friendship?",

the answer may be intended to be 'Friendship occurs between the intermediate

and the good'. But this, to repeat, has not been fully demonstrated. If

τὸ κακὸν μήτε ἀγαθὸν..... τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλον

is to be an adequately demonstrated answer to τί ἔστιν τὸ φίλον then

τί ἔστιν τὸ φίλον must mean either "What is it that likes?" in which case

the answer is "The intermediate, which likes the good", or "What is it that is

liked?" in which case the answer is "The good, which is liked by the intermediate".

^{can see, then,} We have ~~seen~~ that Plato's interest seems to have changed, ~~but these~~ ^{not that}

difficulties arise because his vocabulary has not changed. The word φίλος,

which can mean "liking", "liked" or "a friend" (i.e. liked and liking, mutually

linked), remains useful to Plato despite the apparent shift in his interest.

τοῦ φίλου τὸ φίλον φίλον, as at 219 b (to anticipate a little), could mean

"The liking likes the liked" or "Friend is friends with friend". These

be thought unlikely to
 ambiguities may perhaps have given ~~some~~ trouble to Plato, but they will certainly trouble the English reader, and impede analysis of the discussion, unless a check is made for the sense meant in any context by a careful examination of the arguments and examples being used at that point. Occasionally examples may, as here, seem to be being used to answer wider questions than in fact they meet; in these cases we may have to re-interpret the questions in the light of the answers given to them. On the other hand, if despite the change in the kind of example he is using, Plato seems still to be claiming to answer the same questions as he started with, we may have to wonder whether perhaps Plato had not himself seen, or had seen, but was making illegitimate play with, the ambiguities in the word φίλος.

As we go on, we shall in fact find ourselves forced even further by this new turn of the discussion *to view the rest of the dialogue* as showing a different approach to the question at issue, or indeed as attacking a somewhat different question. Less confusion will be caused by calling the subject of the rest of the dialogue "the pursuit of the good" or "the nature of the desirable" than by continuing, at least in English, to talk of "friends" and "friendship." Plato is able to continue the discussion without change of vocabulary because of the richness of meaning of φίλος and φίλειν in Greek; to find equivalents which will stand unstrained throughout the dialogue is not possible in English, and artificial attempts to make the words "friend" and "friendship" do duty throughout only lead to confusion. We shall, of course, have to return to the problem of how these earlier and later parts of the discussion are related, and we shall then have to give due emphasis to the fact that in Greek both parts of the discussion use largely the same vocabulary. But the second part can be much more lucidly expounded in English if the terminology of "friendship" is dropped; there is no unfaithfulness to the Greek involved, as no translator would maintain that φίλος in Greek should always be rendered as "friend". There is perhaps no context

from (for example) 219 c' to 222 b² where the most natural English rendering would include the word "friend" until 221 e⁵; if translators of the 'Lysis' have used the word 'friend' more often, it has been with the conscious purpose of keeping one word only in use, as far as possible, to render φίλος in the 'Lysis'. Whether this purpose is justifiable or realisable we shall discuss later.

218c - 220b

218c-219b Socrates has steered his way out of the puzzle that neither good men nor bad men can be friends with each other or with their opposites; the recognition of a third class of men, the intermediate, has provided him with a formula which he claims will answer his question about ὁ ἔστιν τὸ φίλον. At once, however, somewhat to his annoyance, he is overtaken by an awkward suspicion that the truth has not yet been reached. A relationship, says Socrates, must have a purpose and a cause; it must be for the sake of something and because of something, ἕνεκα τοῦ καὶ διὰ τι. This can be seen in the case of the sick man's relationship with the doctor; this arises because of sickness and for the sake of health. Here the cause is evil and the purpose is good. So what we have is the body, which is intermediate, pursuing medical skill which is good, because of sickness, which is evil, for the sake of health, which is good; the intermediate pursues the good because of evil and for the sake of good. The more immediate aim is medical skill, which is pursued (φίλον) for the sake of the health it brings, which is also pursued. (φίλον).

Here again it must be emphasised that the relationship being used as an example is not a case of friendship, but of pursuit of the good. The more immediate good in view is medical skill, but it is suggested that pursuit of this must be seen as caused by evil and itself ^{aimed} arrived at another good, namely health, which is a further object of pursuit. Plato is still using the word φίλον to express his meaning, to the extent of producing the monstrous formula ἕνεκα τοῦ φίλου τοῦ φίλου τὸ φίλον φίλον διὰ τὸ ἐχθρόν.

But the nature of the example given does not allow us to translate this as "The friend is a friend of the friend for the sake of the friend because of the enemy", or even as "A relationship of friendship is due to an enmity and for the sake of a further friendship". The instance discussed tends to support the conclusion

"That which desires, desires what is desired for the sake of what is desired and because of what is disliked", or "An object is pursued for the sake of a further object of pursuit and because of an object which is being avoided". Health is an object of pursuit, rather ^{not} than a participant in a friendship.

~~1-207~~ Socrates now permits himself a small logical joke before continuing. The formula τοῦ φίλου τὸ φίλον φίλον looks as if it has involved us in saying that like is the friend of like, which we had earlier denied to be possible. But Socrates passes over this, rightly, since he had never, presumably, meant to deny that friends were alike in being friends, even if in nothing else.* He returns to explain the suspicion he had mentioned at 218 c. We have said that what is pursued is pursued for the sake of something else which is pursued, as ^{for example} medical skill is pursued for the sake of health. But if this is so, and if health is pursued, then there must be some further thing for the sake of which health is pursued. This further thing must be pursued too, and if so, must be pursued for the sake of yet another thing which is pursued. This regress will go on until we reach that thing which is the ^{primary} ~~first~~ object of all pursuit, which is pursued first of all, πρῶτον φίλον, and which will not send us looking further back for any still earlier object of pursuit, but is itself that for the sake of which all the other objects of pursuit were pursued. This shows us where we may have been wrong in defining our previous objects of pursuit; we said they were always pursued for the sake of something else; but there must be a first object ^{of} pursuit which is not pursued for the sake of any other ^{primary} object of pursuit but is the ^{primary} ~~source~~, or ^{of all} ultimate aim, ~~of the~~ pursuit of all those other objects, and this would seem to be the real object of pursuit, whereas the other objects of desire which are only pursued for the sake of further objects are only ^{reflections or} images (εἰκῶλα) of the real object of pursuit (τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς, τὸ τῷ ὄντι φίλον). To call these other objects ~~objectx~~ of pursuit is a mere manner of speaking.

* This seems to be ^{the} point of the joke; ^{it is} the same whether τοῦ φίλου τὸ φίλον φίλον at 219 b³ is meant of mutual friendship or is equivalent to τὸ φιλοῦν τὸ φιλούμενον φιλεῖ; the form of words is what gives rise to the appearance of contradiction, not the sense intended.

(ῥήματι φαινόμεθα λέγοντες αὐτό). So we must abandon the formula of 219 b³ and conclude τό γε τῷ ὄντι φίλον οὐ φίλον κινῶς ἕνεκα φίλον ἔστιν.

To illustrate this distinction between primary and secondary objects of pursuit Socrates takes an analogy in cases of prizing or valuing objects (περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι). A father may value his son above all his other possessions; and this may seem to lead him for his son's sake to value other things. If he knows his son has drunk hemlock, then he will appear to ^{not a just} value wine as an antidote; will this mean that he values a wine-cask or a cup no less than he values his son? Not really; his urgency to obtain these objects is not devoted to these objects themselves, but to that for the sake of which these objects are being obtained. We often say that we value gold and silver; but the truth is that what is absolutely valued is that object, whatever it may be, for the sake of which we obtain gold. The same account must be given for pursuing as for valuing; the one object really valued or pursued must be distinguished from those valued or pursued only for the sake of the first.

This, or a similar distinction about what one wants (βούλεται) in Gorgias 467c - 8c, may be the first introduction of a systematic distinction among our aims between means and ends. The argument in the Gorgias has interesting similarities with this passage. There a man is said, when he is doing something for the sake of something else, not to want what he is doing, but ^{not} that for the sake of which he is doing it - εἰς τὴν κρᾶττην ἕνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται ὃ κρᾶττει, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οὐ ἕνεκα κρᾶττει. (467 d⁶⁻⁸).

This is a more extreme statement than might be made of the conventional distinction nowadays; we might distinguish between wanting an end and wanting the means to the end, but of a man actually acting towards an end we would hardly say that he did not will his present action but only its end, unless in some cases to indicate that

he chose this means only with reluctance; but Plato seems to wish to deny that we ever "will the means".+ Similarly in the "Lysis" at this point Plato denies that anything is really^a pursued ^(φίλων) as a means, and holds that the only true object of pursuit is that which is pursued as an end, and that to talk of other objects as "pursued as a means" is merely a way of speaking. This is a similar paradox to the denial of "willing a means"; but though paradoxical we need not deny that it sharpens the means - end distinction. Our choices of ends are certainly prior to our choices of means.

+ The means to any end is something we simply "do", πράττομεν or ποιούμεν, apparently without wanting to do it - unless οὐ βουλόμεθα αὐτο of an action means in some way that we do not "want it" for itself without including our "wanting to do" it. Examples of what we do not "want," include πίνειν φαρμακον and καθῆσθαι καὶ βαδίζειν and λίθους καὶ ξυλα; examples of what we do "want" include τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, σοφίαν, ὑγίειαν, πλοῦτον.
 (βουλόμεθα here takes both actions and things as its objects in a slightly puzzling way.)

Some comment is necessary on the infinite regress argument. Firstly, it starts from the introduction of the notion that objects of pursuit are only means to further objects of pursuit. This notion is introduced by an argument which is something of a trick; it is suggested that unless an object of pursuit is a means to a further object, the pursuit of the first object is purposeless. A thing cannot be pursued οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα so must ^{be} pursued ἕνεκά του. (218 a⁷⁻⁹) This leaps over the possibility that the pursuit of an object can be purposeful without being a means to a further object precisely because the first object is being pursued for its own sake⁺, or for another purpose not stateable in terms of a further object. The fact that I am doing something without a further purpose does not mean that my behaviour is necessarily aimless. A thing may be φίλον αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, or the question τοῦ εἶναι; may not arise about it. Plato is probably right to insist that the question τῷ φίλῳ; logically requires an answer; but the question τοῦ ἕνεκα φίλῳ; if it implies a further object as an end, may on occasion not be applicable. ‡ However, responsible action is at least often explicable in terms of further purposes, so the notion of objects of pursuit as means to further objects is often useful, even if not universally applicable.

Granted the notion that objects of pursuit are means to further objects of pursuit, it can be demonstrated that there must be at least one object of pursuit which is not merely a means to a further object, but which is itself an end which explains the purpose of the pursuit of other objects. We must sometime be able to stop our search and come to some source which explains this train of pursuit without referring us back to yet another object of pursuit, but which will constitute our

- explanation about the infinite regress introduced

+ That this must sometimes be the case is going to be proved, and this proof will leave the premise even weaker.

‡ A thing ^{is its own} φίλον as a matter of fact ^{might} not be φίλον either for to one man or for the sake of anything else. This was Parmenides' objection to Plato's own description of this.

arrival at a primary object of pursuit for the sake of which we say the other objects are pursued. ἀνάγκη ἀκείπετον ἡμᾶς οὕτως ἕοντας καὶ ἀφικέσθαι εἰς τινα ἀρχὴν ἢ οὐκέτι ἐκνοήσει ἐκ' ἄλλο φίλον, ἀλλ' ἤξει ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἐστὶν πρῶτον φίλον, οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα φημὲν πάντα φίλα εἶναι. Otherwise the explanation of our pursuit of these objects will never be complete; our full purpose will never become clear, since for any object mentioned a further object will have to be mentioned to explain the pursuit of the earlier, even if the earlier is itself the latest of a long train of yet earlier objects. If we have the notion of a means we must have the notion of an end, and if we have objects which are means we must have an object which constitutes an end.

What the regress proves is that there must be at least one end. It does not preclude there being more than one end. The assumption which leads to postulating only one end, as Plato appears to be doing here, is unconnected with the regress argument. An instance of a regress argument carried on without such an assumption can be found in the "Cratylus", at 421d-422d. There it is shown that we cannot explain the meaning of all words by reference to other words of which ^{they are} ~~it is~~ made up, but that this process must stop at a point when we reach those words which are the "elements" (ὡσπερ εἰ στοιχεῖα) of the other words, which must be explained in some other way. These words are called τὰ πρῶτα or πρότερα ὀνόματα, as opposed to τὰ ὑστερα or ὑστατα, "primary" as opposed to "secondary words". Plato adds very carefully that primary and secondary words do not differ in respect of being words, and in having the function of "showing what each thing is"; the difference is in the way in which a word

+ πρῶτα 422c², c⁸, d⁵, d¹¹,

ὑστερα d⁶, d⁸,

πρότερα d⁹:

ὑστατα c⁸.

"shows what each thing is", which cannot in all cases be by including other words in itself but must in some cases be by direct "representation" of the thing.

The regress in the "Cratylus" leads to a more limited conclusion than is apparently drawn from the regress in the "Lysis". In the "Cratylus" two sets of words requiring different explanations are distinguished; in the "Lysis" a distinction is made among objects of pursuit from which it is concluded that there is only one true object of pursuit, the other objects not being truly so. The inference to the uniqueness of the *πρῶτον φίλον* requires some further assumption over and above the regress argument. What this assumption may have been is a point of some interest and will require considerable discussion. This discussion of the uniqueness of the *πρῶτον φίλον* will lead us into wider problems of what the *πρῶτον φίλον* should be taken to be.

219b - 220b
continued

postulating

induced by

A first tendency in favour of a single $\pi\rho\omega\tau\omicron\nu$ $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\nu$ might be a tension between the premiss of the regress argument and its conclusion. The premiss is that $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\nu$ always means $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\chi\acute{\iota}$ $\tau\omicron\nu$ $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\nu$; but it is shown that this cannot be true universally, but there must be at least one $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\nu$ which is an end. But the premiss, though formally refuted, may still be operating to the extent that it is still believed to be not universally but nevertheless generally true, so that it is combined with the minimum requirement of the conclusion, and the total statement made that all $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron$ are $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\chi\acute{\alpha}$ $\tau\omicron\nu$ $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron$ except one. This satisfies the requirement of the regress argument while keeping as much as possible of the former position. But this sort of tension is not apparent in the regress in the 'Cratylus', where when it is seen that not all names are of one kind, no attempt is made to say that all names but a limited number must be of the original kind. And of course there might well be several or any number of objects pursued as separate ends, either directly or each through its own chain of means to which it individually is 'primary'.⁺ For instance Aristotle held that there were two ultimate objects of $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$; $\phi\iota\lambda\eta\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ $\epsilon\dot{\iota}\eta$ $\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}\nu$ $\tau\epsilon$ $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ $\tau\omicron$ $\acute{\eta}\delta\acute{\upsilon}$ $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\eta}\eta$, E.N. 1155 b 20. He was prepared to admit that $\tau\omicron$ $\chi\rho\acute{\eta}\sigma\iota\mu\omicron\nu$ was not a separate end, because it was ultimately a means either to $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}\nu$ or to $\acute{\eta}\delta\omicron\nu\acute{\eta}$; but he would not reduce these two to one. Once it has been shown that there must be the concept of an end if we have the concept of a means, there is no need to cling so closely to a notion of the prevalence of $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron$ as means that we restrict the number of $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron$ as ends to one, except for some special motive.

What then is Plato's motive in trying to restrict the number of $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron$ as ends to one? Motives of different kinds seem possible, both psychological and linguistic. Firstly let us consider a psychological motive. Plato may

+ That $\pi\rho\omega\tau\omicron\nu$ need not imply uniqueness we saw from usage in the 'Cratylus'. Each end could be said to be the 'first' in respect to its own series of means.

have thought that the kind of pursuit whose objects are called φίλα was a matter in which men were entirely consistent, and always had one aim only in view. This on the face of it would be an implausible opinion, if φίλα normally applies to all the various objects which attract men on different occasions. But Plato may have believed that behind the apparent objects of attraction lay some special feature which was what all men ultimately desired; or that only some of the apparent objects of attraction were really φίλα, and that men were mistaken in thinking that they were attracted to the others. Plato takes up this sort of position about the objects of βούλεσθαι and ἐπιθυμεῖν at Meno 77b - 78b, where he argues that apparent desire for evil is based on a mistake, since no one would wish to be harmed; everyone only desires what he thinks to be good, no one knowingly desires evil. Plato may have thought that similarly all pursuit of φίλα was more consistent than it appeared, and would in the end be found to have one aim only. One unique ultimate aim of φίλησις would be the simplest explanation of the phenomenon; Aristotle found so simple a view too sweeping, and required two aims; Plato's psychological theory perhaps was more daring.

The motive of finding a simple psychological explanation of φίλησις must undoubtedly have entered into Plato's postulation of a single πρῶτον φίλον. But linguistic motives may also have entered in, aimed not so much at simplifying explanation of the phenomenon of φίλησις as at simplifying definition of the word φίλον. If the word φίλον is to be defined, there will be a temptation to think that this will be most successfully done if one primary and strongest sense of the word can be found. Such a sense might be taken to exist if there were shown to be one thing to which the word φίλον primarily applied. The application which φίλον had to this object would explain all the subsidiary senses of the word; so that the definition of φίλον would consist

in or be bound up with the discovery of this object. An object of pursuit which was an end and not a means might be φίλον in a stronger sense than objects which were φίλα as means, and if there were only one such object, this would make clear the primary sense of φίλον. To promote one's search for the meaning of a word by postulating a single object to which it is most strongly applicable might sound a naive move; but it could be paralleled from later philosophers than Plato.

But there is also a second stage among the possible linguistic moves that may have led Plato to a single πρώτον φίλον. This stage is more subtle and connected with points which notoriously influenced Plato elsewhere. The search for a single object to which φίλον primarily applied might of course be misguided if φίλον turned out to be a word normally applied in an equally strong sense to each of several objects, where none of these objects was one to which φίλον could be said to have a ^{uniquely} primary application. If there were several objects of pursuit which were ends, we should not obtain a primary sense of φίλον solely by the use of the means-end distinction. On the other hand a possible, though again not necessarily a successful, ~~move~~ move in these circumstances would be to look for a common factor between all the objects which were φίλα as ends. There might be an underlying quality which appeared to be what made these objects φίλα, and so this common quality might help us to see what φίλος primarily meant. But if there is a common quality between all objects pursued as ends which shows why they are pursued as ends, then will it not really be the case that they are pursued precisely for the sake of that quality? Which is to say that it will be the common quality that will really be the end to which the other apparent ends are only means. So that ultimately there will only be one

end, despite the previous appearance of separate ends; since if there is a common quality which makes these "ends" objects of pursuit, that quality itself must ultimately be the one and only $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\nu$ as an end.

Now to assume that between a number of $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\alpha$ as ends there must be a further common quality which is why they are $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\alpha$, is very like a general assumption Plato seems often to have made. Plato seems often to have thought that definition was possible in very simple ways, by statements either of identity or of class-inclusion; many of his suggested definitions are of the form "x is y", meaning either that all x's are y's and all y's ^{are} ~~and~~ x's, or at least that all x's are y's if not vice versa. Plato may have been hankering after establishing this sort of definition of $\tau\acute{o}$ $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\nu$ through the discovery of some quality which all $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\alpha$ had; and the postulation of this quality ^c would lead to the ^(mistaken but tempting) conclusion, as we saw, that it was this quality itself which was the unique $\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\omicron\nu$ $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\nu$.

We must now turn back to the possibility of a psychological motive for the assumed uniqueness of the $\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\omicron\nu$ $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\nu$. We suggested before that to postulate a single aim behind all cases of $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ would provide a simple way of explaining the phenomenon. Slightly different from this at first sight would be the postulation that in all cases of $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$, a certain special quality was present in the objects that were $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\alpha$ which was the cause of $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$. The presence of this quality would be the sufficient condition of an object's becoming $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\nu$, and would be all the explanation of $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ required. Compare the possibility of postulating that all objects of desire possess "desirability", not only in the sense that they can be desired, but also in the sense that this is what makes them desired; "desirability" being taken in a strong sense as not merely a necessary but also a sufficient condition of desire. Postulation of a parallel quality in the case of objects which were $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\alpha$ would provide an attractively simple psychological explanation of $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$. It would also, if the means-end distinction were applied, tend to coalesce with the notion that all $\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$

had one end, since this special quality making things which had it φίλα might seem ultimately to be that for the sake of which each object was φίλον.

~~Now it is not seen that~~ ^{therefore would} A unique πρότον φίλον ~~will~~ be the result not merely of the direct and perhaps naive postulation of one aim of all φίλησις and one strong sense of the word φίλον, but also of the more subtly tempting assumption that all φίλα are φίλα because they have a particular quality which is what makes them φίλα and by which they may be defined. Each of these assumptions is tempting both to a searcher for psychological explanations and to a seeker after linguistic definitions; the second assumption is less obviously ^{implausible} ~~dangerous~~ and resembles moves made by Plato elsewhere.

A parallel for Plato's assumption of a common quality between a series of ends of one kind of pursuit might be found at Gorgias 467b - 468e, in the passage mentioned before ^{which} ~~as~~ ^{all} ~~introducing~~ the means-end distinction. Various ends of action have been mentioned, health, riches, wisdom; and it has been argued that these are all good, that we do τὰ μεταξὺ ἕνεκα τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

This is generalised in the statements τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν.. καὶ ἕσταμεν, and "Ἔνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες". It is difficult here to be sure that the singular ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ has any difference in meaning from ἕνεκα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, especially as at 468 c⁵ we are back to the plural with τὰ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα; and Plato is not here making any special point of the uniqueness of our ultimate end beyond saying that all our ends are of one kind; but if, as is possible, ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ does here mean something like "for the sake of the quality of goodness" + this passage would show us not only Plato maintaining the belief that all ends are of one kind, but also how this belief might slide into the belief that there is only one end.

+ and not merely "the good in general".

This provides a parallel for the psychological element in the motivation of the πρώτον φίλον postulate; parallels for the linguistic motivation will require careful discussion. It was suggested by Grube + that we have in this passage a foreshadowing of the theory of Forms; this seems to be wrong.

Plato's assumption that definition must be possible by statements of the form of "all x's are y", by the discovery, that is, of a defining quality common to all x's, is occasionally backed up by him with the argument that there must be one thing about all x's which is what makes them ^{x's} (what they are.)⁷ In the Euthyphro at 6d - 7a Socrates says μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ... τὰ ὅστια, ὅσια, and demands to be given one distinguishing characteristic by which to know when something is ὅσιον. Now when Euthyphro reacts to this demand with the statement "Ἔστι τοίνυν τό μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλές ὅσιον, τὸ δὲ μὴ προσφιλές ἀνόσιον," this is meant to state an equivalence; if something is τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλές that is a sign that it is ὅσιον, and nothing else is ὅσιον. Now Socrates is perfectly satisfied with ^{the form of} this definition, and ~~s~~ says Παγκάλως, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, καὶ ὡς ἐγὼ ἐξήτουν ἀποκρίνασθαι σε, οὕτως ἄπεκρίνω.

The search for this kind of definition is what we have suspected may in part lie behind the postulation of a single πρώτον φίλον, and also perhaps behind earlier manoeuvres in the "Lysis". In the "Euthyphro" it seems to be being backed up by the premise that all ὅσια must have something in common just because they are all ὅσια. This of course is merely tautological in so far as it means simply that all ὅσια are ὅσια; it has no tendency to show that all ὅσια must have some ^{further} common quality such as being θεοῖς προσφιλες, though Plato because of his naive view of definition in the "Euthyphro" argues as though it had.

On the other hand ^{a rather similar} ~~just this~~ premise is used by Plato elsewhere as a starting-point for arguments leading to the theory of Forms. At Phaedo 100 de it is said

+ "Plato's Thought", p. 8

that we can at least maintain that beauty is common to all beautiful things; ἀσφαλές ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ^{καλά} / καὶ μεγέθει τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα. In this form, this premise at least among the arguments for the Forms is probably rightly described by Ross as a "conscious recognition of universals". + Necessarily common to all objects of one kind is precisely the quality of being of that kind, even if they have no other common quality. Plato found this highly important for attempts at definition and founded a metaphysical theory partly on just this recognition.

Had this recognition consciously occurred to Plato when he wrote the "Lysis"? Can any argument from the recognition of universals have been in Plato's mind when he postulated a unique πρῶτον φίλον? It might seem to give grounds for saying that there must be a quality common to all φίλα as ends; and this might be thought to produce the conclusion that the common quality was the real end.

But if Plato argued in this way, he was making an obvious mistake. The recognition of universals shows us that between φίλα there is the common quality of "being φίλον". But the quality of "being φίλον" is not a common quality for the sake of which φίλα are φίλα. "The quality of being objects of pursuit" is not that for the sake of which objects of pursuit are pursued. So though it is undeniable that objects of pursuit have this in common, it could not be this common quality which was the real end. So the πρῶτον φίλον is not the universal of which the other φίλα are instances.

The recognition of universals could only be a contributory factor underlying the postulation of the unique πρῶτον φίλον if it operated in the following fallacious way:- if it made Plato argue from the indisputable premise that all φίλα have in common the "quality of being φίλον" to the conclusion that all φίλα have some further quality in common for the sake of which they are

+ Ross, "Plato's Theory of Ideas", p. 225. But in saying that this is the 'essence' of the theory of Forms Ross perhaps gives a false impression of other aspects of the theory.

φίλα. Can Plato have made this fallacious inference?

In the "Euthyphro" we have seen that Plato thought all things having the same name must have some further common quality. But this is not a case of the recognition of universals. Plato is not arguing that it is τῷ ὁσίῳ that τὰ ὅσια are ὅσια, but is satisfied when it is suggested that it is the quality of being τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλέσ that is common to all ὅσια. This apparently naive assumption that ~~single defining qualities~~ can always be found, that definition can be done in this simple way, is perhaps an earlier stage in Plato's thought than the conscious recognition of universals. This assumption probably arose first out of a recognition of the need for comprehensiveness in definition, and only later out of the seeing of a significance in the common name of all members of a class. And even when significance is seen in a common name, it is a mistaken inference to argue that any further quality must be common to the objects so named apart from the universal to which the common name refers.

In the "Lysis" then the linguistic motivation of the postulation of a unique πρῶτον φίλον is sufficiently given by the assumption that definition can be done in terms of equivalence. There is no need to appeal to a fallacious inference from the recognition of universals. Also, we must remember throughout that the motive of promoting psychological explanation is at least as strong as any linguistic motive that may be operating here.

Sufficient discussion should by now have been given to show that it is ~~unnecessary~~ ^{and indeed mistaken,} to find the recognition of universals underlying the πρῶτον φίλον and it may be stated that this element of the theory of Forms was probably not present in Plato's mind when he wrote the "Lysis".

There are however other possible elements of the theory of Forms which might be suspected to be present here. Grube quotes the opposition of τὸ τῷ ὄντι φίλον τοῖς ἄλλοις πάντα ἃ εἶπομεν ἐκείνου ἕνεκα φίλα εἶναι, ὡς περ εἶδωλα ἅπαντα ὄντα αὐτοῦ, which sounds at least verbally reminiscent of the opposition

Plato states elsewhere between Form and particulars; Grube calls these "pregnant phrases". This poses the direct question whether the *πρῶτον φίλον* in the "Lysis" is a Form; we have seen that it is not the universal "being φίλον", and that no recognition of universals underlies its postulation; but does it have any other of the attributes commonly possessed by Forms, and do the motives for postulating it resemble any of the other arguments for the Forms? This may be difficult to answer, since a considerable variety of characteristics are attributed to Forms by Plato and by modern critics, and neither does Plato state nor do critics agree which are essential to the theory.

It is at once clear that there is no discussion in the "Lysis" of the metaphysical status of the *πρῶτον φίλον*. The ideal *καλόν* in the "Symposium" is *ἀεί δὲ καὶ οὔτε γιγόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον*, whereas the other *καλά* change and are destroyed. But in the "Lysis" there is no mention of the "two worlds". The argument from the necessity of permanence to ensure the certainty of knowledge, ~~or~~ any discussion of *μέθεξις* or *μίμησις* in the relation between the *πρῶτον φίλον* and other *φίλα*;—any of the more developed apparatus of the classical doctrine of the Forms is completely absent here.

It might be replied that a short dialogue such as the "Lysis" is no place to expect a full exposition of any of the arguments towards the Forms, but that Plato is content here to allude to a theory he had expounded or was going to expound elsewhere. This sort of allusion probably has to be admitted in Plato's work occasionally, though it is rare for Plato to rest a conclusion on a set of arguments merely alluded to; he was not of so dogmatic a temperament as to allow himself simply to appeal to a body of standing doctrine. But it might be that he wished not to appeal to the Form doctrine for support, so much as to suggest that the argument he gives here could be viewed as another contribution

to the collection which seem to indicate the necessity of postulating Forms.

If there is to be this sort of allusion, there must be phraseology which makes the allusion plain enough to be recognised unmistakably. This in the "Lysis" there is not. The "pregnant phrases" noted by Grube are not sufficiently characteristic to establish an allusion. $\delta\ \tau\omega\ \delta\upsilon\upsilon\tau\iota\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron\varsigma\ \kappa\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\omicron\varsigma$ at Rep. 396 b means simply "the man who is truly noble and good", and carries no allusion to Forms; and at Rep. 345 c $\tau\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\ \acute{\omega}\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma\ \iota\alpha\tau\rho\omicron\upsilon\upsilon$ is a character defined by Thrasy-machus. $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\omega\lambda\omicron\upsilon$ might seem a more distinctively Platonic word; it is sometimes coupled with $\mu\acute{\iota}\mu\eta\mu\alpha$, as at Rep. 382 b⁹; but even there it has nothing to do with Forms, and it is too commonly a more or less vague counterpart to $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\varsigma$ in connection with any kind of subject-matter to carry the weight of an allusion to Forms. The contrast between what is "truly" or "really" what it is called, and what is not, is a move ^{commonly} used by anyone aiming at the definition, or more often revision, of any terminology; it is often used by Plato in arguing for Forms; but it is much vaguer and wider and ^{can be made to} ~~cover~~ many more points of contrast than those between Forms and particulars. It is highly likely to be brought into play by anyone who wants to sharpen the means-end contrast on one of its earliest introductions in philosophy. Finally, $\rho\acute{\eta}\mu\alpha\tau\epsilon\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ ^{seems to be} ~~is perhaps~~ never used to contrast what we say about particulars with the application of predicates to Forms; whereas it is used at Gorgias 490 a, where Socrates insists $\omicron\upsilon\ \rho\acute{\eta}\mu\alpha\tau\iota\ \theta\eta\rho\epsilon\upsilon\omega$ and Callicles then announces his definition of $\tau\omicron\ \delta\acute{\iota}\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\upsilon\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota$. And $\kappa\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ said of the position of a Form at the head of a series of particulars, or of any kind of logical or other priority of the Forms, seems in fact not to be paralleled.

There remain however certain characteristics which the $\kappa\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\upsilon$ does share with the Forms. It is a unique object to which the adjective applies in an unqualified sense; $\tau\omicron\ \gamma\epsilon\ \tau\omega\ \delta\upsilon\upsilon\tau\iota\ \phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\upsilon$ ^{Εὐμαχίου} ~~Εὐμαχίου~~ $\omicron\upsilon\ \phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\upsilon\ \tau\iota\upsilon\omicron\varsigma$

ἕνεκα φίλον ἔστιν; ; to all other φίλα, if they may be called φίλα at all, the application of the adjective is qualified πάντα τὰ ἄλλα (´) ἕνεκα ἑτέρου φίλου φίλα ἔφαμεν εἶναι (220 d8),

This is similar to one of the differences between Forms and particulars mentioned in the "Symposium", where the final vision of beauty is said to be of something οὐ τῆ μὲν καλόν, τῆ δὲ αἰσχρόν οὐδὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ καλόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν, these and other qualifications being absent from αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν which is αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, μονοειδές. The obtaining of an object which is a fully clear example of the application of a predicate is one aim of the postulation of Forms, and a similar motive may well have been present behind the postulation of one object which is unqualifiedly φίλον. The absence of the qualification of being merely a means and not an end is nowhere specifically mentioned as a mark of a Form, but might perhaps be assumed as a respect in which Forms could be superior to particulars. On the other hand the method of obtaining by the use of the means-end distinction out of the series of objects that are φίλα one which is φίλον in an unqualified way is very different from the metaphysical hypostatizing of a Form which is ontologically superior to its instances as well as having their characteristic in a superior sense. We have already admitted that Plato may have been influenced by the wish to find a prime instance of an object that is φίλον, but he did not go about this in the way he did in developing the theory of Forms.

We have also already noticed what may be an indication that finding a strongest sense of φίλον may not be the only motive for the linguistic revision of contrasting the πρῶτον φίλον with the ῥήματι λεγόμενα φίλα.

In the "Gorgias" (467 b - 468 c) the means-end distinction carried with it the paradoxical statement that we did not will the means but only the end. This distinction between what is and what is not an object of βούλησις is exactly parallel to the distinction between what is and is not φίλον, and cannot be motivated by the desire to provide a strong case of a predicate but only by a wish to sharpen the means-end distinction. (The motive in both cases

seems to ~~may in fact~~ be a wish to prove (1) that only ends are really wanted or pursued, and (2) that only good things are ends, or in the latter ^{perhaps} that only goodness itself is an end.)

This review of the more definable characteristics of Forms should have shown that there are many of these which are not shared by the *πρῶτον φίλον*, and that those which are are too general to establish any important resemblance. Plato has here tried to sharpen the means-end distinction in certain ways which he also used as minor accessories to the Form-particulars distinction. And as to the broader aspects of the Form theory, there is no reason to think that in the earlier dialogues, or even at all points in the middle dialogues, ^{on all occasions when} ~~whenever~~ Plato talked of qualities he meant Forms, or that by truth he ^{always} implied ontological priority, or that by goodness he ^{always} meant the *μέγιστον μάθημα* which is *ἐπεκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*. The earlier dialogues discuss general moral qualities and assess true and false statements without any reliance on or appeal to the complex metaphysics of the middle period, and they show certain logical predilections ^{of which, by no means all} can be seen as steps in the generation of the Form theory.

220b - 222b

The *πρῶτον φίλον*, then, is unique because it is postulated that there must be one explanation and one ultimate aim of all pursuit. Such an explanation is most easily given if there is one quality which is the sufficient cause of pursuit; and if there is such a quality, then this quality will also ^{appear to} be the primary object of pursuit and the ultimate aim of the pursuit of all other objects. So much can be postulated on the basis of the means-end distinction and a desire for simplicity in explanation and definition. But now that we have postulated such a quality, what can it be? Is it a new discovery, as yet anonymous except that it can be uniquely referred to as the primary object of pursuit? Or can it be identified as any of the qualities we already know?

Before the argument leading to the postulation of a *πρῶτον φίλον* started, Socrates was discussing his suggestion that the objects of pursuit were good. Examples of this were medical skill and health. It was shown, however, that these were only pursued as means, and so were not really *φίλα*. But now that Socrates returns to the problem of the identification of the *πρῶτον φίλον*, he resumes discussion with the apparently recapitulatory question *ἀλλ' ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν φίλον;* (220b⁷); now this presumably cannot now mean "Are all good things objects of pursuit?" since that has just been refuted; so it may perhaps mean "Is goodness an object of pursuit?" Moreover it evidently also means that goodness is the *πρῶτον φίλον* itself, not merely one among other objects of pursuit, since discoveries about *τὸ ἀγαθόν* lead to the comment at 220d⁸ *τὸ ἄρα φίλον ἡμῶν ἐκεῖνο, εἰς ὃ ἐτελεύτα πάντα τὰ ἄλλα, . . . οὐδὲν δὴ τούτοις ἔοικεν*, referring to the *πρῶτον φίλον*; and probably any further suggestions in the dialogue about what is *φίλον* will be meant to show what is the *πρῶτον φίλον*, since it has apparently been shown that this alone is truly *φίλον*.

So the question *ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν φίλον;* at 220b⁷ is probably to

.2.

be taken as suggesting that the primary object of pursuit is the quality of goodness. All other things which are so-called objects of pursuit are good, but they are only means to the primary pursuit of the quality of goodness.

But with the notion that τὸ ἀγαθὸν was an object of pursuit as put forward earlier, at 219a⁶-b², was bound up the condition that the cause of this pursuit was the threat of evil: cf. 217a-218c. Goodness is pursued as a protection against evil. But if this is the situation, what would happen in a world in which there was no evil? Clearly in such a world it would be unnecessary to protect oneself against evil, so that goodness would not be pursued; in fact ^{on the present hypothesis} there would be no objects of pursuit at all, since we have postulated that there is only one real object of pursuit and are at present working on the hypothesis that goodness is this one object. This hypothesis, then, makes the pursuit of the sole φίλον dependent on the existence of evil, because pursuit is caused by evil: τὸ τῷ ὄντι φίλον.. φίλον..... ἀνεξάνη ὄν ἐχθροῦ ἕνεκα, (220e2-3)+

* As Grote¹ observed, the phrasing of this part of the argument leads to a fallacious contrast. At 218b⁷ Plato introduced the notion that a thing was φίλον ἕνεκά του καὶ διὰ τι, meaning different things by these two qualifications; but in 220d he has dropped the distinction between ἕνεκά του and διὰ τι, and διὰ τὸ κακὸν at 220d⁵ becomes ἐχθροῦ ἕνεκα at e⁴. This enables him to present a contrast between the secondary φίλα, which were φίλου ἕνεκά φίλα and the πρῶτον φίλον, which if it is τὸ ἀγαθόν is ἐχθροῦ ἕνεκα φίλον, but αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα οὐδεμίαν χρεῖαν ἔχει. Quite why Plato wanted to produce this contrast is not clear; perhaps he wished to use it as a reductio ad absurdum, for the time being at least, of the identification of the πρῶτον φίλον with τὸ ἀγαθόν by suggesting that the πρῶτον φίλον ought to be αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα φίλον; though in fact he seems so far only to have said that the πρῶτον φίλον is οὐ φίλου τινος ἕνεκα φίλον (220b⁴).

But Shorey (C. Phil. 25, 1930, pp. 380-3) is quite right to point out that this is a verbal fallacy not affecting the main course of the argument, which continues to discuss the cause as distinct from the purpose of φίλησις, cf. 221c² εἰ γὰρ τὸ κακὸν αἴτιον ἦν τοῦ φίλον τι εἶναι, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ κακὸν, and d¹ ἄλλη τις αἰτία τοῦ φιλεῖν τε καὶ φιλεῖσθαι.

1. "Plato", chap. XVIII note Y.

The identification of the *πρῶτον φίλον* with *τὸ ἀγαθόν* then will only be correct if it is true that in a world without evil nothing would be *φίλον*. But this is not the case; ordinary desires such as hunger and thirst are not always harmful and so not always evil, so these will not disappear in a world without evil; and if there are desires there will still be *φίλα' ἄττα*, some objects of pursuit. But since the disappearance of the cause would be expected to lead to the disappearance of the effect, this means that evil cannot be the cause of *φίλησις*.

However in the course of excluding *τὸ κακόν* as the cause of *φίλησις* we have brought another cause to light. Is it perhaps really the case that desire is the cause of pursuit? Ἐὰρ οὖν τῷ ὄντι, ὡς περ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς φιλίας αἰτία, καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν φίλον ἐστίν τούτῳ οὐ ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ τότε ὄραν ἐπιθυμῆ; (221 d²⁻⁴)
But what is the object of desire? One desires what one lacks; one lacks what has been taken away from one, that is to say what is one's own, τοῦ οἰκέτου. So love and pursuit and desire are for what is one's own; τοῦ οἰκέτου δὴ, ὡς εἶπεν, ὅ τε ἔρωσ καὶ ἡ φιλία καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τυγχάνει οὔσα, ὡς φαίνεται. (221 e³⁻⁴)

The steps in this passage of the argument follow each other with startling briskness, equating what one lacks with what is one's own by an unduly swift manoeuvre and apparently excluding the possibility of coveting what is not one's own. Plato was perhaps anxious to find some means of introducing the notion of *τὸ οἰκέτον* without prolonging the dialogue unduly. But before examining Plato's use of the notion of *τὸ οἰκέτον* we must comment on the significance of his introduction of *ἐπιθυμία* as the cause of the pursuit of *τὸ φίλον*. *ἐπιθυμία* covers a wide range of firmly one-directional desires, the instances given here being originally hunger and thirst, and then desires in general for anything which one lacks or which has been taken away from one or which is one's own. Food and

drink certainly, and one's impersonal possessions at least, cannot reciprocate one's desire for them. So if ἐπιθυμία is to explain φιλία directly in the sense that objects of ἐπιθυμία are φίλα (cf 221c¹), then by φιλία here must still be meant the one-directional sense of the word which we have rendered as "pursuit" and which has been under discussion since 216c. + In fact φιλία in 221e⁴ appears to be thought of as parallel in kind to, if it is not almost equated with, ἔρωσ and ἐπιθυμία; objects of ἔρωσ and ἐπιθυμία are φίλα in the sense of being "objects of pursuit".

The sense of φιλία in which it is being made dependent on ἐπιθυμία up to this point needs careful stress, since in 221e⁵ Plato suddenly reverts to the dramatic context and applies the results of the discussion to the relationships in which Menexenus, Lysis and the lurking Hippothales stand to one another. This constitutes a reversion to the earlier topic of discussion, relationships between persons. Addressing Menexenus and Lysis, Socrates says, "Then if you two are friends of each other (φίλοι ἀλλήλους, recalling the boys' avowal at 207c⁸), you are in some way naturally οἰκετοὶ to each other (φύσει καὶ οἰκετοὶ ἐσθ' ἑμὲν αὐτοῖς, 221e⁶)."^{the argument asserts,} τὸ φίλον was found to be τὸ οἰκετόν, therefore it is inferred that φίλοι are οἰκετοί. This is the application of the discussion to Menexenus and Lysis. But furthermore if one person desires another (ἐπιθυμεῖ ἢ ἔρωσ) then/he is in some way οἰκετός τῷ ἐρωμένῳ; and if this is the case then his affection must be returned, since the person loved must himself like what is οἰκετόν to him. The true lover then (ὁ γνήσιος ἐραστής καὶ μὴ προσκοιήτος) must necessarily be liked (φιλεῖσθαι) by the boy he loves (ἐκὸ τῶν κατετικῶν). This final formulation of the conclusion is of

+ This means that we can only strictly translate αἰτία τοῦ φιλεῖν τε καὶ φιλεῖσθαι, 221d¹, as "cause of pursuit and of a thing's being pursued"; the words might suggest the meaning "cause of mutual friendship", but the instances of food and drink exclude this. At 221d³⁻⁴ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν φίλον ἐστὶν τούτῳ οὐ ἐπιθυμεῖ means "that which desires pursues what it desires".

course meant for application to the relation between Hippothales and Lysis; Menexenus and Lysis are reluctant to agree that a lover's affection must be returned, but Hippothales is transported with delight.

The application of the previous conclusion, that pursuit was of what one lacked, to a proof that true love must necessarily be reciprocated, involves not only a shift in the senses of φιλία and φίλος under discussion, but also the use of a sense of οἶκετος which had not been hinted at earlier, if indeed it is not inconsistent with the sense used earlier. To assert that friends were οἶκετοι to each other would have been a normal enough conclusion in Greek, but would not be based on any notion that one "possessed" the other;+ οἶκετοι, if it was taken to be much more than a synonym of φίλοι, would mean something more like "kindred spirits", "having affinities of character or taste". And it is ~~some~~ such necessarily symmetrical relationship which must be introduced to enable Socrates to argue that since a man loves what he finds οἶκετον to himself, he must in turn himself be οἶκετος to the object of his love. This step is made without specific explanation in 221e⁷ - 222a², where Socrates must be relying on οἶκετοι being taken naturally in a symmetrical sense in 221e⁵⁻⁶. It is still τὸ οἶκετον which arouses the ἐπιθυμία of the ἔραστῆς, but not τὸ οἶκετον in an object which he lacks but ^{which} is his own, but in some person who stands in the same relation to him as he to them. Some such notion of common interests or ^{of} an affinity of character or even of common possession of desirable qualities would of course provide an explanation of many friendships ^{and would} accounting for the necessary element of reciprocation of attachment; but it is perhaps a little strained in Socrates' topical application of it to the relations of ἔραστῆς and παιδικά, which in so

+ Aristophanes' speech in the "Symposium" is a burlesque of the notion of οἶκειότης, which would normally mean some non-possessive affinity.

far as based on ἐπιθυμία in the usual sense can only have been one-sided. The friendship between Menexenus and Lysis is a much clearer case of οἰκειότης than the as yet unreciprocated love of Hippothales for Lysis. The dialogue as a whole is more concerned with friendship than with παιδικός ἔρωσ; this point is perhaps a concession to the dramatic situation, or possibly Plato wished to hint that the best result of Hippothales' ἔρωσ for Lysis would be the establishment of a non-erotic mutual friendship.+ It is in this extended application of the argument, however, that Socrates brings out the usefulness of the symmetrical force which can be contained in τὸ οἶκετον for the explanation of mutual friendship. This force of οἰκειότης, even though τὸ οἶκετον is rather oddly introduced and then not originally in this sense, nevertheless might seem to have the makings of the most convincing solution so far to the question τί ἐστὶν τὸ φίλον; in so far as this means "What is friendship?"

+ The sublimation of ἔρωσ into the basis of a joint pursuit of the ideal καλόν is not hinted at here. The affection of παιδικά for γνήσιος ἔρωστος is marked by φιλεῖσθαι, 222a⁷.

222b - end

Any hope that a conclusion has been reached is swiftly dashed. Socrates proceeds relentlessly to scrutinise this notion of τὸ οἰκεῖον, "affinity". He is able to stress the ^{find} difficulties that lie in it merely by recalling some of the arguments used earlier in the dialogue. Is "affinity" the same thing as likeness? But if so it will not explain friendship, since as we saw earlier men who are like each other are useless to each other. So if "affinity" is to explain friendship it must be something different from likeness. Can we then explain affinity in terms of goodness and badness? There are two possible ways of doing this; we might say that the good has an affinity to everything while the bad is alien to everything, or we might say that the bad has an affinity to the bad, the good to the good and the intermediate to the intermediate. But we said before that the bad could not be friends of the bad, so the latter ^{alternative} ~~explanation of "affinity"~~ ^{make some men friends who cannot be} ~~would not account for friendship.~~ But if we identify affinity with good-ness, then there will be friendship only between good man and good man (ὁ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνον φίλος, 222d⁶), and we thought we had denied the possibility of this too.

"What can we do with the argument now? ^{impossible} Clearly nothing! ^{impossible} (τί οὖν ἂν ἔτι χρησαίμεθα τῷ λόγῳ; ἢ δὴλον ὅτι οὐδέν; 222e¹). Socrates gives up investigating τὸ οἰκεῖον at this point, and sums up his whole discussion with Menexenus and Lysis since 212 in despair. He had, he says, meant to take up the discussion with one of the older persons present, but the slave-guardians of the boys descended upon them at that moment, so all ^{he} he could say was that though he and Lysis and Menexenus thought they were friends, they had not been able to discover what a friend was.

Prächter + suggested that there must be here a hint to any "older" readers to observe an omission among the final set of refutations. The identification of goodness and affinity was rejected on the ground that it had led only to good being friends with good (222a⁵⁻⁹); but the original suggestion was in fact that the good had an affinity to everything else, not only to the good: κότερον οὖν καὶ τάγαθόν οἶκετον θήσομεν παντί, τὸ δὲ κακὸν

ἀλλότριον εἶναι (222²c³⁻⁵). Supposing that the bad is excluded from all relationships, this would still leave possible a relationship based on the good's being οἶκετον to the intermediate. This kind of relationship had been suggested earlier in the dialogue, where the good was an object of pursuit to those not already good because of the threat of evil. It was shown that evil could not be the cause of this pursuit; is Plato now hinting that this pursuit is really based on some kind of natural affinity of goodness to its pursuers?

Prächter's suggestion is tempting because even allowing for the swiftness with which Plato is piling on the final appearances of puzzlement, we perhaps find the absence of any discussion of τὸ οἶκετον as the ground of a possible relationship between good and intermediate rather a surprising loose end to be left untied, especially when ~~it~~ ^{the} appears to ^{have} ^{-en} be suggested. But it is quite possible that Plato did think that such a relationship was excluded. He asserts that the identification of τὸ ἀγαθὸν and τὸ οἶκετον (τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ οἶκετον ἂν ταῦτόν φῶμεν εἶναι, 222d⁵⁻⁶), will lead to friendship only between one good man and another. Now if the meaning of τὸ οἶκετον is to be explained by equating it with τὸ ἀγαθὸν and τὸ οἶκετον is being thought of as implying a symmetrical relationship, this

+ In "Die Philosophie des Altertums", Vol. I of Ueberweg, "Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie", 12th ed., 1926, pp. 237-8.

will indeed mean that a pair of οἰκτεῖται both must be ἀγαθοί.

A relationship between the intermediate and the good would be unsymmetrical; if the good were to attract the intermediate because οἰκτεῖται to it as being good, this could not be a symmetrical οἰκτεῖσθαι because the intermediate is by definition itself not good. But Plato has been using οἰκτεῖται in a symmetrical sense in order to prove the need for reciprocity in true friendship; so it is this sense which he is setting out to refute, and which he does refute completely.

On the other hand since 216 b most of the discussion has not been concerned with symmetrical relationships, but with the grounds of one-directional pursuit, and it was apparently as the ground of such pursuit that τὸ οἰκτεῖται was first introduced, at which point its symmetrical sense was not stressed. In fact the relationships of possession, or of lacking, whichever was more essential to the first introduction of οἰκτεῖσθαι, ^{are} ^{usually} seem not ~~to be~~ symmetrical. So it is perhaps just possible that Plato in rejecting the use of τὸ οἰκτεῖται in a symmetrical sense as a ground of mutual friendship was nevertheless not rejecting it as a suggestion about the cause of pursuit. This may perhaps be why he hinted at this possibility in 222 c³⁻⁵. He may have wished to indicate that he still kept in mind a sense in which the good attracted pursuit by the intermediate by being οἰκτεῖται to it, perhaps as being something lacking to and naturally needed by it. This might constitute an unamplified but perhaps significantly unrefuted final suggestion about one at least of the main topics of the dialogue.

Again however, if Plato was principally concerned with friendship rather than with pursuit, his refutation of the symmetrical sense alone of

οἷκετος may indicate no more than lack of interest in its one-directional sense, and the "hint" at 222 c³⁻⁵ may simply be a formal mention of an irrelevant possibility put in to emphasise that it is only symmetrical relationships that he is concerned with here.

Plato at least intended an appearance of ἀπορία here; to assess the degree of sophistication with which he did this and guess whether he himself thought he had a solution will be very difficult. It is time to review the dialogue as a whole.

The following analysis of dialogue

It was shown in the purely linguistic examination of the uses of the word φίλος in Greek that φίλος not only means "friend" as a person who is a partner in a mutual relationship, but also has an occasional one-way active sense of "liking", "well disposed towards", and a frequent passive sense as "the object of pursuit, liking, approval". The last of these is common in poetry but normally survives only in certain set phrases [in prose.]

Plato's first attack on the main subject of the "Iysis", at 212b - 213d, was then seen to be an attempt to explain the notion of φίλος in terms of the verb φιλεῖν; three identifications of φίλοι were suggested: οἱ φιλοῦντες, οἱ φιλούμενοι, and οἱ φιλοῦντές τε καὶ φιλούμενοι. Each of these suggestions was seen to gain its plausibility as giving a rather schematic approximation to one of the senses of φίλος distinguished earlier; but Plato apparently rejected each suggestion because it seemed to conflict with the others. The question arose whether Plato in fact rejected this whole approach, or more sophisticatedly meant the reader to recognise here a conscious analysis of the ambiguity of the word φίλος; the attempt at any final answer to this question was deferred until the rest of the dialogue had been analysed.

In examining the subsequent course of the argument, we have observed by noticing the specific examples he takes that under the question τι ἔστιν τὸ φίλον Plato is discussing two distinct topics: not only friendship between men, but also any form of pursuit the object of which can in Greek be said to be φίλον in the passive sense of the word.

The examples cited of this general pursuit more often have impersonal than personal objects. Plato uses the same terminology to discuss both these topics; how this is possible in Greek will be clear from our linguistic examination of the word φίλος, though it should perhaps be noted that Plato is freely using senses not found elsewhere in prose.^λ More important, the linguistic account of φίλος should have shown how the question τί ἐστὶν τὸ φίλον could suggest both these topics to a Greek. +

Plato nowhere from 213d to the end gives any explicit indication that he thinks of himself as changing at any point from one topic to another or even as discussing more than one topic in the same dialogue. He starts quite clearly with friendship; but only the examples given at 217a b and 218 a reveal that the suggestion being developed since 216c is not meant any longer to cover mutual friendship between men; and the return to the topic of friendship at 222e⁵ is extremely abrupt. Could Plato rely on Greek readers following these moves more easily than many of his modern interpreters have done? Perhaps; but even to a Greek the continued use of the same vocabulary for both topics must have been confusing; and a Greek reader did not have one advantage of the modern interpreter, who habitually thinks in a language in which the various senses of φίλος must be rendered by different words and so are made easier to keep apart.

But let us grant for the present that Plato's Greek readers would have followed his moves from one topic to the other without difficulty. We must next ask why Plato incorporated a discussion of general aims or

+ Set as τί ἐστὶν τὸ φίλον, in the neuter, the question suggests the topic of friendship if it is taken as a generalised or abstract form of τίνες εἰσιν οἱ φίλοι; impersonal objects are not friends, but the neuter τὸ φίλον can be used to generalise about personal φίλοι. Plato varies the gender used in the question freely during the dialogue: cf. 213c⁵, 214d⁸, 216b⁷, c², 218b⁷, 222e³, 223b⁷.

pursuits in a discussion of friendship. He apparently did not think it necessary to comment on this, but must have assumed the reader would see the relationship between the two topics.

The most convenient way of discovering a relationship Plato may have intended between pursuit and friendship will be to study Aristotle's analysis of basis of friendship. This will involve a detailed digression to discuss the relevant passages of the Eudemian and the Nicomachean Ethics, but we shall then be provided with a clear, even if rather rigid, framework within which to return to the analysis of the "Lysis", and we shall incidentally have seen how Aristotle made use of points derived from the "Lysis".

Eudemian Ethics VII presents for the most part the same material as Nicomachean Ethics VIII and IX in a markedly less lucid form + , but occasionally E.E. shows a greater wealth of subsidiary argument which is helpful for understanding how the doctrine of E.N. was arrived at; it also relies less exclusively on Aristotle's technical vocabulary of ethics. This would accord well with the supposition of ^{Kapp.} Jaeger and Walzer that E.E. represents an earlier stage of Aristotle's ethical thinking, and is not merely an alternative presentation by a different editor of the same views as are contained in E.N. (E.E.'s text is both more corrupt and probably, even if corruptions could be removed, more difficult to construe and follow because of telegrammatic writing than E.N.: but if the logical scheme is hunted out the philosophy is less inferior to E.N. than at first appears.)

Aristotle starts in both E.E. VII and E.N. VIII by stressing the importance of friendship in morals and in politics, and then mentions paradoxes and

+ E.N. VIII and IX however are perhaps themselves more lucidly presented than much of the rest of E.N.

puzzles which various theories of friendship have generated. (The "Lysis" must already be one of the texts or discussions which are in Aristotle's mind.) The problem which is mentioned last in E.E. (1235b 19) is the one which in his further discussion Aristotle takes first - *κότερον τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ τὸ φιλούμενον*. (εἰ μὲν γὰρ φιλοῦμεν οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν, ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος, ταύτη μὲν τὸ φιλούμενον τὸ ἡδὺ, εἰ δὲ οὐ βουλομεθα, τὸ ἀγαθόν.)

This in E.N. (1155b 17) is presented directly as the beginning of the exposition: *τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερόν γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ*. *δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν, τουτὸ δ' εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον*. *δόξειε δ' ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι οὐ γίνεταί ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἡδονή, ὥστε φιλητὰ ἂν εἴη τάγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς τέλη*.

Investigation of the object of *φιλεῖν* is considered to be relevant to the explanation of friendship; this is called *τὸ φιλούμενον* + in E.E. and *τὸ φιλητόν* in E.N.; *φιλητός* is an adjective not found before Aristotle; it was probably coined by him from the verb *φιλεῖν* to avoid need for the passive sense of the ambiguous *φίλος*.[§]

The fact that Aristotle investigates *τὸ φιλούμενον* in the course of discussing friendship may suggest how Plato may have found discussion of *φίλον* (passive) relevant to his enquiry about *φίλος* = "a friend". We must go on to see the use to which Aristotle puts his results. ++ This he does at E.E. 1236a⁷ +++: *ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἀγαθὰ πλεοναχῶς* (τὸ μὲν γὰρ

+ Translation of *τὸ φιλούμενον* is extremely difficult here: affection is out of the question: the sense is clearly one of extremely general choice or favour or approval; "desire" in English can cover both the pleasant and the good, but has often to be used for *ἐπιθυμεῖν* which A. here restricts to *τὸ ἡδὺ*. Perhaps "choose" or "prefer", cf. *ἀρετῆσθαι* E.E.1235b 11.

++ The discussions which follow of *τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, ἡδὺ* (τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθόν, ἡδὺ at E.E. 1235b²⁴ - 1236a⁷ and (more briefly) at E.N. not relevant for our present purpose. E.N. 1155b 21-26

+++ Text mainly according to Rackham (Loeb series): Rackham gives a more readable text than Susemihl, (Teubner), who often prints impossible grammar from the mss. where emendation is difficult: but Rackham prints many demonstrably false emendations producing impossible sense. (cf. notes to Solomon, Oxf. Trans. Arist. Vol. IX.)

§ So Wilamowitz, *Platon* 2 II p. 71. Schächer, *Studien zu dem Ethikem...* Paderborn 1940, is utterly wrong in thinking any writer could have reverted to *φίλος* after the change of *φιλετός*.

τῷ τοιόνδ' εἶναι λέγομεν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὠφέλιμον καὶ χρήσιμον), ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἡδύ τὸ μὲν ἀλλῶς καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλῶς, τὸ δὲ τινὶ καὶ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων δι' ἕκαστον τούτων ἐνδέχεται ἡμᾶς αἰρεῖσθαι τι καὶ φιλεῖν, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπον· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ὅτι τοιόσδε καὶ δι' ἀρετῆν, τὸν δ' ὅτι ὠφέλιμος καὶ χρήσιμος, τὸν δ' ὅτι ἡδύς καὶ δι' ἡδονῆν.

In the same way that certain qualities cause us to desire impersonal objects which are characterised by them, so these qualities may cause us to like men who possess them. This is not put fully in E.N., which simply says τριῶν δ' ὄντων δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν, "there being three things which make men desire/like what they desire/like", (1155b 27) without making the distinction and comparison specifically until the next point is reached. But on the next point E.N. is fuller than the corresponding place in E.E.: ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀψύχων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται φιλία· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀντιφίλησις. "In the case of liking inanimate objects we do not talk of friendship, since there is no reciprocal liking". (φίλησις, the verbal noun from φιλεῖν, appears to be an Aristotelian coinage to distinguish the active feeling marked by the verb from the state of φιλία, though Plato appeared to use φιλία to denote this occasionally; φίλησις is not in E.E.) This is more obscurely put in E.E. (1236a 14) φίλος δὲ γίνεται ὅταν φιλούμενος ἀντιφιλήῃ, καὶ τοῦτο μὴ λανθάνῃ πως αὐτούς. "A man becomes a friend when he is liked and likes in return, and both parties are aware of their mutual feelings". (cf. Rhetoric II 4, 1381a 1-3 φίλος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ φιλῶν καὶ ἀντιφιλούμενος· οἴονται δὲ φίλοι εἶναι οἱ οὕτως ἔχειν οἴόμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. The point about the awareness

of the position is more fully developed in E.N. 1155b 34 - 1156a⁵ and E.E. 1239a 33.) The passage in E.E. which specifically notes that reciprocity is not possible in the case of liking inanimate objects is corrupt, but in view of the passages just cited should probably be emended with Fritzsche + and read (1236b 2-5) ἡ πρώτη φιλία ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶν ἀντιφιλία καὶ ἀν~~φ~~^προαίρεσις πρὸς ἀλλήλους. φίλον μὲν γὰρ τὸ φιλούμενον τῷ φιλοῦντι, φίλος δὲ ὁ φιλούμενος καὶ ἀντιφιλῶν.

"Primary friendship is the mutual friendship and approval of purpose towards each other of good men. A thing qualifies as φίλον because φιλον to the man who desires it if it is desired, but a man qualifies as φίλος if he both is liked and likes in return". Aristotle is distinguishing here between the usual sense of φίλον in the neuter and the usual sense of in the masculine: 'dear' or 'desired' and 'afriend' respectively; and between the logical implications of these uses as they can be explained in terms of the verb φιλεῖν. This corresponds to the way in which in E.N. the usual sense of φιλία as a relational state is explained in terms of the verbal nouns from φιλεῖν (i.e. φίλησις and ἀντιφίλησις).

A scheme thus emerges which uses the active notion expressed by φιλεῖν to explain the relational state of friendship; we "like" men for the same reason that we "like" things, because they have certain qualities. But things cannot return our "liking" for them, whereas it is precisely this mutual and returned "liking" which constitutes friendship between men. So to explain the way in which friendships can spring up and be maintained we must always investigate what reason makes each separately of a pair of friends "like" the other; explaining why one man alone "likes" another does not show grounds for talking of a friendship, unless the second also has grounds

+ Or with Dirlmeier, " φίλος and φιλία" Munich 1931, p.77: φίλος δὲ ὁ φιλούμενος τῷ φιλοῦντι καὶ ἀντιφιλῶν, but this involves a more complicated change of the mss., which have φίλος δὲ τῷ φιλούμενῳ καὶ ἀντιφιλῶν. (Ross's emendation seems to be wrong; see next footnote.) (cf. also Zeller, φίλος δὲ τῷ φιλοῦντι ὁ ἀντιφιλῶν, Archiv für Gesch. der Phil. N. F. II 1896, p. 545); *but this is less forceful than Fritzsche's suggestion.*

for "liking" the first + and both men realise that the relation is mutual. Frequently men are friends because each finds in the other the same ground for liking him; both are good men, or each enjoys the other's company, or each can help the other; but this is not always the position; one member of a pair may like the other because he is pleasant company, the other the first because he can help him (cf. E.N. 1158b³). Aristotle develops an elaborate casuistry of justice between friends to cover cases where one party does not "like" the other as much as the other "likes" him. But there must always be φίλησις on both sides.

Two more points must be made before we examine the relation of Aristotle's scheme to Plato's. The first is that Xenophon does not use the feeling expressed by φιλεῖν and φίλησις to explain friendship: his discussion at Mem. II 4-6 is admittedly not an attempt to give a theoretical basis of φιλία, but more a series of practical recommendations about how to treat friends; however in so far as a view of the nature of friendship can be extracted from these recommendations, it is that friendship is based on mutual utility and service (e.g. II 4⁷ ταῦτα ὁ φίλος πρό τοῦ φίλου ἐξήρακεσθαι, 6¹ φίλω τὰ δεόντα πράττειν, 6⁵ μὴ ἐλλείπεσθαι εὖ ποιῶν τοὺς εὐεργετοῦντας αὐτόν, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖν τοῖς χρωμένοις, 6²⁵ τοῖς φίλοις τὰ δίκαια βοηθεῖν, τοὺς φίλους ὠφελεῖν). φιλεῖν is only mentioned in connection with ἡ τῶν καλῶν τε κάγαθῶν θήρα, Socrates says δευνῶς γάρ, ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσω ἀναθρώπων, ὅλος ὄρημαι

* This is why Ross's emendation at 1236b⁵ is wrong: φίλος δὲ τῷ φιλουμένῳ καὶ αὐτός ὁ φιλῶν; "a man liking another man is also himself liked by the man he likes". But Aristotle insists that such mutual feelings are not automatic, as Plato had pointed out at Lysis 212b. cf. E.N. 1155b 32-34. (Also it is perhaps implausible to emend away ἀντιφιλῶν).

ἐπὶ τὸ φίλων τε αὐτοὺς ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ ποθῶν ἀντιποθεῖσθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἀντεπιθυμεῖσθαι τῆς ξυνουσίας.

It could be that Xenophon assumed that friends would naturally be φιλοῦντες τε καὶ φιλούμενοι and thought that more interesting things needed to be said; more probably as he was not looking for a concept to provide a theoretical basis of φιλία he contented himself with the conventional vocabulary and views as to how φίλοι regarded each other, and so his writing betrays to us that φίλος = "a friend" in Greek is not so closely bound up with the verb φιλεῖν as Plato's and Aristotle's theoretical systems might lead us to suppose. (We must however allow for the possibility that Xenophon's outlook was exceptionally "utilitarian".) At least Xenophon does not seem at any point to have had in mind any comparison between φίλησις τῶν ἀψύχων and feelings between friends, such as Aristotle specifically draws [in E.E.]

The second point before considering the "Lysis" concerns precisely this comparison between φιλεῖν as applied to things and φιλία as between men. Aristotle in E.N. but not in E.E. qualifies the comparison somewhat; to take up again the passage cited earlier, 1155b 27 sq. τριῶν δ' ὄντων δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν, ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀψύχων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται φιλία· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις, οὐδέ βούλησις ἐκεῖνω ἀγαθοῦ· γελοιῶν γὰρ ἕως τῷ οἴνω βούλεσθαι τάγαθά, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, σφῆζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα αὐτὸς ἔχη· τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τάγαθά ἐκείνου ἕνεκα. τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τάγαθὰ εὔνους λέγουσιν The sort of affection expected between friends is that the one shall wish for the good of the other; this would be an absurd "affection" to have for an impersonal object such as wine (commentators take the example as coming from Lysis 212d),

because one does not wish for it to do well, except perhaps that it shall keep well and not go sour, which of course is a purely selfish wish. The sort of affection which when mutual creates friendship is by itself called εὐνοια. This makes a distinction between the sort of φιλῆσεις found with things as its objects and with men. On the other hand the comparison between these φιλήσεις is not overthrown in an important respect, since both φιλήσεις have the same causes (i.e. τάγαθόν, τὸ ἡδύ, τὸ ὠφέλιμον): cf. 1156a⁴ δεῖ ἄρα εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας δι' ἕν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.

Aristotle in the rest of E.E. VII and E.N. VIII and IX goes on to discuss friendship with a wealth of sociological and psychological observations which is on a completely different level from anything Plato was aiming at in the short compass of the "Lysis". But throughout his further discussion Aristotle works consistently and rigorously within the framework of the logical analysis with which he has opened these books. The state of friendship is related to the activity marked by the verb φιλεῖν. There is φιλῆσεις both of objects and of men caused by the same qualities both in objects and in men; when φιλῆσεις due to these qualities arises reciprocally between two men who are both conscious of the position, then φιλία, friendship, results. Aristotle has been careful to introduce new terms and define old terms in order to be able to keep this framework clear throughout.

Plato nowhere in the "Lysis" presents any explicit logical framework of this kind, and gives no definition of his terms but indulges in unlimited exploitation of shifting senses of φίλος and φιλία. Can we perhaps nevertheless find underlying Plato's arguments some implicit presuppositions similar to the explicit premises stated by Aristotle?

Aristotle's first premise seems at least sometimes to be present in Plato's mind; that φίλος and φίλια can be linked with what is marked by the verb φιλεῖν. φιλεῖν is used in the "Lysis" very much less frequently than the adjective φίλος in its various senses; but at several points they are linked in different ways; e.g. at 215b² ὁ δὲ μὴ φιλοῦντος φίλος and by contrast at 220b⁷⁻⁸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν φίλον τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖται; cf. also 215d⁵⁻⁷, 217b³⁻⁶, 220d²⁻⁸, 221b^{8-c1}, c5-6. φίλια is linked with φιλεῖν at 221d¹⁻³,
 φαίνεται ἄλλη τις αἰτία τοῦ φιλεῖν τε καὶ φιλεῖσθαι ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς φίλιας αἰτία (cf. note to p. 69 supra.) This is not at first sight consistent with the rejection of such links in 212b-213d; but there perhaps an attempt was being made at a strict definitory identification of φίλοι with φιλοῦντες or one of the other suggestions; the kind of link implied in these later passages is perhaps rather looser. φιλεῖν is only one of several verbs marking the relations of men with friends or objects of pursuit; cf. ἀγαπᾶν 215a¹⁻³, περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι 215c¹, ἐπιθυμεῖν 215e⁴⁻⁵, ἀσπάζεσθαι 217b⁴, ἐρᾶν 221b⁸; but these are often closely coupled with and partly overlap in sense with φιλεῖν itself. Plato thus seems to adopt an approach nearer to Aristotle's than to Xenophon's; even where Plato does consider utility as an element in friendship, at 214e-215c, he regards utility not directly as a cause of friendship but as what would make men ἀγαπᾶν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι ἀλλήλους.

Aristotle links φίλος with φιλεῖν in order to be able to hold a general investigation of the objects of φιλησις. τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο φανερόν γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ. The qualities which are φιλητὰ in general will help to show how φίλησις arises in the cases where

it leads to friendship. φίλησις in general has both personal and neuter objects; by the time he put together the "Nicomachean" version of his ethical views Aristotle wished to qualify the comparison between φίλησις of men and of things, thinking that φίλησις between men at least in the highest kinds of friendship should be unselfish, but even with this qualification he retains the view that φίλησις is caused by the same qualities in men as in things.

Aristotle's investigation of τὸ φιλητὸν may perhaps be due to Plato's discussion of τὸ φίλον in the sense we have rendered as "the object of pursuit". Again Plato gives no explicit statement of his presupposition but he links τὸ φίλον in this sense with the verbs φιλεῖν, ἀγαπᾶν, ἐπιθυμεῖν ++ just as readily as he links φίλος = "friend" with these verbs. Plato's implicit belief appears to be that τὸ φίλον as the object of pursuit attracts the same kind of feeling that gives rise to friendship.

Aristotle might be said to have believed that φίλοι, friends, were φιλητοί as attracting φίλησις. Plato's nearest word for τὸ φίλητὸν is the passive sense of τὸ φίλον. So that if Plato's presupposition on this point is similar to Aristotle's, to put it in his own terminology one would have to say that he believed that φίλοι, friends, were φίλοι (passive) as attracting pursuit. Plato's enquiry into τί ἐστὶν τὸ φίλον, what is the object of pursuit, would then serve the same purpose as Aristotle's enquiry into τὸ φιλητὸν to discover the qualities in objects and in men which attract pursuit and make objects φίλα and men φίλοι. Plato may have thought it unnecessary to comment on this premise of his discussion because in it he was employing what might have been thought an

++ e.g. compare 215b1-2 with 220d2, 221b7 with 222a1.

obvious and fundamental link between the two senses of the word φίλος, or rather reducing the two senses to one by treating friends as being φίλοι in precisely the same sense of the word as objects of pursuit in general. Why else should friends be called φίλοι? Such etymological connections were perhaps a basic assumption in the mind of any Greek reader at the time;# any word must have one fundamental sense which shows the reason for its use in all its other senses. Even if much of the "Cratylus" is burlesque it betrays a strong tendency of the Greeks to think in this way. +

So far then Plato's basic assumptions in the "Lysis" seem to be similar to those which are explicitly stated by Aristotle; but Plato perhaps inclines to link general objects of pursuit more directly with friends by taking φίλος as applied to both in the same sense, whereas Aristotle makes this same connection slightly more circuitously, but in terminology less likely to confuse, by linking φίλος with φιλεῖν and τὸ φιλεῖν.

But Aristotle is not content to identify φίλοι as φιλεῖν without qualification. Friendship is a symmetrical relationship between pairs of men both of whom are φίλοι. Both therefore must be φιλεῖν as Aristotle holds; if the basis of friendship is to be the feeling marked by φιλοῦσθαι, then the attraction causing this feeling must be mutual and felt by both parties. The enquiry into τὸ φιλεῖν will show us what qualities cause φιλοῦσθαι; but these qualities in one man alone will not lead to friendship.

Was Plato aware of the requirement of reciprocity in friendship?

* And even if the "Cratylus" is evidence that Plato himself had by then thrown off this way of thinking, it is a much later work than the "Lysis", since it, ^{seems to have} philosophical affinities with the "Theaetetus".

though it may be remembered that Xenophon either does not make this etymological connection or does not think it particularly significant. His practical approach leaves less room for verbal connections.

Is this present as one of his tacit presuppositions when he digresses from friendship to discuss τὸ φίλον in general? It is difficult to be sure of this.

It is true that in the section of the dialogue directly concerned with friendship between men, from 213d - 216b, Plato clearly was envisaging friendship as mutual. Moreover when at 221e Plato returns to the topic of friendship it is precisely to use the symmetrical sense of οἰκετός to prove that affection if based on natural affinity must be reciprocated. Also it is the symmetrical sense of οἰκετός which perhaps is foremost in Plato's mind while he sets the final ἀπορία in 222b to d, in so far as it is this sense which is given a formal refutation.

On the other hand Plato spends a good deal of space in the argument (216c - 220e; about one third of main discussion) on a suggestion about pursuit in general which could not be used to explain reciprocal friendship. After he has excluded the possibility that the good (ἀγαθόν) are friends (φίλοι), Plato makes the suggestion that nevertheless τὸ ἀγαθόν is φίλον, an object of pursuit, to the intermediate. τὸ ἀγαθόν is not attractive to a person who is already himself ἀγαθός; but the man who is neither already ἀγαθός nor yet so corrupted by the threat of τὸ κακόν as to be unaware of his deficiency, will still have a motive for pursuing τὸ ἀγαθόν. Thus the quality attracting pursuit is goodness, but it is attractive only to the intermediate. Plato gives this suggestion much more discussion than any other in the dialogue; he provides instances to support it and digresses on the notion of παρουσία required by it, and distinguishes a propos of it between primary and secondary objects of pursuit. But it can be a suggestion only about one-directional pursuit.

If it is to be applied to men, then a man who is ἀγαθός can attract φίλησις on the part of a man who is intermediate. But the intermediate man by definition is not good, so he will not attract the good man in turn, and there will not be mutual friendship. (The good man in fact will be attracted by no one at all, since being good already he need not pursue the one object of pursuit).

It is true that Plato finally rejects this suggestion that τὸ ἀγαθόν is the quality attracting pursuit; but he does not do so on the ground that it will not explain friendship. Instead, he offers the apparently serious refutation that this kind of pursuit of the good would be unnecessary in a world without evil (since the intermediate would not be subject to the threat of τὸ κακόν), and from this proceeds to discuss natural pursuit of objects of need. If Plato was discussing pursuit with a view to explaining friendship as based on reciprocal pursuit, it was more than usually "ironical" of him to lay this lengthily false trail and then reject it on entirely different grounds from the main difficulty it presents. It would be much easier to take this part of the discussion as showing a concern with pursuit in general quite apart from its relevance to friendship.

It could be argued that Plato must nevertheless have known of the need to explain reciprocity in friendship because he catered for it in introducing τὸ οἶκετον as the object of pursuit. But in this case we should have expected a rather more careful introduction of the symmetrical sense of οἶκετος by way of giving its value for this enquiry due emphasis. In fact τὸ οἶκετον is brought into the dialogue in a nonsymmetrical sense as the object of desire which is desired as being one's own but lacking to one. The symmetrical sense of the word is not formally introduced or given any explanation but is

suddenly found to have been used without apology. Reciprocity of affection is thereby proved to be necessary in what is not at all obviously a case of mutual friendship, and the whole section has rather the air of a point made in passing to remind the reader of the dramatic context and to recommend that ἔρωϛ such as that of Hippothales should be moderated into something that can be mutual.

Finally if discussion of τὸ φίλον is being consciously linked by Plato with mutual friendship, and the principal interest in 222 b - d is concentrated on the symmetrical sense of οἰκείος, it is impossible to accept Prächter's suggestion that 222 c³⁻⁵ contains a hint of a revised theory that the intermediate pursues the good not because of the threat of evil but because of a natural need. Such a revised theory, if it were being hinted at, would still be open to the difficulty that it would not give any reason why the good should be attracted to the intermediate, so that it would not explain mutual friendship. It could only be of interest to Plato if he was concerned with theories of pursuit independently of theories of friendship.

Aristotle thus links pursuit to friendship by treating friendship as reciprocal pursuit; but it is not clear that Plato made this kind of link between the two topics of his dialogue, since though he treats friendship as closely linked with pursuit, he also discusses kinds of pursuit which could not be reciprocated. He certainly touches on the notion of reciprocity of affection at one point, and talks of friendship as a mutual phenomenon at others; but he also digresses into discussions of one-way relationships of pursuit which cannot illuminate friendship, unlike

Aristotle who always makes allowance for reciprocation. +

Was Plato aware that the two topics of his discussion fell apart in this way? If he was fully conscious of the requirement of reciprocity in friendship, he must have realised that much of his discussion of pursuit, including his analysis of the *πρῶτον φίλον* in this connection, was not strictly relevant to the question with which he began the dialogue. In discussing this form of pursuit he was going beyond what would answer the question *τίνας εἶσιν οἱ φίλοι*, even granted that he believed that *φίλοι* were called this because they were pursued in the same sense as other objects in general.

We must believe therefore either that Plato in the "Lysis" consciously passed from discussing friendship to discussing pursuit in a wider sense than could be related to friendship, or that if he regarded the whole dialogue as relevant to friendship he was ^{unaware} of the requirement of reciprocity in explanations of friendship based on pursuit.

The first of these alternatives is perfectly possible. The absence of a rigid framework such as that constructed by Aristotle, or the perhaps deliberately casual switch from one aspect of the *τί ἐστὶν τὸ φίλον* question to another, need not be surprising in a Platonic dialogue cast in the dramatic form of an unpremeditated discussion. It is quite clear that Plato was giving play to his interest not only in friendship but also in the pursuit of the good; he may not have thought it necessary to state the formal relevance of these topics to each other, which might have required him to explain with some minuteness how much his suggestions on each topic

+ It is perhaps worth noting that any account of friendship based on a notion of attraction or pursuit must contain an allowance for reciprocation as a logical necessity, since "friend" (and the corresponding sense of *φίλος*) is a logically symmetrical term and friendship is essentially a mutual phenomenon.

overlapped or diverged.

On the other hand such outer framework of the discussion as there is sets the main question at the beginning and at the end in the form concerning friendship (212ab, 213c, and 222e, 223b). Plato undoubtedly thought friendship was a case of pursuit, and so may indeed have thought that in discussing pursuit he was contributing directly to the solution of his principal question. This would give the dialogue at least an intention of unity, which on the whole would be expected of Plato despite his apparent informality; he is usually careful to signal both the beginning and end of his conscious digressions and to provide some statement of their relevance. To attribute to Plato an intention of unity in the "Lysis" does mean, however, that he must have been unconscious of the need to explain reciprocity in friendship.

It should be noted that if he assimilated the sense in which friends are φίλοι to the passive sense of φίλον applicable to objects of pursuit, Plato is very likely to have become somewhat blind to the original implication of φίλοι = "friends". He is likely to have thought of himself as attempting to arrive at a single basic sense of the notion of τὸ φίλον, and in doing so to have ignored the important difference represented by the symmetrical force of φίλος when used of friendship. It is precisely his philosophical ideal of comprehensiveness of definition by the discovery of a single equivalent term which may have led him to think the two topics of the "Lysis" more closely related than they are.

We must now return to the question raised about the initial section of the discussion at 212b - 213d. It might perhaps be argued that this initial discussion is a deliberate analysis by Plato of the distinct senses of the word φίλος, and that this was meant to act as a clue to the reader by

which he might follow the changes of topic and interrelations between the arguments in the rest of the dialogue. It might even be maintained that in suggesting one identification of φίλοι as φιλοῦντές τε καὶ φιλούμενοι Plato was showing himself conscious of the symmetrical sense of φίλος and the reciprocity of friendship. The rest of the dialogue would then be intended for the careful reader to sort out for himself; the value of the various suggestions in application to different topics would be clear after brief thought.

In answer to this it can be said that ~~they~~ only reader to have used the dialogue in this way appears to have been Aristotle. If this were Plato's intentions, many learned commentators have missed the point completely; only a few have realised the full extent of the ambiguity of φίλος and few, even if they saw some of the elements of ambiguity illuminated in 212b - 213d, have applied what they learnt there to distinguishing the topics of the rest of the dialogue. Those scholars who have succeeded in discovering the different senses of φίλος underlying the discussion have very largely been following Aristotle. + If Plato did intend the Aristotelian framework to be discovered by his readers out of his "ironical" construction of a casual conversation, there ~~is~~ surely (to quote Mr. R. Robinson's comment on this kind of view of Plato's early dialogues ++) "the degree of irony thus attributed to him is superhuman". If this was irony it took an Aristotle to see behind it. If it is argued that a contemporary Greek reader would have been much more sensitive to Plato's usage of φίλος than a modern

+ Von Armin's discussion of the "Lysis" shows the unacknowledged and perhaps unconscious influence of E.N. VIII - IX at many points *in addition to ~~the~~ several*

++ Mind, 1942 p. 109. *[point at which it is acknowledged.]*

interpreter can be, against that must be weighed the advantage to a modern interpreter of being forced to face the difficulties of translating φίλος into different words in his own language corresponding to its various senses; furthermore modern interpreters should be in general much more conscious of the existence of dangers to language and philosophy lying in ambiguity. The difficulties of disentangling the strands of the "Lysis" would have been much greater to the average Greek reader than to us today, even supposing the average Greek reader was likely in the first place to think of words as able to have more than one sense. Finally, if Plato was being ironical in first distinguishing the senses of φίλος and then leaving it to the reader to follow the thread of the dialogue without further signposting, it must be said that he constructed as teasing a maze as possible for the purpose of this exercise. In ordinary non-philosophical Greek contexts anything so elaborately puzzling as the "Lysis" must have been exceedingly rare.

The alternative interpretation of the connection between 212b - 213d and the rest of the dialogue is that Plato genuinely thought his first attempt puzzling and unhelpful and rejected all the suggestions contained in it; he then proceeded to discuss the question τί ἐστὶν τὸ φίλον with more attention to the facts of the matter and less to what he suspected were purely verbal quirks. Even if Plato had seen that 212b - 213d was an analysis of the ambiguity of the word φίλος, he might have thought it of no importance; in the "Euthydemus" when the ambiguity of μανθάνω has first been played upon by the two sophists and then explained by Socrates, Socrates goes on to observe (278b²) ταῦτα δὲ τῶν μαθημάτων (scil. περὶ

ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος (227e4)) παιδιὰ ἐστὶν παιδιαν δὲ λέγω δια ταῦτα, ὅτι εἰ καὶ πολλά τις ἢ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μάθοι, τὰ μὲν πράγματα οὐδὲν ἂν μάλλον εἰδεῖη πῆ ἔχει, προσκαίξειν δὲ οἷός τ' ἂν εἴη τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διὰ τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων διαφορὰν ὑποσκελίξων καὶ ἀνατρέπων.

Discussion of the application of words is merely an entertainment, παιδιὰ, and does not show us τὰ πράγματα πῆ ἔχει, how things are.

Plato may similarly here have ruled out the possibility of getting any help from verbal enquiry and proceeded at 213e to the serious task of finding out τί ἐστὶν τὸ φίλον; in the sense of discovering as a matter of empirical fact what the phenomenon called friendship^s consists in. 212b - 213d, quite apart from the unsatisfactoriness of its "antilogical" results, was only an attempt at purely verbal definition, at attaching the name φίλος to one or other of three already recognised classes of men; Plato may well have thought the real task was not to bother about the application of labels to phenomena already distinguished, but to pursue the "real" definition of the factors which in practice^s create friendships. If he discriminated between 212b - 213d and the rest of the dialogue in this way, it is possible to understand how he could completely have disregarded the genuinely important results of the first enquiry in his attack on the second.

In rejecting his first attempt at definition as purely verbal and unimportant, Plato missed what might have shown him that there were two separate phenomena to be investigated in his subsequent enquiry which could either be completely separated or given a systematic relation to each other, but could not be completely assimilated. One-way pursuit may be taken as a basic element in friendship but is not in itself a sufficient

description of friendship, and in some cases may be of a kind which does not lead to friendship at all. In his search for the one basic element making anything φίλον, Plato's earnest desire to be satisfied with no mere partial explanation led him to miss a difference which exists in the phenomena as well as in the words. As a consequence of this difference no one simple explanation will be found, but either two separate explanations or one complex explanation such as Aristotle's are necessary. Plato's search for a single simple explanation of τὸ φίλον has of course as its purely linguistic aspect his anxiety to define τὸ φίλον by means of a simple statement of equivalence, to find a term which is both a necessary and a sufficient condition of anything's being φίλον. His explicit statement of this requirement of his methodology in the early dialogues is found at "Euthyphro" 6^d - 7^a, where Socrates insists that all ὅσια must have something in common; μή ἰδέσθαι . . . τὰ ὅσια ὅσα and accepts Euthyphro's suggestion that this ἰδέσθαι is τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλέσθαι only if this gives an equivalence such that ὅσιον ≡ τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλέσθαι. Such a requirement is difficult enough to meet for a word having a wide range of strength and weakness of meaning within a single logical sense, but quite impossible to satisfy for a word such as φίλος which has several senses each having a logically distinct application. Plato in the "Lysis" was thus led to assimilate the different senses of and the different topics under discussion by an ideal of definition which in this case cannot be satisfied.

Conclusions: τὸ ἀγαθόν in the "Lysis"

After τὸ φίλον in its various senses, the next most frequent term to occur in the "Lysis" is probably τὸ ἀγαθόν. To what might have seemed to be principally a psychological question (τί ἐστὶν τὸ φίλον;) answers are suggested which might seem to be couched in ethical terms. What Plato was trying to discover or suggest about τὸ ἀγαθόν in the "Lysis" may well be ultimately a more important question than what he was trying to discover or suggest about τὸ φίλον.

Plato's first suggestion that φίλοι are ἀγαθοί, indeed, relies on his own view of the psychology of ἀρετή. Those who say that ὅμοιοι are friends, he suggests, must mean that only ἀγαθοί are friends, because only they are truly stable and self-consistent in character; instability of character is clearly a disqualification for friendship. The cardinal point of the psychology of the "Republic" may perhaps be here faintly anticipated, the earliest form of the notion of the "integration of the personality"; (but there is as yet no "division of the soul" into parts; and the converse observations that the bad were unstable and unreliable as friends were commonplaces long before Plato). (*See commentary, 214 b⁸, c⁷, d¹⁻².*)

But ἀρετή, Plato observes, implies not only stability of character but also self-sufficiency. This was perhaps Socrates' extension of the concept of σωφροσύνη; not only is self-control and self-contentment a virtue, but true virtue makes self-sufficiency fully possible. This is closest perhaps to the link Plato seeks to establish between κοσμιότης and εὐδαιμονία in the "Gorgias", and of course again anticipates the happiness of the δίκαιος ἀνὴρ of the "Republic". (*See commentary at 215 a⁶.*)

But if stability might tend to promote friendship, self-sufficiency will have the opposite result. The self-sufficient will not need each other's help or even their company. This objection to the suggestion of ἀρετή as the basis of friendship may perhaps seem to rest rather heavily on the notion that mutual utility is required in friendship; could the good not establish a friendship based on sympathy or congeniality, even if not on utility? (*See commentary at 214 e¹.*)

Any attempt to guess how Plato would have answered this question must be based on what he says in the rest of the dialogue. To deal with the dilemma left when the simple classification of men into good and bad fails to explain friendship, Plato develops a theory of a tripartite classification into good, bad and intermediate, on the basis of which he argues that the good will be pursued by the intermediate. The examples offered of this pursuit are all based on the need of the intermediate for the good, the need for the good to make up the deficiencies of those who are not good, where the deficiencies are not yet so great as to make this impossible.

The pursuit of the good is thus based on utility. But it is utility in a broad sense; the ignorant (though not the stupid) will pursue wisdom, as well as the sick man health. Plato is suggesting that the good is useful, rather than that the useful is good; nevertheless the utility of the good is clearly a central point in his arguments recommending the pursuit of the good. This form of "utilitarianism" (though it is not a form so-called utilitarians would always recognise) has to be admitted as a major factor in Plato's earlier ethics. Much of the "Gorgias" turns on the attempt by Plato to suggest that "good" is synonymous with "good for" one; in the "Meno" it is conversely argued that the bad is harmful. Instead of dismissing these arguments as patently fallacious, interpreters would do better to try to analyse Plato's skill in suggesting how they might acquire force.

Plato adds to his argument that the good is pursued because of need for it an argument which seems as if it were meant to prove that only the good is ever pursued (because only the sole end is really pursued, and the end is goodness). A corollary of this, clearly enough, would be that the good alone is the real object of all our needs. The good then, when obtained, would satisfy all our requirements. Insofar as we need it, we are incomplete; insofar as we have achieved it, we have satisfied our needs.

It must be noted that this argument displaying the need to pursue the good not only follows on an assertion of the self-sufficiency of the good, but itself implies this. Whoever is good has satisfied

his needs, and so is selfsufficient. Plato has not given us an alternative means of establishing that the good are friends, but a redoubled proof that goodness is such that the good will not need friends.

Translated into Greek, this can be seen to be the underlying paradox of the whole of the "Lysis". οἱ ἀγαθοί are not φίλοι, because they are selfsufficient; but τὸ ἀγαθόν is φίλον because it satisfies our needs. To us, granted Plato's conception of goodness, this is no puzzle; but in Plato's own terms it is acutely paradoxical. The more strongly he pressed his manner of arguing that τὸ ἀγαθόν was φίλον the more it appeared that οἱ ἀγαθοί could not be φίλοι. The puzzles created by the meaning of φίλον for Plato were perhaps not merely those of definition, but also this of its relation with τὸ ἀγαθόν. The investigation of friendship, not least when it began in terms of the psychology of ἀρετή, suggested an investigation of τὸ φίλον, the general object of our various "pursuits"; this for Plato was an opportunity to develop his theory that all desires are ultimately of the good. But this statement of his theory of man's need for the good only reinforced the puzzles about friendship.

The "Lysis" thus is written round an ἀπορία not merely over definition, but also one of substance. We all pursue the good; our pursuit of friends is an aspect of this pursuit; but how then can the good man need friends? This problem was still a live issue when Aristotle wrote the "Nicomachean Ethics"; it has its origin here in the "Lysis".

One might, on rather inadequate evidence, conjecture that a similar puzzle underlies Plato's curious play with the notion of οἰκειότης at the end of the dialogue. "Kinship" would make ἀγαθοί friends, if τὸ οἶκετον is τὸ ἀγαθόν; but the sense in which Plato saw most strength in the suggestion that τὸ ἀγαθόν was οἶκετον was no doubt that it showed the good as "fitting", "appropriate to", "naturally needed by" those who had not yet achieved it. In this sense οἰκειότης too would explain a relationship between the good and those not already good, and would tend only to make puzzling the relationship between two persons both of whom had achieved goodness already.

To focus the issues of the "Lysis" so closely upon this one paradox of course invites the charge of subjective interpretation. But the frequency with which τὸ ἀγαθόν reappears in the complex argument, after more than once seeming to have been excluded, perhaps justifies the guess that it was the connection between τὸ φίλον and τὸ ἀγαθόν that was Plato's strongest interest in this dialogue.

Note on the relative date
of composition of the dialogue

Controversies over the findings of "Sprachstatistik" raged with especial fury over the "Lysis"; von Arnim + placed it early in Plato's "first period", and was attacked by Pohlenz with some force (though from mistaken motives ++); later Ritter in his last article (Hermes, 1935, never completed) placed the "Lysis" at the end of Plato's earlier period. But many of both von Arnim and Ritter's indicators were unique occurrences (which are not automatically valueless, but in short dialogues give little chance of establishing any precise notion of their frequency); and one of Ritter's key arguments for the "Lysis" rested on the expression ἀλλὰ τί μῆν; which occurs four times on one page of the "Lysis" (208), and probably should be taken as deliberately used there by Plato to indicate the naive liveliness of the boy Lysis imitated in conversation with him by Socrates.

"Sprachstatistik" added great weight to the general division of Plato's work into three or four periods; but perhaps it has so far failed to settle more detailed questions. Further progress, if any is possible, will perhaps have to be made on the basis of comparison between the philosophical content of the dialogues; and here of course many prejudices come into play. My own feeling would be that clues might be found in Plato's treatment of purely logical questions more often than in his modifications of his

+ See refs. in Simeterre, "Introduction a l'etude de Platon", chap. II.

+ In "Aus Platos Werdezeit".

views on wider matters; + it is perhaps easier to see what the order may have been in which he reached the various positions his works reveal in matters of logic than on matters where (for instance) practical problems may have influenced his outlook.

If this is so, the dialogues showing the most similar logical preoccupations with the "Lysis" are the other short "definition-seeking" dialogues. These all fairly certainly fall within Plato's "early" period; they were not necessarily all written together, but by taking them as a group perhaps some slight differences in Plato's approach to methods of definition might be detected. I will merely say here that, without having properly analysed the matter, it seems to me that Plato makes more frequent specific statements about his methods in the "Euthyphro" and "Hippias Major" than in "Laches", "Lysis" and "Charmides", and this would seem to me to suggest that these two were written later than the other three. But the work on this remains to be done.

As for the much-canvassed closeness of the "Lysis" to the "Symposium", I hope my treatment of the dialogue has shown that this is largely illusory. φίλια is not the same topic as ἔρωσ; nor (more significantly) is the suggestion that τὸ ἀγαθόν is φίλον necessarily very close to the suggestion that even the highest forms of καλόν are the objects of ἔρωσ. The linguistic analysis of φίλον will have shown that in poetry, if not in prose, τὸ ἀγαθόν could always have been called φίλον in a sense which had little to do with and was not at all analogous to, affection for men. The true parallel for the πρῶτον φίλον is, as I have shown, the βούλησις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ of the "Gorgias". Finally, as Professor Dodds suggests to me, even insofar as the same kind of analogy between affection for persons and pursuit of the good might perhaps be read into the

+ It is perhaps worth quoting here Dr. George Davie, "The Democratic Intellect", Edinburgh 1961, p. 251: "in (Lewis) Campbell's case the doctrinal analysis of Plato in terms of this stock topic of the philosophy class (i.e. "abstract ideas") enabled him to place the Theaetetus as a mature work by comparison with the Republic and so prepared the way for his stylometric investigation of the order of composition." This is too often forgotten.

"Lysis" as is found in the "Symposium", the fact that the analogy is established through the use of fundamentally different terms - φιλία and ἔρωσ - would tend to suggest the lapse of some time between Plato's two attempts to establish this analogy.

(A further note on the relation of the πρώτον φίλον of the "Lysis" to αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν of the "Symposium" will be found in the commentary at 220b⁶.)

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revised by Ph. Buttman, Berlin 1827.
- Imm. Bekker, *Platonis Opera*, Vol. I: London 1826.
(contains notes from earlier editions, including Heindorf.)
- God. Stallbaum, *Platonis Opera*, Vol. IV; Gotha and Erfurdt, 1833: 2nd edition 1857.

Heindorf and Stallbaum's editions are both excellent; Heindorf did much for the text, Stallbaum even more for the interpretation of Plato. Bekker remains the sole source of information about many of the secondary mss. of Plato.

No full-scale commentary on the "Lysis" has appeared since Stallbaum. Such school editions as I have seen contribute very little; none seems ever to have been published in England.

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- R. Walzer, *Magna Moralia und Aristotelische Ethik*,
chap. B. III, Berlin 1929.
- F. Dirlmeier, *Φίλος und Φιλία*, diss. Munich 1931.
- E. R. Dodds, *Plato's Gorgias*, Oxford 1959.

Evidence for the Text

Professor Dodds, to whose discussion of the manuscripts in his edition of the 'Gorgias' I shall continually have to refer, has emphasised that work on the text of Plato is still far from completed. The general excellence of the tradition, and the sound judgment of Burnet as an editor, had lulled scholars into complacency about our knowledge of the manuscripts.⁺

But
and The evidence of primary manuscripts is still inadequately or wrongly reported; the origins of many readings are reported only as "scr. rec." (scribae recentiores).

In trying to remedy this position I have done much less for the "Lysis" than Professor Dodds has done for the "Gorgias". The "Lysis" is not contained in F, which as representing a second family will when properly collated throw new light on the dialogues from tetralogy VI 3 to IX 1. But I have tried to give a complete account of the readings of W for the "Lysis", some of which were unknown to Burnet;⁺⁺ and I have tried to trace the sources of interesting readings from the secondary manuscripts.

Primary Mss.

The primary manuscripts for the "Lysis" are all from what for the "Gorgias" Professor Dodds has called the first family:-

Bodleianus Clarkianus 39, (B), written in 895.

Clarkianus

Marcianus Append. Class. 4. 1., (T), late 11th or early 12th century (Omont).

Vindobonensis Suppl. Graec. 7, (W), c. 950 - 1050 (Maas).

+ With the exception of Diès and Des Places among the ~~B~~^u dé editors. *Bude*

++ In the "Lysis" I have found very few wrong reports of W by Burnet. Burnet's note added to his sigla in the second edition of Vol. I, "Codicis W ... lectiones cum B consentientex silentio fere praeterii" should probably not be taken to apply to the "Lysis", where Burnet seems to have quoted all the readings he knew of.

These Mss. can be shown to be independent of each other and must all be treated as substantive witnesses, since each is sometimes the sole carrier of the correct reading; but all three though independent seem in some way to be interrelated, since any two of them are liable to agree in a worse or a wrong reading at points where the other has a better or a right reading.+ In addition, each ms. occasionally contains variants in the first hand, and these are frequently in agreement with the reading of one or both of the other mss. ++ The explanation might be that these mss. descend from a hyparchetype which carried variants; +++ Professor Dodds however points to individual uncial errors in each of these mss. and suggests that they have

+ For the "Lysis" alone, it might be difficult completely to exclude the possibility that this happened either because of accidental coincidences in errors or because of conjectural corrections by individual scribes. But the frequency of this pattern and the occurrence of more conclusive cases in other dialogues / confirm that the following are probable instances of this pattern:-

B is right against the agreement of TW at 216e³, 217d⁷, 218b⁶, 223b¹:

T is right against the agreement of BW at 204a³, 209d², 222b⁴:

W is right against the agreement of BT at 204a⁴, 208b⁴, 219c³, 221d⁵

/ See Kral, Wiener Studien 1892.

++ At 222b⁷ W has the different readings of both B and T as variants.

+++ *Histoire du Texte de Platon*,
Allive, pp. 183 - 186, following Kral, Wiener Studien XIV, 1892.

converged by contamination. + But for the editor, whatever the explanation, there are ample cases to show that the agreement of two of these mss. neither requires nor authorises him to reject the reading of the third; he must make his own choice. ++

An apparatus which by elimination represents only the hyparchetype is impossible; the readings of all three mss. must be cited except in the case of obvious individual mistakes. +++

Secondary Mss.

Besides BTW Post⁷ lists 28 later mss. containing the "Lysis" dating from the XIII - XV centuries. The complete filiation of all parts of all these mss. is far from being established; but to do this would probably not be worth the labour required. The general dependence of all these mss. for the "Lysis" on one or other of BTW is fairly certain;

+ "Gorgias", Introd. pp. 38 -41. But the uncial error $\delta\eta$ for $\xi\nu$ at Lysis 204a³ is found in both B and W.

++ In the "Lysis", discounting cases where there are variants, T W agree against B (in a right or a wrong reading) almost as often as BT against W; the agreement of BW against T is only about half as frequent. These figures prove nothing about the relative "closeness" of these mss. to each other unless we assume each scribe added only an equal number of his own errors. The scribes of B and W here may merely have been more careless than the scribe of T.

+++ I have attempted for the "Lysis" to record even these mistakes for all three mss.; I rely on Burnet for reports of B and T, and on my own collation for W.

≠ "The Vatican Plato and its Relations," Connecticut 1934; Post quotes Schanz's or his own identifications of the sources of several of these mss.

some of them however are of interest because they contain a few new readings.+

Descendants of B and W

These are few and of little interest for the "Lysis". Post gives the following:-

from B for "Lysis": Vaticanus 226

from W for "Lysis": Vaticanus 1029

Lobcovicianus VI F. a. 1.

Such readings as are available from Bekker for these mss. accord with these derivations. At 206e⁷ Vaticanus 1029 has what appears to have been the reading of W before correction.

Descendants of T

There are a greater number of versions of the "Lysis" derived ultimately from T. One group of these are Parisinus 1808 and its descendants.

Parisinus 1808: 13th c., (called "Par" by Dodds) was shown by Schanz to be derived from T because it omits complete lines of T; ++ but it has very occasional readings not derived from T. Some of these are variants or corrections which agree with B or W:-

Lysis 209c⁴ ἡγήσηται BT; ἡγήσεται W; ἡγήσεται^η Par.

210a³ διανοίγοντες W; διανύγοντες T; διανύγοντες^{οι} Par.

216a⁵ ἀλλοκότων BT; ἀλλοκότως TW; ἀλλοκότων^σ Par.

+ I have collated Par. 1808, Laur. 85.12., Ven. 189, 186, 184, and examined Laur. 85.6, 59.1 and 85.9. Some reports are available from Bekker and Stallbaum for other mss. in Paris, Florence and Rome.

++ Schanz, Platocodex, p. 47 sq.

At 222a² Par had had τῶν ἐρωμένων (BW), but this has been altered by erasure to τῷ ἐρωμένῳ (T).

But Par in the "Lysis" also has a number of divergences from T which have not been taken from B or W :-

at 204a⁵ the scribe of Par having omitted BTW's less idiomatic τε has added γε above the line.

at 217c⁵ Par omits BTW's intruded τι.

at 218d⁶ the scribe of Par after writing κότερόζ (BTW) has himself corrected this to κότερόν.

These three readings are all accepted by modern editors (the two last are necessary corrections). Professor Dodds accepts Schanz's supposition that Par is descended from T through an intermediary which had been occasionally corrected from B or W; but either the scribe of the intermediary or the scribe of Par himself, or both, must also have made corrections not derived from B W, perhaps by conjecture; at 206a⁹ and 216b⁶ Par instead of δοκοῦ (BTW) and δοκεῖ (BTW) respectively has δοκῆι, which perhaps represents a deliberate attempt to produce the false construction δοκῆι (subj.) ἄν + infinitive. (At the first point δοκοῦ is usually doubted.)

Par is also interesting for the contributions of a later corrector ("Par²"); in the "Lysis" these are:-

213a⁶ μισῶν for φιλῶν.

213c⁴ in marg. γρ. καὶ ὅταν μὴ μισοῦν τις μισῆ.

219c⁶ ἦ for ἧ BT, ἦ W Par (?).

All these are necessary corrections accepted by all editors. +

Thus six readings accepted in modern texts and attributed to "scr. recc." probably have their earliest source in Par and Par². Those at 213a⁶ and 213c⁴, if conjectures, are the work of a reader attending carefully to a complex argument, who was not confused when his mss. presented him with the opposite of what the author meant; but there is no reason why a Byzantine reader interested enough in Plato to read the "Lysis" should not have been capable of this. ++ If these "good readings" had represented access to another ancient tradition one might perhaps have expected them all to come through one scribe or corrector, whereas they are equally divided between both. Furthermore, other "good readings" seem to make first appearances in various places elsewhere among the 13th - 14th c. mss., along with what are clearly false conjectures; e.g. "γρ. ἢ τὸ αἴτιον" corr. Ven. 186 at Lysis 217c⁷, where the true correction was first made by Heindorf; κωμικώτερα Laur. 85.12 for

+ The only other appearance of Par² in the "Lysis", apart from occasional corrections of spelling, is at 214d², where above σχολῆ γέ τω ἄλλω Par² has added something almost illegible, which might be αν (γ' ἄν with γ' deleted: ἄν is supplied by Bekker, Madvig and Burnet); but Ven. 189 has σχολῆ γε κωμικώτερα ἄλλω which suggests it was read by other scribes as κωμ, which though idiomatic is otiose. (Bekker's apparatus may imply that he read this as κωμ altered to ἄν).

++ R. Browning, "Recentiores non Deteriores", Bulletin of Inst. Class. Stud. Univ. London No. 7¹ (1960) has collected many instances where 13th or 14th century scholars had access to early tradition. But this seems unlikely to be the explanation of "good recentiores" of Plato: see Dodds, "Gorgias" pp. 52-3.

κρονικώτερα at 205c⁶; also at 218b⁶ Par had had T's false order νδν πάνυ γε ἐφάτην ἄρα, which was at some time improved by the erasure of νδν but not by its reinsertion before ἄρα where B shows that it should go; this must be conjecture, not tradition. +

Other secondary mss. of the "Lysis" include several which appear to derive from Par; ++ -

Laurentianus 85.6; written before 1355 (called "Flor" by Dodds, and derived from Par for the "Gorgias"); +++ of the six certain corrections quoted above from Par and Par² it has those at 204a⁵ (Par), 217c⁵ (Par) and 219c⁶, (Par²) in its first hand; but

at 213a⁶ Par²'s μισῶν has been added by a correcting hand in Flor.

at 213c⁴ Flor wrote ὅταν ἢ μισοῦν τις φιλήῃ BTW Par, but the corrector altered this to ὅταν ἢ μὴ μισοῦν τις μισῇ, which is an improved version of Par²'s ὅταν μὴ μισοῦν τις μισῇ.

at 218d⁶ Par's self-correction πότερόν has been added by the correcting hand in Flor.

Also, however, Flor at 209a⁷ contributes ἔχῃς; and at 219c⁷ the corrector

+ Another possible case of a conjectural attempt to heal an error where we now have other evidence for the probable reading is at 217e¹, where BF have τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐρωτῶ νδν δῆ. Par here has omitted νδν perhaps purposely; but W has ἐρωτῶν, which suggests that the true reading is ἠρώτων νδν δῆ.

++ Besides the distinctive readings so far noted, which might conceivably reappear in other mss. through contamination, Par has in the "Lysis" two less significant variants which act as further clues to its descendants,

at 203a² ἐπεὶ for ἐπειδὴ BTW:
at 211b⁴ αὐτῷ ἄλλο for ἄλλο αὐτῷ BTW

+++ Dodds, "Gorgias", p. 49.

of Hor seems to have contributed a "good reading" by altering ἄλλοις BTWPar to ἄλλο, in which he had not been anticipated by Par².

Laurentianus 59.1 seems to have been rightly thought by Post + to derive from Par for the "Lysis"; it has all the six quoted corrections of Par and Par² in its first hand, as has its own descendant Laur. 85.9 (except at 219c⁶ where Laur. 85.9 has wrongly reverted to ἦ).

Venetus 189 (S) for the "Lysis" seems also to derive from Par and has the corrections in its first hand; it also has at 204d² ἐγειρομένοις, which appears as a correction in Laur. 85.9.

(Venetus 186 however, despite Schanz and Post, for the "Lysis" does not derive from S, nor from Par, though ultimately from T; at 222c³⁻⁵ it has the full text where S omits τὸ οἴκετον εἶναι. Of Par and Par²'s corrections it only had 218d⁶ πότερόν in its original text; those at 213a⁶, c⁴, 217c⁵ and 219c⁶ have been added as corrections, but at 204a⁵ it has only BTW's τε.

Venetus 184 for the "Lysis" is a copy of Ven. 186^{after correction.}

Other "good readings" are contributed for the "Lysis" in mss. or groups of mss. which descend from T but not through Par. Three of these appear in both Coislinianus 155 ++ and Laurentianus 85.12:

209a⁴ πω corr. Coisl., Laur. 85.12.

210a¹ ἰατρικὸν Coisl., Laur. 85.12

215d³ πρὸς add. corr. Coisl., Laur. 85.12

+ p. 36

++ For this ms. I rely on Bekker. It seems also to share a number of mistakes with Laur. 85.12 (e.g. at 204e⁸ ἔφη Δημοκράτους, at 210a² ἰατρικούς, at 213a² μάλιστα ἐστὶ πάντων) which perhaps derives from it.

Laur. 85.12 has a ^{riotously} ~~poor~~ inaccurate text, and apparently by contamination has acquired some but not all of the corrections of Par and Par²; but at

210a⁹ ἄρ' ἔχει (Priscian)

210c⁶ φιλήσει ἐν

217c¹ ἐστὶν ἄν τι (doubtful sense)

it has improvements for which it seems to be our earliest source. Again the distribution of these readings makes them more likely to be conjectures than fragments of otherwise unknown tradition.

This accounts for most of the "good readings" of 'scribae recentiores' for the "Lysis"; Burnet accordingly was perhaps not unjustified in his observation: "scio equidem vel in deterrimis libris optimae notae lectiones passim ⁱⁿ inveniri, sed plerasque a viris doctis post renatas litteras inter legendum adscriptas ut suum cuique tribui debet, ita coniectura non memoria niti eiusmodi lectiones fatendum est." + On the other hand since "recentiores" of Greek authors occur which do seem to preserve tradition, this possibility can be excluded only by careful recording of the earliest discoverable source of each "good reading", and therefore the blanket-reference "scr. recc." should be avoided. It may seem to some scholars that the possibility will not have been excluded until the complete stemma of the secondary mss. of Plato has been established; but this could not be done by considering one dialogue alone. It would hardly be worth hunting further for clues about the stemma among versions of the "Lysis" alone; it is of course possible that such guesses as I have ventured to offer may be proved wrong whenever a more comprehensive enquiry is made.

+ Burnet, *Platonis Opera* II, praefatio.

Papyrus evidence.

Pap. Oxyrhynchi VI 881, 3rd c. A.D., has about sixty words of the "Lysis" (at 208c³-d³), including eight variants from the text of the medieval mss.:-- two variations in word order, two omissions, and four places where it has words not found in the mss., in three places these being particles. Two of the added particles are misplaced (γε at 208c⁵ and d¹), and the omissions are almost certainly wrong. Perhaps we should therefore be suspicious of the other novelties of this papyrus; the other additions verge on redundancy, and the variations in word-order are unimportant. Wilamowitz⁴ accepted κἄν at 208c⁶ and the new order in the same line, and observed "So lernen wir, das selbst ein Text, an dem wir nicht angstossen, keineswegs gang zuverl⁴ässig ist"; + but more likely this is to be treated as a "wild papyrus", a careless, cheap copy.

Testimonia and scholia

Testimonia for the "Lysis" seem to be few; for instance, there seem to be no quotations in Plutarch or Stobaeus. Priscian however preserves the correct reading^{at} 210a⁹. The scholia are also few, but at 216a⁵ the "scholiasta vetus" ++ preserves a reading which was conjecturally restored by Baiter.

+ Platon, II p. 68

++ I have not examined T at this point, but even the lemma survives as ἀλλόχοτον In P⁴ and Ven. 189.

TEXT and APPARATUS

At the top of the page I have inserted the alterations I would make to Burnet's text. Below follow testimonia, in part derived from Schanz's edition. Below that the apparatus has been completely rewritten. The line numbers throughout are Burnet's.

203b² εὐθὺ Λυκαίου; τὸ εἰς Λύκαιον, Photius s.v.

203a¹, b² ἀκαδημίας BTW (sed priore loco ¹ ex emend. B)

b³ εὐθὺ* rasura facta et B et W: εὐθὺς T

b⁸ αὐτοῖ TW : αὐτοῖ ἦ B

204a² ἔφη t, W² in rasura, Par : φῆν B :

ἔφην T et olim W (?) : φησι b

a³ ἄν T : δὴ BW

a⁴ γε W : δέ BT

a⁵ ἑταῖρος γε Par (γε supra lineam addito) :

ἑταῖρος τε BTW

a⁸ - b²

Βούλει οὖν ἔπεσθαι, ἔφη, ἵνα καὶ
 ἴδῃς τοὺς ὄντας αὐτόθι;
 Αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἠδέεσθαι ἀκούσαιμ' ἂν ἐπι
 τῷ καὶ εἴσειμι καὶ τίς ὁ καλός.

d¹

..... κἄν μὲν δη εὐμάρεια

d⁵

..... καὶ ὃ ἔτι τούτων

204c⁷ - d²

imitavit Aristaenetus Ep. I 24 ἐκκεκώφηκας
 (-ωκας Reiske) ἡμῶν τὰ ὦτα καὶ
 ἐμπέκληκας τοῦ Λύσιδος, ὥστε καὶ
 ἀνεγρομένους ἐξ ὕπνου οἴεσθαι τοῦ νέου
 τὴν προσηγορίαν ἀκούειν
 ἡμῶν οὖν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐκκεκώφωκε τὰ ὦτα καὶ
 ἐμπέκληκε Λύσιδος, Grammaticus anonymus apud
 Schaefer in Add. ad Gregorium Corinthium p. 909.

204a⁶

ἀνήρ Schanz : ἀνήρ BTW

a⁸

ἴδῃς Ficinus : εἰδῆς BTW

b¹

αὐτοῦ BTW : αὐτό Ast : seclusit Burnet

εἴσειμι TW : εἴσειμι B

b⁴

μοι TW : ποι B

c⁷

ἐκκεκώφωκε BTW Grammaticus Schaeferi :

ἐκκεκώφηκε T² : -ῶκε Par :

ἐκκεκώφηκ(ας) Aristaen. cod.

d¹

κἄν Denniston (G.P. p. 393) : ἄν BTW

εὐμάρεια T : εὐμαρία B : εὐμοιρία W

d⁵

ὃ ἔτι Naber : ὃ ἔστιν BTW

204e⁶ ἱκανὸς γὰρ γινώσκεισθαι imit. Aristaenetus
Ep. II 19, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ μόνου τοῦ κάλλους
γινώσκεισθαι.

204e³ ἔτι T : εἶ B : εἶ τι W
e⁴ σφόδρα τὸν TW : σφοδρότατον B
e⁵ δεῖς BW (sed^spraene erasum B) : δεῖ σε T
e⁷ οὗτινος T : οὖν. τίνος B : οὖν ^{οὗ}εἶ τίνος W
e⁸ αἰξωνέως TW : ἐξωνέως B
e¹⁰ ἀνεῦρες TW : ἀν εὔρες B
205a³ ὅδε TW : omisit B

205c⁵ - 206a¹⁰

205c⁶ Κρονικώτερα

205c⁶ cf. Hesychium s.v. κρονικώτερα• ἀρχαιότερα.

205c⁵ νεμέα TW : νέμεα B : νεμέαι Par

ε⁶ λέγει] ἄδει Naber

ε⁶ κρονικώτερα TW : χρονικώτερα B

ε⁷ τινι] νι W, τινι W²

δ⁶ σαυτόν BT² : αὐτόν TW

δ¹⁰ τὸ δέ T : τόδε BW (Socrati attrib. W)

206a⁹ δοκεῖ Urbin. 31 : Heindorf : δοκοῖ BTW :

δοκηῖ Par.

b⁶ ποιήσης

d¹ καὶ οἱ παῖδες. πρόσσειν οὖν σοι .
εἰ δὲ μή,

206b² κηλεῖν BT : καλεῖν W

b⁴ δοκεῖ TW : δοκεῖ γάρ B

b⁶ ποιήσης BTW : ποιήσεις Ven. 186, 184, Heindorf.

c⁷ σε T : γε B : γε^σ W

c⁸ ἄν BT : οὐ W

d⁴ ἑταῖρος TW : ἕτερος^{cu} B

d⁵ προσίη T : προσείη B : προσίη W

e¹ προσῆα Schanz : προσῆειν Laur. 85.12, corr.

Ven. 186, Ven. 189. 184 : προσῆει TW :

προσείη B

e² ἤεσαν BT : ἦεσαν W

206e⁵ - 207c⁸

206e⁵ - 207b⁶

206e⁶⁻⁸ cf. Stephanum in Ar. Rhet. Comm. III 5, p. 316 Rabe
(ad Ar. Rhet. 1407b²) τυχοι ἀρτιασμοῖς]
ἀρτιασμός καὶ ἀρτιάζειν ἐστὶ τὸ δραξάμενον
ἀστραγάλων ἢ τινων ἄλλων ἐξετάζειν τὸν συμ-
καίζοντα πότερον ἀρτίους ἢ περισσοὺς κατέχει.
οὕτω καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ διαλόγῳ τοῦ Λύσιδος λέγει.
Cf. Schol. vet. ad 206e.

206e⁵⁻⁸ respicit Pollux Onom. IX 101 Bethe: καὶ μὴ καὶ
ἀρτιάζειν ἀστραγάλους ἐκφορμίσκων κατερωμένους
ἐν τῷ ἀποδυτηρίῳ τοὺς παῖδας ὁ Πλάτων ἔφη.

206e⁷ ἀστραγάλους καμκόλλους BT et ex₂ correctione W :
ἀστραγάλους καμκόλλους Vat. 1029, et
habuerat W, legit fortasse Pollux (qui tamen καμκόλλους
omisit).

e⁸ πορμίσκων W
προαιρούμενοι BTW : κατερώμενοι fortasse legit
Pollux (καταιρομένους Pollucis cod. A).

e⁹ λυσίας W
207a² καλός B ex correctione, T : κάλλος W, habuerat
ut vid. B

b¹ εἶδεν TW : ἴδεν B

b³ εἶπετο BW et in marg. T : ἔσπετο T.

b⁴ προσήλθον δὴ BT : προσήλθον δὲ W, (Laur. 85.12).

b⁵ ἐπηλυγισάμενος BTW : ἐπηλυγασάμενος T.

206e⁵ - 207c⁸ : contd.

207b⁶ - c⁸

207b⁵ ἐπηλυγησάμενος (sic) παρὰ Πλάτωνι τὸ
προβαλόμενος καὶ ἐπισκιασάμενος Photius (Porson)
s.v. ἡλύγη. cf. Eust. 809.42 (ex Aelio Dionysio)
qui idem refert sed ἐπηλυγασάμενος.

207b⁶ προσέστη Stephanus : προέστη BTW
(b⁷ προσεστῶς BTW)

b⁶ ἦ TW : ἦ B

b⁶ ᾤετο < ἐ > Hirschig

207b⁶ δεδιῶς BTW : δεδειῶς T

b⁶ αὐτῷ BT : αὐτὸ W

c³ καὶ om. W

c⁸ ἐρήσομαι] ἐ expemendatione B.

e⁴⁻⁵

τοῦτο παντί πρόπω δηλον ὅτι
προθυμοσνται, ὅπως ἂν εὐδαιμονοίης

207e⁷

διακωλύουσι BT : κωλύουσι W (sed διακ-
208a¹, a⁴)

208a⁵

τίνα BTW : τί Schanz : ἄλλὰ τί μήν Lysidi
tribuit Richards

a⁶

μισθωτῶ TW : μισθωτῆ B

b¹

τούτου BW : τοῦτο T

208b⁴ - 209a³

208b⁴ - c⁶

b⁴ τί δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μάλιστα; οὐδένι

b⁵ ὀρεωκόμεω

c³ Ὅδε παιδαγωγός, ἔφη.

208c³ ἐπιτρεπου]σιν .. d³ [ἐπει] δαν P. Oxy. VI 881.

208b⁴ - b⁵ πόθεν τύπτειν; in textu omissa in margine
supplevit W

b⁴ τί δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μάλιστα W : μάλιστα
omisit BT : τί δαί bT

b⁸ σε δέ TW : σε B, superascr. δε B²

c¹ καί μοι ἔτι BW et in marg. T : καί ἔτι μοι T

c³ τίς σου BTW : σου τις Pap.

c³ ὅδε corr. Ven. 186 (Bessarion?), Laur. 85.12 :
ὁ δέ BT : ὅδε ὁ W : omisit omnino Pap.

c⁴ ἀλλά τί μὴν omisit Pap.

c⁵ ὄντα BTW : ὄντα γε Pap.

c⁶ τί δέ BTW : τί δέ καί Pap.

c⁶ σου post οὗτος posuit Pap.

208b⁴ - 209a³ : contd.

208b⁷ - 209a³

-
-
- 208d¹ σοι BTW : σοι γε Pap.
- d² ἄρχοντας ἐκῶν BTW : ἄρχοντας ὡς εἴκειν ἐκῶν Pap.
- d⁴ βούλη ἴν' αὐτῆ TW : βούληι ναύτη B
- d⁴ ἦς ἦ T : ἦση B : εἴηις ἦ W
- e¹ ἄν TW : omisit B
- e⁴ ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τίνος BT : ἀλλὰ τί τίνος W

209b⁷ cf. Hesych. s.v. ψῆλαι : ψῆλαι· τελαι.

- 209a⁴ πω corr. Coisl. : που BTW
- a⁷ ἔχης Laur. 85.6 (Flor) : ἔχοις BTW
- b⁷ ψῆλαι BTW sed in marg. τέλαι T : γρ. καὶ τίλλαι
in marg. W
- c¹ ἐν οἷς δὲ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν κωλύουσι in textu omissa
in margine supplevit W
- c⁴ ἠγήσηται BT : ἠγήσεται W : ἠγήσεται Par
- c⁶ τί δὲ τῷ TW : τί θαί· τῷ in ras. B²
- d¹ οἰκονομεῖν T² : οἰκοδομεῖν BTW
- d² οἰκονομίας T : οἰκοδομίας BW
- d⁷ ἐπιτρέψειεν ἐψομένων nescio quis primus; nondum
Stephanus
ἐπιτρέψειεν ἐν ἐψομένων T et revera W
(ἐψ^ομένων W);
ἐπιτρέψειεν ἐνεψομένων B
- d⁸ ἐμβάλλειν secl. Heindorf;
ἐμβαλεῖν Bekker (secluso ἐμβαλεῖν d⁸-e¹)

210c⁷ - 211b⁵

210d⁵ φρονεῖ T : φρόνιμος BW (sed οτ supra ιμος W)
211a⁵ εἰπέ BT : εἶπερ W
b² ἀνερέσθαι] ε in ras. B

211b⁶ - e⁷

211e⁷ ἑταῖρον, ἢ ἄλλον ἢ αὐτὸν Δαρειον

211c¹⁰ - d¹ ὑμεῖς μόνω ἐστιάσεσθον, ἡμῖν δὲ οὐ μεταδίδοτον
Proclus in Timaeum I p. 16 Diehl.

211e² ἐγὼ δὲ e³ ἐρωτικῶς Priscianus Inst. XVIII 277;
respicit Themistius Gr. XXII (περὶ φιλίας) p. 324
Dindorf.

211b⁷ ἐπικουρήσεις T : ἐπικουρήσης BW (ηῖσ
refictum in ras. sed non videtur εἶσ fuisse B)

e⁷ ἢ ἄλλον Madvig : μάλλον BTW

211e⁸ - 212d⁵

211e ⁸	ἐγὼ	BT :	γὰρ	W
212a ³	σύ τε	Heindorf :	σύ δέ	BTW
a ⁶	δῆ	omisit	W	
b ²	ἔφη	omisit	W	
c ¹	οἱ μὲν	Heindorf :	οἴόμενοι	BTW
c ⁴	πότερος	Hirschig :	ὀπότερος	BTW

212d⁶ - 213c⁵

212e¹ ψεύδεσθ' W

213a⁶ μισῶν Par² : φιλῶν BTW

e⁴ ὅταν ἢ μὴ μισοῦν τις μισῆ corr. Flor. :

ὅταν ἢ μισοῦν τις φιλῆ BTW :

γρ. καὶ ὅταν μὴ μισοῦν τις μισῆ in marg. Par²

e⁵ χρησόμεθα W

213c⁶ - 214b⁶

213d² Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σωκράτες,
ὁ Λύσις,

e⁵ ἶέναι, σκοποῦντας κατὰ τοὺς ποιητάς

213c⁷ ante ἀλλὰ signum interrogandi posuere
iam edd. Bipont; ἴρα pro ἀλλὰ conj. Cornarius

c⁹ εὐπορῶ BT²W : ἀπορῶ T

d² ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Λύσις Heindorf : ἔφη
omiserunt BTW : post Σώκρατες addidit

Vat. 1029, Cornarius

e⁵ σκοποῦντας Schleiermacher : σκοποῦντα BTW :
τὰ κατὰ BTW : τὰ secl. Heindorf

214a⁵ πως ὡδί BT (sed δί ex emend. in ras. B):

πρὸς ὡδήν W

a⁶ ὡς BT : ἐς W

b⁴ ἀνάγκη BW : ἀνάγκη T

214b⁷ - 215a⁴

214d² φίλον < ἄν > γένοιτο. ἢ οὐ

214d¹ Hesych. s.v. ἐμπληκτους εὐμεταθέτους.

214b⁸ οὐ TW : om. B

c¹ προσίη T : προσείη BW

c² δέ in rasura refinxit B²

d² εἴη TW : ἄν εἴη B

φίλον ἄν : ἄν hic add. Madvig, post γε Bekker,
post γένοιτο Burnet

e⁶ ἔχειν B : ἔχει TW

e⁷ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ BTW : αὐτὸ αὐτό T²

e⁷ παθεῖν BT : πάθη W

215a⁵ - e⁴

215c⁶⁻⁷ και ὁῆ και̃ μάρτυρα super rasuram scripta
 in W

d² ἔφη BW : ἑφάνη T

d³ πρὸς add. corr. Coisl., Laur. 85.12

d⁴ ἔχθρας BT : ἔχθρασι W

d⁷ φιλεῖν TW : φιλεῖν και̃ φιλεῖ+++ B :
 φιλεῖν και̃ φιλεῖσθαι b

e⁴ ἐπιθυμεῖν TW : ἐπιθυμεῖ B

215e⁵ - 216d²

216a⁵ cf. Photium s.v. ἀλλόκοτον; ἄτοκον, ἐναντίον, etc.

216a⁵ ἀλλόκοτον schol. vet. : ἀλλοκότων BT :

ἀλλοκότως tW : -ω^σ Par

b¹ ἔχθρα φίλια W

b⁴ ἢ τὸ TW : τὸ B (sed ἢ suprascr. B²)

b⁷ τῷ φίλον Cornarius : τῷ φίλῳ φίλον BtW :

τῷ φίλον φίλον T

c¹ ἔτι μάλλον TW : om. B

d¹ διαδύεται BT : διαλύεται W

-
- 216e² δὴ εἴπερ Heindorf : δ' εἴπερ BTW :
 δὴ κέρ ut vid. in δ' εἴπερ mutatum Par
- e³ ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ revera BTW
- e³ ἢ τοῦ τοιούτου B : ἢ οὐ τοῦ τοιούτου TW
- e⁴ ἄν που BTW : δῆλου Schanz
- 217a¹ γίνεσθαι φίλον TW : γίγνεσθαι B
- b¹ μὲν δὴ BT : δὲ δὴ W
- c¹ ἔτι ἄν τι Salvini : ἔστι ἀντί B, ἔστιν
 ἀντί TW : ἔστιν ἄν τι Laur. 85.12
- c¹ οὐδ' haud scio quis primus omiserit; habent BTW rec.

217c³ - 218a⁷

217e¹ ἡρώτων νυν δὴ
217e⁵ ἤδη [τὸ] τοιοῦτον
218a¹ φίλον δὲ ἀγαθὸν κακῶ

217c⁵ ὅτιοσν Par : ὅτιοσν τι BTW
c⁶ ἐπαλειφθέν BT : ἀλειφθέν W
c⁶ πάνυ γε BW : omisit T
c⁷ ἀλειφθέν Heindorf : ἐπαλειφθέν BTW
c⁷ ἐκόν Heindorf : ἔτι ὄν BTW : γρ. ἢ τὸ
αἰτιόν corr. Ven. 186
d³ τότε Heindorf : ποτε BTW
d³ altero loco φαίνοιτ' ἄν B
d⁷ τοῦτο B : τοῦτο τὸ TW
e¹ ἡρώτων scripsi; ἐρωτῶν W : ἐρωτῶ BT :
νυν BTW, omisit Par
218a¹ ἀγαθὸν κακῶ BtW : ἀγαθὸν κακῶ T :
ἀγαθῶ κακὸν Heindorf

ADD:

217e⁵ τὸ secluserit Lamb

218b¹ - e⁴

218d³ τοιούτοις ψευδέσιν ἐντετυχήκαμεν

218b³ φιλοσοφοῦσιν BT : φιλοῦσιν W
b⁶ πάνυ γε ἐφάτην· νῦν ἄρα B : νῦν πάνυ γε
ἐφάτην ἄρα TW Par (sed νῦν postea erasum in Par)
b⁸ αὐτό BTW : ταῦτό Dodds : οὕτω Richards
d³ ψευδέσιν secl. olim Heindorf
d⁶ κότερός in κότερόν mutatum Par : κότερος BTW
e³ ἔφαμεν Heindorf : φαμέν BTW

218e⁵ - 219d³

219c⁶ ἰόντας καὶ ἀφικέσθαι

219a² ὄν addidit Heindorf
a⁴ ἀνῆρηται BT (sed suprascr. ἐπ B²t) :
 ἐκανῆρηται W
b³ τοῦ φίλου hic addidit Burnet, post τὸ φίλον
 Hermann Schleiermachersi versionem secutus
b⁶ πρόσχωμεν T : πρόσχωμεν BW
b⁷ γε BTW : γ' ὅτι Madvig
b⁸ φαμέν BTW : ἔφαμεν t
c² ἦ BT : omisit W
c³ οἷ W : δεῖ BT
c⁶ καὶ BTW : ἦ Schanz
c⁶ ἦ Par² : ἦ BT : ἦ W
c⁷ ἄλλο corr. Flor. : ἄλλον BTW
c⁷ ἀλλ' ἤξει BTW : ἀλλὰ λήξει Apelt
d² ἡμᾶς τᾶλλα T et in marg. γρ. W :
 μάλιστα ἄλλα B : μάλιστα ἀλλὰ B²W

219d4 - 220c2

219d4, 220a⁶ - b³ respicit Aristoteles, Anal. Post. I, 72a³⁰

219d⁵ ἐννοήσωμεν BW : ἐννοήσω μὲν T
d⁵ ὅταν Stephanus : ὁ ἄν BT : εἰ ὁ ἄν W
e⁶ κεραμέαν TW : κεραμέα B
220a¹ ὡς περὶ BT : ὡςπερ W
b¹ ἐτέρου Hermann : ἐτέρῳ BT : ἐτέρῳ W
c² λειφθεῖνη Heindorf : λιφθεῖνη (ut. vid.) B :
 ληφθεῖνη B²TW

220c³ - 221b⁴

220d⁸ - e² :

τὸ ἄρα φίλον ἡμῶν ἐκεῖνο, εἰς ὃ
ἐτελεύτα πάντα τὰ ἄλλα < ἄ > ἕνεκα
ἐτέρου φίλου φίλα ἔφαμεν εἶναι -
ἐκεῖνο οὐδὲν [δὲ] τούτοις εἴδικεν.

220c³ ἐκποδῶν BT : ἐκ ποδῶν W
e¹ ἄ addidit Cornarius ; "fortasse ἀλλὰ addendum", Dodds
ἐκεῖνο scripsi : ἐκεῖνα BTW : secluserit Cornarius
δὲ secluserit Cornarius : Heindorf
e² κέκληται BT : κέκληνται W
221b³ ἀπολλύηται BT : ἀπολύηται W
b⁴ τυγχάνει corr. Coisl. Ven. 186, Vat. 1029 :
τυγχάνη BTW

221b⁵ - 222a⁴

221d⁴⁻⁵, ὃ δὲ καὶ πρότερον

221d⁶ ποίημα Κρονικῶς συγκείμενον

221e² Ἐνδεής δὲ γίνεται οὗ ἂν τις ἀφαιρηται.

221b⁶ ἀπόληται haud scio quis primus :

ἀπόλληται revera BTW

d⁵ καὶ W : τὸ BT

d⁶ Κρονικῶς Naber (Κρόνω prius Madvig) :

μακρὸν BTW : μάτην Ast

e² "vel ἐνδεής τις vel potius ἐνδεές τι,"

Stephanus

ἐνδεές (altero loco) τις BTW

e⁵ λύσι TW : λύσις B

222a² τῶ ἐρωμένω T : τῶν ἐρωμένων BW

a² ὦν TW : ὄν B

a³ τρόπους BTW (sed v erasum in B : τρόπος Vat. 226)

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- 222b² ὑπό τῆς ἡδονῆς χρώματα resp. Aristaenetus Ep. I 11.
 b⁸ Λύσις · τὸ δὲ ἄχρηστον πλημμελεῖ, Photius,
 Suidas, s.v. πλημμελεῖν.
- 223c² μεθύομεν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου imitavit Lucian, Nigr. 5,
 μεθύων ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων.
- e³ ἀναπεμπάσασθαι cf. Hesychium s.v. ἀναπεμπάζεσθαι :
 ἐπαναλαμβάνειν τὰ προειρημένα.
-

- 222b¹ μόγις πως BT : ^{ἄλ} μόγις ^{ποτέ} πῶς W
- b³⁻⁴ εἰ μὲν τι BTW : tum λέγοιμεν ἄν τι ὡς T,
 λέγοιμεν ἄν πως BW : in marg. γρ. εἰ μὲν τοι
 τί τὸ οἰκεῖον τοῦ ὁμοίου διαφέρει λέγοιμ' ἄν
 τι ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ W
- b⁷ ἀποβαλεῖν T : ἀπολιπεῖν B : ἀπολεῖν W
 Sed in marg. γρ. ἀπολιπεῖν καὶ ἀποβαλεῖν W
- c² μεθύομεν in marg. T : μυθεύομεν BTW
- d⁶ ἄλλο τι TW : ἢ ἄλλο τι B
- e³ ἀναπεμπάσασθαι BTW (sed ε supra αι B²)

222e⁴ - 223b⁸

223b¹ ἐκάλουν, ἅμα δ' ἐδόκουν

222e⁷ φίλον BW : φίλων T

223a² κᾶτα T : κᾶτα B : ^{εἰτα} κᾶτα W : εἴτα in marg. T

b¹ ἅμα δ' Kentenich : ἄλλ' BTW

b¹ ὑποπεπωκότες B (sed πω refinxit B²), Vat. 226 :
ὑποπεπτοκότες TW