

PLATO'S LYSIS

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Commentary

27. iii . b2

Socrates meets Hippothales and Ctesippus outside the palaestra of Mikkos.

Socrates is accosted in the street by a group of young men, one of whom, Hippothales, is anxious to get him to come into a new palaestra. Socrates guesses at once that Hippothales wants to show off some handsome boy to him; Ctesippus, Hippothales' companion, exposes the whole affair, scoffing at Hippothales' odes in praise of this boy, Lysis. Socrates agrees to come into the palaestra and show Hippothales a better way of discoursing with his beloved.

This lively meeting in the street is only the first part of the elaborate dramatic setting of the dialogue. We are given a picture of the lover Hippothales, who is going to be present, but silent, during the rest of the dialogue. At first Hippothales is nervously eager to get Socrates to join them, but then becomes consumed with embarrassment when Ctesippus lets out his secret. Ctesippus is spiritedly malicious and gives Hippothales no mercy.

Both the youths are depicted as indulging much more in vigorous colloquialisms, exaggeration and emphatic particles than Socrates' boy interlocutors later in the dialogue, more perhaps than many of Socrates' maturer interlocutors in other dialogues.

203a¹-206e²

For the erotic aura surrounding young boys at gymnasia and palaestras, compare the opening pages of the "Charmides" and the "Euthydemus", and the comic regulations listed by the Δικαιῶς Λόγος at Ar. Clouds 973 sq. (no doubt a parody of the "Solonian laws of Aeschines in Tim. 10; see on 206d¹).

Commentators frequently take this mild eroticism too seriously and lump it together with other manifestations of ancient homosexuality, the various forms of which met with different approval at different levels. (Grube, "Plato's Thought", ch. 3 (esp. p. 90), and Marrou, "A History of Education in Antiquity", pt. I, ch. 3, have sensible general discussions.) But what is depicted in the "Lysis" is no more serious than the romanticism surrounding teen-age "crushes" today (and evidently had similar gossip-value!); Hippothales' feelings would now be labelled "calf-love". Compare Festugiere's observation ("Personal Religion among the Greeks" p. 145 n.19),

203a¹-206e² (contd.)

"The strange mixture of friendship and love that we find in Plato's blushing boys ... it would be rash to label it immediately with the name of homosexuality. It could be often enough a sort of romantic love, an affair of the heart rather than of the senses."

Hippothales is so shy of being noticed by his "beloved" (see 207b⁵) even on a day when the rules of the palaestra were relaxed, that his love-affair can hardly have consisted of much more than staring at Lysis. Socrates volunteers to give him a lesson in how to talk to the boy; but one wonders whether in fact he had yet got the length of reciting his "odes" in the presence of Lysis himself. On ordinary days in the palaestra youths were evidently segregated from the boys (see on 206d¹⁻²), and outside the palaestra Lysis would be under the eye of his (apparently rather fierce) *καταγωγός*. *καταγωγοί* were in part meant as chaperons (cf. Symp. 183c⁴ sq.); and the pursuit of young boys by grown men was regarded with as much horror in Plato's Athens as it is

203a¹-206e² (contd.)

today; cf. Aesch. in Tim. 9 sq. But perhaps adolescents who conceived passions for young boys were regarded merely with amusement; merely as imitating the interest their elders took in them. Socrates is both amused by and sympathetic towards Hippothales; he probably intends to steer him very gently away from the absurder tendencies of his "love".

203

a¹ ἐξ Ἀκαδημαίας εὐθὺς Λυκείου; from one gymnasium directly to another.

The Academy was North West of the city, 1500 metres from the Dipylon Gate in the direction of Colonus, and by the Cephissos (map in Arch. ^{Ang.} ~~Ang.~~ 1934, p.138); the Lyceum has not been identified, but was East of the city by the Ilissos. Socrates probably was skirting the city on the North side between the wall and Mount Lycabettus.

These with the Gynosarges were the three public gymnasia of 5th and 4th century Athens, and were protected by "Solonian" laws; cf. [Xen] Ath. Pol. ii.10 and Dem xxiv, 114.

(The "Old Oligarch" says the δῆμος built itself καλαίστρας κολλῆς, ἀλοδυτήρια, λουτρῶνας; he is most likely referring to the various facilities of the three gymnasia, not to other separate public establishments; so Girard, "L'Education Athénienne" pp. 26 sq., [pace Schneider, P.W. s.v. Palaestra.]).

For the Academy in 5th century cf. (1) Plut. Cimon 13,

(Κίμων) κρῆτος τὰς λεγομένας ἐλευθερίους καὶ

γλαφυραῖς διατριβαῖς, αἱ μικρὸν ὕστερον ὑπερφυῶς
ἠγαπήθησαν, ἐκαλλώπισε τὸ ἄστυ, τὴν μὲν ἀγορὰν,
πλατάνοις καταφυτεύσας, τὴν δ' Ἀκαδήμειαν ἐξ
ἀνύδρου καὶ ἀύχμηρῶς κατάρρυτον ἀποδείξας ἄλλος,
ἠσκημένον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δρόμοις καθαροῖς καὶ συσκίοις
περιπάτοις.

(2) Aristophanes, Clouds 1002 - 5 sq. (the δικαιὸς λόγος
to his follower)

ἀλλ' οὖν λιπαρὸς γε καὶ εὐανθῆς ἐν γυμνασίοις
διατρέψεις

. εἰς Ἀκαδήμειαν κατιῶν ὑπὸ ταῖς μορταῖς
ἀποθρέξει

στεφανωσάμενος καλᾶμψ λευκῷ μετὰ σῶφρονος
ἠλικιώτου,

μίλακος ὄζων καὶ ἀπραγμοσύνης καὶ λεύκης
φυλλοβολούσης,

ἦρος ἐν ὥρᾳ χαίρων ὀκδοταν κλάτανος κτελέει
ψιθυρίζῃ.

Notice in both these passages the emphasis on gentlemanly
leisure (ἐλευθερῶν διατρέβαι, ἀπραγμοσύνη.)

Hard training was only part of the life at the Academy.

For the Lyceum in the 5th century evidence outside Plato's own picture is slight. Philochorus, 328 F 37 Jac., ascribed its foundation to Pericles (perhaps rightly, see Jacoby's note; and this may have been what was in the 'Old Oligarch's' mind loc. cit.). Diog. Laert. IX 54 mentions it as one alleged venue of ~~Protagoras~~^{the} reading of ~~his~~^{Protagoras'} $\kappa\rho\iota\tau\iota\ \theta\epsilon\sigma\upsilon$. Excavations at the Academy by Aristophron before the 1939-45 war and by Stavropoullas since 1956 seem (apart from the fragment with the names of Socrates' friends) to have been disappointing for the Platonist; an early enclosure has been identified, but the palaestra surviving is Roman. (Good photographs in A.J.A. 1933, plate LIV and 1937 p. 141). A recent find is announced of schoolboys' slates with lettering of the early 4th or late 5th centuries and "names such as Demosthenes and Sophocles" (if of this date then not the orator Demosthenes!); but this can hardly be "dramatic evidence for Plato's famous school"; the date would probably be too early, and Plato's Academy is not usually thought to have been an elementary school! (M. S. F. Hood, J.H.S. [Arch. Reports] 1958-9.)

Socrates visited gymnasia in the mornings; cf. Xen. Mem. I, 1.10:

πρῶ τε γὰρ εἰς τοὺς περικάτους καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια
ἦει, καὶ πληθοῦσης ἀγορᾶς ἐκεῖ φανερός ἦν, καὶ
τὸ λοιπὸν αἰετὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἦν ὅπου πλείστοις μέλλοι
συνέσεσθαι: at the Lyceum, again in the morning, Plato
Symp. 223d; and Euthyphro 2a, Euthydemus 271a, 272e - 3a,
Aesch. Sphettus fr. 2 (Dittmar.)

This as it happens is the only reference in Plato or Xenophon
to Socrates' visiting the Academy, but a recent archaeological
find suggests he is likely to have been there no less than at
the Lyceum; a marble fragment with 5th century lettering
found in the Academy carries the names

Χαρμ[ίδης]

Ἄρισ[τον]

Ἄξι[οχος]

Κρί[των]

all of whom were friends of Socrates. (Axiochus was
Alcibiades' uncle and the father of the boy Cleinias of the
"Euthydemus"). (S.E.G. XIII, No. 28, G. Karo Arch. Anz.
1934 p. 140).

(Plato established his school in a garden which seems to have been part of the area of the gymnasium at some date after his first visit to Sicily (Diog. Laert. III 20; Olympiodorus Vita Plat. 6); much later of course than the dramatic date of this dialogue, and probably also later than the date of its composition.)

a¹ τὴν ἔξω τείχους seclisit Naber; but it adds precision and verisimilitude; Socrates is describing in detail where the new palaestra was.

On the deletion of supposed glosses in Plato by Cobet, Naber and others, see Dodds on Gorgias 447a⁵.

In the "Lysis" deletions were also suggested at:-

203a⁶ [κορεύη] Hirschig

203b² [κορεύομαι] Cobet

204a⁸⁻⁹ [αὐτοῖ] Schanz, [αὐτοῦ] Burnet

204b⁶ [Ἰππόθαλας] Cobet

204b⁸ [κορευόμενος] Schanz

205c³ [τοῦ πάππου τοῦ παιδός] Naber

208c⁴ [ἔφεν] Hirschig

211b⁷ [ἄρα] Cobet

222b⁶ [ὁμοιόντε καὶ οἴκετον] Herwerden

None of these is necessary, most of them are unlikely.

a² τὴν κυλίσδα ἣ ἡ Πάνοπος κρήνη; Hesychius and Photius, s.v. Πάνοψ, have: ἦρος Ἀττικός (ἐν τοῖς ἐκωνόμοις Phot.) • ἔστι δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ νεὼς καὶ ἄγαλμα καὶ κρήνη. We can only assume from this passage that Socrates was passing to the north of the city and that the spring came from the slopes of Lycabettus. (Judeich, Topog. von Athen, p. 415; nothing else is certain, see Judeich's note 2, and Aly in P.W. s.v. Panops.)

[204

a⁸

ἵνα καὶ ἴδῃς; "so that you can see the boys who are here"; here the emphatic καὶ perhaps betrays that Hippothales wants Socrates to see and admire.

203

a³ Ἰπποθάλει τε καὶ Κτησιππῶ;

names compounded of Ἴππος were aristocratic and fashionable: see Ar. Clouds 60 sq.; Strepsiades' snobbish wife insisted on a Ἴππος name for their son, ἥ μὲν γὰρ Ἴππον προσετίθει πρὸς τοῦνομα, Εἰνάθηππον ἢ Χάριππον ἢ Καλλιπκίδην, instead of the ancestral Φειδωνίδην; the eventual compromise was Φειδιπκίδην. From these names here, and the alleged riches of Lysis' family (205c), it sounds as if Mikkos' palaestra was a highly fashionable establishment.

(Education of their sons was a matter on which the wealthy lavished their money: cf. Plato Prot. 326³⁻⁶_c, Xen. Mem. II 2.6, Laced. Polit. ii.1. Conversely the sausage-seller had apparently not attended a palaestra at all; see Ar. Knights 1235 - 40. No doubt there was some social cachet about sending one's sons to palaestras and about which palaestras one sent them to! Cf. Demosth. de Corona paragraph 257, τὰ προσήκοντα διδασκαλεῖα.)

203

a⁶ ποῦ δὴ πορεύῃ καὶ πόθεν;

"Where have you been and where are you off to?"

Evidently not regarded as an unduly inquisitive, though a familiar, greeting; cf. Phaedrus 227a¹, Ἦ φίλε

Φαιδῶρε, ποῦ δὴ καὶ πόθεν; Protag. 309a¹, πόθεν,

ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνῃ; (Horace Sat. I 9.62, "unde venis et quo tendis?" rogat et respondet; see Fraenkel, Horace, p. 117.)

(Hirschig deleted πορεύῃ in the question, Cobet also πορεύομαι in the answer, b²; but cf. Phaedrus' answer, Παρὰ Λυσίου , πορεύομαι δὲ πρὸς περίκλιτον ἔξω τείχους, 227a²⁻³.)

b³ Δεῦρο δὴ;

perhaps a little abrupt; as are οὐ παραβάλλεις and ἄξιον μέντοι. For the ellipse cf. Rep. 477d⁷,

Δεῦρο δὴ πάλιν, ὦ ἄριστε; Denniston (p. 218)

includes δὴ here under δὴ following imperatives.

203

b³ εὐθύ is followed by an erasure in both B and W: T has εὐθύς.

Phrynichus (Rutherford CXIX) says: Εὐθύ· πολλοὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ εὐθύς. Διαφέρει δέ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τόπου ἐστίν, εὐθύ Ἀθηῶν, τὸ δὲ χρόνου καὶ λέγεται σὺν τῷ ς.

Photius, under εὐθύ Λυκαίου and εὐθύς καὶ εὐθέως, accepts this distinction and observes: καὶ Εὐριπίδης οὐκ ὀρθῶς· τὴν εὐθύς Ἄργους καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίας ὀδόν (Hippolytus 1197.)

Rutherford quotes passages to confirm Phrynichus' distinction from Aristophanes and accepts it for other Attic poets with the exception of Hipp. 1197, which he allows to stand as an imitation of older usage, which did not make the distinction; but he recommends the removal of any deviations from the rule from the text of prose authors.

(The correction in B and W may be due to the influence of Photius.)

203

b³ οὐ παραβάλλεις; "aren't you joining us?"

for παραβάλλειν cf. Symp. 214c⁷, (Alcibiades), μεθούοντα

δὲ ἄνδρα παρὰ νηφόντων λόγους παραβάλλειν μὴ

οὐκ ἔξ ἴσου ἤ. Perhaps colloquial and a nautical

metaphor, "put along side" (so Jowett-Campbell on

Rep. 556c.)

Hirschig's οὐ παραβαλεῖς, "won't you join us?" would

represent a more formal request; but the present tense

perhaps indicates that Hippothales is presuming Socrates

will join them rather than requesting him to. Similarly

at Symp. 172a⁵ οὐ περιμένεις; (Tw) need not be

reaccented as a future.

(See K.G. I paragraph 387 ann. 3 [but Ar. Birds 1212 and

Wasps 458 are much more peremptory than this.])

b³ ἄξιον μέντοι;

for emphatic μέντοι (almost entirely confined to

dialogue) cf. Rep. 329c³, Theaet. 152b¹ (Denniston 399.)

203

b⁵ παρὰ τίνος τοὺς ὑμᾶς; "Whom do you mean by 'us'?"

"Who are the 'us' I have to join?"

τοὺς ὑμᾶς bedeutet "die von dir 'wir' genannten;
der Ausdruck ist, kühn, der Artikel aber ganz korrekt,"
Wackernagel, Vorles. über Syntax II 138.

cf. Philebus 14c ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῆ πρόταρον,
ἕνα γεγονόςτα φύσει, πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν τοὺς
ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις, "when anyone says - there
are many 'me' 's contrary to each other."

(But Demosthenes de Corona XVIII 88 shows a different usage:

..... ὑμεῖς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. τὸ δ' ὑμεῖς ὅταν
λέγω τὴν πόλιν λέγω. Cf. Plato Prot. 331c⁶.)

203

b⁶ ἐν τῷ καταντικρῷ τοῦ τείλους, "on the opposite side
of the road to the city wall".

περίβολόν τέ τινα καί θύραν ἀνεφγμένην,

"a walled enclosure of some kind with an open door".

b⁷ διατρίβομεν αὐτόθι, "We spend our time here",

cf. Ar. Clouds 1002, Plato Symp. 223d

a¹ τίς ἢ διατριβή, "In what do you spend your time?"

cf. Phaedrus 227b⁶, Symp. 177c⁷ γένοιτο ἄν ἡμῖν ἐν

λόγοις ἰκανή διατριβή, "We could pass our time quite

adequately in talking". (cf. Burnet on Apology 33e⁴.)

b⁷ ἡμεῖς τε αὐτοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι πάνυ πολλοὶ καὶ καλοί,

"we ourselves and many very handsome boys as well"; for ἄλλοι

cf. Gorg. 473d¹ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων;

Hippothales is not trying to include himself among the καλοί,

but mentions them archly to hint at the reason for his own

presence.

204

/a¹ Ἔστιν δὲ οὗ τὸ τοῦτο; "And what is this place?"

A 'surprised' question: see Denniston on δὲ οὗ,
p. 259, and cf. Ἔστιν δὲ οὗ σοί τίς ἡ δίκη,
Euthyphro 3e⁷.

(But δὲ οὗ in 204b⁴ is slightly different. There δὲ οὗ stresses the preceding word ΣΟΙ in particular; here ἔστιν is not specially emphatic, but is perhaps put first to avoid either an echo of the phrase τί δὲ οὗ; or the undue emphasis on τοῦτο which Τοῦτο δὲ οὗ τί ἐστιν would give.)

204

a² Παλαίστρα;

a private wrestling-ground kept by a παιδοτρέφης where he taught children and others who wanted exercises in physical training; cf. Gorg. 456d⁵ sq., Aeschines in Timarch. 10.

To be distinguished from the public gymnasia, which of course had wrestling-grounds as an essential facility, but in addition had running-tracks and περιπάτοι (see Plutarch Cimon 13 quoted on 203a¹). See Gardiner, "Greek Athletic Sports and Festivals", pp. 469 - 70, Girard op. cit. p. 28.

But apparently private palaestras were used as general meeting-places just as the gymnasia were. Socrates visits a palaestra in 'Charmides', cf. 153a², ἀσμένως ἦα ἐπὶ τὰς συνήθεις διατριβάς. καὶ δὴ καὶ εἰς τὴν Ταυρέου παλαίστραν εἰσηλθόν, καὶ αὐτόθι κατέλαβον πάνυ πολλοὺς τοὺς κλειστός γνωρίμους; there were not only younger men at Taureas' palaestra but also Chaerephon and Critias. (This use of palaestras is perhaps surprising in view of the strict regulations for the segregation of young boys (see on 206d¹); but no doubt other persons were freely admitted outside the set hours for the boys' classes.)

204

a⁴ καλῶς γε ποιῶντες, scil. μεταδίδοτε:

"That's very kind of you (to invite me to join you)";

cf. Ar. Acharnians 1050. (Not, as Pernice, "I approve of your discussions".)

For γε, W, cf. Schanz Plat. Op. VI, pp. vi - vii,

Denniston p. 136.

a⁴ διδάσκει δὲ τίς αὐτόθι;

"Who runs his school here?" does not refer to the διὰ τριβῆ

ἐν λόγοις but to the normal function of a palaestra,

i.e. physical training; see on a⁵.

a⁵ σὸς ἑταῖρος γε;

γε though added above the line seems to be in the first hand in Par, and so is a correction either by the scribe of Par himself or deriving from a ms. intermediary between T and Par; see introduction on mss.. It is more lively and idiomatic than τε (BTW, kept by Stallbaum), cf. Denniston p. 133, on γε "in answers to questions which give the answerer no lead slightly colloquial in tone", and p. 150 where he suggests that here γε gives equal emphasis to both σὸς and ἑταῖρος.

204

a⁶ οὐ φασλός γε;

οὐ φασλος make one unit followed by γε, (Denniston
p. 148, cf. Parm. 149e¹⁰ μὴ ὄντε γε).

άνήρ Schanz perhaps rightly, if σοφιστής is the
predicate rather than άνήρ; cf. τὸν άνδρα,
Prot. 311e⁴.

204

a⁵ Μίκκος a⁶ ἱκανός σοφιστής:

"a considerable expert" (in matters of physique, wrestling.)

On ἱκανός, which is frequently used in litotes, see Dodds on Gorg. 485e¹, 480a⁴.

Mikkos is otherwise unknown. Hippothales mentions him as the proprietor of the palaestra and the teacher of wrestling (Stallbaum); he is probably to be identified with the παιδοτρέβης of 207d³, unless this is one of his assistants. Cf. τὴν Ταυρέου καλαίστραν, Charm. 153a; Taureas also is otherwise unknown to us.

Croiset (as also Grote, Girard and Gardiner) distinguished Μίκκος from the παιδοτρέβης, because they took the appellation σοφιστής to mean "Sophist" as (in Croiset's words) "un de ces sophistes qui, dès le V^e siècle, vont enseigner dans les palestres les sciences diverses"; and Croiset compared the Socrates of the "Clouds" and the two logicians of the "Euthydemus". But the φροντιστηρίον was not a palaestra, nor indeed was the Lyceum; and the latter was merely one place the logicians happened to come

into while Socrates was there. "Sophists" are not known to have had professional attachments to particular palaestras. (If Mikkos had been a "Sophist" Socrates hardly have entered his palaestra without having a discussion with him.)

σοφιστής originally meant an "expert" in any art or skill (L.S.J. s.v.). Protagoras includes among the unavowed practitioners of σοφιστική τέχνη :- Homer and the poets;

τούς δὲ αὐτὸν τελετὰς τε καὶ χρησμοδῶς (sc. πρόσχημα ποιουμένους)..... ἐνίοις δὲ τινὰς ἤσθηται

καὶ γυμναστικὴν, οἷον Ἴκκος τε ὁ Ταραντινὸς καὶ ὁ νῦν ἔτι ὢν οὐδενὸς ἡττων σοφιστῆς

Ἡρόδοτος μουσικὴν δὲ Ἀγαθοκλῆς μέγας ὢν σοφιστῆς. (Plato Prot. ³¹⁶ ~~317~~de).

Protagoras is able to claim this pedigree for his profession because these men could already be called σοφισταί as masters of their own arts. cf. Meno 85b⁴, καλοῦσιν

δέ γε ταύτην διάμετρον οἱ σοφισταί, where σοφισταί means "the experts in geometry".

σοφιστής is here meant as a compliment to Mikkos as a gymnast who has brought his skill to high refinement.

204

a⁸ τοὺς ὄντας αὐτόθι ; "who's here", i.e. in the
palaestra: cf. Charm. 153a³ εἰς τὴν Ταυρέου
καλαίστραν . . . εἰσῆλθον, καὶ αὐτόθι κατέλαρον
πάνυ κόλλους.

a⁹ αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἠθέως ἀκούσαιμ' ἄν, κτλ.

"Here where we are now, before I move, I'd like
to be told ... "

So Schleiermacher, Hirschig, Apelt. αὐτοῦ
meaning "here on the spot" might seem to follow
awkwardly after Hippothales' αὐτόθι meaning
"inside the palaestra"; but in lively conversation
the change of reference is easily permitted by
the change of speaker; Socrates says αὐτοῦ
emphatically at the beginning of his reply, and
perhaps we should envisage him as actually not
budging to follow Hippothales till he gets his
answer. For this emphatic early position of αὐτοῦ
cf. Eur. Ion 1026,

αὐτοῦ γὰρ αὐτὸν κτείνε,

H.F. 1397,

αὐτοῦ γενοίμην πέτρος

Many interpreters have failed to see that the change of speaker here makes all the difference. Most of their remedies are unlikely:-

1. Burnet thought αὐτοῦ a variant or gloss on αὐτόῳ, and deleted it. But this leaves Socrates' opening κρῖτον very weak; we would expect a particle, e.g. Ἄλλὰ κρῖτον or κρῖτον μὲν.
2. Heusde, followed by Heindorf (on Sophist 265e) took αὐτοῦ = αὐτοῦ σοῦ, "I should like to hear from you yourself"; but there seem not to be examples of αὐτόῳ = αὐτόῳ σου in the oblique cases, except for the subject of the verb in indirect speech.
3. Heindorf earlier, and Stallbaum at one time, took αὐτοῦ as neuter object of ἀκοῦσαι ; but this would have to be αὐτό, which Ast in fact suggested. Ast's αὐτό is the most plausible emendation; "I should like first to be told the crucial fact, namely, etc. ..." cf. Charm. 166b⁷, Rep.

362a⁵, Αυτό ... οὐκ εἴρηται ὁ μάλιστα
ἔδει βῆθηναι. This would be an attractive
reading; but the change would be
gratuitous.

b¹ ἐκί τῷ καὶ εἶσοιμι; 'the object of my entrance';

ἐκί τῷ is perhaps played upon as ambiguously neuter or masculine, "for what purpose" or "to see whom".

For καὶ emphasising questions see Denniston 312-3;

cf. 214e³, ἴδωμεν τί καὶ ὑποκτεύω; the stress is on the interrogative pronoun in both cases.

καὶ τίς ὁ καλός; "that is to say, who is the handsome one?" Hippothales' hints at 203b⁸ and 204a⁸ have not been lost on Socrates.

For καλός of boys who attract erotic attention cf. Meno 76b⁵, κἂν κατακεκαλυμμένος τις γνοίη ὅτι καλός εἶ καὶ ἔρασταί σοι ἔτι εἶσιν, Xen. Mem. I 3, 8 - 13, Plato Phaedrus 257a⁹, Symp. 213d²; and ὁ κατὰ καλός on vases.

b⁴ Σοὶ δὲ οἷ τίς;

οἷ δὲ here stresses Σοὶ, "who is your favourite?"; but see on 204a¹.

b⁵ ὦ καὶ Ἰερωνύμου Ἰππόθαλες;

Cobet (Novae Lectiones 641) deleted Ἰππόθαλες, and made similar deletions in the parallel cases at Crat. 384a⁸ and Herodotus VII 10. But see Thuc. VII 69, where Nicias invokes his men πατρόθεν τε ἐκονομάζων καὶ αὐτοῦς ὀνομασίῃ καὶ φυλήν. Here of course the occasion is only mock-solemn, and the full form of address is merely humorous; see Thompson on Meno 76e⁶.

b⁶ μηκέτι εἶπες; "you need not now tell me".

b⁸ πόρρω ἤδη εἶ κορευόμενος τοῦ ἔρωτος;

"you have by now reached an advanced point in love".

Schanz's deletion of κορευόμενος is wrong; cf. Meno 84a³,

Ἐννοεῖς αὖ οὗ ἐστὶν ἤδη βαδίζων ὅδε τοῦ

ἀναμιμνήσκεισθαι, and (in a literal sense though

humorous) Ar. Frogs 35, καὶ γὰρ ἐγγύς τῆς θύρας ἤδη

βαδίζων εἰμί τῆσδε: cf. also Plato Crat. 410e³

Πόρρω ἤδη οἶμαι φαίνομαι σοφίας ἐλαυνεῖν.

b⁹ -c² εἰμί δ' ἐγὼ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα φαῦλος κτλ:

Socrates often claimed to have no special knowledge except of τὰ ἐρωτικά: cf. espec. Symp. 177d, ἐγὼ ὅς οὐδέν φημι ἄλλο ἐπίστασθαι ἢ τὰ ἐρωτικά;
 (also Symp. 204[?]b, 212b, Phaedrus 227c, 257a, Theages 128b, Theaet. 210d, Xen. Mem. II 6.28); but the nearest claim to this one (ταχὺ οἶφ' τ' εἶναι γινῶναι ἐρῶντά τε καὶ ἐρόμενον) is perhaps at Xen. Symp. 3.10, where Socrates jestingly observes that he μέγα φρονεῖ ἐπὶ μαστροπείᾳ!

c⁴ ἀστεῖόν γε ὅτι ἐρυθριᾷς, "it is amusing that you should blush";

cf. Phaedr. 242e ἡ εὐήθεια (τοῖν λόγων)

πάνυ ἀστεῖα: and of a person, ἀστεῖος καὶ εὐήθης, Rep. 349b.

(But οἱ ἀστεῖοι at Rep. 452d are "the wits, comedians").

c⁶ συνδιατρέψῃ σοι;

for the dative cf. Symp. 172c⁵, Xen. Mem. I 2.3.

ε⁶ παραταθήσεται ὑπὸ σοῦ ἀκούων, "he will be wearied to death with hearing you say it so often":

cf. Xen. Cyrop. I 311, ἕως παρατείναιμι τοῦτον

ὡσπερ οὗτος ἐμὲ παρατείνει ἀπὸ σοῦ κωλύων,

Plato Euthryd. 303b³ κροτοῦντες ὀλίγου παρετάθησαν,

"almost wore themselves out applauding".

(In a literal sense, τῷ λιμῷ παρατεινόμενα, Symp. 207b).

ε⁷ ἐκκεκώφωκε τὰ ὦτα

ἐκκωφ-όω and -έω are both found, and a similar doubt arises at Eur. Or. 1287⁺.

For ἐμπέπληκε Λύσιδος, "has filled our ears with the name "Lysis", cf. Apology 23e, ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὦτα διαβάλλοντες.

+ The anonymous grammarian from a Darmstadt ms. quoted by Schaefer in Add. to Gregory of Corinth p. 909, cites Eur. Or. 1287 to illustrate ἐκκεκώφηται, and this passage of the Lysis to illustrate ἐκκεκώφωκε, and asserts the existence of the simple κωφ-όω.

εὐμάρεια ἡμῖν ἐστὶν καὶ ἐξ ὕπνου ἐγρομένοις κτλ.

"it can easily happen that we start up out of our sleep thinking we hear the name of Lysis."

Perhaps Hippothales made a practice of toasting his beloved, naming him as he did so; cf.

Theocritus XIV¹ 18-20;

ἤδη δὲ προϊόντος ἔδοξ' ἐπιχεῖσθαι ἄκρατον
ὤτινος ἤθελ' ἕκαστος· ἔδει μόνον ὤτινος εἰπεῖν.
ἄμεις μὲν φωνεῖντες ἐπίνομες

cf. Callimachus Epigr. 29, Meleager A.P.V. 136;

"Ἐγχεί καὶ πάλιν εἰπέ, πάλιν, πάλιν, Ἥλιοδώρας.

For εὐμάρεια cf. Soph. Philoct. 283-4;

ἠῆρισκον οὐδὲν πλὴν ἀνιῆσθαι παρόν
τούτου δὲ πολλὴν εὐμάρειαν, ὃ τέκνον,

where it similarly refers to the likelihood of an unwanted experience.

d¹⁻² (contd.)

(εὐμάρεια is the form always required by the metre in Sophocles, and is found in T here, in W at Prot. 321a⁴, and in all mss. at Laws 738d⁶.)

εὐμοιρία, W here, might perhaps mean, ironically, "we have the good fortune to ..."; but the noun is not found before Dion. Halicarnassi. (The adjective εὐμοιρος occurs at Symp. 197d⁶, but in a highly rhetorical context.)

ἐγγομένους does not necessarily mean "on waking in the morning" as Apelt translates; the aorist tense seems more likely to indicate that the auditory illusion is actually what suddenly rouses them. "Perseverative imagery" is apparently quite common in the "hypnagogic" state of going to sleep at night, though "hypnopompic" illusions on awakening are equally well known; see McKellar, "Imagination and Thinking", chap. 3.

d¹ κᾶν μὲν δῆ:

Denniston (G.P. p. 393) took μὲν δῆ here to be progressive, in which case the mss. reading would be the only instance of simple progressive μὲν δῆ in a positive statement; Denniston therefore suggested κᾶν μὲν δῆ (cf. e.g. 206b² and frequently). Moreover if there is a "progression" from Hippothales sober to Hippothales tipsy, this is an addition to, rather than an instantiation of, the previous statement, and καὶ is preferable to asyndeton.

d³ ἃ μὲν καταλογάδην διηγέται, "what he expounds to us in conversation"; (Croiset, Robin, Heindorf add συγγράμματα). The root idea in καταλογάδην seems to be "as one would speak it"; this often means "in prose (compositions) as opposed to verse", (cf. Symp. 177b³, Hipp. Min. 368d¹); but here ἃ μὲν καταλ. διηγέται is opposed to ποιήματα καὶ συγγράμματα, "written compositions in verse and prose", so must refer to spoken discourses.

There is a precisely similar ambiguity in ψιλῶς; contrast Menexenus 239c, where λόγῳ ψιλῶ is used of written prose as opposed to verse, with Laws 811e, where there is a threefold distinction:- ποιητῶν τε ποιήματα καὶ γεγραμμένα καταλογάδην (here = "in prose") ἢ καὶ ψιλῶς οὕτως ἄνευ τοῦ γεγράφθαι λέγομενα, "poet's verses and writings in prose, or even what is quite simply spoken without having been written down", where ψιλῶς means "unwritten".

d⁴ ποιήματα:

cf. Eurip. Stheneboea, fr. 663 Nauck²,

ποιητὴν δ' ἄρα

"Ἔρωσ διδάσκει, κἂν ἄμουσος ἦ τὸ κρίν,

quoted by Plato at Symp. 196e² πᾶς γοῦν ποιητῆς

γίγνεται, "κἂν ἄμουσος ἦ τὸ κρίν", οὐδ' ἂν Ἔρωσ δῖηται.

Aristotle gives a matter-of-fact explanation, Rhet. 1370b¹⁹:-

καὶ οἱ ἐρῶντες καὶ διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες καὶ

ποιῶντές τι δεῖ περὶ τοῦ ἐρωμένου χαίρουσιν·

ἐν ἅπασιν γὰρ τοῖς τοιούτοις μεμνημένοι οἷον αἰσθάνεσθαι

οἷονται τοῦ ἐρωμένου, κτλ.

d⁵ καταντλῆιν, "drench us with his poems", Jowett.

cf. Rep. 344d¹ Θρασύμαχος ὥσπερ βαλανεύς ἡμῶν
καταντλήσας κατὰ τῶν ὠτων ἄθροον καὶ πολὺν τὸν
λόγον.

d⁴ - 6 Ctesippus is in a great hurry to produce his
denunciation of Hippothales, and leaves out the end of one
sentence in order to go on to the next, of which he then
leaves out the middle. (A semi-colon is probably better
than Burnet's full stop after συγγράμματα.)

The ellipses are in fact very slight; after ἐπειδὴν
συγγράμματα we can mentally supply e.g. ταῦτα δὴ
δεινὰ ἔστιν (Stallbaum); and then καὶ ὃ ἔτι τούτων
<ἔστι> δεινότερον, <ἐκεῖνό ἔστιν,> ὅτι καὶ
ᾄδει ... , Cf. Rep. 491b⁷.

(But Luise Reinhard regarded the second sentence as a case of
anacolonthon, as though where after ὃ δεινότερον
Ctesippus should have continued simply "ᾄδει..." , he
thought he had said simply καὶ τούτων δεινότερον
and continued with a ὅτι clause. [Die Anakoluthē bei
Platon, p. 12, n. 2.]).

d⁵ ἔτι τούτων δεινότερον,

Naber, is perhaps especially appropriate to the third term of a series of increasing horrors; (it is used even of the second term at 205c⁶).

e³ ἔτι πατρὸθεν ἐκονομάζεται;

is mentioned as the son of his father, by naming his father; cf. Euthydemus 271b¹, τὸ Ἀξιόχου μετράκιον (where Cleinias is not given his own name until 273a⁵); Gorg. 481e³ τὸν Ἡυριλάμκου νεανίαν (though Demos' name has been indicated by a pun); also Prot. 309c¹⁰ ὁ Κλεινίου υἱός, Gorg. 482a⁶ ὁ Κλεινίου υἱός, (Alcibiades).

(The fact that the boy is still referred to simply as ὁ Δημοκράτους υἱός is different from his being addressed as ὦ παῖ Δημοκράτους (e.g. at 209a⁵); Socrates himself is addressed as ὦ παῖ Σωφρονίσκου at Laches 180d⁷. See note on 204b⁵ supra).

e⁵ δεῖς BW: for the personal construction cf. Phaedrus 228a³,
πολλοῦ γε δέω: 264a⁴.

e⁵ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδός.

emphatic word-order, "the child's beauty" (Kühner-Gerth I
paragraph 464 [p. 618]).

cf. Ion 530c³, τὸν γὰρ ῥαψωδὸν ἑρμηνεῖα δεῖ τοῦ κοιητοῦ
τῆς διανοίας γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι, where
τῆς διανοίας is specially emphatic.

e⁶ ἱκανὸς γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ μόνου τούτου γινώσκεισθαι,

"he is handsome enough to be known to you by this alone".

for ἀπὸ cf. Phaedr. 230b⁸ ἰερὸν ἀπὸ τῶν κορῶν τε
καὶ ἀγαλμάτων ἔοικεν εἶναι.

e⁸ Δημοκράτους τοῦ Αἰξωνέως;

that our Lysis' deme was Aixone makes it almost certain that in I.G. II - III² 7045 we have a reference to him or at least to his family; this is a funerary stele from the Dipylon bearing, among other names, Ἴσθμονίκη Ἀσπίδος Αἰξωνέως. The first editor, Oikonomos (Ath. Mitteilungen ³⁷, 1912 p. 226sq.) took Isthmonike's father to be our Lysis' grandfather; Wilamowitz Platon II 69 n. 1 and Kirchner in I.G. II - III² think Isthmonike's father is our Lysis himself. In view of the complete uncertainty of the dramatic date of our dialogue we cannot hope to guess when our Lysis was born; similarly we can only date Isthmonike's death in the first half of the fourth century and we do not know how old she was when she died; so either identification is possible.

An Isthmonikos owned a bath south west of the city, I.G. I² 94; and an Ἴσθμόντικος (sis) swore to the treaty of Nicias, Thuc. V 19. This man or one of these may be related to Lysis; but, pace Wilamowitz loc. cit., is not Lysis' father unless he changed his name!

e⁹ ὡς γενναῖον καὶ νεανικὸν τοῦτον τὸν ἔρωτα ἀνησυχῶν,
 "what an admirable and splendid passion to have
 conceived!" (because for so handsome a boy).

Both γενναῖος (originally "well-born") and νεανικὸς
 (originally "vigorous") are common in Plato meaning
 little more than "excellent, admirable"; perhaps these
 were colloquialisms. Cf. (e.g.) Theaet. 183e βάθος
 τοῦ γενναίου, "magnificent depth of mind", (Campbell);
 Rep. 372b μάζας γενναίας "first-rate bread", and
 Rep. 563e ἡ ἀρχὴ κατὴ καὶ νεανικὴ ὄθεν τυραννίς
 φύεται, cf. 363e.

κότερον τὸ ἔρῳν ἔξαρκος εἶ, ἀλλὰ
 (ἔξαρκος εἶμι) μὴ ποιεῖν, κτλ.

for ἔξαρκος εἶναι cf. Charm. 158c⁸, ἔξάρκῳ
 εἶναι τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. Notice that Hippothales
 puts in the idiomatic μὴ to strengthen his denial,
 which Socrates in asking a question had omitted.

Cf. Ar. Plutus 241, ἔξαρκός ἐστι μὴ ' ἰδεῖν με ποκοτα
 (K.G. II p. 20⁷/₄).

Hippothales' embarrassment drives him to a blatant
 fib, but Socrates continues to press him, excusing
 his poetic technique from scrutiny but not his
 material.

a³ τούτων δέ τι σταθμᾶ κτλ. "are you
attaching any weight to, taking any notice of, any of the
things he says?"

σταθμᾶσθαι means usually "to weigh, measure" here
"to take account of". L.S.J. quote Theophrastus,
Historia Plantarum IX 4.9, εἰ τι δεῖ σταθμᾶσθαι
τούτο, "if we are to take this into account at all".

a⁹ - b¹ οὐ τι τῶν μέτρων οὐδὲ μέλος,
"not your verses nor indeed any song".

cf. Symp. 187d³ τοῖς κεκοιτημένοις μέλοσι τε καὶ
μέτροις; μέτρα are here evidently compositions with
metre but without music;

cf. Laws 669d⁷ ... μέλους χωρὶς, λόγους ψιλοῦς
εἰς μέτρα τιθέντες.

b² τῆς διανοίας (scil. τῶν ποιημάτων),

"the matter, drift, general sense, of your compositions" - this is what Ctesippus proceeds to describe, b⁶sq.

cf. Ion 530b¹⁰; τὴν [Ὁμήρου] διάνοιαν ἐκμανθάνειν, μὴ μόνον τὰ ἔπη, ζηλωτὸν ἔστιν, cf. 530c¹⁻⁴, Phaedrus 228d³; and διανοεῖσθαι, Prot. 341e⁸, 347a⁴.

b² τίνα τρόπον προσφέρῃ πρὸς τὰ παιδικά,

"what sort of approach you make to your beloved", cf. Phaedrus 252d⁴ τούτω τῷ τρόπῳ πρὸς τε τοὺς ἐρωμένους προσφέρεται, Charmides 165b⁶.

b⁵ ἀκούων διατεθρύληται, "deafened with listening to my chatter": cf. Xen. Mem. I 2.37; Plato Rep. 358c.

b⁶⁻⁷ καὶ γὰρ ἔστι καταγέλαστα, "the things he says are laughable". The neuter plural refers vaguely to the διάνοια of the poems.

c¹ ὁ οὐχὶ κᾶν κατὰ εἴκοι;

D. Tarrant, GQ 1946 p. 113, classing this as a "familiar saying", 'belonging to current conversational usage', refers to Euthyd. 279d⁶ τοῦτο δὲ κᾶν κατὰ γροίη (where the previous sentence is also apposite: καταγέλαστον δῆκου, ὁ κάλαι πρόκειται, τοῦτο κάλιν προτιθέναί).

(But Symp. 204b¹, Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε ἤδη καὶ παιδί, and Euthyd. 301c¹ refer to a child's understanding, not to his knowledge).

c² ἀ δὲ ἢ πόλις ὅλη ᾄδει, "things that anyone in the city can recite"; this must be just as much a phrase from current conversational usage as c¹: cf. Ion 534d⁷ τὸν δὲ παῖωνα ὄν πάντες ᾄδουσι.

The meaning of ᾄδει here and ᾄδουσιν at d² is not so much "sings" as "repeats, trots out" ("in ore habet", Ast): cf. ὕμνεῖν, e.g. Prot. 317a⁶.

c⁴ κλούτους τε καὶ ἱπποτροφίας καὶ νίκας Πυθοῦ καὶ

Ἴαθμοῦ καὶ Νεμέα τεθρίπποις τε καὶ κέλησι;

Hippothales was highly ambitious as a poet and attempted no less than Pindaric odes; no doubt Lysis' family, if nouveau riche, were especially proud of these victories; the name Isthmonike seems to have occurred in the family (See on 204e⁸ and 205d²).

For the plural abstracts κλούτους τε καὶ ἱπποτροφίας cf. First Alcib. ¹²²122b⁸, κλούτους καὶ τρυφᾶς καὶ ἐσθῆτας ἱματίων θ' ἔλξεις καὶ μύρων ἀλοιφᾶς καὶ θεραπόντων κλήθους ἀκολουθείας τῆν τε ἄλλην ἀβρότητα τῆν Περσῶν; the plural usually suggests numerous cases or the frequent occurrence of these phenomena (see Kühner-Gerth I pp. ~~18-19~~¹⁷⁻¹⁸); perhaps Ctesippus' turn of phrase here is meant to suggest that Hippothales recounts the κλούτος and ἱπποτροφία of each of Lysis' ancestors separately!

ε⁶ Κρονικώτερα, "even more prehistoric twaddle".

schol. vet. ἢ τὰ ἀρχαιότερα καὶ παλαιά, ἢ τὰ εὐήθη, - in fact both these meanings.

cf. Ar. Plutus 581 Κρονικαῖς λήμαις λημώντες τὰς φρένας,
 "blind in mind with prejudices derived from the days of
 Kronos", Clouds 398 ὦ μῶρε σὺ καὶ Κρονίων ὄξων
 "fool, you smell of the age of Kronos", cf. schol. οἶον
 ἀρχαικῆς εὐηθείας ὀδῶδως καὶ κρονίους τοὺς
 λήρους ἐκάλουν.

Strong colloquial abuse: cf. our "that came out of the Ark".

No doubt it was especially applicable to genealogising
 verses: cf. Timotheus fr. 7 (Diehl) (apud Athen. III 22d)

νέος δ' Ζεὺς βασιλεύει,
 τὸ παλαιὸν δ' ἦν Κρόνος ἄρχων·
 ἀπίτω μοῦσα παλαιά.

(cf. note on 221d⁵).

(cf. use of Κρόνος itself as a name of abuse, "old
 fuddy-duddy", Plato Euthyd. 287b, Ar. Wasps 1480).

c⁸ διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἡρακλέους συγγένειαν γεγονῶς
αὐτὸς ἐκ Διός;

Lysis' ancestor and Heracles were thus half-brothers,
according to this story. Heracles' extensive travels
no doubt made him a plausible hero to claim to have
entertained.

d² τῆς τοῦ δήμου ἀρχηγέτου θυγατρὸς;

(as Stallbaum noted, one τοῦ is omitted for euphony.)

ὁ τοῦ δήμου ἀρχηγέτης, "the founder of the deme";
cf. Soph. O.C. 58-61,

οἱ δὲ πληστοὶ γῦαι
τόνδ' ἐκδότην Κολωνὸν εὔχονται σφίσι
ἀρχηγὸν εἶναι, καὶ φέρουσι τοῦνομα
τὸ τοῦδε κοινὸν πάντας ὀνομασμένοι

(where no doubt a statue of "Colonos" is on the stage;
see Jebb ad loc.). But of course Colonos was originally
not a man's name but a placename; no doubt ἀρχηγέται
were invented for the demes at the same time as better-
established heroes were attached as ἀρχηγέται to the
new Cleisthenic tribes.

We know nothing else of this hero ("Aixon?"); perhaps
Αἰξώνη too was originally a placename. The deme
lay by the coast just south of Mt. Hymettus.

This pedigree is obviously a highly inflated piece of imagination; Lysis' family has the best possible male progenitor and a claim to local distinction on its female side. "Noch demselben Schema waren gewiss zahlreiche attische Stambäume fabricirt", E. Meyer, Forsch. zur Alten Geschichte, vol. II p. 521 n. 31.

(And unless "Aixon" was a genuinely ancient hero, this family-tree stressing prominence in the deme is hardly likely to have originated before the reforms of Cleisthenes. Lysis' family must have had recent wealth to keep a four-horse chariot, but evidently did not have a genealogy associating them with the earlier tribal aristocracy; in which case Hippothales' songs πάντων κέρει τῶν προγόνων (205c³) were exaggerated).

(See Wade-Gery, Essays in Greek History, p. 134, who says "it was hardly as Demesman of Aixone that Lysis traced his ancestry, rather as member of some locally-rooted Genos or Phratry"; but why then are we told the opposite in the text?)

d² ἄπερ αἱ γραῖαι ᾄδουσιν, "which the old women repeat"

(on ᾄδουσιν cf. n. on c²);

γραῶν ὕθλος became a proverbial expression for

"nonsense", cf. Theaet. 176b⁷, and Paroemiographi.

(cf. Dodds on Gorg. 527a⁵); but here it was no doubt

literally the case that old women were the experts on

family histories.

d⁵ πρὶν νενικηκέναι ᾄδεις, "are you crowing before
you've won?"

schol. vet. and the Paroemiographi duly record this as

a proverb; παροιμία, "πρὸ πῆς νίκης ᾄδεις τὸ
ἐγκωμιον", ἐπι τῶν τὰ πράγματα προλαμβάνόντων.

But the explanation of the saying has to be found in

Plato's own more elaborate use of it at Theaet. 164c⁴⁻⁵,

φαινόμεθά μοι ἀλεκτρυόνος ἀγεῖν δίκην πρὶν
νενικηκέναι ἀποκηδήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου ᾄδειν;

it takes its origin from cockfighting.

Here ᾄδεις, originally of "crowing", is slyly turned
to suit Hippothales' songs.

d⁹ οὐκ οἴεσθε γε.

"You think you aren't." οὐκ οἴματ' is like
οὐ φημι; K.G. II p. 180 ann. 3.

d¹⁰ τὸ δὲ πῶς ἔχετε;

"Well then, what is the situation?"

for τὸ δὲ see Thompson's note on Meno 97c.

It occurs in questions at Laws 967a⁶, τὸ δὲ οἷ
πῶς ἔχον ἄν εἴη ; 630d⁸, 886b³.

e¹ πάντων μάλιστα εἰς σέ τείνουσιν αὐταὶ αἱ ᾠδαί,
 "These songs affect you yourself more than anyone".
 τείνουσιν "affect" rather than "refer to";
 cf. *Hdt.* VI 109, ταῦτα ὧν πάντα εἰς σέ νῦν
 τείνει καὶ ἐκ σέο ἥρτηται, which seems to mean
 "All this now affects you as well as depends on you";
 τείνειν is intransitive here as in *Prot.* 345b⁸, but
 in *δοκᾷ Κέβης* εἰς σέ τείνειν τὸν λόγον,
Phaedo 63a⁷, it is transitive.

e² ἔλας "capture" is the first of a set of metaphors
 from hunting applied to amorous pursuit; cf. e⁴ διαφύγη,
 206a⁶ δυσσαλωτότεροι, and the full-scale comparison
 in 206a⁹ - b³, which adds θηρευτής, ὄνασοβοί, ἄγραν,
 ἐξαγριαίνειν. This was a frequent way of talking;
 cf. *Prot.* 309a¹, ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν
 Ἄλκιβιάδου ὄραν, and extensively at *Xen. Mem.* II
 6⁸⁻⁹, 28.

(But at e⁴ νενικηκότι is still reminiscent of the
 proverb κρῖν νενικηκέσαι ᾄδειν of d⁵).

e² κόσμος σοι ἔσται τὰ λεχθέντα, "what you
have related will be a credit to you";

for κόσμος in this phrase cf. Thuc. I 5² οἷς κόσμος
καλῶς τοῦτο δρῶν (i.e. ἀρστεύειν),
Ar. Clouds 914 νῦν δέ γε κόσμος τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐμοί
(with a pun on the literal sense of [golden] ornaments),
and cf. κόσμον φέρει τινί Hdt. VIII, 142,
Soph. Ajax 293.

e⁶ τοσοῦτον μαιζόνων καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν,
"all the greater prizes";

καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθά here is neuter, though perhaps
not without a suggestion of its sense in the phrase in
the masculine.

(On the thought cf. Symp. 182d⁹, ἐλόντι τε καλὸν δοκεῖ
εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἐλόντι αἰσχρόν).

a² δεδιώς τὸ μέλλον ὅπη ἀποβήσεται;

a standard phrase like our "what the future will bring"
or "how things will turn out";

cf. Hdt. I 32, Solon's famous advice, σκοπέειν δὲ χρὴ
παντός χρημάτων τὴν τελευτήν κῆ ἀποβήσεται;

VIII 67 τὸν πόλεμον κῆ ἀποβήσεται; Plato Euthyphro 3e³.

a⁴ ἐπαινῆ καὶ ἀξίῃ, "praise and exalt";

ἀξίειν in this sense seems to be otherwise poetic;

Soph. O.T. 1092. Or perhaps here it means colloquially

"inflate", cf. χαινοῦντα at 210e⁴.

a⁶ ὅσῳ μεγαλαυχότεροι δυσσαλωτότεροι;

for the ellipse of τοσοῦτω cf. Rep. 568c⁹.

a⁹ ποτός τις οὖν ἄν δοκεῖ εἶναι;

ἄν goes with εἶναι; the scribes who produced δοκοῖ (BTW) and δοκῆ (Par here and at 216b⁶) failed to understand this, but it was put right in Urbinas 31, anticipating Heindorf. ἄν is often attracted to second place: cf. Prot. 357a³⁻⁵: ὁμολογοῦσιν ἄν ἡμῖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢ οὐ; Ἐδοκοῦσιν ἄν καὶ τῷ Πρωταγόρῳ ὁμολογεῖν. ("Protagoras too thought they would agree") cf. Lysis 216b⁶ οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν.

a⁹ ἀνασοβοῖ, "put up";

the kind of θήρα implied here is the snaring of birds; cf. σοβεῖν in Ar. Birds 34, οὐ σοβοῦντος οὐδενός ἀνεπτόμεσθα.

b² κηλεῖν, "charm";

a change of metaphor, but still to one familiar in this application; cf. ἐκφρασί in Xen. Mem. II 6¹⁰.

b³ πολλή ἀμουσία

"a great deficiency of literary talent."

cf. b⁹ πολλή ἀλογία, "a great failure in logic".

Also πολλή ἀμαθία, ἄνοια, ἀκτεσία; Meno 90e^{1,7,9},
Hipp. Maj. 300c², πολλή τρυφή Ar. Frogs 21.

b⁵ κἄσι τούτοις ἔνοχον

"liable on all these charges", cf. Theaet. 148b⁴;
evidently a legal term also used colloquially.

ὅπως μὴ κοιήσῃς;

It is interesting that the scribe of Ven. 186 should appear to have been observing the "Canon Dawesianus"; but the primary mss. do not, and should not be altered. See Kühner-Gerth II p. 385, where it is suggested that the aorist subjunctive indicates a more immediate danger than the future; and on the abandonment of Dawes' canon see Dodds, Gorgias, pp. 257 and 343.

b⁶⁻⁸

ἄνθρωπα πλάπτοντα ἑαυτὸν βλαβερός ὢν ἑαυτοῦ

Heindorf thought the repetition was meant to hide a weak argument. But Socrates is being ironic; the argument was only too likely to take in any Greek, as it does Hippothales (and Thrasymachus thought precisely this about excellence in shepherds and rulers). Socrates is being emphatic precisely to underline the weakness and flippancy of his argument.

The repetition is an example of what Burnet and Dodds have called "a b a" or "ring structure"; cf. (e.g.) Gorg. 507c⁹-d⁶ τὸν βουλόμενον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, εἰ μέλλεις εὐδαίμων εἶναι; such structures happen frequently in emphatic conversation.

c¹

σοι ἀνακοινοῦμαι, "I put my problem to you":

cf. Prot. 314b⁷, Laches 178b⁵.

c¹⁻² εἴ τι ἄλλο ἔχεις (scil. συμβουλεύειν) συμβόλευε
 τίνα ἄν; τις λόγον

"give me advice, if you can, on this point above
 all, what words . . ."

cf. Phaedo 63c³ εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιοῦτων,
 διισχυρισάμεν ἄν καὶ τοῦτο.

The idioms with ἄλλος are peculiarly difficult;
 but this seems to be the meaning here rather than
 "If you have anything further" or "better to advise"
 (scil. "than singing odes.") (Jowett and Apelt.)
 A fuller paraphrase might be "If you can give me
 advice on anything else, give it me on this."

c⁵ ἕως ἄν δυναίμην σοι ἐπιδειξάι, κτλ.:

cf. Xen. Mem. II/6²⁸, ἕως ὃ' ἄν τί σοι κάγω
 συλλαβῶν εἰς τὴν τῶν καλῶν τε κάγαθῶν θήραν
 ἔχοιμι εἰδὲ τὸ ἐρωτικὸς εἶναι; but in Xenophon (I)
 Socrates surprisingly volunteers this as a sequel
 to a discussion, not of ἔπος, but of γαλία:
 (II) there is no practical demonstration suggested.
 The dramatic plausibility and interest are much
 higher in Plato; also the kind of aid Socrates

c⁵ (contd.)

offers is very different - in Xenophon Socrates promises merely to praise the ἐραστής in the presence of his παιδικά.

c⁶ οὗτοι φασί; "Bene οὗτοι, quanquam unus dixerat Ctesippus; ipso enim silentio ceteri illa comprobaverant," Heindorf; but most of all οὗτοι serves Plato's scene-setting by reminding us that there are others present (as did Ctesippus' ἡμῶς and ἡμῶν at 204c⁷, 205d⁴).

c⁸ ἀλλ' οὐδέν, ἔφη, χαλεπόν. Hippothales has got over some of his embarrassment and is eager that Socrates should talk to Lysis; which might indeed have been difficult (1) on other days, when the boys would have been segregated in the palaestra: (2) if Lysis had not through Menexenus known Ctesippus. See notes on d¹⁻² and d³.

d¹ ὡς Ἐρμαεῖα ἄγουσιν; a special festival held in Athenian palaestras; cf. Aesch. in Tim. 10. For Hermes as the patron of athletics cf. his title (έν-) ἀγώνιος, I. G. I². 5, Pindar Pyth. 2.10, Nem. 1.60, Ar. Plutus 1161-3; for statues of Hermes in palaestras cf. Anth. Pal. VI. 100, 143, 144, App. Plan. 186, 188:

(188) Εἰνοσίφυλλον ὄρος Κολλήνιον αἰ-κὺ λελοίκως,
 τῆδ' ἔστηκ' ἔρατος γυμνασίου μετέων,
 Ἑρμῆς, ᾧ ἔπι παῖδες ἐμάρακον ἠδ' ὑάκινθον
 κολλάκι καὶ θαλεροῦς θῆκαν ἕων στεφάνους.

At the festival it appears that the boys themselves took part in offering the sacrifices (206e³, 207d⁴); also that wine was liable to reach the waiting paidagogoi (223b¹). There may perhaps have been athletic contests or displays not mentioned here; the ephebes in the 2nd century held a torch-race at the Hermaea (I.G. II-III², 2980).

Aeschines refers to the existence of, but does not give details of, "Solonian" laws for the conduct of the festival. (In Timarch. 10) (But for the purported "law" at In Timarch. 12, see next note.)

ἀναμειγμένοι οἷ τε νεανίσκοι καὶ οἱ παῖδες.
cf. 207a¹ ἐν τοῖς παῖσι τε καὶ νεανίσκοις.

cf. Aeschines in Timarch. 9-10: ὁ γὰρ νομοθέτης . . .

ἀποδείκνυσι τοὺς νεανίσκους τοὺς

εἰσφοιτῶντας ^{εὐστίνες} οὐκ ~~αὐτῶν~~ εἶναι καὶ ἄστινας

ἡλικίας ἔχοντας" taking this sentence in conjunc-

tion with Hippothales' remark here, we can infer

that Aeschines by νεανίσκους does not mean the

same as he does by παῖδας a few lines earlier.

The "Solonian" laws evidently made separate

provisions about the use of palaestras by youths

as opposed to boys, cf. earlier, in Tim. 7; from

Hippothales' remark we can infer that Mikhos held

separate classes for παῖδες and for νεανίσκοι,

who on ordinary days were not allowed to mix; but

for the Hermaea this rule was evidently relaxed.

(Note also Aeschines' allusion to a rule περὶ

τῆς συμφοιτήσεως τῶν παίδων, "the companionships

the boys may form at school" (Adams)). (The

age at which a παῖς became a νεανίσκος we are

not told by Aeschines, who earlier (§ 7) has

mentioned the distinction of παῖδες from

d¹⁻² (contd.)

μετράκια and αἱ ἄλλαι ἐφεστῆς ἡλικίας;
 whereas Socrates at 205b¹ referred to Lysis as a
 νεανίσκος. The usual guess is that a division
 would be made round about the age of fourteen or
 fifteen: see Freeman, "Schools of Hellas" pp.
 53-4. Solon fr. 19 perhaps confirms this.)
 (The purported quotation of the actual law, at
 in Timarch. 12, is an obvious forgery: see Drerup,
 "Über die bei den Attischen Rednern eingelegten
 Urkunden", pp. 305-6. It provides reasonably
 enough that adults shall not take part in the
 contests (συγκαθίσταται) at the Hermaea; but its
 implication that adults had to be completely
 excluded from the gymnasium may be ignored in view
 of this passage of the "Lysis").

There might seem to be a problem about the
 situation in the palaestra depicted in the
 "Charmides"; there are κατῶδες present who stare
 at Charmides, who is εἰ μάλ᾽ ἤδη μετράκιον
 (Charm. 154b^c). But it sounds even so as if the
 κατῶδες are in a group together, and there is no
 mention of their being engaged by anyone in
 conversation.

d²⁻³

κρόσεισιν οὖν σοί· εἰ δὲ μή; οὖν

is perhaps both inferential and resumptive; the statement is repeated after reason has been given for believing it.

οὐδὲ in d³ jumps back over the repetition to answer the οἴμαι μὲν of c⁹, which a less voluble speaker might have left "solitarium" (Denniston p. 382); but Hippothales is anxiously exploring all possibilities (see on d⁵).

d³

Κτησίππου συνήθης ἐστὶν οἷα τὸν τούτου ἀνεψιὸν

Μενέξενον; "he's well acquainted with Ctesippus through Ctesippus' cousin Menexenus". With these careful arrangements for approaching the boy Lysis compare Socrates' remark to Critias à propos of Charmides at Charm. 155a³⁻⁶; ἀλλὰ τί οὐκ

ἐπέθειξάς μοι τὸν νεανίαν καλέσας δεῦρο; οὐδὲ

γάρ ἄν μου εἰ ἔτι ἐτύγχανε νεώτερος ὢν, αἰσχρὸν

ἄν ἦν αὐτῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἡμῖν ἐναντίον γε σοῦ,

ἐπιτρόπου τε ἅμα καὶ ἀνεψιοῦ ὄντος. Athenian

boys were evidently warned "not to talk to strange men"! (cf. Symp. 183c⁴ sq.)

d⁴ Μενεξένω μὲν γὰρ δὴ: μὲν is solitarium with Μενεξένω, and is probably similar to Denniston's "μὲν with personal and demonstrative pronouns implicitly contrasted with other persons and things" (G.P. p. 387): here Lysis' friendship with Menedenus is implicitly contrasted with his friendship with everyone else (πάντων μάλιστα). γὰρ δὴ is merely emphatic for γὰρ (G.P. p. 243).

d⁵ ἔδν ἄρα μὴ προσίη αὐτός "If, that is, by any chance he doesn't come himself." ἄρα here indicates a slight reluctance to admit that the possibility need be allowed for, or suggests that the speaker would be surprised if this possibility did arise. Cf. Symp. 185^e¹, where Eryximachus suggests a third alternative cure: εἰ δ' ἄρα πάνυ ἰσχυρά ἐστίν, ... κτάσθαι; implying that this should not be necessary. (Some of Denniston's examples at G.P. pp. 37-38 are like these, but his description of the "possibility as having only just been realized" does not quite cover the case in the "Lysis", where ἔδν ἄρα μὴ is a repetition of εἰ δὲ μὴ in d³).

e¹ ἀποδείξει (or ἀποδείξει') see Schanz, *Platonis Opera*, VII p. xiii; ἀποδείξει in the secondary mss. is a correction introducing a form never found in the primary mss. of Plato. ἀποδείξει TW is perhaps due to dittography of ἀποδείξει' εἰς.

206e³-211a¹

The scene changes to the interior of the palaestra; we see the boy Lysis and his friend Menexenus. Hippothales hides himself in the throng while Socrates gently catechises Lysis about the extent of his knowledge and thus of his claim to have friends.

Not only the scene but also the speakers change here. Socrates fulfils his promise of talking to Lysis, and we have a miniature Socratic dialogue specially adjusted to a young boy, quieter than the earlier knockabout banter of the older youths - but equally amusing to the reader, while at the same time showing Socrates at his gentlest.

206e³-211a¹ (contd.)

Socrates starts from the paradox obvious to any child that though his parents love him there are many things they do not allow him to do, and works round to the lesson that unless one has knowledge one will have no friends. This Socrates describes as "humbling and restraining" Lysis, who certainly shows occasional touches of boyish arrogance; but perhaps especially Socrates wishes to prevent Lysis from thinking he deserves to win friends by his beauty alone, as he might think after the attentions of Hippothales.

Thus Socrates manages to suggest the dangers of the present situation, while stressing even here the value of knowledge, which he of course often elaborated on in wider contexts.

This section and the ensuing interlude to 211d⁶ are as far as Plato allows us a real picture of the young boys: in the main discussion following they say very little that shows us anything about themselves (little in fact except 'yes' and 'no'); but here we are given some idea of the life of an Athenian boy, and what he thought of it.

206e³-211a¹ (contd.)

Lysis is rather given to emphatic and abrupt replies; note his frequent $\text{Μὲν Δεία} \cdot \text{Ὡς γὰρ}$; and ἀλλὰ τί μὴν ; he is even still saying Μὲν Δεία at the climax of his "humbling" at 210d⁷.

206

e⁵ κεκοσμημένους , dressed in white for the festival; and Lysis at least has a garland (ἐστεφανωμένος , 207a¹) cf. Theophr. Characters XXI 11, Aesch. in Ctesiphontem 77, Plato Rep. 328c¹⁻², $\text{καθηστο δὲ ἐστεφανωμένος (ὁ Κέφαλος) . . . τεθυκῶς γὰρ ἐτύγκανεν.}$

e⁶ $\text{ἐν τῇ αἰθῆ} \dots \text{ἔξω, οἱ δὲ} \dots \text{τοῦ ἀποδυτηρίου ἐν γωνίᾳ}$; we can probably picture the palaestra as an open-air courtyard with a covered portico at one side serving as the ἀποδυτηρίον. Menexenus' game (207b¹) could lead him from the one to the other (in pursuit of an ἀσπράγαλος) Where the sacrifices took place we are not told; perhaps in front of a statue in the αἰθῆ.

e⁵ ἀστραγαλίζοντάς τε δῆ ; this jumps back over
καί τὰ ... κεκοιμημένα to τοὺς καΐδας. τε
means "and"; see Denniston p. 500 on τε
"introducing the last item of a series".

ἀστραγαλίζοντας ; "playing games with knucklebones":
for these as children's toys see First Alc.
110b², Asclepiades A.P. VI 308, Leonidas A.P.
VI 309:

ἀστραγάλας τε

κουροσύνης καιγνί', ἀνεκρέμασεν.

The Arethan scholiast has a huge note on ἀστραγάλοι;
sometimes they were marked as four-sided dice,
but for other games such as ἄρτιασμός here they
were used in quantities as an alternative to
stones, coins, nuts or beans. Asclepiades loc.
cit. mentions a school-prize consisting of eighty
ἀστραγάλοι. Some were evidently available in
the gymnasium where the "Theaetetus" is set,
since Socrates uses them as counters; 154c¹.

e⁷ ἤρτιαζον ἀστραγάλους καμπόλους, ἐκ φορμίσκων
 τινῶν προαιρούμενοι, "were playing 'odd-or-even'
 with a great quantity of knucklebones, picking
 them out of some baskets that were there."
 See the scholiasts here and on Ar. Plutus 816
 and 1057; especially schol. Ar. Plut. 816,
 ἐπικρύπτοντες τὰ νομισματα τῷ τῆς χειρὸς σφίγματι
 τὸν συμπαιστορὰ ἐρωτῶμεν· ἄρτιά εἰσιν ἢ περιττά
 ἢ τῇ χειρὶ μου καλύκτω; κἂν μὲν εἰπὼν τύχη,
 ἀφαιρεῖται αὐτά· εἰ δ' ἀποτύχη, καταβάλλει τοσάδε.
 For continuous playing of this, considerable
 numbers of ἀστραγάλοι would be needed for each
 side to compete in accumulating. προαιρούμενοι
 here thus refers to the picking up by each side
 in turn of the mystery handfuls.
 Aristotle remarks that guessing odd or even was
 an easier form of the game than guessing the
 exact number hidden in the hand; Rhet. 1407b²,
 τύχοι γὰρ ἀντίς μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἀρτιασμοῖς ἄρτια
 ἢ περιττά εἰπὼν μᾶλλον ἢ κόσα ἔχει. Aristotle's
 phrasing probably indicates that the second form
 of the game could be called ἀρτιασμός too; so
 either form could be being played here in the
 "Lysis".

e⁷ (contd.)

(Vat. 1029 has ἀστραγάλους καμπόλλους, which confirms that this is what W had before correction; but the point is not that they picked up καμπόλλους, but that they took advantage of the great store to play ἀσπασμός.

Pollux's κατερομένοι (if he is not merely paraphrasing) was perhaps at some time read along with ἀ-ους καμπόλλους to mean "pouring a great quantity onto the floor"; but this is rather less likely to be what they did; while προαιρουμένοι seems to be in context as describing the actual playing of the game).

a² "Junge §: εὖ μόνον ἄξιος ἀκοῦσαι τὸ καλὸς εἶναι," Stallbaum. For ἀκοῦσαι τὸ καλὸς εἶναι, "to have the name of 'handsome'" cf. Symp. 173d²⁷ ταύτην τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔλαβες τὸ μανικὸν καλεῖσθαι. ἀκοῦσαι καλὸς εἶναι would have sufficed but the τὸ indicates S. is referring to other people's statements. The construction is then changed

a² (contd.)

from ἀκοῦσαι τὸ to ἀκοῦσαι ὅτι;

"to have it said of him that he has all the excellences"; the change is from the description Socrates is quoting to the one he himself endorses.

a³ καλὸς τε κἀγαθός: "as excellent in mind as in body": by looking at Lysis one can not only see his beauty, but also guess that he will think and act to equal it.

The senses of καλὸς κἀγαθός cause much confusion:-

(1) The social sense imported by the revisers of Jowett, who allude to Lysis' "look of gentle breeding", though common elsewhere, is out of place here because all the youths in the palaestra were probably the sons of καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ in this sense (see on 203a³); and in any case it would be unlikely that Socrates was self-confessedly a "tuft-hunter".

(2) Adam on Rep. 489e⁴ and Dodds on Gorgias 470e⁹ have pointed out that the term καλὸς κἀγαθός is "transvalued" by Socrates and Plato "to express their ideal of what a man should be" (i.e. in

a³ (contd.)

particular φιλόσοφος.) But Socrates would not commit himself to saying on grounds of looks alone that a young boy came up to his ideal of philosophical integrity; and such exalted notions would in any case be out of place at this point in the dialogue.

The meaning here is simpler than either of these senses. Two similar passages can be considered:

Prot. 315d⁸, μετράκιον ὡς μὲν ἐγῶμαι καλόν
τε κάγαθόν τὴν φύσιν, τήγδ' οὖν ἰδέαν

πάνυ καλός. Here similarly Socrates guesses cautiously that a young man (Agathon) has qualities of φύσις besides those of ἰδέα.

Charm. 154d-e, esp. e⁴; Critias is showing off Charmides, who is obviously καλός; Socrates asks if he is also τὴν ψυχὴν εὖ κεφυκώς; to which Critias replies Ἄλλα πάνυ καλός καὶ ἀγαθός ἔστιν καὶ ταῦτα. When

Charmides' ψυχὴ is referred to Critias slips in the term ἀγαθός in addition to καλός.

a³ (contd.)

When καλός is offset against ἀγαθός a distinction between body and mind is implied: cf Xen. Mem. II 6.30, where Critobulus is interested in friendship both with τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τὰς ψυχὰς and with τοὺς καλοὺς τὰ σώματα: cf. also Xen. Symp. 8.26. The one quality is easily visible, the other less immediately identified. This is already said by Sappho (fr. 49 Diehl, 50 Lobel-Page);

ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλος ἕσσον ἔσθην κέλεται < κάλος > ,
ὁ δὲ κάγαθος αὐτίκα καὶ κάλος ἔσσεται.

Sappho probably meant to say that excellence of character, when discovered, would constitute nobility (κάλος ἔσσεται) better than handsomeness which is found only to be nobility of appearance (ἕσσον ἔσθην κάλος) ; that is to say, ἀρετὴ constitutes a kind of κάλλος superior to the physical kind. Socrates says this at Theaet. 185e³; Theaetetus is not handsome; but Καλός γὰρ εἶ, ὃ θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγε θεοσωρος, αἰσχροός· ὁ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθός.

a³ (contd.)

Thus in this simplest use of the term καλός κάγαθος, it is ἀγαθός which defines the sense of καλός; in fact the term is meant to mark a contrast with the ordinary physical sense of καλός. In brief, καλός when contrasted with ἀγαθός suggests qualities of appearance, when conjoined with ἀγαθός suggests qualities of character; which is why Socrates can contrast the two senses here, saying that Lysis is not only obviously καλός in appearance, but also probably καλός in character.

a³ εἰς τὸ καταντικρῶ, "to the other part of the ἀποδυτηρίον", away from the players of odds-or-evens, but still "inside": cf. εἰσέρχεται in b¹.

a⁵ οὖν, a⁷ οὖν, b² οὖν, b⁴ ὁῖ ; the steps in the narrative are certainly in temporal sequence, but since each event is also the consequence of an earlier one, they might be said to be in logical order also. This illustrates very well the use of οὖν and ὁῖ in narrative; "almost purely

a⁵, a⁷, b², b⁴ (contd.)

temporal" (Denniston p. 425), but here not altogether; especially as this sequence of events has been more or less planned. On the other hand while at 207d¹ δὴ might be "logical", in d² οὖν is not, but quite exclusively temporal.

a⁶ for μὲν ἔπειτα regularly with ~~οὐ~~ δὲ see Denniston p. 376; cf. also τέως μὲν εἶτα Ar. Clouds 66, Xen. Hell. II 2.17, ἔτι μὲν ἔπειτα Plato Prot. 310c⁷.

b⁴ οἱ ἄλλοι, the others who had been with Hippothales and Ctesippus outside and had heard the plan being made. Richards was wrong to delete οἱ.

b⁵ τούτους ἐκφυλάττοντες, "using them as a screen"; cf. Ar. Hist. An. 613b⁹, ὄρωγες ἐκφυλάττοντες ἄκανθάν τινα καὶ ὕλην ... ἐκπαζουσιν Eur. Cyclops 680-1,

οὗτοι σιωπῇ τὴν πέτραν ἐκφυλάττοντες
ἀσφόντες ἐστήκασιν.

b⁵ (contd.)

Ar. Ach. 684, τῆς δίκης τὴν ἠλύγην, looks as if it means "the smoke-screen of the Law", the pettifoggery used to hide the truth (see Starkie ad loc.)

c¹⁻²

Ἰότερος ὑμῶν πρεσβύτερος; Ἄμφισβητούμεν, ἔφη.

Socrates chooses the more confident Menexenus and asks a question which is bound to break down the boys' shyness. The reply seems very strange to us; nowadays children know their ages to the day, because of the annual celebration of their birthdays. But:-

(1) the earliest traceable mention in Greece of a private person's birthday celebration seems to have been in New Comedy, in the Greek source of Plautus' "Pseudolus"; see Schmidt in PW s.v.

Γενέθλιος ἡμέρα, Rose in OCD s.v. Birthday.

This passage of the "Lysis" tells against Schmidt's assumption that importance must nevertheless have been attached to birthdays as such at an earlier date. (Pindar (fr. 193 Schröder) knew his birthday because he had been born on the day of the Pythian festival; Wilamowitz, Pindaros, p.60.)

(2) a child was enrolled in the list of its father's Phratry not at the time of its birth, but at the next occasion of the festival of the Apatouria in the month Pyanopsion (in autumn); see Deubner, *Attische Feste*, p. 234. Thus doubt could obviously arise about the precise seniority of children enrolled at the same year's Apatouria. This may very likely be the situation in the "Lysis"; the two boys had been enrolled in the same autumn, but no one was clear which of them had been born earlier in the preceding year.

(On the other hand even more serious doubt about a person's age within years apparently could arise; cf. Ath. Pol. 42¹, where provision is made for the demesmen to take a vote on youths to be enrolled to judge εἰ δοκοῦσι γεγονέναι τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου (i.e. 18 years); cf. Ar. Wasps 578. This may have been to prevent deliberate deceit, but at least it suggests that no records were available. (This perhaps means the Phratry lists did not date enrolments?)

In Demosthenes xxxix, in Boeotum, §27, a question of seniority is not gone into on the ground that this would be εἴηθεσ; but nothing can be inferred from this, because the speaker may have had something to hide.)

c⁵ καὶ μὴν γε, progressive:

cf. c⁷, οὐ μὴν γε negating what might have seemed to be the next stage in the progression.

These two cases point very clearly to the origin of μὴν as purely emphatic; the progressive and adversative forces respectively are largely given by καὶ and οὐ. γε is rarely absent in these uses: see Denniston G.P. 335, 352.

ὁπότερός γε καλλίων, ὡσαύτως. Ἐγελασάτην οὖν ἄμφω.
Do the boys laugh because Socrates is wrong this time (as he knew himself), and Lysis was conspicuously the more handsome? Or, if they nevertheless did vie with each other about beauty, did each think Socrates had detected the jealousy of the other?

c⁸ φίλω γάρ ἐστων; it looks as if Socrates was already steering the conversation round to the topic of friendship, intending to show Hippothales (and Lysis) what friendship should be, with the friendship of Lysis and Menexenus as an example. But this is interrupted almost at once by the summons for Menexenus.

c¹⁰ κοινὰ τὰ γε φίλων λέγεται, "the proverb says, friends have all in common".

Plato quotes this again at Rep. 424a¹ (κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν κτλ.) and at Laws 739c¹; Euripides at Androm. 376 has:-

φίλων γάρ οὐδὲν ἴδιον, οἵτινες φίλοι
 ὀρθῶς πεφύκασ' ἀλλὰ κοινὰ χρήματα.

But it is also quoted of common interests rather than possessions; cf. Eur. Or. 735, Phoen. 243, Plato Phaedr. 279c⁶.

This and three other proverbs about friendship, all quoted (but not attributed to anyone) by Aristotle, are ascribed by later writers to Pythagoras;

- κοινὰ τὰ φίλων by Timaeus (506 Jacoby F 13)
 φιλότης-ἰσότης by Diog. L. VIII 10
 φίλος ἕτερος αὐτός by Philo, Quaest. in Gen.
 i.17
 μία ψυχὴ by Cicero de Off. I 56.

They perhaps show a slightly less self-directed and utilitarian attitude than many Greek sayings about friendship; on the other hand it is perhaps dangerous to make any definite ascription of utterances which can easily have arisen as proverbs.

On κοινονία see Gorg. 507c-508c, where Dodds argues that Plato is quoting Pythagoreans. Timaeus (loc. cit.) derived κοινὰ τὰ φίλων from Pythagoras' practice of taking over for the sect the property of those who joined him. But the other sense of "common interests" shows that the proverb was given wider application.

For a long account of "Pythagorean" views of friendship, see Sambharius, de Vit. Pyth. ch. 33; but a great part at least of the terminology here ^{is} post-Aristotelian.)

d¹ ἄκότερος δικαιότερος καὶ σοφότερος Was S.

perhaps going to suggest that in these matters
neither could be allowed to admit to being outdone?

d² οὐκ see on 207a⁵.

d⁴ ἔδοκετ γάρ μοι ἱεροκοιῶν τυγχάνειν

"I assumed that he was taking some part in the
rites", Lamb. The actual sacrifice was already
over; see 206e³⁻⁴.

d⁵ ^ἢ σου σφόδρα φιλεῖ σε ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ;

Now that Menexenus has gone Socrates has to work
round to the topic of how to deserve friends by a
new tack, and to think of another situation through
which to lead to his point.

ἢ σου means "I am sure that ..." without the hint
of irony it often carries. But Stallbaum was
wrong to remove the questionmark, since Lysis
answers.

e¹ Δοκεῖ δέ σοι εὐδαίμων εἶναι . . . ἢ μηδέν ἐξέλῃ ποιῆναι:

see Goodwin, G.M.T. §555 under "mixed conditional constructions", who says "an optative in the relative clause sometimes depends on a verb of obligation, propriety, possibility, etc., with an infinitive, the two forming an expression nearly equivalent to an optative with ἄν."

Here after δοκεῖ σοι εὐδαίμων εἶναι there is the same sequence as might happen after δύναται εὐδαίμων εἶναι. Madvig's ἄν (which would have come after εὐδαίμων, not after εἶναι) is thus unnecessary.

e² ἄν ἐπιθυμοῖ: the optative is due to attraction by the conditional ἐξέλῃ.

e⁴⁻⁵ τοῦτο παντὶ τρόπῳ δῆλον ὅτι προθυμοῦνται, ὅπως ἄν εὐδαιμονότης, "they are clearly eager in every way to promote this, that is to say eager for any means by which you might be happy."

παντί τρόπῳ is emphatic and goes with προθυμοῦνται
 ὁπλον ὅτι is a "virtual adverb", see Dodds on
 Gorg. 487d⁷ (where similarly it follows on the
 emphatic adverb οὕτως); τοῦτο is proleptic
 of ὅπως ἂν εὐδαιμονόιης; so Heindorf.

This way of reading the sentence gives a clear

step in the argument; - from εὐδαιμονία σε
ἐπιθυμοῦσι γενέσθαι to παντί τρόπῳ προθυμοῦνται
ὅπως ἂν εὐδαιμονόιης; if Lysis' parents will the
 end (his happiness), they also will every possible
means to it; and letting him do what he liked
 would seem to be a necessary condition (e¹⁻²);
 this is why it is paradoxical that they don't let
 him do what he likes.

cf. Theaet. 148d¹ προθυμήθητι δὲ παντί τρόπῳ ...
 λαβεῖν λόγον; and Hdt. VIII 13, ἐποιεῖτό τε
 πᾶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ὅπως ἂν ἐξιωθεῖη τὸ
 Περσικόν, cf. I 91.

ὅπως ἔν with optative in primary sequence marks clearly (1) the origin of ὅπως as a relative adverb, "the means by which", (2) a potential, not final, sense in the optative. cf. Plato Symp. 190c⁷, Δοκῶ μοι ἔχειν μηχανήν, ὡς ἂν εἴεν τε ἑνέροκοι καὶ παύσαιν-το τῆς ἀκολασίας ἀσθενέστεροι γινόμενοι, "a scheme by which men could continue to exist while ceasing to be wicked", and Hdt. locc. cit.

See Kühner-Gerth II pp. 374-5, Goodwin G.M.T.

§§349-351.

(The other possible reading of the sentence, with a comma after ὅπῃ and taking παντὶ τρόπῳ with ὅπῃ, weakens the step in the thought and makes the potential force in ὅπως ἂν εὐδαίμονος less easily perceptible.)

e⁸ Ναὶ μὲν Δία ἐμέ γε, ὃ Σόκρατες, καὶ μάλα γε πολλὰ
 κωλύουσιν, "Oh but they do, Socrates; they stop
 me doing lots of things" (But one clause only
 in the Greek.)

(1) for the double accusative with κωλύω cf.
 Epist. III, 315d⁴, ταῦτ' ἄρα σὲ μὲν τότε διακώλυσα.

(2) γε and καὶ ... γε are both purely emphatic
 (καὶ meaning "actually"; see Denniston p. 158
 and cf. esp. Theaet. 144c⁵⁻⁶, Phlb. 36b³,) and
 both within one clause (unlike Meno 82b⁵, πάνυ
 γε σφοδρὰ, οἰκογενῆς γε, which is two clauses.)
 Denniston p. 144 seems to doubt the duplication
 of emphatic γε; but it must easily have happened
 in conversation, and no doubt is put here to
 represent the vehemence of Lysis' reply.

a⁵ ἀλλὰ τίνα μὲν; "Well, who do they let drive the
 chariot if not you?"; ἀλλὰ ... μὲν implying
 considerable surprise at the denial of the speaker's
 previous suggestion, or at least puzzlement over
 what can be the case now it has been denied.
 Compare e⁴. Socrates is of course only pretending

a⁵ (contd.)

not to understand, in order to make the paradox clearer to Lysis; he asks this question (who does drive the chariot?) for the sake of the next remark it allows him (do they pay someone to drive it rather than letting you?)

(Richards ingeniously accepted Schanz's otherwise pointless change to ἄλλὰ τί μὴν; and attributed the words to Lysis, pointing out that this is a favourite phrase of his. This makes Lysis himself volunteer the information that there is a charioteer, "They don't let me drive: but why should you think they would? We've got a charioteer." It is true that at b¹ and c⁴ Lysis says ἄλλὰ τί μὴν; to express his surprise at Socrates' apparent ignorance of domestic arrangements. But it is unlikely that Lysis would not have been highly eager to drive the chariot even though there was a charioteer (or Socrates would not have tried to make his point with this example); he wouldn't have admitted that it was unnecessary for him to drive it.)

b¹ 'Αλλὰ τί μὴν; "Of course they pay him" (i.e. "Did you think they wouldn't be able to afford a charioteer?")

Lysis doesn't yet quite see Socrates' point; compare c⁴, where he says "Of course my κραιδαγωγός is a slave; he's one of our own, ἡμέτερός γε." Compare too his laughter at 208d⁷; he is still surprised at Socrates' feigned ignorance of the treatment he gets, and has not begun to be puzzled in the way that Socrates is trying to suggest to him.

Denniston p. 332 remarks "from meaning 'Well, if not that, then what?', elliptical ἀλλὰ τί μὴν; comes to be virtually an emphatic affirmative answer ... 'Of course.'" There is (often) also an implication of surprise that the preceding question should have been asked.

(This is different from cases where ἀλλὰ τί μὴν; is a real question (e.g. Symp. 202d¹⁰, 206e⁴) where it has the same implications as ἀλλὰ τίνα μὴν at 208a⁵.)

b² τοῦ ὀπιθοῦ ζεύγους; the family no doubt had a mule-team for travelling (cf. Aesch. in Ctes. 76), since the horses would be kept for racing?

(The primary mss. have ὀπιθοῦ, not ὀπιτικοῦ; see Ammann, -τικος bei Platon, pp. 148-9, 229-31.)

b⁴ ἴδοεν ἔφεν; "Let me? Of course not", or "what makes you think they'd let me?": compare c² κῶς γὰρ ἐπιτρέκουσιν; "Of course they don't allow me": in both cases Lysis echoes Socrates' question in scornful denial. Cf. Cratylus 398e⁵⁻⁶; ἦ οὐ ἕκατι εἰ-καῖν; ἴδοεν, ὀγαθέ, ἔλω;

(Hirschig and Cobet were thus wrong to delete ἔδοεν; exclamatory κῶς γὰρ; and κῶς γὰρ; seem usually not to stand alone, but to follow or precede fuller statements of the speaker's objection. See Denniston p. 86 on κῶς γὰρ; and the cases of κῶς γὰρ; in L.S.J.)

(Neither is there any need here to debate whether ἄν need be added to optatives in questions. ἄν was present in the previous sentence, from which ἔφεν is quoted, and can easily be understood here;

b⁴ (contd.)

furthermore this is perhaps an exclamation rather than a question; see Thompson's summary of Jebb's findings (Thompson, *Meno*, App. on text, 97c) "this construction (i.e. optative without *ἄν*) even in verse, is limited to places which are exclamations rather than interrogations.")

b⁴ τί δέ, ἦν δ' ἔγώ, μάλιστα; "Well then just what is the situation?" W adds μάλιστα which is perhaps more lively than BT's perfectly correct τί δέ; cf. *Gorg.* 448d⁴.

b⁵ Inscriptions give the form as ὀρεσκόμενος, which is also necessary in *Ar. Thesm.* 491 (see Meisterhans, *Grammatik der Altischen Inschriften*, 1888, p. 20.)

b⁶ Καὶ δοῦλον, "even a slave"; the ἠνίοχος was μισθωτός, but not a slave.

c² πῶς γὰρ ἐλιτρέλουσιν: see on b⁴.

c³ 'ΑΑΑ' ὅρατ τίς σου; This is a livelier question if τίς is interrogative. The papyrus has σου τίς (it omits almost all accents) but perhaps the mss. order should be retained in view of the "wildness" of this papyrus (see introduction).

c³ ὅδε κατὰ πρῶτον "That κατὰ πρῶτον over there"; ὅδε is deictic, and the omission of the article carries a flavour of off-handedness and contempt; cf. Symp. 213b⁶, where Alcibiades asks peevishly, ἀλλὰ τίς ἡμῖν ὅδε πρῶτος συμπόσιος; also Gorg. 521e⁷. Compare the contemptuous use of οὗτος ἀνὴρ; see Kühner-Gerth I, p. 629, and Dodds on Gorgias 467b¹.

The absence of the article puzzled the scribes (as it has puzzled editors); BT misdivided ὅδε as ὁ ὅε; many editors have punctuated ὅδε, κατὰ πρῶτον very awkwardly. These editors might have seized on W's ὅδε ὁ but it is more likely that ὁ in W is an addition than that there was a double corruption in BT; a scribe faced with the misdivision ὁ ὅε ὁ would have been able to correct it without recourse to deletion.

c³ sq.: Παιδαγωγός δοσλος ὄν ἄγων εἰς
 διδασκάλου

Children of the wealthy were put under the care of παιδαγωγός from an early age (ἐπειδὴν θάπτον συνιῆ τις τὰ λεγόμενα, Prot. 325c⁶, Xen. Lac. Pol. 2.1.) until adolescence (τό μαιρακιοῦσθαι, Xen. Lac. Pol. 3.1.), and seem to have been continuously under their eye. Demosthenes had to persuade his παιδαγωγός to take him to hear speeches in the courts: Plut. Dem. 5. It is not clear to what extent the παιδαγωγός was supposed to instruct the child; perhaps very little (note on 223b); his main job was to discipline (and chaperon) the child (Prot. 325c⁶ sq., Symp. 183c⁴).

[215

c³ πῃ παρακρουόμεθα, "where we are being thrown off balance" cf. Theaet. 168a¹ τὰ σφάλματα ἃ παρεκέρουστο; also Crito 47a². A metaphor from wrestling (Louis, *Metaphores*, p. 214): see note on 216d¹.

]

Stallbaum's note

c⁵ The papyrus' $\gamma\epsilon$ after $\delta\upsilon\tau\alpha$ would be misplaced and should be ignored; so should its $\kappa\alpha\iota$ before $\mu\epsilon\upsilon$, which would take the force away from $\alpha\delta$. Similarly in d¹ $\gamma\epsilon$ would be pointless. $\delta\varsigma$ $\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\nu$, after $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\omicron\nu\tau\alpha\varsigma$ in d² is plausible enough; but it might if anything weaken the force of Socrates' exclamation, and perhaps should be ignored along with the other variations in this papyrus.

Stallbaum also points out acutely that Socrates is not strictly here "expecting the answer no;" "observari oportet, saepecumque cum interrogandi forma cum quadam simulatione ^{aut} dissimulatione ab loquentibus adhiberi, idcirco ab eis ita interrogari, ac si quid esse noluit, cum tamen contrarium locum habere praevideant." Socrates here well knows that the answers to his questions will be affirmative, but wishes to suggest his horror at these facts. And even in many univocal contexts the text-book description of the force of $\mu\epsilon\upsilon$ should be altered to "fearing the answer yes";

c⁷ μῶν μὴ καὶ οὕτοι σοὺ ἄρχουσιν; Stallbaum's note here is the locus classicus for the explanation of μῶν μὴ; and should be read in full. He explains that the element of οὕ in μῶν came to predominate, and weakened the force of the μὴ element, which in more forceful questions therefore came to be strengthened by the use of μῶν μὴ. Socrates here, therefore, is making pretence of being even more shocked by these extra schoolmaster-tyrants than he was about the Παιδαγωγός being a slave at c⁴, where he merely used μῶν *simpliciter* in μῶν δοῦλος ἔν;

Stallbaum also points out acutely that Socrates is not strictly here "expecting the answer no;" "observari oportet, saepenumero eam interrogandi formam cum quadam simulatione ^{aut} ~~aut~~ dissimulatione ab loquentibus adhiberi, ideoque ab eis ita interrogari, ac si quid esse noluit, ^{erint,} cum tamen contrarium locum habere praevideant." Socrates here well knows that the answers to his questions will be affirmative, but wishes to suggest his horror at these facts. And even in many univ^{er}sitic contexts the text-book description of the force of μῶν should be altered to "fearing the answer yes";

d¹ δεσπότης καὶ ἄρχοντας, cf. Pseudo-Platonic Axiochus, 366 d⁹, ὁπόταν δὲ εἰς τὴν ἑπταετίαν ἀφίκηται (sc. τὸ νήπιον), ἐπέστησαν παιδαγωγοὶ καὶ γραμματισταὶ καὶ παιδοτρίβασι τυραννοῦντες· αὐξανομένου δὲ κριτικοί, γεωμέτραι, τακτικοί, πολὺ πλῆθος δεσποτῶν.; also *Laws* 808 de.

d⁴ ἔν' αὐτῇ μακάριος ἦς "so that you can be happy for her"; "dative of the person interested," compare the way younger children are nowadays told to "smile for daddy." Stallbaum aptly cited *Rep.* 343 a⁸, ὅς γε αὐτῇ (sc. τῇ τιτθῇ) οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα γιγνώσκεις. "you won't for your nurse show you know the sheep from the shepherd."

d⁶ ἡ τῆς σπύθης ἢ τῆς κερκίδος:

the shuttle is used in and out of the warp-
"her batten or her shuttle";
L.S.J. (9th ed.); see Ar. Physics 243b⁶.

the σπύθη was a batten for "striking the threads
of the woof home, so as to make the web close",
L.S.J. (9th ed.); see Ar. Physics 243b⁶.

Much confusion has arisen over the meaning of
κερκίς because of the entry in early editions by
L.S., which has been modified in the 9th edition.
Blümner, "Technologie der Gewerbe bei Griechen
und Römern" 1875, Vol. I p. 133 sq., cautiously
identifies the κερκίς as "the instrument used
for inserting the woof-threads"; he perhaps means
that κερκίς could be a darning-needle as well as
a more advanced type of shuttle.

(The attempt of Miss G. M. Crowfoot in B.S.A.
Annual 1936-7 pp. 44-6, to deny that κερκίς means
"shuttle" is obviously vitiated by her ignorance
of Greek and failure to consider Plato, Cratylus
388 and Politicus 282.a. These rather elaborate
comparisons, describing κερκιστική as ἡ ἐν
σθήμοσι διακριτική, at the very least must imply

d⁶ (contd.)

the passing of a needle in and out of the warp-threads, if not of a shuttle; and compare Eur.

I.T. 222-4 where the κερκίς is used in embroidery, and Leonidas A.P. VI 288 where (as in Plato) the κερκίς is τὴν ἄτρια κριναμένην.).

"wool-working", not merely "spinning"; see Lamb, and this seems to be what is meant at Politicus

282 a⁶, πάντα ... τὰ περὶ τῆς κείνης αὐτῆς τῆς

ὑποῆτος ἧς λέγομεν μέρη, μὴ τίς ἕκαστ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκείνων πάντων λεγομένων, ἢ ταλαιουργική.

a⁶ ἄλλου του τῶν περὶ ταλασιουργίαν ὀργάνων.

Here Jowett's "any other of her spinning implements" is wrong; either ἄλλου του is "idiomatic" as in 203 b⁷, and the meaning is "any other of her implements, one of her spinning ones", or more likely ταλασιουργία means in general "wool-working", not merely "spinning"; so Lamb, and this seems to be what is meant at Politicus 282 a⁶, πάντα ... τὰ περὶ τὴν ποιήσιν αὐτὴν τῆς ἐσθητοῦ ἧς λέγομεν μέρη, μία τις ἐστὶ τέχνη τῶν ὑπὸ πάντων λεγομένων, ἢ ταλασιουργικῆ.

e² ἵδεν μή, see on 208c⁷.

e⁴ ἄλλὰ ... μήν, see on 208a⁵.

ἀντί τίνος; not merely "Why?" but "What can you
have done to deserve ... ?"

208 ἰσχυροῦσιν "have charge of, control over"; ἑαυτῶν
e⁶ δὲ τῶ "to one after another;" cf. Laws 832 c⁵

ἄρχει οὖν δὲ τινα βίῃ "rules with one
manifestation of force after another."

ἐνὶ λόγῳ "in brief", "to sum it up" : cf. Gorg.
524 d¹, Theaet. 194 a⁸.

ὀλίγου οὐδὲν "virtually none" for ὀλίγου δεῖν
οὐδὲν : often with πᾶς but also with
whole clauses. (Euthyd. 279 c⁹, Symp. 198^{3/6}) as
at 210 e² below.

e⁷ τῶν χρημάτων τοσοῦτων ὄντων : strictly his
family's possessions: his father's chariot, of
which Lysis no doubt is very proud.

a¹ ἄρχουσιν "have charge of, control over"; ἄρχειν is a key-word in this passage. Lysis is made to feel that he is at present very much δουλεύων (208 e⁶) and ἄρχόμενος (208 d²) and himself ἄρχαι οὐδένος (209 a³); but the result of his acquiring knowledge will be that ἢ ἂν φρόνιμοι γενόμεθα αὐτοὶ τε ἐλευθεροὶ ἐσόμεθα ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλων ἄρχοντες (210 b 1-5).

a² ἄλλος ποιμᾶνει καὶ θεραπεύει "some one else acts as shepherd to look after it"; the παιδοσπίβης, probably, is meant; or just possibly the παιδαγωγός who restricts Lysis' movements like a shepherd his sheep's wanderings; but this seems less suitable to θεραπεύει.

For the metaphor in ποιμᾶνει cf. Prot. 320 a ... οὔτε αὐτὸς παιδεύει (sc. τοὺς νεανίσκους) οὔτε τῷ ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ περιιόντες νέμονται ὡς περ ἄφρονοι, cf. Rep. 498 b¹.
(But at Laws 808 d² - 4 it is specifically παιδαγωγοὶ who are likened to ποιμῆνες.)

a⁴ οὐ γὰρ πε ἡλικίαν ἔχω ; the corrector of Coislinianus was almost certainly right. Stallbaum kept σου, but Lysis - even at this point - is not given to hesitant statements (and would perhaps have said ἀλλὰ σου rather than γὰρ σου.)

a⁵ τὸ γε τοῦδ' οὖνε anticipates
ὅταν γὰρ βουλεύονται κτλ in a⁷.

a⁸ τινε ἀναγνωσθῆναι, scil. γράμματα γ of. b³ τῶν γραμμάτων Badham's τι ἤ, to produce a singular, is unnecessary.

(There is no need to infer that Lysis' parents were illiterate! οὐδ' ... κρῦτον... τὰ τοῦδ' οὖνε shows they were deliberately giving him practice).

[d⁶ τὸ ἔρα ὁ μέγας βασιλεὺς;

Socrates teases Lysis by putting to him the proverbial exception to all rules, the Persian King, whose autocracy raised him above everyone else; but Lysis with a touch of childlike confidence thinks he will win over even him.

(For the Persian King as the exception to the rule, see note on 211 e⁷).

]

b² ὅτι ἂν βούλη κριτοῦ τῶν γραμμάτων γράψαι

"You may when writing spell a word in the way that you yourself decide", cf. b⁶ ἢν ἂν βούλη τῶν χορδῶν ἀνεῖναι ; "decide which string to slacken"; Lysis is allowed to exercise his own judgment about spelling and lyre-tuning. ὅτι ἂν βούλη does not imply that he will do these things arbitrarily, but that he will have the ability to decide for himself about them.

b⁷ ψῆλαι τὸ ἄνευ κλήκτου τῆ δακτύλῳ τὰς χορδὰς ἐπαφᾶσθαι, schol. Areth; evidently here opposed to κρούειν τῆ κλήκτῳ ; cf. Athen.^{IV}, 183 d.

The variant ψῆλαι was originally a gloss; cf. Hesychius s.v. ψῆλαι, ψάλλειν. The pun in Cratinus fr. 256 would not justify us in assuming it was an everyday 5th c. term such as could be read here.

c² ...πάντα μὲν ἐπίσταμαι, ἐκεῖνα δ' οὐ. Εἶεν.....

Socrates' Εἶεν, "Well now", indicates that Lysis has now seen the point that will enable Socrates to make his next move. People only let him do things he understands, knows how to do; but vice versa if he knows best how to do something, they will let him do it for them; not only his father, but (after another Εἶεν at c⁶) anyone else too.

For Εἶεν especially at the end of a longish establishment of a point cf. 216 a⁵ (preparatory to a refutation), 219 b⁵. Socrates in this passage has been very patient and skilful in eliciting the key word ἐπίσταμαι from the boy himself.

c³ οὐ. τὴν ἡλικίαν σου περιμένει ὁ πατήρ ἐπιτρέπειν πάντα;

Stallbaum, perhaps rightly, said "hoc est ἵστε οὐ ἐπιτρέπειν πάντα?" Note Rep. 375 c², οὐ περιμενοῦσιν ἄλλους ὅπως διαλέσθαι, Theaet. 173 c³, ἕκαστος (τῶν λόγων) περιμένει ἀποταλεσθῆναι ὅταν ἡμῶν δοκῆ; Kühner-Gerth II p.8 n. 3 suggest these latter cases contain "der Begriff des Willens;" but they are perhaps not exactly parallel to this case.

A very remarkable echo of the next page of this discussion is to be found in Rep. VI, 494 b¹ - d⁶, on the dangers surrounding an intelligent child who might be made φιλοσοφος . There it is suggested that if a child seems outstanding, βουλήσονται δὴ οἶμαι αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι, ἐπειδὴν πρεσβύτερος γίγνηται, ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν πράγματα οἷ τε οἰκεῖοι καὶ οἱ πολῖται. (b⁸ - 10).

He will therefore be subjected to a great deal of flattery; then τί οὖν οἷει (αὐτόν) . . . ποιῆσειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐάν τυχῆ μεγάλης πόλεως ἔν καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ πλουσιὸς τε καὶ γενναῖος, καὶ ἔτι εὐειδῆς καὶ μέγας; ἄρ' οὐ πληρωθῆσεσθαι ἀμηχάνου ἐλπίδος, ἠγοούμενον καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἱκανὸν ἔσεσθαι πράττειν;

and so he will become arrogant, and not realise that he needs to labour to pursue genuine wisdom.

There are almost verbal parallels between "Republic" and "Lysis" here; but the slant of the two passages is quite different. The "Republic" warns us that the clever boy, when he finds that everyone courts his favour and when he imagines he will be able to run the affairs of nations, is thereby

led into senseless arrogance, (δ¹ σχηματισμοῦ καὶ φρονήματος κενοῦ ἄνευ νοῦ ἐμπιμπλόμενον); whereas Socrates is suggesting these things to Lysis for the opposite purpose of removing his self-conceit (210 ε³ ταπεινοῦντα καὶ οὐσιέλλοντα.) The difference of course is that Socrates is only allowing Lysis his high expectations if he acquires the knowledge to deserve them, and finally reminds him that he must not be μεγαλόφρων while he is still ἄφρων (210 δ⁷).

The element common to both passages is the psychology of the boys' imaginations and hopes; both are very ready to believe that other people will entrust everything to them and that they will be able to rule mighty empires. Socrates in the "Lysis" is shown playing on these childish hopes with great skill to arouse Lysis' desire for knowledge and remove any expectation he has of achieving these hopes without knowledge.

Plato when writing the "Republic" can hardly not have been remembering the picture he had once painted of Lysis; if he thought of this as an echo that would be recognised, he perhaps wished to imply that youthful hopes could be turned to good results by the care of a Socrates, but might have had results without such care.

εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς ὄρος περὶ σοῦ;

"does your next-door neighbour not use the same criterion about what to let you do?"

ὄρος is here used in a non-technical sense (though perhaps taken from a technical sense in the same way as our recent colloquial

adoption of "criterion"); cf. Hipp. Major

283 b¹ - 3, πολλοῖς οὐνοῦκεται ὅτι τὸν σοφόν εἶναι. ^{αὐτὸν αὐτὸς μάλιστα οὐ σοφόν}

ταύτου δ' ὄρος ἐστὶν ἄρα, ὅς ἂν πλεῖστον ἀργύριον ἐργάσθῃται;

"the criterion of being wise for one's own ends goes by whoever makes most money."

δ¹, 2 οἰκονομῆναι τ² οἰκονομίας τ¹

are almost certainly the right choice here; not being able to take advantage of his father's possessions is what Lysis has missed; it is τὸ αὐτοῦ (c⁵) that his father will commit to him; so then will his next-door neighbour, rather than keeping charge of the household-management (ἐπιτεταγῆσθαι δ³) himself.

(And surely Lysis' next-door neighbour must have a house already, and won't need Lysis to build him one).

d⁴, Αθηναίους οἷει οὐκ ἐπιτρέψειν κτλ;

that the Athenian democracy was only too likely not to listen to expert advice where appropriate was one of Plato's criticisms of it; see Dodds on Gorg. 455 d⁶ - 456 c⁶.

But Protagoras argues that they will, though not περὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς: Prot. 322d⁵ - c².

- Here, of course, Socrates is only serious about the principle that knowledge should command respect; we are merely being shown Lysis' delightful naiveté when it is suggested that this respect will in fact be forthcoming from the Athenians or from the Persian King.

(For note on 209 d⁶ see ^{after} note on 209 a⁸.)

d^3 ἐμβάλλειν was a gloss or a variant; that the aorist, not the present, is right is suggested by the tense of ἐπιπρῆσειεν d^6 , and ~~ἐβόων~~ (less ~~to~~ gently) by the tenses in e^2 (ἐν-δειξαίμεθα) and e^4 , ἐύσειεν ἐμβάλλειν, e^6 ἐμβάλλειν.

e^4 οὐδ' ἄν ὀμικρὸν "not the least little bit",
cf. Phaedrus 268 e^4 , Theaet. 180 a^2 .

e^5 δραξάμενοι τῶν ἁλῶν "throw salt in in handfuls";
cf. H~~er~~od. III 1³, (τὸς μνῆας) δραξάμενος
διέσπειρε τῇ στρατιῇ.

a¹ μὴ ἰατρικὸν ἠγούμενος ; "unless he thought he had medical skill" - the scribe of Coislinianus here read ἰατρικὸν of the king's son and in the next line ἰατροῦς of Socrates and Lysis; the primary mss. have the reverse of this. The scribe of Coisl. no doubt reasoned that the king would know that his son was not actually a doctor, but might be persuaded that Socrates and Lysis were. He was probably right to change ἰατρὸν in a¹; but there is no need to change ἰατρικουὶς in a². The relevant point in both places is the possession of medical skill rather than following of the medical profession, so Plato no doubt used his favourite -τικός termination in both places.

(The corruption, or at least variant, ἰατροῦς for ἰατρικουὶς is frequent : cf. Ammann, -τικός Platon, pp. 94-5.)

a³ διανοίγοντες τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐμπάσαι τῆς τέφρας,
 "open his eyes wide and scatter ashes on them";

Eye-diseases in Mediterranean and Middle-Eastern countries must often have been caused by dust, so that this would have seemed the least likely remedy. (The use of ἡ τέφρα ἡ φρυγία for the eyes was a "Mirabilis Auscultatio": (Ar.) Mir. Aug. 834 b 30).

a⁵ - 7

ἐπιτρέπει ἄνπερὶ θύων ἄν δόξωμεν ;

cf. 208 a² - ³ ἦν ἐπιθυμῆσης... οὐκ ἄν ἐῴ ἐν σε;

Richards was wrong to want to change ἄν δόξωμεν to δὴ δόξαιμεν - the subjunctives in these two "false sequences" convey vividness and a sense of reality to the imagined situations.

a⁷ Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη : : Eysis has throughout been completely confident about the success of his imagined encounter with the Persian king; cf. 209 e² ἡμῖν δῆλον ὅτι, e⁶ πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

a⁹ οὕτως ἄρα ἔχει should be accepted from Priscian.

The corruption to ἔχει can be explained as itacism; and Stallbaum's οὕτως ἄρ' ἂν ἔχοι would not follow very happily after the hypothetical optatives just preceding.

οὐδείς ... ἐμποδισεῖ, ἀλλ' ... ἐλεύθεροι τε
 ἐσόμεθα καὶ ἄλλων ἄρχοντες:

this will be in contrast to Lysis' situation
 as described in 208-9 above : see note on
 209 a¹, πάντες μᾶλλον ἄρχουσιν ἢ σὺ.

b⁵ ἡμέτερά τε ταῦτα ἔσται - ὀνησόμεθα γὰρ ἀπ'
 αὐτῶν "the things people entrust to us will
 become our own possessions, because we shall
 have the use of them"; this again is in
 contrast to Lysis' position as regards his
 father's chariot, which as far as Lysis is
 concerned might as well not belong to the
 family; cf. 208 e⁷ - 8, σοὶ..... τῶν
 χρημάτων τοσοῦτων ὄντων οὐδὲν ὄφελος.

c² εἴ τι τούτων οἰκειότερόν ἐστιν, "anyone even who is more closely related to us than they are" : for the neuter cf. 222 e⁴ - 5 μήτε οἱ ὄμοιοι κτλ.

.... μήτε τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα διεληθόμεν;
Socrates is generalising about degrees of relationship rather than envisaging actual persons, just as at 222 e he is considering types, not individuals.

Here he can hardly in fact have had in mind any class of persons "closer" than parents, but was merely speaking in hyperbole to enforce the paradox that even one's οἰκειότατον, one's closest οἰκεῖοι (relatives), will not be φίλοι in these matters : cf. d³ - 4.

c⁴ ἡμῖν ἔσται ἀλλότρια· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὄνησόμεθα (sc. ἀπὸ τούτων εἰς ἃ ἂν νοῦν μὴ κτησώμεθα.)

"things we do not know how to use will be someone else's possessions; for we shall derive no advantage from them".

ἀλλότρια in c⁴ is the precise counterpart to ἡμέτερα in b⁵; even what is not ours becomes ours if we have the skill to use it, whereas (it is implied) even what is ours passes out of our hands if we cannot use it. So Socrates implies in saying "even our relatives will stop us", i.e., from using the family property - Lysis and his father's chariot again: see note on b⁵.

In talking in terms of possession and use of property as a result of people's trust in one, Socrates is echoing one sense of the proverb κοινὰ τὰ φίλων (see note on 207 c¹⁰); cf. Xen. Mem. II 6²³, (οἱ ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γενόμενοι) τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις οἰκεῖα ("to look on as their own") παρέχοντες, ἴδὲ τῶν φίλων ἑαυτῶν νομίζοντες.

c⁵ - d⁸ "Ἄρ' οὖν τῶ φίλοι ἐσόμεθα καί τις ἡμῶς φιλήσει ἐν
τούτοις ἐν οἷς ἂν ᾤμεν ἀνωφελεῖς;

"Will any one regard us as friends or be friendly
towards us in matters in which we are useless? "

- This seems to have been a warning which the
historian Socrates gave, but which was perverted
by his opponents and detractors; see Xen. Mem.

I ii, 52, ἔφη δὲ (sc. ὁ κατήγορος) καὶ περὶ τῶν
φίλων αὐτὸν (sc. Σωκράτη) λέγειν ὡς οὐδὲν
ὄφελος εὖνους εἶναι, εἰ μὴ καὶ ὠφελεῖν δυνήσονται.
What Socrates meant was that we should not expect
men to be εὖνοι towards us if we cannot help them,
not that we should be εὖνοι towards them only if
they can help us. Xenophon replies to this attack
in very much the terms we have here in the "Lysis";
cf. especially I ii 55, ἐπιδεικνύων ὅτι τὸ ἄφρον
ἄτιμόν ἐστι παρεκάλει ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ ὡς φρονιμώ-
τατον εἶναι καὶ ὠφελιμώτατον, ὅπως, ἐὰν τε ὑπὸ πα-
τρὸς ἐὰν τε ὑπὸ ἀδελφοῦ ἐὰν τε ὑπ' ἄλλου τινὸς βου-
ληται τιμᾶσθαι, μὴ τῷ οἰκεῖος εἶναι πιστεῦων ἀμελεῖ,
ἀλλὰ πειράεται, ὑφ' ἧν ἂν βουληται τιμᾶσθαι, τούτοις
ὠφέλιμος εἶναι.

c⁷ Νῦν ... οὐδέ σε ὁ πατήρ οὐδέ ἄλλος ἄλλον οὐδένα
φιλεῖ.

"In the present case then not even does your
father love you - nor indeed does anyone else
love anyone ".

Richards' conjecture here, as in 210 d⁸, is wrong
but serves to call attention to the true meaning
of the text. οὐδέ ... οὐδέ is never used by
any Greek author to mean "neither nor"
(Denniston p. 193) - which should be οὔτε ...
οὔτε, which Richards suggested here. But here Νῦν
adds emphasis to οὐδέ σε, which means "not even
you." οὐδέ ἄλλος ἄλλον οὐδένα is added to give
further emphasis to the general principle, but is
not coordinate with οὐδέ σε and is not covered
by Νῦν which means "in this particular situation".

d¹ - 4, Ἐὰν μὲν ἄρα σοφὸς γένη,....πάντες σοὶ φίλοι
καὶ πάντες σοὶ οἰκεῖοι ἔσονται.....εἰ δὲ μὴ,
σοὶ οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς φίλος.....
οὔτε ^{οἱ}οἰκεῖοι.

"If you acquire knowledge, all men will be friends and relatives to you, but if you don't, not even your relatives will be your friends."

This seems to be the force of this sentence; it is best to take πάντες σοὶ οἰκεῖοι ἔσονται to mean "they will all behave as you would expect relatives to behave to you" to keep the contrast with:- (1) Lysis' belief (induced by Socrates) at 208-9 that his parents didn't behave to him in the way one would expect parents to :-
(2) the second unit of the sentence saying "not even οἱ οἰκεῖοι - your relatives - will be friends."

This second unit of the sentence of course in itself derives an air of paradox from the other meaning of οἰκεῖοι namely "friendly" - "even οἱ οἰκεῖοι will not be φίλοι so not οἰκεῖοι"; but to take οἰκεῖοι in the first unit in this way and translate merely "all men will be φίλοι καὶ οἰκεῖοι, friendly and familiar, to you" weakens

the greater paradox of sentence as a whole, i.e., that knowledge or ignorance can gain you or lose you "relatives". (Compare Jowett's and Croiset's correct versions; Lamb here is wrong.)

(Many writers have wished to link πάντες σοι οἰκεῖοι ἔσονται here with Socrates' later suggestion in 221c - 222d that τὸ φίλον is τὸ οἰκεῖον; but (1) at that point Socrates fails to explain what τὸ οἰκεῖον is, so that the later passage can throw no light on this one; (2) the whole context here is especially concerned with Lysis' treatment by his relatives; οἰκεῖότερον referred to this at 210c², οἱ οἰκεῖοι does so again at d⁴; it would spoil the consistency of the passage to take οἰκεῖοι differently in d²).

οἷόν τε ... μέγα φρονεῖν, ἐν οἷς τις μήπω φρονεῖ, κτλ.

Socrates has already shown Lysis that he will have no friends if he has no knowledge, contrary to what Lysis perhaps thought as a result of receiving the attentions of Hippothales; now Socrates goes on to try to remove the pride induced in Lysis by Hippothales' odes in his praise.

Socrates employs two forms of this verbal play on φρονεῖν and -φρων perhaps in order to soften the impact of this point on Lysis by making its formulation amusing. (Socrates was probably fond of etymologising arguments: but he would not have thought this point any less valid if he had not been able to formulate it in this way.) See note on d⁷.

210

d⁵ μέγα φρονεῖν "display pride"
μήπω φρονεῖ, "has no knowledge"
cf. on μεγαλόφρων, ἄφρων in d⁷.

Some reader in order to explain the sense of φρονεῖ
in μήπω φρονεῖ added the gloss φρόνιμος,
which appears in the text in BW; but this could
not be the right reading, since it would remove
the specious, but intentionally playful,
appearance of a fortiori argument from οὐ φρονεῖ
to οὐ μέγα φρονεῖ.

d⁷ οὐδ' ἄρα μεγαλόφρων εἶ, εἵπερ ἄφρων ἔτι.

"Then it follows that you are not proud if you are still ignorant". But in English we cannot render the play on μεγαλόφρων = of great mind, i.e., proud, and ἄφρων = of no "mind", i.e., ignorant; "you cannot have great φρένες if you still have no φρένες."

For ἄφρων meaning not "foolish" but merely

"ignorant, uninformed" cf. Rep. 349e; τὸν μὲν μουσικὸν δῆκου φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ ἄμουσον ἄφρονα;, and at Prot. 332a - 333b two opposites are suggested to ἀφροσύνη, first σοφία and then σωφροσύνη; this is used there to identify σοφία and σωφροσύνη, but in fact it shows the two meanings of ἀφροσύνη.

ἀ⁸ οὐ μοι δοκεῖ "No, Socrates, that seems to be true."

Professor Dodds points out to me that the

impersonal δοκεῖ assents to the whole

proposition οὐδ' ἄρα εἴπερ ἄφρων εἶμι ;

Lysis accepts the inference. Richards' conjecture

δοκῶ would make him say "I am not μεγαλόφρων,"
 assenting only, or particularly, to οὐδ' ἄρα μεγα-
 λόφρων εἶμι.

e² ἐπῆλθε γὰρ μοι εἰπεῖν, "it occurred to me to say to him"; cf. Symp. 197c³, ἐπέρχεται δὲ μοι τι καὶ ἔμμετρον εἰπεῖν, Gorg. 485 e⁵.

ὀλίγον ἐξήμαρτον ; see note on 208 e⁶.

e³ ταπεινοῦντα καὶ συστέλλοντα "humbling him and taking in his sails a bit"; συστέλλειν was perhaps originally a metaphor from reefing sail, cf. Ar. Frogs 999; cf. also Isocr. de Pace 85, τοὺς ἄλλους αἱ συμφοραὶ συστέλλουσι καὶ ποιοῦσιν ἐμφρονεστέρους.

See Dodds' note on Gorg. 511 d³ - 5⁵, προσεστραμμένη "unassuming"; "the term applies properly to one who compresses himself into the smallest possible space, in contrast with the ὀγκώδης or χαῦνος who "spreads himself". Dodds cites also Meno 90 a⁷, κόσμιος καὶ εὐσταλής ἀνὴρ.

e⁴ χαυνούντα καὶ διαθρύπτοντα,

"puffing him up and giving him airs";

cf. Theaet. 175 b³ χαυνότητα ἀνοήτου ψυχῆς,
which refers back to σεμνυνομένων in 175 a⁶.

Also Eur. Androm. 931 ἔχαυνωσάν (με),

937 ἐξηνεμώθην μαρίᾳ. For διαθρύπτω cf. Laws 778 a³

(τοὺς δούλους) θρύπτοντες , which refers back
to 777 e⁴ κολάζειν δούλους δεῖ, καὶ μὴ νοθεύ-
τουέντας ὡς ἐλευθέρους θρύπτεσθαι ποιεῖν,

"Punish slaves, and do not make them put on airs
by admonishing them in the way you would a free
man."

Etymologically θρύπτω is related to τρύφη ;

the shift of meaning was perhaps "crush" → "soften" -
"softness (metaphorical)."

e⁵ ἀγωνιῶντα καὶ τεθορυβημένον.

"struggling with himself in confusion";

in Charm. 162 c¹ and Prot. 333 e³ ἀγωνιῶν
is said of persons "worked up" by the
discussion and anxious to raise objections;
here Hippothales no doubt would have raised
objections but was desperately anxious not
to be noticed; Socrates considerately does
not provoke him into an outburst.

e⁷ ἀνέλαβον ἐμαυτὸν "I checked myself";

cf. Laws 7 01 c⁶, οἶδόν περ ἵππον τὸν λόγον
ἀναλαμβάνειν.

a³ μάλα παιδικῶς καὶ φιλικῶς, "very boyishly and intimately"; Lysis, despite the mild reproof he has just received, tries to win Socrates to put Menexenus through the same homily.

In Cratylus 406 c¹ παιδικῶς is opposed to σπουδαιῶς ; but Ast rightly saw that in the "Lysis" the adverb retains its simple meaning "puerorum modo." The whole of the conversation "aside" between Socrates and Lysis, from here to 211 c¹⁰, has a delightfully comic effect; but the comedy derives precisely from the naiveté, not the conscious humour, of Lysis, the little boy trying to induce Socrates to face up to his "eristical" boy-comrade.

a⁴ ὀμικρὸν πρὸς με λέγων "speaking to me in a low voice"; cf. Phaedo 84 c⁴ and see Burnet's note ad loc., confirmed by Lorimer, C.R. (u.s.) X 1960 p. 7; add also Prot. 356 c⁷, αἱ φωναὶ (αἱ) ἴσαι ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζους, πόρρωθεν δὲ ὀμικρότεραι; and for μέγα λέγειν cf. Rep. 449 b⁵ - 7.

a⁴ ἄπερ καὶ ἐμοὶ λέγεις, εἰπέ καὶ Μενεξένῳ; καὶ ... καὶ are corresponsive even though in non-parallel clauses; translated in English only by some such paraphrase as "what you have already said to me you must also say to Menexenus." See Dodds on Gorg. 458 a¹, Denniston G.P. p.324; Stallbaum quoted Phaedo 76 e² - 3 and 64 c¹⁰ (where B²'s ἄπερ καὶ ἐμοὶ is probably right; read εἰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκῆ ἄπερ καὶ ἐμοί.)

a⁶ οὐ ...ἔρεις "Future in place of imperative";
 but here perhaps rather as we might say "You
 will be able to tell him," or "You can tell him."
 cf. Prot. 338 a⁷ ἄς οὖν ποιήσῃτε, καὶ πείθεσθε μοι.

- This move by Socrates saves audience and readers from a repetition of what Menexenus missed.

b² αὐθις με ἀνεπέσθαι: this has an apparent echo at Theaet. 143 a², where Euclides describes the way in which he compiled a written copy of Socrates' dialogue with Theaetetus, which Socrates had related to him; ὅσπερον δὲ κατὰ ὄχλην ἀναμνηστικὸς ἔγραψεν, καὶ ὁδῶν Ἰσθμίου ἀφικοίμην, ἐπανηρώτων τὸν Σωκράτην ὃ μὴ ἐμεμνήμην.

Certainly the historical Socrates might have invited Lysis to ask to be reminded of advice - but would he really have done this for adults who wanted to write down his philosophy? His "ignorance" might have prevented this.

b⁵ ἄρα ... ἀπιέναι; "time to go" cf. Euthyph. 15 e⁴;
 this ordinary colloquial expression is brilliantly
 put into Socrates' mouth at the end of the
 "Apology" (42 a²); ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ἄρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ
 μὲν ἀποθανουμένῳ, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις.

b⁶ ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ οὐ κελεύεις, "I must do that, then,
 since you order me to"; Socrates agrees and
 pretends to regard himself as under orders; ~~ἐπειδὴ~~
 γε strengthens ἐπειδὴ and emphasises the whole
 clause; καὶ goes not with οὐ but with κελεύεις,
 "it's an order you give me."

b⁷ ὄρα ὅπως is perhaps a little more emphatic than
 simple ὅπως; certainly there is no need to
 follow Cobet in deleting ὄρα.

211

b⁸ ἐριστικός "a lover of contentiousness"; this is followed at c⁴ by δεινὸς γὰρ ... Κτησίππου μαθη-
τῆς.

On Ctesippus as ἐριστικός and ἀντιλογικός,
and on the relation between these two tendencies,
see note on 216 a⁷.

c² ἵνα ... καταγέλαστος γένημαι; "You want me to
 be made a fool of, do you?" like Gorg. 505 e¹
 Αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἔν δύναιτο:,-"Ἴνα μοι τὸ τοῦ
 Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται, κτλ.

c⁴ πῶθεν ; "How can I?" Not quite the same use of πῶθεν
 as in πῶθεν ἔειπεν; at 208 b⁴.

ε¹¹ Τι ὑμεῖς αὐτὸ μόνω ἐστιῶσθεον; "Why are you two hogging it all to yourselves?"

For the metaphor cf. Rep. 352 b³, where

Thrasymachus says to Socrates Εὐωχοῦ τοῦ λόγου, "You can have the argument to yourself"; Socrates then replies ...καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μοι τῆς ἐστιῶσεως ἀποπλήρωσον ἀποκρινόμενος ὡςπερ καὶ νῦν.

d²

ὅδε γὰρ τί ἐν λέγε οὐ μινθάνει;

this is a fib to involve Menexenus, who may think he can outdo Lysis and so enter the discussion. On the other hand, it may perhaps have a second implication that Lysis has not quite grasped the view of friendship which Socrates has been putting to him, and that further investigation of friendship is necessary.

d⁵ τί οὐδὲν οὐκ ἐπειῦς; Ctesippus is anxious to show off the skill he has imparted to his boy-pupil. Previously he mocked Hippothales; now his own loyalties are involved.

d⁷ ἐπιθυμῶν κτήματός του ; cf. 212a², τοῦτο τὸ κτήμα, i.e., φίλον. It was not uncommon to liken friends to valuable possessions; cf. Hdt. V 24.3, κτημάτων πάντων ἐστὶ τιμιώτατον ἀνὴρ φίλος συνετὸς τε καὶ εὖνεος; this is repeated by Xenophon at Mem II 4.1 and used as the basis of Mem. II 4 - 5.

d⁸ ὁ μὲν γὰρ τις ἵππους ἐπιθυμεῖ κτῆσθαι, κτλ.; cf. Xen. Mem. I. 6.14, where Socrates is made to say ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς, ὃ ἀγαπᾷ, ὡς περ ἄλλος τις ἢ ἵππῳ ἀγαθῷ ἢ κυνὶ ἢ ὄρνιθι ἡδεται, οὕτω καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἡδομαι φίλοις ἀγαθοῖς.

e² Πρὸς μὲν ταῦτα πρῶς ἔχω, πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν φίλων
 κτήσιν πάνυ ἐρωτικῶς, "I am indifferent
 about these things, but passionately eager
 about the acquisition of friends."

For πρῶς cf. Crito 43 b 8, ... τῇ νῦν παρεστῶσῃ
 συμφορᾷ ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πρῶς φέρεις.

ἐρωτικῶς ἔχειν here means merely "be very
 eager for" as ἐρᾶν often. Socrates is
 φιλέταιρος (e⁸), not φιλόπαις.

e⁴ ὄρτυγα ἢ ἀλεκτρούνα; cf. Hipp. Major 295 e⁷ sq.

λέγομεν καλὸν εἶναι καὶ αὖ τὰ ζῆα
πάντα, ἔπρον καλὸν καὶ ἀλεκτρούνα καὶ ὄρτυγα.

Cocks were kept for fighting: cf. Laws 789 b 7 sq.

There was a game called ὄρτυγοκοπία or στρυφοκοπία,
alluded to by Aristophanes at "Birds" 1298-9

and described by Pollux, IX 107; this too seems
to have consisted of making the birds fight by
pricking them to rouse them up, (or alternatively
simply "filliping" a single bird on the head or
plucking feathers from it to try to make it
retreat, (Pollux IX 109).

e⁶

ἢ τὸν κῆρα; mention of dogs has reminded

Socrates of a favourite oath of his (though not one peculiar to him); on this oath see Dodds on Gorgias 482 b 5.

e⁶

μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ Δαρείου χρυσίον κηρῶσθαι;

the Persian King was the proverbial figure of great fortune and riches. For his happiness cf. Apol. 40 d 8, Gorg. 470 e⁴; for his possessions cf. Euthyd. 274 a 6, μακαρίζω ἄρ' ὄμῃς ἔγωγε τοῦ κτήρατος πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ μέγαν βασιλέα τῆς ἀρχῆς; Democritus fr. 118; and Theaet. 175 c 4, " εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων κεκτημένος τ' αὖ (?) πολὺ χρυσίον." For the name Darius, see next note.

Compare also Phaedrus 228 a 4, ... ἐβουλόμην γε ἄν μᾶλλον ἢ ποῖ πολὺ χρυσίον γενέσθαι (without mention of Darius).

e⁷ ἑταῖρον, ἢ ἅλλοι ἢ αὐτὸν Δαρεῖον "I would rather have a friend, even if it had to be Darius himself": "sei es nun sonst irgend wer oder gar Dareias selbst," Apelt.

"Jocose Socrates" hunc ipsum (Darium) se accepturum ~~amicum~~ dicit"; so says Madvig, whose ἢ ἅλλοι for πᾶλλοι seems practically certain. There was evidently a colloquial phrase "anyone at all, not excepting even the King of Persia"; cf. Sophist 230 d⁸, τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον αὖ νομιζέον, ἄν καὶ τυχερῆ βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας ἄν, τὰ μέγιστα ἀκέραιον ἔμτα; and cf. the movement in the earlier passage of the "Lysis" at 209 c 6 - d 6 (see note).

There was perhaps also some other proverb suggesting that it was unusual to be a friend of the Persian king; cf. [Aristotle,] Magna Moralia 1212 a⁵, οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἦν Δαρεῖος εὖνους ἐν Πέρσῃς ἔντι, ὡς τερ Ἰώης ἦν, εὐθὺς καὶ φιλία ἦν αὐτῆς πρὸς Δαρεῖον, on which Kapp observes (Gnomon 3, 1927, p. 79) "der Perserkönig ist zur illustration gewählt weil die Vorstellung eines Freundschaftsverhältnisses zu ihm etwas absurdes hat." (But it may merely be that Darius was remote in distance from Greece.)

Much argument has gone on à propos of the passage in Magna Moralia attempting to discover when the M.M. was written according to when Darius III was on the throne of Persia; it is worth observing that this is misplaced; the proverbial Darius was Darius I ὁ ὕψιστος, cf. Aristides loc. cit. infra. Here in the Lysis Socrates' reference to Darius does not tie the dramatic date to the period of Darius II's reign (424-406 B.C.)

e⁷ (contd.)

(Buttmann's μᾶλλον (ὅε) ἢ αὐτὸν Δαρεῖον (scil. κτηθεῖσθαι), adopted by Burnet, for all Buttmann says still does not escape Heindorf's question ' "Darium possidere" quid est?')

Buttmann's other suggestion, which he himself rejected, was μᾶλλον (ὅε) ἢ αὐτὸς Δαρεῖος (γένεσθαι), for which he cited Aristides Orat. XLVI, Vol. II, p. 182 (Dindorf.), ὡς ἐν δεξιῇ ἐν δὲνασθαι λέγειν..... μᾶλλον ἢ μυριάκις Δαρεῖος ὁ Ἰστιάστου γένεσθαι.

But this involves far more alteration of the mss. than Madvig's reading, and hardly produces a strong enough climax to follow a fourth successive μᾶλλον; "Δαρεῖος γένεσθαι," would hardly progress sufficiently beyond Δαρείου χροσίου κτηθεῖσθαι. Whereas Madvig's reading wittily brings in Darius again, but to make a different point by a different turn of phrase.)

212a - end

For summaries of the argument for the rest of
the dialogue, see "critical analysis" in the
introduction.

a⁵

ἕντινα τρόπον γίγνεται φίλος ἕτερος ἑτέρου

"how one man becomes the φίλος of another."

This is the first form of the main question of the "Lysis"; it is adapted to lead directly into Socrates' trick question in a⁸, ἐπειδὴν τις τινα φιλεῖ, ποῦτερος ποτέρου φίλος γίγνεται κτλ. By phrasing his question in terms of the "ways of becoming" φίλος, rather than simply asking "who is" φίλος, Socrates enables himself to introduce references to the puzzling variety of circumstances under which men qualify in some way or other for the name φίλος in one of its senses. But by 213 c⁵ - 8 the question at issue has become closer to the direct τί ἐστὶν τὸ φιλεῖν attacked in the rest of the dialogue. R. Robinson, in "Plato's Earlier Dialectic",^{2nd ed. p. 49,} is a little over-scrupulous in saying that the "Lysis" begins with a question different from the "what is X" question.

οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν Menexenus is no doubt a little taken aback by Socrates' riddle, and chooses the easy alternative as an answer. But the answer is plausible enough;

1. if Menexenus did not take special note of ἐπειδὴν τις τινα φιλεῖ, but was expecting a question about φίλοι = friends (who had been under discussion in 211e - 212a), then he may simply have answered here meaning that φίλοι = friends always come in pairs;
2. alternatively if Menexenus did notice that Socrates had only specified a one-directional relationship, then since φίλος can be equivalent either to φιλεῖν or to φιλοῦμενος then each is in some sense φίλος.

It seems probable that Menexenus answered as for alternative 1, i.e., thinking of friends in pairs; since when Socrates goes on to emphasise that one-directional affection can occur, he then denies that φίλος is an appropriate term for either party. Down to d⁵ Socrates has not yet upset Menexenus' conviction that φίλος means "a friend" and that if either of a pair is in this sense φίλος₁ to the other, then both are.

b⁴

ἂν μόνος ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον φιλή; this must not be altered. It is an emphatic supposition that only one party shows active affection; Richards' ἂν μόνον would mean "so long as at least one likes the other" without excluding return of affection; Schmidt's ἂν μόνος μόνον would introduce a quite irrelevant question about whether the one liked other persons outside the relationship under discussion. The emendations required by the logic of this passage (212b - 213d) had all been made by the end of the 15th century; more recent attempts to tamper with it have been unhelpful and unnecessary.

b⁵ "ἔπολε δὲ καὶ : Menexenus is sticking to his former answer still without seeing the point of Socrates' ἐν πόλει ὁ ἕταρος φιλῆ. This appears from the way in which Socrates has to explain the possibility of unreturned affection.

c¹ ci pèv ořovnat; Heindorf restored this for
all mss'. ořpave, ořovnat, a characteristically
brilliant emendation in which the renaissance
scribes seem not to have anticipated him.

c⁵ εἶναι καὶ ἀντιφιλεῖται εἶναι καὶ μισοῖται,

"it being indifferent whether in return he is loved or hated."

H. Müller altered this to εἶναι μὴ ἀντιφιλεῖται εἶναι καὶ μισοῖται, which would have to mean "even if he is not loved in return, or indeed even if he is hated in return" (which should be (κἄν .. ἢ κἄν ...)). This would insert an extra back-reference to b⁵ and c¹; but reference to those intermediate steps is unnecessary here. A parallel alteration was made by Schanz, at e⁷, where he read εἶναι (μὴ)φιλεῖ εἶναι καὶ μισοῖ; but there too the change is unnecessary and probably mistakes the force of εἶναι εἶναι. The two passages as they stand in the mss. support each other strongly and should not be altered.

d¹ τίς αὐτὸν γὰρ: at b² and b⁵, where Menexenus had not yet understood Socrates' question and thought he was being asked about pairs of friends. Now he has understood the question, he still maintains his (correct) view that φίλοι = friends must come in pairs and return each other's affection. He admits the possibility of unreturned affection but does not think either party to this is a φίλος.

d⁴ ,ὅτι ἔρα ἐστὶν φίλον, κτλ. Socrates generalises the position now reached by stating it in the neuter. This is the first occurrence of φίλον- neuter to creep in, and its significance is very soon seen. Except in generalising statements φίλον = friend does not occur in the neuter (since it is persons who are friends); but φίλον = φιλοῦμενον is of course common in the neuter.

d⁵ φιλιπποι φιλόπτωγες....φιλόκυνες

take up the examples used earlier in a different context, as objects of acquisitive instincts, at 211 d 8 sq; but φιλοτινοί, φιλογυμνασταί, φιλόσοφοι, are new, and introduce lifeless and abstract objects of φιλίας, excluding the possible plea that horses and dogs (and also quails?) can and do return affection.

In φιλο- compounds the φιλο- element is usually active, and often denotes pursuit or approval of the objects or persons named in general or as classes. Thus by introducing these compounds here Socrates turns to a sense of φιλεῖν different from that used so far; up to now it has always been a matter of affection between persons.

5 α 8

ἢ φιλοῦσι μὲν ταῦτα ἕκαστοι, οὐ μὲντοι φίλα ὄντα.

"Or is it possible" (hinting of course it is not) "that all these persons like these objects without the objects being φίλα?"

Menexenus has denied that one-way affection makes persons φίλοι. Socrates now points out that if one has a one-way "love" of wine or wisdom one is called φίλος-οἶνος or φίλος-σοφός, one φιλεῖ these objects, and surely the objects are φίλα? Menexenus is prepared to admit this; in the case of one-way liking for objects, the objects are φίλα. He admits this with objects, though not with persons, because in the neuter φίλον was much more commonly passive, whereas in the masculine φίλος had been introduced in, and commonly kept, its reciprocal sense.

Menexenus' answers are at all points those that would have sounded most obvious to any Greek who was not deliberately watching for Socrates' exploitation of ambiguities. He chooses the answer that suits the sense of φίλος that would seem to be meant in ordinary Greek in Socrates' latest question in the form in which it is put.

Menexenus makes no gratuitous mistakes, but only falls where Socrates has set his traps. On the other hand he does not avoid any of the traps. Plato makes him a "man of straw" in that he does not contribute objections to Socrates' arguments; but he does not show him making things unreasonably easy for Socrates.

e³ ὄλβιος, ᾧ παῖδες τε φίλοι κτλ.

In Solon (fr. 13) this most likely meant "Happy is he who has dear children and horses and dogs and a guest in his house"; but Plato twists it to mean "Happy is he who loves boys, horses, etc." Plato's meaning however is already conveyed in the version of this couplet in Theognis 1255-6:

Ὅστις μὴ παῖδας τε φιλεῖ καὶ μώνυχας ἵππους
καὶ κύνας, οὔποτε οἱ θῆμος ἐν εὐφροσύνῃ.

(But in the Theognid corpus there are perversions as well as imitations of earlier couplets, so there is no need to use this in establishing Solon's meaning.)

e⁶ τὸ φιλοῦμενον ἔρα φίλον. This conclusion is at its most plausible in the neuter; but by means of new-born babies Socrates gets it back into the masculine at 213 a 4-5.

e⁷ ἂντε φίλῃ ἂντε καὶ μισῇ "equally whether it loves or hates in return". See note on 212 c⁵.

a³ φίλιστα is especially applicable to members of the family : τὰ φίλιστα frequently meant "one's nearest and dearest."

a⁴ - 5

ὁ φιλοῦν ὁ φιλούμενος The masculine creeps in again because ὁ φιλοῦν in the example was ὁ πατήρ. Ὁ φιλούμενος then appears in the masculine to balance the sentence (and the child may have been male.)

a⁶ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ μισῶν. Par²'s correction is of course certain, giving the logically necessary sense and antithesis. It is almost surprising that the mss. have not more often reversed μισεῖν etc. and φιλεῖν etc. in this passage; but the only other example is at ²¹³200 c⁴.

a⁶ πολλοὶ ἄρα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν φιλοῦνται ..καὶ τοῖς
 μὲν ἐχθροῖς φίλοι εἰσὶν:

this and its converse do follow from the equations, φίλος = φιλούμενος and ἐχθρὸς = μισοῦμενος, coupled with the established possibility of unreturned affection. But Socrates has worked round to this formulation only in order to seize on it as a paradox and reject it. (See next note.)

b² καίτοι πολλὴ ἄλογία καὶ ἄδύνατον τῷ τε φίλῳ
 ἐχθρὸν καὶ τῷ ἐχθρῷ φίλον εἶναι.

Socrates has just proved that affection can be unreciprocated; why then does he say there is πολλὴ ἄλογία here? He is able to do this because the opposition of φίλος and ἐχθρὸς in the masculine would bring back to Menexenus' and any ordinary Greek's mind the senses "friend" and "enemy"; and it is true that friends and enemies come in pairs, and that friendship and enmity are mutual and symmetrical relationships such that one cannot be "friends with", or the friend of, one's enemy, and vice versa.

(contd.)

Socrates has been exploiting the one-way passive senses of φίλος and ἐχθρός, but on reaching the point where these senses make it possible to talk of being ἀπὸ ἐχθρῶ φίλος Socrates pretends to find this too great a paradox, and rejects the equation φίλος = φιλοῦμενος.

b⁵ οὐκοῦν εἰ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, τὸ φιλοῦν ἔν εἴη φίλον
 τοῦ φιλοῦμένου.

"If that is impossible, then it must be that which
 loves which is the 'friend' of that which is
 loved."

Socrates earlier rejected the notion that the term
 φίλος only applies in cases of reciprocated
 affection; he has now rejected the suggestion
 that in cases of unreturned affection it is the
 recipient of affection who is φίλος ; so that the
 only remaining possibility is that it is the
 giver of affection who is φίλος. - He does not
 quote any examples to make this sense plausible;
 it might have taken him some ingenuity to do so
 while still excluding the likelihood of returned
 affection, since φίλος - active must be said of
 a personal subject and is rarely used of affection
 towards impersonal objects; (he might perhaps
 have had to work through the φιλ- element in
 φιλόπυρες etc. again?) He contents himself with
 arriving at this sense by elimination; he states
 it first, rather surprisingly, in the "generalising"
 neuter; but the masculines creep back in c² sq.
 with οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ φιλοῦν τις φιλοῦν κτλ.

b⁸ πάντα ἄπερ ἐπὶ τῶν κείνων i.e., at b². - 4

The one-way senses of φίλος = φιλῶν and ἐχθρὸς = μισῶν could lead to the possibility of being τοῦ ἐχθροῦ φίλος and vice versa just as correctly as the one-way passive senses led to the possibility of being τῷ ἐχθρῷ φίλος and vice versa. Socrates treats this as the same paradox and rejects it again for exactly the same reason; the commonest sense of the words φίλος and ἐχθρὸς makes such an expression nonsense, because one cannot be the friend of one's enemy, (see note on b².) - nor indeed the friend of anyone who is not also one's friend. (This last point about the strangeness of being φίλον μὴ φίλου was not made earlier.)

c⁴

ἔταν ἢ (μὴ) μισοῦν τις μισῆ;

in the primary mss. at this point μὴ had been lost by haplography (ἡμῆμισοῦν had been reduced to ἡμισοῦν); and then μισῆ had perhaps deliberately been altered to φιλῆ to produce the unwanted antithesis ἔταν ἢ μισοῦν τις φιλῆ ἢ καὶ φιλοῦν μισῆ. Par² either made or discovered a correction of this based on more careful study of the sense of the passage, and wrote γρ. καὶ ἔταν μὴ μισοῦν τις μισῆ, which reintroduced the correct antithesis with c² ἔταν ἢ μὴ φιλοῦν τις φιλῆ. The corrector of Flor. gives Par²'s correction improved by the restoration now of ἢ before μὴ, also confirmed by the antithesis with c².

c⁵ τί οὖν δὴ χρῆσόμεθα; "What are we to make of this?";
 c.f. 222 e¹ τί οὖν ἄν ἔτι χρῆσόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ;
 "What more can we make of the argument?" : Gorg.
 465 e - 466 a.

c⁵ εἰ μήτε οἱ φιλοῦντες φίλοι εἴσονται μήτε οἱ
 φιλοῦμενοι μήτε οἱ φιλοῦντες τε καὶ φιλοῦμενοι;

the three senses of φίλος which have been
 suggested are summarised in the reverse order
 to that in which they were rejected:-

1. the symmetrical sense - οἱ φιλοῦντες τε
 καὶ φιλοῦμενοι, was shown not to explain
 the use of φίλος in its passive sense
 at 212 d⁵ - e⁴;
2. the passive sense - οἱ φιλοῦμενοι - was
 rejected on the appearance of the paradox
 τῷ ἐκθροῦ φίλος at 213 b⁴;
3. the active sense - οἱ φιλοῦντες - was
 rejected by the same manoeuvre at
 213 b⁷ - c⁴.

ε⁷ ἄλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἄλλους, κτλ.

" - but shall we perhaps be able to suggest other kinds of men besides these who do become φίλοι with each other?"

Socrates had been treating his previous classification as exhaustive; then the possibility that it might not be exhaustive occurred to him, which is why he broke into his next sentence with ἀλλὰ . This sentence is nonetheless a question; we would express the ἀλλὰ in English by putting a dash before the question.

(Cornarius' ἔπει for ἀλλὰ would lose force; if an interrogative particle seems necessary perhaps we should read ἀλλ' ἔπει.....;).

c⁹ οὐ πάνυ εὐπορῶ ἔγωγε "I'm not exactly full
of suggestions";

cf. Phaedr. 235 a⁴ οὐ πάνυ εὐπορῶν τοῦ πολλά
λέγειν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, Ion 532 c⁴. εὐ πάνυ εὐπορῶ

a¹ ἄρα μή . . . τὸ παρῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐζητοῦμεν;

"It can't be the case, can it, that our method of enquiry has been wrong all along?"

This question is given emphasis by the way Lysis interrupts to answer it; Socrates then endorses Lysis' answer at e¹ - 3. It seems probable that Plato wished us to take these hints to indicate that he saw no point in this kind of enquiry; he may have begun with this set of puzzles merely to forestall any interjections based on them at any later point by the "eristical" Menexenus. (See introduction § 92-95.)

(Thompson on Meno 89 c⁵ wrongly calls this an "ironic" question; but see note on 208 c⁷; ἄρα μή here expresses Socrates' reluctance to admit the answer "yes", not an ironic "expectation of the answer no".)

d² ἔφη, ἔ Σάπυτας, ὁ Ἀδύς:

the primary mss. omit ἔφη here; Vat. 1029 added it after ἔ Σάπυτας, in the more common position; but Heindorf may well have been right in putting it before ἔ Σάπυτας; this might better explain its omission; and it is perhaps not accidental that Heindorf's parallels for his position are both places where a different speaker breaks in, not the previous and expected respondent; viz. Euthyd. 287 b², 293 e⁷. The broken structure perhaps gives emphasis to the answerer's name.

(Heindorf's observation "sic sexcenties" seems not to be true; examples of this broken structure seem not to be as frequent as might be expected, and perhaps are reserved for special points.)

Earlier versions of each of the views Plato discusses will be quoted in separate notes as they occur. One parallel discussion, however, of friendship between ἀγαθοὶ and κακοὶ needs special consideration, since it raises an interesting case of the "Socratic question."

In Xenophon's Memorabilia, II 6, 14-20, Critobulus puts to Socrates precisely the paradox that Socrates himself produces in the course of this section of the "Lysis", that neither ἀγαθοὶ nor κακοὶ can be friends either among themselves or with each other. Critobulus adduces the same arguments as Socrates does here, except that instead of adducing the ἀντιπρῆτα of ἀγαθοὶ he alleges simply that ἀγαθοὶ are often seen to quarrel. Xenophon's Socrates thereupon (21-27) offers a solution to the paradox by suggesting that the rivalry natural even between ἀγαθοὶ could be advantageously turned into co-operation. Plato's Socrates however does not overthrow any part of his own paradox, but argues that therefore φιλία must involve intermediates.

O. Gigon (Kommentar zu Mem. II, pp. 168-9) argues that these passages of Plato and Xenophon are independent of each other, but are derived from some common written source in "Socratic" literature (which was, in Gigon's view, unhistorical.)

Against this Kerferd in his review of Gigon (C.R. VII (n.s.), 1957, p. 215) says : "But both Plato and Xenophon must have heard innumerable discussions in which friendship figured as a major topic, and there may be no more to it than that." But to go rather further than Kerferd, why should there not have taken place a discussion where Socrates himself took part and in which this paradox was propounded? This much at least is common to Plato and Xenophon's accounts. Plato shows Socrates setting the paradox, Xenophon shows him solving it. But Xenophon understood "Socratic ignorance" much less well than Plato did, and might tend to stress what he thought would have been Socrates' solution to any given puzzle; so his version of this discussion for dramatic purposes gives the setting of the puzzle to Critobulus. Plato however may well have a historically more accurate version

213 - 216

d⁶ - b⁹

in showing Socrates setting the puzzle rather than answering it (though leading on to the notion of "intermediates", which may also have been genuinely "Socratic").

This of course is dangerously conjectural; it is at least safe to point out that Xenophon does not link his version of this discussion with any discussion of ὁμοιοῦς or ἐναντιοῦς as φίλοι. It does not follow that these points cannot have been considered by Socrates on another occasion, but it is perhaps likely that Xenophon did not know of an interweaving of all these views by Socrates in the manner of the "Lysis", or he would surely have been tempted to show Socrates tackling these further puzzles as well.

α^6 Τὸν τε Μενέξενον ἀναπαῦσαι, "give Menexenus
 a rest", cf. Euthyd. 277 α^2 , καὶ ἐγὼ γνοῦς βαπτίζομε-
 νον τὸ μαιράκιον, βουλόμενος ἀναπαῦσαι αὐτὸ, μὴ ἡμῖν
 ἀποδειλιῶσειε, where Socrates
 interposes between the sophists and Claiias.

ἐκείνου ἡθεῖς τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, pleased with
 his "taste for philosophy", (Lamb); but, pace
 Lamb and others, ἐκείνου is Menexenus, whose
 φιλοσοφία has had much more chance to show itself,
 however good Socrates thought Lysis' interruption;
 and otherwise Plato would have written τοῦ Ἀδσίδος
 ἡθεῖς.....πρὸς τοῦτον ἐποιοῦργην τοὺς λόγους.

d⁷ οὕτω "in view of this", "accordingly", ~~the~~ resumptive
of the preceding participial phrase βουλόμενος..κτλ.

e³ ἐπλανώμεθα "strayed off the track", cf. (exempli
gratia) Hipp. Maj. 304 c, πλανῶμαι καὶ ἀπορῶ δέει:
— one of a large number of metaphors from
travelling used by Plato to describe the "course"
of his arguments. Here it leads to ταύτη μὴ κέτι
ἴωμεν; then comes the full comparison in e⁴,
χαλεπή ἢ σκέψις ὡς περ ὁδός, and ἡ ἐτραπήμεν ...
ἰέναι in e⁵. For this metaphor later in the
dialogue cf. ὑφηρεῖται 217 a³, ἐντετυχήκαμεν
218 d³, (ἀκολουθήσεις 218 e²?), ἤκομεν 219 b⁵,
ἤξει 219 c⁷. For references to this metaphor in
Plato see Louis, Les Métaphores de Platon, pp. 45-9.

e⁴ ἢ δὲ ἐτρέπημεν..ἰέναι, "proceed in the direction in which we turned before", (at 212 e¹), cf. Ep. VII 332 e¹, μὴ ταύτη δὲ τραπεύμενος "if he does not take this direction."

e⁵ ὁμοιοῦντας Schleiermacher's plural is necessary in view of the immediately preceding ἴωμεν, e³. (The singular, kept by Burnet, would no doubt be conceivable as a generalising remark, "I think a man ought to proceed in the way we took" - but not in this context where Socrates is being very careful to talk to the boys of "our" enquiry: cf. 213 c⁷, d¹, e², e³, and though ἡμῶν in 214 a¹ may be general, ("for us men"), it certainly includes Lysis and Menexenus.)

e⁵ [τὰ] κατὰ τοὺς ποιητὰς; Heindorf's deletion of τὰ gives more attractive sense and Greek; "conducting our search in the ways suggested by the poets", rather than "examining what is said by the poets" (which would more likely have been ἐξετάζοντες τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν or τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα).

(The corruption would be due to dittography after the mss. reading σκοποῦνται.)

a¹ οἱ ποιηταὶ ... ἡμῖν ὡς περ πατέρες τῆς σοφίας
καὶ ἡγεμόνες "the authors of our knowledge
and our guides in it", the standard 5th century
view, to which Plato showed a somewhat double-
edged allegiance : as in the discussion of
Simonides' poem in the "Protagoras," where Socrates
mis-construes it to support his own views (note
also on Lysis 212 e³). Here a very slight irony
comes out in the next line, λέγουσι δὲ δήπου
(see note.); cf. also Rep. 331 e⁵ - 9.

For πατέρες cf. Symp. 209a³ - 5 φρόνησιν τε καὶ
τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν, ὧν δὴ εἶσι καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πάντες
γεννήτορες, Pindar Pyth. IV, 176, Plato,
Phaedrus 275 a¹ πατὴρ ὧν γραμμάτων,
("inventor of the alphabet".)

a² οὐ φιλῶς ἀποφαινόμενοι "giving a by no means unimpressive account" of friendship; this anticipates ἀλλὰ τὸν Θεὸν αὐτὸν φασὶν ποιεῖν φίλους αὐτοῦς; for a moment Socrates pretends to attach great weight to Homer's ζῆτε θεὸς in his quotation; but we hear no more of the divine authorship of friendship at any point in the dialogue, and even this quotation is really introduced only to support ὅμοιος ὁμοίῳ φίλος.

This may be a serious point thrown up in passing and left for the reader to meditate on; but more likely Plato is guying the practice of quoting the poets by a momentary touch of mock-solemnity. It is not obvious in ordinary life that friends are those whom God hath joined - nor is that what Melantheus originally meant. (He was saying - profanely - "We are always blessed with beggars in pairs"; see note a⁶).

a³ οἱ τυχεύουσι ὄντες "who they really are";
 for τυχεύει ὄν meaning "really is" see Adam
 on Rep. I. 337^b, where he cites also Rep. 379 a,
 518 e, Euthyphro 4 e⁹. Here it is again ironic,
 to guy what the poets are alleged to say.

a⁵ πως.... ἴδι (not to be taken together),
 "they say something like this, I think, in the
 following verse."

a⁶ αἰεὶ τοι τὸν ὅμοιον κτλ.; in *Odyssey* XVII, 217, this is said (beginning ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὅμοιον) by Melantheus when Eumaeus brings in Odysseus disguised as a beggar; it immediately follows the remark νῦν μὲν δὴ μάλ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἄχου κακὸς
κακὸν ἠγγαλᾷζει;

Where Aristotle quotes this verse (*E.E.* 1235 a⁵, *E.N.* 1155a³⁴) he links it with the saying καὶ γὰρ κολοῖτὸς παρὰ κολοῖτὸν and (in *E.E.*), ἔγνω δὲ φῶρ τε φῶρα, καὶ λῦκος λῦκον. . This may indicate that in literary contexts ὅμοιον ..ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον tended to be more common of associations in crime. But Euripides at least applied it more widely (fr. 296 Nauck²): ἀνὴρ δὲ χρηστὸς χρηστὸν οὐ μισεῖ ποτε,
κακὸς κακῷ δὲ συντέτηκεν
ἠδὸν ἦ·

φιλεῖ δὲ θοῦμόφυλον ἀνθρώπους ἔγειν.
Plato often refers to ὅμοιος ὁμοίῳ as a πάλαιος λόγος;
cf. *Symp.* 195 b⁵, *Gorgias* 510 b⁴, and compare his expansion of the similar proverb ἦλιξ ἦλικα τ'

at Phaedrus 240 c; χρόνου ἰσότης ἐπ' ἴσους ἡδονὰς
ἔχουσα δι' ὁμοιότητα φιλίαν παρέχεται.

(For some further special cases of the ὁμοιος
ὁμοίω theory see note on 214^e 1.)

The saying was given a particular use in political
contexts; cf. (Xen.) Ath. Pol. III 10, εἰ μὲν γὰρ
ἠροῦντο τοὺς βασιλεῖς, ἠροῦντο ἔν οὐκί τοὺς ταῦτά
γιννῶσκοντας σφίσιν αὐτοῖς... οἱ γὰρ.....
ὁμοιοὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις εὐνοὶ εἶσι. Cf. Plato Gorg.
510 d, Laws 773 b⁶.

Hippias took over ὁμοιος-ὁμοίω and incorporated it
in his φύσις-theory: cf. Plato Prot. 337 c⁸ sq.,
ἠροῦμαι ἐγὼ συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους καὶ πολίτας
ἅπαντας εἶναι-φύσει, οὐ νόμῳ· τὸ γὰρ ὁμοιον τῷ
ὁμοίω φύσει συγγενὲς ἐστίν.

(So far all the cases cited have been in contexts of
association between men; examples of this
principle in physical theory are discussed on
214 b⁴.)

τοῖς τῶν σοφωτάτων συγγραμμάτων

οἱ περὶ φύσεως τε καὶ τοῦ ὄλου διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γρά-

^{σοφωτῆς} Certainly Lysis could have seen the books of
earlier physicists; the works of Anaxagoras
cost a drachma at most, Plato Apol. 26 d 8sq.

But Socrates may well merely be flattering him,
and Plato inserting a learned reference to fob
off the academics among his readers. Lysis would
have been taught Homer in his junior school, but
hardly cosmology (or his parents might well have
removed him to a more reputable establishment.)

The superlative σοφωτάτων is sarcastic (as σοφοί often
is in Plato); see Socrates on ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἣν
δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἰστορίαν, Phaedo
96 a⁶ - 7 and 96 - 100. Plato often refers to
his predecessors with elaborate flippancy, which
probably covers a justifiable bitterness at their
failure to answer Plato's questions even on matters
of cosmology.

κατὰ φύσιν was certainly a frequent book-title among the Presocratics, but Gigon (Komm. zu Xen. Mem. II, p. 166 n.) is wrong to ask who entitled his book κατὰ τοῦ ἔλεος ; Plato is neither quoting titles nor alluding to specific individuals, and in fact τὸ ἔλεος = κέλευρος (cf. Plato Gorg. 508 a³ τὸ ἔλεος τοῦτο κέλευρον καλεῖται) is not cited by L.S.J. before Plato, nor from "B" fragments in Kranz's Index to Vorsokratiker.

b³ ταῦτα αὐτὰ λέγουσιν "saying precisely this";

suspecting ταῦτα αὐτὰ on grounds of world-order, Heindorf wrote ταῦτα ταῦτα which Richards improved on with ταῦτὰ ταῦτα but no change is necessary; cf. ταῦτα δὴ αὐτὰ at 212 a⁶; also Prot. 329 c⁶, and the singular τοῦτο αὐτὸ very frequently (e.g., Phaedo 107 b⁹, Rep. 471 e³, and especially at Philebus 60 a⁹, where, as here, the meaning is very nearly the same as ταῦτὸ τοῦτο.)

- Note also ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ below at 220 b², and τοῦτον αὐτὸν in Dem. de Cor. xviii, 224.

If we wish to try to identify among early physicists any who originated the view ἕμοιον ὁμοίῳ εἶλον we must first make an important distinction:

1. Aristotle and Theophrastus attempted to classify the views of their predecessors concerning many kinds of interaction, and indeed concerning interaction in general, according to whether it was held to take place between likes or between opposites. Cf. Ar. de Gen. et Corr. 323 b¹⁻¹⁵ on interaction in general (ποιεῖν καὶ κἀόχεῖν): he alleges that everyone thought only unlikes could act upon each other, except for Democritus who said only likes could affect each other (though Ar. elsewhere mentions Empedocles' view of sense-perception as due to the interaction of likes: de Anima 404 b 10, 409 b 23 sq.); and on a particular kind of interaction, Theophrastus begins his περὶ αἰσθησεων in this way:-

Περὶ αἰσθησεως αἱ μὲν πολλαὶ καὶ
 κἀόχου δὲγαὶ δὲ εἰσίν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ
 ποιοῦσιν (naming Parmenides Empedocles and
 Plato), οἱ δὲ τῷ ἐναντίῳ (Anaxagoreans and
 Heracliteans).

It may be that Plato had in mind some of these various theories of interaction when he referred to those who held ἄμοιον-ὁμοίῳ or ἐναντίον-ἐναντιῳ φίλον ; but not all the kinds of interaction which can be traced were strictly cases of attraction; sometimes no doubt an interaction leading to a favourable result might seem to be not unlike a form of φιλία, but this would often have been a rather strained metaphor. (See note on Heraclitus below *(at 2/5 e³⁻⁴)*)

2. In contrast to the many theories of "interaction", the only philosopher who specifically discussed a physical force called φιλότης was Empedocles; but to ask whether Empedocles believed that ὄμοια or ἐναντία were φίλα is to require an answer in terms which Empedocles himself did not use. (See following note.)

We can say, therefore, with reasonable confidence that Plato in this section had in mind :

1. early physicists who employed various notions of the interaction of likes and opposites ;
2. Empedocles, who introduced a cosmic force called φιλότης.

On the other hand in referring to any early
physicists the specific view ὁμοίων-ὁμοίω φίλον
Plato is probably (unless we have lost all
trace of some historical holder of this view)
by the standards of professional scholarship
guilty of a vague and unhistorical conflation
or confusion; though since Plato was not
primarily concerned with ~~confounding~~^{expl-} the
history of philosophy, it would be more
accurate to say that he was producing an
adaptation of earlier views for his own use
in this discussion. (Presentday philosophers
might understand this better than contemporary
classicists do; it is not uncommon to find a
modern philosophical argument usefully
illustrated by reference e.g., to a so-called
"Kantian" or "Leibnizian" position where the
writer openly disclaims any interest in
whether Kant or Leibniz in fact stated this
position. Strict historical accuracy is not
necessarily relevant for progress in thinking,
a fact which should be borne in mind by those
who attempt to extract the history of philosophy
from Plato and Aristotle.)

τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ . . . φίλον.

Perhaps the nearest instance of this type of view in physics - if one must be found - is Democritus, fr. 164, on the flocking of birds and the separation of seeds in a sieve and of stones on the sea shore, ὡς ἂν συνάγωγόν τε ἐχοῦσης τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἐν τοῦτοις ὁμοιότητος. But whether Plato knew of the work of Democritus is uncertain; and in any case he is more likely to be drawing on more general, even if less close, antecedents, in so far as he is not making up this view for his own ends. (See previous note.)

τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον ; Aristotle in
 E.E. 1235a 10^{sup} and E.N.1155 b 1 sq. classes
 Empedocles among those who held this view. But
 this is at the very least a dangerous half-truth.

For Empedocles φιλότης is one of the six elements;
 it causes the combining of the four elements earth,
 air, fire and water in the physical world, just as
 it causes concord between men; fr. 17, 1-35.

In Strife, all things are διαμορφαδιέχουσιν
 εἶδουσιν ; in φιλότης they are ἄρθρια and
 ἀλλήλοισι ἕστερκαται ὁμοιωθέντι ἄρρ^{δι} fr. 21 (esp. 7-8),
 22 (esp. 5-10).

It may be than that Empedocles' φιλότης imposes
 "likeness" on the elements; but the attraction due
 to φιλότης is not caused by likeness, since it
 consists of the combining of the four different
 elements (cf. fr. 35, 1.6, θέλημά συνιστάμεν'
 ἄλλοθεν ἄλλο.)

On the other hand, to quote Burnet, E.G.P.³, p.233,
 "we must carefully distinguish between the Love of
 Empedocles and that 'attraction of like for like'
 to which he also attributed an important part in the
 formation of the world. The latter is not an
 element distinct from others; it depends on the

proper nature of each element, and is only able to take effect where Strife divides the sphere. Love, on the contrary, produces an attraction of unlikes." Burnet is referring to fr. 62, 1.6 and fr. 110, 1.9: the tendency of each element to join its like is part of the disintegration due to Νεῖκος.

Thus Empedocles believed both that during Νεῖκος like attracted like, and that φιλοτης was a force which joined unlikes, though in the face (presumably) of basic repulsion between unlikes. Of the attraction of like for like he does not seem to have used the word φίλον. It would therefore be difficult to know whether to class Empedocles among those Plato was referring to as believing in ἕρπον ἁποία φίλον or ἐναντίον ἐναντία φίλον; in fact it would be misrepresenting E. to put him in either class.

The fact that Aristotle, in recapitulating doctrines of friendship within the framework Plato here provides, put Empedocles among those who believed ἕρπον ἁποία φίλον (E.E. 1235 a 10 sq., E.N. 1155 b 1 sq.), is only evidence that Aristotle,

anticipating modern scholars, assumed too easily that Plato's categories would be made to fit all previous thinkers. It is certainly not evidence that Plato himself had wondered how to classify Empedocles. It has the look of a passage where Aristotle was trying to fill out a framework which Plato may have been better aware was largely of his own devising.

(A propos of Empedocles, it is worth noting that Empedocles himself made use of quite separate notions of interaction between likes in his theory of nutrition, $\alpha\rho\delta\phi\eta$, see fr. 90 (often wrongly quoted as though about $\phi\iota\lambda\delta\tau\eta\varsigma$, but see the context in Plutarch), and in his theory of sense-perception, fr. 109 (cf. Theophrastus $\kappa\epsilon\pi\iota$ $\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\sigma\epsilon\omega\upsilon$ cited in last note.) These uses of this notion have nothing to do with his general theory of $\phi\iota\lambda\delta\tau\eta\varsigma$))

214

b⁷ τὸ ἥμισυ αὐτοῦ (sc. εἰ λέγουσιν), "they are right in half of what they say": αὐτοῦ is the vague neuter, "the matter" (cf. 218 b⁸), expanded into τοῦ λεγομένου at c⁴.

It is precisely this exclusive classification of the world into the contraries good and bad which Socrates is going to overthrow to find a way out of the puzzle at 216 d. But for the moment the bland assumption that the only "likes" are good men and bad men serves to concentrate our attention on the use of this suggestion in the field of ethics.

b⁸ ὁ γε πονηρὸς τῷ πονηρῷ.....ἐχθρῶν γίνεσθαι.
 ἄδικεῖ γάρ.

Theognis gives warnings at some length against making friends with κακοὶ; e.g. ll. 35-72, 101-114; but note, especially, in the course of this, ll. 59-60:

ἄλλήλους δ'ἀπειῶσιν (sc. οἱ δειλοὶ) ἐπ'
 ἀλλήλοισι γελῶντες,
 οὔτε κακῶν γνῶμας εἰδότες οὔτ'ἀγαθῶν,
 (i.e., "having no moral sense", κακῶν being neuter).

Xenophon Mem. II 6.19 perhaps suggests that Socrates had stressed this point afresh: πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἢ ἐχάριστοι ἢ ἀμελεῖς ἢ κλεονέκται ἢ ἄπιστοι ἢ ἀκρατεῖς ἄνθρωποι δύναιτο φίλοι γενέσθαι; (This is put in the mouth of Critobulus; but see note on 213 d⁶ - 216 b⁹.) Plato treats the point at length in Rep. I 349 b - 352 d, to the extent of arguing that any common action achieved by ἄδικοι must reveal in them a remnant of δικαιοσύνη, since οἱ τελέως ἄδικοι τελέως εἰσὶ καὶ πράττειν ἄδύνατοι (352 c⁷ - 8.) Cf. also Gorg. 507 e⁴, Phaedr. 255 b¹ - 2, and see note on 214 c⁷ - d¹.

c⁶. ΑΛΛΑ ΜΟΙ ΔΟΚΟῦΣΙΝ ΛΕΓΕΙΝ ΚΤΛ. Socrates here pretends to make a loophole by means of which the suggesters of ὅμοιοι-φιλοῖ could maintain the whole of their view; he suggests that by ὅμοιοι they meant "those of stable character," i.e., ἀγαθοί. But he is going to go on to refute this too; at this point he is falling over backwards in sophisticated courtesy, mainly for the sake of getting in an extra argument to show that κακοί are not φιλοῖ. (See note on 214 d¹ - 2.)

τούς δὲ κακοὺς, ὅπερ καὶ λέγεται περὶ αὐτῶν,
 μηδέποτε ἑμοίους μηδ' αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἀλλ'
 ἑμπλήκτους τε καὶ ἀσταθμήτους.

"but bad men - so it is said of them - are at
 no time even like themselves, but are impulsive
 and unpredictable".

For ὅμοιος of consistent behaviour see L.S.J. s.v.

"ὅμοιος 2, (σφαιροειδῆς)." It is perhaps worth
 insisting that the contrast with ἑμπλήκτος καὶ
 ἀσταθμήτος reinforces the indication contained in
 μηδέποτε that it is "being the same" over a period
 of time that is meant here by ὅμοιος αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς;
 not as e.g., in Tim. 33 b 6 "the same in all parts,"
 (of a sphere).

Whether there was a saying that κακοὶ in general
 were ἑμπλήκτοι is not clear; but certainly
 inconsistency of behaviour was condemned; cf.
 Theognis 1049-1054, esp. 1053-4, αὖν γὰρ
 βαινομένων πέτται

εὐμῆς τε νόος τε,
 βουλή δ' εἰς ἀγαθὸν καὶ νόον
 ἐοθαλὸν ἔχει;

Pindar Ol. VIII 61, Κουφότερα γὰρ ἀπειρώτωνι φρένες,
Ar. Birds 167-70, esp. 169-170,

ἄνθρωπος ἔρως ἀσταθμῆτος παιδόμενος,
ἀτέκμαρτος, οὐδὲν οὐδέποτε ἐν ταύτῃ μένον.

For ἔμπληκτος "liable to impulses" cf. Eur. Tro. 1204-6,
αἱ τύχαι,

ἔμπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ τ' ἄλλοσε

πηδῶσι; Plato, Gorg. 482 a⁶;

and Suidas s.v. : κοῦφοι, εὐμεταβλητοί,

οἱ μὴ ἔμμενοντες τῇ ἀρχαίᾳ φιλίᾳ καὶ ἀρετῇ.

For ἀσταθμῆτος cf. Harpocration, s.v. περὶ οὗ οὐδεὶς ἔν
δύναιτο τεκμήρασθαι οὐδὲ σταθμῆσθαι, τί ποτε
διανοεῖται ἢ τί πράξει. Δημοσθένης ἐν τῇ
παρυπρεσβείας (§ 136, ὁ Δῆμος ἀσταθμητότατον
πρᾶγμα .) Cf. note on σταθμῆσθαι 205 a³ above.

ὅ δὲ ἄλλο ἀπὸ αὐτῶ ἀνόμοτον εἶη καὶ διαφόρον, ὅμοιόν γε
 ἢ ἄλλῳ ὅμοιον ἢ φίλον γένοιτ' ἔν.

"what is unlike and different from itself could
 hardly be like or the friend of anything else."

There is some danger that this may be merely a play
 on words; Plato has been saying that κακοὶ are *not*
 ὅμοιοι in the sense of "stable in behaviour",
 but this does not show that they are not still
 ὅμοιοι in the sense of "alike in being κακοὶ",
 or even "alike in being unstable;" and of course
 it was "likeness" that the original suggestion
 talked of.

On the other hand this rather sophisticated formulation
 may be a humorous presentation of the serious point
 that instability of character prevents the formation
 of regular common interests such as might lead to
 friendship. This would then become, not so much a
 mere subterfuge to pretend that κακοὶ cannot have
 been included among ὅμοιοι, as a second argument
 to show that κακοὶ cannot be friends. This second
 argument appears to be present, as well as the first
 argument, in Rep. I 349-352 (see note on 214 b⁸);
 cf. Rep. 351 e⁹ - 352 a⁸, esp. a⁶,

(τὸν ἀδικόν)...ποιήσει (sc. ἡ ἀδικία)
στασιάζοντα καὶ οὐχ ὁμονοοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ,
ἕπειτα ἐχθρὸν καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις.

Adam observes, probably rightly, that this passage
"foreshadows the full psychological theory of
Rep. IV"; cf. Rep. 443 d³sq. of the δίκαιος ἄνηρ
who is said (πρῶτα εἶναι)..... τὰ εἰκεῖα (sc. τὰ
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη) εὐθὺς θέμενον καὶ ἄρξαντα αὐτὸν
αὐτοῦ καὶ κορυφῶντα καὶ φίλον γενόμενον ἑαυτῷ
καὶ συναρμόδιον τρία ὄντα, κτλ. Cf. also Politicus
309 e¹⁰ sq., Laws 626 c sq., Ep. VII 332 d³ - 5.

But it is to be noted that if the instability of
character described in Rep. I as being ἐχθρὸς ἑαυτῷ
and as leading to being ἐχθρὸς καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις
assumes the "three parts" of the soul, then this is
not quite parallel to the passage in the "Lysis";
it was seen that in the "Lysis" μηδέποτε ὁμοίως ἂν
αὐτὸς αὐτῷ referred merely to fickleness manifested
at different times; whereas οὐχ ὁμονοοῦν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ
in the "Republic" presumably refers to discord
between parts of the soul at one time. Plato's
theory of instability of character has been
deepened by the time of the "Republic"; the "parts
of the soul" cannot be said to be assumed or
foreshadowed in the "Lysis".

d² Bekker printed ὀχλαῖ γ' ἔν without indicating it as a conjecture; he seems to imply that he thought it was the reading of Par²; and it is more likely that this was what Par² intended than the superfluous κού which later scribes have at this point. The addition of ἔν in this sentence is almost certainly necessary, and Par² is quite likely to have realised this. (See introd. on mss.)

(Bekker may have been right in thinking Par had originally had κού (sup.lin.) here; but more likely κού arose out of a misreading of Par²'s addition.)

Adam on Rep. 437 b cites a long list of omissions of ἔν in the mss. of Plato; but K.G.I. p. 226 deny that ἔν can be omitted with a potential optative.

Where to put the inserted ἔν seems to be impossible to settle; Par² (or Bekker) put it early, Madvig put it after φῖλον no doubt for the sake of a transcriptional ground for its omission, Burnet felt it should follow the verb.

ποῦτε αὐτῶνται "This is the meaning
 they express in a riddling way;" Plato is much
 given to foisting his own views on to poets with
 the plea that this was what they meant though
 they talked in αὐτῶνται; cf. Rep. 332 b⁹,
 Ἡ, νῆατο... ἔ Στεπιδῶν, ποτητικῶς,
 Theaet. 194 c⁷; and similarly of other sayings
 he has reinterpreted, cf. Charm. 162 a¹⁰.
 This is of course always ironic; Plato can
 hardly ever not have realised that he was doing
 violence to the poets' meanings.

d⁶ οὔτε ἀγαθῷ οὔτε κακῷ; friendship between a good man and a bad man was never suggested by the holders of ἔμοιτοι φίλοι, but it was excluded by implication in d¹ - 3.

d⁷ εἰς ἀληθῆ φιλίαν; pace von Arnim, Plato is hardly here implying that there are higher and lower forms of friendship. The distinction between τέλει φιλία and other forms is Aristotle's own, and is not foreshadowed here; ἀληθῆ is superfluous to the sense and is merely added for emphasis.

d⁸ ἔχομεν ἄρα ἤδη κατὰ. "We've now got the answer, then, to who friends are",
 cf. Ἰκλιῶς ... ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι κατὰ,
 Phaedo 71 a⁹, Rep. 477 a²; this is part of the "hunting" metaphor Plato applies to his enquiries,
 cf. below, 218 c⁴, ἔχον ἀγαπητῶς ὁ ἐθηρευόμενον,
 and note there.

d⁸ ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαίνει "the course of our argument shows us". Socrates does not say "we have discovered", but attributes the conclusion to the sheer force of the points brought up by the course of the discussion. Compare 217 a³, Ἄρα... καλῶς δηγγεῖται ἡμῖν τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον;

e¹ φίλοι ... οἳ ἂν ᾖσιν ἀγαθοί

This great doctrine became the centre of Aristotle's theory of friendship, and φιλία δι' ἀρετὴν or φιλία ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ retained a permanent place in later Greek philosophy. It was perhaps originated by Socrates; it presented difficulties to Plato, but he almost certainly would have liked to believe in it even at the time of writing the "Lysis". (See introduction *Ph.* 97-100.)

Earlier Greek moralists had always recommended choosing ἀγαθοί as one's friends; in (for example) Theognis this no doubt is a mark of aristocratic arrogance; but even in Theognis the recommendation is supported by reference to the honesty and generosity which should result from ἀρετή:

Theognis 32 sq. shows both sides of the picture :-
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔχει· καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν κίνε καὶ ἔσθιε,
 καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν
 ἴξε, καὶ ἀνδανε τοῖς; ὣν μεγάλη δύναμις
ἔσθλων μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐσθλῶν παθήσασθαι ἦν
 δὲ κακοῖσιν
 συμπίπτῃς, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἔδντι νόον.

214 e¹ contd.

Compare also Theog. 111-112;

οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἐπαυρίσκουσι παθόντες,
μνημα δ' ἔχουσ' ἀγαθῶν καὶ χάριν ἐξοπίου.

(On the other hand this last quotation echoes another strong strain in Theognis' thought, namely "Avoid being swindled"; his moral and prudential recommendations are oddly mixed.)

Euripides perhaps recommends friendship with ἀγαθοὶ more out of ethical motives;

cf. frs. (Nauck²) 609, 812, 7, 759;

e.g. fr. 609 (from "Peliades")

ὁ γὰρ εὐνῶν κακὸς μὲν ἦν τύχη γέρας, τοιοῦτος
τοὺς εὐνόντας ἐκπαιδεύεται, χρηστοὺς δὲ χρηστὸς.
ἀλλὰ τὰς ὀφειλὰς ἑσθλῶς διδάσκειν, ὧ νῆσι,
σπουδάζετε.

Theognis at one point makes the complementary recommendation that one should expect ἀρετὴ even in a friend, cf. 1079-80 :-

φίλονα τῶν ἐχθρῶν μνησθήσῃ^{σθαι} ἐσθλὸν ἔδοντα,
οὐδὲ μὲν αἰνήσω δειλὸν ἔδοντα φίλον.

None of these recommendations, however, amount to statements of a theory that friendship depends on or is created by, ἀρετή. That this theory is due to Socrates is suggested (in addition to its exalted ethical character) by Xen. Mem. II 6, 21-27. I have already suggested that Plato's account of Socrates' views on this point may be more accurate than Xenophon's (see introductory note to 213 d - 216 b); but Socrates may well have put forward the case for friendship between ἀγαθοὶ in somewhat the terms ^{described} ~~used~~ by Xenophon before bringing up against it the "selfsufficiency" argument. That Plato shows Socrates reaching this view by a process of elimination does not suggest that he did not know of Socrates' positive arguments for it; these in fact are more or less implied in the arguments against the friendship of κῆκοι.

Several passages of Plato (many already or again to be cited) contain either the statement or the implication that friendship can be δι' ἀρετῆν; e.g. Rep. 351-2, 387 d⁵⁻⁶, Phaedr. 255 b¹⁻², Politicus 309 e¹⁰, (where θεωρὸν τοῦτοιοῦς ἀληθοῦ ὁδὸν περὶ ἀρετῆς). On Plato's attachment to this view see introduction, *Mh.* 97-100.

Also to be noted are passages where the theory of friendship between ἀγαθοὶ is combined with the theory of ἴσοις (though not by the device used in the "Lysis" of interpreting ἴσος as "stable in character."); see Thuc. III 10¹, οὔτε φίλων ἰδιώταις βέβαιον γιγνομένην οὔτε κοινωνίαν πόλεσιν..· εἰ μὴ μετ'ἀρετῆς δοκοῦσης ἐς ἀλλήλους γίνονται καὶ τὰλλα ἴσοιότροποι εἶεν; Plato Laws 837 a⁶, φίλον ἴσοιον ἴσοιᾳ κατ'ἀρετὴν καὶ ἴσον ἴσῳ, φίλον δ'αἰ...τὸ... ἐναντίον; Laws 716 c² λόγον.ἀρχαίον, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἴσοιᾳ τὸ ἴσοιον ὄντι, μείριον φίλον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δ'ἀμετρα οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὔτε τοῖς ἐμμέτροις. The point in these passages seems to be that likeness in ἀρετῆς is a particularly effective kind of ἴσοιότης for producing friendship.

e²

ἄσχεταίνα τί γε ἐν αὐτοῖς.....

ἴδουμέν τί καὶ ἔσονται.

Here and again at 218 c Socrates^{has} no sooner found a solution than he launches into the objection to it. Since he is represented as himself providing all the ideas discussed in this dialogue, we tend to feel he must have his tongue in his cheek each time he builds up an answer only to knock it down again. Certainly Plato himself must have been planning the course of what he wrote; but did Plato mean us to find Socrates disingenuous here? Perhaps not to the extent it would now appear; he wished to portray what Socrates' opponents called his εἰρωνεῖ^ῖ but in such a way as to show that it was a serious and philosophically honest "ignorance". Socrates put his utmost effort both into his positive suggestions and into his criticisms of them; in this dialogue we are meant to see a man who never shirks the task of re-examining his own theories; who can fully face the possibility that he "knows nothing", and that he can never avoid all possible objections.

The extent of Plato's "irony" too is usually exaggerated. In the negative early dialogues, and again in the "Parmenides" and "Theaetetus", Plato is displaying with tremendous power his conviction that philosophical positions must be based on watertight and rigorous arguments - the mystic Plato who threw off a cloud of ironic argumentation as a smokescreen to give his "real views" greater solemnity is a long-established, but in the end a very dull, myth.

In the early dialogues we must guard especially against ^{appeals to} the ^{merch} myth of "irony" because we now often find the argumentation shallow and superficial. It was never so for Plato; the "Lysis" in particular is too difficult, too packed with its own peculiar kind of rigour to be a *παύσιον*.

e² τί γὰρ "there is something I don't like in
 it let us see τί καὶ ἔνοηται, just what
 it is I'm suspicious of."

Richards wanted to write γὰρ τί, evidently not seeing
 that γὰρ qualifies τί, not εὐχαραίῃ.

On τί καὶ, see note on 204 b¹.

For εὐχαραίῃ (with acc.~~ent~~), "object to",
 cf. Meno 89 d¹, Politicus 294 a¹.

e³ ὁ ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ καθ' ὅσον ὅμοιος, κτλ.... τῷ
 τοιοῦτῳ;

"Is it in virtue of his likeness that like is
 the friend of like? Can such men be useful to
 each other by reason of their likeness?"

καθ' ὅσον ὅμοιος qualifies both clauses, and is the
 emphatic point. Socrates is not yet questioning
 that ὅμοιοι may be friends, but is only asking
 whether it can be their ὁμοιότης which makes
 them friends.

ὁμοῦν ὁμοίον ὁμοῦν ὁμοίῳ τίνα ὠφέλειαν ἔχειν ἢ
 τίνα βλάβην ἂν ποιῆται δύναται, ἢ μὴ καὶ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ;
 ἢ τί ἂν παθεῖν, ἢ μὴ καὶ ἐφ' αὐτοῦ πάθει;

This apparently is an echo in part of physicists' controversies; see Aristotle, de Gen. et Corr. 323 b 1-15 on interaction (ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν), esp. 3 sq. οἱ μὲν γὰρ πλεῖστοι τοῦτο γε ὁμονοητικῶς λέγουσιν, ὡς τὸ μὲν ὁμοίον ἐπὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου πᾶν ἀπαθὲς ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ποιητικὸν ἢ παθητικὸν εἶναι θάτερον θάτερον (πάντα γὰρ ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν ταῦτά τοῖς ὁμοίοις.)

The words ὠφέλειαν ἢ βλάβην, however, sound more adapted to the present context of human relationships; they anticipate ἐπιχειρίαν in 215 a², which in turn anticipates the clearly "human" sense of ἐπιχειρία in 215 d⁶. Solmsen, in "Aristotle's Physical World," p. 354 n.5, points out that these terms occur in a physical context in Diogenes of Apollonia (Diels-Kranz F.V.S. 64 fr. 2), who is arguing all things must be modifications of one basis substance: Εἰ... μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἓὸν μετέστικτε πολλαχῶς καὶ ἑτεροιοῦτο, οὐδαμῇ οὔτε μίσησθαι ἀλλήλοις ἠδύνατο, οὔτε ὠφέλειαι τῷ ἑτέρῳ (γίγνεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου) οὔτε βλάβη.

Kirk and Raven, on the other hand, think Diogenes probably took these

terms from physiology (Presocratic Philosophers,
pp. 431 - 2).

Plato makes Timaeus take the side of those who did
not believe in interaction of ἄμοια; Tim. 57 a³⁻⁵,
τὸ γὰρ ἄμοιον καὶ ταύτων αὐτῷ γένος ἕκαστον
οὔτε τινὰ μεταβολὴν ἐρποιῆσαι δυνατόν οὔτε τι
παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ κατὰ ταῦτα ἄμοιος τε ἔχοντος,
where Taylor has a long note ("Timaeus", p. 389.)

215

a¹ ἀγαπηθεῖη a³ ὅ δὲ μὴ

ἀγαπῶ~~σ~~-το, πῶς φίλον;

cf. b¹, ὅ δὲ μὴ ἀγαπήη, οὐδ' ἔν φιλοῖ;

d⁷, also 220 d²;

λ. 75

See introduction/for ἀγαπῶν as related to φιλεῖν.

a² ἐπικουρίαν, cf. d⁵ τῆς ἐπικουρίας ἕνεκα;

see note on 214 e⁵.

a⁶

ἢ τί δέ; οὐχ ὁ ἀγαθός, καὶ ὄσον ἀγαθός, κατὰ

ἰσοδυνάμιον ἰκανός ἔν εἴη αὐτῷ;

cf. b³⁻⁶, οἱ ἀγαθοὶ . . . μῆτε ἐπόντες ποθεῖν οὐ

ἀλλήλοις . . . μῆτε παρόντες χρεῖαν αὐτῶν ἔχουσιν;

the selfsufficiency of good men prevents their friendship. Plato recalls this point in the final ἀπορία at 222 d⁵⁻⁹, and it seems likely that he thought it was a real difficulty. Aristotle certainly did, and wrote very interesting chapters to solve it (E.E. VII 12 and E.N. IX 9.) Ar. in E.E.

cites God as the outstanding example of self-sufficiency, and Plato would have done the same: see Timaeus 33 d¹⁻³, 34 a⁸ - b⁹, esp. b⁶;

(τὸν Θεόν) δι' ἑρατὴν . . . αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δευδύναμον συγγινεσθαι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἑτέρου προσδεόμενον, γινώσκον δὲ καὶ εἶλον ἰκανῶς αὐτὸν αὐτῷ.

At Republic 387 d^e, however, Plato describes the ἐπιστακῆς who is μάλιστα αὐτὸς αὐτῷ αὐτάρκειας πρὸς τὸ εἶναι καὶ διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἥκιστα ἑτέρου προσδαῖται; but he does this precisely to show that the ἐπιστακῆς will display least grief when deprived of his friend, another ἐπιστακῆς. Adam sees in this a hint that only ἐπιστακῆς can be friends. The

truth is probably that Plato inclined to believe both that good men were self-sufficient and that shared pursuit of ἀρετὴ was a ground of friendship; see introduction, pp. 97-100.

The notion that the ἀγαθὸς became αὐτάρκης because of his ἀρετὴ must be distinguished from the belief that αὐτάρχεια was in itself a virtue. The latter belief was held in a drastic form by the sophist Hippias; (See Plato, Hipp. Minor, init.); in a milder form of the belief, αὐτάρχεια often merged with σωφροσύνη, cf. Eur. Phoen. 554, τὸ γ' ἀρκοῦνθ' ἰκανὰ τοῖς γε σωφροσίν, cf. fr. 893, and Democritus B.210, τρέφεζαν πολυτελέα μὲν τύχη παρατίθειν, αὐτάρχεια δὲ σωφροσύνη. The converse view which Plato uses here is probably due in the main to Socrates; Xenophon refers to his αὐτάρχεια at Mem. I 2¹⁴, and (in a different sense) at IV 8¹¹; but its strongest exponent was probably Antisthenes, who said (Diog. Laert. VI 11) αὐτάρκη δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχῆος.... αἰὶν καὶ τ' εἶναι τὸν [((§12)]σοφόν· πάντα γὰρ αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.... ἀναφαιρέτων ὅπλων ἢ ἀρετῆ... (§ 13) τεῖχος ἀσφαλέστατον φρόνησιν, κτλ.

(But Antisthenes too also said (D.L. VI 12)

οἱ σπουδαῖοι εἶλοιο, ^{and} κρεῖττον ἐστὶ μετ' ὀλίγων
ἀγαθῶν πρὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς κακοὺς ἢ μετὰ πολλῶν
κακῶν πρὸς ὀλίγους ἀγαθοὺς μάχεσθαι - the latter a
neat blend of both principles.)

(See also Professor Dodds' note at Gorg. 492 e³.)

b¹ ε δὲ μὴ ἀγαπήῃ, οὐδ' ἔν φιλοῖ.

This probably need not be altered; on the other hand if it is kept, it should be noted that ^{ei} ο is accusative; a change from a masculine to a neuter subject and back in three sentences is hardly likely even in this dialogue. "What he does not welcome he does not like either," i.e., οὐδὲ τι, "(not) anything." If this seems implausibly "Irish", then Schliermacher's ^{ei} οἀγαπᾷν should be accepted, to give a complete parallelism with the next remark.

b². φ δὲ μὴ φιλᾷν γε; γε goes with the whole of what precedes; see note on 204 a⁶.

b³ The theory that the selfsufficient will not be friends provides an amusing contrast to the recommendation of Xenophon to choose self-sufficient friends so as not to lose by the friendship (Mem. II 6.2.). But Xenophon is thinking purely of financial solvency.

(For first note in 215 c³ see after note in 208 c³.)

215

c³ ὄλω τινὶ ἐξαπατῆσθαι, "Are we making some complete mistake?" "Is our mistake a total one?"

"referendum ad ἴσως τὸ ἥμιου αὐτοῦ.....ἴσως δε
καὶ πᾶν, (214 b⁷)," Heindorf. Cf. also Phaedrus
235 e³, τοῦ παντὸς ἡμάρτημεν.

(For the dative ὄλω without the article, cf. ὄλω
καὶ παντὶ διαφέρει, Rep. 469 c³ et al.; ^{but} also
τῷ ὄλω καὶ παντὶ διοίσει, Rep. 527 c⁷, al.).

του ἤκουον λέγοντες; not necessarily any historical figure known either to Socrates or to Plato.

Whoever produced this super-universal hotch-potch of poetic quotation, practical observation of human relations, cosmology and medicine, all flung haphazardly together, certainly would have deserved to be called "smart" (σοφὸς 216 a¹); but if he meant it seriously he was an extraordinarily bad philosopher, even amid the confusions of the late 5th century. Plato no doubt invented him to father on him his own conflation of ἐναντίον theories for satirical purposes.

(See note on σοφὸς 216 a¹, and introductory note on 213 d⁶ - 216 b⁹.)

On the other hand even satire must bear some relation to its object, or its point will be unrecognisable. It is perhaps likely that early attempts at ethical and political speculation borrowed a good deal from physics and medicine; vice versa it is clear that cosmologists and doctors attempted to make their knowledge extend to psychology and sociology.

Eryximachus' speech in the "Symposium" is again a burlesque; it achieves its grandiose effect by proceeding from medicine to ~~comment on~~ ^{draw parallels from} agriculture, meteorology, music and prophecy in order to eulogise ^{Epos.} Parts of this remarkable farrago are not unlike the reported arguments of the κορυφαῖοι in the "Lysis"; perhaps Plato was aiming in particular at the less restrained among contemporary medical experts; the same men as the "Ancient Medicine" criticises seriously and pungently.

(The "Ancient Medicine" of course is our best evidence that nonsense like that of Eryximachus could be recognised as such at the end of the 5th century; it absolves us from making undue allowances for any primitiveness in ancient science. There is no need to think Socrates and Plato were alone in ridiculing the "science" of many of their contemporaries.)

c⁷

τὸν ἠοιόθεν ἐπήγετο μάρτυρα,

see Works and Days 25-6; but Hesiod seems

to have regarded the rivalry of followers of

the same craft as ἀγαθὴ ἔργα, see 1.24.

For this rivalry cf. also Eur. Androm. 476 sq;

there it is bad.

c⁷ λέγων ὡς ἄρα "he quoted Hesiod and said that
 it would seem that 'potter quarrels with potter'
 etc."

ἄρα reminds us that we are listening to a
 quotation of a quotation, i.e., a quotation at
 second-hand; cf. Gorg. 493 a⁵, b⁷ where Socrates
 reports what the εὐφροῦς told him the κερυκὸς εὐφροῦς
 had said (Dodds, Comm. p. 297).

d³ <Πρὸς> ἄλληλα φθόνου κτλ. This addition by corr.

Coisliniani is confirmed by Symp. 188 a², ἐπειδὴν μὲν
πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῦ κόσμου τὴν ἔρωτος.

φίλον εἶναι, and ἐπιχειρίας ἕνεκα remind us of
 215 a¹ - 2, where mutual ἐπιχειρία was a
 requirement for mutual ἑταίρησις. But the ἐπιχειρία
 specified here is in all cases one-way only; the
 rich man can help the poor but obviously not the
 poor the rich, or at least, not in terms of
 wealth: and so on. Strictly speaking, therefore,
 no explanation is given here of how a fully
 reciprocated relationship could arise between
 these kinds of men; and strictly speaking φίλον
 εἶναι in 215 d⁵ cannot mean "be friends with",
 but only either "be well disposed to" or "get
 himself liked by". This is hardly more here than
 a weak step on the part of the κομῶδες, who returns
 to reciprocal, though non-human, relationships at
 once; but when the example of sick man and doctor
 is used by Socrates at 217 a⁴ sq. it will be
 important to notice that their relationship is
 not thought of as mutual.

d⁷ μὲν μὴ εἰδότες ἀγαπᾶν τοὺς εἰδότες.

This echoes the little homily delivered by Socrates to Lysis, where the conclusion is that he should become wise in order to acquire friends; 210 b - d.

This echo, and the echoes and anticipations in the preceding line at the mention of ἐπιτροπία suggest that this part of the "speech of the κομψός - the section to do with human relationships - is almost certainly Plato's own contribution to the material here conflated. Repeatedly in this section there are signs that Plato's main interest here is in ethics, despite the more general framework.

e¹ ἐπεξηγεῖ τῷ λόγῳ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον, "he developed his thesis in a more grandiose manner"; a touch of sarcasm on Socrates' part.

For ἐπεξερχεσθαι τῷ λόγῳ see Dodds on Gorg. 492 d, and cf. Rep. 366 e⁸, Philebus 23 b³ - 4; τῷ λόγῳ is object of ἐπεξερχεσθαι, "follow up the argument."

τὸ γὰρ ἐναντιώτατον τῷ ἐναντιωτάτῳ... φίλον.
Aristotle's attempt to add history to Plato's

conceptual framework was commented on in the note on Empedocles at 214 b⁴ - 5; here with equal inaccuracy he names Heraclitus as holding the view ἐναντίον ἐναντιῷ φίλον, (E.E. 1235 a 25 sq. E.N. 1155 a³⁵ sq.) The inaccuracy has been demonstrated by Kirk, whose edition of Heraclitus' fragments concerned with cosmology I shall cite repeatedly.

The relevant genuine fragments are fr. 51 and fr. 80 (Kirk's text and translation); Diels' A 22 and B 8, from Aristotle, are to be ruled out as misleading paraphrases.

Fr. 51 is as follows :-

οὐ συνιᾶσιν ὅπως διαφερόμενον ἑαυτῷ
συμφέρεται· καλίντενος ἄρμῶνιη ὄκασπαρ
τόξου καὶ λύρης.

"They do not apprehend how being at variance it agrees with itself; there is a connexion working in both directions, as in the bow and the lyre."

This stresses "the dynamic nature of the apparent stability or tension between opposites" (Kirk, p. 202.) Plato has this fragment in mind in Symp. 186 d - 187 c, where Eryximachus, starting from the premiss that ἔστι ... ἔχθιστα τὰ ἐναντιώτατα, quotes Heraclitus to show that ἁρμονία, ὑπερφανία and ἁπολογία are achieved ἐκ διενηνεγμένων πρότερον. But on the one hand Eryximachus is misinterpreting Heraclitus' sense of ἁρμονίη (see Kirk pp. 204, ~~200~~), and on the other he does not go so far as to say, that therefore Heraclitus believed that ἐναντία were really φίλα. In fact Heraclitus, though he thought interaction between opposites the normal and perhaps the optimum course of events, clearly called it ἔρις, not φίλια. See fr. 80,

εἰδέναι χρὴ τὸν πόλεμον ἔσθ' ἅπαντα συνόν
καὶ εἰρήνην ἔρις καὶ γινόμενα πάντα κατ'
ἔρις καὶ χρεόν. "One must know that war
is common and right is strife and that all
things are happening by strife and
necessity."

215 e³ - 4 contd.

Thus fr. 126, τὰ ψυχρὰ θερμαίται, θερμὸν ψύχεται, ὕγρον ἀβαίνειται, καρφαλέον νοτίζεται, which mentions some of the standard opposites also present in Lysis 215 e 5 sq., illustrates a process which Heraclitus would himself have called ἔρις.

Aristotle was perhaps deceived into thinking of this process as φιλιᾶν merely because of the great importance Heraclitus attached to this kind of interaction; constructive interaction, so to speak, might seem more naturally to be called φιλιᾶ than ἔρις; but not by Heraclitus.

Again (as over Empedocles) there is no need to think that Plato must have been anticipating Aristotle's mistake. The κρητὸς from whom he heard the ἐναντι-
ον ἐναντιῶ φίλον view was not necessarily a Heraclitean, but is probably a deliberate ghost for Plato himself, whose scheme required the introduction of this view to balance ὁποῖον-ὁμοίῶ.

ἔπιθυπεῖν γὰρ τοῦ τοιοῦτου ἕκαστον (i.e., τοῦ ἐναντίου) ἢ ἀλλ'οὐ τοῦ ἑμοίου, κτλ.

The "opposites" actually instanced at this point begin with pairs which could be taken from very general cosmology: for ξηρὸν-ὕγρὸν, ψυχρὸν-θερμὸν cf. (exempli gratia) Heraclitus fr. 126, cited in the last note. But πικρὸν-γλυκὸς suggests a medical context: and in fact in Alcmaeon fr. 4 these first three pairs occur together in application to medicine:

ῥῆς μὲν ὑγίαις εἶναι συνεχτικὴν τὴν ἰσονομίαν τῶν δυνάμεων, ὕγροῦ, ξηροῦ, ψυχροῦ, θερμοῦ, πικροῦ γλυκέος καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν..... τὴν δὲ ὑγίαιαν τὴν οὐρμετρον τῶν ποιῶν κρᾶσιν.

W.H.S. Jones attributes the word κρᾶσις to Alcmaeon himself (Phil. Med. Anc. Greece p.4 u.13.); could κρᾶσις have been reasonably paraphrased as φιλία? In fact the concept of φιλία seems not to occur in medical writers; but theories following Alcmaeon's view of κρᾶσις were common enough: cf. "On Ancient Medicine" ch. 14-16.

Of the further sets of opposites κενόν-πληρες
is again medical: cf. especially περί φύσιος
ἀνθρώπου ch. 9,

ἕσα πληρομένη ("repletion") τίκτει νοσήματα,
κένωσις ("evacuation") ἰῆται, ἕσα δὲ ἀπὸ
κένωσιος γίνεται, πληρομένη ἰῆται.

But ὀξύ-ἀμβλύ is perhaps a touch of mockery
on Plato's part; in medical contexts ὀξύ can mean
"acid", where its opposite seems to be γλυκύ;
but γλυκύ has served here as opposite to μικρόν,
so Plato humourously slips in the completely
un-medical ἀβραύ applicable principally to
wits or instruments.

These pairs of opposites, except for ὀξύ-ἀμβλύ,
all occur in Eryximachus' speech in "The Symposium";
cf. 186 d⁶ - 7; also c⁷ on πληρομένην καὶ κένωσιν.
These are examples from medicine; but later τὰ αἰ
θερρὰ καὶ τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ ξηρὰ καὶ ὑγρὰ
and their ἀρμονίαν καὶ ἀρῆσιν at 188 a³ - 4, are
taken from meteorology. On Eryximachus' speech
see note on 215 c⁴ - 5.

e⁸

Τροφήν ... τὸ ἐναντιὸν τῆς ἐναντίας:

Τροφή, "nourishment", again has a medical ring about it; but the curious Heraclitising work with the title περὶ τροφῆς has nothing of this theory in it. ἀποκαθῶσαι in 216 a¹ could fit a medical context concerned with nutrition: cf. Ancient Medicine ch. 11; on the other hand it is equally reminiscent of the ἀφελίαν ἔχειν... ἢ παθεῖν at 214 c⁶ - 7. (See note there.)

a¹ καὶ μέντοικαὶ κομψὸς ἔδοξε εἶναι ταῦτα λέγων
 "One cannot deny his argument sounded very clever."
 "Plerisque .. locis apud Platonem vox habet
 aliquid ironiae Socraticae, ut non tam de vera et
 naturali, quam de nimia et adscititia venustate
 capienda videatur. Sophistae imprimis, etiam cum
 videntur, κομψοῦ appellantur", Ruhnken, Timaei
 Lexicon, s.v. κομψὸς λόγος; where Timaeus says
 καὶ ὁ ἀγαθὸς δὲ, καὶ ὁ πιθωνότητι ὑποδεδόμενος
 τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Ruhnken quotes many passages;
 cf. especially Cratylus 399 a³ - 5, ὡς καὶ νῦν
 γὰρ μοι φαίνομαι κομψῶς ἐννενοηχέναι, καὶ
 κινδυνεύσω....σοφώτερος τοῦ δέοντος γενέσθαι,
 Rep. 495 d³ - 4 ἄσμενοιἐκπηδῶσιν εἰς τὴν
 φιλοσοφίαν οἳ ἔν κομψότατοι ὄντες τυγχάνωσι περὶ
 τὸ αὐτῶν τεχνίον.

a³ οὐ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἀκούσει "to judge at first hearing";
 cf. Euthyphro 3 b1 and Burnet's note. Menexenus
 is cautious; either he has his own suspicions or
 has caught the hints of Socrates' sarcasm.

a⁵ οὐκ ἀλλόκοτον; "is this not an outrageous, perverse
 view?" cf. Euthyd. 306 e⁵, Rep. 487 d², where
 philosophers are called ἀλλόκοτοι. But here
 Photius' paraphrase ἐνδύτιον is perhaps especially
 in point; the refutation of this view is done by
 making it seem to support a self-contradiction.

- The lemma and paraphrase of the "scholia vetera"
 are still in the neuter even in Par; it seems
 probable that ἀλλοκότος was an attempt to
 correct BT's mistake ἀλλοκότων. οὐκ ἀλλόκοτον
 (sc. ἐστὶ τοῦτο;) seems simpler than οὐκ
 ἀλλοκότος (sc. φησομεν εἰ οὕτω φησομεν;)

a⁶ ἡμῶν εὐθὺς...ἐπιπρῆθενται ; almost exactly our
 "jump on us" - catch us as soon as we have given
 them the chance. Apparently ἄσπεγ λαγόμενον in
 Plato in this metaphorical sense; but imitated
 by Plutarch, ^{de Garrulitate,} 2, 512 d.

Compare Rep. 495 d³ - 4 , ἄσπεγοι....ἐκ τῶν
 τεχνῶν ἐκπρῆθεν εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, "rush to
 take up philosophy."

a⁷ οἷτοι οἱ κλέσσοφοι ἄνδρες, οἱ ἀντιλογικοί," these excessively clever men, the contradiction-mongers." Plato often uses κλέσσοφος ironically, cf. Euthyd. 287 c 10 (of Dionysodorus), Rep. 598 d⁴, Sophist 251 c⁴.

οἷτοι is probably said with a glance at Ctesippus. From 213 d⁷ to 216 a³ it has been Lysis who has been answering; but at 216 a³ Socrates asked a question of both boys (ὑμῶν δε a²), which Menexenus answered. Socrates now puts the question οὐκ ἀλλόκοτον; specifically to Menexenus. The point of drawing Menexenus back into the discussion is doubtless that, as Κτησίππου πατρῆος (221 c⁵) and ἐπιστηκός (211 b⁸) himself, he will be familiar with the kind of attack οἷτοιοἱ ἀντιλογικοί will make, i.e., "men like Ctesippus here."

For Ctesippus' belief in the possibility of ἀντιλέγειν cf. Euthydemus 285 de.

We have in the "Lysis" these shafts aimed at Ctesippus hinting both that he is ἐπιστηκός and ἀντιλογικός (211 bc and here at 216 a⁷); these terms are linked at Rep. 454 ab, and at Sophist 225 c the ἐπιστηκός is classified as a subspecies of the ἀντιλογικός.

Prof. G.B. Kerferd, however, (in a lecture to the Hellenic Society, ^{January 1960} ~~April 1960~~) has pointed out that elsewhere Plato does not link ἐριστικοὶ and ἀντιλογικοὶ, and he suggests that whereas ἐριστικοὶ were merely "those out to win any argument by any means", ἀντιλογικοὶ seem to have been more serious arguers who believed that contradictions could be revealed systematically behind every statement; he points especially to Phaedo 101 de, and also observes that at Rep. 454 ab it is not implied that ἀντιλογικοὶ always use their method for purely "eristic" purposes. At the very least the terms have different meanings, and do not imply each other.

Here in the "Lysis" Socrates accepts the argument he ascribes to "these ἀντιλογικοὶ," since at least it shows that ἐναντιότης in its widest form is not a sufficient condition of friendship. We should not attempt to attribute this argument to any author but Plato, who being about to use an argument which might sound "antilogical" inserted a touch of dramatic colouring by making Socrates mock Ctesippus, who no doubt often made "eristical" use of "antilogies".

216 a⁷ contd.

Plato's real point in bringing in this particular piece of "antilogic" was to move back to the ethical point that there is no friendship between $\lambda\upsilon\sigma\sigma\iota$ and $\kappa\alpha\chi\sigma\iota$, cf. 216 b⁴ - 5.

b³ - 4

Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ ἐχθρὸν τῷ φίλῳ φίλον κτλ.

We have heard this argument before, at 213 b³ - 4 and c¹ - 4; it was not there ascribed to ἀντιλογικοί, but see introduction, p. 26 and p. 95.

b⁴ τὸ δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ ; ruled out at 214 c² - 3.

τὸ εὖφρον τῷ ἀκολούθῳ: not necessarily a specific reference to the discussion of ἰσοπέτης = "stability"; perhaps merely another case leading up to the general dismissal of friendship between ἀγαθὸς and κακὸς, which had been ruled out at 214 d⁶.

b⁷ T₁ τῷ [φίλῳ] φίλον : we should perhaps accept Cornarius' deletion, on the assumption that T's reading τῷ φίλον φίλον reveals the dittography which began the corruption, and that BW's τῷ φίλῳ φίλον is a correction of this. But it remains possible that T's reading is a corruption of BW's; and it is also possible that BW's reading is right, since anything which is φίλον = "a friend" must be τῷ φίλῳ φίλον, "a friend of its friend."

(εἴπερ τῷ τι ἔστιν φίλον at 216 e² is not a parallel, since there the emphasis is different; T₁ there means not just "a thing" but "anything at all"; τῷ adds to this generality; and it is not clear that there φίλον is used of a reciprocal relationship.)

216

c² τὸ εἶπε δὲ καὶ εἶπε καὶ:

Socrates will explain this at 216 d⁵.

c³ εἶλον . . . γινώσκοντες τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ;

it will become clear after 217 a³ that the relationship between the intermediate and the good is not one of friendship; but for the moment Plato gives us nothing to indicate this, except for the hint in c⁶ - 7 (see note), and at e¹ and e⁵ ~~where~~^{he} appeals to points which were made previously were clearly about friendship. His readers therefore must have gone on understanding εἶλον in its reciprocal sense until 217 a⁶ - without however being given any equivalent term to support this, and having seen a faint hint of something different in the joke at c⁶ - 7. At best this transition passage is awkward; most likely Plato himself did not notice what he was doing (see introduction ^{pp. 41-46 and} ~~pp.~~ ^{pp. 91-92.})

Ἐὶ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν φίλον οὔτω ποτὲ
 γιγνόμενον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ

Probably "It is the neither-good-nor-bad which
 is the friend of the good - this is how a thing
 can sometimes be φίλον."

οὔτω in this sentence appears to be slightly
 pleonastic, but is probably equivalent to "ita-
 demum", and adds emphasis to the new possibility
 introduced with the notion of the "intermediate".
 Lamb translates "(the intermediate)
 will prove after all to be what we call friend
 of the good"; this is probably right (so long
 as he intends "after all" to render οὔτω rather
 than ποτὲ.)

(The alternative is to assume that οὔτω anticipates
 a further explanation which Socrates breaks off
 before giving, "in the following way - that way
 do you mean? - I don't know, etc." Early editors
 compared οὔτω ποτὲ in fables (on which see Fraenkel
 on Agam. 718); but that seems hardly apposite
 here.)

c⁵ εἰλιγγισθῆναι ἕνεκα τῆς τοῦ λόγου δυσπραγίας

"I am dizzy with the difficulty of the argument."

cf. Prot. 339 e² καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἕσπεται
ἕνεκα ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγαῖς ἐσχευόμενον τοῦ καὶ
εἰλιγγισθῆναι (BT) εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα.

Again a metaphor of struggling with the argument
as though with a wrestler or a boxer; cf. c⁷
and 215 c³.

c⁶

κίνδυνος ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν τοποθεσίαν τὸ καλὸν
 φίλον εἶναι.

The Muses at the wedding of Cadmus and Harmonia say:-

ἔστι καλὸν, φίλον ἐστὶ, τὸ δ' οὐ καλὸν οὐ
 φίλον ἐστὶ.

So Theognis no doubt read in Hesiod, and he quotes the line with approval (15-18). Euripides puts it into the mouth of the chorus in the "Bacchae" (ἔστι καλὸν φίλον δαὶ 881, 901) to mean "Honour is precious" (so Dodds ad loc.). That was no doubt the original meaning of the proverb; but Plato here puns on καλὸν to mean "beautiful"; cf. c⁷ μαλακῆ καὶ λεῖψ καὶ κίραξ. (Compare the two senses of φιλόκαμος, "lover of beauty" at Plato Phaedrus 248^{d3} (and cf. φιλοκακοῦσεν περ' εὐσεβείας Thuc. II. 40), and "lover of virtue" at Ar. E.N. 1099 a 13.) But after his pun on beauty, smoothness and elusiveness Plato returns to the ethical sense of καλὸν to move back from τὸ καλὸν φίλον to τὸ ἀγαθὸν φίλον (216 d²). Perhaps the most important result of this otherwise merely humorous aside to the argument is that we have been reminded of an everyday phrase about τὸ φίλον in which φίλον occurs

in a different sense from that of "friend" used since 213 d - namely "precious" or "pursued," not of a person but of an abstraction. This is the sense of φίλον which predominates in the dialogue from here onwards; and only in this sense can Plato continue to maintain that τὸ ἀγαθόν is φίλον ("pursued") after he has denied that οἱ ἀγαθοὶ are φίλοι ("friends").

(It is worth stressing, in view of some interpretations of the dialogue put forward, that τὸ καλόν as the object of φιλοῦσθαι appears nowhere else in the dialogue, and that in this passage it is introduced for the sake of the joke καλόν - λιπερόν; Plato in d² returns to his main thread of argument by saying ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἀγαθόν καλόν εἶναι, but this of course does not equate τὸ ἀγαθόν and τὸ καλόν, and this step is not used again anywhere in the dialogue. For Plato's notion of τὸ καλόν in a work perhaps contemporary with the "Lysis" see the "Hippias Major.")

c⁷ μαλακῆ καὶ λείψ καὶ λισσοῦ, διὸ καὶ ἴσως ῥαδίως
 διαλισσοῦνται καὶ διαδίδονται ἡμῖς, "it seems to
 be soft and smooth and slippery - which is
 perhaps why it easily slips away from us and
 eludes our grip." Again a wrestling metaphor;
 see Louis, *Métaphores*, p. 214, and cf.

παρὰπροσώπῃ, 215 c³.

For διαδίδεται cf. *Sophist* 231 c⁴ - 6, esp.
 ὅτι κατὰ ἔτι διαδίδεται τὸν λόγον.

d³ λέγω τοίνυν ἀπομαντεύμενος d⁵ πρὸς ἃ βέ
 λέγων μαντεύομαι,

"I suggest as a hunch I have The reasons
 in view of which I utter my guess"

Socrates/^{foretells} not to be certain whether his latest
 suggestion will be demonstrable; at present
 he merely guesses that it may be right; he
 goes through the arguments in 216 d⁵ - 217 a²
 to convince himself as much as his hearers.
 Compare Rep. 431 e⁷, where after a proof
 Socrates says ἔργα οὖν ἔτι ἐπιστακῆς ἐμαντεύομεθα
 ἔπειτα δὲ ἀπονοίῃ τιμὴν ἢ οὐκ ἐπεσθῆναι ἐποιήσεται,
 (referring to 430 e³, where note ἄς γε ἐντεῦθεν
 ἰοσῆν;); and cf. the similar use of ἔσπευ
 ἐμαντεύομαι at 443 b⁷. It seems unlikely that
 Socrates when he used μαντεύομαι in this way
 wished to imply that his guesses had any one
 special kind of backing; but for a discussion
 of this possibility and a collection of examples
 see R.J. Collin, "Plato's Use of the Word
 μαντεύομαι," C.Q. II (n.s.) 1952, pp. 93 -96.

d⁵

πρὸς ᾧ δὲ λέγον παντεδομαί;

probably πρὸς ᾧ means "the evidence in view of which", and λέγον παντεδομαί is merely a "variatio" for λέγε ἀποπαντεδομαί above. But Richards, against Heindorf, denied this meaning of πρὸς τι λέγειν, and alleged that πρὸς ᾧ λέγον would mean "the bearing, application I intend"; he therefore wished to revive the conjecture πρὸς ᾧ δὲ πάντων. This would be excellent if it were certain that it was necessary; but if not necessary, it deprives us of a plausible "variatio."

d⁵ ἀσπεῖ ἀπὸ ἅττα γένη

"three races, as it were, of things" :

it is tempting to wonder whether this is the first use of γένος in its logical sense of "class"; it is still evidently felt as metaphorical to speak of γένη of objects in general, as opposed to creatures or men, and Plato apologises for this with ἀσπεῖ. Campbell thought that this use of γένος was peculiar to the later dialogues ("as a metaphysical term, Parm. Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Legg. and once in Phaedr.," intro. to Soph. p. xxvii); Ast mentions no cases at all in earlier dialogues, but precisely his omission of this case prevents us from being sure there are no others.

d⁶ ἢ μὲν ἀγνοεῖν τὸ δὲ καὶ τὸ δ' οὐκ ἀγνοεῖν
 οὕτως καὶ.

For the introduction of this class which it is convenient to call the "intermediate" (cf. τὰ μετὰ Gorg. 467 e - 468 a; but in the "Elysis" Plato never abbreviates the full formula), compare what Socrates says he was taught by Diotima, Symp. 201 e⁸ - 202 b⁵. Bury there comments "Socrates represents himself (ironically) as unversed in the rules of logic and habitually confusing contradictory with contrary notions". But it is worth remembering that Socrates had never seen a text-book of logic, and that this distinction had at some date to be made for the first time. Presocratic thought operated a great deal with pairs of "opposites" which were treated as exhaustive although they were not strictly speaking contradictories; Plato's frequent use of "intermediates" may have been a real advance in logic. (It remains doubtful how soon Plato fully distinguished contraries and contradictories, since his most famous

"intermediate" is one between contradictories,
 μεταξύ τοῦ ἑνός καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου. In fact it could be
 said of Rep. 477-8 that Plato there argued from
 the non-exhaustiveness of contraries to the
 non-exhaustiveness of contradictories, in spite
 of his alleged statement of the "law of the
 excluded middle" at Rep. 436.)

For other uses by Plato of ethical intermediates
 in the earlier dialogues cf.:-

Gorg. 467 e sq :- we desire intermediates
 only as means to ends; only ends are good:

Meno 88 a - e : many things in themselves
 are neither harmful nor beneficial, but
 become the one or the other when used
 wisely or unwisely:

Euthyd. 280 e - 281 d; after arguments like
 those in the "Meno" it is concluded that
 only σοφία is ἀγαθόν, only ἀπορία is
 κακόν, everything else is intermediate.

In the "Lysis" however it is not aims or actions
 which are "intermediate", but the persons who have
 aims, who must be "intermediate" or would not

have these aims. For this compare Symp. 201 e - 204 c, where in saying that "ἕρως" is "intermediate" Plato implies that ἐπιώτες are also intermediate (cf. 204 c⁵).

(Nestlé suggested in his commentary on Prot. 351 d⁶ that "intermediates" arose as an element in Protagorean "relativism". Kerferd, in Durham Univ. Journal, XI (n.s.) 1949 pp 20-21, seems to indicate that Protagoras might have used the formula καὶ κατὰ καὶ ἀπόδ; but surely a thorough-going relativist would have said this of all objects. A division of objects into three classes is hardly "relativist" even though it is put into Protagoras' mouth at Prot. 351 d.)

216

e¹ ἀεὶ μὲν δὲ "By elimination then the remaining
possibility is that

cf. 218 a⁶, Phaedrus 235 c⁹, and τὸ ἰσχυρότερον
Rep. 427 e¹³.

Heindorf rightly observed "rescripsi δὲ pro εἰ,
sensu flagitante."

e⁴

οὐ γὰρ ἔν[τις] κακῆ̄ φαίεν ἔν τε γένοιτο;
 "For surely nothing could become φαίεν to
 the bad."

Schanz's δῆλον for ἔν σου may well be right;
 Denniston, p. 268, calls attention to the
 "common Platonic use οὐ γὰρ δῆλον γε
 supporting a positive statement by an appeal to
 the impossibility of its opposite." This would
 be appropriate here; and the substitution of AN
 for ΔH was a common uncial error. Cobet made
 exactly this emendation with some plausibility
 at Symp. 199 a² (not accepted by Robin). On the
 other hand, οὐ γὰρ σου seems unexceptionable,
 (Euthyphro 2 a³, 13 a²); and for ἔν repeated in
 a short sentence cf. G org. 507 e⁴ (BTW, kept by
 Dodds.) To gain δῆλον we should lose this
 idiom with ἔν .

a³ ἄρα ὄν καὶ καλῶς ... ὑπερβαίνει ἡμῶν τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον

"Is this latest suggestion giving us the right lead?"

For the metaphor of "taking a direction" in the argument compare 213 e³ - 214 a² and see notes there. For τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον cf. 219 b⁹, μὴ ἡμῶς ἐκστρέψῃ τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, and see notes on the personified λόγος at 218 d², 214 d⁸.

a⁴ ἐννοῶσι τὸ ὑγιαίνον σῶμα, "consider as an
example, envisage, the healthy body";

for this sense of ἐννοῶν cf. Charm. 167 c³,
ἐννοῶσι γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ὅψις τις εἶναι, ἢ καί.

a⁵ ἰσχυροὺς ὁμοίως ἰατροῦ φίλος; perhaps best rendered here "no healthy man befriends a doctor". The relationship under discussion would be a one-way affair; the patient needs the doctor because of his sickness; if the doctor needed the patient, it would be on other grounds, and Plato never considers the possibility. But by b³ - 4 οὐρα ... ἰατροῦν ... φίλων, the one-way relationship under discussion has ceased to be a personal one, and so is not even a matter of "befriending", let alone of reciprocal friendship.

b² Σώμα δὲ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι οὔτε ἀγαθὸν
οὔτε κακόν.

"The body in respect of being a body, insofar
as it is simply a body"; i.e., apart from
whether it is healthy or ill.

c¹ ἔνια μὲν, οὐκ ἔν ἡ τὸ κερὸν, τοιαῦτά ἐστι καὶ
 ἀλλὰ, ἔνια δὲ οὐ.

Strictly "some things themselves have the characteristic which that which is present to them has, and some have not." In the following example it is true that ψιμίθιον is white, has whiteness, but of course not true that whiteness is white or has whiteness. Here as often Plato is a prey to the "self-predication" assumption that a quality has the quality which it is.

Compare Charm. 169 e¹ τοιοῦτος ἔν αὐτὸς
 εἶη οἷόν κερ ἐστὶν ὃ ἔχει· ὡς περ ἕταν τυχὸς τις
 ἔχει τυχὸς, καὶ ἕταν κάρκος, κάρκος, καὶ ἕταν
 γυνῶστιν, γιγνῶσκον, κτλ. See also note on d⁴.

(There has been much discussion of self-predication as an element in the theory of Forms : cf. (e.g.) P.T. Geach and G. Vlastos in *Philosoph. Review* 1956 p. 72 sq., and references there cited. But there is nothing about Forms here in the "Lysis" : see next note).

Σκέψασθε δὴ ὃ λέγω

but there is considerable difficulty in estimating exactly what Plato does mean. He seems to want to use this example to make two points:

1. that a quality may affect a thing without that thing actually having the quality;
2. that being affected by qualities can sometimes be remedied, whereas having them sometimes cannot be remedied.

It is clear how the example of white lead and the hair illustrates point (2); the whiteness of old age is irremediable, whereas white lead only makes the hair seem white. But the sense of "affect" implied in point (1) as used of goodness and badness is different from white lead's making the hair seem white; we are not told that badness makes the intermediate seem bad, but that it as it were "threatens it" and makes it desire the good; whilst there is no suggestion that white lead makes the hair desire to be washed!

Plato seems to be suggesting that "threatening", "making to seem", and "making to be" are all different senses of the notion of παρουσία "being present to". Plato makes play again with the ambiguities of this notion at Euthydemus 301a⁴ sq., where Socrates says παρουσίαν ἐκάστῳ αὐτῶν (scil. τῶν καλῶν) κάλλος τι ; whereupon Dionysodorus replies Ἐάν οὖν παραγένηται σοι βοῦς, βοῦς εἶ, καὶ ὅτι νῦν ἐγὼ σοι παρειμι, Διονυσόδωρος εἶ; This is of course frivolous; but it would probably be right to see traces in both "Euthydemus" and "Lysis" of a concern with the notion of predication over which Plato, at least until he wrote the "Sophist", was to remain in difficulties.

It may be helpful to set out here the quasi-logical points which Plato seems to be making in this passage (216d sq.) as a whole, so that comparison with later theories can begin unconfused:-

1. an object which has a predicate in the full sense of $\kappa\alpha\rho\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$, i.e. "making to be", cannot lose the quality so predicated of it;
2. so the bad cannot desire to become good;
3. but there are "intermediates" which do not have either of a pair of contrary predicates;
4. there can be qualities "present to" these intermediates in a sense of $\kappa\alpha\rho\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ which does not imply predication;
5. the neither-good-nor-bad when faced by the latter kind of presence of the bad desires the good.

Plato's arguments in the "Lysis" give no evidence that he had generalised any of these points any further than I have tried to indicate.

It is of course the case that at Phaedo 100d⁵ Plato suggests $\kappa\alpha\rho\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ as one possible name for the relation of Forms to particulars; but it is

difficult to see how Plato would have applied the theory of Forms to some of his points in the "Lysis"; for instance, surely according to the Form-theory even in old age the hair is not really white, since only ^{αὐτό} / τὸ λευκόν can be that. (Compare Professor Dodds' note on παρουσία at Gorg. 497e¹.)

It seems probable also that many of the points adumbrated in the rather perplexing section of the "Phaedo" at 102-5 would entail some modifications of Plato's views here; there apparently some objects can acquire opposite predicates while others cannot; but whatever is being said there in the "Phaedo" has to be regarded in the light of the Form-theory, which is absent here.

Finally, Thurston Davies, S.J., in "Mélanges Joseph Maréchal" (Brussels 1950) Vol. II pp. 235-244, offers the suggestion, attractive at first sight, that by linking Plato's notion of "intermediates" in the "Lysis" and also of ἐνδιάμεσα at Lysis 221d⁷-e²

with these two notions in Symp. 203d-204a, we can see "Platonic sources of Aristotelian "στέρησις"; see Ar. Phys. I 9, esp. 192a¹⁶⁻²²:-

ὄντος γάρ τινος θεοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἑφ' αὐτῷ, τὸ μὲν ἐναντίον αὐτῷ φαμεν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὃ πέφυκεν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν. τοῖς δὲ συμβαίνει τὸ ἐναντίον ὀρέγεσθαι τῆς αὐτοῦ φθορᾶς. καίτοι οὔτε αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ οἶόν τε ἐφίεσθαι τὸ εἶδος διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐνθεές, οὔτε τὸ ἐναντίον (φθαρτικὰ γὰρ ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐναντία) ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ^{scil.} (τὸ ἐφιέμενον τοῦ εἶδους) ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη.

But Aristotle's theory is a much more general account than Plato's here, and sets out to explain all physical change, not merely human desires; and the notion of ὕλη is the product of a long train of metaphysical thinking which sets it a far cry from the "intermediates" of the "Lysis".

c³ (contd.)

Davies may be right to point to this passage as a very minor anticipation of more developed theories, but the "Timaeus" is much nearer to Aristotle's level of thought, even though he expresses disagreement with it.

e⁵ χρώματι τῶ ὄντων ἀλείψαι,

"smear some object with a pigment"

cf. Ar. de Gen. An. 743 b 24, ὑπογράφοντες
 ταῖς γραμμαῖς διακρίνουσι τοῖς χρώμασι τὸ ζῷον
 ("picture!"); and at Gorg. 465 b 4 χρώμασιν
 refers to make-up (see note on ψιπέθειον, d²).

Ἐρώσει τῶν ὁμοίων ἀλλεῖται;

Shorey, "What Plato Said", p. 490, cites several passages where Aristotle discusses colour; e.g., Met. Δ 1022 a 16-17, ἐν ᾧ πᾶσι κέχυκε γίνεσθαι οἶον τὸ χρῶμα ἐν τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ. But none of Shorey's passages show Aristotle remembering this part of the "Lysis", since none of them deals with false colour; nor do any of Aristotle's distinctions seem to help us with this point of Plato's.

- Aristotle at E.N. 1096 b 21-23 also makes use of ψιμύθειον in an example; τὸν ἄγαθοῦ λόγον ἐν ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι δεῖσθαι, καθὼς ἐν χιόνι καὶ ψιμύθειᾳ τὸν τῆς λευκότητος; but all this shows is that Aristotle as we should expect was quite clear about the difference between ψιμύθειον and λευκότης.

d² τὸς λεῖκος ψιφίον, ἀλευρεῖν

White lead was used by women as make-up for the complexion; cf. Lysias I 14 τὸ ὑπόμακρον ἐψιφίον, Xen. Oecon. 10.2, and see T.L. Shear, "ψιφίον," in "Classical Studies presented to Edward Capps," Princeton 1936, pp. 314-318, where the discovery is reported of white lead in vanity boxes in women's graves of the 5th and 4th centuries; "pieces and powder of a white substance, resembling talcum."

Theophrastus on the other hand classes ψιφίον with artists' colours (de Lapidibus, § 50, 56); but archaeological evidence of its use in ancient painting is apparently lacking. (See "Theophrastus on Stones," text and comm. E.R. Caley, J.C.F. Richards, Ohio 1956, pp. 187-191.)

- Whether there was any regular application of white lead to the hair remains uncertain: dying the hair was practised (~~Plin. Nat. Hist.~~ ^{Athenaeus, X} 542d) - but with a white pigment? By actors? Or was it used by artists for white hair in painting or on statues? But there seems to be no evidence on

217 d² (cont'd)

this; and the example here of course requires a white pigment principally because the contrasted natural change of colouring is to white. All we can conclude is that Lysis could have seen $\psi\iota\pi\delta\theta\iota\omicron\nu$ in the $\gamma\upsilon\nu\alpha\iota\kappa\omicron\nu\tilde{\iota}\tau\tau\alpha\iota$ at home if nowhere else.

d⁴ παρεια γ' ἐν αὐτοῖς λευκότης

Strictly "whiteness would be present to them."

Plato's terminology here and in similar contexts is a logician's nightmare. White lead is something white, not "whiteness" or even "a whiteness"; whereas in d⁸ (λευκοῦ παρεια λευκαὶ) the whiteness brought by old age is whiteness and not "a white thing (λευκοῦ)".

- The "self-predication" assumption mentioned above (on c¹) from passages like this can be seen to be almost unavoidable to a Greek: not only can "whiteness" be denoted by the same words as "the", or "a" white thing", but also "a white thing" can be denoted by what might have seemed to be the unmistakable abstract noun for "whiteness."

On "Abstracta pro Concretis" see K.G. I 10-12.

α⁶ οὔτε τι λευκοὶ οὔτε μέλαιναί εἰσιν

"they would not be white any more than black,"
 Jowett. But this emphatic idiom is perhaps
 meant to remind us of the notion of οὐδὲ οὔτε
 ἄγροδὸν οὔτε κροδὸν which is being illustrated.

e¹ ἤρπυτων νῦν δὴ;

W's ἤρπυτων suggests that we should read the imperfect and take νῦν δὴ to mean "just now", referring to 217 c⁶ - d¹ where Menexenus (or Lysis - at this point we cannot tell) had said οὐ μανθάνω. Heindorf's similar emendation to νῦν δὴ ἔφασκεν at 218 e³ is virtually certain. νῦν δὴ with a present is possible; cf. Rep. 353 a⁹, νῦν δὴ εἶπα ἄρτιον ἔν παύσει ὁ ἄρτι ἤρπυτων; but Ast's examples all show it occurring early in the sentence and suggest that his rendering "nunc igitur" is necessary; here this would be excluded by τοίνυν.

e⁵ [10] τοιοῦτον γέγονεν;

Lamb's deletion of το as dittography produces clearer as well as simpler sense; it is preferable that γέγονεν should mean "has become" picking up ἐγένετο in d⁸, rather than "has happened." Also the reference of τοιοῦτον to κινῶν is much easier to see than the reference of το τοιοῦτον to the "real" change described in d⁶ - e¹.

ἀποστερεῖ αὐτὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἀγαθῆς καὶ τῆς
 φιλίας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; "deprives it of its
 desire for and friendship with the good."

At 221 e⁴ we find the coupling of terms ὁ τὸ
 ἔπος καὶ ἡ φιλία καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία where we are
 probably forced to assume that Plato threw in
 the word for reciprocated friendship between two
 words for unreciprocated desires in order to
 prepare for his sudden violent change of topic
 in the next remark of Socrates; he talks there
 as though a definition of ἐπιθυμία amounted to
 a definition of φιλία. Perhaps we should
 interpret this passage similarly; Plato ^{was} ~~is~~ not
 anxious to admit (even if he realised it) that he
 was making a transition to the consideration of
 unreciprocated attraction, and so talked as
 though his account of the attraction of
 intermediate to good was also concerned with
 their friendship.

(See introduction : φιλία never denotes
 one-way affection outside the context of a
 reciprocal attachment.)

a¹ φίλον δὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν;

the meaning for this formula strictly justified by the preceding argument is "the good cannot be pursued by the bad" (that is to say, φίλον here is logically correct if passive in sense.)

Heindorf found this puzzling after what he had taken to be the use of φίλον in an active sense in the line before, and conjectured ἀγαθὸν καὶ φίλον; but even if it were certain that Plato had there meant φίλον to be active, it would be dangerous to start trying to tidy up the senses of φίλος in the "Lysis" by alterations of the text!

a² φαῖμεν ἄν καὶ τοὺς ἤδη σοφοὺς μὴκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν,
εἴτε θεοὶ εἴτε ἄνθρωποι εἶεν αὐτοί.

"we would say that the already wise no longer
pursue wisdom, whether these beings are gods
or men;"

this would have surprised Theognis; see 11.1157-60 :

Ἰλοστός καὶ σοφίη θνητοῖσ' ἀραχότατον αἰεὶ,
οὔτε γὰρ ἄν κλοῦτου θυμὸν ὑπερκορέσαιο·
ὡς δ' αὖτε σοφίην ἔσφατάτος οὐκ ἀποφεύγει,
ἀλλ' ἔρμυσι, θυμὸν δ' οὐ δύναται τελέθει.

Plato however repeats this at Symp. 203 e - 204 b ;

θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς
γένεσθαι—ἔστι γὰρ οὐδ' εἴ τις ἄλλος σοφός,
οὐ φιλοσοφεῖ. οὐδ' αὖ οἱ ἀρεταῖς φιλοσοφεῖσιν
οὐδ' ἐπιθυμοῦσιν σοφοὶ γενέσθαι· αἰτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο
ἔστι χαλεπὸν ἀρετῆς, τὸ μὴ ὄντα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν
μὴδὲ φρόνιμον δοκεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἰκανόν. οὐκ οὖν
ἐπιθυμεῖ ὃ μὴ εἰδόμενος ἐνδεής

εἶναι οὐδ' ἄν τις εἴηαι ἐκτελειώμενι

. ἀναγκάτων φιλοσοφῶν . . . ὅντι

περὶ εἶναι σοφοῦ καὶ ἀρεστοῦ.

In the "Symposium" Plato adds the point that gods are necessarily wise : in the "Thaedrus" (278 d 1) he adds that only gods are wise, and that to be φιλοσοφῶς is as much as a man can achieve. Whether either of these points was in his mind when in the "Lysis" he said

εἴτε θεοὶ εἴτε ἀνθρώποι εἰσὶν εἴτε we cannot be certain. If at 215 a⁶ Plato was prepared to envisage self-sufficient ἀρεστοὶ he may have been prepared here to admit the possibility of completely wise men.

a⁴ οὕτως ἀγνοῦσιν ἔχοντας ὥστε κακοῦς εἶναι

"having ignorance in such a way as to be bad"

Valckenaer (on Phoenissae 364) wanted to write here ἀγνοῦσιν, which would give the meaning "having ignorance to such an extent"; but in a⁶ just below we meet ἔχοντας μὲν ἀγνοῦσιν, μῆτις δὲ κατὰ. which probably excludes Valckenaer's suggestion.

ἔχοντες μὲν τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο τὴν ἀνοσίαν,
 μήτε δὲ ὑπερῷον ὄντας ἀγνώμονας, μήδὲ ἀμαθεῖς,
 ἀλλ' ἔτι ἠγνούμενοι μὴ εἰδέναι ἅμ' ἡ ἴσασιν.

"having this evil of ignorance, but not yet being
 senseless or stupid because of it, but still
 aware of not knowing the things they don't know."

Socrates complained more bitterly of men's unawareness
 of their ignorance than of their ignorance itself;
 awareness of his own ignorance was the only
 respect in which he claimed to be less ignorant
 than others: see Apology 21b - 23b, where
 Socrates is anxious to show that his own
 ignorance is not in the least "ironic", but less
 than other men's precisely because it is
 recognised by Socrates himself. Cf. Philebus
 48c - 49a on δοξασαμία ψευδῆς, and Meno 84 a - c,
 esp. c⁴ - 6 οἷσι οὖν ἐν αὐτῷ πρότερον ἐπιει-
 ρῆσαι ζητεῖν ἢ πανθάνειν τοῦτο ἢ ἄτεο εἰδέ-
 ναι οὐκ εἰδῆς, κριν εἰς ἀπορίαν κατέστησεν
 ἠγνούμενος μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ ἐπέθησεν τὸ εἰδέναι;

(At Republic 477 a sq. it is suggested that the $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\delta\epsilon\ \alpha\iota\ \dots\ \delta\upsilon\nu\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \tau\epsilon\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\epsilon}\tau\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\mu\eta\varsigma$ is $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\eta$, but (quite apart from the absence here of the elaborate metaphysical explanations of the "Republic") the "intermediate" state of the $\phi\iota\lambda\acute{\omicron}\sigma\sigma\omicron\phi\omicron\varsigma$ in the "Lysis" is the having, not of opinions, but of no opinions. Being $\phi\iota\lambda\acute{\omicron}\sigma\sigma\omicron\phi\omicron\varsigma$ is a lower state than being $\phi\iota\lambda\acute{\omicron}\sigma\sigma\omicron\phi\omicron\varsigma$, cf. Rep. 480 a.)

b⁸ - c¹

φαρὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ,, τὸ μήτε κακὸν μήτε ἀγαθὸν
διὰ κακοῦ παρευθίου τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἶλον εἶναι.

There is a slight anacolouthon here, but emendation seems gratuitous. The anacolouthon perhaps even has a slight significance.

αὐτὸ refers to τὸ φίλον, but Socrates cannot simply proceed by saying φαρὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ μήτε κακὸν μήτε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, because his suggestion in the last section has to be stated more precisely, in order to show that he means that the "intermediate" is actively φίλον under certain specified conditions. As a result he has to abandon the φαρὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ construction and proceed as though he had said simply φαρὲν. He began with φαρὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ as though he was going to give a simple equivalent term to εἶλον which would be its definition, but it is not possible for his new definition, which is of a slightly different kind, to be stated so easily. Consciously or unconsciously the anacolouthon tends to disguise this new complexity. A roughly equivalent but harsher anacolouthon in

English might be "We define it as, in respect of etc., that the intermediate pursues the good because of the presence of the bad."

For φημέν αὐτό meaning "we define it", cf. Meno 73 c⁷, τί αὐτό φησί...εἶναι; Prot. 353 a⁶, τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό ποτα εἶναι; here of course εἶναι completes the sense, but compare Rep. 484 b⁶, πῶς εἴν λέγοντες ἐν αὐτό, ἔφη, μάλιστα λέγομεν, 583 c⁸, ἢ οὐχ οὕτως αὐτό λέγεις; Theaet. 146 a¹, Ἐρ' εἴν ἢ ἔχομεν λέγειν αὐτό; where εἶναι cannot be supplied, but λέγειν must in all cases mean "define."

Professor Dodds suggests ταῦτό for αὐτό, which perhaps would give a slightly unexpected emphasis to καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, κτλ. See his note on Gorg. 483 d¹, where he emends away another anacolouthon involving an apparently superfluous αὐτό.

καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα;

this was demonstrated in relation to the ψυχὴ
by the example of φιλοσοφία, 218 a, and in
relation to the σῶμα by the example of the
body's desire for medical treatment, 217 b.

e⁴ ὡσαύτῃ θηρευτῆς τις ἔχων ἀγροῦντος ἢ ἐθηρευόμενον,

"like a hunter having satisfactorily caught
my prey";

for Plato's comparison of philosophical enquiry to "hunting," cf. the elaborate simile at Rep. 432 b⁷ sq., and many places throughout the "Sophist"; e.g., 235 a¹⁰ sq. (See note on ἔχομεν, 214 d⁸).

ἀγροῦντος can imply either (1) that as much as possible or (2) that as much as necessary has been to solve a difficulty; one either must or can be content; for (1) cf. Crat. 439 b, Prot. 328 a⁸, for (2) cf. Hipp. Maj. 302 b, ἐξαρκεῖ, ἀγροῦντά γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα. Here the sense is (2). (Stallbaum's "vix, aegre" seems strained; even sense (1) hardly amounts to that.)

c⁵ μοι ἀνοσιπύτη τις ἔκρυψα εἰσῆλαθεν

"a most absurd suspicion struck me"

ἀνοσιπύτη perhaps merely implies that it seemed particularly absurd and perverse of Socrates to develop a suspicion of his result quite so soon. See note on 214 e².

For εἰσῆλαθεν cf. Rep. 330 d⁶, εἰσέρχεται ἀπὸ τῆς οἴου καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς.

c⁷ Βαβαῖ; the sense of βαβαῖ here is probably shown by ἀχθασθεῖς; it is not merely "exclamatio admirantis" (Ast) but shows exasperation as well as surprise; cf. Hipp. Maj. 294 e⁷.

c⁸ ὄψαυ περὶ χρυσοῦ "to have struck gold only
in our dreams"; cf. Theaet. 203 b¹¹, where
the context again is one of mistaken definition.

d² ὡς περ ἀνθρώποις ἀλαζδόνιν, λόγοις τισὶν τοιοῦτοις
 ψευδέσιν ἀνετυχήκαμεν.

"just as one meets with men who tell tall stories, so we have struck on arguments of a similarly false character."

cf. Rep. 560 c², ψευδεῖς δὴ καὶ ἀλαζδόνες....
 λόγοι τε καὶ ὄψεις ἀναδραμόντας κατέσχον
 (τὴν ψυχὴν) τοῦ τοιοῦτου.

Heindorf at one time deleted ψευδέσιν as a gloss on τοιοῦτοις; but it is perhaps added to elucidate the metaphor in ἀλαζδόνιν λόγοις; see Dodds on Gorg. 447 a³ for Plato's habit of putting metaphor and interpretation side by side (as in Rep. 560 c here cited.)

(At Gorg. 493 b⁶ and Phaedr. 250 d⁵ τοιοῦτον is explained by a repetition of the same adjective as had preceded it; this if anything might seem more rather than less harsh than the addition of ψευδέσιν here). But at Gorg. 493 b⁶ τετραμῆνα has been doubted, though kept by Dodds.)

d⁶ φίλος ὅς ἔν εἴη, "anyone who₂ could be described as a friend"; perhaps slightly wider than the usual φίλος ὅς ἔν ᾧ; probably not to be emended, but described as potential.

From here as far as e⁵ we are back in the masculine, and at e² we might seem to be talking of friendship again; but it continues to be a one-way relationship, and abstract objects reappear with ὑπέστα at e⁶. Probably it would do Plato more credit if we assumed that he was unconscious of the difficulties raised by his usage of φίλος than if we took him to be consciously trying to cover up the shortcomings of his argument.

(Stallbaum at this point commented on the ambiguity of φίλος; "hic et in sequenti disputatione tenendum est φίλον lusu quodam arguto ita dici, ut modo activa, modo passiva significatione accipiendum sit. Ita mox in, his : πᾶσι φίλον ὅς ἔν εἴη, φίλον est "carum, quod a nobis amatur et magni aestimatur": sed statim post est "amicum". Eadem ambiguitas est τοῦ ἑτέρου." But of course the active and passive senses alone could be used systematically without causing confusion; it is when any hint of "friendship" enters in that we should suspect a muddle.)

d⁶ - 8

{ Πότερον ἐστὶν τῷ φίλῳ ἢ οὐ;
 { Πότερόν οὐδένος ἕνεκα καὶ δι' οὐδέν;

These questions are designed to elicit affirmative answers. An affirmative answer to the first is probably logically necessary, in any sense of φίλος ; but it is much less certain that the second necessitates an affirmative answer; friendships can surely be unselfish and so not ἕνεκά του , and Prichard would have said that some objects ought to be φίλοι ("pursued") οὐδένος ἕνεκα, (e.g., moral duties.) Compare the dubious means of proving that every event must have a cause by arguing that no event can be caused by nothing, commented on in "The Nature of Metaphysics," ed. D.F. Pears, 1957, pp 151-2.

For this means of displaying the relational powers of words cf. Symp. 199 d, sq. esp. e⁶⁻⁷, ὁ ἔρως ἔρως ἐστὶν οὐδένος ἢ τινός; - Πάντα μὲν οὖν ἔστιν; Rep. 476 e⁷ ἔ γινώσκων γινώσκει τί ἢ οὐδέν;

Philebus 35 b¹ ὅ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶν τινός ἐπιθυμεῖ, φησὶν ἢ οὐ γὰρ οὐ;

e¹, 2

ἔπομαι, ἀκολουθήσεις;

both said of "following the argument"; cf. οὐχ
ἔπομαι τοῖς λεγομένοις, Euthyphro 12 a³.

Did this still have any metaphorical flavour
for the Greeks? See note on 213 e³; and
consider the different use of ἀκολουθήσει
at 219 c³.

e³ νυν δὴ ἔφασκεν; i.e., at 217 ab.

Heindorf's ἔφασκεν is necessary after νυνδὴ;
see note on 217 e¹.

(At 219 b⁷ and c¹, however, φασκεν can stand
meaning "we maintain".)

e³ τῷ ἰατροῦ φίλος cf. τῷ ἰατρῷ φίλος, 217 a⁶;

both cases are φίλος (active).

e⁶ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ οὐδὲντινα;

here it is only the plural in οὐδὲντινα that we find surprising; but cf. Rep. 349 d³, ὃ δὲ καλεῖται οὐδὲντινα, i.e., οὐτὶς ἐπιθὺντινος οὐτις ἀγαθός, where the neuter seems to us surprising.

(K.G.I. pp. 317-8 (n.21) may be trying to suggest that the use descends from a neuter accusative of respect (?); but it need not; note the (to us) unexpected neuters at 210 c² (see note) and 222 e⁴ - 5; and even we might say "Is he good or wise or neither of these things?")

a³ ἄρρητον; Heindorf added the article, but general abstract nouns do occur without the article; see K.G.I. p. 606-8; and especially names of τῶντων; (Dodds on Gorg. 451 a⁴); and only four lines above we have τὴν τὴν βία (218 e⁵).

a⁴ τὴν φιλίαν ἢ ἐκπερὶθὲ ἀνῆρηται;

strictly all that the context allows this to mean should be "medicine has become sought after, an object of pursuit." At Phaedr. 233 c² ἔχουσαν ἀναίπουτον seems to mean "conceiving a hatred"; but here φιλίαν ἀνῆρηται must be passive. No doubt it would normally mean "has become a partner in a friendship": but Plato at least ought not to have been trying to make it mean that here.

(W's ἐκπερὶθεται (also introduced by B² and t) seems to be post-classical; unless conceivably ἐκ- implied "as a consequence of ἵπτιαι's already being sought after"; but this seems too involved to be plausible.)

a⁵ φίλον....ἢ ὑγιαίνει; φίλον.

Note that this is made to follow from the fact that ὑγιαίνει φιλοῦν. The definition at 218 b stated that τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν was φίλον (active) but implied that τὸ ἀγαθὸν was φίλον (passive). This saved Plato from having to explain that in this sense τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν φίλον is not inconsistent with his previous proof that οἱ ἀγαθοὶ are not φίλοι (215 b.) - if, that is, Plato realised that this would need explaining.

b³ <τοῦ φίλου> τὸ φίλον φίλον;

Schleiermacher apparently was the first to see that this addition is required in view of Socrates' joke at b⁶, - 7 ἔτι...φίλον τοῦ φίλου τὸ φίλον γέροντες, ἐπεὶ χαίρειν, κτλ.

Hermann wrote τὸ φίλον <τοῦ φίλου> φίλον, but Burnet's position would account for the omission on the ground of haplography.

- For the meaning of this mouthful, see note on b⁶ - 7. The context requires "The pursuer pursues the pursued for the sake of the (further) object of pursuit on account of the object of abhorrence."

b⁵ ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἤκομεν "now that we have got to this point"; again see note on 213 e³.

ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φίλον τοῦ φίλου τὸ φίλον γέγονεν,
 ἔφ' αὖτε χαίρειν, κτλ.

"I pass over the fact that," etc. But it is alarming enough that Socrates should have thought it worth recalling 214-15 here, even as a joke.

- (1) : even at 214-15, where it was proved that ὄμοιοι could not be φίλοι, it was presumably not meant that friends were not even alike in being friends (or can Plato still have been genuinely muddled over the "incompleteness" of such notions as likeness? Perhaps; see below.)
- (2) : what 219 b³ ought to mean by τοῦ φίλου τὸ φίλον φίλον is "τὸ φίλον(active) is φίλον (active) of τὸ φίλον (passive)" - the pursuer pursues the object of pursuit." This is all the context justifies. Whereas what was denied of ὄμοιοι was that they could be φίλοι, "friends."
- (3) : τὸ φίλον (active) and τοῦ φίλου(passive) here of course are not alike because the first is τὸ μῆτε ἀπερὸν μῆτε κενόν, while the second is ἄγνοον.

Of course it may be that Plato saw all of this and was pulling the legs of his commentators; if so this is the only place where his dead-pan pretence of seriousness relaxes. I would prefer to think his real reason for putting in this aside was that he had grasped or half-grasped point (1) about the "incompleteness" of ἄπολος ; and he thought it relevant to hint at this here precisely because he had not grasped point (2) about the various senses of φίλος .

For a comparable humorous aside based on the appearance of paradox see Charm. 170 e¹⁰ -12.

b⁷ καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα γε; after γε Madvig added a second ἔτι; but this is probably unnecessary; the construction of the first ἔτι continues easily after the almost parenthetically placed "main clause" ἐὼ χεῖρα; this is conversation, not rhetoric. (There are not in any case two separate propositions being coupled by a conjunction, but one implying the second; καὶ here is "inferential." ἐὼ χεῖρα is perhaps so placed to give a delay for the punch-inference to be anticipated.)

b⁸ μὴ ἡμῶς ἐξαιρήσῃ τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον;
see notes on 215 c³, 217 a³.

c³ εἴπερ ἀκολουθήσει τῇ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίᾳ;

"if it is to follow the principle we agreed on before"; perhaps the subject of ἀκολουθήσει ought grammatically to be ὑγίεια, but it could almost equally well be the new φίλον τι. At Rep. 332 d⁴ the subject of ἀκολουθεῖν... τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένοις may be either (τὴν τέχνην) or personal (ἡμῶς.) This of course is a different metaphor of "following" from that at 218 e²; here it means "be led by" rather than merely "keep up with."

c⁵ ἀνάγκη ἀπειπεῖν ἡμᾶς εἴτε ἴδμεν καὶ ἀφικέσθαι
καὶ τινα ἀρχήν.

"is it not necessary that we should stop going on
in this way and reach some origin"

Plato is arguing that an infinite regress of
objects pursued as means is logically impossible,
and that we must discover some object pursued
as an end.

The terminology of this passage must all points be
carefully compared with the terminology of the
"infinite regress" argument used at Cratylus
421 d³ sq; various mistakes can thereby be
avoided.

Schanz wished to write ἀπειπεῖν ἡμᾶςἢ
ἀφικέσθαι, meaning "we must either get tired of
such a progress or arrive at some origin". This
is a possible sense of ἀπειπεῖν with a participle:
cf. Phaedo 85 c⁶; but it somewhat weakens Plato's
point, which is not that an infinite regress is merely
wearying, but that it is logically unsound. The
mss. reading καὶ should be kept; the correct
sense of ἀπειπεῖν is shown by Crat. 421 e³ sq.;

ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη τελευτῆναι ἀπειπεῖν τὸν
ἀποκρινόμενον; - "Ἐπειγὲ δοκεῖ.- Πότε οὖν ἀπειπὸν
ὁ ἀπαγορευθὲν δικαίως παύοιτο ἔν ; "Must not the
answerer finally refuse to go on? - Yes -
Well then, at what point would he be justified
in making his refusal and stopping?" In the
"Lysis" passage ἀπειπεῖν καὶ ἀφικέσθαι
constitute one notion, "it is necessary to
arrive at a point at which we can stop regressing."

The metaphor involved in ἔλθειν and ἀφικέσθαι is
absent in the "Cratylus" passage, but see note
on 213 e³. Absent also is the word ἀρχή, perhaps
because in the "Cratylus" passage there is on
the whole for Plato remarkably little metaphor.
ἀρχή somewhat surprises us here in the "Lysis",
partly because it follows ἀπειπεῖν, partly
because of our habitual association of means with
"ends"; but ἀρχή is in line with ἀρπύριον in d¹
(see note.) ἀρχή may perhaps indicate a "source
which is the case of" other things being φύλαξ ;
on the other hand it would be more in keeping with
the metaphor of travelling to translate it as a
"starting-point which will not send us on to
another point" but from which we shall be able to
start, or perhaps restart, a correct investigation
of φύλαξ - which will subordinate means to ends.

c⁶ ἀρχὴν ἢ οὐκέτι ἐπιανοίσει ἐπ' ἄλλο φίλον, ἀλλ' ἦξει
ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο ὅ ἔστιν πρῶτον φίλον.

" starting-point which will no longer send us
further back to another object of pursuit, but
will constitute an arrival at that which is a
primary object of pursuit."

ἐπιανοίσει scil. ἡμῶς; just as we can speak of
"referring persons back to" e.g., other sources
of information, as well as of "referring questions
back to", other answers, so here ἐπιανοίσει has
a personal object, without prejudice from the
fact that it has (probably) an impersonal object
at Crat. 422 b², δικαίως ἄν φαίμεν ἐπὶ στοιχείῳ
τε ἤδη εἶναι καὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο (scil. τὸ ὄνομα)
ἡμῶς δεῖν εἰς ἄλλα ὀνόματα ἀναφέρειν.

(Ast and L.S.J.'s "intransitive" sense of
ἐπιανοίσει, invented solely for this passage,
is unnecessary.) After ἀφικέσθαι εἰς τινα,
ἀρχὴν, ἢ οὐκέτι/ἐπιανοίσει(ἡμῶς) we might have
expected either ἀλλ' ἐπάξει(ἡμῶς) ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο
or ἀλλ' ἦξει ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο; in fact we have the
slightly anacolouthic ἀλλ' ἦξει; the subject
of ἦξει can probably quite well be ἡ ἀρχή;

compare Phaedrus 249 d⁴ sq, ἔστιν δὲ οὖν δεῦρο
 ὁ πᾶς ἥκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μανίας.....
 ὦ ἄρα αὕτη....ἀρίστη τε κτλ. Or alternatively
 ἦξει could be impersonal, cf. Theaet. 196 b⁸,
 οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρώτους πάλιν ἀνήκει λόγους;
 Or if ἀνήκει (scil. ὁ λόγος) is to be understood
 there, then ἦξει (scil. ὁ λόγος) is a possible
 explanation here.

Apelt ingeniously suggested ἀλλὰ λήξει, "zu
 einem Anfang ... die seinen Stillstand
 finden wird"; but this is probably unnecessary
 (and would we not have expected τελευτήσει
 cf. 220 b³, d⁸ ?). If any emendation is necessary,
 surely ἦσομεν would be simplest.

c⁷ ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἐστὶν πρῶτον φίλον οὐ ἕνεκα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα
 φαιδὲν πάντα φίλα εἶναι.

"that which is a primary object of pursuit, as
 means to which we call all the other things
 objects of pursuit"

for πρῶτον of logical priority, compare Crat.

422 c - d, where some words are distinguished
 as πρῶτα (or once, at d⁹, πρότερα) ὀνόματα,
 while other words are ἕτερα or ἕστατα; that
 of course is not a statement of the means-end
 distinction, but ~~is~~ the result of a "regress"
 argument.

(I know of no other cases in Plato of πρῶτος of
 logical priority of any kind; but since Ast
 omits even these in the "Lysis" and "Cratylus",
 there may be more. But at Symp. 210 e⁶ πρῶτον
 μὲν is certainly adverbial; Symp. 197 c¹ is a
 rhetorical flourish by Agathon; at Phaedo
 107 b³ τὰς πρῶτας is almost certainly purely
 temporal.)

(A warning should perhaps be put here that
 Aristotle's use of πρῶτη of πρῶτη φίλια is
 quite different from Plato's use of it here;

see Aristotle's explanation of what he means by "priority" in this case at E.E. 1236 a 16 - b 26. What is more, of course, Aristotle is talking of friendships, not merely of objects of pursuit. See G.E.L. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in early Aristotle", in "Aristotle and Plato in mid-fourth Century" ed. Düring-Owen, Göteborg 1960, esp. pp. 182-3; Owen says of the "Lysis" passage "the relationship between these orders of $\epsilon\iota\lambda\alpha$ is not logical but psychological"; this is no doubt very largely true of the main motivation of the distinction, but when at 220 b¹ Plato suggests that other $\epsilon\iota\lambda\alpha$ are only called so by us $\rho\acute{\eta}\mu\alpha\tau\alpha \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma \alpha\iota\tau\acute{o}$ perhaps an attempt at a logical distinction is creeping in. See introduction, ff. 54 sqq.)

d¹

τὰ ἄλλα πύλατα "all the other objects of
pursuit"

at this point it might be possible to take this merely to refer to the chain of objects already mentioned, *ἀρετή, ὑγιεινὰ, etc.*, all of which are *φύλατα* for the sake of some one end; this would not exclude the possibility of other chains of means pursued for other ends. But by the time we reach 220 d⁸, (though perhaps not earlier) it has become virtually certain that by *τὰ πύλατα τὰ ἄλλα* Plato means "all objects of pursuit except the one and only one end of all chains of pursuit" and *τὸ φύλατον ἕκαστου* there means not "all objects which are *φύλατα* as ends" but "the object which is *φύλατον* as the end." This postulation of a unique "end" is of course not supported by the regress argument, nor by the meaning of the term *κρῆστον* (there is more than one *κρῆστον ἕνεκα* in Crat. 421-3.) For its motivation see introduction; Mr. P. T. Geach reminds me that Aristotle made the similar, more famous, error of assuming that it must be possible to talk of *εὐδαιμονία* in a single sense as the one ultimate end of all human action.

μή ἡμεῖς τῶνδε πάντα ὡς εἴημεν ἔντα
 αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ, ἢ ἐξελίκομεν αὐτὸ ἰσχυρὸν ὡς
 ἐκείνῳ ἕσθαι φίλον.

"lest all the other objects deceive us by
 being as it were reflections of it, while it is
 that primary object which is truly an object of
 pursuit."

What is meant by this of course must be
 investigated by attending to Plato's parallel
 example immediately following; note especially
 what is said in 220 a¹ - b⁵; we say that we
 value the means to an end (κατὰ μέτρον σκοπούμεθα)
 but this is not true; what we value above all
 (κατὰ πάντας σκοπούμεθα) is the end itself,
 whatever it is. Similarly, Plato argues, when
 we call objects pursued as means φίλον, then
 ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτὸ ἐκείνῳ, whereas it is
 the end which is really pursued, (φίλον δὲ αὐτὸ
 ἔντα κινουμένῳ ἐκείνῳ αὐτὸ εἶναι, κτλ.)

Plato here is exaggerating; it is just as correct
 to say that we pursue, value, want, means as it
 is that we pursue, value, want ends. (If Plato
 were right how would we talk of our attitude

toward means?) Plato attempts to make exactly this same "linguistic revision" at Gorg. 467 b-c, with considerable lack of clarity; compare 468 b⁹

ἀποκρινόμενον ἢ ἐνεδέχεται ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκείνη
 ἀδύνατον with 468 c³ εἰν μὲν δεδαιμα ἢ ταῦτα,
 βουλομένη πύρινον αὐτὰ; first he argues that
 we do not want "means", ^{then that we want them} if they are δεδαιμα. He
 is striving in both "Gorgias" and "Lysis" to sharpen the means-end distinction as much as possible (for motives which will be discussed in note at 220 b⁷); this leads him into difficulties with "ordinary language", which in the "Lysis" he attempts to evade by the device of saying that some of what we say is merely a turn of phrase and does not represent the "truth".

For εἶδωλον, "reflections," opposed to "truth", cf. Gorg. 463 d², Rep. 443 c⁴, Theaet. 150 c²

πότερον εἶδωλον καὶ ψεῦδος ἀποκρίσται τὸν νόον ἢ /
 διάνοια ἢ γόνιμὸν τε καὶ ἀληθές; and of course often in contexts of the contrast between Forms and the world. But that contrast is not in mind here; see introduction, H. 59 sqq.

d⁵ Stephanus' εἰς is perhaps more likely than Bekker's εἰς in view of εἰς in d⁶. W's εἰς εἰς is clearly already a conjectural attempt to correct εἰς εἰς.

d⁷ ἐνεκα τοῦ κατὰ σκοπὸν ἡγεῖσθαι;

we here have to translate this "because of treasuring his son;" but in view of Plato's verbal confusion at 220 d⁵ (see note) it is worth pointing out that the Greek expresses this by the same word ἐνεκα as has been in use to mean "for the purpose, to the end, of." But at this point (though not later) it may be that ἐνεκα expresses a shade of meaning slightly blunted by our "because of."

e³ ἀλκοὸν τοῦτο (sc. οἶνον) ἡρόδοτος τὴν ἰὼν ἐδάειν.

the ancients apparently did think that wine was a possible antidote to hemlock (though modern pharmacologists assure me it could be no more than a palliative); see Nicander, *Alexipharmaca* 186 sq., esp. 195, 198, who at one point suggests wine would cause vomiting (in which case of course it might be effective), later that it would cause heat to counteract the cold of hemlock; but on this last point there seems to have been doubt; see Plut. *Quaest. Conviv.* III 5 fin, 653 a. (Pepper was also supposed to be useful because *ἄσπερον*, see Nicander loc. cit. and Theophrastus *Hist. Plant.* IX 20.1.)

e⁴

ἢ πῶν;

Compare ἀλλὰ τί; Euthyph. 14 d¹¹, ἀλλὰ τί εἶπες;Hipp. Maj. 296 a⁶.

"A mark of lively assent; a surprised question expressing the inconceivability of any other answer", Ritter, Hermes 70, 1935 p. 2, (*quoting Sittler*)
cf. the rhetorical use of ἀλλὰ τί πῶν; at 208 b¹, c⁴.

ἢ πῶν; in this rhetorical sense is said by Ritter not to be found elsewhere in Plato before the "Republic" and "Phaedrus", but is common in later works. Wilamowitz's alleged counter example (Platon II, ²p. 68) at Ion 531 d⁷ is in fact a genuine question.

e⁴ ἄγγεῖον "container";

cf. Politicus 287 e⁸ ταστα ὅ δὴ ἐπιρεῖς καὶ ὄγρας κ
καὶ ἐμπόροις/ ^{καὶ ἀπύροις} παντοδαπὸν εἶδος ἐργασθῆν ἄγγεῖον
μιῶ καὶ οὐκ ἀποφθεγγόμεθα.

e⁴ ἄρ'.....οὐδὲν ἐπὶ κλισίῳς καταίεται ἀδίκου
 κερύκεον ἢ τὸν υἱὸν τὸν αἰνεῖ, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς κερύκεσι
 αἶνον ἢ τὸν υἱόν;

"Is it therefore the case that he makes no distinction of value between an earthenware cup and his own son, or between a pint of wine and his son?"

This sentence puzzled editors, because the order in which the objects compared are mentioned seems to be the reverse of what would be expected; we would expect either "values his son no more highly than a cup" or "values a cup no less than his son"; we can only keep the Greek order by the expedient of translating οὐδὲν ἐπὶ κλισίῳς as "making no distinction between". But the solution is not Buttman's extremely awkward one of taking οὐδὲν as object of καταίεται and rendering ἢ as "or" (this would have needed οὐδὲντερον surely? and becomes very awkward in the next phrase.) The correct observation was made by Jaeger in "Emendationen zur Aristotelischen Metaphysik," Hermes 52, 1917, pp. 486-8, where he adduced several instances in Aristotle where the

"wrong" order seems to follow οὕτως ἴσως
 (e.g., Met. 985 b 4, Meteor. 356 a 15);
 Jaeger probably rightly calls this "die
 Abschleifung des vielgebrauchten Adverbiums
 zur Bedeutung "in gleicher Weise wie" (mit
 Genetivus oder ἴ)."
 The same has happened
 here with οὕτως καὶ ἴσως (in which οὕτως
 must surely be adverbial); it remains an
 idiom hard for us to appreciate, but Jaeger's
 parallels undoubtedly prove the text sound.
 (No doubt Jaeger is right to suggest it occurs
 in "unstylisierter Rede"; it was probably
 conversational.)

a¹ οὐχ ὅτι πολλάκις λέγομεν ἀλλὰ

"not that we do not often say that ... but ..."

K.G. II p. 260 say of this, "οὐχ ὅτι, wiewohl, nur bei Plato, und zwar selten; es wird gebraucht, wenn der Redende einen vorangehenden Ausdruck berichtigen ... will"; here however the statement most strongly intended to be qualified is the cautious suggestion which is about to follow. K.G. cite Gorg. 450e⁵, Prot. 336d²; and at Theaet. 157b¹ Campbell well translates οὐχ ὅτι "though, as I need not observe".

a² ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον οὕτω τό γε ἀληθές ἔχη

"but I suspect that may not make this any more the fact of the matter."

μὴ here introduces a "cautious assertion"; οὐδέν τι is part of the assertion, that is to say this is a "cautious negative assertion". Compare this with 213d¹, Ἔρα μὴ οὐχ ὀρθῶς ἐξητοῦμεν; which is different in being a question; that question amounts to "I suspect (reluctantly) that ..."; this assertion to "I suspect (with

a² (contd.)

caution rather than reluctance) that ..." For assertions beginning with μή see Dodds on Gorg. 512d⁸; perhaps where the subjunctive is used (as here) the assertion is rather more cautious than where the indicative appears; for μή questions see notes on 208c⁷, 213d¹.

b¹ ῥήματι φαίνομεθα λέγοντες αὐτό

"when we say that it seems to be just a turn of phrase";

cf. Rep. 340d⁵ λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι,
Gorg. 450e⁵, 489c¹.

Would Plato then have said that φίλα- as - means were ῥήματι φίλα? Or just οὐ φίλα? Or perhaps λεγόμενα φίλα, see b³.

b² εἰς δὲ πᾶσαι αὗται αἱ λεγόμεναι φιλῆαι τελευτῶσιν

"which is the ultimate aim, end, of all these other so-called pursuits";

for φιλῆαι see note on 217e⁸; but here it is difficult to see how Plato can have wanted it to

b² (contd.)

mean any more than (active) "pursuits". It is difficult to see what would be meant by calling a friendship "only a friendship insofar as it is a means to another".

εἰς ὃ τελευτῶσιν here and εἰς ὃ ἔτελεύτα πάντα τὰ ἄλλα at 220d⁸ are as near as we get to the word we would expect to find throughout this passage, namely τέλος; the absence of τέλος is no doubt merely due to the way Plato's "regress" argument had led him to christen the φιλον-as-an-end an ἀρχη and a πρῶτον φίλον. Dodds calls τέλος at Gorg. 499e⁸ "perhaps the earliest clear instance of τέλος in the sense of 'purpose', 'end of action'". There are candidates for this title at Prot. 354b-d, where we also meet ἀποτελευτῆ, b⁶; there however perhaps "result" would be the best translation. But in the "Lysis" εἰς ὃ τελευτῶσιν αἱ φίλαι can surely not be very far from ὃ τέλος ἐστὶν τῶν φιλιῶν.

b² (contd.)

(Readers who are reminded here of *τελευταία* ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα should look that phrase up in its context (Rep. 517b⁸) and remind themselves that *τελευταία* there is temporal; so is *τέλος* at Rep. 504d²; the *μέγιστον μάθημα* is the last to be learnt. But see note on 220b⁷.)

b⁶ ἀλλ' ἴρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν φίλον;

At 219b⁴, where the digression about means and ends began, the position appeared to be that τὸ ἀγαθὸν was φίλον (passive) (though not φίλον (active) or as "a friend"). This position is now resumed; after the independent argument that only what is an end is really φίλον, Plato asks again whether τὸ ἀγαθὸν is φίλον in this new sense - or rather, as we see from 220d⁸, whether τὸ ἀγαθὸν is τὸ πρῶτον φίλον. This is again very like Gorg. 467c-468c, where Plato argues not merely that we only desire ends, but also that we only desire good things, since only good things are ends. But there are at the same

b⁶ (contd.)

time differences from the "Gorgias" here; (1) in the "Gorgias" the means-end distinction is used as a means of proving that we only desire good things, whereas in the "Lysis" it was probably already regarded as established before 219b that the good was φίλον (passive); (2) various ἀγαθὰ in the "Lysis" seem to have been shown now not to be φίλα; namely at least ἰατρικὴ because it was ἔνεκα τῆς ὑγείας φίλον, and perhaps also ὑγεία, unless it can now be seen to be wrong to insist that ὑγεία was ἔνεκά του φίλον; but if so ὑγεία must be (or be in some way part of?) the πρῶτον φίλον. So apparently not all ἀγαθὰ can be φίλα; what then is τὸ ἀγαθόν which is φίλον? Perhaps here we must see Plato beginning to think of "goodness" as distinct from "the good", which at most other points ^{in the "Lysis"} can be paraphrased as "all good things". This abstraction of "goodness" from "the good" may or may not be present in the "Gorgias"; one might try to discern its appearance

b⁶ (contd.)

at 499e; but again we are up against the exasperating terminological difficulties noted at 217d⁴. (I must add that even if Plato was here groping after or had grasped the notion of goodness as a quality, this would not in itself amount to the "theory of Forms"; it might be a step towards Forms; but the full story of the genesis of the Forms remains a mystery.)

It would be unwise to try to guess the priority of "Lysis" or "Gorgias" from the similarities and differences just described; both clearly are operating in the general direction of, reinforcing the Socratic paradox οὐδεὶς βούλοται τὸ κακόν. For a good discussion of this see J.P. Gould, "Plato's Ethics", chap. 3, or the slightly inflated but sometimes percipient account by J. Moreau in "La Construction de l'Idéalisme Platonicien", chap. 3. The main point of establishing that there is only one real object of pursuit is that if this one object can be shown to be "the good", then it follows that all "real"

b⁶ (contd.)

pursuit is of the good (thus objection (1) mentioned above is perhaps illusory; even if it was already thought that the good was *ἄλλο*, the postulation of a single end is an argument that it is the sole *φίλον*).

I have emphasised the similarity of this passage with the "Gorgias" passage about good things as ends because it seems likely that the "Gorgias" is chronologically the nearest source of possible parallels to the "Lysis", and because the under- and over-tones, assumptions and implications of the "Lysis" are likely to be connected with the interests shown by Plato's earlier works. But many readers will probably wish to see in the "Lysis" the seeds of the famous "ascent towards the Beautiful" in Symposium 211b⁵ sq: *ὅταν δὴ τις ἀπὸ τῶνδε διὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς παιδραστεῖν ἐπανιῶν ἐκεῖνο τὸ καλὸν ἀρχηται καθορᾶν, σχεδὸν ἂν τι ἄπτοιτο τοῦ τέλους. τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἐστὶ τὸ ὀρθῶς ἐπὶ τὰ ἐρωτικὰ εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλου ἀγασθαι, ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῶνδε τῶν καλῶν ἐκεῖνου ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ αἰε*

b⁶ (contd.)

ἐπανιέναι, ὡσερ ἐπαναβασμοῖς χρώμενον
 ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ μάθημα τέλευτησαι ὃ ἐστὶν οὐκ
 ἄλλου ἢ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ μάθημα καὶ γινῶ
 αὐτὸ τελευτῶν ὃ ἔστι καλόν. Here it is maintained
 that each "step" in παιδεραστία and subsequently
 μάθησις is a step which ideally should be taken
 for the sake of, as a means to, the next step,
 each step studying an ascending order of καλά.
 The "final" step is the knowledge of αὐτὸ τὸ
 καλόν; and certainly it is the τέλος not only
 as the "culmination" (τελευτῶν c⁸) but also as
 the "final goal" (τέλος b⁷ explained by ἐκείνου
 ἕνεκα in c²) of pederasty and philosophy.
 Similarly, though the senses of τελευταία, and
 τέλος are different (see note on 220b²), in the
 Republic it is said that the μέγιστον μάθημα
 is ὃ δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπασα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα
 πάντα πράττει (Rep. 505a¹¹). Plato would thus
 have said that there was "one ultimate end" of
 ἔρωσ and μάθησις as well as that there was one
 πρῶτον φίλον. But the metaphysical basis given

b⁶ (contd.)

to these statements in the "Symposium" and "Republic" is quite absent in the "Lysis"; each ascending step of ἔρωσ and μάθησις studies a καλόν or an ἀγαθόν which has a higher degree of reality in its own right (not merely because it is next in the order of ἐρώμενα or μαθητά); these "degrees of reality" are distinguished on metaphysical grounds quite distinct from their placing on the scale of knowledge; in fact their placing on the scale of knowledge is intended to be determined by the "degrees of reality". (It is worth noticing in Symp. 211a that αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν is not said to be οὐδένοσ ἄλλου ἔνεκα κάλλον), though presumably οὐδένοσ ἄλλου ἔνεκα ἐραστόν.).

In the "Lysis" however there is no distinction between the "degrees of reality" of the ἀγαθά pursued as means and as ends, only between the extent to which they are φίλα. The scale of φίλα in the "Lysis" is only said to affect the "truth" of the φίλα, not of the ἀγαθά. (This remains true even if at 220b⁷ τὸ ἀγαθόν means "goodness";

b⁶ (contd.)

no metaphysics is yet attached to abstract notions.) So in the "Lysis" it can perhaps be said that we have teleological, but not ontological, arguments; whereas in "Symposium" and "Republic" though teleological points are not absent, the predominant arguments seem to be ontological.

b⁶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀπήλλακται, μή κτλ.

"the notion has been dismissed, that, etc. ..."

note μή as after verbs of preventing; this is not just the disproof but the prevention of a mistake.

b⁸ διὰ τὸ κακὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖται;

this was said at 219b¹, and is untouched by the argument for the πρῶτον φίλον.

c¹ τριῶν ὄντων ὧν γυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν;

i.e. at 216d⁵ and following.

c³ τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἐκποδῶν ἀπέλθοι καὶ μηδενὸς ἐφάπτοιτο, κτλ.

"if the bad were to absent itself and not lay hands on either the body or the mind or any of the other things which we maintain in themselves are intermediate."

ἐφαπτέσθαι reminds us of the sense of παρουσία as meaning "threatening"; see note on 217c³, and the example of νόσος at 217ab (where it was first said that σῶμα is "intermediate"); cf. Rep. 574d³ (in a literal sense) ἐφάψεται τοίχου ἢ ἱματίου.

At Theaet. 176a⁶, somewhat in passing, the possibility of abolishing evil is denied; ἀλλ' οὔτε ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὃ θεόδωρε - ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ δεῖ εἶναι ἀνάγκη; see Campbell's note there. But the supposition that evil might disappear could be instructive even though contrary-to-fact; the reason why later at 221a⁴ Plato asks if perhaps it is γελοῖον to ask about the absence of evil could be the difficulty of imagining it rather than the actual impossibility.

ὄτι τὸ κακὸν αὐτὸ δ' ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα

"because of the bad" as opposed to "for its own sake"

"for its own sake" is correct enough if it means no more than "in the absence of a prior cause"; Shorey (C.P. 1930) defended Plato's argument here; but Grote was right to quarrel with Plato's terminology, which confusingly reintroduces ἕνεκα in a different sense from that which it had in application to the πρῶτον φίλον.

(Was Plato trying to suggest that if he had established the πρῶτον φίλον as φίλον οὐδενος ἄλλου ἕνεκα this ought to imply both that it was an end in itself and that it was φίλον without a prior cause? This may have been in the back of his mind when he wrote this passage; but this is not what he says; he allows it to be established that the ἀγαθόν is only φίλον because of a prior cause, and then goes on to establish another prior cause of φιλία, namely ἐπιθυμία. His

d⁵⁻⁶ (contd.)

final view on whether pursuit must have a prior cause is difficult to establish; equally it is difficult to guess whether he really accepted that the good was φῖλον only ἀπὸ τὸ κακόν. Perhaps we should not try too hard to pin him down; his ἀπορίαι were very likely genuine.)

ἀ⁸-ε² τὸ ἄρα φίλον ἡμῶν ἐκεῖνο, κτλ.

I shall argue that the fact that the mss. text could be made to construe, though very awkwardly, tends to suggest that it represents both a corruption and a false attempt to heal the corruption:-

The scribes who wrote the mss. text may have thought they had here three "main clauses";

- (1) τὸ ἄρα φίλον ἡμῶν ἐκεῖνο (scil. ἦν)
εἰς ὃ ἐτελεύτα πάντα τὰ ἄλλα·
- (2) ἕνεκα ἐτέρου φίλου φίλα ἔφαμεν εἶναι
ἐκεῖνα·
- (3) οὐδὲν δὲ τούτοις ἔοικεν.

But the awkwardness of this is that in (1) and (2) ἐκεῖνο and ἐκεῖνα have different references; and rather worse, that we have to go back to ἐκεῖνο in (1) to supply the subject of (3) and to realise that τούτοις in (3) refers to the ἐκεῖνα of (2). Even in conversational style this will hardly do.

Luise Reinhard, in "Die Anakoluthen bei Platon", p. 43, suggested that there was anacolouthon here,

and printed a dash after ἄλλα, leaving τὸ φίλον ἕκτενο without a verb, but to be picked up at οὐδὲν δὲ τούτοις ἔστικεν. The anacolouthon is plausible enough, but does little to remove the awkwardness of the pronouns.

Burnet's device of making (2) a parenthesis and removing δὲ after οὐδὲν similarly leaves the pronouns (and breaks the back of the single "main clause" now made out of (1) and (3).)

Cornarius rightly attended both to the sentence structure and to the pronouns, adding δ' after ἄλλα to make (2) a subordinate clause, and accordingly removing δὲ from (3), and also deleting ἕκτενα completely from (2). I would be inclined to follow Cornarius except that I would change ἕκτενα to ἕκτενο and keep it reattached to (3), punctuating before it. ἕκτενο would thus resume the original subject τὸ φίλον ἕκτενο after the intervening double subordinate clause.

d⁸-e² (contd.)

What happened in the mss. was ^{perhaps} ~~random~~:- first the loss of δ, then the attachment of ἔκεινο as ἔκεινα to (2), then the insertion of δέ in (3).

For a pleonastic pronoun inserted to resume earlier words see Gorg. 482c⁷-d⁵ and Dodds' note; but close at hand there are "resumptive" pleonasms at 219e⁸, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐπὶ τοῖς ... and at 221c², οὐκ ἄν, οὐκ ἄν .. These can be described as "conversational" without also postulating carelessness over pronouns! In general see Denniston, Greek Prose Style, pp. 96-8, and note especially his citation of Gorg. 456d.

a⁴⁻⁵ ἢ γελοῖον τὸ ἐρώτημα τίς γὰρ οἶδεν;

Plato is not here necessarily hinting that the disappearance of evil is impossible, but merely that the consequences would be such that it is impossible to imagine them. (See note on 220c³.) One is tempted to observe "γελοῖον τὸ ἐρώτημα " of modern enquiries such as "Can the effect ever precede the cause?" But the reply that such enquiries serve to illuminate which elements in our conceptual apparatus are or are not indispensable may perhaps throw light on Plato's motives in this passage; he perhaps on the one hand wished to believe that the good would be pursued in the absence of evil, and on the other found it difficult to be sure that he could imagine good without evil.

a⁵ τόδε γ' ἴσμεν, ὅτι καὶ νῦν ἔστιν κεινῶντα
βλάπτεσθαι, ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ὠφελεῖσθαι.

"We can be sure of this at least, that even as things are, hunger can be harmful, but can also be good for us."

Compare Gorg. 499c-d on the pleasures of eating and drinking; ἄρα τούτων (scil. τῶν ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἡδονῶν) αἱ μὲν ἡγίειαν ποιοῦσαι ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ἰσχύν ἢ ἄλλην τινα ἀρετὴν τοῦ σώματος, αὗται μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ τάναντία τούτων κακαί; - Πάνυ γε.

Here we seem only to have two classes of hunger, good and bad; but at 221b²⁻³ we have three classes of thirst and desires in general, good, bad, and intermediate (ἐνίοτε δὲ μηδέτερα); the establishment of the intermediate class is important to the argument (see note on 221b⁵), and it is perhaps a little surprising that Plato omits it a propos of hunger.

b⁵ Ἔσονται ἄρα αἱ μήτε ἀγαθαὶ μήτε κακαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι
καὶ ἐὰν ἀπόληται τὰ κακά.

"Intermediate desires will therefore remain even if evil disappears."

Note that Plato is continuing to allow for the possibility that the disappearance of evil will imply the disappearance also of the good, and so of good desires.

b⁷ τοῦτου οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ἐρᾷ μὴ φιλεῖν
(for the "inverse attraction" see K.G. II p. 413,
Thompson on Meno 96c³.)

There is no difficulty about making the verb φιλεῖν logically parallel to ἐπιθυμεῖν and ἐρᾷ; but see note on 221e⁴.

c⁴ ἀδύνατόν που ἦν,

"we said it was impossible"; this is a generalised statement of what was said at 220e⁵; ἦν means "is, as we agreed", see Thompson's note on Meno 83d³.

c³ φίλον ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ;

every use of φίλον since 219b⁶⁻⁸ has been passive; but ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ begins to suggest "friendship" again, though strictly friendship ought not to be meant until its alarming reintroduction at 221e⁵.

c⁵ ὁμολόγηται τὸ φίλον φιλεῖν τι καὶ διὰ τι;

this recalls 218d⁷; in this sentence φίλον must be active.

c⁶ ᾗθημεν τότε γε : 219a^{6-b2}.

d¹⁻² τοῦ φιλεῖν τε καὶ φιλεῖσθαι

see note on φίλον ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ at c³. All this can mean here is "of one thing's liking and another's being liked", but it sounds as if it should mean "of the same thing's liking and being liked", which might suggest "being friends".

d³ τῆς φιλίας ; the same applies here; φιλία normally only applies to mutual friendship, but in strict logic Plato ought only to mean "pursuit" here.

d³ τούτῳ οὐ ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ τότε ὅταν ἐπιθυμῇ

von Arnim detected here a slighting reference to the extreme subjectivism sometimes ascribed to Aristippus. But Plato's formulation here may be purely a trick of verbal emphasis; and there is some doubt about the origin of Cyrenaic subjectivism; see Mannebach, Aristippi et Cyrenaicorum Fragmenta, frag. 212 and pp. 114-16.

d⁴ ὃ δὲ καὶ πρότερον ἐλέγομεν;

it is perhaps worth accepting W's καὶ here for BT's τὸ; it gives idiomatic emphasis to the whole relative clause (not merely to πρότερον); "as for what we actually allowed ourselves to say before"; see Denniston G.P. pp. 321-2.

d⁵⁻⁶ ὄθλος τις ἦν, ὥσπερ ποίημα κρονικῶς συγκεῖμενον

"was a piece of nonsense, like a poem in an antediluvian style."

the mss. reading ποίημα μακρὸν συγκεῖμενον is doubtful sense (could ποίημα simpliciter mean "fiction"? could μακρὸν ^{alone} be predicative? (if not, we need συγκεῖμενος)). Madvig was almost certainly right in detecting here an echo of 205c⁶, where Ctesippus refers to Hippothales' poems as κρονικὰ (see note there). Socrates is here getting Lysis himself to assent to the notion that κρονικὰ ποιήματα are ὄθλος; Hippothales is meant to notice this and find a better manner of διαλέγεσθαι τοῖς παιδικοῖς, (cf. 206c⁶).

Naber's κρονικῶς is perhaps a clearer reminder of the earlier passage than Madvig's κρόνον.

For συγκεῖμενον cf. Hipp. Min. 368d¹, καταλογάδην πόλλους λόγους καὶ παντοδαπούς συγκειμένους, Hipp. Maj. 286a⁵ παγκάλως λόγος συγκεῖμενος.

e¹ τὸ γε ἐπιθυμοῦν, οὗ ἂν ἐνδεὲς ᾖ, τούτου
ἐπιθυμεῖ,

"that which desires, desires what it lacks."

This is the step used at Symp. 200-4 to prove that ἔρωσ is an "intermediate"; cf. Symp. 204a⁶, οὐκ οὖν ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ μὴ οἶόμενος ἐνδεὲς εἶναι οὗ ἂν μὴ οἴηται ἐπιδοῦσθαι. Compare also Meno 77c⁷, where the slightly weaker definition is given, τί ἐπιθυμεῖν λέγεις; ἢ γένεσθαι αὐτῷ; which is a part of the analysis given in the "Symposium".

e² ἐνδεὲς δὲ γίγνεται οὗ ἂν τις ἀφαιρῆται

"A man lacks that which is taken away from him, stolen from, *him*."

Stephanus here observed "vel ἐνδεὲς ... τις vel potius ἐνδεὲς ... τῷ", no doubt deciding on the latter because of τὸ ἐνδεὲς in the previous sentence. But ἐνδεὲς ... τις is perhaps palaeographically easier, and Socrates is very likely to have moved back into the masculine here in anticipation of his application of his point to Menexenus and Lysis in e⁵.

e³ τοῦ οἰκείου, ὅτι, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅ τε ἔρωσ, κτλ.

"Love and pursuit and desire, then, turn out, as it seems, to be for what is one's own, apparently."

Socrates may very well repeat ὡς ἔοικεν ... ὡς φαίνεται here. He has argued that:-

1. one desires what one lacks:
2. one lacks what has been stolen from one:
3. what has been stolen from one is one's own:

this would appear to be leading to a denial that one can covet what is not one's own (at which ὡς φαίνεται might well need saying); in fact the next step is to say that therefore friends are "akin to each other." This fully justifies the double "apparently"! There is no possible way of interpreting τοῦ οἰκείου here any more sympathetically than as "one's own", or such cogency as the preceding step has (from οὗ ἀν ἀγαπηταί) will be lost.

On φίλα in this collocation see notes on 217e⁹, 221d³.

‘Υμετεσ ἄρα εἰ φίλοι ἐστέον ἀλλήλοισ, φύσει καὶ
οἰκετοῖ ἐσθε’ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖσ.

"Therefore if you two are friends of each other, you are in some way by nature "akin" to each other."

This recalls Lysis and Menexenus' avowal of their friendship at 207c⁸⁻⁹; φίλοι there and here undoubtedly means "friends". Mutual friendship has not been under discussion since 216b; but here it is suddenly reintroduced in a swift return of the argument to its dramatic context.

φύσει καὶ οἰκετοῖ can hardly be interpreted in the same sense of οἰκετοσ as has preceded; the boys are not being said by Socrates to be each other's possessions, such that they could be stolen from each other; they themselves answer so positively (κομῶσῃ) that probably they are thinking of the loose sense of οἰκετοσ in which commonly it is practically a synonym of φίλοι, "associates", "close to each other", "on intimate terms". Socrates however perhaps means a little more than this; see next note.

a² εἰ μὴ οἰκετός κῆ τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἐτύγχανεν ὦν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ κατὰ τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἢ τρόπους ἢ εἶδος.

"if he were not in some way 'akin' to his beloved in his soul or in some disposition or character or aspect of his soul."

ψυχὴ here of course means "mental", or "psychological make-up"; for the ἦθος and τρόποι as parts of the "soul" cf. Symp. 207e²; and at Rep. 435b⁹ Plato sets out to demonstrate that the individual is τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶδη ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ψυχῇ ἔχοντα ... τῇ κόλῳι ; see Adam's note there: cf. also Rep. 435e², τὰ ... ἐν ἑκάστῳ ... ἡμῶν εἶδη τε καὶ ἦθη.

οἰκετός κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν must be rather more than a near-synonym of φίλος (see last note); perhaps Socrates' use of the term φύσει in φύσει κῆ οἰκετοῖ at e⁶ is a clue to this sense.

a² (contd.)

A brief classification of the various meanings of οἶκος is perhaps necessary:-

in origin it means "belonging to the house"

in two senses:

1. of persons who both "belong" to the same household; i.e. who are related to each other (symmetrically).

2. of persons or possessions belonging to the household; non-symmetrically (i.e. the household does not belong to them).

from sense (1) is derived (3) the common sense of "associates", "friends".

from sense (2) is derived (4) the common sense of "one's own", "belonging to" individual persons.

These four senses probably account for all uses of οἶκος down to the end of the 5th c.:

(there are very frequent uses of (4) in

Thucydides of "one's own" allies, territory, affairs, concerns," in which "possession"

becomes a very widely extended notion; but

the "possessor" or "possessors" always remain persons or cities.)

a² (contd.)

At the end of the 5th c. various metaphorical uses of οἰκιστος seem to arise in two ways:

5. from sense (1) of blood-relationship between persons arises a sense of "kinship in character" between persons and between things.
6. from sense (4) of possession of things by persons arises a sense of things as "appropriate to", "suitable to" persons or to other things.

The distinction between (5) and (6) is sometimes not immediately apparent; but it can usually be decided according to whether the relationship intended is symmetrical (sense 5) or asymmetrical (sense 6).

(At Herodotus III 81, δε οὗτ' ἐπειράθη οὐτε εἶδος καλὸν οὐδὲν [οὐδ'] οἰκίον Valckenaer's deletion of οὐδὲ should be accepted in view of the parallels at Thuc. I 138³, οἰκεία γὰρ ξυνέσει καὶ οὐτε κρομαθῶν ἐς αὐτὴν οὐδὲν οὗτ' ἐκτραθῶν, Hesiod, Erga 296; L.S.J. and Friedländer, Platon

a² (contd.)

II² p. 290, are wrong to quote this passage for the later sense of "fitting".)

The earliest case of an outright metaphorical use of οἰκεῖος seems, perhaps significantly, to occur in Antiphon ("the Sophist"), Diels F.V.S.

87 fr. 44: ἕστιν οὖν οὐδέν τῆ φύσει φιλιώτερα
οὐδ' οἰκειώτερα ἀφ' ὧν εἰ νόμοι ἀποτρέπουσι
τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ ἐφ' ἃ προτρέπουσιν;

the coupling with φιλιώτερα, "on more friendly terms", suggests that οἰκειώτερα here is used in sense (5), "more closely akin to"; so perhaps we can translate:- "The acts from which the laws deter men are no closer or more akin to what is natural than those towards which the laws encourage men".

Perhaps the notion of τὸ οἰκεῖον arose as a particularly appropriate metaphor in contexts of the recommendation of φυσικῶς and τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ; "kinship in Nature" was perhaps part of a biological model or metaphor. This may be somewhat borne

a² (contd.)

out by Plato's phrase here at e⁶, φύσει πρὸ οἰκεῖται, cf. τὸ . . . φύσει οἰκεῖτον, 222a⁵ (though this of course means "akin by nature" not "to nature"). Plato was hostile to the supporters of φύσις, but it may be to them that he owes his freedom to use the term οἰκεῖτος in its new and more extended senses.

To sum up, then, οἰκεῖτος κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν here perhaps refers to a "natural kinship" or "congeniality, of character". This was perhaps a novel reinterpretation of the long established near-synonymity of φίλοι and οἰκεῖται.

a⁴ ὁ δὲ Λύσις ἐσέλησεν:

Menexenus' love of reasoning makes him assent warmly to a convincing argument; but Lysis is quicker to see the coming application of this. Menexenus shares his reluctance to agree when the next step is actually made; cf. 222b¹. The boys are wary of showing any enthusiasm for "lovers"; they found Hippothales and his like no more than a nuisance.

ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τῷ γνησίῳ ἔραστῇ καὶ μὴ
προσκοιήτῳ φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν καιδικῶν.

"It is inevitable then that the lover whose love is genuine and unfeigned should meet with friendliness on the part of his beloved."

This, though Hippothales does not realise it, is double-edged; the lover who does not meet with favour is thereby shown to be bogus and no true lover.

This is the only remark in the whole of the work where Socrates expresses a specific view on the subject of Hippothales' - ἔρασι; and even here, τὸ οἶκτον as the basis of mutual φιλία is to be rejected after all. A warning should perhaps also be given, that φιλεῖσθαι here is not ἐρᾶσθαι; nor does appeal to Phaedrus 255e¹⁻² alter this; there Plato says the beloved will feel ἀντίρωσ but think it is φιλία; but here there is nothing to indicate that φιλεῖσθαι is not the right word. Probably Socrates here is hinting to Hippothales that what he ought to establish with Lysis is a

a⁶⁻⁷ (contd.)

mutual friendship, and neither force on him a one-way passion nor expect from him an answering passion. (See introduction, ~~M~~. 5-9.)

b² παντοδαπὰ ἠφείει χρώματα

"turned all manner of colours with joy";

compare Ep. VII, 349a⁷,

ὁ δὲ ἀκούσας ἀνεφλέχθη
τε καὶ παντοδαπα χρώματα ἤκεν, οἳ' ἄν
θυμούμενος ἀφείη.

b³ τὸν λόγον ἐπισκέψασθαι

perhaps "review our discussion" (cf. τὰς τάξεις ἐπισκοπῶν, Xen. Anab. II 3.2.); Socrates proceeds to recall earlier points made at 214-15.

b⁴ λέγοιμεν ἄν τι

"there might be something in what we are saying"; cf. Prot. 339c⁸, καὶ ἄμα μέντοι ἐφοβούμην μὴ τί λέγοι; Rep. 329e⁶, καὶ λέγουσι μὲν τι, οὐ μέντοι γε ὅσον οἴονται.

b⁵ περί φίλου, ὃ ἔστιν.

for the absence of the article cf. Charmides 169c²,

περί σωφροσύνης ὃ ἔστιν. For the omission of
the article with abstract nouns see note on 219a³.

(Or is the article here omitted because in the
full form περί τούτου ὃ ἔστιν φίλον it is possible
to take φίλον as the predicate?)

222

b⁷

τὸν πρόθετον λόγον :

"our previous argument", at $214e^3-215a^3$.

c²

βούλεσθ' οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ὥσπερ μεθύομεν
ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, συγχωρήσωμεν κτλ.

"Are you willing then, since we are fuddled with too much argument, that we should agree on the statement that "kinship" is something different from "likeness"?"

μεθύομεν appears only in the margin of T (though in the first hand); this is a warning never to neglect the variants in BTW. We might otherwise not have realised that Lucian was imitating this passage. Cf. Rep. 407c¹, κεφάλης τινος ἀεὶ διατρεσῖς καὶ ἰλίγγους ὑποπτέουσας καὶ ἀίτωμένης ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἐγγίγνεσθαι (scil. ἢ νοσοτροφίᾳ). (But ἰλίγγοι of course are not always due to μέθη; see note on 216c⁵. For a metaphorical use of μέθη cf. Laws 639b⁶, βελὸς ὢν ... ὑπὸ μέθης τοῦ φόβου κλυπεῖ .)

This request that the non-identity of οἰκέϊον and ὁμοίον should be accepted without discussion covers up a shift to a different sense of οἰκέϊον ; in the sense of οἰκέϊον as "akin" it might have been difficult to show that ὁμοιότης was not at least included in οἰκειότης. See following notes.

Ἡότερον οὖν καὶ τὰγαθὸν οἴκετον θήσομεν παντί,
τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἀλλότριον εἶναι;

"Shall we then posit that the good is "appropriate" to everything, the bad "inappropriate"?"

Socrates allows the boys to decide against this suggestion without discussing it; but Pohlenz and Praechter suggest that it has great importance. It may be significant that Plato leaves it unrefuted (though of course it could be that he thought it absurd at a glance).

παντί is neuter, and means "to all three classes, the good, the bad and the intermediate". The οἰκειότης of the good to the bad (or to the intermediate) cannot be any kind of "kinship", or any symmetrical relationship (because it is not reversible; the bad is ἀλλότριον to everything, including the good: the intermediate presumably is treated as indifferent by the good.) Here then we must have a metaphorical use of οἴκετος in sense (6), (see note on 222a²), derived from sense (4), "one's own".

c³ (contd.)

Plato perhaps wished to revert here to the topic of τὸ φεῖλον as the "object of pursuit"; in which case he could here be meaning to suggest that all things pursued the good because it was "appropriate to them", "fitting for them", "complementary to them"; in particular this theory would be attractive for explaining the pursuit of the good by the intermediate without requiring the bad as a prior cause.

Plato at two other points seems to hint at a belief that τὸ ἀγαθὸν may be οἰκεῖον ; in both cases merely in passing and without explanation:-

(1) at Symp. 205e Diotima is rejecting Aristophanes' theory that οἱ ἄν τὸ ἡμῶν ἑαυτῶν ζητῶσιν, οὗτοι ἐρῶσιν ; men will cut off their own feet and hands, she says, ἐὰν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ τὰ ἑαυτῶν κονηρὰ εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἑαυτῶν οἶμαι ἕκαστοι ἀσπάζονται, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν οἰκεῖον καλεῖ καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἀλλότριον; ὡς οὐδὲν γε ἄλλο ἐστὶν οὐ ἐρῶσιν ἄνθρωποι ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Thus Diotima agrees that men would pursue τὸ οἰκεῖον ^{if it were the good, but denies that they pursue τὸ ἑαυτῶν} (= τὸ οἰκεῖον) for its own sake.

(2) at Rep. 586d⁷ Plato argues that the baser desires, if and only if they are led by reason, τὰς ἀληθεστάτας τε λήψονται (ἡδονὰς)..... καὶ τὰς ἑαυτῶν οἰκειάς, εἴπερ τὸ βέλτιστον ἕκαστῳ, τοῦτο καὶ οἰκειότατον ; they will obtain the pleasures most appropriate to them, "if it is true that what is best for each thing is also what is most appropriate to it".

The most likely explanation of these passing remarks is that Plato was attracted by the notion that τὸ ἀγαθὸν was "appropriate to", "should naturally be desired by" any object, i.e. that τὸ ἀγαθὸν was οἰκεῖον ; but he was probably anxious not to admit the converse that τὸ οἰκεῖον was ἀγαθόν. See Charmides 163d², where Socrates attacks Critias; Ἴδρι Κριτία, καὶ εὐθύς ἀρχομένου σου σχεδὸν ἐμάνθανον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι τὰ οἰκεῖά τε καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ καλοῖς, "I guessed you were going to say that whatever is appropriate to oneself or is one's own is good"; this view Plato accuses Critias of subscribing to clearly was meant to justify selfish pursuit of one's own ends (and may have originated with φύσις-theorists? But this is a different sense of οἰκεῖος from that noted in Antiphon (see note on 222a²)).

Plato thus had reason to be very guarded about any theory that might seem to define τὸ ἀγαθόν in terms of τὸ οἰκεῖον, but might have been

c³ (contd.)

prepared to allow that τὸ ἀγαθὸν was οἶκτον,
or even to define τὸ οἶκτον in terms of τὸ ἀγαθόν.

(These passages have been studied by Brink,
in Harvard Stud. Class. Phil. 1958; but he seems
not to have grasped Plato's hostility to the
naturalism (or plain immoralism) that might have
been involved in identifying τὸ ἀγαθόν with
τὸ οἶκτον in such a way as to define it as "one's
own".)

c⁵ ἢ τὸ μὲν κακὸν τῷ κακῷ οἰκεῖον, κτλ.

Rather disappointingly, after what might have been a promising possibility, Socrates reverts to a suggestion which the boys accept probably because it keeps in view the symmetrical force of οἰκεῖος in some variety of sense (5); this sense is the one which has been predominant since 221e⁶. But this new shot at defining symmetrical οἰκειότης still runs into all the difficulties that arose when we attempted to find alternative interpretations of the ὁμοιότης suggestion. Friendship between symmetrically related pairs has already been explored fairly fully and rejected; Socrates simply quotes earlier arguments. But see note on 222d⁷.

222

d¹ οὗς τὸ πρῶτον λόγους ἀπεβαλόμεθα;
at 214b-c.

d⁵ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἂν ταῦτον φῶμεν εἶναι,
 ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνον φίλος;

"If we say that the good and the "kindred" are the same, will it not follow that the good is only the friend of the good?"

This is true if τὸ οἰκεῖον here is taken in a symmetrical sense, but would not be true if τὸ οἰκεῖον meant (asymmetrically) "appropriate".

In fact the protasis of this sentence on its own could be understood as resuming the suggestion of 222c³, and defining "the appropriate" as "the good"; the good could then be appropriate to other things besides itself, and pursued by them. Is the ambiguity here another deliberate hint by Plato? Or was he unconscious of it?

d⁷ Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτό γε ῥόμεθα ἐξελέγξει ἡμᾶς αὐτοῖς;

"But we thought that we had proved ourselves wrong on this point too."

See 215a⁴-c¹. But it has been suspected that ῥόμεθα is ironic, and that Plato was hinting that he did not think we need any longer accept that refutation. But would he not then have written καὶ τοῦτο ῥόμεθά γε?

Friendship between the good was rejected because of their self-sufficiency. But might some kind of οἰκειότης nevertheless allow them to be friends even though of no use to each other? This perhaps would be some "congeniality of mind" such as that apparently suggested at 222a¹. Plato surely would have been inclined to believe this? But perhaps he was still not satisfied with the notion of οἰκειότης, which he clearly tried to understand in different ways. (See introduction.)

222a⁷

General note on τὸ οἰκεῖον as φῆλον :→

(See previous notes on 221e³, e⁶, 222c³, c⁵, d⁵, d⁷)

Plato's notion of τὸ οἰκεῖον in the "Lysis" remains vague and ambiguous; but perhaps two possibilities in particular were in his mind:

1. that friends were attracted to each other by some form of (mental?) "kinship";
2. that the good was pursued because of its "appropriateness".

(1) does not reappear in the thought of Plato or Aristotle; Aristotle would no doubt have thought οἰκειότης too general to give much explanation of the various kinds of friendship. (See Brink, Phronesis 1955, pp. 123-145, who nevertheless finds traces of οἰκειότης in Aristotle. From Brink I derive much of the rest of this note.)

There seems to be adequate evidence that Theophrastus believed in an οἰκειότης linking all men with each other, starting from family and city groups but eventually embracing the whole of mankind; but he also seems to have thought of a biological

222a⁷ (contd.)

οἰκειότης between men and animals (and even plants). It is not clear how Theophrastus used these theories in his lost books on friendship. Did he allow his postulation of a universal οἰκειότης to override Aristotle's classification in terms of φιλητά? Arius Didymus' summary of peripatetic ethics has an attempt to conflate (1) Aristotle's φιλητά (though not his εἶδη φιλίας), (2) a theory of progressively extending οἰκειότης, (3) an attempt to blend Aristotle's φιλία αὐτοῦ with Stoic οἰκειότης. (Stobaeus (Kh. II 82, 143, W.-H.) II.) It is difficult to decide how much of this to attribute to Theophrastus.

(2) Other appearances of τὸ ἀγαθόν as οἶκετον in Plato have been discussed in note on 222c³. (The term φίλον does not reappear in these passages.)

^{latter}
This theory might be canvassed as an anticipation to some extent of Stoic οἰκειότης, the ethical and psychological theory that by gradual stages men feel οἰκειότης πρὸς τὸν λόγον (the life of

222a⁷ (contd.)

reason); but it seems to be extremely difficult to establish the precise sense that οἰκετόν has in Stoic thought; do men "feel a kinship with" reason or "discover the appropriateness to themselves of" reason? Compare Brink's comment (p.140), "the Stoic principle of οἰκείωσις does not, strictly, refer to mutual relationships as does the Peripatetic principle of οἰκειότης". Does it refer to a symmetrical relationship between men and things, or not even that? In any case the underlying "naturalism" of Stoic ethics was probably never intended to be suggested by Plato.

We should perhaps conclude, then, that Plato's suggestions here in the "Lysis" about τὸ οἰκετόν were not taken further by Plato himself, no doubt because of the vagueness and the "naturalistic" implications of the term; and the impetus to later theories of οἰκειότης and οἰκείωσις can hardly have arisen merely from a reading and re-interpretation by later philosophers of this passage alone.

e¹ τί οὖν ἂν ἔτι χρῆσάμεθα τῷ λόγῳ;

"What more can we make of the argument?"

See note on 213c⁵.

e² δέομαι οὖν, ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοὶ ἐν τοῖς
δικαστηρίοις, τὰ εἰρημένα ἄπαντα
ἀναπεμπέσθαι :

"I beg you to allow me, as the clever pleaders say in the law-courts, to tot up all that has been said."

δέομαι οὖν is perhaps pompous; and compare Isocr. Nicocles, III 62, κεφάλαιον τῶν εἰρημένων; but ἀναπεμπέσθαι means "to count on one's fingers" and originated in the school-room rather than the law-courts. Plato would normally have said ἀναλογίσεσθαι (cf. Prot. 332d¹), but here he makes an ironic joke for his schoolboy interlocutors (especially as, in contrast with emphatic pleaders, he has no positive conclusion to come to).

e² (contd.)

(Lamb's "perpend" for $\rho\upsilon\lambda\pi\sigma\mu\pi\lambda\sigma\lambda\sigma\theta\alpha$ is certainly comic because pompous, but it is not this word which is pompous in the Greek.)

e⁵

μήτε τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα διεκδηλούσαμεν,

"nor the other suggestions we explored."

The neuter surprises us a little; but cf. e⁶,
 (next clause), ἀλλ' εἰ μῦθεν τούτων φίλον ἔστιν;
 the neuter indicates that the discussion is of
 types, not individuals; see note on 210c².

a¹

ἐν νῶ εἶχον ἄλλον ἤδη τινα τῶν
πρεσβυτέρων κινεῖν,

"I had it in mind at this stage to stir up one of the older ones"; presumably Ctesippus, or Hippothales himself if he now felt confident enough to join in. But did Socrates expect to get any further with the eristical Ctesippus? Or is this merely something of an apology for having got above the heads of the younger boys?

For κινεῖν cf. Rep. 329e¹, where Socrates puts a leading question to Cephalus.

a² κἄτα ὥσπερ δαίμονες ἄρα τινες προσελθόντες
οἱ παιδαγωγοί

"coming upon us like an evil apparition", Jowett, surely rightly; the noisy barbarian παιδαγωγοί appear unexpectedly from nowhere and terrify not so much Socrates as their charges Lysis and Menexenus. Compare the Empusa of Ar. Frogs 288 sq., or the Mormo used to frighten younger children, Xen. Hell. IV 4.17. Lamachus' helmet is called a μόρμω at Ar. Ach. 582, Peace 474. See Rohde, Psyche, App. VI.

(The revisers of Jowett say "like tutelary genii"; but this is perhaps too complimentary to the παιδαγωγοί; and did one ever see one's δαίμων?)

a⁷ ὑποβαρβαρίζοντες "falling into broken Greek."

Aristides echoes this passage; - οἱ παιδαγωγοί
 ὑποβαρβαρίζοντες οἱ πολλοί,

orat. XLV, Vol. II p. 127 (Dindorf) and Plutarch

perhaps had it in mind when he complained, ὅτι δὲ
 ἐν εὐρωσίν ἀνδράποδον οἰνόληπτον καὶ ἀχρηστὸν
 πρὸς πᾶσαν πραγμάτων ἀχρηστον, τούτω φέροντες
 ὑποβάλλουσι τοὺς νοῦς, (De lib. educand. 7, 4a).

It no doubt indicates at least that παιδαγωγοί
 were not intended to teach their charges grammar.

b¹ ἄμει δὲ ἐδόκοῦν

This conjecture (recorded by Wilamowitz, *Platon*² Vol. II p. 369) is a great improvement on the mss. ἄλλὰ (which might be right if this were meant to correct οὐδὲν ἤττον ἐκείλων; but in fact it adds to it). Heindorf had already suggested καὶ.

b² ἀποροὶ εἶναι προσφέρεισθαι,

"they seemed impossible to make any approach to"

Stallbaum well compared Thuc. IV 32, οἱ πολέμιοι
..... οἱ ἀπορώτατοι, τῶν ἐνυμδσιν ἔχοντες ἄλκην.

For προσφέρεισθαι cf. 205b².

b² ἡττηθέντες οὖν

Apodotic οὖν without any resumptive force seems to be relatively infrequent; most of Denniston's examples (G.P. p. 428, section (3)) involve slight anaphora. But after a long ἐπειδή clause this οὖν sounds perfectly natural, if perhaps a little conversational.

b³ διαλύσαμεν τὴν συνοσίαν

"we broke up the group"; cf. Laches 201c² τὸ δὲ
νῦν εἶνε τὴν συνοσίαν διαλύσωμεν.

b⁵ γέρων ἄνθρωπος

To boys of twelve Socrates might have described himself as γέρων ἄνθρωπος at any age over forty: this is no help for giving a dramatic date to the dialogue.

b⁶ οἴομεθα ἡμεῖς ἀλλήλων φίλοι εἶναι, ... οὕτω δὲ ὅτι ἔσταν ὁ φίλος οἰοί τε ἰγενόμεθα ἐξευροῖν.

"We think we are each other's friends ... but we have not been able to discover what "a friend" is."

Was Plato really not clear that it is perfectly possible to recognise instances of one's definiendum without being able to make a general analysis of it? Hardly; but he may well have still found this puzzling; is this perhaps one of the points behind the "paradox of analysis" at Meno 80e?

The same negative conclusion to a search for definition is reached in the "Charmides" (175a), "Laches" (199e), "Euthyphro" (15b), "Hippias Major" (304d); lack of a definition is alleged to be responsible for failure in the "Protagoras" (360e) and "Meno" (100b), and for the difficulties of Republic I (354c). Plato's longest and most thorough search for a definition also ends with the observation that all the theories brought forth have been still-born; see "Theaetetus" 210b.

b⁶ (contd.)

Success in definition on the other hand is claimed at Republic IV, 444a, Phaedrus 265a-266b, Sophist 286c, Politicus 311c; and is the end of the "Philebus" perhaps a claim to partial success?

b⁷ ὅτι ἔστιν ὁ φίλος :

"what 'a friend' is"; Plato leaves us with a parting problem; we can understand that he did not need to say ὅστις ἔστιν ὁ φίλος, but is it perhaps significant in this context that he did not say ὅτι ἔστιν τὸ φίλον ?