Modern representational thinking: the ontic, the a priori and the divinization of the human.

A new approach to Heidegger's *Kehre*

Cristina Crichton

New College, University of Oxford

Submitted for the qualification of DPhil in Philosophy, Trinity

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Abstract

This thesis offers a new approach to Heidegger's *Kehre*. This turn in Heidegger's thinking has been understood in various ways including the view that there is no such turning. My analysis is framed within those who think that there is an early and a later Heidegger meaning by this that the former focuses the reawakening of the encounter with Being on Dasein and the latter on the history of Being. A well-known outcome of this last focus is Heidegger's critical view towards modern representations. I will show that an analysis of this critical view can offer a new understanding of Heidegger's turn. Heidegger draws up a distinction between intuitive representations and representations against experience, the latter of which corresponds to his understanding of modern representations. An analysis of this type of representations shows that in the mid-30s Heidegger realizes that thinking Being as the a priori carries a danger, which consists in the fact that Being can break with the ontic domain and become determined by pure reason alone. The danger lurking in the a priori reinforces the view that the withdrawal of Being precludes its aprioricity. This leads Heidegger to lose faith in his project of fundamental ontology as presented in *Being and Time* and compels him to rethink Being in ways that could avoid this danger, as his unorthodox interpretation of Kant's synthetic a priori shows. Commensurate with this, Heidegger becomes increasingly concerned about the ontic domain, as his introduction of the notion of metontology – a failed attempt to break clear with fundamental ontology – reveals. Insofar as the utmost expression of the danger lurking in the a priori is the determination (creation) of reality by representations – where reality has to be understood in its traditional sense –, Heidegger's break clear with fundamental ontology can be read as an attempt to avoid the divinization of the human.

Thesis word counting including citations: 74.411

GLOSSARY

AWP	'The Age of the World Picture,' in *Off The Beaten Track*
B	*Beiträge*
BPP	*The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*
BT	*Being and Time*
CPR	*Critique of Pure Reason*
IM	*Introduction to Metaphysics*
KTB	'Kant's Thesis about Being,' in *Pathmarks*
MFL	*The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*
MHB	'Metaphysics as the History of Being,' in *The End of Philosophy*
WT	*What is a Thing?*
FO	Fundamental ontology

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INTRODUCTION

Martin Heidegger's *Kehre* in the 1930's has been the focus of attention for many scholars who, by way of different interpretations, have suggested an understanding of this turn in Heidegger's thinking. This has also included the view that there is no such turning. I agree with those who think that Heidegger's *Kehre* allows us to say that there is a later Heidegger[1] and, consequently, an early Heidegger, identifying the thinking of the latter with that expressed in his arguably *magnum opus Being and Time*.[2] This, however, does not mean for me that there are two different thinkers under the same name, but that the *Kehre* meant for Heidegger a redirection of his gaze from the centrality of *Da-sein* expressed in *BT* towards 'the history of Being' expressed consistently throughout his later works; a redirection which he thought necessary in order to carry out his thinking on Being already prefigured in *BT.* As George Pattison points out: 'In each case [*BT* and the later works] the aim is reawakening of the encounter with Being, even if this is seen from the point of view of the human subject in the one case and from the point of view of the history of Being in the other.'[3]

Heidegger's view of the history of Being reveals his stance towards the modern epoch in a way that has been widely – and for good reasons – understood as critical. However, Heidegger's view about the history of Being goes together with his view that Being is destined, that that which takes place in modernity is destined by Being. This being the case, it is not at all clear that Heidegger's stance towards modernity can be considered a wholly critical one. In my view, there is no doubt that Heidegger's stance

[1] Pattison, G. (2000) *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to The Later Heidegger* New York, NY: Routledge. p. 6
[2] Hereafter *BT*
[3] Pattison, G. *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to The Later Heidegger* p. 12

towards modernity is not sympathetic. However, I do think that qualifying his stance as critical requires further clarification.

Among the several ways in which Heidegger approaches modernity, I think that his analysis of modern representations is one of the most essential insofar as it points to the way of thinking that underlies this era.

In this thesis I will show that Heidegger's clear critical stance towards modern representations – that is, his view of modern representations from 1930 onwards – is capable of providing new perspectives for understanding Heidegger's *Kehre*. This will involve a deepening of Heidegger's view of modern representations in a way that will throw light upon how his critical stance towards this notion has to be understood.

I will begin my analysis by concentrating on the way in which Laureen Freeman interprets the appearance of the notion of metontology in Heidegger's thinking. Metontology (*Metontologie*) is a notion introduced by Heidegger in his work *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*[4] (1928) and is defined as a 'special and new investigation which has for its proper theme beings as a whole.'[5] Freeman thinks that metontology betrays a concern for the ontic domain on the part of Heidegger which is not present in *BT*. Based on this she suggests that Heidegger's (increasing) concern for the ontic after *BT* is at the heart of his turning away from fundamental ontology.[6] However, metontology is a notion that Heidegger never mentions again throughout his works; a fact that clearly challenges Freeman's view.

In order to evaluate Freeman's interpretation regarding Heidegger's turn away from FO after *BT* I will analyse William McNeill's way of understanding the

[4] Hereafter *MFL*
[5] Heidegger, M. (1984) *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. p. 157
[6] Hereafter FO

disappearance of metontology from Heidegger's thinking. Contrary to what could be expected, McNeill's analysis shows that the disappearance of metontology from Heidegger's thinking does not imply the disappearance of Heidegger's concern for the ontic but the opposite. The reason for this is that McNeill thinks that the disappearance of metontology is a consequence of Heidegger's mid-30s insight that in the appearing of Being in beings, Being withdraws. Based on the notion of the withdrawal of Being, McNeill's analysis shows that metontology disappears from Heidegger's thinking because it is a notion indebted to ontology and, consequently, to FO. Following Freeman's interpretation this means that metontology disappears precisely because it cannot account for Heidegger's concern for the ontic in a sufficient way. In light of this McNeill's analysis allows saying that Heidegger's introduction of metontology is a failed attempt to break clear with the FO model. Although this is a compelling conclusion, McNeill's explanation of the notion of a withdrawal of Being is extremely unclear, which entails that this conclusion lacks the soundness provided by a firm foundation.

The notion of a withdrawal of Being (*Entzug des Seins*) has been widely associated with the later Heidegger. It is usually understood as an equivalent to the abandonment of Being (*Seinsverlassenheit*),[7] which in the later Heidegger is understood as the reason for the oblivion of Being (*Seinsvergessenheit*).[8] In my view, the withdrawal of Being is a difficult notion in Heidegger's thinking. Based on the fact that McNeill does not provide a clear understanding of this notion, I will suggest a way of approaching it which – as far as I have been able to discover – has not been done before and which results in a fruitful understanding of it. I will approach the notion of the withdrawal of Being from Trish Glazebrook's analysis of Heidegger's view of modern science.

[7] Inwood, M. (1999) *A Heidegger Dictionary* Maiden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc. p. 71
[8] Ibid., p. 71. In line with the difference between the early and later Heidegger above mentioned, Inwood points out that in *BT* the 'oblivion of Being' is something that depends on the human being.

Glazebrook maintains that McNeill's account of the withdrawal of Being explains why Heidegger refers to the metaphysical grounding of sciences in terms of the mathematical in his work *What is a Thing?*[9] (1935). In this way, she suggests a significant relation between the notions of 'the withdrawal of Being' and 'the mathematical.' Based on this I will turn to Heidegger's analysis of the mathematical in *WT* in order to find an explanation of the withdrawal of Being that will serve for the purpose of evaluating Heidegger's abandonment of the FO model.

My analysis of the mathematical in *WT* will promptly reveal that this notion is essentially related to the notion of modern representations in this same work. This will allow me to suggest that an analysis of modern representations in the mid-30s can clarify the meaning of the withdrawal of Being, and so suggest that Heidegger's view of modern representation in the mid-30s can help to understand whether the disappearance of metontology from Heidegger's thinking is a failed attempt to break clear the FO model or not. This will, in its turn, serve for the purpose of evaluating Heidegger's abandonment of the FO model.

I will get to Heidegger's view of modern representations in *WT* by showing that his analysis of the mathematical in this work distinguishes between intuitive representations and representations against experience. I will argue that this last type of representations corresponds to Heidegger's view of modern representations and thus constitutes the focus of his clear critical engagement with the concept of representation from the 1930s onwards.

My analysis of modern representations in *WT* will show that in the mid-30s Heidegger realizes that thinking Being as the a priori carries a danger. This danger

[9] Hereafter *WT*

consists in the fact that Being can break with the ontic domain and become determined by pure reason alone. I will show that my view of this danger illuminates the notion of the withdrawal of Being.

Given that the insight about the danger lurking in the a priori is achieved via Heidegger's analysis of modern representation, I will suggest that this danger unleashes in modernity. I will show that this throws light upon the reason for Heidegger's critical stance towards modern representations from the 1930s onwards.

I will argue that Heidegger's insight into the danger lurking in the a priori speaks in favour of Freeman's view that after *BT* Heidegger becomes (increasingly) concerned by the ontic domain. Further to this, I will suggest that Heidegger's insight into the danger lurking in the a priori leaves ontology and consequently FO in a disadvantageous position. In light of this, I will argue that the disappearance of metontology from Heidegger's thinking is a failed attempt to break clear of the FO model: insofar as metontology is indebted to ontology, it carries the danger lurking in the a priori and, therefore, it cannot account in a proper way for the ontic concern that the notion of metontology itself intended to bring forth.

I will suggest that Heidegger's insight into the danger lurking in the a priori forces him to rethink Being in ways that move away from FO. I will argue that this demand is what motivates his analysis of Kant's focus on intuition in *WT* as a delimiting of the mathematical (a priori) tendency to determine whatever there is out of pure reason alone. Based on this I will turn to Heidegger's analysis of Kant in *WT* with the aim of casting further light into the danger lurking in the a priori.

My analysis of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's focus on intuition in *WT* will show that the only unquestionable aspect of Kant's thinking that can be taken as a delimiting of the mathematical (a priori) tendency to determine whatever there is out of

pure reason alone is that in Kant's thinking representations do not determine existence. In light of this I will suggest that the most extreme way in which the danger lurking in the a priori is unleashed in modernity is that it entails the determination of existence by representations, where existence has to be understood in its traditional meaning. I will argue that this in its turn means that this determination is at the heart of Heidegger's concern for the ontic.

Based on this I will suggest that the centreal characteristic of Heidegger's view of modern representations is that this type of representations has an impact on what means to be and that this is at the core of his critical stance towards the notion of modern representation in the mid-30s. In light of this, I will suggest that an analysis of this critical stance can cast further light upon the hitherto gained view of Heidegger's attempt to break clear the FO model.

There is general agreement that Heidegger's critical stance towards modern representations in the mid-30s is clearly developed in his work *The Age of the World Picture*[10] (1938). In my view, *AWP* shows that the main character of modern representations lies in the fact that this type of representations has an impact on our understanding of what is 'real' and what is 'to be.' This is accomplished through the objectification of beings: 'only what becomes an object of representation is, count as in being (*ist, gilt as seiend*).'[11] For Heidegger, that a being comes into being in and through representedness makes the age in which this occurs a new age, distinct from its predecessors: the age of the world picture.

In that a being comes into being through representedness seems to be involved the idea that modern representations have, in some particular way, a productive character. I

[10] Hereafter *AWP*
[11] Heidegger, M. (2002) 'The Age of the World Picture' in *Off The Beaten Track* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. p. 66

will suggest that this character is the key notion for understanding the centreal characteristic of modern representations, that is: their impact on what means to be.

I will first address the well-known *BT* based way of understanding the productive character of modern representation in terms of intelligibility: modern representations determine (produce) the ways in which the entities manifest themselves. Based on this, understanding the productive character of modern representations in terms of intelligibility does not touch the fact that entities 'are.' This being the case, I will argue that intelligibility does not provide a sufficient understanding of the productive character of modern representations given that it does not touch upon the notion of existence in its traditional meaning. This in its turn means that it does not account for Heidegger's concern for the ontic.

With this in view I will look at John Haugeland's *BT* based interpretation of the articulation of two-fold intelligibility into what-being and that-being given that by including the notion of that-being in the concept of intelligibility it looks like a proper way of addressing the productive character of modern representations. Nevertheless I will argue that his interpretation of the productive character of representation in terms of 'enabling and human' is also not able to provide a sufficient understanding of the productive character of modern representations for the same reason given in the case of the standard concept of intelligibility.

Based on my analysis of both the standard way of understanding intelligibility and Haugeland's twofold intelligibility, I will argue that *BT* based readings of Heidegger in terms of intelligibility are incapable of being extended to accommodate his 1930s view of modern representations and, at the same time, are expressions of exactly the danger that Heidegger increasingly becomes aware of in that decade, that is: the danger lurking in the a priori.

I will suggest that the productive character of modern representations should be understood in terms of 'effecting in a divine sense.' To support my view, I will first turn to Glazebrook's analysis of the encroachment of the real in modern science and then to Heidegger's distinction between Greek apprehension (*Vernehmen*) and modern representation (*Vorstellung*) in *AWP*. I will show that both analyses serve for the purpose of understanding the productive character of modern representation in terms of effecting in a divine sense.

However, I will show that although Jacques Derrida's analysis of modern representations in *AWP* is in line with my interpretation, his analysis of representations as a 'sending' (destiny) of Being requires me to evaluate if my understanding of the productive character of modern representations is supported by this view. I will suggest that this entails a deepening of Heidegger's view of the history of Being and I will turn to his text *Metaphysics as the History of Being*[12] (1941) in order to do this.

In *MHB* Heidegger claims that the final stage of the pro-gression (*Fort-gang*) of metaphysics – modernity – consists in a peculiar confounding between representations and reality. I will suggest that disclosing the meaning of this claim results in an understanding of the productive character of modern representations that does touch upon the notion of existence in its traditional meaning and therefore, that accounts for Heidegger's concern for the ontic. I will show that this consists in understanding the productive character of modern representations in terms of 'effecting in a divine sense' or as 'divine creation,' thereby validating my understanding of this character so far.

Based on this I will argue that Heidegger's critical stance towards the notion of modern representation is ultimately based on the fact that this type of representations enables the possibility of the creation of reality by human beings, that is, by the

[12] Hereafter *MHB*

divinization of the human. I will suggest that Heidegger's clear break with the FO model can be read as an attempt to avoid the most extreme way in which the danger lurking in the a priori unleashes in modernity: the divinization of the human.

I will conclude by suggesting that the analysis presented so far can provide a way of understanding Heidegger's 'critical' stance towards modern representation that can account for both: the fact that Heidegger's stance towards modernity is not 'sympathetic' and his view that that which takes place in modernity is destined by Being.

As the above description shows in this thesis I will show that Heidegger's critical stance towards modern representations from 1930 onwards is capable of providing new perspectives for understanding Heidegger's turn (*Kehre*). As it is also clear I will do this on the basis of my interpretation of *MFL*, *WT*, *AWP* and *MHB*. The reader of this thesis will promptly realise that my analysis does not arise from criticism of previous ways of understanding *die Kehre* but of the interpretation of these texts about which – apart from *AWP* – there is few exegetical work. Therefore, the basic thrust of my enterprise is trying to make sense of Heidegger's various claims in these works rather than subjecting them to detailed criticism or to consideration of criticism of them by others.

Chapter one will address the brief appearance of the notion of metontology in *MFL*. Chapters two, three and four will focus on Heidegger's analysis of modernity. On the one hand, chapter two will concentrate on Heidegger's analysis of modern science in terms of the mathematical in *WT* and chapter three on his analysis of Kant's focus on intuition in this same work. On the other hand, chapter four will evaluate the interpretation of the productive character of modern representations in *AWP* in terms of intelligibility and will show the necessity of addressing this aspect of modern representations in light

of a careful account of Heidegger's view of the history of Being. Therefore, chapter five will analyze Heidegger's view of the productive character of modern representation in light of his analysis of metaphysics as the history of Being.[13]

[13] I want to point out that I use 'Being' to translate Heidegger's *Sein*. However, most of the commentators who I quote use 'being.' I will keep 'being' in their quotations as well as when commenting their ideas.

CHAPTER ONE: HEIDEGGER'S CONCERN FOR THE ONTIC AND THE BRIEF PRESENCE OF THE NOTION OF METONTOLOGY IN HIS WORK

INTRODUCTION

In an Appendix to paragraph 10 of *MFL*, Heidegger introduces the notion of metontology to denote the ontic domain to which, according to him, FO has to return to as its point of origin in order to account for 'beings as a whole.' According to Laureen Freeman, in *MFL* the relevance of the ontic domain seems to come to the fore in a way not seen before in Heidegger's early works. Freeman reads Heidegger's introduction of the notion of metontology in terms of an ontic concern on the part of Heidegger. I agree with her on this. Based on this reading, she suggests that Heidegger's (increasing) concern for the ontic after *BT* is at the heart of his turning away from FO.

In light of this, the following question immediately poses itself: in what way does the notion of metontology contribute to Heidegger's turn away from *BT*? Accordingly, this question entails a more specific one: In what way does the notion of metontology contribute to Heidegger's understanding of ontology and FO after *BT*?

However, the fact that the notion of metontology disappears from Heidegger's thinking does call into question the conclusions at which the analyses that have this notion as their basis arrive, which also calls into question the validity of the questions mentioned above. Yet, if this disappearance does not imply the disappearance of Heidegger's concern for

the ontic, it seems that Freeman's analysis can be sustained and that the above-mentioned questions do have a *raison d'être* after all.

In his essay *Metaphysics, Fundamental Ontology, Metontology 1925-1935*,[14] William McNeill offers an explanation for the disappearance of the notion of metontology from Heidegger's thinking. He suggests that the reason for this lies in the fact that around the mid-30s the a priori projection of Being becomes problematic for Heidegger because it is a withdrawal of Being. This means for McNeill that Being can no longer be thought as the 'earlier,' as the a priori ground of beings.

In the following chapter I will show that McNeill's analysis regarding the withdrawal of Being entails that the basic notion of a prior understanding of Being is not continuous between *BT* and a later work like *Introduction to Metaphysics*[15] (1935). This means for McNeill that the notion of ontology is undermined in its very basis, which in turn entails the questioning of metontology as a notion indebted to ontology. In light of this, Heidegger's introduction of the notion of metontology is seen as a failed attempt to break clear of the FO model.

Further to this I will argue that McNeill's analysis regarding the disappearance of metontology does not entail the disappearance of Heidegger's concern for the ontic, thereby validating Freeman's view that this concern is at the heart of his turning away from *BT*.

[14] McNeill, W. (1992) 'Metaphysics, Fundamental Ontology, Metontology 1925-1935' in *Heidegger Studies* Vol. 8, pp. 63-79
[15] Hereafter *IM*

I will end up the analysis of this chapter by pointing out that although McNeill's conclusion does illuminate Heidegger's turn away from *BT*, his exposition of the notion of the withdrawal of Being is extremely unclear. Insofar as this notion is the basis of his conclusion, the lack of clarity about it makes it difficult to admit it. This being the case I will suggest that it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the withdrawal of Being.

I.- METONTOLOGY AND HEIDEGGER'S CONCERN FOR THE ONTIC

MFL is a lecture course given in 1928 which main topic is Leibniz's thinking. Heidegger focuses on the metaphysical problems underlying Leibniz's theory of logical judgment, pointing to the existential analytic of Dasein as the way in which these problems should be addressed. Heidegger makes this move by showing that Leibniz's definition of truth as *identitas* rests – without Leibniz's noticing it – on intentionality and transcendence, which in its turn entails that it is ultimately based on a preliminary understanding of the Being of beings.

In an Appendix to paragraph 10 of *MFL* entitled 'Describing the idea and function of fundamental ontology,' Heidegger says:

> Since being is there only insofar as beings are already there [*im Da*], fundamental ontology has in it the latent tendency toward a primordial, metaphysical transformation which becomes possible only when being is understood in its whole problematic. The intrinsic necessity for ontology to turn back to its point of origin can be clarified by reference to the primal phenomenon of human existence: the being 'man' understands being; understanding-of-being effects a distinction between being and beings; being is there only when Dasein understands being. In other words, the possibility that being is there in the understanding presupposes the factical existence of Dasein, and this in turn presupposes the factual extantness of nature. Right within the horizon of the problem of being, when posed radically, it appears that all this is visible and can become understood as being, only if a possible totality of being is already there. As a result, we need a special problematic which has for its proper theme beings as a whole. This new investigation resides in the essence of ontology itself and is the result of its overturning [*Umschlag*], its μεταβολή. I designate this set of questions *metontology*. And here also, in the domain of metontological existentiell questioning, is the domain of the metaphysics of existence (here the question of an ethics may properly be raised for the first time).[16]

In the last decade Heidegger's notion of metontology has drawn attention to scholars interested in addressing the possibility of setting up a relation between Heidegger's thinking and embodiment and incarnality,[17] on the one hand, and between Heidegger's

[16] Heidegger, M. *MFL* pp. 156-157

[17] See for example Schalow, F. (2006) 'Situating the Problem of Embodiment: A Reply to Overgaard' in *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* Vol. 37 (1), pp. 89-91. In this essay Schalow argues that Overgaard did not realize that the locus of 'incarnality' in Heidegger's thinking is 'the transition to 'metontology' as the 'overturning' (*Umschlag*) of fundamental ontology' introduced by Heidegger in the 1928 Marburg lecture course *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, and not the fundamental ontological

thinking and ethics,[18] on the other. The basis for these kinds of analyses is the undeniable fact that by introducing the notion of metontology Heidegger brings the ontic sphere to the fore in a way that he had not done before. This is clear from the fact that this notion is first introduced in *MFL* and not in an earlier work, and that Heidegger refers to it as a 'new investigation,' as the above-mentioned quote shows.

However, by stating that in *MFL* the ontic sphere comes to the fore in way that it had not done before I do not mean to say that in an important work like *BT* the ontic domain is ignored. It is clear that in *BT* Heidegger is well aware that inquiring into FO is something that must be carried out as an existentiell task of some particular being whose Being is Dasein, and so that the ontic will always be at the basis of FO. Nevertheless, the fact that Heidegger introduces the notion of metontology in *MFL* and not in *BT* does call into question in what respects this 'new investigation' or 'new' way of turning ontology back to its point of origin differs from the way in which the ontic domain comes to the fore in *BT*.

In light of this, the following question immediately poses itself: In what way does the notion of metontology – as a way of going beyond *BT*'s conception of FO in a manner that is nevertheless consonant with that original starting point – contribute to address the very general question of the nature of Heidegger's turn away from *BT*? Accordingly, this question entails a more specific question: In what way does the notion of metontology

framework of *Being and Time* as Schalow claims Overgaard inteds to show. See also Aho, K. (2006) 'Metontology and the Body-Prom in 'Being and Time'' in *Auslegung: A Journal of Philosophy* Vol. 28 (1), pp. 1-20

[18] See for example Freeman, L. (2010) '*Metontology*, moral particularism, and the "art of existing:" a dialogue between Heidegger, Aristotle, and Bernard Williams' in *Continental Philosophy Review* Vol. 43 (4), pp. 545-568

contribute to address the question regarding Heidegger's understanding of ontology and FO after *BT*?

For Laureen Freeman, the above mentioned passage attests that 'metontology is comprised of a new kind of questioning which responds to what was lacking in the merely preparatory nature of fundamental ontology. This questioning will be a part of the metaphysics of existence, whose subject matter is beings as a whole.'[19] Freeman thinks that in this passage '[w]e can already see Heidegger gesturing towards his turn (*Kehre*) of the 1930s, when the human being ceases to take center stage in his questioning and analysis of being.'[20] Similarly, she says, metontology does not privilege only Dasein to the extent that FO did, and for this reason, she thinks it can be seen as Heidegger's first (or proto-) turn.[21]

In line with this Freeman suggests understanding metontology as a *development* of Heidegger's position in *BT* in light of his own uncertain (even tentative) remarks that conclude that text, where Heidegger asks himself whether 'one can provide ontological grounds for ontology, or [whether] it also require[s] an ontical foundation.'[22] As Freeman points out, '[m]etontology is fundamental ontology's self-overturning that at the same time builds upon and develops itself in returning to the concrete, factical condition out of which it emerged.'[23] Freeman understands the nature of this development in terms of an increasing concern for the ontic domain on the part of Heidegger.

[19] Ibid., p. 551
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid., p. 549
[23] Ibid., p. 550

The expression 'ontic domain' in relation to metontology has been interpreted in various ways. For Freeman, 'it does not refer to the ''mere ontic'' of Division I of *BT*, but rather, to an ontologically informed ontic understanding which presupposes the point to which fundamental ontology has brought us in *BT*.'[24] In line with this, she thinks metontology is a neologism to refer to the ontic sphere of human experiences and to the regional ontologies that were excluded from *BT*.[25] For her, the ontic domain in reference to metontology encompasses 'beings, individual human beings, and the relations between them.'[26] However, she is explicit in pointing out that her interpretation stands in opposition to many other interpretations.[27]

For Freeman, there is a tension between the ontic and the ontological in Heidegger's thinking in the mid-to-late 1920s. She argues that this tension might have been one of Heidegger's motivations for trying to rework (only later to abandon) his project of FO.[28]

According to Freeman, one of the premises of FO is that the meaning (*Sinn*) of being (*Sein*) can only be understood once the structures that constitute human existence have been examined through an existential analysis of Dasein. In this context, she says, Heidegger writes that 'the laying bare of Dasein's primordial Being must rather be

[24] Ibid., p. 549, footnote 20
[25] Ibid., p. 545
[26] Ibid., p. 549
[27] Freeman points out that it stands in opposition to Crowell (2000) who thinks that metontology is a reversion to a 'merely ontic' foundation that amounts to an abandonment of fundamental ontology; to Krell (1986) who thinks that it is a return to a domain of pre-ontological significance or that it is something like philosophical anthropology; to Pöggeler (1994) who thinks that it is likened to the Schelerian domain of metanthropology; to Greisch (1987) who thinks that metontology runs the risk of a totalizing ontic thinking and to Kisiel (2005) who thinks that it provides us with a stronger way to combat the public 'battle of worldviews' that arose in Germany from party politics. For Freeman, 'none of these positions get metontology exactly right, insofar as they all miss the point of Heidegger's more nuanced conception of the ontic after the ontological project developed in *BT*: a position that is markedly different from average everydayness, philosophical anthropology, the formation of world-views, existentialism, or politics.' Ibid., pp. 549-550, footnote 20
[28] Ibid., p. 547

wrested from Dasein by following the opposite course from that taken by the falling ontico-ontological tendency of interpretation.' Freeman points out that the next year Heidegger writes that the ontological ground 'implies nothing about…the ontical relations between beings, between nature and Dasein.' However, says Freeman, at the same time that Heidegger seems to maintain that the ontological domain is the most fundamental domain, and necessary in order to understand human beings and their relationship to the question of the meaning of being, there are some important places where this priority is disrupted.[29] In this respect, Freeman points to the following passage of *BT*:

> If, however, 'there is' Being only in so far as truth 'is,' and if the understanding of Being varies according to the kind of truth, then truth which is primordial and authentic must guarantee the understanding of the Being of Dasein and of Being in general. The ontological 'truth' of the existential analysis is developed on the ground of the primordial existentiell truth. However, the latter does not necessarily need the former.[30]

As Freeman points out, the priority of the ontological seems to be put into question in this passage since one does not need the existential truth in order to come to existentiell truths. For example, says Freeman, one's own being can be disclosed to one in one's concrete existing, regardless of whether one becomes a philosopher and develops a conceptual analysis of Dasein's Being in general. That is to say, there are important insights that can be gained about our existence in the world with others without necessarily having to theorize about it. Indeed, she says, ontic facts are conditioned by ontological structures, but truth (the display of phenomena) is not primordially theoretical, nor must it become theoretical. In light of this, Freeman suggests that in the above-mentioned quote Heidegger is emphasizing the priority of praxis over theoria. For Freeman, this passage seems to point in the direction that Heidegger's thought takes a year later, where the ontic

[29] Ibid.
[30] Heidegger cited by Freeman. Ibid., 548

domain is highlighted to a greater extent than it seems to be in *BT*. In light of this discussion, Freeman says, the following passage from *MFL* (where Heidegger reconsiders the scope and direction of FO) is contextualized, becomes clear, and provides further justification for Heidegger's reconsideration of FO. The following passage, which Freeman reads as a segue from *BT* to *MFL*, emphasizes the developmental aspect of Heidegger's analysis in the mid-to-late 1920s:[31]

> Fundamental ontology…is not a fixed discipline, which, once the baby is named, should not for good occupy the previously empty place reserved for it in some putative system of philosophy – a discipline which is now to be developed and completed so as to bring philosophy to a happy ending in a few decades…In fact, that 'place' is, in every philosophy, an occupied place, and it is in each case transformed.[32]

Freeman takes this passage to be a direct continuation of the last few pages of *BT*, where Heidegger puts into question his project as a whole. As Freeman points out, Heidegger concludes *BT* by stating that the way in which he has examined Dasein's existence 'remains only *one way* which we may take' and that the thesis of this text 'still remains 'veiled'.'[33] He then asks whether 'one can provide *ontological* grounds for ontology, or [whether] it also require[s] an *ontical* foundation?'[34] In keeping with this priority of the ontic, says Freeman, one year after the publication of *BT* Heidegger goes on to claim that '[o]ntology cannot be established in a purely ontological manner. Its possibility is referred back to a being, that is, to something ontical – the Dasein. Ontology has an ontical foundation.'[35] As Freeman points out, Heidegger then repeats the same point a year later in the following passage: 'Ontology cannot be grounded in a purely ontological fashion. Its very possibility reverts to a being, which is to say, to the ontic realm: to Dasein. Ontology has an ontic fundament…Hence the *first task* for a clarification of the scientific

[31] Ibid.
[32] Heidegger cited by Freeman. Ibid.
[33] Ibid., pp. 548-549
[34] Ibid., p. 549
[35] Ibid.

character of ontology is the *demonstration of its ontic fundament* and the characterization of this founding.'[36] For Freeman, the Appendix to *MFL* provides an answer to the question raised at the end of *BT* and illuminates the path that Heidegger's thinking begins to take with respect to the importance of the ontic domain. As Freeman points out, it does so by developing and expanding upon the position that FO 'has an intrinsic necessity…to turn back (*Umschlag*) to its point of origin,'[37] namely, to its ontic foundation.

In light of Freeman's analysis the answer to the question regarding Heidegger's understanding of FO after *BT* is that Heidegger's increasing concern for the ontic (at least between the mid to late 20s) undermines his project of FO as envisioned by him in *BT*. This, in its turn, necessarily implies understanding Heidegger's increasing concern for the ontic as key to his turn away from *BT*.

However, there is an undeniable fact that can invalidate the analyses that have the notion of metontology at their basis. This is the fact that the notion of metontology disappears from Heidegger's thinking after he introduces it in *MFL*. This being the case, it seems sensible to ask whether a relation between ethics and Heidegger's thinking – as Freeman intends to establish – on the one hand, and between embodiment and incarnality and Heidegger's thinking, on the other, can be sustained if the basis for these relations is a notion that disappears from Heidegger's thinking right after being introduced. But does the disappearance of metontology from Heidegger's thinking override the concern for the ontic that this notion entails? Or is it the case that Heidegger's concern for the ontic continues but not longer under the name of metontology? Given that Freeman reads Heidegger's introduction of the notion of metontology in terms of his concern for the

[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.

ontic, at least in her case it seems that the disappearance of the former but not of the latter would keep the soundness of her analysis untouched. However, I suggest that in order to fully understand what the introduction of the notion of metontology means for the development of Heidegger's thinking it is indispensable to acknowledge and account for the fact that this notion disappeared right after being introduced.

In *Metaphysics, Fundamental Ontology, Metontology 1925-1935*, William McNeill offers an explanation for the disappearance of the notion of metontology from Heidegger's thinking. He suggests that the reason for this lies in the fact that around the mid-30s the a priori projection of being becomes problematic for Heidegger because it is a withdrawal of Being.

II.- WILLIAM MCNEILL'S INTERPRETATION OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF METONTOLOGY FROM HEIDEGGER'S THINKING: THE WITHDRAWAL OF BEING

Based on the already quoted section of the Appendix to paragraph 10 of *MFL* entitled 'Describing the idea and function of fundamental ontology,' McNeill states that metontology is an "existentiell" questioning that has beings as a whole (*das Seiende im Ganzen*) as its theme.[38] Given that Heidegger introduces the notion of metontology in the context of showing that ontology has an 'intrinsic necessity to turn back to its point of origin,'[39] that is, the ontic domain, McNeill understands the *Umschlag* or μεταβολή of ontology as a 'recoil' of ontology upon itself: 'In 1928, characterizing the idea of a fundamental ontology, Heidegger indicated that the latter must necessarily recoil upon itself and in so doing become transformed into what he designated "metontology".'[40]

Since metontology is an existentiell questioning McNeill suggests that here too 'it would first be possible to deal with a series of other questions concerning human existence – questions which, together with that of ethics, are in *Being and Time* said to require grounding in a fundamental ontology of Dasein: philosophical psychology, anthropology, "politics," poetry, biography and historiography.'[41] However, says McNeill, it is not until *IM* 'that Heidegger explicitly confronts at least three of these issues listed in *Being and Time* under the rubric of existentiell interpretation (namely ethics, politics and poetry, *Dichtung*).' Yet oddly enough, he says, 'we find no mention there of the metontological questioning which, in retrospect, one might expect to be central to this confrontation. Not

[38] McNeill, W. 'Metaphysics, Fundamental Ontology, Metontology 1925-1935,' p. 63
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.

only that, but the fundamental ontology of the analytic of Dasein that would likewise – at least from the impression given in *Being and Time* – found the possibility of such regional disciplines as political science also remains, for the greater part, somewhat eclipsed in this 1935 course.'[42] In light of this McNeill poses the following questions:

1.- Is the fact that in *BT* the possibility of such regional disciplines as ethics and politics is said to require grounding in the FO of Dasein indicative of a change or revision of Heidegger's project between 1927 and 1928, the latter being the year when the possibility of the ethical and other such existentiell issues is directed not toward FO but to metontology?

2.- Does the non-appearance of metontology, if not indeed FO in *IM* imply the abandonment of the unfolding of the question of being in terms of FO and metontology by the year 1935?[43]

McNeill is explicit in stating that he advocates for the continuity of Heidegger's thought; therefore, he thinks that neither is the case, at least not in any straightforward sense.[44]

As McNeill rightly points out, it is easy to answer the first question in a negative way, since Heidegger himself explicitly refers to the continuity between FO and metontology:

> Metontology is possible only on the basis and in the perspective of the radical ontological problematic and conjointly with the latter. Precisely the radicalization of fundamental ontology brings about the above-mentioned turnaround [*Umschlag*] of ontology out of the latter itself. What we seemingly separate here, by means of "disciplines," and provide with tittles is actually one – just as the ontological difference is one, or *the* primordial phenomenon of human existence![45]

[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid., p. 64
[45] Heidegger cited by McNeill. Ibid. McNeill does not follow the standard English translation of *MFL* but offers his own translation.

McNeill focuses on the nature of this *Umschlag* or turnaround by examining the second question. In so doing, he concentrates on three different issues, the third of which deals with the disappearance of metontology. Therefore, in what follows I will concentrate on this third issue.

McNeill begins his analysis by asking what is metontology? He summarizes Heidegger's description of metontology in *MFL* in the following points:

a) Metontology constitutes a new kind of questioning which is to have beings as a whole as its theme.

b) Metontology is to arise 'on the basis and in the perspective of' ontology.

c) The emergence of metontology is to occur as the 'radicalization' of FO, its μεταβολή or *Umschlag.*

d) Metontology is to constitute 'the domain of the metaphysics of existence,' a 'metontological-existentiell' questioning where (*inter alia*) 'the question of ethics can first be raised.'[46]

As McNeill points out, '[e]xistence (*Existenz*), according to *Being and Time*, means the *being* of Dasein; the preparatory fundamental-ontological analytic of Dasein is an *existential* one: it analyses Dasein with respect to its *being*. A metontological-existentiell questioning on the other hand would, as the realm of the metaphysics of existence, and in its unity with fundamental ontology, have to thematize Dasein as a being, and do so in the perspective of its being.'[47] For McNeill, in *BT* Dasein does indeed come into view to some extent as a being, but *only* insofar as is phenomenologically necessary to satisfy the preparatory status of the analytic. This is why Heidegger himself asserts with respect to

[46] Ibid., p. 74
[47] Ibid., pp. 74-75

the existential analytic that 'the metaphysics of Dasein itself does not yet stand at the centre,' says McNeill.[48] Yet metontology as metontological-existentiell inquiry is not to thematize Dasein as a being, but to have beings as a whole as its theme.

For McNeill, that this thematization of beings as a whole remains existentiell indicates that beings as a whole are unveiled, opened up as such *in and through* the existence of Dasein, i.e. its disclosive openness towards being. McNeill suggests that it is for this reason alone that the fundamental-ontological analytic of Dasein in *BT* can assume its preparatory role with respect to the guiding question of the meaning of being in general, i.e. of the being of beings as a whole and as such. And it is for this reason alone that metontology can arise out of and in unity with FO.[49]

'Thematization' means 'objectification' (*Vergegenständlichung*), says McNeill. According to him, the thematization of beings that occurs both in the human sciences and in the natural sciences requires that not only the object – the being to be thematized as such – be uncovered and determined in advance, but equally the place or *region* of that object with respect to beings *as a whole*. Now in the positive sciences this understanding of the thematic being as such with respect to their possible wholeness ensues, according to Heidegger, from a preontological, prescientific projection of the being of such objects, and not from a thematic, transparent understanding of being itself. An understanding of being is nonetheless latent and presupposed in all positing of beings.[50]

[48] Ibid., p. 75
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.

In light of this, McNeill suggests that a *radicalized* thematization of beings as a whole on the basis and in the perspective of ontology would therefore necessitate a projective understanding of beings in the light of the being in general of beings as a whole and as such, in short, in the light of the meaning of being in general.[51]

For McNeill, the point of interest here is the transition or μεταβολή of the analysis of the temporality of being (where the meaning of being in general is first given) into metontology.[52] This transition is not only characterized as the recoil or *Rückschlag* latent in fundamental ontology.[53] It is also, particularly in regard, it seems, to the temporality of being, described as an *Umschlag*: a turnaround or flip over.[54] With this in view, McNeill draws attention to the fact that the word *Umschlag* is the one used by Heidegger in paragraph 69 of *BT* to describe the shift that happens in our understanding of being when we move from circumspective concern to the theoretical comportment involved in thematization.

Having drawn our attention to the notion of thematization in reference to metontology, McNeill brings forth Heidegger's *Antigone* interpretation in *IM*. This interpretation, says McNeill, is said to be decisive for a renewed meditation of the essence of human beings.[55]

Heidegger's *Antigone* interpretation in *IM* is complex and it confronts the reader with issues that go beyond the aim of this thesis. However, insofar as it is the context in which

[51] Ibid. At this point McNeill points out that it is precisely the problem of the non-explicit, non-thematic understanding of the meaning of being in general that calls for the 'necessity of an explicit recovery of the question of being.
[52] Ibid., pp. 75-76
[53] Ibid., p. 76
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.

McNeill's idea of a withdrawal of Being emerges, I think it necessary to offer an account of it, especially because I argue that McNeill is not clear in explaining what the withdrawal of Being means.

McNeill thinks that the counter-twists and turns of the *Antigone* interpretation in *IM* is a way, albeit different, of thinking the above mentioned *Umschlag* which is also described by Heidegger as the turning or *Kehre* into metontology.[56] In the *Antigone* interpretation, says McNeill:

> ...the human being as παντοπόρος, as experiencing the possible openness of beings as a whole and as such comes to encounter the ultimate ἄπορος of the nothing, of death. In this mutual counter-turning of παντοπόρος ἄπορος he is dis-placed, thrust into the "there," the DA, the πόλις as the site [*Stätte*] or place of history. Yet in such radical dis-placement into his Da-sein, in his becoming ὑψίπολις, he first experiences the withdrawal or ἄπολις of his being. Exposed to the mutual counter-turning of ὑψίπολις ἄπολις, the essence of such openness or πόρος as transition, *Übergang* – another word earlier used to translate μεταβολή – shows itself as the happening [*Geschehen*] of history, the happening of the *Da* itself.[57]

In light of this, continues McNeill, '…in man's standing in the intercoiling of παντοπόρος ἄπορος and ὑψίπολις ἄπολις, in the possibility of his en-countering or turning around towards the need of withdrawal, there lies the possibility of his turning around towards the πόρος of history as the need of being itself, the happening of being in beings. The decisive insight of 1935 thus emerges in the *Antigone* interpretation as follows:'[58] 'Understood from the perspective of this need, the need impelled by being itself, the essence of human being opens itself to us for the first time.'[59]According to McNeill:

> Thus impelled [*ernötig*] by being itself, the necessity [*Notwendigkeit*] of man's turning towards this need [*Not*] is therefore not simply initiated by man, but arises as a claim of being itself. The 'movement' or

[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid. Apart from μεταβολή whose meaning is given in this quote, the two Greek words at play are πόρος and πόλις. Heidegger defines the former as 'a going through…, a going over to…, a route.' With respect to the latter, he points out that the usual translations as 'state (*Staat*) and city-state (*Stadtstaat*)' does not capture the entire sense of this word. Rather, it is 'the name for the site (*Stätte*), the Here, within which and as which Being-here is historically. The πόλις is the site of history, the Here, *in* which, *out* if which and *for* which history happens.' (Heidegger, M. (2000) *Introduction to Metaphysics*, New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press. p. 162)
[58] Ibid., p. 77
[59] Ibid.

happening [*Geschehen*] of withdrawal now manifests itself as the history [*Geschichte*] of being itself, a "movement" that essentially exceeds human existence and from which the latter first receives its determination. Yet such excess does not imply absolute difference. Because this need or withdrawal of being itself prevails *as* being's happening or appearing in beings, the encountering of such withdrawal in the disclosedness of Da-sein would then be nothing other than a *turning around* towards the openness of the happening of *beings* in their possible wholeness.[60]

If this turning in the twofold counter-turning of παντοπόρος ἄπορος and ὑψίπολις ἄπολις indeed corresponds to that associated with metontology in 1928, then why is the latter not realized as such?, asks McNeill.[61] The answer, he argues, 'lies in the problem of the sought-after thematization. For the modification or *Umschlag* of *Seinsverständnis*, the withdrawal in the meaning or *Temporalität* of being itself as presence proves so radical, so abyssal, that the horizon of the possible thematizing projection of beings as a whole as such is far from assured.'[62]

McNeill ends his analysis of Heidegger's *Antigone* interpretation in *IM*, by suggesting that there is a double displacement at stake in it:

1.- The withdrawal in the meaning or *Temporalität* of being itself as presence proves unthinkable in terms of Dasein as a being. It must be thought not in terms of the *Seinsverständnis* of existent Dasein, but as an event (*Geschehnis*) of being itself. The essence of the human being is the displaced place where being itself appears. Accordingly, this rethinking of withdrawal as an event of being itself does not at all mean that the human being could be excluded from such thinking. This is the decisive point of the displacement at issue.[63]

[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid., p. 78

2.- Because such withdrawal prevails precisely as the appearing of being in beings, being can no longer be thought of as the 'earlier,' the a priori ground of beings. At stake here is nothing less than a displacement of the ontological difference: being can no longer be conceived in its difference from beings. Not that being itself would thereby be reducible to beings, or that the ontic would become dissolved in the ontological. This second displacement goes hand in hand with the first.[64]

Although McNeill explicitly states at the outset of his analysis that he advocates for the continuity of Heidegger's thinking, he reaches the conclusion that the basic notion of a prior understanding of being is not continuous between *BT* and *IM*. In my view, this necessarily raises the question of how this affects Heidegger's view of ontology and FO as conceived in *BT*.

McNeill suggests that metontology disappears from Heidegger's thinking because in *IM* Heidegger realizes that in the appearing of Being in beings, Being withdraws. For McNeill this means that Being can no longer be thought of as the earlier, the a priori ground of beings, and that, therefore, the thematization that metontology entails lacks the projective understanding of Being which is necessary for it.

It is not difficult to see that this reason for the disappearance of metontology from Heidegger's thinking also explains (since it implies) the disappearance of the notion of FO from Heidegger's thinking. Seen from the other side: if ontology entails the thematization of Being, the destabilization of thematization undermines ontology itself (and with it FO and metontology). This would explain why Heidegger does not mention

[64] Ibid.

FO in *IM*, as McNeill himself points out, and, in general, abandons the notion of FO in his later works.

I think it clear that McNeill's explanation of the disappearance of metontology in the terms just mentioned makes it compelling to say that Heidegger's introduction of the notion of metontology is a failed attempt to break clear of the FO model.

Although one would expect that the disappearance of FO in Heidegger's thinking would entail the disappearance of the centrality of Dasein, McNeill's analysis shows that this is not the case. Dasein continues to be the 'place' of Being. What changes is the way in which Dasein is understood: as the 'displaced place' Dasein is the *place* and in this way the centrality that Dasein had in FO is untouched, but insofar as it is a *displaced* place, the centrality is of a different kind: it carries a non-centrality. Undoubtedly Heidegger's understanding of Dasein in *BT* and after *BT* is an interesting topic within Heidegger's thinking, but it is beyond the scope of the analysis intended in this thesis to address it thoroughly.

What is central to the analysis in progress is to ask what happens in the case of Heidegger's concern for the ontic: does the disappearance of metontology from Heidegger's thinking entail the disappearance of Heidegger's concern for the ontic? In other words, does the withdrawal of Being entail the disappearance of Heidegger's concern for the ontic?

As McNeill rightly points out, the question with which *IM* begins: Why are there beings at all and not rather nothing?, has 'beings as a whole' as its theme. Heidegger says about

this question that it is 'the basic question of metaphysics,'[65] 'the first question,'[66] and 'the question of all questions.'[67] Heidegger thinks that this question has a priority of rank, which is said to be threefold: this is the broadest (first priority), deepest (second priority) and most original (third priority) question.[68] As the broadest, this question has 'beings as a whole' as its theme, and as the deepest, it asks after the reason (why) or ground of beings; it asks after what grounds 'beings as such.'[69] Therefore, as the broadest, this question has the same theme attributed to metontology in the year 1928 and that enables a reading of metontology in terms of a concern for the ontic.

McNeill's analysis of Heidegger's *Antigone* interpretation also shows that the notion of 'beings as a whole' is fundamental for the 'new' way of thinking the human being in *IM* since Dasein 'comes to be' in its relation to 'beings as a whole' (and vice versa).

Finally, McNeill points out that in *IM* Heidegger explicitly confronts three 'existentiell' issues such as ethics, politics and poetry, thereby showing a clear concern for the ontic domain in this work.

In light of this, I think that the disappearance of the notion of metontology from Heidegger's thinking does not imply the disappearance of Heidegger's concern for the ontic domain; at least not until the year *IM* was written.

This allows me to suggest that Freeman's view that Heidegger's (increasing) concern for

[65] Ibid., p. 65
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.

the ontic is at the heart of his turn away from *BT* is not invalidated by the disappearance of the notion of metontology. Actually, I think the opposite is the case.

If the reason for the disappearance of the notion of metontology from Heidegger's thinking is that thematization is no longer possible – since the withdrawal in the meaning or *Temporalität* of Being itself makes it impossible to think Being as the a priori ground of beings –, this argues in favour of understanding this disappearance as due to the impossibility of metontology to account in a proper way for Heidegger's increasing concern for the ontic. Therefore I suggest that the withdrawal of Being not only does not make the concern for the ontic disappear but rather suggests its increase. This means that, on the one hand, there is an essential relation between these two notions and, on the other, Freeman's view should find further support in the notion of a withdrawal of Being. I will come back to this in the following chapter.

I think that McNeill is far from clear in his explanation of the notion of a withdrawal of Being. This notion is the basis for his view that metontology disappears because Being can no longer be thought as the a priori. Insofar as this conclusion is what enables understanding metontology as a failed attempt to break with the FO model, it is indispensable to clarify the meaning of the withdrawal of Being in order to evaluate the soundness of his conclusion and, by this means, go deeper into Heidegger's understanding of ontology and FO after *BT*.

McNeill was certainly aware that the withdrawal of Being (*Entzug des Seins*) is a notion in Heidegger's later thinking. It is also highly possible that he was aware that this notion

first appears in an explicit way in the *Beiträge*[70] (1936-1938) right after *IM* was written and that he was acquainted with this account. Although I do not think it a problem that McNeill suggests that this notion is already present in *IM*, the lack of clarity of his account does make this account problematic.

The notion of a withdrawal of Being is in itself already a difficult notion in Heidegger's later thinking. In my view, the most enigmatic aspect of this notion is that Heidegger describes the withdrawal of Being as a 'need' of Being.[71]

However, as Daniela Vallega-Neu points out, in *B*, the abandonment of Being (withdrawal of Being) carries a double sense: in a narrow sense, it indicates a clearly privative mode in which beings are abandoned by Being; beings are deprived of their very essence (Being) in what Heidegger conceives as the present era of machination. In a wider sense, the abandonment of Being also indicates positively Being's occurrence; being is experienced to sway essentially as withdrawal, yet a withdrawal through which beings may become manifest as such. In this way, the withdrawal of Being allows the appearing of things.[72] Although McNeill does not make any explicit reference to these two senses of the withdrawal of Being, I think that his analysis shows that he refers to the wider sense of this notion.

[70] Hereafter *B*

[71] Vallega-Neu, D. (2003) *Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy: An Introduction* Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. p. 39

[72] Ibid., p. 57. As Vallega-Neu points out, in *B* Heidegger uses the word 'Seyn' (Be-ing) instead of Sein (Being) since he thinks that in this way he avoids thinking 'Being' metaphysically, i.e., think it as analogous to a (highest) Being but rather as an occurrence. (Vallega-New, D. *Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy: An Introduction* p. 7, footnote 1). I will follow McNeill in using the expression 'withdrawal of Being (Sein)' since it goes beyond the scope of this thesis to account for Heidegger's view of the difference between Seyn and Sein.

As is well known, with the expression 'the era of machination' Heidegger refers to modernity. It denotes a mode of being in which beings, things are reduced to mere exchangeable products of calculable thinking.[73] For this, the dominance of representation over the being of beings becomes decisive.[74] Therefore, the narrow sense of the withdrawal of Being points to an event that takes place in modernity and which is essentially related to modern representational thinking. Needless to say, Heidegger does not have a sympathetic stance towards machination.

In line with the enigmatic aspect mentioned above, in this thesis I will not attempt to explain why Being needs to withdraw in its appearing in beings (wide sense of the withdrawal of Being). However, the aim of this thesis does demand an explanation of the narrow sense of the withdrawal of Being since this can throw light upon the question: why does Being's withdrawal preclude its aprioricity?

[73] Ibid., p. 38
[74] Ibid., p. 60

CHAPTER TWO: THE MATHEMATICAL AND REPRESENTATION IN HEIDEGGER'S REFLECTION ON MODERN SCIENCE IN *WT*: THE DANGER LURKING IN THE A PRIORI

INTRODUCTION

In her book *Heidegger's Philosophy of Science* Trish Glazebrook emphasizes the continuity rather than the discontinuity in Heidegger's work. The question of (modern) natural science is for her a constant and continuous support against which Heidegger's thinking develops and grows.[75] With this in mind, she distinguishes three phases in Heidegger's thinking on science. 'What binds these three periods together, such that they are one path of thinking rather than simply three different inquiries, is the notion that science is projective,' she says.[76] On this basis Glazebrook suggests that 'the role of representation on modern science – that is, the question of how scientific projection determines its object – is the decisive factor that underlies each account.'[77]

According to Glazebrook the first period is characterized by Heidegger's view that philosophy is itself scientific and that science is the mathematical projection of nature. For her, these two theses go together insofar as Heidegger takes the task of scientific philosophy to be the investigation of being as a means for establishing the regional ontologies of the sciences on sure ground. Based on McNeill's analysis in *Metaphysics,*

[75] Glazebrook, T. (2000) *Heidegger's Philosophy of Science* New York, NY: Fordham University Press. p. 4
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid., p. 8

Fundamental Ontology, Metontology 1925-1935, Glazebrook states that in the mid-30s the a priori projection of being becomes problematic for Heidegger because it is a withdrawal of being. When this happens, she says, 'the projection of being at work in the regional ontology of science becomes likewise awkward. If phenomenological inquiry [the method of scientific philosophy] with being as its object is no longer possible since the a priori nature of such an understanding of being has been undermined, then the question of what metaphysical assumptions underwrite science becomes not only sensible but also demanded: if being's withdrawal precludes its aprioricity, then on what basis can the sciences be taken to have a metaphysical grounding? It is precisely this question that Heidegger asks in *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, and which he answers with the notion of the mathematical.'[78]

WT is for Glazebrook the work in which the early phase of Heidegger's philosophy of science finds its end. Here, Heidegger still holds that science is the mathematical projection of nature but has untangled this thesis from the central thesis of his early view: that metaphysics is itself a science.[79] This means that Heidegger has rethought the grounding relation between the two. He does this 'by pinpointing the mathematical.'[80]

As Glazebrook states, Heidegger is not strictly interested in the history of science. 'Rather, his concern is with the history of being, and with human being as the location of such history.'[81] In this way, his analysis of modern science is intended to investigate the underlying and foundational mode of thinking that determines both, the modern epoch and the modern human being. As it is well known, this is representational thinking.

[78] Ibid., p. 17
[79] Ibid., p. 14
[80] Ibid., p. 61
[81] Ibid., p. 66

In light of this, Glazebrook suggests understanding the separation of philosophy and science consolidated in *WT* as the basis of Heidegger's criticism of representational thinking.[82] Following her line of thought, this implies accepting the thesis that the problematic character of the a priori projection of being (withdrawal of being) is the basis of Heidegger's criticism of representational thinking. Although I do not think it clear that the problematic character of the a priori projection of being entails a separation of philosophy and science, as Glazebrook suggests, I am sympathetic to the thesis that the problematic character of the a priori is at the basis of Heidegger's criticism of representational thinking.

In light of this, in the following chapter I will show how, based on a peculiar analysis of the mathematical in *WT*, Heidegger draws up a distinction between *intuitive* representations and representation against *experience*. I argue that this last conception of representation corresponds to his understanding of modern representation and thus constitutes the focus of his clear critical engagement with this concept from the 1930s onwards. This will allow me to approach the notion of a withdrawal of Being from Heidegger's criticism of representational thinking, which will result in offering a way of clarifying the meaning of this notion. In accordance with the analysis carried out in chapter one, this will allow me to suggest a way of understanding the disappearance of the notion of metontology from Heidegger's thinking which goes beyond – in a manner that is nevertheless consonant with – the notion of a withdrawal of Being. As expected, this will help in evaluating Heidegger's understating of ontology and FO after *BT*.

[82] Ibid., p. 25

I. HEIDEGGER'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE MATHEMATICAL: THE THREE SENSES OF THE MATHEMATICAL

Heidegger's *WT* consists of lectures given in the winter semester of 1935/36 at Freiburg University under the title *Grundfragen der Metaphysik*. However, in 1962 Heidegger published them under the title: *Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen.* In *WT* Heidegger seeks to grasp the *thingness* of things. He argues that the question what is a thing? is historical, meaning by this that the answer to it varies depending on the epoch in which it is asked. However, he points out that to question historically is to question 'what is still happening even if it seems to be past.' With this in view, he chooses to approach this question via Kant's determination of the thingness of the thing, which he thinks is the metaphysical centre of Kant's philosophy.[83]

WT has two sections. The first one corresponds to the Introduction. Here Heidegger focuses on showing that the question 'what is a thing?' is historical and how this should be understood. He suggests that an adequate approach to this question should involve an analysis of both: the Greek determination of the thing and of the determination of the thing that has become pre-eminent through modern science. Due to the limited length of his lectures, he says that he cannot do this here. This said, Heidegger chooses 'a middle section of this way, one in which, in a creative sense, the beginning and a decisive age [modernity] are joined together in a new manner. This is the philosophical determination of the thingness of the thing which Kant has created.'[84] Heidegger points out that, by means of an interpretation of Kant's work, we put ourselves on the path of the inherently historical question concerning the thing.[85]

[83] Heidegger, M. (1967) *What is a Thing?* South Bend, IN: Gateway Editions. p. 55
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid.

The second section of *WT* is entitled 'Kant's manner of asking about the thing.' This section has two parts: 'The Historical Basis on which Kant's critique of pure reason rests' and 'The question about the Thing in Kant's main work.' The former part concentrates on his analysis of modern science in terms of the mathematical as the required background to understand the necessity of the appearance of a critique of pure reason, and the latter concentrates on his analysis of Kant's focus on intuition as the way in which this critique is carried out. Although Heidegger has warned his reader that he will not approach the determination of the thing that corresponds to modern science, in the former part he does so in a way that also allows him to acknowledge how the Greek determination still 'happens' in modern science's determination of the thing. My analysis in this chapter is based on this part of *WT*.

For Heidegger, the rise of modern natural science became decisive for the essential definition of the thing. Therefore, he thinks it necessary to define the 'character of modern natural science' by studying the transformation involved in its rise. Although he thinks the transformation of science is accomplished always only through itself, he acknowledges a twofold foundation of science: work experience, i.e., the direction and the mode of mastering and using what is, and metaphysics, i.e., the projection (*Entwurf*) of the fundamental knowledge of being out of which what is knowable (*wissensmässig*) develops. These two are for Heidegger reciprocally related, and always meet in a basic feature of attitude and of humanly being there (*einem Grundzug der Haltung und des Daseins*).[86] Therefore, what needs to be clarified is this 'basic feature' of the 'modern attitude toward knowledge' (*der neuzeitlichen Wissenshaltung*):[87]

[86] Ibid., p. 66; translation modified. GA 41, p. 66
[87] Ibid.

We entitle this fundamental feature of the modern attitude towards knowledge for which we are searching by saying: the new knowledge demand is the *mathematical* [der *mathematische*].[88]

Heidegger explains the meaning of the mathematical with reference to Greek thought.[89] In its formation, the word 'mathematical' stems from the Greek expression τὰ μαθήματα, which concerns things, and in a definite respect.[90] 'In what respect are things taken when they are viewed and spoken of mathematically?'[91] Following a preliminary description of μαθήματα and μάθησις as 'what is learnable' and 'learning,' respectively, Heidegger establishes that μαθήματα are the things insofar as they are learnable; insofar as we learn them.[92] Heidegger defines learning as a kind of taking (grasping) and appropriating. By using the example of a specific thing, a weapon, he shows that learning is (1) a taking and appropriating of the use of the thing (this appropriation occurs through practice) and always also (2) a 'becoming-familiar' (*Kennenlernen*) with the thing. According to the English translation, the occurrence of (2) is dependent on the occurrence of (1):

During practice we not only learn to load the rifle, handle the trigger and aim at it, not only the manual skill, but, at the same time, and only through all this, we become familiar with the thing.[93]

However, the German version does not establish this dependence, but rather a precedence of (2):

In der Übung lernen wir aber nicht nur Laden und Druckpunkt Nehmen und Zielen, nicht nur die Handfertigkeit, sondern in all dem lernen wir zugleich und erst das Ding kennen.[94]

Thus, a more accurate translation would be:

During practice we not only learn to load the rifle, handle the trigger and aim at it, not only the manual skill, but, at the same time, and firstly (before all), we become familiar with the thing.

[88] Ibid., p. 68; translation modified. GA 41, p. 68
[89] Heidegger points out that with the Greeks, from whom the word 'μαθήματα' stems, we may safely make the assumption that by keeping to the word itself, we will get to its meaning. Ibid., p. 69
[90] Ibid., pp. 69-70
[91] Ibid., p. 70
[92] Ibid., p. 71
[93] Ibid.
[94] Heidegger, M. GA 41, p. 72

The kind of learning signaled by (2) has different levels. In the case of Heidegger's example of the weapon, these levels can be: (i) to learn ballistics, mechanics, and the chemical reaction of certain materials, (ii) to learn how the thing works and (iii) to learn what belongs to a gun as such and what a weapon is. Heidegger refers to (iii) as a more original 'becoming-familiar' (*ursprünglicheres Kennenlernen*), a 'becoming-familiar' that has to be learned beforehand (*zuvor gelernt sein muss*), so that such particular weapons as this model of gun I am using and its corresponding parts can be at all. This 'becoming-familiar' is what makes it possible to produce the thing; and the thing produced, in turn, makes its practice and use possible.[95] Heidegger refers to (iii) as 'the original learning:'

> The original learning [*Das ursprüngliche Lernen*] takes into cognition [*in die Kenntnis nehmen*] what a thing is, what a weapon is, and what a thing to be used is. But we already know that. We do not first learn what a weapon is when we 'become-familiar' [*kennenlernen*] with this rifle or with a certain model of rifle. We already know that in advance and must know it; otherwise we could not perceive [*vernehmen*] the rifle as such at all. Because we know in advance what a weapon is, and only in this way, does what we see laid out before us first become *visible* [sichtbar] as what it is. Of course, we know what a weapon is only in a general and in an indefinite way. When we come to know this in a *proper* [eigens] and determined way, we come to know something which we really already know. Precisely this "taking cognizance" [*zur Kenntnis Nehmen*] is the genuine essence of learning, the μάθησις.[96]

This last quote has an explicit description of μάθησις and an implicit one of μαθήματα. However, following Heidegger's analysis the latter is made clear:

> The μαθήματα, the mathematical, is that "about" things which we already know. Therefore we do not first get it out of things but in a certain way, we bring it already with us.[97]

Taken together, these remarks suggest an understanding of μαθήματα and μάθησις in the following terms:

[95] Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 72; translation modified. GA 41, pp. 72-73
[96] Ibid., pp. 72-73; translation modified. GA 41, p. 73
[97] Ibid., p. 74

Μαθήματα:

a) That 'about' things which we already know. Therefore, we do not first get it out of things, but, in a certain way, we bring it already with us. This is something that we know only in a general (*allgemeinen*) and in an undetermined (*unbestimmten*) way.[98]

Μάθησις:

b) The 'coming to know' (*zur Kenntnis bringen*) of (a) in a *proper* (*eigens*) and determined (*bestimmt*) way. This is a 'coming to know' something that we already know. This 'taking cognizance' (*zur Kenntnis Nehmen*) is the genuine essence of learning: μάθησις.[99]

Heidegger states that what must be understood as the mathematical is what we can learn in the way signaled by (b).[100] As it has become clear, this *what* corresponds to (a). However, a further step is needed in order to complete Heidegger's analysis of the mathematical. This consists in unfolding the full sense of the respect in which the expression τὰ μαθήματα concerns things:

> The μαθήματα are the things insofar as we take cognizance of them [*in die Kenntnis nehmen*] as what we already know them to be in advance, the body as the bodily, the plant-like of the plant, the animal-like of the animal, the thingness of the thing, and so on.[101]

Heidegger unfolds the meaning of the mathematical in terms of a 'fundamental position we take toward things.' More specifically, he states that the mathematical always has two meanings:

[98] Ibid., pp. 72-74
[99] Ibid., pp. 72-73
[100] Ibid., p. 75
[101] Ibid., p. 73

(1): the mathematical is that evident aspect of things within which we are always already moving and according to which we experience them as things at all, and as the things that they are (*als Dinge und als solche Dinge erfahren*).[102]

(2): the mathematical is that fundamental position toward things (*Grundstellung zu den Dingen*), in which we take up (*vor-nehmen*) things as they are already given to us, must and should be given to us.[103]

It is clear that the mathematical in terms of (a) and (1) coincide. However, (b) and (2) are not the same. (2) involves the determination of *our fundamental way of relating* to things whereas (b) corresponds to the *process of learning* what a thing is. For the sake of the analysis that I will carry on in the final section of this chapter, it is important to notice that (2) is grounded in (1) / (a), since we can only take up things as they are already given to us if there is something about them already given to us. The same reasoning applies to (b), which is clearly grounded in (1) / (a). Thus, I suggest that there are three senses of the mathematical at stake in *WT*: (1) / (a), (b) and 2, with (1) / (a) being the condition of the possibility of (b) and (2).

I think it is clear that (a) and (b) are two easily recognizable different senses of the mathematical, whereas this is not so in the case of (2). Nevertheless, I think that admitting three senses of the mathematical is crucial for accomplishing Heidegger's general aim in *WT*, i.e., to address the question 'what is a thing?' in a historical manner.[104] For him, the different formulas and definitions of the essence of the thing over time are only the residuum and sediment of the basic positions (*Grundstellungen*) taken by historical being

[102] Ibid., p. 75; translation modified. GA 41, p. 76
[103] Ibid., p. 75; translation modified. GA 41, p. 76
[104] Ibid., p. 40

(*geschichtliches Dasein*) toward and in the midst of beings taken as a whole.[105] Thus, to address this question historically is to ask about these basic positions.[106] To do this, Heidegger thinks it necessary to experience both the basic position of the Greeks and the initial transformation of the hitherto existing position toward things.[107] To experience this transformation '…requires that we perceive more exactly with clearer eyes what most holds us captive (*gefangen*) and makes us unfree (*unfrei*) in the experience and determination of the things. This is modern natural science, insofar as it has become a universal way of thinking along certain basic lines. The Greek origin also governs this, although changed, yet not alone and not predominantly.'[108] Clearly then, Heidegger's questioning about the 'character of modern natural science' is intended to get to this transformed 'basic position' toward things. This is the mathematical in terms of (2) and not in terms of (b). Because of this, it is only in relation to (2) that Heidegger's later peculiar treatment of 'the will of the mathematical' – fundamental for grasping the scope of his analysis in *WT* – can make sense. I will address this issue in the final section of this chapter.

Heidegger's description of the mathematical in terms of (a) and (b) opens up some relevant questions, such as: what kind of knowledge is that involved in (a)? What determines the occurrence of (b)? To what extent is it possible to give a separate account of (a) and (b)? Unfortunately, Heidegger does not refer to these issues here. However, I think it relevant to make two remarks regarding Heidegger's description of the mathematical so far. Usually, commentators of *WT* do not differentiate between Heidegger's analysis of the mathematical in terms of (a) and (b), or in terms of a 'position

[105] Ibid., p. 44
[106] Ibid.
[107] Ibid., p. 50
[108] Ibid., pp. 50-51

toward things.' However, this does not preclude them from grasping the general character of this analysis, which consists in understanding the mathematical in a 'basic sense,'[109] as 'all the necessary conditions for the possibility of recognizing a thing as what it is.'[110] According to Theodore Kisiel – probably the author who offers the most elaborated analysis of Heidegger's different senses of the mathematical – the mathematical in terms of (a) corresponds to 'any apriori knowledge whatsoever' and (b) to the process of learning in which we come to know – take cognizance of – the prior knowledge designated by (a).[111] In light of this, the first remark I want to make is that (a) and the corresponding occurrence of (b), places us in the realm of the concepts or representations of things. Secondly, given that (a) is what determines that what we see in front of us first becomes *visible as* what it is, a change in (a) will necessarily involve a change in the way things become *visible* for us.

[109] Roubach, M. (2008) *Being and Number in Heidegger's Thought* London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic. p. 84. As Barton points out, for Heidegger, this basic sense of the mathematical is 'larger than mathematics as the science of calculation itself' (Barton Jr, W.B. (1973) 'An Introduction to Heidegger's What is a Thing?' in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* Vol. 11, 1,2, pp. 15-25, p. 21). This being the case, why does mathematics – which Heidegger calls the 'narrow sense' of the mathematical (Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 76) – become the most familiar form of the mathematical and thus the mathematical itself? Heidegger addresses this problem by recourse to his understanding of the basic sense of the mathematical: because in our usual dealing with things, when we calculate or count, numbers are the closest to that which we recognize in things without creating it from them, they are the most familiar form of the mathematical (Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 75): 'We see three chairs and say that there are three. What "three" is the three chairs do not tell us, nor three apples, three cats nor any other three things. Moreover, we can count three things only if we already know "three." In thus grasping the number three as such, we only expressly recognize something which, in some way, we already have (Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 74). Michael Roubach offers an analysis of Heidegger's understanding of the relation between the mathematical and numbers. Roubach states that for Heidegger, the realms of number and geometric form 'manifest the essential character of the mathematical in the most unequivocal way. We cannot count unless we have a concept of what a number is' (Roubach, M. *Being and Number in Heidegger's Thought* p. 84). Hence, Heidegger's analysis of the mathematical entails that the essence of the mathematical does not lie in number but the other way around: because number has such a nature, therefore it belongs to what is learnable in the sense of μάθησις. (Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 75) Therefore, the numerical meaning of 'the mathematical' is derived from the basic meaning which Heidegger assigns to this concept in terms of (a) and thus, it is dependent on it. Heidegger's explanation why the numerical becomes the most familiar form of the mathematical and thus becomes mathematics itself is not unproblematic. However, for the purpose of the analysis that I intend to carry out in this thesis, what is relevant is to acknowledge that Heidegger understands numbers as the most clear expression of the mathematical in terms of (a).

[110] Ibid., 84

[111] Kisiel, T. (1973) 'The Mathematical and the Hermeneutical: On Heidegger's Notion of the Apriori' in Ballard E.G. and Scott C.F. (1973) *Martin Heidegger: In Europe and America* The Hague Netherlands: Springer, pp. 109-120, p. 109. Note that Kisiel uses the expression 'apriori.'

It is worth noting that Heidegger's analysis of the mathematical so far makes it clear that this concept has a Greek origin. As Glazebrook points out, Heidegger does not say which Greeks he is referring to in his discussion of the mathematical. However, she thinks it clear that he is echoing Plato's *Meno,*[112] as does Kisiel.[113] Hence, with the mathematical in terms of (a) Heidegger has in mind Plato's *Idea* while with (b) he has in mind Plato's 'reminiscence theory' of knowledge.[114] In fact, Heidegger explicitly refers to (b) as Socrates' constant doing: 'Socrates had no other topic than what the things are.'[115] Socrates was 'always saying the same thing about the same thing.'[116] As Glazebrook brings into view, Heidegger thinks Plato is 'the discoverer of the a priori who expresses that discovery in his doctrine that learning itself is nothing but recollection.'[117] In light of this, Kisiel's understanding of (a) as 'any apriori knowledge whatsoever' seems a very sensible interpretation.

The analysis of the mathematical so far clearly shows the Greek origin of this concept, but there is nothing specifically modern in the mathematical that could allow us to visualize the change and loss of Greek predominance in modern natural science; nothing that could allow us to understand what it is that has changed since the Greek origin of this concept that in modernity constitutes 'what most holds us captive and makes us unfree in the experience and determination of the things.'

[112] Glazebrook, T. *Heidegger's Philosophy of Science* p. 51
[113] Kisiel, T. 'The Mathematical and the Hermeneutical: On Heidegger's Notion of the Apriori,' p. 110
[114] Ibid., p. 110
[115] Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 74
[116] Ibid.
[117] Glazebrook, T. *Heidegger's Philosophy of Science* p. 29. Heidegger says this in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (See Heidegger, M. (1982) *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. p. 326)

II. THE SPECIFIC CHARACTER OF THE MATHEMATICAL IN MODERN SCIENCE: REPRESENTATIONS AGAINST EXPERIENCE

Heidegger now returns to the proposed direction of his analysis focusing on the transformation of science involved in the rising of modern natural science. 'Heidegger extracts the mathematical nature of modern science from the law of inertia as presented in Newton's *Principia*:'[118]

> Every body continues in its state of rest, or uniform motion in a straight line, unless it is compelled to change that state by force impressed upon it.[119]

Heidegger thinks of the discovery and establishment of this law as a revolution that belongs to the greatest in human thought, and which first provides the ground for the turning from the Ptolemaic to the Copernican conception of the universe.[120] During the preceding fifteen hundred years, he thinks, scientific-conceptional thought (*begrifflich-wissenschaftliche Denken*) was specially guided by those fundamental representations (*Grundvorstellungen*), fundamental concepts (*Grundbegriffe*) and fundamental principles (*Grundsätze*) which Aristotle had set forth in his lectures on physics and the heavens (*De Caelo*), and which were taken over by the medieval Scholastics.[121] Consequently, Heidegger approaches the task of explaining the character of the mathematical in modern science by indicating the way in which this fundamental law relates to the earlier *conception of nature.* He will do this by comparing *the experience of nature* in Aristotle and Newton through the differences between their doctrines of motion.

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[118] Roubach, M. *Being and Number in Heidegger's Thought* p. 85; Glazebrook, T. *Heidegger's Philosophy of Science* p. 53
[119] Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 78
[120] Ibid., p. 79
[121] Ibid., p. 80

Heidegger thinks that both Aristotle and Newton had a similar basic attitude toward procedure (*Grundhaltung im Vorgehen*). For both, the basic principle of scientific method was the observation of phenomena themselves, and the subsequent inference to propositions by general induction.[122]

> But despite this similar attitude toward procedure, the basic position of Aristotle is essentially different from that of Newton. For *what* is in each case apprehended as appearing and at the same time *how* it is interpreted, are not the same [*denn* was *jeweils als Erscheinendes gleichsam festgenommen und* wie *es ausgelegt wird, ist hier und dort nicht das Gleiche*].[123]

This means that the way in which things become *visible* for Aristotle and the way in which things become *visible* for Newton is different. According to my previous analysis of the mathematical, this implies that the mathematical in terms of (a) is different in both of them. As I will argue in what follows, the change of (a) and the corresponding occurrence of (b) from Aristotle to Newton, is a change from 'representations' to 'modern representations.'

At the centre of Heidegger's brief exposition of Aristotle's fundamental conceptions about nature and motion is the fact that *how* a body moves is determined by its *nature*, and that this nature itself is entirely attached to the *place* to which the body belongs: 'Each body has *its* place *according to its kind*, and it strives towards that place.'[124] This is why the purely earthly body (like a rock) moves downward and the purely fiery body (as every blazing flame) moves upward, because the earthly has its place below and the fiery above.[125] Heidegger compares Aristotle's fundamental conceptions about nature and motion with the ones involved in Newton's first law by establishing eight differences

[122] Ibid., pp. 80-82
[123] Ibid., p. 82; translation modified. GA 41, p. 83
[124] Ibid., p. 83
[125] Ibid.

between them.[126] All the changes that these differences establish (e.g.: change in the concept of nature and change in the manner of questioning nature) are linked together and uniformly based on *the new basic position* expressed on the first law and which Heidegger calls 'mathematical.'[127] The sense in which the mathematical becomes decisive in Newton's first law is expressed by the fact that it:

> …speaks of a body, *corpus quod a viribus impressis non cogitur*, a body which is left to itself. Where do we find it? There is no such body [*Einen solchen Körper gibt es nicht*]. There is also no experiment which could bring such a body to intuitive representation [*Es gibt auch kein Experiment, das jemals einen solchen Körper in die anschauliche Vorstellung bringen könnte*]…This law speaks of a thing that does not exist. It demands a fundamental representation of things [*Grundvorstellung von den Dingen*] which contradict the ordinary [*gewöhnlichen widerspricht*].[128]

As most commentators notice, the crucial issue for Heidegger here is that he thinks that there is no way in which this law can be interpreted as being derived from our experience.[129] From this quotation, and following the contrast Heidegger makes with Aristotle, I think Heidegger understands Aristotle's fundamental representations of things as *representations that do not contradict the ordinary: intuitive representations,* whereas, on the contrary, he understands Newton's law as a *representation of things that do contradict the ordinary.* Given that Heidegger's analysis of modern science is not limited to the understanding of nature that arises from modern physics but is extended to modernity as a whole, I suggest that this last type of representations corresponds to Heidegger's understanding of *modern representations*.

[126] Ibid., pp. 86-88
[127] Ibid., p. 88
[128] Ibid., p. 89; translation modified. GA 41, pp. 89-90. This is a particularly relevant modified translation since it corresponds to a crucial notion for my analysis. The standard English translation for *anschauliche Vorstellung* is 'direct perception.'
[129] Roubach, M. *Being and Number in Heidegger's Thought* p. 85; Glazebrook, T. *Heidegger's Philosophy of Science* p. 87

The notion of representation with which Heidegger is working in *WT* is the following: 're-present (*Vor-stellen*) means to put something before oneself and to have it before one, as the subject to have something present toward oneself and back onto oneself.'[130]

This is the background against which Heidegger gives a first description of the specific character of the mathematical in modern science:

> The mathematical is based on such a claim, i.e., the application of a determination of the thing, which is not experientially created [*die nicht erfahrungsmässig aus diesem selbst geschöpft ist*] out of the thing and yet lies at the base of every determination of the things, making them possible and making room for them.[131]

As Michael Roubach points out, the determination of a thing's motion in advance, prior to any sensory perception of it and against the evidence of experience, is the mathematical component of modern physics.[132] Such a *fundamental conception of the things,* i.e., a representation of things that contradict the ordinary – which is against the evidence of experience – is neither arbitrary nor self-evident. This is why it required a long controversy to bring it into power. In order to characterize this controversy Heidegger refers to Galileo's experiment of the free fall.[133] In this analysis, two levels of what may be called 'advanced knowledge' can be distinguished:

1. Galileo's *mente concipere*: 'I think in my mind of a body thrown on a horizontal plane and every obstacle excluded. This results in what has been given a detailed account in another place, that the motion of the body over this plane would be uniform and perpetual if this place were extended infinitely.' Heidegger thinks of it as the antecedent of the First Law of Newton.[134]

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[130] Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 136
[131] Ibid., p. 89
[132] Roubach, M. *Being and Number in Heidegger's Thought* p. 85
[133] Heidegger, M. *WT* pp. 88-90. Heidegger interprets Galileo as the direct antecedent of Newton's first law of motion. This means that he interprets it as a modern scientist.
[134] Ibid., p. 91

2. Galileo's proposition: 'all bodies fall equally fast and that the differences in the time of fall only derive from the resistance of the air.' This corresponds to Galileo's hypothesis.[135]

Guided by this proposition (hypothesis), Galileo did his experiment at the leaning tower in the town of Pisa. In spite of the differences in time at which the different bodies arrived after having fallen from the tower and therefore, really *against the evidence of experience*,[136] says Heidegger, Galileo upheld his proposition.

> Both Galileo and his opponents saw the same "fact." But they interpreted the same fact differently and made the same happening visible to themselves in different ways. Indeed, what appeared for them as the essential fact and truth was something different.[137]

The reason for this disagreement is that both thought something different regarding the essence of a body and the nature of its motion.[138] In the case of Galileo, this is expressed in his *mente concipere*, which, as the antecedent of Newton's first law, *constitutes a determination of the essence of a body and the nature of its motion that contradicts the ordinary, which is against the evidence of experience*. Galileo upholds his proposition (hypothesis) *against* the evidence of experience, because his proposition (hypothesis) is guided by and built on his *mente concipere*. As it has become clear, in this 'thinking in my mind' (*mente concipere*) a determination of things *against the evidence of experience* (modern representation) lies the specific character of the mathematical in modern science.[139]

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[135] Ibid., p. 90
[136] Ibid.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Ibid.
[139] Although Heidegger does not refer to the notion of 'thought experiments,' his account of Newton and Galileo in connection to his idea of a 'thinking in the mind' (*mente concipere*) makes it quite reasonable to think that Heidegger is asserting that modern science arrives at its fundamental axioms via thought experiments. The evident and difficult problem that follows lies in the fact that he thinks that this 'thinking in the mind' argues against the evidence of experience. How is it to be understood that, the mathematical,

On this basis, Heidegger summarizes the mathematical essence of modern science in six points:

1.- The mathematical is, as *mente concipere*, a project (*Entwurf*) of *thingness* which, as it were, leaps past (*hinwegspringender*) the things. The project first opens a domain (*Spielraum*) where things –, i.e., facts – show themselves. As Pattison states, '[m]athematics is projective, in that it runs on ahead of actual experience, determining in advance and entirely in terms of its own self determining laws what can and cannot count as knowable.'[140]

2.- The project is axiomatic. The anticipating determinations and assertions in the project are axioms. These axioms set things upon their foundation in advance. The axioms are fundamental propositions.

3.- As axiomatic, the mathematical project is the anticipation (*Vorausgriff*) of the essence of things, of bodies; thus the basic blueprint (*Grundriss*) of the structure of every thing and its relation to every other thing is sketched in advance.

4.- This basic plan (*Grundriss*) at the same time provides the measure for laying out the realm that will in the future encompass all things of that sort. Nature is now the realm of the uniform space-time context motion, which is outlined in the axiomatic project and in which alone bodies can be bodies as a part of it and anchored in it.

5.- This realm of nature, axiomatically determined in outline by this project, now also requires for the bodies and corpuscles within it a mode of access (*Zugangsart*) appropriate to the axiomatically predetermined objects. Natural bodies are now only what they *show* themselves as within this projected realm. How they show themselves is thus prefigured

arguing against the evidence of experience, is actually able to determine experience? I will address this issue in chapter four by reference to the difference between 'ordinary experience' and 'the empirical.'

[140] Pattison, G. *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to The Later Heidegger* p. 93

in the project. Therefore, the project also determines the mode of taking in and studying of what shows itself, experience, the *experiri*. Because inquiry is now predetermined by the outline of the project, a line of questioning can be instituted in such a way that it poses conditions in advance to which nature must answer in one way or another. Upon the basis of the mathematical, the *experientia* becomes modern experiment.

6.- Because the project establishes a uniformity of all bodies according to relations of space, time and motion, it also makes possible and requires a universal uniform measure as an essential determination of things, i.e., numerical measurement.[141]

Glazebrook does not distinguish between intuitive representations and representations against experience, and neither (as far as I have been able to discover) does any other commentator. However, Glazebrook is aware that the notion of representation in the context of Heidegger's analysis of the mathematical in modern science has a specific character. This is why she states that she addresses 'the question of representation in science insofar as that representation is mathematical.'[142] The first problem with this characterization is its dependence on a notion which is thought by Heidegger in three different ways. Although Glazebrook does not distinguish between the three meanings of the mathematical, her account is generally in terms of (a). On the basis of this meaning of the mathematical, she interprets Heidegger's understanding of the mathematical in *WT* as that which carries epistemic certainty. Reason, Glazebrook says, is certain of its own creation, 'Heidegger means by the mathematical not just what is projective, but also what carries epistemic force. His phrase "the mathematical projection of nature" can be read as "the epistemically certain projection of nature." He is interested in showing how nature

[141] These six points are developed between pages 92 and 94 of *WT*. I have modified the translation of the German word *hinwegspringender*.
[142] Glazebrook, T. *Heidegger's Philosophy of Science* p. 71

is projected in modern physics as something about which certainty can be had.'[143] I completely agree with Glazebrook in that what I, following Heidegger, designate as representations against experience is fundamentally connected to the notion of certainty. I will come back to this in the final section of this chapter. However, there is a second problem with Glazebrook's notion of 'mathematical representation.' This notion does not make reference to its problematic relation with *ordinary experience* – as it is clear in the notion of representations against experience – and this makes Glazebrook miss a central characteristic of modern representations. I think the analysis so far supports the idea that the notion of experience involved in the notion of representations against experience is 'ordinary experience.'

[143] Ibid., p. 52

III.- REPRESENTATIONS AGAINST EXPERIENCE AS THE FULFILMENT OF THE MATHEMATICAL: THE INNER PROBLEMATIC CHARACTER OF THE A PRIORI

In paragraph 10 of *MFL*, named: 'The problem of transcendence and the problem of Being and Time,' Heidegger reiterates that the understanding-of-being is the basic problem of metaphysics as such and highlights the intrinsic necessity of addressing this problem in its relation to time. Therefore, he focuses on the sense in which this understanding is prior:

> In an obscure sense, being is prior. It grows clearer, in a certain way, if we refer to something else that Plato, in particular, saw in his doctrine of ἀνάμνησις. Being is what we recall, what we accept as something we immediately understand as such, what is always already given to us; being is never alien but always familiar, "ours." Being is, accordingly, what we always already understand, and we only need to recall it once again to grasp it as such. In grasping being we do not conceive anything new, but something basically familiar; we always already exist in an understanding-of-being, insofar as we relate to what we now call "beings."[144]

From this quote it is clear that in 1928 Heidegger takes Plato to be a thinker who grasped the fact that we have a prior understanding of Being. Commensurate with this, in his work *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*[145] (1927), Heidegger refers to Plato as 'the discoverer of the a priori who expresses that discovery in his doctrine that learning itself is nothing but recollection'[146] and he says this precisely in the context of addressing the problem of our prior understanding of Being in its relation to time. In brief, in 1927-1928 Plato is seen by Heidegger as a thinker to whom we can legitimately refer in order to understand the problem of our prior understanding of Being ('the ontological'), that is, the basic problem of metaphysics as such.

[144] Heidegger, M. *MFL* p. 147
[145] Hereafter *BPP*
[146] Heidegger, M. *BPP* p. 326

As I have already pointed out, in *WT* Heidegger defines 'the mathematical' in terms of (a) as 'that 'about' things which we already know and, therefore, we do not first get it out of things, but, in a certain way, we bring it already with us.' In other words, (a) is our prior understanding of entities not derived from our encounter with them, that is: our prior understanding of Being. As I have also pointed out, in *WT* Plato's *Idea* is the unmentioned but evident reference for what Heidegger means by (a) and, in line with this, the mathematical in terms of (b) in *WT* points to Plato's 'reminiscence theory' of knowledge. In brief, in the mid-30s Plato is seen as a thinker to whom we can legitimately refer in order to understand 'the mathematical' (our prior understanding of Being).

I think that by beginning to characterize ontological issues in terms of the mathematical, Heidegger shows that the basic notion of a prior understanding of entities not derived from our encounter with them is not continuous between the late 20s and the mid-30s.

Since McNeill's proposal of the withdrawal of Being entails this same conclusion I suggest that an account of the reason for the change in terminology from the ontological to the mathematical might allow us to deepen our understanding of the notion of a withdrawal of Being.

In line with what I said in the Introduction to this chapter, this account requires understanding what 'the mathematical' is for Heidegger, which in its turn requires understanding the distinction between intuitive representations and representations against experience. Because of this and the fact that the analysis has so far focused on representations against experience, it is first necessary to delve into Heidegger's view of intuitive representations in *WT*.

- Aristotle's intuitive representations

It is not difficult to see that Heidegger's stance towards representations against experience is a critical one. As I already pointed out, he thinks that the way of thinking of modern natural science is what most holds us captive and makes us unfree in the experience and determination of the things; a way of thinking which he thinks is guided by representations against experience.

In the case of intuitive representations, it is true that Heidegger is never as explicit as in the case of representations against experience regarding his stance towards this notion. However, I think it right to say that insofar as intuitive representations are the type of representations which Heidegger assigns to Aristotle's thinking in *WT* and that, in line with this, are the background against which Heidegger develops his view of representations against experience, it is clear that his stance towards this type of representations is a sympathetic one.

Heidegger's sympathetic attitude towards Aristotle's thinking recurs throughout his work. In the context of Heidegger's analysis of modern science, it is seen in his repeated contrast between ancient and modern science. As Glazebrook points out, in the 1930s, Heidegger argues 'that the transition from the ancient experience of nature to that of Galileo and Newton is the move from a realism in which φύσις, nature, is a priori – that is, prior to thought – to an idealism in which the a priori formulation of a hypothesis precedes the investigation of nature.'[147] However, as Glazebrook is also aware, 'Heidegger began thinking through the difference between ancient and modern science

[147] Glazebrook, T. *Heidegger's Philosophy of Science* p. 6

as early as 1916 in *Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft.* Here he noted that in ancient natural philosophy, Aristotle "searched for the metaphysical essence and hidden causes arising in immediate actuality (*unmittelbaren Wirklichkeit*)".'[148] As Glazebrook points out, in Heidegger's view, observation for Aristotle consists in seeing how things behave in their natural context.[149] As she states, this is a view that Heidegger sustains in 1916 as well as in 1938 in a work like *AWP*.[150]

Heidegger's association of Aristotle's thinking on science with 'immediate actuality' and/or 'the natural context' argues in favour of associating intuitive representations with these two notions. In what follows, I offer a way of understanding Heidegger's view of Aristotle's thinking in *WT* that serves for the purpose of arguing in favour of this last association.

In *WT* Heidegger says with respect to Aristotle's fundamental conceptions about nature and motion that: 'the *where* determines the *how* of being, because being means *presence.*'[151] (*Das* Wo *bestimmt das* Wie *des Seins; denn Sein heisst* Anwesenheit). What can this mean?

As I previously pointed out, in *WT* Heidegger states that for Aristotle, '[e]ach body has *its* place *according to its kind*, and it strives towards that place.' If by 'nature' it is understood the 'what' of a being, by 'place' the 'where' of a being and by 'striving towards that place' the 'how' of a being, I think that it can be said that this last statement

[148] Glazebrook, T. (1998) 'Heidegger on the Experiment' in *Philosophy Today* Vol. 42:3, pp. 250-261, p. 250
[149] Ibid., p. 251
[150] Ibid., p. 250-251
[151] Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 84; translation modified. GA 41, p. 85

poses a connection between the 'what' and the 'where' of a being, both determining the 'how' of a being. But in the former statement regarding Aristotle's fundamental conceptions about nature and motion, the 'what' of a being is omitted. This is, I suggest, a revealing omission. In light of my analysis so far I think that the reason for this omission is that Heidegger understands the 'what' of a being – in the Aristotelian context – as fundamentally connected with the 'where' of a being *as its being situated in the world* (immediate actuality / the natural context). This is a connection that Heidegger wants to emphasize by only mentioning the 'where' of a being as determinant of the 'how' of being, since the rupture of this connection and the subsequent leaving behind of the importance of the 'where' as its being situated in the world (because of its replacement with the 'where' as a *thinking in the mind*) is fundamentally related to the change from intuitive representations to representations against experience.

As Heidegger's analysis of Galileo's *mente concipere* shows, in Galileo the connection between the 'what' of a being and the 'where' of a being as its 'being situated in the world' is replaced by the connection between the 'what' of a being and the 'where' of a being as a thinking in the mind. Through experience, intuitive representations maintain a fundamental connection with the 'where' of a being as its being situated in the world (that is, a connection between the 'what' and the 'where' of beings), whereas representations against experience break this connection and leave behind the 'where' of a being as its being situated in the world by replacing it with the 'where' of a being as a thinking in the mind. As I already stated, this replacement is made explicit in Heidegger's account of Galileo's *mente concipere.*

In light of this, I suggest that Heidegger's sympathetic stance towards intuitive

representations is due to the fact that this type of representations maintains a relation with 'immediate actuality' and/or 'the natural context,' whereas Heidegger's critical stance towards representations against experience is due to the fact that this type of representations does not. I will return to this issue later in this chapter in reference to Heidegger's concern for the ontic.

- An account of the reason for the change in terminology from 'the ontological' to 'the mathematical:' representations against experience as the fulfilment of the mathematical

As I have already suggested, in order to understand Heidegger's change in terminology from the ontological to the mathematical it is first necessary to understand his view of the mathematical itself. As I also pointed out, this last understanding can only be achieved in light of Heidegger's distinction between intuitive representations and representations against experience. How is this so?

Given Heidegger's description of (a) as 'that 'about' things which we already know and that therefore, we do not first get it out of things, but, in a certain way, we bring it already with us,' it appears that intuitive representations are determinations of the things that, in accordance with (a), we do not first get out of things, *but despite this*, they are experientially created out of the thing since they do not go against the evidence of experience. On the other hand, it appears that representations against experience are determinations of the things that, in accordance with (a), we do not first get out of the things and, *accordingly*, following Heidegger's description, they are not experientially created out of the thing since they do go against the evidence of experience.

This scenario opens up the following question: since the mathematical, by its original Greek – ontological – definition in terms of (a) involves a knowledge that is not taken out of things, can 'representations against experience' be understood as the development and fulfilment of this concept? I think the answer to this question should be a positive one. This being the case, the mathematical in terms of (a) would be the condition of the possibility of the specific character of the mathematical in modern science, i.e., of representations against experience. Wouldn't this imply that the mathematical does not only become a problem for Heidegger in its modern expression but also in its Greek – ontological – definition? I think the answer to this question should be a positive one. Indeed, I suggest that this is the reason for Heidegger's reference to ontological issues in terms of the mathematical in *WT*. In other words, because the ontological itself becomes problematic for Heidegger, he uses the expression 'the mathematical' to refer to it, an expression that carries within itself the problematic character of the ontological.

In his own way Kisiel had already realized that Heidegger's understanding of the mathematical points to Heidegger's own way of understanding ontological issues: 'In more ways than one, there seems to be an overlap between the mathematical and the hermeneutical as conceived by Heidegger. In its apriori knowledge, in its making explicit of something that is already implicit, in its circular structure, in its "always saying the same about the same," the mathematical is strongly reminiscent of Heidegger's own way of thinking, which he is more prone to call hermeneutical than mathematical. And yet, at least one interpreter has been led to assert that *Being and Time* itself is in fact mathematical in Heidegger's own sense.'[152]

[152] Kisiel, T. 'The Mathematical and the Hermeneutical: On Heidegger's Notion of the Apriori,' p. 110. The interpreter to which Kisiel refers is Laszlo Versenyi. See Versenyi, L. (1965) *Heidegger, Being, and Truth* New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 78-79

However, on what grounds is it possible to talk about a 'fulfilment' of a concept? Heidegger addresses this question in *WT* with recourse to the notion of 'will' (*Wille*). For him, the mathematical has a *will* to a self-grounding of knowledge that involves the rejection of the pre-given (*vorgegebene*).[153] In his analysis, Heidegger also refers to this *will* as the 'own inner drive' (*inneren Zug*) of the mathematical.[154] By recourse to the notion of 'will,' Heidegger is clearly personalizing the mathematical. Although this looks strange at first sight, it does not if we consider Heidegger's understanding of the mathematical in terms of a fundamental position *we* take towards things. Given that this last understanding of the mathematical, i.e., the mathematical in terms of 2, is grounded in the mathematical in terms of (a)/1, the notion of 'the will of the mathematical' involves (a)/1. Therefore, I think representations against the evidence of experience – modern representations – can be understood as a fulfilment of the mathematical. Furthermore, Heidegger is clear in stating that every sort of thought – in this case, modern thought whose fundamental trait is the mathematical – 'is always only the execution and consequence of the historical mode of being (*Dasein*) at that time, of the fundamental position taken toward what is and toward the way in which what is, is manifest as such, i.e., to the truth.'[155]

Heidegger's treatment of the will of the mathematical is fundamentally connected to the notion of truth as certainty. For him, the will of the mathematical to a self-grounding of knowledge that involves the rejection of the pre-given is a will for certainty. Therefore, Glazebrook's understanding of 'mathematical representation' (her equivalent to representations against experience) as that which carries epistemic force is without doubt

[153] Heidegger's treatment of the will of the mathematical is carried out in sections 4.f.1 and 4.f.2 of *WT* pp. 96-106
[154] Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 97
[155] Ibid., pp. 95-96

accurate. In fact, Heidegger's understanding of Rene Descartes' *cogito sum* (the thinker who *par excellence* is linked by Heidegger to the determination of truth as certainty) as a result of the will of the mathematical supports this view:[156]

> Descartes does not doubt because he is a skeptic; rather, he must become a doubter because he posits the mathematical as the absolute ground and seeks for all knowledge a foundation that will be in accord with it. It is a question not only of finding a fundamental law for the realm of nature, but finding the very first and highest basic principle for the being of what is, in general. This absolutely mathematical principle cannot have anything in front of it and cannot allow what might be given to it beforehand.[157]

In light of this, Heidegger continues to assert that the only thing that the mathematical accepts as given is the proposition in general as such, i.e., the positing, the position, in the sense of a thinking that asserts: 'The positing, the proposition, only has itself as that which can be posited. Only where thinking thinks itself, is it absolutely mathematical, i.e., a taking cognizance of that which we already have.'[158] According to Heidegger, when thinking and positing directs itself toward itself, it finds that 'whatever and in whatever sense anything may be asserted, this asserting and thinking is always an "*I* think." Thinking *is* always an "*I* think," *ego cogito*. Therein lies: I am, *sum*. Cogito, *sum* – this is the highest certainty lying immediately in the proposition as such.'[159] In Heidegger's view, 'I posit' is a 'proposition which does not depend upon something given beforehand, but only gives to itself what lies within it.'[160]

Heidegger's reference to a philosopher in his analysis of the mathematical in relation to modern science is not surprising given his view about the relation between the mathematical and metaphysics: '…modern natural science, modern mathematics and

[156] See section 4.f.2 of *WT* in light of section 4.f.1, pp. 96-106
[157] Heidegger, M. *WT* pp. 103-104
[158] Ibid., p. 104
[159] Ibid.
[160] Ibid.

modern metaphysics sprang from the same root of the mathematical in the wider sense.'[161] By modern metaphysics, Heidegger points to rational metaphysics, whose origin he places in Descartes' thinking and whose paradigmatic expression he finds in Leibniz's thinking.[162]

What does appear surprising is his reference to the 'pre-given' or to something 'given beforehand' when referring to the will of the mathematical and the 'I posit.' As it can be seen, these expressions are not equivalent to the expression 'already given' involved in the definition of the mathematical in terms of (a), since the former expressions do not point to an a priori knowledge as the latter expression does, but rather to that which encounters us in ordinary experience. This is a distinction that has to be kept in mind since it will reappear and will play a central role in the following chapter of this thesis.

As Kisiel clearly points out, '[t]he *mathesis* is the realm of pure reason independent of experience, which in its projects and from its concepts alone decides in advance what a thing is, without consideration of things encountered in the confusion of experience. Whence Leibniz could so pithily mark of this domain by his famous emendation to the Aristotelian dictum: "There is nothing in the intellect which is not first in the senses…except the intellect itself".'[163]

In light of this, and following Kisiel in understanding the mathematical in terms of (a) as 'any apriori knowledge whatsoever,' I think the analysis so far reveals that it is right to say that the a priori has an inner tendency to *break* with ordinary experience and become

[161] Ibid., p. 97
[162] Ibid., pp. 108-119
[163] Kisiel, T. 'The Mathematical and the Hermeneutical: On Heidegger's Notion of the Apriori,' p. 111

determined by *pure reason alone*. In light of the analysis so far, I think it clear that this determination is accomplished in representations against experience. As expected, the determination of the a priori by pure reason alone is a central focus of criticism in Heidegger's thinking on modernity since it is *the* expression of the mathematical way of thinking.

This being the case, I suggest that it is the inner tendency of the a priori to become determined by pure reason alone that makes the ontological itself become problematic for Heidegger. This in turn explains why he uses the expression the mathematical to refer to ontological issues that were earlier referred to as 'ontological', since – as I already pointed out – the expression 'the mathematical' carries within itself the problematic character of the a priori, that is, the problematic character of the ontological.

- The mathematical and the withdrawal of Being

In light of my analysis of the mathematical so far, how does the change in terminology from the ontological to the mathematical throw light upon the meaning of the notion of the withdrawal of Being?

My view is that because in the appearing of Being in beings Being withdraws (wide sense of the withdrawal of Being), when Being is thought as the a priori it *may* turn into (and according to the notion of the will of the mathematical it *should* turn into) a determination of Being out of pure reason alone and thereby into an imposition upon the meaning of Being which bears no relation with that which is given in ordinary experience (beings), that is, as representations against experience. In line with what I pointed out in chapter

one regarding Heidegger's view of the era of machination, I suggest that insofar as this type of representations corresponds to modern representations and that Heidegger has a critical stance towards this notion, the determination of Being out of pure reason alone explains the narrow sense of the withdrawal of Being. With this I mean to say that by imposing a meaning on Being which bears no relation to that which is given in ordinary experience (beings), representations against experience deprive beings of their very essence (Being) in modernity.

In the previous chapter I suggested that the notion of a withdrawal of Being and Heidegger's concern for the ontic are two essentially related notions, from which it seems sensible to expect that expanding on the understanding of one should result on expanding on the understanding of the other. How does my suggested understanding of the withdrawal of Being throw light upon the notion of Heidegger's concern for the ontic?

If the notion of the a priori understanding of Being becomes problematic for Heidegger because it may turn into a determination of Being out of pure reason alone, this is likely to strengthen his appreciation for 'the given' in ordinary experience. I suggest understanding this appreciation as a concern for the ontic.

In light of this, Freeman's suggestion that there is an increasing concern for the ontic on the part of Heidegger means an increasing concern for that which is given in ordinary experience. Is this an accurate view?

As I pointed out in the previous chapter, the expression 'ontic domain' in relation to metontology has been interpreted in various ways.

Further to this I suggested that the disappearance of metontology is due to the fact that it cannot account in a proper way for Heidegger's increasing concern for the ontic. Although I will give further support to this in what follows, I think that this releases the understanding of the ontic domain from its bond with the notion of metontology and thereby leaves it free to be interpreted in a new manner.

If 'the withdrawal of Being' and 'Heidegger's concern for the ontic' are two essentially related notions, I think it right to understand 'the ontic domain' in a way that goes together with the way in which I have suggested to understand the 'withdrawal of Being.' In other words, the ontic domain is the given in ordinary experience.

This is consistent with the way in which Heidegger refers to the ontic domain in *WT*. In the Introduction to *WT* Heidegger defines three different meanings of the word 'thing' and delimits his question to 'the narrower one,' i.e., present-at-hand beings (*Vorhandenes*). This includes all inanimate and all animate things, such as a rock, a clock, a rose and a lizard.[164] He has two reasons for this stipulation: the narrower signification is closer to our current linguistic usage, and the question concerning the thing, even where it is understood in its 'wider' (plans, decisions, historical things, etc.) and 'widest' (God, numbers, etc.) meanings, mostly aims at this narrower field and begins from it.[165] He continues to describe the narrow meaning to which he will refer as '…the things around us…what is most immediate, most capable of being grasped by the hand,'[166] '…the realm of the things immediately around us.'[167] Further to this, he points out that modern

[164] Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 6
[165] Ibid., p. 7
[166] Ibid.
[167] Ibid., p. 20

science's way of dealing with things leave behind the things immediately around us.[168] In light of this I think it clear that the ontic domain with which Heidegger is concerned in *WT* is the given in ordinary experience.

This understanding of the ontic domain also goes in line with the notions of 'immediate actuality' and/or 'the natural context,' thereby showing that it is an understanding consistent with the analysis that I have presented so far.

Glazebrook has interpreted Heidegger's appreciation for 'the given' in ordinary experience as a tendency towards realism. However, she thinks that Heidegger has always been a realist, but that his realism has developed from naïve realism to a robust realism, a development for which his insight into the problematic character of the a priori is crucial.[169] As Glazebrook points out, '… as long as Heidegger raises the question of being as a question of human understanding – specifically, as the a priori projected in scientific understanding – he cannot extricate the question of being from the history of idealism, from Kant's a priori. If being is taken as a concept, metaphysics remains embroiled in the web of transcendental subjectivity in which concepts are to be found. That *Being and Time* and *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* were never completed is not symptomatic of Heidegger's failure, but of his eventual insight that being is not prior *in* human understanding, but rather prior *to* human understanding.'[170] The idea that being is prior *to* human understanding and not prior *in* human understanding is one which Glazebrook relates to different issues such as Heidegger's later understanding of being as φύσις, issues

[168] Ibid.
[169] Glazebrook, T. (2001) 'Heidegger and Scientific Realism' in *Continental Philosophy Review* Vol. 34, 4, pp. 362-401
[170] Glazebrook, T. *Heidegger's Philosophy of Science* pp. 45-46

which in her interpretation demonstrate Heidegger's commitment to realism.[171] But Glazebrook's understanding of realism in Heidegger's case is not conventional. She thinks Heidegger is a realist who nonetheless holds antirealists assumptions: 'His realist commitment to the transcendent actuality of nature goes hand in hand with the thesis that human understanding is projective, and its corollary that the idea of a reality independent of understanding is unintelligible.'[172] In this way, Glazebrook thinks that Heidegger's realism exchanges the either/or of realism/antirealism for a both/and.[173]

In light of the analysis so far I think it clear that my analysis of the mathematical and representation in *WT* throws light upon the idea of the withdrawal of Being and, in so doing, it further illuminates the understanding of Heidegger's concern for the ontic.

Following what I have already suggested my view is that Heidegger's (increasing) concern for the ontic is related to the fact that in 1928 he begins to realize that the a priori has a tendency to break with ordinary experience and become determined by pure reason alone. As I already pointed out, the determination of the a priori by pure reason alone is a central focus of criticism in Heidegger's thinking on modernity since it is *the* expression of the mathematical way of thinking. I suggest that by the year 1935 the insight that the a priori has a tendency to break with ordinary experience and become determined by pure reason alone has settled in Heidegger's thinking, as his critical stance towards the notion of 'the mathematical' (a priori) shows. I suggest that my analysis of Heidegger's treatment of the notion of representation in *WT* argues in favour of this interpretation.

[171] Glazebrook, T. 'Heidegger and Scientific Realism,' pp. 369-376
[172] Ibid., p. 362
[173] Ibid.

I have argued that representations against experience are the fulfilment of 'the mathematical,' which means that this type of representations – following their 'mathematical' basis – breaks with ordinary experience and become determined by pure reason alone. As I have already suggested this also means that representations against experience do not maintain a relation with 'immediate actuality' and/or 'the natural context,' this being the reason for Heidegger's critical stance towards this type of representations. In the case of intuitive representations (representations which are not – *already* – a fulfilment of their 'mathematical' basis), I have argued that Heidegger's sympathetic stance towards this type of representations is due to the fact that they do maintain a relation with 'immediate actuality' and/or 'the natural context,' and so do not break with ordinary experience.

With this in view, I suggest that Heidegger's critical stance towards representations against experience can also be understood as a consequence of the fact that they do not maintain a relation with the ontic domain, whereas Heidegger's sympathetic stance towards intuitive representations can be understood as a consequence of the fact that they do maintain a relation with the ontic domain. In other words, Heidegger's critical stance towards representations against experience is due to the fact that the projection of the relevant domain that they involve (given their 'mathematical' basis) is a projection that in some way is not in accordance with that same domain,[174] whereas Heidegger's sympathetic stance towards intuitive representations is due to the fact that the projection of the relevant domain that they involve (given their 'mathematical' basis) is a projection that is in accordance with that same domain. In this way I show how Heidegger's concern

[174] I am aware that this is a complex idea but I will offer a way of making sense of it in chapter four by reference to Glazebrook's view of both 'the encroachment of the real' and 'violence' in modern natural science.

for the ontic is involved in Heidegger's criticism of modern representations. Following Glazebrook's view that the withdrawal of Being is at the basis of Heidegger's criticism of representational thinking, I suggest that this gives further support to my view that the notion of the withdrawal of Being is essentially related to Heidegger's concern for the ontic.

In light of my analysis so far, I think it right to say that thinking Being as the a priori carries a *danger*. This danger consists in the fact that Being can break its relation with that which is given in ordinary experience (immediate actuality / the natural context) and become determined by pure reason alone. This, as I have already suggested, may result in imposing a meaning upon Being which bears no relation with that which is given in ordinary experience (beings). As I already pointed out, I suggest that this explains the narrow sense of the withdrawal of Being: beings are deprived of their very essence (Being) in modernity.

Since Heidegger thinks that Plato is the discoverer of the a priori, my view that the a priori carries a danger necessarily entails a critical stance towards Plato's *Idea*. This is in fact Heidegger's view respect to Plato in several of his works. In the final chapter of this thesis I will refer to this by way of Heidegger's view of Aristotle's thinking as closer to the pre-metaphysical determination of Being than Plato's thinking.

In relation to this, further to his view that the mathematical in terms of (a) corresponds to 'any apriori knowledge whatsoever,' Kisiel suggests that (a) corresponds to whatness. He further states that Plato's *Idea* (whatness) is decisive for the direction later taken by modern philosophy, and highlights that the critical point of this latent knowledge which

makes learning and inquiry possible is that it is not taken out of things but rather taken out of oneself, as Plato explicitly states.[175] The critical point that Kisiel here identifies goes together with my idea of the danger lurking in the a priori: if the a priori (Plato's *Idea* / whatness) were taken out of things (and not only out of oneself), it would not be possible for it to break with ordinary experience and become determined by pure reason alone. In other words, because the a priori is only taken out of oneself (and not out of things) it can (and according to the will of the mathematical it *should*) turn into a determination of Being out of pure reason alone.

It is not difficult to see that my view of the danger lurking in the a priori entails that the modern way of thinking was prefigured in Greek thinking. This is in fact Heidegger's view in several of his works. I will return to this issue in the final chapter of this thesis.

How does my suggested way of understanding the withdrawal of Being throw light upon the disappearance of metontology from Heidegger's thinking?

Recall that the reason why the notion of metontology disappears from Heidegger's thinking is that the thematization of Being is no longer assured. This suggests that the notion of metontology disappears precisely because it cannot account in a proper way for Heidegger's ontic concern, since it implies thematization and thematization implies thinking Being as the a priori ground of beings. This is a way of thinking Being which does not *necessarily* go together with Heidegger's ontic concern since it carries with it the possibility of breaking with ordinary experience (immediate actuality / the natural context) and become determined by pure reason alone. In other words, metontology is

[175] Kisiel, T. 'The Mathematical and the Hermeneutical: On Heidegger's Notion of the Apriori,' p. 110

without doubt a notion that entails an ontic concern on the part of Heidegger, as Freeman sustains. However, insofar as it is a notion indebted to the notion of ontology, it cannot account in a proper way for that same concern which is at the basis of its establishment and, therefore, in light of the persistence of this concern in Heidegger's thinking, this notion has to disappear. In light of this, I think it clear that metontology is in fact a failed attempt to break clear of the FO model.

How does the above-mentioned reason for the disappearance of metontology from Heidegger's thinking help to determine Heidegger's understanding of ontology and FO after *BT*?

It suggests that it is the danger of the a priori that is the determining factor in Heidegger's abandonment of FO and, in general, in his less clear commitment to ontology as the 'science of Being' in his later works. Needless to say, this cannot mean that Being ceases to be Heidegger's main concern in his works after *BT*; but it does entail that the means for thinking Being have to be rethought in ways which do not carry the danger of thinking Being as the a priori, that is, in ways which move away from ontology.

How does the danger lurking in the a priori influence Heidegger's thinking on Being? In other words: how does Heidegger's increasing concern for the ontic influence his thinking on Being?

CHAPTER THREE: HEIDEGGER'S INTERPRETATION OF KANT'S THINKING AS A DELIMITING OF THE MATHEMATICAL IN *WT*

INTRODUCTION

As W.B. Barton states, the characteristic of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant in *WT* is that Kant's treatment of intuition takes centre stage.[176] In the present chapter I will show that the reason for this is that Heidegger understands Kant's account of intuition as a delimiting of modern rational metaphysics, i.e., as a delimiting of the mathematical (a priori). Based on my analysis in chapter two this means that Heidegger's concern for the ontic (and therefore the insight into the danger lurking in the a priori) is at the basis of his interpretation of Kant's thinking in *WT*.

Chapter two established that Heidegger draws up a distinction between intuitive representations and representations against experience. His stance towards the latter of these notions was revealed to be clearly critical, whereas it was not so in the case of the former. I suggested that Heidegger's critical stance towards representations against experience is due to the fact that they are *the* expression of the mathematical position towards things. In light of this it seems reasonable to think that insofar as Kant's account of intuition is a delimiting of the mathematical, it is also a delimiting of representations against experience and that, therefore, his account of intuition amounts to a reinstatement of intuitive representations. Is this the case?

[176] Barton Jr, W.B.'An Introduction to Heidegger's What is a Thing?' p. 16

The question that guides the analysis of this chapter is: on what basis does Heidegger support his view of Kant's thinking as a delimiting of the mathematical?

I will argue that he does so by interpreting Kant's synthetic a priori in *WT* as a search for a balance between the a priori and the ontic or, in other words, an effort to stop to the danger lurking in the a priori. In this way, I will argue that Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's synthetic a priori is an attempt to adapt this notion to his own thinking on Being.

But the fact that Heidegger's example of representations against experience is Newton's first law of motion, which, as is well known, counts as a synthetic a priori knowledge, shows Heidegger's understanding of Kant's synthetic a priori to be far from straightforward. In light of this, we are confronted with the following question: how does Heidegger's understanding of Kant's notion of the synthetic a priori constitute the basis for his interpretation of Kant's account of intuition as a delimiting of the mathematical and therefore, of representations against experience?

As Cristina Lafont says, it is surely beyond question that Heidegger was not an orthodox Kantian.[177] In her essay *Heidegger and the Synthetic A Priori* she proposes to understand Heidegger's way of appropriating Kant's notion of the synthetic a priori as crucial for achieving a proper insight about Heidegger's relation to Kant's thinking. In her analysis Lafont states that Heidegger thinks that Newton's 'new basic concepts' are synthetic a priori knowledge.[178]

[177] Lafont, C. (2007) 'Heidegger and the Synthetic A Priori' in Galt, S, Malpas, J. (eds) *Transcendental Heidegger* New York, NY: Stanford University Press. p. 104
[178] Ibid., pp. 109-110

Drawing upon the distinction between intuitive representations and representations against experience, I will show that it is not the case that Heidegger thought of Newton's first law of motion as a synthetic a priori knowledge, at least not in terms of the meaning that this notion has for him in Kant. This will allow me to bring to light some aspects of Heidegger's understanding of Kant's notion of synthetic a priori judgements which are veiled for Lafont, insofar as she takes Heidegger's account of Newton's law of motion as an example for understanding Heidegger's account of Kant's synthetic a priori knowledge. The result of this analysis will lay the necessary grounds for evaluating to what extent Kant can be considered a thinker who delimits the mathematical.

I will suggest that, in line with Heidegger's last work on Kant, the only unquestionable aspect of Kant's thinking in which Heidegger can base his interpretation of it as a delimiting of the mathematical is Kant's view of existence as absolute position. The reason for this, I will argue, is that this view constitutes an unquestionable delimiting of the mathematical tendency to determine whatever there is out of pure reason alone. This analysis will result in casting further light into the danger lurking in the a priori.

I want to point out that my primary interest in dealing with Heidegger's interpretation of Kant in *WT* is to understand this interpretation in order to throw light upon Heidegger's own thinking. It is not in my interest here to evaluate if this is a defensible reading of Kant, since this goes beyond the scope of my thesis.

I. HEIDEGGER'S ACCOUNT OF KANT'S FOCUS ON INTUITION AND ITS ROLE IN THE DETERMINATION OF A THING

- Kant's focus on intuition: thought in the service of intuition

Heidegger's first reference to Kant's position with respect to the mathematical is found in the opening section of his analysis. By understanding "critique" in the title *Critique of Pure Reason*[179] as a delimitation of what is decisive and peculiar to the essence of reason,[180] Heidegger thinks that Kant's "critique" leads to a new delimiting (*neuen Wesensumgrenzung*) of pure reason and at the same time, therefore, of the mathematical:[181] 'In the execution of the "critique" of pure reason so understood, the "mathematical" in the fundamental sense first comes to its unfolding and, at the same time, to its being lifted (*Aufhebung*), i.e., to its own limit (*an seine eigene Grenze*).'[182] For Heidegger, to critique pure reason means 'to delimit (*Ausgrenzung*) the determination of the being of what is, the thingness of the thing, from out of pure reason; it means to survey and project those principles of pure reason upon whose ground something like a thing in its thingness is determined.'[183] From this, he suggests that the mathematical

[179] Hereafter *CPR*
[180] Heidegger, *WT* p. 120
[181] Ibid., p. 121
[182] Ibid., p. 121
[183] Ibid., p. 122. There is general agreement in translating the German word *Grenzen* in Kant's usage by the English word 'boundaries' whereas the word *Schranken* by 'limits.' The reason for this is that both words have different meanings in Kant's usage: whereas the former presuppose a space existing outside of certain definite place and enclosing it, the latter refers to mere negations which affect a quantity so far as it is not absolutely complete. Consequently, the former is used in reference to the boundaries of metaphysics, whereas the latter is used in reference to the limits to mathematics and natural and scientific knowledge. However, both terms are together in that Kant uses them as analogies for legitimate knowledge. (Caygill, H. (2000) *A Kant Dictionary* Malden MA: Blackwell Publishers. p. 279) A reading of the German version of *WT* shows that Heidegger does not use the word *Schranken* in reference to issues related to legitimate knowledge, but the word *Grenzen*. The word *Schranken* is only used in expressions like: 'we must once more limit (*einschränken*) the stretch of our way…' (Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 56), or 'we restrict (*beschränken*) ourselves to the presentation of the Aristotelian conception...' (Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 83). In light of Kant's usage of these terms I think that the way Heidegger understands the issues related to legitimate knowledge is much better expressed in the word 'boundaries' than the word 'limits,' which is the word that the translator of *WT* chooses for *Grenzen*. Therefore, it is important to notice that every time that the word 'limit' appears in the following chapter, it has to be understood in the sense of 'boundaries.' In light of this

characteristic of modern metaphysics is still preserved in this critique, that is, 'to determine in advance out of principles the being of what is,'[184] but Heidegger considers it a 'real effort' of this critique that it leads to a new formation and grounding of the mathematical.[185] In light of this, Heidegger regards the 'System of All Principles of Pure Understanding' as the ground-providing center of the *CPR*.[186] Hence, his aim of the interpretation of the *CPR* in *WT* will be 'to direct our inquiry and knowledge through this part in such a way that there results an understanding of the entire work. But even this understanding is only in the service of an insight into the question "What is a thing?".'[187]

The first and decisive indication for understanding Heidegger's view of Kant's philosophy as a new delimiting of the mathematical follows from Kant's definition of the essence of knowledge: 'In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, *intuition* is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thoughts as a means is directed. But intuition takes place only insofar as the object is given to us (*der Gegenstand gegeben wird*). This again is only possible, to man at least, insofar as the mind (*Gemüt*) is affected in a certain way.'[188] This essential definition of knowledge, says Heidegger, is the first and completely decisive blow (*Gegenschlag*) against rational metaphysics.[189] With this definition of knowledge Heidegger thinks 'Kant moved into a new fundamental position of man in the midst of

it should be expected that Heidegger uses the word *Grenzen* in *WT* and not the word *Schranken* because he views the former as the appropriate one to refer to 'the boundaries of pure reason' or 'the boundaries of the mathematical.' However, my analysis of *Kant's Thesis About Being* in the final section of this chapter will show that in this work Heidegger chooses the word *Schranken* in reference to 'the limits of understanding.' In light of this, I think that Heidegger turns a blind eye to the distinction between *Grenzen* and *Schranken* in Kant's usage and he understands both of these terms as pointing to the boundary (limit) between the knowable and the unknowable.

[184] Ibid., p. 122
[185] Ibid.
[186] Ibid., p. 122-123
[187] Ibid., p. 123
[188] Kant cited by Heidegger. Ibid., p. 134
[189] Ibid., p. 135

what is, or more precisely he lifted a position, which, at bottom, had always existed, into explicit metaphysical knowledge and laid a basis for it.'[190] Heidegger clearly states that the novelty of this definition lies in Kant's focus on intuition.[191] He thinks that from Kant's new definition of knowledge it follows that 'thought belongs to intuition and in such a way that it stands in the service of intuition.'[192] Therefore he thinks that human knowledge is a uniquely constructed unity of intuition and thought,[193] but a unity in which intuition has a priority over thought. As Heidegger points out, this union is possible because intuition and thought have something in common; they are both 'representations' (*Vorstellungen*).[194]

Why then, asks Heidegger himself, does the doctrine of intuition have around 40 pages whereas the doctrine of thought has more than 650 pages?[195] For Heidegger, the doctrine of thought is so extensive because thought has to be rethought in a new way:[196]

> The priority of logic in the *Critique of Pure Reason* has its ground solely in the non-priority of the object of logic, i.e., in placing thought into the service of intuition [*in der Dienststellung des Denkens gegenüber der Anschauung*] …The modest extent of the aesthetic – as the initial separate doctrine of intuition – is only an outward appearance. Since the aesthetic is now decisive, i.e., everywhere plays an authoritative part; therefore it makes so much work for logic. For this reason logic must turn so extensive.[197]

Heidegger thinks that the neo-Kantian interpretation of the *CPR* leads to a depreciation of intuition as the basic component of human knowledge, and that the Marburg school's interpretation even went so far as to eliminate altogether from the *CPR* intuition as a foreign body.'[198] Thinking that the question about knowledge in Kant is nothing more

[190] Ibid., p. 135
[191] Ibid.
[192] Ibid.
[193] Ibid.
[194] Ibid., p. 136
[195] Ibid., p. 144
[196] Ibid., pp. 146-147
[197] Ibid., p. 147
[198] Ibid., p. 145

than the question about judgment is for Heidegger a prejudice that has prevented penetrating into the center of his work.[199]

Heidegger's view of the fundamental role of the aesthetic and thus of intuition aligns him with a non-conceptualist reading of Kant's work. Although there are discrepancies between the different representatives of this reading, they all agree in reducing the importance of the role of concepts in favour of increasing the one of intuition. What motivates non-conceptualist readings is the view that Kant thinks that – to varying degrees depending on the type of non-conceptualist reading in question – intuitions are sufficient for the production of objectively valid cognitions over and above any conceptual contents (whether empirical or non-empirical) that might be associated with those intuitions.[200] Thereby, a central idea in which non-conceptualism finds support – amongst other ones – is that sensibility is the faculty 'through which objects are given to us,'[201] an idea which Kant states in various sections throughout the *CPR*. As Lucy Allais points out, Kant claims that intuitions are singular and immediate representations which give us objects.[202] It is not clear what Kant means by saying that intuitions *give* us objects and, consequently, this issue has been a central point in the discussion between

[199] Ibid. At this point of the argument Heidegger mentions the fact that the extensive treatment of the one component of knowledge, of thought, is stressed even more in the B edition of the *CPR* (Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 146). Following his argument, this would mean that in the B edition Kant makes an even stronger effort to rethink though and, thus, that the B edition would be an even more faithful intent to accomplish the 'novelty' of his thought than the A edition of the *CPR*. This is an interesting point since in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* Heidegger sees the priority of understanding of the B edition as a shrinking back from the insight achieved in the A edition about the synthesis of intuition and thought in imagination, an insight that shows how understanding is inherently finite through its inseparability from possible experience, its bond to intuition. (Heidegger, M. (1997) *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. p. 115)

[200] Hanna, Robert, 'The Togetherness Principle, Kant's Conceptualism, and Kant's Non-conceptualism.' Supplement to 'Kant's Theory of Judgment,' The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/kant-judgment/>. supplement1.html.

[201] Kant, I. (1998) *Critique of Pure Reason* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 152, A15/B29

[202] See Allais, L. (2015) *Manifest Reality: Kant's Idealism & his Realism* New York, NY: Oxford University Press. p. 146

conceptualist and non-conceptualist readings of Kant's work. In Allais' treatment of this issue, the *singularity* of intuition should be understood as their representing *perceptual particulars* and the *immediacy* of intuition should be understood as their giving us *acquaintance* with or *presenting* the particulars they represent. For her, this is what Kant means when he says that intuitions *give* us objects: intuitions give us acquaintance with objects.[203] As a non-conceptual reader of Kant, the role that Allais gives to intuition is of crucial importance, an importance that is precisely expressed in her understanding intuitions as 'giving us objects.' In light of this, it seems reasonable to think that Heidegger's view of the decisive role of intuition in Kant's *CPR* could entail conceiving intuitions in this way. If this were the case, one might develop an argument in favour of Heidegger's placing Kant on the side of intuitive representations as presented in chapter two, which would in turn explain his understanding of Kant's work as a delimiting of the mathematical. Does Heidegger think that Kantian intuitions present us with objects without the need of conceptual mediation?

- The twofold determination of the object and Kant's double usage of the term 'Gegenstand'

Following the twofold determination of human knowledge, that is, intuition and thought, Heidegger offers an account of the twofold determination of the object (*Gegenstand*) in Kant's thinking. Heidegger thinks that this twofold determination is seen in the German word *Gegenstand* itself:[204] 'What we are supposed to be able to know must encounter us from somewhere, come to meet us. Thus the "gegen" (against) in *Gegenstand*. But not just anything at all that happens to strike us (any passing visual or auditory sensation, any

[203] Ibid., pp. 147, 163
[204] Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 137

sensation of pressure or warmth) is already an object (*Gegenstand*). What encounters us must be determined as standing, something which has a stand and is, therefore, constant (*beständig*).'[205]

In this way, Heidegger says, an object (*Gegenstand*) in the strict sense of Kant is neither what is only sensed (*Empfundene*) nor what is perceived (*Wahrgenommene*).[206] Therefore, if I point to the sun and address it as the sun, thus named and intended it is not the object (*Gegenstand*) in the strict Kantian sense.[207] Likewise, if with reference to the given (*Gegebene*) we repeatedly ascertain something, we still have not attained comprehension of the object (*Gegenstand*). Therefore, says Heidegger, in the statements 'when the sun shines on the rock, it becomes warm' or 'every time the sun shines, the rock becomes warm,' sun and rock are not objects in the strict Kantian sense.[208] The being together of the representations of sun and rock in both assertions is simply a uniting of various perceptions, i.e., a perceptual judgment (*Wahrnehmungsurteil*).[209] 'Here my perceptions (as also those of every other perceiving "I") are always added to one another. This only determines how what is presently given to me appears to me.'[210] In contrast, Heidegger says, in the statement 'because the sun shines, the rock will therefore become warm,' an object (*Gegenstand*) in the strict Kantian sense is grasped.[211] The reason for this is that the sun is now represented as the cause and the becoming warm as the effect. Sun and rock are now joined not simply on the basis of the subjectively ascertainable succession of the perceptions, but they are grasped in the universal concepts of cause and

[205] Ibid.
[206] Ibid.
[207] Ibid., pp. 137-138
[208] Ibid., p. 138
[209] Ibid.
[210] Ibid.
[211] Ibid.

effect in themselves as they stand in themselves and to one another. This is an experiential judgment (*Erfahrungsurteil*). In this way, says Heidegger, what encounters us in sensation and perception and is intuitively given (*anschaulich Gegebene*) – the sun and sunshine, rock and warmth – this 'against' (*gegen*) only comes to the position of a state of affairs standing in itself when the given has already been represented universally and thought in such concepts as cause and effect, i.e., under the principle of causality in general.[212] Heidegger clearly states that the mere intuitive "against" (*das blose anschauliche "Gegen"*) is not yet an object (*Gegenstand*).' But what is only conceptually thought in general as something constant, he adds, is not yet an object (*Gegenstand*) either.[213]

In light of this Heidegger evaluates the opening sentence of the first section of the 'System of the Principles of Pure Understanding', that is, 'The Highest Principle of all Analytic Judgments:' 'The universal, though merely negative, condition of all our judgements in general, whatever be the content of our knowledge, and however it may relate to the object (*Objekt*), is that they be not self-contradictory; for if self-contradictory, these judgments are in themselves, even without reference to the object (*Objekt*), null and void.'[214] In this sentence, says Heidegger, the "content" of our knowledge has to be understood as always determined *by* what (and *as* what) is intuitively given: light, warmth, pressure (touch), color, sound. With respect to the relation to the object he says: 'The "relation to the *object*" (Objekt), i.e., to the object (*Gegenstand*) as such, consists in the fact that something intuitively given has been brought to stand in the generality and

[212] Ibid., p. 139
[213] Ibid., p. 140
[214] Ibid., p. 133

unity of a concept (cause-effect). But we must carefully note that it is always something intuitive that is brought to stand.'[215]

Given the distinction between the German words *Objekt* and *Gegenstand* in Kant's usage, it is striking that Heidegger equates the meaning of both words in this last quotation. Was Heidegger not aware of this distinction? Although there is evidence that Heidegger was aware of the distinction between these two words in Kant's usage,[216] there is no reference to this in his whole analysis of Kant in *WT* and a reading of the German text shows that Heidegger employs both words interchangeably.[217] The only explicit reference to these two words is found just after Heidegger's reference to the opening sentence mentioned above, where he states: 'Instead of "*Objekt*," Kant often uses the word "*Gegenstand*".'[218]

[215] Ibid., p. 141

[216] There is evidence that Heidegger was in fact aware of the distinction between these two words in Kant's usage. In the Translators' Forward to *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, the translators point out that in this work Heidegger 'is careful to maintain' the significant difference between the two German words *Gegenstand* and *Objekt* in Kant's usage (Heidegger, M. (1997) *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. p. xviii). According to the translators, 'Heidegger is fully consistent in his usage of these words throughout his text' (Heidegger, M. *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* p. xviii). For Kant, '*Gegenstand* is the object of thinking as subjective representation. *Objekt*, on the other hand, is subject to the unity of transcendental apperception, by which the manifold of intuition becomes unified. *Gegenstand* says what is happening phenomenologically and is phenomenological enactment. *Objekt* is an experience within subjectivity' (Heidegger, M. *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* pp. xviii-xix). In line with this, in the Translator's Notes to Part One of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Richard Taft says: 'Kant makes an important distinction between *Gegenstand* and *Objekt*, which Heidegger preserves and which is almost impossible to carry over into English. For Kant, a *Gegenstand* is a thing in space and time that is encounterable by the senses, while *Objekt* is an object of thought. Space and Time are themselves *Objekt*' (Heidegger, M. *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* p. 224). With respect to *Gegenstand*, Taft says: 'The reader should also note that it is only a perceivable object, a *Gegenstand*, which can 'stand in opposition to' (*entgegenstehen*) a being. Heidegger makes a great deal of this word play at various points throughout the book, and the etymological connection to *Gegenstand* should be kept in mind.' (Heidegger, M. *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* p. 224)

[217] Perhaps the sections of *WT* in which one could most expect Heidegger to keep the distinction between Kant's usage of both words, are the ones intended to explain Kant's notions of apperception (Heidegger, M. *WT* pp. 157-160) and analytic and synthetic judgments (Heidegger, M. *WT* pp. 160-165). In both sections Heidegger offers a diagram to clarify his explanation. In the diagram that corresponds to his explanation of apperception, the words *Objekt* and *Gegenstand* are placed next to each other; both words are used as synonyms to denote the 'object of experience.' In the diagram that corresponds to his explanation of the difference between analytic and synthetic judgments, he only uses the abbreviation of the word *Objekt*, that is, *Obj*. to denote the same. In his explanations of both diagrams, and especially in the case of the second diagram, Heidegger employs both words interchangeably.

[218] Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 134

Heidegger gives no explanation for the reason of this double usage in Kant, or for the reason why he thinks it relevant to highlight this fact and in so doing, direct our attention to the word *Gegenstand*. However, I think that a useful explanation for the analysis in progress can be developed.

From his interpretation of the opening sentence in question, Heidegger concludes that '…when Kant stresses repeatedly: Through the intuition the object (*Gegenstand*) is given, through the concept the object (*Gegenstand*) is thought, the misunderstanding easily suggests itself that the given is already the object, or that the object is an object only through the concept.'[219] Both are equally wrong, he says, rather, it is true that the object stands only when the intuition is thought conceptually, and the object only confronts us if the concept designates something intuitively given.[220] In light of this, Heidegger suggests that Kant uses the term "object" (*Gegenstand*) in two senses:

a) Narrow and proper: the object (*Gegenstand*) is only what is represented in experience as experienced.[221]
b) Wider and improper: the object (*Gegenstand*) is every thing to which a representation as such refers, be it intuition or thought. In this sense, the object is both: what we have merely thought as such and what is only given in perception and sensation.[222]

Heidegger thinks that although in every case Kant is sure of what he means by "object" (*Gegenstand*), there is in this fluent usage an indication that Kant has 'broached and decided the question of human knowledge and its truth only in a certain respect. Kant has

[219] Ibid., p. 141
[220] Ibid.
[221] Ibid.
[222] Ibid.

disregarded what is manifest (*das Offenbare*). He does not inquire into and determine in its own essence that which encounters us prior to an objectification (*Vergegenständlichung*) into an object of experience (*Erfahrungsgegenstand*).'[223] Insofar as Kant apparently must return to the domain of 'what is manifest,' as in the distinction of mere perception (*blossen Wahrnehmung*) from experience (*Erfahrung*), says Heidegger, the procedure of comparing is always from experience to perception. This means for Heidegger that perception is seen from experience, and in relation to it, as a "not yet."[224]

If the expression 'what is manifest' points to that which encounters us in 'immediate actuality,' 'the natural context' or 'ordinary experience,' Kant's thinking cannot be placed on the side of intuitive representations since these are representations that do account for 'what is manifest.' This also means that Kant's thinking cannot be interpreted as embodying Heidegger's concern for the ontic. Although this seems a very sensible interpretation, I think that Heidegger's emphasis on the value of Kant's focus on intuition calls for a more developed argument in order to decide whether Kant's thinking can be placed – according to Heidegger – on the side of intuitive representations or not.

It is clear that by directing our attention to Kant's usage of the term *Gegenstand* Heidegger can distinguish between the proper and the improper use of this term and in so doing, he can show that Kant does not give an account of the latter. Specifically, his reference to perception as a 'not yet' experience demonstrates that Heidegger is interested in showing that Kant does not give an account of the improper use of this term when it makes reference to 'what is only given in perception and sensation;' that is, what is

[223] Ibid.
[224] Ibid.

'intuitively given.' As it will become clear, this is a crucial point in Heidegger's criticism of Kant.

It is clear that, on the one hand, Heidegger does not think that intuitions give us objects in Kant's narrow and proper use of this term. For Heidegger, as for those who hold a conceptualist reading of Kant's *CPR*, conceptualization is required for objects to appear. This is why in his explanation of the first principle of pure understanding, i.e., 'The Axioms of Intuition,' Heidegger states that '[t]he transcendental aesthetic gives us only a preliminary view. Its real thematic reaches its goal only in the treatment of the first principle.'[225] Even so, for Heidegger it is crucial to highlight that intuition does not lose its decisive role, which is why he adds that 'the object only confronts us if the concept designates something intuitively given.' On the other hand, Heidegger's reference to a wider and improper use of the term *Gegenstand* in Kant's usage does point to an object which is 'only given in perception and sensation.' Does this understanding of an object correspond to that which non-conceptualist readings understand as a result of intuition alone? If the answer to this question is a positive one, then it could be said that Heidegger would address the conceptualist and non-conceptualist debate regarding Kant's ideas about the being-given of objects by saying that intuitions give us objects in a wider and improper sense, whereas concepts, when they designate something intuitively given (precisely an object in a wider and improper sense), constitute objects in the Kantian narrow and proper use of this term. Furthermore, it should be added that it is precisely the object in its improper use of this term which Heidegger believes Kant has left unthought.

[225] Ibid., p. 201

In my view, Heidegger's analysis in *WT* does not give us enough to decide whether Kant's wider and improper use of the term *Gegenstand* corresponds to an object given by intuition alone or not. The reason for this may be that Heidegger is not interested on this issue in *WT*. What it is clear, though, is that Heidegger's view of the decisive role of intuition in Kant's *CPR* is not based on his conceiving Kant's account of intuition as giving us objects in what he thinks of as Kant's proper use of the term *Gegenstand*. This being the case, a different argument has to be found in order to explain Heidegger's placing Kant on the side of intuitive representations. This, if it can be done, would in turn explain his understanding of Kant's work as a delimiting of the mathematical and would thereby support my view that Heidegger's concern for the ontic is at the basis of his interpretation of Kant's thinking.

In *WT* Heidegger thinks Kant offers an account of the 'intuitively given' through the mathematical principles of pure understanding. Therefore this looks like the place where to find an argument in favour of placing Kant on the side of intuitive representations.

- The System of All Principles of Pure Understanding and the 'intuitively given'

As I already mentioned, Heidegger thinks that the twofold determination of human knowledge is clearly expressed in the word *Gegenstand*. Intuition gives us the '*gegen*' and thought makes this '*gegen*' come into '*stand*.' This is even more clearly seen in Heidegger's use of italics in the word *Gegenstand* in the following statement: '*Sensibility* is the capacity for human intuition. The capacity of thought, however, wherein the object (*Gegen*stand) as object (Gegen*stand*) is brought to stand, is *understanding* (*Verstand*).'[226]

[226] Ibid., p. 143; translation modified. GA 41, p. 146

In light of this, it looks as if the 'intuitively given' could be addressed through an analysis of the '*gegen*' character of an "object."

What makes an object into an object, what delimits the boundaries of the thingness of the thing, says Heidegger, is described in its inner connection in the section where Kant systematically presents all synthetic principles of the pure understanding.[227] According to Heidegger:

> The principles of pure reason lay the groundwork for the objectivity of the objects. In them – namely in their connection – those modes of representation are achieved in virtue of which the "against" of the object [*Gegen des Gegenstandes*] and the "stand" of the object [*Stand des Gegenstandes*] are opened up in their primordial unity. The principles always concern this twofold unity of the essence of the object. Therefore, they must first [*einmal*] lay the ground in the direction of the "against" [*Gegen*], the "againstness" [*Gegenheit*], and simultaneously [*zugleich*] in the direction of the "stand" [*Standes*], the constancy [*Ständigkeit*]. Thereby, from the essence of the principles follow their division into two groups. Kant calls them mathematical and dynamical principles.[228]

Heidegger is clear in stating that the mathematical principles grasp the object with respect to the "against" and its inner possibility:[229] 'They speak of appearances (*Erscheinungen*) with respect to their appearing *(Erscheinen*).'[230] Heidegger comes back to this idea after his explanation of the two mathematical principles: 'The axioms of intuition and the anticipations of perception concern the againstness (*Gegenheit*) of an against (*Gegen*) from a double point of view: first, the wherein of what is against (*des Worinnen des Gegenhaften*), and second, the what-character of the against (*des Was-Charakters des Gegen*).'[231] With respect to the dynamical principles, he states: 'The second group of principles, on the other hand, concerns (relative to the possibility of an object in general) the possibility of an object's standing, of its constancy (*die Möglichkeit des Standes,*

[227] Ibid., p. 183
[228] Ibid., p. 190
[229] Ibid., p. 206
[230] Ibid.
[231] Ibid., p. 224

dessen Ständigkeit), or, as Kant puts it, the existence ("*Dasein*"), "the actuality" of the object, or in our words, the being-present-at-hand (*Vorhandensein*).'[232]

Heidegger's distinction of the roles of the two types of principles can be misleading if read as equivalent to his distinction of the roles of intuition and understanding in the determination of an object (*Gegenstand*). It is evident that the role of understanding cannot be restricted to the dynamical principles. Understanding must also play a role within the mathematical principles. Therefore, the treatment of the '*gegen*' in the mathematical principles necessarily involves the role of understanding. Heidegger is certainly aware of this, which is why at a certain point in his account of each of the mathematical principles he states that the *gegen* comes to a 'stand' and is *Gegenstand.*[233] In light of this, the 'stand' that Heidegger takes to be the exclusive concern of the dynamical principles has to be understood – following Heidegger's own description of these principles – in terms of the actuality of the object.

As it is clear, Heidegger thinks that the mathematical principles, i.e., 'the axioms of intuition' and 'the anticipations of perception,' account for the 'intuitively given' in Kant's thinking. However, the 'intuitively given' accounted by the mathematical principles cannot be the same as the 'intuitively given' involved in Kant's wider and improper use of the term *Gegenstand*: the former – as the 'intuitively given' involved in the object of experience – implies understanding the 'intuitively given' as 'magnitudes,' whereas the latter – as the 'intuitively given' involved in the object as 'not yet' the object

[232] Ibid., pp. 224-225
[233] In the case of 'the axioms of intuition' see Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 205. In the case of 'the anticipations of perception' see Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 219

of experience – does not. With respect to the mathematical principles and their role in the determination of the thing, Heidegger states:

> Kant defines the natural thing as the thing approachable by us, the body which *is* as an object of experience, i.e., of mathematical physical knowledge. The body is something in motion or at rest in space, so that the motion can be determined numerically in terms of their relations. This mathematical determination of the natural body is not an accident for Kant, not only a form of calculating that is merely added on to it. Rather, the mathematical, in the sense of what is movable in space belongs first of all to the definition of the thingness of the thing. If the possibility of the thing is to be metaphysically grasped, there is need for such principles in which this mathematical character of the natural body is grounded. For this reason, one group of the principles of pure understanding is called "the mathematical principles."[234]

From this it is clear that the 'intuitively given' involved in Kant's narrow and proper use of the term *Gegenstand* is an 'intuitively given' 'in accordance with' the mathematical principles. As Michael Friedman points out: 'According to the general principle of the [three] analogies in the second Edition (B217): "*Experience is only possible through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions*." Thus experience of appearances adds the representation of necessary connection to the mere intuition or perception of appearances (in accordance with the axioms of intuition and the anticipations of perception), and it thereby subjects the appearances to necessary laws of nature – including, first and foremost, the analogies of experience themselves (compare A216/B263).'[235] Friedman's parenthetical remark is relevant to show that what he refers to as 'mere intuition or perception' does not coincide with the 'mere perception' involved in Kant's wider and improper use of the term *Gegenstand*. As I already suggested and will continue to argue in what follows, by 'intuitively given' in the context of Kant's improper use of the term *Gegenstand* I think Heidegger points to what is given in sensation and perception in 'immediate actuality,' 'the natural context' or 'ordinary experience' – the ontic domain which concerns him in *WT*.

[234] Heidegger, M. *WT* pp. 190-191
[235] Friedman, M. (2013) *Kant's Construction of Nature* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. p. 11

That Kant only gives an account of the 'intuitively given' through the mathematical principles of pure understanding is consistent with Heidegger's view that he does not inquire into and determine in its own essence that which encounters us prior to an objectification into an object of experience. That Kant directs his attention to experience is for Heidegger intrinsically related to the fact that the mathematical characteristic of modern metaphysics is still preserved in his critique. Heidegger is very clear in stating that Kant's account of the two mathematical principles of pure understanding shows that the mathematical belongs first of all to the definition of the thingness of the thing.[236] Heidegger has a clear critical stance towards this fact. By referring to the two senses of the word 'experience' in Kant, that is, 'experiencing as a happening to and an act of the subject I' and as 'that as such which is experienced in such experience,' Heidegger highlights the fact that the object of experience for Kant is nature, but nature understood in the sense of Newton's *Principia as systema mundi.*[237] Insofar as Kant defines the thing as a natural thing, Heidegger says, 'we can judge that from the beginning Kant does not pose the question of the thingness of the thing that surrounds us. This question has no weight for him. His view immediately fixes itself on the thing as an object of mathematical-physical science.'[238] Heidegger is very clear in considering this an essential omission:

> One could pay homage to the opinion that skipping over the things that surround us and the interpretation of their thingness is an omission for which we can easily make up and which can be fitted onto the definition of natural things, or perhaps could also be pre-arranged. But this is impossible because the definition of the things and the way it is set up include fundamental presuppositions which extend over the whole of being and to the meaning of being in general.[239]

[236] Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 190
[237] Ibid., p. 126
[238] Ibid., p. 129
[239] Ibid.

In light of this I think it clear that Heidegger thinks that Kant does not pose the question of the thingness of the thing that surround us because the 'intuitively given' is for him determined in advance out of principles. I think that Heidegger's reference to 'the thing that surrounds us' gives support to the view that by the 'intuitively given' in the context of Kant's wider and improper use of the term *Gegenstand*, Heidegger points to what is given in sensation and perception in 'immediate actuality,' 'the natural context' or 'ordinary experience.' In other words, it points to the ontic domain in which Heidegger is concerned about in *WT*. In fact, in several occasions in *WT* Heidegger opposes the 'encountering things in the realm of everyday experience (*alltäglichen Erfahrung*)'[240] with 'the mathematical starting point concerning the thing as something extended and movable in space and time.'[241]

In short, Heidegger's directing our attention to the German word *Gegenstand* in order to show that Kant does not give an account of this term in its wider and improper sense, is crucial for understanding his criticism toward Kant. Based on my view that by 'intuitively given' in the context of Kant's wider and improper use of the term *Gegenstand* Heidegger points to the ontic domain, this clearly shows that Heidegger's concern for the ontic is at the basis of his criticism towards Kant.

In light of this, I do not think it possible to say that Kant's account of the 'intuitively given' through the mathematical principles of pure understanding can provide an argument in favour of placing Kant on the side of intuitive representations. On the contrary, I think that the fact that Heidegger thinks that Kant conceives the object of experience as nature understood in the sense of Newton's *Principia,* argues in favour of

[240] Ibid., p. 208
[241] Ibid., p. 211

placing Kant on the side of representations against experience. This being the case, what argument is left to understand Heidegger's view of Kant's thinking as a delimiting of the mathematical and therefore for supporting my view that Heidegger's concern for the ontic is at the basis of this view?

II.- HEIDEGGER'S UNDERSTANDING OF KANT'S NOTION OF THE SYNTHETIC A PRIORI

- Heidegger's omission of 'necessity' and 'universality' from his understanding of Kant's notion of the synthetic a priori

In her essay *Heidegger and the Synthetic A Priori*, Cristina Lafont evaluates the extent to which Heidegger adopts Kant's notion of the synthetic a priori. For her, knowing this is crucial for achieving a proper understanding of the relationship between these two thinkers and thus, between Heidegger and transcendental philosophy.[242] Lafont thinks that as a consequence of Heidegger's interpretation of the ontological difference, Kant's transcendental idealism is transformed into a hermeneutic idealism:[243] '…Heidegger's radicalization of transcendental philosophy aims to show, among other things, that what Kant erroneously thought were the invariant features of any human experience whatsoever (i.e., the pure forms of intuition and the categories) are just a special case of what is in fact a much broader phenomenon, namely, the necessarily circular (i.e., temporal) structure of all human understanding. In this sense, Heidegger welcomes Kant's discovery of the synthetic a priori that is at the core of his Copernican revolution, but he thinks that the special function and status of the synthetic a priori is not an issue that concerns some specific judgements (at the basis of positive sciences) but one that concerns being in general.'[244] In light of this, Lafont states that '…an analysis of Heidegger's hermeneutic transformation of the synthetic a priori seems crucial to determining the precise nature of Heidegger's Kantianism.'[245]

[242] Lafont, C. 'Heidegger and the Synthetic A Priori,' p. 104
[243] Ibid., p. 105
[244] Ibid.
[245] Ibid.

Lafont's analysis of this transformation concludes that Heidegger relativizes the notion of truth involved in Kant's notion of the synthetic a priori. The main idea that allows Lafont to reach this conclusion is that Heidegger's understanding in *BT* of our disclosedness as "essentially factical but true" makes it impossible for Heidegger's notion of the a priori to preserve the features of universality and necessity that this notion has in Kant.[246] In her analysis, Lafont points out that:

> Although the priority of an understanding of being over and above any experience of entities is, according to Heidegger, a general feature of all human understanding, the paradigm example that Heidegger favors in order to show the plausibility of this hermeneutic idealism is scientific knowledge. For scientific theories, as opposed to most ordinary understanding, are explicit and highly articulated kinds of interpretation, which for this reason allow for closer scrutiny as to their origin, structure, relationship to experience and so on. Still, as a kind of interpretation they are subject to the same circular (and thus projective) conditions of understanding.[247]

With this in view, Lafont refers to *WT* as a work in which Heidegger offers a very detailed explanation of the structure and characteristics of such a projection through an analysis of the transformation of science from the ancient conception of nature into modern natural science. Lafont points out that Heidegger interprets this transformation as a change of "metaphysical projection" or, as it is called these days, a paradigm shift:[248]

> Heidegger makes clear that the core of this paradigm shift does not consist in the emphasis on observation or experimentation, but on the projection of an entirely different understanding of the being of entities, a new world-disclosure brought about through the establishment and definition of new basic concepts by modern scientists such as Galileo and Newton. According to Heidegger, to the extent that these new concepts organize all possible experience in advance, the grounding postulates or axioms of these modern theories through which these concepts are defined have the status of synthetic a priori knowledge. For only on the basis of such postulates and axioms is something like empirical knowledge possible at all.[249]

I agree with Lafont that an analysis of Heidegger's understanding of Kant's notion of the synthetic a priori is crucial for understanding the relationship between these two thinkers and thus, between Heidegger and transcendental philosophy, but I think she is wrong in

[246] Ibid., pp. 105-113
[247] Ibid., p. 109
[248] Ibid.
[249] Ibid., pp. 109-110

saying that Heidegger considers Galileo and Newton as representatives of Kant's synthetic a priori. I will show that acknowledging this fact allows a deeper understanding of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's thinking.

The section of *WT* to which Lafont refers when stating that Galileo and Newton are representatives of synthetic a priori knowledge is entitled: 'Synthetic Judgments A Priori Necessarily Lie at the Basis of All Knowledge.'[250] Here Heidegger clearly says that science requires this kind of knowledge in order to be science, but he does not mention Galileo or Newton as examples of this. One could say that this omission is irrelevant and that, insofar as Heidegger refers to science, Galileo and Newton must be considered as representatives of synthetic a priori knowledge. However, I think this is not the case, at least not when one considers Heidegger's understanding of the synthetic a priori.

With respect to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's a priori, Glazebrook says: 'Heidegger has always taken investigation of aprioricity to be fundamental to his philosophy… He wants to understand how being belongs to beings a priori, that is, how being always belongs to beings yet is prior to their experience. Yet Heidegger never quite cleared up the meaning of the a priori, for he missed Kant's separation of the a priori from the pure.'[251] In respect to this distinction, Glazebrook points out that '[j]udgements are pure for Kant "when there is no admixture of anything empirical" (B3). A "pure" representation is one "in which there is nothing that belongs to sensation" (A20/B34). A priori judgments, on the other hand, Kant does not characterize solely in terms of whether or not they have empirical content. Rather, necessity and universality are the hallmarks of aprioricity for him, such that he claims that when one is found, the other need not be

[250] Heidegger, M. *WT* pp. 177-181
[251] Glazebrook, T. *Heidegger's Philosophy of Science* pp. 47-48

proven because they always belong together (B4)… Accordingly, the a priori for Kant is not simply prior to experience, but rather carries a certainty, the certainty of universality and necessity. This is precisely Kant's point in arguing that there are synthetic a priori judgments, and that the laws of Newton's physics are exactly such claims. He seeks to show that Newtonian physics involves judgments that are not analytic, but nonetheless certain.'[252] In light of this, Glazebrook states that Heidegger 'recognizes that Kant's a priori coincides precisely with what he wants to say about being: it pertains to beings without being experientially derived. Yet Heidegger neglects the epistemic certainty that is definitive for Kant of a priori judgements. He conflates the pure and the a priori in his reading of Kant.'[253] After all, Glazebrook says, what Heidegger 'is interested in is precisely how being is a priori but hardly pure, since it must for Heidegger belong to beings. He attempts therefore to retrieve the a priori from pure reason, and in doing so he fails to see the definitive characteristic of the a priori for Kant.'[254]

As it is clear, both Lafont and Glazebrook agree in that the features of universality and necessity are missing in Heidegger's understanding of Kant's a priori. I think that they are both right in this. In fact, Heidegger does not mention these characteristics in his account of the synthetic a priori in *WT*, although he does mention them as characteristics of the concepts involved in the conceptual representing by means of which an object in the strict sense of Kant is first represented: 'An object in the strict sense of Kant is thus first of all the represented, wherein the given is determined in a necessary and universal way.'[255] I think it relevant to point out that in this context Heidegger equates 'concepts'

[252] Ibid., pp. 48-49
[253] Ibid., p. 49
[254] Ibid., p. 50
[255] Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 140

with 'principles,'[256] so universality and necessity are understood as characteristics of 'principles,' a notion towards which Heidegger has a clear critical stance all throughout *WT*.

However, there is an important difference between Glazebrook and Lafont in their view of Heidegger's understanding of Kant's a priori, which is that Glazebrook – unlike Lafont – acknowledges that Heidegger does not use the expression 'synthetic a priori' in reference to Newton:

> When Heidegger wishes in *Die Frage nach dem Ding* to pursue the question of what is already given [and here the expression 'already given' points to the 'already given' involved in the definition of the mathematical in terms of (a), that is, to an a priori knowledge, and not to that which encounters us in ordinary experience] and therefore certain in any knowledge, he does not do so on the basis of Kant's a priori. Rather he turns to the Greeks and the mathematical, despite the fact that Kant is the subject of the course and that the Kantian a priori is the obvious candidate for such a discussion. Heidegger intends the mathematical to do exactly the job Kant assigned to the a priori. As the a priori carried the epistemic force of certainty for Kant, so the mathematical entails the certainty of givenness in Heidegger's analysis. Accordingly, Theodore Kisiel is right to identify the mathematical in Heidegger with the Kantian a priori. Yet Heidegger himself did not see this.[257]

From what Glazebrook rightly notices here, it follows that the reason why Heidegger does not mention Galileo or Newton as examples of synthetic a priori knowledge in the section of *WT* above-mentioned, or why – in general – Heidegger never uses the expression 'synthetic a priori' in relation to Newton in *WT* but the expression 'the mathematical,' is that he does not want to attach the notion of certainty (necessity and universality) to Kant's synthetic a priori. Why?

In chapter two I pointed out that Glazebrook thinks Heidegger understands 'the mathematical' as that which carries epistemic force. Based on the distinction between intuitive representations and representations against experience I showed that this

[256] Ibid.
[257] Glazebrook, T. *Heidegger's Philosophy of Science* p. 50

understanding of the mathematical is related to the latter of these notions and that Heidegger ascribes this notion to Newton but not to Aristotle. With this in view, I showed that the certainty entailed by representations against experience is fundamentally connected to another phenomenon, that is: the rejection of the pre-given (and here 'pre-given' or simply 'given' points to that which encounters us in ordinary experience). This rejection was revealed as entailing a breaking up with 'ordinary experience' that in turn implies a determination of the a priori by pure reason alone (the danger lurking in the a priori). As I suggested in chapter two, a consequence of believing that the a priori has a tendency to become determined by pure reason alone is that Heidegger becomes concerned by the ontic domain in a different and more determinant way.

As I have argued, the determination of the a priori by pure reason alone is accomplished in representations against experience. Since this determination is a central focus of criticism on Heidegger's thinking about modernity insofar as it is *the* expression of the mathematical way of thinking, it seems reasonable to think that, insofar as Heidegger understands Kant's thinking as a delimiting of the mathematical, he does not want to attach the notion of epistemic force to the Kantian notion of the a priori. In other words, if Heidegger attaches the notion of epistemic force to the Kantian a priori, there is no way that Kant's thinking could be understood as a delimiting of the mathematical but, on the contrary, as a thinking indebted to the mathematical. This being the case, Heidegger could not adopt the notion of the synthetic a priori to his own thinking on Being since this notion would not lend itself to be interpreted as meaning what he intends it to mean: *it pertains to beings* without being experientially derived. If Heidegger attaches the notion of epistemic force to the Kantian a priori the necessary conclusion is that the Kantian a priori

has to be placed on the side of representations against experience and thus, it cannot be said about it that 'it pertains to beings.'

In terms of Heidegger's concern for the ontic I think it clear that if Heidegger attaches the notion of epistemic force to the synthetic a priori, then this notion cannot account for that which is given in ordinary experience, that is; it cannot account for the ontic domain with which Heidegger is concerned in *WT*. In light of this, I think it clear that Heidegger's concern for the ontic is at the basis of his interpretation of Kant's thinking in *WT* as a delimiting of the mathematical.

The question that naturally follows is: on what basis does Heidegger ascribe the notion of synthetic a priori to Kant but not to Newton?

- Kant's thinking as accounting for the possibility of reality's becoming an object 'for us:' Heidegger's basis for ascribing the notion of synthetic a priori to Kant but not to Newton

In *WT* Heidegger makes two statements that can throw light upon his understanding of Newton and Kant.

1.- With respect to space and time as forms of pure intuition, Heidegger says: 'Space, according to Kant, is neither a thing that is itself present at hand (*an sich vorhandenes Ding*) (Newton), nor a manifold of relationships which result from the relations of things that are themselves present at hand (*an sich vorhandene Dinge*) (Leibniz). Space is the single whole of beside one another, behind and over one another, which is immediately represented in advance in our receiving what encounters. Space is only the form of all

appearances of the outer senses; i.e., a way in which we take in what encounters us. It is thus a determination of our sensibility.'[258] To support this statement, Heidegger immediately quotes Kant: 'It is, therefore, solely from the human standpoint that we can speak of space, of extended things, etc. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can have outer intuition…the representation of space stands for nothing whatsoever.'[259] (A26, B42, N.K.S, P.71) This all holds good for Time, Heidegger adds.

2.- With respect to the anticipations of perception, specifically in reference to what Heidegger thinks is strange about the anticipations, he says: 'And what can be stranger than this, that even where we are dealing with such things as sensations, which assail us, which we only receive, that just in this "toward us" (*auf uns zu*) a reaching out and an anticipation by us is possible and necessary? At first glance, perception as pure reception and anticipation as a reaching and grasping beforehand (*entgegen-fassendes Vorgreifen*) are thoroughly contradictory. And yet it is only in the light of the reaching and anticipating presentation of reality that sensation becomes a receivable, encountering this and that.'[260] Heidegger states that 'Kant's discovery of the anticipations of the real in perception is especially astonishing if one considers that, on the one hand, his esteem of Newtonian physics and, on the other, his fundamental position in Descartes' concept of the subject are not suited to promote the free view of this unusual anticipation in the receptivity of perception.'[261]

[258] Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 199
[259] Ibid.
[260] Ibid., p. 220. As it is well known, in Kant's thinking the term 'real' or 'reality' is not understood in the sense of actuality and existence, but in the sense of 'what belongs to the essence of something,' in the sense of *essentia*. See Heidegger, M. *WT* pp. 211-216. This issue will reappear in the third section of this chapter.
[261] Ibid., p. 222

Considering Heidegger's first statement, it is clear that he was aware of the distinction between Newton and Kant regarding the notion of space. As Sebastian Gardner points out, both Newton and Leibniz 'maintain that space and time are contained in the world independently of the subject's awareness, and that we have representations of space and time because we have knowledge of reality. That is what Kant denies.'[262] Whereas for Newton, space and time are 'real existences,'[263] for Kant space (and time) is not real in an absolute sense.[264]

The second statement says that Kant's esteem for Newtonian physics does not promote his view of the anticipations in the receptivity of perception. According to Heidegger, insofar as modern science interprets the given of sensation (color, sounds, pressure, impact) as the first and foremost building blocks out of which a thing is put together, it interprets the fragment-things, the sensations, as effects of a cause. For example, physics establishes that the cause of color is light waves.[265] Heidegger thinks that in this explanation of sensation the domain of the givenness of sensations and what is to be explained, i.e., color as given, has at the same time been abandoned.[266] In this way, says Heidegger, sensations are represented as something in themselves; they are themselves made into things.[267] According to Heidegger, the mathematical starting point concerning the thing as something extended and movable in space and time leads to the consequence that the usual everyday given (*das umgänglich alltäglich Gegebene*) is apprehended as mere material and is fragmented into the manifoldness of the sensations. Only the mathematical starting point effected a favourable hearing for a corresponding theory of

[262] Gardner, S. (1999) *Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason* London UK: Routledge. p. 88
[263] Ibid.
[264] Ibid., p. 71
[265] Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 209
[266] Ibid.
[267] Ibid.

sensation.[268] Although Kant remains within this starting point (in which Heidegger clearly thinks Newton also remains) and has therefore skipped that sphere in which we know ourselves immediately at home, says Heidegger, his metaphysical interpretation of the givenness of sensations differs from all before and after him, and is superior to all of them.[269] Sensation is not for Kant a thing for which causes are sought, but a given whose givenness is to be made understandable through the conditions of the possibility for experience.[270] It is this view that allows Kant to discover the anticipations in the receptivity of perception.

In light of this it looks as if Heidegger believes that Newton, unlike Kant, views 'things' as independent from our mode of cognition. As Gardner points out, '[p]re-Copernican philosophical systems, according to Kant, set out by assuming a domain of objects which are conceived as having being, and a constitution of their own – a class of real things. In this sense, previous philosophical systems are all realist. (This generalisation includes, strange though it may sound, idealism of George Berkeley's sort, because the 'real things' in question may be mental).'[271] With this in view, Gardner says that in contrast to Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism, '[a]ll other philosophical positions are united in supposing that the objects of our cognition are transcendentally real, i.e., that they have the constitution which we represent them as having independently of (without being determined to do so by) our mode of cognition, and so that things can in principle be known as they are in themselves. Kant calls this claim transcendental realism.'[272]

[268] Ibid., p. 211
[269] Ibid.
[270] Ibid., p. 217
[271] Gardner, S. *Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason* p. 38
[272] Ibid., p. 95

As Gardner shows, Kant's transcendental idealism is fundamentally connected to his preoccupation with accounting for the possibility of reality's becoming an object *for us*.[273] Kant's transcendental idealism is concerned with the question: what makes reality into an object *for us*?[274] On Kant's view, says Gardner, all the epistemologies of pre-kantian philosophy 'reduce on examination to the bare, non-explanatory claim that we represent real things because they affect us and because we have an immanent capacity to represent them.'[275]

I suggest that Heidegger's basis for ascribing the notion of synthetic a priori to Kant but not to Newton is precisely the fact that Kant's thinking is concerned with accounting for the possibility of reality's becoming an object for us, whereas Newton is not.

Heidegger thinks that the a priori knowledge expressed by Newton's law of motion is viewed as independent from our mode of cognition, which goes together with the idea that things can be known as they are in themselves. In fact, this sounds like a very plausible way of describing what modern science thinks its task as a science is. If so, it would be understandable why Heidegger ascribes the notion of certainty (epistemic force / universality and necessity) to representations against experience and thinks of Newton as its representative. From Newton's standpoint (modern science), we can think of acquiring a knowledge of things which is absolutely certain, because we can know, in principle, how things are in themselves.

[273] Ibid., pp. 27-50
[274] Ibid., p. 34; italics added
[275] Ibid., p. 35

Although I have said that evaluating the accuracy of Heidegger's view of Kant is not part of the aim of this chapter I think that it is relevant to point out that Kant thought that his notion of the a priori does entail the possibility of acquiring absolutely certain knowledge of things. Kant thought of space and time (in combination with the pure concepts of the understanding) as providing a criterion for truth and therefore, as universal and necessary.

As Lafont says, it is clear that Heidegger was not an orthodox Kantian.[276] With respect to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant in *WT,* Glazebrook says: '…Heidegger reads Kant here [*WT*] with an openness not earlier evident. Rather than attempt to adapt the *Critique* into the project and terminology of *Being and Time*, this text seeks to explore what Kant's thought makes possible in the history of metaphysics.'[277] I agree with Glazebrook.

I think the analysis so far allows me to suggest that Heidegger's 'free' interpretation of Kant's notion of the synthetic a priori in *WT* is due to the fact that he wants to take this notion beyond the realm of Kantian experience; he wants to apply it to ordinary experience. In this way this notion can account for his concern for the ontic, as it will become clear in what follows.

- *The synthetic a priori as 'the between'* (das Zwischen) *us and things*

Heidegger thinks that one consequence of Kant's new definition of knowledge, that is, thought in the service of intuition[278] is Kant's new definition of judgement.[279] For Heidegger, Kant's focus on intuition results in judgement being understood in its 'relation

[276] Lafont, C. 'Heidegger and the Synthetic A Priori,' p. 104
[277] Glazebrook, T. *Heidegger's Philosophy of Science* p. 41
[278] Heidegger, M. *WT* pp. 135, 149
[279] Ibid., p. 149

to the object' and thus to intuition,[280] unlike the traditional definition of judgement as merely 'the connection of representations.'[281] The 'relation to the object' now defines both analytic and synthetic judgements, although the nature of this relation is different in each case.[282]

For Heidegger, the idea of a 'relation' to the object embodies the notion of transcendence in Kant's thinking: transcendental reflection, Heidegger says, 'is not directed upon objects (*Gegenstand*) themselves nor upon thought as the mere representation of the subject-predicate relationship, but upon the passing over and the relation to the object (*Gegenstand*) *as this relation.*'[283]

According to W.B. Barton, Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's focus on intuition in *WT* turns out to be an appreciation of Kant's notion of transcendence.[284] 'When, in this lecture, we constantly ask about the thingness of the thing and endeavour to pace ourselves into the realm of this question, it is nothing else than the exercise of this transcendent view-point and mode of questioning,'[285] says Heidegger. According to him, transcendence is the "Between" (*Zwischen*). As Barton points out, transcendence 'is what the *Critique of Pure Reason* opens for us, in order that knowledge of objects can become possible for us. Thus the transcendence of human knowledge is revealed through the analysis of the principles of pure understanding as grounded in intuition, which transcendence makes experience itself possible.'[286] The circularity of the proofs

[280] Ibid., pp. 157, 170
[281] Ibid., p. 156
[282] Ibid., pp. 162-164
[283] Ibid., p. 176
[284] Barton Jr, W.B. 'An Introduction to Heidegger's What is a Thing?' p. 17
[285] Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 179
[286] Barton Jr, W.B. 'An Introduction to Heidegger's What is a Thing?' p. 17

constitutes for Heidegger the essence of experience.[287] 'Experience is in itself a circular happening through which what lies within the circle becomes exposed. This open, however, is nothing other than the between – between us and the thing.'[288] As Barton rightly points out, Heidegger's interest in transcendence does not mean a loss of interest in man.[289] Heidegger explicitly says in the final paragraph of *WT* that 'Kant's questioning about the thing asks about intuition and thought, about experience and its principles, i.e., it asks about man. The question "What is a thing?" is the question "Who is man?" That does not mean that things become a human product (*Gemächte*) but, on the contrary, it means that man is to be understood as he who always already leaps beyond things, but in such a way that this leaping-beyond is possible only while things encounter (*begegnen*) and so precisely remain themselves – while they send us back behind ourselves and our surface.'[290]

Intuition is thus the link that enables the relation between man and things, the 'relation to the object,' that is, transcendence (the main characteristic of the synthetic a priori). In fact, Heidegger refers to the synthetic character of the 'relation to the object' (transcendence), as a 'thinking intuition'[291] or 'thought referred to intuition.'[292] This shows that the authoritative role of intuition involved in Kant's new definition of knowledge is preserved in the notion of the synthetic a priori to the extent that it constitutes the condition of the possibility for the main characteristic of this notion, that is: transcendence (the relation to the object).

[287] Heidegger, M. *WT* pp. 241-242
[288] Ibid., p. 242
[289] Barton Jr, W.B. 'An Introduction to Heidegger's What is a Thing?' p. 17
[290] Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 244
[291] Ibid., p. 182
[292] Ibid., p. 176

This means that a human being determined by the union between intuition and thought opens itself to the relation to things, whereas a human being determined by reason alone closes itself to this relation. In fact, I think it is clear that Heidegger's view that the determination of the a priori by reason alone entails a rejection of the given, understood as that which encounters us in ordinary experience (ontic domain), implies that defining the human being in terms of pure reason alone involves a rejection of the given understood in this way. This clearly involves a closure to the relation to things, that is, a closure to transcendence.

In light of this I think that Heidegger's understanding of the synthetic a priori as 'the between' *things* and us is what supports his interpretation of Kant's thinking as a delimiting of the mathematical.

However, it has to be noted that Heidegger clearly emphasizes that Kant's notion of the synthetic a priori, specifically, the highest principle of synthetic a priori judgements, is in need of a transformation. This transformation entails questioning the roles of principles in the determination of things. Therefore I think Heidegger's esteem for this notion and thus his interpretation of Kant's thinking as a delimiting of the mathematical is dependent on his view that this notion encloses the possibility of an 'appropriate transformation to fulfilment in the future.' This goes in line with Glazebrook's view that in *WT* Heidegger is interested in the possibilities that Kant's thinking open up within the history of metaphysics. I think that it is the fact that Kant's notion of the synthetic a priori opens up the possibility of a transformation, rather than the actual configuration of this notion in Kant's thinking that supports Heidegger's esteem for it and thus its viewing it as a delimiting of the mathematical. But it has to be noted that this possibility rests on

Heidegger's peculiar interpretation of the synthetic a priori and not on Kant's own way of understanding this notion.[293]

Heidegger's view that Kant's focus on intuition is a delimiting of the mathematical thus means that he thinks that Kant's notion of the synthetic a priori – on Heidegger's understanding of this notion – embodies the possibility of delimiting the mathematical (a priori) as co-extensive with 'the realm of experience,' where 'experience' has to be understood as 'ordinary or everyday experience.' By doing this Heidegger can adapt Kant's notion of the synthetic a priori to his own thinking on Being: the a priori *pertains* to beings without being experientially derived.

In light of this, I think it right to say that Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's synthetic a priori in *WT* is a search for a balance between the a priori and the ontic or, in other words, an effort to stop to the danger lurking in the a priori. This means that Heidegger's concern for the ontic is at the basis of his interpretation of Kant's thinking.

In the terms of my analysis, Heidegger's view of Kant's notion of the synthetic a priori entails that Kant's determination of the thing has to be placed in a middle position between intuitive representations and representations against experience. On the one hand, the determination of the thing in Kant is not achieved out of mere reason but by the union of intuition and thought and, in this way, it does not correspond to representations against the evidence of experience; but, on the other hand, it is not a determination of the

[293] In light of Heidegger's high esteem for Kant's notion of transcendence, it seems difficult to think that Heidegger's view of Kant's wider and improper use of the term *Gegenstand* would refer to intuition alone. I think that Heidegger's view that the transformation that the synthetic a priori needs involves questioning the notion of principles, argues in favor of understanding 'thinking' in a different way. From this, Kant's wider and improper use of the term *Gegenstand* could point to an object not in need of conceptual mediation, but nevertheless in need of 'thinking.'

thing which can account for the intuitively given in the realm of ordinary or everyday experience, but only as an object of experience (which involves a determination out of principles) and, in this way, it does not correspond to intuitive representations either.[294]

Regardless of Heidegger's interpretation of the synthetic a priori, however, I think that there is another aspect of Kant's thinking that has to be placed on the side of intuitive representations, namely, Kant's view that representations cannot determine the existence of things.

[294] I think that this way of interpreting Kant's position within the difference between intuitive representations and representations against experience can help to understand the changes in Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's thinking throughout his works. As it is well known, Heidegger can be as critic as sympathetic towards the Kantian notion of 'transcendence,' and – although less known – the same happens with the Kantian notion of the 'objectivity of the object.' In light of Kant's middle position within the difference between intuitive representations and representations against experience, I suggest that the changes in Heidegger's interpretation can have to do with the fact that in some occasions he focuses on what Kant's thinking shares with intuitive representations whereas in other occasions he does it on what Kant's thinking shares with representations against experience.

III.- KANT'S DETERMINATION OF EXISTENCE IN RELATION TO THE AFFECTION OF THE SENSES: AN OBSTACLE FOR THE PRESUMPTION (*die Anmaßung*) OF UPROOTED UNDERSTANDING

- The 'already given' to human intuition and existence

As it has become clear, Heidegger thinks that the structure of human knowledge is for Kant a dual one whose components are intuition and thought. This duality also applies to the object of experience since the mere intuitive "against" (*gegen*) is not yet an object (*Gegenstand*) but what is only conceptually thought in general, as something constant, is not yet an object either.[295] In a section entitled 'Sensibility and Understanding. Receptivity and Spontaneity,' Heidegger offers a clearer characterization of the twofold character of human knowledge.[296] So far, Heidegger has characterized intuition as the immediately represented particular and thought as the mediately represented universal. Now he wants to show that these different representations 'take place in correspondingly different behavior and performance of the human being.'[297] As Heidegger points out:

> In intuition what is represented is pre-sented as object, i.e., the representing is a having before oneself what encounters. Insofar as it is to be taken as something, encountering it becomes what is taken up and in [*auf- und hingenommen*]. The character of behavior in the intuition is that of taking-in [*Hinnehmen*], a reception, *recipere-receptio*, receptivity. In contrast, behavior in the conceptual representation is such that the representing from itself compares what is variously given, and in comparing refers them to one and the same and seizes this as such…Because of this "from itself" character, thinking – as representing in concepts – is spontaneous, spontaneity.[298]

[295] Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 140
[296] Ibid., p. 142
[297] Ibid.
[298] Ibid. I think that although it is tempting to say that Heidegger's thinking embraces the notion of receptivity whereas rejects the notion of activity, his esteem for Kant's notion of synthesis – which I have sustained in this chapter – does not allow presenting things in this way, at least not without a proper clarification of what is to be understood by receptivity and activity. For example, one could say that it is the activity involved in thinking understood as modern representational thinking the kind of activity that Heidegger rejects, but if by thinking is understood something else, then Heidegger does not necessarily reject this notion.

Having in view the receptive nature of intuition, Heidegger states that 'human intuition is never able to create (*herbeizuschaffen*) what is to be viewed, the object (*Gegenstand*) itself, through the achievement of its intuiting as such.'[299] 'Human looking (*Schauen*) is intuiting or looking at (*An-schauen*), i.e., a view directed toward something already given (*Gegebenes*).'[300]

Given the twofold determination of the object, that is: intuition and thinking, one could think that this 'already given' points to the 'already given' involved in the definition of the mathematical in terms of (a), that is, to an a priori knowledge. However, this is not the case:

> Because human intuition depends upon something viewable given to it, the given must indicate itself. It must be able to announce itself. This happens through the sense organs. By means of these organs, our sense, such as sight, hearing, etc., are "stirred" [*gehürt*], as Kant says. Something is done to them; they are approached. That which so attracts us and how the attraction is initiated is sensation as affection [*ist die Empfindung als Affektion*].[301]

As Heidegger clearly states, human intuition is necessarily sensuous (*sinnliches*). This means that the immediately represented must be given to it (*gegeben*).[302] 'Since human intuition depends upon such giving (*auf Gebung angewiesen*), i.e., is sensuous, therefore it requires the sense organs.'[303]

From this it is clear that with the expression 'already given' Heidegger is now pointing to something existing, something actual; to a 'thing' that exists and that we can sense through our sense organs. I think that this sense of the expression 'already given' is related

[299] Ibid.
[300] Ibid., p. 143
[301] Ibid.
[302] Ibid.
[303] Ibid.

to one of the two senses of this expression that I have been pointing out so far, that is: 'that which encounters us in ordinary experience,' therefore, with the ontic domain.

As I already pointed out, Heidegger works out the distinction between representations against experience and intuitive representations against the background of the distinction between nature as understood by modern science and by Aristotle's thinking. When Heidegger takes this distinction to the sphere of metaphysics, it takes the form of the distinction between rational metaphysics and Kant's thinking. Kant's thinking cannot be placed entirely on the side of intuitive representations but in a middle position between this type of representations and representations against experience. Nonetheless, there is an aspect of Kant's thinking that has to be placed on the side of intuitive representations: the fact that Kant's thinking, unlike rational metaphysics, does not conceive of existence (actuality) as determined out of pure reason alone. As I pointed out in chapter two, Kisiel understands the mathematical as '…the realm of pure reason independent of experience, which in its projects and from its concepts alone decides in advance what a thing is, without consideration of things encountered in the confusion of experience.' In light of this I think it clear that, according to Heidegger, there is an aspect of Kant's thinking that does not succumb to the mathematical will to determine whatever there is out of pure reason alone and, thereby, that it does account for Heidegger's concern for the ontic in an unquestionable way.

There is no section in *WT* that refers more clearly to the difference regarding the determination of existence between rational metaphysics and Kant's thinking, than the section intended to explain Kant's view of 'The Postulates of Empirical Thought.'

The three groups of principles corresponding to the categories of quantity, quality, and relation, i.e., the axioms of intuition, the anticipations of perception and the analogies of experience, says Heidegger, have in common that 'they determine in advance what belongs to the factual nature of the object as something encountering and constant…These three categories are the realities of the nature of the object.'[304] Therefore, the three groups of principles in question 'prove that these categories as these realities make the object (*Gegenstand*) possible and belong to an object (*Objekt*) as such. They show that the categories have objective reality.'[305] Although I will return to Kant's notion of reality in what follows, it has to be noted that – as is well known – Kant's usage of the term reality points to the what-content (*Wasgehal*t) of a thing, to its essence. The fourth group of principles, that is, the postulates of empirical thought, corresponds to the categories of modality. Modality, says Heidegger, in contrast to the *what*, to the real as such.[306] As Heidegger explains, the categories of modality (possibility, actuality or existence, necessity) do not belong to the factual content of the nature of the object. The categories of modalities are not real predicates of the object.[307] 'Rather, they assert something of how the concept of the object is related to its existence (*Dasein*) and the modes of its existence, that is to say, according to which modes the existence of the object (*Gegenstand*) is to be determined.'[308]

With regard to the first postulate, Heidegger says that:

> Kant conceives of "possibility" as agreement with what regulates in advance the appearing of appearances: with space and time and their quantitative determination. The possibility of a representation can be decided only as the representation obeys what was said about the object in the first group of principles. Rational metaphysics, on the contrary, had until then defined possibility as non-contradiction.[309]

[304] Ibid., p. 237
[305] Ibid.
[306] Ibid.
[307] Ibid.
[308] Ibid., pp. 237-238
[309] Ibid., pp. 238-239

According to Kant, says Heidegger, 'what does not contradict itself is indeed thinkable. However, nothing about the possibility of the existence of an object is settled by this possibility of thought. What cannot appear in space and time is an impossible object for us.'[310]

According to Heidegger, the second postulate shows that:

> Kant conceives of actuality [*Wirklichkeit*] as connection with what shows us something real, having content: with sensation. The actuality of an object can be decided only in that the representation obeys what is said about the object in the second group of principles. Rational metaphysics until then, on the contrary, formulated actuality only as a complement to possibility in the sense of conceivability: *existentia* as *complementum possibilitatis.* But with this nothing is settled about actuality itself.[311]

Finally, with regard to the third postulate, Heidegger says that:

> Kant conceives of necessity as determination by that which, out of agreement with the unity of experience as such, establishes the connection with actuality. The necessity of an object can be decided only in that the representation obeys what is said in the third group of principles concerning the constancy of the object. Rational metaphysics, until then, on the contrary, understood necessity merely as what cannot not be. However, since existence is defined only as a complement of the possible and this only as what is conceivable, this definition of necessity also remained within the domain of conceivability.[312]

From this elucidation,[313] says Heidegger, we can see that the merely logical clarifications of possibility, actuality, necessity, as in rational metaphysics, are rejected. *Being* is no longer determined out of mere thought. Now, possibility, actuality, necessity are understood out of the relationship between our capacity to know (an intuiting determined in accordance with thought) and the conditions of the possibility of objects – conditions which lie in our knowing capacity itself.[314] As Heidegger points out, although the

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[310] Ibid., p. 239
[311] Ibid.
[312] Ibid., pp. 239-240
[313] Heidegger is clear in saying that the principles of empirical thought cannot (like the three first principles) concern the question if and how the categories (possibility, actuality, necessity) have objective reality, since they do not belong at all to the reality of the object. Because the principles cannot assert anything like this, says Heidegger, neither can they be demonstrated in this respect. This is why there are no proofs of these principles but only elucidations and clarifications of their content. See Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 238
[314] Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 240; italics added

modalities add no content (*Sachhaltiges*) to the content (*Sachhaltigkeit*) of the object, they are a synthesis since:

> They put the object into a relationship to the conditions of its standing-against [*Gegen-stehen*]. These conditions, however, are also those very ones of the letting-stand-against [*Gegenstehenlassen*] of experience, and, therefore, of the actions of the subject. The postulates, too, are synthetic principles, although not objective, but only subjectively synthetic. This is to say that they do not put together the content of the object, but they put the whole nature of the object as determined by the three first principles into its possible relations to the subject and to its modes of intuitively-thought representing [*des anschauend-denkenden Vorstellens*]. The modalities add to the concept of the object its relation to our cognitive faculty.[315]

In his explanation of the postulates of empirical thought in *WT*, Heidegger employs the expressions 'the modes of being' (*die Weisen des Seins*) and 'the modes of existence' (*die Weisen des Daseins*) in a very close way. When explaining that the postulates are merely assertions of a requirement which lies in the nature of experience, Heidegger says that this requirement is what counts as the 'standard by which the modes of existence and, therewith, the essence of being is measured.'[316] Although Heidegger does not offer any explanation of this in *WT*, I think that his treatment of Kant's thesis that being is not a real predicate in *Kant's Thesis about Being*[317] can be of great assistance in gaining an insight into this issue.

- Being as position and the affection of the senses

Barton thinks that the distinction between Heidegger's use of the terms 'real' or 'reality' and 'actuality' is not only important to understand his interpretation of Kant's thinking in *WT* but also that 'the relation of these terms has occupied his attention throughout most of his work.'[318] Barton suggests that this is because this relation is fundamentally

[315] Ibid., p. 241
[316] Kant cited by Heidegger. Ibid., p. 238
[317] Hereafter *KTB*
[318] Barton Jr, W.B. 'An Introduction to Heidegger's What is a Thing?' p. 24

connected to Heidegger's understanding of Being.[319] As Barton points out, reality refers to the what-being of an entity, to the *essentia,* whereas actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) refers to *existentia*.[320] In Heidegger's words: 'Reality comes from *realitas*. *Realis* is what belongs to *res*. That means a something (*Sache*). That is real which belongs to something, what belongs to the what-content (*Wasgehalt*) of a thing, e.g., to what constitutes a house or tree, what belongs to the essence of something, to the *essentia*.'[321]

As Barton points out, we immediately recognize the importance of this distinction when we recall Kant's illustration that the actuality, the being present-at-hand, is not a real predicate of a thing. According to Barton, the importance of this distinction for Heidegger's mature notion of Being 'does not come out fully until the last work, *Kant's These Über Das Sein*. Here it is seen as the key to what positive metaphysics Kant was able to achieve.'[322]

Barton is right in saying that *KTB* is a work intended to show what Kant's thinking achieved regarding the problem of Being.[323] He thinks that whereas *WT* focuses on Kant's treatment of 'intuition,' *KTB* does it on the 'synthetic unity of apperception.'[324] Although I have not dealt with the differences between Heidegger's interpretations of Kant's thinking in different works and it is not part of the aim of this thesis to do so, I agree with Barton that the focus of *WT* is intuition. However, I think that stating that the focus of *KTB* is the synthetic unity of apperception gives the mistaken impression that this is a

[319] Ibid.
[320] Ibid.
[321] Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 212
[322] Barton Jr, W.B. 'An Introduction to Heidegger's What is a Thing?' p. 24
[323] It is worth noting that, as Barton states: '*Kant's Thesis on Being* stands as a major change from his [Heidegger's] earliest interpretation of Kant in *Being and Time*, where he declared that Kant "altogether neglected the problem of Being." Now this thesis shines through every elucidation of the *Critique*.' See Barton Jr, W.B. 'An Introduction to Heidegger's What is a Thing?' p. 18
[324] Barton Jr, W.B. 'An Introduction to Heidegger's What is a Thing?' pp. 15-18

substantial shift from his previous focus on intuition.[325] As it will become clear in what follows, Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's focus on intuition is the basis for his treatment of the synthetic unity of apperception as the key to what Kant's thinking was able to achieve regarding the problem of Being. In fact, the only section of Heidegger's analysis in *KTB* to which Barton makes explicit reference shows the central role of intuition in this work:

> Being is *not real* but signifies "position," "the being-set, steadiness [*Gesetztheit*] in the setting [*Setzen*]," which is grasped by thought in the act of the understanding, but first given in a sensible intuition. The position sets something as object, i.e., as something which is brought over against us, and brought to a stand as an object [*Gegenstand*], when that which can be set [*Setzbares*] is given to the position through a sensible intuition, i.e., through the affecting [*Affektion*] of the senses. Only the position as position of feeling [*Affektion*], i.e., intuition, lets us understand what Kant meant by the Being of the entity.[326]

Barton points out that Heidegger refers to this same idea in *WT* by stating that "Reality…is only a condition for the givenness of an actuality, but not yet the actuality of the actual.'[327]

Characterizing Kant's notion of 'position' as 'position of feeling' (*Affektion*) is puzzling. One thing is clear from the last quote: with the notion of 'position of feeling' Heidegger is invoking 'intuition.'

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[325] Barton thinks that Heidegger's three works on Kant, that is: *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, *What is a thing?* and *Kant Thesis about Being*, focus on three different aspects of Kant's thinking. Whereas the first one focuses on 'transcendental imagination,' the second one does it on 'intuition.' For its part, the last one focuses on the 'synthetic unity of apperception' (See Barton Jr, W.B. 'An Introduction to Heidegger's What is a Thing?' pp. 16-18). I am sympathetic to the idea that there is a substantial shift between Heidegger's interpretation of Kant between *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* and *WT*. I think that the fact that Heidegger changes his view regarding the value of the first and second editions of the *Critique* from *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* to *WT* is an important argument for sustaining this shift. However, I do not think that there is a substantial shift between *WT* and *KTB* but rather a development of a same insight, that is: the crucial role of intuition in Kant's thinking. In fact, in both works Heidegger sustains the importance of the second edition of the *Critique* over the first one.

[326] Barton Jr, W.B. 'An Introduction to Heidegger's What is a Thing?' p. 25

[327] Ibid.

Barton himself translates the above-mentioned section of *KTB*.[328] In the standard translation of *KTB* (1998)[329] – which is a revised translation of the one first published in 1973[330]– the German word *Affektion* is translated by the English word 'affection,' which I think is a better translation than 'feeling' in the context of Kant's thinking. Therefore, in what follows I will refer to the 1998's revised translation of *KTB.*

In *KTB* Heidegger refers to Kant's thesis about Being as expressed in both *The Only possible Ground of Proof for a Demonstration of the Existence of God* and the *Critique of Pure Reason.* As Heidegger explains, in both works Kant characterizes being as positing.[331] Heidegger points out that 'being as positing points to an ambiguity that is not accidental and also not unknown to us. For it plays about everywhere in the realm of that setting and placing that we know as representing….Being, as position, means the positedness of something in representational thinking.'[332] However, says Heidegger, depending on what is posited and how it is posited, position, being has a different meaning.[333] According to Heidegger, these different meanings correspond to 'the logical use of being' and 'the ontic' or 'the objective use of being.'[334] This last use of being corresponds to absolute positing, whereas the former one corresponds to relative positing.[335] In the case of absolute positing it is a matter of the objective use of being in the sense of *Dasein* and *Existenz*.[336] Heidegger suggests that only in the critical period

[328] Ibid., p. 15, footnote 4
[329] Heidegger, M. (1998) 'Kant's Thesis about Being' in *Pathmarks* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[330] Heidegger, M. (1973) 'Kant's Thesis about Being' in *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* Vol. IV, no. 3, pp. 7-33
[331] Heidegger, M. 'Kant's Thesis about Being,' pp. 339-341
[332] Ibid., p. 343
[333] Ibid.
[334] Ibid., pp. 343-344
[335] Ibid., p. 344
[336] Ibid., p. 344

and especially in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, did Kant achieve an insight into the significance of these two different meanings of being:

> In the logical use of being (a is b) it is a matter of the positing of the relation between subject and predicate of a sentence. In the ontic use of being – this stone is ("exists") – it is a matter of the positing of the relation between I-subject and object – this, however, in such a way that the subject-predicate relation cuts across, as it were, the subject-object relation. The significance of this is that the "is" as copula in the statement of an objective cognition has a different and richer sense than the merely logical sense. But it will be seen that Kant arrived at this insight only after long reflection and did not even express it until the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Six years after the first edition he is able to say what is involved with the "is," i.e., with being. Not until the *Critique of Pure Reason* are fullness and certainty brought into the interpretation of being as positing.[337]

However, regardless of the difference between the critical and the precritical period regarding Kant's view of the ontic use of being, Heidegger thinks that 'for Kant one thing stands firm from the beginning: he thinks of existence and being "in relation to the capacities of our understanding." Even in the *Critique of Pure Reason* being continues to be defined as positing. The critical reflection, to be sure, attains no "higher degree of clarification," that is, according to the precritical way of explaining and dissecting concepts. But the *Critique* achieves a different sort of explanation of being and of its different modes, which we are acquainted with as being possible, being actual, being necessary.'[338] What has happened? Heidegger asks himself. 'What must have happened through the *Critique of Pure Reason*, if the reflection on being was begun as a reflection on the "relation" of being "to the capacities of our understanding"?'[339] Heidegger thinks that Kant himself gives the answer to this question in the following passage of *CPR*:

> So long as the definition of possibility, existence, and necessity is sought solely in pure understanding, they cannot be explained save through an obvious tautology.[340]

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[337] Ibid., pp. 344-345. In line with Heidegger's preference for the B edition of the *CPR* expressed in *WT*, Heidegger also expresses this preference in *KTB*.
[338] Ibid., p. 345
[339] Ibid., pp. 345-346
[340] Kant cited by Heidegger. Ibid., p. 346

However, says Heidegger, 'it is just such an explanation that Kant himself still attempts in his precritical period. Meanwhile the insight came to him that the relating of being and of the modes of being solely to the "capacities of our understanding" does not afford a sufficient horizon from which being and the modes of being can be explained, i.e., now – from which their meaning can be "verified".'[341]

To explain what is lacking, Heidegger refers to a supplementary remark in the second edition of the *Critique* (B 302):

> [Possibility, existence, and necessity] cannot be verified by anything [i.e., authenticated or proved]… if all sensuous intuition (the only kind of intuition we have) is removed.[342]

Without sensuous intuition, says Heidegger, 'the concepts of being lack the relation to an object, through which relation alone they acquire what Kant calls their "reference".'[343] At this point of Heidegger's analysis we find the section of *KTB* mentioned above quoted by Barton, in which it is stated that 'only positing as positing of an affection lets us understand what, for Kant, the being of being means (*Erst die Position als Position einer Affektion läßt uns verstehen, was für Kant Sein von Seiendem bedeutet*).'[344]

However, as Heidegger points out, in the affection through our senses a manifold of representations is continually given to us and this given "turmoil," the flux of this manifold, can only come to a stand and thus show itself as something standing over against us (Gegen*stand*), if it is ordered, i.e., connected. Since this connection can never come through the senses, it comes, according to Kant, from that power of representation

[341] Ibid.
[342] Ibid.
[343] Ibid.
[344] Ibid.

that is called understanding. The basic feature of understanding, says Heidegger, is positing as synthesis.[345] In light of Heidegger's view of the crucial role of intuition, i.e., of the affection of the senses for the determination of being, he says:

> Positing has the character of proposition, i.e., of judgment, whereby something is placed before us as something, a predicate is attributed to a subject by the "is." To the extent, however, that the positing is necessarily related as proposition to what is given in the affection, whenever an object is to be cognized by us, the "is" (as copula) receives from this a new sense. Kant does not define this until the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[346]

Once Heidegger has developed his view of Kant's new insight in the second edition of the *Critique* regarding the crucial role of intuition, i.e., the affection of the senses, he carries on to explain Kant's notion of transcendental apperception. As I suggested earlier in this section, his analysis of this notion is informed by his view of this new insight, as it can be seen in the following section:

> …the legitimate use of the understanding depends on the following: that thinking continues to be specified as representational thinking that posits and judges – i.e., as positing and proposition by virtue of transcendental apperception, and that thinking remains related to affection by the senses. Thinking is ensconced in human subjectivity, which is affected by sensibility, i.e., is finite. "I think" means: I connect a sensuously given manifold of representations by virtue of a prior glance toward the unity of apperception, which articulates itself into the limited multiplicity of pure concepts of the understanding, i.e., categories.[347]

As it can be seen, Heidegger's reference to the legitimate use of the understanding is essentially connected to his understanding of Kant's view of the central role of intuition. The original German version of *WT* includes an Appendix which is omitted from the English translation of this work. In this Appendix Heidegger offers a supplement to the section of *WT* entitled: 'Kant's Distinction Between Analytic and Synthetic Judgements,'[348] which is part of a major section entitled: 'Kant's Essential Definition of the Judgment,'[349] and in which he states:

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[345] Ibid., pp. 346-347
[346] Ibid., p. 347
[347] Ibid., p. 350
[348] Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 160
[349] Ibid., p. 153

Through Kant's critic determination of judgment and of thinking in general, *intellectus*, the presumption of uprooted understanding [*des entwurzelten Verstandes*] is metaphysically overcome for the first time in a justified manner.[350]

In light of Heidegger's analysis of Kant's focus on intuition as a delimiting of the mathematical in *WT*, I think that by 'uprooted understanding' Heidegger refers to the understanding that has been deprived of its necessary relation to the affection of the senses, i.e, to intuition. I think that the presumption of this uprooted understanding is, accordingly, to determine the being of what is out of pure reason alone. In this way, the presumption of this uprooted understanding goes together with the will of the mathematical to determine whatever there is out of pure reason alone (the danger lurking in the a priori). This, as I have previously argued, involves a rejection of the given understood as that which is given in ordinary experience (ontic domain). This means that the rejection of the given in ordinary experience goes together with trying to determine whatever there is out of pure reason alone.

Based on the relation that I have set up between this understanding of the given and the more basic one as 'something existing,' 'something actual' (to a 'thing' that exists and that we can sense through our sense organs), I think it right to say that the rejection of the given is a rejection of anything that requires the affection of our senses to reach us, that is: a rejection of anything actual or existent. In light of this, I suggest that the presumption

[350] My translation. GA 41, p. 249. '*Durch Kants kritische Bestimmung des Urteils und des Denkens überhaupt, intellectus, wird erstmals in begründeter Weise die Anmaßung des entwurzelten Verstandes metaphysisch überwunden*.' I have chosen the English word 'uprooted' to translate the German word '*entwurzelten*' for two reasons. Firstly, in the same major section to which this Appendix belongs, Heidegger uses the same German word '*entwurzelt*,' which the English translator translates as 'uprooted.' Here Heidegger uses this word in relation to the traditional definition of judgment which, insofar as it only takes 'one component' (relation of concepts), represents an artificial construction which has been 'uprooted' from the supporting basis of the relations to the object, and to the knowing I. (See Heidegger, M. *WT* pp. 158-159) Secondly, I think that the word 'uprooted' gives the sense of the movement involved in the shift from intuitive representations to representations against experience, or, in other words, the movement involved in the search for the fulfilment of the will of the mathematical, a search which finds its satisfaction in rational metaphysics.

of this uprooted understanding must entail the determination of existence by pure reason alone.

As I showed in chapter two, the determination of the a priori by pure reason alone is accomplished in representations against experience (not *yet* in intuitive representations). In light of this, it follows that the presumption of this uprooted understanding must entail the determination of existence by representations against experience.

In *KTB*, Heidegger delves into the issue of the legitimate use of understanding by saying that '[a]t one with the critical unfolding of the essence of the understanding is the limitation of its use (*die Einschränkung seines Gebrauches*), namely, the determination of that which is given through sensuous intuition (*die sinnliche Anschauung*) and its pure forms.'[351] It is Heidegger's view that the legitimate use of the understanding in Kant's thinking means an understanding rooted in sensibility that allows him to say that in Kant's thinking 'Being remains position, but drawn into the relationship to affection.'[352] Thus, according to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's new insight in the second *Critique* of the central role of intuition, the limitation of the use of the understanding carried out in Kant's thinking through the focus on intuition can be understood as its being rooted in its *proper* ground.

At the beginning of *KTB*, Heidegger states that there are two reasons why we should listen to Kant in order to learn something about being. 'First, Kant took a far-reaching step in the discussion of being. Second, Kant took this step out of loyalty to the tradition, i.e., in

[351] Heidegger, M. *KTB* p. 350; translation modified. GA 9, p. 463
[352] Ibid., p. 353

a critical encounter with it, which threw new light on it.'[353] With respect to the latter of these reasons, Heidegger says that Kant's critical interpretation of being as the objectness of the object of experience not only preserves the age-old prevailing meaning of being (constant presence (*ständige Anwesenheit*)) but that it even makes it reappear in an exceptional form in the definition of "objectness".'[354] In contrast to this, says Heidegger, the interpretation of being as the substantiality of substance virtually covers it up or even disguises it.[355] In light of the analysis so far, I suggest to understand Heidegger's view of Kant's loyalty to tradition in terms of the rooting of the understanding in its proper ground that takes place in Kant's thinking.

The determination of being as the substantiality of substance corresponds to Leibniz's thinking and thus, to rational metaphysics. As I have already pointed out, for Heidegger there is a significant difference between Kant's thinking and rational metaphysics with respect to the determination of existence: the latter determines existence out of pure reason alone whereas the former determines it in relation to the affection of the senses, i.e., intuition. As I have already pointed out, this means that with respect to the determination of existence, Kant's thinking must be placed on the side of intuitive representations. In light of this, I suggest that we understand Kant's determination of existence in relation to the affection of the senses as an obstacle for what I think is the presumption of the uprooted understanding: in Kant's thinking, unlike rational metaphysics, existence is not determined out of pure reason alone. In this way, I think that Kant's view that representations cannot create existence is the unquestionable aspect

[353] Ibid., p. 338
[354] Ibid., p. 351 This is an example of Heidegger's being sympathetic to the notion of the 'objectivity of the object' in the year 1961, whereas, for example, between the years 1936-1946 he is highly critical of this notion in the *Nietzsche* Volumes.
[355] Ibid., p. 351

of his thinking that can stand as a reason for understanding it as a delimiting of the mathematical.

Heidegger's view regarding rational metaphysics echoes that of many other commentators who argue that at least certain rationalists end up giving creative power to the human subject. In his book *All or Nothing* Paul Franks describes the way in which in working through their most crucial problematic, post-kantian thinkers such as Fichte and Schelling (who pertain to German Idealism) end up making recourse to a monistic demand[356] which was essential to pre-kantian rationalism. This means that they need a single absolute principle in which to ground all other principles and to guarantee the coherence of their systems. Inasmuch as in traditional rationalism the place of this absolute principle is God and now with these thinkers this place is shifted to the absolute I (as in Fichte),[357] the interpretation came about that German Idealists such as Fichte and Schelling, would end up giving the human subject the creative power formerly ascribed only to God, thus implying a subjective idealism that 'would involve a kind of insanity.'[358] According to this view for Fichte and Schelling only what is posited and thus 'created' by the I is real: 'Through the creative power of reason whatever is posited is made real.'[359] According to Franks, Heidegger would tend to subscribe to this interpretation.[360] I will return to the issue of the creative power of reason in Heidegger's interpretation of modern thinking in chapter five.

In light of my analysis so far I think it clear that Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's view

[356] Franks, P. W. (2005) *All or Nothing. Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. p. 20
[357] Ibid., p. 80
[358] Ibid., p. 356
[359] Ibid., p. 357
[360] Ibid., p. 356

regarding the determination of existence in *KTB* is guided by Heidegger's concern for the ontic. The way in which Heidegger interprets Kant's thinking regarding the determination of existence in *KTB* by bringing forth, on the one hand, the notion of position as the affection of the senses and the corresponding focus on sensuous intuition and, on the other, the idea of the limitation of the use of the understanding through the focus on intuition (understanding rooted in sensibility) in contrast to the presumption of uprooted understanding, confirms this.

I think that the analysis so far allows me to suggest that the most extreme way in which the danger lurking in the a priori unleashes in modernity is that it entails the determination of existence (as *actualitas* or reality understood in its traditional sense) by representations against experience. As I have argued, this determination implies a rejection of the given in ordinary experience. This being the case, I suggest that this determination is at the heart of Heidegger's concern for the ontic domain (the given in ordinary experience). In other words, I think it right to say that the determination of existence or reality by modern representations is at the core of Heidegger's critical stance towards representations against experience (modern representations).

But how exactly is the determination of reality by modern representations to be understood?

CHAPTER FOUR: THE PRODUCTIVE CHARACTER OF MODERN REPRESENTATIONS IN *AWP*

INTRODUCTION

There is no doubt that in *AWP* Heidegger is critical of the notion of modern representation. This being the case, Heidegger's analysis of modern representation in *AWP* must include his view about what I think is its most critical aspect, that is, the determination of existence by modern representations.

In *AWP* Heidegger aims to disclose the metaphysical foundations of modernity. He thinks that this can be done by way of an analysis of any of the characteristic phenomena of modernity for which reason he undertakes an analysis of modern science. As expected, this analysis will disclose the underlying and foundational mode of thinking that determines both, the modern epoch and the modern human being, that is: representational thinking.

Following Heidegger's analysis of modern science as research in *AWP* I will show that Heidegger's understanding of modern representation in this work corresponds to representations against experience. By showing that representations against experience have an impact on what is 'to be,' I will bring to the fore the productive character of modern representations – the key notion for understanding the determination of reality by representations in modern science.

A well-known way of understanding the productive character of modern representation is in terms of 'intelligibility:' '…the *being* of entities (their intelligibility, the ways in which they can manifest themselves) is now determined by the demands of human thought and action.'[361]

I will argue that intelligibility does not provide a sufficient understanding of the productive character of modern representation given that it does not touch upon the notion of existence in its traditional meaning, which means that it does not account for Heidegger's concern for the ontic.

John Haugeland's understanding of two-fold intelligibility as articulated into 'what-being' and 'that-being' seems to be a better basis for achieving a proper insight into the productive character of representation. However, I will argue that insofar as 'that-being' is not understood in its traditional way, Haugeland's two-fold intelligibility does not offer a sufficient understanding of the productive character of modern representations for the same reason that the standard concept of intelligibility cannot.

Based on this I will argue that *BT* based readings of Heidegger in terms of intelligibility are incapable of being extended to accommodate his 1930s view of modern representations and in fact are expressions of exactly the danger that Heidegger increasingly becomes aware of in that decade, that is: the danger lurking in the a priori.

I will argue that Glazebrook's account of the 'encroachment of the real' in modern science is a better way of understanding the determination of reality by representations that takes

[361] Rouse, J. (2005) 'Heidegger's Philosophy of Science' in *A Companion to Heidegger* Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing. p. 185

place in modern science and that, in doing so, it indirectly offers what I think is a proper way of viewing the productive character of modern representation. As expected, this means that Glazebrook's view does account for Heidegger's concern for the ontic.

I will conclude the analysis of this chapter by exploring Heidegger's distinction between Greek apprehension (*Vernehmen*) and modern representation (*Vorstellung*) in *AWP* since this enables a deeper understanding of the productive character of modern representation. I will show that Derrida's analysis of modern representation in *AWP* is in line with this and, at the same time, indicates the path to follow in order to achieve a thorough understanding of the productive character of modern representation.

I think it relevant to point out that this is a particularly long chapter. The reason for this is that it contains the explicit connection between Heidegger's critical stance towards modern representational thinking (in which I have based my analysis so far) and his view that this is a type of thinking destined by Being, thereby justifying the direction that my analysis will take in the next and final chapter of this thesis.

I.- HEIDEGGER'S ANALYSIS OF MODERN SCIENCE AS RESEARCH IN *AWP* AND THE IMPACT OF MODERN REPRESENTATIONS ON OUR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS 'TO BE'

AWP is an essay written in 1938 and published in 1950 together with other five essays and lectures which span a little more than a decade from 1935 to 1946 under the title *Holzwege.* In *AWP* Heidegger aims to disclose the metaphysical ground of modernity which he identifies with both a particular interpretation of beings and truth. He suggests that this metaphysical ground can be achieved by way of an analysis of any essential phenomena of modernity. He mentions five and chooses one of them to carry out his analysis; modern science. He begins with the following questions: In what is the essence of modern science to be found? What conception of beings and of truth grounds this essence?[362]

- The three essential characteristics of science as research: procedure (Vorgehen), method and Betrieb

1) Heidegger's first description of the essence of research is that it consists in the fact that *knowing as a procedure establishes itself within some realm of beings* (nature or history). Heidegger describes procedure in terms of (a) methodology (how things are done), and (b) the required open region – opened up in advance – within which procedure operates. Heidegger focuses his attention on (b) since 'the opening up of such a region constitutes the fundamental occurrence in research.'[363] Following (b), the 'such' character of the open region is based on being a region (i) opened up in advance, and (ii) within which procedure operates. The opening up of 'such' a region is accomplished:

[362] Heidegger, M. *AWP* p. 58
[363] Ibid., p. 59

..through the projection, within some region of (for example, natural) beings, of a ground-plan [*Grundriss*] of natural processes. Such a projection maps out in advance the way in which the procedure of knowing is to bind itself to the region that is opened up. This commitment is the rigor of research.[364]

Immediately after, Heidegger states that through 'the projection of the ground-plan' and 'the prescribing of rigor,' 'procedure secures for itself, within the realm of being, its *sphere of objects*.'[365] This means that 'the sphere of objects secured for procedure,' is that (such) region (i) and (ii).

In terms of Heidegger's first description of the essence of research, I take this to mean that 'procedure establishes itself within some realm of beings' by 'securing for itself, within the realm of beings, its sphere of objects.' Therefore, the determination of 'beings' as 'objects' is crucial for the establishment of procedure, and thus, for the essence of research.

By recurring to modern physics and its fundamental relation to 'the mathematical,' Heidegger clarifies his description of procedure. As with his treatment of τὰ μαθήματα in *WT,* Heidegger also refers here to the Greek meaning of this expression: 'that which, in his observations of beings and interactions with things, man knows in advance: the corporeality of bodies, the vegetable character of plants, the animality of animals, the humanness of human beings.'[366] When physics assumes an explicitly (*ausdrücklich*) mathematical form, says Heidegger, this means that 'through it and for it, in an emphatic (*betonten*) way, something is specified in advance as that which is already known.'[367] I suggest that Heidegger's use of the words 'explicitly' and 'emphatic' indicates that he

[364] Ibid.
[365] Ibid.
[366] Ibid.
[367] Ibid.

refers to the modern meaning of the mathematical: previous knowledge and against experience. That is, he refers to representations against experience. Given that the determination of nature in modern physics is the context that Heidegger chooses to develop the idea of representations against experience in *WT*, my suggestion finds further support in his explanation of this specification:

> This specification concerns nothing less than what, for the sought-after knowledge of nature, is henceforth to count as "nature:" the closed system of spatio-temporally related units of mass.[368]

This specification is the constitutive core of the ground-plan of modern physics. Pertaining to this ground-plan, in accordance with its prior specification, are to be found other definitions, like those with respect to motion, place and force.[369]

The ground-plan has such a decisive character for what is to count as a natural event, that *any event which is not in accordance with it, is not considered a natural event*: 'Only within the perspective of this ground-plan does a natural event first become visible (*sichtbar*) as such.'[370]

Given the foundational character of the ground-plan, it is imperative for it to be secured in place:

> The ground-plan of nature is secured in place in that physical research, in each step of the investigation, is obligated to it in advance. This obligation [*Bindung*], the rigor of research, has at any given time, its own character in keeping with the ground-plan. The rigor of mathematical science is exactitude.[371]

This description of rigor in terms of (a) the *Bindung* between 'the ground-plan' and 'physical research,' appears to be different from the previous description of rigor in terms

[368] Ibid., pp. 59-60
[369] Ibid., p. 60
[370] Ibid., translation modified. GA 5, p. 79
[371] Ibid.

of (b) the *Bindung* between 'the region that is opened up' and 'the procedure of knowing.' However, by taking (b) in its context, it becomes clear that (b) involves (a): The projection of the ground-plan maps out in advance the way in which the procedure of knowing is to bind (*Bindung*) itself to the region that is opened up (b). Thus, in each step of the investigation, physical research is obligated (*Bindung*) to the ground-plan in advance (a). This double *Bindung* of rigor will become clear in the description of the second essential character of research.

2) Heidegger begins his exposition of the second essential character of research by stating that science becomes research through the projected plan and through the securing of the plan in the rigor of procedure.[372] Here, rigor is thought in terms of (a), since the ground-plan of nature is secured in place in these terms. However, says Heidegger, 'projection' and 'rigor' first develop in what they are in 'method.'[373] This is an important point, since method is not an essential character of research that has to be added to or placed besides the previous essential character, but that nevertheless makes it be what it is.

Immediately after this statement Heidegger recognizes the significance of the determination of beings as objects for science as research by describing how this objectification takes place:

> If the projected region is to become objectified, then it must be brought to encounter us in the full multiplicity of its levels and interweavings. Procedure must therefore be free to view the changeableness in what it encounters. Only from within the perspective of the ever otherness of change does the plenitude of the particular, of the facts, reveal itself. The facts, however, are to become objective.[374]

[372] Ibid.
[373] Ibid.
[374] Ibid.

Procedure accomplishes this objectification by 'representing the changeable in its changing, by bringing the changeable to stand and yet allow the motion to remain the motion.'[375] This is why the rule (*Regel*) is: *'the fixedness of the facts* and *the constancy of their change* as such,'[376] and the law (*Gesetz*) is '*the constancy of change* in *the necessity of its course*.'[377] It has to be noted here that law is built on rule, since 'necessity' can only be determined within the horizon of 'constancy,' which is only achieved by 'the fixedness of the facts.'

> Only from the perspective of rule and law do facts become clear as what they are. Research into the facts in the realm of nature is the setting up and confirmation of rule and law.[378]

The method by means of which a domain of objects is represented has the character of a clarification from out of the clear, of explanation.[379] Explanation has two simultaneous sides (i) it accounts for something unknown through something known, and (ii) confirms the known through the unknown.[380] Explanation takes place in investigation. In the natural sciences, this happens in the experiment.[381]

According to Heidegger, the experiment begins with the fundamental postulation of a *law*. To set up an experiment is *to represent a condition according to which a specific nexus of motions 'can become capable of being followed in its necessary course'* (it can be mastered in advance by calculation).[382] But the setting up of the law is accomplished with reference to the ground-plan of the sphere of objects. Thus, *the ground-plan provides*

[375] Ibid., pp. 60-61
[376] Ibid., p. 61
[377] Ibid.
[378] Ibid.
[379] Ibid.
[380] Ibid.
[381] Ibid.
[382] Ibid.

the standard and constrains the anticipatory representation of the condition.[383] This is why this representing (the law), with and within which the experiment begins, is no arbitrary invention. Heidegger thinks this is the reason why Newton said: *hypothesis non fingo.*[384] As it can be seen, unlike his analysis of Galileo's *mente concipere* in *WT*, here Heidegger does not establish a clear distinction between laws and hypotheses. In *AWP*, the role of hypotheses is left almost untouched, whereas the role of laws stand out:

> Experiment is that method which, in its planning and execution, is supported and guided by what is postulated as a fundamental law, in order to bring forth the facts which either confirm the law or deny it such confirmation.[385]

In terms of the two simultaneous sides of explanation I take this to mean that the law is the known and the facts are the unknown, which, in being brought forth for the verification of the law, become clear as what they are (and the unknown becomes 'known'). From what Heidegger has said so far it follows that when beings become clear as what they are by means of being brought forth for the verification of the law, they are objectified.

The double *Bindung* of rigor (exactitude) is seen in the fact that the more exact the projection of the ground-plan of nature, the more exact is the possibility of the experiment, that is: the setting up and confirmation of rule and law by reference to the domain of objects (confirm the law is confirm the rule on which the former is built).

In line with his confrontation between Newton and Aristotle in *WT*, Heidegger here compares modern research-experiment to Greek ἐμπειρία (*experientia*) and medieval

[383] Ibid.
[384] Ibid.
[385] Ibid., p. 62

experimentum (Roger Bacon). While Greek ἐμπειρία and medieval *experimentum* are 'the observation of the things themselves, their characteristics and alterations under changing conditions, resulting in knowledge of the way in which they behave as a rule,'[386] modern research-experiment begins with the postulation of a law in order to bring forth the facts which either confirm the law or deny it such confirmation. I will come back to Heidegger's understanding of the role of laws in modern science later in this chapter.

3) Heidegger defines the third essential character of research as *Betrieb* (constant activity, ongoing activity).[387] Constant activity is the phenomenon whereby a science (natural or humanistic), in order to achieve proper recognition as a science, is required to be capable of being institutionalized.[388] Thus, institutions are necessary because science as research has the character of constant activity. What is this constant activity?

As it has become clear until this point of Heidegger's exposition of science as research, science is based on the projection of a bounded object domain. This entails that science possesses an individualized character.[389] 'In developing its projection through its methodology, moreover, every individual science must focus on a particular field of investigation.'[390] This focusing (specialization), does not imply that research becomes

[386] Ibid., p. 61
[387] As William Lovitt says, the German word *Betrieb* is not easy to translate in this context. He suggests to translate it as 'ongoing activity,' but he reminds us that *Betrieb* 'means the act of driving on, or industry, activity, as well as undertaking, pursuit, business. It can also mean management, or workshop or factory. (Heidegger, M. (1977) 'The Age of the World Picture' in *The Question Concerning Technology* New York, NY: Garland Publishing. p. 124, footnote 10). With this in view, I will follow the translation which I have used so far, which is Young's and Haynes' translation of *AWP*, in which *Betrieb* is translated by constant activity.
[388] Heidegger, M. *AWP* p. 63
[389] Ibid.
[390] Ibid.

dispersed into random investigations so as to lose itself in them, rather, it is the ground of the progress of all research:[391]

> The methodology through which individual object domains are conquered does not simply amass results. Rather, it uses its results to direct itself toward a new procedure… More and more, methodology adapts itself to the possibilities of procedure it itself opens up.[392]

The *having-to-be-based on its own results as the ways and means of a progressing methodology* is the essence of the character of research as constant activity and thus, is the inner ground for the necessity of its institutional character.[393]

In constant activity, through the accomplishment of the institutionalization of research, the projection of the object domain is, for the first time, *built into beings* (*in das Seiende eingebaut*).[394] This institutionalization involves all the arrangements that: (i) facilitate the planned amalgamation of different types of methodology, (ii) promote the reciprocal checking and communication of results and (iii) regulate the exchange of labor.[395]

When this institutionalization takes place, 'modern science begins to enter the decisive phase of its history: only now it does take possession of its own complete essence.'[396] Heidegger understands the spread and entrenchment of the institutional character of the sciences as the establishment of the precedence of methodology over the beings (of nature and history), which in each case are objectified in research.[397]

[391] Ibid.
[392] Ibid.
[393] Ibid., pp. 63-64
[394] Ibid., p. 64
[395] Ibid.
[396] Ibid.
[397] Ibid.

On the basis of their character as constant activity, the sciences create for themselves their own appropriate coherence and unity.[398] This implies that:

- Only a science that has become institutionally active enters in this coherence and unity; not a science that remains in mere scholarship.

- The scholar disappears and is replaced by the researcher:

> From an inner compulsion, the researcher presses forward into the sphere occupied by the figure of, in the essential sense, the technologist. Only in this way can he remain capable of *being effective* [wirkungsfähig], and only then, in the eyes of his age, *is he real* [wirklich].[399]

The effective (*wirkende*) unity and therefore the reality of the university, is that it is an establishment which still, in a unique way, on account of its administratively self-contained form, makes possible and visible both the fragmentation of the sciences into the specialities and the peculiar unity of constant activity.[400] 'Because it is in constant activity that the essential forces of modern science become immediately and unambiguously effective (*Wirkung*), it is only self-directed research activities which, proceeding from themselves, can prefigure and establish an inner unity with other appropriate research activities.'[401]

- The impact of modern representations on what means 'to be'

As I already mentioned, Heidegger's analysis of modern science in *AWP* is intended to reach the metaphysical foundations of modernity. Therefore, once the analysis of modern science as research has been carried out, he returns to his initial question: What

[398] Ibid.
[399] Ibid.
[400] Ibid.
[401] Ibid., p. 65

understanding of beings and what concept of truth is it that underlies the transformation of science into research?[402] Heidegger's immediate answer is the following:

> Knowledge as research calls beings to account with regard to the way in which, and the extent to which, they can be placed at the disposal of representation. Research has beings at its disposal when it can, through calculation, either predict their future or retrodict [*nachrechnen*] their past. In the prediction of nature and retrodiction of history [*in der historischen Nachrechnung*], nature and history are set in place in the same way. They become objects of explanatory representation. Such representation counts on nature and takes account of history. Only what becomes, in this way, an object *is* – counts as in being [*ist, gilt as seiend*].[403]

As I already stated, the notion of representation with which Heidegger is dealing in *AWP* is that of representations against experience, that is: modern representation. Therefore, everything that he says about representation in this work refers to representations against experience. In this last quote it is clear that Heidegger thinks that representations against experience have an impact on the notion of what is 'to be:' the objectification of beings has an impact on what is 'to be.' It is also clear that calculation plays a crucial role in modern representing. I will come back to this issue later in this chapter.

Heidegger's reference to the way in which the researcher has to perform within the university in his analysis of *Betrieb* shows that this objectification also applies to us: only as a technologist, can the researcher remain capable of *being effective* (*wirkungsfähig*), and only then, in the eyes of his age, *is he real* (*wirklich*).[404]

I take this sentence to mean that the reality of the researcher as determined by his effectiveness is a kind of human example of a more general connection in modernity between productivity and reality (one that includes all beings), a connection which Heidegger wants to brings forth in his detailed account of science as research.

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[402] Ibid.
[403] Ibid., pp. 65-66. Note that in the German text, the italics for 'is' are not added as in the English translation.
[404] Ibid., p. 64

For Heidegger, that beings come into being in and through representedness (*Daß das Seiende in der Vorgestelltheit seiend wird*) makes the age in which this occurs a new age, distinct from its predecessors: the age of the world picture.[405]

It seems that stating that a being 'comes into being' through representedness implies assuming that representations have, in some particular way, a productive character. This being the case, I suggest that this character is the key notion for understanding the determination of reality by representations that takes place in modern science.

But how is it to be understood?

In his essay *Heidegger on Science and Naturalism*, Joseph Rouse tackles this problem by commenting on the following section of *AWP*: 'World-picture, when understood essentially does not mean a picture of the world but the world conceived as picture. What is in its entirety [entities] is now taken to be first and only insofar as it is set in place by human representation and production.'[406] It is important to notice that what Rouse translates as 'human representation and production' corresponds to the German expression '*vorstellend-herstellenden Menschen*,' which is more accurately translated as 'representing-producing humans.'[407] In my view, this last translation shows that, on the one hand, Heidegger understands representation in an essential relation to production and, on the other hand, Heidegger understands this essential relation as constitutive of the (modern) human being. I think that Rouse's translation does not acknowledge these two issues. Rouse's comment on this section is the following:

[405] Ibid., p. 68; translation modified. GA 5, p. 90
[406] Ibid., pp. 67-68; translation modified by Rouse. GA 5, p. 89
[407] Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes translate this expression by 'representing-producing humanity.' See Heidegger, M. *AWP* p. 68

> Note well that Heidegger was not here endorsing an idealist or constructivist thesis about how entities come to exist. He was instead claiming that the being of entities (their intelligibility as entities) is now determined by the demands of human thought and action. That is not merely a distinctive understanding of other entities as objects, but also of humans as subjects. The link between the two can be seen in the conception of accountability to entities in terms of "objectivity," or correct representation. The ideal of objectivity is to allow the object to show itself as it is, unchanged by our ways of conceiving or dealing with it. But what is thereby determined is not something about the object, but how we ought to deal with it. Taking the right stance toward it or employing the right methods is decisive for whether it shows itself rightly. Human representation and praxis thereby become the arbiter of what is real.[408]

Even though Rouse's translation detaches the notion of representation from that of production, the productive character of representation is still present in his interpretation in that representation determines (produces) the intelligibility of entities, that is, it determines the ways in which the entities can manifest themselves. In light of this, the determination of reality by representations has to be understood in terms of intelligibility (*Verständlichkeit*).[409] Although I think this is a very helpful insight into the productive character of modern representation, I do not think that the notion of intelligibility captures its entire significance.

In chapter three I suggested that representations against experience somehow determine reality, where reality has to be understood in its traditional sense. Given that in *AWP* the notion of representation involved in modern science is 'representations against experience,' Rouse's comment that Heidegger was not endorsing an idealist or

[408] Rouse, J. (2005) 'Heidegger on Science and Naturalism' in *Continental Philosophy of Science* Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing. pp. 137-138. Although slightly different, this quote also appears in his essay 'Heidegger's Philosophy of Science:' 'Heidegger was not thereby endorsing an idealist or constructivist thesis about entities. He was instead claiming that the *being* of entities (their intelligibility, the ways in which they can manifest themselves) is now determined by the demands of human thought and action, in ways that also reconceive humans as subjects. The link between these reconceptions is apparent in treatments of accountability to entities as "objectivity," or correct representation. The ideal of objectivity is to allow the object to show itself as it is, unchanged by how we conceive or deal with it. But what is thereby determined is not the object, but our dealings with it. Taking the right stance toward it or employing the right methods is taken as decisive for whether it shows itself rightly. Human representation and praxis thereby seem to arbitrate what is real.' (Rouse, J. 'Heidegger's Philosophy of Science,' p. 185)

[409] The word 'intelligibility' is used in several sections of *BT*. This word translates the German word *Verständlichkeit*. Given the obvious connection in the German between *Verständlichkeit* and *Verständins*, the translators of *BT* point out that a more faithful translation for *Verständlichkeit* is 'understandability.' Intelligibility, as the translators notice, does not keep the strong connection with 'understanding' that the German words do have. (See Heidegger, M. (1962) *Being and Time* Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. p. 193, footnote 1)

constructivist thesis about how entities come to exist when addressing modern science in a work like *AWP* does not seem to acknowledge Heidegger's crucial concern about modern science. I think that Heidegger's analysis of modern science in *WT* and *AWP* entails that he thinks that modern science does somehow endorse an idealist thesis about how entities come to exist, and that Heidegger's placing modern science on the side of rational metaphysics in *WT* argues in favour of this view.

The insufficiency of the notion of intelligibility for addressing the productive character of modern representation will be further confirmed in the next chapter of this thesis, in which I will give further support to the idea that the concept of reality involved in Heidegger's view of the determination of reality by representation that takes place in modernity is the traditional one as actuality or existence. This will show that it does not seem sufficient to address this determination in terms of intelligibility or, at least, that it seems necessary to rethink the notion of intelligibility so that it can offer a better account of the productive character of modern representation by tackling the notion of reality in its traditional sense.

In his essay *Heidegger's Philosophy of Science*, Rouse divides Heidegger's philosophy of science into two periods. The first one concentrates on *BT* and works from that period, and the second one begins in the mid-1930s:

> Reflection on science was central to Heidegger's reorientation of his philosophical project in the mid-1930s. Notably, Heidegger abandoned fundamental ontology. His attempt to articulate essential differences among ways of being, and thus make ontology a philosophical "science," was supplanted by an historicized understanding of the intelligibility of entities…Not only did Dasein's way of being thereby lose centrality, but occurrentness and availability also ceased to be basic categories. Science could then no longer have the ontological significance of discovering entities as occurrent.[410]

[410] Rouse, J. 'Heidegger's Philosophy of Science,' pp. 181-182.

Although an analysis of Heidegger's understanding of science and, specifically, of representation in the *BT* period is not part of the aim of this thesis, in what follows I will refer to this analysis only insofar as it helps me to show why I think that the understanding of Being as intelligibility does not permit a full account of the productive character of representation from the mid-1930s onwards.

The abandonment of FO is for Rouse the crucial change that guides Heidegger's new way of thinking about science, and *AWP* is the work in which Heidegger most extensively develops his transformed view:[411] 'Having lost its fundamental-ontological significance, science was reconceived as an essential phenomenon of modernity. Heidegger's earlier account of science as the discovery of the occurrent now seemed too reminiscent of traditional accounts of science as cognition or justified assertion. To replace this residue of traditional epistemology, Heidegger characterized modern science instead as research.'[412]

We can concede to Rouse that there is a substantial change between Heidegger's analysis of science in the *BT* period and the mid-1930s onwards. But because of the way I understand this change, I do not think that both positions can be evaluated in terms of the understanding of Being as intelligibility. However, if we were to evaluate both positions in terms of intelligibility, then two different ways of understanding this notion would be necessary – one for each period – and not only one, as Rouse suggests.

In chapter two I suggested that Heidegger's insight in *WT* that representations against experience (the modern expression of the mathematical) are derived from the

[411] Ibid., p. 182
[412] Ibid.

mathematical in its original Greek definition (a priori), has an impact on Heidegger's understanding of ontology and FO in *BT*. Following my analysis in chapter two this means that the basic notion of a prior understanding of entities not derived from our encounter with them is not continuous between *BT* and *WT*, thereby implying that something substantial has changed by the time these lectures were delivered. Given that from the mid-30s onwards Heidegger realizes that there is a problem with the basic notion of a prior understanding of entities not derived from our encounter with them, because this prior understanding can (and according to the will of the mathematical *should*) turn into a representation against experience (the danger lurking in the a priori), the notion of Being as intelligibility as such, without further clarification, risks finding itself in the service of representations against experience. This is because understanding Being as intelligibility puts everything on the side of the human being and does not take into account the ontic domain. I will return to this issue later on this chapter.

However, this is certainly not Rouse's position, since he is clear in saying that intelligibility does not touch the fact that entities 'are,' but only the way these entities manifest themselves *as*. This means that intelligibility neither rejects the ontic domain nor intends to 'create' it. But this being the case, it is clear why intelligibility as understood by Rouse is not sufficient for understanding Heidegger's analysis of modern science for that analysis does imply that the type of representations involved in modern science somehow touches the fact that entities 'are' by determining (or trying to determine) their existence (which entails the rejection of the given in ordinary experience; the ontic domain). As I also already suggested, this is at the heart of Heidegger's concern for the ontic.

With this – as I have already suggested – I do not mean to say that the understanding of Being as intelligibility should be necessarily replaced by a different understanding of Being, but at least that it should be rethought and qualified in a way that could account for Heidegger's (increasing) concern for the ontic.

I think that what is necessary in order to evaluate the productive character of modern representation in *AWP*, is to address Heidegger's understanding of Being in terms of the basic articulation of Being into what-being and that-being, since this will allow to bring to the fore the notion of reality in its traditional sense which is what is missing in the understanding of the productive character of representation in terms of intelligibility. Along with this, I think it is also necessary to address the relation between 'being effective' and 'being real' that Heidegger brings forth in his analysis of *Betrieb*. The reason for this is that from the mid-1930s onwards (and even in an earlier work such as *BPP*, 1927), Heidegger highlights the fundamental connection that the notion of effectiveness has with the notion of that-being (understood in its traditional sense) throughout the history of metaphysics. John Haugeland's work on Heidegger is very illuminating in this respect.

II.- HAUGELAND'S ACCOUNT OF DASEIN'S PRODUCTIVE COMPORTMENT IN LIGHT OF HIS VIEW OF TWOFOLD INTELLIGIBILITY: THE ENABLING SENSE OF LETTING BE

- Haugeland's account of 'twofold intelligibility'

Haugeland's work on Heidegger mainly focuses on the early Heidegger, especially, on *BT*. Although this is not the period of Heidegger's work in which I focus on in this thesis, I will show that Haugeland's analysis of modern science in light of his understanding of Being as intelligibility can serve as a very helpful background to develop a proper analysis of the productive character of representation in *AWP*.

I am not assuming that Haugeland's explanation can be applied directly to Heidegger's later text since, as I have already suggested in reference to Rouse's interpretation of *AWP* in light of *BT*, I think that this cannot be done. On the contrary, as I will show in what follows, I think that Haugeland's understanding of two-fold intelligibility allows a clearer view of why this cannot be done and, in so doing, can serve as a very helpful background to show what is lacking in order to achieve a proper insight into the productive character of representation in Heidegger's later texts.

Haugeland's view of Being as intelligibility is developed throughout his posthumous book *Dasein Disclosed*. Although everywhere it is clear that his understanding of Being as intelligibility is fundamentally connected to the articulation of Being into what-being and that-being, there is only one point in the book in which he makes this explicit by introducing the notion of 'twofold intelligibility:' 'The *being* of entities is that in terms of which they are *intelligible as entities*. The qualifier "as entities" (as I am using it) is

short for this: with regard to the fact *that* they are (at all) and with regard to *what* they are. Understanding an entity *as an entity* – and there is no other way of *understanding* it – means understanding it in its that-it-is and what-it-is. Disclosing the being of entities amounts to letting them become accessible in this twofold intelligibility – that is, as phenomena that are *understood*. When taken with sufficient generality, a pretty good colloquial paraphrase for "disclosing the being of" is *making sense of*.'[413]

This way of understanding intelligibility takes Haugeland to suggest a quite striking interpretation of Heidegger's understanding of what-being and that-being in relation to the different regions of being developed by Heidegger in *BT*. Following Heidegger and via him the history of philosophy, says Haugeland, 'we may distinguish between the *how* (*wie*) of an entity's being and its *way* (*Weise*) of being. The "how" of its being is how it has a determinate character, how it is *as* it is, how it is "what it is like." In the case of things, we might say that they are determinate in general by having *intrinsic properties* – *those* properties which, for each particular thing, make it what it is. The "way" of an entity's being is the way or manner in which it is at all, as opposed to not. In the case of things, we might say that the way they are is by *actually occurring*, being present at particular times and places. Thus, the how concerns *what* the thing is, whereas the way concerns *that* (or *whether*) it is. In medieval ontology (oriented to the thing), this distinction shows up as that between essence and existence.'[414] For Haugeland, when Heidegger says that it is the being of entities that is disclosed, he means both the how and the way of being, for, Haugeland says, they go together.[415]

[413] Haugeland, J. (2013) *Dasein Disclosed* New York, NY: Harvard University Press. p. 191
[414] Ibid., p. 21
[415] Ibid., p. 22

Furthermore, Haugeland says that every region of being not only shares the articulation of being into what being and that being, but also into thus being: 'What these respective "articulata" mean, exactly – their sense – varies from region to region (that is what makes the regions different). But the threefoldness of the articulation – that/what/thus – is common to all regions.'[416]

Following this interpretation, at different points in his book Haugeland states that being-available (*Zuhandensein*) is the that-being of equipment and equipmental role (*Bewandtnis)* is its what-being.[417]

As expected, Haugeland's interpretation of the intelligibility of entities in light of the articulation of being incorporates other regions of being as well. For example, at some point he says that 'the others' is another region of being whose that-being is co-dasein (*Mitdasein*) and whose what-being is "what they do" (their respective professional and interpersonal roles).[418]

For the purpose of my analysis, I will only focus on Haugeland's distinction between *Zuhandensein* and *Vorhandensein* as different ways of that-being.

According to Haugeland, in addition to the specifically regional concepts like the region of dasein and the region of equipment, 'Heidegger also often uses another ontological term, "being-occurrent" (*Vorhandensein*), which is not specific to any region but is oblivious of regional differences.'[419] Although Haugeland says that Heidegger never

[416] Ibid., p. 226
[417] Ibid., see for example pp. 105-106, 169
[418] Ibid., p. 224
[419] Ibid., p. 57

explained what he meant by it, he thinks it clear that 'To understand an entity as occurrent is to understand it as real – that is, as an independent *thing* that bears properties in the traditional philosophical sense. But the mark of reality in that sense is *independence*: a thing is *at all* and also is *what* it is *all by itself*.'[420]

Consistently throughout his book, Haugeland states that in the history of ontology there is only one sense of that-being: *Vorhandensein.*[421] 'Being-occurrent is a kind of umbrella term for ontologies which sustain the notion of an independent substance that does not need anything else (save, perhaps, a creator) either to be at all or to be what it is.'[422] In fact, he says, in ontologies of this sort (which is to say: throughout all the history of ontology) 'the regional differences are all relegated to the moment of what-being. Descartes, for instance, drew an ontological distinction between *res extensa* and *res cogitans* – a classic example of two different regions. But the sense of that-being from entities from either region is the same – reality=actuality=being-occurrent – the regional distinction residing instead in the respective essential attributes (extension versus thinking).'[423] Haugeland is convinced that in contrast to this, 'Heidegger insists that the senses of the that-being of equipment (being-available) and of (mere) things (being-occurrent) are fundamentally different.'[424]

Haugeland has a very critical stance toward the dominance of the notion of occurrent-things: both Aristotle's and Kant's, he says, silently (unwittingly) *take it for granted* that to be is to be an occurrent thing. They have no alternative to consider or counterpose.

[420] Ibid.
[421] Ibid., see for example p. 226
[422] Ibid., pp. 121-122
[423] Ibid., p. 226
[424] Ibid.

Heidegger, by contrast – he says – has several alternatives to compare, develop, and deploy.[425] According to Haugeland, none of the philosophical concepts on Heidegger's list is compatible with the ubiquitous (common sense) unnoticed assumption that to be at all is to be occurrent.

With this in view, the issue of the relation between *Zuhandensein* and *Vorhandensein* as two forms of that-being turns out to be quite complex. To address this issue, it is important to have in mind that Haugeland, as Rouse, thinks that Being, not entities, is dependent on the understanding of Being. As I have already pointed out, this means that intelligibility does not touch the fact that there are entities.[426] This is a crucial issue since it is what gives Rouse and Haugeland an argument for distancing their interpretation of Being as intelligibility from idealism.

In the Editor's Introduction to *Dasein Disclosed* Rouse says: 'The dependence of truth (the disclosure of being and the discovery of entities) upon dasein is nevertheless not any form of idealism. The being of entities (their intelligibility as the entities they are) depends upon "existing dasein, as does the possibility of their truthful discovery and disclosure. The entities themselves are not dependent upon us.'[427]

Immediately after, Rouse brings into discussion a crucial notion for Haugeland's interpretation of Heidegger, which is the notion of *beholdeness*: 'Moreover, in the case of ontical truth as the correctness or incorrectness of various comportments toward entities, what Haugeland's Heidegger shows is how it is possible for those comportments

[425] Ibid., p. 84
[426] Ibid., p. 222
[427] Ibid., p. xxvi

to be beholden to the entities themselves and not merely to our own constructions or impositions.'[428]

This notion is the basis on which Haugeland explains why, even though being "is" only in how it is understood, such understanding can fail or be faulty: 'I argue that an essential aim and (unfinished) achievement of *Being and Time* is to show how – without circularity or vacuity – understandings of being are beholden to *entities*: the very same entities to which ontical claims are beholden. Exhibiting that ontological beholdeness will complete the explication of the truth character of being.'[429] And again: '…one might suppose that making sense is the exclusive province of understanding. Yet if that sense making were not concretely situated and "beholden" to the entities themselves, it would float free as mere fantasy.'[430]

It is not at all clear what Haugeland understands by the expression 'the entities themselves.' In another passage of his book, he says that '…there is no denying that there *are* real, occurrent things, indeed occurrent things of ontologically different sorts [although they all understand being as being-occurrent]. What is questionable is rather whether everything is occurrent: whether to be at all is just to bear properties and stand in relations.'[431]

From this it seems that Haugeland thinks that 'the entities themselves' are occurrent things. This being the case, is it appropriate to equate being-occurrent and being-available

[428] Ibid., p. xxvi
[429] Ibid., p. 59
[430] Ibid., p. 149
[431] Ibid., p. 58 The parenthetical remark I added in this quote is taken from a footnote that corresponds to this same quote. Ibid. p. 58, footnote 8.

as two forms of that-being? Given that being-available is – according to Haugeland – a way of being (that-being) dependent on our understanding of Being, whereas being-occurrent (as 'the entities themselves') is not, I think the answer to this question should be a negative one. In light of this, it seems that if one wants to sustain that being-occurrent and being-available are two forms of that-being, then that-being cannot be understood in the same way in both cases, which in turn makes one wonder whether both should be thought as two ways of that-being after all.

For Haugeland, the relation between being-occurrent and being-available is clearly a problematic one. In his discussion of equipmental breakdown and unavailability he says that in addition to and along with unavailability, 'equipmental breakdown also lets mere occurrentness come into view as an extreme case. This means at least that, in bringing absorbed dealings to a halt, it lets entities show up in a way that is not immediately tied to their roles and assignments. The nails and wood can be seen as "just sitting there" – taking up space, as it were. Such entities open up the prospect of decontextualized "observation," and thence even pure disinterested objectivity.'[432] Haugeland thinks that what Heidegger says about availability and occurrentess in this context is 'ambivalent and possibly confused:'[433] 'On the one hand, in introducing availability, he [Heidegger] protests against the all-too-easy assumption that the entities that initially show up in careful dealings are "mere things" or even things that are also, somehow, "invested with value" (SZ 67ff.).'[434] By reference to a passage from *BT* in which Heidegger explicitly deals with the relation between availability and occurrentness,[435] Haugeland states that Heidegger seems 'to say that availability and occurrentness are distinct ontological

[432] Ibid., p. 109
[433] Ibid.
[434] Ibid.
[435] Heidegger, M. *BT* p. 101

categories and, in particular, that available entities are not to be understood as occurrent entities "in themselves" but with some distinctive character "added on" by dasein.[436] Yet, Haugeland says, in another section of *BT*, Heidegger says that 'in conspicuousness, an unavailable piece of equipment shows itself as an equipmental thing that has also been occurrent all along; that, in obtrusiveness, it reveals itself as merely occurrent; and that, in obstinacy, the occurrentness of the available announces itself as the being of that which still lies before us (SZ 73ff).'[437] Both positions, says Haugeland, seem to be in apparent conflict. The latter of these seem to say that available entities are also always occurrent entities and that the disruptions that lead to unavailability (a deficient mode of availability) reveal this.'[438]

Having the latter of these positions in view, Haugeland says that he cannot see '…how, if being-available and being-occurrent are two distinct ways of being, they could ever both belong to the same entity. How can a single entity *be* in two different ways? To be sure, he continues, any available hammer – any hammer that *there is* – is somehow made of various occurrent physical atoms, suitably arranged. The question is what that shows – and, in particular, whether it shows that the hammer and the arrangement of atoms are numerically identical. This is a version of what has come to be known as a question of *token identity*, and it may be that Heidegger just did not have the resources to think it through clearly.'[439]

In light of this I think it is clear that the appropriateness of the equivalence between being-available and being-occurrent as two forms of that-being is not by any means obvious. I

[436] Haugeland, J. *Dasein Disclosed* p. 109
[437] Ibid.
[438] Ibid.
[439] Ibid., pp. 109-110

think Haugeland was aware of the difficulties of this equivalence and that thinking through it was an important concern for him. A very illuminating essay on this respect and which allows bringing dasein's productive comportment in relation to the notion of effectiveness to the fore, is one of Haugeland's late papers on Heidegger entitled *Letting Be*.

- Haugeland's account of dasein's productive comportment in light of his understanding of twofold intelligibility

In *Letting Be*, Haugeland intends to offer an account of Heidegger's use of the expression *sein lassen*, "to let be" and a number of broadly related verbs used in similar ways such as *begegnen lassen*, "to let show up;" *bewenden lassen*, "to let have-a-role;" *entlassen*, "to release;" and even *freigeben*, "to set-free."[440] As Haugeland points out, 'in all these cases the active subject (if mentioned at all) is typically dasein or its world, and the passive objects are entities of some sort.'[441] Thus, the questions that guide Haugeland's analysis are: 'What could it mean to say that dasein's world "lets entities be" and "sets them free"? Free from what? And what would happen if it stopped doing that? Would all entities ceased to be – or cease to be free? But dasein's world is only insofar as dasein is. Does that mean that if there were no dasein, there would be no entities at all?'[442] Although Haugeland acknowledges that some of these questions may be misguided, he thinks it necessary to confront them in order to figure out what Heidegger meant to say with the expressions in question. To carry out his analysis, Haugeland distinguishes four basic senses in the English language for the verb phrase "let be." These are: acquiescing (what we mean by "let it be" when we advise someone not to struggle with something), allowing

[440] Ibid., p. 167
[441] Ibid.
[442] Ibid., p. 168

(to permit, in the sense of not preventing), enabling (to permit in the sense of making possible, as when a new highway lets a city be approached from the south) and effecting (to bring something about or make it so, as when God said "Let there be light" (and there was light). But it is the same sense at play, thinks Haugalend, when a geometer says, "Let C be the midpoint of line AB" or ballplayers say, "Let this sidewalk be the goal line."[443]

Haugeland begins his analysis with the case of everyday intrawordly equipment, which is the context in which Heidegger introduces the *lassen* verbs *bewenden lassen* and *begegnen lassen*. *Zuhandenheit* and *Bewandtnis* are both defined as the being of equipment. Haugeland thinks that the difference between them is what Heidegger calls the articulation of being into that-being and what-being. 'The that-being of an item of equipment (what is at stake in whether it is at all or not) is its *Zuhandenheit* (what I call availability). Its what-being (what is at stake in what "kind" of thing it is) is its *Bewandtnis* – which I therefore translate as its (equipmental) role. So: availability is the equipmental analog of actuality, and roles are the analogue of essences.'[444]

By referring to the relational character of the various roles to which equipmental entities are "assigned," that is, in Heidegger's terms, "signifying," and to the totality of such signifying as what makes up the structure of the world (the world of everyday dasein), Haugeland concludes that 'it is not so weird after all to say that dasein's world lets intrawordly entities "have their roles" (*bewenden lassen*) or even that it lets them "show up" as anything whatsoever (*begegnen lassen*). For the world is defined, in effect, as the totality of all those roles in their essential interrelations…who could deny that the "world"

[443] Ibid., pp. 168-169
[444] Ibid., p. 169

of baseball lets certain discernible configurations be strikes, home runs, and the like?'[445] The problem with this kind of case, says Haugeland, is that it is too easy and that it does not account for those 'entities that have been around since long before there was dasein and still will be long after – entities that are (as we want to say) independent of dasein.'[446] As Haugeland says, this problem cannot even be addressed without some grasp of the relevant sense of "independence," and that turns out to presuppose the concept of that-being.[447]

Haugeland bases his analysis on Heidegger's account of the articulation of being into what-being and that-being in *BPP*. He refers to part one, chapter two, in which Heidegger deals with the historical background pre-requisite to addressing the problem.[448] As usual, Heidegger suggests tracing the sense of *existentia* back to its roots in Greek ontology, and claims that the Greek understanding of that-being – in which the scholastic concept of *existentia* is still rooted – makes sense within the horizon of productive comportment. Following Heidegger's analysis, Haugeland shows that the Kantian definition of existence as absolute position makes sense within what Heidegger calls the horizon of perceptual comportment; that is, 'Kant's understanding of "empirical" entities as such takes its guidance from the perspective of their being knowable, going back ultimately to intuition.'[449]

[445] Ibid., p. 170
[446] Ibid.
[447] Ibid.
[448] Part 2 of *BPP* was supposed to have four chapters, the second of which was going to give a phenomenological account of the basic articulation of Being. Heidegger did not write this chapter, as well as chapters 3 and 4 of Part 2.
[449] Haugeland, J. *Dasein Disclosed* p. 171

As Haugeland points out, Heidegger focuses on the reversing of the respective priorities of *morphe* (the shape or form of a thing) and *eidos* (the "look" of the thing) that takes place when we shift from perceptual comportment to productive comportment. In Haugeland's own words: 'Within the horizon of perception, the "object" is understood as already existing (actual), and so such existence itself can (only) be grasped as standing-over-against-ness (*Gegenständlichkeit*, objectivity), with no further insight into what that amounts to. Within the horizon of production, on the other hand, the entity to be produced is precisely not understood as already existent – but rather merely what can be – and, more specifically, can, via this very production, come into being (become an entity for the first time). Thus, existence – that-being – is somehow to be "conferred upon" or "accorded to" something (determined by the *eidos*) that does not yet "have" it. And the idea is that this "according of existence to" – "letting be" – can in turn be a clue to that which is accorded by it (=that being).'[450]

Haugeland uses an example of a potter making a pot to show that the senses of 'let be' that are involved in making a pot are those of allowing, acquiescing and, specially, enabling: 'in producing, the producer must enable the product to be whatever it is to be and, in so doing, enable it to stand on its own – which is to say, to be or *ek-sist* at all –. And precisely within the enabling sense lies the intelligibility of creation as actualization – the possible union of essence and existence.'[451] Therefore, says Haugeland, 'at least within the horizon of production, the enabling sense of letting be is ultimately the deepest.'[452]

[450] Ibid.
[451] Ibid., p. 172
[452] Ibid.

In an earlier essay, *The World of Everyday Dasein*, Haugeland carries out a very similar analysis. The four senses of 'let be' remain the same except from the fact that the first one is named 'accepting or putting up with' instead of 'acquiescing.' However, there is a significant difference in the way he conceives the importance of the effecting sense:

> …with regard to equipment, the idea of *effecting* comes immediately to the fore. When someone drives in tent stakes with a rock, she is *letting* that rock *be* a hammer in the sense of making it the case by using it as one… *Mere* effecting, however, would be mere fiat, as if roles could be assigned in any way whatsoever. If assignments were random and unconstrained, however, they would also be gratuitous and vacuous. But, of course, they *are* constrained: our camper *could not* drive in her stakes with a handful of wet sand – it simply would not work – and she has to accept that…Thus we see, at least in outline, that letting equipment be has a surprisingly intricate structure. In particular, three of the four listed senses of the verb 'let be' are involved in an interdependent way. Dasein lets equipment be in the *effecting* sense by assigning it to roles in the first place. Yet it cannot "effect" equipment with carte blanche, but only in also *accepting* and *putting up with* what will and will not work. Finally and most tellingly, however, this putting-up-with presupposes the distinctive sort of breakdown or failure that is itself *enabled* and *made possible* only by the original assignments to roles.[453]

Haugeland carries on his analysis in *Letting Be* by admitting that, however, '[i]t is one thing to say that dasein "lets" its own equipment "be," that it "sets" the products of labour "free," but it is quite different to say that any such thing about protons, planets and prehistoric lizards. Yet it is perfectly clear that Heidegger wants to make that claim too.'[454] By reference to Galileo and his struggle to convince his opponents that the specks of light visible in his telescope were moons of Jupiter and not mere artifacts of the instrument itself, Haugeland argues that when Heidegger says that dasein's thematizing sets protons and planets *free*, he means by this that '…until dasein releases them, entities remain in the darkest of all prisons, the prison of utter obscurity; we let them out by bringing them to light (into the clearing); and we enable them to throw themselves against a pure discovery by erecting a pure discovery in their path and accepting what happens as the result of their coming up against it. Or, less metaphorically, we introduce measuring instruments and accept their "readings" as evidence.'[455] According to Haugeland, the sort

[453] Ibid., pp. 114-115
[454] Ibid., pp. 172-173
[455] Ibid., p. 173

of work that Galileo had to do in order to 'convince' his opponents is the sort of work 'that Heidegger means by "letting entities show up" (*begegnen lassen*) and, more specifically, letting them "throw themselves against" (*entgegenwerfen*) a pure discovery. Such "letting" is clearly more than mere allowing or acquiescing-in: it is also and specially enabling.'[456]

As Haugeland correctly points out, in German, the words themselves lubricate the transition from *begegnen lassen* and *entgegenwerfen* to *Gegenstand* and *gegenständlich*, but, philosophically, those moves still have to be explained and justified, since '[i]t is one thing to say that dasein enables entities to show up, but it is quite another to say that it enables them to be – or, be objects – at all. Yet the latter, I am convinced, is the claim he is really trying to make – or, more cautiously, was setting himself up to make in division III,'[457] Haugeland says.

It might seem, says Haugeland, 'that Heidegger explicitly repudiates the thesis I just attributed to him. For he says in section 43: 'If dasein does not exist, then 'independence' 'is' not, either, nor 'is' the 'in-itself'…It can be said *then*, neither that entities are nor that they are not. But *now*, so long as the understanding of being is, and with it the understanding of occurrentness, it can perfectly be said that entities will still continue to be then.' And adds in the next section: ''*There is*' *truth only so far and so long as dasein is*. Only *then* are entities discovered, and they are disclosed only *so long as* dasein *is* at all.' Finally, on the following passage: 'That prior to Newton, his laws were neither true nor false cannot mean that the entities those laws discoveringly point out were not [there] prior to him. Through Newton, the laws became true; with them, the entities in themselves

[456] Ibid., p. 174
[457] Ibid.

became accessible to dasein; with the discoveredness of these entities, they show themselves as precisely the entities they already were and will continue to be.'[458]

In light of these passages, says Haugeland, the most obvious way of dealing with the problem in question is to say that 'there are (past, present, and future) whatever entities there are, whether dasein is there – to "let" them be – or not. What depends on dasein, when it exists, is not what there is at that time but only what can be said, pointed out, or accessed then – hence what can be true or false.'[459]

But the fact that this implies that the laws of gravity, for example, were not true before Newton discovered them, shows that this way of dealing with the problem is not fully adequate. Therefore, Haugeland continues his analysis by posing the following question: How does physics (Newtonian physics, say) let physical objects be – "stand on their own, over against us"?[460]

For Haugeland, the crucial notion in order to address this question is the notion of 'law.' For him, scientific laws are one version of a more general sort of factor that is essential in every understanding of being and every way of letting entities be: 'that *understanding* entities is projecting them onto their *possibilities*.'[461] The advantage of proceeding via scientific laws, thinks Haugeland, is that the form of their contribution is especially clear.[462]

[458] Ibid.
[459] Ibid., p. 175
[460] Ibid.
[461] Ibid., p. 176
[462] Ibid., p. 175

In order to let entities be, says Haugeland, dasein must somehow discover them, which in science generally means to observe or measure them. But observation and measurement make sense only if there is some way to distinguish between correct and incorrect results. The only fundamental way to establish that something must be wrong is to show that some plurality of results are not mutually compatible, and that, finally, presupposes antecedent constraints on what combinations would and wouldn't be possible: laws.

In light of this, Haugeland explains that 'Newton and his colleagues could have far better astronomical data that could Galileo not simply because of technical advances but rather and mainly because they had much better laws. Knowing, as they did, with far greater accuracy what had to be the case, they could calibrate and fine-tune their instruments and techniques in ways their predecessors could scarcely dream of.'[463]

Therefore, the crucial role of laws, says Haugeland, 'is to restrict what there can be by ruling out various conceivable combinations. Only by virtue of that restrictive function can subsumption of particulars under laws render the actual intelligible – that is, explain why one thing happened rather than another.'[464]

If the preceding is the general form of scientific letting be, says Haugeland, 'and if the that-being of scientifically discovered entities is *Gegenständlichkeit* – being-an-object or objectivity – then the relevant sense of letting be is again the enabling sense. For the upshot of subsumption under laws is to enable entities to stand up against observations and measurements – that is, to defy and repudiate them. And the crucial prerequisite for

[463] Ibid., p. 176
[464] Ibid.

this defiant repudiation is, as we have seen, the law-mandated impossibility of certain combinations of observed characteristics or measured magnitudes.'[465]

With this interpretation, Haugeland offers a way of understanding what it means to say that through Newton and his laws, for example, the entities of Newtonian physics became accessible as the entities they already were and would continue to be. However, as he acknowledges, it remains utterly opaque 'what could be meant by saying that, through Newton, his laws became true – not to mention the inevitable follow-up question of whether they became neither true nor false again through Einstein. What is worse, he thinks, is that with this opacity, the force of the seemingly clear "as they already were and would continue to be" becomes pretty murky after all. What could Heidegger have been thinking?[466]

Haugeland offers an answer to this question in terms of the different sorts of time in *BT*. Even though it is a very interesting approach to the problem, it does not help for the purpose of understanding the issues in question in this chapter about modern representation in *AWP*. What is relevant, however, is one of the problems that, as Haugeland himself acknowledges, follows from his approach, namely, that 'we would have to say, even now, that it has really always been only X-ian universe, where X is Einstein's successor – or, rather, the ultimate end of the line in that successorship, assuming there "is" such an end and science lasts long enough to get there.'[467] This, as Haugeland says, is clearly not a stable position.

[465] Ibid., p. 177
[466] Ibid.
[467] Ibid., p. 178

Haugeland suggests that thinking in this way is the easiest and most tempting thing to say and he thinks that the reason for this lies in the legacy of scholasticism: 'The original and final science – the only one that has ever really been right – is God's science: the *scientia* of omniscience. This *scientia* is supposed to be absolutely and eternally correct, literally by fiat – the effecting sense of "letting be".'[468]

Thus, Haugeland ends his analysis by calling us to overcome scholasticism: 'No one who has ever tried to think about it could imagine that "getting over" this legacy is or will be easy. It will require at least a profound reconception of reality as such – which is to say a new and deeper understanding of being.'[469] Haugeland states that his analysis has shown that the idea of letting be, taken not as effective and divine but as enabling and human, is an integral part of that larger endeavour.[470]

***- The insufficiency of the enabling sense of letting be for a proper account of the productive character of modern representation in* AWP**

Even though I think Haugeland's suggestion is very interesting I doubt whether the idea of letting be taken as enabling and human can give a proper account of the productive character of modern representation in *AWP*. I think that there are several arguments that show that this is not the case. From Haugeland's analysis in *Letting Be* and considering that his understanding of intelligibility (like Rouse's) touches the way the entities manifest themselves but not the fact that these entities 'are,' I think the following can be said in order to prove the insufficiency of the enabling sense of letting be for offering a proper account of the productive character of modern representation in *AWP*:

[468] Ibid.
[469] Ibid.
[470] Ibid.

1.- In his example of a potter's making a pot Haugeland says that 'in producing, the producer must enable the product to be whatever it is to be and, in so doing, enable it to stand on its own – which is to say, to be or *ek-sist* at all. And precisely within the enabling sense lies the intelligibility of creation as actualization – the possible union of essence and existence.' At first sight, it seems that Haugeland's view coincides with Heidegger's. However, this is not the case. Insofar as Haugeland's claim implies understanding that-being in a non-traditional way, it leaves the traditional understanding of that-being untouched and so it does not account for Heidegger's view of the determination of reality by representation that takes place in modernity. As I have already argued, this also means that it does not account for his concern for the ontic. In light of this I think that the enabling sense of 'let be,' regarded by Haugeland here as the deepest one, cannot give a proper account of this determination, which implies that the enabling sense cannot give a proper account of the productive character of modern representation.

2.- As I have already pointed out, from the mid-1930s onwards (and even before in a work like *BPP*), Heidegger highlights the fundamental connection that the notion of effectiveness has with the notion of that-being understood in its traditional sense. Although I will analyze this issue in the following chapter of this thesis, I think that the analysis so far already shows that Haugeland's understanding of 'effecting' in relation to the assignment of roles does not touch the notion of reality (that-being) in its traditional sense. This means that Haugeland's understanding of 'effecting' cannot account for Heidegger's view of the determination of reality by representation that takes place in modernity and therefore it does not account for his concern for the ontic.

3.- Haugeland states that in *BPP* Heidegger suggests that the Greek understanding of that-being – in which the scholastic concept of *existentia* is still rooted – makes sense within the horizon of productive comportment. In *BPP*, Heidegger distinguishes between dasein's productive comportment and dasein's intuitive finding present (*das anschauende Vorfinden*) as a purely contemplative perception of the extant.[471] Haugeland shows that Heidegger places Kant on the side of dasein's intuitive finding present rather than on the side of productive comportment. He also shows that Heidegger (and him) finds that productive comportment can serve as a better source for understanding existence (that-being) than intuitive finding present. As I pointed out, Haugeland takes this view as an argument to sustain the importance of the enabling sense of letting be. I think that my analysis so far supports the view that once the insight into the danger lurking in the a priori is achieved, Heidegger tends to value more dasein's intuitive finding present and identifies dasein's productive comportment as that comportment which, in modernity, can serve as a path for the fulfilment of the mathematical, that is: representations against experience and its ensuing determination of reality. This – as it is clear from Heidegger's esteem for Kant's notion of the synthetic a priori – does not lead to a rejection of productive comportment,[472] but to a search for a limitation of what productive comportment can achieve. I will return to this issue in the last section of this chapter. I think that understanding dasein's productive comportment in relation to the enabling sense of let be does not explain Heidegger's worries about productive comportment in the mid 1930s and thus cannot offer an account of the shift in Heidegger's thinking from productive comportment to intuitive finding present or of his concern for the ontic.

[471] Heidegger, M. *BPP* pp. 109-110
[472] See footnote 298 where I already suggested this idea.

1 and 2 explicitly say that Haugeland's account of dasein's productive comportment in terms of enabling and human omits the category of reality in its traditional sense. By saying that the enabling sense of let be does not explain Heidegger's concern for the ontic, 3 involves an implicit reference to this omission.

I think that this is not necessarily a weakness on Haugeland's account as an account of *BT*, but it shows that an account based on *BT* is not directly applicable to Heidegger's later texts. In other words, since it is not an aim of this chapter to evaluate if Haugeland's interpretation of Heidegger's *BT* is right or not, I am not suggesting that the enabling sense of the idea of letting be is not appropriate for accounting for what Heidegger means by letting be in a work like *BT*. However, I do think that this is not the sense that can give a proper account of the productive character of representation in *AWP*.

Understanding Being as intelligibility, without further clarification, lends itself to the service of representations against experience since this understanding puts everything on the side of the human being and thereby it does not take into account the ontic domain. Indeed, I suggest that in light of my view that the a priori has a tendency to become determined by pure reason alone, understanding Being as intelligibility – without any further clarification of what this notion means than the one that immediately presents to us – is in fact a symptom of the tendency Heidegger is criticising. For the understanding of Being as intelligibility can result in a rejection of that which is given in ordinary experience, that is; a rejection of the ontic domain. In line with what I have already said, the rejection of the ontic domain goes together with trying to determine existence (ontic domain) by representations (the danger lurking in the a priori).

Haugeland's view of beholdeness attempts to avoid the conclusion that our comportments toward entities are not merely the result of our own constructions or impositions, but I think that as long as this attempt leaves the notion of that-being in its traditional sense untouched, it is subject to the danger lurking in the a priori.

Based on my view that Haugeland's *BT* based account of Dasein's productive comportment threatens to occlude the traditional idea of existence or reality, I think that this shows that Heidegger was right to suspect that FO as a method risked implicating him in the danger that the a priori unleashed in modernity. In short, readings of Heidegger in terms of intelligibility are not only incapable of being extended to accommodate Heidegger's 1930's view about modern representations, but are also expressions of exactly the danger that Heidegger increasingly becomes aware of in that decade.

I think that the only way of understanding the productive character of modern representation that touches the notion of reality in its traditional sense and, in so doing, accounts for Heidegger's clear critical stance towards modern representations in *AWP*, is the idea of letting be taken as *effective and divine*. Therefore I suggest that this is the only way of understanding the productive character of modern representation that can account for Heidegger's concern for the ontic.

However, it still remains unclear what this interpretation amounts to within the sphere of modern science. I think that Glazebrook's interpretation of the 'encroachment of the real' in modern science can be very illuminating in this respect.

III.- GLAZEBROOK'S VIEW OF MODERN SCIENCE'S ENCROACHMENT OF THE REAL AS AN ACCOUNT OF THE DETERMINATION (CREATION) OF REALITY BY REPRESENTATIONS IN MODERNITY

- Glazebrook's implicit acknowledgment of the problematic relation between modern representations and reality

In chapter two I suggested that whereas the notion of 'representations against experience' in itself shows the problematic relation between the notions of modern representation and experience that follows from Heidegger's analysis in *WT*, Glazebrook's notion of 'mathematical representation' does not. As I already pointed out, this makes Glazebrook miss a central characteristic of Heidegger's view of modern representations.

In light of my analysis so far I think it clear that in order to give a proper account of the determination of reality by representations, it is indispensable to acknowledge the problematic relation between modern representation and ordinary experience.

In light of this, it seems that Glazebrook cannot offer a way of understanding this determination. However, this is not the case. Her analysis of the contrast between *experientia* and modern experiment does serve as a basis to show this problematic relation, thereby validating the possibility of finding in her views an account of the way in which the determination of reality by representations takes place in modern science. This means that Glazebrook can also offer a way of viewing the productive character of modern representation which fits with my suggestion of understanding it in terms of effecting in a divine sense.

From point 5 of Heidegger's summary of the mathematical essence of modern science which I pointed out in chapter two, it follows that throughout his analysis of Newton's first law of motion and Galileo's *mente concipere* in *WT*, Heidegger employs the word 'experience' in the sense of *experientia* and not in the sense of 'modern experiment.' As the Aristotelian background against which Heidegger's analysis of the mathematical is developed in *WT* suggests, Heidegger's understanding of the word *experientia* is closely related to his understanding of Aristotelian ἐμπειρία which is for Heidegger 'phenomenological in the sense that it looks to the thing under inquiry to show itself.'[473] It is only against this understanding of experience that the characterization of modern representation as representations *against the evidence of experience* makes sense.

Glazebrook understands Heidegger's contrast between *experientia* and modern experiment as one between 'ordinary experience' and 'empirical evidence:' 'Athough modern science appeals to the empirical in the experiment, it does not in fact appeal to ordinary experience. Rather, it appeals to an isolated, controllable empirical situation. Modern science returns to the empirical only insofar as it separates the empirical from ordinary experience.'[474] For her, the separation between 'experience' and 'the empirical' is a result of Heidegger's insight that the experiment argues against the evidence of experience in *WT*.[475]

In my exposition of Heidegger's analysis of Galileo's experiment of the free fall in chapter two, it became clear that *modern experiment argues against the evidence of experience because it is guided by representations against the evidence of experience.*

[473] Glazebrook, T. 'Heidegger on the Experiment,' p. 250. In fact, as I pointed out in the first section of this chapter, in *AWP* Heidegger puts in brackets the word *experientia* right after the word ἐμπειρία.
[474] Glazebrook, T. *Heidegger's Philosophy of Science* p. 87
[475] Ibid., pp. 71, 84 and 86

Considering this, I suggest that Glazebrook's view (that Heidegger first separates the empirical evidence of the experiment from experience based on his insight that the experiment argues against the evidence of experience) can be taken further and placed in the more fundamental sphere of representations: it is based on the shift from intuitive representations to representations against experience that Heidegger first separates *experientia* (ordinary experience) from modern experiment (the empirical).

As Glazebrook suggests, '[t]he distinction between experience and the empirical is a Heideggerian innovation that warrants careful attention.'[476] In light of my interest in the productive character of modern representation, the most relevant expression of the attention that this distinction deserves is made manifest in Glazebrook's question: Does his [Heidegger's] claim in *WT* that experimentation is a separation of the empirical from ordinary experience commit him to holding that the experiment *creates* reality?[477] Based on what I have suggested in the previous paragraph I think that this question can be re-formulated as follows: does his [Heidegger's] claim in *WT* that experimentation is a separation of the empirical from ordinary experience commit him to holding that representations against experience *create* reality? This last question clearly shows a problematic relation between representations against experience and ordinary experience.[478]

[476] Ibid., p. 84
[477] Ibid., p. 88
[478] In relation to this, it is illuminating to notice that although Heidegger does not make any explicit reference to the notions of primary and secondary qualities, it is quite clear that representations against the evidence of experience could not account for secondary qualities such as colour. In her discussion of the relation between experiment and representation in Heidegger's thinking Glazebrook argues that only that which can be represented in the experiment (and here Glazebrook is thinking on mathematical representations; her equivalent to representations against experience), *is* for science. (Glazebrook, T. *Heidegger's Philosophy of Science* p. 115). Hence, colour would not *be* for science. This is in line with Galileo's view that secondary qualities do not exist in the physical world. In relation to this, Glazebrook quotes Silvio Vietta's recount of a conversation with Heidegger: 'While I was still in school Heidegger took me along on a walk and explained to me in perceiving the colours of one of the branches hanging over a garden fence, the tendency of modern science and especially physics to resolve its object into abstract measurements, here the frequency of light waves.' (Vietta cited by Glazebrook in *Heidegger's Philosophy*

- Glazebrook's account of modern science's encroachment of the real: a way of understanding the productive character of modern representations which goes together with the idea of letting be taken as effective and divine

In her essay *Heidegger on the Experiment,* Glazebrook draws primarily on *B* and *AWP* to show that Heidegger's analysis of the experiment in the 1930s is a pivotal moment for his later critique of the modern epoch,[479] but she also sometimes refers to other works like *WT*. In this essay Glazebrook suggests that the crucial aspect of Heidegger's view of scientific observation is that it constitutes a 'setting up of the real.'[480]

Glazebrook begins her analysis by laying out Heidegger's understanding of the difference between ancient and modern science. She states that what is essential to modern research experiment, is missing in Aristotle's method: 'Experiment begins with the laying down of a law as a basis.'[481] In modern science, she argues, the intent is to demonstrate an ideal law, whereas in ancient science, the intent is ordinary experience; ancient science relies on ordinary experience.[482]

Following Heidegger's analysis of modern science in *WT* and *B,* Glazebrook points out that the experiment is only possible where an area of objectivity exhibits measurable regularities. The experiment, she highlights, projects nature a priori as quantifiable.[483] In its a priori formulation of a law that can be evidenced in measurable regularities, Glazebrook says, modern experiment stands over and against Aristotle's generalization

of Science p. 115. Glazebrook takes this quote from Vietta, S. (1977) 'Dialog mit den Dingen' in *Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger* Pfullingen: Neske. p. 234). Therefore, Heidegger's notion of representations against experience could be understood as a way of alluding to modern science's denigration of secondary qualities.

[479] Glazebrook, T. 'Heidegger on the Experiment,' p. 250

[480] Ibid.

[481] Ibid., p. 251

[482] Ibid.

[483] Ibid., p. 252

over a series of observations.[484] 'Whereas Aristotle looked to nature to see how things behave when left to themselves, the modern experiment projects nature as law-like, formulates its laws a priori, and then seeks their validation in empirical evidence under ideal conditions.'[485]

Glazebrook suggests that projecting nature as law-like does violence to nature. In order to show what she means by this, she distances her interpretation of violence from the one Heidegger develops in *What is Metaphysics?* and *IM*.[486] Glazebrook points out that in the former of these works, 'the violent bursting of human being into the whole of beings is the condition for understanding beings. Science is a rupture for Heidegger in which beings are exposed as what and how they are. Hermeneutic violence and phenomenology are reconciled in that Heidegger holds that an act of conceptual violence is needed to make scientific investigation possible.'[487] In this same line of thought, Heidegger's account of *polemos* in the latter of these works is of such a rupture that opens up a world: 'The struggle that opens a world makes visible beings in their being, for beings are only encountered in Heidegger's account within a world. Here too a kind of violence is the condition for understanding, but is not a violent assault on beings so much as it is the ground of their possibility for that understanding.'[488]

Glazebrook brings forward her understanding of violence by reference to Heidegger's account of violence in *WT*. As she rightly points out, in this work Heidegger argues that

[484] Ibid.
[485] Ibid.
[486] Ibid., pp. 252-253
[487] Ibid., p. 253
[488] Ibid.

the distinction between "natural and against nature, i.e., violent"[489] has disappeared in Newton's doctrine of motion. 'For Aristotle, violence (*bia*) consisted in making something do what goes against its nature, what it would not do according to its own nature. It is, for example, in the nature of rocks to move toward the center of the earth. To throw a rock upward is accordingly violent in this sense. Heidegger's claim is that since for Newton, "force [is] only a measure of the change of motion and is no longer special in kind," the Greek distinction between natural and violent motion can no longer be drawn.'[490] For Glazebrook, '[t]he implication of this argument is that there is an inherent tendency to violence in modern science which itself remains concealed.'[491]

For Glazebrook, the experiment is violent in the above-mentioned sense of *bia*. She points out that '[t]he experiment seeks its object by constraining it to behave in ways it may not when left to itself. Indeed, an experiment is performed in a laboratory precisely because one attempts to establish the conditions in which a thing will behave in a certain way, a way in which it would not behave outside those determined conditions.'[492] As it is clear, this view relies on the distinction between the empirical and ordinary experience.

Glazebrook suggests that this view goes in line with Heidegger's understanding of scientific observation in *Science and Reflection* as 'an entrapping and securing refining of the real.'[493] The question that she thinks relevant is 'to what extent scientific

[489] Heidegger, M. *WT* p. 88. The standard English translation for this is: 'natural and against nature, i.e., forced.' The German word for what is here translated as 'forced' is *gewaltsamer*, which I think is rightly translated by Glazebrook as violent.
[490] Ibid.
[491] Glazebrook, T. 'Heidegger on the Experiment,' p. 253
[492] Ibid.
[493] Ibid.

observation sets upon its object when it sets it apart in specialized, experimental science.'[494]

To approach this question, Glazebrook sets Heidegger's thinking against Ian Hacking's work on the problem of realism. She thinks that for Heidegger the worry goes deeper than the analytic concern that theoretical entities may be fictitious. Heidegger, Glazebrook suggests, holds that physics gets at the real, but in doing so it encroaches upon nature by confining it reductively as object. The experiment, she argues, has access to the real, but science sets up the real to show itself in a certain and limited way: objectively.[495] 'For Heidegger, physics is an encroachment in that "nature has in advance to set itself in place for the entrapping securing that science, as theory, accomplishes".'[496] The picture painted in science is reductive and never complete. Scientific representation 'is never able to encompass the coming to presence of nature; for the objectness of nature is, antecedently, only *one* way in which nature exhibits itself.'[497] In this sense, says Glazebrook, 'modern science is essentially violent for Heidegger.'[498] As it is clear, the work in which Glazebrook finds support for this view is *Science and Reflection*. Although this is a work written in 1954 Glazebrook thinks that this work is in line with earlier works like *AWP* and *B* in what respects to modern science:

> Heidegger's argument in the *Beiträge*, "The Age of the World Picture," and "Science and Reflection" is that the experiment forces beings to behave in a way they would not when left to themselves: as objects. In this sense, it is violent. The "new assault upon reality," Heidegger attributed to Descartes' age in *Die Frage nach dem Ding* is not the rupture described in *What is Metaphysics?* and *Introduction to Metaphysics*. The scientific reduction of things to objects opens a world, in the sense that there is, for example, "a world of a mathematician." A realm of possible objects is defined. But this opening of a world in modern science is an assault upon reality that confines beings reductively to that world.[499]

[494] Ibid.
[495] Ibid., p. 254
[496] Ibid., p. 255
[497] Ibid.
[498] Ibid.
[499] Ibid.

For Glazebrook, calculation is the culprit in the modern assault upon reality.[500] In her interpretation, Heidegger suggests that 'the experiment sets up and entraps nature by mastering it in calculation.'[501] According to Glazebrook, '[t]he essence of calculation is, for Heidegger, the will to master everything as something that can be calculated. In Heidegger's analysis, modern science is violent in its demand that all beings can be accounted for in exactitude.'[502] How then is the modern scientific method a representation of nature in exactitude? As she rightly points out, Heidegger explores this question in *AWP* by examining research as the essence of science.[503]

Heidegger begins his account of science in *AWP*, Glazebrook says, as he has often done: with a contrast between ancient and modern natural science. The crucial aspect of this contrast is that modern science is exact whereas ancient *epistēmē* was not.[504] 'The essence of Greek science is not further elucidated. But Heidegger's point remains clear, that exactitude is unique to modern science.'[505] What distinguishes modern science, says Glazebrook, 'is that "the essence of what we today call science is research".'[506] Glazebrook does not offer a detailed account of Heidegger's analysis of science as research in *AWP*. As expected, she focuses on the fact that Heidegger identifies the rigor of research as exactitude. She highlights the fact '…that scientific research into nature is not exact because it calculates with precision. Rather, it must calculate with precision because its rigorous demand as research is for exactitude.'[507]

[500] Ibid.
[501] Ibid., p. 250
[502] Ibid., p. 255
[503] Ibid.
[504] Ibid.
[505] Ibid.
[506] Ibid., pp. 255-256
[507] Ibid., p. 256

Glazebrook acknowledges that the condition of the possibility for exactitude is that nature is projected as quantifiable. She focuses on Heidegger's account of scientific method as having a priority over nature, since it entails a determination in advance of what nature is: nature is represented beforehand.[508] As I pointed out in the first section of this chapter, Heidegger defines a scientific law as the representation of a condition according to which a specific nexus of motions can become capable of being followed in its necessary course, which means that it can be mastered in advance by calculation.[509] Given that the setting up of the law is accomplished with reference to the ground-plan of the sphere of objects, Glazebrook is right in putting her attention on the 'in advance' projection of nature.

I think that Glazebrook's view that modern science entails a 'reduction of the real' acknowledges the tendency of modern representations to determine (create) reality since it does touch the notion of reality (that-being) in its traditional sense. Based on what I have previously argued, this means that modern science is determined by the tendency to break with ordinary experience and reject what is given in sensation and perception (since this goes together with the determination of reality by representations). However, modern science has to deal with 'reality' understood in its traditional sense (existence, actuality).

Based on Glazebrook's analysis, the result of this scenario is that modern science deals with reality by narrowing it down. My view is that as long as that which is given in sensation and perception (ordinary experience) resists modern science's tendency to determine reality by representations, modern science has no other option than to reduce what reality is. I will come back to this in the next chapter of this thesis.

[508] Ibid.
[509] Heidegger, M. *AWP* p. 61

In this way I think that Glazebrook's analysis offers an understanding of the way in which the determination (creation) of reality by representations takes place in modernity within the sphere of modern science. By way of this, it indirectly offers a way of understanding the productive character of modern representations which is close to the idea of letting be taken as effective and divine since it results in viewing representations against experience as having a tendency to place themselves as the author and master of everything that 'there is.' As expected, this means that Glazebrook's interpretation does account for Heidegger's concern for the ontic.

For Glazebrook, it is always a concern to show that modern science, in contrast to ancient science, is not phenomenological. Modern science, she says, 'does not let beings be and allow them to reveal themselves as they are.'[510] In this sense, she says, modern representing is different form Greek apprehending, since the Greek thinker apprehends what is.[511]

In *AWP* Heidegger clearly confronts modern representation (*Vorstellung*) to Greek apprehension (*Vernehmen*). While the former is related to productive comportment, the latter is related to a more contemplative comportment. In the following section of this chapter I will explore Heidegger's distinction between Greek apprehension and modern representation in *AWP* given that this allows a more detailed understanding of the productive character of modern representation.

[510] Glazebrook, T. 'Heidegger on the Experiment,' p. 257
[511] Ibid.

IV.- THE CONTRAST BETWEEN *VERNEHMEN* AND *VORSTELLUNG* IN *AWP:* RESTRICTED VERSUS UNRESTRICTED ACTIVITY OF THE HUMAN BEING

- Heidegger's view of Vernehmen *and* Vorstellung *through his interpretation of Parmenides and Protagoras*

As I already mentioned, Heidegger's reflection on the essence of modern science in *AWP* aims to discover its metaphysical ground so he begins this analysis by posing the following question: what understanding of beings and what concept of truth is it that underlies the transformation of science as research? In line with Glazebrook's interpretation, Heidegger's answer is that representation has beings at its disposal when it can, through calculation, either predict their future or retrodict their past. In this prediction and retrodiction, beings become objects of explanatory representation, and only what becomes in this way an object, is – count as in being. Therefore, the understanding of beings that underlies the transformation of science as research is this 'objectness of representation.'

Heidegger suggests that calculation is what enables the man who calculates to achieve certainty,[512] and with this, he shows that the understanding of truth that underlies the transformation of science as research is truth as 'certainty of representation:'[513] 'This objectification of beings is accomplished in a setting-before, a representing, aimed at bringing each being before it in such a way that the man who calculates can be sure – and

[512] Heidegger, M. *AWP* p. 66
[513] Ibid.

that means certain – of the being. Science as research first arrives when, and only when, truth has transformed itself into the certainty of representation.'[514]

However, further analysis is needed in order to reach the metaphysical ground of modern science: 'If, now, science as research is an essential phenomenon of modernity, it must follow that what constitutes the metaphysical ground of research determines, first, and long in advance, the essence of modernity in general.'[515] What is decisive, says Heidegger, is that the essence of humanity altogether (*des Menschen überhaupt*) transforms itself in that man becomes the subject.[516] But, Heidegger continues, this transformation is only possible 'when there is a transformation of the understanding of beings as a whole.'[517] Having said this, Heidegger asks himself in what does this transformation of the understanding of beings as a whole manifest itself. And his answer is: world picture.[518]

Where the world becomes picture, 'beings as a whole are set in place as that for which man is prepared; that which, therefore, he correspondingly intends to bring before him, have before him, and, thereby, in a decisive sense, place before him…Beings as a whole are now taken in such a way that a being is first and only in being insofar as it is set in place by representing-producing humans.'[519]

With this in view, Heidegger goes back to the understanding of beings as objects by stating that whenever we have a world picture, an essential decision occurs concerning

[514] Ibid.
[515] Ibid.
[516] Ibid.
[517] Ibid., p. 67
[518] Ibid.
[519] Ibid., pp. 67-68; translation modified. GA 5, p. 89

beings as a whole: the being of beings is sought and found in the representedness of beings. Therefore, when beings are *not* interpreted in this way, there can be no world picture.[520] In the Middle Ages, the being is the *ens creatum*. Here, to be a being means: '…to belong to a particular rank in the order of created things, and, as thus created, to correspond to the cause of creation (*analogia entis*). But never does the being's being consist in its being brought before man as the objective. Never does it consist in being placed in the realm of man's information and disposal so that, in this way alone, it is in being (*und so allein seiend ist*).'[521]

The modern interpretation of being, says Heidegger, is still further removed from that of the Greeks. 'One of the oldest expressions of Greek thinking about the being of beings reads: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι:'[522]

> This statement of Parmenides means: the apprehension [*Vernehmen*] of beings belongs to being since it is from being that it is demanded and determined. The being is that which rises up and opens itself; that which, as what is present [*Anwesende*], comes upon man, i.e., upon him who opens himself to what is present in that he apprehends it [*vernimmt*]. The being does not acquire being in that man first looks upon it in the sense of representation that has the character of subjective perception. Rather, man is the one who is looked upon beings, the one who is gathered by self-opening beings into presencing with them. To be looked at by beings, to be included and maintained and so supported by their openness, to be driven about by their conflict and marked by their dividedness, that is the essence of humanity in the great age of Greece. In order to fulfil his essence, therefore, man has to gather and save, catch up and preserve, the self-opening in its openness; and he must remain exposed to all of its decisive confusion. Greek humanity is the receiver [*Vernehmer*], which is the reason that, in the age of the Greeks, the world can never become picture.[523]

The translation of *Vernehmen* by 'apprehension' and *Vernehmer* by 'the receiver' makes it tempting to say that *Vernehmen* points to a receptive comportment. This way of interpreting *Vernehmen* is further confirmed by the fact that this quote opposes *Vernehmen* to representation. The German version of this quote, however, shows that

[520] Ibid., p. 68
[521] Ibid.
[522] Ibid. As is well known, this sentence is usually translated as 'a same indeed is both thinking and being' or 'the same it is to think and also to be.'
[523] Ibid., pp. 68-69

what is here translated as 'representation that has the character of subjective perception' is more accurately translated as 'representation of the type of subjective perception' (*des Vorstellens von der Art der subjektiven Perception*).[524] Clarifying this is relevant insofar as the first of these translations gives the idea that representation, *per se*, has the character of subjective perception, whereas the second one clearly does not.[525] In light of this, I think it right to say that *Vernehmen* is opposed to a type of representations and not to representations *per se*. This, however, makes it less clear what the difference between *Vernehmen* and *Vorstellung* is.

In the year 1950, when *Holzwege* was published, Heidegger added 15 appendices to *AWP*. Right after the above-mentioned quote, Heidegger introduces Appendix 8. In this Appendix Heidegger argues that although Protagoras' statement 'man is the measure of all things' seems to be in accordance with modernity and in this way serves as an argument against his interpretation of the difference between Greek and modern thinking, this is not the case. By mentioning this, I want to show that it is clear that Heidegger thought that his analysis of Protagoras' statement was relevant for achieving an understanding of Parmenides' statement about the Being of beings.

In an essay entitled *Protagoras re-discovered: Heidegger's explication of Protagoras' fragment*,[526] Manfred Frings addresses Heidegger's treatment of Protagoras' statement in a short work entitled *The Statement of Protagoras*. This work is part of a major section of the Nietzsche II Volume (Volume 4 in the English translation) entitled *European*

[524] Heidegger, M. GA 5, p. 90
[525] This is not the only section of *AWP* in which Heidegger refers to modern representations as a 'type' of representation. In p. 67 he says: 'Or is it only a modern kind of representing (*neuzeitliche Art des Vorstellens*) that inquires into a world picture?
[526] Frings, M.S. (1974) 'Protagoras re-discovered: Heidegger's explication of Protagoras' fragment' in *Journal of Value Inquiry* Vol. 8, pp. 112-123

Nihilism, written in 1940. In this short work, Heidegger uses the German word *Vernehmen* in several occasions in order to point to the same phenomenon of 'apprehension' that the above-mentioned quote does. The English translation is however different, since the translator chooses the word 'perception' to translate *Vernehmen*. In this context, Heidegger clearly confronts the words *Vernehmen* and *Vorstellung*, where *Vorstellung* is always and explicitly linked to modernity.[527] Frings is aware of the difficulties of translating the word *Vernehmen*, which is why he thinks it necessary to dwell on this issue:

> …Heidegger's re-discovering Protagoras demands that we translate a certain passage of Heidegger's as literally as possible into English. But before we can do so, I should like to inject a linguistic comment on the German verb "vernehmen" which Heidegger so frequently uses and which also repeatedly occurs in the crucial passage to follow. The German verb "vernehmen" comes from "nehmen" which means "to take." "To take," however, came into English only with the Scandinavian invasions in the ninth century and replaced Old English "nimman" which is of the same Indogermanic root as its German kinsman "nehmen." In modern English the root "nim" is lost. Its last instance in English occurs in Shakespeare's Merry Wives of Windsor and Henry V where a follower of Falstaff, a thief taking things from others, has the name "Nym." To the Elizabethan ear "Nym" may well have connoted the Old-English "nimman" (to take), but then it became extinct. The German prefix "ver-" in "vernehmen" connotes in this instance one's being "engaged" in taking. But this engagement (ver-) in taking (-nehmen) has no specific relation whatsoever to the "how" of one's taking something. "Vernehmen," therefore, means more than taking something physically or with one's five senses. It means that one "takes in" something, but not in a particular thought, feeling or sense. It plainly means "to be the recipient of something." The English verb "to take" does not connote this, nor is it in use in this non-committing way. This is also the precise literal meaning of German "Vernunft" which is derived from "ver-nehmen." When a lengthy endeavor to find a good translation for a word becomes fruitless it is best to use the most simple term in the translation. I translate German "vernehmen" simply with "to receive," bearing in mind that "to receive" is to mean the taking of "what is" in our letting it come upon us.[528]

I agree with Frings' translation of *Vernehmen* as 'taking 'what is' in our letting it come upon us,' and I suggest that this translation accounts for both a passive and an active character involved in this notion. In fact, I think that the crucial aspect of *Vernehmen* as opposed to *Vorstellung* has not to do with whether the first one is passive and the second one is active, but with the kind of activity involved in both. In *The Statement of Protagoras* Heidegger is clear about this:

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[527] Heidegger, M. (1991) *Nietzsche. Volumes III and IV* San Francisco CA: HarperCollins. Volume IV, p. 93

[528] Frings, M.S. 'Protagoras re-discovered: Heidegger's explication of Protagoras' fragment,' p. 119

> Protagoras' statement says unequivocally that "all" being is related to man as ego (I) and that man is the measure for the Being of beings. But what is the nature of the relation of beings to the "I," granted that in our retrospective understanding of the saying we are thinking it *in a Greek way* and are not unwittingly inserting representations [*vorstellungen*] of man as "subject" into it? Man perceives [*vernimmt*] what is present within the radius of his perception [*Vernehmen*]. What is present is from the outset maintained as such in a realm of accessibility, because it is a realm of unconcealment. The perception [*Vernehmen*] of what is present is grounded on its lingering within the realm of unconcelament. We today, and many generations before us, have long forgotten the realm of the unconcealment of beings, although we continually take it for granted. We actually think a being becomes accessible when an "I" as subject represents [*vorstellt*] an object. As if the open region within whose openness something is made accessible *as* object *for* a subject, and accessibility itself, which can be penetrated and experienced, did not already have to reign here as well! … By lingering in the realm of the unconcealed, man belongs in a fixed radius of things present to him. His belonging in this radius at the same time assumes a barrier against what is not present. Thus, here is where the self of man is defined as the respective "I;" namely, by its *restriction* to the surrounding unconcealed.[529]

I think that this quote allows me to suggest that *Vernehmen*, as *Vorstellung*, implies activity. The crucial difference is that whereas the activity implied by *Vorstellung* seems to be unrestricted, the one implied by *Vernehmen* clearly does not.

Heidegger is clear in stating that *Vernehmen* implies a relation of 'man' to 'beings' in which man *restricts* himself to the surrounding unconcealed; *Vernehmen* implies a relation of man to beings in which the lingering of man in the realm of the unconcealment rules. As it can be seen, this means for Heidegger that 'man belongs in a fixed radius of things present to him. His belonging in this radius at the same time assumes a barrier against what is not present.'

Although in this quote Heidegger is more explicit about *Vernehmen* than about *Vorstellung*, the fact that he makes a contrast between both concepts shows that that which Heidegger highlights as the crucial aspect of *Vernehmen*, occurs in the opposite way in *Vorstellung*. This is: *Vorstellung* implies a relation of 'man' to 'beings' in which man does not restrict himself to what is present in unconcealment. In fact, Heidegger says something in this quote that supports this interpretation: 'We today, and many generations

[529] Heidegger, M. *Nietzsche.* Volume IV, p. 93

before us, have long forgotten the realm of the unconcealment of beings, although we continually take it for granted. We actually think a being becomes accessible when an "I" as subject represents (*vorstellt*) an object.' I take this to mean that *Vorstellung* implies a relation of 'man' to 'beings' in which man *makes* what is accessible instead of restricting himself to what is (already) accessible.

Based on this, I take this restrictive character of *Vernehmen* to be the crucial aspect of Heidegger's view of this notion. The passive character of *Vernehmen* is a matter of its restrictive character and not a lack of activity. I think this way of understanding *Vernehmen* is in line with Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's thinking as a delimiting of the mathematical, since both views sustain the importance of 'delimiting' human activity.

In light of Glazebrook's interpretation about the 'reduction of the real' that modern science entails, I think that viewing the difference between *Vorstellung* and *Vernehmen* in terms of 'unrestricted/restricted activity' allows us to bring forward the following inversely proportional relation: as the restriction of human activity decreases, the reduction of the real (ontic domain) increases. In other words: the more unrestricted the productive character of modern representation is, the more restricted reality (ontic domain) is.

I think that my interpretation so far supports the view that representations against experience (and not *yet* intuitive representations) are the type of representations that involves an unrestricted activity of the human being. Representations against experience do not restrict themselves to that which is given in ordinary experience (ontic domain). In fact, they reject what is given in ordinary experience and, in so doing, try to determine

(create) reality. In light of my above interpretation of *Vorstellung* I think it can be said that representations against experience intend to *make* what is accessible.

This gives further support to my suggestion of understanding the productive character of modern representation in terms of effecting in a divine sense in a work like *AWP* and not in terms of enabling, as Haugeland does.

This is also in line with the view that Heidegger's concern for the ontic domain is involved in his critical stance towards modern representations. Furthermore, I think that my view of *Vorstellung* and *Vernehmen* in terms of unrestricted/restricted activity of the human being allows us to refine the hitherto gained understanding of Heidegger's concern for the ontic in relation to modern representations and say that *Vernehmen* takes into account the ontic domain insofar as it implies a relation between 'man' and 'beings' in which man *restricts* himself to the surrounding unconcealed. In contrast to this, *Vorstellung* does not take into account the ontic domain insofar as it implies a relation between 'man' and 'beings' in which man intends to make (create) what is accessible, thereby showing why Heidegger's concern for the ontic is involved in his critical stance towards modern representation (*Vorstellung*).

***- Derrida's view of Heidegger's equivalence between* repraesentatio *and modern representation in* AWP**

In line with what I pointed out at the end of the Introduction to this chapter, the analysis that follows has two purposes: to show that my view of Heidegger's critical stance towards modern representations is consistent with Derrida's view and, by way of this, to

introduce the idea of the destining of Being, which is what motivates the turn to the next and final chapter of this thesis – placing the whole analysis in the history of Being.

Heidegger says much more about *Vorstellung* than about *Vernehmen* in *AWP*. With respect to the former, he is clear in stating that:

> … in distinction from Greek *Vernehmen*, modern representing, whose signification is first expressed by the word *repraesentatio*, means something quite different. Representation [*Vor-stellen*] here means: to bring the present-at-hand before one as something standing over-and-against [*Vorhandene als ein Entgegenstehendes vor sich bringen*], to relate it to oneself, the representer [*den Vorstellenden*], and, in this relation, to force it back to oneself as the norm giving domain.[530]

As this quote shows, Heidegger's definition of modern representation in *AWP* is: to bring the present-at-hand before one as something standing over-and-against, to relate it to oneself, the representer, and, in this relation, to force it back to oneself as the norm giving domain. Although this quote suggests that the Latin word *repraesentatio* 'first' expresses what modern representation means, the German version says that the former 'best' expresses the meaning of modern representation.[531] This is an important point since it allows making equivalence between *repraesentatio* and modern representing.

In an essay entitled *Sending: On Representation*,[532] this equivalence is at the basis of Derrida's analysis of Heidegger's understanding of representation in *AWP*:

> When one tries today to think what is occurring with representation, at once the extension of its domain and its being called in question, it is impossible to avoid (whatever conclusions one may come about it) this central motif of Heideggerian meditation when it attempts to determine an epoch of representation in the destiny of Being, a post-Hellenic epoch in which relations to Being would have come to a halt as *repraesentatio* and *Vorstellung*, in the equivalence of one to the other. Among the numerous texts of Heidegger that ought to be reread in this connection I must limit myself to a passage in *Die Zeit des Weltbildes* (The Epoch of Worldviews) in *Holzwege*. Heidegger there inquiries what best expresses itself, the sense [*Bedeutung*] which comes best to expression [*Ausdruck*] in the word *repraesentatio* as in the word *Vorstellung*.[533]

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[530] Heidegger, M. *AWP* p. 69
[531] Heidegger, M. GA 5, p. 91. '*Ganz anderes meint im Unterschied zum griechischen Vernehmen das neuzeitliche Vorstellen, dessen Bedeutung das Wort repraesentatio am ehesten zum Ausdruck bringt*.'
[532] Derrida, J. (1982) 'Sending: On Representation' in *Social Research* Vol. 49, 2. pp. 294-326
[533] Ibid., pp. 304-305

Derrida offers his own translation of the above mentioned quote, stating that the signification of modern representation reaches its best expression in the word *repraesentatio*.[534] In light of this, Derrida says that 'Heidegger thus uses the Latin word *repraesentatio* and settles at once into the equivalence between *repraesentatio* and *Vorstellung*.'[535] Derrida points out that 'this is not illegitimate, on the contrary, but it does require explanation.'[536]

According to Derrida, in the philosophical code or ordinary language *Vorstellung* seems not to imply immediately the meaning that is carried in the re- of *repraesentatio*.[537] As Heidegger emphasizes, he says, *Vorstellen* seems to mean simply: to place, to dispose before oneself, a sort of theme or thesis.[538] But Derrida points out that this sense or value of 'being-before' is already at work in "present:"

> *Praesentatio* signifies the fact of presenting and *re-praesentatio* that of *rendering* present [*et la* re-praesentatio *de* rendre *present*], of a summoning as a power-of-bringing-back-to-presence [*de faire-venir comme pouvoir-de-faire-revenir-à-la-présence*]. And this power-of-bringing-back, in a repetitive way, is marked simultaneously in the re- of representation and in this positionality [*est marqué à la fois dans le re- de la representation et dans cette positionalité*], this power-of-placing, disposing, putting, that is to be read in *Stellen* and which at the same time refers back to the self, that is to the power of a subject who can bring back to presence and make present, make something present to itself, indeed just make itself present.[539]

Derrida's analysis continues by exposing two senses in which this 'making-present' (render present) can be understood. He intends to show that 'to render present' sometimes means to present, to allow or cause to come to presence, into presentation, and sometimes it means to cause or allow to return, to restore for the second time to presence, perhaps in

[534] Ibid., p. 307
[535] Ibid.
[536] Ibid.
[537] Ibid.
[538] Ibid.
[539] Ibid., pp. 307-308; translation modified. Derrida, J. (1987 [1980]) 'Envoi' in *Psyché: Inventions de l'autre*, tome 1, Paris: Éditions Galilée. pp. 109-145. p. 120

effigy, by sign or symbol, what was not or was not longer present, this not or no-longer having a very great diversity of possible modes.[540]

Having distinguished these meanings, Derrida asks the following question: what is the source, in philosophical or more or less scientific language, of the semantic determination of *repraesentatio* as something that takes place in and for the mind, within the subject and over against it, in it and for it, object for subject? In other words how could this meaning of *repraesentatio* be contemporary, as Heidegger says it is, with the Cartesian or Cartesian-Hegelian epoch of the *subjectum*?[541] Derrida's answer reads as follows:

> In representation, the present, the presentation of what is presented comes back, returns as a double effigy, an image, a copy, an idea as a picture of the thing henceforth at hand, in the absence of the thing, available, disposed and put forward for, by and in the subject. *For*, *by*, and *in*, the system of these prepositions (puttings-forth) marks the place of representation or of the *Vorstellung*. The prefix *re-* marks the repetition in, for, and by the subject, *a parte subjecti*, of a presence which otherwise would present itself to the subject without depending upon it or without having it in its own place. Doubtless the present which returns thus had already the form of what is for and before the subject but was not at its disposition in this preposition itself. Whence the possibility of translating *repraesentatio* by *Vorstellung*…And the ideality of the idea as a copy in the mind is precisely what is most readily available, most repeatable, apparently most docile to the reproductive spontaneity of the mind.[542]

Besides answering the above-mentioned question, this quote shows that Derrida does not think that that which is re-presented *for*, *by* and *in* the subject (*repraesentatio*) had not already the form of what is for and before the subject (representation). He deepens on this view by explaining the characteristic of the 'modern' way of representing:

> The fact that there should be representation or *Vorstellung* is not, according to Heidegger, a recent phenomenon, characteristic of the modern epoch of science, of technique and of subjectness [*subjectité*] of a Cartesian-Hegelian type. But what would be characteristic of this epoch is rather authority, the dominant generality of representation. It is the interpretation of the essence of what is as an object of representation. Everything which becomes present, everything that there *is*, this is, what is present, what presents, everything that happens is apprehended in the form of representation [*Tout ce qui devient present, tout ce qui est, c'est-à-dire est présent, se présente, tout ce qui arrive est appréhendé dans la forme de la representation*]. The experience of what-is becomes essentially representation. *Representation* becomes the most general category to determine the apprehension [*l'appréhension*] of whatever it is that is of concern or interest in any relation at all.[543]

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[540] Ibid., p. 308
[541] Ibid.
[542] Ibid., pp. 308-309
[543] Ibid., p. 310; translation modified. Derrida, J. 'Envoi' p. 122

As it is clear, Derrida thinks that the crucial character of what Heidegger understands by modern representation has to do with the authority and dominant generality of representation. I think that this view supports my interpretation of representations against experience and their tendency (will) to a self-grounding of knowledge that involves a rejection of anything 'given' (the danger lurking in the a priori). As I have argued, this tendency seeks to place representations against experience as the master of everything that 'there is,' which entails the determination (creation) of reality – understood in its traditional sense – by representations.

As expected, this also means that Derrida's view of the crucial character of modern representations in terms of the authority and dominant generality of representational thinking goes together with my view of *Vorstellung* in terms of unrestricted activity of the human being.

That what characterizes modernity is not representation *per se*, is further confirmed by Derrida:

> Of course, Heidegger does not interpret this reign of representation as an accident, still less as a misfortune in the face of which we must retract shivering. The end of *Die Zeit des Weltbildes* is very clear in this respect, at the point where Heidegger evokes a modern world which is beginning to remove itself from the space of representation and of the calculable. We might say in another language that a criticism (critique) or a deconstruction of representation would remain feeble, vain, and irrelevant if it were to lead to some rehabilitation of immediacy, of original simplicity, of presence without repetition or delegation, if it were to induce a criticism of calculable objectivity, of criticism, of science, of technique, or of political representation. The worst regressions can put themselves at the service of this antirepresentative prejudice.[544]

I am very much in agreement with Derrida in that insofar as Heidegger's view of modernity has not to do with representation *per se* but with representation understood in a specific way, it is not adequate to think that Heidegger's stance toward modernity

[544] Ibid., p. 311

implies a calling to support any form of antirepresentationalism. I think that my analysis of intuitive representations and representations against experience clearly gives support to this view.

I think that the view that Heidegger's criticism of representation does not entail any form of antirepresentationalism does justice to Heidegger's view of a 'destiny of Being.' This view is something that Derrida clearly has in mind as it can be seen in the guiding motive of his essay: 'sending,' in French '*envoi*,' is related to the German '*schicken*.' As it is well known, in Heidegger the term '*Geschick*' has to do with 'destiny' in relation to the idea that Being is somehow destined. In Derrida's own words: '…this reign of representation should have been fated, predestined, *geschickte*… The advent of representation must have been prepared, prescribed, announced from far of, emitted, I will say signalled at a distance in a world, the Greek world, where however representation, the *Vorstellung* or the *Vorgestelltheit des Seienden* had no dominion.'[545] As Derrida points out, Heidegger thinks that it is with the world of Platonism that the determination of the world as *Bild* announces itself and is sent on its way. For Heidegger, no doubt Greek man before Plato did not inhabit a world dominated by representation.[546]

As it is clear, my interpretation of the productive character of modern representations in terms of effecting in a divine sense has followed from Heidegger's critical stance towards modern representations. I think that Derrida's view of representations as a 'destiny' of Being suggests that in order to get a comprehensive understanding of the productive character of modern representation, and therefore of Heidegger's 'critical' stance towards

[545] Ibid.
[546] Ibid., p. 312

modern representations, it is indispensable to relate that stance to his view of metaphysics as the history of Being. This is the subject of the next and final chapter of this thesis.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE PECULIAR CONFOUNDING BETWEEN REPRESENTATION (WHATNESS) AND REALITY (THATNESS) AT THE FINAL STAGE OF METAPHYSICS

INTRODUCTION

MHB is a text in which Heidegger's view about the history of Being is methodically developed. The importance Heidegger gives to this view is not only revealed by the methodical character of his analysis, but also by his insight that the distortions of the truth about beings which goes under the title "metaphysics," calls for a "destruction" of this distortion. But this destruction, he says, 'like "phenomenology" and all hermeneutical-transcendental questions, has not yet been thought in terms of the history of Being.'[547]

In my reading of *MHB* the most novel idea that Heidegger brings forth in this text is that the final stage of metaphysics involves the disappearance of the traditional metaphysical distinction between whatness and thatness; a disappearance which takes place through a peculiar confounding (*eigentümlichen Vermischung*) between representation (whatness) and reality (thatness), as that distinction manifests itself in modernity.[548] Based on this the following chapter aims to present Heidegger's treatment of the peculiar confounding between whatness and thatness in his work *MHB*, unfolding the crucial notions and conceptual relations that are involved in his understanding of this confounding. For this reason, this chapter involves a more than usually exegetical approach, but not exclusively

[547] Heidegger, M. (2003) 'Metaphysics as the History of Being' in *The End of Philosophy* Chicago, IL: Illinois University Press. p. 15
[548] Ibid., p. 10

so since this approach will serve to the purpose of improving the hitherto gained view of Heidegger's understanding of modern representation.

My analysis will show that Heidegger's treatment of the peculiar confounding between whatness and thatness in *MHB* argues in favour of understanding this confounding as the making possible (causing) of the latter by the former, where thatness is understood in its traditional sense. In other words, my analysis will show that in *MHB* Heidegger argues in favour of the idea that modern representations produce its objects in so far as existence is concerned. In line with this view the productive character of modern representation will be revealed as carrying an essentially divine sense. Based on this I will argue that Heidegger's view of Being as destined does not invalidate my interpretation of the productive character of modern representation as effecting in a divine sense but on the contrary, it reinforces it.

I argue that Heidegger's critical stance towards the notion of modern representations is ultimately based on the fact that this type of representations enables the divinization of the human, that is: the determination (creation) of reality by representations. As expected, this will strengthen my interpretation of the danger lurking in the a priori so far, and allow me to suggest that Heidegger's increasing concern for the ontic domain after *BT* is fundamentally related to his criticism towards modern representational thinking. I will argue that Heidegger's break clear the FO model can be read as an attempt to avoid the most extreme way in which the danger lurking in the a priori unleashes in modernity: the divinization of the human.

In *MHB* Heidegger's analysis of modernity in general and of the productive character of representation in terms of causality in particular, establishes an essentially Christian provenance of modernity. Christianity, for its part, is revealed in its appropriation of Greek thought. Of course Heidegger's interpretation of both the Greek world and Christianity, can be challenged. However, the aim of this chapter is solely to disclose the elements of Heidegger's interpretation of Christianity and the Greek world which are essential to his understanding of modern representation, for which I need to use these interpretations (mistaken or not) as a starting point.

I.- THE HISTORY OF BEING AS THE HISTORY OF *THATNESS*

MHB was written in 1941 and published in Volume II of *Nietzsche.* It was translated into English in 1973 and published together with other three essays under the title *The End of Philosophy*. As the title clearly indicates, in this work Heidegger develops his view of metaphysics as the history of Being, which he thinks begins with Plato and finds its definitive form in Leibniz's thinking.

The history of Being as metaphysics, says Heidegger, begins with the division of Being into whatness and thatness and with the preparation of this distinction.[549] 'Thus the beginning of metaphysics is revealed as an event that consists in a determination of Being, in the sense of the appearance of the division into whatness and thatness.'[550] Whereas whatness answers the question *ti estin*: what is (a being)?, thatness says of a being *hoti estin*: that it is.[551]

Throughout *MHB* Heidegger states and analyses the fact that this distinction takes different determinations throughout the history of Being: whereas the scholastic language of metaphysics is acquainted with this distinction as that between *essentia* and *existentia*, Greek thinking thinks this distinction as the one between *idea* and *energeia*.

However, regardless of the possibility of being able to trace in detail the ways in which each of these determinations have changed, Heidegger thinks that the origin of this

[549] Ibid., p. 2
[550] Ibid., pp. 2-3
[551] Ibid., p. 4

distinction, for more so the origin of Being thus divided, remains concealed, expressed in the Greek manner: forgotten (*vergessen*).[552]

In light of this, Heidegger defines the 'oblivion of Being' as 'the self-concealing of the origin of Being divided into whatness and thatness in favour of Being which opens out beings as beings and remains unquestioned *as* Being.'[553] This suggests that the 'forgetting' of Being is something Being "does" rather than an act of forgetting on the part of human beings. The idea that what takes place throughout the history of metaphysics finds its origin in Being itself and not in human actions, is one that appears very openly in Heidegger's later works and which is in line with the view of metaphysics as a 'destiny of Being.'

As I already pointed out in the Introduction to this thesis, in the later Heidegger the forgetting of Being is a consequence of the abandonment of Being (withdrawal of Being).[554] This means that the withdrawal of Being must stand in some relation to the division of Being into whatness and thatness. I think that my analysis so far suggests that the division of Being into whatness (a priori) and thatness is the condition of the possibility for the danger lurking in the a priori. In other words: if Being were not divided into whatness and thatness, the a priori could not break with ordinary experience and become determined by pure reason alone (the narrow sense of the withdrawal of Being).

As I pointed out in chapter one, in this thesis I do not aim to explain why Being needs to withdraw in its appearing in beings (wider sense of the withdrawal of Being). However,

[552] Ibid., p. 3
[553] Ibid., pp. 3-4
[554] Vallega-Neu, D. *Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy: An Introduction* pp. 57-58; Inwood, M. *A Heidegger Dictionary* p. 71

I think that in light of what I have just mentioned it seems sensible to say that the withdrawal of Being in its wider sense – at least within the metaphysical tradition –, takes place through the division of Being into whatness and thatness.

Heidegger continues to explain the idea of the 'oblivion of Being' by stating that '[w]hen it becomes valid as Being, whatness encourages the predominance of looking at *what* beings are, and thus makes possible a peculiar precedence of beings. Thatness, in which nothing seems to be said about beings themselves (about their "what"), is enough to establish that beings are, whereby the "is" and Being thought in that "is" are simply taken for granted. When it becomes valid as Being, thatness makes it possible that the essence of Being is assumed as self-evident. *Both factors, the precedence of beings and the assumed self-evidence of Being, characterize metaphysics*.'[555]

The precedence of beings over Being allows Heidegger to assert that 'the history of Being is primarily revealed in the history of *energeia* which is later called *actualitas* and *existentia*, reality (*Wirklichkeit*) and existence (*Existenz*).'[556]

Although it is clear that Heidegger suggests that the precedence of beings is, in the first place, a precedence of beings (thatness) over Being, the fact that he also suggests that it is the determination of Being as whatness that encourages this precedence, does call for further clarification.

[555] Heidegger, M. *MHB* p. 11
[556] Ibid., pp. 11-12; translation modified. GA 6.2, p. 411. The translator of *MHB* sometimes translates the German word *Wirklichkeit* by 'reality' and sometimes by 'actuality.' I think that this is misleading for which reason I will always translate *Wirklichkeit* by reality. I choose reality and not actuality since the translator sometimes uses the latter to translate *actualitas*.

In fact, towards the end of his analysis in *MHB* Heidegger states the following: 'But since the beginning of metaphysics, the *existentia* which then first came to essence has had precedence over the *essentia* in that the essential character of reality determines that of possibility. This does not exclude the fact that, in reverse, what is possible previously determines what is correspondingly real.'[557]

As it will become clear, Heidegger understands the notion of possibility in terms of *essentia*, which points to whatness. Thus, in this quote Heidegger says that the precedence of thatness does not preclude the fact that whatness previously determines thatness. In my reading of Heidegger's analysis in *MHB*, I understand this (previous) determination of thatness by whatness as an explanation of Heidegger's suggestion that Being as whatness encourages the precedence of thatness: because whatness determines thatness we can approach beings (thatness) looking for *what* beings are (looking for whatness), which gives way to the precedence of beings (thatness). In light of this, Heidegger can state that whatness makes this precedence possible.

In order to address Heidegger's view of the relation between whatness and thatness in *MHB*, it is first necessary to focus on his treatment of the change from determining thatness as *energeia* to thatness as *actualitas*. In order to do this it is first necessary to deal with Heidegger's understanding of Aristotle's notion of *energeia* in *MHB*.

[557] Ibid., p. 40

- *Heidegger's understanding of Aristotle's* energeia *in* MHB

Throughout *MHB*, Heidegger refers to 'the primordial essence of Being' as 'presencing in unconcealment' (*Anwesen im Unverborgenen*) or 'emergent presencing in what is unconcealed' (*das aufgehenden Anwesens im Unverborgenheit*).[558]

He expands on his understanding of this by stating that '[i]n the beginning of its history, Being opens itself out as emerging (*physis*) and unconcealment (*aletheia*). From there it reaches the formulation of presence (*Anwesenheit*) and permanence (*Beständigkeit*) in the sense of enduring (*Verweilen*) (*ousia*). Metaphysics proper begins with this.'[559] Therefore, at a certain point in the text Heidegger refers to the primordial essence of Being simply as '*aletheia-physis*.'[560]

Although not without certain qualms, in *MHB* Heidegger is inclined to set up a relation between 'the primordial essence of Being' and Aristotle's thinking.

For Heidegger, it is easy to establish historically 'the connection of the distinction between *essentia* and *existentia* with the thinking of Aristotle, who first brought the distinction to a concept, that is, at the same time, to its essential ground (*Wesensgrund*). This occurred after Plato's thinking had responded to the claim of Being (*dem Anspruch des Seins…geantwortet hat*) in a way that prepared that distinction by bringing its establishment out into the open.'[561] The idea of a 'claim of Being' goes together and casts further light onto the view of 'metaphysics as the history of Being.' Insofar as we, human

[558] Ibid., p. 5
[559] Ibid., p. 4
[560] Ibid., p. 10
[561] Ibid., p. 4

beings, "respond" to Being's "claim," our actions are viewed as responses to Being's claims rather than actions that find their origin within 'our own self.' In line with what I have already suggested, I think that this is in line with the view of metaphysics as a 'destiny of Being.'

As expected, Heidegger focuses on Aristotle's treatment of the twofold determination of Being, that is, a twofold *ousia* (presence), but specifically – in accordance with his view that the history of Being is primarily revealed in the history of thatness – in one of its members: *energeia*.

In order to explain Aristotle's *energeia*, Heidegger uses the example of a house that is 'standing there.' What Heidegger wants to emphasize is the fact that viewed from the standpoint of Aristotle's thinking – or, more accurately, from his interpretation of Aristotle's thinking – the house there *is* as *ergon*.[562] Heidegger's understanding of *ergon* – work – is entwined with his understanding of 'the primordial essence of Being:' '"Work" ("*Werk*") means what is completely at rest in the rest of outward appearance (*Aussehenden*) – standing, lying in it – what is completely at rest in presencing (*Anwesen*) in unconcealment (*Unverborgenheit*).'[563]

Here, it is helpful to draw upon the contrast Heidegger makes between work thought in the Greek manner and work thought within the medieval context. Although the following quote is not as explicit as one would want about the fact that the type of work to which Heidegger is contrasting the Greek work is the work within the medieval context, the reference to 'reality' (*Wirklichkeit*) shows that this is the case: 'Thought in the Greek

[562] Ibid., p. 5
[563] Ibid.

manner, the work is not work in the sense of the accomplishment of a strenuous making. It is also not result and success (*Ergebenis und Erfolg*). It is a work in the sense of that which is placed in the unconcealment of its outward appearance and endures thus standing or lying. To endure means here: to be present at rest as work.'[564] Thought in the Greek manner, says Heidegger, *ergon* 'characterizes the manner of presencing. Presence, *ousia*, thus means *energeia*: to presence-as-work (understood verbally) in the work of workness. Workness does not mean reality (*Wirklichkeit*) as the result of an action, but rather the presencing standing there in unconcealment, of what is set up.'[565]

Although I will come back to Heidegger's understanding of 'work' within the medieval context in the next section of this chapter, I think that this quote suggests that Heidegger's understanding of Aristotle's *energeia* is permeated by his understanding of 'the primordial essence of Being.'

The other member of the twofold determination of *ousia* in Aristotle's thinking is *idea*. As it is well known, Aristotle thinks that *idea* is in a secondary rank with respect to *energeia*. For Aristotle, says Heidegger: 'Presence in the primary sense is Being which is expressed in the *hoti estin*: that something is, *existentia*. Presence in the secondary sense is Being, to which we trace back in the *ti estin*: what something is, *essentia*.'[566] This difference in rank is understood by Heidegger as implying a priority of *existentia* over *essentia*: since Aristotle thinks *ousia* (presence) in the primary sense as *energeia* and since this presence means nothing other than what in a changed interpretation is later called *actualitas*, "reality" (*Wirklichkeit*) and "existence" (*Existenz*) and "existence"

[564] Ibid., translation modified. GA 6.2, p. 403
[565] Ibid., translation modified. GA 6.2, p. 404
[566] Ibid., pp. 7-8

(*Dasein*), the Aristotelian treatment of the distinction between *energeia* and *idea* reveals a priority of the later so-called *existentia* over the *essentia*.[567]

Heidegger's view of the priority of *existentia* over *essentia* that Aristotle's thinking entails is further clarified by his treatment of the difference between Plato's and Aristotle's thinking.

According to Heidegger, what Plato thought as the true, and for him sole, beingness (*ousia*) of beings, presence in the manner of *idea* (*eidos*), in Aristotle's thinking moves to the secondary rank within Being: 'For Aristotle, Being consists in the *energeia* of the *tode ti*. In terms of *energeia*, *eidos* can be thought as a manner of presencing. In contrast, the *tode ti*, the respective being (*das jeweilige Seiende*), is incomprehensible in its beingness when thought in terms of *idea* (The *tode ti* is a *me on* – and yet an *on*).'[568]

As usual, Heidegger challenges the standard way of interpreting the thinking of philosophers throughout the history of philosophy. In this case, with respect to the common explanation of the relation between Aristotle and Plato which basically argues that Aristotle took Plato's free-floating "Ideas" back from their "supraheavenly place" and planted them in actual things,[569] Heidegger says:

> How should Aristotle be able at all to bring the Ideas down to real being [*das wirklich Seiende*] if he has not in advance conceived the individualized respective being [*das geeinzelte Jeweilige*] as that which truly presences? But how should he reach the concept of the individual real being's presence [*der Anwesenheit des einzelnen Wirklichen*] if he doesn't previously think the Being of beings in the sense of the primordially decided essence of Being in terms of presencing in unconcealment. Aristotle does not transplant the Ideas (as if they were things) into individualized things [*die geeinzelte Dinge*]. Rather, he thinks for the first time the ever individualized as the respective being [*das je Geeinzelte als das Jeweilige*], and thinks its lasting [*Weile*] as the distinctive manner of presencing, of the presencing of *eidos* itself in the most extreme present of the indivisible, that is, no longer derived, appearance [*Aussehens*] (*atomon eidos*).[570]

[567] Ibid., p. 8; translation modified. GA 6.2, pp. 407-408
[568] Ibid., pp. 8-9
[569] Ibid., p. 9
[570] Ibid., translation modified. GA 6.2, p. 408-409

Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's thinking in *MHB* is guided by his view that it is in agreement with 'the primordial essence of Being.' So much so that Heidegger thinks that despite the fact that, temporally speaking, Plato is closer to 'the primordial essence of Being' than Aristotle, Aristotle is, metaphysically speaking, closer to it than Plato: 'In that Plato can never admit the individual being (*das geeinzelte Seiende*) as what is truly in being, and in that Aristotle, however, conceives the individual (*Geeinzelte*) together with presencing (*Anwesen*), Aristotle is more truly Greek in his thinking than Plato, that is, more in keeping with the primordially decided essence of Being.' [571]

However, as I already mentioned, Heidegger does not say this without certain qualms: 'Still, Aristotle was able to think *ousia* as *energeia* only in opposition to *ousia* as *idea*, so that he also keeps *eidos* as subordinate presence in the essential constitution of the presencing of what is present. To say that Aristotle is more truly Greek in his thinking than Plato in the way described does not mean, however, that he again comes closer to the primordial thinking of Being. Between *energeia* and the primordial essence of Being (*aletheia-physis*) stands the *idea*.'[572] Furthermore, Heidegger's own view of metaphysics as based on the distinction essence-existence compels him to say that insofar as a form of this distinction is in the core of Aristotle's thinking, this thinking is necessarily metaphysical.

Although it could be argued that this last statement overrides the previous one, Heidegger's analysis of Aristotle's thinking in *MHB* continues to be guided by the view that it keeps the primordial essence of Being more than Plato's thinking does. This is particularly clear in Heidegger's view of the difference between *energeia* and *actualitas*.

[571] Ibid., pp. 9-10
[572] Ibid., p. 10; translation modified. GA 6.2, p. 409

Although Heidegger has already stated that *energeia* is later called *actualitas* and *existentia*, reality and existence, he thinks that *actualitas* and *existentia* do not preserve the same essence as *energeia*:

> *Ex-sistere speculo* means for Cicero to step out of the cave. One might suspect here a deeper relation of *existentia* as stepping out and forward to coming forward to presence and unconcealment [*Anwesenheit und Unverborgenheit*]. Then the Latin word *existentia* would preserve an essential Greek content. That is not the case. The literal translation is misleading. In truth, it brings precisely another transposition or misplacement to the word of Being. This transposition of another type of humanity to the whole of beings occurs by virtue of the closure of Being. The character of the that-*being* and of the "*that*" has changed.[573]

The crucial notion to understand this change is 'work:'

> In the beginning of metaphysics, beings as *ergon* are what presence in their being produced. Now *ergon* becomes the *opus* of the *operari*, the *factum* of the *facere*, the *actus* of the *agere*. The *ergon* is no longer what is freed in the openness of presencing [*das ins Offene des Anwesens Freigelassene*], but rather what is effected in working [*im Wirken Gewirkte*], what is accomplished in action [*im Tun Geleistete*]. The essence of the "work" is no longer "workness" in the sense of distinctive presencing in the open, but rather the "reality" of a real thing which rules in working and is fitted into the procedure of working [*Das Wesen des "Werkes" ist nicht mehr die "Werkheit" im Sinne des ausgezeichneten Anwesens in das Freie sondern die "Wirklichkeit" eines Wirklichen, das im Wirken beherrscht und in das Vorgehen des Wirkens eingespannt wird*]. Having progressed from the beginning essence of *energeia*, Being has become *actualitas*.[574]

As I already stated, I will come back to Heidegger's understanding of work within the medieval context in the next section of this chapter. However, this quote already shows that Heidegger thinks that *actualitas* preserves nothing of the essence of *energeia* over and above the indefinite relation to the work.[575] Nevertheless, says Heidegger, 'the essence of Being at its beginning still prevails in *actualitas*, too, since whatness is determined as *idea*.'[576]

[573] Ibid., p. 12
[574] Ibid.
[575] Ibid., p. 13
[576] Ibid.

For Heidegger, i*dea* as whatness has the character of *aitia*, cause.[577] This means for him that '[o]rigination from its whatness dominates in every coming-to-be of beings.'[578] In this way, says Heidegger, '[w]hatness is the matter of every thing, that is, its cause. Accordingly, Being is in itself causal.'[579] In light of this, Heidegger states that existence is dependent upon causality.[580]

I suggest understanding this dependence as the dependence of thatness upon whatness, which in its turn I understand as the determination (creation) of thatness by whatness, where creation has to be understood in terms of divine creation. It is therefore crucial to delve more extensively into this dependence.

The fact that Heidegger brings into view this dependence in the context of his analysis of *actualitas* and not in reference to *energeia*, suggests that it only applies to the former. Therefore, in order to address this dependence it is necessary to focus on Heidegger's view of *actualitas*.

[577] Ibid.
[578] Ibid.
[579] Ibid.
[580] Ibid., p. 18

II.- THE CAUSAL CHARACTER OF BEING AS *ACTUALITAS* (*WIRKLICHKEIT)*: THE CONDITION OF THE POSSIBILITY FOR THE DETERMINATION (CREATION) OF THATNESS BY WHATNESS

Heidegger differentiates between 'the premetaphysical' determination of Being as *arche* and the later – with which he means metaphysical – determination of Being as *aitia*.[581] In the case of the former, he thinks that the character of 'being responsible for as making possible' that corresponds to this notion does not necessarily and exclusively have the character of 'effective working.'[582] However, he states that:

> …the precedence of *aitia* gets so firmly fixed in the beginning of metaphysics that it takes over the place of the premetaphysical determination of Being as *arche*; more exactly: it brings about the transformation of the character of *arche* to that of *aition*. Soon the equation of *arche* and *aitia*, in part already with Aristotle, becomes a matter of course. Being shows the essential characteristic of the making possible of presence [*der Ermöglichung der Anwesenheit*], that is, of effecting permanence [*Erwirkens der Beständigkeit*].[583]

Early in his analysis of the change of *energeia* to *actualitas*, Heidegger equates the meaning of *actualitas* to that of *Wirklichkeit* (reality):[584] 'When Being has changed to *actualitas* (reality), beings are what is real (*Wirkliche*). They are determined by working, in the sense of causal making.'[585]

The description of work as 'causal making' goes together with Heidegger's previous description of work within the medieval context as: 'the accomplishment of a strenuous making,' or as 'result and success.' In this context, he described 'workness' as 'reality (*Wirklichkeit*) as the result of an action.' In contrast to this way of understanding 'work,' Heidegger's description of work in the context of *energeia* does not involve the idea of 'action,' of one's *doing* something. As it is clear from Heidegger's own words in the

[581] Ibid., p. 14
[582] Ibid., pp. 13-14
[583] Ibid., p. 14; translation modified. GA 6.2, p. 414
[584] Ibid., p. 13
[585] Ibid., p. 14

already mentioned quote: Now (in the context of *actualitas*) *ergon* becomes the *opus* of the *operari*, the *factum* of the *facere*, the *actus* of the *agere*. This means for Heidegger that the *ergon* is no longer (as it was in the context of *energeia*) what is freed in the openness of presencing, but rather what is effected in working in the sense of what is accomplished in action.

Heidegger finds support for his view that in the context of *actualitas* beings are what is real (*Wirkliche*) – and thus to his view that they are determined by working in the sense of causal making – in his interpretation of Christianity:

> The reality [*Wirklichkeit*] of human action and divine creation can be explained in terms of this. Being which has changed to *actualitas* gives to beings as a whole that fundamental characteristic which the representational thinking of the biblical-Christian faith in creation can take over in order to secure metaphysical justification for itself. Conversely, through the dominance of the Christian-ecclesiastical interpretation of beings, the fundamental position of Being as reality [*Wirklichkeit*] attains an assumed self-evidence which has remained decisive ever since for all subsequent understanding of the beingness of beings, even apart from the attitude of strict faith and its scholarly interpretation of beings as a whole. The predominance of the interpretation of Being as reality [*Wirklichkeit*], now immediately comprehensible to everyone, gets so firmly fixed so that soon, conversely, *energeia* is understood in terms of *actualitas*, and the primordial Greek essential character of Being is once and for all misunderstood and made inaccessible by the Roman interpretation of Being.[586]

In my view, this quote shows that Heidegger thinks that the 'causal character' of work – the understanding of 'work' as 'what is accomplished in action' – only comes up when Being has changed to *actualitas*. Furthermore he suggests that the reality (*Wirklichkeit*) of human action and divine creation can only be explained in terms of this understanding of work, that is: only in the context of Being as *actualitas* and not in that of Being as *energeia*.

Heidegger explicitly states that he does not think that 'the causal character of work as what is accomplished in action' applies to *energeia* in the following passage: 'It can only

[586] Ibid. I understand that by 'Roman' Heidegger refers to 'Roman Catholic'

be recollected that Being has been given to the essence of reality. Recollection points back to the previous essence of Being in the sense of worklike and visible presencing. The progression (*Fortgang*) out of this essence allows the *agathon* and the *aition* to become determining. The essential origin of Being as making possible and as causing rules throughout the history of Being.'[587] That with the expression 'worklike presence' Heidegger refers to *energeia* is made clear in a parenthical remark in a section that follows: '…in the face of worklike presence (*energeia*)…'[588]

For Heidegger, *actualitas* is *causalitas*.[589] In order to unfold his understanding of this statement, he again draws upon his interpretation of Christianity:

> The causal character of Being as reality [*Wirklichkeit*] shows itself in all purity in that being which fulfils the essence of Being in the highest sense, since it is that being which can never not be. Thought "theologically," this being is called "God." It doesn't know the state of possibility because in that state it would not yet be something. In every not-yet there is a lack of Being, in that Being is distinguished by permanence [*Beständigkeit*]. The highest being is pure realization [*erfüllte Verwirklichung*] always fulfilled, *actus purus*. Effecting is here the persisting presencing itself of what persists for itself [*Das Wirken ist hier die aus sich wesende Beständigung des für sich Bestehenden*]. This being (*ens*) is not only what it is (*sua essentia*), but in what it is, it is always also the persistence [*Beständigkeit*] of what it is (*est suum esse non participans alio*). For this reason, metaphysically thought, God is called the *summum ens*. The apex of this Being, however, consists in his being the *summum bonum*. For the *bonum* is *causa*, and as *finis*, the *causa causarum*. Thus, precisely with respect to *causalitas* (that is, *actualitas*) the *bonum* is what gives persistence [*Bestandgebende*] to everything that persists [*Bestandige*] and is thus *prius quam ens*; *causalitas causae finalis est prima*.[590]

But this does not mean for Heidegger that there is a moral characterization or even an idea of "value" contained in the statement "*Deus est summum bonum*."[591] Heidegger understands '[t]he name *summum bonum* as rather the purest expression for the causality which is appropriate to the purely real (*dem reinen Wirklichen*), in accordance with its effectuating the persistence (*Beständigkeit*) of everything that can persist (*Bestandhaften*)

[587] Ibid., p. 19
[588] Ibid.
[589] Ibid., p. 15
[590] Ibid., translation modified. GA 6.2, pp. 415-416
[591] Ibid.

(cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theol. I, qu. 1-23).[592] Thus, ontologically understood, says Heidegger, 'the *bonum* thought with regard to the *summum ens* is the echo of the Platonic *agathon*, that is, what absolutely makes capable, namely for beings as such – what makes possible (*das Ermöglichende*): the condition of possibility (cf. "Plato's Doctrine of Truth")."[593]

Heidegger's reference to Christianity shows that his understanding of the causal character of Being as reality (*Wirklichkeit*) has a fundamental connection to divine creation. As will become clear in the next and final section of this chapter, this supports my view that the dependence of thatness upon whatness has to be understood as the determination (creation) of thatness by whatness, where creation is understood as 'divine creation.' As expected, this also gives further support to my view that the productive character of modern representation has to be understood in terms of effecting in a divine sense.

Further confirmation that Heidegger thinks that the difference between *energeia* and *actualitas* is the fact that whereas the latter is determined by causality (understood as *aitia*: a making possible in terms of effective working) the former is not, is found in his way of understanding the difference between presence (*Anwesenheit*) and God's ubiquity: 'But also in the *actualitas*, which is determined in every respect by *causalitas*, the essence of beingness at the beginning maintains itself in a changed form: presence (*Anwesenheit*). The *summum ens* is distinctively characterized by *omnipraesentia*. However, "ubiquity," (to be present everywhere) is also determined "causally." *Deus est ubique per essentiam inquantum adest omnibus ut causa essendi* (qu. 8a, 3)."[594]

[592] Ibid.
[593] Ibid., pp. 15-16
[594] Ibid., p. 16

Heidegger thinks that the interpretation of *existentia*, which is mostly equated in meaning with *actualitas* and it is even used far more often in the conceptual language of metaphysics than reality (*Wirklichkeit*) – above all in the distinction of *essentia* and *existentia* –, can also be explained by the causal character of reality (*Wirklichkeit*).[595] (This 'causal character' understood as *aitia*: a making possible in terms of effective working). He first refers to Aristotle and then to Suarez in order to show this.

With respect to Aristotle, Heidegger refers to two passages in his *Metaphysics* which Heidegger thinks treat almost identically the *on hos alethes,* the Being of beings in the sense of "unconcealed" (*Unverborgen*) (*Met*. E 4, 1027b and *Met*. K 8, 1065a 21ff.).[596] In these passages, says Heidegger, Aristotle speaks about *exo ousa tis physis tou ontos* and about the *exo on kai choriston.* The crucial point in Heidegger's treatment of these passages is the fact that here the 'exo' (outside) means 'the outside *tes dianoias*, that is, human reception (apprehension), which through discussion 'takes' (apprehends) beings and in doing so establishes what is talked about. What is established in this way, only consists and presences for 'the taking' (the apprehension) and within its execution' (*des menschlichen Vernehmens, das im Durchsprechen das Seiende durchnimmt und dabei das Durchgesprochene aufstellt, welches Aufgestellte nur besteht und anwest für das Durchnehmen und im Umkreis seines Vollzugs*).[597] What is outside (*exo*), Heidegger states, 'consists (*besteht*) and stands (*steht*) as something persisting (*Ständiges*) in itself in its own place (*choriston*). What thus "stands outside" (*"ausserhalb-Stehende"*), *ex-*

[595] Ibid.
[596] Ibid.
[597] Ibid., translation modified. GA 6.2, p. 417. This translation follows my interpretation of the difference between *Vorstellung* and *Vernehmen* as I presented it in chapter four of this thesis.

sistens, the ex-isting, is nothing other than what presences of itself in its being produced (*das von sich her in seiner Hergestelltheit Anwesende*), the *on energeia*.'[598]

Heidegger wants to highlight the fact that although 'truth' in Aristotle is still called *alethes* (the unconcealed), 'what is true, namely the proposition, is true not because it itself as revealing is something "unconcealed," but rather insofar it apprehends and determines something through the adequation of apprehension' (*sondern insofern sie ein solches durch die Angleichung des Vernehmens vernimmt und feststellt*).[599] This means for Heidegger that the determination of Being in the sense of *ex-sistentia* as Aristotle thought it originates in the change of the essence of truth from the unconcealment of beings to the correctness of the apprehending proposition (*des durchnehmenden Aussagens).*[600] Heidegger thinks that this change already begins with Plato and underlies the beginning of metaphysics. But although this origin – which is likewise already metaphysical – also echoes indefinitely enough in the concept *ex-sistentia*, says Heidegger, *ex-sistentia* receives its dominant interpretation from *actualitas*, that is, with regard to *causalitas*.[601] Heidegger then offers his interpretation of Suarez's determination of existence. According to Suarez, says Heidegger:

> Existence [*Existenz*] is that Being through which a being is truly and immediately established outside of the causes [*ausserhalb der Ursachen*] with the result that nonbeing ceases, and a respective being begins to be [*ein Jeweiliges zu sein beginnt*]. *Ex-sistentia* is related in each case to one being in accordance with the underlying distinction in Being. What a being is in each case is established by existence in the sphere outside causality [*Ausserhalb der Verursachung*]. This means: Whatness undergoes a causal realization in such a way that what is thus produced [*Erwirkte*] is released as a product from causality [*Gewirktes aus der Verursachung*], and established on its own basis as something real [*Wirklichen*].[602]

[598] Ibid., translation modified. GA 6.2, p. 417
[599] Ibid.
[600] Ibid., pp. 16-17; translation modified. GA 6.2, p. 417
[601] Ibid., p. 17; translation modified. GA 6.2, p. 417
[602] Ibid.

As it can be seen, Heidegger thinks that whereas Suarez's interpretation of existence establishes a clear and fundamental connection between causality and existence, Aristotle's interpretation does not. I think that this supports my view of Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle in this thesis so far: Aristotle's thinking acknowledges the necessity of 'the given in ordinary experience' and therefore, his view of existence requires that which 'consists and stands as something persisting in itself in its own place' so that human reception apprehends it (takes it) and, in so doing, asserts its 'existence.' As I already suggested in chapter two, this means that Aristotle's thinking does account for Heidegger's concern for the ontic.[603]

In light of this, I think it clear that Heidegger's analysis of Aristotle's thinking in *MHB* is in line with, and deepens his interpretation of Aristotle as I presented it in chapter two. Heidegger's analysis of Aristotle's thinking in *MHB* is as a thinking that is closer to 'the primordial essence of Being' than Plato's thinking, which gives further support to my view that Aristotle's thinking can account for Heidegger's concern for the ontic. This in turn explains Heidegger's sympathetic stance towards Aristotle and his critical stance towards Plato: the discoverer of the a priori.

Further to this, I think that based on my analysis of the difference between *Vernehmen* and *Vorstellung* in terms of restricted/unrestricted activity of the human being in chapter four, Heidegger's analysis of Aristotle's thinking in *MHB* justifies placing Aristotle's thinking closer to *Vernehmen* than to *Vorstellung.*

[603] I think that a way of saying this in Aristotle's own terms is that the 'material cause' has to be given. Within the four causes, say: efficient, final, formal and material, the material cause is the only one that is necessarily independent of the human being.

That Suarez is a better representative of the dominant interpretation of *existentia* than Aristotle is confirmed by Heidegger's comparison between the two in the following passage: '[In Suarez] the "extra" is no longer related like the Aristotelian *exo* to the *dianoia*, to human reception (apprehension) (*das menschliche Vernehmen*), but rather to a transpiring causality. *Ex-sistentia* is *actualitas* in the sense of the *res extra causes et nihilum sistentia*, an effectuation, which transposes something (to the realm) outside of causality and effectuality (realization), to being effected (being real), and in this way overcomes nothingness (that is, the lack of the real) (*einer Wirkendheit, die etwas ins Ausserhalb von Verursachung und Verwirklichung in die Gewirktheit versetzt und so das Nichts (d.h. das Fehlen von Wirklichem) überwindet*).'[604]

The fact that, according to Suarez, *ex-sistentia* is placed (in the realm) outside causality does not mean for Heidegger that *actualitas*, and therefore causality, does not determine the essence of existence (*Existenz*). On the contrary, '[i]n that existence exposes from the area of causality to the openness of working which is now a real being (*Wirkliches*) upon itself and thus an effective (*Wirksamen*) being, existence is precisely dependent upon causality. Placing and establishing, the making-stand of *ex-sistentia*, is what it is *out of* causality, but only out of *it*. The *ex-sistentia* is the *actus*, *quo res sistitur*, *ponitur extra statum possibilitatis*. It alone can and should ex-pose from the cause the thing as caused, that is, produced (*heraus-setzen*).'[605]

Heidegger's view of the dependence of *actualitas* and existence (thatness) – but not of *energeia* – upon causality (whatness) thus makes it compelling to say that this dependence has to be understood as the determination (creation) of thatness by whatness. In

[604] Heidegger, M. *MHB* p. 17; translation modified. GA 6.2, p. 418
[605] Ibid., pp. 17-18

Heidegger's own words: whatness undergoes a causal realization in such a way that what is thus produced (*Erwirkte*) is released as a product from causality (*Gewirktes aus der Verursachung*), and established on its own basis as something real (*Wirklichen*).

From this, I think it clear that Heidegger's understanding of the causal character of whatness as 'making possible' (causing) in terms of effective working is at the basis of his view of the dependence of *actualitas* (thatness) upon causality (whatness). This being the case, I think it sensible to understand this dependence as the determination (creation) of thatness by whatness. This in its turn shows that I am right in understanding the making possible (causing) as a determination (creation).

In light of this, I am now in a position to account for the confounding between whatness (representation) and thatness (reality) that characterizes modernity. How does this confounding take place?

III.- INDUBITABLE REPRESENTATIONAL THINKING (*REPRAESENTARE*) AND THE CONFOUNDING BETWEEN WHATNESS AND THATNESS

Heidegger brings forth the notion of a confounding between whatness and thatness by stating that the pro-gression (*Fort-gang*) of metaphysics from its beginning consists in the fact that the first metaphysical determinations (*idea* and *energeia*) change and also draw the mode of their mutual distinction until their distinction finally disappears in a peculiar confounding (*eigentümlichen Vermischung*).[606]

Further to this, Heidegger states that *idea* becomes idea and this becomes representational thought.[607] Therefore, there is no doubt that representation refers to whatness. For its part, thatness refers to reality, as it will become clear later.

The German phrase '*eigentümlichen Vermischung'* – which could also be translated as 'peculiar mixing' – does not by itself entail a single way of understanding the '*Vermischung*' between whatness (representation) and thatness (reality). One option would be (a) that it means that the idea of a thing's reality gets occluded by the excessive dominance of our representational conception of what-being or essence. Another option could be (b) that it means that we lose our grip on the distinction between what-being and that-being, so that reality acquires the ideality of essence and essence the reality of the real, but with neither reality nor ideality meaning what they previously meant. However, my view is that these different ways of understanding this phrase can be interpreted as expressions of a primary way of understanding it. Based on my analysis so far I suggest that the fundamental way of understanding this phrase is in terms of a divine capacity of

[606] Ibid., p. 10
[607] Ibid., p. 11

human beings to bring things into being. In my view, the phrase refers to the utmost expression of the way of thinking that characterizes modernity: the determination (creation) of reality by representation; it refers to the *telos* of the tendency of the human being to become the master of 'whatever there is.' Insofar as (a) and (b) can be read as implying this tendency, they can be interpreted as less radical expressions of the fundamental way of understanding this phrase.

Heidegger's treatment of the notion of representation in *MHB* comes out in his analysis of the transformation of truth to certainty. Further to his view of the transformation of truth from the unconcealment of beings to the correctness of the apprehending proposition (*des durchnehmenden Aussagens*), Heidegger now states that certainty is the ultimate essence of truth:

> Truth, meanwhile in metaphysics changed to the distinctive trait of the *intellectus* (*humanus, divinus*), comes to its ultimate essence which is called certainty. The name expresses the fact that truth concerns consciousness as a knowledge, a representation [*Vor-stellen*] which is grounded in consciousness in such a way [*dergestalt*] that only that knowledge is valid as knowledge which at the same time knows itself and what it knows as such, and is certain of itself in this knowledge. Certainty here is not to be taken only as an addition to knowledge in the sense that it accomplishes the appropriation and the possession of knowledge. Rather, certainty is the authoritative mode of knowledge, that is, truth, as the consciousness, conscious of itself, of what is known. The mere having of something in consciousness is, in contrast, either no longer knowledge or not yet knowledge.[608]

This quote already suggests that Heidegger thinks that the notion of representation does not by itself carry a single meaning: there is a type of representations which goes together with truth as certainty, and a type of representations which does not. Insofar as certainty is the modern determination of truth, the former of these types of representations must necessarily correspond to modern representations.

[608] Ibid., p. 20

With the aim of expanding on his understanding of certainty, Heidegger again turns to his understanding of Christianity, specifically, to his view about the certainty of salvation. What Heidegger wants to show is that the place of God – as *actus purus* and thus the causality of everything real, that is, the source and the place of salvation which as blessedness guarantees eternal permanence –, is somehow taken by man.[609]

By himself, says Heidegger, 'man can never become, and be, absolutely certain of his salvation. On the other hand, through faith and similarly through lack of faith, man is essentially established in the attainment of salvation's certainty. Thus, a necessity rules, hidden in its origin, that man can make sure of his salvation in some fashion in the Christian or in another sense.'[610]

This means for Heidegger that the reality of man is determined by the search for the assurance of himself and of his effectiveness, which for Heidegger entails that man seeks to determine the essence of certainty (self-assurance) by himself. When this happens, thinks Heidegger, humanity places itself in a position of dominance within what is real (*des Wirklichen*).[611] In other words, when truth becomes certainty, a 'peculiar pre-eminence of humanity within what is real' takes place.[612]

In line with Heidegger's view that the will of the mathematical to a self-grounding of knowledge that involves the rejection of the pre-given is a will for certainty, in *MHB* Heidegger clearly states that the essence of certainty is self-assurance. This means for him that certainty seeks to determine the reality of what is real (*die Wirklichkeit des*

[609] Ibid., pp. 21- 24
[610] Ibid., p. 21
[611] Ibid.
[612] Ibid.

Wirklichen) by itself.[613] This supports what I have previously argued regarding the rejection of the pre-given that the will of the mathematical entails, that is: that this rejection involves trying to determine whatever there is out of pure reason alone (representations against experience).

Certainty, says Heidegger, seeks to determine reality by itself – that is, it seeks to determine what first appears to be its actual support.[614] I suggest understanding the fact that certainty seeks to determine 'reality' as a phenomenon that goes together with the presumption of the uprooted understanding to determine the being of what is out of pure reason alone (the danger lurking in the a priori). This, as I have previously argued, involves a rejection of the given understood as that which is given in ordinary experience (ontic domain). In light of this, it has to be said that the attempt of certainty to determine 'reality' involves a rejection of the ontic domain. In other words, the attempt of certainty to determine reality goes together with Heidegger's concern for the ontic.

In light of his view of the certainty of salvation in *MHB*, Heidegger states that man's position of dominance within what is real – which is a result of the essence of certainty as self-assurance – does not come from a revolt against the doctrine of faith, but on the contrary, '…it is the necessary consequence of the fact that the highest truth has the character of the certainty of salvation.'[615] In *MHB*, Heidegger shows himself confident about the Christian provenance of modern thinking. The transformation of truth to the certainty of representational thinking is for him determined by the essence of Being as *actus purus*.[616] This view takes him to assert that 'the world of Christian faith remains

[613] Ibid.
[614] Ibid.
[615] Ibid., p. 24
[616] Ibid.

authoritative throughout manifold transformations for the organization and cultivation of what is real (for culture) in the history of the modern period, but it is also authoritative for the interpretation of what is real in terms of its reality (for modern metaphysics). Modern culture is Christian even when it loses its faith,'[617] thinks Heidegger.

As in many other works, Heidegger refers to Descartes' thinking in order to develop his view about certainty and, as in other works as well, he focuses on Descartes' view about certainty as *clare et distincte perceptio*:[618]

> Something true is that which man of himself clearly and distinctly brings before himself and confronts as what is thus brought before him (re-presented) in order to guarantee what is represented in such a confrontation. The assurance of such representation [*solchen Vor-stellens*] is certainty. What is true in the sense of being certain is what is real. The essence of the reality of what is real lies in the constancy and continuity of what is represented in the certain representation [*gewissen Vorstellen*]. This constancy excludes the inconstancy of the placing here and there (wavering) common to all re-presenting as long as it doubts. [*Diese Ständigkeit schliesst die Unbeständigkeit des Hin- und Herstellens aus, das in allem Vor-stellen umgeht, solange es zweifelt*]. Representational thinking which is free of doubt [*Das zweifelsfreie Vorstellen*] is clear and distinct thinking. What is thus represented has also already presented what is constant, that is, what is real, to representational thinking.[619]

This quote suggests that Heidegger is here making a distinction between two types of representations:

- Representational thinking which is free of doubt. Heidegger clearly calls this type of representations 'certain representations.'
- Representational thinking which is not free of doubt (includes the inconstancy of the wavering common to all representational thinking as long as it doubts). I suggest calling this type of representations 'uncertain representations.'

In light of this distinction, Heidegger makes a first approach to a way of understanding the relation of representation and reality in terms of a 'confounding' between these two

[617] Ibid.
[618] Ibid., pp. 24-25
[619] Ibid., p. 25

notions: 'Reality is representation in the sense of the constancy of the continuous which is set up *by* certain representational thinking and *for* it.'[620] This means that the confounding between reality and representation implies that the notion of representation involved in it is 'certain representations' and in no way 'uncertain representations.' I want to suggest that what I have described in this thesis so far as 'modern representations' (representations against experience) correspond to what Heidegger here identifies as 'certain representations.'[621]

In order to give an account of the meaning of this last quote, I think it necessary to consider four ideas that follow from the analysis so far:

1.- Heidegger brings forth the notion of 'certain representations' as the way in which whatness takes place in modernity, therefore this notion carries the causal character of whatness (making possible)

2.- Heidegger brings forth the notion of 'reality' as the way in which 'thatness' takes place in modernity, therefore this word carries its traditional meaning (*energeia*, *actualitas*, existence)

3.- 'certain representations' go hand in hand with the position of dominance that human beings acquire in modernity and, therefore,

4.- 'certain representations' enable man to somehow place himself in the place of God.

[620] Ibid.

[621] Does this mean that intuitive representations as presented in chapter two correspond to uncertain representations? I think yes. If we disregard the notion of certainty as the utmost parameter of truth, uncertainty does not necessarily show itself as a 'negative' characteristic. But this, of course, would be against modern science's way of thinking.

With these fours ideas in view, I think that this first description of the relation between the notions of representation and reality in terms of a confounding entails the making possible (causing) of reality by representation where, on the one hand, reality has to be understood in its traditional sense and, on the other, representation has to be understood as 'certain representations' (representations against experience).

This making possible (causing) of reality by representations has to be understood as a determination (creation) of reality by representations understanding by this a 'divine creation' of reality by representations, since this is the only way of understanding the notion of 'creation' that can account for Heidegger's view that in modernity man somehow places himself in a position of dominance within what is real and that therefore somehow places himself in the place of God. In light of this, I suggest that Heidegger's view of the confounding between representation and reality in modernity goes together with the divinization of the human.

Clearly, Heidegger's view in *MHB* that there is a determination (creation) of reality (thatness) by representation (whatness) relies on his treatment of the causal character of whatness in this same work. Insofar as the productive character of modern representation has been presented so far as implying this same determination (creation), I suggest understanding the productive character of modern representation in terms of the causal character of whatness. Heidegger's understanding of the causal character of Being as reality (*Wirklichkeit*) has a fundamental connection to divine creation. In other words, I think it right to say that Heidegger's analysis in *MHB* is clear in affirming the Christian provenance of modern thinking and, in this way, suggests that modern representations have a theological origin.

In light of this, I think that Haugeland's view (that the productive character of modern representations has to be understood in terms of enabling and not in terms of effecting in a divine sense) does not do justice to Heidegger's own view about modern representations. This is clearly seen in the fact that Haugeland's interpretation of the productive character of representation in terms of 'enabling' cannot account for Heidegger's view that in modernity, man somehow puts himself in the place of God; it cannot account for the divinization of the human. This is confirmed by Heidegger's treatment of the relation between the notions of 'effect' and 'existence' in what follows.

According to Heidegger, having become certainty, the essence of truth brings about its adequate relation to what is real through and for man who is placed in the essence of truth by requiring him to construct what is knowable (*des Wissbaren*) as that which can be produced with certainty (*des sicher Erwirkbaren*). In line with the essence of certainty as self-assurance, the certainty for this construction requires a basis in which certainty's own essence is incorporated as the foundation.[622] This being the case, 'something real must be secured in advance for all representational thinking whose reality, that is, persistence, is removed from every threat to representational thinking in the sense of dubitability. The demand for certainty goes after a *fundamentum absolutum et inconcussum*, a basis which no longer depends upon a relation to something else, but rather is absolved from the very beginning from this relation, and rests within itself.'[623] Clearly, this view about certainty goes together with Heidegger's view about the rejection of the pre-given in ordinary experience that the will of the mathematical entails.

[622] Heidegger, M. *MHB* p. 26
[623] Ibid.

Heidegger's treatment of certainty's requirement for a *fundamentum absolutum et inconcussum* brings with it a further clarification of his understanding of modern representation:

> When a *fundamentum absolutum et inconcussum* is required in the beginning of modern metaphysics which as a true being suffices for the essence of truth in the sense of *certitudo cognitionis humanae*, a *subiectum* is being asked for which already lies present in all representing and for all representing, and is what is constant and standing in the sphere of indubitable representational thinking [*im Umkreis des zweifellosen Vor-stellens*]. Representational thinking (*percipere*, *co-agitare*, *cogitare*, *repraesentare in uno*) is a fundamental characteristic of all human behavior, even of nonepistemological behavior. From this perspective, all behavioural actions are *cogitationes*. However, what constantly already lies present for representational thinking during representation which presents something to itself is the representer itself (*ego cogitans*), before which everything represented is brought, to which and back to which (*re-praesentare*) it becomes present. As long as representing continues, the representing *ego cogito* is also expressly what already lies present in representing and for it. Thus the distinctive character of continually already lying present, of the *subiectum*, belongs to the *ego cogito cogitatum* in the sphere of the essential structure of representational thinking (*perceptio*). This constancy is the permanence of that which can never be doubted in any representing, even if this representing is itself a kind of doubting.[624]

This quote shows that Heidegger incorporates the notion of *re-praesentare* to expand on his understanding of 'certain representations' in relation to the subject. This confirms Derrida's analysis of Heidegger's use of this Latin word in the previous chapter of this thesis, where I argued that *repraesentare* is for Derrida an expression that shows in a clear way the dependence of the notion of 'modern representation' to the subject. I suggested that it is not the notion of representation *per se* that has to be linked to Heidegger's understanding of modern representation, but a determined notion of representation which – insofar as linked to the modern subject – was revealed as entailing the authority and dominant generality of representation.

In *MHB*, Heidegger is very clear about the centrality of the subject in modernity. This centrality 'circumscribes a new essence of the *existentia*.'[625] Heidegger defines this new essence of *existentia* by reference to Descartes' well-known sentence: 'He who thinks

[624] Ibid., pp. 28-29
[625] Ibid., p. 29

must exist while he thinks' ('*is qui cogitat, non potest non existere, dum cogitate*'[626]). However, Heidegger offers a very different translation for this sentence: 'Whoever behaves toward something while representing cannot not continually effect while representing' ('*Derjenige, der vorstellend sich zu etwas verhält, kann nicht nicht ständig wirken, während er vorstellt'*).'[627] As I already mentioned, it is not uncommon that Heidegger challenges the standard way of interpreting philosophers' thinking throughout the history of philosophy. This usually involves providing different translations of crucial passages of the philosopher in question. Although this certainly calls for an evaluation of the accuracy of Heidegger's 'new' translations and interpretations, in this case I need to disclose what his 'new' translation can reveal about Heidegger's own view of modern representation, for which reason it is not pertinent here to question whether this is a truthful translation of Descartes' thinking or not.

On the one hand, Heidegger's translation of the Latin word '*cogitat*' by 'representing' shows that for him 'representation' is definitive of the modern way of 'thinking.' On the other hand, his translation of the Latin word '*existere*' by 'effect' (*wirken*) and not by 'existence' reveals that in modernity the notion of existence is for Heidegger entirely dependent on the subject. It is the subject who determines the existence of anything, and Heidegger's analysis so far suggests that the subject does this by effecting permanence through representation:

> Reality is characterized as constancy by permanence (the persistence of representational thinking). But at the same time it makes the representing being into an *ens actu*. The effecting of the new essence of reality of this distinctive real being has the fundamental characteristic of representational thinking. Accordingly, the reality of what is represented and added in all representing is characterized by being represented.[628]

[626] Descartes cited by Heidegger. Ibid.
[627] Ibid.
[628] Ibid.

In light of this I think it clear that the notion of 'effecting' is crucial for Heidegger's treatment of the determination of reality by representation (and therefore for his understanding of the confounding between representation and reality). This, together with the fact that Heidegger suggests the theological origin of modern representations, makes it clear that – if the intention is to account for Heidegger's own way of understanding this character –, the productive character of modern representations has to be understood in terms of effecting in a divine sense.

Since Heidegger treats the notion of existence in *MHB* in its fundamental linkage to *energeia*, *actualitas* and *existentia*, he understands it as carrying its traditional connotation. This means that although it is tempting to understand Heidegger's treatment of the confounding between representation and reality as something that takes place within the sphere of the mind – since it would make this confounding easier to understand – this cannot be the case. That with the determination (creation) of reality by representation Heidegger does not refer to something that only takes place within the sphere of the mind, is clearly confirmed in the following passage:

> Representational thinking brings about the presentation of the opposition of the object. As long as we think metaphysically and not, in a manner inappropriate to Being, psychologically, reality as being represented never signifies that what is real is a mental-spiritual product and effect of representational activity, and thus something which can only exist as a mental structure. On the contrary, as soon as the fundamental characteristic of representing and being represented comes to power in the essence of reality, the constancy and persistence of what is real is narrowed down [*eingegrenzt*] to the sphere of presencing in the presence of *re-praesentatio* [*den Umkreis des Anwesens in der Praesenz der re-praesentatio*]. The character of presence [*Anwesenheit*] prevailing in the metaphysical essence of Being which was not fully obliterated, only changed, even in the transformation of *energeia* to *actualitas* (cf. the *omnipraesentia* of the *actus purus*), now appears as presence [*Praesenz*] within representational thinking [*repraesentatio*].[629]

This clearly shows that Heidegger understands the notion of 'presence within representational thinking' as something that does not belong to the realm of the mind, but

[629] Ibid., pp. 29-30. As it can be seen, Heidegger keeps the word '*Anwesenheit*' for 'presence' in the Greek and Medieval context, whereas he uses the word '*Praesenz*' for 'presence' in Modernity.

to the realm of 'reality' understood in its traditional sense as *actualitas, existentia*, reality and existence; thatness in its traditional sense. The quote also shows that Heidegger thinks that reality as 'presence within representational thinking' entails a 'narrowing down' of 'what is real.' This is in line with Glazebrook's view that modern science entails a 'reduction of the real.' As I argued in the previous chapter, Glazebrook's view acknowledges the fact that the productive character of representation has an impact on the notion of reality understood in its traditional sense, which I suggested places her view close to understanding this productive character in terms of effecting in a divine sense. In contrast to this, Haugeland's interpretation of the productive character of representation in terms of enabling does not have an impact on reality understood in this way. Considering that it is clear that in *MHB* Heidegger treats the notion of reality in its traditional sense, I think that there is no doubt that Glazebrook's view about this matter does justice to Heidegger's own way of understanding it, whereas Haugeland's view does not.

In the previous chapter of this thesis I suggested that insofar as that which is given in sensation and perception (the ontic domain) resists modern science's tendency to create reality, modern science has no other option than 'reducing what reality is.' I think that Heidegger's view of 'presence within representational thinking' as entailing a 'narrowing down' of 'what is real' in *MHB* gives further support to this view.

Although Descartes is the philosopher who Heidegger favours when offering an account of his view about truth as certainty, in *MHB* Heidegger is clear in stating that Descartes' thinking is only the beginning of modern metaphysics but in no way its accomplishment. The reason for this, he thinks, is the fact that the *res cogitans* (as *fundamentum absolutum*

et inconcussum – the eminent *subiectum*) is at the same time a *substantia finita*, that is, *creata*. This means for Heidegger that the reality of the *substantia finita* is determined by the causality of the *causa prima*,[630] which in turn means that the subject has not – yet – achieved its position of dominance within what is real since it is – still – dependant on God.

In *MHB*, Heidegger takes Leibniz's thinking to be the utmost expression of the fundamental way of thinking that characterizes modernity. Because of this, the section of *MHB* intended to give an account of Leibniz's thinking is entitled: *Leibniz: the Belonging-together of Reality and Representation*. For Heidegger, the crucial distinction between Descartes' and Leibniz's thinking is that whereas the former thinks that the *actualitas* of the *subiectum* has its essence in the *actus* of the *cogitare* (*percipere*), the latter thinks that *actualitas* itself contains this basic trait of the *percipere* in general.[631] Heidegger focuses on Leibniz's notion of monad in order to show that this is so.

There is no doubt that there is not a single way of interpreting Leibniz's thinking and it is clear that an analysis of his thinking goes beyond the scope of the analysis of this thesis. However, it is important to notice that in *MHB* Heidegger understands Leibniz's thinking as an expression of the belonging-together of reality and representation. Based on my analysis so far, this means that Heidegger thinks that in Leibniz's thinking representations create reality, in the full traditional sense of that term. In short, Heidegger understands Leibniz as an idealist. In other words, there is no other reality than representation; representation accounts for what reality is.

[630] Ibid., p. 30
[631] Ibid., pp. 31-32

Despite the fact that an analysis of Leibniz's thinking goes beyond the scope of this thesis, it is relevant to highlight that the reason why Heidegger refers to Leibniz as the utmost expression of modern thinking and not to Descartes is that in the latter, the subject has not – yet – achieved its position of dominance within what is real since it is – still – dependant on God. I think that this confirms my view that the confounding between representation and reality (the utmost expression of the fundamental way of thinking that characterizes modernity) is something that, for Heidegger, goes together with the divinization of the human.

Given the importance that I attach to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's thinking in relation to Heidegger's understanding of modern representation in this thesis so far, the almost complete omission of a reference to Kant's thinking in *MHB* requires explanation. However, as I mentioned in chapter three,[632] Heidegger does refer to Kant in other texts of the *Nietzsche* Volumes and he does it in a highly critical way. *MHB* is no exception in this respect since the only mention of Kant is to point out that his notion of the 'objectivity of the object' is the clear conception of the essence of reality as representation.[633] As I also already pointed out in chapter three, in an even later text (*KTB*) Heidegger shows himself highly sympathetic to Kant's notion of the 'objectivity of the object.' In chapter three[634] I suggested that Kant's middle position between intuitive representations and representations against experience can be taken as an explanation of the changes in Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's thinking. On the one hand, the determination of the thing in Kant is not achieved out of mere reason but by the union of intuition and thought and, in this way, it does not correspond to representations against the evidence of

[632] See footnote 354
[633] Heidegger, M. *MHB* p. 29
[634] See footnote 294

experience; but, on the other hand, it is not a determination of the thing which can account for the intuitively given in the realm of everyday experience (ontic domain), but only as an object of experience (which involves a determination out of principles) and, in this way, it does not correspond to intuitive representations either. In light of this, I suggest that when Heidegger focuses on what Kant's thinking shares with representations against experience his stance toward Kant is necessarily critical, but when he focuses on what Kant's thinking shares with intuitive representations (as in the case of *KTB* where Heidegger focuses on the necessary role of intuition in the determination of existence in Kant's thinking), his stance toward Kant is a sympathetic one.

Heidegger's view of metaphysics as the history of Being compels him to say that modern representational thinking is a way of thinking that 'was meant to be.' As I pointed out in the previous chapter of this thesis, this view gives support to Derrida's understanding of Heidegger's criticism of representational thinking as a criticism that does not entail any form of antirepresentationalism but an attempt to call into question the authority and dominant generality that representational thinking achieves in modernity. This entails – as I already mentioned – that it is not the notion of representation *per se* that Derrida thinks Heidegger associates with modernity, but a certain type of representations: 'modern representations.'

I think that my analysis so far allows me to suggest that Heidegger's critical stance towards the notion of modern representations is ultimately based on the fact that this type of representations enables the divinization of the human, that is: the determination (creation) of reality by representations. I have suggested that this determination is the most extreme way in which the danger lurking in the a priori unleashes in modernity. In

line with this, I have also suggested that this determination is at the heart of Heidegger's concern for the ontic domain after *BT*. In my view, this allows me to suggest that Heidegger's increasing concern for the ontic domain after *BT* is fundamentally related to his criticism towards modern representational thinking. This means that Heidegger's break with the FO model (due to the danger lurking in the a priori) is fundamentally related to his criticism of modern representational thinking. In light of my analysis in this chapter, I think I am right in suggesting that this allows reading Heidegger's break with the FO model as an attempt to avoid the most extreme way in which the danger lurking in the a priori unleashes in modernity, that is: the divinization of the human.

Given that modern representational thinking is for Heidegger (a) a way of thinking that 'was meant to be' and (b) a way of thinking towards which he has a critical stance, the following question seems unavoidable: can the analysis carried out throughout this thesis contribute to the understanding of the word 'criticism' in reference to Heidegger's 'critical' stance towards modern representation, an understanding that can account for both (a) and (b)?

CONCLUSION: LIMITATION FREES

In this thesis I have aimed to offer a new approach to Heidegger's *Kehre* based on his view of modern representational thinking. Via Heidegger's critical stance towards modern representations (representations against experience) I have argued that around the mid-30s Heidegger realized that thinking Being as the a priori carries a danger. This danger consists in the fact that when Being is thought as the a priori, our will towards the mathematical tries to break the relation between the a priori and the ontic so that the former becomes determined by pure reason alone and, in so doing, this will towards the self-determination of everything that there is can find its way. I have argued that the ultimate ambition of this will is to determine (create) reality by representations, that is: the divinization of the human.

In light of this I have argued that the danger lurking in the a priori makes Heidegger lose faith on his project of FO as presented in *BT* and forces him to rethink Being in ways that can avoid this danger. This entails trying to tie the a priori to the ontic domain understood as that which is given in ordinary experience, for which 'Kant's claim that existence is added synthetically to the concept is food for thought about being.'[635] Hence, Heidegger's unorthodox interpretation of Kant's synthetic a priori and, consequently, his sympathetic stance towards this notion.

Throughout my analysis I have assumed that Heidegger's stance towards modern representations from the mid-30s onwards is a critical one and I have rather focussed on identifying the reasons for that critical stance – reasons not hitherto identified. This has

[635] Glazebrook, T. 'Heidegger's Philosophy of Science,' p. 28

entailed drawing a distinction between two types of representations: intuitive representations and representations against experience (modern representations). I have argued that, whereas Heidegger has a clear critical stance towards the latter of these notions, his stance towards the former is a sympathetic one. I suggested that this is in line with Derrida's view regarding Heidegger's stance towards representations. For Derrida, Heidegger does not criticize the notion of representation *per se*, but representation understood in a specific way: as the most general category to determine the apprehension of whatever it is that is of concern or interest in any relation at all.[636] I argued that this authority and dominant generality of representation, which Derrida suggests is characteristic of modernity, goes together with representations against experience. Insofar as the background of Derrida's analysis is the later Heidegger's view of the destiny of Being, his analysis acknowledges that this view refutes the claim that Heidegger's criticism of modern representations entails any form of antirepresentationalism, since modern representational thinking is a way of thinking that was destined to us.

In light of this I think that a comprehensive account of Heidegger's critical stance towards modern representational thinking from the mid-30s onwards has to contemplate two ideas at the same time:

1) Heidegger's reference to modern representational thinking with expressions that show that in this way of thinking there is something 'undesirable' and therefore, something that it is better to abandon.
2) Heidegger's view of modern representational thinking as a way of thinking that 'was meant to be' and therefore cannot be abandoned.

[636] Derrida, J. 'Sending: On Representation,' p. 310

I think that the analysis that I have carried out throughout this thesis supports understanding the notion of 'criticism' in relation to Heidegger's stance towards modern representational thinking as a 'delimitation' or 'putting limits' to our mathematical will to place representations against experience as the master of everything that 'there is.' Understanding the word 'criticism' in this way allows a proper account of Heidegger's 'critical' stance towards modern representational thinking insofar as, on the one hand, it does not entail a search for antirepresentationalism and, on the other, it acknowledges what is undesirable in this type of thinking by implying the necessity of its 'delimiting.' I think that my analysis also points to the way in which this 'delimiting' can take place, that is: through the reconnection of representations to sensibility. In this way, representations keep a connection to that which is given in ordinary experience (the ontic domain) and avoid the danger lurking in the a priori, which in the end means avoiding the divinization of the human. This means that I think that although the dominance of representations against experience is a destiny of Being, this destiny has room for this reconnection. In fact, Heidegger is clear about this in the Introduction of *WT* by bringing forth the idea of 'an original reference to things:'

> …if, for example, we undertake the effort to think through the inner state of today's natural sciences, non-biological as well as biological, if we also think through the relation of mechanics and technology to our existence (*Dasein*), then it becomes clear that knowledge and questioning have here reached limits which demonstrates that in fact an original reference to things is missing, that it is only simulated by the progress of discoveries and technical successes.[637]

Based on this, Heidegger's quest in *WT* can well be read as an attempt to open up the possibility of an original reference to things. This being the case, Heidegger's view of Kant's focus on intuition in terms of a delimiting of the mathematical (a priori) as co-extensive with the realm of ordinary or everyday experience, suggests that Kant's synthetic a priori encloses the possibility of this original reference. This shows that

[637] Heidegger, M. *WT* p.41

Heidegger does not find this original reference in any form of antirepresentationalism but in the reconnection between representations and sensible intuitions.

Regardless of the fact that anyone who hears the expression 'reconnection between representations and sensibility' could make sense of it, my analysis shows *why* this reconnection should take place, but it doesn't show *how* it could take place. This necessarily involves further and rigorous analysis and I would like to signal a possible way in which this could be carried out that follows from my analysis so far.

There are several ways in which Heidegger manifests his clear critical stance towards modern representations from the mid-30s onwards. Among these, I want to bring to the fore one that I have already mentioned and which I think reveals a crucial aspect of this critical stance: '…what most holds us captive (*gefangen*) and makes us unfree (*unfrei*) in the experience and determination of the things is modern natural science, insofar as it has become a universal way of thinking along certain basic lines.'[638] Based on my analysis in this thesis so far, I think it is clear that the way of thinking that underlies modern science is modern representational thinking.

In my view this quote reveals that Heidegger's understanding of our actual way of thinking is in disagreement with common sense. What could be more obvious than thinking that in the achievement of our will to become the masters of everything that there is we are freed from our own limitations? That modern science and technology are in the service of this development towards an ever-increasing mighty freedom in our relation to things?

[638] Heidegger, M. *WT* pp. 50-51

But Heidegger shows that the opposite is the case: this alleged liberation is the imprisonment of ourselves in representations of things (including ourselves). Insofar as these representations have little or even nothing to do with those actual things, they condemn us to an inner prison – a (supposed) interiority which has lost its link to our finite nature; to our feelings, our body, our world and, in so doing, has attempted to determine all of these by a *mente concipere*. In this determination of reality by representations we have no other alternative than to become aliens to ourselves, at least as long as we continue to be human beings.

This necessarily directs our attention to the question: what is it to be a human being? This being the case; what can Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein say about this? Is the fact that Heidegger lost faith in the project of FO as presented in *BT* something that invalidates his rich analysis of Dasein carried out in this work?

Heidegger's *BT* in itself has not been and is not part of the focus of this thesis; therefore I am not in a position to give a definite answer to these questions. In line with what I have already mentioned, I want to suggest a possible way of approaching this question.

In my view, the attempt to overcome our finite nature, which goes together with the tendency to determine whatever there is out of pure reason alone, is an attempt to overcome nothingness. Our finite nature prevents us from being in control and having dominance over reality. Nothingness emerges as a result of this incapacity. We are not capable of controlling a relative's sickness or the occurrence of a devastating earthquake. There is nothing to be done; our capacity for control over these situations is limited. But

representations against experience want to overcome this limitation by creating reality, which would enable us to be in total control of reality, and the possibility of the appearance of nothingness would be closed off.

What has enabled me to reach this conclusion is the recognition that, though Heidegger does have a critical stance towards modern representations, this does not imply any form of antirepresentationalism. Among other complexities – such as the distinction between intuitive representations and representations against experience – acknowledging this fact has brought to light the notion of delimiting, which has played a crucial role in my analysis as a whole and in my interpretation of Heidegger's view of Kant in particular. The reason why I say this is that I believe that if I had begun my analysis on the basis of the well-known understanding of Heidegger as an antirepresentationalist, I would not have been able to unveil the complexities involved in his view of modern representations.

That Heidegger cannot be read as an antirepresentationalist challenges the widely influential interpretation of *BT* sustained by Hubert Dreyfus. As Stephen Mulhall points out, the main characteristic of Dreyfus' interpretation is that '…it presents a reading of Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein as a sophisticated and nuanced species of pragmatism – an account of human beings as inherently social and socialized creatures whose primary mode of apprehending intra-worldly entities lies in the know-how embedded in their practical activity within it.'[639] This interpretation, Mulhall says, has focused on Division One of *BT* and has treated Division Two as if it '…had no essential role to play in Heidegger's analysis, or at least led the analysis of Division One off into

[639] Mulhall, S. (2011) 'Heidegger and the Enigma of the Human' in *Making a Difference*: *Rethinking Humanism and the Humanities* Edited by N. Forsberg and S. Jansson, Stockholm: Thales. p. 146

the trackless depths of morbidity and nihilism.'[640] Based on this, Mulhall suggests that Dreyfus' commentary on *BT* is the clearest exemplification of an appropriation of Heidegger's early writings for 'analytical' philosophy which bears in itself a central weakness or limitation.[641] He offers a clear and detailed account of this weakness by showing that the sense of completeness regarding Dasein's Being achieved in Division One through the care-structure, is challenged by Division Two.[642] The key point to his argument is that Division Two discloses Dasein as unavoidably related to nothingness, nullity, negation, which prevents any sense of completeness with respect to Dasein's Being.[643] Mulhall explains what this fact means for the existential analytic of Dasein by stating that:

> …from the point of view of phenomenology, nothingness does not appear as such and is not an object of a possible discursive act; it is neither a phenomenon nor of the logos. It is not a representable something, and not an unrepresentable something either; hence it can be represented only as beyond representation, as the beyond of the horizon of the representable, its self-concealing and self-disrupting condition. And phenomenological philosophy can only acknowledge it by allowing 'nothing' first to conceal itself and then to disrupt its concealment, to constitute itself as that upon which the existential analytic is shipwrecked. Only in this way can an existential analytic of Dasein achieve the only kind of completeness that its condition allows – by presenting itself as essentially incomplete, beyond completion, as completed and completable only by that which is beyond it.[644]

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[640] Ibid.

[641] Ibid., pp. 145-146. In this respect I think it interesting to bring forth the debate regarding Heidegger's antirepresentationalism or representationalism about intentional states. According to Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall's interpretation of Heidegger's account of perception, 'Heidegger's phenomenology supports a view on which the fundamental forms of intentional comportment are, at least for the most part, unmediated by mental representations.' (Wrathall, M. (1998) 'Intentionality without representations. Heidegger's account of perception' in *Philosophy Today* Vol. 42, pp. 182-189, p.182). In contrast to this, Carleton B Christensen's interpretation of Heidegger's account of intentionality is that 'Heidegger endorses the traditional idea that the subject always relates to the world via representations, provided the proper understanding of these notions.' (Christensen, Carleton B. (1997) 'Heidegger's Representationalism' in *The Review of Metaphysics* Vol. 51, Nº 1, pp. 77-103, p. 79). For Christensen, Dreyfus' interpretation of Heidegger as a thinker who anticipates contemporary anti-representationalist critiques of representational theories of mind is significantly based on a misconstruction of certain passages of Heidegger's works and on a lack of sensitivity to Heidegger's own intellectual context. (Christensen, Carleton B. (1998) 'Getting Heidegger Off the West Coast' in *Inquiry. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy* Vol. 41, Nº 1, March, pp. 65-87). I think that my analysis of Heidegger's view of modern representations in this thesis could be used to address this debate from a different point of view and I think it right to advance that the most likely outcome of this would give support to Christensen's interpretation.

[642] Ibid., pp. 146-147

[643] Ibid., pp. 147-154

[644] Ibid., p. 154

As Mulhall's analysis shows, Heidegger's view of death illustrates in a clear way what it means that we are inescapably related to nothingness and, at the same time, shows what it means to acknowledge this fact:

> For Heidegger, death is a phenomenon of life; it shows up only in and through life, in and through that which it threatens to render impossible…And insofar as Dasein's life is fated to be utterly nullified by death, Dasein must acknowledge its utter non-necessity – the non-necessity of our birth, of the actual course of our life, of its continuation from one moment to the next. Being-towards-death is thus a matter of living in a way that does not treat the merely possible or actual or conditionally necessary as a matter of fate or destiny beyond any question or alteration – the stance that "das man" exemplifies and inculcates. It means stripping out false necessities – becoming properly attuned to the real modalities of finite human existence.[645]

This means that the acknowledgement of nothingness has an impact on the way we live our lives; it would entail living our lives in a *certain* way. In fact, Heidegger does talk about different 'types of humanity' when referring to the way in which the human being *is*, depending on the way of thinking that determines it.[646] In light of this, I think it sensible to say that the reconnection of representations to sensibility which I suggested earlier as a way of avoiding the danger lurking in the a priori, must correspond to a 'type of humanity' or to a specific way of leading our lives.

I want to suggest that this reconnection of representations to sensibility is in line with Mulhall's view that acknowledging nothingness (death) means becoming properly attuned to the real modalities of finite human existence. This means that an analysis of Division Two of *BT* is revealed as a resource that provides an answer to the question concerning how this reconnection could take place.

[645] Ibid., p. 151
[646] See quotation 573

However, the following question necessarily follows: does not the way in which I have suggested to understand Heidegger's *Kehre* argue against going 'back' to *BT* to look for an answer to the question regarding Dasein's Being?

In chapter five I pointed out that in *MHB* Heidegger claims that the distortions of the truth about beings which goes under the title "metaphysics," calls for a "destruction" of this distortion. But this destruction, he says, 'like "phenomenology" and all hermeneutical-transcendental questions, has not yet been thought in terms of the history of Being.'[647]

I suggest understanding this as an invitation to read *BT* in light of Heidegger's view of the history of Being, and I think that the insight about the danger lurking in the a priori – achieved via this view – could serve to do this. Approaching Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein in *BT* in light of the danger lurking in the a priori could result in disclosing possibilities for understanding ourselves that admit our unavoidable relation to nothingness. This, of course, would also entail acknowledging which issues treated in *BT* were re-thought by Heidegger in different ways after his *Kehre*. But the important achievement would be to get a real sense of Heidegger's analysis in *BT* as a whole by acknowledging nothingness.

Coming back to Heidegger's association between captivity and modern representational thinking I think it compelling to say that the delimiting of modern representational thinking through a reconnection to sensibility is the only way to secure our freedom in our relation to things, insofar as it allows us to be what we are, that is, finite beings. In this sense: limitation frees.

[647] Heidegger, M. *MHB* p. 15

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