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The surprising truth about disagreement

Abstract:
Conciliationism—the thesis that when epistemic peers discover that they disagree about a proposition, both should reduce their confidence—faces a major objection: it seems to require us to significantly reduce our confidence in our central moral and political commitments. In this paper, I develop a typology of disagreement cases and a diagnosis of the source and force of the pressure to conciliate. Building on Vavova’s work, I argue that ordinary and extreme disagreements are surprising, and for this reason, they carry information about the likelihood of error. But deep disagreement is not surprising at all, and token deep disagreements do not put pressure on us to conciliate. However, a pattern of deep disagreements points to a different concern: not the problem of disagreement but the problem of irrelevant influences. Deep disagreement constitutes some pressure to examine the foundations from which we reason, rather than to conciliate on our central moral and political claims.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1007/s12136-020-00437-x

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Division:
HUMS
Sub department:
Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Author


Publisher:
Springer
Journal:
Acta Analytica More from this journal
Volume:
36
Pages:
137-157
Publication date:
2020-06-08
Acceptance date:
2020-05-26
DOI:
EISSN:
1874-6349
ISSN:
0353-5150


Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1107307
Local pid:
pubs:1107307
Deposit date:
2020-05-28

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