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The moral insignificance of self-consciousness

Abstract:

In this paper, I examine the claim that self-consciousness is highly morally significant, such that the fact that an entity is self-conscious generates strong moral reasons against harming or killing that entity. This claim is apparently very intuitive, but I argue it is false. I consider two ways to defend this claim: one indirect, the other direct. The best-known arguments relevant to self-consciousness’s significance take the indirect route. I examine them and argue that (a) in various way...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Author
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Name:
Wellcome Trust
Grant:
104347
Publisher:
Wiley
Journal:
European Journal of Philosophy More from this journal
Publication date:
2017-02-01
Acceptance date:
2016-03-14
DOI:
ISSN:
0966-8373
Pubs id:
pubs:684159
UUID:
uuid:1bd9c58f-df16-4a58-a71b-6fb391274d97
Local pid:
pubs:684159
Deposit date:
2017-03-07

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