"What would there be to create if gods existed".

Nietzsche (1974:111)

Having forsaken all reference to a metaphysics of Social Anthropology as constituting a discrete discursive field, or text, and, more generally, upon releasing the general text which is society from corresponding metaphysical determinants, we are left with (only) those material statements which constitute social intercourse. However, if all appeals to underlying determinant structures and internal dynamics were to be so suspended, how shall we account for the emergence of new discursive fields? Indeed, as an example of such, we might note the relatively recent appearance of Social Anthropology as a field of discourse in some ways separate from the nineteenth century ethnographical and ethnological discourses from which it might be said to have emerged.

We repeat that the set of statements which together constitute, and have constituted, the discursive field, the text, of Social Anthropology, are not to be seen as constituting a text on account of their common subject matter or referent. Other discursive fields contain reference to a number of these objects (see below). The point is made here that there is no set of objects, or concepts, solely by reference to which any statement is rendered particularly social anthropological. This amounts to a re-statement of the supremacy of the text; adds up to a recognition of the primacy of the material statements which together comprise Social Anthropology (see ref. to Paul de Mann, fn. 3 and by 'material' is meant 'supported' in the sense of constituting and occupying a node (locus) within a network of discursive relations (pace Foucault, 1972).

Neither is any suggestion being made that these material statements constitute a discrete set of discursive elements. By which we mean that social anthropological discourse neither emerged, nor is it maintained, as a function of an internal dynamic peculiar to itself. Rather, the discursive field of Social Anthropology itself constitutes and occupies a node within a whole network of discursive relations which together constitute that general text of the social; that general text which is at once the support of anthropological discourse and the proper object of its study.

Following Heidegger, our present enterprise might be seen as the destruction (in the sense of 'de-structuring') of the signified; the de-structuring of that Being, as a set of classificatory features, by reference to which elements of language have been credited with a function of power, have been regarded as sign-ificant. From Heidegger we note, also, that metaphysical thinking has presupposed such a Being, and recognise how subsequent investigations have combined to disguise the active potential of being behind several layers of intelligibility and knowledge. But the con-struction of these layers of information which have provided answers to questions of what Being is, and provided accounts for the fact that Being is, has done no more than substitute an external understanding of Being in place of an acknowledgement of the active capacity of being, i.e. the fact that it is. As a field of discourse dealing with a metaphysical subject

matter, Social Anthropology, particularly in its several 'structuralist' guises, has been profoundly guilty of such concealments.

But what is this active potential which we claim Social Anthropology conceals? It could be said that it is that title itself - Social Anthropology (capital letters and all) - which, by attributing an a priori substantiality to itself (or to that which it signifies), pre-disposes us to assume that all the writings which we might recognise as social anthropological, we recognise as such to the extent that they refer to, or are compatible with, that existent (Being) which is Social Anthropology. Unlike those philosophers arguing in the debate over the existence of God, we cannot accept that Social Anthropology is that One which contains Its own reason for being; Its very essence being Its own necessity.

It has already been pointed out, however, that Social Anthropology is evidenced only as text; as pen, pencil, or type-written marks on paper. The papers, notepads, journals, and books, are but evidence of an activity; they are evidence of, but not signs of, social anthropology. They are the traces of work undertaken; they do not signify a Social Anthropology situated elsewhere.

An analogy with an organic life-form, so effectively used by a founding father of our work, Wilhelm Von Humboldt, can perhaps help to elucidate this point. Regarding a living organism (let us take as our example, a tree) as developing through time, we can take these traces as evidencing this development, thereby enabling a diagnosis of the state of that organism at the instance of those traces. The organism develops, producing new limbs, new branches, new growths; all the while being in an ecological relationship with all other features of its environment. To the extent that this organism is essential for the continuance of this environment, and having such compounded and fundamental relations with all other features, its development must be regarded as a profound and intimate function of the whole. That these traces might be taken naively as enabling merely a diagnosis of the state of the single organism is question would amount to a trivialisation of our procedure, placing unacceptable limits on any diagnosis. (2)

The traces of that activity which is social anthropology, therefore, might enable an historian of academia to construct a history of the development of Social Anthropology (or of social anthropological thought) as a discrete and unitary discipline; but only at his peril. Rather, each statement (trace), whether sentence-length or book, is to be seen as occupying a locus of discursive relations; a nexus of linkages and connections, both intra- and inter-discursive field, which constitutes the proper instance for that particular discursive event (statement).

The Being of Social Anthropology evidences itself in the materiality of text.3. But do these material texts conceal the Being of Social Anthropology? A discipline is Being at rest in unconcealment. The repose of Being is sometimes defended by an appeal to those statements as the bearers of Truth. In such a fashion it is being emasculated; the

impetus of being (verb), and its capacity to overcome
resistance, congeals as an inertia. That inertia is the
resistance presented by Being
        Yet Beings, in our case, disciplines, discursive fields,
and statements, do not exist a priori. They come into Being,
and this through the action of being (verb).""Being' names
this 'that' as the decisiveness of the insurrection against
nothingness." (Heidegger, 1973:I)

The considerable knowledge which constitutes the intel-
ligibility of Being at once both obscures and evidences being.
Being congeals and becomes lost in the 'true', and the Being
of those statements which represent this truth become estab-
lished authorities suppressing all insurrection. And this
after their Being is established by a similar insurrection.
The authority of Being thus represents a reactionary force.
This is the power of inertia, the resistance of the mechanisms
of the customary.

Having emerged through the activity of being, Being
itself becomes an object for study. This constitutes the
field of metaphysics: the largely complementary analyses of
what a Being is and that a Being is. These analyses of what-
ness and thatness represent synchronic and diachronic studies
respectively.

Such investigations should occupy our time no longer.
We must learn to live with them and not allow ourselves to
become concerned with them. The attraction of any investi-
gation into Being is a function of the accptance of the
authority of Being. This authority is the guarantee of Truth
regarding the products of such investigations into Being.
As such a guarantor, Being might rest in the authority of
its own Truth. Concerning investigations into Being, it
has been possible for investigators arriving at different
analytical results to exchange arguments, to demonstrate
their validity, and 'to be right'. Such arguments over the
whatness and thatness of Being have been articulated in an
arena of theoreticism which we have since left. We are no
lomger preoccupied with such debates over our knowledge and
the intelligibility of this authoritative Being, regarding
all such 'knowledge' as obscuring the primitive force of
being; that process of becoming, of coming into Being.

So that our concern lies rather with that very primitive
force of becoming. We must be careful to ensure that our
writings concerning this process of coming into Being are
not confused with those writings of the metaphysician, who
undertakes a diachronic survey in order to account for the
fact that a 'Being' exists. The metaphysicians enquiry is
possible only having first accepted the authority of that
Being. That such an authority has been invested in Being,
might be seen to present the most formidable obstacle in our
path. The problem can thus be stated: to the extent that
Being is attributed with actuality, as That wherein is
situated Authority as the Guarantor of Truth, to that same
extent is being denied its capacity for productive activity,
and as Being occupies the locus of inertia.

"The activity of the actual can be limited to the
capacity of producing a resistance." Whereas we note the
actual to be the completed act or product of an activity, by
'actual' we refer to that Being which is constructed at/s a
node within the general text. Upon coming-into-Being, the

actual (as a crystallisation of prior activity) provides
a foundation for new beginnings; a material point of departure
for subsequent discursive developments.

We are able to outline a certain ambiguity in Heidegger's
statement that "The activity of the actual can be limited to
the capacity of producing a resistance". How can the comp-
leted. act, this end product of activity, which is Being (the
'actual' which has the 'thingness' of 'whatness' and 'thatness')
how can this completed act be seen to exercise that activity
which Heidegger credits it with?

"The capacity of producing a resistance"; but a resistance
to what?

It was previously, if naively, suggested how Being is
allocated a role as arbiter of the truth of successive
statements. This we might take as the Authority of Being; as
that completed Being which operates as the external criterion
of validity for subsequent statements; thereby providing a
security for the complacent.

In what other way might Heidegger's atatement be read?
Does the use of the term 'resistance' necessitate such a
reactive reading?

Making reference to Edward Said's book, Beginnings, we
note that for reasons of material significance there is a
practical necessity to base each new beginning within the
completed act of discursive Being. Only as a correlate to
the accepted materiality of the customary can each beginning be
said to have a material point of departure. With its point of
departure secure, each subsequent development is able to utilise
the energy implicated in the completed act of Being by evoking
a resistance to its own development.
     Hence Derrida in L'ecriture (1967:404)

          "Thus we perceive force in recognising the tension,
          the divided significance of any limiting boundary:
          as the enclosure of a homogeneous system of meaning
          and as the point which necessarily incites the
          transgression of that system."

and again, in De la grammatologie   (1967:25)

          "Within the enclosure itself, by means of indirect
          and always perilous manoeuvres,risking constantly
          a relapse back into what ones intends to deconstruct,
          our task is to encircle the critical concepts with a
          prudent and scrupulous discourse, to note the conditions,
          the context, the limits of their effectiveness, to
          indicate in a rigorous manner their adherence to the
          mechanisms which they themselves will enable us to
          deconstruct."

It would appear that for Said, and to a lesser (if more
obscure) degree, Derrida, the articulation and animation of
these uncircumscribed systems depends upon the intentions of
an author.

We should like Said to indicate more clearly whether his
central notion of 'intention' refers to an author's intention
to produce a foreseen end-product, or to an intention involving
the production of difference, with no concern as to the results.

Does the author need to examine motives and intentions for
producing particular differences, exciting certain resistances,
perhaps unleashing certain destructive energies? Or does
the responsibility lie within discourse itself? We need only
note that, contrary to Enid Blyton, as caricatured by Joyce
Grenfell, books do not 'write themselves'.

It does not appear to be straightforward, nevertheless.
Jean-Pierre Faye certainly appears to place the responsibilities
(and blame) within the procedures of discourse (language-
field). Witness what he has to say (?) in a passage taken
from his monumental monograph Langages  Totalitaires:

> "Action follows on, is only possible within a
> 'language field' (un champ de langage). The
> semantic structures create an empty but prepared space,
> which political action must fill; or they can seal
> off other spaces of alternative political behaviour."

Reviewing Faye's book for the T.L.S. (5 April 1974) an
un-named critic had this to say:

> "What rational sense can be attached to the proposition
> that it is 'the linked series of utterances'(les chaines
> de l'enonciation) which has constituted the 'locus'
> (le lieu) in which, in advance, the Nazi murders were
> possible, justified, and accomplished?"

It would appear that for Faye the limits of our political
action are established by the procedures of semantic structures
within a 'language field'. What we should like to know, if our
behaviour is so pre-determined, is what are the criteria to
which these semantic structures appeal in deciding which
'semantic spaces' to create and which to 'seal-off'. It
might well prove  to be an instructive exercise to plot the
beginnings and subsequent development of that discursive
procedure which created the semantic space within which
"the Nazi murders were possible, justified, and accomplished."
But such an academic exercise would be as speculative as its
arguments and associations would be tenuous. Like the
statistician who relates the state of the United Kingdom
'balance of payments' to the average midnight temperature
on the island of Muckle Flugga. What we would rather invest-
igate are the control mechanisms, the several limitations on
the 'acceptability' of various beginnings; the procedures
whereby one potential development is selected and allowed
to create its semantic space, whereas other discursive act-
ivities are, in some way, disallowed.

Two obvious and external criteria in relation to which a
selection can be accomplished are, the availability of
financial backing, and the presence of physical opposition or
defence [4]. In both cases it is the author with intention
who is to be encouraged  or otherwise. But by that time the
initial selection has been made.

It seems as though from an infinite number of possible
beginnings the author has selected the one he has selected.
Why? We might be led  into inquiring why the beginning
selected by the author appeared to him 'more imperative'
than the others.

(We recognise the importance of Derrida's warning:

> "Within the enclosure itself, by means of indirect
> and peri_ous manoeuvres, risking constantly a relapse
> back into what one intends to deconstruct,....")

This question is raised bacause I feel it demonstrates, quite adequately, the import of Derrida's warning, rather than that it presents a substantial problem. In any discursive development which aims at the deconstruction of a previous language field it is re-emphasised that the beginnings of such a development are given a material ground within the completed act of discursive Being; i.e. "(W)ithin the enclosure itself"; within the language field which is th* object of that discursive development. But that language field is at once the object of Peconstruction and the means by which that deconstruction will take place.
(Derrida:

> "....our task is to encircle the critical concepts
> (and) to indicate in a rigorous manner their adherence
> to the mechanisms which they themselves will enable
> to deconstruct.")

Hence the risk of a relapse "back into what one intends to deconstruct". We shall observe how the imperative question which might be answered only in the form of an explanation of why one discursive development rather than another constitutes (invites) such an opportunity for relapse.

Questions relating to the origins of Beings tend to be answered by making appeal to that (or those) eing (s) which 'existed' prior to that Being under question. Thus appeal is made to concepts of causation and history; evidence is provided in order to situate this Being (existent) as the contemporary representative of an evolutionary or developmental process; as the effect of       *ings (as cause).

But such questions are based upon the false assumption that phenomenological evidence of Being is of the primitive nature of Being; rather, it is proposed that prior to that evidence of Being, there is developed a necessity of Being. This necessity is referred to as the ground of Being. Hence Leibnitz: "Thus every possible being can be said to strive to exist."

Our question regard.ng the 'selection' out of possible discursive developments, now becomes directed towards the distinction between 'possibility' and 'necessity'. Why, from amongst the 'possibles' is one seen as 'necessary'; as representing the 'imperativeness of the structure'? In this we detect an echo of Foucault's criticism of linguistics; that having accepted a notion of e.g. grammatical competence, of an infinite number of immanent well-formed strings, no account is offered, nor as yet demanded, of why any one of these strings should be 'realised', should break through the 'threshold of materiality', rather than any other string. Appeals to contexts will not help as this simply implies a sub-language, the grammar for which retains a smaller, yet still infinite, competence.

As a generality we are able to state that the 'necessity' of Being (along with the possibility of Being(s)) is 'generated', rather, 'developed', by the activity of being, prior to the evidence of Being presented to the philosophical subject. And it is in this sense that we understand the concept of materiality.

A statement (which presupposes materiality) is an articulation
of the ground. That ground is constituted by, is contempor-
aneous with, those relations which are produced by the articu-
lation of that statement in its materiality. The statement
does not fill a prepared space, neither does it represent the
construction of a material edifice upon an area made fit before-
hand. In this we might be seen to differ from Faye.

Yet we note that Faye claims that it is the 'semantic
structures' which do the selection and this is certainly
more in keeping with the general theme of this thesis. It
is as though our category 'discourse' is, in some as yet
obsure fashion, its own criterion of developmental selection;
"that within the 'general text' mechanisms operate which,
in their own particular instance appear to exercise a power
of veto and engender some function of necessity". Such a
discourse is a process without criteria. We hear Foucault
admonishing us to consider only those statements which have
been articulated in their material instance. Foucault's
admonition might be contrasted with Heidegger (1973:40)
"What is possible previously determines what is real" and
"soon they let this origin become completely forgotten".
No effort must be wasted on determining which other 'accept-
able' statements might have been articulated. Our concern is
with statements and in using this term we assume materiality.
Neither will it be of value to provide explanation, nor give
reason, why one statement was articulated rather than other
apparently possible, and what would appear, equally probable
statements. Such an investigation would place us back in
that area of metaphysics which was concerned with the pro-
vision of accounts of whatness and thatness. The fundamental
importance of Heidegger's writings can thus be demonstrated
in the subsequent writings of contemporary critics such as
Derrida, Foucault, Faye, and Said.

We can perhaps summarise by saying that Being is the
crystallisation of the activity of becoming-into-Being. This
is equally the case whether we refer to the Being of a state-
ment or to the Being of an academic discipline. We note
further that the activity of 'becoming' is the proper sense
of the verb 'being'. The completed act which is Being presents
a resistance in two senses of the term. It can assume an
Authority-of-Being (what is actual) regarded by some as the
guarantor of Truth. In this it invites complacency and
self-satisfaction to those who see themselves as in possession
of the Truth. Yet it also provides that essential point of
departure; that material resistance which provides a ground
(Ur-grund) for new beginnings, for new activities of being.

If one were to credit discourse with an internal dynamic;
regard it as exemplifying an 'organic', as opposed to an
imposed 'technical', or analytic, form, then by analogy
(or to the extent that 'society' is a variable, dependant
upon discourse as a free variable), society must be recognised
as containing its own dynamic. Humboldt and Heidegger both
appear to identify the site of this linguistic (sc. discursive)
activity as the functioning of several declensions, in the
sense of a falling away from a standard.

Yet by 'standard' there is no wish to imply a reference
to some normative state situated in either a mythical or an
historic past; nor yet to any theoretical category of 'language'.

On the contrary, though not immediately recognisable as such,
by 'standard' I refer to an idealised state of affairs within
discursive development; any synchrony (pace Saussure); any
idealised stage represented by the relative positions of the
pieces in Saussure's chess board analogy. However, contrary
to Saussure, we propose that the 'value' (valeur) of any
piece depends on the possible positions which that piece
might occupy at its next move, and the state of the board
which such a move might anticipate. Not that the state of
the board at any moment in the game is a notion which might
be ignored. Such an idealised 'state' we might take as
representing that 'norm', or 'standard', which both Humboldt
and Heidegger declared constitutes that from which these
various declensions originate. Yet to accept this would
constitute a compromise.

Again we recognise the true magnitude of Derrida's
warning:

> "Within the enclosure itself, by means of indirect
> and perilous manoeuvres, risking constantly a relapse
> back into what one intends to deconstruct...."

<div align="right">(1967:25)</div>

(It is as though the whole weight of argument conspires to
urge us to take that prior theoretical category of 'language'
as the normative, or standard, from which actual articulated
linguistic performance deviates; we shall constantly be in
danger of reverting back to that security offered to the
complacent; for ever aware that that same Being which provides
the necessary resistance to any departure will also provide
both relief and accolade for those faint-hearted who either
choose or are deceived into reposing in Truth's authority.)

Within linguistic studies, since Saussure, the distinction
between la langue and la parole is generally accepted as being
of the very nature of the object of linguistic study, viz.
language. Coinciding with the acceptance of such a distinction
has been the demand to regard la langue as the proper object
of linguistic enquiry. Yet historical studies have tended to
focus upon phonological matters, which, alongside both semantic
and syntactic investigations, have been largely restricted
to the comparison of two or more stages of development.
Evidence for such development is gained upon a consideration
of recorded linguistic performance, i.e. at the 'level' of
la parole. There is no contradiction here, and it is necessary
to demonstrate such.

The distinction between la langue and la parole is no
more than a statement regarding the 'form' of any natural
language.

It is a statement which is:

> "...in itself independent of any experience. In
> itself, it says nothing at all about the possibility
> of its application and relation to experimental data.
> It includes no existence postulate. It constitutes
> what has been called a purely deductive system, in
> the sense that it may be used alone to compute the
> possibilities that follow from its premises."

<div align="right">(Hjelmslev, L:1953:8)</div>

This distinction, between _la langue_ and _la parole_, consists
of the fewest and most general premises. In many ways it
might be said to correspond to Chomsky's distinction between
_competence_ and _performance_? In that such a linguistic theory
need make no reference to recorded linguistic performance there
is good reason to suppose that any such linguistic theory is
_arbitrary_. (ibid.1953:8) Similarly Chomsky proposes a
linguistic theory based only on such formal assumptions
as he feels are necessary for the construction of an adequeate
grammar for any natural language. Contrary to the arbit-
rariness of both Saussure's and Chomsky's linguistic theory,
a grammar (which is a theory of a particular language) must
be _appropriate_,i.e. it must provide a sufficient account of:
"all and only those utterances which a competent native
speaker would recognise as being grammatically well-formed".

Many grammars might be constructed, and be sufficiently
justified to the extend that they account for, not only those
recorded sample data of _performance_(la parole), but also
the competent native speaker's intuition of well-formedness
(_la langue - competence_)

> "In this sense, the grammar is justified on _external_
> grounds, on grounds of correspondence to linguistic
> fact."
>
> (Chomsky, 1965:27)

It is precisely in the matter of principles, of those
'fewest and most general premises';to the extent that a
grammar, as a theory of a particular language, is based
upon those 'formal assumptions', that a grammar is said to
be justified on _internal_ grounds. A grammar which is
justified on internal grounds must demonstrate its own
possibility as reflecting or as deducible from those
fundamental premises which constitute a linguistic theory.

It should not be necessary to point out that linguistic
theories such as proposed by Saussure and Chomsky, which
make statements regarding the nature of the object under
investigation, and which are situated 'out of time', are
timeless. It may not be so widely accepted that in theories
of language such as composed by Saussure and Chomsky respect-
ively, the categories of _la langue_ and _competence_, are
similarly ahistoric. This point was made by Hjelmslev:

> "The calculation permits the prediction of possibilities,
> but says nothing about their realisation."
>
> (Hjelmslev, 1953:9)

and has been articulated more recently by Ardener:

> "Such models are in themselves 'timeless', or neutral
> in regard to time - achronic."
>
> (Ardener, 1971:210)

So that, in no way, could it be said that _la parole_ (performance)
is but an element, or example, of _la langue_ (competence).6
_La langue_ (competence)comprises those lexical items, the set
of rules allowing for their various combinations, and a
device which will enable a semantic and phonetic representation
of such combinations to be realised. _La parole_ (performance)
on the other hand, is precisely those realised representations.

To suggest, therefore, that a contradiction pertains between
la langue and linguistic performance (la parole), evinces a
misapprehension. La langue (competence)and la parole (per-
formance) are of a different order and thus not comparable
in this fashion; the one is abstract and atemporal, the
other is recordable as an event in an historical instance;
on the one hand we might refer to a purely theoretical
'systematic, on the other hand we are confronted with a
material, and hence, significant object. We must also bear
in mind that statements which either constitute linguistic
theories, or comment upon the same, are situated within
the category la parole. We would feel more justified in
situating the origin of the category la langue within
la parole, than we would in seeking the grammatical
'history' of la parole within la langue

The acceptance of la langue as the proper object of
linguistic enquiry, and the necessity of considering la
parole when undertaking historico-comparative studies, does
not constitute any contradition. Such assumptions and
procudures do raise various obstacles however, and, sub-
sequently, these must be addressed. But the claim that there
was a contradiction at issue here is discredited and we must
conclude this aside and return to our main argument.

It will be remembered that we left unsolved those
problems relating to the selection of particular discursive
developments from amongst the plethora of possibilities.
But to address ourselves to this probelmatic would be to
surrender our effort, and to enjoy the satisfaction and
compacency proper to those engaged in providing account of
the metaphysical history of Being. Corresponding to our
decision to consider only material statements,7 we must
necessarily abandon those enquiries which aim to demonstrate
what 'might have been said' in their place.

With the recent nullifying of the apparent contradiction
engendered between the categories of la parole and la langue,
our criticisms of Linguistics might be situated more specifically.
Providing account of a purely theoretical and ahistorical
systematic will, in no way, provide detail of the emergence
of a statement in that material instance proper to it.
Working within the boundaries set by such a timeless automaton,
it is surely impossible to provide adequate account as to
how its own phenomenal existence, and those theoretical
categories proper to itself, came to emerge at that historical
conjuncture at which it did.

A claim is made that discourse is the essential process
of becoming-into-Being; that this process is the very nature
of discourse. It has been proposed, however, that any
discursive development requires a material point-of-departure
in the Authority-of-Being. There appears to be yet another
paradox here. If the essential nature of discourse is that
of becoming -into-Being, where then is that Being which
provides that point-of-departure, which is to be regarded as a
function of the trace left by that discursive activity?
We propose that discourse is the very activity of producing
those traces which evidence that activity. There can be no
discourse except it leaves a trace. (It is the elucidation
of such traces in the subconscious, that constitutes the
problematic of psychoanalysis. For example, see Derrida:
'Freud and the scene of writing'. In Y.F.S.) An 'understanding'

of the trace left behind by that activity constitutes the
Being from which that development will proceed.  The activity
of writing, for example, is thus a constant-moving-away-from
-Being; an articulation, which we regard as the corollary of
the production of a trace, might be described as the attempt
to escape that Being, which congeals immediately behind that
activity.  This constitutes a resistance, a tension, between
the articulation (speaking or writing) and the becoming-into-
Being.  Like Lot's wife, a suspension of activity and a
retrospective glance in search of verification, will pre-
cipitate a collapse of that tension which is the essential
characteristic of that activity which is discourse, and will
precipitate a calcification of that activity into Being.


NOTES.

1.  By 'founding father' we simply refer to the one who
occupied the site at which the development of being (verb)
overcomes the resistance offered by the boundaries of that
Being (noun).  The impetus of the activity of being event-
ually necessitates, and so constitutes, an insurrection
against the Authority of Being.  This insurrection is
energised from within that Being which it displaces.
Institutions have the essential function of maintaining the
Being of a discursive formation.  Thus, no reference is made,
nor implied, to any category of 'creative subject' or 'genius'.

2.  A reference to homeopathic medicine.  Contemporary
medicine is concerned only to suppress individual symptoms,
whereas the homeopathic practitioner considers the state of
affairs of the patient as a whole.

3.  Paul de Mann has this to say about history, a subject
which we recognise as having much in common with social anth-
ropology.
      "To become good literary historians, we must remember
that what we usually call literary history has little or
nothing to do with literature and that what we call literary
interpretation - provided only it is good interpretation -
is in fact literary history.  If we extend this notion beyond
literature, it merely confirms that the bases of historical
knowledge are not empirical facts but written texts, even
if these texts masquerade in the guise of wars or revolutions."

                              Paul de Mann;'Literary history and
                              literary modernity.'In Daedalus:
                              Theory in Humanistic  Studies. 1970.

4.  Marxists have no difficulty in providing such accounts.
For example:-
      "(I)t is clearly necessary to think the history of
discursive events as structured by material relations embody-
ing themselves in institutions."

                              Dominique Lecourt: Marxism and
                              Epistomology; 1975:195.

5.  There is, however, at least one major sense in which
Chomsky's competence:performance couple differs from that of
Saussure's la langue : la parole distinction.  This difference
evinces the historicity of the respective theories.  Working
within the volkgeist of late 19th.-early 20th. century France,

Saussure situated la langue in le consentement collectif,
i.e. as a social fact. Chomsky, in an increasingly liberal,
Post-War America, proposes that competence is a function of
the individual's bio-chemical constitution.

6.   It is worthy of note, however, that any theory of language
(which is a theory of la langue, or competence) must be founded
upon an initial consideration of linguistic performance.
Thus, as a footnote to p.14 in Syntactic Structures, Chomsky
writes: 'Notice that to meet the aims of grammar,..., it is
sufficient to have a partial knowledge of the sentences....
of the language, since a linguistic theory will state the
relation between the set of observed sentences "and the set
of grammatical sentences; i.e. it will define 'grammatical
sentence' in terms of 'observed sentence,' certain prop-
erties of observed sentences, and certain properties of grammars.
To use Quine's formulation, a linguistic theory will give a
general explanation for what 'could' be in language on the
basis of 'what is plus simplicity of the laws whereby we
describe and extrapolate what is'. (W.V.Quine, 1953:54)"
Thus it can be argued that Chomsky offers us a 'performance'
model, but of an extended type.

7.   The qualification 'material' is here redundant, as by
'statement' we assume materiality.

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