

Moving Muslims: The Great Northwestern Rebellion and the Transformation of Chinese Islam, 1860-1896



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I, Hannah Theaker, confirm that this thesis, submitted for examination at the University of Oxford, is my own work and that it has not been previously submitted to this institution nor any other in application for a degree.

Abstract

This thesis explores the history of an empire's attempt to remake its Muslim subjects. The reconstruction process that followed the Great Northwestern Muslim Rebellion (1860-1874) was a highly ambitious project of social engineering that strove not to resurrect the antebellum order, but to transform the entire northwest. Governor-General Zuo Zongtang proposed the resettlement of thousands of Chinese Muslims (Hui) away from their Han Chinese neighbours, on the grounds that separating the two groups was the only way to ensure that violence would not reoccur.

Based on extensive archival research using a local Qing county archive combined with gazetteers, Muslim histories, interviews and stele from local areas, this thesis opens with a revisionist history of the role Sufi paths played in the 18th century extension of Qing empire into Gansu's Sino-Tibetan fringes. Whilst the Sufi paths were politically dominant in He-Huang prior to the Great Northwestern Rebellion, the reconstruction period fundamentally changed the structures of everyday life and governance. The new clusters of Muslim settlement and rise of generation of military elites in the postbellum period produced the conditions for a religious revival which ultimately ended the political role of Sufi lineages in borderland life and created the conditions for the arrival of currents of Islamic reformism in China. This outcome is the product of the complex interplay of a new nationalism with older Qing ideas of empire and ethnicity, and of the local, half-implemented reconstruction project that remade the Gansu-Qinghai social world in unanticipated ways. The legacy of the resettlements, however, lives on in the process of minoritization it catalysed: Muslims in China today are considered an entirely separate ethnicity from the Han. Overall, this thesis describes two parallel arcs: the rise and fall of China's Sufi paths and the rise of the Muslim nationalist military lineages, who would become the Republican-era 'Muslim warlords'.

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No clear impressions, either from above or from without, can be received by a mind turbid with excitement and agitated by a crowd of distractions. The stillness needed for the clear shining of light within is incompatible with hurry.

Caroline Stephen, 1834-1909

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First and perhaps most importantly, I would like to thank my supervisors. Professor Henrietta Harrison has been a patient inspiration throughout this project, quietly guiding my thought and writing to the next level: I could not have asked for a better supervisor, and only hope I can do her training justice. Dr. Matthew Erie's knowledge of the field and expertise have been invaluable in helping me strategically frame and position my work, always guiding me to consider the bigger picture. Before them, thanks also to Dr. Laura Newby and Dr. Anthony Garnaut, whose twin influences have shaped this project from its callow beginnings as the pipedream of a student who simply wished to go back to Gansu.

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Dedicated to the memory of Roy Millward, 1919-2016.

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Conventions and Abbreviations

All terms in Chinese are transcribed in pinyin, with the exception of names better known in alternatives (i.e. Sun Yat-sen). Tibetan is given in Wylie, and Manchu using Möllendorf, after the fashion of Jerry Norman. Chinese characters are given the first time a name or term appears in the text. I have followed Wang Jianping's transcriptions for Arabic and Persian terms.

A short glossary covering Chinese Islamic terms, and vocabulary for Qing administration (including Tibetan) is given at the front of this dissertation for convenience of the reader.

Charles Hucker's *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China* was used as a reference for translation of titles.

The Salar surname 'Han' 韓 has been transcribed as 'Hann' to avoid any possible confusion with the ethnonym 'Han' 漢.

A shared surname does not indicate a familial relationship, unless clearly indicated. The preponderance of individuals with the surname 'Ma' (馬) in this dissertation means that in places I have elected to refer to individuals primarily by their given names for sake of clarity.

I have chosen to anonymise interviewees and correspondents throughout this dissertation, in view of the worsening political situation. In places where a person's status or ancestry was relevant to our discussions, I have attempted to indicate this without disclosing details that would immediately identify them.

Archival Abbreviations

FHA – First Historical Archives of China, 中國第一歷史檔案館

QHDG – Qinghai Archives 青海檔案 collection of memorials from the Xunhua Archives

QSGC – Qing History Project database of items from the Xunhua Archives, 清史工程, National Project for the Compilation of Qing History Library, Beijing

NPM – National Palace Museum of Taiwan, memorials from the Qing Palace Memorials and Archives of the Grand Council database 清代宮中檔奏摺及軍機處檔摺件

Glossary

Ahong (*ahong* 阿訇、阿洪 or *ahun* 阿渾) – derived from the Persian *ākhund*, ‘Islamic teacher’ and is generally translated as ‘imam.’ In Northwest China, it is a general title for Muslim clerics and those who have completed madrasa education to college level. A *kaixue ahong* (開學阿訇) is the cleric employed to direct the religious affairs of a mosque, and who will accept students (*khālifa*, *manla*)

Baojia (保甲) – Decimal community household registration and mutual self-defence system, sometimes with tax collecting functions. Officially, under the *baojia*, ten households were arranged into one *pai* (牌); every ten *pai* made a *jia* (甲); and every ten *jia* a *bao* (保)

Bonan (C. Bao’an 保安) – Ethnic group who speak Mongolic language, Muslim, resident mostly near Jishi in Hezhou. Formerly residents of Bao’an (保安) near Rebgong, they were forced out during the Great Northwestern Rebellion. The non-Muslim half of the former linguistic community, known as the Tu (土), remain in the Rebgong valley.

Dhikr – (*jike’er* 即克爾; *qike’er* 齊克爾) an important Sufi ritual, a repeated invocation in praise of Allah, often comprising a repeated chant of Allah’s names performed as a group. Gansu Sufis historically were divided by their advocacy of a loud dhikr (the dhikr al-jahri) or a silent/low tone dhikr (the dhikr al-khafi)

Khufiyya (*hufuye* 虎夫耶) – A sub-order of the Naqshbandiyya, and one of Ma Tong’s Four Great Teaching Schools. The name derives from the Arabic *khufi* (khafi), meaning silent, hidden or concealed. Khufiyya groups are known for their adoption of the silent dhikr, as opposed to the loud dhikr of the Jahriyya. The Huasi, Mufti, Beizhuang, Humen, Xianmen and Hongmen are all primarily Khufi brotherhoods.

Kouhuan (口換) – Arabic *ijaza*, permission or oral transmission of succession and responsibility from shaykh to his chosen successor. The term normally implies a face-to-face encounter, although it can also happen in dreams. It also is used to denote the sanction of the community: the authenticity of a *kouhuan* can be challenged.

Gong (工) – Units of Salar administration, groups of villages centred on a great mosque. There were eight Salar gong prior to the 1781 Rebellion, reduced to 8 after it.

Gongbei (拱北) - derived from the Persian, *gumbad* “dome”. As used in the northwest, it generally refers to a tomb complex dedicated to a Sufi master, and are key ritual sites for menhuan worshippers.

Han kitab (*han ketabu* 漢克塔布) – corpus of Islamic texts either translated into Classical Chinese or composed in it, which use Confucian, Daoist and Buddhist terminology to expound Islamic teachings. Often referred to as a synthesis of ‘Islam and Confucianism’. The first texts in this tradition were composed in the late 16th century, and peaked during the mid-18th century. Particularly important to the Xidaotang and Mufti.

Huasi (華寺、花寺) – one of the principle Khufiyya Sufi paths discussed in this thesis. Founded c.1730s

Ikhwan (*yihewani*, 伊赫瓦尼) – Chinese transcription of the Arabic *ikhwān*, brothers. Reformist teaching school, broadly Wahhabi inspired and explicitly anti-Sufi, founded c.1890s by Ma Guoyuan (馬果園). Rose to prominence during the Republican-era thanks to the sponsorship of Muslim governors in Qinghai.

Jahriyya (*zheherenye* 哲赫仁野; *zhehelinye* 哲赫林野) – A sub-order of the Naqshbandiyya and one of Ma Tong's Four Great Teaching Schools. The name derives from the Arabic *jahar*, to speak aloud or declaim, referring to their practice of loud recitation of the *dhikr*, sometimes accompanied by head-shaking and movement through the body. Labelled the 'New Teaching' (新教) during the 1781 Rebellion of Su Forty-Three, suppressed after it.

Menhuan (門宦) – Chinese Sufi paths, tariqa. See Introduction.

Mufti (穆夫提) – one of the principle Khufiyya Sufi paths discussed in this thesis. Founded c.1670s.

Qadīm (C. gedimu 各迪目) – from the Arabic for 'old', this term refers to the traditional, mosque-based communities of Chinese Muslims. Hanafi and Sunni.

Salar (C. 撒拉) – Muslim ethnic group who speak a Turkic language, settled around Xunhua.

Dongxiang – (C. Dongxiang, 東鄉) – Muslim ethnic group who speak a Mongolic language settled in the hills in Hezhou's eastern district.

Tusi (土司) – lit. 'local office'. Hereditary titles given to non-Han headmen or leaders by both Ming and Qing rulers. In exchange, the *tusi* were to supply troops when needed and permit passage through their lands and co-operate with imperial representatives. The subjects of a *tusi* did not pay land tax, owed fealty directly to their headman, and were in effect in a different legal category from Chinese commoners

Xiangyue (鄉約) - lit. village covenant, village officials tasked with the maintenance of public order. They were quasi-official, and served in place of legal institutions below the level of the magistrate

Xidaotang (西道堂) – Hall of the Western Way. Taozhou-based *menhuan* founded in the late 19th century, commune-like in structure.

Xiejia (歇家) – hereditary government runners and collectors of the grain tax from Tibetan groups in Xunhua subprefecture

Xieyi (歇役) - hereditary government runners and collectors of the grain tax from Tibetan groups in Xunhua subprefecture

Zhangjiao (掌教) – teaching-holder, imam

Zong zhangjiao (總掌教) – head teaching-holder, head imam

Dramatis Personae

Unless explicitly indicated otherwise, a common surname should not be taken as an indicator of a blood relationship.

Dong Fuxiang 董福祥 1839-1908 – Han rebel who was incorporated into Zuo's armies and became known for leading the Muslim brigades known as the 'Kansu Braves'

Ma Anliang 馬安良, 1855-1918 – son of Ma Zhan'ao, who inherited his father's military positions and became one of the most important political figures in the northwest in the early twentieth century

Ma Fulu 馬福祿, 1854-1900 – son of Ma Qianling, father of Ma Hongbin. Military commander who died defending the gates of Beijing during the Boxer Rebellion

Ma Fuwang 馬福旺, d. c.1900? – uncle of Ma Zhan'ao, important Muslim negotiator in Tibetan disputes

Ma Fuxiang 馬福祥, 1876-1932 – son of Ma Qianling, important military leader through late Qing and Republican eras who held posts in Qinghai, Ningxia, Suiyuan and Anhui. Strongly connected to the GMD

Ma Guoliang 馬國良, – second son of Zhan'ao, brother of Anliang. Ahong and military leader.

Ma Haiyan 馬海宴, 1837-1900 – father of Ma Qi and Ma Lin, grandfather of Ma Bufang. Military leader who served under Ma Zhan'ao and went on to serve the Qing, died defending the gates of Beijing during the Boxer Rebellion

Ma Laichi 馬來遲, c. 1681-1751 – founder of the Huasi order

Ma Mingxin 馬明心, 1719-1781 – founder of the Jahriyya order

Ma Qianling 馬千齡, 1826-1910 – military leader who served under Ma Zhan'ao from Hann Family Market. Qianling may have also been a descendant of Ma Laichi. Father of Ma Fuxiang and Ma Fulu.

Ma Rubiao 馬如彪, d.1896 – son of Ma Yongrui, reformist Huasi shaykh

Ma Wuzhen 馬悟真, – Dongxiang leader and spiritual leader within the Beizhuang order, served under Ma Zhan'ao

Ma Yonglin 馬永林, d.1895 – descendant of Ma Laichi of the same generation as Yongrui and hereditary custodian of the Huasi gongbei

Ma Yongrui 馬永瑞, - descendant of Ma Laichi of the same generation as Yonglin and hereditary custodian of the Huasi gongbei, fought alongside Ma Zhan'ao

Ma Zhan'ao 馬占鰲, 1830-1886 – ahong who rose to prominence as a military leader in Hezhou during the 1860s rebellions and went on to serve the Qing

Ma Zhankui 馬占奎, 1858-1950 – son of Ma Fuwang, cousin to Zhan'ao. Served in the military and prominent in the wood trade.

Zuo Zongtang 左宗棠, 1812-1885 – Qing commander, originally from Hunan, who rose to prominence fighting the Taiping and was later entrusted with reconquest of the northwest

Introduction

On the 22nd October, 1936, the Yuhai County Muslim Autonomous Government (豫海縣回民自治政府) was founded in Tongxin Great Mosque, Ningxia Province (寧夏同心清真大寺). *Red China* (紅色中華) proclaimed this event under the headline ‘Muslims Organise Their Own Government, Implement Soviet Government’.¹ Earlier that year, Mao (毛澤東), Zhou Enlai (周恩來) and Yang Shangkun (楊尚昆) had telegraphed Peng Dehuai (彭德懷) and other Communist leaders, reminding them that ‘The Party Central Committee has decided that the basic principle of Muslim work is Muslim self-determination.’² The Muslim Soviet proclaimed on the 22nd was the practical realisation of this statement, and as the first autonomous minority nationality county established under CCP ambit, it set a vital precedent for future ethnic policy.³

Yuhai County Muslim Autonomous Government lasted less than a month before it was disbanded by the Guomindang. Moreover, it has not been judged a success as an experiment. Despite claims to the contrary made by the CCP, Muslims did not flock to the cause of autonomy, and the Communists failed to attract the support of leading clerics.⁴ Why, then, did the Communists assume that this was the correct way to appeal to Chinese-speaking Muslims? That Muslims would require special consideration was taken for granted by seemingly all parties in 1936. As Edgar Snow, who was present through the Tongxin episode observed, the offer of self-government was naturally appealing to Muslims as it ‘had been their demand for many years.’⁵ Some twenty-five years before Snow in the wake of the Xinhai Revolution, newspapers reported the dispatch of Muslim gentry mediators to the northwest to placate (宣慰) the Muslim

¹ 回民組織自己的政府，實行蘇維埃政府，*Red China* 紅色中華，22nd October 1936, Issue 307.

² 中央決定回民工作基本原則是回民自決。Telegram quoted in Qiu Wangjun 仇王軍, *Yuhai xian hui min zizhi zhengfu chengli shimo* 豫海縣回民自治政府成立始末 [*The Establishment of Yuhai County Muslim Autonomous Government*], (Ningxia: Ningxia renmin, 2009), 65.

³ Beyond Qiu’s work on Yuhai County, there is comparatively little scholarship on the Yuhai County Muslim Autonomous Government. What there is tends to treat it in terms of the evolution of party minority policy, securely within the annals of Chinese Communist history. See, for instance, Bu Qinghu 布清滬 and Lu Weicheng 陸維成, *Zhongguo minzu qu zizhi shijian de mengya – Zhonggong lingdao jianli Yuhai xian huimin zizhi zhengfu zhi tanxi* 中國民族區自治實踐的萌芽 – 中共領導建立豫海縣回民自治政府之探析 [*Regional Autonomy of Ethnic Minorities in China: A Probe into the Hui Autonomous Government of Yuhai County under the Leadership of the CCP*], *Zhonggongdang shi yanjiu* 12 (2012), 94-100.

⁴ See Włodzimierz Cieciora, ‘The Crescent and the Red Star: Hui Muslims and Chinese Communism in a Historical Perspective,’ *Dálný Východ*, 4, no. 1 (2014): 6–21.

⁵ Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China: The Classic Account of the Birth of Chinese Communism*, New edition. (New York: Grove Press, 2018), 316.

population there and head off calls for separate political representation.⁶ Meanwhile Chinese Muslim intellectuals debated faith, identity, and how they related to Islamic political participation through the pages of the journals that flourished throughout the Republican period.⁷ The assumption made by the Communists at Yuhai – that Muslims were different and that their needs could not be accommodated within a system that did not reserve specific niches for them – was not a new one.

It is entirely possible to see the Communist promise of autonomous, separate government to the Muslims of Tongxin as merely a cynical ploy. However, shifting to the global context, CCP promises of autonomous government for Muslims were made precisely as Muhammad Ali Jinnah was in the process of building the Mumbai house where the Partition of India would be negotiated. Communal rioting had engulfed the city, forming the spur that propelled Jinnah back to active leadership of the All-India Muslim League.⁸ The League of Nations, meanwhile, had become in the words of Laura Robson ‘a massive experiment in demographic engineering’. Based on the idea that physical separation could ensure viable states the League of Nations resettled Armenians into Syria and European Jews to any empty space available.⁹ The international project to ‘stretch the short, tight skin of nation over the gigantic body of empire’ was creaking at its seams, as administrators sought desperate solutions to the modern requirement that the minority be protected from the majority.¹⁰

Cemil Aydin has identified the 1870 – 1930s period as crucial for the formation of the concept of a ‘Muslim world’, a term too often still bandied around

⁶ News digest beginning ‘Proposal to Exhibit Qing Emperor’s Jade Seal’ 議以清帝玉璽作為陳列品, *Dagongbao* Tianjin edition 大公報天津版, 1912/04/02.

⁷ There has been a recent wealth of excellent scholarship exploring the Chinese Muslim intellectual movements and their relationship to both Chinese nationalism, Islamic internationalism and global politics. See John T. Chen, ‘Re-Orienting The Chinese Azharites between Umma and Third World, 1938-55’, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 34, no. 1 (1 January 2014): 24–51; John Chen, ‘Islam’s Loneliest Cosmopolitan: Badr Al-Din Hai Weiliang, the Lucknow–Cairo Connection, and the Circumscription of Islamic Transnationalism’, *ReOrient* 3, no. 2 (2018): 120–39.; Włodzimierz Cieciora, ‘Ethnicity or Religion? Republican-Era Chinese Debates on Islam and Muslims’, in *Islamic Thought in China: Sino-Muslim Intellectual Evolution from the 17th to the 21st Century*, ed. Jonathan N Lipman (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016); Noriko Unno-Yamazaki reminds us that not everything is about faith and country, Noriko Unno-Yamazaki, ‘Cutting off the Queue for Faith, Preserving the Queue for Face: Chinese Muslims’ Queue-Cutting Movements in North China during the Xinhai Revolution Period’, *Asian Studies* 6, no. 1 (2018): 11–31.

⁸ Meena Menon, ‘Chronicle of Communal Riots in Bombay Presidency (1893-1945)’, *Economic and Political Weekly* 45, no. 47 (2010): 68-70.

⁹ Laura Robson, *States of Separation: Transfer, Partition, and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2017), 6.

¹⁰ Benedict R. O’G Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991), 86.

unproblematically in reference to the perceived unity of global Muslims.¹¹ In Aydin's analysis, the 19th century saw both an imperially-driven racialization of Muslim-ness, in conjunction with intellectual Muslim resistance to empire which creatively utilised ideas of Muslim unity, producing a narrative of Muslim exceptionalism which remains all too vivid within contemporary Islamophobia.¹² Seen from a wider perspective, Mao's offer of autonomy to the Muslims of Tongxin was a local articulation of an emerging global discourse that othered Muslims.

However, some sixty years before Mao arrived in Tongxin, the Qing empire had conducted its own massive experiment in demographic engineering. In the wake of the Great Northwestern Muslim Rebellion, c. 1862-1874.¹³ In the wake of the violence, Qing commander Zuo Zongtang (左宗棠) embarked on a programme to ensure that war would not reoccur, firstly by resettling Muslims away from non-Muslims and secondly through a planned programme of transformation designed to render them less problematically Muslim, at least from a public, administrative perspective. This dissertation is concerned with the consequences of those resettlements. It is an exploration of a structural relationship between the Qing and its Muslim subjects in the specific context of the Sino-Tibetan borderlands of Gansu and Qinghai, and the manner in which this was transformed by the Great Northwestern Rebellion.

It is my contention that the aftermath of the 1860s rebellions aided the construction of an opposition between Han Chinese and Chinese Muslim (*Hui* 回), a binary which has been given precedence in subsequent understandings of the history of Muslims in China. Hence, in latter-day accounts that emphasize the sinicization of

¹¹ Aydin makes a distinction between the idea of the 'Muslim world', as a concept specific to modernity, and the ummah, as the religious community of Islam.

¹² Cemil Aydin, *The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2017), 1-13.

¹³ In Chinese, it is either referred to as the Tongzhi-period Muslim Rebellion (同治回亂) or the Righteous Uprising of the Shaanxi and Gansu Muslims (陝甘回民起義). In English it is occasionally also known as the Dungan Rebellion, 'dungan' (東干) being a term of obscure origin used to refer to Chinese Muslims and particularly the Chinese Muslim population in Xinjiang, where it serves to distinguish them from the local Turkic Muslim population. It is now specifically used for populations of Chinese Muslims who settled in parts of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan after they had fled the rebellion and its subsequent repression in Shaanxi and Gansu. A parallel rebellion occurred in Xinjiang in the same time period, leading to the establishment of a short-lived state under Ya'qub Beg. That rebellion is not directly linked to events in Shaanxi and Gansu, although they share many of the same causes. For an examination of the rebellion, see Ho-dong Kim, *Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-1877* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2004); for its consequences see Eric T. Schluessel, 'The Muslim Emperor of China: Everyday Politics in Colonial Xinjiang, 1877-1933' (PhD, Harvard University, 2016).

Chinese Muslims and the possibility of accommodation between 'Islam' and 'China', it is this interpretative paradigm they seek to challenge.¹⁴ I am exploring an alternative narrative for the creation of Aydin's Muslim world, far from the Ottoman intellectual centres. The post-rebellion attempt to physically separate Muslims from Han brought Chinese Muslims into administrative focus and established the fact of their difference. The attempt was not successful, but the response to its half-implementation by the Muslim communities of the northwest alongside the precedent it created laid the foundations for the creation of the modern Hui minority (回族) within the ethnic categorisation framework of the PRC. Rather akin to the response to the 1857 Indian Rebellion, also defined as a specifically Muslim event, the response to the Great Northwestern Rebellion confirmed a process of minoritization.¹⁵

To explore the rebellion and its impact, this dissertation explores the arc of the rise, institutionalization and subsequent fall of the Sufi paths (c. *menhuan* 門宦, A. *tariqa*) active in Gansu province. Sufism entered Gansu alongside the Qing, became institutionalized as the Qing expanded into Gansu's Sino-Tibetan borderlands, and was at the forefront of early Qing encounters with Muslims. Some two hundred and fifty years later, the repercussions of the 1895 He-Huang Rebellion (C. 乙未河湟起義) – itself a consequence of the way northwestern Muslim society had changed following the earlier Great Northwestern Rebellion – ended the temporal power of the institutionalized Sufi paths. Their arc provides the entry into this topic, a way to assess what came before the great rebellion and how the northwest was transformed in its wake.

The Great Northwestern Rebellion ultimately remade the Islamic communities of the northwest, but not in the way that was envisaged by the Qing authorities. The limits of state knowledge and the process of reconstruction drew state officials into the village, but left them reliant on a new generation of military Muslim elites, forged in the revolution and now reborn as Qing officials.¹⁶ Meanwhile, the logic behind the reconstruction itself was predicated on an idealised model of static, nuclear rural

¹⁴ See, for example, Dru C. Gladney, 'Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism?', *The China Quarterly*, no. 174 (2003): 451–67.

¹⁵ Ilyse R. Morgenstein Fuerst, *Indian Muslim Minorities and the 1857 Rebellion: Religion, Rebels and Jihad*, International Library of Colonial History; 24 (London: IB Tauris, 2017).

¹⁶ There are parallels in the formation of defence militias and the subsequent incorporation of their gentry leaders into Qing governance, the contrast here is the elites the Qing were working with in Gansu rose to prominence fighting against the state, rather than for it. See Philip A. Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1980).

communities, where movement between locales was the exception rather than the norm.¹⁷ The nature of the borderland economy precluded this – as it always had – and as the fulcrums of the trading networks into Amdo and beyond, Muslims in fact profited under the resurrected regime. The need of local officials for the economic and political connections of those leaders made them indispensable, drawing them into a Qing embrace and transforming the position of those leaders within their own communities. This paved the way for a transformation of Islamic practice in those same communities, ultimately driving out the Sufi *tariqa* which had dominated northwestern politics pre-bellum, in favour of a new generation of reformist Muslim nationalists.

In essence, I have gone searching for the afterlife of a rebellion that has been deliberately forgotten within the communities it devastated: its remembrance suppressed until it has all but eroded away. The Qing reconstruction after the rebellion built tombs and shrines to the martyred Han dead across Gansu and Shaanxi, thereby inscribing a particular, proto-nationalist understanding of what the rebellion had been into the ritual networks of Qing officialdom. Republican-era constructions of Muslims as part of a Chinese nation largely side-stepped the awkward questions posed by the issue of earlier communal violence, highlighting instead the sinification of Islam in China and the contributions made by Muslims to China.¹⁸ Under the PRC, this elision has continued: despite the formal identification of the rebellion as an anti-imperial peasant uprising, the Great Northwestern Rebellion is not taught in school textbooks. It is remembered only in certain contexts, time and places: in the Tibetan communities forced up the slopes by Salar attacks, the Chinese Sufi traditions whose self-understanding was reconstructed around the rebellion experiences of dispossession, among the resettled

¹⁷ In this respect, I am engaging with a long tradition of studies exploring both Qing conceptions of locality in central China, the complex economic domain that in fact existed, and the influence of such notions on governance. See Hsiao Kung-chuan, *Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century*, Far Eastern and Russian Institute Publications on Asia ; No. 8 (Seattle ; London: University of Washington Press, 1960)., or latterly Yongtao Du, *The Order of Places: Translocal Practices of the Huizhou Merchants in Late Imperial China*, Sinica Leidensia ; Volume 119 (Leiden: Brill, 2015).on the translocal identity of merchants as far back as the Ming. Likewise, Dear explores Qing conceptions of 'livelihood' in structuring approaches to the late imperial Mongolian economy. Devon Margaret Dear, 'Marginal Revolutions: Economies and Economic Knowledge between Qing China, Russia, and Mongolia, 1860 - 1911' (Harvard University, 2014).

¹⁸ See, for instance, Bai Shouyi 白壽彝, *Zhongguo Yisilan jiao shi gangyao* 中國伊斯蘭史綱要 [*Essentials of the History of Islam in China*] (Shanghai: Wentong shu ju, 1948). Bai did also write extensively on Muslim rebellions, but in general his framework emphasizes these as part of wider Chinese anti-imperial movements and the suffering born by Muslims as a result. For a systematic examination of the way in which Hui studies in China has attempted to deal with the twin poles of Chinese and Islamic identity, see Zvi Benite, 'From "Literati" to "Ulama": The Origins of Chinese Muslim Nationalist Historiography', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 9, no. 4 (2003): 83–109.

Shaanxi Muslims and in the Islamophobia still found in non-Muslim communities of the Hexi Corridor.

The next sections of this introduction give a brief overview of relevant literature, an introduction to sources and the specific locality this dissertation addresses, and an introduction to the Chinese Sufi paths known as *menhuan*.

Searching for Chinese Muslims

Some twenty-five years ago in his field-defining study, Dru Gladney drew forth the debate over the oddness of the classification of Sinitic-speaking Muslims as a separate ethnicity, or in the parlance of pre-1980s CCP ethnic policy, as a 'minority nationality'.¹⁹ The Yuhai promise of autonomous government for Muslims likewise remains at least theoretically enshrined in modern PRC policy in the definition of Chinese Muslims as the Hui ethnic minority (*Huizu* 回族), and the network of Hui autonomous provinces, prefectures, counties and townships in areas of dense Chinese Muslim settlement.²⁰ The 1950s minority nationality (*minzu* 民族) identification campaigns which formed the basis of the formal state ethnic categories used today in China drew on the Soviet notion of the 'four commons': common language, common territory, common economic life and a common culture.²¹ The other Muslim nationalities recognised in China match the Soviet Central Asian model reasonably neatly, being groups with their own language, concentrated in a single locality or region. Chinese-speaking Muslims, known as the Hui (回), do not. Encompassing the Chinese-speaking Muslims and a few non-Sinitic groups that fell through the anthropologist's net, the Hui as a group are united only by a memory of identifiably Muslim ancestors.²² Gladney thus identified a process of ethnogenesis around interaction with the state census categories:

¹⁹ See Dru C. Gladney, *Muslim Chinese : Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic* (Cambridge, Mass ; Cambridge, Mass: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University ; London, 1991).

²⁰ See Matthew Erie has noted the legacy of the Yuhai Muslim Autonomous Government in the existence of Islamic publishing houses in Ningxia – and certain policy innovations. See Matthew S. Erie, *China and Islam: The Prophet, the Party, and Law*, Cambridge Studies in Law and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 291.

²¹ Dru C. Gladney, *Dislocating China: Reflections on Muslims, Minorities and Other Subaltern Subjects* (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2004).

²² The question of whether it is possible to be Hui without being Muslim ignites significant controversy within modern Hui communities. Northwestern Hui communities are often extremely devout, whereas in some communities the only trace of Islamic observance that remains is a taboo on the eating of pork. See David Stroup for a recent study of relationship between religious practice and ethnic boundaries. David R. Stroup, 'Boundaries of Belief: Religious Practices and the Construction of Ethnic Identity in Hui Muslim Communities', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 40, no. 6 (3 May 2017): 988–1006.

‘with regard to the Hui, where once there were Muslims interacting as co-religionists, the state identified, institutionalized and, in short, invented a nationality.’²³

The struggle to create a Chinese nation from the fractured pieces of the Qing empire has been extensively, exhaustively debated across the twentieth century and into the present. Both scholars and political reformers have questioned the content of a Chinese identity, the relationship of the majority Han to non-Han and the creation of law and policy relating to minorities within the modern state.²⁴ The overarching nature of this debate has engulfed much writing by Chinese Muslims themselves and scholarship dealing with Muslims in China since the early twentieth century. Prior to Gladney, Lattimore noted the artificiality of the Chinese-Muslim binary – the logic that says that Chinese and Muslim identities are not compatible, and that a Chinese Muslim must forever justify their identity as either Chinese or Muslim depending on their interlocutor.²⁵

Separateness is taken for granted with Chinese Muslims. Jonathan Lipman titled his magnum opus of northwestern Chinese Muslim history ‘Familiar Strangers’, a title both memorable and compelling. It captures that sense of difference and portrays an image of a people apart, those with whom one shares a physical space but with whom

²³ Lest this sound overly reductive, Gladney emphasizes Hui agency in pushing for definition as a minority and self-examination around the definition of the census category as crucial components in the ethnogenesis process. Gladney, *Muslim Chinese*, 17.

²⁴ A brief, non-exhaustive list: Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1996). Peter Zarrow, *After Empire : The Conceptual Transformation of the Chinese State, 1885-1924* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012); Henrietta Harrison, *The Making of the Republican Citizen: Political Ceremonies and Symbols in China 1911-1929*, Studies on Contemporary China (Oxford, England) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Edward J. M. Rhoads, *Manchus & Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861-1928*, Studies on Ethnic Groups in China (Seattle ; London: University of Washington Press, 2000); S. A. Smith, *Like Cattle and Horses: Nationalism and Labor in Shanghai, 1895-1927*, Comparative and International Working-Class History (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001). Scholarship within the PRC tends to locate the formation of a Chinese identity significantly earlier than the fall of the Qing, often arguing for 2000 years of continuous culture and for the sinicization hypothesis. For influential takes on this thesis, see Fei Xiaotong 費孝通, *Zhonghua Minzu Duoyuan Yiti Geju* 中華民族多元一體格局 [*The Pattern of Unity in Diversity of the Chinese People*] (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu xueyuan, 1989). Ge Zhaoguang gives a recent, sophisticated historical take focusing on perceptions of China in Ge Zhaoguang 葛兆光, *Zhai zi Zhongguo: Chongjian youguan ‘Zhongguo’ de lishi lunshu* 宅茲中國：重建有關“中國”的歷史論述 [*Here in China I Dwell: Reconstructing Historical Discourses Concerning ‘China’*] (Taipei: Lianjing, 2011). In English on the Sinicization thesis see Ping-ti Ho, ‘In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski’s “Reenvisioning the Qing”’, *The Journal of Asian Studies* 57, no. 1 (1998): 123–155.

²⁵ Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia; Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia*, 1st ed.] (Boston: Little, Brown, 1950), 119.

one does not interact.²⁶ There is a good deal of truth in this portrayal, especially within contemporary China where a significant proportion of the population has little understanding or experience of what it means to be Muslim, let alone how that might relate to the experience of being Hui. Gladney and Lipman have both argued in various ways that the Hui in contemporary China function as an institutionalized other, whilst David Stroup has catalogued the ways in which proximity does not necessarily produce meaningful engagement in his recent studies of the workings of everyday ethnicity.²⁷

The term 'Hui' is now seen as a term so implicated in the modern *minzu* system that it can no longer be disentangled from that institutional context. Indeed, there is an entire school of *minzu* studies (民族學; 'folk studies') within China dedicated to writing the history of each *minzu*, assuming an ahistorical continuity of identity. Modern folk etymologies often suggest that the term Hui derives from the alternative meaning of the same character, 'to return', implying the foreign origins of the Chinese Muslim population and their descent from Muslim merchants who had arrived during the Tang.²⁸ More accurately, the word is derived from Huihe (回鶻), originally a reference to the Uyghur Khaganate (c. 744-840). The original Uyghur Khaganate were not Muslims, being Manichean and Buddhist, and were a Turkish federation based in Mongolia, who migrated south into northern Gansu and Turfan. Islam arrived in the Tarim Basin during the 10th century with the Kara-Khanids, eventually displacing Buddhism almost entirely, often by violence. By the Yuan dynasty, 'Huihui' (回回) had come to refer to all Muslims as large numbers of Central Asian Muslims moved into China.²⁹ By the Qing, 'Hui' as the

²⁶ The title is likely derived from Stanley Milgram's 1972 paper, *The Familiar Stranger: An Aspect of Urban Anonymity*, a study which analysed the phenomenon of the people we recognise, but to whom we never speak: the commuter with whom one shares a bus each morning, the walker whose path crosses yours like clockwork. Stanley Milgram, 'The Familiar Stranger: An Aspect of Urban Anonymity', in *The Individual in a Social World: Essays and Experiments*, Addison-Wesley Series in Social Psychology (Reading, Mass; London: Addison-Wesley, 1977), 51-53.

²⁷ Gladney, *Dislocating China*; Stroup, 'Boundaries of Belief'; Jonathan N Lipman, *Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China* (Seattle; London: University of Washington Press, 1998).

²⁸ This can be highly pejorative. In one folk story telling of the origin of the Hui, originally from Linxia, the name originates from a pun made by the Tang Emperor. In the tale, Wan Gars had arrived in China as a missionary, and received permission from the emperor himself to stay and teach. On hearing that Wan was homesick and wished to leave, the Emperor responded 'Go tell that returner (Hui) he may leave in another month, when the weather improves.' Of course, Gars chose to stay. The story does not explain the pun: Wan Gars in other stories is identified as Huihe (回紇). Shujiang Li and Karl W. Luckert, *Mythology and Folklore of the Hui, a Muslim Chinese People* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 247.

²⁹ The distinction between Huihe and Huihui did not get entirely elided: Kwangmin Kim notes that Ming scholars and some Qing scholars drew clear distinctions between Huihe and Huihui. Kwangmin Kim, 'Saintly Brokers: Uyghur Muslims, Trade, and the Making of Qing Central Asia, 1696--1814' (Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, 2008), 14-17.

short form of 'Huihui' had come to mean 'Muslim', although understandings of what Islam was and the connections between different populations of believers continued to vary widely. Distinctions between different kinds of Muslim remained in contexts where disambiguation was necessary: 'turbaned Muslim' (*chantou Hui* 纏頭回) for Turkic Muslims in Altishahr, Salar Muslim (*sala Hui* 撒拉回 or *fan hui* 番回) for the Turkic-speaking Salars of Qinghai, and Han Hui (*Hanhui* 漢回) for Sinitic speakers.³⁰

Usages of 'Huihui', 'Hui' and 'Huijiao' (回教, lit. teaching of the Hui, Islam) were not entirely stable in their connotations nor usage. In the hands of some writers it implied a sense of religious affiliation, distinguished from *Fojiao* (佛教; teaching of the Buddha) and even occasionally *Hanjiao* (漢教, teaching of the Han). In the hands of others "Hui" is a descent category indicating an ethnic identity of a sort, those descended from Muslim traders who had settled in China during the Tang and Yuan.³¹ Written with a dog radical, "Hui" could be an insult implying a lack of civilization and proper governmental structure. Even without the radical, for some writers the earlier association of the name with a Turkic nomadic federation inevitably meant barbaric and foreign.³² For the writers of the Han kitab, a corpus of Islamic texts written in Chinese across the late Ming to mid-Qing, the use of 'Hui' was both a self-identification and a defence of their beliefs. Adding to the confusion, the Tarim basin was known throughout the Qing period as the 'Muslim regions' (回部 or 回疆). Following its annexation in 1762, the Qianlong Emperor formally recognized the Hui as one of the constituent peoples of the Qing empire, complete with attendant imperial sponsorship of a mosque beside the Forbidden City.³³

³⁰ As an example of the importance of not reading categories backwards, failure on the part of modern scholars to identify 'Hanhui' as a category, instead reading as 'Han and Hui' leads to errors – instances where scholars have concluded that the Qing banned marriage between Han and Hui: in fact, they banned marriage between Turkic Muslims and commoner subjects, including Han Hui.

³¹ David G. Atwill, *The Chinese Sultanate : Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856-1873* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2005).

³² The writing of 'Hui' with a dog radical was outlawed by the Qianlong Emperor in official correspondence from 1775. See Ma Haiyun, 'New Teachings and New Territories, Gansu 1700-1800' (Ph.D., Georgetown University, 2007), 160.

³³ The project paralleled Qianlong's built representations of his empire at Chengde, and also showed a very strategic understanding of the overlapping meanings of "Hui". See Tristan Brown, 'Towards An Understanding of Qianlong's Conception of Islam: A Study of the Dedication Inscriptions of the Fragrant Concubine's Mosque in the Imperial Capital', *Journal of Chinese Studies* 53 (2011): 137–53; Takahiro Onuma, *250 Years History Of The Turkic-Muslim Camp in Beijing*, TIAS Central Eurasian Research Series ; 2 (Tokyo: Dept of Islamic Area Studies, Center for Evolving Humanities, Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology, The University of Tokyo, 2008).

In short, parsing the connotations of 'Hui' in the hands of an individual writer requires care and attention, particularly during the nineteenth century where ideas surrounding the quality and importance of ethno-religious identification were changing rapidly. Debates concerning the nature of Chinese Muslim identity predate the nineteenth century, and I am not suggesting that either Chinese Muslims entirely lacked a group identity prebellum, nor that Islamophobia is entirely a creation of modernity. This is not a straightforward account of how the essentializing straitjacket of the nation has resulted in modern ethnic violence where the looser coalitions of empire allowed for diversity. Nevertheless, there is a distinct narrative underpinning how China arrives at the point in 1936 where it is accepted, fairly unproblematically, that the idea that Muslims require separate political representation must be taken seriously.³⁴

In exploring the lived experience of Muslims in pre- and post-bellum Gansu, and in the changing relationship between Islam and the Qing empire, this dissertation is particularly concerned with 'Hui' as it was used by Qing administrators, for whom it was primarily a legal designation.³⁵ As Lipman has stated, administratively speaking Muslims in the interior were legally Han: subject to the same anti-miscegenation laws as Han and likewise required to wear the queue. In effect it was an evolving subcategory of the legal category of 'Han', as represented orthographically in the Qing legal code (大清律例). Each headline statute represented a legal principle, qualified by sub-statutes which gave interpretation and specifics. It is in these legal statutes that specific regulations against Hui were added across the 18th and 19th centuries.³⁶ Within the specific area addressed by this dissertation, however, multiple legal codes were in operation and the distinction between Han and Hui was not always as important as that between Han and Mongol (蒙), or Han and Fan (番; 'Tibetan').³⁷ In areas where it was

³⁴ There were, of course, extensive debates about whether ultimately this was necessary, and the nature of Chinese Muslim identity. The key fact is that the idea had to be taken seriously.

³⁵ It is worth noting that Muslims were not always labelled Muslim. Statutes mandating more severe punishment for Muslims were only used in certain crimes. Likewise, note the difficulty of securely identifying Muslim officials. There were large numbers of Muslims in the Ming military, many of them in high positions: many of these would have ended up in the Green Standard armies. There were Muslims who passed the palace examinations (進士), but securely identifying them as Muslim is normally only possible via circumstantial evidence, or their private writings. See Yang Daye, *Ming Qing Huizu jinshi kaolue* 明清回族進士考略 [Study on Ming and Qing Muslim Graduates of the Palace Examinations] (Ningxia: Ningxia renmin, 2011).

³⁶ See Jonathan N Lipman, "'A Fierce and Brutal People': On Islam and Muslims in Qing Law", in *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China*, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton, Studies on China ; 28 (Berkeley, Calif; London: University of California Press, 2006), 83–112.

³⁷ Oidtmann has argued at length that *fan* 番 in Qing legal codes should not be translated simply as 'Tibetan', as it referred to a number of groups who were not straightforwardly Tibetan.

the only other category, it became the opposite to Han, the other tick-box category. The slow evolution of what it meant to be Hui seen over the timespan examined in this dissertation, the debates over inclusion and exclusion, over descent, over mobility and rights, over precisely what that identity encompassed were anchored by the legal meaning of Hui as a class of people for whom sometimes – but only sometimes – the laws were different. The fluid nature of the category, its ill-defined state, make it precisely an imperial project of the Ann Laura Stoler kind.³⁸

This thesis looks to join a recent literature exploring the lasting scars of war, that seeks to explore the consequences long after the last gunshot was fired, and a second literature working on histories of rebellion and minoritization. It was inspired by the historical anthropology of Tobie Meyer-Fong, whose study of the Taiping Rebellion highlighted what that cataclysm meant for those who lived through it and gave a sense of its lasting impacts.³⁹ The Great Northwestern Rebellion, which lies at the heart of this dissertation, is part of the same civil war moment Meyer-Fong explores: a series of interconnected ruptures that transformed nineteenth-century China. Yet in the decision taken in Gansu to blame that cataclysm on one section of the population, it had consequences that much previous scholarship has neglected, as Muslim rebellion and Muslim particularity are taken as givens defined at a much earlier historical point.

The body of work loosely described as ‘New Qing’ scholarship has emphasized the high Qing maintenance of ethnic separation between the constituencies of empire as both a key characteristic of Qing imperial ideology and a necessary construction for the success of the empire.⁴⁰ This dissertation examines the postbellum re-articulation of

Moreover that the term Tibetan is misleading, given the modern associations of the word with a nationalist Tibetan consciousness. Max Oidtmann, ‘Overlapping Empires: Religion, Politics, and Ethnicity in Nineteenth-Century Qinghai’, *Late Imperial China* 37, no. 2 (2016): 41–91.

³⁸ Ann Laura Stoler, ‘On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty’, *Public Culture* 18, no. 1 (2006): 125–146.

³⁹ Tobie S. Meyer-Fong, *What Remains: Coming to Terms with Civil War in 19th Century China* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013).

⁴⁰ For debates concerning the development of Qing imperial ideology and the construction of ethnic categories, see, particularly, Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1999).; Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way: the Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001). Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton, *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China*, Studies on China; 28 (Berkeley, Calif; London: University of California Press, 2006). It is worth noting that the broad tendency to conceptualize different categories of people as best governed separately and in separate spaces did not preclude attempts on the part of Qing officials to transform social structures where it was deemed this would governance easier; encouragement of Han settlement and assimilationist policies were pursued in a number of arenas, and particularly towards peoples not recognised as one of the five constituencies of empire, namely Manchu, Han, Mongol, Tibetan, and Muslim. For a concise account of tensions between different policy approaches in

that same ideology of ethno-spatial separation, in other words, the manner in which old tenets gained new significance, articulated specifically in the idea that Muslims must be spatially segregated from Han. In the post-civil war era, following the state identification of the war as a specifically *Muslim* rebellion, Qing officials directing reconstruction became committed to ensuring that Islam would be henceforth removed not just from the immediate vicinity of the Han, but from public life entirely. The resettlement of population was intended to both separate population groups and to regularise the administration of Muslim villages to bring them in line with an implicitly interior, Han Chinese norm. The plans thus involved the creation of physical spaces effectively designated as being for Muslims, coupled to an intent to dismantle the structures of variegated sovereignty that had previously linked mosque communities to Qing officialdom at the lowest level.⁴¹ They lacked the resources to actually achieve these ends, and in the area this study addresses, in fact ended up supporting a new generation of Muslim military elites who held their own transformative agenda. However, the manner in which they failed nevertheless left both a policy legacy and is indicative of late Qing reconceptualization of place, space and ethnicity.

Sources

This dissertation rests on materials drawn from the archives of the former Qing empire, complemented by gazetteers, private writings of officials and travellers, stele records, a variety of Muslim histories, published and unpublished, and the surveys made by the author over the course of six months spent in Gansu and Qinghai.

Of central importance to this project are the Xunhua County (循化廳) archives, portions of which I was able to access courtesy of the Qing History Project (清史所), China Renmin University (中國人民大學) and through the generosity of a various colleagues.⁴² The extant archive runs to some 100,000 documents in Chinese and

action, see Donald S. Sutton, 'Violence and Ethnicity on a Qing Colonial Frontier: Customary and Statutory Law in the Eighteenth-Century Miao Pale', *Modern Asian Studies* 37, no. 1 (1 February 2003): 41–80., for Qing colonial policy in Amdo post 1724 see Max Oidtmann, 'Between Patron and Priest: Amdo Tibet Under Qing Rule' (Ph.D., Harvard University, 2014); Ma Haiyun, 'New Teachings and New Territories, Gansu 1700-1800'.

⁴¹ This process has obvious parallels with the policy turn in Xinjiang towards incorporation and encouragement of assimilationist policy in post-rebellion Xinjiang. There is, however, a clear point of distinction in the spatial separation advocated in Gansu and Shaanxi, in contrast to the late advocacy of migration into Xinjiang. See James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang* (London: Hurst, 2007).

⁴² I owe a particular debt to colleagues at Renmin University for their assistance. Likewise to Professor Yang Hongwei 楊紅衛 of Lanzhou University and Professor Max Oidtmann, of Qatar Georgetown. Likewise to Professor Yang Hongwei of Lanzhou University, and Max Oidtmann, of Qatar Georgetown.

Tibetan, making it among the largest extant collections for a single Qing dynasty county. The Xunhua County archives constitute a source body of rare richness for the study of a Sino-Tibetan borderland.⁴³ Furthermore, the archive itself is an institutional memory defined by the 1860s rebellions. As the yamen was burnt in 1865, the vast majority of its holdings date from 1870 – 1911. In its diverse holdings, including petitions, legal investigations, tax records, censuses, and even materials from local educational initiatives is to be found a history of the logic of reconstruction, of structured remembrance and of the manner in which He-Huang was remade. The archive itself is a deliberate reconstruction of Xunhua's history, for the postbellum world.

Despite the attempt to weave sources together and to read them against the grain, the people in my dissertation appear most often through the institutional contexts in which they were seen. That is where they met the archival record, and hence my dissertation is constrained by that institutional vision. This dissertation derives also from an absence, namely the invisibility of the everyday lives of Chinese Sufis in the historical record. The Sufi tariqas of Gansu have been read as anti-state, rebellious, and as organisations that fundamentally run against the grain of the archive and the state. It is undeniably true that the moments in which those tariqas are most visible in the official record are the moments in which they are in contravention of social norm or Qing authority. Those moments produce an explosion of documents, a flurry of reports, a brief encounter all-too-often followed by a massacre. This dissertation has attempted to see Sufi tariqas not as latent potentialities of violence, but as part of the everyday structuring of borderland life. The arc of this dissertation is formed by the story of their rise and fall: the manner in which Gansu changed in the late nineteenth century, ultimately removing the space wherein they operated.

As a dissertation specifically exploring the experiences of Muslims within the post-1870s moment of reconstruction, I have sought to draw on a range of non-archival sources. Extensive fieldwork has allowed me to collect a range of locally published Muslim histories and mosque publications, to visit the villages mentioned in this dissertation, and to conduct interviews with elders from Salar, Tibetan, Han and Hui communities. Cross-hatching this work with generations of anthropological fieldwork allows at least an understanding of the modern context of Gansu's Sufi traditions, and I

⁴³ The Xunhua County archives have to date have been utilised by the merest handful of researchers. My own work is heavily indebted to the insights made by my predecessors, most notably Yang Hongwei 楊紅衛, Max Oidtmann and Wes Chaney. This dissertation would not have been possible without the foundations laid by their work, and their generosity as scholars.

have sought to carefully sift from the modern traditions keys to understanding their past. Thus I have sought to uncover something of the context in which the archive and the edited narratives of Qing memorials spoke, allowing access to alternative visions of space, place, time and person.

There is a certain irony to the fact that I am trying to enter a world of traditions which have been utterly transformed over the last century, whilst most sources discussing the history of those same Sufi paths have only become available in the last twenty years. Idries Shah, author of *The Sufis* and among the first people to write Sufism for a western audience, noted that 'We cannot say that such and such a ritual, such and such a book, incarnates Sufism. We start with human, social and literary material that both is incomplete (because now unaccompanied by the living exemplar, the teacher) and secondary, in that it is only partially absorbed.'⁴⁴ Many Sufis, of course, would say that their traditions are simply incomprehensible to outsiders. To a certain extent, that is precisely the point of Sufi paths as institutions. It is the initiation into the mystery that binds the whole together.

For Gansu, it is often the case that neither the books nor the physical shell of the paths at the heart of this thesis no longer exist, whilst the ritual, social and human side has been transformed utterly by the last hundred and fifty years. Whilst a number of pre-Cultural Revolution mosques survive in Qinghai and Gansu, I have not as yet located even a single *gongbei* (拱北, P. *gumbad*) which survived the Cultural Revolution.⁴⁵ The Sufi paths that are still active in Gansu today claim an inheritance from the past. They depend on the connections of blood and bone through time that are in effect the physical manifestation of the shaykh's mastery. Their adherents would be greatly offended by the notion that these are not the same traditions that held sway in nineteenth century Gansu, and in one sense, they are absolutely correct. The Sufi paths have transformed themselves. They have reinterpreted their past for a modern context, and they have sought to find new ways of belonging within a present avowedly Communist and

⁴⁴ Idries Shah, *The Sufis* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969), xxiv.

⁴⁵ 'Gongbei', a term used to refer the tomb and surrounding shrine of a Sufi master, is derived from the Persian *gumbad*, meaning 'tomb' or 'dome'. They are focal points for the activities of Sufi paths in China, and most of the larger paths comprise a network of gongbei. Typically, gongbei complexes feature a cupola dome with layered eaves below over the tomb itself and are often of significant height. Whilst the graves themselves are generally simple, the shrine walls are often lavishly carved and the eaves covered in glazed tiles. Shrine compounds will generally feature a garden, and perhaps an adjacent mosque for convenience of visitors.

atheist.⁴⁶ Listening to the modern tales they tell of themselves, and sifting them for details of their past history has required a sensitivity to this transformation: although the outline of the stories has stayed the same, the balance between the elements in the stories has shifted.

As, in some senses, with all histories, this is a history partly of how history becomes history. It is a history wherein my own inspiration for writing it lies partly in the omission of the narratives I found from the mainstream historical record. In doing so, like the tariqas of Gansu, I am connecting past to present. I am favouring certain pasts in arguing that they have been systematically neglected. It also serves to note the things that this dissertation is not: for the most part, this thesis is not a reconstruction of the spiritual life of Gansu's Sufi menhuan. This is not to deny the validity of that spiritual life, more to stress the inability of this researcher to access that register. I am a scholar largely of Qing local history, and my work is shaped by this. This dissertation is largely concerned with habitus and its transformations: the role Sufi tariqa played in the organisation of social life, and the manner in which they have been shaped by interaction with the Qing state. Latterly, it is concerned with Muslim responses to the transformation of borderland life postbellum, and impetuses toward reform. The Sufi tariqas of southern Gansu did not vanish wholesale post the 1895 Rebellion, nor did the meaning they carried for their followers abruptly vanish. However, 1895 marks an end to their power as political forces and social movements and hence is where this dissertation marks their fall.⁴⁷

He-Huang and Taoxi

He-Huang (河湟) and Taoxi (洮西), the two regions discussed in this thesis, must themselves be considered sources. Their geographies, and in particular their settlement geography, formed a touchstone for my encounter with archival histories of displacement and rebellion. The selection of this particular region as a way into discussing the changing relationship of Islam and empire was determined partly by the

⁴⁶ Garnaut explores this adaptation of Sufi path to Communist present through analysis of Zhang Chengzhi's (張承志) *History of the Soul*, a remarkable work in which Zhang, a former Red Guard, comes to terms with his Jahri heritage. Anthony Garnaut, 'Pen of the Jahriyya: A Commentary on *The History of the Soul* by Zhang Chengzhi', *Inner Asia* 8, no. 1 (1 January 2006): 29–50.

⁴⁷ The Jahriyya, who by the late nineteenth century were based primarily in eastern Gansu and Ningxia, form a partial exception to this trend. They weathered the anti-Sufi storm of 1895 with grace, and shaykh Ma Yuanzhang was a figure of significant authority until his death in 1921. See Anthony Garnaut, 'The Shaykh of the Great Northwest: The Religious and Political Life of Ma Yuanzhang (1853-1920)' (Ph.D., Australian National University, 2010).

availability of sources, an area of dense Muslim settlement, with an extant local archive. However, more significantly, the area is home to the spiritual centres of almost all Sufi paths in China and likewise, the Muslim warlords who dominated Republican era politics in northwest China all came from this one area. As this dissertation shall explore, neither of these occurrences can be considered coincidence. Moreover, it is a classic borderland, a space of overlap, interaction and mobility, within which imperial policy was made.



Fig. 1 Research area within political boundaries of the Qing Empire. Map credit Hannibal Taubes.

This dissertation has been first and foremost a work of local history, drawing extensively on sources rooted in the locality – written or told in reference to those places.¹ Qing maps reveal official conceptions of where boundaries lay, networks of Sufi shrines show the connections across those boundaries. Satellite pictures taken in the 1960s, prior to Cultural Revolution-era demolitions, provided a sense of the shape of communities which have now lost their walls and spilled out over their earlier bounds.² This provided a means to track the location of mosques and *gongbei* in certain key settlements, as their orientation towards Mecca renders them instantly visible from above. Sacred geographies here provide a key to more mundane geographies. A mosque located inside the walls signals a Muslim-dominated community, *labtse* (places consecrated to particular local mountain gods) mark the boundaries of Tibetan villages, whilst walls and yamen mark the institutions of the state.

This dissertation is animated by Appadurai's conception of 'process geographies', his idea of 'an architecture for area studies that... sees significant areas of human organization as precipitates of various kinds of action, interaction and motion – trade, travel, pilgrimage, warfare, proselytization, colonisation, exile and the like'.³ Appadurai argues for this conception of geography – in effect landscape and settlement as the precipitates of various sorts of movement – in opposition to the concept of a 'trait geography', wherein areas are defined by their coherence in terms of particular traits, be the trait chosen language, economic activity or whatever else. The trait in question, then, is too often taken to be fixed and static, an approach that sees boundaries between trait areas as ahistorically enduring. As explored in Chapter One, this dissertation is focused on connections across boundaries, and the development of boundaries now taken as

¹ Although there is little by way of wider recollection of the Great Northwestern Muslim Rebellion – no Gansu-wide consensus – memory of the rebellion and its effects survives in effect in isolated pockets. Individual families remember tales, resettled villages remember their resettlement. There is little sense of how these individual stories fit into a wider drama that played out across Shaanxi and Gansu, but the stories are there. For the researcher, however, it is a frustrating experience trying to gather such tales – it requires significant effort to collect and piece together those that are still told.

² It would merit further investigation, but it seems that the settlement geography of western Gansu was transformed in the immediate post-bellum period, and then remained broadly stable until the Communist takeover. There are, of course, exceptions to this pattern, but following careful reading of the archive this appears true for Hezhou's western districts at the very least. Satellite images accessed from US declassified Corona data, <https://earthexplorer.usgs.gov/>, accessed May-September 2018. For an introduction to the images see 'Declassified Intelligence Satellite Photographs', Report, Fact Sheet (Reston, VA, 2008), USGS Publications Warehouse, <https://doi.org/10.3133/fs20083054>.

³ Arjun Appadurai, 'Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination', *Public Culture* 12, no. 1 (2000): 7.

inevitable: the linkages between nomadic and agrarian economies, the opposition between Muslim and non-Muslim.

He-Huang and Taoxi are defined by their rivers: the copper curls of the Yellow River (黄河, T. rma chu), the flat green valleys of the Huangshui (湟水, T. tsong chu), and the tumbling waters of the Tao (洮河, T. klu chu) , beloved of exile poets. The deep river gorges cut by these watercourses would have formed significant obstacles in the pre-modern age but also made agriculture possible in the valleys around them. The Huangshui and the Yellow River bisect the terrain south of the Qilian Mountains (祁連山) down to Rongwo and Labrang, where the land rises to meet the edge of the northern Tibetan Plateau. From the great bend of the Yellow as it turns to flow south-east at Guide (貴德, T Khri kha), the two rivers run more or less in parallel from the eastern tip of Lake Kokonor until they reach the western edge of the loess plateau. Eventually the two converge, not far from the city of Lanzhou. The area described by these two rivers takes its name from them, He-Huang.



Fig 2. He-Huang and Taoxi. Map credit Hannibal Taubes

He-Huang is a beautiful place, still comparatively remote. The vivid greens of the lands in the central river valleys contrast starkly against the red earths of the jagged peaks above them. To the south, snow-capped peaks stand over grassland, with stands of old trees still tucked into near-vertical slopes. Whilst the fertile valley floors of He-Huang offer a decent living to industrious farmers, the area stands on the frontiers of a nomadic world. The valley floors themselves sit at an altitude of some 2000 metres, whilst the arid peaks which divide them soar to over 5000 m. The Jishi (積石; lit. Heaped Stone) Mountains, now the border between the modern provinces of Gansu and Qinghai, divides this area from the loess plateau. Guarded by the Twenty-Four Passes of Hezhou (河州二十四關), this line of mountains represents an enduring physical and psychological division between Sinophone interior and Tibetan periphery.⁵¹ Alternatively it is equally true that they mark a border between Tibetophone Amdo and its Sinophone periphery.

He-Huang is as diverse in its population as it is in its landscape. Each piece of scholarship addressing it notes that it has been called ‘the crossroads of four civilizations’, namely Chinese, Tibetan, Mongolian and Turkic.⁵² Equally pertinently, it is a transitional zone between nomadic and sedentary economies, a distinction that was of perhaps more relevant than any barriers of language or ethnicity in the 18th century. Nomadic Mongol banners occupy the grasslands west of Xining around Lake Kokonor, whilst Tibetan-speaking clans roam to the south and west. The Salars, a population of Muslims speaking a Turkic language, farm lands near Xunhua (循化) and Guide (貴德). Modern transportation has transformed the geography of the region. The Yellow River was once a formidable obstacle, forming a sharp divide between the communities to its north and to its south. Although crossable at Xunhua by ferry, there were no bridges along its upper course.⁵³ Despite the mountains of the Jishi Pass, Xunhua and the Salar

⁵¹ The Twenty-Four Passes of Hezhou were first garrisoned during the Hongwu reign period, although the troops there were later recalled in favour of ‘local soldiers’ (土兵). They were regarrisoned as a line of defense in the wake of the Lobzang Danjin rebellion. See Gong Jinghan 龔景韓, *Xunhua Ting Zhi* 循化廳志 [*Xunhua Gazetteer*], ed. Li Benyuan 李本源 and Cui Yonghong 崔永紅 (Xining: Qinghai renmin, 2015), 68 (juan 2).

⁵² Paul Kocot Nietupski, *Labrang: A Tibetan Buddhist Monastery at the Crossroads of Four Civilizations* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1999).

⁵³ Locals rafted across it; there were attempts to maintain an official boat on the crossing in the 18th century, so as to ensure communication between Bayanrong and Xunhua but the boat was expensive to maintain and often fell into unusable disrepair. See Gong, *Xunhua Gazetteer*, 71 (juan 2, 關津).

gong remained more easily accessible from Hezhou than from Xining.⁵⁴ The city of Xining (西寧), now the capital of the modern province of Qinghai, was theoretically the administrative centre for the He-Huang region, but the difficulty of crossing the Yellow River ensured that the Qing garrisons guarding Xunhua continued to be commanded from Hezhou.

Taoxi (洮西), or 'the region west of the River Tao', lies to the east of He-Huang, separated by the mountains of the Jishi Range. The River Tao flows west to east to the south of Labrang, forming the northern border of the semi-independent Tibetan polity of Chone (T. co ne, C. 卓尼).⁵⁵ When it reaches Min County Town (岷縣縣城) it performs a right angle turn to the north, bisecting southern Gansu before it too joins the Yellow River near Lanzhou. Taoxi, as used in this dissertation, refers to the lands immediately south of Lanzhou, west of the Tao and north of the mountains. The curving line of the Jishi Mountains which divides it from He-Huang to the west and south forms a rough border.⁵⁶ This means that 'Taoxi' here becomes a shorthand for the Qing counties of Hezhou and Didao and excludes Chone and the nomadic grassland areas on the south side of the Jishi Mountains.⁵⁷ The land here is lower than He-Huang, entirely agricultural, the hills terraced to their summits and divided from each other by sharp gullies where the erosion of loess soils cuts the land into increasingly fantastic shapes. Unlike He-Huang, modern Taoxi is now solidly sinophone and is generally seen as culturally part of the loess plateau, the Yellow Earth, that cradle of Chinese civilization.⁵⁸ However, it is defined by its proximity to the world of the steppe.

Within Taoxi, the town of Hezhou (河州, now Linxia 臨夏) just to the east of the Jishi Mountains was a bustling entrepot and trading hub, serving caravans travelling to the Tibetan uplands to south and west. Hezhou, today, is Muslim dominated, known as the 'Little Mecca' of Chinese Islam. In addition to the sinophone population, the districts around it include communities of Muslims speaking Mongolic languages, namely the

⁵⁴ This particular problem vexed administrators to the fall of the Qing: the civil administration of Xunhua was repeatedly transferred from Hezhou to Xining and back.

⁵⁵ See Grey Tuttle, 'The Kingdom of Choné', THL Place Library, University of Virginia, 2011, <http://places.thlib.org/features/24353/descriptions/81>. Accessed 20.09.2018.

⁵⁷ Chone and the grasslands to the south of the Jishi range were under the jurisdiction of Taozhou (洮州, modern Lintan 臨潭) under the Qing. Labrang and Tsö, meanwhile, were under the jurisdiction of Xunhua. In effect, Xunhua and Taozhou were jurisdictions which dealt with Fan, beyond the passes. Taoxi was theoretically sinophone, and within the passes.

⁵⁸ Although part of Qin and Han, the medieval history of Taoxi saw it incorporated into the domains of the Tuyuhun khanate and the Tibetan Empire. It is only from the Ming onwards that Taoxi can be considered to have been securely within the domain of a Chinese dynasty.

Bonan (C. Bao'an (保安) and the Dongxiang (C. Dongxiang 東鄉, lit. east district). West of Hezhou and situated directly on the Tao, Didao (狄道, now Lintao 臨洮) guarded the road over the river and was a crucial strategic crossing point for access in and out of the river. Didao was proud of its incorporation into the imperial centre, however: an introduction to the collection of Tang border poetry contained within the Didao Gazetteer reminds the reader that the lonely vistas beyond the Tao, despite the shared name, were actually referring to the place Taozhou, rather than to Didao.⁵⁹ The poems are included merely for their artistic merit, rather than for their reflections of Didao life.⁶⁰ Didao is now a solidly Han town, lacking even a mosque, following the post-war exile of its Muslim population. The contrasting history of these two centres forms a key theme of this dissertation.

To the west and south, He-Huang and Taoxi are overlapped by the space of Amdo, the northernmost region of Tibet. Amdo does not have clear boundaries, it has ebbed and flowed with the changing political and demographic ties – there is a fine argument to be made, for instance, that it was in the postbellum resettlements that Taoxi moved out of Amdo. During the mid to late Qing, Amdo as a name references an orientation, an affiliation with a Tibetan-ordered world. Major dGe lugs monasteries in the area were tied by religious threads of silk to the Lhasa bureaucracy, including the vast complexes of Labrang Tashi Khyil (T. bla rang bkra shis 'khyil, 拉卜楞寺), Kumbum (sku 'bum byams pa gling, 塔爾寺) and Rongwo (T. rong wo thos bsam rnam rgyal gling, 隆務寺), each of which governed substantial estates and numerous branch monasteries. Further afield, the kingdom of Ngawa (C. rnga ba, 阿壩), Chone (T. co ne ,卓尼) and the Golok clans (T. 'go log, 果洛) were active throughout the Qing dynasty in seeking to limit the influence of both Beijing and Lhasa over their domains, swaying with the political winds as necessary. To the north and east lay the cities of Xining and Lanzhou and the road to Beijing, and the familiar world of the Confucian bureaucratic establishment – lineages, Confucian temples and the rest of it.

There have been Muslims in He-Huang and Taoxi since the time of Marco Polo, who recorded the presence of mosques and a trading community in Didao (then Xizhou

⁵⁹ The poems in question refer to 'Lintao', a name which during the Tang referred to Taozhou, and from Jin to Ming was used for 'Didao'. Both places are on the banks of the Tao and both served as borders.

⁶⁰ Huyan Huaguo 呼延華國, *Didao zhou zhi* 狄道州志 [*Didao Gazetteer*], ed. Wu Zhen 吳鎮 (Taipei: Chengwen, 1970 [1763]), 'Literature juan 藝文卷', 14.

熙州).⁶¹ The Salar communities around Xunhua are home to several of the oldest mosques still standing in China. The Dongxiang claim descent from Muslim artisans settled into the Jishi mountains by Chinggis Khan. Bafang (八坊, lit. 'eight congregations'), the Muslim suburb of Hezhou that sits outside the walls of Hezhou, is named for its eight Ming mosques. The point here is a simple one: although often treated as peripheral to the affairs of either Lhasa or Beijing in Gansu, the mosque communities of He-Huang predate both the late imperial rise of the vast monastic complexes and the incorporation of the area into Beijing's ambit. The Muslim populations were and always were deeply enmeshed in local affairs. It remains hard to trace the precise early trajectory of Muslim arrival into the area or of conversions to Islam. This is quite simply as it was not a question of interest to any of the chroniclers of Gansu history at the time: extant Tibetan histories are both chronologically later and almost exclusively histories of the faith, the earlier Chinese language gazetteers are manuals of administration that do not see Muslim faith as a matter requiring administrative attention. They can be not considered as newly arrived migrants with but a passing interest in the locality, nor peripheral to political affairs, but rather were a significant population deeply embedded in the region.

Defining Sufism in China

"For example, in Hezhou Islam has eight large menhuan: the Zhangmen, established the earliest, the Huasi founded during the Ming in Bafang, Hezhou, the Baizhuang based in Dongxiang, Hezhou and controlled by Old Ma Lin, the Basuchi a branch of the Baizhuang, the Hongmen active in Ningding County and founded by Ma Guodong, the Bijiachang based in Xixiang, Hezhou, the Lintao Gongbei a branch of the Didao-based Mufti, the Great Gongbei akin to the Han disciples who renounce their homes to study the Way."⁶²

⁶¹ The town in question is named by Polo as 'Silinggiu' or 'Sinju'. Some older studies suggested this was Xining, but Haw decisively demonstrates it is more probably Didao. Stephen G. Haw, *Marco Polo's China: A Venetian in the Realm of Khubilai Khan*, Routledge Studies in the Early History of Asia ; 3 (London: Routledge, 2006), 91.

⁶² 案河州回教有八大門宦，曰張門傳教最早，曰華寺建於明在河州八坊，曰白莊在河州東鄉老馬麟實主持之，曰巴素池由白莊分支，曰紅門寧定縣馬國棟先人所創，曰畢伽場在河州西鄉，曰臨洮拱北狄道穆夫提之一支，曰大拱北似漢人之出家修道者。Mu Shouqi 慕壽祺, *Gan Ning Qing shilue* 甘寧青史略 [*An Outline History of Gansu, Ningxia and Qinghai*], ed. Zhao Yuanzhen 趙元貞 and Li Bing 李炳, 10 vols (Taipei: Guangwen shuju, 1972)., Vol 9, 28.25c.

In Chinese, Sufi tariqa are most often referred to as *menhuan* (門宦), a term which first entered the archival record in 1897.⁶³ It is a semi-technical term, etic in origin, referring to the institutional forms developed by Sufi traditions in China. Menhuan ritual and organisation are most often strongly hierarchical, focused on a leader (Ar. *shaykh*, Ch. *jiaozhu* 教主) who derives his authority from a claim of spiritual genealogy (Ar. *silsila*) traced back to a key founder and ultimately the Prophet Mohammed. Through the power of their religious charisma (Ar. *baraka*), the shaykh gathered converts, whilst the donations of followers allowed menhuan leaders to amass considerable property. Their spiritual authority gave them great influence, particularly in resolving local conflicts. On death, the secrets of the order and the religious authority would be transmitted to a successor, almost always a son. They bear a distinct structural resemblance to the late imperial Chinese institution of the family lineage organisation, who similarly prioritised male descent lines, held property in a communal trust organised around a lineage temple, and were heavily involved in the organisation and regulation of village life.⁶⁴ The menhuan paradigm of saintly authority in both the closeness to God and the exercise of power and authority in the temporal world has been compared to the relationship between Sufi shaykhs and political authority in Morocco.⁶⁵

Unlike the *qadīm*, the traditional, localized Islamic communities centred on a single mosque, the Sufi shaykhs travelled between mosques and initiating followers, thereby linking communities together into a tightly co-ordinated network. Menhuan networks spread primarily along the trade routes, linking places as distant as Xinjiang, Heilongjiang and Yunnan, whilst remaining spiritually centred in the towns and communities surrounding Hezhou. The gongbei – shrines built around the graves of former masters – provided ritual focal points for the traditions. Most menhuan had strong pilgrimage traditions, and followers would often gather in their thousands to hold *ermaili* (C. 尔麥力, A. 'amal), a memorial service and feast commemorating the birth

⁶³ See Chapter Five for an exploration of this moment. Dong's memorial was drafted on basis of an earlier report by Yang Zengxin, 杨增新, then the Hezhou magistrate. NPM, Dong Fuxiang 董福祥, 408003067, 《奏為續辦河狄逸匪並拆毀回民拱北禁革掌教名目以靖地方》, GX 23 05 16.

⁶⁴ Lineages developed in both north and south China from the mid-Ming onwards, although they were generally much richer and more tightly organised in the south. See Myron L. Cohen, *Kinship, Contract, Community, and State: Anthropological Perspectives on China*, Studies of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005); also Michael Szonyi, *Practicing Kinship: Lineage and Descent in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002).

⁶⁵ Garnaut, 'The Shayk of the Great Northwest', 9.

or death of a shaykh.⁶⁶ Many, although not all, menhuan also had teaching lodges (道堂, *P. khaniqah*), generally attached to the gongbei of their founder shaykh. The complexities of the traditions of different Sufi teachings, succession conflicts and local politics have ultimately given rise to over 40 menhuan branches and sub-branches, many of whom are still active today.⁶⁷

There are several suggestions for the derivation of the word: a corruption of *menhu* (門戶), a word which broadly means 'family household' or perhaps 'doorway', but which can carry connotations of 'sect' or even 'faction'. Another possibility is that it is derived from *menfa* (門閥), generally glossed as 'a family of power and influence'. The glyph *fa* (閥) is refers to the pillars outside the house of an important family or official, and is used to metaphorically describe those individuals whom the authorities rely on to assist with the processes of governance.⁶⁸ In modern Chinese, *fa* is most strongly correlated with the term *junfa* (軍閥) warlord. The third proposed root is from the word *huanmen* (宦門), meaning a family with links to the bureaucracy.⁶⁹ The three suggested roots are united in their connotations: family/lineage, temporal power and links to state authority. Whilst probably coined before 1897, its etymology encapsulates the problem posed by the Sufi sects of Gansu as it appeared the officials tasked with governing them: not one of religion, but one of entrenched local elites and entrenched local interests.

Existing scholarship concerning the menhuan largely follows the path set by the work of two key figures: Ma Tong and Joseph Fletcher. Ma Tong's 1983 study remains the touchstone work on the menhuan. However, himself a member of the Jahriyya, Ma's focus is religious but tied to the foundational tenets of Marxist ethnic history. His work details the genealogies of leadership for each menhuan, basic ritual practice, key texts and organisational structure for each menhuan, classified by denomination (*jiaopai* 教派). His scholarship is largely descriptive, treating the individual menhuan as unconnected, largely exclusive entities and as institutions produced primarily by the particularities of faith. Discussion of the evolving relationships between menhuan and

⁶⁶ Arabic "*amal*" often means doing charitable work, and the term technically refers to the donation made to the order on the occasion of commemorating the life of a shaykh.

⁶⁷ See Li Weijian 李維建 and Ma Jing 馬景, *Gansu Linxia menhuan diaocha* 甘肅臨夏門宦調查 [Survey of menhuan in Linxia, Gansu] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 2011).

⁶⁸ Luo Zhufeng 羅竹風, ed. *Hanyu da cidian* 漢語大詞典, (Shanghai: Hanyu da cidian chubanshe, 2001): Vol. 12 (1), 111.

⁶⁹ Mian Weilin 勉維霖, *Ningxi Yisilan jiaopai gaiyao* 宁夏伊斯兰教派概要, (Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 1981), 20.

state, between menhuan and menhuan and of the 'process' of menhuan are beyond the scope of his work. His work is also explicitly moralistic: as a believer in the separation of religion from politics, he condemns those leaders who do become politically active.⁷⁰ Recent critiques of his work emphasize his party connections and the element of coercion in his interviews.⁷¹ Nevertheless, his work has been written into modern menhuan lore, and stands at the intersection between official and unofficial histories. His identification of four main schools within Chinese Sufism, namely the Jahriyya, the Khufiyya, the Kubrawiyya and the Qadariyya, and their mutual opposition to both the *qadīm* and the Ikhwan, set the terms of the debate concerning Sufi ritual, affiliation and the nature of engagement between different Islamic schools in northwestern China. Erie observed that northwest China is unique in this respect: everyone, down to small children, can name which teaching school they are part of.⁷² Joseph Fletcher's work as foundational as that of Ma: his superb detective work in identifying the origins of 18th century Islamic movements within the Sufi Naqshbandiyya traditions of Yemen made a direct connection between the content of the new Sufi teachings and violence.⁷³ So path-breaking has Fletcher's work been that his writings have changed the menhuan understanding of themselves.⁷⁴

The 1991 publication of Zhang Chengzhi's (張承志) bestselling novel *History of the Soul* 《性靈史》 produced renewed critical interest in menhuan and the publication of a number of important internal sources.⁷⁵ Such sources provide vital insight into internal menhuan dynamics that were previously inaccessible through the imperial sources that form the extant written material on the history of Gansu. The menhuan still in existence today are active participants in the shaping of their own history and legacy, seeking to drive interpretation of their past through publication of histories based on

⁷⁰ See, for instance, his later discussion of the Beizhuang. Ma Tong 馬通, *Zhongguo Yisilan jiaopai yu menhuan zhidu shilüe* 中國伊斯蘭教派與門宦制度史略 (Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 1983), 287-293.

⁷¹ Erie, *China and Islam*, 139-142.

⁷² Ibid, 7.

⁷³ Joseph Fletcher, *Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia*, ed. Beatrice Forbes Manz (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995).

⁷⁴ Jahriyya histories related that their founder, Ma Mingxin 馬明心 had studied in Yemen but not the identity of the order he had studied with. In the light of Fletcher's identification of them as Naqshabandi, modern Jahri have made the journey to Yemen to research their own history. Dru C Gladney, "Ethnoreligious Resurgence in a Northwestern Sufi Community" in *China Off Center: Mapping the Margins of the Middle Kingdom*, edited by Susan Blum and Lionel Jensen, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002): 123.

⁷⁵ For full analysis of the content and impact of Zhang's work, see Anthony Garnaut, "Pen of the Jahriyya: a commentary on The History of the Soul by Zhang Chengzhi" *Inner Asia* 8:1 (2006):29 - 50.

inherited oral traditions. The religious modality in which they operate has thus proven the dominant identifier in the modern context: internal menhuan sources naturally emphasize mysticism and ritual and seek to project an image of continuity, whilst Zhang's own work emphasizes the menhuan as anti-institutional, proto-communist radicals. The Hui background of many scholars further defines the work of many of the principal names in the field. The importance of genealogy and chains of transmission to menhuan self-identity make the remembrance of past events crucial to their modern claims. Rituals typically focus on the anniversary of the deaths of former shaykhs, when congregations gather at gongbei. Histories of violence and martyrdom carry lasting significance, as does their own self-positioning vis a vis the other menhuan active in the region. However, the vicissitudes of the 20th century – warfare, suppression, and the upheaval of the old relationships between menhuan and state – make such a portrait problematic when uncritically projected backwards. There has been a process of change, of evolution, and the menhuan as they exist today are fundamentally different from those who took up arms in the 19th century.

This thesis, however, is concerned with the institutional aspects of menhuan and the roles played by their leadership in local governance: I wish to integrate them back into their local world. It remains true that there is a considerable degree of variance in the size and extent of menhuan organisations, or indeed the extent to which they were organised at all. The mystical aspects of menhuan traditions and the complexity of succession disputes makes them prone to fission, whilst the secular power accrued by established traditions never precluded the rise of new preachers. From the perspective of religious history, the menhuan of Gansu include both traditions founded by lone mendicant preachers such as the 'Mad Master' (瘋爸爸, 1852-1925) and the vast, centralized tradition of the Jahriyya, who once ran a trading network which reached from Heilongjiang to Xinjiang.

In respect of these aims then, I adopt an explicitly structural definition of a menhuan adapted from Ma Jing's work, in order to evade ritual and definitional issues,. In this analysis, a 'menhuan' thus should i) be united under a leader whose authority is expressed in religious terms, ii) possess a tradition wherein religious authority is transmitted on that leader's death to a successor, most often a close relative and iii) demonstrate a structure of command encompassing a network of mosques and

gongbei.⁷⁶ This definition excludes some groups who would normally be considered *menhuan*, perhaps most notably the Qadiri Da Gongbei (大拱北) whose adherents left home in a manner akin to Buddhist monks. The definition, however, does permit inclusion of the Xidaotang (西道堂), whose unorthodox doctrine has led some scholars to doubt whether they are in fact Sufi. Under this definition, the most important *menhuan* are the Huasi (花寺), founded by Ma Laichi (馬來遲 c.1681-1751), the Jahriyya 哲赫忍耶, founded by Ma Mingxin (馬明心 1719-1781), and the Beizhuang (北莊), founded Ma Baozhen (馬保真 1772-1880).

Outline

This dissertation describes an arc, from the entry of Sufism into He-Huang to the 1895 He-Huang Rebellion. I trace the rise of Sufi paths and their institutionalization in Gansu's borderlands, and their eclipse in the post-war era by a new generation of reformist Muslim military officials.⁷⁷ The core of this thesis, however, looks at the processes behind this transformation, locating them securely in the social transformation that followed the Great Northwestern Muslim Rebellion, 1862-1874.

Chapter One, "Sufi Travellers and the Politics of Movement, 1644-1860", proposes that the development of a 'menhuan system' in the He-Huang and Taoxi regions is inextricably linked to the extension of Qing governance into Amdo following the 1723 rebellion of Lobzang Danjin (C. 羅布藏丹津, T. blo bzang bstan 'dzin), a Khoshud Mongol prince. This is based on an analysis which places Qing policies for the control of movement into their Amdo domains as the fulcrum of Qing power in the area, arguing for the *menhuan* networks as key mediators of cross-border connections. The analysis traces the intersections of belief, politics and sacred geography, and the complexities of an environment in which multiple *menhuan* operate. The whole thus examines the dynamics of local governance, Qing imperial ideology and the importance of the Tibetan sphere in shaping the policy and legal environments which structured Muslim lives in pre-1860s He-Huang.

⁷⁶ Ma Jing 馬景, *Zheherenye Xuanhuagang Jingji Yanjiu* (1889-1949) 哲赫忍野宣化岡經濟研究 (1889-1949) [Research on the Economy of the Xuanhuagang Jahriyya], (Ph.D., Northwest University for Nationalities, 2006).

⁷⁷ These lineages are more often known as the Ma Family Warlords (馬家軍伐), although this term is both more often used for the Republican era descendants of the same men. 'Warlord', however, is highly pejorative and does not accurately reflect the complexities of those leaders or the sophistication of their politics.

Chapter Two, “Zuo Zongtang and the Remaking of the Muslim Northwest, 1860-1874” describes the nature of the break that occurred in the 1860s, setting forth the history of the rebellion and initial reconquest for the menhuan and He-Huang and Taoxi. I examine the particularities of the outbreak of violence in He-Huang, and the role of the menhuan and the failures of local mediation. I portray the rebellion largely as a collapse of the Qing state, which produced a kaleidoscope of local experience through the war years. The rebellion became a rebellion in truth when Zuo Zongtang began his reinvasion and defined the Muslims as the problem. The chapter then moves into an analysis of the significance of the proposals to resettle Muslims away from non-Muslims, and the manner in which surrendered Muslim leaders became entwined with the Qing military. Looking at the surrender of Ma Zhan’ao and Ma Anliang, leaders of the Hezhou centre of rebellion, I argue that this moment set the terms for reconstruction processes across He-Huang. I explore the creation of a legal baseline for the reconstruction process through the establishment of pacification articles dictating the surrenders of Didao, Hezhou and Xunhua. Finally, I look at the local consequences of the line drawn down the River Tao, where Muslims were to be permitted to its west and prohibited to its east. I argue that the rebellion and its aftermath represent a watershed moment in the history of Islam in China, a paradigm shift that left Muslims afterward to explain how they could be both Muslim and loyal.

Chapters Three and Four are broadly contemporaneous in their scope and address different aspects of the consequences of the postbellum settlements. “Land and Reconstructions: The Consequences of Pacification, 1870-1884” draws on postbellum land litigation and stele records to propose that the demographic transformations transformed the settlement geography of He-Huang. Refugee settlements in upland areas became permanent, dense new Muslim settlements emerged west of Hezhou even as Muslims were exiled from cities and gongbei elsewhere. The chapter argues the politicization of being Muslim resulted in a transformation of the structure of Islamic communities around the leaders who represented them to the state, producing the emergence of large ‘haiyi’ (海乙) communities tightly linked to a central mosque. Whilst Chapter Three tackles the consequences for the structure of ecumenical communities, “Military Muslims, Amdo and the Wood Trade” focuses on the resurrection of controls on movement into Amdo in the postbellum period, and the rise of the surrendered Muslim leaders to prominence as the interpreters of Tibetan affairs to a weakened Qing state. The attempt to control the borders into Amdo allowed those Muslim leaders to

dominate trade and information over the passes, confirming their rise to political power and a shift away from the informal menhuan militias that had previously dominated.

Chapter Five, “Hezhou Burning: the He-Huang Rebellion of 1895-6 and the End of a Sufi World”. Having traced the established and incorporation of a Muslim elite in Hezhou and Didao in the previous two chapters, this chapter turns to the content of the Islamic revival they fostered within He-Huang. Tracing the influence of young, reformist *ahong* (C. 阿訇, P. *akhund*, imam) and the arrival of Wahhabi-esque teachings in the borderland, this chapter explores the consequences of the split within the Huasi (華寺) menhuan and the subsequent anti-menhuan crackdown, spearheaded by the Muslim military leaders who had emerged as the beneficiaries of the postbellum settlements. In doing so, they decisively ended the menhuan system, ending the political influence of Sufism in western Gansu. I argue these leaders represent a nascent nationalist strain of Chinese Islam.

Chapter One

Sufi Travellers and the Politics of Movement, 1644-1860

Song of Geshu Han 哥舒歌

The Seven Stars of the Dipper are high,
And in the night, Geshu stands with his blade,
Outside the Tibetan foe spies on our cavalry,
Not daring to pass Lintao.¹

Humble Servant from the West (西鄙人)

Introduction

Hongshuiquan Mosque (洪水泉清真寺) feels remote. Tucked away in the hills above Xining, the road winds steeply upwards from the valley floor through yellow, uncultivated hills with only the occasional graveyard on route. The village itself is but a few houses huddled in the crown of the hill. The mosque, however, is remarkable. Built of wood and rose-gold brick, it is a masterpiece of Qinghai craftsmanship, its minaret constructed without use of a single nail. In addition to the panels of Arabic calligraphy on the *qibla* wall, mythical animals of the Chinese pantheon adorn the shield wall, a cat peeks out from carved tableaux on the base of the minaret, intricate flower borders enclosing each scene. The wooden doors to the prayer hall are carved with dharma wheels and conch shells, whilst Daoist emblems are hidden in the panels to either side.

When I visited in July 2018, the *ahong* there explained to me that the mosque was founded during the Ming.² In his telling, it was a counterpart to nearby Qutan Monastery (瞿曇寺). Both were founded by imperial edict during the Hongwu reign, the Buddhist monastery for incoming Han settlers and the mosque for the incoming Muslims. According to the *ahong*, this explained the presence of dharma wheels in the

¹ 北斗七星高，哥舒夜帶刀，至今窺牧馬，不敢過臨洮。Translation by the author. Geshu Han (哥舒翰, d. 757) was a Tang general of Turkic extraction, Lintao is the name used for Didao both currently and prior to the Qing.

² Site visit by the author, 29/07/2017.

woodwork. The emperor had employed Tibetan craftsmen, and it was their influence that had led to the profusion of non-Islamic symbols adorning his mosque.

The ahong's tale does not quite match up with the historical record. As is well attested, Qutan Monastery was founded by Tibetan lama Sanggye Trashi (d. 1414) in 1392, who requested and was subsequently granted imperial protection for his temple. However, most of the construction dates to the later patronage of the Yongle Emperor (r. 1402-1422).³ By contrast, Hongshuiquan is not mentioned in any surviving Ming record that has been found to date. Whilst there were a number of mosques that received Ming imperial support, Hongshuiquan is too remote for this to have been likely. Furthermore, the current building is a survival from the expansion of the mosque conducted in the fifteenth year of the reign of the Qianlong Emperor (1750).⁴ The syncretic elements in its designs are representative of a local Islam that has now largely vanished, a sign of a historical reciprocity between religious traditions that would now be denied by both local Muslims and Tibetans.⁵

The gongbei shrines of Gansu and Qinghai, however, do resemble Hongshuiquan. The Huasi (花寺) menhuan were named for the rich patterns that adorned their mosque and gongbei.⁶ Moreover, the foundation of most of the major menhuan traditions of the northwest date back to the years when Hongshuiquan Mosque was expanding. This chapter explores the development of Sufi paths in Gansu, situating them firmly in their time and political contexts. Fletcher famously set the chronology of Sufism in the northwest within that of the Naqshbandiyya elsewhere.⁷ This chapter argues, however, that it was not coincidental that the institutionalisation of Sufism in the northwestern

³ Karl Debreczeny, 'Sino-Tibetan Artistic Synthesis in Ming Dynasty Temples at the Core and Periphery', *The Tibet Journal* 28, no. 1/2 (2003): 52; see also Aurelia Campbell, *The Impact of Imperial and Local Patronage on Early Ming Temples at the Sino-Tibetan Frontier*, (PhD, University of Pennsylvania, 2011) for analysis of Qutan Monastery, its art and architecture.

⁴ Hongshuiquan Mosque Stele 《紅水泉清真寺碑》, photographed by the author, 29/07/2017.

⁵ Tony Stewart is correct that the word 'syncretism' implies an 'unholy admixture' of two or more originally pure traditions and implies that it is an incorrect mix waiting to be corrected. It is, however, the quickest way of getting this idea across. See Tony Stewart, 'In Search of Equivalence: Conceiving Muslim-Hindu Encounter through Translation Theory', *History of Religions* 40, no. 3 (2001): 260–87.

⁶ There are conflicting explanations for the origin of the name 'Huasi'. Some within the menhuan attribute it to the donation of a flower garden by a convert for purpose of extending the mosque, others to the distinctive decoration, still others argue the 花 (flowery) character is a mistranscription of 華 (as in 華夏, the culture of the central plains), signalling the entry and adoption of an originally foreign Islamic tradition into Hezhou. The gongbei, however, is highly decorated, as are most Sufi gongbei in the Hezhou area.

⁷ See Joseph Fletcher, "The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China" in Joseph Fletcher, *Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia*, ed. Beatrice Forbes Manz (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995), 3.

Qing provinces coincides also with the century and a half that saw the Ming-Qing transition and the violent annexation of the Tarim Basin (southern Xinjiang) into the Qing empire. The history of Sufism and its arrival in northwestern China is concerned with the connections of He-Huang and Taoxi to a wider Islamic world. However, it is also of a history of disconnection: the times and places when it was *not* possible for pilgrims to travel far afield. Both are vital to understanding the manner in which China's nascent Sufi traditions improvised and embedded themselves in the particular context of Gansu's Sino-Tibetan borderlands.

The vast majority of menhuan traditions in China were founded in He-Huang and Taoxi, and most remain deeply rooted in that landscape.⁸ This is generally explained through the density of Muslim settlement in the area and its rural character. However, I move beyond this to explore the connections of the menhuan to borderland governance. Analysing Qing expansion into Amdo both before and after the 1724 Rebellion of Lobzang Danjin, I argue that the form taken by Sufi tariqa in China is intimately linked to the extension of Qing empire. The Sufi travellers, traders and border-crossers of He-Huang were a crucial part of that empire, sustained by the regulation of the borders and the divided nature of Qing rule. Hongshuiquan is a symbol of the interchange and overlap between Islamic and non-Islamic cultures in the particular environment of the North-Western borders of China.

This chapter takes a deliberately revisionist approach towards Sufi menhuan in China. Most studies of Sufism in China have tended to focus on Sufi connections to Islam beyond the Qing, and to their history of violent rebellion. It is true that Chinese Sufis enter the historical record only when relationships between menhuan, or between menhuan and the state, break down. To produce a history outside of those moments of violence has involved reading the archive against the grain and scouring menhuan hagiographies for elusive detail, a deliberate choice to sift for particular sorts of information. The historical record is sparse and many of the relevant archives remain off-limits to researchers.⁹ Producing a history of cooperation has involved collapsing time, space and the differences between menhuan traditions in a fashion with which I am not entirely comfortable. I hope, however, that in stitching together such accounts I

⁸ The possible exception to this is the Jahriyya, who never regained much of a foothold in either He-Huang or Taoxi following the 1781 Rebellion. The post-1780s Jahriyya reformed in Eastern Gansu (Ningxia). The repeated exile of Jahri followers by the Qing further ensured lively Jahriyya communities in Heilongjiang, Yunnan and Xinjiang.

⁹ Throughout the year and a half I spent in China, the First Historical Archive collections for both 'minorities' (民族類) and 'peasant movements' (農運類) were unavailable.

have created a convincing portrait. Moreover, a history of Sufi-state co-operation has a value simply as a correction to the many histories that speak only of rebellion.

Myths, Movement and Ming Borders

The principle protagonists of this dissertation prior to the rebellion are two Naqshbandiyya Khufiyya traditions, the Huasi and the Mufti, historically the two largest and most powerful of the Gansu menhuan.¹⁰ Both trace their origins to the journeys into Qinghai made by Naqshbandi shaykh Āfāq Khoja (c.1626-1694).¹¹

Joseph Fletcher's work has emphasized that the history of Islam in China is not one of isolation. His pioneering work traces the linkages of the primary Sufi tariqa of Gansu and Qinghai – the Khufiyya and the Jahriyya – back to Yemeni Naqshbandiyya master, 'Abd al-Khāliq. Fletcher was convinced that it was the influence of this master and their connection to a fundamentalist 18th century revival that gave the Jahriyya, the classic opponents of the Khufiyya in Gansu, their rebellious edge. For Fletcher, it is likewise the Naqshbandi nature of the tradition that explains the political imbrication of both Jahriyya and Khufiyya. Bahā'-al-dīn Naqshband Bukhari (1318-1389), founder of the Naqshbandi, was closely associated with Ghazān Khān, a descendant of Chingghis Khān who ruled the Chagatayid khanate. Āfāq Khoja himself was among the principle exponents of this Naqshbandi union between religion and politics. However, Āfāq's impact on the Sino-Tibetan borderlands was partly predicated on the fact that his journeys came just before an era which saw an end to the Central Asian world in which Āfāq Khoja's migrations were possible. The Gansu Sufi traditions, hence, were formed at the moment between connection and disconnection.

Āfāq Khoja was the great-grandson of Aḥmad Kāsānī, also known as Makhdūm-i A'zam (the Great Teacher, 1461-1542). Born in the Ferghana valley to a sayyid family, Kāsānī rose to become a leading shaykh and scholar of the Naqshbandi tradition in Central Asia. Commanding a broad following that spanned city, hinterland and nomad, he was closely connected to a number of Central Asian rulers and was able to parlay his religious authority into significant political power. Although Kāsānī himself never visited Kashgaria, one of his sons, Ishāq Walī (d.1599), subsequently settled there, taking the khan of Kashgaria as his disciple. The Naqshbandi suborder named for Ishāq – the Ishāqiyya – rose to dominate Kashgari Sufism in the late 16th century. Āfāq's father

¹⁰ With the exception of the Jahriyya in Ningxia.

¹¹ Āfāq Khoja, ('Master of the Horizons', C. 阿帕克霍加) is more often known in Chinese by the transcription of his name, Hidāyat Allāh: Hidayetong Laxi (赫達葉通拉希), also given as Yidayatu Leila (伊達雅圖勒拉).

Muḥammad Yūsuf Khoja (d. 1653), a grandson of Kāsānī by another line, preached across the Tarim Basin and northwest China, quickly gaining an influential following which included the support of the powerful khan of Yarkand. His success there brought envy and Yūsuf was poisoned, probably by rival Ishāqīs. Following his father's death, Āfāq Khoja took on his work and founded a rival tradition in the Tarim Basin that became known as the Āfāqiyya. Venerated by the then khan of Kashgaria, Āfāq Khoja became the *de facto* ruler of Kashgar until the 1670s, when he was driven out by an alliance between the khan's son and the Ishāqiyya. Āfāq Khoja thus took to the road. According to his hagiographies, he travelled to Lhasa and met the Fifth Dalai Lama, defeating him in a battle of magic. The Dalai Lama thereupon agreed to help Āfāq regain his rightful rule over Kashgaria by enlisting the aid of the Zunghars, the Tibetan Buddhist-confessing steppe empire that ruled north of the Tianshan.¹² Whilst the tale is likely apocryphal, the Dalai Lama did furnish Āfāq with an introduction to Galdan Khan, the Zunghar leader. The Zunghars duly invaded in 1680, conquering the Tarim and effectively installing Āfāq as local ruler- in return for an annual payment.¹³

Sometime during his 1670s exile from Kashgaria, Āfāq Khoja passed through Xining. For Āfāq himself, the journey was most likely not exceptional. Xining was another city within an interconnected Central Asian spiritual and political world that spanned India, Tibet, Mongolia, Zungharia and the Altishahr. Before Āfāq's arrival in Xining, his father Muḥammad Yūsuf had also preached in Gansu, arriving at Suzhou in the Hexi Corridor in the 1630s where he founded a mosque, gave daily teachings on Rumi and taught the silent *dhikr* that gives the Khufiyya menhuan their name (Khufiyya, the silent ones). He also purportedly taught near Xunhua and is attested in Salar hagiographical accounts as having taught the *Masnavi-i Ma'navi*, and having initiated a master there.¹⁴ However, it was Āfāq Khoja's visit to Xining in 1671 that came to assume mythic proportions for the Sufi orders founded in Gansu in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. His particular vision of the Naqshbandi and their place at the left-hand of

¹² In some versions of the hagiography, it is heavily implied that the Dalai Lama converted to Islam. See Thierry Zarcone, 'Between Legend and History: About the "Conversion" to Islam of Two Prominent Lamaists in the Seventeenth-Eighteenth Centuries', in *Islam and Tibet : Interactions along the Musk Routes*, ed. Anna Akasoy, Charles Burnett, and Ronit Yoeli-Tlalim (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 281–311.

¹³ James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads : A History of Xinjiang* (London: Hurst, 2007), 88. Fletcher, "The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China" in *Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia*, 11.

¹⁴ Most oral histories conflate the deeds of father and son. Alexandre Papas, 'Sufi Lineages Among the Salar', in *Muslims in Amdo Tibetan Society: Multidisciplinary Approaches*, ed. Marie-Paule Hille, Bianca Horlemann, and Paul Kocot Nietupski (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2015), 109–110.

power was an inspiring one: a vision of Islamic rule and an active, transformative faith. Fletcher compared the Naqshbandi in this respect to another reformist movement then taking off: the Gelukpa, who were actively proselytising across Amdo during the 17th century.¹⁵ The distinctively Tibetan Buddhist concept of the 'patron-priest' relationship is likewise not dissimilar to how the Naqshbandi shaykhs viewed their relationship to secular authority.

Whilst Āfāq was in Qinghai, he initiated the generation of masters who enacted the localization of Sufism into the Sino-Tibetan borderlands.¹⁶ His legacy is not just claimed by Khufiyya masters: he also met Qi Jingyi (祁敬一 1656-1719), founder of the Qadariyya Da Gongbei (大拱北), and Ma Zongsheng (馬總生), founder of the Bijiachang (畢家場) menhuan.¹⁷ However, it is in the Khufiyya traditions – those that inherited his silent *dhikr* – that he was most influential.

The Mufti founder, Ma Shouzhen (馬守真, c.1632-c.1722), stands out among this generation in that only he claimed a blood connection to the master. His hagiographies record that Ma's mother, Lady Tian (田氏), married Āfāq during his first missionary venture into Qinghai, and bore him a son shortly after his departure.¹⁸ According to his hagiographies, Ma Shouzhen was marked from birth as special, born with a birthmark on his back. When the child was taken to a lama, the lama declared him worthy to be an emperor and took the child Ma travelling across Qinghai, to great acclaim.¹⁹ Their

¹⁵ Of Amdo's major Geluk monasteries, Kumbum was founded in 1560 and expanded on command of the Third Dalai Lama after he passed through; Rongwo became Geluk in 1630 and Labrang, founded 1709, was always a Geluk institution, was founded in 1709. Fletcher, "The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China" in Fletcher, *Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia*, 33.

¹⁶ Āfāq Khoja continues to be venerated in Gansu as a result, whilst in modern Kashgar he is now often a villain: the man who invited a heathen state to help his reconquest of Kashgar, thereby setting in motion a chain of events which ended with the Qing invasion of Altishahr in 1758 and an end to Muslim rule. He is a figure at the centre of a number of complex historical narratives. Rian Thum, 'Beyond Resistance and Nationalism: Local History and the Case of Āfāq Khoja', *Central Asian Survey* 31, no. 3 (2012): 293–310.

¹⁷ Āfāq is said to have met Qi, but declared that another was to be his master, prophesying the arrival of Abd Allah Khoja, his true master. See Tiffany Cone, *Cultivating Charismatic Power: Islamic Leadership Practice in China* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 47.

¹⁸ Despite the importance Āfāq Khoja assumes in the Mufti tradition, he was almost certainly not Ma Shouzhen's father, given that Āfāq was born in 1626. If he was in fact a direct descendant, he would have been the son of Mohammad Yusuf (d. 1653). The adoption of the surname Ma – derived from the first syllable of Muhammad – might be a reference to Muhammad Yusuf. Of course, Ma is an extremely common surname among Chinese Muslims, and Shouzhen may have chosen the surname simply to display his faith. Nevertheless, all hagiographies of Shouzhen are insistent that his father was Āfāq.

¹⁹ The tale continues that the lama put it about that Ma Shouzhen was playing outside when a mysterious stranger (異人) appeared, bearing a wooden fish [Chinese temple percussion instrument, shaped like a fish]. When Shouzhen struck it, instead of the normal wooden 'tock', the

activities brought suspicion from the authorities, who had the lama arrested and executed. Ma Shouzhen escaped thanks to his youth, but the family were forced to flee to a village near Didao. Poverty forced Tian to send her son into commerce and he became an itinerant donkey peddler (腳戶哥) working the roads between Didao and Xining. When the master returned in the 1640s, his son journeyed to see him, but arrived too late. The Khoja left him a letter bidding him to study under Li Tai Baba (李太爸爸). On his final visit to Xining in 1671, father and son were reunited. Āfāq initiated him into the Naqshbandiyya, gifted him eight ritual items, and the title of 'Mufti' (C. 穆夫提).²⁰

Ma returned to Didao and in 1685 he founded a lodge in a village just to the north of the city. On his death, the mantle of his spiritual authority was inherited by his son and his followers built him a gongbei in the hills to the east of the county town, close to the other religious sites of the town, which are located to the south on the same slopes.²¹ Lady Tian is herself venerated within the Mufti tradition: Shouzhen was buried at her feet.²²

The founder of the Huasi, Ma Laichi (馬來飭, c. 1670-1766), did not have a physical connection to Āfāq Khoja at all.²³ Instead, Laichi's father, a rich merchant by the name of Ma Jiajun (馬家俊), travelled to meet Āfāq in Xining to ask his blessing that he

sound of Quranic chanting was heard. The stranger asked Shouzhen if he recognized the chanting, and when Shouzhen said he did, he gave him the wooden fish. This – if it is reminiscent of anything – is reminiscent of the recognition process of khutuktu. Mufti Congregation. 穆夫提教眾, "The Relationship Between Hidayat Allah and Lady Tian" (赫達葉統拉黑與田氏之關係) in Ma Tong 馬通 and Ma Haibin 馬海濱, eds., *Zhongguo Sufei Pai Dianji* 中國蘇菲派典籍 [Collected Primary Sources for Chinese Sufi Sects] (n.p.: n.p., 2010), Vol 2, 451; see also Ma Cikuo 馬茲廓, "Linxia gongbei suyuan 臨夏拱北溯源 [Origins of Linxia's Gongbei] in *Xibei shiji* 西北世紀 4 no. 6 (1949), reproduced in Li Xinghua 李興華 and Feng Jinyuan 馮今源, eds., *Zhongguo Yisilanjiao shi cankao ziliao xuanbian 1911-1949* 中國伊斯蘭教史參考資料選編, 1911-1949 [Selected Historical Materials on Chinese Islam 1911-1949] (Ningxia: Ningxia renmin, 1985), Vol 1, 147-148.

²⁰ A Mufti is an Islamic scholar expert in the interpretation of law, empowered to give fatwas. Mufti Congregation, "The Relationship Between Hidayat Allah and Lady Tian, in Ma Tong and Ma Haibin, eds. *Zhongguo Sufei pai dianji*, Vol 2, 451.

²¹ Ma Weijun 馬維俊 "The origins and development of the Mufti Madrasa and gongbei" (穆夫提道堂、拱北源流), in Ma Tong and Ma Haibin, eds., *Zhongguo Sufei pai dianji*, 433.

²² Mufti Congregation, "The Relationship Between Hidayat Allah and Lady Tian, in Ma Tong and Ma Haibin, eds. *Zhongguo Sufei pai dianji*, Vol 2, 451.

²³ *The Legend of the Huasi Master* 《華寺太爺傳奇》, a pamphlet in internal circulation within Qinghai Sufi communities, gives the dates of Laichi's life as 1649-1734. Whilst this is most detailed hagiography I have seen and contains a number of excellent stories, the dates are clearly erroneous, as Ma Laichi was sued for heresy by Ma Yinghuan in 1748. The same hagiography records the construction of the gongbei as 1766. Linxia Huasi Gongbei Committee 臨夏華寺拱北委員會, *Huasi taiye chuanqi* 華寺太爺傳奇 [Legend of the Huasi Master], (n.p., np.: c.2013).

might have a son.²⁴ Jiajun himself originated in Shaanxi, and had passed the military examinations before turning to business. Ma Congshan (馬從善), a Ming general, was also among his ancestors.²⁵ Both aspects echo the accounts of Ma Shouzhen's genealogy: Lady Tian was said to be born of a military family, and Shouzhen himself was a peddler. The associations with military and trade – themselves both professions of mobility – are repeated throughout menhuan histories, intertwined with the histories of preachers whose mobility was key to their following. Likewise, their association with these twin roles, and the mobility both necessitate, are key to understanding the role of menhuan within the borderlands.

Ma Jiajun duly met Āfāq Khoja in Xining, who told him to return to Hezhou and marry a non-Muslim woman surnamed Zhang (張). She had been repeatedly betrothed, but never married as her fiancés kept passing away prior to the wedding. She and Ma Jiajun were married and she soon became pregnant. However, before their son was born, a fire ripped through Ma Jiajun's shop, destroying the family wealth. Hence, Jiajun christened his son 'Laichi', meaning 'arrived too late'. Poverty meant that the young Laichi was sent to Milagou (米拉溝) to study under Ma Tai Baba (馬太爸爸), one of the masters Āfāq had initiated. On graduation, Ma Tai Baba transmitted Āfāq's baraka to Laichi, granting him the Naqshbandi *kouhuan* (口換, A. *ijāza*, oral transmission) and the hand of one of his own daughters in marriage.²⁶ After 30 years as an ahong in mosques across He-Huang, Laichi himself left to perform the Hajj. Taking the sea-route, he left Guangzhou alongside an Arab master he had met there in 1727 as soon as the sea ban (海禁) that the Qing had enforced through the period of consolidation of their rule was lifted. He returned in 1733, having spent time in Mecca, Yemen and Bukhara, empowered with new texts and ritual items.²⁷ Ma Laichi thus commenced a career preaching across He-Huang, now under direct Qing rule.

²⁴ Ma Jiajun is sometimes known as Ma 'One Hundred Thousand' (馬十萬), a reference to his wealth.

²⁵ Ma Cikuo, "Linxia gongbei suyuan", in Li and Feng, *Zhongguo Yisilanjiao shi cankao xuanbian*, Vol 1, 148.

²⁶ 'Kouhuan' literally translates as 'to pass over by means of speech', and is most often used to indicate the formal transmission of leadership by the master, often on his deathbed, to one of his disciples. It can also be used to refer to initiation into a path. It does not have the wider senses of 'permission, license' nor does it refer to a legal opinion on the validity of succession that the Arabic *ijaza* does. Jianping Wang, *A glossary of Chinese Islamic terms*, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies monograph series (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press on behalf of the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2001), 132.

²⁷ There is much speculation and little agreement about when, where and how Laichi travelled to Yemen. Huasi accounts are consistent in their assertion that he took the sea route. Ma Cikuo –

Ma Laichi's story is famous and well-known to scholars of Islam in China, but it has to be understood within the wider context of Inner Asian politics. As Perdue has argued, this period saw the closing of the frontiers as integrated, militarized empires expanded into Central Eurasia. In doing so, they brought an end to the last major nomadic empire (the Zunghars) and ended the role of Eurasia as a crossroads within a Chinggisid world order.²⁸

Prior to the Qing conquests, hundreds of Central Asian merchants and officials had moved into Ming territory, bringing with them Sufi perspectives embedded within their Islamic practice. During 15th century, it has been estimated that perhaps a third of the personnel manning caravans from the steppe to Beijing were Muslims, and a significant number of these people settled around Suzhou in northwestern Gansu.²⁹ Accompanying the arrival of Central Asian Muslims into China was an expansion in mosque building across the Chinese northwest through the early to mid Ming period, and the establishment of a tradition of madrasa education.³⁰ The Ming decision to retreat behind the Jiayu Pass (嘉峪關) in 1530 and relinquish Qumul (C. Hami 哈密) and Dunhuang, reduced the flows of population from Central Asia into China, but did not cut them off entirely. Limits were set on the number of trade missions permitted to enter the passes from the 1530s onwards; nevertheless, they continued to arrive.

The rise of the Qing began to sever such older patterns of mobility. The enforcement of the sea ban (海禁) just three years after the Manchus took Beijing

who says he took the land road – also says that Ma arrived in Mecca, and then travelled from Mecca to Bukhara to study Sufism. He then returned to Mecca, before taking the sea road home via Guangzhou. I would cautiously suggest that this is half-accurate: he did originally depart from Guangzhou, had planned to return via Bukhara, but was prevented by Zunghar attacks on Transoxiana. The chronology here is from a translated version of an Arabic account claimed to be authored by Ma Laichi himself, probably the “Guide to the Path” 《路引集》. They fit what is known of the chronology of Laichi's life well, and I am inclined to regard them as credible. Text translated Ding Shiren 丁士仁, “Legend of the Huasi Menhuan Founder Ma Laichi” (花寺門宦道祖馬來遲傳) in Ma Tong and Ma Haibin eds. *Zhongguo Sufei pai dianji*, 491-494; Ma Cikuo, “Linxia gongbei suyuan”, in Li and Feng, *Zhongguo Yisilanjiao shi cankao xuanbian*, Vol 1, 148.

²⁸ Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, 2009), 10-12.

²⁹ Suzhou, as a gateway city to the interior, and also home to a large Muslim population, would reward further research. It suffered greatly during the 1860s rebellions: much lost. He Yan 和龔, ‘Ming chao yu wala “gongci” maoyi zhong de Huihui 明朝与瓦剌“贡赐”贸易中的回回 [Muslim Involvement in the “Tribute” Trade Between the Ming and the Oirats]’, *Nei menggu shehui kexue bao*, no. 05 (1987): 51-54.

³⁰ Zhao Can 趙燦, *Jingxue xi chuan pu 經學系傳譜 [Lineage of Classical Learning]*, ed. Yang Yongchang 楊永昌 and Ma Jizu 馬繼祖 (Xining: Qinghai renmin, 1989 [c.1700s]). Li Xinghua 李興華, ‘Xian Yisilanjiao yanjiu (shang) 西安伊斯蘭教研究(上) [Islam in Xi'an (I)]’, *Huizu yanjiu* 19, no. 04 (2009): 39-55.

signalled their intent. In 1661, additional measures were taken to actually enforce the ban, thereby severing the sea route. This closed China to Muslim missionaries travelling from South-east Asia and India for the next 70 years, hence the timing of Ma Laichi's pilgrimage as the sea route re-opened. Both the Qing and the Zunghars were expanding empires, seeking to define their influence: in 1647 Erdeni Batur Hong-Taiji, founder of the Zunghar khanate, negotiated a border with Moscow, dividing Siberia between the two powers. The Russia-Qing Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 defined zones of influence for the two powers and mandated the use of passports to cross between them. From the 1690s, the various wars conducted by the Zunghars under Galdan cut trade routes across the Kazakh steppe and Zungharia.³¹ Even during times of relative peace, such as the period following the 1738 Zunghar-Qing truce, the Qing sought and were largely successful in limiting Central Asian movement into their domains, and in trying to control movement out of them.

Returning to Xining, in the late 1680s the *Qinbian jilüe* (秦邊記略) had recorded the presence of a lively community of Central Asian Muslims, most of them merchants. The same writer described the city as 'connected to everywhere' (無所不通).³² By the early 18th century, however, this trading network was beginning to contract under Qing regulation. By the time Ma Laichi returned from his pilgrimage, the roads to the west were closed. In 1739, the Governor of Gansu Yuan Zhancheng (巡撫元展成) reported that prior to 1715, merchants from Yili habitually came to Xining to trade. However, since then Zunghars had consolidated their strength outside the passes once again, with the result that a number of Yili merchants had been left stranded in Xining for years, unable to return. Their resources now exhausted, some of these former merchants were destitute. Yuan was seeking permission to grant them land and simple houses, and to settle them in the vicinity of Xining. Qianlong rejected the petition, fearing that if the precedent was established that 'poor Fan' (窮番) could be resettled in the interior, Xining would soon be overwhelmed with requests.³³ Seven years later, Qianlong inquired again about these same families: although their numbers were now reduced by

³¹ As a result, the Russia-Qing trade permanently shifted to routes through Mongolia. David Christian, *A History of Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia. Volume II, Inner Eurasia from the Mongol Empire to Today, 1260-2000*, Blackwell History of the World (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Blackwell, 2018).

³² Liang Fen 梁份, *Qin Bian Ji Lue* 秦邊記略 [*Essentials of the Qin Frontier*], ed. Zhao Shengshi 趙盛世 et al. (Xining: Qinghai renmin, 2015 [1689]), 77, 58.

³³ Veritable Records of the Qianlong era 清乾隆朝實錄, entry headed 又會同甘肅巡撫元展成奏。西寧多壩、七石峽、等處居住之回民蘇爾坦、胡裡等, QL 04 09 00; accessed via Airusheng database, <http://small.wenzibase.com/spring/front/use>, 10/09/2018.

illness and a number had chosen to travel the open roads to Tibet, there were still 39 households stranded in Xining, unable to make the journey home.³⁴

Āfāq Khoja's journeys to Xining happened at the last moment such journeys could have taken place: before the roads were cut, before the Qing began to enforce movement regulations, whilst the Naqshbandi khojas were at their most powerful. After Āfāq Khoja's death in 1694, the Āfāqiyya in the Altishahr fractured. In the ensuing conflict, two of his sons ended up in India, whilst another was taken hostage (alongside an Ishaqi counterpart) by the Zunghar khan, Tsewang Rabten, in order to consolidate his control of the Tarim Basin.³⁵ When the Qing finally invaded the Zunghar homeland in 1755, they found Āfāqi khoja brothers, and initially hoped to support them in retaking the Tarim Basin to rule in the Qing name. However, the two rebelled, hoping to rule independently. Unable to brook rebellion, even in an area they had not intended to rule directly, the Qing were drawn south into the Tarim Basin and emerged victorious by 1769. Both brothers were handed over to the Qing and executed. Qianlong had Karamatullah (a pro-Qing brother of Āfāq) and his family brought to Beijing, a mosque built and Chagatai added to the languages of empire: the southern circuit of Xinjiang had been brought within the fold and onto the maps. Muslims had finally been formally incorporated into empire.³⁶

Following the conquest of Xinjiang, the Qing encouraged migration to Zungharia to repopulate the regions left empty following the genocide of the Zunghars. The development of the postal system in Xinjiang and the roads and passes needed to support it encouraged both trading and smuggling.³⁷ However, border posts now were now maintained on the roads leading out of the new region and, prior to 1831, interior settlers (Han and Hui) were not permitted to settle in the Tarim Basin.³⁸ The conquest ushered in an era of territorial definition, in which freedom of movement was a

³⁴ Veritable Records of the Qianlong era 清乾隆朝實錄, entry headed 又諭、據鄂彌達奏稱、陝西西寧等處住居之喀什噶爾各處回民, QL 11 05 00, accessed via Airusheng database, <http://small.wenzibase.com/spring/front/use>, 10/09/2018.

³⁵ Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 92.

³⁶ Brophy, 'Confusing Black and White', 49.

³⁷ Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 103.

³⁸ Movement regulations – specifically the requirement to have a road pass to travel through military checkpoints on the borders – had been on the books during the Ming, but largely had been unenforceable. For the specific regulations, see Article 241 'Passing Guard Posts or Ford without Authorization, by Circumvention or by Deception' (私越冒度關津) of the Ming Code. See 'Code of the Great Ming' Da Ming lü jijie fuli 1740 (大明律集解附例), hosted at Legalizing Space in China, http://lsc.chineselegalculture.org/eC/DMLJJFL_1610/8.5.3.241, accessed 06/02/2019. For a detailed exploration of the porousness of Ming borders, see Henry Serruys, 'Chinese in Southern Mongolia During The Sixteenth Century', *Monumenta Serica* 18 (1959): 1–95.

privilege. The establishment of Ma Shouzhen's and Ma Laichi's paths must be seen within the early 18th century context, wherein an earlier period of connection to Central Asia was giving way to an era of disconnection. As Thum observed for the Tarim Basin, restrictions on travel to places beyond its limits – the interior, or to Ferghana – did not preclude pilgrimage to shrines in those places entirely. Nevertheless, the corresponding freedom of movement permitted *within* the Tarim Basin encouraged the development of local pilgrimage traditions, unfettered by those rules.³⁹ The same is true for the development of the Gansu traditions. The intense veneration of Āfāq is occasioned by this, perhaps: rather than lone -seekers searching for truth in distant lands beyond the passes, this was the time the Master himself, Naqshbandi shaykh and descendant of the Prophet, came to Gansu.

Mobility is built into the genealogy of Sufi traditions. *Silsila* (C. 道統) – the all-important chains of initiation – collapse time and space, connecting masters in rural Gansu directly to the Prophet himself. Sufi preachers roamed widely: the trading background of both Laichi and Shouzhen is no coincidence. Networks connected believers in otherwise distant centres, a pattern quite different from the otherwise intensely local village mosque communities of the *qadīm* (A. old), as non-Sufi Chinese Muslim communities are known.

In the case of the Mufti, the blood connection to Āfāq and the line of distant masters sanctified a profound localisation of the tradition, manifested in the intense attachment to Didao and the gongbei of Ma Shouzhen, the physical symbols of their genealogy. The subsequent seven shaykhs were all buried there, and it was at the heart of a specifically Mufti religious geography, connecting Didao town to the strong Mufti presence that developed in Xining, where the tariqa was known as the 'Great Association of Lintao (臨洮大會).⁴⁰ If the single extant painting of the Qing gongbei is to be believed, the site was an elaborate complex set into the hills of Didao, laid out in accordance with

³⁹ Rian Richard Thum, *The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014), 158.

⁴⁰ Lintao is an alternative name for Didao. This same attachment to landscape is found in Zhang Chengzhi's History of the Soul 《心靈史》, his modern mythologies of the Jahriyya set in the arid landscapes of Xihaigu. Likewise, the attachment seen in the Chinese Qadariyya to refuge spaces and miracle sites. On Sufi tombs in China, see Dru C. Gladney, 'Muslim Tombs and Ethnic Folklore: Charters for Hui Identity', *The Journal of Asian Studies* 46, no. 3 (1 August 1987): 495–532. See also Zhang Chengzhi 張承志, *Xinling shi* 心靈史 [A History of the Soul] (Changsha: Hunan wenyi, 1999). Wang Shoukuan 汪受寬, 'Da hui menhuan kaobian 大會門宦考辨 [Textual Research on the "Great Association" Menhuan]', *Qinghai shifan xueyuan xuebao*, no. 04 (1981): 61–64.

Chinese geomantic requirements: mountains behind and water in front.⁴¹ The Mufti considered pilgrimage to the Eastern Gongbei as equivalent to making the Hajj pilgrimage.⁴² As pilgrimage to Mecca was beyond the reach of all but a select few, this made the Didao centre particularly important to Mufti adherents. For the Huasi, meanwhile, the connection to a Turkic world sanctified the creation of their own network of shrines across the Sino-Tibetan borderlands, themselves now also brought within the ambit of the Qing empire. Frontiers closed in one direction, as they opened in another.

Colonial Ambitions of the Yongzheng Emperor: Lobzang Danjin, the Partition of Amdo, and the Spread of Sufism in He-Huang

The same Qing drive toward expansion that resulted in the end of Zungharia and conquest of the Tarim Basin, also, paradoxically, provided the Gansu menhuan with their own space in which to expand.. The partition of Amdo enacted in the wake of the rebellion of Lobzang Danjin (1723) pushed the boundaries of the Qing empire outwards into He-Huang, as direct rule was enacted over Amdo's agrarian fringes. And as with the other expanding empires of that age, behind the soldiers followed traders and missionaries: Ma Laichi and his miracles.

The history of Qing attempts to define space in Amdo/Qinghai truly begins in 1723 with the rebellion of Lobzang Danjin (Tib. bLo bzang bstan 'dzin; Ch. Luobuzang Danjin 羅卜藏丹津). The rebellion itself had begun as yet another power struggle among the Khoshud princes of Kokonor. In this case, the Qing interpreted the fighting as a rebellion due to its implications for the Zunghars and Tibet.⁴³ The rebellion itself was swiftly crushed by Nian Gengyao (年羹堯 1679-1726), but the region was left in ruins with over 80,000 dead.⁴⁴ The pacification process included a complete overhaul of the administration of the region. The Lifan Yuan (C. 理藩院, M. tulergi golo be dasara jurgan) conducted extensive research before dividing the Kokonor Khoshud into two wings and

⁴¹ The painting now hangs in the entrance hall of the modern Mufti Eastern gongbei in Didao.

⁴² Ma Tong 馬通, *Gansu Huizu shi* 甘肅回族史 [*History of Gansu Muslims*] (Lanzhou: Gansu renmin, 1994), 190.

⁴³ Kato Naoto, 'Lobzang Danjin's Rebellion of 1723', in *The Tibetan History Reader*, ed. Gray Tuttle and Kurtis R. Schaeffer (New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2013), 425.

⁴⁴ Luciano Petech, 'Notes on a Tibetan History in the 18th Century', *T'oung Pao* 52:4-5 (1996): 276 – 292.

twenty-nine banners, led by hereditary nobles selected for their loyalty to the Qing.⁴⁵ In 1725, the post of Xining *amban* (M. lit. 'great official', C. 大臣) was formally established, with a remit to manage governmental and ritual affairs relating to the Mongol and Tibetan populations of Qinghai, working closely with the relevant aristocrats and lamas.⁴⁶ The banners were further divided into units of around a hundred households, allocated pasturelands and forbidden to cross the borders of the terrain that the Qing had defined for them, nor to cross into the lands of the interior (i.e. those regions governed under the system of counties and magistrates).⁴⁷ The Tibetan groups to the south and east of Xining were now separated from the Mongols to whom they had previously remitted their grain tax, and brought under the administration of a magistrate installed initially in Hezhou. Each clan (*zu* 族) appointed a hundred-household head and was registered for tax, albeit with a deliberately light tax burden. For those under banner rule, the times when they could cross into the interior were restricted to biannual yearly markets held at designated border towns.⁴⁸ Major monasteries, many of which had held vast tracts of land, were at least theoretically now stripped of their incense households, to be supported instead by grants from the state.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ The Lifan Yuan is sometimes rendered in English as 'the Court of Colonial Affairs', although the Manchu name simply translates as 'Department for Administering the Outer Regions'. Staffed primarily by Manchus and Mongols, it had broad responsibilities for dealing with Inner Asian populations in the north-west.

⁴⁶ C. *Xining banshi dachen* 西寧辦事大臣. It has been suggested that the post effectively existed for some years before its formal creation. Although the official term of service for the post was three years, most appointed to it were experienced administrators who had served in the Lifan Yuan and many served multiple terms. See Dai Yan 戴燕, *Xining banshi dachen shulüe* "西寧辦事大臣述略" [A Brief History of the Xining Ambans], *Qinghai Shifan Daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui xueban)*, no. 01 (1992): 108–13.

⁴⁷ Uradyn Erden Bulag, *The Mongols at China's Edge: History and the Politics of National Unity*, World Social Change Y (Lanham ; Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 26. See Oidtmann's analysis of this process for the Chaghan Nomun Han for its outcomes. Oidtmann, 'Between Patron and Priest: Amdo Tibet Under Qing Rule'.

⁴⁸ For Nian Gengyao's 13 Articles and the 12 Prohibitions, see Veritable Records of the Yongzheng era 清雍正朝實錄, entry beginning 總理事務王大臣等、遵上日議覆。撫遠大將軍年羹堯、條奏青海善後事宜十三條, YZ 02 05 00, accessed via Airusheng database, <http://small.wenzibase.com/spring/front/use>, 10/09/2018. See also Nian Gengyao 年羹堯, "Twelve Prohibitions for Qinghai" (禁約青海十二事) in First Historical Archives of China 中國歷史第一檔案館, *Yongzheng chao hanwen zhupi zouzhe huibian* 雍正朝漢文硃批奏摺彙編 [Collected Chinese Language Vermilion Rescript Memorials of the Yongzheng Era], (Nanjing: Jiangsu, 1989), 27–43. Mu Shouqi 慕壽祺, *Gan Ning Qing shilüe* 甘寧青史略 [An Outline History of Gansu, Ningxia and Qinghai], ed. Zhao Yuanzhen 趙元貞 and Li Bing 李炳, 10 vols (Taipei: Guangwen shuju, 1972) Vol 6, juan 18:15–16a, 28b–30.

⁴⁹ Reforms to monasteries – although still impactful – were not fully implemented. See Brenton Sullivan, 'The Mother of All Monasteries: Gonlung Jampa Ling and the Rise of Mega Monasteries in Northeastern Tibet' (University of Virginia, 2013), 323–352.

There was a transformative intent embedded in Nian Gengyao's reforms. Their immediate purpose was to break the power of the Khoshud Mongols of the Kokonor, to ensure that there could be no further possibility of challenges to either Qing suzerainty over Tibet nor alliances with the Zunghars.⁵⁰ All those resident within the newly designated Xining Prefecture (西寧府), and the new counties created within it – Guide (C. 貴德, T. Khri ka), Danga'er (C. 丹噶爾, Mon. Dan gar, T. stong 'khor), Bayanrong (巴燕戎, T. ba yan rong, Mon. Bayan rong) and Xunhua (循化 T. ya rdzi) – were to be brought under direct administration, their subject populations transformed into commoner-subjects (民), subject to the same laws as the Han.⁵¹ Although broadly within the ambit of empire since the Ming, the intent was to bring He-Huang fully into the administrative fold, a process which should have regularised the older systems of broadly independent local leaders, with titles conferred by the Ming, bringing them under the jurisdiction of the yamen and its attendant official.

The process was costly, and slow. In Xunhua, the Muslim Salar populations were registered in 1728, the Xunhua garrison town established in 1730, and it was given its own magistrate (同知) in 1762.⁵² Temples were constructed to the deities of sinophone administration: a City God Temple (城隍廟), a Guandi Temple (關帝廟), a Temple to the Source of the Yellow River (河源廟).⁵³ The name of Xunhua itself, bestowed on the new fortified town by the Yongzheng Emperor himself, denotes the intention: 'xun hua' translates as either 'to become good' or 'to become obedient'.⁵⁴ County lines were further drawn in such a way as to re-orientate Tibetan populations towards the Qing centres of Lanzhou and Xining, away from Lhasa and connections to Kham and Sichuan. The extent of the Yongzheng Emperor's transformative designs has drawn the attention of scholars in other contexts: the drawing of the boundary between Guizhou and Yunnan in 1726 betrays much the same logic.⁵⁵ This was a very deliberate attempt to remake

⁵⁰ This the reforms achieved admirably. The banners had collapsed almost utterly by the 1800s.

⁵¹ Oidtmann has dealt extensively with this issue, and its consequences. Oidtmann, 'Between Patron and Priest: Amdo Tibet Under Qing Rule' 363.

⁵² The residence for the magistrate was built in Hezhou. It was only after the 1781 Rebellion that the Emperor insisted that the Xunhua magistrate must be resident in Xunhua. Gong, *Xunhua ting zhi*, 99.

⁵³ Gong Jinghan, *Xunhua ting zhi*, 205-210; Deng Chengwei 鄧承偉, *Xining fu xu zhi* 西寧府續志 [Continued Gazetteer of Xining], ed. Wang Yu 王昱 (Xining: Qinghai renmin, 2015), 72.

⁵⁴ Gong Jinghan, *Xunhua ting zhi*, 76.

⁵⁵ On the politicised drawing of this border and its relationship to mint metal extraction, see Nanny Kim (Heidelberg), unpublished manuscript, viewed by kind permission of the author, 2017.

Amdo: the Lobzang Danjin reforms represent the beginning of the place now called Qinghai.

Although the intent was to transform, in practice the subprefectures of He-Huang became halfway houses: poised between the ‘inner lands’ (*neidi* 內地) and the ‘outer realms’ (*guanwai* 關外). This distinction was not just rhetorical: it encoded a set of ideas about the nature of appropriate governance for the peoples of each area, which can roughly be defined as ‘direct, Chinese-style administration’ in the interior, and ‘indirect rule’ in the outer. For some officials and writers, it was a split between civilization and barbarity, the ordered interior versus the wild outer. For others, it was not a judgement, but nevertheless indicated a split between an agrarian world and a nomadic one, with corresponding ideas of how the subject populations of each should behave.⁵⁶

The four subprefectures, Danga’er, Xunhua, Bayanrong and Guide, formed a bulwark between inner administration and the outer systems of indirect rule like the Khoshud Mongol banners, wherein the Qing continued to enfeoff local nobility and subcontract all aspects of governance to them. Furthermore, it was recognised that the Qing law codes were not appropriate to govern the Fan (番) population of the area, including Salars. A ‘Fan Code’ (番例, often ‘the Tibetan Codes’) was drawn up on basis of the extant Mongol Code. Although intended to be temporary, the Fan Codes were still in use when the Qing fell in 1911: a civilizing project half-implemented, never entirely abandoned.⁵⁷ A bewildering patchwork of different forms of administration came to co-exist in Xunhua and its neighbours: the Great Qing Code (大清律例) alongside Fan codes, *tusi* under the jurisdiction of the magistrate, monastic estates and pastureland grazed in common by the clans.

The unusual status of this region is perhaps best represented cartographically. Mapping the late nineteenth century county boundaries shows the four subprefectural *ting* (廳) units as poised between the interior (*xian* 縣 and *zhou* 州), and the banner (*qi* 旗) and *tusi* (*si* 司) governed-units of the exterior (see Fig. 3, below). The designation of ‘subprefecture’ (*ting* 廳) is a distinctive one within the Qing administrative system. William Skinner identifies it being reserved for regions of particular strategic

⁵⁶ Devon Dear found something akin in her study of the economic life of Qing Mongolia. Dear, ‘Marginal Revolutions’.

⁵⁷ Discussions of Tibetan Code here is all based on Max Oidtmann. Oidtmann, ‘Between Patron and Priest’, 407-9.

significance.⁵⁸ The four subprefectures are the only four with *ting* status in the northwest. Furthermore, the Draft History of the Qing lists Guide, Xunhua, Taozhou and Bayanrong as the seats of ‘Magistrates for Pacifying Fan Affairs’ (撫番同知), the only four so listed across the entire empire.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, the extension of law and tax-collecting into these areas meant that the Qing became increasingly enmeshed in governance of He-Huang, whether they wanted to be or not. Over the course of the 18th century, the resident offices in the He-Huang subprefectures were gradually made higher appointments, in recognition of the complexity of their tasks. Guide was granted its own magistrate in 1792, whilst Bayanrong’s prefect (通判) was upgraded to a magistrate in 1829. Despite the intention of Nian’s reforms, the old, Ming line of the Twenty-Four Passes of Hezhou remained a crucial dividing line, as the Qing saw it: the key barrier that the (mostly) sinophone world inside the passes from the (mostly) Tibetophone one beyond (see Fig. 4, below).⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Qing government has been characterised as ‘a government of men, not of laws’, whereby control was assured by the strategic placement and ranking of officials. In Skinner’s terms, this system gives a ‘span of control’, defined as the number of subordinate units under a higher one. A narrow span of control results in higher ranking officials reporting directly to their superiors and the capital, allowing for much closer oversight of happenings in an area. The apotheosis of this form of rule is thus direct military control. *Ting* have a much narrower span of control than standard counties (縣). William Skinner, *The City in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1977), 303.

⁵⁹ The prefect of Lifan 理番 in Ngawa (Sichuan) had a similar title ‘magistrate governing the Tibetans’ (理番同知). Nowhere else did. Zhao Erxun 趙爾遜 et al, *Qing shi gao* 清史稿 [Draft History of the Qing], juan 64, Record 39 志三十九, Geography 11 地理十一, Xining fu (西寧府), accessed from ctext CADAL digitization project, <https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=767411&remap=gb#p10>, 10/11/2018.

⁶⁰ Fig. 4, “The 24 Passes of Hezhou” (河州鎮城通番二十四關要隘與圖), from Nayanceng 那彥成 and Song Tingsheng 宋挺生, *Nayanceng Qinghai zouyi* 那彥成青海奏議 [Nayanceng’s Qinghai Memorials] (Xining: Qinghai Renmin, 1997), 22-23.



Fig. 3. He-Huang and Taoxi, with subprefectures marked. Map credit Hannibal Taubes, 2018.

All boundaries below are approximate. Neither Guide nor Xunhua had strongly defined southern borders: rather, their authority faded out.



Fig 4. The 24 Passes of Hezhou, c. 1822. Note that south is up, and the passes into He-Huang are to the right and top

It was this newly colonized space that Ma Laichi returned to, following his time in Mecca. Thus commenced a career preaching across He-Huang from around 1730 onwards: a life and a *menhuan* founded on the premise of mobility and the crossing of borders.¹³⁸

In Laichi's hagiographies, he debated against lamas and *khutuktu* – as *Āfāq* himself had done. He re-converted the Salar population to Islam and converted the Tibetans on the north side of the river in Bayanrong.¹³⁹ He quickly gained a significant number of Salar followers – most accounts suggest that the Salar gong had accepted his teachings in their entirety by around the 1740s. It remained normal for Huasi leaders to take Salar wives and to speak Salar, and their links to both Bayanrong and Xunhua remained strong prior to the 1860s.¹⁴⁰ The Hezhou Muslims developed strong links to their Salar co-religionists, and it is likely that the Qing decision to push the borders of Gansu west encouraged a significant number of them to migrate into Salar villages and to trade across the old line of the Ming borders. The establishment of Green Standard garrisons across the area also moved Sinophone Muslims from Hezhou into He-Huang.

As his hagiographies tell, Ma Laichi then travelled south from Xunhua to Bao'an (保安), the fort at the entrance to the Rebong valley, where he converted a number of villages. The population converted around Rebong were most probably the Monguor ancestors of the modern Bao'an minority, who now reside on the eastern slopes of the mountains between Hezhou and Xunhua. The Muslim Monguors were forced to leave

¹³⁸ The direction of Laichi's mobility was partly dictated by the fact that the deep gorges of the Yellow River meant that despite the mountains of the Jishi Pass, Xunhua and the Salar *gong* remained more easily accessible from Hezhou than from Xining. This particular problem vexed administrators to the fall of the Qing: the civil administration of Xunhua was repeatedly transferred from Hezhou to Xining and back. The military administration remained constant: the garrisons at Xunhua, Bao'an and Qitai were consistently under the command of the Hezhou Regional Commander (河州總兵).

¹³⁹ There is a Tibetan Muslim population on the north side of the river, most famously at Khargang. The region is sometimes called 'the outer five gong' (外五工), 'gong' being the Salar administrative unit, normally meaning village cluster focused around a central mosque, which directed the religious and legal affairs of the district. The population is sometimes described as Salars who Tibetanized rather than Tibetans who converted. The depth of the influence of Ma Laichi on the area, however, is well attested. Yongdrol Tsongkha 宗喀·羨正岡布 and Julang 巨浪, 'Dangdai liudong renkou da chao xia Hualong Kaligang, Qunkuo'er, Gandu deng an di Wo Hui wenhua rentong bianqian yanjiu 當代流動人口大潮下化隆卡李剛、群廓爾、甘讀等三地幹回文化認同變遷研究 [Cultural Identification and Change in the Three Tibetan Muslim Communities of Hualong, Khargang and Gandu in the Present Conditions of Mass Migration]', in *Zhongguo minzu xue, di shiwu ji* 中國民族學, 第十五輯 [*China Ethnography, Vol 15*], ed. Gao Yongjiu 高永久 (Lanzhou: Gansu renmin, 2015), 98–108.

¹⁴⁰ The Huasi influence over the Salar gong remained unrivalled until the death of the shaykh Ma Guiyuan, and the rise of Musa Aye (木撒阿爺), a Salar Qadiriyya master, in the late nineteenth century.

Bao'an during the Tongzhi period rebellions. However, their continued residence in Bao'an prior to that point – apparently without significant friction – suggests that conversion to Islam did not *have* to be political in its implications.

Ma Laichi's hagiography continues that his Rebgong converts were about to hold a conversion festival when a guard of armed men arrived from Lanzhou to arrest Laichi. Laichi consented to go with them against the wishes of his followers, and was sentenced to death. Petitions from Xining, from the Salars and from Hezhou were sent to Beijing written on snow-white paper, and the court dispatched officials to investigate. The Emperor exonerated Laichi, had him freed and returned to his hometown. His chronicle, the Mingshale (C. 溟沙勒, A. *Munshar*) was stamped with the seal of the Emperor's approval. The Lanzhou commander who had originally had Laichi arrested was suitably admonished and had Laichi escorted back to Hezhou.¹⁴¹

Laichi spent the rest of his old age preaching around Hezhou, Taozhou and in the interior. He coordinated the rebuilding of the Flowery Mosque (Huasi 花寺) in Bafang. Following his death, probably in 1753, his followers erected a gongbei over his grave in 1766.¹⁴² The careers of the subsequent shaykhs further developed the influence of the Huasi across He-Huang: third shaykh Ma Guangzong (馬光宗, d.1826) was buried near Bayanrong, and a gongbei established there for him; his successor (d.1843) was buried in Xining.¹⁴³ The spread of Huasi gongbei across He-Huang connected the region back to the Ma Laichi's gongbei in Hezhou: the bones of the shaykhs a claim to spiritual territory.

Ma Laichi's Khufiyya, in short, crossed boundaries. His teaching connected the old interior to the newly incorporated regimes. Muslim traders, fluent in Salar, Tibetan and Chinese, and with connections to all these places, were more easily able to navigate the emerging borderland regimes. By the time of Ma Laichi's death, he had transformed Islam in the northwest: connecting believers in distant mosques into a single

¹⁴¹ In an alternative version of this tale, the Governor-General first intended to sentence Laichi to death on hearing that his holy text was called the 'Daylight Murder' (明殺), but on seeing Laichi's master appear behind him, realised that Laichi was genuine and instead sent him to Beijing, where he preached in the Ox Street Mosque for a time. Descendants of the Huasi Menhuan Founder, 'Famed Chinese Islamic Scholar: the Huasi Menhuan Founder' (中國伊斯蘭教卓明學者: 華寺門宦道祖) in Li Weijian 李維建 and Ma Jing 馬景, *Gansu Linxia menhuan diaocha* 甘肅臨夏門宦調查 [Survey of menhuan in Linxia, Gansu] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 2011), 264.

¹⁴² This account is based on the Legend of the Huasi master 華寺太爺傳奇, but with the dates corrected. Linxia Huasi Gongbei Committee, *Huasi taiye chuanqi*, 22-30.

¹⁴³ 'Famed Chinese Islamic Scholar' in Li and Ma, *Gansu Linxia menhuan diaocha*, 264.

organisation with a focal point, quite unlike the traditional *qadim* village mosques.¹⁴⁴ The Mufti, too, expanded into He-Huang, garnering a following around Xining and in the town of Tongkhor, a trading post serving the Mongol banners near the Kokonor.

Hongshuiquan Mosque, introduced at the start of this chapter, was constructed precisely as this expansion occurred: a tribute to a diverse world in which lamas and imams competed to make rain, in which Muslims married Tibetans, shared certain worship sites, a world in which Muslim leaders could be seen as reborn enlightened beings, and in which Muslims would perform corvée labour for monasteries, alongside everyone else.¹⁴⁵

Boundary-Crossing Lowlifes

*'Following investigation Su Cheng is found to have habitually privately travelled outside the passes, and done business in Mongol and nomadic Tibetan areas, he and the Gangzan headman Dorje as well as others swore an oath of brotherhood. He ordered his son Su Forty-nine to correspond with nomadic Tibetans and further ordered his employee Ma the Little Manla to hide among the Gangzan clan, and all manner of illegality...'*¹⁴⁶

Menhuan crossed borders. In the case of Ma Laichi, these were both linguistic borders, the physical borders of Qing rule, and the ethno-legal boundaries between subjects, as Qing officials perceived them to exist. For the state, there was both a utility to this and a threat.

Qing governance in He-Huang was founded on the basic principle of the control of movement: control of who could enter which places and when they were permitted to do so. There is a logic here that is perhaps universal to all systems of indirect rule.

¹⁴⁴ Jonathan N Lipman, *Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China* (Seattle; London: University of Washington Press, 1998), 71.

¹⁴⁵ Paul Kocot Nietupski, "Islam and Labrang Monastery: A Muslim Community in a Tibetan Buddhist Estate" in Marie-Paule Hille, Bianca Horlemann, and Paul Kocot Nietupski, *Muslims in Amdo Tibetan Society: Multidisciplinary Approaches*, Studies in Modern Tibetan Culture (Lanham; London: Lexington Books, 2015), 140.

¹⁴⁶ 查蘇城積慣私出口外，在蒙古野番處交易，與剛咱頭目人多利等結拜，並令伊子蘇四十九子與野番通信，又令僱工馬尕滿拉，在剛咱族潛匿，種種不法…… in Nayanceng 那彥成, *Nayancheng Qinghai zouyi* 那彥成青海奏議 [*Nayanceng's Qinghai Memorials*], ed. Song Tingsheng 松挺生 (Xining: Qinghai Renmin, 1997), 152-155.

Studies of the Ganden Phodrang regime in Tibet for instance have puzzled over its decentralized nature, noting that the powers the centre held – thus that it could be called a centre – were those relating to the right to move. Broad bundles of rights could be delegated to political sub-units, *provided those sub-units remained intact and their members bound to them*. Goldstein’s classic analysis of this problem notes that Tibetan serfs could not leave their estates without their master’s permission and had no way of breaking their linkage with their ruler. The central government, however, retained the right to move through all territory, to run a postal system and mint currency, and as a final court of appeal.¹⁴⁷

Moreover, whilst Qing imperial ideology was still emerging, even in its infancy, it was an ideology based on the idea of the maintenance of separate spaces for separate peoples. Construction of the Willow Palisade, designed to divide off the Manchu homeland, began as early as 1648, with guards appointed to man its gates in the 1650s.¹⁴⁸ There was a clear practical purpose to this: Mongols, Manchus, Tibetans, and Han had different ways of life, and thus required different regulations to ensure the smooth functioning of their societies. Under the Qianlong emperor (r. 1735-1790) when the Qing dynasty reached its apex and Qing imperialism reached its greatest level of articulation, the empire was conceived of as a universal project, as ‘all under heaven’. The ‘multi-hatted’ emperor ruled over a multitude of separate yet equal constituencies, united and resolved in their allegiance to the throne.¹⁴⁹ Thus within the differentiated space of the Qing empire, the maintenance of ethnic and cultural divisions became essential to the functioning of imperial power, a structure reflected in the evolving administrative system.¹⁵⁰ Those objectified in the narrative schema (the five main constituencies being Manchu, Mongol, Han, Tibetan and Muslim) were then required to

¹⁴⁷ Mervyn C. Goldstein, “The Balance Between Centralization and Decentralization in the traditional Tibetan Political System: An Essay on the Nature of Tibetan Political Macro-Structure,” *Central Asiatic Journal* 15, no. 3 (January 1, 1971): 174–177, 182.

¹⁴⁸ Richard L. Edmonds, ‘The Willow Palisade’, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 69, no. 4 (1979): 603

¹⁴⁹ Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1999).

¹⁵⁰ See Michael Clarke, “The Problematic Progress of ‘Integration’ in the Chinese State’s Approach to Xinjiang, 1759 – 2005,” *Asian Ethnicity* 8, no. 3 (October 1, 2007): 263; on environmental history and the Mongolian borders see Jonathan Schlesinger, *A World Trimmed with Fur: Wild Things, Pristine Places, and the Natural Fringes of Qing Rule* (Stanford University Press, 2017); similarly Devon Margaret Dear, ‘Marginal Revolutions: Economies and Economic Knowledge between Qing China, Russia, and Mongolia, 1860 - 1911’ (Harvard University, 2014), PhD diss.

continue to display their narrative hallmarks.¹⁵¹ Qing principles of ethnic separation were matched by regimes of spatial separation.

Imperialisms are rarely coherent: these are evolving, unstable discourses capable of encompassing internal contradictions which make little sense to the eye examining them in retrospect. Crossley's analysis of Qianlong-era imperialism is an analysis of an ideal of empire: a mental construct arguably held by only the elites. The five constituencies did not reflect identities necessarily recognised by those they referred to, nor was there an entirely unified understanding of what they were and how they related to empire.¹⁵²

Returning to the post-Lobzang Danjin reforms, the most significant of these involved the settlement of the banners and the creation of a road pass systems controlling Mongol and Tibetan movement into the interior. Over the course of the 18th century as the Qing attempted to keep peace in Amdo, this most often manifested itself in the belief that if all stuck within their bounds, all would be well. The institutions needed to police movement across He-Huang – networks of military posts and, checkpoints (M. *karun*, C. 卡倫) – developed over the course of the 18th century. The exact location of the checkpoints shifted, alongside the changing demographics of Tibetan and Mongol clans, and with the capacity of the increasingly-stretched state to maintain a military presence on the edges of already far-flung subprefectures. Nevertheless, the principle remained entrenched that those from the interior should not journey outside the passes without good cause, and those from outside should enter

¹⁵¹ There is a vast and ever-expanding literature on the ramifications of the imperial designation of these constituencies and the relationship between this and processes of ethnogenesis, and the rise of discourses of nationalism and ethnicity in the 19th century. Elliot's work on the banner system and Manchu identity is essentially a case study of this process. Note also the presence of 'civilizing mission'-type rhetoric within aspects of the Qing administration: governance of Taiwanese aborigines and rhetoric on the Guizhou frontiers demonstrates the debate over to what extent it was desirable that these people should undergo acculturation/assimilation and to what extent this was desirable. A fairly fundamental in attitudes further occurred in the late 19th century. See, variously Mark Elliot, "Ethnicity in the Qing Eight Banners," in *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity and Frontier in Early Modern China*, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 45–51; John E. Herman, *Amid the Clouds and Mist: China's Colonization of Guizhou, 1200-1700*, Harvard East Asian Monographs; 293 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007); Frank Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 1992);

¹⁵² There was, for instance, no Tibetan ethnonym directly equivalent to the Chinese *fan* 番 in use in 19th century Amdo. Tibetan populations at the time would refer to themselves by religious category, local place terms or the nomadic/sedentary divide, and there is no sense of a fundamental opposition/divide in identity with co-religionist Mongol groups. The modern ethnonym for Tibetans (T. *bod rigs*) has only latterly come into widespread use. See Max Oidtmann, 'Overlapping Empires: Religion, Politics, and Ethnicity in Nineteenth-Century Qinghai', *Late Imperial China* 37, no. 2 (2016): 41–91.

only on certain occasions. The “Concise Extracts on Qinghai Affairs” (青海事宜節略), an 1810 manual of governance, is essentially a chronicle of judgements on border disputes, checkpoints established, and road passes checked between the years 1730 and 1810.¹⁵³

The mobility of Muslims and Muslim preachers was thus perceived as a threat, but this mobility was also *necessary* to the normal functioning of borderland life. From one perspective, a border only has a reality if smuggling across it is possible. Soon after Xunhua was founded, a number of these same Muslim boundary-crossers became indispensable to the Qing regime, as government runners and professional collectors of the grain tax owed to Xunhua by the agricultural Tibetan clans (zu 族). The professional grain tax collectors were known as *xiejia* (歇家, lit. rest merchants). Records from the late 19th century contain depositions in which individual *xiejia* explain that their ancestors moved into Xunhua from Hezhou to take up a *xiejia* position around 1730, and that their families have been employed in that capacity ever since.¹⁵⁴ Whilst a lone deposition is not entirely sufficient to determine the antiquity of the role, it is certain that *xiejia* existed in 1822 when Nayanceng (那彥成, 1764-1833) arrived in the border seeking to resolve a long-running conflict between the Cagan Nomun Han and the Mongol banners near Lake Kokonor over access to pastureland.¹⁵⁵ Instead of sending an army into the grasslands, Nayanceng responded by closing the border, thereby producing a detailed examination of the nature of people crossing said border.

Over 18,000 nomads had reportedly crossed the Yellow River from Xunhua and Guide to head north, and pressure on the banners had sent Mongol refugees flooding into the interior.¹⁵⁶ Nayanceng had concluded that the war was being both facilitated and encouraged by interior traders who would fence stolen goods from raids to the interior. In his view, the increase in violence was in part due to the seditious influence of merchants and other lowlives, and by extension, the growing commercialization and integration of the frontier economy.¹⁵⁷ As the nomadic groups of the grasslands were

¹⁵³ Changbai Wenfu 長白文孚, *Qinghai shiyi jielue* 青海事宜節略 [*Concise Extracts on Qinghai Affairs*], ed. Wei Mingzhang 魏明章 (Xining: Qinghai renmin, 1993).

¹⁵⁴ QHDG, 7—永久—2724, 《歇家馬來遲等為被誣告上的稟》, GX 09 12 04.

¹⁵⁵ See Max Oidtmann, ‘The Collapse of the Mongol Banners in Amdo in the 19th Century: Presentation Summary’, 2010, <https://sfs-georgetown.academia.edu/MaxOidtmann>.

¹⁵⁶ Nayanceng, *Nayanceng's Qinghai Memorials*, 185-186.

¹⁵⁷ Sutton observes that in the Miao pale, Manchu officials tended to blame the evils of the frontier on the immigration of Han population, whilst Han officials tended to blame the savage nature of the indigenous population. Accordingly, Manchu officials tended to advocate isolationist policies, whilst Han were more inclined to argue for the necessity of more contact. Nayanceng's attitude here is entirely consistent with this trend. Donald S Sutton, ‘Violence and Ethnicity on a

also reliant on this trade for essential commodities such as tea and firearms, his solution was to close the border and arrest any individuals suspected of involvement in smuggling commodities across it. His efforts were successful: within six months, the Cagan Nomun Han sued for peace.¹⁵⁸

The settlement to the affair reiterated the same principles of He-Huang governance: individuals wishing to travel to the interior for purposes of trade were to apply for tickets to permit travel, with the tickets acting both as permits to trade and as passports to the interior. The tickets were single-use and further stipulated the quantity of trade each person was allowed to engage in. Good behaviour among Tibetan and Mongol populations was to be enforced through the tickets: those suspected of robbery or similar were to be denied permits to travel and trade by their headman or lama.

Nayanceng identified 20 crossing points over the Yellow River and made the neighbouring Cagan Nomun Han and the Tibetan headmen responsible for their guarding.¹⁵⁹ A reward system was set up to encourage these individuals in competent execution of their charge. Toll gates were to be manned enroute to the major trading centres, including Xining, Xunhua, Guide and Hezhou. Furthermore, the prohibition on illegally crossing the Yellow River, a crime now punishable by death, was translated into Tibetan and circulated by local lamas.¹⁶⁰ Patrols were conducted four times per year into the grasslands to ensure compliance.¹⁶¹

The investigation, embargo and the resultant settlement all caused Nayanceng to ask who was crossing the boundaries and why they did so. The resulting investigations threw an unusual degree of attention onto issues of cultural hybridity and trade, activities which Nayanceng himself was extremely suspicious. His memorials castigate Muslims, Mongols and Han found passing themselves off as Tibetans.¹⁶² Nevertheless, Nayanceng was bitterly aware that the borderland economy needed those who used the boundary as an opportunity rather than a divide. At an elite level, these partnerships were centred on high lamas and Mongol aristocrats, but the traders plying the routes

Qing Colonial Frontier: Customary and Statutory Law in the Eighteenth-Century Miao Pale." *Modern Asian Studies* 37, no. 1 (February 1, 2003): 63.

¹⁵⁸ Nayanceng, *Nayanceng's Qinghai Memorials*, 123 – 126.

¹⁵⁹ Nayanceng's memorials state that 20 such points were identified, in three categories of importance. Nayanceng, *Nayanceng's Qinghai Memorials*, 216-217.

¹⁶⁰ Nayanceng, *Nayanceng's Qinghai Memorials*, 182-185.

¹⁶¹ See memorial No. 98 for full details on troop placements and re-organisation. All was done with the aim of ensuring security along major trading routes and controlling access to market towns. Nayanceng, *Nayanceng's Qinghai Memorials*, 205-211.

¹⁶² Nayanceng, *Nayanceng's Qinghai Memorials*, 142-149.

between grasslands and frontier trading outposts such as Danga'er and Hezhou were crucial as conduits of news and pathfinders for troops venturing beyond the checkpoints.

Hence, Nayanceng commenced an investigation into the *xiejia*, normally invisible in the archives as they were not formally paid by the state. Whilst the rhetoric of Nayanceng's memorials castigates *xiejia* for their untrustworthiness, the system he established highlights their role at the frontiers of official knowledge of Mongol and Tibetan domains. The *xiejia* were the middlemen in this system in several registers: able to travel both physically and mentally between cultures, protected by their personal relationships with the nomads among whom they traded. The *xiejia* were the first port of call for officials seeking information into cases and were often called on to act as translators.

Analysis of the named figures from the cases given in Nayanceng's memorials back to the throne reveals 109 named individuals whose cases were taken through the civil courts. 39 of these are explicitly identified as Muslim, with a further 14 who probably are also Muslim.¹⁶³ Every single one of those named as *xiejia* are Muslim, whilst the further 7 individuals who are not named as *xiejia* but who played *xiejia*-like roles are either Muslim or likely to be so, based on their names and origins. The investigation thus points to a remarkable domination of the cross-border trade by Muslims.

Muslims also dominated illegal movement over the borders. The principal villain of Nayanceng's investigation was a man who called himself "Mamugou" (麻木溝, lit. Mamu Valley).¹⁶⁴ The agents in his illicit gold-panning operation are almost all Muslim and had originated in locations from across the Hexi Corridor: hometowns named include Liangzhou, Suzhou, Zhangye, Hezhou, Liangzhou and Didao. The variety here is suggestive of the vitality of inter-regional Muslim networks in facilitating smuggling and raiding as well as trading. A number are further clearly identifiable as religious professionals by virtue of their given names (Bai *Ahun* 白阿混, Ma *Manla* 馬滿拉) and may well have been itinerant Sufi preachers.

¹⁶³ In the case of these 14 individuals, they are described merely as commoners (民). My tentative description of them as Muslim is based on either name, their associates or place of origin. The lack of information appears mostly in instances where criminals were either not apprehended or died before questioning could be completed.

¹⁶⁴ Probably the name of his village: Mamu Valley is a village in the Gansu county of Anding (安定, now Dingxi 定西), not far from Hezhou. Nayanceng, *Nayanceng's Qinghai Memorials*, 190-94.

The domination of the intermediary, middleman roles by Muslims seen in Nayanceng's memorials was enabled by inter-community Muslim networks, the Sufi *menhuan*, the close connections between Muslim communities and Tibetan and Mongol ones (Salar, Bao'an, Bayanrong) and traditions of bilingualism among trading families. The profits to be made in the cross-border trade, meanwhile, provided both an income for the *menhuan*, and gave the mobility required of a Sufi preacher a simple path to profitability. It is not a coincidence that the families of both Laichi, Shouzhen and almost every prominent Muslim figure of the late Qing began their careers as peddlers, working the cross-border routes.

The Rebellion of Su Forty-Three: the Khufiyya Enshrined and the Huasi Militant

回教一而已矣。

There is one Islam only.¹⁶⁵

The 1781 Rebellion of Su Forty-Three (蘇四十三起義) is famed throughout Gansu, in a way that the Great Northwestern Rebellion is not. It is a tale every elder can tell: the death of the New Teaching Jahriyya shaykh Ma Mingxin (馬明心) on the walls of Lanzhou and the last stand of his Salar followers. While a significant instance of Muslim violence, the rebellion also had the effect of enshrining the Khufiyya as orthodox, confirming the increasing incorporation of Khufiyya shaykhs into Qing strategies for managing Islam in the northwest and the borderlands.

Ma Mingxin's career echoes that of Ma Laichi. He too travelled to Yemen and was initiated into the Naqshbandiyya. He returned with a mission to reform and a distinctive vocal recitation of the *dhikr* (al-jahri), unlike the silent *dhikr* practised by the Khufiyya. He began preaching in Salar areas in 1761, and soon began gathering followers, criticizing the Khufiyya traditions for demanding excessive donations and the practice of hereditary succession to shaykh-hood.¹⁶⁶ Competition between Islamic orders in the northwest had socio-economic implications: these orders survived off the donations off

¹⁶⁵ From the opening line of Gong's introduction to Islamic rebellions in Xunhua, 'Muslim Rebellions' 回變. Gong Jinghan, *Xunhua Gazetteer*, 270.

¹⁶⁶ Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 89-90.

followers, and gained prestige though their ability to settle disputes in their communities and in the eyes of the Qing.

Court cases concerning Islamic practice in He-Huang and Taoxi had reached Qing courts as early as 1730. Gong Jinghan records mutual accusations between Hann Hajji (韓哈即) and a Ma Khoja (馬火者, possibly Ma Laichi?), in which Hann accuses Ma of trying to divide Muslims.¹⁶⁷ Throughout the early 18th century, Qing judges were largely unwilling to rule on issues of Islamic faith. In 1747, when Ma Yinghuan (馬應煥) took his petition against Ma Laichi for heresy to Beijing, Laichi was exonerated. The laws against heresy were largely designed for prosecution of Buddhist millenarian societies, and by these standards, Laichi's teaching was found to be no different from other Islamic practices in Gansu.¹⁶⁸ The story of Ma Laichi's arrest given in his hagiography reflects these events, complete with the imperial seal of approval on his personal text, the *Munshar*, allowing him to take his teaching to He-Huang.

Nevertheless, rival Muslim traditions continued to bring their cases before Muslim courts. As Ma Haiyun has argued, whilst there were genuine doctrinal issues at stake, intra-menhuan conflict was heightened by the administrative divide between Xunhua and Hezhou. Ma Mingxin and Ma Guobao (Laichi's son and successor as Huasi shaykh, 馬國寶 d.1780s) were both subjects of the interior, and when their names came up in court cases, they were simply expelled from He-Huang: their presence was causing trouble, their movement was suspicious and they did not have a right to be there. Moreover, the Salar gong were communities organised around their mosques, with hereditary *qadi* recognised by the state. They also had traditions of bloodfeud, yet murder under the Tibetan Codes merely required payment of a life price (命價), enabling conflict to spiral through cycles of revenge provided the participants could afford to pay their fines.¹⁶⁹ The line between inner and outer here exacerbated intra-menhuan conflict, making Sufism inflammatory in the Salar regions where it was less so in neighbouring Hezhou or Didao.

In 1781, feuding between Jahriyya and Khufiyya flared once again in the Salar areas. Following the murder of an official sent to investigate, Ma Mingxin was taken into

¹⁶⁷ Gong Jinghan, *Xunhua ting zhi*, 138.

¹⁶⁸ NPM 001176, Zhang Guangsi 張廣泗, 《陝西河州回民馬應煥報告回教馬來遲邪教惑眾一案》QL 12 08 06; NPM 001781, Huang Tinggui 黃廷桂, 《拿獲叩關控告馬來遲邪教惑眾一案之回民馬應煥》, QL 12 12 24, Ma Haiyun, 'New Teachings and New Territories, Gansu 1700-1800', 44-45.

¹⁶⁹ Ma Haiyun, 'New Teachings and Territories', Chapters 3 and 4, 70-142.

custody and ultimately executed, triggering rebellion across the Salar *gong*. By the time the area was pacified, the twelve Salar *gong* had been reduced to just eight, and the imperial gaze firmly brought to bear on the nature and legality of the Gansu *menhuan*.

The investigation into the Jahriyya and the nature of their teaching brought firmly to light the confusions around the identity and legal status of Muslims in the Qing empire: notably confusion about the relationships between Muslims of the Tarim Basin (回子), sinophone Muslims of the interior (回民) and Salar Muslims (番回), and the nature of their faith. All three were Muslim, clearly, but all three carried different legal statuses: Muslims in Xinjiang governed largely under Islamic legal precedents through the beg system, Chinese Muslims under the Great Qing Code that governed commoner-subjects of the interior, and the Salar under the Tibetan Code that governed Fan populations in Amdo.

The incorporation of Xinjiang in 1759 acted as a driver for change in high official attitudes to Muslims: the first Veritable Records case wherein the offender was named as Muslim was that of Lin Fu (林福), a merchant from Guyuan, in 1760. Lin's identity as a Muslim was of no relationship to his actual crime (a brawl which resulted in the death of another man, probably also Chinese Muslim), nor his sentence: instead concerns were expressed that waiting to transport Lin from Qumul (Hami) to Suzhou for execution as under normal procedures was inappropriate to the newly settled region. Instead to convey the impression of the swiftness and severity of Qing justice, it was decreed that Lin should be executed in Hami.¹⁷⁰ Even in the earlier 1750 case of Ha Panlong (哈攀龍), where Dou Bin (豆斌) recommended against the appointment of Ha, a Muslim, to lead garrisons in a strongly Muslim area, Dou drew on his 'thirty years in Hexi' and Guyuan background as justification for his claims of Muslim banditry and the inappropriateness of appointing a Muslim commander to a Muslim garrison. Dou's proposal was approved on basis of the statutes concerning the law of avoidance, and Ha transferred to a different post of equal rank.¹⁷¹

¹⁷⁰ Earlier entries involving Muslims (回民) are largely either to do with Xinjiang Muslims or settlement of various groups originally from Hami in the north-west Hexi corridor. See Veritable Records of the Qianlong Emperor 乾隆朝實錄, entry headed 又諭永寧等奏稱固原州戶民林福、與民人馬友飲醉, 互毆扎傷馬友殞命, QL 25 03 00. Accessed via Airusheng database, <http://small.wenzibase.com/spring/front/use>, 10/09/2018.

¹⁷¹ See Veritable Records of the Qianlong Emperor 乾隆朝實錄, entry headed 廣西提督豆斌密奏、臣接閱邸鈔。奉旨、哈攀龍補授固原提督, QL 15 11 00, accessed via Airusheng database <http://small.wenzibase.com/spring/front/use>, 01/03/2018.

The first discriminatory law was enacted in 1762 on proposal by Min Eyuan (閔鶚元), then Surveillance Commissioner of Shandong (山東按察使), mandating harsher punishments for gangs of Muslim thieves.¹⁷² Once entered onto the books, a powerful precedent for different legal treatment for Muslims was established. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that the drivers for legal discrimination against Muslims were either officials who had served in Xinjiang and then been transferred away to eastern jurisdictions, or (mainly) those in Shandong and Anhui, where there were a high-profile series of cases involving Muslim bandits.¹⁷³ Moreover, individual officials differed in their attitudes: Min himself was noted for his dislike of itinerant Buddhist clergy and was later sharply reprimanded by the Qianlong Emperor in 1782 for overly vindictive treatment of Muslims found carrying Islamic classics in Chinese.¹⁷⁴ Whilst the actions of these individual officials echo through the historical record, I would tentatively suggest that at this early stage they were reflective primarily of the individual prejudices of a growing subset of officials. After all, it was in 1775 that the Qianlong emperor banned the use of the character Hui written with a dog radical, and Ha Panlong's son, Ha Guoxing (哈國興) had as distinguished a career in the Qing military as his father,

Although the movement toward legal prejudice did not originate in eastern Gansu, it nevertheless was enshrined in precedent by the time Su Forty-Three rebelled. The 1781 Rebellion left deep scars over the He-Huang area and in its wake, followed a series of investigations into the nature of Muslim belief and population across the Qing empire. Nevertheless, when a series of measures was proposed in the wake of the rebellion that would have sharply demarcated the Muslims off from their Han neighbours, they were rejected.¹⁷⁵ In 1822, when Nayanceng closed the border it was still possible for Muslims to be referred to as *Hanjian* ('sinophone lowlives' 漢奸). Likewise, Chinese Muslims were not necessarily identified as Chinese Muslim in official writing: either in criminal cases unrelated to discriminatory statutes, nor when in service to the state, and there is little evidence that they were consistently registered

¹⁷² Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 94.

¹⁷³ H Theaker, survey Qianlong-era Veritable Records mentioning 'Hui', forthcoming. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 103-166.

¹⁷⁴ Lipman, "'A Fierce and Brutal People': On Islam and Muslims in Qing Law", 107; NPM 403041781, Min Eyuan 閔鶚元, 《奏為遵旨釋放持有漢字回經回民事》, QL 47 06 11.

¹⁷⁵ Gong's inclusion of Tuo Delong's proposals, however, suggests that he may have approved on a personal level: his gazetteer account of Xunhua is overshadowed by the 1781 Rebellions. Gong, *Xunhua ting zhi*, 281.

separately in baojia lists prior to the 1860s.¹⁷⁶ It remains impossible to track growth in Muslim population through gazetteers, as for the most part, gazetteers simply did not record the numbers of Muslim inhabitants in their jurisdictions

Particularly in eastern Gansu, the primary differentiation remained Han versus Fan, sinophone and agricultural versus non-Sinophone and pastoral. Hence in 1806, when the relationship between Muslim merchant Ma Jinzhong (馬進忠) and Mongol prince *qinwang* (親王) Ngawang Dargye (T. nga dbangs dar rgyas, M. Naqan-darji, 1736-1807) came under scrutiny after Ma complained about the cost of road passes, Ma is identified as Muslim only in a single memorial. Despite the imperial suspicion brought to bear on his case – an interior merchant suspected of travelling beyond the passes and entrapping a Mongol noble via debt – his Muslimness was never raised as an issue throughout the case. He is simply a wood merchant from the interior (內地木商).¹⁷⁷

Whilst Muslims were sometimes officially described as ‘fierce’ (強悍), particularly in incidental writing, the same adjective was applied to adulterers, the customs of coastal peoples, and numerous travelling groups: this was standard terminology for broad categories, generally employed by officials making a rhetorical point concerning their jurisdictions. It was not specifically applied to Muslims.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ See, for instance, reporting on jade smuggling in the downfall of Gao Pu in the 1770s: the porters are almost certainly Muslim (profession, surname and connections to Hezhou), but never named as such. The identification of Hui officials serving the Qing remains problematic in many cases, and is often only possible through non-state sources. There are exceptions, as in the case of the Ha 哈 family, where Ha Guoxing is identified as Muslim in a praise authored by the Qianlong Emperor and appended to his portrait as it hung in the Ziguang Pavilion (紫光閣). See, for instance, Yang Daye 楊大業, *Ming Qing Huizu jinshi kaolue* 明清回族進士考略 [Study on Ming and Qing Muslim Graduates of the Palace Examinations] (Ningxia: Ningxia renmin, 2011). Lu Weidong’s study of Muslim population registration produces only slim evidence to suggest registration of Muslim population pre-1860s; this topic would, however, reward further research. Lu Weidong 路偉東, ‘Zhangjiao, xiangyue yu baojia ce - Qingdai renmin hukou guanli tixi zhong de Shaan-Gan Huimin renkou 掌教、鄉約與保甲冊- 清代戶口管理體系中的陝甘回民人口 [Imams, Xiangyue and Baojia Registers - Muslim Population in Shaanxi and Gansu in the Qing Era Household Registration Management System]’, *Huizu Yanjiu* 78, no. 2 (2010): 38–46.

¹⁷⁷ See variously, FHA, Dorgiya 都爾嘉, 04-01-08-0117-008 《奏為木商馬進忠控告原西寧辦事大臣都爾嘉勒換新票索銀一案俟訊明再定擬事》, JQ 10 00 00; FHA, Yuning 玉寧 and Tecingge 特清額 《奏為議結那漢達爾濟將木植大黃抵馬進忠欠賬一案事》, JQ 10 閏 06 09; First Historical Archives of China 中國第一歷史檔案館, *Jiaqing Daoguang liang chao shangyu dang* 嘉慶道光兩朝上諭檔 [Imperial Edicts of the Jiaqing and Daoguang Reigns], 55 vols (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue, 2000) Vol 10, 415 (JQ 10 07 03).

¹⁷⁸ In the digitised *Guangxu huidian shili* 會典實例, *qianghan* is only once used in reference to a case involving Muslims. Most results for ‘Muslim’ within the 1899 *huidian* are to do with the vexing question of where to exile Muslims to, rather than whether different measures should be applied. The presence of substantial Muslim populations in Xinjiang and later in Yunnan made

Moreover, discrimination was not universal, and the sub-statutes against Muslims were not always applied even where they existed.¹⁷⁹ Elsewhere, there are instances wherein Muslim plaintiffs are described as Han – or simply not described as either Han or Hui (context would lead the reader to assume they had the legal identity of an interior subject). Where harsher statutes existed, these seem to have been a response to the perceived cohesiveness of Muslim communities in certain areas. In essence, anti-Muslim discrimination remained uneven, although it was undeniably on the rise. Prior to the 1860s, it was broadly still the case that Hui as a legal identity was a subcategory of Han, rather than an opposite to it: unless certain conditions applied, Hui were treated alike with the Han.

Even of the prohibitions imposed on Muslim communities in the wake of the 1781 Rebellion and the 1784 successor rebellion, most were to do with their movement: this was the objectionable part of their teaching. Rules were put in place designed to break the connections between Islamic communities and eliminate the shaykhs: most pertinently, stipulations that worshippers should attend their own mosque and not invite other preachers beyond their own *xiangyue* (鄉約, village wardens) to participate. Campaigns against both *zhangjiao* (長教) and *ahong*, in which the state in both cases eventually admitted it was wrong after extensive investigation, disrupted the lives of Muslims across the northwest.¹⁸⁰

Within He-Huang the Khufiyya teaching traditions – notably the Huasi, the principle antagonists of the Jahriyya – were largely protected from campaigns that followed the 1781 and 1784 rebellions. Enshrined as ‘Old Teaching’ (老教, orthodox), they fought for the Qing, were rewarded for their service, and emerged from the rebellion strengthened, recognised and semi-institutionalized.

After the fighting was done, the property formerly owned by the Jahriyya believers was confiscated by the state and either auctioned off or distributed to followers of the loyal Old Teaching [Khufiyya] in reward for their service.¹⁸¹ Loyal Old Teaching Salars were rewarded. The two Salar tusi, Hann Yu (韓昱) and Hann Guangzu

both inappropriate destinations, simply as it was viewed as a security risk. Full text searches performed via ‘Legalizing Space in China’, <http://lsc.chineselegalculture.org/>, 04/10/2018.

¹⁷⁹ A case in point being the substatute stating that Muslims should not be eligible for mitigation: in the sole example case I have seen, the judgement is overturned on appeal. Lipman, “A Fierce and Brutal People”, 96.

¹⁸⁰ See glossary. Gong Jinghan, *Xunhua ting zhi*, 276-8.

¹⁸¹ Gong Jingha, *Xunhua ting zhi*, 282.

(韓光祖) originally did not have seals, and it was unclear whether they were ‘thousand-household heads’ or *tusi*. Both were rewarded for leading loyal detachments of Old Teaching Salars in both 1781 and 1784 and issued with seals stating their authority over the upper six gong and lower six respectively.¹⁸² A further nine Salar leaders who distinguished themselves in battle were rewarded with non-hereditary military ranks, prefixed ‘local’ (土) to indicate that these were positions within the Salar force that could be mustered on Qing command, should it be needed.¹⁸³

In the harsh frontier conditions, where caravans travelled as semi-military expeditions and where the Qing expected to be able to call troops from local leaders, leadership roles implied attendant military power: the authority to direct local militias. From the 1781 rebellion onwards, a close connection developed between the Huasi and military activism, as a manifestation of their institutionalization within borderland governance. The career of Xiao Fulu (蕭福祿, sometimes 肖福祿, c. 1754-1829), a Hezhou ‘Old Teaching’ Muslim who had entered the Green Standards and distinguished himself fighting against the Jahriyya in 1781 provides a useful example. As Company Commander (千總) of the Xunhua Brigade in 1784, he distinguished himself once again and was promoted again. During the White Lotus Rebellion, he requested Salar troops to be called up under the leadership of Ma Guangzong (馬光宗, d.1826), Ma Guobao’s successor as Huasi shaykh. In the Huasi account of his involvement, Ma Guangzong led the Salars to victory, but returned with just a handful of men. The Qing sought to reward Guangzong, appointing him to rank of Deputy Commander (協鎮) and proffering lavish rewards.¹⁸⁴ Guangzong declined the money and requested instead to be given enamel tiles to be used in the renovation and expansion of the Huasi gongbei, completed in 1798, and recorded by all later observers as a gorgeous structure, brightly coloured, a

¹⁸² Whilst Gong Jinghan suggests that there was no formal change to their prestige, in the Jiaqing period Veritable Records, Hann Yu is stated to have been promoted from thousand household head to *tusi*. Gong Jinghan further worries the titles to the six gong they have been given extend their authority too far, as this definition is in spatial terms and thus includes the non-Salar in the area. He states that jurisdiction for local leaders outside the pass is defined in terms of authority over people, rather than over geographic area, in contrast to practice inside the passes. Gong Jinghan, *Xunhua ting zhi*, 194. Jiaqing-era Veritable Records 嘉慶朝實錄, entry beginning 諭內閣、長麟奏、土司韓輝宗承襲世職。JQ 06 11 00. Accessed via Airusheng database. <http://small.wenzibase.com/spring/front/use>, 14/11/2018.

¹⁸³ Part of the duties of a *tusi* was to provide troops when needed.

¹⁸⁴ *Xiezhen* is an informal reference to a *fujian* 副將, ‘Deputy Commander’, subordinate to a Regional Commander *zongbing* 總兵, but ranked above the *canjiang* 參將 ‘Assistant Regional Commander’. The title, however, if ever awarded, was honorary only.

tribute to the menhuan's wealth and prestige.¹⁸⁵ The back of each tile was inscribed with the name of a fallen soldier. His residence, thereafter, was titled the 'Deputy Commander's Residence' (協鎮府).¹⁸⁶

Around the same time, a dual structure of authority emerged during within the leadership of the Huasi. Guangzong's brother, Xuzong (馬緒宗), was educated to pass the imperial exams, and did so at the county level (秀才).¹⁸⁷ This parallel inheritance served to ease interactions with the Qing state, providing a status that Qing officials could instantly recognise: the menhuan leadership as local gentry. Little is known of the shaykhs that followed Guangzong, but it is apparent that the Huasi continued in military service.¹⁸⁸ Ma Yongtai (馬永泰), a son of Ma Guangzong, served first as Xunhua Assistant Regional Commander (循化參將), but died in 1855 fighting the Taiping.¹⁸⁹ His son, Ma Kuiyuan (馬奎源) inherited his position.¹⁹⁰ For the subsequent generation, of whom more is known courtesy of their involvement in the Great Northwestern Rebellion, the pattern was clearly established. In Xining, the 6th shaykh Ma Guiyuan (馬歸源) was named 'zongyue' (總約) of the Huasi on the death of the previous shaykh: an official

¹⁸⁵ Ma Cikuo laments that the Huasi will never be able to rebuild to the standard of the Jiaqing gongbei after its destruction in 1896. Ma Cikuo, "Linxia gongbei suyuan", in Li and Feng, *Zhongguo Yisilanjiao shi cankao xuanbian*, Vol 1, 148.

¹⁸⁶ This story is found in slightly different variants in both Ma Cikuo and Ma Tong. See *Ibid*, 148 ; Ma Tong, *Zhongguo Yisilan jiaopai yu menhuan zhidu*, 167.

¹⁸⁷ Descendants of the Huasi Menhuan Founder, 'Famed Chinese Islamic Scholar' in Li and Ma, *Gansu Linxia menhuan diaocha*, 265.

¹⁸⁸ Some versions of the Huasi silsila do not recognise any shaykhs between Guangzong and Rubiao, see Appendix I.

¹⁸⁹ There is a little uncertainty as to where precisely Ma Yongtai served. In memorials detailing the outbreak of intra-menhuan conflict near Xining in the Tongzhi period, Ma Yongtai is described variously as 'the former assistant regional commander of the Huamaying camp' (原仁副將衛甘肅花馬池營參將), and has having served twice as assistant regional commander (兩任參將馬永泰). Ma Tong's interviews with his descendants state that he served as Regional Commander (*zhentai* 鎮台, informal reference to a *zongbing*) in Inner Mongolia, and as assistant regional commander in Xunhua. His death fighting the Taiping meant he was included in the shrine (昭忠祠) to those who died in battle in Jiangdu County (江都縣) where the local gazetteer lists his title as 'Gansu Recommended-Deputy Commander and Assistant Regional Commander' (甘肅儘先副將參將馬永泰). The Huamaying post is most probably the Inner Mongolian one mentioned by Ma Tong's respondents, and it is likely that he began as Xunhua Assistant Regional Commander before being promoted to the Huamaying post, a comparatively prestigious appointment within a major Ningxia fort. NPM, Enlin 恩麟, 090342 《在查西寧華寺回民與循戎撒拉敢於爭教生事》, TZ 02 08 04; Xie Yangeng 謝延庚 and Liu Shouzeng 劉壽曾, *Jiangdu xian xu zhi* 江都縣續志 [Supplementary Gazetteer of Jiangdu County], (woodblock print, 1883), accessed via Airusheng gazetteer database (<http://server.wenzibase.com/spring/front/read>), Vol 12.1:13. NPM 090343, Enlin 恩麟, 《奏西寧地方回民爭鬥事》 TZ 02 08 04; Ma Tong 馬通, *Biansai jishi* 邊塞紀事 [Remembrances of Frontier Fortresses], (Lanzhou: Gansu wenhua, 2012): 313-316..

¹⁹⁰ NPM, Enlin 恩麟, 090342 《在查西寧華寺回民與循戎撒拉敢於爭教生事》, TZ 02 08 04.

position attested in memorials dealing with the 1860s that in effect made him the 'head xiangyue' or chief among of the Huasi, and by extension, the paramount religious leader for the Salar areas.¹⁹¹ His brothers, Ma Benyuan (馬本源) and Ma Zhenyuan (馬震源) both served in the military.¹⁹²

Following the White Lotus Rebellion, officials continued to call on Muslim troops, and particularly Salar troops, as auxiliaries in their ongoing effort to control raiding in Amdo. The partnership did not necessarily prove successful: in 1840, a full-blown military invasion was required to prevent Salar attempts to move into Tibetan areas around Heicheng (黑城) and construct mosques – something they claimed was imperially sanctioned by virtue of their prior military service to the Qing.¹⁹³ Likewise, in 1819 when an anonymous deposition claiming the Salar were on the point of rebellion was printed, stamped with a seal and pasted onto the gate of the Xunhua camp, the Xining amban Cangling (長齡) dismissed it instantly, saying that the Salar had been 'extremely quiet' (極為安靜) since the 1781 Rebellion.¹⁹⁴ By this point, the Huasi line was entrenched in He-Huang governance, mediating (often unsuccessfully) between the Sufi faithful, the state and other.

Other Paths: the Mufti and the Turn Away from Central Asia

Much of the early history of the Mufti has been lost: burnt in the repeated destructions of their gongbei, and driven underground as the tradition became closed and private to ensure its own survival. However, whilst the Mufti were not drawn into He-Huang politics to the extent that the Huasi were, they too underwent a process of incorporation into local politics over the later 18th century. The name 'Mufti' itself is indicative of the role that the Mufti shaykhs played within their local community. A mufti is an Islamic judge empowered to give *fatwas*: in essence, a cleric whose jurisdiction

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹² Ma Tong records visiting the Deputy Commander's Residence (協鎮府) once occupied by Ma Zhenyuan, whose descendants said he was a grandson of Yongtai (more probably a son, based on generational characters). Ma Tong, *Biansai jishi*, 313-316.

¹⁹³ FHA, Qishan 琦善, 04-01-30-0381-001, 《奏為青海黃河北各番回及循化撒拉悔罪投誠縛獻凶賊業經審明辦理并撤兵歸伍事》, DG 30 01 04.

¹⁹⁴ Veritable Records of the Jiaqing era, 嘉慶朝實錄, entry beginning 又諭、長齡奏、審明匿名揭告回民叛逆重犯、請上日辦理一摺, JQ 24 06 00, accessed via Airusheng database, <http://small.wenzibase.com/spring/front/use>, 10/09/2018.

transcends that of the local, lower level *qadi* (C. gazui 尕最). The name ‘Mufti’ is both a signal of the importance of investiture by Āfāq Khoja, and a statement of the role Shouzheng and his successors played in Didao as not just Sufi masters, but as local judges and arbiters.

Although Erie is correct in proposing that formal *qadi* courts and a written Islamic jurisprudence died out ‘comparatively early in the history of Chinese Muslims’, there nevertheless remained significant space at the village level for Islamic legal authority.¹⁹⁵ In both Han and Hui communities, cases that could be settled through mediation at the local level normally were, simply as official justice was both expensive and brutal. For Muslim communities in Gansu, the *xiangyue* often were *ahong*. This was made explicit in the wake of the 1781 Rebellion, when *ahong* were formally converted into *xiangyue*, in effect recognising the role they were already performing and partially incorporating them.¹⁹⁶ The Mufti shaykh, for these village arbiters, was an expert, a reference and an additional source of authority.

The career of the sixth shaykh, Ma Xianzhong (馬顯忠), also known as Ma Jinhuan (馬金煥), c.1741-1797, demonstrates a late 18th century reorientation of *menhuan* practice observed within some of the Khufiyya traditions: away from Central Asia, and towards a sinophone Sufism with an emphasis on service to the state. His choice of name, ‘Xianzhong’, or ‘Manifest Loyalty’, was a deliberate one, occasioned by a secession dispute within the *menhuan*. Ma Xianzhong’s father had been accused of heresy (邪教) by local Han early in the reign of the Qianlong Emperor, apparently as they were jealous of the Mufti prosperity. Ma Jinhuan’s father was imprisoned alongside his younger son Yuhuan (玉煥). As the elder son, Jinhuan should have inherited his father’s position, but Yuhuan claimed that his father, who died in jail, had transmitted his *kouhuan* to him. Yuhuan eventually moved to Hezhou and founded a rival tradition that became known as the ‘Lintao *menhuan*’ (臨洮門宦). His choice of name signifies his

¹⁹⁵ Matthew S. Erie, *China and Islam: The Prophet, the Party, and Law*, Cambridge Studies in Law and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 51.

¹⁹⁶ This was a very confused process: the wake of the 1781 Rebellion saw an initial attempt to ban *ahong* that was later reversed when it was realised that *ahong* were a normal part of Muslim communities. Nevertheless, the overlap between *xiangyue* and *ahong* stuck. Ma Haiyun, ‘New Teachings and New Territories, Gansu 1700-1800’ (Ph.D., Georgetown University, 2007), 140. For a history of the institutional evolution of the system from a state perspective, see Wu Mu 武沐 and Chen Yunfeng 陳雲峰, ‘Qingdai Hezhou Musilin *xiangyue* zhidu kaoshu 清代河州穆斯林鄉約制度考述 [Textual Research on the Muslim *Xiangyue* System in Qing Dynasty Hezhou]’, *Xibei shi daxue bao (shehui kexue bao)*, no. 05 (2006): 115–21.

decision to dissociate from his brother, abandoning their shared generational character.¹⁹⁷

As leader of the Mufti, Xianzhong promoted Chinese-language education, probably including the body of Islamic works written in Chinese now known as the Han kitab. He founded a Confucian Academy (義學) and worked closely with Han gentry in Didao. In recognition for his loyal service, he was eventually appointed to a leadership position (*zongguan* 總管), which carried responsibility for overseeing Muslim affairs, an earlier parallel of the position of *zongyue* later claimed by Ma Guiyuan.¹⁹⁸ The Mufti were gifted a plaque by the Shaanxi and Gansu Governor-General inscribed with the title 'Mufti'.¹⁹⁹

An early Jiaqing period Mufti stele text further reveals the extent to which the tradition's self-conception had evolved from the moment when Āfāq met Shouzheng in Xining.²⁰⁰ The stele gives a detailed history of Islam in China and imperial patronage till that date. The history concludes 'and thus our present imperial court [lit. holy dynasty] respects Muslims, the great Ming respected Muslim writing, the great Yuan respected Muslim talent, the Great Song respected Muslim learning and the Emperors of the Great Tang respected Islam'.²⁰¹ It lists the actions taken by Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong to protect Islam, quoting edicts issued by Yongzheng and Qianlong.²⁰² Qianlong is said to

¹⁹⁷ Ma Yingjia et al 馬英俠等, "History of the Lintao menhuan silsila" (臨洮門宦道統史) in Ma Tong and Ma Haibin, eds., *Zhongguo Sufei pai dianji*, 485-85.

¹⁹⁸ Ma Tong 馬通, *Zhongguo Yisilan jiaopai yu menhuan zhidu shilüe*, 180; Ma Weijun 馬維俊 "The origins and development of the Mufti Madrasa and gongbei" (穆夫提道堂、拱北源流), in Ma Tong and Ma Haibin, eds., *Zhongguo Sufei pai dianji*, 433.

¹⁹⁹ Conversations with followers, June 2017; Tuo Jinrong 妥進榮, *Gansu sheng zhi zongjiao zhi* 甘肅省志宗教志, (Lanzhou: Gansu renmin chubanshe, 2005): 209.

²⁰⁰ The provenance of this text is questionable: the version I have seen is a transcription made by Ma Weicheng (馬維誠) of the Kangle County Gazetteer office from the record in the Mufti *silsila* 《穆夫提道統》, a text probably compiled during the Guangxu period. There are a couple of mistranscribed characters, but the whole is not dissimilar in style to other Muslim stele texts of the period. There is no record of where it stood, but given the singular geographic focus of the Mufti, it is reasonable to assume that it stood outside the Eastern Gongbei in Didao. "Gratitude for Generations of Grace Stele" (感沐歷代褒獎恩綸碑文) in Ma Tong and Ma Haibin, *Zhongguo Sufei pai dianji*, Vol 2, 448-9.

²⁰¹ 故我聖朝大清重回人，大明祖忠回文，大元代重回才，大宋世重回學，大唐皇帝重回教以天子之尊。 *Ibid*, 449.

²⁰² Both are slight misquotations of genuine edicts – see YZ 08 05 06

([https://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hant/%E4%B8%8A%E8%AB%AD%E5%86%85%E9%96%A3\(%E5%9B%9B%E5%BA%AB%E5%85%A8%E6%9B%B8%E6%9C%AC\)/%E5%85%A8%E8%A6%BD4](https://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hant/%E4%B8%8A%E8%AB%AD%E5%86%85%E9%96%A3(%E5%9B%9B%E5%BA%AB%E5%85%A8%E6%9B%B8%E6%9C%AC)/%E5%85%A8%E8%A6%BD4)); Veritable Records of the Qianlong era, 乾隆朝實錄, entry beginning "丁亥。諭、据萨载奏、接准广西抚臣朱椿、咨拏回民海富润案内之改绍贤等三犯。" QL 47 07 00, accessed via Airusheng database, <http://small.wenzibase.com/spring/front/use>, 10/11/2018.

have appointed Ma Biao (馬彪, d.1784), a military commander who rose from humble origins to serve as Provincial Military Commander (提督) in both Ningxia and Xi'an, to repair the crumbling mosques of the northwest.²⁰³ The stele ends with an explanation that to repay the imperial grace, tablets to the emperors are installed in all mosques under heaven. Only in its closing lines does the stele mention the Master Ma, introduced as being both a descendant of the prophet, and the descendant of loyal Ming soldiers who moved from Nanjing to serve in the borders. In recognition of his worthiness – and it is implied, this dual ancestry – he is imam over the city (城內掌教; lit. teaching holder).²⁰⁴ One allegedly Qing drawing of the original gongbei, which now hangs in the modern Eastern Gongbei, shows the gongbei to be built with river in front and mountains behind, with a spirit wall and incense burner, located in the hills housing the other temples of Didao: the Mufti integrated into their environment, their pilgrims encouraged to journey to them rather than the distant west.²⁰⁵

Ma Xianzhong's name also appears on a 1785 stele praising the founder of the Humen (胡門, lit. Way of the Beard), Ma Fuhai (馬伏海, c.1715-1809), commemorating Fuhai's establishment of a madrasa in Guanghe.²⁰⁶ The stele further lists the supporters to the project, which included all ten mosques of Bafang, and 19 villages from the Dongxiang area. Xianzhong himself is listed among the organisers, beside his brother, Yuhuan. According to Ma Zhiyong, nine of the ten mosques in Hezhou were formally *qadīm*, the tenth Huasi, and the leader of the Huasi mosque is named as Ma Yu[illegible], possibly Ma Yuxi (馬玉璽), the name of the man better known as Ma Guobao, shaykh of the Huasi.

The communities listed include almost all of the Dongxiang villages, with the exception of one Qadariyya village and one Mufti. The passage was composed by Mi Tiancheng (米天成) and carved after the calligraphy of Ma Shijie (馬士杰), both of whom

²⁰³ Ma Biao was born in Xining and would have been known to the Mufti.

²⁰⁴ "Gratitude for Generations of Grace Stele" in Ma Tong and Ma Haibin, *Zhongguo Sufei pai dianji*, Vol 2, 448-9.

²⁰⁵ The extent to which the Mufti encouraged pilgrimage to the Eastern Gongbei – as equivalent to the Hajj – remains yet another point of contention between themselves and the other teaching schools of Gansu in the modern context.

²⁰⁶ The Way of the Beard: so named for a legend in which the octogenarian Fuhai's beard overnight turned black, and his whiskers grew glossy and beautiful. The stele is almost always described as located at his gongbei: however, it is clearly a praise erected before his death. It would have become the site of his gongbei following his death in 1809. For an introduction to the Way of the Beard, see Ma Tong, *Zhongguo Yisilanjiao sufei pai yu menhuan zhidu*, 211-217. "Praise to Ma Fuhai", in Ma Zhiyong 馬志勇, *Hezhou minzu lunji* 河州民族論集 [Collected Essays on Hezhou Ethnicities] (Lanzhou: Gansu renmin, 1995).

were Shaanxi military officials. The stele also lists the names of twelve *xiangyue* (鄉約), who appear following the names of the ahong of the ten Hezhou mosques, but ahead of the community donors: at the intersection of religion and society. The range of donors listed suggests a recognition of the Muslim professionals of Hezhou by a wider Muslim society and a reciprocity between different paths.

Ma Fuhai was a man after Ma Xianzhong's own religious principles. Educated in Xi'an, the stele in praise of his thought opens with a quote from the 'Record of Transmitted Practice' (傳習錄), authored by Ming Confucian philosopher Wang Yangming (王陽明, 1472-1529).²⁰⁷ 'Praise to Ma Fuhai' neatly illustrates the manner in which the menhuan were enmeshed in local governance, and the Sinophone turn taken by a number of the Khufiyya traditions. It is worth noting, however that the stele was erected less than a year after the rebellion of Tian Wu which had devastated Tongwei, some 140km directly east of Didao. In the wake of the 1781 Rebellion and the inquisition of Muslims that followed, travel to study Islam in the Tarim Basin had become dangerous again: in 1782 18 Gansu Muslims were arrested in Yarkand for studying with a local master.²⁰⁸ Overt demonstrations of loyalty to the state provided a kind of insurance.

Conclusion

The Khufiyya menhuan traditions of eastern Gansu were deeply enmeshed in the governance of their local areas, playing key roles in the ordering of Muslim religious life in the region, settlement of civil disputes and in long-distance trade. Whilst they rarely enter the archival record in this capacity – existing, rather like the smugglers over He-Huang's borders in a grey area between the local and the extra-local – they emerge as crucial participants in the ordering of borderland life. Institutional Sufism in Gansu and Qinghai was able to profit from its proximity to the Qing border between 'inner' and 'outer': providing the networks to enable trade, the militias that provided additional martial capacity and as skilled local mediators. They were, in effect, the silent partners

²⁰⁷ Yangming is Wang's honorific, and the name that he is most often known by in English. His personal name was Shouren (守仁). The line in question is 道無方體 – "the way is directionless and formless."

²⁰⁸ Qianlong era Veritable Records, 乾隆朝實錄, entry beginning 諭軍機大臣等、前據琅玕奏、葉爾羌回子邁瑪第敏、私教內地前往貿易回民李子重等十八名, QL 47 04 00. Accessed via Airusheng database, <http://small.wenzibase.com/spring/front/use>, 10/09/2018.

to Qing rule in Xunhua: expanding into Amdo as the connections that had founded them, those to Altishahr and Central Asia, were cut by Qing invasion and closure of the borders. The 1781 Rebellion of Su Forty-Three, whilst it cast imperial attention onto Muslims and was itself an additional step in the slow evolution of legal discrimination against Chinese Muslims, also confirmed the evolving relationship between Khufiyya menhuan and state. The Huasi profited directly from it, and the connection between Sufi path and military service – a shaykh and a soldier for each generation – endured. The menhuan system – roughly speaking, an accord between state and paths – endured until the 1860s, when the Great Northwestern Rebellion changed the Sino-Tibetan borderlands forever.

Chapter Two

Zuo Zongtang and the Remaking of the Muslim Northwest, 1860-1874

‘...they forbade the Mohammedans to reside within the towns and cities, but this only led to their gathering in thousands outside the walls or in separate settlements, where they brooded over their lack of freedom, and cherished a hatred towards the Chinese, fanned by the memory of the treachery by which during the war the latter had beguiled them into many a bloody snare....’¹

Susie Carson Rijnhart, missionary to Qinghai, on the lingering effects of the 1860s rebellions

In Susanna Carson Rijnhart’s 1901 memoir of the years she spent in He-Huang, the shadow of the Great Northwestern Rebellion (c. 1860-1874) looms over her own tale: the ruined villages still abandoned twenty years after its end, the separate settlements dividing Muslims from other populations, and in the communities who mobilised reflexively against each other at the first hint of trouble in 1895. The Great Northwestern Rebellion was a traumatic, historical rupture of a depth that the northwest had not suffered in centuries. Even after the reinvading Qing armies under their commander Zuo Zongtang (左宗棠) had left and reconstruction had begun, the scars the violence had left on land and people ensured that society could not simply return to how it had been before.

By the time Zuo entered the Hexi corridor, the decade-long rebellion had left a fractured landscape. Fields had been left to grow wild, the roads were blocked, villages left deserted, yamens burnt and their officials either fled or dead. The toll in lives alone was catastrophic: demographically, Gansu took over a hundred years to recover. Board of Revenue figures estimate a population of around nineteen million in 1842; in 1879 the census showed a mere 6m. Shaanxi’s Muslim population was either wiped out or forced into Gansu, save a single enclave in remaining in Xi’an.² To resurrect Qing

¹ Susie Carson Rijnhart, *With the Tibetans in Tent and Temple: Narrative of Four Years’ Residence on the Tibetan Border, and of a Journey into the Far Interior* (London: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, 1901), 54.

² See Popoff in Edward Harper Parker, “The Population and Revenue of China”, *Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection*, 1897, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/60237006>, 6. The Muslim communities of Shaanxi, meanwhile, were permanently destroyed save for a population in Xi’an.

government in Gansu, Zuo was forced to remake it from the ground up: reregistering populations, rebuilding cities, and remaking governance.

As shall be explored, Zuo's vision for Gansu had transformative intent, envisioning as it did the resettlement of tens of thousands of Shaanxi Muslims into the poor lands of southern Gansu. These policies demonstrate what can be seen as a deliberate attempt by the state to remake space and place along a new logic, designed to ensure specifically that Muslim revolt could not reoccur. In essence, this was a partition of Gansu along ethno-religious lines.

Remaking the borderlands was not and could not be an entirely unilateral process. Zuo's designs for remaking the Gan-Qing borderlands were filtered through the matrix of local connections held by local Muslim leadership, Han gentry and Tibetan elites. Legal baselines for reconstruction and resettlement were established through the negotiation of pacification articles (善後章程). Based on an exploration of the articles for Hezhou, Xunhua and Xining, this chapter demonstrates the manner in which the theoretically uniform principles of pacification framed local negotiations over the new configurations of settlement and authority. As the Qing reregistered population, the state was drawn into the villages to an unprecedented degree to survey, measure and begin rebuilding. In doing so, they gave increased latitude for influence to a new generation of local elites. The very manner of the reconquest meant for certain Muslim leaders – like Ma Anliang (馬安良) and his father Ma Zhan'ao (馬占鰲), who had risen to prominence leading the coalition of menhuan who had fought the Qing - the moment of surrender acted as a moment of rebirth into the reconstituted realm.

This dissertation is predicated on the idea that broader trends of history only come into focus within the prism of the local, and hence this chapter is specifically concerned with He-Huang and Taoxi. To understand, however, the manner in which He-Huang and Taoxi were reconstructed, it is first necessary to understand the way in which they were broken. This chapter provides a brief introduction to the origins and nature of the Great Northwestern Rebellion, before exploring the particularities of the He-Huang/Taoxi centre and the relationship of the rebellion there to the connections between menhuan leaders and Qing officials. I seek here to portray the manner in which the rebellion initially more resembled a collapse of the state than a rebellion, particularly prior to Zuo's reinvasion. In He-Huang, wider trends were filtered through

See Maris Gillette, "Violence, the State, and a Chinese Muslim Ritual Remembrance," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 67, no. 3 (2008): 1011.

the shifting sands of personal connections and long-running feuds. The identification of the Muslims as the rebel element in Shaanxi transformed the nature of the violence in Gansu, making it inevitable that it became one.

The rise of Ma Zhan'ao and son demonstrates the above trends: the manner in which armed groups formed in absence of an effective state. The chapter then turns to Zuo's own understanding of the rebellion and approach to the negotiation of surrenders, exploring in particular his conviction that a permanent peace required the spatial separation of Han and Hui. Finally, I address the significance of the pacification agreements for Hezhou and Xunhua, and the decision to draw a line down the River Tao, banning Muslims from residing to its east.

The Great Northwestern Rebellion, 1860-1874

The Great Northwestern Rebellion goes by a number of names. In English it is sometimes known as the Dungan Rebellion; in Chinese it is generally referred to as either 'the Righteous Uprising of the Shaanxi-Gansu Muslims' (陝甘回民起義) within the PRC, or as the 'Tongzhi-era Muslim Rebellion' (同治回亂) in Taiwan.³ The variety of dates given for its outbreak - variously, 1860, 1861, 1862 and 1865 - speak to the complexity those years of upheaval. A full accounting of the entire period lies beyond the reach of historians, due to both the sheer immensity of the task and a lack of sources. Save from the memorials detailing the reinvasion, themselves prone to elide or exaggerate details as suited the needs of the memorialist, there are few extant sources written during the war. Post-war, a full soul-searching examination of the causes of the rebellion was neither possible nor desirable. As the yamen were rebuilt and records restored, officials compiled lists of the martyred dead and built shrines to those held to have died for the Qing: a centrally-directed, imperial enterprise of memory writing with little room for the ambiguous or conflicting experiences of 1860s violence. Within that enterprise, the multiple rebellions of the 1860s, each separate but linked, were condensed into a single narrative of a Muslim uprising.

There exists an extensive, if now dated, historiography in Chinese on the Great Northwestern Rebellion. Within the PRC, the rebellion is largely understood within a Marxist historiographical paradigm emphasizing anti-imperialist peasant rebellion –

³ The contemporaneous rebellion in Xinjiang is distinct from the Shaanxi and Gansu centres, despite the common religion of the participants. For an introduction to the Xinjiang centre and the aftermath there, see Ho-dong Kim, *Holy War in China : The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-1877* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2004) and James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads : A History of Xinjiang* (London: Hurst, 2007), 124-177.

hence its designation as a 'righteous uprising' (起義). Debates have revolved around the nature of the rebellion and its leadership: to what extent its ethnic nature should be stressed, does the socio-economic dimension mean it can be classed as a part of the Taiping-era anti-imperialist movement or whether Muslim rebels can still be positively assessed in view of their willingness to surrender to the Qing.⁴ Working within this Marxist paradigm, scholars such as Bai Shouyi (白壽彝) and Ma Changshou (馬長壽) can be seen as searching for a place in the history of revolution for the Hui *minzu*. Based on surveys conducted in the 1950s, Ma's collection of oral histories from resettled Shaanxi Muslim communities remain foundational to construction of a Chinese Muslim history.⁵ Such work places the 1860s within a longer history of Muslim rebellion, wherein rebellion is framed in Marxist terms as anti-imperialist and linked to a search for ethno-religious freedom against a background of Qing anti-Muslim oppression.

Post the Cultural Revolution, Zhang Chengzhi (張承志)'s *History of the Soul* (心靈史) and the historical narratives constructed by menhuan traditions of their experiences are also written as histories of martyrdom, oppression and heroism against a repressive state.⁶ Academic scholarship has also largely returned to the 1950s themes, albeit with a more positive assessment of rebel leaders who surrendered to the Qing.⁷ Hampered by the sensitivity of Han versus Hui violence and the necessity of continuing to identify the northwestern uprisings within a wider, anti-feudal movement, recent years have seen little scholarship revisiting the rebellion itself. Pioneering studies have instead focused

⁴ For instance, Ma Xiaoshi is a classic example of the 'peasant revolution' thesis, whilst Lin Gan's influential work established the later broadly accepted thesis that the rebellion was both ethnic and anti-feudal in nature. Ma Xiaoshi 馬霄石, *Xibei Huizu geming jianshi* 西北回族革命簡史 [A Brief History of Northwest Muslim Revolution], Xin shi dai Yazhou xiao cong shu ; 3 (Shanghai: Dong fang shu she, 1951); Lin Gan 林幹, *Qing dai Huimin qiyi* 清代回民起義 [Muslim Rebellions in the Qing Period] (Shanghai: Xin zhishi, 1957).

⁵ See Bai Shouyi's documentary collection. Bai Shouyi, *Huimin qiyi*, 4 Vols (Shanghai, Shenhua guoguang, 1953). Ma Changshou 馬長壽, *Tongzhi nian jian Huimin qiyi lishi diaocha jilu* 同治年間陝西回民起義歷史調查記錄 [Records from Historical Investigations on the Tongzhi-period Shaanxi Muslim Rebellions] (Xi'an: Shaanxi renmin, 1993).

⁶ See Anthony Garnaut, "Pen of the Jahriyya: A Commentary on *The History of the Soul* by Zhang Chengzhi," *Inner Asia* 8, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 29–50 for analysis of this Marxist-Muslim tradition. Zhang Chengzhi 張承志, *Xinling shi* 心靈史 [A History of the Soul] (Changsha: Hunan wenyi, 1999).

⁷ Huo's work was considered a breakthrough in resolving why righteous leaders were so keen to surrender: he argues it was a tactic to delay Zuo's forces. Huo Weitao 霍維洮, "Tongzhi nianjian Gansu Huizu fan Qing yundong xingzhi zai renshi 同治年間甘肅回族反清運動性質再認識 [Reconsideration of the Nature of the Nature of the Tongzhi-era Gansu Muslim Anti-Qing Movement]", *Jindai shi yanjiu*, no. 04 (1990): 49–63.

on the role of Zuo Zongtang (now seen as a Qing patriot and one of history's 'great men'), the nature of reconstruction and post-rebellion changes in society.⁸

Few studies of the rebellion have been conducted outside the PRC. Zhu Wenzhang's work remains largely unsurpassed as an account of Zuo's reinvasion, based as it was on detailed reading of his memorials.⁹ Scholarship in English has also been largely constructed around the same ambiguity concerning the ethno-religious nature of the rebellion and its Muslim participants. Raphael Israeli's controversial theory of a clash between the fundamentally incompatible Islamic and Confucian civilizations, whilst now extremely outdated, nevertheless set the terms for engagement with the nature of the rebellion. In work such as Israeli's, the spark for the uprising is ascribed to communal tensions between Han and Hui communities, those tensions implicitly seen as *a priori* and of natural origin given the religio-cultural divide between the two groups.¹⁰ Lipman ultimately rejects this hypothesis in his ground-breaking exploration of the 1860s, noting the role of empire-wide socio-economic changes and the similarity of the rebellion to the Nian Rebellion.¹¹ Later studies have addressed aspects of the reinvasion, particularly Zuo's fiscal and environmental policy, with some work addressing the dynamics of individual centres.¹² Although Schluessel has done parallel work for Xinjiang, this is the first study to attempt a detailed examination of not just the rebellion, but the social transformation it engendered in the interior provinces.¹³

⁸ See, for instance, Ma Xiao 馬嘯, *Zuo Zongtang zai Gansu: 1869-1880: 左宗棠在甘肅 1869-1880* [Zuo Zongtang in Gansu: 1869-1880] (Lanzhou: Gansu renmin chubanshe, 2005); Seng Haixia 僧海霞, "Wan Qing Shaan-Gan Huimin qiyi yu Guanzhong diqu Han ren xinyang de bianqian 晚清陝甘回民起義與關中地區漢人信仰的變遷 [The Late Qing Shaan-Gan Muslim Rebellion and Shifts in Han Beliefs in the Guanzhong Area]," *Beifang minzu daxue xuebao (shehui kexue bao)*, no. 4 (2009): 33-37.

⁹ Zhu Wenzhang, *The Moslem Rebellion in Northwest China, 1862-1878: A Study of Government Minority Policy* (The Hague: Mouton, 1966).

¹⁰ See for instance Raphaël Israeli, "The Muslim Revival in 19th Century China," *Studia Islamica*, no. 43 (1976): 119-38.

¹¹ Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 217-220. See also Zhang Zhongfu 張中復, *Qing dai xibei Huimin shibian: shehui wenhua shiying yu minzu rentong de shengsi 清代西北回民事變: 社會文化適應與民族認同的省思* [Qing Northwestern Muslim Rebellions: Social and Cultural Adaptions and Reflections on Ethnic Identification] (Taipei: Lianjing, 2001).

¹² See among others, Elisabeth Kaske, "Fund-Raising Wars: Office Selling and Interprovincial Finance in Nineteenth-Century China," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 71, no. 1 (2011): 69-141; Peter Lavelle, "The aesthetics and politics of Chinese horticulture in the late Qing borderlands" in Liu Cuirong, *Environmental History in East Asia: Interdisciplinary Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2014), 213-242; Garnaut, "The Shayk of the Great Northwest".

¹³ See Schluessel, "The Muslim Emperor of China: Everyday Politics in Colonial Xinjiang, 1877-1933".

Seen in the wider arc of Qing history, the Northwestern Rebellion occurred toward the end of the civil war era: in the wake of the Taiping (1850-1864), Nian (1851-1868) and Panthay (1856-1873) Rebellions. These earlier rebellions both catalysed the northwestern collapse, and informed policy decisions and strategy toward its recovery, as part of the wider Tongzhi Restoration.¹⁴ Their proximity perhaps also explains why the Great Northwestern Rebellion has been neglected: it appears peripheral, and occurred at a point when the Qing seemed as though it had won the war, a victory inevitable.

Given the complexity of the events and the lack of any well-defined ideology of rebellion or coordination between different rebel centres, studying the Great Northwestern Rebellion as a single, linear chain of events is problematic – although this is precisely what narrative histories are ultimately required to do. The date most often cited for the formal outbreak of rebellion is that given by Zhu. His patient detective work traced the beginnings of Shaanxi communal violence to a single 1862 dispute in Huazhou (華州) between a Han seller of bamboo poles and a Muslim buyer.¹⁵ The quarrel escalated, resulting in a Han militia burning a Muslim village. Further reprisals followed, and the violence spread to neighbouring areas.¹⁶

As Zhu explains, the threat of Taiping incursions into Shaanxi some months earlier had led resulted in official encouragement of the formation of village-level militias (*tuanlian* 團練). Han units organised under local merchant or lower-level degree holders whilst Muslim units largely formed around mosque communities and religious leadership. The formation of local militias was facilitated by the earlier state embrace of militias in other theatres of conflict: the Tongzhi Restoration and response to

¹⁴ See, variously, Mary Clabaugh Wright, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism : The T'ung-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1962); Pamela Kyle Crossley, *Orphan Warriors : Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Stephen R. Platt, *Provincial Patriots: The Hunanese and Modern China* (Harvard University Press, 2007).

¹⁵ Zhu concludes that the formal report on the causes of the violence from the then Governor of Shaanxi, Yingqi 瑛榮, now collected within the *Pingding Shaan Gan Xinjiang Huifei fanglue*), is authoritative. The report is dated to the 26th day of the 5th month of the first year of the reign of the Tongzhi Emperor. See Zhu Wenzhang, "The Immediate Cause of the Moslem Rebellion in Northwest China in 1862," *Central Asiatic Journal* 3, no. 4 (1958): 316; Yixin 奕訢 and Zhu Xuele 朱學勤, *Qinding pingding Shaan Gan Xinjiang Huifei fanglue* 欽定平定陝甘新疆回匪方略 [*Imperially Commissioned Record of the Pacification of the Muslim Bandits in Shaanxi, Gansu and Xinjiang*] (Taipei: Chengwen, 1968), Vol 8:7.

¹⁶ Later official-authored accounts tend to attribute the violence to Muslim origins. In the case of Shaanxi, this is a retrospective rewriting of the course of events, although it was true in other theatres.

widespread conflict had seen the devolution of defence to regional armies. Encouraging the formation of village militia in early 1862 in Shaanxi and Gansu was intended to provide a solution to local policing and defence in a fiscally constrained environment. Furthermore, the policy was tried and tested from both the responses to both White Lotus and Taiping responses: uncontroversial, and part of a much wider trend towards devolution of local governance to local elites.¹⁷ As in Kuhn's classic study of militia formation in late imperial China, in some cases the new policy merely gave formal recognition to extant militias. However, based on preliminary surveys, the multi-village 'multiplex' militias Kuhn observed in Hunan and Guizhou were not the norm in Gansu.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the formation of village defence associations in 1860s Shaanxi and Gansu had explosive consequences. The countryside was effectively armed, allowing violence to spread beyond the state's capacity to contain it. Numerous local incidents sparked a broader descent into chaos: violence spread swiftly across Shaanxi as local officials vacillated or sided with the Han militias. Muslim soldiers and officers within the nearby Green Standard garrisons responded to rumours that Han gentry and Qing officials were colluding to massacre Muslims, setting off mutinies across the northwest.

The preconditions for this rapid descent into violence are perhaps best understood as a result of the slow compounding of socio-economic pressures rural inhabitants faced and increasing official prejudice against Muslims. Demographic growth over the previous century had pushed the peasantry toward a subsistence crisis. Whilst the population had tripled between the mid-seventeenth to mid-nineteenth centuries, the amount of land under cultivation had only doubled.¹⁹ With government coffers depleted by the efforts against the Taiping and Nian Rebellions elsewhere, the

¹⁷ Philip A. Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China : Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1980), iv-v. See also Wang on local mobilization under gentry leadership in the Jiaqing period, which he argues is key to understanding the response to the mid-century rebellions. Wensheng Wang, *White Lotus Rebels and South China Pirates: Crisis and Reform in the Qing Empire*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England: Harvard University Press, 2014), 6.

¹⁸ See for instance, the foundation of a village militia in 1862 in Wan Family Fort (萬家堡) in southern Gansu as recounted in a later investigation of a murder case. The bureau here was established in 1862 by the Wan clan, and from the details given on their attempts to repel bandits in 1868, they remain merely a village level organisation. This is typical of accounts I have found of tuanlian operation in Gansu. See Zuo Zongtang 左宗棠, *Zuo Zongtang quan ji* 左宗棠全集 [Complete Works of Zuo Zongtang], ed. Liu Yangyang 劉泱泱, 15 vols (Changsha: Yuelu shu she, 2009), Vol. 6 zougao, 636-638 (GX 03 05 18). Philip A. Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China : Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1980), 65-70.

¹⁹ Susan Naquin and Evelyn Sakakida Rawski, *Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 24-25.

ability of officials to mitigate the effects of seasonal drought or other natural disasters was severely limited. Whilst Shaanxi had been formerly prosperous, Gansu had always been reliant on stipends from other provinces to make up for its own lack of revenue and support its extensive military establishment.²⁰ With this money gone, government troops were already on the point of mutiny over lack of pay and were poorly prepared for combat.²¹

Across Shaanxi and Gansu, the Qing fell like a house of cards, as governance collapsed in place after place, each locality responding to the chaos of its neighbours. As Muslim militias laid siege to Xi'an in 1863, rumours of state anti-Muslim pogroms prompted Muslims elsewhere to take up arms. In other places, Han militia moved against their Hui neighbours, opportunistically or to pre-empt an attack they thought inevitable. Elsewhere in the mountainous Shaan-Gan borderlands, dispossessed men – regardless of religious persuasion – turned to banditry. In cities across southern Gansu, officials made deals with potential rebel leaders allowing the Qing to stay in nominal control. The result was a complex patchwork of events, groups and individuals acting along alliance lines that shifted and changed incessantly. It is worth noting, however, that these initial mobilisations did not necessarily follow ethno-religious lines, particularly in Gansu.

In the context of the collapse of Qing authority across the northwest, local political structures began to form from the initial chaos in a number of places, each engaged in a complex negotiation of its relationship to the central government and to other groups. Post-1864, Muslim-dominated political-military centres emerged around rebel-controlled major cities, namely Jinjibu (金積堡), Hezhou, Xining and Suzhou (肅州) respectively. These were loosely organised around existing *menhuan* networks and leaders, but in places incorporated Han or sometimes Tibetan elements. There are few reliable accounts of how these centres functioned. Mass conversions of Han to Islam did occur around these centres: in many cases these were forced; in others, the choice to

²⁰ R. Kent Guy, *Qing Governors and Their Provinces: The Evolution of Territorial Administration in China, 1644-1796* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010), 221. See Elizabeth Kaske on provincial funding in the war years. Kaske, 'Fund-Raising Wars'.

²¹ Zhang Jixin paints a vivid picture of the ineffectiveness and corruption of the local establishment in Gansu through the early 1860s: his account of a bungled grain seizure where disputes and delays among officials and gentry result in bandits burning all the grain. See Zhang Jixin 張集馨, *Dao Xian huan hai jian wen lu* 道咸宦海見聞錄 [Record of Things Seen and Heard as an Official in the Daoguang and Xianfeng Eras] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), 326.

convert appears to have been a tactical one, sometimes to ease the incorporation of Han militias into armies under Muslim leadership.²²

The individual rebel centres were tenuously connected by tissues of fraternal solidarity and personal relationship, and ambiguously linked to the remaining structures of Qing governance. The degree to which a formal government or military structure was articulated varied: the Jinjibu centre appears to have been tightly organised under Jahriyya leadership and had a functioning tax system. However, even here, shaykh Ma Hualong (馬化龍) held a complex and often strained relationship with the Shaanxi battalions who were openly fighting the Qing, in contrast to Ma's strategy of accommodation. None of the above centres held a clearly articulated ideology of rebellion or had the intent to overthrow the central government.²³ Indeed, both Xining and Jinjibu remained technically under Qing control until the moment of Zuo's reinvasion. In Xining, Ma Guiyuan reported to the Qing in his capacity of Prefect (知府) until 1872, whilst the Jinjibu leader Ma Hualong was reporting to Mutushan (穆圖善), the Governor General of Gansu, as an adjutant general (副將) until Zuo's decision to attack Jinjibu in 1868.

Zuo's reinvasions of Shaanxi and later Gansu pushed waves of refugees and fleeing Shaanxi rebels into Gannan, He-Huang and up the Hexi corridor. Although the first waves from Shaanxi had arrived in 1863 and again in 1865, there was a sharp increase from 1868 onwards of refugees into the corridor itself and a further escalation following the fall of Jinjibu in 1871.²⁴ The arrival of Shaanxi rebels, destitute and impoverished, tipped Gansu toward large-scale, open warfare. The Shaanxi Hui were not

²² The issue of those who had either tactically converted to been forced to convert (suijiao 隨教) became highly politicised post-rebellion, with Qing officials engaged in the rescue of kidnapped Han and popular sentiment inclined to regard those who had tactically converted as akin to traitors. The situation during the rebellion, where Han militia sometimes tactically converted in order to serve under Muslim leadership and where desperation produced any number of accommodations, was rather more fluid. One such example would be Dong Fuxiang (董福祥), later a Qing general often mistaken for Muslim due to the Muslim troops he commanded, began his career as a local bandit leader affiliated with Ma Hualong's Jinjibu. Robert Ekvall further notes that some who converted chose to remain Muslim, perhaps partly for socio-economic reasons or and in part due to the rite of circumcision. The body thus marked, it was not easy for them to return to their former communities, should they wish to. Robert B. Ekvall, *Cultural Relations on the Kansu-Tibetan Border* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939), 27.

²³ Jinjibu is occasionally given as a partial exception. However, the characterisation of Ma Hualong's centre as religious martyrs for their faith is a retrospective interpretation following the failure of Ma Hualong's attempt to surrender and his eventual martyrdom/execution. Within Jahriyya histories, Ma Hualong's death is generally portrayed as a sacrifice to allow the survival of his people. See Garnaut, "The Shayk of the Great Northwest," 180-190.

²⁴ Ma Xiao, *Zuo Zongtang zai Gansu*, 41-46.

always welcomed by their Gansu coreligionists, who knew that aiding fleeing Shaanxi rebels would definitely brand them as rebels too.

This portrayal of the outbreak of the rebellion is accurate in its outlines, especially in terms of the view from the centre and the reporting lines back to Beijing. However, to explore the fall of He-Huang, it is necessary to take a step backwards from this narrative of rebellion and to focus in on a single piece of the kaleidoscope. He-Huang and Taoxi were part of this wider picture, but the course of the rebellion there was intimately linked to the entanglement of menhuan politics and local officialdom. The wider trends of socio-economic distress, official prejudice, and the crisis of the empire outlined above were diffused through prism of specifically local conflicts, producing a distinctively local rebellion.

He-Huang and Taoxi, 1860 – 1868

The rebellions in He-Huang can be traced to 1860, two years before the Huazhou incident. The first stirrings of trouble emerged from an inter-menhuan dispute between Mufti and Huasi adherents in the Xining area, itself a recurrence of an older feud. The divide between Mufti and Huasi further partially mapped onto ethno-linguistic lines, with a division between the Huasi Salars and Hui Mufti, although it should be stressed that not all Salars were Huasi and neither were all Huasi Salars. The pressures of drought on an expanding Salar population further catalysed a febrile situation. This, likewise, was a not untypical pattern for conflict in the area: a socio-economic search for subsistence in marginal agricultural areas.

Whilst the Huasi were the still largest menhuan across Qinghai at the time, the fluid nature of Sufi charisma-based spiritual authority produced a vibrant but often fractious ecumenical scene, wherein a single charismatic leader could quickly gain an influential following. Around the 7th month of the year, the Xunhua-based Huasi became concerned over the increasing numbers of their followers converting to the Mufti, and hence for the security of their influence and donation revenue stream in Xining. They thus challenged the Xining Mufti and *qadim* imams to a collective scripture reading within the city. The authorities intervened to prevent the reading, provoking one faction of the Xunhua Salars to attack communities outside the walls. Even as Ma Guiyuan (馬歸

源), then shaykh of the Huasi, urged calm and led the Salar headmen in to beg forgiveness of the Qing, Mufti followers attacked another Huasi village in revenge.²⁵

Referred to as the 'Behatted Master' (*dingzi taiye* 頂子太爺) in Sufi histories – a reference to the official position he held as 'religious community leader' *zongyue* (總約) – Ma Guiyuan's relationship with the Qing was well-established. However, his position as shaykh of the Huasi was not. The previous shaykh Su'erdeni (鹿茸的尼) had passed away earlier that year, and Ma Guiyuan had not yet been able to decisively prove his claim to shaykh-hood.²⁶ With feuds ongoing and poor harvests compounding distress, Ma Guiyuan was unable to control the actions of another charismatic Huasi ahong, Ma Wenyi (馬文義).²⁷ Knowing that troops in Xining were on the verge of mutiny over lack of provisions and unpaid wages, Ma Wenyi continued his opportunistic raids on communities of Mufti and Han settlers. A temporary settlement was reached in 1862, following the dismissal of the Xining amban and the Shaan-Gan Governor-General from their positions for their failure to take decisive action. In their place Shen Zhaolin (沈兆霖) drew up pacification articles (善後章程) designed to resolve the conflict. The articles stipulated that henceforth, although the Salar and Xining Muslims were considered two sects, they were to worship together. Neither side was to be allowed to build more mosques and both were to respect the authority of Ma Guiyuan. Furthermore, Han

²⁵ Ma Tong's account of the Xianfeng era origins of the disputes is based largely on the memorials contained in the 11th juan of the *Imperially Commissioned Record of the Pacification of the Muslim Bandits in Shaanxi, Gansu and Xinjiang* (欽定平定陝甘新方略). An alternative account of rising Huasi-Mufti tensions is given in the *Continued Gazetteer of Xining* (西寧府續志), juan 10, and this corroborates the course of events given by Ma. See Ma Tong 馬通, *Gansu Huizu shi* 甘肅回族史 [History of Gansu Muslims] (Lanzhou: Gansu renmin, 1994), 87-88 for a history of the Xianfeng disputes. The relevant section of the *Xining fu xu zhi* is reproduced in Anon, *Salazu shiliao ji lu* 撒拉族史料輯錄 [Collected Historical Documents of the Salars], (Xining: Qinghai minzu xueyuan minzu yanjiusuo, 1983), 165-166, .

²⁶ The difficulty of demonstrating a claim to shaykh-hood is well-noted. Furthermore, this version of the Huasi lineage is contested by the modern Hezhou-based Huasi, who do not recognise Ma Guiyuan as shaykh. It may well be the case that by the 1860s, the Huasi was already functionally divided into two branches, namely the Xining/Xunhua-based centre of Ma Guiyuan and the Hezhou centre, where the tradition was focused on Ma Laichi's tomb and its custodians. Ma Tong 馬通, *Zhongguo Yisilan jiaopai yu menhuan zhidu shilüe* 中國伊斯蘭教派與門宦制度史略 [Outline History of China's Islamic Sects and the Menhuan System] (Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 1983), 233; Committee of the Huasi Gongbei 臨夏花寺拱北委員會, ed., *Huasi Taiye chuanqi* 花寺太爺傳奇 [Legend of the Huasi Master], (Linxia: Linxia Huasi gongbei, 2013), 34.

²⁷ Ma Wenyi is also known as Ma Gasan 馬尕三 and as the "Third Ahong" *san ahong* 三阿訇.

communities across He-Huang were to form militias and train to defend themselves, a measure probably inspired by the Shaanxi policy.²⁸

Subsequent events demonstrated both Qing strategy for the management of Muslim disputes in He-Huang, and correspondingly, the limitations of their approach. Conflict recurred in 1863 and 1864-5, along the same flashpoints as before. Mediation attempts by Yutong (玉通) and Enlin (恩麟), the new appointees to the Xining amban and Shaan-Gan Governor-General positions respectively, proved clumsy and counterproductive. Ma Guiyuan and his military brother Ma Benyuan (馬本源) were appointed to a series of ever-more important positions, concessions made in the hope that they would restrain their followers. This, however, merely further increased the influence of the Huasi faction and did nothing to pacify the Mufti, by now locked into a vicious cycle of revenge attacks. Whilst this appears to have prevented the fall of Xining itself and to have produced a temporary calm, this did nothing to calm the nerves of anxious Tibetan and Han communities. Initial brawls between Mufti and Huasi followers within trading communities at Kumbum Monastery and the market town of Danga'er then spread to both Han and Tibetan communities. This was partly simply due to Mufti and Huasi efforts to mobilise non-Muslim support and further due to defensive action taken by communities who felt themselves threatened. Further efforts by Enlin and Yutong to calm Salar areas by calling on Lady Ma *nee* Nie (馬也氏), the wife of a deceased Qing commander Ma Yongtai, to advocate peace produced only temporary accommodations.²⁹

Whilst the Mufti Huasi conflict convulsed the Xining area, the spiritual home of both traditions lay over the Jishi mountains - in the cities of Didao and Hezhou, respectively. News travelled fast along menhuan news and trade networks. However,

²⁸ 議政王軍機大臣會同吏部等部、議准署陝甘總督沈兆霖覆奏甘肅善後章程。戊子同治元年。壬戌。五月。壬午朔。Qing Muzongyi Huangdi shilu 清穆宗毅皇帝實錄 [Veritable Records of the Qing dynasty, Tongzhi era], juan 27, accessed through Airusheng client.

²⁹ Lady Nie had been linked to the Huasi menhuan, as her former husband was another direct descendant of founder Ma Laichi – an uncle of Ma Guiyuan. As a noted commander with the Qing, he had possessed standing in both worlds, a measure of which was inherited by his wife. The series of memorials on this particular conflict are fascinating for their detailed insight into official awareness of Huasi politics at the time. See NPM, Enlin 恩麟, 090341, 《奏恩麟西寧華寺助剿回民教眾情形由》, TZ 02 08 04; NPM, Yutong 玉通, 095438, 《奏為西寧西南二川漢民因被回匪屢次焚殺受害過重十室九空一時難於解散現在奴才首倡捐後設法辦理緣由恭摺奏》, TZ 03 03 30; and a petition for aid sent by the 4th Akya khutuktu, Ye shes skal bzang mkhas grub rgya mtsho (Ajia hutuketu 阿嘉呼圖克圖) of Sku 'bum Monastery (Ta'er Si 塔尔寺) NPM, Ajia hutuketu 阿嘉呼圖克圖 099300, 《西寧塔爾寺阿家呼圖克圖懇請調派大兵速赴西寧剿滅回逆之稟文》, TZ 03 08 00.

the escalation of the old feud into outright violence in He-Huang did not prompt the Muslims of Taoxi to any immediate uprising. Muslim militias from Hezhou joined the fight against Ma Wenyi in 1862 when he attempted to cross into Gansu proper, concerned for their own security. In Didao, as news from Shaanxi began to arrive and which was soon corroborated by the arrival of the first refugees from both Shaanxi and He-Huang, the Mufti shaykh Ma Yun (馬雲), the leader of the Han militias and Prefect Tu Xuchu (屠旭初) agreed a defensive alliance. Initially successful, this collapsed following the refusal of Han militia to allow Dongxiang troops to cross the Tao and an influx of refugees into the city. A 'pre-emptive' massacre of some 4000 Muslims sheltering in the city late in 1863 ended any possibility of peace.³⁰ On the 17th day of the 8th month of the 2nd year of the reign of the Tongzhi Emperor (1863), furious Mufti and Dongxiang troops stormed Didao and massacred all those left within, including Prefect Tu. Reportedly, a reinforcement brigade of Qing troops watched from the heights as the violence unfolded but refused to intervene.³¹

The manner of the fall of Didao, just 85 kilometres distant from Hezhou, changed the tenor of the conflict across He-Huang and Taoxi: this was the kind of bloodshed that made ceasefire untenable across the region. The breakdown in governance in He-Huang and the ensuing violence further must be seen as a process in and of itself, that in and of itself hardened and broke communal relations, shattering communities and leaving scars that led the survivors to seek armed revenge. Whilst there are few sources to trace the moment of rebellion, the formation of the loose coalition which took Hezhou in 1865 was likely prompted by a collective fear for Muslim security following the Didao massacres. It was this coalition that Ma Zhan'ao rose to lead: comprised of the Hezhou Huasi leaders, Ma Yonglin (馬永琳) and Ma Yongrui (馬永瑞,) the Dongxiang shaykh of the Beizhuang menhuan Ma Wuzhen (馬悟真), and other representatives of the Humen, Mufti, and the mosque communities of the region.³²

³⁰ Muslim histories and the Xuantong-era Didao gazetteer diverge dramatically on the fall of Didao: Mufti accounts tell of the betrayal of a previous coalition between their leader, the Didao Prefect and Han gentry. The Didao Gazetteer suggests that pressure on the seat from refugees and the approach of the rebellious Dongxiang led to a Mufti conspiracy to rebel, justifying the massacre of Muslims. Li Weijian 李維建 and Ma Jing 馬景, *Gansu Linxia menhuan diaocha* 甘肅臨夏門宦調查 [Survey of menhuan in Linxia, Gansu] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 2011), 136-137; Lianying 聯瑛 and Li Jingqing 李鏡清, *Xuantong Didao zhou xu zhi* 宣統狄道州續志 [Xuantong-era Didao County Gazetteer] (Nanjing: Fenghuang, 2008), juan 7: 7a.

³¹ Zhang Jixin 張集馨, *Dao Xian huan hai jian wen lu* 道咸宦海見聞錄 [Record of Things Seen and Heard as an Official in the Daoguang and Xianfeng Eras] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), 347.

³² Ma Tong, *Zhongguo Yisilan jiaopai yu zhidu shilüe*, 290.

From the little that is known from his pre-Tongzhi past, Ma Zhan'ao was an ahong originally hailing from Monigou Village (莫泥溝), not far from Hezhou. The family originated in Shaanxi and emigrated to Monigou as merchants during the early Qing, but were not notably wealthy.³³ Zhan'ao studied the Islamic classics when young, probably spending time in a variety of Hezhou mosques, and excelled in his mastery of the scriptures. As a young man, Ma Zhan'ao journeyed to Xi'an to complete his training in the Great Mosque, one of the classical centres of Chinese Islam. On return, he became a teaching imam (開學阿訇) and became noted for both his learning and his leadership.³⁴

Although it is unclear to what extent he was formally initiated into the Huasi, Ma Zhan'ao studied with Huasi masters and remained closely affiliated to them throughout his career.³⁵ The close relationships he maintained with the custodians of the Huasi gongbei, Ma Yonglin and Ma Yongrui, were of crucial significance to his own community standing. However, to see him as defined by those Huasi connections alone would be a dangerous simplification of the shifting and multiple sensitivities of the politics he negotiated: between multiple Muslim Sufi orders and non-Sufi communities, the Qing state and the Tibetan world beyond the passes. An association with a menhuan at this time was not necessarily exclusive. Public debate and the invitation of imams from different solidarities to preach in a single mosque was a common feature of eighteenth and nineteenth century Islamic religious life.³⁶ In addition to his religious training, prior to the war, Ma Zhan'ao led militias for the Qing against both Tibetan rebels and Ma

³³ He was certainly connected to the business world: there are numerous tales of his feud with his money-lending uncles. Li Guo 李果 and Li Fu 李富, *Ma Zhan'ao chuanqi* 馬占鰲傳奇 [The Legend of Ma Zhan'ao], (Lanzhou: Dunhuang wenyi, 1993), 18; interviews with descendants, conducted June 2017.

³⁴ Ma Jing lists early appointments held by Ma Zhan'ao, all in Hezhou's western district. Ma Jing 馬景, "He-Huang diqu Yisilanjiao 'haiyi' zhidu de lishi bianqian 河湟地區伊斯蘭教'海乙'制的歷史與變遷, [Historical evolution of the Islamic 'haiyi' system in the He-Huang area]" *Shijie zongjiao yanjiu* 1 (2009): 140.

³⁵ The retrospective rewriting of menhuan history, however, makes the modern Huasi menhuan unwilling to claim Ma Zhan'ao and Ma Anliang as adherents, given Ma Anliang's black reputation. Ma Anliang is held responsible by many for the brutal repression of the 1895 He-Huang Rebellion, which resulted in the deaths of numerous local Muslim leaders. In the subsequent years, he became infamous for his violent repression of the Xidaotang, who he saw as heterodox and potentially dangerous. Vice versa, other menhuan are happy to cast the Huasi as a tradition who sold their faith out for political gain and describe both Ma Zhan'ao and Anliang as initiates.

³⁶ For instance, the stele in Hezhou's North Mosque (北關寺) is indicative of the fluidity within a single mosque. It records notable ahongs from numerous traditions who preached there across the 18th and 19th century. From photographs taken by the author, July 2016.

Wenyi.³⁷ By 1865, he was well-respected within his local community as both a religious and militia leader, and was familiar with working with Qing officials.

The precise dynamics of Ma Zhan'ao's rise to prominence remain unclear. In oral histories collected from Ma Peiqing (馬培清), an officer who served under Ma Zhan'ao's son a, the Ma Wuzhen-led first attacked Didao in 1863, casting themselves irreversibly as rebels in the process. Ma Wuzhen subsequently invited Ma Zhan'ao to join them in laying siege to Hezhou in 1864. The gates were opened to the rebels in the 10th month of the year as the city began to starve after a prolonged siege, but Qing forces and officials within were able to escape. The willingness to allow these men to leave was recast after his later surrender as a sign of Ma Zhan'ao's ultimate loyalty to the Qing.³⁸ Nevertheless, the taking of Hezhou was not bloodless. Muslim forces sacked the city, plundering and looting, before retreating back into the mountainous hinterlands. Genealogies from Hezhou families remember the individual tragedies that occurred as the city fell: the wife of Qing military leader Zhang Dayuan (張大元) committed suicide to protect her virtue. His mother attempted to throw herself into a well but was dragged out by a Muslim leader and spent the next eight years serving in his kitchens.³⁹

Over the mountains, the gates of Xunhua had been opened to rebels some six months earlier. It seems that they had encountered little resistance in taking the city: with the garrison already sent to fight in eastern Gansu, there were only a few men left to defend the walls. Following the brutal capture of the few holdout forts remaining in the Hezhou-Xunhua region, the Hezhou coalition was left in control of a tract of land incorporating the Xunhua valleys to the south of the Yellow River and eastwards to the River Tao and Didao.⁴⁰ The Hezhou coalition, however, did not remain united for long,

³⁷ Ma Peiqing 馬培清, "Ma Zhan'ao qishi yu touxiang 馬占鰲起事與投降 [Ma Zhan'ao's Rebellion and Surrender]," in *Gansu wenshi ziliao xuanji* 甘肅文史資料選集, vol. 1 (Lanzhou: Gansu renmin chubanshe, 1962), 15.

³⁸ Yixin 奕訢 and Zhu Xuele 朱學勤, *Qinding pingding Shaan Gan Xin Huifei fanglüe* 欽定平定陝甘新疆回匪方略 [Imperially Commissioned Record of the Pacification of the Muslim Bandits in Shaanxi, Gansu and Xinjiang] (Taipei: Chengwen, 1968), 83:7b.

³⁹ Zhang Jian 張建, *Fuhan Zhang san dai shilüe* 袍罕張三代史略 [A Brief History of Three Generations of the Fuhan Zhang Family], (Gansu Provincial Library collections, 1912), 14b–15a.

⁴⁰ Extant lists of the dead compiled post-rebellion for Xunhua city suggest that although many fled following the fall of Xunhua, very few fell in its defence. Those listed mostly died as refugees on the road, or in the massacre that followed the capture of Twisted Mouth Fort (歪嘴堡) which had taken in most of the displaced Han. See QSGC 07-187, 《為採訪同治三年三月二十一日循城失陷所有殉難官紳士庶及婦女死亡情節事》, GX 07/00/00; QSGC 07-188 《為採訪過循城失陷所有殉難官紳士庶及婦女死事情節事》, GX 08/01/00; QSGC 07-190, 《造齋採訪過循化地方同治三年官員殉難事》, GX 07/00/00; QSGC 07-191, 《造齋甘省軍需案內採訪過陣亡弁兵花名》, GX 08/10/00.

and nor they were unilaterally willing to take in the Shaanxi rebels and refugees who drifted into the area post 1865. Ma Zhan'ao himself stepped down and retreated from Hezhou in 1868 following a dispute with the Dongxiang militias, stating that "Hereafter I will hold the Jishi Pass, I will hold Xunhua and I won't deal with Hezhou matters any longer." As the most able military commander in the region, he was invited back only in the face of Zuo Zongtang's advance.⁴¹

Ma Zhan'ao's authority within Hezhou was based on both his credentials as a military leader and an imam, and he required both aspects of that identity to maintain leadership of the forces under him. His ability to forge some degree of consensus among multiple Islamic traditions and language groups may have in fact been as he was not a hereditary holder of a menhuan position and was able to negotiate more effectively between them.

Beyond Hezhou, the Qing remained nominally in control of Lanzhou and a few other key settlements throughout the 1860s. In He-Huang, the countryside mostly fell into the hands of Muslims and other assorted militias and the Hezhou centre was able to profit from the chaos. Refugees fled to the safety of the comparatively well-defended Tibetan monasteries of the region, which then themselves came under attack from rampaging forces lured by their wealth, or bands of the dispossessed seeking to seize land.

As Chaney notes, the violence through the late 1860s was at times deliberately iconoclastic: as in the destruction of Gonlung (C. 佑寧寺, T. dgon lung) and Dzomo Khar (C. 宏華寺, T. mdzo mo mkhar) monasteries in 1866 and the tendency of Muslim militias to target yamen, temples and official symbols of authority.⁴² Similarly in attacks on Muslim groups (often Muslim against Muslim) mosques and the tombs of Sufi saints were targeted, both for their function as community nuclei and for the symbolic functions of such an act. The burning of mosques in Danga'er, Bao'an and Didao were key events in the course of the rebellion. However, He-Huang mostly did not suffer the anti-Muslim pogroms that characterised the Shaanxi rebellion and most land expropriations in the region seem to have been Muslims forcing Han and Tibetans off their lands, rather than the other way round. The archive, however, silences acts

⁴¹ "以後我就守積石關，守循化，河州的事我再不管了。" Ma Peiqing, "Ma Zhan'ao qishi yu touxiang", 17.

⁴² Wesley Byron Chaney, "Land, Trade, and the Law on the Sino-Tibetan Border, 1723-1911" (Ph.D., Stanford University, 2016), 312-313.

committed against Muslims: lawsuits and petitions submitted to the authorities after the end of the rebellion rarely offer redress to Muslims.⁴³

Both the fluidity of alliances in this period and the complexity of grassland politics again meant that the chaos remained unevenly patterned through He-Huang and Taoxi. The entire war was punctuated by periods in which Qing officials sought to negotiate with Muslim leaders and rebuild. There were seasonal lulls in the violence most years to allow planting and harvest.⁴⁴ The destitution produced by the violence, however, had a logic of its own: with the government unable to effectively finance reconstruction even when peace had been negotiated, displaced people were left stranded and unable to re-establish themselves.⁴⁵ This was the context in which Ma Zhan'ao honed his leadership, and the situation which faced Zuo Zongtang, the man entrusted with retaking Shaanxi and Gansu, as his forces entered Gansu.

A Practical Ideologue: Zuo and Approaches to the Northwest

Viewed from afar, the chaos that engulfed Qinghai and the entire Shaan-Gan region was entirely a Muslim problem and the court handed one man the task of dealing with it: Zuo Zongtang. Whilst it seems perhaps perverse to ascribe Qing policy choices for pacifying the entire northwest to a single man, it was decisions made in the northwestern campaigns he led that determined both the pattern of reconquest and later rebuilding, and his proteges who governed Gansu for the following thirty years. In particular, his decision to effectively reorder northwestern space by resettling Muslims away from Han is of crucial significance, both as a sign of changing Qing approaches to Muslims and in terms of its consequences for Gansu society.

By this time, Zuo was a battle-hardened campaigner leading a force of men who answered first to him, collectively forged by their experience fighting against the Taiping. Absolutely loyal to the Qing and espousing a distinctive form of Hunanese patriotism, Zuo was of the generation of modernising provincial gentry who had risen to nationwide importance through their efforts during the mid-Qing civil wars, rather than through the ranks of the bureaucracy. Although he was a provincial exam graduate (举

⁴³ In informal conversations conducting during fieldwork, I observed that Tibetan elders tended to have stories about the 1860s. Muslim and Salar informants told stories about more recent violence, in 1895 and 1928, in which their communities were harder hit. Fieldwork conducted by author, June 2016.

⁴⁴ Rijnhart, *With the Tibetans in Tent and Temple*, 53.

⁴⁵ NPM, Yutong 玉通, 095427, 《華寺回匪滋事撫恤難民由》, TZ 03 02 06.

人), Zuo never progressed further through the examination system, and spent much of his early life in straitened financial circumstances.⁴⁶ Closely affiliated with the emergent statecraft school (經世派) with its focus on the practical arts of governance and revitalisation of the Qing, Zuo was known for his interest in geography, agriculture and economics, accompanied by the Confucian rites as key to good governance: committed to what Schluessel described as a 'sino-normative' worldview.⁴⁷ His personal connections to prominent Hunanese scholar-officials brought him staff appointments during the anti-Taiping campaigns, following which his notable successes as a military commander led to a swift ascent to become one of the most powerful military officials in China.

Zuo had a long-standing interest in the northwest and believed in the necessity of his mission to recover it. Supported by various colleagues, following the recovery of Gansu he successfully argued that Xinjiang must be reconquered in the face of determined court opposition.⁴⁸ Appointed to the position of Governor-General of Shaanxi and Gansu and with status as an Imperial Commissioner (欽差大臣) he was ordered to Shaanxi in 1866. Zuo was granted executive authority - including over financial resources - in his recovery programme, a significant devolution of authority on the part of the court.⁴⁹ With the means at his disposal, Zuo saw his task as twofold: both the initial military recovery of the northwest and a programme of investment and reconstruction to ensure that government of the region did not simply collapse again.

Zuo acknowledged at the outset that the violence was a tragedy which exceeded in scale any previously experienced by the Shaanxi Muslims.⁵⁰ He was not overtly prejudiced in his treatment of surrendered Muslim forces in Shaanxi and Gansu, although he and those who served with him were ruthless in pursuit of the overarching aim of reconquest. Muslim leaders who expressed an honest desire to surrender and return to the benevolent arms of the great Qing were mostly permitted to do so,

⁴⁶ Lanny B Fields, *Tso Tsung-T'ang and the Muslims: Statecraft in Northwest China, 1868-1880* (Kingston, Ont.: Limestone Press, 1978), 15.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 16-18; Eric T. Schluessel, 'The Muslim Emperor of China: Everyday Politics in Colonial Xinjiang, 1877-1933', 467.

⁴⁸ Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, 'The Great Policy Debate in China, 1874: Maritime Defense Vs. Frontier Defense,' *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 25 (January 1, 1964): 212-28.

⁴⁹ Ma Xiao, *Zuo Zongtang zai Gansu: 1869-1880*, 38-39.

⁵⁰ "This is a calamity unprecedented in thousands of years for Muslims." 實回族千數百年未有之浩劫. Zuo Zongtang 左宗棠, *Zuo Zongtang quanji* 左宗棠全集 [Complete Zuo Zongtang]. (Changsha: Yuelu, 2009), ed. Liu Yangyang 劉泱泱, Vol 4 zougao, 359 (1292: 收撫回民安插耕墾片), TZ 09 07 18.

provided their intent was couched in the appropriate forms and geopolitical circumstance did not intervene.⁵¹

His analysis of the issues now facing the northwest after ten years of sporadic violence and a massively destructive reinvasion was firstly practical. The Shaanxi rebels – a force in many respects as much composed of refugees, stragglers and dependents as it was fighting men – could not go home. With their former lands and property occupied by their neighbours and with communal tensions unabated, Zuo judged that resettlement of surrendered Muslims onto lands either uncultivated or recently abandoned was the most appropriate solution.⁵² Furthermore, as in Zuo's analysis Muslim revolt was likely to reoccur, Muslim communities were to be moved away from key roads and strategic points along the Gansu corridor, although neither were they to be moved into inaccessible mountain areas.⁵³

The memorials further display his commitment to a form of civilising mission. In the hope that structural reorganisation and assimilation (同化) to Confucian norms might reduce the likelihood of future violence, Zuo decreed that imams were henceforth to be merely religious professionals and were not to represent their communities at the local level, as had previously been the case. Matters of law both civil and criminal were to be handled by officials, removing the tacit acceptance of religious authority in civil affairs which previously prevailed. Community schools (義學) were to be opened to educate Muslim youth in the Confucian Classics.⁵⁴ It is not that Islam was to be banned: despite prohibitions on the 'New Teaching' (新教), likely inspired by identification of the connection between Ma Hualong's Jahriyya and the earlier Jahriyya 1781 'New Teaching' rebellion, Zuo allowed communities to rebuild mosques or establish them in their new

⁵¹ It should be noted that this graciousness did not extend to the battlefield itself and the campaign was brutal. Furthermore, where geopolitical circumstance did intervene, Zuo was ruthless. The case of the 'guest Muslims' *kehui* 客回 massacred in Suzhou after their surrender is particularly pointed. Zuo was determined that this area, a key transit zone to Xinjiang, should be left empty of Muslims. With no obvious place to resettle this particular Muslim population, many were executed following their surrender. Jonathan N Lipman, *Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China* (Seattle; London: University of Washington Press, 1998), 128.

⁵² The clearest statement of the logic behind Zuo's determination to resettle the Shaanxi Muslims into Gansu occurs likewise found in the above memorial), in which he first lays out the differences between the Muslim and the Taiping and Nian rebels to support his conclusion that resettlement is the only immediate solution to communal violence. Zuo, *Zuo Zongtang quanji*, Vol 4 zougao: 358 (1292: 收撫回民安插耕墾片), TZ 09 07 18.

⁵³ Ma Xiao, *Zuo Zongtang zai Gansu*, 50.

⁵⁴ On the preliminary resettlement of Muslims to Pingliang, Huapingchuan and Zuo's plans to break the influence of the religious leadership by bringing Muslims under the same systems of governance as Han, see Zuo, *Zuo Zongtang quanji*, Vol 5 zougao: 15-16 (1360: 安插就撫回眾請曾設平涼通判都司摺), TZ 10 01 25.

settlements, although a ban was instituted on the construction of additional mosques. However, henceforth Muslim religious observance was to be a private affair. The hope was to encourage the Muslim elite to participate in state ritual and education first, to invest them in imperial civil system thus that in future Muslim children would be sent to learn the Classics, rather than to study in madrasas.⁵⁵ In such way, the organisational power of Muslim mosques and lineages might cease to pose a threat to the Qing northwestern order.

Such measures were not unprecedented, particularly in the context of He-Huang: measures taken in the wake of Su Forty-Three's 1781 rebellion had included a similar attempt to impose the community household registration and mutual self-defence system (*baojia* 保甲) system over Muslim households and to open community schools.⁵⁶ However, the similarity of the measures masks both a difference in scale and a difference in context. The chaos now spread across Gansu gave both an imperative and a space in which intervention at the micro-level could occur, whilst the court devolution of military and fiscal autonomy to Zuo gave him an unprecedented authority to do so. Zuo's own background as a Hunanese Han gentleman and patriot gave familiar measures a different intent, especially within the administratively diverse terrain of He-Huang, Taoxi and beyond the passes. Prior to the arrival of Zuo and his staff, officials in Gansu and particularly those in Qinghai were normally bannermen, and generally either Manchu or Mongol. Zuo's measures were designed to remake Gansu and remake Muslims: partners to the colonial policies that were enacted in Xinjiang following its subsequent reconquest.⁵⁷

Zuo's memorials detail the proposed spatial patterning of Muslim resettlement across the northwest. Documents such as the "Proclamation on the Resettlement of Muslims" (安插回民告示) quite deliberately makes the power of the state to manifest Zuo's reorganisation of Muslim space seems absolute. Issued in 1873, this decree was primarily directed at the remaining destitute Shaanxi rebels and refugees. Its articles state that plots of land will be allocated by officials, who are also responsible for

⁵⁵ See the logic behind the decision to grant Muslim Chen Lin's 1871 request to build a mosque for the resettled community in Pingliang. The request was granted, on the grounds that it was made with good intent and there was no reason why Muslims should not reopen mosques, provided their children also entered school to study the classics. See Zuo, *Zuo Zongtang quanji*, Vol 14 zhajian: 272 (468: 平涼善後局馮道邦棟稟回民陳林等請建清真寺由), TZ 10 00 00.

⁵⁶ See FHA Fukanggan 福康安, 04-01-38-0184-034, 《請准循化廳設立學校興建文廟抽撥文武生員邊額》, QL 49/12/22.

⁵⁷ Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 124-177.

appointing the headmen who will act as state representatives at the local level.⁵⁸ Beyond these few lines and the records of the seed grain with which they were issued to begin cultivation, these communities then mostly vanish from the central archival record. Thus were the surviving communities of former Shaanxi Muslims were dispatched to semi-barren lands of the Gansu corridor, the majority to near Pingliang (平凉) and Zhangjiachuan (張家川).

Despite the rhetoric of transformation, the above policies show a broad commitment to the differentiation and regularisation of what, for want of a better term, might be called 'ethnic space': the idea that Hui were distinct from Han in religion, descent, custom and even in speech. The solution to the violence was to physically separate the two groups. Han communities were to be separated from Hui and comprehensive restrictions imposed on the movement of Hui to ensure that they stayed where they were put. The settlements Zuo created thus eventually became entirely new Muslim centres: the Zhangjiachuan settlement formed the base for the resurrected Jahriyya in the post-rebellion period.⁵⁹ The logic of Zuo's spatial choices also betrays a fundamental commitment to an idealised model of nuclear agricultural communities, a model quite unlike the mixed economic structures which dominated life in the borderlands.

As the campaign progressed westwards from Shaanxi into Gansu, Zuo remained implacable in his insistence on certain conditions being met before the surrender of Muslim leaders could be permitted – notably, surrender of arms, handover of census documents and a request couched in suitably penitent language – the precise terms and timing of the surrenders of many leaders were still subject to a negotiation process. Every major Muslim leader did try to surrender to the Qing, albeit with varying degrees of success. However, there was an important distinction made in the treatment of the surrendering Shaanxi Muslims and Gansu Muslims, a differentiation which was to gain some legal weight in the post-rebellion period. The Shaanxi Muslims were desperate and largely wished to return to their homes, a condition on which Zuo was never willing to negotiate. By contrast, the Gansu Muslims were neither so geographically removed from

⁵⁸ See Articles 2 and 3 respectively of "Proclamation on Resettlement of Muslims" 《安插回民告示》 in Zuo, *Zuo Zongtang quanji*, Vol 14 zhajian: 583-85 (867: 安插回民告示), TZ 12 00 00.

⁵⁹ On this community, see Ma Jing Ma Jing 马景, 'Zheherenye Xuanhuagang Jingji Yanjiu (1889-1949) 哲赫忍耶宣化冈经济研究 (1889-1949) [Research on the Economy of the Xuanhuagang Jahriyya]'.

their origins, nor so destitute and thus had a degree of latitude in negotiation denied to their co-religionists.

Zuo's ability to achieve his rhetoric of reconstruction was based on the negotiated surrenders of each leader, thereby setting the baselines for resettlement and reconstruction itself. The difficulty of the task facing Zuo and the officials cannot be underestimated: widespread famine, population displaced and the records burnt meant Gansu was left administratively opaque. The negotiation of those surrenders, thus, marked a baseline for the new Gansu, marked by the symbolic handover of the population registers for each pacified group.⁶⁰ I thus now turn to the moment at which Zuo's designs for Gansu met Ma Zhan'ao and the Hezhou rebels: at the battle of Taizi Si (太子寺) and the surrender that followed.

Remade in Revolution: The Battle of Taizi Si and Transformation of Ma Zhan'ao and Ma Anliang

To protect his family and for the people, he was victorious at Taizi Si
For his veneration of the prophet and respect for his teachings, his name is known across
the Jishi Range
A man of exceptional talents

保家為民功成太子寺
崇聖尊教名垂積石山
一方雄傑

(Couplet over the gate of Ma Zhan'ao's tomb, Dahejia)

It was a cold winter's day early in the eleventh year of the reign of the Tongzhi Emperor (1873), the yellow loess hills of southern Gansu frozen hard beneath the ice blues of northwestern skies, when a 22 year old Muslim youth named Ma Qiwu (馬七五) walked into the Anding encampment of Zuo Zongtang (左宗棠). Behind him followed nine sons of the Hezhou Muslim military leadership, as he represented his own father, Ma Zhan'ao (馬占鰲), to present the surrender of the Hezhou Muslims to the waiting Qing commander, Zuo Zongtang. Impressed with the bravery and the elegance of the

⁶⁰ There is a performative aspect to the surrenders, at least as recounted in Qing memorials, in which rebels cry before Qing commanders and repent their former ingratitude towards the emperor's grace.

young Qiwu and realising he did not yet have a formal personal name, Zuo gifted him the name Anliang (安良). In true Qing style, the name is said to be either short for the phrase “to know one’s place as good citizens” (安分為良民), or “to expel tyrants and bring peace to the good” (除暴安良).⁶¹

The tale above of the meeting between Ma Anliang and Zuo Zongtang is based on the largely on the memories of Ma Peiqing (馬培清). Peiqing served under Ma Anliang, and heard Anliang personally tell the story, emphasizing his family’s loyalty to the Qing and China.⁶² Alternative versions of that same meeting are told by Anliang’s opponents, spun to emphasize his betrayal of his Muslim brothers in surrendering. The fact that the tale never happened – or at least not in the way it is told – is largely irrelevant to its significance.⁶³ The story and its competing interpretations are foundational to the beginning of a post-rebellion era: the moment in which Zuo’s vision for a remade Gansu met local political dynamics.

There is a certain irony, thus, to the fact that the quote above from the arch leading to Ma Zhan’ao’s tomb today references his most famous victory as that of Taizi Si, a battle in which he led rebel forces against the Qing. Taizi Si was the last military engagement of Hezhou’s rebellion and was a battle which formed the opening act to Ma Zhan’ao’s surrender and subsequent career within the ambit of the Qing state.

Following the fall of Jinjibu in 1870, plans were drawn up for advance on Hezhou as the second major campaign of Zuo’s entry into Gansu. The best point of entry into the region was by crossing the River Tao at Didao, which had been retaken by the Qing in 1871. However, Didao’s hinterland – the lands west to Hezhou – was mountainous and well-fortified. Furthermore, swollen by autumn rains, the River Tao itself presented a formidable obstacle. A three-pronged strategy was thus devised. Qing troops would cross the Tao at three different points and march simultaneously on Hezhou. But first,

⁶¹ ‘To know one’s place as good citizens’ is found in Mu Shouqi 慕壽祺, *Gan Ning Qing shilüe 甘寧青史略* [An Outline History of Gansu, Ningxia and Qinghai], Vol 9 29:23-24b., a slightly alternative version of the story in which Ma Anliang admonishes his own son. ‘To expel tyrants and bring peace to the good’ is found in a Republican version of the tale, as told by ahong Ma Linxiang 馬祥麟 to Shan Huapu 單化普. See Shan Huapu 單化普, “Shaan Gan jieyu lu 陝甘劫餘錄 [Record of the Shaan Gan Disasters]” in Bai Shouyi 白壽彝 ed., *Huimin qiyi 回民起義* [Muslim Rebellions], 4 vols., (Shanghai: Shenzhou guoguang, 1953), Vol. 4, 308-9.

⁶² Ma Peiqing, “Ma Zhan’ao qishi yu touxiang”, 14.

⁶³ Ma Anliang and the sons of the Hezhou leadership were indeed delivered as hostages to Zuo, but by the time this happened, the surrender had already been negotiated and accepted through other intermediaries.

the middle column, comprised of 40 camps of men led by Commander Fu Xianzong (傅先宗), were to construct a floating bridge over the Tao and cross over it to begin construction of Qing fortifications for the advance into Hezhou County.⁶⁴

Meanwhile in Hezhou, Ma Zhan'ao sent envoys to Xunhua and the Beizhuang to gather his forces. As the Qing began to take the forts along the banks of the Tao, their communications with the outside world were cut. Ma Zhan'ao decided to make a stand, fortifying the fortress at Taizi Si, a village south-east of Linxia, into an impregnable fastness. Unprepared for the ferocity of the defence, Fu Xianzong's army suffered numerous setbacks as they attempted to take the fort through the 11th and 12th months. Thwarted, they retreated first to Xinpolu (新坡路) to establish camp and prepare for a continued onslaught. However, as they did so, Ma Zhan'ao's forces took advantage of their mobility and familiarity with the terrain to retake around 70 mountain forts beside the Tao, thereby cutting the Qing supply lines back across the Tao.⁶⁵

Ma Zhan'ao's *coupe de grace* was a strategic masterpiece, a gambit he himself called "the black tiger scoops out the heart" (黑虎掏心). Having laid men on the heights behind the Qing encampments at Lanni Ditch 爛泥溝, Ma Zhan'ao's scouts realised that there was a hole in the Qing defensive cordon: a hilltop left undefended and unwatched between Fu's two encampments. On the 4th night of the 1st month, an elite force crept in and ascended the heights unnoticed. They carried bricks and kettles of water with them to construct earthen ramparts, shored up using water that swiftly froze to ice in the bitter Gansu winter.⁶⁶ When the Qing forces awoke, they found a new fort perched on the heights above them. Incensed, Commander Fu attacked, only to be beaten back by the archers inside. Cut off from all escape and beginning to starve, Fu and his men were completely stranded. Despite repeated attempts to break out, Fu fell in battle two days later. Encouraged by his death the triumphant Muslims attacked from all sides. One battalion succeeded in breaking out. Harried by Muslim forces as they attempted to

⁶⁴ Dong Hua'er dan 東華爾丹, "Ma Zhan'ao ji qi junshi moulüe 馬占鰲及其軍事謀略 [Ma Zhan'ao and His Military Strategy]," *Huizu Yanjiu* 36, no. 4 (1999), 92.

⁶⁵ See Zuo's account of the battles. Zuo, *Zuo Zongtang quanji*, Vol 5 zougao: 189-194, (1494: 迭攻太子寺屢勝兩挫逆回乞撫摺), TZ 11 02 22.

⁶⁶ Ma Peiqing, "Ma Zhan'ao qishi yu touxiang", 21-22. Zuo's account of the battle broadly corroborates Ma Peiqing's account, including the rebels 'secretly constructing' (偷筑) battlements overnight. Zuo, *Zuo Zongtang quanji*, Vol 5 zougao: 191, TZ 11 02 22.

retreat to Didao, their camp was surrounded on the night of the 11th. In the ensuing massacre all the remaining Qing officers were killed alongside over 140 of their men.⁶⁷

This three-month battle, culminating in the two final bloody defeats, was the worst loss of Zuo's entire career. However, even as the Muslim forces were dealing with the aftermath, Ma Zhao'ao sent a letter offering his surrender to the Sanjiaji Left Encampment (三家集左軍).⁶⁸ Zuo was delighted by the sudden surrender as Ma's decision prevented him a costly campaign. Furthermore, in Qing eyes Ma Zhan'ao was an orthodox 'Old Teaching' (*laojiao* 老教, Khufiyya) Muslim and thus his surrender could in many respects be spun as a victory: a subject returning to the imperial fold. Nevertheless, as was standard, envoys were first dispatched to negotiate and assess the veracity of Ma's commitment to surrender. In this instance, the first negotiator dispatched was Ma Shouqing (馬壽清), also known as the Pu'er Ma Ahong (普洱馬阿洪), thanks to his Yunnanese origins. Caught up in the conflict in Shaanxi, Pu'er Ma had become a key intermediary between Zuo and surrendering forces, trusted by both sides.⁶⁹ Facilitated by Ma Guiyuan, who in 1871 was still held to be loyal, the Hezhou clique arranged the surrender of their weapons and sent their sons as hostages to Zuo's Anding camp.⁷⁰

In the official annals of Qing history, Ma Zhan'ao and Ma Anliang subsequently become loyal bit players in the campaigns of other generals. However, as shown in the tale of Ma Anliang's encounter with Zuo, the moment of their surrender is writ large in the historical memory of the nineteenth century history of Gansu and Qinghai. It is a tale that occurs and reoccurs in local sources. In alternative, more mythologized versions to the Ma Peiqing recounting, Ma Anliang arrives to surrender on foot and wearing grass slippers leading a sika deer carrying a red banner announcing peace on earth, leading 4000 camels and 14,000 men to surrender behind him.⁷¹

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* 192.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* 193.

⁶⁹ Pu'er Ma's own account suggests he persuaded Zuo to surrender: this could be a possible indication that the surrender was actually suggested by Zuo. Without the full text of Pu'er Ma's account of the rebellion, it's hard to know. See Hu Long 虎隆 and Ma Xianxi 馬獻喜, "'Xiaojing' riji 'Zheng da guangming' ji Pu'er Ma ahong '小经'日记《正大光明》与普洱马阿洪 [The 'xiaojing' diary 'Honest Light' and Pu'er Ma zhong]," *Huizu yanjiu*, no. 03 (2006): 76–82.

⁷⁰ Mu, *Gan Ning Qing*, Vol 7, 23:31a.

⁷¹ Xu Xianlong 许宪隆, *Zhu Ma junfa jituan yu xibei muslim shehui* 诸马军阀集团与西北穆斯林社会 [The Ma Warlord Clique and Northwestern Muslim Society], (Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 2001), 42.

For Mu Shouqi (慕壽祺), Han Chinese Republican intellectual and author of the *Brief History of Gansu, Ningxia and Qinghai* (甘寧青史略), the story represents a transformative moment for Ma Zhan'ao and his son. Enjoined by the Qing to keep the peace, they are to be commended for their patriotic loyalty and their willingness to ensure safety for their fellow Muslims, albeit often by the brutal quelling of dissension within the Muslim communities of the area.⁷² For the Muslims of the village Zhan'ao founded, Ma Zhan'ao's surrender was a moment of tactical genius that saved thousands of Muslim lives by avoiding the bloodshed that would inevitably accompany a reconquest. The subsequent leadership of father and son walked a tightrope, balancing their duties to Qing court against protection of Muslim interests. For others, the surrender was a ruthless betrayal of his co-religionists. In the name of the Qing policy of 'using Muslim to rule Muslim' (以回制回), Zhan'ao and his lineage would go on to consolidate their rule of the He-Huang region. The surrender becomes a moment around which interpretations of history divide, sensitive to time, context and audience.

The stories told about the two Mas, and the roles they played remaking Hezhou and the He-Huang region following the Xianfeng-Tongzhi Muslim Rebellions gain significance only through understanding of the compound status they held within their local communities: authority held as Qing military officials, authority held through their links to local Islamic structures and connections to the communities beyond the passes, especially Tibetan and Salar. The story was foundational to the image Ma Anliang presented of himself to the world and he told it often: as both Muslim and as loyal Qing patriot.⁷³ That image, of the Muslim youth walking into a Qing encampment bearing a flag of surrender, is a keystone to his identity and later career. The image moreover contains the contradiction of the post-rebellion reconstruction: predicated on the loyalty of surrendered rebels who owed their careers to the rebellion itself.

In the immediate months following the Battle of Taizi Si, Ma Zhan'ao and his battalions were sent forth to assist in the retaking of Xining. Ma Zhao'ao first negotiated the surrender of Xunhua, a success again mediated through his own standing as an imam.⁷⁴ Controversially he was also involved in the complex series of events by which

⁷² Mu Shouqi similarly emphasized Ma's service as a loyal Muslim patriot, whilst modern novelised retellings of his life valorize both the righteousness of his uprising and his later service to the Qing. Mu Shouqi, *Gan Ning Qing Shilüe*, Vol 8 28:18a.

⁷³ Ma Peiqing, *Ma Zhan'ao qishi yu touxiang*, 14.

⁷⁴ QSGC 06-178, 《為河州鎮沈兵馬占鰲出隊試剿未勝賊擾關廂情形並速派各軍會剿事》, TZ 12 12 21.

Ma Guiyuan, now firmly identified as a rebel, was finally apprehended.⁷⁵ He was awarded a Feathered Cap of the Fifth Rank for his role in leading his battalions to assist in the reconquest of Xunhua and Xining, before ostensibly returning home and resuming his position as a local ahong.⁷⁶

It is in the events of 1873 that the narratives of Ma Zhan'ao and Zuo converge. The tale of the surrender for Ma Zhan'ao and Ma Anliang as conveyed by Ma Peiqing is essentially a creation narrative, justifying their place within a Qing order. Their surrender made them intermediaries for the following campaign in He-Huang and reconstruction across the area, formalised in the pacification agreements that framed the post-rebellion Gansu.

The Logic of Pacification Agreements in Xunhua and Hezhou

雖有智者，不能善其後矣

No man, however wise, is capable of preventing the consequences that follow.⁷⁷

Sunzi, *The Art of War*

The process of reconstruction, especially in Xunhua, drew officials into the villages to a greater extent than ever before, but in doing so increased the influence of the very informal structures of authority that Zuo's plans were designed to curtail. Reconstruction, in the first instance, was conducted along the baselines laid down in the pacification agreements (*shanhou zhangcheng* 善後章程) drawn up after the surrender of each Muslim leader. The term 'pacification' (*shanhou* 善後) has a varied spectrum of meanings within Qing discourse, descended from its much older, original meaning 'to prevent the consequences'. During Zuo's 1860s campaigns and indeed elsewhere, it was a catch-all term referring to the disparate processes needed to restore order to a disrupted space and remake the administrative terrain. Its connotations imply that whatever is considered necessary to prevent a recurrence of the disruptive event will be

⁷⁵ For a brief account, see Yu Shi 豫師, *Yu Shi Qinghai zougao* 豫師青海奏稿 [Yu Shi's Qinghai Memorials], ed. Wu Fengpei 吳豐培 (Xining: Qinghai Renmin, 1981), 104-106.

⁷⁶ Zuo, *Zuo Zongtang quanji*, Vol 5 zougao: 376-77 (1637: 請給回目馬占鰲等翎頂片), TZ 12 01 07.

⁷⁷ See 'Waging War' Zuo zhan 作戰 in Sunzi 孫子, *Sunzi bing fa: Han-Ying duizhao* 孫子兵法：漢英對照 [Master Sun's The Art of War: Parallel Chinese-English], trans. Yuan Shibin 袁士楨, (Beijing: Waiyu jiaoxue yu yanjiu chubanshe, 1997), 7. Own translation.

done. The agreements themselves consisted of simple, bullet-pointed lists of regulations, which in He-Huang brought unintended clarity to many of the accommodations that had previously structured Qing rule.

Surrender and pacification were negotiated on a case-by-case basis as Zuo's armies progressed through Shaanxi and Gansu. Initial surrenders were brokered as the Qing armies advanced and once the former rebels had handed over their weapons. This achieved, the drafting of pacification articles began in each separate locality.⁷⁸ The immediate nature of the administrative structure behind implementation of the pacification articles was military in origin, tied in the first instance to the financing apparatus of Zuo's armies. Money and reporting lines were channelled through the Armaments Bureau (軍需局) and the Reimbursement Bureau (報銷局), a reflection of the centralised structure reporting back to Zuo, and the initial orientation of the reconstruction process toward provisioning Zuo's troops for the onward campaign.

The articles for each locality correspond to a rough standard model and reveal similar concerns in the swift establishment of governance to examples drafted for post-Taiping Jiangnan. Given the transfer of military personnel from the Taiping theatre to the northwest, it seems reasonable to assume this continuity is in part informed by experience of the Taiping settlements. As in Jiangnan, the pacification articles and the establishment of 'pacification bureau' (善後局) appear to have been designed initially largely as temporary accommodations.⁷⁹ On the basis of measures in the articles, the bureau were intended to begin sorting through the chaos and re-establishing collection of the land tax. Personnel were then dispatched to sub-offices (分局) to superintend the return of refugees, distribute seed grain, take cadastral surveys and census, and to oversee the full-scale resettlement (安插) of people where this had been determined necessary.

The Xunhua Archive includes copies of the pacification articles for Hezhou, Xining and Xunhua, issued in late 1873, 1874 and late 1874 respectively.⁸⁰ The extant articles for each place are broadly similar in design and intent, and reveal broadly

⁷⁸ I am aware of articles for Hezhou, Xining and Xunhua, and references to similar documents for Suzhou, Jinjipu and Didao exist. As they were issued at a local level, albeit in accordance with directives from on high, such documents are only rarely contained in central archives.

⁷⁹ The specific establishment of these bureau and their structure will be examined in the next chapter.

⁸⁰ QSGC 06-122 《西寧善後章程三十二條》, TZ 12/00/00; QSGC 06-29 《善後章程十條[循化]》 TZ 12 01 12; QSGC 06-16 《河州善後章程》 TZ 11/12/12; QSGC 06-28 《會擬善後章程十條[循化]》 TZ 12 08 14.

similar concerns to the pacification articles drawn up for post-Taiping Jiangnan.⁸¹ The articles also set down the legal basis for the settlement of disputes arising from the war and resumption of collection of taxes. They were in effect designed to address the entire gamut of issues involved in re-establishing governance over Qinghai and Gansu: lands fallen fallow, displaced refugees now returning en masse to lands often now occupied by new incomers, destruction of key transport infrastructure and myriad groups now turning to the Qing to seek redress for injuries, deaths and thefts which had occurred during the ten years previous.

Comparison of the articles for Hezhou, Xining and Xunhua shows a degree of adaptation to each locality.⁸² In addition to the standard articles determining how ownership of land and land disputes arising from sales made under duress or owners returning to find their property had been expropriated, the Xunhua articles further stipulate guidelines for dealing with Tibetan contracts and the return to use of the *baojia* system over 'assimilated Tibetans' (熟番) in the area.⁸³ The commonalities to each set of rules, however, include the establishment for processes to ensure the return of property to its appropriate owners and an overriding concern for the swift resumption of land tax dues collection. Amnesty was given on outstanding criminal litigation cases which had occurred between 1863 and 1873, and which did not involve either kidnapping or land. Land cases, however, were to be dealt with as swiftly as possible, so that cultivation could resume: in order to return the land to productivity, to assist in the provisioning of Zuo's own armies and to pre-empt the emergence of future land feuds. The amnesty clause is both an acknowledgement of the breakdown in Qing governance for the preceding ten years and of official inability to right these wrongs. In effect, the pacification articles are a statement of the aims of reconstruction. The swift re-establishment of a taxable base was the overriding priority, to the extent that cultivators on disputed land were permitted to stay to reap their harvests before being resettled. The articles also permit those occupying seized land to purchase it in perpetuity on payment of its value to the state, should its owners fail to return within three years.⁸⁴

⁸¹ I am grateful to Ma Xingzi of China Renmin University for this insight, based on her analysis of the memorials of Ma Xinyi (馬新貽) from his time in Jiangnan. See Ma Xinyi 馬新貽, Ma Duanmin gong zou yi 馬端愍公奏議 [The Memorials of Ma Duanmin], (n.p. 1894).

⁸² Only 12 of the original 32 Xining Pacification Articles are extant.

⁸³ To what extent the *baojia* system was ever in place over any Tibetan populations in Xunhua is another matter entirely: the administrative patchwork operating in Xunhua was never internally consistent. Nevertheless, the point stands that the intention was to return to whatever system had been in operation before.

⁸⁴ This article is common to all sets of regulations.

However, there was a process of negotiation that underpinned their formulation. The commitment to pacification and reconstruction formed one of the conditions of surrender demanded by Zuo, as was the handover of population registers by surrendered groups. The negotiation of articles was further tied to the surrenders, and acceptance of the conditions was a prerequisite for both sides.⁸⁵ The first step for returning officials was to understand their jurisdictions, a process expediated by Zuo's request for the law of avoidance to be suspended for Shaanxi and Gansu in the interim and through the appointment of officials from the ranks of Zuo's Hunanese army to the vacant civil positions.⁸⁶

The newly appointed civil officials, entering war-torn districts with little knowledge of the region, required collaborators and those often were themselves the surrendered Muslim leaders. This pattern is repeated throughout the pacification process: Shaanxi Muslims were resettled in groups to Pingliang under the leadership of their former along/military leaders, who cleared their names through military service to the Qing. As with the transformation of former bandits such as Dong Fuxiang (董福祥) into loyal dynasty men – or at least, permitted dynasty enforcers – military service offered a chance for such leaders to erase their pasts, and to be incorporated into the processes of reconstruction.

This was partly necessity. Resettled Shaanxi Muslims had to be dispatched to their new territories under the leadership of their imams simply as these were units they surrendered in, organised by native-place. Similarly, in Jinjibu prior to Ma Hualong's execution, there are reports that he was responsible for tax collection and the distribution of relief. Whilst this is partly due to the wide-ranging authority held by Ma Hualong as Jahriyya shaykh, it also reflects a reality of governance. As the man who had been in control for the previous decade, Ma Hualong had the administrative knowledge of the locality the Qing needed.⁸⁷ The effect, however, was to confirm the overlap between religious and military leadership for all the resettled communities.

⁸⁵ See, for instance, the role here played to be played by Ma Guiyuan in announcing the articles and effecting the surrender of the Xining Muslims, and comments on the addition of extra articles to those originally determined. Zuo, *Zuo Zongtang quanji*, Vol 5 Zougao: 193-4, (1494: 迭攻太子寺屢勝兩挫逆回乞撫摺), TZ 11 02 22.

⁸⁶ Ma Xiao, *Zuo Zongtang zai Gansu*, 109-110.

⁸⁷ See Zhu Wenzhang on the initial conciliatory policy. Zhu, *The Moslem Rebellion in Northwest China, 1862-1878*, 64.

Lines Down the River Tao: Defining Space for the Postbellum Order

Turning to the patterns of resettlement for Muslims, Hezhou and its environs enjoyed a privileged space within the landscape of the northwest. The timely surrender of the Hezhou centre and the status of the combatants as 'Gansu Muslims', rather than as Shaanxi Muslims, meant that the Muslims of Hezhou and Gansu were permitted to remain in their local area, and in the interim, even permitted to remain on any lands they had occupied. In the context of the wider pacification, this was a substantial concession on the part of Zuo Zongtang, distinguishing their treatment from that of the surrendered of other regions. With their forces heavily involved in the battles to retake He-Huang and Xining, the leaders of the former Muslim rebel militias had direct access to the Qing military establishment that was directing the reconstruction.

Zuo decreed that henceforth Muslims were to be permitted to reside to the west of the River Tao (hence in Xunhua and Hezhou) and banned from its eastern shore and from the city of Didao, which had seen some of the fiercest fighting of the southern Gansu campaigns. The Hezhou area, in line with Zuo's reluctance to permit mixed settlement, was subject to some movement of people. In other places it was Muslims who were moved out; in the vicinity of Hezhou it was instead Han and 'non-native Muslims' (客回) who were moved away.⁸⁸ The almost 1000 Han who were resettled to Anding were either Han who had been heavily involved in anti-Hui fighting and thus could not be settled beside their erstwhile neighbours or those who had arrived alongside the Shaanxi Muslim forces and refugees. Meanwhile, two Muslim groups, the Muslim Bonan (modern Bao'an ethnicity 保安族) who had been driven from their former homes in Rebgong by their Tibetan and Han neighbours in 1865, and the Didao Mufti, who had been located on the east of the Tao, were resettled into Hezhou.

To complete the process, the new prefects Pan Xiaosu (潘瀟肅) and Yu Guangrong (喻光榮) subsequently effectively re-divided Didao's West Districts, (西鄉), simplifying the border so that it ran down the Tao. This ensured that all of the heavily Muslim and extremely mountainous Dongxiang (東鄉, lit. East District) area was now under the jurisdiction of Hezhou. To compensate Didao for the lost land, to the south the border line then swung out to encompass a mountainous area on the heights above the

⁸⁸ "Move the non-native Hui, appease the local Hui." (遷徙客回, 安輯土回). Zuo, *Zuo Zongtang quanji*, Vol 5 zougao: 281 (1360: 安插就撫回眾請曾設平涼通判都司摺), TZ 10 01 15.

crossings of the River Tao which had previously been a part of Hezhou's Southern District (南鄉). The move effectively divided Xunhua and Hezhou from Didao, making the former areas where Muslims were permitted and the latter non-Muslim, at least by design.

The population divisions created by the nineteenth century resettlements can still clearly be seen on a map. A strip of land in which there are noticeably fewer Muslims divides the southwest of Gansu from the southeast, a lasting legacy of Zuo's forced migrations (Fig. 6).




Fig. 5. Black here represents mosques distribution across the northwest. The grouping to the left is the Hezhou-Xining region, to the right Ningxia and Gansu's eastern border.. Map credit, Anthony Garnaut/Karl Ryavec. Not to be reproduced.

Whilst Hezhou was never mono-ethnic and Zuo's resettlement programme did not intend to make it so, the Hezhou resettlements and the redrawing of county boundaries between Hezhou and Didao make clear that Zuo had tacitly accepted Hezhou as something approaching a 'Muslim space', or at least a zone of Muslim influence. Didao, meanwhile, was not. The ethnic complexity of Xunhua and the He-Huang region to the west meant that the intent here was to restore the pre-rebellion status quo – although demographic change and land appropriations made that practically impossible.

Across the remainder of He-Huang Muslims were expelled from residence within the city walls in Xining, Danga'er and Datong, but otherwise permitted to remain. The redrawing of boundaries and the broad process of spatial definition that accompanied it was not uniformly driven by a purely ideological motivation that people would be easier

governed if they were separate. The decision to transfer the Maiwu (買吾), the nomadic Tibetan clans resident on the grasslands between Hezhou and neighbouring Taozhou, to the administration of Taozhou was entirely predicated on the view that as Maiwu troops had mobilised against Hezhou Muslims, administering the two groups from the same yamen was likely to cause further trouble. Without this specific motivation, no reorganisation would have been taken: the move was prompted by repeated petitions from the Maiwu themselves.⁸⁹ At the village level, however, the process of settling land lawsuits was one that would play out over the subsequent decades, and the question of who was permitted to reside where was determined by legal claim, counter-claim and socio-economic bargaining.

Ma Zhan'ao and his fellow menhuan-derived leaders were thus left able to direct aspects of the subsequent reconstruction, particularly within Hezhou and Xunhua. However, the Qing rationalisation of administrative space was accompanied from the outset by a set of "Post Surrender Prohibitions" (撫後禁令). This was an announcement (告示,) which would have been distributed across Hezhou and Didao to the newly pacified areas.⁹⁰ These are essentially a series of prohibitions on Muslim movement and the instatement of a pass system for Muslims to leave the boundaries, akin to the system previously imposed on nomads attempting to cross to the interior. Henceforth, it was declared that Muslims were neither permitted to cross the Tao nor travel to Xining, Minzhou, Taozhou or other such places unless they had been granted a travel pass by their 'security group' (*baojia* 保甲) head. The *baojia* head must further confirm their permission with the local official, and once granted they must travel only by government roads and manned bridges. The prohibitions further state that in future, civil and criminal cases are to be handled by officials rather than Muslim religious leadership. Markets were to be held at Sanjiaji (三家集), Taizi Si (太子寺) and Hezhou itself, thereby removing the need for Muslim traders to travel themselves beyond the borders. The prohibitions on Muslim mobility were an extension of that older system of control of nomads: the same logic now applied to another category of people, this time defined by their religious identification rather than economic mode of production.

⁸⁹ QSGC 06-99-891 《為遵辦查造買吾八族番民改隸洮州每年應征糧石數目事飭循化洮州》，TZ 13 10 20.

⁹⁰ "Post Surrender Prohibitions" (撫後禁令), *Zuo, Zuo Zongtang quanji*, Vol 14: zhajian, 581 (866: 撫後禁令), TZ 10 00 00.

The prohibitions on movement were a counterpart to the tacit acceptance of Muslim influence over Hezhou and its environs. Numerous Muslim accounts portray the decision of Zuo to leave Ma Zhan'ao's stronghold largely untouched as a sign both of a personal relationship between the two and an extension of the official policy of 'using Muslim to govern Muslim' (以回治回). The definition of the Hezhou area and the imposition of movement restrictions can be seen as practical accommodation to the realities of the rebuilding process: control of movement was a prerequisite for the land surveys and census activity needed to re-establish government. However, it is also a strategy which in itself permits what can be described as latitude at the locality in exchange for broader extra-local control: partnerships with ahong, surrendered Muslims and menhuan leaders to govern and make the locality legible, whilst control of borders promised an ability to prevent that local influence from forming destabilizing connections to the world beyond. As later chapters shall explore, the realities of borderland economies made implementation of separation rather more complex than intended.

Conclusion

As explored above, the Tongzhi-era violence shattered Gansu, across each and every axis. What is now called the Great Northwestern Muslim Rebellion did not truly begin as a 'Muslim rebellion', and the dynamics of the early years were dictated by local events. However, the official interpretation of it as a specifically Muslim series of uprisings made it so, setting the stage for the Zuo-led campaign to remake the northwest. This involved a determination to ensure that Muslims would never again be able to cause such destruction, through first separating them from their antagonists (the Han), and secondly a commitment to remoulding Muslim society away the Islamic structures that had underpinned public life, toward a Han Confucian norm.

Nevertheless, the ways in which administrative legibility was reconstructed were determined by the course of the rebellion itself. Surrender to Zuo confirmed Ma Zhan'ao's pre-eminent position within the emerging and reconfigured political landscape of the post-rebellion world. Ma Anliang's own life was constructed around this moment: named as his father's heir and quite literally named by Zuo as a guarantor of a specifically Qing peace. Whilst there was a transformative impulse embedded in Zuo's vision of the northwest remained, in practice the reconstruction was mediated through local elites and dependent on their cooperation. These processes paradoxically confirmed the relationship of the Qing establishment to certain Muslim military leaders.

Their ability to rebuild and further to reshape and regularize ethnic space in the pursuit of stability was a project that required penetration down to the village level.

Chapter Three

Pacification: Land and Reconstructions, 1870 – 1885

Dahejia (大河家) today is not so much a town as it is a crossroads set above the Yellow River as it emerges from the Jishi Gorges (積石峽) into the Hezhou plains. Buses still thunder through, travelling the old route from Hezhou to Xining and shaking the buildings as they pass. But save for the brief swirls of dust they raise and the short line of drivers sitting by the road, the town these days is quiet, its crossroads largely made redundant by the efficiency of modern transport. The grave of Ma Zhan'ao (馬占鰲) lies hidden off the western arm of the crossroads. An elaborate concrete archway marks the shrine's entrance, but the paint now peels from it and the garden inside tended by just one elderly man. Further up the road in the grand mosque that Ma Zhan'ao's son had built, elderly Muslim men in Mao suits and starched white caps told me that the mosque had always been there, a claim directly contradicted by the stele they were sat next to.

Dahejia is a deceptive town: it looks like a backwater, and today, at least, that would be an accurate conclusion to draw. But it stands above the Yellow River, where wood would have once been rafted down from the mountain communities, and on two roads, the good road to Xining and the bad road above the gorges to Salar country. Behind it lies the entry to the Bonan villages, the Muslims resettled from Rebgong in Qinghai following the Tongzhi rebellion. Some 50 kilometres south of Dahejia, on the plains west of Hezhou, Hann Family Market (韓家集) boasts a similar history. An elongated village that stretches itself along the main road in the valley that runs from Hezhou toward Xunhua, like Dahejia it is dominated by a gigantic mosque, the largest in Gansu. From within the mosque, the green minarets of the mosques of the hill villages can be seen, each seemingly positioned to remain visible from that first towering edifice. Likewise, both Dahejia and Hann Family Market passed as market towns in their day.¹ Most importantly, though, both owe their present form to the post-rebellion moment, and to the transformation of society and the local structures of Islam that occurred at that time.

Ma Zhan'ao built Dahejia, I was told. The walls of the settlement he made his own are gone now, the town so impacted by modern progress that tracing their old course is impossible even by satellite image. But locals told me, approvingly, of how the old mosque had stood inside

¹ Zhang Tingwu 張庭武, *Hezhou caifang shiji* 河州採訪事蹟 [Inquiries into Hezhou Affairs] (manuscript, National Library of China collections, 1909). Volume 1: 26-29.

the walls rather than being relegated to a suburb of a walled, Qing-dominated government seat, as in Hezhou. They told me how Ma Zhan'ao had made the town Muslim. By their accounts, following his relocation to Dahejia, the few non-Muslims settled there had been given a choice to either abide by his local mandate or go elsewhere. A qadi (C. *gazui* 尕最), an Islamic judge, exercised justice from the seat of the local mosque, reportedly until the early years of the Communist period.² Likewise in nearby Hann Family Market, the stele recording the Ma Qianling lineage's role in the construction of the mosque and adjudication of the religious life of the community still stands, carefully wrapped in plastic sheeting to protect it from the latest set of renovations to the mosque itself. By contrast, on the other side of the Tao River, although there is a gongbei complex set into the hills that flank Didao's eastern edge, there is no mosque within the town at all and few remember that one might once have been there.³

The modern spaces of these villages, though they seem small and distant from any urban centres, hide a history of quite profound significance: the consequences of Zuo Zongtang's attempt to remake the northwest, and the resultant changes in the structure of local society. Furthermore, the association of this locality with the Republican-era Muslim Ma family warlords who dominated China's northwestern provinces throughout the early twentieth century makes these modern backwaters significant. All three separate lineages, each surnamed Ma but not related, emerged from three villages west of Hezhou. The Ningxia Mas came from Hann Family Market, the Gansu Mas from Dahejia and the Qinghai Mas from Monigou.⁴ In effect, these villages form a model pattern for the transformation of Muslim society in the postbellum moment, replicated to varying degrees across He-Huang, Taoxi and Gansu.

The resettlement and the changes in land-holding produced profound changes within the Islamic traditions and structures of Islamic authority of He-Huang and Taoxi, as communities reformed around their varying experiences of rebellion, resettlement and aftermath. The resettlement as it was implemented cannot be seen a unilateral process. The resulting societal changes were an outcome of complex interactions between empire, local society, legal due process, the course of the reconstruction and the inherent tension between the aims of the state and its capacity to achieve them. The pacification envisaged by Zuo was never fully realised. Instead, half-implemented, it produced a patchwork of results – none of them quite what had been intended.

² Personal communication from the ahong and manager of Dahejia Great Mosque, June 2017.

³ See Figure 6 for a map showing locations of Dahejia and Hann Family Market, p110.

⁴ Monigou is not discussed in this chapter: its later role as the hometown of the founder of the Ikhwan means that the religious history of the village prior to his birth has been entirely overwritten. Monigou is now talked about only in terms of his birth.

This chapter thus examines pacification in three different instances, following an initial exploration of the government bureaus tasked with managing the process. I analyse the formation of new mosque communities in the upland Tibetan areas, the creation of new clusters of dense Muslim population in the villages west of Hezhou, and the results of the alienation of the Mufti from their former religious/business centre. Finally, I look at the significance of what can be seen as a state-led religious transformation, namely the creation of a network of shrines and an infrastructure commemorating the martyred dead. This in effect places the transformations in Muslim religious and community space within the wider context of the Qing society in which they were embedded.

That there should be an emphasis on place, ancestral residency, on graves and ritual sites throughout postbellum property disputes is not surprising. Property rights, confessional boundaries and the various forms of authority and jurisdiction operating in late imperial China were always deeply intertwined. The establishment of a mosque or a gongbei within a village makes it a religious space; vice-versa, the establishment of a mosque makes a village. Chinese cities can be read as religious sites, their walls and temples as a single coherent ritual/administrative system.⁵ The building of such sites - or their destruction - has to be considered as part of the definition of a ritual tradition. Mosques were often taken to mark the formal establishment of a permanent right to reside for Muslims, as had happened in Heicheng (黑城) in the 1840s.⁶ Gongbei gave transnational Sufi networks local purchase and tied the small Muslim communities of the Gansu frontier into a spiritual genealogy descending from the prophet himself. *Labtse* (T. lab rtse), arrow-spear structures for the veneration of local gods of the place (T. yul lha; gzhib bdag), marked the edges of Tibetan communities, whilst temples to the dragon kings could mark the Chinese or Tu village boundaries and the structure of irrigation rights.

Above the level of the village, Qing conceptions of the locality made it an enclosed, bounded space, nested within a hierarchically defined system of administrative units. Its ritual landscape - the physical temples, gods and heavenly apparatus with which the earthly bureaucrats had to co-operate - was structured on the same pattern.⁷ The ritual landscape could

⁵ Gaubatz is one of the few writers to explore the multiple roles of the Chinese city in an integrated fashion. Piper Rae Gaubatz, *Beyond the Great Wall: Urban Form and Transformation on the Chinese Frontiers* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1996).

⁶ The content of the dispute had originally concerned a mosque built by Muslims on land Tibetans considered to be their own. The Muslims, conversely, claimed that they had been granted the right to settle permanently and construct a mosque in gratitude for their military service to the Qing.

⁷ Officials in China effectively worked in co-operation with an otherworldly bureaucracy that mirrored the structure of the empire, from local territorial deities (prefects) to the Jade Emperor (emperor). To ensure harmony was maintained, they had to perform the appropriate rituals for the appropriate gods at

not be separated from the administrative one: they were one and the same. By contrast, a menhuan mosque network might cross a thousand miles, connecting distant locations like beads on a string and yet still not include the whole population of a single village on route. A menhuan network is instead a genealogy of the places its members had travelled to, a record of journeys and connections made and maintained by the faithful. Changes in spatial population distribution had both socio-economic and religious significance, and these aspects must be discussed together.

This chapter thus outlines a set of interlocking religious, spatial, and social changes. The designs of reconstruction were constrained by the ability of the local government to effect them. This meant that state attempts to restore lands to their rightful owners in fact often confirmed the presence of Muslim settlers on lands they had either seized or occupied as abandoned, whilst clusters of Chinese-speaking refugees (both Han and Hui) in the upland Tibetan communities became permanent. Hezhou's Muslim character was confirmed by the influx of Muslim population, whilst the consolidation of military/religious authority in the hands of the family lineages through the reconstruction process transformed the structures of local Islamic communities, as explored through examinations of Dahejia and Hann Family Market. However, the patchwork of pacification produced uneven terrain. Elsewhere, Muslims were the ones forced from their homes, and the experience of dispossession became written into the religious genealogies of those traditions. Across the wider space of empire, Muslims were excluded from commemorations of the dead which made the rebellion Muslim. The new Muslim elite of Hezhou were able to articulate their authority in ways that made sense to a Qing order, but nevertheless, henceforth community divides were always ethno-religious first.

the appropriate times. In times of calamity – drought, or pestilence – they would lead ceremonies to intercede with their counterparts.




Fig 6. Location map for places detailed in Chapter Three, base image from Google Earth satellite data, 14/02/2019.

The Pacification Apparatus

As was briefly stated in the previous chapter, the establishment of a baseline for reconstruction first stipulated restrictions on the movement of people, particularly Muslims, but was mostly designed to promote the swift return of the land to productivity via the settlement of refugees and distribution of seed grain.⁸

He-Huang and Taoxi had been spared the communal violence attendant on the reconquest of Shaanxi and eastern Gansu. However, both regions had been left administratively a void: entire communities had fled to seek refuge, their land then seized by their former neighbours. The process of returning the regions to productivity and bringing them conclusively back within the Qing imperial fold required effectively rebuilding Qing administrative knowledge. The Xunhua archive, the only extant Qing county archive for this region, is full of references to the gaps in state knowledge produced by the burning of the yamen and its holdings in the 1860s, and the difficulty of re-building the institutions. In effect the archive is a self-conscious creation of the reconstruction. In its materiality - the weight of paper, the reports

⁸ Issues of movement and trade – essentially an exploration of the transformation of Muslim relationships to other communities – are explored in Chapter Four of this dissertation.

and censuses – in invested the physical heft of a rebuilt Qing authority. Xunhua prefect Wang Shengyuan's (王聲遠) dispatch alongside his draft pacification articles complains the difficulty of the task he has been given in rather plaintive terms: "From the rebellion onwards, there have been no officials in the city and so ten years have passed where [the people] did know not know law, discipline, officials nor punishment, did not know etiquette, righteousness, honesty nor shame."⁹

The legacy of the destruction of the former archive is writ through postbellum cases. With the institutional knowledge built up over the previous century gone up in smoke, Qing officials found themselves attempting to settle disputes over monastic land holdings by reading the 1790s Gong Jinghan-authored Xunhua Gazetteer (循化志) aloud to the plaintiffs.¹⁰ Elsewhere, memorials were dispatched to the monasteries so that the document collections they held, specifically edicts issued in times past, could be examined and verified to determine the tax status of certain groups.¹¹

However, despite the pressing urgency of the tasks at hand, there was a certain ad hoc nature to the Pacification Bureaus that were established to deal with the actual details of reconstruction. At the centre, they reported back to the Gansu Head Bureau (甘肅總局), established by Zuo in 1869 and headed by a committee of the top civilian officials for the province.¹² However, this central office – as with most Qing central offices – merely issued broad directives, leaving the detail to the local bureaus. The structure of the bureaus echoed that of the administration: beneath the central office was a regional office in Xining, whose committee was formed from the prefect, the Military Circuit Intendant (兵備道), and a ranking officer from Zuo's Hunan Army (楚軍) – or, in effect, a partnership between the civil administration, local

⁹ 自叛亂以來城中無官已及十年不知如何為法紀官刑，如何為禮義廉恥。QSGC, 06-122-1, 《為擬報善後十條事》，TZ 12 08 14.

¹⁰ The gazetteer was then read for the crowd to hear, and the heart went from then, and furthermore they now all understood the roots of this matter and so they were even more unwilling to fight.' 志書又念給眾聽，眾心已離，再又皆明白此事根底，更不肯出力。QHDG, 7—永久—2678, 《為在拉卜楞訪問情上的肅稟》，GX 15 07 08. This memorial is part of a series concerning a much longer conflict between Labrang and Rongwo Monasteries, for the details of the case see Max Oidtmann, 'Between Patron and Priest: Amdo Tibet Under Qing Rule' (Harvard University, 2014), 480-501. In the second case, Labrang Monastery submitted an edict they had received in 1865 confirming their governance over a far-flung tribe, which is then verified by the yamen as confirmation of the tax status of the group in question.

¹¹ QHDG, 7—永久—258, 《循化廳為請給諭由拉布楞管理玉樹的稟》，GX 02 08 15.

¹² Namely, the Provincial Administration Commissioner (布政使), the Judicial Commissioner (按察使) (Hucker, 103) and the Lanzhou Circuit Intendant (蘭州道台). See, for example, the letter heading with the composition of the committee on a memorial recording the decision to subsume the functions of the Provisions Bureau into the ambit of the Pacification Bureau, QSGC, 07-14-1, 《為甘肅軍需局改為善後總局並即啟用關防事致循化分府安》，GX 05 04 21.

military and Zuo's own forces.¹³ The county bureau in Xunhua was then under the control of Xining, and was tasked with handling pacification affairs throughout the county.¹⁴ Similar structures would have been in place in Hezhou and Didao, reporting back to Lanzhou.

However, the neatness of this geographical administrative hierarchy masks a certain vagueness in the duties and composition of these bureaus. They were established on an ad-hoc basis, as Zuo's troops progressed through Gansu, and their functions overlapped with those that would normally have been undertaken by the civil administration. Wang himself stated in his addendum to his pacification articles, the reconstruction needed to be conducted "according to locality and moment" (因地因時) and so although he stressed the manner in which his own regulations would conform to the broader patterns of pacification work, they needed to be adapted to the conditions of his district. Funding was originally channelled to these bureaus alongside the Provisions Bureau (軍需局), a body whose responsibilities were mostly to do with army logistics.¹⁵ At a central level, they were responsible to the Ministry of Works (工部) and the Board of Revenue (戶部). They were a creation of military necessity, and their close association with Zuo's armies and funding made them in the beginning an extension of the military apparatus. Reconstruction began as a strategic imperative. It took for the yamens of the civil administration to regain the capacity to tackle the full range of functions of office.

Tracking the evolution of the pacification apparatus is challenging, due to the scattered nature of the documentation and the complex way in which the bureaus intertwined themselves with multiple, competing systems of administration, a pattern which can be seen repeated across the late Qing political field. Guan Xiaohong has argued that the explosion in the number of bureaux in the post-rebellion period both expedited processes of reconstruction, but also represent a further fragmentation of the central system. There were repeated attempts to dissolve these bureaus and absorb them back into the system, but having developed their own funding mechanisms, they became deeply embedded into local systems.¹⁶ This fragmentation and an associated devolution of power to the local elites is considered to be a defining feature of

¹³ The Hunan Army was originally a regional army raised by Zuo at his own initiative from his home areas in Hunan to fight the Taiping Rebellion. As the army was based on kinship networks and regional affiliations – in contrast to government armies – its officers were personally loyal to Zuo. For a history of these armies and their local militia origins, see Philip A. Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1980), esp. 105-164.

¹⁴ See QSGC, 06-122-1, 《為擬報善後十條事》, TZ 12 08 14.

¹⁵ They were eventually rolled into one office. See QSGC, 07-14-1, 《為甘肅軍需局改為善後總局並即啟用關防事致循化分府安》, GX 05 04 21.

¹⁶ See Guan Xiaohong 關曉紅, 'Wan Qing jusuo yu Qing mo zhengti biange 晚清局所与清末政體變革 [Late Qing Bureaus and Reform of the Late Qing Political System]', *Jindai lishi yanjiu*, no. 05 (2011): 4-21.

the late Qing and is used as a shorthand for the declining effectiveness of the regime. It did often effectively allow space for successful governmental initiatives at a local level, but it also further contributed to the difficulty of co-ordinating policy and the impression of an unravelling empire staffed by self-made men, whose priorities were increasingly distant from those of the court.¹⁷

As a slight modification to the above paradigm, I would suggest that the relationship of the bureaus to the central government can be conceptualised as akin to the shards that hang within a shattered pane of glass. Although fractured every which way, the tension across the pane means that it retains its overall shape – at least provided none of the shards are disturbed. In Xunhua, as elsewhere, the bureaus were tied into the formal systems of government and their functions were justified in reference to central policy. Hence, the local gentry staffing them were effectively drawn into this matrix. They were neither independent of the central system, yet nor did they work solely for the Governor-General.¹⁸ Whilst they represent a devolution of functions to a local level, the bureau themselves were invested in the centre. The profusion of bureaus was a particular feature of the immediate postbellum period. In 1884, following the conclusion of what can be considered the early phase of reconstruction across the Qing empire, the central authorities made a concerted and broadly successful attempt to reclaim devolved powers. This involved both reclaiming the right to collect the likin tax (internal customs; 釐金) and directly ordering the closure of a number of bureaus.¹⁹

This pattern is seen in Xunhua, where the offices appear to have endured for some ten years, until Governor-General Tan Zhonglin (譚鍾麟) rationalised their functions by combining the Provisions Bureau, the Pacification Bureau and the Commissary (糧台).²⁰ The accounts submitted by Tan in closing the Pacification Bureau and Provisions Bureau for the period from

¹⁷ There is a lively argument about when such devolution began, its precise impacts and the extent to which it occurred at all. See, variously, Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China*, esp. Introduction; Stephen R. Platt, *Provincial Patriots: The Hunanese and Modern China* (Harvard University Press, 2007), Introduction. Wensheng Wang, *White Lotus Rebels and South China Pirates: Crisis and Reform in the Qing Empire [Electronic Resource]*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England: Harvard University Press, 2014); Mary Clabaugh Wright, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism : The T'ung-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874*, College ed.. (New York: Atheneum, 1967).

¹⁸ The idea that they were independent and loyal to provincial administrators is an argument made by Li Zhiming, which I believe represents a misunderstanding of the ways in which the bureaus operated in cooperation with the older system. Li Zhiming 李志茗, *Wan Qing si da mufu 晚清四大幕府* (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 2002), 275.

¹⁹ See Kaske for a lucid explanation of the complexities of provincial war finance and the postbellum period. Kaske, 'Fund-Raising Wars'.

²⁰ The post of Commissary was roughly equivalent to that of quartermaster, responsible for troop provisioning and supply lines on a fairly ad hoc basis. In the context of Xunhua, I would suggest that this was the local office of the Provisions Bureau, responsible for requisitioning grain from the locality to support ongoing campaigns in Gansu. See Charles O. Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1985), 310.

1869 – 1882 are the most comprehensive single source for examination of their operations and reveal that the two bureaus worked largely in tandem. The Pacification Bureau received most of its reported income from the likin tax, which was collected by the Provisions Bureau, which itself supervised the apparatus responsible for manning the tolls. This was then distributed back to the various Pacification Bureaux for use on local projects. Income for the above period stood at 53,431 *taels* (兩), spent on a number of headings, including the provisioning and support of local militias, provision for destitute refugees, the rebuilding of infrastructure including schools and examination halls, campaigns to attract farmers to Longxi (隴西), and the expenses associated with a military campaign undertaken in far-off Sichuan in 1879. Expenses relating to the dead, the honours system and the Hunan Army were handled by the Provisions Bureau.²¹

The individual sums given in the accounts should, however, be considered unreliable, given that Tan's accounts are more symbolic than literal – a way of retrospectively approving expenditure and formally incorporating the bureaus into Qing records so that they could be abolished. The recentralisation drive behind Tan's submission of his expenses is clear within his accounts: it is stated that the expenses for the militias dispatched to Guazhou (瓜州) were originally born by the Gannan Likin Office (甘南釐金局). This agency was later abolished and folded into the Gansu Likin Head Office (甘肅釐金總局), whose accounts for the period were submitted as part of Tan's deposition.²² The accounts, however, do make clear that the two agencies were in effect responsible for all aspects of civil reconstruction.

Given the overlap between different agencies and the broad responsibilities they held, the apparent mission creep of the Xunhua Pacification Bureau makes sense, as does the difficulty it had in effectively performing its roles. Whilst initially involved mostly in cadastral surveys and refugee registration, this role quickly expanded into dealing with anything that could be construed as a legacy of the rebellion. Hence an 1881 order to the Xining Pacification Bureau instructs them to attend to the maintenance of the graveyards on the hills above the city, and further makes it clear that the funding for this enterprise is to be found at the local level.²³ Spiralling responsibilities required these bureaus to seek innovative lines of funding, hence their connections to likin collection. Whilst precedents for how reconstruction had operated in one area could be instructive, they were rarely determinative. Hence, in instructions sent down

²¹ NPM, Tan Zhonglin 譚鍾麟, 124738b, 《軍需局清單》, GX 09 12 20.

²² NPM, Tan Zhonglin 譚鍾麟, 124738a, 《善後局清單》, GX 09 12 20.

²³ See QSGC, 07-2066-15, 《為修理省城南北兩山義墳掩埋骨殖致循化分府張》, GX 07 09 22.

from the Gansu Head Provisions Bureau (甘肅軍需局) to Xining, it is stated that although it would normally be advisable to sell off rebel property (叛絕產業) as a source of income, the comparative lack of confiscated property in Xunhua means alternative measures must be found.²⁴

The unclear reporting lines, the need to raise a certain proportion of their own funds, the cooperation required between local elites, re-established authorities and military establishment for their operation, and the vagaries concerning precise content of their respective duties soon produced friction. Xunhua went ahead and established two sub-offices in its jurisdiction, to handle issues for two areas (Maying 馬營集 and Dongxiang) distant from the county town and staffed by local examination graduates. The cost of surveying land and the salaries of the graduates were to be paid by the locality, by means of a crude tax per land-holding assessed. However, it seems Wang Shengyuan may have jumped the gun in establishing the sub-offices. The retrospective petition sent to Xining asking for their creation was denied, and his successor ruminated on the foolishness and expense of creating unnecessary bureaucracy, even as the graduates were beginning their surveys.²⁵ Although there is no document in the record confirming this, the sub-offices appear to have continued to operate. The complex administrative make-up of Xunhua made them a necessity, despite the concern of the prefect for the expenses incurred.

Following the proclamation of the Pacification Regulations, the prefects of Xunhua, Hezhou and Didao moved swiftly to put them into action. By the 5th month of the 11th year of the reign of the Tongzhi Emperor (1872), Xunhua's Prefect Wang was posting public notices far and wide calling for Han settlers who had fled the region to return, promising food and support to re-establish their lives. Traders were reassured that the roads were safe and that their livelihoods would be safeguarded if they would reopen shop in the Xunhua region.²⁶ Muslims who had fled to other districts were now escorted back to Xunhua, and the local magistrate were tasked with feeding them and restoring them to their former lands.²⁷ Meanwhile, headmen were ordered to report any refugees living in their communities, and systems of community responsibility were re-instated.

²⁴ QSGC, 06-15-3, 《為辦理善後經費事》, TZ 13 09 02.

²⁵ QSGC, 06-13-8, 《千為無項設局繳回鈐記事致善後局委員》, TZ 13 05 03.

²⁶ QSGC, 06-124-1, 《為找回逃散流難漢民事》, TZ 12 05 12

²⁷ See, for instance, a communication originally sent from Suzhou on the return of 34 Muslims to Chajia gong (查家工), a Salar region in the area. This gives a list of the names and places of origin of those dispatched, and states that they are to be resettled on fallow land in their former villages. QSGC, 06-171-8-10 《為照單安插男婦三十四名事至循化分府注》, TZ 12 11 07.

The majority of the reconstruction work, however, was targeted towards the agricultural areas of Xunhua only: here endless registers were taken, refugees supported, tools dispersed, all in the name of reinstituting the land tax as swiftly as possible. The nomadic areas further to the south, while in principle part of Xunhua, were in practice under the jurisdictions of the principle Tibetan Buddhist monasteries in the area, Labrang and Rongwo.²⁸ These regions did not pay tax directly to the Qing and were not registered under the decimal headman system. The bureaus thus broadly left these areas alone, declaring a return to the old systems. Responsibility fell to the monasteries for handling the refugees under their domains: Tsö Monastery (T. gtsos dgon pa; C. *Heicuo si* 黑錯寺) was responsible for guaranteeing that the Han and Hui refugees then living under their jurisdiction would 'not go out and cause trouble' (不出外生事), to ensure interim stability.²⁹

The difficulties, however, were manifold. In some cases, villages had been left entirely depopulated and repopulating them required finding entirely new tenants. Anxious to bring their land under cultivation in order to meet their tax demands, landlords and communities could not afford to be picky about who these tenants were, and this ultimately led to long-term changes in the structure of communities and administration in the Xunhua area. Likewise, Chaney cites this as one reason for the later decline of the *tusi* system: the new Han farmers drafted onto *tusi* lands were willing to fulfil their tax but not their corvee obligations. To simplify somewhat, the newly arrived Han were tenants, rather than subjects of the *tusi*.³⁰ Merchants were reluctant to return to towns that were destitute, without a functioning economy for their goods. Refugees encamped in the Tibetan areas to the south of Hezhou were reluctant to return until they knew what they were returning to, or in many cases were unable to do so as their lands had been occupied by others. The difficulty of persuading people to return to an uncertain and devastated land is clear in Wang's proclamation entreating Han to return the county town itself cited above – or perhaps, more accurately, persuading the right people to return to the right places. He emphasized that food and shacks (窩棚) by way of

²⁸ Labrang Monastery (T. dge ldan bshad sgrub dar rgyas bkra shis gyas su 'khyil ba'i gling C. 拉卜楞寺) is the largest Tibetan monastery outside the Tibetan Autonomous Region; Rongwo Monastery (T. rong po dgon chen thos bsam rnam rgyal gling, C. 隆務寺) is likewise venerable and formerly powerful. The two fought a series of conflicts over the 18th and 19th century. For the evolution of the Gelug 'mega-monasteries' in Amdo, see Brenton Sullivan, 'The Mother of All Monasteries: Gonlung Jampa Ling and the Rise of Mega Monasteries in Northeastern Tibet' (University of Virginia, 2013).

²⁹ In this document, the pledge is given by three monks (小僧) of Tso Monastery. QSGC 06-173-13 《為保證漢回不出外生事勾結打槍者》, TZ 12 09 22.

³⁰ Wesley Byron Chaney, 'Land, Trade, and the Law on the Sino-Tibetan Border, 1723-1911' (Stanford University, 2016), 387-388.

temporary accommodation would be provided until families could re-establish themselves.³¹ The lack of manpower was a further complicating factor. The sub-offices in Xunhua were staffed with just one or two men each, responsible for hundreds of square miles of devastated terrain. It is unsurprising then that these men ended up reliant on village leaders, surrendered rebel commanders, or indeed, any organisation pre-existing within the territory they were surveying.

The establishment of the bureaus themselves thus reveals a tension between both the desire of the state to swiftly re-establish a taxable base and the desire to ensure stability via separating problematic populations. There is a further tension between the sweeping remit for the remaking of northwestern society envisaged by Zuo and the capacity of the local government for achieving anything of the sort. It is the gap between intention and capacity that ended up determining much of the resettlement process for the Muslims of He-Huang and Taoxi.

Settling Land Cases

In the areas west of the Tao, the nature of the surrender of Ma Zhan'ao meant that local Muslims (土回) were (mostly) not to be dispossessed. Non-local Muslims (客回), largely refugees from Shaanxi who had fled into He-Huang and Taoxi, were to be registered and forcibly removed to the areas designated for Muslim resettlement.

However, the need to strike a balance between compensation for the losses of the non-Muslim population, the need to return the land to profitability and respect for property rights of Muslims ensured that in many places where Muslims had occupied land in the previous decade, the course of litigation often resulted in them retaining the rights to that land. Investments occupiers had made, improvements to houses or mills, were to be respected: the former owner was required to compensate them for work done, or a sale would be arranged of the property to its occupier.³² Warnings, moreover, were given to those involved in handling disputed land cases that they needed to be on the look-out for Han returnees who might try to leverage their non-rebel status into dispossessing Muslims from land they rightfully owned. Moreover, there was a structural blindness built into the system for adjudicating land conflicts that often ended up confirming Muslim occupation of appropriated lands, or in some cases, the pre-existing fact of Muslim residence in Tibetan market towns. In absence of a contract, testimony was taken from community leaders and neighbours, themselves hardly disinterested parties.³³ Muslim headmen around Xunhua and Hezhou, still in their positions thanks to Ma Zhan'ao's timely

³¹ QSGC, 06-124-1, 《為找回逃散流難漢民事》, TZ 12 05 12.

³² See Articles 1-5 for an example, but similar regulations were in place in all sets of Pacification Regulations I have seen. QSGC, 06-16-5-10, 《河州善后章程》, TZ 11 12 12.

³³ *Ibid.*

surrender, had in some cases benefitted from land occupation themselves. In cases where there was no decisive balance of proof, the occupiers normally ended up retaining the land.

To explore how this unfolded in practice, I shall take a more detailed look at the post-rebellion experience of two upland communities, which had harboured refugees during the rebellion itself. Tawa, (C. 塔哇 T. mtha' pa), today more commonly known as Xiahe 夏河, the village and market that serves Labrang Monastery, and village beside Tsö Monastery. This will demonstrate the decisive role of the post-rebellion period in confirming the establishment of new Muslim and Han communities in the Tibetan uplands. In effect, the upland fringe of Xunhua and Hezhou became more diverse, whilst the lowland communities – where the refugees had originated – became increasingly religiously homogenous.

In the case of Tawa, etymology of the name speaks to the manner of the founding of Labrang Monastery itself, established by bequest in 1709: the name simply means 'outskirts', or by extension, 'a village found around a monastery'.³⁴ The community settled around Labrang emerged from the need to serve the monastery, supplying a market and craftsmen. The town grew swiftly following the establishment of the monastery and hosted a noticeably diverse community.³⁵ The land around the monastery, however, was originally owned by the monastery itself. The monastic establishment, although willing to trade with outsiders, was unwilling to allow those not directly under the authority of the monastery to permanently settle. The presence of Muslim traders serving Labrang began with the monastery itself, but given this reluctance, it is hard to ascertain at what point the community became permanent. An old story relates that the Third Jamyang Zhepa, Lobsang Tubten Jigme Gyatso (T. blo bzang thub bstan 'jigs med rgya mtsho, 1792-1855) invited four Han and four Hui families from Hezhou to settle in Tawa. The Han families were invited for the expertise as craftsmen, the Hui as traders.³⁶ The

³⁴ Gongbaocao 貢保草, *Labuleng 'Tawa' de Shehui Wenhua Bianqian* 拉卜楞"塔哇"的社會文化變遷 [*Social and Cultural Change in Labrang's Tawa*] (Beijing: Renmin, 2009), 1-2.

³⁵ In 1928, one study estimated the population at about 2600, of whom around 45% were Tibetan and 35% Muslim. Xiahe County Gazetteer (夏河縣志) cited in Paul Kocot Nietupski, *Labrang: A Tibetan Buddhist Monastery at the Crossroads of Four Civilizations* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1999), 64.

³⁶ Dating of the story varies. In some versions, it is the First Jamyang Zhepa and the eight families were invited to settle as the monastery was founded. The more convincing version says it was the Third Jamyang Zhepa, a man known for being an astute politician who brokered a number of deals between Qing and other parties in the region and for defending Labrang against attempted incursions by Rongwo. The most precise date given for this invite is found in a 1956 mosque survey conducted by the Xiahe County United Front Work Department (夏河縣統戰部), which gives 1848. The eight families were effectively given monopolies by the monastery: their business guaranteed. See Chen Shiming 陳世明, 'Xiahe xian Musilin ji qi qingzhensi 夏河縣穆斯林及其清真寺 [Muslims in Xiahe County and T. 額 heir Mosques]', *Huizu Yanjiu*, no. 4 (1993): 39.

story is unverifiable, but nevertheless indicates the oversight the monastery exercised over the community around it.

Muslims began trading with Labrang from its foundation, and but it is likely that they only began to settle in Tawa in the early 19th century. The Third Jamyang Zhepa granted permission and land to construct a mosque in 1854, a formal sign of the Muslim community's permanent presence at Labrang.³⁷ This pattern was repeated in the foundation of mosques in similar communities: a mosque was founded beside Tsö Monastery in 1839, and in Bola Jiake (博拉加科) in 1853.³⁸ All retained strong links to the Hezhou communities. Well into the Republican period, along for these mosques were all exclusively recruited from Hezhou and its immediate environs.³⁹ With the exception of Tawa Mosque itself, which considers itself a broad church affiliated to the 'four great menhuan', all mosques founded in the upland areas around Labrang and Tsö in the 19th century were affiliated to the Huasi menhuan.⁴⁰ Combined with further, relatively well-attested Xianfeng-era mosque construction in the villages surrounding the Lushar Mosque (魯沙爾清真寺) immediately outside Kumbum Monastery and across Bayanrong, this trend implies increasing recognition of the permanent presence of Muslims in the upland Tibetan-speaking regions, or perhaps, the increasing assertiveness of Muslims in those communities over the mid-19th century.⁴¹ This is not to say that these communities were new, necessarily, simply that the formal move to construct a proper mosque to replace an older informal prayer hall was a significant moment in the life of these communities, given both the expense and the symbolic nature of the act. ⁴²

The 1840s -50s period in which these mosques were built saw the influence of both Qing state and Mongols over the Labrang area decrease. The Third Jamyang Zhepa, Lobsang Thubten Jikme Gyatso (1792-1855), expanded ties to Lhasa and effectively increased Labrang's autonomy from Amdo powers.⁴³ The presence of Muslim settlers in the immediate vicinity was a tribute to the importance the monastery had acquired as an economic centre whilst the Muslim

³⁷ The mosque, which is still on the same site, is not in a Muslim area of town: it is set back from the main road and in a Tibetan suburb that also contains a temple and another monastery. The current ahong explained its location to me as a function of the Jamyang Zhepa's decision to grant them land and argued that its placement made them in a sense a part of the monastery's domains. Personal communication, fieldwork, July 2017.

³⁸ Chen Shiming, 'Xiahe xian Musilin ji qi qingzhensi', 42.

³⁹ *Ibid.* 43-46.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 42.

⁴¹ The Lushar Mosque predates others in the area by some 50 years, having been founded around 1783. See Ma Yingku 馬應庫, *Lusha'er qingzhen da si zhi* 魯沙爾清真大寺志 [*Lushar Great Mosque Gazetteer*], (n.p.:n.p., 2010), 1.

⁴² Analysis of mosque construction dates in Qinghai, H Theaker, forthcoming.

⁴³ The Jamyang Zhepas are the incarnate lineage of tulkus which have effectively ruled Labrang throughout its history. See Nietupski, *Labrang*, 139.

traders here provided the links into the interior that the monastery needed in order to effectively sustain its own independence.

During the rebellion, both Labrang and Tsö Monasteries sheltered large numbers of refugees. This was common throughout the highland hinterlands of Qinghai and Gansu, refugees there were protected by distance and the relative stability of the Tibetan regions. Censuses were taken late in 1873 across the area to determine which populations were located where. A register compiled in late 1873 from the village around Tsö monastery listed some 60 households of Han refugees originally from Hezhou.⁴⁴ A petition by refugees from Hezhou who had fled to Labrang Monastery stated that there were around 200 Han families in Labrang territory.⁴⁵ Elsewhere, the same census found 26 Han and four Hui families living at Khagya Monastery.⁴⁶ Having identified the location and status of the families in question, the intent was to return them to their original lands.

However, even in cases where returning was apparently straightforward, it was not always easy to persuade families to return or to abandon an area in which they had been resident for some years. In one pledge sent by Du Xuexiu (杜學秀) and four fellow merchants, they explain they and some 50 households had arrived in Tso during the troubles and made a living by doing business. Now that the troubles are over, they had returned their families to Hezhou, but that they and their fellows 'for the moment are residing to put our shops in order' (暫且居住整頓鋪內).⁴⁷ In this instance, the orders to return are in direct conflict with the financial interests of the refugees. Return to the Hezhou environs, full of irate Muslim neighbours, was simply not an appealing prospect. Elsewhere, those responsible for masterminding and ensuring the resettlement of the Shaanxi Muslims then resident in the Salar areas of Xunhua, are found entreating Xunhua to send edicts to the Salar headmen to force them to get the Shaanxi Muslims to leave.⁴⁸

The case of Tawa demonstrates the ways in which non-Muslims could lose out from the litigation processes surrounding resettlement. In the summer of the 12th year of the reign of the Tongzhi Emperor (1873), as the refugee registers were being compiled and as the work to move the Shaanxi Muslims into the areas designated for their resettlement began to swing into action,

⁴⁴ QSGC, 06-95-19-27, 《為黑錯寺他哇住漢民姓名年歲居址丁口數目》, TZ 12 09 00.

⁴⁵ QSGC, 06-53-5, 《為逃難漢民不能強行霸占回商鋪屋攔阻回民貿易事》, TZ 12 08 29.

⁴⁶ QSGC, 06-95-12-18, 《呈造卡家寺住居漢回姓名年歲居址丁口數目》, TZ 12 08 21.

⁴⁷ QSGC, 06-137-12, 《為漢民不出外生事勾結打搶者事》, TZ 12 09 22.

⁴⁸ QSGC, 06-173-1, 《為催清水工難民起身各歸原籍事》, TZ 12 05 04. There is a very good chance that the individuals in question never left: there is no further record of either registers of these groups or of their migration, and large numbers of Shaanxi Muslims did ultimately remain settled in the area.

a merchant leader (貿易行頭) by the name of Ma Wujiu (馬五九) submitted a petition to the Xunhua authorities, alleging that Han refugees from Hezhou and Taozhou had occupied his shopfront in Tawa and were preventing him and other Muslim businessmen from conducting their trade. In the petition, Ma emphasizes the legitimate nature of his business, and a long-standing relationship with the authorities where in the past, he had been entrusted with official business, presumably goods procurement. As all goods had previously been transported via Hezhou, foot trade had been badly disrupted by the troubles and for it to resume – thereby facilitating the resurrection of the local economy - the refugees now occupying Tawa property had to leave. On this basis, Xunhua issued a public notice (告示) informing the refugees that they must return to their original residences, and an edict to the Labrang authorities instructing them likewise.⁴⁹

Almost immediately, a counter-suit was sent in response by Wang Huanan (王化南) and four other representatives of the refugee community, claiming their inability to return and the economic distress of their circumstances. Wang's petition relates how the families had fled into Tibetan areas (番地) to escape the violence in Hezhou and Taozhou, begging for food to survive. He further tells how although the Tawa refugees had been delighted by news of the victory in Hezhou, many of those attempting to return had found that the Hui who had occupied their lands refused to leave. News had filtered back to the refugee community at Tawa that some who had returned had even been attacked by those who had occupied their land, and now they were afraid to leave the comparative safety of Tawa. Wang graphically describes the poverty of the refugees and insists that their residences were rightfully rented from the Tibetan landlords, using their own money. He further attempts to defend claims that they are preventing Hui merchants from conducting business, via what is in essence a defence of free trade quite out of keeping with Qing attitudes towards the Tibetan borders.⁵⁰

From the descriptions given, it appears that Ma Wujiu was an influential figure, representing a significant consortium of the Muslim businessmen operating in Labrang. Wang Huanan describes him as leading '800 families of merchants' and 'using his power as a 'trade leader' (以八百家之眾商，以行頭之勢力) to oppress the Han refugees encamped at Labrang.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Ma Wujiu's original petition is not within the Xunhua documents database that I have, content of his petition is contained in the Qing proclamation (告示), which quoted his petition at length.

⁵⁰ 至於貿易一事，天下貿易之地，天下人共居之所，房產鋪面俱係番子業屋，自回民赴河造反以後，都被大水淹去，僅存者不過四五十間，生等即於番子處賃居，實非希圖霸佔回民鋪屋... 祇懇恩主明鏡高懸，恩施格外，暫準生等潛藏幽谷以待先天化日之時等得以歸鄉樂業。QSGC, 06-53-5, 《為逃難漢民不能強行霸佔回商鋪屋攔阻回民貿易事》，TZ 12 08 29.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

Yang Hongwei identifies the 'trade leader' (*hangtou* 行頭) as a position established alongside the parallel position of 'trade manager' (*hangyue* 行約) by the monastery for managing the market. He suggests that this system was probably established in either the Xianfeng or Tongzhi years alongside the mosque, as the size of the community around Labrang grew and became more permanent.⁵² The two managers were clearly also responsible to the Qing: a later order from Xunhua to the trading community at Tawa makes clear that they were responsible of the enforcement of official regulations on the sale of tea.⁵³ There is little else that can be determined about Ma Wujiu's background, but it is clear that in 1873, he had an established relationship with both monastic authorities and local yamen.⁵⁴

In attempting to both appease the refugees and to protect the prior rights of the Muslim trading group, the judgement from the Pacification Bureau on the case did not take a firm line. Returning Muslim merchants were ordered to buy the leases back, rather than simply seizing property currently occupied by (Han) refugees. The refugee community was ordered not to interfere with Muslim merchants pursuing their business. The orders to Labrang that the refugees should be returned to their homes were not rescinded, nor was any delay granted.⁵⁵ The prevarication, however, favoured the returning Muslim traders: with limited capacity to act, the state in effect confirmed their prior right of access to the Labrang market. Whilst in theory enabled to return to their old livings, the Hezhou refugees were in effect left dispossessed, whilst the Muslim traders were able to return to their pre-bellum profession, their families secure in either Labrang or lands near Hezhou. The refugees lacked the capacity to retake their old lands by force from well-established Muslim groups who moreover enjoyed close relationships with the emerging establishment, courtesy of their role in fighting for the Qing following the surrender of Hezhou.

As the refugees hesitated over even attempting to return, the passage of time made their claims to land yet more tenuous. Occupiers who had planted crops were always permitted to remain until they had reaped what they had sown (and tax had been collected), and should this continue, the license given to households to farm plots they had would become permanent

⁵² It is unclear how the two roles differ. Yang Hongwei 楊紅衛, 'Jindai Gan Qing Zang qu shichang kongjian fenbu yanjiu 近代甘青藏區市場空間分佈研究 [Research on Market Space Distribution in Tibetan Areas of Gansu and Qinghai in Modern Times]', *Qinghai minzu yanjiu* 25, no. 1 (2014): 111.

⁵³ See QSGC 07-3269-19, 《為官茶攤售出價銀解來拉卜楞他哇鋪戶》, GX 03 07 29.

⁵⁴ Ma Wujiu was conducting official business: earlier that summer, a yamen runner had been sent to Labrang to purchase geldings of high quality from him and a number of other merchants. See QSGC, 06-180-4, 《為差催馬五九等買馬事》, TZ 12 06 09.

⁵⁵ QSGC, 06-53-5, 《為逃難漢民不能強行霸占回商鋪屋攔阻回民貿易事》, TZ 12 08 29.

within three years.⁵⁶ Equally deserving of attention is the way in which a case which was about trading and occupation rights in an area under Labrang's jurisdiction was now being expressed as rebel/non-rebel, Muslim/non-Muslim conflict. All such cases now were, and it was expected that they would always be expressed in those terms, a sign of the way in which the rebellion and state legal practice together were combining to harden ethno-religious divides.

Returning to the wider picture across He-Huang and Taoxi, the patterns in general favoured whoever had ended up in occupation of the land prior to the re-establishment of Qing control. In land cases that were contested, dispossessed tenants were faced with both with the burden of proof to prove their right to their land and, often, with ensuring a judgement in their favour could be enforced.⁵⁷ Whilst the Pacification Regulations made clear that any contracts made between Han and Hui parties during the rebellion were considered suspect, they were still proffered as verification in post-rebellion land disputes – and often accepted. In some cases, although a land claim was proven, the eventual judgement would confirm the occupier as in effect a tenant of the returning landlord. This was the result in the case of Ma Jincai (馬進才), who was sued by Xiao Wanlu (蕭萬祿) in 1873. Although Ma was found to have occupied Xiao's land, the existence of a sale contract and his work in tending it entitled him to 40% of the harvest and a share in managing Xiao's property henceforth.⁵⁸

In the Xunhua valley, the Salar occupation of formerly Tibetan lands is seen in the movement of Tibetan names up the valley: there are older Tibetan names for what are now Salar/Hui communities on the good agricultural land of the valley floor.⁵⁹ The Muslim dispossessed from Bao'an (保安) were resettled into the hills behind Dahejia, banned from returning home and their former property appropriated by the state and the remaining soldiers and locals. The Rebgong valley, seat of Rongwo Monastery, thus became Muslim-free, save for the mosque and trading community that served the monastery market. Communities of refugees in Tibetan areas became permanent, as in Tawa and around Tsö. The mosques along the Hezhou-Labrang route each trace their foundation back to the refugees who fled there during the rebellion years.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ QSGC, 06-16-5-10, 《河州善后章程》, TZ 11 12 12.

⁵⁷ In one pointed rescript on a case presented by Dzomo Khar Monastery, the prefect admits that the monastery has suffered cruelly and that its lands have remained occupied by the force which burnt it down. However, he can do nothing to aid the monks if the occupiers refuse to vacate.

⁵⁸ QSGC, 03-311-11, 《為告侵占產業案事》, TZ 12 閏 06 00.

⁵⁹ Personal communication, Dorje Tsering, July 2016.

⁶⁰ Chen Shiming, 'Xiahe xian musuln ji qi qingzhensi', 42-49.

In effect, diversity of the upland communities increased post-rebellion through the incorporation of the refugees as a permanent presence. However, on the plains, the rebellion – particularly within the agricultural communities – further entrenched the idea and increasingly the reality to match that individual villages should ideally be ethnically and religiously homogenous. Hence it was that by the Republican era, missionary Joseph Ekvall could travel through Taozhou, Didao and Hezhou and comment on the seemingly complete alienation of Han and Hui communities, a passage worth quoting in full for its eerie evocation of two separate worlds that existed in parallel:

“On one occasion we made a trip with Moslem muleteers. They were friendly and suggested that we stay with them in their village, so for that night we stopped in a little Moslem world. The children were called I-si-mer (Ismael) Fa-ti-mai (Fatima) Er-pu-tu (Abdul). It was the fast of Ramadan (or feast, if you think of it in terms of night), and the fires blazed all night, and people called and shouted. Before darkness fell, pious bearded men said their evening prayers in public places; one, who wore a white turban as a sign that he had made the pilgrimage to Mecca, argued points of theology, quoting the Koran in oddly mutilated Arabic. The Moslems referred to themselves as "we" (being careful never to use the inclusive "we," which would include those spoken to) and to the Chinese in the near-by villages as "they." The village had a small building that did duty for a mosque, where the children were gathered at regular periods to receive instruction in Islam and learn the Arabic alphabet and phonetics so that they would be able to read the sounds of necessary prayers and religious formulas even if they couldn't understand them. Some of them went also to the government school, to which a teacher came daily from a neighbouring town.

We made another trip over the same general route but on this occasion had Chinese muleteers. We kept a lookout for the Moslem village but missed it nevertheless; inquiry brought out that we had been taken around it. Somehow the landscape seemed to have a much more typically Chinese complexion than before. Again we stayed for the night in the native village of our muleteers. The homes were plastered with newly-posted kitchen and door gods. The local shrine, or temple, stood at the crossroads, with a platform over it for the performance of plays, and the smell of incense was in the air as it is at New Year's time. Pigs grunted in the courtyards and in the streets; after dark, accompanied by the beating of gongs and the clashing of cymbals, effigies and masks were carried around in celebration of some aspect of pagan worship. When the people said "we"- and sometimes, with greater tolerance than the Moslems, they included us -

they referred to themselves and also to Chinese in general; "they" meant the others, who were defined with some hesitancy as the Moslems who lived in other villages around."⁶¹

Two worlds, layered over the same space: a visible representation of the way in which the rebellion-fractured landscape could not and would not simply be fitted back together again.

Religious Sanctions and the Reach of the Local Government

The transformation of the northwest envisioned by Zuo was originally intended to incorporate not just the spatial separation of Muslim from non-Muslim, but also the cultural transformation of the former population group, such that that their Muslim-ness would no longer pose a hindrance to their incorporation into a Han Chinese world. However, as with the state's capacity to pursue reconstruction, Zuo's ambitions were sorely constrained by the realities of governance.

As described in the previous chapter, the programme initially envisioned by Zuo had involved both the suppression of the heterodox New Teaching (新教, loosely speaking the Jahriyya), and a statement that Muslim governance was to be brought into line with Han norms. Henceforth the children of Muslim elite were to be educated in the Confucian classics, and all civil Muslim disputes should be handled by the local yamen. This agenda, however, was stymied by both the incapacity of the government to put this bold programme into action, and by the structure of the reconstruction itself, which depended on a Muslim military elite to enact its directives. Despite bold pronouncements on the part of the men initially entrusted with the pacification of the west, local governments largely lacked the capacity to effectively police the religious affairs of Muslims. The physical weight of the needs of reconstruction, rebuilding, and replanting did not leave space for the policing of such (for the Qing officials) abstract matters. The potential consequences of intervening in Muslim religious affairs were also weighty: Qing officials knew all too well that any Muslim disturbance of the peace would be blamed on their lax governance, and precedent had shown that ham-fisted approaches to religious affairs could quickly provoke a community-wide backlash.

Thus, in the post-rebellion period there was only one campaign enacted at the local level that appears to have explicitly targeted Muslim religious affairs in the Xunhua area. On instructions handed down from Xining and ultimately traceable back to the initiative of Zuo Zongtang himself, Xunhua carried out what seems to have effectively been a propaganda

⁶¹ Robert B. Ekvall, *Cultural Relations on the Kansu-Tibetan Border* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939), 19-20.

campaign against the twin evils of opium and heresy, conducted by means of big-character posters in 1877. The campaign was conducted on two fronts: firstly the distribution of posters to local settlements reminding locals against the lures of opium and heresy, and secondly the appointment and remuneration of local gentry to inspect villages for traces of opium cultivation and presumably heresy as well.⁶² No example of the posters survives, but they are described as 'four character edicts to be distributed to each beadle, fortress headman, gentleman and elder' (四字諭分發各鄉堡紳耆). Despite repeated injunctions to Xunhua to appoint local gentry for the inspections, Xunhua dragged their feet over implementation of even this modest campaign. In practice, beyond the 'strictly prohibit heresy' (嚴禁邪教) banners, no effective oversight of Muslim religious affairs was ever enacted. One petition even suggested that the Muslim and Tibetan communities of He-Huang be exempted from inspection altogether, as neither Muslims nor Tibetans grew opium, nor was it easy for Chinese officials to determine what was or wasn't heresy within Islam or Tibetan Buddhism.⁶³

Religious affairs were thus left to the adjudication of the relevant local communities, with oversight from the Qing authorities only when it was either specifically requested or when a problem expanded beyond the abilities of community elders to contain it. However, just two extant cases within the Xunhua Archive explicitly request Qing intervention in Muslim religious affairs.⁶⁴ One is a case in which a Muslim elder reported a new imam for fears that he might be a part of the prohibited New Teaching.⁶⁵ The second is an instance in which the community of Suzhi *gong* (蘇至工) request permission to rebuild a collapsed minaret. Upon investigation, it was determined that the minaret really had collapsed and that this as not a covert attempt to construct a new mosque, and thus permission was granted.⁶⁶

As with both management of land disputes and the reconstruction process as a whole, the structure of the administration meant that there was significant flexibility at the local level. Systems of precedent and lateral communication tied the Xunhua yamen to its neighbours across Gansu in their handling of such affairs, but the strictness of the approach taken in practice depended on the make-up of the region, the attitude of the presiding prefect and Han

⁶² QSGC, 07-3419-2, 《為嚴禁邪教四字諭分發各鄉堡紳耆事致循化廳》, GX 04 03 18, QSGC, 07-3425-9, 《為稽查罌粟邪教選派紳士事致循化廳》, GX 05 02 09.

⁶³ QSGC, 07-3418, 8, 《為查禁栽種罌粟傳習邪教事》, GX 04 01 04.

⁶⁴ It is possible that other such cases exist and I was simply not able to access the relevant documents. However, I am confident in saying that they are proportionally few, given the number of Muslims within the district and the generally litigious nature of the populace.

⁶⁵ Sadly, there is no further record of the outcome of this case. QSGC, 07-256-10, 《為任用漢六十為查家工副總辦頭人事》, GX 14 02 13.

⁶⁶ QSGC, 07-1028-11, 《為派差查明舊樓倒塌事》, GX 16 閏 02 28.

gentry, and particularly the proportion of resettled Hui to local Hui. Thus, in practice, the patterning of religious tolerance was locally determined. In Xunhua and Hezhou, which had large numbers of Muslims, this meant tolerance; in Xining, the provincial capital where no Muslims lived within the walls, this did not. Systems of precedent and hierarchical oversight ensured that from a province-wide level, policies enacted appeared broadly contiguous. From the local level, although the general direction was indeed uniform, the degree of articulation and implementation was quite widely varied. For instance, a lateral communication from 1876 passed to Xunhua from Pingluo 平羅 in Ningxia records a case in which a local Muslim gentleman (回紳) illicitly constructed a mosque. The local magistrate had it summarily demolished due to his failure to observe the correct registration procedures.⁶⁷ Xunhua would have noted this precedent, and been aware of it, but no such case ever occurred within the county.

Mosques and gongbei were demolished across He-Huang and Taoxi in communities where Muslims had been expelled. In the subsequent decade, however, there are no cases recorded of mosque demolition in Muslim-majority villages in Xunhua and Hezhou. As will be examined in the following cases studies, the reverse was true of Hann Family Market and Dahejia. The creation of a local Muslim elite, and the devolution of the management of religious affairs to that elite, resulted in an expansion of mosque building in areas where Muslims were permitted to remain, as well as the evolution of a new pattern of religious management that was to have profound consequences for Muslims across the northwest. The expansion in mosque building in these areas was of course matched by the confiscation and demolition of Muslim structures in areas where they were not: paralleling the construction of mosques and gongbei in Hezhou and Dongxiang was the demolition of the mosques in the towns of Danga'er, Bao'an and Didao. In effect, the postbellum changes produce a partial rationalisation of religious space, as villages became mono-confessional and the more religiously plural pre-rebellion world began to vanish.

Mosque Building and Authority: Hann Family Market, Dahejia and the Creation of the Haiyi System

In general, tracing mosque construction, funding and significance is challenging. Records are few and oral histories rarely include the details of mosque renovations. It is possible to trace

⁶⁷ QSGC, 07-1753-4, 《為馬德儉等違建寺一案至循化廳》, GX 20 02 09.

the change in structure of Hann Family Market and Dahejia precisely because these villages are unusual, and because the presence of eminent military lineages provided the impetus to record events there. The creation of the religious establishments of Hann Family Market and Dahejia was a function of the patronage of the two Ma family lineages, a sign of their claim to spiritual authority that bolstered their civil and military leadership.

In both Hann Family Market and Dahejia, the post-rebellion period was marked by the emergence of the *haiyi* (海乙) system. 'Haiyi' is derived from the Ottoman Turkish for 'centre', and is a term used to refer to a hierarchical system of mosque administration. In this arrangement, the head imam (總長教) of each great mosque supervised a network of smaller mosques in the area, selecting their *ahong*, directing their teachings and managing any civil cases or matters of law which arise in the vicinity. The *haiyi* system and its spread across Qinghai is most commonly associated with the Ikhwan, a late 19th century Gansu reformist movement that was explicitly anti-Sufi and opposed to the syncretic practices seen in some Chinese Muslim traditions. The patronage of the Republican-era Muslim leaders in Qinghai and the hierarchical nature of religious authority within the *haiyi* system allowed the quick spread of the new teachings, as *ahong* were dispatched from Xining to convert Muslims in the hinterland and bring local mosques formally under Xining's jurisdiction, occasionally by force.⁶⁸

However, this system of organisation did not originate with the Ikhwan, despite their association with it. The structural organisation of some *menhuan* shows a certain resemblance to the hierarchical system of a *haiyi* mosque in their adherence to the teachings of a single shaykh. However, *menhuan* did not normally subordinate all the mosques of an area to a single centre and thus the *haiyi* system can be seen an innovation in Muslim communities that emerged specifically in the postbellum period.⁶⁹ The central great mosques in both Hann Family Market and Dahejia predate the Ikhwan, and the earliest use of 'haiyi mosque' is as a title recorded in the stele that relates the founding of the Hann Family Market mosque.⁷⁰ Even today the districts around both communities remain largely non-Ikhwan. Like the mosque in Tawa, the two great mosques function as broad churches, accepting of devotees of all the various Sufi lineages and of those with no *tariqa* affiliation at all. Indeed, the only local Muslims who do not worship in them are the few local Ikhwan converts, who have founded their own separate

⁶⁸ On the rise of the Ikhwan, see Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 200-211.

⁶⁹ The Salar gong are a partial exception to this: the gong have functioned as *haiyi* communities for much longer.

⁷⁰ Hann Family Market Haiyi Great Mosque Stele (韓家集海一大禮拜寺碑記) in Zhang Siwen 張思溫, *Jishi lu* 積石錄 [Jishi Records], (Lanzhou: Gansu wenhua, 1999), 200-204. Photographed by the author, June 2017.

mosques. The physical separation of their mosques from the older community religious spaces speaks to the depth of the divisions with the modern Chinese Muslim confessions.

Hann Family Market: Pre-existing Muslim community

Hann Family Market offers perhaps the most complete record of mosque history in the northwest, owing to the existence of a number of projects conducted by Republican era 'Ningxia Mas' to record their own history, and the existence of a unique stele detailing the role of charitable donations made by the same family to the mosques of the valley. The village is also intensely proud of its history as the home of the famous Ningxia Ma warlords, and thus provides an ideal case study for description of the evolution of the haiyi system.

The Hann Family Market Haiyi Great Mosque stele (also known as Mochuan Great Mosque 磨川大寺) gives a history of Islam in the valley from the arrival of the earliest Muslim settlers onwards. It relates that originally there were two mosques in the Hann Family Market valley, both founded in the late Ming or early Qing. The first was Yangwa Mosque (陽窪), originally tiled in wooden boards as the congregation could not afford lacquered tiles, and so known as the Clapboard Mosque (塔板寺). The second was on the Mochuan site. Thanks to its location beside a river, it quickly became known as a place to pray for rain and thus was known as the Entreating Rain Mosque (求雨寺). In the stele narrative, although the rebellion is not mentioned by name, the period after it is identified as a golden age for the Muslim community. "After the Xianfeng [1851-1860] and Tongzhi [1860 – 1874] reigns, Muslims from outside [lit. guest Muslims] converged like the spokes of a wheel around Hann Family Market, business flourished, and with our surplus wealth, we could not have no teaching."⁷¹ This suggests both the role of expanded role of Hann Family Market in the post-rebellion era, and the presence of a newly substantial and emboldened Muslim population. It is quite possible that the 'Muslims from elsewhere' mentioned here were among the Shaanxi Muslims who had refused to vacate the lands they had occupied in favour of the Tawa refugees. It is thus in 1881, when the congregations had outgrown the size of the original two mosques, that the brothers Ma Fushou

⁷¹ 咸同以後，韓家集客回輻湊，商務盛行，口富之餘，不可無教。The Tongzhi reign period is so closely associated with the Great Northwestern Muslim Rebellion that it is often just referred to as 'the Tongzhi-period rebellion.' Hann Family Market Haiyi Great Mosque Stele (韓家集海一大禮拜寺碑記) in Zhang Siwen, *Jishi lu*, 201.

(馬福壽) and Ma Fulu (馬福祿) return to the village following a military campaign and propose renovating and expanding the two mosques.⁷²

Ma Fushou and Ma Fulu were both sons of Ma Qianling and served the Qing in various military capacities. Indeed, Fulu had passed the military exams (武進士) exams in 1880 and was quickly rising to prominence. Ma Qianling was another of the leaders who had served alongside Ma Zhan'ao in the Tongzhi-era rebellion. The family originated in Yangwa Village (陽窪村), located on a hillside a short ten-minute walk up Hann Family Market on the valley floor. Their family grave plot is still found in a shady dell on the hilltop, although nothing remains of the inscribed headstones: destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, the graves are now nothing more than mounds of earth in a field, with a few Quranic readers tucked into a hollow in the loess nearby.⁷³

According to the Ma Family genealogy, Qianling had been a tea peddler in his youth. His fortunes were made after he rescued a Mongol headman by the name of Youwu (尤務) when he and his young bride were attacked on the road. The family grew prosperous thanks to the trading partnership that was founded on basis of this encounter.⁷⁴ Predictably, the family genealogy omits his participation in the rebellion, concentrating instead on his dispersal of his wealth to aid refugees on the road and his loyalty to the dynasty. However, other sources name Qianling as a brigade leader under Ma Zhan'ao.⁷⁵ The genealogy gives him credit for persuading Ma Zhan'ao to surrender, and he went on to serve in a variety of Qing military roles.⁷⁶ Locals say that it was Qianling who donated the land for the transformation of the Entreating Rain Mosque. The stele does not mention this but does give him credit for organising the project in cooperation with village elders. It further attributes the decision to transform the Entreating Rain Mosque into a *haiyi* mosque and make Yangwa Mosque subject to Qianling's authority. The project was completed successfully, in part due to the Ma family's connections to the wood trade and their ability to acquire appropriate beams.

The stele further records both the creation of another mosque in 1885 for the community of Lower Yin'ao (下陰凹). As this community was separated from the central mosque in Mochuan by a river, it was agreed that the convenience of daily prayers a new small

⁷² *Ibid.* 200-204.

⁷³ Site visit by the author, June 2017.

⁷⁴ Ma Hongda 馬鴻達, *Ma shi zupu* 馬氏族譜 [Genealogy of the Ma Family], (unpublished manuscript, in Gansu Provincial Library, c. 1946), Vol 3, 3:8a.

⁷⁵ Ma Peiqing, 'Ma Zhan'ao qishi yu touxiang', 14-22.

⁷⁶ See 'Gravestone of Ma Qianling' (馬千領墓碑) in Zhang Siwen 張思溫, *Jishi lu* 積石錄, 217-223.

mosque should be constructed, but that it should remain subject to the Mochuan Mosque. In outlining the development of the *haiyi* community around Hann Family Market, the stele also lists the disputed creation of another mosque. In the same year that the construction of Lower Yin'ao Mosque was agreed, a community of 'outsider merchants' (客籍商戶) tried to 'draw on the assistance of powerful outsiders' (恃外方有力者之援) to found a new mosque at the market itself. They did not discuss their plans with the village elders, and according to the stele, their intent was to splinter the community (意在破壞我數百年固結之團體). The Mochuan elders took them to court, where on basis of the precedent of Zuo Zongtang's rules forbidding the founding of new mosques, the Hezhou Prefect had the building confiscated and turned into a community school (義塾). Seventeen years later, after mosques had been constructed in an approved fashion for a number of further villages in the valley, the family raised money to purchase the school back and it was eventually converted into a mosque.⁷⁷ The stele in question was raised in 1918, as a record of fifty years' worth of charitable donations made to the mosques of the valley by various scions of the Ma family.

The process here suggests the manner in which the Ma family were able to consolidate their position of influence within the Hann Family Valley through endowments, conspicuous charity, and their military service to the Qing state. It is telling that the first mosque renovation project is pursued after Ma Fushou and Ma Fulu return in glory (歸榮) from a Qing military campaign: their service to the state is the leverage for the family transformation of the religious space and organisation of the village. The creative manner in which the Ma lineage uses Zuo's prohibitions on mosque building to enforce a unity of religious observance within their assumed domain is a form of forum shopping: although seemingly happy to overlook local religious politics otherwise, the Hezhou prefect is forced by the twin power of central directives and local manoeuvring to produce the desired judgement. The whole trend, however, suggests a significant expansion in the Muslim population of the valley and its wealth in the post-rebellion period. Furthermore, it shows the significance of the Muslim military families in effecting a shift away from the charisma-based authority of the Sufi shaykhs who had previously dominated religious life.

Dahejia: New Muslim Community

Unlike Hann Family Market, Dahejia had not been a majority Muslim domain prior to the rebellion and owes its present state entirely to the post-rebellion arrival of the Ma Zhan'ao

⁷⁷ 'Hann Family Market Haiyi Great Mosque Stele' in Zhang Siwen 張思溫, *Jishi lu*, 202-204.

lineage. In the context of the space of Dahejia, the mosque stands opposite the former Ma family residence, and some two minutes walk up the road from the formerly lavish grave complex of Ma Zhan'ao. Whilst now dramatically reduced in size, the complex would have once included a number of additional compounds and lotus gardens. The spire of the gongbei would have been visible from the road: a symbolic, and un-subtle, statement of the family's leading role.

It is uncertain, however, when precisely the family relocated to Dahejia. Ma Zhan'ao himself was born in Monigou and was known as the 'Monigou ahong' for most of his life.⁷⁸ Given the proximity of Dahejia to the Bao'an communities resettled in the Jishi Mountains, a move Ma Zhan'ao helped coordinate, as well as its position on the main road to Xining, it seems reasonable to suggest this was a strategic choice of residence. The Muslim character of Dahejia arrived alongside Ma Zhan'ao himself, guaranteed by his authority and the walls he built. The mosque, mansion and family graves were the heart of the town, built on land acquired in the wake of the rebellions with profit made in the wood trade.

As in Hann Family Market, the creation of a haiyi mosque is explicitly attributed to the endorsement of the local military lineage. The modern stele outside Dahejia Great Mosque dates its foundation in its current form to the year 1896, although it is reasonably clear that a smaller mosque existed on the same site prior to that date. Ma Anliang, Ma Zhan'ao's eldest son, is credited with coordinating the expansion of the mosque in obedience to his father's dying wishes.⁷⁹ Mu Shouqi includes a similar tale in his encyclopaedic Republican-era history of Gansu, Ningxia and Qinghai. In Mu's telling, Zhan'ao commands his son, "If you wish to protect our family's property, turn our military might to fulfilment of official purpose, and build a haiyi mosque [system]. Take as doctrine that in managing all things, it is essential to unite with the Han."⁸⁰ The stele now outside the mosque also defines the area over which the Great Mosque has jurisdiction: 'south for 30 li to Gaji (Little Market), and westward to the Qinghai woodlands

⁷⁸ As for instance, in the following report on a case in which Ma Anliang was accused of killing a headman in a dispute over woodland. Despite the fact that both Zhan'ao and Anliang had official titles, he is referred to throughout this report, sent down from the Provincial Administration Commissioner and the Judicial Commissioner to Xunhua, as the 'Monigou ahong' and Ma Anliang is identified first and foremost as his son. QHDG, 7—永久—2943, 7—永久—2944 《甘肅布政使張、提刑按察使裕扎循化廳》，GX 16 07 17.

⁷⁹ Dahejia Haiyi Great Mosque stele (大河家海乙大寺), photographs by the author, June 2017.

⁸⁰ 爾欲保守家產，得意宦以兵力，實行海一寺，主義須事事與漢人聯合。Mu Shouqi 慕壽祺, *Gan Ning Qing shilüe* 甘寧青史略 [*An Outline History of Gansu, Ningxia and Qinghai*], ed. Zhao Yuanzhen 趙元貞 and Li Bing 李炳, 10 vols (Taipei: Guangwen shuju, 1972), Vol 8, 28.18a. It is possible that the Mu Shouqi recording of this version influenced the later writers of the stele.

and Tasa Slope, every jumu'ah [congregational Friday prayer] the jamaat [congregations] proceed to the great mosque to worship together.'⁸¹

Examination of the gravestones in the gongbei complex, however, demonstrates the complex interplay between the creation of the space of the village as a Muslim community, the role of the Ma Zhan'ao lineage, and their relationship to the restored Qing state. Whilst Ma Zhan'ao himself passed away in 1886, his twin headstones were not erected until 1898 – some twelve years after his death.⁸² The inscriptions, in Arabic and Chinese, give an account of his funeral and emphasize his identity as both a loyal official and a spiritual leader, culminating in a series of auguries of near-sainthood. It is said that on the day when he "returned to Allah" (歸真), his room was filled with an otherworldly fragrance (異香) that would not disperse.⁸³

Ma Zhan'ao's gongbei, however, was erected alongside a memorial archway (牌坊) bearing the inscription 'Take pleasure in doing good and give generously' (樂善好施). According to the Chinese face of the stele which stood beside it, permission to construct the arch was granted in accordance with precedents (照例) in recognition of the donation of 1000 *taels* by Ma Anliang for relief of victims of the Henanese floods in 1888. Ma Anliang attributed this praiseworthy act of charity to the inspiration of his father's dying wishes.⁸⁴ The act in itself was not unusual, nor especially noteworthy: the inscription was standard, as was Anliang's dedication of the giving act to his father. Qing statutes mandated that an archway could be built for any gifts of over 2000 tael, but in the cash-strapped environment of the late Qing, smaller donations were often likewise recognised.⁸⁵ Charitable giving was an established part of the moral economy and was an expected part of being a community leader, to the extent that local elite contributions to charitable drives were sometimes forced. The Chinese face of the stele

⁸¹ 南三十裡外的朶集，西至青海木場，塔撒坡等村，每逢主麻日，各者麻提結隊來大寺聚禮，每逢大寺有事，即共同聚合商議決定。· Dahejia Haiyi Great Mosque stele, photographed June 2017.

⁸² The original headstones were smashed during the Cultural Revolution. The version of the text here is taken from transcriptions made by Zhang Siwen around the 1950s, and the translation of the Arabic by Ma Xuelian (馬學廉).

⁸³ 'Ma Zhan'ao's Headstone' (馬占鰲墓碑) in Zhang Siwen, *Jishi lu*, 445-459.

⁸⁴ 'Stele Commemorating the Archway Built Beside Ma Zhan'ao's Grave' (馬占鰲墓建坊碑記) in Zhang Siwen, *Jishi lu*, 467-470.

⁸⁵ There are numerous such cases in both the First Historical Archives and the National Palace Museum collections in Taiwan. See, for instance, an identical request for an archway inscribed with the same saying, made on behalf of a low-ranking official in Taiwan who had donated money according to the will of his deceased parents. FHA, Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, 03-7079-101, 《奏為署雲林縣知縣陳世烈故父母遺命捐資賑災請建坊給予樂善好施字樣事》，GX 14 08 04. Furthermore, the fundraising drive was clearly a major initiative across the area. A register of donations made from Xunhua lists money given by the important trading houses of the area and local Muslim leaders. The quantities given, however, are far below the 1000 tael donated by Anliang. QSGC, 07-2061-11-21, 《勸捐豫皖賑撫銀錢》，GX 14 00 00.

emphasizes the process of approval for Anliang's charity, cites the various communications sent in the donation process, and emphasizes the permission granted to erect an archway in memory of his father.⁸⁶ The Arabic face emphasizes the locality, without reference to the chain of messages sent up through the bureaucracy linking Ma Anliang's donation to the distant imperial centre of Beijing. Instead it highlights the personal acknowledgement of the Hezhou Regional Commander (總兵) of Ma Zhan'ao's superior moral character. Moreover, it gives an explication of each character of the inscription: the surface reading of loyalty to the dynasty and love for its people, contrasted against a deeper, Islamic and Sufi-inflected reading that emphasizes submission to Allah and the journey to the divine.⁸⁷

The site and inscriptions work on multiple levels. The presence of the archway justifies the grave complex within a Qing ritual world. The Islamic exegesis of the inscription justifies the presence of a Qing archway beside the grave of a man whose headstone positions him for shaykh-hood. Ma Anliang's filial devotion to his father both confirms and justifies his position as his successor. The construction of tomb and mosque, both occurring comparatively late within his career, can be seen as a textualization of his position within Qing and local society. The act of stele carving creates a genealogy written in stone that is both legible to non-Muslim Qing contemporaries and acceptable within a shifting Islamic world. Both the act of donation and the twin acts of composition confirm the integration of the Ma family into a network of Qing gentry: it is an attempt to portray their comfort in both worlds. The Muslim space of Dahejia, carved out and protected by the family, is reintegrated back into a Qing world through those tombs.

Assessing the Haiyi System

The mosques at Hann Family Market and Dahejia are the earliest, to my knowledge, to be titled as 'central mosques'. As stated above, it possible that similar systems had been instituted in Islamic communities before. However, the level of centralisation, its association with military lineages, and the creation of a new name for the system, suggests that this did represent a sea-change for the Islamic communities of the area, in contrast to the looser menhuan networks. Gao Wanxuan (高萬選), using information drawn from oral history projects conducted by the PRC in the 1950s, claims that Ma Zhan'ao instituted the same system in Hezhou itself, beginning in 1870. The command structure of the military gave Zhan'ao the ability to appoint along across He-Huang. According to Gao, the haiyi system in Hezhou

⁸⁶ 'Stele Commemorating the Archway Built Beside Ma Zhan'ao's Grave' in Zhang Siwen, *Jishi lu*, 467-470.

⁸⁷ 'Translation of the Arabic Language Stele Commemorating the Archway Built Beside Ma Zhan'ao's Grave' (馬占鰲墓建坊阿拉伯文石刻譯文) in Zhang Siwen, *Jishi lu*, 471-482.

remained largely intact until the death of Ma Anliang.⁸⁸ This confirms once again the increasing centralisation of military and religious authority in the hands of just a few families, a development that becomes even clearer in the Republican-era patronage of the growing Ikhwan movement by warlords Ma Qi, Ma Lin and Ma Bufang.

The policing of Muslims had been devolved to the surrendered military leaders. The developing relationship between the Qing authorities and the Ma lineages of Hann Family Market and Dahejia did not go entirely unchallenged. Min Dianchen (閔殿臣), another leader who had served with Ma Zhan'ao through the rebellion, rebelled again in 1873. It seems extremely likely that the reason for his second rebellion was a growing grudge against the centralisation of property and authority in the hands of these lineages.⁸⁹ Min had been appointed to the position of patrol commander (哨長) after the rebellion but was dismissed for a failure to abide by military regulations. Although the rebellion was later written as a rebellion against the Qing, his primary targets were Ma Zhan'ao, and the menhuan/military leaders Ma Yongrui and Ma Wuzhen. He gathered a force of around 1000 malcontents with the explicit intention of killing Ma Zhan'ao, and first proceeded to Monigou where they burnt his house. In the memorials reporting the affair, the pursuit and execution of Min is written as a heroic mission for revenge by a loyal servant of the Qing, furious at the disruption to his local area and the attack on his own person.⁹⁰

A Sufi Path Adrift: the Mufti Resettlements

The case of the Mufti, who migrated into the eastern district of Hezhou following the alienation of their former lands to the west of the River Tao in Didao, provides both a demonstration of the way in which traditions reformed around their experience of rebellion and a reminder that even when resettlement did occur, it was a negotiated process. A series of instructions sent to Prefect Yu Guangrong (喻光容) by Zuo Zongtang on the determination of a single Muslim Ma Rong (馬榮) to remain in his native place and to guard the graves of his ancestor provides an archival record of unusual completeness that can be tied to the experience

⁸⁸ Gan Wanxuan 高萬選, "Linxia qingzhensi haiyi zhidu de jianli yi zi bianqian" 臨夏清真寺海乙制度的建立及其變遷 [The Establishment of Evolution of the Haiyi System in Linxia's Mosques], in *Gansu wenshi ziliao*, Vol 2, (Lanzhou: Gansu renmin, 1986), 197-202.

⁸⁹ Whilst there are a lot of oral histories concerning Min and the nature of his enmity with Ma Zhan'ao, enough of this is confirmed by the memorials for the gossip to seem verifiable.

⁹⁰ Zuo Zongtang 左宗棠, *Zuo Zongtang quan ji* 左宗棠全集 [Complete Works of Zuo Zongtang]. Vol 6, 128-132, (1851: 河州南鄉撫回構釁數剿除折), TZ 12 13 17.

of a single Sufi path. The ensuing investigation of Ma Rong's case, over a period ranging from the 12th year of the reign of the Tongzhi Emperor (1873) to the 2nd year of the reign of the Guangxu Emperor (1876) provides a glimpse of both the terms of the protracted negotiations and the emerging gap between rhetoric and practice in the resettlement of Hui communities.⁹¹

As introduced earlier, Didao had been a stronghold of the Mufti for close to 200 years. The accord brokered between Muslims and non-Muslims in Didao was broken first by a brutal pre-emptive massacre of Muslim residents, followed by a reprise attack in which the Mufti took the town and a bloody revenge. As a county seat and furthermore a key crossing point of the River Tao, Didao was a priority target for Zuo Zongtang's reinvasion. The fighting was brutal and Ma Yun's forces succeeded in inflicting serious casualties on Zuo's troops.⁹² However, with the realisation of the inevitability of defeat, Ma Yun chose to surrender in 1870 in the hope of avoiding reprisal massacres of his followers by the victorious Qing troops.⁹³ As they re-entered Didao, the victorious Qing burnt Ma Shouzhen's gongbei and the attached teaching complex to the ground. After the initial census had been taken, it was further decided that the Muslims of Didao would be relocated to the western banks of the Tao, to the Didao Western Villages (狄道西鄉) – away from both their religious centres and the key river crossing.⁹⁴ The county boundaries were subsequently redrawn slightly to ensure that Hezhou had administration of Muslim areas west of the Tao, whilst Didao mostly did not. The new line assigned areas of Dongxiang to Hezhou, but granted the region west of the Tao to Kangle to Didao to compensate for the lost villages (see Fig. 7, below). Hence the county line did not precisely follow the river. Didao was, nevertheless, philosophically east of the Tao: no Muslims allowed.

⁹¹ Respectively, Zuo, *Zuo Zongtang quanji*, Vol 14, zhajian, 318 (543: 狄道州喻牧光容稟撫回馬榮請歸故土情節由), TZ 12 00 00; 371 (629: 狄道州喻牧光容稟回民馬榮等懇於祖墳附近撥給祭田由), TZ 12 00 00; 345 (588: 狄道州喻牧光容稟回民馬榮所筑圍牆情形由), TZ 13 00 00; 382 (646: 狄道州喻牧光容稟回民馬榮等擅修牆院取結永不違犯由), GX 02 00 00.

⁹² Yang Yuxiu 楊毓秀, *Ping Hui zhi* 平回志 [*Records of the Pacification of the Hui*] (Yinchuan: Ningxi renmin, 1987).

⁹³ Memorials sent by Zuo et al identify the particular religious affiliation of the surrenderees as the 'North Village Moufodi' (北庄牟佛諦). See Zuo, *Zuo Zongtang quanji*, Vol. 14 zhajian, 286 (489: 楊提督世俊稟葭台堡回目來營乞撫由) TZ 10 00 00..

⁹⁴ Zuo, *Zuo Zongtang quanji*, Vol. 14 zhajian, 371.



Fig. 7. , Map taken from the Xuantong-period Didao Gazetteer illustrating the redrawn county boundaries⁹⁵

⁹⁵ Lianying 聯瑛 and Li Jingqing 李鏡清, *Xuantong Didao zhou xu zhi* 宣統狄道州續志 [Xuantong period Gazetteer of Didao Prefecture, Revised] (Nanjing: Fenghuang, 2008), Vol 1:5a.

Defeated in battle and with residence in Didao impossible at least in the interim, the Mufti leadership migrated to the community of Fengtai Fort (葑台堡) in neighbouring Kangle to await the cessation of ongoing fighting in neighbouring Hezhou and their own eventual resettlement. The choice of Fengtai was most likely predicated on the prior existence of a Mufti community there, whilst its more remote location would have preserved it from direct involvement in the fighting. Furthermore, the location west of the Tao meant it was already within the zone demarcated by Zuo for Muslim settlement: inside the boundaries of the new Hezhou, albeit by the slimmest of margins.⁹⁶ As a tradition, the Mufti began to reconsolidate themselves in Fengtai and a new *khaniqah* (道堂) was built there in 1871 under the direction of Ma Zhigao (馬智高) and Ma Yinglin (馬應林). Following the death of Ma Yun in 1876, a gongbei was constructed over his grave, eventually becoming known as the Western Gongbei (西拱北), in contrast to the old site of Ma Shouzhen's grave, henceforth known as the Eastern gongbei (東拱北).⁹⁷ By the time the new madrasa was complete, it was clear that the Mufti were neither going to be resettled again nor able to easily return en masse to their former residences east of the Tao. Fengtai became a permanent new centre.

The Mufti stayed partially underground through the lifetime of Ma Yun's successor, Ma Zhen 馬真 (1836-1884).⁹⁸ The existence of a madrasa and growing community at Fengtai suggest that they did regain a degree of prosperity in post-Tongzhi period, but the tariqa otherwise largely eschewed either active proselytising or any engagement in politics beyond the affairs of the village during Ma Zhen's lifetime. The Fengtai gongbei remained a simple affair until 1889, when Ma Zhen's successor, Ma Weihuan (馬維翰, 1870-1896) had a two-storey eight-sided pavilion with golden roof constructed over the grave.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ The county boundaries were redrawn slightly to ensure that Hezhou had administration of Muslim areas west of the Tao, whilst Didao mostly did not. The new line assigned areas of Dongxiang to Hezhou, but granted the region west of the Tao to Kangle to Didao to compensate for the lost villages. Hence the county line did not precisely follow the river. Didao was, nevertheless, philosophically east of the Tao: no Muslims allowed. Lianying 聯瑛 and Li Jingqing 李鏡清, *Xuantong Didao zhou xu zhi* 宣統狄道州續志 [*Xuantong period Gazetteer of Didao Prefecture, Revised*], juan 3:10-14

⁹⁷ Unlike other menhuan traditions, which moved the bones of their shaykhs under similar circumstances, it does not appear that the Mufti ever moved the bones of Ma Shouzhen. See Ma Weijun 馬維俊 "The origins and development of the Mufti Madrasa and gongbei" (穆夫提道堂、拱北源流), in Ma Tong and Ma Haibin, eds., *Zhongguo Sufei pai dianji*, 442.

⁹⁸ Given naming conventions in northwest China, it likely that Ma Yun, Ma Zhen and Ma Rong were brothers. *Ibid.* 442

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* 443

However, the relocation of the tradition to Fengtai Fort was bitterly contested by the Mufti themselves across the 1870s. From the information found in Prefect Yu's reports, Ma Rong was a 'pacified Muslim' (撫回) originally from Didao, and among those Mufti adherents who had migrated to Fengtai Fort (葑台堡). Their former military commander, Ma Zhigao (馬智高) was now collectively responsible for the community to the Qing local authorities.¹⁰⁰ Ma Rong is identified as being from 'Moufodi', a Qing transcription of 'Mufti', and was clearly influential within the menhuan, quite likely a hereditary caretaker of the Eastern gongbei. He is described as a rich Muslim (富回) who had coordinated the construction of a sturdy Muslim fort that had stood 'apart from the city' prior to the 1860s Muslim rebellion.¹⁰¹ The 'Mufti fort' outside the city walls mentioned in Yu's reports refers to the Eastern Gongbei complex and the surrounding Muslim suburb. It is the most likely site for any fort that could have rivalled the town walls itself, and the description given suggests a significant construction.

Whilst his experience of the 1860s conflict was undoubtedly violent, he would not have experienced the profound displacement of the surrendered Shaanxi Muslim refugees. Left destitute by their flight and protracted warfare, they were given little choice to but settle where told or to keep fleeing.¹⁰² Ma Rong would have fought in his home, alongside his imams and alongside his community. His determination in submitting not one but a series of petitions suggests he was well-educated and, despite the disruption of the 1860s, still had financial resources at his disposal. Although removed from Didao, the wider Mufti networks remained reasonably intact.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, it is worth noting the contrast here with the Hezhou-based Islamic traditions: the Huasi gongbei remained intact all through the war years. Fighting in Didao and in the western districts of Hezhou had been fierce. Over 20 years later, Didao was still rebuilding basic infrastructure that had been lost, its gazetteer more a to-do list for institutions that should have been found in the town than a list of buildings in fact present.

Ma Rong's initial petition was sent whilst he is resident in Fengtai Fort and awaiting resettlement to the Didao Western Villages.¹⁰⁴ The instructions given by Zuo make clear that although he has occupied land there he was to be resettled as soon as the autumn harvest is in. Whilst the instructions make clear that Ma and his fellow Muslims are absolutely not to be

¹⁰⁰ Ma Tong identifies Ma Zhigao as a Mufti leader. Ma Tong, *Zhongguo Yisilanjiao yu mehuan zhidu shilüe*, 185.

¹⁰¹ Zuo, *Zuo Zongtang quanji*, Vol 14 zhajian, 345.

¹⁰² Some did keep fleeing. The legend of Bai Yanhu, who escaped into Russia with a group that included a number of Mufti adherents, is famous throughout northwestern Muslim communities.

¹⁰³ There is no extant copy of the Didao Pacification Regulations, but the Hezhou version contain just such an item. QSGC, 06-16-5-10, 《河州善后章程》, TZ 11 12 12.

¹⁰⁴ This appears not have happened.

permitted to return to Didao itself, there was a certain amount of leniency. Ma was permitted to establish boundary markers around the gravesite and Prefect Yu was made responsible for ensuring that the integrity of this boundary would be respected by all. Without the original petition, it is hard to know precisely in what terms Ma requested protection of and access to the graves of his ancestors. However, however it was originally phrased, the request was understood in profoundly Confucian terms. Maintaining the integrity and sanctity of gravesites was a noted concern of Qing attempts to clarify and redistribute land in the post-Tongzhi period, and both claims and counter-claims regarding access to land were often debated in terms of 'ancestral right'.¹⁰⁵ Ma Rong thus fits into a tradition of creative attempts to utilise the legal biases of the Qing for Islamic ends, stretching back to Ma Yinghuan's 1747 allegation of heresy.¹⁰⁶

Sent later in the same year, Ma Rong's second petition contained a request for curtilage: for 'sacrifice fields and house land' (祭田宅地) to be granted to him near the site of his grave in order to better guard it. Again, this suggests both Ma Rong's insistence on his continued right of access to the space and grave and further suggests that, for him, the graves were an active ritual site. On consideration, this petition was unilaterally rejected as an unsubtle attempt to manipulate the authorities into allowing him to return. Zuo argued that the concessions given already were generous.

However, by 1874, at least portion of his former living had been returned to Ma Rong, and he had constructed a perimeter wall around the site. Han locals, their identity unspecified, reported Ma Rong to the authorities on charges of constructing a fort, a deliberately inflammatory charge. Prefect Yu investigated the site, and found that although Ma Rong was building walls, they were not high and were quite unlike fortifications. He thus permitted construction to continue.¹⁰⁷ Zuo's instructions to Yu emphasize that Ma Rong cannot be allowed to return to his former residence under the terms of the pacification articles and that Muslims cannot be allowed to build fortifications. However, the response is also damning of the apparent attempt by Han locals to use a (potentially malicious) accusation to once again defame Ma Rong, especially as Prefect Yu's report indicates that Ma Rong is not building any illicit fortifications. The instructions thus request further clarification of the issues involved.

¹⁰⁵ The Hezhou Pacification Regulations contain just such an article. QSGC, 06-16-5-10, 《河州善后章程》, TZ 11 12 12.

¹⁰⁶ See Ma Haiyun, 'New Teachings and New Territories, Gansu 1700-1800' (Georgetown University, 2007), 43-69.

¹⁰⁷ Zuo, *Zuo Zongtang quanji*, Vol. 14, zhajian, 345.

The final report from 1876 reveals that Ma Rong had in fact returned to his former residence and had dared to construct both walls and a house there. Ma had been allowed by this point to split his household and leave two or three household members to guard the grave, to construct an earthen house to house them, and in deference to the fact that the graves and house were on ‘wild land’ (荒野), a low wall could be constructed around them. However, Ma is found to have added height to his walls and to have fortified the residence and this should be punished. The local Han, who presumably were behind the repeated requests for investigation of Ma Rong and his walls, are warned that any further attempt to interfere with his right to those lands will be investigated. However, the second half of the communication makes clear where responsibility for the laxity of the local government response to Ma lies: with the Muslim leader Ma Zhigao. For his error in not only failing to alert the authorities to have the construction of walls, but in fact interceding on their behalf to request leniency (“repeatedly straightening his back to represent them in asking clemency”), Ma Zhigao was found to have been both “bumptious and confused” (膽大糊塗) and was stripped of his cap badge.¹⁰⁸

The state at the local level was willing to respect Ma Rong’s claims to his graves and his right to maintain them. As with Ma Zhan’ao’s tombs, integrated into an idiom familiar to local officials, this was not just permitted but encouraged. Furthermore, despite the explicit prohibition on Muslim settlement east of the Tao, in practice some accommodations were made. Prefect Yu and local Han gentry were, however, highly concerned that Ma Rong might try and rebuild the former site. In effect, the limits of observance at the grave were tightly set. Whilst the Mufti were permitted to maintain the site, it could never again be the ritual centre that it once was nor host the lavish remembrances (*ermaili* 爾麥力) for Ma Shouzheng that it once had. The legacy of resettlement is written into Mufti history: it is divided between the first eight masters, buried in the Eastern Gongbei, and the latter six, buried in the West. So too is it commemorated within the tariqa ritual. Uniquely among Gansu Sufis, the Mufti were known for sharing a pipe among believers before the dhikr. The act remembers the escape of shaykh Ma Yun, who smoked a pipe to prove to Han soldiers that he was not Muslim so that they would spare his life.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ Zuo, *Zuo Zongtang quanji*, Vol. 14 zhajian, 371.

¹⁰⁹ The smoking question is highly controversial within the Mufti themselves, and is a bone of contention with other traditions who consider smoking to be haram. Reports differ on whether it is current practice: most followers say it used to be, but that the current shaykh has banned it. The Lintao menhuan (the Hezhou-based Mufti splinter group) claim that this was the original cause of their split from the Mufti proper, although I believe they have their chronology wrong. Given the intensity of the debate, I speculate that it may be opium that Ma Yun smoked, as opposed to tobacco. This, as an issue, would reward further research. From interviews conducted by the author, 06/2017.

Ma Zhigao's dismissal, however, illustrates the dilemmas of collective responsibility and the overlaps between religious and military authority. As with Ma Zhan'ao and Ma Qianling, these leaders effectively represented their communities to the yamen – Ma Zhigao's actions, in forwarding Ma Rong's petitions and advocating for the Mufti, were beyond the pale. In placing his community's interests before those of the Qing, he was found to have exceeded his authority and been insensitive to the grace bestowed upon him by the emperor. Zhigao had significant latitude in his authority to handle Mufti affairs and, in effect, represent his community to the state. However, his was also the responsibility.

Death and the Muslim

Bones like white jade illuminate sun and moon,
In graves rest red hearts, which move heaven and earth.
骨如白玉光日月，冢有赤心感乾坤。

Inscription from a mass grave at Geng Family Flat¹¹⁰

Mufti attempts to regain access to their ritual space must be set against the background of the creation of what can be termed a post-rebellion commemorative landscape. The creation of a commemorative landscape was a two-part process: first the reinterpretation of pre-existing sites and symbols in the post-rebellion world, and second the creation of a new network of graveyards and shrines set up *in-memoriam*.

Sites were transformed by their relationship to the events of the rebellion, understandings of the landscape itself reconfigured by trauma. The Temple to the River Source (河源廟) outside Xunhua had been founded in the 1720s, part of the extension of empire into He-Huang. The temple itself had a key symbolic function within Qing cosmology as the place where sacrifices to the Yellow River were performed. Following the war, locally the older meaning was overwritten with the knowledge that this was also the place where women fleeing the fall of Xunhua had leapt into the river and drowned themselves.¹¹¹ Encoding certain claims to place and its understanding in their very existence, the rebuilding of ritual and religious

¹¹⁰ Zhang Siwen, *Jishi lu*, 192.

¹¹¹ QSGC, 07-187-1-7, 《為採訪同治三年三月二十一日循城失陷所有殉難官紳士庶及婦女死亡情節事》，GX 07 00 00.

spaces and the commemoration of the dead became a fraught enterprise in the uneasy, imbalanced postbellum moment.

The aftermath of the rebellion sought to come to terms with the chaos and suffering inflicted on the locality, fitting the deaths into a set of imperially sanctioned forms and transmogrifying the horror of the mass suicides into righteous deaths for the dynasty. Even as the last battles were fought in the Xunhua area, local gentry were beginning to petition the authorities for recognition of their relatives as martyrs, partly to access pensions for widows and children.¹¹² Mass graves were constructed outside Hezhou for the dead, later expanded for burying the dead of the 1895 He-Huang Rebellion. As explored by Tobie Meyer-Fong in Jiangnan, the process of collating and naming the dead was often driven by the initiative of local elites, even as official commemoration and recognition of their loss tied them to a distant imperial centre.¹¹³ And as in Jiangnan, there were a patchwork of commemorative initiatives across He-Huang and Taoxi. Martyrs' Shrines (昭忠祠) were established in Xining, Hezhou and Didao across the years 1874-8, founded by the Hunanese and then expanded by Gansu gentry as they added the names of their own dead.¹¹⁴ Xunhua dragged its feet over construction of a shrine. Nevertheless, formal instructions to Xunhua to found a Bureau of Investigation (採訪局) to produce a Record of the Righteous and the Loyal (正義錄) recording the martyred dead were handed down in 1883, with a note implicitly chiding the Xunhua district for its tardiness on this front.¹¹⁵ Xunhua's shrine was completed only in 1888, whilst Lanzhou completed another shrine in 1891.¹¹⁶ The remembrance of the dead shadowed the entire reconstruction.

Investigations over the next five years produced lists of hundreds of names of the dead and the circumstances in which they died. In the case of Xunhua, it is notable that very few of the named dead died in Xunhua itself. Soldiers of the Xunhua garrison posted to eastern Gansu died fighting there, those who fled Xunhua after the city opened its gates to the rebels died on the road or in the massacre following the fall of Crooked Mouth Fort (歪嘴堡) in the Jishi

¹¹² See, for instance, the petition sent by Wang Zhaoxiang 王兆祥 et al requesting recognition of their relatives and support for dependants. QSGC, 06-124-6-8, 《為陳氏之夫等數人為國捐軀其家人請求給予撫卹事》, TZ 12 11 00.

¹¹³ Tobie S. Meyer-Fong, *What Remains: Coming to Terms with Civil War in 19th Century China* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013), Chapter 5 "Wood and Ink", 135-174.

¹¹⁴ The Hezhou stele also records the two watermills, presumably rebel property and both formerly owned by men named Ma, dedicated for its upkeep, that the dead could be honoured in perpetuity. 'Record of the Martyrs' Shrine (昭忠祠記, 1876) in Zhang Siwen, *Jishu lu*, 171-174.

¹¹⁵ QSGC, 07-191-1, 《為設立採訪局纂修忠義錄表傳事飭循化廳》, GX 09 01 16.

¹¹⁶ QSGC, 07-3174-16, 《為差查昭忠祠是否竣工事》, GX 14 03 02; 'Temple Erected to Those Killed in Mohammedan Rebellion, 25th January 1891, in *The Chinese Times, Volume V* (Tianjin: the Tientsin Printing Company, 1891): 74.

Mountains. Some merely retreated from the town to the countryside and died at the hands of bandits. One individual starved himself to death in mute protest against the Muslim bandits occupying the city.¹¹⁷ The names underwent an approval process and then were eligible to be listed within the shrines. Postbellum gazetteer compilation projects, such as the Continued Gazetteer of Xining Prefecture (西寧府續志), contained volumes listing the names again.¹¹⁸ As in Jiangnan, the deaths remembered by such projects show a widening of the category of those who could be said to have died for the state. Most of those remembered were not soldiers, unlike those honoured in commemorations for earlier wars. Some did not even die as a direct result of the violence, instead perishing due to hunger or illness during the war years: war deaths, absolutely, but not as the early Qing would have understood them. The shrines, whilst state institutions, also stand as an implicit rebuke to the state's failure to prosecute the many murder cases of the war years.¹¹⁹ The inclusion of the many, also, represents an attempt to find meaning in the suffering: in the idea that they died for something, that their deaths will be remembered and they will not rise again as hungry ghosts.

In the Jiangnan region, the Taiping rebels were dead or fled by the time commemoration began. However, although fuelled by the same state/local interplay, the context of Gansu was quite different: the Muslims of He-Huang were very much alive and still on their lands. Former rebel leaders were playing visible, important roles in the reconstruction of the districts. They supplied wood for the rebuilding of temples, including the martyr shrines and all the symbols of the Qing state. Elsewhere, the dispossessed, Muslim and non-Muslim, settled on abandoned lands and attempted to rebuild their lives. By contrast, led by local Han graduates of the Confucian academy, the processes of commemoration specifically excluded Muslims, the rebels. For those Confucian graduates, participation in the formal commemorative process was a means of drawing themselves into local administration in a register inaccessible to the new Muslim elite.¹²⁰

It is in this context that petitions were sent to transform requisitioned mosque and gongbei sites into shrines to the martyred dead, most notably in the case of Xining's Dongguan Great Mosque (東關大寺). Backstreet Mosque (後街清真寺), inside the city walls, had already been turned into a Martyrs' Shrine and the Dongguan mosque – in the primarily Muslim suburb

¹¹⁷See QSGC 07-187-1-7 《為採訪同治三年三月二十一日循城失陷所有殉難官紳士庶及婦女死亡情節事》，GX 07 00 00.

¹¹⁸ Deng Chengwei 鄧承偉, *Xining fu xu zhi* 西寧府續志 [*Continued Gazetteer of Xining*], 185-242.

¹¹⁹ The same also in Jiangnan. Meyer-Fong, *What Remains*, 9-10.

¹²⁰ Literati Luo Younian was one such in Xunhua: he had a key role as an interviewer/compiler for the lists, and he parlayed his closeness to the project into petitions to occupy former Muslim property in Bao'an.

outside the walls - was demolished in 1874. The petition discussing the demolition of the Dongguan mosque site emphasizes the inappropriateness of the former building – that its minaret had been ‘higher than the city walls, in contravention of fiat’ (高逾於城，大屬違制). The concern that mosques and gongbei might overshadow imperial constructions has both defensive connotations and ritual ones with long precedents, but the stress placed on adherence to them is a feature of the changed relationship between Han gentry, state and Islam in the post-war era.¹²¹ However, as Muslims returned to Xining after the war the Dongguan mosque was rebuilt, as the site had not been used for construction of a Confucian academy, as had been intended. In 1881, the Xining Commander He Zuolin (何作林) and Prefect Long Xiqing (龍錫慶) ordered the new mosque and its stele pavilion demolished again, its beams now requisitioned for the building of a Guandi Temple on another site.¹²² In other areas, where the Muslims had all been killed or driven out, similar processes occurred. In Danga’er and in Bao’an, where all Muslim presence had been removed from inside the walls, Muslim property was confiscated by the state and turned to its service.¹²³ Across Shaanxi, former mosques were in effect re-consecrated to the Qing.¹²⁴

This happened even as the Muslim leadership of Hezhou sought to justify its own place in the new order – a process perhaps most vividly demonstrated by the building of Ma Zhan’ao’s own tomb, or the establishment of the Ma Qianling lineage grave complex in neighbouring Hann Family Market. In both cases, the construction of graves and inscriptions couched in an appropriately Confucian Muslim idiom were physical statements of the right of the lineages to be in those towns at all. The Mufti establishment of a new gongbei and madrasa complex in their new location likewise inscribes their claim to settlement on the village of Fengtai and but was also a demarcation of the line drawn between the pre-Tongzhi and post-Tongzhi life of the Sufi collective. Whilst the post-rebellion settlements for Ma Zhan’ao and Ma Fuxiang mark their rise in local society, the settlements for the Mufti mark the beginning of the transformation of the

¹²¹ Zuo, *Zuo Zongtang quanji*, Vol 14 zhajian, 418-9, (693:西寧張道宗翰詳西寧禮拜寺士民改建生祠及書院情形由), GX 03 00 00.

¹²² The mosque site was in use again by 1895. Following a massacre and demolition in 1896, it was not rebuilt again until 1913 when Ma Qi, Xining Regional Commander and Qinghai Commissioner for Tibetans and Mongols, threw his support behind the project. Che Manbao 車滿寶, ed., *Xining Dongguan Qingzhen Da Si Zhi* 西寧東關清真大寺志 [*Gazetteer of the Xining Dongguan Great Mosque*] (Lanzhou: Gansu wenhua, 2004), 61-62.

¹²³ In the case of Bao’an, disputes occurred for the next twenty years and was, and was not, rebel property. QSGC, 07-1750-2 為《查營房並非回產定價領照投稅事致循化撫番》，GX 06 11 05.

¹²⁴ Seng Haixia 僧海霞, ‘Wan Qing Shaan-Gan Huimin qiye yu Guanzhong diqu Han ren xinyang de bianqian 晚清陝甘回民起義與關中地區漢人信仰的變遷[The Late Qing Shaan-Gan Muslim Rebellion and Shifts in Han Beliefs in the Guanzhong Area]’, *Beifang Minzu Daxue xuebao (shehui kexue bao)*, no. 4 (2009): 33-37.

Mufti from an expansive, public-orientated lineage to a largely private tradition. Henceforth, membership was confirmed by familial descent. They moved from being an urban lineage based in a prosperous market town to a rural farming community, hidden away against the world.¹²⁵

Furthermore, despite the success of that both Ma Zhan'ao and Ma Fuxiang had in creating a place for themselves in the postbellum world, there could be no commemoration of the Muslim dead of the rebellion. The Muslim refugees who had died alongside the fleeing Han were disqualified from such projects of remembrance, let alone the civilians massacred by Zuo's troops. As Muslims, they could not have died for their country. Henceforth, Muslim loyalty had to be proven. It could not be assumed.

Conclusions

The narratives here – both the consolidation of Muslim-dominated communities in the vicinity of Hezhou, the manner in which refugee communities settled in the Tibetan uplands, and the migration of the Mufti – speak to the manner in which post-rebellion land conflicts and settlements were increasingly articulated in religious terms. The changes in settlement patterns produced by the rebellion and its aftermath changed the structure of society across Gansu and Qinghai, producing permanent new communities of former refugees, removing certain population groups from certain places, producing new concentrations in certain others. In certain areas, the result was the homogenization of villages. In others, notably the hinterlands of Hezhou and Xunhua, the result was increased diversity. However, the reconstruction did produce the fixed idea that communities ideally *should* be homogenous, a self-fulfilling ideal which ensured that communal violence would reoccur. The post-rebellion years witnessed a hardening of religious identities and a subtle but pervasive transformation of local society and its structures around that fact. Henceforth, religious sites needed to exist in one world, rather than multiple worlds.

The new post-rebellion Muslim clusters in the villages of Hezhou had direct consequences for Islamic practice in those areas. The new military elite, through the sponsorship of mosque building, establishment of regional bases, and their own need to ensure peace within the areas of their administration, encouraged the creation of the 'haiyi' system. This shift away from the individual charisma of Sufi shaykhs was to have long-term repercussions for Islamic practice in the area. This shift was the first institutional sign of the

¹²⁵ Interviews conducted by author, Fengtai Fort, June 2017.

reformist impulse that led to the 1895 He-Huang Rebellion, and to the end of Sufi paths as political actors.

Chapter Four

Pacification: Military Muslims and the Amdo Connection

'It was not difficult to recognise the gain-loving Moslems, who were in evidence in large numbers. These worthy sons of the Prophet easily outstrip both Chinese and Tibetans in business proclivities. Not even an idolatrous fair is prohibited them by their religion if there is an opportunity to fleece kaffirs.'¹

David Ekvall, 1890s missionary to Didao

There was a saying within the Muslim communities around Hezhou: 'learning Tibetan is worth silver' (學了藏話值銀子).² In Tibet-focused accounts, Amdo's late nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century are described as 'the era of Muslim domination', a periodisation which entirely neglects the fall of the Qing Empire and transition to the Republican era which normally structures more China-orientated accounts.³ It does, however, neatly encapsulate the years in which much of the northwest was ruled by the Muslim 'Ma Family Warlords' (馬家軍伐), three interlinked families who all originate west of Hezhou. This chapter explores their origin story: the ways in which postbellum conditions allowed a handful of Muslim lineages to dominate commerce and politics in the interstitial zone between Gansu and Amdo. Their rise was predicated on particular conditions of the late Qing borderlands, and their collective ability to navigate both Chinese and Tibetan politics. Their place in one world rested on their ability to navigate or evade the rules of the other.

Others have noted that the rise to power of the Republican-era Muslim warlords began in the post-civil war era, but this chapter is concerned with a detailed examination of how state policies enabled this rise. Muslim domination of military and cross-border trade occupations in the postbellum era were mutually reinforcing, courtesy of Qing restrictions on movement into upland Tibetan and Mongolian communities outside the

¹ David P. Ekvall, *Outposts, or, Tibetan Border Sketches* (Alliance Press, 1907), 16.

² Ma Zhankui 馬占奎 and Ding Hua 丁化, 'Linxia Huizu shangye de fazhan lishiji qi tedian 临夏回族商业的发展历史及特点 [The Development and Particularities of Linxia Hui Commerce]', *Huizu yanjiu*, 14:2 (1994), 70.

³ For instance Nietupski, *Labrang*, 154.

passes and the manner in which the local economy grew around those restrictions. Furthermore, this chapter explores how structural changes in the postbellum era forced Muslims into a straitjacket, wherein their interests increasingly had to be negotiated as a collective. In essence, Muslims in the He-Huang region moved from being constrained by one set of movement restrictions to actively participating in the maintenance of borders restricting the movement of others. The chapter opens with an examination of the movement restrictions placed on Muslims immediately post-rebellion, before moving into Muslim participation in the resurrection of controls on movement into Amdo and the evolution of an off-book Muslim military force. Finally, I examine the wood trade as a trade monopoly produced precisely by those same controls on movement.

Han and non-Han in a Post-Bellum World

In post-rebellion Gansu, the Qing state was increasingly a distinctively 'Han' state. The officials represented the state were predominantly Han, invested in a particular set of ideas concerning Confucian governance and the path toward regeneration. Local initiatives mostly consisted of reforms to the infrastructure of their jurisdictions or to their people, in form of anti-opium campaigns or support for schooling projects. Perhaps most importantly, to those it governed, the Qing were perceived as Han. The state was sinophone, locally embodied in the walls of Hezhou and the magistrate in his yamen. Cosmopolitan Beijing and its Manchu city were distant centres, far to the east. To the porter leading his donkeys up the pitted steep track to the Jishi Pass, the state was the soldier, requesting his stamped road pass and fare before he would be permitted to continue into the jagged lands of the Qing frontiers. Moreover, to be Han was emerging as the default identity within Gansu. Marked as Han on your *baojia* registration, this made your family the legal norm. To be anything else – to be Muslim (回), Tibetan (番), Mongolian (蒙), 'local' (土) or even Manchu (滿) – marked your family as different, subject to different law-codes, different permissions, and additional restrictions.

The co-existence of these different regimes for different identities is often seen as a marker of the nature of the Qing as an empire: inner Asian, cosmopolitan, united only by the Emperor. In the late Qing, the significance of these categories was changed by their re-articulation at the hands of a new generation of officials in Gansu, Confucian Qing loyalists from Hunan. Their programme was designed to be transformative, to turn others into administrative equivalents of the Han. In practice, however, the different codes increasingly marked the difference from the norm, as opposed to being separate but equal.

The officials who arrived alongside Zuo were the primary drivers of this impetus. Zuo remained a figurehead, both politically and ideologically. His letters to Tan Zhonglin (譚鍾麟) for instance, who would later serve as Governor General of Shaanxi and Gansu, show the transmission of his philosophy of Muslim difference to the generation who served after him.⁴ Zuo and his clique were devotees of the statecraft school of governance, as mentioned earlier. Overly prescriptive law was in fact an obstacle the ideals of self-cultivation and Confucian rites they espoused, but cultural transformation of immoral practices in the borders was necessary to achieve the ideal self-ordering society.⁵ As the Hunan Army fought their the Hexi corridor, trusted commanders were installed in magistrate positions. Akin to the other provincial armies, Zuo's command structure was based on personal loyalties and composed of men from a handful of Hunanese counties and plus the Gansu forces incorporated en route. The Qing had always covertly mitigated the laws of avoidance by ensuring that officials were transferred to like jurisdictions, shown in the rotation of borderland officials between Gansu, Xinjiang and Yunnan. In postbellum Gansu, this trend was institutionalized. Many of the officials who arrived with Zuo served the rest of their careers in the northwest, given formal exception from the laws of avoidance under the 'flexible articles' (甘肅變通章程).⁶

As mentioned in chapter one, whilst Muslims are not absent from the prebellum historical record for Gansu, Muslim-ness was often not a salient category of enquiry. Particularly in the Sino-Tibetan borderlands of Amdo, it was more important that Sino-Muslims were sinophone (i.e. not Tibetan) than that they were Muslim. Generally speaking, the opposition here was between Han (漢) and Fan (番). "Han", in the context of pre-bellum Gansu, is perhaps best understood as signifying language and as signifying a legal category of person. The evolution of 'Hui' (Muslim) as a separate legal category – a subcategory of Han, to be specific – can be observed from 1762 onwards in the gradual establishment of separate statutes mandating harsher punishments for Muslims for certain crimes.⁷ Over the course of the later 18th and 19th century, earlier conceptions of

⁴ Zuo, *Zuo Zongtang quan ji*, Vol 11 shuxin (1), 266-269 (0911 答護陝撫譚文卿中丞), TZ 11 00 00 .

⁵ See Eric Schluessel, 'The Law and the "Law": Two Kinds of Legal Space in Late-Qing China', *Extrême-Orient Extrême-Occident*, no. 40 (21 November 2016): 39-58. For a detailed examination of the politics of the 'Xiang army clique' see Zhao Weixi 趙維璽, *Xiang jun jituan yu Xibei Huimin da qiyi zhi shanhou yanjiu* 湘軍集團與西北回民大起義之善後研究 [Research on the Xiang Army Clique and the Aftermath of the Great Northwestern Muslim Rebellion] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 2014).

⁶ Eric T. Schluessel, 'The Muslim Emperor of China: Everyday Politics in Colonial Xinjiang, 1877-1933', 84; Nailene Chou, 'Frontier Studies and Changing Frontier Administration in Late Ch'ing China: The Case of Sinkiang, 1759-1911.' (PhD, University of Washington, 1976).

⁷ Lipman, "'A Fierce and Brutal People": On Islam and Muslims in Qing Law', 83-112.

Han gained additional content, notably the idea that the identity mandated certain community forms and communal roles (temple cults and rain-making, collective organisation membership), which Muslims, by nature of their faith, did not entirely fit. Rather as with the late Qing evolution in attitudes towards Christian converts, the problem was not entirely to do with what Muslims believed or did not believe despite the rise of popular Islamophobia.⁸ The question was also do with their participation in the collective organisations that officials expected to regulate village life: the temple cults, corvée labour obligations, taxes.

Following the rebellion, the spaces in which previously Muslims were treated like their Han neighbours were removed. As detailed above, this was in part the culmination of a process that had begun prebellum, both in the evolution of Hui and the accumulation of ideas of what it meant to be Han. Nevertheless, post-rebellion reforms marked a sharp divide in the formal legal categorisation of Muslims. Henceforth, Muslims were marked as Muslim in law and by social organisation through the election of community leaders, as part of an officially-driven process of minoritization.⁹ The 'security group' *baojia* (保甲) registers compiled by the Honghua zu (鴻化族, T. mdzo mo khar) in 1887 display this change.¹⁰ The compilation of the registers was a delayed response to instructions from the Board of Revenue (戶部), which explicitly instructed that *baojia* registers should list each household as either Han or Hui.¹¹ Honghua was among the former Tibetan communities for which the rebellion resulted in an influx of new population, in effect completing their demographic transformation away from Amdo.¹² The *baojia* register details this new population exhaustively, providing the name of each household head, their profession, their status as either new arrivals or original tenants. The names of the village elders, gentry and commander of the local militia, given at the start of the document also identify

⁸Harrison details similar issues among Christian communities in Shaanxi, where foreign missionary pressure to divest local converts from institutions of Chinese public life underlay much friction between officials and converts. See Henrietta Harrison, *The Missionary's Curse: And Other Tales from a Chinese Catholic Village*, Asia--Local Studies/Global Themes ; 26 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 83.

⁹ Ilyse R. Morgenstein Fuerst, *Indian Muslim Minorities and the 1857 Rebellion: Religion, Rebels and Jihad*, International Library of Colonial History ; 24 (London: IB Tauris, 2017).

¹⁰ QSGC, 07-2002-1-5, 《鴻化族頭社轉道村編練保甲花戶》, GX 13 06 00.

¹¹ QSGC, 07-90-2, 《為編查漢回保甲分析趕造簡明清冊致循化廳分府安》, GX 04 09.

¹² Chaney argues that *zu* 族, often translated as 'clan' by Ming and Qing officials in reference to a variety of Tibetan community organisations, underwent a linguistic shift over the course of the Qing: in nomadic areas, it continued to refer to people, in the regions closer to Qing administration they became place designations. Hence an individual from Honghua zu is simply someone who farms land there. Wesley Byron Chaney, 'Land, Trade, and the Law on the Sino-Tibetan Border, 1723-1911' (Ph.D., Stanford University, 2016), 62.

them as either Han or Hui. The structure of the *baojia* register suggests it was intended to promote mutual cooperation between Honghua's two denominational communities, perhaps to guarantee the security of the minority Han population.¹³ This logic of categorisation was thus enduring: having begun to register population by religion, those categories became monolithic, permanent and written into administrative certainty. At the turn of the twentieth century, Xunhua was still registering *baojia* systems under precisely the same system.¹⁴

There is an enumerative logic at play in the operations of the late Qing Xunhua yamen, paralleled by the relationship between census and caste in British India.¹⁵ Censuses are tools of power, they set the terms of political participation. They are among the quintessential tools of the modern state in their ambition to quantify everyone. Whilst Zuo intended to create a population of Hui who would be Muslim in private (if at all) and neutral-Han in public, the postbellum re-registration of population along ethno-religious lines produced religion as a flattening, hegemonic category within the locality: to the extent that even registers drawn up of poor families requiring aid would list their religious status.¹⁶ It also raised questions about the nature of individual responsibilities within a multi-faith society: not so much over what was believed, but about how public participation should be organised.

Movement Regimes: Banning Muslim Travel

Examination of the realities of governance, however, reveals the slippages in the process detailed above, especially in a region where Muslims had been formally allowed to remain and where the Qing were dealing with a non-sinophone frontier. The neatness of the differentiation between the legal identities of Han, Hui and Fan swiftly became complicated in practice. To explore this, I examine the ways in which those legal categories were enacted in the right to travel across certain spaces. That movement was a privilege rather than a right had been a principle at the core of Qing governance in He-Huang since

¹³ QSGC, 07-2002-1-5, 《鴻化族頭社轉道村編練保甲花戶》, GX 13 06 00. The register gives two thirds of the households as Muslims, the majority of these new arrivals. The few Han residents were all pre-rebellion residents.

¹⁴ QSGC, 07-3490-8 《某族保甲》, GX 25 02 04.

¹⁵ Nicholas B. Dirks, *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India* (Princeton, N.J.; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001).

¹⁶ QSGC, 07-2029-9-18, 《呈造漢回貧民》, GX 21 03 28.

the early 18th century. Among the first orders promulgated following the recovery of Gansu in the 1870s were strict prohibitions on Muslim movement. To travel even across county lines, Muslims required passes issued by their hundred-household head (百家戶). To travel further, they had to apply for a road pass at the local yamen, who would forward the query to the Circuit Intendant (道臺).¹⁷ The intent was clear. Unless completely unavoidable, Muslims were to stay put, as good farmers working their fields.

Nevertheless, in 1882 Muslim Hann Quanxi (韓全喜) successfully requested a road pass from the Xunhua yamen. He begged for permission to travel beyond the passes to distant Yarkand (口外葉爾羌) to seek his father Hann Yufeng (韓玉鳳) who had left many years ago to trade there. In his petition he explains that quite contrary to expectation he had encountered a trader from Bayanrong (巴燕戎) who brought news that his father was alive. Hann thus requested permission to go seek his father, concerned that he has simply been trapped in Xinjiang unable to return without a pass.¹⁸

Some years later in 1888, Hann Quanxi petitioned Xunhua again. This time he reported that his father, Hann Yufeng, had been residing in Yarkand since the Xianfeng era. Hann Yufeng was now old and being infirm, now wished to return to Xunhua but was unable to make the journey alone. Quanxi and his brother were seeking permission from Xunhua to travel there and to bring his father, his family and attendants home.¹⁹ An additional pledge from friends and relatives confirmed that the brothers Hann were of good character and that should they cause trouble on the road they were willing to bear the blame (小的等願甘承罪).²⁰

Yarkand is some 3000 km from Xunhua, a journey that would have taken in the region of six months. The route would have taken Hann up through the Hexi Corridor, through Suzhou where Zuo had turned a blind eye to the massacre of Muslims he could not resettle, and through Xinjiang, where the remainder of Yaqub Beg's forces were only defeated in 1878. Repeated injunctions from Gansu's high officials across the period reminded local authorities that it was imperative that Muslim movement should be controlled. Nevertheless, Hann was granted his passes.

¹⁷ QSGC, 07-3294-2, 《為回民外出填發護票詳細註明事致循化廳》, TZ 12 05 02.

¹⁸ The family were probably merchants and may also have belonged to a menhuan with links to Yarkand, Of the later passport applications within the Xunhua archives, stated destination of most applications is Yarkand. QSGC, 07-3291-13, 《為請討路票事》, GX 08 08 07.

¹⁹ QSGC, 07-3282-11, 《為送父回原籍賞發路票事》, GX 14 05 10.

²⁰ QSGC, 07-3283-2, 《為承保韓保等隨帶妻子前往新疆沿途不滋事》, GX 14 05 11.

The remarkable thing about Hann Quanxi's journey is neither its length, nor its destination. Trade and pilgrimage routes connecting Hezhou and Xunhua to Central Asia were well-established, and Hann's petition was safely couched in the language of filial loyalty. It is simply that by 1882, it was only journeys of such length, far out beyond the passes, that required a formal application to the yamen. Petitions like Hann's are rare within the archive, despite the orders which should have mandated Muslim movement as the exception, rather than the rule.

The system as designed was almost entirely unworkable, especially given the large-scale return of refugees in the late Tongzhi period and the ongoing resettlement of Muslim population. It seems likely that the full-blown ticketing system for Muslims was quickly abandoned in practice or at least devolved to local garrisons and checkpoints. The Xunhua archive contains only a few petitions requesting passes for travel within Gansu, and most of these concern journeys that would have taken the petitioner beyond the passes.

Yet official suspicions regarding Muslim movement remained and the system was never formally abolished, despite its administrative ungainliness. A directive from mid-1876 reminded merchants on official business (官商) that they were forbidden from employing Muslim porters. The reminder, issued to Xunhua from Xining, was prompted by a series of cases in which Muslims had been found within the walls of Lanzhou with no record of how they had entered into the city nor any of the appropriate paperwork.²¹ Shortly after the above directive was issued, the magistrate of Qingshui County (清水縣) Gao Weixia (高蔚霞) petitioned to report the difficulties his borders faced in policing Muslim movement. Qingshui borders both Shaanxi and the resettlement zone in Zhangjiachuan (張家川). The primary trade route to Xi'an, known as the 'West Road' (西路), passed through the county. Movement restrictions were a particular concern to Gao, given Qingshui's strategic position and the need to ensure that resettled Muslims did not return to Shaanxi. Proclamations had been posted to his district reminding Muslims that the West Road into Shaanxi was closed to them, and that there would be consequences for over-requesting road passes.

Magistrate Gao, however, was in a quandary. Li Dechang (李德昌), a Muslim rebel turned Qing commander, had led ten hundred-household heads (百戶) to his yamen.

²¹ QSGC, 07-3278-10, 《為官商車馱駱腳不得用回民充夫如違章從嚴核辦事致循化廳》, GX 02 06 23.

Collectively, they submitted a petition arguing that the Zhangjiachuan Muslims were all loyal Gansu Muslims and thus there was no danger in them trading in Shaanxi. The movement restrictions were impoverishing them for no good reason. Gao's report also noted that the sheer number of Muslim peddlers travelling the roads to Xi'an meant the offices of his district were overwhelmed with requests. Furthermore, the Qingshui poor customarily supplemented their income by travelling into Shaanxi to work as hired labourers. Zhangjiachuan also had a large number of Muslim-owned camel caravans working the Lanzhou-Jinyang route. Movement restrictions were endangering local security through their economic impact.²²

Gao's petition cuts to the crux of the movement rights debate. Qing governmental logic assumed that the majority of people worked on the land, and that their day-to-day lives should not involve travel. However, the requirements of reconstruction and the complex economy of the late Qing required the easy flow of goods, people and information. Unfortunately for Magistrate Gao, there was no easy solution as the logic of the entire resettlement programme depended on those resettled staying put. Furthermore, lifting restrictions in Qingshui would potentially have resulted in free movement for Muslims across Gansu, something the authorities saw as perilous. The Grand Secretariat's comments on Gao's requests specifically noted that following the fall of Suzhou, all Hui dependants there had been resettled to the east. Concerned that here, too, Muslims might seek to return to their former lands, the Secretariat emphasized that movement restrictions on Gansu Muslims could not unilaterally be lifted.

Throughout the discussions, all parties made a crucial distinction between types of Muslims: "Indigenous good Muslims are different from resettled pacified Muslims, travelling Gansu Muslims are different from resettled Shaanxi Muslims (土著良回與安插撫回有別，遷徙甘回與安插陝回有別)."²³ In practice, a quasi-legal distinction quickly emerged between resettled Muslims (referred to variously as 'resettled Muslims' 安插回

²² Li Dechang, often Li Decang (李德倉 or 李得倉). Li was in fact local, having been born in Qingshui County. During the rebellion, he rose to become commander of the 'Eight Southern Battalions' (南八營) of the Shaanxi Muslims. Having surrendered to the Qing, he and his men were incorporated into Zuo's armies. Returning to his home county covered in military valour (軍功), he spent the remainder of his life representing the resettled Muslims there to the local authorities. The Jahriyya communities in Zhangjiachuan credit the post-bellum survival of the tariqa to his efforts. The communities he represented were absolutely not all from Gansu, the plea was probably targeted towards the relaxation of all restrictions on Muslim movement. See his biography in the modern Jahriyya gazetteer, Ma Guobin 馬國斌, ed., *Xuanhuagang Zhi* 宣化岡志 [*Xuanhuagang Gazetteer*] (Lanzhou: Gansu renmin, 2004), 169-172.

²³ QSGC, 07-3294-11-13, 《為安插各處回民不准遠赴他處事致循化廳》, GX 02 07 02.

民; 'Shaanxi Muslims' 陝回; 'outsider Muslims' 客回) and the unresettled ('Gansu Muslims' 甘回; 'local Muslims' 土回). The eventual solution was a compromise. Gansu Muslims were permitted to travel provided they have the relevant tickets; Shaanxi Muslims resettled into Gansu were denied that freedom. Whilst Gansu Muslims were still required to apply for passes for long distance travel, henceforth they could so directly from the county (縣) authorities, and they would be permitted to enter cities, crucial for merchants. Even those without passes should be handled leniently, subject to verification of their identity. With guarantees from city gentry, they were to be allowed to enter. Regulations for Xi'an issued in the wake of Gao's request emphasize that this relaxation is necessary for the 'benefit of the people', and so that trade might flow. Furthermore, traveller's lodges (行店) were reminded that it was forbidden to systematically turn Muslims away.²⁴

This relaxation of the regulations formally neutered the ticketing system for non-resettled Gansu Muslims, whilst also further entrenching the legal difference between the resettled and the remainers. Nevertheless, the precedent set by the Regulations for the Resettlement of Muslims (安插回民章程) remained powerful. The final lines of the same regulations permitting the entry of Muslim traders into Xi'an contain a blunt statement of the gratitude owed by the resettled for the grace that had granted them land and seed with which to restart their lives.²⁵ Should they cross the border into Shaanxi for whatever purpose, be it trade or to seek lost relatives, they would be returned to their new homes for punishment.²⁶

Throughout the postbellum period, the precedents contained in the Pacification Regulations would be excavated for debate with each new case wherein the culprits were found to be Muslim. Cases from across Gansu repeatedly resulted in the Gansu Surveillance and Administration Commissioners posting reminders to Xunhua and Hezhou that the Pacification Regulations remain in force and must be respected.²⁷ A debate in

²⁴ QSGC, 07-3278-14-15, 《為懲辦無路票冒充勇夫商販私行來陝安插甘回事致循化廳》, GX 02 09 12. No case I have seen specifically states the punishment. Most likely, they would have been judged under the statutes for 'passing guard posts or fords without authorization, by circumnavigation or by deception' (私越冒度關津), which stipulated 80 strokes of the cane (杖八十) as punishment. See 'Code of the Great Qing' Da Qing lüli 1740 (大清律例), hosted at Legalizing Space in China, http://lsc.chineselegalculture.org/eC/DQLL_1740/5.5.3.220, accessed 20/09/2018.

²⁵ The counties in question also required their new population to pay their grain tax, and concerned about the possibility of a mass exodus from unfertile land. QSGC, 07-3278-14-15, 《為懲辦無路票冒充勇夫商販私行來陝安插甘回事致循化廳》, GX 02 09 12.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ See, for instance, the following case in which a theft of ironware results in the Pingliang magistrate determining that the regulations on Muslim movement are still in force, and the culprit

1886 on whether to increase garrisons to deal with an apparent increase in Muslim footpads and highwaymen notes that Muslims are forbidden from crossing county lines in groups.²⁸ Restrictions were renewed again in 1890 following a request by Ningxia as part of its efforts to control the opium markets.²⁹ In 1895, the He-Huang Rebellion resulted in a full-scale revival of the system, following a period in which all Muslims were briefly banned from travelling. Whilst effectively dormant for years at a time and laughably easy to evade even when enforced, the principle that Muslim movement should be restricted remained firmly enshrined.

The movement regulations, no matter how theoretical their existence, formed an additional line between Han and Hui communities. As the regulations on Muslim entry to Xi'an suggest, the ticketing system drove Muslims towards Muslim establishments: whether those were the traveller's lodges that were willing to accept them without question, or into the arms of the 'Muslim gentry' (回紳) tasked with checking the passes of Muslim traders entering the walls. Although by law a travel pass should cost just four copper cash, the system also left Muslim travellers at the mercy of the soldiers manning the checkpoints. This was an endemic problem: the revival of the pass system in the wake of the He-Huang Rebellion was accompanied by a reminder to garrisons that 'for the sake of Han-Hui harmony' (為漢回和睦之道), it was strictly forbidden to harass Muslims or prevent them from going about legitimate business.³⁰ The system was an additional agent in tying the interests of Muslims together, no matter where they were in China.

This is not to say that the system produced an instant unity between Muslims within Gansu and Shaanxi. At times, it probably exacerbated the socio-economic divides between the resettled poor and the wealthier indigenous Gansu Muslims, many of whom had actively profited from the rebellion. Archival cases hint at frictions between the two communities – the desire of Shaanxi Muslims to construct their own mosque in Hann Family Market met with local opposition; elsewhere, a bizarre case from Xunhua in which a Shaanxi settler accuses a local Salar of violating religious rules, apparently in protest against the terms on which the Salar employed a friend of his.³¹ The differing experiences

thus doubly guilty. QSGC, 07-3279-4-5, 《為安插回民出境均照章程請護票事致循化廳》, GX 08 02 28.

²⁸ QSGC, 07-3279-8, 《為嚴禁回民不准成群出境滋事致循化廳》, GX 10 04 19.

²⁹ QSGC, 07-1866-11, 《為回民出境貿易由各地方官填護照注明人數不准私帶軍器事致循化分府》, GX 16 10 15.

³⁰ QSGC, 07-3296-5-6, 《為張貼禁止阻擾回民外出謀食告示日期事致循化廳黃》, GX 23 07 02.

³¹ "Hann Family Market Haiyi Great Mosque Stele" 韓家集海乙大寺碑 (1917) in Zhang Siwen 張思溫, *Jishi lu*, 200-204; QSGC, 06-211-7-8, 《告大別列庄撤回亂白山不遵教規事》, TZ 13 01 24.

of the two communities are also written into their oral histories. For the Shaanxi Muslims moved into Pingliang and Zhangjiachuan, Zuo's actions are remembered as punitive and the resettlements are said to have produced a century of poverty. The Gansu Muslims of Hezhou remember the heroics of Ma Zhan'ao's fight against the Qing, but also recall the later nineteenth and early twentieth century as a period of unrivalled Muslim wealth and influence.³² In practice the restrictions contributed to increasing stratification between those rich and well-connected enough to navigate the system and those who were not.

The decision to amend the Pacification Regulations in favour of Gansu Muslims reached He-Huang in late October 1876. Ma Zhan'ao's gravestone celebrates the overturning of restrictions on Muslim movement and settlement as one of the signal achievements of his life: "The Master insisted that this [the separation of Muslim from Han across the River Tao] was not possible, saying: If now things are handled thus by the state, that will ensure that the enmity becomes eternal, as though Wu and Yue live in the same house.³³ If like this, then not only will this not contain public sentiment, but it will engender new resentments." On this basis, the earlier plan was laid to rest."³⁴ Whilst his life did see the relaxation of restrictions for 'good Muslims' (良回), he never formally achieved that goal. Settled in the heart of a region that was home to a new density of Muslims and incorporated into Zuo's Hunanese armies, for Ma Zhan'ao and the Muslim leaders of Hezhou movement restrictions were something that happened to other people. This very freedom was a marker of the position of Hezhou Muslims at the apex of Gansu Muslim society. Nevertheless, the existence of the bans on Muslim movement and the repeated confirmation of their salience remained a powerful marker of the gulf between Muslims and their Han neighbours.

Fiscal Austerity and the Rise of a Muslim Military

The latter part of Ma Zhan'ao's life was dominated by his role in enforcing a different set of borders, those between the non-Sinophone communities of Amdo and the

³² For experiences of Shaanxi Muslims, see Ma Changshou 馬長壽, *Tongzhi nian jian Huimin qiyi lishi diaocha jilu* 同治年間陝西回民起義歷史調查記錄 [*Records from Historical Investigations on the Tongzhi-period Shaanxi Muslim Rebellions*] (Xi'an: Shaanxi renmin, 1993). I also visited Zhangjiachuan in July 2017, and conversations with ahong and elders there confirmed this impression. I visited Linxia and Dahejia numerous times, 2015-2017.

³³ The states of Wu (吳) and Yue (越) were famed arch-enemies during the Zhou period.

³⁴ 公執不可，曰：“事今由官辦，正可使怨仇永釋，吳越同家。如此，則不惟不篋輿情，且啟新撫之疑。”於是前議遂寢。“Ma Zhan'ao's Gravestone” 馬占鰲墓碑 (1898) in Zhang Siwen, *Jishi lu*, 445-450.

interior. Even as the Muslim pass system was collapsing under its own weight, the Xining administration was moving toward the resurrection of the old borders dividing inner from outer, namely the posts (M. *karun*, C. 卡倫) that prevented Tibetans and Mongolians from entering the interior at will, and Han and Hui from travelling into nomadic areas. The resumption of movement controls to divide Tibetan and Mongolian population from Han and Hui reflects older patterns of the understanding of the relationship between ethnicity, economic way of life and cultural identity.

In He-Huang the overriding worry continued to be the proximity of the region to Tibetan and Mongol Amdo. In his initial memorial on the possibility of allowing Muslims to settle in the Xining area, the Qinghai amban, Yushi (豫師) recommended instead the urgent re-establishment of the Green Standard garrisons and the building of forts in strategic locations to control the roads into Amdo proper. The Muslim population and the violent nature of the Salars, although both merit a mention, are entirely subsidiary as strategic considerations.³⁵ Memorialising again in 1877, he revived the logic of Nayanceng to argue that the primary leverage the Qing had over the grasslands was economic. Without effective control over grain and tea markets, achieved via control over the traders moving through the passes, he argued there would be chaos. Furthermore, the brick tea illegally entering Amdo was damaging the livelihood of local Gansu tea peddlers, who were being undercut by Sichuanese traders.³⁶

Yushi's proposals, however, were out of step with the military austerity of the day. In order to make control of the borders realistic, a substantial permanent military force was required. Beijing was concerned by the spiralling costs of the maintenance of the Green Standard armies alongside the privately-raised 'brave armies' (勇營). The Green Standards were poorly funded and poorly trained, but the Board of War retained administrative control of their organisation; the private armies of men such as Zuo, Zeng Guofan, and Li Hongzhang were well-funded, experienced and well-armed, but were also worryingly opaque. Although now state-funded, Zuo's Hunan Army remained organised around personal loyalties. The Board of War (兵部) fretted that it had no oversight of the internal workings of these forces. A number of solutions to the problem were trialled, but in 1878 the court issued an edict requesting reduction in the stipends for private armies (勇節餉), resulting in mass demobilisations. Gansu was permitted to demobilise later than

³⁵Yu Shi 豫師, *Yu Shi Qinghai zougao* 豫師青海奏稿 [*Yu Shi's Qinghai Memorials*], ed. Wu Fengpei 吳豐培 (Xining: Qinghai Renmin, 1981), "安插西寧回民片" (TZ 13 00 00), 132.

³⁶ Yu Shi, *Yu Shi Qinghai zougao*, "請飭禁四川私販黃茶摺" (GX 03 09 09), 161.

other regions, thanks to ongoing conflict in Xinjiang and the employment of troops stationed across Gansu in pacification work. By 1881, demobilisation was a priority, part of the state's attempt to recapture control of finances and military from the provinces.³⁷

For Gansu, this involved a mass reduction in the numbers of Green Standard troops. Zuo had already experimented with radical reductions in the number of Green Standard troops during his time in Min-Jiang. His policy was founded on the principle that fewer soldiers, better fed and better trained, would prove significantly more beneficial to the pursuit of local order than the ragtag Green Standard troops.³⁸ In the scathing words of the 1909 New Gansu Gazetteer (甘肅新通志), 'the state maintained these men for two hundred years, yet in our time of need, not even the labour of one soldier did we have to command'. According to Lei Zhengwan's (雷正綰) report, despite repeated troop reductions since the Yongzheng era, Shaan-Gan still hosted some 57,400 troops in 1862.³⁹ Theoretically, the reduction in numbers should have left Gansu with a mere fifth of its former complement, clearing out inadequate troops and rationalising expenditure in a manner most pleasing to a cash-strapped authority.

Nevertheless, the regional armies could not immediately be dispersed. In the short-term, they were necessary for defence and the cost of disbanding armies and sending men home was itself not insubstantial. Under the programme of military reform instituted by Zuo and implemented by Yang Changjun in 1880, the number of men stationed across Gansu and Xinjiang was reduced by over half. In many cases, former Hunan soldiers were transferred into positions into the Green Standards, the original holders of these positions being either dead, fled or easier to dismiss. The surrendered Muslim units were given fallow land in Xinjiang and left to guard the borders.⁴⁰ The He-Huang battalions were not exempt from the decommissioning process. Based on gazetteer figures, Yang Hongwei gives 171 men stationed at Xunhua, down from a Qianlong-era peak

³⁷ See Wu Changwen 吳昌穩, 'Tong Guang shiqi Qing zhengfu dui bingzhi gaige de tansuo 同光時期清政府對兵制改革的探索 [Military System Reform in the Tongzhi to Guangxu Period]', *Zhongguo Guojia Bowuguan Guankan*, no. 03 (2015): 122-33.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 123, 128-9.

³⁹ 以國家養兵至二百餘年，而倉使時曾不得一兵之用'. Shengyun 升允 and An Weijun 安維峻, *Gansu xin tongzhi 甘肅新通志 [A New Gazetteer of Gansu]* (Nanjing: Jiangsu Guangling guji, 1989). 兵防志，卷 41. See Ma Xiao 馬嘯 *Zuo Zongtang zai Gansu: 1869-1880 左宗棠在甘肅: 1869-1880 [Zuo Zongtang in Gansu: 1869-1880]* (Lanzhou: Gansu renmin chubanshe, 2005), 94-96.

⁴⁰ Ma Xiao, *Zuo Zongtang zai Gansu*, 99-100.

of 857.⁴¹ The new Green Standards in the area were, as elsewhere, mostly transfers from the Zuo's armies.⁴²

The proximity to the border, the need for manpower to maintain it, and the frequent need to dispatch troops to police Tibetan and Mongol conflicts ensured that Hezhou was partially exempt from late Qing austerity. The garrisons stationed in Hezhou, the encampments at Xunhua, Bao'an, Qitai, and the smaller detachments manning the old Twenty-Four Passes of Hezhou had to be at strength, no matter how this was achieved.⁴³ The shortfall here was met in effect by the number of 'defending braves' (防勇) who remained in the area, off the registers of the Green Standards but still supported by the provincial authorities. Officially, they were adjuncts to the garrisons. In reality, however, these off-books troops became the most significant military force in southern Gansu.

Following Ma Zhan'ao's surrender, his troops were incorporated into Zuo Zongtang's Hunan Army (楚軍). There was nothing out of the ordinary about this: their participation in subsequent fighting against remaining rebels was a condition of the surrender and their employment as frontline troops was an effective way for Zuo to protect the core of his army. The incorporation preserved the structure and personal affiliations that had defined the former menhuan-brokered alliance.⁴⁴ Following meritorious service in assisting with the fighting against Xining Huasi leader Ma Guiyuan and having proved themselves trustworthy, Zuo reorganised them into two Muslim

⁴¹ Yang Hongwei 楊紅衛, *Qing chao Xunhua ting zangzu juju zhi quanli jizhi* 清朝循化廳藏族聚居之權利機制 [*The Power Mechanisms of the Tibetan-inhabited Area of Xunhua ting during the Qing dynasty*] (Beijing: Gaodeng jiaoyu, 2015), 128.

⁴² Registers of 防勇 posted to the Xunhua garrison in 1873 show a mix of origins: of the 40 men posted, just under half were from Shaanxi and Gansu (most of these from Hezhou and Xunhua); the remainder from Hunan and Hubei. QSGC, 07-1128-5-7, 《造具防勇四十名花名年歲籍等》, TZ 12 07 10.

⁴³ Although Xunhua prefecture remained under the jurisdiction of Xining for civil affairs, its three garrisons were under the authority of the Hezhou Regional Commander (總兵). The Hezhou Commandery thus remained the most significant military authority in the region, although mobilisation of forces generally required cooperation between the Xunhua Magistrate (同知), the Hezhou Command, the Xining amban and the Governor-General of Shaanxi and Gansu.

⁴⁴ It is often said that the three banners were given to Dong Fuxiang, and formed the basis of the later Gansu Army (Kansu Braves; 甘軍). However, Dong's Gansu Army was stationed in Xinjiang for most of the next two decades. The 'Kansu Braves' – namely the forces known for their Muslim component led by Dong – did not properly come into existence until the He-Huang Rebellion in 1896, at which point Dong's armies fused with a number of local Hezhou brigades. These were then transferred away from the Hezhou area, in effect forming the army. The account given in the New Gansu Gazetteer makes it clear that Ma Anliang, Ma Fuxiang, and Ma Fulu – the local Muslim commanders – were all based in Hezhou prior to the rebellion, as they are responsible for leading relief efforts prior to Dong's arrival in the 10th month. Shengyun and An Weijun, *Gansu xin tongzhi*, juan 47. On the reputation of Dong's forces, see Jonathan N Lipman, 'The Border World of Gansu, 1895-1935' (Ph.D., Stanford University, 1981), 177-178.

battalions (回勇兩營), with Ma Zhan'ao as commander (都司) and Ma Yongrui as his second (守備), to serve beneath Hezhou Regional Commander Shen Yusui (河州鎮總兵沈玉遂). Zuo met the trio and commended them highly for having atoned for prior mistakes. Ma Zhan'ao and Ma Yongrui were recommended for the right to wear a peacock feather (花翎) and a hat button of the fifth rank (五品頂戴). Ma Wuzhen received the cap button, but without the right to wear a peacock feather.⁴⁵

Min Dianchen's rebellion, a minor Hezhou Muslim commander who had fallen out with Ma Zhan'ao and Ma Yongrui, pushed the Muslim brigades into further active service. Zhan'ao was promoted at this point to Brigade Commander (游擊) and Ma Wuzhen and Ma Yongrui to Assistant Brigade Commanders (守備).⁴⁶ The praise showered on the Muslim leadership for putting down the rebellion confirmed the position of those particular religious leaders in their military roles, and the composition of the brigades underneath them. The three Muslim commanders were listed first in the register for rewards and commendation (冊記) submitted to the Board of War, whilst Zuo's memorials emphasized Ma Zhan'ao's personal bravery in hunting down Min.⁴⁷ The Tibetan militias who had fought for the Qing during the rebellion were not rewarded in this fashion. Although eligible for the same medals for military bravery, the Tibetans and Mongolians were not incorporated into Zuo's armies. This was despite the very significant contributions some had made, as around Danga'er, where Mongol leaders had effectively provided security for most of the decade.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, such militias were simply disbanded, ad hoc military service being assumed as part of the duties of local *tusi*. For the Tibetans, the maintenance of this older Inner Asian-style relationship now became exclusionary, given the importance of military relationships in post-bellum Hezhou. The nearby garrisons were then re-staffed with Sinophone soldiers, Muslim and non-Muslim.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Zuo, *Zuo Zongtang quanji*, Vol 5 zougao, 376-7 (1637 請給回目馬占鰲等花翎頂片), TZ 12 01 27.

⁴⁶ Many of the promotions at this stage became honorary. With a surfeit of soldiers to be rewarded for their active service, it is not uncommon to see men titled as 'Recommended Regional Commander' (補用總兵) serving in a position with the responsibilities of a Brigade Commander (游擊). Zuo, *Zuo Zongtang quanji*, Vol 6 zougao, 151-156 (1869 河州叛回首要犯伏誅地方肅清摺), GX 01 02 03.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Yu Shi, *Yu Shi Qinghai zougao*, 153 (『擇尤保獎積年出力青海蒙番摺』), (GX 01?).

⁴⁹ See Theobald on the system of medals for military bravery. These were honorary titles, and the awardee would be gifted a certificate confirming their honour and their right to wear a cap button of the appropriate rank. Ulrich Theobald, 'Monetary and Non-Monetary Military Rewards in the Early and High-Qing Period (1673-1795)', in *Money in Asia (1200-1900): Small Currencies in Social and Political Contexts*, ed. Jane Kate Leonard and Ulrich Theobald, *Monies, Markets, and Finance in East Asia, 1600-1900* ; Volume 6 (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2015), 407-408.

In another district, the advancement of the Muslim leaders could well have ended here. However, a string of cases requiring military intervention into Amdo ensured that there was a constant need for additional troops. Such cases provided a way for the former Muslim rebels to demonstrate their loyalty and to establish themselves as experts in Tibetan affairs.

The Guazi Valley (瓜子溝) campaigns in 1879 established the reputation of the Muslims as crack troops. The war was fought against a Tibetan leader by the name of Gudanba (古旦巴) who had proclaimed his son a tulku (Mong. khutuktu; 活佛) and in the ensuing controversy attacked a series of fortified settlements in the mountainous regions to the east of Hezhou. Ma Zhan'ao's gravestone described the campaign as one of his greatest victories: 'The mountains there are rocky and precipiced, ten-thousand staves high and where the only paths turn like the intestines of a goat, passable only by birds. The place is known as a pass that a single man can hold, and ten thousand will struggle to cross. The Master led 300 riders to storm their lairs, and in one battle seized a bloody victory. The local people there said: 'The might of the cavalryman of Hezhou is like a deity. We had heard this before, but now we have seen him for ourselves.'⁵⁰ The rewards that followed saw Ma Zhan'ao promoted once again, this time to Assistant Regional Commander (參將). Further named in the list of promotions are Ma Yongrui, Ma Anliang, Ma Wuzhen (shaykh of the Beizhuang), Ma Zhanyuan (agnate brother of Zhan'ao), Ma Zhankui (agnate brother or cousin) and Ma Rujiao (son of Ma Yongrui).⁵¹

After the Guazi Valley campaign, the Muslim cavalry forces became fixtures within Hezhou. Moreover, they had emerged as both the troops and mediators necessary to handle Xunhua's dealings with Tibetans. Moreover, they were working in parallel with a series of commanders all of whom were derived from the former Hunanese army, and who shared a history of campaigning together – notably, Shen Yusui (沈玉遂), who served as Hezhou Regional Commander (河州總兵) for a decade post rebellion, Shen Futian (沈福田), his successor, and Yang Changjun (楊昌濬).⁵² Memorials dealing with the 1881 Henan Mongol raiding case, in which an accusation of robbery during the war period now

⁵⁰ 山石峭壁，高極萬丈，羊腸鳥道，無路可入。所謂一人守險，萬夫難越者。公以三百騎直搗其穴，一戰而奪紅執馘。其土著百姓有“河州馬軍門，威武若大神。當時聞其語，而今見其人”之語。“Ma Zhan'ao's Gravestone” 馬占鰲墓碑 (1898) in Zhang Siwen, *Jishi lu*, 445-450.

⁵¹ See family trees in Appendix I. FHA, 03-5813-002, 《呈遵保剿辦瓜子溝番匪擒獲首逆全境肅清在事出力員弁紳圖清單》，GX 06 00 00.

⁵² Shen Yusui spent the remainder of his life in Hezhou; Shen Futian may have been his son.

threatened to break into open warfare, mention the ‘defence brigades’ (防營) of Hezhou, three banners of cavalry and one of foot. ‘Defence brigade’ is given by Li Boyuan as a term for the battalions who could not be disbanded from the former provincial armies.⁵³ These are the units Zuo’s Muslim battalions evolved into, retaining their command structure from their earlier incarnations.⁵⁴ As Tao Mo’s (陶墨) report demonstrates, the Muslim battalions were both the military arm of the Qing in He-Huang and its translators. Shen Futian, then in training to take Shen Yusui’s position as commander, was sent with Ma Zhan’ao, to garrison Labrang and awe the locals with a display of military force until the Henan Mongols and the Dowa (多哇, T. mdo ha) could be brought to the table.⁵⁵ To dispatch Muslim cavalry beyond the passes to handle Tibetan affairs became routine, the precedent confirmed by each successive case. By the time of his death in 1886, Ma Zhan’ao commanded a status equivalent to that of the Hezhou Regional Commander himself and arguably higher. His titles as enumerated on his gravestone were listed as follows: ‘the General of Manifest Martiality, Peacock Feather and Regional Commander-in-Waiting, the Broadminded Hero and Commander of the Township South Foot and Horse and the Middle Banner Cavalry Ma Zhan’ao’.⁵⁶

⁵³ Li is scathing about the former battalions – whilst their military honours made it hard to dismiss them, in his account by the late Qing they were geriatric pensioners who could no longer chase a bandit even if someone had dared ask them to. Li Boyuan 李伯元, *Guan chang xian xing ji* 官場現形記 [Officialdom Unmasked], (Taipei: Sanmin shuju, 1979 (c.1906)), 119.

⁵⁴ Almost all Muslim accounts of Ma Zhan’ao’s career give three banners, with Ma Zhan’ao as commander. Ma Peiqing gives Ma Zhan’ao as Regional Commander and Brigade Commander of the Central Banner 都帶兼中旗管帶), Ma Wuzhen as Brigade Commander of the Left (左旗管帶), and Ma Yongrui as Brigade Commander of the Right (右旗管帶). Ma Haiyan became Brigade Commander of the Central Camp Infantry (督標中營步隊管帶). Titled ‘*dubiao* 督標’, this unit should have been under the direct control of the governor-general, but what it meant in practice in the late Qing is less clear. The title ‘Commander’ (*guandai* 管帶) is unique to the new army units formed in the late Qing, distinct from either Green Standards or Banners. In Zuo’s original memorial, however, only two units are mentioned. It is likely that three brigades were formed on basis of the original two sometime in the next two decades, but I have been unable to establish precisely when. Ma Peiqing, ‘Ma Zhan’ao qishi yu touxiang’, 21.

⁵⁵ NPM, Yang Changjun 楊昌濬 and Aisin Gioro Fukun 宗室福錕, 119517, 《奏為查辦蒙番積年搶案》, GX 07 10 14.

⁵⁶ 誥授顯武將軍、花翎、補用總兵、督帶鎮南馬步全軍兼帶中旗馬隊勒爾津巴圖魯. The first title here, the ‘General of Manifest Martiality’ is the highest title here. Given to officials who did not hold a current appointment (散官), this had a formal rank of 2a (正二品). Le’erjin Baturu is the Chinese transcription of the Manchu ‘largin baturu’, ‘broad-minded hero’. By the late Qing, ‘Baturu’ titles could be conferred on anyone who had distinguished themselves in battle. “Ma Zhan’ao’s Gravestone” 馬占鰲墓碑 (1898) in Zhang Siwen, *Jishi lu*, 445-450.

Yet in the official chronicles of Gansu administrative history, Ma Zhan'ao does not appear due to the off-books status of his men.⁵⁷ The equivocation likely suited the Muslim commanders, allowing them a compromise that maintained their positions as religious leaders. Ma Zhan'ao, Ma Yongrui and Ma Wuzhen were able to progress up a career ladder that existed in parallel to that of the Green Standard forces, without fear of the laws of avoidance which would have seen them transferred to posts outside their base in Hezhou. Ma Zhan'ao was himself a respected *ahong*. Ma Yongrui was among the leadership of the *Huasi menhuan* at the time, while Ma Wuzhen was the *shaykh* of the *Beizhuang*. It is likely that the structures that would become features of the later Gansu Army, notably the inclusion of *ahong* as chaplains (隨軍阿訇) emerged at this time, as the command of the brigades solidified into a permanent structure, distinct from the loose alliances which had characterised the Muslim forces through the rebellion.

The off-books structure further allowed members of prominent Muslim families to move in and out of the military. The next generation effectively served apprenticeships, moving between employment in the Green Standards and the Muslim battalions. Ma Anliang served first as Assistant Brigade Commander (守備) for the *Qitai Garrison*, before taking over Ma Zhan'ao's command on his death. The registers of appointments to military positions in the late Qing gazetteers for Xining and Gansu show a generational shift occurring in the very final years of the dynasty. Following the service of Muslim troops in 1895 and under Dong Fuxiang during the Boxer Rebellion, the second-generation Muslim commanders who had graduated from those campaigns were appointed to formal high-ranking positions in the Green Standards in their own right. Several were then transferred away from their immediate locality, something the older generation had strenuously sought to avoid. This transition post-1895 is the point at which the proto-Muslim warlords transcend their local origins and their religious bases to become the most significant force in the entire northwest. By the time of the Boxer Rebellion, they were considered to be among the most reliable troops in the empire.

Closing the Passes: Controlling the Outer

It was the need to police Tibetan and Mongol affairs that demanded military capacity in Hezhou. However, the strike forces that provided Xunhua's military capabilities

⁵⁷ See Shengyun and An Weijun, *Gansu xin tongzhi*. Juan 51-54; Deng Chengwei 鄧承偉, *Xining fu xu zhi* 西寧府續志 [*Continued Gazetteer of Xining*], ed. Wang Yu 王昱 (Xining: Qinghai renmin, 2015), 387-391; 395-404.

were only effective in combination with the ability to close the borders between sinophone and non-sinophone worlds, in a revival of the prebellum controls on movement across the passes. There was a parallel economic logic in play, as the taxes levied on goods through the passes ('likin' 釐金) paid the salaries of those forces.⁵⁸

The system functioned much as it had done prior to the rebellion. From 1877, Tibetans and Mongolians from the Kokonor area were to apply for passes via the office of the Xining amban to enter through the passes in order to purchase grain and tea at designated markets. Each pass would permit them to buy 'three months of tea and grain' and could only be used once. Tibetans to the south, in Guide and Xunhua, were permitted to apply to the closest yamen, given the distance to Xining.⁵⁹

The pass system for the realm beyond the passes was as effective as the pass system for Muslims in terms of its actual operations. The increasing connections between Hezhou, Xunhua and the formerly Tibetan upland communities meant that the border was increasingly nominal. The neat lines of ethno-spatial division it envisaged did not really exist, and policing supposed lines was challenging.⁶⁰ The state nevertheless maintained a number of tax and administrative systems that assumed the spatial division to be in place as before. Most important were the continuation of strict controls on tea merchants, grain traders, lumberjacks and rhubarb diggers, and the continued use of xiejia to collect tax from Tibetan communities. Moreover, in times of trouble the Twenty-Four Passes of Hezhou were still liable to be closed.⁶¹ Although less of a true divide, they remained highly symbolic.

The old lines of division gained a new fixity as customs barriers instead, providing vital likin revenue for the state. An investigation conducted in 1893 following a serious incident in which porter (腳夫) He Jiuling (賀九齡) and his companions had stormed a pass sheds a certain light on the postbellum borders. He Jiuling was found to have submitted repeated suits to Hezhou, Xunhua and finally to Xining in protest at the excess levies he was being charged, but his suits were ignored. He invoked the 'old statutes', under which travellers were required to pay 5 cash to cover the cost of the paper and ink required to write them a permit for passage into the uplands. When confronted by Shen

⁵⁸ On the post-Taiping rise of the likin tax, see Edwin George Beal, 'The Origin of Likin, 1853-1864' (Harvard University, 1958).

⁵⁹ QHDG, 7—永久—4164, 《陝甘總督左為蒙番買賣糧茶札循化廳》, GX 03 09 16.

⁶⁰ The system remained more functional around Danga'er and in the Kokonor.

⁶¹ This occurred in both 1890, when authorities were attempting to broker a resolution to the White Earth Slope Case, and in the wake of the He-Huang Rebellion in 1895.

Yongzhen (沈永貞), Squad Leader (把總) of the strategic Stone Gate Pass (石門關), He stuck to his lines, emphasizing that 'I do not dare to place suit against Lord Shen, I am merely laying a suit against the 'new statutes'...' Shen's response emphasized that he too was following orders: He's proclamation on the old statutes was issued by Xunhua Prefecture. As an officer under the command of Hezhou, he was required to charge the full amount as correct under his regulations.⁶²

The investigation, outsourced given its potential to engulf the military hierarchy of Hezhou, uncovered a detailed system of charges, ranging from 1000 cash per gelding to 16 cash for an unloaded donkey.⁶³ This was despite repeated attempts to reform the system. Following an incident in 1880 when an official surnamed Luo was discovered to be operating an illegal checkpoint in Zhao Valley (朝溝), Commandant Shen Tiren (沈體仁) had begun drawing up new statutes at the time, but they were never promulgated. In 1890, reform had been tried and again failed. As He's refusal to challenge Leader Shen indicates, the border was too closely aligned with military interests. Leader Shen was dismissed for his role, He Jiuling was also fined and given a month in the cangue for his insubordination. Nevertheless, a stele was erected at the Jishi Pass, recording that henceforth the old regulations will be enforced, and merchants will pay a mere 5 cash. Local peasantry were exempt.⁶⁴

The ability to navigate the checks and barriers guarding entry into Amdo was crucial for the profitability of trading ventures. Connections to the military or government did not entirely determine access over the passes, but made it dependable, less subject to the whims of cash-strapped officials. By the late Qing and early Republican era, most of the physical infrastructure of the border was moribund. Yet the economic structures built around that border remained in place – a path dependency that would have profited those who knew how to navigate the paths. The revival of the border and notional limits on the passage of people into and out of Amdo ensured the revival of the pre-bellum *xiejia* (歇家) and runner (*xieyi* 歇役) systems. *Xiejia* and *xieyi* were both quasi-official posts, runners who were effectively given monopolies on collection of the grain tax from client Tibetan and Mongol communities. This ensured they also had a partial monopoly on information

⁶² 我不敢沈老爺，我是告新章程與楊殿元、張復聚等，老爺切莫怪我。QSGC, 07-1757-10-14, 《為抽收關稅勒索商民事》，GX 19 00 00.

⁶³ Charges differed slightly at the different checkpoints; the Jishi Pass, which is where these charges are taken from, was the most expensive. *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ "Proclamation of the Abolition of Pass Charges" (革除關幣告示碑), 1893, in Zhang, *Jishi lu*, 433-437.

and trade with the community they served. The *xiejia* system was reinstated as soon as it was feasible to do so.

That translators and *xiejia* were predominantly Muslim was well-known, to the extent that it was noted within the Xining pacification articles themselves: 'However, of the Muslims many make their living as translators and *xiejia*, and they are accustomed to speaking Tibetan. If not dealt with promptly, it will be difficult to ensure that they do not conspire with each other, brewing concerns for other days.' The proposed solution here, however, was not to ban Muslims from taking such employment, but instead to grant confiscated and abandoned lands in the Western District to 'civilian soldiers', who would farm when all was well and secure the borders by their presence. No objection to Muslim *xiejia* was given, however, despite the official bans on all Muslim travel outside their immediate neighbourhoods.⁶⁵ This may have been as *xiejia* positions were generally hereditary and as the entire system depended in part on the establishment of a guest-host relationship between the runner and the villages he served.⁶⁶ Extant registers of *xiejia* in the immediate post-bellum period show that once again, Muslims dominated the positions serving the upland communities and that most were drawn from the communities west of Hezhou, particularly Mai Family Market and Hann Family Market.⁶⁷

Mediation and Tibetan Law

The Muslim commanders and Muslim *xiejia* were drawn from the same communities and shared the ability to move in multiple worlds. Whilst the Guazi Ditch expeditions made the presence of the irregular forces in Hezhou permanent, the Muslim military leadership eventually rose to become trusted interpreters of Tibetan affairs to the Qing yamen. This was facilitated by the Tibetan law codes (番例), which required the use of community elders as mediators to determine appropriate compensation in theft and murder cases. For major cases, a committee of mediators was generally drawn from a pool

⁶⁵ 況回民多以通事歇家為業，慣習番語，若不早為之所，難保不潛相勾引，釀為異日之憂。QSGC, 06-122-4-23, 《西寧善後章程三十二條》, TZ 12 00 00.

⁶⁶ In a slightly woeful petition submitted by a Ma Sijiu (馬四九), he requests restoration to the post of *xieyi*, although his father had been dismissed from the position, as he was at risk of destitution as he 'knew no other trade.' QSGC, 07-150-5-9, 《為復懇充南番歇役事》, GX 27 08 12.

⁶⁷ QSGC, 06-99-13-19, 《造送西番各寨歇家戶籍並各寺院僧番》, TZ 13 00 00; QSGC, 07-203-3-9, 《造齋南番各歇家姓名籍貫年貌戶口糧石數目》, GX 01 11 29.

of local dignitaries: respected khutuktu, abbots, village headmen (頭), *nangso* (昂鎖), those with titles for military valour (軍功), and military leaders.⁶⁸

In the early years of the pacification, the tendency for the Qing to turn to local Muslim leaders to broker Tibetan cases seems likely to have been simply a product of necessity. With peace declared across the area, petitions began to arrive from the Tibetan communities to the south and the west requesting judgement on feuds, land cases and the many legacies of a decade of violence. The Muslim commanders spoke Tibetan, and were trusted by the Hunanese. Documents from the White Earth Slope Case (白土坡案), a major accord negotiated between Labrang and Rongwo monasteries, state that Ma Haiyan and Ma Fuwang were recalled as negotiators in 1890 as they had been involved in the original settlement of the disputes in 1875.⁶⁹ With Labrang and Rongwo engaged in open and increasingly violent hostilities across 1874-5, the Muslim leaders may have appeared to all participants as the closest neutral authorities.

By 1879, Muslim leadership was actively representing themselves to the state as expert in Tibetan disputes. A petition sent by Ma Zhan'ao and a coalition of merchants and leaders of Zhangha *gong* (張哈工) requests closure of a case in which Tibetans of Qitai Valley (起台溝番民) had accused a man named Hualuo, of nearby Gori Village (古雷庄), of murder. The case had already been sent up as far as Xining, and in the petition Ma Zhan'ao states that as he was familiar with the Tibetans in question, he could not bear to sit by and watch (治下素與該番民相識，不忍坐視興訟). Hence, he took responsibility for bringing together the leaders of the neighbouring Salar community of Zhangha Gong and those implicated in the case to arrange mediation. Ma Zhan'ao presents himself as being 'under the command of the Hezhou right banner' (河鎮右旗治下), alongside the merchant Ma Sanshun (馬三順) and the Zhangha headmen. The case itself was complex, involving an internal dispute between monks in Gori Dratsang Monastery (C. 古雷寺, T. sgo ris grwa

⁶⁸ The Tibetan title 'Nangso', in Chinese 'Angsuo' (昂鎖), lit. 'domestic watchmen' were normally secular lineages who governed communities in conjunction with monastic authority. Duties could include tax collection and mediation, and in He-Huang, nangso often were responsible for collections of villages and could wield significant authority. For example, see the Guanshou confession to events in their feud with the Dowa, in which both the 'Great Buddha Lord' (大佛爺, presumably the Jamyang Zhepa), the local estate manager (捏力哇, T. gnyer las bas) and Han-Hui community leaders (漢回鄉約) are describing as bringing the two feuding sides to the prayer hall (咒房; T. mani-khang) to mediate. See QHDG, 7—永久—2707, 《官受為多哇牛馬、殺傷人命數目上的稟》, GX 07 07 11.

⁶⁹ See Max Oidtmann, 'Between Patron and Priest: Amdo Tibet Under Qing Rule' (Ph.D., Harvard University, 2014), c. 492-521.

tshang dga' ldan 'phel rgyas gling) in which the half-Tibetan son of Dondrup Pal (冬至保), a Han man originally from Hezhou, was accidentally killed.⁷⁰ Guanquhu (官去乎, T. dgon chog), a former monk exiled from the monastery now seeking revenge, had urged Dondrup Pal to sue the monastery for the death of his son. Ma Zhan'ao, judging that the case originated with Guanquhu, fined him 20 *taels*, the money to be given to the grieving father for funeral expenses. Both sides signed pledges, and Xunhua was requested to close the case, which they duly did.⁷¹

The language of this petition echoes precisely the forms used in depositions made by Muslim leaders looking to contain conflict within their own communities.⁷² The urge to settle disputes within the community stems from a similar desire to avoid the yamen, Dondrup Pal's willingness to take his complaint to Xining that prompted Ma's intervention. The recourse to authorities that were neither the abbots of Gori, the village elders nor the *nangso* may have been dictated by the Hezhou Han identity of Dong Zhibao, or by Guanquhu's outsider status. Ma Zhan'ao himself was also known as a mediator, from his status as an *ahong*, and for his previous handling of Salar irrigation disputes.⁷³

Increasingly, Muslim community representatives were directly dispatched to mediate Tibetan disputes, very much in the manner that Ma Zhan'ao had dispensed justice to Dondrup Pal and Guanquhu. When a petition arrived at the Xunhua yamen, Xunhua would pick from a pool of Muslim leaders, some employed as military officers, others on basis of their status as community leaders, whether that authority was defined religiously or courtesy of their wealth.⁷⁴ The men selected would then proceed to the villages in question, gather the plaintiffs, summon the religious leaders who would fill out the remainder of the mediation committee, and report back to Xunhua with the outcome. Although almost all the men who served in these capacities held some form of dual status, their prestige with Xunhua was founded on basis of their military service, either historic

⁷⁰ Dondrup Pal appears either have had or to have taken a Tibetan name, but is identified in case documents as Han.

⁷¹ QHDG, 7—永久—2674, 乡《老等为调处冬至保诬告息状所上禀》, GX 05 10 00.

⁷² See Chapter 4.

⁷³ Whilst mediation was used extensively at the local level in Muslim communities as well, Salar conflicts were still sometimes judged under the Tibetan Code, and hence mediation and the paying of blood prices were cultural norms. Ma Zhan'ao's resolution of Salar irrigation disputes appears on his gravestone, again as one of the significant victories of his life. "Ma Zhan'ao's Gravestone" 馬占鰲墓碑 (1898) in Zhang Siwen, *Jishi lu*, 445-450.

⁷⁴ The brokers of an agreement between Shagou and Kayga features Ma Fuwang 馬福旺, another decorated Muslim commander and uncle of Zhan'ao, and two Muslim landowners. QHDG, 7—永久—2676, 《沙溝所立永遠和氣自己沙沟所立永遠和氣字据》, GX 05 04 03.

valour or current command. Within the shifting world of cross-border politics those leaders appear sometimes as community representatives, representing their own interests or those of their immediate community. Likewise, sometimes they appear in memorials in their military function, as representatives of Qing might. This fluidity is a product itself of the grey area in which the Muslim brigades existed, half state-command, half acknowledgement of Hezhou's distinctively Muslim nature.

A series of petitions sent around 1890 by Muslim community leaders protesting the existence of a 'private jail' (私設地牢) run by Labrang Monastery thus appear not as simple protests against independent Tibetan justice, but rather as strategic interventions in a regime founded on the idea of multiple jurisdictions. The petitions were ostensibly sent over the death of a trader by the name of Ma Gajin (馬尕今) in Labrang's jail, backed by Ma Haiyan, and were both about ensuring justice for Ma and protection against racketeers for future merchants.⁷⁵ The claim that Labrang was running a jail was not a shock to anyone concerned. It seems likely that Xunhua was probably well aware of this, given their involvement in policing Tibetan disputes. Similar accusations made at the time implying that Labrang was collecting tax from commoners were not shocking: this was part of Labrang's *raison d'être*. Its claim to the operation of an equally valid alternative court of law to that of the Xunhua yamen was a key part of its place in Geluk Amdo society; making real the claim that in some sense Labrang was an independent fiefdom.⁷⁶ Certain of its disputes with Xunhua and Beijing over justice – most especially controversies over the application of the death penalty – encoded an entirely moral legitimacy.⁷⁷

It would be too glib to say that either Xunhua or Labrang welcomed the existence of the other. The tendency of plaintiff to go forum shopping complicated judgements, turning to Labrang when Xunhua had failed them, or vice versa. The relationship was more of a delicate balance, given that the parallel worlds of the borderlands were not in fact parallel. There were overlaps, connections, events that act in both spheres. Parallel implies that what moves in one does not move in the other, that agents in one are not responding to events in the other. This is a fallacy. The law might give the impression that

⁷⁵ QHDG, 7-永久-3131, 《馬三五為桑吉勒贖上循化的稟》, GX 15 12 19.

⁷⁶ Nietupski portrays Labrang as operating entirely independently of Qing authorities, as did Pirie's respondents. Paul Kocot Nietupski, *Labrang: A Tibetan Buddhist Monastery at the Crossroads of Four Civilizations* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1999); Fernanda Pirie, 'Feuding, Mediation and the Negotiation of Authority among the Nomads of Eastern Tibet', *Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Papers*, no. 72 (2005): 5.

⁷⁷ Max Oidtmann, 'A Case for Gelukpa Governance: The Historians of Labrang, Amdo and the Manchu Rulers of China', in *Greater Tibet: An Examination of Borders, Ethnic Boundaries, and Cultural Areas*, ed. P. Christiaan Klieger (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 111–50.

it is a closed system, a universe unto itself, but the actors performing within those systems knew neither system stood alone. The magistrate knew he did not have a monopoly of interpretation, but simply ignored the existence of the other heuristic.

Repeated Muslim accusations about Labrang Monastery's jail were not made into a void. As with many aspects of the governance of Xunhua and Hezhou, there were areas in which it was simply easiest for local officials to not ask questions. Accusations made by Muslim leadership served both to protect their own business interests and were made effective by their own use of evolving stereotypes made by Chinese officials regarding Tibetans – notably reproducing ideas that Tibetans were foolish, unsuited to business, and violent. Whilst in situations where the other was Han, Muslims were dangerous and likely to be given many of the labels they now applied to Tibetans, in situations involving Tibetans, Sinophone Muslims were able to align themselves with Han.⁷⁸ They actively sought to do this, placing themselves as the privileged interpreters to the state of the strange world of the Tibetan frontier. The accusations concerning Ma Gajin's disappearance were made as Xunhua and Hezhou attempted to broker a resolution to the 'White Earth Slope Case'. At the same time, Labrang was seeking to portray Ma Anliang as an unsuitable representative of the state, accusing him of responsibility for the death of a Tibetan headman, illegal-tree felling and with an agenda of his own.⁷⁹ Xunhua rejected the claims against Anliang as preposterous, defending his credibility to handle Tibetan disputes as a representative of the Qing.

The Muslim-ness of the participants in the process was not leveraged as capital within this process, save occasionally against them. No-one claimed that Muslims were better able to understand Tibetans by nature of their religious belief, although it is tempting to wonder whether they were viewed by Han interlocutors as able to mediate thanks to their intermediate position an imagined scale of distance from the Confucian Han norm. However, Muslim domination of both army and trade routes, thanks to linguistic competence, and the increased identification of economic interests with ethno-religious ones prompted a group effort to defend their intermediate position. As with the *xiejia* who argued that acting as a courier to Tibetan communities was the only trade he

⁷⁸ Muslim community leaders, when brokering Tibetan disputes, were often referred to as 'Han', or occasionally as Han-Muslim (漢回), as in the Shagou petition above where all non-Tibetan participants are Muslim, but they are referred to as Han. QHDG, 7—永久—2676, 《沙溝所立永遠和氣自己沙沟所立永遠和氣字据》, GX 05 04 03.

⁷⁹ In the petition, Anliang is referred to as 'the son of the Monigou ahun', a reminder of his Muslim identity and perhaps an additional attempt to discredit him. QHDG, 7-永久-2944, 《甘肅布政使張、提刑按察使裕札循化廳》, GX 16 07 17.

knew, knowledge of the borders, military positions and trading corporations were transmitted within family or extended family lines. This unity was maintained by the religious connections, and the mosque networks of the Sino-Tibetan frontier. These served to structure an identification between Muslim trading families, not entirely dissimilar to the way in which native-place associations were key to formation of regional identities for Han traders.

The role Muslim commanders had in interpreting Tibetan affairs was, however, used strategically by the commanders themselves. Faced with an order that would have transferred Ma Anliang eastward to fight the Boxers, Tao Mo petitioned the court to request that he be permitted to remain in Hezhou for the sake of his expertise in Tibetan affairs.⁸⁰ The initiative for such an act may well have originated from both men. Tao needed Ma Anliang's ability to play the strongman. However, Ma Anliang was also aware outside Hezhou, he would be just another commander within the Green Standards. Similarly, Ma Fuxiang used his campaigns as part of his self-presentation as a literati soldier. His poetry collection, 'The Ink Ground From My Shield' (磨盾余墨) features a series of poems describing his experiences fighting in He-Huang, alongside those describing the death of his brothers defending Beijing during the Boxer Rebellion.⁸¹ The incorporation of the Muslim leaders into the late Qing state required the border with Amdo. Their authority was built on their ability to navigate the divide between Tibetan and Sinophone. In doing so, they became invested in ensuring the borders remained.

Wood and Water

The borders provided the Muslim communities of He-Huang and Taoxi with their economic livelihood. Accessing upland produce and markets required the ability to cross the passes, but without paying a premium for it. In effect, the Qing movement regime encouraged the development of monopolies, the most significant of which was that on the wood trade. In a society where the majority of prestige buildings are constructed from wood, and where entire townships have recently been reduced to smoking ruins, the

⁸⁰ NPM, Tao Mo 陶模, 408003146 《奏為擬留記名總兵馬安良暫緩東調以資彈壓恭摺御覽（附一：飭總兵帶隊查辦番情片）（附二：陳揀員委署甘涼道缺片）》，GX 24 03 16.

⁸¹ Ma Fuxiang 馬福祥, "Mo dun yu mo 磨盾余墨 [The Ink Ground from my Shield]" (1924), reproduced in Wu Haiying 吳海鷹 et al., eds., *Huizu diancang quan shu* 回族典藏全書 [Complete Library of the Hui People] (Lanzhou: Gansu wenhua, 2008), Vol 208, 95-138.

woodcutter – or perhaps more truthfully, the wood merchant – became a kingmaker. Or at the very least, in his hands lay the power to create shrines, and with them, saints.

For the Muslims of Hezhou and Didao, this claim is literally written into the mosques built after the rebellion. In the rare steles that record moments of mosque foundation or expansion, the donor of the wood is always prominently highlighted. Often, the giver is synonymous with the originator of the project, he who symbolically led the community by putting his faith into action. For Ma Zhan'ao's lineage, it was why they chose to settle in Dahejia, where the Yellow River emerges from the Jishi Gorges, the first point of arrival for wood being rafted downstream.

The hinterlands of southern Gansu were among the few places in north China where substantial stands of old-growth trees remained. Felled trees were transported down to the Yellow, Xia or Tao rivers, to be rafted downriver. Trees that entered the water above Xunhua could be floated as far as Ningxia. Access to forests, however, was a privilege of those able to enter the upland slopes and to negotiate access with the rights holders. Woodlands could be designated communal resources of local Tibetan and Mongol communities, privately owned by a headman, or the property of monastic communities. Furthermore, given the state's interest in controlling and restricting access to the areas 'beyond', the state continued to attempt to restrict and monitor the flow of people across the passes.

As the fighting ceased in 1872, Zuo began to turn to the task of rebuilding shattered cities. In Hezhou, surrendered menhuan leaders (Ma Zhan'ao, Ma Yongrui, Ma Wuzhen, Ma Wanyou) were made responsible for the rebuilding of all public infrastructure save the walls of the city, in accordance with the general understanding that rebels were responsible for repairing damaged property.⁸² In Xunhua, the Muslim community was expected to contribute some 12,000 *taels* toward the reconstruction, much of it collected in kind.⁸³ Elsewhere in Maying Market, the Muslim community directly conducted the repairs necessary to fort and granary, thus clearing their war-debt through corvee and materials.⁸⁴

⁸² QSGC, 06-16-5-10, 《河州善後章程》, TZ 11 12 12.

⁸³ QSGC, 06-47-28-29, 《為循化回民賠修衙署廟宇銀兩由汪代丞經收尊辦事, 欽差大臣陳, 札》, TZ 12 06 20. QSGC, 07-1008-5-8, 《移交前汪署任內賠修各項銀兩並經修各廟署倉屋動用銀兩數目》, GX 05 12 20 gives some 7568 taels collected.

⁸⁴ QSGC, 06-49-1, 《為馬營回民幫同補築堡城修復庫房事》, TZ 12 12 16.

As a result, the Muslim leaders became responsible for wide swathes of reconstruction in the months following Hezhou's surrender. They continued to fight for the Qing, whilst also being responsible for the organisation of Muslim labour and collection of contributions across He-Huang and Taoxi. Ma Zhan'ao's gravestone lauds the post-war dispersal of his wealth in the name of charity, whilst Ma Qianling's genealogy notes the same: their literary memorials transform their state-given obligations into accolades.⁸⁵ Muslim military leadership thus were invested in rebuilding projects, had connections to upland areas, and were often tasked by the state with either procuring or protecting the procurement of the beams needed for rebuilding projects, as these had to be floated downstream from the old-growth forests. It is tricky to determine precisely when the connections between the wood trade and the Muslim military leadership began, as the documentary record is partial and further does not clearly distinguish public and private initiative clearly. Nevertheless, by 1873 the connection was established, and it became close and enduring.⁸⁶

Transporting wood was fraught with danger. The rafting of tens of thousands of logs required the employment of the skilled 'waterhands' (水手), the only men with the skills to safely navigate the Jishi gorges (See Fig. 1). The scale of the demand produced further difficulties, with counties simultaneously placing orders for thousands of logs. For woodcutters to travel beyond the passes to do the felling was in itself suspicious, especially as the waterhands and woodcutters were mostly Muslim. Likewise, wood laid to rest on the banks above the gorges had to be guarded against theft. After 2000 of Hezhou's requested 5000 trees for building of the yamen vanished on route, Salar headmen of the waterside *gong* conducted a house-to-house search, which produced not one log of stolen wood.⁸⁷ Felling on this scale guarantees a significant proportion of the riverside village population must have been involved in aspects of the wood trade – either directly, as woodcutters and waterhands, or indirectly as craftsmen employed to work on reconstruction projects. Likewise, acquiring wood from the majority Tibetan communities required negotiation with the complex local politics. In 1874 when Ma Zhan'ao was requested to assist with the purchase of beams for the rebuilding of the Lanzhou

⁸⁵ "Ma Zhan'ao's Gravestone" in Zhang, *Jishi lu*, 445-450; Ma Hongda 馬鴻達, Ma shi zupu 馬氏族譜 [Genealogy of the Ma Family], (unpublished manuscript held in Gansu Provincial Library: 1946), Vol 3, 3:8a.

⁸⁶ The six wood firms mentioned all state that they established lumber yards in 1873. QSGC, 07-1765-1-3, 《為運住下河木植抽收厘銀事飭循化廳》, GX 04 11 13.

⁸⁷ QSGC, 06-46-1, 《為祥查報所失木料事》, TZ 12 09 04; QSGC, 06-46-4-5 《為按戶搜查並無隱匿漂流木料事》, TZ 12 09 15.

examination hall, this may have been due to his role in Hezhou reconstruction and his business connections.⁸⁸ However, an ongoing disputes between Rongwo Monastery and Khagya Monastery were also delaying transportation of the felled wood downstream: in order to force an intervention, Khagya was effectively holding the wood hostage.⁸⁹ Ma Zhan'ao, as the pre-eminent local military commander familiar with Tibetan politics, was the natural person to turn to.



Fig. 8: Still from 1940s missionary footage of Salars rafting wood down the Yellow River.⁹⁰

Following an initial period where the need for wood outweighed all other considerations, the state moved to regulate the companies (商號) involved in felling and transporting wood downstream. Each company negotiated rights to fell in particular mountain areas and then arranged felling and transportation downstream. State company licenses listed the location of the lumber yards, the names of the areas in which they will fell, and the districts across which the merchant will transport wood. The nature of the

⁸⁸ QSGC, 06-46-10-1, 《為興修貢院同馬占鰲買就需用大木放運赴省事致循化廳》, TZ 13 05 20.

⁸⁹ QHDG, 6—永久—247, 《循化廳為卡加、隆哇爭鬥上陝甘總督、青海大臣的稟》, TZ 13 11 09

⁹⁰ Carter Holton Film Collection, made available courtesy of the Christian and Missionary Alliance National Archives, Colorado, UAS, disseminated by the Digital Himalaya Project, <http://www.digitalhimalaya.com/collections/films/holton/>, accessed 01/06/2016,

work required merchants to pledge that they would abide by regulations, neither crossing borders illegally nor assisting others to do so. In return, the license granted permission to travel beyond the passes and into the mountains to fell. The license system further required that they provide a guarantor for their good character, a requirement that likely limited the entry of new firms into the market. Figure 9 below shows the companies, dates, named merchant and their guarantor based on data compiled from all extant licenses found in the Xunhua Archive. Firms renewed their licenses every ten years.

Name	Date	Merchant	Guarantor
元生興 Yuanshengxing	GX 02 10 06	徐興嶧 Xu Xingyi	商民關森臨 Merchant Guan Linlin
隆盛公 Longshenggong	GX 02 10 06	馬占元 Ma Zhanyuan	商民關森臨 Merchant Guan Linlin
萬順福 Wanshunfu	GX 09 01 24	馬占奎 Ma Zhankui	隆盛公 Longshenggong
天德公 Tiandegong	GX 09 01 24	白長清 Bai Changqing	隆盛公 Longshenggong
奎盛和 Kuishenghe	GX 10 02 18	徐易安 Xu Yi'an	商民關森臨 Merchant Bai Linlin
永興德 Yongxingde	GX 10 04 23	姚廣德 Yao Guangde	商民 X 隔瑞? Merchant X Gerui?
恆泰祥 Hengtaixiang	GX 10 閏 05 18	馬永忠 Ma Yongzhong	no data
隆盛公 Longshenggong	GX 13 閏 04 25	馬遂良 Ma Suiliang	馬占奎 Ma Zhankui
隆順源 Longshunyuan	GX 16 12 17	馬國良 Ma Guoliang	隆盛公, 萬順福 Longshenggong, Wanshufu
興元昌 Xingyuanchang	GX 19 12 22	李瑞齡 Li Ruiling	祥太公 Xiangtaigong
萬順福 Wanshunfu	GX 20 04 24	馬占魁 Ma Zhankui	隆盛公 Longshenggong
永興德 Yongxingde	GX 21 05 01	何席珍 He Xizhen	復興成 Fuxingcheng
祥太公 Xiangtaigong	GX 21 05 01	李敢睦 Li Ganmu	復興城白瑞 X Fuxingcheng Bai Rui X
恆順元 Hengshunyuan	GX 23 05 01	段永祥 Duan Yongxiang	祥太公, 興元昌 Xiangtaigong, Xingyuanchang
積盛源 Jishengyuan	GX 24 04 09	楊子箴 Yang Zizhen	天德公, 復興成 Tiandegong, Fuxingchng
天裕木 Tianyumu	GX 34 09 17	家慶餘 Jia Qingyu	隆順源 Longshunyuan
積盛源 Jishengyuan	GX 34 10 04	楊子箴 Yang Zizhen	天德公 Tiandegong

Fig. 9. Table of wood companies active in Xunhua drawn from license data. Red highlights firms securely linked to Ma Zhan'ao.

In Figure Nine, red has been used to highlight all licenses given to firms securely connected to Ma Zhan'ao and his extended family, clearly showing that the wood trade around Xunhua was dominated by the Ma Zhan'ao lineage. Ma Zhanyuan (馬占元) was an agnatic brother of Ma Zhan'ao and Ma Zhankui (馬占奎, 占魁). Ma Suiliang is named in the 1887 license transfer document as Zhanyuan's son, although many oral histories give Suiliang as either brother to Guoliang and Anliang or as a son of Ma Zhankui, indicating the closeness of the family relationship. Ma Guoliang was Ma Anliang's brother. The relationships here show a parallel to the menhuan structures where one family member served as shaykh whilst another entered the Green Standard armies, here one brother serves in the military whilst another represents the business interests.

The companies associated with these men – Longshenggong, Longshunyuan and Wanshunfu – were significantly the largest in the area and acted as mutual guarantors to each other. The felling areas listed for the three were mostly within the jurisdiction of Xunhua, and include Kagya, Galeng, Bitang, and further areas above the Hezhou Twenty-Four Passes. The three firms held a near monopoly on these areas as the other firms listed here are mostly active above Xining, in Datong, or further west in Guide.⁹¹

The close association between these three firms and state-funded projects was not coincidental. When ordered to donate wood for the repair of the River Source Temple (河源廟) in 1890, the order is addressed to Ma Guoliang, Honoured Soldier (軍功馬國良). His status as foreman for the project rested on his military identity and connections, whilst his position representing Longshunyuan is unmentioned.⁹² The flow of official reconstruction projects to these firms ensured their privileged position within the market. As 'official merchants' (官商), they were exempt from likin dues for wood floated down past Lanzhou for sale in the markets of Ningxia and Weiyuan. This right had originally been granted to wood firms as a courtesy after they donated wood for the rebuilding of the floating bridge at Lanzhou. However, in 1878 when six firms petitioned to preserve that right they argued that the wood they provided was as a public good. Their services were required in order

⁹¹ QSGC, 07-1765-14270, 《為萬福順號木商馬占奎發照准其伐運事飭循化廳》, GX 09 01 24; QSGC 07-1767-14276, 為隆盛公號木商馬遂良更換新照准其伐運木料飭循化廳, GX 13 閏 04 25. QSGC, 07-1766-14277 為隆順源號木商馬國良發照准其代運木材飭循化廳, GX 16 12 17.

⁹² QSGC, 07-3176-15372, 《為督辦建修廟宇趕緊竣工事飭督工軍功馬國良》, GX 16 07 22.

for the economy of the troubled lands downstream to recover, that the people of Ningxia, Jingyuan and Zhongwei could rebuild their houses and waterwheels.⁹³

The process by which Longshenggong, Longshunyuan and Wanshunfu acquired their logging rights is largely opaque. Some land may well have been seized during the rebellion, or appropriated in the 1873 rush. Ma Zhanyuan is listed among the buyers of mountainous land above Hann Family Market registered for tax in 1880.⁹⁴ Later, the expanding companies were beneficiaries of feuds and the need for the participants to raise large sums in order to pay life prices (命價): in an undated case most likely from the 1880s, the headman of Cuoshi Village (措拭庄) sold his woodland holdings to the Longsheng firm to settle a complex dispute in which he had killed his nephew.⁹⁵

Tantalising references found in archival murder cases suggest that the firms played much wider roles in connecting Hezhou and hinterland than simply facilitating the movement of wood. Wang Wannian (王萬年), a Muslim originally from Bao'an who migrated to Hezhou during the troubles, was now trying his luck as a trader plying the routes to Rongwo. With the area newly settled in 1874, his two sons took his family's capital of 160 *taels*, bought goods to the value of 214 taels from the Hezhou Longsheng store, and borrowed a further 341 taels from Chief Trashhi (隆布扎什). On return, having bought 38 yak, 230 cashmere goats, two pack animals, a pair of antlers, 10 musk, and bearing 100 taels, butter and clothing, they were attacked at Stone Gate Dyke by over thirty men. His goods were stolen and his son carried away. His son was later returned four days later, with horrific injuries such that 'he passed away on the spot' (登時斃命).⁹⁶ Although initial orders for an investigation were made, Wang Wannian's quest for justice came to nothing.⁹⁷ Six years later in 1879, he resubmitted his petition, emphasizing his poverty as both Longshenggong and Chief Trashhi were pursuing him for his debts.⁹⁸ Wang's case, however, usefully suggests the continued role of personal connections in accessing

⁹³ The firms that petitioned in GX 06 to preserve this privilege granted apparently due to their contributions towards rebuilding the floating bridge at Lanzhou were the following: 隆盛公、祥泰公、萬鑑豐、林臨瑞、復興成、元生興. QSGC, 07-1765-1-3, 《為運住下河木植抽收厘銀事飭循化廳》, GX 04 11 13.

⁹⁴ Life price: fine required under the Tibetan codes for murder. QSGC, 07-1631-03-20, 《造具納貢糧花戶姓名》, GX 06 10 11.

⁹⁵ QHDG, 7-永久-4641, 《措拭庄紅布果麥上循化廳的稟》, no date.

⁹⁶ QHDG, 7-永久-2699, 《王万年稟控銀占木千戶司正目杀子越貨》, GX 05 03 28; QHDG, 7-永久-2699, 《王万年復稟控銀占木千戶司正目杀子越貨》, TZ 14 01, 29.

⁹⁷ QSGC, 06-187-20-21, 《為派差提訊銀占目紅布等歸案》, TZ 13 08 08.

⁹⁸ QHDG, 7-永久-2699, 《王万年稟控銀占木千戶司正目杀子越貨》, GX 05 03 28.

credit. His Muslim identity acted as a form of guarantee for the moneylenders of Longshenggong. As a former resident of Bao'an, he knew the Rongwo neighbourhood and able to access credit there.

Republican sources confirm the wood trade was the personal domain of the warlord families.⁹⁹ The Muslim lineages were able to dominate the wood trade simply as it existed at the precise point of intersection between state, military and market. The reconstruction process, in accelerating the movement of refugees and commerce into the Gan-Qing highlands, accelerated the incorporation of the region into north Chinese networks of trade and global capital. As with the emergence of landowners in the Hezhou region following the rebellion, Muslim military leaders were uniquely well-placed to profit, and local government both expected and encouraged them to do so. The stele built commemorating Shen Yusui's shrine in 1893 records names and positions of donors. Listed first are the military commanders, and the 17 battalions (營堡) of Hezhou, but following them are listed the names of 95 trading entities, ranging from vast Muslim firms to family shopfronts.¹⁰⁰ The sheer number of trading entities listed demonstrates both their ubiquity within the economy of Hezhou and the expected contribution they made to local projects.

Qing stereotypes portrayed Tibetans and Mongols, even when not nomads, as innocent of capital enterprise. This is not accidental - both the state and private enterprises profited from the former's control of the borders. The lines on the map drawn on the map, made visible in the gates guarding the roads out of Hezhou and the paper passes issued to its merchants, took the profits from wood away from the Tibetan and Mongolian groups in whose lands the woods nominally were. For both soldier and merchant, the maintenance of the barrier between inner and outer was profitable. For the Muslim firms it was crucial to their success.

Late Qing Transformations in the Borderland Economy

By the late nineteenth century, the Hezhou region was drawing the attention of both Shanghai banks and foreign trading firms seeking access to upland markets due to

⁹⁹ Claude Moevus, 'The Chinese Hui Muslims Trade in Tibetan Areas', *The Tibet Journal* 20, no. 3 (1995): 115-23.

¹⁰⁰ Lord Shen's Shrine Stele" (沈公祠碑), Zhang, *Jishi lu*, 181-191.

European demand for wool. The boom in the wool trade produced an evolution in the role of the *xiejia*, away from their earlier role as government grain collectors.

Horlemann's work on the Republican *xiejia* describe them as a group of traders who cultivated close relationships with Tibetan hosts to guarantee safe passage. Trading expeditions could last from three months to two years. Many traders took Tibetan wives during their time in residence with their hosts. Reciprocal visits were made by household heads to the interior, when they would reside in *xiejia*-run inns. Horlemann notes that *xiejia* were overwhelmingly drawn from Muslim communities but does not mention any relationship to government.¹⁰¹ The portrait she gives is reflective of the late 19th century transformation of borderland trading life. Whilst *xiejia* retained their function as tax collectors and official government runners before 1911, increasingly they became agents for European firms. According to Linda Grove, *xiejia* agents would barter for the wool with producers and sell to Chinese firms based in Xining. These firms then rafted the wool to Baotou where it would be unpacked and cleaned for transfer to European purchasers.¹⁰² As the trade developed, bartering systems were gradually replaced by coin or other currency, accelerating the incorporation of Amdo's herding communities into global networks of capital.¹⁰³

The new profitability of trade into the grasslands led to an impetus to safeguard the economic niches which Muslims occupied. The later nineteenth century sees an increasing number of cases in which Muslim community representatives attempted to defend the need for border-crossing agents. *Xiejia*, the military establishment, and the new plethora of trading firms became swiftly invested in the maintenance of a division between inner and outer and in selling the idea that they were particularly qualified to negotiate that divide. When the *xiejia* Ma Laichi (馬來飭, not to be confused with the Huasi menhuan founder) and Ma Bashi (馬八十) were dismissed from their posts collecting the grain tax from Bimdo (C. Biandu Gully 邊都溝) they first attempted to petition on their own behalf. In their deposition, they first mention their own ancestry. As Muslims from Hezhou, their ancestors moved into Gaizi gong when the Xunhua county seat was founded and had been employed as runners ever since.¹⁰⁴ Their personal petition, however, was

¹⁰¹ Bianca Horlemann, "Tibetan Nomadic Trade, the Chinese 'Xiejia' System and the Sino-Tibetan Border Market in Stong 'Khor/Dan'Gaer in 19th/20th Century Amdo," in *Studies on the History and Literature of Tibet and the Himalayas*, edited by Vitali, R. (Kathmandu: Vajra, 2012): 109–42.

¹⁰² Sugiyama Shin'ya and Linda Grove, eds., *Commercial Networks in Modern Asia* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2001), 105–6.

¹⁰³ Moevus, 'The Chinese Hui Muslims Trade in Tibetan Areas', 115–23.

¹⁰⁴ QHDG, 7-永久-2724, 《歇家馬來遲等未被誣告上的稟》, GX 09 12 18.

supported by a second suit, sent by the elders (老人) of Gaizi gong. The concern of the elders here is mostly not for the specifics of the case against the two men, but rather the people of Bimdo are now daring to deliver their own tax without employing a *xiejia* at all:

“We have heard that the Tibetans of Bimdo Gully are not employing a *xiejia*, and instead complaining of their hardship recklessly come to deliver each year’s tribute themselves. In reality, they wish to break a new road, and their intentions are challenging to judge. Thus, I and my fellows being careful in our duties must be outspoken. The Bimdo *xiejia* have many years’ experience, and have committed no fault that can be noted. Unfortunately a couple of bad individuals have bedazzled and confused the childlike Tibetans, saying that the authorities are going to abolish *xiejia*, that they will deliver their grain tax themselves and other such things. However, we know that there are some fifty to sixty *xiejia* serving the Tibetan communities to west and south, and if Bimdo gets away with its swindle, others will be bound to follow their bad example. Thus, it will be hard to ensure that there will not be other worries to plague the region.”¹⁰⁵

The attempt of the Gaizi elders to intervene on behalf of the two men was not well-received, perhaps unsurprisingly given the veiled threat it contains. The rescript to the petition of the two *xiejia* themselves castigated their lack of respect for the formalities - their use of red paper for their submission - and further condemned the daring (大膽妄為) of the elders in attempting to intervene in an official matter.¹⁰⁶ The response to the petition rejected hollow appeals to tradition, arguing that postbellum Xunhua was still in a state of flux where ‘tradition’ was unclear. Nevertheless, that the elders who were not themselves employed as *xiejia* felt moved to intervene indicates a community who recognised certain niches as their own and who would defend them using the full range of legal chicanery at their disposal.

In their official capacity, the *xiejia* acted to fix boundaries themselves. A petition sent in by Ma Wanlin (馬萬林), Ma Yuanshun (馬元順), Ma Shun (馬順) and Ma Xinge (馬信個) in 1900 begins with the assertion that they have collectively as grain collectors for the Ganjia area to the south (南番甘家) for many years and ‘took delight in

¹⁰⁵ 窃小的等聞得邊都溝番子不用歇家，哭來肆行完哪每年番貢額糧，其實欲开新路，居心難測。因而小的等小心辦公，知無不舉。今邊都歇家歷有年所，且無過可指，不料番子仅有一二懷人，煽惑番愚，謠言上憲斥革歇家，他们私自完納糧石等語。况小的等备知西南二番歇家亦有五六十人，倘邊都得行其詐，勢必效尤成風，地方上亦難保無他虞。QHDG, 7-永久-2724, 《街子工老人為邊都誣告歇家上的稟》, GX 09 11 17

¹⁰⁶ QHDG, 7-永久-2724, 《循化廳批街子工老人為邊都誣告的歇家上的稟》, no date.

the peaceful settlement of the people' (喜其百姓安堵).¹⁰⁷ In recent years 'unworthy foolish Tibetans' (不肖之愚番) have wilfully moved afar to places such as Bao'an or Hortsang whilst others have joined nearby villages, either by simply by fleeing or joining another family as son-in-law. The situation has become so grave that the entirety of the Layi zu (拉乙族), the responsibility of *xieyi* Ding Fulu (丁福祿), have left and Ding was thus unable to collect tax. The four requested Xunhua to instruct the remaining headmen to prevent their subjects from dispersing prior to payment, or preferably not to migrate at all. The only record of Xunhua's response is the rescript on the document itself, which agrees with the petition. In strong language, the rescript emphasizes that it is the duty of headmen to ensure that not a single household vanishes, especially not without paying tax. The reaction of the Tibetan headman is not recorded, and nor is there a further investigation into what appears to be an ongoing process of demographic change within the Ganjia communities. Nevertheless, both the petition and reaction demonstrate the manner in which runners/traders and state interests aligned in enforcement of both certain interpretations of borders and the right to cross them, and, similarly ethnically-determined ideas of livelihood. Tibetans, under this schema, were farmers and herders. Hui and Han were tradespeople, travellers and runners.

The *xiejia* are a manifestation of the same system that permitted the evolution of the military wood trade monopoly. However, the majority of such small traders did not get rich. Although the violence levelled the cities, the postbellum landscape was not a *tabula rasa*, nor was it an equal playing field. Those able to quickly seize financial openings did so, closing them off to those whom the rebellion had dispossessed. The vast sums derived from such trade and the access to wood allowed the Muslim military leadership the wealth to dominate mosque and menhuan organisations. This is not to say that menhuan networks became unimportant in trade: the Xidaotang (西道堂) in particular were particularly successful through this period.¹⁰⁸ However, the existence of such powerful firms associated so closely with individual families, and the entry of foreign capital into Hezhou business life shifted the entire commercial landscape.

¹⁰⁷ QSGC, 07-1667-1, 《為懇請速飭嚴諭約束甘家千戶及各族不得任意移居事》, GX 26 10 09.

¹⁰⁸ Gao Xulong 高旭龍, Li Na 李娜, and Fang Jirong 房繼榮, 'Minguo Shiqi Labuleng Diqu Hui Shang Maoyi Jiaowang Chuyi 民國時期拉卜楞地區回商貿易交往芻議 [Preliminary Research on Republican Era Muslim Merchants Trading Activity in the Labrang Area]', *Journal of Qinghai Nationalities University* 158, no. 2 (2014): 123–30.

Muslim Rebellion and Muslim Wood: Closing the Borders in 1896

The connections between Muslim domination of the military and of the wood trade come into particularly clear focus following the He-Huang Rebellion in 1896, when a coterie of Han merchants attempted to break into the previously exclusive market.

As had been the case with earlier outbreaks of Muslim violence, Xunhua's response had included shutting down the normal lines of communication through the Twenty-Four Passes of Hezhou, Muslims were banned from non-essential travel, and the disruption in Salar areas had disrupted trade for some months. In the petition delivered to Xunhua by the representatives of the Ma Zhan'ao lineage-affiliated Longshunyuan and Longshenggong, the companies portray themselves as victims, unable to access their woodlands to the west and south of Hezhou. Moreover, the attack on their lumberyard in Qingshui *gong* (清水工) had burnt all but a few hundred of the tens of thousands of logs they had floated downstream that season. Without road permits to access the borders, and without edicts issued to local headmen to ensure their safe passage, they feared bankruptcy.¹⁰⁹

The petition sent in by the two firms was answered immediately, likely helped by the family association with Ma Anliang. Edicts were sent the next day to the Jamyang Zhepa at Labrang, Tsö Monastery, Rongwo and other prominent leaders. Authorities feared that Muslim rebels would escape into the great beyond disguised as woodsmen. Hence although they permitted Longshenggong and Longshunyuan to resume business, they insisted that travelling Muslims carry approved road passes, to be verified by the Tibetan authorities.¹¹⁰

Less than a fortnight afterwards, Longshunyuan reported a bizarre incident in flagrant contravention of the yamen's orders. Some forty of their woodcutters had been detained by Tibetans under the Guanyin Hortsang Lama (觀音火力藏佛), who were now demanding payment of a lifeprice (命價).¹¹¹ On investigation, the Guanyin Hortsang Lama explained that they had indeed held up the woodcutters in pursuit of a life price that the Muslims refused to pay. However, Xunhua also requested an explanation from the two wood merchants. In their deposition, Longshenggong and Longshunyuan made creative

¹⁰⁹ QSGC, 07-3264-4, 《為愚發諭示采伐木料事》, GX 22 03 19.

¹¹⁰ QSGC, 07-3264-5 《為隆順源木商發給示諭並路票采伐木料事飭拉卜楞加木樣等》, GX 22 03 20.

¹¹¹ QSGC, 07-3264-6, 《為番民不遵諭示特強檔人伐木事》, GX 22 04 09

use of common stereotypes. Instead of blaming the Tibetans, they argued that the headmen of these areas had been incited by Han lowlives (漢奸) to kidnap the woodcutters, with a specific accusation laid against the manager of Bridge Gully (橋溝), Deng Xiangcai (鄧相才). In their account, jealous of the domination of the wood market the Muslim firms had achieved, Han firms were attempting to gain a foothold by using the post-rebellion tension to force them out. The implication of the logger's petition is that business should be politically neutral. The issue here is not their own identity, but that others would try to use the logic of communal conflict against their legitimate interests, thereby destabilising the area once again.

Lanzhou ordered an investigation. In response, Xunhua stated that the truth of the accusations could not be determined. The Hortsang were known for feuding with local Salars, in a series of cases stretching back to Hortsang participation in the campaigns against Muslims in the final years of the Tongzhi Rebellion. Merchants are crafty, and Han merchants especially so. Xunhua is, however, certain of two things: first, that the overwhelming need for wood in order to repair the floating bridge at Lanzhou trumps all else. Secondly, they noted that "Only Muslims can handle the hardships of rafting wood down from the mountains. Longshengong and Longshunyu are both Muslim firms and hence it is naturally easy for them to hire men. However, although Han merchants have taken advantage of present difficulties to gather, they remain unable to quickly hire Muslims to seize the market".¹¹²

In effect, then, the appeal of the Muslim merchants to well-known stereotypes – invoking the old image of innocent Tibetans led astray by crafty Han merchants, and the reputation of Muslims as essentially tougher than their Han counterparts – proved entirely effective. Xunhua transferred the case to Lanzhou for judgement, but all subsequent documents on the case emphasize the overwhelming need of the authorities for wood. All parties are simply requested to respect the road passes and edicts allowing woodsmen to pass.¹¹³

The developing stranglehold held on by Muslim participants on certain niches was defended. The persistence of both the stereotypes mentioned above, and the hold that particular sections of the community retained over certain economic niches are

¹¹² '木料出入山水，非回民不能應此艱險。該隆盛公、隆順源皆係回商，僱覓人夫，自然容易，而漢商狡難招集，且不肯急急招回，奪市擅行。' QSGC, 07-3264-1-2, 《為查辦番民收押木商由漢奸主唆回商索費案事》，GX 22 06 02.

¹¹³ QSGC, 07-3264-14, 《為不准留難阻擾木商伐木事》，GX 22 08 23.

remembered to this day. However, the magistrate here demonstrates a logic which associates particular trades with particular ethnicities: the origin of the idea that Chinese Muslims are by birth skilled traders.

Conclusions

“Monopolies are not unknown. Woe to the raftsmen who should have the temerity to try to pass a raft of lumber below the bridge opposite this city, for the purpose of disposing of it at the provincial capital or the nearer markets below Tih tao. It is to be feared that he would be literally torn to pieces by the carters and lumber merchants of Tih tao lumber yards, who would combine to resist to the utmost any infraction upon their self-asserted rights.”

Ekvall the Elder, on the Didao wood trade¹¹⁴

The physical restrictions on migration and trade outlined in this chapter were mostly obsolete by 1911. Nevertheless, the ethnic and occupational boundaries that the border delineated hardened, ensuring that despite the erasure of one boundary, the mental lines on the map remained. Longshenggong, Longshunyuan and Wanshunfu did not survive the Republican-era decline of the Ma Zhan’ao lineage. All three vanish from the historical record. The pattern they established, however, was repeated by in the rise of the Ma Qianling and Ma Haiyan families: their ascendancy was entirely attendant on their ability to deal with Amdo. Movement, military and trade were connected through Qing ideas of governance and border, and their success was predicated on manipulation of those connections.

It is an oddity of the particular environment of north-western China that a proclivity for business is given as one of the essential features of the Muslim *minzu* of the area, as the defining characteristic that makes them an ethnicity, rather than merely a religious grouping. The implication is that it is born in, as fundamental to Chinese-speaking Muslims as their distant Persian or Arabic ancestry. The valency given to such accounts depends on perspective: the trope of the unscrupulous, money-grubbing merchant is a common one, found not just among the moralising tracts written by Confucian officials concerned for licentious behaviour within their jurisdictions, but likewise a feature of Communist rhetoric and Islamophobic diatribes about the untrustworthiness of the Muslim race. Since reform and opening, this same trait is argued

¹¹⁴ David P. Ekvall, *Outposts, or, Tibetan Border Sketches* (New York: Alliance Press, 1907), 108.

to be that which befits Chinese Muslims to the modern world and ensures their competitiveness as a minority.¹¹⁵

The ubiquity of the depiction of Muslims as traders and businesspeople, and hence distinguished by profession from the more sedentary, agricultural Han, links most twentieth-century descriptions of Chinese Muslims. Fei Xiaotong himself noted Hezhou as a trading centre comparable to Wenzhou, whilst ‘Muslims are good at business’ (回回善商) type formula are found in the introduction to almost every article dealing with the topic. Yet the majority of Muslims in the He-Huang area make their living through agriculture and animal husbandry.¹¹⁶ There is an element of self-fulfilling prophecy in the way this operates: in looking for the origins of the stereotype, scholars hunt for Muslim businesses, identify their nature as ‘Muslim’ and hence a small cottage industry of studies reproduces the association. Muslims did, however, dominate in certain economic niches: surveys of pre-liberation camel trains in north China suggest that perhaps 80% of drivers were Muslim, Yunnanese Hui are likewise known for their links to the South-east Asian trade.

Modern stereotypes of Muslims in China are largely derived from this post-rebellion period of ethnogenesis, and of the debate concerning the nature of Muslim identity which occurred during the early nineteenth and twentieth century. The ‘merchant’ stereotype thus reflects the activities of certain, and highly visible members of the community, such as the Ma Zhan’ao lineage, taken as a proxy for the whole. The dominance of those members both confirmed and reproduced the association between Muslims and commerce for the first generation of anthropologists who would venture into the borderlands in the Republican period, seeking to understand the fringes of the national body they sought to create.

¹¹⁵ Gao Xulong 高旭龍, Li Na 李娜, and Fang Jirong 房繼榮, ‘Minguo shiqi Labuleng diqu Hui shang maoyi jiaowang chuyi 民國時期拉卜楞地區回商貿易交往芻議 [Preliminary Research on Republican Era Muslim Merchants Trading Activity in the Labrang Area]’.

¹¹⁶ Bianca Horlemann, ‘Tibetans and Muslims in Northwest China: Economic and Political Aspects of a Complex Historical Relationship’, *Asian Highlands Perspectives* 21 (2012): 149.

Chapter 5

Hezhou Burning: the He-Huang Rebellion of 1895-6 and the End of a Sufi World

In the 5th month of the 21st year of the Guangxu Emperor (1895), the world of the Huasi came to an ending. It happened on a dark night when the memorial archway (牌坊) that guarded the entrance to the Huasi gongbei went up in flames. The flames, however, were no accident, but were orchestrated by Ma Yonglin, hereditary custodian of the gongbei. Although he attempted to blame the arson on Han bystanders, most interpreted it as an attempt to rally the followers of the Huasi to defend their faith. Fanned by a strong wind, the flames swept out of control. By the time the blaze was extinguished, whilst the gongbei itself still stood, six were dead, much of Hezhou's Muslim suburb was in ashes and armed conflict spreading across He-Huang and Taoxi.¹ Trouble had been building for months before. Multiple cases of conflict between different Islamic groups had found their way before the Xunhua magistrate. Brawls had escalated to arson attacks on the homes of rivals and open fighting, against each other and local representatives of Qing authority. But with Ma Yonglin's intervention, events were precipitated towards a tragic conclusion. Ma Yonglin attacked Hezhou, as Qing troops were sent in. By late 1895, the Muslim rebels were dead and fleeing, and the Huasi gongbei itself lay in ashes. 15 males of Ma Yonglin's family were executed as traitors, as was the reformist Huasi shaykh, Ma Rubiao (馬如彪).² The indiscriminate crackdown saw a series of brutal massacres, and sent thousands of local Muslims fleeing into Amdo and further, most of them never to return. In Didao, the Mufti gongbei was demolished, its timbers repurposed as beams for rebuilding the Didao Academy (狄道書院).

The events of 1895-6 in Hezhou and Xunhua are collectively known as the He-Huang Rebellion. There is a surface similarity in the events of the He-Huang Rebellion to the rebellions that preceded it. Indeed, the similarity of events was noted by the participants themselves. Just prior to the outbreak of rebellion in late 1894, Salar headman and ahong Hann Nuli (韓努力)

¹ Mu Shouqi 慕壽祺, *Gan Ning Qing shilüe* 甘寧青史略 [An Outline History of Gansu, Ningxia and Qinghai], Vol.7, 24:44b; 25:2.

² Ma Yuan (馬援), grandson of Ma Yonglin, "The Circumstances of the Murder of the Huasi Custodian in the 12st Year of the Reign of the Guangxu Emperor" (光緒二十一年華寺負責人被害情況) in Ma Tong 馬通 and Ma Haibin 馬海濱, eds., *Zhongguo Sufei pai dianji* 中國蘇菲派典籍 [Collected Primary Sources for Chinese Sufi Sects] (unknown: unknown, 2010), 529-530.

representing the 'Old Teaching', had arrived in Xining to defend himself against accusations of persecution brought by Hann Musa (韓木洒), ahong of the 'New Teaching', and to simultaneously accuse Hann Musa of a heresy that has resulted in the violent disruption of the normal patterns of life.³ The presiding magistrate would have found the case laid before him equally familiar. Hann Nuli was making a conscious appeal to tropes with precedents that both he and the magistrate understood, recalling the warring Islamic menhuan of 1781. Whilst ruling on religious issues was not part of the magistrate's mandate, diffusing internecine conflict with the potential to spark communal violence most certainly was. In presenting himself as the orthodox Old Teaching, Hann Nuli was attempting to mobilise the power of the state behind his faction.

The language used in court deliberately recalled the past history of Islamic conflict in He-Huang. The continuities in the way the participants represented their differences to the yamen, however, says more about the yamen and its expectations than the beliefs of Hann Nuli and Hann Musa. The origins of Hann Nuli's plaint and Ma Yonglin's symbolic act of destruction lie in the changed relationship between religious authority, Muslim elite and Qing state. Rather than being simply another menhuan conflict, the He-Huang Rebellion was an outgrowth of currents of Islamic reformism fostered in the postbellum period. Its bitter aftermath moreover confirmed the manner in which the religious landscape had changed. A coterie of Muslim military leaders in alliance with the Hezhou magistrate Yang Zengxin and Shaanxi and Gansu Governor General Tao Mo embarked an anti-menhuan campaign, ending the temporal power of the Sufi networks in western Gansu.

This chapter focuses on the currents of Islamic reformism that entered He-Huang in the late nineteenth century and their relationship to the rebellion of 1895, and secondly on the impact of the Qing crackdown that followed. Drawing on the analysis of the changes to northwestern society produced by the rebellion explored in the previous chapters of this dissertation, I first argue for the period between rebellions, c.1870-1895, as a period of religious experimentation and revival. Secondly, the outbreak of the rebellion itself is explored, as an outgrowth of the reformist current sweeping through He-Huang and a failure of Qing processes of mediation and the limitation of the policy of 'using Muslim to govern Muslim.' Finally, I explore the anti-menhuan campaign that sought to destroy Gansu's Sufi tariqa as the product of an alliance between Qing officials and the reformist Muslim elite. Within this, the destruction of the Mufti gongbei is explored. Whilst this moment in itself speaks to the changing nature of Islam in northwestern China, it occurred – and was often interpreted – within the context of a

³ Mu, *Gan Ning Qing shilüe*, Vol 8 24:14.

wider society in which Islamophobia was now commonly accepted. Ultimately, the rebellion of 1895 stemmed from the changes in northwestern Islam. Its consequences, however, ended what I have described as the menhuan system. The tacit alliances between shaykhs and officialdom at the local level were demolished, alongside the gongbei.

Revival and Reform

The Qing establishment of the area west of the Tao as a Muslim enclave produced an unexpected side-effect as a result of the resettlements following the Great Northwestern Rebellion: the conditions for an Islamic revival. The new clusters of dense Muslim settlement, mosque building projects, and the arrival of famed *ahong* and teachers from Shaanxi and elsewhere produced a highly dynamic period of experimentation with religious forms: a movement which came to a partial end with the He-Huang Rebellion. The dynamism of the post-1870s period is perhaps rivalled only by the late 17th and early 18th centuries when institutional Sufism established itself in Gansu.

Since the loss of Arabic and Persian as spoken languages of daily life during the late Ming dynasty, Islam in China has been distinctively characterised by its own awareness of its place on the fringes of the Muslim world. One variant of a famed *hadith* reads, ‘Seek knowledge, even unto China’, signalling China’s place at the outer edge of a world known to Islam, at the fringes of comprehensibility.⁴ That awareness means that Islam in Gansu existed in a permanent state of seeking renewal, to fend off concerns about inauthentic practice or misunderstanding of religious texts written in languages most followers could not read. The power of the Sufi shaykh within the menhuan was in itself a demonstration of this. Shaykhs traded on their connection to Allah and the Prophet, their initiation into networks connecting them back to Central Asia, India or the Middle East, manifested in their ability to perform miracles. For young *ahong* to establish a following, a journey was required: a pilgrimage to find a master, an initiation or a text.⁵ And every shaykh was vulnerable to the next student who returned, bearing with him a newer initiation and a claim to a greater authenticity.

In that sense, the revival of the 1870s fits earlier patterns. The aftermath of the rebellion brought a natural period of rebuilding within existing menhuan traditions. However, more than this, the late nineteenth century was a period in which Muslims in He-Huang and Taoxi sought

⁴ Zvi Aziz Ben-Dor, ‘“Even Unto China”: Displacement and Chinese Muslim Myths of Origin’, *Bulletin of the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies* 4, no. 2 (2002): 93–114.

⁵ Of course, not all journeys were physical.

to renew their connections to distant Islamic centres, notably Bukhara, and there encountered the Islamic reformism now taking hold across Central Asia.

The profits made from wood, wool and military service, in addition to funding mosque building, were used to sponsor pilgrimages. Technological transformation – steamships and the telegraph – here too ushered in change, as greater numbers of Muslims were now able to make the Hajj than ever before. Ma Zhan’ao never made the pilgrimage himself, but sponsored the pilgrimages of Ma Rubiao (馬如彪), son of Ma Yongrui and with a claim to Huasi shaykh-hood, alongside two other ahong.⁶ Rubiao, fluent in Arabic, Persian and Ottoman Turkish, returned having been gifted the dhikr of Shadiliyya, Naqshbandiyya and Suhrawardiyya: echoing the multiple initiations of the Huasi founder Ma Laichi. The explicit parallel made between the two men within the Huasi tradition serves to sanctify Ma Rubiao not as an innovator, but one who desired to purify the Huasi faith and return them to their former glory. As Ma Zhan’ao did with Ma Rubiao, it was popular for the new Muslim elite to sponsor clerics. There is more evidence for this during the Republican period, when Ma Fuxiang sponsored a number of prominent Chinese Muslim intellectuals, including Wang Jingzhai (王敬齋, 1879-1949) the author of the first full translation of the Qur’an into Chinese. Ma further entrusted Fa Zhen (法真, c.1870-1957), an ahong in the Shaanxi learning tradition from Hezhou, on his pilgrimage c.1917 to purchase land in Mecca in order to establish a resthouse for the benefit of all future Chinese Muslim pilgrims.⁷ However, it is clear that this sponsorship predated Fuxiang’s efforts.

For powerful, devout men like Zhan’ao and Fuxiang, sponsoring the journeys of the learned was simultaneously an expression of their own faith and a signal of their particular religious agendas. However, others too were able to make their own journeys, often without such patronage. Ma Wenquan (馬文泉, 1840-1882), founder of the Qadiri ‘Wenquan Hall’ (文泉堂), made the Hajj three times before returning to teach in He-Huang. Hann Musa (韓母撒; sometimes 韓木洒), a Salar Qadariyya master whose legacy dominates modern Salar Sufism,

⁶ Ma Yongrui was a Huasi ahong and brother to Ma Yonglin, the secular Huasi leader, who fought alongside Zuo and remained in the military post rebellion. Depending on the stance of the teller, the story varies. Either Zhan’ao was motivated by guilt over his involvement in the death of the Xining Huasi leaders, Ma Benyuan and Ma Guiyuan, or he paid for their journeys as a form atonement as his own commitments in Gansu prevented him from travelling himself. Ma Tong 馬通, *Gansu Huizu shi* 甘肅回族史 [History of Gansu Muslims] (Lanzhou: Gansu renmin, 1994), 90.

⁷ Matsumoto Matsumi, ‘Rationalizing Patriotism Among Muslim Chinese: The Impact of the Middle East on the Yuehua Journal’, in *Intellectuals in the Modern Islamic World: Transmission, Transformation and Communication*, ed. Stephane A. Dudoignon, Komatsu Hisao, and Yasushi Kosugi (London: Routledge, 2006), 123. Ma Tong, *Zhongguo Yisilan jiaopai yu menhuan zhidu shilüe*, 210.

studied in Yarkand under a series of Afghan Mujaddidi masters.⁸ But even a number of the comparatively undistinguished were able to make the journey: Gu Shizhong (古世忠, 1882-1968) made the Hajj whilst still a child, and went on to found a school and clinic in Hann Family Market.⁹

As the identities of the hajji named above suggest, the revival was by no means confined to just the Huasi, or the menhuan affiliated with the military leaders. The Mufti, now in Fengtai Fort, rebuilt their madrasa and refounded their business. The importance of Hezhou as a Muslim centre was redoubled in the postbellum period: massacres in Gansu's Suzhou, mosque demolition movements outside He-Huang, and the resettlement of Shaanxi's Muslims made Hezhou a safe haven. Always important, Hezhou now came to eclipse Xi'an, Xining and Suzhou as the 'Little Mecca' of the Northwest, and in particular a centre where renowned for the linguistic competency of its teachers.¹⁰ The arrival of the Shaanxi ahong – including Pu'er Ma – helped revitalise He-Huang's connections to the Chinese-language Islamic tradition (*jingtang jiaoyu* 經堂教育), bringing the Han kitab with its emphasis on Chinese learning and the compatibility of Islam and Confucianism back to attention.¹¹ In Taozhou, inspired by just this tradition, local examination graduate Ma Qixi (馬啟西, 1857-1914) founded the "Hall of the Western Way" Xidaotang (西道堂).¹² Numerous others set out their own religious stalls – the Hongmen (洪門), another Khufiyya group, were founded over this period whilst the Beizhuang expanded significantly.¹³ Meanwhile, the Mad Master (風爸爸) – a mendicant Qadiri preacher named Ma Yilong (馬一龍) far divorced from the rich Sufi brotherhoods like the Huasi and Mufti

⁸ This is the same Hann Musa who was accused by Hann Nuli in 1894. He died in jail in obscure circumstances. Alexandre Papas, 'Sufi Lineages Among the Salar', in *Muslims in Amdo Tibetan Society: Multidisciplinary Approaches*, ed. Marie-Paule Hille, Bianca Horlemann, and Paul Kocot Nietupski (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2015), 120-123.

⁹ "Introduction to Gu Shizhong" 古世忠, Linxia Archives wenshi ziliao, <http://www.linxiaxian.gov.cn/show.asp?id=132>, accessed 11/04/2018.

¹⁰ This still the case: Yunnanese ahong send their children to Hezhou to learn Arabic.

¹¹ Pu'er Ma (普洱馬), otherwise known as Ma Shouqing 馬壽清, was mentioned in Chapter 2 for his role as an intermediary between Zuo and surrendering Muslims. Postbellum, he was among the many who established Pingliang as a major centre for the Shaanxi tradition of madrasa education. Several of his disciples preached in Hezhou (notably the 'Green-Plaited Ahong 綠辮阿訇). See Huang Dengwu 黃登武 and Ma Xiaoping 馬小平, *Zhongguo jingtang jiaoyu yu Shaan xue ahong* [中国经堂教育与陕学阿訇] *Chinese Madrasa Education and Ahongs of the Shaanxi School* (Pingliang: private, 2010), 63-65.

¹² The Xidaotang operate rather like a commune and are held to be near heretics for the unorthodoxy of their teachings by some of their fellow Muslims. See Marie-Paule Hille, 'Le Xidaotang: Processus de Legitimation d'un Nouveau Courant de l'islam Chinois Au Debut Du XXe Siecle Dans Le Sud Du Gansu', *Etudes Chinoises* 27 (2008): 118-45.

¹³ Ma Tong 馬通, *Zhongguo Yisilan jiaopai yu menhuan zhidu shilue*, 218-222, 198-207

– travelled through He-Huang, leaving a rich collection of oral legends in his wake.¹⁴ Ma Wanfu (馬萬福, c.1853-1949), founder of the Wahhabi-esque Ikhwan who would violently dominate the Republican period, was just one among many charismatic preachers active in late Qing He-Huang.¹⁵

The Muslim leadership of Hezhou were active participants in this revival. In some senses they had to be: after all, as community leaders, they held both the power of judgement over their communities and the responsibility should their communities fall out of line.¹⁶ The haiyi system, explored in Chapter Three, was in part an outgrowth of this, although it reflected changing conceptions of Islam as well. As mosque patrons, moreover, they could direct appointments of preachers. Following Ma Zhan'ao's death in 1886, Anliang invited the leading clerics of the day to preach in Dahejia: Ma Qixi, Ma Wanfu and a disciple of Ma Wenquan are all said to have preached there, three representatives of three very different branches of Islam.¹⁷ The whole adds up to a picture of religious experimentation, of dynamism and diversity wherein clerics debated ideas of the day.

Religious revival in He-Huang needs to be set into its wider contexts, namely the search for answers and modernisation that characterised the Self-Strengthening Movement in China, and the beginnings of the Islamic modernism that would produce the Jadids and Pan-Islamism in Central Asia. Ma Zhan'ao was a contemporary of Zuo Zongtang, after all, and despite their dissimilar origins, the two men were motivated by surprisingly similar drives: a loyalty to the

¹⁴ Ma Yilong is now recognised as founder of the “Hall of the Soul Enlightened” (Lingmingtang, 靈明堂). Wang Jianping has argued that although generally held to be Qadiriyya, Ma Yilong in fact came under the influence of Bábí teachers fleeing Iran, transmitted via Xinjiang. They are presently one of richest and most visible traditions in the Hezhou area, a post-1980s recovery deserving of greater study. See Wang Jianping, ‘The Influence of Babi Teaching on Ling Ming Tang and Nineteenth Century China’, *Lights of 'Irfan* 3 (2002): 185–98.

¹⁵ Ma Wanfu (馬萬福), also known as Ma Guoyuan (果園), was born in Ma Zhan'ao's ancestral village of Monigou around 1853. He went on Hajj in 1886, and stayed for a number of years, returning to Hezhou around 1892. Like Wang Haoran in Beijing, he was deeply impressed by his experiences in the Hejaz, and returned with a mission to purify Chinese Islam and return to religious practice as proscribed in the Qu'ran and Hadiths. He advocated 10 Principles (often called ‘the Guoyuan 10’), which included explicit opposition to worship at gongbei and veneration of shaykhs.¹⁵ He founded a new ‘anti-menhuan’ movement, known as the Ikhwan (A. brotherhood, C. 伊赫瓦尼), who rose to dominate the religious scene of the northwest thanks to the patronage of various Muslim leaders through the Republican period. Often described as either Wahhabi, or ‘Wahhabi-inspired’, the Ikhwan were profoundly nationalistic in their origins.

¹⁶ See Chapter 3.

¹⁷ Zi Heng 子亨, ‘Zhongguo yisilanjiao shilüe 中國伊斯蘭教西道堂史略 [Outline History of China's Islamic Xidaotang]’, in *Xidaotang shiliao ji* 西道堂史料輯 [*Historical Materials on the Xidaotang*, ed. Qinghai minzu yanjiusuo 青海民族研究所 (Xining: Qinghai minzu xueyuan minzu yanjiusuo, 1987), 9. Gao Wenyuan 高文遠, *Guoyuan hazhi: xunjing gesu de changdao zhe* 果園哈智: 遵經革俗的倡導者 [*Guoyuan Hajji: An Advocate of Respect for Classics and Reform of Custom*] (Taipei: 中國回教文化教育基金會, 1989), 9-11. Papas, ‘Sufi Lineages Among the Salar’, 125.

Qing, and a sense of backwardness, a need to renew self and community to face the catastrophes of the arriving modern world. Connections between Republican Islamic reform movements in China and Central Asian and Turkish reformers remain under-researched. However, it is certain that revival in Central Asia, and in the Ottoman Empire, did pique intellectual interest in Muslims in China. In 1906, the Xunhua and Hezhou magistrates raised an alarm about an ‘Aliyasi’ (阿里亞斯), a Turk travelling with a French passport, who was found to be selling ‘Muslim scriptures’ (回經) in He-Huang and Taoxi.¹⁸ Abdürreşid İbrahim (1857-1944), a Tatar qadi and Pan-Islamist, journeyed through China in 1909, and recorded his impressions, whilst famed Muslim reformer Wang Haoran invited Ottoman teachers to his school as the ‘imagined community of Chinese Muslims’ began to form.¹⁹ Before all this, however, Ma Zhan’ao found himself a teacher from Bukhara, named Salim (塞利目).

At the time, Bukhara was beginning its own Islamic revival. Manghit rule in Bukhara had fostered institutions of Islamic learning from the late eighteenth century, and the city was a key point in a network spreading reformism from India to Russia via the Mujadiddiyya networks.²⁰ However, the Russian conquest of Turkestan in the 1860s gave a new impetus to reform.²¹ The Russian policy of non-interference in Muslim society empowered Muslim judges (qadis, Ch. gazui 尕最) and the ‘ulama. Meanwhile, Kokand saw the ‘rebirth of madrasas’, as *waqf* income grew alongside cotton production. From the 1880s, a proto-Jadid movement began to take hold, focused particularly on educational reform and a return to the core texts of Islam, moving away from medieval commentaries now perceived as decadent.²² The movement was also largely pro-state. Intellectuals such as Muhammad Yunus Khwaja Ta’ib considered Turkestan under Russian rule to be Dar al-Islam, precisely because Muslim law was enforced.²³ Ta’ib and those of his ilk were largely pro-state, pro-modern science and often anti-Sufi, seeing them as backward and opposed to progress.

Beyond his Bukharan origins, little is known of Ma Zhan’ao’s master, although Gao Wanxuan dated his arrival in Hezhou to 1871. Under his guidance, plans were made to unite the

¹⁸ QSGC, 07-2107-21, 《為保護土耳其人艾利亞司遊歷甘肅並不得販賣回經事致循化廳》, GX 32 11 17.

¹⁹ Noriko Yamazaki, ‘Abdürreşid İbrahim’s Journey to China: Muslim Communities in the Late Qing as Seen by a Russian-Tatar Intellectual’, *Central Asian Survey* 33, no. 3 (3 July 2014): 405–20.

²⁰ The influence of these same networks can be seen in the career of Hann Musa, mentioned above: his Afghan master was a Mujadiddi.

²¹ Stéphane A. Dudoignon, ‘Echoes to Al-Manar Among the Muslims of the Russian Empire’, in *Intellectuals in the Modern Islamic World: Transmission, Transformation and Communication*, ed. Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Hisao Komatsu, and Kosugi Yasushi (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 85–116.

²² Hisao Komatsu, ‘From Holy War to Autonomy: Dār Al-Islām Imagined by Turkestani Muslim Intellectuals’, *Cahiers d’Asie Centrale*, no. 17/18 (2009): 449–75.

²³ *Ibid.*

mosques of Hezhou into a haiyi system under Wang Mosque (王寺), and to open a madrasa.²⁴ The significance of Salim's influence on Zhan'ao's life is displayed on his headstones over his grave. This inscription is an important statement: the gongbei built for Zhan'ao by his son reflects the care the son took in visibly inheriting his father's legacy. In a landscape full of gongbei, where they marked borders and teaching schools, the gongbei over Dahejia with its stele in Arabic and Chinese stood as a lasting reminder of his religious philosophy.

Ma Zhan'ao's Chinese language headstone is perhaps understandably vague on the details, casting the encounter in terms not entirely dissimilar to a meeting with a Buddhist master, as a final line after the listing of the achievements of Ma's life: "Before this, a descendant of the Prophet had arrived from the west, his face weathered but his voice young. He ate neither flesh nor grain, and daily would drink but a little milk or honeyed water. Widely he taught the Prophet's Way. He met our Master, and on meeting it was as though they were acquaintances of old, and the Master learnt all his secrets. I have heard that on the day our Master returned to Allah (歸真), an otherworldly fragrance filled the room and did not clear."²⁵

However, whilst in Zhan'ao's Arabic gravestone, the chronology of Ma Zhan'ao's life is similarly respected, but significantly more detail is given to the importance of his Bukharan master and his teachings: "He encountered a revered, perfected Prophet-descended elder who came from the territory of Bukhara, they met face to face, and mouth to mouth they talked, and he welcomed a new teaching. As for his new teachings, he implemented them in each day's prayer, never neglecting to do so, rigorously performing his practice, until he approached familiarity (the second stage of skill), his skill increasing. He displayed *shele'erti* (shir'a, divine law, first stage of observance of law in Sufism), concealing his *tuolegeti* (tariqa, way, path towards realising the truth). All scholars asked of his learning and benefited from his understanding of the faith. All seekers of the way found light from his doing. The bright were persuaded by his doing. From his words, the ordinary were warned. He helped Islam. He established a number of judgements (telling right from wrong). He assisted a number of scholars. He reconciled the ignorant. Village along followed his instructions. He stopped the sins of the people by reminding them of the consequences of evil. He established the *Sunna*, and

²⁴ Gan Wanxuan 高萬選 "Linxia qingzhensi haiyi zhidu de jianli yi zi bianqian" 臨夏清真寺海乙制度的建立及其變遷 [The Establishment of Evolution of the Haiyi System in Linxia's Mosques] in *Gansu wenshi ziliao*, Vol 2, (Lanzhou: Gansu renmin, 1986), 197-202.

²⁵ 先是，有聖后自西域來，蒼顏童聲，不葷不飯，日飲乳汁或蜜水少許，廣傳聖教。見公如舊相識，公盡得其秘。聞公歸真之曰，異香滿室，竟不散云。 "Ma Zhan'ao's Gravestone" 馬占鰲墓碑 (1898) in Zhang Siwen, *Jishi lu*, 445-450.

overthrew *bidaati* (innovation, deviation from the Sunna).²⁶ Ma Zhan'ao's descendants in Dahejia echo this story: they told me he was not a member of the Huasi, despite his early association with them, but had his 'own, private teaching'.²⁷

Huasi oral histories also speak of Salim, as an influence on Ma Rubiao, the reforming Huasi shaykh mentioned above. Salim is said to have come to him, advocating respect for knowledge (A. 'ilm, C. 尔領) and sharia (教法).²⁸ He told him 'Your region lacks ten *akham* (胡空; rules), you must establish them.'²⁹ And so Rubiao gathered forty great among of the region. Together they read the volumes the Huasi Master (Ma Laichi) had left behind, and sure enough, they found that their present practice went against ten *akham*. Thus Ma Rubiao embarked on an ambitious programme of reform within the Huasi. He advocated reform to dress codes, encouraging men to wear beards and hats, and women to cover their heads and stop binding their feet. Reforms to prayers included reciting the Muslim words of witness after prayer and the addition of a Shadiliyya-inspired recitation to the Friday dawn prayer.³⁰ Whilst they came from within a menhuan and were Sufi inspired, Ma Rubiao's reformist principles came from a similar place to Ma Guoyuan's later Ten Principles for the Ikhwan. Both were motivated by a desire to return their traditions to their older, purer forms: simply that Guoyuan's principles saw this as removing the space for Sufism entirely.

The Huasi account further mentions that more details of Salim's life are recorded in the *Kailamati Aoliya* (開拉瑪提奧里亞經), mostly likely to be a reference to Shadiliyya qadi and imam Yusuf al-Nabhani (1849-1932)'s *Jami' Karamat al-Awliya* (Miracles of the Saints), an early twentieth century collection of miracle tales. Whilst this needs further research, the possibility of a connection to Nabhani is revealing: a staunch Ottoman loyalist, Nabhani believed Sufism

²⁶ 他接觸了從布華裏的國土來的一位尊貴的、全美的聖裔長者，面對面相遇，口對口談話，迎接了新的受記。他對新的受記，貫徹在每日的功課裏，從不怠慢，上緊練習，一直鄰近“性熱”（第二步功夫），功夫在升騰。他明顯了“舍勒爾提”，暗藏了“妥勒格提”，所有學者，從他的學問上求的教益。所有行道的人，在他的幹辦上得到了光。聰明人在他的幹辦上受了勸。普通的人在他的言語中受了記。他幫助了伊斯蘭。他立出了一些斷語（辨是非）。他襄助了一些學者。他勸解了一些無知的人。農村開學者受他的派命。他以後世的孽果禁止了人們的罪行。他立起了“孫乃提”（聖行），他坍塌了“彼得爾提”（異端）。“Ma Zhan'ao's Arabic Gravestone” 馬占鰲墓阿拉伯文碑(1898), from in Zhang Siwen, *Jishi Lu*, 450-465.

²⁷ Dahejia interviews, from the author's fieldnotes, July 2017.

²⁸ “Descendants of the Huasi Founder” 華寺門宦道祖後裔, Huasi menhuan dao zu 華寺門宦道祖 [The Huasi menhuan founder] in Li Weijian 李維建 and Ma Jing 馬景, *Gansu Linxia menhuan diaocha* 甘肅臨夏門宦調查 [Survey of menhuan in Linxia, Gansu] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 2011), 265.

²⁹ Akham, singular hukm, has a variety of meanings: arbitration, judgement, or simply Allah's will. It often refers to a judgement in law, based on Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*), or to specific Quranic rules.

³⁰ *Ibid*, 266

should be strictly subject to shariah, whilst strongly opposing Wahhabi and Salafi reformers of the day.³¹

Whilst al-Nabhani was an arch conservative within his own context, his thought transposed to China may have been more radical. Ma Zhan'ao's gravestone suggests a sensibility similar to that of the qadis of Kokand: supportive of a legal Muslim order, the Sunna, and strongly against *bida'ati* – innovation, or non-Islamic practices. Late Qing He-Huang provided space for Islamic judges to operate at the local level, before cases made it to the yamen, and there was a *qadi* dispensing justice in Dahejia until the 1950s.³² Ma Zhan'ao, at the apex of the emerging haiyi system – a system of mosque organisation which paralleled the county administration – and responsible for legal mediation across Xunhua and Hezhou had compelling reason to subordinate the authority of the shaykhs, of whom there were many, to that of the judges. To a man like Ma Zhan'ao strengthening Islamic governance to a man was precisely the same as strengthening the Qing. And similar to the way Ta'if had understood Russian rule in Turkestan, Qing rule in He-Huang was legitimate precisely in the spaces it could not reach.

Ma Zhan'ao and Ma Anliang are generally described as pro-Qing 'conservatives'. Descriptions of the Muslim Kansu Braves in the defence of Beijing during the Boxer Rebellion describes them as fanatics, irrationally loyal to Cixi.³³ This is perhaps true – they were pro-Qing, but in a manner similar to that in which Zuo was pro-Qing. On his deathbed in 1886, Ma Zhan'ao enjoined Anliang to continue uniting the mosques of Hezhou beneath him: a project both religious, and, perhaps, patriotic. Ma Zhan'ao, however, remained broadly Sufi in his practice, as far as can be determined. Elsewhere, however, in Bukhara and Kokand, the 'ulama were beginning to turn against Sufi practice: perhaps a harbinger of Ma Anliang's own spiritual evolution. It also serves as a reminder that whilst Ma Zhan'ao was pre-eminent prior to his death, other members of the Muslim military elite did not necessarily share his beliefs. The Ningxia Ma family (the sons of Ma Qianling, notably Ma Fuxiang and Ma Fulu) turned to the Han kitab in their search for a patriotic Islam, finding its synthesis of Islam and Confucianism appealing. Meanwhile, the Qinghai Ma family (the sons of Ma Haiyan, Ma Qi, Ma Lin and Qi's son Ma Bufang) embraced the Ikhwan and a profoundly anti-Sufi agenda. All these leaders, however,

³¹ Ghazal Amal, "‘Illiberal’ Thought in the Liberal Age: Yusuf Al-Nabhani (1849-1932), Dream Stories and Sufi Polemics Against the Modern Era', in *Arabic Thought beyond the Liberal Age: Towards an Intellectual History of the Nahda*, ed. Jens Hanssen and Max Weiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 214–34.

³² Dahejia interviews, from the author's fieldnotes, July 2017.

³³ For instance, B. L. Putnam Weale, *Indiscreet Letters from Peking: Being the Notes of an Eye-Witness, Which Set Forth in Some Detail, from Day to Day, the Real Story of the Siege and Sack of a Distressed Capital in 1900--the Year of Great Tribulation* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1919), 10.

were searching for a Muslim modernism; a renewal of the faith, support for their military ambitions and support for their place within Gansu and within China.

Nile Green has explored the relationship between the military and forms of Islamic belief in the context of the British Indian army, noting that the scale of Muslim employment in the army promoted some forms of religiosity among soldiers whilst restraining others.³⁴ The late Qing Islamic revival was neither driven nor entirely contained by the military positions held by the Muslim elite, including a number of Sufi shaykhs, but, as in India, there is a salience to these connections that deserves further investigation. Ma Zhan'ao was able to direct Muslim politics in postbellum He-Huang quite simply as he now outranked the shaykhs and saintly descendants who served underneath him.³⁵ The changing relationship between religion and politics in the post-bellum era twists on these figures and their ability to move in two worlds, and their ability to sponsor, spearhead and protect their proteges. Nevertheless, the period from 1870-1895 stands out for its intellectual dynamism and connections to Central Asian reformism.

Muslim to Govern Muslim: Failures of Mediation and the Outbreak of Rebellion

However, as had happened before in Xunhua, the overlap between religion and politics meant that religious movements had social consequences. Where Muslim leaders were able to successfully mediate between groups, or simply squash them, settlements that suited both sides could be found. When mediation failed, Muslim disputes could still be brought before Qing magistrates, who were both poorly qualified and unwilling to judge them, preferring to throw them back to Muslim leaders to solve if possible. Leaving Muslim to govern Muslim further meant that these ostensibly spiritual divisions had real meaning, especially for the tight-knit Salar communities still theoretically subject to the authority of their *tusi*. In the late 1894, the absence of a coterie of those Muslim leaders, called away to fight the Japanese as part of Dong Fuxiang's army, and a series of local failures to defuse conflict resulted in the He-Huang Rebellion.

Ma Rubiao's reformist movement and the growing influence of Hann Musa in Xunhua, both referred to as the New Teaching (新教), did not go unchallenged. The Shadiliyya teachings promoted by Rubiao were rejected by none other than Ma Yonglin, custodian of the Huasi gongbei and Rubiao's uncle. Yonglin himself was a powerful figure. As custodian of the Huasi gongbei in Hezhou, he handled most of the day-to-day business of the menhuan. In his capacity

³⁴ Nile Green, *Islam and the Army in Colonial India: Sepoy Religion in the Service of Empire*, Cambridge Studies in Indian History and Society ; 16 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

³⁵ Very much like in Green's work, there remains much research to be done on the role of 'troop-following *ahong*' (隨軍阿訇), Muslim chaplains employed within the late Qing and Republican era Muslim units.

as a businessman, he had helped finance Ma Zhan'ao's campaign during the 1860s. In his capacity as *ahong*, he would be called to sit in consultation on cases involving both Han and Hui. Within Hezhou, he had extensive authority to handle intra-Hui cases. His authority was such that each time he entered Hezhou, a cannon was fired, and on leaving, three blasts sounded his departure.³⁶ The Huasi, moreover, did not have a candidate with an incontrovertible claim to shaykh-hood. Ma Guiyuan's death in Xining left a void, which no candidate was quite able to fill. That absence left Ma Yonglin as almost-shaykh, the paramount authority in Hezhou.

The division between Ma Rubiao and Ma Yonglin produced a split in the Huasi themselves, with Ma Yonglin's faction emerging as the Old Teaching (老教). Prior to 1886, Ma Zhan'ao was able to keep the two factions at peace. However, after his death, matters escalated. Ma Rubiao arrived to preach in Xunhua, gathering followers. Drought in 1891 intensified socio-economic hardship in Xunhua. Multiple cases were brought before sitting magistrates there, requesting judgement on ritual matters through the 1880s and 90s. In each case, the magistrates called in appropriate mediators, ideally local Muslims with licentiate degrees: using Muslim to govern Muslim.³⁷ However, the authorities in Xunhua lacked the ability to enforce any decision made, and hence, the violence continued, with the 1891 Xunhua famine giving an additional edge to the unfolding community schism.

Nevertheless, prior to 1894, Qing-brokered mediation had mostly contained the violence, and the rebellion in 1895 appears to have been largely occasioned by an unfortunate failure in the procedures for diffusing conflict. The post-rebellion soulsearching by Qing officials revealed the death of long-serving magistrate Cangyun (長贊) in 1894 as a key cause of the escalation. Cangyun had representatives of Old and New factions in custody in Xunhua following another outbreak of violence. Having obtained assurances from the Salar *tusi* and Ma Guoliang (馬國良), brother of Ma Anliang, that they would settle affairs quietly, he approved the release of Hann Nuli and his rival Hann Laosi (韓老四) on the 18th day of the 11th month.³⁸ Cangyun died suddenly on the 21st day of the 11th month, leaving his clerk Chen Qinglin (陳慶麟) in charge. When Hann Nuli and Hann Laosi continued to cause trouble, Chen hesitated, and requested assistance from Xining to handle the case. In the 12th month, Hann Nuli dispatched one of his subordinates, who entered Xunhua with Qur'an in hand, proclaiming the inevitable victory of the Old Teaching. Goaded beyond forbearance, Chen had this subordinate arrested. However,

³⁶ Interview, Ma Laoshi, June 2016.

³⁷ QSGC, 07-404-6-7, 《為查明武生馬維善年貌呈循化廳長》, GX 19 09 16.

³⁸ Ma Guoliang, although an *ahong* in his own right and also a respected commander and mediator, was probably called in simply as his brother was absent.

the man fell ill in jail, and died shortly after his release. Hence, when Magistrate Chen Jiaji (陳嘉績) arrived from Xining, he was greeted by a crowd of Salars at the gates, claiming that the man had been beaten to death and making all manner of accusations against Chen Qinglin and their religious rivals.³⁹ Jiaji responded by executing eleven leaders of the Old Teaching for reasons that remain unclear. One theory suggests he saw the devastation that had been wrought on the property of New Teaching disciples on route and thus blamed the Old Teaching for the violence.⁴⁰ The response however was predictable: on the 8th day of the 3rd lunar month (2nd April 1895) Hann Nuli raised the now united Salar and laid siege to Xunhua. The febrile atmosphere, absence of effective troops in the region due to the ongoing Sino-Japanese war, and threat of an indiscriminate Qing crackdown on all Muslims soon resulted in multiple centres of conflict, drawing in Muslims of differing menhuan, differing grievances and differing allegiances.⁴¹

In the words of Suzanna Carson Rijnhart, a missionary who weathered the rebellion at Kumbum Monastery, once the siege had begun:

“No reverse tide of second thought could dam back the mighty cataclysm of bloodthirsty revenge which had broken out over the land. This first proclamation had done the work; already the blacksmiths were busy night and day sharpening old swords and making new ones, and people from the villages were flocking into the cities with their families, furniture and grain. Farming was suspended, and a general panic prevailed as it became known that the Salars had risen up in the fulness of their strength, all joining swords from various motives – fear, zeal, revenge, and the hope of gain through success and plunder being the chief ones.”⁴²

As the siege of Xunhua was lifted in the 5th month by troops dispatched from Xining, Ma Yonglin still stationed at the Huasi gongbei outside Hezhou, first requested arms from Lei Zhengwan, claiming he was going to the defence of an embattled Qing force fighting the Salar in Xunhua. Having been granted the arms, he then burnt the Huasi archway, laying siege to Hezhou

³⁹ Chen Qinglin was tried in Lanzhou for incompetence resulting in rebellion, but was ultimately found innocent, partly thanks to the evidence of Ma Guoliang. Tao Mo 陶模, 1897.4.22 Shan-Gan zongdu Tao Mo shenming yi ge Xunhua ting zhubao zhe 1897.4.22 陝甘總督陶模審明已革循化廳主簿折 in *Salazu dang'an shiliao* 撒拉族檔案史料, (Xining: Qinghai minzu xueyuan minzu yanjiusuo, 1981):353-355; QSGC, 07-38-8-9, 《為遵札轉奏為審明革職陳慶麟原保要證人分別擬結事》, GX 23 05 07.

⁴⁰ Ma Peiqing 馬培清. “Qing Guangxu ershiyi nian He-Huang shibian qiyan” 清光緒二十一年河湟事變起因.” In *Gansu wenshi ziliao xuanji* 甘肅文史資料選集 Vol. 2 (Lanzhou: Gansu renmin chubanshe, 1962):8.

⁴¹ Rumours of an indiscriminate crackdown on all Muslims were common – missionary accounts of the time accuse Yang Changjun of issuing a proclamation declaring he would exterminate all Muslims. Regardless, the rumours were believed by nervous Muslims. “A Terrible Retribution”, *North China Herald*, October 25th 1895, 694.

⁴² Rijnhart, *With the Tibetans in Tent and Temple*, 56-57.

city. With this act, he escalated the rebellion, assuming de facto leadership of the rebel forces.⁴³ The rebellion, however, was territorially confined to the areas west of the Tao. In the east, Jahriyya shaykh Ma Yuanzhang ensured peace, whilst Taozhou, dominated mostly by the Xidaotang, acted to ensure rebellion did not affect their trading interests.⁴⁴ The Mufti, caught on the line between Muslim Hezhou and Han Didao, hedged, gathering their forces only to defend themselves. Across He-Huang, chaos reigned. Memories of the Tongzhi-era rebellions fresh, Muslims, Han and Tibetans mobilised reflexively against each other. Near Xining, a man by the name of Hann Wenxiu (韓文秀) capitalised on the chaos to declare himself the secret son of Ma Guiyuan and legitimate shaykh of the Huasi.⁴⁵

The role of the Muslim gentry in the early stages of the rebellion is ambiguous. The Qing leadership clearly did not trust them but were forced to call on authority they did not understand to have any hope of quelling the uprising. And yet, Ma Yonglin initially was responsible for mediating between nervous Muslims in Hezhou and Qing commanders, and was able to convince Lei to supply him with valuable arms. Ma Guoliang, meanwhile, who raised a force to assist with suppression of the revolt was later forced to defend himself against accusations that he too was in league with the rebels: Han gentry noted that his house was not burnt to the ground by rebels, unlike those of the sons of Ma Qianling, Ma Fulu and Ma Fuxiang.⁴⁶

The rapid slide of the whole area into warfare demonstrates both the tenuous grasp all parties had on Salar religious politics, and the power that memories of earlier rebellions held. In the absence of the Muslim elite, and with the death of an experienced official, the accommodations that dictated He-Huang daily life simply collapsed.

Ma Anliang and the Fall of the Huasi

⁴³ This account is taken from the record written by Yang Lingxiao, who most probably was a minor Hezhou official during the 1895 rebellion. Yang Lingxiao 楊凌霄, "Yiwei Xun Hui jilue" 乙未循回記略, [Recollections of the 1895 Xunhua Muslim Affair] *Jindai lishi ziliao* 3 (1958): 31

⁴⁴ Bao Yongchang 包永昌, *Taozhou Ting Zhi* 洮州廳志 [Taozhou Gazetteer], ed. Zhang Yanma 張彥篤, 2 vols (Taipei: Chengwen, 1970), Vol 2, 990-991

⁴⁵ There seems little likelihood that he actually was – it appears to have been an opportunistic claim to gain support. Yang Changjun 楊昌浚, Yang Changjun zouzhe 楊昌浚奏折 (1895.9.15) in Anon, *Salazu dang'an shiliao* 撒拉族檔案史料 [Archival Materials for Salar History] (Xining: Qinghai minzu xueyuan minzu yanjiusuo, 1981), 342.

⁴⁶ Huang Yun 黃運, Lao xin lu 勞薪錄 [Record of Hard Work], extracts in *Salazu dang'an jilu*, 168-9.

Dong Fuxiang's army, including the troops originally called up from Hezhou – Ma Anliang and Ma Haiyan's brigades – were called back to deal with the rebellion, arriving in September 1895. Armed with modern weaponry, his troops proved decisive in quelling the uprising. Although Mu Shouqi and official compendiums deprioritise the role played by Ma Anliang, menhuan sources emphasize the manner in which the reconquest was predicated on his authority. Dong sent him ahead to Hezhou, where he was able to negotiate the surrender of Ma Yonglin and the pacification of the Xunhua. Through his understanding of local dynamics, access to a religious idiom in which to phrase his request for their surrender and authority within the Huasi, he was able to do so without firing a shot.⁴⁷ The contrast between his success and the successive, bloody failures of the Qing commanders who had previously attempted the retaking of Hezhou merely emphasize the extent to which Hezhou, Xunhua and the Salar areas were effectively under Muslim rule, nominally sanctioned by the Qing. This said, the limits of Ma Anliang's authority can be seen in the brutal reconquest of the territories north of the Yellow river, where more protracted campaigns were required and where the taking of each town was followed by a massacre and the burning of the mosque.⁴⁸ The most notable of these is the massacre that occurred in the Muslim suburb of Xining, Dongguan, during which the alleyways behind the mosque are said to have run red with blood.⁴⁹ However, the ambitions of the clear-up programme were significantly more ambitious than merely an anti-Muslim pogrom.

The commanders on whom Dong relied to crush the rebellion – Ma Anliang, Ma Fulu, Ma Qi and Ma Lin – were all local Muslims, and were entrusted with co-ordinating the clear-up in Hezhou and Xunhua. The same term used by Zuo for the aftermath of the 1870s was deployed – *shanhou* (善后). 'Shanhou' outside of Zuo's transformative vision, often simply meant the summary execution of remaining rebels and, in the case of He-Huang, was probably not intended to be anything beyond this. The aftermath of the 1895 rebellion did indeed incorporate a number of brutal massacres, and Ma Anliang's reputation as a commander of unscrupulous savagery stems from this period. Muslim sources lay the blame for the violence squarely on his shoulders: his official's hat dyed red in the blood of his fellow Muslims, he is described as a traitor to his fellow Muslims (回姦) and a running dog of the Qing empire.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Ma Peiqing, "Qing Guangxu ershiyi nian He-Huang shibian qiyan", 11.

⁴⁸ See telegrams between commanders, reproduced *Salazu shiliao ji lu* 撒拉族史料辑录, 138-163.

⁴⁹ Xu Xianlong 許憲隆, *Zhu Ma junfa jituan yu xibei musulan shehui* 諸馬軍軍集團與西北穆斯林社會, (Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 2001): 46.

⁵⁰ 馬安良的紅頂子，是回民的血染紅的。Ma Tong, *Yislan jiaopai yu menhuan zhidu shilüe*, 175. Whilst Ma Anliang was undoubtedly unscrupulous when it suited him, so were the commanders he fought alongside and the Muslim warlords who succeeded him. His reputation as the arch-villain of Gansu history rests partially on his role in the suppression of various menhuan, and as he makes a convenient historical

The *shanhou* processes in Hezhou, however, did have transformative intent: directed by Anliang, Fulu, Qi and Lin, they aimed to end the power of the menhuan. The memorials sent in the wake of the He-Huang rebellion are the first time the term enters the archival record. Dong's memorial recommending the demolition of gongbei in 1897 analyses menhuan in terms of power, wealth and with a nod to bizarre practices that would offend both orthodox Qing officials and reforming Muslims, tracing their history back to the 1781 Rebellion of Su Forty-Three. The Huasi and Mufti are singled out as the richest, oldest and most troublesome of the traditions, and those most closely associated with the rebellion.⁵¹ The memorial emphasizes that the gongbei must go: "They must be destroyed, and so I instructed Ma Anliang, Ma Fubao and Ma Fulu to lead the Muslim masses to take them down themselves. Each of these officials are themselves Muslim, but all swore their loyalty and eagerly set to the task. Already by the end of the 4th month, all [gongbei] had been demolished alike."⁵² Further stipulations in the memorial – all of which were approved by rescript, albeit with a reminder to distinguish good and bad Muslims – included mandating that Muslims must worship at their local mosque rather than at gongbei and banning the use of non-canonical texts. Muslim communities were to appoint trusted *xiangyue*, to ensure that these precepts are obeyed. The memorial was drafted by Ma Fuxiang, and the level of knowledge it displays of menhuan politics reveals the active role the Muslim military leaders took in determining the direction and targets of the post-1895 reforms.

The specifically anti-menhuan agenda displayed in the campaign likewise explains the near complete elimination of the Huasi menhuan at the end of the rebellion, and the expansion of targets to those who had not participated. Not just Ma Yonglin and his sons, but also their original opponent Ma Rubiao was executed, alongside 60 others. It was not clear that Ma Weihuan (馬維翰), the Mufti shaykh, had participated in the rebellion at all, but he was clearly a Sufi leader. Although Dong's states that the Mufti shaykh was still at large (dated GX 23 05), he had been executed on the 15th day of the 2nd month of the previous year.⁵³ It seems likely that the approval of the memorial by the throne provided retrospective justification for an execution which had already occurred. Warrants were posted for capture of Ma Guoyuan, the Ikhwan

villain: as a Qing loyalist, he went on fight against the Revolution, and then was closely associated with Yuan Shikai. Ma Tong even claims 1895 was planned by Ma Anliang: troubled by being removed from his power base to fight in the Sino-Japanese War, Anliang encouraged Ma Yonglin to cause trouble. On being summoned home, he then used the conflict as an excuse to rid himself of troublesome rivals

⁵¹ NPM, 408003067, Dong Fuxiang 董福祥, 《奏為續辦河狄逸匪並拆毀回民拱北禁革掌教名目以靖地方》, GX 23 05 16.

⁵² 不可以不毀。因飭馬安良、馬伏保、馬福祿等督率回眾自行拆毀。各該員等均隸回籍，皆能力矢公忠，踴躍從事。已四月底一律平毀盡。 *Ibid.*

⁵³ Lianying and Li Jingqing, *Xuantong Didao zhou xu zhi*. juan 11:3b.

leader who had in fact fought alongside the rebels, who was reportedly smuggled to safety in Jingning (靜寧) by none other than Ma Anliang.⁵⁴ The Zhangmen gongbei near Didao was demolished alongside the Mufti gongbei, and the Xianmen leadership killed on the road as they tried to deliver a grain ransom (忠糧) to Xining.⁵⁵

Anti-menhuan campaigns have historically been associated with the Ikhwan, and a particular strand of Islamic modernity. Tentatively, I would suggest that 1895 is an anticipation of the later campaigns. This campaign brought a clear end to the period of experimentation in western Gansu's religious scene, drawing a line under a new and much less Sufi orthodoxy. In addition to the demolition of gongbei, further reforms included the abolition of the *tusi* system and of hereditary qadi positions in Salar areas.⁵⁶ This removed the sanctioned space the hereditary clergy had there, bringing the Salar eight gong closer to the interior.

1895 confirmed Ma Anliang's rise to dominance in Hezhou. It likewise launched the careers of the next generation of Muslim leadership into a sphere beyond that of the local. Ma Haiyan, Ma Qi, Ma Fulu and Ma Fuxiang were promoted and were formally incorporated into Dong's army, under whose lead they were transferred east.⁵⁷ Ma Anliang remained in Gansu on request of Tao Mo, and subsequently pursued a number of apparently personal vendettas against unorthodox Muslim groups including the Xidaotang. Ma Anliang's authority now unchallenged – one Muslim governing Muslims – the space for multiple politically-active tariqa to co-exist in He-Huang narrowed.

The Fate of the Mufti

The fate of the 11th Mufti shaykh, Ma Weihan, mentioned briefly above, illustrates both the manner in which Ma Anliang was able to dictate the course of the crackdown and the wider consequences of the rebellion, where it was interpreted through the lens of a popular Islamophobia which cared nothing for the details of Sufi politics. The Supplemental 1909 Gazetteer of Didao (狄道州續志) authored by Lianying (聯瑛), is one of the best sources

⁵⁴ Ma Guoyuan did in fact join the rebels. Li Xinghua 李興華, 'Jiang jing hui yu jiaopai douzheng 講經會與教派鬥爭 [Scripture Debate Meetings and Sectarian Conflict]', in *Guoyuan hazhi yu Yihewani yanjiu lun ji* 果園哈智與伊赫瓦尼研究論集 [Collected Essays on Guoyuan Hajji and the Ikhwan], ed. Hai Mo 海默 (Hong Kong: Lan yue, 2015), 255–6.

⁵⁵ Xian Peili 鮮培禮, 'Yisilanjiao hufeiye Xianmen shilue 伊斯兰教虎夫耶鲜门史略' [History of the Islamic Khufiyya Xianmen], 1983, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_8b8fdf3c0100tiaz.html, accessed 10/2014.

⁵⁶ Arienne M. Dwyer, *Salar: A Study in Inner Asian Language Contact Processes* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2007), 23.

⁵⁷ They first participated in helping suppress the Hundred Days' Reform, and then in the defence of Beijing during the Boxer Rebellion. Haiyan and Fulu were both killed during the Boxer wars.

for Mufti history, as it recounts out the course of Didao's involvement with the Mufti since the 1860s. It is perhaps also the pinnacle of postbellum politically-motivated gazetteer creation. Read critically, the gazetteer is a book-length justification of Lianying's decision to reinforce the ban on Muslim settlement to the east of the River Tao in 1909. It is notably Islamophobic, employing the dog-radical variant of the character for Hui – something which had been banned by the Qianlong Emperor over a century earlier. As a document, it provides a compelling insight into the changed relationship between faith and governance since the Tongzhi-period rebellions.

The most detailed narration of the He-Huang Rebellion is found the 'writings' volume of the gazetteer, which collects important documents to the county and writing of merit. It presents a series of memorials, arranged chronologically, which collectively build a narrative of the rebellion's aftermath in Didao. It opens with a missive authored by Circuit Intendant Zhang Chengji (張成基道台) and Commander Qikeshen[bu] (奇克伸[佈]都統), which describes chaos caused by Muslims during the rebellion and lays blame at the feet of Ma Weiham: 'all generations of his family line have caused chaos, their crimes are great and evil utmost, one death is not enough for him.' Hence the Mufti leaders were executed, their gongbei levelled, its beams used for the Didao that had burnt in the rebellion, and their property confiscated to serve as its endowment.⁵⁸

Mufti-centric accounts tend to insist that Ma Weiham was innocent or took up arms purely for defensive purposes. Ma Tong's version tells that Ma Weiham gathered his followers into Fengtai Fort and prepared to defend themselves. A number of Mufti villages were razed as Dong Fuxiang's troops crossed the river into Hezhou, but Ma Weiham nevertheless obeyed Dong Fuxiang's summons to Hezhou, where he played a minor role in lifting the siege. However, after the surrender of Hezhou, Ma Anliang, jealous of the wealth of the Mufti, accused Ma Weiham of heresy and deceiving the people (邪教惑眾). Forty soldiers arrived in the night to arrest Weiham and he was taken to Hezhou. Despite payment of numerous bribes (罪銀), he was executed on the 15th day of the 2nd month of the 22nd year of the Guangxu Emperor.⁵⁹ A later Mufti version of the same story prevaricates over Weiham's involvement in the rebellion, saying that Weiham was

⁵⁸ 祖孫相繼倡亂，罪大惡極，一死不足蔽辜。Yinglian and Li Jianying, *Xuantong Didao zhou xu zhi*, juan 11, 3b.

⁵⁹ Ma Tong, *Zhongguo Yislan jiaopai yu menhuan zhidu shilüe*, 186. A later Mufti version of the same story prevaricates over Weiham's involvement in the rebellion, saying that Weiham was pressured by another Muslim leader, Ma Qiwa (馬七哇) into raising banners over Fengtai Fort, but gives broadly the same outline. See Ma Tong and Ma Haibin, *Zhongguo sufei pai dianji*, Vol 2, 435.

pressured by another Muslim leader, Ma Qiwa (馬七哇) into raising banners over Fengtai Fort, but gives broadly the same outline.

Republican chronicler Mu Shouqi's account of Weiha's death agrees with the above: Weiha was broadly innocent of the charges of rebellion, and his death was politically motivated.⁶⁰ Ma Anliang's motives for having Ma Weiha executed were considered suspicious at the time: a memorial snippet in a hand-copied volume held in Gansu Provincial Library records that the gossip of the day was that Ma Anliang 'had a plaque hanging in his home that reads 'within the four seas, all are one family', and in having him killed, he secretly desired to bring all Muslims into his *haiyi* system'.⁶¹

The Didao gazetteer, however, also records the remarkable turnaround in the Mufti fortunes that occurred after Weiha's execution, perhaps partly occasioned by suspicion of Ma Anliang's motives. Ma Weizhang (馬維章), surviving brother of Ma Weiha and now the representative of his ecumenical community, had been taken to Lanzhou in irons after his brother's execution. When questioned there, he offered to lead his followers in relinquishing their religion and to live as Han forever more.⁶² The Didao Gazetteer presents a doubly edited narrative: first the narrative given by memorialist Ceng Su (曾蘇) followed by the re-editing done by Yinglian, in compiling the gazetteer. It is impossible to know whether this was Weizhang's own initiative, or whether he was coerced. Nevertheless, in the subsequent memorials given in the gazetteer account, Weizhang is restored to his former status. Now titled in the text as 'military valedictorian' (*jungong* 軍功), the family property is returned to him – minus a small portion that is still to be set aside for support of Didao Academy. Moreover, the concern of the later memorials shifts from punishment of Muslim rebels to the need to protect Weizhang and his community from reprisals, and the threat of Hezhou Muslims who seek to 'unite the faith' (並教) or who might 'secretly send troops' (私派隊伍). Although proposals to move the family to Xining or their own safety are rejected, Ma Weizhang begged for himself and his dependents to be temporarily sheltered in Lanzhou.⁶³

⁶⁰ Mu Shouqi, *Gan Ning Qing shilüe*, Vol 7 25.27b.

⁶¹ There is a pun here: the *haiyi*, from the Arabic for centre, is here written using the characters for 'sea' and 'one', taken from the phrase on Ma Anliang's plaque. 其家上廳掛有四海一家匾額，所以唆殺其類籍，公為私欲收服回眾大行其海一之教。"Materials relating to the Guangxu Muslim Rebellion" 《清光緒回民事變有關文獻》，in Ma Tong and Ma Haibin, *Zhongguo sufei pai dianji*, 466.

⁶² 情願率其教下之人，全數反教，永為漢民。Yinglian and Li Jianying, *Xuantong Didao zhou xu zhi*. juan 11, 4a.

⁶³ Lianying and Li Jingqing, *Xuantong Didao zhou xu zhi*, juan 11: 5a.

The inclusion of Ma Weizhang's offer in the Didao Gazetteer narrative provides a fascinating insight into changing conceptions of faith and community in late Qing Gansu. The circumstances of Ma Weizhang's offer suggest that this was likely a compromise to ensure that the Mufti retained their property, and moreover, there is no indication that the Mufti ever did convert *en masse*. Ten years later when American missionary David Ekvall arrived in Didao to preach he recalled meeting 'delegations of grey-bearded Moslems' and 'the Mufti's son'. They were willing to politely listen to his sermons in the hope that he might be able to intercede on their behalf with the authorities and that they might be allowed to return to the east bank of the Tao.⁶⁴ Unlike in 1875, however, this time their efforts to regain access to the gongbei site were unsuccessful. Despite protesting as before that the graveyard was falling into disrepair and their ancestors disrespected, the Mufti were not granted access. To borrow Ekvall's metaphor, officials were concerned that permitting return would be like the camel of Arabic legend, who by first getting his head inside the tent eventually ousted the tent's inhabitant.⁶⁵

Nevertheless, the inclusion of the precedent that Muslims could convert in the gazetteer is indicative of the extent to which ideas of 'religion' and its relationship to governance had transformed since the Tongzhi years. That Muslims could convert to being Han and that giving up their faith was sufficient to achieve this, was an innovation previously unknown. No emperor ever outlawed Islam. The 1781 prohibition of the Jahriyya was a ban merely on heretical innovation (shaykh, dhikr and a Sufi text). Zuo, too, sought to restrict forms of Islamic expression and to contain its influence over public life, but he never tried to prohibit the faith itself. It seems likely that Zuo believed that with correct teaching, believers would eventually voluntarily abandon it. As so much of Qing concern was for community life – the close-knit mosque communities which officials feared for their opacity, the immorality of long-range travellers – it is unclear whether the possibility that a Muslim could cease being Muslim would have occurred to officials prior to this moment in time. They might have been able to stop attending prayers at the mosque, but unless they removed themselves entirely from family and community, to the judgment of an official who cared little for details of faith and praxis, they remained Muslim. Hence, perhaps, why it was never proposed as a get-out clause against the harsher punishments levied for certain crimes for Hui, and why Qianlong, who accepted Muslims as one of his constituent peoples, would not countenance the conversion of bannermen.⁶⁶ Islamic identity was seen largely as a category of descent, and conversion away

⁶⁴ David P. Ekvall, *Outposts, or, Tibetan Border Sketches* (New York: Alliance Press, 1907), 107.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 187.

⁶⁶ For the case in question, see FHA, Sonam Tsering 索諾木策凌, 03-0189-2894-041, 《奏嚴禁盛京旗人入回教摺》, QL 46 09 16 [in Manchu]; for Qianlong's response, see No. 1 Historical Archives, *Qianlong chao*

would have involved rejecting filial and lineage obligations. The intense concern exhibited by the state for Han who converted during the rebellion (隨教) is reflective of this: whilst officials were entirely correct that there were large numbers of Han who had been coerced into adopting the faith, it further displays their belief that Han could not genuinely become Muslim. This was paralleled by a principle of governance that stated that it was possible to be a good Muslim (良回). With good governance, and suitably moral leadership, Muslims had an (almost) equal right to Han spaces.

It is likely that whole idea of 'conversion' had become politicised by the arrival of missionaries in He-Huang and Taoxi, for all that the missionaries in Didao and elsewhere were largely unsuccessful in their attempts to garner converts to Christianity. Nevertheless, the acceptance of Weizhang's proposal (if his proposal it was), and its inclusion in the gazetteer alongside Lianying's 1909 stele banning Muslims from settling in Didao and businesses from hiring Muslims, is instructive of the way in which Muslim rebellions had transformed attitudes to Muslims.⁶⁷ For Lianying, determined to keep Muslims out of Didao, Islam itself was the problem. The stele implies that his initiative was supported by a number of Han gentry from east of the Tao, who collectively asserted their commitment to banning Muslims and Muslim businesses from the city. The only way for a Muslim to be acceptable – to cross the Zuo's line out of the enclave permitted west of the Tao – was to abandon the faith entirely. That Hui could convert was also a recognition of their closeness to the Han. This was not, after all, a privilege extended to Tibetans. Yet for Lianying and the Han gentry of Didao, the construction of the familiar stranger was complete. Unaware of the complex Muslim politics which had resulted in rebellion in the first place, for them 1895 was interpreted simply as another proof of the inevitably violent and seditious nature of Muslims.

Conclusion

The He-Huang Rebellion brought a decisive end to the role of both the Huasi and the Mufti menhuan in northwestern Chinese politics. The rebellion itself was a product of the ways in which He-Huang and Taoxi had already changed following the Tongzhi period civil war. Fostered by demographic change and the growth of wealthy, powerful Muslim military families with connections to the Qing state, the period between the two rebellions saw a period of religious revival and a growing interest in religious reform. Alongside the growth in mosque building, the numbers able to make the Hajj soared, whilst Central Asian teachers arrived once

Manwen jixindang yibian 乾隆朝滿文寄信檔譯編 [*Manchu Record Book of Court Letters from the Qianlong Period, Translated*] (Changsha: Yuelu shu she, 2011), Vol 15, 584.

⁶⁷ Lianying and Li Jianying, *Didao zhou xu zhi*, juan 11, 6a-6b.

again in He-Huang – few in number, but with far-reach influence. The move towards reform is seen within the transformation within Ma Zhan'ao's own beliefs, Ma Fuxiang's embrace of the classical Chinese tradition of Islamic philosophy, Ma Rubiao's programme for the Huasi and the growth of Ma Guoyuan's teachings: all different solutions to the same perceived problem. However, the mutual imbrication of religion and politics in He-Huang brought conflict, and when this expanded outside the Qing capacity to contain it, rebellion. The crackdown that followed changed the religious landscape once again. Inspired by both a desire to protect themselves and by a growing perception of Sufism as backward and un-Islamic, the Muslim military elite initiated a violent end to both the period of experimentation and to the temporal power of the menhuan themselves. In contrast to the post-rebellion reforms directed by Zuo, aimed to transform Muslims, the anti-menhuan campaign was conceived and directed by Hezhou's Muslim military elite: in effect, a Muslim attempt to transform Muslim beliefs, albeit with the firm support of the Qing officials with a desire to ensure that Muslim rebellion did not again occur. For the non-Muslim community of Didao watching from across the River Tao, however, in the areas where Muslims had been banned from by Zuo's older division of space, the He-Huang Rebellion of 1895 merely confirmed their expectations of Muslims, fitting neatly into a paradigm of Muslims who could not be loyal by nature of their beliefs. Read differently, the rebellion was once again leveraged as a justification to exclude Muslims from urban space.

Conclusion

I looked everywhere, but could find no sign of a merchant caravan. I could only hear the drifting sounds of camel bells from the now distant merchant train. Yet on the carpet where they had laid out their goods, they left behind the scent of musk and perfume.

From the Preface to the "Maktubat: Letters [of Shaykh Ahmad al-Sirhindi]" [as told to the author by his grandfather]

"Grandfather, are you talking of today's menhuan?" I asked.

My grandfather was silent.

Conclusion to "Talking Faith with my Grandfather" 《與爺爺談教門》, a modern Huasi text¹

Gongbei for the Huasi and the Mufti stand in Hezhou and Didao today, the current edifices both reconstructed the Cultural Revolution. The Mufti gongbei complexes are splendid edifices in painted concrete, but on the occasions I visited, they were mostly empty of people. The Huasi gongbei, meanwhile, is in need of renovation. The custodians complained slightly resentfully that the government gave support to other Sufi groups but still denied it to them. In truth, neither the Mufti nor the Huasi, formerly the two largest and most powerful of the Sufi brotherhoods in He-Huang, ever really recovered from the death of their leaders in 1895 and the subsequent anti-menhuan campaign. Although both are active, the last century has been a long, slow battle to reinterpret their history within Islamic and Chinese modernities, both of which see Sufism as superstitious and backward. The many Sufi traditions still active in China are now avowedly apolitical, confining their non-religious activities largely to poverty uplift carefully targeted towards both Muslim and non-Muslim communities.

The Hongshuiquan community have recently converted to the Ikhwan (伊赫瓦尼), who ascribe to a textual and reformist Islam which has some connections to Wahhabi teachings. They thus now consider the animal figures carved into the mosque's woodwork to be un-Islamic, representations of an Islam that they see as overly sinified and untrue to itself.

The dominance of the Ma Zhan'ao lineage also did not last, for all that he and his son Anliang have towered over this dissertation. Following Anliang's death, Republican-era northwestern politics came to be dominated by the descendants of Ma Haiyan and Ma Qianling,

¹ "我四處找尋，哪裡還有什麼商隊的影子。忽然，隻聽得從遠處隱隱約約傳來商隊駱駝的駝鈴聲。在他們曾存放過貨物的氈房，還殘留著一些麝香、香料的香味。"——《麥克圖布。書信集》序言"爺爺，你說的是今天的門宦嗎？"我問道。爺爺沉默了。Nurundini, *Yu Yeye tan jiaomen* 《與爺爺談教門》 *Talking Faith with my Grandfather*, unpublished epub, c. 2014, provided by kind generosity of Ma Laoshi (馬老師), a descendant of Ma Laichi active within the modern Huasi.

and by the rise of Ma Guoyuan's Ikhwan. Ma Bufang, patron of the Ikhwan and Nationalist grandson of Ma Haiyan, and the de facto ruler of Qinghai from 1936 to 1949, conducted a series of campaigns against various Tibetan forces, brutally consolidating the Chinese hold over Qinghai in a fashion that overwrote the borders that had enabled his grandfather's rise. Meanwhile, a new generation of intellectual Chinese Muslims went on to study overseas, debating the nature of Sino-Muslim history and identity and their place within the emerging Chinese nation. In the effort to reconcile two identities viewed as incompatible, the 1860s civil war was largely side-lined and its legacies forgotten.

He-Huang and Taoxi, however, have a crucial place within the history of both the formation of Qing colonial practice and of a modern Hui identity, forming a classic borderland where the tensions of distant centres come into focus. The arc of menhuan history, from the first Qing extension of rule into the Kokonor to the burning of the Huasi gongbei in 1895 and the retreat of the menhuan from public life, is reflective of transformations in Qing conceptions of empire and identity. The Qing state helped shape the institutional forms that Sufism took in China, while the internal borders and discontinuous spaces of empire provided the capital and leverage for them to flourish.

Through the lens of Sufi history, the late nineteenth century civil wars and reformations emerge as a profound juncture in Qing imperial history. The Great Northwestern Rebellion acted as a process in itself, breaking older relationships and intensifying the divisions between communities. The extent of the destruction, too, left millions dead, cities in ruins and refugees, roads severed and famine spread across Shaanxi and Gansu. The decision to brand the Muslims as rebels, begun in Shaanxi in the first stirrings of violence, proved fateful. Zuo Zongtang's decision to resettle Muslim away from non-Muslim transformed the settlement pattern of the northwest. Muslims were expelled from Shaanxi or forbidden to return, save only in the city Xi'an, resettled into the mountainous regions on the Gansu side of the Shaanxi border. The area, west of the Tao, meanwhile, was designated a space for Muslims thanks for Zuo's acceptance of Ma Zhan'ao's surrender. The postbellum reforms ushered in a series of transformations in governance, some philosophical, some practical, that ultimately removed the space in which the menhuan had operated. Zuo's measures, designed to reform and control Muslims, confirmed a process of minoritization for Chinese Muslims. Henceforth, the movement of Muslims was itself suspicious, even if not prevented, their status written into household registrations, communities settled under their former military leaders. Moreover commemoration of the rebellion wrote the Muslims as the rebels, transforming mosques into loyalty shrines, and erasing the complexities of a conflict that had begun as chaos on all sides.

The lack of capacity that the state had to see through its planned transformation of Muslims, however, transformed the structure of He-Huang's Muslim communities. Confirmed as leaders, the surrendered Muslim leaders became responsible for rebuilding, troops for the Qing policing of Tibetan communities and moreover, rich off wood and land. Whilst Muslims elsewhere were dispossessed, those in He-Huang profited. Men like Ma Zhan'ao and Ma Fuxiang poured profits back into mosque-building and sponsorship of religious professionals, ushering in a religious renaissance in He-Huang. With the move towards a haiyi system, the rising influence of both reformist Sufi teachings and reformist anti-Sufi teachings in a region, and the older accommodations between shaykh and local official waning, the result was ultimately the 1895 rebellion and a campaign led by the Qing Muslim military elite to take down the gongbei and end the menhuan. In the details of resettlements, mosque building and petty trade cases is written the history of what it meant to experience the violence of the 19th century civil wars, and of the religious transformation that these cataclysms ultimately produced within the Islamic communities of northwest China.

Moreover,

China is still often perceived as outside the mainstream of colonial imperial history, despite much recent work arguing precisely for its identity as a colonial empire. Even less often is it viewed as a driver of global imperial movements. More often seen it is seen as an imitator, reacting to the actions of the Western colonial empires or clumsily and retroactively attempting to adopt elements of Western learning. And yet imperial polities were not isolated. Anti-colonial resistance was often trans-imperial, but so was the making of imperial policy. British, French, Dutch, Chinese, Russian, and Ottoman officials proactively copied examples of imperial 'best practice' or successful models, and global events were read through the lens of experiences elsewhere. Contemporary foreign observers read the Great Northwestern Rebellion in China through the lens of the Indian Rebellion of 1857, also an event defined by the Islamic beliefs of its participants. The Tongzhi Rebellion and the resettlements that followed were at the forefront of a trans-imperial discourse that othered Muslims, an anticipation of 20th century logics and nationalism. The connections between the late Qing resettlements of Muslims and imperial policy outside China need to be written back into the construction of Aydin's 'Muslim world'.

There is a depressing and extremely urgent relevance to the study of the history of Muslim rebellion in China. Approximately one million Uighurs in Xinjiang are thought to be detained in re-education centres, many of whom have been arrested for nothing more than the everyday observance of their faith. There are signs that aspects of the anti-extremism campaign

in Xinjiang are now spreading to the interior, as seen in the removal of 'Arabic' architectural features from mosques in Ningxia and the closure of Qur'an teaching schools in Hezhou.²

Neither is history immune. In March 2017, celebrity Weibo Islamophobe (穆黑) Hu Cheng (胡成; Weibo handle 'No Action Without Consideration' 弗慮弗為) launched his 'Project to Rescue the History of the Tongzhi Shaanxi and Gansu Muslim Rebellions' (同治陝甘回亂歷史拯救計劃).³ The project aims to collect rare texts, stelae and accounts relating to the rebellion, then crowd-funds to publish them in edited and punctuated editions. The 'rescue' of the title refers to the erasure of the rebellion from China's official historical record, and particularly the destruction of Qing loyalty shrines to the dead and erasure of the Han victims from China's historical memory, something Hu Cheng's followers have declared equivalent to destroying Holocaust memorials. The first of his publication projects, 'The Record of an Unprecedented Unveiling' (曠典闡幽錄), a Qing collection of interviews made during the process of determining the names of the righteous dead by the Bureau of Investigation for Dali County (大荔縣), came out in June 2018.⁴ Numerous others are in the pipeline. Meanwhile netizens flock to thank him online for informing them of a catastrophe they were previously completely unaware of, forming part of a wider discourse of Chinese Islamophobia that fuels virulent anti-halal movements, a fear of creeping Islamization ('greenification' 綠化) and support for the camps in Xinjiang.

Hu's project, ironically, was motivated by much the same impetus as my own: a rebellion forgotten, erased from the record. This was never intended to be a thesis with political relevance. However, if the consequences of the Tongzhi period civil war are to be resurrected in the present, they require a full and balanced telling. Let this thesis form a part of that.

² "China Uighurs: One million held in political camps, UN told", BBC, 10 August 2018. Closure of Quranic schools in Hezhou from personal communication with local contacts.

³ 'No action without consideration' 弗慮弗為, https://www.weibo.com/p/10080897471a4427c77bb2882e46725bc44221/super_index#_rnd1540747816324 Screenshots taken by the author, 25/10/2018.

⁴ 'No action without consideration' 弗慮弗為, 'Epilogue to the 'Record of Unprecedented Unveiling' 《曠典闡幽錄》出版後記, <https://www.weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309404257688375683627>. Screenshots taken by the author, 25/10/2018. See Song Youwen 宋佑文, *Kuang dian chan you lu* 曠典闡幽錄 [Record of Unprecedented Unveiling], ed. Hu Cheng 胡成, Guanlong jihua (Taipei: Xiuwei zixun keji, 2018).

Appendix I

Huasi *silsila* (1) – Ma Tong (馬通)

1. 馬來遲 Ma Laichi (d. 1753)
2. 馬國寶 Ma Guobao (d. 1773?)
3. 馬光宗 Ma Guangzong (d. 1826)
4. 舍木蘇松的尼 Shemusongdeni (d.1843)
5. 奴榮吉尼 Nurongjini (d.1861)
6. 馬桂源 Ma Guiyuan (d. 1873)
7. 馬禎源 Ma Zhenyuan (d. 1897)
Brother of Ma Guiyuan, survived in hiding
8. 馬克里木 Ma Kalim (d. 1976)
Grandson of Ma Zhenyuan

This version of the *silsila* is not that given by the current Linxia Huasi, who do not recognise Guiyuan and Zhenyuan as being the primary line of transmission.

Ma Tong, *Zhongguo Yisilan jiaopai yu menhuan zhidu*, 359.

Huasi *silsila* (2) – Gansu linxia menhuan diaocha (甘肅臨夏門宦調查)

1. 馬來遲 Ma Laichi (d.1753)
2. 馬國寶 Ma Guobao (d.1773?)
3. 馬光宗 Ma Guangzong (d.1836)
4. 馬永林 Ma Yonglin ('Fifth Master' 五太爺); 馬永瑞 Ma Yongrui ('Young Master' 尕爺)
Joint custodians of the gongbei
5. 馬如彪 Ma Rubiao (d.1896)
Son of Ma Yongrui
6. 馬顯福 Ma Xianfu (d.1949)
Son of Rubiao
7. 馬克里木 Ma Kalim (d.1977) and 馬顯維 Ma Xianwei (d.1976)
Ma Xianwei was brother to Ma Xianfu, but being unable to preach during the 1950s, passed his kouhuan to his son Kalim as Kalim was better able to travel.
8. 馬鴻章 Ma Hongzhang (哈三 Hasan) (d. 2017?)
Grandson of Ma Xianfu

‘Descendants of the Huasi menhuan master’ 華寺門宦道祖後裔, ‘Famed Chinese Islamic scholar: the Huasi menhuan master’ 中國伊斯蘭教著名學者: 華寺門宦道祖 in Li Weijian and Ma Jing, *Gansu Linxia menhuan diaocha*, 252-270

Huasi silsila (3) – Legend of the Huasi Master (華寺太爺傳奇)

1. 馬來飭 **Ma Laichi (d.1766)**
2. 馬國寶 **Ma Guobao (d.1773)**
3. 馬光宗 **Ma Guangzong (d.1826)**
4. 舍木蘇松吉格 **Shemusongjige (d.1842)**
5. 奴戎吉尼 **Nurongjini (d.1861)**
6. 馬如彪 **Ma Rubiao (d.1896)**
7. 馬顯富 **Ma Xianfu (d.1949)**
8. 馬顯維 **Ma Xianwei (d. 1976)**
Brother of Xianfu
9. 馬玉清 **Ma Yuqing (d. 2005)**
Third son of Ma Xianfu
10. 馬敬章 **Ma Jingzhang**
Son of Yuqing.

Committee of the Huasi gongbei, *Huasi taiye chuanqi*, 36-40.

It should be noted that succession politics over the Huasi silsila remain a live issue, hence the variation in these silsilas. Ma Jingzhang is most popularly recognised as the current shaykh. The ‘Legend of the Huasi Master’ also recognises Ma Guiyuan as shaykh of a separate branch of the Huasi, the tradition having split following the death of Nurongjini. It does not detail further transmissions down this lineage chain, however.

Known generational characters for the Huasi in temporal order: 宗、源、永、如、顯、玉、章

Mufti *silsila*

1. 馬守禎 **Ma Shouzhen** 伯什勒力勒比尼 (d. 1722)
2. 阿卜都·若豪麻尼 **Abudu Ruohaomani** ‘Abd Rahmani (1682-1741)
3. 阿卜都里·妥黑勒 **Abuduli Tuoheile** ‘Abd al Tahara? (d.1744)
4. 阿卜都里·罕法勒 **Abuduli Hanfale** ‘Abd al Khaliq? d.1760
5. 阿卜都里·散他勒 **Abuduli Santale** ‘Abd al Sabur? d.1749
6. 馬顯忠 **Ma Xianzhong** d.1797

Also known as Jinhuan, 金煥, style name Tingyang 廷揚

7. 納蘇龍的尼 **Nasulongdeni** d. 1810
8. 伯哈認的尼 **Boharendeni** d.1844
9. 馬雲 **Ma Yun** d. 1876

Also known as Futang 福堂

10. 馬真 **Ma Zhen** d.1884

Brother of Ma Yun

11. 馬維翰 **Ma Weihān** d.1896

Considered a martyr, executed in 1896 in the wake of the He-Huang rebellion

12. 馬福壽 **Ma Fushou** d.1929

Style name Haishan 海山. Considered a martyr, died in 1929 at the hands of Ma Bufang

13. 馬延壽 **Ma Yanshou** d. 1941

Style name Ziling 子齡.

14. 馬孝 **Ma Xiao** 1934-1974

Died in jail.


The first eight masters are buried in the Eastern Gongbei, the latter five in the Western Gongbei. Ma Xiao died in jail before the Western Gongbei site had been returned to the Mufti, and was buried in Kangwangcheng (康王城). Despite proposals to move his grave to join the masters in the Western Gongbei, differing opinions within the Mufti have ensured that thus far this has not occurred.

The above silsila was compiled on basis of ‘Origins and Development of the Mufti Lodge and Gongbei’ (穆夫提道堂、拱北源流), author Ma Weijun (馬維俊), in *Zhongguo Sufei pai dianji*, Vol 2, 432-446. Information about current Mufti shaykhs is not generally found in published sources, and thus I have elected not to include details of the shaykhs who followed Ma Xiao.

Appendix II

Key to the family trees: red for important figures within this distance, light blue for figures whose names/identities are not entirely certain. No living figures are named.

Dahejia Ma family tree 大河家馬氏世系



Notes to the above tree:


For clarity, only the members of the lineage closely connected to Ma Zhan'ao and Ma Anliang have been included here.

The lineage is tied to that of Ma Haiyan 馬海宴 through the marriage of Ma Fuliang (馬福良), a grandson of Ma Fuwang by an unknown son, to one of Haiyan's daughters.

Ma Tingxiang inherited Ma Anliang's military positions following his death, but died after turning on Feng Yuxiang and the Guomingdang in 1928. The family's military power largely ended with him.

Generational characters: 占, 良, 廷

Hann Family Market Ma family tree 韓家集馬氏世系




Notes to the above tree:

For clarity, only the principle members of the lineage are listed here.

Ma Fulu, Ma Zhaotu, Ma Yaotu, Ma Fuxuan and Fuheng died fighting during the Boxer Rebellion, a key moment in the rise to national prominence of Ma Fuxiang. Ma Hongbin and Ma Hongkui were key politicians and military leaders through the Republican era.

Generational characters: 福, 鴻/圖

Monigou Ma family tree 莫尼溝馬氏世系



Notes to the above family tree:

As with the two previous family trees, less notable members of this family tree have been omitted in this chart for clarity.

Ma Qi, Ma Lin and their offspring Ma Bufang, Ma Buqing and Ma Burong dominated Qinghai politics through the Republican period, rising to prominence following the death of Ma Anliang. Ma Bufang left China on the eve of the Communist victory in 1949 for Saudi Arabia.

Ma Zhongying turned on his cousins in 1928, leading a brutal attack on the Guomindang and Hezhou which left Hezhou in ruins. He and his army left Hezhou for Xinjiang, where Sven Hedin described him as 'like the rider on the pale horse which appeared when the fourth seal was broken.'

Generational characters: 海、single character names, often mythic animals、步/仲

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