

OBEDIENT REBELLION:

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Global Nuclear Order, 1967–2017



Sizwe Mpofu-Walsh

Department of Politics and International Relations

University of Oxford

Trinity Term, 2020

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ABSTRACT

Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) cover territories from Africa to Latin America, and from the South Pacific to Southeast Asia. Yet traditional and critical scholars alike under-value their importance to global nuclear order and International Relations theory. In a comparative case study of the African, Latin American, and South Pacific NWFZs, I draw on archival and oral historical evidence to analyse why these zones exist, and why they persist. All three zones were triggered, I assert, by external nuclear interventions into already-peaceful, postcolonial contexts. The zones exist and persist, I contend, by paradoxically symbolising both obedience to—and rebellion against—global nuclear order. To actors inside the zones, on one hand, they legitimise an institutionally unequal nuclear order; on the other, they echo a tradition of postcolonial anti-nuclear solidarity. To the nuclear-weapon states, NWFZs at once tokenise nuclear responsibility, and entrench nuclear hierarchy. Counterintuitively, these ambivalences consolidate these zones by accommodating multiple, conflicting domestic and international audiences simultaneously. NWFZs thus offer unique insight into the complex, contending forces that balance nuclear order.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
ABACC	The Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
ALP	Australian Labour Party
ANC	African National Congress
ANN	Anti-Nuclear Norm
ANWFZ	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CDME	Committee for the Denuclearization of the Middle East
CNVA	The Committee for Non-Violent Action
COPREDAL	Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CTBTO	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation
DAC	The Direct-Action Committee
ENDC	Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament
ExComm	Executive Committee of the National Security Council
EZT	Expected Zonal Threat
HEU	Highly Enriched Uranium
HINW	Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons
IAEA	The International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEC	Israel Atomic Energy Commission
ICAN	International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICJ	International Court of Justice
LANWFZ	Latin American NWFZ
LEU	Low Enriched Uranium
Mt	Megaton
N-NWS	Non-Nuclear-Weapon State
NAC	New Agenda Coalition
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NPDI	Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSS	Nuclear Security Summit

NWFZ	Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
NFIP	Nuclear-Free and Independent Pacific Movement
NWS	Nuclear-Weapon State
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
P5	Permanent Five members of UN Security Council
PAROS	Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
PCC	Pacific Council of Churches
PNET	Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
PPW	Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space
PrepCom	Preparatory Committee
PTBT	Partial Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
SADR	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
SCCC	Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
SEANWFZ	Southeast Asian NWFZ
SLBM	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
SPF	South Pacific Forum
SPNWFZ	South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
SSOD	Special Session on Disarmament (UN)
UNCOPUOS	United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WCC	World Council of Churches
WILPF	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
ZOPFAN	The Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

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INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND | WHY NWFZs MATTER | AIMS AND ARGUMENT | RESEARCH DESIGN | STRUCTURE

Nuclear-weapon-free zones and the demilitarised Antarctica comprise more than half the world's land mass, promote non-proliferation and reinforce progress toward nuclear disarmament. The success in achieving consensus on such a complex matter indicates the potential of South-South cooperation for helping shape the emerging world order.¹

—Nelson Mandela

BACKGROUND

At a summit in Cairo on the 11th of April 1996, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak grinned before a phalanx of international dignitaries gathered to celebrate the birth of the long-awaited African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ). To Mubarak's left stood Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin; to his right was Amr Moussa, Egypt's Minister of Foreign Affairs. Behind them shone a bright white slogan emblazoned in three different languages against an emerald green background: 'Africa Free of Nuclear Weapons'. On that day, forty-seven of Africa's then-fifty-three states signed what became affectionately called the 'Treaty of Pelindaba'.

The name 'Pelindaba' was intentionally ironic: it was the name of the South African nuclear research facility, concealed among the jagged Magaliesberg mountains to the west of Pretoria, which housed apartheid South Africa's secret nuclear weapons programme. The term 'Pelindaba'—a portmanteau of *phela indaba*—means 'end the story' in the South African language of *isiZulu*. For the apartheid government, 'ending the story' meant secretly acquiring nuclear weapons to establish unassailable military

¹ From Mandela's speech to the MERCUSOR Summit of 1998, quoted in: Nelson Mandela and Mandla Langa, *Dare Not Linger: The Presidential Years* (Picador, 2017), 279.

supremacy in Africa. Now, the term assumed new meaning, as African states committed to ‘ending the story’ of nuclear weapons on the continent through a NWFZ.² Yet, far from ‘ending the story’, the treaty of Pelindaba formed part of a vast, transcontinental story that began four decades earlier, and persists to the present.

Figure 1: Hosni Mubarak Greets Delegates at the Signing of the Pelindaba Treaty in Cairo³



Since the middle of the twentieth century, NWFZs have spread across half the world’s territory, from Latin America to the Pacific, and from the Seabed to Outer Space. Today, they cover over 100 countries, encompass 39% of the human population, and span the entire Southern Hemisphere. Yet International Relations (IR) scholarship is only beginning to appreciate the profundity of this ‘story’,⁴ despite the existential

² Sometimes referred to as Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction (WMD) Free Zones.

³ Amr Nabil. “Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak Waves to Delegates at Signing of Treaty of Pelindaba” *Getty Images*, 1996, www.gettyimages.ae/detail/news-photo/egyptian-president-hosni-mubarak-waves-at-african-delegates-news-photo/513088946.

⁴ See pages 28–64 of this thesis for a full survey of the literature.

importance of nuclear security.⁵ In this thesis, I trace that ‘story’ through a comparative case study of three NWFZs: Africa, Latin America and the South Pacific. NWFZs prevent the stationing, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, transportation and use of nuclear weapons in each ‘zone’. The first such zone was agreed under the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, nearly a decade before the NPT opened for signature.⁶ Other NWFZs governing uninhabited zones include the Outer Space Treaty of 1967,⁷ the Seabed Treaty of 1971, and the 1984 Moon Treaty of 1979.⁸ The first successful NWFZ in an inhabited area was the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which opened for signature in 1967⁹ in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis.¹⁰ The Treaty of Rarotonga followed in 1985, which applies to the South Pacific.¹¹

The post-Cold War world saw fitful progress on nuclear non-proliferation. On one hand, India obtained nuclear weapons to deter China, prompting Pakistan into a

⁵ See Chomsky, Noam. *Who Rules the World?*. Macmillan, 2016; Beres, Louis Rene. “Terrorism and Global Security: The Nuclear Threat.” (1987); Daalder, Ivo, and Jan Lodol. “Logic of Zero-Toward a World without Nuclear Weapons” *Foreign Affairs*. 87 (2008): 80.

⁶ Hanessian, John. “The Antarctic Treaty 1959.” *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 9.03 (1960): 436-480.

⁷ Dembling, Paul G., and Daniel M. Arons. “The evolution of the outer space treaty.” *The Journal of Air Law and Commerce* 33 (1967): 419.

⁸ The official name of this treaty is the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; Hamel-Green, Michael. “Nuclear-weapon-free zone initiatives: challenges and opportunities for regional cooperation on non-proliferation.” *Global Change, Peace & Security* 21.3 (2009): 357-376.

⁹ Robinson, Davis R. “The Treaty of Tlatelolco and the United States: a Latin American nuclear free zone.” *The American Journal of International Law* 64.2 (1970): 282-309.

¹⁰ Robinson.

¹¹ Baaro, Makurita. “The South Pacific nuclear-free zone treaty (the treaty of Rarotonga).” *Nuclear-weapon-free zones in the 21st century*. 1997.

nuclear security dilemma.¹² North Korea also acquired nuclear weapons in 1993.¹³ On the other hand, two further NWFZ treaties were established. In addition to the Treaty of Pelindaba, which entered into force in 2009,¹⁴ the Treaty of Bangkok (1995) governs the spread of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia.¹⁵ Although the Bangkok Treaty enjoys widespread regional support, it is yet to be signed by the P5¹⁶ due to concerns over nuclear transportation in the sea lanes defined under the treaty.¹⁷

Several proposed NWFZs have failed to materialise. The Rapacki Plan of 1958 envisaged a NWFZ buffering the Soviet Union and Western Europe. It was to include the two German Republics, Poland and Czechoslovakia.¹⁸ The Plan was introduced at the 12th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Initially promising,¹⁹ it ultimately faltered as the Cold War intensified and NATO crystallised.²⁰ After the launch of the Committee for the Denuclearisation of the Middle East in 1962,²¹ Iran and Egypt tabled a successful joint resolution on a Middle Eastern

¹² Gregory, Shaun, ed. *Democratic Transition and Security in Pakistan*. Routledge, 2015.

¹³ This is the date that the IAEA could no longer assure the international community that nuclear weapons 'were not being produced'. See, Chanlett-Avery, Emma, and Ian E. Rinehart. "North Korea: US Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation." *Current Politics and Economics of Northern and Western Asia* 22.3 (2013): 341.

¹⁴ Hamel-Green, 360.

¹⁵ Hernandez, Carolina G. 'South East Asia: The Treaty of Bangkok.' *Nuclear weapon-free Zones, London: Macmillan Press Ltd* (1998): 81-92.

¹⁶ The United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China

¹⁷ Hernandez, 84.

¹⁸ Ozinga, James R. *The Rapacki Plan: The 1957 Proposal to Denuclearize Central Europe, and an Analysis of Its Rejection*. McFarland & Company Incorporated Pub, 1989.

¹⁹ Western European states were uneasy about the possibility of any German states acquiring nuclear weapons soon after the Second World War. The Soviet Union was interested in halting the spread of NATO into its territory. The United States needed an excuse to avoid stationing its own nuclear weapons in Germany, a fact that was attracting the approbation of other European powers. But the US was unsure whether the Plan was an independent Polish initiative, or a scheme of the USSR.

²⁰ Stefancic, David. "The Rapacki Plan: A Case Study of European Diplomacy." *East European Quarterly* 21.4 (1987): 401.

²¹ Lewis, Patricia, and William C. Potter. 'The Long Journey Toward a WMD-Free Middle East.' *Arms Control Today* 41.7 (2011): 8.

zone to the UNGA in 1964.²² However, the initiative stalled after the Six-Day War of 1967. Although some Middle Eastern states continue to support the resolution, little progress has been made towards the proposal for over fifty years.

Table 1: Attempted NWFZs (Chronological, by Date of Opening for Signature)²³

Region	Treaty	Success/ Failure	Signed	Number of Signatories	Entry into Force
<i>Antarctic</i>	Antarctic	S	1959	54	1959
<i>Outer Space</i>	Outer Space	S	1967	132	1967
<i>Latin America</i>	Tlatelolco	S	1967	33	1969
<i>World</i>	NPT	S	1968	188	1970
<i>Seabed</i>	Seabed	S	1971	115	1971
<i>Pacific</i>	Rarotonga	S	1985	13	1986
<i>Mongolia</i>	Mongolia	S	1992	1	2000
<i>South East Asia</i>	Bangkok	S	1995	10	1997
<i>Africa</i>	Pelindaba	S	1996	52	2009
<i>Central Asia</i>	Semipalatinsk	S	2006	5	2009
<i>Middle East</i>	Middle East	F	NA	NA	NA
<i>Scandinavia</i>	Nordic NWFZ	F	NA	NA	NA
<i>Eastern Europe</i>	Rapacki Plan	F	NA	NA	NA
<i>North Asia</i>	North Asia	F	NA	NA	NA


²² Pande, Savita. ‘Nuclear weapon-free zone in the middle east.’ *Strategic Analysis* 22.9 (1998): 1369-1379.

²³ “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones – UNODA.” *UN News Centre*. UN, n.d. Web. 10 Nov. 2016.

WHY NWFZs MATTER

The implicit assumption throughout this thesis is that NWFZs deserve greater scholarly attention than they currently enjoy. In this section, I shall defend this assumption explicitly by showing that NWFZs are an exciting and fruitful area of scholarly inquiry; that they illuminate nuclear order from a useful perspective; and that the scholarly dismissal of NWFZs is based on flawed assumptions.

Figure 2: Nuclear Security Governance Arrangement, by Region²⁴



Why are NWFZs Intriguing?

NWFZs are arguably the single most successful feature of the global nonproliferation regime. Whereas the promise of disarmament contained in Article VI of the NPT

²⁴ Arms Control Association, “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) At a Glance”. Fact Sheets and Briefs, 2017, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nwzfz>.

²⁵ In Figure 2, the blue shading shows all the regions covered by NWFZs, the red shading shows territory occupied by NWSs, the orange shading shows nuclear umbrella arrangements, and the yellow shading shows states which are only signatories of the NPT and not members of any NWFZ.

remains unfulfilled, NWFZs have blossomed. For instance, the geographical coverage of NWFZs far outstrips nuclear umbrella agreements (guarantees by NWSs to protect N-NWSs), and a majority of states prefer membership of NWFZs along with NPT membership. NWFZs are also unique in that their remit and jurisdiction extend over non-state territory such as the seabed and outer space. In addition, NWFZs are particularly sustainable legal instruments: no zone that has opened for signature has ever subsequently been abandoned. Thus, NWFZs are both widespread across time and space. With the exception of the NPT, therefore, they are the most common and long-lasting feature of global nuclear governance. My first contention, therefore, is that NWFZs' coverage, reach and sustainability merits more concerted exploration.

The popularity and reach of NWFZs is not their only interesting feature. They also reveal the tensions inherent in global nuclear order itself through their location in the global South.²⁶ This Southern perspective is sorely needed at a time when nuclear order is experiencing its most profound existential crisis in a generation.²⁷ From this Southern perspective, NWFZs become key to international nuclear law by legitimising legally binding negative security assurances (commitments from nuclear weapons states (NWSs) not to use nuclear weapons).²⁸ These assurances find legal legitimacy through a UNGA resolution on one hand, and 'additional protocols' applicable to the NWSs on the other. UNGA Resolution 3472 (XXX) B of 11 December 1975 states:

²⁶ There is a vast literature on whether terms like 'global South' or 'Third World' are analytically useful. My thesis does not rest on the analytical importance of these categories. I prefer to use these terms instead of listing the hundreds of states that fall under NWFZs. Sometimes, I use the term States Inside NWFZs, which I have invented for this purpose.

²⁷ This is both because of events on the Korean Peninsula, and because of heightened uncertainty surrounding the US's commitment to the nuclear status-quo. The recent Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons also reveals disappointment over the failure of disarmament among NWSs.

²⁸ That is, to obtain commitments from the P5 not to use nuclear weapons inside NWFZs.

All nuclear-weapon States shall undertake or reaffirm, in a solemn international instrument having full legally binding force, such as a treaty, a convention or a protocol, the following obligations:

- (a) To respect in all its parts the statute of total absence of nuclear weapons defined in the Treaty or convention which serves as the constitutive instrument of the zone;
- (b) To refrain from contributing in any way to the performance in the territories forming part of the zone of acts which involve a violation of the aforesaid treaty or convention;
- (c) To refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the States included in the zone.²⁹

The remit of these assurances, and the importance of these additional protocols, was recognised by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons. It holds that the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons must be compatible, ‘with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with *specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons* (emphasis added)’³⁰. Hence, NWFZs play a central role in the legal prohibition of nuclear use as the ‘treaties’ and ‘undertakings’ to which the ICJ opinion refers. NWFZs are thus a crucial feature of global nuclear security, of nuclear non-proliferation, and of international law.

Equally deserving of scholarly attention are the ambiguities and paradoxes of NWFZs. On the one hand, NWFZs seem to represent a sharp rejection of the global nuclear order; a sense of classical postcolonial anti-nuclear solidarity. In this context, NWFZs

²⁹ Roscini, Marco. “Something old, something new: The 2006 Semipalatinsk Treaty on a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia.” *Chinese Journal of International Law* 7.3 (2008): 598.

³⁰ Smis, Stefaan, and Kim Van der Borght. “Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, The.” *Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L.* 27 (1998): 345. The opinion also permits self-defence in extreme circumstances.

apotheosise the notion that, ‘nuclear weapons need to be eliminated entirely for the goal of complete decolonization to be advanced’³¹. On the other hand, NWFZs conform to—and reinforce the inequality within—global nuclear order: they draw legal legitimacy from the NPT and the ICJ; they recognise institutionalised legal inequalities between nuclear-weapon states (NWSs) and non-NWSs (N-NWSs); and many states inside NWFZs enjoy strong relations with the NWSs. In another sense, therefore, NWFZs represent submission to nuclear order in the global South. This paradoxical tension calls for further examination, making NWFZs an intriguing and challenging area of scholarly inquiry.

Why are NWFZs Dismissed?

If NWFZs are indeed intriguing, why do they feature low on the scholarly agenda? First, several traditional theories ignore the global South as a matter of necessity. The ‘great power gaze’ central to neorealism—but which pervades the theoretical spectrum—systematically excludes evidence from ‘weak states’ as incidental. For instance, Waltz consciously ‘leaves out one continent (Africa)’ from his theory to conserve intellectual energy. His conscious exclusion of Africa occurs despite purporting to theorise ‘international politics’.³² Mearsheimer, too, unapologetically defends the ‘great power’ gaze:

The theory [offensive realism] focuses on great powers because these states have the largest impact on what happens in international politics. The fortunes of all states - great powers and smaller powers alike - are determined primarily by the decisions and actions of those with the greatest capabilities.³³

³¹ Itty Abraham, “‘Who’s Next?’ Nuclear Ambivalence and the Contradictions of Non-Proliferation Policy,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 45, no. 43 (2010): 48–56.

³² Theory Talks, *Kenneth Neal Waltz – The Physiocrat of International Politics* ([s.n.], 2008), <http://www.theory-talks.org/2011/06/theory-talk-40.html>.

³³ John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (W.W. Norton & Co, 2001).

Thus, to the offensive realist, examining nuclear order beyond the ‘great power gaze’, let alone from the South, is pointless and naive. To explain nuclear outcomes, we must privilege the P5 (or the United States alone), according to this view. For offensive realists, the notion of disarmament itself is a ‘maze of unrealism’ inside a ‘fictional utopia’, and ‘arms control’ is a sensible alternative to the Panglossian notion of ‘non-proliferation’.³⁴ Offensive realists also believe that theory emanating from the United States deserves special privilege. For example, Mearsheimer acknowledges that, ‘Anglo-Saxon³⁵ scholars dominate... in the realm of methods, and especially theory’ but suggests that this ‘domination’ is ‘benign’ because of the pre-eminence of Anglo-Saxon ideas and the strength of American universities.³⁶ This position thus privileges ‘great power’ theorists as it does ‘great power’ politics.

Hence, the offensive realist may dismiss NWFZ as follows: NWFZs occur when ‘hegemonic states’ lack ‘the need to fight’ and others ‘lack the ability’³⁷. They are the product of great power dominance over weak regions. NWFZs mirror relations of military inequality because they are products of that inequality. Moreover, NWFZs are a performance of peace built upon cheap institutions reliant on raw *realpolitik*. Several scholars suggest that international institutions are incapable of securing strong commitments because the costs they impose are limited. As Martin puts it, institutions

³⁴ Lyndon Burford, “National Identity and Nuclear Disarmament Advocacy by Canada and New Zealand” (University of Auckland, 2016).

³⁵ It is telling that Mearsheimer uses an ethnographic definition here, as opposed to a national one. ‘Anglo-Saxon’ scholars dominate, not just American ones.

³⁶ John J. Mearsheimer, “Benign Hegemony,” *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (March 2016): 1–3, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viv021>.

³⁷ As Waltz suggests, quoting: A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1958); Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

‘cannot change incentives so dramatically that they provide an absolute commitment’³⁸.

The idea that institutional commitments are circumscribed by power-relations cannot be totally dismissed, but I shall argue that this view is severely limited in denying the South of agency. The incoherence of the ‘great power gaze’ consists in claiming universality while simultaneously admitting to parochialism. This narrowed gaze obscures many phenomena, exemplified by the failure to appreciate the importance of NWFZs, I shall contend.

Other grand narratives might accept that agency exists outside the ‘great powers’ but maintain that NWFZs can be explained. Theorists might believe that NWFZs are the product of naked statecraft (defensive realism),³⁹ of soft balancing (soft realism),⁴⁰ of an ineluctable liberal order (liberalism),⁴¹ of institutional design (institutionalism and neoliberalism),⁴² or of the socialisation of ‘emerging’ states into international society (English School).⁴³ I shall consider these viewpoints in Chapter One. For now, I contend that there is more to NWFZs than any of these traditional approaches can explain in advance. Further, several of these paradigms also implicitly accept the ‘great power gaze’. For example, take Wendt’s view of how his theory applies to Africa:

³⁸ Martin, Lisa L. “International institutions: weak commitments and costly signals.” *International Theory* 9, no. 3 (2017): 353-380.

³⁹ Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” *International Security* 24, no. 1 (1999): 42–63, <https://doi.org/10.1162/016228899560040>.

⁴⁰ T. V. Paul, *Restraining Great Powers: Soft Balancing from Empires to the Global Era* (Yale University Press, 2018).

⁴¹ G. John Ikenberry, “The Liberal International Order and Its Discontents,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 38, no. 3 (May 10, 2010): 509–21, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829810366477>; Joseph Nye, “Will the Liberal Order Survive?,” *Foreign Affairs*, 2018.

⁴² Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutional Theory,” *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 39, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539214>.

⁴³ Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, *The Expansion of International Society* (Clarendon Press, 1984).

I have little in-depth knowledge about Africa, but I would agree that Africa is not a Hobbesian or a Kantian world, but rather a Lockean, because African states in general do survive. However, I don't know the level up to which this culture is internalized. Because of my teleological view of the world, I tend to agree with the view that African IR is just one or two steps behind Europe, but will eventually get there just like everyone else.⁴⁴

Like Waltz, Wendt accepts that 'international theory' can ignore the South and remain universal. According to Wendt, theory must not change to fit Africa; rather, Africa must change to fit *theory*. Furthermore, Wendt's claim that African IR remains 'one or two steps behind' Europe imposes an evolutionary narrative fundamental to Eurocentrism. What unites Waltz and Wendt—and many scholars in between—is a view that the South's exoticism exempts theory from any explanatory burden.

Krasner⁴⁵ makes the opposite error: instead of ignoring the 'Third World', he thinks neorealist theory explains all of it. Styling the 'Third World', Krasner argues that 'the South' seeks to 'attack' the 'global liberalism' of 'the North' by maximising its power in international institutions.⁴⁶ He claims the South uses solidarity as a veneer for materialist ambition. The South's call for a more inclusive global system expresses a 'desire for authoritative institutions' which protect the South from the North, in Krasner's view⁴⁷. Here, the Third World is exoticised as a 'threat' to 'Western values', on a power-seeking collision course with free markets and free speech. Krasner's position is speculative. He does not substantiate claims that the South is plotting to

⁴⁴ Wendt, Alexander. *Alexander Wendt on UFO's, Black Swans and Constructivist International Relations Theory*. Interview for 'Theory Talks'. 2008. Accessed at: <http://www.theory-talks.org/2008/04/theory-talk-3.html>.

⁴⁵ Krasner, Stephen D. *Structural conflict: The third world against global liberalism*. University of California Press, 1985.

⁴⁶ Krasner, 5.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 28.

overthrow the North for material gain.⁴⁸ Rather, he relies on realism, which in turn relies on the ‘great power gaze’. A vicious circle ensues: one scholar creates a theory which does not apply to a large section of the world, then another scholar, applies that theory to the very part of the world that it does not explain. As Smith observes, ‘those IR stories which have come to dominate the field have become accepted as fact to the extent that they are no longer thought of as stories’⁴⁹. For these reasons, the ‘great power’ gaze is a major obstacle to appreciating the importance of NWFZs to nuclear order, from a wide variety of theoretical perspectives.

In response, countless critical scholars, typified by Barkawi and Laffey,⁵⁰ lament the, ‘blatant erasure of experiences and ideas that emanate outside the West and the silencing of voices outside Eurocentrism in its broad sense’⁵¹. Yet critical scholarship has also largely neglected NWFZs. Reasons for this vary across approaches. For instance, neo-Marxists may claim that NWFZs stem from extractive economic relations;⁵² post-structuralists may view NWFZs as examples of deterritorialisation or biopolitics;⁵³ feminist theorists may argue that NWFZs are no more than phallic folly

⁴⁸ A point that needs evidence given that scholars like Fukuyama and Ikenberry argue that the South has internalized Northern values.

⁴⁹ Smith, Karen. “Has Africa got anything to say? African contributions to the theoretical development of International Relations.” *The Round Table* 98.402 (2009): 269-284.

⁵⁰ Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, “The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies,” *Review of International Studies* 32, no. 2 (2006): 329–52, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210506007054>.

⁵¹ Siphamandla Zondi, “A Decolonial Turn in Diplomatic Theory : Unmasking Epistemic Injustice,” *Journal for Contemporary History* 41, no. 1 (2016): 18–37.

⁵² Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Duke University Press, 2004), <https://www.iwallerstein.com/alternatives-the-united-states-confronts-the-world/>; Paola Gemme and Frank Furedi, “The Silent War: Imperialism and the Changing Perception of Race,” *The Journal of American History* 87, no. 1 (June 2000): 278, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2568025>.

⁵³ Gilles Deleuze, and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus, SubStance*, vol. 20, 1995, doi:10.2307/3684887.

(and there is much to commend this view);⁵⁴ critical race theorists may suggest that NWFZs represent the triumph of global nuclear apartheid;⁵⁵ and postcolonial theorists may explain NWFZs in terms of a collective Third World anti-nuclear ethos.⁵⁶ These approaches explain important aspects of NWFZs, but also remain limited. I shall contend that some of these approaches *also* denude the South of agency, while others accord it extreme agency, which is also mistaken.⁵⁷ I shall argue, therefore, that NWFZs cannot be explained by recourse to one or another ‘master variable’.⁵⁸ Therefore, NWFZs are exciting from a theoretical perspective because they require dialogue between traditional and critical approaches. Theoretical eclecticism is now common in IR scholarship, though not in the study of NWFZs.⁵⁹ Dunne, Hansen and Wight argue that, ‘the paradigm wars... are now over, and the discipline seems to have

⁵⁴ Cristina Masters, “Tales of the Shield: A Feminist Reading of Ballistic Missile Defence,” 2003, <https://yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/xmlui/handle/10315/1355>.

⁵⁵ Shampa Biswas, ““Nuclear Apartheid” as Political Position: Race as a Postcolonial Resource?,” *Alternatives* 26, no. 4 (2001): 485–522; Ritu Mathur, “Sly Civility and the Paradox of Equality/Inequality in the Nuclear Order: A Post-Colonial Critique,” *Critical Studies on Security* 4, no. 1 (2016): 57–72, <https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2015.1106428>.

⁵⁶ See, for instance, Itty Abraham, “Decolonizing Arms Control: The Asian African Legal Consultative Committee and the Legality of Nuclear Testing, 1960–64,” *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 1960, 1–32; Egeland, Kjølsv, Torbjørn Graff Hugo, Magnus Løvold, and Gro Nystuen. “The nuclear weapons ban treaty and the non-proliferation regime.” *Medicine, conflict and survival* 34, no. 2 (2018): 74–94..

⁵⁷ For instance, Hobson shows that Marxism is also deeply Eurocentric in its classical form.

⁵⁸ The term ‘master variable’ is borrowed from: Neta. Crawford, *Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention* (Cambridge University Press, 2002). Crawford uses this phrase to explain traditional notions of change in IR theory.

⁵⁹ This approach was debated in the European Journal of International Relations in September 2013. See, for instance, Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, “Eclectic Theorizing in the Study and Practice of International Relations,” in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Duncan Snidal and Christian Reus-Smit, 2008, 772; David A. Lake, “Theory Is Dead, Long Live Theory: The End of the Great Debates and the Rise of Eclecticism in International Relations,” ed. Colin Wight, Lene Hansen, and Tim Dunne, *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (September 5, 2013): 567–87, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066113494330>; Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen, and Colin Wight, “The End of International Relations Theory?,” ed. Colin Wight, Lene Hansen, and Tim Dunne, *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (September 5, 2013): 405–25, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066113495485>.

settled into a period of “theoretical peace”, with the dominant logic now that of considering the prospects for various forms of pluralism⁶⁰. I shall suggest theoretical pluralism allows a richer and deeper understanding of the emergence, persistence, and importance of NWFZs in what follows. This eclecticism acknowledges the hegemony of the ‘West’ and ‘Western’ academia as fact, whilst insisting that a ‘re-appropriation’ of this inheritance can, ‘displace the moral and historical centrality of Western theory where it has failed to give credence to “peripheral” experience and social thought’⁶¹. The eclecticism in which I am interested also concedes that power matters, while rejecting the constant perspective of the powerful. As such, NWFZs are deserving of scholarly attention through their geographical and temporal reach, as well as through the challenge they pose to IR theory (IRT).

AIMS AND ARGUMENT

The Puzzle

NWFZs are situated within a broader scholarly puzzle, known as the ‘proliferation puzzle’, encapsulated by Potter and Mukhatzhanova as, ‘why some states choose to acquire nuclear weapons, why a subset of these states reverse course and abandon their pursuit, and why others never initiate the quest’⁶². Potter and Mukhatzhanova suggest that this puzzle is often framed in distinctly state-centric and Single-N terms. They call for theory-driven comparative work to supplement this literature. NWFZs thus

⁶⁰ Dunne, Hansen, and Wight, “The End of International Relations Theory?”, 406.

⁶¹ Amy Niang, “The Imperative of African Perspectives on International Relations (IR),” *Politics* 36, no. 4 (2016): 453–66, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395716637092>.

⁶² William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, “Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay,” *International Security* 33, no. 1 (2008): 139–69, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2008.33.1.139>, 141.

provoke questions at the *avante garde* of nuclear scholarship. For example, why do *several* states in close geographical proximity collectively exercise nuclear restraint through NWFZ treaties? Why do states that have already signed the NPT take the *additional* step of creating NWFZs? Why do nuclear powers acknowledge and abide by NWFZs, which limit their power? Lastly, why do some NWFZ treaties open for signature while others never gain traction? These questions could form the basis of a new sub-discipline in IR concerned solely with the theoretical importance of NWFZs. A work of this scope cannot confront them all. Hence, here I will narrow my focus to accommodate the limits of this thesis. First, I narrow my focus to three NWFZs: Africa, Latin America, and the South Pacific. Second, although NWFZs have existed since 1959, I narrow my focus to the period between 1967 and 2017. This period frames the birth of the first treaty I consider—the Latin American NWFZ (LANWFZ)—on one end, and the birth of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), on the other. Against this backdrop, I therefore pose the following research question: *why do the African, Latin American and South Pacific NWFZs exist and persist?*

The first part of the question—*Why do the African, Latin American and South Pacific NWFZs exist*—allows me to explore the origins of these three NWFZs. Through this question, I explore why these zones exist at all, despite alternative means of nuclear protection, such as the NPT or nuclear guarantees. I analyse the historical moments that precede these NWFZ treaties, and the causal factors that bring them about. Through the second part of the question—*Why do the African, Latin American and South Pacific NWFZs persist*—I analyse the consolidation of these zones once they open for signature and probe the reasons for their resilience. This question allows me to examine the life of NWFZs once they emerge.

This two-part question also allows me to explore the significance of NWFZs to global nuclear order. I consider whether NWFZs symbolise the tensions inherent in global

order writ large, and what consequences these tensions have on the stability of nuclear order. I likewise explore the entanglements between zones. These research questions thus allow me to probe deeply into a small set of cases, but also to reflect generally on NWFZs and their wider significance, both to IRT and to global order.

The Argument

In response to these two questions, I make one central argument: NWFZs exist and persist because of an attitude of obedient rebellion to nuclear order. This attitude occurs both within and between states inside zones and the NWSs. States express obedient rebellion at the international level, while strategic elites within states express obedient rebellion at the domestic level. ‘Obedient rebellion’ is an attitude of ambivalence to nuclear order which combines legitimacy-acceptance with legitimacy-rejection; and recognition-seeking within nuclear order with recognition-seeking outside it. Obedient rebellion manifests differently in the ‘existence’ and ‘persistence’ phases of NWFZs. During the ‘existence’ phase, NWFZs are triggered by *External Nuclear Interventions* (ENIs). ENIs occur when a foreign NWS uses, tests, or stations nuclear weapons in an external territory without universal regional consent. For example, ENIs occurred when the USSR stationed nuclear weapons in Latin America during the Cuban missile crisis, when France tested nuclear weapons in Africa, or when various nuclear powers tested nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. These responses are eventually mediated through the creation of a NWFZ, which appeals to both obedient and rebellious actors in the wake of an ENI. The creation of the zone itself triggers a new phase of ‘persistence’. In this phase, obedient and rebellious actors continue to

accommodate their differing conceptions of nuclear order through the maintenance of NWFZs.⁶³

The complex causes which birth and sustain NWFZs uniquely epitomise the tensions within nuclear order writ large: the same logic that sustains NWFZs in these regions also sustains nuclear order in these regions. This is because nuclear order, like NWFZs, reproduces itself through multiple contradictory meanings which serve manifold audiences. I thus take NWFZs as a microcosm for the ambiguities and ambivalences that ironically sustain the fragile balance of nuclear order.

Aims and Limits

This work aims at several contributions. First, I wish to map the complex causes that birth and sustain NWFZs. Second, I wish to paint a more global picture of the emergence and persistence of NWFZs, which identifies the multiple simultaneous entanglements between states and zones across wide geographical and temporal divides. This involves telling the ‘story’ of NWFZs from a perspective which consciously includes the agency of the global South. By doing so, I wish to advance the broader project of ‘Global IR’, by demonstrating the tangible theoretical and empirical insights available outside of the ‘great power gaze’. Other aims include contributing to ‘the nuclear puzzle’ and shedding light on policy options open to countries like Iran, North Korea, members of the P5, Brazil, South Africa, New Zealand, and pacific island states as they relate to nuclear non-proliferation.

These aims are confined within several limits. This work does not aim to predict the future. Rather, it seeks to build a plausible explanation of the past. Its aim is to explain why three NWFZs have emerged and persisted, without wishing to suggest that these

⁶³ I expound on this argument at length in the next chapter.

insights apply to other cases.⁶⁴ If the arguments I advance here have wider applicability, this will be for future scholarship to confirm. However, there are some insights from this analysis that apply to the universe of cases. Although the aim of this thesis is not a general theory of NWFZs, I will in the conclusion reflect on the generalisability of these arguments across other cases beyond African, Latina America and the South Pacific. Furthermore, this is not an attempt to map *all* the relations between the states inside these zones, nor is it an exhaustive account of relations between NWSs and these states. This would far exceed the scope of this work, given that there are approximately 976 bilateral relationships between the NWSs and SIZs.⁶⁵ Instead, I seek to identify the major forces that explain the emergence, persistence and importance of three NWFZs, which necessarily involves omitting multiple stories from the discussion.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Methodology

This is an abductive,⁶⁶ explanatory thesis: it takes an outcome—the existence and persistence of three NWFZs—and tries to explain why it obtains. To do this, I use the case study method. Specifically, this is an illustrative, comparative case study which considers Africa, Latin America, and the South Pacific. According to Eckstein, an illustrative case study ‘gives the reader a “feel” for a theoretical argument by providing

⁶⁴ Throughout the thesis, I refer to NWFZs in general terms. This should not be mistaken for a universally applicable argument. It is simply a choice of efficiency to prevent me from constantly having to refer to three separate NWFZs throughout the text.

⁶⁵ There are roughly 122 states within current NWFZ agreements, and eight NWSs. Thus, $122 \times 8 = 976$.

⁶⁶ Abductive research observes a given outcome and seeks a plausible explanation for an already-existing phenomenon.

concrete examples of its application' or shows, 'the empirical relevance of a theoretical proposition by identifying at least one relevant case'⁶⁷. According to Gerring,⁶⁸ the case study is, 'an intensive study of a small number of units for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units'⁶⁹. Gerring suggests that co-variation happens across and within units. Studies of co-variation across both time and units are called comparative historical case studies. I follow this logic by investigating three NWFZs across time and space. I compare the attitudes of states and 'strategic elites' across space in signatory states (inside NWFZs and among the NWSs). Within-unit variation focuses on the perceptions of key states and 'strategic elites' within these key states across time.

The cases are selected according to the Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) strategy. MDSD seeks, 'maximal heterogeneity in the sample of systems' and is, 'based on a belief that in spite of inter-systemic differentiation, the populations will differ with regard to only a limited number of variables or relationships'⁷⁰. In other words, MDSD is interested in what unites differing cases which produce the same outcome.⁷¹ My cases represent a geographical mix that spans three continents and nearly six decades. The cases include zones with many states, and those with few states. They include formally recognised regions and large states along with small island states and

⁶⁷ Eckstein, H. 1975. Case studies and theory in political science. In Greenstein, F., and N. Polsby, eds. *Handbook of political science*, vol. 7, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 79–138.

⁶⁸ Gerring, John. 'What is a case study and what is it good for?' *American political science review* 98.2 (2004): 341–354.

⁶⁹ Gerring, 342.

⁷⁰ Adam. Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (Wiley-Interscience, 1970), <https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/1162029>. pp

⁷¹ For a deeper look at MDSD (also called MDSO), see chapters 6 and 7 in, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, *Mixed Methods in Comparative Politics: Principles and Applications* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

large seas. In this way, I aim to minimise selection bias, long seen as a weakness in work on nuclear decision-making.⁷²

According to Blatter and Haverland,⁷³ case studies also test abstract explanations against hard evidence. By testing predictions against specific cases, scholars can identify the weaknesses of existing theory. They can also refine, reject, or confirm propositions with greater confidence. In this sense, I use the case study method to test the robustness of traditional theory surrounding the ‘proliferation puzzle’ and to show the strengths and weaknesses of existing theories and concepts.

Evidence

This work rests on evidence from three main sources: primary archival sources, individual testimonies, and the secondary historical literature.⁷⁴ Archival sources take three main forms: private correspondence, public declarations and speeches, and official documents. This includes evidence from individuals,⁷⁵ state actors, regional institutions, and declassified or leaked policy documents. Further, I rely on various legal documents, treaties, official records, proceedings, and agreements. Legislative records, like parliamentary minutes from a wide array of countries and regions are examined, particularly in the cases of the UK, the US, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. For instance, I reference sources found in the South African

⁷² Jim Walsh “PhD Thesis: Bombs Unbuilt.”

⁷³ Joachim Blatter and Markus Haverland, *Designing Case Studies* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012), <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137016669>.

⁷⁴ The Wilson Centre’s History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive contains rich primary material on South African, Brazilian and Israeli nuclear diplomacy.

⁷⁵ On the African NWFZ, there is a vast diplomatic record contained in the annexures to Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji’s book on the ANWFZ. Ambassador Adeniji’s account is particularly useful as he was perhaps the central player in the creation of the ANWFZ as the Chair of the UN/AU Panel of Experts on the Denuclearisation of Africa.

Parliamentary Library, the Brazilian Congressional Archives, the African Union Commission Archives, the National Archives of Australia, and the various sites governed by Archives New Zealand.

In addition to this, several other primary sources are pursued, including Congressional records, declassified records of the US Department of State, records of each country's respective Nuclear Energy Councils, and records of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It also focuses on the policy documents and recorded proceedings of international bodies like the United Nations and the IAEA.⁷⁶ A chief source of declassified documentation is the Wilson Centre's Digital Archive. This constantly expanding digital database holds, 'once-secret documents from governments across the globe' with a strong focus on nuclear questions through the Nuclear Proliferation and International History Project (NPIHP). Twenty-Four collections were particularly useful within this archive. These include: The South African, Chinese, Brazilian, Argentinian, Pakistani, Soviet, French, Indian, Chinese, Israeli, North Korean, and South Korean Nuclear History Collections; The Non-Proliferation Treaty Collection; and The Cuban Missile Crisis Collection. One final source of archival material is the over two million diplomatic cables in the WikiLeaks Public Library of US Diplomacy. This evidence further illuminates the secret state decision-making process. The library contains cables relating to nearly every NWFZ, though it displays a strong US bias.

The second main source of evidence comes from individual testimony. Again, I am fortunate to be able to rely on much existing oral history scholarship. Between 2015 and the present, the Wilson Centre Digital Archive has published two particularly relevant oral history collections. First, the '1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference' collection includes 'critical oral histories' in the form of extended one-on-

⁷⁶ Walsh.

one scholarly interviews with twenty-seven ‘strategic elite’ decision-makers, conducted by Dr Michael Onderco for the 2018 Critical History Conference. These interviews are crucial to the sections of this work that reflect on the persistence of NWFZs and their relation to global nuclear order.⁷⁷ In addition, the Avner Cohen collection, which contains ten one-on-one interviews, traces Israeli nuclear history, sheds great light on the Middle Eastern context, and illuminates the views of American and French ‘strategic elites’. This proved useful in examining the relationship between the Middle Eastern zone and the African zone as they pertain to Egypt and Libya.

Another major source of oral history is contained in *The Origins of Nuclear Cooperation*, a project edited by Professors Nicholas Wheeler and Mattias Spektor, along with Rodrigo Mallea, focusing on Brazil and Argentina’s nuclear relationship. This work follows a ‘critical oral history methodology’ by archiving conversations between nuclear academics and experts, ‘on a series of events that the practitioners had an active role in’⁷⁸. This work is distinct from one-on-one interviews, as it prioritises records of collective conversations. Participants at the conference were presented with a ‘briefing book’, which contained several shared resources on which discussions were based. The eventual shared discussions were archived in a ‘verbatim transcript of the meeting’ which resulted from this process.⁷⁹ This oral history is crucial to understanding developments around nuclear cooperation in Latin America, and specifically in Brazil and Argentina, two states that pursued nuclear programmes and became central to the Latin American NWFZ.

⁷⁷ I could not hope to have amassed this number of interviews with key decision-makers myself, and am greatly indebted to the work of Dr. Onderco for this evidence.

⁷⁸ Rodrigo Mallea, Matias Spektor, and Nicholas J Wheeler, *The Origins of Nuclear Cooperation: A Critical Oral History Between Argentina and Brazil* (FVG School of Social Sciences, 2012).

⁷⁹ Mallea, Spektor, and Wheeler.

In two instances related to the African zone, I also rely on my own semi-structured interviews, to support claims about norm formation (particularly in the South African case). Through these interviews, I build evidence on the attitudes of decision-makers, the discourses they employ, and the identities they construct. A digital audio recording of the interview is preserved for accuracy. A copy of this recording is availed to the participant. Where necessary, these recordings were deleted on request of the interviewee after use.⁸⁰ As Chigudu suggests, individual narratives are an important prism through which to understand how agents construct their realities: ‘the dialogical character of storytelling reveals the intricate relation between individual and collective memory as a complex composite, neither entirely ineffable and individual nor entirely socially determined’⁸¹.

Using testimonial evidence to uncover the discursive strategies of ‘strategic elites’ follows a long tradition of scholarship on nuclear questions.⁸² There are several reasons for supporting my claims with this elite-centric and state-centric form of evidence. First, nuclear decisions are by definition secret and sensitive. Direct testimonial evidence is often the only way around this secrecy. However, testimonial evidence must be regarded with due scepticism. Despite the agendas of interviewees, testimony remains a useful source of evidence, for two reasons. First, since state rhetoric often appeals to multiple conflicting audiences at once, I am interested precisely in the differences between rhetoric and action. I am also interested in how strategic elites

⁸⁰ Both interviewees requested deletion.

⁸¹ Simukai Chigudu, “‘State of Emergency’: The Politics of Zimbabwe’s Cholera Outbreak,” 2017. Here, Chigudu draws on Nuttall, Sarah, and Carli Coetzee, eds. *Negotiating the past: The making of memory in South Africa*. Oxford University Press, USA, 1998.

⁸² For instance, Hymans’ canonical book, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation*, focuses to a large extent on the official rhetoric of presidents.

mislead and obfuscate, or in what Bhabha calls ‘discursive doubleness’.⁸³ The evidence is marshalled to disentangle the multiple rhetorics of ‘strategic elites’ across time and space. In this sense, I follow from Strauss, who claims that, ‘rhetoric is part of a complex of critical appeals between the state and significant audiences it wishes to attract, persuade, mobilise or consolidate support within’ and that, ‘reality in policy implementation often departs from stated ideals, but the grounding rhetoric continues to matter to a range of different audiences, both domestic and international’⁸⁴.

Throughout, I test archival and testimonial evidence against the backdrop of a deep secondary literature combining Large-N empirical analyses, Single-N case studies and intensive comparative state-centric case analysis. I also draw on a host of journalistic sources, official websites, reports, and conference proceedings, where necessary. These sources are meant only to supplement the academic, oral historical, and archival records. This approach—which combines a wide variety of evidentiary sources—mirrors the overall approach of theoretical eclecticism.

STRUCTURE

Chapter One situates the analysis within a larger conceptual history and set of academic debates. I situate the thesis around debates concerning ‘nuclear order’ as well as debates around the ‘nuclear puzzle’. I also differentiate this thesis from similar work

⁸³ Ranajit. Guha, *A Subaltern Studies Reader, 1986-1995* (University of Minnesota Press, 1997).

⁸⁴ Julia C. Strauss, “The Past in the Present: Historical and Rhetorical Lineages in China’s Relations with Africa,” *The China Quarterly* 199 (September 10, 2009): 777, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741009990208>.

in the field. Next, I introduce the conceptual model and expand on the notion of ‘obedient rebellion’.

In **Chapter Two**, I analyse Latin America zone. I examine the ENI of the Cuban missile crisis and observe the long period of persistence from 1967-2017. I this case first because it was the first zone to successfully open for signature among the three cases I consider.

In **Chapter Three**, I assess the African zone. I take Africa next because this zone took the longest to materialise and was, in fact, the first inhabited NWFZ ever proposed. I examine the role of French nuclear tests between 1959 and 1963. Finally, in **Chapter Four**, I look at the South Pacific. I examine the role of various nuclear tests in the region over four decades, before analysing the persistence of the zone since 1986. Throughout these cases, I argue that the contradictory forces of obedience and rebellion that bind NWFZs also unexpectedly stabilise nuclear order.

CHAPTER ONE: *Context, Concepts and Models*

STATUS QUAESTIONIS | CONCEPTUAL MODEL | CONCLUSION

The vision of the world order that is projected by our arms control arrangements is one against which the majority of states are in revolt.

—Hedley Bull, *Arms Control and World Order*¹

In this chapter, I lay the conceptual foundations for this thesis. In the first part, I distinguish this study from similar existing scholarship. I also establish the scholarly context, locating this work in several conceptual histories and disciplinary debates. In the second part, I propose a conceptual model to explain the existence and persistence of the African, Latin American, and South Pacific NWFZs.

STATUS QUAESTIONIS

In this section, I situate this work in a scholarly context by highlighting relevant academic disputes, and exploring key conceptual histories. The section follows in two parts. In the first, I analyse existing work of direct relevance to my research questions. In doing so, I distinguish this work from the current field. Although this section is pivotal, there is relatively less work to cover, because relatively fewer scholars have addressed my research question directly. I begin this section by focusing on two Large-N studies that ask directly similar question to this thesis. I then move to work which maps the empirical landscape, without explicitly providing theoretical insights. Finally, I look at Single-N studies with some relevance to my overall conceptual claims. The aim of this section is to demonstrate that this work is different from other work in the

¹ Hedley Bull, “Arms Control and World Order,” *International Security* 1, no. 1 (1976), 3.

field and fills a clear gap in the literature. Furthermore, this section will demonstrate that this thesis complements existing scholarship, empirically and methodologically. Filling a ‘gap’ in the literature is one thing; filling a valuable gap is quite another. In the second section, I demonstrate why filling this gap is worthwhile. I do this by moving to a higher level of abstraction, examining some of the major conceptual debates around which this thesis revolves. Although this work answers different questions to my thesis, it is nonetheless essential to understanding the theoretical, conceptual, and methodological contributions made here. It also shows how other scholars *might have* answered my research questions, even if they have not *actually* responded to them directly. In this section, I focus on two major debates. First, I analyse debates on the definition of ‘nuclear order’; second, I examine debates surrounding ‘the nuclear puzzle’. Differing approaches to these questions shed light, in turn, on how scholars explain examples of multilateral nuclear cooperation.

These debates are especially relevant to this thesis because they show how scholars from diverse perspectives conceptualise nuclear order, and how they explain the decision to pursue—or not to pursue—nuclear weapons. In both of these debates, scholars advance realist, idealist, economic and normative claims to define nuclear order and explain states’ nuclear choices. I analyse each of these approaches, and then explain how my approach differs from these dominant viewpoints in key respects.

Existing Scholarship on NWFZs

Existing scholarship on NWFZs falls into three broad categories. First, a rare brand of scholarship that examines why states join NWFZs; second, a descriptive literature that compares zones from a legal, historical, or policy-related perspective; and, finally, a Single-N literature on specific zones.

Two Large-N studies, by Tago and Fuhrmann and Li, directly address the causes of NWFZ formation. Tago applies survival analysis to a Large-N dataset which covers every states’ decision to join a NWFZ or sign a nuclear security cooperation agreement,

since 1958.² He tests these cases against three hypotheses: first, low threats make a state more likely to sign NWFZ treaties (a key focus of this thesis); second, lacking a nuclear ally makes states more likely to sign NWFZ treaties; and third, democracies and open economies are more likely to sign NWFZ treaties (this variable, he believes, is a proxy for security community behaviour).³ He claims states can adopt three possible strategies on nuclear security: obtaining their own nuclear weapons, joining a security alliance with a NWS, or joining a NWFZ.⁴ He then asks: why do states join NWFZs when they could join a nuclear umbrella? This matters because, ‘it is difficult to say whether the nuclear-weapon-free zones are a product of existing security communities or vice versa’⁵.

Tago reaches three main conclusions. He finds a significant relationship between threats and NWFZs, yet no significant relationship between democracy and economic openness and NWFZs.⁶ Specially significant is the presence of a nuclear rivalry, which decreases the chance of signing a NWFZ treaty by 74%.⁷ Surprisingly, Tago also finds that having a nuclear ally *increases* the chance of signing a NWFZ, contradicting the prevailing wisdom—and his original hypothesis—that the two strategies compete.⁸ His overall conclusion, crucial for this thesis, is that NWFZs happen in already-peaceful regions: ‘NWFZs are less instruments to create peace than they are mechanisms to maintain cooperative relationships in peaceful regions’⁹.

² Atsushi Tago, “The Origins of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones: Security Communities or Substitutes for a ‘Nuclear Umbrella’?,” n.d.

³ Tago.

⁴ In reality, states’ decision are much wider than this, but he stylises the choices to three. For other strategies, see Vipin Narang’s *Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation* article, cited earlier.

⁵ Tago, “The Origins of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones: Security Communities or Substitutes for a ‘Nuclear Umbrella’?”

⁶ Tago, 18.

⁷ Ibid, 19.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid, 21.

Fuhrmann and Li offer a second rare work theorising states' decision to join NWFZs.¹⁰ Like Tago, they apply survival analysis to the universe of cases (109 states that have decided to join NWFZs). Unlike Tago, they study the decision to ratify a treaty in regions where NWFZs already exist. They test twelve hypotheses against this outcome, dividing their hypotheses into 'costs' and 'benefits'. Despite using similar methods to Tago, they find different results (partly because they are analysing different outcomes). Whereas Tago finds nuclear rivalry salient, Fuhrmann and Li find no necessary relationship; whereas Tago finds having a nuclear ally important, Fuhrmann and Li find it has no bearing. By far the two most important factors in NWFZ ratification, according to Fuhrmann and Li, are membership of the NPT, and involvement in military conflict. Signing the NPT significantly increases the likelihood of ratifying a NWFZ, while involvement in a military conflict significantly reduces it, they find. Other influential variables include: the power of a state, the number of states that have already ratified a NWFZ treaty, and the number of negative security assurances already given by NWSs.¹¹

These two Large-N studies are pioneering in testing general theoretical claims against evidence from NWFZs. They also support the intuition that threats matter to the birth of zones. Yet, drawing general correlations only further necessitates detailed case analysis, to interrogate these relationships in detail. Existing Large-N work also encourages further questions. For instance, why does NPT membership matter for ratifying NWFZ treaties? Do states involved in conflicts avoid NWFZs for the same reasons? Moreover, more detailed case study work can uncover why these two Large-N studies contradict each other in places. Finally, case study work can challenge the embedded epistemological assumptions of Large-N work. Fuhrmann and Li do not find normative explanations persuasive. But this may also relate to the construction of

¹⁰ Matthew Fuhrmann and Xiaojun Li, "Legalizing Nuclear Abandonment: The Determinants of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty Ratification," *Managing the Atom Working Paper Series* March 2008, no. March (2008).

¹¹ Fuhrmann and Li.

normative variables in their studies. Only through a more thorough qualitative analysis can we determine which normative factors to analyse.

In addition to this Large-N work, several scholars have approached the question of NWFZs from a comparative perspective. These works fall either in the category of comparative history or comparative policy-studies. In the first category, five books stand out, by: Thakur¹², Pitt and Thompson¹³, Bennett¹⁴, Moorthy¹⁵ and Graham¹⁶. In work spanning between 1987 and 2017, these authors empirically map various NWFZs. Thakur, Pitt and Thompson, and Bennett devote primary attention to successful NWFZs.¹⁷ Graham, the most recent author, also analyses successful zones, yet from an exclusively American perspective. Except for Graham, this comparative historical literature is more than fifteen years old and avoids any explicit theoretical ambitions. Other work which places NWFZs in comparative perspective adopts a policy-oriented lens. In two books separated by as many decades, Hamel-Green and Alves analyse NWFZs within the framework of UN institutions, to glean policy insights for UN disarmament institutions.¹⁸ Like the previous body of literature, this work is also written prior to the Treaty of Pelindaba's entry into force.

Outside book-length works, several scholars have also compared NWFZs. Hamel-Green again looms large in this literature, first in a series of studies of the Treaty of Rarotonga

¹² Thakur, Ramesh. *Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones*. London: Macmillan, 1998.

¹³ Pitt, David, and Gordon Thompson, eds. *Nuclear-free zones*. Routledge, 1987.

¹⁴ Bennett, Gordon C. *The New Abolitionists: The Story of Nuclear Free Zones*. Brethren Press, 1987.

¹⁵ Moorthy, P. *Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone*. Concept Publishing Company, 2006.

¹⁶ Graham, Thomas. *The Alternate Route: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones*. Oregon State University Press, 2017.

¹⁷ For some of these authors, there were only two successful zones in existence at the time of publication.

¹⁸ More recently, Hamel-Green analyses the intersection between the Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty (TPNW) of 2017 and NWFZ treaties, highlighting several inconsistencies between the two. For instance, some NWFZ treaties allow the launch of nuclear attacks from within a given zone if they land outside that zone, while others permit nuclear command communication activity which contravenes the TPNW. See, Michael Hamel-Green, "The Implications of the 2017 UN Nuclear Prohibition Treaty for Existing and Proposed Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones," *Global Change, Peace & Security*, February 15, 2018, 1–24, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2018.1438387>.

and later in a series of comparative historical articles on various NWFZs.¹⁹ This comparative literature reached a peak in the 1990s with several similar studies tracing the background, provisions and prospects of NWFZs.²⁰ These works, too, occurred mostly prior to 2010. Like the books on these subjects, these articles are less interested in theoretical claims than in empirical mapping.

Beyond comparative histories, several scholars have approached the NWFZs that I address as single case-studies. In Latin America, for example, a host of scholars have mapped the background, provisions, and prospects of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.²¹ In Africa, work tends to focus on the South African nuclear renunciation. Yet, even in Single-N studies like these, explicit theoretical claims that unite one zone with another are absent. NWFZs are tangential features of works reappraising the Cuban missile crisis²², and those focused on nuclear diplomacy and Latin American nuclear politics.²³ One virtue of literature on the Latin American case is a rich declassified archive.

¹⁹ See, for instance, Hamel-Green, Michael. "The South Pacific—The Treaty of Rarotonga." in *Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones*, 59-80. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1998; Hamel-Green, Michael. "Regional Arms Control in the South Pacific: Island State Responses to Australia's Nuclear Free Zone Initiative." *The Contemporary Pacific* (1991): 59-84; Hamel-Green, Michael. "The Not-so-Nuclear Free Zone: Australia's Arms Control Policy in the South Pacific Region." *Global Change, Peace & Security* 1, no. 1 (1989): 37-59; Hamel-Green, Michael. "Nuclear-weapon-free zone initiatives: challenges and opportunities for regional cooperation on non-proliferation." *Global Change, Peace & Security* 21, no. 3 (2009): 357-376.

²⁰ Davis, Zachary S. "The Spread of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Building a New Nuclear Bargain." *Arms Control Today* 26, no. 1 (1996): 15; Magnarella, Paul J. "Attempts to Reduce and Eliminate Nuclear Weapons through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Creation of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones." *Peace & Change* 33, no. 4 (2008): 507-521; Leigh-Phippard, Helen. "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Problems and Prospects." *Contemporary Security Policy* 14, no. 2 (1993): 93-114; Mulas, Roberta. "Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and the Nuclear Powers." *Academic Peace Orchestra Middle East, Policy Brief* 5 (2011).

²¹ Epstein, William. "The making of the Treaty of Tlatelolco." *J. Hist. Int'l L.* 3 (2001): 153; Redick, John R. "The Tlatelolco regime and nonproliferation in Latin America." *International Organization* 35, no. 1 (1981): 103-134; Hymans, Jacques. "Lessons from Latin America." *Routledge Handbook of Latin America in the World* (2014): 362; Serrano, Mónica. "Common Security in Latin America. The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco." *ISA Research Papers* 30 (1992); Musto, Ryan A. "A Desire so Close to the Hearts of all Latin Americans': Utopian Ideals and Imperfections Behind Latin America's Nuclear Weapon Free Zone." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 37, no. 2 (2018): 160-174.

²² Laffey, Mark, and Jutta Weldes. "Decolonizing the Cuban missile crisis." *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 3 (2008): 555-577.

²³ Hunt, Jonathan. "Mexican Nuclear Diplomacy, the Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone, and the NPT Grand Bargain, 1962-1968." *Negotiating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origins of the Nuclear Order*, Nueva York, Routledge (2017);

In the African case, Adeniji offers a rare book focusing on the genesis and provisions of the Treaty of Pelindaba.²⁴ As a key diplomat in the process, this book offers valuable insight into the bureaucratic detail but again avoids theoretical insinuations. Van Wyk offers a rare theoretical work focusing on the African case by linking it to theories of constructivism.²⁵ This is done through an explicit focus on the South African case. Others, like Stott²⁶ and Ogunbanwo²⁷, address the zone from the perspective of policy. Again, the zone is also addressed tangentially in works of history which focus on decolonisation, Ghanaian independence and African American opposition to nuclear weapons.²⁸

In the South Pacific, a raft of articles on the zone appeared soon after it entered into force, mostly critical of the compromises reached in the zone.²⁹ The zone also features in histories of the decolonisation of the South Pacific and nuclear testing.³⁰ Once more, this work does not answer the same question as is posed here, but largely maps the diplomatic processes which led to the zone, its provisions, and its prospects. Except for a recent article by Thakur³¹, this literature is again over a decade old.

²⁴ Adeniji, Olu. *The Treaty of Pelindaba on the African Nuclear-weapon-free-zone*. United Nations Publications UNIDIR, 2002.

²⁵ Van Wyk, Jo-Ansie. "No nukes in Africa: South Africa, the denuclearisation of Africa and the Pelindaba Treaty." *Historia* 57, no. 2 (2012): 263-297.

²⁶ Stott, Noël. "The Treaty of Pelindaba: towards the full implementation of the African NWFZ Treaty." In *Disarmament Forum*, vol. 2, pp. 15-25. 2011.

²⁷ Ogunbanwo, Sola. "Accelerate the ratification of the Pelindaba treaty." *The Nonproliferation Review* 10, no. 1 (2003): 132-136.

²⁸ Hill, Christopher Robert. "Britain, West Africa and 'The new nuclear imperialism': decolonisation and development during French tests." *Contemporary British History* 33, no. 2 (2019): 274-289; Intondi, Vincent J. *African Americans against the bomb: Nuclear weapons, colonialism, and the black freedom movement*. Stanford University Press, 2015.

²⁹ Pande, Savita. "Regional denuclearisation—II treaty of Rarotonga: Nuclear-free South Pacific?." *Strategic Analysis* 22, no. 2 (1998): 195-207; Mogami, Toshiki. "The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone: A Fettered Leap Forward." *Journal of Peace Research* 25, no. 4 (1988): 411-430; Paul, T. V. "Nuclear-free-zone in the South Pacific: Rhetoric or reality?." *The Round Table* 75, no. 299 (1986): 252-262; See, also, the Hamel-Green works mentioned earlier.

³⁰ The pre-eminent work here is, Maclellan, Nic. "The nuclear age in the Pacific islands." *The Contemporary Pacific* (2005): 363-372.

³¹ Thakur, Ramesh, ed. *The South Pacific: Problems, Issues and Prospects*. Springer, 2016.

Several separate case studies analyse non-territorial NWFZs, such as the Seabed³² and Antarctic treaties.³³ There is also a thriving debate on astropolitical security and the evolution of the Outer Space Treaty.³⁴ In this sense, there are several works which pursue similar questions to the one presented in this thesis. However, this thesis is distinct from these works in pursuing both a comparative theoretical methodology, and also in the configuration of the cases it regards.

Order

‘Nuclear order’ is a central concept around which this thesis revolves. In this section, I first consider various articulations of ‘order’, and link these to the different conceptions of ‘nuclear order’ which follow. This is key to the conceptual model, which relies on actors’ attitudes to nuclear order. I present a postcolonial critique of both notions, then link ‘nuclear order’ to the ongoing debate over ‘Global IR’.³⁵ Finally, I reflect on the limits of the postcolonial critique and defend a position of theoretical pluralism.

This section approaches my research questions from a higher level of abstraction. By understanding debates on nuclear order, we can appreciate how certain scholars might answer my research questions, even if they have not explicitly approached them in

³² Richard Kennedy Guelff, “The 1971 Seabed Treaty Revisited,” *Millennium Journal of International Studies* 8, no. 2 (1979): 117–29, <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298790080020401>.

³³ John Hanessian, “The Antarctic Treaty 1959,” *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (1960): 436–80, <https://doi.org/10.1093/iclqaj/9.3.436>; F. W G Baker, “Some Reflections on the Antarctic Treaty,” *Polar Record*, 2010, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0032247409990209>; Marcus Haward, “Introduction: The Antarctic Treaty 1961–2011,” *Polar Journal*, 2011, <https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2011.586555>; Guelff, “The 1971 Seabed Treaty Revisited.”

³⁴ Natalie Bormann and Michael Sheehan, “Securing Outer Space,” *Securing Outer Space*, 2009, 1–260, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203882023>; David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, “The Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual,” *A Reference Manual. Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 2005, 178; Paul G Dembling and Daniel M Arons, “The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty,” *Journal of Air, Law and Commerce* 33 (1987): 419–56, <http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/spacelawdocs/3/>.

³⁵ This debate consumed the International Studies Association (ISA) between 2014 and 2017, as captured in Volume 18 of the *International Studies Review*. I would venture to suggest that it is the ‘fifth great debate’ of the discipline.

scholarship. This link to the later work done in this thesis in the case chapters, where I test my explanation against rival hypotheses.

Traditional Narratives

Before exploring the term ‘nuclear order’, I shall examine the term ‘order’, as it relates to IRT. The term ‘order’ immediately invokes ambiguity. On one hand, ‘order’ is a state of affairs (order as fact); on the other, it is a *desired* state of affairs (order as value).³⁶ As Hurrell warns, these two meanings are oft-confused. Two major traditional paradigms centre order: liberalism, and the English School. I shall consider both in turn. The liberal tradition is pre-occupied with the concept of ‘liberal order’³⁷. For example, Ikenberry—one of the term’s key proponents—contends that, ‘for seven decades the world has been dominated by a western liberal order’³⁸. In this tradition, ‘liberal order’ is conceived in various ways. One perspective locates ‘liberal order’ in the triumph of ‘liberal values’. Fukuyama epitomises this position, famously asserting that capitalist democracy after the Cold War was the zenith of human organisation (defined narrowly as the minimisation of historical contradictions).³⁹ Sagar⁴⁰ summarises the position: ‘the modern scientific method... technological advancement, and market capitalism [can] explain how humanity had successfully managed to develop—haltingly, but definitely—on an upward course of civilisational progress’⁴¹. In this sense, the ‘demonstrable success’ of ‘liberal ideas’ shaped, ‘a progressively more forceful liberal structure’ that, ‘increasingly constrained the choices of agents or statespersons’, and ‘stabilised the world’⁴². In this conception, then, ‘order’ hinges on a set of ineluctable values which underpin the western liberal project.

³⁶ Andrew Hurrell, *On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society* (Oxford University Press, 2011), <https://doi.org/10.1360/zd-2013-43-6-1064>.

³⁷ Also ‘global liberal order’, ‘liberal global order’, ‘liberal world order’.

³⁸ G John Ikenberry, “The End of Liberal International Order?,” *International Affairs* 1 (2018): 7–23, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241>.

³⁹ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (The Free Press; 1992), 208.

⁴⁰ Here, Sagar is summarising and reviewing Fukuyama’s ‘The End of History’.

⁴¹ Paul Sagar, “The Last Hollow Laugh,” Aeon, 2016, <https://aeon.co/essays/was-francis-fukuyama-the-first-man-to-see-trump-coming>.

⁴² Nye, “Will the Liberal Order Survive?”

Other liberal scholars disagree. Some maintain that institutions consolidate ‘liberal order’, while others claim that raw power is fundamental. To the former, ‘institutions play an important role in the diffusion of norms and in the patterns of socialization and internalisation by which weaker actors come to absorb those norms’⁴³. Institutions thus circumscribe action in world politics, constraining the behaviour of all those within their reach. Accordingly, interdependence is both inevitable because of the complexity of global challenges and desirable as an antidote to ‘great power’ rivalry.⁴⁴ By contrast, others argue that ‘liberal order’ is a function of power, built to serve the interests of the prevailing global hegemon, the US. On this account, liberal order is under-written either by US beneficence or military might. For instance, Ikenberry—the main exponent of this argument—claims that, ‘American hegemony underlies the liberal order, whose reach has largely coincided with the extension of US power’⁴⁵ and that, ‘unilateralism can be compatible with the need for global regulation’⁴⁶.

Liberal narratives are contested vigorously by liberalism’s opponents, and increasingly by liberal theorists themselves. First, realists deny that order is possible or desirable. Order is merely a chimeric feature of *realpolitik* under anarchy, they maintain. When stability occurs, it relies on a fragile balance of power (on some versions, a ‘balance of threat’). Periods of ‘peace’ such as the Cold War grow from delicate power distributions, on this account. As Allison asserts, ‘the “long peace” was not the result of a liberal order but the by-product of the dangerous balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States...’⁴⁷. Similarly, Mearsheimer describes liberal order

⁴³ Hurrell, *On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society*.

⁴⁴ John R. Oneal et al., “The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-85,” *Journal of Peace Research* 33, no. 1 (February 24, 1996): 11–28.

⁴⁵ G. John Ikenberry, “Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order,” *Perspectives on Politics* 7, no. 1 (2009): 71–87, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592709090112>.

⁴⁶ Hurrell, *On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society*.

⁴⁷ Graham Allison, “The Myth of the Liberal Order,” *Foreign Affairs*, June 14, 2018, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-06-14/myth-liberal-order>.

as ‘a great delusion’, while Walt quips, “‘liberal order’ was neither liberal nor particularly orderly”⁴⁸.

Attempts at building order not premised on survival and self-help are therefore doomed, by this account. Within the liberal tradition, three main concerns dominate: the increasing illiberalism of the US, the fracturing of Europe, and the descent of democracy. Consequently, prominent liberal theorists have questioned whether, ‘the liberal project... has lost some of its traction’⁴⁹ or whether, ‘the liberal international order may always have been more fragile than it appeared’ evidenced by the, ‘growing clamour for closed borders, selective globalisation and the increasing relevance of right-wing politics across the world’⁵⁰. I agree with these dissenting voices in questioning the stability of ‘liberal order’, however I do not think these criticisms go far enough. A stronger critique of liberal order, I contend, must question the fundamental assumptions of traditional theory. I shall turn to such a critique after considering another traditional school concerned with order, the English School.

The English School is equally pre-occupied with ‘order’, which Hurrell and Alderson describe as its ‘central question’⁵¹. Bull defines order in terms of goal-orientation. That is, Bull sees order as the, ‘combined, purposive patterns of thought’ in ‘international society’ that govern war avoidance, survival and economic development.⁵² By ‘international society’, Bull means states’ conception of mutual commitment to common values, rules and institutions. Crucially, this social conception tolerates conflict between states, provided it occurs within pre-agreed normative and

⁴⁸ Stephen M. Walt, “Global Summitry Episode 23: Shaking the Global Order in the Age of Trump” (Munk School of Global Affairs, 2018), <https://academic.oup.com/globalsummitry/pages/podcasts>.

⁴⁹ Riccardo Alcaro, “The Liberal Order and Its Contestations: A Conceptual Framework,” *The International Spectator* 53, no. 1 (2018): 1–10, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2018.1397878>.

⁵⁰ Samir Saran, “India’s Role in a Liberal Post-Western World,” *The International Spectator* 53, no. 1 (2018): 92–108, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2018.1396433>. For an even more recent assessment of liberal order, see Volume 43 (4) of *International Security*, the most recent edition of the journal available at the time of writing.

⁵¹ Andrew Hurrell and Kai Alderson, *Hedley Bull on International Society* (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62666-3>.

⁵² Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 3rd ed. (Palgrave, 2002); Bull and Watson, *The Expansion of International Society*.

institutional confines. Bull supports this definition of ‘international society’ with historical claims about this ‘society’s’ emergence. He asserts that, ‘a reasonably cohesive international society’ emerged, ‘within the classical European state system’ and that ‘Renaissance times’⁵³ offer insight into contemporary ‘international society’⁵⁴. This move draws criticism from two main sources: realist scholars dispute its historical validity, while postcolonial scholars accuse Bull of Eurocentrism. Let us consider first the realist critique. Realist scholars attack the notion of ‘international society’ on historical, analytical, and theoretical grounds. Historically, they deny that cooperation is ever based on social bonds.⁵⁵ Analytically, they depict the notion of ‘international society’ as ‘vague’, ‘unhelpful’ and ‘unfalsifiable’⁵⁶. For example, Copeland complains that, ‘it is difficult to figure out what exactly the School is trying to explain, what its causal logic is, or how one would go about measuring its core independent (causal) variable’⁵⁷. Theoretically, realists claim the English School ignores the inherent uncertainty of an anarchical state system, and overstates the agency of institutions.⁵⁸ The perceived Eurocentrism of ‘international society’ also rankles postcolonial thinkers. Bull’s harshest critics charge that his historical narrative verges on neo-colonial apologism,⁵⁹ while more sympathetic critics suggest that his notion of ‘expansion’ assumes a unidirectional flow no longer tenable in a global world. Buzan, for example, claims that, ‘the English School sees global international society... through the institutions that the Europeans imposed on the rest of the world’⁶⁰, while Reus-Smit

⁵³ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*.

⁵⁴ Hurrell and Alderson, *Hedley Bull Int. Soc.*

⁵⁵ Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate.”

⁵⁶ Dale C. Copeland, “A Realist Critique of the English School,” *Review of International Studies* 29, no. 29 (2003): 427-- 441, <https://doi.org/10.1017/ISO260210503004273>.

⁵⁷ Dale C. Copeland.

⁵⁸ Dale C. Copeland. I might add that this is a simplistic reading of the English School. Copeland conflates Bull’s optimism about procedural consensus with optimism about the prospects for peace. Bull does not define order in terms of the intensity of conflict but rather the means by which conflicts are resolved.

⁵⁹ Mathur, “Sly Civility and the Paradox of Equality/Inequality in the Nuclear Order: A Post-Colonial Critique.”

⁶⁰ Barry Buzan, “Could IR Be Different?,” *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (March 1, 2016): 155–57, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viv025>.

and Dunn argue that international society has not ‘expanded’ but rather ‘globalised’ after repeated, multidirectional contestations and accommodations.⁶¹ They narrate the origins of ‘international society’ in relation to ‘global’ events, and foreground contributions to ‘international society’ from beyond the ‘core/periphery’ binary.⁶² Nonetheless, Bull’s sympathetic critics maintain that his analytical insights can be preserved, even if his historical insights should be disregarded.⁶³

I agree that Bull’s notion of ‘expansion’ too readily disregards extra-European agency. Resultantly, the classical English school conception of order confuses ‘order’ with preserving the West. I shall now turn to this critique in more detail, and link it to the notion of global order, laying the ground for an interrogation of ‘nuclear order’ in the section that follows.

Critique and Counter-Critique

Since the end of the Cold War, a ‘deluge’ of work from critical theory, post-colonialism, historical sociology, gender studies and constructivism insists that, ‘mainstream western IR is sorely inadequate for understanding the problems and the dynamics of the Global South’⁶⁴. This view disputes the post-Cold-War consensus, ‘marked by a clear sense of the liberal ascendancy and a clear assumption that the United States had the right and power to decide what the “liberal global order” was all about’⁶⁵. It complicates the narrative of ‘an ever-expanding West’ and criticises IRT as parochial. This two-pronged attack problematises ‘order’ as, ‘a historicist hegemony that... too

⁶¹ Tim Dunne and Christian Reus-Smit, eds., *The Globalization of International Society* (Oxford University Press, 2017), <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198793427.001.0001>.

⁶² Andrew Hurrell, “Beyond Critique: How to Study Global IR?,” *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (March 1, 2016): 149–51, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viv022>; Aleš Karmazin et al., *Regions in International Society. The English School at the Sub-Global Level* (Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2014), <https://doi.org/10.5817/CZ.MUNI.M210-6787-2014>.

⁶³ Bull’s own work beyond *The Anarchical Society*, demonstrates a deep aversion for racial domination and narrow Eurocentrism. For instance, he was a harsh critic of Western support for Apartheid South Africa and maintained strongly that Third World states should be accommodated rather than dominated. This does not detract from the Eurocentrism of his notion of expansion, however.

⁶⁴ Anna Triandafyllidou, *Global Governance from Regional Perspectives: A Critical View* (Oxford University Press, 2017).

⁶⁵ Triandafyllidou.

easily assumed that history was moving down a one-way street; and, an analytical liberal hegemony that tended to work with a narrow notion of agency...'⁶⁶. Typified by Cohen, this view holds that 'liberal order' is a neo-imperialist façade:

From this optic, the discourses and practices of humanitarian or democratic intervention, transformative occupations, targeted sanctions, terrorist blacklists and so forth... are mechanisms to foster the de-formalization of existing international law, so as to enable the very powerful (the US or the 'West') and/or those states aspiring to become twenty-first century great powers (Russia, China) to create self-serving global rules instead of being ways to limit power by law...⁶⁷

While Cohen focuses on the economically exploitative dimensions of order, others emphasise its political dimensions. For instance, Laffey and Barkawi assert that 'liberal order' defines the West, 'in ethical and progressive terms', while Wang describes western conceptions of order as a, 'Manichean world view that sees only good and evil and, moreover, demands of otherness that it convert or be demonised'⁶⁸. Similarly, authors like Rose and Chung suggest that liberal notions of order define any resistance to order as pathological deviance. Hence, labels like 'rogue state' or 'global terror' are veils behind which Western scholars portray the South as inescapably irrational: 'Resistance to Northern domination of the international system is often delegitimised by the West, leading to labels such as "rogue states" or "terrorism"'⁶⁹. Comparably, Vucetic maintains that 'order' is defined in racial terms in traditional IRT. He claims that Western alliances exploit racial solidarity, creating an 'Anglosphere', while Vale, wonders if, 'the underlying purpose [of IR] is to continue the racialism of the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries'⁷⁰. Likewise, Vitalis probes the origins of prominent US IR journals, which he finds date back to the study of 'race-relations' and the preservation of 'white hegemony' within the US and in the world at large.⁷¹

⁶⁶ Hurrell, "Beyond Critique: How to Study Global IR?"

⁶⁷ Jean L. Cohen, *Globalization and Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 126.

⁶⁸ Hung-Jen Wang, *The Rise of China and Chinese International Relations Scholarship* (Lexington Books, Lexington, MA, 2013).

⁶⁹ Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder*, 2012.

⁷⁰ Peter Vale, "Inclusion and Exclusion," *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (March 1, 2016): 159–62, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viv027>.

⁷¹ Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations*, n.d.

The volume and diversity of work critiquing ‘Western-centrism’ in IRT is immense. For instance, Booth claims that IRT is, ‘ethnocentric, masculinised, northern and top-down’; Mirbagheri suggests that, ‘conventional IR paradigms do not adequately address the concerns and needs of the contemporary era’⁷²; Barkawi and Laffey posit that IRT is, ‘by and for Western powers’⁷³; Chung charges that IRT is, ‘blind to... the security needs and interests of “small” or “weak” states’⁷⁴; and Katzenstein avers that, ‘IR was shaped by a European, American, and North Atlantic perspective on the world’⁷⁵. Moreover, Ann Tickner asserts that, ‘IR has been quite focused on questions of importance to the great powers of the Eurocentric Westphalian system’⁷⁶; Phillips states that, ‘a flawed understanding of the “rise of the West” continues to ‘contaminate IR’; while Aning and Edu-Afful contend that, ‘principles, norms, and examples from Africa are extremely scarce in IR’⁷⁷. Beyond description, this critique also challenges scholars to imagine the discipline outside of narrow, Western assumptions. For instance, Buzan asks, ‘What would IR (the discipline) look like if it had been invented somewhere other than in Europe/the West?’⁷⁸; Rai wonders, ‘what would IR look like if we were standing in the global South?’; and Acharya questions, ‘how to build generalizable concepts and theories from a national or regional context that should not only be applicable to a specific country or region but must have broader generalization

⁷² Farid Mirbagheri, “Human Agency, Reason, and Justice,” *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (March 1, 2016): 166–69, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viv033>.

⁷³ Barkawi and Laffey, “The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies.”

⁷⁴ Alex Chung, “Postcolonial Perspectives on Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” in *ISAC-ISSS Joint Annual Conference*, 2014, 1–12.

⁷⁵ Peter J. Katzenstein, “Diversity and Empathy,” *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (March 2016): 151–53, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viv023>.

⁷⁶ J. Ann Tickner, “Knowledge Is Power: Challenging IR’s Eurocentric Narrative,” *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (March 2016): 157–59, doi:10.1093/isr/viv026; See, also, Arlene B. Tickner, “Core, Periphery and (Neo)Imperialist International Relations,” ed. Colin Wight, Lene Hansen, and Tim Dunne, *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (September 5, 2013): 627–46, doi:10.1177/1354066113494323. Arlene and Ann Tickner are not to be confused though they share the same surname.

⁷⁷ Kwesi Aning and Fiifi Edu-Afful, “African Agency in R2P: Interventions by African Union and ECOWAS in Mali, Cote D’Ivoire, and Libya,” *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (March 1, 2016), 120.

⁷⁸ Buzan, “Could IR Be Different?”

potential'⁷⁹. However, these scholars stop short of actually answering these questions, leaving only a challenge to 'imagine' the discipline anew.

For this reason, several scholars suggest that the postcolonial critique reaches its limit at theoretical diagnosis. That is, the postcolonial critique identifies the biases in traditional IRT but fails to solve those problems in an explanatory research agenda. As Bilgin notes, 'the question of what it would mean for IR to become more international does not have a straightforward answer'⁸⁰. One reason for this is the inescapability of the Eurocentric position, acknowledged by many postcolonial scholars.⁸¹ Hence, Spivak's now-famous question, 'can the subaltern speak?' is a key concern of postcolonial IR scholars. Neospivakians examine whether one can escape Eurocentrism from the perspective of an Anglo-American canon,⁸² and doubt if a non-Eurocentric IRT is even legible to a Eurocentric academy. By contrast, Chakrabarty holds that Europe can be 'provincialised', while recognising the ironic debt owed to the Eurocentric canon.⁸³ To 'decentre' is not to *ignore*—or to wish to—but to navigate, on this view. Chakrabarty advocates an academic honesty which accepts the difficulty of escaping Eurocentrism but retains an ambition to transcend it:

⁷⁹ Amitav Acharya, "Advancing Global IR: Challenges, Contentions, and Contributions," *International Studies Review*, 2016, 6.

⁸⁰ Pinar Bilgin, "'Contrapuntal Reading' as a Method, an Ethos, and a Metaphor for Global IR," *International Studies Review* 18, no. 1 (March 2016): 134–46, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viv018>.

⁸¹ Graham K. Riach, "Can the Subaltern Speak?," *Can the Subaltern Speak?*, 2017, 1–96, doi:10.4324/9781912281770; Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair, "Power Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race, Gender and Class," *Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race, Gender and Class* 4 (2013): 1–324, doi:10.4324/9781315017181; Michael Murrin, "Book Review: Culture and Imperialism, and: Edward Said: A Critical Reader," *Modernism/modernity* 1, no. 3 (1994): 259–63, doi:10.1353/mod.1994.0051; George Ghevarughese Joseph, "Foundations of Eurocentrism in Mathematics Visiting Fellowship Collecting Material for a Forthcoming Book, Entitled History of Mathematics: A Non-Eurocentric Approach," *At Oxford University Libraries on October 12* (2015); Achille Mbembe, "What Is Postcolonial Thinking?," *Eurozine*, no. 12 (2008): 1–13, <http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2008-01-09-mbembe-en.pdf>; Achille Mbembe, "Decolonizing Knowledge and the Question of the Archive," *Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research (WISER)*, University of the Witwatersrand, 2015, 29.

⁸² Gayatri Chakravorty. Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present* (Harvard University Press, 1999).

⁸³ Dipesh. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton University Press, 2000).

To ‘provincialise’ Europe was precisely to find out how and in what sense European ideas that were universal were also, at one and the same time, drawn from very particular intellectual and historical traditions that could not claim any universal validity. It was to ask a question about how thought was related to place. Can thought transcend places of their origin?⁸⁵

Comparably, Ling proposes a harmony between Western and Southern perspectives. She posits a dialectical relationship, reminiscent of *yin* and *yang*.⁸⁶ Instead of ‘extricating’ ourselves from either perspective, we should recognise their co-constitution and mutual re-enforcement; instead of renouncing old concepts, or intentionally subverting ‘traditional’ narratives, scholars should ‘let a thousand flowers bloom’.⁸⁷ This requires constant theoretical dialogue between the received canon and new, experimental scholarship. Methodologically, Ling interrogates the mundane and quotidian aspects of international life⁸⁸ as opposed to questions of ‘grand strategy’. For example, she explores Sino-Indian relations from the perspective of cuisine and demotic conversation, instead of border war and nuclear rivalry. She acknowledges the uses of traditional IRT, but combines different disciplinary strategies to ‘enlarge’ the discipline.⁸⁹

Others pursue a multiperspectival historical project.⁹⁰ One such approach calls for greater reflexivity in scholarship on European empire, thereby ‘decentering’ Europe from within. It centres colonialism in global politics, tracing its legacies and questioning its impact on contemporary IR.⁹¹ For instance, Nicolaidis et al. explore the role of colonial imaginaries in shaping contemporary EU policy, and stabilising narratives of

⁸⁵ Chakrabarty, *xxi*.

⁸⁶ L.H.M. Ling, *The Dao of World Politics: Towards a Post-Westphalian World*. (Routledge, 2014).

⁸⁷ To quote Mao, ironically. L.H.M. Ling, “Decolonizing the International: Towards Multiple Emotional Worlds,” accessed April 20, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297191400030X>.

⁸⁸ Boyu Boyu Chen, Ching-Chane Hwang, and L.H.M. Ling, “Lust/Caution in IR: Democratising World Politics with Culture as a Method,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 37, no. 3 (May 1, 2009): 743–66, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829809103241>.

⁸⁹ Boyu Chen, Hwang, and Ling.

⁹⁰ Sizwe Mpofu-Walsh, “Fees Must Fall: Student Revolt, Decolonisation and Governance in South Africa,” 2016.

⁹¹ Kalypto Nicolaidis, Berny Sebe, and Gabrielle Maas, *Echoes of Empire: Memory, Identity and Colonial Legacies*, n.d.

European democracy.⁹² Others redefine longstanding disciplinary boundaries, arguing that terms like ‘African philosophy’ confuse ethno-philosophy for philosophy itself.⁹³ ‘Postcolonial’ theory should be concerned with theory practised *by* postcolonial scholars, instead of pre-occupied *with* the extra-European.⁹⁴ Yet a final approach applies ‘Southern theory’ to real-world problems, demonstrating the virtues of abandoning crude Eurocentrism.⁹⁵

Comaroff and Comaroff take a more radical stance by entirely reversing the direction of theoretical meta-narratives, placing the West in a position of subordination.⁹⁶ Beginning in the South, and applying theory to the West, they turn Eurocentrism on its head.⁹⁷ This act of theoretical protest purposely privileges ‘the South’ as a site of theory-production to expose the arbitrariness of a Western starting point. This approach they call ‘Theory from the South’:

What if we invert the ‘order of things’? What if we subvert the epistemic scaffolding on which it is erected? What if we posit that, in the present moment, it is the global South that affords privileged insight into the workings of the world at large? That it is from here that our empirical grasp of its lineaments, and our theory-work in accounting for them, is and ought to be coming?⁹⁹

In this thesis, I draw inspiration from traditional, postcolonial and *post*-postcolonial thought. I accept the diagnoses of postcolonial scholars, and actively privilege Southern experiences against the great power gaze. Yet, I am also aware of the postcolonial critique’s prognostic limits. From the counter-critique I take up the challenge of

⁹² Nicolaïdis, Sèbe, and Maas; Kalypso Nicolaidis and Robert Howse, *The Federal Vision* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), <https://doi.org/10.1093/0199245002.001.0001>; Onar, Nora Fisher, and Kalypso Nicolaïdis. “The Decentring Agenda: Europe as a post-colonial power.” *Cooperation and Conflict* 48, no. 2 (2013): 283-303.

⁹³ Paulin J. Hountondji, *African Philosophy: Myth and Reality* (Indiana University Press, 1996).

⁹⁴ Hountondji.

⁹⁵ Raewyn Connell, “Using Southern Theory: Decolonizing Social Thought in Theory, Research and Application,” *Planning Theory* 13, no. 2 (May 2, 2014): 210–23, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1473095213499216>.

⁹⁶ Jean Comaroff and John L Comaroff, “Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America Is Evolving Toward Africa,” *Anthropological Forum* 22, no. 2 (2012): 113–31, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00664677.2012.694169>.

⁹⁷ Comaroff and Comaroff.

⁹⁹ Comaroff and Comaroff. Some of the examples they cite include treating inanimate objects like mobile phones as idols, coping with rapid mass urbanisation, and the wholesale privatisation of the state.

pursuing an explanatory agenda from a critical perspective. I also concede that some concepts from the traditional canon remain useful to such an explanatory agenda and thus rely on ideas from the traditional perspective, although I often stretch these ideas in different ways and apply them to new evidence. Having conducted a conceptual history of the term ‘order’ in IRT and considered the critique of this term, I shall now turn to the related question of ‘nuclear order’, to elaborate further on the theoretical approach adopted in this thesis.

Nuclear Order and its Critics

‘Nuclear order’ is an oxymoron: the term ‘nuclear’ conjures fears of ontological uncertainty and apocalyptic devastation, while ‘order’ implies uninterrupted stability. The tension within this term epitomises the tension in nuclear order itself; at once a source of stability and anxiety in international politics. This tension also pervades definitions of nuclear order in the scholarly literature.

The term ‘nuclear order’ has existed since at least 1977, but saw little sustained academic attention until the 2000s.¹⁰⁰ As late as 1996, scholars like Kapur held that, ‘terms [such] as... nuclear order are widely used as political slogans and have been embraced... without subjecting them to strict academic scrutiny’¹⁰¹. Even in 2012, Leveringhaus described the term as ‘relatively new’¹⁰². William Walker’s examination of ‘nuclear order’ is the most comprehensive account available. Drawing on Bull, Walker defines order through ‘patterns of thought’ that rely on ‘two systems’ and ‘three logics’¹⁰³. The ‘two systems’ concern the management of deterrence on one hand, and the management of nuclear abstinence on another. These two systems are underpinned by three logics: armament, disarmament, and restraint. ‘Armament’ is

¹⁰⁰ Nicola Horsburgh, “China’s Engagement with Global Nuclear Order since 1949” (Oxford University Press, 2012).

¹⁰¹ Ashok Kapur, “Rogue States and the International Nuclear Order,” *International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 51, no. 3 (September 25, 1996): 420–39, <https://doi.org/10.1177/002070209605100302>.

¹⁰² Horsburgh, “China’s Engagement with Global Nuclear Order since 1949.”

¹⁰³ William Walker, *A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order* (Routledge, 2012).

the logic concerned with acquiring and maintaining nuclear weapons, ‘disarmament’ is the opposite logic, and ‘restraint’ is the logic of non-proliferation inside a legal framework of nuclear discrimination.¹⁰⁴ These two systems and three logics produce, ‘evolving patterns of thought and activity that serve primary goals of world survival, war avoidance and economic development; and the quest for a tolerable accommodation of pronounced differences in the capabilities, practices, rights and obligations of states’¹⁰⁵. Extending on Walker’s work, Leveringhaus distinguishes between order, and order’s purpose (again alluding the fact vs. value distinction).¹⁰⁶ She contends that the purpose of nuclear order is ‘strategic stability’ or the, ‘prevention of arms races and major war, especially escalation to nuclear war’¹⁰⁷. To Walker’s three logics, she adds arms control. These two systematic definitions are accompanied in the literature by less precise ‘list’ definitions. For instance, Kutchesfahani defines nuclear order as ‘a set of arrangements, institutions, norms, laws, rules, and regimes established internationally for maintaining global political stability’¹⁰⁸.

Several scholars have critiqued the notion of ‘nuclear order’ from a critical perspective. Some problematise the term ‘nuclear’, others the term ‘order’. The former approach is typified by Hecht’s work on ‘nuclearity’¹⁰⁹. To Hecht, the term ‘nuclear’ is fundamentally ambiguous because it serves the interests of antagonistic discursive communities. Some discursive communities strip ‘the nuclear’ of connotations of danger for pecuniary advantage, like mining multinationals and uranium exporters.¹¹⁰ These actors actively define the nuclear as ‘banal’ to avoid commercial regulations. Nuclear

¹⁰⁴ Walker.

¹⁰⁵ Walker, 12.

¹⁰⁶ Nicola Horsburgh, *China and Global Nuclear Order: From Estrangement to Active Engagement* (Oxford University Press, 2015); Horsburgh, “China’s Engagement with Global Nuclear Order since 1949.” Horsburgh changed her surname to Leveringhaus after 2015.

¹⁰⁷ Horsburgh, “China’s Engagement with Global Nuclear Order since 1949.”, 11.

¹⁰⁸ S. Z. Kutchesfahani, *Global Nuclear Order* (Routledge, 2018). Kutchesfahani’s work is nonetheless a very helpful guide to nuclear order.

¹⁰⁹ Gabrielle Hecht, *Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade* (The MIT Press, 2012), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004>.

¹¹⁰ Gabrielle Hecht, *Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War* (The MIT Press, 2011).

states also banalise ‘the nuclear’ when convenient, particularly through outsourcing nuclear danger in offshore nuclear tests.¹¹¹ On the other hand, an opposing discursive community invests ‘the nuclear’ with ‘magical’, destructive power reinforcing global nuclear hierarchies. For instance, the American, French and South African¹¹² militaries defined ‘nuclear material’ as hazardous to avoid proliferation.¹¹³ These opposing meanings permit a deregulated system of nuclear trade alongside a hyper-regulated system of nuclear militarism.¹¹⁴ Likewise, Abraham questions the distinction between nuclear energy programmes and nuclear weapons programmes, suggesting that nuclear technology is fundamentally ambiguous.¹¹⁵ This inherent technological uncertainty causes nuclear instability, rather than the motivations of nuclear states. Consequently, definitions of ‘nuclear’ are dependent on the interests which shape them, and assume opposite meanings to different actors.

By foregrounding the ambiguity of ‘nuclearity’, Hecht and Abraham successfully extend the debate over nuclear order into a new dimension. Instead of explaining nuclear actions through single master variables, Hecht and Abraham implore scholars to appreciate the multiple, often incoherent, motivations that drive states in the nuclear realm. Yet neither Hecht nor Abraham applies these insights to the question of NWFZs. This raises a theoretical opportunity to apply notions of ambiguity to a new and relevant problem. While I apply this notion of ambiguity in this thesis, I treat it as an explanatory variable rather than a description.

Another criticism of ‘nuclear order’ aims at IRT itself. As Leveringhaus argues, ‘nuclear order research has so far remained largely US-centric or conceptual in nature’¹¹⁶; while Biswas maintains that, ‘questions of “order” continue to be privileged over questions of

¹¹¹ Hecht, *Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade*.

¹¹² During apartheid.

¹¹³ Hecht, *Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War*.

¹¹⁴ Gabrielle Hecht, *The Radiance of France. Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II* (The MIT Press, 2009), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004>.

¹¹⁵ Abraham, “‘Who’s Next?’ Nuclear Ambivalence and the Contradictions of Non-Proliferation Policy.”

¹¹⁶ Horsburgh, *China and Global Nuclear Order: From Estrangement to Active Engagement*.

justice' closing the, 'epistemic space to raise the question of race'¹¹⁷. Mathur posits that 'nuclear bargains' evince a pretence of equality within relations of inequality;¹¹⁸ while Chung charges that nuclear scholarship, 'is indicative of an international regime that perpetuates logics of colonial violence, oppression and inequity as represented by the emblematic clash between nuclear "haves" and nuclear "have-nots"' ¹¹⁹. More broadly, scholars from the critical security studies paradigm claim that the definitions of security which frame order are unduly narrow.¹²⁰ For example, Cohn reflects on the gendered language that pervades 'technostrategic' nuclear discourse (almost always employed by men) in Cold War nuclear planning, claiming that terms like 'order' intentionally distract from the devastating realities of nuclear war by, '[the] elaborate use of abstraction and euphemism, of words so bland that they never forced the speaker or enabled the listener to touch the realities of nuclear holocaust that lay behind the words'¹²¹.

While critical scholarship on nuclear order is analytically useful, it remains largely descriptive rather than explanatory. On one extreme of the debate, then, traditional scholars aim to explain a wide range of phenomena without adequate critical reflection; on the other, critical scholars offer critique without prioritising an explanatory agenda. This thesis aims to balance these two approaches, by combining critical sensitivity with explanatory ambition. The key theoretical move in this regard is to treat the inequalities and ambiguities of nuclear order as explanatory variables in the context of NWFZs. Or, further, to assess whether these inequities and ambivalences paradoxically stabilise order. In doing so, I accept much of the postcolonial critique of order—and nuclear order—but follow it to a further conclusion: the inequalities inherent in nuclear

¹¹⁷ Biswas, "'Nuclear Apartheid' as Political Position: Race as a Postcolonial Resource?"

¹¹⁸ Mathur, "Sly Civility and the Paradox of Equality/Inequality in the Nuclear Order: A Post-Colonial Critique."

¹¹⁹ Chung, "Postcolonial Perspectives on Nuclear Non- Proliferation."

¹²⁰ Richard Wyn Jones, "Security, Strategy and Critical Studies," 1999; Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies: An Introduction*, vol. 9780203847, 2010, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203847473>.

¹²¹ Carol Cohn, "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 12, no. 4 (July 22, 1987): 687–718, <https://doi.org/10.1086/494362>.

order produce an overall stability by serving multiple audiences at once. Order is both iniquitous enough to retain the participation of NWSs, but egalitarian enough to accommodate N-NWSs. The contradictions highlighted by postcolonial theorists are, on my account, a source of the persistence for nuclear order, not an obstacle to it. NWFZs become crucial to this claim, since they epitomise this tension uniquely. I explore this argument in full depth in the conceptual model which follows, and through the cases I analyse.

A Polyrhythmic Order?

In this context, I draw inspiration from work which embraces the ambiguities of postcolonial modernity as a cause, rather than simply a description, of nuclear order. I shall now turn to work which scrutinises the ambiguities of nuclear order, to elaborate on this position. A range of scholars suggest that nuclear order is a balance between ‘resistance’ and ‘compliance’.¹²² That is, nuclear order cannot survive on western agency alone, but requires the agency of the global South. Likewise, the global South cannot act in isolation from the North, despite incentives to revolt. These two opposing poles must be simultaneously apprehended to fully appreciate nuclear order, they claim. Furthermore, the antagonism between these two poles is a paradoxical source of stability in the case of NWFZs, I shall argue.

This mode of ‘contrapuntal’ thinking draws on longer tradition within postcolonial theory which sees ambivalence—and not emancipation—as the product of postcolonial contestation. Literally, ‘contrapuntality’ refers to a musical arrangement that juxtaposes two simultaneous, but distinct melodies. According to Said, postcolonial modernity involves two, mutually co-constituting ‘melodies’—the ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’.¹²³ Drawing on this tradition, Abraham insists on the ‘simultaneous presence

¹²² To quote Scott’s now-famous dichotomy. See, also, Egeland, Kjølsv. “Punctuated Equilibrium in Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament.” *Peace Review* 28, no. 3 (2016): 318-325.

¹²³ Geeta Chowdhry, “Edward Said and Contrapuntal Reading: Implications for Critical Interventions in International Relations,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 36, no. 1 (December 24, 2007): 101–16, <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298070360010701>.

of more than one meaning of nuclear practices'¹²⁴. He suggests that India's nuclear weapons programme itself represents the ambiguities inherent in the postcolonial Indian state, at once seeking nuclear responsibility, and at once averse to its inherent inequalities.¹²⁵ Similarly, Sullivan de Estrada reflects on India's nuclear programme in the context of India's 'rising' status.¹²⁶ She applies Scott's 'compliance/resistance' motif to India's nuclear programme, revealing multiple ambiguities in its meaning to Indian security elites. On one hand, India's decision to withdraw from the NPT and ultimately pursue nuclear weapons evinces a desire to eschew nuclear order (resistance); on the other hand, India's close nuclear cooperation with NWSs—especially the US after 2005—indicates compliance with order.¹²⁷ This, she asserts, exemplifies a foreign policy strategy that, 'can be understood in terms of two competing, and at times overlapping, rising power practices: compliance with and resistance to the hegemonic norms and institutions of the existing international political and economic order'¹²⁸. Comparably, Biswas reads nuclear order as a combination of US-centred power politics alongside the resistance of marginalised states against US hegemony. Neither, she argues, can be viewed in isolation.¹²⁹

Elsewhere, Abraham explores how agreements like the CTBT relied crucially on the agency of the global South. Focusing on the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, a post-Bandung international legal institution, he argues that, 'without in any way dismissing the value of studying arms control agreements between and among nuclear powers, it is important to balance this dominant view with attention to the importance of global public opinion as a constraint on the actions of the Great

¹²⁴ Itty Abraham, "The Ambivalence of Nuclear Histories," *Osiris* 21, no. 1 (January 22, 2006): 49–65, <https://doi.org/10.1086/507135>.

¹²⁵ Itty Abraham, *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State* (Zed Books, 1998).

¹²⁶ Kate Sullivan de Estrada, *Competing Visions of India in World Politics: India's Rise Beyond the West* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

¹²⁷ Sullivan de Estrada.

¹²⁸ Sullivan de Estrada.

¹²⁹ Biswas, "'Nuclear Apartheid' as Political Position: Race as a Postcolonial Resource?"

Powers'¹³⁰. Thus, in the case of the CTBT, seemingly 'powerless' states managed to, 'raise the costs of business as usual'¹³¹.

Despite the many virtues of these works, further opportunities remain. As with postcolonial scholarship more broadly, South Asian experiences tend to dominate the literature on postcolonial nuclear order. It is important to test whether the intuitions which hold in this context apply more broadly to the African, South Pacific and Latin American cases. Second, while several scholars appreciate the value of this narrative of ambivalence, very few scholars apply ambivalence as an explanatory lens as opposed to an analytical device. Thus, Abraham and Sullivan de Estrada are unique in *explaining* Indian choices in terms of competing postcolonial desires. I seek to extend this approach to the subject of NWFZs.

Instead of viewing the existence and persistence of NWFZs as either a triumph of global order, or a postcolonial 'war of position', I claim that NWFZs represent *both* of these competing logics at once. In this sense, the notion of contrapuntality is not completely accurate, since it implies two melodies within a single rhythm. Nuclear order should rather be understood, in more jarring terms, as a polyrhythm: a single composition in which two entirely competing rhythms occur at once. Despite the apparent incoherence of these rhythms, their dissonance itself creates a new rhythm which is regular, repetitive and stable.

The Nuclear Puzzle

A second debate relevant to this thesis addresses the 'nuclear puzzle', which considers why, 'after more than half a century, the most striking feature of the nuclear age is that there are so few nuclear states'¹³². The neorealist position is a key point of departure in this debate. Neorealists maintain that nuclear choices are reducible to

¹³⁰ Abraham, "Decolonizing Arms Control: The Asian African Legal Consultative Committee and the Legality of Nuclear Testing, 1960-64."

¹³¹ Abraham.

¹³² Jim Walsh, "Understanding a Nuclear Puzzle: A Review of Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons by Thazha Varkey Paul," *International Studies Review* 3, no. 3 (2001), 177.

structural, security-related factors.¹³³ Waltz outlines this position most clearly, addressing nuclear choices in at least four places.¹³⁴ He argues that paranoia leads states into security dilemmas which climax in nuclear possession in technologically-capable and sufficiently threatened states.¹³⁵ Following this logic, several neorealists boldly predicted significant nuclear proliferation during or after the Cold War. Novelist and scientist C.P. Snow predicted in 1960 that, ‘Within, at the most, 10 years, some of those [nuclear] bombs are going off. I am saying this as responsibly as I can. That is the certainty’¹³⁶, while French General Pierre-Marie Gallois argued that proliferation was, ‘as irreversible as... the generalization of firearms’¹³⁷. Waltz himself predicted as many as twenty new nuclear states by 2020,¹³⁸ while Frankel claimed proliferation would, ‘intensify in the 1990s and beyond...’¹³⁹. Even in 1998, Mearsheimer warned, ‘the US will have to learn to live with the spread of nuclear weapons in the decades ahead... We cannot stop it’¹⁴⁰.

¹³³ Liberal institutionalists believe complex interdependence is persuasive, there are various constructivist approaches, and critical approaches also frame the question in terms of imperialism.

¹³⁴ Adam R. C. Humphreys, “Kenneth Waltz and the Limits of Explanatory Theory in International Relations,” 2006, 304; Kenneth N Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, no. 4 (1988): 615–28, <https://doi.org/10.2307/204817>; Scott Douglas Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate,” 2012, 288; Mark T. Clark, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate,” *Orbis* 41 (1997): 130, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0030-4387\(97\)90100-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0030-4387(97)90100-9).

¹³⁵ Provided there is a credible threat, and the state is technologically and economically capable of acquiring nuclear weapons.

¹³⁶ C. P. Snow, “Risk of Disaster or a Certainty,” *The New York Times*, 1980, <https://www.nytimes.com/1981/08/17/opinion/risk-of-disaster-or-a-certainty.html>. The prediction was republished in 1981 after Snow’s death though it was first made in 1960 in his ‘Two Cultures’ speech.

¹³⁷ Walsh, 8.

¹³⁸ Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, “Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed - UCTV - University of California Television,” UCTV, 2005, <https://www.uctv.tv/shows/Scott-Sagan-and-Kenneth-Waltz-The-Spread-of-Nuclear-Weapons-A-Debate-Renewed-9491>.

¹³⁹ Benjamin Frankel and Zachary S. Davis, “Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Theory and Policy,” *Security Studies* 2, no. 3–4 (1993): 1–3, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419309347517>.

¹⁴⁰ Peter Toft, “John J. Mearsheimer: An Offensive Realist between Geopolitics and Power,” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 8, no. 4 (2005): 381–408, <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800065>.

These predictions fell short. Since the end of the Cold War, only three states ‘went nuclear’,¹⁴¹ while at least seven reversed serious nuclear weapons programmes.¹⁴² Since then, offensive realists have addressed this predictive failure. Some suggest that ‘security guarantees’ explain the discrepancy: strong states can credibly promise protection to ‘weaker’ states, who balance against their enemies through these alliances.¹⁴³ Japan, South Korea, and Germany are oft-cited examples. However, after the Second World War, states have kept nuclear guarantees despite becoming *more* powerful.¹⁴⁴ Further, ‘weaker’ states like North Korea and Israel¹⁴⁵ rejected nuclear guarantees in favour of nuclear possession. Moreover, security guarantees must be credible to be useful, but how can they be credible in a world of explicit self-reliance? Some realists respond that security alliances are merely temporary, pragmatic arrangements. If so, why have they lasted so long, and why do states enter temporary arrangements over such crucial security choices? In response to these concerns, defensive realists counter that state behaviour can be constrained, which explains ‘why we are not all dead yet’¹⁴⁷. However, even these less ambitious predictions are still too conservative to explain unilateral nuclear disarmament, let alone the decision to preclude future nuclear possession through a NWFZ. At best, defensive realists think nuclear weapons can be temporarily avoided.¹⁴⁸ But this neglects evidence of states actively straining to limit their military power.

¹⁴¹ India, Pakistan, and North Korea.

¹⁴² South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Argentina, Brazil, and Libya; Rublee, 109.

¹⁴³ Bleek, Philipp C., and Eric B. Lorber. ‘Security guarantees and allied nuclear proliferation.’ *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58.3 (2014): 429-454.

¹⁴⁴ See Mastanduno, Michael. ‘Preserving the unipolar moment: realist theories and US grand strategy after the cold war.’ *International security* 21.4 (1997): 49-88.

¹⁴⁵ Iran may join this list in the future.

¹⁴⁷ Jervis.

¹⁴⁸ See Blazevic, Jason J. ‘Defensive realism in the Indian Ocean: oil, sea lanes and the security dilemma.’ *China Security* 5.3 (2009): 59-71.

Another strand of realist literature argues that nuclear non-proliferation can be explained by an ‘absence of threat’.¹⁴⁹ There is merit in this approach, but some ambiguities remain. If states are concerned with security, why do they renounce nuclear weapons, even when immediate threats subside? After all, there is no guarantee, according to realists, that *all* future threats will dissipate.¹⁵⁰ Despite various attempts to account for realism’s predictive failures, then, I am not convinced that nuclear realities confirm neorealist hypotheses. The assumption of self-help simply clashes with decades of nuclear forbearance and regional cooperation, and is at odds with the persistence of NWFZs. Rather than twisting realist assumptions to fit reality, a more fruitful approach is to relax the assumptions, I contend. The element of this approach that I extract is that threat perceptions inform the way that states and strategic elites within them take security decisions.

‘Prudential realism’ confronts this challenge.¹⁵¹ It holds that national security drives states’ choices, but not always towards maximum military capability.¹⁵² Instead, states may ‘prudentially’ forgo military capabilities that threaten more powerful rivals.¹⁵³ Accordingly, states balance their threat perceptions against their military capabilities, remaining ‘under the radar’ of powerful adversaries.¹⁵⁴ Prudential realism therefore

¹⁴⁹ See Sagan, Scott D. ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb.’ *International Security* (1996): 54-86; May, Michael M. ‘Nuclear weapons supply and demand.’ *American Scientist* (1994): 526-537; Frankel, Benjamin. ‘The brooding shadow: Systemic incentives and nuclear weapons proliferation.’ *Security Studies* 2.3-4 (1993): 37-78.

¹⁵⁰ Walt, Stephen M. ‘The progressive power of realism.’ *American Political Science Review* (1997): 931-935; Finniss, John, Joseph M. Boyle Jr, and Germain Grisez. ‘Nuclear deterrence, morality, and realism.’ (1987).

¹⁵¹ Prudential realism also combines aspects of ‘balance of threat theory’. The term was first coined by T.V. Paul in Paul, Thazha Varkey. *Power versus prudence: Why nations forgo nuclear weapons*. Vol. 2. McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP, 2000. It was also used by Kaufmann, although in another context in Kaufman, Robert G. ‘EH Carr, Winston Churchill, Reinhold Niebuhr, and US: The case for principled, prudential, democratic realism.’ *Security Studies* 5.2 (1995): 314-353. See also, Paul, T. V. ‘Disarmament Revisited: Is Nuclear Abolition Possible?.’ *Journal of Strategic Studies* 35.1 (2012): 149-169. See also Tziampiris, Aristotle. ‘Balance of Power and Soft Balancing.’ *The Emergence of Israeli-Greek Cooperation*. Springer International Publishing, 2015. 21-37.

¹⁵² Paul, 3.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

explains states' attempts to avoid security dilemmas and, in extreme cases, disarm¹⁵⁵: 'nuclear forbearance is the result of a conscious effort by technologically capable states not to create an intense negative security externality for other significant actors that will be most affected'¹⁵⁶.

According to prudential realists, the security of middle-power¹⁵⁷ states possessing—or capable of possessing—nuclear weapons is tied to other states, especially great powers.¹⁵⁸ Unlike great powers, however, middle-powers must appreciate the reciprocal effects of their actions. These states intentionally adjust their policies to avoid unwanted arms races.¹⁵⁹ Middle-powers calculate that nuclear acquisition is costly in the long-term and forgo weapons to escape possible counter-measures. Importantly, this makes them *more* secure. Decision-makers in these states avoid the nuclear option to lower security risk, because of the known cost of the security dilemma. Therefore, middle-power, nuclear-capable states reason that allies and enemies alike view the decision to acquire or keep nuclear weapons as dangerous, *even* if it provides a deterrent.¹⁶⁰ Thus, when nuclear-capable states play a deterrence strategy with a 'new proliferator', the new proliferator's net security still diminishes as, 'marginal gains accrued through nuclear acquisition would be nullified by its constant worry about the possibility of an attack, especially if it does not possess a second-strike capability'¹⁶¹. A theoretical opportunity thus lies in applying the prudential realist view to NWFZs to test these assumptions against new evidence.

Others critique realism more stringently. In his psychological explanation of the nuclear puzzle, Hymans laments realism's 'tragic sensibility' and posits that, 'decisions to go or not to go nuclear result not from the international structure, but rather from

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, 12.

¹⁵⁷ Measured in terms of military capability

¹⁵⁸ Paul, Thazha Varkey, ed. *International relations theory and regional transformation*. Cambridge University Press, 2012.

¹⁵⁹ Levite, 67.

¹⁶⁰ Paul

¹⁶¹ Ibid, 17.

individual hearts'¹⁶². Individual psychology trumps structure, according to Hymans, because nuclear decisions are taken by inherently elite and secretive groups. Hymans thus investigates leaders' 'national identity conceptions' (NICs), or their views of, 'what the nation naturally stands for and of how high it naturally stands, in comparison to others in the international arena'¹⁶³. He categorises four ideal NICs, along two dimensions: the 'solidarity dimension', and the 'status dimension'¹⁶⁴.

I concur that identity conceptions matter, but do not limit my focus only to official statements by presidents and prime ministers, as Hymans does. I also differ from Hymans to the extent that I am asking why states *pursue* NWFZs, and not why they pursue NWs. One of Hymans' lesser-considered NICs is, therefore, relevant for the purpose of understanding NWFZs. Specifically, the 'sportsmanlike subaltern' category—given little attention even by Hymans himself—describes many of the states that decide to opt for a NWFZ, I contend. This is because 'sportsmanlike subalterns' see themselves as marginalised (subaltern) but still conceive of international politics in 'us *and* them' terms. NWFZs thus reconcile these seemingly contending identity conceptions. I shall pursue this argument further in the next section. I do not use Hymans' categories directly, but I draw inspiration from his methods of categorisation to inform my argument on obedient rebellion in the section that follows.

Another important psychological account comes from Wheeler, who suggests that security dilemma spirals¹⁷⁰ are reversed by relationships of trust between national leaders. By 'trust', Wheeler means, 'the expectation of no harm in contexts where betrayal is always a possibility'¹⁷¹. Trust is to be distinguished from confidence:

¹⁶² Jacques Hyman, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotion, and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), <http://files/338/Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation.pdf>.

¹⁶³ Jacques Hymans, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation* (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

¹⁶⁴ Potter and Mukhatzhanova, "Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay."

¹⁷⁰ Cases in which the perception of enemy aggression leads to armament and possibly war. See, for instance, Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," *World Politics* 31, no. 02 (January 22, 1979): 289–324, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009945>.

¹⁷¹ Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict," *Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict* 6 (2018): 1–384, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199696475.001.0001>.

confidence implies a mere absence of fear based on past action; trust requires faith in the face of uncertainty.¹⁷² Trust arises through calculation or bonding: calculations of trust require risk/reward predictions, while trust through bonding emerges, ‘out of a transformation of identities and interests’ through interaction between individuals¹⁷³. In the context of nuclear order, Wheeler argues that trust is fundamental to the NPT.¹⁷⁴ This is because the NPT is based on the expectation that NWSs will not exploit the vulnerabilities of the N-NWSs.¹⁷⁵ It is also because trust exists between the NWSs, according to Wheeler. This logic extends to NWFZs, I maintain, where relationships of trust must, in many ways, be stronger than in the case of the NPT. In NWFZs, states not only trust that NWs will not be used, but also that they will not even be transported, stationed or stockpiled. States within zones must also trust that their neighbours will not undermine NWFZ treaties, thereby threatening these treaties’ very legitimacy. In what follows, I focus on why states are prepared to take that leap, and on why specific normative and strategic environments encourage trust in some cases, but not others.

Also opposing the security argument, Solingen claims that economic survival drives nuclear choices, by analysing nine cases.¹⁷⁶ She suggests that states wishing to integrate into the global economy ultimately forego nuclear weapons for economic reasons. Japan, for instance, did not sacrifice its nuclear programme because of anti-nuclear norms, but because the Yoshida model of economic development required deep integration with global capital markets. Only states that are prepared to ignore the economic cost of nuclear acquisition dare to cross the nuclear threshold, she

¹⁷² Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford University Press, 2000).

¹⁷³ Wheeler, “Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict.”

¹⁷⁴ Jan Ruzicka and Nicholas J. Wheeler, “The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” *International Affairs* 86, no. 1 (2010): 69–85, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00869.x>.

¹⁷⁵ Ruzicka and Wheeler.

¹⁷⁶ Etel Solingen, *Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy*, Princeton University Press (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1998), <https://doi.org/10.2307/2585920>.

maintains.¹⁷⁷ Walsh disagrees. He claims that, ‘institutional explanations, especially those involving organizational politics and regimes’ ultimately capture, ‘what factors lead governments to reject and even renounce the ultimate weapon’¹⁷⁸. The NPT regime along with domestic nuclear institutions determines nuclear choices over other considerations, he claims.

There is merit in both Walsh and Solingen’s explanations, however each again falls into the ‘master variable’ trap. The complexity of nuclear decisions over the last seven decades defies a single explanation, however persuasive. Rather, my view is that nuclear decisions happen because of a *confluence* of factors. How, for instance, did states like South Africa, Israel, Britain and France successfully pursue nuclear weapons without harming their economic prospects? If they did not, why did they decide to pursue nuclear weapons despite these costs? If a US ally like Australia or South Korea pursued nuclear weapons, would this truly impact on their integration into the global economy? Even Walsh admits that his institutional argument includes several outliers. The key question is: how do all these variables—threats, norms, institutions and economics—interact?

Sagan appreciates the highly contextual nature of nuclear decisions. He proposes three different ‘models’ to explain the ‘search for the bomb’: the security model, the norms model, and the domestic politics model.¹⁷⁹ What differentiates Sagan’s analysis from that of Solingen, Walsh or the neorealists, is that he does not privilege one explanation, variable, or model over another. Rather, he claims that these three different models prevail in different contexts: ‘Nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear restraint have occurred in the past, and can occur in the future, for more than one reason: different historical cases are best explained by different causal models’¹⁸⁰. This is an important

¹⁷⁷ Etel Solingen, *Nuclear Logics, Comparative Regionalism* (Princeton University Press, 2007), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315758657-11>.

¹⁷⁸ Jim Walsh, “Jim Walsh PhD Thesis: Bombs Unbuilt.”

¹⁷⁹ Scott D Sagan et al., “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb”. *International Security* 21, no. 3 (1996): 54–86, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539273>.

¹⁸⁰ Sagan, 54.

insight, since Sagan abandons any single view in making this argument. Rather, he focuses on which variable *combinations* produce nuclear possession. This is a key source of inspiration for this thesis, since the diversity of NWFZs requires an explanation flexible enough for highly varied cases. Yet, whereas Sagan proposes three models that work independently in different contexts, I propose one explanation that includes several variables. Before I explicate this model fully, however, I wish to focus on one final approach to explaining security cooperation, in the literature on ‘security communities’.

Security Communities

The literature on security communities addresses why states cooperate over nuclear questions. It defines ‘communities’ as groups of actors with shared values that traverse traditional state boundaries.¹⁸¹ These shared values create expectations of an absence of war. Deutsch, an early advocate of the concept, argues that security communities rely on ‘integrated people’ which in turn rely on ‘a sense of community’.¹⁸² Adler and Barnett expand on this, arguing that transnational cooperation happens through, ‘interactions and face-to-face encounters’ often wholly independent of geographical proximity.¹⁸³ These networks of understanding create ‘imagined’ regions which are

¹⁸¹ Alex J. Bellamy, *Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problems of Regional Order, Politics in Asia Series. 2009*, 2nd ed (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2001), [http://files/194/AmitavAcharyaConstructingaSecurityCommunityinSoutheastAsia_\(2009\).pdf](http://files/194/AmitavAcharyaConstructingaSecurityCommunityinSoutheastAsia_(2009).pdf); James Eayrs, “Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience by Karl W. Deutsch Review,” *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue Canadienne d’Economie et Science Politique* 24, no. 1 (2012): 121–23, <https://doi.org/10.2307/139125>.

¹⁸² Miroslav Hroch, “Three Encounters with Karl W. Deutsch,” *Czech Sociological Review* 48, no. 6 (2012): 1115–29; Richard N. Lebow, “Karl Deutsch and International Relations,” *International Relations* 28, no. 3 (2014): 288–95, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117814545946>.

¹⁸³ Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, “Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the Study of Security Communities,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 10, no. 1 (March 28, 1996): 63–98, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.1996.tb00004.x>.

triggered by ‘cataclysmic events’.¹⁸⁴ Evidence of such regions abounds, they claim, from the contested contours of Europe and the notion of a ‘family of democracies’, to the US-Israeli relationship and the inclusion of Australia in the ‘Western’ alliance.¹⁸⁵ Acharya¹⁸⁶ concurs, but disputes the ‘widespread assumption among liberal theorists that such communities require a quintessential liberal-democratic milieu’¹⁸⁷. Rather, strong shared interests, defined in rationalist terms, suffice. He supports this view with reference to the ASEAN region.¹⁸⁸ Similarly, Vitalis argues that ‘shared values’ are not always romantic: pernicious racial solidarities, he argues, are central to IRT and the alliance structure of ‘the West’.¹⁸⁹ Both are based on the construction of ‘whiteness’, which he argues acts like one of Adler’s ‘imagined regions’.¹⁹⁰

Security communities have been analysed in a range of contexts. Higgart and Nossal analyse the concept in the tension between Australia’s Western alliances and its increasing Asian security connections.¹⁹¹ Hurrell argues that Latin American peace can be explained by democratic institutions, market liberalism, and legal regional institutions which, ‘placed a break on conflict spirals’¹⁹². Several studies apply the concept to North America, and Western and Northern Europe. Africa is noticeably absent from Adler and Barnett’s classic volume, but has been analysed by several authors since then: Ngoma, for instance, argues that SADC is becoming a security

¹⁸⁴ Here, Adler and Barnett draw directly on Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’ in the realm of international security. See, also Mai’a K. Davis Cross, “The Limits of Epistemic Communities: EU Security Agencies,” *Politics and Governance* 3, no. 1 (2015): 90, <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v3i1.78>.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problems of Regional Order*.

¹⁸⁷ Acharya.

¹⁸⁸ Acharya.

¹⁸⁹ Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations*.

¹⁹⁰ Vitalis.

¹⁹¹ Richard A. Higgot and Kim Richard Nossal, “The International Politics of Liminality: Relocating Australia in the Asia Pacific,” *Australian Journal of Political Science* 32, no. 2 (July 9, 1997): 169–86, doi:10.1080/10361149750887.

¹⁹² Andrew Hurrell, “An Emerging Security Community in South America?,” in *Security Communities* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 260.

community, citing the Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS);¹⁹³ whereas Laakso finds the concept ‘limited’ and ‘unhelpful’ in explaining African security because, ‘states are the building blocks of security communities; and whether we like it or not, concentrating on states makes little sense in order to grasp the political realities in Africa’¹⁹⁴.

There is a surprising scarcity of work analysing NWFZs in the context of security communities. Kacowicz compares the Latin American and West African ‘zones of peace’, in a rare major work analysing the causes of peace in the global South.¹⁹⁵ ‘Zones of peace’ are, ‘regions, states or *zones* (my emphasis) that are linked by a geographical relationship and mutual interdependence’ that maintain lengthy periods of stable peace (defined as the absence of war for at least thirty years).¹⁹⁶ Kacowicz highlights, ‘the neglected fact that there have been long periods of regional peace in disparate regions of the Third World’¹⁹⁷. His comparative study of South America and West Africa defines these ‘zones’ by their regional borders, though he concedes that, ‘delineating the exact spatial borders’ of a given region is ‘difficult’¹⁹⁸. He argues that these two ‘zones of peace’ can be explained by their respective acceptance of the territorial status quo (borders), the presence of an aspiring regional hegemon, and a normative consensus.¹⁹⁹ Kacowicz realises the similarity between ‘zones of peace’ and NWFZs: ‘in terms of international security and international law, another current usage of “zones

¹⁹³ Naison Ngoma, “SADC’S Mutual Defence Pact: A Final Move to a Security Community?,” *The Round Table* 93, no. 375 (July 2004): 411–23, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0035853042000249997>.

¹⁹⁴ Liisa Laakso, “Beyond the Notion of Security Community: What Role for the African Regional Organizations in Peace and Security?,” *The Round Table* 94, no. 381 (September 2005): 489–502, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00358530500243567>.

¹⁹⁵ Kacowicz, Arie M. *Zones of peace in the third world: South America and West Africa in comparative perspective*. SUNY Press, 1998.

¹⁹⁶ Arie M. Kacowicz, “Explaining Zones of Peace: Democracies as Satisfied Powers?,” *Journal of Peace Research* 32, no. 3 (1995): 265–76, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343395032003002>.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Kacowicz, Arie M. *Zones of peace in the third world: South America and West Africa in comparative perspective*, 9.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

of peace” in the international system is associated with the NWFZ concept²⁰⁰. He does not, however, expand on the differences between ‘zones of peace’ and NWFZs.

There is some logical and empirical overlap between this usage and mine, although not all the NWFZs I have traced are zones of peace in Kacowicz’s sense²⁰¹. Other work sees NWFZs as symptomatic of security communities. For instance, Acharya argues that the Southeast Asian NWFZ (SEANWFZ) is a by-product of the ASEAN ‘Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality’ (ZOPFAN) which is, in turn, a pillar of the ASEAN security community. Severino, a former Secretary-General of ASEAN, cites the Treaty of Bangkok as, ‘an important part of the global non-proliferation regime, of ZOPFAN and of ASEANS’s broader structure of political and security cooperation’²⁰². Davies also cites the Latin American NWFZ (LANWFZ) as evidence of a Latin American security community.²⁰³ The security community literature is important to this thesis for two key reasons. First, its suggestion that ‘cataclysmic events’ can trigger security cooperation inspires my hypothesis that ENIs trigger NWFZs. Second, by grounding cooperation in normative solidarities, the security community literature supplies a viable alternative explanation to the dominant realist hypothesis. The methodological approaches in this literature also accord with my approach here, by comparing geographically distinct areas of peaceful cooperation according to the MSSD.

Elsewhere, Adler proposes combining realism with constructivism in his work on security communities. In drawing a model for security community formation, he suggests that material factors create the underlying conditions for security cooperation, whereas ideational factors act as triggers.²⁰⁴ Particularly, new external threats cause,

²⁰⁰ Kacowicz, “Explaining Zones of Peace: Democracies as Satisfied Powers?”

²⁰¹ Ibid, 10.

²⁰² See, Rodolfo Severino. *Southeast Asia in search of an ASEAN community: Insights from the former ASEAN secretary-general*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006; Rodolfo C. Severino, “ASEAN Beyond Forty: Towards Political and Economic Integration,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 29, no. 3 (2007): CS29-3B, <https://doi.org/10.1355/CS29-3B>.

²⁰³ Simon J. Davies, “Community Versus Deterrence: Managing Security and Nuclear Proliferation in Latin America and South Asia,” *International Relations* 18, no. 1 (2004): 55–72, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117804041741>.

²⁰⁴ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511598661>.

‘new interpretations of social reality and the desire to reduce mutual fear’²⁰⁵. Along with technological and environmental changes, mutual threat perceptions are thus necessary for cooperative behaviour. But these underlying factors must combine with ‘conductive factors’ such as transactions and flows of people and ideas, shared meanings, organisations, and institutions. When these conducive factors align, they produce, ‘a wellspring of mutual trust and collective identity which... are the proximate necessary conditions for the development of peaceful change’²⁰⁶. Similarly, Adler argues that, ‘balance of power and security community often coexist’²⁰⁷. This under-emphasised coexistence reshapes the understanding of regions:

While analytically and normatively distinct, radically different orders, and in particular, the security systems of governance on which they are based often coexist or overlap in political discourse and practice... it is theoretically and empirically promising to make the overlap a key subject of research in its own right. This means going beyond acknowledging overlap in principle; it means understanding and explaining overlap and inquiring into empirical consequences for regional security governance.²⁰⁸

By ‘overlap’, Adler means that international actors simultaneously respond to materialist and normative factors, neither of which supersedes the other. These factors may complement, or compete with, each other. They may also vary over time. For instance, Adler argues that NATO’s origins lie in ‘balance of power logic’, but that its persistence stems from the establishment of a normative community. The change from one mode of security governance to another over time is only one form of overlap. Another is when states face competition over which logic to follow: when states are committed to cooperative regional arrangements but have regional adversaries, they

²⁰⁵ Ibid, 44.

²⁰⁶ Ibid, 45.

²⁰⁷ Emanuel. Adler, Michael N. Barnett, *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 78 (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), doi:10.1017/CBO9780511598661.

²⁰⁸ Adler and Barnett, 45.

must choose between the two. It is not always clear which choice states will make, so privileging one logic over another masks the influence of overlap, according to Adler.²⁰⁹ Adler also holds that failure to appreciate overlap leads to an unhelpful division of labour where, ‘realists study conflict and liberals and constructivists study peace’²¹⁰. Overlap also affects the definition of regional boundaries: regions can be defined as the space of overlap between ‘cognitive regions’ (governed by norms) and ‘practical regions’ (governed by threats). These two regions sometimes intersect, and sometimes diverge. For instance, in the ‘war on terror’, NATO functioned as a ‘cognitive region’ to encourage multilateralism, but as a ‘practical region’, to further US interests.²¹¹ In this sense, extended coalition behaviour that stretches across territorial divides can be thought of as ‘regional’ behaviour of a special kind. The key insight that Adler contributes to this thesis is that normative and materialist explanations can be complimentary. I pursue the explanatory potential of this insight against new evidence. In the case of NWFZs, I hypothesise that neither threat-based nor normative explanations can succeed alone. Rather, the overlap between them is salient.

In this section, I have surveyed various scholarly debates relevant to this thesis. I have argued that the concept of ‘nuclear order’ is key to understanding NWFZs. I then explored the conceptual debate around this idea before discussing work on the ‘nuclear puzzle’ and analysing the security community literature. I ended by reflecting on other work of direct similarity to this thesis. Having situated this study in a scholarly and disciplinary context, I now turn to explicating the conceptual model.

²⁰⁹ Emanuel Adler and Patricia Greve, “When Security Community Meets Balance of Power: Overlapping Regional Mechanisms of Security Governance,” *Globalising the Regional, Regionalising the Global*, 2009, 59–84, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139087339.004>.

²¹⁰ Adler and Greve.

²¹¹ Adler and Greve, “When Security Community Meets Balance of Power: Overlapping Regional Mechanisms of Security Governance”; Emanuel. Adler and Michael N. Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,” in *Security Communities* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 462.

CONCEPTUAL MODEL

In this section, I introduce the conceptual model. I begin by defining ‘obedient rebellion’, the key idea in the model. First, I define this term in its simplest form, before expanding on each aspect of the simple definition. I then outline the actors involved in the definition and the levels on which they act. Then, I show how ‘obedient rebellion’ influences both the existence and persistence of the three NWFZs under consideration. Thereafter, I offer several qualifications and clarifications before summarising the elements of the model diagrammatically.

I end the section by considering the limitations of this model from the perspectives of parsimony and explanatory power. Finally, I conclude that the tensions inherent in NWFZs epitomise the tensions inherent in nuclear order writ large, and assert that these tensions are a source of stability rather than instability in nuclear order. As such, NWFZs provide a unique vantage point through which to understand the longevity of nuclear order itself.

Actors and Levels

Obedient rebellion is the central idea in this thesis. At its simplest, obedient rebellion is an attitude of ambivalence toward the global nuclear order. In this section, I expound on the key elements of this definition. First, I identify the actors experiencing this ‘ambivalence’; second I define the terms ‘obedience’ and ‘rebellion’; next, I examine the spectrum of obedient rebellion, the social construction of obedient rebellion, and the shifting nature of the global nuclear order over time; finally, I summarise these elements in a series of diagrams to clarify the concepts from various perspectives.

My model identifies two sets of actors, each operating at distinct levels. These are states, which operate at the international level, and strategic elites, operating at the domestic level. These two actors, working at distinct levels, are divided into two further categories. States and strategic elites inside NWFZs, and states and strategic elites in the NWSs (the US, the UK, China, Russia, and France). For instance, within Africa,

the attitude of African states matters to the existence and persistence of the African NWFZ, as does the attitude of the NWSs toward the African zone. Thus, obedient rebellion applies both to the states which form part (or may form part) of a potential NWFZ, and the NWSs. This is summarised in Table 2.

Table 2: *Actors and Levels in the Conceptual Model*

Levels	Actors		
	<i>International</i>	States inside zones	Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs)
	<i>Domestic</i>	Strategic elites inside zones	Strategic elites in NWSs

This definition references both the systemic and sub-systemic variables. There is precedent for this kind of explanation in various schools of IR theory. One example of such an explanatory model is found in the work of Giovannini, who advances a two-layered explanation for the proliferation of regional nuclear security regimes.²³⁷ On one hand, she believes these regimes can be understood from the perspective of functional causes; on the other, she claims that regional regimes are products of power, and a desire to balance against US dominance.²³⁸ Only when we adopt both lenses can we understand the proliferation of these regimes. While my argument, and the object of my inquiry, are different to Giovannini's, I maintain that a two-level model is the best way to understand NWFZs.

Another example is neoclassical realism, which focuses on explaining foreign policy decisions through the interaction between systemic and domestic variables. As the school's earliest exponent, Gideon Rose, suggests:

Neoclassical realism argues that the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by the country's relative material power. Yet it contends that the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because

²³⁷ Francesca Giovannini, "Cooperating to Compete: The Role of Regional Powers in Global Nuclear Governance" (2012).

²³⁸ Giovannini.

systemic pressures must be translated through intervening unit-level variables such as decision-makers' perceptions and state structure.²³⁹

In this sense, neoclassical realism unites the systemic logic of realism with the sub-systemic logic often found in liberalism or constructivism. Importantly, it centres the interactions between the system-level and the unit-level, and vice-versa. As Taliafero et al. claim, neoclassical realists see 'anarchy as a permissive condition, rather than an independent causal force'²⁴⁰. Beyond great power politics, other scholars argue that 'small states' can also be understood through neoclassical realism. Whereas the great power gaze ignores small states or assumes that they orbit their nearest hegemon, neoclassical realists argue that state-level variables cannot be ignored. Unlike neorealism, neoclassical realism avoids general predictions. It is a recipe for *how* to theorise rather than a specific theory. For this reason, neoclassical realists' predictions vary widely while their method of theorising is similar.

This is not a work of neoclassical realism, but I borrow its structure by combining two levels of analysis to explain the foreign policy outcome I wish to explain. While I deny the centrality of anarchy for the reasons covered earlier, I concur that foreign policy outcomes are best explained by multiple simultaneously aligning factors. For these reasons, I maintain that a multifactorial causal model is necessary to understand the three zones that I consider. Having defined the actors involved in obedient rebellion, I shall now move to explain the terms 'obedience' and 'rebellion' more carefully.

Defining 'Obedience' and 'Rebellion'

Obedient rebellion is an attitude of ambivalence toward global nuclear order. 'Obedience' to nuclear order, means two things: *accepting the legitimacy* of nuclear order (legitimacy-acceptance), and *seeking recognition* within it (recognition-seeking).

²³⁹ Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (October 13, 1998): 144–72, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100007814>.

²⁴⁰ Steven Lobell, Jeffrey Taliaferro, and Norrin Ripsman, "Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy," n.d. 7

Legitimacy

As Egeland observes, ‘there is broad consensus that legitimacy, along with coercion and self-interest, is an important ingredient of norm compliance’²⁴³. In this thesis, ‘legitimacy’ comprises two aspects. The first is a regime’s ability to provide procedural and substantive *outcomes* consistent with actors’ priorities.²⁴⁴ For example, if actors prioritise sovereign equality, then international institutions gain legitimacy in proportion to their ability to deliver equality on the international stage. The procedural aspect of legitimacy is a regime’s ability to convince actors that rules apply fairly. As Franck argues, ‘legitimacy is... that quality of a rule which derives from a perception on the part of those to whom it is addressed that it has come into being in accordance with right process’²⁴⁵. The second aspect of legitimacy is ‘moral acceptability’, to use Wight’s phrase.²⁴⁶ That is, the legitimacy of nuclear order consists in its ability to accord with states’ moral priorities, or the ‘desirability’ or ‘appropriateness’ of a regime in fulfilling a, ‘socially constructed system of norms and beliefs’²⁴⁷. Therefore, the legitimacy of nuclear order comes from two sources: its ability to deliver security, and its resonance with the moral priority of equality. Thus, nuclear order is legitimate insofar as it promotes sovereign equality on the one hand, and delivers nuclear security on the other. Where states and strategic elites see nuclear order improving their security, this improves the legitimacy of nuclear order; where they see nuclear order detracting from their security, so the legitimacy of nuclear order declines.

The legitimacy of nuclear order, then, relies on its ability to promote the security of states inside zones, and the NWSs. Actors cede authority to security regimes in return

²⁴³ Kjølsv Egeland, “The Road to Prohibition: Nuclear Hierarchy and Disarmament, 1968 – 2017” (University of Oxford, 2018), 62.

²⁴⁴ Nina Srinivasan Rathbun, “The Role of Legitimacy in Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” *Nonproliferation Review* 13, no. 2 (2006): 227–52.

²⁴⁵ Thomas M Franck, “Legitimacy in the International System,” *The American Journal of International Law* 1 (1988): 705–59.

²⁴⁶ Martin Wight, “International Legitimacy,” *International Relations* 4, no. 1 (April 26, 1972): 1–28, <https://doi.org/10.1177/004711787200400101>.

²⁴⁷ Mark C. Suchman, “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches,” *Academy of Management Review* 20, no. 3 (July 1, 1995), 574.

for nuclear safety. In the case of nuclear institutions, this is all-the-more central since nuclear security is existential. Thus, the legitimacy of nuclear institutions is central to their ability to mitigate particular nuclear threats, and nuclear order maintains its legitimacy by diminishing these threats.

For the actors in this model, threats to security can emerge from multiple directions. These threats, in turn, colour actors' perception of the legitimacy of nuclear order. First, NWSs can threaten states inside a potential NWFZ. For example, NWSs have threatened states in the Middle East with nuclear war on several occasions since the end of WWII.²⁴⁸ North Korea has also experienced similar threats.²⁴⁹ Second, and conversely, states in a potential zone can pose threats *to* external NWSs. For instance, North Korea has threatened nuclear war against the US.²⁵⁰ Next, players *within* a potential zone pose threats toward *each other*. These take two forms: either, an internal nuclear-capable state can threaten a zone from within (like Israel in the Middle East or India and Pakistan in South Asia), or the zone itself can pose a threat to an internal NWFZ (as Israel is threatened by states in the Middle East). In the cases I consider, all the actors concerned decide on whether to join a NWFZ based on their perception of whether the zone will diminish these different threats.

Accordingly, states (at the international level) and strategic elites (at the domestic level) evidence legitimacy-acceptance in several ways. For states, the first way is through active participation in the institutions of nuclear order, covering deterrence, arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation. 'Active participation' means joining

²⁴⁸ Andrew MacLeod, "Donald Trump Could Drop a Nuclear Bomb on Iran within Two Years" *The Independent*, 2017, <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/donald-trump-could-drop-a-nuclear-bomb-on-iran-within-two-years-a7787416.html>; Zachary Keck, "How the U.S. Military Would Strike Iran: Everything You Need to Know," *The National Interest Blog*, 2017, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-the-us-military-would-strike-iran-everything-you-need-21616>.

²⁴⁹ Edward Luttwak, "It's Time to Bomb North Korea – Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy*, 2018, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/08/its-time-to-bomb-north-korea/>.

²⁵⁰ Jonathan Kaiman, "North Korea Threatens to Turn U.S. Mainland into a 'Theater of Nuclear War,'" 2017, <http://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-na-essential-washington-updates-north-korea-threatens-to-turn-u-s-1502294652-htmlstory.html>; Mark Moore, "North Korea Threatens to Go Nuclear over US Military Exercises," *The New York Post*, 2017, <https://nypost.com/2017/10/19/north-korea-threatens-to-go-nuclear-over-us-military-exercises/>.

institutions and subscribing to their rules by signing or ratifying treaties. For instance, ratifying global nuclear treaties like the NPT, CTBT, and TPNW is a sign of active participation. Other examples in the realm of disarmament include participation in UNGA Special Sessions, the UN Disarmament Commission, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, and the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament. In the realm of nonproliferation, legitimacy is seen through participation in the Nuclear Security Summits, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Nuclear Suppliers' Group. Further evidence of a state's acceptance of the legitimacy of nuclear order is evidenced in the realms of arms control and deterrence. Here, key institutions include regional arms control and nuclear sharing initiatives like NATO or bilateral defence treaties such as the US-South Korea Mutual Defence Treaty. Legitimacy is further shown by the alignment of domestic rules with global rules. For instance, the pursuit of domestic and even local nuclear-free status (as in the case of New Zealand), or constitutional commitments to NPT goals such as disarmament or non-proliferation (as in the case of Brazil's constitution²⁵¹).

For strategic elites, legitimacy-acceptance is evidenced in rhetoric on nuclear order (especially the NPT), both public and private. Where public and private 'transcripts' align, this strongly indicates legitimacy-acceptance.²⁵² Thus, legitimacy-acceptance is gauged by participation in institutions, adherence to rules, and public and private rhetoric. High participation, strong rule-adherence, and friendly rhetoric suggests high legitimacy-acceptance and, thereby, strong commitment to nuclear order.

One may object that participation *per se* does not indicate legitimacy-acceptance, since states may participate in regimes begrudgingly. However, my definition of obedience does not require harmony. Rather, it requires the resolution of disputes within the

²⁵¹ Guido F.S. Soares, "The Treaty-Making Process under the 1988 Federal Constitution of Brazil," *Chicago-Kent Law Review* 67 (1991).

²⁵² For a detailed analysis of the difference between public and private 'transcripts' and their relation to domination and resistance, see James Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (Yale University Press, 1990). Hidden transcripts refer to the 'backstage discourse' that cannot be spoken in front of a group with opposing interests. For the powerful these are direct avowals of their power; for the powerless their disdain for the powerful.

confines of a regime. Indeed, the resolution of a dispute within a regime is often stronger evidence of legitimacy-acceptance than silence.

Rebellion is the converse of obedience. Where obedience requires legitimacy-acceptance, rebellion requires legitimacy-rejection; where obedience at the international level requires active participation in institutions and adherence to rules, rebellion requires withdrawal from—or rejection of—institutions, norms, and rules; where obedience at the domestic level requires friendly public and private rhetoric from strategic elites, rebellion requires the opposite. In the nuclear realm, rebellion is denoted by acquiring nuclear weapons against NPT dictates, using nuclear weapons, or enriching uranium without international inspection or safeguarding. Examples of rebellion through legitimacy-rejection include India, Israel and North Korea. States wishing to pursue rebellion, then, see NWFZs as a symbol for rejecting the wider legitimacy of global nuclear order. In the case of security regimes, a lack of legitimacy relates to the regime's potential to diminish threats. States may feel that joining a regime reduces their security or strengthens their aggressors. In this sense, the rejection of the legitimacy of an institution is also tied to actors' threat perceptions.

Recognition

The second dimension of obedience is recognition-seeking within nuclear order.²⁵³ I define recognition, in turn, along several dimensions. Foundational to recognition is an actor's self-conception. Just as in the inter-personal realm, identity requires self-conception²⁵⁵, so in the international realm states (or strategic elites) must develop a conception of state identity. Recognition, then, entails a correspondence between an actor's self-conception and other states' external perceptions. As Murray observes, 'to say that identity formation depends on the experience of recognition is to acknowledge

²⁵³ For an excellent account of the role of recognition in the nuclear regime, see Egeland, "The Road to Prohibition: Nuclear Hierarchy and Disarmament, 1968–2017"; Nick Ritchie and Kjølsv Egeland, "The Diplomacy of Resistance: Power, Hegemony and Nuclear Disarmament," *Global Change, Peace & Security* 30, no. 2 (May 4, 2018): 121–41, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2018.1467393>.

²⁵⁵ Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts* (MIT Press, 1996).

that states' fundamental ontological condition is relational'²⁵⁶. Resultantly, 'misrecognition occurs when a state is represented in ways that differ from how it constructs its own particular identity, which makes it difficult for it to enact its desired social status in the international sphere...' ²⁵⁷. Recognition-seeking occurs when actors bid to align discrepancies between external perception and self-conception. To do this, they may seek 'thin recognition', like being acknowledged at the UN, or 'thick' recognition like being accorded empathy, understanding, and even prestige by others.²⁵⁸

At the international level, recognition-seeking thus involves actions and statements which, 'demand that other states recognise [a state] "as it already really is" and, importantly, a normative claim that enables [a state] to enact that status unhindered in its interactions with other states'²⁵⁹. Traditionally, recognition theorists have assumed that recognition is directed against, 'perceived inequalities in political order'²⁶⁰. However, Fehl argues that recognition dynamics can be, 'more complex and more ambivalent' by influencing, 'not only the collapse but also the creation and stability of unequal order'²⁶¹. In this regard, nuclear order is the paradigmatic example of recognition-seeking in a context of inequality: 'the NPT is probably the clearest contemporary case of an unequal yet almost universally recognized international institution'²⁶². To appreciate why states that prioritise equality nonetheless seek

²⁵⁶ Michelle Murray, *The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations: Status, Revisionism, and Rising Powers* (Oxford University Press, 2019).

²⁵⁷ Michelle Murray, *The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations: Status, Revisionism, and Rising Powers*, 14.

²⁵⁸ Alexander Wendt, "Why a World State Is Inevitable," *European Journal of International Relations* 9, no. 4 (December 21, 2003): 491–542, <https://doi.org/10.1177/135406610394001>.

²⁵⁹ Murray, *The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations: Status, Revisionism, and Rising Powers*, 14.

²⁶⁰ Christopher Daase et al., *Recognition in International Relations: Rethinking a Political Concept in a Global Context Edited, Education* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

²⁶¹ Caroline Fehl, "Understanding the Puzzle of Unequal Recognition: The Case of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," in *Recognition in International Relations* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015), 104–22.

²⁶² Fehl.

recognition in the NPT, Fehl highlights the various, often-contradictory, moral priorities to which states (and strategic elites inside them) aspire.

Thus, actors inside potential NWFZs may pursue recognition through the NPT for several reasons. First, although the NPT differentiates between NWSs and N-NWSs, it promises that NWSs will constrain their power in future. By joining the NPT, then, N-NWSs sacrifice immediate inequality for a future guarantee of equality.²⁶³ The alternative is rejecting the regime at the risk of perpetuating the existing equality in the long-term. Second, small N-NWSs can gain disproportionate power through NPT procedures, which allow for expression in excess of their actual power. For example, island states in the South Pacific have wielded the institutions of nuclear order to gain the compliance of major nuclear powers. Thus, the procedures built into nuclear order's institutions sometimes privilege—rather than subordinate—small N-NWSs. Finally, for nuclear threshold states, such as Germany or Sweden, recognition as 'responsible nuclear states' may trump a desire for nuclear prestige. In this sense, the NPT accords with a self-conception of rectitude, trustworthiness or maturity, for states and strategic elites which 'tie their status to being law-abiding, nonnuclear members of the international community'²⁶⁴. Hence, recognition-seeking can affirm states' core identities even within regimes of institutionalised inequality like the NPT.

Accordingly, recognition-seeking involves states' attempts to affirm their self-conceptions through the rules and institutions of nuclear order which, in turn, inform the reforms they have pursued to this order since 1967. In the cases I consider, NWFZs thus become a key venue for recognition-seeking since they depend both on states' self-conceptions and other states' perceptions. Importantly, this self-conception may be ambiguous or even contradictory. For some elites, membership of a NWFZ may confirm an identity of postcolonial resistance; for others, the same NWFZ can connote

²⁶³ This is another dimension of trust in the NPT related to the work of Wheeler mentioned earlier.

²⁶⁴ Murray, *The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations: Status, Revisionism, and Rising Powers*.

an identity of nuclear responsibility or law-abidance. It is precisely this ambivalence that stabilises NWFZs.

Conversely, actors rebel by seeking recognition outside nuclear order. What factors contribute to the construction of an anti-nuclear identity in N-NWSs? Nuclear norms constrain nuclear states because of the moral aversion to nuclear first-use, and the reputational damage associated with nuclear use. By contrast, norms apply to N-NWS through aversion to nuclear possession and the reputational damage associated with ‘going nuclear’. I hypothesise that in the cases I consider, rebellion to nuclear order centres on the association of nuclear weapons with colonialism.²⁶⁵ All but one of the NWSs was a colonial power in regions that eventually became NWFZs. In each case I consider, former colonial powers often used their former ‘possessions’ as sites of nuclear testing or stationing. Similarly, a major wave of decolonisation coincided with the global debate over non-proliferation, between the late 1950s and the early 1970s. At various multilateral forums, therefore, the two questions became linked on the global agenda. This explains why NWFZs have been particularly prevalent in the postcolonial world. Hence, I contend that decolonisation and denuclearisation became linked in minds of postcolonial states, and on the agendas of several global institutions. Leaders inside these potential zones saw NWFZs as a remedy to both the problem imperial intervention, and the problem of disarmament.

As such, obedience means seeking recognition through inclusion in the NPT, rebellion means seeking recognition outside it, or by directly challenging its fundamental assumptions from within; where obedience means affirming state identity through ‘nuclear responsibility’, recognition means affirming it through nuclear acquisition; where obedience means enlarging state power through inclusion in the NPT, rebellion means enlarging state power through rejecting the NPT; where obedience means rhetoric friendly to nuclear order, rebellion means rhetoric that challenges it; and,

²⁶⁵ China being the exception.

where obedience means affirming identity through rule-adherence, rebellion means the opposite.

In this sense, NWFZs can affirm opposing identity conceptions: on one hand, NWFZs can affirm an identity of rule-breaking autonomy; on the other, they can affirm an identity of law-abidance; on one hand, they can symbolise the promise of disarmament within a global regime, and the ideal of nuclear equality, or they can tokenise regional protest against global nuclear inequality. Hence NWFZs enjoy regional and domestic support by mediating the contradictions which pervade nuclear order. Actors who seek obedience with the global nuclear order view NWFZ as symbolic of the promise of universal disarmament; those who oppose nuclear order, by contrast, see NWFZs as totemic of resistance and a regional protest.

In sum, obedience means actors accepting the legitimacy of the institutions of nuclear order, while recognition involves identity-affirmation within these institutions; rebellion, by contrast, requires the opposite. *‘Obedient rebellion’, then, is when both impulses—of obedience and rebellion—exist within states (and strategic elites) and across states (and strategic elites) in a potential NWFZ, and within and across the NWSs.* The case can thus be summarised succinctly: the African, Latin American, and South Pacific NWFZs exist and persist because of obedient rebellion. At NWFZ birth, obedience is framed largely around the ability of a NWFZ to create safety from nuclear intervention, while rebellion derives from an anti-colonial nuclear antipathy after an ENI. After a NWFZ is born, obedience and rebellion centre on a state’s attitude towards the NPT: obedience means actively endorsing the NPT while rebellion means rejecting it.

Triggers

Obedient rebellion explains the underlying attitude of the key actors involved in my model. However, each stage in the lifecycle of a NWFZ—birth and persistence—also has its own trigger. By ‘trigger’ I mean an event that is necessary, but not sufficient, to produce an outcome, and that always precedes this outcome. In terms of existence,

I claim that *External Nuclear Interventions* (ENIs) trigger the three zones that I consider. ENIs occur when a foreign NWS uses, tests or stations nuclear weapons in another region without that region's consent. For example, when the USSR stationed nuclear weapons in Latin America during the Cuban missile crisis, when France tested nuclear weapons in Africa, or when several NWSs tested nuclear weapons in the South Pacific.

I will show that in all these cases, ENIs triggered both states and strategic elites inside zones and the NWSs to drastically reconsider nuclear policy. The 'existence' phase of a NWFZ lasts from the moment of an ENI to when it successfully opens for signature. The next phase is 'persistence', which lasts from the point of opening for signature to 2017. In this phase, the opening for signature which marks the end point of the first phase becomes the trigger for the second phase. In this sense, each stage in the life of a NWFZ has a trigger: For the existence phase, the trigger is an ENI; for the persistence phase, the trigger is the successful opening for signature of a NWFZ.

Caveats and Qualifications

To develop the concept of 'obedient rebellion' further, I shall now enter several caveats. In this section, I explain that obedient rebellion is spectral, rather than monolithic. I then clarify that obedient rebellion is socially constructed. Next, I show that power relations constrain actors' ability to express obedient rebellion. I end by showing that the legitimacy of the NPT itself shifts over time, and that NWSs and N-NWSs often hold conflicting interpretations of nuclear order as expressed through the treaty.

The Obedience/Rebellion Spectrum

Obedient rebellion is an equifinal destination: the same end-state can be reached through multiple routes. Rather than a single, monolithic attitude, obedient rebellion is a constellation of attitudes, which lie on a spectrum. The actors I investigate follow different patterns of obedient rebellion even though, in aggregate, they exhibit similar tendencies. Hence, some NWFZs are born of one expression of obedient rebellion, while

others emerge from similar, but distinct, trajectories. I delineate different forms of obedient rebellion through a stylised typology, which ranks obedience and rebellion from ‘low’ to ‘high’, and depicts these ideal types in combination with each other. This is pictorialised in Figure 4.

Figure 3: The Obedience/Rebellion Spectrum




Figure 4 depicts the concepts of obedience and rebellion on separate axes, and visualises various combinations of the two. It stylises these respective phenomena into three types, from ‘low’, to ‘medium’, to ‘high’. This results in nine possible combinations.²⁶⁶ The central pane represents a perfect balance between obedience and rebellion. I argue that the actors in successful NWFZs tend to cluster around this pane. The panes above this central pane, ‘high-medium’ and ‘medium-high’, represent states of obedient rebellion leaning towards either obedience or rebellion. This is still obedient rebellion, even though the tension is not perfectly balanced. The pain at ‘high-high’ is a very rare (possibly practically impossible) category where a state is both highly obedient

²⁶⁶ I express these combinations beginning with obedience and then rebellion i.e. ‘low-high’ means low obedience and high rebellion. The nine categories are: high-low, high-medium, high-high, medium-high, medium-low, medium-medium, low-high, low-medium, low-low.

and highly rebellious toward nuclear order. By definition, the panes in the first column and the bottom row do not describe obedient rebellion, since they demonstrate either low rebellion, or low obedience, and hence a lack of tension between the two.

Power and Perception

A further qualification pertains to the nature of obedience and rebellion. Obedient rebellion is defined by what actors do, *and* by how these actions are perceived by the other actors constituting a zone. The interplay between NWSs and N-NWSs is key. These perceptions resolve potential ambiguities in the model. For instance, NWSs like France may claim that unilaterally testing nuclear weapons in foreign territories is *obedient* to nuclear order, because it strengthens deterrence. By contrast, the states of the South Pacific or Africa where such tests occur, perceive this as *rebellion* because it violates promises of disarmament. In scenarios where such discrepancies emerge between actors' perceptions, my model privileges the views of opposing actors, not the perceptions of actors *themselves*. This ties in with the earlier discussion of recognition, since recognition-seeking involves attempts to align external perceptions with self-identity.

This is also true among the NWSs. One NWS may view another's actions as rebellious, while the original state may view its actions as ambiguous, or obedient. Again, I resolve this by privileging the perception of the opposing actor. While these perceptions give a criterion by which to decide difficult cases, obedience is not only defined by perceptions. There are clear acts, like using nuclear weapons outside of war, which are universally agreed as rebellious. As such, obedient rebellion involves an interplay between objectively understood acts of obedience and rebellion, and external perceptions of obedience and rebellion. Sometimes these coincide; sometimes they diverge. Where they diverge, the perceptions of opposing actors are privileged.

Furthermore, expressions of obedience and rebellion differ according to the power actors wield. NWSs hold power over N-NWSs. Hence, acts of obedience and rebellion must be contextualised within this power imbalance. Many N-NWSs view the NPT bargain as unfair. For this reason, even if NWSs avoid strict violation of the NPT,

they can still be perceived as rebellious. This is particularly true in cases of nuclear testing. Although the NPT is agnostic on nuclear testing, N-NWSs categorically reject the idea of becoming unsuspecting testing sites for NWSs. They see rebellion as the unfair use of power that comes from nuclear possession, not simply from narrow adherence to the often-ambiguous precepts of the NPT. Here, the perceptions of N-NWSs are key to creating the ultimate compromises which birth and sustain NWFZs. Obedience and rebellion, then, are not solely based on a narrowly defined legal adherence to the NPT, but also to opposing actors' perceptions of what the NPT stands for, and the power-relations which circumscribe this balance. These perceptions can be mutually incoherent, and even divergent.

Nuclear Order

Previously, I defined nuclear order and related the concept to current debates in the literature. I also examined the variables of 'obedience' and 'rebellion', and analysed what triggers each in different phases of the life of a NWFZ. Finally, I showed how obedient rebellion is socially constructed and reliant on power relations. I shall now consider nuclear order as a variable in this model. Above, I defined global nuclear order as the set of norms, rules and institutions that balance the tension between nuclear security and sovereign equality. Nuclear order mediates these two values through a compromise: on one hand, N-NWSs agree to forego nuclear weapons; on the other, NWSs agree to disarm.

Theoretically, the choice of the N-NWSs to forego nuclear weapons improves the safety of the NWSs, and the decision to disarm reassures the N-NWSs. In order to guarantee this mutual security, N-NWSs accept a temporary compromise in legal equality, while NWSs accept legal equality despite significant inequality in actual power. The respective participants in the global nuclear order thus trade one value for another, in order to preserve the overall value of both. Nuclear order, then, is the set of institutions, rules and norms which mediate this compromise. However, each compromise creates an attendant resentment in the actors concerned. In this sense,

NWFZs accommodate these resentments by symbolising compromise among each of the actors.

Earlier, I depicted the major norms, rules and institutions involved in this mediation (this is pictorialised in Table 3). For the purposes of this conceptual model, I must enter two further caveats. First, nuclear order itself changes through time, and as it changes, so the meanings of obedience and rebellion change with it. When the NPT enjoys wide legitimacy, so obedience to nuclear order coincides with the legitimacy of its main norms, rules and institutions. When these institutions themselves lose legitimacy, obedience to nuclear order may involve challenging these norms, rules and institutions for failing to live up to their promise. Hence, obedient rebellion to the NPT in 1968 as experienced in Latin America differs from obedient rebellion in 2009 as experienced in Africa. I will not define these changes in detail here since they are contingent on a variety of factors which are explicated in the case-study sections. For the purposes of this conceptual model, I stress that obedience and rebellion evolve across time and across different cases depending on the legitimacy of nuclear order itself.

Second, I will take actors' attitudes toward the NPT as a proxy for their attitudes towards the norms, rules and institutions of the global nuclear order. There are five reasons why I believe this is a defensible theoretical move. First, the NPT is the centrepiece of nuclear order, involving the full range of arms control, disarmament, nonproliferation and deterrence logics; second the NPT is founded on the compromise that sustains nuclear order that I outlined above between equality and security; third, states and strategic elites seldom address global nuclear order itself, but often address the NPT as a representation of this order; fourth, the NPT lends NWFZs their international legal legitimacy; finally, the scope of this project excludes an examination of actors' attitudes towards the full range of rules, norms and institutions in nuclear order which involves the attitudes of hundreds of states inside NWFZs and at least eighty institutions and treaties. The NPT is not a perfect proxy for nuclear order, but I shall show in the case-study section that, for my purposes, it can be used as an

adequate token for states' overall attitude towards the global nuclear order. For these reasons, the case-study chapters of this thesis focus to a large extent on the NPT.


As I take the NPT as a proxy for nuclear order, so I identify several key states within each NWFZs as representative of the overall attitude of the zone. This again is a theoretical move designed to contain the scope of this work. This move will, no doubt, sacrifice some accuracy and nuance by confining my analysis to the views of a few representative states. Since there are over one-hundred states inside the NWFZs I consider, however, I cannot give them all equal focus within the confines of this work. In sum, to limit my analysis in the case-study section, I will analyse the views of several representative states within each zone towards the NPT and take these views as a proxy for the general attitude within the zone towards nuclear order.

The Conceptual Model: A Summary

Having analysed the conceptual model in full detail, I can now summarise the elements discussed above through three further diagrams. The first summarises the lifecycle of the NWFZs I consider; the second depicts the 'existence' phase; and the third depicts the 'persistence' phase. Figure 4 summarises the lifecycle of the NWFZs I consider. It begins with the 'existence' phase, which lasts from the start of an ENI to the successful opening of a NWFZs for signature.

The ENI triggers reactions of obedience and rebellion to nuclear order in both states and strategic elites within them (the diagram only depicts states for simplicity), as highlighted by the two lines emanating from the ENI. These reactions are, in turn, experienced differently by states and strategic elites inside zones, and states and strategic elites among the NWSs. The tensions caused by this obedient rebellion are temporarily resolved through the creation of a NWFZ, which serves the interests of both the 'obedient' and the 'rebellious' actors at both the domestic and international levels. This closes the 'existence' phase and inaugurates the persistence phase.

Figure 4: Lifecycle of NWFZs




In the persistence phase, the opening for signature of a NWFZ which closes the existence phase becomes the trigger for the new phase. It once again sparks obedient rebellion, which is ultimately resolved by a decision to maintain the NWFZ. Figure 6 depicts the model from the perspective of the actors²⁶⁷, states inside zones and the NWSs (and the strategic elites within them on the domestic level). The figure depicts two stylised actors, a NWSs (red) and a state inside a prospective NWFZ (blue) in a two-player sequential game. The first decision goes to the NWS, which must decide whether to conduct an ENI. If it does not conduct an ENI, then the status quo prevails. However, if a NWS chooses an ENI, then the state inside the zone has three potential options²⁶⁸: either, it can respond aggressively (by a military retaliation), or it can ignore the provocation (this option includes signing the NPT but taking no extra military or diplomatic steps), or it can reach a compromise between these two extremes

²⁶⁷ This figure can be thought of both from the perspective of states and strategic elites within those states.

²⁶⁸ In reality there are several more options and various combinations of these options, but I present these three stylised strategies to represent this complexity. The combinations of these options fall within the bounds of these three choices. This logic applies equally to strategic elites within states.

of proposing a NWFZ. If the state inside the zone chooses military retaliation, this ends the game on an undesirable outcome for both parties.

Figure 5: Existence from the Perspective of NWS and States Inside Zones



If it chooses to ignore the intervention, this results in subordination for the state inside the zone and supremacy for the NWS. If, on the other hand, the state inside the zone proposes a NWFZ then the onus returns to the NWSs, which must now decide whether to join the zone or reject it. If the NWSs rejects the zone, this detracts from its legitimacy and force. If the NWSs joins the zone, then the outcome represented in the three cases I consider obtains. This ends the ‘existence’ phase of the zone. What has come before this, therefore, describes why both a state within a prospective zone and a NWS would choose to go down these particular branches of the decision tree, represented in green.

In figure 6, I depict the ‘persistence’ phase from the perspective of NWS and states inside zones. Once a NWFZ opens for signature, then NWSs must decide whether to join it and states within the zone must decide whether to stay.

international boundaries by catering to multiple, conflicting elites at once. At different points in the life of a NWFZ obedience and rebellion work differently. At NWFZ birth, obedience is framed largely around the ability of a NWFZ to create safety from nuclear intervention, while rebellion derives from an anti-colonial nuclear antipathy after an ENI. After a NWFZ is born, obedience and rebellion centre on actors' attitudes towards the NPT: obedience means actively endorsing the NPT while rebellion means rejecting it. The complex causes which birth and sustain NWFZs uniquely epitomise the tensions within nuclear order writ large: the same logic that sustains NWFZs in these regions also sustains nuclear order in these regions. This is because nuclear order, like NWFZs, is reproduced through multiple contradictory meanings which serve manifold audiences. I thus take NWFZs as a microcosm for the ambiguities and ambivalences that ironically sustain the fragile balance of nuclear order.

CONCLUSION

NWFZs epitomise the tensions which stabilise nuclear order: between sovereign equality, and nuclear inequality; between local solidarities, and global commitments; and between contestation, and compromise. Whereas other authors warn that these tensions imperil order,²⁶⁹ I contend that these tensions stabilise order through opposing appeals to obedient and rebellious elites. NWFZs uniquely illustrate these tensions in Africa, Latin America, and the South Pacific.

In this chapter, I have outlined the conceptual foundations of this thesis. I began by tracing several conceptual histories, focusing on nuclear order. I also distinguished this thesis from similar work in the field. I then turned to the conceptual model, which

²⁶⁹ David Yost, "Analysing International Nuclear Order," *International Affairs* 83, no. 3 (May 1, 2007): 549–74; Brad Roberts, "'All the King's Men'? Refashioning Global Nuclear Order," *International Affairs* 83, no. 3 (May 1, 2007): 523–30; A Chakravorty, "A New Nuclear Age: An Exclusionary Global Order?," *Groningen Journal of International Law*, 2017; Kapur, "Rogue States and the International Nuclear Order".

explains why the three NWFZs I consider exist and persist. I suggested that obedient rebellion is an ambivalent attitude towards nuclear order. This ambivalence occurs at the domestic and international levels between two sets of actors (strategic elites and states) and concerns actors in two kinds of states (states inside NWFZs and the NWSs). Domestic obedient rebellion refers to a domestic tension in the public and private rhetoric of strategic elites over whether to support or reject nuclear order. Next there is regional obedient rebellion. This refers to a tension between states in each region over whether to support or reject nuclear order. Finally, there is obedient rebellion within and between the NWSs. When a NWFZ comes into existence, the tension created by obedient rebellion is resolved in a compromise involving a NWFZ. Once a zone emerges, obedient rebellion sustains it. Having outlined my hypotheses in this chapter, I shall now test these claims against evidence from three cases in the sections that follow.

Table 3: Institutions and Rules of Nuclear Order¹

Deterrence		Arms Control		Non-proliferation		Disarmament	
Rules	Institutions	Rules	Institutions	Rules	Institutions	Rules	Institutions
NPT	National militaries	NPT	CTBTO	NPT	Nuclear Security Summits	NPT	UNGA Special Sessions
ICJ Advisory Opinion	UNSC	Bilateral arms control agreements	NATO	TPNW	Proliferation Security Initiative	ICJ Advisory Opinion	UN Disarmament Commission
Domestic defence policies	UNGA	Nuclear sharing agreements	UNSC	NWFZ treaties	Nuclear Suppliers' Group	NWFZs	Geneva Conference on Disarmament
Domestic law of war	National legislatures	CTBT	UNGA	Uranium export control treaties	NPT RevCons	CTBT	CTBTO
TPNW	National security councils	Multilateral arms control agreements	Regional institutions		UNSC	TPNW	UNGA First Committee
NWFZ treaties	Regional institutions	TPNW	NWFZ commissions		UNGA	IAEA	NPT RevCons
Regional security treaties	NWFZ commissions	NWFZ treaties	IAEA		NWFZ commissions	NWFZ treaties	UNSC
UN Charter	NPT RevCons		NPT RevCons		Regional institutions		UNGA
			Bilateral institutions		IAEA		Regional institutions
			Multilateral institutions				NWFZ commissions
							NPT RevCons

¹ List is non-exhaustive. Sources: Walker, William. "Weapons of mass destruction and international order to 1990." *Adelphi papers* 44, no. 370 (2004): 21-30; O'neil, Andrew. "Nuclear proliferation and global security: laying the groundwork for a new policy agenda." *Comparative Strategy* 24, no. 4 (2005): 343-359; Mulas, Roberta. "Strategies of disarmament: civil society and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty." PhD diss., Luiss Guido Carli, 2017; Egeland (2016).

CHAPTER TWO: *The Latin American NWFZ*

BACKGROUND | THE TREATY | EXISTENCE | PERSISTENCE | CONCLUSIONS

Nuclear weapons, whose terrible effects are suffered, indiscriminately and inexorably, by military forces and civilian population alike, constitute, through the persistence of the radioactivity they release, an attack on the integrity of the human species and ultimately, may even render the whole earth uninhabitable.

—*The Treaty of Tlatelolco*¹

In the previous chapter, I outlined the conceptual model. In this chapter, I test the model against a first case, the Latin American NWFZ. Latin America is the primary global example of successful nuclear non-proliferation. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco), which antedates the NPT by a year, is the centrepiece of this success. As the first NWFZ in an inhabited area, Latin America is the benchmark against which all subsequent NWFZ treaties compare. Any analysis of NWFZs must therefore consider this paradigmatic case.

In this chapter, I examine the origins and provisions of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. I then test the case against the conceptual model. I find that the model provides a plausible explanation of the case, despite some residual ambiguities. I focus on the views of three main Latin American states: Mexico, Brazil and Argentina and assess their attitudes to nuclear order over time. I then consider the position of the NWSs, from the perspective of the existence and persistence of the zone.

¹ NTI, “Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (LANWFZ),” Nuclear Threat Initiative, accessed June 1, 2018, <http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weapons-latin-america-and-caribbean-lanwfz-tlatelolco-treaty/>.

BACKGROUND

In the late 1950s, as the Third World emerged from colonisation and the Bandung consensus solidified, Latin American and African states set their sights on confronting the peril of nuclear war. The first formal sign of this came in 1958, when Costa Rica proposed a ‘Latin American Nuclear Arms Control Agreement’ to a Council Meeting for the Organisation for the American States (OAS) and, in 1961, Brazil supported the Declaration on the Denuclearisation of Africa at the UN.² The African initiative prompted Ecuador and Mexico to propose a Latin American NWFZ treaty at the UN later that year, which included African denuclearisation as a principle.

Tentative progress toward a LANWFZ was accelerated by the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The crisis shook the region and galvanised the cause of denuclearisation. Brazil soon brought an updated proposal to the First Committee of the UNGA on Latin American denuclearisation, while Mexican President Lopes Mateos led five countries in Latin America—Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador—to issue a joint declaration on banning the manufacture, storage or testing of, ‘nuclear weapons or devices for launching nuclear weapons’³. That November, the declaration was converted into resolution 1911 at the UNGA (XVIII),⁴ which mandated ‘studies’ to ‘advance denuclearisation’⁵. In November the following year, seventeen states convened

² NTI, “Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (LANWFZ). Nuclear Threat Initiative, accessed June 1, 2018, <http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weapons-latin-america-and-caribbean-lanwfz-tlatelolco-treaty/>.

³ Hugh Stinson and James Cochrane, “The Movement for Regional Arms Control in Latin America,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 13, no. 1 (1971): 1–17.

⁴ Six countries joined the original five in this resolution: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Panama and Uruguay.

⁵ United Nations General Assembly, “General Assembly Resolutions 18th Session,” United Nations General Assembly, 1963, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/18/ares18.htm>.

at the ‘Preliminary Meeting on the Denuclearisation of Latin America’, which established the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America (COPREDAL), headquartered in Tlatelolco, Mexico. COPREDAL’s mission was to ‘prepare a preliminary draft of a multilateral treaty for the denuclearisation of Latin America’⁶. COPREDAL held four sessions, between March 1965 and February 1967. The First Session established three separate working groups: one defined the extent of the zone; another, the obligations of the treaty, and the third, the duties of NWSs. The Second Session discussed securing a mandate from the UNGA and agreed on a compromise clause that ensured consistency between membership of the OAS and the LANWFZ.⁷ By the Third Session, the world’s attention zoomed on Latin America. UN Secretary-General, U Thant, opened with an optimistic message:

Success in your endeavours will not only be of great benefit to the states of Latin America, it would indeed be of great importance to the entire world. It could well have a catalytic effect on other initiatives for de-nuclearization in other areas of the world, and could contribute to one of our main objectives in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in facilitating other measures of disarmament.⁸

To the surprise of several nations, Brazil challenged the emerging draft text at the Third Session and submitted a stringent counter-proposal. Mexico countered, defending the existing draft. COPREDAL was charged with reconciling the two proposals, delaying the Fourth Session by several months.

⁶ N.M. de Faria and M.D. de Goes Fischer, “Some Considerations on the Tlatelolco Treaty,” accessed July 20, 2018, https://inis.iaea.org/search/search.aspx?orig_q=RN:14718002.

⁷ Bill Epstein, a Canadian Director of the UN Disarmament Division, tells a fascinating story about the early draft of Tlatelolco which came together over a single night: ‘With no time to lose, Sergio Gonzalez Galvez, legal advisor to the Foreign Ministry, and I sat down in the Foreign Office at about 5.00 pm with three secretaries, a large plate of sandwiches, and a bottle of whiskey to prepare a draft of what ultimately became the Treaty of Tlatelolco, including its provisions on special inspections and verification and the control system, as well as the structure of the entire organization.’

⁸ U Thant, “Secretary-General’s Statements - XI , 4 January 1966 - 5 May 1966” (United Nations, 1966).

Cuba was the only Latin American state not represented at the Fourth Session. All P5 states were observers except for the USSR, which sided with Cuba in avoiding direct participation.¹⁰ After successful negotiations, the treaty opened for signature on the 14th February 1967 and entered into force on the 11th ratification in 1969. This birthed the Agency for The Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America And the Caribbean (OPANAL), the treaty's verification organisation, which was formed on the 2nd of September 1969. REOPANAL, the preparatory conference for OPANAL, then convened before the inaugural General Conference of OPANAL.

The United Kingdom became the first NWS to sign the treaty, on the 11th December 1969, followed by the United States on the 11th of December 1971. France and China both ratified in 1974, on the 22nd of March and the 2nd of June, respectively. The USSR was the last NWS to ratify, on the 8th of January 1979.¹¹ For his work on the treaty, Mexican diplomat Alfonso Garcia Robles won the Nobel Peace Prize.¹²

Yet the treaty's success did not prevent some Latin American states from pursuing nuclear weapons programmes in the ensuing period. Argentina's nuclear ambitions date to the 1940s, and reached maturity in 1970 when it was competing for nuclear export contracts in countries as diverse as Australia, Algeria, Peru and Egypt.¹³ In 1983, Argentina successfully enriched uranium, but only to the 20% level (not the 90%

¹⁰ Moscow sent a general statement in support of NWFZs, deferring a final position on the zone to conclusion of the final text.

¹¹ John R Redick, "The Tlatelolco Regime and Nonproliferation in Latin America," *International Organization* 35, no. 1 (1981): 103–34.

¹² W. Epstein, "The Making of the Treaty of Tlatelolco," *Journal of the History of International Law / Revue d'histoire Du Droit International* 3, no. 2 (February 1, 2001): 153–79, <https://doi.org/10.1163/15718050120956938>.

¹³ Jacques Hymans, "The Dynamics of Nuclear Politics: Lessons From Latin America," in *Routledge Handbook of Latin America in the World* (Routledge, 2014).

required for weapons).¹⁴ Despite Argentina's aggressive pursuit of nuclear technology, most scholars agree that the programme was not intended to develop nuclear weapons.¹⁵ Brazil, on the other hand, did pursue a weapons programme. In 1975, it angered the US by partnering with West Germany on a nuclear agreement that spanned the full fuel cycle.¹⁶ This project ultimately failed due to technical and economic glitches but, by 1986, Brazil had developed the capacity to enrich uranium, with pressure from some sections of the Brazilian military for nuclear weapons.¹⁷ Other Latin American states also pursued nuclear technology.

Cuba entered an ultimately fruitless arrangement with the Soviet Union for as many as twelve nuclear reactors in 1976.¹⁸ Despite the failure of this project, Cuba produced over 1500 nuclear scientists by the mid-1980s, as many as Argentina or Brazil.¹⁹ Mexico, too, was keen on pursuing nuclear energy in the 1980s, though this was for strictly peaceful purposes. At present, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico have peaceful nuclear programmes.

¹⁴ Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, "Autonomy, Even Regional Hegemony: Argentina and the toward Its First Research Reactor (1945–1958)," *Science in Context* 18, no. 02 (October 6, 2005): 285, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0269889705000487>.

¹⁵ See, Emanuel Adler, "State Institutions, Ideology, and Autonomous Technological Development: Computers and Nuclear Energy in Argentina and Brazil," *Latin American Research Review* (The Latin American Studies Association, 1988), <https://doi.org/10.2307/2503235>; J.A. Sabato, "Atomic Energy in Argentina: A Case History," 1973, <https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/handle/10625/21264>; Jacques E. C. Hymans, "Of Gauchos and Gringos: Why Argentina Never Wanted the Bomb, and Why the United States Thought It Did," *Security Studies* 10, no. 3 (March 2001): 153–85, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410108429440>.

¹⁶ Juan E. Guglielmelli, "The Brazilian-German Nuclear Deal: A View from Argentina," *Survival* 18, no. 4 (July 3, 1976): 162–65, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396337608441625>.

¹⁷ Matias Spektor, "The Evolution of Brazil's Nuclear Intentions," *The Nonproliferation Review* 23, no. 5–6 (November 9, 2016): 635–52, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2017.1345518>.

¹⁸ Hymans, "The Dynamics of Nuclear Politics: Lessons From Latin America."

¹⁹ See, Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado and Alexander Belkin, "Cuba's Nuclear Power Program and Post-cold War Pressures," *The Nonproliferation Review* 1, no. 2 (March 1994): 18–26, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736709408436536>.

Several important developments since the treaty entered into force merit attention. In 1991, at the General Conference of OPANAL, Paragraph 2 of Article 25 was amended to permit states outside the original region to join the treaty. On 23rd of March 1995, Cuba signed the treaty and subsequently signed amendments, ensuring that all 33 states in Latin America and the Caribbean became signatories. Cuba ratified the treaty in 2002, provoking former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon to hail Tlatelolco as ‘an example of regional initiatives’ ability to ‘advance peace’ and, ‘a model for the world to follow’²⁰.

IAEA Director-General, Yukiya Amano, also praised the treaty’s ability to, ‘inspire similar other treaties in Africa, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Pacific’²¹. In 2015, OPANAL submitted a memorandum to the NPT Review Conference on activities relating to the treaty since 2010, and the US agreed to Cuba’s reaffirmation of Latin America as a ‘zone of peace based on a treaty’, which was one of the conditions for the re-establishment of ties between Washington and Havana under the Obama administration.²² In 2017, Tlatelolco celebrated its 50th anniversary.

²⁰ NTI, “Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (LANWFZ) (Tlatelolco Treaty).” *Nuclear Threat Initiative*. <http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weapons-latin-america-and-caribbean-lanwfz-tlatelolco-treaty/>

²¹ Ibid.

²² The rapprochement with Cuba is under severe pressure in the Trump administration.

Figure 7: Ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, by Date (Lightest to Darkest)²³



Figure 8: Meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America²⁸



²³ Author's own map.

²⁸ Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, "The Treaty of Tlatelolco," OPANAL, 2018, <http://www.opanal.org/en/treaty-of-tlatelolco/>.

Table 9: Ratification of Additional Protocol I, LANWFZ (chronological order)³⁶

<i>Country</i>	<i>Signature</i>	<i>Ratification</i>
United Kingdom	20 Dec 1967	11 Dec 1969
Holland	15 Mar 1968	26 Jul 1971
Unites States	26 May 1977	23 Nov 1981
France	02 Mar 1979	24 Aug 1992

Table 10: Ratification of Additional Protocol II, LANWFZ (chronological order)³⁷

<i>Country</i>	<i>Signature</i>	<i>Ratification</i>
United Kingdom	20 Dec 1967	11 Dec 1969
United States	01 Apr 1968	12 May 1971
France	18 July 1973	22 Mar 1974
People's Republic of China	21 Aug 1973	02 Jun 1974
Russia Federation (USSR)	18 May 1978	08 Jan 1979

³⁶ NTI, “Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (LANWFZ).”

³⁷ Ibid.

EXISTENCE

In this section, I test the Latin American case against the conceptual model. I start by establishing the importance of the Cuban missile crisis as an ENI. I then analyse simultaneous responses of obedient rebellion in key states (Mexico, Brazil and Argentina) and strategic elites within those states to the Cuban missile crisis. I then assess the attitude of the NWSs to the missile crisis and explain why they eventually supported the LANWFZ. I then turn to the question of persistence. I again analyse key states and strategic elites' attitude towards the global nuclear order, this time by assessing their stance toward the NPT. I claim that obedient rebellion also explains the persistence of the LANWFZ since 1967.

Legitimacy: 'The Noose Was Tightening'

The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 fundamentally shaped Latin American threat perceptions and the subsequent decision to form a NWFZ. In this section, I will argue that the missile crisis triggered a simultaneous reaction of obedient rebellion across and within Latin American states.³⁸

During the crisis, Latin American states faced two main threats which dictated their attitudes toward the emerging nuclear order: first, they feared a proxy war; second, they feared the use of nuclear weapons on the Latin American territory.³⁹ The key question was whether they would see nuclear order as a force to exacerbate or reduce these threats. Several confrontations during the crisis confirmed that threat perceptions were high in the region with, 'literally dozens of cases when it came within minutes of

³⁸ J R Martinez Cobo, "The Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Latin America," *IAEA Bulletin* 24, no. 2 (1982): 24–26.

³⁹ Redick, "The Tlatelolco Regime and Nonproliferation in Latin America."

a nuclear war'⁴⁰. For instance, on October 27th, during the embargo of Cuba, an American spy plane was shot down after intruding into Cuban airspace. On the same day, Russian submarines with nuclear-tipped missiles (unbeknownst to the US) were attacked by US depth charges (a type of anti-submarine weapon).⁴¹ Two of three submarines' captains resolved to launch their missiles in retaliation but the third captain, Vasili Arkhipov⁴², vetoed the move, almost certainly averting nuclear war.⁴³ Khrushchev's own memoir recounts a request from Castro to strike the US with nuclear weapons if it invaded Cuba again, a proposal the USSR refused.⁴⁴

These events escalated threat perceptions in the region, with states caught between the interventionist impulses of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Mexico was put on a 'high threat alert' after a cable of 23rd October explained that Cuba was preparing for battle: 'Faced with the declarations made by President Kennedy yesterday, the government of Cuba gave the order to be at battle stations [*orden de alarma de combate*] to all its armed forces in anticipation of an air attack against this

⁴⁰ Noam Chomsky, "Cuban missile crisis: How the US Played Russian Roulette with Nuclear War," *The Guardian*, 2012, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/15/cuban-missile-crisis-russian-roulette>. On the subject of the missile crisis and its nearly leading to war, see: May, Ernest R., and Philip Zelikow, eds. *The Kennedy tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban missile crisis*. WW Norton & Company, 2002; Chayes, Abram. *The Cuban missile crisis*. Oxford University Press, USA, 1974. Tetlock, Philip E., and Aaron Belkin, eds. *Counterfactual thought experiments in world politics: Logical, methodological, and psychological perspectives*. Princeton University Press, 1996.

⁴¹ Edward Wilson, "Thank You Vasili Arkhipov, the Man Who Stopped Nuclear War," *The Guardian*, 2012, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/27/vasili-arkhipov-stopped-nuclear-war>.

⁴² Because of this decision, Chomsky suggests Arkhipov should get 'twenty Nobel prizes'.

⁴³ Niccola Davis, "Soviet Submarine Officer Who Averted Nuclear War Honoured with Prize," *The Guardian*, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/oct/27/vasili-arkhipov-soviet-submarine-captain-who-averted-nuclear-war-awarded-future-of-life-prize>.

⁴⁴ Robert Pear, "Khrushchev Memoir Tells of Castro Plea For Attack on U.S.," *The New York Times*, 1990, <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/24/world/khrushchev-memoir-tells-of-castro-plea-for-attack-on-us.html>; Nikita Khrushchev and Sergei Khrushchev, *The Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*, vol. 2 (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).

country'⁴⁵. In response, some Latin American states were even willing to sanction force against Cuba to deter the greater danger of a nuclear confrontation.⁴⁶ Brazil, whose Prime Minister described the clash as the 'most serious crisis since World War II'⁴⁷ accepted a US request to mediate the conflict. Yet, intense negotiations with the US and Cuba did not avert confrontation, and agitated neighbours: in a series of diplomatic cables, Chile described Brazil's mediation efforts as 'diplomatic pyrotechnics', and mocked attempts to 'secure world peace'⁴⁸.

In this context, the LANWFZ became central to averting impending war. Brazilian Ambassador to the US, Roberto Campos, explained how the zone could avert disaster in a cable from Washington to Rio: 'Soviet support for the initiative [a NWFZ] after a UN decision to internationalize the question would permit Cuba [and] the Soviet Union to save face diminishing the dangerous direct confrontation... [there is an] urgent necessity for creative formulas that, avoid humiliation for both sides, reduce the tension'⁴⁹.

It is no coincidence, therefore, that the very next day after Soviet missiles were withdrawn from Cuba, Brazil proposed extending the General Assembly's proposal on the denuclearisation of Africa to Latin America.⁵⁰ The relief brought by the end of the crisis, the change in threat perceptions, and the progress toward the LANWFZ, were

⁴⁵ Mexican Embassy Havana, "Telegram From Mexican Embassy Havana," Wilson Center Digital Archive, accessed July 9, 2018, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115194>.

⁴⁶ Fidel Castro et al., "The Final Frontier: Cuban Documents on the Cuban missile crisis" (Wilson Centre Digital Archive, 2002).

⁴⁷ Hershberg, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban missile crisis, 1962 (Part 2)."

⁴⁸ Castro et al., "The Final Frontier: Cuban Documents on the Cuban missile crisis," 298.

⁴⁹ Castro et al.

⁵⁰ Ryan A Musto, "'A Desire so Close to the Hearts of All Latin Americans': Utopian Ideals and Imperfections Behind Latin America's Nuclear Weapon Free Zone," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 37, no. 2 (2018): 160–74.

most clearly articulated a year later by Carlos Bernades, Brazilian Ambassador to the UN, in a statement to the General Assembly:

A year ago, we surmounted a dreadful crisis and we managed somehow to reach, at last, the end of a dark, frightful tunnel. It was recognised at the time that the denuclearisation of Latin America provided an adequate answer for the predicament in which all nations found themselves in those days of fear and uncertainty. Fortunately, the problem has been solved and a nuclear holocaust averted. But the passing of fear should not mean the weakening of the determination to destroy the root of the crisis.⁵¹

From within Latin America, the ambivalent attitudes of Brazil and Argentina were key to the birth of Tlatelolco. One indication of Brazilian ambivalence was its decision to sign Tlatelolco in 1967 (though it only entered into force in 1994⁵²) while maintaining vocal criticism of the NPT. Brazil only signed the NPT in 1994, ratifying in 1998.⁵³ Argentina, on the other hand, perceived threats from a potential Brazilian weapons programme as early as 1967, when Brazil's stance on the LANWFZ had changed. An Argentine naval intelligence report commissioned on 'Brazil's Prospects in the Field of Nuclear Energy', suggested that a faction within the Brazilian military supported acquiring atomic weapons. This was based on Brazilian demands for PNEs to be allowed in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, recently signed nuclear agreements with France and Israel, and significant reservations on the NPT concerning the right to house PNEs on the Brazilian territory.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Musto, 162.

⁵² Although Brazil ratified the treaty in 1968, entry into force was conditional on waiving certain other conditions contained in Section 28.1 of the treaty. Brazil waived these conditions on 30th May 1994.

⁵³ Andrew Hurrell, "Brazil and the New Global Order," *The Current History*, no. January (2010); Paulo S. Wrobel, "Brazil and the NPT: Resistance to Change?," *Security Dialogue* 27, no. 3 (September 29, 1996): 337–47, doi:10.1177/0967010696027003009; José Goldemberg, "Lessons From the Denuclearization of Brazil and Argentina," *Arms Control Today* 36, no. 3 (2006): 41–43.

⁵⁴ Argentina Naval Intelligence Service, "Brazil: Prospects in the Field of Nuclear Energy," Wilson Center Digital Archive, 1967, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121347>.

These fears were entrenched when the President of the National Nuclear Energy Commission, General Uriel da Costa Ribeiro, made the startling claim that, ‘we cannot enter the atomic era without a test and this will be discussed in Geneva... Brazil will have to manufacture an atomic bomb if it is threatened with nuclear war, in spite of our decision to remain outside an arms race and its high cost; no nation can trust its allies to provide it with an atomic bomb in that eventuality’⁵⁵. Miller Hudson, scientific attaché at the US embassy in Rio, reiterated hard-liners’ desire to pursue the programme: ‘the gist of what he said was that the hard-line elements of Brazil’s military were and continue to be in support of Damy’s [Damy Souza Santos President of the Brazilian Atomic Energy Commission] efforts actively engaging in a nuclear device programme’⁵⁶. Despite this, the report estimated that it would be at least a decade before Brazil could manufacture nuclear weapons.

Some evidence suggests that Brazilian support for PNEs was cover for the pursuit of a device. For instance, Dr. Antonio Delfim Netto, the Brazilian Minister of External Relations, admitted in declassified minutes from the Fortieth Session of the Brazilian National Security Council that:

In spite of my belief that indeed in a dire moment for the history of the country what is meant for peaceful purposes may change into war purposes, I believe there will be no harm for us to give some emphasis to the peaceful uses, because this will provide us with cover for the several statements and the intransigent defence that we are taking, because even for peaceful purposes we must have unity of opinion, we must be firm, because otherwise we will not succeed.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Argentina Naval Intelligence Service.

⁵⁶ Herman Pollack and Miller Hudson, “Letter from Director of the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs Herman Pollack to Miller Hudson, Jr. At the US Embassy in Rio de Janeiro,” Wilson Center Digital Archiv, 1970, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/145013>.

⁵⁷ “Minutes of the Fortieth Session of the Brazilian National Security Council” (Wilson Centre Digital Archive, 1969).

Despite the initial relief, the crisis had provoked strong reactions inside Latin America. On one hand, states like Mexico believed that Latin America could only avoid another similar crisis by integrating into global nuclear institutions; on the other, states like Cuba believed that nuclear order was only another representation of the nuclear imperialism that caused the crisis in the first place.

Cuba's position on the zone was complex. On one hand, it supported denuclearising Latin America; on the other, it rejected denuclearisation within the confines of an unequal nuclear order. This view was clarified in a cable from Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa to the Cuban Mission to the United Nations on the 11th November 1962. Roa explained that Cuban support for the zone relied on the inclusion of Panama and Puerto Rico, territories excluded on request of the US: 'Government resolved to present following amendments to Brazilian [NWFZ] proposal: Specifically, include Puerto Rico and Panama Canal Zone as territories with the objective of denuclearization...' ⁵⁸ (this was a view that Brazil would ultimately support, delaying its own signature). Cuba also wanted the, 'withdrawal of all existing military bases in the Latin American territory and Africa belonging to nuclear powers... obviously, including Guantánamo' because it was, 'absurd that other nuclear powers cannot have bases in Latin America and the United States has one in Cuba' ⁵⁹. In sum, the decision about whether to join the zone rested on states within the zone's perceptions of its ability to diminish unprecedented nuclear threats. However, the decision to join the zone also relied on questions of recognition.

⁵⁸ Castro et al., "The Final Frontier: Cuban Documents on the Cuban missile crisis."

⁵⁹ Ibid, 143.

Recognition: ‘To Hell With the Imperialists!’

In this section, I explore the attitudes of several Latin American states, namely Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Cuba and highlight the importance of anti-colonial sentiment in driving their sense of recognition. I then focus on the US and the Soviet Union, arguing that recognition was a crucial feature of the overall drive toward a LANWFZ.

From the Latin American perspective, Tlatelolco must be understood against the backdrop of decolonisation, the Cold War, and a climate of economic nationalism. As Hunt observes, ‘decolonization’s aftermath, the twin discourses of nuclear catastrophism and modernization, and U.S. machinations in Latin America during the Cold War engendered a purer model of nuclear prohibition in the form of nuclear-free zones’⁶⁰. The history and legacy of nuclear confrontation in Cuba fundamentally shaped the zone’s perception of nuclear threats, and its view of the nuclear powers. Much of this opposition was again framed in anti-interventionist terms. The Cuban missile crisis was the central event in this process.

In a letter from Castro to Khrushchev at the height of the tension on the 28th October 1962, Castro explained his government’s readiness for military confrontation: ‘Yesterday the US government tried as before to find juridical justification for the right to the violation of our air space at any hour of the day or night. We cannot accept this, since to do so would be a renunciation of our sovereign prerogatives’⁶¹. Blight and Welch summarise the view of Cuban leaders on the causes of the crisis: ‘the main origin... was American aggression against Cuba’⁶². Laffey concurs: ‘For the Cubans,

⁶⁰ Jonathan Hunt, “Mexican Nuclear Diplomacy, the Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, and the NPT Bargain, 1962-1968,” in *Negotiating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Making of a Nuclear Order*, ed. Roland Popp, Liviu Horovitz, and Andreas Wenger (Routledge, 2016), 179–202.

⁶¹ Fidel Castro, “Telegram from Fidel Castro to N. S. Khrushchev” (Wilson Centre Digital Archive, 1962).

⁶² Bruce Allyn, Blights James, and David Welch, “Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban missile crisis,” *International Security*, 1989.

the missile crisis was about the sovereign rights of small states in a world dominated by great powers. It was about imperial power and competition, and the corresponding need to build laws and institutions that defend the independence of small states'⁶³.

In a report to the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, Castro recounted a conversation with Mikoyan: 'Initially, after we explained to him our standpoints, we had him clarify what was going to happen with the IL-28 planes (a post-war Soviet jet bomber), and he vouched that no, the IL-28s would not leave Cuba. Then, if I remember correctly, I asked him, "But what if they demand their withdrawal, what will you do?" He answered, "then to hell with the imperialists, to hell with the imperialists!"'⁶⁴ Mikoyan explained the Soviet position on Cuba using a pacifist interpretation of communist doctrine. It is not clear whether this was a deeply-held belief, given the deployment of missiles to Cuba, or whether this was a ploy to placate Castro after missile withdrawal:

The moment of liquidating imperialism has not come... Peaceful coexistence is the path to follow for the development of humanity toward socialism and the defeat of imperialism. The ideas of communism are not carried on bayonets. Communism is not imposed by cannon fire or nuclear bombs.⁶⁵

Yet many Latin American states were agitated by a lack of disarmament in the NWSs. Tlatelolco became a symbol for the possibility of a new nuclear order, built from the global South. Brazil's foreign policy leading to Tlatelolco is a case in point. Characterised by the 'three Ds' of disarmament, development, and decolonisation⁶⁶,

⁶³ Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, "Decolonizing the Cuban missile crisis," *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 3 (2008): 555–77.

⁶⁴ Fidel Castro, "Fragments of the Intervention of Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party," Wilson Centre Digital Archive, 1968, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110767>.

⁶⁵ Faure Chomon, "Letter From Faure Chomon to Fidel Castro."

⁶⁶ Glen Rosenbaum, Jon; Cooper, "Brazil and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," *International Affairs* 46, no. 1 (1970): 74–90.

Brazil became a fierce advocate of denuclearisation in the missile crisis. As Brazilian Diplomat and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Azeredo da Silveira averred, ‘the will of non-nuclear States to forgo the production and use of nuclear weapons must be in accordance with the willingness of the nuclear-weapon States to offer a counterpart’⁶⁷. Latin American states viewed the right to peaceful nuclear energy as central to development. Brazilian officials complained of the NWSs’ seeming antipathy towards peaceful nuclear energy in a meeting of the National Security Council:

The several conversations I have had have been difficult. We are going to have many problems. This is a new field that came up for the development and the big countries, who are the masters of nuclear energy, because of the development they achieved through it, will not wish to give ground. There is this constant allegation that total knowledge of the matter will result in countries being easily able to produce an atomic bomb. Despite its peaceful tradition, Brazil has not been understood, no matter how much it repeats this. I believe, Mr. President, that we are on the right path in examining this issue with maximum seriousness.⁶⁸

Brazil’s allies were similarly perturbed by efforts on the part of NWSs to curtail peaceful nuclear energy. As Nicaragua’s statement on the signing of the treaty reflects, the road to nuclear energy was seen as a chance to develop past Western dependencies:

The delegation of Nicaragua understands that the prohibitions laid down in this Treaty refer solely to the use of nuclear energy for warlike purposes. Consequently, Nicaragua in signing this Treaty, reserves its sovereign right to use nuclear energy as it sees fit for peaceful purposes, such as the large-scale removal of earth for the construction of inter-oceanic or other canals, irrigation works and electric power stations, and to permit transit of atomic materials through its territory.⁶⁹

Yet, Latin American states separated desires for development from their deep aversion to nuclear conflict. This distinction was clear in the final text of the treaty, which held on one hand that, ‘The incalculable destructive power of nuclear weapons has made it

⁶⁷ Argentina Naval Intelligence Service, “Brazil: Prospects in the Field of Nuclear Energy.”

⁶⁸ “Minutes of the Fortieth Session of the Brazilian National Security Council.”

⁶⁹ “Telegram from Ambassador Trivedi on Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament” (Wilson Centre Digital Archive, 1967).

imperative that the legal prohibition of war should be strictly observed in practice if the survival of civilization and of mankind itself is to be assured'⁷⁰ but, on the other, that, 'nuclear energy should be used in that region exclusively for peaceful purposes, and that the Latin American countries should use their right to the greatest and most equitable possible access to this new source of energy in order to expedite the economic and social development of their peoples'⁷¹.

Mexico was key to this balance. Its relationship of solidarity with post-revolutionary Cuba drew from a shared experience of US imperialism. The first Latin American government to recognise the Castro regime, Mexico became one of Castro's main regional allies between the Cuban revolution and the missile crisis. In a speech welcoming Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado to Mexico in 1960, for instance, Mexican president Alfonso Lopez Mateos said, 'we, who have travelled similar paths, understand and value the transformative effort that Cuba is undertaking'⁷². When the OAS severed diplomatic ties with Cuba in 1964, Mexico was the sole dissenter. In reaction to Mexico's support at the OAS, Castro responded, 'With the government of Mexico, we are disposed to commit ourselves to maintaining a policy subjected to norms, inviolable norms of respect of the sovereignty of each country'⁷³.

Meyer thus argues, 'One of the principles defended by the Mexican government in a more or less systematic manner for the last 100 years is that of the non-intervention

⁷⁰ Alfonso Robles, "The Latin American Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone" (The Stanley Foundation, 1979), 14.

⁷¹ NTI, "Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (LANWFZ)."

⁷² Renata Keller, "The Latin American Missile Crisis," *Diplomatic History* 39, no. 2 (2015): 195–222, <https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dht134>.

⁷³ Renata Keller, "Building 'Nuestra América:' National Sovereignty and Regional Integration in the Americas," *Contexto Internacional* 35, no. 2 (2014): 537–64.

of one country in the internal affairs of another'⁷⁴. Mexico's aversion to US intervention relied on harnessing the memory of colonial wars, as well as the preceding dissatisfaction with the US intervention into Guatemala in 1954 as a key rallying point for its overall nuclear policy in the region.⁷⁵ Mexico's position on Cuba prior to the missile crisis was also designed for a domestic audience. As Keller suggests, Mexico wished to, 'use their relations with Cuba to placate both the domestic left and Castro himself, while at the same time engaging in back-room negotiations with US leaders to convince them to cooperate with their decision'⁷⁶.

Mexico's commitment to non-intervention was severely tested by the missile crisis, however. In a letter from Mateos to Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos on the eve of the crisis, Mexico privileged the latter principle over the former: 'On board [a] plane on [a] return flight to my country after a friendly mission to four countries in Asia, the essence of which was to express the need to preserve peace, to seek an end to the arms race, and to abolish the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons. I consider that the possible existence of the installations of the type referred to could constitute a serious threat not only to the security of the peoples in the American continent but for the peace of the world'⁷⁷. Mateos expresses two important interrelated concerns in this statement. First, he shows solidarity with Cuba, while categorically privileging an antipathy to nuclear weapons over this solidarity. Mateos issues a firm rejection of

⁷⁴ Lorenzo Meyer, "The United States And Mexico: The Historical Structure Of Their Conflict," *Journal of International Affairs* 43, no. 2 (1990): 251–71.

⁷⁵ Meyer.

⁷⁶ Renata Keller, "A Foreign Policy for Domestic Consumption: Mexico's Lukewarm Defense of Castro," *Latin American Research Review* 47, no. 2 (2012): 100–119.

⁷⁷ Adolfo Lopez Mateos, "Message from Mexican President Adolfo López Mateos to Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos" (Wilson Centre History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 1962), <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115225>.

nuclear belligerence even in the context of Mexico's prior public support of Cuba. This illustrates the depth of Mexico's nuclear aversion.

Mateos' multi-state Asian trip also showed a desire to garner support for the LANWFZ from a diverse array of allies. A report on Foreign Minister Tello's trip to Scandinavian countries also highlights these efforts:

Foreign Minister Manuel Tello, who toured Scandinavia during the month, described the purpose of his visit in these words: "To unite efforts with the Governments of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland in the struggle which the President of Mexico is carrying forward in favour of peace. He referred to the Nordic countries as "figuring amongst the most fervent supporters of peace and disarmament." Repeatedly, in all four capitals, he stressed President Lopez Mateos' efforts in this cause, with special reference to the proposal for a Latin American denuclearized zone...⁷⁸

At the United Nations General Assembly's Eighteenth Session, Mexico outlined its public position: 'Mexico's role must in essence be that of a moderator... To be true to its tradition of peace, it should join with other states having similar aspirations in a combined effort to persuade the great Powers by the force of example, to seek diligently for ways and means of achieving general and complete disarmament'⁷⁹. Mexico also advocated a common position within the NAM on the question of nuclear order, according to notes from a meeting of the NAM in 1967: 'Tello expressed the view that this informal group of the non-aligned members should explore the possibility of evolving a minimum common stand in regard to various matters, which were of special interest to the non-aligned members'⁸⁰. It continues: 'Castaneda of Mexico remarked that while he agreed that there were certain essential elements in a balance of

⁷⁸ P. L. Bhandari, "Mexican Foreign Minister Manuel Tello Visited Scandinavia to Unite Efforts for Disarmament" (Wilson Centre History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 1963).

⁷⁹ United Nations General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Official Records, Monday, November 11, 1963. New York), 114.

⁸⁰ "Note on Meeting of the Non-Aligned Group at the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament" (Wilson Centre History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 1967), <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/133987>.

obligations, he would stress the fact that a non-proliferation treaty was a valuable objective worth seeking for its own sake. Again, it was a limited objective, because we could not hope to achieve nuclear disarmament under a non-proliferation treaty'⁸¹.

Besides its statements at multilateral institutions, Mexico also invoked Bolivarian anti-imperialism to support the cause of a LANWFZ. Garcia Robles framed the success of Latin American non-proliferation as a civilizational accomplishment that would eclipse the achievements of classical antiquity and, 'exceed and supplant those of the European civilization that had conquered, colonized, and for so long controlled the Western hemisphere'⁸²:

One hundred centuries from now, when posterity traces the origin of our public law back to the treaties that shaped its future, it will honor the Isthmus protocols... it will find the design of our future relations with the world. What then will the Isthmus of Corinth be next to that of Panama?⁸³

Brazil's response to the missile crisis mirrored Mexico's obedient rebellion in important respects. Like Mexico, Brazil rejected external nuclear installations on the Latin American territory while denouncing US interventionism. Minister of Foreign Affairs (later Prime Minister) Hermes Lima explained the Brazilian position, at once condemning nuclear conflict and decrying external intervention:

We voted [for] the necessary measures to impede the transport of offensive weapons to Cuba, and to any other country of America, in keeping with what we approved in Punta del Este⁸⁴, with respect to the prohibition of such weapons in the Continent. We voted without indecision and freely, against the accumulation of nuclear material in America [i.e. the Western Hemisphere]. What we did not vote on and will not vote for is a condemnation of the Cuban regime or for an authorization of the invasion. It is necessary to distinguish between the accumulation of nuclear weapons in the

⁸¹ "Note on Meeting of the Non-Aligned Group at the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament."

⁸² Jonathan Hunt, "Into the Bargain: The Triumph and Tragedy of Nuclear Internationalism During the Mid-Cold War, 1958-1970" (The University of Texas at Austin, 2013).

⁸³ Hunt, "Mexican Nuclear Diplomacy, the Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, and the NPT Bargain, 1962-1968."

⁸⁴ A meeting of Latin American states which decided on the Latin American position towards revolutionary Cuba.

Americas and the measures that tend towards overthrowing a population's domestic regime.⁸⁵

Lima's remarks illustrate how anti-interventionist rhetoric and anti-nuclear rhetoric combined during the crisis to produce support for the NWFZ. Brazil was concerned both that nuclear weapons might lead to devastating conflict *and* that such conflict might become a pretext for US intervention.⁸⁶ Like Mexico, Brazil was thus fighting a duel rhetorical battle, one anti-nuclear and the other anti-imperialist. Hermes Lima again explained the Brazilian position in a press interview reported in a Mexican diplomatic cable drafted by Robles: 'The Government of Brazil and its envoy are well aware that the fundamental conditions for overcoming the crisis will be "proof of the existence of the nuclear bases and its [sic] dismantling," which must have as a counterpart the commitment of the United States to not invade Cuba'⁸⁷. After the crisis, Brazil commended the NWSs for averting catastrophe on the one hand, while stressing its views on the obligations of nuclear possession, on the other. As Lima put it:

With the nature of the nuclear weapons that the great powers possess, they are the ones who must have the most patience and care, for they are the ones who possess nuclear armaments, the first and greatest victims of an atomic war in contrast to what happened in the past to the better armed nations... the United States, with its nuclear superiority, gave an example of prudence and care. This proves the high political capacity and statesmanlike ability of President Kennedy. The same can be affirmed of Prime Minister Khrushchev.⁸⁸

Brazil's concerns over the inequalities of nuclear order peaked in the concurrent negotiations over Tlatelolco and the NPT. In the missile crisis, Brazil privileged the

⁸⁵ Alfonso Robles, "Air Letter from Mexican Embassy, Rio de Janeiro: Brazil's International Policy" (Wilson Centre History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 1962).

⁸⁶ Hunt, "Into the Bargain: The Triumph and Tragedy of Nuclear Internationalism during the Mid-Cold War, 1958-1970."

⁸⁷ Robles, "Air Letter from Mexican Embassy, Rio de Janeiro: Brazil's International Policy."

⁸⁸ Robles.

concern of nuclear war over that of non-intervention by disavowing Cuba; it privileged the opposite priority during NPT negotiations, where frustration over the inequalities of nuclear order prevailed. Without firm commitments from NWSs on disarmament, Brazil was prepared to forgo the NPT. Brasilia was also keen to break the monopoly that the NWSs retained over nuclear energy:

The basic question was: Are we ready to sign a non-proliferation treaty without any obligations on the nuclear-weapon powers? Certain obligations inevitably fell on the nuclear-weapon powers, for example, a halt in the nuclear arms race, guarantees of security, an assurance regarding the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon powers. While the non-nuclear powers could agree to the nuclear-weapon powers having a monopoly of nuclear weapons, it would be completely wrong to let the nuclear-weapon powers enjoy a monopoly of nuclear research as well, as then we would be surrendering ourselves to the will of the nuclear-weapon powers.⁸⁹

Brazil's nuclear programme formed part of a high modernist project centring on state-led economic development, which included the nationalisation of the oil industry.⁹⁰ Thus, the aversion to external military intervention was mirrored by a desire for economic independence, with the nuclear programme at the intersection of these two impulses. These economic motives were, in turn, informed by an earlier tradition of anti-imperial resistance. In this sense, the Latin American antipathy toward nuclear weapons was forged in the fire of anti-imperialist rhetoric. Nuclear weapons—and the inequalities of nuclear order—became a symbol of broader inequalities in the Cold War, and nuclear independence became a token for freedom from these inequalities. The Treaty of Tlatelolco became the key stage on which this aversion was expressed.

⁸⁹ V.C. Trivedi, "Telegram From Ambassador Trivedi, 'Non-Aligned Meeting'" (Wilson Centre History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 1967), <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/133988>.

⁹⁰ James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (Yale University Press, 1998).

NWSs: 'Diminishing Danger'

As Cuba perceived threats from the US, so the US perceived threats from Cuba. The presence of Soviet nuclear weapons within ninety miles of the American coast may have constituted the greatest threat to the US mainland since Pearl Harbour.⁹¹ Attorney General Robert Kennedy (also a member of ExComm) recalled, 'a feeling that the noose was tightening on all of us, on Americans, on mankind, and that the bridges to escape were crumbling'⁹². President Kennedy, who perceived a fifty-fifty chance of war,⁹³ was prepared for a military confrontation despite the dramatic risk: 'We're certainly going to do "number one": we're going to take out these missiles... the questions will be whether [we do] what I would describe as number two, which would be a general air strike. That we're not ready to say, but we should be in preparation for it. The third is the general invasion'⁹⁴. The US was also threatened by the 'communisation of Latin America'⁹⁵, having already invested heavily in curtailing this threat before the crisis, climaxing in the botched Bay of Pigs incident.⁹⁶ At the height of the crisis, Washington offered Castro non-intervention if Havana broke ties with Moscow, which Cuba refused.⁹⁷ It also attempted the less subtle option of assassination on Castro as well as diplomatic efforts to sever ties between Castro and the Soviet

⁹¹ David Gibson, *Talk at the Brink* (Princeton University Press, 2012).

⁹² Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban missile crisis* (W. W. Norton and Company, 1969).

⁹³ Chomsky, "Cuban missile crisis: How the US Played Russian Roulette with Nuclear War."

⁹⁴ Blight and Bundy, "October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm."

⁹⁵ Blight and Bundy.

⁹⁶ James G. Blight and Peter. Kornbluh, *Politics of Illusion: The Bay of Pigs Invasion Reexamined* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

⁹⁷ Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban missile crisis*; Hershberg, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban missile crisis, 1962 (Part 2)."

Union.⁹⁸ For these reasons, the US could not yet be sure whether supporting a NWFZ would embolden its enemies, or contain them, given its strong perception of threat from Cuba and other Soviet allies.

The link between the crisis and the LANWFZ is illustrated in declassified recordings of the US Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) during the period. Between the 25th and 27th of October 1962, ExComm considered the Brazilian proposal, ‘of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America (and possibly Africa, in some variants), a step that would, inter alia, require the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba’⁹⁹. Some members of ExComm believed the zone would resolve the nuclear standoff by placating the Soviet Union. As a CIA memorandum proposed:

Brazil sees itself as a peacemaker in the Cuban situation, proposing that the UN undertake denuclearization of Latin America. Rio feels this would permit Cuba and the Soviet Union to save face, thus diminishing the danger of direct confrontation. The Brazilian Ambassador in Washington cabled his foreign ministry that ‘according to reports’ USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Frol Kozlov supported this idea.¹⁰⁰

Secretary of State, Dean Rusk was the zone’s chief advocate in ExComm. He suggested the zone would, ‘put enormous pressure... around the world and I think on the Soviet Union’ and that, ‘many Latin American States would support this zone, along with

⁹⁸ Barbara Walters and Fidel Castro, “An Interview with Fidel Castro,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 28 (1977): 22, doi:10.2307/1147794; Louis A. Perez, “Fear and Loathing of Fidel Castro: Sources of US Policy Toward Cuba,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 34, no. 02 (May 20, 2002): 227–54, doi:10.1017/S0022216X02006387; Font, Fabián Escalante. *CIA Targets Fidel: Secret 1967 CIA Inspector General's Report on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro*. Ocean Press, 1996; Escalante, Fabian, and Fabián Escalante Font. *Executive action: 634 ways to kill Fidel Castro*. Ocean Pr, 2006.

⁹⁹ James G. Hershberg, “The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban missile crisis, 1962 (Part 2),” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 6, no. 3 (2004): 5–67, doi:10.1162/1520397041447364.

¹⁰⁰ CIA Memorandum, “The Crisis: USSR/CUBA, Information as of 0600, 26 October 1962,” in CMC/NSA, p. IV-3; also in FRUS, 1961–1963, Vols. X–XII, microfiche supplement, doc. 413.

many other UN members, and the Soviets would have a difficult time opposing it'¹⁰¹. Rusk believed the proposal would placate Moscow by resolving the crisis under the pretext of an international agreement rather than through direct American pressure.¹⁰² Similarly, the US could justify aggressive measures more easily if Moscow refused the Brazilian NWFZ proposal. However, the military and President Kennedy were indifferent to the zone. Kennedy questioned, 'whether we could commit ourselves not to invade Cuba'¹⁰³, given Brazilian insistence on the territorial integrity of all Latin American states. Likewise, US Secretary for Defence, Robert McNamara, and several generals argued that the zone would compromise US storage and transportation facilities in Panama, impede US interests in Puerto Rico, and limit the aerial transportation of nuclear weapons.¹⁰⁴ Initial views of the zone thus solicited an ambivalent response from within the US security establishment.

As soon as the crisis subsided, however, the US showed early support for Tlatelolco. UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson argued, 'that a Latin American NFZ, under appropriate circumstances, would be a most constructive contribution to the cause of peace'¹⁰⁵. The US also observed the four sessions of COPREDAL, 'generally approving' of the process and encouraging the treaty. Rusk noted, 'The US believes the project of a NWFZ in Latin America is constructive statesmanship in the best tradition of the

¹⁰¹ James Blight and McGeorge Bundy, "October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm," *International Security* 12, no. 3 (2011): 30–92; See, also, Dean Rusk, "A Personal Reflection on International Covenants on Human Rights," *Hofstra Law Review* 9 (1980).

¹⁰² Sheldon Stern, *The Cuban missile crisis: Myth Versus Reality* (Stanford University Press, 2015).

¹⁰³ Mark J. White, *The Cuban missile crisis* (Palgrave Macmillan, 1996).

¹⁰⁴ "Summary Record of the Sixth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council," John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, 1962, <http://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct26/doc1.html>.

¹⁰⁵ Davis Robinson, "The Treaty of Tlatelolco and the United States: A Latin American Nuclear Free Zone," *The American Journal of International Law* 64, no. 2 (1970): 282–309, 283.

hemisphere'¹⁰⁶ and at the conclusion of the treaty, US Ambassador Fulton Freeman noted, 'The United States considers the conclusion of this first international instrument establishing a NWFZ to be an event of unique significance, and the United States will study the detailed provisions of the treaty with great interest'¹⁰⁷. The US saw NWFZs as beneficial in areas where it did not have a significant nuclear presence, but strongly opposed NWFZs where it did have a strategic nuclear interest. US Ambassador Stelle articulated this view at the General Assembly in 1963:

Some proposals [for NWFZs]... are serious attempts to find a way to alleviate the frightening threat of nuclear war... Others would alter the balance of power in a way that would be detrimental to world peace. In this connection I refer to proposals calling for NWFZs in Europe, Asia and the Pacific.¹⁰⁸

The US was also unwilling to accept any transit restrictions through the Panama Canal, claiming this was a fundamental aspect of its security. Signing the treaty without these assurances would have threatened US interests, according to Epstein.¹⁰⁹ The US was also clear that its territories, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, would not be subject to the treaty. Despite these caveats, US support was based on an assessment that Tlatelolco would radically reduce the risk of proliferation in Latin America. For instance, in a 1968 message from the US Embassy in Rio to Washington, officials doubted Brazil's ability and willingness to embark on the nuclear path: 'There is no evidence to suggest that Brazil has embarked or is presently seriously contemplating embarking on a programme to build a nuclear device'¹¹⁰.

¹⁰⁶ Robinson.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 294.

¹⁰⁸ Robinson, "The Treaty of Tlatelolco and the United States: A Latin American Nuclear Free Zone," 294.

¹⁰⁹ Epstein, "The Making of the Treaty of Tlatelolco."

¹¹⁰ Embassy of the US in Rio de Janeiro, "Assessment of Brazilian Nuclear Device Capability," Wilson Center Digital Archive, 1968, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/145011>.

Similarly, the Soviet Union viewed a US attack on Cuba as a major threat to its interests. A ‘top secret’ intelligence report of March 1962 warns, ‘The USA has completed preparations for an invasion of Cuba. A final decision by the Kennedy administration regarding the date of attack on Cuba is still to be made. The main area for concentration of the armed forces of the Cuban counter-revolution is in Guatemala and Panama’¹¹¹. In another ‘top secret’ telegram between Rodion Malinovsky (then Soviet Minister for Defence) and Issa Pliyev (the General in charge of missile deployment in Cuba), Malinovsky cautioned, ‘In connection with the possible landing of Americans participating in the manoeuvres in the Caribbean Sea on Cuba, undertake urgent measures to increase combat readiness, and to repel the enemy by joint efforts of the Cuban army and all units of the Soviet troops, excluding the weapons of Statsenko’s and of all Beloborodov’s cargo’¹¹².

Yet once the crisis ended, the Soviet Union also saw a LANWFZ as a way to avert future threats.¹¹³ To Soviet strategists, missile placement had averted an invasion of Cuba and preserved Soviet interests. This was evidenced in a letter from Anastas Mikoyan (the chief Soviet envoy to Cuba and high-ranking member the Soviet Communist Party and Government) to the Cuban Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Faure Chomón:

Humanity has been freed from a catastrophic war, and Cuba from its complete liquidation. It must be understood that the situation has improved for Cuba. The missiles accomplished their task. We thought about six months beforehand; then Cuba had no missiles and there was the danger of an immediate invasion. The problem was

¹¹¹ Committee for State Security, “Intelligence Report on US Plan to Attack Cuba,” Wilson Digital Archive, 1962, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114514>.

¹¹² Rodion Malinovsky, “Telegram From Trostnik (Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to Pavlov (General Isa Pliyev),” Wilson Centre Digital Archive, 1962, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117316>.

¹¹³ Peter Barnes, *Latin America: The First Nuclear Free Zone?* (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1946).

stopping the aggressors, and this has been accomplished in Kennedy's promise not to invade Cuba. We must believe this promise.¹¹⁴

China's position was no different. Though the People's Republic was not a member of the UN when Tlatelolco was signed, Latin American diplomats held regular bilateral meetings with the Beijing on the treaty. China ratified Tlatelolco in 1978, after the US, France, and the UK. In doing so, it relaxed a pillar of military doctrine dictating that, 'nuclear weapons should be abolished throughout the world' because it saw no major threat from Latin America, and indeed enjoyed strong relations with several Latin American countries.¹¹⁵ China's voting record after becoming a member of the UN showed a heavy Third World bias.¹¹⁶ Since it experienced some geopolitical threats from the Soviet Union, China tolerated non-proliferation efforts perceived to be in its strategic interest:

We have consistently held that socialist countries have to get and maintain nuclear superiority. Only then can we force imperialism not to dare to initiate nuclear wars and make our contributions to the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.¹¹⁷

France initially rejected the treaty, and its reservations eventually prevented it from extending to Africa. A Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the UNGA explained reasons for removing the African sections of the treaty to appease France:

Some African countries would make restrictions of the proposal... France also has an interest to utilize the Sahara desert as a testing ground and would not accept denuclearization. The action of these two countries [sic—other country besides France

¹¹⁴ Faure Chomon, "Letter From Faure Chomon to Fidel Castro," Wilson Center Digital Archive, 1962, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110773>.

¹¹⁵ Xin Zhan, "Prelude to the Transformation: China's Nuclear Arms Control Policy during the U.S.-China Rapprochement, 1969–1976*," *Diplomatic History* 41, no. 2 (April 1, 2017): 288–304, <https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhw056>, 290.

¹¹⁶ Trong R. Chai, "Chinese Policy toward the Third World and the Superpowers in the UN General Assembly 1971–1977: A Voting Analysis," *International Organization* 33, no. 03 (June 22, 1979): 391, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300032215>.

¹¹⁷ Mingquan Zhu, "The Evolution of China's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy," *Nonproliferation Review* 4, no. 2 (1997): 40–48, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736709708436664>.

not identified—trans.], who lead groups in the UN, would even bring down the proposition. Therefore it was appropriate to eliminate the part relative to Africa.¹¹⁸

By the Third Session of COPREDAL, France was committed to avoiding testing in any of its territories within the zone (French Guyana, Guadalupe, and Martinique).¹¹⁹ Hence the NWSs eventually came to see the LANWFZ as a venue through which broader tensions over nuclear order could be resolved. NWSs were able to signal their commitment to disarmament after the Cuban missile crisis, while not themselves disarming. With the exception of the Soviet Union, NWSs accepted the legitimacy of nuclear order insofar as they believed a NWFZ could limit threats from Latin America but rejected the legitimacy of order insofar as disarmament applied to their own nuclear weapons. The LANWFZ became a venue through which this tension between obedience and rebellion to nuclear order could be sustained.

Recognition: ‘The Minds of Survivors’

Latin American perspectives of the missile crisis are one part of this story. The other centres on the NWSs. Tannenwald argues that by the early 1960s, the nuclear taboo was entrenched in the US, placing a key constraint on nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union and Cuba during the missile crisis. Joint domestic and international pressure consolidated the taboo in the US in the years leading to the signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Internationally, The US was under ‘growing pressure’ from non-aligned states at the UN, who in 1961 began linking nuclear weapons with crimes against humanity.¹²⁰ US officials felt pressure to ‘show progress’ on disarmament and

¹¹⁸ Hershberg, “The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban missile crisis, 1962 (Part 2).”

¹¹⁹ Gros Espiell, “The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (The Tlatelolco Treaty): Present Situation and Future Prospects,” vol. 20, 1963.

¹²⁰ Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” *International Security* 29, no. 4 (2005): 5–49, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2005.29.4.5>.

domestic public interest groups grew in size and strength.¹²¹ The creation of the US Arms Control Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in 1961, counterbalanced the more aggressive postures of the Pentagon and the Atomic Energy Commission. The ACDA supported an expansive definition of ‘nuclear weapon’ which included all nuclear explosions against the AEC’s desire to exclude PNEs. Inside the cabinet and ExComm, Rusk and McNamara were against first-use, calling it ‘unthinkable’¹²². Rusk remained a strong advocate of the LANWFZ, even at the height of the missile crisis.¹²³

The US taboo traced back to the fallout from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Truman developed a distinct aversion to nuclear weapons in the ensuing period and diverted US policy from first-use. He supported international custodianship of nuclear weapons in a precursor to the Baruch plan and actively dissuaded military commanders from including first-use in US military plans.¹²⁴ Others within the US decision-making structure concurred. Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, argued that the idea of preventative war involving first use was ‘worse than nonsense’¹²⁵, while Truman cautioned:

I don’t think we ought to use this thing unless we absolutely have to. It is a terrible thing to order the use of something that... is so terribly destructive, destructive beyond anything we have ever had. You have got to understand that this isn’t a military weapon... It is used to wipe out women and children and unarmed people, and not for military uses. So we have got to treat this differently from riffles and cannon and ordinary things like that.¹²⁶

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Rusk, “A Personal Reflection on International Covenants on Human Rights.”

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1956).

¹²⁵ T. V. Paul, *The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons* (Stanford Security Studies, 2009).

¹²⁶ Account of a conversation with Harry Truman and others on July 21, 1948, in David E. Lilienthal, *The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Vol. 2: The Atomic Energy Years, 1945-1950* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 391.

There were some deviations from the taboo. Kennedy, for instance, appeared to accept the doctrine of first-use in relation to a potential Chinese invasion of India. When senior military officials advocated a nuclear strike in case of a Chinese invasion, he responded '[w]e should defend India, and therefore, we will defend India'¹²⁷. The Eisenhower administration also considered first-use in a policy paper from the National Security Council (NSC-16/1): 'in the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions'¹²⁸. Yet, these statements were contradicted at other times.

Kennedy also said, 'you can't use them [nuclear weapons] as a first weapon yourself, they are only good for deterring... I don't see quite why we're building as many as we're building'. Eisenhower admitted, 'thermonuclear weapons are tremendously powerful' but noted that they were, 'not, in many ways, as powerful as is world opinion today in obliging the United States to follow certain lines of policy'¹²⁹. Despite doubts and misgivings, both Kennedy and Eisenhower finally erred on the side of non-use, despite opportunities for the contrary.

The Johnson administration refused to use nuclear weapons in Vietnam and China, based partly on Johnson's own aversion to first-use.¹³⁰ For instance, during the 1964 presidential campaign, Johnson made the now-famous remark that, 'there is no such

¹²⁷ Paul, 67.

¹²⁸ See, for instance, Nina Tannenwald, "Nuclear Weapons and the Vietnam War," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29, no. 4 (August 24, 2006): 675–722, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390600766148>; Michael Jackson, "Beyond Brinkmanship: Eisenhower, Nuclear War Fighting, and Korea, 1953-1968," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 1 (March 2005): 52–75, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2004.00235.x>.

¹²⁹ These statements are all quoted in, Paul, *The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons*, 2009, 62.

¹³⁰ G.T. Seaborg and B.S. Loeb, "Stemming the Tide - Arms Control in the Johnson Years" (Lexington Books, Lexington, MA, January 1, 1987), <https://www.osti.gov/biblio/5444646>.

thing as a conventional nuclear weapon'¹³¹. Indeed, Johnson linked nuclear weapons to the imperial question, well aware that their use may be counterproductive. Undersecretary of State, George Ball, argued in a memo from 1961 that nuclear use would cause 'profound shock... among the non-white nations on every continent'¹³². These sentiments were confirmed by McGeorge Bundy, who served in both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, who cautioned:

Would what was decisive in a military sense have had terrible consequences not only in human terms but in the minds of the survivors? Could you, in that reaction, lose the war by winning it? And what would have been the reputation of the United States elsewhere—in the nearby countries whose future was so large a part of what had led the American government to persist, or in the rest of the newly independent world, or in Latin America, or in the Atlantic Alliance?¹⁷

Several scholars conclude that the nuclear taboo shaped US policy through the 1950s and 1960s leading up to, and during, the negotiations of Tlatelolco. By signing Tlatelolco in 1967, the US accepted the first ever limit on its use of nuclear weapons.¹³³ This constraint on power was due in part to the threat calculations made by the US, but also due to a strong aversion to first-use gripping strategic elites during the period of Tlatelolco's formation.

Moscow was also averse to first-use, despite a strong belief in deterrence. As Khrushchev noted, 'what is fundamental is this: We have achieved our bottom line. Let us ask ourselves: Why did they not attack Cuba? The only answer is: because of the missiles... We accomplished our objective'¹³⁴. He continued, 'We are convinced that

¹³¹ Quoted in, Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Lyndon Johnson, Vietnam, and Public Opinion: Rethinking Realist Theory of Leadership," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 29, no. 3 (September 1999): 592–616, doi:10.1111/j.0268-2141.2003.00051. pp 596

¹³² T.V Paul, *The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons* (Stanford University Press, 2009), <https://doi.org/10.1080/13576275.2011.586166>.

¹³³ The Soviet Union had proposed to do so some five years before the crisis with the Rapacki plan.

¹³⁴ Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Nikita Khrushchev, "Record of Conversations in Moscow between Cuban Communist Official Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Soviet Leader Nikita Khrushchev" (Wilson Centre Digital Archive, 2002).

if we had not placed missiles in Cuba, Cuba would already have been crushed'¹³⁵. Khrushchev even bemoaned Cuba's ingratitude for the deterrent provided by the USSR, stating that the object of the missile placement was never first-use, condemning Cuba's 'rude criticism of the Soviet Union after missile withdrawal'¹³⁶. Russian historian Sergo Mikoyan¹³⁷ reinforces the view that the Soviet Union was acting to deter the US: 'We thought atomic weapons were a much stronger warning to the United States. This is a typical example of deterrence-type thinking'¹³⁸.

This exposed a paradox: Cuba wished to retain the Soviet Union's weapons after the crisis, but the Soviet Union believed they would reduce Cuba, and the USSR's, security. Soviet leaders thus convinced Cuba to renounce weapons that were not theirs. This soured relations, earning the description among some scholars of a 'second Cuban missile crisis'.¹³⁹ Anastas Mikoyan was deployed to convince Castro to renounce the missiles, a suggestion Castro initially rejected: 'You Russians don't know anything about the Americans. Only we people of Latin America know what they are able to do, in spite of agreements or written law'¹⁴⁰. Mikoyan eventually resolved the bitter disagreement by referring to the LANWFZ, convincing Castro that the zone would avoid future US intervention.¹⁴¹ At a meeting at the Cuban Ambassador's residence on the 19th November 1962, Mikoyan agreed with senior ministers to, 'coordinate

¹³⁵ Rodriquez.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Mikoyan is also the son of Anastas Mikoyan, a leading figure in the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis.

¹³⁸ B Greiner, "The Cuban missile crisis Reconsidered - the Soviet View - an Interview with Sergo Mikoyan," *Diplomatic History* 14, no. 2 (1990): 205–21, doi:DOI 10.1111/j.1467-7709.1990.tb00085.x.

¹³⁹ See, James Blight and Philip Brenner, *Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba's Struggle with the Superpowers After the Cuban missile crisis* (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).

¹⁴⁰ Castro et al., "The Final Frontier: Cuban Documents on the Cuban missile crisis."

¹⁴¹ Greiner, "The Cuban missile crisis Reconsidered - the Soviet View - an Interview with Sergo Mikoyan."

common tactics' on the zone which resulted in Cuba's conditions for signing the treaty.¹⁴²

Khrushchev himself adopted a paradoxical view of nuclear weapons, calling them 'frightful' but also recognising their strategic value. Nuclear weapons' chief virtue, he recalled, was putting, 'moral pressure on those who were preparing war against the USSR'¹⁴³. Khrushchev's attitude over Cuba was consistent with the Soviet Policy of fighting anti-colonial and 'anti-capitalist' wars in the Cold War. In this period, he saw weapons as, 'symbols of Soviet prestige and scientific ability'¹⁴⁴. The Soviet Union was also concerned with its reputation among N-NWSs in the nuclear propaganda war that accelerated during Cuban missile crisis. Khrushchev sent, 'repeated warm messages' to anti-nuclear conferences and summits, such as Pugwash.¹⁴⁵ As such, the Khrushchev era was marked by a consolidation of the nuclear taboo, aided in significant part by events in Latin America, and the LANWFZ. Khrushchev also recalls the nuclear aversion displayed by senior soviet scientists. Nobel laureate Pyotr Kapitsa and physicist Andrei Sakharov both refused to work on nuclear weapons out of 'pacifist concerns', much to Khrushchev's annoyance.¹⁴⁶

Paul argues that Soviet nuclear doctrine was, 'motivated by a combination of strategic and reputational considerations'¹⁴⁷. On one hand, reputational concerns were driven by a fear of nuclear consequences. While Khrushchev thought nuclear first-use was conceivable in extreme circumstances, he ultimately explained the decision avoid

¹⁴² Anastas Mikoyan, "Mikoyan Telegram to the CC CPSU (No. 1856)" (National Security Archive, 1962).

¹⁴³ Khrushchev and Khrushchev, *The Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Khrushchev and Khrushchev, *The Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*.

¹⁴⁶ Khrushchev and Khrushchev, 499.

¹⁴⁷ Paul, *The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons*, 2009.

nuclear weapons in terms of his ‘fear of nuclear exchange’¹⁴⁸. Elsewhere he suggested that, ‘fear of nuclear war in a country’s leader can paralyze that country’s defences’¹⁴⁹. This fearful component of Khrushchev’s view influenced Soviet policy in the period surrounding Tlatelolco. As the treaty was negotiated, Moscow entered a nuclear feud with China, who Khrushchev called an ‘irresponsible power’ based on its nuclear desires. Just three years before the missile crisis, the Sino-Soviet split occurred when Khrushchev withdrew from a 1957 agreement to supply nuclear technology to China.¹⁵⁰ Beijing, by contrast, supported Tlatelolco. It preferred NWFZs to the dictates of the NPT, which it saw as, ‘a conspiracy concocted by the USSR and the US to maintain their nuclear monopoly’¹⁵¹. According to Leng, China’s enthusiastic support for Tlatelolco was also, ‘obviously designed to appeal to the Third World’, after nuclear acquisition had disappointed some Chinese allies.¹⁵² China itself announced a non-use policy on the 17th October 1964 stating it would, ‘never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons’¹⁵³. China’s own position on non-proliferation in the early 1960s combined strategic and normative concerns informed by the Cuban debacle. China openly refused to partake in ‘sham’ international disarmament efforts unless the US and USSR agreed to full disarmament in advance (including the establishment of NWFZs).

¹⁴⁸ Khrushchev and Khrushchev, *The Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*.

¹⁴⁹ Khrushchev and Khrushchev.

¹⁵⁰ Michael M. Sheng, “Mao and China’s Relations with the Superpowers in the 1950s,” *Modern China* 34, no. 4 (October 11, 2008): 477–507, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0097700408315991>; Harold P Ford, “Calling the Sino-Soviet Split,” 1999, <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA524258>. China even codenamed its first atomic bomb 596 to recall the ‘betrayal’ of the Soviet withdrawal in 1959.

¹⁵¹ Xinhua, “Quannian Jielu Sulian de ‘Huanhe’ ‘Caijun’ Pianju” (Comprehensive Disclosure of Soviet Fraud of ‘Detente’ and ‘Disarmament’), *Rennin Ribao*, May 30, 1978, 2.

¹⁵² Shao-chuan Leng, “China’s Nuclear Policy: An Overall View,” *Contemporary Asian Studies* 1, no. 60 (1984).

¹⁵³ Zhu, “The Evolution of China’s Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy”; Leng, “China’s Nuclear Policy: An Overall View.”

China was content with the psychological value of deterrence, even if its actual nuclear capabilities were limited.¹⁵⁴ The aversion to first-use was reinforced by Mao, who claimed, ‘Our country in the future may produce a few atomic bombs, but we by no means intend to use them. Although we do not intend to use them, why produce them? We will use them as a defensive weapon’¹⁵⁵. As paramount leader Deng Xiaoping later noted, ‘Our reason for building a few [nuclear weapons] is that we will have them if they have them. Nuclear weapons have only this function’¹⁵⁶.

Britain and France were less directly involved in Tlatelolco than other NWSs, but both committed early to honouring the LANWFZ. Britain had maintained a firm aversion to use since Hiroshima. As Eisenhower noted in his memoir, ‘For the British, for example, the use of atomic weapons in war at that time would have been a decision of the gravest kind’¹⁵⁷. Upon signing Additional Protocol I of Tlatelolco, Britain announced its policy on first-use:

We are now ready to give the following assurance to N-NWS which are Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices: Britain undertakes not to use or to threaten to use nuclear weapons against such states except in the case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its Armed Forces or its Allies by such a state in association with a nuclear weapon state.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁴ See, for instance, Yunzhu, Yao. “China's perspective on nuclear deterrence.” *Air & Space Power Journal* 24, no. 1 (2010): 27; Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, “Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control,” *International Security* 20, no. 3 (1995): 43, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539139>.

¹⁵⁵ M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” *International Security* 35, no. 2 (2010): 48–87, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00016.

¹⁵⁶ Nicola Leveringhaus, “Why China Joined the Nuclear Weapons Club,” *The Conversation*, 2015, <https://theconversation.com/why-china-joined-the-nuclear-weapons-club-43500>.

¹⁵⁷ Richard Hanania, “Tracing the Development of the Nuclear Taboo: The Eisenhower Administration and Four Crises in East Asia,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 19, no. 2 (April 2017): 43–83, https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_a_00740.

¹⁵⁸ Gallacher, “Article VII, The Treaty of Tlatelolco and Colonial Warfare in the 20th Century.”

For these reasons, both a nuclear taboo in NWSs, and a deep aversion to nuclear possession in Latin America contributed to the formation of the LANWFZ. While these norms were tested throughout the period of formation, and the subsequent period of norm entrenchment, they eventually prevailed, leading to a strong anti-nuclear regime in the region, evidenced by a popular NWFZ treaty and universal acceptance of the NPT.

In total, Latin American threat perceptions rose dramatically during the Cuban missile crisis, which I define as an ENI. These perceptions then fell dramatically after the crisis was averted and nuclear missiles were removed from the Latin American territory, opening a window of opportunity for policy change. The questions before Latin American states then was whether they would acknowledge the legitimacy of the emerging nuclear order being negotiated through the NPT in parallel with Tlatelolco, or whether they would seek recognition by rebelling against this emerging order. Similarly, NWSs saw no threat from Latin America and thus supported a NWFZ after the crisis. While the threat environment was thus crucial to the birth of Tlatelolco, this was combined with a conducive normative climate. In the next section, I turn to the question of persistence.

PERSISTENCE

Having considered the birth of the LANWFZ, I shall now examine the reasons for its persistence. I will focus on the immediate post-Tlatelolco period, which in key respects determined the trajectory of Latin American nuclear policy. I shall again highlight three key states to illustrate my argument: Mexico, a key supporter of nuclear order, and Brazil and Argentina, two key nuclear rebels that ultimately embraced ambiguity. I shall argue that the LANWFZ became a token for both obedience and rebellion. I

will also examine the ambiguous positions adopted by NWSs, and strategic elites within them since the birth of Tlatelolco in 1967.

Brazil and Argentina: ‘Common Enemies’

In comparison to Mexico, Brazil and Argentina adopted a more rebellious position to nuclear order after Tlatelolco. Argentina and Brazil’s 200 million inhabitants account for approximately 35% of the LANWFZ.¹⁵⁹ Like Mexico, their non-proliferation policies eventually, ‘embraced liberal nonproliferation norms while believing that the existing regime [was] unfair, selective, and skewed in favor of the strong’¹⁶⁰. But in the immediate post-Tlatelolco period, Brazil and Argentina became opponents of nuclear order. Both nations only assented to the NPT and Tlatelolco in the mid-1990s. After participating in the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD) in Geneva and being one of Tlatelolco’s most active supporters in early UN negotiations, Brazil ultimately rejected the NPT’s, ‘discriminatory character, dividing the world into nuclear “haves” and “have-nots”’¹⁶¹. Similarly, Argentina claimed the NPT was, ‘all about ensconcing [us] in the global nuclear periphery, while granting special rights to the major nuclear powers of the day and their nuclear-industry cartels’¹⁶²; represented the ‘disarmament of the disarmed’¹⁶³; and was, ‘an unbalanced tripod’ whose ‘original sins will only be made good with the complete disarmament of all countries’¹⁶⁴.

¹⁵⁹ Goldemberg, “Lessons From the Denuclearization of Brazil and Argentina.”

¹⁶⁰ Matias Spektor, “The Evolution of Brazil’s Nuclear Intentions,” *Nonproliferation Review* 23, no. 5–6 (2016): 635–52, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2017.1345518>.

¹⁶¹ Spektor, 638.

¹⁶² Mallea, Spektor, and Wheeler, *The Origins of Nuclear Cooperation: A Critical Oral History Between Argentina and Brazil*.

¹⁶³ Toby Dalton, Togzhan Kassenova, and Lauryn Williams, *Perspectives on the Evolving Nuclear Order* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016).

¹⁶⁴ Mallea, Spektor, and Wheeler, *The Origins of Nuclear Cooperation: A Critical Oral History Between Argentina and Brazil*.

Brasilia and Buenos Aires also converged on the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. Artur da Costa de Silva, Brazilian President during this period, reflected before his National Security Council that, ‘nothing prevents us from doing research... and even developing devices that can explode. We don’t have to call it a bomb, but a device that can explode’¹⁶⁵. At the highest levels of the Brazilian government, a strategy of intentional ambiguity over nuclear explosions was debated. Officials in Brasilia saw restrictions on peaceful nuclear energy as an affront to economic independence.¹⁶⁶

Ironically, the path towards greater obedience to nuclear order for these two regional hegemony involved overcoming their mutual suspicion of one another. The escalation of nuclear rivalry between them seemed initially to signal an inevitable security dilemma: not only were they two rivalrous regional powers, but they also had reasons to fear one another. Military doctrines on both sides of the border identified each state as a threat to the other.¹⁶⁷ Both Brazilian and Argentinian strategic elites had developed contingencies for a war, and both regimes concealed their nuclear programmes and intentions under the cover of secrecy. Domestic intelligence agencies, along with the CIA, thus predicted that direct military confrontation was a live option. In 1975, Brazil again tilted towards rebellion when it announced a comprehensive nuclear deal with West Germany covering the complete fuel cycle. Despite openly pursuing a nuclear energy programme, Brazil also submitted this programme to full IAEA safeguards. Both public and secret deliberations, however, suggest that the intentions behind the agreement were economic: After the 1970s oil crisis, Brazil sought

¹⁶⁵ Ata da Quadragésima Sessão do Conselho de Segurança Nacional, October 4, 1967, AN.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Mallea, Spektor, and Wheeler, *The Origins of Nuclear Cooperation: A Critical Oral History Between Argentina and Brazil*.

ways to diversify its energy sources.¹⁶⁸ Brazil joined the Nuclear Suppliers' Group in 1974 yet NWSs remained sceptical about the West German agreement. Kissinger argued that Brazil could not be pushed too aggressively, suggesting that the US was 'not a non-proliferation agency'¹⁶⁹. He offered several economic concessions in exchange for Brazilian accession to the NPT. Yet Carter's election to the US presidency changed the US-Brazil dynamic. Congress later passed the Nonproliferation Act which prevented technology transfers to non-NPT members.¹⁷⁰ US pressure on West Germany eventually collapsed the cooperation agreement with Brasilia. Brazil then decided to develop its own internal programme of uranium enrichment. In the 'parallel programme', Brazil commissioned several military agencies to separately pursue uranium enrichment. By the 1980s, Brazil had developed a limited enrichment capability.¹⁷¹ In this sense, Brazil openly rebelled against nuclear order in the period between Tlatelolco and the 1980s.

Argentina, too, faced significant threats over the same period which pushed it toward rebellion. Primary among these was the Falklands War of 1982. As a CIA memorandum after Argentinean defeat observed:

The immediate effect of Falklands defeat cuts two ways. Emotionally, it has probably increased the desire to develop a nuclear weapons option. Politically and economically

¹⁶⁸ Togzhan Kassenova, "External Perceptions of Brazil's Nuclear Policy: Views from Argentina and the United States," *Nonproliferation Review* 23, no. 5–6 (2016): 595–615, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2017.1339932>.

¹⁶⁹ Togzhan Kassenova, "Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope an Evolving Identity," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, March (2014).

¹⁷⁰ Guglielmelli, "The Brazilian-German Nuclear Deal: A View from Argentina."

¹⁷¹ John R. Redick, Julio C. Carasales, and Paulo S. Wrobel, "Nuclear Rapprochement: Argentina, Brazil, and the Nonproliferation Regime," *The Washington Quarterly* 18, no. 1 (March 1995): 107–22, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01636609509550135>.

however, it has reduced Argentina's capability to fulfil this desire. Consequently, we have great uncertainty over the future course of Argentina's nuclear policy.¹⁷²

At the same time, a tradition of peaceful conflict resolution was also establishing itself in Latin America. The Beagle conflict¹⁷³ flamed tensions between Argentina and Chile and threatened an arms race, but an arms control agreement based in the principles of Tlatelolco ensured de-escalation. In 1974, Peruvian President, General Juan Velasco Alvarado, proposed a decade-long freeze on all arms spending in Latin America citing the region's history of peaceful cooperation.¹⁷⁴ Barring Brazil, this initiative gained significant traction. On December 9, 1974 the 'Ayacucho Declaration' was signed in Lima Peru to, 'to foster and support the building of a permanent order of international peace and cooperation and to create conditions permitting the effective limitation of armaments and putting an end to their acquisition for offensive military purposes'¹⁷⁵. As Ornstein (a major Argentinian nuclear diplomat of the period) suggests, Brazil and Argentina shared one thing in common: an aversion to global nuclear order.¹⁷⁶ This united them in a desire for nuclear independence and created common enemies and threats. Slowly, during the 1980s, strategic elites in both states began to realise that bilateral nuclear cooperation between Brazil and Argentina could insulate the two nations against the greater threats of nuclear domination that lay outside their borders.

¹⁷² "Special National Intelligence Estimate: Argentina's Nuclear Policies in Light of the Falklands Defeat" (Central Intelligence Agency, 1982),

https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001265543.pdf.

¹⁷³ A border dispute between Argentina and Chile over Picton, Lennox and the Nueva Islands.

¹⁷⁴ Mario E Carranza, "A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order,"

Contemporary Security Policy 33, no. 1 (January 22, 2012): 214–17,

<https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2012.678678>.

¹⁷⁵ Mario Carranza, "Disarmament and World Development from a Latin American Perspective," no. 4 (1974), 70.; See, also, Norman M Smith, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Latin America," 1977, <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA047580>; Felix C. Calderon, "Security and Arms Limitation in Latin America and the Caribbean," *Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems* 2 (1992).

¹⁷⁶ Mallea, Spektor, and Wheeler, *The Origins of Nuclear Cooperation: A Critical Oral History Between Argentina and Brazil*.

As Mallea, Spektor and Wheeler observe, ‘Officials in both Argentina and Brazil since the 1970s had also seen US non-proliferation policy of technology denial’ and, ‘both countries shared a common view of the global non-proliferation regime as intrusive, discriminatory, and corrosive of their national rights to technological development’¹⁷⁷. A confluence of domestic and external factors thus encouraged nuclear cooperation in both nations, leading to major breakthroughs in the 1980s.

The signing of the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) was a major advance in this regard.¹⁷⁸ The agreement rested on six undertakings: the acceptance of safeguards on all nuclear activities; IAEA adjudication on implementation; ABACC’s commitment to complying with the IAEA; IAEA jurisdiction over safeguards; and a commitment to avoid the duplication of efforts.¹⁷⁹ The effect of the agreement was that the two states submitted their respective nuclear programmes to independent inspection and analysis, and agreed to abide by the determinations of the IAEA. Each committed to holding the other to account, while the IAEA kept each objectively accountable. ABACC and the IAEA were invited to draw independent conclusions on adherence.¹⁸⁰ Brazil and Argentina agreed to use nuclear material for exclusively peaceful purposes. ABACC was recognised as an international organisation, with a Commission Secretariat. The Commission could

¹⁷⁷ Mallea, Spektor, and Wheeler.

¹⁷⁸ Julio C. Carasales, “The Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Rapprochement,” *The Nonproliferation Review* 2, no. 3 (September 1995): 39–48, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736709508436591>; Redick, Carasales, and Wrobel, “Nuclear Rapprochement: Argentina, Brazil, and the Nonproliferation Regime.”


¹⁷⁹ Orpet Peixoto, Antonio Oliveira, and Odilon do Canto, “Safeguards in Latin American Countries: The Role of ABACC,” in *LAS/ANS Symposium* (Rio de Janeiro, 2008), 1–9.

¹⁸⁰ Olga Mafra, “ABACC and the Regional Approach for the Application of Safeguards,” in *Nuclear Safeguards Symposium—The Role of National and Regional Safeguards: Past, Present, and Future*. (Tokyo, 1997).

make senior appointments and take strategic decisions, while the Secretariat managed day-to-day functions, and reported to the Commission.¹⁸¹

Further moves toward obedience were seen through the establishment of the SCCC. The SCCC is a bilateral NWFZ treaty alongside the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The SCCC came into force on the 13th December 1991, under the Guadalajara Agreement, seven months after the establishment of ABACC. The quadripartite agreement between Brazil, Argentina, ABACC and the IAEA entered into force on the 4th March 1994. ABACC is the only bilateral initiative of its kind and has been central to the full enforcement of Tlatelolco by drawing Argentina and Brazil into the wider regional regime of nuclear nonproliferation.¹⁸²

Figure 9: President Fernando Collor de Mello Pours Ash into Well at Alleged Nuclear Test Site¹⁸³



Ultimately, Argentina and Brazil were able to sense mutual external threats, which prompted a sense of solidarity sufficient to drive rapprochement. These shared threats

¹⁸¹ Orpet J M Peixoto et al., “Twenty Years of ABACC: Accomplishments, Lessons Learnt and Future Perspectives,” in *Symposium of the European Safeguards and Development Association* (Budapest: European Safeguards and Development Association, 1991), 1–8.

¹⁸² Peixoto et al., “Twenty Years of ABACC: Accomplishments, Lessons Learnt and Future Perspectives.”

¹⁸³ Goldemberg, “Lessons From the Denuclearization of Brazil and Argentina.”

drove a shared identity and incentivised collective security over security dilemma logic.

As Ornstein explains:

The Argentine and Brazilian positions had always been coincident... and this is clear in the negotiations of the treaty of Tlatelolco, when the two delegations worked as one and the “common enemies” were the same. The position of the two countries was that they did not accept limitations of any kind to their nuclear technological development at a time when peaceful explosions were being mentioned as a solution for civil works. Moreover, the construction of the new Panama Canal was being talked about. The new canal would not be in Panama, but in Nicaragua, making of that country the main ally of Brazil and Argentina in the negotiations that supported peaceful nuclear explosions. Neither of us wanted to renounce at that moment any possibility that could be brought about by nuclear technology, a perfectly logical position for two mature countries.¹⁸⁴

What began as a rebellion against order became one of order’s great strengths, however.

As Brazil and Argentina’s nuclear cooperation increased in sophistication, so it became an example of regional and global non-proliferation. And once the global context of the Cold War changed, Brazil and Argentina began to see the NPT and Tlatelolco as complimentary to their overall attitude of nuclear cooperation. In this sense, an initial attitude of direct rebellion against order, became a position of greater ambiguity.

Since the turn of the century, Brazil’s and Argentina’s engagements with nuclear order have again cemented this ambiguity. Argentina is at once an active participant in global nuclear order but also a fierce critic of its inconsistencies attempting, ‘to attain a balance between domestic and international responsibilities, on the one hand, and between its Western and Latin American identities, on the other hand’¹⁸⁵.

Argentina and Brazil both refuse to sign the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, because it, ‘imposes further nonproliferation burdens on non-nuclear-weapon states and

¹⁸⁴ Mallea, Spektor, and Wheeler, *The Origins of Nuclear Cooperation: A Critical Oral History Between Argentina and Brazil*.

¹⁸⁵ Dalton, Kassenova, and Williams, *Perspectives on the Evolving Nuclear Order*.

establishes an even more unequal nuclear nonproliferation regime'¹⁸⁶. In a statement to the High-Level Debate on Nuclear Disarmament, Argentina expressed grave concerns with the state of nuclear order:

The failure of the nuclear weapons states to comply with the obligations they assumed in the NPT introduces an element of inequity in the security balance of the Treaty and at the same time provides arguments to those questioning the credibility of the nonproliferation regime.¹⁸⁷

Under the Lula and Rousseff governments, Brazil accelerated its nuclear energy programme, proposing to double production by building four new power plants. In addition, it persisted with the construction of a nuclear-powered submarine, despite American concerns. Its 2008 National Defence Strategy again rejected signing the IAEA additional protocol unless NWSs disarmed. Moreover, Brazil's attempt with Turkey to broker a fuel swap agreement with Iran in 2010 angered the US and other members of the P5, who saw the move as an Iranian attempt to avoid further UN sanctions. These actions challenged order, while testing its limits.¹⁸⁸ As Spektor avers:

To a significant degree, Brazil has moved toward the liberal international order, including in nuclear policy. But firm commitments to economic orthodoxy and democracy at home—and a willingness to adopt comprehensive safeguards under the umbrella of international nuclear agreements—do not exclude a self-identity based on the image of a non-status-quo power committed to challenging existing norms and institutions.¹⁸⁹

Thus, Tlatelolco has served the agendas of multiple elites since its birth. For Mexico, Tlatelolco became a tool of global nuclear diplomacy and securing concessions within the NPT. Simultaneously, Mexico also used Tlatelolco as a symbol of Latin American

¹⁸⁶ Togzhan Kassenova, "Nuclear Safeguards in Brazil and Argentina: 25 Years of ABACC," in *AIP Conference Proceedings*, vol. 1898 (AIP Publishing LLC, 2017).

¹⁸⁷ United Nations General Assembly, "Statement by Argentina: High Level Debate on Disarmament" (United Nations, 2013).

¹⁸⁸ Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, "Building Trust and Flexibility: A Brazilian View of the Fuel Swap with Iran," *The Washington Quarterly* 34, no. 2 (April 2011): 61–75.

¹⁸⁹ Spektor, "The Evolution of Brazil's Nuclear Intentions," 2016.

pride and pacificism. For Brazil and Argentina, Tlatelolco originally became a target for frustration with global nuclear order. This shared resentment evolved into a common position which, in turn, cemented the NPT in the region in the 1990s. Tlatelolco's ability to send different messages to different states—and different elites within those states—has ultimately been key to its longevity. For this reason, Tlatelolco succeeded precisely because of its symbolic ambiguity.

Mexico: 'Good Faith'

Mexico has dominated the politics of non-proliferation since the birth of Tlatelolco. Immediately after the signing the treaty, Mexico followed a trajectory of obedience by becoming a key participant in the NPT negotiations, and the first Latin American state to sign a full safeguards agreement with the IAEA.¹⁹⁰ Mexico's early stance toward nuclear order was bound to Tlatelolco, both because of its prominent role in negotiations and because NPT negotiations followed soon after. A key link between the two treaties emerged when Robles realised that he could trade Mexican support for the NPT for US support for Protocol II of Tlatelolco. As he argued:

Mexican public opinion—and perhaps the same may be said of the other Latin American countries—would find no justification for the Delegation of Mexico to recommend the signature of a draft treaty on nonproliferation which... will continue to be... very inferior to the Treaty of Tlatelolco as far as the rational objectives pursued thereby are concerned, in the event that the present situation respecting Additional Protocol II should still exist.¹⁹¹

¹⁹⁰ Arturo C. Sotomayor, "Brazil and Mexico in the Nonproliferation Regime," *The Nonproliferation Review* 20, no. 1 (2013): 81–105, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2013.769377>.

¹⁹¹ Robles, "Air Letter from Mexican Embassy, Rio de Janeiro: Brazil's International Policy."

Similarly, Hunt observes that, ‘United States policymakers thus recognized that the fate of the NPT was intimately connected to their support of the Treaty of Tlatelolco’¹⁹². As Rusk admitted:

The Latin American countries are observing US actions on Protocol II closely as an indication of our support for the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone and arms control measures generally. An early public announcement, prior to signature of the Protocol, would be highly desirable in order to encourage ratification of the Treaty by additional Latin American nations and to obtain their support in the NPT negotiations.¹⁹³

Mexico also leveraged NPT negotiations to secure Moscow’s support for Protocol II of Tlatelolco. In this sense, Mexico exploited Tlatelolco to express both a desire for disarmament and a commitment to nuclear order. The same dual impulse would shape Mexico’s role in important amendments that sealed the NPT. Amendments to Article V included imposing a ‘duty’ on NWSs to avoid proliferation in N-NWSs. This proposal was ultimately unsuccessful, but demonstrated Mexico’s ambition to marry nonproliferation with obligation. Next, Mexico successfully amended Article V to permit the pursuit of peaceful nuclear energy and ensure, ‘non-discriminatory access to peaceful nuclear explosives’. Next, it proposed new articles VI and VII that would fundamentally alter the NPT. Its proposal for article VI defined disarmament commitments more clearly:

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty under takes to pursue negotiations in good faith, with all speed and perseverance, to arrive at further agreements regarding the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, as well as to reach

¹⁹² Hunt, “Into the Bargain: The Triumph and Tragedy of Nuclear Internationalism during the Mid-Cold War, 1958-1970.”

¹⁹³ Hunt.

agreement on a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under strict and effective international control.¹⁹⁴

More importantly, Mexico proposed the recognition of NWFZs within the NPT in Article VII. This again was part of consolidating the legality of Tlatelolco in exchange for offering support on the NPT. This article not only ensured that the LANWFZ would not be threatened by the NPT, but also allowed future NWFZs to be recognised by the NPT. In this sense, Mexico balanced anti-imperial resentment with a desire for multilateralism by wielding Tlatelolco as a bargaining tool in the broader NPT debate.

NWSs: ‘Reducing Risks’

The persistence of Tlatelolco between 1967 and 2017 has also hinged on the support of the NWSs. It took the NWSs just over a decade to lend full support to the treaty. The events leading to, and since, their support for Tlatelolco have been crucial to its persistence. Unlike in the African and South Pacific cases, the US and the USSR maintained their support for Tlatelolco through the nuclear arms race between the 1970s and 1980s. This arms race was a key strategic prism through which each superpower made nuclear choices.¹⁹⁵ Why, then, did they sacrifice their capacities for power projection in the heat of this dangerous rivalry? One dimension of this story is their commitment to obedience. Obedience relies on a nuclear regime’s ability to provide security for its participants. Therefore, one reason that the US and the Soviet Union eventually signed the LANWFZ was that each believed the zone would neutralize Latin America as a nuclear threat. In this sense, I claim the USSR and the

¹⁹⁴ William Burr, “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Mexican Amendments: The Negotiating Record” (The National Security Archive, 2018), <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2018-05-24/nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-mexican-amendments-negotiating-record>.

¹⁹⁵ M. Y. Prozumenshikov, “The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives,” *Cold War International History*, 1996.

US eventually saw Tlatelolco as legitimate because it would guarantee the security of each superpower's security interests in Latin America. This was particularly important for the US, given Latin America's geographical proximity, and the scale of the threat created during the missile crisis. Latin American was also special as the only region where the prospect of nuclear war had reached boiling point.

Moreover, the US was concerned that China's decision to test nuclear weapons, as a Third World state, would inspire states in Latin America, particularly in Brazil and Argentina.¹⁹⁶ In addition to mitigating Soviet threats, the legitimacy of Tlatelolco was thus enhanced in Washington by the treaty's ability to mitigate other Third World examples of proliferation.¹⁹⁷ A Pentagon report of 1969 warned that 'Chinese possession... has increased the possibility for proliferation among the other nations, particularly in Asia'¹⁹⁸. As such, each superpower was prepared to limit its capacity for power projection in return for an overall diminishment of Latin American threats through the treaty. The aftermath of the missile crisis thus influenced the NWSs to eventually persist with the zone.

Key debates within the US leading to the signing of Tlatelolco reveal this logic. In a hearing before the Senate in 1978, several senior officials made the case for US participation in the Tlatelolco treaty. John A Bushnell, Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs at the State Department, presented the case and suggested that the treaty would improve the safety of the Latin American neighbourhood and provide strategic benefits for the US in the region. A primary

¹⁹⁶ Nicola Horsburgh, "China's Engagement with Global Nuclear Order since 1949" (2012).

¹⁹⁷ United States Senate, "Treaty of Tlatelolco: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress, Second Session" (Library of Congress, 1978), <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/pur1.32754076953896>.

¹⁹⁸ US Department of Defense: Response to National Security Memorandum 9: Review of the International Situation, 23 January 1969.

reason that the treaty merited support, according to Bushnell, was that ‘one of the priority elements of US foreign policy is to build as productive and harmonious a relationship as possible with our immediate neighbours in Latin America and the Caribbean’ in order to ‘make this hemisphere a safer place to live’¹⁹⁹. To achieve this ‘security’, however, Bushnell claimed ‘the treaty will only be effective when all eligible states inside and outside the treaty region have adhered...’²⁰⁰. Similarly, Charles van Doren, Assistant Director for Nonproliferation at the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, averred that the treaty would ‘advance our two prime nonproliferation objectives... to secure treaty commitments [from N-NWSs] not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons’²⁰¹.

Van Doren also suggested that the treaty held ‘the prospect of furthering a number of the objectives of our nonproliferation policy, all of which are important to our national security interests’²⁰². In addition to the State Department and the Disarmament Agency, the Department of Defense also accepted that the treaty would lessen US threat perceptions. For example, David McGiffert, the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs of the Department of Defense, claimed before the Senate in the same hearing that the treaty ‘would be an important US contribution to reducing the risks and costs to all nations of living in a heavily armed, less-than-peaceful world’²⁰³. Despite these statements, members of the Senate continued to question whether the treaty would, in fact, advance US security and diminish threats. These

¹⁹⁹ United States Senate.

²⁰⁰ Russian Federation, “Declaration Upon Ratification of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco” (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1979), https://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/tlateloco_p2/russianfederation/rat/mexico+city.

²⁰¹ Russian Federation, 22.

²⁰² Ibid, 23.

²⁰³ Ibid, 25.

objections demonstrate the rebellious current also running through strategic elite discourse. The following exchange clearly depicts these concerns:

The Chairman: Will the US retain the right to visit ports in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the Guantanamo Naval base with vessels carrying nuclear weapons?

Mr McGriffert: Yes, it will, Mr Chariman.

The Chairman: Would the US have the right to repair and service ships carrying nuclear weapons in ports in the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and Guantanamo?

Mr McGriffert: Yes, Mr Chairman.²⁰⁴

In this sense, various strategic elites within the US became convinced by the late 1970s, that Tlatelolco would lower US threats from Latin America. These arguments ultimately convinced the US to sign and ratify the LANWFZ Treaty, the only such treaty it has ever ratified. It did so not only because of an obedient inclination, but because its broader attitude of obedient rebellion could be accommodated by supporting the zone after its birth. On one hand, it suited strategic elites that wished to maintain some US nuclear presence in the region, on the other it aided elites wishing to demonstrate nuclear responsibility and honour nonproliferation commitments. The US official position of retaining control over Guantanamo and the Virgin Islands while also signing and ratifying the treaty demonstrated this ambiguity.

Moscow ratified Tlatelolco on the 8th of January 1979, a year after those US deliberations in the Senate. Like Washinton, the *Kremlin* adopted an ambiguous position toward nuclear order after the birth of Tlatelolco. Its statement on ratification outlined this position, which has remained consistent through the transition from the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation. In its declaration upon ratification of the treaty, Moscow claimed, ‘The Soviet Union proceeds from the principle that Article 1 of the treaty applies, as laid down in article 5 of the Treaty, to any nuclear explosive

²⁰⁴ Ibid, 29.

device and that, consequently, the carrying out by any party to the Treaty of explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes would constitute a violation of its obligations as defined in Article 1, and would be incompatible with its non-nuclear status’²⁰⁵. In this sense, Moscow concurred with Mexico in interpreting the clauses on nuclear devices more strictly than several Latin American states, and indeed than Washington.

To the *Kremlin*, the legitimacy of the treaty relied on preventing Latin American adversaries and other NWSs from cheating. For this reason, Moscow refused to recognise territories that had not ratified the treaty as parties in the ratification declaration: it wanted to ensure that states that had not ratified the treaty or its protocols (like the US at the time) would not be subject to its benefits and protections, thereby incentivising them to join.²⁰⁶ This was crucial in the case of Cuba, where the US continued to retain significant military assets. Finally, like other NWSs, the Soviet Union wanted breaches of the treaty by other NWSs to result in a Soviet ‘review’ of the decision to ratify.

Beyond the strategic considerations influencing the legitimacy of the treaty, the *Kremlin* also wanted to affirm its identity of nuclear responsibility. In the preamble to its ratification declaration, Moscow referred to itself as ‘a consistent supporter of the creation of NWFZs in various regions of the world’²⁰⁷ and linked Tlateloco with Soviet support for decolonisation, claiming that ‘the Soviet Union reaffirms its position with respect to the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, in accordance with the United Nations Declaration on this question (General Assembly resolution

²⁰⁵ Joseph Gallacher, “Article VII, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and Colonial Warfare in the 20th Century,” *Arms Control* 5, no. 3 (December 28, 1984): 75–89, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01440388408403804>.

²⁰⁶ Government of the Russian Federation.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

1415 (XV) of 14 December 1960)’²⁰⁸. Moscow’s position in interpreting the treaty was thus diametrically opposed to the US interpretation. Yet, both superpowers eventually endorsed the treaty to signal their commitment to disarmament in Latin America. Neither state actually disarmed, but each saw value in endorsing Tlatelolco to placate Latin American states and strategic elites inside and outside the zone.

As the US and USSR pursued steps to ratify Tlatelolco, Britain was testing its limits. An example of British rebellion was evidenced in the debate concerning the alleged transport of nuclear weapons on board British war ships during the Falklands conflict. While such acts are permitted under the NPT, Tlatelolco expressly states that all nuclear material must be used for ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’²⁰⁹. For these reasons, OPANAL raised the issue in 1982, which caused division among the members. Some Latin American states wished to construe the treaty as allowing nuclear-powered submarines, while others, like Argentina, argued that Britain had violated the treaty.²¹⁰ Several press reports suggested that the UK had, in fact, violated Tlatelolco. For instance, *Der Spiegel* claimed that the ‘ships were armed with nuclear anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes’²¹¹. *The Times* called denials of nuclear deployments ‘Balderdash’ and *The Guardian* also raised suspicion.²¹² Whitehall, however, routinely denied any nuclear transportation or remained silent. Statements from defence officials left room for ambiguity. In the House of Commons, for instance, a Junior Defence Minister claimed there had ‘never been an incident involving a British nuclear weapon

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Opanal, “The Treaty of Tlatelolco for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean,” 2013, 1–21, <http://www.opanal.org/opanal/about/about-i.htm%5Cr%5Cn>

²¹⁰ Gallacher.

²¹¹ Opanal, “The Treaty of Tlatelolco for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean,” 2013, 1–21, <http://www.opanal.org/opanal/about/about-i.htm%5Cr%5Cn>.

²¹² Gallacher, 82.

leading to its loss or the dispersal of radioactive contamination'²¹³ and that 'successive governments' had a longstanding practice of 'neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons in particular locations at given times'²¹⁴. This conflicted with the provisions of Protocol II, which held that the Treaty should be 'fully respected... in all its aims and provisions'²¹⁵.

Further ambiguity followed the war, when further press reports claimed that the cabinet had 'considered the use of nuclear weapons against Cordoba'²¹⁶. Government officials strongly denied these claims, however. For instance, Junior Minister for Defence Procurement Lord Trenchard, claimed 'there is no question but that nuclear weapons are not applicable to the current situation in the Falklands Islands area'²¹⁷. Thatcher herself sent a letter to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the period stating, 'it is inconceivable that Britain would use such weapons with Argentina in the Falklands Islands'²¹⁸. The Falklands debacle outlined clearly the limits of the legitimacy of Tlatelolco in British eyes. But this only reinforces the point that legitimacy is premised on a regime's capacity to provide security. When NWSs perceive threats in treaty territories, the British example suggests they are prepared to disregard Additional Protocols. Nonetheless, categorical assurances from senior government officials also show the extent to which nuclear use remained taboo. In this sense, some idea of nuclear responsibility continued to characterise Britain's engagements in Latin America, even under conditions of hot war.

²¹³ Ibid, 90.

²¹⁴ Ibid, 91.

²¹⁵ Paul Rogers, "The Falklands War and British Defence Policy," in *International Perspectives on the Falklands Conflict* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1992), 191–202.

²¹⁶ Gallacher, 91.

²¹⁷ Gallacher, 92.

²¹⁸ Sarah Kutchesfahani, *Global Nuclear Order* (Taylor & Francis, 2018).

France, still committed to nuclear testing in the South Pacific, was opposed to the NPT. It was particularly averse to a potential ban on testing, which it saw as a ‘willingness by the US and USSR to dominate the Eurasian world’²¹⁹. Paris also directly challenged the in-built inequality of the treaty, claiming that only universal disarmament could create a fair nuclear agreement. As such, the NWSs were split, with the USSR, the US, and the UK obeying nuclear order and France and China rebelling. The USSR was caught between these two positions. It is no surprise then, that the US and the UK (with some reservations) were the first states to sign Tlatelolco, while France and China followed only in the mid-1970s.²²⁰

China’s position on Tlatelolco evolved in different stages. In the early years of the treaty, Beijing balanced a position of support for Tlatelolco in principle with reservations about the treaty’s exceptions. Beijing believed that Tlatelolco would only advance nonproliferation if it limited the ‘imperial’ tendencies of the US.²²¹ Like the USSR, China made its support for Tlatelolco conditional upon the withdrawal of US military bases from Latin America, particularly in Cuba. In this sense, China balanced two aspects of its identity: one as a new NWSs committed to Third World solidarity; another, an anti-imperial revisionist nuclear power.²²² In this sense, the early period of Tlatelolco saw China erring on the side of rebellion, eschewing the NPT, acquiring its own nuclear weapons, and making support for Tlatelolco conditional on US withdrawals from the region.

²¹⁹ John R Redick, “The Tlatelolco Regime and Nonproliferation in Latin America,” *International Organization* 35, no. 1 (1981): 103–34.

²²⁰ Chih-Chiang Hu, “Arms Control Policy of the People’s Republic of China, 19479–1978” (1984).

²²¹ Nicola Horsburgh, *China and Global Nuclear Order: From Estrangement to Active Engagement* (Oxford University Press, 2015).

²²² Kutchesfahani, *Global Nuclear Order*.

As Chinese policy shifted toward obedience in the 1970s, however, so China's attitude to Tlatelolco changed. Beijing eventually decided that ratifying Tlateloco would symbolize its broader commitment to non-proliferation.²²³ In 1974, China ratified the treaty, indicating a more compromising attitude to nuclear order, and a pursuit of classical obedient rebellion. On one hand, China continued to reject the NPT; on the other, it acknowledged the legitimacy of various global norms, rules and institutions.²²⁴ In 1973, China's representative to the Security Council affirmed that 'the Chinese government attached great importance to the efforts of the Latin American countries for the denuclearization of Latin America'²²⁵. Whereas China had committed itself to 'socialist proliferation' in the early-1960s (supplying socialist allies with support to build atomic weapons), the policy was abandoned in 1965 as 'unrealistic'.²²⁶ As such, China was moving toward an appreciation of the dangers of Third World proliferation, which was evidenced by its early support of Tlatelolco. In 1967, when Nasser sought Chinese assistance in the Egyptian nuclear programme, China refused. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai later remarked 'if the Egyptians wanted to step into the atomic field they would have to do it themselves'²²⁷. In the same meeting, Enlai outlined his position on Tlatelolco:

This is a good start, but one must consider some specific situations that one may face. For example, there is the establishment in Latin America of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. If the United States does not evacuate its military base from Guantanamo, does not evacuate its Caribbean military bases, and the nuclear powers give no guarantee, then

²²³ Hu, "Arms Control Policy of the People's Republic of China, 19479–1978."

²²⁴ Mingquan Zhu, "The Evolution of China's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy," *Nonproliferation Review* 4, no. 2 (1997): 40–48, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736709708436664>.

²²⁵ Peking Review, 23 March 1973, 10.

²²⁶ George Bunn and Roland M. Timerbaev, "Security Assurances to Non-nuclear-weapon States," *The Nonproliferation Review* 1, no. 1 (September 1993): 11–20.

²²⁷ Michael Yahuda. *China's Role in World Affairs* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 204.

Latin America's nuclear-weapon-free zone will have no guarantee. Therefore, each specific region has its own complicated problems.²²⁸

In this sense, China came to accept that the LANWFZs could diminish global threats of proliferation, and affirm China's identity as a responsible nuclear power. But it also retained aspects of rebellion to nuclear order by refusing to ratify Tlatelolco. In the same period, China also became a vocal critic of several Arms Control agreements between the NWS, and continued a rebellious rhetoric. It called the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty agreed between the US and the USSR 'a new fraud in the Soviet-US nuclear arms race' and continued to refer to the NPT as 'fraudulent indenture'²²⁹ which entrenched a 'superpower monopoly'²³⁰. In sum, Tlatelolco gained currency in the NWSs neither because it signified obedience to nuclear order nor because it signaled rebellion, but because it symbolised both.

CONCLUSION

In this final section of the Latin American case, I analyse Latin American states on the obedience/rebellion spectrum, contrasting them with NWSs. As the foregoing analysis shows, different actors express obedient rebellion differently. In Figure 12, I take several states to represent broader regional attitudes toward global nuclear order. Brazil is the most representative state in the region, during the existence phase of the LANWFZ (1965-1967), and fits the definition of obedient rebellion most cleanly. On

²²⁸ "Summary of Third Conversation between Premier Zhou Enlai and President Nasser" (Wilson Centre Digital Archive, 1965), <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/165424>.


²²⁹ Renmin Ribao. 'Nuclear Fraud Could Not Save US Imperialism'. 3 September 1967.

²³⁰ Jonathan Pollack. Chinese Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons 1964-1969. *The China Quarterly*. No 50 1972, 244-277.

one hand, it saw the importance of nuclear disarmament and vocally supported international institutions tasked with this role, particularly the UNGA. However, it was also sceptical of the emerging order, and its inherent inequalities. For this reason, soon after the zone emerged, Brazil became rebellious.

Mexico was another example of obedient rebellion, although leaning toward obedience. That is, Mexico was more committed to multilateral nuclear order than its Latin American contemporaries, and actively participated in the NPT and UNGA deliberations. However, its continued diplomatic support for Cuba in the run-up to the missile crisis evinced an anti-imperial solidarity which falls under the definition of rebellion. Nevertheless Mexico's expression of obedient rebellion was clearly different from Brazil's, for instance.

Figure 10: The Latin American Obedience/Rebellion Spectrum, 'Existence'



Cuba represents a minority tendency of extreme rebellion. Not only did it welcome Soviet missiles on its territory, but also eventually asked the USSR to use nuclear

weapons. It rejected both the NWFZ and the NPT, on the grounds of anti-imperialism. Although Cuba was an example of extreme rebellion in this case, the overwhelming tendency of obedient rebellion in the rest of the region allowed the NWFZ to successfully open for signature.

Once the LANWFZ opened for signature, the persistence phase began. Here, states continued to constellate around the central pane of the obedience/rebellion spectrum. Notably, previously rebellious states like Cuba gravitated back into the central pane, as they demonstrated greater obedience.


It appears from this that the NWFZ exerted a pull on states that initially rejected it. This is also true of Brazil and Argentina, which experienced similar trajectories between 1967 and 2017. Both were initial supporters of Tlatelolco, but soon turned rebellious once the NPT was signed, which they saw as unfair. They then proceeded down paths of extreme rebellion, settling in the bottom right pane. Eventually, however, like Cuba, they were pulled toward the obedient rebellion strategy in the central pane.

Obedient rebellion is a heterogenous attitude. Different actors express their obedience in different ways. Sometimes they express obedient rebellion simultaneously, other times they oscillate between obedience and rebellion. Nevertheless, Latin American states tended towards obedient rebellion, which coincided with the birth and sustenance of the LANWFZ.



and nuclear testing on one hand, and a commitment to the Latin American zone and the NPT on the other, became the dominant attitude of NWSs toward the LANWFZ.

Figure 12: The Latin American Obedience/Rebellion Spectrum, NWSs



Having argued that obedient rebellion adequately describes the existence and persistence of the LANWFZ, I will now consider why this explanation gives new insights. The security community literature may suggest that the LANWFZ was birthed and sustained by shared interests, values, and norms. However, the above analysis shows that this explanation ascribes undue coherence to actors' motivations. Instead of being birthed by a set of stable, developing norms for peace and stability, the zone was, in many ways, the unintentional consequence of a multivalent and incoherent tension between competing norms. Conversely, then, I argue that Latin America shows that incoherent and ambivalent desires on one level can create a regional regime of peace at another.

Postcolonial perspectives are inaccurate for different reasons. Here, postcolonial theorists may suggest that the zone was borne of anti-imperial frustration on the part of Latin American states with the NWSs. However, this view would ascribe undue agency to Latin American states, without considering the agency of the NWSs. Further, it would also ascribe coherence among Latin American that was absent between 1967 and 2017. Although these anti-imperial currents were important in Latin American during this period, they were tempered by attempts at appeasing the NWSs, and the attraction of multilateral institutions.

The realist position would also fail to take account of the complexity of the Latin American case. Here, instead of ascribing undue agency to the Latin American states, it ascribes undue importance to the NWSs. As the above analysis has shown, the agency of Latin American states was central to the success of the Latin American zone, and even to certain sections of the NPT. Furthermore, the realist position struggles to reconcile the trajectory of Latin America, which moved from a potential nuclear arms race, between Brazil and Argentina, and the eventual long-term success of a complex multilateral security regime in the form of Tlatelolco. For these reasons, the concept of obedient rebellion advances our understanding of the LANWFZ, beyond the view of traditional theories.

In this chapter, I have analysed the Latin American NWFZ and judged it in relation to the conceptual model, after tracing its origins and main provisions. I find that the model provides a plausible explanation of the case, despite some residual ambiguities. I focused on the views of three main Latin American states: Mexico, Brazil and Argentina and assessed their attitudes to nuclear order over time. I then considered the position of the NWSs, from the perspective of the existence and persistence of the zone.

I began by analysing the threat environment in Latin America and argued that the Cuban missile crisis constituted an ENI which triggered impulses of obedient rebellion against nuclear order among the actors involved in the formation of the zone. I then demonstrated how the removal of Soviet missiles from Latin America opened a window of policy of opportunity allowing the NWFZ proposal to emerge. Next, I considered legitimacy-acceptance and recognition-seeking in Latin American states. I argued that a tension emerged between a desire to mitigate nuclear threats on one hand, and anti-imperial sentiments which drove Latin American states to rebel against the inequalities of the NPT, on the other.

I also analysed ambiguity in the NWSs, claiming their support for Tlatelolco stemmed both from a desire to retain nuclear superiority and a need to symbolise nuclear responsibility. Finally, I considered the persistence of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. I argued that the Treaty was consolidated by its appeal to multiple elites, inside the zone and among the NWSs. In the next section, I test the model against the Treaty of Pelindaba in Africa.

CHAPTER THREE: *The African NWFZ*

BACKGROUND | THE TREATY | EXISTENCE | PERSISTENCE | CONCLUSION

There are two threatening swords of Damocles hanging over the continent, and we must remove them. These are the nuclear tests in the Sahara by the French government and the apartheid policy of the Government of the Union of South Africa.

—Kwame Nkrumah¹

In the previous chapter, I analysed the Latin American NWFZ. In this chapter, I test the model against another case: the African NWFZ (ANWFZ), codified under the Treaty of Pelindaba. I open the chapter by sketching the background to the treaty and outlining its main provisions. Following this, I assess the case against the conceptual model. I claim that French nuclear tests were an ENI that triggered a new urgency on the continent. I then claim that Africa exhibited obedient rebellion at the birth of the treaty.

Here, I focus on the differing response of South Africa, Nigeria and Ghana at the international level, and examine strategic elite opinion within those states. I then assess the persistence of the ANWFZ, arguing that an attitude of obedient rebellion has characterised African and NWS engagement with nuclear order since the birth of the zone. In this section, I focus on South Africa, Egypt and Libya, as well as the NWSs.

¹ Van Wyk, “No Nukes in Africa: South Africa, the Denuclearisation of Africa and the Pelindaba Treaty.”

BACKGROUND

The African vision for a NWFZ took more than four decades to materialise. In the 1960s, as decolonisation spread and a new era of nuclear rivalry beckoned, Africa's new states gathered to discuss the spectre of nuclear war. The announcement of French nuclear tests in the Sahara Desert in 1959 rippled across the continent and incensed several newly decolonised African states: Nigeria broke diplomatic relations, Ghana froze French assets, and eight African countries tabled a successful motion to sanction France at the 15th Session of the General Assembly in 1960.² Called 'Consideration of Africa as a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone', the resolution focused on prohibiting the testing, storage and transport of nuclear weapons on the continent, laying the basis for the African NWFZ.³

The formation of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) in 1963 gave the first continental platform to coordinate denuclearisation.⁴ The Inaugural Summit's first agenda item concerned 'general disarmament' with members agreeing, 'to affirm and respect the principle of declaring Africa a denuclearised zone, to oppose all nuclear and thermonuclear tests as well as the manufacture of nuclear weapons'⁵. In 1964, the Secretariat of the OAU drafted a Convention on the Denuclearisation of Africa.⁶ This became the Declaration of the Denuclearisation of Africa adopted by the heads of state later that year. This convention arrived at the General Assembly in 1965, where it was

² Van Wyk, 36. It eventually passed in 1961.

³ Wakana Mukai, "The Importance of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones," *ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs* 1, no. 2 (October 7, 2005): 79–86, http://www.scienceandworldaffairs.org/PDFs/Mukai_Vol1.pdf.

⁴ See Padelford, Norman J. "The Organization of African Unity." *International Organization* 18.03 (1964): 521-542.

⁵ Adeniji, 37.

⁶ Ibid.

endorsed.⁷ However, the goal of a denuclearised Africa faced two main obstacles: the NPT was competing for international attention,⁸ and NATO states were against NWFZs during the Cold War (with the exception of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the nuclear powers only ratified other NWFZ treaties after 1989).⁹ The final—and most significant—barrier to the African NWFZ was apartheid South Africa's covert nuclear weapons programme, gathering pace as African states advocated nonproliferation abroad.¹⁰

As early as 1944, during the final stages of the Second World War, Winston Churchill wrote to Jan Smuts (then South African Prime Minister),¹¹ requesting exploration into uranium deposits in South Africa. Five years later, after the discovery of significant amounts of the element, South Africa's first uranium mine opened at West Rand Consolidated Mines, near Johannesburg.¹² In 1948, the Atomic Energy Board¹³ (AEB) was established by an act of the South African Parliament,¹⁴ the same year the

⁷ Adeniji.

⁸ Dhanapala, Jayantha. "Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones-Challenges and Opportunities." *Development Dialogue* 1/2 (2000): 16-25.

⁹ Dhanapala.

¹⁰ See Moore, John Davey Lewis. "South Africa and nuclear proliferation." *South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation*. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1987. 105-118; Cervenka, Zdenek, and Barbara Rogers. "Nuclear axis. Secret collaboration between West Germany and South Africa." (1978); Spector, Leonard S. *The undeclared bomb*. Vol. 4. Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988.

¹¹ South African Prime Minister at the time.

¹² Masiza, Zondi. 'A chronology of South Africa's nuclear program.' *The Nonproliferation Review* 1.1 (1993): 34-53.

¹³ The Atomic Energy Board became the Atomic Energy Corporation in 1982. The two terms are used interchangeably in the literature, often confusingly.

¹⁴ Murphy, Mojalefa. 'Historical highlights of the rise and demise of South Africa's nuclear capability.' *Africa Insight* 40.4 (2011): 121-135.

National Party¹⁵ unseated Smuts' United Party, ushering in apartheid.¹⁶ South Africa soon became a major supplier of uranium to its Western allies. By 1955, no fewer than sixteen uranium mines were in authorised operation.

Uranium exploration turned to exploitation, primarily for economic reasons.¹⁷ This required raw materials, technology, and international cooperation. In 1957, under the aegis of the US Atoms for Peace programme,¹⁸ South Africa signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States¹⁹ resulting in shipments of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to South Africa, and the construction of Safari-1, a five megawatt thermal, HEU-fuelled research reactor.²⁰ Construction on Safari-1 began in 1961, and was completed in 1965 at Pelindaba.²¹ Safari-2, a second reactor, was commissioned in 1967,²² the same year South Africa took a secret decision to enrich uranium, and refused to sign the NPT because, 'the Treaty did not obligate the weapon-states to reduce their arsenals...'²³. Concurrently, South Africa conducted

¹⁵ The racist regime that would introduce formal apartheid and rule South Africa until its first democratic elections in 1994.

¹⁶ The National Party would rule South Africa until 1994, for the duration of the nuclear weapons programme's existence. The AEB's initial function was to 'exercise control over the production of, and trade in, uranium'

¹⁷ Masiza

¹⁸ A US programme aimed at encouraging peaceful nuclear energy exploitation. See Tal, David.

"Eisenhower's disarmament dilemma: From chance for peace to Open Skies proposal." *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 12.2 (2001): 175-196.

¹⁹ Hewlett, Richard G., and Jack M. Holl. *Atoms for peace and war, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission*. Vol. 3. Univ of California Press, 1989.

²⁰ For more information on reactors of this type, see Xu, Y., X. Wei, and Z. Zhang. "The fuel assembly of the 5 MW t Nuclear Heating Reactor." *Nuclear engineering and design* 154.2 (1995): 219-223.

²¹ Cochran, 34.

²² Ibid, 34.

²³ Ibid, 34.

research into Peaceful Nuclear Explosives (PNE), said to be applicable in deep-level mining.²⁴

South Africa was undeterred by opposition from African states in this period: its nuclear weapons programme coincided almost directly with the Declaration of the Denuclearisation of Africa. However, under the Johnson administration, the United States grew suspicious of South Africa's intentions.²⁵ Johnson subjected South Africa to IAEA safeguards, and placed various conditions on the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement.²⁶ Nevertheless, in 1974 South Africa took the secret decision to build a, 'limited nuclear deterrent capability'.²⁷ Between 1975 and 1977, South Africa drilled two nuclear test shafts at Vastrap military base in the Kalahari. In 1977, a 'cold test'²⁸ was conducted at Vastrap. US sources suggest that South Africa cancelled another test after Soviet Satellites discovered preparations. According to Pabian, South Africa next took two important decisions: 'first, it decided to establish a completely autonomous once-through nuclear fuel cycle²⁹ to meet all the requirements of its research and power reactors and thereby free itself from dependence on unreliable outside supplier states;

²⁴ Sagan, Scott D. 'Why do states build nuclear weapons? Three models in search of a bomb.' (2012).

²⁵ Pabian, Frank V. 'South Africa's nuclear weapon program: Lessons for US nonproliferation policy.' *The Nonproliferation Review* 3.1 (1995): 1-19.

²⁶ Spector, Leonard S. "Repentant nuclear proliferants." *Foreign Policy* (1992): 21-37.

²⁷ de Villiers, Jacobus W., Roger Jardine, and Mitchell Reiss. 'Why South Africa gave up the bomb.' *Foreign Affairs* (1993): 98-109; Masiza, Zondi. 'A chronology of South Africa's nuclear program.' *The Nonproliferation Review* 1.1 (1993): 34-53; Howlett, Darryl, and John Simpson. 'Nuclearisation and denuclearisation in South Africa.' *Survival* 35.3 (1993): 154-173; Horton, Roy E. *Out of (South) Africa: Pretoria's nuclear weapons experience*. Institute for National Security Studies, US Air Force Academy, 1999.

²⁸ A 'cold test' is when an explosive is tested without its highly enriched uranium core.

²⁹ Uranium is mined, enriched, used in a reactor (where it becomes radioactive nuclear waste), and then stored until it is no longer dangerously radioactive.

second, it decided to proceed with a major transformation and expansion of the nuclear weapons program'³⁰.

In 1979, South Africa completed its first prototype nuclear device and, in September that year, a 'double flash of light' was recorded over an area of the South Atlantic near Cape Town.³¹ By 1981, a new facility³² was established responsible for, 'gun-assembled nuclear weapons with their associated air-drop delivery systems'³³. South Africa also researched, 'implosion and thermonuclear technology and the accompanying longer-range ballistic missile delivery systems' and, 'the production of plutonium, lithium-6, and tritium'³⁴. Production proceeded at a speed of about one device per-year from 1982 onwards.³⁵ However, the mid-1980s marked a significant turning point for the programme. As the Namibian War of Independence de-escalated, the end of the Cold War loomed, and mass protests spread through apartheid's streets, South Africa took the unprecedented decision to renounce nuclear weapons in 1989.

With the end of South Africa's nuclear weapons programme in sight, the denuclearisation of Africa returned to the UNGA agenda. At its Forty-fifth Session, the General Assembly adopted, 'The Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearisation of Africa'.³⁶ It included a section condemning South Africa's nuclear weapons programme, in Chapter 2 and Chapter 9, and called for, 'the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance that the OAU may seek regarding the

³⁰ Pabian, Frank V. 'South Africa's nuclear weapon program: Lessons for US nonproliferation policy.' *The Nonproliferation Review* 3.1 (1995): 1-19.

³¹ Horton, 20.

³² The Kentron Circle (now Advena), an Armscor facility.

³³ Horton.

³⁴ Ibid, 5.

³⁵ Stumpf, Waldo. 'South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From deterrence to dismantlement.' *Arms Control Today* 25.10 (1996).

³⁶ Jo-Ansie van Wyk, "South Africa and The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty" (University of Pretoria, 2011).

convening, at Addis Ababa during 1991, of a meeting of experts to examine the modalities and elements for the preparation and implementation of a convention or treaty on the denuclearisation of Africa'³⁷.

An Inter-Governmental Group of Experts was convened in Abuja in 1991, comprising representatives from Algeria, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Togo, Zaire and Zimbabwe.³⁸ The Group produced a report on the basis of which the OAU Council of Ministers—and later a joint meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group and the UN-OAU Group—drafted the first version of a treaty for comment at the Council's fifty-eighth meeting in June 1993.³⁹ At the General Assembly of 1992, the UN advised that the Secretary General, 'take steps to implement the NWFZ in Africa by initiating a meeting between OAU and UN experts in 1993'⁴⁰. Despite the progress made in reversing apartheid, South Africa was not yet a member of the OAU. After President de Klerk announced the renunciation of South Africa's nuclear programme in 1993, Dr Waldo Stumpf, a senior figure in the apartheid nuclear programme, was invited to address the Programme for the Promotion of Non-Proliferation. At this meeting, Stumpf expressed South Africa's readiness to partake in the African NWFZ.

After several further meetings, the breakthrough came at Addis Ababa in 1994. The final text was completed at Pelindaba, and approved by African heads of state on the 23rd of June 1995. The 1995 regular session of the UNGA then approved the treaty on

³⁷ Adeniji, 41.

³⁸ Thomas Graham, *The Alternate Route: Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones* (Oregon State University Press, 2017), <http://www.osupress.oregonstate.edu/book/alternate-route>.

³⁹ Graham, 42.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

EXISTENCE

In this section, I compare the African case against the conceptual model. First, I suggest that the ANWFZ was triggered by an ENI in the form of French nuclear tests in the Sahara between 1959 and 1963. I then contend that Africa exhibited obedient rebellion during the birth and maintenance of the treaty. I will investigate this obedient rebellion between African states and the attitudes of strategic elites within them. I will advance the case that the ANWFZ confirms the assumptions in my conceptual model.

African States

Recognition: 'The New Nuclear Imperialism'?

In this section, I contend that French nuclear tests between 1959 and 1963 served as an ENI which triggered the African NWFZ. Unlike the Latin American case, which materialised soon after proposals for the LANWFZ emerged, the African NWFZ took four decades to materialise. Africa is also unique among the cases I consider in that it housed a NWSs in the form of South Africa. Thus, the African journey towards a NWFZ included a process of disarmament as well as nonproliferation. For these reasons, changes in nuclear order and the evolutions in states and strategic elites' threat perceptions are a key focus of the African story. I begin by analysing the obedient rebellion of newly decolonised African states, which both challenged the legitimacy of French nuclear tests and sought recognition within the UN. I then analyse South Africa, which swung from a position of extreme rebellion to one of extreme obedience between the 1960s and the 1990s. I then chart the response of African states to the apartheid nuclear programme, its effects on their threat perceptions, and their views of the legitimacy of nuclear order. Finally, I focus on disputes across and within

the NWSs, particularly surrounding the response to French tests and the South African nuclear programme. The ambiguity produced by these events, particularly in Britain and the US, is a further example of obedient rebellion, I argue.

When the first nuclear explosive device was used in 1945 at Hiroshima, only Liberia, Ethiopia and Egypt were independent African states. The nuclear era thus coincided with African decolonisation in the decades to follow. As Hill observes:

At the same time that Ghanaians, Nigerians and Sierra Leoneans established and imagined their futures as independent people, they also lived in fear of radioactive fallout from the [French] tests and what Africans and international activists described as ‘the new nuclear imperialism—an imperialism more menacing than anything you have ever known’, as a propaganda leaflet circulated by activists in four languages put it.⁷⁶

The link between colonialism and nuclear weapons thus became central to the African attitude to the emerging nuclear order. Rebellious sentiment towards order was first expressed at a series of Third World summits. For instance, at the Bandung Conference of 1955, African representatives supported a section on nuclear disarmament in the conference’s final communiqué, which stated that ‘universal disarmament’ was, ‘an absolute necessity for the preservation of peace’ and requested, ‘the United Nations to continue its efforts... to bring about the regulation, limitation, control and reduction of all armed forces and armaments, including the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of all weapons of mass destruction’⁷⁷. At the 1961 Non-Aligned Movement’s first summit in Belgrade, African representatives also contributed to the drafting of the resolution on disarmament:

A radical solution of this problem [nuclear proliferation], which has become an urgent necessity in the present state of armaments, in the unanimous view of participating

⁷⁶ Christopher Robert Hill, “Britain, West Africa and ‘The New Nuclear Imperialism’: Decolonisation and Development during French Tests,” *Contemporary British History* 33, no. 2 (2018), 275.

⁷⁷ Plesch, Dan. “The South and disarmament at the UN.” *Third World Quarterly* 37.7 (2016): 1203-1218, 1205.

countries, can be achieved only by means of a general, complete and strictly internationally controlled disarmament.⁷⁸

Yet it was French tests that ultimately unleashed the simultaneous forces of obedience and rebellion to nuclear order on the continent. During the French tests, Kwame Nkrumah convened two important conferences for newly independent African states: the All African People's Conference,⁷⁹ and the First Conference of Independent African States (FCIAS).⁸⁰ In addition, Ghana hosted the *World Without Bomb* conference in 1962 which discussed whether, 'the new colonialism could be more easily terminated in a disarmed world'⁸¹. Addressing this conference in 1962, American intellectual W.E.B. Du Bois 'begged' delegates to appreciate that, 'Africa which is just on the point of recovering her past greatness after centuries of domination and oppression faces the danger of having this bright future blotted out...'⁸². At the FCIAS, a resolution on disarmament called on the international community, 'to suspend all such [nuclear] tests not only in the interest of world peace but as a symbol of their avowed devotion to the rights of man'⁸³. It strongly condemned, 'all atomic tests in any part of the world and in particular the intention to carry out such tests in the Sahara' and appealed to the NWSs, 'to use atomic, nuclear and thermo-nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes'⁸⁴. It also affirmed that, 'the reduction of conventional armaments

⁷⁸ Morphet, Sally. "Multilateralism and the Non-Aligned Movement: what is the Global South doing and where is it going?." *Global Governance* 10.4 (2004): 517-537.

⁷⁹ Munger, Edwin S., and Kwame Nkrumah. *All-African People's Conference*. Vol. 3. No. 1. American Universities Field Staff, 1959.

⁸⁰ Legum, Colin. *Bandung, Cairo and Accra: A Report on the First Conference of Independent African States*. Africa Bureau, 1958.

⁸¹ Wyland Young, "Mosquitoes in Accra," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 18, no. 45-46 (1962).

⁸² Vincent J. Intondi, *African Americans against the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Colonialism, and the Black Freedom Movement* (Stanford University Press, 2015).

⁸³ Saxena, S. C. "Disarmament: The African Perspective." *Disarmament: The African Perspective*. N.p., n.d. Web. 25 Nov. 2016.

⁸⁴ Saxena.

is essential in the interest of international peace and security' and condemned, 'the policy of using the sale of arms as a means of exerting pressure on governments and interfering in the internal affairs of other countries'⁸⁵.

In this sense, strategic elites within newly decolonising African states were already demonstrating an ambivalent attitude toward the norms, rules and institutions of nuclear order. On one hand, French nuclear tests provoked a strong rhetoric of anti-nuclear imperialism. On the other hand, African states brought these grievances to the very international institutions which underpinned this unequal order. In this sense, African states rebelled against the emerging inequality of nuclear order on one hand, but obeyed its fundamental logic on the other, establishing a pattern that would characterise African engagement with order until the birth of Pelindaba in 1996.

Figure 14: Cartoon from *Ghana Evening News*⁸⁶



⁸⁵ Intondi.

⁸⁶ Cartoon is found on page 87 of: Jean Allman, "Symposium Inuclear Imperialism and the Pan-African Struggle for Peace and Freedom: Ghana, 1959–1962," *Souls* 10, no. 2 (2008): 83–102, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10999940802115419>. The cartoon is taken from *Ghana Evening News*, from the 7th of July 1957.

The 15th, 16th and 17th Sessions of the General Assembly (1960–1962) were a key opportunity for African states to articulate a position on the emerging global nuclear order. On one hand, African leaders launched an unprecedented rhetorical assault on ‘nuclear colonialism’: At the 15th Session, Nkrumah asserted, ‘we on the African continent will take positive steps isolate ourselves as far as is possible from the effects of nuclear warfare... One of the first steps which could be taken in this regard is to prevent any state having nuclear weapons from possessing military bases on the African continent’⁸⁷. He then described the consequences of nuclear fall-out, linking environmental and humanitarian degradation to the deeper question of imperialism: “Fall-out” is no respecter of frontiers, and a declaration of neutrality cannot save the people of any African State from nuclear poisoning once atomic war is introduced into the African continent... We have no doubt that France chose the Sahara to demonstrate to African States their political weakness’⁸⁸. In what then became a typical strategy, Nkrumah shamed the silence of other great powers who failed to condemn French tests:

We have a right to know which of the Great Powers support atomic tests on African soil, which of them oppose these tests, and, perhaps more important than everything else in assessing the situation, which of the Great Powers hold African opinion in so little regard that, though in their hearts they oppose the French action, they are prepared to sacrifice African friendship in the interests of appeasing French pride and ambition.⁸⁹

Continuing the theme, he addressed further comments to France:

General de Gaulle is reported to have said recently that while other countries have enough nuclear weapons to destroy the whole world, France must also have nuclear weapons with which to defend herself. I would say here... that Africa is not interested in such ‘defence’ which means no more than the ability to share in the honour of

⁸⁷ Kwame Nkrumah, “Speech to the 869th Plenary Meeting at the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly” (United Nations, 1960).

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Yifru et al., 306.

destroying mankind. We in Africa wish to live and develop. We are not freeing ourselves from centuries of imperialism and colonialism only to be maimed and destroyed by nuclear weapons.⁹⁰

Other African leaders echoed Nkrumah in the sessions that followed. For instance, Ibrahim Aboud, President of newly-decolonised Sudan, argued:

What the General Assembly should now stress is the inescapable necessity of general and complete disarmament and the immediate cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.... To explode nuclear devices on one's own territory is reprehensible enough; and to do the same on the territory and at the doorsteps of others is morally, as well as legally, wrong.⁹¹

Louis Beavogui, the Guinean Minister of Foreign Affairs concurred, addressing the nuclear powers and urging them to support the NWFZ initiative:

We address an urgent and solemn appeal to the governments of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, and France to take into account the concern felt by all people and to put an immediate end to all nuclear tests of whatever nature.⁹²

At the 16th Session, Wachuku Jaja, Nigeria's first UN Ambassador used his maiden speech to issue a stinging attack on imperialism and nuclear colonialism:

We put up this sign: "*Please do not touch. Take your rockets to your own homes. Test your atom bombs, in your own kitchens. Do not bring them to our continent.*" That is why we were unanimous in opposing France's test explosions in the Sahara Desert. France can carry out these explosions in the Pyrenees and the Alps and on the farms of France. It is all right with us if France wants to bomb itself... as human beings, we support the simple ordinary French human beings who want peace despite the fact that there are madmen who want to destroy themselves.⁹⁴

Algeria, which obtained independence from France in 1962, joined the bitter attack on French tests in its first appearance at the UNGA. Pleading to the Assembly as 'the conscience of the world', Foreign Minister Mohammed Khemisti called for the,

⁹⁰ Ketema et al.

⁹¹ Ibid, 308.

⁹² Ibid, 306.

⁹⁴ Wachuku Jaja, "Speech to the 1031st Plenary Meeting at the Sixteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly" (United Nations, 1961).

‘cessation of nuclear tests which poison the atmosphere both literally and figuratively’ and the ‘denuclearisation of Africa’⁹⁵. Algerian independence, secured at the Treaty of Évian, controversially allowed French tests to continue in the Sahara. Revulsion against these tests sparked a six-decade-long call for reparations from the Algerian victims of fallout, currently before the French Parliament.⁹⁶ Appeals for compensation from French veterans of the tests added to the anti-colonial sentiment at home.⁹⁷ Fiery speeches were complimented with protest action, often led by African leaders. Nkrumah supported marches to French nuclear facilities, arguing:

It would not matter if not a single person ever reached the site, for the effect of hundreds of people from every corner of Africa and from outside it crossing the artificial barriers that divide Africa to risk imprisonment and arrest, would be a protest that the people of France, with the exception of the De Gaulle Government... could not ignore. Let us remember that the poisonous fallout did not, and never will, respect the arbitrary and artificial divisions forged by colonialism across our beloved continent.⁹⁸

On one hand, then, African states expressed revulsion against the inequality inherent in nuclear order typified in the French nuclear tests. Yet, the choice of the UNGA as a venue to ventilate this frustration was itself a form of obedience. African states did not decide to boycott these institutions, or pursue a path of nuclear acquisition, as South Africa later would. Rather, they sought recognition for their disaffection through precisely the institutions that they claimed were deaf to their cries. In this sense,

⁹⁵ Mohammed Khemisti, “Speech to the 1151st Plenary Meeting at the Seventeenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly” (United Nations, 1962).

⁹⁶ Johnny Magdaleno, “Algerians Still Suffer From French Atomic Legacy,” Al Jazeera America, 2015, <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/3/1/algerians-suffering-from-french-atomic-legacy-55-years-after-nuclear-tests.html>; Angelique Chrisafis, “French Nuclear Tests ‘Showered Vast Area of Polynesia with Radioactivity,’” The Guardian, 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/french-nuclear-tests-polynesia-declassified>.

⁹⁷ Angelique Christafis, “France Finally Agrees to Pay Damages to Nuclear Test Victims,” *The Guardian*, November 27, 2008.

⁹⁸ Christafis.

African states continued to honour the legitimacy of several of the norms, rules and institutions of the nascent nuclear order. In this sense, the earliest articulation of African states' perceptions of nuclear order conform with my definition of 'obedient rebellion', in which strategic elites and states appear torn between seeking recognition within and without nuclear order.

Obedient rebellion was also evident in the emergence of several important official texts from this period. At the founding OAU conference, the parties undertook: 'To bring about, by means of negotiation, the end of military occupation of the African continent and the elimination of military bases and nuclear tests, which elimination constitutes a basic element of African independence and unity'⁹⁹. At the following Casablanca conference, the view was reinforced when states committed, 'To do everything in their power to prevent these tests from taking place, and oppose the use of African territories for purposes of political domination'¹⁰⁰.

Official UN texts on African denuclearisation also assumed a strongly anti-colonial recognition-seeking flavour. Specifically, Section C of the resolution on Africa denuclearisation called on NWS to 'respect' Africa as a NWFZ. This discourse of respect was carried through several documents, from the Cairo Declaration of 1963, to the OAU's 1964 Declaration on the Denuclearisation of Africa. The Cairo Declaration also combined the question of military occupation with nuclear nonproliferation. In Section 3, African states called for, 'the end of military occupation of the African continent and the elimination of military bases and nuclear tests, which elimination

⁹⁹ Adeniji, Oluyemi. "African Political, Military and Economic Affairs in their Relationship to Security, Disarmament and Confidence-building." *Disarmament: Newsletter of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs* 12 (1989).

¹⁰⁰ Ajala, Adekunle. *Pan-Africanism: Evolution, Progress, and Prospects*. St. Martin's Press, 1973.

constitutes a basic element of African independence and unity'¹⁰¹. African opposition to nuclear weapons was central to the creation of the Disarmament Commission of the Security Council with the objective of, 'regulating, limiting and reducing all armed forces and all armaments – for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for effective international control of atomic energy'.¹⁰² For these reasons, French nuclear tests sparked a strong anti-nuclear movement in Africa supported by senior African leaders. Simultaneously, African leaders and states appealed to international institutions for legitimacy and recognition. In this sense, the early years following French nuclear tests provoked obedient rebellion in the newly decolonised African states. As newly decolonised African states continued with obedient rebellion in the 1960s, a fundamental shift occurred when South Africa chose to pursue nuclear weapons in the 1970s. This decision would delay the ANWFZ for twenty-seven years.

Legitimacy: Pretoria's Bombs

As the continent's preeminent military power, South Africa is a particularly important state for African threat perceptions and, in turn, for African perceptions of the legitimacy of nuclear order. Threats on the African continent shifted dramatically when South Africa decided to acquire nuclear weapons in 1977, a decision which significantly frustrated the ANWFZ. Likewise, South Africa's voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons dramatically lowered threat perceptions on the continent and provides a useful natural experiment for my hypothesis: when South Africa's nuclear ambitions

¹⁰¹ Organisation of African Unity, "Resolutions Adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of State and Government" no. 1, July (1964), <http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/.pdf>.

¹⁰² Goldblat, Jozef. *Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements with New CD-ROM Supplement*. Sage, 2002.

threatened Africa, the NWFZ proposal faltered for three decades; when South Africa renounced its nuclear weapons, the ANWFZ materialised in just three years.

What threats did South Africa perceive, and how were other African states, in turn, threatened by South Africa? Deterrence featured high on the South African agenda in the 1970s. As decolonisation raced across its northern borders, depriving the apartheid regime of its long-cherished military 'buffer zone', South Africa was prepared for a dramatic military confrontation with Angola and Cuba.¹⁰³ Apartheid, too, was under increasing international scrutiny,¹⁰⁴ and Pretoria's relations with the West were strained. The apartheid state saw threats from two sources. First, the ANC was committed to armed struggle to end apartheid from within and, by 1974, had executed several acts of sabotage on symbolic state infrastructure.¹⁰⁵ Second, liberation movements from the 'frontline states' (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe) were hostile to the apartheid regime.¹⁰⁶ Although each of these liberation movements was engaged in a domestic struggle of its own, they were in close

¹⁰³ See Kane-Berman, John Stuart. *Soweto: black revolt, white reaction*. Raven Press (South Africa), 1978; Wilson, Henry S. "African Decolonisation (London: Edward Arnold, 1994)." *Northedge: op. cit.* 34-38.

¹⁰⁴ A new wave of domestic rebellions began in 1976 in South Africa, sparked by the Soweto riots against the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in 'black' schools.

¹⁰⁵ See Cherry, Janet. *Umkhonto weSizwe*. Jacana Media, 2011; Motumi, Tsepe. "Umkhonto we Sizwe: Structure, training and Force Levels (1984 to 1994)." *African Defence Review* 18 (1994): 4: '30 July-3 August, The "Luthuli Detachment", comprising ANC and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU guerrillas), crossed the Zambezi river into Southern Rhodesia (the present Zimbabwe) and engages joint Rhodesian and South African troops at the start of the Wankie and Sipolio battles, which rage until late 1968'; In December, 1982 a secret African National Congress sabotage mission succeeded in a strike on a South African nuclear energy facility, estimated to have cost the government billions of Rands, and set the project back by about one year. See Bundy, Colin. "Cooking the rice outside the pot? The ANC and SACP in exile-1960 to 1990." *Treading the waters of history: Perspectives on the ANC* (2014): 52.

¹⁰⁶ Saunders, Chris. "South Africa and Africa." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 652.1 (2014): 222-237.

collaboration with the ANC's military wing, *uMkhonto weSizwe*.¹⁰⁷ These movements were unable to defeat the apartheid state in a conventional war, but the threat of guerrilla warfare consumed the attention of the highest ranks of the apartheid military establishment.¹⁰⁸

The apartheid state also perceived a third threat from a Chinese-backed nuclear strike. This theory was taken seriously at the top of the South African military. In a memorandum dated the 21st of March 1975,¹⁰⁹ Chief of the Defence Staff, Lt-Gen. R. F. Armstrong, wrote to Chief of the South African Defence Force, Admiral H. H. Biermann about, 'The Jericho Weapon System'¹¹⁰. The letter argued that China may provide a hostile neighbouring African state with a nuclear weapon:

In spite of the considerable cost involved in acquiring even a limited number of missiles with the Jericho weapon system, in view of the potential threat which faces the RSA111 in the foreseeable future, the possession of such a system will greatly add to our ability to negotiate from a position of strength.¹¹²

A second threat was perceived from a possible Soviet-backed military invasion of the South African territory.¹¹³ From 1975, South Africa became involved in the Angolan

¹⁰⁷ See Leys, Colin, John S. Saul, and Susan Brown. *Namibia's Liberation Struggle: the two-edged sword*. Ohio University Press, 1995.

¹⁰⁸ See Emerson, Stephen A. "The Battle for Mozambique: The South African Factor." *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 5.1 (2014): 61-82; Baines, Gary. *South Africa's' Border War': Contested Narratives and Conflicting Memories*. A&C Black, 2014; De Fronzo, James. *Revolutions and revolutionary movements*. Westview Press, 2014.

¹⁰⁹ Harris, Verne, Sello Hatang, and Peter Liberman. 'Unveiling South Africa's nuclear past.' *Journal of Southern African Studies* 30.3 (2004): 457-476.

¹¹⁰ South Africa's system of space-launched vehicles and ballistic missiles. Harris, 461.

¹¹¹ The Republic of South Africa

¹¹² The document is available to the public at the South African History Archive, based at the University of the Witwatersrand. (Reference AL 2878, A 3.1.1.) Particulars about SAHA and its nuclear history programme, other freedom-of-information initiatives, and collections can be accessed online at www.wits.ac.za/saha/.

¹¹³ Spence, Jack, and David Welsh. *Ending apartheid*. Routledge, 2014; Asuelime, Lucky, and Suzanne Francis. "Drivers of nuclear proliferation: South Africa's incentives and constraints." *Journal for Contemporary History* 39.1 (2014): 55-68.

War. What began as a civil conflict between the *Movimento Popular de Libertagao de Angola* (MPLA) and *Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola* (UNITA) consumed two middle-range powers: Cuba (fighting with the MPLA), and South Africa (fighting with UNITA). This foreshadowed a larger Cold War struggle between the Soviet Union (backing Cuba and the MPLA) and the US (backing South Africa and UNITA)¹¹⁴. Between 1975 and the 1989 ceasefire,¹¹⁵ the Angolan conflict was the most significant African conflict of the Cold War. In the 1980s, fighting spread Southward towards the Namibian border.¹¹⁶ This provoked a second South African invasion in 1981. South African involvement in the conflict would continue unabated until 1987.¹¹⁷ Thus, during this period threat perceptions remained high on the African content, particularly relating to its main hegemon, South Africa.

In 1987 and 1988, battles comparable to those in the Second World War¹¹⁸ raged and South Africa deployed sophisticated weapons systems.¹¹⁹ Concurrently, four neighbouring states became independent, governed by parties hostile to Pretoria. The NP believed that the South African Communist Party (SACP) was the ‘ideological

¹¹⁴ In reality, the war was much more complex than this. For instance, one bizarre twist saw Cuba and the MPLA protecting a US oil company from UNITA and South Africa, proving, according to Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, that ‘politics never got in the way of good business’. See Soares de Oliveira, R. “Magnificent and Beggar Land: Angola Since the Civil War.” (2012).

¹¹⁵ After a brief peace accord the war would actually continue until 2002.

¹¹⁶ Soares de Oliveira.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Wessels, André. “The SADF in the Border War 1966–1989.” *African Historical Review* 46.2 (2014): 144-146.

¹¹⁹ Zunes, Stephen. “The townships rise up.” *Civil Resistance and Conflict Transformation: Transitions from Armed to Nonviolent Struggle* (2014): 100; Oosthuizen, Gerhard JJ. “The South African Defence Force and Operation Hooper, southeast Angola, December 1987 to March 1988.” *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 42.2 (2014): 84-116; Barnard, Rita, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Nelson Mandela*. Cambridge University Press, 2014. Although the war did not occupy the popular Western imaginary as comprehensively as it might have, it is fair to say that South Africa was in a state of all-out war.

base' of the ANC-led liberation movement in South Africa, and that *uMkonto weSizwe*, was a front for the SACP.¹²⁰ Members of the de Klerk regime also believed that, 'the international campaign against apartheid made significant use of Soviet propaganda'¹²¹. According to de Klerk's Chief of Staff, Dave Steward, 'Angola became the key to our decision.... The Soviets were also key.... Many members of the ANC NEC were members of the South African Communist Party'¹²². P.W. Botha, de Klerk's predecessor, termed the period 'total onslaught'.¹²³

The apartheid state therefore perceived threats from various directions in this period. In the conceptual model, I suggested that the legitimacy of nuclear order hinged on its ability to mitigate threats. States which are obedient to order trust the NPT to mitigate these threats, while rebellious states reject the NPT or acquire weapons of their own. South Africa during this period clearly falls into the latter category, of a state facing significant threats and rejecting the NPT as a route to security. Hence, from the continental perspective, one of Africa's main powers was entrenched in a rebellious attitude towards nuclear order in this period.

Far from embracing the NPT, the apartheid regime believed that nuclear weapons would deter international and domestic 'threats' and pursued a policy of 'catalytic deterrence'. Catalytic deterrence is the, 'incitement of third-party intervention to stave

¹²⁰ The point here is not that this view is well-founded, but that it is genuinely what the NP believed at the time. For a lively historical debate on the question of the SACP's influence on the ANC, see the clash between Stephen Ellis and Hugh Macmillan: Ellis, Stephen. *External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960-1990*. Oxford University Press, 2013; Macmillan, Hugh. "Debating the ANC'S External Links During the Struggle Against Apartheid." *Africa* 85.01 (2015): 154-156.

¹²¹ Interview with Dave Steward.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ See Hughes, Geraint. "Why Military Interventions Fail: An Historical Overview." *British Journal for Military History* 1.2 (2015).

off invasion'¹²⁴ or one state's reliance on the extended deterrence of another.¹²⁵ South Africa believed it could induce US intervention in an emergency by threatening to use nuclear weapons against a major African city. As Steward suggests, 'we could have hit any major city in Africa'¹²⁶. As de Klerk stressed in a speech to the South African Parliament in 1993, 'the strategy was that if the situation in southern Africa were to deteriorate seriously, a confidential indication of the deterrent capability would be given to one or more of the major powers, for example the United States, in an attempt to persuade them to intervene. It was never the intention to use the devices and from the outset the emphasis was on deterrence'¹²⁷. He reaffirmed this view in a speech to the Legatum Institute: 'forget about my personal feelings now. The strategy was, as explained to me when I was first briefed about it, we wanted never to use it [nuclear weapons], but we want it to act as a deterrent'¹²⁸.

In recently declassified top-secret minutes of a meeting between President Reagan and Prime Minister P.W. Botha (also attended by the South African Minister of Foreign

¹²⁴ Donald L. R. Goodson, "Catalytic Deterrence? Apartheid South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Strategy," *Politikon* 39, no. 2 (January 22, 2012): 209–30, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2012.683940>.

¹²⁵ Goodson.

¹²⁶ Interview with Dave Steward. 2015. Cape Town, South Africa.

¹²⁷ Ibid. He also said 'Any doubt about the Government's intentions with regard to nuclear matters must, for once and all, be removed. For this reason, the Government has decided to provide full information on South Africa's past nuclear programme despite the fact that the NPT does not require this. At one stage, South Africa did, indeed, develop a limited nuclear deterrent capability... the objective was the provision of seven nuclear fission devices, which was considered the minimum for testing purposes and for the maintenance thereafter of credible deterrent capability'

¹²⁸ F. W. de Klerk. Speech to the Legatum Institute: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j80qArtrGSY>. De Klerk also said: 'We want other countries, we want the United States, we want Russia and so on to feel that in all probability that we have it... so that was the philosophy, we wanted it as a deterrent... we wanted to convince the world that we were not playing games, that we were very serious about 180-degree turn in South Africa. We announced as soon as possible that we had broken those bombs down, that we could account for every milli-milli-milli-milligram of material, that we would open all facilities to full inspection by the International Atomic Agency, and that is exactly what we did'.

Affairs and the US Secretary of State), Botha stressed the importance of deterrence to South Africa: ‘the Minister explained in this context that if we [South Africa] were to sign the Treaty (NPT), we would be deprived of a deterrent of major psychological value’¹²⁹. Moreover, US planners also understood South Africa to be following a strategy of deterrence. In an inter-agency intelligence memo, the Director of Intelligence argues, ‘nevertheless he [Botha] may have become persuaded that undeclared and un-denied weapons would have an important psychological deterrence effect that South Africa could better achieve through testing’¹³⁰. Furthermore, a recently declassified intelligence memorandum compiled by the Director of Central Intelligence for the US Director of Arms Control states, ‘because of his personal convictions and his official responsibilities, he [then-president Botha] has advocated more than any other cabinet officer for the military components of South Africa’s strategy for coping with external threats’¹³¹. This commitment to deterrence would last for a period of ten years. Following the 1970s, South Africa’s attitude towards nuclear order and the ability of the NPT (and thereby nuclear order) to improve its security shifted dramatically, from extreme rebellion, to extreme obedience. This, too, was shaped by a domestic debate among strategic elites which remained polarised between these two extremes.

South Africa’s threat perceptions changed drastically in the 1980s. This began with the de-escalation of the Angolan War. After peaking between 1987 and 1988, South Africa’s involvement in the war waned after a cease-fire on the northern border of

¹²⁹ Botha is also reported to have said that ‘South Africa was not preparing or intending to explode a nuclear device, but he made it clear that we could not publicly surrender this option’.

¹³⁰ de Klerk.

¹³¹ A 1979 CIA memo also says, ‘he has probably sympathised with views that a nuclear weapon may be needed’.

Namibia. This ensured a phased withdrawal of 50 000 Cuban forces from Angola,¹³² which members of President de Klerk's inner circle identify as pivotal¹³³: 'Namibia was also of importance to the decision [to forgo nuclear weapons] when it was clear independence would go ahead'¹³⁴. With the removal of the external threat, 'it became obvious that South Africa's nuclear deterrent capability was superfluous and could, in fact, become a liability... The strategic threat had disappeared, and nuclear weapons no longer made sense'¹³⁵.

The threat from Southern African liberation movements had also changed. The liberation movements that the apartheid regime feared in 1974, were now governing parties on South Africa's borders in 1989.¹³⁶ The idea that China might supply them with nuclear weapons by the late 1980s had been discredited.¹³⁷ During this period, a dispute also arose within the South African security elite over the wisdom of retaining nuclear weapons. On the one hand, some continued to believe that South Africa needed a deterrent; on the other, a group led by de Klerk, Pik Botha, and de Villiers (Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs), believed that nuclear weapons, 'served no clear

¹³² Melber, Henning. "Namibia's negotiated transition to independence." *Self Determination and Secession in Africa: The Post-Colonial State* (2014): 217; Melber, Henning, ed. *Re-examining liberation in Namibia: political culture since independence*. Nordic Africa Institute, 2003.

¹³³ Interview with Dave Steward. Although the Angolan war would restart in 1989, it no longer retained its global significance, and South Africa withdrew from active fighting. The threat of a South African invasion had, according to several South African Sources, subsided substantially.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Melber, Henning. "From liberation movements to governments: on political culture in Southern Africa." *African Sociological Review/Revue Africaine de Sociologie* 6.1 (2002): 161-172. Not all of these liberation movements had supported the ANC, however. See Dorman, Sara Rich. "Post-liberation politics in Africa: Examining the political legacy of struggle." *Third World Quarterly* 27.6 (2006): 1085-1101.

¹³⁷ Although it was not immediately clear in 1989 how long it would take for the Soviet Union to fall, the Berlin Wall had already begun to come down by the time South Africa was deciding on its nuclear future. Therefore, the need for nuclear deterrence, according South Africa's threat perception, had substantially decreased.

purpose' and were paradoxically *decreasing* South Africa's security. This group's logic was founded on the notion that nuclear possession would render South Africa vulnerable after the Cold War. A senior figure in the de Klerk government, Mike Louw,¹³⁸ describes this view:

Armscor had developed atomic weapons, and South Africa was a rising military power. In spite of this nuclear power, I experienced a sense of helplessness. There was a deep futility about possessing power in a military sense. It was counter-productive. It resulted in South Africa drawing more fire... With the removal of the external threat, it became obvious that South Africa's nuclear deterrent capability was superfluous and could, in fact, become a liability... the strategic threat had disappeared, and nuclear weapons no longer made sense.¹³⁹

Acceding to the NPT thus became an increasingly attractive option for South African strategic elites. This view was shared by members of the ANC government when it came to power in 1994. The ANC's first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo, was a strong opponent of nuclear possession, claiming, 'security is provided by nuclear disarmament rather than by nuclear proliferation'¹⁴⁰. His actions demonstrated a strong obedience to nuclear order, fully reorienting South African foreign policy to a position of active participation within the institutions of nuclear order. Other members of the ANC believed that reactivating the nuclear weapons programme upon assuming power would, 'cause us all sorts of problems'¹⁴¹. They reasoned that the apartheid regime was, 'starting to feel less secure than before they even had them [nuclear

¹³⁸ The successor of Neil Barnard as Director General of South Africa's National Intelligence Service between 1992 and 1994.

¹³⁹ Heald, Geoffrey Ronald. *South Africa's voluntary relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal and accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in terms of international law*. Diss. 2011, 193-194; de Klerk himself felt that 'weapons of mass destruction create more problems than they are ever likely to solve. In retrospect, I firmly believe that I did the right thing, especially when I assess the present situation in Iran and Iraq, and the intensely complicated problems that the issue of weapons of mass destruction is creating' in Speech to the Ligatim Institute.

¹⁴⁰ Nzo, Alfred. "Foreign ministers budget vote address." *South African Journal of International Affairs* 6.2 (1999): 217-226.

¹⁴¹ Interview with Buyelwa Sonjica, Cape Town, 2015.

weapons]¹⁴². Further, the ANC also felt ‘insecure internally’: some within the movement argue, ‘we felt fine that they got rid of the weapons, because they might even have used them as a way of bargaining for a domestic outcome to the negotiations. They could have leveraged them even after 1994. They had all the scientists, all the know-how’¹⁴³. ANC support was also important in ensuring that the decision to renounce nuclear weapons ‘stuck’ and enjoyed widespread political consensus after full IAEA inspection.

For these reasons, South Africa conforms with my definition of obedient rebellion. More than any other state on the continent, South Africa vacillated between two extreme positions since the ANWFZ was first proposed after French nuclear tests. On one hand the apartheid regime pursued a position of extreme rebellion in the 1970s. However obedient strategic elites within the apartheid state began to swing the position towards the early 1980s, and eventually succeeded in shifting South Africa to a position of official obedience by the early 1990s. In the forty years that it took the ANWFZ to materialise, then, South Africa was caught in a debate over the question of the legitimacy of nuclear order. Eventually, this debate caused an unprecedented swing from extreme rebellion to extreme obedience, opening the space for the birth of the ANWFZ.

Other African States

As South Africa felt threatened by increasingly hostile independent African states during the 1970s and 1980s, so African states were threatened by South Africa during this period. This also prompted a choice: would African states seek to mitigate the

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

threat of apartheid through the NPT or by acquiring an African deterrent? Evidence of this tension emerges in three main areas: the perceptions of frontline states; the statements of African leaders at regional and international forums (especially the UNGA); and the formal declarations of international and regional institutions, like the OAU.

First, frontline states were threatened by Pretoria. The apartheid government engaged in railway sabotage, cross-border raids, abductions, and bomb attacks during Botha's strategy of 'total onslaught'¹⁴⁴. These actions threatened the sovereignty of Botswana, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Mozambique at various stages. Between 1975 and 1989, the apartheid government conducted fourteen raids, twenty-eight bomb attacks, and fifteen abductions. In addition, Pretoria also funded and supported several proxy armies against liberation movements' military wings.¹⁴⁵

Pretoria also prepared to engage in overt military invasion.¹⁴⁶ From the moment of its independence in 1975, Angola was a vulnerable state: 'all major institutions imploded amidst civil war, the exodus of white settlers, and a flurry of foreign invasions'¹⁴⁷. In addition, South Africa also occupied Namibia to its North-western border. This caused great insecurity in Namibia and drew criticism from the OAU:

We are left with no alternative but to support the escalation and intensification of the armed struggle heroically being waged by SWAPO. In this regard the OAU member

¹⁴⁴ Robert Scott Jaster, "Growing Militancy and Isolation under P.W. Botha since 1978," in *The Defence of White Power* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1989), 79–91, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19601-2_6.

¹⁴⁵ Hennie Van Vuuren and Anine Krieger, *Apartheid Guns and Money: A Tale of Profit* (Jacana, 2017).

¹⁴⁶ Douglas G. Anglin, "Southern Africa Under Siege: Options for the Frontline States," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 26, no. 4 (1988): 549–65, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00015378>.

¹⁴⁷ Ricardo Soares De Oliveira, "Illiberal Peacebuilding in Angola," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 49, no. 2 (2011): 287–314, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X1100005X>.

states as a whole pledge their full backing. Africa pledges increased material and financial assistance to SWAPO until final victory and total liberation of Namibia.¹⁴⁸

Several other African states were threatened by South Africa's nuclear programme. Nigeria—an early champion of African denuclearisation—became one of apartheid South Africa's most ardent nuclear critics in the 1970s advocating for African rebellion against nuclear order. As Shehu Shagari, Nigeria's president between 1979 and 1983, stated 'Nigeria might acquire nuclear weapons to protect herself if racist South Africa persisted in acquiring the deadly weapons to threaten the continent'¹⁴⁹. He claimed further that, 'Nigeria cannot fold her arms and suffer in silence while apartheid South Africa arms herself threateningly and behaves like an outcast in the community of nations'¹⁵⁰. The same year, Nigeria's Foreign Minister, Iya Abubakar, cautioned, 'Nigeria will develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and eventually become a nuclear power... Nigeria is a great country and it needs a strong, invincible and unassailable defence capability'¹⁵¹. Abubakar also warned, 'as long as protagonists of apartheid have access to nuclear capability, Nigeria should, as of necessity, endeavour to acquire it at any price'¹⁵².

At the nineteenth OAU Regular Assembly of Heads of State and Government, then Secretary-General Edem Kodjo shocked his audience with a speech calling for the immediate development of an 'African liberation bomb'. He argued, 'it is the duty of member states which are able, resolutely to embark on the nuclear path, since South Africa had developed weapons which could only be directed against OAU member

¹⁴⁸ Femi Otubanjo, "The Nuclear Factor in the Politics of Apartheid and Liberation by Femi Otubanjo," *Conflict Quarterly*, 1984, 22–40, 25.

¹⁴⁹ Thakur, *Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones*, 1998.

¹⁵⁰ Julius Emeka Okolo, "Nuclearization of Nigeria," *Comparative Strategy* 5, no. 2 (1985): 135–57, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495938508402686>, 127.

¹⁵¹ Ramesh Thakur, *Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones* (Macmillan Press; St. Martin's Press, 1998), 95.

¹⁵² Okolo, "Nuclearization of Nigeria."

states'¹⁵³ and that, 'the OAU must encourage any African country which has the capacity to engage in a nuclear energy program to do so, as a matter of urgency and duty... in order to develop a nuclear weapon capacity to counter-balance the nuclear capacity which South Africa is believed to have attained in recent years'¹⁵⁴. Prominent scholars joined the call for a 'liberation bomb' to deter against, 'lunatics who will use all available means to perpetuate their peculiar system'¹⁵⁵.

One example was Ali Mazrui who addressed the question in the Reith Lectures of 1979: 'Africa should give up the idea of promoting itself as a nuclear-free-zone... Those African countries which signed the non-proliferation treaty should review their positions and consider setting up a continental nuclear consortium allied to a strategy of developing a small military nuclear capability, first in Nigeria and later on in Zaire and black-ruled South Africa'¹⁵⁶. Professor A. B. Akinyemi, Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, concurred: 'the best defence against nuclear attack is for the possible targets to develop nuclear power of their own'¹⁵⁷. In sum, African states were threatened by apartheid South Africa, which hindered progress toward an ANWFZ until the late 1980s. This led to a section of African strategic elites openly advocating for rebellion against nuclear order and the abandonment of the NPT. Unlike the African leaders who addressed the UNGA in the 1960s, these calls for open rebellion occurred within Africa and inside African institutions, further cementing their rebellious nature.

¹⁵³ Ogunbadejo, Oye. "Africa's nuclear capability." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 22.01 (1984): 19-43. See also, Kodjo, Edem. *Africa tomorrow*. New York: Continuum, 1987.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Okolo, "Nuclearization of Nigeria."

¹⁵⁶ Ali Mazrui, "Africa's Nuclear Future," *Survival* 22, no. 2 (1980): 76-79, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338008441880>.

¹⁵⁷ Mazrui, Ali. "Africa's nuclear future." *Survival* 22.2 (1980): 76.

In total, this historical account suggests three things. First, Africa experienced an ENI through French nuclear tests in the Sahara between 1959 and 1963, and this intervention triggered the ANWFZ. Despite significant support for the African zone after French tests, the proposal was hindered by high threat perceptions on the continent, resulting mainly from apartheid's nuclear rebellion. In addition, several conflicts involving South Africa further escalated these tensions. Thus, the threat environment on the continent precluded a NWFZ for several decades as ambiguity pervaded the African threat landscape. However, once those threats subsided and apartheid renounced nuclear weapons, the NWFZ proposal gained new steam. Strategic elites were able to support the ANWFZ from both sides of the obedience/rebellion divide. In this sense, Africa provides a useful experiment for the threat hypothesis: for three decades a proposed zone failed, but with the change in threats, the same zone speedily emerged. This adds weight to the hypothesis that threats play a key role in determining the legitimacy of nuclear order.

I have now described the picture leading to the formation of the ANWFZ from the perspective of several key states inside Africa. In the next section, I investigate how French tests sparked the obedient rebellion between and within the NWSs which birthed Pelindaba.

The NWSs

Recognition: Division in the NWSs

Obedient rebellion also emerged within the NWSs during the four decades leading to Pelindaba, notably in the US and the UK. While the NWSs pursued rebellious policies of nuclear testing and retention through official policy, the domestic picture showed increasing signs of ambiguity. This was driven by increasing links between anti-racism and civil rights campaigners in the global North, and movements for decolonisation in

the global South. These movements, in turn, affected the calculus of strategic elite decision-makers within the NWSs.

In the US, African American opposition to nuclear weapons began soon after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the African American press, several authors criticised the bombings on racial grounds. This mood was symbolised by Reverend J. E. Elliot, who argued, ‘I have seen the course of discrimination throughout the world and the fact that Japan is of a darker race is no excuse for resorting to such an atrocity’¹⁵⁸. The poet Langston Hughes voiced discontent in the pages of *The Defender* through his popular character ‘Simple’:

Simple: How come we did not try them [nuclear weapons] on Germany?

Narrator: You know better than that. They just did not want to use them on white folks. Germans is white... Japs [sic] is coloured.¹⁵⁹

African American opposition to the use of atomic weapons was based on a climate of racism towards people of Japanese origin. Newspaper reports described Japanese people as, ‘yellow monkeys, Japanese apes, and beasts’¹⁶⁰. Writing to his wife during WWII, US General Joseph Stilwell—who led the allied invasion of North Africa—said, ‘When I think of how these bowlegged cockroaches have ruined our calm lives it makes me want to wrap Jap guts around every lamppost in Asia’¹⁶¹. Even the relatively conservative journalist, George Schuyler, writing in the *Pittsburgh Courier*, claimed, ‘[devastation] it must be admitted is the way of white imperialism which firearms enabled them to establish two centuries ago... Controlling this tremendous power for evil are second-rate and small-minded men like Truman...’¹⁶². Despite these early

¹⁵⁸ Vincent J. Intondi, *African Americans against the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Colonialism, and the Black Freedom Movement* (Stanford University Press, 2015).

¹⁵⁹ Intondi.

¹⁶⁰ Intondi.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² George Schuyler, “Views and Reviews,” *Pittsburgh Courier*, August 18, 1945.

critiques, a norm against nuclear use in Africa would still take two decades to materialise.

The African American critique of nuclear weapons assumed new force after France announced nuclear tests. The announcement precipitated unprecedented international collaboration between Western and African campaigners. Civil rights activists from the United States, British anti-apartheid campaigners, and African anti-colonial movements embarked on sophisticated collaboration to shame French nuclear ambitions. In 1960, what became known as the Sahara Project saw various Western anti-racism organisations join with Ghanaian movements and politicians to protest at the gates of France's nuclear testing site in the Sahara.¹⁶³ The risks were immense, as campaigners vowed to, 'place their lives in the way of the nuclear instrument that may ultimately wipe out thousands of lives'¹⁶⁴. On the 5th of December 1959, Michael Scott, a member of the Sahara Project, took to Radio Ghana, declaring: 'we are embarking on a holy war, a non-violent war, against the inhumanity of nuclear war'¹⁶⁵. One thousand Ghanaians filled a small stadium in a send-off rally for the Sahara protestors. At the rally, Ghana's Finance Minister K. A. Gbedemah fumed, 'It seems nowadays that when Frenchmen assume high office, they become mad'¹⁶⁶. From Accra the protesters travelled seven hours to another large rally in Kumasi, and then to the border of French Upper Volta (still a French colony at the time). Beyond the border,

¹⁶³ Sarah Azaransky, "Resisting Jim Crow Colonialism: Black Christianity and the International Roots of the Civil Rights Movement," in *The Religious Left in Modern America* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018), 125–44, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73120-9_7.

¹⁶⁴ Vincent Intondi, "The Dream of Bandung and the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons," *Critical Studies on Security*, 2018, 1–4, <https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2018.1468131>.

¹⁶⁵ Allman, "Symposium On Nuclear Imperialism and the Pan-African Struggle for Peace and Freedom: Ghana, 1959–1962."

¹⁶⁶ Intondi, *African Americans against the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Colonialism, and the Black Freedom Movement*.

the team was immediately detained by French police. As Sutherland notes, the Sahara Project became a key link between, ‘European anti-nuclear forces, the African liberation forces and US civil rights movements’¹⁶⁷.

After further civil disobedience, France sent a hundred police, ‘armed with revolvers, rifles and machine guns’ to quell the protest.¹⁶⁸ This reached the international press, drawing public sympathy from Ralph Abernathy, Dr Martin Luther King, Jr.’s senior aide in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and renowned intellectual, Frantz Fanon.¹⁶⁹ French tests also prompted European movements to campaign against ‘nuclear imperialism’ with more fervour. At the European Congress for Nuclear Disarmament, the Direct-Action Committee (DAC) discussed plans to protest the French tests.¹⁷⁰ The DAC collaborated with the anti-colonial Committee of African Organisations (CAO) in a two-thousand-person protest against French ‘imperialism’¹⁷¹. The DAC forged strong links with the Committee for Nonviolent Action (CVNA) and assisted its campaigns against the Sahara tests: ‘protests against the French tests had brought British and US anti-nuclear pacifists into alliance with African anti-colonial campaigners who explicitly connected the history of ‘centuries of

¹⁶⁷ Bill Sutherland and Matt Meyer, *Guns and Gandhi in Africa: Pan-African Insights on Nonviolence, Armed Struggle and Liberation* (Trenton NJ: Africa World Press, 2000), <https://www.worldcat.org/title/guns-and-gandhi-in-africa-pan-african-insights-on-nonviolence-armed-struggle-and-liberation/oclc/41273084>.

¹⁶⁸ Intondi, *African Americans against the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Colonialism, and the Black Freedom Movement*.

¹⁶⁹ Intondi, “The Dream of Bandung and the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.”

¹⁷⁰ Rob Skinner, “Bombs and Border Crossings: Peace Activist Networks and the Post-Colonial State in Africa, 1959–62,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 50, no. 3 (July 17, 2015): 418–38, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009414552148>.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

slavery and imperial exploitation' with, 'the pollution of our air with radioactive fallout'¹⁷².

Virtually all independent African states at the time issued condemnatory statements.¹⁷³ Egypt's President Nasser denounced the actions while the Moroccan cabinet considered retaliatory action. French tests also intensified the Algerian civil war, and galvanised international anti-nuclear activists around the several conferences in Ghana already mentioned. Later that decade, African American campaigners joined the Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy in the United States. Martin Luther King Jr. became a signatory to several SANE petitions between 1958 and 1962.¹⁷⁴ Anti-nuclear protests with large African American contingents swelled in major cities, culminating in a concert at Madison Square Garden by Musicians for Safe Energy where seventeen thousand demanded 'an end to nuclear testing'¹⁷⁵. According to a Gallup Poll in 1961, '77% of the American people were against nuclear tests'¹⁷⁶.

Throughout the 1960s, major African American celebrities, literary figures, and activists reinforced the nuclear taboo in America. James Baldwin captured the sentiment in 1961, arguing that, 'racial hatred and the atom bomb both threaten the destruction of man as created free by God'¹⁷⁷. Not all African American activists

¹⁷² Skinner, "Bombs and Border Crossings: Peace Activist Networks and the Post-Colonial State in Africa, 1959–62."

¹⁷³ Except Côte d'Ivoire, which congratulated France.

¹⁷⁴ "National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE)," The Martin Luther King, Jr. Research and Education Institute, 2018, <https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/national-committee-sane-nuclear-policy-sane>.

¹⁷⁵ Blake Slonecker, "Springsteen's Nuclear War," in *A New Dawn for the New Left* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2012), 159–66, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137280831_13.

¹⁷⁶ Intondi, *African Americans against the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Colonialism, and the Black Freedom Movement*.

¹⁷⁷ Vincent Intondi, "Martin Luther King on Non-Violence and Disarmament," *Boston Review* (Boston, January 2015).

agreed, however. For instance, as early as 1963, Malcom X responded positively to China's pursuit of nuclear weapons, observing that:

Up until now the nuclear devices have been in the hands of the Europeans, they have exercised a monopoly over nuclear weapons, or the ability to use nuclear weapons but now the Chinese have equalised it, by being a non-white nation and at the same time developing successfully the ability to produce nuclear weapons... and I do hope they will build bigger and better ones every day, because power is the only language that the Western powers understand.¹⁷⁸

X's view was contested. Accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in 1964, Martin Luther King Jr. linked racial hatred to nuclear annihilation, warning that 'whites will hardly solve the problems of other whites or negroes if it means equality in a society under the spell of terror and a world doomed to extinction'¹⁷⁹. Three years later, in a speech in Los Angeles on the Vietnam War, he reinforced the point: 'In a day when vehicles hurtle through space and guided ballistic missiles carve highways of death through the stratosphere, no nation can claim victory in war... If modern man continues to flirt unhesitatingly with war, he will transform his earthly habitat into an inferno such as even the mind of Dante could not envision'¹⁸⁰. By the mid 1960s, international pressure had forced France to abandon African nuclear tests in favour of South Pacific island sites.

Peace movements and anti-nuclear campaigns were at odds with official state policy, however. On one hand, the US and UK pursued actions in direct rebellion against emerging nuclear order by maintaining and expanding their nuclear weapons programmes. France itself was pursuing a directly rebellious position by actively testing

¹⁷⁸ X. Malcolm, "Malcolm X Praises Chinese Nuclear Weapons," 1964, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ShNMd4MRy2A>.

¹⁷⁹ Martin Luther King, "Acceptance Speech: The Nobel Peace Prize," The Nobel Prize, 1964, <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1964/king/acceptance-speech/>.

¹⁸⁰ Martin Luther King, "Beyond Vietnam - A Time to Break Silence," *American Rhetoric Online Speech Bank*, 1967, 1–8, <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkatimetobreaksilence.htm>.

nuclear weapons in Africa. On the other hand, public opinion and anti-nuclear campaigners exerted pressure on these NWSs to denounce the French nuclear tests. In this sense, the US and UK were caught between a position of rebellion against nuclear order through their actions, and obedience to order through public pressure on strategic elites.

French tests also exposed disagreements between the NWSs. The Berlin Conference of 1954, which addressed the Korean War and prospects for disarmament, was attended by the foreign ministers of the US, the UK, the USSR and France. On the question of disarmament, the parties were divided. The conference's final communique only stated that, 'the parties were unable to reach agreement upon these matters'¹⁸². The parties promised a 'subsequent engagement' on disarmament which ultimately led to the Geneva Partial Test Ban talks, which also ultimately failed. Chief among the disagreements was France's insistence that a test-ban would disadvantage Paris in comparison to the other nuclear powers who themselves had tested nuclear weapons through the early fifties.¹⁸³ France was 'prepared' to discuss universal disarmament, but would continue nuclear testing while the other NWSs retained their nuclear arsenals. Thus, while the Soviet Union and Britain were supportive of a ban, the US and France were sceptical. In this sense the NWSs were divided over the extent to which they should honour the emerging norm of disarmament, and whether Africa could be sacrificed as an unwilling venue for nuclear tests.

¹⁸² "American Foreign Policy. 1950-1955, Basic Documents: Indochina - Plans for the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina: Quadripartite Communique of the Berlin Conference" (Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, 1954), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/inch018.asp.

¹⁸³ "U.S. Intelligence and the French Nuclear Weapons Program, Document 11," The National Security Archive, 2006, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB184/index.htm>.

French tests ultimately solidified French rebellion to nuclear order and further divided opinion inside Britain and the US. In the UK, for instance, obedient strategic elites argued strongly that Britain should pressurise France to cease the African tests. By contrast, rebellious elites maintained that French tests would not endanger the health of African peoples, and that public condemnation would prove counterproductive. When Nigerian Prime Minister, Alhaji Abubaker, visited Britain in 1959, he registered strong concern over French testing. This spilled into a debate in the House of Commons in November that year. After a question from Labour MP Fenner Brockway¹⁸⁴ on the Nigerian visit, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan claimed that Abubaker ‘came to England in September to explain to me Nigerian anxieties about the proposed tests’ and suggested that, ‘the information I was able to give them... will have helped to allay some of these anxieties’¹⁸⁵. This failed to convince Brockway who insisted, ‘this is not only a matter of the safety of the fall-out—in respect of which scientists differ—but also a matter of the resentment of African countries that these tests should take place in their continent at all when the nations concerned have had no responsibility for this instrument of annihilation?’¹⁸⁶ Macmillan replied that ‘that the possible health hazards are very small indeed’ and that the best possible way to allay other fears was through a general prohibition on testing to be negotiated by the four nuclear powers at that time. This exchange typifies the ambiguity surrounding British nuclear policy in Africa at the time. On the one hand, some strategic elites supported the French tests, while others called for strong condemnation. Britain sought recognition both through its alliance with France but also through its commitment to the newly emerging values of

¹⁸⁴ Later Lord Brockway.

¹⁸⁵ “Atomic Test in the Sahara, Nigerian Representations (Hansard, 10 November 1959),” 1959, <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1959/nov/10/atomic-test-sahara-nigerian>.

¹⁸⁶ “Atomic Test in the Sahara, Nigerian Representations (Hansard, 10 November 1959).”

disarmament and nuclear equality. These tensions would lay the foundation for Britain's support for Pelindaba decades later.

The US was similarly ambivalent over the French tests. In a meeting held in the office of the State Department's Special Assistant for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, State Department Official Richard St Francis Post recorded a recently declassified meeting concerning French nuclear tests. The meeting was designed to establish the feasibility of an attempt to spy on French tests for US scientific benefit in either Mali, Niger or Libya. Representing the perspective of obedience to nuclear order, US diplomat William Jones criticised the plan, claiming that international organisations would leave 'any connection between the US and French tests... open to the charge, especially from the Russians, that we have not lived up to our self-imposed ban on nuclear testing'¹⁸⁷. Jones argued further that US efforts to observe the French test for the benefit of the US programme would meet strong reaction from African states, who were 'publicly committed to Africa being nuclear-free'¹⁸⁸.

In response to these submissions, State Department official, Howard Funes, eventually stalled the proposal to spy on the French tests, noting on one hand the 'desirability of minoring these [French] tests' but also that 'Mali, with a government somewhat oriented to the Soviet Bloc... would be totally unsuitable' while Niger was also unsuitable because it was 'committed to a policy of a "nuclear-free" Africa'. He ultimately decided that 'the final decision would require further study'¹⁸⁹. Like the British dispute over the French test, this dispute decision exemplifies a broader

¹⁸⁷ "U.S. Intelligence and the French Nuclear Weapons Program, Document 11," The National Security Archive, 2006, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB184/index.htm>.

¹⁸⁸ "U.S. Intelligence and the French Nuclear Weapons Program, Document 13," The National Security Archive, 2006, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB184/index.htm>.

¹⁸⁹ "U.S. Intelligence and the French Nuclear Weapons Program, Document 15," The National Security Archive, 2006, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB184/index.htm>.

attitude of ambivalence and division among US strategic elites toward the question of nuclear order in Africa.

French tests also produced ambivalence in Beijing. In a conversation between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, both Nkrumah and Enlai outlined their respective positions on the ANWFZ:

Everybody wants lasting peace. Ghana, and Africa, can only develop when we have peace. It would be very bad if Africa were to turn into a nuclear weapons zone. Imperialism and colonialism want to use nuclear weapons to impose their will on us. For example, the Congo has 20 airports that serve as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Kamina is their military base. We Africans do not want to be involved in nuclear war. We hope to have a policy of struggle for peace.¹⁹⁰

In response to Nkrumah's position Enlai navigated a Chinese position that at once showed sympathy for the anti-imperial tenor of Nkrumah's remarks, but also denied full support for the ANWFZ:

I support the Addis Ababa Conference with regard to the resolution for the establishment of an African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. But the nuclear powers should assume an obligation to guarantee it. Otherwise, the great powers may still use them. Therefore, Cuba has put forward the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Americas. The United States must first of all withdraw its military base from Guantanamo. The first few steps are favorable. The people oppose nuclear weapons. If not under imperialist control, one could have a public referendum. One can say so in theory, but in fact it is not possible. If the will of the people arises through an Asian-African-Latin American people's conference and summit conference, it could be favorable to force imperialism to retreat. Imperialism knows that waging nuclear war is not easy.¹⁹¹

On the African NWFZ, then, Enlai both said 'We [China] support it' but warned that this support came with 'several conditions' including the 'removal of foreign bases' the cessation of testing in the Sahara, and 'nuclear power guarantees'¹⁹². He further

¹⁹⁰ "Record of Premier Zhou Enlai's Talks with Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah" (Wilson Centre Digital Archive, 1964), <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/165410>.

¹⁹¹ "Record of Premier Zhou Enlai's Talks with Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah."

¹⁹² Ibid.

encouraged Nkrumah to raise the proposal at the UN, arguing ‘in Latin America the establishing of a nuclear-free zone also should be like this’¹⁹³. Similarly, in a conversation between Enlai and Nasser on the same subject, Enlai addressed the Middle Eastern NWFZ:

The reason is that in establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, if it does not include all the Arab countries, does not include Israel, and the nuclear powers offer no guarantee, then the African nuclear-weapon-free zone will have no guarantee... If West Asia and Israel do not participate and the nuclear powers give no guarantee, then an African nuclear-weapon-free zone will have no guarantee.¹⁹⁴

Legitimacy: The NWSs and Apartheid

The key question facing the NWSs in Africa in the 1960s was whether to support French tests, or African calls for denuclearisation. In the 1970s, focus shifted to the urgent question of South Africa’s nuclear programme. The US and UK’s respective relationships with South Africa were key to this question since South Africa was a strategic ally of both. The story of the 1970s and 1980s centred on whether the US and the UK would risk alienating an increasingly rebellious Pretoria, or support apartheid and rebel against nuclear order.

In the 1970s and 1980s, apartheid became synonymous with nuclear aggression, and nuclear aggression with apartheid. After Pretoria embarked on the nuclear path, Washington and Whitehall pursued an ambiguous response: on one hand reducing support from apartheid’s military programmes while remaining supportive of the apartheid regime overall. As a result, sanctions movements increasingly focused on the nuclear issue. American support for apartheid declined significantly when Pretoria refused to sign the NPT in the 1980s. At first, Pretoria avoided damage by turning to

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

West Germany and Israel, but this was ultimately unsustainable. In 1976, the US embargoed HEU from entering South Africa, and a year later, halted all ‘nuclear technology transfers’¹⁹⁵. An arms embargo, in place from 1977, fundamentally debilitated South African military capability, according to Van Wyk. Sophisticated military technology was withheld from South Africa; South Africa could no longer replace outdated military equipment; and the clandestine importation of nuclear material became economically unsustainable¹⁹⁶. Nuclear exports plummeted during the latter years of the embargo. Arms exports as a proportion of manufacturing exports fell to 1.5%, from a five-year high in 1987 of 3.5% in 1988¹⁹⁷, and to 0.9% in 1989. As a proportion of total exports, arms exports also fell from 0.9% to 0.3% in the same period.¹⁹⁸ In 1977 the UNSC passed a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa, which focused strongly on nuclear exports. Later that year, it removed South Africa from the Board of Directors of the IAEA. In 1985, pressure on the nuclear programme peaked with President Reagan’s Executive Order strengthening nuclear sanctions, and the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act passed in the US Congress, which banned purchases on uranium, special nuclear material, and sensitive nuclear technology.¹⁹⁹ Simultaneously, the European Community banned nuclear collaboration with apartheid South Africa, along with Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

¹⁹⁵ Neta Crawford and Audie Klotz, *How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa*, 1999.

¹⁹⁶ Van Wyk, Anna-Mart, and Jackie Grobler. “The Carter administration and the institution of the 1977 mandatory arms embargo against South Africa: rhetoric or active action?” *Historia* 51.1 (2006): p-163; Van Wyk, Martha Susanna. *The 1977 United States arms embargo against South Africa: institution and implementation to 1997*. Diss. 2006.

Levy, Philip I. “Sanctions on South Africa: What did they do?” *American Economic Review* (1999): 415-420.

¹⁹⁷ Batchelor, Peter, and Paul Dunne. “The restructuring of South Africa's defence industry.” *African Security Review* 7.6 (1998): 27-43.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, 31.

¹⁹⁹ Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid* (Cornell University Press, 1995).

Washington and Whitehall's sanctions policy ultimately debilitated Pretoria's nuclear programme. As Dugard suggests, 'although the effects of sanctions were not immediate, they undoubtedly contributed to de Klerk's decision to abandon apartheid in February 1990'²⁰⁰. Heald concurs suggesting that, 'the comprehensive international sanctions and trade embargoes that were levied against South Africa were emblematic of this pariah status. Mr de Klerk took the decision to relinquish the nuclear arsenal and accede to the NPT because he calculated that this action would mitigate the risks of a breakdown in state continuity and juridical security both during and after the constitutional transition'²⁰¹. Otubanjo reinforces the point, suggesting that 'South Africa's inclination toward maintaining the existing structure of racial relations and her resolve to defend it through the acquisition of a deterrent military capability—conventional and nuclear—constituted a challenge to attain the important goal of eliminating colonial and white minority rule from the African continent'²⁰². For these reasons, the US and the UK were forced into an ambivalent position on apartheid's nuclear programme. After initial support or silence over the programme, they eventually pressurised Pretoria to renounce the weapon. When their respective positions turned, the ANWFZ became an attractive compromise between apartheid's fears and the NWSs commitment to a new nuclear order on the continent.

In sum, French nuclear tests sparked simultaneous responses of obedience and rebellion to the global nuclear order from within Africa and among the NWSs. Inside Africa, nuclear weapons became entangled with external intervention, causing a deep anti-nuclear aversion on the continent. At the same time, newly decolonised African states accepted the legitimacy of existing global institutions and sought recognition through

²⁰⁰ Heald, 45.

²⁰¹ Heald, 96.

²⁰² Otubanjo, "The Nuclear Factor in the Politics of Apartheid and Liberation."

them. In the NWSs, France adopted an attitude of outright rebellion by persisting with nuclear tests in Africa, while other NWSs like the US and the UK adopted a more ambiguous position. In the 1970s and 1980s, anti-colonial aversion merged with anti-apartheid sentiment. Pretoria's nuclear programme caused division among African states regarding nuclear order and split the NWSs. South Africa's swing from extreme rebellion to extreme obedience to nuclear order eventually tipped the continent in favour of a NWFZ, to mediate between attitudes of obedience and rebellion within and between African states and the NWSs.

PERSISTENCE

In this section, I consider the persistence of the ANWFZ since its opening for signature in 1996. African views of the ANWFZ are characterised by tension: on one hand, African states continued to strongly criticise nuclear order; on the other, they have continued to accept its fundamental legitimacy and seek recognition within it. NWFZs have thus become an important token for nuclear ambiguity: at once representing Africa's disaffection with the nuclear status-quo; at once affirming its institutions and norms. By serving these two contending agendas, the ANWFZ has not only persisted but also consolidated since opening for signature in 1996. In the first part of this section, I review the main positions taken on the zone within the continent. In the second part, I analyse the position of various key states to illustrate the broader African position.

Since 1996, the African position on nuclear order has revolved on a tension between the acceptance of order on one hand, and its rejection on the other. On one side of this tension several North African states, like Libya and Egypt, have challenged nuclear order directly. Another group of African states, typified by South Africa, has strongly



multiple conflicting global and domestic audiences, each committed to the opposing ideals of obedience and rebellion. South Africa argued that NAM states should sacrifice indefinite extension in return for firmer disarmament commitments from the NWSs. Supporting indefinite extension, South Africa claimed, could be traded for ‘principles’ that would pledge the NWSs to disarmament. This stance was a key breakthrough in negotiations at the 1995 conference and ultimately delivered an indefinite extension of the NPT.²⁰³ South Africa’s position of compromise sought to satisfy competing impulses: it wanted to appeal to the rebellion of the NAM states while accommodating the NWSs. It also wished to accommodate the competing attitudes of obedient rebellion among strategic elites inside South Africa.

To appreciate why South Africa took this position—pitched at both hardliners within the NAM and NWSs alike—I interrogate the rhetoric of its most senior nuclear diplomats. In a series of structured interviews conducted by Michal Onderco, South Africa’s nuclear diplomats outline their views on nuclear order, which support my hypothesis on the importance of ambivalence in consolidating NWFZs. The key voice in South African nuclear diplomacy over the twenty-five years since Pelindaba is Ambassador Abdul Minty, who served in various roles in the South Africa Department for International Relations and Cooperation (Dirco) since 1995. His explanation for the NPT extension decision rests on two arguments:

[First] if you left open the possibility of the NPT not being permanently extended, it would mean that some governments could leave open the possibility of embarking on a nuclear weapons program after the adoption of whatever period we have. Because they may wait for the period to expire and then they would reserve the right to more fuel, producing nuclear weapons.... The other [reason we supported extension], was even less appreciated by many—they didn’t understand it—is that we had in Africa before banned nuclear tests, Nigeria was a focus of that in earlier years, and we did

²⁰³ Michal Onderco, “Oral History Interview with Richard Butler” (Wilson Centre History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 2017).

not want to create the possibility for further nuclear weapons tests to take place in Africa.²⁰⁴

Minty's two arguments reflect the tensions I have described above. In the first, Minty tacitly concedes to a deep faith in the institutional architecture of the NPT. He takes a position of extreme hope in nuclear order: that the best way to prevent proliferation was to extend the NPT into infinity. Thus, Minty's first argument is based on accepting the legitimacy of the NPT. Likewise, the African NWFZs is seen by Minty as intimately tied to the NPT, which underwrites its legitimacy. Thus, another key reason that South Africa supported indefinite NPT extension was to guarantee the success of the ANWFZ. In this sense, Minty did not see the ANWFZ as a protest against global nuclear order, but one of its redeeming features. Thus, South Africa's support for indefinite NPT extension was intimately bound with the goal of creating an ANWFZ. However, Minty's position of optimism is quickly tempered by the reverse logic further into the interview:

And then, unfortunately, when we tried to work on that, we found that the major powers were really not interested in making that kind of progress.... It was a big disappointment on our part. It was also an expectation that they did not do that... So, the record doesn't make Third World countries look bad on non-proliferation, but the record certainly makes the big countries bad on nuclear disarmament. And more and more, we are getting nuclear umbrella states increasing, and as you get them increasing, the area of nuclear weapons use or possible use is extended.²⁰⁵

Here, Minty expresses doubt over the credibility of nuclear order, and again reinforces dissatisfaction with the special status of the NWSs. He pins blame on the NWSs, who he claims exploited South Africa's bargain only to renege on their promises. Minty rests immediately on a rhetoric of postcolonial solidarity in this complaint, drawing on the 'Third World'. These two seemingly opposing views show the rhetorical tensions—

²⁰⁴ Michal Onderco, "Oral History Interview with Abdul Minty" (Wilson Centre History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 2017), <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/177542>.

²⁰⁵ Onderco.

even incoherencies—inherent in the discourse of senior South African nuclear diplomats over nuclear order, and by extension the ANWFZ. These tensions are evidenced in yet further statements from Minty. When considering the ANWFZ, Minty again suggests obedience:

We [South Africa] wanted to, in a way, seal off Africa and the prospect of increasing nuclear weapons by also working for the ANWFZ. Now, I had worked on that since the early 1960s onward to try and get an ANWFZ. Through the OAU, we adopted a number of resolutions collectively for the continent of Africa to shield Africa from further nuclear tests, and to declare that Africa would become a NWFZ... But remember, we didn't simply take this position that we must have an indefinite extension. We also brought in different procedures for the NPT review meeting itself, for all the reviews that took place, you know, before the actual NPT review meeting, and so on. And those proposals also aimed at trying to get regular discussions on disarmament issues and to make progress.²⁰⁶

Minty's views, in this instance, are supported further by another key South African nuclear diplomat during the period, Peter Goosen, who claims that, 'The question then became how to push for compliance with the NPT without jeopardizing the Treaty itself'²⁰⁷. He explains further:

A decision was made that perhaps South Africa will support the indefinite extension, but this cannot be a blame trick... There has to be something else, there has to be a commitment, particularly by the weapon states. And not just the weapon states, but all of the treaty's parties that things were not going to be the same as what they'd been in the past. That things have to change.²⁰⁸

However, both Minty and Goosen again seem to contradict this earlier view by expressing concerns over the integrity of the NWSs. Minty claims, for instance, that:

Unfortunately, the parties of the NPT and, you see, the major powers and the nuclear-weapon states did not go along with the expectations of the NPT decision... So, we are living in a very unfair and unbalanced world because of that, and when we raise

²⁰⁶ Onderco "Oral History Interview with Abdul Minty", <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/177542>.

²⁰⁷ Onderco, "Oral History Interview with Peter Goosen" (Wilson Centre History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 2017), <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/177446>, 1–42.

²⁰⁸ Onderco "Oral History Interview with Peter Goosen", 5.

that, not many people want to listen... the danger now is that people do not have great expectation about nuclear disarmament because more and more weapons are being modernized, more are produced, and less and less international control is being exercised over that. They are not even transparent about it... I mean, this is the great difficulty and the fundamentals about the whole NPT process. I did say at the last NPT Review Conference. I made quite a long statement—just extremely well received by the countries of the South and others—we are always told that they need nuclear weapons for security. So, if country A needs it for security, why should country B, C, and D not claim that they need it for security?²⁰⁹

It is important to note that again, in this instance, Minty only relies on a rhetoric of ‘Southern’ solidarity when criticising the failures of the NWSs. He slips between this rhetoric of rebellious solidarity and a language of ‘global’ compromise throughout his reflection on nuclear order. As suggested in the conceptual model, the tensions inherent in national positions on nuclear order are themselves reflected by tensions within specific strategic elite decision-makers. Goosen is again a case in point:

You can tell me if the CTBT has entered into force, and whether the states have signed up to it. It calls for negotiation of a Fissile Material [Cut-off] Treaty. You could tell me whether it’s being negotiated or not, you know. It called for security assurances to be provided. You can tell me whether they have or whether they haven’t, you know I mean. You get to the 13 steps, you can tell me what of those 13 steps have been done.²¹⁰

These statements show a strongly critical stance from South Africa’s key nuclear diplomats. Yet these critical statements are framed in the context of hope in the legitimacy of nuclear order. To Goosen and Minty, only the bad faith of NWSs obstructs a fair nuclear order. This position of ambiguity is thus summarised in the eventual policy memo produced by South Africa prior to the NPT extension, which at once endorses nuclear order, and at once challenges it, illuminating the differences between this official policy and private diplomatic opinion:

²⁰⁹ Onderco.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

The Department did not recommend that South Africa should support the indefinite extension of the NPT or that we should be in support of the position as held by the developing countries. These countries argue that the NPT is the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and that the security and economic interests of all states will be best served if the NPT is extended indefinitely in 1995. South Africa should share the concern of the developing countries that the nuclear weapon states have not met their disarmament obligations under the Treaty. However, care should be taken not to allow the debate on the extension of the Treaty to endanger the existence of the Treaty.²¹¹

This statement is less ambiguous than those of the individual diplomats, but continues to straddle preserving the treaty on one hand, and reflecting disaffection with the treaty on the other. This view was reinforced by South African foreign minister Alfred Nzo at the 1995 RevCon who argued, ‘South Africa believed that the inequalities inherent in the Treaty, as well as the criticisms of some of its provisions, should not be dealt with in such a way that they threatened the security that the Treaty provided’²¹². This tension was further reflected in how the US communicated its own policies on South Africa, and thereby other players on the continent. Princeton Lyman, the Ambassador to South Africa at the time of the 1995 RevCon, explained his view on South Africa’s position on the NPT extension:

I would describe it as ambivalent, if you will. On the one hand, President Mandela was very anxious to establish a strong relationship with the United States, as were we. But, the South Africans, in particular President Mandela, were extremely disappointed with the aid that was offered after the transition. He had thought it would be like Camp David, and there were people whispering in his ear to say that that would be the case, even though I publicly had warned people that wasn’t the case. So, he was shocked and angry, and called it “peanuts” when we announced basically a technical assistance program. But what he was also reflecting was that a large part of the ANC cadres had been trained in the Soviet Union, had grown up

²¹¹ South African Department of Foreign Affairs, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): South African Position and Preparations for the NPT Review and Extension Conference,” 1995.

²¹² United Nations, “NPT/CONF.1995/32(PARTIII). Final Document. Part III. Summary and Verbatim Records” (New York, 1995),
<https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt1995/official-documents>.

thinking of the United States as an imperialist country and he was very anxious to change that, but he said it was up to us to make it clear we were different.²¹³

South Africa's position on NPT extension is thus emblematic of a larger tension over its position on nuclear order. Nuclear diplomats tried to reconcile these tensions through the ANWFZ, which itself served the agenda of both those who wished to resist nuclear order, and those who wish to grant it further legitimacy. South Africa thus reflects one example of an Africa state at tension with nuclear order, which saw the ANWFZ as a symbol to resolve these tensions.

Libya and Egypt: 'Here We Are, We Have a Problem'

Libya, by contrast, is an example of an African state in the middle-ground. Like South Africa, its nuclear policies since the end of the Cold War have been described in terms of 'discontinuity'²¹⁴, 'paradox' and 'contradiction'²¹⁵. Unlike South Africa, Libya directly challenged nuclear order until 2003 after which it renounced its nuclear weapons programme.²¹⁶ Motivations for this position of rebellion included countering the threat from Israel's nuclear programme, responding to American airstrikes in 1986, and protecting the Libyan regime from external intervention.²¹⁷ Libyan threat perceptions rose dramatically between the Reagan and Clinton administrations, when Gaddafi was linked to the Lockerbie Bombings²¹⁸. Libya's use and pursuit of chemical

²¹³ Michal Onderco, "Oral History Interview with Princeton Lyman" (Wilson Centre History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 2017), <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/177541>.

²¹⁴ Målfred Braut-Hegghammer, "Libya's Nuclear Turnaround: Perspectives from Tripoli," *Middle East Journal* 62, no. 1 (2008): 55–72.

²¹⁵ Solingen, *Nuclear Logics*.

²¹⁶ See, for instance, Målfred Braut-Hegghammer, "Libya's Nuclear Turnaround," *The RUSI Journal* 151, no. 6 (December 2006): 52–55, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071840608522858>.

²¹⁷ Solingen, *Nuclear Logics*.

²¹⁸ A bomb went off in a commercial plane killing 259 people and crashing into Lockerbie, Scotland, killing a further 11 people.

weapons also angered the United States: by the second year of the Clinton Administration, some US officials proposed a nuclear strike on the Libyan nuclear facility at Tarhuna.²¹⁹ Throughout this period, Libya pursued a policy of ambiguity by signing the NPT (in 1968 the year before Gaddafi's coup) and ratifying in 1975, while also pursuing nuclear weapons.²²⁰ Similarly, Libya signed the Pelindaba Treaty in 1996 during its nuclear pursuit, but did not ratify it for twenty years. Libya's position of ambiguity is summarised by Braut-Hegghammer who argues, 'Libya sought to improve relations with the West, and the United States in particular, while maintaining its nuclear weapons program as an "insurance policy" in case rapprochement failed'²²¹.

Despite this early rebellious position Libya, like many other African countries, gravitated toward nuclear order with the advent of the ANWFZ. This culminated in a 2003 decision to dismantle its nuclear and chemical weapons programmes and allow international safeguards and inspections.²²² Through this period, a sense of ambiguity pervaded the rhetoric of Libyan strategic elites as they contended with the competing impulses of obedience and rebellion. This was illustrated in the ongoing argument within the Libyan security elite about the value of nuclear weapons: some believed nuclear weapons had a deterrent effect; others that they disconnected Libya from the global economy and attracted unwanted security attention.²²³ This tension surfaced in 2004 when Gaddafi publicly changed his position on nuclear weapons, calling their

²¹⁹ Yahia H. Zoubir, "Libya in US Foreign Policy: From Rogue State to Good Fellow?," *Third World Quarterly* (Taylor & Francis, Ltd., 2002), <https://doi.org/10.2307/3993575>.

²²⁰ Sharon Squassoni, "Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction," 2006; Braut-Hegghammer, "Libya's Nuclear Turnaround."

²²¹ Braut-Hegghammer, "Libya's Nuclear Turnaround: Perspectives from Tripoli.", 996.

²²² Squassoni, "Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction."

²²³ Solingen, *Nuclear Logics*.

pursuit ‘crazy’ and stating, ‘any national state that will adopt this policy cannot protect itself. On the contrary, it exposes itself to danger’²²⁴. In his first public statement after Libya’s reversal, Gaddafi’s second son, Saif, focused again on the externalities of nuclear possession, claiming, ‘Libya now is a safe country. And I think we are safer without those items’, while a senior Libyan security official argued, ‘weapons of mass destruction are very costly... It’s better that we concentrate on our economic development’²²⁵. These ‘costs’ were explicated most clearly by Foreign Minister Mohamed Abd-al-Rahman Shalgam, who warned:

We cannot continue to be left out, not only politically and militarily, but also scientifically and economically. You need to take part in or create an entity that motivates you and helps you develop—in a world where muscle counts—your scientific, educational, and economic muscles... I do not wish to talk about this or that Arab country. However, I do not think there is a bare minimum Arab reality or situation that is pulled by awareness for the need to create a language for the 21st Century—the language of science, of blocs, of strength, and the acceptance of each country by the other.²²⁶

Solingen argues that this sense of economic isolation was key to Libya’s nuclear reversal.²²⁷ A desire to reintegrate into the global economy after the polarising period of the Cold War drove Libya to review the economic consequences of outright rebellion against nuclear weapons, she claims.²²⁸ This is supported by further statements from within the Libyan security establishment at the time of its nuclear reversal. Ma’atouq Mohamed Ma’atouq, the head of Libya’s clandestine nuclear programme stated, ‘We thought this would make us look better in the eyes of the world and set an example

²²⁴ Sudarsan Raghavan, “Libyan Leader Says the Race to Develop Nuclear Weapons Is ‘Crazy’,” Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, February 29, 2004.

²²⁵ Solingen, *Nuclear Logics*, 216.

²²⁶ Douglas Frantz and Josh Meyer, “The Deal to Disarm Kaddafi,” Los Angeles Times, March 13, 2005: A1.

²²⁷ Solingen, *Nuclear Logics*.

²²⁸ Etel Solingen, “The Domestic Sources of Regional Regimes: The Evolution of Nuclear Ambiguity in the Middle East,” *International Studies Quarterly* 38, no. 2 (June 1, 1994): 305.

for others in the Middle East to follow...'²²⁹ while Shukri Ghanem, Prime Minister during the reversal, argued, 'you need to be strong as a state to be treated well, but [being strong] can create other problems'²³⁰.

Along with questions of reintegration, there was also growing doubt in Libya over the military value of nuclear possession. As Ma'atouq put it, "Let's assume we have these weapons... what would we do with them? Who is the target?"²³¹ This combination of a desire for obedience, and doubt over the military value of nuclear weapons, initiated a swift re-entry into global nuclear order. Soon after subjecting Libyan nuclear facilities to safeguards and inspections, Libya ratified the CTBT and signed the IAEA's Additional Protocol.²³² In late September, the US cancelled restrictions on oil imports and lifted several sanctions.²³³

This turn to obedience led Libya to ratify the Treaty of Pelindaba in 2005 and culminated in Gaddafi's first appearance at the UNGA in 2009. On one hand, his speech strongly condemned nuclear order; on the other, he lent order legitimacy by calling for reform rather than revolution. Gaddafi suggesting that the mandate of the Security Council should be transferred to the General Assembly, and not reliant on nuclear possession: 'In this way, we will have justice and democracy, and we will no longer have a Security Council consisting of countries which have been chosen because they have nuclear weapons, large economies or advanced technology... That is

²²⁹ Braut-Hegghammer, "Libya's Nuclear Turnaround: Perspectives from Tripoli."

²³⁰ Braut-Hegghammer.

²³¹ Judith Miller, "How Gadhafi Lost His Groove: The Complex Surrender of Libya's WMD," *Wall Street Journal*, May 16, 2006.

²³² Wyn Q. Bowen, *Libya and Nuclear Proliferation* (Routledge, 2017).

²³³ Solingen, *Nuclear Logics*.

terrorism'²³⁴. He claimed it was unfair that some NWSs had permanent seats on the Council while other equally powerful states were unrepresented: 'If we gave India a seat, Pakistan would say that it, too, is a nuclear country and deserves a seat, and those two countries are at war'²³⁵.

Figure 16: Muammar Gaddafi Throws UN Charter at UNGA President, Deputy Secretary-General²³⁶



The tension between obedience and rebellion was further illustrated in Gaddafi's remarks on the IAEA. On one hand, he called it 'an important institution' but also criticised its selective mandate: 'We have discovered that the IAEA is used only against us... We are told that it is an international organization, but, if that is the case, then all the countries of the world should be under its jurisdiction. If it is not truly

²³⁴ Muamar Gaddafi, "Muammar Gaddafi at the 64th UN General Assembly in 2009" (Africanews, 2009), <https://www.africanews.com/2017/09/19/speech-muammar-gaddafi-at-the-64th-un-general-assembly-in-2009/>.

²³⁵ Gaddafi.

²³⁶ "Gaddafi Slams UN Security Council" (Al Jazeera, 2009), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2009/09/2009923164415325345.html>. It is hard to think of a better single representation of obedient rebellion than this image.

international, then right after this speech we should no longer accept it and should close it down'²³⁷. Most clearly, Gaddafi revealed Libya's ambiguous position in the post-Pelindaba era, by reflecting on the connection between the Libyan nuclear programme and UN institutions:

I called Mr. El Baradei and asked him if the agreements by the super-powers to reduce nuclear supplies were subject to Agency control and under inspection, and whether he was aware of any increases in their activity. He told me that he was not in a position to ask the super-powers to be inspected. So, is the Agency only inspecting us? If so, it does not qualify as an international organization since it is selective, just like the Security Council and the International Court of Justice.²³⁸

In this sense, Gaddafi's stance on nuclear order mirrored the African position: harsh criticism within newfound institutional acceptance. Libya's move from outright rebellion to ambiguity was served by the ANWFZ, which both symbolised protest against—and acceptance of—order. Libya thus represents one strand of thought on the continent which was particularly averse to nuclear order from its inception, but which nonetheless embraced the ANWFZ. I shall now turn to Egypt, a state that has not yet ratified the ANWFZ treaty.

Like Libya, Egypt also considered—then abandoned—a nuclear weapons programme, in the 1950s and 1960s. However, unlike Libya, Egypt directly borders a NWS in the form of Israel, which has fundamentally shaped its stance on nuclear order. Military confrontations in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 entrenched this perception.²³⁹ Despite early attempts to pursue nuclear weapons, and a sophisticated missile programme, Egypt became a major advocate for both the Middle Eastern and African NWFZs²⁴⁰,

²³⁷ Gaddafi, "Muammar Gaddafi at the 64th UN General Assembly in 2009."

²³⁸ Gaddafi.

²³⁹ Gawdat Bahgat, "Nuclear Proliferation: Egypt," *Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no. 3 (2007): 409–21.

²⁴⁰ Patricia Lewis and William C Potter, "The Long Journey toward a WMD-Free Middle East," *Arms Control Today* 41, no. 7 (October 9, 2011): 8.

and its simultaneous entanglements in both regions affect its position on each one in turn.

Egypt's enthusiastic early support for the ANWFZ appeared to signal a turn to obedience, as it acceded to NPT, became a founding member of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), and continued vocal disarmament advocacy within the NAM.²⁴¹ Yet other actions suggested a deep disaffection with the institutions of nuclear order. At the 1995 NPT RevCon, Egypt broke with the NAM (and South Africa) to oppose indefinite extension.²⁴² Its primary concerns in the twenty-five ensuing years have followed a similar pattern. First, it criticises the NWSs for failing to disarm; second, it criticises Israel for failing to comply with the NPT.

The Israeli question has affected Egypt's stance on nuclear order in two ways: on one hand, Egypt's own threat perceptions are influenced by a nuclear neighbour; on the other, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is entangled with the Middle Eastern NWFZ. These two issues became central to Egypt's position on both the Middle Eastern and African zones.²⁴³ Finally, Egypt criticises the NWSs (especially the US) for giving Israel special treatment. Egypt outlined these positions in a statement made upon ratification of the NPT in 1981: 'Egypt wishes to express its strong dissatisfaction at the NWSs, in particular the two super-powers, because of their failure to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament'²⁴⁴.

²⁴¹ Bahgat, "Nuclear Proliferation: Egypt."

²⁴² William C. Potter, "The Unfulfilled Promise of the 2015 NPT Review Conference," *Survival* 58, no. 1 (January 2, 2016): 151–78, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.1142144>.

²⁴³ William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, *Nuclear Politics and the Non-Aligned Movement: Principles vs Pragmatism* (Routledge, 2017).

²⁴⁴ Government of Egypt, "Statement on Ratification of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)" (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1981), <https://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/npt/egypt/rat/london>.

The trend of participating within global institutions while offering a harsh critique of their deficiencies was again typified at the 1995 NPT RevCon. According to official records of the meeting, Amr Moussa, Egypt's then Foreign Minister, shared reservations on both universal disarmament and the Israeli question:

Egypt had signed and ratified the Treaty (NPT) on the assumption that it would encourage Israel to take similar steps. Israel had failed to do so despite assurances from several countries to that effect. The entrenchment of the *de facto* status quo by the indefinite application of the Treaty to all the Middle East countries, with the exception of Israel constituted a serious imbalance threatening not only the region's security but its stability as well. The League of Arab States had recently declared that such a situation was unacceptable. The Middle East was going through a period of extreme sensitivity and significance where the foundations of future peaceful relations in the region were being laid. That could not be accomplished if there were double standards or privileged status was granted to one party at the expense of the other.

For these reasons, Egypt adopted the opposite position to South Africa on the question of NPT extension. The link between a rejection of indefinite extension and the Egyptian position on the NPT was further elaborated by former political adviser to the Foreign Ministry on nuclear affairs (and later Foreign Minister), Nabil Fahmy:

The indefinite extension continued the asymmetry and made it open-ended. That made it even more problematic for us domestically because there was no promise on the Israeli side. And don't forget, somewhere in our Parliament's records there should be a statement by Kamal Hassan Ali when he was Foreign Minister on the ratification of... NPT... that if the Israelis got nukes, we would withdraw. And I'm not exactly sure where that statement is, frankly.²⁴⁶

Egyptian strategic elites thus saw the two NWFZs—the African and the Middle-Eastern—mediating between impulses of obedience and rebellion on both sides of the Red Sea. But, if Egypt acceded to the African NWFZ without Israel acceding to the MENWFZ, this would leave Egypt vulnerable to permanent nuclear subordination. This tension was expressed most clearly by Fahmy, who suggested, 'Egypt proposed

²⁴⁶ Michal Onderco, "Oral History Interview with Nabil Fahmy" (Wilson Centre History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 2017).

zone concepts' which were, 'not really our preferred option... but because they were options that frankly accommodated others in the region, be that Israel or Iran, we went along with that'²⁴⁷. This view differs from the public position adopted by Egypt, which is more enthusiastic about NWFZs:

Convinced that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world shall be instrumental in enabling the Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve its objectives and aims, Egypt has exerted great efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as well as in Africa.²⁴⁸

Fahmy's statement, read against this official statement, reveals two important things about Egypt stance on NWFZs. The first private statement suggests that Egyptian strategic elites saw zones as a tool to accommodate the diverging interests of multiple regional players in Africa and the Middle East. This view accords with our understanding of zones as tools of compromise and peace consolidation.

The second statement highlights the difference between Egypt's private beliefs about zones and its public statements. In public rhetoric, Egypt is unambiguous about zones being 'instrumental' to the 'aims and objectives' of the NPT. Yet in private Fahmy admits that zones were not a 'first option' for Egypt. This stance is thus representative of the role Egypt has played in nuclear order at large. After the 1995 RevCon, Egypt has continued to be a critical but active member of international institutions. One further case highlights this ambivalence. In July 2009, Egypt assumed the role of Chair of the NAM which coincided with preparations for the 2010 NPT RevCon.²⁴⁹ In this role, Egypt criticised nuclear order, forwarding an ambitious action plan on universal

²⁴⁷ Onderco.

²⁴⁸ Government of Egypt, "Statement on Ratification of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)."

²⁴⁹ Potter and Mukhatzhanova, *Nuclear Politics and the Non-Aligned Movement: Principles vs Pragmatism*.

disarmament to be achieved by 2025.²⁵⁰ The plan criticised the NWSs for their failure to disarm and exploited the voting power of NAM to shift the global nuclear debate in a new and urgent direction. Yet, ultimately, Egypt supported a consensus final document that back-tracked on the ambitious disarmament targets, much to the chagrin of some NAM states, leading Potter and Mukhatzhanova to describe Egypt's overall strategy as, 'a balance between the competing tendencies of pragmatism and principle'²⁵¹.

In a leaked 2009 cable from former Egyptian Ambassador to the UN, Maged Abdelaziz, to Rose Gottemoeller, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Verification and Compliance, Egypt claimed to have rejected nuclear advances from the Soviet Union. The cable, which summarised several bilateral meetings held on the side-lines of the NPT PrepCom in 2009 reads, 'in an apparent attempt to portray Egypt as a responsible member of the international community, Abdelaziz claimed that Egypt had been offered nuclear scientists, materials and even weapons following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but Egypt had refused all such offers'²⁵². The cable continued, '[Assistant Secretary of State] Gottemoeller asked how he knew this to be true, to which Abdelaziz replied he was in Moscow at that time and had direct personal knowledge'²⁵³.

This exchange is less salient for the truth of Abdelaziz's claims than for his desire to gain recognition for responsible nuclear behaviour from a key nuclear ally. It shows that in senior nuclear negotiations, Egypt leveraged notions of nuclear

²⁵⁰ Potter and Mukhatzhanova.

²⁵¹ Potter and Mukhatzhanova.

²⁵² Julian Borger, "WikiLeaks Cables: Egypt 'turned down' Black-Market Nuclear Weapons Deal," *The Guardian*, December 19, 2010, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/19/wikileaks-cables-egypt-nuclear-weapons>.

²⁵³ Borger.

responsibility to extract concessions in other areas of diplomacy. Despite Egypt's misgivings about Israeli exceptionalism, it continued to seek benefits from recognising the legitimacy of global nuclear norms. Similarly, Mubarak's failure to embark on a new nuclear energy programme in 2009 could be explained because, 'the president [Mubarak] is afraid of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. He very reluctantly accepted the proposal for peaceful use of nuclear power, only because of the energy shortage. When the decision was made to keep the program shelved due to finding the gas reserves, a lot of people said it was a big mistake to stop investing in nuclear power'²⁵⁴.

The Egyptian position on nuclear order is summarised in a statement by current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sameh Shoukry, which demonstrates a fundamental commitment to global nuclear institutions couched within a critique: 'The inability of the international community to achieve the universality of the NPT until now has impacted the treaty negatively... The continued non-adherence of a few states to the NPT has questioned whether the NPT will be able to achieve its objectives'²⁵⁵.

In sum, all three of the African states I have analysed show a tension between obedience to nuclear order and rebellion against it. These three countries should be seen on a spectrum of this tension. On one hand, South Africa is a key advocate of nuclear order, and has tended toward obedience. Libya occupies the middle-ground between direct obedience and direct rebellion, while Egypt has tended towards the rebellion in action, although demonstrating obedience in its rhetoric. Despite the diversity of these states, I contend that this fundamental tension of obedience and rebellion explains why the

²⁵⁴ Maria Rost Rublee, "Egypt's Nuclear Programme," *The Nonproliferation Review* 13, no. 3 (November 2006): 555–67. Rublee withholds the name of this diplomate but calls him 'senior'.

²⁵⁵ "Egypt Committed to Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: FM," *Egypt Today*, February 27, 2018.

ANWFZ has persisted. By serving the agendas of both critical and conservative elites, the ANWFZ has, at least, enjoyed signature from a diverse range of actors and enjoyed ratification from some of Africa's most rebellious states.

NWSs: 'Operational Flexibility'

Pelindaba emerged at a time when US commitment to nuclear order was strong. After the Cold War, the US reduced its nuclear stockpiles and embarked on the road to cease nuclear testing. Relations with Russia, once a source of existential nuclear threat, increasingly normalised, as evidenced through several bilateral treaties like START I, and the transfer of nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.²⁵⁶ In this sense, the general nuclear threat environment invited greater commitment to nuclear order in the NWSs immediately after Pelindaba's birth.

Accordingly, the Clinton administration took several steps towards obedience. In its Nuclear Posture Review of 1994, the administration 'abandoned guidelines issued by the Reagan administration in 1981 that the United States must be prepared to fight and win a protracted nuclear war'²⁵⁷. Before the UN General Assembly in September 1996, Clinton also claimed that a CTBT would 'help to prevent the nuclear powers from developing more advanced and dangerous weapons... toward a century in which the risks of nuclear weapons can be further reduced and ultimately eliminated'²⁵⁸. And

²⁵⁶ Thomas Graham, *The Alternate Route: Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones* (Oregon State University Press, 2017), <http://www.osupress.oregonstate.edu/book/alternate-route>.

²⁵⁷ Bill Clinton, "Remarks by President Bill Clinton to the 51st General Assembly of the United Nations" (John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, 1996).

²⁵⁸ David Hafmeister, "Progress in CTBT Monitoring Since Its 1999 Senate Defeat," *Science & Global Security* 15, no. 3 (December 3, 2007): 151–83.

in 1995 on the eve of Pelindaba, Washington pushed for the indefinite extension of the NPT.²⁵⁹

However, great ambiguity remained over nuclear policy in the mid-1990s. Although the nuclear posture review backpedaled on Cold War rhetoric, it continued to envisage a role for nuclear weapons in US foreign policy contrary to the promises of the NPT. While Clinton himself supported the CTBT, strategic elite disagreement resulted in the treaty's defeat in the Senate in 1999.²⁶⁰ The US's 'tacit acceptance' of the Indian nuclear programme also showed its preparedness to entertain nuclear possession in some Third World contexts.²⁶¹

In the Obama era, US nuclear policy again oscillated between obedience and rebellion concerning Pelindaba. On one hand, President Obama appeared to signify a turn to obedience, when he announced far-reaching changes to the US nuclear doctrine in Prague on 5th April 2009: 'Some argue that the spread of these weapons cannot be stopped... Such fatalism is a deadly adversary, for if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable'²⁶². Obama's own Nuclear Posture Review also excluded the possibility of a nuclear strike on a non-nuclear nation for the first time.²⁶³

²⁵⁹ "Clinton Issues New Guidelines on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Doctrine," 1994, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997-11/news/clinton-issues-new-guidelines-us-nuclear-weapons-doctrine>.

²⁶⁰ Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Barack Obama In Prague As Delivered" (The White House, 2009).

²⁶¹ Vandana Bhatia, "Nonproliferation Policy of the Clinton Administration toward India: Shifting of Nuclear Goalposts?," *Comparative Strategy* 32, no. 3 (July 2013): 261–82.

²⁶² Alfred Nujra, "Obama Submits NWFZ Protocols to Senate," Arms Control Association, 2011, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_06/NWFZ.

²⁶³ Barack Obama, "Message to the Senate on the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty" (The Whitehouse, 2011).

The White House also signaled obedience by forwarding both the African and South Pacific NWFZ treaties for ratification in the Senate in 2011.

From 2009, the Obama White House argued before the Senate that ratifying Tlatelolco would ‘extend the policy of the United States not to use or threaten use of nuclear weapons against regional zone parties that are members of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and are in good standing with their non-proliferation obligations’²⁶⁴. However, after significant internal resistance, both politically and within the US bureaucracy, Obama’s second term regressed to the mean. Opposition to NWFZs was typified in this period by Senate Minority Whip Jon Kyl, who claimed he was ‘deeply troubled that President Obama is attempting to codify by international agreement his flawed nuclear weapons declaratory policy, which would limit the instances in which the President would use nuclear weapons to defend the United States and its allies from attack’²⁶⁵.

As in Latin America, Britain has used obedient rhetoric to nuclear order in Africa, while violating some of its key terms in practice. The key example of British rebellion against nuclear order on the continent is the Chagos Archipelago. As mentioned above, Britain retained control over Diego Garcia (an island in the Chagos) after the decolonization of Mauritius in 1968, the year the NPT opened. Before Britain eventually ratified Pelindaba in 2001, it called for a clause effectively excluding Diego Garcia from treaty prohibitions. This was rejected in favour of a compromise clause, which says that the map of the territory—which includes Diego Garcia—‘appears

²⁶⁴ Peter H. Sand, “The Shadow of Pelindaba: Chagos and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone,” *South African Journal of International Affairs*, October 8, 2019, 1–25, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2019.1658620>.

²⁶⁵ Alfred Nurja.

without prejudice to the question of sovereignty'²⁶⁶. This clause has caused confusion: African countries agree that the Chagos Archipelago is within the treaty's 'territory', but the UK refuses 'to accept the inclusion of that Territory within the African nuclear-weapon-free zone [emphasis added]'²⁶⁷. The US sides with Whitehall, with the State Department suggesting that 'Diego Garcia is under the sovereign control of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as part of the British Indian Ocean Territories and is not part of the "territory" of the Zone as defined in the Treaty; therefore neither the Treaty nor its Protocols applies to U.S. operations there'²⁶⁸.

In response to parliamentary questions regarding the storage of US nuclear or other weapons in Diego Garcia, the FCO has stated 'that the general policy is that we allow the United States to store only what we ourselves would store'²⁶⁹. Vague denials have not comforted Mauritian leaders in particular. For instance, Foreign Minister Arvin Boolell agitated for a nuclear inspection of the island in 2010, and President Cassam Uteem issued an open letter to AFCONE calling for an IAEA investigation on Diego Garcia, based on Annex IV of the treaty.²⁷⁰ This proposal was also made by political party Lalit in 2018, and has been a constant focus of the Mauritian press.²⁷¹

NWSs have seen the ANWFZ as an opportunity to demonstrate a symbolic commitment to the principle of disarmament while failing themselves to disarm. In this sense, NWSs have largely committed to the ANWFZ since its opening for

²⁶⁶ Adeniji.

²⁶⁷ "House Congressional Record H329: Commemorating the Accession of the United States of America to the Protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty" (Unites States House of Representatives, 1996).

²⁶⁸ Sand, 10.

²⁶⁹ Baroness Kinnock of Holyhead, Private Notice Questions, Hansard: House of Lords Debates (6 April 2010).

²⁷⁰ In 2019, an ICJ Advisory Opinion held, by thirteen to one, 'that the United Kingdom is under an obligation to bring to an end its administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible'.

²⁷¹ Sand.

signature, despite their unwillingness to apply its principles to themselves. This ambiguity, between NWSs own rhetorical commitment to disarmament, and their support for the disarmament of other states, has solidified the ANWFZ.


CONCLUSION

In this conclusion, I analyse African states and NWSs on the obedience/rebellion spectrum. As mentioned, obedient rebellion is a constellation of attitudes rather than a monolithic idea. I map these attitudes on a spectrum, in both the ‘existence’ and ‘persistence’ phases of the ANWFZ.

In Figure 18, I take several states to represent broader regional attitudes toward global nuclear order. Ghana is the most representative state in the region, during the earliest phase of the ANWFZ. It also directly fits the definition of obedient rebellion. On one hand, it valued nuclear disarmament and vocally supported international institutions tasked with this role, particularly the UNGA. On the other, it was sceptical of the emerging order, and its inherent inequalities. Its reactions against French testing were a clear act of rebellion.

Nigeria and South Africa represented a minority tendency of extreme rebellion, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. South Africa was the only African state to acquire nuclear weapons; Nigeria, openly advocated for an African deterrent. In both cases, these states moved from extreme rebellion (bottom right pane) to ambivalence (central pane). In this sense, African states were divided between a majority reflecting the Ghanaian position throughout the existence phase, and a minority which followed the South African and Nigerian trajectories of rebellion, then ambiguity.

Figure 17: The African Obedience/Rebellion Spectrum, ‘Existence’




When the ANWFZ opened for signature, the persistence phase began. Here, states continued to constellate around the central pane of the obedience/rebellion spectrum. Notably, previously rebellious states, like South Africa, gravitated back to the central pane, often demonstrating greater obedience than other African states.


Two other states present an interesting conundrum. Libya, a state which professed to support the ANWFZ, pursued a trajectory of rebellion in the early 2000s. It ultimately returned to ambivalence, although its rhetoric on nuclear order in the late Gaddafi era was intensely critical. In this sense, Libya moved from the central pane, to the bottom right pane, and then back to the central right pane. Nevertheless, like many other states in this study, Libya eventually settled on a variant of obedient rebellion.

Egypt is a special case, as a state bordering one successful NWFZ, and another unsuccessful one. Egypt’s expression of obedient rebellion is unique for this reason. On one hand, it was a vocal and active participant in NPT-related institutions. As

neighbour to nuclear-armed Israel, this is significant. However, due to the threats faced from the Israeli programme, Egypt has not ratified the ANWFZ, even as a vocal early proponent. While Egypt maintains an ambiguous attitude to multilateral nuclear treaties, then, this ambiguity is expressed uniquely, because of Egypt's multiple nuclear concerns and commitments. It is the only state that I examine which lies in the central pane that has not ratified its own NWFZ. These cases again show that obedient rebellion is a heterogenous attitude. Different actors express it in different ways: sometimes in a single timeframe; other times oscillating between obedience and rebellion before settling on an equilibrium. Nevertheless, African states tended towards obedient rebellion, which coincided with the birth and sustenance of the ANWFZ.

Figure 18: The African Obedience/Rebellion Spectrum, 'Persistence'





ambivalent positions toward African nuclear order. By the end of the existence phase all NWSs moved from their original positions depicted in Figure 20, to the central pane.

Having argued that obedient rebellion adequately describes the existence and persistence of the ANWFZ, I will now consider why this explanation provides unique insight. The security community literature may suggest that the ANWFZ was birthed and sustained by shared interests, values and understandings which created stable peace. However, the above analysis shows that this explanation ascribes undue coherence to actors' motivations. Instead of a set of stable, developing norms for peace and stability, the zone was, in fact, the unintentional consequence of an ambivalence between competing norms. Conversely, then, I argue that Africa, like Latin America, shows that clashing desires on one level can birth regional stability at another.

Realist scholars may claim that South Africa's nuclear renunciation was, in fact, the key driver of the African NWFZ. I offer two responses. First, as a matter of fact, the process of forming an ANWFZ began before South Africa considered, let alone acted on, a nuclear weapons programme. My argument, then, is not that South Africa's nuclear renunciation did not matter, but rather that it formed part of a broader historical picture of African denuclearisation which began with the obedient rebellion of Ghana. This question, however, of what caused the ANWFZ—French tests or South African renunciation—is difficult to settle. This is because there are no other historical parallels against which we can judge the importance of nuclear renunciation against the creation of a NWFZ. Further experience may shed greater light on whether external testing or renunciation is the more salient trigger.

A crude postcolonial perspective is inaccurate for the opposite reason. Here, postcolonial theorists may claim that the ANWFZ was borne of anti-colonial resistance. However, this view would ascribe undue agency and coherence to African states,

without considering the agency of the NWSs. Although these anti-imperial sentiments were present in Africa during the period, they were tempered by attempts at appeasing the NWSs, the desire for global citizenship, and the attraction of multilateral institutions.

Recently, Africa has played an important role in forwarding the ‘Humanitarian Initiative’ which seeks to broaden the debate about nuclear weapons to the devastating consequences they may have on humanity. This initiative has gained significant traction, reaching the agenda of several NPT RevCons and special UN conferences, all of which have seen significant African involvement. At the Second Session of the PrepCom for the 2015 RevCon, seventy-five countries supported an African statement which read:

Our countries are deeply concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. While this has been known since nuclear weapons were first developed and is reflected in various UN resolutions and multilateral instruments, it has not been at the core of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation deliberations for many years. Although it constitutes the *raison d’être* of the NPT... this issue has consistently been ignored in the discourse on nuclear weapons.²⁷²

African states have also been among the most active proponents of the TPNW of 2017. In less than a year since the treaty’s inception, twenty-six African states have made supportive public declarations, and sixteen states became immediate signatories, including South Africa and Nigeria. These positions show that African antipathy to nuclear weapons has withstood several historical tests and remains robust, but also

²⁷² Abdul Minty, “Joint Statement Delivered by Ambassador Abdul Samad Minty, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations on: ‘The Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons’” in Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Geneva, 2013), <http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2013/mint0424.html>.

shows that this antipathy is based on a fundamental acceptance of the institutions and norms of global nuclear order.

In this chapter, I traced the origins of the African NWFZ, detailed its provisions, and discussed important developments since the zone entered into force. I then compared the case against the conceptual model and found that, despite some exceptions, the model plausibly explains the existence and persistence of the ANWFZ. Having analysed the African case, I shall now move to the South Pacific NWFZ, to test the conceptual model against further evidence.

CHAPTER FOUR: *The South Pacific NWFZ*

BACKGROUND | THE TREATY | EXISTENCE | PERSISTENCE | CONCLUSION

The Pacific... gives lie to the notion that the world has only seen the use of two nuclear bombs.

—*Itty Abraham*¹

In the previous chapter, I analysed the African NWFZ and judged it against the conceptual model. In this chapter, I review the South Pacific NWFZ. I analyse the origins of the Treaty of Rarotonga and examine its main provisions. I then test the case against the conceptual model. I find that the model provides a plausible explanation for the case but highlight a key exception in the form of Australia. I reflect on what this complication means for my overall model and conclude that Australia is an outlier.

This reflection takes place in the final section which considers the persistence of Rarotonga, which has remained in force since 1986. I also differentiate Rarotonga from the previous two cases: the South Pacific NWFZ (SPNWFZ) has thirteen signatories, compared to Tlatelolco's thirty-three and Pelindaba's fifty-three; it took longer to mature than Tlatelolco, but was signed over a decade before Pelindaba; and, it occurs in a diffuse archipelagic region as opposed to a densely populated continent. These differences are important tests for the validity of my hypotheses.

¹ Itty Abraham, "Book Review: Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade," *Technology and Culture* 54, no. 4 (2013): 996–97.

BACKGROUND

In the early 1960s, as Africa tabled motions on denuclearisation at the UN and Latin America negotiated its own NWFZ, Australian and New Zealand peace movements and politicians³ debated the feasibility of a SPNWFZ. Widespread nuclear testing in the region impelled island states to action. Soon after the fateful detonations at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the US carried out sixty-six tests in the Marshal Islands between 1946 and 1958, one third of all US nuclear tests in history.⁴ The United Kingdom and France also pursued damaging testing in the region.⁵ Following atmospheric tests at Reganne in Algeria, France moved its testing operation to French Polynesia from 1962. Its first site was the coral atoll of Mururoa, where it launched an atmospheric test in July 1966. The second site, Fangataufa, was twenty-five miles Southeast of Mururoa.⁶ It hosted France's first thermonuclear test, on the 24th of August 1968, which rendered the island uninhabitable for six years.⁷ Even after the

³ Particularly from each country's Labour Party.

⁴ Nic Maclellan, "The Nuclear Age in the Pacific Islands," *The Contemporary Pacific* 17, no. 2 (2005): 363–72, <https://doi.org/10.1353/cp.2005.0062>; Ernest J. Sternglass, "Infant Mortality and Nuclear Tests," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 25, no. 4 (April 15, 1969): 18–20, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1969.11455200>.

⁵ Teresia K. Teaiwa, "Bikinis and Other s/Pacific n/Oceans," *The Contemporary Pacific* (University of Hawai'i Press, 1994), <https://doi.org/10.2307/23701591>; Anthony D'Amato, "Legal Aspects of the French Nuclear Tests," *North Western University School of Law Faculty Working Papers*, 1967, 1–12.

⁶ Graham, *The Alternate Route: Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones*.

⁷ Hervé Guillou et al., "Geological Reconstruction of Fangataufa Atoll, South Pacific," *Marine Geology* 110, no. 3–4 (March 1, 1993): 377–91, [https://doi.org/10.1016/0025-3227\(93\)90095-D](https://doi.org/10.1016/0025-3227(93)90095-D).

PTBT of 1963, France continued significant testing in Polynesian atolls until 1996⁸ when it signed the CTBT under major international pressure.⁹

In 1962, the Australian Labour Party's (ALP) parliamentary executive mooted a Pacific NWFZ which was eventually widened to include the entire Southern Hemisphere.¹⁰ These early proposals were hindered by Conservative victories and US pressure. Beyond Australia, Island states mobilised against nuclear presence in the South Pacific through organisations like Against Testing on Mururoa (ATOM) and Nuclear Free Independent Pacific (NFIP).¹¹ In December 1975, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Fiji passed resolution 3477 (XXX) at the UNGA, despite opposition from the NWSs and Australian equivocation. This provoked lengthy deliberations among members of the South Pacific Forum (SPF)¹² and the NWSs about the modalities of a SPNWFZ.¹³ In the same year, the SPF formally committed to denuclearising the South Pacific, but it would be ten years before the plan materialised, due to Australian ambivalence.

Australia's opposition to the SPNWFZ was rooted in its Cold War alliance with the US. The US saw the South Pacific as a crucial theatre of power projection, and

⁸ Richard Ettenson and Jill Gabrielle Klein, "The Fallout from French Nuclear Testing in the South Pacific: A Longitudinal Study of Consumer Boycotts," *International Marketing Review* 22, no. 2 (2005): 199–224, <https://doi.org/10.1108/02651330510593278>.

⁹ Chusei Yamada, "The History of the CTBT and Where It Stands Today," *Asia-Pacific Review* 4, no. 1 (1997): 69–81, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13439009708719940>.

¹⁰ T. V. Paul, "South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone: Rhetoric or Reality?," *The Round Table* 8533, no. 1986 (2001), <https://doi.org/10.1080/00358538608453761>.

¹¹ Toshiki Mogami, "The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone: A Fettered Leap Forward," *Journal of Peace Research* 25, no. 4 (December 1, 1988): 411–30, <https://doi.org/10.1177/002234338802500407>.

¹² The South Pacific Forum was established in opposition to the South Pacific Commission which was rejected by island states as a colonial institution in 1971. The Forum's name later changed to the Pacific Islands Forum in 1999.

¹³ Papadimitropoulos, P. "The Rarotonga Treaty: A Regional Approach to Non-Proliferation in the South Pacific," *IAEA Bulletin*, 1975, 29–31.

Australia wished to avoid Soviet encroachment.¹⁴ Thus, between 1976 and 1983, the SPF made no mention of the NWFZ proposal. Domestic political changes in Australia in the early 1980s provoked a shift in the Australian attitude. Prime Minister Bob Hawke's Labour government prioritised non-proliferation and reversed longstanding Australian security policy. At the 1983 SPF, Australia formally endorsed a SPNWFZ, provided it accommodated several reservations. In the following year, participating states, 'agreed on the desirability of establishing a nuclear-free zone in the region at the earliest possible opportunity' and formed a Working Group to draft a treaty.¹⁵ The Working Group met five times, between November 1984 and June 1985. These meetings discussed the major preliminary obstacles¹⁶ and produced a draft text with the help of a 'Legal Drafting Committee', which reported to the Working Group. Although the final proposal came from Australia and New Zealand, Island states gave the main impetus through their consistent resistance to nuclear testing. As US diplomat Thomas Graham notes, 'Both the 1975 New Zealand initiative under Prime Minister Kirk and the 1983 Australian South Pacific Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone proposal, which led to the Rarotonga Treaty, were put forward in the context of longstanding island state support for regional denuclearisation'¹⁷. As in Latin America and Africa, the South Pacific debate over denuclearisation was fundamentally intertwined with decolonisation. Samoa, Fiji, Papua New Guinea,

¹⁴ Andrew O'Neil, "Australia and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty: A Reinterpretation," *Australian Journal of Political Science* 39, no. 3 (November 2004): 567–83, <https://doi.org/10.1080/103614042000295156>.

¹⁵ Papadimitropoulos, "The Rarotonga Treaty: A Regional Approach to Non-Proliferation in the South Pacific.", 30.

¹⁶ These included whether military sites and bases would be allowed in the zone, and whether nuclear dumping would be covered in the treaty or whether a pre-existing environmental treaty was sufficient for this purpose.

¹⁷ Graham, *The Alternate Route: Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones*, 68.

Vanuatu and Tuvalu were all British colonies during early tests, often gaining independence from NWSs (or colonial administrators Australia and New Zealand) between 1962 and 1980.¹⁸ Germany's 'possessions' in New Guinea, Samoa and Micronesia were claimed by Britain after World War II, while French Polynesia and New Caledonia remain under French control at the time of writing. The US also enjoys sovereignty over Guam and Hawaii¹⁹ and 'strategic trusteeship' over the Marshall Islands, which gained independence a year after the treaty opened for signature in 1986.²⁰

On Hiroshima Day, on the 6th of August 1985, eight states signed the SPNWFZ Treaty. It entered into force in 1986, after the eighth ratification.²¹ The treaty recognises 'dialogue partners', in the US, Canada, China, the EU, Japan, South Korea, and the UK. France was suspended in 1995 after resuming tests but was reinstated after 1996 when it reversed this decision. Despite several early reservations, the treaty is now a firmly established feature of political life in the South Pacific. On the 25th of March 1996—a decade after entry into force—the UK, the US and France²² signed Protocol I, which applies to territories within the zone under foreign control. France ratified the treaty in the same year, and Britain a year later. The USSR signed in 1986 and the China in 1987 (both ratified in 1988). The US, however, is still to ratify the Protocol.

¹⁸ Robert Aldrich, "The Decolonisation of the Pacific Islands," *Itinerario* 24, no. 3–4 (November 22, 2000): 173, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0165115300014558>.

¹⁹ Waiden Bello, "U.S. Imperialism in the Asia-Pacific," *Peace Review* 10, no. 3 (September 1998): 367–73, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659808426171>. The Philippines became independent in 1946, the same year testing began.

²⁰ Stewart Firth, "Sovereignty and Independence in the Contemporary Pacific," *The Contemporary Pacific* (University of Hawai'i Press, 1989), <https://doi.org/10.2307/23701893>.

²¹ Australia, Cook Islands, Kiribati, Fiji, New Zealand, Tuvalu, Western Samoa and Niue.

²² France, too, made a statement of reservation, saying that it could not be bound by Protocol II in the event of an invasion or attack, or if serious breaches of the NPT were committed concerning France.

All states except the US have also ratified Protocol II, which binds them to the treaty's prohibitions. The USSR's position on the treaty followed a similar pattern to Tlatelolco: it originally declared that another NWSs' violation of the treaty would constitute USSR withdrawal, though its final ratification of the treaty excluded this proviso. Parties recommitted themselves to Rarotonga in 2005 by joining the Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish NWFZs, held in Tlatelolco.²³

Table 4: Signatories to the Treaty of Rarotonga, by Date of Deposition²⁴

<i>State</i>	<i>Signed</i>	<i>Deposited</i>
Fiji	Sep 6 1985	Oct 4 1985
Cook Islands	Sep 6 1985	Oct 24 1985
Kiribati	Sep 6 1985	Oct 28 1985
Australia	Sep 6 1985	Dec 11 1985
Tuvalu	Sep 6 1985	Jan 16 1986
Niue	Sep 6 1985	May 12 1986
Samoa	Sep 6 1985	Oct 20 1986
New Zealand	Sep 6 1985	Nov 13 1986
Nauru	Jul 17 1986	May 13 1987
Solomon Islands	May 29 1987	Jan 27 1989
Papua New Guinea	Sep 16 1985	Sep 15 1989
Vanuatu	Sep 16 1995	Feb 9 1996
Tonga	Jul 2 1996	Dec 18 2000

²³ See, Ramesh Thakur, "The Nuclear Ban Treaty: Recasting a Normative Framework for Disarmament," *The Washington Quarterly* 40, no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 71–95, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1406709>; Chakravorty, "A New Nuclear Age: An Exclusionary Global Order?"

²⁴ "South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty of Rarotonga," NTI, 2018, <http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/south-pacific-nuclear-free-zone-spnfz-treaty-rarotonga/>.

Figure 20: Map of South Pacific Islands²⁵





Figure 21: Pacific Nuclear Testing Sites, 1946–1996²⁶



²⁵ Image from Wiki Commons based on the following sources: Paul. D'Arcy, *The People of the Sea: Environment, Identity, and History in Oceania* (University of Hawai'i Press, 2008), <https://www.uhpress.hawaii.edu/p-4123-9780824832971.aspx>; John K. Wright, "Pacific Islands," *Geographical Review* 32, no. 3 (July 1942): 481, <https://doi.org/10.2307/210391>. The three regions outlined in the map reflect groups usually identified by cultural affinity.

²⁶ Nic Maclellan, *Grappling with the Bomb: Britain's Pacific H-Bomb Tests, Global Change, Peace & Security* (Australian National University Press, 2017), xxiii. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2018.1460718>.

EXISTENCE

In this section I test the SPNWFZ against the conceptual model. I argue that nuclear tests in the South Pacific constituted an ENI that triggered the zone. I then focus on threat perceptions inside the zone, before analysing how norms intersected with threats to birth the SPNWFZ. I trace the development of anti-nuclear movements in South Pacific island states, as well as in Australia and New Zealand. I also consider the response to this resistance from the US, the UK, and France. Following this, I assess the persistence of the zone, arguing that the idea of obedient rebellion is a useful lens through which to understand the zone's consolidation. Australia remains an outlier for my model, as a purely 'obedient' state.

Legitimacy: 'An Unfriendly Act'

As in the two cases I have already considered, nuclear testing was fundamental to the SPNWFZ. As early as the 1950s, New Zealand rejected a British request to use New Zealand for nuclear testing. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden wrote to then New Zealand Prime Minister Sydney Holland asking to, 'count on him for co-operation' in a project, 'important to the Commonwealth and the defence of the free world'⁴¹. Holland refused, citing the likelihood of immense domestic political opposition.⁴² Meanwhile, British tests at Maralinga in South Australia caused severe public backlash after they destroyed traditional migration routes, toxified the environment in Aboriginal lands, and caused generational health risk for the nearby population.⁴³

⁴¹ Rebecca Priestley, *Mad on Radium: New Zealand in the Atomic Age*, accessed July 13, 2018, <http://www.press.auckland.ac.nz/en/browse-books/all-books/books-2012/Mad-on-Radium-New-Zealand-in-the-Atomic-Age.html>.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Maclellan, *Grappling with the Bomb: Britain's Pacific H-Bomb Tests*.

These ‘minor trials’, designed to test the safety of British nuclear weapons, contaminated inhabited areas with some 8 000kg of uranium, 24kg of plutonium, and 100kg of beryllium.⁴⁴

After French tests in the 1970s, New Zealand Prime Minister William Rowling remarked, ‘The Government reaction to such explosions remains unchanged... we have a blanket protest against any kind of nuclear explosions, whether atmospheric or underground, and whether exploded by the British, Chinese, French, Americans, Russians or Indians’⁴⁵. Labour governments in Australia and New Zealand, along with the government of Fiji, instituted successful proceedings against France at the ICJ in 1973.⁴⁶ The court ruled that France, ‘should avoid nuclear tests causing radioactive fall-out on Australian or New Zealand territory’⁴⁷.

Under the Lange government in the 1980s, New Zealand further consolidated a fiercely anti-nuclear stance, risking its relationship with the US by challenging the Australia-New Zealand-US (ANZUS) alliance, previously the bedrock of US policy in the region.⁴⁸ The split emerged when New Zealand refused to grant docking rights to US carrier USS *Buchanan* suspected of transiting nuclear weapons. Washington’s reaction was bitter, with one official referring to New Zealand as, ‘a piss-ant little country south of nowhere’, and Reagan embarking on several retaliatory steps, including cancelling

⁴⁴ Maclellan.

⁴⁵ L. N. Ray, “Letter, L. N. Ray, High Commissioner of India, Wellington, ‘French Nuclear Test,’” 1975.

⁴⁶ Dana D. Fischer, “Decisions to Use the International Court of Justice: Four Recent Cases,” *International Studies Quarterly* 26, no. 2 (June 1, 1982): 251.

⁴⁷ International Court of Justice, “Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France),” 1973, <http://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/59>.

⁴⁸ See, for instance, Andrew Mack, “Crisis in the Other Alliance: Anzus in the 1980s,” *World Policy Journal* 3, no. 3 (1986): 447–72; David McLean, “Anzus Origins: A Reassessment,” *Australian Historical Studies* 24, no. 94 (April 1990): 64–82, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10314619008595832>.

joint ANZUS exercises and intelligence coordination.⁴⁹ By endangering its relationship with the US, New Zealand risked jeopardising longstanding security guarantees. Despite these risks, US retaliatory measures did not change New Zealand's position, though it did slightly soften New Zealand's position on the SPNWFZ.⁵⁰ As Lange explained:

That exclusion [of nuclear weapons] is not an unfriendly gesture towards any nuclear power. The countries which may most recently have brought nuclear weapons into New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, could hardly be better friends to New Zealand, and we to them. Exclusion is an unfriendly gesture towards nuclear weapons, that is all.⁵¹

Lange himself became an antinuclear advocate and outlined his views on nuclear weapons publicly on several occasions. In a piece for *Foreign Affairs* in 1985, on the eve of Rarotonga, Lange explained the change in New Zealand's threat perceptions. Wellington's, 'decision to exclude nuclear weapons from its territory' Lange claimed, 'raised serious questions about the character and management of ANZUS'⁵². The change in New Zealand's threat perceptions stemmed from a fear that its nuclear relationships were becoming a source of insecurity. As Catalinac argues, 'perceptions of threat had changed over the course of the post-war period'⁵³. Whereas New Zealand

⁴⁹ Mack, "Crisis in the Other Alliance: Anzus in the 1980s." The US, for its part, was keen to avoid a precedent that might spread to Europe.

⁵⁰ See, for example, William T. Tow, "The Anzus Dispute: Testing U.S. Extended Deterrence in Alliance Politics," *Political Science Quarterly* 104, no. 1 (1989): 117, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2150990>; Kiri Anna Wilson, "David Lange and the ANZUS Crisis: An Analysis of Leadership Personality and Foreign Policy" (University of Canterbury. Political Science and Communication, 2006), <https://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/handle/10092/956>; Henry S. Albinski, "The ANZUS Crisis: US Policy Implications and Responses," in *ANZUS in Crisis* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1988), 83–103, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08870-6_5.

⁵¹ Kevin P. Clements, "New Zealand's Role in Promoting a Nuclear-Free Pacific," *Journal of Peace Research* 25, no. 4 (1998): 395–410.

⁵² David Lange, "New Zealand's Security Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, 1985, 1009–19.

⁵³ Amy L. Catalinac, "Why New Zealand Took Itself out of ANZUS: Observing 'Opposition for Autonomy' in Asymmetric Alliances," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6, no. 4 (September 22, 2010): 317–38.

had previously feared ‘Japanese resurgence’ after World War II, which prompted its alliance with the US, the situation had, ‘obviously altered since then’, according to Lange.⁵⁴ Now, there was ‘growing concern’ over, ‘the intrusion of elements of the global nuclear confrontation into the South Pacific’ which imperilled New Zealand’s security, Lange maintained.⁵⁵ In particular, New Zealand’s strategic elites began to see their nuclear partnership with the US as a potential threat.

As Labour Minister Richard Northey observed, ‘My view was that every time a ship came to New Zealand, we were at risk. The ships all carried nuclear materials and it was reasonable to believe that the Russians probably tracked them. Just because we were friends with the US didn’t seem to me that we should volunteer to be on the line’⁵⁶, while former cabinet minister Mike Moore claimed, ‘at the height of the Cold War we felt that [having nuclear ships] made us a nuclear target’⁵⁷. The Cold War arms race only heightened these threat perceptions. As Ken Shirley asserted, ‘The world was on the brink of a nuclear holocaust... [expelling nuclear weapons from New Zealand]... reflected concern about the escalating Cold War tensions’⁵⁸. Lange himself now saw New Zealand’s security as fundamentally tied to, ‘arms control talks between the United States and the Soviet Union’ and attached, ‘particular significance to... preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons’⁵⁹. New Zealand had thus shifted from feeling secure in US protection to recognising that this protection was

⁵⁴ Lange, “New Zealand’s Security Policy.”

⁵⁵ Lange.

⁵⁶ Richard Northey (Member of the Fourth Labour Government). Interviewed in New Zealand on August 11, 2005 in Catalinac, “Why New Zealand Took Itself out of ANZUS: Observing ‘Opposition for Autonomy’ in Asymmetric Alliances”.

⁵⁷ Catalinac, “Why New Zealand Took Itself out of ANZUS: Observing ‘Opposition for Autonomy’ in Asymmetric Alliances.”

⁵⁸ Catalinac.

⁵⁹ Lange, “New Zealand’s Security Policy.”

fuelling the arms race. This caused, ‘an increasing sense of frustration and concern that progress in bringing the nuclear arms race under control has been minimal overall and in recent years non-existent’⁶⁰, Lange claimed. The SPNWFZ was, therefore, seen as an opportunity to insulate New Zealand from the risks of nuclear rivalry.

Unlike New Zealand, Australia did not always oppose nuclear weapons, and flirted with nuclear acquisition itself. Between 1956 and 1963, senior defence officials weighed the value of a nuclear deterrent. On the 12th of September 1956, Liberal politician (and later Defence Minister) Athol Townley wrote to then Defence Minister Philip McBride to suggest acquiring tactical nuclear weapons for the Australian Air force.⁶¹ McBride forwarded the proposal to the Defence Committee which eventually resolved that, ‘the effectiveness of all Australian services would be considerably increased if they were equipped with low-kiloton nuclear weapons’⁶². When the Head of the Royal Airforce Dermot Boyle visited Canberra in March 1957, the nuclear question featured prominently, as in subsequent meetings between Prime Ministers Macmillan and Menzies.⁶³ Australia’s nuclear pursuit reached its peak when, in 1961, Menzies proposed trading support for the global nuclear test ban for, ‘recognition now of the United Kingdom’s obligation to provide Australia, if ever necessary, with a nuclear capability’⁶⁴. Australia never publicly declared a desire for nuclear weapons, however, despite support among sections of both the Australian and British military establishments.

⁶⁰ Lange.

⁶¹ T.V Paul, *Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons*, (Montreal ; Ithaca, N.Y: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt81bqm>.

⁶² Paul, 57.

⁶³ Hymans, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation*.

⁶⁴ Cabinet Minute, Decision No. 1383 marked “Secret,” June 13, 1961, “Nuclear Tests Conference: Control Posts in Australia,” Series A5818/2, National Archives of Australia. Document provided by Jim Walsh.

Figure 22: Maralinga Test Site after the Marcoo Test, 1956⁶⁵



When China tested nuclear weapons in 1964, this raised Australian threat perceptions, and the nuclear question returned to the forefront of the strategic debate. This coincided with the pro-nuclear Gorton premiership. Chairman of the Australian Atomic Energy Corporation (AAEC), Phillip Baxter, observed: ‘plans for the purchase of a reactor with considerable potential for the easy manufacture of plutonium were nearly signed in the context where Australia's accession to the recently concluded NPT was uncertain’⁶⁶.

The threat from China illustrated a wider concern among Australian strategic elites that Cold War conflicts could engulf Australia. Having strongly supported US and British interests in the region, Australia saw itself as a target of communist backlash in the Pacific. These anxieties linked to nuclear questions, as negotiations over the NPT consumed the global nuclear agenda. Naval Officer C. L. Hewitt wrote to Prime Minister Gorton expanding on the threat: ‘China will not be a signatory. Will the

⁶⁵ CTBTO, “United Kingdom’s Nuclear Testing Programme: CTBTO Preparatory Commission,” 2018, <https://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/the-effects-of-nuclear-testing/the-united-kingdoms-nuclear-testing-programme/>.

⁶⁶ Hymans, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation*.

Americans come to our aid, under ANZUS, with nuclear weapons in the event of a threat to Australia by Chinese nuclear weaponry? This year; next year; in twenty-four years from now? Will they???'⁶⁷. While some sectors of the Australian security establishment concurred that an Australian deterrent was necessary, and that the problem of delivery could be overcome,⁶⁸ others supported joining the NPT, since Australia, 'had no capacity to build a credible independent deterrent'⁶⁹.

Despite these perceived threats during the Cold War, the Australian security establishment was not convinced about the necessity of deterrence. I concur with Paul, and disagree with Hymans, that Australia ultimately faced low threats during the Cold War. China had no real intention or need to confront Australia in a nuclear conflict, and proxy battles elsewhere in Asia showed no sign of threatening the Australian mainland. This was confirmed by a study of the Australian Services Institution in 1975, which concluded that nuclear threats would only become significant if proximate powers like Japan or Indonesia gained nuclear weapons.⁷⁰ By the time of Rarotonga, this view was entrenched, as evidenced in a defence report from 1986 which noted that, 'neither China's nuclear capability, nor India's or Pakistan's nuclear potential, has any direct significance for Australian security'⁷¹. A 1987 defence white paper further held that:

The military capabilities required for a large-scale conventional attack on Australia, in particular the naval and air power to project and sustain substantial operations against Australian forces, are beyond those currently possessed by any regional

⁶⁷ Hymans, 128.

⁶⁸ For instance, AEC chief Phillip Baxter argued delivery was not an obstacle because 'you could sneak them [nuclear bombs] into enemy cities'.

⁶⁹ Hymans, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation*, 128.

⁷⁰ Paul, *Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons*, 80.

⁷¹ "Australian Strategic Assessments and Defense Policy Objectives, 1976," cited in Brian Toohey and Marianne Wilkinson, *The Book of Leaks*, 228.

power... The features of our northern environment would complicate large scale conventional military operations.⁷²

Therefore, Australian strategic elites ultimately determined that nuclear acquisition would be counter-productive in sparking a possible nuclear cascade in the South Pacific and, ‘arousing unnecessary and hostile reactions from its neighbours’⁷³. Despite the views of rebellious members of the Australian establishment, this view ultimately prevailed. In 1975, Prime Minister Menzies finally ruled out an Australian nuclear weapons programme, which Paul asserts relied on the, ‘low-conflict environment and the lack of credible security threats from Asia’⁷⁴.

The threat perceptions of island states were also influenced by decades of nuclear testing, which island states resisted from their inception. The impact of tests conducted from 1946 on the Marshal Islands and its surrounds was staggering. As Ruff notes: ‘the total explosive yield of the bombs detonated in the Marshalls was ninety-three times that of all US atmospheric tests conducted in Nevada; the equivalent of 1.6 Hiroshima bombs each day over the twelve years of the tests (1946–58)’⁷⁵. Between 1946 and 1958, the US detonated twenty-three nuclear devices underwater, on the island reef, in open air, and underground, threatening the very existence of several island states. A 1952 test of the world’s first true hydrogen bomb destroyed and vaporised the Island of Elugelab, turning it into a crater.⁷⁶

⁷² *The Defense of Australia 1987*, 21. The same paper concluded that it would take Indonesia ten years to develop even a limited nuclear deterrent.

⁷³ Paul, *Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons*, 81.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 81.

⁷⁵ Tilman A. Ruff, “The Humanitarian Impact and Implications of Nuclear Test Explosions in the Pacific Region,” *International Review of the Red Cross* 97, no. 899 (2015): 775–813, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383116000163>.

⁷⁶ Myres S. McDougal and Norbert A. Schlei, “The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security,” *Yale Law Journal* 64 (1954): 648.

Other tests during this period at Enewetak Atoll caused similar damage. Forced removals of the populations of these atolls were routine.⁷⁷ Despite early denials, the 1954 test at Mt Castel Bravo produced fallout that seriously contaminated the surrounding area, spreading as far as Australia, Japan, India, the United States, and parts of Europe.⁷⁸ Its explosion was the largest recorded in US history: had the bomb been dropped in Washington DC in a north-easterly wind, it would have destroyed the populations of the District of Columbia, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York City in three days.⁷⁹ Emergency evacuations in the atoll followed, prompting a press conference addressed by the head of the American Atomic Energy Commission, Lewis Straus, who reassured the audience that, ‘the medical staff on Kwajalein have advised us that they anticipate no illness, barring, of course, diseases which may be hereafter contracted’⁸⁰. In this sense, external nuclear testing threatened not only the territorial integrity of island states, but also the very survival of their inhabitants.

Recognition: ‘Frenchmen into the Sea!’

Anti-nuclear norms in the South Pacific were founded on reactions to nuclear testing in the region. Tests caused great resentments among Pacific populations, wrought environmental destruction, and triggered multiple humanitarian crises. These crises, in turn, illustrated the colonial dimensions of nuclear testing. As Maclellan notes, ‘the interconnection of racism, colonialism, and the nuclear era is fundamental, and blaming

⁷⁷ S. I. Schwartz, *Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of US Nuclear Weapons since 1940* (Brookings Institution Press, 2011).

⁷⁸ H Barker, “Bravo for the Marshallese: Regaining Control in a Post-Nuclear, Post-Colonial World,” 2012.

⁷⁹ Sarah Davis, *Empires’ Edge: Militarization, Resistance, and Transcending Hegemony in the Pacific* (University of Georgia Press, 2015),

<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oxford/reader.action?docID=1836113&ppg=10>. pp 53

⁸⁰ Dan O’Neill, *The Firecracker Boys: H-Bombs, Inupiat Eskimos, and the Roots of the Environmental Movement* (Basic Books, 1994).

the “Anglo-Saxon powers (Australia and New Zealand)” for leading anti-nuclear sentiment against France downplays the depth and range of opposition to nuclear testing in the Islands’⁸¹.

Pacific Island states, NGOs, and citizens vocally criticised nuclear tests from the outset. The Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Movement (NFIP) and the Fijian Against Tests on Mururoa (ATOM) are two examples of successful popular antinuclear movements. In 1974, ATOM lunched a petition of 1 380 signatures (the population was around 500 000) sent to French president Georges Pompidou.⁸² At its conference the following year, the Pacific People’s Charter was agreed, the nuclear aspects of which were adopted by the NFIP.

The charter envisaged the creation of a NWFZ, modelled on the treaty of Tlatelolco and the Antarctic Treaty.⁸³ According to Maclellan, ‘the NFIP made the connection to broader Pacific campaigns for indigenous self-determination, decolonisation and political independence’ and stressed that, ‘Western powers could only test nuclear weapons in the Pacific because they were colonial powers in the region’⁸⁴. The NFIP established a secretariat in Hawaii that became the Pacific Resource Centre, an administrative bureau dedicated to fighting nuclear excesses in the Pacific. The first Nuclear Free Pacific Conference, organised by the Fiji Young Women’s Christian Association and ATOM, was held in Suva, Fiji, in 1975. The conference communique railed against nuclear imperialism:

This conference, noting in particular the racist roots of the world’s nuclear powers, calls for an immediate end to oppression, exploitation and subordination of the

⁸¹ Maclellan, “The Nuclear Age in the Pacific Islands.”

⁸² Vijay Naidu, “The Fiji Anti-Nuclear Movement: Problems and Prospects,” in *The Pacific: Peace, Security, & the Nuclear Issue* (The United Nations University, 1988).

⁸³ Roy H. Smith, *The Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Movement: After Mururoa* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997).

⁸⁴ Maclellan, *Grappling with the Bomb: Britain’s Pacific H-Bomb Tests*.

indigenous peoples of the Pacific. We, the Pacific people, want to get something clear. We are sick and tired of being treated like dogs. You came with your guns and fancy words and took our land... You forced your way of life on us and we want to tell you we do not like your way of life. It stinks. You worship dead things like your concrete jungles and now you bring in your nuclear bombs and you went to 'practise' on us.⁸⁵

The conference's main aim was, 'ending nuclear tests in the Pacific', but noted that 'the more we discuss it, it becomes obvious that the main cause is colonialism'⁸⁶. At the 15th Pacific Forum, where states outlined several principles for a NWFZ, they stressed that, 'South Pacific countries should be free to live in peace and independence and to run their own affairs in accordance with the wishes and traditions of their people' and that, 'South Pacific countries retain their unqualified sovereign rights to decide for themselves...'⁸⁷.

The ANN in the South Pacific was also reinforced by the church. Particularly, the World Council of Churches (WCC) invested great energy in condemning nuclear testing in the Pacific, shaping both local and international perceptions. Ecumenical condemnation was also an important driver of South-South antinuclear coordination. The WCC's first statements on the Pacific came in the early 1970s, and were directed at French nuclear tests. In a letter to French President Georges Pompidou, the Council argued that tests were: 'not only a subject of serious anxiety for the populations of the neighbouring area, but set a pattern contrary to universal aspirations for general and complete disarmament and towards better protection of the environment'⁸⁸.

In 1976, the Pacific Council of Churches publicly condemned nuclear testing for the first time. Its Assembly passed a motion stating, 'the continued use of the Pacific by

⁸⁵ Smith, *The Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Movement: After Mururoa*, 25.

⁸⁶ Quoted in, Graham, *The Alternate Route: Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones*, 63.

⁸⁷ Aukino Taiea, "An Assessment of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty," 1986.

⁸⁸ Weir, "The Opening of the Coconut Curtain: Pacific Influence on the World Council of Churches through the Campaign for a Nuclear-Free Pacific, 1961 to 2000."

foreign powers... for nuclear weapons testing' showed disregard for the, 'wishes of the people of the region for self-determination...' ⁸⁹. At the Nairobi Assembly of the WCC 'high priority' was given to 'the disarmament issue' ⁹⁰. A year later, at the Kingston Assembly, the dual questions of Pacific decolonisation and denuclearisation dominated. The Assembly adopted resolutions which called for the independence of pacific nations and supported the formation of a NWFZ in the South Pacific for the first time. ⁹¹ Advocates of French nuclearisation in Tahiti described the campaigners for denuclearisation and decolonisation as 'Ayatollahs for Polynesia' in the pages of *Les Nouvelles de Tahiti*. ⁹² Tongan Anglican Bishop of Polynesia, Jabez Bryce, criticised French Tests in 1980 on a visit to Tahiti, arguing that, 'the indigenous people are emerging and they have the belief that they have the right to say what they think' and declaring that, 'we must make it known to the French that we do not want these nuclear tests' ⁹³. By the end of the 1970s, global, regional and local religious leaders and bodies contributed to growing public pressure on nuclear testing in the region. The WCC's campaign against nuclear tests only intensified in the 1980s. In 1982, the General Synod of the Evangelical Church denounced nuclear tests and sent letters of protest to the French President François Mitterrand. ⁹⁴ Catholic voices grew louder in this period, too. Then mayor of Faa'a (and later President of French Polynesia), Oscar Temaru claimed that the catholic church could not have, 'a bible in one hand and the

⁸⁹ PCC, *Report of the Third Assembly* (Suva: Lotu Pacifika, 1976), 86.

⁹⁰ *The Churches in International Affairs: Reports 1974–78*, 73.

⁹¹ CIA, *The Churches in International Affairs: Reports 1979–1982* (Geneva: CCIA, WCC, 1983), 111.

⁹² *Les Nouvelles de Tahiti*, 5 September 1979, as appendix 10 in Tauria, "The Protestant Church".

⁹³ *Les Nouvelles de Tahiti*, 4 March 1980, as appendix 13 in Tauria, "The Protestant Church,"; Tauria Interview with John Doom, 31 August 2011, Samoa.

⁹⁴ Weir, "The Opening of the Coconut Curtain: Pacific Influence on the World Council of Churches through the Campaign for a Nuclear-Free Pacific, 1961 to 2000."

bomb in another’⁹⁵. The PCC ran a poster competition focused on messages supporting denuclearisation, offering Fiji\$400 to the winner. The PCC also commissioned a book titled *Call to a New Exodus* which argued that churches had a responsibility to protest nuclear intervention and its attendant environmental degradation.⁹⁶ The 6th Assembly of the WCC in 1983 held in Vancouver dedicated a full plenary session to the nuclear question in the pacific, which focused on, ‘the many threats to life [pacific people] are facing, concentrating on nuclear and cultural threats’⁹⁷. The presentation at plenary included an account of the human toll of nuclear testing presented by Marshallese activist Darlene Keju, who told of, ‘jelly fish babies’ and ‘scientific guinea pigs’ and displayed the winning poster of the PCC’s competition. The efforts of the PCC and the WCC thus strongly influenced the normative environment surrounding nuclear tests in the period preceding the birth of Rarotonga. The moral arguments made by church bodies and leaders, combined with the strategic environment, prepared the ground for the treaty.

Island states also played a key role in entrenching an attitude of rebellion against nuclear order. Following the Bravo test, a coalition of Marshall Islanders sent a petition to the UN Trusteeship Council, linking land and sovereignty to the question of nuclear intervention:

The Marshallese people are not only fearful of the danger to their persons from these deadly weapons in case of another miscalculation, but they are also concerned for the

⁹⁵ Taura, ‘The Protestant Church’, 56.

⁹⁶ Weir, “The Opening of the Coconut Curtain: Pacific Influence on the World Council of Churches through the Campaign for a Nuclear-Free Pacific, 1961 to 2000.”

⁹⁷ David Gill, ed., *Gathered for Life: Official Report of the VI Assembly of the World Council of Churches* (Geneva: WCC, 1983).

increasing number of people removed from their land... land means a great deal to the Marshallese.⁹⁸

In 1956, Western Samoa petitioned the Council over British tests on Kiritimati. The Fijian newspaper *Jagriti* argued, ‘nations testing these bombs should realise the value of the lives of the people settled in this part of the world... they too are human beings’⁹⁹. Tahitian politician Oopa Pouvana—a French veteran of both world wars—led a radical campaign against French intervention on the slogan, ‘Tahiti for the Tahitians; Frenchmen into the sea!’¹⁰⁰, which resulted in his ultimate arrest and imprisonment in France.¹⁰¹ French officials were decidedly wary of the anti-colonial sentiments that could jeopardise their nuclear testing, as they did in Algeria. They advanced a ‘psychological campaign’ that would counter local disenchantment:

Whatever the precautions taken, an announcement of such projects in Polynesia will give rise to local opposition from native political leaders and from the Territorial Assembly. It is especially important that the leader Pouvana, now in prison in France, not be allowed to return to the territory.¹⁰²

After independence in 1980, Vanuatu also became a particularly vocal Melanesian antinuclear advocate. At the South Pacific Conference of 1981, Prime Minister Walter Lini insisted that the NWFZ was a, ‘matter of life and death’ and that ‘Testing of any kind’ should be, ‘outlawed, as must the dumping of nuclear waste, the firing of nuclear devices and the passage of submarines or overflying aircraft carrying them’¹⁰³.

⁹⁸ Petition from the Marshallese People Concerning the Pacific Islands: *Complaint regarding explosions of lethal weapons within our home islands to United Nations Trusteeship Council, 20 April 1954*, circulated as UN Trusteeship Council document T/PET.10/28, 6 May 1954.

⁹⁹ Quoted in, Nic Maclellan, *Pacific Diplomacy and Decolonisation in the 21st Century, The New Pacific Diplomacy*, 2016, 10; and Graham, *The Alternate Route: Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones*, 63.

¹⁰⁰ Bolton, “The ‘-Pacific’ Part of ‘Asia-Pacific’: Oceanic Diplomacy in the 2017 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.”

¹⁰¹ Jean-Marc Regnault, “France’s Search for Nuclear Test Sites,” *The Journal of Military History* 67, no. 4 (2013): 1223–48.

¹⁰² Regnault, 1241.

¹⁰³ Hamel-Green, “The Rarotonga South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty.”

NWSs' responses to early protests only exacerbated the recognition aspect of the NWFZ. When, in 1975, French secret service agents sunk *Rainbow Warrior*, a Greenpeace ship on route to protest continued nuclear testing at Mururoa.¹⁰⁴ The operation, which also claimed the life of photographer Fernando Pereira, was claimed by protestors to have been sanctioned by President Mitterrand.¹⁰⁵ The tests also provoked consumer boycotts of French products in Australia. An Australian Manager of a French auto manufacturer (kept anonymous by a study into the effectiveness of the boycotts) remarked:


Instructions from the home office were to maintain strong consumer advertising but there was hysteria out there. And while we had a bit of warning, no one realised the backlash... We stopped all advertising, both print and broadcast, but the media would not let go of the issue. It was a difficult situation... our customers were being victimised... We wanted to take an aggressive approach and state publicly that 'we do not support tests' but that wasn't on. So we had to just sit back and take our lumps.¹⁰⁶

When the boycott ended, French producers returned to previous levels of production, further strengthening the case that the boycotts were successful.

¹⁰⁴ John Schofield and Wayne Coroft, *A Fearsome Heritage: Diverse Legacies of the Cold War* (Routledge, 2007).

¹⁰⁵ David Robie, "The Insecurity Legacy of the Rainbow Warrior Affair: A Human Rights Transition from Nuclear to Climate-Change Refugees," *Pacific Dynamics*, 2017, <https://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/handle/10092/13641>.

¹⁰⁶ Ettenson and Klein, "The Fallout from French Nuclear Testing in the South Pacific: A Longitudinal Study of Consumer Boycotts."

Figure 23: Winning Poster in 1982 PCC Competition.¹⁰⁷

As research into the humanitarian and environmental impact of nuclear tests spread, revealing vastly more pronounced damage than previously thought, so the ANN strengthened. In the decades following testing, mass medical ailments linked nuclear weapons with deep personal bereavements spread through pacific populations. Rio et al. show that incidences of acute myeloid leukaemia in French Polynesia are the highest in the world.¹⁰⁸ This was worsened by revelations that medical consequences were known, and even encouraged, by NWSs in advance of tests. In some cases, local populations unwittingly formed part of racialised medical experiments. For instance, Dr Thomas Shipman of Las Alamos nuclear laboratory noted, ‘the development defects

¹⁰⁷ Weir, “The Opening of the Coconut Curtain: Pacific Influence on the World Council of Churches through the Campaign for a Nuclear-Free Pacific, 1961 to 2000,” 134.

¹⁰⁸ Bernard Rio et al., “Incidence Rates of Leukemia in French Polynesia,” *International Journal of Cancer* 131, no. 6 (September 15, 2012): 1486–87, <https://doi.org/10.1002/ijc.27364>; Constance Xhaard et al., “Differentiated Thyroid Carcinoma Risk Factors in French Polynesia,” *Asian Pacific Journal of Cancer Prevention* 15, no. 6 (March 30, 2014): 2675–80, <https://doi.org/10.7314/APJCP.2014.15.6.2675>.

in the small children are also of considerable interest, and I presume an attempt will be made to correlate these findings with what has been reported in Japan'¹⁰⁹. Merrill Eisenbud of the US AEC Committee of Biology and Medicine noted that, it would be 'interesting' to understand:

what isotopes are involved and a sample of food changes in many humans through their urines, so as to get a measure of the human uptake when people live in a contaminated environment. Now, data of this type has never been available. While it is true that these people do not live, I would say, the way Westerners do, civilised people, it is nevertheless also true that these people are more like us than mice.¹¹⁰

British tests, too, were expressly intended to discover the human cost of nuclear weapons, and not just their technical impact. As noted by one British military document, 'The Army must discover the detailed effects of various types of explosion on equipment, stores and men, with and without various types of protection'¹¹¹. A plan to remove human bone samples at autopsy and send them to the US and UK for testing under 'Project Sunshine' was kept secret for decades. Project Sunshine formed part of some 4 000 human radiation experiments under the auspices of the US AEC.¹¹²

Besides the military and anti-colonial aspects of nuclear testing, environmental concerns were also key to establishing the SPNWFZ. Further, as campaigners researched the origins of the nuclear testing programmes, and as more documents became declassified, the racialised origins of the tests escalated antinuclear

¹⁰⁹ Letter from Thomas L. Shipman M.D., Los Alamos, New Mexico to Dr Robert Conard, Brookhaven National Laboratory, New York, 13 March 1961. MINDD.

¹¹⁰ AEC: *Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Biology and Medicine, 13–14 January 1956* (AEC, New York, 1956), cited in Holly Barker: *Bravo for the Marshallese*, op. cit., p. 45.

¹¹¹ Nic Maclellan, Tubanavua-Salabula, and Joshua Namoce, "Kirisimasi: Fijian Troops at Britain's Christmas Island Nuclear Tests," 1999.

¹¹² Maclellan, "The Nuclear Age in the Pacific Islands"; Maclellan, *Grappling with the Bomb: Britain's Pacific H-Bomb Tests*; Ruff, "The Humanitarian Impact and Implications of Nuclear Test Explosions in the Pacific Region."

sentiment.¹¹³ For instance, a 1956 British Report on the ‘danger area’ for Operation Grapple remarked:

The [radiation] dosage at this... level is about 15 times higher (for primitive peoples) than that which would be permitted by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP).... The levels recommended by the ICRP would necessarily be exceeded... [but] only a very slight health hazard to people would arise, and that only to primitive people.¹¹⁴

French damage to Mururoa was particularly egregious. The first test at Mururoa on July 2nd 1966, caused the atoll’s lagoon to, ‘rain fish and molluscs down on the atoll’ when it was effectively emptied by the blast. Marine and wildlife were impacted by the tests, with ciguatera—toxic poisoning of plankton which in turn affects carnivorous fish—affecting up to half of the piscine population around Hao Atoll. At least 3 000 tons of waste poured into oceans surrounding Mururoa and Hao.¹¹⁶ Early French tests damaged island rims, causing fracturing in the structural rock. When a device that was supposed to be detonated 1km underground got stuck at 800m, it was still detonated, causing a ‘submarine landslide’ which dislocated coral rock and created a 3m wave over Mururoa.¹¹⁷ The explosion caused a crack 2kms long and 40cm wide in the atoll.¹¹⁸ The amount of waste accumulated in Mururoan subsoil is, ‘371 times the threshold for the classification of basic nuclear installations’¹¹⁹. Clean-up operations

¹¹³ See, for instance, Smith, Anita. “Colonialism and the Bomb in the Pacific.” In *A Fearsome Heritage: Diverse Legacies of the Cold War*, 51-72. Routledge, 2016.

¹¹⁴ Air Vice-Marshal W. E. Oulton, “Danger Area”, Top Secret Paper, No. GRA/TS.1008/1/Air, 19 November 1956; minutes of meeting on 27 November 1956 marked Top Secret – UK Eyes Only, XY/181/024, cited in Nic Maclellan, “Grappling with the Bomb: Opposition to Pacific Nuclear Testing in the 1950s”, in Phillip Deery and Julie Kimber (eds), *Proceedings of the 14th Biennial Labour History Conference*, Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, Melbourne, 2015, 11-13.

¹¹⁶ Smith, *The Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Movement: After Mururoa*.

¹¹⁷ Hughes, “A French Nuclear Testing Site in the Pacific? -- Plans and Repurcussions.”

¹¹⁸ Chrisafis, “French Nuclear Tests ‘Showered Vast Area of Polynesia with Radioactivity.’”

¹¹⁹ Christine Chaumeau, “France Urged to Clean up Deadly Waste from Its Nuclear Tests in Polynesia,” *The Guardian*, 2012, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/07/france-polynesia-atolls-nuclear-tests>.

during British tests involved dumping thousands of maimed, blinded, and dead seabirds into the sea.

The atoll's fissures continue to be contaminated by radiation. According to some geographic studies, long-term effects may include seismic tidal waves and a tsunami capable of engulfing all of Polynesia. As Reverend Francois Pihaatae of the Pacific Conference of Churches laments: 'Three of the world's major powers—France the United States and Britain—conducted nuclear tests in the Pacific with blatant disregard for human life and the environment. This unwanted activity has maimed generations of Pacific people and hundreds of European servicemen and their families'¹²⁰. Continued accusations of an environmental and humanitarian cover-up plague the French programme to the present. Secret Ministry of Defence documents show levels of toxicity and radioactivity far greater than previously acknowledged, indicating Tahiti suffered exposure to radiation, 'five hundred times in excess of the accepted level'¹²¹. Nowhere is the effect of nuclear testing clearer than in the chilling report of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Operation Crossroads at Bikini Atoll. They concluded, based on the damage done to local populations, that:

Of the survivors in the contaminated areas, some would be doomed by radiation sickness in hours, some in days, some in years. But, these areas, irregular in size and shape, as wind and topography might form them, would have no visible boundaries. No survivor could be certain he was not among the doomed, and so added to every terror of the moment, thousands would be stricken with the fear of death and the uncertainty of the time of its arrival... the bomb's demonstrated power to deliver death to tens of thousands, of primary military concern will be the bomb's potentiality to break the will of nations and of peoples by the stimulation of man's primordial fears, those of the unknown, the invisible, the mysterious...¹²²

¹²⁰ Graham, *The Alternate Route: Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones*, 65.

¹²¹ Chrisafis, "French Nuclear Tests 'Showered Vast Area of Polynesia with Radioactivity.'"

¹²² Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Board, "The Final Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Board for Operation Crossroads: The Evaluation of the Atomic Bomb as a Military Weapon," 1947,

In this sense, the identities of island states were profoundly shaped by the impact of nuclear testing. Public opinion in Australian and New Zealand also contributed to the resistant attitude toward nuclear powers. As senior Australian nuclear diplomat, and former Minister for Disarmament, Richard Butler observed, ‘Australian people were very aware of nuclear weapons because nuclear testing had been conducted in Australia by the British with our permission’ and that, ‘the constituency within Australia that I represented was strongly in support of nuclear arms control, and that was increased by the way by the fact that the French were testing nuclear weapons at Moruroa Atoll, in the Pacific, and in French Tahiti. And there was very deep concern about that also in Australia’¹²³. According to Butler, this was one of the reasons that the Hawke Labour government was, ‘activist in the whole field of nuclear arms control’ and, ‘had an Ambassador for Disarmament which I had been previously for five years... only one other country that had one of those and that was Mexico in the person of very famous Alfonso Garcia Robles...’¹²⁴.

Concurrent with popular pacific island antinuclear movements, Australian campaigners exerted pressure on their own government. In 1952, most Australians were in favour of the tests.¹²⁶ However, opinion moved steadily against testing until, in 1957, polls showed a majority of 49% opposed to the tests.¹²⁷

http://nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/testing/crossroads-final-report_1947-06-30.htm.

¹²³ Onderco, “Oral History Interview with Richard Butler.”

¹²⁴ Onderco.

¹²⁶ Lorna Arnold and Mark Smith, *Britain, Australia and the Bomb: The Nuclear Tests and Their Aftermath: Second Edition* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 250.

¹²⁷ Arnold and Smith.

Figure 24: Australian Anti-Nuclear Rally Notice, 1984¹²⁸

Popular movements in Australia centred on both the questions of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. The Australian peace movement began mobilising against nuclear issues in the early 1960s, when a petition on a nuclear-free-zone in the Southern Hemisphere gained over 200 000 signatures.¹²⁹ On Hiroshima Day in 1961, protests of 5 000 and 3 000 people were recorded in Sydney and Melbourne respectively. That year, hundreds of people marched from Sydney to Canberra to demand, ‘banning all nuclear tests, world disarmament, peaceful settlement in Berlin and the withdrawal of all foreign military bases from Australia’¹³⁰.

Australian unions also propelled the peace movement in the latter part of the decade. For example, a meeting of South Pacific Unions in 1965 noted, ‘concern at the proposed nuclear weapons testing by the French government in the Pacific, the immediate effect

¹²⁸ Dora Alves, “Anti-Nuclear Attitudes in New Zealand and Australia,” *National Defense University Washington DC*, 1985.

¹²⁹ Ralph V. Summy, “Militancy and the Australian Peace Movement, 1960–67,” *Politics* 5, no. 2 (1970): 148–62, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00323267008401209>.

¹³⁰ Summy.

this testing can have on people in the vicinity of the testing area and its long-term effect on people everywhere, and our concern at all other nuclear testings'¹³¹. The workers' movement, in turn, influenced the ALP, so that a broad front covering ordinary people, peace movements, workers' movements and political parties drove the sentiment of rebellion against nuclear order. Traction throughout the 1960s had thus taken the Australian peace movement from, 'a movement on the margins... excluded from mainstream politics because of its association with communist politics in the cold war era' to, 'a national mass movement'¹³².

After French tests in 1972 and 1973, nuclear questions commanded increased public attention.¹³³ In 1976, the Friends of the Earth established the Campaign Against Nuclear Energy (CANE) in Perth with the aim of, 'opposing the development of nuclear power stations' and, 'the mining and export of Australian uranium for other than biomedical purposes'¹³⁴. CANE held its first major demonstrations in 1977, marching from Esplanade to Parliament House, attracting 600 people.¹³⁵ Later that year, rallies grew to 10 000, while the Waterside Workers Union refused to work on the Columbus Australia, a ship transporting uranium.¹³⁶ Local councils began passing their own nuclear-free laws. Like the workers' movement, the peace movement targeted the ALP as a key conduit for its policies, and succeeded in lobbying Labour to

¹³¹ PND NSW records, ML MSS 5522, Box 12 (74), Trade Union Committee file

¹³² Sigrid Mccausland, "Leave It in the Ground: The Anti-Uranium Movement in Australia 1975-82" (Austalian National University, 1999).

¹³³ Brian Martin, "The Australian Anti-Uranium Movement," *Alternatives: Perspectives on Society and Environment* 2 (1980): 55–70.

¹³⁴ Alex Boyd, "Anti-Nuclear New Zealand: A Report on the Decline of Anti-Nuclear Sentiment within the New Zealand Public National Identity Abstract," vol. 1503, 2016.

¹³⁵ Marty Branagan, "The Australian Movement against Uranium Mining: Its Rationale and Evolution," *International Journal of Rural Law and Policy*, no. 1 (2014): 1–12, <https://doi.org/10.5130/ijrlp.i1.2014.3852>.

¹³⁶ Branagan.

campaign against uranium mining between 1975 and 1982.¹³⁷ When Labour abandoned this policy, the peace movement held mass rallies in various Australian cities attracting over 200 000 people.¹³⁸

Public pressure forced nuclear issues onto the parliamentary stage. In a parliamentary question from Labour MP (and future Minister of Foreign Affairs) George Hayden to then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ian McCahon, Hayden asked: ‘did the Australian Government protest to the French Government for its conduct of this series of nuclear tests; if so, when and by what means?’ McCahon responded:

France, together with the other nuclear weapon states, is well aware of Australia's strong opposition to nuclear weapons testing in all environments. The Government has frequently made this clear, both in international meetings and in direct communications to the Governments concerned. It is not our practice to protest to France, or for that matter to any other nuclear weapon state, about each underground nuclear test.¹³⁹

Similarly, L.H. Barnard, acting as Prime Minister, issued a press statement condemning French tests in 1973:

The French Government has rejected its clear legal and moral obligation to the world community... They have acted in defiance of the ruling of the International Court of Justice and with complete disregard for the safety of the people of the Pacific region... I appeal to the French Government to halt the test programme immediately.¹⁴⁰

New Zealand also developed a strong aversion to nuclear weapons from an early stage, developing a sophisticated anti-nuclear movement that permeated society and government, ‘linking French nuclear testing, United States ship visits, and United States installations with global nuclear catastrophe’¹⁴¹. As Arnold and Smith aver, the

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ “House of Representatives Answers to Questions Upon Notice: French Nuclear Tests (Question No. 1831)” (Australian House of Representatives, 1978).

¹⁴⁰ L. H. Barnard, “Statement by Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Lance Barnard MP: Second French Test” (Parliament of Australia, 1973).

¹⁴¹ Clements, “New Zealand’s Role in Promoting a Nuclear-Free Pacific.”

anti-nuclear position became a, 'point of political orthodoxy' in the 1970s and 80s.¹⁴² This 'orthodoxy' took several decades to build.¹⁴³ After Hiroshima and Nagasaki the beginnings of an anti-nuclear movement in New Zealand emerged. Regular commemorations of Hiroshima day took place throughout the 1950s, and several petitions and protests were registered against the early forms of nuclear testing in the pacific.

When the global Campaign for Disarmament (CND) established roots in New Zealand, its first project was to arrange a petition for a Southern Hemisphere NWFZ. The petition eventually received 80 238 signatures and was submitted to parliament in 1963. In the same year, the New Zealand Labour Party (NZLP) adopted policies that would make New Zealand 'nuclear free'. In the 1970s, the nuclear issue became, 'a nation-wide, hot button, election topic'¹⁴⁴. This was due to two main factors: the ANZUS crisis, and opposition to nuclear testing. These two factors spurred popular resistance. In 1970, the Holyoake government ratified the NPT soon after its inception in 1970, under no major public opposition.¹⁴⁵ When France tested nuclear weapons in 1972, New Zealand sent a Naval frigate to observe the testing in an act of 'silent protest'¹⁴⁶. The New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone Committee launched a project to declare schools, homes work places and councils nuclear-free. The nuclear-free movement began to

¹⁴² Arnold and Smith, *Britain, Australia and the Bomb: The Nuclear Tests and Their Aftermath: Second Edition*.

¹⁴³ Boyd, "Anti-Nuclear New Zealand: A Report on the Decline of Anti-Nuclear Sentiment within the New Zealand Public National Identity Abstract."

¹⁴⁴ Boyd.

¹⁴⁵ Paul Reynolds, "Popular Responses to the New Zealand Government's Nuclear Weapons Policy: 1984–1986," *Politics* 22, no. 1 (2007): 60–66.

¹⁴⁶ Boyd, "Anti-Nuclear New Zealand: A Report on the Decline of Anti-Nuclear Sentiment within the New Zealand Public National Identity Abstract."

affect public opinion. As a letter by Prime Minister Norman Kirk to the French Government from 1972, observed:

This public mood... so widespread that it must be heeded by a democratically elected Government, is based, on three factors: anxiety about the possible physical effects of radioactive fallout, concern at this demonstrable evidence of proliferating nuclear weapons, and resentment that a European power should carry out such experiments not on its own metropolitan territory but in an overseas territory in what may seem from Paris a remote region, but which is nevertheless the region in which we and the Pacific peoples live.¹⁴⁷

Kirk was correct that that the New Zealand public showed an anti-nuclear bias, and this sentiment only grew stronger into the 1980s. For instance, between 1976 and 1985, the New Zealand electorate was evenly divided on the question of granting entry to foreign nuclear ships.¹⁴⁸ By 1985—the year Rarotonga opened for signature—59% were opposed to entry and the number of people opposed to nuclear-armed ships increased from 60% to 66%.¹⁴⁹ In 1982, the Conservative government established a Disarmament and Arms Control Select Committee on nuclear issues. In 1985, the committee released its report to parliament stating, ‘the lasting impression left on the committee by the public submissions was the depth of concern, felt by those individuals and groups who appeared before it, about the danger to world security posed by the arms race’¹⁵⁰. When asked what they felt was ‘a present worry’, the majority (48%) responded ‘nuclear war’¹⁵¹. In 1986, a poll on banning all nuclear weapons from New Zealand was

¹⁴⁷ International Court of Justice, “Oral Arguments on the Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection (New Zealand),” June (1973): 4.

¹⁴⁸ Clements, “New Zealand’s Role in Promoting a Nuclear-Free Pacific.”

¹⁴⁹ Clements.

¹⁵⁰ Foreign Affairs and Defence Select Committee. 1985. *Report on the Enquiry into Disarmament and Arms Control*. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, I.19, Wellington.

¹⁵¹ Reynolds, “Popular Responses to the New Zealand Government’s Nuclear Weapons Policy: 1984–1986.”

supported by a majority of 76.4%, while 69.2% favoured the SPNWFZ and 92% opposed nuclear stationing in New Zealand.¹⁵²

To New Zealand politicians, nuclear freedom symbolised independence. The language used in this justification by politicians was not directly ‘anti-imperial’ but its sentiments bore great resemblance to the anti-colonial rhetoric of island states. For example, Phil Goff, an eventual Labour leader, asserted, ‘it was important to us that we were not merely an echo of somebody else’s voice. We speak with our own voice and we do what we believe is appropriate to our interests and values’¹⁵³, while MP David Caygill opined that nuclear-free policies were ‘about setting our own course’ and ‘speaking with our own voice’¹⁵⁴. Richard Northey, the head of the CND in New Zealand, argued that nuclear-free policies symbolised pride in taking, ‘an independent stance on contributing to world peace’¹⁵⁵. Lange himself lamented the French tests, which stoked, ‘anti-nuclear sentiment... fanned by French intransigence in persisting with its nuclear testing program in the South Pacific, in defiance of the expressed views of countries in the region’¹⁵⁶. In 1982, Christchurch itself became the world’s first nuclear-free city.¹⁵⁷ In a survey of all parliamentary speeches in the New Zealand House of Commons, Catalinac determines that 49% of the speeches focused on questions of ‘security’, and a further 28% of speeches focused on identarian concerns related to

¹⁵² Reynolds.

¹⁵³ Amy L. Catalinac, “The Evolution of Nuclear-Free New Zealand: Ideas and Foreign Policy Change,” 2009, 1–43.

¹⁵⁴ Amy L. Catalinac, “The Evolution of Nuclear-Free New Zealand: Ideas and Foreign Policy Change,” 2009, 18.

¹⁵⁵ Catalinac.

¹⁵⁶ Lange, “New Zealand’s Security Policy.”

¹⁵⁷ Boyd, “Anti-Nuclear New Zealand: A Report on the Decline of Anti-Nuclear Sentiment within the New Zealand Public National Identity Abstract.”

‘independence’¹⁵⁸. The two dominant themes in these speeches, then, correspond my two variables: threat perceptions, and norms.

Other Pacific powers also contributed to the norm. Japan harbored longstanding concerns over pacific tests to its south-western border tracing back to the 1950s. After a Japanese tuna fishing vessel, *Daigo Fukuryu Maru No5. Lucky Dragon*, was caught in the contamination of the US Bravo test, major public and government opinion rallied against the tests. Protests pressured the British government, which was also considering tests in the period: On ‘Hiroshima Day’ in 1954, a nationwide signature campaign solicited thirty-two million signatures against nuclear testing. The Japanese Council Against A and H Bombs organised a large rally in Tokyo in March 1957, commemorating three years since the Bravo test, leading British officials to complain, ‘the whole emphasis was on the forthcoming British tests’¹⁵⁹. The protest received messages of support from Egyptian diplomats fresh from the Suez victory, the Japanese and Sri Lankan Prime Ministers, as well as from Soviet Premier, Marshall Bulganin.¹⁶⁰ Japanese fallout from the Bravo test also swayed public and government sentiment in Australia. An Australian government briefing noted an increase in public pressure, ‘partly due to the death of a Japanese fisherman injured by radioactive fallout from an American H-bomb explosion in the Pacific’¹⁶¹. Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi even threatened to support a ‘sit down protest’ at the site of tests to prevent British testing:

The British government might not suspend its hydrogen bomb tests even though the Japanese protest fleet carried out a sit down movement. Unless public opinion in

¹⁵⁸ Catalinac, “The Evolution of Nuclear-Free New Zealand: Ideas and Foreign Policy Change.”

¹⁵⁹ Foreign Office, “Telegram From British Embassy Tokyo to Sir Esler Dening” (London, 1957).

¹⁶⁰ Maclellan, *Grappling with the Bomb: Britain’s Pacific H-Bomb Tests*.

¹⁶¹ Maclellan.

Britain makes the British government leaders reconsider atomic bomb experimentation, there will be no way of suspending the nuclear bomb test.¹⁶²

In total, then, three main factors solidified rebellion against nuclear order among the states of the South Pacific. First, popular movements in Australia, New Zealand, and island states drove anti-nuclear sentiment to the forefront of public consciousness. Second, Labour governments in Australia and New Zealand, as well as anti-colonial governments in island states, forwarded the anti-nuclear agenda domestically and on the international stage. Third, the continuation of nuclear tests, despite widespread condemnation, further fueled anger toward the NWSs reaching a peak in the 1970s after renewed French nuclear testing.

NWSs: ‘Out-of-Step Behaviour’

Superpower rivalry was a key driver of threat perceptions in the region in this period. Although NWSs experienced low threats from states in the South Pacific themselves, they experienced threats from each other in the Pacific. That is, NWSs were threatened by being overtaken by rivals who gained advantage through nuclear testing in the Pacific. For example, the US, Britain, and France all cited fear of supersession as the reason for pursuing Pacific nuclear testing. The US, for example, was ‘panicked’ about Soviet ICBM launches in August 1957. The launch of Sputnik 1 on the 4th of October in the same year compounded the fear. A White House research group expressed fear over how these advances would affect public opinion and US alliances in an October report:

Public opinion in friendly countries shows decided concern over the possibility that the balance of military power has shifted or may shift soon in favour of the USSR. The general credibility of Soviet propaganda has been greatly enhanced and American prestige and the American reaction, so sharply marked by concern, discomfiture and

¹⁶² Telegram No. 75 from British Embassy, Tokyo to Sir Esler Denning, Foreign Office, London, 5 March 1957. CO1036/281.

intense interest, has itself increased the disquiet of friendly countries and increased the impact of the satellite.¹⁶³

A declassified memorandum from the CIA requested by the State Department, which analysed the potential impacts of different scenarios, observed, ‘we need to determine, to the extent possible, reactions from countries or groups of countries to one of several policy options the US might adopt in reaction to the SPNWFZ Treaty. Possible Soviet behaviour should also be analysed’¹⁶⁴. The ‘policy choices’ to which the memo referred were whether to adopt the treaty’s three protocols, and the ‘countries to be analysed’ were potential nuclear rivals: France, Britain, China, Japan, ASEAN members and other NWSs.¹⁶⁵ The Soviet Union, in turn, leveraged Pacific nuclear tests to shift domestic and Third World public opinion. As a Soviet propaganda pamphlet stated, ‘The first British hydrogen bomb was exploded on this island in 1957. The British imperialists have established big airbases in Fiji. The British military command regards these islands as the strategic centre of the south-western part of the Pacific’¹⁶⁶.

Britain also defended its decision to embark on testing by invoking the threat of rivalry. After the successful H-bomb test, a newsletter for staff and troops of Christmas Island exemplified this impulse: ‘Bomb gone! H-bomb puts Britain on level terms’¹⁶⁷. Lord Frederick Cherwell, Churchill’s scientific adviser, argued, ‘If we are unable to make the Bomb ourselves and have to rely entirely on the United States for this vital weapon,

¹⁶³ White House Office of the Staff Research Group, “Reaction to the Soviet Satellite—A Preliminary Evaluation,” 1957.

¹⁶⁴ United States Department of State, “Memorandum to the CIA: Request for Study on the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone” (United States Department of State, 1986).

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ J Lebedev, “Colonialism and National Liberation Movements in Oceania,” *The Peoples of Asia and Africa (Translated in ‘Translations from the Soviet Press’, Colonial Office Digest No. 399)* 5 (n.d.).

¹⁶⁷ “Bomb Gone! H-Bomb Puts Britain on Level Terms,” *The Mid-Pacific News*, May 15, 1975.

we shall sink to the rank of a second-class nation...'¹⁶⁸ Churchill himself argued that Britain, 'could not expect to maintain our influence as a world power' without, 'the most up-to-date nuclear weapons'¹⁶⁹. After Soviet H-bomb tests, Churchill pled with the US for greater cooperation on nuclear affairs, calling for, 'better sharing of information and also perhaps resources in the nuclear sphere'¹⁷⁰. British tests on Australian soil, agreed by Menzies without cabinet approval, began in October 1952. Thousands of tons of equipment and 14 000 military and scientific personnel were transported to execute this mission.

However, the Australian government cancelled any further tests in 1956, bowing to public pressure.¹⁷¹ In June 1956, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, still keen to advance the British nuclear advantage, confirmed British nuclear tests would be conducted in the 'Pacific Ocean'. Between 1952 and 1957, Britain conducted twelve atmospheric tests, at Maralinga, Emu Field and Monte Bello Island. A year later, it conducted nine further tests under 'Operation Grapple', at Christmas Island (Kiritimati) and Malden Island, then part of the British Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony (later Kiribati and Tuvalu after decolonisation) in the central Pacific Ocean.¹⁷² These further exacerbated threat perceptions among pacific states.

¹⁶⁸ Cited in, Margaret. Gowing and Lorna Arnold, *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952* (Macmillan [for the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority], 1974), 407.

¹⁶⁹ Jonathan Rosenberg, "Before the Bomb and After: Winston Churchill and the Use of Force," in *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb* (Oxford University Press, 1999), 171–93, <https://doi.org/10.1093/0198294689.003.0008>.

¹⁷⁰ Winston Churchill, "Message From the Prime Minister" (Eisenhower Presidential Library, 1954).

¹⁷¹ Ruff, "The Humanitarian Impact and Implications of Nuclear Test Explosions in the Pacific Region."

¹⁷² Some of these explosions were several times more powerful than those at Nagasaki and Hiroshima.

France, too, was concerned about cementing its status as a *puissance mondiale moyenne* (middle-ranking world power).¹⁷⁴ French desires for nuclear testing were, like Britain's, based on an anxiety of loss of 'great power' status, following the Suez crisis.¹⁷⁵ For instance, in 1968, De Gaulle complained to his new Foreign Minister of Research and Atomic Space Affairs: 'of the five nuclear powers we are going to be the only one which hasn't made it to the thermonuclear level? Are we going to let China get ahead of us?'¹⁷⁶ French nuclear testing in the South Pacific started immediately after France stopped nuclear tests in Africa in 1966, and continued for three decades.¹⁷⁷ France's main test site at Mururoa was roughly equidistant from Australia and Chile. Testing thus provoked strong rejections from Pacific populations, raising threats and provoking nuclear anxiety. As a State Department memo argued, 'while there appear to be no real objections to the establishment of a military base in Tahiti', there were nonetheless serious concerns about 'nuclear testing' which solicited, 'strong rejection as exhibited in the 1962 election when almost all parties supported the establishment of a military base, but opposed it for testing purposes'¹⁷⁸. This rejection of nuclear testing is a key example of how nuclear weapons *per se* provoked threats, and not simply conventional military presence. By 1995, when France was the sole power testing nuclear weapons in the region, Australia expelled the French Ambassador.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁴ Christine Weir, "The Opening of the Coconut Curtain: Pacific Influence on the World Council of Churches through the Campaign for a Nuclear-Free Pacific, 1961 to 2000," *Journal of Pacific History* 54, no. 1 (2019): 116–38, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00223344.2018.1512370>.

¹⁷⁵ D'Amato, "Legal Aspects of the French Nuclear Tests"; Tariq Rauf, "French Nuclear Testing: A Fool's Errand," *Review Literature And Arts Of The Americas*, 1995, 49–57.

¹⁷⁶ Cited in, Graham, *The Alternate Route: Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones*, 61.

¹⁷⁷ Davids Tost, "France's Nuclear Dilemmas" 75, no. 1 (1996): 108–18.

¹⁷⁸ Thomas Hughes, "A French Nuclear Testing Site in the Pacific? -- Plans and Repurcussions," 1963.

¹⁷⁹ Ramesh Thakur, "The Last Bang before a Total Ban: French Nuclear Testing in the Pacific," *International Journal* 51, no. 3 (1995): 466–86.

While NWSs perceived threats from each other, they felt little threat from Pacific Island states themselves. The vulnerability of these states, and their inability to compel alternative action, became a key reason that the Pacific was chosen as a testing site. A chief reason that the South Pacific was considered unthreatening was its remoteness. Island testing sites were imagined as ‘empty’ and threat-less spaces. Bikini Atoll was described variously as a ‘non-place’, a ‘backwater’, and a ‘deserted isle’¹⁸⁰. Two US Navy officers recall how the site was chosen for testing: ‘We just took out dozens of maps and started looking for remote sites. After checking the Atlantic, we moved to the west coast and just kept looking’¹⁸¹. US national intelligence estimates identified no threats from Pacific nations in the years preceding, and during, testing operations.¹⁸² As Bolton contends, NWSs saw pacific islands as ‘exotic, enchanted, docile and primitive...’¹⁸³.

What changed NWSs’ threat perceptions and, thereby, their views on nuclear order? Why did the US, the UK and France (the three states with foreign territories in the region) shift rapidly between fears of superpower advantage, and support for a NWFZ in the mid-1990s? There are two main causes: the de-escalation of the Cold War, and the successful 1995 NPT RevCon. Before these two events, the SPNWFZ was unthinkable to NWSs. After these two events, the US, UK and France soon signed Protocol I. With no threat of immediate nuclear confrontation across Cold War lines, and with an indefinite extension of the NPT, NWSs saw the costs of nuclear testing

¹⁸⁰ Davis, *Empires’ Edge: Militarization, Resistance, and Transcending Hegemony in the Pacific*.

¹⁸¹ Jonathan Weisgall, *Operation Crossroads: The Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll* (Naval Institute Press, 1994).

¹⁸² Richard Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security* (Columbia University Press, 2007).

¹⁸³ Matthew Bolton, “The ‘-Pacific’ Part of ‘Asia-Pacific’: Oceanic Diplomacy in the 2017 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” *Asian Journal of Political Science* 26, no. 3 (2018): 371–89, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2018.1515641>.

outweighing the potential benefits for the first time. Consider the significant change in the US position in this period. Before these two events, the US was opposed to the SPNWFZ, viewing it as an obstacle to the movement of military ships and aircraft in the South Pacific.¹⁸⁵ It also feared the limits such a zone would impose on its ability to project power in the region:

From the US point of view, the [NWFZ] proposal was seen as open-ended on the question of what constitutes nuclear presence in the region. The New Zealand Government's reported claim that it would not affect transit did not placate American fears on the matter. New Zealand assurances were... also vague on the question of boundaries... this would also have concerned the US because of the possibility of its American territories being considered part of the region.¹⁸⁶

But within just a few years, the US entered into an agreement with members of the SPF, offering to ratify the treaty in exchange for SPF support on indefinite NPT extension. Thomas Graham, lead US negotiator at the 1995 RevCon, explains: 'Speaking on behalf of the US government—without instructions but without any opposition—I promised the ten South Pacific Forum states that if they all supported permanent, or indefinite extension, of the NPT, the United States would ratify the three protocols of the Rarotonga Treaty; a matter that gradually became a matter of considerable importance to these states'¹⁸⁷. France, and Great Britain also changed their positions on Rarotonga soon after the conference. Prior to these events, France was against Rarotonga. According to a CIA report from 1986 France, 'believed strongly that a comprehensive test ban treaty and a SPNWFZ would have an adverse effect on their nuclear forces'¹⁸⁸. France remained, 'adamantly opposed to the CTBT, which it

¹⁸⁵ Ramesh Thakur, "A Nuclear-Weapon-Free South Pacific: A New Zealand Perspective," *Pacific Affairs* 58, no. 2 (1985): 216, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2758261>.

¹⁸⁶ Graham, *The Alternate Route: Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones*.

¹⁸⁷ Graham, 72.

¹⁸⁸ Central Intelligence Agency, "France: Current Defense Policy" (Central Intelligence Agency, 1986).

believed would hamper its nuclear modernisation efforts'¹⁸⁹. For the same reason, it stressed to US officials that signing the SPNWFZ treaty would be viewed as an 'unfriendly act'¹⁹⁰. Yet, France itself signed and ratified Rarotonga just a few months after the NPT RevCon.

Figure 25: Children Flee Bikini Atoll, 1946¹⁹¹



For these reasons, threat perceptions played a key role in birthing the SPNWFZ. The advent of widespread nuclear testing reshaped pacific states' sense of vulnerability. In some ways, the threat environment in the South Pacific resembled the African and Latin American cases: ENIs caused regional instability, in the same way as the Cuban

¹⁸⁹ Central Intelligence Agency.

¹⁹⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, "France: Current Defense Policy." The US signed the treaty, but did not meet its promise to ratify it, which Graham later described a 'unjustifiable out-of-step behaviour' which 'does not help US credibility internationally'.

¹⁹¹ CTBTO, "The United States' Nuclear Testing Programme: CTBTO Preparatory Commission," accessed June 2, 2018, <https://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/the-effects-of-nuclear-testing/the-united-states-nuclear-testing-programme/>.

missile crisis and French tests in Algeria. The cessation of these ENIs created a window of policy opportunity in which to enact coordinated policy change. Yet, the SPNWFZ is also different from these two cases in key respects. Unlike in Latin America, threats among the members of the SPNWFZ remained low i.e. there were no nuclear rivalries such as the one between Brazil and Argentina, and no internal NWSs like South Africa in Africa. Threats were thus shaped more in this case by the external players. Again, these external threats were more significant for the rivalries between superpowers than any conflict between South Pacific states. Indeed, two of the key regional hegemons, Australia and New Zealand, enjoyed alliances with the NWSs.

What are the implications for my model? First, the claim that ENIs trigger the opportunity for NWFZs in postcolonial contexts is reinforced by the SPNWFZ. Second, Rarotonga shows that the pace at which threat perceptions change is key to the birth of NWFZs. After the period of nuclear testing in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, threat perceptions were highest. Yet, a sudden commitment to cease testing in the region caused a sharp drop in threat perceptions, accentuated by the scale of threats faced before. In this sense, the conceptual model does not fully account for *relative* changes in threat perceptions. This holds true for the three cases I have considered. Central to the Latin American case, for instance, was not just that Soviet missiles were recalled, but that their removal caused a sudden drop in threat perceptions, which provoked policy change. Similarly, when South Africa suddenly renounced nuclear weapons, threat perceptions changed swiftly on the African continent, and these moments of opportunity became key to successfully navigating NWFZ treaties. Hence, what these three cases reveal is that relative threat perceptions matters in addition to absolute changes in threat for NWFZs.

PERSISTENCE

In this section, I analyse the persistence of the SPNWFZ since its birth in 1985. I argue that the South Pacific is another example of ‘obedient rebellion’. The section starts with an analysis of Australian and New Zealand nuclear policy since Rarotonga. I then reflect on the role of island states in perpetuating obedient rebellion through the prism of two main events since Rarotonga: French nuclear tests in 1995 and the TPNW.

Australia and New Zealand: ‘Bugger off’

Australia’s stance toward nuclear order in the period since Rarotonga opened can be viewed through several prisms: the 1995 NPT RevCon, Australia’s stance on the CTBT, The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, and the 1995/6 French Tests.¹⁹² Australia shifted to a position of radical multilateralism and obedience to nuclear order in the mid-1990s. Richard Butler explains Australia’s position on NPT extension:

We wanted to see the Treaty extended indefinitely. And I remember making it clear in statements and so on that any, and this is very difficult with some of the Arab countries, Egypt in particular, that any qualified extension would simply postpone the pain and the problem to another day and I also said repeatedly and it was the position of the Australian government which was you do not qualify absolute objectives and principles as those that are found in NPT.¹⁹³

While Australia did not actively rebel against its Western allies, it did challenge US positions at the 1995 RevCon. Particularly, Australia challenged the US on its support for Israel, and criticised NWSs for failing to disarm.¹⁹⁴ Beyond this, it refused to dilute

¹⁹² Marianne Hanson, “Australia and Nuclear Arms Control as ‘Good International Citizenship,’” *Working Paper (Australian National University. Dept. of International Relations)*; No. 1999/2., 1999.

¹⁹³ Onderco, “Oral History Interview with Richard Butler.”

¹⁹⁴ Onderco.

language on disarmament and supported the South African position which mediated between indefinite extension with weak disarmament commitments on one hand, and the radical desire to terminate the treaty on the other. This caused unease in the US as Butler recalls:

We had difficulties within the Western Group... because the Western Group's deliberations on the issues were very often dominated by the nuclear weapons states. And we had very great difficulty with that, we thought that they were not acting in terms of the real spirit of the Treaty by insisting on their interests and the Article VI of the Treaty.¹⁹⁵

When Butler refused to side with the US on language concerning non-signatories to the treaty including Israel, the US complained to Canberra. Yet Canberra supported Butler and directly disagreed with its ally in Washington, as Butler colourfully recounts:

The matter of dispute in the Western Group was referred to Canberra... It was considered at a high level, and, the Minister of Foreign Affairs personally told the Americans to bugger off, that Butler was carrying out our policy, and that they should calm down and let the conference do its work.¹⁹⁶

Australia's concerns stemmed from a perception that NWSs were contravening the rules of order. If anything, these disagreements reinforced Australia's obedience: Australia was thus prepared to risk diplomatic fallout with one of its most important allies to uphold its NPT commitments. In the 1990s, Australian foreign policy was anchored on the idea of 'Good International Citizenship' (GIC), defined as 'principled action' shaping 'foreign policy'¹⁹⁷. Nuclear diplomacy became a key pillar of this strategy. In 1995, the Australian Government appointed the Canberra Commission, a panel of experts assigned to investigate the strategic aspects of nuclear weapons. The commission met over ten months and produced a report which argued that Australia

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Hanson, "Australia and Nuclear Arms Control as 'Good International Citizenship.'"

should support universal disarmament within a regime of strict verification.¹⁹⁸ The report was also presented to the 51st Session of the UNGA in the wake of indefinite NPT extension. This loyalty to multilateralism was further evinced in Australia's actions after the 1995 RevCon: Australia launched the twelve-nation Non-proliferation and Disarmament and Initiative (NDPI), participated actively in the Vienna Group, stayed a member of the Nuclear Safeguard Protocol and the Zangger Committee, contributed to the IAEA Board of Governors, co-chaired the 'Friends of the CTBT' and remained an 'annual sponsor' of the UNGA resolution on the CTBT.¹⁹⁹ Australia's participation with the SPNWFZ was thus an extra step of many demonstrating its major commitment to multilateral nuclear institutions.

Despite this, Warren counters that, 'Australia has become a paradoxical player in which it adheres to its US alliance obligations while clinging to the waning vestiges of its position as a good global citizen'²⁰⁰. In this sense, he contends that Australia's nuclear diplomacy is ambiguous in a different way to the hegemons I have previously interrogated. Particularly, Warren avers that Australia's fierce multilateralism is only possible because of the security it gains from nuclear protection. In this sense, Australia tacitly supports and benefits from nuclear possession while rhetorically performing a desire for disarmament out of expedience. Its multilateral alliances reveal this, Warren argues. For instance, the NPDI, which appears to be a disarmament initiative, is a collection of states that benefit from US or NATO nuclear sharing (Australia, Canada, Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Turkey).²⁰¹ These states can afford to

¹⁹⁸ Hanson.

¹⁹⁹ Aiden Warren, "Rethinking Australia's Middle-Power Nuclear Paradox," *Arms Control Today*, no. May (2019): 18–24.

²⁰⁰ Warren.

²⁰¹ Warren.

criticise a lack of disarmament precisely because they are the beneficiaries of nuclear security.

This impression is further strengthened by Australia's stance on the TPNW. When confronted with a choice between abandoning nuclear security and abandoning nuclear weapons, Australia has abandoned its faith in multilateralism because of 'the current, real, security concerns of states with nuclear weapons or those states, like Australia, that rely on extended nuclear deterrence as part of their security doctrine'²⁰². The Australian government avoided negotiations over the treaty and argued that the ban risked undermining the NPT. Former foreign minister Julie Bishop, who led Australia's response to the treaty argued, 'to "ban the bomb" may be emotionally appealing' but claimed that, 'disarmament could not be achieved this way'²⁰³. Rather, she suggested the 'global community' needed to, 'address the security drivers behind nuclear choices'²⁰⁴.

Australia is a challenging case for my model because of its strong obedience to nuclear order. Australia's obedience hinges on strong alliances with NWSs in general, and the US in particular. Whereas other hegemonies like Brazil or South Africa criticise order as unfair, Australia supports order because it benefits from this unfairness. In both cases, action and rhetoric frequently depart. Australia rhetorically supports order while supporting alliances which preserve its inequalities; Brazil and South Africa criticise order while suffering from its inequalities. Australian ambiguity in the post-Rarotonga era is thus the converse of other cases I have so far have examined.

Australia sees Rarotonga as a tool to placate regional anxieties over nuclear order without having to forgo the protections of nuclear weapons. In this sense, the SPNWFZ

²⁰² DFAT, "Steps Towards a Nuclear-Weapons- Free World."

²⁰³ Warren, "Rethinking Australia's Middle-Power Nuclear Paradox."

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

speaks to multiple elites in Australia in different ways to previous cases. It resonates with one set of elites that acknowledge the virtues of multilateralism, but also accords with another elite that wishes to freeze nuclear inequalities in place. By denying adversaries in the region nuclear capabilities, this elite sees the treaty as holding the balance of power in Australia's favour, and preventing nuclear adversaries from encroaching on the US-Australia alliance. Australia, then, is perhaps less a case of obedient rebellion than one of expedient rebellion.

By contrast, New Zealand resembles the other states I have analysed so far in this thesis. After the passing of Rarotonga, it has directly confronted order, while accepting its fundamental logic. Soon after Rarotonga entered into force, New Zealand signed the *New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act* of 1987, to align domestic law with its international obligations.²⁰⁵ This act has remained in place for over thirty years. In the 1987 election, called after New Zealand joined the SPNWFZ, nuclear policy drew disproportionate attention. The incumbent Labour government's opponents initially derided the legislation an 'exercise in futility', but later backpedalled as polls indicated the popularity of the policy.²⁰⁶ Labour was eventually returned with a resounding majority. When power changed hands in 1990, nuclear policy remained unchanged. When a government-commissioned report proposed an alternative policy, it was rejected for fear of inciting public backlash: '[T]he report was so aggressively pro-nuclear the government did not risk using it and instead quietly buried it'²⁰⁷. The nuclear-free policy remained uncontested for fifteen years.

²⁰⁵ Jack Vowles, "Nuclear Free New Zealand and Rogernomics: The Survival of a Labour Government," *Australian Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 1 (1990): 81–91.

²⁰⁶ Kate Dewes and Robert Green, "The World Court Project: History and Consequences," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 7, no. 1 (2011): 61–83, <https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.1999.9673201>.

²⁰⁷ Dewes and Green.

Only in the 2005 election was the longstanding consensus around the nuclear-free policy again challenged. National Party leader Don Brash proposed a referendum on the nuclear-free stance and proposed the law be repealed and replaced. In a conversation with a US congressional delegation in 2004, Brash promised that the policy would be ‘gone by lunchtime’ if he were elected.²⁰⁸ By contrast, Labour leader Helen Clark claimed the policy was, ‘an important symbol of New Zealand’s values in the twenty-first century’ which, ‘speaks for itself’²⁰⁹. Phil Goff, by then foreign minister, insisted that the policy was, ‘part of the way we promote ourselves to the world’ and, ‘symbolic of New Zealand’s right to make its own decisions’²¹⁰. This final phrase emphasises the symbolic importance of this policy and its role in shaping New Zealand’s foreign policy identity. After Labour won the election, the National Party elected a new leader and abandoned the challenge to anti-nuclear policy, further demonstrating the resilience of the policy in the wake of Rarotonga.²¹¹ A study of electoral attitudes after the election conducted by Vowles revealed that, ‘defence and economic policy opinion were at least of equal importance’ in the election, and that, ‘defence policy opinion was the more important’ in expressing “post-materialist” values through ‘anti-nuclear politics’²¹². A US cable supports this:

While at first glance the potential changes seemed significant, in reality it was always unlikely National could meet the current policy’s pre-condition of public support for a vote. It was even less likely the result would be a majority vote in favour of removing what many see as an iconic piece of legislation.²¹³

²⁰⁸ Joannah Luetjens, Michael Mintrom, and Paul Hart, “Nuclear-Free New Zealand: Contingency, Contestation and Consensus in Public Policymaking,” in *Successful Public Policy: Lessons from Australia and New Zealand* (Australian National University Press, 2019), 379–99.

²⁰⁹ Luetjens, Mintrom, and Hart.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Luetjens, Mintrom, and Hart.

²¹² Vowles, “Nuclear Free New Zealand and Rogernomics: The Survival of a Labour Government,” 81.

²¹³ Luetjens, Mintrom, and Hart, “Nuclear-Free New Zealand: Contingency, Contestation and Consensus in Public Policymaking,” 391.

In the decades straddling the 21st Century, New Zealand again criticised nuclear order from within. As Burford argues, New Zealand's post-Rarotonga nuclear position was influenced by non-governmental actors which played a significant role on the global nuclear stage. A key example of this was the World Court Project, the main impetus behind requesting the ICJ to pronounce on the legality of using nuclear weapons, a now-famous advisory opinion released in 1996.²¹⁴ Formed by retired New Zealand District Court judge, Harold Evans, the WCP harnessed international NGOs concerned with nuclear disarmament to forward a UNGA resolution calling for an ICJ advisory opinion. The resolution passed in 1994. The resulting ICJ opinion did not unambiguously outlaw nuclear use, but New Zealand celebrated findings on the obligation to disarm which read, 'There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring a conclusion to negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control'²¹⁵.

At the 2000 NPT RevCon, New Zealand's Disarmament Ambassador, Clive Pearson, chaired the body drafting disarmament language for the New Agenda Coalition (NAC). This language eventually found its way into the '13 steps' for disarmament which became the signature commitment of the conference.²¹⁶ The 13 steps along with the ICJ ruling became the basis for the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, a forerunner to the TPNW of 2017. The Model NWC was co-authored by New Zealand campaigner Alyn Ware.²¹⁷ A draft treaty was first presented to the UNGA in 1997 and revised substantially in 2007. In addition, New Zealand participated in the Middle Powers

²¹⁴ Dewes and Green, "The World Court Project: History and Consequences."

²¹⁵ International Court of Justice, 'Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons'.

²¹⁶ Luetjens, Mintrom, and Hart, "Nuclear-Free New Zealand: Contingency, Contestation and Consensus in Public Policymaking."

²¹⁷ Luetjens, Mintrom, and Hart.

Initiative, an NGO which supported the NAC.²¹⁸ In 2000, New Zealand passed a parliamentary resolution calling on UN Member States to, ‘fulfil their obligation to conclude negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament’²¹⁹. In this context, New Zealand like South Africa and Mexico, has challenged the inequalities of nuclear order since the birth of the SPNWFZ. However, its decision to reject closer US ties and maintain an independent anti-nuclear policy demonstrate a tendency to rebellion. Nevertheless, this rebellion remains within the strict limits of multilateral institutions. As such, New Zealand falls into the category of soft rebellion i.e. strong participation within the nuclear order along with strong criticism of order from within.

Island States: ‘The Word Autonomy’

For pacific island states, two key events reflect their attitudes toward nuclear order after Rarotonga: French nuclear tests in 1995 and the TPNW. When Paris announced plans for new pacific tests in June 1995, it unleashed a ‘Typhoon of Anger’²²⁰. The NFIP coordinated the largest and most violent protests seen in French Polynesia, in Pape’ete, and a referendum on whether to accept the French Constitution in both New Caledonia and French Polynesia brought nationalist leaders to the fore. The SPF called an urgent meeting and established an anti-testing committee to engage Paris and agitate at the UN.²²¹ Catholic bishops from twenty-three pacific states issued a strong condemnation of the announcement, decrying it as, ‘an act of theft from the poor of

²¹⁸ Potter and Mukhatzhanova, *Nuclear Politics and the Non-Aligned Movement: Principles vs Pragmatism*.

²¹⁹ New Zealand House of Representatives, ‘Motion on Nuclear Disarmament’ (February 23, 2000), http://www.gsinitute.org/pnnd/docs/parliamentary_motion_on_nuclear_disarmament.html (accessed October 26, 2017).

²²⁰ Egeland, “The Road to Prohibition: Nuclear Hierarchy and Disarmament, 1968 – 2017.”

²²¹ Keith Suter, “Testing the South Pacific’s Nuclear Patience,” *Peace Review* 7, no. 3–4 (1995): 419–23, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659508425910>.

the world and from generations of people yet to come'²²². Addressing the UN's First Committee, Marshall Islands Representative Epsen Ronneberg argued that, 'as if our own four decades of painful experience with the dreadful business of nuclear testing is not enough, there appeared once again this year in our beautiful Pacific the trauma of yet a further series of nuclear testing, intended to continue until May next year'²²³, and continued, 'it is simply incomprehensible to us that this great nation of culture, science and fine arts could visit this abomination upon us in the Pacific'²²⁴.

Pacific states rallied around New Zealand when it reopened an ICJ complaint over French tests in 1995. This case became a key stage for island states to articulate their views on nuclear order after Rarotonga. In a series of letters to the court, the Solomon Islands, Narau and Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea outlined their rejection of nuclear testing and implored the court to interdict France. Max Rai, Papua New Guinea's Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, insisted for instance that, 'the court should in the interest of maintaining international peace and security firmly reach a favourable decision, decisively rejecting the use of nuclear weapons in any conflict situation'²²⁵. Similarly, the Solomon Islands outlined a detailed position on nuclear weapons, seeking to establish their illegality under several laws and conventions.²²⁶ While these states strongly condemned France, and by extension all NWSs, for failing

²²² Thakur, "The Last Bang before a Total Ban: French Nuclear Testing in the Pacific"; See, also Ramesh Thakur, *In Defence of New Zealand: Foreign Policy Choices in the Nuclear Age* (Routledge, 2019).

²²³ "Press Release GA/DIS/3025: France's Nuclear Testing 'Must Stop Now', Marshal Islands Tells First Committee," United Nations, 1995, <https://www.un.org/press/en/1995/19951018.gadis30.25.html>.

²²⁴ "Press Release GA/DIS/3025: France's Nuclear Testing 'Must Stop Now', Marshal Islands Tells First Committee."

²²⁵ "Letter from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Papua New Guinea to the United Nations" (Permanent Mission of Papua New Guinea to the United Nations, 1994).

²²⁶ "Written Statement of the Government of the Solomon Islands" (Government of the Solomon Islands, n.d.).

to disarm, their criticism was framed within an acceptance of the legitimacy of the ICJ. This is a strategy typical of obedient rebellion, which seeks at once to challenge prevailing order through its institutional and normative organs.

Pacific island states have extended this strategy to the more recent TPNW. At the Nayarit conference in 2014, Kiribati delivered a statement supported by Samoa, Tuvalu, Marshall Islands, Tonga and Papua New Guinea stating, ‘we understand all too well the devastating impact of nuclear weapons... which contaminated the environment and exposed our people to high levels of radiation... Nuclear-free nations should not sit back and wait for nuclear-armed nations to lead the way. We must set the agenda’²²⁷. In 2017, Fiji, Nauru, Palau, Samoa and Tuvalu submitted a joint Working Paper to the treaty negotiations, titled *Prohibiting the Financing of Nuclear Weapons Production*²²⁸. It argued that parties to the NPT were ‘legally bound’ to pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations, and asserted that, ‘every nation, whether nuclear-free or nuclear-armed, small or large, has a direct interest in realizing a world without these indiscriminate, inhumane weapons’²²⁹. It argued that the SPNWFZ was ‘a useful starting point’ for, ‘new legally binding instrument that would transform these regional norms into global norms’²³⁰. It also supported positive obligations in the treaty to, ‘provide assistance to victims towards the fulfilment of their rights’, and Fiji forwarded a specific reparations clause which would, ‘provide assistance to victims and environmental redress for Pacific islanders who have lost much as a result of nuclear

²²⁷ “Prohibiting the Financing of Nuclear Weapons Production,” *Item 9, A/CONF.229/2017/L.3/Rev.1 Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons* (United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, 2017).

²²⁸ United Nations.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ “Prohibiting the Financing of Nuclear Weapons Production.”

testing’²³¹. Fiji also delivered a statement to the 71st Session of the First Committee on Disarmament at the UNGA, linking NWFZs to the cause of a nuclear ban:

Fiji supports strengthening nuclear-weapon-free zones and encourages states to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in their respective regions. This is an important first step in our collective endeavour towards a complete nuclear disarmament and evinces an effective measure and an important first step towards a nuclear-free world.²³²

Papua New Guinea, which submitted a separate Working paper to the TPNW negotiations, also supported such positive obligations.²³³ Titled *Possible elements of a United Nations Nuclear-Weapon-Ban Treaty*, Papua New Guinea made several claims which exposed its view on nuclear order and the SPNWFZ. For instance, Papua New Guinea advised applying the definition for ‘nuclear device’ from the SPNWFZ treaty to the TPNW.²³⁴ It also demonstrated a deep aversion for NWs through several preambular declarations, rejecting any role for nuclear weapons in military doctrines, condemning their ‘indiscriminate nature’, and denouncing their, ‘inherent immorality and potential to annihilate humanity and the planet as a whole’²³⁵. The statement stressed further that, ‘the role of public conscience’ was key to, ‘furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the global call for the total elimination of nuclear weapons’²³⁶.

Island states constantly linked their stance on the nuclear ban treaty to their experience of nuclear testing: ‘This lived experience of the horrors of nuclear weapons

²³¹ “Fiji Statement at the United Nations Conferenc to Negotiate a Legally-Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, Leading Towards Their Total Eliminiation” (Government of Fiji, 2017).

²³² “Fiji Statement at the United Nations Conferenc to Negotiate a Legally-Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, Leading Towards Their Total Eliminiation.”

²³³ Bolton, “The ‘-Pacific’ Part of ‘Asia-Pacific’: Oceanic Diplomacy in the 2017 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.”

²³⁴ “Possible Elements of a United Nations Nuclear-Weapon-Ban Treaty” (United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, 2017).

²³⁵ “Possible Elements of a United Nations Nuclear-Weapon-Ban Treaty.”

²³⁶ “Possible Elements of a United Nations Nuclear-Weapon-Ban Treaty.”

informs our policies on nuclear disarmament and impels us to contribute substantively to the United Nations negotiations on a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons'²³⁷. Despite strong language condemning nuclear weapons, then, and harsh denunciation of the NWSs who continue to harbour them, Papua New Guinea continues to invest great energy in forcing multilateral institutions to reform and adapt. In this sense, its actions accord with the tensions characteristic of obedient rebellion.

Fiji continued to advocate a critical view of nuclear order in the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament in 2017, castigating the 'deafening silence' of NWSs and lauding the 'small island developing states' which had pursued the treaty.²³⁸ Several Pacific states have also been central to various UNGA resolutions on the creation of a NWFZ covering the entire Southern Hemisphere.²³⁹ Support for the TPNW again accords with a strategy of obedient rebellion by simultaneously registering frustration and compliance with the institutions of nuclear order. Other actions further entrench this pattern. On the 24th of April 2014, the Marshall Islands took Britain to the ICJ over failing to uphold the NPT.²⁴⁰ Though the case was narrowly lost, it resulted in Britain's withdrawal from the ICJ's jurisdiction over nuclear issues.²⁴¹ During the

²³⁷ Thakur, "The Nuclear Ban Treaty: Recasting a Normative Framework for Disarmament"; "Fiji Statement at the United Nations Conferenc to Negotiate a Legally-Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, Leading Towards Their Total Elimination."

²³⁸ "Fiji Statement at the United Nations Conferenc to Negotiate a Legally-Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, Leading Towards Their Total Elimination."

²³⁹ Douglas B Shaw, "The Contribution of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones to the Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Regime," 2011.

²⁴⁰ Maitê de Souza Schmitz, "Decision of the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Arms Race Case," *Harvard International Law Journal*, 2016, <http://www.harvardilj.org/2016/11/decision-of-the-international-court-of-justice-in-the-nuclear-arms-race-case/>.

²⁴¹ For more on this case, see: Sahar Asadi Moghadam and Abu Mohammad Asgar Khani, "Investigating the Petition of Marshall Islands against Britain in the International Court of Justice," *Journal of Politics and Law* 10, no. 4 (2017): 15, <https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v10n4p15>; Andrea

proceedings Tony de Brum, a former Marshall Islands foreign minister, told the court, ‘several islands in my country were vaporised and others are estimated to remain uninhabitable for thousands of years... the entire sky turned blood-red’²⁴².

Pacific states further demonstrated obedient rebellion in calls for reparations for past nuclear tests. For example, on the 30th of January 2015, Fijian Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama—whose father led a naval contingent to Christmas Island—announced that his government had lost hope in any compensation from the NWSs, and would compensate the Fijian victims of nuclear testing itself:

You may ask: why is Fiji taking responsibility for something that is the fault of Britain? My answer is this: Too much time has passed. The ranks of these survivors are rapidly thinning. Too many men—our fellow Fijians—have gone to their graves without justice. Those who remain deserve justice and Fiji as a nation is determined for them to finally get it... Not only the British but other colonial powers such as the United States and France, used the Pacific to test weapons of mass destruction that some of them would never have tested in their own backyards.²⁴³

Fiji is not the only state to leverage a narrative of reparations to reinforce nuclear antipathy in the post-Rarotonga era. Tahiti has pursued reparations vigorously, adopting an international legal strategy to shame France for its nuclear excesses. This effort is led by senior politician, nuclear activist, and former president of Tahiti Oscar Temaru. Temaru, a veteran anti-nuclear campaigner, took this fight to the global stage upon election as Prime Minister in 2011. In October 2018, Tahiti lodged a formal

Bianchi, “Choice and (the Awareness of) Its Consequences: The ICJ’s ‘Structural Bias’ Strikes Again in the Marshall Islands Case,” *AJIL Unbound* 111, no. 1988 (2017): 81–87, <https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2017.26>; Antony T. Anghie, “Politic, Cautious, and Meticulous: An Introduction to the Symposium on the Marshall Islands Case,” *AJIL Unbound* 111, no. 2016 (2017): 62–67, <https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2017.27>.

²⁴² Agence France-Presse in The Hague, “Marshall Islands Nuclear Arms Lawsuit Thrown out by UN’s Top Court,” *The Guardian*, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/06/marshall-islands-nuclear-arms-lawsuit-thrown-out-by-uns-top-court>.

²⁴³ Quoted in, Ruff, “The Humanitarian Impact and Implications of Nuclear Test Explosions in the Pacific Region”, 788.

complaint with the International Criminal Court for ‘crimes against humanity’²⁴⁴. Temaru explained the justification for this bid to the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation in 2016: ‘We owe it to all the people who died from the consequences of nuclear colonialism... We see French nuclear tests as no less than the direct result of colonization’²⁴⁵. In a later interview, Temaru expanded on the bid: ‘We are going further to sue France in front of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity... We will also go to Geneva to request a censure from the Human Rights Committee... The only real compensation we’re looking for is independence’²⁴⁶. Temaru strongly condemned France in a further interview with *Contemporary Pacific*, suggesting that Paris did not, ‘understand the word “autonomy” or they have another understanding’²⁴⁷. ‘We are looking for support from the people—from the people’, Temaru argued, ‘Because we have been treated like animals, you know, in our small islands. Our people are dying of cancers, all kinds of cancers, related to nuclear testing. We are paying for the stupidity of human beings’²⁴⁸. In an official statement after lodging the complaint with the ICC, Tahiti stated, ‘This case aims to hold all the living French presidents accountable for the nuclear tests against our country’²⁴⁹. Pacific island states have thus illustrated the tensions that consolidates NWFZs. On one hand, they are antagonistic to nuclear order and its inequalities. The have acted

²⁴⁴ “France Faces Hague Complaint over Polynesia Nuclear Tests,” *France24*, October , <https://www.france24.com/en/20181010-france-faces-hague-complaint-french-polynesia-nuclear-tests-international-criminal-court>.

²⁴⁵ “France Faces Hague Complaint over Polynesia Nuclear Tests.”

²⁴⁶ Oscar Temaru, “Trouble in Paradise: Oscar Temaru on Nuclear Testing and Independence Aspirations,” *Journal of International Affairs*, 2018, <https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/trouble-paradise-oscar-temaru>.

²⁴⁷ Terence Wesley-Smith, Gerard Finin, and Tarcisius Kabutaulaka, “An Interview with Oscar Temaru,” *The Contemporary Pacific* 25, no. 2 (2013): 300–307, <https://doi.org/10.1353/cp.2013.0042>.

²⁴⁸ Wesley-Smith, Finin, and Kabutaulaka.

²⁴⁹ “France Faces Hague Complaint over Polynesia Nuclear Tests.”

against the NWSs and spoken out consistently against their failure to disarm and damaging nuclear tests. On the other hand, because of their geographical isolation and dependence on regional hegemons and global partners, pacific island states have not challenged the fundamental legitimacy of the institutions that preserve order's inequality. In criticising order, they have appealed to the very bodies—the UNGA and the ICJ—that underpin it. This ambiguity is symbolised in the SPNWFZ, which at once affirms nuclear order, and at once protests it. In this sense, the multiple contradictory meanings of the SPNWFZ have played a stabilising role in the regions since Rarotonga's inception, making the zone attractive to conflicting elites with contending agendas.

NWSs: 'Operational Flexibility'

The treaty of Rarotonga opened for signature in 1995, triggering a new phase in the life of nuclear order in the South Pacific. In response to the treaty's birth, the NWSs have continued on a trajectory of obedient rebellion. On the one hand, they have supported the treaty in action and through rhetoric; on the other, they have failed to honour their global promises of disarmament to the nations of the South Pacific.

The US's position of ambiguity over Rarotonga was best summarised in Congressional deliberations over whether to sign the treaty between Eni Faleomavaega (a major legislator in support of the zone) and various US officials. These exchanges culminated in a Congressional resolution which ultimately approved the signing of the Treaty of Rarotonga. Faleomavaega made three successful arguments for the treaty in a series of letters to US president Bill Clinton, and other top US security officials,²⁵⁰ claiming that: signing Rarotonga would entrench the norm on non-proliferation, improve

²⁵⁰ "House Congressional Record H329: Commemorating the Accession of the United States of America to the Protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty."

prospects towards the indefinite extension of the NPT, and secure US interests in the South Pacific. Each of these arguments is linked to the case that I make for the persistence of NWFZs in this thesis.²⁵¹

First, Faleomavaega claimed that the US's image as a supporter of non-proliferation was at stake. In a letter to President Clinton on the 20th September 1995, he argued, 'While the U.S. has yet to act on the SPNFZ Protocols, ironically, both China and Russia are signatories' and suggested a potential inconsistency in the US's commitment to nonproliferation, because the US was 'a signatory to the Protocols of the Latin America Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, substantively the same as SPNFZ, which your administration has lauded as a critical building block for peace and stability in our back yard, the Western Hemisphere'²⁵². In a similar letter to Ambassador Ralph Earle, Head of the US Delegation to the NPT Review Conference in 1995, Faleomavaega claimed that 'The protocols to the Rarotonga Treaty are substantially identical to our commitments under the Latin America Treaty'²⁵³. In this sense, one argument made by obedient strategic elites concerned the image of the US as a promoter of non-proliferation, and the conformity of Rarotonga with this image, as exemplified in the ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

While the US establishment eventually adopted this view, there were residual concerns in 1995 about the US's ability to project power. As such, US strategic elites required reassurances that Rarotonga would improve US security. At a hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 18 May in 1992, Secretary for Defense Warren M.

²⁵¹ "House Congressional Record H329: Commemorating the Accession of the United States of America to the Protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty."

²⁵² Eni Faleomavaega, "Letter to Ambassador Ralph Earle" (United States House of Representatives, 1995).

²⁵³ "House Congressional Record H329: Commemorating the Accession of the United States of America to the Protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty."

Christopher said that signing the treaty may ‘impact in the US’s operational flexibility and freedom in the South Pacific’²⁵⁴. In a letter replying to Christopher, Faleomavaega countered that the clauses concerning transit were ‘not inconsistent with US national interests or present security practices’ because the treaty respected ‘rights under international law to freedom of the seas and leaves it up to individual signatories to decide whether to allow foreign ships and aircraft to visit or transit their territory’²⁵⁵. In the Clinton administration, Rarotonga thus became linked with boarder commitments to nonproliferation and the maintenance of the NPT as a whole. Extending the NPT in 1995 became a key security priority and US planners eventually accepted that signing Rarotonga would secure support of indefinite NPT extension in Pacific states.²⁵⁶ As Faleomavaega argued, ‘At a time when it is crucial that the US utilize all resources to forge a majority for indefinite extension of the NPT, joining the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty would materially enhance U.S. credibility’²⁵⁷. Clinton concurred, responding after the successful extension of the NPT that the opportunity was ripe for supporting the SPNWFZ treaty.²⁵⁸

The Congressional motion to sign Rarotonga eventually passed, as the House stated ‘the Treaty of Rarotonga is consistent with United States security commitments in the South Pacific since it does not prohibit port calls by naval vessels which are nuclear powered or may be carrying nuclear weapons and does not create other impediments to United States military operations in support of the Security Treaty between

²⁵⁴ Eni Faleomavaega, “Letter to Warren M. Christopher” (United States House of Representatives, 1993).

²⁵⁵ “House Congressional Record H329: Commemorating the Accession of the United States of America to the Protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty.”

²⁵⁶ Graham, *The Alternate Route: Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones*.

²⁵⁷ Horsburgh, “China’s Engagement with Global Nuclear Order since 1949.”

²⁵⁸ Bill Clinton, “Letter to Eni Faleomavaega” (The White House, 1996).

Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS Treaty)’²⁵⁹. At the same time, the obedience was always tempered by a desire for the nuclear transport and nuclear power projection in the region. In a statement announcing their decision to sign Rarotonga, the US, UK and France said ‘Our decision to sign the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga demonstrates our clear support for a nuclear weapon free zone in the South Pacific’²⁶⁰.

Yet while the US ultimately agreed to sign the treaty, concerns over its limitations on transit prevented full compliance and ratification. This position of ambiguity was only tested again in the Obama Administration. In 2009, when President Obama petitioned the Senate to ratify Rarotonga, he claimed it would be ‘an important further milestone in demonstrating our commitment to nuclear non- proliferation’²⁶¹. He stressed further that:

Ratification of Protocols 1, 2, and 3 to the Treaty would fully support US nonproliferation policy and goals, and I am convinced that it is in the best interest of the United States to ratify these Protocols... This step will strengthen our relations with our South Pacific friends and allies and enhance US security by furthering our global nonproliferation and arms control objectives.²⁶²

However, as in the case of Pelindaba, the Senate rejected the ratification and left the US in a position of tentative support of the treaty, without offering the full guarantee of ratification. With the end of the Cold War, Britain’s attitude to nuclear order

²⁵⁹ Eni Faleomavaega, “Letter to President Bill Clinton” (United States House of Representatives, 1995).

²⁶⁰ The White House. “Joint Statement by the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America on the Signing of the Protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.” 1996.

²⁶¹ Alfred Nurja, “Obama Submits NWFZ Protocols to Senate,” 2011,

<https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011-06/obama-submits-nwfz-protocols-senate>.

²⁶² Nurja.

also shifted significantly, resulting in the ratification of two NWFZ treaties, the CTBT and support for indefinite extension of the Treaty of Rarotonga. On one hand, there has always been strong support for universal disarmament among British strategic elites, particularly from the Labour party. For instance, a few months after Rarotonga opened for signature, former Labour Minister Lord Kennet asked then Leader of the House of Lords, Baroness Young, whether it was ‘Her Majesty’s Government’s intention to sign in the appropriate manner the Treaty of Rarotonga and whether any of the other nuclear weapon states have as yet done so’²⁶³. Young replied that it was ‘an issue which is currently under consideration... The Soviet Union signed Protocols II and III on 15th December 1986’²⁶⁴. However, just as there was a strand of obedient thought pushing for British support of the treaty, there was also a rebellious strand of thought in opposition to Rarotonga. The same year, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs typified this position, stating:

We have also given careful consideration to the protocols to the south Pacific nuclear-free zone treaty (the treaty of Rarotonga). We have taken full account of our security interests in the region and more widely, the views of our allies and the regional states themselves, the texts of the treaty and protocols and the announced policy of the Soviet Union. Against this background we have concluded that it would not serve our national interest to become party to the protocols to the treaty. We intend to keep our attitude to the treaty and the protocols under review.²⁶⁵

In 1995, the debate returned to the floor of the House of Commons as Labour MP Tony Lloyd asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, David Davis, whether he had plans to sign the treaty. Just one year before Britain signed

²⁶³ “Treaty of Rarotonga (Hansard, 27 January 1987)” (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 1987), https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-answers/1987/jan/27/treaty-of-rarotonga/#S5LV0483P0_19870127_LWA_14.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ “South Pacific (Hansard, 20 March 1987)” (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 1987), <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-answers/1987/mar/20/south-pacific>.

Rarotonga, Davis replied that ‘we have no current plans to become a party to any of the protocols to the treaty of Rarotonga’²⁶⁶. Yet in 1996, when Labour MP Paul Flynn asked Davis the same question, Davis replied, ‘We announced in October last year that we would sign the relevant protocols to the treaty of Rarotonga in the first half of 1996. A firm date has yet to be fixed. But preparations are in hand and we expect to sign in the near future’²⁶⁷. Whereas Britain has tested the limits of other NWFZ treaties to which it is party, it has remained obedient to Rarotonga, neither testing nuclear weapons in the territory, nor placing nuclear weapons on any of its surrounding islands. After the birth of Rarotonga, France entered a major debate over its nuclear policies. This debate was divided into two camps, one obedient and the other rebellious. On the obedient front, a group around President Jacques Chirac and the Rally for The Republic party maintained that France should retain significant nuclear forces and an ability to strike potential adversaries, particularly in the ‘South’.²⁶⁸ By contrast, a set of obedient strategic elites, centered around François Mitterrand, wished to bring France squarely into the global nuclear order by agreeing to the CTBT, ratifying the NPT, and supporting NWFZs. This position was justified by the change in the post-Cold War threat landscape: whereas France’s nuclear deterrent was justified because of the threat from Moscow in the decades prior, Mitterrand and his allies argued that threats to France had fundamentally diminished.²⁶⁹

Because of this, France wavered between obedience and rebellion in the immediate post-Cold War period. For example, in April 1992 Prime Minister Pierre Bérégovoy

²⁶⁶ “House of Commons (Hansard, 3 July 1995)” (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 1995), <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199495/cmhansrd/1995-07-03/Writtens-1.html>.

²⁶⁷ “House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 12 Feb 1996” (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 1996),

<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199596/cmhansrd/vo960212/text/60212w03.htm>.

²⁶⁸ David Yost, “Nuclear Debates in France,” *Survival* 36, no. 4 (1994): 113–39.

²⁶⁹ Yost, 117.

announced President Mitterrand's decision to suspend nuclear tests until the end of that year.²⁷⁰ However, Chinese tests in 1993, reopened the question of French tests. At the same time, the norm of non-use strengthened under Mitterrand: despite chemical attacks in Iraq, he suggested that nuclear use would be a 'retreat to barbarism'²⁷¹. Likewise, Foreign Minister Roland Dumas claimed that 'nuclear weapons cannot be battlefield weapons, and cannot be used except as the ultimate recourse when the national territory is threatened'²⁷² and in 1993 Bérégovoy said that France would 'retain our doctrine of non-use'.²⁷³

However, France's policy ambiguity was most clearly obvious over pacific tests between 1993 and 1996. In this period, France went from promising to cease nuclear testing, ratifying the NPT, and reducing the nuclear share of France's defense budget from 40% to 20%, to resuming nuclear testing in the Pacific in 1995 against near-universal global outcry.²⁷⁴ It then swung back to an obedient position by signing and ratifying Rarotonga in 1996. The to-ing and fro-ing between obedience and rebellion was the result of an ambiguous and ambivalent stance to nuclear order most harshly exposed in French policy in the Pacific.

CONCLUSION

In this conclusion, I analyse South Pacific states and NWSs on the obedience/rebellion spectrum. As discussed, different actors express obedient rebellion differently. I plot

²⁷⁰ Jonathan Marcus and Bruce George, "The Ambiguous Consensus: French Defence Policy under Mitterrand," *The World Today* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, n.d.), accessed October 20, 2019.

²⁷¹ Yost, "Nuclear Debates in France."

²⁷² David S. Yost, "France's Nuclear Dilemmas," *Foreign Affairs* 75 (1996).

²⁷³ Yost.

²⁷⁴ Yost, "Nuclear Debates in France."

these attitudes on a spectrum of obedient rebellion, in both the ‘existence’ and ‘persistence’ phases of the SPNWFZ.

Figure 26: The South Pacific Obedience/Rebellion Spectrum, ‘Existence’




Figure 27 depicts three South Pacific states to represent a cross-section of attitudes to nuclear order. Fiji, which most closely fits the definition of obedient rebellion, is representative of several island states in the region, during the earliest phase of the SPNWFZ. On one hand, it recognised the legitimacy of multilateral nuclear institutions and sought to affirm its identity within them. On the other, it protested French, US, and UK nuclear tests, which it saw as contravening nuclear order.


Australia and New Zealand represented a different, minority tendency within the obedience/rebellion spectrum, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. Australia is important in this regard, because it differs from so many of the states we have hitherto considered in Latin America and Africa. On one hand, Australia tacitly benefitted from

the nuclear protection afforded through the ANZUS alliance. In this way, it is seen by island states as entrenching nuclear hierarchy, and rebelling against their spirit of nuclear rejectionism. Unlike New Zealand, it opted to allow us nuclear docking during the ANZUS crisis. This made it an advocate of nuclear order in the eyes of the US, and a source of disorder in the eyes of island states. On the other hand, Australia avoided nuclear acquisition, and was a global voice for disarmament and the emerging multilateral institutional framework.

New Zealand lands on a similar place in the obedience/rebellion spectrum for another reason. Like Australia, it became an important voice for nuclear disarmament on the global stage. But, unlike Australia, it matched this rhetoric on the regional stage, taking the costly decision of differing with the US on the question of nuclear transit and docking. In this sense, island states viewed New Zealand as a proponent of regional order, while the US and Australia saw this as destabilising the prevailing order. In this sense, New Zealand was more consistent than Australia in its regional actions, but this provoked opposing perceptions among island states and NWSs.

Once the SPNWFZ opened for signature, the persistence phase began. Here, states continued to constellate around the central pane of the obedience/rebellion spectrum. Notably, New Zealand moved to a position of greater obedience, while Australia and various island states remained in similar positions. New Zealand continued to espouse a distinctly anti-nuclear position after the birth of Rarotonga, and became among the first states to sign and ratify the treaty. It maintained its anti-nuclear stance to the cost of closer cooperation with the US. It also pursued international legal recourse against French nuclear testing. Further, and unlike Australia, it supported the TPNW, siding with many island states in this regard. In this sense, New Zealand is among the most obedient states I have analysed in this thesis, and aligns with the trajectory of other important obedient-leaning states in the persistence phase, like Mexico and South

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existing theories. The security community literature may suggest that the SPNWFZ emerged through shared norms. However, this explanation ascribes undue coherence to actors' motivations. Further, it elides the contestation over norms that has characterised nuclear politics in the South Pacific since nuclear testing began in the 1960s. Instead of a set of stable, developing norms for peace and stability, the zone was, in fact, the unintentional consequence of an ambivalence between competing norms. It was further the result of the divergent views between island states on one hand, and states loyal to an Anglo-American alliance on the other. Conversely, then, I argue that the Pacific demonstrates that incompatible desires on one level can birth regional stability at another.

A crude postcolonial perspective is inaccurate for different reasons. Here, postcolonial theorists may claim that the SPNWFZ was borne of anti-colonial resistance, particularly from island states. However, this view would ascribe undue agency and coherence to island states, who necessarily acted within very narrow boundaries. The power differential between the NWSs and the island states cannot be ignored in the Pacific context, as in the other cases I have discussed. Although these anti-imperial sentiments were present in the South Pacific during the period, they were tempered by attempts at appeasing the NWSs, the desire for global citizenship, and the attraction of multilateral institutions.

Perhaps the key outstanding question concerns the realist explanation. Realist scholars may claim that Australia eventually drove the SPNWFZ. I disagree. First, island states exerted enough pressure on Australia to make it consider the SPNWFZ proposal. Second, internal elites within Australia were also prepared to challenge American pressure. Even harder for the realist to explain is New Zealand's attitude. Realist thinkers may assume that the US was capable of pressurising New Zealand into submitting over the question of nuclear transit and docking. Yet, despite great security

costs, and at the risk of the ANZUS alliance, New Zealand adopted an independent nuclear policy. Realist assumptions also underestimate the agency of island states in setting the disarmament agenda and establishing the tradition of anti-nuclear anti-imperialism.

The SPNWFZ has cemented its importance to pacific security since 1985. In over thirty years, French nuclear tests in 1995 constitute the only violation of the treaty—a violation swiftly condemned and reversed. The durability of Rarotonga will, however, be tested by the US’s ‘pivot to Asia Pacific’²⁷⁵ and China’s increasing interest in the region in the decades ahead.²⁷⁶ The Pacific’s growing strategic importance, therefore, will challenge the delicate balance that has entrenched Rarotonga for over three decades.

In this chapter, I have analysed the SPNWFZ, the last of the three cases analysed in this thesis. I described the origins of the Rarotonga Treaty, outlined its main provisions, and compared it to other NWFZ treaties. I then analysed the case against the conceptual model and determined that the model plausibly explained the South Pacific case. The previous three cases, therefore, support the hypothesis that ENIs trigger NWFZs. In Latin America this event was the Cuban missile crisis, in Africa it was French nuclear testing in the Sahara, and, in the Pacific, it was the widespread nuclear testing of the 1950s, 60s, and 70s.

In this section of the thesis, I have tested conceptual claims against evidence from three cases. Despite some exceptions, I claim that my model plausibly explains the existence and persistence of NWFZs. In making these arguments, I have also reflected

²⁷⁵ Kurt Campbell and Brian Andrews, “Explaining the US ‘Pivot’ to Asia,” *Chatham House*, 2013, 1–9.

²⁷⁶ Yongjin Zhang, “China and the Emerging Regional Order in the South Pacific,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, no. 3 (September 2007): 367–81, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710701531537>.

on the significance of NWFZs to nuclear order. In the concluding chapter of this thesis, I reflect on the correspondence between the conceptual model and the evidence I have presented, examine the broader contribution of this thesis, outline its limits, and assess opportunities for future scholarship.

CONCLUSION

FINDINGS | CONTRIBUTION | FUTURE RESEARCH | LIMITATIONS | IMPLICATIONS AND REFLECTIONS

The misconception that a victory can be worth its price, has in the nuclear age become a total illusion.¹

—Alva Myrdal

‘You get ideas when you ask yourself simple questions’, says author Neil Gaiman.² This thesis started with a ‘simple question’: why? This question has led down a zigzagging path—past a ‘tangle of self-contradictory rights’³ and a jumble of opposing causes—to a deeper understanding of the existence and persistence of NWFZs. In this conclusion, I reflect on what that path means for scholarship. I begin by assessing whether the evidence in my empirical chapters supports the hypotheses advanced in Chapter One. I then examine the unique contribution this work makes to the discipline. Following this, I outline the shortcomings and limitations of the work. Finally, I consider possibilities for future research, before offering final reflections.

FINDINGS

In this thesis, I posed the following research question: *why do the African, Latin American, and South Pacific NWFZs exist and persist?* I made the following argument in response: NWFZs exist and persist because of an attitude of obedient rebellion to

¹ Carolyn Warner, *The Words of Extraordinary Women* (Newmarket Press, 2010).

² Neil Gaiman, “Where Do You Get Your Ideas?,” 1997, <http://www.neilgaiman.com/CoolStuff/Essays/EssaysByNeil/>.

³ To use Jonathan Hunt’s phrase

nuclear order. This attitude occurs both within and between states inside zones and the NWSs. States express obedient rebellion at the international level, while strategic elites within states express obedient rebellion at the domestic level. ‘Obedient rebellion’ is an attitude of ambivalence to nuclear order which combines legitimacy-acceptance with legitimacy-rejection; and recognition-seeking within nuclear order with recognition-seeking outside it. Obedient rebellion manifests differently in the ‘existence’ and ‘persistence’ phases of NWFZs. During the ‘existence’ phase, NWFZs are triggered by *External Nuclear Interventions* (ENIs). ENIs occur when a foreign NWS uses, tests, or stations nuclear weapons in an external territory without universal regional consent. For example, ENIs occurred when the USSR stationed nuclear weapons in Latin America during the Cuban missile crisis, when France tested nuclear weapons in Africa, or when various nuclear powers tested nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. These responses are eventually mediated through the creation of a NWFZ, which appeals to both obedient and rebellious actors in the wake of an ENI. The creation of the zone itself triggers a new phase of ‘persistence’. In this phase, obedient and rebellious actors continue to accommodate their differing conceptions of nuclear order through the maintenance of NWFZs.

In this section, I will review the success of this argument, and claim that the case I have made is plausible, despite some exceptions. The hypothesis about which I am most confident is that that ENIs—especially nuclear tests—triggered these NWFZs. I found much evidence corroborating this claim. In Africa, French tests were critical to sparking the call for an ANWFZ, and every NWFZ proposal since the tests has referenced their damaging influence. This was true both for African states pursuing an end to tests at the international level and several African strategic elites at the domestic level. The case of Ghana in the 1960s is particularly apt. The same goes for the Cuban missile crisis in Latin America and the many nuclear tests in the South

Pacific. These events reshaped threat perceptions and upended norms. The quantity of evidence supporting this hypothesis was considerable. I am thus confident that the concept of the ‘ENIs’ makes an explanatory contribution to the discipline.

Obedient Rebellion and Legitimacy

I claim that obedient rebellion relies on an ambivalent attitude towards the legitimacy of nuclear order. This legitimacy is based on perceptions of nuclear order’s ability to provide nuclear security to the actors mentioned above. I maintain that this argument is supported by the evidence I have presented here, with some exceptions. For instance, the Treaty of Tlatelolco emerged in a heightened threat environment for all actors concerned. Hence, the link between nuclear order and the creation of the LANWFZ stemmed from its ability to convince actors of the legitimacy of the treaty in the context of nuclear threats in Latin America. Further still, the speed at which threats changed, heralded by the withdrawal of nuclear missiles from the Cuban territory, was immediately followed by the imposition of the LANWFZ. Latin America, therefore, is the case which demonstrates the relationship between the legitimacy of nuclear order, threats, and the emergence of NWFZs most clearly.

In the case of Africa, threats assumed a special dimension because of the existence of a NWS (South Africa) inside the foreseen zone. This additional internal threat diluted the relationship between external threats and the formation of the zone. Even when the external threat subsided, the internal threat from Pretoria meant that the ANWFZ took longer to emerge than either the LANWFZ or the SPNWFZ. The apartheid nuclear programme is a useful natural experiment: when Pretoria abandoned nuclear weapons—thereby changing continental threat perceptions—the ANWFZ emerged. This explains why the gestation period for the ANWFZ was so different to the Latin

American example, where the zone took just five years to materialise after the missile crisis.

In the South Pacific, the relationship between the legitimacy of nuclear order, as seen by strategic elites and states, was unique. This was because the South Pacific neither experienced a threat of nuclear use (as in Latin America), nor contained an internal NWS as in Africa. For this reason, the gap between the proposal of the zone, beginning around the early 1960s, and the eventual birth of the zone (1986), falls midway between the Latin American and African examples. Some ambiguities remain. In terms of individual states, the threat argument is strongest in relation to New Zealand and island states that genuinely felt threatened by the presence of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. But, for Australia, US nuclear presence in the region complicates the picture.

From the perspective of the NWSs, NWFZs balance between regional initiatives which focus on nuclear equality, and a power-centric logic that seeks dominance over the world through nuclear preeminence. Their ability to balance these competing desires is the key source of their legitimacy: on one hand, NWFZs give the NWSs an opportunity to symbolise nuclear responsibility in strategically useful non-threatening arenas, while retaining their nuclear arsenals in violation of the spirit of the NPT. NWFZs are unique by feeding, rather than exposing, the tensions in NWSs' nuclear policy, catering to the impulses of both obedient and rebellious strategic elites. For this reason, NWFZs have remained remarkably stable, often binding otherwise bitterly divided states into far-reaching nuclear agreements.

Despite some ambiguity, then, the evidence surveyed in this thesis thus supports the intuition in previous Large-N scholarship⁴ that threats are salient in the formation of NWFZs, and further that NWFZs occur in already-peaceful contexts. What is new in this thesis is *why* these threats matter and *how* they inform the existence and persistence of NWFZs.

Obedient Rebellion and Recognition

Another claim supported by the evidence is that decolonisation was key to birthing NWFZs. The preceding analysis demonstrates an anti-colonial theme pervading rhetoric on NWFZs in postcolonial states and strategic elites. A key period for this argument, which unites all three cases, is the 1960s. In this period, Third World states—previously under the control of NWSs—confronted ENIs as they welcomed national sovereignty. Although several Latin American states were already independent by this time, the decolonisation which spread across the Third World in the 1960s also influenced independent Latin America. For this reason, the self-conception of several states, and the strategic elites inside them, was bound up with nuclear independence as expressed through NWFZs.

Yet, during this period, newly decolonised states were also negotiating their relationship with the emerging post-war global order. For this reason, they also sought recognition as sovereign states within a pre-existing global architecture. NWFZs served both impulses: one demonstrating anti-colonial, antinuclear independence; the other,

⁴ Atsushi, Tago. "The Origins of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones: Security Communities or Substitutes for a 'Nuclear Umbrella'?" Fuhrman, Matthew, and Li Xiaojun. *Legalizing nuclear abandonment: The determinants of nuclear weapon free zone treaty ratification*. Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, 2008.

demonstrating commitment to an unequal multilateral global order. In this sense, the period of decolonisation is uniquely epitomised through the popularity of NWFZs in Africa, Latin America, and the South Pacific, because they reflect both the desire for decolonisation and the goal of achieving global citizenship, a conflict central to the struggle for recognition in newly independent states across the Third World.

Recognition-seeking through protest rhetoric most convincingly applies to New Zealand, pacific island states, South Africa (after apartheid), Brazil, and Argentina. However, there are some counter-examples. Chief among these is Australia, which may be considered purely ‘obedient’. Let me concede, for the purpose of argument, that Australia showed no sign of rebellion after signing Rarotonga. This is not fatal to my case. It would only show that NWFZs can occur in cases of ‘obedient rebellion’ and in cases of pure ‘obedience’ in a minority of states in a potential zone. Further, Australia is not a powerful enough counter-example to contradict evidence from the other cases I have considered. In the worst case, then, Australia is an outlier. Other ambiguous cases are Mexico and South Africa. These cases are not as clearly obedient as Australia, but still not clear archetypes of obedient rebellion either. South Africa after apartheid and Mexico demonstrate a large inclination toward obedience despite some rebellion among strategic elites. In this sense, they fall into a category of cases where obedience is the dominant impulse but there is still some rebellion in rhetoric. A more elaborate conceptual model could place these cases into different categories along a spectrum of obedient rebellion. The model here is already quite elaborate, so I have decided to keep ‘obedient rebellion’ as a stable category.

Beyond these nuances, I believe that the contending desires of obedience and rebellion succeed in explaining the apparent paradox of NWFZ persistence. For instance, it is otherwise difficult to explain why New Zealand would risk abandoning US nuclear protection, or why many states continue to criticise nuclear order while remaining

members of the NPT. The argument here explains the position of island states and the vast majority of African and Latin American states. In this sense, while not every actor fits the model perfectly, I believe it remains plausible and useful.

Recognition-seeking was also key to the NWSs' obedient rebellion. The US and the USSR, for instance, pursued distinctly ambiguous nuclear policies during the arms race after the birth of the NPT. As Kutchesfahani suggests, between 1968 and 1989, 'the US and the USSR contributed both to nuclear order and to nuclear disorder'⁵. In one sense, they pursued obedience through recognising the legitimacy of various global and bilateral nuclear agreements; in another, they pursued rebellion by increasing their nuclear stockpiles and weapons capabilities. Both of these impulses aided their support for NWFZ treaties.

China, as a Third World NWS⁶, is also a key example of obedient rebellion through recognition-seeking. In the 1970s and 1980s, China persisted with its 'three nots' policy: 'we do not advocate proliferation, we do not engage in nuclear proliferation ourselves, nor do we help other countries develop nuclear weapons'⁷. This third aspect of the three knots policy applied directly to China's support of NWFZs.⁸ As then Premier Li Peng suggested, 'We have no intention at present or in the future to help non-nuclear countries develop nuclear weapons'⁹. In the post-Mao period, China's overall 'opening up' was mirrored in its nuclear strategy, as China gravitated closer to nuclear order while maintaining some features of its earlier rebellion. This was evidenced by China's decision to join the Conference on Disarmament, and its further commitment to NWFZs. China continued with its move toward obedience by proposing a non-first-use

⁵ Kutchesfahani, Sara Z. *Global Nuclear Order*. Routledge, 2018.

⁶ At least at key points in this story.

⁷ Kutchesfahani

⁸ Horsburgh.

⁹ Kutchesfahani, 99.

treaty to which all NWSs would be bound, strengthening its self-conception of responsibility. It also joined the UN and assumed its seat on the UNSC. Yet, simultaneously, it continued to reject the legitimacy of the NPT.

The NWSs confronted a double challenge following the end of the Cold War. The period of stability that followed offered an opportunity to honour their disarmament agreements. By 2000, the patience of several NAM states had expired, provoking a crisis in the nuclear order.¹⁰ This Third World proliferation ultimately resulted in weapons programmes in India, Pakistan, and later North Korea. This proliferation, in turn, provoked uncertainty among the NWSs. On one hand, the fall of the Soviet Union thawed nuclear hostility between Moscow and Washington.¹¹ On the other hand, the new ‘War on Terror’ and its attendant risk of non-state nuclear proliferation assumed new importance in NATO. These factors conspired to disincentivise disarmament.

This led to a decade of stalemate from, 2005 to 2015, in which most nations demanded greater disarmament, and the NWSs continued to drag their feet. Despite moments of hope in the early Obama presidency, this pattern persisted until a new rupture in the situation prompted the TPNW in 2017, the point at which the scope of this thesis ends. In one way, NWSs have demonstrated rebellion against nuclear order by failing to honour their disarmament commitments and updating and expanding their nuclear capabilities. This has bred resentment among states inside the NWFZs I consider. To offset this resentment, NWSs have largely supported NWFZs to symbolize fidelity to disarmament and nonproliferation, even while failing to follow through on other promises. In sum, I claim that I have given a plausible explanation for what triggered

¹⁰ Potter and Mukhathanova.

¹¹ For instance, Yeltsin stopped the positioning of warheads towards NATO members in 1997, signifying a major shift away from the Cold War pattern.

the birth of the African, Latin American and South Pacific NWFZs, and partially explained their existence and persistence, despite some ambiguities.

CONTRIBUTION

Conceptual Contribution

In Chapter One, I located this thesis in the broader debate over ‘Global IR’. The core question in this debate is whether IRT can, or should, transcend its Euro-American biases. Those pursuing Global IR believe it can and should. Comaroff and Comaroff frame the problem aptly:

Western enlightenment thought has, from the first, posited itself as the wellspring of universal learning... concomitantly, it has regarded the non-West—variously known as the Ancient World, the Orient, the Primitive World, the Third World, the Underdeveloped World, the Developing World, and now the Global South—primarily as a place of parochial wisdom, of antiquarian traditions, of exotic ways and means. Above all, of unprocessed data. These other worlds... are treated less as sources of refined knowledge than as reservoirs of raw fact...¹²

In this thesis, I consciously confront this problem identified by the Comaroffs. However, this imposes an explanatory burden, as Acharya observes: ‘scholars from the South should not just confine their research agenda to the traditional signature issues for the South—underdevelopment, development, race, and internal conflicts—but also get engaged with *all* the big issues and debates in IR, including climate change, security, and global governance’¹³. Thus, a ‘key element’ of Global IR is, ‘offering concepts and theories’ that expand the explanatory canvass of the overall discipline.

¹² Comaroff and Comaroff, 14.

¹³ “Interview—Amitav Acharya. ‘e-International Relations’”. Nov. 2016.

In this thesis, I address this challenge in two ways. First, I foreground the global South in explaining nuclear non-proliferation. In doing so, I reject the dominant view in the sub-field that, ‘major states are the major actors’ around which, ‘the structure of international politics is defined’¹⁴. Instead, I claim that understanding nuclear order requires engagement with the global South. Appreciating Southern contributions to nuclear order is not merely useful—it is essential. Through this work, I exemplify the insights available to the wider discipline by foregrounding the global South in theory-building, particularly in the realm of nuclear security.

This does not mean expunging traditional concepts or theories altogether. Not only is this impossible, it is also undesirable. Rather, I seek to role model the mediation between traditional concepts, theories and lenses, and a critical sensibility. In this sense, I present a tangible example of scholarship that theorises nuclear security ‘from below’, where:

The “below” implies a geopolitical space as well as an evaluative threshold: As space, it connotes the global South or the Third World; as threshold, it points to those below a certain civilizational or material level, and specifically those below the vital ability of shaping the world according to their own vision.¹⁵

A further conceptual contribution of this thesis lies in the formulation of its hypotheses. Rather than testing cases against existing theory, I have sought to develop new hypotheses to explain NWFZ existence and persistence. In Chapter One, I situated this thesis within a wider debate over nuclear order. One set of scholars in this debate warned that the contradictions of order undermined its durability; another claimed these contradictions were over-emphasised. In this thesis, I challenge both viewpoints. On one hand, I argue that contradictions very much exist in nuclear order; on the

14 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Theory of International Politics,” *Theory of International Politics*, 1979, 1–251, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13398-014-0173-7.2>.

15 David L. Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah, *International Relations from Below* (Oxford University Press, 2008), <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199219322.003.0038>.

other, I posit that these contradictions are a counterintuitive source of stability. The reason is that nuclear order, like NWFZs, survives through multiple, contradictory appeals to various audiences, which are themselves conflicted between incoherent ambitions.

To expand this argument, I introduced the concept of ‘obedient rebellion’, which captures these contending impulses among nuclear elites. One group, I claim, seeks to obey the rules and institutions of nuclear order, while another seeks to rebel. Both groups use NWFZs to symbolise these ambitions, and NWFZ themselves come to symbolise the ambiguities of nuclear order writ large. This argument extends on the work of critical nuclear scholars who have long-cited ambivalence as a tenet of nuclear order.¹⁶ It extends this work by treating this ambiguity as an explanatory variable, as opposed to a descriptive feature. It also applies this logic of ambivalence to a new body of evidence.

Second, the legitimacy and recognition arguments introduce a new vocabulary to explain ‘overlap’¹⁷ between material and ideational variables. These variables bridge a dispute over the salience of threats or norms in explaining NWFZs, and broader nuclear outcomes. By foregrounding ‘overlap’ through a new conceptual vocabulary, I add to the growing body of literature that disputes a direct tension between threats and norms.¹⁸ Instead, I have added weight to the argument that factorial, rather than

¹⁶ See, Abraham, Itty. *The making of the Indian atomic bomb: Science, secrecy and the postcolonial state*. Zed Books, 1998; Biswas, Shampa. *Nuclear desire: Power and the postcolonial nuclear order*. University of Minnesota Press, 2014. See, also, the discussion on pages 34-46.

¹⁷ To use Adler’s phrase.

¹⁸ For instance, Adler, Emanuel, and Patricia Greve. “When security community meets balance of power: overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance.” *Review of international studies* 35, no. S1 (2009): 59-84. See, also, the discussion on pages 54-59.

single-variable, analysis is key to explaining multiple cases in IRT. I also test these concepts against a new body of evidence in the form of the zones I consider.

Methodological Contribution

A further contribution made in this thesis is methodological. The current literature is characterised by Single-N descriptions on one end, and Large-N correlations, on the other.²⁰ This work mediates these two approaches: on the one hand, it tests theoretical hypotheses; on the other, it regards cases in detail. This matters because Single-N descriptions have limited generalisability, while Large-N correlations elide the detail of case analysis. Applying the comparative method, I have developed hypotheses between these two extremes, thus responding directly to a gap identified in the literature for, ‘hypothesis-testing or comparative analyses’²¹. Further, the selection of these cases and their arrangement distinguishes this work in the emerging sub-field of NWFZ studies. Therefore, this thesis makes a methodological contribution to the discipline as a first comparative, theoretical case study of the African, Latin American and South Pacific NWFZs.

Historical Contribution

The fourth contribution made here is historical. Specifically, this work reintroduces NWFZs as crucial to the birth of the NPT, the development of the Cold War, and the shape of contemporary nuclear institutions. I reinsert NWFZs as central to the story

²⁰ The gap in the literature is pointed out in several major review studies on the field, including: Potter and Mukhatzhanova, *Nuclear Politics and the Non-Aligned Movement: Principles vs Pragmatism*; Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb”; Scott D Sagan, “The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation NPT: Non- Proliferation Treaty,” *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci* 14, no. February (January 22, 2011): 225–44, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052209-131042>; Potter and Mukhatzhanova, “Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay.”

²¹ Potter and Mukhatzhanova, “Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay”, 141.

of nuclear order in both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. In this sense, I reprioritise NWFZs in the larger story of nuclear nonproliferation over the last seventy-five years.

Second, this work builds on research linking decolonisation with denuclearisation. In official histories of nuclear weapons, the story of decolonisation often plays a peripheral role, as the ambitions of colonial powers and NWSs take centre stage.²² On the contrary, I argue here that decolonisation reoriented the trajectory of nuclear order and contributed significantly to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. As former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs between 1998 and 2003, Jayantha Dhanapala, puts it:

I think the key issue that should be born in mind is the fact that the non-aligned, true nuclear-weapon-free zones have long demonstrated they have rejected of nuclear weapons. It did not take the NPT, which was concluded one year after Tlatelolco to force us to realize that it was not in our interest to have nuclear weapons, so our rejection of the nuclear weapons predates the NPT.²³

A final historical contribution of this work exposes and explores the entanglements between these three zones. By comparing these cases for the first time in one work, these multiple entanglements are visible from a new vantage point.

Generalisability

In this section, I will reflect on the extent to which the hypotheses advanced in this thesis apply to further contexts. Although applying my conceptual model to other potential NWFZs is not the goal of this thesis, there are some preliminary remarks to be made on this possibility. If the argument I have presented on ENIs holds, then the

²² See, for instance, Cirincione, Joseph. *Bomb scare: the history and future of nuclear weapons*. Columbia University Press, 2007; Reed, Thomas C., and Danny B. Stillman. *The nuclear express: A political history of the bomb and its proliferation*. Zenith Press, 2010.

²³ Michal Onderco, “Oral History Interview with Jayantha Dhanapala” (Wilson Centre History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 2017).

emergence of new NWFZs is very unlikely. Several cases explicate this point. For instance, in the Middle East, I would only expect to see the birth of a NWFZ in the context of an ENI. Israel's nuclear possession does not fit this definition, because Israel is an internal NWS. However, should an external NWS test nuclear weapons in the region, or should Israel's alliance with the US prompt external nuclear installation or even testing in the region, this would increase the likelihood of a future NWFZ.

Other unlikely candidates for NWFZ's are territories in which there are already NWSs, such as North America, Western Europe, East Asia and South Asia. In these cases, the likelihood of an ENI is even lower than in the Middle Eastern case. For this reason, the hope that NWFZs can secure universal disarmament 'from the bottom'²⁴ is contradicted by the evidence here, since NWFZs only seem to emerge where nuclear threats are externally imposed.²⁵

If a prediction flows from this analysis, then, it is that the NWFZs which currently exist are likely to persist, but that any new NWFZ are unlikely to emerge and persist. Hopes that NWFZs will spread should therefore be tempered. If nuclear order undergoes significant turbulence in the next decade, then another surprising prediction follows: with certain limits, NWFZs in African, Latin American, and the South Pacific become *more* robust as the tensions within nuclear order that provoke obedient rebellion tighten, rather than loosen, the paradoxical stability which maintains NWFZs.

For this reason, as contradictions sharpen within nuclear order in a new multipolar environment, the reasons for staying in NWFZs grows stronger in Africa, Latin

²⁴ See, for instance, Agyeman-Duah, Baffour. "Nuclear Weapons Free Zones and Disarmament." *Africa Today* 32, no. 1/2 (1985): 77-89; Kim, John H. "Another Path to Nuclear Disarmament: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones." *Fellowship* 76, no. 1-3 (2010): 10.

²⁵ With the exception of South Africa in Africa, itself a very special place

America and the South Pacific. There is, of course, a threshold over which such tension will destabilise global order itself. For example, in the event of a nuclear attack, or an unforeseen acceleration in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this case, existing NWFZs will be severely tested. Yet, until this threshold is reached, the analysis presented here suggests that tensions strengthen existing NWFZs while excluding the possibility of further NWFZs. In sum, if the analysis I have presented holds, then I expect a resilient status quo, neither prone to the disintegration of existing zones, nor the proliferation of new ones.

FUTURE RESEARCH

This work opens several avenues for new research. First, further research can enlarge on each part my research question. For instance, future comparative work could focus solely on the birth of NWFZs, or solely on the persistence of NWFZs. This would allow scholars to place these two separate questions under closer focus. Such research could consider the three cases I have explored, or it could include other cases or configurations. This work could test my hypotheses more closely, or it could pursue rival hypotheses. Further enlarging on these two separate questions could also apply other methods, for example Single-N studies zooming on one case, or Large-N studies like Tago's, or Fuhrman and Li's, mentioned in Chapter One.²⁶

²⁶ Tago Atsushi. "The Origins of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones: Security Communities or Substitutes for a 'Nuclear Umbrella'?.", Fuhrmann, Matthew, and Xiaojun Li. "Rethinking Ratification: Legalization and Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaties." *Available at SSRN 1452775* (2009). See, also, the discussion on pages 59–64 above.

Other Cases

Another opportunity for future research is consideration of different cases using the same method. There are ten successful NWFZs and at least four unsuccessful zones. These cases can, in turn, be arranged in several permutations. Further research can compare successful zones against unsuccessful ones, compare different successful zones, or compare only unsuccessful zones, according to multiple arrangements. Such comparisons would lend themselves to various research designs.

Some NWFZs are particularly ripe for further research. First, the Southeast Asian NWFZ is an important postcolonial example, which traces its roots to the 1970s when the countries of ASEAN were devising a Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). This zone could easily be tested against the evidence from my three cases. A second case worthy of consideration is the Central Asian NWFZ. This case would illuminate resistance to Soviet nuclear expansion. This case lends itself to comparison against the Latin America zone, also a key site of Soviet Cold War strategy.

Further, since Central Asia was a site of Soviet nuclear testing, it could provide further confirmation for my hypotheses concerning ENIs. In this regard, the Mongolian NWFZ is also an important future case to consider in comparative perspective. The unique feature of this case is the overlap between zone and state. Whereas the zones I have considered fall within regional boundaries, the Mongolian case tests this regional conception of zones. Mongolia is also interesting as a member of the NPT. The key question, then, is why Mongolia decided to become a NWFZ despite its NPT membership. This case would thus highlight differences between state-level, regional and global regimes. Again, in the Mongolian case, Soviet tests at Semipalatinsk just west of Mongolia's western border present an opportunity to explore the role of nuclear tests in the birth of the Mongolian NWFZ. In this sense, there are several territorial NWFZs that lend themselves to further comparative analysis following this work.

Similarly, non-territorial NWFZs also present an exciting opportunity for comparative research. A particularly interesting future question, then, is why NWFZs exist and persist in both territorial and non-territorial settings. For example, why do the Outer Space and Antarctic NWFZs exist and persist, and do the reasons for their existence and persistence differ from territorial zones? Practically, scholars could compare one territorial NWFZ against a non-territorial zone to discover their similarities and differences. For example, one could compare the Latin American zone with the Outer Space Treaty, since these two treaties emerged in similar periods. One could also compare the Seabed Treaty, the Moon Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and the Antarctic Treaty.

These non-territorial zones are a challenging set of cases for theory-building because they force scholars to think outside the state-centric assumptions of the discipline. These zones also present fascinating challenges to current conceptions of scale, territory, space, and ‘levels of analysis’ in the discipline. Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of the Outer Space Treaty. Astropolitics is defined by a challenge to traditional notions of ‘sovereignty’, particularly the dominant Westphalian view which rigidly links statehood with terrestrial territory: Westphalian states are ‘impenetrable’, ‘impermeable’, and ‘territorial’,²⁷ whereas zones ‘unbundle’ Sovereignty in outer space both practically and legally, according to Stuart.²⁸

Of relevance, therefore, is a question comically put by scientist Neil deGrasse Tyson: ‘Why would we have a “peaceful uses of space treaty”? If it works there, why don’t we have a peaceful uses of earth treaty?’ Although asked in jest, this is a fascinating

²⁷ Leonard Krieger and John H., “Review: The Development of the German Public Mind: A Social History of German Political Sentiments, Aspirations and Ideas. The Middle Ages, The Reformation,” *Social Research* (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1958), <https://doi.org/10.2307/40982565>.

²⁸ Jill Stuart, “Unbundling Sovereignty, Territory and the State in Outer Space: Two Approaches,” January 30, 2009, 16–31, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203882023-6>.

research question which uncovers assumptions about the ‘dialectical interaction between spatial and social processes’²⁹ in IRT. One of the key aspects of the Outer Space treaty, for instance, is the prevention of space colonisation. The treaty, like many NWFZ treaties, explicitly links the militarisation of space with the prospects of space colonisation. Thus, what began as a treaty to subvert the space arms race, became a deeper attempt to prevent the appropriation of space for national purposes. The idea of ‘space colonisation’ also infused the imaginaries of superpowers and postcolonial states alike. Testing links between norms that apply to terrestrial and extra-terrestrial regions is thus an exciting future area of research.

Failed NWFZs are another theoretical opportunity. Further comparative work could focus on the reasons that NWFZ proposals fail. Here, the Middle East is a key example, given its importance to nuclear order. Scholars may probe why the MENWFZ has failed to materialise by comparing it against any number of successful zones. Here, there are several problems that pertain specifically to the Middle East. First, should African states that are already part of one NWFZ also be part of another zone, like Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and Djibouti? Second, should Turkey be a member, given its membership of NATO? Third, how should Pakistan and India be included in additional protocols, given their proximity to the Middle East? Further disagreements arise over the MENWFZ’s link to the NPT: Arab states favour a zone tied to the treaty, while Israel does not. All these nuances are useful tests for the hypotheses advanced here. A comparison against the African zone would be useful because of the

²⁹ Sarah Davis, *Empires’ Edge: Militarization, Resistance, and Transcending Hegemony in the Pacific* (University of Georgia Press, 2015), 54; See, also, Tim. Cresswell, *Place: An Introduction*, accessed July 16, 2018; Edward W. Soja, *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places* (Blackwell, 1996); David Harvey, *Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference* (Blackwell Publishers, 1996).

regions' geographical proximity. The same logic applies to the Central Asian zone to the Middle East's eastern borders.

Another comparative strategy could compare failed NWFZs. The failed North Asian zone is another important example, as it includes North Korea and Japan. A comparison of the failed Middle Eastern and North Asian zones, for instance, is an exciting scholarly prospect. Further examples of failed zones include Western and Eastern Europe. Other cases of interest include regions where NWFZs have not been proposed, but where they could theoretically exist. South Asia, for example, is a particularly important instance. Why did South Asian states break the dominant postcolonial tradition of nuclear forbearance by rebelling directly against nuclear order? Comparing South Asia to Latin America, for instance, where the India-Pakistan tension led to nuclear escalation, while the Brazil-Argentina tension did not is a potentially fruitful line of inquiry. More theoretically daring would be an examination of North America, Western Europe, or Russia itself. What would it take to make these regions NWFZs? Do any similarities exist between these regions and successful NWFZs? These contrasts again present exciting theoretical opportunity. For these reasons, NWFZs present vast opportunity for comparative, theory-building research. The conceptual model could be tested against the universe of nuclear threshold states to ascertain its general applicability. For instance, one could compare South Africa to Ukraine, Kazakhstan and (or) Belarus, who transferred their nuclear assets to the Soviet Union. Similarly, South Africa could be compared against past and present nuclear threshold states. Iran and North Korea are also cases of special current relevance.

Other Methods

NWFZs lend themselves to other methodological approaches. Tago, and Furhman and Li, pioneered the application of survival analysis to NWFZ ratification (as explained fully in Chapter One). This deserves to be revisited in light of the analysis in this thesis. Particularly, scholars could test whether normative variables, as I have framed them, show statistical significance using survival analysis. Multifactorial survival analysis—considering the combined salience of two or more variables—would provide a further test of my legitimacy/recognition hypothesis. In addition, various other quantitative methods could prove fruitful. Of interest would be the application of text mining—structuring large texts into databases and searching for recurrent patterns—to the evidence I have examined here. This could determine themes that emerge from the sources I have compiled and be particularly useful to determine the extent of anti-colonial language used in these three cases.³⁰ Resulting data visualisations would also prove extremely useful. NWFZs are thus a case ripe for the application of textual analytics.

Similarly, the archival and oral historical record also lends itself to discourse analysis. That is, scholars may benefit from critically approaching the statements and speech acts which I have compiled here in the context of various meta-dynamics. This may involve analysing the text through the prism of race, class, gender or patterns of colonial subordination. Of particular interest in this enterprise would be parsing the inconsistencies embedded in the discourse of nuclear diplomats surrounding the 1995 NPT RevCon. Beyond notions of ‘power, subordination and oppression’, predisposed to classical discourse analyse, a Boltanskian ‘sociology of critique’ could also bear fruit.

³⁰ See, for instance, Charu C. Aggarwal and ChengXiang Zhai, *Mining Text Data*, *Mining Text Data* (Boston, MA: Springer US, 2012); Julia Silge and David Robinson, *Text Mining with R A Tidy Approach*, vol. 9781461441, 2014, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-4151-9>.

This method investigates ‘how actors justify their behaviours in settings in which multiple and potentially contradictory logics exist and how they can reach legitimate agreements without resorting to violence...’³¹. This approach to nuclear discourse seems particularly germane to the existence and persistence of NWFZs. This work therefore opens several new avenues for further scholarship, from a variety of methodological, epistemological and ontological perspectives.

Another lingering question concerns the commitment of the NWSs to NWFZs. It might be argued NWSs have kept the commitments contained in the Additional Protocols to NWFZ treaties out of pure expediency. This claim is currently unfalsifiable, because no NWSs that has signed an Additional Protocol has reneged on it thereafter. Furthermore, even if the analysis here is incorrect and NWSs only support NWFZs out of expediency, the question still remains as to why they continue to commit themselves to defined, elaborate, and costly agreements. A potential exception to this rule is the US, given that it has failed to ratify Rarotonga and Pelindaba.

LIMITATIONS

The contributions mentioned above are contextualised by several limitations and shortcomings. Managing the extreme variation across cases, both synchronic and diachronic, has been a major difficulty in this thesis. Identifying common threads across cases has proved unimaginably demanding: just as one case crystallised, so another unravelled; as I demystified the latter, it complicated the former. For this reason, my

³¹ Philippe Naccache and Bernard Leca, “Book Review: On Justification: Economies of Worth by Luc Boltanski, Laurent Thévenot and Catherine Porter,” *Administrative Science Quarterly* 53, no. 4 (2016): 762–64.

conceptual hypotheses became significantly more elaborate than initially planned. What emerged in explanatory power was thus lost in parsimony. While I have tried to balance accuracy and generalisability across the three cases, I could not foresee how difficult a task this would be.

Further, any comparative work necessarily sacrifices depth for breadth. Even by narrowing this work to three cases, I had to sacrifice the depth that would have accompanied a single or two-N study. In this sense, I have privileged comparative insight over comprehensiveness, to some inevitable cost.

I also wish to clarify the ambition of this thesis, in the context of its limits. What I present here is a first scholarly attempt at a comparative theoretical case-study of NWFZs. A work of this kind cannot settle any debates entirely. Rather, I have only aimed to introduce a plausible argument through which a new sub-disciplinary debate can begin. This thesis is thus a starting point, rather than an ending point, given the nascence of NWFZ studies. My theoretical aim was not to complete the full puzzle, but to lay enough pieces that a broader pattern has begun to emerge between the gaps. On research design, this thesis could have been organised in diverse ways. In terms of case selection, I chose three positive cases to test my hypotheses. One limitation of this choice is that I have not been able to test my claims against ‘dogs that did not bark’, like the failed Middle Eastern or Eastern European NWFZs. This comes at a price, as counter-evidence would improve the robustness of my hypotheses. Ultimately, I decided that this was a task for future scholarship. A second way to test the robustness of my claims would be to study uninhabited NWFZs, such as the Seabed or Outer Space. In these instances, scholars could establish whether my hypotheses about threats, norms, or ‘obedient rebellion’ apply outside a state-centric context. This task is again left to future work.

Another limitation of this thesis concerns evidence. Due to the secrecy of nuclear decisions, evidence of nuclear intentions is often, ‘incomplete, sometimes missing, and many times purposely misleading’³². This problem is particularly acute in the global South, where nuclear records are often inaccessible or non-existent. For this reason, and despite concerted efforts to privilege evidence from the global South, I have had to rely on the more extensive archives of the NWSs. Thankfully, the archive used most commonly in this thesis—the Wilson Centre’s Digital History Collection—contains material from diverse geographies, even though it demonstrates a US bias.

Further, because of the secrecy pervading nuclear decisions, I have had to draw on creative sources, such as artwork, cartoons, and secondary analyses. This may compromise rigour in some instances. Primary sources from the Cold War era are abundant, but recent nuclear developments remain more tightly guarded. For this reason, the more distant past appears in sharper focus in this thesis than the recent past. A further limitation concerns language, since I have had to limit this analysis to anglophone sources. This means that I have had to omit much first-language evidence from Latin America and the South Pacific. All these difficulties place limitations on this work, but do not, in my view, undermine the contributions mentioned in the preceding section.

A further complication surrounds the concept of nuclear order, which itself changes through time and, as it changes, affects the meanings of obedience and rebellion with it. When the NPT enjoys wide legitimacy, so obedience to nuclear order coincides with the legitimacy of its main norms, rules and institutions. When these institutions themselves lose legitimacy, obedience to nuclear order may involve challenging these

³² Shlotno Aronson, *The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East: Opacity, Theory, and Reality, 1960-1991*, vol. 9 (State University of New York Press, 1992).

norms, rules and institutions. Hence, obedient rebellion to the NPT in 1968, as experienced in Latin America, differs from obedient rebellion in 2009 as experienced in Africa.

Second, I have taken actors' attitudes toward the NPT as a proxy for their attitudes towards the norms, rules and institutions of the global nuclear order. There are several reasons why I believe this was a defensible theoretical move. First, the NPT is the centrepiece of nuclear order, involving the full range of arms control, disarmament, nonproliferation and deterrence logics; second the NPT is founded on the compromise that sustains nuclear order that I outlined above; third, states and strategic elites seldom address global nuclear order itself, but often address the NPT as a representation of this order; fourth, the NPT lends NWFZs their international legal legitimacy. Nevertheless, the scope of this project excludes an examination of actors' attitudes towards the full range of rules, norms and institutions in nuclear order which involves the attitudes of hundreds of states inside NWFZs and at least eighty institutions and treaties. The NPT is not a perfect proxy for nuclear order, but I maintain that, for my purposes, it was an adequate token for actors' overall attitude towards the global nuclear order.

As I take the NPT as a proxy for nuclear order, so I identify several key states within each NWFZs as representative of the overall attitude of the zone. This again is a theoretical move designed to contain the scope of this work. This move has, no doubt, sacrificed some accuracy and nuance by confining the analysis to a few representative states. Since there are over one-hundred states inside NWFZs, however, I cannot give them all equal focus within the confines of this work. In sum, to limit my analysis in the case-study section, I have analysed the views of several representative states, and strategic elites within those states, within each zone towards the NPT and taken these views as a proxy for the general attitude within the zone towards nuclear order.

In order to further confine the limits of this analysis, I have defined the NWSs using the NPT definition. A further layer of nuance would be added to this analysis by considering the role of the four NWSs not recognised by the NPT, namely India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. These states share some similarities with the P5, and other similarities with states inside NWFZs. An example of the role that these states have played in nuclear politics within NWFZs is Israel's support for the South African nuclear program in the 1970s and 1980s.³³ Another example is recent North Korean nuclear tests. Tracing the attitudes of states inside NWFZs to these North Korean tests is another way of appreciating their attitudes to nuclear order in the post-Cold War world. I have had to exclude these non-NPT NWSs from my analysis for reasons of scope.

If the arguments presented here around the persistence of NWFZs hold, they must be seen in the context of the complex timeframes involved in this analysis. The Latin American zone is the strongest case against which to test my hypotheses around persistence, because it has persisted for over five decades. The next strongest case to test hypotheses surrounding persistence is the South Pacific, which has persisted since 1985. The arguments around persistence are weakest in the case of Africa, since the data at our disposal is only from 2009 to 2017. Hence, the extent to which these hypotheses can be confirmed differs according to the cases I have identified.

³³ Polakow-Suransky, Sasha. *The unspoken alliance: Israel's secret relationship with Apartheid South Africa*. Vintage, 2010.

IMPLICATIONS AND REFLECTIONS

This is not a work of public policy. Nevertheless, some policy-related insights merit attention. One main insight, in this regard, concerns how states can induce the US to ratify a NWFZ treaty—a feat only achieved in Latin America. Here, the manoeuvre which proved crucial was Mexico’s decision to make Latin American support for the NPT—support which the US needed—reliant on US support for Protocol II of Tlatelolco. For current zones which seek US ratification, like the South Pacific and African zones, a strategy of begging and pleading will fail. Nor will remonstrations at international meetings work.

Rather, these regions should leverage their voting power at nuclear negotiations in return for NWS concessions. This leverage could even extend beyond nuclear negotiations into areas like trade and climate change. As global power diffuses, and China vies for increasing influence in the South Pacific and Africa, this game of leverage should become easier. In this sense, Africa and the South Pacific can learn much from the Mexican strategy which ultimately achieved US ratification of Tlatelolco. The 2020 NPT RevCon presents an opportunity for such a strategy. The US will be keen to avoid further shame over the TPNW and will face major criticism over the failed Middle Eastern zone and its perceived defence of its ally Israel. These are two areas in which concessions in one area could be traded for ratification in another.

The second implication for policy is less optimistic. What emerges clearly from this analysis is that NWFZs cannot be imposed. A careful balance of material and normative forces must align for a zone to emerge, let alone consolidate. In a

situation of high threats, the likelihood of a NWFZ is near zero. Thus, in the Middle East, a NWFZ will be a result—not a cause—of greater peace in the region. The same is true for North Asia, where US attempts at rapprochement with North Korea have raised hopes in some quarters of a potential NWFZ.³⁴

In the period since the end of the Obama administration, some of the fundamental assumptions binding nuclear order in the post-Cold War world have come under increasing pressure. NWFZs are an interesting prism through which to understand the extent of these new divisions. Support for NWFZs, at least in the form of signing the treaties, is one area of agreement between and within NWS, and between and within the N-NWS. NWFZs are also a key source of trust between the NWSs and the N-NWSs. Any fraying of existing NWFZs, I maintain, would be a more worrying sign for global nuclear order than further contestation around the NPT.

In terms of the impact of the TPNW on NWFZs, two opposing scenarios seem imaginable. First, the TPNW can reinforce the logic presented by NWFZs and put further pressure on the NWSs to honour their disarmament commitments, thereby further strengthening the centrality of the NPT. On the other hand, the TPNW could compete with NWFZs as an attractive alternative for states in the global South growing increasingly frustrated with the slow pace of disarmament, and the relative latitude afforded to NWSs in the NPT. If the TPNW does increase in popularity in

³⁴ For an analysis of the North Asian proposal, see, Michael Hamel-Green, “Implementing a Korea-Japan Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone: Precedents, Legal Forms, Governance, Scope, Domain, Verification, Compliance and Regional Benefits,” *Pacific Focus* 26, no. 1 (October 7, 2011): 90–112, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1976-5118.2011.01057.x>; Leon V. Sigal, “Political Prospects for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in Northeast Asia,” *Pacific Focus* 26, no. 1 (October 7, 2011): 22–36, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1976-5118.2011.01054.x>; For a summary on the debate over North Asian denuclearisation, see Nicola Leveringhaus, “Beyond De-Nuclearization: Debating Deterrence and North Korea in Asia’s New Nuclear Age,” *Asian Security*, April 2019, 1–5; For a speculative fictional account of the North Asian situation, see Jeffrey Lewis, *The 2020 Commission Report on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks against the United States: A Speculative Novel* (Mariner Books, 2018).

the South, this could also lead to calls for the expansion of the prohibitions contained in NWFZ treaties, particularly around transportation in Latin America and the South Pacific. This would, in turn, reduce the likelihood of US ratification. Hamel-Green has begun the important early work of parsing these potential contradictions.³⁵

Concluding Thoughts

Since their invention, nuclear weapons have divided scholarly opinion: some claim they bring war where there could be peace; others peace where there could be war. In addressing this debate, International Relations theory has privileged the gaze of great powers over the choice of forbearance and the view from below. In doing so, it has under-valued the significance of NWFZs to the overall ‘story’ of nuclear order. Instead of ‘ending the story’, as hoped by African leaders on that day in Cairo in 1996, NWFZs have only further extended it. As the world enters a new era of nuclear uncertainty, driven by a pantomimic news cycle and confronted by the spectre of multipolar competition, the ‘story’ of NWFZs will foretell much about the fate of nuclear order itself.

³⁵ Hamel-Green, Michael. “The Nuclear Ban Treaty and 2018 Disarmament Forums: An Initial Impact Assessment.” *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* 1, no. 2 (2018): 436-463

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