The Memory of Ignatius of Antioch

The Martyr as a Locus of Christian Identity, Remembering and Remembered

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Trinity 2021

Abstract

The Memory of Ignatius of Antioch
The Martyr as a Locus of Christian Identity, Remembering and Remembered

The fundamental argument of my thesis is that the concept of 'memory' provides remarkable insight into the early second-century bishop and martyr, Ignatius of Antioch; my thesis seeks to explore the nature of this insight and unpack its significance. His palimpsestic literary legacy and personal preoccupation with remembering and its correlates make Ignatius uniquely suited among early Christians to be unlocked by the key of memory. This endeavour broadly takes its lead from Elizabeth Castelli's *Martyrdom and Memory* (2004). She argues that 'memory work' done by early Christians on the experience of persecution and martyrdom was a form of 'culture making'; Christian identity is coloured by memory of the religious suffering of others. My focal question is an extension of hers, and has three parts. Given that remembering in community is central to the development of the early church, its theology and self-understanding: 1) What is the nature of the memories inherited by Ignatius and his communities, and how are they engaged in the rhetorical and polemical context of his letters? 2) How does Ignatius construct himself as a figure to be remembered by Christian interpreters? 3) How was Ignatius in fact memorialised in early Christian history?

This thesis spans three centuries and three distinct parts. I therefore establish my argument by a combination of means: close reading of the 'authentic' middle recension letters, select and critical interaction with sociology and anthropology, and thorough analysis of the long recension and Ignatian martyrological accounts. The long recension has received only meagre scholarly attention, so my work constitutes a significant contribution to Ignatian scholarship with regard to this corpus in particular. Memory is demonstrated to afford a previously unnoticed hermeneutic from which to approach Ignatius, who is at once one remembering, one aspiring to be worthy of remembrance, and one indeed remembered.

Long Abstract

The Memory of Ignatius of Antioch
The Martyr as a Locus of Christian Identity, Remembering and Remembered

The fundamental argument of my thesis is that the concept of 'memory' provides remarkable insight into the early second-century bishop and martyr, Ignatius of Antioch; my thesis seeks to explore the nature of this insight and unpack its significance. Ignatius is uniquely suited among early Christians to be unlocked by the key of memory. Whereas most other early Christian martyrs are available to us only through the words and reflections of others, Ignatius is peculiar in having left us his own thoughts about his impending death. His letters contain images and indications of how he wishes to be remembered, while attempting to provide a normative interpretation of the significance of his life and death. Ignatius' literary corpus is granted authority through the destruction of his physical body. He even hints that the legible, textual Ignatius is to be accorded precedence over his physical self (*Rom*. 7.2). Ignatius' persona and voice are memorialised and appropriated by an author in the late fourth century, whose presentation of Ignatius is coloured by (though not beholden to) his own ecclesial cares and concerns. Finally, Ignatius himself evokes certain memories within the congregations to which he writes—some of the pre-Christian dispensation of prophets, patriarchs, and law, and others of pagan and 'extra-Christian' realities—which serve both to unite and to exclude. Memory and the act of remembering may therefore be seen as an interpretative focal point for Ignatius, crystallising key elements of his significance both in his own time and in the early Christian centuries. The hermeneutic potential of 'memory' in early Christian studies has been increasingly recognised over the last two decades by scholars such as Elizabeth Castelli, Markus Bockmuehl, and Benjamin White. My thesis benefits from their work, and concentrates their insight upon the figure of Ignatius of Antioch.

Part I explores how Ignatius situates himself and his communities as participants in the divine economy by evoking certain memories in the minds of his readers. His recollection of the election,

history, prophecy, and heroes of Israel constitutes an early attempt at explaining and justifying why these should be legitimate objects of Christian remembrance. Ignatius deftly establishes Christ as a type to which these figures are shown to conform, and from whom they gain their legitimacy. It is those who preach Christ, not Judaism, who are the proper inheritors of their memory. Christ is the centre-point of history, towards whom the prophets strove, and whom Christians now strive to imitate. Ignatius also constructs Christian identity in relation to the pagan world, which he 'baptises' into the service of the gospel. I engage with Allen Brent's idea that Ignatius performed an elaborate 'stage management' of his own 'contrived martyrological cult' to undermine the imperial. Although Brent's theory would form a neat endorsement of my thesis, I demonstrate it to exceed the evidence on several counts, and indeed distort Ignatius' intentions. I approach the MR through a text-critical perspective in this part, and interrogate the relationship between these memories and Christian identity as understood by Ignatius, with particular reference to its borders with 'Jewish' and 'pagan' identity. Ultimately, Ignatius is shown to create collective identity and solidary for diverse communities through correct remembrance of the past; this is sometimes performed through the active exclusion of others, whether on the basis of their misinterpretation of their memories and blindness to Christ revealed therein, or because of their own insubstantiality, which leads to their being quickly forgotten. Like Paul before him, Ignatius recognises the power held latent within memories, and exercises masterful command over them.

The centrality of memory as an optic through which to view martyrdom has already been successfully demonstrated by Castelli (2004), and I build upon her insights particularly in part II. Ignatius was one of the first to make sense out of the early Christian experience of martyrdom and persecution; it would become a 'form of culture making, whereby Christian identity was indelibly marked by the collective memory of the religious suffering of others' (Castelli). Ignatius shows a keen consciousness that his letters constitute a physical instantiation of himself, whose potency will endure and in fact gain significance as a result of his meaningful death. Ignatius presents himself as

a figure to be remembered in particular ways: point of union, pneumatic, pastor, both Christomorphic and 'Paulomorphic.' Many of these aspects are encapsulated in his tendency to refer to himself using sacrificial language, which I explore in detail. His intention in doing so has proved something of a gridlock in scholarship, and several interpreters are quick to characterise his suffering as vicarious or that of a scapegoat. Through close reading of the middle recension text, with reference to the NT and adjacent literature, Ignatius' sacrificial self-references are shown to express a relationship of mutual love and self-offering with his fellow-Christians, and a hope that his suffering will benefit them and advance the gospel message. The thought-world of Ignatius shows remarkable correspondence with that of the anthropologist and scholar of literature René Girard, a connection (to my knowledge) never before noticed. I explore the usefulness of Girard's theories of scapegoat and mimesis to understand the relation between Ignatius and the communities that remember him. While Girardian theory can interpret Ignatius as a scapegoat for wider Roman society via 'negative mimesis,' it also reveals his intention to undermine the demonic human impulse to scapegoat altogether. His vision for community is one that operates on the basis of 'positive mimesis' of Christ's nonviolence, epitomised in the Eucharist and the threefold order of ministry. Girard proves to be a useful and telling conversation partner for Ignatius, bringing fresh air to a stifled area of scholarship.

Part III turns to textual memorialisations of Ignatius, the most substantial of which originate from the late fourth century. Since most of these texts 'dissemble' in some way, I begin part III with an exploration of the intricate notions of 'authenticity,' 'authorship,' and 'biography,' and examine how attitudes towards each have evolved since the first centuries of the Christian church—the academy's quest for 'authenticity' has often been unattainable and misleading. It is becoming increasingly recognised that many aspects of a person's significance become apparent only after (and sometimes long after) their death. The fourth-century texts that I explore are revealed as underutilised resources for understanding Ignatius the second-century man, bearing their own claim

to legitimacy. My extended analysis of the long recension provides the 'exhaustive examination of all the important features of the forger's work' called for by Bart Ehrman, and explores the ways in which the text memorialises Ignatius for a new age and audience. I explore the long recension's theology, heresiology, and ecclesiology, which bear witness not only to the fourth-century Antiochene context in which it was composed, but also to the redactor's desire to remain faithful to the character and ethos of his hero. The long recension's combination of novel and redacted letters allows Ps-Ignatius' understanding and portrayal of Ignatius of Antioch to be analysed from several perspectives. The long recension emphasises and extends the polyphonic quality of the martyr's voice, illuminating the 'spurious' nature of all literature (Ruthven). My work constitutes an original and overdue contribution to literature on the LR, its social and polemical context, authorial motivations, and particularly its role in refreshing and developing the memory of Ignatius in fourth-century Antioch. I then examine three (similarly little-known) texts that bear witness to the development of the martyrological cult of Ignatius. John Chrysostom's *Homily on the Holy Martyr Ignatius*, and the two martyrologies known as the Antiochene and Roman *Acts*, each presents contrasting memorialisations of the martyr. I also examine how each interacts with the devotional, liturgical, and material phenomenon that was the cult of saints. A particular theme that emerges from all the texts examined in part III is their understanding of Ignatius' suffering and death to have been effective. Comparison with part II reveals that Ignatius' sacrificial self-references became a generative *topos* out of which later Christians could find meaning and create culture.

Drawing from such exotic fields as anthropology and sociology, my thesis demonstrates memory's potential to engage patristic theologians in inter-disciplinary dialogue. It highlights new directions for research, both within Ignatian studies and beyond. Memory's ability to act as a source of power is amply demonstrated throughout this work, and illuminates key rhetorical and polemical dynamics of Ignatius' literary corpus. However, my thesis also limns the more subtle ways remembering can take kenotic forms, and derive from a desire to love rather than to control.

It seems appropriate that one who accorded ultimate significance to his writings, though desiring to leave behind no bodily remains, should so strongly abide in today's collective imagination as to become the subject of a doctoral thesis. It is in keeping with my subject's morbidness to point out the piquancy in this thesis' application of 're-membering' to one whose fulfilment was to be torn limb from limb. This work's three parts together demonstrate the immense wealth of meaning able to be held within this single figure Ignatius, and the power of memory to unlock it.

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List of Abbreviations

ANF	*The Ante-Nicene Fathers: Translations of the Writings of the Fathers down to A.D. 325*. Ed. Donaldson, J. and Roberts, A. with Coxe, A.C. American reprint of the Edinburgh Edition. 10 vols. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1985.
BDAG	*A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*. Ed. Arndt, W.F., Gingrich, F.W. and Bauer, W. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000.
LCL	Loeb Classic Library.
LPGL	*A Patristic Greek Lexicon.* Ed. Lampe, G.W.H. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.
LSJ	*A Greek-English Lexicon.* Ed. Liddell, H. J. and Scott, R. 9th revised edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940.
NPNF 2	*A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church: Second Series*. Ed. Schaff, P. and Wace, H. 14 vols. Reprinted Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994. Originally published Oxford; New York, NY: Parker; Christian Literature Company, 1890–1900.
OCD[4]	*Oxford Classical Dictionary*. Ed. Hornblower, S., Spawforth, A. and Eidinow, E. 4th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
SC	Sources Chrétiennes

Letters of Ignatius

Middle and long recensions:

Ephes. – Letter to the Ephesians.
Mag. – Letter to the Magnesians.
Trall. – Letter to the Trallians.
Rom. – Letter to the Romans.
Phld. – Letter to the Philadelphians.
Smyrn. – Letter to the Smyrneans.
Pol. – Letter to Polycarp.

Long recension only:

Mary to Ign. – Letter of Mary to Ignatius.
Ign. to Mary – Letter of Ignatius to Mary.
Tar. – Letter to the Tarsians.
Phlp. – Letter to the Philippians.
Ant. – Letter to the Antiochenes.
Hero – Letter to Hero.

References to Ignatius' letters are in italicised type with a full stop separating chapter and verse. By contrast, references to Paul's letters are in roman type with a colon separating chapter and verse.

As it engages with both the middle and long recensions, in part III all references to Ignatian letters are prefixed by either MR- or LR-.

The bibliography of primary sources lists all other abbreviations of ancient texts employed in this thesis.

Note to the reader: All translations are my own unless specified otherwise. Where I translate or cite a primary text in its original language, I supply the editor and page number when useful, e.g. Gregory of Nyssa, *Life of Saint Macrina* 1 (ed. Maraval, 140).

For the Greek text of the MR I rely upon Holmes, M.W. (2007) *The Apostolic Fathers.* Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, pp. 166–271. For the Greek text of the LR I rely upon Lightfoot, J.B. (1889) *The Apostolic Fathers: Clement, Ignatius, and Polycarp*. Part II. Vol. III. 2nd edn. London; New York, NY: Macmillan, pp. 135–273.

Introduction

Scholarship on Ignatius of Antioch has traditionally concerned itself first and foremost with questions of authorship, authenticity, and date. It is almost obligatory that each new piece spend a good deal of space summarising the historical arguments, weighing their merits and faults, and then situating itself within the raft of opinions offered on the debate over the centuries. The prevailing opinion since Theodor Zahn and J.B. Lightfoot (writing at the end of the 19th century) has been that the seven letters of the so-called middle recension (MR) were written by the Syrian bishop in the early second century.[1] Yet even the combined testimony of scholars of such calibre is not allowed to settle before increasingly more convoluted studies emerge to reconsider the interrelations of the recensions: that the long recension (LR) in fact predates the MR;[2] that the Syriac short recension (SR) is really the most ancient;[3] or that Ignatius wrote just four letters, which relate to our current corpus only via many subtly interconnected mutations.[4] Others accept the MR as earliest, but argue for a date considerably later than traditionally ascribed.[5] Clearly, these kinds of discussions are important in their own right; they are valuable for highlighting the provisionality and ambiguity of the source material, and the sensitivity with which it must be treated. They also stem from a very proper concern about authenticity, that a text's purported author is also its author in fact.[6]

As is slowly being recognised within the academy, however, Ignatian scholarship is saturated with such studies, and each new attempt met by the logic of diminishing returns. None, it is

[1] Zahn (1873); Lightfoot (1889).
[2] E.g. Hannah (1960); Weijenborg (1969).
[3] Vinzent (2019), esp. 327.
[4] Rius-Camps (1980).
[5] E.g. Barnes (2008); Hübner (1997).
[6] Lookadoo (2020b) admirably attempts to make sense out of the voluminous scholarship produced since 1997 on the question of the MR letters' dating and authenticity.

commonly accepted, has been able to upset the Lightfoot/Zahn consensus.[7] Some of the most influential studies of Ignatius have given relatively little attention to the problem of historical authenticity;[8] indeed, some of the most recent articles make no reference at all to the debate, and proceed on the assumption that the MR represents what Ignatius really wrote.[9] I join these in accepting the MR as 'genuine'—that is, written in the early second century by the man Ignatius, whose remarkable journey from Antioch to Rome we are led to believe ended in the arena. (To anticipate chapter 6, I follow Lightfoot and J.D. Smith who believe the LR to have been a late fourth-century work, probably composed in Antioch.[10]) By accepting this, in full knowledge of the attendant problems, the scholar is freed to move the conversation on, to consider the figure of Ignatius as he is known and met *through* the letters. Nonetheless, it will become clear that much of my argument would stand even if discussion of the MR required the name 'Ignatius' to be surrounded by quotation marks.

Every piece of literature, whether fictional or non-fictional, 'forged' or 'genuine,' invites the reader to infer an authorial persona. For this reason, all the recensions that make up the Ignatian corpus are open to a study of how they portray the figure of Ignatius. This allows the scholar effectively to bypass questions of 'historical authenticity' and investigate the more stimulating questions surrounding the locus of *memory*. The letters of the MR assume of their audiences certain memories, sacred and profane. How does Ignatius evoke these memories, and transform them towards the cause of Christ and community? How does Ignatius portray himself as a figure to be

[7] Foster (2006: 489) nuances the notion of consensus: 'perhaps it would be better from a text-critical perspective to say that they [the seven MR epistles] represent the earliest recoverable stage of the textual transmission of the Ignatian letters.'
[8] E.g. Corwin (1960); Schoedel (1985).
[9] E.g. Hartog (2019); Lookadoo (2019). I, like these scholars, remain conscious that the MR is to some degree a scholarly construct: we rely upon the Antiochene *Acts* to supply the text of *Romans*, and corrections to the other letters are often supplied on the basis of the Latin translation or quotations from other authors. See Lookadoo (2020b).
[10] J.D. Smith (1986).

remembered in the MR? How does this compare to the manner in which he has indeed been remembered in the church, such as in the LR and in martyrological texts?

Such questions have only begun to receive attention in scholarship. Elizabeth Castelli uses Ignatius as a case study in her exploration of how the early Christian experience of martyrdom and persecution became a 'form of culture making, whereby Christian identity was indelibly marked by the collective memory of the religious suffering of others.'[11] She expresses a similar frustration as I with insoluble questions of 'what really happened,' and employs memory because of its particular suitability to ask 'how particular ways of construing the past enable later communities to constitute and sustain themselves.'[12] Candida Moss has recently undertaken an analysis of the style of the Antiochene martyrology's memorialisation of Ignatius as a Pauline martyr.[13] Memory has already proved to be a popular tool to break the stalemate of 'historical Jesus' research,[14] and elsewhere in New Testament (NT) and patristic scholarship.[15] My thesis takes a cue from Dale Allison (among others), who points out that some aspects of a person's character and significance are not accessible to the person themselves, or even to their contemporaries, but are only appreciable *after* their death: 'Self-perception is only partial perception, and while the passing of time dims memories, it can also unfold significance.'[16] The LR is proof that Ignatius continued to be significant centuries after his martyrdom. My thesis questions the privileging of the MR as our *only* source of insight into Ignatius, and the second century as the definitive context in which the meaning of Ignatius' words must be decided.

However recently 'memory' has attracted interest within the academy, it goes without saying that memory was as important for the ancients as it is for us moderns. Indeed, Carruthers

[11] Castelli (2004), 4.
[12] Castelli (2004), 5.
[13] Moss (2016).
[14] See Keith (2015), (2015a) for an overview of the project's progress.
[15] E.g. Bockmuehl (2010), (2012).
[16] Allison (2009), 24; cf. Bockmuehl (2010), 18–29.

notes a dissonance between the modern tendency towards a pejorative view of the faculty of memory as merely functional and uninteresting, compared to the ancients' awe and esteem of it as the seat of the intellect, morality, and identity.[17] The broad conceptual structure of all Abrahamic religions lends particular significance to memory, as the means of contextualising current lives within the divine economy and in reference to God's revelation to humanity.[18] Christianity has a particularly strong relationship with memory as it understands God himself to be the object of memory, in the life of the human being Christ. Remembrance of the person of Jesus was from very early on central to the worship and praxis of the believing community.[19] The Jesus of each gospel is constructed in relation to (and as the culmination of) centuries of history, prophecy, divine election and economy, as well as elements thought outside of that relationship with God; Jesus presents himself to be remembered in certain ways, and patristic theology may in part be seen as the charting of that memory. Most apostolic and post-apostolic Christians show a concerted interest in the 'memoirs' and lineages of 'living memory' stemming from witnesses to the NT events, and often orientate their own authority in relation to them.[20] Ignatius demonstrates a similar connection with and interest in memory, and benefits from treatment in the light of it.

However, 'memory' can be a term as vague and elusive as it is evocative and penetrating. Although its popularity in the humanities increased from its most influential modern study by Maurice Halbwachs almost a century ago,[21] successful application in one field does not necessarily guarantee the same in another. Its use in the NT field has not met with universal approval. Some nervousness regarding such a theory-based approach goes without saying,[22] but the heart of some scholars' mistrust seems to be the over-confidence with which memory studies are employed to

[17] Carruthers (2008), 1–16.
[18] The atrocities of the Holocaust sparked a revival of Jewish scholarship rediscovering the centrality of memory for Judaism. See particularly Yerushalmi (1982), Spiegel (2002).
[19] See Luke 22:19; 1 Cor. 11:24–25.
[20] Bockmuehl (2010), 22–29.
[21] Republished Halbwachs (1992).
[22] Crook (2013), 61–67; Foster (2012), 201–2.

establish the historical validity of the gospel accounts, particularly the words of Jesus.[23] More generally, there is a large degree of uncertainty about the relation between the *presentist* concerns of 'social' or 'collective memory,' and the past events of historical reality.[24] Doubtless some scholars, especially in historical Jesus research, have exploited this uncertainty to claim maximal correspondence between memory and history,[25] though others are more circumspect.[26]

Many of these criticisms are valid. To them might be added: the multiplicity of 'memory theorists and theories'; the historian's lack of qualification in choosing just one of these, and in applying it appropriately; and the polysemy of the word 'memory' not only between disciplines, but even individual people.

It will be seen, however, that my use of the word memory largely escapes such pitfalls. My project does not use memory with the (implicit) aim of confirming certain historical facts, nor does it rely on 'memory theory' in a specialist or technical sense.[27] Rather, I believe Ignatius to be a figure whose contours and significance are thrown into particularly sharp relief by the *idea* of memory. For this reason, and because of the diverse uses to which I put the word throughout my thesis, it is impossible to give a single definition of the term 'memory,' other than what is commonly understood by the word in its non-technical, everyday use. Whereas most other early Christian martyrs are available to us only through the words and reflections of others,[28] Ignatius is peculiar in having left us his own thoughts about his impending death, and so specially lends himself to such an investigation. I wish to unpack how memory can help us to understand what Ignatius (or the author of the MR) considered valuable to hand on to posterity, both in continuing the memory of pre-existing Old Testament and pagan figures, and also in forging anew a memorial for himself.

[23] Foster (2012), 191–92.
[24] Foster (2012), 196–98; as noted by Halbwachs (1992), 182–83. Cf. Erll (2011), 39.
[25] Foster (2012: 200) suggests Bauckham (2006).
[26] Foster (2012: 201) suggests Allison (2010).
[27] Practitioners of 'memory theory' are occasionally consulted for their hermeneutic value, accompanied by appropriate caveats.
[28] See Buol (2018).

Memory also covers the remit of reception history, with which I intend to examine how Ignatius has in fact been remembered. This will be based around the LR whose first-person biographical testimony must be rare if not unique in antiquity, but also examines martyrological accounts of Ignatius. I hope thereby to expand the work of Castelli and other scholars of Christian hagiography, to understand how the memory of Ignatius has created meaning, purpose, and culture out of Christians' experiences of suffering and earthly estrangement. In short, my project seeks to discover the interpretative potential of memory understood as a *creative* faculty and exercise.

Since its marginalisation by Zahn and Lightfoot, the long recension has been largely overlooked in scholarship. 'While each decade brings forth a new dispute on the authenticity of seven letters attributed to Ignatius, the second-century bishop of Antioch, barely a drop of ink is spent on the persona that he acquires in [the LR],' writes Edwards.[29] This is partly due to a fascination with 'authenticity,' and a corresponding apathy towards anything convicted of pseudepigraphy. As I demonstrate in my thesis, questions of 'authenticity' and 'authorship' are far more complex than they appear, and opinion regarding what constitutes each has altered considerably since the first centuries of the Christian church. An examination of the LR reveals that these 'forgeries' contain reminiscences of the second-century bishop, which demonstrate the continued influence of Ignatius' persona. These are interesting as much for the light they shed on their own age as for the manner in which they are 'resurrected' and exploited in the service of specific theological, social, and polemic causes. The figure of Ignatius who emerges from the LR as the intended authorial persona is found to be a catena of individuals and communities that have each contributed towards the memorial tradition of Ignatius—written testimony for the continuing life and relevance of the bishop through the centuries. The LR's memorial of Ignatius is one of several in fourth-century Christianity, each competing for legitimacy, historical verisimilitude, and the right

[29] Edwards (2013), 342.

to claim the martyr for themselves. My thesis goes some way to exploring the untapped potential in the LR, and providing the 'exhaustive examination of all the important features of the forger's work' called for by Ehrman.[30]

In part I, I investigate how Ignatius situates himself as a participant in the divine economy by evoking certain memories in the minds of his readers. Ignatius characterises the election, history, prophecy, and heroes of Israel as preparation for the revelation of Christ, and the proper inheritance of Christian communities (chapter 1). Ignatius also constructs Christian identity in relation with pagan things, people, and events, sometimes concluding that these too are ultimately to be brought within the fold of God's love (chapter 2). In this first part, I approach the MR from a text-critical perspective, and interrogate the relationship between these memories and Christian identity as understood by Ignatius, with particular reference to its borders with potential 'Jewish' and 'pagan' identities. While my research at times intersects with that of other modern scholars, this is a largely novel approach to Ignatius, and yields original findings.

Part II is entitled '"Memory Poiesis"—Ignatius as a Forger of his own Memorialisation,' and looks at the ways in which Ignatius constructs himself as a figure to be remembered in the MR. Central to this issue is the question of whether, and if so, how, Ignatius portrays himself as a sacrifice. Chapter 3 involves a close reading of the passages in question. I ask what kind of sacrifice might be intended and the reasons for it, investigating potential sources for this notion. The fourth chapter builds upon the third and tests the suggestion of Allen Brent that Ignatius considered himself to have been a scapegoat for his communities' sake. Whereas Brent describes only a vague 'social-psychological theory,' without any workable mechanism, I employ the mimetic theory of René Girard, whose affinities with Ignatius are striking. Although Ignatius' self-presentation might be said to show an awareness of his (and Christians' in general) function as a scapegoat in a Graeco-

[30] Ehrman (2013), 469.

Roman context (as Brent suggests), he himself wishes to undermine this impulse to violent mimesis by offering himself, like Christ, as a model of nonviolence and self-denial to be imitated by Christians and the world. He longs for his legacy to be the establishment of a system of ministry by which this positive mimesis might be promulgated. Part II may be seen to compare conventional text-critical methods with modern anthropological theory, as hermeneutical tools for Ignatian studies. While some clear discrepancies arise, the two chapters produce strikingly similar conclusions with regard to Ignatius' understanding of his suffering as vicariously beneficial.

Since most of the texts which memorialise Ignatius 'dissemble' in some way (the LR is pseudepigraphic, the martyrologies employ first-person narration), I begin part III with an analysis of literary 'forgery' (chapter 5). I consider what it means to write 'honestly' or pseudepigraphically, authentically or inauthentically, using one's own words or the words of another, and attempt to critique some of these common false dichotomies. This analysis takes in evidence from the early church, and engages with modern scholars of literature, philosophy, and theology. I end with a discussion of the 'genre' of biography in antiquity, and in this regard compare the biographical elements present in Athanasius' *Life of Antony*, Gregory's *Life of Saint Macrina*, and the long recension, which all adopt the epistolary form for their projects. As the LR constitutes the most substantial literary memorialisation of Ignatius, chapter 6 looks in depth at the probable context of its composition, and the ways in which its author 'resurrects' Ignatius to speak to the issues of his own day. The combination of redacting the seven MR letters, and composing six from scratch, grants the author unique command over the authorial voice of Ignatius; moreover, it allows me to compare how these two modes depict the martyr, and to draw out commonalities and themes. I also examine the LR's theological persuasion, anti-heretical polemic, ecclesiology, and the means by which he attempts to create verisimilitude. Finally, chapter 7 turns to three other early reminiscences of Ignatius, namely the Antiochene and Roman martyrologies, and John Chrysostom's *Homily on the Holy Martyr Ignatius*. As well as examining their portrayal of Ignatius, I trace how each bears witness

to the novel devotional, liturgical, and material phenomenon of the cult of saints. A comparison of these portrayals of Ignatius with his own self-memorialisation finds divergence as well as surprising points of commonality, particularly surrounding the efficacious nature of his suffering for fellow Christians.

Due to the breadth of this thesis, I have decided that the relevant secondary literature is best dealt with in the context of each chapter, rather than in a prefacing section. In a voluminous chapter of his 2019 book *Writing the History of Early Christianity*, Markus Vinzent has provided something of a history of scholarship on the three recensions since the Enlightenment.[31] Even if my project quite quickly diverges from his, Vinzent convincingly demonstrates the value of applying a retrospective perspective to Ignatius,[32] of considering the chronically-overlooked LR, and indeed the worth of studying Ignatius at all.[33] That Ignatius is a figure who has 'impacted,' well as been a 'product of' various 'social, political, ethical and religious constellations,' is a point at which our projects coincide.[34]

The need for a study such as this is, I believe, quite clear. In the year I began this project, Harry Maier hinted at the generative potential of applying a lens of memory to the figure of Ignatius, which I have taken as encouragement for the first two parts of my project.[35] Similarly, Markus Bockmuehl speaks of his study on the memory of Simon Peter[36] as a 'test case for both the potential promise and the limits of an approach that seeks to attend more carefully to the way Christianity's originating figures left a footprint in living memory.'[37] His project has more than vindicated such an approach, and I offer my thesis as a further opportunity for its potential to be plumbed and extended

[31] Vinzent (2019), 266–409.
[32] See Vinzent (2019), 273–74.
[33] See Vinzent (2019), 272–73.
[34] Vinzent (2019), 409.
[35] Maier (2017: 212): 'Social memory—both what is past and the form that Ignatius creates in the course of his writings—is central to Ignatius's strategies as religious entrepreneur vouching for a particular vision of God and the social consequences he derives from it.'
[36] Bockmuehl (2010) and (2012).
[37] Bockmuehl (2012), xiv–xv.

in a second-century context. The third part of my thesis has received backing from Bart Ehrman, who in 2013 considered 'a full critical commentary on the Pseudo-Ignatians' to be a 'major desideratum in the field.'[38] The three parts together demonstrate the immense wealth of meaning able to be held within this single figure Ignatius, and the power of memory to unlock it. The work of Jan and Aleida Assmann on the connective power of memory,[39] though explicitly mentioned in these pages only occasionally, has been instrumental in encouraging me to pursue this project. I would count it a great compliment if echoes of their words are detected among my own.

It is one of the many ironies about Ignatius that he places more trust in what he writes than in his verbal testimony and physical presence.[40] The fixity and durability of writing was appealing to one whose bodily (and perhaps mental) circumstances were so unpredictable. Indeed, it is appropriate that though Ignatius wishes to be annihilated bodily, he longs to be remembered literarily;[41] while other writers hope to remain in their writings *in spite* of their death, Ignatius hopes to remain *because of* his death. My thesis charts the nature of this hope, and the manner in which it is realised.

[38] Ehrman (2013), 469.
[39] E.g. J. Assmann (2006), 1–30, 81–100; (1995), 128–33; A. Assmann (2010), 17–20.
[40] *Rom*. 7.2: 'If upon my arrival I myself should appeal to you, do not be persuaded by me; believe instead these things that I am writing to you.'
[41] *Rom*. 4.2; cf. *Rom*. 2.1 where he hopes that through death he will become λόγος θεοῦ, as opposed to φωνή if he remains alive. Space does not allow me a full exploration of Ignatius' rich (and enigmatic) use of the conceptual locus λόγος, which is coupled both with φωνή and σιγή/ἡσυχία.

Part I: The Remembering Ignatius

Chapter 1: Patriarchs, Prophets, and Israel: Remembered and Reconstructed

This first part of my thesis sets out to frame Ignatius as both a passive recipient of the memories proper to his time and social milieux, and also an active agent shaping, directing, and sometimes omitting these memories to confront issues present and anticipated. As an inherent faculty of the human mind, 'memory' is in essence intangible. My exploration in this chapter examines the material traces of memories, as they became visible in the interaction between Ignatius and his addressed communities. I also use the term 'collective memory/memories'[1] to refer to a body of memory (of events, figures etc.) which may be considered to be shared between a number of people—in our case, Ignatius, the members of his communities, and often his polemical opponents.

In this chapter, I examine memories associated with Israel: that is, the extent and manner in which Ignatius recalls figures and elements of the Hebrew scriptures, and the work that remembrance of the same performs. The context of this creative recollection is often polemical, as we glimpse Ignatius searching for language and concepts to define and delimit authentic Christian identity *against* a pre-existing religious identity. Indeed, the father of modern memory studies, Maurice Halbwachs, believed that early Christians' self-construction as in continuity with Hebraic religion was essential for its viability as a movement.[2] This chapter seeks to investigate the limits of this claim in the context of Ignatius of Antioch.

[1] My use of this term does not presuppose or invoke any particular theory; rather, it is descriptive.
[2] Halbwachs (1992), 86–87.

§1: Ignatius' memory of the heroes of Israel

While it is regularly noted that Ignatius shows only a vague interest in Hebrew scripture—quoting it explicitly twice, non-explicitly once, and alluding to it perhaps three times more[3]—it is certain that scriptural theology, concepts, and figures provide for him essential confirmation of the historical legitimacy of Christianity, and indeed act as witnesses against the contemporary groups with whom Ignatius contended.[4] Vall notes that Ignatius' 'modus operandi is not to cite authoritative texts but to adapt and weave them into the fabric of his own discourse.'[5] Grant too sees him as a faithful recipient and hander-on of the body of 'apostolic tradition' as interpreted in Antioch, often expressed through concepts and terminology drawn from Hebrew scriptures.[6] Ignatius draws upon the memories held by the congregations to whom he writes, and what can be assumed knowledge surrounding scriptural types and prophecies, to fill out or affirm their understanding of the significance of Christ, which in turn informs their understanding of Ignatius' own life and impending death.[7] In this sense, Ignatius resembles the medieval rabbis who found meaning in contemporary events insofar as they conformed to scriptural types.[8]

Schoedel is correct in noting that scripture's 'authority is simply taken for granted in the Christian community.'[9] For Ignatius, scripture and the body of traditions and information it provides are true and salutary—when interpreted correctly—and thus must continue to be held within the community's memory, and be used for teaching and worship. Those who deny the reality of Christ's passion and resurrection Ignatius berates as ignorant and obstinate, 'whom the prophecies did not

[3] *Ephes*. 5.3; *Mag*. 12; *Trall*. 8.2; *Ephes*. 15.1; *Mag*. 10.3, 13.1. See Holmes (2007), 174; Schoedel (1985), 9.
[4] I use 'scripture' to refer to the writings considered part of the Hebrew Bible, or 'Old Testament' (OT). Though I do not treat it here, the prospect that Ignatius may well draw from traditions surrounding the Maccabean martyrs in 2 and 4 Maccabees and other apocryphal literature is tantalising; see chapter 3 below and Perler (1949). For the parallels between Ignatius and the *Ascension of Isaiah*, see Hall (1999).
[5] Vall (2013), 43.
[6] Grant (1963), 333–34.
[7] Vall (2013: 7) talks about Ignatius' directing his audience's attention to 'extratextual realities.'
[8] Spiegel (2002), 152: for medieval rabbis, 'recent or contemporary occurrences acquired meaning only insofar as they could be subsumed within Biblical categories of events and their interpretation bequeathed to the community through the medium of Scripture.'
[9] Schoedel (1985), 234.

persuade nor the law of Moses.'[10] The Smyrneans are to pay attention to 'the prophets,' whom he elsewhere says that he loves.[11] In keeping with later patristic writers, yet in a manner less subtle and nuanced, Ignatius understands scripture's value as derived primarily from its anticipation of, and continuity with, the figure of Christ. Athanasius will write in the same vein: 'For when he that was signified had come, what need was there still to signify him? When the truth was present, what need was there still of the shadow? For this was the reason for their prophesying in the first place—until the true Righteousness should come, even the one who ransoms the sins of all.'[12] Despite the unusual terminology, the force of his statement that 'the archives are Jesus Christ' is clear. The writings of the ancients are fulfilled and made unalterable by Christ's 'cross and death and…resurrection and the faith that comes through him.'[13] As Schoedel writes, 'Ignatius thinks of the appeal to the Scriptures as making sense only if it is recognized that they point forward to Christ and find their fulfilment there.'[14] This complementarity between the testimony of the Old Testament and the life of Christ, and the continuity of the divine plan evident therein, explains Ignatius' so readily recalling the scriptures.

§2: Jews and Judaisers refuted by the memory of Israel

Ignatius is surely aware that there exist Jews who reject Christ.[15] They might be said to observe the practices of the 'priests,' who indeed 'were good,' but have not submitted to the 'high priest,' who

[10] *Smyrn*. 5.1.
[11] *Smyrn*. 7.2; *Phld*. 5.2.
[12] Athanasius, *De Incarn.* 40.2 (PG 25:165).
[13] *Phld*. 8.2.
[14] Schoedel (1985), 234.
[15] Lieu (1996), 23–24. While it seems unlikely that Ignatius directly addresses Jews who have shown no interest in Christianity at all, it is probable that he 'brings an indictment against Judaism as a whole' (Robinson [2009: 151]); this is natural for a group whose identity was 'most sharply defined at points where the Christian community was reshaping the boundaries or revising the core of its Jewish heritage' (Robinson [2009: 142]). It is sufficient here to highlight the presence of Jews as a party contending for both adherence and interpretative licence over certain memories, within the same polemical arena in which Ignatius also operated and contended. For ease, I use the term 'Jews' to refer to these, and 'Judaisers' to refer to those who accept Christ in some measure. See Zetterholm (2003), 203–11.

'is better.'[16] This tussle between Ignatius and those Jews who deny Christ might be understood as a contested claim to direct and interpret the memory of the early church. If the language Ignatius uses against Judaism is 'sharp, sweeping, uncompromisingly dismissive, and perhaps even shameful,'[17] this betrays Ignatius' polemical effort to discount the legitimacy of the Christ-denying Jews, by delegitimising their interpretation of communal memories. Both parties remember and revere the same patriarchs, prophets, and scriptures, as foundations of their faith. Yet whereas the one understands them as forerunners to Christ, to be remembered insofar as they relate to him, the other denies this association, and wishes them to be remembered as founders in their own right, whose provisions for piety and religious observance pertain to this day. These Ignatius seems to call 'erroneous teachings' and 'ancient myths,' which those who live in accordance with Judaism still practise.[18] These practices, as well as their memory and its interpretation, are παλαιοί[19]—a word Ignatius uses elsewhere to mean that directly opposed to, and abolished by, God.[20] Not only are they ancient or obsolete, but also 'bad,' 'stale and sour' yeast which must give way to the new leaven, Jesus Christ.[21] Ignatius argues that without the addition of Christ, these memories and practices of Judaism will continue to ferment and fester, bringing forth fruit tending towards corruption and displeasing to God.[22] Failure to remember and enact what it means to live κατὰ Χριστιανισμόν results in not belonging to, or being of, God.[23] Such strong language reflects how the interpretation of collectively-held memories functioned as boundary markers for group identity, often antagonistically situated.

[16] *Phld*. 9.1.
[17] Robinson (2009), ix.
[18] *Mag*. 8.1
[19] *Mag*. 8.1, 9.1.
[20] *Ephes*. 19.3; see Schoedel (1985), 119.
[21] *Mag*. 10.2.
[22] *Mag*. 10.2.
[23] *Mag*. 10.1.

Yet it appears that Ignatius also faces a more insidious problem than Jews who reject Christ altogether. His appeals to the scriptures and the figures therein also seem to be aimed against Judaising Christians,[24] who, despite their acceptance of Christ, 'still live according to Judaism,' and thus deny the 'grace' which comes through Christ.[25] His aim in recalling the scriptures is to ensure that his audience's interpretation of them accords with Christ, for 'the most godly prophets lived according to Christ Jesus.'[26] To interpret the prophets without reference to Christ is to misconstrue them completely, since 'they believed in him,' and expected him 'as their teacher.'[27] Molland believes Ignatius understands the prophets as 'Christians already, not Jews,' judging from the difficult *Magnesians* 9.[28] But whatever label people profess to have, unless they mention Jesus Christ, Ignatius regards them as 'gravestones and tombs of the dead, upon which only people's names have been written.'[29] Despite using language which anticipates later formulations, Vall's summary of the relation between scripture and Christ is consonant with Ignatius' words on the subject: 'Among those realities that can be called λόγος θεοῦ, Jesus Christ is the prime analogate. He alone is Word of God in a definitive and unqualified sense, while Scripture is the "word of God" by virtue of its economic participation in the mystery of Christ.'[30]

There is in Ignatius a relentless and unquestioning Christo-centrism to the act of remembering. It is taken for granted that Christ is the key that unlocks the entirety of history; this

[24] Much has been written about the precise nature of Ignatius' Judaising opponents: e.g. Boyarin (2018), Myllykoski (2005), Goulder (1999), Lieu (1996, chapters 2 and 8), Sumney (1993), Barrett (1976). See especially Marshall (2005), who helpfully problematises definitions involved in this discussion, and suggests that the heat of Ignatius' wrath towards his opponents stems from insecurity about his actual degree of separation from them. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that the Judaisers 'see a different sort of continuity between Judaism and Christianity than Ignatius allows' (Sumney [1993: 359]). Whether or not Ignatius wrote to any churches in which Judaising practices were observed, he surely writes to guard against such an eventuality occurring. Note the first-person plural at *Mag*. 8.1: 'For if *we* still live according to Judaism, *we* admit not to have received grace.' There seems to be a large element of intra-ecclesial tension reflected here.
[25] *Mag*. 8.1.
[26] *Mag*. 8.2.
[27] *Phld*. 5.2; *Mag*. 9.2.
[28] Molland (1954), 3–4.
[29] *Phld*. 6.1.
[30] Vall (2013), 31.

is why Ignatius can make the paradoxical statement 'Christianity did not believe in Judaism, but Judaism in Christianity.'[31] No history, whether before or after his coming, is understood correctly unless it is understood in the light of Christ—whose gospel has become the 'untouchable archives.'[32] Temporal succession would appear to be a matter of little importance: all events and personages, insofar as they have any abiding significance in God, come to him through the 'door' that is Christ.[33] But as the communal act of remembrance has been turned on its head by Christ, so does this hermeneutical assumption direct the congregations' present and future. This last statement is made against those who believe faith in Christ and the practice of Judaism to be compatible. Judaism and the prophets were good and necessary insofar as they proclaimed Christ beforehand, but they were incomplete; now that we have the gospel, the 'imperishable finished work,' it would be madness to cling to what was only ever intended to be provisional.[34] Indeed, the church should cease from divisions based on such quibbling, and come together in the 'unity of God'[35]—the same unity that encompasses all the historical figures the church remembers to partake in salvation history.[36]

Ignatius' Christo-centric lens for remembering is at once both a theological statement—a move of supersessionism, relegating the self-sufficiency of Judaism at a stroke—and a means of reinforcing the collective identity of the congregations to whom he writes. He lays down a rule concerning those who persist in their Judaism, and refuse properly to confess Christ: they are to him 'gravestones and tombs of the dead,' squarely outside the church's boundaries.[37] They are in fact pawns of the 'ruler of this age,' whose schemes work to disrupt the unity enjoyed by the church.[38]

[31] *Mag*. 10.3.
[32] *Phld*. 8.2.
[33] *Phil*. 9.1.
[34] *Phld*. 9.2 (trans. Holmes); cf. Gal. 3:22–25.
[35] *Phld*. 8.1.
[36] *Phld*. 9.1.
[37] *Phld*. 6.1.
[38] *Phld*. 6.2.

Like the docetists and non-Christians, the definition of these people as opposed to, and other than, the genuine Christian community, works to strengthen the bonds which unite the church.[39]

It is sometimes said that Ignatius understands the prophets and patriarchs as types of Christ. Of course, that they dwelt on earth and preached before Christ is sure, and Ignatius certainly believes them to have 'anticipated' Christ, 'hoped in him and awaited him…[and] believed in him.'[40] Yet I believe he rather understands Christ himself as the type of the prophets, the mould to which they conformed. Vall is right to comment that for Ignatius, 'the Old Testament prophets did not simply foresee the coming of Christ but participated in his mystery proleptically.'[41] Christ is described as 'the door [θύρα] of the Father, through which [δι᾽ ἧς] Abraham and Isaac and Jacob and the prophets and the apostles and the church enter in: all these come into the unity of God.'[42] Ignatius' image of a door, to whose dimensions these heroes of Israel must conform to enter into God's unity, surely grants Christ the status of 'pattern' or 'mould.' It is conceivable that Ignatius here obliquely refers to 1 Corinthians 10:1, the Pauline epistle he appears to know best.[43] Paul tells the Corinthians that

> our fathers were all under the cloud, and all passed through the sea [πάντες διὰ τῆς θαλάσσης διῆλθον], and all were baptized into Moses in the cloud and in the sea, and all ate the same supernatural food and all drank the same supernatural drink. For they drank from the supernatural Rock which followed them, and the Rock was Christ.[44]

The image of the patriarchs 'passing through' a significant, but ultimately provisional, stage in their salvation history, invites a complement, which Ignatius finds in the image of Christ the door, through whom these same heroes not only pass, but in fact 'enter in' (εἰσέρχονται). Whereas the people of Israel passed through the sea into the uncertain and desolate 'wilderness,' where many desired evil,

[39] Cf. *Mag*. 10.2.
[40] *Phld*. 5.2.
[41] Vall (2013), 32.
[42] *Phld*. 9.1.
[43] Foster (2005), 164–67.
[44] 1 Cor. 10:1–4 (RSV).

displeased God, and were 'overthrown' (vv. 5–6), the church, along with its sanctioned heroes—the patriarchs, the prophets, and the apostles—through Christ enter into the 'unity of God,' a reality which appears to be in some sense completed. Abraham, Isaac and Jacob appear to have represented to early Christians genuine piety among the dross of misinterpretation and hardheartedness which otherwise characterised Judaism; Barnabas also singles out these three, calling them 'great in God's sight.'[45] In any case, in a manner consistent with Paul in 1 Corinthians 10, Ignatius appears to envisage Christ as the form and model by which all heroes of faith have lived, and through whom they have entered the unity of God.[46]

As well as this description, the Christological formula used in *Magnesians* 6.1, that Jesus Christ 'before the ages was with the Father and appeared at the end,' suggests that Ignatius held some sort of (possibly nascent) conception of the pre-existence,[47] or perhaps even co-eternality of Christ. His potential familiarity with Paul's idea that Christ was the spiritual Rock following the Israelites would support some notion of Christ's pre-existent state; so too would his counsel to Polycarp to await the one who is 'above time, the Eternal, the Invisible, who for us became visible.'[48]

But like other early Christian writers, Christ's pre-existence was only interesting to Ignatius insofar as it was balanced with his appearing lately in the end or present time.[49] Appearing to draw what little eschatology he expresses from Paul,[50] Ignatius understands Christians to exist in a world radically changed by Christ:

> All magic was dispersed, every spell vanished, the ignorance of evil destroyed, and the old kingdom laid waste, when God appeared in human form to bring about the newness of eternal life. That which had been prepared by God began to take hold; from which point all things were in a state of upheaval, because the abolition of death was being effected.[51]

[45] *Barn*. 8.4 (trans. Holmes, 405); cf. 6.8.
[46] *Phld*. 9.1.
[47] Burghardt (1940), 132.
[48] *Pol*. 3.2.
[49] *Ephes*. 11.1; cf. 1 Pet. 1:20; John 1:1–18.
[50] E.g. 1 Cor. 10:11.
[51] *Ephes*. 19.3.

Of course, Ignatius is keenly aware of the presence of demonic forces still active in the world. Yet the manner in which history has changed does not seem to depend so crucially upon the second coming of Christ, as upon his recent manifestation. In fact, the absence of such language exhorting expectation of Christ's next appearance is striking, particularly compared to the letters of Paul.[52] He does use the word παρουσία, but it is in clear reference to Christ's already-completed earthly appearance—the first instance of such a use in Christian literature.[53] Citing *Ephesians* 19, Bultmann notes that 'Precisely in his historical appearance the cosmic catastrophe that apocalyptic eschatology looks for in the future has already taken place.'[54] Bultmann reads Ignatius as understanding the 'paradoxical presence of the future salvation' as already at work within among the 'existence of the faithful.'[55] We need not adopt Bultmann's existentialist perspective to appreciate his broader point: Ignatius directs the gaze of the church firmly backwards, to reflect upon such a miracle as the incarnation, and its significance for the lives of Christians and the order of the church. Before the incarnation, history's saints were those who anticipated and longed for Christ's advent—the prophets and the patriarchs, who were conformed to Christ, and whom the faithful still hold in reverence;[56] since the incarnation, history's saints have been those who remember the incarnation, and through remembering represent it in themselves, becoming imitators of Christ.[57] In other words, Christ is, for Ignatius, the *telos* of all acts of remembering, the

[52] The most certain instances of this come at *Pol*. 3.2 and *Ephes*. 11.1.
[53] *Phld.* 9.2; Schoedel (1978), 104.
[54] Bultmann (1961), 272.
[55] Bultmann (1961), 272.
[56] Through the prophets' believing in Christ, they too were saved, 'since they belong to the unity centred in Jesus Christ, saints worthy of love and admiration, approved by Jesus Christ and included in the gospel of our shared hope' (*Phld*. 5.2, trans. Holmes). It is intriguing to consider whether Ignatius believes this act of salvation to have occurred only since Christ's advent, or whether this salvation was obtained proleptically, as they too 'believed in him' who has not yet appeared. There is an intriguing oscillation in this section between the poles of already realised/confirmed (the prophets are 'saved,' 'approved,' 'included') and current reality ('they belong,' 'we love,' 'our shared hope'), which may illuminate Ignatius' eschatology.
[57] *Phld.* 7.2; *Ephes*. 10.2; *Rom*. 6.3 etc. See chapters 3 and 4 below for Ignatius' notion of 'imitation of Christ.'

point from which and to which history is proceeding; and it is by living and acting 'in Jesus Christ'[58] that disciples can join history's heroes and share in the present reality that is the 'unity of God'[59] (or as Bultmann has it, 'real existence'[60]).

Ignatius' Jesus stands with the entire succession of God's people behind him; hence Ignatius too, in recalling these figures, and Christ in whose name he lives, arrogates to himself a measure of their authority. Christ is the hermeneutical key which unlocks the significance of these remembered heroes of faith. As well as those mentioned in *Philadelphians* 9.1, Ignatius traces Jesus' fleshly lineage through David.[61] Though this connection remains undeveloped, Jesus' direct relation to David surely functions similarly in proving his consummation of OT kingship and favour with God, and also demonstrates the power of the gospel and resurrection among both Jews and Gentiles, 'in the one body of his church.'[62]

The complementarity between the two dispensations is demonstrated well by Ignatius' subtle allusion to Psalm 1:3:

> Therefore seek eagerly to be established in the instructions of the Lord and the apostles, so that in whatsoever you do, you may prosper [ἵνα πάντα ὅσα ποιεῖτε, κατευοδωθῆτε], in the flesh and the spirit, in faith and love, in the Son and the Father and in the Spirit….[63]

Adhering to the Septuagint text (πάντα ὅσα ἂν ποιῇ κατευοδωθήσεται) except for necessary alteration to verb forms, while seamlessly integrating this scriptural voice into the economy now present in 'the Son and the Father and in the Spirit,' Ignatius illustrates in miniature the present dynamic between the old and new dispensations. The old and its literature, precepts, and figures, have not been abrogated but qualified and completed by the new—Christ, the archives[64]—and have

[58] *Ephes*. 8.2.
[59] *Phld*. 9.1.
[60] Bultmann (1961), 272.
[61] *Smyrn*. 1.1.
[62] *Smyrn*. 1.2.
[63] *Mag*. 13.1.
[64] *Phld*. 8.2.

therefore reached their God-intended fulfilment. Moreover, that Ignatius precedes this allusion with one of his two explicit scriptural quotations ('as it is written, The righteous one is his own accuser'[65]), demonstrates his awareness that the context of the first psalm is blessedness through the study of the law; yet now, beatitude is transformed into following the 'instructions of the Lord and the apostles.' This allusion, then, is on the one hand 'suggestive of the way the old Scriptures may be taken up into the fabric of Christian parenesis and transformed in the process;'[66] and on the other reflects Ignatius' broader attitude towards Christian memory of Old Testament *topoi*, that they must be unpacked and reinterpreted in the light of Christ in order to be usefully employed.

§3: Docetism refuted by the memory of Israel

Ignatius also speaks of the Old Testament in arguing with those who deny the reality of Christ's bodily passion. The 'prophecies' and 'the law of Moses' ought to persuade them of this truth. It is noteworthy that he mentions these in direct continuity with his 'own individual suffering,' which he sees as a most forceful witness to Christ's bodily death and resurrection.[67] There is no artificial breach between the old dispensation found in the scriptures, and the new dispensation of his own time; they are united by their single-hearted confirmation of Christ.

Indeed, Ignatius deems it inappropriate even to name the Christ-deniers, and declines to contribute towards their being remembered (ἀλλὰ μηδὲ γένοιτό μοι αὐτῶν μνημονεύειν).[68] Later, the Smyrneans are told to 'keep away from such people,' and not even to 'speak about them, whether privately or in public.' To mention them in any forum entails recollection and enhancement of their influence. Instead they should devote themselves 'to the prophets and above all to the gospel, in which the passion has been made clear to us, and the resurrection consummated.'[69] As

[65] *Mag*. 12 (Prov. 18:17, LXX).
[66] Vall (2013), 51.
[67] *Smyrn*. 5.1; *Trall*. 10.
[68] *Smyrn*. 5.3.
[69] *Smyrn*. 7.2.

they refuse to remember the reality and significance of Christ, neither should those who 'exist only in appearance' have reality conferred upon them by being committed to memory.[70] Since they decline to come together as one body to celebrate the Eucharist—the 'free gift of God,' the physical memorial of Christ's physical manifestation[71]—neither will they be held in remembrance by that same body.

Ignatius, however, as one whose physical sufferings confirm (and are confirmed by) the reality of Christ's, leaves behind the physical testimony of his letters as *loci* from which his memorialisation can derive. So he beseeches the Ephesians, 'Remember me, as Jesus Christ remembers you.'[72] The fact of being remembered is for Ignatius a powerful polemical and didactic tool. Whether one is remembered or not speaks to one's legitimacy and substantiality.[73] Ignatius, therefore, joins himself to the 'prophecies' and 'the law of Moses' (and Christ to whom all of these point) as legitimate objects of memory, reflection and authority, for future generations of Christians. *Pace* Donahue, who speaks of Ignatius' 'rejection of the Law,' and the 'radical newness of Christianity,'[74] believers are consciously positioned in continuity with the Hebrew scriptures, from which they should derive spiritual nourishment.

This is evident in Ignatius' evocation of the 'most godly' prophets. They lived according to Jesus Christ, and for this reason 'they too were persecuted, being inspired by his grace….'[75] Like Ignatius' own, the prophets' suffering guarantees their conformity to the pattern found in Christ. Ignatius esteems the apostles because 'they too looked down upon death, and were found to be above death.'[76] This line of argument, which sees suffering for Christ as a kind of confirmation of godliness, might further explain the emphasis the martyr places on the reality of his own suffering,

[70] *Smyrn*. 2.
[71] *Smyrn*. 7.1.
[72] *Ephes*. 21.1.
[73] See part II below.
[74] Donahue (1978), 87.
[75] *Mag*. 8.2.
[76] *Smyrn*. 3.2.

which he situates in direct opposition to 'certain unbelievers.'[77] For him, the moment when he may 'not only be called a Christian but also be proved to be one' will be 'whenever [he is] no longer visible to the world.'[78] It will be through suffering—through the 'fire and cross and battles with beasts, tearing, rupturing, shattering of bones, the chopping up of limbs, the grinding up of my whole body, cruel tortures of the devil'—that he might finally 'reach Jesus Christ.'[79] To be 'an imitator of the suffering of my God' is finally to become a 'human being.'[80] In the same way, it is by 'succeeding' to fight with wild beasts in Rome that Ignatius 'might be able to be a disciple.'[81] Most strikingly, perhaps, Ignatius writes that 'if I suffer, I will be a freedman of Jesus Christ and will rise again in him, free.'[82] For Ignatius, these ontological realities—humanity and discipleship—are unattainable without suffering and death.[83] Herein the seed may lay dormant which would come to fruition a few years later in Justin Martyr, for whom fraudulent 'Christians' were identifiable by their avoidance of persecution.[84] It might be said for Ignatius as well as Justin that 'the experience of persecution serves both as proof of authentic Christian identity and as the constituting element of Christian identity itself.'[85]

While it is clear that Ignatius believes his *own* Christian identity to be predicated on his present submission to suffering, and soon to death, he implies that a similar dynamic is at play at a communal level in the ἐκκλησία. The Ephesian church is said to be 'united and elected through genuine suffering [ἐν πάθει ἀληθινῷ]';[86] whatever is meant by their having 'completed perfectly the task' so natural to them, they have done so by being 'imitators of God' and having 'taken on new

[77] See *Smyrn*. 2.1–4.1.
[78] *Rom*. 3.2.
[79] *Rom*. 5.3.
[80] *Rom*. 6.3.
[81] *Ephes*. 1.2.
[82] *Rom*. 4.3.
[83] E.g. *Trall*. 5.2.
[84] Justin Martyr, *1 Apol.* 26.1, 26.6–7.
[85] Moss (2012), 84.
[86] *Ephes*. inscr.

life through the blood of God.'[87] This corresponds clearly to the letter's wider theme of Christian fellowship being confirmed through common suffering.[88] Using strongly definitional language of 'coinage' (νόμισμα) and 'stamp/character' (χαρακτήρ), Ignatius identifies two distinct coinages: one is 'of God,' the other 'of the world.' Whereas the latter bears the 'stamp of this world,' the former bears the 'stamp of God the Father through Jesus Christ.' This is further glossed by the sentence that 'his life is not among us unless we voluntarily choose to die into his suffering.'[89] It seems that sharing in Christ's suffering constitutes at least part of the proving of this godly coinage; indeed, the subsequent exhortation to unity that the Magnesians 'run together as to one temple of God, as to one altar [θυσιαστήριον],' can hardly have failed to evoke thoughts of the letting of their own blood.[90] (The ready altar [θυσιαστήριον ἕτοιμόν] is where Ignatius longs to be 'poured out as an offering to God.'[91]) In several letters Ignatius considers presence within the θυσιαστήριον ('altar'/'sanctuary'/'place of sacrifice'[92]) as a principal criterion for full membership of the Christian community.[93] The collective recollection of suffering might therefore be said to strengthen and even confirm people's identity as fellow-Christians, and thus their unity as church. As noted above, this is often presented in contradistinction to the unbelievers who deny the reality of Christ's sufferings and ignore Ignatius' own, and thus bear none of the qualities that define a Christian congregation—such as charity towards the suffering,[94] submission to ecclesial authority,[95] and participation in the Eucharist[96]—for which Ignatius condemns them to oblivion: 'Seeing as they are unbelievers, their names did not seem to me worth recording. In fact, far be it from me to remember them at all….'[97]

[87] *Ephes*. 1.1.
[88] See *Ephes*. 10.1–3, where a strong polarity is established between 'the rest of humanity' and the Ephesian congregation.
[89] *Mag*. 5.2.
[90] *Mag*. 7.2; on temple language, see pp. 26–28 below.
[91] *Rom*. 2.2 (trans. Holmes).
[92] As preferred by Bethune-Baker (1933), 404.
[93] *Trall*. 7.2; *Ephes*. 5.2; *Phld*. 4; *Mag*. 7.2.
[94] *Smyrn*. 6.2.
[95] *Smyrn*. 8.1–2.
[96] *Smyrn*. 6.2.
[97] *Smyrn*. 5.3.

Yet we see within the letter to the Smyrneans a further complication of this picture. Ignatius does not claim that it is due to their individuality or autonomy that the unbelievers will be forgotten. He is aware that they hold rival baptism and 'love feasts [ἀγάπην ποιεῖν],' not sanctioned by the one whom Ignatius considers the bishop.[98] Communality appears to have been central to their worship. Conceivably, these rival Christians may have employed similar rhetorical strategies against Ignatius as Ignatius did against them, counselling each other not to mention, meet, or remember them. Ignatius' own response to this, as we have seen, is to align himself and all who submit to the bishop with the prophets, the law, the salvation history of God's people, and to cast these as anticipating Christ's fleshly sojourn. Yet given the apparent absence of any remains of Ignatius' opponents (an eventuality which Ignatius predicted), we must admit that their argument for legitimacy may well have been based on the same prophets, yet differently interpreted.[99] Indeed, speaking about the stubbornness of docetists in the face of testimony from the prophets, the law and the gospel, Ignatius seems to concede as much: 'for they [the docetists] think the same thing about us.'[100] We are obliged at least to acknowledge that with Ignatius' opponents perished a body of memory, out of which meaning was found and culture created.[101]

§4: Memory of the scriptures transformed by Christ into a source of union

While the preceding demonstrates the polemical and sectarian use to which collective memory can be put, Ignatius also envisages that the memories shared between disparate groups are capable of drawing them into closer communion. Ignatius appears to hold that despite previous confession, practice or piety, all may come to be united in Christ. The most striking passage occurs in the

[98] *Smyrn*. 8.2.
[99] See Corwin (1960), 56–57; Molland (1954), 4; Lightfoot (1889), II.263.
[100] *Smyrn*. 5.2.
[101] See Halbwachs' discussion about the Ebionites as retaining a distinctive collective memory of Christ (1992: 226).

extended doxology of *Smyrneans* 1, where Ignatius glorifies Christ, who established the Smyrneans in a faith so unmovable as if they themselves were nailed

> to the cross of the Lord Jesus Christ in both flesh and spirit, and firmly set up in love by the blood of Christ, absolutely convinced about our Lord's being truly of the family of David according to the flesh, Son of God according to [God's] will and power, truly born of a virgin, baptised by John so that all righteousness might be fulfilled by him, truly nailed in the flesh for our sake under Pontius Pilate and Herod the tetrarch—from the fruit of which we exist, from his God-blessed suffering—so that he might set up a banner for the ages through [his] resurrection for his holy and faithful people, whether among Jews or among Gentiles, in the one body of his church.[102]

This 'semi-credal,'[103] enthusiastic passage occurring at the beginning of the epistle might be seen as preparing common ground between Ignatius and his readers through the establishment of shared memories. Styled as an expression of praise for Christ and the Smyrneans, this chapter outlines key remembrances of Christ's existence, while performing multiple tasks:

1. Ignatius believes that these aspects of Christ's existence are (or will be) affirmed by the congregation there, and so establishes agreement upon which his letter and its exhortations can build. Historical fact surrounding Jesus' death, and oppression by ruling forces,[104] becomes a point of commonality.
2. It excludes certain people for whom Jesus' 'true' (ἀληθῶς) and full experience of life and suffering did not form part of their memory of him. Henceforth Ignatius addresses only those for whom it does, and who themselves live as if crucified (cf. Gal. 2:20; 2 Cor. 4:10).
3. By making reference to Jesus' fleshly relation to David, Ignatius acknowledges and indeed emphasises his heritage among the champions of Israel, and perhaps hints at his fulfilment of prophecy.[105] As in the genealogies of Luke and Matthew, Jesus is here presented as falling

[102] *Smyrn*. 1.1–2.
[103] Schoedel (1985), 220.
[104] See Joslyn-Siemiatkoski (2009).
[105] See Isa. 11:1; cf. Rom. 1:2–3.

within the story of God's chosen people and OT messianic expectation.[106] Yet Ignatius does not wish thereby to delimit Christian identity, but goes on to say that Christ's 'holy and faithful people'[107] might be found 'among Jews [and] among Gentiles, in the one body of his church.'[108] David is not to be remembered as the root out of which a messiah would spring and lead the Jews to victory in an earthly battle, nor as property solely of the Jews, but as the ancestor of a crucified saviour for all. Ignatius performs the same act of memorial 'de-particularisation' in relation to the Jerusalem Temple.[109] Previously the domain of Jews alone, Ignatius transforms the image to include Gentiles as well, by characterising his addressees as temples themselves—perhaps following Paul.[110] God is no longer to be understood as specially present in a particular building, but 'dwells in [κατοικεῖν ἐν]' believers.[111] The Ephesians are elsewhere described as 'stones of a temple [λίθοι ναοῦ],' who are formed into a 'building [οἰκοδομή] of God the Father, carried up into the heights by the crane of Jesus Christ, which is the cross, using the Holy Spirit as a rope.'[112] In both the case of David and the Temple, Ignatius 'de-particularises' a figure which has previously been

[106] See above §2. Pioske (2015) argues that early Christians' memory of ancient Israel was handed on through knowledge of and reference to the physical landscape, in dialogue with textual sources.

[107] ἅγιοι καὶ πιστοί is contrasted immediately by Ignatius' polemical passage (*Smyrn*. 2.1–7.2a) against the ἄπιστοι (2.1). See Sumney (1993), 349.

[108] Vall (2013: 291) considers 'banner' (σύσσημον) to be a conscious allusion to 'a whole trajectory of prophecies from the book of Isaiah.' Cf. Zetterholm (2003), 203–11.

[109] Although none of his uses of the term ναός demands identification with the Jerusalem Temple, it is highly likely that it is at least an intended resonance, as in Paul. See Regev (2019), 66–67, and n.110 below.

[110] See 1 Cor. 3:16–17, 6:19; 2 Cor. 6:16; Eph. 2:20–22. Regev (2019: 54) argues that Paul 'uses Temple imagery to illustrate God's acceptance of Jews and Gentiles alike—a sense of belonging to God.' Regev's account demonstrates that Paul's use of temple language implies 'acknowledgement rather than replacement' of the Jerusalem Temple, since clearly 'the Jerusalem Temple does not cease to have religious significance for Paul' (68). Paul speaks of the Christian life in terms of the temple and 'Jewish' cult because of its rich conceptual and ethical resonances, but transforms it to make it accessible to non-Jewish Christians (90). Frey (2012: 460) disagrees, holding that 'the Temple played no major role in the constitution of [the] new identity' of Paul's addressees. Regev does admit that the cultic imageries Paul derives from this are 'multiple, diverse, and duplicated and do not cohere in a holistic, integral whole' (85). Of course, an essential difference between Paul and Ignatius in this regard is that whereas Paul can visit the Temple (and even sees fit to participate in ritual purification and offerings there according to Acts 21:26), Ignatius writes in the light of its physical destruction. However, I believe both evoke the Temple because of associations with the presence of God, sanctity, and purity, but transform its former exclusivity into radical Christian inclusivity of Jew and Gentile alike.

[111] *Ephes*. 15.3.

[112] *Ephes*. 9.1; cf. 1 Pet. 2:5.

uniquely 'Jewish,' and recasts it as the property of all believers, both Jew and Gentile. 'Two historical eras of redemption' are united in the church: 'the period of the old covenant, in which God sent his word to Israel; and the age of the new covenant, in which the gospel is proclaimed to all the nations.'[113] Whereas Ignatius' stress on Christ's physical reality functioned to exclude some would-be 'Christians,' his evocation of David (like the Temple) is made to unite and include. To my knowledge, no academic research has found that Ignatius faced opponents who denied the legitimacy of the Old Testament; in fact, many of his opponents seem better versed in scripture than he.[114] Since Gentiles were integrated into the community which remembered the figures and events of the Hebrew scriptures in relation to Christ, the appeal to the memory of David contributes to the laying of common ground between the community at Smyrna (almost certainly drawn from Jewish and Gentile milieux[115]) and Ignatius, united in the one body of the church.

This reading is confirmed by many of the passages mentioned above in relation to the construction of Christian identity in distinction to another group. Christ provides the means by which all those who remember the patriarchs and the old dispensation can be brought together, whatever their previous identity. Christ is the door through whom all the scriptural heroes, the prophets, the apostles and the church can 'enter in' and 'come into the unity of God.'[116] Christ is not the 'possession' of the church or the apostles, but himself enfolds the entire saving history of God. Christ can be remembered and thence represented by all.[117] The Magnesian congregation, composed of some who at least question Christianity's relationship to its history in Judaism,[118] are exhorted to 'run together as to one temple of God, as to one altar, to one Jesus Christ, who came forth from one

[113] Vall (2013), 291.
[114] See *Phld*. 8.2.
[115] See Cadoux (1938), 312, 319.
[116] *Phld*. 9.1.
[117] However, Ignatius clearly acknowledges that it is not a matter of simply remembering Christ, but frequently stresses the necessity of faith and love for the remembrance of the 'gospel' (*Phld*. 5.2, 8.2, 9.2; *Trall*. 9.2).
[118] Sumney (1993), 360–64.

Father and was with the One and returned [to the One].'[119] Ignatius evokes these images pertaining to Jewish sacrificial practice in order to reinterpret them in the light of Christ's sacrifice as a source and archetype of union, which the Magnesians should engender in their own communal life. It is no coincidence that almost all Ignatius' references to the scriptural champions occur in relation to the unity found in God.[120] Indeed, the thrust of Ignatius' proposition that Christianity did not believe in Judaism, but Judaism in Christianity,[121] appears to be that 'Christianity has supplanted Judaism as the means by which mankind as a whole (πᾶσα γλῶσσα) is brought to God.'[122] The openness and universal accessibility of Christianity expresses God's unity more than the narrow election and exclusivism of the Jews ever could.

Here it may be of interest to apply Halbwachs' distinction between 'historical memory' (of moments before the lifetime of the rememberers), and 'autobiographical memory' (of moments witnessed by the rememberers themselves).[123] The collective memory held by Ignatius' communities of their scriptural heritage is naturally 'historical,' and as such must be maintained by 'reading or listening or in commemoration and festive occasions.'[124] By the early second century, few if any eyewitnesses of the first formative events of Christianity were still alive, and so memory of this too was largely historical. Yet in the figure of the martyr, whose continuity with the Hebrew scriptures and the person of Christ is understood, the community's historical memory is in a sense transfigured into autobiographical, as they become witnesses to the re-instantiation, narrative and ontological, of these historical figures and events.[125] Ignatius' refreshing and reifying of Christians' memory does not supplant their continued historical memory of important *topoi*, which continue

[119] *Mag*. 7.2.
[120] *Mag*. 7.2; *Phld*. 5.2, 6.1–2, 9.1; *Smyrn*. 1.1–2, 7.2–8.1.
[121] *Mag*. 10.3.
[122] Barrett (1976), 236.
[123] Outlined in Coser (1992), 23–24.
[124] Coser (1992), 24.
[125] Cf. Krueger (2004: 194): 'To the extent that they emulated Christ himself, holy men and women made Christ legible in their bodies, became representations of the Logos enfleshed—textual bodies.'

to be celebrated communally, but supplements it, adding another dimension to their understanding.[126]

§5: Conclusion

I have outlined some of the ways in which Ignatius draws from the reserves of memory held within early Christian communities, and how he enlists these in the service of strengthening the cohesion and identity of his own community; I have also shown how this is sometimes achieved through an ostracisation of others, whether on the basis of their misinterpretation of their memories and blindness to Christ revealed therein, or because of their own insubstantiality, which quickly leads to their being forgotten. Community is therefore constructed on the basis of shared remembrances correctly interpreted. Memories shared, whether experienced at first-hand or inherited through traditions and stories, constitute and contribute towards the communal identity of those who remember together.[127] Ultimately, however, Christ being the centre-point of history, towards whom the prophets strove, and upon whom Christians now reflect, the 'imperishable' gospel of his suffering and resurrection is the memory through which people of all backgrounds can be united in faith.[128]

The preceding has advanced the interpretative potential which the notion of memory holds for the middle recension letters of Ignatius. I continue this same line of inquiry in chapter 2, which turns to the presence of memories that stem from the extra-Christian thought-world of the ancient Mediterranean.

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[126] As the second century wears on, Ignatius too transitions from being the subject of 'autobiographical' to 'historical memory.' See parts II and III below.

[127] The connection between memory and identity is often left undeveloped in memory studies; see Kansteiner (2002), 184. For a preliminary attempt, see J. Assmann (1995).

[128] *Phld*. 9.2.

Chapter 2: Ignatius' Inheritance of 'Extra-Christian' Memory

According to one scholar, 'it is clear that Ignatius takes a religious and cultural world for granted and that it includes elements not readily classifiable as biblical.'[1] Another can state that 'Ignatius borrowed from the political vocabulary and imagery of contemporary civic ideals to achieve a unique theological appropriation of Hellenistic commonplaces.'[2] Ignatius' written legacy bears witness to an education outside the confines of synagogue and church. We now turn to this sphere, and attempt to discern some aspects of the pagan[3] and imperial remembrances upon which he draws, and the manner in which he transforms these in his letters.

The considerable number of parallels between the MR and Plutarch are one quantifiable metric by which the scale of Ignatius' debt to Hellenistic thought and culture may be demonstrated.[4] The possibility that Hellenising gnostic elements are present in his letters always merits consideration in studies of Ignatius.[5] His understanding of the Christian communal gathering is at least partially indebted to the pre-existing model of the Hellenistic club; both are characterised by social obligations and a common sense of purpose.[6] Brent believes that Ignatius consciously styles elements of his martyrdom procession upon the *homonoia* treaties agreed between two city-states in the second sophistic, and the imperial cult;[7] although I take exception to aspects of his thesis (see §3.2 below), Brent succeeds in citing numerous resemblances between Ignatius and writers such as

[1] Schoedel (1985), 15.
[2] Maier (2005), 323.
[3] Although conscious of the difficulties surrounding the word 'pagan,' like Alan Cameron, I use it non-pejoratively for its convenient synthesis of meanings touching 'non-Christian,' 'non-Jewish,' and 'polytheistic,' as well as for its association with cults, imperial and otherwise; see Alan Cameron (2011), chapter 1.
[4] See Betz (1975 & 1978), and §2 below.
[5] Most notably the works of Schlier (1929) and Bartsch (1940).
[6] Schoedel (1985), 270; Kloppenborg (2006).
[7] Brent (2007), 52.

Dio Chrysostom, which underscore Ignatius' participation in the philosophies and paradigms of his time.[8]

Schoedel's observation that 'the boundary between true and false Christians is drawn more sharply by Ignatius than the boundary between the churches and their immediate environment' must be considered.[9] Despite speaking trenchantly against the folly and cruelty of non-Christians,[10] and even noting how the world's hatred of Christianity in fact nurtures its growth,[11] Ignatius elsewhere counsels against giving pagans offence or reason to despise Christians, appearing almost conciliatory.[12] His stance toward pagan thought and culture may resemble Augustine's notion of spoiling the Egyptians, whereby what has been truthfully said and done among the heathen may, and indeed ought to, be appropriated by Christians in service of the gospel.[13] Akin to Christ the Door's sanctification of pre-Christian figures,[14] even pagan practice might to some extent be brought into the unity of God by being performed 'in Christ'; as Ignatius writes to the Ephesians, 'even the things you do according to the flesh are spiritual, because you do everything in Jesus Christ.'[15]

§1: Antioch

Ignatius' letters are often used to supplement scholarship's reconstruction of its—somewhat 'irregular and deficient'[16]—profile of first-century Antioch, both its ecclesial situation and the wider cultural climate; but it is also important to read Ignatius informed by what we know of Antioch from other sources. If 'Ignatius is essentially a witness to the Christian tradition as it was known and

[8] Brent (2007).
[9] Schoedel (1985), 14.
[10] E.g. *Ephes*. 10.1–2.
[11] *Rom*. 3.3.
[12] E.g. *Trall*. 8.2.
[13] *On Christian Doctrine* 2.40.60.
[14] *Phld*. 9.1.
[15] *Ephes*. 8.2.
[16] Downey (1961), 8; see pp. 35–37 below.

practised in Antioch,'[17] he is also no less essentially subject to the influences of cultural and intellectual inheritance which affected all, to greater or lesser extent, in the metropolis. This dynamic is precisely what this first part, and particularly this chapter, sets out to explore.

Although reconstructing the life and tenor of a city from which we are so far removed as first-century Antioch can render only provisional results, it can be said with some certainty that Antioch was intensely cosmopolitan. Favoured for its proximity to numerous trade routes, it was, in its time, the third most important city of the empire, after Rome and Alexandria.[18] Antioch was a major commercial centre, home to a large Jewish population since its foundation, and a palimpsest of the mores of successive ages and rulers—a melting pot of people drawn from all nations and cultures.[19] The city was also endowed with a rich diversity in religiosity, containing 'not only the old established Hellenic cults, of Zeus, Apollo, and the rest of the pantheon, but the Syrian cults of Baal and the mother-goddess—partly assimilated to Zeus and Artemis—as well as the mystery religions.'[20] Libanius speaks of Antioch as a veritable magnet for foreign gods.[21] Since 'it was from this cosmopolitan population that the Christian Church drew its members,'[22] Ignatius would have been well aware that pagan and local references, metaphors, and cultural assumptions served as common currency among the congregation to whom he ministers. It is natural that Ignatius appropriates non-Christian expression in his correspondence with other churches, as it forms his established mode of communicating with the faithful and expounding Christian truth.

For example, Ignatius demonstrates a generous and colourful use of metaphor in his letters, particularly those that include an agonistic element. Several times he evokes the image of the victorious, virtuous 'athlete,'[23] even indulging in an extended characterisation of Polycarp's flock as

[17] Barnard (1963), 205; see Corwin (1960), 30.
[18] At least by Josephus' count; *BJ* 3.29.
[19] Downey (1963), 11, 21–22.
[20] Downey (1963), 120.
[21] *Or.* 11.110–17.
[22] Barnard (1963), 196.
[23] *Pol*. 1.3, 2.3, 3.1.

athletes and soldiers: 'Work alongside one another: train together, run together, suffer together, rest together, awake together, as God's stewards, assistants, and servants.'[24] While it is true in general that 'Ignatius and his audiences were bound together in a social memory of the arena and amphitheatre as a potent cultural locus,'[25] a more specific source for this allusion might be Antioch's particular celebrity across the empire as the location of games that would come to be known as Olympic. Founded under Augustus by Sosibius, a senator of Antioch, these games would come to be 'one of the most famous festivals of the Roman world,' lasting 30 days and held every four years.[26] Memory of this festival may well have influenced the images and vocabulary reached for by Ignatius in describing Christian duty. Even if many of the faithful to whom he wrote had never travelled to Antioch for the games, knowledge of the great festival would likely be transmitted to them through accounts shared by acquaintances and through its popularisation in vernacular.

Barnard argues that Ignatius demonstrates a familiarity with metaphor attesting a particularly oriental and Semitic origin current in Antioch.[27] There are indeed many common features between the language of Ignatius and the so-called *Odes of Solomon*, a work tentatively dated to the first quarter of the second century AD, and originally written either in Greek or Syriac.[28] Two of its recent editors comment that 'links between the epistles of Ignatius and the *Odes of Solomon* do not mandate Antioch as the place of origin but do strongly suggest Syria as the area.'[29] Images in the MR like that of the tree, its offshoots and plantings, also drawn upon by Paul in Romans 11:16–24, are strongly paralleled in the *Odes*;[30] so too is Ignatius' 'well-woven spiritual crown.'[31] The 'reek of the teaching of the ruler of this age' mentioned in *Ephesians* 17.1,[32] and

[24] *Pol*. 6.1.
[25] Maier (2017), 221–22; cf. Tuck (2013).
[26] Downey (1963), 81–82.
[27] Barnard (1963), 196.
[28] Ehrhardt and Attridge (2009), 7–11.
[29] Ehrhardt and Attridge (2009), 11.
[30] *Trall*. 11.1–2; *Odes* 38.17–19.
[31] *Mag*. 13.1; *Odes* 1.
[32] See *Odes* 18.11.

Ignatius' evocation of 'rabid dogs,'[33] appeal to a body of metaphor cultivated in such an environment.

Antioch is also conspicuous among almost all other great ancient cities (until the fourth century AD, at least) for its *loss* of memory: that is, the striking paucity of records—epigraphic, municipal and scholarly—and remembrances concerning the metropolis and its common life. Downey describes our knowledge of Antioch as 'irregular and deficient,'[34] especially concerning subjects about which we usually learn from epigraphic sources. Indeed, 'in the early Roman Imperial period, Antioch furnishes virtually nothing of the evidence for municipal life and imperial administration that is supplied by inscriptions elsewhere in the eastern provinces.'[35] Our knowledge about its 'cults, festivals, and dedications' is similarly sparse.[36] While naturalistic causes may have contributed towards this collective amnesia (such as earthquakes and fires which necessitated reuse of materials bearing inscriptional matter[37]), the extent of the loss seems to suggest a more intriguing reason:

> Considering the general scarcity of literary texts concerning the early church, the limitations of our knowledge of this phase of the history of Antioch are perhaps not surprising. In another area, however, it seems less easy to account for our lack of information. This is the intellectual history of the city… [T]he sum of our information is in no way comparable to what we know of elsewhere in the Hellenistic world.[38]

Downey poses the question 'whether Antioch may not have been less of a literary and scientific centre than the other Hellenistic capitals and Athens.'[39] Does the fact that 'no Greek region has fewer memorial stones or fewer inscriptions to show'[40] imply some collective apathy on the part of

[33] *Ephes.* 7.1; *Odes* 28.13–14; *Odes* 38.14; cf. Phil. 3:2.
[34] Downey (1961), 8.
[35] Downey (1961), 6–7.
[36] Downey (1961), 6.
[37] Downey (1961), 6.
[38] Downey (1961), 7.
[39] Downey (1961), 8.
[40] Barnard (1963), 205.

Antioch towards future memorialisation of itself and its inhabitants? Is it possible that ancient Antiochenes, including those in Ignatius' own time, ascribed less value to being remembered by posterity than those in comparable centres of culture, such as Ephesus?

If any such lack of concern about self-memorialisation did in fact exist among pagan individual agents and collective institutions at Antioch, the importance Ignatius ascribes to memorialisation becomes all the more striking. His frequent appeals that the congregations to whom he writes should remember him and his Syrian church in their prayers form the coda to most of his letters, summed up by the exhortation to the Ephesians: 'Remember me, as Jesus Christ remembers you.'[41] As will be explored in part II, his letters themselves constitute material expressions of Ignatius' will to be memorialised, and bear witness to this fact. It is despite, or perhaps only through, his bodily absence that he will 'truly be a disciple of Jesus Christ,'[42] that he will be a 'word of God,' not 'only a voice.'[43] Polycarp, perhaps while Ignatius was still alive,[44] demonstrates an early interest in collecting and disseminating Ignatius' letters.[45] It is intriguing to consider that such an impetus towards self-memorialisation might have been formed in an environment apathetic towards oblivion, and have been strengthened by this very contrast.

For Ignatius, the fact of being remembered is a blessing, and one that has been divinely endorsed. The Ephesians are told that they are remembered by Jesus Christ, and are trusted to respond in kind to Ignatius.[46] Like other expressions of positive relationality such as loving,[47] thanksgiving,[48] and encouraging[49] evinced in the Pauline and Johannine correspondence, remembering is understood as a mutual act whose origin lies ultimately in God's revelation in Christ;

[41] *Ephes*. 21.1–2; *Mag*. 14.1; *Trall*. 13.1; *Rom*. 9.1.
[42] *Rom*. 4.2.
[43] *Rom*. 2.1.
[44] His words—'concerning Ignatius himself and those who are with him, if you learn anything more certain, tell us' (Pol. *Phil.* 13.2)—seem to suggest that confirmation of Ignatius' fate had not yet reached Smyrna.
[45] Pol. *Phil.* 13.2.
[46] *Ephes*. 21.1.
[47] 1 John 4:19; Eph. 6:23.
[48] Rom. 1:8; 1 Cor. 1:4; Phil. 1:3–5.
[49] Rom. 1:12.

one might even go as far as to describe this as resembling a triangular dynamic of grace, whose movement between two Christian subjects is supplied by and returned to God. The inverse is also true: those who deny Jesus are more properly to be known as those who 'have been denied by him';[50] Ignatius immediately goes on to assert that 'their names did not seem to me worth recording. In fact, far be it from me to remember them at all, until they should have a change of heart regarding the passion.'[51] There appears to be a particularly Christian impulse towards remembering, derived from the God from whom 'nothing is hidden,'[52] which may have been in strong contradistinction to the civic climate of Ignatius' Antioch.

§2: Ignatius and the pagan cult

The similarities between the words of Plutarch and those of Ignatius, filling nearly five columns of index references in Betz's two editions,[53] give a sense of the indebtedness of Ignatius to his non-Christian intellectual and social culture more generally. One particularly striking example is Plutarch's description of Typhon as one 'who is himself and in himself the unmixed and dispassionate Reason, but is made spurious by matter through the corporeal element.'[54] The reader of Ignatius is immediately reminded of his description of Jesus as ἀπαθής (*Ephes*. 7.2; *Pol*. 3.2), the almost playful ambiguity between λόγος and mere 'talking' with regard to Jesus and Ignatius himself (*Ephes*. 15.1–2; *Rom*. 2.1), and Ignatius' concern with the corrupting potential of corporeal matter (e.g. *Rom*. 3.3; 6.2). This is not to posit direct dependence, but to demonstrate the permeability of philosophical boundaries separating Christian and pagan milieux. Ignatius, like all early Christians, drew from the wellspring that was existing philosophical and prosaic reflection in order to articulate

[50] *Smyrn*. 5.1.
[51] *Smyrn*. 5.3.
[52] *Ephes*. 15.3.
[53] Betz (1975), 356; Betz (1978), 566.
[54] *Is. et Or.* 373B (trans. Griffiths, 204–5): λόγος αὐτὸς καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἀμιγὴς καὶ ἀπαθής, ἀλλὰ νενοθευμένος τῇ ὕλῃ διὰ τὸ σωματικόν.

the gospel and its significance. But beyond this general observation, what can we say specifically about Ignatius' correspondence with pagan ideas? Further, what implications does this have for our understanding of the memories he shares with his congregations?

We might start from the broad base built for us by Riesenfeld, writing in the early 1960s. For him, the writings of Ignatius demonstrate that the 'first step in the Hellenization of the Christian Gospel has already been accomplished.'[55] Ignatius' style allows us to conjecture about his education, which Riesenfeld believes was lacking in philosophy but adequate in Greek rhetoric, since 'he exhibits a solid command of the language and moreover was able to work out his letters in a consistently applied literary form in spite of the hardships of his journey.'[56] He even suggests that 'a pleader in a law court in Antioch, an advocate or a local politician' may all be likely professions for Ignatius, before or possibly while being a Christian.[57] Joly similarly praises Ignatius' mastery of rhetoric,[58] while for de Halleux, the letters 'obéissaient…aux règles du style «asianique», répandu dans les écoles de rhétorique de tout l'Orient aux premiers siècles de notre ère.'[59] Ignatius draws from a range of 'images and metaphors' probably acquired in his education:

> He mentions the physician and medicine, wounds and bandages, fever and wet compresses, he speaks of musical instruments and the harmony of strings, when he wants to exhort the congregations to concord. The vessel taking shelter in a harbour and the sailor waiting for fair wind are well-known figures, and the competing athlete is an appropriate symbol in a letter of exhortation.[60]

In other words, Ignatius appears to be one thoroughly comfortable with the workings of the Greek world of his time, its colloquialism and expression.

[55] Riesenfeld (1961), 312.
[56] Riesenfeld (1961), 317.
[57] Riesenfeld (1961), 317.
[58] Joly (1979), 95: 'les *Lettres*…témoignent d'une rhétorique asianiste fort bien maîtrisée et même virtuose.'
[59] De Halleux (1982), 21.
[60] Riesenfeld (1961), 317.

Even the dynamic between Ignatius and the communities to which he writes evident in his letters can be seen to be based upon civic societal values proper to the ancient Mediterranean. Writing with explicitly sociological methodology and aims, Malina argues that Ignatius' presumption upon the hospitality of fellow Christians 'implies a set of social expectations,' which he broadly identifies as the consensual legal contract known as *societas*.[61] Partnerships of this nature—involving mutual obligations, sharing of goods and losses—had a long pedigree, and were widely practised throughout the ancient world; indeed, the Christian movement's integration of *societas* into their own notions of community and κοινωνία has been recognised.[62] That Ignatius is indebted to this pre-existing social feature, and demonstrates it in his own writing in a number of ways (see §3.1 on *homonoia*), is not surprising, but exemplifies how important it was for Ignatius that he and his addressees shared non-Christian points of reference.

§2.1: Mysteries and processions

Discussing Ignatius' several colourful metaphorical passages in his letter to the Ephesians, Lightfoot noted his 'vivid appeal to the local experiences of an Ephesian audience.'[63] Harland takes his lead from this observation, going on to demonstrate the intimate connections between images evoked in Ignatius' letters and the cult of his Greek pagan backdrop. He sets out to examine material and artefactual evidence which broadens our knowledge of the latter, in order that we might better understand the resonances Ignatius evokes, and 'what…these passages would spark in the imaginations of Ignatius and the addressees of his letters.'[64] Harland's aim, in other words, is to explore how Ignatius 'could express Christian identity in terms familiar from local social and cultural life, particularly association life,'[65] and is thus apposite to this chapter.

[61] Malina (1978), esp. 74–80, 93–94.
[62] Sampley (1977).
[63] Lightfoot (1889), II.17–18, 54–57; see also M.P. Brown (1963), 88.
[64] Harland (2003), 482.
[65] Harland (2003), 483.

Harland rightly focuses his attention on the language of initiation, bearing, and mysteries regularly used by Ignatius, which seems to draw from established conventions in pagan cults. His letters are peppered with references to his addressees as 'fellow-initiates' (συμμύσται),[66] partaking in divine 'mysteries' (μυστήρια),[67] bearing holy things together in common worship (σύνοδος), a celebration which Ignatius joins by proxy.[68] His description of the Ephesians as 'God-bearers and temple-bearers, Christ-bearers, bearers of holy things, in every way adorned with the commandments of Jesus Christ,' is particularly suggestive of a pagan procession.[69] For Wallace-Hadrill writing about Christian Antioch, 'the Syrian evidence suggests that during the early years of the Christian era paganism was by no means dead and that, in places, it was a force to be reckoned with. It was part of the soil in which Christianity was planted and part of the background against which we must see its growth.'[70]

The terms 'mysteries' and συμμύστης are indeed commonly found in the literature of Asia Minor from the second century AD and before.[71] Counter to popular imagination, elements of the cultic practices known to Ignatius appear to have been openly publicised, present in various contexts—civic, guild, and association—even if the full experience was reserved for the initiated.[72] Attestation of public announcements of 'associations of initiates' in mystery cults is readily forthcoming among many of the cities to which Ignatius wrote.[73] The procession (πομπή) formed a central aspect to festal celebrations in honour of the Roman pantheon.[74] Inscriptional evidence attests that sacred objects and statues were carried around by designated bearers, and that official names were given to each person according to their holy burden.[75] In the mid- to late second

[66] *Ephes*. 12.2.
[67] *Ephes*. 19.1; *Mag*. 9.1; *Trall*. 2.3.
[68] *Ephes*. 9.2.
[69] *Ephes*. 9.2.
[70] Wallace-Hadrill (1982), 17–18.
[71] Harland (2003), 483–84. For μυστήρια as an ancient locus, see J.Z. Smith (1990).
[72] Harland (2003), 484–85.
[73] Harland (2003), 484–87.
[74] Price (1984), 110–12.
[75] Pleket (1970), 55–88.

century, Lucian also records worshippers in Syrian Hierapolis carrying water from the sea[76] up to a shrine (ναός) in recognition of the work of several deities who had once alleviated a primordial flood there.[77] As part of their rite, participants are reported to have borne with them a golden image or statue (ξόανον), probably of a deity, which is crowned with a dove.[78] They act thus 'in order that it might be an everlasting remembrance at once of the visitation [of the deluge] and of its alleviation.'[79]

Lightfoot also notes the striking similarity between some of Ignatius' terms of address to the Ephesians, and a ceremonial procession devoted to the goddess Artemis.[80] From inscriptional evidence, we learn that a wealthy Roman called Salutaris endowed the temple of Artemis with several images in precious metals and ordered that they be processed through the city on the birthday of the goddess and other important occasions. The party was to consist of the curators of the temple, 'victors in the sacred contests,' and *epheboi*, according to the decrees set up in the temple, one of which is dated to AD 104.[81] This practice was therefore flourishing in Ephesus, and likely other centres of Asia Minor, in precisely the time of Ignatius, as literary sources also attest.[82] Lightfoot concludes that at this time, Ignatius' metaphor

> would speak with more than common directness to the imagination of his Ephesian readers, when, alluding to these pagan festivals, he tells them that as Christians they all alike are priests and victors… They too are duly arrayed for their festivities, not indeed in ornaments and cloth of gold, but in the commandments of Jesus Christ which are their holiday garments.[83]

[76] Understood to be the river Euphrates; see Philostratus, *Vita Apollonii* 1.20.
[77] Lucian, *The Syrian Goddess* 12–13. This act is later (§48) associated with sacrificial practice (θύσαντες).
[78] Lucian, *The Syrian Goddess* 33.
[79] Lucian, *The Syrian Goddess* 13 (trans. Strong and Garstang, 52).
[80] Lightfoot (1889), II.17–18.
[81] Sextus Attius Suburanus is named as the consul on the inscription in Wood (1877), 36 line 74.
[82] Xenophon*, Ephesian Tale* 1.2; Aristophanes *Lysistrata* 640–48. See Lightfoot (1889), II.54–57.
[83] Lightfoot (1889), II.18.

§2.2: The pagan cult and memory

The suggestion that Ignatius was a convert from such a mystery religion is therefore not necessary;[84] his knowledge of this terminological and conceptual vocabulary is relatively unsurprising, as is his appeal to it in addressing a variety of contexts. As Harland suggests, 'The *Christ-bearing* fellow-initiates (so to speak) at Ephesos had their holy-object-bearing counterparts in many of these same groups of initiates of Dionysos, Demeter, and others.'[85] For the community in Syrian Hierapolis (some 100 miles east of Antioch), ὑδροφορία[86] and bearing special images to a particular location in an evidently cultic procession were intimately related to the community's continued memorialisation of moments considered foundational for the group. So too the procession in celebration of Artemis: the procession, while not necessarily commemorating a particular event as in Hierapolis, is a physical act of memorialisation of the benefits conferred upon the *polis* and its people by the goddess, as it traverses the entire city from the Magnesian to the Coressian gates.[87] Its routinisation (held annually on her birthday) acknowledges the previous constancy and support of Artemis, and beseeches its continuity. Beginning and ending at the temple, it established a concrete locus for this remembrance, in which the holy objects and images are normally housed. The communal aspect of the procession, involving and incorporating many members of society, from youths to aged priests, allows the goddess to come to life as it were, her sacred items and image being borne about by a representative part of the entire community that she invigorates. In general, the rituals of procession 'visually communicated the virtues, power and efficacy of the deity in question, re-mapping sacred space and ensuring the continued favorable actions of the god or

[84] *Pace* Schilling (1932), 38; Downey (1961), 298; Elze (1963), 62–64. Grant firmly rejects this possibility (1963: 331).
[85] Harland (2003), 486–87 (emphasis original).
[86] The term is J.L. Lightfoot's (2003: 335f.).
[87] Wood (1877), 42; Lightfoot (1889), II.17.

goddess (i.e. benefactions) in relation to the community. These rituals expressed concretely the identity of the god and of the community.'[88]

§2.3: The pagan cult baptised

We may glimpse a similar dynamic present yet transposed in Ignatius' letters, which appear to represent Christians in conscious comparison and distinction to such practice. Whereas Salutaris' decrees made explicit that the priests and officiants involved in the festival were to be rewarded monetarily for their participation,[89] Ignatius counsels his Christian readers to hope for nothing material in return, only God. He celebrates spiritually with the Ephesians in their 'shared worship' and rejoices with them (συγχαρῆναι) 'because you love nothing in human life [κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπων βίον], but God alone.'[90] As he says to the Smyrnean church, which he also describes as ἁγιοφόρος: 'God is your reward; by patiently enduring all things for his sake, you will reach him.'[91]

Whereas only people of certain social stations are nominated as official 'bearers' and participants in the procession for Artemis, Ignatius stresses that 'you are *all* σύνοδοι.'[92] On this point Schoedel notes:

> [Ignatius'] democratization of [participation in the procession]…indicates that it reflects a sense of the separation of the Christian community from the profane world at least as much as the indwelling of God in individual believers.[93]

Though Ignatius declines to spell it out, the well-known image of the pagan procession might be styled as a representation in miniature of the Christian life, which is a passing of holy things and people through a profane, mundane, and even overtly hostile backdrop. Moreover, just as the

[88] Harland (2003), 488.
[89] Wood (1877), 38, 40.
[90] *Ephes*. 9.2.
[91] *Smyrn*. inscr., 9.2.
[92] *Ephes*. 9.2.
[93] Schoedel (1985), 67.

processions in honour of Artemis were known by all to affirm the communal identity of the pagan world and its inhabitants, so the Christian procession—interpreted as a bearing of holy things by a chosen and eternal people,[94] through an evil and transient world[95]—might be similarly efficacious. The *Epistle to Diognetus* describes Christians as πάροικοι (vagrants, non-residents, aliens) who possess no citizenship in this transient world, but a heavenly citizenship;[96] this same attitude of detachment from the trappings of this age I believe we see strongly affirmed by Ignatius. All followers of Christ, whether captive like Ignatius, or at liberty like the θεοφόροι, ναοφόροι, χριστοφόροι, and ἁγιοφόροι of *Ephesians* 9, can transform their daily life in Christ into a service performed to the glory of God.

Lightfoot thinks it probable that Ignatius took the surname ὁ θεοφόρος for himself, 'as a token of his Christian obligations.'[97] Found at the head of all the genuine letters, and followed by many of the forged, this designation was clearly central to Ignatius' personal identity. On the basis of later Christian literature, Lightfoot argues for an active sense of 'bearing God,' rather than the passive 'being borne by God.'[98] Writing some decades after Ignatius, Clement describes his ideal Christian 'Gnostic' as 'carrying God and being carried by God [θεοφορῶν καὶ θεοφορούμενος].'[99] It seems reasonable to admit a similar element of ambiguity in Ignatius' own use of the image, especially given that such appears to be intended for ναοφόρος.[100] This image is further extended by his addressing the chains which he carries around in divine and spiritual terms.[101] Epictetus admonishes a reprobate with the words θεὸν περιφέρεις…καὶ ἀγνοεῖς ('you are carrying around

[94] *Ephes*. inscr.
[95] *Ephes*. 11.1, 19.3; *Rom*. 7.
[96] *Diog.* 5.5–9; cf. Gen. 15:13; Eph. 2:19; 1 Pet. 2:11.
[97] Lightfoot (1889), II.22.
[98] Lightfoot (1889), II.21–23.
[99] *Stromata* VII.13/82.2. Cf. Melito of Sardis, *On the Pasch* 105, l.822 for a similar reciprocal ambiguity: '[Christ] carries the Father and is carried by the Father.'
[100] Within a few chapters, Ignatius both hopes that 'we may be [God's] temples (ναοί), and he may be in us as our God' (*Ephes*. 15.3), and describes the Ephesians as 'temple bearers' (ναοφόροι, *Ephes*. 9.2).
[101] *Smyrn*. 10.2; *Pol*. 2.3; *Trall*. 12.2; 5.2. At *Ephes*. 11.2 his chains are his 'spiritual pearls.'

God…and you do not know it'),[102] while Plutarch speaks of those who 'carry in their soul, as in a box, the sacred lore about the gods which is pure of all superstition and vain curiosity.'[103]

The general memory of bearing holy things would for many have borne connotations of mystery cults, as we noted above. For Allen Brent, Ignatius explicitly styled himself ὁ θεοφόρος in rivalry to pagan θεοφόροι. Whereas these latter bear the images (εἰκόνες/τύποι) of the emperor in the imperial cult procession, Ignatius, being as a bishop the τύπος θεοῦ,[104] represents (or manifests) the suffering God in himself.[105] As I go on to argue, Brent's comparisons often push beyond what can reasonably be demonstrated by the existing textual and artefactual evidence. Yet although caution must be exercised regarding Brent's full thesis, that Ignatius intended some sort of parallel with burgeoning impulses towards imperial worship is probable. At the very least, it is likely that in using these metaphors of bearing the divine, Ignatius appeals to his congregations' memories of similar pagan practice popular in cities of Asia Minor, and ideas current in popular philosophical speculation. The Christian life and its duties, as described by Ignatius, are consciously to be understood in the light of non-Christian memory.

§3: Ignatius and empire

Despite his awareness that 'these are the last times'[106] and his counsel to 'wait expectantly for the one who is above time,'[107] Ignatius urgently seeks to provide for the situation of Christians in the meantime. As well as building his 'theory of the Church' around the bishop as a 'centre of unity,'[108] he also appears consciously to construct the church in the style of the Greek *polis*, and more generally appeal to pagan practice and thought in service of ongoing Christian ministry.

[102] *Discourses* 2.8.13 (ed. Oldfather, 256).
[103] *Is. et Or.* 352B (trans. Griffiths, 121).
[104] *Mag*. 13.1.
[105] Brent (1998), 37–46.
[106] *Ephes*. 11.1
[107] *Pol*. 3.2.
[108] Bethune-Baker (1933), 373.

§3.1: Ignatius and *homonoia*

Some of Ignatius' pagan contemporaries, including Dio Chrysostom (c. AD 40–115), seemed concerned with advancing a system of city governance by which citizens would co-relate in rational symphony with one another, thereby optimising their city's operation. A term used to describe this relation was that of *homonoia*, illustrated by Dio in his oration to citizens of Borysthenes with reference to the harmonious rhythm of the celestial bodies.[109] Dio would reserve the esteemed term *polis* for an establishment governed most sagely and nobly, 'in accordance to law, with all friendship and concord';[110] a people governed by tyranny, decarchy or oligarchy, by contrast, will be subject to factionalism and will eventually succeed only in ripping each other apart.[111] Ὁμόνοια καὶ εἰρήνη ('concord and peace') are often coupled together as a unit in Greek writers contemporary to Ignatius like Dio, Plutarch, and Lucian,[112] as are *pax et concordia* in Latin writers such as Tacitus and Sallust.[113] It was desirable that relations *between* cities should also be governed by *homonoia*, with a good deal of artefactual evidence confirming that 'concord' was sought after as an ideal.[114] According to Shepperd, while there are a number of explanations for this, 'the most natural context for a mention of *homonoia* on inscriptions or coins is a campaign for, or celebration of, the ending of a quarrel between two communities.'[115] The highest concentration of *homonoia* coins is in fact found in cities of Asia Minor which have a known and long history of disputes, such as Ephesus, Smyrna and Laodicea.[116] Indeed, the term *homonoia* had an extensive heritage: 'In Greek thought and discourse about the state since the middle of the 5th century B.C., "homonoia" played a central

[109] Dio Chrysostom, *Oration* 36.31, 22.
[110] Dio Chrysostom, *Oration* 36.31: κατὰ νόμον μετὰ πάσης φιλίας καὶ ὁμονοίας (ed. Russell, 99).
[111] Dio Chrysostom, *Oration* 36.31.
[112] Unnik (2014), 270–72; see Bakke (2001), 73–75.
[113] Unnik (2014), 272–73.
[114] See Pera (1984).
[115] Sheppard (1986), 233.
[116] Sheppard (1986), 233.

role. Among the Romans, the idea was further elaborated by the use of *concordia*.'[117] As can be seen, the term *homonoia* enjoyed a prominent place in 'discussion of relations between citizens in the cities or between the cities themselves in Asia Minor' up to and beyond the second century AD.[118]

Ignatius employs the term eight times,[119] and uses it chiefly to describe ideal interpersonal relations within a congregation. It also bears mentioning that the word occurs 14 times in *1 Clement*, where it is 'the principal term for expressing the ideal state of unity that should have characterised the Corinthian Church.'[120] On three occasions in Ignatius, *homonoia* is connected with order in accordance with the threefold ministry,[121] notably so at *Ephesians* 4:

> So it is proper for you to run together according to the mind of the bishop, as you are indeed doing. For your presbytery (worthy of its name and worthy of God) is attuned to the bishop as strings to a harp. Therefore in your unanimity [ὁμόνοια] and harmonious love Jesus Christ is sung. And every one of you must join this chorus, so that, being harmonious in unanimity [σύμφωνοι ὄντες ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ] and having taken the key from God, you may sing in unison in a single voice through Jesus Christ to the Father….[122]

Interestingly, the term ὁμονοία is attested nowhere in the NT, and only 11 times in the LXX.[123] While he may have derived some knowledge of the concept from the scriptures, the frequency with which Ignatius uses it, and the importance it appears to hold in his system of ecclesial organisation, would suggest another source. We might safely follow Brent when he writes that 'Ignatius is…appealing to

[117] Unnik (2014), 276.
[118] Schodel (1985), 74.
[119] *Ephes*. 4.1, 4.2, 13.1; *Mag*. 6.1, 15; *Trall*. 12.2; *Phld*. inscr., 11.2. Schoedel (1985), 74.
[120] Bakke (2001), 72. While Ignatius' knowledge of the letter is highly unlikely, that both reach for the same metaphor to illustrate collective life demonstrates both its prevalence across the empire and its compatibility with Christian purposes. See Lotz (2007: 125–56) for the connections between *1 Clement*'s use of the term and 1 Corinthians.
[121] *Ephes*. 4.1; *Mag*. 6.1.
[122] *Ephes*. 4.1–2.
[123] Bakke (2001), 73. It is intriguing to note, however, that three of these occur in 4 Maccabees, a book with which Ignatius was likely familiar (see Perler [1949]). The first (3:21) relates an attempted revolution 'against the public harmony [πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν…ὁμόνοιαν],' while the others appear in a eulogy of the goodwill, affection and sympathy the seven martyred brothers shared towards one another (13:23, 13:25). It stands to reason that for Ignatius the concept of *homonoia* may well have been substantially informed by his knowledge of these passages.

pagan, secular political concepts' in his use of the term.[124] He goes on: '[Ignatius'] appeal was…to a Christianity formed in the broader, Hellenistic culture of Asia Minor, and expressed in the pagan, political rhetoric of *homonoia.*'[125] Through his evocation of a concept necessarily familiar to all in the ancient world—the *polis*—Ignatius fashions the Christian gathering after the ideal *polis*, operating according to *homonoia*, in peace, symphony, and with due respect given to appointed officials. I therefore agree with Brent in recognising the broad parallels between the longing for peace amidst factionalism as felt by ordinary citizens of an empire ravaged by civil war, and members of Ignatius' congregations, themselves subject to division.[126]

§3.2: The thesis of Allen Brent

However, Brent wishes to push far beyond this affinity of thought and circumstance, and those noted by Lightfoot and Harland earlier. He proposes a grand synthetic narrative in which he argues that Ignatius and his correspondents conspired in explicit and self-conscious 'stage management' of his journey to Rome to conform to, and so undermine, elements of imperial cultic practice; Ignatius' procession, therefore, was a 'contrived martyrological cult.'[127] Ignatius' own self-presentation will be treated in greater depth in part II, but we should here at least note and test some of the supposed similarities between Ignatius' 'martyr procession' and those of the pagan imperial world.

According to Brent, Ignatius sends and receives ambassadors from different congregations who relate news concerning his journey in which he will ultimately constitute a *sunthusia* or 'joint sacrifice'; by their presence they would confirm Ignatius' acting as a 'joint sacrifice,' thus 'creating *homonoia* between divided Christian communities.'[128] This operation is supposed to reference and

[124] Brent (2007), 34; though his use of the term 'secular' in this context is contestable; see chapter 1 of Whitmarsh (2016) for a recent discussion. See also Maier (2005), 314–17.
[125] Brent (2007), 34.
[126] Brent (1999), 240–41.
[127] Brent (1998), 31.
[128] Brent (2007), 52.

undermine pagan imperial practice. The terms Ignatius uses to denote these ambassadors are θεοδρόμος are θεοπρεσβύτης, translated by Holmes as 'God's courier' and 'godly ambassador' respectively. However, despite much massaging of a passage from Lucian's *Peregrinus*, Brent is unable to adduce any attestation of these terms from anywhere in non-Christian literature.[129] The more common appellation for an ambassador of this sort would be ἡμεροδρόμος, which Ignatius never employs. Nonetheless, this does not discount the possibility that the imperial ambassador might have been evoked in the memories of those receiving Ignatius' letters, or that an oblique allusion was intended.

A second problem with Brent's thesis is his notion that these ambassadors, each sent from different congregations, are supposed to bring reconciliation '*between* divided Christian communities.'[130] In attempting to conform Ignatius as closely as possible to the mould of imperial society, in which 'famous *homonoia* treaties' were brokered between rival cities by ambassadorial visits to the empire, and a resulting 'joint sacrifice' was performed,[131] Brent exceeds the evidence. Nothing in the Ignatian literature suggests that any division or animosity existed between communities; rather, it was within them. Scarcely a chapter elapses without some exhortation to unity, whether around the bishop and his Eucharist,[132] as opposed to the disunity of the heretics,[133] or as a guard against the devil.[134] Since Harrison,[135] prevailing opinion regarding Ignatius' report that 'the church at Antioch in Syria is at peace (εἰρηνεύειν)' is that this refers to the resolution of intra-ecclesial division, rather than relief from external persecution.[136] Brent himself admits that many

[129] Brent (2007), 54–55.
[130] Brent (2007), 52 (emphasis mine).
[131] Brent (2007), 52. As he often does, Brent speaks of these institutions as if we have evidence that they were well established and well known, whereas, as Sheppard demonstrates (1986: 231–33), the reconstruction of the evidence is tentative and subject to disagreement within scholarship.
[132] *Smyrn*. 8.1–2.
[133] *Phld*. 3.3.
[134] *Ephes*. 13.1.
[135] (1936), 81–106.
[136] *Phld.* 10.1; cf. *Smyrn.* 11.2; see Schoedel (1985), 212–14. Of course, the two are not mutually exclusive: lack of external peace may compromise internal peace.

congregations to which Ignatius writes, as well as his own at Antioch, are 'torn by *internal* strife';[137] indeed, this fact is central to his argument.[138] Yet nothing is suggestive of *inter*-ecclesial hostility. While I believe Brent argues beyond the available evidence, his comments are still apposite if taken to relate to the importance of concord within communities, as I discussed above:

> Imperial society with the collective memory of several generations of destructive civil war, in greeting *pax et princeps*, would have concurred that 'nothing is better than peace (οὐδέν ἐστιν ἄμεινον εἰρήνης), in which all war of earthly and heavenly things is abolished (ἐν ᾗ πᾶς πόλεμος καταργεῖται ἐπουρανίων καὶ ἐπιγείων).'[139]

There is a correspondence between the promises of the reconciliation promised by Christianity, and the function of the imperial cult. Moreover, we might begin to suspect that Ignatius intended the efficaciousness and potency of his death starkly to highlight the impotence of sacrifices made outside the Christian domain (expanded upon in part II below).[140] However, once again Brent does not provide us with sufficient evidence to allow us to follow the parallel between the imperial and Ignatius' own ambassadorial missions to the extent Brent intends.

A third unravelling of Brent's grand synthetic narrative occurs over the central point of the *sunthusia.* He styles this as a pagan act confirming a *homonoia* treaty between two cities, which Ignatius is apparently paralleling in the sacrifice of himself. It must initially be noted that despite speaking of himself often in sacrificial language, and once explicitly as a θεοῦ θυσία,[141] nowhere does Ignatius employ the term *sunthusia*.[142] Brent's characterisation of Ignatius thus is therefore highly speculative. Moreover, he presents little or no evidence for the use of a *sunthusia* to validate a *homonoia* treaty in antiquity, or even its use in the proximity of the term *homonoia*. In his learned

[137] Brent (2007), 47 (emphasis mine).
[138] Brent (2007), 56–58.
[139] Brent (1999), 240; citing *Ephes.* 13.2.
[140] Cf. Castelli (2005), 124–25.
[141] *Rom*. 4.2.
[142] Decrept (2008), 396 n.42 also notices Brent's occasional slipperiness with regard to the text.

article on *homonoia* in the ancient world, Sheppard fails to mention the *sunthusia* or its supposed centrality to *homonoia* treaties.[143]

These concerns are reflected in a more general confusion demonstrated by Brent himself concerning what specifically the function of Ignatius' cultic procession was supposed to be. It is variously 'involved with securing the *pax Christi*';[144] 'a *sunthusia* or joint sacrifice creating *homonoia* between divided Christian communities';[145] we are elsewhere told that 'Ignatius' martyrological cult was also to celebrate the peace experienced by the Church of Antioch';[146] even more baffling is his statement that 'it is his martyr's bonds that produce the prayer of the Christian cult that achieves this restoration of corporateness.'[147] The carelessness with which Brent argues that Ignatius was a scapegoat sacrifice has been noted by Buol, whose treatment is far more thorough.[148] As well as the difficulties already highlighted with these readings, we might note a problem of chronology. Brent properly contends that the χορός (evoked at *Ephes*. 4.2 and *Rom*. 2.2) 'extols that divinized quality of imperial unity that is ὁμόνοια,' and goes on to associate this with the martyrological cult's celebration of the Antiochene peace.[149] However, Ignatius only learns about the Antiochene peace during his stay at Troas, by which time he has already written to the Ephesians and the Romans.[150] Brent's argument that 'Ignatius' martyrological cult' (if we accept its existence) was concerned with unity and *homonoia* is uncontroversial, but that he evokes the image of the choir to celebrate a peace of which he was not yet aware is of course impossible. In the same way, while the nexus of ideas, pagan and Christian, that he explores and compares is interesting and provocative, Brent's

[143] Sheppard (1986).
[144] Brent (1999), 245.
[145] Brent (2007), 52.
[146] Brent (1999), 234.
[147] Brent (1999), 246.
[148] Buol (2018), 161 n.118.
[149] Brent (1998), 37.
[150] According to the chronology of Schoedel (1985), 11.

thesis about Ignatius' cult seems to suffer from a lack of clarity in terms of both causation and purpose.

I therefore believe Brent gets slightly carried away in the severity of his thesis, over-arguing several points, and appearing to treat the 'imperial cult' as having a long-established heritage against which Ignatius consciously shapes his own cult, despite noting at the outset that the imperial cult was only 'developing' in his time.[151] Most of his epigraphical evidence post- or antedates Ignatius by several decades, and none is taken from Antioch. He neglects to point out that in Antioch we have evidence of no ex-votos dedicated to the emperor, and that what epigraphical evidence we do have is taken from private or domestic settings,[152] rather than from public contexts as was the Ephesian Artemis above. Pleket's warning must be borne in mind that the line between religious worship and political devotion is ill-defined.[153]

Despite the lack of precise evidence for Brent's strong reading of Ignatius and the imperial cult, there is certainly a marked affinity between Ignatius' understanding of the circumstances surrounding his martyrdom and several features of the imperial cult; indeed, I have argued that Ignatius does allude to his congregations' familiarity with pagan society, such as the ideal of *homonoia* and the Greek *polis*; in part II, I will argue for Ignatius' subversion of pagan and Jewish interpretations of sacrifice in his self-presentation. Harry Maier also understands Ignatius to have interacted closely with such pagan ideas, though not as prescriptively as Brent. According to Maier, Ignatius consciously portrayed himself and other bishops as men possessed of qualities which are extolled by pagan authors as nurturing concord.[154] Ignatius was 'at home in pagan commonplaces…[and] adept at refashioning them theologically to nurture communal unity and concord.'[155] Cognisant of his congregations' knowledge of pagan society, and the richness of

[151] Brent (1998), 32; cf. Pleket (1965), 342–43.
[152] Pleket (1965), 334.
[153] Pleket (1965), 332–33, 347.
[154] Maier (2005), 319–20.
[155] Maier (2005), 320.

association and meaning which such knowledge possessed, Ignatius appeals to this rich source in order to promote the message of the Christian gospel, simultaneously subverting the validity of its pagan counterpart.

§4: The possible contribution of sociology

It is worth considering the opinions of sociologists Jan Assmann and Peter Berger, who both discuss the kind of re-appropriation of memories with which we have seen Ignatius engage, in this chapter and the last. They are particularly interesting on a group's (re)definition of itself, simultaneously on the basis of, yet in opposition to, a cultural Other. Assmann differentiates between 'communicative memory' and 'cultural memory,' in a way similar to but distinct from Halbwachs' distinction between 'autobiographical' and 'historical' memory.[156] Whereas communicative memory is concerned with the messiness and reciprocity of everyday interactions,[157] cultural memory, for Assmann, is rooted in events of the distant past, which are commemorated in *objective* ways, such as in texts, memorials, rites, rituals, and ceremonies. The primary aspect of cultural memory, he argues, is in what he calls the 'concretion of identity.'[158] A group's common remembrance through objective means informs and reinforces how the group understands itself both positively ('we are this') and negatively ('we are not that').

> The concept of cultural memory comprises that body of reusable texts, images, and rituals specific to each society in each epoch, whose "cultivation" serves to stabilize and convey that society's self-image. Upon such collective knowledge, for the most part (but not exclusively) of the past, each group bases its awareness of unity and particularity.[159]

[156] See above chapter 1, §4.
[157] J. Assmann (1995), 126–27.
[158] J. Assmann (1995), 130.
[159] J. Assmann (1995), 132.

We might see the pagan procession of Artemis as just such a ritual. Being a united act of homage to the goddess for her benevolence towards the city, this festive occasion would have cultivated and rekindled the cultural memory of the people involved (whether parading or spectating), and through its annual repetition conveyed and stabilised the civic identity.

It is of special interest, then, why Ignatius sees fit to utilise the image of a pagan procession to convey a Christian message. It is possible that Ignatius realised the power the image held to convey and embody piety, social unity, and communal identity, despite its pagan origins. In transposing the image to express Christian instead of pagan symbols, he simultaneously affirms the superiority of the new community's system of representation and memory over their old, while retaining the positive elements of the communally-held act of remembering.[160] Their baptism into Christ and subsequent membership in the Christian community involve a complete reconfiguring of how one interprets the events in one's life, both current and remembered.

Peter Berger argues that 'the past is malleable and flexible, constantly changing as our recollection reinterprets and re-explains what has happened,' at least within the 'consciousness' of the individual.[161] While this reinterpretation is usually haphazard, according to external circumstances that happen to affect us, a frame of reference can be consciously and violently altered at significant turning points in one's life:

> This happens when the reinterpretation of one's biography is one aspect of conversion to a new religious or ideological *Weltanschauung*, that is, a universal meaning system *within which* one's biography can be located… Classic statements of this would be Augustine's *Confessions*… In other words, conversion is an act in which *the past* is dramatically transformed.[162]

[160] The transposition of the procession into Christian terms could also imply the overturning of conventional social order and structures of authority as represented by the procession, by the economy inaugurated by Christ.
[161] Berger (1963), 57.
[162] Berger (1963), 61–62 (emphasis original).

Although Berger speaks of these 'conversion' events as applying within the recollecting consciousness of an individual,[163] I contend that the same would apply *mutatis mutandis* to a remembering community. In the case of the Ephesians, this moment might be that referred to by Ignatius at 1.1: 'when you took on new life (αναζωπυρήσαντες) through the blood of God.'[164] The memories of such pagan events as the procession for Artemis cannot and should not be erased—constituting a undeniable part of one's civic and personal identity—but are to be taken up and reinterpreted in the light of Christ's death. Averil Cameron might well have used such an example to demonstrate the distinctive formation of early Christianity's religious discourse amidst so many other discourses,[165] or Christianity's particularly effective 'capacity to create its own intellectual and imaginative universe.'[166] As we saw in the context of communities' memories of the Old Testament and the figures therein, Christ provides the new hermeneutic through which one's former memories can be correctly interpreted and perhaps 'baptised.' Hence instead of bearing golden statues and icons, they are Christ-bearers, God-bearers, temple-bearers and bearers of holy things, their formerly 'profane' memories having been assumed into, and coloured by, the memory of Christ. And just as in remembering their Jewish past involved an act of dissociation with those who persist in maintaining the ultimacy of Judaism, so recalling a pagan element of the congregation's memory here involves an implicit but forceful 'othering' of those who continue to perform the old procession. The true Ephesian community consists of those who, having taken on new life, replace the obsolete items in the procession with Christian ones, and whose procession becomes a spiritual one, in which Ignatius can co-celebrate despite his physical absence.[167]

[163] Berger (1963), 61–62.
[164] It should be mentioned that Ignatius describes the 'Christians of Ephesus' as those who 'have always (πάντοτε) been in agreement with the apostles' (11.2), and speaks of their Christian 'work' as something 'natural' (συγγενικόν) to them (1.1). However, these appear to be used at least partly for rhetorical effect; it seems reasonable to assume that many in the Ephesian community were not born into the faith, and thus at some time were converted.
[165] Averil Cameron (1991), 42, 155–88.
[166] Averil Cameron (1991), 6.
[167] *Ephes*. 9.2.

Therefore we might say with Assmann that the Ephesians' 'cultural memory' of the pagan procession 'preserves the store of knowledge from which [the] group derives an awareness of its unity and peculiarity':[168] a peculiarity that nonetheless admits the composite nature of the Christian memory (comprising both profane and sacred recollections), and which is constructed in conscious distinction to those who do not share their Christic interpretative lens; and a unity emphasised by the comparison of the multiplicity of the pagan processions and gods they are supposed to honour, with the oneness of the Christian God.[169] Harland concludes that such a self-portrayal implies both distinction and continuity: 'describing oneself in terms drawn from the world of associations might simultaneously establish a sense of place within local culture or society while also forming a basis from which to assert distinctiveness and even pre-eminence (for the group or its God).'[170]

§5: Limits and taking it too far

While this investigation of the pagan memory assumed by Ignatius has been in many ways fruitful, reading such memories into the letters of Ignatius where none is present must also be avoided and called out. Schermann is particularly guilty of such misreading. While his general point that 'Die Ausdrücke φάρμακον ἀθανασίας, ἀντίδοτος τοῦ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν sind nicht originelle ignatianische Worte, sondern medizinischer Terminologie entlehnt'[171] is potentially true, and coheres with my thesis concerning Ignatius' borrowing of concepts from wider society, he also understands Ignatius as being in close dialogue with the mystery cults of his time.[172] Ignatius' description of the Eucharist ('breaking one bread') as the 'medicine of immortality' (φάρμακον ἀθανασίας) is apparently a

[168] J. Assmann (1995), 130.
[169] See *Mag*. 7.2: 'May you all run together as to one temple of God, as to one altar, to one Jesus Christ, who came forth from one Father and was with the One and returned [to the One].' Ignatius offers a rudimentary gesture towards an imaging of the one-in-threeness of God, describing the Ephesians as stones for the building of God the Father, raised by the crane of Jesus Christ, using a rope of the Holy Spirit (*Ephes*. 9.1).
[170] Harland (2003), 499.
[171] Schermann (1910), 12.
[172] Schermann (1910), 7–10.

conscious challenge to the claims that Isis raised one from the dead using a drug simply called ἀθανασία.[173] The Eucharist is therefore in competition with the offerings of other, rival religions.

However, it seems more likely that Ignatius' use of the phrase 'medicine of immortality' here complements his reference earlier in the same letter to teachers of error, who are 'rabid dogs that bite in secret,' whose 'bite is hard to heal.'[174] Immediately following that sentence comes Ignatius' hymnic description of Jesus, who is one in himself, but constitutes the reconciliation of antitheses:

> There is [only] one physician, who is both flesh and spirit, born and unborn, God in man, true life in death, both of Mary and of God, first passible and then impassible, Jesus Christ our Lord.[175]

Ignatius is one of the first in the long lineage of Christian thinkers to imagine Christ as doctor, one who heals physical and spiritual ills alike.[176] Plutarch, too, analogises the work of God to that of a physician.[177] It is proper, therefore, that the physician should administer the medicine, the 'antidote' (ἀντίδοτος) to the pernicious venom of the 'rabid dogs.' Moreover, the stress of the above passage appears to be primarily on the *unity* of the eucharistic offering, the gathering which celebrates it, and the faith in which they hold it,[178] rather than any riposte to a mystery religion. For Ignatius, this unity is found in, and derives from, Christ, the 'one physician,' the 'one Jesus Christ,' which should lead the congregation to unity among themselves.[179]

Ignatius also uses the term φάρμακον in *Trallians*, to describe false teachers as like those who 'administer a lethal drug (θανάσιμον φάρμακον) with honeyed wine.'[180] The ambiguity of the word φάρμακον is teased out by Ignatius, as he contrasts its positive use by Christ to its negative

[173] *Ephes.* 20.2; Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca Historica* 1.25.6.
[174] *Ephes*. 7.1.
[175] *Ephes*. 7.2
[176] Cf. e.g. Mark 2:17; Matt. 13:15.
[177] *On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance* 4 (549F–550A).
[178] *Ephes*. 20.2.
[179] *Ephes*. 20.2.
[180] *Trall*. 6.2.

use by false teachers.[181] His application of the term therefore appears to be twofold: (1) in stressing the unity of Christ and his followers, and (2) in effectively placing this unity in direct contradistinction to the polemical enemies combatted by Ignatius in his letters. The almost chaotic multiformity and multiplicity of these enemies is emphasised in both of these cases and throughout Ignatius' corpus, juxtaposed with the unity of God and that of Christian life. At *Ephesians* 7.1, there are 'some' (τινες) who are accustomed to carry around the name with deceit and malice, who are 'wild beasts' (θηρία) and 'rabid dogs' (κύνες λυσσῶντες), while *Ephesians* 7.2 describes the unity of Christ the physician. *Trallians* 6.2–7.1 counsels avoidance of 'these people' associated with the 'mutant plant, which is heresy,' who conspire to poison the 'unknowing one' (singular); the sure defence against 'such people' (τοιούτους), outlined at *Trallians* 7.2, is to be 'inextricable from Jesus Christ and the bishop.' The domain in which the bishop performs his eucharistic duty, and the locus of the Christian identity, is the altar/sanctuary (θυσιαστήριον), outside of which one becomes unclean. Ignatius therefore prescribes that no Christian action be 'apart from' (χωρίς) the threefold order of bishop, presbyters and deacons. For Ignatius, unity and multiplicity function as an index to alignment with the purposes of God.

Ignatius therefore expends little or no effort in addressing the mystery religions, which Schermann reads as central for him. Ignatius' supposed response to aspects of the mystery religions is generally based on a handful of coincidences in vocabulary, such as the above example, rather than from a wider, more systematic coherence of thought. Indeed, this is often taken to the extreme, for example by Schilling. He argues that these parallels are of such substance that we can conclude not only that Ignatius 'thought of Christianity as a mystery religion,'[182] but also that Ignatius himself was a practising member of such a cult—an institution which 'gave him the

[181] Cf. Sirach 6:16 (LXX), which compares a faithful friend to φάρμακον ζωῆς, though there is little evidence that Ignatius consciously draws from this passage.
[182] Schilling (1932), 34.

framework for his Christian cultic idea and mysticism.'[183] This school of opinion gained some prominent voices in the first two-thirds of last century, such as A.D. Nock and Dom Odo Casel, whose chapter on the ancient mysteries was even entitled 'Die Vorschule Christi.'[184] However, Walter Burkert for one has counselled against making such uncritical comparisons and assumptions of influence, which 'leads to distortions…obscuring the often radical differences between the two [ancient mystery cults and Christianity].'[185] Our knowledge of ancient mystery cults comes almost entirely from those who have not been initiated into them, who are consequently largely ignorant, and whose information comes from a vantage-point which is far from impartial. As Strousma comments, 'What happened in the mysteries was kept secret, and very little has reached us.'[186] Scholarship faces 'insurmountable difficulties' in the face of the initiates' oath of secrecy; 'at best,' Burkert writes, 'we are in the position of eavesdroppers, of strangers at the gate.'[187] Much scholarship is based on reconstructions from literature unsuited for the task.

In sum, it may be said that if there is reliance upon pagan thought in this passage, it is of an indirect kind, a drawing from a common inheritance of conceptual metaphors surrounding sickness, wholeness, and immortality, and their relation to the divine ('independent appropriations of a widespread theme'[188]), rather than direct response to a perceived religious threat. While sensitivity to non-Christian influences upon Ignatius and his potential reference to them is essential, as this chapter has demonstrated, we must first look within the Christian sphere, and indeed Ignatius' own existing corpus, to determine its most likely meaning and origin.

[183] Schilling (1932), 38.
[184] Nock (1964), though in his comparison he does warn against 'any tendency to assume simple relations of cause and effect in an area in which they are very rare' (145); Casel (1922), 1.
[185] Burkert (1987), 3.
[186] Stroumsa (2005), 51.
[187] Burkert (1987), 90.
[188] Schoedel (1985: 97–98) lists many who use it.

Part II: 'Memory Poiesis'—Ignatius as a Forger of his own Memorialisation

Chapter 3: θυσία θεοῦ: Ignatius' Self-Construction as Sacrifice

We move now from Ignatius' evocation and manipulation of memories that pre-exist within the congregations to which he writes, to his construction of his own memorialisation.[1] It is worth emphasising the particular suitability of Ignatius among all early Christians for such treatment. Whereas most other early Christian martyrs are available to posterity only through the words and reflections of others, Ignatius is peculiar in having left us his own thoughts about his impending martyrdom in the form of the middle recension. His letters contain literary images of how he wishes to be remembered, and an attempt to provide a normative interpretation of the significance of his life and death.[2] Ignatius is conscious that letters written by prominent ecclesial figures bear great potency, and can immortalise the writer.[3] In his case, their effect will endure and in fact gain in significance as a result of his death.

The relationship between the written word and memory has exercised thinkers for millennia. In a well-known passage, Plato explores the dynamic through an interaction between the Egyptian gods Theuth and Thamus. Theuth is of the opinion that writing is 'an elixir of memory and wisdom [μνήμης τε γὰρ καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον]'; Thamus counters with the judgement that writing will in fact 'produce forgetfulness [λήθην…παρέξει]' among those who use it, because they neglect their memories.[4] The external [ἔξωθεν] written words should not be preferred to their own internal

[1] Castelli (2004: 84–85) uses the language of 'crafting a self.'
[2] Buol (2018), 133.
[3] *Pol*. 8.1; see Castelli (2004), 70.
[4] *Phaedrus* 274e–75a (trans. Fowler, 562–63). Rutherford (1990) suggests that the expression μνήμης φάρμακον might be imitating Euripides fr. 578 (λήθης φάρμακα), which may also make pejorative insinuations about the written word.

[ἔνδοθεν] memories. Reliance on writing gives the impression of wisdom, but hides the reader's own ignorance.[5] Written words are of negligible use except to remind (ὑπομνῆσαι) someone who already knows the subject at hand. As an educational tool, the written word is apparently ineffectual, as it has no ability to engage or respond dynamically to the questions of the reader, does not adjust its content to the needs of its reader, and must rely on others to defend it.[6] There is of course an irony in the fact that we only learn of this opinion through the medium of writing—an antinomy that Plato surely intended, and hoped would provoke further inquiry.[7]

In a basic sense, writing allows the living to communicate with, and in a way 'revive' the dead. (Eusebius, indeed, speaks of creating 'in writing an imperishable monument' to his heroes, the martyrs of Palestine.[8]) Writing guarantees a kind of immortality for the writer, perduring longer than more physically impressive legacies like tombs and obelisks. The historian and cultural anthropologist Aleida Assmann treats this curious phenomenon in an article exploring the dynamic between writing and 'cultural memory.' There is a kind of 'stored energy' in letters, held latent within them until such a time that they are read, and the energy is released upon the reader afresh.[9] Yet the 'energy' of ideas contained within letters is not consistent over time. It may increase, generating in the reader some new and suggestive thought or connection; it may also attenuate due to some intervening falsification of the words, some failure in the receptivity of the reader, or a loss of the cultural assumptions that underpin the work. She appears to agree with Plato's Thamus when she writes, 'Only in alliance with memory can writing stand against ruin and death. Writing prolongs life and ensures remembrance only if planted in the memories of future generations.'[10] 'Living

[5] *Phaedrus* 275a–b (trans. Fowler, 562–65).
[6] *Phaedrus* 275c–e (trans. Fowler, 564–67).
[7] See Mackenzie (1982), 71–72. The ambiguity is heightened by the fact that a φάρμακον was understood to possess beneficial as well as deleterious power; see Derrida (1972).
[8] Eusebius, *The Martyrs of Palestine*, pref. 2 (trans. Laylor and Oulton, I.329), translation based on the long (Syriac) recension.
[9] A. Assmann (1996), 123–24.
[10] A. Assmann (1996), 125.

memories' are required both in order to facilitate an informed and traditional interpretation of the text, and to ensure the physical text is guarded, preserved, and, if appropriate, disseminated.

The importance of writing for Ignatius is self-evident in the number of letters he wrote, the duress of his prisoner's journey to Rome notwithstanding. He appears to count writing a privilege and a divine blessing, which communicates his real existence to his addressees, and theirs to him: 'I exult that I have been deemed worthy to converse with you (προσομιλῆσαι; Lightfoot: 'to bear your company') through writing this letter, and to rejoice with you.'[11] I do not suggest that he wrote with the primary aim of securing for himself a particular legacy; clearly, Ignatius wrote to the six churches and Polycarp for any number of reasons: pastoral, hortatory, educative etc. Yet it is no less true (and should cause no embarrassment to admit) that in his writings Ignatius also seeks to impart a particular impression of himself, at least insofar as every example of writing invites the reader to infer an authorial persona. Indeed, he gives us clear indication that his writing holds the ultimate expression of himself and his meaning. At the climax of his letter to the Roman church, he writes: 'If upon my arrival I myself should appeal to you, do not be persuaded by me; believe instead these things that I am writing to you.'[12] The Romans are to give priority to the legible, textual Ignatius, rather even than to his visible, corporeal counterpart. Ignatius understands Paul to remember (μνημονεύειν) the Ephesians in every one of the apostle's letters.[13] Ignatius seems to suggest to Polycarp that it is through writing that the Smyrnean bishop might secure for himself an everlasting remembrance.[14] Through his writing he also entreats the faithful to hold him in remembrance ('Remember me, as Jesus Christ remembers you,')[15] and thereby to imitate the Lord. The conclusions of his letters often bear counsel to remember, whether himself or various churches.[16]

[11] *Ephes.* 9.2.
[12] *Rom*. 7.2.
[13] *Ephes*. 12.2.
[14] *Pol*. 8.1: 'Write to the adjacent churches…that you may be glorified by a work which shall be remembered for ever, as indeed you are worthy to be.' (Trans. Roberts and Donaldson.)
[15] *Ephes*. 21.1.
[16] *Ephes*. 21.1; *Mag*. 14; *Trall.* 13.1; *Rom*. 9.1.

Ignatius' desire to be memorialised is of course not unique. It may be seen in relation to Jesus' own imperative that his followers remember him in the eucharistic formula.[17] Paul also clearly wishes to be remembered, commending the Corinthians 'because you remember me in everything,'[18] and asking the Colossians to 'remember my chains';[19] his literary output may be analysed as an attempt at self-fashioning.[20] In this, the early Christian movement follows a general assumption within Hebraic thought that remembrance was worthy, honourable, and desirable.[21]

Although there is a multitude of aspects to Ignatius' self-portrayal which might be examined, one that has justly generated much scholarly interest is that of 'sacrifice.' It is to Ignatius' intriguing tendency to speak of himself in sacrificial terms that I now turn.

§1: Sacrifice in early Christianity

It is almost axiomatic in modern scholarship to state that '"sacrifice" is an evaluative not a descriptive term.'[22] Sacrifice as a concept carries weighty polemical power: to arbitrate on what is a sacrifice, and what is not, is to be in a position of great influence. Christians sought early on to redefine the meaning of sacrifice, seeking to 'disrupt the dominant culture's assessment of sacrifice,' and to portray sacrifice as 'solely the domain of the Christian.'[23] 'Discourse,' understood as the communication of social power through a network of words, symbols, and practices[24]—in other words, 'control over what *may be said*'[25]—will be key to our analysis. Ignatius appears to have thought of himself, and desired to portray himself, in sacrificial terms—a claim which this chapter

[17] 1 Cor. 11:23–25; Luke 22:19.
[18] 1 Cor. 11:2; cf. 1 Thes. 2:9.
[19] Col. 4:18.
[20] E.g. Becker and Mortensen (2018).
[21] E.g. Prov. 10:7; Sir. 44ff., esp. 44:8–15. Though see Rewa (1979: 60–63) who provocatively nuances this statement. See also Yerushalmi (1982), Spiegel (2002), and chapter 1 above.
[22] Ullucci (2015), 393; cf. 412.
[23] Castelli (2004), 50; see F.M. Young (1975), 9ff.
[24] Heyman (2007), 220.
[25] Polaski (1999), 37 (emphasis original).

hopes to assess and develop. Cognisant of the deficiencies in the term 'sacrifice' itself as a meaningful subject of any analysis,[26] I will briefly attempt to contextualise the climate in which Ignatius thus self-defined.

The practice of sacrificing to some being or power considered divine was almost ubiquitous in the ancient world. Among Hebrew communities, 'sacrifice' bears a long tradition of quite diverse use and reflection, a heritage with which early Christians self-consciously engaged in their own use of the language.[27] The 'comprehensive' word for sacrifice in the Hebrew Bible, *qorban*, comes from a root meaning 'to draw near, to bring near'; this aptly captures the substance of *qorban* (i.e. that which is brought forward in offering to Yahweh), and the purpose of the sacrifice, that the sacrifier[28] should be brought nearer to God.[29] The metaphysical transfer of something from the realm of the mundane to that of the divine, as *qorban* entailed, was expressed in a variety of different sacrificial practices, such as the *olah* (burnt offering),[30] *zebaḥ shelamim* (peace offering),[31] and *ḥata't* (sin offering).[32] The actual variegation of sacrificial practices in the Torah and the prophetic books especially was flattened for Greek readers by the translators of the Septuagint, who took some liberty in translating several different Hebrew terms as θυσία.[33] The influence of its use of the term to describe both blood and bloodless sacrifices[34] upon early Christian theology, particularly that surrounding the Eucharist, can hardly be overestimated.[35]

Roman society's understanding of sacrifice was no less important for the early church.[36] For a Roman, sacrifices, vegetal as well as animal, were supposed to open a channel of communication

[26] Ullucci (2015), 399; Eberhart (2011), 18–19.
[27] See F.M. Young (1975), 26–35.
[28] This term is favoured by Hubert and Mauss (1964), 10ff.; see pp.73–74 below for its definition.
[29] Eberhart (2011), 23.
[30] E.g. Lev. 1:3ff.
[31] E.g. Lev. 7:11ff.
[32] E.g. Lev. 4:1ff.
[33] Eberhart (2011), 27–28.
[34] Eberhart (2011), 24–30.
[35] McGowan (2012), 196.
[36] As Ullucci (2015: 418) notes, this separation of (what he calls) 'Judaean' from wider Mediterranean sacrificial practice is to a large extent artificial.

between the sacrifier and a god. Sacrificing was a 'gesture of piety,' an accompaniment to a request or plea, sometimes constituting an appeasement of the gods. From a functional perspective, it helped to maintain social order, networks, and hierarchy. It is commonly argued that sacrifice (and the imperial cult in general) functioned as a focus to solidify Roman identity across the sprawling empire—an identity marker that was supposed to transcend other markers of identity such as *ethnos* or trade.[37] It was partly through response to, and appropriation of, Roman imperial sacrificial discourse that Christian identity was established, and thought surrounding the meaningfulness of the death of Christ and his martyrs formed.[38] The importance of 'spectacle' in the ancient world, particularly centred around the Roman arena, and the power and ideological structures it served to reinforce, has been the subject of much scholarship since late last century,[39] with some scholars turning to look at its bearing on early Christianity.[40]

Refusal to sacrifice was treated with great suspicion regarding one's intention to undermine the social fabric;[41] it was also one of the most conspicuous touchstones of Christian identity, sometimes occurring alongside one's confession: 'I am a Christian [Χριστιανός εἰμι].'[42] By denying the external sacrifice to the gods or the emperor, and thus imperilling one's life, a Christian would sometimes be understood (by other Christians) to *become* a sacrifice to the Christian God, in an imitation of Christ's own sacrifice—a dynamic we glimpse in Ignatius. Christians appear to have appropriated pre-existing conceptual frameworks and language about sacrifice, and transformed them to reflect their own experience of persecution. Having usurped agency and power from the state in an inversion of its ideology, Christian martyrs were often simultaneously characterised as

[37] E.g. Rives (1999); Gradel (2002); cf. Gunderson (1996: 115ff.) on the arena's role in the maintenance of social hierarchies.
[38] Heyman (2007), 162.
[39] E.g. Plass (1995); Gunderson (1996); Clavel-Lévêque (1984); Futrell (1997).
[40] E.g. Castelli (2005); Barnes (1996); Schnusenberg (1988); Jürgens (1972).
[41] Castelli (2004), 51.
[42] The only recorded words of the martyr Sanctus (Eusebius, *HE* 5.1.20). Sacrificial terminology (ἐτύθησαν) is used to describe his eventual death, alongside the martyr Maturus (*HE* 5.1.40). Polycarp makes the same confession (*Mart. Pol.* 10.1) and the account of his death is replete with sacrificial imagery (§§13–16).

offerer as well as victim: Origen understands the martyr as a 'blameless priest offering a blameless sacrifice.'[43] A goal of the rhetoric of Christian martyrdom was to argue that the martyrs, not the Roman authorities, were the holders of power.[44]

§2: Analysis of Ignatius' self-references as sacrifice

Does Ignatius think of himself, and wish to portray himself, as a sacrifice? If he does, what is the nature of his sacrifice (especially in relation to contemporary discourse about sacrifice), and what does it effect? An answer to these questions requires close analysis of the instances in which Ignatius apparently refers to himself in sacrificial terms. It is my contention that he does consider himself sacrificially, and that he wishes to be understood as a sacrifice to God, yet whose suffering is also for the sake of the Christian communities with whom he corresponds, whom he hopes will be thereby strengthened and united; a Girardian reading of Ignatius' self-conception as sacrifice is performed in the next chapter.

Without ignoring the substantial methodological difficulties in creating a useable definition of the term 'sacrifice,' a degree of laxity in scholarship surrounding Ignatius' self-understanding must be acknowledged.[45] Translators and scholars must be transparent about the process of arriving at a definition of 'sacrifice,' our purpose in doing so, and be wary of any unconscious privileging of one understanding of sacrifice over another.[46] As Kirk notes, Ehrman's tendency to translate the relevant terms so as to imply Ignatius' understanding of his death as in some sense salvific, expiatory

[43] *Exhortation to Martyrdom* 30 (PG 11:601): ὁ ἄμωμος ἱερεὺς ἄμωμον ἱερεῖον προσφέρων; cf. *AC* 8.12: 'He was pleased by Thy good will to become man, who was man's Creator; to be under the laws, who was the Legislator; to be a sacrifice, who was an High Priest; to be a sheep, who was the Shepherd' (ANF 7, 489).
[44] See Castelli (2005), 124.
[45] Brent (2007: 45–64) treats the terms 'sacrifice' and 'scapegoat' cavalierly, muddling the two and not addressing how they relate to vicariousness; e.g. Ignatius claims 'that the death to which he is going is a sacrifice to God on their behalf in which they have made him a scapegoat' (45). His definition of θυσία leaves much to be desired: 'Ignatius does not shrink from using a characteristically pagan word for sacrifice, *thusia*, which refers quite literally to a slain animal' (48). This ignores both the history of the word's use in the LXX and the NT, and the fact that it can also describe bloodless offerings. See Vall (2013), 83.
[46] Ullucci (2015), 424–25.

or substitutionary, reflects perceptible, and arguably unjustified, trends in recent scholarship.[47] Brent uncritically refers to περίψημα as 'the word for scapegoat sacrifice,' ignoring much nuanced scholarly discussion.[48] We must not conflate or confuse the concept of sacrifice with the action of atonement, nor ought it to be assumed that self-sacrificial language on the part of anyone but Christ necessarily impugns the 'once and for all' nature of Christ's atoning death. Christian discipleship, the NT repeatedly claims, demands of us continued sacrifice of ourselves, both for God and for neighbour.[49] For example, Paul transitions from the grand theological exposition of Romans 9–11 to more pastoral instruction with the sentiment, 'I exhort you therefore, brethren, through the mercies of God, to present your bodies as a living sacrifice (θυσίαν ζῶσαν), holy and well-pleasing to God.'[50]

We now turn to a close analysis of the passages in question.

§2.1: *Romans* 4.1–2

> I am the wheat of God [σῖτος εἰμι θεοῦ], and I am being ground up by the teeth of wild beasts, so that I may be proved pure bread [ἵνα καθαρὸς ἄρτος εὑρεθῶ]. Even better, goad the wild beasts, so that they may become my tomb and may leave nothing of my body remaining, lest I become a burden to anyone once I fall asleep. Then I will truly be a disciple of Jesus Christ, when the world will no longer see my body. Implore the Lord for my sake, that through these instruments I might prove to be a sacrifice of God [λιτανεύσατε τὸν κύριον ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ, ἵνα διὰ τῶν ὀργάνων τούτων θεοῦ θυσία εὑρεθῶ].

This excerpt is the clearest point at which Ignatius interprets himself as sacrifice. Protestant scholars tend to stress the metaphorical nature of his 'sacrifice,'[51] while Roman Catholic scholars seem willing to interpret his sacrifice as a more mystical reality.[52] Lightfoot rightly notes the presence of 'pure

[47] Kirk (2013), 66–69; for critique of Ehrman's translation, see Cline and Thompson (2006), 449.
[48] Brent (2007), 48.
[49] For Ignatius' knowledge of the NT, see Foster (2005).
[50] Rom. 12:1.
[51] Typified by Schoedel (1985), 176; cf. Zahn (1873), 421.
[52] E.g. the comments of Vall (2013: 145) on *Rom*. 4: 'Ignatius's ecclesial-sacramental existence in this life is to be consummated by martyrdom in such a way that he himself, in some sense, becomes eucharist… Ignatius's images direct our attention to a profound mystery that deserves careful reflection.'

bread' within Hellenic pagan and Hebraic thought.[53] It was thought a worthy offering to the Egyptian gods in Herodotus, and proper to a sacred banquet by Hermeias.[54] In a Jewish context also, like the unblemished lamb, the superior quality of bread made from purified barley was understood as a sacrifice pleasing to God.[55] The Pentecost celebrations outlined in Leviticus 23:17 require fine flour (which the Mishna stipulates must have been sifted twelve times[56]) to be baked with leaven and presented as 'firstfruits unto the Lord.' Josephus records that nothing of the sacrifices of the bread and lambs was allowed to be left until the following day[57]—a detail particularly akin to Ignatius' desire that the beasts 'leave nothing of my body remaining.' While to claim that Ignatius consciously styled himself in the manner of a pentecostal Jewish sacrifice is unreasonably specific, it remains plausible that he wished his death to resonate with the popular, cultural understanding of an acceptable offering to God which is effected through its annihilation. Although Bakker thinks it impossible that Ignatius had pagan sacrifice in mind here,[58] it is legitimate to believe that he wished to appeal to both pagan and Jewish notions of sacrifice, especially since we have seen that he evokes both 'deposits of memory' in his bid to address an audience from diverse backgrounds (chapters 1 and 2 above). As Vall observes, 'Ignatius's sacrificial imagery (in *Romans* 4 and elsewhere) skilfully blends biblical and pagan motifs.'[59]

It accords with his 'strong' Christomorphic understanding of Ignatius' death that Bakker should interpret καθαρὸς ἄρτος in the light of Ignatius' desire (θέλω) for the 'bread of God, which is the flesh of Christ…[and] his blood' at *Romans* 7.3.[60] Yet that explicitly eucharistic resonances were here intended is not obvious. Schoedel notes the term's currency in the 'realm of baking' in

[53] Lightfoot (1889), II.207.
[54] Herodotus, *Histories* 2.40; Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* 4.149E.
[55] Josephus, *Ant.* 3.10.5.
[56] Mishna, *Menahot* 6.7.
[57] *Ant.* 3.10.6.
[58] Bakker (2003), 180.
[59] Vall (2013), 83.
[60] Bakker (2003), 176–79.

antiquity,[61] and Buol rescues σῖτος from Bakker's eucharistic interpretation with the observation that the word is never connected to the Eucharist among the apostolic fathers or the books of the NT.[62] The significance of wheat for Ignatius perhaps rather lies in its crude state, its needing to be transformed into flour before being ready to be baked;[63] in the same way, Ignatius is still in a crude form, and requires further purging before he can become fully a disciple.[64]

It is not, however, inconceivable that Ignatius should have intended his death to take on some eucharistic resonances as presented at *Romans* 4.1–2. Bakker is one of a number of scholars who so believes,[65] but builds a rather extreme and unlikely argument upon it. One would find it difficult to disagree with his anodyne statement that 'Ignatius' death and Jesus' death are in agreement';[66] it seems less obvious, however, as he goes on to argue, that 'the "bread" he yearns for becomes the bread he is to be himself.'[67] Bakker's Ignatius finds it difficult to ascertain the boundary between himself and Christ, and understood 'his death as a sacrifice that augmented Jesus' death.'[68] Bakker claims his views do not reach the extremity of Bartsch's,[69] for whom Ignatius is 'another Christ';[70] yet there is little discernible daylight between the two. Both argue for the virtual merging of Ignatius' identity with Christ's, and the complementarity of the salvific effects of their deaths, while providing insufficient evidence for either claim.

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[61] Schoedel (1985), 175–76.
[62] Buol (2018), 173.
[63] Ashton (1904: 49–50) describes how this was, in Ignatius' time, a tremendously labour-intensive process. This further strengthens Ignatius' metaphor.
[64] See *Rom*. 5.1, 6.2.
[65] Including Corwin (1960: 253), who allows it to be 'reminiscent at once of the eucharist and of the passion,' and Grant (1966: 89), who baldly states that he 'identifies himself with the Eucharistic bread.' Like Bakker, these scholars are generally reticent about the implications of this connection; see Kirk (2013), 68.
[66] Bakker (2003), 176.
[67] Bakker (2003), 177. Because of his apparent acceptance of the reading 'that I may be proved pure bread *of God*,' Bakker discerns greater parallel between *Rom*. 4.1 and 7.3 than actually exists according to the more widely-accepted shorter reading, 'that I may be proved pure bread.' As Buol (2018: 172–73) notes, the additions of τοῦ Χριστοῦ and θεοῦ are most likely the result of later interpretative speculation. However, Bakker's own position on the original reading is somewhat confused; see Buol (2018), 172 n.180.
[68] Bakker (2003), 189.
[69] Bakker (2003), 177 n.931; 178 n.939.
[70] Bartsch (1940), 80; cf. 126–27.

It seems that we are perfectly able to understand Ignatius as speaking of himself in eucharistic terms, and even comparing his death upon the altar of the arena with the eucharistic service, without going as far as Bakker and Bartsch. Ignatius wished to represent his death as a worthy sacrifice, which he achieved effectively through the metaphor of pure bread made from crude yet serviceable wheat. That he intended this portrayal of his death to take on Christic characteristics—that he acted as an imitator of Christ—is undeniable. Yet it seems quite another thing to suggest that he thereby conceived of his death to result in Christ's assumption and continuation of Ignatius' suffering,[71] and the augmentation of the salvific effects of Christ's death—a conclusion which Bakker struggles to support with close reference to the text.[72] Indeed, if we believe that the significance of the metaphor of wheat lies in the fact that despite wheat's crudeness, it may still be transformed into 'pure bread' (just as Ignatius hopes and expects to be 'proved' before taking on a new status of being[73]), then Bakker's close parallel with Christ seems even less likely. We continue to analyse Bakker's thesis in the following sections.

§2.2: *Romans* 2.2

> Grant me nothing more than to be poured out as an offering to God while there is yet an altar prepared [πλέον δέ μοι μὴ παράσχησθε τοῦ σπονδισθῆναι θεῷ, ὡς ἔτι θυσιαστήριον ἕτοιμόν ἐστιν], in order that forming a chorus in love you might sing to the Father in Jesus Christ, because God has deemed the bishop of Syria worthy to be found in the west, having summoned him from the east.

[71] Bakker (2003), 198.
[72] The lack of textual evidence Bakker provides to support his claims has been noted by Buol (2018), 170 n.167.
[73] As he stresses throughout *Romans*, e.g. *Rom*. 3.2: 'Only pray that I have power both internally and externally, so that it is not only a matter of my lips but also of my heart, so that I am not only called a Christian but am also proved to be one. For if I am proved to be one, I am able also to be called one, and then I will be faithful, whenever I am no longer visible to the world'; *Rom*. 6.2: 'Let me receive pure light; when I reach that point I will be a human being.'

For Bakker, this passage also demonstrates that Ignatius considers his death to be 'a subsidiary offering that augments the one made by Christ.'[74] Subjected to analysis, we find that his claim that Ignatius understood his death to supplement Christ's is presented more as an interpretative rule than a conclusion derived from the text: he believes that *Romans* 2.2 'shows' this to be the case, without producing any argument besides citation of the passage, and the somewhat deficient observation that 'Ignatius compares himself to a libation.'[75] To make such a serious claim, one requires clear supporting evidence and explanation; yet I believe the text nowhere demands such an interpretation, and in several places precludes it. Of course, the parallel of this sacrifice to that of Christ is not to be ignored, as his reference to himself in quasi-eucharistic terms only a few lines later makes clear;[76] yet Kirk[77] makes a compelling argument that the most obvious interpretative context for this passage is Pauline, since both instances of the verb form σπένδω[78] in the NT are found on the lips of Paul.[79] This passage of Ignatius' arguably finds its closest parallel at Philippians 2:17–18, which runs:

> Yet even if I am being poured out as a libation [σπένδομαι] upon the sacrifice and offering of your faith [ἐπὶ τῇ θυσίᾳ καὶ λειτουργίᾳ τῆς πίστεως ὑμῶν], I am glad and rejoice with all of you—and in the same way you must also be glad and rejoice with me.

Paul's offering of himself is situated in the context not of Christ's death, but the faith of his addressees, whom he expects to rejoice with him [συγχαίρετέ μοι] as a consequence. While it is possible that Paul intended resonances with the sacrifice of Christ's passion to be noticed here,[80] it

[74] Bakker (2003), 179.
[75] Bakker (2003), 179.
[76] *Rom*. 4.1.
[77] Kirk (2013), 86–87.
[78] For the relation between σπένδω and σπονδίζω, see BDAG s.v. σπονδίζω.
[79] Phil. 2:17; 2 Tim. 4:6.
[80] Lightfoot (1994: 143–44), Collange (1979: 113–14), Martin (1987: 123–25), Holloway (2017: 136–37) and Fee (1995: 250–55) do not find any; they generally consider pagan and/or Jewish sacrificial practices as the most likely source of the allusion. Fee (1995: 252 n.54) only notes that Eph. 5:2 uses θυσία to refer to 'Christ's offering himself to God,' though since we are here concerned with σπένδομαι, and the θυσία is the Philippians', this is hardly relevant. Zamfir (2017: 80–93) provides a catalogue of patristic readings of Phil. 2:17 and 2 Tim. 4:6. Almost all witnesses interpret Paul's suffering and death to have been either for the sake of God or for the community's

is more likely that he refers to his foundation of the faith at Philippi, for which he suffered and continues to suffer.[81] So too with Ignatius, his sacrificial offering of himself upon the altar which is the Roman judicial system is indeed to God (θεῷ), but it occurs in order that (ἵνα) the believers come together and praise God. Kirk's observation that much Ignatian scholarship ignores the Pauline dimension of Ignatius' *imitatio Christi* is apposite here.[82]

We can say, then, that his fellow Christians benefit from Ignatius' sacrifice at *Romans* 2.2, not in the sense that Ignatius acts as an expiatory victim, but that they are united by (or around) his sacrifice. This is analogous to Paul who 'did not consider his suffering vicarious, but for the benefit of (ὑπέρ) the church, and it was effective in that it brought about growth for the church.'[83] Perhaps Ignatius imagines the Roman Christians gathering and singing around the altar as his blood is let, after the parallel pagan sacrificial custom, and thus also participating in the sacrifice.[84] The act is no longer a punitive display of Roman power, but a Christian sacrificial rite, in which Christians are granted agency to offer a victim and praise God. Yet as the resemblance to *Ephesians* 4.2 makes clear, the primary significance of the image of a chorus is the symphony, harmony, and unity that its members enjoy.

Buol, in wishing to deprive *Romans* 2.2 of any intended eucharistic resonances whatsoever, maintains that 'there is no mention in these images of his fellow Christians receiving a benefit from

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spiritual or material edification; only Origen (*Hom. 10 in Num. 18.1–7*, 2.1 [ed. Hall and Scheck (2009), 46–47]) reads 2 Tim. 4:6 (and Num. 18:1) as referring to the suffering of the apostles and martyrs as expiatory for the sins of Christians.

[81] As Fee (1995: 255) suggests; cf. Luke's account of Paul's foundation of the faith at Philippi at Acts 16:11–40. See Zamfir (2017), 77–81; Buol (2018), 116–17: 'since he refers to himself as a drink offering which accompanies a sacrifice and not the actual blood sacrifice, it is not clear if this metaphor implies his suffering and death for the good of the community, or simply expending himself in his work for the gospel.'

[82] Kirk (2013), 70 n.12. Kirk (2013: 70) states his position strongly thus: 'the mimetic influence of Jesus is mediated through Paul—that is, the shape of Ignatius' death is Christomorphic but only insofar as it is Paulomorphic.' Y. Moss (2017) indeed argues that Ignatius was engaged in a tussle with charismatic opponents, both of whom intricately styled themselves as genuine inheritors of Paul's authority and memory. Waldner (2006) also understands Ignatius' literary output primarily as a bid for authority, as he seeks to establish himself as a mobile centre of Christian authority, in the mould of a Roman imperial magistrate.

[83] Buol (2018), 175. Paul's understanding of his own suffering is treated at §3.4 below.

[84] Apollonius of Rhodes (*Argonautica* 1.536–39) speaks of the presence of a chorus around an altar as a well-known practice; also Callimachus, *Hymn to Delos* 300–13; see Lightfoot (1889), II.201.

his sacrifice'; rather, they 'help with the offering,' by forming a chorus around the altar, goading (καλακεύσατε) the beasts to consume him, and entreating (λιτανεύσατε) the Lord that he may be found a sacrifice to God.[85] I agree that the primary 'recipient' of his self-sacrifice is God. This is evident in the dative σπονδισθῆναι *θεῷ* in *Romans* 2.2 and the genitive *θεοῦ* θυσία at *Romans* 4.2, and is unsurprising: we would hardly expect any ancient to sacrifice *to* anything other than a divine being.[86] I also agree that Ignatius asked for their help in achieving the sacrifice properly, evident in the many imperatives found in *Romans*. Yet I believe it is no less correct to speak of the Roman Christians as 'benefiting' from the sacrifice, at least as in *Romans* 2.2, in that they are united as a direct result of it: 'Grant me…to be poured out as an offering to God while there is yet an altar prepared, *in order that* [ἵνα] having formed a chorus in love you may sing [ᾄσητε] to the Father.' Their communal singing is the consequence and indeed purpose (indicated by the ἵνα construction) of his being poured out upon the altar. Had Ignatius considered their common singing to be a prerequisite of the sacrificial process, we would have expected an imperative as found with καλακεύσατε and λιτανεύσατε.

Does this mean that Ignatius understands the Roman community as somehow participating in the sacrifice of Ignatius upon the Roman altar, and thereby accruing benefits usually thought to accrue to a sacrificing party? Hubert and Mauss, in their landmark treatment of sacrifice, define the 'sacrifier' as 'the subject to whom the benefits of sacrifice thus accrue, or who undergoes its effects.'[87] They go on: 'This subject is sometimes an individual, sometimes a collectivity—a family, a clan, a tribe, a nation, a secret society. When it is a collectivity it may be that the group fulfils collectively the function of the sacrifier, that is, it attends the sacrifice as a body; but sometimes it

[85] Buol (2018), 174.
[86] Sacrifice is said to be made *to* God at Rom. 12:1 and Heb. 13:15, though these are apparently non-physical (θυσίαν ζῶσαν and θυσίαν αἰνέσεως).
[87] Hubert and Mauss (1964), 10 (original emphasis removed). While I am aware of some of the problematic aspects of this work, I believe this definition to be of enduring use.

delegates one of its members who acts in its stead and place.'[88] Indeed, many scholars claim that Ignatius understands his death as substitutionary, serving to expiate other Christian congregations;[89] often this judgement is made as self-evident, perhaps citing one or two translations, which are themselves informed by such a conviction.[90] In order to decide whether this definition might be applicable in our case, we must look more closely at the points at which Ignatius establishes an apparently vicarious relationship between himself and his community.

§3: Language of vicariousness

Before we approach the specific terms commonly associated with Ignatius' supposed understanding of his death as in some way vicarious, we must treat the particular prepositions that Buol reckons are commonly used in such contexts in earlier literature,[91] particularly ὑπέρ.[92] This word Ignatius uses only twice in relation to his own suffering, and on both occasions, the subject for whom he suffers is God or Christ.

At *Ephesians* 1.2 he writes: 'For when you heard about me coming bound from Syria for the sake of [our] common name and hope [ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ ἐλπίδος]….' That this refers to Christ is clear from the fact that Ignatius frequently refers to Christ as ἐλπὶς ἡμῶν[93] and τὸ ὄνομα[94] separately elsewhere.[95] This use of ὑπέρ appears to bear the sense of 'out of loyalty to,'

[88] Hubert and Mauss (1964), 10.
[89] E.g. Bakker (2003), 176ff.; Frend (1965), 199; Bommes (1976), 222–24; Brent (2007), 48; cf. Camelot (1951), 93 n.1. Zahn (1873: 420) is more careful: 'Minder deutlich ist, ob Ignatius den später nicht seltenen Gedanken einer auf Andere sich erstreckenden Sühnkraft des Martyriums theilt.'
[90] See Moss (2010), 83–84; Frend (1965), 199; Brent (2007: 48) offers a particularly reductive analysis of the relevant terms: 'Ignatius uses, in addition to the word for scapegoat sacrifice (*peripsema*), the general word for expiation in Hellenistic Jewish literature, namely *antipsuchon*, which means literally something or someone given in place of the soul or life of another,' citing (erroneously) '4 Macc. 6.9, 17.'
[91] Buol (2018), 156ff.
[92] See in particular about Christ at Eph. 5:2; John 11:50; 1 Cor. 15:3; 2 Cor. 5:15; Rom. 5:8; Paul about himself at Col. 1:24; Eleazar at 2 Macc. 14:37.
[93] *Ephes*. 21.2; *Mag.* 11; *Trall.* inscr., 2.2; *Phld*. 11.2.
[94] *Ephes*. 3.1, 7.1; *Phld*. 10.1.
[95] Cf. Boyarin (2018), 314, who understands the 'common name' to refer to 'Christian,' as in Acts 11:26. Cf. also Marshall (2005), 20.

and gives a reason for his imprisonment, resembling *Ephesians* 3.1: 'For even though I am bound for the sake of [ἐν] the name….' It does not appear to bear a vicarious meaning here.

Romans 4.1 contains the intriguing statement that 'I willingly die for God [ἐγὼ ἑκὼν ὑπὲρ θεοῦ ἀποθνήσκω].' Buol is perplexed that Ignatius 'follows the formula for vicarious or effective death very clearly,'[96] yet claims the beneficiary for his death is God. He dismisses the suggestion that it is being used as a synonym for διά, ἐν, or εἰς to supply a cause for Ignatius' death because of the 'tradition of "dying for" phraseology.'[97] Yet I see no reason why we cannot understand this statement in the same way as we have understood Ignatius' other neighbouring declarations of his self-sacrifice to God (σπονδισθῆναι θεῷ at *Romans* 2.2; θεοῦ θυσία at *Romans* 4.2), as a sacrifice to God reminiscent of Jewish, pagan, and possibly eucharistic contexts. We might therefore interpret ὑπὲρ θεοῦ ἀποθνήσκω as 'I die for the sake of God,' which implies his absolute loyalty and devotion to God.[98] This reading is supported by Pauline parallels: Paul is content with all manner of injuries, weaknesses and hardships ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ at 2 Corinthians 12:10, and to the Philippians it has been granted 'to suffer for his sake [τὸ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ πάσχειν].' Just as Paul considered it legitimate and even praiseworthy to speak of Christians suffering ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ, Ignatius also speaks of his passion and death to be ὑπὲρ θεοῦ—a fact he announces to 'all the churches.' As Zahn notes in relation to this, 'Es bedeutet die willige Aufopferung um Gottes willen.'[99] Therefore, no notion of vicarious suffering is necessary or even likely in Ignatius' use of 'the common preposition for indicating vicarious death.'[100]

The same is found to be the case in his use of other prepositions which are elsewhere used to portray vicarious suffering. He carries around his chains for the sake of (ἕνεκεν) Jesus Christ, and

[96] Buol (2018), 160.
[97] Buol (2018), 160.
[98] As suggested by Mellink (2000), 141–43.
[99] Zahn (1873), 420.
[100] Buol (2018), 156.

exhorts endurance for the sake of (ἕνεκεν) God, that he might endure with the faithful.[101] Ignatius frequently speaks of suffering 'in Jesus/Christ' or in his name, which translations tend to render with the sense of 'for the sake of.'[102] Again, we have no reason to believe this language necessarily conveys any notion of vicarious suffering. The gospels expressly commend suffering ἕνεκεν Jesus,[103] and to understand one's sufferings (especially as a prisoner) as being for or in Christ is thoroughly Pauline.[104] At least in these examples, Ignatius does not represent himself as suffering on behalf of other Christians.

§3.1: περίψημα

> περίψημα ὑμῶν καὶ ἁγνίζομαι ὑμῶν Ἐφεσίων, ἐκκλησίας τῆς διαβοήτου τοῖς αἰῶσιν.
> I am scum on your behalf and I am dedicated to you Ephesians, a church that is famous forever (*Ephes.* 8.1).
>
> Περίψημα τὸ ἐμὸν πνεῦμα τοῦ σταυροῦ, ὅ ἐστιν σκάνδαλον τοῖς ἀπιστοῦσιν, ἡμῖν δὲ σωτηρία καὶ ζωὴ αἰώνιος.
> My spirit is scum of the cross, which is a stumbling block for the unbelievers, but for us salvation and eternal life (*Ephes.* 18.1).

περίψημα is literally an 'offscouring,' anything 'wiped off,' usually from something requiring cleansing. Its primary meaning, therefore, is that of 'scum,' something lowly or base. Yet it bears an ambivalence of meaning, since it can also refer to an agent of purification. Thence comes its secondary meaning: a scapegoat or sacrificial offering. This sense is in fact a tertiary definition in Liddell and Scott, and is completely absent in Lampe.[105] Nonetheless, in translations of Ignatius, περίψημα is commonly understood either in this substitutionary sense,[106] or as a simple expression

[101] *Trall.* 12.2; *Pol*. 3.1.
[102] See Buol's analysis (2018: 157–59).
[103] Matt. 5:11, 10:39, 19:29.
[104] See Phil. 1:13; Phlm. 1, 9, 13; Eph. 3:1, 4:1; 2 Tim. 1:8. Kirk (2013: 72) notes that 'Paul as a chained prisoner was a well-known image of Paul in early Christianity and thus Ignatius' similar emphasis on his chains is significant.'
[105] LSJ, LPGL s.v. περίψημα.
[106] For *Ephes*. 8.1, Ehrman (2003): 'I am your lowly scapegoat'; Camelot (1951): 'Je suis votre victime expiatoire'; Brent (2007: 48): 'I am your scapegoat sacrifice'; Bommes (1976: 223): 'Ich bin euer Auswurf und ein Sühnopfer

of self-abasement or devotion.[107] The translations of Holmes and Grant both reflect a sense of Ignatius' 'sacrifice' for the Ephesians.[108] How are we best to interpret Ignatius' intention from this broad spectrum of opinion?

Given Ignatius' apparent familiarity with 1 Corinthians, the most obvious interpretative context for his use of περίψημα must be 1 Corinthians 4:11–13:

> To this very hour we hunger and thirst, we are naked and buffeted and displaced, and we grow weary, working with our own hands. Being abused, we bless; being persecuted, we endure; being slandered, we comfort; as the dregs of the world we have become, the offscouring of all things to this day [ὡς περικαθάρματα τοῦ κόσμου ἐγενήθημεν, πάντων περίψημα ἕως ἄρτι].

I agree with Kirk in judging any kind of expiatory meaning to be highly unlikely here, since it would imply a kind of universalism (*πάντων* περίψημα).[109] Rather, Paul is contrasting the exalted and arrogant status of the Corinthians (4:6–7, 18) with the lowliness and sufferings of Paul and the apostles (4:9–13), and calls upon them to imitate him (4:16). As their condemned-ness is a spectacle to the world (θέατρον…τῷ κόσμῳ, v. 9), so in the opinion of the world, they have become like (ὡς) dregs and offscouring. In Kirk's opinion, 'Paul is creating a metaphor. It is not that he *is* scum (let alone a scapegoat) but that he is *like* scum in the eyes of the world.'[110] περίψημα functions for Paul as a term of insult which typifies Paul's worldly status which he assumes διὰ Χριστόν (v. 10), and a protreptic image whereby the Corinthians may learn to quell their pride.[111] This contrast between Christians' debased worldly appearance and their glorified invisible reality is made explicit at 2 Corinthians 4:17–18.

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für euch und weihe mich für euch Epheser.' Cf. Campenhausen (1936: 72–73), who thinks it obvious that 'er [Ignatius] den Segen seines Sterbens bestimmten Personen vor anderen zugewandt steht, also nicht bloss allen treuen Kirchenchristen im allgemeinen… So wird der Märtyrer, indem er sein eigenes Heil vollendet, wirklich zu einer Quelle des Heils für die Kirche, die mit ihm den wahren Glauben teilt.'

[107] For *Ephes*. 8.1, Lightfoot (1889): 'I devote myself for you'; Roberts and Donaldson (1867): 'I am far inferior to you'; Lake (1970): 'I am dedicated to you.'

[108] Holmes (2007): 'I am a humble sacrifice for you'; Grant (1966): 'I am a sacrifice for you.'

[109] Kirk (2013), 75–76; see Conzelmann (1975: 90 n. 49): 'To be sure, we should not here speak of an expiatory sacrifice.'

[110] Kirk (2013), 76 (emphasis original).

[111] See Rewa (1979: 76–77).

This context immediately appears consonant with Ignatius, for whom appearance is often opposed to a hidden reality.[112] Indeed, a particular concentration of references to 1 Corinthians is clearly observable surrounding both of Ignatius' uses of περίψημα. *Ephesians* 10.2 is a close recalling of 1 Corinthians 4:12–13, and *Ephesians* 18.1 itself evokes both 1 Corinthians 1:23 and 1:20 (ποῦ σοφός; ποῦ συζητητής). Moreover, at *Ephesians* 12.2 Ignatius explicitly speaks of Paul, 'who was sanctified, confirmed, [and] rightly-blessed,' and hopes that he may be found in his footsteps. It is likely that Ignatius uses this term within a Pauline interpretative framework, and wishes it to be understood as such.

Two further observations appear to deny implications of vicarious suffering in Ignatius' use of περίψημα. Firstly, Ignatius only uses the term in addressing the Ephesian Christians, whom he otherwise praises lavishly, sometimes even in the same breath (*Ephes*. 8.1).[113] It would appear odd to deem expiation necessary for such a presently harmonious and virtuous church, and not for a church more beset with strife.[114] Among those scholars who consider περίψημα and related language to be used in an expiatory sense, it is commonly held that Ignatius considers his suffering to be on behalf of the divided church in Syria, whose eventual restoration to peace he mentions.[115] Yet he never represents himself, in any way, as suffering for the Antiochene church. He is a περίψημα only for the Ephesian church (8.1) and 'the cross' (18.1); to anticipate the findings of the next few pages, he is an ἀντίψυχον for the Ephesians, the Smyrneans, and Polycarp himself. Moreover, Ignatius understands the peace at Antioch to have been brought about through prayer, not his own suffering.[116] Secondly, at *Ephesians* 18.1 Ignatius refers to his πνεῦμα, not his physical self, as a περίψημα (which is also true of ἀντίψυχον). This seems to disallow his own suffering and death from being a continuation of Christ's own. Of Christ's salvific death, in contrast, Ignatius

[112] E.g. *Ephes*. 15.1–3, 19.1; *Trall*. 5.2; *Rom*. 3.2–3; *Pol*. 3.2.
[113] See *Ephes.* inscr., 2.2.
[114] Such as the church at Magnesia; see *Mag*. 4, 6.2, 7.1–2, 8.1–2, 10.2–3.
[115] Brent (2007), 45–49; Bakker (2003), 198–99; Schoedel (1985), 13–14.
[116] *Phld*. 10.1: κατὰ τὴν προσευχήν ὑμῶν; *Pol*. 7.1: διὰ τῆς προσευχῆς ὑμῶν; cf. *Smyrn*. 11.1.

speaks in expressly material terms: Christ was 'truly nailed in the flesh for our sake'; Ignatius desires 'the bread of God, which is the flesh of Christ…[and] his blood.'[117]

It would therefore appear highly unlikely that Ignatius uses the word περίψημα to express the vicariousness of his suffering. I believe his usage reflects the Pauline sense of ideal Christian lowliness in contrast both to the worldly ideals of glory, and to the believer's hope of true and eternal glory. Just as Paul urged the Corinthians to imitate his debased status as περίψημα (which call Ignatius takes up in his condemned life and in his letters suffused with Paulinisms), by portraying himself in such terms as well, Ignatius presents himself as a role model to be imitated by the Ephesians. As I will demonstrate in chapter 4, this must be understood in the larger context of Ignatius' scheme of imitation (μιμητής) and discipleship (μαθητής).[118]

The meaning of περίψημα as an expression of courtesy, which was common by the third century at least,[119] might not be completely absent in Ignatius. This appears to be the sense of its use in the *Epistle of Barnabas*, where it features self-referentially and almost parenthetically, in order to indicate the author's consideration of the pedagogic needs of the readership.[120] Schoedel's assessment is judicious: 'Ignatius' use of *περίψημα* and related terms expresses somewhat more conventional sentiments of devotion or dedication to Christ and the church. At the same time, however, the language does not reflect merely polite self-effacement.'[121] Kirk, too, argues for a *tertium quid* to the two options of scapegoat or courtesy.[122] As I go on to argue, such expressions of

[117] *Smyrn.* 1.2; *Rom*. 7.3. See Bommes (1976), 221.
[118] Morgan (2015: 359) stresses that Paul's call to imitate him at 1 Cor. 4 commands more than just an acceptance of his teachings, but a following of his entire disposition and example as a servant of Christ (as τὰς ὁδούς μου at v. 17 suggests).
[119] See Dionysius of Alexandria who says that Christian caregivers, in tending to the sick and thereby infecting themselves, became 'their devoted servants [ἀπιόντες αὐτῶν περίψημα],' 'in very deed making good the popular saying' (Eusebius, *HE* 7.22.7 [trans. Lake et al., 187]).
[120] *Barn.* 6.5 (trans. Holmes, 397): 'I am writing to you very simply, so that you may understand—I, the devoted servant of your love [ἐγὼ περίψημα τῆς ἀγάπης ὑμῶν].' Cf. *Barn.* 4.9.
[121] Schoedel (1985), 64.
[122] Kirk (2013), 76. Cf. Bauer (1920: 207–8) who suggests that Ignatius chose the customary term of salutation περίψημα specifically for its sacrificial implications.

self-sacrifice participate in, and derive their meaning from, an expansive tradition of Christian self-perception and identity—individual and collective—and so refuse simplistic definition.[123]

§3.2: ἁγνίζομαι

> ἁγνίζεται ὑμῶν τὸ ἐμὸν πνεῦμα, οὐ μόνον νῦν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν θεοῦ ἐπιτύχω.
> My spirit is dedicated to you, not only now but also whenever I attain God (*Trall.* 13.3).
>
> περίψημα ὑμῶν καὶ ἁγνίζομαι ὑμῶν Ἐφεσίων.
> I am scum on your behalf and I am dedicated to you Ephesians (*Ephes.* 8.1).

Bauer's lexicon notes that ἁγνίζω is used to describe the action of purifying, especially before religious or ritual observances;[124] as such it resembles περίψημα, often carrying a cultic sense of ritual sacrifice.[125] An example of this is found in the *Epistle of Barnabas* 5.1, which speaks of the Lord suffering 'so that we might be cleansed [ἁγνισθῶμεν] by the forgiveness of sins, that is, by his sprinkled blood.' Lightfoot notes in addition that it came to bear connotations of dedication or devotion, which sense he thinks 'predominates' in Ignatius.[126]

Both instances of his use of this word occur in the middle/passive voice, which would seem to rule out Ignatius' active purification of his fellow Christians.[127] As with περίψημα, Ignatius refers to his πνεῦμα as that which is dedicated at *Trallians* 13.3, confirming our refusal to attribute to it a sense of material atonement. The proximity of the two words at *Ephesians* 8.1 would suggest that a similar or complementary meaning is intended, though it is not exclusively or even necessarily

[123] On the above section, cf. Paul's statement at Rom. 9:3.
[124] See John 11:55; Acts 21:24, 26.
[125] BDAG s.v. ἁγνίζω.
[126] Lightfoot (1889), II.51.
[127] It should be mentioned that Roberts and Donaldson translate ἁγνίζομαι to express Ignatius' purification or sanctification by his fellow Christians, according to its common usage in the LXX. 1 Pet. 1:22 appears to use it in such a sense, in urging purification of the audience's souls. However, the genitival use, already noted as exceptional by Lightfoot (1889: II.51), more easily bears the sense of direction rather than instrument, especially given the sentence at *Trall.* 13.3 continues in the active voice. If this reading is adopted, it would appear close to instances (often at a letter's close) in which Ignatius asks for prayer on his behalf (e.g. *Trall.* 12.3; *Mag.* 14).

sacrificial.[128] Moreover, and again as we noted in relation to περίψημα, the two congregations to whom he uses the word are highly praised and 'blameless,' thus unlikely to require Ignatius' expiation.[129]

Furthermore, 'not only now but also whenever I attain God' in *Trallians* 13.3 implies that his spirit's devotion or dedication occurs principally (οὐ μόνον) in his present bodily existence; the suggestion that his attaining God will also contribute to this process he anticipates to be somewhat unexpected (ἀλλὰ καί) for the Trallians. Kirk writes that 'Ignatius is not describing a one-time sacrifice of himself at death but rather a continual "sacrifice" of himself as he serves his fellow Christians.'[130] ἁγνίζομαι occurs in Ignatius' farewell to the Trallians, among other of his expressions of self-abasement (οὐκ ἀξιός εἰμι…ἔσχατος). Its appearance here is strikingly similar to the conclusion of Ignatius' *Romans* (9.3), where, among similar statements of humility, he writes 'My spirit greets you [ἀσπάζεται ὑμᾶς τὸ ἐμὸν πνεῦμα].' A type of self-offering which is effected in his present bodily life (but also after it) approaches most closely a meaning of 'devotion' or 'intimate affection' towards the Ephesian and Trallian Christians. Despite this, his use of ἁγνίζομαι might also convey elements of the traditional meaning of the term as a sacrifice which *benefits* another, but I understand this to be in a non-expiatory, Pauline sense (see §3.4 below).

§3.3: ἀντίψυχον

> Ἀντίψυχον ὑμῶν ἐγὼ καὶ ὧν ἐπέμψατε εἰς θεοῦ τιμὴν εἰς Σμύρναν.
> I am an offering for you and for those whom you sent to Smyrna for the honour of God (*Ephes.* 21.1).
>
> ἀντίψυχον ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα μου καὶ τὰ δεσμά μου, ἃ οὐχ ὑπερηφανήσατε οὐδε ἐπῃσχύνθητε.
> My spirit is an offering for you, as are my chains, which you neither despised nor treated with shame (*Smyrn.* 10.2).

[128] *Contra* Bakker (2003), 185; Camelot (1951), 76 n.2.
[129] See p.78 above and *Trall.* 1.1–2.
[130] Kirk (2013), 82; cf. Zahn (1873: 422) on the meaning of *Trall.* 13.3: 'Seine Liebe zu den Gemeinden, seine Freude an ihnen, seine Bereitwilligkeit, ihnen zu dienen, soll den Tod überdauern.'

> κατὰ πάντα σου ἀντίψυχον ἐγὼ καὶ τὰ δεσμά μου, ἃ ἠγάπησας.
> In every way I am an offering for you, as are my chains, which you have loved (*Pol.* 2.3).
>
> ἀντίψυχον ἐγὼ τῶν ὑποτασσομένων τῳ ἐπισκόπῳ, πρεσβυτέροις, διακόνοις.
> I am an offering to those subject to the bishop, presbyters, and deacons (*Pol.* 6.1).

The word ἀντίψυχον is attested very infrequently in literature contemporaneous to Ignatius. It is found twice in 4 Maccabees, which is often cited as the closest point of reference for Ignatius' use of the term.[131] Both of these instances bear the sense of giving one's life in exchange for another or that of the nation. The first falls in the context of the torture of the old man Eleazar at the hands of the tyrant Antiochus, portrayed in unmistakably cultic, expiatory language. Just before his death, he prays, 'Be merciful to your people, and let our punishment be sufficient for them [ἀρκεσθεὶς τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν δίκῃ]. Make my blood their purification [καθάρσιον], and take my soul in exchange for theirs [ἀντίψυχον αὐτῶν λαβὲ τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχήν].'[132] The second Maccabean example shares connotations of purification, atonement, and cultus with the first. It speaks of the renovation of the covenantal relationship between Israel and God by the sacrifices of the Maccabean martyrs, who became 'as a ransom for the sin of the nation [ὥσπερ ἀντίψυχον…τῆς τοῦ ἔθνους ἁμαρτίας]. And through the blood of those pious ones and the expiation [ἱλαστήριος] of their death, the divine providence preserved Israel, so formerly afflicted.'[133] In both of these passages, the substitutional propitiation achieved by the martyrs' deaths is pronounced: the nation avoids punishment which has been borne by the martyrs. ἀντίψυχον also tends to mean a vicarious sacrifice when it appears elsewhere in ancient literature.[134]

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[131] Perler (1949: 49) finds great affinity between many 'Gedanken, Bilder, [und] Ausdrücke' of Ignatius and 4 Maccabees. Bowersock (1995: 78) justly criticises the generality and strain of Perler's parallels, and considers influence of 4 Maccabees upon Ignatius impossible; rather, their language reflects 'a common origin for both in the imperial Greek of Asia Minor' (79). Cf. the suggestion of Meinhold (1963: 322) that Ignatius' understanding of his death stems from 'der allgemeinen Verbreitung der Idee vom Opfertode einzelner hervorragender Personen für die von ihnen vertretene Gemeinschaft.'

[132] 4 Macc. 6:28–29.

[133] 4 Macc. 17:21–22.

[134] See Buol (2018), 167; though he notes that Lucian uses the word to refer to money which can be exchanged for a life, like λύτρον.

Many scholars believe that Ignatius adopted such a meaning wholesale,[135] while other scholars reach quite the opposite conclusion. Kirk finds the comparison between the use of ἀντίψυχον in 4 Maccabees and Ignatius illuminating for the very reason that their contexts are so divergent.[136] The Maccabean passages are saturated with cultic imagery, and concepts surrounding substitutionary sacrifice and atonement (καθάρσιον, ἱλαστήριος, ἁμαρτία, the ὑπέρ + genitive construction). Such a context is completely lacking in Ignatius. Several reasons already mentioned also warn against a meaning of vicarious suffering. He does not speak as himself as an ἀντίψυχον on behalf of the Antiochene community, or for the sake of its divisions, as Brent seems to interpret him;[137] he continues to self-identify as ἀντίψυχον even after learning of their having found peace (*Smyrneans* and *Polycarp*). It is his spirit and chains which are an ἀντίψυχον at *Smyrneans* 10.2;[138] the context for all four instances of ἀντίψυχον is one of delight on behalf of his addressees, in which 'his affection for his fellow Christians is pronounced';[139] there is no suggestion of their sinfulness or requisite purification.

Even more than affection, Ignatius owes the Ephesians a debt of thanks for quickly sending a delegation from Ephesus to see him (five of whom he identifies by name), who in turn refreshed him and acted as a living example of the Ephesians' love for him.[140] He thanks the Smyrneans for refreshing him κατὰ πάντα, and for welcoming Philo and Rhaius Agathopus,[141] just before calling his spirit and chains their ἀντίψυχον. Indeed, frequently throughout his letters to the Ephesians, Smyrneans, and Polycarp, Ignatius portrays himself as dependent upon the addressees and their prayers,[142] rather than their depending upon him for some expiation. His gratitude is not merely

[135] See Perler (1949); Frend (1965: 199); DeSilva (1998: 149–50); and above pp.76–77 n.107. Cf. van Henten (1986: 137).
[136] Kirk (2013), 79–81.
[137] Brent (2007), 45–49.
[138] See Zahn (1873), 422.
[139] Kirk (2013), 80.
[140] *Ephes.* 1.2–2.1.
[141] *Smyrn*. 9.2.
[142] *Ephes.* 1.2, 11.2, 21.1; *Mag*. 14; *Smyrn*. 11.1; *Pol*. 7.1, 8.1. See Zahn (1873), 421–22.

verbal, but is expressed in the form of an offering to them of his very self (ἀντίψυχον), along with various instruction and encouragement. This co-dependence strongly speaks against any notion of vicarious suffering.[143] The assertion of one such as Bakker that 'the identification with Jesus dominates Ignatius—the martyr unites so strongly with Jesus that he, while actually still belonging to the church, stands with Jesus apart from the church,'[144] is shown to contradict the true sense of Ignatius' self-sacrificial language.

The two occurrences of ἀντίψυχον in the letter to Polycarp also appear in a context of deep personal affection, approval and respect for his addressees. Kirk analyses Ignatius' particular use of the phrase κατὰ πάντα, and finds that it is usually used in the context of a personal relationship between believers.[145] In most of these cases, the relationship is centred around one 'refreshing [ἀναπαύω]' the other. It makes sense, then, to interpret ἀντίψυχον in the context of providing spiritual nourishment. Indeed, this is just the sense in which it is used to Polycarp. In chapters 2 and 3 of the letter, Ignatius offers difficult but sound advice to the bishop about his dealings with his congregation. He must be 'like an athlete of God,' 'like an anvil being struck,' ready to be 'bruised'; he must 'patiently endure all things for the sake of God,' and indeed 'be more zealous than [he is]' already. It is for this taxing spiritual task of Polycarp's that Ignatius offers himself to him as an ἀντίψυχον. The word appears for a second time in this letter at the point where Ignatius turns from addressing Polycarp singly, to the Smyrnean community as a whole.[146] He begins this address by calling himself an ἀντίψυχον of all those who observe correct ecclesial order, going on to command

[143] *Pace* Bommes (1976: 222–23), who rightly notes the context of thanksgiving for ἀντίψυχον, but still interprets it as Ignatius giving his life 'als stellvertretendes Opfer' (222). He offers his martyrdom as a sacrifice to God, 'durch die sie [his fellow-Christians] Heil erlangt.' Bommes seems to soften her view, later writing that 'Die Stellvertretung bedeutet also nicht, daß er »sein Leben anstelle…des Lebens seiner Adressaten hingeben« will, wie Perler meint, sondern sein Martyrium ist in einer umfassenderen Weise ein fürbittendes Opfer um jegliche Hilfe für die Kirche, deren sie auf ihrem Weg zu Gott bedarf' (222). Bommes understands Ignatius to offer himself to God as an 'intercessory sacrifice,' in order that God might give help to his addressees.

[144] Bakker (2003), 181.

[145] Kirk (2013), 84–85.

[146] The last second-person singular occurs at 5.1, and the first second-person plural at 6.1 (though both occur from 7.2 onwards).

them in metaphors that are overwhelmingly military and agonistic: they are to 'work alongside one another, train together, run together, suffer together…[to] please the one whom you serve as soldiers,' not to be found deserters, and to let 'your baptism serve as a shield, faith as a helmet, love as a spear, endurance as a panoply.'[147] They are advancing into spiritual battle, for the sake of which Ignatius desires to support them through the gift of himself.

A strong parallel, to my knowledge not noticed in any secondary literature, is to be found at 2 Corinthians 12:15a. In the midst of a passage in which he describes how he became weak, foolish, nothing, and inferior for the sake of the Corinthians, Paul informs them: 'I will most gladly spend and be spent for the sake of your souls [ἐγὼ δὲ ἥδιστα δαπανήσω καὶ ἐκδαπανηθήσομαι ὑπὲρ τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν].' This phrase closely resembles the terminology and intention of Ignatius' ἀντίψυχον. The apostolic mission which seeks to convert and save souls demands of Paul both that he spends of his resources (physical and spiritual) and is himself exhausted;[148] the same applies to Ignatius, who twice sees fit to include his chains, symbols of his devotion to Christ and his ministry, as participating in his ἀντίψυχον offering.[149] As we have seen for Ignatius, Paul's spending and being spent for the Corinthians' souls[150] is an expression of love and demonstrates that love (v. 15b): 'If I love you more abundantly, am I loved the less? [εἰ περισσοτέρως ὑμᾶς ἀγαπῶν, ἧσσον ἀγαπῶμαι;].' To Paul's distress, the Corinthians have not reciprocated this love, and in fact love him less for his efforts on their behalf. Ignatius, however, expresses himself and his chains as an offering in a gesture of love which itself reciprocates the love shown him by his addressees. In light of this comparison, then, Ignatius uses the term ἀντίψυχον to express his self-emptying for the sake of others. The

[147] *Pol*. 6.1–2.
[148] As Barrett comments, 'There are no lengths to which Paul will not go for the salvation (the highest interest) of the Corinthians' (1973: 324).
[149] *Smyrn*. 10.2; *Pol*. 2.3.
[150] I have chosen to translate as 'souls' to accentuate the verse's similarity with Ignatius' ἀντίψυχον, but I am aware that it is likely intended to mean 'simply one's whole "natural" life'; see Furnish (1984), 558.

tokens of his imprisonment act as proof that this self-emptying is not merely verbal, but encompasses Ignatius' entire being, physical and spiritual.

As has become apparent, Ignatius, his spirit and bonds, are consistently an ἀντίψυχον supporting those with whom he enjoys positive and affectionate relations, and whose sound obedience he stresses. It is likely that he understands the term as analogous to his refreshing Christians who are enduring hardship. Unlike its occurrence in the Maccabean literature, the word is never used in a context which supports its interpretation in a cultic sense of expiation or substitutionary suffering. Its parallel with 2 Corinthians 12:15 situates it in the context of Ignatius' being spent for the sake of the souls to whom he ministers, and by extension, for the gospel. We therefore understand the term as expressing elements of love, thanksgiving, and acknowledgement of personal debt, for which he reciprocates in offering his suffering self as spiritual nourishment.

§3.4: Language of vicariousness—conclusion

As with his use of explicitly sacrificial language, Ignatius often employs apparently vicarious terminology (especially ὑπέρ and ἐκών) to depict his suffering and death as being *for the sake of God or Christ.* Despite the squeamishness of some commentators about its implications, the idea of suffering for God is given ample sanction in literature of the New Testament. Ignatius understood himself as dying out of a feeling of intense devotion to Christ, and a wish to 'attain God,' which led him to describe himself thus.

This discussion has been salutary in underlining how essential were his 'fellow learners,'[151] the community of believers, for Ignatius to make sense out of his own death.[152] For a number of reasons, we have concluded that none of the vicarious suffering vocabulary indicates that Ignatius considered his death as expiatory towards his fellow-Christians, either those of the congregations

[151] *Ephes.* 3.1.
[152] A point emphasised by Rebell (1986), 463.

to whom he wrote or his own community in Antioch. We found that the three specific terms analysed occurred in the context of relations of love and mutual affection, often in the context of Ignatius' reciprocating some act of love shown towards him. Yet there is still the matter of deciding whether such language can properly be said to be vicarious—that is, whether Ignatius understood his suffering to benefit the Christian communities in some way. At its weakest interpretation, such language merely expresses Ignatius' disposition of gratitude and love, its connotations of suffering and substitution only metaphorical.[153] At its strongest interpretation, it expresses Ignatius' belief (or hope) that his suffering will result in an effectual benefit enjoyed by (probably) the community to whom he writes. Two considerations must be discussed in deciding this point.

(1) Ignatius' language of sacrifice must be seen within the context of his wider tendency towards self-abasement. He is 'last' (ἔσχατος) of the Antiochenes,[154] a 'miscarriage' (ἔκτρωμα),[155] condemned,[156] and has frequent doubts concerning his worthiness.[157] Clearly, he shares many of these with the apostle Paul, whom he aspires to imitate.[158] His sacrificial self-references must be situated within the complex nexus of ideas related to Christian identity, suffering, and worthiness. 'Dedication of oneself' may be a helpful way to articulate the ambivalence of his meaning. A translation of his self-sacrificial language (particularly ἀντίψυχον) which appears to convey this, while still remaining open to cultic resonances is 'offering.'[159] The effectiveness of this offering might be said to approximate to intercessory prayer, which Ignatius believes efficacious, in both asking for

[153] See e.g. Zahn (1873: 422), who suggests that such expressions 'nur abgeschliffene Bedeutung haben, dem Verkehrsleben entlehnte Bezeichnungen hingebender Liebe sind.'
[154] *Ephes.* 21.2; *Trall.* 13.1; *Rom*. 9.2; *Smyrn*. 11.1; cf. 1 Cor. 4:9, 15:8–9.
[155] *Rom*. 9.2; 1 Cor. 15:8.
[156] *Trall.* 3.3; *Rom*. 4.3.
[157] *Ephes.* 2.2; *Mag.* 12.1, 14; *Trall.* 4.2; 13.1; *Rom*. 9.2; *Smyrn*. 11.1.
[158] E.g. *Ephes.* 12.2. Mitchell (2006: 36) reminds us of the proximity of such statements of abasement to Christian authority: 'Ignatius' pattern of using language filled with humility and near self-denigration, while yet giving directions and commands, bears a strong resemblance to Paul's writings, in which he claims to be both an unworthy apostle and an apostle who receives his apostolic status and authority from God directly.'
[159] As suggested by Kirk (2013), 81.

and offering prayer.[160] Ignatius offers his very self (as a περίψημα, ἁγνισμός, ἀντίψυχον) for the sake of the addressees, in the same way that he offers prayers for them, in the belief that they will thereby be benefitted through God.[161] Some commentators forget the centrality of God for Ignatius' self-offering for his communities, thereby reducing his offering to some sort of unmediated transmission between Ignatius and his addressees—a mechanism as theologically unsatisfying as it is unworkable. Understanding Ignatius' self-offering in a context of prayer, rather than one of expiation or atonement, allows us to avoid inferring his belief in a God whose anger towards humanity requires appeasement (a view scarcely evident in the letters),[162] and is more easily reconciled with the overall timbre of his letters as expressing godly counsel and affection.

(2) Paul also speaks of suffering 'for the sake of' other believers, usually those to whom he writes, indicating that they and their congregation will derive some benefit from his suffering.[163] Buol, after analysing the Corinthian correspondence, overstates the case somewhat in saying that 'Paul equates his own suffering and affliction with Christ's sufferings… Just as Christ's sufferings and death yielded vicarious benefits to his followers, so the affliction and sufferings of Paul yield benefit for the Corinthians.'[164] The terms 'equate' and 'just as' lack nuance. We need not adopt such an extreme interpretation as Buol's to acknowledge that there are several instances in which Paul does speak of his suffering as being for the sake of his fellow-Christians, in a manner partly analogous to Christ's sufferings for humankind.

(a) The most famous and controversial instance occurs at Colossians 1:24. Paul states that his sufferings (παθήματα) are for the Colossians (ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν), and that he 'fills up [ἀνταναπληρῶ]'

[160] *Ephes.* 1.2, 11.2, 21.1, 21.2; *Mag.* 14; *Trall.* 13.1; *Rom*. 1.1, 9.1; *Phld*. 5.1, 8.2, 10.1; *Smyrn*. 11.1; *Pol*. 1.3, 7.1, 8.1.

[161] Ignatius' letters do not offer sufficient material for us to conclude precisely how he understands prayer to function, though God is glossed as 'the one who willed all things that exist [τοῦ θελήσαντος τὰ πάντα ἃ ἔστιν]' (*Rom*. inscr.).

[162] See §4 below.

[163] I draw here from the entire Pauline corpus, not only the seven universally accepted letters.

[164] Buol (2018), 111. Immoderate readings of early Christian martyrdom as redemptive abound; see e.g. R.D. Young (2001), 12.

what is lacking of Christ's afflictions in his body (τὰ ὑστερήματα τῶν θλίψεων τοῦ Χριστοῦἐν τῇ σαρκί μου) for the sake of Christ's body, which is the church (ὑπὲρ τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ, ὅ ἐστιν ἡ ἐκκλησία). The secondary literature on this verse is prohibitively immense, but we note here only that the context demonstrates that Paul's benefit to the church is that they have been reconciled to Christ, having heard and believed in the gospel, of which Paul is a minister (vv. 21–23). His ministry involves his 'fulfilling [πληρῶσαι] the word of God' (v. 25), which is explained as preaching Christ to the Gentiles (vv. 26–27). Paul's sufferings, therefore, do not provide any kind of extension of Christ's salvific death—his death has already 'reconciled [ἀποκατήλλαξεν]' the Colossians, allowing them to be holy and blameless and irreproachable (ἁγίους καὶ ἀμώμους καὶ ἀνεγκλήτους) before him (v. 22); rather, Paul's sufferings are 'for the sake of [ὑπέρ]' the Colossians and Christ's body (the church), in the sense of growing and nurturing the church through his gospel ministry, for which he toils and struggles (κοπιῶ ἀγωνιζόμενος), unto the end of presenting 'every person perfect in Christ' (vv. 28–29). Kremer summarises, 'Wie deshalb noch etwas fehlt an der Verkündigung Christi, das Christus selbst durch seine Gesandten ergänzt, so fehlt auch noch etwas an den Bedrängnissen und Leiden Christi, die mit seiner Verkündigung in diesem Äon verbunden sind.'[165] Such an understanding of the benefit of Paul's suffering is corroborated elsewhere in the Pauline corpus.

(b) At Philippians 1:12–14 Paul speaks about what has befallen him (τὰ κατ' ἐμέ), for which his bonds (οἱ δεσμοί) serve as a metonym, as having occurred 'for the advancement of the gospel [εἰς προκοπὴν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου],' and that the believers have been strengthened by them (πεποιθότας τοῖς δεσμοῖς μου περισσοτέρως τολμᾶν ἀφόβως τὸν λόγον λαλεῖν). Indeed, we have already noted that Paul's reference to himself as being poured out as a libation most likely refers to his labours in establishing the church, or promoting the gospel in general.

[165] Kremer (1956), 192.

Occasions in which Paul speaks of suffering in order that his fellow-Christians might obtain salvation must be interpreted in light of the fact that gospel proclamation (and its associated dangers) was a *sine qua non* of others' salvation.[166] Paul's several catalogues of his own sufferings serve a number of functions,[167] foremost among which is to present himself as a model for Christian behaviour and perseverance in service of the gospel[168]—a model that is of course based on Christ's endurance.[169] Instances in which Paul speaks of Christ as suffering in or with him serve to demonstrate that Paul's suffering is both in imitation of Christ, and brings some benefit to fellow Christians.[170] This benefit, I have contended, is the growth and strengthening of the Christian movement. Paul understands his suffering to be 'for the sake of' the church, in the sense that his sufferings are part and parcel of his apostolic ministry. Such is also the case with 2 Corinthians 12:15 which we discussed above: Paul spends and is spent for the sake of the Corinthians' souls—a circumlocution for his establishment, strengthening, and confirmation of their Christian community. Yet as we have seen in relation to Ignatius, Paul does not understand his sufferings as providing expiation or substitutionary atonement to his churches. He does not 'equate' his suffering to Christ's any more than his suffering provides benefit to fellow-Christians 'just as' does Christ's—the most we can say is that he (and all, especially apostolic, Christians) suffers analogously to Christ. Paul does not provide a systematic analysis of the 'intricate network in which the sufferings of Jesus, Paul, and Paul's churches all participate,'[171] certain though he is of such a nexus.

[166] See 2 Tim. 2:10; 2 Cor. 1:6–7. At 2 Tim. 2:9 this is made clear, since it is 'the gospel for which I am suffering [κακοπαθῶ]'; the elect's salvation is explicitly 'in Christ' (v. 10). Cf. 2 Tim. 1:8 where Timothy is commanded to 'suffer together for the gospel [συγκακοπάθησον τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ].'

[167] See Fitzgerald (1988).

[168] Especially when addressing a church struggling with the sin of pride and glory. See 1 Cor. 4:9–13 and 4:16: 'become imitators of me.'

[169] This dynamic is summed up at 1 Cor. 11:1: 'Be imitators of me as I am of Christ.'

[170] 2 Cor. 1:5–7: ὑπὲρ τῆς ὑμῶν παρακλήσεως καὶ σωτηρίας…ὡς κοινωνοί ἐστε τῶν παθημάτων, οὕτως καὶ τῆς παρακλήσεως; 2 Cor. 4:10–15: δι' ὑμᾶς. Paul's theme of sharing in Christ's sufferings of course also entails Christians' hope that they might also be raised with him; see Rom. 6:3–8; 2 Tim. 2:11.

[171] Buol (2018), 132.

Since Paul's letters provide an interpretative context so close to Ignatius' (compared to e.g. 4 Maccabees), the manner in which Paul speaks about his own suffering should be accorded precedence in understanding how Ignatius speaks about his. We argued in relation to *Romans* 2.2 that, although the primary 'beneficiary' of Ignatius as θυσία is God, the sacrifice is also performed 'so that [ἵνα]' the believers come together and praise God. While I do not claim that such a sentiment is intended in every instance of his self-offering, it might certainly be said to be present in some of them. *Polycarp* 6.1 is such a case, in which Ignatius is explicitly said to offer himself (ἀντίψυχον) for those who subject themselves to the bishop, presbyters, and deacons, and who (it is implied) might receive benefit on the basis of this obedience and unity. Furthermore, Ignatius twice employs self-sacrificial language in the midst of commanding unity among the addressees, or praising a community for their present unity.[172] An association may be said to exist, whereby Ignatius promotes or commends his congregations' unity through his self-offering.

As an essential aspect of Christian identity since the time of Christ, suffering (especially vicarious suffering) was inevitably polysemous in the writings of early Christians. Ignatius is no exception. Suffering, for Ignatius, is a means to participate in imitation of Christ and Paul;[173] a means to become a true disciple and human being; through it he hopes to attain God; it forms part of his apostolic self-idealisation as weak, poor, and despised. Thus suffering also confers authority as bearing the hallmark of the apostles and Christ himself; in a Pauline manner, the lowliness of Christian suffering and death, so apparent to the world, in fact concealed the divine glory of life which God would soon reveal. Given the centrality of intercessory prayer, mutual refreshment, and the language of self-offering for Ignatius, it seems churlish of Zahn to deny 'dass er zu ihrer [the

[172] *Ephes.* 6.2–8.1; *Trall.* 12.2–13.3.

[173] *Smyrn*. 4.2: εἰς τὸ συμπαθεῖν αὐτῷ; *Mag.* 5.2. Winslow (1965: 128) is right to refuse any substantial contradiction between Ignatius' understanding of *imitation* of Christ's death and *participation* in it: 'Discipleship involves accepting the "cup" that Christ himself drinks; it also involves receiving of that "cup" which he offers to us in his perfect sacrifice.'

communities to which he writes] Versöhnung oder auch nur zu ihrem Besten sterben werde.'[174] In the footsteps of Paul, and indeed Christ, Ignatius does hope that the congregations to whom he writes will derive real benefit from his suffering. This form of devotion is not to be separated from the other means by which Christians enjoy fellowship with one another, and is not coterminous with Ignatius' mortal life.[175]

If Ignatius' words bear only a weak authority while he is still alive, as he suggests,[176] he hopes that his martyrdom will sanctify his words, as Paul was 'sanctified, confirmed, [and] rightly-blessed.'[177] Suffering will transform him from a δοῦλος into an ἀπελεύθερος, just as Peter and Paul were ἐλεύθεροι.[178] The authority that he anticipates will accrue to him after death is enshrined most obviously in his letters, which Polycarp indicates were collected together and in high demand,[179] possibly even before news of his death had reached Smyrna.[180] The degree to which Ignatius was conscious of this is debatable, though Buol's conclusion is attractive:

> By choosing to create his own memorial through his letters, Ignatius ensures that his authority actually remains within his letters themselves. It is their exhortations to obey bishops, elders, and deacons, to avoid false teaching, and to pursue unity, which would become authoritative commands after death.[181]

Through their exhortations and godly sentiments, Ignatius hopes these letters also will continue to support and confirm the church. Polycarp indeed confirms as much, telling the Philippians that from Ignatius' letters they 'will be able to receive great benefit [ἐξ ὧν μεγάλα ὠφεληθῆναι

[174] Zahn (1873), 421. Similarly, acknowledgement that his suffering is in some sense for others does not detract from the fact that 'der Opfertod des Ignatius…einmal Bedeutung für ihn selber und seine Beziehung zu Gott hat' (Rebell [1986: 462]).
[175] See *Trall.* 13.3.
[176] *Ephes.* 3.1; *Rom*. 4.3.
[177] *Ephes.* 12.2.
[178] *Rom*. 4.3.
[179] Pol. *Phil.* 13.2.
[180] Pol. *Phil.* 13.2: 'Concerning Ignatius himself and those who are with him, if you learn anything more certain, tell us [Et de ipso Ignatio et de his qui cum eo sunt, quod certius agnoveritis, significate].'
[181] Buol (2018), 175.

δυνήσεσθε].'[182] The injunction which eclipses all others in intensity is surely that his addressees should live in unity under the bishop, presbyters, and deacons. Ignatius' expressions of self-sacrifice, then, must be seen in the context of the multiple ways Ignatius envisages that he, in word and deed, in life and death, will prove beneficial to the Christian communion.

§4: Étienne Decrept—a further theory about Ignatius' self-portrayal as sacrifice

Before moving on to analyse Ignatius' sacrificial offering of himself through a Girardian lens, we must mention one other theory surrounding Ignatius' interpretation of the significance of his death. That of Brent has already been addressed in chapter 2 (§3.2), and will reappear in the next chapter, so we set it aside for now. In two articles (2008 and 2009), the French scholar Étienne Decrept proposes an intriguing theory on the same topic that deserves analysis.

For Decrept, Ignatius' report that 'the church at Antioch in Syria is at peace [εἰρηνεύειν]'[183] does not refer to the resolution of intra-ecclesial division, as the majority of scholarship since Harrison has held;[184] rather it refers to the cessation of persecution directed towards Christians. Cross-referring between the *Acts of Drosis*[185] and the testimony of Malalas, Decrept concludes that the Christians at Antioch were victims of a persecution initiated by Trajan, which he calculates as having begun on 25 July, AD 116. Various factors such as an earthquake in Antioch and the surrounding regions in 115,[186] and the fire of Rome in 64, 'mettaient en cause son [the Empire's] *auctoritas*.'[187] Trajan himself had been stationed at Antioch for the winter when the earthquake struck, and narrowly escaped with his life.[188] Many other 'portentous' (ἀλλόκοτοι) signs of nature

[182] Pol. *Phil.* 13.2.
[183] *Phld.* 10.1.
[184] Harrison (1936), 81–106; see Schoedel (1985), 212–14. Streeter (1929), 175–77 also hints at such a solution.
[185] See Delehaye (1902).
[186] Malalas (PG 97:416B); Cassius Dio, *Roman History* 68.24–25.
[187] Decrept (2008), 393 (emphasis original).
[188] Cassius Dio, *Roman History* 68.25.

occurring alongside this earthquake[189] seemed to express divine disapproval of the emperor's already controversial Parthian campaign, though this assessment is absent from the historical records, and is Decrept's own reconstruction of contemporary accounts. In the wake of the fire of Rome, we are told that Nero ordered all manner of public prayers and divine propitiations (*deum placamentis*), but that he finally resorted to a severe persecution of the Christians to divert blame for the fire from himself.[190] Decrept believes a similar motivation to be behind the persecution of the Christians mentioned in the *Acts of Drosis* and Malalas:[191] 'ils furent accusés d'avoir par leur impiété provoqué la colère divine.'[192]

Decrept suggests that, just as the Roman Christians had probably suffered under the pronouncement of *coercitio extra ordinem* for hatred against humanity, so the Antiochene Christians were condemned to death in the public interest: 'Considéré comme le chef des athées, Ignace fut dirigé sur Rome afin de participer à l'une des venationes prévues pour le triomphe parthique de Trajan.'[193] His somewhat circuitous route to Rome is comprehensible if it is understood as visiting cities which had in recent decades been affected by earthquakes:

> le spectacle du chef des athées, offert en victime publique pour expier le séisme d'Antioche et prévenir le retour de la colère des dieux, était susceptible de les rassurer. Le voyage d'Ignace entouré d'une escorte de dix soldats fut présenté par les autorités comme le parcours de dérision et de malédiction d'un bouc émissaire.[194]

For the authorities, then, Ignatius is a scapegoat intended to appease the gods and to demonstrate to citizens that the source of the impiety was being dealt with. But for Ignatius, he understands himself as 'une victime s'offrant librement en sacrifice' for the sake of the Christian communities through which he passes, to save them from imminent persecution. This interpretation of his

[189] Cassius Dio, *Roman History* 68.24.
[190] Tacitus, *Annals* 15.44.
[191] Malalas (PG 97:417B–420A).
[192] Decrept (2008), 394.
[193] Decrept (2008), 394.
[194] Decrept (2008), 395.

significance would have been obvious to them through his use of the sacrificial vocabulary discussed above. In Ignatius' eyes, his reception was in accordance to the civic ceremonial practice of *adventus*, whereby a dignitary or famous person, often expected to bring benefit to its inhabitants, would be welcomed into a city with great festivity.[195]

The coincidence of the unusual word δροσισθῆναι at *Magnesians* 14 and in 3 Maccabees 6:6 in the mouth of Eleazar, Decrept takes as definitive proof that Ignatius does indeed speak to a context of persecution. In the midst of beseeching God's saving help, Eleazar evokes the memory of Daniel's three companions, whom the Lord 'rescued unharmed, even to a hair, moistening the fiery furnace with dew [δροσίσας] and turning the flame against all their enemies.' When the Magnesians read of Ignatius' fervent hope 'that the church in Syria might be deemed worthy to be refreshed by the dew [δροσισθῆναι] of your zeal,' they would be reminded of the persecution in which the Antiochenes were currently suffering.[196] The word εἰρηνεύειν, which is at the centre of the dispute, he believes also should be interpreted in the light of the Maccabean literature, where it is used three times, always to refer to the cessation of persecution.[197] The nautical metaphors employed by Ignatius also fit well into this context of Christians seeking relief from the tempest of persecution.[198]

According to Decrept, the Maccabean literature illustrates stories which follow a general sequence of events:

> les infidélités du peuple juif et la trahison du judaïsme par certains membres de l'aristocratie sacerdotale provoquent aussitôt la colère de Dieu qui punit son peuple par une persécution. Au moment où celle-ci est à son apogée les supplications du peuple et le martyr de quelques héros apaisent la colère divine. Dieu met fin sans tarder à la persécution. Réjouissances et cérémonies festives célèbrent le retour à la paix et à l'unité… Ces épisodes nourrissaient le réflection de ceux qui, juifs ou chrétiens, désiraient maintenir l'intégrité de leurs croyances et de leur mode de vie dans environnement païen.[199]

[195] MacCormack (1972).
[196] *Mag.* 14; Decrept (2009), 205.
[197] 1 Macc. 6:60; 2 Macc. 12:4; 4 Macc. 18:4.
[198] Decrept (2009), 209–10. *Pol*. 2.3; *Smyrn*. 11.3.
[199] Decrept (2009), 212; drawing from Johnson (2004).

There is evidence that the Maccabees were venerated to some extent in Antioch around the time of Ignatius,[200] and so present an obvious interpretative background to his writings. The reason why Ignatius never explicitly mentions a persecution is simple: the most important thing for him is the internal crisis which has sparked the divine outpouring of wrath manifest in the Roman persecution; besides, everyone was already aware of it.[201] Because the internal crisis centred around conflict between episcopal and charismatic Christians, 'au regard de Dieu il [Ignatius] figurait au premier rang des coupables.'[202] When he learns that the church at Antioch had been relieved of divine punishment, therefore, he knows that his 'self-sacrifice' was successful: 'Cette divine surprise était le signe du pardon accordé par Dieu à son Église et à son épiscope.'[203] Ignatius indeed bears some similarities with Eleazar, who both offer themselves as ransoms for their communities. But whereas Eleazar was supposed to purify the Jewish people of their sins, Ignatius was 'un sacrifice vicaire' supposed to save the churches of Asia Minor from the local persecutions that sprung up in the wake of the earthquake of AD 115.[204] Although he wishes his general martyrial purpose to be understood in the light of the Maccabees, Ignatius 'n'est pas un Eléazar chrétien: il n'offre pas l'image stéréotypée d'un héros de légende; sa personnalité est plus complexe que celle des martyrs maccabéens.'[205]

The coherence of Decrept's theories with my own question regarding Ignatius' self-presentation hardly requires elucidation: Ignatius understands himself as a sacrifice to God, whose acceptance as such appeases the divine wrath and atones for the faults in which he was a key-player. He also offers himself as a ransom on behalf of the churches of Asia Minor, for whom he acts as a

[200] Dupont-Sommer (1939), 71.
[201] Decrept (2009), 212–13.
[202] Decrept (2009), 213.
[203] Decrept (2009), 213.
[204] Decrept (2009), 215.
[205] Decrept (2009), 215.

substitute. Yet I believe Decrept's argument to be lacking in several aspects, which make it impossible for me to accept his findings.

Firstly, according to Decrept, Ignatius holds a conception of God as vengeful, quick to anger, and who demonstrates his wrath by using imperial and popular powers as a means of chastisement; God is able to be appeased only through righteous (or perhaps guilty) people offering themselves as a sacrifice to him. This view indeed approximates to that found in the Maccabean writings, but I find evidence for it completely lacking in Ignatius. Even if the extent of the Maccabean martyrs' influence upon first-century Antioch was as great as Decrept imagines,[206] this does not in the least entail that Ignatius shares their theology—indeed, it would be remarkable if he did. Instead, Ignatius' God emerges as quite the opposite: he takes pleasure in and is concerned about humans,[207] indeed is patient with them,[208] and provides assistance to them;[209] we learn of his mercy,[210] love,[211] kindness,[212] and grace.[213] Ignatius describes the communities at Rome and the Tralles as beloved by God,[214] and knows that the Lord loves the church:[215] indeed, faith and love, when they exist in unity, are God.[216] Ignatius orders prayer for those who persecute Christians, 'that they might find God.'[217] The one instance that seems to address divine wrath is remarkably attenuated:

> Henceforth may we be reverent; may we fear the forbearance of God, lest it become a judgement against us. For may we either fear the coming wrath or love the present grace, one of the two things; only may we be found in Christ Jesus, leading to true life.[218]

[206] Decrept (2009), 212. The specific textual evidence amounts to his use of δροσισθῆναι and ἀντίψυχον, as well the faint resemblance of *Rom*. 5.3 with the tortures suffered by the Maccabean Martyrs (though this hardly demonstrates that Ignatius was 'hanté par l'exemple des martyrs maccabéens'). The claim that δροσισθῆναι would immediately recall memories of the Maccabees for the congregations in Asia Minor is groundless.
[207] *Mag.* 3.2; *Pol*. 6.1.
[208] *Pol*. 6.2.
[209] *Smyrn*. 11.3.
[210] *Trall.* 12.3.
[211] *Phld*. 1.1.
[212] *Phld*. 1.2
[213] *Smyrn*. 6.2.
[214] *Rom*. inscr.; *Trall.* inscr.
[215] *Pol*. 5.1.
[216] *Ephes.* 14.1.
[217] *Ephes.* 10.
[218] *Ephes.* 11.1

His avoidance of attributing wrath directly to God by employing the form τὴν μέλλουσαν ὀργήν, and offering of an alternative, both seem to imply his reluctance to ascribe to God such an anthropomorphised emotion as anger, and his embarrassment that obedience should be based on fear of it. This same concern is demonstrated in contemporary Hellenic authors such as Plutarch, who are arguably far more representative of Ignatius' thought-world than the Maccabean literature.[219] In any case, this passage 'presents traditional Christian eschatology in a much softened form.'[220] Decrept's theory is difficult to reconcile with the understanding of God that Ignatius himself exhibits.

Secondly, Decrept believes that Ignatius *knew* that his sacrifice to God had been deemed worthy upon learning of the Antiochene church being at peace. However, Ignatius still expresses uncertainty about his worthiness, and his worthiness to be able to attain God in martyrdom, after having learnt of the Antiochene peace,[221] though some reduction in frequency is perceptible. Ignatius was 'judged worthy' before he hears the news as well as after, so cannot only refer to God's acceptance of his sacrifice.[222] His first response to learning of their peace is not relief as regards his own worthiness towards God, but eagerness to congratulate them.[223] As Stoops has pointed out, Ignatius' authority derives from the fact that he has accepted a life of suffering and self-abnegation which conforms to an apostolic and Christic pattern, not solely from the moment of his martyrdom (which he is at pains to stress may well not eventuate);[224] the worth of his life as Christian witness

[219] Plutarch, *On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance* 5.550f; see Schoedel (1985), 71. Decrept's claim (2009: 216) that Ignatius, 'conformément à la mentalité de son temps, il s'agissait avant tout d'apaiser la colère de Dieu,' seems to regard the Maccabean literature as Ignatius' only influence.
[220] Schoedel (1985), 71.
[221] See *Phld*. 5.1, 8.2; *Smyrn*. 10.2, 11.1; *Pol*. 2.3, 6.1, 7.1.
[222] *Mag*. 1.2 (καταξιωθείς); *Smyrn*. 11.1 (κατηξιώθην).
[223] *Phld*. 10.1; *Smyrn*. 11.2; *Pol*. 7.2.
[224] Stoops (1987), 172.

is diachronic rather than synchronic. Decrept's belief that in the news from Antioch Ignatius has a divine guarantee of his death, is not supported by the evidence.

Lastly, as I have argued above, his offering of himself for the churches of Asia Minor expresses his gratitude for their efforts in refreshing him through their visits and prayers, and his devotion to them in the manner of Paul; while Decrept's suggestion—that he acts as a substitutionary figure, whose death occurs instead of theirs like Eleazar's—is conceivable in theory, Ignatius' confidence that this would be fully grasped by all the churches in Asia Minor, with only vague cues, would be remarkable. The Maccabean martyrs may have enjoyed a cultic presence in Antioch, but this can hardly be assumed to have extended as far as Smyrna or Philippi. Furthermore, Ignatius' indebtedness to Paul as a letter writer and apostolic hero has been demonstrated throughout this chapter; Paul's letters have consistently been found to be the closest point of reference for Ignatius' understanding of his sacrifice. It should be instructive for our understanding of Ignatius that scholarship has failed to find in Paul's statements of suffering for God and his fellow believers any perceivable intention that this should avert persecution of Christians.

§5: Conclusion

I agree with Corwin who writes that in Ignatius' prayer to be poured out as an offering to God, 'He is affirming his belief that the martyr's death has a real effect on the church, in the sense that it is a sacrifice, and a final affirmation of God.' [225] Ignatius primarily wishes himself to be remembered as a Christian whose entire life was an offering to God, which is made most visible in his final martyrial procession and death. Thus he styles himself as a sacrifice, as suffering for the sake of and because of his God. While some commentators have viewed his language of sacrifice as indicating his vicarious suffering in order to expiate the sins of the Antiochene church, or to obviate divine

[225] Corwin (1960), 213; *Rom*. 2.2.

punishment, we have found such a motivation to be lacking in the text, and from his primary influence, Paul. Ignatius indeed presents himself in debased and sacrificial terms in order to conform to apostolic precedent (especially in his use of περίψημα). The knotty state of Pauline scholarship notwithstanding, Ignatius might be seen as sharing Paul's belief that his (Christomorphic) suffering is effective insofar as it benefits the churches in growth and strengthening (see 2 Cor. 12:15). Ignatius wishes his suffering self to confirm the gospel message and make the churches of Asia Minor resilient against division and apostasy. Ignatius also portrays himself sacrificially in order to express gratitude and devotion to his addressees, from whom he has benefited in turn.

Although I have argued against the scapegoat theories advanced by Decrept and Brent, who provide inadequate explanations or evidence for the operation of such a scheme, the prevalence in scholarship of the notion of 'Ignatius as scapegoat' demands that we reassess the question. In the next chapter, I assess Ignatius' self-sacrificial language through a Girardian lens, which provides the most promising explanation for how 'scapegoating' might be seen to operate in Ignatius' life and letters.

Chapter 4: The Girardian Ignatius

§1: Introduction: Girard and patristic theology

To undertake a study applying the insights of René Girard—the modern literary critic, philosophical anthropologist, and theologian—to writings of the patristic era is unconventional. Despite the popularity of Girardian theory over the last quarter of a century, Johannes Zachhuber's 2013 article on the operation of Girard's 'scapegoat mechanism' in the Arian crisis is, to my knowledge, the only extended attempt to do so. Within theology, Girard himself contains his observations to the immediate context of the Hebrew Bible and the NT, for which his theories provide an 'extraordinarily powerful biblical hermeneutic.'[1]

Yet given that he argues for the universal applicability of his theories concerning the origins and perpetuation of society, culture, and violence, and given that patristic writers undoubtedly hold a strong claim to 'legitimate' interpretation of NT events, an extension of Girardian insight into the second century appears justifiable and even overdue. The successful implementation of Girardian criticism in NT studies, broadening and deepening its remit, augurs well for its compatibility with the patristic era.[2] Raymund Schwager—Girard's close collaborator and disciple—argues that, far from imposing some modern hermeneutic upon ancient texts, Girard is, in reality 'taking up again the scriptural interpretation of the church fathers on a level permeated by modern critical theory.'[3] Girard himself holds the 'Greek Fathers' to have had particular insight into the overthrow of Satan wrought by the cross,[4] and even that three-quarters of his work is already to be found in Augustine.[5] Moreover, the intensive Girardian attention paid to the biblical era makes scholarship's reluctance to continue this into a contiguous period all the more startling, and the call for such research more

[1] Kirwan (2009), 143.
[2] See McKenna (1985).
[3] Schwager (2000), 137; cf. Schwager (2000), xii.
[4] Girard (2001), 149–51; see also Girard (1987), 193.
[5] Girard (1994), 196.

pressing. The insights brought to birth by Girard refuse isolation: in his research he has proffered 'not simply research…but a research *programme*,'[6] and one which demands engagement with the early church.

Perhaps the most striking commonality between Girard and Ignatius is their profound treatment of *violence*. Ignatius' corpus is perfused with anticipation of his martyrdom, and betrays a penetrating insight into the violent operation not only of the Colosseum, but of the entire world. As such, he is often criticised for his 'morbid obsession' with death and suffering,[7] being supposed to have an 'abnormal mentality'[8] and a 'thoroughly neurotic deathwish.'[9] Morris has convincingly refuted this diagnosis, arguing that it fails properly to situate Ignatius within the context of his own theological and apologetic concerns.[10] The last chapter argued that his sacrificial self-references are unlikely to imply vicarious atonement of his suffering; the question of how his suffering might qualify him as in some sense a scapegoat we have left open, because of the defective treatment of the issue by some scholars. It is sufficient to note that several scholars have, both in translating Ignatius' letters and in analysis of them, held that Ignatius understands himself as a 'scapegoat.'[11] Imitation is also a key feature of Ignatius' letters, particularly in his exhortations to his addressees and in his descriptions of his own actions.[12] Ignatius might be seen as understanding imitation as the mechanism by which human beings interact, learn patterns of behaviour, and ultimately, attain God: 'Allow me to be an imitator of the suffering of my God.'[13]

As we shall see, this précis of Ignatius' thought confirms his close affinity to key elements of Girard's—namely, the prominence of violence, scapegoating and imitation. In this chapter, I explore

[6] Fleming (2004), 153 (emphasis original).
[7] G.L. Williams (1958), 254
[8] De Ste. Croix (1963), 24.
[9] Grant (1966), 2, describing the assessment of Streeter (1929), 163–76. See Middleton (2013), 562.
[10] Morris (1994), 24f.
[11] E.g. Brent (2007), 48; Bommes (1976), 223; Decrept (2008), 395; translations of *Ephes*. 8.1: Ehrman (2003) ad loc.; Camelot (1951) ad loc.
[12] E.g. *Ephes*. 1.1, 10.3; *Trall*. 1.2; *Phld*. 7.2; *Smyrn*. 12.1; *Pol*. 1.3, 2.1, 2.3. See Drake Williams (2013).
[13] *Rom*. 6.3.

the hitherto uncharted Girardian resonances present in Ignatius' writings, examining the particular instances where the scapegoat mechanism or the 'logic of mimesis' might function,[14] and assessing any explanatory potential such an analysis might provide. I argue that, while mimetic desire and its violent corollaries are indeed at play in Ignatius, his refusal to return the violence shown him by his persecutors is a penetrating subversion of humankind's tendency to scapegoat, and thus the entire matrix upon which society and culture is founded. Ignatius proposes a new way of existing in community, centred around positive mimesis, or *imitatio Christi*. Finally, I consider the implications of Ignatius' inversion of society for his construction of communal identity surrounding the Eucharist, his insistence on the three-tiered ministry, and for Christian identity more generally. The degree to which he is able to extricate himself from the grasp of mimetic desire manifest in worldly power will determine how successful his subversion has been.

§2: The Girardian system

Girard began his career in literary criticism, but quickly developed a remarkable breadth of knowledge of the indigenous cultures of South America and Africa, especially the prominence of religious manifestations and shamanism in those societies. In parallel, he noted a profound pattern of behaviour and social interaction evident particularly in the works of Proust, Dostoevsky, Shakespeare, classical Greek tragedy, and biblical literature. Human beings, he concluded, are not essentially the rational, autonomous beings that the assumptions of Enlightenment philosophy imagine us to be; we are in fact driven by blind passions and impulses underwritten by a seething violence operating largely below the level of conscious thought. I summarise here the parts of his theories relevant to our study.

[14] Szakolczai (2016), 154.

§2.1: Mimesis, scapegoat, and sacrifice

The figure of the 'scapegoat' has long been noted in scholarship, and appears in almost all civilisations and cultures.[15] Girard's particular insight lies in his suggestion that the entire operation of this social phenomenon, and indeed all human existence,[16] occurs by means of what he calls 'mimesis' or imitation. Beyond the satisfaction of our basic physical needs, Girard asserts, humans tend to desire according to 'models,' people believed to be in some sense superior; the subject discerns the model's desires, and imitates them. Since therefore the subject and the model tend to desire the same object of finite quantity, a rivalrous relationship is established, intensifying as the model perceives the subject's parallel desire: 'Rivalry does not arise because of the fortuitous convergence of two desires on a single object; rather, *the subject desires the object because the rival desires it.*'[17] The model possesses an ambiguous standing in the eyes of the subject, being both role-model and obstacle, 'idol and archenemy all in one.'[18]

Owing to this universal triangular dynamic of mimetic desire, the innate situation of humankind is one of Durkheimian anomic unrest.[19] Community and relationships are inhibited because all interaction is governed by the mimetic impulse to rivalrous violence. This is the dystopian state that Hobbes described as *bellum omnium contra omnes*, the 'natural state' of human beings who hypothetically exist without the moderating effects of civil society.[20]

Yet this pervasive mimetic hatred which prevents the formation of social bonds is ironically also alleviated by means of mimesis. Among these conflictual altercations, one chance blow dealt to a victim fascinates the bystanders; mimetic desire leads them to imitate this original act, striking and communally lynching the victim. Through this shared act of persecution, interactions of mutual

[15] Frazer (1925: 562ff.) offered perhaps the first 'modern' treatment. For a comparison of the thought of Girard and Walter Burkert, see Palaver (2010).
[16] Girard (2000), 310.
[17] Girard (2013), 164 (emphasis original).
[18] Schwager (2000), 11.
[19] See e.g. Durkheim (2002), 219, 350.
[20] *De cive*, præf. (ed. Molesworth, 146). Cf. *Leviathan* 14; see Kirwan (2009), 97.

hatred are transformed into those of unity and solidarity against the common scapegoat. A state of order and harmony follows, and relationships, forming the foundation of society and culture, are allowed to develop. Since the victim's expulsion appeared to dispel the anomic disease, the victim is understood to have been responsible for it, and thus his execution justified. Girard names this the 'collective transfer of diffuse violence upon a chance victim' or the *scapegoat mechanism*. Mimetic desire is both the source and the 'solution' of anomy.

This peace, however, is tenuous. A dynamic of mimetic rivalry still underlies all interactions, but has been temporarily appeased through the selection of a scapegoat. Since this uniting victim has been expelled and is thus no longer able to function as the outlet of communal violence, society's foundation is jeopardised. Yet the influence of the scapegoat does not cease to exist with its physical presence: it continues to hold a compelling and ambiguous position in the memory of the sacrificing community. The scapegoat is still understood as the source of the original mimetic war; however, since its death also effected sought-after peace and cohesion, it is ascribed the position of the liberating hero, by whose death the gods were placated: 'The accidental victim still bears the onus of monstrous evil but at the same time exudes the aura of a superhuman savior.'[21] Girard calls this ambiguity 'double-transference,' and sees therein the genesis of notions of sacredness and profanity, holiness and taboo—in other words, of religion.

The community reenacts the archetypal act of the scapegoat's death, in what is known as ritual, which thus continues to effect its original unifying significance. As Girard writes, 'The function of sacrifice is to quell violence within the community and to prevent conflicts from erupting.'[22] The cross-cultural prevalence of ritual sacrifice, both in 'primitive' and modern religion, demonstrates the centrality of the scapegoat mechanism for the formation of society. Moreover, sacrifice is almost universally practised in a *communal* setting, each member of the community participating in some

[21] Schwager (2000), 19.
[22] Girard (2013), 15.

way to the immolation of the selected victim. Girard notes how in the sacrifice ritual of diverse cultures it is common that 'All the participants, without exception, are required to take part in the death scene.'[23]

§2.2: The ambiguity of mimesis

In his earlier works, Girard considered mimesis almost exclusively in pessimistic terms: the subject-model relationship which entailed rivalry for finite goods, or competition for status and 'being,' led inexorably to an impassioned, violent enmity. The truth of this relationship usually escapes both parties, but is described by Girard in great depth:

> The model, even when he has openly encouraged imitation, is surprised to find himself engaged in competition. He concludes that the disciple has betrayed his confidence by following in his footsteps. As for the disciple, he feels both rejected and humiliated, judged unworthy by his model of participating in the superior existence the model himself enjoys.[24]

The relationships formed via the effects of scapegoating, while temporarily beneficial, are at heart the fruit of Satan.[25] The gospels' prime significance is their revelation of mimetic rivalry and the truth about violence (they are essentially 'the source of our anthropological knowledge'), as well as their summons to eradicate both.[26] As Girard himself says, 'the gospel text contains an explicit revelation of the foundations of all religions in victimage, and this revelation takes place thanks to a nonviolent deity.'[27] Like the relationship between Fyodor Karamazov and his sons Dmitri and Ivan in Dostoevsky's novel, mimetic desire ends in antagonistic rivalry, violence, and abiding hatred.

Only later in his academic career did Girard investigate the latent positivity of mimesis. Mimesis, properly defined, should be considered good, since it entails openness to the divine and

[23] Girard (2013), 110–13.
[24] Girard (2013), 164–65; Steinmair-Pösel (2007), 2.
[25] Girard (2001), 43f.
[26] Kirwan (2009), 21.
[27] Girard (1987), 184; cf. 178.

human Other.[28] For Girard, this positive mimesis became essentially equivalent to the imitation of Christ: the NT texts 'do not claim that humans must get rid of imitation; they recommend imitating the sole model who never runs the danger—if we really imitate in the way that children imitate—of being transformed into a fascinating rival.'[29] Christ, insofar as he is God and thus mediates completely 'externally,'[30] transcends the human rivalries for status, material well-being etc., evidenced in his ultimate sacrifice[31] of himself for the world; he embodies the nonviolent refusal to retaliate and scapegoat. Yet insofar as Christ is man, he serves as an appropriable model in accordance to which we may cultivate a life of nonviolence and self-sacrifice, not driven by mimetic desire for earthly goods or station, but by agapeic openness towards the other. This is positive mimesis. Alyosha Karamazov is the only brother who does not allow mimetic desire to ensnare him in rivalrous familial relationships, but imitates Christ's self-sacrificial love towards all. Christ's resurrection is God's affirmation that this non-rivalrous relationality leads to life in its fulness, and imitation of Christ is how it is attained.

While I argue that both facets of mimesis—negative and positive—are observable in the writings and circumstance of Ignatius, I believe that the latter characterises his understanding of ideal Christian discipleship, manifest both in his pastoral admonition to his congregations and in his theological understanding of his own life. Ignatius refuses to operate according to the logic of a world mesmerised by the scapegoat mechanism, but insists on the ultimate truth of God's vindication of the persecuted victim—Christ—who is Ignatius' peerless model.

[28] Girard (2001), 15–16.
[29] Girard (1987), 430.
[30] Girard makes a distinction between 'external mediation,' which does not create violent rivalries because the 'distance' between the subject and mediator (model) is sufficiently great, and 'internal mediation,' from which rivalries spring, the subject and the mediator occupying mutual spheres. See Girard (1965), 9.
[31] For the development of Girard's thought concerning sacrifice in dialogue with Schwager, see J.G. Williams (2014), 50–51.

§3: Synthesis: The Girardian Ignatius

§3.1: Ignatius as scapegoat for Roman society?

Girard's scheme provides an illuminating interpretation of Ignatius' functioning as a scapegoat for the sake of wider Roman society. Girardian theory performs an analysis similar to that of Decrept, discussed in the previous chapter. In the early second century, as at any time, Roman society was suffering as a result of unbridled mimetic violence, the 'seething cauldron of chaotic and mimetic desires' which engender mutual violence and discord.[32] This mimetic rivalry was mollified to an extent in the day-to-day civic and domestic sacrifices of the cult. However, perhaps because of recent earthquakes, tensions were particularly high around AD 116. At the time, this may well have been understood as due to the displeasure of the gods. Leaders sought to quell this violent anxiety by finding a scapegoat on whom the blame might be heaped. The Christians were chosen,[33] and their subsequent persecution was public and widely known. Ignatius is just one example of this tendency of civic leaders to scapegoat Christians, and a particularly visible scapegoat. His prisoner convoy passed through many cities of Asia Minor, drawing substantial attention to his role. The public nature of his (supposed) spectacular death in the Colosseum symbolises the communal efficacy of his action as scapegoat: simply attending a show in the Colosseum represents participation in the sacrificial lynching of the victim, whose violent death proves irresistibly mesmerising.[34] The fabric of Roman society was (temporarily) pacified by their communal mimetic involvement in the violent death of Ignatius the scapegoat. Because the truth of the scapegoat mechanism is rarely comprehended in full by its participants, this peace would probably have been understood as a sacrifice accepted by the gods, and Ignatius evidently a guilty and deserving victim. Yet in light of Girard's theories (or more essentially, the gospels), we are able to understand Ignatius

[32] Kirwan (2009), 25.
[33] Harrison (1936: 91) suggests that the Romans concentrated their persecution specifically upon Ignatius because he was viewed as fomenting disturbance among his congregation, which overflowed into pagan society.
[34] See Palaver (2013: 89) for the Colosseum as an archetypal venue of mimetic contagion.

as an innocent and randomly selected victim, whose lynching served to unite the factious Roman society.

There are several potential flaws in this sketch: Is Ignatius really innocent (see n.33 above)? Were the Roman authorities completely ignorant of the implications of the scapegoating process? Did Ignatius in fact make it to the Colosseum?[35] Not to mention the substantial criticisms to be levelled at Girardian theory more generally.[36] Yet the broad significance of the characterisation remains. Mimetic and scapegoat theory can be used to explain the significance of Ignatius' death for Roman society.

In fact, Ignatius appears to be aware of the function that he and indeed all Christians play as an outlet for the brutality of the non-Christian world. His most comprehensive passage concerning the correct response to the world's maltreatment echoes 1 Corinthians 4:9–13 and Luke 6:29–31, and forcefully commends a Girardian reading:

> And pray unceasingly for all other people, for in them there is the hope of repentance, that they might encounter God. Therefore suffer them to learn from you, if only from [your] works. In response to their wrathful impulses [ταί ὀργαί], you be gentle; in response to their proud words, you be humble; in response to their slanders, you give prayers; in response to their error, you be steadfast in the faith; in response to their fierceness, you be civilised, *not being eager to imitate them*. Let us show ourselves to be their brothers by forbearance, and *let us be eager to be imitators of the Lord,* [seeing] who might be the more wronged, who [more] defrauded, who [more] rejected, lest any weed of the Devil be found among you, but that in all purity and temperance you might remain in Christ Jesus physically and spiritually.[37]

This passage starkly opposes 'us' and 'other people [ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι],' the former suffering unjust persecution by the latter. Out of all the forms this persecution might take, first and foremost Ignatius mentions ταί ὀργαί, the manifestations of wrath and anger approximating to Girard's mimetic violence. Yet the exhortatory thrust of this passage is counter-intuitive. Whereas the world operates through retaliation and the repayment of violence with counter-violence, victimisation with

[35] Decrept (2008: 398–99), for one, believes not.
[36] On which see Merrill (2017).
[37] *Ephes.* 10.

counter-victimisation, Ignatius counsels the Ephesians to respond with the exact opposite, illustrated with striking antitheses. Moreover, they are expressly ordered not to imitate them (ἀντιμιμήσασθαι), but to be imitators (μιμηταί) of the Lord.

So led by example and imitation is this passage that it hardly needs translation into Girardian terms. Ignatius discerns, whether consciously or not, the mimetic nature of human behaviour, but rejects imitation according to the violent, victimising model of the world.[38] Instead, imitation should be according to the example set by Christ, apparent in faithful meekness, humility, and civilised forbearance. Indeed, since Christ was the one who was *most* wronged, defrauded, and rejected, the Ephesians are (ironically) counselled almost to compete in seeing who can approach most nearly this exemplar. The Devil might be understood as both mimetic rivalry itself, and the tendency among human society to converge around the common scapegoat.[39] He is therefore guarded against through imitation of Christ's nonviolent being which is beyond rivalry.

Also conspicuous in this chapter is the Christian's duty to remain open to the persecuting and cruel other. Twice are the Ephesians commanded to pray for 'all other people,' who are still even to be considered 'brothers.' Their 'hope of repentance' suggests that Christian life is characterised by a recognition of one's own contribution to mimetic cycles of violence (perhaps sinfulness), currently lacked by non-Christians. Moreover, Christians should allow themselves and their actions to be examples to the other. Just as the faithful are to imitate the self-emptying of Christ, so should the faithless be drawn to God through learning from the Christian model: a succession of imitations is established. We glimpse here Ignatius' affirmation of the potential goodness of mimesis, as long as it be nonviolent imitation after the kenotic love of Christ. As I shall argue, this coheres exactly with the Girardian concept of positive mimesis, whose hallmark is openness towards and acceptance of the Other.

[38] Girard (2001), 14.
[39] Girard (2001), 43: 'The Devil…signifies rivalistic contagion, up to and including the single victim mechanism. He may be located either in the entire process or in one of its stages.'

If Ignatius is aware of Christians' role as magnets of mimetic violence, his point in mentioning this is not to characterise himself or other Christians as society's scapegoats—he never refers to himself as a scapegoat for unbelievers, nor counsels others to do so. He mentions it to admonish the Christians to respond to the inevitable violence of the world in a nonviolent fashion: '…not being eager to imitate them… [Rather] let us be eager to be imitators of the Lord.' Through this sequence of positive imitation, Ignatius hopes Christians will bring about the end of the cycle of scapegoating. He is not complicit in the scapegoating process, regardless of whether governing authorities view him as a scapegoat whose immolation will unify society. From Ignatius' perspective, the value of martyrdom suffered at pagan hands lies not in this incidental role; rather, its significance lies, at least in part, in the martyr's acting as a model and exemplar of virtuous, nonviolent behaviour, for both Christians and non-Christians alike. The martyr's countercultural refusal to retaliate, meeting wrath with gentleness, acts as a mirror which reveals the violent truth about the operation and foundation of all facets of society.

§3.2: The state of Ignatius' communities according to current scholarship

Let us next turn to Ignatius' own communities. Here we assume with the majority of commentators that Ignatius' concern that the Antiochene community be at peace (εἰρηνεύειν) refers to the healing of divisions within the community, not to the cessation of external persecution.[40] Several other congregations to which Ignatius writes seem plagued with similar factionalism. The Philadelphian community is so factionalised that Ignatius forgoes his custom of personally eulogising the bishop, but instead goes on to address 'the division of certain people.'[41] In nearly all of his letters, the 'very intensity of that zeal with which he pleads for loyalty, unity and peace, as the chief things of all in a Christian Church,' betrays the extent and nature of the problem: widespread internal division.[42]

[40] *Phld*. 10.1; *Smyrn*. 11.2; *Pol*. 7.1.
[41] *Phld.* 7.2.
[42] Harrison (1936), 96.

The work of Brent must now be re-examined: it constitutes a recent contribution to scholarship on Ignatius of Antioch, and includes the strongest existing argument for Ignatius' having acted as a scapegoat to relieve such intra-ecclesial tensions. As I noted in chapter 2 (§3.2), Brent's understanding of the role of Ignatius as sacrifice and scapegoat is confused and sometimes contradictory. Within the space of six pages he is able to say that Ignatius' expulsion creates harmony 'between divided Christian communities'[43] and 'relieves their [the Antiochene Christians'] internal tensions.'[44] For the sake of clarity, I focus on what I believe to be the most coherent thesis of Brent's work, that Ignatius 'provides us with an example of the scapegoat…reducing tension and division within the community that has scapegoated him.'[45]

According to Brent, Ignatius' solution to the problem of factionalism and discord in Antioch is the structure of ecclesiastical hierarchy, headed by a single bishop. This arrangement is vigorously opposed by certain 'charismatics,' who claim authority on the basis of spiritual manifestations such as glossolalia. What Ignatius sought for his community was known in the pagan world as *homonoia* ('likeness of mind'), and was frequently established through a treaty sealed by a *sunthusia* ('joint sacrifice') offered by the former antagonists. Ignatius is consciously 'appealing to pagan, secular political concepts' in his bid to unite his communities.[46]

Instead of the usual ritual burnt offering of a beast, Ignatius offers himself up as the sacrifice (which explains his self-abasing language), around which his community and those whose representatives he meets on the way to Rome, can in their 'collective guilt,' be united;[47] 'he becomes their scapegoat: his removal and condemnation becomes a sacrifice that relives their internal tensions.'[48] Brent proposes a rather complex structure for Ignatius' so-called 'martyr

[43] Brent (2007), 52.
[44] Brent (2007), 47.
[45] Brent (2007), 49.
[46] Brent (2007), 34.
[47] Brent (2007), 56.
[48] Brent (2007), 47.

procession,' apparently constructed in conscious resemblance to its (somewhat ill-defined) pagan prototype, which we analysed above.[49] Furthermore, the 'fine print' of this *homonoia* treaty is the common acceptance of the fashion of leadership advocated by Ignatius, a 'hierarchy focused on a single bishop at its apex.'[50] Yet Brent offers no mechanism for how this 'fine print' is effected or enforced; perhaps it was simply out of reverential obedience to a martyr.

The dubiousness of several elements of this theory notwithstanding, Brent's proposal to associate the self-sacrifice of Ignatius with the restored interpersonal relationships among his congregation through the concept of 'scapegoat' is interesting, and at least internally coherent. However, the mechanism by which any such scapegoat might be effective is completely obscure in Brent. We are left with little more than the observation, 'As is common in social groups who have produced scapegoats, the expenditure of guilt and regret has led to a reduction of social tension and to social peace.'[51] Let us attempt to justify the general thrust of Brent's thesis using a Girardian conceptual framework.

§3.3: Girardian analysis of Ignatius' communities

We might first understand the unrest within the Antiochene and other relevant congregations to have been driven by the same mimetic rivalries discernible in the wider society. Brent describes this in terms of several groups vying for authority over the Christian congregation, some on the basis of charismatic manifestations, others on the basis of a hierarchy of ministries authenticated via the apostolic succession.[52] This is as historically likely a suggestion as any. However, this reconstruction implies that only a small proportion of each congregation—those with pretensions to leadership and authority—is directly involved in the unrest. According to Girard, authority is one among a

[49] Brent (2007), 60–70; see chapter 2, §3.2.
[50] Brent (2007), 56.
[51] Brent (2007), 58; in a footnote (46 n.4) he refers the reader to Douglas (1995).
[52] Brent (2007), 18–35.

number of points around which mimesis can operate. Because imitation of another can take all manner of material or spiritual goods as the object upon which the model's superior 'being' appears to consist, the effects of mimetic rivalry are by no means confined to a 'ruling elite'; even the lowest societal strata, completely unaffected by the power-struggles among the higher-classes, are affected by mimetic violence.

According to a conventional Girardian paradigm, the Antiochene Christians have effectively (whether or not this can be maintained causally) scapegoated Ignatius, through their dissension, discord, and perhaps active will to be rid of him. He has been selected to be killed on the pagan altar by the Roman magistrate, his guard of 'ten leopards,'[53] and those who spectate his martyrdom. Although those who physically enact his death are external to the community, all the faithful have contributed to his expulsion and death through their violent infighting. Harrison in fact suggests that his communities themselves blamed Ignatius for their divisions, and actively offered him up as a scapegoat,[54] which would conform neatly to Girard's archetype. Whatever the case, the expulsion of a single member from a context of violent mimetic contagion achieved peace for the many. The resultant feeling within the congregation having recently scapegoated is one of renewed peace and relieved tensions, about which Ignatius hears while still alive: 'the church in Antioch of Syria is at peace.' [55] His expulsion and conviction (ἐγὼ κατάκριτος[56]) satisfied the mimetic tensions within his community.

We might discern the workings of the phenomenon called 'double transference' in the situation in Antioch. According to Girardian theory, once a scapegoat has been expelled, the figure fascinates and takes on immense significance for the community, as both the source of the original violence, and of its resolution: 'Since his death is seen to have won divine favour, the victim is

[53] *Rom*. 5.1; see Callon (2015).
[54] Harrison (1936), 97.
[55] *Phld.* 10.1.
[56] *Rom*. 4.3; cf. *Trall*. 3.3.

himself invested with a divine aura.'[57] Having won divine favour through effecting a miraculous peace, Ignatius is understood by the Antiochenes to have been a man of particular holiness, and his advocation of the threefold order of ministry confirmed as divinely sanctioned. (The excitement felt by the Christians of Asia Minor to meet such a man and refresh him is sometimes evident in Ignatius' responses to them.[58]) Perhaps Ignatius intuited the implication of peace having been established at Antioch: he would be remembered as a sacralised figure in the community, and his cause would likely prevail. This would provide a mechanism for Brent's ill-defined 'fine print' of the *homonoia* treaty.

So far, a Girardian hermeneutic is able to support the outline of Brent's claims. It is possible that Ignatius acted as a scapegoat whose expulsion and death lead to the quelling of tensions among both the Christian community at Antioch, and the wider Roman society. Moreover, Ignatius himself and his preferred ecclesial arrangement were endowed with a divine aura through the workings of double transference.

It should be noted that both these situations involve Ignatius' complicity in the scapegoat mechanism and the perpetuation of violence which ultimately stems from it. We have already suggested that there is no evidence that Ignatius understood himself or other Christians as *society's* scapegoats. However, do Ignatius' self-references support his conceptualisation of himself as a scapegoat, whose bodily immolation leads to the reconciliation of *his own community*?

§4: Ignatius' self-conception as scapegoat

An extensive analysis of the terms in question, and a survey of the secondary literature about these, was undertaken in the previous chapter. There I argued that the terms commonly adduced to argue that Ignatius considered his death to be a perpetuation of Christ's atoning death do not necessitate

[57] Kirwan (2009), 26.
[58] See *Ephes*. 1.2; *Trall*. 1.1–2.

such a reading, and often positively disallow it. The language of self-abasement and self-sacrifice deals first and foremost not with a continuation of the 'objective' atoning significance of Christ's death, but expresses Ignatius' faithful participation in the imitation of Christ: 'allow me to be an imitator of the suffering of my God.'[59] His understanding of the nature of Christ is supplemented and partially mediated through positive imitation of Paul:[60] he praises the Ephesians for being 'fellow-initiates' (συμμύσται) of Paul, and prays that he may 'be found in his footsteps whenever I reach God';[61] he speaks about how through suffering he will become a 'freedman of Jesus Christ,' thereby approaching the status of Peter and Paul.[62] Ignatius' implicit debt to Paul, stylistically, structurally, and in part theologically, has been clearly demonstrated elsewhere.[63] 'Discipleship' is closely related to 'imitation' for Ignatius as we shall see, and corresponds to Ignatius' imitation of both Christ and Paul.[64] Indeed, 'The Ignatian letters have more references to imitation and discipleship than all the other apostolic fathers together.'[65] It is likely, therefore, that mimesis may prove to be the lens through which Ignatius' humble self-offering is best interpreted.

I wish to argue that, rather than his death acting as an expiation of some 'metaphysical,' objective sin, or as temporarily placating the mimetic antagonisms in the churches, Ignatius interprets his death chiefly in the light of his life: that is, as providing a model to be imitated, just as he followed the models of Christ and Paul. In Girardian terms, this imitation is not the negative mimetic tendency of Satan to retaliate and victimise, but is the positive mimetic calling of Christ to self-denial and openness to Other. Ignatius undeniably interprets both his imminent death and his

[59] *Rom*. 6.3; cf. *Smyrn*. 4.2.
[60] See also chapter 3, §3.4 (2) above.
[61] *Ephes*. 12.2.
[62] *Rom*. 4.3.
[63] See esp. Lindemann (2005), 16–24; Foster (2005); C.B. Smith (2011); Reis (2005), 293–300.
[64] For μαθητής see *Ephes*. 1.2; *Mag*. 9.1, 9.2, 10.1; *Trall*. 5.2; *Rom*. 4.2, 5.3; *Pol*. 2.1, 7.1. For μαθητεύω see *Ephes*. 3.1, 10.1; *Rom*. 3.1, 5.1. For *μαθητεία* see *Trall.* 3.2. Morgan (2015: 358) notes that the terms μίμησις θεοῦ, θεῷ ἔπεσθαι, and ὁμοίωσις θεῷ were all current in philosophical circles in the first century AD; the extent to which Paul or Ignatius would have been familiar with them is uncertain, but probably not significant. See also C.B. Smith (2011), 55.
[65] Corwin (1960), 228 n.9.

abased life in sacrificial terms. Edwards agrees: 'Sacrifice, for [Ignatius], as in the New Testament, is no mere rite but an immolation of the self.'[66] This sacrifice, however, must be understood as performed both (1) for the sake of God, whom he serves in life and death, and (2) for the sake of his fellow Christians, but only in the sense that he offers himself (body and spirit) in love as an exemplar of nonviolence and humility to be imitated, as he imitates Christ. This same dual aspect to sacrifice was evident in Girard's mature understanding of the word.[67] His martyrdom, then, is the fitting and inexorable consummation of a kenotic and self-sacrificial life, as Williams writes: 'martyrdom comes as the natural culmination of a far more prosaic process of un-selfing; but it *is* a climax and it is an end to the process and, for Ignatius, a glory and a privilege.'[68]

This reading exculpates Ignatius from collusion with Satan in the establishment and consolidation of society through violent means (Ignatius' suffering as the communities' scapegoat), and on the basis of a lie (the scapegoat's guilt). Instead of following the world's formation of community through the violent expulsion of a single victim, Ignatius envisages Christian community to be built upon common imitation of Christ, through the eucharistic gathering and the threefold ministry.

§5: Ignatius and Mimesis

§5.1: *Nachfolge* and *Nachahmung*

Several scholars have thought it necessary to maintain a hard boundary between the terms μαθητής and μιμητής in the thought-world of the early church.[69] The former is supposed to have chiefly

[66] Edwards (1998), 220.
[67] See J.G. Williams (2014), 50–51. Girard's understanding of sacrifice is notoriously complex. Raymund Schwager (esp. Schwager [2000]) was crucial in moving Girard beyond a complete denial of a sacrificial element in Christ's death, to a more rounded appreciation of sacrifice as the culmination of a nonviolent life which has not depended upon mimetic rivalries or scapegoating. Girard has always rejected the strain of Christian theology which understands sacrifice as necessary for God's propitiation or appeasement. See Girard (2014), 41–45.
[68] R. Williams (2014), 18 (emphasis original).
[69] Appropriated in the German-speaking world as the difference between *Nachfolge* and *Nachahmung*; see esp. Schulz (1962) and Betz (1967).

Jewish roots, and the latter Hellenistic.[70] The gospels are indeed saturated with language of 'discipleship' (and its closely-related verbs ἀκολουθέω [I follow], and ἔρχομαι ὀπίσω [I come after]),[71] whereas Paul instead prefers the language of 'imitation.'[72] Some scholars imply that Paul intentionally avoids the word μαθητής (since he never met Jesus in the flesh, unlike other apostles); 'imitation' can be more easily mediated through himself as a figure of authority: 'be imitators of me as I am of Christ' (1 Cor. 11:1).[73] The argument runs that discipleship was a 'following after Christ,' and a type of faith and obedience requiring the grace of God; imitating, however, involves replicating qualities of Christ, usually understood as an achievement of the imitator's own (and often in order to attain sainthood).[74]

There are several reasons why this presentation of the situation does violence to the NT evidence, and why the supposed dichotomy between *Nachfolge* and *Nachahmung* is in many ways false. That each term is supposed to correspond neatly to the binary of 'Jewish' and 'Hellenistic' is evidence of the crude over-simplification of this theory. Hengel is right to note that Jesus in many ways *did not* conform to the type of traditional Jewish rabbi, and that his radical preaching of the kingdom of God often disrupted conventional order and ideas of what it means to be a disciple or follower.[75] It is a facile reading of the gospels that understands the prevalence of a phrase therein to be a pure reflection of the words of the 'historical Jesus,' unalloyed by peculiarities of the evangelists, their sources, and the zeal of post-Easter kerygma. Moreover, that the notion of imitation did indeed enjoy currency in Hellenistic circles (including mystery cults) by no means confirms its particular influence upon Paul, and to conclude so would be to assume a great deal

[70] Schulz (1962), 196–97; Betz (1967), 2; Ong (1994), 75.
[71] E.g. Matt. 16:24; Mark 8:34; Luke 14:27; 9:23.
[72] Girard neglects this difference, placing Paul's language of imitation on the lips of Jesus (Girard and Adams [1993], 23).
[73] Ong (1994), 73.
[74] Betz (1967), 187; see Schoedel (1985), 30; Wilkins (1992), 308.
[75] Hengel (1968), 20, 57.

about the apostle's experiences; imitation as a concept could have arisen from the thought-world and theology contained in the Hebrew Bible.[76]

A analysis of the terms μαθητής and μιμητής in 'secular' and Christian literature across several centuries, performed by Copan, does indeed reveal a difference in usage, though not as sharp as Betz and Schulz suggest. The terms are not simply interchangeable, but one a subset of the other:

> the term "disciple" refers to the status of an individual—that is, a clearly defined and recognized relationship with a teacher. In contrast, "imitator" refers to the action of the disciple within that clearly defined relationship.[77]

A disciple, then, is any who has declared loyalty to a specific religious figure, but an imitator is a disciple who enacts this discipleship by patterning her very life on that of her master.[78]

While this suffices for a general definition, we turn to Morgan for an examination of Paul's language of imitation and its relation to discipleship. Morgan is not the first to note that Paul urges fellow Christians to imitate him principally because in doing so they imitate Christ; yet given that the unqualified directive to 'imitate Christ' might appear at best unhelpful in its lack of specificity, and at worst impossible or blasphemous, she builds from this observation to note that the specific aspect of Christ which Paul appears most concerned should be followed is his suffering and death.[79] Most likely, the content of this imitation is not to suggest that everyone ought to be killed for Christ, even if such an event would be the ultimate expression of a faithful life; nor is it that a Christian's is supposed somehow to replicate the actual soteriological significance of Christ's death.[80] Suffering

[76] See Nasuti (1986), 16–19; Barton (2014), 179; cf. K.F. Morrison (1982), 34–48.
[77] Copan (2007), 320.
[78] Copan (2007), 322–23. Copan also stresses that imitation is not subsumed under, or restricted to discipleship, since it is found in many relational contexts (323).
[79] Morgan (2015), 357–61. Instances where imitation language is explicit (e.g. 1 Thes. 1:6–7; 1 Cor. 4:16–17, 10:31–11:2) are supported by Pauline metaphors such as being 'crucified with Christ' (Gal. 2:20), and 'carrying about in the body the dying of Jesus' (2 Cor. 4:10). The connection with imitation and suffering is of course also prominent in the gospels, although principally using the term ἀκολουθέω; see esp. Matt. 16:24; Mark 8:34; Luke 9:23.
[80] Morgan (2015), 364.

for Christ is commended but insofar as that suffering: (1) represents one's death to the world, and (2) aids the salvation of others. Morgan's paraphrase of 1 Corinthians 11:1 as 'Imitate me, as I imitate Christ, in seeking the benefit of the many, that they may be saved,'[81] corresponds almost exactly with the findings of chapter 3 (§3.4). Morgan is right in refusing to reduce imitation to either an embodiment of certain virtues, or a replication of certain actions; adopting an exemplar's virtues will doubtless also involve the repetition of some of his actions. Indeed, in general imitation involves *both* 'commitment to the very thing that the exemplar is understood as committed to, *and* acceptance of the consequences as modelled by the exemplar.'[82]

§5.2: Imitation in apostolic literature[83]

Morgan demonstrates that the connection of imitation with suffering is in evidence throughout the Petrine and deutero-Pauline letters,[84] and she could easily have extended this comparison to the apostolic literature. Polycarp urges the Philippians to 'be imitators of [Christ's] endurance, and if we should suffer because of [διά] his name, let us glorify him. For this is the model [ὑπογραμμόν] he established for us in his own person, and this is what we have believed.'[85] Indeed, in the next breath Polycarp sets up Ignatius and Paul among others as examples of 'great endurance [πᾶσαν ὑπομονήν]'; these have now earned presence with the Lord, 'with whom they also suffered [συνέπαθον].' The martyrs are called 'disciples and imitators of the Lord' in the *Martyrdom of*

[81] Morgan (2015), 361.
[82] Morgan (2015), 365.
[83] Vinzent (2017: 27–32) believes the gospels as we now understand them were redactions of Marcion's gospel, and were, even by the mid-second century, still not considered authoritative texts. The *Urfassung* of *Mart. Pol.* and other post-apostolic literature, were not then imitating the gospels as references, but were written as supportive texts, which 'paved the way…for the Gospels to become more widely accepted' (32). This would have substantial implications for the locus of 'imitation of Christ' found in *Mart. Pol.* and indeed Ignatius, since audiences of such texts could not be assumed to have a clear knowledge of Christ and his passion. While this is an interesting and innovative proposal, Vinzent's theory does not persuade me to a sufficient degree to adopt the (quite drastic) alteration in dating of all early Christian texts that it demands.
[84] Morgan (2015), 361–63; see esp. 1 Pet. 2:21: 'To this you were called, because Christ suffered for you, leaving you an example, that you should follow in his steps [Χριστὸς ἔπαθεν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, ὑμῖν ὑπολιμπάνων ὑπογραμμὸν ἵνα ἐπακολουθήσητε τοῖς ἴχνεσιν αὐτοῦ].'
[85] Pol. *Phil*. 8.2.

Polycarp.[86] This imitation is taken one stage further as the martyrs themselves become figures whose exemplary suffering is to be imitated by other Christians: '[Polycarp] proved to be not only a distinguished teacher but also an outstanding martyr whose martyrdom all desire to imitate since it was in accord with the pattern of the gospel of Christ.'[87] Both of these texts follow Paul in establishing a sequence of models to be imitated, each representing to the observer the original suffering of Christ.

Most likely later than both these texts, the *Epistle to Diognetus* uses imitation in a distinct but recognisable manner, whereby one may imitate the positive virtues of God. One becomes an 'imitator of [God's] goodness' by loving him. God's 'majesty [μεγαλειότης]' is alien to the acquisition of power and wealth, but expressed in gracious giving. When one takes up another's burden, acts to the benefit of others, and gives freely of oneself, then one is most truly an 'imitator of God [μιμητής…θεοῦ].'[88] It is noteworthy that the primary subject of this entire chapter is 'the Father' (10.1), and 'God [ὁ θεός]' (10.2), and that the imitation exhorted appears to be of him. The advent of his Son is mentioned once, but only as evidence of God's great love for humanity. It therefore appears that *Diognetus* intends God the Father to be the exemplar whose model we are to imitate.

Imitation is used similarly by Justin Martyr, for whom God accepts only 'those who imitate the good things that are his attributes, temperance and justice and loving-kindness and all the things that are proper to God.'[89] Justin Martyr also makes it clear that this imitation is of God who 'crafted all things in the beginning from unformed matter for the sake of human beings.'[90] For writers such as these,[91] imitation is primarily of God in his creative, gracious aspect, and his corresponding

[86] *Mart. Pol.* 17.3.
[87] *Mart. Pol.* 19.1 (trans. Holmes).
[88] Diognetus 10.4–6.
[89] *1 Apol.* 10 (trans. Minns and Parvis, 96–99).
[90] *1 Apol*. 10 (trans. Minns and Parvis, 98–99).
[91] See also Aristides, *Apology* 14.

'active' virtues of generosity, justice, and philanthropy, rather than of the 'passive' suffering of Christ.

§5.3: Imitation and discipleship in Ignatius

Ignatius' use of imitation must be seen in relation to these other post-apostolic witnesses. Imitation is frequently commended to be of God, sometimes mediated through a third party. The Philadelphians are to 'become imitators of Jesus Christ, just as he is of his Father';[92] Ignatius wishes the Smyrneans to imitate Burrhus, as he is a 'model of God's service [ἐξεμπλάριον θεοῦ διακονίας].'[93] The Ephesians and Trallians are simply described as 'imitators of God,' though it is difficult to discern the specific reason;[94] the phrase appears to be a favourite expression of pleasure and compliment towards a community. Yet it is much more difficult than in *Diognetus* and Justin Martyr to say that this imitation is of God the Father as distinct from Jesus; indeed, it seems that Ignatius' understanding of the Creator God, and what it means to imitate him, is inseparable from Christ.

Certainly in two instances, the exemplar to be imitated is specifically Christ's suffering and endurance. This is epitomised by the cry: 'Allow me to be an imitator of the suffering of my God.'[95] The Ephesians are exhorted to 'be eager to be imitators of the Lord, [seeing] who might be the more wronged….'[96] Imitation is more obliquely related to suffering elsewhere.[97]

We see similar patterns emerge as we turn to instances in which Ignatius clearly draws upon the theme of imitation, though employing words synonymous with μίμησις and its cognates. The

[92] *Phld*. 7.3.
[93] *Smyrn*. 12.1.
[94] *Ephes*. 1.1; *Trall*. 1.1.
[95] *Rom*. 6.3. With reference to the discussion above, Schoedel (1985: 183) comments about this passage: 'no sharp distinction is relevant here that opposes imitation as a human achievement to imitation as existence transformed by God or Christ.'
[96] *Ephes*. 10.3.
[97] *Trall*. 1.1–2; *Ephes*. 1.1.

bishop of Ephesus, Onesimus, 'a man of indescribable love' is set up as a model for the Ephesians: 'I pray that…all of you will be like him [πάντας ὑμᾶς αὐτῷ ἐν ὁμοιότητι εἶναι].'[98] Ignatius exhorts the Magnesians to 'be united with the bishop and with those who preside, as an example (τύπος) and lesson (διδαχή) of incorruptibility.'[99] The 'χαρακτήρ (stamp/impress/type/image) of God the Father through Jesus Christ' and his love is in believers *only if* 'we voluntarily elect to die into his suffering.'[100]

Ignatius' application of 'imitation' in his letters highlights certain themes: imitation is ultimately of God, though may proceed according to a succession of 'divine imitators,' be they Christ or an ecclesial leader. Though suffering is sometimes the content of the imitation, 'active' virtues such as service, love, and incorruptibility are also worthy of imitation.

That 'imitation' and 'discipleship' are closely connected in the early church we have seen above, and the relationship pertains for Ignatius as well. Wilkins believes they have a 'kindred meaning' for Ignatius: 'Discipleship implies devotion to Christ and following His pattern. Imitation emphasizes the pattern, but assumes the devotion.'[101] Corwin describes the relationship well:

> The key to Ignatius' view of the Christian life is an understanding of the twin conceptions of imitation and discipleship, for they are central to his thinking. They give content to the choice that he urges, and in following the path that they indicate the Christian life is grounded securely, for it is provided both with an effective motive, in devotion to the Lord, and a pattern for life, in a general sense at least.[102]

'Disciple' and its cognates appear some 14 times in Ignatius' letters.[103] Its connection with imitation is further suggested, both by the fact that discipleship too is demonstrated by following exemplary

[98] *Ephes.* 1.3.
[99] *Mag.* 6.2.
[100] *Mag*. 5.2.
[101] Wilkins (1992), 306; cf. Drake Williams (2013), 84.
[102] Corwin (1960), 227.
[103] For μαθητής see *Ephes*. 1.2; *Mag*. 9.1, 9.2, 10.1; *Trall*. 5.2; *Rom*. 4.2, 5.3; *Pol*. 2.1, 7.1. For μαθητεύω see *Ephes*. 3.1, 10.1; *Rom*. 3.1, 5.1. For μαθητεία see *Trall*. 3.2. For the limited use of the term in other apostolic fathers, see primarily *Diognetus* 11.1–2.

figures,[104] and the collocation of the two terms.[105] Discipleship is found to be primarily related to suffering and death, though it occasionally relates to other virtues. Indeed, Ignatius' own discipleship appears to be coterminous with his martyrial sufferings, and is often presented as the goal of a diachronic process. It is through successfully fighting with beasts that Ignatius 'might be able to be a disciple';[106] indeed, his discipleship is truly (ἀληθῶς) assured 'when the world will no longer see my body.'[107] He speaks of the beginning of his discipleship as though it were initiated by the same set of sufferings which will end in his death and attaining of Christ.[108] If his discipleship is to some extent dependent upon the prayers of the Smyrneans, this is only insofar as their prayers are for his successful suffering and death.[109] The necessity of suffering for discipleship is proper not only to Ignatius, but to his addressees as well: the mystery of the resurrection is the reason that 'we patiently endure, in order that we may be found to be disciples of Jesus Christ, our only teacher.'[110] The μαθητ- word-group is also employed to refer to learning from the behaviour of a model,[111] when Polybius is described as one whose very demeanour is a 'great lesson [μεγάλη μαθητεία].'[112] To be a disciple also involves more generally learning what it is to live in accordance with Christianity;[113] similarly, the OT prophets are called 'disciples in the spirit' because they were awaiting Christ as their teacher.[114] 'Disciple' is once employed simply as a synonym for 'believer/Christian.'[115]

It is worth noting that Ignatius never actively counsels imitation of himself, often emphasising his insufficiency and failings, and addressing himself as less than or equivalent to his

[104] *Ephes*. 10.1; *Trall*. 3.2.
[105] *Ephes*. 10.1–3.
[106] *Ephes*. 1.2.
[107] *Rom*. 4.2.
[108] *Rom*. 5.3; *Ephes*. 3.1.
[109] *Pol*. 7.1.
[110] *Mag*. 9.1.
[111] As it does at *Mart. Pol.* 22.2.
[112] *Trall*. 3.2; also see the debate surrounding the variant reading at *Pol*. 7.1.
[113] *Mag*. 10.1.
[114] *Mag*. 9.2.
[115] *Pol*. 2.1.

readers.[116] However, it must be admitted that his presentation of himself as one striving to become a faithful disciple, consumed by his desire to attain God through imitating Paul and Christ, is paradigmatic at least insofar as he himself has relied upon extant paradigms. He sets himself up, at least implicitly, in the succession of imitators, each of whom strives to imitate God through imitating human exemplars. Indeed, his self-abasement (and with it, self-sacrifice) itself is surely also to be imitated by his readers.[117]

While the word 'discipleship' is more concerned with suffering like Christ, and 'imitation' with modelling one's behaviour on the active Christian virtues displayed by an exemplar, taken together, the theme of imitating is shown to be a diverse and complex locus of Ignatius' thought. If suffering and death is prominent, it is not because of a morbid fascination of Ignatius with mystically reenacting Christ's death in a desperate bid to secure his own personal salvation; the passion is the centre around which the ethical life of all Christians revolves—the epitome of a life lived in obedience to God—and which they engage with through imitation.[118] Whatever merit there is in distinguishing *Nachfolge* and *Nachahmung* in Christian thought, my study joins with other scholars in denying that it pertains for Ignatius. As Wilkins writes, 'For Ignatius, imitation of Christ, even in suffering, is not a special saintliness. Rather, it is the calling of Christians in general.'[119] Moreover, imitation is concerned with far more than just the relationship between Christ's death and his own; it is the basis upon which the whole Christian life and mission is formed.[120] As we demonstrated in the previous chapter, Ignatius understands his death to have significance beyond his own personal salvation and relationship to God,[121] in benefitting the congregations to whom he writes and

[116] *Ephes*. 3.1: 'For now I am beginning to be a disciple [μαθητεύεσθαι], and I speak to you as my fellow learners [συνδιασκαλίταις].'
[117] Cf. Reis (2005), 299–300.
[118] See *Ephes*. 1.1: 'Being imitators of God, having taken on new life through the blood of God, you perfectly completed the task natural to you.'
[119] Wilkins (1992), 308.
[120] See Schoedel (1985), 30; Corwin (1960), 227.
[121] Though this is of course important to him; see Rebell (1986), 462.

ministers. Provocatively, and returning to Girard, mimesis might be considered the means by which Ignatius understands human relationships, good and bad, to operate—a claim which will be substantiated in the following sections.

§5.4: Ignatius' vision of positive mimesis

Girard's reticence surrounding the propriety and implications of positive mimesis has already been noted. One commentator has called this 'a neglected area in Girard's work and in writings on Girard,' and seeks to redress this void with a Girardian analysis of the widespread concept of imitation in the NT.[122] Reflecting directly on Swartley's analysis, in a rare passage Girard reflects on how positive imitation might work:

> Since Paul imitates Jesus just as faithfully as Jesus imitates his Father, he is almost as good a model as Jesus himself and since he is still around, unlike Jesus, he advises his converts to imitate him. This recommendation is not a symptom of Paul's narcissism, or of his "will to power"; it is practical advice to people who get bogged down in scandals.[123]

While the claim that Paul's imitation of Christ is 'almost' as exact as Jesus' of the Father is dubious, the thrust is clear. Paul acts *in loco Christi*, serving as Christ's plenipotentiary in his bodily absence.

Castelli's study of Paul's imitation language highlights its key function as a rhetorical strategy serving to extract absolute submission and conformation to the burgeoning power structures within the church.[124] Is Ignatius' exhortation to imitate similarly a thinly-veiled demand that his congregations accept and perpetuate the ecclesial hierarchy, now crystallised into three orders?[125] Swartley argues against Castelli's conclusions on the basis that the imitation enjoined by Paul is 'securely linked with renunciation of *acquisitive mimetic* desire, through Jesus' own model, so that

[122] Swartley (2000), 218 n.2.
[123] Girard (2000), 311.
[124] Castelli (1991), 117; Reis (2005) applies Castelli's theories to Ignatius, and emerges with the same conclusion: Ignatius employs imitation as power-move in seeking authority and ecclesial unity. Imitation, and Ignatius' corpus in general, is essentially 'a construction of the self that is embedded in ancient notions of power' (288).
[125] See Pettersen (1991), 45; cf. Drake Williams (2013), 83.

the spiral of rivalry and violence is decisively broken.'[126] As evident in 1 Thessalonians 1:6–7—'And you became imitators of us and of the Lord, having received the word in much affliction with joy of the Holy Spirit, so that you became a model [τύπος] to all the faithful in Macedonia and in Achaia'—Christian imitation does not necessarily reinforce pre-existing power-relations, or function from leader to led, but can operate between equal congregations. In all cases, positive imitation is recognised as such because it always follows the type of Christ's selfless and agapeic suffering: 'Their [the Thessalonians'] suffering certified their character, as those who did not mimetically counter-respond but experienced typologically the fate of Jesus.'[127]

I wish to suggest that the same is true in the case of Ignatius. He encourages his congregations to positive imitation, but only of those who epitomise the paradigm of Christian non-retaliation, victimisation, and consequently suffering. Indeed, Ignatius constructs a vision for Christian community based upon positive imitation of Christ. Yet I wish to go further than Swartley and suggest that, while passive *suffering* for Ignatius is a hallmark of Christian identity, to be mediated from Christ to believer through imitation, so too is the active *lovingkindness* which Christ embodied, evident in acts of charity towards neighbour and alien, to be imitated.

§5.5: The threefold ministry

The primary means by which Ignatius envisaged positive imitation of Christ to be disseminated among Christian congregations was through the threefold ministry of bishop, presbyters, and deacons. As Chadwick and others have shown, Ignatius understood this ministerial arrangement to receive divine justification through its resonance with, and reflection of, the heavenly order: 'The whole foundation of Ignatius' position is the view that the earthly church is nothing less than a microcosm in which the relationships of the heavenly hierarchy are to be found reflected.'[128]

[126] Swartley (2000), 220 (emphasis original).
[127] Swartley (2000), 222.
[128] Chadwick (1950), 170.

Ignatius understood the bishop to derive his authority directly from his being the τύπος τοῦ πατρός, and presiding εἰς τόπον θεοῦ.[129] Similarly, the presbytery have their prototype in the council of the apostles (συνέδριον τῶν ἀποστόλων), and the deacons represent the 'ministry of Jesus Christ.'[130] While Ignatius articulates this order several times, Brent notes that 'Ignatius is not always consistent in his imagery nor does he make the clear distinctions of later Trinitarianism between the divine persons.'[131] This patterning is not adhered to as a rigid dogma, but gestures towards the intersection of the divine with the earthly in the church.

Just as each station resembles its heavenly pattern, so Ignatius intends this order to serve as a model to be imitated positively by the entire congregation. The Philadelphians' anonymous bishop is 'attuned to the commandments as a harp to its strings.' Ignatius' soul 'blesses his godly mind (recognising it to be virtuous and perfect), his immovability, and his absence of anger [ἀόργητος], living in all godly gentleness [ἐπιεικεία]… Where the shepherd is, there follow ye like sheep.'[132] Ignatius commends imitation of the paradigmatic, nonviolent bishop: 'Do nothing without the bishop… Become imitators of Jesus Christ, just as he is of his Father.'[133] He trusts that the Philadelphians are 'at one with the bishop [ἐν ἑνὶ ὦσιν σὺν τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ], and the presbyters and deacons who are with him.'[134]

Ignatius informs the Ephesians that he has received Onesimus, 'a man of inexpressible love who is also your earthly bishop,' and trusts that 'you will love him in accordance with the standard set by Jesus Christ and that all of you will be like him [αὐτῷ ἐν ὁμοιότητι].'[135] The Trallians' bishop is a 'pattern [ἐξεμπλάριον]' of the congregation's love.[136] Lightfoot notes that this word properly

[129] *Trall.* 3.1; *Mag.* 6.1.
[130] *Mag.* 6.1.
[131] Brent (2007), 87.
[132] *Phld.* 1.2–2.1.
[133] *Phld.* 7.2.
[134] *Phld*. inscr.
[135] *Ephes.* 1.3 (trans. Holmes).
[136] *Trall.* 3.2.

means 'a copy, not in the sense of a thing copied from another, but a thing to be copied by others.'[137] Such a sense is confirmed by Ignatius' commendation of Burrhus to the Smyrneans: 'Would that all imitated him, for he is a pattern [ἐξεμπλάριον] of the ministry of God.'[138] Following his exposition of the celestial-ecclesiastical analogues, Ignatius exhorts the Magnesians to 'Let there be nothing among you that shall be able to divide you, but be united [ἑνώθητε] with the bishop and with those who preside, as an example [τύπος] and lesson [διδαχή] of incorruptibility.'[139] The presbyters too are to be followed (ἀκολουθέω) and the deacons 'turned towards' (ἐντρέπω).[140] The tripartite ministry, and particularly the bishops, in their typological imitation of their divine counterparts, are clearly understood to serve as models to be imitated positively.

Ignatius' corpus is marked by a distinctive interest in the concept of silence (σιγή and ἡσυχία). We are told that 'the more one observes the bishop keeping silence, the more one should fear him.'[141] Ignatius paradoxically writes that the one who truly has Christ's word can 'hear his silence' and be known through it.[142] Given what we have noted above concerning the bishop-God typology, it should come as no surprise that silence is also descriptive of God himself,[143] and the 'coming forth' of the Logos.[144] Silence, then, is an admirable, quasi-divine property. While there may be much truth in several of the conventional theories surrounding the significance of silence,[145] I wish to argue that the ideal silence of bishops corresponds to their ideal eirenic, nonviolent character as imitators and re-presenters of God and Christ, who did not repay the insults and of his persecutors; Pettersen too believes Ignatius' use of ἡσυχία reflects God's essential 'pacificity,' rather than betraying any Gnostic influence.[146] Indeed, it was foretold in Isaiah 53:7 that the so-

[137] Lightfoot (1889), II.34.
[138] *Smyrn.* 12.1.
[139] *Mag.* 6.2.
[140] *Smyrn.* 8.1.
[141] *Ephes.* 6.1.
[142] *Ephes.* 15.2.
[143] *Ephes.* 19.1.
[144] *Mag.* 8.2.
[145] E.g. Bauer (1920), 206; Chadwick (1950); Maier (2004).
[146] Pettersen (1990), 338.

called suffering servant would be silent (ἄφωνος) before his shearers. Whether or not we believe this resonance to have been present in the mind of Ignatius (who does appear to be familiar with Deutero- and Trito-Isaiah[147]), we are still able to attribute his commendation of silence to its connotations of eirenicism, non-retaliation, and endurance of suffering. Just as Christ refused to contribute to the cycles of mimetic violence that would kill him, so should the bishop be a typification of God's own nonviolent silence.

A bishop's function as the centre and safeguard of ἕνωσις is thoroughly compatible with his role as Christomorphic exemplar. Ignatius' abundant language of harmony—that 'it is proper for you to run together according to the mind of the bishop,' and that 'the presbytery…is attuned to the bishop as strings to a harp'[148]—is best understood not as a euphemistic description of slavish subjugation to an institutionalised authority, or an enforcement of social order through compulsory homogeneity of thought;[149] rather, it may be seen as Ignatius' vision of the ideal Christian community, in which the 'mind of God' is instilled into every member through positive imitation of the church leaders. This can occur because of the ministers' special communion with the divine, for 'Jesus Christ, our inseparable life, is the mind of the Father, just as the bishops appointed to the furthest parts of the world are in the mind [γνώμη] of Jesus Christ.'[150] We glimpse again Ignatius' notion of sequential imitation. While the Greek differs, it is plausible that Ignatius here recalls Paul's exhortation that the same mind (φρονέω) be in the Philippians that was in Christ, whose kenosis extended even to death on a cross.[151] Through the Ephesians' 'having taken the key from God,' being united with their bishop and 'harmonious in unanimity,' they may 'sing in unity in a single voice through Jesus Christ to the Father.'[152] The same imitative patterning I believe is being urged in the

[147] See *Trall*. 8.2, cf. Isa. 52:5. *Mag*. 10.3, cf. Isa. 66:18.
[148] *Ephes.* 4.1.
[149] *Pace* Reis (2005).
[150] *Ephes.* 3.2.
[151] Phil. 2:5f.
[152] *Ephes.* 4.2.

language of 'submission' (ὑποτάσσω), 'following' (ἀκολουθέω) and being of the same mind (γνώμη).[153] So essential is this mimetic dynamic for Christian communality that without the bishop, presbyters and deacons, 'no group can be called a church.'[154]

Granting the above to be true, how does the positive imitation of the threefold ministry differ from the world's rivalrous imitation which ultimately leads to scapegoating? The leaders Ignatius most highly extols are characterised by a Christomorphic eirenicism: 'absence of anger,' 'godly gentleness'; indeed, the bishop is one whose 'gentleness is his power.'[155] We have already seen the extent to which Ignatius offers himself as a paragon of nonviolence and humility. Ultimately, these bishops, being 'in the mind of Christ,' themselves represent Christ; by imitating them, Christians in a sense participate in the imitation of Christ himself: 'Do nothing without the bishop… Become imitators of Jesus Christ, just as he is of his Father.'[156] Christ's prime significance for Ignatius lies not in his teaching, but in his exemplary suffering, whose 'life is not among us unless we voluntarily elect to die into his suffering,' and with whom Ignatius wishes 'to suffer together.'[157]

§5.6: The Eucharist

The centre of Christian communal, ethical and spiritual life for Ignatius is certainly the eucharistic gathering. It is the unparalleled locus of communal and heavenly ἕνωσις precisely because it embodies the nonviolent passion of Christ, through which all dissension is destroyed. Not only is its performance inextricably connected with submission to the bishop,[158] but it is a mystical manifestation of Christ's founding act of self-emptying and renunciation of violent mimesis; this each Christian individually and communally is called to reflect and instantiate, in order that the

[153] *Trall.* 13.2; *Smyrn.* 8.1.
[154] *Trall.* 3.1 (trans. Holmes).
[155] *Phld.* 1.2; *Pol.* 2.1; *Trall.* 3.2.
[156] *Phld*. 7.2.
[157] *Mag.* 5.2; *Smyrn*. 4.2.
[158] See *Ephes.* 5.2–3; *Phld.* 4.

'ecclesial hypostasis' might be realised,[159] and Satan vanquished. As such, much of what was said concerning the threefold ministry applies here, so I reserve my comments to a few brief expositions.

The unity of the Eucharist, there being only one bread, one cup and one bishop, reflects and promotes the unity of those gathered:

> If anyone dwells in a foreign mind, he does not conform to the passion. Be eager, therefore, to observe one Eucharist (for there is one flesh of our Lord Jesus Christ, and one cup unto unity [εἰς ἕνωσιν] of his blood; one altar, as there is one bishop, together with the presbytery and the deacons, my fellow-servants), in order that whatever you do, you may do according to God.[160]

What we have seen throughout is confirmed here: the Christian's remembrance and imitation of Jesus' self-offering leads directly both to unity with neighbour and unity with God.[161] To live in accordance with God (κατὰ θεόν) is a symbol of the ordering of one's life in agreement with the kenotic and unifying self-giving of Christ, typified in the Eucharist. This destruction of the impulse to self-preservation and acquisitive desire inherent in the eucharistic act directly forestalls the nefarious power of Satan in the structures of society:

> Be eager, therefore, to come together more frequently for thanksgiving (εὐχαριστία) to God and for [His] glory. For when you meet together frequently, the powers of Satan are cast down, and his destruction is dissolved in the unanimity of your faith. There is nothing better than peace, in which all warfare of things in heaven and things on earth is abolished.[162]

In this passage which expounds Girardian theory well, concord (ὁμόνοια), peace and thanksgiving, which are of God, combat destructiveness (ὄλεθρος) and fighting (πόλεμος), which are of Satan. These latter are not only metaphysical entities 'in heaven,' but are tangible realities 'on earth' and within human societies, able to be affected and neutralised by the life and worship of the Christian community. Ignatius knows no better antidote (ἀντίδοτος) to the reign of death than 'breaking one

[159] See below p.135 n.175.
[160] *Phld.* 3.3–4.1.
[161] See Downs (2018).
[162] *Ephes.* 13.1–2.

bread, which is the medicine (φάρμακον) of immortality';[163] to 'live forever in Jesus Christ' one must imitate his agapeic self-emptying in one's present life.[164] In the next sentence Ignatius offers himself as an exemplar: Ἀντίψυχον ὑμῶν ἐγώ. If my thesis is valid, it should be unsurprising that most of Ignatius' references to the Eucharist are accompanied by an expression of Ignatius' own exemplary self-devotion, or that of the bishop:[165] the imitation of Christ is fed by, but also parallels, the celebration of the Eucharist.[166] The community is encouraged to receive their identity not from rivalrous conflict, self-promotion and expulsion of scapegoats, but from the 'self-giving victim' himself.[167]

This dynamic is evident in Ignatius' reference to himself in *Romans* 4.1 as 'the wheat of God…I am being ground up by the teeth of beasts, so that I may be proved pure bread.' We left it unresolved as to whether eucharistic resonances were intended here; certainly they have been inferred. If Ignatius does parallel his experience in the arena to the Eucharist, his *imitatio Christi* does not in any way rival Christ's salvific death, but rather illustrates the extent of his love and dedication to God and his congregations.[168] This is confirmed by his other expression of self-offering in *Romans*: 'Grant me nothing more than to be poured out as an offering [σπονδισθῆναι] to God while there is yet an altar prepared, in order that forming a chorus in love you might sing to the Father in Jesus Christ.'[169] Ignatius' self-sacrifice occurs not to expiate the Romans' sins, but to unite the congregation and guide them in worthy praise. Such an offering in which Ignatius presents himself as a model of Christian nonviolence and selflessness, even unto death, depends upon the authentic understanding of the Eucharist as Jesus' very body and blood. Just as God freely gave the

[163] *Ephes.* 20.2; see Girard (2001), 51–52 n.3; cf. Sirach 6:6 (LXX) which compares a faithful friend to φάρμακον ζωῆς.
[164] It is conceivable that Ignatius thought εὐχαριστία and ἀγάπη synonymous; see Klawiter (2007), 131.
[165] See *Ephes.* 11.2–13.1, 4.1–6.1; *Phld.* 4.1–5.1.
[166] See Lusvardi (2017).
[167] Alison (1998), 169.
[168] Cf. Schoedel (1985: 183): 'The fact that the theme [of imitation] does not always have in view Christ's death or does so only to draw attention to the love of God or Christ's endurance also indicates how improbable it is to regard imitation in Ignatius as linked with the idea of cultic reenactment of the Lord's passion.'
[169] *Rom*. 2.2; cf. Phil. 2:17.

'good gift' of the Eucharist to humankind,[170] so Ignatius, having been nourished by it spiritually, physically and mimetically, freely returns himself, physically and spiritually, as a gift to his congregations and to God.

Indeed, so inextricably linked is the correct interpretation of the Eucharist to Christian identity, community life, and obedience to the bishop, that it is a *sine qua non* of community membership. Ignatius explicitly states that 'if someone is not within the θυσιαστήριον, they lack the bread of God,' and that 'only that Eucharist which is under the bishop (or whomever he himself designates) is to be deemed valid.'[171] Ignatius places such emphasis on the community's submission to the bishop in this crucial celebration because only there can the authentic interpretation of the Eucharist, as the real 'flesh of our saviour Jesus Christ, which suffered for our sins,' be ensured.[172] Ignatius is only too aware of what is born of an insufficient understanding of Christ's passion and therefore the importance of the Eucharist.[173] Only the society which ingests and embodies Jesus' suffering, and thus lives κατὰ θεόν, can form relationships without the victimisation of others, and instead derive their identity from the vindicated Victim: 'Do nothing without the bishop… Love unity. Flee divisions. Become imitators of Jesus Christ, just as he is of his Father.'[174]

§5.7: Ignatius' contribution to positive mimesis

Girard's theories have been left largely unarticulated, though materially underlie the entirety of this section. Their correspondence with Ignatius' understanding of the role of the threefold ministry and

[170] *Smyrn.* 7.1. Alison (2013) faithfully expounds Girard's mature thought in understanding the actions of the Jewish priest in the Temple to be in continuity with the Christian Eucharist, insofar as they are both the locus of God's own self-gift. The action of forgiveness of sins or atonement depends on God's action towards humankind, and not on human effort to placate him.
[171] *Ephes*. 5.2; *Smyrn.* 8.1; cf. John 2:21.
[172] *Smyrn.* 6.2.
[173] *Smyrn.* 5.3–6.2.
[174] *Phld.* 7.2. Alison (2013: 58) describes what Christians do in celebrating the Eucharist as 'entering by praise and thanksgiving into a certain real participation in the one true sacrifice, so that our ability to live it out in our daily life is strengthened.' While Ignatius never defines the Eucharist *as* 'sacrifice,' if he did, it would have been akin to Girard's mature view of the term (as a participation in Christ's true sacrifice, which shows up the falsity of all others), and emphatically not as a means of propitiating an angry God.

Eucharist, both as the models of self-sacrifice by which positive mimesis can be transmitted, and as the consequent basis upon which Christian society can be founded, is clear. It has been argued that a Girardian reading of Ignatius' letters reveals a bishop who considers himself not as a scapegoat whose immolation unites a divided community, but as an imitator and model of Christ's nonviolence. Alison's suggestion is proved in the case of Ignatius, that through the mediation of the ministry and eucharistic gathering, 'The pacific imitation of Jesus beyond his death and through [the disciples'] own deaths is what forms the ecclesial hypostasis.'[175] Christian revelation teaches us the way in which Christian society might be built upon rightly ordered mimesis: 'What Jesus advocates *is* mimetic desire. Imitate me, and imitate the father [*sic*] through me, he says… Jesus seems to say that the only way to avoid violence is to imitate me, and imitate the Father.'[176] This is not only because Jesus epitomises nonviolence in himself, but also because 'neither the Father nor the Son desires greedily, egotistically.'[177] To merge the language of theology and Girardian theory, since Christianity understands Jesus to be fully God (infinite, self-sufficient, lacking nothing), only imitation of him is immune from the initiation of mimetic rivalry on the basis of finite goods. He is 'the sole model who never runs the danger…of being transformed into a fascinating rival.'[178] His mediation is absolutely external.

Satan also features prominently in the thought of both men, as both the human proclivity to scapegoat, and the manifestation of the tentative societal 'peace' which arises from it. Ignatius exhorts the Ephesians to imitate Jesus' non-retaliatory response to persecution, to see 'who might be the more wronged…' in order that 'no weed of the Devil might be found among' them. A Girardian reading might render βοτάνη τοῦ διαβόλου as a reference either to the human tendency to scapegoat, or the social structures which result from this mechanism. In each case, Ignatius

[175] Alison (1998), 168.
[176] Girard and Adams (1993), 23; see above p.117 n.67.
[177] Girard (2001), 14.
[178] Girard (1987), 430.

understands positive imitation of Christ to be prophylactic against the Devil's influence, and indeed the very basis for Christian community. Ignatius often reminds his addressees of the ever-present and insidious threat of jealousy or envy (ζῆλος) towards another. Girard understands this vice as a synonym for the demonically-driven mimetic desire which tends towards violent rivalries.[179] Having warned the Trallians against envy, which tempts even him, Ignatius concludes: 'Therefore I need gentleness (πραότης), in which the ruler of this age is destroyed.'[180] Both the renunciation of envy/acquisitive mimesis and the abandonment of one's tendency to violence continue Christ's destruction of the satanic forces.

But as well as simply cohering with Girardian ideas, Ignatius creatively supplements and enriches Girard's own meagre exposition of the potential of positive mimesis to be the foundation of a new type of society. Imitation of Christ does not simply entail a passive submission to suffering and persecution, but also involves assuming his mantle of active lovingkindness.

It must be remembered that Ignatius' letters were concerned not principally with the minutiae of positive ethical action, besides commendation of the bishops as models, and general statements like 'faith and love are everything.'[181] However, we are allowed at least two glimpses of his thought on this matter. Before reminding the bishop Polycarp about the many day-to-day responsibilities demanded by his station, Ignatius informs him of his duty of care towards the marginalised: 'May the widows not be neglected. After the Lord [μετὰ τὸν κύριον], you be their protector.'[182] Whether μετά ought to be understood temporally or typologically, the thrust is clear: the bishop is to undertake the same general attitude and specific deeds of love towards the outcast as Christ, and by extension set the standard of Christian ethics for his community. Elsewhere, by inverting Ignatius' description of heretics' behaviour, we can discern his understanding of Christian

[179] Girard (2001), 7–10; see Girard (1991).
[180] *Trall.* 4.2.
[181] *Smyrn.* 6.1; cf. *Mag*. 13.1, 1.2.
[182] *Pol.* 4.1.

orthopraxy. Since the heretics 'have no care for love, none for the widow, none for the orphan, none for the oppressed, none for the prisoner or the freed man, none for the hungry or thirsty' and are therefore 'counter to the mind of God,'[183] true Christians are expected to represent Christ's compassionate advocation for all victims ('the least of these my brothers'), typifying the inheritors of the kingdom at Matthew 25:35–40; moreover, every victim offers an opportunity for us to refute the fallacy of the scapegoat mechanism, exposed once and for all in the passion and resurrection of Christ.[184] This provides patristic parallel of, and substantiation for, modern attempts to define more fully the contours of the positive side of mimetic theory, and its implications for Christian ethics.[185]

§6: Treading the fine line: Ignatius' perpetuation of negative mimesis

It has been the nature of this chapter to highlight the feasibility of Ignatius' engagement with positive mimesis in contradistinction to the operation of the world according to negative mimesis. Its thesis has entailed the limitation of my focus to a specific thread of Ignatius' somewhat idealistic self-conception, and the consequent neglect of the elements of his thought which fail to attain this ideal, or which appear to rely upon the operation of negative mimesis.

In the fourth-century context of Athanasius' rhetoric against Arius, Zachhuber perceives an indissoluble tension at the heart of the Christian church: insofar as it is a worldly institution whose existence depends upon the formation and maintenance of social structures of identity and belonging, the church employs and relies upon the very pernicious fallacy—the scapegoat mechanism—it is its vocation to disclose.[186] Zachhuber explores the idea that the church's institutional integrity depends upon a 'rhetoric of evil,' or the demonising of the Other and their views, in order to reinforce one's self-justification, beliefs and identity, thereby ensuring social

[183] *Smyrn.* 6.2.
[184] Girard (1987), 202–3.
[185] E.g. Adams (2000).
[186] Zachhuber (2013), 207.

cohesion. Therefore, 'The exclusion of scapegoats is both necessary and impossible within the Christian Church.'[187]

This 'cynical' appropriation of the scapegoat mechanism is as evident in Ignatius as in Athanasius. Just as it is true that 'Nicaea is the foundation of ecclesial unity precisely because it defines it through the exclusion of Arius,'[188] so does Ignatius strive for united congregations through the exclusion of those who 'are accustomed to carrying about the name by malicious deceit,' who sow 'evil doctrine' among the Ephesians, who are 'outside the sanctuary,' or who say that Christ 'suffered only in appearance.'[189] Such as these are 'rabid dogs' and to be avoided 'as wild beasts'; they are 'evil offshoots' who will become 'disembodied and demonic';[190] indeed, their very humanity is questioned, being in reality 'wild beasts in human form [θηρία ἀνθρωπόμορφα].'[191] One might protest that Ignatius here simply defends his flock against heresy and blasphemy; yet, as Zachhuber notes concerning Athanasius, Ignatius highlights not simply the erroneous doctrines, but trenchantly anathematises the heretics themselves in personal terms.[192] This might explain why Ignatius' only letter addressed to an individual (Polycarp) rather than a congregation is free of any such vivid character assassinations.[193]

Ignatius appears to have defined the identity of his own congregation in direct contradistinction to those he anathematises. Throughout *Ephesians* 5–10 the subject periodically alternates between deprecation of 'outsiders' (those who separate themselves, heretics, deceivers, the fleshly, etc.), and illustrations of ideal behaviour to be followed (those who gather in the sanctuary, obedience to the bishop, Christ the One Physician, the spiritual, etc.). This culminates in Ignatius' celebrated declaration: 'I am scum (περίψημα) on your behalf and I am dedicated to you

[187] Zachhuber (2013), 215.
[188] Zachhuber (2013), 203.
[189] *Ephes.* 7.1, 9.1; *Trall.* 7.2; *Smyrn*. 2.1.
[190] *Ephes.* 7.1; *Trall.* 11.1; *Smyrn*. 2.1.
[191] *Smyrn.* 4.1.
[192] Zachhuber (2013), 199.
[193] Although a collective audience is assumed in several instances (6.1–7.1).

Ephesians.' Such an example of ideal Christian behaviour and conviction—self-abasement, self-sacrifice and openness to Other—surely constitutes Ignatius' most potent expression of Christian identity, simultaneously commended both through positive mimesis of Christ (μιμηταὶ τοῦ κυρίου σπουδάζωμεν εἶναι), and in distinction (μὴ σπουδάζοντες ἀντιμιμήσασθαι αὐτούς) to the marginalised Other. Only twice does Ignatius mention the 'kingdom of God,' in both cases mentioning only who will be *excluded*, never who can expect to inherit it.[194] It is no coincidence that one so concerned with social unity and organisation finds it necessary to rely upon the scapegoat mechanism.

The tensional state in which Christianity is suspended is such that any confession of Christ, insofar as it is impossible to say *credemus* without also saying *damnamus*,[195] simultaneously involves 'both faithfulness to Christ and betrayal of him.'[196] However, confession of Christ is least disloyal when one's confession leads not the scrutinisation of the Other's inequity, but to the recognition of the inequity within oneself, and thence to self-sacrifice for the Other—themes we have returned to again and again in Ignatius.

Even on a cursory reading, however, one is unable to ignore the instances in which Ignatius appears to speak of humiliation and death as a competition in which all Christians are called to partake, in an effort individually 'to attain God' (ἐπιτυχεῖν τοῦ θεοῦ). This has already been noted above in relation to *Ephesians* 10.3, where Ignatius calls upon the Ephesians to challenge each other, 'who might be the more wronged, who [the more] defrauded, who [the more] rejected.' This might be explained as a rhetorical strategy encouraging Christomorphic behaviour, and a warning against the Devil's goading to mimetic desire of worldly goods. More problematic, and perhaps latent in *Ephesians* 10.3, is the accusation of Bakker:

[194] *Ephes*. 16.1–2; *Phld*. 3.3. Reis (2005), 304.
[195] Barth (1970), 179f.
[196] Zachhuber (2013), 213.

> In Ignatius' eyes, Paul accomplished [Jesus'] suffering; therefore the bishop also modelled himself on Paul. In this form of devotion, Ignatius shows himself to be ambitious and not in anyway [*sic*] humble. This is also made evident by his desire to "attain" God… The Christian martyr enters into a unity with God and is placed beyond reach of his worldly opponents, no matter how his departure from the world may appear.[197]

The eccentricities of Bakker's reading aside, it is difficult to dismiss as sheer cynicism his assessment of Ignatius as deeply ambitious for personal divine consummation, which will eclipse all physical hardship. He, eternally blessed, will have the final word against his persecutors, eternally damned. It might be said that his purpose is temporarily self-humbling, but ultimately self-exalting. The same accusation can and has been levelled at the entire Judaeo-Christian ethical framework, perhaps most forcefully by Nietzsche's identification of its 'slave morality.' The origins of the Christian acclamation of 'weak' virtues such as mercy, humility, and compassion are found in the *ressentiment* held by the oppressed lower classes towards their oppressors. Their act of 'spiritual revenge' is in lionising the wretched virtues they were forced to embody, and cursing the virtues held by the nobility, such as power, pride, and self-assertion.[198] The Christian God, too, scapegoats those disliked by Christians, but his persecution is deferred and eternal. One is minded of Kierkegaard's epigrammatic comment:

> The tyrant, himself with a craving for power, compels by force; the martyr, in himself unconditionally obedient to God, compels through his own sufferings. So the tyrant dies and his rule is over; the martyr dies and his rule begins.[199]

It is impossible to address in any depth such a criticism here, yet I will offer two observations that may prove instructive.

(1) Girard explains that 'a search for truth is necessarily violent since it may lead to some definite stance regarding what is true and what is false. A clash with people who have different

[197] Bakker (2003), 198.
[198] Nietzsche (2008), I §7 (18–20).
[199] Kierkegaard (1996), 48 IX B 63:13 (trans. Hannay, 352).

conceptions of the truth becomes a distinct possibility.'[200] For one so fervent in believing Jesus Christ to be 'true life' as Ignatius,[201] this possibility becomes an inevitability: those who disagree with his interpretation are 'advocates of death rather than of the truth.'[202] They receive in Ignatius' polemic a foretaste of the 'inextinguishable fire' awaiting them.[203] Yet it must be noted that Ignatius does not here depart from tradition—Jesus' violent excoriation of hypocrites and the faithless (e.g. Matthew 23) surely goes beyond any of Ignatius' words. Arguably, all Christian polemic is intended primarily to maintain the right beliefs and ways of the faithful, lest heterodox opinions infiltrate.[204] In Ignatius' case, this is the belief in Christ's fleshly life, death and resurrection, and the Christian's call to imitate his nonviolence and selflessness to bring the powers of Satan to an end. This practical isolation must be differentiated from a fundamental severance of care for the Other. We see this confirmed in Ignatius, who, having thoroughly denounced certain people for their doctrinal inadequacies, clarifies the appropriate Christian orientation towards them:

> Now I am warning you of these things, beloved, knowing that you also have the same mind. But I guard you beforehand against the wild beasts in human form, whom not only must you not welcome, but if possible, not even meet. Only, however, do pray for them, that they might somehow repent, however difficult it may be. Yet Jesus Christ, our true life, has authority over this.[205]

To preserve the Smyrneans' correct understanding of Christian revelation, interaction with heretics must be avoided. The Smyrneans' communion with these people would imperil not only their ethic of Christomorphic self-sacrifice, but also their very existence.[206] However, Ignatius exhorts prayer and concern for the heretical other, and longs for their repentance. Ignatius imputes to Jesus Christ

[200] Girard and Adams (1993), 15–16.
[201] *Smyrn.* 4.1.
[202] *Smyrn*. 5.1.
[203] *Ephes.* 16.2.
[204] Cf. 2 John 10–11: 'If anyone comes to you and does not bear this teaching, do not receive him into the house, neither give him any greeting; for he who greets him partakes in his wicked deeds.'
[205] *Smyrn.* 4.1.
[206] *Smyrn*. 2.1.

the power to grant the heretics insight into their theological errors, and thus realisation of their contribution to mimetic violence and scapegoating.

(2) In a little-known article, Swartley's application of statistical linguistic analysis to Ignatius' letters convincingly demonstrates the relationship between Ignatius' use of expressions of anxiety for his own future, and his concern for unity of the Syrian church. Instances of language betraying this anxiety for himself markedly decrease in the letters written in the knowledge of the Syrians' unity.[207] Swartley concludes:

> Only *when* the church over which he is bishop is united (and less decisively, the whole church), and only when the church in Syria unitedly celebrates the Eucharist, will his death be a true martyrdom, certifying his attaining God, his true discipleship, and his actual participation in the sufferings of God (the cross) which the Eucharist when unitedly shared celebrates.[208]

Ignatius did not understand his death to be the catalyst for his church's reunion, but that their coming together was the vindication of his mimetic episcopate. Swartley's observation illustrates Ignatius' inherently community-centric martyrological paradigm and circumscribes accusations of self-interest.

It is foolhardy to deny Ignatius' own contribution to mimetic violence, hostility towards doctrinal dissenters, and an interest in the preservation of himself in the eternity of God. This is largely due to the impossibility of 'treading the fine line' between embodying the gospel imperative to selfless positive mimesis of Christ, and the necessity of employing mimesis negatively to ensure community stability. Yet while this may be unattractive, it is perhaps a small price to pay for the profound insight he provides into the nature of positive mimesis, for his personal sacrifice and commitment to church unity, and tireless proclamation of the gospel of Christ crucified.

[207] Swartley (1973), 93–96 (emphasis original).
[208] Swartley (1973), 102.

§7: Conclusions

Despite the many deliberations and changes of mind to which his thought was subject, Girard always maintained that the divinity of Christ was no hyperbolic or purely metaphorical gesture; it plumbed to the very heart of God's nonviolent being. Proper confession of Christ as the Son of God, therefore, entails recognition of our mimetic selves as the origins of violence.[209]

It has been my contention throughout this chapter that Ignatius was one of the first to fully recognise what confession of Christ's divinity entailed for one's own attitude towards authority, selfhood, and community. Expressions of Christ's kingship and deity are rarely treated apart from its means of expression and fulfilment, his sacrificial, kenotic suffering.[210] While we have noted the potential presence of a 'delayed victory' in Ignatius' thought, it is clear that he sought to emulate Christ's manner of life. He then offers himself and other bishops to their congregations as models of Christian self-renunciation. We also glimpse the intersection between the practical structures through which this Christomorphic living can best be disseminated and instilled in a world ruled by mimetic contagion, and the theological realities which these structures strive to embody. The Girardian paradigm as a hermeneutical tool I believe to have been vindicated: although the scapegoat hermeneutic can be applied to his situation (Brent), Ignatius consistently refuses the construction of social bonds upon the basis of violence, and sacrifices himself that it might be upon the foundation of Christ. Although they interpret the same event, Ignatius' sacrifice for the gospel and his fellow-Christians is of a completely different kind to the sacrifice that the Roman authorities believe to be making in casting Ignatius to the beasts.[211] His vision is vindicated not only in the reconciliation of his Antiochene community, but in his becoming a universally recognised pillar of the Christian church.

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[209] Girard (1987), 219.
[210] See especially the hymnal creed of *Ephes.* 7.2.
[211] See chapter 3 (§1) above for sacrifice as an evaluative term with great rhetorical force.

Ironically, the words of Nietzsche most aptly describe the intersection of Ignatius and Girard we have explored:

> Through Christianity, the individual was made so important, so absolute, that he could no longer be sacrificed: but the species endures only through human sacrifice… Genuine charity demands sacrifice for the good of the species—it is hard, it is full of self-overcoming, because it needs human sacrifice. And this pseudo humaneness called Christianity wants it established that no one should be sacrificed.[212]

Nietzsche is right to understand humankind as operating on the fuel of immolated victims, whose lynching brings about stability and coherence among the persecuting community, a peace which is 'as the world gives';[213] and he is justified in seeing in Christianity a concern for the individual not hitherto demanded. Moreover, Christianity understands the ultimate sacrifice made by Christ to be salvific, once and for all, thence uncovering, according to Girard, the fallacies of the sacrificed victim, both his guilt and his reconciling divinity.

Although Nietzsche may provide a faithful description, he fails to perceive the insight afforded by Christianity, that is the altering of perspective from that of the persecutors to that of the victims.[214] In assuming the perspective of the victim, Christianity indeed removed the necessity for a victim *to be sacrificed* by a community to reconcile their disunity. Yet Ignatius demonstrates that it is in imitation of Christ's agapeic life and kenotic death that a new and supremely lasting form of society can be based. The individual has been so sanctified by Christ's death 'for us,' and his importance as an individual and a member of a community so affirmed, that he is moved to embody Christ's *self*-humbling and *self*-sacrifice; in *actively sacrificing himself*, in bearing the burdens and diseases of others, and in forgiving and enduring persecution nonviolently, he consolidates the 'ecclesial hypostasis.' To adapt Nietzsche, genuine charity demands sacrifice *of oneself* for the sake of the community, which is of course hard and full of self-overcoming. Girard might join Ignatius in

[212] Nietzsche (1967), 142.
[213] John 14:27.
[214] Girard (2002), 169.

saying that it is only in overcoming oneself that one 'will truly be a disciple of Jesus Christ' and at last become 'a human being.'[215]

[215] *Rom*. 4.2, 6.2.

Part III: The Early Christian Memory of Ignatius

Chapter 5: Authenticity and Forgery in Literary Remembrance

This chapter examines the intricate notions of 'authenticity,' 'authorship,' and 'biography,' and considers how attitudes toward each have evolved since the first centuries of the Christian church. It lays the foundations for my exploration of the texts that memorialise Ignatius in chapters 6 and 7.

The energy latent in a community whose members share common memories is immensely powerful and capable of provoking an entire spectrum of actions, ranging from altruistic to genocidal. Long recognised by sociologists,[1] this insight is becoming increasingly valuable in the study of early Christianity. Zachhuber has forcefully demonstrated the rhetorical capital Athanasius gained from defaming the memory of Arius, using him as a 'scapegoat' upon which metaphorically to heap the ills plaguing the church.[2] This slander is most useful directly contrasted with eulogy: 'Arius' wickedness has to be recalled and kept in memory along with the saintliness of the Fathers if the evil of division and dissent is to be kept outside the Church permanently.'[3] Exemplary heroes of faith from previous generations—in particular martyrs, bishops, and ascetics—were vied for by various corners of Christianity, each convinced that they themselves had the greatest claim to inherit the memory (and thereby authoritative capital) of the figure.

The constitution of this memory was often complex and subject to refashioning. In many cases the hero left behind relics—literary, physical, liturgical—from which this memory could continue to draw life. Today, the authenticity of many of these relics is regarded with scepticism. However, there is a clear dissonance between modern notions of 'authenticity' and how an early

[1] David Rieff argues for the dangers of 'collective memory' and called for a reassessment of Western society's admiration of 'remembering' qua remembering, which is considered a moral imperative and civic duty; in many cases, suffering, hatred, and apathy can be more sensitively and effectively alleviated by letting go of collective memories that emphasise a group's distinctiveness, and embracing the benefits of forgetting (2016: 110).
[2] Zachhuber (2013).
[3] Zachhuber (2013), 205.

Christian might have understood the concept. Whereas the history, classics, and theology faculties of our academic institutions are built upon the pursuit of distinguishing the original text from the forgery, and devoting one's attention to the former, in the early Christian centuries scholars seemed ready to extend the appellation 'authentic' to pieces that represented the subject's character, thought, and ideals, whether these withstood the severest 'historical' scrutiny or not.

In a sense, the period in which 'genuine' memories of a subject might be forged does not end at the subject's death, but extends indefinitely; as long as her identity continues to be represented and forms a centre around which culture and meaning can be created, memories of the subject can be said still to be established afresh. To repurpose Benjamin White's comment about the 'historical Paul,' it is naive to suggest that 'there is some Archimedean point from which we as twenty-first-century scholars can reconstruct an untraditioned' Ignatius.[4]

This is a particularly provocative assertion and it admits some softening. My primary contention here is that memories do not die with the last eyewitness, but are subject to resurrection, appropriation, revision, and manipulation in succeeding generations and indeed centuries. This will become clear in my exploration of the long recension and the martyrological texts.

§1: Forgery and authenticity re-examined

The act of resurrecting, appropriating, revising or manipulating a historical personage can take several forms, whether physical (portraiture, the transmission or 'discovery' of physical relics), literary (biography, martyrology), or oral (the passing on of stories). It can also take the form of curation, that is, a collecting and editing of the champion's own writings. In such a case, one has a curious blending of voices: that of the living being added to that of the dead, yet both seeking to

[4] White (2014), 106.

allow the subject to speak to the present. How 'authenticity' should be defined in this instance is far from clear. In another case, the biographer might not only *compile* and *edit* the subject's words but, being inspired by their beauty and truth, *extend* them, and in fact write in the guise of the subject. This might be viewed as an extrapolation of the subject's thought, an extension of her ideals to a new context in which she is allowed to speak afresh. Of course, with all these forms of appropriation come substantial methodological difficulties. However, as I set out to demonstrate below, few of these would have been shocking or deemed inappropriate, scandalous, or indeed inauthentic, in the ancient world.

Our contemporary understanding of the notion of genuineness and its corruption must be re-examined. Firstly, it is necessary to admit a great deal of ignorance about the status of literary impersonation and forgery and its reception not only in late antiquity, but the ancient world in general.[5] Indeed, Syme advises against the use of language such as 'forgery' to describe such literature, which implies 'personal guilt and criminal handiwork,' preferring the word 'imposture,' which he thinks better encapsulates the positive, creative, and potentially culturally accepted intention of the literary 'forger.'[6] Ruthven agrees, challenging the common binary whereby 'literature is valorised as the authentic Self and literary forgery disparaged as its bogus Other.'[7] He argues that 'the ritual scapegoating of those caught perpetrating literary forgeries distracts attention from the spuriosity of literature itself.'[8] This spuriosity has been overlooked because of Western culture's 'patriarchal anxiety about legitimacy of descent and the inheritance of property,' which must denounce rival claimants as 'corrupt' and 'bastards,' thereby confirming the sovereignty of the 'legitimate' heir.[9] Our assumptions regarding the nature of 'forgery' have led us both to treat 'literature' as having an essential rather than a culturally constructed existence, and to consider

[5] See Rosenmeyer (2001), 196.
[6] Syme (1972), 13.
[7] Ruthven (2001), 3.
[8] Ruthven (2001), 63, 71.
[9] Ruthven (2001), 40–41.

'genuine literature' and 'forged literature' almost as opposing entities. This has resulted in a pronounced apathy towards pseudepigraphical literature in scholarship.

According to Vessey, the reign of Theodosius the Great (AD 379–95) saw a veritable sea change in the church's approach to the authority of the fathers, and conventions for utilising them in polemical debate and doctrinal controversy. Firstly, it then became generally accepted that 'the essence of the Christian faith could be captured in a short declamatory statement or creed…written out (*conscripta*) and published (*edita*),' in order to guard against novel perversions to Nicene orthodoxy.[10] Secondly, prior to this time appeals to fathers and teachers of the church rarely took the form of explicit textual reference; by the end of the fourth century, however, a pattern emerged of theologians arguing with formal reference to (what we would now call) patristic texts.[11]

Ambrose of Milan's *De Incarnatione*, which abounds with language and formulations of Athanasius and Basil without explicitly mentioning them, is perhaps one of the last texts to conform to the pre-Theodosian style. (Ambrose might be said to make Athanasius and Basil 'speak through him.') Far from being considered forgery, this practice was wholly accepted in both Christian and non-Christian contexts.[12] However, over time the elegance of implicit citation gave way to the necessity of demonstrating authority and pedigree, possible only through explicit citation; this also 'shifts one of the burdens of memory (*memoria*) from the mind of the individual reader to the manuscript repository.'[13] This change, Vessey opines, constituted 'little less than a revolution in Christian literary practice.'[14]

The fixed page was increasingly preferred over the labile human mind for the grave duty of memorising points of ultimate importance (such as the faith of the church). This shift in the medium

[10] Vessey (1996), 498–99.
[11] Vessey (1996), 499.
[12] Seneca (*Ep. to Lucilius* 84.3–7) likens drawing from and combining a variety of authors into one's own prose to bees producing honey from different flowers.
[13] Vessey (1996), 502.
[14] Vessey (1996), 499–500.

of argument, however, highlights various weaknesses in the theological exposition of the Theodosian era. Foremost among these is its susceptibility to manuscript falsification and forgery, since texts were obtained primarily through the copying of exemplars, frequently subject to corruptions.[15] The supposed immutability of the written word was in fact illusory.

This 'anxiety,' as Vessey describes it, 'about *the integrity of the Christian doctrinal oeuvre as* [*a*] *collaborative work of art*,'[16] is illustrated most famously by Rufinus' defence of Origen's works, arguing that they had been corrupted by heretical followers.[17] However, the long recension of Ignatius' letters, on the cusp of this Theodosian transition, also grapples with the same challenges of how to engage faithfully with 'patristic' texts.

According to Bart Ehrman, the 'purity' of Ignatius' original work has been adulterated by a foreign hand, his views distorted, and theology repurposed to heretical ends. Pseudo-Ignatius (henceforth 'Ps-Ignatius') was in fact a strong Arian, who employed remarkably convoluted feats of deception in order to infiltrate 'his real theological agenda.'[18] Yet the work of Ps-Ignatius might not be as far from the accepted practice of theological composition as Ehrman portrays it. As new generations of theologians incorporated the writings of past masters into their own work, not only to amplify their own work, but also to extrapolate from existing theological premises, so Ps-Ignatius incorporates the writings of Ignatius into his own literary output. This serves the dual purpose of furthering his own theological concerns while also extending the life and influence of an historical figure's voice.[19] The obvious difference in this case is that, whereas most would claim the literary product as one's own, perhaps adverting to patristic authorities, Ps-Ignatius directs all credit for the

[15] Vessey (1996), 503.
[16] Vessey (1996), 513 (emphasis original).
[17] See Rufinus, *Book Concerning the Adulteration of the Works of Origen*. While he believed his redaction of Origen's works to be justified, it was famously and vociferously challenged; see Jerome *Apology Against Rufinus*, passim.
[18] Ehrman (2013), 464–68.
[19] Cf. Cobb (2018).

composition to Ignatius himself. Is there a sense in which the latter might be judged the more Christian act of humility and respect to one's forefather in the faith?

§2: Authorship

§2.1: The notion of authorship re-examined

To explore the issue of authenticity from a different perspective, let us examine the ambiguity inherent in the notion of 'authorship.' As mentioned above, authorship of a work has generally been considered a question with one of two possible answers: written by the purported author (in which case genuine), or written by someone who is not the purported author (in which case forgery). However, various 20th-century literary and philosophical developments have exposed this judgement as an oversimplification.[20]

Reacting against literary criticism that considered the author's biographical detail as key to interpretation, Roland Barthes argued that the very medium of literature disallows such a judgement:

> Who is speaking thus?… We shall never know, for the good reason that all writing is the destruction of every voice, consisting of several indiscernible voices, and that literature is precisely the invention of this voice, of every point of origin. Writing is that neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away, the negative where all identity is lost, starting with the very identity of the body writing.[21]

All attempts at writing (or indeed speaking) necessarily engage in explicit and implicit borrowings, and result in a mingling of voices—those of the 'writer,' her educators, literary influences, scripture, wider philosophical/cultural forebears, the characters themselves and so on. The acknowledgements section of any book testifies to this fact. Every text is a 'tissue of quotations

[20] Ruthven (2001), 63–64.
[21] Barthes (1977), 142.

[French: *citations*] drawn from the innumerable centres of culture.'[22] In a sense, then, originality is impossible, forgery inevitable. In the very act of becoming an author (that of writing), one immediately relinquishes one's claims to interpretative authority, because of the polyphonic nature of literature. Unlike the bulk of prior reflection on literature, Barthes believes that a text's unity lies not in the (illusory) singularity of its 'originator,' but in its 'destination,' its receiving audience. It is the reader who makes meaning out of the symbols, words, and ideas gathered together by the 'author.' Barthes also believes that the notion of the 'author' is a modern construction, born out of the combination of Cartesian individualism, positivism, and capitalism, which all lionise the claims of the discrete human being. Earlier cultures were less concerned about delimiting writing as 'belonging to' the author, and saw writing as having a mediative role.[23]

Barthes' ideas are critiqued and extended by Michel Foucault, who saw every text as producing a so-called 'author-function,' which always diverges from the biographical reality of the writer.[24] An 'author-function' characterises discourse within a society, and is a means of classification. Foucault believes that, rather than an 'author' being a prerequisite for writing, authorship is a function that originates from the writing itself and from what readers project onto it. An 'author-function' can never refer to a single, real individual, since 'it simultaneously gives rise to a variety of egos and to a series of subjective positions that individuals of any class may come to occupy.'[25]

Commenting on the issue of editing and curating texts in (especially Christian) antiquity, Scherbenske also employs the idea of an 'imagined authorial construct' or 'authorial image.'[26] In the

[22] Barthes (1977), 146.
[23] Barthes (1977), 142. Tim Whitmarsh (2013: esp. 235–36) convincingly argues that the distinction between 'author' and 'narrator' is far more rigid in modernity than in antiquity, evidenced in ancient readers' assuming Apuleius' novel *Metamorphoses* to be autobiographical.
[24] Foucault (1977), 130–31. Barthes (1984) does make such a distinction between the *auteur* (the historical person who wrote the text) and the *scripteur* (the author-effect the text produces when read).
[25] Foucault (1977), 131.
[26] Scherbenske (2013), 41.

process of compiling texts of a famous author, this 'image' functioned as a touchstone according to which texts would be variously selected, rejected, or edited. Such an image is, of course, constructed with reference to 'genuine' works of the hero, but is also inescapably *interpreted* through the eyes of the curator. In editing the works of Hippocrates, Galen uses his own 'authorial image' of the philosopher to discern what should be considered 'Hippocratic':

> The importance of Galen's interpretation of Hippocratic doctrine is evident, when Galen claims that, even if a work is inauthentic (νόθον), the teachings found therein are authentic (γνήσιον) and so should not be rejected. Alongside doctrinal authenticity as proof for textual authenticity was a reading's utility (χρήσιμον). Galen's statements that a phrase (or book) is authentic (γνήσιον) or inauthentic (νόθον) insofar as it conforms to (Galen's conception of) Hippocratic doctrine underscores the dependence of authenticity on interpretation.[27]

So long as a work—whether a revision or edition—retained the ὑπόθεσις ('argumentative foundation or elemental presupposition') of the original, it can still be considered authentic, and not a 'new work.'[28] Scherbenske does comment, however, on the difficulty of identifying the 'hypothesis' of a work, which is itself a matter of interpretation. Just as for Foucault, 'the function of an author is to characterize the existence, circulation, and operation of certain discourses within a society,'[29] so for the early Christians, their 'authorial image' of a literary hero guided their curation, editing, and reconstruction of a hero's writings.

We can see several parallels here with the case of the long recension and its adaptation of the voice of Ignatius, which will be treated below. Briefly, I suggest that the LR's rewriting of the seven Ignatian epistles (and perhaps even the penning of six new ones) does not differ greatly from the ancient practice of revising or editing existing texts. We might continue to consider the LR 'authentically Ignatian' as long as the 'argumentative foundation' is retained. Moreover, if as soon as he dispatched his letters, Ignatius relinquished control over his writings, other early Christians

[27] Scherbenske (2013), 37.
[28] Scherbenske (2013), 40.
[29] Foucault (1977), 124.

reading these letters are justified in extending and adding to the polyphony of voices that already speak within the 'original' text. That this practice appears to be widely accepted in antiquity (see below) would support Barthes' thesis. Ps-Ignatius continues to deconstruct the illusion of the single author, adding to the already palimpsestic text several other voices, including his own and that of scripture.

The question 'What matter who's speaking?' has been answered provocatively by Ruthven: 'It matters a great deal, of course, to those who cannot accept the annihilation of the self as a condition of discipleship in the transmission of a tradition.'[30] We might understand Ps-Ignatius, who of course leaves us no name with which to identify him, as interpreting his role as faithful disciple of Ignatius to entail just such an 'annihilation of the self.' For him, it would be meaningless to claim (as a modern would) that the LR no longer has Ignatius as an author, but him. Ps-Ignatius wishes to engage in this 'act of suicidal generosity'[31] in subordinating his own self to the figure of Ignatius, to allow Ignatius to continue to speak to the church. For Ps-Ignatius, the act of writing, historically understood as 'protection against death'[32] (as we have argued Ignatius himself understood it), instead does the opposite for him as an historical, identifiable personage. Ps-Ignatius has in a sense sacrificed himself for the sake of Ignatius of Antioch and the church as a reading community which will benefit because of him. As Barthes sums up, 'the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.'[33]

More practical questions arise from this complexifying of 'authorship.' It is arguably more correct to say that Romans was an epistle written not by Paul but by Tertius, his amanuensis, 'who wrote this letter in the Lord.'[34] Are we to understand Paul's voice as continuous in the letter until this verse in which Tertius writes his greeting, or is it Tertius' voice mediating the message of Paul?

[30] Ruthven (2001), 105.
[31] Ruthven (2001), 104.
[32] Foucault (1977), 117.
[33] Barthes (1977), 148.
[34] Rom. 16:22.

Is it Paul or Tertius who continues to speak in verse 23 when the letter speaks about Gaius sending his greeting? Regardless of the skill of Tertius as an amanuensis (and Paul as a speaker), it is unlikely that every word in the letter is as it would be if Paul had physically written it himself.[35] Should the idea of co-operative or collective authorship be promoted?[36]

The possibility that Ephesians and Colossians were physically written by a disciple of Paul, charged to write by the apostle through the bars of his prison cell, presents a problem different not in kind but in degree. Are we still to consider a letter written by one immersed in the thought of the master as being 'by Paul,' or perhaps merely 'Pauline'? Would it matter if the work had in fact been 'authorised' by Paul?[37] Does the notion of collective authorship resolve any of these issues? Ruthven again addresses this issue, noting the closeness of the two senses of 'authorship': the first is the act of 'authoring' (writing) a text, the second is that of 'authorising' a text written by someone else, thereby assuming its words as one's own.[38] The latter has been common practice in politics since antiquity, especially in speech-writing. If both senses entail the authorisation of words as representing one's own true position, it becomes insubstantial whether the words themselves originally issued from the mind of the subject, or one close to him. All this continues to challenge a strong distinction between the authentic and the spurious in literature.

§2.2: Authorship in the early church

The more theoretical points addressed above are borne out in the early church's reflection upon the meaning of 'authorship.' M.P. Brown confidently asserts: 'scholars have long ago recognized

[35] Kim Haines-Eitzen (2000) forcefully illustrates the degree to which scribes exercised power over texts and their interpretation through the process of transmission, which is no less true for amanuenses.

[36] See Richards (2004), who provides evidence for secretaries and stenographers exerting quite some independent influence on the texts they record, and argues for a more complex understanding of co-authorship of the Pauline letters; see especially 33–46, 104f. Gorman (2004: 87–89) and Murphy-O'Connor (1995: 19) both see a flaw in modern biblical scholarship to be the fallacy of a 'pure' Pauline authorship: namely, the restriction of authorship in the Pauline letters to Paul alone, whether or not co-senders or 'we' expressions are present.

[37] White (2014: 2–6) problematises the notion of the 'real' Paul.

[38] Ruthven (2001), 98.

that it was a common and not morally reprehensible practice for a writer to assume the name, and thereby claim the authority, of some more notable personage for his own publications.'[39] Writing in the late third and early fourth centuries AD, Iamblichus considers it honourable to write in the style of one's hero and attribute one's works to him.[40] Barth and Blanke agree that oftentimes 'pseudonymous documents…were set in circulation because disciples of a great man intended to express, by imitation, their adoration of their revered master and to secure or to promote his influence upon a later generation under changed circumstances.'[41] The epistolary form was considered an excellent means of achieving such a task. Letters 'offer insights into a philosopher's mind, which would in turn presumably deepen his disciples' understanding of his public teachings.'[42] The writings of a great philosopher's disciples, 'whether in his name or in their own voices after his death, praise the actions and words of their hero, confirm the importance of his beliefs, and transfer the oral tradition that developed around him into a more permanent written form.'[43]

By some it was considered immodest of the individual writer to attach one's name to a work which was so heavily indebted to the founder of one's school and to one's teachers. This was claimed by a priest of Marseilles named Salvian concerning a letter written in c. AD 440, penned in the name of 'Timothy, least of the servants of God.' Although not admitting to having written the letter himself, Salvian nonetheless defended the practice of writing in the voice of a famous other, mainly on the grounds of modesty, but also so that the writer's own insignificance does not devalue the message (a phenomenon Ruthven calls 'allonymity'[44]). According to Salvian,

> …we are urged to avoid every pretense of earthly vainglory, for fear that while we are covetous of the mere bauble of man's praise we should lose our heavenly reward… [Furthermore] the author wisely selected a pseudonym for his book for the obvious reason that he did not wish the obscurity of his own person to detract from the influence of his

[39] M.P. Brown (1963), 140; cf. Gamble (2009), 359.
[40] *De vita Pythagorica* 198; cf. 31.
[41] Barth and Blanke (1994), 123.
[42] Rosenmeyer (2001), 201.
[43] Rosenmeyer (2001), 201.
[44] Ruthven (2001), 103–4.

> otherwise valuable book… This is the reason—whoever wants to know it—why the pamphlet was published pseudonymously.[45]

One wonders whether Foucault had read Salvian, who comments 'For in the case of every book we ought to be more concerned about the intrinsic value of its contents than about the name of its author. And therefore, if the book is profitable reading and offers something to edify the reader, what does it matter whether or not it happens to satisfy someone's curiosity about the name of the author?'[46] Moffat concludes that it is nothing more menacing than 'innocent admiration and naive sympathy which prompted a disciple to reproduce in his own language the ideas, or what he conceived to be the ideas, of his master, and yet forbade him, out of modesty, to present these under his own name.'[47] Tertullian indeed commends the attribution of a disciple's works to his teacher, and thus says that Mark's gospel can be maintained to be Peter's, and Luke's Paul's.[48]

The question of ancient pseudepigraphy has received the most scholarly attention because of the Pastoral Epistles. While scholarship fairly unanimously deems the Pastorals not to have been penned by Paul the Apostle, indisputable author of the seven genuine Pauline letters, scholars disagree as to the nature of their reception. Torm takes one pole in saying that 'Entweder glaubte man an die Echtheit einer pseudonymen Schrift und konnte sie dann sehr hochschätzen, oder man nahm die Unechtheit an, und dann war die betreffende Schrift schon wegen ihrer Pseudonymität jedenfalls etwas anrüchig'[49]—a work's reception depended upon its perception as genuine or otherwise. Harrison takes the other pole, implying that writing pseudepigraphically was morally permissible in the early Christian context, and that the author of the Pastorals

> was not conscious of misrepresenting the Apostle [Paul] in any way; he was not consciously deceiving anybody… It seems far more probable that…[the Pastorals] went out for what they really were, and the warm appreciation with which the best minds in the Church received

[45] Salvian, *Letter* 9 (trans. Haefner, 13–14).
[46] Salvian, *Letter* 9 (trans. Haefner, 12).
[47] Moffatt (1918), 41.
[48] *Against Marcion*, 4.5.3–4.
[49] Torm (1977), 119.

them, would not be tinged with any misunderstanding as to the way in which they had been written.[50]

A mediating position is perhaps preferable. On the one hand it acknowledges that while the Pastorals were intended to be received as the words of the Apostle Paul, and in this sense were intended to deceive. On the other hand the primary concern of the receiving community was not the actual identity of the text's writer, but the doctrinal truth it contained, and its claims to represent apostolic tradition.

The decision of Eusebius of Caesarea to include in the first book of his *Ecclesiastical History* the supposed correspondence between Abgar king of Edessa and Jesus Christ, has been described as 'something of an embarrassment' for the credibility of one of the primary narrative sources of knowledge about the early church.[51] How could the esteemed historian be so naive as to include as fact (he endorses them as 'from the archives of Edessa' and 'from the public registers there, which contain accounts of ancient times and the acts of Abgar'[52]) 'such an obviously apocryphal tale'?[53] Various explanations have emerged. Walter Bauer represents a prominent trend in scholarship on Eusebius which simply sees him as rather credulous and wishful in his acceptance of spurious stories, all the more in this case since he was not knowledgeable of the Syriac language.[54] More recently, Corke-Webster has sought to redeem Eusebius' reputation, suggesting that he shrewdly included the correspondence as a 'programmatic introduction' to his refashioning of Christian history in order to appeal to a fourth-century, increasingly elite, audience.[55] The correspondence portrays Jesus as literate, accepted and even sought-after in high social circles, tends away from common depictions of him as irrationally death-obsessed, and apportions blame for his death to the Jews, thereby

[50] Harrison (1921), 12.
[51] Corke-Webster (2017), 566.
[52] *HE* 1.13.5.
[53] Corke-Webster (2017), 566.
[54] Bauer (1972), 9–10, 36.
[55] Corke-Webster (2017), 570.

acquitting Rome.[56] Even if standards of ascertaining a text's authenticity were not as rigorous in the fourth century as they are now, it seems almost impossible that Eusebius could have believed himself to have discovered the only known words written by Christ himself, including reflections on his own significance, and not accorded this greater prominence. Such a text would surely outstrip the four gospels, written at degrees of remove from Jesus. The most likely conclusion is that Eusebius realised the story probably did not represent the very words of Christ, but that their sentiment and message was orthodox, in accordance with the church and edifying to its believers. This case offers another example in which a text's 'authenticity' is not the only, or even the most important, criterion of its acceptance as useful. Pseudepigraphical authorship does not immediately disqualify a writing.

Moreover, a claim to divine inspiration (usually derived from apostolic succession) would appear to have often granted one the ability to write in the voice of another in good conscience. Aland notes that when an oral message thought to reflect the teaching of the apostles was eventually written down, to attach to it the name of the amanuensis would have been to do violence to its true apostolic origin: 'not only was the tool by which the message was given irrelevant, but according to the view of that time it would have amounted to a falsification even to name this tool, because, according to this conception, it was not the author of the writing who really spoke, but only the authentic witness, the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the apostles.'[57] Meade thinks similarly, that many biblical and non-biblical writings which are commonly deemed pseudepigraphal, would not have been considered deceptive, but are in fact making a claim to write in the authentic line of tradition derived from an authoritative figure, be they Isaiah or Paul.[58] Meyer argues along these lines, finding it unsurprising that pseudepigrapha comprise part of the NT canon, since 'Man hat… angenommen und verworfen nach dem Maßstab der kirchlichen Wahrheit, nicht der literarischen

[56] Corke-Webster (2017), 571–81.
[57] See Aland (1961), 44.
[58] Meade (1986).

Echtheit.'[59] Augustine, despite coming to believe the Epistle to the Hebrews not to have been written by Paul, continues to maintain its canonicity, authority, and inspiration.[60] Likewise, he concedes that the texts Wisdom of Solomon and Ecclesiasticus are falsely ascribed to Solomon because of a similarity in style, but were actually written by one Jesus Sirach; however, they are still reckoned to be prophetical 'since they have recognition as being authoritative [*quoniam in auctoritatem recipi meruerunt*].'[61]

Despite this body of evidence, several prominent scholars of primitive Christianity argue the opposing position: that ancient authors did in fact strongly object to the practice of counterfeiting literature when it became known to them. Donelson aligns with Torm in stating clinically: 'No one ever seems to have accepted a document as religiously and philosophically prescriptive which was known to be forged. I do not know a single example.'[62] Ehrman criticises several of the authors cited above, and sets forth convincing ancient evidence to this end.[63] Eusebius' *Preparation for the Gospel* 10 rails at length against the Greeks' shameless practice of stealing phrases and writings from one another, and from the Hebrew scriptures.[64] The zeal of the Alexandrian librarians, especially Aristarchus of Samothrace, for excising 'corruption, conjecture, and interpolation' from ancient texts (especially Homeric) was renowned and esteemed.[65] Tertullian records that responsibility for the forgery of the *Acts of Paul and Thecla* was accepted by a presbyter in Asia Minor, at which point he withdrew from his position (*loco decessisse*).[66] Even death was thought a just punishment for the

[59] Meyer (1936), 279.
[60] See Bonner (1970), 561–62; Origen is recorded to have thought similarly (Eusebius, *HE* 6.25.11–14), considering the work's more polished language to be the work of a disciple of Paul, who afterwards recorded the apostle's thoughts. He too judges that Hebrews should practically be remembered as by Paul, and indeed regularly cites it as such (e.g. *Contra Celsum* 3.53).
[61] *De Doctrina Christiana* 2.8.13.
[62] Donelson (1986), 11; Torm (1977).
[63] Ehrman (2013), 11–92.
[64] For the under-examined topic of literary imitation in the Hebrew Bible, see van Seters (2000).
[65] *OCD*[4] s.v. Aristarchus (2).
[66] *On Baptism* 19; the forger claimed to have done it out of 'love of Paul [*amore Pauli*],' wishing to 'add of his own to the renown of Paul [*quasi titulo Pauli de suo cumulans*]' (trans. Evans, 36–37).

'crime' of forgery by some.[67] That the early Christians were invested in knowing the precise identity of the writers of the NT epistles, Ehrman also makes abundantly clear.[68]

The cumulative power of the ancient testimonies which rebuke the practice of forgery is indeed forceful. Yet it is striking that almost all of the texts adduced by Ehrman as evidence for early Christian rejection of pseudepigraphy also bring the charge of heresy against the 'forged' text;[69] none complains about a pseudonymous 'orthodox' text.[70] Either no orthodox pseudepigrapha were known about, or the practice of faithfully writing in the name of another was to a large extent accepted; the accusation of forgery, in other words, was one among a number of charges one could level at a text one disagreed with. Ehrman at one point even supports my position, admitting that the ancients accepted something as, for example, 'Pauline,' if it 'agreed with the interpreter's own understanding of Paul,' and thus utilised more subjective theological (rather than objective historical-critical) criteria to judge a text's authenticity.[71] Similarly, Metzger finds that 'patristic writers condemned pseudonymous works not merely on literary grounds but also, and sometimes primarily, on doctrinal grounds.'[72] A text's fidelity to the existing corpus is not just one of a number of criteria, but is the perhaps the most important criterion for evaluating authenticity.

Pseudepigrapha provide further evidence that writing in another's name was not considered in connection with the sin of lying. Ehrman cites several examples of forged texts that condemn the practice of falsification.[73] We occasionally see such apparent ironies in the LR itself, in its command to 'hate falsehood [ψευδολογία], for it says [God] shall destroy all those who speak lies [Ps. 5:6].'[74] Mary reminds Ignatius of Josiah who 'exposes those possessed by a wicked spirit as speaking falsely

[67] Ehrman (2013), 84–85.
[68] Ehrman (2013), 86–92.
[69] Any number of instances could be proffered, e.g. Hegesippus in Eusebius, *HE* 4.22.9; Dionysius of Corinth in Eusebius, *HE* 4.23.12; Tertullian, *Against Marcion* 4.4; Rufinus, *De adult. libr.*, passim.
[70] As Ehrman himself partially concedes (2013: 81).
[71] Ehrman (2013), 88.
[72] Metzger (1972), 15.
[73] Ehrman (2013), 14–17; cf. Metzger (1972), 14–15.
[74] LR-*Hero* 5.

[ψευδολόγοι], and deceivers of the people [λαοπλάνοι].'[75] Such instances force us to question whether Ps-Ignatius would have considered his project a 'falsehood.'[76] Even if many Christian authors condemned the practice of writing pseudepigraphically in certain cases (and we have already seen that these cases are almost always also thought theologically deficient), it was considered merely venial or indeed commendable in others. As Ehrman acknowledges, to 'lie' towards a good end was often thought to be 'noble' in Christian and non-Christian circles alike.[77] Moreover, while his book deals with identifying forged literature and the context of its production, he concedes that:

> I do not mean to imply any kind of value judgement concerning its content or its merit as a literary text (religious, theological, ethical, personal, or any other kind of merit). In particular, I am not claiming that it is somehow inferior in these ways to a work that is orthonymous. I am not, that is, contrasting later forged texts with texts that are somehow pristine, "original," and therefore better or more worthy of our attention.[78]

Indeed, he considers the work of Ps-Ignatius to be of such value that a 'full analysis…is long overdue.'[79]

Duff is highly nuanced in his treatment of the phenomenon of pseudepigraphy. In his wide-ranging overview of the scholarship, he argues strongly against the likes of Aland[80] and Meyer.[81] Acknowledging the limitations of the evidence and the necessity often to rely upon arguments from absence and negative conclusions,[82] Duff convincingly argues that for early Christians 'the value of

[75] LR-*Mary to Ign.* 4.
[76] On the vexed question of intention in forgery, see Ehrman (2013: 128–37). He rightly stresses that one's intention to deceive should be separated from one's motivations to perform the deception. As we have seen in the case of Salvian, motivations are often diverse. As Brox (1975: 92) avers, 'Man kann also nicht weiterhin sagen, daß alle Fälscher (auch die christlichen) schlechten Gewissens gefälscht haben müssen.'
[77] Ehrman (2013), 132–37, 534–48. Although his identification of 'lying' and 'forgery' seems to me to require more rigorous justification than Ehrman provides (533–34).
[78] Ehrman (2013), 7.
[79] Ehrman (2013), 469.
[80] Duff (1998), 50–55, 92–94.
[81] Duff (1998), 37–39.
[82] Duff (1998), 272, 280.

a text was closely connected to its true authorship.'[83] He goes on to assert more specifically (though perhaps not as securely) that even by 'the end of the second century Christians felt that for material to have authority it had to genuinely come from an authoritative source, and furthermore that predominantly "an authoritative source" was seen as meaning authorship by one of a small set of figures, all from the earliest time of the church.'[84] Duff's statement does not seem to take into account the various ways authority can be vested in Christian texts and individuals in any age, not only the apostolic (for example through an author's martyrdom or asceticism). However, he does recognise the complexity of the landscape: he allows for exceptions to this general rule, so that hypothetically, 'in the case of a particular text, written within a particular sub-culture, its pseudonymity could have originally been understood differently.'[85] Indeed, in certain real contexts, such as the compilation of the Mishnah and other Rabbinic texts, 'the authority of traditions or texts does *not* seem connected to their authorship.'[86] Nonetheless, his firm conclusion against any acceptance of pseudepigraphy as a practice must be taken into account.

At the very least, however, even scholars such as these are bound to admit the complexity of the issue of ancient pseudepigrapha, and the 'prevalence of differing degrees of sensitivity to the morality of such productions.'[87] I have shown that in antiquity, the practice of writing in the voice of another was defensible variously by appeals to modesty, honouring one's teachers, divine authority, and the intrinsic value of one's message. Moreover, we see such pseudepigraphic writing to be driven by a multiplicity of motivations, none of which can be reduced simply to a desire to deceive. Composing pseudepigraphically appears to have been vastly more acceptable in Christianity's early centuries than it is now. Morrison suggests that ancient readers' opinions of fictionality and authenticity of a work are best displayed by means of a spectrum, and that we ought

[83] Duff (1998), 280.
[84] Duff (1998), 278.
[85] Duff (1998), 280.
[86] Duff (1998), 277 (emphasis mine).
[87] Metzger (1972), 19.

not to approach the questions of 'authorship' and 'authenticity' as demanding binary answers: 'there remains a space in between—texts that contain some element of fidelity or accuracy with regard to the author's life or work, but are not viewed as straightforwardly "by" that author.'[88] Such a nuanced understanding of 'author' is not always demonstrated by Ehrman;[89] similar scholars show a tendency also to import value judgements concerning what constitutes writing 'innocently and openly.'[90] As I shall argue pertains to the LR, Morrison notes that 'in antiquity there were clearly those, among authors and readers alike, who took the view that the author himself was not the only one who could employ his voice to reveal some truth about that author's life, works, or achievements.'[91] Texts which, although unlikely to have been written by the subject, may still be considered authoritative in their portrayal of the subject's life, thought, or teaching. This later attempt to shape the memory of a historical figure is worthy of study in its own right.

§2.3: The example of Phalaris

Such has proven to be the case with the letters of Phalaris, described as 'the most ambitious example of fictitious epistolography that survives from antiquity.'[92] Accepted as the correspondence of the sixth-century BC tyrannical leader of Akragas, in which he is portrayed to be a philanthropic patron of culture and benevolent philosopher, these enjoyed a long and esteemed history of reception, proving particularly popular in the Byzantine world. However, when Richard Bentley published his 1697–99 dissertation debunking the authenticity of these letters, they immediately fell out of favour. Despite the letters' evident intrinsic value,[93] Bentley's demonstration was 'so

[88] A.D. Morrison (2013), 308.
[89] Ehrman (2013), 29–30.
[90] Donelson (1986), 10.
[91] A.D. Morrison (2013), 311.
[92] Russell (1988), 94.
[93] In 1690, only a few years prior to Bentley's publication, William Temple eulogised the letters as exhibiting 'such freedom of thought, such boldness of expression, such bounty to his friends, such scorn of his enemies, such honour of learned men, such esteem of good, such knowledge of life' (1814: 478).

complete that for almost three centuries scholars forgot that the letters have their own interest as a literary artefact, however little they have to tell us of the historical Phalaris.'[94] Bentley saw little in the letters besides rhetorical posturing, calling them 'the forgeries and impostures of the Sophistae,'[95] commenting that it would be for him 'no unpleasant labour…to pull off the disguise from those little pedants, that have stalked about so long in the apparel of heroes.'[96] Arguments have already been adduced above to challenge Bentley's wholly negative colouring of pseudepigraphic writing, and to qualify the usefulness of the word 'disguise.'[97] In response to Bentley, Morrison asks, 'Were ancient readers simply more naïve or less rigorous than their modern equivalents, or were their conceptions of authorship and authenticity (or the relationship between the two) different from or looser than ours?'[98]

The case of Phalaris demonstrates that 'forged' literature is valuable and worthy of study in its own right. It constitutes an ancient literary artefact whose content, style, and contribution are of interest to scholarship, while shedding light on the circumstances surrounding its composition. More pertinent to my thesis, pseudepigraphical writing also presents a new site where memories of the assumed subject can be collected, and allows us to explore a host of meaningful questions: What aspects of his are remembered, and which are forgotten, and what degree of parity is there between this and the original author's intended self-presentation? How is the original author made to speak to an audience and situation not his own? How has the forger's voice been interwoven with that of the original author, and what does this say about their identities? In short, what kind of memorial palimpsest has been produced in the intervening centuries, how can we explain it, and why does it matter?

[94] Edwards (2013), 342.
[95] See Jones (2017), 49.
[96] Bentley (1817), 391.
[97] See Ruthven (2001). Russell (1988: 97–105) demonstrates the letters' sophisticated construction and defends their inherent literary worth.
[98] A.D. Morrison (2013), 288.

All of these questions pertain to the case of the so-called long recension of Ignatius' letters, considered by a broad unanimity in scholarship to have been written some two and a half centuries after Ignatius' death.[99] These forgeries contain reminiscences of the second-century bishop that are invaluable and interesting not only for the light they shed on their own age, but also for the manner in which they are 'resurrected' and exploited in the service of a specific theological, social, and polemic cause. My project accords with Scherbenske, who repaints textual corruptions or amendments as material which affords us unique access into the interpretative history of a passage, rather than 'obstacles to be surmounted in the search for the original reading.'[100] I intend to take a similar approach to the LR of Ignatius' letters, which in their textual alterations to the original middle recension text, provide insight into the continuing life and use of Ignatius of Antioch as his memory lives on in the church. (Cobb has recently initiated such a project, wishing to understand the LR as witness to the particular social and theological concerns of fourth-century Antioch, while also questioning the academy's historical definition of authenticity: 'the accretions are *also* authentic.'[101]) As will become apparent, this 'resurrection' itself becomes subject to competition, Ignatius' voice acting as an authoritative but multivalent resource; his remembrance alters according to the aims of the rememberer. The emergent portrait, therefore, is not of a single personage, but of a long lineage of individuals and communities that have contributed towards the memorial of Ignatius fixed in a recension of his letters in the fourth century: or as Ruthven has it, 'the "spurious" and the "genuine" are consubstantial.'[102]

[99] I generally follow Lightfoot and more recently J.D. Smith (1986), both discussed below. Gilliam's (see below chapter 6 §1.1) entire reflection upon the LR's pseudepigraphy occurs in a comment (2017: 96) about Pseudo-Ignatius' penning of the six novel letters of the long recension: 'The move that he makes here, in relation to the out and out forgeries, is no different to someone writing letters in the name of the apostle Paul to address issues that had arisen after Paul's lifetime. This too was a common practice among Christians of antiquity.' Although this statement broadly accords with my own thesis, it seems to me a highly deficient and uncritical treatment of an issue so central to his work. It is my hope that this chapter sheds light on how the LR might fit into the rich history of Christian thought about pseudepigraphy.

[100] Scherbenske (2013), 7.

[101] Cobb (2018), 186.

[102] Ruthven (2001), 3.

§3: Biography in antiquity

Christianity's relationship to the ancient practice of writing biographies or *bioi* is relevant to chapter 7 on Ignatian martyrology, where I also discuss literature that may be termed 'hagiographical.' But it must be noted here that the LR as a literary creation possesses elements of biography. It consciously adapts a historical personage to the culture and audience of the writer; like biography, it balances the claims of historical fidelity with the imperative of the audience's ethical instruction and their attainment of higher truths; it too shows reluctance to fit into any one literary genre, exhibiting elements of several, and adhering to the rules of none.[103]

Ancient expectations of a *bios* and biographical literature were markedly different from the modern; to sacrifice what might be termed historical fidelity for the sake of edifying the reader was not uncommon. Plutarch, a writer known for his contribution to the genre of biography, and an almost exact contemporary of Ignatius the martyr, is quite explicit in contrasting the art of writing 'bare' history with that of biography, employing the analogy of painting a portrait:

> Accordingly, just as painters get the likenesses in their portraits from the face and the expression of the eyes, wherein the character shows itself, but make very little account of the other parts of the body, so I must be permitted to devote myself rather to the signs of the soul in men, and by means of these to portray the life of each, leaving to others the description of their great contests.[104]

It is entirely at the discretion of the biographer which elements of a person's life best illuminate her 'character' (ἦθος) and thus must be emphasised, and which are superfluous and must be left to those concerned with the matters of chronology and history. Also in the Christian tradition, Eusebius of Caesarea compares his role as Constantine's biographer to that of 'a human painter,' dedicating

[103] Burridge (2004), 77; see Edwards (1997: 228–30) for a critique of Burridge's careless use of the terms 'genre' and 'βιός.'
[104] Plutarch, *Alexander* 1.3 (trans. Perrin, 224–25).

'a verbal portrait in memory of the Godbeloved.'[105] This imagery illustrates the creative (as opposed to merely archival) nature of biography in the early Christian centuries. An account of a life could be considered faithful to the true 'character' of a figure precisely because of its creative omission, adjustment, and extension of her features.

Even if (as Hägg contends) Plutarch's famous phrase, 'it is not Histories that I am writing, but Lives,' has long been 'misused' in scholarship,[106] it is no less true that Plutarch considered biography to be different from history, and in fact, as a pursuit, ethically superior. Just as a vibrant and pleasant colour stimulates the human vision, so the 'intellectual vision' (διάνοια) ought to be applied to objects whose attractiveness leads it towards its proper good.[107] Plutarch continues: 'Such objects are to be found in virtuous deeds; these implant in those who search them out a great and zealous eagerness which leads to imitation (μίμησις).'[108] The biographer is the means by which such virtuous deeds are first discerned and sifted from the less important, recorded, and ultimately lead to the edification of the audience.[109] If there is a line dividing ancient 'biography,' 'panegyric,' and 'hagiography,' it is decidedly porous.[110]

And as with the author of the LR, Plutarch wrote about figures from the distant past, dead at least a century. His role, therefore, was not to preserve oral traditions circulating about his heroes, but rather, having analysed the extant historical data, to 'distil from historical tradition the elements that have paradigmatic significance and reproduce them in the narrative framework of a persuasive Life.'[111] The biographer's task was in many ways creative, determining what aspects of the figure were significant for the contemporary context, and then depicting them. Desideri notes

[105] Eusebius, *Life of Constantine* 1.10.1 (trans. Averil Cameron and Hall, 71); see Averil Cameron (1997), 156–57.
[106] Hägg (2012), 268; Plutarch, *Alexander* 1.2 (trans. Perrin, 224–25).
[107] Plutarch, *Pericles* 1.3 (trans. Perrin, 4–5).
[108] Plutarch, *Pericles* 1.4 (trans. Perrin, 4–5).
[109] Cf. Fornara (1983: 99).
[110] See Averil Cameron (1997: 155 n.53, 164, 173) and Barnes' (1989: 110) disagreement over the proper classification of Eusebius' *Life of Constantine*.
[111] Hägg (2012), 273.

this generative aspect of biography, arguing that for Plutarch it was 'that particular kind of historical discourse which allows us to grasp, through the reconstruction of the human qualities of history's protagonists, what is still truly alive of the past.'[112] Figures long dead were given present reality, and a chance to speak again—the biographer ensured that this speech was apposite and could be received by the contemporary ear, and that it was ethically enriching.

§3.1: The letter and Christian biography

Early Christian biographers considered the epistle a particularly useful form to express their admiration for a hero of faith, and to tell their story. Hägg's prime example of Christian biography, Athanasius' *Life of Antony*, takes the form of a letter (albeit an extremely long one), which is 'written and dispatched to the monks abroad.'[113] Athanasius clarifies that he writes at the request of these monks who seek to learn 'if the things said concerning [Antony] are true.' He then addresses them directly, saying that his aim in writing is 'that you also might lead yourselves in imitation of [Antony].'[114] The letter's protreptic purpose was in the first instance directed towards the 'monks abroad,' but was equally intended for wider circulation; the last paragraph of the letter charges the recipients to 'read these things now to the other brothers so that they may learn what the life of the monks ought to be, and so they may believe that our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ glorifies those who glorify him… And if the need arises, read this to the pagans as well….'[115] Far from a private affair, the early Christian letter was a form of literature that lent itself to being widely disseminated. As an epistle, the piece naturally assumed conventional structure, with ample opportunity to state one's intentions in writing and to cultivate an intimate and affectionate tone.

[112] Desideri (1995), 22, trans. at Hägg (2012), 273.
[113] συγγραφεῖς καὶ ἀποσταλείς πρός τούς ἐν ξένῃ μοναχούς. *PG* 26:835–36.
[114] Athanasius, *Life of Antony* inscr. (trans. Gregg, 29); cf. Krueger (2004), 192–94.
[115] Athanasius, *Life of Antony* 94 (trans. Gregg, 99).

Gregory of Nyssa also adopts the epistolary form in writing to the monk Olympius about the life of his sister Macrina. He immediately notes that his report of the subject is derived largely from personal experience, not from second-hand accounts, and so can be taken to record the facts 'with exactitude [δι᾽ ἀκριβείας].'[116] He may include this to distance the work from the widely-circulated *Life of Antony*, whose introduction states that it was written quickly and before Athanasius had heard from the monks nearest Antony. We could hardly hope for a biographer closer to his subject than Gregory. Furthermore, the siblings were from a prominent Cappadocian family, necessitating a higher standard of historicity in the biographical account. Yet in many ways Gregory's letter about his sister shares with *Antony* the didactic motivation of constructing the monastic role, clarifying the ideal ascetic life, and heightening the holiness and esteem of the monk in the popular Christian imagination. As such, it cannot be understood as an 'impartial' biographical report.[117] Gregory opens his letter by reminding Olympius of their chance meeting in Antioch, a highly specific and personal context; yet as the letter progresses, second-person addresses fall away. By the conclusion, Gregory does not even salute Olympius, but instead adds an apology for not including the multitude of extraordinary wonders associated with Macrina, 'lest the unbelievers should be injured [βλαβεῖεν].'[118] This again firmly demonstrates that Gregory intended his letter to be widely read. If it retained the form of a personally-addressed epistle, this was to facilitate its broader dissemination for the reasons suggested above.

Despite numerous distinctions, then, *Antony* and *Macrina* are quite similar pieces of writing.[119] Neither is a straightforward 'biography' (if such a genre ought even to be allowed),[120] but comprise a strong biographical core alongside elements of encomium, rhetoric, moral philosophy,

[116] *Life of Saint Macrina* 1 (ed. Maraval, 140).
[117] Barnes (2012: 31–32) agrees with J.W. Smith (2004: 58) who describes it as an 'hagiographical tribute.'
[118] *Life of Saint Macrina* 39 (ed. Maraval, 266).
[119] Krueger (2004), 196.
[120] Edwards (2006 and 1997) prefers to recognise 'biography' as a trait present in several different genres of writings, rather than a genre in itself. Averil Cameron (1997: 165) accepts that in many ancient contexts, 'biography was part and parcel of apologetic.'

and perhaps the novel. The life, deeds, and words of the hero are in each case adapted to address the specific needs of the audience. Moreover, the letters tell their story by creatively interweaving the speech of different voices, including the 'narrational' voice, reports from various sources, the voice of scripture, and the subject's own. The result of this polyphonic narrative is a composite and multifaceted biographical portrait, to which the author gives coherence. Hägg speaks about Gregory in *Macrina* as 'creating an intricate web of mutually supporting and supplementing narratives.'[121] Likewise Athanasius, whose text is dominated by Antony's direct speech, 'performs a delicate balancing act on the tightrope of trust: when do we hear Antony's voice, when that of his ghostwriter? Such "impersonation" is the biographer's privilege.'[122] *Antony* has an additional voice, that of the crowds witnessing Antony's words and deeds. Their reactions punctuate important lessons and provide an index to orthopraxis. One is reminded of Barthes on the intertextuality of all literature, the borrowing—conscious or unconscious—of the words of preceding people and texts, and the resulting 'tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture.'[123]

Comparing these paragons of fourth-century Christian biography to the LR and its biographical portrait of Ignatius of Antioch reveals great similarity. As we will discover in the next chapter, the corpus comprises just such an interweaving of voices, including that of the saint, the various passages of scripture which the redactor is so fond of incorporating, the redactor himself, and echoes of Nicaea. The resulting literary picture is not diminished for being composite; rather, this bricolage account reflects how persons are not discrete units, controlling their own perception and influence, but constantly engaged in interactions largely beyond their control, which colour one's legacy. Dale Allison comments that 'Self-perception is only partial perception, and while the passing of time dims memories, it can also unfold significance.'[124] This is no less applicable to the

[121] Hägg (2012), 386.
[122] Hägg and Rousseau (2000), 8.
[123] Barthes (1977), 146; cf. Redfern (1989), 91.
[124] Allison (2009), 24.

Ignatian LR than to the question of the 'historical Jesus.' The additional perspectives found in the LR might be understood as, if not corrective, then certainly complementary to Ignatius' self-presentation in his MR letters. Moreover, as we have seen in general and in the case of Ignatius in particular,[125] letters in the ancient world were regularly intended to reach a readership beyond the original addressee.

Some might consider this enterprise to constitute an attempt to pass off what is little more than 'fiction' as genuine historiography, and thus abuse the confidence readers place in writers; Fornara, for example, calls late antique biography 'a genre…dominated by alien interests and predisposed to gross characterization and fraudulent exposition,'[126] while Momigliano is troubled that fourth-century AD biographers do not keep 'a constant and clear distinction between reality and imagination.'[127] Yet as we have seen from the example of Plutarch and others, these comments reflect peculiarly modern standards of historiographical rigour and understandings of biography. In the ancient world, good biography was widely understood never to be free of creative re-fabrications, which highlight and mute various aspects of the subject's personality. The biographer's goal was in many ways 'to create a convincing portrait of a magnificent man by capturing in prose the ideals which that man represented,'[128] to the point of crafting entire conversations or orations, as long as 'some kind of verisimilitude is maintained.'[129] Hägg goes on: 'The establishment of any form of higher truth—be it poetic, psychological, philosophical, or religious—overrules demands for the truth of facts.'[130] Quite simply, ancient expectations for what constituted sound biography, and the balance between insight into character and historical verifiability, were very different from our

[125] See Pol. *Phil.* 13.1–2.
[126] Fornara (1983), 189.
[127] Momigliano (1993), 110.
[128] Cox (1983), 101.
[129] Hägg (2012), 3.
[130] Hägg (2012), 3–4.

own. To retroject modern standards of veracity and authenticity upon the ancients is to confuse two notions of the word 'true,' and is nothing short of 'naïve.'[131]

As has been argued, the LR can in several ways be understood as a biographical act, which is akin to other Christian biographies of the fourth century. They share an epistolary form, various polemical or doctrinal motivations, and a desire to represent the significance of the subject for a didactic context which was not their own.[132] All achieve this representation by a mingling of voices, including the biographer's and the hero's, scripture, and other authoritative sources, which reflects the impossibility inherent in the task of biography. Finally, all agree that although a portrait of a person in all her complexity can never be achieved to any degree of completeness, only through such a composite depiction can anything like a faithful representation of the hero's life, character, and abiding message be reached.

The particular potency of the letter for affording personal, dynamic, and spontaneous insight into the character of the *writer* has long been recognised. As early as the fourth century BC, Demetrius of Phalerum commented that the letter reveals the 'virtual image of [the writer's] soul. In every other form of speech it is possible to see the writer's character, but in none so clearly as in the letter.'[133] Trapp speaks of the 'salient characteristic of epistolary form, its special effectiveness in embodying and displaying character.'[134] This salience is derived in part from the particularity of context of both writer and intended audience, the personal gestures natural to any meaningful exchange, and the intrigue of overhearing a conversation—none of which occurs in treatises, tracts, or even orations or sermons.

Yet the case of the LR is slightly different. Here too we are allowed insight into the authorial personality behind the letters, his context and concerns, but Ps-Ignatius consciously intends

[131] Hägg (2012), 3.
[132] See Rapp (1999), 79–81.
[133] Demetrius, *De elocutione* 227 (trans. Innes, 478–81).
[134] Trapp (2006), 335.

(presumably) to remain anonymous, to blend his identity with that of the letters' proper subject—Ignatius the martyr. He utilises the epistolary form partly, of course, because this is the form in which he originally discovered Ignatius, but also because letters allow special insight into the subject's character. He was not alone in this pseudonymous endeavour: the writings of Socrates' followers, for example, 'whether in his name or in their own voices after his death, praise the actions and works of their hero, confirm the importance of his beliefs, and transfer the oral tradition that developed around him into a more permanent written form.'[135] It was perhaps because letters so expose the soul that Ps-Ignatius chose the epistolary form to perform his biographical act.[136] Handled well, the genre allowed him to lay bare the interior life of letter's purported author, Ignatius the martyr. Yet it also posed a risk. Even as he allowed the epistolary form to illuminate the martyr, Ps-Ignatius was presented with the temptation to pour out his own soul unguardedly, potentially jeopardising the literary effect he set out to create. It is to his work that we now turn.

[135] Rosenmeyer (2001), 201.
[136] See Hodkinson (2007) for other reasons that the epistolary form was a favourite among ancient writers, as well as some of its disadvantages.

Chapter 6: Ignatius in the Long Recension

§1: The long recension according to Lightfoot and J.D. Smith

It is reflective of the abiding scholarly apathy towards pseudepigraphical literature that of the three most recent substantial treatments of the long recension of Ignatius' letters, two are PhD dissertations—J.D. Smith (1986) and Fackler (2017)—the third being a 2017 monograph by Gilliam. The two latter scholars both interact with Smith's work, which will be more fully outlined below. Like my own, Fackler's project exploits the hermeneutic potential of 'memory' in approaching the LR, focusing on its evidence of Jewish-Christian relations.[1] Gilliam responds in part to Smith, and sets out to argue that the LR was composed in a very specific Christological controversy in the mid-fourth century.[2] Regarding other scholarship that touches upon the LR, Gilliam is correct in noting the lack of attention given to the role it and the figure of Ignatius play in the controversies of fourth-century Christianity; all connection between the LR and the historical Ignatius is severed, and the LR is abstracted from the context of its composition.[3] I set Gilliam aside for the moment and return to his work at §1.1 below.

In many ways, Smith's dissertation is an amplification of the foundational work of Lightfoot nearly a century prior. They share a conviction that the 13 letters of the LR—seven of which are interpolated redactions of the seven middle recension letters, and six of which are original compositions[4]—date from the second half of the fourth century, and exhibit mildly Arianising tendencies. Smith takes seriously Lightfoot's suggestion that the LR has a conciliatory tone and

[1] Much of my project was complete before Fackler's became available. While our theses at times converge, his is not interested in comparing Ignatius' self-memorialisation with Pseudo-Ignatius' reconstruction of the martyr, and could not take into account Gilliam's work. I am pleased to see that he supports my judgement on many points, but since we worked independently from one another, little would be gained by noting specific points of coincidence.

[2] Gilliam (2017).

[3] Gilliam (2017), 7.

[4] Although one of these six purports to be from Mary *to* Ignatius, this is usually considered as part of the LR.

purpose, possibly constituting an 'eirenicon'[5]—an idea rarely taken up in subsequent scholarship.[6] Smith also follows Lightfoot in considering the parallels between the LR and the *Apostolic Constitutions* (*AC*) to betray a common community of origin, whose location was likely Syria.[7]

Yet Smith goes beyond Lightfoot in several areas. Of particular importance to my thesis, he holds a specific 'early-Arian'/'weak Arian'/Homoian[8] Antiochene community responsible for a large-scale 'resurrection' of the memory of Ignatius of Antioch. This community was headed by Euzoius, compatriot of Arius, deposed with him by Alexander in c. AD 320,[9] and cosignatory to the anodyne yet thoroughly scriptural statement of faith accepted by Constantine.[10] The community's literary fruits included the LR and the so-called Roman *Acts of Ignatius* (in fact composed in Alexandria by a missionary delegation from Antioch).[11] It also oversaw the 'rediscovery' of Ignatius' remains, outside Antioch's Daphnitic gate.[12] Smith explains their broad motivation: 'This community, in a time of need, sought to appropriate Ignatius as their own saint and advocate.'[13]

The 360s and 370s were indeed a period of reckoning for Euzoius' Homoian community, for several reasons. Previously held together by the non-polarising figure of bishop Leontius, the Christians of Antioch had coexisted more-or-less peaceably, their doctrinal differences not given occasion to cause tension.[14] However, from the arrival of the inflammatory Anomean Aetius around the year 350, until the death of Leontius in 357, differences which had once been hairline fractures were exacerbated, becoming grave fissures in the Antiochene church. With Constantius II's summoning of Euzoius from Alexandria and his appointment to the episcopal seat of Antioch in early

[5] Lightfoot (1889), I.273.
[6] J.D. Smith (1986), 94.
[7] Lightfoot (1889), I.262–65, I.274.
[8] I use these terms provisionally (see §2.1.2 below) and as labels of convenience (since it is unlikely any was employed as a self-designation), though for the purposes of this chapter I consider these three to be synonymous.
[9] Socrates, *HE* 1.6; Sozomen, *HE* 1.15; Theodoret, *HE* 1.4. See Stevenson and Kidd (1957), 342–43.
[10] Socrates, *HE* 1.6; Sozomen, *HE* 2.27. See Kelly (1950), 231–34.
[11] J.D. Smith (1986), 29–34. The argument that the Roman *Acts* and the LR have the same provenance is problematic, as I discuss in chapter 7 below.
[12] J.D. Smith (1986), 9–14.
[13] J.D. Smith (1986), 14.
[14] J.D. Smith (1986), 48–50.

361,[15] and the ascension of Julian the Apostate to the imperial throne later that year, these parties divided into three: the Nicenes (cautiously defined) under Meletius, the Homoians under Euzoius, and the Anomeans under Eudoxias.[16] Euzoius' party, despite enjoying the support of emperor Valens from 364,[17] was now left searching for members, spokesmen, and a sense of identity, having been so thoroughly shaken by these events.

Meanwhile, the Nicene party was gaining traction. They had better success than the Homoians in producing charismatic theologians, not least Athanasius, whose well-known hatred of Arianism perhaps disguised their significant doctrinal similarities. The ascetic, holy men, gaining in popularity and force of persuasion around this time, were almost unanimously supporters of Athanasius.[18] Saint Antony's support of Athanasius was publicised widely through the latter acting as his biographer (the work had already been translated into Latin before AD 375 by the Antiochene Evagrius).[19] Styled as the life and words of the holy man, Antony's biography survives as a powerful example of anti-Arian literature, combining technical theological refutations with pervasive undertones of suspicion. In general, the Nicenes demonstrated considerably more acumen than the Arians in evoking the memory and authority of holy figures, living and dead. In 359, Athanasius drafted Ignatius 'as a cog in his anti-Arian polemic,'[20] citing a portion of MR-*Ephesians* 7.2 in an apparent bid to refute some corner of Arianism.[21] Gilliam also understands Athanasius to use Ignatius as a resource to resolve a doctrinal dispute.[22]

Euzoius' party, therefore, was under attack from multiple sides and losing ground. According to Smith, the Antiochene Homoians attempted to remedy their weakened position by rekindling the

[15] Euzoius was an obvious candidate for selection by the emperor, as much because of his theology as because the foreign Euzoius was hoped to be free from local biases and partisanship; see J.D. Smith (2001), 515.
[16] J.D. Smith (1986), 64–82; though Smith's (2001: 515) description of the Meletians as 'broadly Nicene' bears nuancing; see Spoerl (1993). For ancient witnesses see Socrates, *HE* 2.44; Sozomen, *HE* 4.28.
[17] Cf. Barnes (1997).
[18] Theodoret, *HE* 4.23–26.
[19] Quasten (1950–86), III.40.
[20] J.D. Smith (1986), 22.
[21] *De synodis* 47.1.
[22] Gilliam (2017), 175–80.

memory of Ignatius as a historical holy man, bishop, and martyr, who could speak to and on behalf of their group, and address problems currently besetting them: 'the Homoian community there "resurrected" Ignatius as a holy man and venerable advocate in order to counter the advances being made by the growing Nicene coalition, while giving a positive missionary statement of the Homoian Christian position.'[23] This 'resurrection' may be seen as an effort to unite and give direction to the rudderless Homoian party, who could thenceforth rally under the banner of their city's former bishop and martyr.[24] Central to this were the 'discovery' of the remains of Ignatius and the composition of the LR, which could corroborate the teachings present in the *Apostolic Constitutions*.

Several additional reasons existed for their decision. The Meletian party appears to have adopted the martyr Babylas as a figurehead and champion of the Nicene cause.[25] Having overseen the construction of a church which became the martyrium of Babylas, Meletius himself was buried alongside the martyr after his death in 381—a fact supported by words of Chrysostom,[26] and confirmed by archaeological finds.[27] That the Meletians used Babylas' shrine as a church is similarly substantiated by the physical remains.[28] The Homoian appropriation of Ignatius can be seen as a parallel attempt to make Christian history's heroes take sides. As I demonstrate below, the LR tacitly critiques some of the excesses being demonstrated by the Nicene-sympathising ascetics and holy men, such as Antony.[29]

Publication of the LR may be seen as a concerted Homoian response to Athanasius' polemical drafting of Ignatius in support of the Nicene cause. Their redefinition of Ignatius' memory and voice promoted a comprehensive Homoian interpretation that cast doubt on the Athanasian reading of

[23] J.D. Smith (1986), 6.
[24] J.D. Smith (2001: 519) relays that Henry Chadwick, with whom he was in conversation, was of the opinion that 'Euzoius' creation of the LR, in his Antiochene struggle against competing religious communities, seems quite evident.'
[25] J.D. Smith (1986), 24–26.
[26] *De Sancto Babyla* 3 (PG 50:533); cf. Mayer and Allen (2012), 43–45.
[27] Downey (1961), 414–16; see Lassus (1938), 11, 37–38: 'au centre de notre église, un sarcophage avait reçu deux corps. Il apparaît comme probable que c'étaient ceux du martyr Babylas et de l'évêque Mélèce' (38).
[28] Lassus (1938), 41; see also Downey (1938).
[29] See J.D. Smith (1986), 138–44; Cobb (2018), 187–96.

the martyr. Better than citing only one sentence of the father to reinforce their own doctrine, the Homoians offered a complete reimagination of Ignatius' entire literary deposit. The LR also provided convenient amplification of many of the rulings prescribed in the *Apostolic Constitutions*, also arguably composed by the Antiochene Homoians. Both documents address a present situation in a voice sanctified by the annals of history; Smith notes several correlations in both texts' attitudes, including those towards Judaism and the relationship between church and state.[30] Finally, the LR expressed the kind of moderate, conciliatory Homoian theology which the Euzoians were desirous to advocate, *without* the warnings associated with known Arian theologians.[31] Their 'speaking through' Ignatius short-circuited any prejudices being cast on their message.

Besides brief (and often unacknowledged) citation, Ignatius had hitherto received surprisingly little treatment by the church fathers after Polycarp. The first piece of any substance is a sermon preached by John Chrysostom in Antioch (probably sometime in the 380s),[32] which itself resembles an attempt to 'reclaim' Ignatius for the Nicene church after his Homoian appropriation.[33] Ignatius' memory in popular culture before the publication of the LR would appear to be greatly attenuated at best. The first attestation of his shrine appears in AD 392 in Jerome's *De Viris Illustribus* 16, which places him in the cemetery outside the Daphnitic gate. No details of Ignatius' burial place, relics or martyrial acts are recorded in Eusebius' chapter about him,[34] nor do historians Socrates or Sozomen mention him when recounting the translocation of the martyr Babylas in AD 362 to the very same cemetery that would come to house Ignatius' shrine.[35] This would suggest that before his 'rediscovery' and the establishment of his shrine sometime in the 360–70s, no visible

[30] J.D. Smith (1986), 130–49.
[31] Hanson (1988: 384) notes that Euzoius' approach to the warring parties at Antioch was one of general tolerance; see Wiles (1996), 27.
[32] See chapter 7 (§3) below.
[33] J.D. Smith (1986), 34; Gilliam (2018: 205): 'John is at pains to claim Ignatius for his Nicene camp against the claims of his non-Nicene opponents.'
[34] *HE* 3.36.
[35] Socrates, *HE* 3.18 (ed. Hansen, 213–14); Sozomen, *HE* 5.19 (*PG* 67.1273f.).

popular devotion was accorded to him, at least none which centred around his relics.[36] Therefore, while it is impossible to know with certainty his previous level of celebrity in Antioch, the paucity of mentions of him in Christian literature and the apparent absence of a shrine seem to indicate that he was held in 'reverent obscurity.'[37] If Ignatius was remembered in Antioch, it was for little else than his general role as an ancient pillar of Antiochene Christianity, whose faith had led him to spectacular feats of self-denial. Perhaps his *name* bore a ring of quasi-mystical authority and legendary antiquity; but since 'his *persona* was a field not yet cultivated,'[38] this presented an opportunity for the bare outlines of Ignatius, etched upon the memory of the Antiochene Christians, to be filled in and fleshed out by the Homoian creator(s) of the LR.

§1.1: The work of Paul Gilliam (2017)

Insofar as Gilliam attempts to show that the figure of Ignatius functioned as a polemical 'battleground,' over whose memory fourth-century Christians fought, and upon whom they projected their various doctrinal concerns, his project is consistent with my own. The 'Ignatian long recension' does indeed provide 'an open invitation to investigate the role that Ignatius of Antioch played in the fourth-century Arian controversy'—an invitation that has been rarely taken up.[39]

Yet rather than confining his study to the LR as I do in this chapter, he extends his claim and attempts to show that Ignatius enjoyed great celebrity throughout the fourth century, contradicting the conclusion of Smith.[40] His primary evidence for this is Eusebius' three mentions of Ignatius, and Athanasius' citation of MR-*Ephesians* 7.2.[41] That an historian whose purpose is explicitly comprehensive[42] should mention a prominent apostolic writer is hardly a sure sign of contemporary

[36] J.D. Smith (1986), 9–14.
[37] J.D. Smith (1986), 14.
[38] J.D. Smith (1986), 14 (emphasis mine).
[39] Gilliam (2017), 7.
[40] J.D. Smith (1986), 13–14; Gilliam (2017), 109–11.
[41] Gilliam (2017), 133–37, 222–24.
[42] *HE* 1.1.1–5.

popularity, and Athanasius' one citation of Ignatius fails to clinch the argument. Gilliam takes Lightfoot's 10-page documentation of all pre-300 AD Ignatian references and quotations as evidence that Ignatius was 'a well-known and respected figure before the fourth century.'[43] Yet only Irenaeus and Origen directly cite him (Irenaeus without mentioning Ignatius' name),[44] and the other references are usually little more than allusions to or coincidences with his letters, also citing anonymously. This hardly paints a picture of Ignatius' supposed Christian celebrity.[45]

Gilliam's only other argument against Smith is that there is no conclusive evidence that the LR was written in Antioch, and Smith's thesis depends upon this provenance. Smith recognises that no positive conclusion can be drawn about the place of authorship, but follows the bulk of scholarship which considers that Antioch is the *most likely* candidate, especially given the strong personal association of Ignatius to the city, on which local patriotism might be based.[46] Gilliam's demand for conclusive evidence is excessive. If no argument about early Christianity can be considered valuable if it relies upon *likely* assumptions, little patristic scholarship is salvageable. In any case, the cogency of the conclusions that derive from Smith's reasoning strengthen his assumption of Antioch as the provenance of the LR. Ironically, Gilliam later relies upon the Antiochene origin of the LR to support his own argument.[47]

Gilliam's claim, that affinities between some wording of the LR and the Macrostich creed of c. AD 344 indicate a similar date of composition, seems to me to be a weak argument. As DelCogliano notes, the similarities are nowhere exact, and are akin to credal formulations from a wide range of dates.[48] Gilliam is certainly not the first to notice the anti-Marcellian timbre of many passages in the

[43] Lightfoot (1889), I.135–44; Gilliam (2017), 110.
[44] Irenaeus: *AH* 5.28.4; Origen: *On Prayer* 20; *Commentary on the Song of Songs* prologue; *Homily on Luke* 6.4.
[45] Cf. Cobb (2018), 197.
[46] J.D. Smith (1986), 5–6. Ehrman (2013: 463–66) follows Hagedorn (1973) in considering Julian, a deacon of Antioch and author of a commentary on Job, to be a likely author of the LR. Smith argues elsewhere (2001: 518) that 'no imperial city nor ecclesiastical party had so much to gain from the resurrection of Ignatius and reappearance of his revised epistolary as the Antiochene Homoeans under Euzoius.'
[47] Gilliam (2018), 209.
[48] DelCogliano (2018), 454.

LR, but he is perhaps the first to be bold enough to deduce from this a date of composition as specific as AD 344–50. On what basis he does this is not clear, but it is certain that Marcellus was considered a worthy doctrinal sparring partner throughout the fourth century.[49]

Gilliam's thesis also attempts the ambitious task of demonstrating that the MR, commonly accepted as authentic, in fact shows signs of contamination by fourth-century 'pro-Nicene scribes,'[50] in response to which Ps-Ignatius (who was vying for a return to a pre-Nicene Christology of paradox) penned the LR.[51] He argues for this on the basis that of the 14 occasions in which the MR refers to Jesus/the second Person as God, only three can be said to be definitely authentic, because of the discrepancies among textual authorities. The other 11 were allegedly adulterated by 'pro-Nicene scribes' during the time of the Christological controversies of the fourth century.[52] This scribal work therefore being only an 'intensification of Ignatius' God language,'[53] an enormous burden of proof rests upon Gilliam to demonstrate why all 14 cannot be original. His reasoning also seems problematic. Are we to consider every element in Ignatius' letters which might become a locus of controversy in later Christian history to have been the product of, or at least severely affected by, the later era of controversy? Is Ignatius' 'God language' the only aspect of his theology which is less than ideal according to Nicene standards, and which might tend to heresy?

It seems to me that Gilliam's criteria for Christological analysis of the LR, which DelCogliano deems 'insufficient,' are equally problematic in his assessment of the MR.[54] Despite noting several

[49] Basil of Caesarea writing around the 370s is perhaps his most vociferous antagonist; see esp. *ep*. 69.2, 125.1, 263.5 and Lienhard (1989). In AD 380 a synod in Rome convened to condemn heresies including that of Marcellus in all but name; see Theodoret, *HE* 5.11. Epiphanius in his *Panarion* (esp. 72), dated to c. AD 376, also discusses Marcellus and his followers, of whom pockets remained across the empire, including in his native Ancyra. The Marcellians are also condemned in the first canon of the Council of Constantinople in AD 381 (NPNF 2-14, 172–76). On Athanasius' supposed condemnation of Marcellus, see Lienhard (1989), 161 n.14. The dispute about Marcellus was certainly not exhausted by the time of his death in the mid-370s.
[50] Gilliam (2017), 40.
[51] Gilliam (2017), 96–98.
[52] Gilliam (2017), 40.
[53] Gilliam (2017), 11.
[54] DelCogliano (2018), 455.

scholars' reservations surrounding the misnomer that is the 'Arian controversy,'[55] Gilliam continues to employ quite simplistic differentiations between 'Arian' and 'Nicene' parties, and the editorial policies they (quite self-evidently) must have adopted. For example, his assessment of the LR, which he bases on the description of Christ as begotten πρὸ αἰώνων at LR-*Antiochenes* 14, seems distinctly lacking: 'we behold a subordinate Christology that is *before the ages*. Pseudo-Ignatius clearly understands Jesus to have always been subordinate to God.'[56] He appears to neglect the precedence of the phrase 'before the ages' in scriptural and patristic witness (including the Nicene-Constantinopolitan creed), which we will assess below. In his determination to colour the Ignatian corpus as a battleground for Arian polemic, Gilliam often seems to consider as touchstones of Arian theology words and phrases that had great currency far beyond those who sympathised with Arianism.[57] His reassessment of the MR, while provocative, is not cogent enough to undermine the mainstream position of Lightfoot and Zahn.[58]

Given the doubtful nature of much of Gilliam's thesis touching the LR and its relationship with the MR, as well as the tide of scholarly opinion against which he works, I intend to build on the studies of J.D. Smith and Lightfoot, referring to Gilliam when appropriate.

§2: Analysis of the long recension

The long recension of Ignatius' letters differs in many respects from the middle recension. The hand of Ps-Ignatius is particularly evident in his alterations to the pre-existing text of the MR, illuminating what he finds offensive or irrelevant. The six novel compositions of the LR provide Ps-Ignatius a clean slate, as it were, to speak through the figure of Ignatius unbound by pre-existing texts. Five of

[55] Including Hanson (1988), Ayres (2004), whom Gilliam references (2017: 2 n.4).
[56] Gilliam (2017), 93.
[57] Gilliam (2017), 95.
[58] As DelCogliano appears to believe (2018: 457).

these are of course written in the voice of Ignatius, while the sixth, a letter from a certain Mary to Ignatius, provides a 'third-person' perspective that highlights particular features of how the fourth-century writer understood the martyr, and wished him to be remembered.

The only comparison between the two recensions known to me was published in 1963 by M.P. Brown, who analysed the vocabulary, style and grammar of each. Yet very little concern was given to any theological issues or those which might shed light on their ecclesial or other contextual differences, since Brown's was explicitly a study 'to establish by a controlled demonstration of certain linguistic and stylistic tests the value and utility of such tests as criteria of authenticity.'[59] It is little wonder that Ehrman considers 'a full critical commentary on the Pseudo-Ignatians' to be a 'major desideratum in the field.'[60] Even more recently, Cobb has called for the 'undervalued and…understudied' LR to 'reenter the canon of late antiquity—not merely as a foil for Ignatius but, rather, as an author in his own right whose literary output is both sizeable and important.'[61] While I will draw from specific parts of Brown's study, and at times from Lightfoot, the bulk of what follows are original findings, reflecting the scholarly apathy the LR has by and large met.

For my own study, the LR is valuable also because of its historical prominence in the church. Translated into Latin in the ninth century, 'for several centuries the Long Recension held exclusive possession of the field in the West.'[62] For a large part of Christian history, then, the figure encountered in the LR, not the MR, was that evoked in the memory of Christians by the name 'Ignatius.'[63]

In this section I examine the features of the LR under five broad headings—theological formulations, heresiology, ecclesiology, imitation of the MR, and remaining concerns—concluding

[59] M.P. Brown (1963), xiv.
[60] Ehrman (2013), 469.
[61] Cobb (2018), 202, 182.
[62] Lightfoot (1889), I.274.
[63] See Weijenborg (1969: 15–21) for the LR's acceptance by medieval and Byzantine sources as genuine; cf. Vinzent (2019), 373.

with a case study of the first chapter of LR-*Tarsians*. I go on to unpack the significance of these features in illuminating the context from which they sprung, and explore how the *topos* of remembrance functions in the enterprise that is the composition of the long recension.

§2.1: Theology

As a fourth-century text, one of the clearest features of the LR is its modernising of the theology of the MR, and the writer's evident queasiness at many of Ignatius' usages. He depicts Ignatius as an ambassador for the conciliatory weak Arian theology of his community, sealed by the twin imprimaturs of antiquity and martyrdom.

§2.1.1: Trinity

While the MR does at several points gesture towards some inchoate notion of a triad of divine beings, it exhibits no standardised Trinitarian vocabulary, little reflection on the interaction between the three Persons, and limited consistency in employing it. Moreover, the Spirit does not immediately emerge as an agent in the same sense as God the Father or Jesus, but is rather a 'divine power associated with God or Christ.'[64] Ps-Ignatius on the other hand shows a close familiarity with the concept of the Trinity,[65] as might be assumed for a theologian of his era. The three Persons are often evoked as a salutation, as in LR-*Antiochenes* 14, 'Farewell in God, and in Christ, being illuminated [πεφωτισμένοι] by the Holy Spirit.' Also in the first chapter of LR-*Philippians*: 'There is one God of the universe, the Father of Christ, from whom are all things; and also one Lord, our Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, the Lord of the universe, through whom are all things; and also one Holy Spirit, who was active in Moses and the prophets and apostles.' The following chapter

[64] Schoedel (1985), 20. Vall (2013: 115) euphemistically says that for Ignatius 'the Spirit's relation to the Son and Father is not strictly symmetrical to their relationship to each other'—a description more appropriate to the theology of the LR. Cf. Downs (2018), 150.

[65] While nowhere does Ps-Ignatius use the word 'Trinity,' I continue to use the term to refer to his collocation of the three Persons for ease.

provides an abundance of scriptural attestation for belief in such a nature of God, which Ps-Ignatius describes as consisting of 'three equal in honour [τρεῖς ὁμοτίμους].'[66] That the Trinity has been established as an essential element of apostolic tradition for Ps-Ignatius is made clear in his embedded introduction to Matthew 28:19: 'Therefore the Lord, when sending out the apostles to make disciples of all the nations, commanded them to baptise….'[67] Ps-Ignatius also exhorts the deacon Hero 'before [ἐπί] the God of the universe, and before Christ, in the presence of the Holy Spirit.'[68]

On occasions in the MR when only the Father and the Son are evoked, the LR frequently adds the Holy Spirit, completing a Trinitarian formulation.[69] Where the MR farewells the Magnesians 'in the harmony of God, [you] who possess [the] inseparable [ἀδιάκριτον] spirit, who is Jesus Christ,' the LR creatively refashions the passage to distinguish between three Persons: 'Farewell in harmony, [you] who possess [the] inseparable Spirit, in Christ Jesus, through the will of God.'[70] Ps-Ignatius also extends the MR's exhortation to communal unity to the Persons of the Trinity, whose unanimity confirms the unity of preaching, faith, baptism, and the one apostolic church.[71]

The LR exhibits a greater ease in discussing the Spirit and its function. At LR-*Trallians* 1, to the MR's 'by the will of God and Jesus Christ' is added 'with the cooperation [συνεργία] of the Spirit'; the Spirit's instrumentality is supported by its frequent use with the preposition ἐν.[72] Believers are instructed in orthopraxis by the Spirit,[73] they are filled by it, and are to do all things according to it;[74] the same Spirit that inspired the apostles inspired the prophets.[75] The text also hints at the Spirit's

[66] LR-*Phlp*. 2 exhibits close similarity to the Athanasian Creed in its insistence that there are 'neither three fathers, nor three sons, nor three paracletes, but one Father and one Son and one Paraclete.'
[67] LR-*Phlp*. 2.
[68] LR-*Hero* 7.
[69] LR-*Ephes*. 20, 21; LR-*Rom*. inscr.
[70] LR-*Mag*. 15.
[71] LR-*Phld*. 4.
[72] E.g. LR-*Phld*. 11; LR-*Rom*. 8; LR-*Smryn*. inscr.
[73] LR-*Ephes*. 4.
[74] LR-*Ephes*. 8.
[75] LR-*Phld*. 5.

role in the inspired interpretation of scripture when Mary beseeches Ignatius to call to mind several biblical examples 'through the Spirit which God has given you through Christ.'[76]

Ps-Ignatius sometimes speaks grandly of the 'one and the same Holy Spirit, who is good and sovereign, and true, and the author of [saving] knowledge.'[77] Although there is evidence, as we shall see shortly, that the Persons of the Trinity in the LR are not entirely as equal as would come to be demanded by fifth-century orthodoxy, the LR's notion of precedence by order of procession is arguably in keeping with the Nicene formulation.

§2.1.2: Christology

The MR's surprising readiness to refer to Jesus as God is well-known, and this language which 'seemed to transgress the bounds of careful definition'[78] has been suggested to betray a modalist theology in which Jesus is simply a mode of God.[79] The writer of the LR evidently felt uncomfortable about this,[80] consistently removing such an identification, or replacing it with a more palatable designation.

'Jesus Christ our God' is replaced by 'Jesus Christ our Saviour' in the inscription of *Ephesians*, and the next chapter's phrase 'the blood of God,' clearly alarming even by fourth-century standards, is amended to 'the blood of Christ.'[81] 'Our God Jesus Christ' is changed to 'the Son of God,'[82] and elsewhere Ignatius is made to glorify not 'Jesus Christ, even God' but 'the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.'[83] At least once does the LR retain the MR's description of Jesus Christ as 'our God,' but qualifies this by adding 'and Saviour.'[84] This being said, the LR does use the word θεός

[76] LR-*Mary to Ign*. 2.
[77] LR-*Phld*. 5 (trans. Roberts and Donaldson, 229).
[78] Lightfoot (1889), I.267.
[79] Schoedel (1985), 20, 120.
[80] See the section on modalism in §2.2 below.
[81] LR-*Ephes*. 1; though cf. Acts 20:28.
[82] LR-*Ephes*. 18.
[83] LR-*Smyrn*. 1.
[84] LR-*Rom*. inscr.

appositively of the second Person in his original constructions, though in most cases referred to as λόγος, notἸησοῦς or Χριστός, and in nearly all cases anarthrously.[85] It appears that while Ps-Ignatius accepts Jesus Christ also properly to be θεός, he refers to him thus only with 'certain fairly clear limitations,'[86] believing other appellations to be more salutary, and less likely to fall into heresy.

Our fourth-century writer often betrays his desire to clarify Ignatius' teaching about the relation between the Persons of the Trinity, consistently ensuring that God the Father is accorded the precedence due to him, and the Son worshipped in second place. Jesus himself is said to have 'rejoiced in the pre-eminence [ὑπεροχή] of the Father,'[87] and elsewhere Ignatius is made to say: 'I am not an anti-God, I acknowledge the pre-eminence [ὑπεροχή].'[88] The force of Ignatius' statement that there is 'one physician…Jesus Christ,' is greatly attenuated by the LR: 'Our physician is the only true God, the unbegotten and unapproachable, the Lord of the universe, even the Father and begetter of the only-begotten. We also have as a physician our Lord God Jesus Christ….'[89] The LR sacrifices the unity of the physician, along with the symmetry and economy of the semi-hymnal passage that follows, to ensure the correct order of praise is maintained. Distinction between God and Christ is also achieved by Ps-Ignatius' application of the descriptor 'Almighty [παντοκράτωρ]' to the former,[90] and his frequent emphasis on the priestly role of the latter. God is to be honoured as the 'cause and Lord of all things,' while Christ as 'the only high priest, by nature, of the Father,' to whom he is explicitly said to be 'subject [ὑποτάσσω].'[91] LR-*Magnesians* 4 has the same description of Jesus, but adds that he is also 'the true and first Bishop.' Jesus is the 'captain and guardian' of the

[85] LR-*Tar*. 4, 6; LR-*Phlp*. 2, 3; LR-*Ephes*. 15; LR-*Smyrn*. 5. Though cf. LR-*Tar*. 1, perhaps the LR's strongest reference to Christ as God: 'so that I might see Christ, my Saviour and God, who died for me.' The LR uses (or rather retains) the article with θεός when referring to Christ at LR-*Rom*. inscr. and 6.
[86] M.P. Brown (1963), 51.
[87] LR-*Smyrn.* 7.
[88] LR-*Phlp*. 12.
[89] LR-*Ephes*. 7.
[90] E.g. LR-*Mag*. 8; LR-*Hero* inscr.
[91] LR-*Smyrn*. 9. Subjection to the bishop is often exhorted in imitation of Christ's subjection to the Father. See LR-*Mag*. 13.

choir of believers[92]—all of which titles have been supposed 'to betoken a desire to withhold higher titles.'[93]

The LR seems to regard as infelicitous Ignatius' habit of speaking of nouns such as 'mind,' 'name,' and 'knowledge' as if they were reified entities, and almost always amends them.[94] He no longer comes 'bound from Syria for the common name and hope [ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ ἐλπίδος]' but 'for Christ, the common hope.'[95] Sometimes this simply serves to clarify, but often it distinguishes Christ from the Father. Ps-Ignatius follows Ignatius in calling upon the Ephesians to 'run together in the mind of God [συντρέχητε τῇ γνώμῃ τοῦ θεοῦ],' but where the MR clarifies that 'Jesus Christ, our inseparable life, is the mind [γνώμη] of the Father,' the LR says that 'Jesus Christ does all things according to the mind [κατὰ γνώμην] of the Father.'[96] Similarly, ministers can no longer be said to have been appointed 'in the mind of Jesus Christ,' but 'in the will of God the Father, through the Lord Jesus Christ.'[97] The LR goes to some lengths to recast the MR's phrase, 'we have received the knowledge of God, which is Jesus Christ,' substituting 'we have received from Christ and had planted in [ἔμφυτος] us the faculty of judging [κριτήριον] concerning God.'[98] These seem to conform more closely to the principle of the Father's pre-eminence. However, the LR does appear concerned to de-hypostasise terms not directly pertaining to the relation between the Father and the Son, such as amending 'grace will reward him [Burrhus]' to 'the grace of the Lord will reward him.'[99]

Whether Christ has authority independent of God the Father appears to have caused Ps-Ignatius some concern, as the MR's 'the Lord forgives' is changed to 'God forgives.'[100] Likewise, in

[92] LR-*Ephes*. 4.
[93] Lightfoot (1889), I.269.
[94] M.P. Brown (1963: 126, cf. 49) notes such a linguistic difference.
[95] LR-*Ephes*. 1.
[96] LR-*Ephes*. 3.
[97] LR-*Phld*. inscr.
[98] LR-*Ephes*. 17.
[99] LR-*Smyrn*. 12.
[100] LR-*Phld*. 8.

the letter to the Roman Christians, as reluctant as Ps-Ignatius appears to have been to tamper with it, Ignatius' promise that 'Jesus Christ will reveal these things to you' is amended to 'God the Father himself and the Lord Jesus Christ will reveal these things to you.'[101] Where the MR has believers being united with Jesus Christ, the LR changes this to union with God.[102] In the MR, prayer is performed by earthly communities and individuals, but in the LR Jesus Christ himself 'is always mindful of [the Ephesians] in his prayers.' This would appear to emphasise the distinction between Christ's status as *supplicator* and God's as *supplicandus*.[103]

Jesus' relation with God is emphatically described in the language of John 1:14 as being μονογενής.[104] It would be superfluous to enumerate all the instances,[105] but the LR shows a preference in using the term to highlight the distinction between the Father's 'unbegotten-ness' and the Son's 'begotten-ness.' The final salutation to the Antiochenes separates 'He who is alone unbegotten [ὁ ὢν μόνος ἀγέννητος]' from 'He who was begotten before time began [τοῦ πρὸ αἰώνων γεγεννημένου],' and likewise in the final greeting to Hero.[106] Ps-Ignatius elsewhere casts this difference particularly strongly, evoking the 'Almighty God,' and then 'Christ Jesus our Lord, his only-begotten Son.'[107] To the MR's simple statement that Jesus was 'of Mary [ἐκ Μαρίας],' the LR adds 'who was truly begotten of God and of the Virgin, but not in the same manner.'[108] Ignatius' tentative attempts to describe the manner of Christ's generation by the Father are deleted and replaced with the orthodox language of 'begetting.' Jesus Christ can no longer be said to have 'come forth [προελθόντα] from one Father and remained with the One and returned to the One,' but to be 'the high priest of the unbegotten God.'[109] Perhaps because of the controversy already mounting

[101] LR-*Rom*. 8.
[102] LR-*Trall*. 7.
[103] LR-*Ephes*. 12; see Hanson (1988: 569) for other attestation of the Homoian belief that Christ was both supplicator and high priest of the Father.
[104] Lookadoo (2020a) discusses the LR's use of Johannine language, particularly in Christological contexts.
[105] E.g. LR-*Ephes*. 7, 16; LR-*Mag*. 6.
[106] LR-*Ant*. 14; LR-*Hero* 9.
[107] LR-*Hero* inscr.
[108] LR-*Trall*. 9.
[109] LR-*Mag*. 7.

about Ignatius' statement that Christ is God's 'Word who proceeded [προελθών] from silence,'[110] Ps-Ignatius prefers the more anodyne 'substance begotten by divine power [ἐνεργείας θεϊκῆς οὐσία γεννητή].' While he shows a clear preference for speaking about this begetting as happening 'before the ages [πρὸ αἰώνων]' and thus in some sense atemporally,[111] it cannot be said to rival the eternity and unbegotten-ness of the Father. This increase in terminological precision is of course to be expected, reflecting a heightened sensitivity to the fine line between ortho- and heterodoxy in the fourth century compared to the second. Indeed, whereas the LR reserves the term ἀγέννητος for the Father alone,[112] the MR naively applies it to Christ.[113]

It is clear why many since Lightfoot, and indeed before him,[114] have seen the LR as tending towards Arianism.[115] Like Arius himself, however, Ps-Ignatius extremely eloquently justifies this position through extensive use of scriptural prooftexts.[116] Christ's pre-temporal generation is confirmed as scriptural truth by reference to Wisdom's relationship with God in Proverbs 8:22,[117] a 'favourite text in the Arian controversy.'[118] He casts the Son as 'maker of all things' with reference to 1 Corinthians 8:6, and Colossians 1:16–17, stressing that he was according to Colossians 1:15 also 'firstborn of all creation.'[119] This line he extends, citing John 20:17 and 1 Corinthians 15:28, which demonstrate 'that [Christ] himself is not the God over all, but his Son.'[120] He sums up this idea thus: 'Therefore it is One who subjected, and who is all in all, and another to whom they were subdued, who also himself, along with all things, becomes subject.'[121] Wiles' summary of the Homoian

[110] For the disagreement surrounding this reading, see discussion on Marcellus below (§2.2).
[111] LR-*Ant*. 14; LR-*Ephes.* 7, 18; LR-*Mag*. 6, 11.
[112] LR-*Hero* 6; LR-*Ant*. 14; LR-*Phlp*. 7.
[113] MR-*Ephes*. 7.2.
[114] See Zahn (1873), 132f.; Newman (1871), I.239f.
[115] Lightfoot (1889), I.267–73.
[116] R. Williams (1987), 96.
[117] LR-*Tar*. 6.
[118] Lightfoot (1889), III.184.
[119] LR-*Tar*. 4.
[120] LR-*Tar*. 5.
[121] LR-*Tar*. 5.

approach is consistent with the LR: 'Conservative in temper, they sought to eschew the language of philosophical debate and to keep as far as possible to the language of Scripture.'[122]

However, as Lightfoot is at pains to point out, the LR's Arianism is far from absolute. He perhaps 'leans to the side of Arianism, though without definitely crossing the border,'[123] expressing an 'Arianism of very diluted quality.'[124] Most of his 'Arianising' features find some parallel among orthodox writings.[125] Even the catchphrase πρὸ αἰώνων was used within the fold of orthodoxy.[126] His confession of the three Persons as 'equal in honour'[127] is paralleled in many thoroughly orthodox Fathers such as Gregory Nazianzen,[128] Athanasius,[129] and Basil of Caesarea,[130] and might be seen as a 'virtual acknowledgement of the Nicene doctrine.'[131] Indeed, Athanasius portrays Arius as teaching that the Son is τῇ φύσει τρεπτός,[132] while the LR describes him as τῇ φύσει *ἄτρεπτος*.[133] While 'Arian' views surely continued to be held after Nicaea, whether many Christians were confessedly 'Arians' is up for debate;[134] the idea of a band of enemies uniformly opposed to Nicene truth under the banner of Arius has been shown to be primarily a product of Athanasius' polemic.[135] Clearly, a simple binary answer as to whether the LR is an 'Arian' text is insufficient.

As suggested above, the LR can be seen as 'writing with a conciliatory aim.'[136] Indeed, Ps-Ignatius' Homoian and mildly Arianising leanings, and his apparent reluctance to affirm a clear

[122] Wiles (1996), 27.
[123] Lightfoot (1889), I.271.
[124] Lightfoot (1889), I.273.
[125] Lightfoot (1889), I.268–70.
[126] Lightfoot (1889), I.270.
[127] LR-*Phlp*. 2.
[128] *Oration* 31.12 (PG 36:145).
[129] *Expositio Fidei* 1 (PG 25:201).
[130] *De Spiritu Sancto* 5.8 (PG 32:81) and passim.
[131] Lightfoot (1889), I.270. Meletius appears to have been equally reluctant to use language of οὐσία; see Spoerl (1993), 124.
[132] *Apologia contra Arianos* 1.5, 9; although all Arius himself appears to have said on the matter is that the Son is 'unchangeable and inalienable [ἄτρεπτος καὶ ἀναλλοίωτος]…by his will' (*Letter to Eusebius* and *Letter to Alexander*), from which Athanasius (and Alexander at Socrates, *HE* 1.6) inferred that Arius must therefore believe that he is changeable by nature. On this thorny issue, see R. Williams (1987), 113–15.
[133] LR-*Phlp*. 5.
[134] R. Wiliams (1987), 82–83.
[135] Kannengiesser (1983), chapter 2.
[136] Lightfoot (1889), I.273.

doctrinal position, might constitute some part of his attempt to provide a middle ground for several parties who disagreed on minor doctrinal points, but who were still essentially 'reasonable men.'[137] Pastoral and ethical concerns were also at stake (see §2.5 below). There, too, 'Pseudo-Ignatius affirms a mediating position between polarized stances regarding sex and marriage.'[138] However, despite his general 'broad churchmanship,' Ps-Ignatius' toleration only extends so far.

§2.2: Heresiology

While in many ways the LR tones down the spontaneity of Ignatius' expression, it consistently heightens polemic against heresies, Jews, and factionalism, both extending pre-existing refutations and introducing new arguments. We note a general exaggeration of Ignatius' anti-heretical language, such as the addition of 'most-worthless people [φαυλότατοι]' to the MR's simple τινες;[139] or an extended philippic against a general 'spirit of deceit,' which is counter to Christ and the Holy Spirit, adding a catena of distinguishing qualities reminiscent of the works of the flesh in Galatians 5.[140] The moderate tone of MR-*Magnesians* 9 is turned into a violent castigation of certain unidentified 'enemies of Christ,' who are described as 'pawners of Christ,' 'corrupters of women,' and 'whirlpools of wealth [χρηματολαίλαπες].'[141] Ps-Ignatius picks up Ignatius' portrayal of heretics as beasts,[142] extending it to cast them as 'dumb dogs, trailing serpents, scaly dragons, asps, basilisks, scorpions' and even 'monkeys mimicking the form of humans [ἀνθρωπόμιμοι πίθηκοι].'[143]

[137] Lightfoot (1889), I.273; see above and M.P. Brown (1963), 50. We might then hesitate to identify him as a 'Homoian' or 'weak Arian,' for the very reason that his Homoianism might be one of compromise. In this sense he might be akin to the position of Emperor Constantius II, whose Homoian theology was driven, at least in part, by a conciliatory purpose; see Flower (2016), 19–20, and Wiles (1996), 27.
[138] Cobb (2018), 192.
[139] LR-*Ephes*. 7.
[140] LR-*Ephes*. 9; see LR-*Ephes*. 16.
[141] LR-*Mag*. 9.
[142] MR-*Ephes*. 7.1; MR-*Smyrn.* 4.1.
[143] LR-*Ant*. 6; cf. MR-*Smyrn.* 4.1: θηρία ἀνθρωπόμορφα.

LR-*Trallians* 6 warns against some 'empty-talkers and deceivers, who are not Christians but Christ-sellers [χριστέμποροι],' going on to enumerate a lengthy catalogue of heresies which 'they' are said to profess. I use this as an initial guide to address some of the heresies facing Ps-Ignatius.

'*They alienate Christ from the Father*.' This would appear to be a refutation of strong Arianism or perhaps Judaising tendencies.

'*They alienate the law from Christ*.' Ps-Ignatius at several points betrays a desire to refute elements of Manichaeanism or Marcionism. LR-*Philadelphians* 5 contains a harmonisation of the old dispensation with that of the new, especially the inspiration of the prophets by the Holy Spirit: 'For there is one God of the Old and New Testament.' In the following chapter, while the MR stresses the importance of Christianity for the right interpretation of Judaism, the LR balances this by emphasising the converse: 'If someone confesses Christ Jesus [to be] Lord, but denies the God of the law and the prophets, saying that the maker of heaven and earth is not the Father of Christ, such a one does not stand in the truth, any more than his father the Devil.' The relation between Christ and the Creator appears to have been one of substantial concern: 'Whoever declares that there is but one God, only so as to take away the divinity of Christ, is a devil, and an enemy of all righteousness.'[144]

'*They calumniate his birth from a virgin; being ashamed of the cross they deny the passion and do not believe in the resurrection*.' This represents a broadly docetic position. Ps-Ignatius' epistles extend the MR's anti-docetic polemic, even naming several notorious docetists.[145] At LR-*Tarsians* 3 he defends the reality of Christ's virgin birth, passion, and resurrection, mentioning the readiness of the apostles to endure the same sufferings as evidence of this. Soon after he cites a number of scriptural proofs for Christ's and our bodily resurrection.[146] The 'incarnation' was 'not in appearance, nor fantasy, but in truth'; 'he truly grew up, truly ate and drank, truly was crucified.'

[144] LR-*Ant*. 5; see LR-*Tar*. 2.
[145] LR-*Trall*. 11.
[146] LR-*Tar*. 7.

He who believes this is blessed, and he who does not is 'cursed no less than those who crucified the Lord.'[147] Though one may fast and excel all in self-denial, even working spiritual wonders, denial of the cross and shame in the passion render these of no benefit.[148]

'*They introduce God as a Being unknown.*'[149] Ps-Ignatius might still have gnosticism in mind here, but may also consider such a belief to be generally productive of moral deficiency.[150] He alters the condemnation of 'those who are of a different opinion concerning the grace of Christ which has come to us' to 'those who preach other doctrines, how they reckon the Father of Christ to be unknown [ἄγνωστος].'[151]

'*They suppose Christ to be unbegotten…and that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are but the same person.*' This is perhaps the principal novel heresy the LR evidently sets out to refute, approximating to a confusion of the Persons in the Godhead, and variously called modalism, Sabellianism, and monarchianism. Refutation of such a belief consumes the first five chapters of the letter to the Antiochenes, who are commended that they do not 'deny Christ under the pretence of [maintaining] the unity of God.'[152] While scripture does indeed confess God to be one, it also differentiates between multiple agents in the Godhead. He concludes (as we saw above): 'Whoever, therefore, declares that there is but one God, only so as to take away the divinity of Christ, is a devil, and an enemy of all righteousness.'[153] Baptism is performed 'not into one having three names, nor into three incarnate ones, but into three equal in honour.'[154] In his extended denunciation of Satan, Ps-Ignatius accuses him of holding Christ to be 'the God over all, and the Almighty,' denying 'that Christ was born,' and of affirming 'that the unbegotten was begotten, and that he who had no

[147] LR-*Phlp*. 3.
[148] LR-*Hero* 2.
[149] Trans. Roberts and Donaldson.
[150] LR-*Smyrn*. 6.
[151] LR-*Smyrn.* 6.
[152] Trans. Roberts and Donaldson.
[153] LR-*Ant*. 5.
[154] LR-*Phlp*. 2.

beginning was nailed to the cross.'[155] The LR corrects some instances in the MR which strongly tend towards such patripassianism, amending phrases such as 'the blood of God,'[156] as we have already mentioned.

Exactly which heresy is combatted in *Magnesians* 8 depends heavily on a matter of textual criticism within the MR. The phrase in question describes Jesus Christ as God's 'Word who came forth from silence [ὅς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ λόγος ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθών],' the meaning of which is inverted by many authorities, reading 'his *eternal* Word who did *not* come forth from silence [ὅς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ λόγος ἀΐδιος οὐκ ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθών].' Lightfoot, followed by many 20th-century scholars, favours the former reading, justifying his decision in over two pages of footnotes.[157] Barnes, however, believes this scholarship to have acquiesced uncritically to Lightfoot's authority, and Lightfoot himself to have acted 'in defiance of both evidence and logic.'[158] Barnes argues that remarkable affinity between the language of Ignatius and the gnostic Ptolemaeus (fl. c. AD 130–) as reported by Irenaeus,[159] leaves one unable to deny the former's knowledge of the latter.[160] In writing that Christ is God's 'eternal Word not proceeding [ἀΐδιος οὐκ προελθών] from silence,' Ignatius refutes the Valentinian notion of Christ's descent from Buthos and Sige.[161] On the basis of this, Barnes therefore wishes to date the MR to the 140s,[162] joining scholars such as Joly who deduce a later date for the MR partially on the basis of his familiarity with full-developed gnostic systems.[163] I am not here overly concerned by matters of dating; what is really significant is whether or not Ps-Ignatius had in his copy of the MR the words ἀΐδιος οὐκ.

[155] LR-*Phlp*. 7 (trans. Roberts and Donaldson).
[156] MR-*Ephes*. 1.1.
[157] Lightfoot (1889), II.126–28; including Schoedel (1985) and Holmes (2007).
[158] Barnes (2008), 125–26.
[159] The resemblance comes at only one point: *AH* 1.6.1 and MR-*Pol*. 3.2.
[160] Barnes (2008), 123–25.
[161] Barnes (2008), 126.
[162] Barnes (2008), 127–28.
[163] Joly (1979), 71–73.

It is difficult to conclude,[164] as Ps-Ignatius completely reinvents the passage:

> ὅς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ λόγος οὐ ῥητὸς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐσιώδης· οὐ γάρ λαλιᾶς ἐνάρθρου φώνημα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνεργείας θεϊκῆς οὐσία γεννητή·
>
> who is his Word, not spoken but essential; for he is not the voice of an articulate sound, but a substance begotten by divine power.

If Ps-Ignatius did notice Ignatius' anti-Valentinian purpose in this passage, he does not appear to reproduce it. His version seems to target the theology of Marcellus of Ancyra, who was said to have taught that the Son and the Spirit only emerged from the unity of the Godhead temporarily for the purposes of creation and redemption, but that before creation and at the end of time, their independent existence ceases; the Logos for Marcellus was little more than an 'utterance of the Father' and a 'voice issuing from silence' according to Lightfoot.[165] Eusebius records Marcellus as teaching that 'there was God and silence; and after the silence and stillness the Word of God came forth in the beginning of the world's formation in active energy [ἦν θεός καὶ σιγή· μετὰ δὲ τὴν σιγήν καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν προελθεῖν τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς κοσμοποιΐας δραστικῇ ἐνεργείᾳ].'[166] This passage conforms quite closely to Lightfoot's version of MR-*Magnesians* 8, which leads Lightfoot to argue for Marcellus' reliance upon Ignatius.[167] Whether or not this is the case, Ps-Ignatius seems to have in mind Marcellus' view that the Word lacked separate existence (οὐσία) from the Father, in stressing the essential quality of the Word's existence. Ps-Ignatius elsewhere appears actively to contradict Marcellus: 'He, having been begotten before the age by the Father, was God the Word, only-begotten Son, and he remains such to the end of the

[164] Comparing the two versions, Lightfoot (1889: II.171) believes that Ps-Ignatius 'would not have gone so far out of his way' to alter the text had his copy of the MR contained ἀΐδιος οὐκ.
[165] Lightfoot (1889), III.171.
[166] *Ecclesiastical Theology* 2.9.4.
[167] Lightfoot (1889), II.127.

ages [ὃς πρὸ αἰῶνος παρὰ τῷ πατρὶ γεννηθεὶς ἦν λόγος θεός, μονογενὴς υἱός, καὶ ἐπὶ συντελείᾳ τῶν αἰώνων ὁ αὐτὸς διαμένει].'[168]

Having said this, Ps-Ignatius elsewhere takes great pains to make Ignatius refute gnostic ideas, and alters passages that might be considered inclined to gnosticism. The passage in MR-*Ephesians* 15.1–2 about Christ's relationship with silence (both σιγή and ἡσυχία) is tactfully omitted and replaced with scriptural amplification. It is likely that by the fourth century, even relatively benign remarks about Jesus having done things in silence (ἃ σιγῶν δὲ πεποίηκεν), or a faithful one being 'able to hear his silence [τῆς ἡσυχίας αὐτοῦ],' had assumed distinctly suspicious overtones. Ps-Ignatius finds it necessary to interpret the passage concerning the 'three mysteries' with a Pauline insertion: 'Hence, worldly wisdom became folly.'[169] Satan is said to be impelling those who 'deny the cross, [are] ashamed of the passion, call death an appearance, mutilate the birth from the virgin, and calumniate the [human] nature itself as abominable,' positions which are all perceived to be touchstones of gnosticism or docetism.[170] Presumably because the MR's statement that 'there are two coinages, the one of God and the other of the world,' might lend itself to misinterpretation by Manichaean or gnostic elements, Ps-Ignatius appends to this statement a clarification: 'I do not mean that there are two [different] human natures, but that there is one humanity, sometimes belonging to God, and sometimes to the devil,' to whom one belongs 'not by nature, but by his own choice.'[171]

'*As to the Spirit, they do not admit that he exists.*' Since it appears unlikely that anyone who denied the very existence of the Spirit could be classed a Christian, Ps-Ignatius likely describes this heretical view with some degree of freedom. Probably he refers to some strain of Pneumatomachianism, which flourished in the late fourth century.[172] Their denial of the equality of

[168] LR-*Mag*. 6; see Lightfoot (1889), III.169–70.
[169] LR-*Ephes*. 19; cf. 1 Cor. 1:20–25.
[170] LR-*Phlp*. 4.
[171] LR-*Mag*. 5.
[172] See Haykin (1994), 18–34.

the Spirit, while consonant with the Nicene Creed's 'we believe in the Holy Spirit,' was tantamount to denial of his existence for one so vocal about the Spirit's importance as Ps-Ignatius.

'*Some of them say that the Son is a mere man.*' Ps-Ignatius thoroughly condemns teaching that in any way detracts from the divinity of Christ, because it makes him a 'mere man [ψιλὸς ἄνθρωπος].' LR-*Tarsians* 6 provides no fewer than nine scriptural prooftexts that refute such a belief.[173] The LR employs anti-Jewish polemic in denouncing psilanthropism, claiming that 'if anyone says the Lord to be a mere man, he is a Jew, a murderer of Christ [χριστοκτόνος].'[174] The meaning of 'mere man' appears to be 'possessed of a soul and a body only,'[175] supported by Ps-Ignatius' description of the mortal Polycarp as 'composed of soul and body.'[176] This connection is confirmed in LR-*Philadelphians* 6: 'If anyone…considers the Lord to be a mere man, and not the only-begotten God, and wisdom and Word of God, and deems him to be [only] of a soul and body [ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος], such a one is a serpent, preaching deceit and error for people's destruction.' Indeed, the Word cannot be thought simply to be 'dwelling in' Christ, for 'the Word became flesh, the Word [became] man.'[177] Lightfoot believes the LR to stress Christ's distinction from humankind to the point of heterodoxy, so much so that 'it is certain that he denied the perfect manhood.'[178] In LR-*Smyrneans* 4, Ps-Ignatius omits the MR's description of Christ as 'the complete/perfect human being [τοῦ τελείου ἀνθρώπου].'[179] He appears to believe that Christ bore the Word instead of a human soul,[180] and manuscript tradition attests that later scribes attempted to rectify this tendency.[181] This approximates to a strain of Apollinarianism, as scholars have noted.[182] Ps-Ignatius also suggests that

[173] See LR-*Phlp*. 6.
[174] LR-*Hero* 2.
[175] LR-*Phlp*. 5.
[176] LR-*Pol*. 2.
[177] LR-*Phlp*. 5.
[178] Lightfoot (1889), I.271.
[179] Cf. Eph. 4:13.
[180] LR-*Phlp*. 6: θεός λόγος ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῳ σώματι κατῴκει…διὰ τὸ ἔνοικον εἶναι θεὸν ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ ἀνθρωπείαν ψυχήν.
[181] Lightfoot (1889), I.271; III.193.
[182] E.g. Funk and Diekamp (1913), II.26f. Perler (1958: 73–75) notes that his apparent denial of Christ's human soul, in combination with his refutation of Christ as ψιλὸς ἄνθρωπος, places Ps-Ignatius in striking similarity to Eusebius of Emesa.

Jesus felt hunger only in order to prove that he had assumed a body subject to the same sufferings as the rest of humanity, but that Satan's tempting him in the wilderness had no effect since 'he who had kept his [corruptible] body from feeling any want for forty days and as many nights, could also have done the same forever.'[183] Here, perhaps unsurprisingly, the LR shows some affinity to Antiochene Christology in its characteristic concern to guard the impassibility of Christ's divine nature, and its subsequent deficiency in describing the unity of his person.[184] That one manuscript felt compelled to insert φθαρτόν suggests that this sentence was controversial in its reception history. Yet again we must acknowledge Ps-Ignatius' contextual purpose of countering psilanthropism, especially as he does elsewhere take pains to stress Jesus' real humanity.[185]

Having reached the end of the heresiological catalogue of LR-*Trallians* 6, we must address two further polemical targets of Ps-Ignatius. The first is Judaism and the Jews, upon whom vituperative slander is frequently heaped in the LR. If Ignatius himself is concerned to correct judaising tendencies among Christians, and to view Israel and its history within the frame of Christian salvation, the LR shows evidence of active and apparently longstanding antagonism between two clearly differentiated parties.[186] We have already seen the condemnation of other enemies being compared to that of the Jews.[187] Those who deny the cross are even said to be worse than 'the Jews, those fighters against God, those murderers of the Lord: for it were too little merely to style them murderers of the prophets.'[188] The Jews are remembered not only as those who killed the prophets and Christ, but who also killed the first generation of the apostles. Paul's Romans 5:6, where Christ is said to have died 'for the ungodly [ὑπὲρ ἀσεβῶν],' is here reversed: Christ was

[183] LR-*Phlp*. 9 (trans. Roberts and Donaldson).
[184] See Sellers (1940), 176–77. The Antiochene language of 'conjunction [συνάφεια],' and natures in general, is absent; other doctrinal problems seem to have been more pressing than an assertion of a specifically Antiochene Christology.
[185] See above section on docetism and LR-*Phlp*. 5.
[186] That such hostility was live in Antioch at the time of the LR is seen in Chrysostom's series of orations κατὰ Ἰουδαίων delivered in the late 380s.
[187] LR-*Hero* 2.
[188] LR-*Trall*. 11. The appellations 'Christ-killers [χριστοκτόνοι],' 'Christ-murderers [χριστοφόνοι]' or 'Lord-killers [κυριοκτόνοι]' are often used of the Jews; e.g. LR-*Phld*. 6, LR-*Mag*. 11, LR-*Tar*. 3.

crucified *'by* the ungodly [ὑπὸ τῶν δυσσεβῶν].'[189] While Ps-Ignatius is happy to retain and slightly extend the MR's section commending Jewish heroes,[190] his original sections far more readily evoke Jewish history in order to illuminate those who have been inspired by the 'spirit who is the author of all evil.'[191] LR-*Philadelphians* 6 denounces a Christ-denier as a 'liar,' whose 'father [is] the devil,' and who, being 'also under circumcision, is a false-Jew [ψευδοϊουδαῖος].' Here Ps-Ignatius seems to be drawing on Revelation 3:9's 'synagogue of Satan, who call themselves Jews, though they are not but are liars.' Both texts appear to leave some room for the 'true Jew,' which presumably approximates to a Christian who interprets the law spiritually. Indeed, some chinks in Ps-Ignatius' anti-Judaism are apparent. Whereas keeping the Sabbath is explicitly proscribed in the MR, the LR softens this, urging the Sabbath to be observed 'spiritually.' The Sabbath is transformed into a spiritual Christian ordinance, believers 'rejoicing in contemplation of the laws, [but] not in indulgence of the body, admiring the workmanship of God, and not eating day-old food.' After the Sabbath, the Lord's day is to be kept 'as a festival [ἑορτάζω], the resurrection-day [αναστάσιμον], the queen and highest of all the days.'[192] Festivals are to be esteemed, as is the correct order of fasts.[193]

The final condemnation is that of Epicureanism or hedonism, though it is not named as such. 'To live and pursue a life of pleasure [ἀπολαυστικὸν βίον]' is said to derive from a belief that 'this flesh does not rise [again],' for 'this is the chief good to beings who after a little while will perish.'[194] Following Paul, belief in the resurrection entails good conduct; lack of such belief results in people differing not at all from 'asses and dogs, who give no thought to the future, but only to eating, and

[189] LR-*Tar*. 3.
[190] LR-*Phld*. 9.
[191] LR-*Smyrn*. 7.
[192] LR-*Mag*. 9.
[193] LR-*Phlp*. 13.
[194] LR-*Tar*. 2.

are appetitive of things that follow after eating… For they are unaware of any mind active within them.'[195] Absence of reason is indeed the hallmark of Satan's operation.[196]

§2.3: Ecclesiology

§2.3.1: Centrality of the apostles

In the LR, the apostles function as central pillars to Ps-Ignatius' theological and pastoral message.[197] They are remembered as paragons of Christian virtue, their teaching as authoritative, and apostolic succession is considered a primary means of establishing Christian identity. Ps-Ignatius clearly builds upon Ignatius' own profound reverence towards Paul, 'sanctified, confirmed, rightly-blessed, in whose footsteps may I be found,'[198] and towards the apostles in general.[199]

The teaching (διδαχή) of the apostles is to be observed,[200] in the sense used by Paul in Romans 6:17, as doctrine committed/handed down (παραδίδωμι) to a disciple from a teacher. Indeed, the Antiochenes are reminded that they 'have been disciples of Paul and Peter,' then commanded: 'do not lose that which has been committed to your trust.'[201] Drawing from 1 Timothy 6:20, Ps-Ignatius exhorts Hero to 'guard my deposit, which I and Christ committed to you,' perhaps emphasising Ignatius' apostolicity and supposed connection with Christ.[202] Indeed, Mary is made to describe Ignatius as the 'most blessed bishop of the apostolic church which is at Antioch,'[203] and the apostles are remembered as those who by their own sweat and toil established the 'one church.'[204]

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[195] LR-*Tar*. 7; cf. 1 Cor. 15:32.
[196] LR-*Phlp*. 4–11.
[197] On this, see now D.L. Eastman (2019).
[198] MR-*Ephes*. 12.2.
[199] See MR-*Trall*. 12.2; MR-*Rom*. 4.3; MR-*Mag*. 13.1; MR-*Phld*. 9.1.
[200] LR-*Ant*. 1.
[201] LR-*Ant*. 7.
[202] LR-*Hero* 7; see Brox (1976: 187): 'Ignatius ist hier zum Apostel stilisiert.'
[203] LR-*Mary to Ign*. inscr.
[204] LR-*Phld*. 4; cf. LR-*Mag*. 10.

The Ephesian church is commended because of their supposed connection with the apostles, Paul, John, and Timothy the most faithful [πιστότατος].[205]

The apostles are frequently referred to as providing a pattern whereby other Christians can learn. Paul is presented as an exemplar (ὡς Παῦλος) to the Ephesians in guarding against the Devil, because of his perfect faith and love towards Christ;[206] and again as one in whom Christ spoke (Χριστὸς ἐν ἡμῖν λαλείτω, ὡς καὶ ἐν Παύλῳ).[207] The Tarsians' connection with him is portrayed as intimate. They are 'fellow citizens and disciples of Paul.'[208] Apostles often feature in lists of heroes of faith.[209] Paul and Timothy are both esteemed as instructors (παιδευτής), and as χριστοφόρος and πιστότατος respectively.[210] Indeed, Ps-Ignatius appears to have a special penchant for Timothy, who features prominently as a model, specifically of youthful piety, a particular concern for the LR.[211]

The LR shows a consistent tendency to remove passages which speak of imitation of God, often substituting Christ or the apostles as proper points of emulation. This coheres with the LR's tendency to de-reify the MR's quasi-hypostasised divine attributes. The Ephesians are no longer 'imitators of God [μιμηταὶ θεοῦ]' but 'imitators of God's love towards humanity [φιλανθρωπία].'[212] The LR seems reluctant about such explicit relation between God and people, altering 'you are full of God' to 'you are full of all good';[213] similarly, it deletes the MR's exhortation that the Magnesians model their habits upon God's (ὁμοήθειαν θεοῦ λαβόντες).[214] Similarly in *Ephesians* 3, where the MR records that the bishops are 'in the mind [γνώμη] of Jesus Christ,' Ps-Ignatius exhorts the Ephesians to 'live according to the mind of God in Christ, and to emulate [ζηλοῦν] him, as did Paul:

[205] LR-*Ephes*. 11; D.L. Eastman (2019), 217–18.
[206] LR-*Ephes*. 14.
[207] LR-*Ephes*. 15; Paul and Peter are at LR-*Trall*. 6 presented as ideal disciples.
[208] LR-*Tar*. 2.
[209] LR-*Phld*. 4; LR-*Ephes*. 10; LR-*Tar*. 3; LR-*Smyrn*. 3.
[210] LR-*Ephes*. 6.
[211] See LR-*Hero* 1, 3 and LR-*Mary to Ign*. 2–4. Zahn (1873: 158) believed that 'sehr persönliche Motiv' must have led Ps-Ignatius to so stress the blessedness of youth.
[212] LR-*Ephes*. 1; see LR-*Trall*. 1 where the same phrase is replaced with 'imitators of Jesus Christ the Saviour.'
[213] LR-*Mag*. 14.
[214] LR-*Mag*. 6.

for he says, "Become imitators of me as I am of Christ" [1 Cor. 11:1].' This trend is highlighted well in *Philadelphians* 7. The MR has 'become imitators of Jesus Christ, just as he is of his Father,' which Ps-Ignatius replaces with 'become imitators of Paul and all the apostles, just as they are of Christ.' The order of imitation has been pushed back one level, so that the faithful are not expected to emulate Christ, or even less God, but only the apostles, who appear to have some special connection with God.

As we saw in chapter 4, the MR justifies the bishops, presbyters, and deacons of the threefold ministry through their presiding 'in the place of' a divine person or group of people.[215] While the LR usually follows this trope,[216] it also introduces a more distinctive notion of apostolic succession, whereby current ranks of the priesthood are given support through their historical connection to the apostles. Stephen is described as 'performing a pure and blameless ministry [λειτουργία]' towards the blessed James, as Timothy and Linus did for Paul, and as Anencletus and Clement did for Peter.[217] This seems to be an obvious commendation of the authority of these ministers, who had so close a connection with Peter and Paul, three of whom indeed went on to succeed Peter in the position of bishop of Rome. This is confirmed in Ps-Ignatius' letter to Mary, who is said to have been 'in Rome with the blessed Pope [πάπα] Anencletus, whom the deservedly blessed Clement, the hearer of Peter and Paul, has now succeeded [διαδέχομαι].'[218] Moreover, the Antiochenes are to 'remember Euodius, your deservedly blessed shepherd, into whose hands the leadership over you [τὴν ὑμετέραν προστασίαν] was first committed by the apostles.'[219] Ps-Ignatius explicitly hands over [παρατίθημι] the Antiochene church to Hero, both relying upon and reinforcing the notion of apostolic succession.[220] The LR bids the Trallians to revere their bishop as Christ himself, 'just as the

[215] Chadwick (1950: 170) writes that 'Ignatius shows no knowledge of any doctrine which would base the authority of the bishop upon Apostolic Succession.'
[216] E.g. LR-*Mag*. 6, 13; LR-*Trall*. 2, 3; see §2.3.2 on church order below.
[217] LR-*Trall*. 7.
[218] LR-*Ign. to Mary* 4.
[219] LR-*Ant*. 7.
[220] LR-*Hero* 7.

blessed apostles commanded you.'[221] Whether or not we are to see in these examples reference to the *Apostolic Constitutions* and amplification of its teachings,[222] for Ps-Ignatius, current church order is understood to have been derived from the apostles themselves, through an unbroken succession.

By mingling Paul's words with those of Ignatius, Ps-Ignatius stresses their similarity and continuity, and imparts apostolic authority upon the latter. While the MR's Pauline phrases suggest Ignatius was familiar with several of Paul's letters and esteemed them greatly, it is impossible to know the status of these texts for him *vis-à-vis* scripture.[223] Yet we can say with some certainty that for Ps-Ignatius, the writings of the apostles, from which he quotes liberally, often mingling his own words with theirs, bear a 'sanctity and canonical authority.'[224] A good example of such is LR-*Antiochenes* 7, which he finishes with an imitation of Ignatius' style and vocabulary, 'My soul be yours when I attain to Jesus,' and then a citation of Colossians 4:18: 'Remember my chains.' As Cobb notes, 'Pseudo-Ignatius is staking an equal claim to both Pauline authority and Ignatian authority when he writes in Ignatius's name.'[225]

§2.3.2: Church order

Language of the established church and its institutions comes more readily to the tongue of Ps-Ignatius than Ignatius himself—a trait to be expected for one writing in the late fourth century.[226] The LR shows great readiness to use the word ἐκκλησία, above and beyond the MR's own instances, and speaks of it as a more reified entity endowed with certain powers.[227] Whereas in the MR the Philadelphian clergy—bishops, presbyters and deacons—have been 'established in security,' in the

[221] LR-*Trall*. 7.
[222] As Lightfoot suggests (1889), III.155.
[223] Downs (2018: 160–61) discusses the difficulties inherent in investigating the nature and extent of Pauline influence on Ignatius. Mitchell (2006) analyses differences in Ignatius' treatment of 'scriptural' sources.
[224] M.P. Brown (1963), 116.
[225] Cobb (2018), 198.
[226] Though see Downs (2018) for the various ways the MR refers to Christian community.
[227] E.g. LR-*Ephes*. 2, 16.

LR this description is glossed by Christ's having 'firmly established his church upon a rock [ἐπὶ τῇ πέτρᾳ].'[228] In *Ephesians* 17, 'you' is replaced by the substantive 'the holy church of God.' In the same chapter, the MR records that the significance of Christ receiving oil upon his head was 'so that he might breathe [πνέω] incorruptibility into his church'; Ps-Ignatius subtly but substantially inverts this, writing that it was 'so that his *church* might breathe forth incorruptibility,' which would appear to grant to the church the power of administering what is Christ's. Elsewhere, the church's 'prayers' are refashioned as those which 'ascending in harmony to God, prevail for the granting of all [the church's] petitions in Christ.'[229]

The church's institutions are also clarified and accorded importance. Ignatius sparsely records that 'He [Christ] was born and baptised in order that by his suffering he might cleanse the water.' The LR clarifies this mysterious phrasing and affirms baptism as a sacramental office by adding that it was John who baptised Christ, 'in order that he might confirm the institution [διάταξις] entrusted to the prophet.'[230] Ignatius' stress on unity is imitated in LR-*Philippians*, which observes that there is 'one baptism, which is administered into the death of the Lord; and also one elect church,' going on to quote Ephesians 4:5.[231] A more developed soteriology is expressed at *Trallians* 2 where the MR speaks of Christ's dying so that we can 'escape from death,' but where Ps-Ignatius writes that 'by believing in his death, you may by baptism become partakers of his resurrection.' Marriage is defended by apostolic precedent (including the alarming implication that both Peter and Paul were married[232]), not as a satisfaction of appetite, but as a means towards 'the continuing existence of that race [τοῦ γένους ἔσκον ἐκείνους].'[233] Ps-Ignatius ties himself in knots over what to

[228] LR-*Phld*. inscr.
[229] LR-*Ephes*. 5.
[230] LR-*Ephes*. 18.
[231] LR-*Phlp*. 1.
[232] Some Latin textual authorities omit 'et Paulus' in correction; see Lightfoot (1889), III.209. Cf. Eusebius, *HE* 3.30 who records Clement of Alexandria's claim that Peter and Paul were both married, citing it against those who reject marriage.
[233] LR-*Phld*. 4; see §2.5 below for discussion of the LR's anti-rigorism.

make of virgins, who are finally exhorted to submit themselves 'to Christ in integrity, not counting marriage an abomination [βδελύσσομαι], but desiring that which is better, not for the reproach of union, but for the sake of attending to the laws.'[234] Indeed, denial of the good of marriage and procreation is censured in the strongest terms.[235] The LR also shows some sign of a more advanced interpretation of the Eucharist,[236] and extends Ignatius' provisions for accepting penitents back into the fold.[237]

Ignatius in the MR argues for the authority of the threefold ministry upon an analogous relationship between the bishop, presbytery and diaconate, and the three Persons of the Godhead: 'The earthly Church is nothing less than a microcosm in which the relationships of the heavenly hierarchy are to be found reflected.'[238] Ignatius understood the bishop to derive his authority directly from his being the τύπος τοῦ πατρός, and presiding εἰς τόπον θεοῦ.[239] Similarly, the presbytery have their prototype in the council of the apostles (συνέδριον τῶν ἀποστόλων), and the deacons represent the 'ministry of Jesus Christ.'[240] While Ignatius articulates this order several times, Corwin correctly notes that 'his comparisons are not consistent, but on the contrary fluid and changing.'[241]

Ps-Ignatius in most instances retains the analogies between the threefold ministry and the Godhead,[242] but confers greater responsibility upon each of the roles, especially the bishop. The LR appears to draw from the MR's various comments about the bishop, who 'presides in the place of God,'[243] and who should be regarded 'as the Lord himself,'[244] with the grand sentence: 'For what is

[234] LR-*Phld*. 4.
[235] LR-*Phld*. 6.
[236] LR-*Ephes*. 5; LR-*Phld*. 4. On the latter of these Cobb (2018: 196) observes that Ps-Ignatius 'finds Ignatius's brief comments on Eucharistic unity a fitting occasion for discussing larger issues of communal harmony.'
[237] MR-*Phld*. 3.2, LR-*Phld*. 3.
[238] Chadwick (1950), 170.
[239] MR-*Trall.* 3.1; MR-*Mag.* 6.1.
[240] MR-*Mag.* 6.1; see Vall (2013), 341–50 for a thorough analysis of Ignatius' ministerial typology.
[241] Corwin (1960), 194.
[242] LR-*Mag*. 6, 13; LR-*Trall*. 3.
[243] MR-*Mag*. 6.1.
[244] MR-*Ephes*. 6.1.

the bishop but one who beyond all others possesses all power and authority, so far as it is possible for a man to possess it, who according to his power becomes an imitator of the Christ of God?'[245] One can hardly imagine a more absolute commendation of an office, which indeed has as its archetype Jesus Christ, 'the true and first bishop, and the only high priest by nature.'[246] The bishop is to be honoured 'as the high priest, who bears the image of God—of God inasmuch as he rules [ἄρχω], and of Christ insofar as he is a priest [ἱερατεύω].'[247] He moreover precisely defines the bishops as those who 'baptise, offer sacrifice [ἱερουργέω], ordain, and lay on hands.'[248] A key soteriological function is performed by the bishop, 'who ministers as a priest to God for the salvation of the whole world.'[249] The bishop no longer only 'presides [προκάθημαι],'[250] but 'rules over you according to God [τοῦ κατὰ θεὸν ποιμαίνοντος ὑμᾶς].'[251]

Whereas in the MR subjection is commanded to all three ranks of priests, often with little concrete discrimination,[252] Ps-Ignatius more clearly defines the order of subjection as a pyramid, with the bishop (and ultimately God) at its apex: 'Let the laity be subject to the deacons; the deacons to the presbyters; the presbyters to the bishop; the bishop to Christ, as he himself is to the Father.'[253] Ps-Ignatius elsewhere endorses a similar arrangement with the Ignatian expression, 'Let my soul be for theirs [ἀντίψυχον ἐγώ] who preserve this good order [εὐταξία].'[254] Where in the MR the Magnesians are counselled to 'do nothing without the bishop and presbyters,' the LR has 'neither presbyter, nor deacon, nor layman [is to] do anything without the bishop,' which is again modelled on the Lord's relationship with the Father.[255] Just as the LR affords greater attention to

[245] LR-*Trall*. 7.
[246] LR-*Mag*. 4.
[247] LR-*Smyrn*. 9.
[248] LR-*Hero* 3.
[249] LR-*Smyrn*. 9.
[250] MR-*Mag*. 6.1.
[251] LR-*Ephes*. 4.
[252] MR-*Trall*. 7.2, 13.2; MR-*Phld*. 7.1.
[253] LR-*Smyrn*. 9.
[254] LR-*Tar*. 8.
[255] LR-*Mag*. 7.

the hierarchy within the Godhead, so also it more clearly delineates the earthly hierarchy as the Godhead's type.

For one elsewhere so concerned with verisimilitude, Ps-Ignatius surprises by importing a string of ecclesial roles completely foreign to the MR and its time, which also disrupts the quite consistent pattern and typology of the threefold ministry. Ps-Ignatius greets 'the subdeacons, the readers, the singers, the doorkeepers, the labourers, the exorcists, and the confessors. I salute the keepers of the holy gates, the deaconesses in Christ.[256] I salute the Christ-possessed virgins, of whom may I have joy in the Lord Jesus.'[257] A reification of the station of 'virgin' is also variously evident,[258] as is the position of the 'laity' as distinct from the threefold ministry and the virgins.[259] However, this catena might also give the appearance of historical veracity, since one unfamiliar with the church at Antioch could hardly know and greet these people. More practically, the concern for these minor ecclesial offices is shared with the *Apostolic Constitutions*, which appoints the remit and allowances of each rank.[260]

There are two instances where the importance of the church or its ministers would seem to be minimised. The first is the rather alarming removal of the definition that 'wherever Christ Jesus is, there is the catholic church [ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία].'[261] As if embarrassed and attempting to make up for the omission, Ps-Ignatius supplies extremely florid and honorific language instead, which destroys the symmetry of the original sentence: 'Wherever Christ is, there does all the heavenly host stand by, waiting upon him as the chief captain of the Lord's might, and the governor of every intelligent nature.'[262] Ignatius most probably used the phrase merely in the sense of the 'whole,' 'universal,' or reified church, which is defined in microcosm by the meeting of bishop and

[256] See *AC* 8.28, 2.57 for reference to female doorkeepers.
[257] LR-*Ant*. 12; see Lightfoot (1889), I.258–59.
[258] LR-*Phld*. 4; LR-*Ant*. 8, 12.
[259] LR-*Mag*. 7; LR-*Smyrn*. 9.
[260] *AC* 8.16–28.
[261] MR-*Smyrn.* 8.2.
[262] LR-*Smyrn*. 8.

congregation together;[263] the term also appears to entail a censuring of intra-ecclesial division, since the following sentence condemns meetings apart from [χωρίς] the bishop.[264] Even Vall concedes that 'it would be anachronistic to suppose that he is using the phrase in its later technical sense, as specifically referring to the orthodox church over against identifiable "churches" of heretics.'[265] Clearly the phrase ἡ καθολική ἐκκλησία had by the late fourth century come to bear a more specific sense of Nicene. The phrase is frequently used by Athanasius as a circumlocution for the church conforming to the Nicene Creed,[266] and in opposition to the Arian 'heresy.'[267] Indeed, the anathemas appended to the Nicene Creed of 325 specifically condemn in the name of ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία those who profess Arianising sentiments.[268] Its use, then, would exclude those who were not members of the Meletian party at Antioch (including Ps-Ignatius himself), and run counter to the LR's conciliatory aim. De Halleux suggests an alternative explanation for Ps-Ignatius' alteration: his long list of celestial figures reflects his exegesis of ἡ καθολική ἐκκλησία to mean a spiritual communion—we are to understand 'la catholicité en cause au sens de la communion spirituelle de l'Église invisible.'[269]

The second is the LR's excision of the description of the bishop and those who 'preside/lead [οἱ προκαθήμενοι]' as 'an example and lesson of incorruptibility [τύπον καὶ διδαχὴν ἀφθαρσίας],' instead re-emphasising how subjection to the bishop entails subjection to God.[270] It is possible that this is another example of Ps-Ignatius' programme of de-reification, which considers the MR to make rather incautious analogies between God and humans.[271] Despite the LR's lionising of the bishop, its

[263] MR-*Smyrn.* 8.2. Schoedel (1985: 238) translates the expression 'the whole church.' De Halleux (1982: 23) judges it to mean no more than '[l'Église] dans sa totalité.'
[264] MR-*Smyrn.* 8.2; Joly (1979), 63–64.
[265] Vall (2013), 333.
[266] *De synodis* 9.2 (*SC* 563.202); *De Decretis* 6.27 (PG 25:468).
[267] *De synodis* 5.1 (*SC* 563.190); *Apologia contra Arianos* 1.1.19 (PG 25:279); 2.6.77 (PG 25.388).
[268] See Kelly (1950), 216; Hanson (1988), 163.
[269] De Halleux (1982), 14.
[270] LR-*Mag*. 6.
[271] See §2.1.2 above.

author perhaps believes this could too easily be construed as implying the bishop presently and actually to be immortal.

As this section has shown, these two occasions are the exceptions to Ps-Ignatius' rule of generally affirming the church, its ministers and institutions.

§2.3.3: Church and state

The findings of chapter 2 notwithstanding, Ignatius only rarely addresses the pagan world, let alone secular leaders. He counsels patience and forgiveness towards those who mistreat Christians,[272] speaks generally about the 'ruler of this age,'[273] and tells of his battles with the wild animals who are his military guard.[274] 'The ends of the earth and the kingdoms of this age are of no use' to him.[275] A strong contrast is set up between the Christian congregations and the ecclesial environment as 'ultimately hospitable,' and 'the Roman power alone as diabolic.'[276] He does, however, portray the accessories and eventual apotheosis of his condemnation in spiritual terms, since they paradoxically represent both the presence of evil and his ultimate attaining to God.[277]

The changed position of Christianity in relation to the state is quite evident in the LR. At LR-*Philadelphians* 4, Ps-Ignatius prescribes the ideal societal order, making pronouncements not only about intra-ecclesial affairs, but also about how the church ought to be orientated with regard to secular entities. He does so in a sequence of third-person imperatives, beginning with 'Let governors be obedient to Caesar [οἱ ἄρχοντες πειθαρχειτωσαν τῷ Καίσαρι]; soldiers to those that command them,' and culminating with 'the presbyters and the deacons, and the rest of the clergy, together with all the people, and the soldiers, and the governors, and Caesar himself, to the bishop.' That

[272] MR-*Ephes*. 10.
[273] MR-*Ephes*. 17.1; MR-*Mag*. 1.2.
[274] MR-*Rom*. 5.1.
[275] MR-*Rom*. 6.1.
[276] Schoedel (1985), 14–15.
[277] Esp. MR-*Rom*. 4; MR-*Smyrn*. 4; MR-*Ephes*. 11.2.

Ignatius, on his way to martyrdom in Rome, might be thought capable to ordain the emperor to obey the bishop, and to assume that soldiers would heed the commands of one in their custody, suggests some extremely creative reimagining on the part of Ps-Ignatius. However, it should be mentioned that this hierarchy of obedience is concluded with a characteristically Ignatian concern that 'thus unity is preserved through all.'[278]

A similar ranking of offices appears at LR-*Smyrneans* 9, though with the remits of the authority of the two rulers—the king and the bishop—more clearly defined as parallel, and not necessarily in conflict. Having ordered that God must be honoured, and then the bishop, as bearing the functions of God and Christ, he goes on: 'After this one [μετὰ τοῦτον], we must also honour the king. For there is no one superior to God, or even comparable, among all beings that exist. Nor is there anyone in the church greater than the bishop.' It is ambiguous, possibly intentionally so, to whom the initial μετὰ τοῦτον refers, whether to the bishop, Christ, or God. The king and bishop are both accorded great importance for their role as maintaining order in their various realms, yet, a preference towards the bishop's ruling is apparent. Whereas he who rises up against the king is 'justly worthy of punishment,' he who dishonours the bishop 'shall receive punishment from God.' Indeed:

> For if he that rises up against kings is justly held worthy of punishment, insofar as he dissolves public good order, how much more severely do you think will he deserve to be punished, who chooses to do anything without the bishop, thus both tearing apart [the church's] concord [ὁμόνοια], and confounding its order?[279]

Insofar as the king in his capacity as ruler enforces good order among his people, he is to be obeyed; yet he is portrayed as mortal, and his punishment merely physical. But the bishop, insofar as he represents God's sovereignty and order, also ought to be esteemed and honoured; disobedience to him is disobedience to God, and will be rewarded with divine punishment. Little provision is made

[278] LR-*Phld.* 4.
[279] LR-*Smyrn*. 9.

for whether those outside the church should obey the bishop—presumably their disregard of God is evidence enough of their immorality.

LR-*Antiochenes* 11 contributes to this picture of church-state relations. Ps-Ignatius commands: 'Be subject to Caesar in matters in which subjection is not dangerous [ἀκίνδυνος]. Do not provoke to anger those who rule over you, that you may give no pretext against yourselves to those who seek it.' It is difficult to make a conclusive ruling about the status of secular power in the LR, but it appears to approximates to Paul's position in Romans 13:1–7. Secular authorities should be obeyed where obedience is necessary and does not conflict with duties towards conscience and church. But there should be little divergence between church and state, insofar as they both strive towards harmony and good order according to the ranks of submission.

It is perhaps because of the disagreeable implications of this as it bears on Ignatius—a prisoner being led to Rome under a large guard of soldiers, to be executed in surely the most conspicuous physical symbol of imperial might, the Colosseum—that the LR several times demonstrates a desire not to portray Ignatius as one 'condemned [κατάκριτος].' Ps-Ignatius deletes Ignatius' self-designation as κατάκριτος in MR-*Trallians* 3.3, replacing it with words about him being 'bound for Christ' but not yet being 'worthy of Christ.' The MR's strong 'I am condemned [ἐγὼ κατάκριτος]' is weakened in the LR, which has 'I am the very insignificant [ἐλάχιστος] Ignatius, who am akin to those afflicted by danger and judgement [κρίσις].'[280] The same self-designation of ἐγὼ κατάκριτος in the letter to the Romans, which Ps-Ignatius seems loath to alter, is deleted and replaced with ἐγὼ…ἐλάχιστος.[281] While it is possible that Ps-Ignatius simply interprets self-effacement to have been Ignatius' intended meaning in using κατάκριτος, the fact that he feels compelled not only to provide an explanatory gloss, but to remove the word altogether, suggests that he feels some embarrassment about it. Its strong suggestion of opposition to the governing

[280] LR-*Ephes*. 12.
[281] LR-*Rom*. 4.

authority is likely unpalatable for a context in which the church and state are imagined to be largely cooperative.

It must be mentioned that in an original composition, the LR does speak of Christ as having been 'condemned [κατεκρίθη].' However, the Jews are recorded as the primary agents in his condemnation, followed by 'Pilate the governor.' It also occurs in the context of a narration of the seminal events of Jesus' life, among which it would seem foolish to pretend his condemnation was not essential. As the church came to command increasing power beyond its own walls in the fourth century, it was necessary to formulate means of reconciling its hero's death at the hands of the state. Yet for Ps-Ignatius, it was easier simply to forget Ignatius' status as condemned by, and in many ways opposed to the state, refashioning his condemnatory allusions as expressions of self-effacement.

§2.4: Imitation of the MR

In his literary and theological project to resurrect the voice of Ignatius in his own fourth-century ecclesial context, Ps-Ignatius attempts to assume the mantle of the martyr, and to write, as far as is possible, according to his manner. His 'textual alterations were…fundamentally dependent on an authorial construct that shaped and structured the proffered textual restitution'[282]—an 'authorial image'[283] of the martyred Ignatius which the redactor attempts faithfully to reproduce. According to M.P. Brown, Ps-Ignatius 'makes very obvious efforts to affect the style and the format of the genuine letters,'[284] often weaving together novel concerns with 'myriad verisimilitudes.'[285] Frequently, however, Ps-Ignatius was unable in his programme of impersonation to account for the

[282] Scherbenske (2013), 5.
[283] Scherbenske (2013), 41.
[284] M.P. Brown (1963), 39.
[285] Ehrman (2013), 469.

distinctiveness of his own vocabulary and style, or various errors of continuity and anachronism. I mention some of the more important instances.

§2.4.1: Self-abasement

Ignatius' tendency to self-deprecation is not ignored by Ps-Ignatius, who extends this theme throughout the LR. He gives orders not as if he were an apostle,[286] or of any consequence (οὐκ ὤν τι), but as a brother,[287] and 'fellow-servant [σύνδουλος].'[288] Though he is the least of men (ἐλάχιστος), he counsels Hero to follow and imitate him (ζηλωτής μου γενοῦ· μίμησαί μου τὴν ἀναστροφήν),[289] closely emulating several key Ignatian themes. Indeed, he is aware of the dual status imprisonment afforded Ignatius. He is legally and according to wider society indeed the least of all men, one without rights or hope; yet as a Christian, through his bonds he acquires 'all the more the character of a disciple,'[290] which gives him both the right to speak authoritatively,[291] and a conviction that he will see Christ.[292]

The LR reproduces the Ignatian watchword ἀντίψυχον, perhaps even more diligently than Ignatius himself.[293] Ps-Ignatius uses it in a commendatory sense, calling himself a 'substitute-soul' for those who maintain the correct order (εὐταξία) of subjection among the ecclesial ranks,[294] and for the threefold ministry in general.[295] He twice hopes to be an ἀντίψυχον for Mary of Cassobola, once because 'she is the exemplar of pious women,'[296] and once because 'you love Jesus the Son of

[286] LR-*Ant*. 11.
[287] LR-*Phlp*. 13.
[288] LR-*Ant*. 11.
[289] LR-*Hero* 6; cf. LR-*Ephes*. 12 where Ps-Igntatius also adds ἐλάχιστος.
[290] LR-*Ign. to Mary* 2.
[291] LR-*Tar*. 9: ταῦτα οὐκ ἐπιτάττω ὡς ὤν τι, εἰ καὶ δέδεμαι.
[292] LR-*Tar*. 1.
[293] Occurrences of ἀντίψυχον in MR: four (*Ephes*. 21.1; *Smyrn*. 10.2; *Pol*. 2.3, 6.1); novel occurrences in LR: seven (*Tar*. 8; *Ant*. 7, 12; *Hero* 1, 9; *Phlp*. 4; *Ign. to Mary* 3). The LR reproduces the MR's four occurrences unaltered.
[294] LR-*Tar*. 8; cf. MR-*Pol*. 6.1.
[295] LR-*Phlp*. 14.
[296] LR-*Hero* 9.

the living God.'[297] The word occurs often in the closing salutations in the LR, which has some precedent in the MR;[298] however, Ps-Ignatius appears uneasy to follow Ignatius' grammatical construction, feeling it necessary several times to add the optative γενοίμην. Bearing in mind chapter 3 (§3.3) above, Ps-Ignatius appears to use the term to express agapeic affection, and spiritual devotion towards his correspondents, as Lightfoot suggested concerning the MR.[299] Ignatius twice refers to his bonds as part of his ἀντίψυχον offering,[300] a trait imitated in LR-*Hero* 1, which we have seen may be interpreted as a sacrificial offering of oneself.

Occasionally Ps-Ignatius seems to use ἀντίψυχον to include a sense of effective vicarious suffering. The strongest instance occurs at LR-*Antiochenes* 7, where he writes 'may I be your ἀντίψυχον whenever (ὅταν) I attain to Jesus.' That this offering appears to receive its completion at or after his death,[301] and that it is made for the congregation over which he presides as bishop, might strengthen this point. Furthermore, he twice wishes to be an ἀντίψυχον for Hero, the deacon who will 'occupy my place when I shall attain Christ.'[302] The scarcity of evidence prohibits us from concluding with more certainty, but it remains possible that Ps-Ignatius sought to depict an Ignatius who considered his death to be in some sense effective for fellow Christians, especially those of his own city. At the very least, we are justified in saying that he wished Ignatius to be remembered as one who suffered in imitation of Christ, at least in his self-offering, if not also in his atoning efficacy.

Yet the LR does not unquestioningly assume Ignatius' total self-effacement. The effect of both instances of the MR's use of the word περίψημα is mitigated. The first is in *Ephesians* 8.1, the MR version of which states: 'I am scum on your behalf [περίψημα ὑμῶν] and I am dedicated to you

[297] LR-*Ign. to Mary* 3.
[298] MR-*Ephes*. 21.1.
[299] Lightfoot (1889), II.88.
[300] MR-*Smyrn*. 10.2; MR-*Pol*. 2.3.
[301] In this regard, this passage is remarkably similar to the sentiment expressed at MR-*Trall*. 13.3, although the terminology differs somewhat: 'My spirit is dedicated to you [ἁγνίζεται ὑμῶν τὸ ἐμὸν πνεῦμα], not only now but also whenever [ὅταν] I attain God.'
[302] LR-*Ant*. 12; LR-*Hero* 1.

Ephesians [ἁγνίζομαι ὑμῶν Ἐφεσίων], a church famous forever.' Ps-Ignatius retains the first two words—περίψημα ὑμῶν—yet replaces ἁγνίζομαι with τῆς ἁγνοτάτης, immediately followed by the description of the Ephesian church as renowned. Again in *Ephesians* 18.1, the phrase 'My spirit is scum of the cross [Περίψημα τὸ ἐμὸν πνεῦμα τοῦ σταυροῦ]' is substituted with a meditation on 1 Corinthians 1:23. It would be legitimate to read the *Ephesians* 8 example as Ps-Ignatius' interpretation of Ignatius' words. Lightfoot suggests that Ps-Ignatius inserts ἁγνοτάτης because ἁγνίζομαι was '(to him) unintelligible';[303] yet without the verb to express an agent, little sense can be made of περίψημα ὑμῶν, which Roberts and Donaldson render as 'Cast out that which defiles you,' declaring the passage 'difficult to translate.'[304] In any case, περίψημα in the LR would hardly be taken to refer to Ignatius himself, nor does the passage continue to hold the sacrificial sense carried by ἁγνίζομαι. It strikes me as slightly odd that both expressions of self-abasement in this sentence should be accidentally erased in one fell swoop, simply because Ps-Ignatius could not understand the word ἁγνίζομαι. Combined with his apparent queasiness towards the word περίψημα in *Ephesians* 18, it stands to reason that he actively dislikes the light such a description casts upon Ignatius. While Ignatius himself understood this word to liken him to Paul's own abased state in the eyes of the world,[305] Ps-Ignatius may well fear his audience's misinterpretation of such a charged word.

§2.4.2: Other points of imitation

Ps-Ignatius draws from Ignatius' distinctive habit of speaking of his 'attaining [ἐπιτυγχάνω]' God or Christ, and appears to assume the same sense of a 'communion with God at death,'[306] which is consummated through martyrdom. He asks the Tarsians to pray that he might 'attain to Jesus [Ἰησοῦ

[303] Lightfoot (1889), III.256.
[304] Roberts and Donaldson (1867), 154 n.3.
[305] See 1 Cor. 4:13.
[306] Schoedel (1985), 28.

ἐπιτύχω],'[307] as the MR does elsewhere;[308] like Ignatius at MR-*Romans* 5.3, he rejoices in his sufferings, so long as they lead him to 'attain Jesus Christ.'[309] Ps-Ignatius is remarkably faithful in his reproduction of this Ignatian trope. His wish that he be made perfect (τελειωθῶ) is also achieved with the prayers and remembrance of fellow-Christians.[310] While not finding exact parallel in the MR, the LR's τελειωθῶ shares the sense of both ἐπιτυγχάνω and Ignatius' preferred word to express his own completion, ἀπαρτίζω;[311] it also agrees with Ignatius' use of τέλειος elsewhere,[312] particularly his description of Jesus Christ as ὁ τέλειος ἄνθρωπος.[313] Ps-Ignatius thus draws together various strands in Ignatius' thought, making the martyr's approach toward the object of his desire—Christ—more explicit and coherent.

If Ps-Ignatius does use the LR as an occasion to promote certain doctrinal and pastoral concerns, he certainly does not neglect of details of verisimilitude in doing so. Lest the reader lack context about the second-century bishop, in LR-*Philippians* 14 he describes his special concern for Antioch, 'whence also I am being led as a prisoner to Rome'; in LR-*Ephesians* 11 he adds that he carries around his chains 'from Syria as far as Rome.' Lightfoot even suggests that Ps-Ignatius substitutes δείνων for θηρίων as the object of Ignatius' enjoyment[314] in order to maintain the pretence that he writes from Antioch *before* hearing his condemnation and means of his death.[315] In writing to the church at Antioch, he appears to assume from MR-*Philadelphians* 10.1 and MR-*Smyrneans* 11 the knowledge that 'you are in peace (εἰρηνεύειν), and that you live in all harmony (ὁμόνοια) both of the flesh and spirit.'[316] Where the MR simply refers to the Smyrneans' 'bishop,' the LR identifies him as Polycarp, perhaps simultaneously a point of verisimilitude and a chance to

[307] LR-*Tar*. 10.
[308] E.g. MR-*Mag*. 14; MR-*Trall*. 12.2.
[309] LR-*Ign. to Mary* 2.
[310] LR-*Hero* 9; LR-*Phlp*. 15; LR-*Ephes*. 11.
[311] E.g. MR-*Phld*. 5.1; MR-*Ephes*. 3.1.
[312] Especially at MR-*Smyrn*. 11.
[313] MR-*Smyrn*. 4.2.
[314] LR-*Ign. to Mary* 2, which adapts MR-*Romans* 5.
[315] Lightfoot (1889), III.146; LR-*Ign. to Mary* 2.
[316] LR-*Ant*. 1.

reflect the fame of the latter upon Ignatius.[317] The name of Ignatius, mentioned only in the opening greetings of the MR letters, is used with some liberality throughout the LR, perhaps in order to enhance the vividness of the first-person account, or to allay any concerns of the redactor that his impersonation is unconvincing.[318] Extended salutations in several of the novel letters impart verisimilitude,[319] and Mary's description of the occasion for her writing provides explicit detail of people, their names, stations, and relationships to both writer and recipient.[320] Even such a small detail as his addition to the catalogue of the heretics' immoralities ('they spit upon the afflicted one; they laugh at the one who is in bonds'[321]) shows a concern to assume a narrative position that is as close as possible to Ignatius the martyr and his context.

He occasionally draws attention to the process of epistolary construction, perhaps, like other pseudonymous letters, revealing 'a self-consciousness about their epistolary medium through references to the acts of reading, writing, and sending.'[322] The circumstances of his sending are conspicuously emphasised when writing to the Philippians: 'I have sent you these my writings through Euphanius the reader, a man honoured of God and exceedingly faithful, happening to meet him in Rhegium, as he was embarking upon a ship.'[323] To the Antiochenes he notes that 'I am writing these things to you from Philippi.'[324] The supposed correspondence between Ignatius and Mary of Cassobola is full of references to the writing process. (It is perhaps no coincidence that the [fictional] epistolary form was sometimes favoured in ancient literature for its ability to 'give a voice to those who would otherwise not be heard,' women prominent among these.[325]) A striking instance comes in the first chapter of his letter to Mary:

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[317] LR-*Smyrn*. 12.
[318] See esp. LR-*Ephes*. 12 where 'Ignatius' occurs twice.
[319] Esp. LR-*Ant*. 12–14; LR-*Hero* 8–9; LR-*Phlp*. 14–15.
[320] LR-*Mary to Ign*. 1.
[321] LR-*Smyrn*. 6.
[322] Rosenmeyer (2001), 194.
[323] LR-*Phlp*. 15.
[324] LR-*Ant*. 14. Reference to the writing process (MR-*Ephes*. 13.1, 20.1; MR-*Pol*. 8.1), or to the origin of a letter (MR-*Ephes*. 21.1; MR-*Rom*. 10.1), is not altogether absent in the MR.
[325] Hodkinson (2007), 292.

> Sight indeed is better than writing, inasmuch as, being one of the company of the senses, it not only, by communicating proofs of friendship, honours him who receives them, but also, by those which it in turn receives, enriches the desire for better things. But *the second harbour of refuge, as the phrase runs, is the practice of writing, which we have received, as a convenient haven, by thy faith, from so great a distance, seeing that by means of a letter we have learned the excellence that is in thee*.[326]

In a sentence more elegant and better constructed than any in the MR, Ps-Ignatius self-referentially forges an encomium to Mary's letter in the very medium which he himself is praising. Despite the great distance supposedly separating them, Ignatius has learnt of Mary's virtue and devotion to him, almost as powerfully as if he were seeing her in person. At the time of writing, Ignatius has apparently already fulfilled (ἐπλήρωσα) the things Mary commanded in the letter (διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς); moreover, the scriptural quotations she proffered were not formalities, to be merely 'run over with the eyes (ὀφθαλμοῖς ἐκδραμεῖν),' since she provided a thorough demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) of them in her letter.[327] He amplifies the same theme a few chapters later:

> I greatly desired to come to you, that I might have rest with you; but…the military guard hinders my purpose, and does not permit me to go further. Nor indeed, in the state I am now in, can I either do or suffer anything. *Wherefore deeming the practice of writing the second resource of friends for their mutual encouragement*, I salute thy sacred soul, beseeching thee to add still further to thy vigour.[328]

Besides adding details of Ignatius' antagonistic relationship with the military guard (described as 'ten leopards' in MR-*Rom*. 5.1), and his own tortured state, Ps-Ignatius also continues his reflection on writing, as being second, presumably to physical presence or sight, in its power to comfort and encourage friends. We may here find a veiled reference to Ps-Ignatius' own community, whom he hopes to support through his letters.[329] He therefore crafts the Marian correspondence to serve as

[326] LR-*Ign. to Mary* 1 (trans. Roberts and Donaldson, emphasis mine).
[327] LR-*Ign. to Mary* 3.
[328] LR-*Ign. to Mary* 4 (trans. Roberts and Donaldson, emphasis mine).
[329] Cf. Rapp (1999), 81.

a meditation upon the practice of writing. A written presence is both distinct from but deeply similar to a physical presence, able to provide conclusive demonstrations and spiritual refreshment.

Rosenmeyer believes a common feature of pseudonymous letters to be just such self-conscious reference to their epistolarity. She notes that 'writers of fictional letters apologize for their shaky handwriting, mention tears shed on the page, or worry about the next boat leaving for Athens.'[330] They stress the physical act of their composition in order to heighten verisimilitude. This emphasis on writing,

> whether a reference to the physicality of the letter itself or a more complex analysis of epistolary style, testifies to a self-consciousness on the part of the writer, an anxiety that his letter fit the expectations of the genre (of "real" letters, that is). The more realistic the epistolary moment appears, both in terms of the occasion and the specific letter, the more convincing it will be to its readers, who seek the literary thrill of reading someone else's private messages.[331]

Examining epistolary fictions from Homer to the third century AD in her work, Rosenmeyer assumes that agreed expectations existed among ancient literate audiences whereby the fictionality of pseudonymous epistles was understood by reader and writer; the fictional epistle presents a type of 'literary game,' in which the writer must give as believable an appearance of historical and epistolary reality as possible, and the reader is expected to knowingly enjoy the playful pretence.[332] The near absence of Christian letters in Rosenmeyer's work[333] I believe allows us to expect some difference in attitudes to Ps-Ignatius' epistles (see chapter 5 above). Moreover, whereas Rosenmeyer is concerned with epistolary fictions from a great number of ancient contexts in her work, the sum of our letters of interest is a mere 13, stemming from the pen of a single redactor. Nonetheless, pagan and Christian authors agreed in imagining the letter 'as a document, an artifact

[330] Rosenmeyer (2001), 22.
[331] Rosenmeyer (2001), 207; cf. Hodkinson (2007).
[332] See Rosenmeyer (2001), 204.
[333] Although she touches upon Christian texts at 24–25 and 340–41.

that guaranteed some sense of authenticity';[334] its interpretation as an object of power was also universal.[335] We are offered what might be termed a Christian version of the tears on the page and the departures from Athens: words that both unpack the significance of the epistle as a written form for Christians, while also drawing attention to the supposed epistolarity of those words themselves.

Besides Mary, the other singular addressee of the new LR letters is Hero, a young 'deacon of Christ' supposedly in Ignatius' church in Antioch. It is filled with dense passages of imperatives and (mainly ethical) injunctions, as is the MR's letter to Polycarp.[336] Again the work displays touches of familiarity proper to personal correspondence: Ps-Ignatius refers to Hero as 'my child [ἐμόν τέκνον]' and 'dear son [παιδίον ποθεινόν].'[337] The theme of the blessedness of youthful piety which is so prominent in the Marian correspondence is developed here in the language of 1 Timothy 4:12,[338] and with a play on words Ps-Ignatius counsels Hero to 'act like a hero [ἡρωικῶς] and a man [ἀνδρικῶς].'[339] That Hero was thought by Ps-Ignatius to have succeeded Ignatius as the bishop of Antioch becomes evident: he trusts that God will show him 'Hero upon my throne.'[340] The word παραθήκη and its cognates appear four times in as many lines as Ps-Ignatius charges Hero to guard the deposit [παραθήκη] which he and Christ entrust [παρεθέμεθα] to him, and even explicitly hands over [παρατίθημι] the church of Antioch, before saying that he has commended [παρεθέμην] Hero to Polycarp.[341] He goes on to compare his and Hero's relationship to that of Moses and Joshua, though with characteristic modesty demurs from the equivalence of such an analogy.[342] If the LR is written in Antioch for an Antiochene audience as we suspect, this seems like a blatant attempt to legitimate the succession of the Antiochene episcopacy and further eulogise its early holders. The

[334] Rosenmeyer (2001), 343.
[335] Rosenmeyer (2001), 27.
[336] Amelungk (1899: 553) believes LR-*Hero* to be a partial plagiarism of MR-*Polycarp*.
[337] LR-*Hero* 6.
[338] LR-*Hero* 3.
[339] LR-*Hero* 8.
[340] LR-*Hero* 7. At LR-*Ant*. 12 he expresses a similar wish to see 'the one dear [ποθεινόν] to me' occupying his place instead of him (ἀντὶ ἐμοῦ); cf. LR-*Ant*. 14.
[341] LR-*Hero* 7; see Brox (1976: 187): 'Ignatius ist hier zum Apostel stilisiert.'
[342] LR-*Hero* 8.

letter is also notable for its attempts at verisimilitude: in drawing from the typically Ignatian trope of referring to believers as constituting the temple (ναός) of God who dwells in us (ἐν ἡμῖν κατοικοῦντος),[343] especially the proto-Trinitarian formulation at MR-*Ephesians* 9, Ps-Ignatius tells Hero that he is the 'dwelling place [οἰκητήριος] of God,' the 'temple [ναός] of Christ,' and the 'instrument of the Spirit.'[344] His retention of Ignatius' self-designation as Θεοφόρος in every letter is hardly surprising, but in the greeting to Hero he also imitates the string of -φόρος nouns from MR-*Ephesians* 9.2, referring to his recipient as Χριστοφόρος and Πνευματοφόρος, in what is perhaps another Trinitarian allusion.[345]

Ps-Ignatius complexifies the MR's glancing reference to the flesh and blood of Christ with more advanced soteriological content, which he somewhat awkwardly attempts to couch in Ignatian language. In the MR, the Trallians are enjoined: 'renew yourselves in faith, which is the flesh of the Lord, and in love, which is the blood of Jesus Christ.'[346] These few words are distinctively Ignatian, pregnant both with his favourite faith/love pair and reference to the two elements of the eucharistic celebration, well-balanced and with a familiar Pauline timbre.[347] The opportunity to exploit the theological potential of this passage seems too good for Ps-Ignatius to pass up. He writes:

> become imitators of Christ's sufferings and of his love with which he loved us when he gave himself as a ransom for us, in order that by his blood he might cleanse us from our old ungodliness, and grant us life when we were almost on the point of dying through the wickedness that was in us.[348]

In biblical language, the LR's version expounds some of the soteriological consequences and images which might be derived from the Lord's suffering: giving life to those who are perishing,[349] his acting

[343] MR-*Ephes*. 15.3; cf. MR-*Phld*. 7.2.
[344] LR-*Hero* 6.
[345] LR-*Hero* inscr. Ps-Ignatius also refers to Mary as the 'Christ-bearing daughter' (LR-*Ign. to Mary* inscr.).
[346] MR-*Trall*. 8.1.
[347] Cf. Col. 3:14; Eph. 6:14–17; 1 Cor. 10:16.
[348] LR-*Trall*. 8.
[349] John 6:33, 6:48–51.

as a 'ransom [λύτρον],'[350] and the cleansing potency of his blood.[351] One might argue that Ps-Ignatius here extends Ignatius' existing comments about the implications of Christ's death.[352] He also appears to borrow Ignatius' frequent command to 'imitate' Christ, particularly in his passive sufferings,[353] but also, as I have argued, in his active love.[354] Where Ignatius simply commands Polycarp to 'bear the diseases [νόσος] of all, as a perfect athlete,' Ps-Ignatius adds 'even as the Lord of all,' going on to cite Matthew 8:17: 'for he himself took our weaknesses [ἀσθένεια] and carried our diseases [νόσος].'[355] For Ps-Ignatius (as arguably for Ignatius himself), Christ's ethical and soteriological consequences are not separate; believers are to imitate Christ, whose actions were at once physically, psychologically, and soteriologically efficacious, restorative of body and of soul. Yet what Ps-Ignatius has gained in theological richness he has lost in Ignatian style, concision, and symmetry. He rather clumsily destroys the terse, suggestive style of the original, and, lacking σάρξ, removes any immediate reference to the Eucharist. Whether this may be deemed an improvement of Ignatius is doubtful, but it appears that Ps-Ignatius attempts to remain faithful to the sentiment of the martyr in his theological manoeuvrings.

§2.4.3: Anachronisms and discrepancies

Despite Ps-Ignatius' effort to conform closely to Ignatian language and themes, cracks in his mask readily appear to the careful observer. Since the difference between the LR and the MR is the subject of this entire chapter, I mention only a handful of cases.

Most easily proven to post-date Ignatius are the names of heretics who arose only after his death. Expanding upon Ignatius' reference to the 'wicked offshoots that bear deadly fruit,' Ps-

[350] Mark 10:45; Matt. 20:28; 1 Tim. 2:6.
[351] Heb. 9:22; Rev. 7:14.
[352] E.g. MR-*Trall*. 9.1–2; MR-*Rom*. 7.3; MR-*Smyrn*. 6.2, 12.2.
[353] E.g. MR-*Ephes*. 10.3; MR-*Mag*. 5.2.
[354] See chapter 4 above.
[355] LR-*Pol*. 1.

Ignatius names a number of heresiarchs whom he believes likely to have troubled Ignatius (even though Ignatius himself gives away little more about their identity than their doceticism).[356] He begins plausibly enough with Simon[357] and Menander, but goes on to name Basilides and Theodotus, who flourished only after Ignatius' death.[358] He elsewhere mentions the Ebionites,[359] whose name is first recorded by Irenaeus.[360] Ps-Ignatius' attempt at verisimilitude may well have been successful in his own day, when such heretics were perhaps characterised as parasitic on the church almost since its inception.

A particularly blatant slip is Ps-Ignatius' reference to Anencletus (or perhaps Linus),[361] the bishop of Rome as 'pope [πάπα].'[362] Controversy naturally surrounds such a term, but it appears that only by the third century was it commonly being applied honorifically to bishops.[363] Dionysius of Alexandria refers to his predecessor Heraclas as πάπα, in what appears to be the first instance of its use in this sense.[364] At any rate, despite ὁ ἐπίσκοπος being counted among Ignatius' favourite subjects and one he often expands upon, the MR never uses the term πάπα, so this can safely be considered an anachronism.

The comparative work of M.P. Brown also elucidates many discrepancies between the language of Ignatius and his fourth-century imitator. Overall, the LR is 'clearly not the work of a man pushed for time or harassed by his guards on the way to probable death. The choice of words is studied—often preferring a less common synonym to repetition of the more ordinary word.'[365]

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[356] LR-*Trall*. 11.
[357] Sc. Magus; see LR-*Phld*. 6.
[358] Cross and Livingstone (2005) place Basilides in the second quarter of the second century, and Theodotus in the late second century. Basilides is first referred to in Irenaeus (*AH* 1.24), and then by Clement of Alexandria (*Stromata* passim) and Hippolytus (*Refutation* 7.1–15); Theodotus by Hippolytus (*Refutation* 7.23–24) and Eusebius (*HE* 5.28). Cf. the similar but more obvious anachronisms at *AC* 6.8.
[359] LR-*Phld*. 6.
[360] *AH* 1.26.2; 3.11.7.
[361] See Lightfoot (1889), III.147 for discussion.
[362] LR-*Ign. to Mary* 4.
[363] Cross and Livingstone (2005) s.v. Pope; though for Moorhead (1985: 349) the title more commonly refers exclusively to the bishop of Rome among non-Roman audiences.
[364] Eusebius *HE* 7.7.4 (τοῦ μακαρίου πάπα ἡμῶν Ἡρακλᾶ).
[365] M.P. Brown (1963), 39.

Brown also notices great differences in style and vocabulary,[366] including several words whose usage indicates a date significantly later than the early second century such as ἐνανθρώπησις, προσκομιδή, and σύναξις.[367] In Brown's opinion, 'While Ps-I makes conspicuous efforts to adopt certain Ignatian phrases and borrows extensively from his exemplar, he is by no means slavish and apparently does not intend to be.'[368] Also glaring is the sheer wealth of LXX and NT citations made by Ps-Ignatius (Brown counts 164), compared to the modest number of quotations and allusions found in the MR.[369] Lightfoot and Zahn also argue convincingly for the LR's dependence upon the *Apostolic Constitutions*, usually dated to the third quarter of the fourth century.[370]

Other smaller details, not definitively anachronistic in themselves, might be taken cumulatively to indicate the LR to have its provenance in the fourth and not the second century. The expansion of Christianity in Syria in the intervening generations meant Ps-Ignatius was obliged to make more specific Ignatius' reference to 'the church in Syria,' praying for 'the church of Antioch which is in Syria.'[371] The LR removes Ignatius' complaint about heretics that they 'avoid the Eucharist and prayer, because they do not confess the Eucharist to be the flesh of our saviour Jesus Christ.'[372] This characteristic of heresy is perhaps no longer relevant at the time of Ps-Ignatius, in which a eucharistic offering of some description would be practised by all Christians known to him. Ignatius' hope of addressing the Ephesians in a second little work (ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ βιβλιδίῳ) is deleted in the LR,[373] presumably due to its redundancy, or its potential to upset readers who have no knowledge of such a letter.

[366] M.P. Brown (1963), 38–66, 97–113.
[367] M.P. Brown (1963), 41, 45.
[368] M.P. Brown (1963), 48.
[369] M.P. Brown (1963), 114.
[370] Lightfoot (1889), I.262–66; Zahn (1873), 145ff.
[371] LR-*Ephes*. 21.
[372] MR-*Smyrn*. 6.2.
[373] LR-*Ephes*. 20.

The brief summary of the promised letter, that he will explain to them the dispensation with regard to the new man, Jesus Christ, in his faith, love, suffering and resurrection, is reworked in the LR as the content of an exhortation: 'Stand fast, brothers, firm in the faith of Jesus Christ and in his love, in his suffering and resurrection.'[374] While artfully avoiding the dissonance of an unfulfilled promise, Ps-Ignatius inadvertently leaves a trace of his editorial handiwork.

§2.5: Remaining concerns

Having dealt with the primary features of the LR, several points of interest that deserve attention remain.

The cultic language used by Ignatius is extended in the LR, which would correlate with its composition in an age fascinated by the cult of saints. It refers to Ignatius as 'the least [ἐλάχιστος] of those who have been cut off for the sake of God, from the blood of righteous Abel until the blood of Ignatius,'[375] in a clear reference to Matthew 23:35. The redactor here expands upon Ignatius' conviction that the prophets proleptically believed in,[376] were persecuted for,[377] and 'lived in accordance to Christ Jesus,'[378] in imagining Abel as the first to have died 'for the sake of [διά] God.' Ignatius, then, joins the long line of martyrs of Christ, and is to be the most recent (yet least worthy) victim. The Homoian community of Antioch, whose project it was to 'resurrect' the memory of the martyr Ignatius through penning the long recension and 'rediscovering' his remains,[379] presumably found this sentence particularly useful for garnering interest in Ignatius and his shrine. Taken in addition to the several evocative comments in *Romans* concerning the significance of his death, that

[374] LR-*Ephes*. 20.
[375] LR-*Ephes*. 12.
[376] MR-*Phld*. 9.2.
[377] MR-*Smyrn*. 3.2.
[378] MR-*Mag*. 8.2.
[379] See §1 above.

such an early pioneer of the faith as Ignatius refers to his blood as admitting him to the ranks of Christian martyrs would have granted considerable motivation to the burgeoning cult of saints.

The chapter continues in this martyrological vein, going on to speak of 'Paul, the sanctified, the martyred [μεμαρτυρημένος]' who is 'a chosen vessel; in whose footsteps may I be found, and those of the rest of the saints.'[380] The passage is largely similar to the MR, except for the addition of 'and those of the rest of the saints.' Such an amendment might suggest a readiness to acknowledge the existence of many more who conform to the definition of sainthood as compared to the early second century, when martyrdom was practically still the reserve of the apostles. Yet by the late fourth century, the cult of saints, growing in scale and popularity, already included hundreds of witnesses and martyrs,[381] which surely motivated Ps-Ignatius' addition.

The hypothesis of Antioch as the location of the LR's composition would appear to be further confirmed by a passage praising the city for its connection to the origins of Christianity. Woven into Ignatius' exhortation to live in accordance with Christianity, and the statement that 'whoever is called by any other name than this [Christian] does not belong to God,' the redactor adds:

> for he has not received the prophecy which speaks thus concerning us, 'The people shall be called by a new name, which the Lord shall name them, and shall be a holy people' (Isa. 62:2, 12). This was first fulfilled in Syria; for 'the disciples were called Christians at Antioch' (Acts 11:26), when Paul and Peter were laying the foundations of the church.[382]

As well as continuing Ignatius' programme of supersessionism, and his integration of the Old Testament to reach fulfilment in Christianity, this passage lionises Antioch in Syria, both for its having been the location of believers (first) being given the name of 'Christians,' and second because of its status as the foundation of both apostolic pillars, Paul and Peter. Moreover, as the LR clarifies in the preface to Polycarp, Ignatius is consistently remembered as *the* 'bishop of Antioch, and a

[380] LR-*Ephes*. 12.
[381] Already in 366, the *Depositio martyrum* records 38 names (and feast days) of those who were martyred in the vicinity of Rome alone. See Lapidge (2018), 633–36.
[382] LR-*Mag*. 10.

martyr for Jesus Christ,' contrary to some scholars who believe his claim to the title was, in his own time at least, far from secure.[383] Our redactor, for whom the 'resurrection' of Ignatius through the LR was important largely because of his identity as an Antiochene, and for whom Ignatius represented the church of Antioch's 'own saint and advocate,'[384] was surely eager to utilise his epistolary platform to place such a promotion of Antioch on the lips of one so close to the church's apostolic origin.

Ps-Ignatius attempts to clarify several of Ignatius' more impenetrable sayings. MR-*Trallians* 9.1 reads, Christ 'was truly crucified and died, in the sight of all beings in heaven, and on the earth and under the earth [βλεπόντων (τῶν) ἐπουρανίων καὶ ἐπιγείων καὶ ὑποχθονίων].' The LR retains this statement, but goes on to place an interpretation on the lips of Ignatius: 'By those in heaven I mean such as are possessed of incorporeal natures, by those on earth, the Jews and Romans, and such persons as were present at the time when the Lord was crucified; and by those under the earth, the multitude that arose along with the Lord.'[385] Ignatius' confusing reference to 'the virgins who are called widows' is clarified by Ps-Ignatius, who separates 'those who are ever virgins, and the widows [ἀειπαρθένους καὶ τὰς χήρας].'[386]

The deeply enigmatic and controversial reference to 'the archives [τὰ ἀρχεῖα]' in MR-*Philadelphians* 8 is altered and expanded to clarify Ignatius' meaning. Ps-Ignatius retains the quotation of those who say 'If I do not find it in the archives, I do not believe it in the gospel'; yet he does away with the following elusive exchange, in which Ignatius says 'it is written [γέγραπται],' and the opponents reply 'that is the issue [πρόκειται].' That this passage had the potential for enormous controversy was probably evident even in the fourth century. Instead, Ps-Ignatius proceeds straight to Ignatius' comment that 'for me the archives are Jesus Christ,' his cross, death, and resurrection.

[383] E.g. Bauer (1972), esp. 61–65, 69–70; Brent (2007), 39–40.
[384] J.D. Smith (1986), 14.
[385] LR-*Trall*. 9 (trans. Roberts and Donaldson).
[386] LR-*Smyrn*. 13.

The LR then provides a statement apparently intended to clarify Ignatius' meaning: 'The one who does not believe in the gospel does not believe in everything along with it. οὐ γὰρ πρόκειται τὰ ἀρχεῖα τοῦ πνεύματος.' This last sentence itself is rather ambiguous. If he intends the meaning of 'the archives do not precede the Spirit,' this might be read as a statement about the Christian inspiration of the sacred writings, that they are to be interpreted in the light of the saving events of Christ's life. If he intends the meaning of 'the archives ought not to be preferred to the Spirit,'[387] a similar conclusion is drawn, again guarding against those who wish to interpret the scriptures without a Christic lens. A third alternative is 'the archives of the Spirit do not lie exposed,'[388] which would be a general comment about the inscrutability of God's ways. In any case, the existing language of the MR is repurposed, and Ignatius' opponents refuted. While Ps-Ignatius' attempt at elucidating the intention of Ignatius here was (for me) far from successful, it offers a prime example of Ps-Ignatius' work as redactor and an indication that the original passage in the MR was also mysterious for fourth-century readers.

That the redactor was concerned over Ignatius' orthodoxy is already clear, but he also appeared concerned over Ignatius' inclusion of a reference from a potentially suspect text. Ignatius records the resurrected Jesus as saying 'to Peter and those with him': 'Take hold of me; handle me and see that I am not a disembodied demon.'[389] Already Origen, noting that the phrase 'I am not a bodiless demon' is taken from the so-called *Teaching of Peter*, showed some circumspection about the source's reliability.[390] Jerome recorded the source of this saying as the so-called *Gospel according to the Hebrews*, which he himself had recently translated.[391] Much uncertainty remains about the provenance of the text Ignatius cites, but it suffices to say that by the fourth century its source may have been the subject of some concern, especially if it was already known to be from a

[387] Roberts and Donaldson's primary translation.
[388] An amended version of Roberts and Donaldson's alternative translation.
[389] MR-*Smyrn*. 3.2.
[390] *De Prin.* I inscr. 8.
[391] *De vir. ill.* 16.

text deemed apocryphal and doctrinally deficient.[392] The quotation is clearly similar to Luke 24:39, 'see my hands and my feet that it is I myself; handle me, and see; for a spirit has not flesh and bones as you see that I have,' but since 'evidence for dependence on Luke is virtually absent in Ignatius,'[393] it is extremely unlikely that Ignatius simply paraphrases this verse. Interestingly, Ps-Ignatius retains the quotation, but immediately follows it with Luke 24:39b.[394] Yet unlike anywhere else in the LR, he does this without any introductory formula, eliding the two as a single quotation.[395] The canonical text here confirms the potentially dubious text as orthodox, absolving Ignatius of suspicion. Moreover, the Lukan text provides amplification of the first quotation, whose thrust might not be obvious to the neophyte.

Ps-Ignatius' concern to undermine the strong wave of asceticism which was being promoted by holy men such as Antony has already been touched upon. LR-*Hero* 1 and LR-*Philadelphians* 6 are both strongly anti-rigorist passages, affirming the goodness of food and drink, marriage and procreation. He also strongly proscribes practices that appear to have sprung up in which important days were kept as fasts, even employing one of his strongest labels, χριστοκτόνος: 'If anyone fasts on the Lord's day or the Sabbath, except the one Sabbath [of the Pasch], this one is a murderer of Christ.'[396] However, as suggested here, he does also allow fasting in principle, and in fact prescribes it for the 'fourth day and that of preparation [παρασκευή]' after the week of the passion.[397] Neither does the habit of fasting, nor a life of continence, excuse teaching 'anything beyond what has been ordained [παρὰ τὰ διατεταγμένα].'[398] Such polemic may well find its origin in the hostility between Christian parties in the Antiochene church. If, as Smith has suggested,[399] the LR tacitly critiques some

[392] As Bruce (1974: 93) believes, and as Eusebius (*HE* 6.12) implies about teachings circulating under Peter's name. However, Eusebius elsewhere (*HE* 3.36.11) claims not to have been able to find the source of Ignatius' citation.
[393] Schoedel (1985), 226; *contra* R.E. Brown (1997), 273–74.
[394] LR-*Smyrn*. 3.
[395] The LR's standard introductions to a scriptural citation are variously γάρ (LR-*Smyrn*. 2), φησί (LR-*Pol*. 1), φασὶν γὰρ τὰ λόγια (LR-*Smyrn*. 3), or καὶ πάλιν (LR-*Phlp*. 2). See M.P. Brown (1963), 116–17.
[396] LR-*Phlp*. 13.
[397] LR-*Phlp*. 13.
[398] LR-*Hero* 2.
[399] J.D. Smith (1986), 138–44.

of the excesses of the Nicene-sympathising ascetics and holy men, such as Antony, it is reasonable to suspect that such figures were being claimed by the Meletian party in Antioch as normative and praiseworthy. Ps-Ignatius, then, as one of Euzoius' flock, employed Ignatius as an ancient authority to arbitrate on ascetic practice; for him, while moderation is important, it must not be taken to extremes but be done in an orderly fashion. More pointedly against the Meletian party, accomplishment in physical restraint can never justify doctrinal error. Issuing from one remembered particularly for his readiness to subject his body to mortification and pain, this ruling must have been particularly forceful.

Connected with this move away from rigorism is Ps-Ignatius' favourable portrayal of women.[400] As well as his commendation of marriage and procreation already mentioned, he also composes several passages justifying respect towards women, including this on motherhood:

> Do not hold women in abomination, for they have given birth to you and brought you up. It is necessary, therefore, to love those who were the cause of [our] birth, only in the Lord; now without a woman a man cannot produce children. It is necessary, therefore, to honour those who had a part in [our] birth.[401]

His salutations illuminate a particular concern for women. He concludes his letter to the Tarsians with 'I salute all, both male and female [πάντας καὶ πάσας], who are in Christ';[402] elsewhere the virgins—'betrothed to Christ [χριστολήμπτους]'—are singled out, as are the 'deaconesses in Christ,' and he greets 'all my sisters in the Lord.'[403] Ps-Ignatius asks Hero to 'exhort my sisters to love God,' and bids him to 'watch over the virgins, as the valuable treasures [κειμήλια] of Christ.'[404] That respect for the Virgin Mary is to be maintained is seen a number of times throughout the novel letters.[405]

[400] Cf. Vinzent (2019), 383.
[401] LR-*Hero* 4; cf. Ps-Ignatius' theological interest in breastfeeding and the womb at LR-*Trall*. 10.
[402] LR-*Tar*. 10.
[403] LR-*Ant*. 12.
[404] LR-*Hero* 5.
[405] LR-*Phlp*. 4, 6; LR-*Mary to Ign*. 1.

Ps-Ignatius also diligently and quite elaborately constructs an intimate relationship between Ignatius and Mary of Cassobola. His affection for her is apparent in the letter to Hero, when he salutes 'Mary my daughter, the most erudite [πολυμαθεστάτη], and the church which is in her house; may I be her ἀντίψυχον. She is the very exemplar of godly women.'[406] This typically Ignatian word is again employed in his letter to Mary, where he wishes to be in place of her soul because 'you love Jesus the Son of the living God.'[407] That the redactor chose a woman to be the correspondent with Ignatius, and goes as far as to fabricate a letter in the voice of a woman (however godly), is remarkable. Moreover, Ps-Ignatius' Mary is highly erudite: the letter is written in Greek far surpassing that of the MR; her knowledge of and reference to scripture is abundant; she is the 'most faithful, worthy of God, Christ-bearing daughter.'[408] His praise for her is seemingly limitless, calling her 'all-wise woman [ὦ πάνσοφε γύναι],'[409] 'equipped with every good work and will,'[410] and speaking of 'the virtue that is in you.'[411] To say that Mary is portrayed in an unequivocally favourable light would be to understate the matter.

Lastly, the redactor places a number of delightful images and phrases upon the lips of Ignatius, which, while perhaps not theologically profound, ought to be mentioned as an aspect of Ignatius' memorialisation in the LR. Retaining the MR's affirmation that true joy is found only in Christ Jesus, in whom is true life, the LR continues 'Do not at any time desire so much as even to breathe apart from him.'[412] This sentiment would, I think, be thoroughly endorsed by the martyr. The redactor commits to Ignatius a new salutation, which he employs on several occasions: 'I salute the people of the Lord, from the least to the greatest [ἀπὸ μικροῦ ἕως μεγάλου],'[413] perhaps with

[406] LR-*Hero* 9.
[407] LR-Ign. to Mary 3.
[408] LR-*Ign. to Mary* inscr.
[409] LR-*Ign. to Mary* 1.
[410] LR-*Ign. to Mary* 5.
[411] LR-*Ign. to Mary* 1.
[412] LR-*Ephes*. 11 (trans. Roberts and Donaldson).
[413] LR-*Phlp*. 15; LR-*Ant*. 12.

a gesture towards Ignatius' tendency to refer to himself as ἐλάχιστος. Finally, the words ἐπιλέγων καὶ τοῦτο ('adding this also'), supplied in what appears to be a gratuitous position—between two original sentences that are otherwise altered very little—[414] presents an apt summary of the work of the fourth-century scholar upon the letters of Ignatius. Do we do an injustice to Ps-Ignatius to see in these three words, not merely a turn of phrase improving the fluency between two thoughts, but his self-conscious comment upon his role as redactor, a momentary yet deliberate lowering of the mask?

§2.6: Case study: *Tarsians* 1

This short chapter in LR-*Tarsians* might stand as representative of Ps-Ignatius' modelling of the voice of Ignatius according to that of the Apostle Paul and scripture. The sheer polyphony of voices the writer mingles together, and their resulting texture, is remarkable. The chapter opens with words lifted verbatim from MR-*Romans* 5.1, 'all the way from Syria to Rome I fight with beasts,' which itself draws its verb (θηριομαχέω) from 1 Corinthians 15:32. But he clarifies that it is not 'senseless [ἄλογος]' beasts that devour him—'for these, as you know, by the will of God spared Daniel'—but 'wild beasts in human form [ἀνθρωπόμορφος],' referencing MR-*Smyrneans* 4.1. Then comes a direct quotation of Paul's words in Acts 20:24, 'but none of these words move me, nor do I count my life dear to myself [ἀλλ' οὐδενὸς λόγου ποιοῦμαι οὐδὲ ἔχω τὴν ψυχὴν τιμίαν ἐμαυτῷ],' interrupted only by Ps-Ignatius' addition of 'hardships [τῶν δεινῶν]' after ποιοῦμαι; nor do these hardships move him to 'love it [life] better than the Lord,' which resonates strongly with Paul's sentiment at Philippians 1:21.

The following sentence combines a loose rendering of Ignatius' words at MR-*Smyrneans* 4.2 ('[I am prepared] for fire, for beasts, for sword…'), with MR-*Romans* 5.3 ('…for cross, only so that I

[414] LR-*Phld*. 8.

might see Christ…'), replacing the word μάχαιρα with ξίφος, and ἐπιτύχω with ἴδω. Next, Paul's words from Ephesians 4:1 ('Παρακαλῶ οὖν ὑμᾶς ἐγὼ ὁ δέσμιος') are used, highlighting the parallel status of the two men as prisoners for Christ, and the writer's gloss of Ignatius as 'driven along by land and sea' picks up MR-*Romans* 5.1. The content of this exhortation is taken from 1 Corinthians 16:13: 'στήκετε ἐν τῇ πίστει,' the reason for which is immediately supplied by Habakkuk 2:4's Ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται—itself a favourite verse of Paul's.[415] Finally, Ps-Ignatius adds his own encouragement to 'be unwavering [ἀκλινεῖς],' reinforced by words from Psalm 67:7 (LXX): ὁ κύριος (LXX: θεὸς) κατοικίζει μονοτρόπους ἐν οἴκῳ.

Unpacking this brief passage from the novel LR literature demonstrates the polyphonic quality of the martyr's voice, as imagined by Ps-Ignatius. Interweaving the words, sentiments and stories of Paul, David, Habakkuk, Daniel, and Ignatius with his own, the writer condenses centuries of theological reflection upon God and faith into a few lines. His familiarity with Paul and NT narrative suggests that Ps-Ignatius 'feels the sanctity and canonical authority of the passages [that] he quotes,'[416] which impulse Ignatius himself shared. Ignatius is made to recover from his former rather embarrassing neglect of the OT. He is reimagined as eminently learned, highly acquainted with the whole of scripture, generous and comfortable with its deployment in his own context, not hesitating to mingle quotations from the two testaments together. Indeed, he is made to praise Mary for her 'numerous recollections [μνῆμαι] of scriptural passages.'[417] One's facility with scripture—in learning, manipulation, and application—was clearly considered by Ps-Ignatius to be a most authoritative skill.

Even in this section, it is evident that he imitates the style of the MR and retains its concerns. The writer is preoccupied by the prospect of a gruesome death; like Paul he speaks from a situation of imprisonment and travel, but would sacrifice anything for the sake of Christ; he wishes to ensure

[415] Rom. 1:17; Gal. 3:11; Heb. 10:38.
[416] M.P. Brown (1963), 116.
[417] LR-*Ign. to Mary* 3.

his readers continue in faith, and hints at his trouble with certain bestial heretics. We discern Ps-Ignatius as one immersed in the thought-world of the martyr, both qualified and eager to breathe new life into his letters.

§3: Memory and memorialisation in the LR

We have treated in parts I and II the importance in the MR of memory and memorialisation—exhortations to remember various churches, warnings about the impossibility of committing the names of heretics to memory or writing, and Ignatius' own hopes that he will be remembered.[418] That all of these instances are retained in the LR might be interpreted simply as the redactor's indifference towards memory, or his desire to retain such a characteristic feature of the martyr. Yet, perhaps unsurprisingly given the nature of his endeavour, Ps-Ignatius appears to hold an actively positive stance towards the locus of memory, frequently developing the MR instances. Indeed, M.P. Brown can speak of Ps-Ignatius' 'habitual use of μιμνήσκομαι and related words.'[419]

In praise of the Tarsian church, the title 'worthy of remembrance [ἀξιομνημόνευτος]' is accorded the central position in the LR's threefold ἀξιο- formulation, between 'worthy of praise [ἀξιέπαινος]' and 'worthy of love [ἀξιαγάπητος].'[420] Hero will never sin if he is able to 'keep God in remembrance [μέμνησο].'[421] Ps-Ignatius exhorts his own congregation at Antioch to 'remember Euodias, your shepherd worthy of blessing, who was first entrusted leadership over you by the apostles.'[422] They are also to 'remember my chains,'[423] accessories to his martyrdom which in the MR are personified, able to exhort and even act as an ἀντίψυχον.[424] Again to the Antiochenes he

[418] Especially MR-*Ephes*. 21.1; MR-*Trall*. 13.1; MR-*Rom*. 9.1; MR-*Smyrn*. 5.3.
[419] M.P. Brown (1963), 57.
[420] LR-*Tar*. inscr.
[421] LR-*Hero* 7.
[422] LR-*Ant*. 7. Tradition ascribed Euodias the title of first (or second after Peter) bishop of Antioch; see Eusebius *HE* 3.22, 3.36. *AC* 7.46.4 records that Euodias was ordained by Peter and Ignatius by Paul.
[423] LR-*Ant*. 7; perhaps drawing from Col. 4:18.
[424] MR-*Trall*. 12.1; MR-*Smyrn*. 10.2; MR-*Pol*. 2.3.

reports that 'the entire church of the Smyrneans remembers [μνημονεύει] you in their prayers in the Lord.'[425] To remember is thus also to demonstrate a 'noble and exemplary attitude or action,'[426] which is to be imitated by others.

Ps-Ignatius redacts Ignatius' wish that the Trallians 'remember in your prayers the church in Syria' to 'remember your church which is in Syria';[427] such an omission seems to have been effected either hastily or unthinkingly—in any case clumsily—as it leaves the sentence imperfect and misleading, sparking some confusion among the textual authorities.[428] While the resulting command may have been understood to be a circumlocution for prayer, the omission may indicate the belief of Ps-Ignatius that remembering one, whether within or outside the context of prayer, is in some sense efficacious. Evidence to support such a claim is found in a second occasion in which he asks for remembrance of his bonds, 'in order that I might be perfected [ἵνα τελειωθῶ] in Christ.'[429] It seems that Christians' remembering of Ignatius and his martyrdom journey is understood to contribute in some meaningful way to Ignatius' own perfection in Christ, or, more loosely, his salvation. This belief is already attested in the MR, all of which occurrences are retained in the LR.[430] In addition to the above, the LR frequently uses μιμνήσκω and its cognates in the sense of reminding his congregations of a certain fact or person.[431] While Brown suspects that Ps-Ignatius here draws from OT injunctions to 'remember,'[432] there is evidence that having noticed Ignatius' proclivity towards the word and concept, he consciously broadens its use.[433]

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[425] LR-*Ant*. 13.
[426] M.P. Brown (1963), 58.
[427] LR-*Trall*. 13.
[428] Lightfoot (1889), III.163.
[429] LR-*Phlp*. 15.
[430] See e.g. MR-*Ephes*. 11.2 where Ignatius wishes by his bonds 'to arise through your prayers'; MR-*Phld*. 8.2 where Ignatius desires 'through your prayers to be justified'; MR-*Smyrn*. 11.1 where Ignatius prays that 'through your prayer I may attain God'; and MR-*Pol*. 7.1 where Ignatius 'may be found a disciple through your prayers.' Even in the MR, therefore, there is a belief of the real contribution of the faithful to the post-mortem acceptance of Ignatius by (or into) God; see Vall (2013), 366.
[431] E.g. LR-*Tar*. 3, 9; LR-*Phlp*. 1; LR-*Ant*. 9, 11.
[432] M.P. Brown (1963), 57.
[433] The word ὑπομιμνήσκω, foreign to the MR, is found three times in the LR (LR-*Tar*. 9; LR-*Ant*. 11, 13).

Just as right standing before God is implied by the concept of remembering in the LR, so its inverse applies for forgetting, a term he employs no fewer than five times. It is in fact the Devil who is most often said to forget. In the extended apostrophe to Satan in LR-*Philippians*, the Devil forgets [ἐπιλαθόμενος] 'the commandment of the Law-giver that "You shall not test the Lord your God" [Deut. 6:16].'[434] He is accused of forgetting 'out of malice [ἐκ κακονοίας] that "man shall not live on bread alone but on every word that proceeds out of the mouth of God" [Deut. 8:3].'[435] The catena of events concerning the saving events of Christ's life that the Devil forgets [σε λανθάνει] runs to an entire chapter, or 22 lines in the Greek.[436] While the Devil is also frequently chastised for being 'full of ignorance [ἀγνοίας πεπλήρωται],'[437] blind,[438] and lacking real (ὄντως) knowledge,[439] the charge of forgetfulness seems the more weighty indictment, showing as it does a conscious lack of respect for God and scripture, rooted in Satan's own self-importance and 'ambition [φιλαρχία].'[440] For Ps-Ignatius, as Brown notes, forgetting 'seems to denote not just the lapse of memory but the wilful, perverse neglect of the good example and its issue in overt evil.'[441] A more innocuous usage of the concept occurs in the penultimate sentence of the letter to Tarsus, when Ps-Ignatius bids them 'do not forget me [ἐμοῦ μὴ ἐπιλάθησθε].'[442]

Ps-Ignatius therefore successfully reproduces in his letters Ignatius' own belief in the potency of being remembered by the Christians he leaves behind, and his real fear of being submerged beneath the sands of time. Appropriately, through his very literary creation, he positively counteracts the church's growing amnesia towards the figure of Ignatius of Antioch, recalling his ecclesiastical and ethical significance, and thrusting the story of his self-narrated passion back into

[434] LR-*Phlp*. 11; cf. Matt. 4:7; Luke 4:12.
[435] LR-*Phlp*. 9.
[436] LR-*Phlp*. 8.
[437] LR-*Phlp*. 4.
[438] LR-*Phlp*. 6.
[439] LR-*Phlp*. 9.
[440] LR-*Phlp*. 11.
[441] M.P. Brown (1963), 58.
[442] LR-*Tar*. 10.

the public Christian consciousness of Antioch. Indeed, all pseudepigraphy, despite the calumny heaped against it by the likes of Ehrman, Duff, and Metzger, and regardless of its 'legitimacy'—ancient or modern, moral or otherwise—may be considered a form of commemoration. The 'forger' memorialises the person, life, and teaching of one no longer physically present, extending their influence and example (though necessarily altered) into modern times. Indeed, 'the evidence for respect for a figure of the past being sufficient and primary motivation for pseudonymity is overwhelming.'[443] Entailed in the act of writing pseudepigraphically is the writer's necessary refusal of personal credit for their efforts, the redirection of attention towards the other and away from self. For one so concerned with his abiding memory and the welfare of his Syrian church as Ignatius, the project and (auto)biographical act of the long recension must surely be considered in keeping with his will and legacy.

§4: Summary and conclusion: The LR's appropriation and memorialisation of Ignatius

In the same way that other Greek pseudonymous authors were drawn to write in the voice of a historical figure by the possibility of affording a 'glimpse into the glorious Greek past from a more personal angle,'[444] so might we imagine the author of the LR to have wished to evoke a seminal period of Christian history through the narrative voice of Ignatius. Though we might quibble with Duff on several points, he is certainly correct that 'the earliest time of the church' occupied a place of particular authority in Christian literature.[445] The glories of this former time, evident in the martyr's approach to death and struggles against the Devil, are looked back upon with pride in late fourth-century Antioch. As we have seen, the peculiar context in which Ps-Ignatius lived, and the pertinent issues he addressed, all shape the character of the LR. His adoption and adaptation of the

[443] Donelson (1986), 10 n.9.
[444] Rosenmeyer (2001), 197.
[445] Duff (1998), 278.

voice of Ignatius is symptomatic of various alterations in the audience for which he writes, which are briefly summarised here.

In keeping with this glorification of the seminal days of the church's history, the LR maintains the MR's gruesome language describing Ignatius' physical sufferings. Yet we noted a subtle shifting of culpability from the state, to whose king 'no one among rulers is to be compared,'[446] onto the Jews and heretics. The drastic alteration of the church's standing with regard to the state necessitated sensitive recasting of Ignatius as one respectful of both secular and ecclesial authority, though ultimately subordinating both to God's. Ignatius is thus memorialised as perhaps less radical and more diplomatic than his original letters would indicate.

The LR's presentation of Ignatius as one learned in scripture, who is able to apply its words judiciously to the situation at hand, might be seen as expanding upon the few scriptural allusions present in the MR. In the manner of a counterfactual, the LR may even anticipate what passages Ignatius *would have* drawn from if the benefit of physical scriptures had been at his disposal. We have already touched upon the conciliatory aims of Ps-Ignatius, whose Homoian theology the LR only moderately promotes, containing few and minimised distinctive Arian features, and no controversial watchwords of Nicaea (we recall its subtle omission of ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία).[447] The LR's choice of language betrays a writer who 'obviously seeks a mediating path between two contemporary extremes.'[448] Gilliam also notes a marked purpose of reconciliation in the theology of the LR and the Macrostich creed.[449] Ps-Ignatius' anti-Marcellianism was shared by the Meletian party at Antioch.[450] It is my contention that part of his motivation behind recasting Ignatius as a learned scriptural theologian was the advantage this would afford him as a reconciler of divided parties. Ps-Ignatius' copious use of scripture is conspicuous, and its worth as a device of persuasion

[446] LR-*Smyrn*. 9.
[447] See §2.3.2 above.
[448] M.P. Brown (1963), 50; see Wiles (1996), 27.
[449] Gilliam (2017), 120–26.
[450] Spoerl (1993), 112–24.

quite evident to him: Mary's 'numerous recollections [μνῆμαι] of scriptural passages greatly delighted me; having read them, I no longer had a single doubtful thought concerning the matter.'[451] Yet, excepting the polemical sparring partners treated in §2.2, scripture was not used to condemn fellow Christians, but only to unite. The irrefutable words of scripture provided an enduring basis upon which divided parties could meet and consensus could be found.

Indeed, the enhancement in learning enjoyed by the Ignatius of the LR goes beyond scripture: 'his vocabulary is one of considerable scope, marked by precision in the choice of words, enriched by numerous classical expressions,'[452] and he exhibits a preference for relatively obscure synonyms.[453] The MR's sometimes 'rambling structure' is condensed, and its 'extemporaneous' style is granted greater precision, imparting an impression of writing which is 'premeditated, if not rehearsed, bearing the stamp of the…rhetorician.'[454] While this might easily be explained as simply reflecting the writing style of the redactor, I believe this does an injustice to the fidelity and creativity with which Ps-Ignatius attempted to assume the persona of Ignatius. As many have argued elsewhere,[455] in a society in which Christianity was increasingly required to present lucid justification for its claims, that a prominent apostolic-adjacent figure should be well-read, intelligent, and cogent would have been desirable. Fourth-century Christians would surely also have derived comfort from knowing that Ignatius was formidable in intellect and learning. If this recasting of the martyr brought existing arguments into greater contrast, and imparted to the letters a greater degree of rhetorical persuasion, that would only have added to the redactor's incentive.

Ignatius' status as a Christian knowledgeable of spiritual and perhaps even mystical authorities is also advanced in the LR. The 'heavenly realities [τὰ ἐπουράνια]' that the MR's Ignatius can 'comprehend'—'heavenly things, the constellations of the angels and the assemblies of

[451] LR-*Ign. to Mary* 3.
[452] M.P. Brown (1963), 48.
[453] M.P. Brown (1963), 39.
[454] M.P. Brown (1963), 108.
[455] See Eusebius' account of the correspondence between Jesus and Abgar (chapter 5, §2.2 above).

principalities, things visible and invisible'[456]—looks meagre in comparison to the those understood by Ps-Ignatius:

> heavenly things, the angelic orders, and the variations of archangels and hosts, the distinctions between powers and dominions, and the differences between thrones and authorities, the majesties of the ages, the pre-eminence of the cherubim and seraphim, the sublimity [ὑψηλότης] of the Spirit and the kingdom of the Lord, and above all, the incomparable majesty of Almighty God….[457]

Ignatius' reputation as one in touch with spiritual realities is clearly cultivated in the redactor's amendment of *Philadelphians* 7.1, which in the MR runs: 'Even though certain people wanted to deceive me according to the flesh, even so the Spirit is not deceived, being from God.' The LR turns a general statement about the Spirit [τὸ πνεῦμα] into one specifically about Ignatius' own God-given spirit: 'Even though certain people wanted to deceive me according to the flesh, even so *my* spirit [τὸ πνεῦμα μου] is not deceived, for I have received it from God [παρὰ γὰρ θεοῦ αὐτὸ εἴληφα].'

We have discussed at some length Ps-Ignatius' imitation of the apostle Paul, and possible motivations for this. For a disciple to speak the words of Paul and walk his footsteps confirms his honourable pedigree as a Christian and strengthens the authority of the disciple's writings. Our case study on LR-*Tarsians* 1 demonstrated just how infused are the words of Paul, in addition to those of other biblical figures, in the prose of the LR, especially his reflections upon his status as a prisoner and the significance of his approaching death. Although I do not believe the redactor would have confessed embarrassment about Ignatius' thirst for martyrdom, he makes a noticeable effort to colour this desire in explicitly Pauline terms. One example occurs when Ps-Ignatius conflates two excerpts from the Pauline corpus—2 Timothy 4:6 and Philippians 3:8—in interpreting Ignatius' death: I am 'now ready to be poured out as a libation [σπένδομαι], that I may win Christ.'[458] His desire for death is given explicit sanction through the appropriation of Paul.

[456] MR-*Trall*. 5.2.
[457] LR-*Trall*. 5; the passage bears close similarity to *AC* 8.12.
[458] LR-*Ant*. 8; cf. MR-*Rom*. 2.2.

Perhaps above all things, Ignatius is memorialised as a pastor: always ready to provide ample pastoral advice,[459] moderate in regard to what ascetic demands ought to be followed,[460] and traversing the full spectrum of emotions from tender to tempestuous dependant on the needs of his addressees. The letter of Mary to Ignatius, so valuable for providing the most 'objective' glimpse into the LR Ignatius, calls him a 'blessed shepherd,' her 'father in God,' and describes the Christians of Antioch as 'your Christ-loving people who are shepherded under your care.'[461] He puts the Antiochenes on their guard against heresies, 'as a father does his children.'[462] As a compassionate listener and correspondent, positive towards the status and potential of women and the young,[463] the LR's Ignatius represents a relatable and sympathetic figure for the Christians of late fourth-century Antioch.

Ps-Ignatius' unique project of 'resurrection' and memorialisation from the narrative position of autobiography is thoroughgoing, and yet has been deemed a failure or worse, both because its act was 'deceptive,' and because this deception was discovered. As I hope this chapter has demonstrated, the long recension is thoroughly worthy of study in its own right. But it also represents the work of one attempting to remain faithful to his second-century paragon and hero. Ps-Ignatius, in amplifying the MR letters, embodied the authorial voice of Ignatius in an attempt to resurrect the memory of him in his own day, and to constitute a new centre of culture around which memories of the martyr and his message could be formed. His embodiment of Ignatius' identity and voice was an expression of personal self-abasement and kenosis, denying himself personal glory or remembrance for the sake of the continued immortality of the name of his hero. Such a view does not entail ignorance of the more practical stimuli towards forgery, such as Ehrman's monograph sets out to demonstrate:

[459] E.g. LR-*Tar*. 9; LR-*Ant*. 9–10; LR-*Hero* 1, 3.
[460] See §2.3.2 and §2.5 above and Brox (1976).
[461] LR-*Mary to Ign*. 5.
[462] LR-*Ant*. 6.
[463] See LR-*Hero* and §2.5 above.

> [Forgeries'] authors assumed false names for one chief end: to provide for their views an authority that otherwise would have proved difficult to obtain had they written anonymously or in their own names. These were authors in the throes of controversy, eager to establish their views as both legitimate and authorized.[464]

As this chapter has extensively shown, the long recension does indeed reflect and engage in a great deal of polemical controversy—doctrinal, ecclesiastical, political, and practical—in aide of which the author employs the authoritative voice of Ignatius. What I hope to have problematised about Ehrman's thesis, however, is the airtight seal he assumes between the 'views' of the forger and those of his pseudepigraphal subject. At least in the case of the LR, we encounter a forger whose voice and ethic are profoundly shaped by and around his hero. His endeavour is not to impose his views upon Ignatius artificially, but to engage the martyr, scripture, and other authorities in conversation. Ps-Ignatius (as it were) conducts this chorus of voices, so that being harmonious in unanimity, and having taken their key from God, they might sing in unity in a single voice.[465] Ehrman's binary dissolves under the weight of this forgery's 'consubstantiality' with 'genuine' literature.[466] As Scherbenske writes in a context not altogether different, 'textual alterations were…fundamentally dependent on an authorial construct that shaped and structured the proffered textual restitution.'[467] Scholarship would be less inclined to count as unmitigatedly pejorative its act of 'forgery' if it were understood more as an act of biography, as valuable for its literary merits as for the light it sheds on Ignatius and his influence.

[464] Ehrman (2013), 150.
[465] MR-*Ephes.* 4.2.
[466] Ruthven (2001), 3.
[467] Scherbenske (2013), 5.

Chapter 7: The Ignatian Cult—Martyrology and Material Culture

If Ps-Ignatius' redaction of the long recension was a unique way to memorialise the martyr, others ensured he remain in the annals of Christian memory through the more established means of recording the acts of his martyrdom (*acta*). Only two of the five known martyrologies of Ignatius are assessed by Lightfoot to have an 'independent character,' the other three deriving in some sense from either of these originals.[1] I concentrate on these independent two—the so-called Antiochene and Roman *Acts*—not only because they are the most primitive, but also because their content is the most compelling. While all five represent a valuable tradition of Christian memory of their hero, reflecting various shades in the kaleidoscope of Ignatius' life and influence, I restrict myself to exploring the manner in which the authors of the two 'independent' martyrologies remember and portray Ignatius of Antioch. This chapter joins Candida Moss in calling out scholarship's lack of interest in the martyrologies for analysing how Ignatius the martyr was understood in the early church.[2]

As well as these two pieces of literature, John Chrysostom penned what must be considered the most eloquent hagiographical piece about Ignatius.[3] This takes the form of a homily apparently delivered to the community gathered at the shrine commemorating Ignatius at Antioch, on the very day of Ignatius' festival. Delivered adjacent to the relics of the martyr, and on his *dies natalis*, the primary focus of the sermon is naturally on the holy nature of Ignatius' martyrdom, but it also includes explicit pastoral and ethical meditations upon the significance of Ignatius' life for the assembled community. This contrasts with the martyrologies, whose ethical teachings are more implicit, to be inferred from the sanctified passion of the martyr.

[1] Lightfoot (1889), II.368–77 (quotation on 377).
[2] Moss (2016), 90–91.
[3] *Homily on the Holy Martyr Ignatius* (PG 50:587–96).

Accounts glorifying the final words and deeds of a holy person naturally reflect the theological, ecclesiastical, political, and social concerns of the authorial community. As we saw in the case of the LR, the authority of the martyr, now invested with the sanctity of martyrdom vividly recollected, is appropriated to promote the agendas of those remembering. In highlighting and discussing these, I do not bring into question the spirit of sincerity and devotion with which they remember Ignatius, but hope to examine how these concerns might influence their portrayal of Ignatius.

It has been widely argued that martyrologies were created and circulated in an atmosphere of competition.[4] The traditions found in a martyrology, especially one written several centuries after the events it records, are naturally the result of something of a process of natural selection: memories of the martyr's final hours are retained, adapted, or omitted, depending on their resonance with the remembering community, whose temper and taste themselves change from generation to generation—a community's portrait of the martyr is of necessity painted with the palette of colours the community itself supplies. There was competition also in the sense that, in writing a martyrology, a community vied for the rights to determine the genuine and authoritative memory of the martyr.

Although their accounts differ upon particulars, Smith and Gilliam both agree that these texts reflect conflict between 'Nicene' and Homoian Christian communities in the fourth century. Smith believes the Homoian community that produced the LR and 'rediscovered' the relics of Ignatius was also responsible for the Roman *Acts*, producing such 'Ignatiana' in a concerted effort to 'resurrect' the memory of the saint and claim him as an Homoian champion. Enjoying the support of the Arian-sympathising Emperor Valens, members of the Homoian community created the martyrology during a missionary trip to Alexandria; this explains the several instances in which the Roman *Acts* follows

[4] See e.g. Moss (2010), (2012), (2013).

the wording of the LR rather than the MR, and the existence of the text in two Coptic dialects. Upon Valens' death and Theodosius I's accession, favour for Arianism dwindles, and Ignatius is wrested to the side of the Nicenes, evidence of which exists in the form of Chrysostom's sermon.[5] However, Smith's thesis that the LR and the Roman *Acts* find a shared origin in the Antiochene Homoians does not sit well with Lightfoot's observation that Antioch is almost completely ignored in the text.[6] Not even a supposed Alexandrian audience could account for the Roman martyrology's peculiar fixation upon Rome, to the point of contradicting the well-known fact that Ignatius' remains were interred (and perhaps rediscovered) in Antioch. Judging only from this, Rome must be a prime contender for its place of origin. Lightfoot's cautiously broad dating of sometime during the fifth and sixth centuries seems one of the only incontestable features of this text.[7]

Smith is reticent about the Antiochene *Acts*, but Lightfoot argues for their being written and initially circulated in Antioch.[8] The fact that this text shows no knowledge of the LR would appear to be evidence against a common authorship. However, especially given that Antioch is its clear focal point, I believe the Antiochene martyrology likely to have been created in the wake of that city's renewed enthusiasm for Ignatius generated by the circulation of the LR, and the 'rediscovery' of his remains. As will be seen, it too vies to be the authoritative record of the martyr's last days (and may well be if Bisbee is to be believed),[9] bearing signs of such a competition.

Gilliam builds substantially upon the basis provided by Smith, particularly that of terminally divided Christian communities in Antioch.[10] While quibbling with Smith's dating of Chrysostom's sermon and the LR,[11] he detects in Chrysostom a clear defence of Ignatius as a specifically Nicene

[5] J.D. Smith (1986), 28–34.
[6] Lightfoot (1889), II.382.
[7] Lightfoot (1889), II.382–83.
[8] Lightfoot (1889), II.368–69.
[9] See below §2.4.
[10] Gilliam (2017), 204 n.36.
[11] Gilliam (2017), 190.

figure.[12] He also follows Lightfoot in holding that Chrysostom knew and alluded to the MR on several occasions, and toys with the suggestion that he knows and actively avoids quoting from the LR.[13] I believe we can follow Gilliam in considering the figure of Ignatius in this later period as a 'battleground' upon which doctrinal clashes were fought.[14]

It is arguable that Smith and Gilliam both exceed the evidence in drawing such a specific conclusion from such sparse evidence, but we need not adopt either thesis in full to acknowledge the context of polemic and competition in which all these texts were composed.

§1: Hagiography and the cult of saints in Christian antiquity

Although the LR itself may be termed a form of 'hagiography,' this chapter focuses on three texts more conventionally hagiographic. We therefore begin with a brief overview of hagiography as a style of writing, and its connection with the early Christian cult of saints.

There exists a wide variety of perspectives about the usefulness of hagiographical sources for gleaning historical information, which is still the central concern of many modern studies.[15] On the one hand, the very title of Grig's monograph *Making Martyrs in Late Antiquity* reveals her emphasis on hagiographers' *fabrication* of the martyrs they champion, and scepticism regarding scholarship's ability to perform anything like a 'critical' or 'scientific' analysis of them.[16] On the other hand, Barnes is of the opinion that, since many martyr texts were written very soon after the events they record, and since it was possible for believers to obtain records of other Christians' trials, they may be plumbed for detail which has the ring of historical truth about it.[17] Both of these arguments bear softening (it seems hasty of Grig to deny categorically the compatibility of hagiography and

[12] Chrysostom's motivations for doing so are spelled out at great length by Gilliam (2017), 204–20.
[13] Gilliam (2017), 206–10; Lightfoot (1889), I.165–66.
[14] Gilliam (2017), 222.
[15] See Gemeinhardt & Leemans (2012), 4.
[16] Grig (2004), 146–51.
[17] Barnes (2012), 18–19; cf. 'les coordonnées hagiographiques' which Delehaye believes 'nécessaires et suffisants pour identifier un saint' (1934: 13).

history, while Barnes is arguably too optimistic about his ability to discern historical truth from literary fiction); as usual, the truth is probably somewhere in the middle.[18]

Since our concern is with the memory of Ignatius as it existed in the early church, the question of historicity is not of supreme importance to us. However, it is of interest to us that hagiography had become central to Christian literature in both East and West by the end of the fourth century,[19] exactly the time of two of our texts (Antiochene *Acts* and Chrysostom's *Homily*). The texts we deal with, then, and their interest in the abiding physical presence of Ignatius in his shrine, are to be seen as part of the unprecedented surge of enthusiasm for Christian martyrs and holy people.[20] As Krueger notes, this mode of writing did not emerge *ex nihilo*, but grew up in imitation of biblical and proto-hagiographical texts.[21]

I do not wish the same complexities of definition we encountered with regard to the genre of 'biography' (chapter 5) to occupy us at such great length here. This is partly because the fluidity of ancient genre boundaries has already been demonstrated, and partly because hagiography is commonly thought of as a *feature* present in writings of other genres, while not being a genre itself.[22] I propose to follow Delehaye, for whom a strictly 'hagiographical' writing 'doit avoir un caractère religieux et se proposer un but d'édification. Il faudra…réserver ce nom à tout monument écrit inspiré par le culte des saints, et destiné à le promouvoir.'[23] An essential feature of early Christian hagiography, then, is its relevance to the cult of saints, i.e. the relics of, or cultic devotion to, revered heroes of faith.[24] As Delehaye stresses, the genre (if it be one) may be used in service of

[18] D. Brown's (2000) moderate position with regard to medieval saints is equally applicable to late antiquity.
[19] Barnes (2010), 237; for the *terminus a quo* of hagiography, see Barnes' comment that Eusebius was 'the first hagiographer whose name is known' (43).
[20] Cf. Averil Cameron (1991), 90.
[21] Krueger (2004), 195–96; for the centrality of imitation in hagiography, see ibid., 192–94.
[22] Rapp (1999) argues that 'hagiographic' texts are defined by their subject matter rather than their form; Barnes (2010: 237) writes that 'hagiography was never a literary genre on the strict definition of that term,' but notes that hagiographical themes and material 'permeate all types of literature from the late fourth century onwards.'
[23] Delehaye (1906), 2.
[24] Barnes (2012: 33) agrees: 'Christian hagiography and the cult of the saints are indissolubly linked to each other.'

(variously and in varying measure): Christian apology, paraenesis, exhortation, consolation, history, and entertainment. These observations will be borne out in the texts examined below.

With the increase in popularity of hagiography and the rise of the cult of saints came a new or at least heightened awareness of the sacred potential latent in space, physical objects, and times that are associated with saints. MacMullen's suggestion that the cult of martyrs was the primary form of liturgy for over 95 percent of the Christian population in late fourth-century Antioch[25] demonstrates not only the cult's immense popularity, but also its potential to draw a varied audience, functioning as a point of unity among the classes. The legalisation of Christianity at the beginning of the fourth century brought a number of factors which catalysed this change: (1) an immunity from the threat of persecution and the production of martyrs; (2) widespread fascination with the heroism and virtue of recent history's martyrs; and (3) the possibility that Christian practices and beliefs might become visible and manifest in public life.[26]

We observe throughout the fourth and fifth centuries a rapid increase in the creation of shrines (martyria) dedicated to a particular saint. Usually housing the martyr's relics and intricately decorated,[27] such a shrine was considered a locus of intense spiritual presence, 'the joining of Heaven and Earth.'[28] Basil of Caesarea believed that 'he who touches the bones of a martyr partakes in the sanctity and grace that reside in them.'[29] Such sites provided a space for Christians to visit, be refreshed, and to pray, being convinced that martyrs were 'very powerful intercessors' for their fellow-believers.[30] Diverse practices arose in association with the martyria, such as passing oil through the tomb and collecting the sanctified effluence, and 'incubation,' or sleeping in the martyrium in the hope of receiving meaningful dreams or healing.[31] Items associated with the

[25] MacMullen (2009), 15–31.
[26] Cf. Barnes (2010), 154.
[27] See e.g. Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Martyr Theodore* (PG 46:737, §44f.).
[28] P. Brown (1981), 1.
[29] Basil, *Homily on Psalm 115* (PG 30:112).
[30] Leemans (2003), 11.
[31] Leemans (2003), 12–13; Bear (2017), 62–64, 218–20, 239–40.

martyr, particularly their passion, were also invested with great power. While these shrines were always available to be visited, their popularity peaked on the feast day of the martyr, when the entire Christian community of the surrounding area would convene, and often hear a sermon.[32] Just as the landscape was dotted with sites of intense sanctity, so the Christian calendar was punctuated by sanctified days.[33] As locations of intense devotion and remembrance, martyria quite clearly correspond to Pierre Nora's *lieux de mémoire*. Although Nora's primary interest is how the victors in post-Revolution France curated national identity around physical sites that encoded a normative version of the remembered past,[34] many of his insights are wonderfully transferrable to other contexts. *Lieux de mémoire* are physical objects and spaces that inculcate normative memories and narratives in a changing and confusing present, unite and induct members into a shared identity, and are also places where new culture and meaning is created.[35] Nora's comment that the 'purpose' of sites of memory is to 'block the work of forgetting, to establish a state of things, to immortalize death, to materialize the immaterial,'[36] may as well have been written with early Christian martyria in mind.

Hagiographic literature arose as a product of the very same enthusiasm that motivated the martyria, in order to rationalise, explain, and perhaps justify it, but also to further enflame believers in their reverence towards the martyrs. Hagiographic literature presented ordinary Christians with vivid, edifying, and (to some extent) imitable models of Christian piety: 'Sacred lives functioned as ideological and literary exemplars,' and present a 'blueprint for the interpretation of history.'[37] Holy men and women are often presented in hagiography as reproducing the pattern laid down by Christ

[32] Shepardson (2014), 169–70. Such feast days were often direct replacements of festivals surrounding the imperial cult or in honour of pagan deities; see Delehaye (1906), 202–9 and MacMullen (2009), 26.
[33] One recent study opens with the assumption that 'the material world was permeated by the imaginary in Late Antiquity…and had an important function in creating community memories,' and thus prioritises 'holy places and holy objects' (Neil [2018: 1]).
[34] See Nora (1996)
[35] Nora (1989), 8–9, 12, 18–24.
[36] Nora (1989), 19, although discussion of intentionality is perhaps more difficult in our context.
[37] Averil Cameron (1991), 145, 146.

in his death—particularly appropriate for Ignatius who wished to 'imitate the suffering of [his] God.'[38] This presentation endowed the martyrs 'with Christly authority, authority that could be manipulated by those controlling the memory, legacy, and cults of the saints, but an authority that could never quite be harnessed.'[39] How this mercurial authority is realised in our three martyrological accounts of Ignatius is the subject of the remainder of this chapter.

§2: The Antiochene *Acts of Ignatius*[40]

It is not surprising that this text seeks to establish its veracity as an authoritative and historical account, especially in light of the atmosphere of competition in which it was composed. The hagiographer goes to some length to impart verisimilitude (even including the entirety of Ignatius' epistle to the Romans), its various anachronisms notwithstanding.[41] The first two-thirds of this martyrology (chapters 1–4) are narrated in the third person, but midway through chapter 5 the narrative voice moves to the first-person plural.[42] Eye-witness testimony was perhaps particularly desirable given the conversation held between Ignatius and Trajan, and the geographical and temporal specificity with which Ignatius' journey is recounted. Ignatius' physical remains are said to have been gathered up and transported from Rome to Antioch by the martyrologist's party in a sarcophagus (ἐν ληνῷ), hinting at the inauguration of cultic practice that reveres such an 'inestimable treasure [θησαυρὸς ἀτίμητος].'[43] The martyrology is sealed with a statement of authenticity from one who was an 'eyewitness [αὐτόπτης]'[44] of not only the martyr's blessed journey from Antioch to Rome, and of the translation of his relics, but also Ignatius' post-mortem apparition κατ᾽οἶκόν.

[38] MR-*Rom*. 6.3.
[39] Moss (2010), 46.
[40] I follow the Greek text of Lightfoot (1889), II.477–95.
[41] As listed by Lightfoot (1889), II.383–90; Bisbee (1988), 146–49; Ehrman (2013), 507.
[42] A move common in martyrologies, e.g. *Mart. Pol.* 15.1f.; cf. 9.1.
[43] *Ant. Mart.* 6.
[44] *Ant. Mart.* 7.

In a possible allusion to the Gethsemane scene,[45] and perhaps also hinting towards the practice of incubation, sleep overcomes the watching and praying of the 'weak [ἀσθενής]' eyewitnesses.[46] This weakness seems to have been for the best, as Ignatius himself appears, to each person in a different form—embracing one, praying over another, and to some in the guise of a warrior fresh from battle. The martyrologist does not appear concerned by this ambiguity, even recording that upon awaking, the faithful 'compared the visions of their dreams [συμβαλόντες τὰς ὄψεις τῶν ὀνειράτων].'[47] Given the variety of ways different witnesses interpreted the risen Christ, the author may have considered ambiguity desirable or proper to post-mortem apparitions, and applied such to Ignatius. The complete historical unverifiability of these visions is mitigated by their theological and spiritual significance: believers are comforted, blessed, and cheered by the 'martyr of Christ, who trampled upon the Devil.'[48] This martyrology commands authority via an intriguing combination of historical and theological touchstones.

One of its purposes is certainly exposed in the final complete sentence of the work: 'We have revealed to you the day and the time, so that [ἵνα] gathering together at the season of the martyrdom we might hold communion with the athlete and noble martyr of Christ.'[49] The fact that Ignatius appeared to *multiple* people suggests the distinctly communal setting of the birth of his cult (while also improving the credibility of the visions). Although it is presented as a founding document which should initiate the yearly veneration of the martyr, it is more likely a retrospective account attempting to justify some established practice, and the date on which his celebration is held (13th day before the Kalends of January). Indeed, the parenthetical remark that on Ignatius' journey to Rome 'all swarmed to him hoping that they might receive a portion of some spiritual gift [μέρος

[45] Cf. Matt. 26:41: γρηγορεῖτε καὶ προσεύχεσθε, ἵνα μὴ εἰσέλθητε εἰς πειρασμόν· τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα πρόθυμον ἡ δὲ σὰρξ ἀσθενής.
[46] *Ant. Mart.* 7.
[47] *Ant. Mart.* 7. For the importance of dreams as a narrative device in early Christian hagiography, see Keskiaho (2015), 24–75.
[48] *Ant. Mart.* 7.
[49] *Ant. Mart.* 7.

χαρίσματος πνευματικοῦ]'[50] may be read as reflecting the authorial community's beliefs surrounding their cultic practice, as we saw above. For our martyrologist then, just as all rightly flocked to Ignatius in life to gain spiritual enrichment, so it is proper that the community comes to him in death in the same hope.

The belief in the power of martyrs to act as intercessors we see embedded in the martyrology. The last act Ignatius is supposed to have carried out before being led off to amphitheatre is to fall to his knees and 'intercede [παρακαλέσας] to the Son of God for the churches, for the cessation of persecution [ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ διωγμοῦ καταπαύσεως], and for the love of the brethren to one another.'[51] It is likely that the martyrologist has in mind the adherents of his cult who brought pleas to his shrine in the hope that he will act as their spokesman before God.

§2.1: Ignatius memorialised in the Antiochene *Acts*

That Ignatius is recorded as praying for an end to persecution is noteworthy, shedding light on several of the hagiographer's motives and readings of the MR. The martyrology records Ignatius to have already 'weathered the past storms of the many persecutions under Domitian,' and as having been 'fearful lest he should lose any of the weak-hearted or inexperienced [δεδοικὼς μή τινα τῶν ὀλιγωψύχων ἢ ἀκεραιοτέρων ἀποβάλῃ]'—presumably through recantation under threat of death.[52] When a period of respite came, while he was glad [ηὐφραίνετο] 'at the tranquillity of the church [ἐπὶ τῷ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἀσαλεύτῳ],' he was also

> distressed for himself that he had not yet attained true love towards Christ or the perfect rank of a disciple: for he considered that the confession that comes through martyrdom would bring him to dwell more closely to the Lord.[53]

[50] *Ant. Mart.* 3.
[51] *Ant. Mart.* 6.
[52] *Ant. Mart.* 1.
[53] *Ant. Mart.* 1.

By means of an introduction, the narrator records that after having remained 'a few years longer with the church' in Antioch, Ignatius 'attained the fulfilment of his prayer.'[54] Even years before the time of his condemnation, then, Ignatius is presented as familiar with state persecution and its operation, and expresses an ambivalent attitude towards it. He is eager for the opportunity it might present for himself and other true Christians to prove their devotion to Christ, though afraid for those whose weakness might lead them to deny Christ. He also seems to regard the absence of persecution as a good in itself and an occasion for rejoicing.

The events in the body of the martyrology occur under the auspices of Trajan, whose plans are narrated: buoyed from several recent victories, and considering his triumph not to be absolute until the Christians submitted to the gods of the nations, he threatened them with persecution and 'compelled [κατηνάγκαζεν] all those who were living piously either to offer sacrifice or to die.'[55] It is due to his 'fearing for the church of the Antiochenes' that Ignatius 'was led by his own free will [ἑκουσίως ἤγετο]' before the emperor,[56] after which a lengthy dialogue ensues. The martyrologist ascribes complex motivation to Ignatius' decision to go before Trajan, emphasised by the juxtaposition between ἑκουσίως and the middle/passive ἤγετο: it is partly for the benefit of his own standing before Christ and status as a disciple, but also out of concern for the Antiochenes in the face of Trajan's wrath. Whether this anxiety is specifically for those 'weak-hearted or inexperienced' who might be lost through recantation, or for the peace of the Antiochene church, is unclear. Either way, what is certain is that Ignatius chose to expose himself to Trajan in the hope that, in so doing, the emperor's wrath towards his community might be mitigated.

The picture of Ignatius that emerges approximates to one of a scapegoat, who averts the punishment of others onto himself. This might be substantiated by the martyrology's comparison of Ignatius to a sacrificial figure of a 'distinguished ram, the leader of a fine flock [κριὸς ἐπίσημος

[54] *Ant. Mart.* 1.
[55] *Ant. Mart.* 2.
[56] Possibly alluding to MR-*Rom*. 4.1: ἐγὼ ἐκὼν ὑπὲρ θεοῦ ἀποθνήσκω.

ἀγέλης καλῆς ἡγούμενος].'[57] In a manner redolent of Origen's description of a martyr as a 'blameless priest offering a blameless sacrifice,'[58] the Ignatius of the martyrology is represented as simultaneously in possession of and lacking agency. A ram itself is an animal fit to be sacrificed, but also expressly one with agency to lead many others. While it is Trajan's order that Ignatius should be 'put in chains by soldiers [δέσμιον ὑπὸ στρατιωτῶν γενόμενον],' the middle περιθέμενος conveys the reality of Ignatius' agency when he in fact 'invested *himself* in his chains with delight [μετ᾽ εὐφροσύνης περιθέμενος τὰ δεσμά].'[59] Indeed, Ignatius' joy at his sentence (he is said to have 'shouted aloud with joy' upon hearing it) strips from Trajan the force and authority normally proper to him, and places it squarely in the hands of the martyr. The majority of his journey from Antioch to Rome is narrated in the active voice, with such verbs as κατελθών, καταβάς and ἔσπευδε seeming to imply Ignatius' control over his own destiny.[60] However, upon reaching Rome, the voice changes suddenly to the passive: he is 'led away [ἀπήχθη] with haste to the amphitheatre,' immediately 'thrown in [ἐμβληθείς] to the arena,' and 'cast [παρεβάλλετο] by these godless men to ferocious beasts.'[61] The hagiographer appears to toy with the conception of Ignatius as sacrifice who is at once passive victim and active priest. Castelli's comment about the Origen extract above seems equally apposite to our text: 'The sacrificer and the sacrificed fuse into a single figure whose pure offering of self constitutes a complete and acceptable sacrifice.'[62] The martyrology is likely drawing from a wealth of pre-existing Christian reflection about martyrdom in his presentation of Ignatius as scapegoat for his community.

As we mentioned above, the martyrology's Ignatius regards the absence of persecution as a good, petitioning God that persecution may cease, though is ready to exploit the presence of

[57] *Ant. Mart.* 2. A clear allusion to *Mart. Pol.* 14.1, where Polycarp is 'like a distinguished ram chosen from a great flock for a sacrifice [ὥσπερ κριὸς ἐπίσημος ἐκ μεγάλου ποιμνίου εἰς προσφοράν].'
[58] *Exhortation to Martyrdom* 30 (PG 11:601).
[59] *Ant. Mart.* 2; Moss (2016: 94–96) discusses the interpretative fertility of Ignatius' act.
[60] *Ant. Mart.* 3.
[61] *Ant. Mart.* 6.
[62] Castelli (2004), 53.

persecution for his own spiritual gain. The martyrologist may have had good reason to portray Ignatius as firmly opposed to persecution, and definitely not a voluntary martyr.[63] Indeed, to judge from the MR, one would be forgiven for attributing to Ignatius at least an ambivalent view towards the persecution that finds him imprisoned and facing martyrdom.[64] Ignatius of the MR surely believes suffering under persecution to be a way to 'attain God,' at least for him.[65] Ignatius' joy at his church's rediscovery of peace (εἰρηνεύειν) most likely refers not to the quelling of external harassment, but to internal division, according to a majority of scholars.[66] If there were suspicion surrounding the potential voluntary martyrdom of Ignatius, the martyrologist may be attempting to dispel it. Moss reads the martyrologist's assimilation of Ignatius to Polycarp (especially his borrowing κριὸς ἐπίσημος) as serving just this purpose. Ignatius' quest for martyrdom is established as sharing the piety of 'Polycarp's patient self-withdrawal,' and indeed the 'entire church in fact is made complicit in Ignatius' endeavors.'[67] The petition of Ignatius recorded in the martyrology may also be interpreted as evidence for an early reading of εἰρηνεύειν to in fact refer to persecution, *contra* Harrison. This is especially likely given the faithfulness with which the martyrologist appears to adhere to the MR letters.[68] In any case, the martyrologist clearly treads a fine line in depicting Ignatius' stance towards persecution.

Ignatius is naturally remembered by the martyrologist as having unimpeachable virtue. He is introduced as a 'man of apostolic character in all ways [ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν ἀποστολικός]' (cf. MR-*Trall*. inscr.), and a 'disciple [μαθητής] of the apostle John.'[69] Our hagiographer's decision to claim

[63] Though there exists a contradiction in the martyrologist's use of ἑκουσίως; for a possible solution, see my comments on Bisbee below (§2.4). See Moss' problematisation of 'voluntary martyrdom' as an identifiable early Christian phenomenon (2012: 539–51). It is clear that disapproval of voluntary martyrdom lingered on after the real threat of martyrdom vanished; see Dearn (2006).
[64] Even if he found the agents of its enforcement less than pleasant (MR-*Rom*. 5.1).
[65] Though he occasionally uses the same language of others; see MR-*Ephes*. 10.1; MR-*Mag*. 1.2; MR-*Smyrn*. 9.2; MR-*Pol*. 2.3.
[66] MR-*Phld*. 10.1; MR-*Smyrn*. 11.2; MR-*Pol*. 7.1. See p.93 n.184 above.
[67] Moss (2016), 96.
[68] See §2.2 below.
[69] *Ant. Mart.* 1.

for Ignatius a degree of connection to the apostolic era that not even Ignatius himself claims highlights his objective to heighten Ignatius' credentials.[70] Problems with relative ages notwithstanding, it is claimed that Ignatius was a fellow-student [συνακροατής] of Polycarp under the tutelage of John. Undoubtedly guaranteed by his acquaintance with the apostles is Ignatius' insight into scripture: the martyrologist compares him to 'a divine lamp' as he 'illuminated the mind of each person by his exegesis of the scriptures.'[71] Despite a relative paucity of scriptural use in the MR, that Ignatius existed in the same pedagogic pedigree as two famous Christian saints ensures his orthodoxy.

Ignatius' martyrdom in the arena is said to acquire for him 'the crown of righteousness [ὁ στέφανος τῆς δικαιοσύνης],'[72] perhaps an allusion to 2 Timothy 4:8, or an adaptation of the more common prize for the martyr: the 'crown of immortality.'[73] Ignatius' particular righteousness is stressed throughout the martyrology, presumably to make the indictment of his condemners all the more powerful.[74] He joins history's catalogue of those righteous ones slain by the godless, of which Christ is the paragon.[75] Indeed, one of the martyrology's two direct quotations of scripture magnifies this theme: 'the desire of the righteous one is acceptable [ἐπιθυμία δικαίου δεκτή]' (LXX: Prov. 10:24).[76] The hagiographer's choice of Proverbs may be coincidental, but may equally betray a close familiarity with Ignatius' letters, in which Proverbs is a favourite.[77]

The image of the crown or garland is of course derived from agonistic or military spheres, in which the victor was awarded with such a token, from which the martyrology draws frequently:[78]

[70] Lightfoot (1889), II.477–79.
[71] *Ant. Mart.* 1.
[72] *Ant. Mart.* 5.
[73] See 1 Cor. 9:25; *Mart. Poly.* 17.1; Eusebius, *HE* 5.1.42 of Blandina. Cf. Jas. 1:12; Rev. 2:10; Tertullian, *De corona* 15 (PL 2:101).
[74] *Ant. Mart.* 5.
[75] *Ant. Mart.* 6: ἀπολέσθαι τὸν δίκαιον. See 1 Cor. 1:30; 1 John 2:1; cf. Jer. 33:16; Isa. 53:8–9.
[76] *Ant. Mart.* 6.
[77] MR-*Ephes*. 5.3 (LXX: Prov. 3:34); MR-*Mag*. 12 (LXX: Prov. 18:17).
[78] Other Christian martyrs portrayed in similarly agonistic language include Perpetua (*Passion of Perpetua and Felicity* 10.1–14) and Thecla (*Acts of S. Thecla* 1.9–18, 9.72–80).

Ignatius is an 'athlete and noble martyr of Christ,' and appears in the vision 'dripping with sweat, as if he had come from a great struggle [ἐκ καμάτου πολλοῦ].'[79] The martyrologist plays upon 'the inverted logic of martyrdom,' in which 'the ordinary values of honor and shame, glory and dishonor are disrupted':[80] while to the pagan spectator in the arena the martyr appears to be defeated by the beasts, in reality he emerges from the battle triumphant, having 'trampled upon the Devil and finished the race he desired out of love of Christ.'[81]

§2.2: Relationship with the MR

In this section, I set out to nuance Candida Moss' rather imprecise statement that in the Antiochene *Acts*, 'Ignatius sounds like and is intended to sound like the Ignatius of the [MR] epistles.'[82]

The martyrologist indeed appears to know the MR text and be eager to mould his portrait of Ignatius upon it. This is seen most clearly by his inclusion of the entirety of MR-*Romans* in his narrative. Several other allusions to the MR are immediately identifiable. Trajan's fascination with Ignatius' name θεοφόρος in the trial scene, and the theological mileage Ignatius makes on the back of this,[83] reflect the prominence of the title in the letters: Ignatius not only refers to himself as θεοφόρος in the inscription of every MR letter, but also extends the metaphor of 'bearing holy things' to fellow-Christians.[84] The martyrologist likely borrows from MR-*Polycarp* 2.3 the image of the bishop as a pilot guiding his ship of souls through tempestuous weather.[85] The cruelty of the soldiers in leading Ignatius to become 'food for bloodthirsty beasts' is redolent of MR-*Romans* 5.1–2 and 4.1. His 'longing to tread in the footsteps of the apostle' is clearly lifted from MR-*Ephesians*

[79] *Ant. Mart.* 7; the MR employs athletic and militaristic imagery at *Pol*. 1.3, 2.3, 3.1, 6.1–2.
[80] Castelli (2004), 91, 118; cf. Rewa (1979), 77.
[81] *Ant. Mart.* 7. See Castelli (2005: 121–23) for the various narrative functions an audience to a martyrdom can perform in a martyrology.
[82] Moss (2016), 92.
[83] *Ant. Mart.* 2.
[84] MR-*Ephes*. 9.2.
[85] *Ant. Mart.* 1.

12.2. The martyrology's gloss that Ignatius began his martyrial journey 'in longing desire for the [Lord's] passion [ἐπιθυμίᾳ τοῦ πάθους]' is surely a fair representation of MR testimony.[86] We discuss several further points of commonality in more depth.

His overriding motivation for martyrdom, repeated several times through the martyrology, is that he desires to be in the presence of the Lord. He longs to enjoy 'friendship [φιλία]' with Jesus;[87] in a passage reminiscent of Ignatius' MR-*Romans* (especially 3.2–3), he wills that 'soon disappearing to the world through the wild beasts, he might appear in the presence of Christ [ἐμφανισθῇ τῷ προσώπῳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ].'[88] Again, he wishes to depart the world quickly, 'that he might come [ἵνα φθάσῃ] to the Lord whom he loved.'[89] That he gained this most fervent desire is confirmed when he appears to the watchers 'standing by the Lord [with much boldness and ineffable glory].'[90] However, the martyrologist nowhere uses the typically Ignatian language of 'attaining God [ἐπιτυχεῖν θεοῦ].'[91] We might speculate as to the reasons for this: perhaps he found such language obscure and not well attested elsewhere; maybe he judged the intimate connection with the Almighty God which it seemed to entail to be inappropriate. In any case, the martyrologist reimagines this Ignatian trope in the more personal, familiar, even vaguely anthropomorphic language of proximity and friendship, and clarifies that it is Jesus, not God himself, to whom Ignatius is connected.

In relation to this is a passage mentioned above, which demonstrates Ignatius' self-doubt regarding his status as a Christian and disciple. The temporary abatement of persecution is said to have distressed Ignatius, who worried

> that he had not yet attained [ἐφαψάμενος] true love towards Christ [τῆς ὄντως εἰς Χριστόν ἀγάπης] or the perfect rank of a disciple [τῆς τελείας τοῦ μαθητοῦ τάξεως]: for he considered

[86] *Ant. Mart.* 3; cf. MR-*Rom*. 6.3; MR-*Mag*. 5.2.
[87] *Ant. Mart.* 2; cf. *Ant. Mart.* 7: φιλοχρίστος.
[88] *Ant. Mart.* 3.
[89] *Ant. Mart.* 5.
[90] *Ant. Mart.* 7; the text in square brackets is disputed according to Lightfoot.
[91] E.g. MR-*Ephes*. 12.2; LR-*Mag*. 14; MR-*Trall*. 12.2, 13.3. Ignatius speaks of attaining Christ twice at MR-*Rom*. 5.3.

> that the confession that comes through martyrdom [διὰ μαρτυρίου] would bring him to dwell more closely to the Lord [προσοικειοῦσαν τῷ Κυρίῳ].[92]

We firstly see the observations of the previous paragraph confirmed regarding the language in which Ignatius is made to speak of his ideal connection with the Godhead. Ignatius' supposed concern about the perfection of his discipleship also closely mirrors passages in the MR, particularly in *Romans*.[93] Ignatius' comment about the current insufficiency of his love towards Christ is not an error; after he is sentenced, he thanks the Lord (δεσπότης) for having 'deigned to honour me by perfecting my love towards you [με τελείᾳ τῇ πρός σε ἀγάπῃ τιμῆσαι κατηξίωσας].'[94] There is no instance in the MR where Ignatius betrays that his love for Christ is in any doubt, though he does not tend to speak of his relationship with Christ in terms of love.[95] Nonetheless, this passage in the martyrology is in keeping with the MR's Ignatius, who is also plagued with insecurities about his own insufficiency.[96]

The martyrology records Ignatius asking the Romans to show him 'genuine love [ἀληθινή ἀγάπη]' in not grudging him his haste towards the Lord, discoursing 'at greater length than in the epistle.'[97] The martyrologist again (this time showing his working) displays a high degree of fidelity to the MR letters, and clearly draws from Ignatius' 're-interpretation' of what it means to love at MR-*Rom*. 1.2: 'I am afraid of your love [ἀγάπη], lest it should do me wrong.'[98] According to the MR, it is only *after* God has deemed Ignatius worthy at the altar that the Romans might properly 'in love

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[92] *Ant. Mart.* 1.

[93] MR-*Rom*. 4.2: 'Then I will truly be a disciple of Jesus Christ, when the world will no longer see my body'; MR-*Rom*. 5.1: 'by [the soldiers'] mistreatment I am becoming more of a disciple'; MR-*Ephes*. 3.1: 'even though I am bound for the sake of the name, I have not yet been perfected in Jesus Christ. For now I am beginning to be a disciple.' Cf. MR-*Rom*. 5.3; MR-*Ephes*. 1.2; MR-*Mag*. 9.1; MR-*Trall*. 5.2; MR-*Phld.* 5.1; MR-*Pol*. 7.1.

[94] *Ant. Mart.* 2.

[95] He refers to 'the beloved Jesus Christ' (MR-*Smyrn*. inscr.), says that 'we justly love' God (MR-*Ephes*. 15.3), and wills that the sisters at Smyrna should 'love the Lord' (MR-*Pol*. 5.1). 'Love' features more commonly as something sought-after among believers. Cf. Ignatius' definition of ἀγάπη as 'the blood of Jesus Christ' at MR-*Trall*. 8.1, and Ignatius' desire for 'the drink of God' which is 'incorruptible love and eternal life.'

[96] See above p.87 n.157; cf. Stoops (1987), 174–75.

[97] *Ant. Mart.* 6.

[98] Cf. MR-*Rom.* 2.1: 'If you keep silence because of me, I will be a word of God; but if you love [ἐρασθῆτε] my flesh, I will again be only a voice.'

[ἐν ἀγάπῃ]' form a chorus and praise the Father[99]—a prophecy confirmed in the conclusion of the martyrology.

That Ignatius of the martyrology does indeed 'sound like the Ignatius of the [MR] epistles'[100] has been confirmed. While the martyrologist clearly wishes his hero to be faithful to the MR, his interpretation of several of its phrases reveals characteristics of the ideal martyr he wishes to portray.

§2.3: Excursus: The Depiction of Trajan

The Antiochene martyrology's portrayal of Trajan is intriguing and repays comparison with depictions of the emperor elsewhere.

The reason for Trajan's condemnation of Ignatius is not made completely explicit in the martyrology.[101] Although it is narrated that he gave Christians the ultimatum 'sacrifice or die,'[102] there is no mention of sacrifice at all in the trial scene. Trajan introduces Ignatius as one who is 'eager to transgress our commands' and who 'misleads others so that they come to a bad end.'[103] This seems similar to Pliny's primary problem with the Christians, about which he addresses Trajan.[104] The emperor's response was that Christians are not to be sought out, but that if they are brought forward (as Ignatius is 'willingly'), and the charges against them proved, they are to be punished.[105] According to the emperor's own words, therefore, the evidence provided by the martyrology presents sufficient substance for the emperor to rule against Ignatius.

[99] MR-*Rom*. 2.2.
[100] Moss (2016), 92.
[101] This apparent confusion regarding the specific grounds of condemnation continues into modern debates. See the altercation between Sherwin-White (1952: 210) and de Ste. Croix (1963), (1964), and the discussion at de Ste. Croix (2006), 144–45.
[102] *Ant. Mart.* 2.
[103] *Ant. Mart.* 2.
[104] Pliny (*ep.* 10.96.3) speaks of Christians' '*pertinaciam…et inflexibilem obstinationem*.'
[105] Pliny, *ep.* 10.97.

From there, Trajan's conversation with Ignatius appears to some degree contrived to display the theological objectives of the martyrologist, though not necessarily to the detriment of the account's historicity. The two come to blows about the validity of pagan gods, and Trajan proves curious about Ignatius' claim to 'carry Christ within' himself. Indeed, this features in his statement of condemnation: 'We command that Ignatius, the one who says he carries around the crucified in himself, to be put in chains….' This fact—that Ignatius is inhabited by one who was officially condemned and declared an enemy of the state to the point of execution—surely also contributed to Trajan's case against him.

Despite pronouncing Ignatius' condemnation in our martyrology, Trajan appears to be remembered in a relatively neutral light, as a barely-caricatured necessary player in Ignatius' story. The least favourable aspect of his presentation (from the perspective of a Christian audience) is his labelling Ignatius a 'wretch of a devil [κακοδαίμων]'—hardly the height of offensive language.[106] The martyrologist acknowledges Trajan's military victories and narrates his desire to bring the Christians into submission fairly dispassionately.[107] After giving his sentence, he disappears from the narrative. Our martyrologist's restraint is emphasised all the more when compared to the Trajan of the Roman *Acts of Ignatius*, whose unbounded cruelty and doggedness in tormenting Ignatius is quite simply fanciful (see §4 below).

Trajan appears in Eusebius' chronicle mainly as a historical marker by which to judge the episcopacies of various bishops and other significant events.[108] However, Eusebius also employs discernible discretion in treating Trajan's involvement with martyrdoms. Referring to *epistle* 10.96–97, Eusebius records Pliny as contacting Trajan because he was 'disturbed at the number of martyrs [ἐπὶ τῷ πλήθει τῶν μαρτύρων κινηθέντα]' who appeared to have done nothing deserving of punishment, and in fact 'did everything according to the laws [πάντα τε πράττειν ἀκολούθως τοῖς

[106] *Ant. Mart.* 2. In fact, Lightfoot notes its colloquial use to mean simply 'miserable creature' (1889: II.481).
[107] *Ant. Mart.* 2.
[108] *HE* 3.20.8; 4.1f.

νόμοις].'[109] Trajan's reply is said to be that Christians 'should not be sought out, but punished when met with [μὴ ἐκζητεῖσθαι μέν, ἐμπεσὸν δὲ κολάζεσθαι].' This may be seen as a reasonable summary of the text as we have it, but Eusebius continues: 'Thereby the pressing threat of persecution was checked somewhat, but nonetheless pretexts remained for those who wished to do us harm.'[110] Trajan's actions are seen to have *relieved* persecution, and what harassment continued ascribed to other agents. Persecution which Eusebius explicitly states occurred 'under the emperorship of Trajan' is effected by 'certain heretics'—an apparently intra-Christian affair.[111] We must be mindful about his proximity to imperial power in assessing Eusebius' construal of Trajan as largely exculpated from guilt for Christian blood.

His favourable portrayal in Eusebius and our martyrology might also be explained by the fact that, as an emperor, Trajan was almost uniformly remembered as among the best. Pliny's fulsome panegyric to Trajan, delivered in AD 100, set the tone for history's subsequent assessment of the ruler. Trajan was only very rarely made to bear any form of criticism, even earning for himself the title *Optimus Princeps*, and regularly appeared in lists of 'good' emperors.[112] In praising Theodosius, the author of the *Epitome de Caesaribus* found a paragon of statesmanly virtue in Trajan, to whom Theodosius is said to be similar in manners, physique, and intellect.[113] Moreover, he was received into the medieval Christian tradition as an example of a virtuous pagan. That Dante situates Trajan in heaven is testament as much to the abiding legacy of the emperor's justice and mercy as to the power of Gregory's intercession.[114] Aquinas agrees that Trajan was pardoned and released from hell, even while noting his role in persecuting Christians.[115]

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[109] *HE* 3.33.1. In his own account of Pliny's opinion, Eusebius omits the Christians' contumacy with regard to sacrifice. Only in the translation of Tertullian's *Apologeticus* 2 which he appends is Pliny made to say that he found 'nothing wicked' in the Christians, 'except their not being willing to sacrifice to idols [ἔξω τοῦ μὴ βούλεσθαι αὐτοὺς εἰδωλολατρεῖν]' (3.33.3).
[110] *HE* 3.33.2.
[111] *HE* 3.32.2–3; cf. 3.32.6.
[112] See Nixon et al. (1994), 462, 466.
[113] *Epitome de Caesaribus* 48.8–9; cf. 13.
[114] *Paradiso* XX.43–48, 103–117; cf. *Purgatorio* X.73–93.
[115] *ST* IIIa Suppl. q.71, a.5.

It appears that the virtue of the man was so renowned that even Christians soon forgot that their own had died under his rule. Even martyrology, a genre in which the state is invariably depicted as Satan's earthly plenipotentiary, is apparently susceptible to this trend. A note of embarrassment, perhaps, is detectible in the author of the Antiochene *Acts of Ignatius*, for needing to record so great a man in a compromising position.

§2.4: Historical context

Having performed this brief analysis of the martyrology and its memorialisation of Ignatius and Trajan, is any information regarding the context of its composition able to be determined? That Antioch is the centre around which the martyrology turns has long been noted. The introduction focuses upon Ignatius' care for the church at Antioch; Ignatius' trial occurs there (however unlikely this would have been); his relics are returned to the city; there the martyr appears to his sleeping friends; annual celebration of his cult in Antioch is endorsed. Lightfoot justly took the intensity of interest in the city to betray the location of its authorship.[116]

Just as we saw the city championed in the LR, the person of Ignatius apparently served the martyrologist as a means of raising the profile of Antioch, perhaps also through the rediscovery of his remains in the late fourth century. Yet we need not follow Smith's hypothesis[117] to argue that Antioch may have had cause, independent of inter-denominational struggles, to feel itself slighted as a city of Christian prominence during the late fourth and fifth centuries. Boasting Peter as its first bishop, and indeed being the place Christians became Christians by name (Acts 11:26),[118] Antioch's importance as a Christian centre was in little doubt. By the fourth century, it emerges as the third patriarchal see of Christendom after Rome and Alexandria, and its bishop oversaw vast swathes of

[116] Lightfoot (1889), II.369.
[117] J.D. Smith (1986), 28–34.
[118] See Trebilco (2012), 272–97.

the east. However, the mid-fourth century saw Antioch caught between two cities whose influence was increasing rapidly.

Jerusalem grew in significance under Constantine, for whom the city was an attractive site of pilgrimage and sanctity, mainly because of its historical connection to the passion events of Jesus.[119] Its status continued to expand to such an extent that at the Council of Chalcedon the city was granted independence from the patriarchate of Antioch as autocephalous. Thus, by the mid-fifth century, Antioch had not only lost jurisdiction over Jerusalem, but had been equalled in its status as patriarchate.

The case of Constantinople must have been even more galling for Antioch's pride. Having no claim to association with Christ and little with the apostolic era, it also rose to prominence under Constantine. Its reputation was bolstered through its habit of translating saints' relics to the city from elsewhere.[120] Chrysostom, having been 'poached' as Constantinople's archbishop,[121] also contributed to this practice.[122] At the council there in AD 381, it was invested with honorary pre-eminence after the bishop of Rome (as the 'New Rome'), eclipsing Antioch and Alexandria which had traditionally been ranked next.[123] This insult was completed in AD 451 where it too was accorded patriarchal status.

Antioch was, geographically and metaphorically, caught between these two parvenu superpowers. Its own authority was challenged and diminished. Antioch had perhaps further cause for concern with regard to its reputation as a breeding-ground for heresy: it is easily surmised that a city that fostered not only Paul of Samosata and Theodore of Mopsuestia, but even Nestorius himself, must have some inherent inclination towards heterodoxy.[124] In the fifth century, there is

[119] Eusebius, *Life of Constantine* 3.25ff.
[120] See Woods (1991).
[121] Although his election there may have benefitted Antioch in several ways; see Mayer (2004), 457–59.
[122] See e.g. his homily for the reception of the relics of St Phocas (PG 50:699–706).
[123] Canon 3 (NPNF 2-14, 178).
[124] See Loofs (1924), 69–72.

an odour of heresy that lingers around Antioch, from which other major Christian centres were largely immune. Eastman considers the LR as an Antiochene production partially intended to bolster Antioch's authority as a Pauline foundation, in the face of 'Roman pretensions to preeminence,'[125] which argument is equally applicable to the Antiochene martyrology.

It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that the martyrologist wrote in a climate in which Antioch felt the need to assert itself as a city from which brave martyrs for Christ issued, and indeed over which they presided. The martyrology gives explicit notice that his remains lie in a sarcophagus (ἐν ληνῷ) there, and supplies the date of his celebration. Although an Antiochene readership appears to have been intended, its dissemination would have ensured that the martyrology also acted as publicity for Ignatius' shrine and the reputation of his city.

It is worth mentioning the opinion of Bisbee on the Antiochene *Acts*.[126] He accepts that the martyrology as we have it was created in the fifth century, though argues that it incorporates a second-century *commentarius* on Ignatius' trial (§2), in the same way that it incorporates the pre-existing MR letter to the Romans. This hypothesis does accord with my observation that the trial scene is terse and relatively non-theologised, and would account for its significant historical verisimilitude. Moreover, the inconsistency between the word ἑκουσίως (§2) and the martyrology's apparent aversion to voluntary martyrdom is problematic. Certain similarities between Lucian's account of the death of Peregrinus and the story of Ignatius could also be more easily explained if Lucian had been familiar not only with certain MR letters and the martyrdom of Polycarp,[127] but also a *commentarius* of his trial.[128] Bisbee's intriguing hypothesis would certainly improve the martyrology's claim to historicity and further strengthen the connection between the second century and the fourth.

[125] Eastman (2019), 223–24.
[126] Bisbee (1988), 133–62.
[127] That Lucian bases Peregrinus upon these sources is suggested by Lightfoot (1889: II.356) and Harmon (1936), 47.
[128] Bisbee (1988), 149–51.

§3: John Chrysostom's *Homily on the Holy Martyr Ignatius*[129]

Chrysostom's sermon is so rich in meaning and interest that our obligation to restrict ourselves to its memorialisation of Ignatius is a great shame. Yet even this topic provides a wealth of material for discussion. Shepardson has recently examined how Chrysostom bid for and exercised religious and political power through arbitrating upon physical spaces (which were encouraged for the faithful, and which dangerous), or what she calls 'spatial rhetoric.'[130] His instruction that Christians should frequent some sites (Nicene churches, shrines to orthodox martyrs etc.), and prohibition that they visit others (heterodox churches and shrines, synagogues), function as a means to 'patrol' the boundaries of his community.[131] One such site he forcefully urges his listeners to visit is the martyrium of Ignatius outside the city of Antioch—the same shrine hinted at in the Antiochene martyrology. As several comments make clear, this homily is in fact delivered at the location of his shrine, on Ignatius' *dies natalis*, where a large crowd had assembled, probably having arrived in procession from Antioch. It is likely that Chrysostom writes this homily at least partly in response to an Homoian attempt to claim the martyr for their cause. His evocation of the memory of Ignatius as unassailably Nicene combines with the sanctity of the place and time to produce a performative act of community building and definition.

It is interesting to compare this initiative with the physical manoeuvre made by Chrysostom's bishop while in Antioch, Flavian. Barriers of expense and logistical complexity did not dissuade Flavian from rearranging several of the burials in a nearby martyrium, in order to draw attention to tombs of his own followers and obscure those of some he considered 'heretics,'[132] thereby

[129] I follow the Greek text of PG 50:587–96; however, as its section divisions are awkward, I assume those of Mayer and Neil's (2006) edition, using the symbol §.
[130] Shepardson (2014), 92.
[131] Shepardson (2014), 92.
[132] PG 50:443.

'attempting to censure them in the community's memory.'[133] Chrysostom and Flavian both undertake to direct and correct how Antiochene Christians remember the departed.

Chrysostom strives to associate Ignatius with other martyrs celebrated in Antioch, forming them into an unbroken company of saints held in the church's remembrance; elsewhere he describes the saints' bodies as so numerous that they form a protective wall around their city.[134] At the beginning of our homily he recalls that a young woman Pelagia recently 'gave us a feast' at her martyrial table, and that today in their celebration of Ignatius, although the martyrs are different, 'the table is one.' They are united and energised through 'the grace of the Spirit' which is 'continuously laying the tables of martyrs for us, one after another.'[135]

§3.1: Similarities with the Antiochene *Acts*

Unsurprisingly, Chrysostom magnifies some of the same themes as the martyrology, which we briefly mention here. Ignatius' apostolicity is confirmed by the fact that he 'truly associated with the apostles and benefited from their spiritual springs.' He was even 'in their company everywhere [πανταχοῦ], and shared with them things both spoken and unspoken.'[136] He 'strove to emulate the apostles [τοὺς ἀποστόλους ἔσπευδε]' both in his death and his enthusiasm, and 'desired to imitate his teachers [μιμήσασθαι τοὺς διδασκάλους].'[137] His absolute unity with the apostles is highlighted through the fact that he was entrusted the office of bishop by the saints, who 'touched his sacred head.'[138] Ignatius accords completely with Paul's sketch of the archetypal (ἀρχέτυπος) bishop; he 'with precision impressed the [image] in its entirety upon his own soul.' The proof of all this? 'The very same people who said these things ordained him… [I]f they did not see that this great virtue

[133] Shepardson (2014), 200.
[134] *Encomium on Egyptian Martyrs* 1 (PG 50:694).
[135] §1.
[136] §3; cf. MR-*Ephes*. 11.2.
[137] §16; cf. MR-*Ephes*. 12.2.
[138] §4.

had been planted in this martyr's soul, they wouldn't have ordained him to this office.'[139] Ignatius' impeccable virtue and apostolicity go hand in hand due to explicit reference to Pauline texts describing the character of bishops.[140]

Chrysostom apparently follows Origen[141] in recording that Ignatius directly succeeded Peter as bishop of Antioch (οὗτος δέ ἐστι τὸ μετ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τοῦτον διαδέξασθαι τὴν ἀρχήν): for just as the very integrity of a building is imperilled unless one replaces a stone removed with an equivalent stone, so 'when Peter was intending to head away from there, the grace of the Spirit inserted in his place a different teacher, equivalent to Peter [ἀντίρροπος Πέτρου].'[142] While the martyrologist of the Antiochene *Acts* made the apostolic connection through the apostle John, Chrysostom does so through Peter and Paul.[143]

Chrysostom remembers Ignatius as an athlete and soldier, who returned from the struggle victorious. He initially proposes that the Spirit wove for Ignatius' 'holy head' a 'triple crown,' apparently corresponding to his three offices of martyr, bishop, and apostle.[144] Chrysostom seems to wish to use the crowns as a mnemonic device to aid the preacher in ordering his points. However, they turn out to be more of a hindrance than a help as Chrysostom soon becomes overwhelmed by the sheer number of crowns, multifold and multilayered, from which continually shoot forth new ones. Only midway through the sermon he has already counted up five crowns, and then gives up trying to count.[145] This is a forceful rhetorical strategy on the part of the preacher: Ignatius is so remarkable, virtuous and praiseworthy, that Chrysostom's stated intention is frustrated by the sheer number of his fine qualities. Every athlete requires an adversary, who is colourfully revealed as the Devil. He cunningly imposed upon Ignatius the arduous journey ('longer laps of the race

[139] §5.
[140] See D.L. Eastman (2019), 224–26.
[141] *Hom. in Luc.* 6.4 (Lightfoot [1889], I.144).
[142] §10.
[143] Cf. MR-*Rom*. 4.3.
[144] §3; cf. MR-*Mag.* 13.1.
[145] §11.

[μακροτέρους…τοὺς διαύλους τοῦ δρόμου]') to weaken him for the final battle. Little did he know that he and the churches along the way would mutually benefit each other, he 'training up [συνεκρότει]' the faithful, and they 'running together from all directions [συντρέχουσαι πάντοθεν] anointed [ἤλειφον] the athlete,' as if he were about to compete in the gymnasium.[146]

That Ignatius was martyred in the Colosseum—surely the most prominent place of spectacle in the known world—is made to bear great significance, and gives him a degree of agency in dying there.[147] Ignatius 'endured [ὑπέμεινε]' the way of martyrdom 'in order that [ἵνα] he might make all the spectators emulators [ζηλωταί] of his own struggles, raising a trophy [τρόπαιον] against the Devil in the sight of all.'[148] The metaphor of victory does not stop at his triumph over Satan; the particularly memorable fortitude and pleasure with which Ignatius met death continue to win converts to Christianity. The Devil's conspiracy in arranging his execution 'backfired on him with the reverse effect [εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον αὐτῷ περιετράπη],' because 'the crowned victor' Ignatius was borne aloft, just as 'the spectators immediately receive with magnificent glory a noble athlete who has wrestled down all his opponents and emerged from the ring.'[149] Chrysostom capitalises on every ounce of rhetorical potential the agonistic metaphor affords him in memorialising Ignatius.

§3.2: Relationship with the MR

Lightfoot produces a formidable list of instances where the homily appears to allude to the MR letters, on the basis of which it is more than likely that Chrysostom, like our martyrologist, had a working knowledge of Ignatius' corpus.[150] Yet his use of the letters is quite different from that of the Antiochene *Acts*, and the portrait of Ignatius that emerges worthy of analysis.

[146] §13; cf. MR-*Ephes*. 3.1; MR-*Rom*. 9.3; MR-*Phld*. 2.2.
[147] For Chrysostom's well-known antipathy towards theatre and spectacle, see Leyerle (2001).
[148] §16.
[149] §17.
[150] Lightfoot (1889), I.165–66. Though Zahn (1873: 34) disagrees: 'Eine sichere Anspielung an irgend einen ignatianischen Brief finde ich in dieser Rede nicht.'

Chrysostom narrates how the Devil reckoned that if he removed the shepherd the sheep would be scattered. God, however, 'allowed this to happen, with the intention of showing him that it is not humans who steer [κυβερνῶσιν] his churches, but he himself who in every instance shepherds [ποιμαίνων] those who believe in him.'[151] The preacher merges two Ignatian allusions (his comment that the church in Syria 'has God as a shepherd [ποιμήν] instead of me,' now that he is on his journey to Rome,[152] and his comparison of Polycarp to 'pilots [κυβερνῆται]' at the helm of a ship[153]) into one grand metaphor about the church's divine headship.

I agree with Lightfoot in judging Chrysostom to draw on MR-*Romans* 7.2 and the double appearance of ἔρος language,[154] in a passage regarding Ignatius' reaction to his condemnation to death by wild animals:

> When he heard that this means of punishment awaited him, he said: 'I have delight in those beasts!' Such are those who passionately love [τοιοῦτοι γὰρ οἱ ἐρῶντες]. Whatever they suffer for their loved ones [ὅπερ ἂν πάσχωσιν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐρωμένων] they receive with pleasure [μεθ' ἡδονῆς] and seem to be filled with passion [ἐμφορεῖσθαι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας] precisely whenever that which is happening is much more painful. This, then, is also what happened in the case of [Ignatius].[155]

Like Origen before him,[156] Chrysostom seems to interpret ἔρος here in a positive light: Ignatius is an exemplar of passionate love, which finds pleasure in suffering, when it is for the sake of loved ones (ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐρωμένων).[157] We should not be surprised that he blesses the instruments of his death, for the more cruelly he suffers, the more passion and pleasure those like him derive from it. Lightfoot interprets τοιοῦτοι γὰρ οἱ ἐρῶντες as the 'lover's passion for Christ,' though the text

[151] §12.
[152] MR-*Rom*. 9.1.
[153] MR-*Pol*. 2.3.
[154] Lightfoot (1889), I.166.
[155] §16.
[156] *Comm. in Cant.* prol. 2.
[157] Cf. Chrysostom's comments on the futility of martyrdom *without* love (ἀγάπη) at *Homily on Saint Romanus* (PG 50:607–8).

nowhere suggests this, lacking an object.[158] Indeed, the apposition of οἱ ἐρῶντες and ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐρωμένων implies that the love is directed towards a number of people or things, which would seem to preclude Christ as the sole object. We might ask whether Chrysostom also intends to style Ignatius' passionate loving, and especially his suffering 'for his loved ones,' as Christomorphic. Chrysostom applies Jesus' (largely) self-referential saying—'The good shepherd lays down his life for his sheep'—to Ignatius, who, upon hearing this verse, 'freely gave it up for his sheep [ἐπέδωκεν ὑπὲρ τῶν προβάτων] with all manliness.'[159] Some analogy with Christ's self-offering is clearly intended here, but probably only insofar as Christ himself counted his own death as according to his advice at John 15:13, that 'No one has greater love than this, to lay down one's life for one's friends [ἵνα τις τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ θῇ ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων αὐτοῦ].' This reading provides supporting evidence that the early church preferred to understand Ignatius' ἔρος at MR-*Romans* 7.2 as good and worthy of imitation, and perhaps also suggestive of Christ or the manner of his suffering. While this discovery should naturally not be determinative for our understanding of Ignatius, it should at least contribute towards it, especially since it has recently been dominated by a scepticism regarding the goodness of ἔρος for Ignatius.[160]

§3.3: God and the Devil

As hinted at above, Chrysostom imagines Ignatius as caught up in a struggle between the forces of evil and those of God. He endows Ignatius with 'yet another crown blasting forth' on the basis of Ignatius' commanding the church on Antioch at a time in which Christians were in almost constant mortal danger: 'wherever one might look were cliffs and pits and wars and conflicts and hazards; and governors and emperors and peoples and cities and tribes—both domestic and foreign—were

[158] Lightfoot (1889), I.166.
[159] §2; John 10:11.
[160] ὁ ἐμὸς ἔρως ἐσταύρωται is commonly interpreted in the light of Gal. 6:14 as a love for worldly things with which Ignatius wrestled; see Schoedel (1985), 184.

laying snares for the believers.'[161] The flock was also threatened from within by the spread of heresy. All this Ignatius was forced to contend with, and indeed overcome.[162] Responsibility for these trials is soon revealed as the Devil's. Indeed, Chrysostom's account of the persecution under which Ignatius suffered is laid squarely at the feet of Satan.[163] He was aware that execution in his own city of Antioch might have been too easy for Ignatius, and so imposed upon him the intensely arduous journey to Rome. However, Satan was thwarted in this both because of the refreshment offered by fellow-Christians, and because 'he had Jesus as a fellow merchant and migrant.'[164] As we have seen, Ignatius finally lifted up a 'trophy against the Devil' and wrestled his competitors to the ground.[165]

To what extent agency over Ignatius' journey and martyrdom should be considered God's or the Devil's seems to have confused Chrysostom. In addition to the Devil's actions noted above, he says that God simply 'allowed [συνεχώρησε]' Ignatius to be taken from Antioch,[166] and that he 'allowed [συνεχώρησεν] the saint to be perfected [τελειωθῆναι]' in Rome,[167] while later commenting that 'God took him from you for a short while.'[168] Chrysostom appears to claim that the events surrounding his martyrdom and the return of his relics were all part of God's οἰκονομία, though does not address how the activity of Satan might be reconciled with this. However, a more systematic approach may have been unwarranted in the work's homiletic context.

[161] Chrysostom's heightened language of danger is at odds with the tone of the Antiochene *Acts*, in which Ignatius' journey 'more resembles the progress of a conqueror than the transportation of a convict' (Lightfoot [1889]: II.368–69).
[162] §7.
[163] §12.
[164] §13.
[165] §§16–17.
[166] §12.
[167] §16.
[168] §17.

§3.4: Ignatius' effective suffering

We saw above how the Antiochene martyrology can be read as portraying Ignatius as a scapegoat figure, whose death benefits his fellow Antiochene Christians, namely, by diverting imperial punishment onto himself. This is related (but not equivalent) to Ignatius' own self-presentation in the MR, which we argued accords with the Pauline notion that his (Christomorphic) suffering benefits the churches in growth and strengthening.

Chrysostom also remembers Ignatius' suffering as occurring on behalf of the churches and for their benefit. Because Rome was a city of extreme impiety, it was necessary that 'both Peter and Paul, and this man [Ignatius] after them were all sacrificed [ἐτύθησαν] there.' He uses distinctly cultic language to speak about these sacrifices, which occurred in order that (ἵνα) 'they might purify with their own blood [τοῖς οἰκείοις αἵμασιν ἐκκαθάρωσι] the city defiled with the blood of idols.'[169] Rome's moral degeneracies are imagined as impurities, the scale of which requires not one but three Christian martyrial sacrifices to be purified. This should be compared with the passage we noted above, which represents Ignatius as one who suffers for the sake of those he loves (ὅπερ ἂν πάσχωσιν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐρωμένων, §16).

It appears that this suffering refers not only to his ultimate death, but also to the hardships he experienced on his way. Many cities are said to have 'received no ordinary comfort when they saw the martyr running to meet death.'[170] The MR image of Ignatius as the sun rising in the east and setting in the west is employed to convey how Ignatius 'benefitted [ἐυεργετήσας] everyone along the road in the greatest possible way.'[171] The nature of this benefit appears to have been at least partly instruction: Ignatius the 'wonderful teacher' is supposed to have 'convinced them to despise the present life and to regard visible things as nothing….'[172] Chrysostom also supplies a second

[169] §15.
[170] §13 (trans. Mayer and Neil).
[171] §14 (trans. Mayer and Neil); cf. MR-*Rom*. 2.2.
[172] §14; cf. MR-*Rom*. 3.3.

purpose for Peter, Paul, and Ignatius' sacrifice in Rome: in order that (ἵνα) they might 'present proof [παράσχωνται ἀπόδειξιν]' of Christ's resurrection, since they were willing to suffer such torments for his sake.[173] Indeed, it was 'in order that his death would be a lesson in piety [διδασκάλιον εὐσεβείας] for all those who inhabit Rome' that God allowed him to die there.[174]

In addition to the sacrificial benefit of his death, and the benefit of his teaching on his martyrial journey, Ignatius' suffering is also portrayed as providing an exemplar for other Christians to imitate. In the same way that the apostles provide a model which Ignatius 'strove to emulate,' so Ignatius 'endured [ὑπέμεινε]' the way of martyrdom 'in order that [ἵνα] he might make all the spectators emulators of his own struggles [ζηλωτὰς ποιήσῃ τῶν ἀγωνισμάτων τῶν ἑαυτοῦ].'[175]

§3.5: Commemoration of Ignatius' martyrdom

The inscription to the homily mentions that having been martyred in Rome, Ignatius was 'carried back [κομισθέντα]' to Antioch, an event that Chrysostom expounds as beneficial to Christian witnesses. It was indeed 'part of God's economy [οἰκονομία] to bring him back to us anew and distribute [διανεῖμαι] the martyr between the cities.'[176] While Rome and Antioch were clearly the most directly blessed, all cities that witnessed the victorious escort of his remains also derived benefit. Just as a crowd welcomes back with shouts of acclamation and praise a 'noble athlete who has wrestled down all his opponents and emerged from the ring,' not allowing him to touch the ground but bearing him aloft on their shoulders, so too was Ignatius 'the crowned victor' greeted as he returned from Rome to Antioch.[177] Yet while this parade indeed 'benefited and restored all those

[173] §15; Ignatius is the most convincing, who had not even met the one for whom he suffered.
[174] §14; cf. §15 which in which God allowed this in order that the Romans 'should learn these things in practice [ταῦτα ἔργῳ μάθωσιν].'
[175] §16.
[176] §17.
[177] §17.

cities' for a time, 'from that moment even until the present he enriches' Antioch.[178] Ignatius is likened to a 'perpetual treasure-house [θησαυρὸς διηνεκής] that is drained each day and does not run dry, and makes all those who partake in it more wealthy,' since there is no end to the blessings 'this blessed Ignatius' bestows upon believers.[179]

Chrysostom, then, sheds a great deal of light on what the tradition of pilgrimage to and assembly around the martyr's shrine meant to the participants, and how specifically it was understood to benefit them.[180] He recalls the case of Elisha, whose bones a corpse touched and was revivified,[181] and asks his audience to imagine how much more potent touching a saint's remains or tomb will be in this time, 'when grace is more abundant, when the activity of the Spirit is greater.'[182] They are to hope, and even expect, to 'pluck spiritual fruit from him [Ignatius]' and 'reap great blessings' when they come; indeed, if one so much as touches the tomb [θήκη] with faith they will 'draw much power from there.'[183] Yet such advantage is not unbounded or unconditional, but operates in forming believers into the likeness of the martyr. Indeed, God only permitted (εἴασεν) the church to have martyrs' relics 'wanting to lead us by the hand to the same zeal [as theirs], and to offer a harbour and an unfailing encouragement in the face of the ills that always afflict us.'[184] It is 'by the prayers of the saints themselves' that believers might 'become housemates [σύσκηνοι] of these saints and share their lifestyle [ὁμοδίαιτοι].'[185] Chrysostom encourages every Christian, in whatever state—sick or healthy, cheerful or glum, in trouble or safe—to visit the martyrium. Our

[178] §17. As in the case of the Antiochene martyrology and the LR, Chrysostom shows more than a hint of patriotism towards Antioch. He addresses Antioch as 'our city,' and imagines its oversight by Ignatius to have been secured because 'the significance of this city to God was great, as he also made clear through his actions' (§10).
[179] §17.
[180] See Shepardson (2014), 180–83.
[181] 2 Kgs. 13:21
[182] §18.
[183] §18.
[184] §18.
[185] §18; cf. Krueger (2004), 194.

presence there leads us to remember the martyr and his virtuous actions, by which memory (τῇ μνήμῃ) we should be persuaded to think more humbly of any good deeds of our own.[186]

§4: The Roman *Acts of Ignatius*[187]

A great deal of what has been said in relation to the Antiochene *Acts* and Chrysostom's *Homily* also pertains to this text, which I will not repeat. Much of the text consists of description of the numerous and extreme tortures applied to Ignatius by Trajan. This appears to me to be a generic martyrological *topos*, and unspecific to Ignatius,[188] except insofar as it reflects his explicit willingness to be exposed to an assortment of tortures.[189] Indeed, much of what Ignatius is made to say seems generic in its apologetic argument against pagan deities,[190] the reasonability of Christian faith,[191] the short-sightedness of the emperor's counsel,[192] and his fulsome quotation of scripture. In many ways, therefore, the Roman martyrologist's portrayal of Ignatius sees him conformed to the (by the late fifth century) well-worn tradition of idealising martyrs. His individual identity is diminished, and he becomes largely indistinguishable from the collective identity of the company of saints and martyrs among whom he stands. Indeed, most of what seems specifically 'Ignatian' is clearly drawn from letters of the LR, particularly to the Romans and Antiochenes, which he both quotes formally and subtly alludes to.[193] Our analysis of this text will accordingly occupy less space than the other two.

Trajan also becomes a caricature in his baffling, single-minded obsession with forcing Ignatius to sacrifice, his vast array of torture methods, and his failure to accept the gospel. He

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[186] §18.
[187] I follow the edition of Lightfoot (1889), II.496–540.
[188] Lightfoot describes the martyrologist as a 'romance writer, founding his story on the single fact that Ignatius was martyred at Rome' (1889: II.382).
[189] MR-*Rom*. 5.3; LR-*Rom*. 5.
[190] *Rom. Mart.* 2–4, 7–8. I take this as generic, not as reference to Ignatius' apparent knowledge of pagan religion; see chapter 2 above.
[191] *Rom. Mart.* 6, 8.
[192] *Rom. Mart.* 5, 6, 9.
[193] Lightfoot (1889), II.380–81. The Roman *Acts* also agrees with the LR on details such as Ignatius' receiving the episcopal mantel from Euodias, not Peter; see LR-*Ant*. 7.

eventually relents, but only partially, admitting: 'Great is the endurance of those who hope in Christ; for who of the Greeks or barbarians ever endured to suffer such things for his own god, as this man suffers for the sake of the one in whom he believes?'[194] His interaction with Ignatius is altogether less believable than that recorded in the Antiochene *Acts*, which we observed may reflect an early witness to the trial. The two martyrologies are agreed that Ignatius' main offence is his refusal to sacrifice.[195] The reason for Ignatius' original condemnation in Antioch is said by Trajan to have been that Ignatius 'made the city of the Antiochenes rise up, as it has come to my ears that [Ignatius] turned all Syria from the Greek [religion] to Christianity.'[196] Ignatius is remembered as persecuted because of his overwhelming and disruptive evangelistic success.

Whereas the Antiochene *Acts* seemed to cohere with Trajan's correspondence with Pliny by retrospective comparative analysis, the Roman *Acts* explicitly associates this correspondence with Ignatius' plight. After the spectacular death of Ignatius, at which Trajan 'was astounded and dumbstruck,' Trajan is supposed to have received Pliny's letter. Upon which the emperor,

> taking into account what happened with the blessed and holy Ignatius—for he had led the charge of the rest of the martyrs—issued a decree that the tribe of the Christians are not to be sought out, but when chanced upon are to be punished.[197]

He follows this with another benevolent act towards the Christians, allowing any who wished to take up Ignatius' remains to do so. Ignatius' torture and immolation, or at least his exemplary fortitude, effectively leads to the abatement of imperial persecution of Christians. It is intriguing to note that even in this account where subtlety is at a premium, Ignatius is represented as a kind of scapegoat, whose death spares others from punishment.

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[194] *Rom. Mart.* 10.
[195] *Rom. Mart.* 2: Trajan said: 'I will punish you with every torment, not only as heedless but also as disgraceful, and as not being persuaded by the decree of the sacred senate to sacrifice'; §9: the senate said: 'We also are in agreement with his sentence, for he insulted us all along with the emperor, in not conceding to sacrifice to the gods.'
[196] *Rom. Mart.* 2.
[197] *Rom. Mart.* 11.

That this salvific efficacy of Ignatius' is intended to be Christomorphic is suggested by a clear allusion to Christ's entombment and resurrection. Trajan commands Ignatius to be cast into an 'inner prison [ἐσώτερα φυλακή]' or 'dungeon [εἰρκτή],' and to remain there 'three days and three nights.'[198] There he is to receive neither bread nor water, and no one is to see him.[199] In a manner likely styled to resonate with existing Christian formulations, the paragraph narrating Ignatius' death begins: 'on the third day [τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ].'[200] Ignatius' immolation therefore becomes a living testimony to the words he speaks just prior to his three day imprisonment, based upon the model of Christ: 'I believe that I have prevailed and shall prevail [νικάω].'[201] However, as has been the case elsewhere, the martyrologist does not go as far as to say that Ignatius is drawn into some kind of mystical union with Christ. The beginnings of the cult are narrated as the Roman Christians praising God and Christ 'for perfecting [ἐπὶ τῇ τελειώσει] the holy bishop and martyr Ignatius.'[202] Indeed, Ignatius' final sentence speaks of his extraordinary deeds of endurance as based solely upon 'enthusiasm and faith, which are drawn into conformity with Christ [ἐφελκομένης εἰς ὁμοήθειαν Χριστοῦ].'[203] The martyr's passion and its significance are represented as resembling Christ's and expressive of the same *ethos*, while remaining distinct from it. The bread and water which Ignatius is denied in prison is supplied by Christ, whom he calls 'the bread of immortality and the drink of eternal life.'[204]

The cultic context of this text is made clear by its record that the lions crushed Ignatius to death but did not consume his flesh. Interestingly, just prior to his death, Ignatius is made to quote MR/LR-*Romans* 4.1: 'I am the wheat of God, and I am ground up by the teeth of beasts, so that I may be proved pure bread.' The martyrologist clearly considered this rich seam of Christic imagery

[198] Cf. Matt. 12:40.
[199] *Rom. Mart.* 9.
[200] *Rom. Mart.* 10. Cf. e.g. 1 Cor. 15:4; Hos. 6:2; Nicene creed etc.
[201] *Rom. Mart.* 9. Cf. 1 Cor. 15:54–57; Rev. 17:14.
[202] *Rom. Mart.* 11.
[203] *Rom. Mart.* 10; cf. MR-*Mag*. 6.2; MR-*Pol*. 1.3.
[204] *Rom. Mart.* 10; cf. LR-*Rom.* 7.

and metaphor to be worth the slight dissonance present in Ignatius' unfulfilled prophecy. This particular manner of death is said to have occurred 'so that [Ignatius'] reliquaries might be a protection [φυλακτήριον] to the great city of the Romans.'[205] The Christians of that city then took his body and 'laid it apart in a place where they were allowed to gather together and praise God.'[206] Contradicting Ignatius' own words and all other known accounts of the journey of his remains, the martyrologist apparently spared no effort to justify the basis of Ignatius' cult in Rome.

§5: Conclusion

The three texts examined here constitute what Gemeinhardt and Leemans call a 'hagiographical discourse'—that is, a number of varied documents which together 'testif[y] to a plurality of images and receptions of the saint who is a figure of history and at the same time of tradition.'[207] The figure who emerges from each of these treatments has certain aspects of his character and significance emphasised, and others muted, but remains recognisably Ignatius the martyr and bishop of Antioch. As we saw in the case of the LR, it is through these acts of discourse that Ignatius is allowed to continue to speak to the novel context in which the church found itself as it approached the fifth century AD. This specific context is particularly evident in our texts' reference to, and commendation of, the existence of the cult devoted to Ignatius. As Krueger comments, 'Hagiography did, and does, offer images of holiness embodied, textual identities invested with cultural value.'[208]

One thread running through all three of these texts is the memorialisation of Ignatius as one whose suffering and death in some sense benefits others. The Antiochene *Acts* achieves this through crafting an Ignatius who is 'willingly' led to Trajan, a passive victim and active priest, the mystery of whose sacrifice is illustrated through several linguistic tensions and contradictions. For Chrysostom,

[205] *Rom. Mart.* 10; cf. Lightfoot (1889), II.534.
[206] *Rom. Mart.* 11.
[207] Gemeinhardt & Leemans (2012), 6.
[208] Krueger (2004), 194.

Ignatius' death and suffering are portrayed as benefitting all churches related to him, whose suffering for those he loved takes on a markedly Christic form. The Roman *Acts* also draws out this significance, despite being so loosely tethered to received opinion surrounding Ignatius. His exemplary fortitude and determination in the face of death convinces Trajan to effect a favourable imperial policy towards Christians.

A comparison of this testimony with our analysis of Ignatius' self-representation in chapters 3 and 4 reveals a considerable degree of correspondence. There we concluded that Ignatius wished to be remembered as a Christian whose entire life was an offering to God, made most visible in his martyrial procession and death; he styled himself as a sacrifice whose suffering benefits the churches by confirming the gospel, and by bolstering the communities to whom he writes against division and apostasy. A Girardian analysis also reveals the agapeic, nonviolent, and mimetic significance of Ignatius' death. These elements of Ignatius' self-memorialisation are all present in his fourth-century hagiographies: the martyrologies quite clearly portray Ignatius as saving other Christians from imperial punishment through his honourable death, while Chrysostom draws out the potency of Ignatius in strengthening the faithful, both before and after his death. That such consonance should be found between a subject and his interpreters separated by some three centuries is remarkable.

Where we see divergence is on the point that his death was that of a scapegoat. In part II, I argued that the conventional understanding of a scapegoat—as understood by Decrept and Girard, as one whose death placates wrath (whether divine, imperial, or primordial)—is counter to Ignatius' thought, although he may be seen to note the operation of the scapegoat mechanism in society's persecution of Christians. In the same way that some modern commentators have proved over-zealous in interpreting Ignatius' death as that of a scapegoat, the martyrologists tend towards a similar understanding. Although the scapegoat mechanism is apparent in Ignatius' death through the veiled eyes of a non-Christian, properly understood through the eyes of faith his Christomorphic

death shows a path out of humanity's reliance upon scapegoats. Chrysostom's is the account that most closely conforms to Ignatius' understanding of the effectiveness of his suffering as providing an exemplar to be imitated, and in strengthening and refreshing the faithful (though he does imagine Ignatius' blood as purifying Rome's idolatrous defilements).

Given the remembered shape of a figure is constantly subject to modulation, development, attenuation, and reconsideration, variance from the original is absolutely to be expected. The notion of 'originality' and 'authenticity' themselves are beset with a host of problems that we only touched upon in chapter 5, and it must be remembered that fidelity to a subject's own self-portrayal is not necessarily a hagiographer's priority, if it is a consideration at all. Needless to say, all our authors were unanimous in remembering Ignatius as an exemplar of Christian piety. The Roman *Acts*' invocation of Ignatius' favourite book of Proverbs seems a fitting conclusion to this part: 'The memory of the righteous is commended.'[209]

[209] *Rom. Mart.* 11; Prov. 10:7.

Concluding Comments

The notion of 'memory' has demonstrated its usefulness in a number of academic disciplines seeking to connect with and understand the past. Memory neatly captures the observation fundamental to the pursuit of history that all knowledge of the past is necessarily mediated and to some extent constructed, though manages to soften its pejorative undertones and illuminate its creative potential. Especially when used without specialised theories and technical vocabulary, as my project has sought to achieve, memory provides an accessible entry point for non-specialists to engage with otherwise prohibitive scholarship—to remember is a universal human phenomenon.

'As a normative version of the past, memory is, conceptually, quite close to tradition,'[1] a feature particularly generative in an early Christian context. It was as true in the first Christian centuries as it is today that 'memory' has great potential to bind diverse communities, both synchronically and diachronically. My thesis traced the strands of memory from the Old Testament heroes of faith to Ignatius, and from Ignatius on to communities in the fourth and fifth centuries, each of these nodes representing a group of people itself held together through shared forms of interacting with a remembered past.

Today, memory, like tradition, is becoming an intersection of academic fields that otherwise have difficulty speaking to each other. My use of the anthropological insights of René Girard to sidestep the scholarly impasse surrounding Ignatius' self-conception as 'scapegoat' demonstrates just this synergetic potential of memory. One of the aims of this thesis is to highlight the ripeness of patristic theology for inter-disciplinary engagement, proposing 'memory' as a focus around which this might occur. An appraisal of how Ignatius' memory lives on in our own time, continuing to bind and refresh communities of faith in disparate corners of the world, would form a worthwhile

[1] White (2014), 90.

appendix to my project, and one with the potential to incorporate insights from sociology and anthropology. Ignatius is an exemplary candidate for interrogation through the lens of memory, as this study has proved; however, I believe this same approach could be fruitfully applied to other apostolic-adjacent figures like Polycarp, Justin Martyr, and Irenaeus. Additionally, a synoptic analysis of early Christian attitudes to remembering would be able to extend some of my work's insights into the theological and cultural centrality of memory, and would doubtless prove a valuable conversation partner for theologians working in medieval or modern contexts. I commit these tasks to future generations of patristic scholars more qualified to execute these projects than I.

The wealth of insights in part III provides a further justification of the use of memory in early Christian studies, which is its ability to bypass insoluble (and often tedious) questions of 'the historical Ignatius.' Successive schools of modern historical inquiry are beset by the same type of hermeneutical predispositions in examining an historical figure as are early Christian interpreters. That contemporary witnesses often demonstrate alarming lack of perception into the events they purport to recount should warn us against reading them as determinative, or to the neglect of later interpreters.[2] Whereas 'the historical Ignatius' lived for perhaps a few decades, it is *the remembered Ignatius* whose influence is perceptible to this day—a conclusion the martyr himself seems to have drawn. Indeed, the notion that there is some 'pristine' Ignatius hidden beneath the detritus of centuries of tradition seems somehow counter to the essence of the man whose self-doubts and ambiguities we glimpse in his letters. The annals of Christian history crystallise rather than distort his existence.

Drawing together this remembered profile of Ignatius in the generations after his death has affirmed the enduring ecclesiological and theological relevance of the martyr, and allowed us to identify several of his 'prosopographical' features that proved especially influential. All accounts

[2] Bockmuehl (2010), 18–29.

remember him as a benefactor of the church, both before and after his death: imitation of Ignatius' exemplary bravery and devotion to Christ serves to materially strengthen Christian communities, as Ignatius himself appears to have envisioned. Ps-Ignatius understands Ignatius' language of self-abasement as expressing agapeic devotion, but his use of ἀντίψυχον also inches towards implying the effectiveness of the martyr's suffering for his Antiochene congregation; Chrysostom and the martyrologies show no such subtlety, developing this idea to the point of imagining Ignatius as a scapegoat whose suffering and death serve to avert punishment from other Christians and purify the idolatries of Rome. In the LR, we glimpse an Ignatius whose unitive power extends not only to the congregations his letters address, but also to the various Christian factions in fourth-century Antioch. Ignatius' scriptural and eirenic voice in the LR serves as a meeting point for Euzoius' and Meletius' parties.

All this might lead us to say that the fourth-century portraits of Ignatius did indeed uncover elements of Ignatius' persona and significance that were hidden from the martyr himself and his contemporaries. That there is relative consonance between Ignatius' hope that the church will benefit from his suffering, and early Christians' understanding of his death as effective, suggests that this is an aspect of our modern understanding of the martyr that ought to be reconsidered.

Apparent throughout this thesis is memory's ability to serve as a locus of power. We witnessed this from chapter 1, where the Hebrew prophets and heroes are recalled as confirming Ignatius' authority by their willingness to suffer for Christ as he does, while others are deemed unworthy of being remembered because of their fallacious memorialisation of a Christ who did not suffer. Ignatius identifies great authority in his own letters as genuine impressions of himself, as explored in chapters 3 and 4. The Romans should judge as authentic his letter's image of an Ignatius determined to imitate Christ's suffering, even in preference to the bodily Ignatius whose resolve might weaken as he approaches the crucial moment. Ignatius' complex self-portrait of his death we discerned as both 'Christomorphic' (though without an ability to atone) and 'Paulomorphic' (in the

sense that his suffering strengthens other Christians and serves to spread the gospel). However, a Girardian understanding of ecclesial leadership, built upon a system of nonviolent imitation, we found more consistent with the martyr's ethos than seeing 'imitation' as a means to confirm structures of control and enforce ecclesial 'sameness.'

In one sense, the long recension is an attempt to arrogate the authority and influence held latent within the figure of the martyr Ignatius. At a moment when Christians' interaction with textual authorities was beginning to change,[3] the redactor wields Ignatius' memory on the 'battleground' of fourth-century intra-ecclesial conflicts, and confirms his own orthodoxy and orthopraxis. Parts of my analysis in chapter 6 are consistent with this perspective. In another sense, Ps-Ignatius performs an act of selflessness which ensures his own name is forgotten while that of Ignatius glorified. The focus on power is tempered by a fundamental impulse of this thesis towards the inherent creativity of memory. The redactor creatively refashions the voice of the martyr to allow him to speak afresh, shaping but also being shaped by Ignatius' legacy. Chapter 5's problematisation of discrete notions of 'authenticity' and 'spuriosity,' 'authorship' and 'forgery,' situated the creative task of Ps-Ignatius firmly within the landscape of ancient and early Christian literary practices. Together with Chrysostom and the two martyrologists, the LR may be seen as both documenting and crafting the living memory of Ignatius. Indeed, my project in its entirety may demonstrate Christian memorialisation to be as much about a process of self-creation (and creation of selves) as it is about bids for authority. An approach that explores both power and creativity allows the reader to be more sensitive to the agapeic and kenotic intentions behind memory we have encountered in this thesis.

Despite their differing objectives and perspectives, the three parts of my thesis together depict Ignatius as one whose intense longing to attain Christ was ultimately confirmed. Like for the

[3] See Vessey (1996).

Hebrew champions of faith, the apostles and the church, Christ is the type to which Ignatius conforms and the door of the Father through which he enters.[4] A tender and compassionate pastor of many sheep; passionate and fiery in the face of evil; one whose weakness is turned into strength, insufficiency into superabundance; imitator of Christ and model for many; Spirit-filled in addressing esteemed emperor or forgotten woman alike; an imperfect priest offering a perfect sacrifice. The diverse voices these pages have surveyed are united in remembering Ignatius as a pillar and benefactor of the church, whose halls still resound with the martyr's voice.

[4] *Phld*. 9.1.

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