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Patronage, Politics and the Court in the reign of William III and Mary II, 1689-1702

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Short Abstract

This is a political study of William and Mary's use of patronage rights, analyzing how that use influenced the court's relations with the elite. A new regime's integration into the society which it governs rarely occurs without friction. The unresolved conflicts between monarch and people of the preceding half-century, together with the expanding needs of the fiscal-military state, made discord more likely. Study of the joint monarchs' use of their appointment powers can aid understanding of their perception of the extent of monarchical authority and how it should be exercised. I will also examine the degree of pressure to transfer patronage control within the executive to Parliament: I approach the much-analyzed subject of the Revolutionary Settlement from an unfamiliar angle.

More broadly, employment practices offer a window into the mentalities of a society. Study of how William and Mary shared patronage responsibilities offers insights into the dynamics of late seventeenth-century gender relations. Exploration of application methods, employment criteria, patron-client connections and remuneration practices reveal aspects of societal customs and linkages. Comparison with Dutch stadhouder patronage methods aids understanding of whether and how Williamite practices were adapted to English circumstance. I will also study how methods were adjusted to accommodate the oversight of appointments across geographies demanding increased specialist expertise, rendering dependence upon personal linkages less effective.

Stuart-Orange patronage methods were a hybrid, combining Charles II's court practice with Williamite stadhouder techniques. Laissez-faire in areas lacking strategic importance combined with gradual adjustments in critical spheres to contribute positively to the new regime's integration, whilst also preserving monarchical powers. Crown patronage rights changed little during the reign. This owed much to their means of application, combining the talents of the joint monarchs and their advisers in a mostly adept blend of old and new.

Long Abstract

Study of Stuart-Orange patronage practices, examining the identities and selection methods of those chosen for employment, provides a means of enhancing our understanding of William and Mary's perceptions of monarchical authority and how it should be exercised. I look to throw light upon the much-analysed subject of the Revolutionary Settlement by approaching it from an unfamiliar angle. Rather than solely concentrating upon the court's internal functioning, I focus upon how its oversight of patronage influenced the regime's relations with members of the elite. This is primarily a study of the political use of the powers of patronage.

A new regime's integration into the society which it governs rarely occurs without friction. Conceptual justifications for change need to be supported by actions. The unresolved conflicts between monarch and people of the preceding half-century made discord more likely. The monarchs' appointment powers were wide-ranging: the court and its agents oversaw the selection of the principal officers within the polity's major branches. Rewards in the court's remit, in the form of office or assets, could also be used to influence behaviours, especially in Parliament. The fiscal-military state's growth led to expansion in posts whose allocation was under sovereign control. I will examine the degree to which there was pressure to transfer the control of patronage within the executive from monarch to Parliament. Much has been written concerning the assertion of executive control by Parliament after 1688. And yet, monarchical patronage rights by 1702 were little changed.

More broadly, study of the nature of the patron-client relationship along with exploration of application methods, employment criteria, and remuneration practices can reveal a society's customs and linkages. Comparison with stadhouder court methods can aid understanding of whether Dutch patronage practices were adapted to suit English circumstance. The regime's geographic diversification facilitates study of how methods were adapted to the requirement across borders to oversee appointments often demanding increased specialist expertise, rendering dependence upon personal linkages less effective.

William and Mary reigned as joint monarchs. Study of how they shared patronage responsibilities offers insights into the dynamics of late seventeenth-century gender relations. Mary in her Memoirs emphasised her frailty and William's right to be the dominant partner in the exercise of rule because of his superior qualities. The actual nature of their relationship as joint rulers is more nuanced. Mary undertook a difficult balancing act. Anxiety to support William's authority occasionally conflicted with a desire for involvement in policy formulation and place allocation. Mary's practice of queenship has received limited scholarly attention; her approach to patronage allocation differed significantly from that of her husband. There has been greater recognition of Mary's role in the regime's representation. Juxtaposition of the call for 'Godly Reformation' with Stuart-Orange patronage practice unveils contradictions inherent within the regime's composition. Those contradictions' reception may also tell us much about the disposition of the society over which it ruled.

With few written testaments to his thought processes, William's patronage practice can disclose important aspects of his character. I will examine both the attributes which William

valued and those to which he was indifferent, or wary. In this context, William's attitudes to the importance of gentlemanly status and incorruptibility as determinants of suitability for employment can be used to illuminate his primary motivations.

The thesis's main chapters are prefaced by an analysis of Dutch stadhouder practice and take as their subject matter discrete spheres of patronage activity: the court itself; Parliament; the armed forces; the Church; and the law. Each chapter also serves as a focal point for analysis of one or more of the overarching themes which the thesis explores.

Study of Williamite patronage methods in the United Provinces can inform our understanding of Stuart-Orange appointment practices in England. I will assess the individuals and mechanisms through which decisions were made and examine the criteria used to evaluate candidates along with the standards by which performance in office was judged. William consistently exploited opportunities to build influence and control through expansion of the stadhouder's patronage network, and, when opposed, rarely ceded defeat without struggle. The overall effect was to increase stadhouderly power far beyond that enjoyed by William's predecessors.

Disputes concerning office-holder practice, patronage control, and the criteria for office-holding regularly led to conflict between the stadhouder and other parts of the devolved Dutch state. Many comparable points of friction between ruler and ruled were potentially present in the allocation of office in England. Nevertheless, the English court's size, the importance of party-based faction, the country's more integrated governmental structure, and the broader range of patronage under monarchical control, differentiated England from

the United Provinces. The new monarchs' areas of patronage responsibility all had existing practices associated with their use. There was a need to assimilate those practices quickly and to fashion them in ways acceptable to both monarch and subject. Subsequent chapters will establish the challenges in each area, together with the associated requirements and responses. There were significant differences to the form which 'monarchical republicanism' took in England and the United Provinces, including the ways in which patronage was allocated. Transferring stadhouder appointment practices wholesale across the North Sea was unlikely to prove successful.

The chapter on the English court examines the allocation of office within the royal households. Patronage allocation within the households was a means of projecting the regime's power and character more widely. I will examine how William and Mary used the bestowal of employment opportunities within the court to further their political aims. William expressed a pronounced dislike of faction. I will consider Stuart-Orange reward of place within the context of a political environment which was considered inimical by William and yet was firmly entrenched. I will also outline the qualities other than political utility required to achieve preferment to senior positions within the household.

The physical spaces of the court were used to portray the legitimacy, power, and splendour of the new regime, whilst also being adapted to suit William's need for a setting in which to engage undisturbed with a small circle of advisers. The patronage rights of senior court officers were retained- withdrawal of those rights could have occasioned unnecessary opposition. The tension between the regime's call for godly reformation and its tacit acceptance of employment methods incorporating unethical practices will be examined.

Their retention associated the new regime with the practices of its Stuart predecessors before the initiation of James II's reforms. In other respects, relating especially to monarchical accessibility and the nature of the client-patron relationship, the Stuart-Orange court differed significantly from that of Charles II. The significance of those differences will be examined.

Attempts to employ place and other rewards to influence voting behaviour are examined in the chapter on Parliament. I consider whether a court party existed, and, if it did, explore its characteristics. I also explore the extent to which William's profession of respect for parliamentary rights was a ploy concealing an aspiration for increased monarchical authority.

Stuart-Orange use of patronage in a parliamentary context was intermittently successful. The Junto's exchange of office and money for votes contributed to the achievement of mutually desired outcomes for monarch and party. William's overly ambitious demands for the peacetime standing army's size and insistence on an unrestricted right to allocate the Irish land forfeitures contributed to the Junto ministry's dissolution. Preference for trimming, in which office and rewards were distributed across party lines, was an aspect of William's desire to avoid dependence upon any favourite or minister. It led to a greater challenge to the royal prerogative than would otherwise have occurred. The stadhouderly policy of divide and rule required adaptation to an environment where William ruled through a Parliament split across Whig-Tory lines.

Scholarship devoted to the growth of the fiscal-military state has not incorporated detailed research into how its armed forces' officers were chosen. William and Mary faced issues of loyalty, existing practice, faction and officer conduct in fashioning military forces capable of opposing Louis XIV. I will describe and assess the success of the methods used to reduce those issues' negative effects.

William retained responsibility for army officer selection. The effectiveness of the officer corps was gradually improved over the course of the reign- a necessary contrast with the more drastic measures implemented by William after his assumption of Dutch army command. The importance William attached to the relative merits of noble birth, expertise, and connection will be explored. His recognition of Mary's abilities led to the queen's participation in naval administration. The queen formed an effective partnership with the Earl of Nottingham to monitor the aptitude and behaviour of the navy's officers. Mary's involvement in the navy's administration, including officer selection within it, provides a means to investigate the joint monarchs' differences in patronage technique.

Interlinkages of secular and ecclesiastical politics led to the assignment of senior clerical positions having consequences beyond the religious sphere. Mary's High Church affinities blended with William's Calvinist leanings to produce an ecclesiastical bench which was known for its piety, whilst also reflecting Church of England divisions to the extent that neither Latitudinarian nor High Church elements within it could feel excluded. This was trimming in successful action and contributed to the comparative calm over religious matters which characterised much of the reign after 1690.

Analysis of Mary's substantial involvement in clerical appointments provides a suitable point of departure for wider investigation of the queen's political techniques. Her diligent enquiry into the characters of candidates for clerical office contrasted with William's delegational style. The queen's willingness to let it be known that church preferment was in her purview was facilitated by William's public acknowledgement of that delegation.

The regime's judicial appointments were generally well-received. The justice dispensed fulfilled the twin purposes of adhering to a rule of law which met the requirements of the bulk of the elite, whilst also doing much to provide judicial protection for the regime. Consensus of legal interpretation was, however, lacking between king and Parliament concerning the land grants to William's favourites. The disputes reveal the differences between William and many amongst the elite concerning the extent of the royal prerogative. In resisting that prerogative, legal precedent was referenced against (in the view of his opponents) a foreign, badly advised king. That such a legal interpretation prevailed says much about how a shared, if flawed, view of the English past contributed to the forging of the Revolution Settlement. The episodes also demonstrate the difficulty which William experienced, throughout the reign, in understanding and adapting to English practices.

Court rights of appointment changed little during the reign and were subjected to limited parliamentary scrutiny. The preservation of the Protestant state and religion lessened the degree to which disillusion with the regime was channeled into criticism of its employment practices. Patronage methods and the identities of those selected for office were mostly

endorsed, as were the monarchs' qualifications to appoint- acknowledgement of William's diplomatic and military expertise and Mary's outstanding piety. A further reason for lack of challenge may have emanated from realisation amongst the elites of William's determination to preserve Crown rights, including those of patronage. This motivation diminished when the likelihood of a less palatable alternative- the return of James II- declined. William's oversight of patronage after 1697 was increasingly challenged, a period characterised by inflexibility in William's political manoeuvring- a contrast with the more malleable stance adopted in the United Provinces before 1688.

The Stuart-Orange framework of patronage techniques through which senior appointments were made defies neat categorisation. At its core was a deliberate imitation of the practices of Charles II's court. There was, for example, no justification for the increase in the Stuart-Orange court's size other than to bolster the new monarchs' association with Charles. The grouping at court surrounding William was little changed through the reign and transcended national boundaries- many of the same figures also attended the king on campaign and during his Dutch hunting expeditions. Some of those court officers were assigned wider duties within the informal network of responsibilities overseen by William. In their often narrowly assigned areas of authority, William showed greater concern for the results produced than the methods used. Mary was one of the small number of individuals to whom William entrusted responsibility for patronage allocation. Her style of queenship, including her methods of patronage, incorporated a level of collaboration between monarch and subject rarely practiced by William. Despite significant character differences, the political partnership between Mary and William was effective. Mary assumed responsibility only

where William permitted. She was anxious to emphasize William's primacy, always submitting without public complaint when William intervened in her areas of influence.

William's delegational style was a necessary response to his wide-ranging responsibilities. The differences in the joint monarchs' methods demonstrate the dangers of catch-all phrases such as that of 'Stuart-Orange patronage practice.' There are also dangers in delineating Mary's style as 'traditional' compared with that of William, whose emphasis upon role compartmentalisation and results-based assessment resembles more modern employment practices. William was often slow to adopt new practices. Other stadhouders had gone further to detail the requirements placed upon those offered employment- William Frederick for example had drawn up 'contracts of correspondence' to outline the duties of the most prominent Friesian regents. William did not employ such instruments. Nor did he attempt to transfer the British navy's examination-based criteria for officer selection to the army, despite its proven usefulness and the need to improve the army's capability. He maintained reliance on his own observations and those of trusted confidantes. William's judgement was heavily influenced by the gentility of an individual- he assumed that individuals of lower-birth were unlikely to display the bravery necessary in an army officer.

In contrast with the coherent certainties which the visual representation of the Stuart-Orange regime portrayed, the practical application of its rule was less consistent. This reflects William's pragmatic attitude. He was assiduous in the preservation of his perceived rights as king and often dismissive of the abilities of the English to rule themselves. The Revolution Settlement was a messy compromise, worked out in piecemeal fashion and often containing much ambiguity within its areas of application. However, those

contradictions were mostly acceptable to both monarchs and elites. William was generally adept at allocating office in areas where he maintained personal control and delegating responsibility elsewhere to individuals with the expertise to fulfil that role effectively. In Parliament, he was aided by the alliance engineered by Sunderland and Portland between William and the Whig party. The coalition's breakdown and its architects' withdrawal from active political involvement deprived William of important sources of advice. William's disregard of the determination upon the part of the House of Commons to control the Irish forfeitures' distribution indicates a lack of consideration of parliamentary sentiment. His insensitivity intensified the conflict between ruler and ruled which marked William's final years, contributing to a further step in the relocation of power from monarch to Parliament.

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Studying for a Doctorate is not easy. Balancing the competing requirements upon a student's time of study with all the other elements which make up a life has only been possible with the support of family and friends. I would like to record my gratitude to the Fox's book of tomatoes for their unique ability to aid my maintenance of some form of perspective. I would also like to thank Coral and Hugh for their support. Finally, without the support of my parents and Nicole, none of this would have been possible. Thank you.

Conventions

Dates are given as in the original sources: letters from Britain and Ireland under the Julian calendar are given in old style (o.s.), and in Europe under the Gregorian calendar in new style (n.s.), with the year beginning on 1 January in both cases.

List of Abbreviations

BL	The British Library, London
Ailesbury, *Memoirs*	*Memoirs of Thomas, Earl of Ailesbury, Written by Himself* (2 vols, London, 1890)
BIHR	*Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*
Burnet, *History*	Gilbert Burnet, *History of his own time: from the restoration of King Charles the Second, to the Treaty of Peace at Utrecht, in the reign of Queen Anne* (6 vols, Oxford, 1823)
CJ	*House of Commons Journal*
CSPD	*Calendar of State Papers Domestic*
CTB	*Calendar of Treasury Books, 1660-1714,* ed. W.A. Shaw (32 vols, London, 1904-62)
Dalrymple, *Memoirs*	Sir John Dalrymple, *Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland* (3 vols, Edinburgh, 1771-88)
HMC *Finch*	HMC *Report on the manuscripts of Allan George Finch, Esq., of Burley-on-the-Hill, Rutland* (5 vols, London, 1913-2004)
HOP 1690-1715	*The House of Commons, 1690-1715,* D. Hayton, E. Cruickshanks, S. Handley (eds.) (5 vols, Cambridge, 2002)
ODNB	*Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*
POAS	*Poems on Affairs of State*
Savile, *Life*	Sir George Savile, *Life and Letters of Sir George Savile, Bart., first Marquis of Halifax*, ed. H.C. Foxcroft (2 vols, London, 1898)
Talbot, *Correspondence*	*Private and original Correspondence of Charles Talbot, Duke of Shrewsbury, with King William*, ed. William Coxe (London, 1821)
SP	State Papers
TNA	The National Archives, Kew

Vernon, *Letters*	*Letters Illustrative of the Reign of William III from 1696 to 1708 addressed to the Duke of Shrewsbury, by James Vernon, esq.,* ed. G.P.R. James (3 vols, London, 1841)

Introduction

Study of Stuart-Orange patronage practices, examining the identities and selection methods of those chosen for employment, provides a means of enhancing our understanding of William and Mary's perceptions of monarchical authority and how it should be exercised. [1] I look to throw light upon the much-analysed subject of the Revolutionary Settlement by approaching it from an unfamiliar angle. Rather than solely concentrating upon the court's internal functioning, I consider how the court's oversight of patronage influenced the regime's relations with members of the elite; this is primarily a study of the political use of the powers of patronage. My focus is upon the patronage practices relating to the English court. William and Mary possessed rights of patronage as joint monarchs in Scotland and Ireland. I will refer to these when they can help to illustrate my observations concerning the English court, which was larger in size and influence.[2]

A new regime's integration into the society which it governs rarely occurs without friction. There is a need for conceptual justifications for change to be supported by actions. Patronage is a means by which 'ideas work in practice.'[3] The new monarchs' appointment powers were wide ranging: either directly or indirectly the court and its agents oversaw the selection of the principal officers within the major branches of the polity. The attractions of

[1] I have chosen to use the term Stuart-Orange regime when describing events which occurred in England during the lifetimes of the joint monarchs. This phrase reflects the joint nature of their rule. However, when the regime's actions and representation were solely under the control of William, I have chosen to use the term Williamite. This applies to events in the United Provinces throughout the period of analysis and in England after Mary's death. For observations which apply to both time-periods, I opt to use the phrase Stuart-Orange.
[2] Patrick Riley has written a detailed study of Scottish politicians' dependence upon the English court during this period- P.W.J. Riley, *King William and the Scottish Politicians* (Edinburgh, 1979).
[3] L. Levy Peck, *Court Patronage and Corruption in Early Stuart England* (London, 1990), p.2.

rewards in the remit of the court, either in the form of office or assets, could also be used to influence behaviours, especially in Parliament. The allocation of patronage was an essential means through which to indicate the identity of the new regime and to cement its place within the state. Conversely, use of those extensive powers of patronage in unfavourably received ways had historically contributed to conflict between English monarch and people. The growth of the fiscal-military state led to expansion in the number of posts whose allocation was under sovereign control. The expansion was particularly marked within the armed forces. I will examine the degree to which there was pressure to transfer the control of patronage within the executive from monarch to Parliament.

More broadly, study of the nature of the patron-client relationship along with exploration of application methods, employment criteria, and remuneration practices can reveal a society's customs and linkages. Comparison with methods used at the stadhouder courts in the United Provinces can aid our understanding of whether and how Williamite patronage practices were adapted to suit English circumstance. Relative to the lack of work undertaken on late seventeenth-century English court patronage, there is an abundance of work on the stadhouder courts.[4] A comparative approach can aid our understanding of the degree to which there was a shared patronage culture in the late seventeenth century, transcending both national boundaries and the distinctive practices of individual patrons. I

[4] C. Wilders, *Patronage in de Provincie: Het Utrechtse netwerk van stadhouder Willem III* (Amsterdam, 2015); D.J. Roorda, 'Le secret du Prince. Monarchale tendenties in de Republiek 1672-1702', in D.J. Roorda and A. Gabriels (eds.), *Rond prins en patriciaat: verspreide opstellen* (Weesp, 1984); D.J. Roorda, *Partij en Factie: de oproeren van 1672 in de steden van Holland en Zeeland, een krachtmeting tussen partijen en facties* (Groningen, 1961; J.J.Woltjer, 'Willem III en Leiden', in J.W. Marsilje et al. (eds.), *Uit Leidse bron geleverd* (Leiden, 1989); M. van der Bijl, 'Utrechts weerstand tegen de oorlogspolitiek tijdens de Spaanse Successie-oorlog', in *Van Standen tot Staten. Stichtse Historische Reeks 1* (Utrecht, 1975); G.H. Janssen, *Princely power in the Dutch Republic: Patronage and William Frederick of Nassau (1613-64)* (Manchester, 2008).

will also explore how appointment methods and criteria were adapted to the requirement across multiple geographies to oversee appointments often demanding increased specialist expertise, rendering the traditional dependence upon personal linkages less effective.

William and Mary reigned as joint monarchs. Study of how they shared patronage responsibilities offers insights into the dynamics of late seventeenth-century gender relations. A study of their patronage practice can provide evidence of whether and how they shared the day-to-day responsibilities of rule. William's assertion of sole executive control notwithstanding Mary's superior claim to the throne is well known. So too is his somewhat grudging public recognition of Mary's aptitude as Head of the Regency Council during his absences from England, and his eventual willingness to cede responsibility for the choice of replacements for the non-juring bishops. Although William Speck has produced a recent short biography and Melinda Zook has written on her involvement with the Church, there has been no substantial biography of Mary since that of Hester Chapman.[5] Mary in her Memoirs and letters took care to emphasise William's primacy by stressing her frailty and William's right by virtue of his superior qualities to be the dominant partner in the exercise of rule. The actual nature of their relationship as joint rulers is more nuanced. Mary undertook a difficult balancing act. Anxiety to support William's authority occasionally conflicted with a desire to contribute to the regime's survival through involvement in its formulation of policy and

[5] T. Claydon and W. Speck, *William and Mary* (Oxford, 2007); M. Zook, 'A Latitudinarian Queen: Mary II and her Churchmen,' in S. Apetrei and H. Smith (eds.), *Religion and Women in Britain, c.1660-1760* (London, 2016; H.W. Chapman, *Mary II, Queen of England* (London, 1953). For an earlier assessment, see A. Strickland, *Lives of the Queens of England: from the Norman Conquest* (6 vols, London, 1864-5).

distribution of patronage. Mary's participation in the allocation of office has received comparatively little attention but its study can tell us much regarding her practice of queenship, further removing the question mark from William Speck's enquiry, 'William - and Mary?'[6]

Conversely, Mary's role in the representation of the joint regime has been assessed from several angles.[7] A gap in scholarship here seems to be in the assessment of how the regime's representation coalesced with its actions. Study of how the regime's calls for 'Godly Reformation' resonated with its patronage practice can do much to unveil contradictions inherent within the regime's composition; the reception of those contradictions may also tell us much about the disposition of the society over which it came to rule. The Introduction will now summarise the methods and sources which will be used to answer these questions, followed by a brief description of the thesis's structure.

Historiography, Methodology and Sources

The historiography of Early Modern English courts has increasingly focussed upon their representational importance. This is a relatively recent phenomenon. The 'Tudor Revolution in Government', so extensively debated by Elton, Starkey and many others was a debate

[6] W. Speck, 'William - and Mary?', in L.G. Schwoerer (ed.), *The Revolution of 1688-1689: Changing Perspectives*, (Cambridge, 1992).

[7] L.G. Schwoerer, 'Images of Queen Mary II, 1689-1694', *Renaissance Quarterly,* 42 (1989); J. Farguson, *Visualising Protestant Monarchy: Ceremony, Art and Politics after the Glorious Revolution, (1689-1714)* (Woodbridge, 2021); K. Sharpe, *Rebranding Rule, The Restoration and Revolution Monarchy, 1660-1714* (New Haven, 2013); C. Murray, *Imaging Stuart Family Politics: dynastic crisis and continuity* (London, 2017).

about the locus of government- whether it had moved away from the court or not.[8] It was a debate about the practice of politics, incorporating discussion of the identities and positions of those involved in the power to appoint. Examination of the use and conduits of court patronage remained central to the work of Linda Levy Peck and Neil Cuddy in their analyses of the courts of James and Charles I.[9] However, post Restoration historical study has seen two separate historiographical trends divert attention away from study of the court as a political centre.[10] Study of the Late Stuart Revolution in Government has not devoted much attention to the role of the court. The work of David Hayton, Geoffrey Holmes and Henry Horwitz in particular has concentrated upon Parliament and the growth of political faction within it.[11] The existence and nature of a court party within Parliament, widely recognised by contemporaries, has received little attention from historians. The last specific study of this subject was performed by Clayton Roberts in 1983. His portentous conclusion that 'There are few phenomena in English history which historians have so egregiously ignored, so totally overlooked, as the capture of patronage by party' has not acted as a call

[8] G.R. Elton, *The Tudor Revolution in Government- Administrative Changes in the reign of Henry VIII* (Cambridge, 1953); D. Starkey, 'Introduction: Court History in Perspective', in D. Starkey (ed.), *The English Court from the Wars of the Roses to the Civil War* (Harlow, 2001).

[9] L. Levy Peck, *Court Patronage and Corruption in Early Stuart England* (London, 1993); L. Levy Peck, *Northampton: patronage and policy at the court of James I* (London, 1982); L. Levy Peck (ed.), *The mental world of the Jacobean Court* (Cambridge, 1991); N. Cuddy, 'Reinventing a Monarchy: The Changing Structure and Political Function of the Stuart Court, 1603-88', in E. Cruickshanks (ed.), *The Stuart Courts* (Stroud, 2000); N. Cuddy, 'The King's Chambers: The Bedchamber of James I in administration and politics, 1603-1625' (D.Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1987).

[10] The principal exception to this statement is the work of G. Aylmer, 'Patronage at the Court of Charles II', in E. Cruickshanks (ed.), *The Stuart Courts* (Stroud, 2000).

[11] D. Hayton, E. Cruickshanks, S. Handley (eds.), *The House of Commons, 1690-1715* (5 vols, Cambridge, 2002); D. Hayton, 'The Reorientation of Place Legislation in the 1690s', *Parliaments, Estates and Representation,* 5(2) 1985; H. Horwitz, *Parliament, Policy and Politics in the reign of William III* (Manchester, 1977); H. Horwitz, 'The Structure of Parliamentary Politics', in G. Holmes (ed.), *Britain after the Glorious Revolution* (London, 1969); G. Holmes, *The Divided Society: Parties and Politics in England, 1694-1716* (London, 1967).

to arms.[12] Instead, the cultural turn now dominates the way in which the court's role is considered. There is no comprehensive study dedicated to Stuart-Orange court patronage. Andrew Barclay's article describing Williamite court practice is the closest to a detailed study of the court's workings, doing much to counter some of the long-held but highly contestable perspectives of the court as dull, losing importance and Dutch dominated.[13] Barclay also correctly highlighted the deliberate imitation of Charles II's court adopted by William and Mary in the fashioning of the scope and characteristics of their own establishment as a means of bolstering their claims to legitimacy. The article, together with the concluding chapter to his PhD thesis on James II's court, has done much to inform our perception of how, in Barclay's words, political patronage 'happens to be the best way in which to reinterpret how William saw his role as King and… what some of those around him thought that role should be'.[14] Barclay's earlier work, that concerning James II, concentrated upon the 'political activities of the king's servants and the administration of the departments of the royal household', whilst the much briefer analysis of William's court focussed significant attention upon court ceremony and its representative significance, a neat encapsulation of the cultural turn.[15] The significance Barclay attached to the court's representational importance has been further explored in the work of Julie Farguson describing the place of art and ceremony in the depiction and positioning of the Stuart-

[12] C. Roberts, 'Party and Patronage in Later Stuart England', in S. Baxter (ed.), *England's Rise to Greatness* (Berkeley, California, 1983), p.194.
[13] A. Barclay, 'William's Court as King', in E. Mijers and D. Onnekink (eds.), *Redefining William III: The Impact of the King- Stadholder in International Context* (Abingdon, 2007).
[14] A. Barclay, 'The Impact of King James II on the Departments of the Royal Household' (Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge,1994); Barclay, 'William's Court as King', p.242.
[15] Barclay, 'James II', p.1.

Orange regime.[16] The court's influence over religious practice and custom, together with the associated political implications, has been examined by Tony Claydon in his work on the regime's campaign to fashion godly revolution in England.[17]

All these studies were in part responding to Robert Bucholz's depiction of William's court as an institution whose deterioration presaged the decline of court culture which Bucholz associated with Queen Anne's reign, a view with which Kevin Sharpe broadly concurred.[18] This thesis questions that depiction by examining an area of court activity which Bucholz deliberately omitted from his analysis- his study 'was primarily concerned with the court in its narrower sense of household servants, courtiers, and the environment they inhabited.'[19] Control of patronage was a means of projecting the power and character of the Stuart-Orange court outside the physical spaces of its palaces. Anglican bishops and English and Scottish judges together with over five thousand army officers and approaching five hundred senior naval officers were employed by royal commission. It cannot be an exaggeration to state that nearly every major aristocratic family in the country was in some way influenced by the direction of royal patronage over the course of the reign. The search for employment was often a key reason for attendance at court.[20] When applicants for position were regularly far larger in number than the extent of posts available, the scope for personal

[16] Farguson, *Visualising Protestant Monarchy*.
[17] T. Claydon, *William III and the Godly Revolution* (Cambridge, 1996). See also C. Rose, *England in the 1690s: revolution, religion and war* (Oxford, 1999), esp. chs.5 and 6.
[18] R.O. Bucholz, *The Augustan Court: Queen Anne and the Decline of Court Culture* (Stanford, 1993), pp.26-35; Sharpe, *Rebranding Rule*, pp.341-507.
[19] Bucholz, *The Augustan Court*, p.3.
[20] R.O. Bucholz, 'Going to Court in 1700: A visitor's guide', *The Court Historian,* 5/3 (2014), p.187.

disappointment to augment disillusion born of ideological reasons with an already unpopular regime was large.

Including a survey of court patronage within an analysis of the role of the court has been avoided by a number of historians, partly due to the difficulty of articulating precisely the meaning of the phrase, court patronage.[21] As Gerald Aylmer wrote at the start of his survey of patronage at the court of Charles II, 'Patronage is a very general concept which is used by historians in many different ways...Its elasticity invites, perhaps indeed requires, some definition, however imprecise.' [22] This study will concentrate on William and Mary's allocation of the positions of employment under their control, along with the methods they used in that exercise. In answer to Linda Levy Peck's question, 'What, and where, was the court?', it is necessary to go beyond the royal palaces' physical environs.[23] In so doing, analysis of the reception of the direction of court patronage becomes one means by which, in the words of C.S.L. Davies, 'Political historians,.., may be better placed to ask crude questions about practicalities, about impact, about meaning; about reception and indeed rejection, as against projection.'[24]

This approach aligns with that of the substantial body of work which has been undertaken relating to stadhouder patronage in the United Provinces. Geert Janssen, D. J. Roorda, and Coen Wilders have all written monographs detailing stadhouder patronage methods and

[21] Neil Cuddy, for example, wrote of 'the obstacles of confusing abstraction regarding the Court's structure.' Cuddy, 'Reinventing a Monarchy', p.62.
[22] G. Aylmer, 'Patronage at the Court of Charles II', in E. Cruickshanks (ed.), *The Stuart Courts* (Stroud, 2000), p.191.
[23] Levy Peck, *Mental World*, p.3.
[24] C.S.L. Davies, 'Review: Representation, Repute', review of *Selling the Tudor Monarchy* by Kevin Sharpe, *English Historical Review,* 124/511(2009), p.1447.

practices.[25] Their work, together with that of Olaf Mörke describing the composition of the Williamite court and that of Pauline Kiesow examining the constitutional role of the stadhouder, has substantially advanced our knowledge of late seventeenth-century Dutch patronage practice.[26] There was a large degree of difference in the patronage methods employed by stadhouders. Geert Janssen's study of William Frederick of Nassau described the stadhouder of Friesland and Gelderland's attempts to maintain his rights of patronage in the face of both internal competition and potential external encroachment by Frederick Henry of Orange-Nassau.[27] William Frederick emphasised the need for sociability on the part of the patron and the reciprocal nature of the client-patron relation: deficiencies in these areas formed two of his main sources of criticism of his fellow stadhouder, William II. Relating to a period only twenty years later, Coen Wilders's work concerning the highly effective Williamite patronage network in Utrecht revealed significantly different stadhouder methods, objectives and criteria for appointment. Loyalty remained an essential attribute of the applicants for position, but Wilders demonstrated how the emphasis amongst the stadhouder's requirements had become dominated by that of utility. Wilders used a combination of sources including court records, client-patron correspondence and applications for employment to piece together a highly detailed and convincing picture of Williamite patronage practice. I will look to use similar sources to explore the extent to which these patronage methods and objectives were transferred to England. The resultant insights

[25] Janssen, *Princely power in the Dutch Republic;* Wilders, *Patronage in de Provincie;* Roorda, *Partij en Factie*.
[26] O. Mörke, 'William's Stadholderly Court in the Dutch Republic', in E. Mijers and D. Onnekink (eds.), *Redefining William III* (2007, Abingdon); P. Kiesow, 'The office of stadhouder and the preservation of unity in the Dutch Republic, 1559 - 1672' (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2020).
[27] Janssen, *Princely Power*, p.47.

can then be used to increase our understanding of the degree of flexibility within Stuart-Orange statecraft along with the reasons for the regime's reception in England.

A comparative approach can also serve to explore the degree to which William and Mary differed in their patronage practice from their Stuart predecessors in England. In considering the latter, Linda Levy Peck described a world where reciprocity infused the clientage relationship and in which clients were allowed considerable latitude to develop their own patronage networks as a means of disseminating the influence of the monarch more broadly. Her work was substantially informed by that of Sharon Kettering, developed in her studies of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century French patronage practice.[28] The framework and vocabulary employed by Kettering has influenced the methodology of Early Modern patronage study significantly. This thesis will examine two of the central planks of her framework within the context of Stuart-Orange patronage practice - the culture of reciprocity and the role of the chief minister/favourite- thereby providing a means of assessing how the concept of patronage was adapted by William and Mary to changed circumstance.

Neglect or perceived misuse of the practice of reciprocity, often exhibited through the custom of gift giving, has not received significant attention within the context of Stuart-Orange patronage practice. To Sharon Kettering, the exchange of gifts was an essential means by which emotional attachment and a feeling of shared identity could be created

[28] S. Kettering, *Patronage in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France* (Aldershot, 2002); S. Kettering, *Patrons, brokers, and clients in seventeenth-century France* (New York, 1986).

between patron and client.[29] Reciprocity built trust. Gift giving remained a feature of patron-client relations at slightly lower levels of late seventeenth-century English society- the work of Susan Whyman on the Verneys for example has explored its practice in great detail.[30] Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos, in *The Culture of Giving*, identified an inability to oversee satisfactorily the provision of the rewards demanded by the elite as a source of conflict between English monarch and people. She wrote that 'By the mid-seventeenth century, as the demands on its major office holders mounted and divisive politics pervaded the localities, rivalries heightened and occasionally brought the mechanisms of dispensing favours and services to the brink of collapse.'[31] Differences in understanding between monarch and people regarding the role of the Stuart-Orange court as a fount of patronage need to be examined more fully.[32] Did William have a concept of patronage which was alien to his new subjects? And, if so, how harmful to the regime was it? How did Mary differ in her patronage practice? This is not a study of the mechanics of patronage per se, but of the extent to which Stuart-Orange methods- either through on the one hand lack of access to the monarch or, on the other, the largesse of the Irish land grants to a select few- so obviously flouted English convention that they engendered significant political opposition to the regime.

[29] Kettering, *Brokers and Clients,* p.38.
[30] S. Whyman, *Sociability and Power in late- Stuart England: the cultural worlds of the Verneys, 1660-1720* (Oxford, 1999).
[31] I.K. Ben-Amos, *The Culture of Giving: informal support and gift-exchange in early modern England* (Cambridge, 2008), p.286.
[32] Linda Levy Peck described court patronage as a fountain through which monarchs controlled the circulation of reciprocal obligations. Levy Peck, *Patronage and Corruption*, p.1.

The role of the Early Modern monarchical or princely Favourite in the formulation of policy and allocation of position has received considerable scholarly attention.[33] The (long) apogee of the Favourite's influence has been considered to span the century and a quarter between approximately 1530 and 1660, coinciding in J.H. Elliott's words with a time when 'the growing complexity of the early modern state, ... imposed increasingly heavy demands on the monarch ... After 1660, however, the figure of the single omnicompetent minister disappeared from the scene.'[34] And yet that complexity grew still further in the late seventeenth century, and, in Hans Willem Bentinck, there appeared a figure whom his biographer has described as the 'Anglo-Dutch Favourite.'[35] There is, unfortunately, no modern biography of William's other Dutch favourite in England- Arnold Joost van Keppel.[36] However, their existence and the often-voiced opinion that they were the reincarnation of Buckingham or, from an earlier age, Piers Gaveston, requires a re-assessment of whether the Favourite was indeed dead, or perhaps modified. Such an approach can cast light upon important aspects of the Favourite's role including their part in the politics of access.[37] It can also deliver insights relating to broader aspects of Stuart-Orange patronage practice- the nature of delegation within it and the degree of trust between patron and client especially.

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[33] J.H. Elliott and L.W.B. Brockliss (eds.), *The World of the Favourite* (New Haven, 1999); R. Lockyer, *Buckingham: The Life and Political Career of George Villiers, First Duke of Buckingham, 1592-1628* (London, 1981); J. H. Elliott, *Richelieu and Olivares* (Cambridge, 1984).

[34] Elliott, *World of the Favourite,* p.4.

[35] D. Onnekink, *The Anglo-Dutch Favourite: the career of Hans Willem Bentinck, 1st Earl of Portland, (1649-1709)* (Aldershot, 2007).

[36] James Falkner, 'Keppel, Arnold Joost van, first earl of Albemarle (1669/70-1718)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, September 2004), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/15438 (20 June 2024).

[37] The politics of access have been examined in the reign of Charles II in the works of B. Weiser, *Charles II and the politics of access* (Woodbridge, 2003), and D. Allen, 'The Political Function of Charles II's Chiffinch', *Huntingdon Library Quarterly,* 39/3 (1976).

Aaron Graham enhanced our understanding of the development of the fiscal-military state by demonstrating the importance of established networks and transaction methods as means of facilitating the state's expanded requirements.[38] In contrast, how the Stuart-Orange regime responded to the increased scale and complexity of its military and fiscal needs through changes in the selection methods and characteristics of the army and navy officers whom it employed has not been explored in detail. This study will examine the degree of parliamentary pressure to assume responsibility for the allocation of place. Much has been written concerning the theoretical assertion of executive control by Parliament after 1688.[39] But how did the Revolution Settlement work in practice? There were multiple opportunities for Parliament to question monarchical competence to maintain its rights of appointment- occasioned particularly by military losses, corruption allegations, and, to a lesser degree, ecclesiastical appointments. And yet, monarchical patronage rights at the end of the reign bore remarkable similarity at least in theory with those in existence at its start.

Nor have the criteria used by the Stuart-Orange regime's leading figures to determine the allocation of position received much scholarly attention. In contrast, recent historical study of the late seventeenth-century quest for scientific knowledge has devoted much attention to analysis of the relative strength of the credibility of evidence provided either by the

[38] A. Graham, *Corruption, party, and government in Britain, 1702-1713* (Oxford, 2015).
[39] R. Kay, *The Glorious Revolution and the Continuity of Law* (Washington, 2014); L.G. Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights, 1689* (Baltimore, 1981); R. Beddard, *A Kingdom without a King* (Oxford, 1988).

gentleman or the expert.[40] As the heads of one of the largest employers in the country, William and Mary faced an analogous choice, whether to trust birth or expertise, when deciding the allocation of place within their substantial areas of control. Consideration of the relative merits of these potentially competing attributes was of most consequence in the allocation of military position. Methods of, and reasons for, officer selection within the armed forces have been neglected, perhaps due to the subject's location at the intersection of historiographies- forming a core area of research for neither the court historian nor the armed forces specialist. And yet the issue of who to employ and indeed how to establish suitability at a time of substantial change in methods of warfare can tell us much about the mentalities of those responsible for officer selection.

The study of court patronage also provides a means to assess the differences and any resultant friction between Stuart-Orange self-representation and practice. The gulf between the regime's representation of its probity and the activities of some of its principal officers needs to be assessed. Contemporary commentators regularly criticised those officials' venal practices. Teri Moores has described the network controlled by the Lord Chamberlain, the Earl of Dorset, together with the substantial profits from the sale of offices shared between Dorset and those whom he appointed to adminster the patronage chain.[41] The degree of complicity of the monarchs with this activity and the reasons for it need to be

[40] R.K. Merton, *Science, Technology and Society in seventeenth century England* (New York, 1970); S. Shapin and S. Schaffer, *Leviathan and the air-pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental Life* (Princeton, 2018); S. Shapin, *A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England* (Chicago), 1994.
[41] T. Moores, 'The Earl of Dorset and the Sale of Offices in the Household above Stairs, 1689-97', *The Court Historian,* 20(2) (2015).

examined. Was there an acceptable degree of venality, occasioned by an unspoken but generally accepted acknowledgement of the paucity of official remuneration scales?

The indications which examination of such questions can provide have particular bearing as a means of assessment of the character and motivation of William III. Having left few written testaments to his thought processes, William's patronage practice can be used to explore important aspects of his values and conduct. Gilbert Burnet commented upon the king's considerable powers of observation, and it is helpful to examine where those powers were most enthusiastically employed and what qualities he was seeking.[42] I will explore both the attributes which William valued, along with those to which he was seemingly indifferent, or even wary. In this context, William's attitudes to the importance of gentlemanly status and incorruptibility as determinants of suitability for employment can be used to illuminate his primary motivations. Recent biographers' views of William have generally been favourable, concentrating upon his success in achieving his main objectives of preserving the Protestant state and religion.[43] Study of William's patronage practice can inform our perceptions of the reasons for that success in addition to throwing light on his attitude to his rights as king. Stubborn refusal to compromise, often concerning issues of patronage, led to avoidable confrontations which ultimately lessened his authority. The multiple conflicts which marred the closing years of his reign bear particular witness here. William's patronage practice can

[42] 'he was an exact observer of men and things.' Gilbert Burnet, *History of his own time: from the restoration of King Charles the Second, to the Treaty of Peace at Utrecht, in the reign of Queen Anne* (6 vols, Oxford, 1823), iv, p.548.

[43] S. Baxter, *William III* (London,1966); T. Claydon, *William III Profiles in Power* (Abingdon, 2014); W. Troost, *William III, the Stadholder-king: a political biography*, trans. J.C. Grayson (London, 2016); T. Claydon, *William III* (Abingdon, 2025).

also inform our perceptions of his attitude to the delegation of responsibility and his expectation of the nature of the patron-client relationship.[44]

This thesis builds a picture of Stuart-Orange patronage practice by using evidence from three source types: letters and petitions from those seeking employment or reward, delineating both their reasons and qualifications for preferment along with indications of their methods and direction of application; the responses to applications by those controlling selection, explaining employment rationales and exploring the identities of those involved in the process; and finally the reaction by members of the elite both to selection methods as well as the identities of those employed. We have varying degrees of information from all three categories, but the nature of recruitment practice for the most senior positions in late seventeenth-century English society limits our ability to achieve greater clarity. Oral rather than written communication would appear to have been the normal medium by which decisions were reached and conveyed, and both William and Mary often destroyed written material which they considered to contain confidential or compromising information.[45] In addition, the absence of a culture of collegial responsibility and documented rationales for decision-making has limited the surviving quantity of written evidence. Nevertheless,

[44] The biographies of some of the regime's principal courtiers and politicians can help here. J. P. Kenyon, *Robert Spencer, Earl of Sunderland, 1641-1702* (London, 1958); A. Browning, *Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby and Duke of Leeds, 1632-1712* (3 vols, Glasgow, 1951).

[45] 'I looked over all my meditations, and burnt most of them fearing they might fall into hands I did not like. The journals I had kept, I put in a bag and tied by my side resolving if any thing happened to have them ready to burn.' Mary, *Memoirs*, pp.38-9.

enough written documentation has survived to piece together with some confidence a picture of court patronage practice.

Most abundant are the letters and petitions from applicants requesting promotion to specific posts, particularly within the military although requests for ecclesiastical and court positions are also relatively common.[46] Their value can be reinforced by the existence of evidence from discrete sources upon the reasons for an applicant's success or failure.[47] For clergy, lawyers and army officers, autobiographies and near contemporaneous biographies provide insights into applicants' mentalities. [48] The surviving correspondence of the Secretaries of State, James Vernon, Charles Talbot Duke of Shrewsbury, and Daniel Finch Earl of Nottingham, provide insights both regarding qualities required as well as the nature of the recruitment procedure.[49] In this respect, the absence of a letter chain in their papers, potentially signalling a lack of involvement in the recruitment process, is sometimes as

[46] The commissions are mainly contained in the SP 44/166 and 44/167 series of the State Papers. Petitions to Secretaries of State are found in SP 44/235,6 and 7. Naval Petitions are held separately in SP 44/204 and 205. SP44/98 contains Nottingham's letters as Secretary of State. Shrewsbury's and Vernon's letters are contained in SP 44/74. Regency papers for 1695 are held in SP44/274. The letters of James Stanhope to his father (Kent History and Library Centre Stanhope Papers, U1590) are particularly informative concerning army officer recruitment practice.

[47] The Portland papers held by the Nottingham University Library in the Pw A series are particularly useful for their portrayal of discussions between Portland and William's ministers relating to the competing claims of applicants for office and reward.

[48] Examples of clerical biographies and autobiographies include: Thomas Birch, *Remarks upon the Life of the most Reverend Dr John Tillotson* (London, 1753); Thomas Sharp and Thomas Newcome, *The Life of John Sharp, D.D. Lord Archbishop of York* (2 vols, London, 1825); *Memoirs of the Life and Times of the Most Reverend Father in God, Dr. Thomas Tenison* (London, 1716); Timothy Goodwln, *The Life and character of that eminent and learned prelate, Dr. Edward Stillingfleet* (London, 1735); *The Life of Richard Kidder, D.D., Bishop of Bath and Wells: Written by himself,* ed. A.E. Robinson (Somerset Record Society, 37, 1924); Edward Carpenter, *The Protestant Bishop, being the life of Henry Compton, Bishop of London* (London, 1956).

[49] *Letters Illustrative of the Reign of William III from 1696 to 1708 addressed to the Duke of Shrewsbury, by James Vernon, esq.,* ed. G.P.R. James (3 vols, London, 1841); *Private and original Correspondence of Charles Talbot, Duke of Shrewsbury, with King William*, ed. William Coxe (London, 1821); HMC *Report on the manuscripts of Allan George Finch, Esq., of Burley-on-the-Hill, Rutland* (5 vols, London, 1913-2004), ii, iii, iv.

telling as its presence.[50] Locating evidence for the thinking of the monarchs themselves is more problematic. The attitude of Mary is easier to discern. Her letters and Memoirs are an invaluable source of information, although, as we shall see, they need to be treated with care.[51] Comparatively, William has left very few written records of his thoughts. A form of reading against the grain needs to be undertaken, referencing actual outcomes and more generalised statements made by William concerning the qualities in candidates which he was seeking. [52] Histories of the reign, memoirs and parliamentary records provide contemporary commentary upon methods of recruitment together with the suitability of those selected. [53] Of their authors, Gilbert Burnet was best placed to provide informed observation upon Stuart-Orange recruitment policy. Indeed, he was anxious to highlight his own role in the decision-making for many of the most important roles within the polity. However, Burnet's combination of proximity to the regime, self-worth, literary dexterity and known employment as regime propagandist is a potentially dangerous one.[54] Corroboratory evidence from alternative sources is often necessary to support the opinions of an author with very pronounced beliefs and strong opinions on individuals' merits. Similar caveats

[50] For example, the Earl of Nottingham's papers contain numerous applications for naval posts, but hardly any for army commissions.

[51] Mary's letters are mainly found in *Letters of Two Queens,* ed. B. Bathurst (London, 1924), and Sir John Dalrymple, *Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland* (3 vols, Edinburgh, 1771-88). The Memoirs were printed in *Memoirs of Mary, Queen of England, (1689-93)*, ed. R. Doebner (Leipzig, 1886).

[52] C*orrespondentie van Willem III en vans Hans Willem Bentinck, eersten Graaf van Portland,* ed. N. Japikse (5 vols, The Hague, 1927-37); *Letters of William III and Louis XIV*, *1697-1700*, ed. P. Grimblot (2 vols, London, 1848).

[53] Gilbert Burnet, *History of his own time: from the restoration of King Charles the Second, to the Treaty of Peace at Utrecht, in the reign of Queen Anne* (6 vols, Oxford, 1823); *Memoirs of Thomas, Earl of Ailesbury, Written by Himself* (2 vols, London, 1890); Savile, *Life*; *Journals of the House of Commons; The Parliamentary Diary of Narcissus Luttrell*, ed. H. Horwitz (Oxford, 1972).

[54] Martin Greig, 'Burnet, Gilbert (1643-1715)', *ODNB* (Oxford, September 2004), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/406120 (20 June 2024).

need to be applied to other well-placed commentators whose agendas may, consciously or unconsciously, have influenced their writing- the memoirs of George Savile, Marquess of Halifax and Thomas Bruce, Earl of Ailesbury especially provide many memorable quotes and anecdotes whose accuracy often needs to be validated elsewhere. Many of these primary sources are well known to historians. The originality of my approach lies in their treatment as sources of information for the direction of patronage.

CHAPTER OUTLINES

The main chapters of the thesis, prefaced by a brief analysis of Dutch stadhouder practice, take as their subject matter discrete spheres of patronage practice: the court itself; Parliament; the armed forces; the Church; and the law. Each chapter also serves as a focal point for analysis of one or more of the overarching themes which the thesis explores.

Prince William of Orange had successfully made use of his rights of patronage as stadhouder in the United Provinces for sixteen years before his invasion of England in 1688. I will assess the individuals upon whom William relied for advice and the mechanisms through which decisions were made. I will examine the criteria which William used to evaluate candidates along with the standards used to judge performance in office. William consistently exploited opportunities to build areas of influence and control through the expansion of the stadhouder's patronage network, and, when opposed by competing interests, rarely ceded defeat without prolonged struggle. The overall effect, as summarised

by Jonathan Israel, was to increase stadhouderly power far beyond that enjoyed by any of William's predecessors.[55]

Many comparable points of friction between ruler and ruled were present in the allocation of office in the United Provinces and England. Disputes concerning admissible office holder practice, the control of patronage, and the criteria for office-holding regularly led to conflict between the stadhouder and other parts of the devolved Dutch state. A brief study of Williamite patronage practices in the United Provinces before 1688 therefore acts as a suitable preface to the more detailed study of Stuart-Orange English patronage which follows. Nevertheless, the English court's size, the importance of party-based faction, the country's more integrated governmental structure, and the broader range of patronage under monarchical control differentiated England from the United Provinces. Each of the new monarchs' distinct areas of patronage responsibility had already existing practices associated with their use, often varying between area of patronage. There was a need for William and Mary to assimilate those practices quickly and then to fashion them in ways which were acceptable to both monarch and subject.[56] This was not an easy task and the chapters in the thesis will bring out the challenges in each area, together with the associated requirements and responses. For example, a balance needed to be found in the army between an officer corps which had already proven itself in battle and one which satisfied calls for more commissions for British soldiers. Both England and the United Provinces were

[55] J. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806* (Oxford, 1995), pp.807-863.
[56] Geert Janssen noted a similar problem of assimilation in his analysis of William Frederick of Nassau's integration into the patronage networks of Frisia and Gelderland. Because William Frederick lacked 'any backing, knowledge or credit in the province', his command of the patronage system was 'a work in progress' where networks took years to construct. Janssen, *Princely Power*, p.54.

ruled by a form of 'monarchical republicanism'.[57] But there were significant differences in the form which it took, including the ways in which patronage was allocated. Although many of the causes of friction between ruler (as patron) and elite (as client) existed on both sides of the North Sea, the new regime in England needed to take account of local practice and custom.

The chapter on the English court examines the allocation of office within the royal households. Patronage allocation was a means of projecting the power and character of the court outside the physical spaces of its palaces: I will examine how William and Mary used the bestowal of employment opportunities within the court to further their political aims.

There is no comparable work for William and Mary's court to that of Linda Levy Peck and Neil Cuddy detailing the political impact of the changes which the first Stuart monarch, James I and VI, made to the composition of the English court after his accession. The purpose of this chapter, aided by the detailed lists of court officials compiled by Robert Bucholz, is to fill that gap.[58] Many of William's most senior ministers were rewarded by office within his household, despite their affiliations with either the Whig or Tory parties. William expressed a pronounced dislike of faction. This chapter will consider Stuart-Orange reward of place within the context of a political environment which was considered inimical by William and

[57] The phrase of Patrick Collinson, applied by Tony Claydon to the mixed form of government in place in England in the seventeenth century. Claydon, *William III: Profiles in Power*, p.52.
[58] R.O. Bucholz and J. Sainty, *Officials of the Royal Household, 1660-1837* (London, 1997).

yet was firmly entrenched. I will also examine the qualities other than political utility which were required to achieve preferment to the most senior positions within the household.

The chapter also explores the representational significance of the constitution of the Stuart-Orange court. What were the monarchs attempting to achieve by the changes which they made to the court's composition after their accession? As Andrew Barclay has observed, the court's size, together with the retention of many of Charles II's courtiers, sent out a clear message regarding the respect for long-established practice which the new monarchs wished to display, a respect which contrasted with James II's reforms. I will consider how this backward-looking approach was combined with the retention of features from William's court as stadhouder. There was a need to take account of the potential opposition of members of the English elite to the maintenance of a household which was regarded as overly Dutch in its members and practices.

The message of continuity with the court of Charles II was reinforced by the retention of the practice of delegation of large numbers of patronage rights over less politically sensitive roles to the king's most senior household officials. The latters' ability to make substantial profits from the sale of offices was rarely questioned.[59] Whether and how this was justified will be considered. The composition of Mary's court will be analysed separately, although this is something of an artificial division. The two courts shared many members, and their staffing was predominantly William's responsibility. However, patriarchal dominance was not maintained in all areas of Stuart-Orange patronage practice. Why William was willing to

[59] Moores, 'Earl of Dorset', pp.187-209.

allocate responsibility to Mary and how that allocation of control was portrayed will form a core theme of the thesis.

The chapter on Parliament focuses upon Stuart-Orange attempts to employ the offer of place and other rewards to influence voting behaviours. The chapter will also provide perspective on Stuart-Orange conceptions of monarchical rights.

Many members of William's court also served in Parliament, and it was a constant theme of political commentators that positions at court were influencing MPs' voting behaviour. Multiple attempts were made during the reign to control the ability of holders of office in the remit of the Crown to sit in the House of Commons.[60] Ostensibly providing evidence of the correlation between office holding and voting behaviour, the House of Lords – of whose members almost forty percent also held court office- was markedly more consistent in its support of government sponsored legislation than the lower chamber. I will examine a number of aspects of court related involvement with Parliament. Firstly, I look at whether a court party could be considered to have existed, and, if it did, to explore its characteristics. Scholarship has focussed upon the growth of the Tory and Whig parties during the reign and whether division between these two groups formed the major reason for factional strife in Parliament rather than conflict between court and country members.[61] Within this debate, the existence and nature of the court party has been insufficiently questioned. I will also examine how William attempted to influence parliamentary outcomes through an analysis

[60] D. Hayton, 'The Reorientation of Place Legislation in the 1690s', *Parliaments, Estates and Representation,* 5(2) 1985.
[61] B.W. Hill, *The Growth of Parliamentary Parties 1689-1742* (London, 1976); G. Holmes (ed.), *Britain after the Glorious Revolution* (London, 1969).

of the ministers upon whom he relied, together with the methods which were employed to obtain favourable voting outcomes, and the consistency of utilisation of those methods.

William's advocacy of trimming as an antidote to what he perceived as the deleterious effects of faction remained a central plank of his political thinking throughout the reign, despite the repeated evidence of its ineffectuality within the House of Commons. I examine the motivation which lay behind William's attempts to employ such a policy in Parliament. The investigation can also help to inform our perception of William's concept of the royal prerogative. I look to answer the question of whether William's profession of respect for parliamentary rights was a subterfuge behind which there existed a desire for increased levels of monarchical authority. Having found a workable solution to the problems of implementing court policy in Parliament through the formation of the Sunderland coordinated Whig Junto, William's contribution to its undoing, by insistence upon the maintenance of a standing army whose size was so vehemently opposed by the House of Commons, should be seen in this light. Although those to whom he delegated responsibility were allowed significant freedom of action within their often-limited spheres of authority, William seems to have been highly motivated by a desire to avoid dependence upon any individual or party.

The chapter concludes with consideration of House of Commons members' attitudes to the regime. There was a variety of influences in addition to that of court patronage upon MPs' voting behaviour- party affiliation, constituents' demands, geographic ties for example. Nevertheless, when used in conjunction with the party apparatus of the Whig Junto, the ability of the court to use its powers of patronage to effect positive outcomes in Parliament

was significant. The success in raising increased amounts of supply funding for the armed forces during this period is the most tangible evidence for that influence. In addition, ministers remained the choice of the king. Shrewsbury, Vernon and Nottingham, despite their party affiliations, were assiduous in their attempts to influence and then implement court policy in Parliament. William's aloof and naturally suspicious nature perhaps prevented him from using that loyalty more effectively.

The substantial coverage of the late seventeenth-century English state's interactions with its expanded military resources has not incorporated detailed research into how its armed forces' officers were chosen.[62] The new regime faced issues of loyalty, existing practice, faction and officer conduct in fashioning military forces capable of opposing Louis XIV. I will describe and assess the success of the methods used to reduce those issues' negative effects.

The joint monarchs maintained responsibility for the selection of the officer corps. I will examine why Parliament's limited attempts to gain control of the process, or place constraints upon the monarchs' freedom of action, were unsuccessful. Army officer selection was one of William's primary concerns, leading to a gradual improvement in the effectiveness of the officer corps over the course of the reign. The entrenched nature of existing practices prevented implementation of the more drastic measures enacted by William after his assumption of Dutch army command. The importance William attached to

[62] J. Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, money and the English state, 1688-1783* (London, 1989); M.J. Braddick, *State formation in early modern England c.1550-1700* (Cambridge, 2000); H. Smith, *Armies and Political Change in Britain, 1660-1750* (Oxford, 2021); A. Graham, *Corruption, party, and government in Britain, 1702-1713* (Oxford, 2015).

the relative merits of noble birth, expertise, and connection will be assessed. His recognition of Mary's abilities led to the queen's participation in naval administration. The queen as head of the Regency Council formed an effective partnership with the Earl of Nottingham to monitor the aptitude and behaviour of the navy's officers. Mary's involvement in the navy's administration, including officer selection within it, provides a means to investigate the joint monarchs' differences in patronage technique.

Interlinkages of secular and ecclesiastical politics led to the assignment of senior clerical positions having consequences beyond the religious sphere. It was impossible to separate the direction of ecclesiastical patronage from the secular divisions caused by political faction. Divisions within the Church of England ensured that the direction of ecclesiastical preferment had the capacity to destabilise the new regime. Against such a backdrop, the unifying message of the campaign for 'Godly Revolution' was unlikely on its own to restore religious harmony. Mary's High Church affinities blended with William's Calvinist leanings to produce an ecclesiastical bench which was known for its piety, whilst also reflecting Church of England divisions to the extent that neither Latitudinarian nor High Church elements within it could feel excluded. This was trimming in successful action and contributed to the comparative calm over religious matters which characterised much of the reign after 1690.

Analysis of Mary's substantial involvement in clerical appointments provides a suitable point of departure for wider investigation of the queen's political techniques. Her diligent enquiry into the characters of candidates for clerical office contrasted with William's

delegational style. The queen's willingness to let it be known that church preferment was in her purview was facilitated by William's public acknowledgement of that delegation.

The final chapter of the thesis, relating to court patronage and the law, analyses the extent to which the justice dispensed by the regime's legal appointees can be deemed to have conformed with the precept of the rule of law. Within the chapter, a discussion of the Williamite land grants explores further the legal mentalities of the regime together with the inferences concerning Williamite attitudes to monarchical rights and respect for the past which the grants supply.

All of James II's judges were replaced by the new regime. In no other branch of the polity were the changes so sweeping- the purge represented the practical enactment of the revolutionaries' aim to restore the laws and liberties of England. It provided a means by which the Stuart-Orange regime could distance itself from the manipulation of the law for political purposes which James II had been accused of committing. The extent to which the new regime displayed a greater respect for the rule of law than its predecessor has recently received much scholarly attention. The final chapter in the thesis will look at that claim from multiple angles.

I will examine the methods by which the new judicial bench was chosen, along with the individuals involved in its appointment. The performance of those judges will then be analysed to determine the nature of their interpretation of the rule of law. The chapter will build upon George Artley's exploration of Sir John Holt's career and legal judgements, together with the recent studies of 1690s treason trials in the edition of essays edited by

Brian Cowan and Scott Sowerby.[63] Both works have depicted a highly nuanced attitude to the concept of the inviolability of the rule of law on the part of the regime's judges. Both have described a judicial bench which regularly acted in ways which, although procedurally correct, could also have been considered inequitable. Comparison with Williamite practices in the United Provinces will be used to elucidate further the purpose of the regime's legal practices. I will argue that those legal practices received less criticism than those of the preceding reign due to the direction of legal outcomes aligning more closely with the political and religious affiliations of the majority of the nation's elite.

The findings of this study of the regime's legal patronage are then incorporated into an analysis of the Williamite land grants. The grants have received little attention from historians, but, as a detailed case study, they can tell us much concerning William's attitude to the law as well as providing insights into how he envisaged the nature of the patron-client relationship, including the extent of his right to reward favourites. The sources for this part of the chapter- the works of John Somers and Charles Davenant especially- will be used to cast light upon late seventeenth-century attitudes to the rule of law and respect for historic precedent. I will consider the degree to which the scale of parliamentary objection to both the Welsh land grants proposed for Portland and the Irish forfeitures' allocation to a wider grouping was heightened by those grants' ability to serve as focal points for protest against the regime. I will also explore the extent to which the episodes demonstrate the difficulty

[63] G. Artley, 'Law and Politics under the Later Stuarts: Sir John Holt, the Courts, and the Constitutional Crisis of 1688' (D. Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2019); B. Cowan and S. Sowerby (eds.), *The State Trials and the Politics of Justice in Later Stuart England* (Woodbridge, 2021).

which William experienced, even at the end of his reign, in understanding and adapting to English practices.

Chapter 1 - Stadhouder Patronage Practice in the United Provinces, 1672-1702

Prince William of Orange had held the position of stadhouder in the United Provinces for sixteen years before his invasion of England in 1688.[1] Prior to his election, the office of stadhouder under the republican regime of Johan de Witt had been left vacant in five of the seven Provinces, contributing to an imprecise definition of the stadhouder's role in the political structure of the United Provinces.[2] The increased threat of foreign invasion which culminated in the events of 1672, the disaster year, enabled William to assume command of the army and also recover the political influence exerted by his predecessors. This did not occur without opposition and the role of the stadhouder remained contested. In Jonathan Israel's opinion, William raised the powers of the stadhouder far beyond those enjoyed by his father, with successful use of patronage being a primary instrument in this expansion of authority.[3] The allocation of office was a means of both signalling the identity of the regime as well as contributing to its ability to unify. For William, the need to establish unity in Britain after the events of 1688 replicated an equivalent requirement in the United Provinces in 1672. Exploration of William's patronage techniques in the United Provinces is therefore an appropriate and necessary precursor to a more detailed examination of Stuart-Orange appointment methods in the Three Kingdoms.

[1] Each province of the United Provinces was entitled to elect its own stadhouder. After the invitation to become stadhouder of Holland and Zeeland in 1672, William was subsequently elected to the position of stadhouder in three more provinces.
[2] The constitutional position of the stadhouder is discussed in detail by P. Kiesow, 'The office of stadhouder and the preservation of unity in the Dutch Republic, 1559 - 1672' (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2020).
[3] J. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806* (Oxford, 1995), pp.810-825.

This analysis will concentrate on three separate but related areas. Firstly, I will provide an overview of the practices underpinning William's involvement in the bestowal of patronage in the United Provinces: I will look at the people involved in the patronage process; the communication mechanisms between those individuals; the qualities expected of successful applicants for place; and the benefits to which those applicants aspired. I will then consider differences in patronage practice in the main areas over which the stadhouder had influence, concentrating on provincial and urban appointments for administrative roles but also briefly surveying his involvement in military, ecclesiastical and legal patronage. Lastly, I will consider how William's use of patronage informs our view of his perceived role as stadhouder and the sought-after degree of control which accompanied that interpretation. The closing paragraphs of the chapter will act as a transition into the more detailed discussion of Stuart-Orange patronage practice in the Three Kingdoms which follows. I will concentrate attention upon perhaps the most striking feature of his oversight of the allocation of place in the United Provinces- skill as a political operator incorporating flexibility, ruthlessness, awareness of limitations, concentration on a small number of goals- as a means of introduction to how the skills and methods displayed came to be utilised and adapted across the North Sea.

It is only recently that historians have approached William of Orange's patronage techniques in the United Provinces as a subject of distinct study. The biographies of William by Stephen Baxter, Woot Troost and Tony Claydon describe the stadhouder's increasing political influence after 1672 together with an analysis of his aims without assessing in detail

his ability to bind the Provinces together through a network of patronage.[4] Jonathan Israel's history of the Dutch Republic ascribes greater weight to this area of his political activity- 'where, initially, his popular appeal had been his foremost weapon, after 1675, William III relied chiefly on behind the scenes influence, power of patronage, and twisting arms'- but the large chronological scope of his work enables him to provide only brief descriptions of some of the more contested political appointments which either defined or challenged William's authority.[5] More specialised studies such as David Onnekink's biography of Bentinck and Simon Groenveld's essay 'William III as Stadholder: Prince or Minister?' have provided valuable insights into William's patronage technique, whilst an overview of William's involvement in political appointment-making in the United Provinces in the 1690s has been provided by Jan de Jongste.[6] His work draws considerably on the studies of D.J. Roorda, J.J. Woltjer and M. van der Bijl detailing William's patronage of a diplomatic service which operated separately from that of the States-General together with, in the latter cases, analyses of the political and administrative structures of individual towns.[7] The most comprehensive analysis of the stadhouder's role in local political appointment making is

[4] S. Baxter, *William III* (London,1966; W. Troost, *William III, the stadholder-king: a political biography* (London, 2016); T. Claydon, *William III: Profiles in Power* (Abingdon, 2014); T. Claydon, *William III* (Abingdon, 2025). The unifying role of the stadhouder is analysed by Kiesow, 'Office of Stadhouder'.
[5] Israel, *The Dutch Republic,* p.818.
[6] D. Onnekink, *The Anglo-Dutch Favourite: the career of Hans Willem Bentinck, 1st Earl of Portland, (1649-1709)* (Aldershot, 2007); S. Groenveld, 'William III as Stadholder: Prince or Minister?', in E. Mijers and D. Onnekink (eds.), *Redefining William III: The Impact of the King- Stadholder in International Context* (Abingdon, 2007); J. de Jongste, 'The 1690s and after: The Local Perspective', in J. de Jongste and A.J. Veenendaal (eds.), *Anthonie Heinsius and the Dutch Republic, 1688-1720: politics, war, and finance* (The Hague, 2002).
[7] D.J. Roorda, 'Le secret du Prince. Monarchale tendenties in de Republiek 1672-1702', in D.J. Roorda and A. Gabriels (eds.), *Rond prins en patriciaat: verspreide opstellen* (Weesp, 1984; D.J. Roorda, *Partij en Factie: de oproeren van 1672 in de steden van Holland en Zeeland, een krachtmeting tussen partijen en facties* (Groningen, 1961); J.J.Woltjer, 'Willem III en Leiden', in J.W. Marsilje et al. (eds.), *Uit Leidse bron geleverd* (Leiden, 1989); M. van der Bijl, 'Utrechts weerstand tegen de oorlogspolitiek tijdens de Spaanse Successie-oorlog', in *Van Standen tot Staten. Stichtse Historische Reeks 1.* (Utrecht, 1975).

that by Coen Wilders detailing William's involvement in Utrecht.[8] It is unfortunate that there is no similar work for other provincial urban centres, although William's relations with Amsterdam are discussed in detail by Elizabeth Edwards.[9] The role of the court as a source of patronage has been considered by Olaf Mörke whilst Jill Stern has analysed the stadhouder's representation in word and image.[10] William's role in the appointment of army officers is given brief consideration by John Stapleton and John Childs although there is no detailed assessment of William's involvement with navy appointments.[11] What is lacking is a study which brings these strands together. This is partly because of the nature of the sources- there are relatively few direct statements of either desire for roles by individual applicants or William's reaction to those applications. This leads to the necessity of a form of reading against the grain of those primary sources which do relate indirectly to the subject. In this context, the inventories of William's principal advisors' correspondence in the Archief Nationaal, the letters of Fagel and Heinsius in particular, together with the letters of William III and Bentinck preserved in the Koninklijke and published in the editions of correspondence by Japiske and Kramer provide the most valuable sources of information.[12]

[8] C. Wilders, *Patronage in de Provincie: Het Utrechtse netwerk van stadhouder Willem III* (Amsterdam, 2015).
[9] E. Edwards, 'Amsterdam and William III: the role of influence, interest and patronage on policy-making in the Dutch Republic, 1672-1684' (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1998).
[10] J. Stern, *Orangism in the Dutch Republic in word and image, 1650-75* (Manchester, 2010).
[11] J. Childs, *The British Army of William III, 1689-1702* (Manchester,1987), pp.34-84; J. Stapleton, 'The Dual Monarchy in Practice: Anglo- Dutch Alliance and War in the Spanish Netherlands 1689-1697', in Mijers and Onnekink (eds.), *Redefining William III*. J.R.Bruijn, 'William III and his two navies', *Notes and Records of The Royal Society*, 43(2) (1989).
[12] *Correspondentie van Willem III en van Hans Willem Bentinck, eersten Graaf van Portland*, ed. N. Japiske (5 vols, Gravenhage, 1927); *Archives ou Correspondance Inédite de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, ed. F.J.L. Kramer (ser.1, t.1, Leiden, 1907).

William's patronage network was overseen by a small number of individuals who were assigned significant freedom to act in the stadhouder's name. This is unsurprising. Although maintaining the final say in senior appointments, the wide range of William's concerns made personal, thorough oversight of such appointments unachievable. The relative unimportance of the posts concerning whose appointments William was kept informed suggests a recognition on his part of the importance of patronage as well as a desire to maintain at least some level of involvement in its allocation, even at relatively low levels. For example, despite multiple other concerns, in a 1690 letter to Heinsius William writes that 'he is unable to do anything for Mr. van Duyvenvoorde's son, but will do so in the future' and that he 'should like to help Mr. Fabritius to be Steward of Kennerland.'[13] This desire to maintain control of appointments to such relatively minor positions was unachievable on a large-scale; William was instead highly dependent upon the opinions of a select group of advisors to guide him. For example, on 23 January 1690, William wrote to Bentinck agreeing with his choices for échevins (sheriffs) in Haarlem, commenting that he 'did not have the time to disagree.'[14] In a letter from a few days earlier, Bentinck had informed William of his choices of councillor for Rotterdam.[15] The range of the areas of influence allotted to those

[13] 'Ik kan voor ditmaal den zoon van den heer van Duyvenvoorde niet helpen in zijne pretensie tot het drostampt van Muyden, zijnde geëngageert voor den fiscaal Hooft of zijn zoon, waarover UEdl. aan den heer van Duyvenvoorde mijne excuses wil maken, en dat ik in 't toekomende wat anders voor zijn zoon zal doen. Ik ben genegen om den heer Fabritius tot het rentmeester -plaats van Kenmerland te helpen, waartoe ik verzoek dat UEdl. het zijne wil contribueren.' William letter to Heinsius, November 21 1690. *Correspondance inédite, 1689-97*, p.129.

[14] 'n'estant pas le temps pour le désobligé.' Translation of a letter from William to Bentinck, January 23 1690. *Correspondentie van Willem III en Bentinck*, i, p.91.

[15] Bentinck was in the United Provinces for two months in the winter of 1690 to manage on William's behalf a disagreement with Amsterdam concerning whether William, since he was no longer resident, could continue to administer patronage in the province. The volume of correspondence between William and Bentinck over the period was considerable, dealing extensively with the allocation of positions. The correspondence allows

entrusted with patronage management varied widely. At the top of the patronage pyramid, Fagel, Heinsius and Bentinck had broad-ranging responsibilities. Heinsius, for example, advised on appointments in areas as diverse as ambassadorships to states allied with the United Provinces against France and magistrates in Delft.[16] Others were assigned more specific areas of responsibility, often solely relating to the towns which they represented. For example, in Leyden Jacob van der Maes was William's unofficial agent and conduit through which choices of councillor were made.[17] In Dordrecht, this responsibility was allotted to Anend Muys van Holy.[18] These agents advised William on the most appropriate candidates for local office and kept him informed of those candidates' performance after their election.[19] Attempts by most individuals to widen their spheres of influence were unsuccessful. Interaction between William and his agent in the patronage chain was for the most part confined to the perceived areas of expertise and influence of the intermediary. For example, Amerongen wrote unsuccessful letters of recommendation to William for a nephew to be given a place at court.[20] The same compartmentalisation of roles was to occur in England, where to courtiers such as Carmarthen it was a source of frustration. Only the raadpensionaaris Fagel and his successor Heinsius, together with Bentinck, seem to have been encouraged to offer more wide-ranging opinions, writing to and receiving from William

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a rare insight into the mechanics of the patronage process- usually the details would have been discussed verbally.

[16] William letter to Heinsius, January 7 1690. *Correspondance inédite, 1689-97,* p.47.

[17] Troost, *William III*, p.116.

[18] Troost, *William III*, p.118.

[19] Wilders, *Patronage,* p.98.

[20] C. Wilders, 'Subservient to the Stadholder: How William III's Interpretation of Capability Determined Politics in the Province of Utrecht, 1674-88', in J. Hartman et al. (eds.), *Public Offices, Personal Demands. Capability in Governance in the Seventeenth-Century Dutch Republic* (Cambridge, 2009), p.211.

lengthy letters written in a relatively informal manner. Heinsius's opinions on political events in the United Provinces and European diplomatic relations received detailed replies, William often concluding with the highly informal farewell remark of 'Your good friend, William.'[21] It was uncommon, but not impossible, for two individuals to possess influence for the same area. For example, in Utrecht, van Dijkvelt and van Amerongen both petitioned William in support of their choices for membership of the Utrecht council.[22] This was a rare duplication of sources of advice and over time William came to rely on van Dijkvelt solely. Dijkvelt had been a prominent supporter of de Witt, publicly declaring that he wished to set strict limits on the powers of the stadhouder.[23] It is perhaps unsurprising that it took time for William to be completely convinced of his loyalty.

Much of the decision-making process was managed by letter rather than in person. William's official visits to towns seem to have been confined to moments of political crisis when personal intervention was employed to emphasise his authority and influence local opinion- for example he made ceremonial visits to Amsterdam only three times between 1672 and 1684 and visited Utrecht formally only once after his oversight of its revised regeringsreglementen (constitution) in 1674.[24] A similar disinclination to make public appearances was a feature of William's kingship in England. Even the Royal Progress in 1695 was, in some of his subjects' eyes, marred by a lack of engagement by William with his

[21] William letter to Heinsius, January 9 1690. *Correspondance inédite, 1689-97,* p.63.
[22] Wilders, *Patronage*, pp.98-123.
[23] Wilders, *Patronage*, p.35.
[24] Edwards, *Amsterdam*, p.7; Wilders, *Patronage*, p.142.

subjects.[25] Attendance at court in order to petition for place was rarely effective. Amerongen, for example, delegated his son to petition at court on his behalf for the post of President of the Utrecht States without success.[26] The importance of the court as the fount of patronage was not present to the same degree as in England in the late seventeenth century, although this did not stop some individuals attempting to influence appointment making decisions by personal attendance at the Orange court. The reasons for their lack of success can be explained by: William's preference to limit his social interactions to a small number of associates, severely limiting opportunities to approach the stadhouder in person; and the lack of posts available at court itself (staffed by approximately 120 officers rather than the thousand members of Charles II's court). It would be wrong though to conclude that William did not seek his courtiers' advice. For those who had access to William, the Orange court was an essential forum for the exchange of information and opinions. This reliance upon a small group of close associates was replicated in England after 1688. Keppel remarked of William at the English court in 1697: 'He talks fast enough at night over his bottle, when he has none about him but his Dutch friends.'[27] The importance of these close associates as sounding boards was also remarked upon by James Vernon, William's Secretary of State in England, after Mary's death and William's estrangement from Bentinck: 'The King finds himself in great want of some he may be free with.'[28]

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[25] 'It is said in Warwickshire and many other places the King (William) greatly disappointed the county, not coming the roads where they wanted to see him.' Edward Harley letter to Sir Edward Harley, November 12 1695. HMC *Report on the manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland, Preserved at Welbeck abbey* (10 vols, London, 1891-1931), iii, p.573.
[26] Wilders, *Patronage,* pp.103-4.
[27] Bodleian, MS Carte 231, fos. 32-34.
[28] James Vernon letter to the Duke of Shrewsbury, December 27 1697. Vernon, *Letters*, i, p.450.

Utility and trustworthiness were the essential attributes of the select group which advised William about Dutch affairs. In Coen Wilders's words, 'William measured capability in terms of the level of support for his policy and the manner in which it was executed.'[29] His advisers were from diverse backgrounds- Heinsius came from a wealthy merchant family, Bentinck's forebears were moderately important members of the provincial nobility in Overijssel.[30] When either trustworthiness or ability to achieve desired results came into question, replacements were found. Amerongen, for example, had come by 1690 to be regarded as surplus to requirements: Bentinck reported to William that 'Although he bears himself well, he is becoming old and slow.'[31] He was appointed to the relatively unimportant embassy to Denmark, where, bereft of instructions, he constantly complained that he was ignored.[32] Simon van Halevijn had been William's main advisor on local affairs in Dordrecht until in 1692 he secretly began negotiations with France. At his subsequent trial, William put pressure on the judges to impose the maximum sentence allowable.[33] William's intermediaries were expected to work hard to promote his interest, overseeing the lists of candidates for office which were sent to the stadhouder from which his selections were made and then monitoring the elected representatives' voting behaviour. This could be time-consuming. For example, a preferred Williamite candidate for the position of alderman in Leiden, Pieter Cunaeus, had his eligibility for election questioned: Fagel compiled an eight-page document, detailing Cunaeus's lineage going back multiple generations, to promote

[29] Wilders, *Patronage*, p.200.
[30] Onnekink, *Favourite*, p.8.
[31] 'quoy qu'il se porte bien, il devient vieux et lent.' Bentinck letter to William, January 23 1690. *Correspondentie van Willem III en Bentinck*, i, p.92.
[32] Wilders, *Patronage*, p.164.
[33] de Jongste, *1690s*, p.70.

his election.[34] In return, William's agents were allowed a surprisingly free hand. Zuylen van Nievelt, his main agent in Rotterdam, was convicted in 1690 of peculation by a local court. William wrote to the court to overturn the decision.[35]

William used his powers of patronage as stadhouder primarily in the sphere of local and provincial politics where the decentralised nature of the political structure in the United Provinces offered William significant opportunity. The capacity to select local government administrators mattered to William because these officials were primarily responsible for the way in which the provinces and towns which they represented voted in the States-General on the central issues of diplomacy, war and taxation. The voting and organisational structures of individual provinces and towns were substantially amended after William's election to the stadhouderate. On 27 August 1672, at the time of national emergency, the States of Holland had empowered the Stadhouder to 'persuade, dispose, and, if necessary oblige such changes in the town councils as he should deem necessary to restore order.'[36] This he did with vigour. 14 out of 40 government officials were replaced by mainly Orangist supporters in Dordrecht, 20/40 in Delft and 10/36 in Amsterdam.[37] Of the 460 regents in the province of Holland, William replaced 130 in 1672.[38] Even greater scope for manipulation occurred in those towns and provinces which had to apply for readmittance to the Union after their recovery from French possession. In return for the grant of entry, William increased stadhouderly control of the constituents of their governments. For example,

[34] The Hague, Archief Nationaal, Fagel Inventory, 3.01.18. 3540.
[35] de Jongste, *1690s*, p.70.
[36] Israel, *Dutch Republic,* p.42.
[37] Israel, *Dutch Republic,* p.807.
[38] Israel, *Dutch Republic,* p.808.

William, with the assistance of Fagel, changed membership of the vroedschap (council) in Utrecht from life membership to only one year, enabling William to remove uncooperative members more swiftly, and inserted a clause in its regulations granting him the right to screen the province's choice of delegates to the States-General.[39] William, exploiting the popularity emanating from his military and political achievements in the early years of his stadhoudership, presented the new regulations to the Utrecht regents as immutable. Senior local governance posts came increasingly to be filled by Orangist supporters who in turn endeavoured to promote their own relations and associates. For example, in Utrecht Dijkelt was successful in engineering the election of his brother to the vroedschap and Gideon Hoeuft, who had married Dijkvelt's sister, was appointed regent.[40] Fagel's brother-in-law, Jonathan van Luchtenburg, was made secretary to the States.[41] By such linkages, the influence of the stadhouder was extended down through the governance structure of the United Provinces.

Why was this packing of local governmental institutions accepted? Assent to the initial increase in control had much to do with the perception that only through support of William's policies could the United Provinces be saved from foreign invasion; a more republican structure had clearly been unable to instill the unity of purpose necessary to combat Louis XIV. The continued threat of French invasion was a useful tool through which William could promote unity under his direction. An anonymous English Jacobite in 1688

[39] Wilders, *Patronage*, p.46.
[40] Wilders, *Patronage*, p.161.
[41] Wilders, *Patronage*, p.67.

employed the example of William's governance in the United Provinces with its emphasis of the French threat as a warning to his fellow English citizens: William, 'having well nigh enslaved his own States, is come to fight us into Liberty.'[42]

That William could plausibly be considered to have used the ploy of the necessity of unity to further absolutist intentions had much to do with four further factors: the political, religious and familial divisions which affected many Dutch towns; William's willingness to allow his representatives much scope for personal aggrandisement; his ability to sense and keep within the limits of his opponents' tolerance of his methods; and his skilful cultivation of the belief in his centrality as arbiter, particularly over the allocation of taxation, between the constituents of the Dutch union of provinces. I will examine each of these elements separately.

Within Dutch towns of the late seventeenth century there existed multiple possible sources of factional conflict. In addition to divisions between Orangists and Republicans, local governmental institutions provided a forum in which familial rivalries were fought out. For example, Elizabeth Edwards has described in detail the competition in Amsterdam between the rival Munter, Valckenier, van Beuningen and de Graeff families. Membership of the vroedschap was coveted as a means of controlling local regulation, particularly concerning taxation.[43] Economic and cultural rivalries were also played out in the local governmental assemblies between competing factions of regents (urban leaders) and ridderschap

[42] Quoted by J. Israel in, 'Propaganda in the making of the Glorious Revolution', in S. Roach (ed.), *Across the Narrow Seas* (London, 1991), p.173.
[43] Edwards, *Amsterdam,* pp.120-5.

(nobility): most councils had separate voting powers allotted to the two. At the provincial level, William had the right to elect the members of each State's ridderschap. One of the first privileges granted by William to Bentinck was membership of the Holland ridderschap. There he joined three other of William's appointees-Wolfert van Brederode, Maurits van Nassau- Beverweert and Frederik van Reede, making it, according to Bentinck's biographer, a 'reliable Orangist body in the States of Holland.'[44] Town councils were also an important location for the airing and resolution of disputes between Voetian and Cocceian religious denominations. Local governments were responsible for the selection of preachers in the churches under their jurisdiction, incentivising the religious groupings to attempt to pack local government with their supporters. William was able to manipulate these divisions for his benefit, often playing off one faction against another by offering support on local matters in return for agreement to sanction Williamite policy at the national level. As an example, in the States of Holland, the Haarlem representative, Willem Fabricius, whom William had selected for office, was a constant defender in debates of the stadhouder's interest when that interest was opposed by speakers from Amsterdam.[45] The variety of sources of disagreement helped to prevent the coalescence of factional interests into a two-party system such as the one which emerged in England, making manipulation more achievable. William's stated dislike of faction was more accurately a dislike of faction which he could not manage for his own benefit.

[44] Onnekink, *Favourite*, p.20.
[45] de Jongste, '1690s', p.71.

This pragmatism extended to the leeway which William allowed his representatives in their search for personal aggrandisement. William's intermediaries used their reputation for influence at court to enhance and take advantage of the perception of their importance in their local areas of influence. It was one of the less attractive aspects of the Williamite patronage network. In the words of Jonathan Israel, William 'tolerated the blatant corruption, for which his favourites became notorious, as inherent in the web of influence, and clientage, on which his authority depended.'[46] For example, he restored Lodewijk Huygens to the post of drost (councillor) of Gorcum in 1678 even after he had been found guilty of extortion by the Hof (main court) of Holland.[47] The capacity to use public office as a means, either legally or illegally, to improve individual and family wealth was significant: the value of Bentinck's Dutch possessions was the equivalent of £142000 in his will of 1709.[48] William turned a blind eye. There was at least one positive effect for the stadhouder- the perpetrators' dependence upon William increased as a result. The damage to the reputation of his regime seems to have been of less concern to William than the means of control which the patronage network provided.

Disapproval of the corrupt practices of some of William's intermediaries did not expand into wider protest against his regime. This owed much to the stadhouder's ability to sense and keep within the limits of his opponents' tolerance for his methods and policies. His ability to keep within those limits is perhaps best displayed by his tactics relating to Amsterdam,

[46] Israel, *Republic,* p.826.
[47] Israel, *Republic*, p.827.
[48] Onnekink, *Favourite*, p.90.

where his conduct was more circumspect than that which he employed with other urban centres. Amsterdam was by far the most economically important region of the United Provinces, and, due to its dependence on trade, also the one most likely to advocate a policy of appeasement rather than war to combat the threat of France.[49] William was aware of this and in a conciliatory speech to the Amsterdam vroedschap in 1683 had highlighted his own belief that 'commerce was the pillar of the state' and that the Republic's foreign policy had to take account of trade and shipping.[50] Throughout his stadhoudership he tended to treat Amsterdam with more caution than other towns. For example, in 1672 he replaced less than a third of the city council's members, allowing prominent supporters of Johan de Witt to maintain their positions.[51] Although his policies were regularly opposed in the States-General by Amsterdam's representatives, he never threatened the city with physical force as his father had done in 1650. Instead, more oblique means were used to curtail Amsterdam's influence. William used informal alliances with other provinces where his powers of patronage had resulted in their representatives displaying a greater propensity to align their voting behaviour in the States-General with that encouraged by the stadhouder. For example, representatives from Utrecht, whose geographical position made its delegates more wary of the dangers of French aggression, regularly voted for William's more warlike policies in the States-General.[52]

[49] Edwards, *Amsterdam,* p.10.
[50] G.H. Kurtz, *Willem III en Amsterdam* (Amsterdam, 1928), pp.67-8. The main area of difference between William and Amsterdam concerned the level of French interference with Dutch trade which necessitated a switch to a more warlike stance.
[51] Edwards, *Amsterdam*, p.58.
[52] Wilders, *Subservient*, p.215.

The war with France and the costs related to it- the state of Holland's debt doubled to 310 million guilders between 1688 and 1713- was not solely a source of conflict between William and some provinces in the Union. It was also a cause of inter-provincial dispute. The way in which the cost of the war was divided between the provinces was a constant source of friction as a result of which the stadhouder was able to use his position as mediator to forge agreement and unity. For example, in 1674 William acted as arbiter between Utrecht and Holland over how the cost of repairing the dikes destroyed in 1672 to prevent the French advance should be apportioned.[53] Jill Stern has described how Orangism emphasised the position of the stadhouder as a unifying force.[54] Arbitration between provinces was a practical means of demonstrating that capability. For the provinces, this necessitated the maintenance of good relations with William, something which was more likely to be achieved through representatives who had been approved by and maintained good relations with the stadhouder.

Other areas of patronage within the Dutch polity were less directly controlled by William in his capacity as stadhouder, but this did not prevent him from attempting to influence appointments within those areas to serve his political ends. The same desire to manipulate effectively can be seen in William's approach to legal and clerical patronage. The stadhouder possessed the right to appoint legal officers in some of the larger Dutch towns in addition to being the president of each provincial court of justice. On 22 July 1684, for example, William informed Bentinck that he wished Fagel to coordinate with Jacob van der

[53] Wilders, *Patronage,* p.141.
[54] Stern, *Orangism*, p.113.

Maes the election of échevins (sheriffs) in Leiden whilst in 1690, William's secretary, Tassin d' Allonne, wrote to Bentinck informing him that William had not chosen a greffier (clerk of the court) for Breda and instead delegated Bentinck to make the appointment.[55] In Nijmegen, William was responsible for the election of its judge as well as the eight members of the vroedschap. Pressure was applied to these appointees to apply the law in a way which suited the Williamite cause- as we have seen in Rotterdam in 1690 where the judges were persuaded by a letter from William to reverse their judgement of corruption against his unofficial representative in the city, the baljuw Jacob van Zulen van Nyevelt, and he also arranged for a number of the Rotterdam magistrates who had brought the prosecution to be removed.[56] When it suited, William completely ignored local regulations. Seven army officers and William's doctor, William van Straten, were appointed to official positions in the Utrecht council, despite their lack of required residency qualification for the city.[57] William's relation, Van Nassau Ouwerkerk, who did at least buy a ruined castle to satisfy those residency requirements, was allowed to take a place on the council despite his inability to display the levels of wealth required by local regulation to qualify for office.[58] In Leiden, the discussions as to who should replace van der Meers as sheriff produced no candidate acceptable to William, so Meers was retained in office despite his legitimate term of appointment only lasting for three years. In Dordrecht, William was so incensed by the composition of its new council in 1684 that he declared the election invalid, despite the lack

[55] *Correspondentie van Willem III en Bentinck*, i, p.117.
[56] de Jongste, '1690s', p.70.
[57] Wilders, *Patronage*, p.64.
[58] Ouwerkerk was the illegitimate son of Prince Maurits von Nassau. Wilders, *Patronage*, p.63.

of evidence for this.[59] Resistance to Williamite policy regularly led to legal measures being taken against opponents- Utrecht's alliance with Amsterdam in opposition to William's policy to combat increased French economic pressure in 1684 led to the removal of nine members of the city council.[60] It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that William was willing to manipulate the law to benefit his policies and adherents. For example, again in Utrecht, he explained to Amerongen that the reason he could not be appointed President of the Council was that he did not have the correct qualifications. As we have seen, such legal niceties had not influenced him in the past. This very Williamite interpretation of the law was dependent upon the ability to appoint amenable officials.

William did not have the power to appoint religious ministers in his capacity as stadhouder, but, as in other areas of patronage, this did not prevent him from attempting to use clerical appointments for political leverage. Although many Voetian preachers had supported the House of Orange from the pulpit during the stadhouderless era, William rarely interfered in council elections solely to promote the Voetian interest.[61] There were times when William did display a pro-Voetian stance. In 1676 William made a formal visit to Middleburg to replace six Middleburg regents who had regularly opposed his wishes on secular issues after they had elected a Cocceian minister contrary to his stated wishes.[62] But on other occasions he sided with those wishing to promote Cocceian preachers. For example, as a means of diffusing the intensity of his dispute with the other stadhouder in the United Provinces-

[59] de Jongste, *1690s*, p.65.
[60] Wilders, *Patronage*, p.208.
[61] Israel, *Republic*, pp.691-9.
[62] Israel, *Republic*, p.819.

Hendrick Casimir of Frisia- William, in the opinion of Jonathan Israel, agreed to dilute 'his pro-Voetian stance in church and intellectual matters in order that the disagreement between the two stadholders could be patched up.'[63] In both Middleburg and Frisia, William seems to have become involved in religious dispute primarily to further his secular, political aims. Voetians and Cocceians both comprised significant proportions of the population of the United Provinces- an overly pro-Voetian stance on William's part could have been counterproductive for unity. The two denominations were both branches of the Reformed Church which were sanctioned by the state and a balanced stance also tallied with William's own viewpoint- he seems to have been highly tolerant in his religious views.

To complete this survey of Williamite patronage techniques in the United Provinces, I will briefly describe stadhouder involvement with appointments in the armed forces. After his appointment as Captain-General of the provinces of Holland and Zeeland in 1672, William exercised a high level of personal control over the allocation of senior positions within the army. Although the States-General had the right to appoint deputies in the field with powers to participate in major military decisions, in practice those rights were ignored. The army was William's personal domain: his interest in all areas of its operation was recognised by the States-General who effectively ceded command to him.[64] He was constantly in the company of fellow army officers. Olaf Mörke has described how William's dining arrangements at court were a replication of those on campaign-he was surrounded by

[63] Israel, *Republic*, p.837.
[64] Israel, *Republic*, p.822.

military personnel.[65] He also strictly enforced the regulations governing army officer conduct, in contrast with his often-looser interpretation of the rules concerning governmental office. For example, in order to demonstrate his determination to have the regulations regarding false musters obeyed, he had one General executed, whilst another suffered the same fate for cowardice in battle after William had intervened to increase the more lenient sentence which had been pronounced at his court martial.[66] Although the regiments raised by some provinces were legally under separate regional command, in practice William was allowed to coordinate their staffing and deployment. As in England after 1688, William tended to favour officers whom he considered trustworthy, irrespective of their nationality. This led to a significant presence in the army of German officers. Prince Georg Friedrich of Waldeck, for example, remained his most senior military commander in the 1670s and 1680s. This was not without reason. The Dutch army leadership had not performed well in 1672 and William had grown up with many of the foreign commanders whom he appointed. Over time, as he came to trust more Dutch officers, they were elevated to the most senior positions. By 1683, three of the five major-generals in the army- Bentinck, van Zuylestein and Ginckel- were Dutch.[67] These officers were also often favoured with important diplomatic missions. Waldeck, for example, was given the task of heading several diplomatic missions to German Protestant States before the invasion of 1688. At the same

[65] Mörke, *Court*, p.236.
[66] Baxter, *William III,* pp.99 and 102.
[67] Onnekink, *Favourite*, p.19.

time, another of William's generals, Hendrik van Nassau Ouwerkerk, was in England helping to co-ordinate its invasion with the most prominent English opponents of James II.

This high level of involvement with army staffing provides a stark contrast with William's participation in the Dutch navy's operations. William held the title of Admiral-General of the fleet, equivalent to the rank which he held in the army. And yet his level of participation in naval matters was much more limited. The Dutch navy remained an organisation comprised of the ships of five provincial fleets which were brought together under the leadership of an Admiral appointed by the States-General. The individual provinces retained the right to appoint the officers of the ships which they had financed: William rarely seems to have become involved in the selection process. For example, William's letters very rarely refer to naval matters, and, even in the provisioning of the armada for the invasion of England, he left all the details to Bentinck and Job de Wildt, the secretary of the Amsterdam Admiralty.

What can this overview of Williamite patronage practice in the United Provinces tell us about the underlying motivations of the regime? The declared purpose underlying Williamite patronage practice did not change during his stadhouderate. To Jill Stern, 'The stadholder's task was to defend the Republic against external foes and maintain the True Reformed Faith. He was to defend the rights, freedoms and privileges of the provinces, the towns and their citizens.'[68] The most important practical consequence emanating from this duty during William's tenure of the office of stadhouder was a determination to oppose the threat of Louis XIV by maintaining the unity of the United Provinces and utilising the strength which

[68] Stern, *Orangism,* p.9.

unity provided in the most effective manner possible. The ways in which William used patronage adapted to reflect political circumstance. In the early 1670s, with a need to promote immediate unity of purpose and action under his leadership, William was ruthless in the way in which he used his powers of appointment to increase his control of both the army and local government. In the 1680s, William adopted a more conciliatory stance as the threat of France had less of an ability to force compliance. This involved compromise, often involving changes to his patronage practices. For example in 1679, after repeated previous vetoing, he allowed republican regents who had opposed him in 1672 to be re-elected to the Delft vroedschap.[69] Even in the field of army officer appointments, William compromised to achieve support elsewhere. The stadhouder of Frisia and Groningen, Hendrik Casimir, theoretically had the right to appoint the officers in regiments which had been raised and financed in Frisia. In the early years of his stadhoudership, William had ignored this right.[70] However, in 1684, when the United Provinces were divided as to how to confront France, William secured Frisian support in the States-General for his policies by agreeing to yield the power of patronage in the Frisian regiments of the army to his cousin. With Amsterdam, the accommodation culminated in the province's agreement to sanction and finance the invasion of England in 1688, an enormous risk. The agreement was certainly aided by the increased economic pressures being applied by France, but it also owed much to William and the Amsterdam regents being willing to demonstrate mutual trust and accommodate the other side's views. Over the course of his stadhoudership, William used the combination

[69] Israel, *Republic*, p.829. William admitted in a letter to the Delft regents that the Republican candidates whom he had repeatedly vetoed were better qualified for office than those he had selected.
[70] Israel, *Republic*, p.837.

of the threat of France and the ambiguities present within the definition of his constitutional role to expand his spheres of authority. By employing a small number of politically effective, loyal individuals and rewarding them with the means to benefit personally from their service, he oversaw a patronage network which played a central role in maintaining the unity of the States in its opposition to France.

What is more difficult to gauge is whether William believed that in order to achieve the goals of preserving both the Union of Provinces and the Reformed religion against external threat a more centralised form of governance was permanently required, at the expense of the rights of individual towns and provinces. The motivation driving William's expansion of stadhouderly influence can be interpreted in one of two ways: either it was solely the necessary response to French aggression which would have been adjusted when that threat receded; or it formed part of a wider objective to increase permanently the role of the stadhouder within the political system of the United Provinces. Jill Stern, in her study of Orangism between 1650 and 1675, stated that 'Orangists were not monarchists. They just wanted past practices to continue: the Republican de Witts were the revolutionaries.'[71] But what if circumstances had changed by 1672- that the external threat necessitated a response incapable of being delivered by the previous system of governance and it was to these changed circumstances that William was responding by constructing a system of government based around a centralised patronage system? Was the Williamite assertion that the Stadhouder was returning the political order to its historic form a deliberately

[71] Stern, *Orangism*, p.202.

constructed screen behind which a more wide-ranging scheme of control was assembled in order to preserve the Union? Since the threat of Louis XIV remained throughout his stadhoudership, the circumstances for change never emerged, or at least William was unprepared to concede that they did. This makes it difficult to reach a conclusion between the two alternatives and the evidence is often contradictory. On the one hand, there is the systematic exploitation of the stadhouder's powers of patronage to increase centralised control in both local government and the army and his manipulation of the legal requirements for the holding of office to help achieve this goal. Conversely, William's lack of interest in naval appointments, and, perhaps most importantly, the absence of effective preparation to preserve the increased levels of stadhouder control after his death, suggest that anything more than an opportunist response to the French threat, stretching existing powers of patronage to their limits in order to promote unity under his leadership, is unlikely to have determined William's thinking.

William was taught by his tutors from an early age that 'it was acceptable to pretend, but concealment was absolutely forbidden.' [72] Whatever the differences between the two behaviours, the emphasis upon some form of dissimulation, combined with the paucity of William's recorded utterances, increases the importance of looking to William's actions as a means of understanding his motivations and beliefs. This is why an overview of the ideology and techniques of Williamite patronage practice in the United Provinces forms a necessary precursor to a more detailed study of those techniques in the Three Kingdoms

[72] 'Le feindre est défendu, mais le dissimuler point.' *Discours sur la Nourriture de son Altesse Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange*, p.367. The Hague, Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 73 J 11.

after 1688. Although the political and religious situation of the United Provinces bore significant differences to those which William encountered in the Three Kingdoms after 1688, the system over which William had presided in the United Provinces had been successful and the external threat was the same, and so, even if the methodology had to be adapted to different political circumstances, it makes sense to be aware of what that methodology was.

The conclusions that can be drawn from this brief analysis of the stadhouder's patronage practices are that William was a skilful political operator who successfully utilised the often-base motivations of those upon whom he bestowed patronage to forge networks, co-ordinated by a small number of trusted confidantes, which significantly increased his authority. He was severe in his requirements of those whom he favoured, demanding loyalty and dedication. In return, they were allowed to utilise their positions' potential for personal aggrandisement, a necessity if the appointments were to be of mutual benefit. William's flexible use of his powers of patronage also demonstrates an ability to appreciate and react to the degree of opposition to his political actions: he used the potential of his powers of patronage to extend, without breaching, the accepted boundaries of his authority. The evidence of William's actions in the United Provinces would not seem to indicate that his use of patronage formed part of a coordinated scheme to promote absolutism by stealth. This is an important inference to consider when utilising knowledge of William's behaviours and motivations in the United Provinces in a British context. Aaron Graham's study of the British Fiscal-Military States emphasised the importance of personal networks, concluding that 'State formation was ultimately a political rather than administrative process, as

politicians, officials and private contractors struggled to harmonise competing priorities.'[73] He demonstrated how political parties competed to achieve control of the departments which collectively formed the bureaucratic apparatus of the state and how the use of corrupt practices formed an essential element in the efficient functioning of those departments. In the late seventeenth century in England, the Crown still possessed control of the ability to appoint to the most senior positions in these departments. I have demonstrated in this chapter how William employed patronage in the United Provinces during his stadhouderate to increase his areas of authority. That there was, in Elizabeth Edwards's words, no 'return to the crisis politics of 1650 and 1672', was largely due to William's knowing how to play, but never overplay, his hand to achieve that increase of control.[74] His extensive knowledge of the mechanics of the Dutch polity together with his understanding of the motivations of its most important members had been learned over the course of many years- a period of time which was not available to him in England. I will now turn to the methods and aims of Stuart-Orange patronage practice in the Three Kingdoms.

[73] A. Graham, *Corruption, party, and government in Britain, 1702-1713* (Oxford, 2015), ch.1.
[74] Edwards, *Amsterdam,* p.2.

Chapter 2 - The role of patronage in the composition and representation of the courts of William III and Mary II

The reward of place within the Stuart-Orange courts served as a means of encouraging support for the newly established monarchs.[1] The method and direction of allocation also provided a means to communicate the identity of the regime. This chapter will look at patronage within William and Mary's courts from the viewpoints of the monarchical donors of place, the potential recipients, and what can loosely be termed the political nation which used knowledge and interpretation of the courts' compositions to gauge approval or otherwise for their new monarchs.[2] The study will concentrate upon the decision making relating to the allocation of those places which were of political significance, either through their nature or value. Such an exploration will throw light on how the new monarchs attempted to integrate within and mould the nation over which they had gained control. The lines of questioning will also provide insights into the influences on William and Mary's formulation of their courts' composition, and, in a broader dimension, the continuing significance of the court within the English polity.

A thematic analysis of the appointments made as William and Mary established and then consolidated their courts will focus on: the reasons for appointments made within them; the

[1] The definition of a court for the purposes of this study is a wide-ranging one. It incorporates analysis of the members of the royal households, the buildings in which the court was physically situated, as well as the means by which the court influenced the behaviours of the elite through its patronage practice.

[2] The public sphere and the nature of the political nation have been much debated recently. The work of Mark Knights in particular has widened our perception of its membership. M. Knights, *Representation and Misrepresentation in later Stuart Britain: partisanship and political culture* (Oxford, 2005). For the purposes of this study, the reception of the court will be gauged through its influence upon parliamentary activity and the production of pamphlet and satirical literature.

scale of the two courts; analysis of how those appointments related to the contemporary political environment; and description of the difference in composition and scale between Mary's court and that of her joint monarch. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the place of Stuart-Orange court construction within the achievement of the regime's objectives. I summarise the difficulties associated with achieving a court composition and mode of operation which balanced the potentially conflicting perspectives of monarchs and political elites, highlighting areas of relative success and failure.

There is limited historiography relating to the significance of place allocation at the Stuart-Orange courts within the context of the political environment of the reign. Andrew Barclay concluded his study of James II's court with a description of how William III deliberately dismantled the changes made by his predecessor to the size and composition of the English court.[3] This was subsequently complemented by a wide-ranging study of the nature of William's court.[4] Barclay did not attempt to locate the allocation of place at court within the changing political backdrop of the reign, nor to probe extensively the interplay of political considerations with the multiple influences which also affected the allocation of place-tradition, greed, ability, desire for security, personality, to name but a few. To aid in that analysis, Bucholz and Sainty's comprehensive cataloguing of the holders of court positions between 1660 and 1837 provides an invaluable quantitative guide to the identity of office holders during the reign.[5] In *The Augustan Court,* Robert Bucholz placed William's court

[3] A. Barclay, 'The Impact of King James II on the Departments of the Royal Household' (Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1994), ch.7.
[4] A. Barclay, 'William's Court as King', in E. Mijers and D. Onnekink (eds.), *Redefining William III: The Impact of the King- Stadholder in International Contex*t (Abingdon, 2007), pp.241-261.
[5] R.O. Bucholz and J. Sainty, *Officials of the Royal Household, 1660-1837* (London, 1997).

within his overall narrative of the decline of the English court as an institution of representational and political importance.[6] At a representational level, that account has recently been challenged- in particular by Farguson's work but also in studies demonstrating the influence of royal taste in literary, architectural and gardening styles.[7] What is still lacking is an analysis of how the composition of the court remained integral to the political life of the nation. Events in other areas, Parliament particularly, need to be understood within the dynamics of what was happening at court.

The composition of the new courts had exercised the minds of William's closest advisers, and most probably William himself, even before he had been offered the throne. Gilbert Burnet wrote a paper in the months between late November 1688 and the formal offer of the throne in February 1689 in which he listed the major posts which would need to be filled in the event of William and Mary's accession, along with a list of suggested recipients.[8] This is, to say the least, an unusual document. The circumstances of its preparation and indeed its addressee are uncertain. The detail of the document and the accuracy of its predictions suggest some degree of official sanction for its production. Robin Eagles, the document's

[6] R.O. Bucholz, *The Augustan Court: Queen Anne and the Decline of Court Culture* (Stanford, 1993).
[7] Farguson, *Visualising Protestant Monarchy;* H. Smith, 'Court Culture and Godly Monarchy: Henry Purcell and Sir Charles Sedley's 1692 Birthday Ode for Mary II', in J. Champion, J. Coffey, T. Harris, J. Marshall (eds.), *Politics, Religion and Ideas in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-century Britain: Essays in Honour of Mark Goldie* (Woodbridge, 2019); J. Marschner, 'Mary II: Her Clothes and Textiles', *Costume,* 34 (2000); U. Janssens-Knorsch, 'From Het Loo to Hampton Court: William and Mary's Dutch Gardens and their influence on English Gardening', in P. Hoftijzer and C.C. Barfoot (eds.), *Fabrics and Fabrications: The Myth and Making of William and Mary* (Amsterdam, 1990); S. Thurley, *Hampton Court: a social and architectural history* (London, 2003).
[8] London, British Library, Add. MS 32681 (Sydney Papers), fos. 317-31. R. Eagles, 'If he deserves it: William of Orange's Pre-Revolution British Contacts and Gilbert Burnet's Proposals for the Post-Revolution Administration', *Parliamentary History*, 32(1) (2013). Eagles dates the list to this period because 'John Holles, Lord Houghton, succeeded his father as earl of Clare on 16 January 1689. The fact that Burnet refers to him as Houghton suggests that the list was drawn up prior to, or shortly after, that date'. Eagles, 'Burnet', footnote 90.

only recent commentator, has deduced that Henry Sidney was the potential recipient.[9] Whoever it was, it is difficult to envisage a scenario for its composition which did not involve William himself to some degree. Burnet was undoubtedly conscious of his own worth and the value of his opinions to the nascent regime, but writing such a detailed paper without the approval of the soon-to-be monarch would have displayed a level of presumption with which even Burnet might have struggled.[10] For the purposes of this study, its interest is in the order with which the major posts in the polity are considered. The major offices at court are considered first- Lord Chamberlain and Lord Steward- followed by recommendations for the posts of Gentlemen of the Bedchamber. After submissions for five Treasury positions, Burnet makes recommendations for the office of Groom of the Bedchamber. It is only after the recipients of these posts have been named that Burnet proceeds to consider overtly political positions whose holders were not in regular attendance upon the monarch - the new monarchs' Privy Councillors and Secretaries of State for example. The document is an indication of how important the role of the court was in the construction of the new regime to William and his advisers.

[9] Eagles, 'If he deserves it', pp.128-147. The document is now part of the Sydney Papers at the British Library and Sydney (always referenced as 'yourselfe' rather than by his surname) is allocated numerous positions- Groom of the Bedchamber, Lord Chamberlain and Commissioner of the Treasury- suggesting that Burnet was keen to ingratiate himself with Sydney.

[10] The document was mostly accurate in its predictions. For example, twelve privy councillors were correctly identified. Those who appear in the list but were not given office, Clarendon for example, may have disqualified themselves for office at a later date as a result of their stance over the direction of the Crown in the Convention Parliament.

The aims of William and Mary in the allocation of court office

The importance which was assigned to the allocation of court office was reflected in the substantial changes which occurred in the royal households' composition during the early months of the reign.[11] The changes were also occasioned by necessity- many of James II's supporters had taken the decision to relinquish their posts with their master, often to follow him to Saint-Germain.[12] These vacancies tended to be in the areas of greatest proximity to the king and coincided with William's desire to be surrounded by those who could be relied upon to protect him and had committed most to the success of his cause. The regime's dependence on armed force was particularly strong in its first months. London effectively became an armed camp guarded by Dutch regiments in the months following the events of the winter of 1688-89.[13] In Burnet's document, governors of ports and major garrison towns such as Portsmouth, Berwick, Tilbury and Carlisle were named before his nominations for archbishops and bishops within the Church.[14] Within the court, the desire to protect the regime and in particular its heads led to wholesale changes in the constituents of the members of the household who were responsible for the monarchs' personal safety: there were nine new gentlemen of the bedchamber; seven new grooms of the bedchamber; twenty-five gentlemen pensioners; and thirty yeomen of the guard.[15] The most senior of these appointments often shared common characteristics. Gentlemen of the bedchamber

[11] For example, most of the new Gentlemen of the Bedchamber were appointed on 1 March 1689. TNA, L/C 3/32, p.9.
[12] N. Genet-Rouffiac, 'Jacobites in Paris and Saint-Germain-en-Laye', in E. Cruickshanks and E. Corp (eds.), *The Stuart Court in exile and the Jacobites* (London, 1995).
[13] L. Jardine, *Going Dutch: How England Plundered Holland's Glory* (London, 2008), pp.18-23.
[14] Childs, *British Army*, pp.89-90 and 172-4.
[15] Compiled from analysis of Bucholz and Sainty, *Database of Court Officers: 1660-1837*.

such as Mordaunt, Lumley, Sidney and Churchill all had military backgrounds, having served with William in the United Provinces. They were, in Barclay's phrase 'almost a roll call of those who had made decisive contributions to the success of William's invasion'.[16] The same attributes were shared by newly appointed grooms such as Percy Kirke, Charles Trelawney and Emanuel Scrope Howe. Barclay has ascribed the purge of the gentlemen pensioners to 'the radical Whig Captain' of that grouping, Lovelace.[17] It is likely to have been with William's approval- the new king oversaw large scale changes in bedchamber posts where the responsibility for patronage lay with the crown.[18]

The result was a grouping around William at court which was not dissimilar to that which surrounded him on campaign.[19] Nor would it have differed significantly from William's experience in the United Provinces where he also dined surrounded by his army officers.[20] In Dalrymple's words, 'though cold to courtiers, William was warm and cordial to men of the profession of arms.'[21] With companions such as Percy Kirke- 'a very brute'- and Lovelace- 'rarely sober'- conversation was probably dominated by the shared pursuits and occupations of the participants.[22] Hunting and war related topics must have figured highly.

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[16] Barclay, 'William's Court', p.246.
[17] Ibid., p.250.
[18] Ibid., p.250.
[19] The two were to a degree synonymous- prominent courtiers such as Bentinck, Sidney, Stanley, Ormond, Mordaunt, Oxford, Drumlanrig, the Earl of Arran, Albemarle, Kirke, Trelawney, Cholmondeley, Wentworth, Godfrey and Lovelace all held senior army office. A requirement of the Yeomen of the Guard was to attend the King when he went abroad.
[20] O. Mörke, 'William's Stadholderly Court in the Dutch Republic', in E. Mijers and D. Onnekink (eds.), *Redefining William III* (2007, Abingdon), p.236.
[21] Dalrymple, *Memoirs*, i, p.332.
[22] The description of Kirke is that of Samuel Pepys in his *Tangier Papers*, ed. E. Chappell (London, 1935), p.95. Thomas Hearne provided that for Lovelace. David Hosford, 'Lovelace, John (c.1640-93)', *ODNB* (Oxford, 21 May 2009), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/17054 (18 July 2024) quoting from *Remarks and collections of Thomas Hearne*, ed. C. E. Doble et al. (11 vols, Oxford, 1885-1921), iii, p.349..

This was William constructing his court as a personal household in which he felt comfortable and safe. The reward of office within it strengthened the ties between the monarch and his most important supporters. The only other area with a similarly substantial turnover of staff at the start of the reign was the Stables. As Barclay has pointed out, this reflected the need to manage the army's horses, many of whom formed part of the Royal Stables, but it also demonstrated the personal interests of the monarch. Tade Vausant, a Bottlegroom in the Stables, had the dubious distinction of being 'dismissed by his Majts. p'ticular warrant' on 21 March 1693, a rare example of dismissal, together with reasons, being provided during the reign.[23]

This overtly military, masculine atmosphere did not sit easily with the deliberate attempt by William to evoke the court of his uncle, Charles II. To the admittedly partisan Earl of Ailesbury, 'No Prince was ever so diverting and amusing as the King (Charles II) was at his levee.'[24] It is difficult to imagine this statement being applied to William. In comparison to 'the ball and a comedy every other day' at Charles's court, William 'neglected the attentions of access,' even 'keeping his Christmas at Hampton Court where he is out of reach.'[25] And yet, in its scale, as well as many of its members, William attempted to bring back Charles's court. He reversed the reduction in the size of the court undertaken by James II. Three hundred posts were reinstated, often, as with the expansion in number of cupbearers and

[23] Bucholz and Sainty, *Officials,* citing TNA, LS 13/198, fo. 43v.
[24] Ailesbury, *Memoirs*, i, p.93.
[25] N. Cuddy, 'Reinventing a Monarchy', in E. Cruickshanks (ed.), *The Stuart Courts* (Stroud, 2000), p. 53, quoting the French ambassador; Dalrymple, *Memoirs,* i, p.394; Fleetwood Sheppard, 'A Description of a Hampton Court Life', in *POAS,* v, p.56.

gentlemen sewers, without any practical purpose.[26] The Lord Chamberlain for much of the reign, the Earl of Dorset, had impeccable credentials as a link between William's court and that of the Stuart monarchs preceding James II. His grandfather had been Charles I's Lord Chamberlain, his mother had been governess to Charles I's children, and he himself had been a Gentleman of the Bedchamber at Charles II's court for most of the reign.[27] Dorset's counterpart below stairs, the Earl of Devonshire, carried Charles II's train at his coronation. Although Devonshire became a prominent Exclusionist, he did not participate in the more extreme Whig actions against Charles and James such as the Rye House plot, instead attempting to act as a mediator between the two sides.[28] Courtiers were readmitted to posts they had held under Charles but relinquished during his brother's reign. For example, Ralph Montagu returned to his post as Master of the Great Wardrobe, Kirke to his post as Groom of the Bedchamber, whilst Bryan Fairfax, who 'left Whit-hall when the Mass came into it,' resumed his post as Equerry upon that religion's retreat.[29] Such acts were a means of portraying continuity with the court of a monarch who, for all his faults, was generally looked upon considerably more favourably than his brother by his English subjects.

The expansion in the court's scale also provided a means by which William could more fully display his status as monarch. As Prince of Orange, William had been engaged in a long struggle to preserve the principality's independence from France. The strategic value which

[26] The number of office holders of both of these sinecures was increased from three to four. In 1693, Tregonwell Frampton became the First Keeper of the King's Racehorses. TNA, LS 13/257, fo.109.
[27] Earl of Dorset entry in Bucholz and Sainty, *Officials*. 'Gentleman of the Bedchamber 23 December 1669'. TNA, LC 3/24, fo.2.
[28] David Hosford, 'William Cavendish, First Duke of Devonshire (1641-1707)', *ODNB* (Oxford, 23 Sept. 2004), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/4948 (20 July 2024).
[29] Andrew Hopper, 'Fairfax, Brian (1633-1711)', *ODNB* (Oxford, 23 September 2004), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/9075 (20 July 2024).

possession of the territory bestowed was limited. More important was the title and rank associated with its ownership. In like manner, the long wrangling over William's title preceding the signing of the Peace of Ryswick was an indicator of the importance which he attached to the correct recognition of his royal standing.[30] William was fully aware of the questionable legitimacy of his claim to the English throne and his own relatively lowly background in that regard. Surrounding himself with the trappings of majesty was a means of validating his right to the throne, both to himself and to his subjects. The cost of this exercise was modest. Employing Charles II's courtiers in an environment which replicated Charles's court in scale if not style was a shrewd means for William to insert himself within a shared vision of the English polity: three hundred new posts, with wages mostly ranging between £30 and £100 per annum, was a small price to pay, certainly compared with the cost of financing the king's overseas wars.[31]

The negative effect of the dissonance caused by the contrast between the nature of what might be termed William's inner circle and the impression which he attempted to convey in his construction of the wider court can be exaggerated. William retained his personal household in a form which suited his needs and wrapped around it a much larger grouping whose scale and grandeur were integral to the image he wished to send out to his subjects. Of course, there were instances where the overall impression caused by this combination

[30] The subject of William's title is an almost constant theme of the correspondence between Bentinck and William in the months before the signing of the Peace of Ryswick. *Correspondentie van Willem III en van Hans Willem Bentinck*, ii, pp.22-86.

[31] Even without the cost of war, the amount spent on the court as a proportion of total expenditure by the Crown was diminishing. Beattie calculated that George I spent 15% of his revenue on his court, compared with the figure of 40% spent by Charles I. J.M. Beattie, *The English Court in the Reign of George I* (Cambridge, 1967), p.64. William's impecunity led to substantial backlogs of wages accruing amongst the servants below stairs- Bucholz, *Augustan Court*, p.29, fn.145.

would not have appeared harmonious- William's character made that highly likely. A court which had expanded so much in size and yet where the monarch was rarely visible must have appeared incongruous.[32] However, the separation was for the most part convenient and effective, representing the continuing progression of the process of dislocation of the public and private life of the monarch.[33] In adapting the English court to his personal preferences whilst retaining its capacity to demonstrate the extent of monarchical power and magnificence, this two-tier court, public and private, was innovative whilst retaining its connections with the more useful aspects to the new regime of its past. The combination is physically represented in the architecture of the newly constructed wing at Hampton Court- the grandeur of the State Rooms on the first floor easily and privately connecting with the more utilitarian accommodation on the ground floor.[34]

William's decision not to surround himself with foreign favourites demonstrates a similar desire to conform with English sensibility whilst adapting the court subtly to the monarchs' needs. We have seen this already in his selection of individuals to staff his bedchamber: many of those members had served in Dutch regiments, some had Dutch wives and relations, but very few were of Dutch nationality.[35] An understanding of the need not to pack the court with his compatriots extended across all its major divisions. Just four of the most senior household offices were allocated to Dutchmen, and two of these were given to the

[32] Despite occasional appearances in public, the combination of William's absences abroad, preference for Hampton Court and Kensington over Whitehall and preference for the company of his inner circle will have made it difficult for his subjects to see William.
[33] D. Starkey (ed.), *The English Court from the Wars of the Roses to the Civil War* (London, 1987), esp. ch.1, 'Introduction: Court History in perspective'.
[34] S. Thurley, *Hampton Court: A Social and Architectural History* (New Haven, 2003), p.186 fig. 173, and p.194.
[35] Henry Sidney and the Earl of Oxford had spent much of the 1680s campaigning in Flanders. Algernon Capel had married Bentinck's eldest daughter. The Earl of Arran's mother was Dutch.

same individual, Bentinck.[36] By employing Dutchmen in senior positions only when he regarded their appointment as essential for his service, William lessened the degree to which English xenophobia could be used as a weapon to criticise the new regime. Bentinck was given the positions of Groom of the Stole and Keeper of the Privy Purse because William relied upon his advice and needed his close attendance on a regular basis. Nassau-Ouwerkerk was appointed Master of the Horse because the provisioning of horses was essential for a successful land campaign and Ouwerkerk had performed the role successfully in the United Provinces.[37] William had grown up in a multinational environment where an individual's talent and family were often the main determinants of employment rather than nationality. Until the 1660s, the offices of Stalmeester and Hofmeester (equerry and Lord Chamberlain) at the Orange court had been filled by nobles of French and German origin.[38] English xenophobia and association of nationality with loyalty would have seemed odd to William, particularly in view of the recent lack of it shown to their previous monarch. Nevertheless, William chose not to provoke his English subjects and Parliament by wilfully ignoring their prejudices.

William also respected established practice through his lack of engagement in the selection of individuals for positions which were traditionally in the remit of other members of his

[36] 'First Groom of the Stole', 1 March 1689. TNA, LC 3/31, p.9. 'Keeper of the Privy Purse', 20 February 1689. CTB, ix, p.3.

[37] Nassau-Ouwerkerk was stalmeester at the Dutch Court from 1672 as well as being colonel of the Dutch Horse Guards. John Childs, 'Nassau van Ouwerkerk (1640-1708)', *ODNB* (Oxford, 23 September 2004), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/19804 (19 July 2024). William's distrust of the English as potential holders of the highest army positions is demonstrated in the complete lack of discussion of army posts In Burnet's document. As a contrast, senior posts in the navy are allocated to Russell and Herbert.

[38] Mörke, 'William III's Stadholderly Court', p.237.

court. To put this in perspective, the monarch had rights of patronage over approximately 90 household posts: the Lord Chamberlain had patronage over between 285-400 offices.[39] That patronage was valuable. Ormonde, the Lord Steward at the beginning of Charles II's reign, is said to have accrued £16000 from the sale of 84 offices. William's Chamberlain, Dorset, is estimated to have appointed at least 170 new salaried officers over the course of his tenure of the post.[40] Customary payments such as that of £50 to the Lord Chamberlain when selling a Messenger's place were established perks of the job.[41] Delegating responsibility and profit to his senior courtiers was a means by which Wiilliam bound the members of the court together. To Teri Moores, 'While they may have owed their jobs at court directly to their departmental heads, they (the lesser members of the court) ultimately owed their incomes and their loyalty to the king.'[42] Giving away patronage rights was effectively a means of giving away power and profit. The return was a deepening of the ties of loyalty within the court. Charles II had attempted to divert some of the control and profits of patronage back to himself. 'He (Charles) soon after ordered several to sell their employments, and named the persons they were to sell to, and for what sum.'[43] Charles's attempt was unsuccessful, and William did not repeat it despite his financial difficulties. He used to his advantage a court patronage network of huge complexity where some offices' importance made it essential for the monarch to retain control of their allocation, whilst others were of less consequence and could safely be left in the remit of those who were traditionally responsible.

[39] Bucholz, *Database of Court Offices*, Introduction, p.xlviii.
[40] Moores, 'Earl of Dorset', p.194.
[41] TNA, LC 5/192, fo.11.
[42] Moores, 'Earl of Dorset', p.200.
[43] Ailesbury, *Memoirs*, i, p.95.

William's involvement in the allocation of court place to influence outcomes in Parliament also displayed a light touch, certainly lighter than that desired by many of his ministers. There were approximately sixty MPs who held places at court during the reign, sitting on both sides of the Whig-Tory political divide; membership of a particular party was not a reason why William employed people in his court. William's preference for trimming extended to the way in which he constructed his court. The moderate Whig stance of Dorset and Devonshire was acceptable but more extreme expressions of Whiggish sentiment were not rewarded, as, for example, Thomas Wharton was to discover.[44] Within Parliament, the degree to which members' voting behaviour was affected by possession of court place was exaggerated by contemporary commentators. William's enforcement of a court line on office holding MPs was inconsistent. Dorset voted against Fenwick's attainder for example, but this did not lead to his removal from office. The vice-chamberlain, Peregrine Bertie, voted repeatedly against the King's ministry- Grascombe categorised him as 'an officeholder who did not support the court', but he also kept his place.[45] The co-ordination of the Whig Junto, and Sunderland's influence with Bentinck and William, led to a period in the middle of the reign where the lure of office was used more effectively to influence voting behaviour- Charles Boyle, for example, was made a Gentleman of the Bedchamber in 1697

[44] 'Trimming' to William was not a passive concept: he regarded the role of a trimmer as analogous to that of the captain of a boat, overseeing its crew to maintain balance. The function bore similarities with that described by the Marquis of Halifax in his *Miscellanies: The Character of a Trimmer* (London,1704). Although extreme Whigs such as Wharton and Lovelace had been rewarded with court office at the start of the reign, it was rare for them to achieve further preferment. Wharton, for example, was unsuccessful in his desire to be made either a Secretary of State or Commissioner for Ireland. J. Kent Clark, 'Wharton, Thomas (1648-1715)', *ODNB* (Oxford, 21 May 2009), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/29175 (19 July 2024).

[45] Bertie supported the triennial bill and voted against the government on naval votes in 1692-3. For example, on 11 Jan 1693 he voted for a bill to appoint as Admiralty commissioners only men experienced in maritime matters. 'Grascombe list', Oxford, Bodleian MS Rawlinson, D846, fos.1-5.

in ‘a flagrant bid to buy his goodwill’ in the parliamentary vote against revoking Irish land grants.[46] However, the association of party allegiance with court position never reached the same levels as that attained in the reigns of William’s successors.[47] By refusing to allow his ministers to perpetrate extensive changes in the members of his court on their accession to office, just as within the legal profession he refused to permit wholesale changes within the rolls of the Justices of the Peace, William attempted to dissociate place at court from membership of party.[48] This was in itself a political act, signalling his antipathy to faction.

A disinclination to interfere was also demonstrated by William’s attitude to the mechanisms for allocating place at court. Teri Moores has described in detail the system by which the Lord Chamberlain, the Earl of Dorset, controlled and milked the patronage system for his own benefit.[49] Moores has shown that William was aware of the situation, even if he did not gain monetarily from its functioning. The more important cogs in the wheel were all given lucrative court positions. Fleetwood Sheppard, Dorset’s private secretary, was initially appointed to the post of Gentleman Usher Daily Waiter at William’s court before being promoted to First Gentleman Usher in 1694. Richard Colinge, who had been secretary to the three previous Lord Chamberlains, continued in this role under Dorset as well as acting

[46] David Hayton, ‘Charles Boyle (1660-1704)’, *HOP 1690-1715*.
[47] G. Holmes, *British Politics in the Age of Anne* (London, 1967), ch. 11, ‘The Court and the Parties in the House of Commons’; Bucholz, *The Augustan Court*, ch.III, ‘Patronage’. Court positions were occasionally used to reward and keep in contact with individuals whom parliamentary changes threatened to remove from the political scene. For example, Shrewsbury was offered the position of Lord Chamberlain in 1698 as a gift, so that he could remain in close contact with William without any connected work pressures. Stuart Handley, ‘Charles Talbot, Duke of Shrewsbury (1660-1718)’, *ODNB* (Oxford, 23 Sept. 2004), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/26922 (19 July 2024).
[48] L. Glassey, *Politics and the Appointment of Justices of the Peace* (Oxford, 1979), pp.11-22.
[49] Moores, ‘Earl of Dorset’, pp.187-209.

as Clerk of the Robes and Cupbearer to William.[50] Collectively, they presided over a highly profitable system of which many were aware, but few talked openly: Colinge, who according to Pepys was 'made up of bribes', is reported to have said 'It is against the law at Court for a man that borrows money of me, even to buy his Place with, to own it the next Sunday.'[51] As recompense for Dorset's loss of income on his resignation to make way for Sunderland in 1697, William gave him a gift of £12000.[52] The condoning of participation in such morally questionable behaviour does not sit easily with the regime's quest to improve the nation's morality. The incongruity was sufficiently large for both James II and Anne to attempt the system's reform. William showed no such desire to initiate reform. Disinclination to interfere with traditional practices and preoccupation with other matters may have played a part. So too might William's ability to control the system successfully: as Wout Troost and Jonathan Israel have both shown, William had proved adept at using a similarly corrupt system to his advantage in the United Provinces.[53]

It often took disloyalty to the regime of a degree which threatened its internal cohesion, or, in extreme cases, its existence to provoke William to remove individuals from their positions at court. John Churchill's ongoing correspondence with James II at a time when the country was under threat of invasion led to his loss of post as Gentleman of the Bedchamber.[54] Charles Mordaunt was removed from the same position as a result of his attempt to

[50] TNA, LC 3/24, fo.13v.
[51] *The Diary of Samuel Pepys*, ed. R.C. Latham and W. Matthews (11 vols, London, 1970), i, p.193 and viii, p.369.
[52] CSPD, April 19 1697, p.110.
[53] J. Israel, *The Dutch Republic,* ch.32, The Stadtholderate of William III 1672-1702; W. Troost, *William III, the Stadholder King,* ch.5, pp.95-119.
[54] H. Smith, *Armies and Political Change in Britain, 1660-1750* (Oxford, 2021), pp.138-140.

incriminate the Duke of Shrewsbury in the Fenwick affair. Mordaunt had lost the same post three years previously due to his leading role in the attempt to pass a Triennial Bill through Parliament- William had vetoed an identical bill a few months previously. The Treasurer of the Chamber, Roland Gwynne, accused Henry Sydney of corruption in Ireland in 1692 and was removed from office shortly afterwards. A more vigorous response to the number of its office holders who maintained links with James II's court at Saint-Germain or who attempted to stir up discord by bringing accusations against their fellows could have occurred. Instead, the regime seems to have been successful at distinguishing genuine threats to its survival from the actions of the uncommitted or disgruntled who simply wished to maintain links, however tenuous, with both William and James.

William made few alterations to the members of his court after 1689. Sir Stephen Fox had reminded Charles II in 1678 that 'no man will presume to dispute your power, but your goodness has been hitherto such as that never any sworn servant hath been put away since your happy restoration, nor can there be found any precedent in any of your predecessors' times.'[55] William respected the tenure of his court officers to a similar degree, in marked contrast to the substantial changes of James II's reign.[56] Those changes which did occur were often enforced by death, incapacity, or the promotion of the incumbent to another role within the court. For example, within the complement of twelve Gentlemen of the Bedchamber, nine had been appointed by William in 1689. There were only seven further appointments in the rest of the reign, two of which were made to replace the promoted

[55] Sir Stephen Fox to Henry Gascoigne, April 27 1678. HMC *Report on the manuscripts of the Marquess of Ormonde, K.P., preserved at Kilkenny castle. New series* (8 vols, London, 1902-20), iv, p.139.
[56] Barclay, 'Impact of James II', chs.4-6.

Sidney and the disgraced Churchill and another to accommodate William's new favourite, Albemarle. Amongst the Grooms of the Bedchamber, usually between eight and ten in number, William appointed seven in 1689 and only four in the remainder of the reign. Four new gentlemen ushers of the Privy Chamber were appointed in 1689. There were only four changes in their number over the course of the reign, a sizeable contrast with the complete replacement of incumbents which occurred in 1702.[57] This approach to the allocation of place was a means of emphasising the new regime's recognition of the importance of continuity. William also seems to have used the court to exhibit the regime's inclusivity: the diversity of the elite families represented by those holding court office testifies to this. Unless determinedly Jacobite, William used the attraction of court position to bolster support, even if the seniority of position might not have been all that was desired. Danby, for example, was never rewarded with the court office and prominence which he deemed appropriate for his support of the Revolution. Nevertheless, his family interest remained well represented at court through the presence of his close relations, the Berties. James Butler, 2nd Duke of Ormond, voted against the Convention Parliament's motions that James had abdicated, and that William and Mary should be declared joint monarchs. William still appointed him as Gentleman of the Bedchamber in March 1689 and was rewarded with Ormond's consistent loyalty and support through his military service in Flanders.[58] After both Nottingham and Halifax had left political office, members of their families were found

[57] The statistics in this section have been compiled from information provided in Bucholz and Sainty, *Database of Court Officers: 1660-1837*, pp.36-8.
[58] Stuart Handley, 'Butler, James, 2nd Duke of Ormond (1665-1745)', *ODNB* (Oxford, 23 September 2004), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/4193 (19 July 2024).

or retained their positions at Mary's court. The Portland papers show that William and his ministers spent much effort attempting to gain the support of the Earls of Mulgrave and of Bath in 1693-4, both potential waverers in their allegiance, through the reward of office.[59]

To analyse Mary's court apart from that of William exaggerates the separate natures of the two entities: the two courts inhabited the same spaces and William's attendants often served both monarchs.[60] Nevertheless, Mary had possessed her own household in the United Provinces and Burnet's list indicates that, even before the offer of the joint Crown, plans were being made for a similar entity to be created in England.[61] The most obvious differential between William and Mary's English households was their scale. William's court in the United Provinces had 200 members at most: in England, that number rose to over a thousand.[62] As a contrast, Mary's court had consisted of forty attendants in the United Provinces, rising to approximately 120 in England. Whether as a result of bad weather and tides, or a desire on William's part to ensure that he would be offered the English crown on his terms with sole executive responsibility, Mary did not arrive in England until February 1689.[63] Her public appearances remained limited until William named her as head of the Regency Council on his departure overseas in 1690. Burnet emphasised her lack of political agency: 'Though the queen set herself to make up what was wanting in the king, by a great

[59] 'Only the Earls of Bath and Mulgrave are to have something other than money'. Sunderland letter to Portland, June 20 1693. University of Nottingham, Portland Papers, PwA 1217.
[60] 'Mary's kitchen was overseen by the King's Board of Greencloth and other domestic needs were supplied by the Household below Stairs.' Bucholz and Sainty, 'Household of Mary II', compiled by Annah Hackett, p.1 in *Database, 1660-1837*.
[61] Suggestions for Mary's Court are made at the end of the document. The proposals for her principal attendants are the least accurate amongst the categories of appointment.
[62] Mörke, 'Stadholderly Court', p.230 and Barclay, 'William's Court', p.250.
[63] 'He kept the Princess in Holland, on purpose to prevent intrigues for her interest'. Dalrymple, *Memoirs*, ii, p.282.

vivacity and cheerfulness; yet when it appeared she meddled not in business, so that few found their account in making their court to her, though she gave a wonderful content to all that came near her, yet few came'.[64] The size of the two courts provided a very public means of displaying where William wished power to be seen to lie within the regime. The deliberate underplaying of the importance of Mary's court was underlined by its size being smaller than that of Catherine of Braganza, notwithstanding her status as joint monarch rather than Dowager Queen.[65]

William's assertion of authority extended to his oversight of the allocation of place within Mary's court. He inserted within it individuals who were probably not to Mary's taste- the most obvious example being her vice-chamberlain at the start of the reign, John Howe, who was eventually removed from office partly as a result of singing bawdy songs behind Mary in church.[66] Edward Nicholas, MP for Shaftesbury, was given the post of Mary's Treasurer in 1693 as a reward for his successful raising of loans for the government- his predecessor, Richard Coote, Lord Bellamont, having been dismissed because, as Mary told him, he 'behaved himself impertinently.'[67] The military influence was also apparent in the choice of her Chamberlain, the Earl of Wiltshire, who absented himself from her court when he campaigned with William in Flanders in 1691.

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[64] Burnet, *History,* iv, p.3.
[65] The differential is exaggerated by Mary's sharing of attendants with William's court. Nevertheless, Catherine's court was served by over two hundred attendants, including gardeners. Comparative figures are sourced from Bucholz and Sainty, *Database,* 'Household of Mary II' and 'Household of Queen (from 1685 Queen Dowager) Catherine 1660-1705', (compiled by J.C. Sainty, Lydia Wassmann, and R. O. Bucholz).
[66] Narcissus Luttrell, *A Brief Historical Relation of state affairs from September 1678 to April 1714* (6 vols, Oxford, 1857), ii, p.390. Howe voted consistently against Court sponsored measures in Parliament at this time also and was rumoured to be in correspondence with St-Germain.
[67] Mary, *Memoirs*, p.59.

The core of Mary's court had accompanied her from the United Provinces and was supplemented by some of Mary's childhood friends. Anna von Golstein, for example, travelled with Mary from the United Provinces and retained her position as first Lady of the Bedchamber, whilst Lady Derby was appointed Groom of the Stole and Mistress of the Robes.[68] Mary's court may have possessed proportionately more Dutch influence than that of her husband. Howe's replacement as Vice-Chamberlain, George Sayer, had a Dutch mother and had been schooled in The Hague. Her secretary and Master of Requests, Abel Tassin D'allonne, had also been Mary's secretary in the United Provinces whilst her Master of the Horse, Sir Edward Villiers, had accompanied Mary to the Netherlands in 1677 on the occasion of her marriage. Analysis of the place holders in the wider reaches of Mary's court perhaps reveals themes which reflect her influence and interests, although the small scale of her court makes it difficult to say with certainty. In addition to D'allonne, there are a number of Huguenot names in the lists of members of Mary's court- Antoine Cassan, Jean Reim de Montigny, and Olivier de la Muce, whose subsequent career after Mary's death led him to Florida to encourage Huguenot settlement there.[69] The employment of Huguenot refugees resonates with Mary's reputation for charitable works. The appointment of Edward Clarke, friend of John Locke and philanthropist, as Auditor General of the Revenues in Mary's court in 1689, perhaps hints at a desire on Mary's part to reward individuals known for their intellectual and charitable pursuits which it is difficult to find replicated in William's choice

[68] Bucholz, *Database,* 'Household of Mary II', p.8.
[69] O. Stanwood, *The Global Refuge: Huguenots in an Age of Empire* (Oxford 2020), p.129.

of attendants.[70] Her profound religiosity is not obviously represented in the names of the members of her court- she had no chaplains of her own. However, William's choice in 1689 as Dean of the Chapel Royal, Henry Compton, had been a childhood tutor to Mary and it is noticeable how markedly the numbers of chaplains appointed to William's court reduced after Mary's death in 1694.[71]

It is not scale and office holders alone which define a court. It is how those people interact. The occasion recounted by Ailesbury when he was invited to play basset with Mary and her ladies-in-waiting whilst under suspicion of Jacobite plotting evokes an atmosphere of inclusivity somewhat different to that emanating from William's court.[72] Even the story of Mary examining the bedding on her first arrival at the Palace of Whitehall suggests a lighter mood than that created by William and his military colleagues.[73] This is an atmosphere much more reminiscent of Charles II's court. As such, it must have been useful in creating a favourable association, which, for all William's conscious construction, was obviously lacking from the spirit of his court. William seems to have grudgingly conceded Mary's use to the regime over time. As he began to acknowledge her political judgement, he rewarded her with a small increase in her retinue- three more maids of honour were appointed by 1692 along with two more Grooms of the Great Chamber. William may have been jealous of Mary and wary of her superior claim to the throne. Eventually he came to trust her more, to a

[70] Locke had lived in exile in the United Provinces between 1683-1689 and accompanied Mary on her return to England. Mary was one of the dedicatees of Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*.
[71] Fifty-four chaplains were appointed between 1689 and 1694, only eighteen from 1695 to 1702. Information derived from Bucholz and Sainty, *Database,* Chamber List 6.
[72] Ailesbury, *Memoirs*, i, p.265.
[73] *An Account of the Conduct of the Dowager Duchess of Marlborough* (London, 1742), p.14.

degree acknowledging that her strengths complemented his own. In Burnet's words, 'Each of them having peculiar Talents. He was to Conquer Enemies, and She was to gain Friends.'[74]

The motivations of the applicants for court position

The court was one of the largest single employers in the country and provided an honourable, stable and often well-paid career. The motivations of those seeking employment within it needed to be understood by William and Mary in order that they could exploit the court's potential as an institution which could enhance the reputation of the new regime and promote loyalty to it. Its potential was well understood by William's closest adviser, Bentinck. As Burnet was compiling his list of suitable recipients of place within the English polity, Bentinck's secretary, Henning, was writing to Richard Colinge, the Lord Chamberlain's secretary, to learn more about the monetary value of the offices at the Chamberlain's disposal. Colinge sent back a highly detailed reply, explaining how many years' purchase each of the main offices would cost to buy.[75] For example, a place as a Sergeant-at-arms worth £100 per annum was estimated by Colinge to be available for a price of £400. Bentinck had not waited for confirmation that the Crown was William's before looking for information on how to profit from the Revolution. With so much still uncertain, it is a telling indication of Bentinck's motivation.[76] He may have been extreme in his avarice, but he was not alone. Court offices were regarded in the same light as all private property.

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[74] Gilbert Burnet, *An Essay on the Memory of the Late Queen* (London, 1695), p.37.
[75] Worcester Record Office, Henning Papers, 705:366, BA 2252/6 and 2252/6(i).
[76] The Earl of Ailesbury also complained that it was impossible to speak with Bentinck unless the conversation potentially concerned money and was convinced that Bentinck was only interested in prosecuting him because he 'had an eye on his estate.' Ailesbury, *Memoirs*, i, p.227.

They had been purchased by the holders and were therefore eligible to be used as a source of profit: Thomas Wharton, for example, used his position as Comptroller of the Household to sell horses worth £43000 to the army in 1690.[77] The Earl of Sunderland, who spent much of the reign avoiding office in order to lessen the possibility of impeachment, was lured by the prospect of easily gained profits to accept the offer of the Lord Chamberlain's post in 1697.

Many of those holding office in the Stuart-Orange courts were members of families who had been in royal service for generations. Robert Bucholz has demonstrated how court office was regularly passed down within families from one generation to the next.[78] Such service was a way of life, and the religious and ideological beliefs of the monarch were often of limited consequence to office holders compared with their desire to continue in employment at court. The Page of Honour to James II and Groom of the Bedchamber to William, Thomas Windsor, was a descendant of Andrew Windsor who had been Henry VIII's Keeper of the Wardrobe. Successive generations of the Colinge family had been employed at court. In William's reign, Richard Colinge was joined by at least three other members of his family, holding posts as diverse as Yeoman of the Guns and Cormorant Keeper.[79] Others sought court positions for the honour which they bestowed and their potential use as stepping stones to future employment. For example, the chaplains to the court received no

[77] Stuart Handley, 'Charles Godfrey (c.1648-1715)', *HOP 1690-1715*. Godfrey partnered Wharton in the sale of the horses.
[78] 'Under Queen Anne, over twenty five percent of her officers and servants could trace relatives at her own court, and thirty percent could do so to the courts of her uncle, father and sister and brother-in-law.' R.O. Bucholz, 'Venality at court: some preliminary thoughts on the sale of household office, 1660-1800', *Historical Research*, 91/251 (2018), p.78.
[79] Bucholz, *Database,* entries for Benjamin, Charles, Henry and Richard Colinge.

salary. However, the names of those appointed after 1689 reads like a list of future Church of England bishops: Richard Kidder, soon-to-be Bishop of Bath and Wells; Francis Atterbury, Bishop of Rochester; William Wake, Archbishop of Canterbury; and William Fleetwood, Bishop of Ely.[80] William's disinclination to disturb the practices and incumbents of the court after his initial alterations will have been well received after the upheavals of the previous reign.

Collectively, profit, honour and tradition made the court a highly attractive place to work. With the exception of Jacobites who had no intention of working for an interloper and a small number who were worried that court employment could lead to parliamentary scrutiny, there were few categories of individual not attracted by the possibility of a place at court. To Sir John Dalrymple, 'The number of the great, who had ventured their lives and fortunes in the cause of the revolution, or whom it was of consequence to conciliate to it, was so considerable, that it became impossible to gratify the expectations of the former, or to hold out sufficient temptations to the latter.'[81] The need for balance between rewarding the loyal and tempting the waverer back into the fold was important in a country where the ability of the newly established regime to survive was still uncertain. This was something which William understood. In the United Provinces he had used court positions to balance the often conflicting interests of the Seven Provinces whilst also using the court to reward and control senior members of the Orange and Republican factions. Members from Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht and Gelderland all sat on his Demesne Council and William exploited their rivalries to

[80] The information in this section is sourced from the individual entries in Bucholz, *Database, 1660-1837*.
[81] Dalrymple, *Memoirs,* ii, p.3.

promote his own interests.[82] William's role in the successful defence of the United Provinces in 1672 had given him the authority to insert into the political system his nominees- for example, he forced through the replacement of one hundred and twenty Regents in Utrecht.[83] After 1672, William reached 'a more dominant position in politics, than any Stadholder had.'[84] 'The social practice of patronage' with 'the Orange court ..the centre of a system of communication' was pivotal to this success.[85] The same ability to reinforce the political leverage gained from military success applies to William's use of positions in England at court to promote unity and loyalty. With limited evidence of motivation directly provided by William relating to his involvement in the establishment of his English court, the continuity of practice between England and the United Provinces is perhaps the best means of demonstrating his agency in the staffing and use of the court. In both England and the United Provinces, the court was an instrument which he used to foster unity rather than division.

Reaction to the courts' composition

This did not prevent the Stuart-Orange courts from being the subjects of considerable criticism. Unsuccessful applicants for office along with those who opposed the regime on ideological grounds criticised both court practice as well as the behaviour of its officers. Yet it is striking how little different in either scale, practices or members the English court of 1702 appeared compared with that of 1689. The reasons why the criticisms had such limited effect is best explained by analysing the different strands of disapproval separately. Broadly,

[82] Troost, *William III, the Stadholder King*, pp.95-119; Mörke, 'Stadholderly Court', pp.232-239.
[83] Troost, *William III, the Stadholder King*, p.109.
[84] J. Israel, *The Dutch Republic* (Oxford, 1995), p.810.
[85] Mörke, 'Stadholderly Court', pp.232-3.

there were three categories within which negative commentary fell: those which held the court responsible for the afflictions of the nation as a whole; criticisms of the behaviour and actions of court favourites; and attacks on specific court practices.

A prominent participant in the first category of criticism was Robert Crosfeild who wrote a series of pamphlets in 1694-5 associating problems at court with the woes of the nation: 'there is a Corrupt Party at Court... that carry on a separate Interest from that of their Majesties and the Publick.. from whence the greatest of our Evils have sprung.'[86] The greatest of those evils to Crosfeild related to the costs of war, the inefficient raising of taxes due to poor advice being offered at court, and the incorrect emphasis upon waging war on land rather than at sea. Crosfeild presented a petition to Parliament on these subjects in 1695 only for it to be ignored. Much of the difficulty in gaining parliamentary support for a motion condemning the court and its practices related to the criticism of the monarch which such an action implied, something with which many were unwilling to be associated when the alternatives represented by Louis XIV, or a returning James II, were even less palatable. Parliament showed more unity of purpose in its attempts to eradicate the negative effect of the court by removing office holders, including courtiers, from its ranks. There were multiple bills to dissociate office holding from parliamentary membership over the course of the reign and a Place Bill had passed both Houses in 1693-4, only to be vetoed by William.[87]

[86] Robert Crosfeild, *Great Britain's Tears* and *Truth brought to light* (London, 1695), p.4. The subjects of the association of wrongdoing at court with the wider distress of the nation, and the court's involvement in the formation of the Societies for the Reformation of Manners, are treated in greater depth by C. Rose, 'Providence, Protestant Union and Godly Reformation in the 1690s', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 3 (1993), pp.151-169.

[87] Place bills were brought before Parliament in 1692-3, 1693-4, 1694-5, 1698-99, 1699-1799 and 1701.

Eventually, a diluted measure was passed as part of the Act of Succession in 1701. The practical effect of the passing of this measure can again be overemphasised. As we have seen, and will explore further in the following chapter, the ability and indeed desire of William to affect parliamentary outcomes by the marshalling of court resources for voting purposes was considerably exaggerated.

When criticism was targeted at specific individuals, often Dutch, and, even more specifically, often Bentinck, it was again rare for the censure to have any material effect.[88] Despite the efforts of the Country party within Parliament, Bentinck ended the reign considerably wealthier than at its beginning.[89] He also avoided impeachment. William retained the ability to construct his court as he wished and to choose his advisers without external influence. His policy of allocating areas of responsibility to different individuals meant that he was never seen to be completely dominated by one courtier alone, as, for example, James I had been. Nor did he allow networks of patronage and policy formulation to be controlled by the same favourite.

Criticism of corrupt court practices, particularly concerning the method of allocation of place, was similarly unsuccessful in achieving reform. In June 1689, John Bearecroft, a disgruntled office-seeker who had previously been Sergeant-at-Arms during Charles II's reign, brought a petition to the House of Commons to complain that the Lord Chamberlain and his associates were openly selling offices to the highest bidder. His petition was never

[88] In the volume of P*oems on Affairs of State* for 1688-97, only Bentinck and the Earl of Dorset are consistently satirised.
[89] His will reveals the worth of his English property was well over £900,000 in 1709. BL, Egerton MS 1708, fos. 277-80.

debated, and an associated Bill entitled 'Abuses in the Selling of Offices' failed to pass.[90] This was not because the sale of court office was regarded as unequivocally acceptable, even by those perpetrating it- this explains Colinge's desire that anyone receiving 'help' from him relating to the purchase of office should never mention it. A number of factors account for the ambivalent attitude which led to the system's survival during the reign. A common justification was that court office was an individual's property which had been purchased. As such, it was theirs to use as they desired, including the right to recoup the outlay by selling it. Many Members of Parliament were place holders at court who stood to lose if the system was abolished. The attitude and actions of Charles Sedley, MP for New Romney, are illustrative of the somewhat confused motivations at play: although wary of the malign influence of place holders sitting in Parliament, in October 1691 Sedley unsuccessfully applied to the Lord Chamberlain for the post of housekeeper at Whitehall, worth £600 per annum.[91] It is unsurprising that William saw no need for reform: he was adept at utilising the system and the pressure for change was insufficiently strong. In the United Provinces, William similarly disregarded the calls to reform the corruption of the patronage system and instead used it to promote personal loyalty.[92]

All three categories of criticism had substance and could potentially have contributed to greater hostility to the regime. Ideological and personal sources of grievance made criticism

[90] Moores, 'Earl of Dorset', p.194.
[91] Charles Sedley, despite his aversion to 'ask(ing) the King for anything,' had written unsuccessfully to Dorset for the post of housekeeper at Whitehall worth £600 a year in October 1691. *Life of Sir Charles Sedley* (London, 1722), p.10; Luttrell, *Brief Relation*, ii, p.158; Bodleian, MS Carte 79, fo.405.
[92] For example, William promoted to and retained Lodewijk Huygens in the position of sheriff of Gorinchem despite his judicial conviction for financial malpractice. Troost, *William III, the Stadholder King*, p.114.

of the courts' composition unavoidable. Although political structures differed, analysis of the methods and experiences of two monarchs of foreign nationality who were similarly imported- James I and George I- helps to guard against any underestimation of the complexity of the task faced by the Stuart-Orange regime in its attempts to integrate within a divided society. Neil Cuddy has described how James I tried to maintain the perception of a court where office was equally apportioned between Scots and Englishmen at the start of his reign.[93] In reality, the most influential positions were allocated to Scots, both within the Bedchamber and also within the Captains of the Guard. Englishmen were assigned to mainly decorative posts within the Privy Chamber- Sir John Holles complained that 'the Scottish monopolize his (James's) princely person'.[94] Later in the reign, the Duke of Buckingham dominated policymaking, consolidating his position by controlling the levers of patronage. In Cuddy's view, neither form of court construction was successful in enabling James to achieve his aims. George I initially used his court to shield himself from the English by bringing over from Hanover ninety ministers and servants. Beattie has described how 'courtiers such as Bernstorff and Bothmer were the most direct channel to the king and were employed as such by English ministers and courtiers...English ministers were in some measure dependent on them.'[95]

William was more successful at lessening the level of criticism by avoiding unnecessary inflammation of his opponents' sources of discontent. For example, although he was

[93] N. Cuddy, 'The Revival of the Entourage: The Bedchamber of James I, 1603-1625', in D. Starkey (ed.), *The English Court: from the Wars of the Roses to the Civil War* (London, 1987), pp.173-226.
[94] Cuddy, 'Revival of the Entourage', p.205, quoting HMC *Report on the manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland Preserved at Welbeck abbey* (10 vols, London, 1891-1931), ix, p.113.
[95] Beattie, *English Court in the Reign of George I*, pp.223-4.

regularly criticised for his reward of office to Dutch compatriots, their degree of influence was limited. William did not choose his favourites by nationality but for their usefulness. The advantages of being Dutch were far less than some English imaginations perceived.[96] Bentinck was neither the sole fount of patronage nor the sole gatekeeper to the King and William regularly consulted English politicians directly. The concerns of a Dutch monopoly upon William should quickly have dissipated in the light of the evidence of William's allocation of place. The reason why William was a distant figure, to English and Dutch subjects alike, stemmed from his character, not the structure of his court.

The corrupt practices associated with the distribution of office at the Stuart-Orange court were also widely criticised. Their retention owed much to William's desire to maintain the practices of Charles II's court, the capacity for discontent which reform could have occasioned amongst incumbent office holders, and the usefulness which William derived from his manipulation of the system. William's treatment of the allocation of court office as a means of influencing political activity was less successful. He wished the court to be independent of faction and yet capable of maintaining its place as the principal source of executive authority through his ministers' control of Parliament. The increasing assertion of parliamentary supremacy and the consolidation of a two-party system within Parliament made this unworkable. Despite this failure, by sending the message that the court was above party politics by refusing to align employment within it with the gyrations of party, William took some of the intensity from factional fighting. A loss of parliamentary office did

[96] Lord Grey asked his sister to find him a Dutch wife as 'it is the fashion to marry the Dutch ladies to get interest at court.' Wrest Park Bedfordshire Archives, Lucas MS L/30/2/11. Quoted in Eagles, 'Burnet', p.135.

not lead to loss of employment at court. This helped to dissociate adherence to the institutions of the state from the conviction that such adherence could only be maintained if the right party was in power. I will now turn to a more detailed examination of the motivations influencing William's allocation of place as a means of attempting to affect parliamentary proceedings.

Chapter 3 - Ways and Means: The Court Party and voting behaviour relating to military funding in the House of Commons

To contemporary observers it was a truism that the Court possessed significant influence over the voting behaviour of MPs. Pamphlets such as the 'Hush Money Paper' of 1693 asserted that 'the king has about sixscore members that I can reckon who are in places, and who are thereby so intirely at his devotion,.., they vote as lumpingly as the lawn sleeves.'[1] MPs themselves were convinced of the Court's influence: in Robert Harley's opinion, 'There was such a weight in a Court, that if things were not grossly mismanaged, they would never lose a question; and it required but little skill to foresee what would pass in the House of Commons.' [2] Quantitative studies by historians of the composition of the House of Commons would seem to validate these suppositions. Henry Horwitz for example has surveyed Williamite House of Commons members and concluded through analysis of voting lists made during the period that between 100-130 MPs can be designated as holders of positions dependent upon royal grant (placeholders). [3] Since a full-strength House of Commons consisted of just over 500 members, and average attendance was far less, place holding MPs potentially wielded enormous influence as a group.[4] The expansion of the State occasioned by the need to increase military resource seemed to be fostering a form of royal absolutism as the beneficiaries of that expansion (army and navy officers, customs and

[1] Charlwood Lawton, *A Short state of our condition with relation to the present Parliament* (London, 1693), p.1. 'Lawn sleeve' was a term used to describe the episcopacy, whose voting behaviour in the House of Lords was predominantly in line with Court direction.
[2] Robert Harley letter to James Vernon, June 22 1700. Vernon, *Letters*, iii, p.90.
[3] Horwitz, *Parliament*, Appendix D and p.97.
[4] Horwitz, *Parliament*, p.97.

excise officials for example) became an increasing presence in Parliament. And yet the 'king's business' often failed to proceed smoothly in the lower House. This chapter looks at the reasons why the prevalence amongst MPs of office holders whose positions were dependent upon court favour was not a more powerful influence upon voting patterns, focussing upon the issue of supply to finance the army during the reign.[5] By doing so, it casts light upon the methods and mentalities of monarch, ministers, and MPs. In a wider sphere, it contributes to the debate relating to the nature and timing of the evolving power relationship between English monarch and Parliament in a period of huge instability. If the politically polarising Whig initiatives following the Assassination Plot of 1696 formed, as Pincus considered, the second phase of the 'Revolutionary Transformation', the implications of the mentalities behind the voting behaviour in Parliament between 1697 and the end of the reign were at least as significant.[6]

An examination of supply voting patterns is an effective means of gauging the nature and strength of the faction within Parliament which for ease of reference can be termed 'the court party': votes on war funding occurred almost yearly through the reign and their successful handling was integral to the achievement of the regime's aims. In addition, the broader importance of issues relating to supply was widely recognised within the House. As the court sceptic MP Sir John Thompson stated, 'Really I am afraid of a Standing Army... I look upon this War with France to be merely a Colour.'[7] Analysis will be confined to the

[5] Supply is used in a broad sense to include also the standing army debates of the latter part of the reign.
[6] 'The (Assassination) plot made it possible for the Whigs to consolidate their radical revolution.' S. Pincus, *1688: The First Modern Revolution* (New Haven and London, 2009), p.473.
[7] Anchitell Grey, D*ebates of the House of Commons, from the year 1667 to the year 1694* (10 vols, London, 1763), x, p.177.

voting behaviour of House of Commons members- supply was a 'money' issue and therefore its debate and approval was confined to the lower House. The study also confines its reference to the ideologies and practices of court affiliated members at Westminster. It will not look at the substantial ways in which ministers and other court supporters attempted to influence the results of elections to Parliament.[8]

After a survey of the historiography and relevant primary sources, the study will examine the nature of the 'court party.' It is certainly a neat construct to envisage the existence of such an entity, providing a counterpoint to the country party upon which much historical scholarship has concentrated. However, very little research has been undertaken into the motivation, coherence and composition of the individuals who attempted to achieve the monarchs' objectives in Parliament. I will look to answer the questions of whether a coherent set of aims can be said to have existed to unify its adherents and how effective were the tools, both in theory and practice, which it possessed to achieve its aims. The perspectives of monarchs, ministers and MPs – the three main constituents of the grouping within the context of House of Commons activity- will be examined separately in a chronological survey which divides the reign into three periods: 1689-93 ('Initial Steps'- this section will concentrate upon the attitude of the monarch); 1693-97 ('Sunderland and the Whig Junto'- with the focus on the king's ministers); and 1697-1702 ('Confusion'- mainly

[8] The ways in which the regime's principal ministers and officers extended the influence of the Crown into the parliamentary constituencies is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, the influencing of elections to Parliament was considered an important and legitimate occupation. For example, Somers, as Lord Keeper and Head of Chancery was responsible for changing the details of Town Charters in order that the composition of electorates might be skewed in favour of the Whig party. An important source of information concerning the formation and use of patronage networks in this context is the History of Parliament Trust's entries for individual MPs.

addressing the behaviours of MPs). In each of the time periods I will look at the evidence provided by voting activity on supply in the House of Commons to see how the motivations of the constituents of the grouping played out in practice.

Historiography relating to voting behaviour in the House of Commons in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries has concentrated upon the nature of the alignments within the House, looking to answer the question of whether MPs mainly voted along Whig-Tory or Court-Country lines. Research by Horwitz, Holmes and Hayton utilising MPs' voting records has emphasised the importance of Whig-Tory loyalties and David Hayton in particular has shown the influence of Country party ideology to be an intermittent determinant of voting behaviour.[9] Although such beliefs were endemic in members of both Whig and Tory parties, partly due to lack of trust in the monarch, Hayton concluded that only occasionally did they have the strength to overlie loyalty to party as the determinant of voting behaviour. The attempt by Walcott to assign primarily Namierite motivations of family and personal affiliation to voting behaviour has been discredited, particularly by the work of Holmes and Hill.[10] Quantitative assessment of voting patterns has been complemented by individual studies of some of the more influential participants in the direction of parliamentary proceedings- Portland, Sunderland and Carmarthen- along with entries in the House of Commons section of the *History of Parliament* relating to MPs with ministerial

[9] *HOP 1690-1715;* H. Horwitz, *Parliament, Policy and Politics in the reign of William III* (Manchester, 1977); G. Holmes and W. Speck, *The Divided Society: Parties and Politics in England, 1694-1716* (London, 1967).
[10] R. Walcott, *English Politics in the Early Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 1956); B.W. Hill, *The Growth of Parliamentary Parties 1689-1742* (London, 1976); G. Holmes, *Britain after the Glorious Revolution* (London, 1969).

responsibilities such as Montagu, Somers and Vernon.[11] What has not been attempted is a thorough exploration of the mechanisms by which ministers sought to influence the voting patterns of the House of Commons. An analysis of the evidence provided by parliamentary diaries, letters and pamphlets together with the relevant House of Commons journals and extant voting lists can shed light on the role of oratory, the marshalling of voters as well as the use of financial inducement in the influencing of voting behaviour.[12] The evidence is often fragmentary. We lack voting lists for the main supply votes and written confirmation of payments for votes was rarely recorded. However, enough evidence survives to provide strong indications of the main drivers of MPs' voting rationales.

The King: Initial Steps

A successful party needs leadership and shared objectives. William III's vision of his rights as king and the methods he used to implement that vision have not been subjects of substantial debate amongst historians. He is usually portrayed as a thoroughly pragmatic

[11] A. Browning, *Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby and Duke of Leeds, 1632-1712* (3 vols, Glasgow,1944-51); D. Onnekink, *The Anglo-Dutch Favourite: the career of Hans Willem Bentinck, 1st Earl of Portland (1649-1709)* (Aldershot, 2007); J.P. Kenyon, *Robert Spencer, Earl of Sunderland 1641-1702* (London, 1958); *HOP 1690-1715*.
[12] Narcissus Luttrell, *A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs from September 1678 to April 1714* (6 vols, Oxford, 1857); *The Parliamentary Diary of Narcissus Luttrell, 1691-93*, ed. H. Horwitz (Oxford, 1972); Anchitell Grey, *Debates of the House of Commons from the year 1667 to the year 1694* (10 vols, London, 1769); William Cobbett, *Cobbett's Parliamentary History of England from the Norman Conquest, in 1066, to the year, 1803* (36 vols, London, 1806-1820); *Journals of the House of Commons* (vols x-xiii, London, 1802); *The Parliamentary Diary of Sir Richard Cocks,* ed. D.W. Hayton (Oxford, 1996); University of Nottingham, *Portland (Welbeck) Papers;* Savile, *Life*; *Memoirs of Thomas, earl of Ailesbury, written by himself,* ed. W.E. Buckley (2 vols, London, 1890). Gilbert Burnet, *History of his own time: from the restoration of King Charles the Second, to the Treaty of Peace at Utrecht, in the reign of Queen Anne* (6 vols, London, 1883); *The Works of George Savile, Marquis of Halifax,* ed. M. Brown (3 vols, Oxford, 1989); *Correspondentie van Willem III en vans Hans Willem Bentinck*, ed. N. Japikse, (5 vols, The Hague, 1927-37).

monarch, only interested in finding the best means available to utilise the resources of the Three Kingdoms to protect the United Provinces specifically and the Protestant religion more generally from the threat of Louis XIV.[13] Analysis of activity in the House of Commons after 1688 has concentrated upon the methods and motivations of William's parliamentary opponents. The monarch's actions have rarely been studied in the same vein. An analysis of William's attitude to the role of the House of Commons and his actions to influence its behaviour helps to shed light on this issue. This section considers William's attitudes to court patronage in a parliamentary context. As I discuss more fully in a separate chapter, Mary's involvement with parliamentary politics was constrained by both her own inclinations and William's desire to maintain, and be seen to maintain, sole control of this aspect of their joint rule. William alone, for example, attended the openings of Parliament. There are indications that Mary did have some interest in matters of political patronage- for example Halifax mentions that she talked with Burnet about 'bringing Lord Rochester into business' in 1689.[14] However, surviving references to her involvement in matters concerning political appointments are very limited, lending strong credibility to the likelihood that William controlled this aspect of monarchical patronage.

If a Court Party within the House of Commons existed, it did so without either the publicly voiced approval, or, on a regular basis, the practical support of the monarch. The importance, good judgement and integrity of that institution were often subjects of William's

[13] Stephen Baxter, in his extensive biography of William III, spends little time analysing the beliefs which motivated William's actions relating to Parliament. The same is also the case in Pincus's discussion of *1688: The First Modern Revolution*.

[14] Savile, *Life*, ii, p.232.

infrequent public pronouncements. He repeatedly stated in 1688 that he had come over to England to protect the religion and liberties of the English people through the mechanism of the calling of a Parliament.[15] Even if this was a subterfuge behind which existed the aim of claiming the throne, William professed the desire to rule through Parliament consistently during his reign and sought that institution's advice on how to govern. In his first address to Parliament in 1689, he stated that 'It should be therefore my chief care never to give any Parliament cause to distrust me, and the best Methods I can use for that purpose is never to expect anything from them, but what shall be their own interest to grant.'[16] He repeatedly stressed his shared purpose with the people through their representatives in Parliament and his respect for that institution's ability to provide good counsel. There was, in this iteration of the commonality of purpose between monarch and Parliament, no need for a court party.

Such public declarations were of course not necessarily indicative of William's entire view of how he envisaged his relationship with Parliament. Just as the fashioning of William and Mary's courts owed much to the influence of Charles II, the methods and personnel employed by William at the start of his reign to implement royal policy in Parliament also shared characteristics with those employed by his uncle. Charles's experiences with Parliament should have provided warning of the potential dangers of such a guide. In addition, the questionable applicability of that model was accentuated by William's need for a scale of war funding which could only be sanctioned by Parliament- personal rule was not a fall-back option. William seems to have believed that the severity of the existential

[15] *The Declaration of His Highnes William Henry… Prince of Orange, of the Reasons Inducing Him to Appear in Armes in the Kingdom of England* (The Hague, 1688).
[16] Abel Boyer, *The History of King William III. In III Parts* (2 vols, London, 1703), ii, p.15.

threat facing the country from Louis XIV, combined with the Protestant religious viewpoint which the majority of his subjects shared, would be sufficient to reduce the severity of faction within Parliament; the House of Commons would see the necessity of unified action to serve the interests of the country. His vision was of a partnership between monarch and people. Conflicting loyalties to individual parties amongst MPs were an unnecessary distraction. Halifax noted in 1689 William's view that 'The best party is but a kind of conspiracy against the rest of the nation.'[17] The king perceived his own role not as a party leader but as a 'trimmer' guiding the activities of Parliament for the greater good of the country. Trimming to William was not a passive concept. He regarded it in much the same way as the Marquis of Halifax- analogous to the function of the captain of a boat, overseeing its crew to maintain balance.[18] In practical terms this occasioned, in William's opinion, the need 'to form a party between the two extremes' of Whig and Tory members.[19] The king's speeches at the start of each parliamentary session emphasised objectives whose achievement would have been desirable to the majority of his audience: the need for a godlier nation; the requirement of a timely and adequate supply of funds in order to achieve victory over Louis XIV.[20] In addition, he encouraged other measures which were popular across party lines- the establishment of a Parliamentary Committee of Accounts to expose the causes of the maladministration which seemed to plague his service, and, more generally, the need for moral reformation, including the rooting out of corruption. William

[17] Savile, *Life*, ii, p.505.
[18] The Marquis of Halifax, *Miscellanies: The Character of a Trimmer* (London, 1704).
[19] Savile, August 8 1689, *Life*, ii, p.229.
[20] For example, CJ, x, October 19 1689 and October 2 1690.

himself refused a bribe of £50,000 to aid the East India Company's attempts to prolong its monopoly.[21] 'My readiness to extend protection to all my.. subjects who will thereby see, that they can recommend themselves to me by no other methods, than what the Laws prescribe' was not a statement which was contradicted by William's personal behaviour.[22]

The first administration which William put in place, with Halifax and Carmarthen at its head and constructed across Whig-Tory party lines, was an attempt to achieve this vision.[23] William was accustomed to ruling in partnership with others where posts were allocated according to ability and political utility rather than along party lines. Olaf Mörke, for example, has described how nobles of French and German origin along with representatives from the Amsterdam bourgeoisie were integrated within the Orange court at The Hague in order that 'the court became Dutch.'[24] It took time for William to realise that the strength of domestic party faction in England often had a greater bearing on voting behaviours than the fear of disunity in the face of foreign threat, and he struggled to cope with it. He remarked to the Dutch Pensionary Heinsius in 1698, 'It were to be wished that the example of the States of Holland were followed in this country; but the people here are so foolishly engrossed with themselves, that they do not pay the least attention to what is going on in foreign countries.'[25]

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[21] Bentinck also refused the offer of a bribe. Carmarthen was less scrupulous. Horwitz, *Parliament,* pp.150-2; CJ*,* xi, pp.316-8 and pp.320-6; Browning, *Danby*, i, pp.518-19.

[22] Grey, *Debates,* x, p.2. William speech to the Houses of Parliament, March 21 1690.

[23] William was anxious not to concentrate power in the hands of one individual. For example, the Treasury was placed in Commission rather than being allocated to Carmarthen, who had served in that role under Charles II. In Halifax's opinion, William had 'a great jealousie of being thought to bee governed'. Savile, *Life,* ii, p.203.

[24] O. Mörke, 'William III's Stadhoderly Court in the Dutch Republic', in *Redefining William III*, p.237.

[25] *Letters of William III and Louis XIV and of their ministers*, ed. P. Grimblot (2 vols, London,1848), i, p.184.

The use of monetary inducements and offers of place in exchange for votes were other aspects of Charles II's dealings with Parliament which William was considered to have appropriated. The potential for court bribery to influence voting behaviour was a constant theme of pamphlet literature during William's reign.[26] Although no stranger to the use of money and place as a means of influencing voting behaviours in the United Provinces, William initially seems to have shied away from their use in England. For example, in 1689 Halifax found William to be hesitant to allow the use of monetary bribes: 'I shew'd him (the king) Sir R. Atkins letter, and telling him my opinion, that 300l. a year more would do, he said, it would not be done without a president for others.' [27] William's desire for financial transparency worried Halifax: 'Hee spoke of leaving a Committee of Parliament in the interval, to consider and report what pensions were fit to bee payd, but upon discourse, he went from it.'[28] According to Burnet, William's disinclination to use bribes only changed with the appointment of Sir John Trevor as Speaker of the House in March 1690: 'And by him began the practice of buying off men, in which hitherto the King had kept to stricter rules. I took the liberty once to complain to the King of this method; He said, he hated it as much as any man could do; But he saw, it was not possible, considering the Corruption of the Age, to avoid it, unless he would endanger the whole.'[29] Trevor had employed monetary rewards in his role as Speaker in Charles and James II's reigns to influence voting behaviour, to the

[26] Charlwood Lawton, *A Short state of our present condition, with relation to the present Parliament* (London, 1693); John Toland, *The Danger of Mercenary Parliaments* (London, 1698).
[27] Savile, August 18 1689, *Life,* ii, p.230. The grounds for not sanctioning the use of bribes- financial rather than moral- are interesting.
[28] Ibid., July 22 1689, p.224.
[29] Burnet, *History,* iv, p.74.

extent that in 1689 William had described Trevor as 'such a knave, that it would be objected, if he was employed.'[30]

Despite the deployment of financial inducement, William was consistently disappointed by both the amounts of war finance which he received from Parliament in the early years of his reign and also the speed with which supply was agreed. War with France was declared on 17 May, 1689. It was only on the 2nd November that the House of Commons agreed an extraordinary supply of £2m for war funding. Even this was not the end of the delay- debate on the sources for this funding dragged on into 1690. John Childs has emphasised the strategic advantages which early readiness for the campaigning season gave an army.[31] This advantage was rarely allowed to William. MPs such as Foley and Harley, anxious to monitor and control the extent of monarchical power, deliberately prioritised the discussion of grievances before the approval of supply; keeping the carrot of the granting of supply dangling was one of their principal means of parliamentary leverage. Ministerial representatives were unable to smooth the path of supply measures through the Commons as other highly contentious issues- the extent of indemnity to James II's supporters, the framing of the oaths of allegiance- were allowed to take up time in the parliamentary calendar. Additionally, in the face of detailed questioning from MPs concerning the necessity of the quantity of financing, the king's ministers were regularly forced to accept reduced supply quota. In 1690, the king's ministers asked Parliament for £1.4m to finance the army: the House of Commons reduced the figure to £1.2m. In 1691, Harley, as chair of

[30] Savile, *Life*, ii, p.228.
[31] J. Childs, *The Nine Years' War and the British Army 1688-97* (Manchester, 1991), p.125.

the Committee for examining the estimates of the Fleet, was able to persuade its members so that 'Every question was carried against the Court,' leading to navy supply being reduced by £279/-.[32]

William did not respond well to the setbacks occasioned by what he perceived to be the political myopia of his English subjects. As early as 1689, he was complaining to Halifax that 'the Commons used him like a dog.'[33] He was at best inconsistent in his attempts to understand and influence the workings of the English parliamentary system. The evidence of engagement provided by the conversations between Halifax and William in the *Spencer House Journals* of 1689-90 was not replicated later in the reign. He was regularly asked by his ministers, without success, to curtail his visits to Het Loo after the campaigning season in order to return to England where his presence was deemed useful in advance of parliamentary sessions. In 1695, the effect of the Royal Progress, whose itinerary had been devised by the Whig Junto for political advantage before the parliamentary elections, was marred by a combination of William's decision to extend the time he spent hunting and the limited public appearances which he made. After the Peace of Ryswick, William's disgruntlement due to his perception of the ingratitude of his English subjects led to almost complete withdrawal from personal involvement in parliamentary activity. He made little attempt to explain the reasoning behind his desire to maintain a large Standing Army or to intervene in the infighting which precipitated the collapse of the Junto. His lack of approachability increased still further. Somers wrote to Shrewsbury in October, 1698, 'Your

[32] Horwitz, *Parliament*, pp.71-3.
[33] Savile, March 28 1689, *Life*, ii, p.207.

grace knows how resolutely the king declined speaking of his business, to any in his service, all the winter, and that in such a matter, as if he was not unwilling it should be known.'[34] Instead, in his correspondence with Portland in 1697 and 1698, when the Standing Army debate was at its height, William's letters are dominated by political events in the United Provinces and France. William wrote to Portland at this time, 'You know that I dread refusals more than anything whatever.'[35] Confronted by it in the English Parliament, William made insufficient attempt to understand his political opponents' viewpoints and persuade them of the validity of his position. He persevered with his stance that party was at best a necessary evil which should be discouraged rather than exploited; as late as 1697 he 'declared, that several had so behaved themselves this session, that, if no punishment were made, no government could be expected for the future, and said, this must not be extended particularly to one kind of men, but some should be displaced of different denominations.'[36] Personality and beliefs combined to make William a highly ineffective party leader in England.

Ministers: Sunderland and the Whig Junto

Hans Willem Bentinck, created Earl of Portland in April 1689, was William's principal adviser concerning the management of the English Parliament for much of the reign. David Onnekink has shown how the combination of Portland's access to the king, his close personal relations with members of the English elite, and his control of the Privy Purse

[34] Somers letter to Shrewsbury, October 25 1698. Talbot, *Correspondence*, p.560.
[35] William letter to Portland, February 18 1698. *Letters of William III and Louis XIV and of their ministers,* ed. Grimblot, i, p.175.
[36] Vernon letter to Shrewsbury, April 24 1697. Talbot, *Correspondence*, p.478.

positioned him for this role.[37] Portland and William constantly debated policy together. One of William's closest advisers in the United Provinces, Constantijn Huygens, mentioned in his diaries the long hours the King and Portland spent in his cabinet working or discussing matters of importance.[38] Within the context of English parliamentary management, Bentinck became the means through which ministers gained access to the king and, in turn, the king articulated his wishes to his ministers. Sunderland directed much of his correspondence with William through Portland, writing in 1694 for example, 'I told him (the king) before he went away that what I had to say to him I would write to you.'[39] William had given Bentinck responsibility for the promotion of his interest in England even before 1688: Bentinck was William's envoy to Charles II in 1677, James II in 1685, and was the main coordinator of the 1688 invasion. His marriage to Anne Villiers provided connections to some of the more important English aristocratic families and he had developed strong personal ties with politically influential members of the nobility such as Sidney and Danby during his stays in England. It is difficult to apportion responsibility for policy formation between William and Portland due to the similarity of views expressed in their public statements. For example, on the issue of party, Portland's ideological position reflected precisely that of William: in 1691 he wrote, 'I have never listed to that which the animosity of one party did … but I have followed reason without any distinction between people or

[37] Onnekink, *Anglo-Dutch Favourite*, especially chapters 3-5.
[38] Constantijn Huygens, *Journaal van Constantijn Huygens, den zoon, van 21 October 1688 tot 2 Sept. 1686* (2 vols, Utrecht, 1876-7), i, pp.96-102. Diary entries for 20, 25 and 30 March 1689. Referenced by D. Onnekink in 'Mynheer Bentinck now rules over us: the First Earl of Portland and the Re-emergence of the English Favourite, 1689-99', *English Historical Review,* 121/492 (2006), p.699.
[39] Letter from Sunderland to Portland, September 13 1694. NUL, PwA 1243.

parties.'[40] However, in practice, Portland was more willing to work and to be seen to work within the framework of a party system. It was Portland who in 1692 interviewed Sir William Trumbull for the post of Secretary of State, judging his suitability against the party affiliation criteria in whose formulation Nottingham was concerned that Sunderland was involved.[41] Portland's known influence with the king along with his relative approachability came closest to providing an effective substitute for the greater monarchical accessibility of Charles II's reign.

Sunderland was adept at using the influence of Portland to gain access to the king. He had written to Portland in May 1692 to reestablish contact with the court and offer his services to the king.[42] Over the course of the next year, the Earl oversaw the shaping and coordination of the predominantly Whig administration which was responsible for the king's business in parliament between 1693 and 1698. The extent of Sunderland's influence, together with the nature of his methods, provides a strong contrast with that of his predecessor, Carmarthen. Both used the skills and practices they had employed in the reign of Charles II for the twofold, and, in their estimation, complementary, purposes of serving the monarch and furthering their own interests. However, Sunderland's means of operation recognised more fully the importance of party and attempted to incorporate its manipulation. His model for the means by which the King's ministry was to attain its aims was transitional: it recognised the dominance of party within Parliament, but still retained at its core the concept that a

[40] Portland letter to Nottingham August 27 1691. HMC, *Finch*, iii, p.211. Quoted in Onnekink, *Anglo- Dutch Favourite*, p.129.
[41] Trumbull Diary, February 26 and March 5 1692. BL Add. MS 52279 (unfoliated). Quoted in Horwitz, *Parliament*, p.77.
[42] Sunderland letter to Portland May 16 1692. NUL, PwA 1210.

minister's power derived ultimately from the monarch rather than Parliament. The next stage of the transition, taken on by Harley and Walpole, recognised to an even greater degree the importance of parliamentary party as the power base of a minister, albeit a power base which still needed to be sanctioned by the monarch. In contrast, the foundation of Carmarthen's and Sunderland's influence was built upon their personal relation with the monarch. They used their position and access to the king, however limited, to assert their political authority in Parliament. They were not leaders of a party. Instead, they regarded themselves as the monarch's advisers whose success would be assessed by their ability to direct the king's interest in Parliament.

Carmarthen portrayed himself as the king's natural advisor. He had held the position of Lord Treasurer in the reign of Charles II and regarded his suitability for that position after 1688 as self-evident. Carmarthen's rival Halifax considered in 1689 that he 'did not ask things as favours but as his right.'[43] Carmarthen himself proclaimed that 'No pretender can claim an equall share in his (William's) service.'[44] The basis of that assumption seems to have revolved around his previous experience, extensive landholdings, personal connections and early support for the Revolution. He regarded one of his main tasks as advising the king on the allocation of place, and, unsurprisingly, recommended candidates who were loyal to his interest. Halifax 'said Lord Danby did never speak of anything (to William) but to recommend men.'[45] He headed a following connected by ties of family, geography, and shared High Church beliefs. Part of this grouping was relied upon to effect the King's business in

[43] Savile, *Life,* ii, p.210.
[44] Browning, *Danby,* ii, p.117.
[45] Savile, *Life,* ii, p.210.

Parliament; its nature was recorded in a series of memoranda either made by or for Carmarthen relating to the years 1690-2 listing members of the Houses of Parliament and their likely voting intentions.[46] Carmarthen's followers, together with place holders loyal to the new regime, formed what his biographer, Andrew Browning, termed 'a loose confederation' of around one hundred members.[47] Efforts to fashion this grouping into a coherent voting bloc were hardly thorough: the King was encouraged to speak to MPs if he saw them at the races at Newmarket, whilst 'some (army officers) may bee discourst by the Lord Ranelagh, but the Lord Colchester is above it .'[48]

There were substantial defects with this loose grouping as a means of achieving the court's aims in Parliament. William did not hide the equivocal nature of his support for Carmarthen- for example he mentioned to Savile that: 'as for my Lord Danby he knew not what to make of him.' [49] The grouping also lacked both a formal structure to marshal voters and, in Carmarthen's opinion, access to sufficient funding to influence voting behaviour- he had been disappointed that William had placed the Treasury in Commission rather than appointing him to its head.[50] Other weaknesses related to the constituents of the grouping- the ability to form a working administration was not helped by the unwillingness of many

[46] These are listed in Browning, *Danby*, iii, pp.173-9.
[47] Browning, *Danby*, iii, p. 173.
[48] BL Add. MS 2809, fos.149-53. The same document states that 'The officers of the army are to be spoken to by the king' and 'Some of the Somersetshire men discontented. To be set right by the Lord Fitzharding.'
[49] Savile, *Life*, ii, p.206.
[50] Carmarthen, in Halifax's opinion, believed the Treasury to be worth £20000 a year to its First Lord. Savile, *Life*, ii, p.63. In Charles II's reign John Ferris has demonstrated how the Treasury was the main conduit through which funds were allocated to MPs. For example, Ferris described how Sir Philip Warwick, the secretary to the Treasury, 'kept a little book with the names of 50 MPs in receipt of Secret Service money.' J. Ferris, 'Official Members in the Commons, 1660-1690: A Study in Multiple Loyalties', in J. Morrill et al. (eds.), *Public Duty and Private Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England* (Oxford, 1993), p.302.

potential ministers to serve. The threat of parliamentary impeachment or the restoration of James II made the holding of ministerial position a potentially dangerous occupation: for example, Halifax was told by Lord Godolphin in 1690 that 'he would do all that was possible to avoid imployment at the king's return.'[51] Shrewsbury's use of multiple ailments to avoid or to extricate himself from office were especially pronounced in the early years of the reign when the political situation was most volatile. In addition, the list of Carmarthen's supporters is dominated by House of Lords members rather than those of the lower House. In the Commons, those representatives did not always possess sufficient technical or oratorical skills to facilitate the king's business. The Paymaster General for the Army, the Earl of Ranelagh, had not been able to provide in the early years of the reign the figures asked for by the House of Commons to justify the Court's requests for supply funding. For example, in 1689, he gave this somewhat vague response to a question relating to the amounts required to finance the army:

> I hope, that, by virtue of my memory, you will not put me to give account of every foot of things. When, the last session, the Account was called for, the charge was £1,700,000l. Per ann. Whether it was wrong cast up may soon be found out…we all know the Muster-rolls are not complete.[52]

Such lack of clarity played into the hands of MPs suspicious of the ultimate destination of the funds raised through Parliament. The weakness of Ranelagh's arguments only contributed to the parliamentary delay in agreeing to supply measures.[53] Even more importantly, the grouping ignored the Whig-Tory axis around which parliamentary voting

[51] Savile, August 24 1690, *Life,* ii, p.206.
[52] Cobbett, *Parliamentary History,* v, p.438.
[53] 'The long procedures and deliberations of Parliament are driving me crazy.' William letter to Heinsius, November 1690. *Archives et correspondances,* III, i, p.126.

revolved. Reliance upon connections made outside Parliament to affect voting behaviour within it did not take adequate notice of the structure of the House of Commons.

Turning to Sunderland represented a major volte-face on William's part and is probably a recognition by the king of the difficulty which he was encountering in finding a means of working with Parliament. In conversation with Halifax in 1689, his attitude to James II's Lord President and Secretary of State had been different: 'Hee shewed mee Lord Sunderland his letter, and spoke of him with great contempt.'[54] It was also risky, associating the king with a character whose religious vacillation and seeming complete lack of principle during James II's reign made him a subject of suspicion and ridicule. At least Sunderland had, to William, the advantage of the necessity of loyalty- he had no party to support him.

The core of Sunderland's parliamentary practice was 'the need to make all his (William's) servants of a piece, and put his business into a method.'[55] The main planks of this method were: the employment of the organisational and ministerial talent of the Whig party to increase the likelihood of parliamentary approval for court sanctioned measures; the careful planning of parliamentary business; and the use of the resource of place and financial inducement to its maximum effect. Policy making remained the remit of the king, but its implementation rested with Sunderland and the Whig Junto. A limited Tory

[54] Savile, *Life,* ii, p.209.
[55] Letter from Sunderland to Portland, July 13 1694. NUL, PwA 1238. The belief that improved organisation was likely to improve chances of parliamentary approval for the king's policies was not confined to England. A letter from Sydney and Coningsby to Portland on September 27 1690, concerning how to control the Irish Parliament, states a need for a 'number of men on whom ye king may consistently rely- joined with the speaker and they to meet privately every night.' These men should be 'rewarded afterwards.' NUL, PwA 299.

involvement was maintained to prevent the monarch's total dependence upon the Whig party.[56]

Sunderland himself had many qualities which enabled him to be the focal point of the court's attempts to push its agenda through Parliament. Not least of these was a keen eye for the possible and an appreciation of the main obstacles to its achievement, as his statement of his initial goals in 1693 demonstrated: 'if under all the ill circumstances of the King's affairs, his business can be set right, without doing anything dishonourable, anything that interferes between Whig and Tory, or that shall lessen the prerogative, I think he ought to be satisfied and approve of all. I hope to keep within these bounds.'[57] An emphasis upon practical expediency enabled him to calculate what was possible politically and to persuade others of a more dogmatic nature to bow to his judgement. Sunderland's influence may account for why William eventually allowed the Triennial Act to pass in 1694- persuaded that it was worthwhile if it facilitated the entry of Shrewsbury into the Junto.[58] He regarded politics as a business, writing for example in 1693 to Portland concerning the construction of a House of Commons which would be more favourable to the king's interests: 'Our great Project goes on beyond Expectation.'[59] Sunderland was helped by his lack of binding ties to specific individuals, groupings or indeed policies other than those of the king.[60] He knew everyone's price and the nature of their relations with others. Gentlemanly courtesy on his

[56] Godolphin, for example, retained his position at the Treasury until 1696.
[57] Letter from Sunderland to Portland, July 10 1693. NUL, PwA 1222.
[58] Shrewsbury had previously used William's refusal to allow the passing of a Triennial Act as a major reason for his not accepting office.
[59] Letter from Sunderland to Portland, April 25 1693. NUL, PwA 1211.
[60] Sunderland 'said once to me that a Commonwealth would be very well, if it could be had.' Savile, May 1691, *Life*, ii, p.46.

part often masked a brutally simple analysis of motivation: 'I shall soon know on what terms Jack Grenvile is to be had' is how he described one parliamentary recipient of monetary bribes.[61] His self-confidence, durability and optimism persuaded others to follow him. Sunderland's home at Althorp became a centre of the court's attempts to control activity within Parliament. He was pivotal in the allocation of place. Together with Guy, Trenchard and Somers, he 'looked over and considered the list of Parliament men, and agreed upon the best means of persuading them to be reasonable.'[62]

Despite widespread internal distrust, not least occasioned by the presence of Sunderland himself, the Junto managed to effect 'the king's business' in Parliament successfully for nearly five years.[63] Sunderland brought together a grouping whose abilities were necessary for the successful implementation of government policy: Guy, the 'captain of the pensioners,' whose knowledge of and position at the Treasury facilitated financial payments to MPs;[64] Montagu, whose financial knowledge and ability to communicate that knowledge were essential to winning over the House in matters relating to supply; and Somers, whose legal expertise enabled challenges to governmental policy through the law courts to be more

[61] Letter from Sunderland to Portland, April 25 1693. NUL, PwA 1211.
[62] Letter from Sunderland to Portland, May 3 1693. NUL, PwA 1212. The letter, having discussed which MPs should be bribed, and who should negotiate the transaction, states … 'the strongest arguments are such as they may not use.' This implies that both donor and recipient know the nature of the transaction- ie a bribe- but that even when discussing it between themselves, the exact details needed to be kept secret. It is therefore unsurprising that outside observers found little evidence of payment chains.
[63] 'I am sensible what a disadvantageous character people lay under, who are said to be recommended by my Lord Sunderland, and I wished people would make more candid judgements, since there are but few now in employment, that had not his help in obtaining them, at least, he pretending that they owe him that obligation.' Vernon, *Letters*, ii, p.218.
[64] The phrase appears in a letter from Sir Charles Lyttleton to Christopher Hatton dated November 9 1693: 'I heare they are very sharp to discover ye pensioners, which, for a jest, they say that Harry Guy is made captain of.' *Correspondence of the Family of Hatton*, *being chiefly letters addressed to Christopher, First Viscount Hatton, A.D. 1601-1704,* ed. E.M. Thompson (2 vols, London, 1878), ii, p.199.

effectively combated. The scale and complexity of the financial needs of the court and its dependence upon Parliament for funding necessitated the employment of individuals with specialist, technical skills to formulate and defend government policy. The Junto ministry possessed these to a degree which the Carmarthen ministry did not. Sunderland also included within the ministry individuals who possessed talents which were more akin to those prioritised by Carmarthen. Shrewsbury's influence upon the formulation of policy and its day-to-day implementation seems to have been limited. For example, a letter from James Vernon to Shrewsbury as Secretary of State concerning the Rose Club revealed a significant lack of either interest in or knowledge of parliamentary detail: 'I can't satisfy your Grace what the rates and duties are that must raise this year's supply. I take it for granted the whole is concerted… and the scheme is opened by degrees at the club, as it is necessary to bring it on to a conclusion.'[65] Shrewsbury's letters to Portland are devoid of advice on policy but instead concentrate upon the merits of candidates for place. His importance to the ministry rested upon William's trust, his ability to provide a bridge between the more ideologically fervent Whig ministers and the king, and his connections. His inclusion is a demonstration of how Sunderland attempted to use the traditional ministerial model based upon connection rather than party and adapted it to changing circumstances.

Sunderland's enhanced influence coincided with William's decision to move away from a policy of attempting balance between the parties. The court became dependent upon Whig support and organisation. This party's members supported the court's agenda in Parliament

[65] Vernon, *Letters,* i, p.83.

consistently in the period between 1693-97. It was a marriage of convenience on both sides. In exchange for dominance of ministerial positions and the resultant influence over policy and the allocation of patronage, the Whig Party placed its internal apparatus at the disposal of the court. The organisation of this grouping- the regular meetings of both its ministers and its MPs- was based along Whig party lines. Junto ministers met together at Althorp and attended the gatherings of Whig MPs at the Rose Club, which acted as a forum for the formulation of policy and tactics: 'They meet almost every night, and settle what they will propose, and how manage it.. They did so last night to near the number of fifty, and agreed to all the resolutions that were taken this day about the coin, so that it went smoothly.'[66] Although it was a grouping which was enacting court sanctioned policies, Whig members' primary allegiance remained to their party. Unity was initially maintained despite support for measures which were highly contentious to many Whigs- the impeachment of Fenwick for example on the evidence of a single witness was reminiscent of the questionable judicial treatment of the Whig Martyrs during the Exclusion Crisis. The inability to push through a more concerted Whig agenda, along with the continued influence of Sunderland, was a source of discontent to more ideologically committed Whigs such as Wharton and Montagu. When combined with the attempt by Junto ministers to implement the court's highly unpopular policy on the size of the peacetime Standing Army, these divisions led to the collapse of the ministry. Sunderland's hybrid model which attempted to use the power of the Whig party for the benefit of the king without leading to the monarch's complete

[66] Vernon to Shrewsbury, October 26 1696. Vernon, *Letters,* i, p.30. Vernon regularly refers to the Rose Club members as 'they', a distancing which had disappeared by 1699: 'We are endeavouring to save ourselves by setting up the Rose Club.' Vernon, *Letters*, ii, p.258.

subservience to that party was unable to survive. For many, it came to impose an unacceptable degree of subjugation of Whig principles to the requirements of the monarch.

The allocation of patronage and monetary inducement was considered a core element in the application of 'better method' to the task of achieving greater support for court policies in Parliament. Its distributors and recipients, together with commentators upon the practice, were all convinced of the powerful effect which such inducements possessed. This section will look at the means by which Sunderland and the Junto attempted to coordinate the allocation of patronage with the aims of the ministry. It will also consider the reasons why the effect of such measures may have been overestimated by contemporary critics of the Whig ministry.

It is difficult to know the extent of the scale of the use of monetary bribes to MPs. Part of the problem relates to the uncertainty of knowing the precise source(s) within the government's finances from which payments were made. Compared to the very specific detailing in Charles II's reign of the recipients of court favour as well as the amounts they received, critics of the practice of monetary bribery in William's reign, although convinced of its existence, had considerable difficulty providing particular instances of its use.[67] Focus often centred on the entries for Secret Service payments in Exchequer records and ministers were regularly asked to make an account of payments from this source in the House of Commons. In 1691, Thomas Wharton, replying to the House on behalf of William Jephson, the Secretary

[67] For example, the *Flagellum Parliamentarium,* attributed to Andrew Marvell*,* cites multiple Members who 'had a lick of the bribe-pot.' Some of the specific sums mentioned as being granted in return for votes are small- Thomas Morrice, said to be under the 'pay of Bribe-Master Clifford,' received £50.

to the Treasury, said that 'No sum of Money was paid, but what was very justifiable.' He quoted Jephson as saying that only two MPs had been paid from the account, and that was for 'discoveries.'[68] Sir John Lowther, speaking for the government in the same debate, expressed the opinion that 'it is a great fault in allowing so little Money for Secret Service.'[69] He continued by stating that Oliver Cromwell had received a larger allocation, and that this had been completely appropriate. The investigating House of Commons committee was unimpressed: Thomas Clarges, one of its commissioners, complained that 'there was very ill management in the accounts so that it is impossible to give you a clear account.'[70] However, no further action was taken. The issue was raised again in 1693, when the new Secretary to the Treasury, Henry Guy, in line with the seemingly greater transparency exhibited by the Junto ministry, provided to the Public Accounts Committee appointed by the House of Commons a list of recipients of Secret Service monies together with amounts paid and reasons for payment. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there seemed to be no suspicious payments to MPs.[71]

To a different audience, Guy was telling a different story. In a letter to Portland in June 1693, Sunderland wrote that 'The Speaker, Guy, and myself, have done a great deal to persuade men to serve the king, and I think with good success…I need not tell you the particulars of what will suffice, such as are to have money, but I can assure you it will come within

[68] Grey, *Debates*, x, p.199.
[69] Ibid., p.193.
[70] Luttrell, *Parliamentary Diary*, December 3 1691, p.60.
[71] CJ, xi, December 9 1693. The largest amount paid was to Sir John Trevor 'for equipage and allowance as speaker.'

compass.'[72] On June 27th, Sunderland wrote to Portland that the 'Earl Stamford and other Lords must have money.'[73] Sunderland followed up on 28 July of the same year with a letter to Portland stating that 'what Guy wrote to him concerning money is absolutely necessary.'[74] Many of the funds may have come from the Privy Purse which was controlled by Portland. Total payments from this source were loosely monitored and increased substantially during the reign, from £9/- in 1689 to £23/- in 1693, £68500 in 1695 and nearly £200/- in 1697.[75] Much of the increase will have related to war expenditures and the expenses of moving the king's household each year- the amount decreased sharply again after 1697 to £83000 in 1698 and 1699. Nevertheless, this was still far above the levels seen at the start of the reign. The problem lies with the lack of availability of information regarding the ultimate destination of funds after they had left the Treasury (usually in round figure amounts such as £500 or £1000) and been distributed by the Privy Purse. Occasionally, other sources provide indications of the destination of the funds- for example Huygens's letters reveal that the travel expenses of Job de Wildt, secretary of the Amsterdam navy, were paid from this source when he visited England.[76] But often the trail is frustratingly blank. In contrast to Andrew Marvell's very overt naming and shaming, Charlwood Lawton in 1693 proclaimed

[72] Letter from Sunderland to Portland, June 20 1693. NUL, PwA 1217.
[73] Letter from Sunderland to Portland, June 20 1693. NUL, PwA 1217.
[74] Letter from Sunderland to Portland, July 28 1693. NUL, PwA 1224.
[75] Onnekink, *Anglo- Dutch Favourite*, p.100, based on *Calendar of Treasury Book* figures for each year.
[76] 'Die middag sondt mijn equipagie en bagage weg met die van Privy Purse.' Huygens, *Journaal*, i, June 6 1690, p.279.

that he 'once thought to have affix't to this Paper a List of those... bought off', but refrained from doing so.[77]

Parliament itself had much difficulty in proving wrongdoing. Guy, the 'captain of the pensioners,' was never brought to trial for his involvement in the practice of bribery. He was forced to resign his office as Secretary to the Treasury in 1695 because of his involvement in financial wrongdoing relating to subsistence money paid to soldiers billeted at Royston.[78] Even here, after a brief spell in the Tower, Guy was released and allowed to choose his successor, William Lowndes. Parliament had much greater success in its investigations of corrupt practices elsewhere: its inquiries into the monetary inducements relating to the affairs of the East India Company and the relief of London orphans produced more spectacular results in terms of both members implicated and amounts involved.[79] It is difficult to find an informed, impartial opinion on the extent of MPs' taking of bribes. Perhaps James Vernon came closest. As Secretary of State in 1697 he wrote to Shrewsbury,

> your Grace knows better than anybody of what consequence it is to the public service, that the Secretaries may now and then have interest enough to recommend a worthy person,..., they must otherwise make but an insignificant figure, if they have no other way of gratifying people, but out of the King's small allowance for secret service.[80]

The ability of monetary inducement to influence parliamentary voting behaviour seems to have been overestimated by contemporary observers. Sunderland's demonstration in his

[77] Charlwood Lawton, *A Short state of our present condition, with relation to the present Parliament* (London, 1693), p.2. The lack of specific detail may also partly reflect Lawton's greater fear of the potential legal consequences of such an action.
[78] Childs, *British Army*, p.50.
[79] The East India Company, for example, was accused of spending nearly £200,000 to influence MPs' voting behaviour. Horwitz, *Parliament*, pp.149-51.
[80] Letter from James Vernon to Shrewsbury, August 23 1698. Vernon, *Letters*, ii, p.156.

letters to Portland of his complete control of the process and its consequences was designed to display his influence. Other evidence would suggest that the effect was modest: the state of government finances prohibited substantial payments- Somers complained that he could not even find money to pay two reliable Jacobite spies in 1695;[81] the mechanisms for effecting payment were increasingly monitored; and MPs risked loss of reputation if caught.

The scale and implications of the allocation of place to bolster ministerial measures in what came to be known as 'the office holder's Parliament' of 1690-95 are easier to analyse. Whereas Sunderland and Guy were often vague in their correspondence about the amounts and direction of monetary inducements, it was less easy to hide the identity of the beneficiaries of the allocation of place. For example, in 1694 the Junto administration promoted six Whigs to the Excise Commission including two Whig MPs, Edward Clarke and Foot Onslow, to fill the places of those removed for either their Tory leanings or ineptitude.[82] The appointments were coordinated by Sunderland in the face of opposition from both William and the Tory first Lord of the Treasury, Sidney Godolphin. Sunderland informed Portland that 'if those commissions are not changed .. it was to no purpose to do anything else.'[83] Although the need for a 'better method' was behind the allocation of place to members of both Houses of Parliament, it is interesting that Sunderland's correspondence to Portland is dominated by the allocation of patronage to members of the House of Lords, and not the Commons. In the letter of 20 June, 1693 in which he states, 'I will not tell you the

[81] Letter from Somers to Portland, May 28 1695. NUL, PwA 1177.
[82] Horwitz, *Parliament*, p.134.
[83] Letter from Sunderland to Portland, July 13 1694. NUL, PwA 1238.

particulars of what will suffice, such as are to have money, but I can assure you it will come within compass,' the only individuals named are the Earls of Mulgrave, Bath and Brandon, and they are to receive honours and places.[84] In the following months, there is a series of letters from Sunderland to Portland concerning the rewards to be offered to the Earls of Bath and Mulgrave.[85] It may be that there is an informal responsibility for the allocation of money and patronage between Sunderland and Guy- Sunderland to deal with the Lords and Guy with the Commons. But this seems unlikely- Sunderland himself occasionally reports on Guy's allocations of money to Portland, whilst Guy's seventeen letters to Portland maintained in the Portland Archive give only one reference to allocations of place or money.[86] As a means of facilitating the passage of measures through the House of Commons this seems an error on Sunderland's part. Sunderland lamented 'the trouble of dealing with abundance of people of all sorts.'[87] Notions of hierarchy were perhaps interfering with the most efficient allocation of place along with an incorrect assessment of the relative importance of Commons and Lords.

Another reason why the importance of the allocation of patronage was probably exaggerated relates to the lack of places available relative to the number of petitioners. Edward Clarke, one of the MPs appointed to the Excise Commission in 1694, reckoned 'no less than twenty Parliament men in a day' spoke to him 'for some or other that they have to

[84] Letter from Sunderland to Portland, June 20 1693. NUL, PwA 1217.
[85] Letters from Sunderland to Portland, July 10, August 1 and 21 1693. NUL, PwA 1222, 1225 and 1230.
[86] To increase secrecy, the identities of individuals under consideration for reward are usually encoded.
[87] Letter from Sunderland to Portland, October 11 1694. NUL, PwA 1244.

recommend.' [88] Even Sir Henry Hobart, the main coordinator of the Rose Club, was disappointed in his attempt to gain the place in the Excise Commission which he had been promised in return for his exemplary behaviour- Sunderland had offered it elsewhere.[89] The promise of preferment could be more important in influencing behaviour than its actual bestowal. Additionally, the dangers of disappointing the unsuccessful were potentially as great as the benefits from the granting of place: Sunderland, stressing the need to give Mulgrave what he wanted, stated, 'two or three bad angry men will spoil what many others cannot mend.'[90]

Between 1693 and the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697, the House of Commons voted as the court desired on major issues despite significant economic problems associated with the cost of war. Record amounts of supply were granted, attacks on military tactics abated, and parliament's function as a court of law was turned to the monarch's advantage to achieve the judicial conviction of Sir John Fenwick. Parliamentary consent was encouraged by military success- in particular the capture of Namur and the abatement of merchant shipping losses made possible by the constant presence of the fleet in the Mediterranean. In turn, that success led to the enhanced prospect of a satisfactory peace with France. But parliamentary support for the king's measures was also partly occasioned by more effective utilisation of the resources available to ministers to influence Parliament's behaviour.

[88] Letter from Edward Clarke to John Spreat, 16 January 1699, quoted in Mark Knights, 'Edward Clarke (1650-1710)', *HOP 1690-1715*.
[89] David Hayton, 'Sir Henry Hobart (c.1657-98)', *HOP 1690-1715*.
[90] Letter from Sunderland to Portland, June 20 1693. NUL, PwA 1217.

Parliament's improved compliance in the period between 1693 and 1697 can best be illustrated by the significant increases in the amounts of military supply which it sanctioned together with the speed with which those grants were authorized. In 1689, Parliament had voted to supply the king with finance to raise an army of 49,238 men for the land campaigns of the following year. This figure had remained the same in 1690 but had fallen to 48,828 in 1691 and 40,763 in 1692.[91] The transfer of ministerial responsibility to the Whig Junto coincided with a significant increase in the size of the army approved by Parliament: 68,725 men in 1693 and 66,148 in 1695 and 1696.[92] The monetary sums required in order to fund such an increase were significant. The total bill for the financing of the army and navy in 1691 was £3.4m. This figure had risen to nearly £5m in 1695.[93] To put such numbers in context, the total size of the economy in the late 1690s has been estimated at approximately £50m.[94] In addition, the voting of supply was achieved more precipitately, allowing William to begin preparations for his campaigns earlier: the increase of twenty thousand men which the King sought in December 1693 for the following year's campaign season was passed without a division.[95] It is unsurprising that Queen Mary felt able to write in her Memoirs for 1693 that 'things go pretty well, far beyond what could be hoped.'[96] In 1695, supply had already been approved by 14 December and the Commons began its deliberations on the Ways and

[91] Childs, *British army*, pp.102-3.
[92] Ibid., p.103.
[93] Horwitz, *Parliament,* p.162.
[94] S. Broadberry et al., *British Economic Growth, 1270-1870* (Cambridge, 2015), p.201.
[95] Grey, *Debates,* December 11-15 1693*,* x, pp.358-64.
[96] Mary, *Memoirs*, p.61.

Means of supply on the 18th December.[97] In 1696, the maintenance of an army of 87,000 men in 1697 was agreed in the House of Commons by 223 votes to 67 on the 4th November.[98]

The method required to achieve approval for such increases was based upon improved techniques of organisation and explanation in addition to those of financial inducement. The Junto was able to field specialists with the oratorical skills useful in persuading Members of the House to vote with them. Charles Montagu became the ministry's principal manager in the House. The Marquis of Halifax described how 'When with Underling Members he's pleased to carouse/ He modestly tells them he governs the House.'[99] In addition to his proficiency in financial matters, he marshalled the forces in favour of Fenwick's attainder, frequently intervening to guide the course of proceedings in the House of Commons. His management was achieved through a combination of debating skills and understanding of often complex issues. In contrast to the Earl of Ranelagh's previously mentioned imperfect knowledge of military finance and its usage, the House of Commons came to be furnished with much more detailed breakdowns of how funds were to be spent. For example, amongst the Portland papers at the University of Nottingham there is an exact copy of the information which was also provided to the House of Commons to justify the £480, 614.6.3d cost of the twenty-six new regiments which Parliament agreed to finance in 1693. The cost is broken

[97] CJ, x, December 14 1695.
[98] CJ, xi, November 4 1696.
[99] George, Marquis of Halifax, *The Clubmen of the House of Commons,* BL Harleian MS 7315, fo.237.

down in great detail: the size and components of each regiment are delineated, together with the cost of financing each soldier.[100]

Confusion- The multiple Influences on MPs' behaviour

The ability of the Junto Ministry to coordinate the voting activities of the Commons in its favour was never complete. Previous sections have looked at the motivations and methods of the king and his ministers in their attempts to influence voting patterns within the House of Commons. This section will look at the reasons why MPs often did not respond in the hoped-for manner, particularly after the Peace of Ryswick, even if inducements were offered.

The wishes of the court regularly collided with multiple conflicting influences upon MPs. In the previous reign, the voting behaviour of John Hervey, MP for the Cinque Ports and Treasurer to Charles II's consort, encapsulated the problems of divided loyalties. Having voted against the Court once, Hervey voted with the Danby ministry in a subsequent division. This change of voting direction caught Charles II's attention: 'You were not against me today,' to which Hervey replied, 'No, Sire, I was against my conscience today.'[101] This conflict of loyalties continued to afflict MPs throughout the period. Sir Richard Cocks, in his first speech to the House of Commons, opposed the maintenance of a substantial standing army in 1698, stating that, 'I am guided by reason not party.'[102] The claims of party were significant, as the work of Burton has shown.[103] But the claims of individual conscience did not always

[100] 'A calculation of the costs involved in raising and maintaining 26 new regiments for one year;' n.d. [c. 1692]. NUL, PwA 2391.
[101] Quoted in Ferris, 'Official Members', p.280.
[102] Cocks, *Parliamentary Diary,* January 4 1699, p.1.
[103] Referring to what voting patterns reveal about the consistency of MPs' party alignment, Burton wrote that 'The correlation between the Grascombe list (of 1693-4) and the 1696 classification is therefore 92%.' Burton

direct MPs to vote along party lines. After the Peace of Ryswick, when the policy of the Whig Junto ministry was sufficiently divergent from that of Whig MPs, many of the party's members voted according to their individual consciences. Earlier in the reign, the Grascombe list of MPs from 1693-4 includes nineteen members who are designated as holding an office or pension and yet are not listed as Court supporters.[104] Just as there was a small number of office-holding MPs such as Ranelagh and Blathwayt who voted as consistently with the government as the 'lawn sleeve' bishops in the Upper House, there were also place holders who regularly ignored the influence of office upon their voting behaviour. In the 1696 Board of Trade Division List for example, three army officers- Granville, Erle and Belasyse- voted with the opposition.[105]

Pressure on voting behaviour from local and regional influences could also be significant. In 1690, Paul Foley, despite his strong support for the Revolution, was only narrowly returned to Parliament by voters in his constituency of Hereford who had resolved 'to choose no man that had given his vote to destroy them' after his support for the repeal of the Corporation Act.[106] His fellow Whig candidate in Hereford lost his seat on the same issue. Both Guy and Harley considered that MPs from the West Country would vote as a bloc: they were loosely managed by Sir Hugh Pollard who regularly entertained to dinner the 124 MPs whose constituencies were in the region.[107] The surviving 1690s diaries and journals of MPs are

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et al., 'Political Parties in the Reigns of William III and Anne: The Evidence of Division Lists', *BIHR,* 41 special supplement 7 (1968), p.31.

[104] 'Grascombe list', Oxford, Bodleian MS Rawlinson, D846, fos.1-5.

[105] Burton, *List*, p.11.

[106] Nottingham letter to Lord Hatton, February 15 1690. BL Add. MS 29594, fo.196.

[107] Henry Guy letter to Robert Harley, November 2 1697. HMC *Report on the manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland Preserved at Welbeck abbey* (10 vols, London, 1891-1931), iii, p.592.

interesting for their demonstration of the limited range of social contacts which some MPs kept. Roger Whitley, one of the MPs for Chester during the reign, recorded his visits to London for parliamentary sessions. He never seems to have dined with any other MPs apart from a small number of other North-Western MPs and his concerns remained predominantly with the local politics of Cheshire.[108] At the start of the reign, the infrequency of parliamentary meetings in the previous decade meant that MPs were naturally more acquainted with events in their localities and parliamentary managers were unused to dealing with them. This changed gradually. As John Toland wrote in 1698, 'The necessity we have lain under of frequent meetings of Parliament during the War, has taught our Managers so much dexterity and address in their applications to the Members of that Assembly, that they have now become consummate Masters in the most detestable art of corrupting our Representatives, by hopes and fears of attaining or losing Offices and Preferments.'[109] But the regularity of contact by the end of the reign between Ministers and MPs can be exaggerated. It is only in 1699 that the Whig Secretary of State, James Vernon, mentions for the first time his plans to meet with MPs: 'I write this in the morning, because I shall have some members to dine with me.'[110] Robert Harley only started to have regular meetings with MPs in 1703.[111]

In the face of these multiple influences on MPs' voting behaviour, a ministry's ability to enforce loyalty by withdrawing the benefits of place could be limited. Sir Walter Yonge, MP

[108] *The Diary of Roger Whitley, 1684-1697*. Oxford, Bodleian MS English History, C711, 1689 and 1695-7 passim.
[109] John Toland, *The Danger of Mercenary Parliaments* (London, 1698), p.5.
[110] Letter from James Vernon to Shrewsbury, November 30 1699. Vernon, *Letters,* ii, p.370.
[111] G. Holmes, *British Politics in the Age of Anne* (London, 1987), p.352.

for Honiton and Commissioner for Customs between 1694 and 1701, voted with the opposition in the debate over the Wine Duties bill- his allegiance to the ministry was overridden by the desire to protect his West Country constituents from the increased textile tariffs from Spain and Portugal which the measure was likely to cause.[112] The King was so incensed by Yonge's behaviour that he demanded that he lose his place. Shrewsbury and Somers, appreciating the multiple calls on an MP's loyalty, intervened on his behalf, stating that a single infringement did not merit eviction.[113] He retained his place. Peregrine Bertie was even more lightly treated, maintaining his post despite voting against the court on multiple occasions through the reign.[114]

The success of the Court's efforts to win support in the House of Commons between 1693 and 1697 for the financing required to provide military forces in line with its estimation of needs provides a strong contrast with the situation which prevailed after the Peace of Ryswick. In January 1698, Harley was able to take the lead in the House of Commons and propose an uncontested motion that all troops raised since 1680 should be disbanded. The establishment for the following year was reduced still further to seven thousand men.

The main reason for this removal of support related to the widespread belief in the House of Commons that a large standing army in times of peace was unnecessary. Burnet thought 'the disbanding the army had rendered the members, who promoted it, very popular to the

[112] Andrew Hanham, 'Sir Walter Yonge (1653-1731)', *HOP 1690-1715*.
[113] Somers letter to Shrewsbury, April 24 1697. Talbot, *Correspondence*, p.478.
[114] In the Grascombe list of 1693, he was cited as an office-holder who did not support the court. Bodleian, MS Rawlinson, D846, fos.1-5.

nation.'[115] Extra-parliamentary pressure, such as that attempted to be exerted by the author of 'The Black List' of 1701 which listed the MPs who were considered unpatriotic as a result of their refusal to sanction war with France, was sometimes so strong and so consistent with the position of the majority of MPs that it cut across Whig-Tory party lines to make the monarch's position untenable.[116] No amount of financial inducement or offer of place could compensate for lack of support for the king's measures.

The severity of the defeat was aided by missteps on the part of all of the components of the king's ministry. William failed to persuade the House of Commons that the threat posed by Louis XIV necessitated the continued existence of a large standing army. Although convinced that 'They (the French) have made no change to their troops, on the contrary they have increased them,' he completely neglected to provide evidence to the House for this view.[117] Instead, he attempted to preserve his establishment by means which contradicted his own maxim of the necessity of trust between monarch and Parliament. He sought to hide army troops either as marines or in Ireland: 'I think I have found a means to keep my regiment of dragoons,.., As soon as ever Parliament closes, I shall make preparations for sending it to Ireland'.[118] When this was discovered, it unsurprisingly increased Parliament's lack of trust in the motives of the monarch. Portland was no longer serving as intermediary between William and his ministry, having lost favour to Albemarle, whose ability to advise William on

[115] Burnet, *History*, iv, p.422.
[116] Bodleian, MS Rawlinson, D918, fo.165.
[117] 'ils n'ont fait auqu'une reforme parmi leurs trouppes, au contraire augment.' In response to this threat, William believed he would be able to persuade Parliament to maintain the finance for an army of 30000 men. Wiilliam letter to Bentinck, November 8 1697. *Letters of William III en Portland,* iii, p.133.
[118] William letter to Portland, March 22 1698. *Letters of William III and Louis XIV and their ministers*, i, p.322.

English parliamentary issues seems to have been limited. Sunderland also had withdrawn from involvement in the Ministry. He attempted to turn the disarray to his own advantage; in a letter which typically exaggerated his own importance, he stated, 'If I were among you, in the same condition I was two months ago, I could influence men, whose condition and dependence are quite changed; but as I am, I cannot influence at all.'[119] Other ministers also, in William's words, thought 'only of saving and supporting themselves.'[120] Somers even refused to write the king's speech to Parliament in 1700 - as a consequence no speech was delivered. Internal unity and communication within the Whig ministry collapsed. Letters between Portland and Sunderland ceased- Sunderland described Portland as 'so dull an animal that he can neither fetch nor carry'- and the Rose Club also stopped meeting.[121]

War with France had acted as a means of unifying a nation which on many other issues was deeply divided. This very quickly became apparent after the Peace of Ryswick. Whig and Tory parties had agreed that a monarchy was necessary, but the two parties disagreed concerning the form which monarchy should take. Each attempted to assert their vision of its form by controlling both king and Parliament. The manner in which Robert Harley voiced his concern over William's attempts to maintain a sizeable standing army was characteristic of the way in which politicians believed that they knew the rights and duties of the king better than the king himself. Harley declared that 'It is inconsistent with liberty and consequently

[119] Letter from Sunderland to Shrewsbury, January 25 1698. Talbot*, Correspondence,* p.526.
[120] William letter to Portland, February 18 1698. *Letters of William III and Louis XIV,* i, p.176.
[121] Kenyon, *Sunderland*, p.135. Vernon wrote to Shrewsbury on January 31, 1699, that, after a break of over a year, 'We are endeavouring to retrieve ourselves by setting up the Rose.' Vernon, *Letters*, ii, p.258.

with the honour of the King.'[122] Perhaps fortunately for the peace of the country, there was no sizeable court party in Parliament and William did not use the power of veto as a backstop to protect his interest. 'Old and worn out,' as he described himself to the French Ambassador, le duc de Tallard, William instead concentrated on guiding through Parliament measures such as the Act of Succession.[123] Harley himself was instrumental in forging the working relation between Parliament, party and monarch which took shape in the next reign. John Brewer has argued convincingly that 'The Country party preserved England from the worst excesses of the emerging fiscal-military state.'[124] Equally importantly, the lack of a coherent court party prevented the parliamentary dissension of the latter part of the reign from escalating further.

Conclusion:

There is little evidence for the existence at any time between 1689 and 1702 of a coherent court party bound together by allegiance to the monarch based upon shared beliefs and/or financial inducement. There were MPs who voted as the court desired irrespective of other motivations, whether personal or party related. But they were few in number. Better 'method' could increase the likelihood of voting behaviours moving in directions which aligned with the monarch's wishes. But the degree of court influence was exaggerated: by its detractors

[122] Salwey Winnington's notes on debates and proceedings in the House of Commons, December 23 1698-March 10 1699, quoted in D. Hayton (ed.), 'Debates in the House of Commons, 1697-99', *Camden Miscellany,* 29 (1987), p.383.
[123] Tallard letter to Louis XIV, April 11 1698. *Letters of William III and Louis XIV*, i, p.365. It is interesting that William was open about his mental and physical state to a former military opponent in a manner which he was unable to convey to any British confidante.
[124] Brewer, *Sinews of Power*, p.131.

in order to highlight its deleterious effects; and by the ministers who were its overseers to bolster their influence. The strength of that influence was more likely to be affected by events such as military success or failure and the assassination attempts upon William III. The majority of MPs were willing to voice the belief that their primary loyalty was to William and Mary as sovereign guardians of their liberties and their religion. And yet the evidence provided by Burton that voting behaviour was predominantly determined by Whig-Tory party affiliation is compelling.[125] In practice, lack of trust in the monarch to preserve their perceived liberties led MPs to vote according to their Whig or Tory affiliations, even when the direction of that vote was contrary to the monarch's stated wishes. MPs regularly voted in ways which seemed to indicate that their overriding loyalty was not to their monarch, or at least not to the individual who represented that office at the time. Votes relating to war funding were a manifestation of this. The related debates and voting patterns show how fragile trust in the Stuart-Orange regime was and how ineffectual the attempts made by the court to unify the House of Commons in line with its objectives often were. Even between 1693 and 1697, the period of greatest success for the implementation of court policy within Parliament, it was effectively the Whig party in court party clothing which was responsible for that success. Absence of a coherent court party, when combined with the widespread conviction of its existence, accounted for many of William's difficulties in implementing his policies in Parliament. Instead, an increasing consolidation of parliamentary activity along party lines occurred as Whigs and Tories attempted to assert their vision of parliamentary

[125] I.F. Burton et al., 'Political Parties in the reigns of William III and Anne: the Evidence of Division Lists', *BIHR,* 41 special supplement 7 (1968).

democracy and the monarch's place within that vision. The court was unable to fashion political debate within Parliament in the way it wished, along non-party lines. Both Tory and Whig parties' visions of the rights of their monarch differed from those of William himself. Realisation of this and lack of trust in William induced MPs to adhere to each other rather than to the court, which was regarded as an entity to be constrained and manipulated in the fashion the different parties desired. After 1697, when the external threat of France appeared to have been removed and William's inability to explain his desire to retain a sizeable standing army along with other seemingly autocratic behaviours increased fears of royal absolutism, the desire to control the monarch increasingly came to the fore. William's aspiration for the House of Commons to be a House of Trimmers under his guidance was an unachievable objective in the climate of mistrust towards monarchical ambitions which existed in England in the late seventeenth century. MPs wary of William's motives- from both the Whig and Tory sides of the House- took advantage of the vacuum created by the lack of a coherent court party within Parliament to force through measures after 1697 whose implementation William had been able to avoid in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution: greater parliamentary control of foreign policy and land grants; along with measures to control the presence of place holders in Parliament.[126] Increased self-confidence on the part of the Commons, aided by experience built up through the continuous parliaments of the past decade and William's strategic missteps (of which an

[126] David Hayton has described how the last years of William's reign marked a high point for support for place legislation: 'The ''place clause'' of the Act of Settlement was something of a freak, both in the extension of its approach and in its success in getting through the Commons, let alone the Lords as well.' Hayton, 'Place Legislation', p.106.

inability to work through the party system was core), led to a shift in power relations between monarch and Parliament. This shift had been prefigured by the 1688-9 Revolution, but many of its practical implications were determined by the events of 1697-1702.

Chapter 4 - William III, Mary II and Officer Appointments in the Armed Forces

The Stuart-Orange regime's ability to retain power was dependent upon the successful use of armed force. Large, capably led armies and fleets were required to combat the external threat of Louis XIV. Domestically, the regime was supported by the policing function provided by the armed forces. The perceived equitable allocation of place within those forces also played an important role in maintaining elite support for the new monarchs. The army and, to a lesser extent, the navy required a substantial number of new officers in the aftermath of the events of 1688/9. This chapter analyses the rationale and methods employed by William and Mary in the allocation of military office, and provides an assessment of the success of those methods. An officer for the purposes of this chapter is defined as anyone holding the rank of ensign and above in the army, and lieutenant in the navy. The geographic scope of the chapter extends to all three establishments of the British army and navy, although the bulk of the evidence relates to English ships and regiments.

In addition to comprising an important element of William and Mary's exercise of patronage, the study complements the work of historians of the growth of the fiscal-military state; without an adequate officer base to control them, the enlarged military forces associated with this growth would have failed to achieve the objective of preserving the regime.[1] The

[1] In particular, J. Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, money and the English state* (London, 1989) and M.J. Braddick, *State formation in early modern England* (Cambridge, 2000).

chapter also highlights the complexity of circumstance facing William and Mary as they attempted to insert themselves within the polity. Finally, it sheds light upon how conception of the prioritisation of gentility as a prerequisite for the allocation of military place responded, if at all, to methods of warfare requiring increasing degrees of specialist skill, discipline and organisation.

The chapter will examine the monarchs' views of the attributes required to be commissioned as an officer within the armed forces, together with their degree of involvement in those appointments and the mechanisms by which such appointments were made. It will then consider the difficulties which the monarchs faced in achieving their preferred allocation of place. Extant methods of patronage, differing views of where the right to appoint lay, conflicted loyalties, corruption, xenophobic pressures and the influence of party politics combined to render the process and workings of military patronage a highly contested space. Disappointed applicants for place could increase the numbers of those opposed to the new regime. Case studies examining the birth, character and experience of some of the more senior army and naval appointments made by William and Mary will illustrate the attributes which were sought after as well as some of the difficulties associated with the appointment of applicants possessing such attributes. The careers of John Cutts and Arthur Herbert will be used to illustrate some of the common traits in background and experience of the officers upon whom reliance was placed; other studies- of Churchill, Tollemache and Russell- will highlight why control of military patronage was rarely a straightforward exercise. Put together, these individual analyses will also serve to illustrate some of the main differences which existed between army and navy patronage

practice and the reasons for those differences. The conclusion highlights the joint monarchs' achievements in utilising their position at the top of the military patronage chain. Mutual engagement and accommodation between monarch and subject was encouraged by the knowledge that the alternatives for patron and client were even less palatable. The individuals entrusted with senior rank were relied upon to ensure that the patronage chain spread out through the ranks in a way which produced a military leadership capable of both opposing Louis XIV as well as achieving acceptance with its domestic audience.

Historiography directly relating to the subject of monarchical involvement in the allocation of military place is limited. Although the large-scale studies by Childs and Ehrman of the Stuart-Orange armies and navies extensively discussed recruitment practice, they concentrated upon how promotion to the most senior positions was influenced by political events and the consequences of military success or defeat. Neither analysed in detail the roles played by the monarchs in officer appointments.[2] Concentration upon analysis of patronage practice from the perspective of the recipient of place rather than that of the monarchical donor is a feature of Neil Sanghvi's study of commissioned officer mentalities and backgrounds within the British army.[3] Alan Guy's study of British Army organisation and staffing between 1714 and 1763 depicts the changes in patronage practice which occurred in the decades after William's death, changes which were substantial and provide a useful

[2] J. Childs, *The British Army of William III, 1689-1702* (Manchester, 1987; J. Ehrman, *The Navy in the War of William III 1689-1697* (Cambridge, 1953).
[3] N. Sanghvi, 'Gentlemen of Leisure or Vital Professionals? The Officer Establishment of the British Army, 1689-1739' (D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 2017).

source of comparison with previous practice.[4] Hannah Smith analyses the army's role in political change in the British Isles between 1660 and 1750, demonstrating how both by the practical means of deployment and the conceptual means of their part in the debate over the location and degree of sovereign power, armies played a significant role.[5] This chapter looks to research in more depth Stuart-Orange military patronage networks and their means of operation to contribute to that debate. Studies of royal involvement in naval officers' appointments during the period are even more limited. Davies's study of the officers and men of the Restoration Navy, illustrating how the competing claims for preferment of 'Gentlemen' and 'Tarpaulins' came to be accommodated within an increasingly professionalised system of training and examination, has not been built upon by a corresponding study of the Stuart-Orange navy.[6] Ehrman's monumental study of the navy between 1689-97 is strong in its analysis of the background and process of senior officer appointments but does not consider in detail the modes of thought of those responsible for the decisions. Nor have historians of the Stuart-Orange court studied the mechanics of patronage outside the confines of the court itself.[7] There is a resultant gap in the historiography which, if filled, can illuminate the mentalities of both patron and client.

Some of this omission may be due to the sparsity of direct evidence for the thought processes of those involved in the selection process. Much of the communication relating

[4] A.J. Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline: Officership and Administration in the British Army, 1714-1763* (Manchester, 1985).
[5] H. Smith, *Armies and Political Change in Britain, 1660-1750* (Oxford, 2021), ch.5.
[6] J.D. Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins: The Officers and Men of the Restoration Navy* (Oxford, 1991).
[7] The only study touching on the subject is that of A. Barclay, 'William's Court as King', in E. Mijers and D. Onnekink (eds.), *Redefining William III: The Impact of the King- Stadholder in International Context* (Abingdon, 2007).

to the seeking of, and reasons for success in attaining, commissions was not recorded in writing.[8] Being seen at court remained an important component of the process by which aspirants for army commissions made themselves known. For example, John Cutts in a letter dated April 1,1698 advised Joseph Dudley to 'come to the King's levee (which you should doe if ever you expect any thing).' [9] There is little surviving written evidence addressing the questions of why applications for officer commissions were successful, how they were made, and the strength of competition for those places. This is despite the numbers involved- at its height the British army during the Nine Years' War required a complement of five thousand officers. [10] It also forms a contrast with the relative proliferation of documentary evidence from subsequent reigns which has enabled patronage channels and methods to be more easily analysed.[11] Even after the Battle of Landen in 1693, during which ninety British officers were killed, there is no documentation in the Petitions or Secretary of State's letters contained in the State Papers to indicate an increase in applications to take their place. The thousands of Articles of Commission surviving in those Papers provide scant evidence on their own for the reasons for preferment, never venturing beyond generic phrases such as that a commission was granted 'as a reward for loyal service' and stating the need for the commissioned officer to maintain 'good order and discipline.'[12] Where written petitions for place do survive, they seem mostly to

[8] For example, two coffee shops near Charing Cross were said to be important locations for the sale of army officer commissions. HMC, *Finch*, iv, p.98.
[9] *Letters of John, Lord Cutts to Colonel Joseph Dudley* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1886), p.21.
[10] Childs, *British Army*, p.37.
[11] In particular by Guy, *Oeconomy*, and Sanghvi, *Gentlemen*, ch.3.
[12] The commissions are mainly contained in TNA, SP 44/166 and 44/167 series of the State Papers. Petitions to Secretaries of State are found in SP 44/235,6 and 7. Naval Petitions are held separately in SP 44/204 and 205.

have been unsuccessful. An analysis of State Petitions for 1689-90 reveals twelve applicants for the post of captain in the navy. None succeeded.[13] The improbability of speculative written approaches alone achieving their desired outcome is corroborated by the experience of James Stanhope, who eventually rose to the rank of Major-General in Anne's reign. He wrote multiple letters in the early 1690s looking for assistance in his quest for an army commission: 'the other great men I apply to promise me faintly and in such general terms that their offers of service seem only to put off and but a compliment. However, I make my court assiduously to all I can expect anything from.'[14] Nevertheless, by combining in a manner akin to assembling pieces in a jigsaw puzzle a knowledge of individuals' birth and past careers together with an analysis of related letters from secretaries of state, senior military officers and from the monarchs themselves, some conclusions can be drawn regarding the reasoning and methodology behind appointments made during the reign.

I shall begin by outlining the qualities which William and Mary looked for in their choices of officer as well as considering the means by which the monarchs evaluated applicants for position. Much of the evidence for this section relates to William's role in the decision-making process. However, Mary's interest and influence should not be underestimated, and I will highlight the areas where she was particularly concerned as well as the means which she employed to achieve her aims. Evidence from the Stadhouder's oversight of military

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SP44/98 contains Nottingham's Letters as Secretary of State. Shrewsbury's and Vernon's letters are contained in SP 44/74. Regency papers for 1695 are held in SP44/274.

[13] Petitions to the Secretary of State were sent by Edward Aston, John Butcher, George Cox, William Dore, Joseph Hall, Edward Holbridge, William Holder, Mr. Leigh, Thomas Newman, James Roch, Norman Stout and William Stout. Cross-referencing these names with entries of Captain's appointments recorded by Charnock in *Biographia Navalis* for 1689-90 found no matches. J. Charnock, *Biographia Navalis* (4 vols, London, 1794), ii.

[14] James Stanhope letter to his father, February 13 1694. Stanhope Papers, U1590/C7/1.

patronage in the United Provinces before 1688 will be used to compare Dutch patronage practices with those used in Britain after 1688. The reasons for the differences reveal much about the pragmatism displayed by the new monarchs when confronted with the challenge of preparing British military forces for war.

The situation which William and Mary faced in the Three Kingdoms after 1688 bore similarities to that experienced by William in the United Provinces in 1672. On both sides of the North Sea, the threat of invasion from Louis XIV enabled William to refashion the armed forces under his command. The appointment of senior military commanders whom he could trust was a major component of the process. In the United Provinces, the inner circle of his court comprised an important element of the small group whom William appointed to senior military command. He had grown up with army officers such as Bentinck and van Nassau-Ouwerkerk, and his prospects were interlinked with theirs. The degree of mutual dependence was such that, in Roger Manning's view, 'Court and camp were almost indistinguishable in the Netherlands.'[15] The same desire to be surrounded by men whom he could trust can be seen in William's choice of senior army commanders upon his arrival in England in 1688. Many of those whom he chose to command regiments had fought with William on the Continent and had come over with him to England in 1688 where, as we have seen, they came to form a significant element of his household.

[15] R. Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army, 1585-1702* (Oxford, 2006), p.438.

However, their numbers were insufficient to fill all vacant senior army posts.[16] William relied upon his own observation to identify other suitable candidates. According to Burnet, he 'had a memory that amazed all about him, for it never failed him: he was an exact observer of men and things.'[17] He was also passionate about the minutiae of army life, even down to the correct placement of sentries. The Irish General, Humphrey Bland, admittedly relying on the evidence of older colleagues, stated that 'King William, whose Military Capacity was Second to none, was perfectly knowing in the Small, as well as the Grand Detail of an Army.'[18] Over the course of the reign, William combined his powers of observation with his interest in military matters to build a substantial picture of the men who applied to serve him. This can be seen in his comments to the Earl of Nottingham about two individuals competing for preferment to the relatively lowly rank of ensign: 'His Majesty leaves the choice of Mr. Bowles or Mr. Fallerby to your Lordship. The latter indeed has more sense but is very warm and uneasy. The other is more experienced.'[19] If there was a category of social standing for which William showed a preference in his choice of officer, it would be that of modest, but not overly high, gentility. Other than when compelled by the necessity of replacing officers in the field quickly, he rarely considered applicants with low social status for officer appointments, either because of their perceived inability to command the respect of those under their

[16] Officers had to be appointed to the new regiments raised in the first four years of the reign, along with replacements for the officers of James II's army who had resigned their commissions. Childs, *British Army,* pp.37-9.
[17] Burnet, *History,* iv, p.548.
[18] Humphrey Bland, *A Treatise of Military Discipline* (London, 1727), p.115.
[19] Blathwayt to Nottingham, July 21 1692. HMC *Finch,* iv, p.330.

command or because of a conviction that they would not display courage in battle.[20] He was equally suspicious of the qualities of those of the highest rank: he explained to Halifax, 'the humour and character of a peer of England do not agree very well with the discipline to which a colonel must be subject.'[21] William did make exceptions to these general criteria, but they tended to be based upon an individual's display of exceptional bravery, and were more likely to occur in the navy. For example, he gave a naval commission to the lowly born civilian sea captain Stephen Elliot, who in 1695 managed to escape his French captors and paddle in a canoe from Hispaniola to Jamaica.[22] William also intervened to promote John Benbow, believed to have been a tanner's son, first to the post of captain and then swiftly afterwards to the rank of admiral as a result of his bravery in charge of a merchant ship.[23]

To bolster his own observations, William relied upon the recommendations of his most senior commanders. During the Irish campaign, the Duke of Schomberg regularly provided opinions about the merits or otherwise of the applicants for high military command: Captain Cagny, for example, was recommended by Schomberg for the post of Lieutenant-Colonel as he spoke 'un peu anglais' and more importantly had fifteen years of service as a cavalry captain.[24] Conversely, Schomberg wrote that 'There is one here named Grafton Who has brought me a letter from Lord Shrewsbury for a regiment, but he is not a strong man and is of low birth.'[25] Grafton was not given a commission. James Stanhope, whose speculative

[20] The commissions recorded in SP 44/166 regularly mention the good birth of the commissioned officer. A fuller discussion of the perceived advantages of good birth is provided by N.A.M. Rodger, 'Commissioned Officers' careers in the Royal Navy,1690-1815', *Journal for Maritime Research,* 3(1) (2001).
[21] Savile*, Life*, ii, p.206.
[22] Charnock, *Biographia Navalis*, iii, p.101.
[23] Charnock, *Biographia Navalis,* ii, p.226.
[24] 'King William's Chest'. TNA, SP 8/6, fo.276.
[25] 'King William's Chest'. TNA, SP 8/6, fo.257.

letters of application had proved unsuccessful, finally gained a captain's commission in 1694 through the ministry of Halifax and Portland after a two-year long search. Halifax recommended Stanhope to Portland who in turn mentioned him to William, 'who remembered him and put him in.'[26] This last instance of the route to preferment is a good example of the often multiple elements in the patronage chain: Halifax providing local knowledge and connections (the same function also seems to have been fulfilled by other senior well-born political figures upon whom William relied such as Sidney and Shrewsbury);[27] Portland vetting the application and perhaps assessing suitability from a military perspective; and William making the final decision. I will explore the channels of military preferment further within case studies of senior military officers who operated as central cogs in this informal mechanism.

John Cutts is a good example of the experienced, loyal army officer upon whom William relied. From a moderately wealthy, landed Essex family, Cutts had left England in 1685 to join William's military service in the United Provinces, even though he had recently inherited his family's estate. The timing of his move abroad despite coming into his inheritance suggests his concern with the religious and/or political beliefs of James II.[28] From the United Provinces, Cutts joined the Imperial Army in which he distinguished himself at the Siege of Buda before returning to William's service as Colonel-Commandant of the English Regiment in the Netherlands in 1688. He had by this time also developed links with William of a more

[26] James Stanhope letter to his father, March 27 1694. Stanhope Papers, U1590/C7/1.
[27] For example, the Earl of Meath wrote to Shrewsbury on June 15 1689 when attempting to influence the direction of commissions in his newly raised regiment. Quoted in Sanghvi, *Gentlemen,* p.98.
[28] H.M. Chichester, revised John Hattendorf, 'Cutts, John (1660/1-1707)', *ODNB* (Oxford, September 2004), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/6984 (24 July 2024).

personal nature. When Cutts was in financial difficulties in 1699, he reminded the king 'how earnestly you desir'd me (by the Duke of Monmouth) to break my match with Mrs. (Elizabeth) Villiers and what a promise you made me upon it.'[29] He did indeed break his match in 1685, and, having accompanied William to England in 1688, achieved regular promotions, becoming Colonel of the Coldstream Guards in 1694. The basis of the relationship was in mutual trust and shared military professionalism. Cutts was increasingly given responsibilities away from his regiment, becoming Governor of the Isle of Wight in 1693, an inspector of other army regiments in 1695, and captain of the King's bodyguard in 1696 when the assassination threat to William was at its height. Cutts has left a number of letters and reports which detail how William's patronage led to a mutually beneficial relationship which Cutts perceived to involve obligations on both sides. In John Brewer's phrase, 'Private connection and public duty were not necessarily incompatible, and it behoved both patron and client to ensure they were consonant.'[30]

As illustration of the way in which patronage was used to extend loyalty through the chain of command, in 1695 Cutts was asked to report on and make recommendations for the improvement of a number of regiments based in the South of England.[31] The observations he made of the strength and morale of those regiments were generally favourable. Cutts also used the exercise as a means of weeding out unsuitable officers. He recommended the extreme act of 'breaking' Lillingstone's regiment on the basis that it would lead to the

[29] H.W. King, 'The descent of the manor of Horham and of the family of Cutts', *Transactions of the Essex Archaeological Society,* 4 (1869), p.40.
[30] Brewer, *Sinews of Power*, p.74.
[31] No such reports survive from earlier in the reign. They suggest an attempt by William to increase oversight and control of the British army establishment.

removal of Lillingstone himself- an unpopular figure within his regiment.[32] By doing so, the best officers could be transferred elsewhere. Cutts wrote to Blathwayt that 'I desire you will lay this before his Majesty with my humble opinion that he will be pleased not to dispose of the vacancies in Faringdon, Northcot's and Colt's regiments 'til I have the honour to return to his presence.'[33] Cutts was effectively engaging in talent spotting whilst also constructing his own chain of dependents. He was confident that William would take his advice. As he himself wrote, 'I put two captains of Colonel Lillingstone's late regiment into Colonel Brudenell's.'[34]

William used Cutts to extend the Crown's influence in other areas. Firstly, William appointed Cutts to the Governorship of the Isle of Wight in 1693. This was part of a royal policy of promoting loyal officers to command strategic locations on the South Coast. For example, Tollemache was appointed Governor of Portsmouth and Charles Trelawney, a former major-general and groom of the bedchamber, became Governor of Plymouth. To help him govern the Isle of Wight, Cutts relied extensively on his colleague, Colonel Thomas Dudley. As with his promotion of the claims of other officers, Dudley became part of a network of connections overseen by Cutts to deepen the influence of the Crown and further his own interests simultaneously. Dudley became Cutts's local representative on the island, having been elected Mayor of Newtown on the Isle of Wight through his influence. In turn, Dudley was encouraged to extend the patronage network still further. For example, Cutts

[32] 'It seems all the captains of the regiment, as well as the lieutenant colonel and major, have thought themselves very hardly used by their colonel.' Cutts letter to Blathwayt, January 15 1695. *Lord Cutts's Letters, 1695,* ed. J. Childs. Camden Fourth Series, Volume 39: Camden Miscellany XXX, July 1990, p.382.
[33] Cutts letter to Blathwayt, January 15 1695. *Cutts's Letters*, p.383.
[34] Cutts letter to Blathwayt, March 24 1695. *Cutts's Letters*, p.403.

encouraged him to 'send me up a list of what Officers you think proper to fill up the Militia. As soon as ever my own Life is safe, I'll endeavour to save yours.'[35] Cutts's language is often florid, but the purpose is clear: 'Serve but the king, and me, effectually in this present storm, and I'll be instrumentall to put you in such circumstances as you shall have reason to be more than easy in.'[36] In the words of his biographer, 'Cutts is constantly stimulating Dudley's zeal by promises of preferment, and exacting in return all manner of services, not only in managing the municipal and electoral constituencies of the island, but in paying his bills.'[37] Despite constant complaints that his services went unrecognized, Cutts ended the reign with the rank of Brigadier-General.

The degree of William's involvement with the navy contrasts with his day-to-day command of the confederate land forces and his personal interest in army procedures and staffing. His relative lack of naval oversight led to a much greater dependence upon others in the allocation of place. In the United Provinces, William had delegated responsibility for naval officer selection to Job de Wildt, the secretary of the Admiralty of Amsterdam. The historian of the seventeenth-century Dutch navy, Jaap Bruijn, stated that William 'did not take a personal interest in naval affairs. The Admiral-General himself never commanded the fleet, not even in 1688.'[38] Certainly, the Stuart-Orange courts in The Hague and London had no officers with a naval background amongst their most senior members and few naval

[35] *Letters of John, Lord Cutts to Colonel Joseph Dudley* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1886), p.31.
[36] Ibid., p.26.
[37] Chichester, revised Hattendorf, 'John Cutts', *ODNB*.
[38] J.R.Bruijn, 'William III and his two navies', *Notes and Records of The Royal Society*, 43(2) (1989), p.123. In addition, William seems to have positively disliked sea travel. For his regular cross-Channel journeys, often in terrible weather, he would have himself strapped to the mast. On his journey to attend the Congress at The Hague in 1691, he became so cold that he could not speak. *Waar-agtig Relaas, Van de Overkomst van zyn Majesteyt William de Derde,* quoted in Baxter, *William III*, p.292.

applicants for place thought it worth their while to appear at court. It would be an exaggeration to assert that William had no interest in naval affairs. There are regular updates in the documents of King William's Chest from the start of the reign concerning the size and preparedness for battle of the English fleet.[39] William was a consistent proponent of the strategy in 1694/5 of maintaining a sizeable portion of the fleet in the Mediterranean over the winter in order to protect English merchant vessels from French attack. Nevertheless, in matters of naval patronage, William relied more upon the opinions of others. His initial choice for Admiral of the English Fleet was Arthur Herbert, who came to dominate naval preferment in the first two years of the reign.

Samuel Pepys's assessment of Herbert's character was unfavourable: 'Of all the worst men living, Herbert is the only man that I do not know to have any one virtue to compound for all his vices.'[40] What were the qualities which Herbert possessed which led William to think differently? Firstly, his commitment to the Williamite cause was clear.[41] Having resigned his commission in opposition to James's attempt to repeal the Test Act in 1687, he joined William in the Netherlands, was instrumental in planning the invasion, and commanded its fleet.[42] He had also proved himself in battle, having been wounded several times in the

[39] For example, 'King William's Chest,' December 18 1688. TNA, SP 8/2, fos.93-4. Schedule of location of Royal Navy ships.
[40] *The Tangier Papers of Samuel Pepys*, ed. E. Chappell (Navy Records Society, 1935), p.224.
[41] As with Russell, Herbert maintained contact with the Jacobite court. However, his intention to act upon that contact should be doubted. The regime's concerns in this respect were more directed towards disaffected army officers, as the imprisonment of Marlborough and others in 1692 demonstrated. After 1688, it was rare for naval officers to go over to James. The example of Sir William Booth is unusual and was occasioned by his displeasure at Herbert's preferment over his own. He fled on his own, even though, he 'considered defecting to France with his own ship and the Warspite.' Ehrman, *Navy*, p.289. TNA, ADM 1/5253, fo.132.
[42] Herbert, on being asked whether he could agree to the repeal of the Test Acts, 'answered the king very plainly that he could not do it either in honour nor conscience. The king said he was a man of honour, but the rest of his life did not look like a man that had great regard to conscience.' Burnet, *History,* iii, p.95.

Dutch Wars of the 1660s and 1670s. Just as importantly, he had the support of many of the fleet's officers.[43] Pepys wrote that 'W. Hewer, (Pepys's servant), tells me of captains submitting themselves to the meanest degree of servility when he was at Tangier, waiting on his rising and going to bed, combing his perruque...'[44] Herbert had been sent under the patronage of the Duke of York with a fleet to the Mediterranean in 1679 and remained there until 1683. As the senior commander, in Davies's opinion, 'he dominated Mediterranean patronage.'[45] The voyage served as a means of making private gains for Herbert and the officers under his command through both the taking of prizes and the lucrative transport of merchants' shipments back to England. Of the eight naval officers whom Edward Russell identified in a letter as loyal to William's cause in 1688, six had been with Herbert in the Mediterranean.[46] Senior officers such as Shovel, Wheeler, Kirke, Rooke and Stafford Fairborne, who all owed both office and consequent enrichment to Herbert, in turn oversaw significant patronage networks in the ships which they commanded. By such means loyalty to the new regime was extended down through the navy. When Cloudesley Shovel changed ships, he took over a hundred men with him who preferred to remain under his command.[47] As Captain John Cremer, writing in the early eighteenth century, noted: 'Changes of captain made great alterations on board men of War both to Officers and Common men.'[48] In the

[43] Herbert maintained the respect of his fellow officers after Beachy Head. On returning from his court martial, he was saluted by the fleet with guns and cheering. *An impartial account of Some Remarkable Passages in the life of Arthur Earl of Torrington together with some Modest remarks on his Tryal and Acquitment* (London, 1691), pp.16-18.
[44] Pepys, *Tangier Papers,* p.204.
[45] Davies, *Tarpaulins*, p.185.
[46] Russell letter to Herbert, November 13 1688. BL, Egerton MS 2621, fos.13, 47.
[47] Cloudesley Shovel letter to Phineas Bowles, March 14 1689. Quoted in Davies, *Tarpaulins*, p. 99.
[48] *Ramblin' Jack: the journal of Captain John Cremer, 1700-1774* (London, 1936), p.55.

absence of the level of monarchical involvement which characterised the reigns of Charles II and James II, Herbert seems to have made himself the lynchpin at the start of the reign around which decisions regarding naval officer appointments were made. William appointed him as both head of the Board of Admiralty commissioners and commander-in-chief of the fleet. Others made their voices heard, but they all sought Herbert's approval. Nottingham, for example, wrote to Herbert, 'If you will let me know what you think fit to be done, I will lay it before the King, though I think the representatives of the Admiralty Commissioners, supported by your own, would have more weight than anything I can say.'[49]

Queen Mary provided a counterbalance to William's comparative lack of personal interest in, and knowledge of, the navy. Mary's Memoirs and letters are full of her professed dislike for affairs of state and of her inability to provide the leadership which she constantly stated was much better provided by her husband.[50] To a large extent she has been successful at masking both to contemporaries and subsequent commentators her active involvement in governance, including patronage. However, the evidence emanating in particular from the documents describing Mary's role as executive head of the Regency Council during William's long absences abroad indicates a much greater involvement with, and indeed genuine interest in, military affairs than Mary wished to reveal through her own writings. She reviewed troops regularly in Hyde Park and on Hounslow Heath before their departures for Flanders and also seems to have been involved at least to a degree with army preferment.

[49] Nottingham letter to Torrington, June 13 1689. HMC *Finch*, ii, p.215.
[50] 'I know who is most necessary in the world', referring to Mary's professed estimation of her worth comparative to that of her husband. Mary letter to William, July 2 1690, quoted in Dalrymple *Memoirs,* Appendix to ii, p.118.

Nottingham reported that 'The Queen being well satisfied of the loyalty and merits of Captain Theodore Russell commands me to acquaint you that upon the first vacancy of an employment in the army in Ireland which may be fitt for him, she would have you give me notice of it, her Majesty intending to confer the same upon him.'[51] Such an indication of Mary's willingness to exercise the right to appoint army officers is intriguing, hinting at an involvement which was more often successfully hidden. That degree of involvement should not be overstated, however. With regard to the army at least it may be that her influence remained limited- the request she made for a commission mentioned above is the only one which I have found and, more generally, one of the common features of commentaries upon her oversight of the Regency Council was that even decisions of little political significance were referred to William.[52]

Mary undertook a considerably more active role in naval decision-making, demonstrating an involvement which she perhaps took less care to conceal due to William's comparative lack of interest in the fleet. In addition, the threat of seaborne invasion during the early years of the reign whilst she was Head of the Regency Council necessitated her very public oversight of the response to that threat. Whilst Mary writes in her letters and Memoirs of her aversion to many forms of public activity, no such dislike is voiced regarding naval affairs. The State Papers reveal her involvement in all aspects of the navy, from strategic issues to the everyday: as an example of the former, a letter from Nottingham to Blathwayt on August 26, 1690 states that it is the Queen who will direct how many ships will stay to protect England

[51] Nottingham letter to Ginkel, Whitehall, January 11 1691. TNA, SP 67/1, fo.125.
[52] 'her Majesty would take no resolution without the King.' Nottingham letter to Blathwayt, March 22 1692. HMC *Finch,* iv, p.40.

and how many go to Ireland; to illustrate the latter, on September 4, 1690 Mary issued orders for powder and tallow to be issued to the Master Gunner.[53] Her concern for the welfare of the navy's personnel, most visibly shown by her involvement in the establishment of the Greenwich Hospital, is also revealed by her requests that the pensions owed to the wives of naval officers be paid and her reward of naval officers involved in successful action against the French fleet.[54] Evidence for her participation in the process of naval officer selection, although limited, is significant. She was the leading figure in the response to Herbert's defeat and alleged cowardice at Beachy Head, calling for his removal and court martial as well as co-ordinating the process of appointing his replacement in the face of limited assistance from her husband and considerable opposition from some elements of the Admiralty Commission. Amongst the few public recommendations for public office made by Mary to William, her statement to William in 1690 that 'they tell me Shovell is the best officer of his Age' is telling, showing an interest in the subject as well as a desire to further the career of someone who was to become one of the most prominent naval officers of the reign.[55]

Mary formed a partnership with the Earl of Nottingham in the administration of the navy. Nottingham had been a Commissioner of the Admiralty between 1679 and 1684, and, as

[53] TNA, SP 44/166, fo.151: 'The Queen having been made acquainted with this Paper, commands me (Nottingham) to signifie her pleasure, That these particulars be furnished to the Master Gunner out of the Office of the Ordnance.'

[54] 'The queen; has ordered gold chains and medalls to be pre- pared for the captains of the fireships that burnt the French ships.' Luttrell, *Brief Historical Relation*, ii, p.463.

[55] Mary letter to William, July 6 1690. Dalrymple, *Memoirs*, Appendix to ii, p.131. The statement also alludes to the difficulties of how to judge a good naval officer. Qualities of seamanship, leadership, knowledge of naval tactics and bravery were all required: it was difficult for a non-specialist to determine who was best qualified. Shovel, like Rooke, was at least able to provide evidence of some of these traits by successfully carrying William across the Channel, often in the middle of winter.

Secretary of State, had been advising William and Mary on naval affairs since the start of the reign. Admirals and vice admirals regularly sent reports to Nottingham about the conduct of their subordinates.[56] Mary used Nottingham's male authority to support her rule, and her status as monarch lessened party-influenced resistance to Nottingham's orders. Conscious of the opposition which any decision accredited solely to him might occasion in a highly politicised environment, Nottingham, a prominent Tory politician, used the Queen's authority to convey his wishes. For example, he wrote to the Whig Admiral Russell, 'The Queen will have you consult with your flag officers and report in writing whether any of the captains of the fleet are unfit to be employed this summer.'[57] The joint decision-making nature of their partnership seems to have been regarded as an unexceptionable part of their working relationship. They regularly read to each other William's letters from Ireland which had only a single addressee, either to Nottingham or Mary individually. During the preparation of the fleet before the Battle of La Hogue, Russell received orders from the Queen about which he replied to Nottingham. For example, on May 7, Nottingham wrote to Russell, 'I send you the enclosed papers by order of the Queen. I need say nothing of the importance of this service or to quicken your zeal.' Russell replied to Nottingham on May 9, 'Her Majesty leaves it to mee, if I judge it fitt, to venture soe great a fleet at sea, in regard of the season of the year.'[58] Secretaries of State were regularly the recipients of letters from

[56] 'A list of the Command of their Majesty's Ships and Vessells now in service, with an account by whom they were Recommended or put into Employment, … with Flag Officers Approbation of them.' Dated April 7 1692. Leicestershire Record Office, DG7 NM29.
'A list of names of Captaines fitt to be employed at sea.' Dated April 27 1692. Leicestershire Record Office, DG7 NM29(6).
[57] Nottingham to Russell, April 2 1692. HMC *Finch*, iv, pp.56-7.
[58] Russell letter to Nottingham, May 9 1691. HMC *Finch*, iii, p.55.

applicants looking for naval posts.[59] Although Nottingham always passed them on to the Admiralty, it is significant that this is where applicants thought naval patronage lay. I have found no similar petitions addressed to him in the State Papers for army positions.

Mary and William's use of partnership with a small number of trusted political figures such as Nottingham is an important component of the means by which they controlled the allocation of place. Although the final responsibility for that allocation lay with the monarchs, their realisation of the need for inclusivity in the process should not be underestimated. It was a means both to improve the quality of their decision making and also to increase the ties between the new monarchs and their subjects. The degree and use of partnership varied between the monarchs. Mary's collaboration with Nottingham was rarely replicated to the same degree by William with any of his British subjects. He relied much more upon his own observation, together with that of often foreign advisers such as Bentinck, Schomberg and Solms. It was only later in the reign, for example, that he came to use Cutts. In the navy, he dispensed joint commissions in order to lessen dependence upon any one individual. William's use of his Secretaries of State also differed from the way in which Mary worked with Nottingham. There are letters from Shrewsbury to army commanders directing to whom commissions should be awarded.[60] Unfortunately, they are very few in number and it is impossible to know whether Shrewsbury was merely following William's instructions or

[59] For example, on May 5 1693: 'Proceedings upon the petition of Captain William Martin, who sets forth his good services, and prays the command of a frigate. Referred to the Admiralty.' 'Petitions to the Secretaries of State.' TNA, SP 44/236, fo.321.

[60] For example, on February 18 1690, Shrewsbury wrote to Lieutenant-Colonel Harley and George Winfield: 'Mr. Maurice Bowen, having lately petitioned the King to make him a lieutenant and producing a certificate signed by you on his behalf, his Majesty directed, if you think him qualified for the employment he seeks, that some of you recommend him to Lieutenant-General Douglas for that purpose.' TNA, SP 44/97, fo.90.

whether he had significant influence over the decision. There are also petitions addressed to Shrewsbury applying for military commissions, but they are again rare, dwarfed by the numbers of requests for pay and pensions. As with other senior political figures, it is likely that William was relying on Shrewsbury for his ability to explain local custom and provide a conduit between the new monarch and his more important subjects as much as for an ability to provide military insights. For example, on 7 May 1689, Robert St. Claire petitioned the King, claiming the right of succession to the colonelcy of the regiment of fusiliers (he had been its lieutenant-colonel). This had already been given to John Churchill and 'in consequence thereof he (St. Claire) had not his right of succession as all other lieutenant-colonels of the army had.'[61] William referred the matter to Lord Sydney, but did not change his original decision to give the position to Churchill. Shrewsbury had a similar post facto role after William's allocation of commissions in the newly formed Earl of Meath's regiment. Meath complained to the Earl of Shrewsbury that his own preferences had been ignored, to which Shrewsbury replied somewhat unhelpfully that '... His Majesty has thought fit to sign for the vacancies in your regiment, but [I] shall for my own part be ready to propose only those that you name.'[62]

This discussion of the role of the Secretary of State highlights that precise definitions of individuals' responsibilities in the allocation of military place did not exist. Nor were a precise set of criteria for advancement consistently applied. The regular use of the principle of precedence through seniority would have lessened the confusion which existed amongst

[61] TNA, SP 44/236, fo.213.
[62] Shrewsbury letter to Meath, June 18 1689. TNA, SP 44/97, fo.105.

applicants for commissions regarding both the qualities required for advancement and the process which should be adopted to apply for positions. William himself often advocated the use of seniority. For example, in 1693, Nottingham wrote to Blathwayt that the King had decided that the other officers of the fleet are 'upon the death of Sir John Ashby .... to rise gradually.'[63] And when a decision needed to be made on who should command the squadron sailing to the Mediterranean in 1695, William's preference was for Cloudesley Shovel, with the qualification that 'if there be an objection because of his rank in the Fleet which may not be equal or agreeable to such a Command- Delavall should be appointed.'[64] But as we have already seen, there were multiple occasions when seniority was circumvented by other criteria such as conspicuous acts of bravery. William often complained about the trials of having to field requests for position from petitioners; he did not make his own task easier by ignoring criteria which he himself encouraged.

Monarchical preferences regularly collided with conflicting interests and customs relating to appointment practice. The next section looks at areas of friction in the allocation of patronage and how conflicts were resolved, examining those sources of conflict by theme- loyalties, existing practice, behaviours, xenophobia and the role of party. Case studies of army and navy officers whose careers reflected in some manner the disparity between monarchical wish and opposing interests will be used to highlight those tensions as well as the ambiguities of the patronage system within which the new monarchs operated.

[63] Nottingham to Blathwayt, June 23 1693. HMC *Finch*, v, p.163.
[64] National Maritime Museum, *Bibliotheca Phillippica,* vi, fo.48v. Quoted in Ehrman, *Navy of William III*, p.454.

Loyalty

The loyalty to the new regime of both army and navy officers was questioned throughout the reign, but it was the army which particularly concerned William and Mary.[65] Childs calculated that 'only about one-third of James II's officers were, ultimately, to serve consistently with the armies of William III.'[66] Many of the officers who left William's service remained loyal to their previous master and fought against William in Ireland and Flanders. Their replacement could not be achieved immediately. It was instead, in John Childs's view, a two-stage process. The army's loyalty was first established, only after which was its fighting capability addressed. 'Political trustees of William were sent to "regulate" the regiments which had lost their commanding officers.'[67] If officers did not possess other necessary qualities, their removal was delayed. For example, Colonel John Hales, who candidly remarked to the Secretary at War, William Blathwayt, that, 'I am not fond of fighting', was only replaced in 1692.[68] Roman Catholicism was deemed incompatible with loyalty to the Protestant monarchy leading to Catholic officers losing their commissions, although William himself was not as concerned by this as his subjects- he arranged in 1689 for the Irish Roman Catholics in the ranks to be shipped off to fight for the Imperial Army. In their place, officers who could raise men quickly were commissioned and sent to fight in Ireland and Flanders. For example, Thomas Erle raised troops in Dorset and was given the colonelcy of a regiment which was sent to Ireland in August 1689 to fight under the Duke of

[65] Davies calculated for the navy that 'only 10-15% of 157 commissioned officers resigned or were dismissed in 1689.' Davies, *Gentlemen*, p.224.
[66] Childs, *British Army*, p.13.
[67] Ibid., p.16.
[68] BL, Add. MS 9727, fos.46-7. Quoted in Childs, *British Army*, p.52.

Schomberg.[69] Concerns about the religious beliefs and allegiance to the new regime of the army remained a constant theme of the reign. On June 29, 1697 a Captain Robertson was called in by the Lords Justices and 'gave an account of his being employed by Lord Cutts, by means of Sir Fleetwood Sheppard, to discover what papists had crept into the army. He discovered sixty-four in a battalion of Lord Cutts,' although the veracity of this discovery was never substantiated.[70] William's preference for troops whom he could trust- for example the Dutch Blue Guards formed the vanguard of his attack at the Battle of the Boyne- was not based solely upon an irrational fear of the British. There was a continuing danger of disloyalty amongst the officer corps. The most prominent example of disloyalty within that corps was exhibited by John Churchill. His career, although well known, illustrates the complexity of the issues facing William in his choice of senior army officers.

John Churchill's family background had similarities to that of John Cutts. He too was born into a gentry family of very modest means, and, after military service with the Duke of York, had gone abroad in his early life, serving with distinction in the French army under Turenne.[71] He returned to England in the late 1670s and resumed his connection with the Duke of York, purchasing the post of his Master of the Robes and also obtaining a position in 1683 as colonel of the royal regiment of Dragoons. At the Battle of Sedgemoor, in a way characteristic of his career, he combined military success with the desire that his abilities

[69] John Childs, 'Erle, Thomas (1649/50-1720)', *ODNB* (Oxford, September 2004), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/8837 (25 July 2024).
[70] Minutes of the Proceedings of the Lords Justices, June 29 1697. TNA, SP 44/275, fo.91.
[71] His modest birth was cited as a justification for his being overlooked for more senior roles during the early part of the reign. Nottingham to William, July 15 1690: 'Some of the officers may make a difficulty of submitting to the Chief (Marlborough).' HMC *Finch,* ii, p.360.

be more fully recognised: 'I see plainly that I am to have the trouble and that the honour will be anothers.'[72] William wished to use Churchill's abilities, but remained wary of his ambition and correspondence with the court of King James after 1689. He was made a gentleman of the King's Bedchamber in 1689 and given significant military responsibilities, but never the full command which Churchill believed should be his. William was determined, as he told Halifax, that 'Lord Churchill could not govern him nor his wife as they did the Prince and Princess of Denmark.'[73] In the meantime, Churchill was taking advantage of the potential financial rewards of command. The Earl of Ailesbury, for example, claimed that Churchill sold the Governorship of Tilbury for 2000 guineas. [74] More concrete evidence of the improvement in the Churchills' financial condition comes from their bank accounts of the period. [75] This behaviour was insufficient to provoke William to replace him. In 1691, Nottingham confirmed Churchill's retention of influence with the king, writing to William, 'These military matters you will know better from Lord Marlborough.'[76]

The cause of Churchill's loss of position was instead his continuing contact with the Jacobite court in the months before the invasion scare of 1692. His motivation for maintaining those contacts seems to have been a combination of doubt that William's rule was legitimate (in February 1689, he had not voted for the motion in Parliament declaring that the throne was

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[72] *The Correspondence of Henry.. and Laurence Hyde*, ed. S.W. Singer (2 vols, London, 1828), i, p.141. Quoted in John Hattendorf, 'Churchill, John (1650-1722)', *ODNB* (Oxford, September 2004), (25 July 2024).https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/5401 (25 July 2024).
[73] Savile, *Life*, ii, p.203.
[74] Ailesbury, *Memoirs,* i, p.245.
[75] Child's Bank Ledgers for 1688-1732, fos. 66-7. Cited by Frances Harris in *A Passion for Government: The Life of Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough* (Oxford, 1991), p.71. 'The Marlboroughs were generally reputed to have grown wealthy after the Revolution (the result, it was said, of Marlborough's sale of commissions during the reorganization of the army).'
[76] Nottingham letter to William, 24 June 1691. HMC *Finch,* ii, p.313.

vacant), hope that James's return would incorporate a willingness on his part to protect the Church of England's primacy, and frustration at his own lack of preferment. A mixture of greed, huge self-worth and genuine doubt as to where his loyalties should lie motivated Churchill to maintain links with both William and James.

For William, doubt concerning Churchill's loyalty in 1692 came to outweigh all other factors. He preferred to leave command of the army in the hands of less gifted commanders such as Solms. Churchill was briefly imprisoned in the Tower, followed by a much longer removal from participation in military command and the allocation of place, fuelling still further his sense of frustration. His divulgence of the plans for the descent on Brest can only be seen in this light. William was right to remain wary of Churchill's loyalty: he wrote to Shrewsbury in 1694 that 'I do not think it for the good of my service to entrust him with the command of my troops.'[77] It was not until Anne's reconciliation with William after Mary's death that Churchill was gradually able to rebuild his career.

That Churchill was not more severely dealt with may reflect the weakness of William's position in the period before the victory at Namur in 1695 and the subsequent Peace made at Ryswick with Louis XIV. Churchill was not the only army officer committed to the Tower in 1692 and one anonymous letter to Portland spoke of 'Marlborough promising to ingage a great part of the army', having obtained a pardon and assurances from James.[78] His

[77] William III, letter to the Duke of Shrewsbury, July 15 1694. Talbot, *Correspondence*, p.53.
[78] Anon. letter to Portland, May 1 1692. HMC *Finch*, iv, p.115.

frustration with William's regime was shared by many. That Churchill was eventually reemployed in senior roles is evidence of exceptional pragmatism on William's part.

Existing Practice.

The monarchs' right to commission officers was not amended by statute during the reign. The closest to the introduction by Parliament of restrictions upon the monarchs' freedom to appoint came in 1692-3, after a succession of military defeats. Robert Harley introduced a debate which eventually led to the motion 'that the Admiralty be entrusted to such persons as have known experience in maritime affairs and that all orders to the fleet may pass through the said Commissioners' (rather than by way of the Secretary's office).'[79] In the same month, Harley also proposed to the House of Commons 'that the general of the foot may be an Englishman.'[80] Although both motions were well supported and lengthily debated, neither was taken to a vote. The matter in the House of Commons was brought to a conclusion by Sir John Lowther who, speaking of foreign generals, pointed out that 'this nation has been long in peace and not versed in these matters, so the King is forced for the present to make use of them.'[81] William promised to take account of the House of Commons's thoughts in future appointments, and this, together with improved control of the House by the Whig Junto and eventual military victories, seems to have prevented any further attempted parliamentary measures to constrain the royal prerogative.[82]

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[79] Luttrell, *Parliamentary Diary*, November 22 1692, p.248.
[80] Luttrell, *Parliamentary Diary*, November 23 1692, p.256.
[81] BL Add. MS 42592, fo.175. Luttrell, *Parliamentary Diary*, December 17 1692, p.325. Childs, *British Army,* pp. 75-6.
[82] Luttrell, *Parliamentary Diary*, pp.270-6 and pp.301-11.

A more substantial barrier to monarchical freedom of action emanated from an aversion to Standing Armies, which forced English monarchs into dependence upon wealthy individuals to raise and finance army regiments. This also led to the location of the right to appoint officers being contested. Colonels regarded the commissions in the regiments which they had raised as being in their personal remit and looked to fill them with their own choices of officer. The potential friction between the concepts of the regiment as the personal property of its colonel and that of the monarchs' right to nominate all commissioned officers was allowed to remain. Appointments seem to have been made on a mutually agreed basis between regimental colonel and William. As a result, some regiments remained virtually under single family control. Nottingham, acting as the channel of communication between the king and one colonel, wrote that 'Mr. Cunningham, son of Sir Albert, … hopes to succeed his father in the regiment and is recommended for it by the general as well as the lieutenant-colonel. His pretensions are just and reasonable, but his majesty will better judge of this if you will lay the cause before him.'[83] In the United Provinces, the Stadhouder alone appointed all officers, by right at the level of captain and below and through unopposed practice above the level of captain.[84] As the British army was expanded, over five thousand army officers were appointed, and William was aware that unpopular decisions here could alienate large sections of the elite.[85] The king, despite his doubts concerning the abilities of

[83] Nottingham letter to Sydney, September 25 1691. HMC *Finch,* iii, p.276.
[84] S. Groenveld, 'William III as Stadholder: Prince or Minister?' in E.Mijers and D. Onnekink (eds.), *Redefining William III: The Impact of the King-Stadholder in International Context* (Abingdon, 2007), p.25.
[85] 'The army gave the nobility an opportunity to perpetuate the martial tradition of their ancestors. Between 1660 and 1707, thirty eight percent of all regimental commands were held by men who were already peers at the time of their appointment.' K. Brown, 'Gentlemen and Thugs in Seventeenth-Century Britain', *History Today,* 40(10) (1990), p.29.

such well born colonels to provide the leadership which was required, had little option other than to leave them with considerable influence in their choice of commissioned officer.

The assertion of monarchical control over naval appointments was faced with different challenges. The Navy had been better funded in Charles II's reign- the ability of potentially absolutist monarchs to use maritime force to impose their will was not regarded as a threat to domestic liberty and Royal Navy ships were required to protect English merchant interests.[86] By the time of William and Mary's accession, a centralised organisation had also been developed to control the Navy's operation. The Admiralty Commission had been reformed in 1679 to take over the duties of the Lord High Admiral, its then incumbent the Duke of York having been disqualified from office as a Catholic following the Test Act of 1673. The Commission was the administrative hub of the Navy, responsible for the fitting out, manning and positioning of the navy's ships. Its members were usually a mix of senior naval officers and political appointees. It was also responsible for holding naval records, including the reports made by ships' captains of voyages and the seniority lists and officer conduct reports which would increasingly be employed to determine officer appointments. By the early years of the eighteenth century, it had become the main body responsible for naval officer appointments but in 1689 its role in that process had not been defined.[87] A potentially destabilising set of circumstances existed: the Admiralty Commission possessed the records necessary to evaluate performance; William was not as involved in naval decision-making as his predecessors; and elements of the House of Commons, some of whose

[86] In the reign of Charles II, expenditure on the navy averaged twice that spent on the upkeep of land-based forces. Expenditure equalised in William and Mary's reign. Ehrman, *Navy,* p.37.
[87] Ehrman, *Navy*, esp. ch. VII.

members sat on the Commission, were increasingly looking to assert control over the management of public finances, including the selection of those responsible for its use. Helped by the comparative lack of need to make new appointments in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution, together with Herbert's strong influence over both the Commission and the king, there were no significant confrontations until defeat at Beachy Head undermined Herbert's position. The choice of his successor led to a confrontation between Mary and Sir Thomas Lee, one of the members of the Commission. In an interview between the queen and the Commission, Mary, angered by the Commission's assertion of its right to approve Herbert's replacement, stated that 'the King had given away his own power, and could not make an admiral which the Admiralty did not like.'[88] 'No, no more he can't,' was Lee's reply. The Commission was split down party lines on whether it could object to an appointment which had not been approved by its members. A solution to the confrontation was only achieved by the selection of a group of admirals to replace Herbert which was acceptable to monarch and Commission alike.[89] The fundamental point of where responsibility for choice and ratification of appointment lay remained unresolved. A more permanent stability was eventually re-established by Russell's appointment as senior Admiral of the Fleet. Russell, like Herbert previously, came to dominate both Admiralty Commission and monarch in his influence over naval appointments. Although the navy required less reform in the aftermath of the Revolution, the existence of a centralised

[88] Dalrymple, *Memoirs*, ii, p.147.

[89] The composition of the joint Commission which replaced Herbert - Haddock, Killigrew and Ashby- was a compromise which managed both to accommodate Whig and Tory interests as well as having a Gentleman and Tarpaulin representative.

structure formed around the Admiralty Commission enabled a competing patronage source to develop. Amicable relations between Commission and monarch were essential for the relationship to function successfully.

William's delegation of appointment-making responsibility in the navy was surprisingly wide-ranging. Even in the marines, a hybrid force positioned between the army and navy, he was willing to delegate control. Herbert was informed in 1690 that 'His Majesty allows of your placing and displacing such officers in the Marine regiments as you see cause for.'[90] A combination of constraints of time, knowledge and interest was probably responsible for William's comparative lack of personal involvement in naval patronage. The Navy's organisational structure made it better equipped to make appointment decisions; it was not William's area of expertise; and attention to the army was a more pressing concern. Not only was the army in greater need of reform, but inappropriate staffing decisions within it could have greater consequences in the society from which recruitment occurred. Officer positions in the navy amounted to at most five hundred at the start of the reign and naval officers seem on average to have been of lower status within the elite at the time of their entry into the profession. A combination of greater danger, more need for dedication, and diminished opportunity to show one's worth to the monarch made the navy a less favoured choice of career for the gentry.[91]

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[90] Nottingham to Torrington, June 1 1690. HMC *Finch*, ii, p.284.

[91] In addition to the perils of the sea, court-martials seem to have been more common in the navy than the army. There were roughly one hundred court-martials of sea officers in the period, of which sixty resulted in convictions. R.E. Glass, 'The profession of the sea officer in late seventeenth-century England' (Ph.D. thesis, University of California, 1990), p.102. Midshipmen or officer's servants often joined the navy at the age of seven or eight. In order to attain the rank of lieutenant, they had to have served for at least three years and passed an examination. No comparable requirements existed in the army.

Officer Conduct

After 1672 in the United Provinces, William had acted quickly and ruthlessly to improve the efficiency of the land forces under his command. As we have seen, in order to stop the practice of false musters, an order was issued threatening all officers who continued the practice with execution. One colonel, Louis Francois de Grijsperre, ignored the order and was beheaded.[92] In the Three Kingdoms, William acted in a much more circumspect manner. In addition to the accommodations into which he was forced in his relations with the colonels of regiments, he also had to compromise in areas such as the sale of commissions and officer involvement in regimental provisioning. Sales of commissions were illegal, but flourished in practice.[93] Childs stated that William's 'failure (to abolish the commission purchase system) effectively secured the political loyalty of the British officer corps. Purchase made certain that only those who could afford it and enjoyed the approved social and political background became members of the army elite.'[94] However, the use of the word 'failure' understates the degree of intentionality on William's part in his willingness to allow the existing system to continue. He realised it was the lesser of two evils. To insist upon the abolition of the system would have led to the alienation of a large proportion of the serving officers who had paid for their commissions and who expected to be recompensed in time by the sale of those commissions to their successors. The practice provided a form of pension for retiring officers.[95] William realised it was simply not possible to change it.

[92] Baxter, *William III*, p.102.
[93] William required officers to swear on oath that they had taken no consideration for their commissions. Childs, *British Army,* p.58, quoting TNA, WO 5/5, fo.73.
[94] Childs, *British Army*, p.57.
[95] A captain's commission cost up to £1000, a Colonelcy over £2000. Childs, *British Army*, p.59.

Childs also stated that 'Purchase guaranteed that the army did not become an immediate prey to political faction as the nature and composition of the officer complement within each regiment could not be affected with each shift on the Whig and Tory wind.'[96] This overemphasises the ability of the Whig and Tory parties to influence army officer selection: the combination of William's interest in that selection and the lack of military failure after 1693 kept patronage rights in the hands of the monarch. It was only after William's death that monarchical influence started to reduce.[97] Another area of army practice which was used by its officers for personal benefit was that of regimental procurement. The complete rationalisation of the system of procurement for the British army would have lessened the opportunity for profit which the existing system offered to army officers. Although the procurement of essential supplies such as forage came to be centralised under the same independent contractors who supplied the Dutch army, individual officers retained the right to clothe the men of their regiments.[98] It remained an accepted means by which the expenses associated with an army commission could be recouped.

Nor were other measures which were utilised in the United Provinces to improve the efficiency of its army instituted in Britain. For example, the shadowing mechanism which was employed by the Blue Guards in the United Provinces to introduce volunteers to the rigours of military life was not copied. Nor was an official army officer training school established, although one had been mooted by Parliament in 1689.[99] Was this laziness on

[96] Ibid., p.57.
[97] Even then that influence remained strong. For example, Queen Anne used her authority to have the Earl of Hertford promoted to a vacant colonelcy in 1709. Sanghvi, *Gentlemen*, p.90.
[98] Childs, *British Army*, pp.167-171 and p.247.
[99] Childs, *British Army*, pp.53-4.

William's part or a sensitivity to English concerns regarding anything which suggested the permanent establishment of a standing army? William's obviously pragmatic behaviour in other areas suggests that it was deliberate. Wholesale changes were impossible to achieve in the face of entrenched interests and customs. His ideal was to produce an officer corps combining the courage he associated with the status of a gentleman together with the discipline and organisational skills required to command such a hugely expanded fighting force. It took time. On 10 April, 1694, James Stanhope reported to his father that William was angry with the army officers who had remained at court rather than joining their regiments in Flanders: he was heard to utter 'the first oath he had taken since his coronation.' [100] Nevertheless, the fighting force which William praised for its contribution to the successful Siege of Namur had improved significantly from the forces led by Schomberg in Ireland.

Party

William's opponents often claimed that the king was trying to use the votes of commissioned officers who also served as MPs to influence parliamentary proceedings. As we have seen in the previous chapter, between 100-130 MPs, many of whom were army and

[100] James Stanhope letter to his father, April 10 1694. Stanhope Papers, U1590/C7/1.

navy officers, could be designated as holders of positions dependent upon royal grant (placeholders).[101]

However, this bloc rarely acted cohesively- officers followed their own course, often determined by the stance of the party to which they were affiliated. For William, commissions into the armed forces were not allocated as a reward for political service and nor was that preferment considered bound to influence an individual's voting behaviour in Parliament. To William, the army's efficacy was measured solely in terms of its use as a fighting force, rather than as a potential source of parliamentary leverage. Fashioning of this grouping into a coherent voting bloc was not attempted with rigour by either William or members of his court until Sunderland and the Whig Junto employed more systematic methods for the mutual benefit of court and Whig party. Additionally, William, aware of the depth of parliamentary feeling on the matter, respected the Country party principle that neither army nor navy officers should be able to use their positions to influence the course of elections. Cutts, for example, was instructed by William through the War Secretary, Blathwayt, to keep soldiers away from a constituency where an election was taking place in order that they could not be accused of influencing voting behaviour.[102]

[101] Horwitz, *Parliament*, Appendix D and p.97.

[102] Blathwayt letter to Cutts, 26 March 1695. HMC, *Report on the Manuscripts of Mrs. Frankland-Russell-Astley, of Chequers Court, Bucks* (London, 1900), p.85. 'your Lordship has ordered the two companies from Portsmouth to come and quarter at Yarmouth during the election, where none or no such proportion of men used to be at another time. I hope, my Lord, it is quite otherwise, for that it is a constant rule and his Majesty's express pleasure that all soldiers do ever remove from a place where there is to be an election, as it is absolutely necessary in this case, where the least intimation of such quartering would set the House of Commons in a flame, and make void any election your Lordship should countenance.'

Politically influenced interference in the allocation of military patronage instead came from the attempts of senior army and navy officers to use their positions to further the interests of the party to which they were affiliated and also from the attempts of politicians more generally to use military events for political ends. The career of Edward Russell illustrates both strands of this interference. Russell's use of the control of naval patronage eventually brought him into conflict with William and his enforced resignation illustrates how political opponents could use military misdemeanours to remove a political opponent. In response to Russell's increasingly overbearing behaviour, William advanced the careers of Cloudesley Shovel and George Rooke.

Edward Russell was the nephew of the Whig martyr, William, Lord Russell. He had joined the navy in 1666 at the age of fourteen, fighting at the Battle of Solebay in 1672 as a lieutenant and serving as a captain in the Mediterranean under Narborough and Herbert. His ability as a seaman was recognised, even by his opponents. Samuel Atkins, secretary to Dartmouth on the Tangiers expedition 'says that however disorderly Russell otherwise is as to getting of money and thereby got such an estate as he believes he will hardly ever go to sea again, he is the best seaman of a gentleman and do more himself in person in the navigating his ship all himself than any gentleman ever did.'[103] He had quit the navy in 1682 during the Exclusion Crisis as a result of his uncle's conviction and execution for treason. At the time of the Revolution, he acted as William's secretary on his journey to London and had been promoted to the position of rear admiral in 1689.

[103] *Tangier Papers of Samuel Pepys,* ed. Chappell, p.226. Pepys was not convinced: his comment was 'Query. The truth of this.'

Russell possessed the twin attributes of loyalty to the Williamite cause and ability as a seaman, eventually replacing Herbert after the Battle of Beachy Head. His decision not to accept immediately the position of chief admiral of the fleet may be evidence of an astute political mind: he seems to have used the time until he was willing to take the post to build his patronage base. A list from 1693 gives the names of recently promoted captains. Twenty-three of them are identified as having been promoted by Russell, a sizeable proportion of the captains of the fleet.[104] Conversely, officers associated with Herbert found it difficult to obtain commissions after Russell's promotion. John Granville, for example, 'appears to have formed a firm attachment to the brave and unfortunate earl of Torrington' and never held a captain's position again.[105] After his appointment as admiral of the fleet, Russell consolidated his position by assiduously promoting his own candidates into senior positions. Queen Mary, writing to William in Ireland, informed him that 'The commissioners of the admiralty have resolved to come to me tomorrow with some names for flag: Mr. Russell recomends Churchill and Ellnor, because he says nothing has been done for them, tho' they both were trusted when you came over, and have been ever very true to your interest.'[106] Priestman, who owed his position to Russell, was the only other naval officer on the Admiralty board. Dominance of the board, combined with membership of the cabinet council, helped to consolidate Russell's influence over naval patronage. When he did not get his way, he made his feelings known: 'You have appointed Captain Mason for the Vanguard, a ship wholly without men, and hee soo great a cripple that he is not able to

[104] TNA, ADM 8/2, 24 March 1692.
[105] Charnock, *Biographia Navalis*,ii, p.158.
[106] Dalrymple, *Memoirs,* ii, p.160.

stirr.'[107] Despite a temper and roughness of expression which often astonished his audience and was distinctly inconsonant with the diplomacy supposedly required of a gentleman naval officer, Russell maintained the support of William through much of the decade.

Russell did not go to sea again following his return from the Mediterranean in 1695, instead concentrating upon his political career as a leading member of the Whig Junto. His control of naval appointments became increasingly domineering, as John Macky recorded. 'No Gentleman was ever better beloved by the English sailors than he,..., but he soon lost all by his Pride and Covetousness; he was a good Patron to those who depended immediately upon him,.. But irreconcileable to those whom he suspects to be in any other Interest; this created him a great many Enemies in the Parliament.'[108] James Vernon's letters as Secretary of State show William becoming personally involved in the selection of naval officers in response to Russell's attempts to use control of naval patronage for political benefit. Vernon wrote, 'I am afraid the behaviour of the Admiralty is extreme ill taken, and that they have impudently asserted this authority. This is not the first time they have been turning out captains, and the King has restored them... If my Lord Orford will please to moderate, there is no fear that the rest will abate of this prerogative.'[109] As sole monarch, without the guidance of either Mary or Nottingham, William's participation in naval affairs seems to have increased, personally intervening in the arrangements for naval court martials and the fitting out of the fleet.[110] He refused to submit to Russell's threats to resign which the admiral used

[107] Russell to Commissioners of the Admiralty, 27 March 1692. HMC *Finch*, iv, p.46.
[108] John Macky, *Memoirs of the Secret Services of John Macky, Esq.* (London, 1733), p.76.
[109] James Vernon letter to the Duke of Shrewsbury, June 26 1697. Vernon, *Letters,* i, p.293.
[110] Concerning his court martial, Captain Ripley 'acquiesced when it was read to him in what manner the king had directed it.' With regard to the provisioning of the fleet, 'Mr. Blathwayte sends directions that there should

as leverage in his disagreements over naval deployments. Instead, William used his powers of patronage along with those of other senior naval officers such as Shovel and, in particular, Rooke to attempt to counterbalance Russell's increasingly domineering behaviour.

Rooke was favoured by William as a competent officer who could provide a counterweight to Russell. He was not a particularly successful commander- he had held senior positions at both Beachy Head and with the Smyrna convoy. But he retained his independence from Russell, even though originally promoted by him. When both were members of the Admiralty Commission in 1698, Russell 'felt that Rooke had not come to his defence during the previous session and would not accept Rooke's justification for his conduct.'[111] As a political follower of Nottingham, his nephew through marriage, Rooke provided a useful counterbalance in Parliament to Russell. A willingness to accept orders and to refrain from manoeuvring on behalf of political party were attractive to William. Rooke wrote to Trumbull, the Secretary of State similarly troubled by Whig party-derived antagonism at this time, 'My province is to obey and execute, and I will do so to the best of my capacity and power for the good of old England.'[112] Macky, alluding to the favourable effect which Rooke's commitment to place loyalty to the regime above the claims of party had on William, stated that 'King William liked him for his Taciturnity, and his Readiness to obey Orders, without Reasoning about them.'[113] Russell was eventually forced to resign in 1698 as a result of accusations of

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be no want of provisions towards the end of the year, and that seamen be procured to man the fleet up to the highest compliment.' Vernon, *Letters,* i, pp.299 and 308.

[111] Horwitz, *Parliament*, pp.257-8.

[112] Rooke letter to Sir William Trumbull, 2 December 1695. HMC *Report on the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Downshire : preserved at Easthampstead Park, Berks* (6 vols, London, 1924-1995), i(2), p.591.

[113] Macky, *Memoirs*, p.119.

mismanagement of naval funds four years previously- the accusations would not have had such a serious effect if the Junto's dominance of the House of Commons had not collapsed. His forcing from office was part of the parliamentary backlash against the Whig Junto.

Xenophobia

William was accused of favouring foreign born officers at the expense of English candidates for senior army command.[114] It was a fair criticism. William did favour them because he knew them and trusted their abilities. Ten out of the fourteen General Officers engaged in the expedition to Ireland were of foreign nationality, of whom only six were Dutch. With the exception of those officers who had served with him in Flanders before 1688, William had little knowledge of British officers' abilities, and it is unsurprising that so few were promoted. William's aversion to their employment was corroborated by the experience of experienced officers whom he trusted- Schomberg regularly reported back to William from Ireland with uncomplimentary opinions of the English officers under his command: 'there are many officers whom I should be glad to see back in England; ...The colonels only care to make a living by their regiments;... we need more brigadiers, but I see none fit for the post in this army.'[115] Judging ability by results in the early years of the reign, it would appear that William was correct to hold his jaundiced view. Robert Parker in his *Memoirs* wrote of the situation in Athlone where 'he (the Duke of Schomberg) gave orders for the army to hut: on which the Dutch and French regiments soon built them good warm Barracks, which preserved them

[114] No foreign naval commanders were promoted in a similar way, reflecting the perception of a lessened need for interference in the British navy.
[115] Schomberg letter to William, September 20 1689, from Dundalk. 'King William's Chest.' TNA, SP 8/5, fo.300.

from the wet weather that came on immediately: but the English being raw soldiers, neglected the duke's orders… This occasioned the death of numbers of our men.'[116] This did not stop some members of the English Parliament in 1691-2 blaming military defeat upon a lack of English officers in command. Sir Peter Colleton introduced a motion that 'None but natives should command Englishmen,' as foreigners could not have 'the same affection for England.'[117] As with the debate on the right of Parliament to become involved in officer appointments more generally, nothing came of it. William did become more willing to employ English officers in senior roles as their experience of what was required of an officer to wage war successfully increased. I will use the career of Thomas Tollemache to illustrate other traits which dissuaded William from promoting English officers earlier in the reign.

Tollemache's career followed a similar path to that of other officers who were given senior roles in the British army after 1688. In 1678 he had served with William in Flanders opposing the forces of Louis XIV, returning to England the next year to take up a commission as Captain in the Coldstream Guards. He was then posted to Tangiers where he established a reputation for bravery in action which he was to build upon throughout his career. In 1686, in protest at the introduction of Catholic officers, he resigned from the British army, joining the English regiment in the pay of the Dutch government in the United Provinces in 1688.[118]

[116] Captain Robert Parker, *Memoirs of the Most Remarkable Military Transactions from the year 1683 to 1718* (Dublin, 1746), p.15.
[117] Childs, *British Army*, p.76.
[118] Piers Wauchope, 'Tollemache, Thomas (1651-94)', *ODNB* (Oxford, September 23 2004), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/27500 (25 July 2024).

Tollemache's subsequent career in the British army highlights some of the character traits which help to explain why he was not entrusted by William with the even higher office to which he felt entitled. This perceived neglect was despite the undoubted bravery which Tollemache continued to display, leading as a volunteer the attack against the defendants of the town of Athlone in 1691 in a way which, according to Mackay 'defied all the rules of law and policy,' and eventually being fatally wounded whilst leading the unsuccessful attack upon the recently strengthened French defences at Carteret Bay near Brest.[119] It may well be that Tollemache's bravery was too reckless for William. It took significant amounts of time to train infantry into the highly organised formations which the methods of warfare of the time required.[120] The loss of life associated with Tollemache's recklessness may have been regarded as unacceptable by William, whose comments on the news of Tollemache's death were certainly less complimentary than others who praised only his bravery: 'although I do not approve of his conduct, yet I am of opinion that his too ardent zeal to distinguish himself induced him to attempt what was impracticable.' [121] William's comment also alludes to other characteristics which lessened his opinion of many English officers- elevated senses of self-worth and excessive desire to have that worth acknowledged and rewarded. At its most destructive, this led to violent attempts to defend personal honour against perceived slights. Tollemache had already fought one duel with a fellow officer in Tangier in 1682 as a result of which he was deprived of his commission. Duels amongst

[119] H. Mackay, *Memoirs of the War carried on in Scotland and Ireland* (Edinburgh,1833), p.144.
[120] Jacques-Louis Bale, marquis de Chamlay and a Maréchal Général in Louis XIV's armies, commented that 'whereas it was possible to have good cavalry within a year of their enlistment, it took a minimum of five to six years to produce infantry who grasped the rudiments of disciplined fire and cohesiveness.' Quoted in H. Drevillon, *L' impot du sang. Le métier des armes sous Louis XIV* (Paris, 2005), p.365.
[121] William letter to the Duke of Shrewsbury, 1 July 1694. Talbot, *Correspondence*, p.46.

officers over points of honour and precedence were common and did not help the army's cohesion.[122] It was rumoured that one of the reasons why Churchill was said to have divulged the plans of the attack on the French coast was out of jealousy for the leading role which Tollemache had been assigned. Tollemache's memorial plaque hints at this, stating that he died as a result of 'the envy of some of his pretended friends.'[123] William's response to the pressure to promote Tollemache in 1692, emanating both from Tollemache himself, who threatened to resign in protest at the precedence awarded to foreign officers, and from MPs who stated that English lives were being lost unnecessarily because of the poor leadership of foreign commanders, was conciliatory without leading to any meaningful diminution in his ability to direct patronage. He closeted Tollemache for two hours and subsequently promoted him to Lieutenant-Colonel.[124] No other significant changes amongst his most senior commanders in Flanders were made.

Conclusion

It was not a simple task to assemble British armies and navies which could contribute successfully to the struggle against Louis XIV. It depended upon the recruitment and deployment of a suitably qualified and motivated officer corps from within a nation which

[122] William needed to take account constantly of his subjects' belief as to their self-worth and how that worth should be treated relative to others. It can be seen in letters such as this from Stanhope to his brother, Alexander, in July 1695, when he was seeking promotion: 'The king promises far in general terms but has given away two Commissions in the Guards which I asked for to persons which I did not expect would be put before me.' Stanhope letter to his father, July 29 1695. Stanhope Papers, U1590/C7/1.
[123] Epitaph on Tollemache's Memorial, quoted in Wauchope, 'Tollemache', *ODNB*.
[124] Luttrell, *Brief Historical Relation*, ii, p.338.

was divided internally and which had not been involved in a major land war for forty years. The combination of a lack of proven local resource, entrenched ways of operation and thinking, and the need for immediate results presented a complex situation for William and Mary. Compromises were required by the monarchs as well as a prioritisation of attention upon those areas of the armed forces which were in most need of reform. The army and navy were treated differently according to the perception of the degree of change required within them and the expertise and interests of the respective monarchs. The actions taken display a combination of resolution, organisational skill and willingness to adapt to local circumstance which has been somewhat overlooked. It was not perfect- William's unwillingness to allow access to his presence along with his disinclination to explain his actions, as in many other areas, frustrated his subjects. The lack of direct communication with his subjects was to an extent alleviated by the monarchs' sensitive continuation of existing patronage methods and inclusion of senior political figures as contributors to decision-making concerning the allocation of place. Mary's death and increased attempts by William's ministers (Russell particularly) to politicise further the allocation of patronage, led to changes in the weight of importance of the influences upon officer appointments. The size and operational capability of both the British army and navy were transformed between 1689-1702. This would not have been possible without the adaptation of an existing patronage system which, although never precisely defined, served the twin purposes of maintaining domestic support for the new regime and recruiting an officer base capable of fighting the war with France.

Chapter 5 - William III, Mary II and Church Patronage

The latitudinarian views of many of the bishops appointed by William and Mary, together with their promotion of the 'Godly Revolution', has comprised a principal focus for historians' study of the Stuart-Orange episcopate.[1] This chapter aims to build upon those observations to incorporate analysis of the most important ecclesiastical appointments made during the joint reign within the framework of the regime's broader aims. It will throw light on the precarious nature of the balancing act which the joint monarchs were forced to undertake; the evidence of James II's reign showed how ecclesiastical patronage remained a divisive issue whose insensitive handling could prove inimical to political stability. The chapter will indicate the changing degrees of influence of the principal directors of church patronage over the course of the reign and the reasons for those changes. It will also demonstrate how William and Mary's differences in religious observance were accommodated within an externally displayed unanimity of purpose. Mary played an important role in the allocation of clerical preferment for much of the joint reign before her death in 1694 and the chapter provides an appropriate location for analysis of the methods which she employed in patronage allocation, together with the motivations behind her actions. I will place her involvement in clerical appointments within a wider discussion of Mary's political skills and techniques. The study will also look to aid our understanding of how the joint monarchs' visions for the place and role of the Anglican Church were adjusted due to political

[1] T. Claydon, *William III and the Godly Revolution* (Cambridge, 2004); C. Rose, *England in the 1690s: revolution, religion and war* (Oxford, 1999).

requirements, driven by the entanglement of factional conflict with religious beliefs, concentrating upon appointments to senior church positions in England and Ireland. The Scottish bishops of the Episcopalian Church refused to swear allegiance to William and Mary in 1689, leading to the establishment of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland.

After a brief study of the historiography relating to the major ecclesiastical appointments of the reign, I will analyse the religious beliefs and practices of the joint monarchs, concentrating upon the evidence provided by their personal devotional practice and involvement with religious controversies in the United Provinces before 1688. This will highlight some of the important variances in religious thought which could coexist under the umbrella of terms such as latitudinarian and tolerationist. I will then divide analysis of ecclesiastical preferment in England between 1689-1702 into three distinct phases: the immediate aftermath of the Revolution; the period of increased influence of the queen in Church appointments; and the years after Mary's death when William, in theory if not always in practice, devolved responsibility for senior ecclesiastical appointments to a clerical commission. The sections will examine the reasons for appointments, the identities of those primarily responsible for selection, and the mechanics of the patronage chain. I will conclude with observations drawing out some of the major themes exhibited across the time periods: the impossibility of dissociating matters of church patronage from those of secular politics; the dangers of either attempting to classify individuals too rigidly or of searching for comprehensive consistency of thought on the part of patrons; and finally, and perhaps most importantly, how monarchical involvement (and sometimes lack of involvement) in ecclesiastical patronage contributed to a reduction of internal religious conflict.

As a means of investigating patronage practices, Stuart-Orange senior ecclesiastical appointments have received relatively little attention. This is despite the recognised importance of religious dispute as a determinant of the establishment of the regime and the rich nature of the related historical sources for its study. The autobiographies or near contemporaneous biographies of those appointed to senior ecclesiastical positions are not shy in denoting the patronage chain which led to the bestowal of office, together with the qualities which gave rise to advancement.[2] The historical works, memoirs and letters of those primarily responsible for the bestowal of office- Queen Mary and Gilbert Burnet in particular- provide much evidence from the donor side of the patronage chain.[3] The only study to consider the reign's ecclesiastical appointments in detail is that of Gareth Bennett from 1966.[4] This analyses in depth the backdrop of religious debate against which the most important preferments were made. However, Bennett's emphasis upon, in his words, 'the moderate clerical alliance of Nottingham and Tillotson' somewhat masks the influence of Burnet and William himself.[5] Bennett's lack of attention to the part played by Mary has been corrected by Melinda Zook, although the extent and methods of Mary's involvement in

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[2] Thomas Birch, *Remarks upon the Life of the most Reverend Dr John Tillotson* (London, 1753); Thomas Sharp and Thomas Newcome, *The Life of John Sharp, D.D. Lord Archbishop of York* (2 vols, London, 1825); *Memoirs of the Life and Times of the Most Reverend Father in God, Dr. Thomas Tenison* (London, 1716); Timothy Goodwln, *The Life and character of that eminent and learned prelate, Dr. Edward Stillingfleet* (London, 1735); *The Life of Richard Kidder, D.D., Bishop of Bath and Wells: Written by himself,* ed. A.E. Robinson (Somerset Record Society, 37, 1924); Edward Carpenter, *The Protestant Bishop, being the life of Henry Compton, Bishop of London* (London, 1956).

[3] Mary's letters are mainly found in B. Bathurst, *Letters of Two Queens* (London, 1924) and Sir John Dalrymple, *Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland* (3 vols, Edinburgh, 1771-88). The Memoirs were printed in *Memoirs of Mary, Queen of England, (1689-93)*, ed. R. Doebner (Leipzig, 1886). Gilbert Burnet, *History of his own time: from the restoration of King Charles the Second, to the Treaty of Peace at Utrecht, in the reign of Queen Anne* (6 vols, Oxford, 1823).

[4] G.V. Bennett, 'King William III and the Episcopate', in G.V. Bennett and J. Walsh (eds.), *Essays in modern English church history, in memory of Norman Sykes* (London, 1966), pp.104-32.

[5] Bennett, 'Episcopate', p.105.

church patronage were not a particular focus of her work.[6] Substantial modern biographies of the main participants in the direction of ecclesiastical patronage either do not exist, in the case of Mary and Archbishop Tillotson, or, if they do, spend little time on its analysis.[7] The latitudinarian views of the majority of bishops appointed by the joint monarchs and their role in the promulgation of 'Godly Revolution' have been extensively described by Tony Claydon and Craig Rose, although the ways in which those appointments either corresponded or were made to dovetail with the needs of secular politics were not a central theme of their work.[8] Relatively recently, Jonathan Israel has emphasized the European facing aspect of the thinking behind Stuart-Orange church policy in his work on the Glorious Revolution, throwing fresh light on the rationale for senior ecclesiastical appointments.[9] The multiplicity of angles from which these studies have approached ecclesiastical patronage is perhaps an indicator of the subject's complexity. This study aims to demonstrate the considerable extent to which complexity derived from the pressures of secular politics. That does not mean that the views of either William or Mary were predominantly secular. The interplay of religious and secular considerations required the monarchs to take account of political faction in order that the long-term objectives of preserving and ultimately improving the Godly Protestant nations of Europe could be achieved. Political and religious aims were interlinked.

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[6] M. Zook, 'A Latitudinarian Queen: Mary II and her Churchmen,' in S. Apetrei and H. Smith (eds.), *Religion and Women in Britain, c.1660-1760* (London, 2016).
[7] S. Baxter, *William III* (London, 1966); T. Claydon and W. Speck, *William and Mary* (Oxford, 2007).
[8] Claydon, *William III and the Godly Revolution*; Rose, *England in the 1690,* ch.5.
[9] J. Israel, 'The Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution', in J. Israel (ed.), *The Anglo-Dutch moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its world impact* (Cambridge, 1991), pp.123-44.

A brief survey of William and Mary's religious beliefs and practices in the United Provinces prior to 1688 can provide insights into each monarch's vision for the post-Revolution Anglican Church, together with the qualities they desired of its clergy. It is useful as a means of highlighting the differences in interpretation of the term latitudinarian which existed between William and the Anglican clerics whom he came to appoint (many of whom also struggled to agree on the term's meaning). Those religious beliefs and practices will then be juxtaposed against the English ecclesiastical order over which William and Mary came to preside, concentrating upon the dangers to political stability which the allocation of patronage had occasioned in the preceding reign.

William III's depth of religious conviction was questioned by his contemporaries. Early in the joint reign, Burnet advised him to attend chapel more often.[10] William's laconic sense of humour, demonstrated when he asked Burnet 'what he thought of the doctrine of predestination now?' after the Protestant wind had miraculously brought William's invasion fleet into harbour unopposed, could be deemed evidence of an individual who did not take religion sufficiently seriously.[11] Such an inference is incorrect. Rather, William's devotional practice emphasised the individual's personal relation to God. A constant feature of his many years on campaign was attendance at daily prayers, irrespective of circumstance. He possessed a Calvinist dislike of forms of religious observance which emphasised elaborate forms of worship at the expense of the centrality of the Bible and prayer. This dislike did not extend to a perceived need to convert forcibly others to his form of religious belief. Nor did

[10] Gilbert Burnet: 'it will appear very strange if he does not come, at least in the morning, frequently to prayers in the lobby,' quoted in R.W. Blencowe (ed.), *Diary of the times of Charles the Second* (London, 1843), ii, p.288.
[11] Burnet, *History*, iii, p.311.

it entail a belief in the need to impose secular penalties for the refusal to participate in the religion of the state. In the United Provinces, William was prepared to appoint individuals, including Roman Catholics, to senior administrative and military office irrespective of their form of Christian belief.[12] William did not use his influence as stadhouder to promote specific factions within the Dutch Reformed Church. His interventions in religious disputes, as we have seen in the introductory chapter on stadhouder practice in the United Provinces, were often occasioned by a desire to gain political advantage rather than to promote a particular religious grouping. He rarely intervened on behalf of Voetians in their disputes with members of the more overtly Republican Cocceian faction, even though Voetian clergy had been supportive from the pulpit of the House of Orange during the stadhouderless period. In both Middleburg and Frisia, William became involved in religious factional disputes primarily to further his aim of preserving unity under his leadership in the face of the French threat to Dutch political independence and religious diversity.[13] Voetians and Cocceians both comprised significant proportions of the Dutch population - an overly pro-Voetian stance on William's part could have been counterproductive for unity. The demographics of religious diversity combined with William's personal faith to produce an interpretation of the term latitudinarian which was far more tolerant of minority religious beliefs than William was to find amongst many of the Anglican clerics whom he promoted.

[12] The stadhouder did not administer clerical patronage in the United Provinces. This was under the control of the individual towns and cities.
[13] Israel, *Republic*, pp.819-21.

Mary was accustomed to demonstrating her Protestant faith in a public setting at religious services on a much more regular basis than William.[14] She had been tutored by upholders of Anglican High Church practice such as the future Bishop of London, Henry Compton. An early point of difference in her relationship with William related to her desire for a private chapel where she could attend services performed according to the rites of the Anglican church. This was allowed to her, but only in what became a multipurpose space where she would greet guests. William was openly critical of the step to the altar which was incorporated into the chapel's design.[15] Mary's Anglican chaplains also irritated William; he sent a number of them back to England, although in at least one case for the good reason that they had been spying on behalf of James II.[16] When, in 1678, one of Mary's chaplains voiced his opposition to the idea of liberty of conscience for English Dissenters, William told him, 'Well, Dr. Hooper you will never be a bishop.'[17] Although both Mary and William were convinced of their roles as vessels of God charged with the promotion of the Protestant faith, they were not completely aligned as to how to demonstrate that faith. Their differences were encapsulated in their reactions to the 1689 Coronation service: William complained to Witsen of 'the comedy of the coronation' with its 'crazy old Papal ceremonies;' Mary was

[14] H.W. Chapman, *Mary II, Queen of England* (London, 1953), p.84. She attended services in her chapel twice a day.
[15] A. Prowse, 'Some memorandums concerning Bishop Hooper', Lambeth Palace Library, MS 3016, p.5. Quoted in William Marshall, 'Hooper, George (1640-1727)', *ODNB* (Oxford, September 2004) https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/13705 (25 July 2024).
[16] Letter of the Prince of Orange to the Earl of Rochester, October 22 1685. Singer (ed.), *Hyde Correspondence*, i, p.163.
[17] Prowse, 'Hooper', p.6.

more concerned that she would not be in the right state of mind to participate in one of those ceremonies- the receiving of communion.[18]

The previous reign had shown how divisive appointments to senior positions both within the universities, where future clerics were educated, and within the Anglican church itself, could prove. James II had used ecclesiastical preferment as a means of increasing his control over the Anglican Church. In the Universities he pursued a policy of promoting Roman Catholics to senior collegiate positions- for example in 1687 he tried to insert Anthony Farmer as President of Magdalen College, Oxford. Within the Anglican Church, he promoted High Churchmen, such as Samuel Parker (to the See of Oxford) and Thomas Sprat (to Rochester), who consistently supported James's actions.[19] The events leading to the trial of the Seven Bishops in 1688 demonstrated the degree to which the Church was in danger of losing its independence as well as the role of its senior clerics in providing leadership against James's perceived attempts to alter the constitution and religion of England. Church leaders' authority was enhanced by their influence over the direction of preferment within their individual dioceses. The bishops in Wales, according to Burnet, 'gave almost all the benefices in their diocese,' whilst Stillingfleet, in his role as Dean of Saint Paul's Cathedral in London, controlled the direction of many of the livings in the City.[20] In addition, as members of the House of Lords, the twenty-seven English and Welsh bishops had significant

[18] *Correspondentie van Willem III en Bentinck*, ii, pp.277 and 281; Mary, *Memoirs*, p.13.
[19] Both Sprat and Parker proclaimed James II's Declaration of Indulgence, for example. T. Harris, *Revolution: The Great Crisis of the British Monarchy, 1685-1720 (*London, 2006), p.219.
[20] Burnet, *History*, iv, p.407; Goodwin, *Life of Stillingfleet*, p.59.

influence over the progress of new legislation.[21] The tendency to follow royal instructions pliantly in their voting behaviour was regularly criticised. [22] Algernon Sidney, although extreme in his level of criticism, was not alone in his belief that bishops were 'mitre-bearing parasites', who, 'by rendering themselves slaves to those who have usurped the civil powers, make use of their swords to oppress all that are truly godly.'[23]

These introductory remarks have illustrated how religious dispute, often connected with the allocation of place, contributed to political instability in James II's reign. They have also indicated the potential fissures that could have developed during their joint reign due to William and Mary's contrasting views of the correct form of religious observance. The monarchs' shared view that it was essential to concentrate upon what Tillotson called 'the weightier things of the law, faith, and mercy, and judgement and the love of God' rather than to be 'zealous about small things' was a major reason why this did not occur.[24] I will now examine how this overriding principle was incorporated within decision-making relating to appointments to high ecclesiastical office.

At the beginning of the reign, the potential for a public display of divergence between the joint monarchs was diminished by William assuming sole oversight of church business, including ecclesiastical preferment. Displaying a confidence in his ability to oversee a

[21] The role of the bishops in the House of Lords is considered in R. Paley and P. Seaward (eds.), *Honour, Interest and Power: an Illustrated History of the House of Lords, 1660-1715* (Woodbridge, 2010), pp.140-6.
[22] Charlwood Lawton, *A Short state of our condition with relation to the present Parliament* (London, 1693), p.1.
[23] Algernon Sidney, *Court Maxims*, ed. H.W. Blom et al. (Cambridge, 1996), p.105.
[24] John Tillotson, 'The Care of Our Souls', 14 April 1689, *Sermons*, 2:432, quoted in Pincus, *Revolution*, p.429. Beveridge's attitude to these reforms led John Tillotson to say to him, 'Doctor, doctor, charity is better than rubrics' (Thomas Birch, *The Life of ... John Tillotson*, 1752, p.lxxxviii). Quoted in Leonard Cowie, 'Beveridge, William (bap.1637-1708)', *ODNB* (Oxford, September 2004), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/2321 (15 August 2024).

reconciliation of Anglicans, Dissenters and Catholics which was subsequently eroded by the realisation of the degree of difference and hostility between the various religious factions, this was when the partly successful attempts to introduce religious toleration and comprehension by legislation were made in England.[25] Mary's knowledge of English religious conditions and friendships with many leading clerics were not used by William. Until his return from Ireland in late 1690, William seems to have regarded his wife's interest in religious affairs, if combined with her perceived lack of political awareness, as a potential threat to political stability rather than as something which could be used to the regime's advantage. One of the few publicly voiced instructions which William gave before his departure for Ireland in 1690 was that 'the Queen is to give no bishoprics.'[26] He did not display consistency of confidence in Mary's abilities, was concerned that she would interfere, and was aware of the divisive effects which a misallocation of patronage could produce.[27]

Initially, William was influenced heavily by the advice of Gilbert Burnet in his allocation of ecclesiastical patronage.[28] Even before acceptance of the throne, William had been provided by Burnet on the march from Exeter to London in late 1688 with a list of candidates

[25] Horwitz, *Parliament*, pp.22-8; Claydon, *William III: Profiles in Power*, pp.102-5; Harris, *Revolution,* pp.350-4. No significant further attempts were made, perhaps reflecting William's recognition of the depths of division between the religious groupings.
[26] William to Halifax, quoted in Savile, *Life,* ii*,* p.231.
[27] William did occasionally voice confidence in his wife's political ability. For example, after one outburst complaining at his lack of ability to understand his English subjects, particularly the High Church element, he told Halifax, 'if he left us, the Queen would govern us better.' Savile*, Life,* ii, p.222.
[28] Burnet had been known to William since his arrival in The United Provinces in 1686. Greig, 'Gilbert Burnet', *ODNB.* Conversely, Tillotson seems only to have become known to William in 1689. Isabel Rivers, 'Tillotson, John (1630-94)', *ODNB* (Oxford, September 2004), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/27449 (25 July 2024).

suitable for preferment- a list which mirrors Burnet's simultaneous recommendations of individuals for preferment to England's most important secular positions. In a document headed 'The Clergy of London that deserve more particular regard from your Highness,' Burnet recommended ten Anglican ministers with metropolitan responsibilities.[29] Many of those named came to be elevated to the episcopacy in the early years of the reign to fill the large number of vacancies which occurred due either to the deaths of previous incumbents or the enforced vacation of sees previously occupied by non-juring bishops. The most important promotion was that of John Tillotson, Dean of St. Paul's, to the Archbishopric of Canterbury in 1691. William described Tillotson to his successor, Tenison, as 'the honestest Man, and the best Friend that ever he had in his life.'[30] Other significant promotions were those of John Sharp, rector of St Giles in the Fields, to York in 1691, Edward Stillingfleet, rector of St. Andrews Holborn, to Worcester in 1689, and Richard Kidder, vicar of St. Martin Outwich, to Bath and Wells in 1691.

Reputations for pastoral care, strong preaching ability, together with publicly voiced opposition to the immorality of Charles II, and, more importantly, the religious policies of James II, were common attributes of those preferred. Stillingfleet, for example, preached before Charles II on 13 March 1667 on the text 'fools make a mock of sin' and later told him, 'It is the love of sensual pleasure which is most apt to ensnare men in the practice of sin.'[31] All of the new bishops had opposed the reading from the pulpit of James II's Declaration of

[29] Gilbert Burnet to the Prince of Orange. Printed in *Diary of the times of Charles the Second,* ed. R.W. Blencowe (2 vols, London, 1843), ii, pp.281-8.
[30] Tenison, *Memoirs*, p.17.
[31] *The Works of…Edward Stillingfleet* (6 vols, London, 1710), i, pp.17-30 and p.224.

Indulgence to those not in communion with the Church of England. None were committed to the broad interpretation of toleration for Dissenters which William himself espoused. As Richard Ashcraft has argued, latitudinarianism was not a moderate middle ground for these bishops.[32] Even Tillotson, perhaps closest in religious positioning to William amongst the newly appointed bishops, had accused Nonconformists of 'gross hypocrisy' for their 'neglect of the sacrament.'[33] And Tillotson's views were decidedly moderate compared to the stringent High Church Anglicanism exhibited by Grove, Stillingfleet and John Sharp.[34]

Burnet retained his influence with William on matters of preferment after the coronation. His appointment in 1689 as Bishop of Salisbury, a diocese which extended to Windsor, along with his post as chaplain to the king, gave Burnet regular access to both William and Mary.[35] Bennett's assertion of William's reliance upon Nottingham and Tillotson is correct, but the degree of dependence fluctuated in the early years of the reign. Another influence upon Wiilliam's thinking regarding ecclesiastical preferment in 1689 was provided by George Savile, Marquess of Halifax, who believed that he was responsible, for example, for the elevation of Stillingfleet to Worcester in 1689 rather than the strongly Calvinist, John Hall.[36] Bennett's assertion that Nottingham and Tillotson were engaged in 'a dogged rearguard action to prevent the Church of England from becoming the battlefield of political faction' is also only partly correct.[37] Religious disagreement was integral to political faction and the

[32] R. Ashcraft, 'Latitudinarianism and toleration: historical myth versus political history', in R.Kroll et al (eds.), *Philosophy, Science and Religion 1640-1700* (Cambridge, 1992), pp.151-177.
[33] Ashcraft, 'Latitudinarianism', p.159.
[34] Exhibited, for example, in Robert Grove, *A Vindication of the conforming clergie from the unjust aspersions of heresie* (London, 1676).
[35] Burnet spent four months of the year in Windsor. Greig, 'Gilbert Burnet', *ODNB*.
[36] 'I said so much to him, that I think I stopt it, from Dr. Hall.' Savile, *Life*, ii, p.223.
[37] Bennett, 'Episcopate', p.105.

ability to influence episcopal appointments was regarded as important by both clerics and politicians. William was deeply influenced in his ecclesiastical appointments by the views of his closest English political advisers.

At the start of the reign, those advisers were predominantly Whig and their views on ecclesiastical matters corresponded with the advice of Burnet and the disposition of William himself. William's statement to the House of Lords in March 1689 that he wished for 'the admission to public office of all Protestants ... willing and able to serve' is evidence of his proximity to Whig modes of thinking at this point as well as his lack of understanding of the depth of support for the Test Acts as a means of protection for the position of the Church of England.[38] It took the overplaying of the Whig hand, demonstrated by their pursuit of retribution upon those regarded as responsible for the injustices of the previous reigns, to persuade William to appoint to his ministry advisers more sympathetic to Tory High Church ways of thought. The appointment of the High Church and violently anti-Whig Robert Grove to the Bishopric of Chichester in 1691 would have been unlikely without the change of political persuasion amongst William's political advisers. Grove's views on the position of the Church were, in the view of his biographer, 'Filmeresque'- almost as far from latitudinarian as you could get in many respects.[39] It was a common trope to bemoan the existence of faction; nevertheless, the structure within which English state governance was

[38] Bennett, 'Episcopate', p.115.
[39] J.S. Chamberlain, 'Grove, Robert (c.1634-1696)', *ODNB* (Oxford, September 2004), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/11684 (25 July 2024).

undertaken at this period forced monarchs and politicians alike to accommodate it within their political thinking and practice.

The necessity of relying upon more than piety alone to influence monarchical views on ecclesiastical matters was also well known to the clergy. Tillotson, for example, sent a paper on September 13, 1689 to Portland regarding the extent of concessions to the Church of England required to enable the passing of a Comprehension bill in Parliament. His subsequent elevation to Canterbury over the rival claims of John Sharp was due, in Burnet's opinion, to the fact that Sharp 'did not know the world so well.'[40] The personal relationships formed between politicians and Churchmen were as significant as the allegiances formed by the contours of religious and political debate. On the occasion of Shrewsbury's first decision to resign from government, it was Tillotson whom William sent to attempt to dissuade him. Monarchs, politicians and clerics needed to work within a governance framework dominated by factional politics to achieve their desired outcomes for ecclesiastical policy and preferment.

The senior church appointments made in the first two years of the reign helped to balance and thereby reduce the destabilising effects of political and religious faction. The low Church views of those initially appointed- Tillotson, Burnet, Patrick, Ironside- were later counterbalanced by the promotions of Sharp, Stillingfleet and Grove. This was important at a time when the abolition of the episcopacy in Scotland and the strong growth of attendance at Dissenting places of worship following the passing of the Toleration Act in England were

[40] Burnet, *History,* iv, p.131.

causing heightened fears of neglect amongst High Church members.[41] Satisfying the views of all competing factions within the Church of England was an impossible task. Widely shared antipathy to the religious policies of James II did not evolve into agreement on the shape of the religious landscape in his successors' reign. Tony Claydon has demonstrated that Stuart-Orange religious policy 'left many matters ambiguous and contested.'[42] The appointment of bishops potentially lessened the room for ambiguity of interpretation: the balanced nature of the religious viewpoints of those selected reduced the risk of accentuating divisions. Here was a successful utilisation of 'trimming'- the episcopate was shaped in ways which furthered the long-term goals of the regime, whilst simultaneously responding to the short-term need to preserve unity. It is impossible to know whether this balancing act occurred providentially or through deliberate policy on the monarchs' part. As with so many areas of executive policy involving William, there is no surviving written evidence. However, the indications from William's preferred means of operation in other areas, his balancing of religious faction in the United Provinces, and the nature of his personal religious beliefs, all point to some degree of intentionality on William's part.

The appointments also helped to reassure the European audience which William needed to placate. Jonathan Israel has emphasised how the European reception of religious policy in England at the start of the reign was an important determinant of the policy's formulation.

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[41] 3901 Dissenters' places of worship were licensed between May 1689 and 1710. J. Israel, 'William III and Toleration', in O.P. Grell, J. Israel, N. Tyacke (eds.), *From Persecution to Toleration: The Glorious Revolution and Religion in England* (Oxford, 1991), p.151; G.V. Bennett, 'Conflict in the Church', in G. Holmes (ed.), *Britain after the Glorious Revolution*, 1689–1714 (London, 1969), p.163; G. Holmes, *The Trial of Doctor Sacheverell* (London, 1973), p.36.

[42] Claydon, *Godly Revolution*, p.159.

To preserve the confederate league against Louis XIV, William needed to demonstrate his desire for toleration for both Catholics and dissenters to a dubious audience: for example, both the Holy Roman Empire and Spain had delayed recognition of William and Mary as rightful monarchs until after the Toleration Act had passed.[43]

Of equal bearing to the survival of the regime as the allocation of episcopal place was the treatment of incumbent non-juring clerics whose religious views occasioned their opposition to the new monarchs. At the same time as his recommendations for preferment, Burnet had advised William that 'because a great many ill men have been put in the Church by the King (James II), it may be considered if it is not surely fit to turn out all that have been put in by him, and then to restore such to their places whose behaviour may have deserved it.'[44] William did not take this advice and was loath to remove clerics from their positions, aware of the dangers of creating martyrs who could act as focal points for protest. The non-juring bishops were allowed to remain in post for almost two years after their refusal to take the oath of allegiance to William and Mary- it was only when one of those bishops, Turner of Ely, was implicated in the Preston plot to restore James that William decided on their replacement. The desire not to punish opponents for their religious beliefs again made sense within a European context. It was another example, in Burnet's view, of William's attempt to 'manage the English Nation as dexterously as he hath hitherto done the Dutch' in order that 'he will be the arbiter of all Europe.'[45] In addition, William was lenient to some (but not all) of those who initially refused on grounds of conscience to replace the non-juring

[43] Israel, 'William III and Toleration', p.151.
[44] Blencowe, *Diary,* ii, p.286.
[45] Burnet, notes for *History*. BL Add. MS 63057B, fo.128. Quoted in Rose, *England in the 1690s*, p.7.

bishops. Beveridge, for example, was removed from the list of Court Chaplains after he refused to accept the Bishopric of Bath and Wells due to his belief that the previous non-juring incumbent could not be 'uncanonically turned out to beg his bread.' [46] He only received episcopal preferment in the next reign when promoted by Anne to St. Asaph in 1704. Conversely, Sharp was consecrated Archbishop of York despite his earlier refusal of Norwich and Kidder was appointed to Bath and Wells almost immediately after he had refused Peterborough.

Tillotson's advocacy was provided in the *Life of Kidder* as the main reason for Kidder's elevation to the Bishopric of Bath and Wells.[47] The archbishop was equally influential after Mary gained William's trust and was allowed to become more prominent in ecclesiastical management from late 1690 onwards. Burnet attributed William's transferral of responsibility to regret that he 'could not resist importunities' in matters of ecclesiastical preferment.[48] He 'devolved that care upon the queen, which she managed with strict and religious prudence: she declared openly against the preferring of those who put in for themselves.' [49] Another reason for William's delegation of authority may have been increased confidence on the king's part in Mary's ability to take into account the wider political implications of ecclesiastical preferment. Mary consistently referred to the dangers of political division in her letters at this time and had demonstrated the ability to withstand

[46] William Beveridge letter, May 28 1691. Oxford, Bodleian MS Tanner, 26, fo.74. His refusal of it made him popular with the nonjurors but disliked at court, and he was violently criticized in a pamphlet, *A vindication of their majesties' authority to fill the sees of the deprived bishops, in a letter out of the country, occasioned by Dr. B—'s refusal of the bishoprick of Bath and Wells* (1691). Cowie, 'William Beveridge', *ODNB*.
[47] *Life of Kidder,* p.61.
[48] Burnet, *History,* iv, p.205.
[49] Burnet, *History*, iv, pp.205-6.

the pressures of faction during William's absence on campaign in Ireland.[50] Her Memoirs for 1691 stress 'a great division in the Church' as one of the main reasons for her unquiet mind over the course of the year.[51] The Queen's increased influence coincided with the period during the reign when religious controversy had the least disruptive impact upon secular politics. This was despite the deposition in 1691 of the non-juring bishops- an event which could have been expected to produce heightened tension. The differences in Protestant religious belief and practice which existed between Mary and William may have acted to lessen religious tension within England rather than to magnify it. Dissenter and High Church adherent alike could look to a sovereign whom they believed would protect their cause. The monarchs' shared emphasis upon the core elements of the Christian faith rather than matters indifferent was a key element of the messaging of their desire to unite the nation through a deepening of religious faith.[52] Mary's increased role in governance may have acted as a unifying force despite the two monarchs' religious differences.

The queen's approach to the direction of ecclesiastical preferment differed from that of William. Burnet, eager to highlight Mary's piety, wrote that whereas William 'judged right… to have Canterbury well filled: for the rest would turn upon that,' Mary 'was under a real anxiety when Church Preferments, especially the most Eminent ones, were to be disposed of. She reckoned that that was one of the main Parts of her Care; for which a particular

[50] She had, for example, declined an offer of a loan of £200,000 made by Monmouth in return for her agreement to prorogue Parliament. This was made on behalf of the Whig party who believed a new Parliament would contain a greater contingent of Whig members. Horwitz, *Parliament*, p.61.
[51] Mary, *Memoirs*, p.39.
[52] Claydon, *Godly Revolution,* esp. pp.90-110.

Account was to be given to..... God.'[53] The final conversation Burnet held with Mary included a discussion of how best to provide for Church livings.[54] Selection of the most suitable candidates for preferment was part of a multi-faceted attempt on her part to improve the godliness of the nation.[55] She participated in the selection of clergy for all levels of preferment and monitored their performance.

Mary adopted a collaborative approach to ecclesiastical preferment. Although she 'consulted chiefly with the Archbishop of Canterbury,' she sought advice and information from a wide variety of sources.[56] Daniel Finch, Earl of Nottingham, whose religious positioning seems to have corresponded closely with her own, was Mary's main source of advice from amongst government ministers. His influence was wide-ranging; Burnet believed that 'Nottingham's being in the ministry ... first saved the church and then the crown.'[57] The choice of replacements for the non-juring bishops, whose selection William made a point of leaving to Mary after his departure on campaign, was considered to have been heavily influenced by Nottingham:

> The Whigs believe that my Lord President and my Lord Nottingham will have absolute control along with the Archbishop of Canterbury in the disposal of the bishoprics and most important benefices, and that they will choose those of their friends who are the most solid supporters of the High Church.[58]

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[53] Burnet, *History*, iv, p.135. Burnet, *Essay*, p.105.
[54] Burnet, *Essay*, p.105.
[55] 'The first thing that surprised me at my coming over, was to see so little devotion in a people so lately in such eminent danger.' Mary, *Memoirs*, p.11.
[56] Burnet, *History,* iv, p.206.
[57] *A supplement to Burnet's History of my own time*, ed. H.C. Foxcroft (London, 1902), p.314.
[58] 'Les Whigs croyent par avance que my Lord President et my Lord Nottingham gouverneront absolument par adresse en autrement l'archeveque de Canterbury pour la disposition des eveches et des autres gros benefices, et qu'ils choisiront parmy leurs amis les plus rigides pour l'eglise episcopale.' Newsletter in the *Report of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts 7* (London, 1879), p.198.

Between 1691 and 1693, senior ecclesiastical preferment was often bestowed upon clerics known for their High Church views. The elevation of John Sharp, formerly Nottingham's chaplain, to the Archbishopric of York, is the best example of this, although the preferments of Kidder, to Bath and Wells, and Hooper, to the Deanery of Canterbury, show a similar direction.[59] The appointments correspond with the increased influence of Tory politicians, whose outlook had much in common with that of Nottingham, in Stuart-Orange government ministries. Mary allied with Nottingham in order to persuade Kidder to accept Bath and Wells: it was 'from the Queen's direction that I was recommended to Bath and Wells, and that the Earl said that I must not refuse it.'[60] But Mary did not confine herself to reliance upon those with High Church views if she thought it would serve her purpose. For example, as part of her effort to promote Stillingfleet as Tillotson's successor as Archbishop of Canterbury, she solicited Shrewsbury's help to attempt to persuade the Whig party that Stillingfleet's High Church views would not prove detrimental to that faction.[61]

Mary used her wide range of contacts 'to inform herself particularly of the merits of such of the clergy as were not so much as known at court.'[62] According to Burnet, 'She looked to appoint clerics who would 'watch over their Flock, and … edifie them by good Preaching and diligent Catechising. She was resolved to have the whole Nation understand, that by these ways, and by these only, Divines were to be recommended to Favour and Preferment.'[63] Her

[59] Hooper's appointment occurred in the Spring of 1691 when William was on campaign. He may not have become a bishop, but Mary elevated him to the next highest level.
[60] *Life of Kidder*, p.62.
[61] Burnet, *History,* iv, p.238.
[62] Burnet, *History*, iv, p.206.
[63] Burnet, *Essay,* p.103.

influence seems to have become widely recognised. Thomas Framalier wrote to Viscount Hatton, Nottingham's son-in-law: 'But I have no other, nor know of any more effectual way, than to pray your Lordship to Recommend me to my Lady Nottingham for her Recommendation to her Majesty: I am informed the King leaves the disposal of all inferior preferments to her, and that My Lady has a particular share, as she justly deserves in the Queen's favour.'[64] The timing of this request was unfortunate- the letter, dated December 22, 1694, was written just a few days before Mary's death and Framalier never seems to have achieved significant promotion.[65] But the letter demonstrates Mary's reputation along with the conduits of patronage which were considered to lead to her. Nor was she afraid to stand in the way of those whom she did not consider worthy of advancement: 'the Queen has commanded me to write to my Lord Sydney about it,... that Mr. Trench should have this preferment (the Deanery of Rapho) and that Mr. Chambers should not.. of whom the Queen has received so ill a caracter that she will be much dissatisfied if he be advanced.[66] The seniority of the cleric did not matter if Mary considered their actions inappropriate. The Bishop of Durham's attempt to translate himself to the lesser diocese of Coventry and Lichfield as a means of avoiding complete dismissal was effectively blocked by Mary's intervention: 'The Queen will not endure this offer.'[67]

[64] BL Add. MS 29565, fo.501.
[65] Thomas Framallier is recorded as the curate of Great Haseley in the Diocese of Oxford until 1695. 'Thomas Framallier (CCEd Person ID 19231)', *The Clergy of the Church of England Database 1540-1835* <http://www.theclergydatabase.org.uk> (15 December 2024). The next mention of Thomas Framallier in the *Database* is on his appointment as Vicar of Heston in 1712, although it is unclear whether this is the same individual. A Thomas Trammalier (CCEd Person ID 163173) is also recorded as being appointed Vicar of Heston in 1712.
[66] Nottingham letter to the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, August 13 1691. HMC Finch, iii, p.203.
[67] Nottingham letter to Sydney, May 8 1691. HMC Finch, iii, p.53.

Mary was particularly concerned for the state of the clergy in Ireland. Almost as soon as it became clear that the campaign to reconquer Ireland would be successful, Mary wrote to William that she wished he would 'take care of the church in Ireland.'[68] Matters of patronage especially concerned her: 'There are new bishoprics vacant, and other things, I beg you would take time to consider who you will fill them with.'[69] These remarks date from late 1690, a time when Mary seemingly did not yet have either the authority from William or the confidence to act independently. This had changed by the summer of 1691 when Mary was redirecting the Irish Deanery of Rapho to Mr. Trench. Her independent agency in matters of Irish senior ecclesiastical preferment was especially apparent in 1693. In that year she commanded Viscount Sidney, the monarchs' representative in Ireland, to rescind the elevation of one of Sidney's kinsmen to a bishopric due to his bad reputation.[70] She also attempted to persuade, unsuccessfully, Thomas Tenison to accept appointment as the Archbishop of Dublin.[71]

The queen was careful not to emphasize publicly the extent of her involvement with church business, including patronage. She does mention in her Memoirs that she was involved with the choice of replacements for the non-juring bishops. Even here though, she attempts to apportion any credit for success to William: 'The only thing of busines I concerned myself in, was the filling the Bishopricks which was now done; and I am sure the king made it a point of conscience to do it well, which I think he has.'[72] As Tony Claydon noted, when Tillotson

[68] Dalrymple, *Memoirs,* Appendix to ii, p.132.
[69] Ibid., p.142.
[70] Burnet, *History*, iv, p.209.
[71] Carpenter, *Tenison,* p.364.
[72] Mary, *Memoirs,* p.37.

asked Mary to issue a royal injunction to tighten control of clerical ordination, the queen agreed but preferred to delay the order until William returned from campaign in Flanders. 'She worried that producing the orders solely in her name might create the suspicion that she was the only one of the royal couple to care about the church.'[73] When the preferences of William and Mary differed, it was the queen who capitulated. For example, Mary had wished for Tillotson to be succeeded by Stillingfleet in 1694. That Tenison eventually prevailed is evidence of the reversion of Whig ministerial control and William's desire both to accede to Whig views and perhaps also to show his ultimate authority over ecclesiastical matters. The degree of dissension between the monarchs may have been lessened by Mary's high regard for Tenison.

Mary's involvement in clerical appointment-making provides a suitable entry point for a wider analysis of the queen's political techniques, surveying both her methods of engagement with a predominantly male audience and her control of self-representation. In the opinion of Agnes Strickland, 'The abilities of Queen Mary, and the importance of her personal exertions as sovereign, have been as much under-rated as the goodness of her heart has been overestimated.'[74] Strickland has insights which deserve to be incorporated within a less jaundiced account of Mary's character and actions.[75] How Mary and William divided responsibility for the allocation of church preferment illustrates the complex and changing relationship between the two monarchs. William's initial reluctance to permit

[73] Claydon, *Godly Revolution,* p.173, quoting Letter from Tillotson to Burnet, 10 September 1694. BL Add. MS 4236, fo.261.
[74] Strickland, *Lives,* p.569.
[75] Rosemary Mitchell, 'Strickland, Agnes (1796-1874)', *ODNB* (Oxford, September 2004), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/26663 (30 August 2024).

Mary's involvement in senior clerical selection was eventually replaced by an almost complete devolvement of control, albeit one in which William remained anxious to be seen to retain ultimate responsibility. The reasons for the reallocation of control can partly be attributed to force of circumstance: William's multiple responsibilities made personal oversight in all areas impossible. It can also be attributed to Mary's success in persuading William of her ability to perform the task of church preferment in a way which was both superior to that which he could have achieved himself, but which also would not be seen to threaten his primacy within the joint monarchy.

Mary's wish to lead a simple, pious life should not be doubted. This is evidenced by her twice daily attendance at church services and the repeated iteration in her writings of the desire to be sheltered from the world's concerns to facilitate concentration upon her spiritual welfare. Complete withdrawal was made impossible by William's need to delegate some of his multiple responsibilities and Mary's perception of her role as queen of an internally divided country threatened by invasion which she regarded as perilously unaware of its religious iniquity. In the United Provinces, William's infidelity, which she considered to have both personal and public repercussions, had eventually led in 1685 to Mary's direct confrontation with her husband.[76] That direct approach failed. Elizabeth Villiers, whom Mary had forced to return to England, was quickly reinstated by William within the court at The Hague.[77] As Queen of England, Mary came to employ a much more complex set of skills in

[76] Chapman, *Mary II,* pp.123-4.

[77] 'The princess's heart is like to break; and yet every day… (she) counterfeits the greatest joy… The prince hath made her his absolute slave.' Dr. Covell, letter to Mr. Skelton, Dieren, October 15 1685. Printed in *Hyde correspondence*, i, p.165.

order to achieve her aims, aims whose achievement she considered essential both for her personal salvation and for the survival of the Protestant regime.

Mary continued to emphasise publicly her female weakness. She professed a self-deprecating view of female capability, epitomised in phrases such as 'My sex was not able to bear these violent passions.'[78] Her coordinated approach to improving the religious life of the nation shows a diligence and self-assurance which does not tally with her professed weakness. Simple piety was supported by the use of more worldly techniques and accomplishments to achieve her aims. 'Pretending ignorance as a cultural script', in Daybell's apposite phrase, was a deliberately employed trope which she used to increase male sympathy and support.[79] It simultaneously helped Mary to highlight her husband's qualities and increase her own influence over a predominantly male audience. Her piety was supported by strong use of her powers of observation, sociability and capacity for hard work, and, unlike her father, she did not break down in the face of the threat of invasion.

It is difficult to imagine William acting in the same way as his wife when, during the 1690 invasion threat, Mary invited the Jacobite Earl of Ailesbury to play basset with her, even giving him money do so.[80] Mary knew Ailesbury well enough to realise that he was sufficiently courteous not to pose a physical threat (he described her as 'a Princess perfect in all respects').[81] Her hospitality and generosity were qualities designed to promote the regime favourably at a time of considerable political tension. In contrast, she had no hesitation in

[78] Mary, *Memoirs*, p.50.
[79] J. Daybell (ed.), *Women and Politics in Early Modern England* (Aldershot, 2004), p.13.
[80] Ailesbury, *Memoirs*, i, pp.264-5.
[81] Ailesbury, *Memoirs*, i, p.345.

'clapping up' genuinely dangerous threats to the regime such as Sir John Fenwick, who stalked and threatened her in St. James's Park, and her uncle, Henry Hyde, whom she knew to be in regular correspondence with the Jacobite court. Mary's innate sense of fun seems to have found a politically useful outlet in impressing her fellow councillors with her bravado and mettle. Ailesbury again was a beneficiary when Mary removed his name from a list of Jacobite suspects to be imprisoned. The Queen replaced it with that of another whose guilt was equally questionable, commenting that 'I thought persons were to be taken up for crimes and not to make up numbers as they empanel jurymen.'[82] Mary seems to have been amused by the slightly absurd element in the proceedings: 'Since you will have your number, put in that lord's name instead of my Lord Ailesbury's, and if titles please you, there is an Earl for an Earl. What is sauce for one is sauce for another.'[83] Such actions displayed a self-confidence which will have been honed by years of observation at the court of her uncle. It seems to have worked as a means of impressing her male audience. Danby, for example, initially exhibited scepticism concerning Mary's ability to preside over the Regency council. He very pointedly asked her what she would do in the event of invasion, as if to test her.[84] It was his place to offer advice rather than ask direct questions. Mary herself complained that meetings of the council were taking place without her knowledge. The queen's conduct at those meetings, together with the practical steps which she oversaw to respond to the invasion threat, seems to have won over her detractors. Danby, for example, wrote to William that 'Her Majestie is very diligent at Cabinett Councills... she will not be served

[82] Ailesbury, *Memoirs*, i, p.298.
[83] Ailesbury, *Memoirs*, i, p.298.
[84] Mary, *Memoirs*, p.31.

superficially.'[85] Mary made no public complaints about either her subordinate role within the joint monarchy or William's adultery. She realised the need to subjugate her personal feelings for the good of the political relationship. She also professed happiness at her ability to disappear into the background on William's return to England from his overseas campaigns. Within the constraints imposed by William's need to assert his pre-eminence, Mary's executive actions did much to support the regime.

Mary's surviving letters and Memoirs from 1688 until her death replicate the contrast between, on the one hand, a consistently displayed desire to portray an uncomplicated character- pious, simple, inferior to her husband- and, on the other, the sophisticated behaviours of a ruler attempting to use all the resources she possessed to protect her religion and regime. The increasing complexity of Mary's writing reflects her maturity and self-awareness along with her central positioning in the European politics of the last two decades of the seventeenth century. Mary's limited correspondence with her sister Anne had, before 1688, been relatively mundane, confining itself to Anne's descriptions of James's measures to promote the Catholic religion and details of the changes to her household which Anne was making.[86] That changed with James II's intensified attempts to catholicise England and Mary of Modena's pregnancy and subsequent delivery of a male heir to James. This was of paramount concern to William, Mary and Anne as it secured a Catholic dynasty in England. Initially, Mary wrote to James congratulating him on the birth of his son.[87] However, over the summer of 1688, as divisions in England deepened over the trial of the

[85] Danby, Letter to William, 23 June 1690. Quoted in Browning, *Danby*, ii, p.167.
[86] *The Letters of Queen Anne,* ed. C. Brown (Newcastle, 1935).
[87] Dalrymple, *Memoirs,* ii, p.297.

Seven Bishops and William formulated plans to invade England, the volume of correspondence between the two sisters increased and Mary began to express doubts regarding the baby's legitimacy. It is uncertain how the bedpan rumours started, but Mary and Anne certainly played their part in spreading those rumours in a way which can scarcely be described as showing paternal regard. Anne's letters to her sister in 1688 depict her as increasingly concerned for the Protestant succession and worried that if Mary attempted to visit England, she would not be safe.[88] Mary's eighteen question response to Anne after the birth reads more like a highly sceptical cross-examination performed in a court of law. A good example is question 11:

> If any women, besides her closest associates, saw the Queen's expression whilst she was in labour, and if she had the appearance of a woman in labour? Who was in the bedchamber, both men and women? When did they arrive and how close to the queen were they?[89]

This has the mark of Burnet on it, who had been trained as a lawyer, even if he did not actually write it. Burnet was regularly in William and Mary's company at this time- actively employed by William in the propaganda war preceding the 1688 invasion.[90] Answers to the questions in the letter could have been used to emphasise Mary's status as a daughter unlawfully robbed of her rightful inheritance. This is the only one of Mary's surviving letters to take such a form, and, according to Burnet himself, he was the only one of the British exiles to live in

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[88] Dalrymple, *Memoirs*, ii, p.171.

[89] 'Si quelques femmes, hormis les confidantes, virent le visage de la Reine pendant qu'elle fut en travail d'enfant, et si elle avoit le visage d'une femme en travail d'enfant? Qui etoient dans la chambre, tant hommes que femmes? A quel temps ils arriverent et combien proches ils etoient?
Questions sent by the Princess of Orange, to the Princess Anne of Denmark, July 21 1688. Dalrymple, *Memoirs*, ii, p.177.

[90] Greig, 'Gilbert Burnet', *ODNB*.

The Hague: 'I found the Prince was resolved to make use of me. He told me, it would not be convenient for me to live anywhere but at The Hague: for none of the outlawed persons came thither.'[91] Kevin Sharpe wrote that 'The last months of James's reign were dominated by a struggle: a battle as much about what could effectively- and persuasively- be represented as the truth, as well as the truth. Like the Popish Plot, the struggle concerning the Prince of Wales was one that revolved around words and witnesses.'[92] Mary and Burnet were heavily involved in that struggle.

Mary was anxious to cast doubt on the legitimacy of James II's male heir because his birth provided a threat to the Protestant succession. Another potential obstacle to succession in the form which William desired was Mary's superior claim to the English throne. Burnet constructed and publicised a skilful answer to the problem:

> That which fixed me in their confidence was, the liberty I took, in a private conversation, with the princess, to ask her, what she intended the prince should be, if she came to the crown. She, who was new to all matters of that kind, did not understand my meaning, but fancied that whatever accrued to her would likewise accrue to him in the right of marriage. I told her it was not so and I explained king Henry the seventh's title to her, and what had passed when queen Mary married Philip of Spain. I told her, a titular kingship was no acceptable thing to a man… She desired me to propose a remedy. I told her… the remedy was, to be contented to be his wife, and to engage herself to him, that she would give him the real authority as soon as it came into her hands… this would lay the greatest obligation on him possible, and lay the foundation of a perfect union between them, which had been of late a little embroiled… William said he had been nine years married, and had never the confidence to press the matter on the queen… Ever after that, he seemed to trust me entirely.[93]

This is a version of events which contained the promise of solving multiple issues at a stroke. The Protestant succession would be settled to the satisfaction of both William and Mary and

[91] Burnet, *History*, iii, p.127.
[92] Sharpe, *Rebranding Rule*, p.313.
[93] Burnet, *History*, iii, p.129.

Burnet could claim credit for it. That William had never previously broached the subject with Mary could be used as evidence that she had not been forced to waive her sole claim to the throne. It also emphasised character traits in both William and Mary which cast them in as favourable light as possible: the simple, naïve Mary anxious to subjugate herself to her husband; and the nervous husband, wary of stepping on his wife's prerogative.

It seems too convenient to be wholly true. Did Mary or Burnet really believe that this unwritten contract would solve William's adulterous behaviour? More importantly, is it likely that Mary had never thought about the issue of the succession before? She had been designated sole heir to the throne by Parliament during the Exclusion crisis. Burnet himself wrote that 'She had read much, both in history and divinity' and 'had great knowledge.'[94] It seems unlikely that she would have been unaware that Mary I's marriage to Philip of Spain had not given her the right to transfer sovereignty to her husband and that she ruled alone. There were multiple pamphlets circulating pointing out the similarities between the situation in England in the 1680s and that which existed in the 1550s.[95] Burnet's influence on Mary is of course conjectural. What cannot be doubted is that he remained one of Mary's most trusted advisers throughout her reign - she had weekly meetings with him, and he was a preferred preacher at the services which she attended. In the matters of both the bedpan letter and the succession revelation, it is difficult not to see Mary and Burnet working together to use Mary's position and image for a common aim in a way which was far from

[94] Burnet, *History*, iii, p.126.
[95] A good example was *The History of Queen Mary's Big Belly* (London, 1688). Its less than subtle subtitle was *there is no new thing under the Sun*- a quote from the Book of Ecclesiastes- and it gave an account of Queen Mary I's false pregnancy.

simple on Mary's part. She had become, and was highly aware that she had become, a central player in the increasingly tense relations between her father and her husband. She had been forced to let go of one of her most trusted servants, her former nanny, as a result of the attempts of her personal chaplain, Dr. Covill, to provide information to the English court about the state of her marriage with William. To use another cleric in that propaganda war must have seemed appropriate to both William and Mary.

Mary's literary self-representation after 1688 is dominated by the Memoirs. They seem not to have been meant for public circulation but were nonetheless carefully constructed by Mary at the end of each year. They exhibit a constant emphasis on Mary's spiritual state and lay stress upon the same character traits consistently- piety, female weakness, the necessity of subjugation to William. The faults which she acknowledges in herself are ones which Mary wished to act as an aide-memoire for 'necessary reflection' to assist self-improvement.[96] Some of the events which could be seen as deserving of greater self-criticism, but which were more damaging to the regime, are not mentioned at all- the visit to the theatre to see a play which dealt with patricide, the love of luxury as shown by the expensive shopping trips, the chance meeting with the daughter whose father she has condemned to die. If the Memoirs were truly meant as a form of spiritual self-cleansing, did not such events deserve mention? The Memoirs are a very selective account of the public events involving Mary between 1689 and 1693. Mary's natural caution may have caused this:

[96] Mary, *Memoirs*, p.1.

the omitted events perhaps painted too unflattering a picture for Mary to feel comfortable including them in a document which might become public despite her desire for secrecy.[97]

Nor is this complexity of character much alluded to in Marian panegyric. Stuart-Orange propaganda is consistent and for the most part unchanging in its depiction of Mary's virtues: piety; loyalty to her husband; care for the poor. At the start of the reign, Mr. Rymer in his 'Poem on the Arrival of Queen Mary' declared:

> Her no Ambition moves, nor is She Proud, Save, in the Glorious Power of doing Good; So may She still above proceed a Queen, If she, on Earth, should ever cease to Reign.[98]

In 1695, after Mary's death, Gould pronounced:

> She did move in such a Glorious Sphere, She often stoop'd, and made the Poor her Care…Her diffusive love to Humane-Kind Yet did She not more often Give, than Pray.[99]

The consistency of the virtues explored suggests that Mary was successful in controlling the messaging relating to her character. Jacobite literature aimed at denigration was also consistent in its focus, concentrating on Mary's lack of true legitimacy to rule and her unnatural behaviour to her father:

> O' th' father's side she had honour we grant, But duty to parents she sadly doth want, Which makes her a fiend instead of a saint.[100]

'The Female Parricide' continued the same theme in 1690:

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[97] The alternative is that the Memoirs were edited after Mary's death. It is impossible to determine who was responsible for the surviving content of the Memoirs. However, Mary's desire to control other aspects of her representation make it at least possible that the editing is her own. See, for example Farguson, *Visualising Protestant Monarchy*, pp.125-7 for examples of Mary's use of ceremonial performances to affirm her authority.
[98] *A Poem on the Arrival of Queen Mary, February 12, 1689* (London, 1689).
[99] Robert Gould, *A poem most humbly offered to the memory of Her late Sacred Majesty, Q.M.* (London, 1695).
[100] 'The Coronation Ballad, April 11 1689.' *POAS*, v, p.45.

> Thou wouldst , like Tullia, with triumphant pride, Thy chariot drive, winged with ambitious fire, O'er the dead body of thy mangled sire.[101]

Mary did not wish to publicise her more worldly qualities and her ability to fashion her own image has been remarkable: her influence has consequently either been underestimated or its recognition confined to areas which she herself encouraged. Those closest to her acknowledged that they had difficulty truly understanding her. Burnet stated, 'she is the most reserved person alive, unto whose thoughts no creature can enter further than as she discovers them.'[102] William also had difficulty in understanding his wife: when discussing how to relate to her, he could only offer this advice to the Duke of Leeds: 'She would not always tell the whole truth.'[103] This ability to mask her thoughts facilitated Mary's control of her image. She combined that ability with her other qualities, both pious and practical, for the securing of the Stuart-Orange regime and Protestant religion. Even in death, Mary continued to support the regime: those who revered her memory were encouraged to transfer their affection and loyalty to the husband whom she had so consistently supported- it was what she would have wanted.[104] She has remained a somewhat one-dimensional character: simple and pious to her admirers; a perfidious and ungrateful daughter to her (mainly Jacobite) detractors. The former view was the more widely voiced with the result that her self-fashioning has become the accepted view of her character. There are other sides to

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[101] 'The Female Parricide.' *POAS,* v, p.157.
[102] Burnet, *Supplement*, p.195.
[103] William to the Duke of Leeds. Quoted in Dalrymple, *Memoirs*, Appendix to iii, p.199.
[104] 'the mandate of Heaven and the people's love.. Has passed from her to him.' George Stepney, *Poem dedicated to… Queen Mary.* Quoted in A. Garganigo, 'William without Mary: Mourning Sensibly in the Public Sphere', *The Seventeenth Century,* 23(I) (2008), p.113.

that character which were successfully masked. It is often said that history is written by the winners. Mary's career and representation are a good, if complex, example of this statement.

After Mary's death, William appointed an Ecclesiastical Commission of nine senior clerics 'to encourage a pious and a laborious clergy.'[105] The Commission was one of the ways in which, in Burnet's view, he sought to continue the queen's influence and promote her legacy. [106] One of its purposes was to make recommendations to the king for major preferments and to appoint to minor ones. A similar commission had been appointed to take responsibility for ecclesiastical preferment in Charles II's reign.[107] Its members comprised clergy from whom Mary had previously sought advice- Stillingfleet, Patrick, Sharp, Burnet, and, in the place of Tillotson, Tenison, the new Archbishop of Canterbury. Despite the public reconciliation between William and Anne which occurred following Mary's death, the Bishop of London, Henry Compton, was not included in the Commission notwithstanding his seniority and the high regard in which he was held by Anne. His diminution in influence over the course of the reign is an indication of the importance which both William and Mary attached to the attribute of absolute loyalty. [108] Other High Church clerics such as Stillingfleet and Sharp were able to retain influence; Compton's association with Anne may have counted against him even after the public reconciliation. Overall, the Commission had

[105] 'Commission about Royal Preferments', 12 March 1695. TNA, SP 44/150, fo.160.
[106] Burnet, *Supplement*, p.406.
[107] R. Beddard, 'The Commission for Ecclesiastical Promotions, 1681-84: An Instrument of Tory Reaction', *The Historical Journal*, 10/1 (1967). Beddard ascribed its creation to a desire on Charles's part to influence ecclesiastical preferment towards High Churchmen at the expense of their mainly Whig latitudinarian counterparts.
[108] Compton, as one of the Seven Bishops tried by James, had played a leading role in the Revolution. He helped Anne to escape from London in November 1688 and officiated at William and Mary's coronation. He was considered by William as a replacement for Sancroft, but by the middle of 1689 was being described by the king to Savile as 'that weak man.' Savile, *Life,* ii, p.249.

a Low Church bias, reflecting the political dominance of the Whigs, although Nottingham's fear that 'some about the king may presse things.. which the Queene might have prevented or restrained,' does not seem to have occurred.[109] An attempt to reduce factional influence was made by the inclusion of a clause within the Commission's document of incorporation that the 'principall secretaries of State are not to interfere with the Ecclesiastical Commission.'[110] Instead, the influence of John Somers, Lord Chancellor and member of the Whig Junto, seems to have been strong over the Commission's work. Even before the queen's death he had exerted influence over the direction of ecclesiastical preferment: for example, he had received one undated letter from Archbishop Tillotson recommending a Mr. Vernon 'to whom the Queen hath promised a kindness upon the intercession of the Bishop of Salisbury.'[111] After 1695, that influence grew. Archbishop Tenison regularly sent letters to Somers as Lord Keeper recommending clerics for livings- Grefford to Sedgwick, Burges to a living in Bedfordshire, Ashton to a Mr. King.[112] His advancement to the position of Lord Chancellor will only have increased Somers's influence over ecclesiastical preferment- a right to present to a significant number of church livings went with the post. His influence was strong despite a somewhat murky personal life, perhaps helped by the trust which both William and the Commission (he had been instrumental in the acquittal of the Seven Bishops) placed in him. In the first years of its existence, the actions of the Commission met

[109] BL Add. MS 29595, fos.72-4, quoted in H. Horwitz, *Revolution Politicks: the career of Daniel Finch, second Earl of Nottingham, 1647-1730* (Cambridge, 1968), p.131.
[110] SP 44/150, fo.161.
[111] 'Letters from Archbishop of Canterbury and other Bishops, undated.' Surrey History Centre, John Somers Papers, 371/14/D/1.
[112] 'Letters from Archbishop of Canterbury and other Bishops, undated.' Surrey History Centre, John Somers Papers, 371/14/D/1.

with little opposition: there were no major benefices to bestow, and the strong hold of the Whig Junto on power lessened the ability of its High Church opponents to counter its actions.

This changed in the final years of the reign. The gradual disintegration of the Whig Junto facilitated High Church opposition to the Commission's actions. Ecclesiastical preferment became another area where Whig-Tory divisions could be played out. Attempts to obstruct the Commission's work were led by Compton, Trelawney of Exeter, and Sprat of Rochester.[113] The increase in disputes over nominations to major benefices coincided with the attempt to reconvene Convocation, a body which, if allowed to sit, would have reflected the High Church views of the majority of Anglican clergy. The Commission's unity of purpose was not helped by the king's reassertion of his right of involvement in ecclesiastical preferment. The reasons for this are not clear, although it did coincide with William's attempt to assert his right to grant land from the Irish forfeitures to a small number of his favourites. He may have been reacting to the lack of recognition for his part in the restoration of peace to the country.[114] In 1697, notwithstanding unanimity of recommendation from the Commission, William refused to endorse the elevation of Fleming Finch to the Deanery of York, despite the Archbishop of York's strong personal recommendation. Even more divisively, in the same year, the Commission recommended Dr. Pratt for a Prebendary Canonry at Windsor. Princess Anne had first recommended Pratt, and this had been endorsed by Archbishop Tenison. William, although unwilling to provide a reason for his

[113] Bennett, *Episcopate,* p.127.

[114] A letter from Somers to Shrewsbury on October 25 1698 reveals another means by which William demonstrated his irritation: 'Your grace knows how resolutely the king declined speaking of his business, to any in his service, all the winter, and that in such a matter, as if he was not unwilling it should be known.' Talbot, *Correspondence*, p.560.

dislike of Pratt, spent the next few months suggesting alternative candidates only to accede eventually, again without stating his reasons.[115] William also started to promote without the Commission's knowledge- for example Archbishop Tenison complained that, in 1700, 'Mr. Stapleton, the chaplain of Lord Jersey, the new secretary of State, was appointed a Prebend of Worcester without the Commission's knowledge.'[116] After this, the Commissioners stopped making recommendations for place and both Burnet and the Bishop of Norwich threatened to resign. William's interventions both undermined the Commission and seemed to lack purpose. The coherence of approach which characterised Stuart-Orange attitudes to ecclesiastical preferment in the early years of the reign was replaced by an inconsistency and loss of control which presaged the religious controversies of Anne's reign.[117]

The study of Stuart-Orange ecclesiastical patronage practice helps to underline the interrelated nature of religious and secular politics in late seventeenth-century England, along with the precarious nature of the regime's tenure of power. Nine of the twenty-seven bishops incumbent in 1689 refused to take the Oaths of Allegiance to William and Mary. Most Anglican curates and vicars were opposed to the passing of the Toleration Act, although the majority did take the Oaths. Religious dispute had the potential to destabilise the new regime. One means of lessening disagreement was to divert attention to the

[115] Carpenter, *Tenison*, ch.8.
[116] Carpenter, *Tenison*, p.175.
[117] Horwitz, *Parliament,* pp.311-12 also describes attempts made in Parliament in the last years of the reign to prevent William from being able to translate prelates. The attempts failed.

elements of Christianity upon which all could agree; this was an integral part of the campaign for Godly Revolution which Tony Claydon and Craig Rose have described so well. But the depth of religious tension, both internally within the Anglican Church and between the Established Church and its Dissenting and Roman Catholic rivals, meant that concentration upon common beliefs alone was insufficient to provide the solution to the divisions. Few would have disagreed with the 'Godly Revolution's' central tenet of the need to concentrate upon the most important aspects of Christianity and to turn focus away from matters indifferent. Unfortunately, many were unable to agree on which matters were important and which were not.

Monarchical control of senior ecclesiastical patronage provided a means to insert at the apex of the Anglican hierarchy bishops who were exemplars of the principles of the 'Godly Revolution.' None of those appointed could be described as the most extreme representatives of either High or Low Church perspectives, but there were differences in their religious emphases. The new bishops' affiliations within the Anglican Church reflected its differing strands of devotional thought and practice; this helped to reduce, if not eradicate, factional tensions. The reputations and practices of the bishops informed a wide audience of the character of the new regime. Their ability to co-operate- for example the majority of bishops signed a petition in 1691 for the laws against vice to be implemented - sent a message to the whole population concerning the need to concentrate on areas of agreement between Christians. More tangibly, the bishops' significant control of patronage within their dioceses enabled the monarchs' preferred religious modes of practice and thought to start to percolate through the whole body of clergy. It would plainly be an

exaggeration to state that the allocation of senior ecclesiastical preferment helped to eradicate religious discord. It would be more accurate to state that in an environment of significant religious division and distrust, Stuart-Orange ecclesiastical preferment on the whole lessened rather than accentuated that division. It was impossible in practice to dissociate political faction from religious issues, including those of preferment. Rather, William and Mary used their powers of preferment, with the advice of those religious and political leaders whom they trusted, to construct an episcopal bench which reflected their long-term vision, whilst simultaneously accommodating the need to assuage short term factional pressures. They harnessed their differing views of the correct form of Protestant religious observance in a way which maintained the loyalty of a large proportion of the Anglican church whilst also emphasising the ultimate authority of William. To achieve this, whilst simultaneously maintaining the support of the Catholic members of the coalition against Louis XIV, and containing domestic political faction, was no small feat. I will now turn to consideration of another field of patronage practice which had caused significant discontent in James II's reign, that of legal appointments.

Chapter 6 - Williamite Land Grants, Court Patronage and the Law

William III was not known for his generosity with time, words or gifts.[1] From this perspective, there are elements of irony as well as rarity in his unsuccessful attempts to grant land to those whom he considered had served him well. The two most substantial grants were of land in the Welsh Marches which William proposed for the Earl of Portland in 1695 and the gift of forfeited land in Ireland to a wider grouping, dating mainly from after 1695. Both occasioned significant parliamentary opposition to which the Williamite ministry struggled to respond effectively. The arguments against the grants regularly incorporated elements of caricature: both donor and potential recipients were easily reduced to the status of tropes, often foreign and beneficiaries of exorbitant grants through their stereotyped identities as royal favourite or mistress.[2] It would be easy to leave the story there. On deeper consideration, the arguments used for and against the grants, together with the extent of parliamentary opposition to them, reveal much about the ways in which debate concerning the roles of monarch and parliament were encased in a legal framework based upon the evidence of the past. As such, the disputes throw light not only upon the evolution of executive authority from monarch to Parliament but also

[1] 'his silence, when he admitted any to an audience, distasted them as much as if they had been denied.' Burnet, *History*, iv, p.147. 'He was close, perhaps even tight with his money on most occasions. His accounts had balanced ever since he was eighteen, and the habit of reading them once a week was one which the King kept up throughout his life.' Baxter, *William III,* p.348.

[2] The ferocity of the attack upon Portland in particular and the resultant fear of prosecution may account for Price's G*loria Cambriae* only appearing in print after William's death in 1702.

upon topics such as the use of and respect for law and the way in which late seventeenth-century English society regarded and used knowledge of its past.

This study will place the Williamite land grants in the context of the use of the law for political purposes. It will examine the arguments of both sides in the debates relating to the grants to show how reference to Statute and Common Law was employed to fashion the Revolution Settlement. After a survey of the historiography relating to both the land grants and more broadly the legal framework of the reign, I will outline the senior legal appointments made between 1689 and 1702, and why those appointments contributed to a gradual diminution of intensity in forensically centred political conflict compared with the experience of the two previous reigns. This occurred partly as a result of a lessening in the number of monarchically inspired initiatives which tested to extreme the extent to which the law could be used for political ends.[3] But it was also occasioned by a reduction in the scale and overtness of the manipulation of legal process for partisan purposes by Whigs and Tories.[4] In the second part of the study, I will place the Williamite land grants against the backdrop of this framework, focussing upon their extent and intended recipients

[3] *The Declaration of his Highness William Henry…Prince of Orange… Of the Reasons Inducing him to Appear in Armes in … England* (The Hague, 1688) had accused James's counsellors of overturning 'the Religion, Laws and Liberties' of England, Scotland and Ireland. It went on to catalogue James's abuses of the law. The importance of being seen to rule within the law will have been made immediately apparent to William by the content of the *Declaration of Rights*.

[4] It is an indication of the factional nature of the protest against the legal abuses of the two previous reigns that Whig criticism of monarchical abuse was directed at both James's and Charles's use of the law courts, whilst Tory reaction was concentrated on James after his turning away from protection of the Anglican Church. This is a theme developed by Mark Goldie in 'Revolutionary Justice and Whig Retribution in 1689', in B. Cowan and S. Sowerby (eds.), *The State Trials and the Politics of Justice in Later Stuart England* (Woodbridge, 2021), pp.179-204.

together with the arguments used for and against their implementation. Those arguments will be shown to cast light on: the objectivity of the appeals to the past as a means of deciding late seventeenth-century constitutional debate; and how Parliament, and in particular the House of Commons, used the evidence of history and the law to increase its areas of authority, not only relative to the Crown but also against the conflicting claims of potential rivals such as the Irish Parliament.[5] I will conclude with a discussion of how the episodes illuminate elements of William's character and his thought processes concerning his perception of the roles of those closest to him and how they should be rewarded.

Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century historians emphasised perceived changes in the legal system after 1688 to demonstrate the importance of the Glorious Revolution within their Whiggish accounts of English history.[6] Trevelyan wrote of 'the triumph of the Common Law and lawyers over the king.'[7] Similarly, legal historians such as Foss and Campbell contrasted the subservient and, in their estimation, inadequately qualified judicial bench of James II's reign with the independently

[5] Parliament's treatment of the Kentish Petitioners at the end of William's reign can be seen as evidence of an attempt to define and expand Parliament's rights relative to the English people, a theme explored at the time by Lord Chief Justice Holt and by Defoe in *The history of the Kentish petition* (London, 1702). More recently it was the subject of Philip Hamburger's 'Revolution and Judicial Review: Holt's Opinion in City of London v. Wood', *Columbia Law Review,* 94 (Nov. 1994), pp.2091-2153.

[6] This chapter will confine itself to analysis of changes in the English legal system after 1688. However, reference will be made to Scottish and Dutch Williamite legal practices where they are relevant.

[7] Quoted by M. Landon in *The Triumph of the Lawyers: Their role in English Politics, 1678-1689* (Alabama, 1970), p.10.

minded and more accomplished judiciary of his successor.[8] Foss, for example, provided an eye-catching assertion of the contrast in the practice of law during the reigns of James and William: 'It is one of the glories of the Revolution that it forms a new era in our judicial history. Here were no longer any violent dismissals or convenient political resignations, and the judges succeeded each other in quiet independence.'[9] A century later, the contrast was broadly recognized by Geoffrey Holmes: 'the post-Revolution monarchy exhibited a respect for the judiciary which had been all too lacking from Charles II and James II.'[10] Considering the importance attached to the perceived change in legal practice occasioned by the accession of the Stuart-Orange regime, recent historical scholarship has been slow to question this aspect of the Whig view of the Glorious Revolution and its consequences. In comparison with the studies concentrating on the politically charged legal trials of the later years of Charles II's and James II's reigns- for example the treason trials of the Exclusion Crisis and the Quo Warranto disputes over Charters- their counterparts in the reign of William and Mary have until recently received little attention.[11] The work of Hopkinson, Artley, Goldie and Sowerby has addressed aspects of Williamite legal practice through, for example, detailed analysis of specific trials and legal

[8] E. Foss, *The Judges of England, from the time of the Conquest* (9 vols, London, 1848-1864). J. Campbell, *Lives of the Lord Chancellors and Keepers of the Great Seal of England* (7 vols, London, 1848-1850).
[9] Foss, *Judges*, vii, p. 291.
[10] G. Holmes, *Augustan England: professions, state and society, 1680-1730* (London, 1982), p.117.
[11] The Lancashire treason trials and the attainder of Sir John Fenwick have not been discussed in the same depth as, for example, the trial of Algernon Sidney- J. Scott, *Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683* (Cambridge, 1991). Both Henry Horwitz, *Parliament, Policy and Politics in the reign of William III* (Manchester, 1977) and Tim Harris, *Revolution, The Great Crisis of the British Monarchy, 1685-1720* (London, 2006) provide overviews of how the Williamite trials relate to the political environment of their time.

practitioners but a comprehensive study of the way in which court, parliament and the law interacted in the 1690s remains to be written.[12] The most substantial study addressing the means by which the law was used to influence political outcomes has been performed by Halliday in his work on charter disputes.[13] However, Halliday's focus was not directed at the contribution of the positioning of William and his ministers to the gradual reduction in tension over disputed charters. Nor did he consider the ways in which those local disputes related to and influenced political events at the centre. Nothing has been written specifically on the Welsh land grants whilst the emphasis of Simms's study on Irish forfeitures was neither upon the rationale for the grants nor the way in which opposition to them shared themes with other legally framed forms of opposition to the Williamite regime. To an extent this has been remedied by biographies of two of the main participants in these episodes-

[12] This is in contrast to the substantial body of work relating to the composition of the *Declaration of Rights*: M. Landon, *The Triumph of the Lawyers: their role in English Politics, 1678-1689* (Alabama, 1970); H. Nenner, *By colour of law: legal culture and constitutional politics in England, 1660-1689* (Chicago,1977); R. Kay, *The Glorious Revolution and the Continuity of Law* (Washington, 2014); L.G. Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights* (Baltimore, 1981); R. Beddard, *A Kingdom without a King* (Oxford, 1988); G. Artley, 'Law and Politics under the Later Stuarts: Sir John Holt, the Courts, and the Constitutional Crisis of 1688' (D. Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2019); B. Cowan and S. Sowerby (eds.), *The State Trials and the Politics of Justice in Later Stuart England* (Woodbridge, 2021); M. Goldie and C. Jackson, 'Williamite Tyranny and the Whig Jacobites', in E. Mijers and D. Onnekink (eds.), *Redefining William III: The Impact of the King Stadholder in International Context* (Abingdon, 2007); R. Weil, *A Plague of Informers: Conspiracy and Political Trust in William III's England* (New Haven, 2013). The concentration upon the formulation of the *Declaration* rather than its immediate interpretation and consolidation belies Tim Harris's observation that the Declaration was never meant as a standalone document but the start of a confirmatory process to define the rights of sovereign and people.

[13] Paul Halliday, *Dismembering the Body Politic: partisan politics in England's towns, 1650-1730* (Cambridge, 1998). The interaction of Jacobites with the law has been extensively explored by Paul Hopkins, 'Aspects of Jacobite Conspiracy in England in the Reign of William III' (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1981).

Sachse on Somers and Onnekink on Bentinck.[14] However, the overall effect is that in contrast to the substantial historiography of the law and its usage in the two preceding reigns, its impact has been underplayed in that of William III. The degree to which there occurred the triumph of the rule of law remains contested and insufficiently examined. The more sanguine views of Hamburger, and, in particular Hopkins, clash with the highly sceptical estimations of Monod, Cowan and Artley.[15] In turn, there remains a gap in our knowledge of turn of the century attitudes to legal precedent and history. Close study of the major polemic tracts relating to the grants together with more detailed analysis of the judicial appointments of the reign along with how the judiciary operated can help to close the knowledge gap.

James II's judges had either fled or been disqualified from reappointment in 1689 by their support of measures such as the dispensing power which had provided focal points for discontent with his regime.[16] The legally focussed content of the Declaration of Rights will have demonstrated to William the central place which

[14] W. Sachse, *Lord Somers: A political portrait* (Manchester, 1975); D. Onnekink, *The Anglo- Dutch Favourite: The Career of Hans Willem Bentinck, 1st Earl of Portland, (1649-1709)* (Aldershot, 2007).

[15] 'Under William, miscarriages of justice remained isolated.' P. Hopkins, 'Aspects of Jacobite conspiracy in England in the reign of William III', (Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1981), p.183. This statement contrasts with: 'Jacobite treason trials showed that the abuses in English justice associated with the Stuarts had not ceased with the Revolution.' Monod, 'Politics and Sentiment in the Jacobite State Trials,' in Cowan, *State Trials*, p.226; and 'state control over the theatre of justice appears more assured in the decades after the Revolution of 1688-89.' Cowan, *State Trials*, p.36; and 'the Williamite regime seems to have been able to use the law in much the same way that James had wanted,' Artley, 'Law and Politics', p.150.

[16] For example, four of James's judges were disqualified by their support of the dispensing power. Their close association with such measures accounts for the high proportion of judges amongst those excluded from the Bill of Indemnity. Harris, *Revolution*, pp.191-5.

concern to eradicate manipulation of the law for political advantage held in the thinking of those who sought James's deposition.[17] As Tim Harris observed,

> There are good grounds for thinking that what the Declaration of Rights claimed to be existing law was genuinely believed, by those who helped frame the document, …, actually to be existing law. It is conceivable that they were wrong, or deceiving themselves in order to vindicate the overthrow of a king they disliked,.., though the fact that the Declaration passed a bi-partisan and bi-cameral Convention shows that, if this was the case, there must have been a wide degree of consensus underpinning this self-deluding desire to believe in a particular (though erroneous) interpretation of the constitution.[18]

In order to safeguard that constitution, there was a need to appoint a judiciary which was acceptable both to William and Mary and also to those who were effectively responsible for the monarchs' appointment. William completely changed the senior members of his judiciary in 1689: in addition to the Lord Chancellor, Attorney General and Solicitor General, all twelve judges of the Common Law courts were replaced.[19] A similar purge occurred in Scotland where only one member of the previous judicial bench was retained. In both countries, William retained responsibility for the selection of their successors.[20] In England, a list of candidates for senior judicial positions was put forward by each of the thirty-four members of the Privy Council and

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[17] The first two articles for example state that James and 'his evil counsellors, judges and ministers… were guilty of dispensing and suspending laws without the consent of parliament' and 'prosecuting people for protesting the King's reign.' Geoffrey Holmes calculated that there were sixty-two Members of the House of Commons with a legal training in the 1701-2 session of Parliament. Holmes, *Augustan England*, p.123.

[18] Harris, *Revolution*, p.336.

[19] In contrast, James II had maintained all of the judicial bench from his brother's reign. However, during the course of his reign, James subsequently removed twelve judges, mainly through displeasure with their behaviour. Changes in William's reign only occurred as a result of death or illness.

[20] J.D. Ford, *Law and Opinion in Scotland during the Seventeenth Century* (Oxford, 2007), p.390.

it was from these lists that William made the final choice.[21] The recommendations of Sir John Holt and Henry Powle, the only practising lawyers within the Council, may have contributed to the predominantly Whig affiliations of the newly created senior judiciary: for example it was only the Whig members of the defence counsel of the Seven Bishops who were promoted to the Bench.[22] Other common attributes of those appointed included previous removal from James II's judicial bench due to opposition to his policies, and participation as opponents of the Crown in both the Quo Warranto cases and Whig martyrs' trials.[23] The extensive legal experience and reputation for legal probity of the newly appointed justices, some of whom such as Somers, Pollexfen and Holt had been celebrated by Tory and Whig alike for their significant contribution to the defence of the Seven Bishops, may have allayed fears of their partisan positioning. [24] Burnet, admittedly not an unbiased observer, commented that William's new judges 'were well received over the nation.'[25] In his selection, William seems to have been heavily influenced by personal acquaintance- he will have met many of those appointed as a result of their role in the formulation of the Revolution Settlement. Pollexfen, who was made Chief Justice of Common Pleas, was one of those to advise William in December 1688 of his right to declare

[21] Foss wrote of Robert Atkyns, for example, that 'His reputation as a lawyer was so high as to ensure the admission of his name into the lists which William desired the privy councillors to send in.' Foss, *Judges*, vii, p.309.
[22] Of the seven lawyers defending the Bishops, Treby, Pollexfen and Somers (all Whig) were promoted unlike their Tory colleagues, Sawyer, Finch, Francis Pemberton and Cresswell Levine. Foss, *Judges,* vii.
[23] Holt and Pollexfen had, for example, aided London in its Quo Warranto dispute. Holt had defended Thomas Pilkington, Samuel Shute and Lord Grey; Atkyns had defended Lord Russell.
[24] In the view of Hamburger, Holt, for example, 'strove to establish that government, even representative government, was subject to law.' Hamburger, 'Holt,' p.2093.
[25] Burnet, *History,* iv, p.7.

himself king, whilst Serjeant Maynard, who presented the first address of representatives of the legal profession to William, was appointed a Commissioner of the Great Seal at the advanced age of eighty-seven. Maynard's prominence within the legal community and undoubted loyalty to the new regime was sufficient to gain him the post, although he was only able to remain in position for just over a year during which time increasing numbers of complaints were made about the difficulty of doing business in the Chancery Court over which he presided.[26] As we have seen, the tactic of placing the most senior legal position in commission was replicated at the Treasury and was part of William's unsuccessful attempt in the early years of the reign to mitigate the effects of party faction within his government. By appointing a combination of Tories and Whigs to the most senior financial and legal positions, William hoped to avoid dependence upon one individual acting primarily on factional grounds.[27] The practice came to be recognized as inoperable within a legal context by William and after two years the role of Lord High Chancellor, the senior judicial position in the country and 'Keeper of the King's Conscience,' was granted to John Somers alone.[28]

[26] 'Their (the Commissioners of the Great Seal) conduct of business was slow and cautious. When the King wanted them to discover more about the character of some persons recommended to be added to the Essex commission, the result was a delay of over eighteen months before an order was given to include them.' L. Glassey, *Politics and the Appointment of Justices of the Peace, 1675-1720* (Oxford, 1979), p.111.

[27] This was, for example, the reason why the Treasury was kept in commission rather than given to Carmarthen. 'King said there were two places must always be in Commission, Admiralty and Treasury.' Savile, June 24 1689, *Life,* ii, p.221.

[28] Edward Chamberlayne, *Angliae Notitia or The Present State of England* (London, 1684), p.111.

Somers held the post of Lord Keeper from 1693 until 1700 when he was forced to resign during the period of political turmoil partly caused by parliamentary opposition to the Irish land grants. As a senior member of the Whig Junto, he combined his judicial responsibilities with active participation in Parliament. In addition to his role as Speaker in the House of Lords, from 1695 he was appointed to the position of Lords Justice during the king's absences abroad. The accumulation of posts enabled him to combine oversight of legal appointments with the direction of governmental involvement in legal cases possessing potentially significant political repercussions. It was purely the degree of his blending of political and judicial functions which differentiated Somers. Five of William's new judges had been members of the Convention Parliament and over the course of the reign twenty-four barrister-MPs were granted legal positions in the royal gift.[29] In Foss's opinion, Henry Pawle owed his promotion to the office of Master of the Rolls more to his being a Whig leader than to his prominence at the bar.[30] Importantly for William, Somers's political stance was acceptable. As what might be termed a moderate Whig who had demonstrated a willingness to defend the rights of the monarchs within the newly established regime, he was able to act as a bridge between William and the more extreme members of the Whig Junto.[31] The degree of control of judicial appointments shifted as William

[29] Kay, *Glorious Revolution*, p.199 and Holmes, *Augustan England,* p.123.
[30] Foss, *Judges*, vii, p.340.
[31] 'He had always agreed in his notion with the Whigs; and had studied to bring them to better thoughts of the king, and to a greater confidence in him.' Burnet, *History,* iv, p.188. In addition to his performance in the law courts, Somers's written works such as *A Brief history of the Succession of the crown of England* (London, 1680) will have demonstrated to William the acceptability of his political thinking.

became more comfortable with Somers's ability and disposition.[32] Initially William had attempted to maintain complete control of senior judicial appointments: one of Somers's first acts as Lord Keeper was to write to William to complain in a firm but deferential way that he had not been consulted on the appointment of a new Attorney General and to make clear that if his advice continued to be ignored, he would resign.[33] William had appointed Edward Ward, Nottingham's choice for the position, before Somers could put forward his own candidate, (the Whig) Sir Thomas Trevor. The issue was eventually decided by a compromise- Ward kept the position but Trevor was promoted to it in 1695. When senior positions became available, it was the Lord Keeper who was petitioned by applicants and their sponsors. For example, in 1695 Lord Bradford wrote to Somers to ask that Sir Lyttleton Powys be made a judge on the death of Lord Justice Eyre: 'I hope your Lordship in whose power it is now more than ever will effect this matter as well for the kings service as to oblige.'[34] When William wished to put forward candidates for judicial office, he made sure to confirm their suitability with Somers. Portland wrote to Somers in 1695: 'The king orders me to inform you that Mr Hawkes will have the position of Solicitor General unless you have a reason against it.'[35] Somers's direction of judicial appointments extended to the nomination of Justices of the Peace- for example there is extensive

[32] 'As Chancellor he asserted his right to nominate the judges- a right which had been assumed both by James II, and exercised by William III while the great seal had been in commission,' W.S. Holdsworth, *A History of English Law* (17 vols, London, 1903-1909), vi, p.537.
[33] W.L. Sachse, *Lord Somers: A political portrait (*Manchester, 1975)*,* pp.92-5.
[34] Lord Bradford letter to Somers, 4 May 1695. Surrey History Centre, John Somers Papers, 371/14/L/9.
[35] 'le roy m'ordre de vous dire… que Mr. Hawkes l'ait (the position of Solicitor General, unless you have) quelque raison contraire.' Portland letter to Somers, 7 July 1695. Surrey History Centre, John Somers Papers, 371/14/K/3.

correspondence between Robert Harley and Somers regarding the appointment of JPs for Radnorshire. Harley provided a list of candidates for office to Somers, commenting that 'the enclosed list I am verily persuaded will leave no Room for any reasonable person of ye County to object against and considering the number of ye County it will be hard to find better in all respects.' [36] Despite their political differences, the selection criteria of Harley and Somers concentrated on loyalty to the new regime rather than exclusively on membership of party. [37] The 'good affections to your government' which helped to secure Powys his position as Justice of the King's Bench in 1695 were equally important in those seeking lesser judicial appointments.

Does the evidence provided by William's senior legal appointments, along with the justice which they dispensed, concur with Foss's glowing assessment of the transformation which the events of 1688 occasioned? Did the rule of law triumph to the extent that monarch (and parliament) were generally perceived to have acted within the law rather than above it? That would surely be too great a claim to make. Some of the more extreme judicial assertions of political influence were removed. The judges appointed by William at the start of the reign were not removed following changes in ministerial policy or affiliation. Nor did William exercise his right to remove judges at his pleasure- new appointments were made solely due to the deaths or

[36] Robert Harley letter to Somers, September 3 1695. Surrey History Centre, John Somers Papers, 371/14/ A 1-3.

[37] Occasionally Somers was responsible for the removal of Whigs from the bench: for example, he recommended the removal of the Whig Abraham Trent solely due to his low birth. *Diary of Mr. Justice Rokeby*, p.30, quoted in Glassey, *Politics and the Appointment of the Justices of the Peace, 1675-1720,* p.112.

promotions of incumbents. But these facts on their own do not prove judicial integrity and independence; they may instead indicate a confluence of politically induced bias between executive and judicial bench which survived throughout the reign.

The treason trials of the reign provide an effective forum for gauging the extent to which the language of the advice of Judge Jeffreys to Herbert upon his appointment as chief justice to the King's bench was repeated: 'Be sure to execute the law to the utmost of its vengeance upon those that are now knowne by the name of Whigs; and you are likewise to remember the snivelling Trimmers.'[38] In contrast, when Portland pressed Somers to use monetary payments to secure convictions in the Lancashire treason trials, Somers was firm in his refusal. Responding to Portland's desire that 'a way should be found to put a sum of money into the same person's hands who was before employed in that affair,' Somers replied that 'he cannot meddle in the affair and nor should anyone in public employment.'[39] And yet in those trials, Lord Justice Eyre, who had been appointed by Somers to the judicial bench in the previous year, denied counsel to one of the defendants who was deaf, even rejecting his request for a friend to explain the evidence against him.[40] The purge of the Cheshire Justices of the Peace who publicly voiced their support for the defendants in the Lancashire Treason Trials would have been sanctioned by Somers, as would the decision to bring Sir John Fenwick to trial and conviction by means of attainder in the Houses of Parliament- a conviction which the requirement of the newly passed Treason Act

[38] Holdsworth, *A History of English Law,* vi, p.509.
[39] Somers letter to Portland, May 28 1695. NUL, PwA 1177.
[40] Hopkins, 'Aspects of Jacobite Conspiracy', p.201.

would have made impossible in a lower court due to its requirement for two witnesses to treasonable activity.[41] Most commentators upon Fenwick's trial have concluded that Fenwick was guilty of treason, but not the treasonable activity for which he was tried.[42] The closeness of the vote in Parliament over the attainder reveals the degree of disquiet with the means of trying Fenwick, even amongst many Whigs convinced of Fenwick's guilt.[43] George Artley in his study of Sir John Holt noted Holt's concentration upon the need for correct trial procedure to be followed.[44] This was also a feature of some of the treason trials of the reign. The judge in Crone's treason trial spent much time deliberating whether the incorrect spelling of the words 'billa vera' should invalidate the indictment.[45] However, the benefits to the defendant which could accrue from the necessity of a strict adherence to court procedure were not combined with other forms of action which would now be regarded as equitable. Viscount Preston, before his trial over which Somers presided, was not allowed a copy of his indictment, assistance of counsel, or delay to question members of the jury and obtain witnesses. No evidence was produced at the trial of John Ashton to prove that he was aware of the contents of the letters he was carrying- Pollexfen, the

[41] The Treason Act and the Junto ministry's immediate attempt to circumvent its measures is a good example of how perceived political necessity could clash with fundamental beliefs. The Act had been originally devised by Whigs such as Somers to make it impossible for the politically engineered convictions of the Exclusion Crisis to recur.

[42] Paul Hopkins, 'Fenwick, Sir John, (c.1644-97)', *ODNB* (Oxford, September 2004), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/9304 (27 July 2024).

[43] 'The Commons third reading passed only by 189 votes to 156, with some government supporters opposing or abstaining.' Hopkins, 'Fenwick', *ODNB*. The bill in the Lords passed by an even smaller majority on 23rd December 1696 of 68 votes to 61.

[44] Artley, 'Law and Politics', chs.7 and 8.

[45] Kay, *The Glorious Revolution and the Continuity of Law*, p.214.

presiding judge, simply stating that 'his behaviour showed that he knew what was in them.'[46]

With regard to appointments to lesser judicial positions, the same ambiguous picture emerges. Turnover of Justices of the Peace did fall as party allegiance declined in importance as a determinant of qualification for position. Lionel Glassey has calculated that on average there were 50.8 changes of JP each year between 1691 and 1695 and 56.6 between 1696 and 1700. The slight pick-up in turnover in the second half of the 1690s is accounted for by the removal of Justices of the Peace who refused to sign the Association in 1696/7. These numbers compare with an average of 100 each year between 1681 and 1685, 106 between 1686 and 1690 and 66.8 between 1701 and 1705.[47] Loyalty to William and Mary was an overriding requirement; loyalty to a specific party was not. As we have seen in the case of the purge of Cheshire JPs which occurred after the Lancashire Treason trials, politically motivated interference in appointments did not cease completely.

This more nuanced version of the triumph of the rule of law itself deserves further analysis concerning the thought processes of those involved. There was a very real conflict for many members of both the executive and judiciary between the need to defend the liberties of the nation, the need to protect the Revolutionary Settlement, and, in some cases, the desire for personal gain. Where priority lay varied widely. For William and his closest advisers, such as Bentinck, the law was primarily a means

[46] Monod, *State Trials*, p.229.
[47] Glassey, *Politics and the Appointment of Justices of the Peace*, pp.11-22.

through which to promote loyalty to the regime and purge its enemies. It was a weapon to be used in the struggle to ensure the regime's survival. The same pragmatic attitude to the use of the law applied in the United Provinces. It was a desire for increased control rather than respect for precedent which drove William's refashioning of Utrecht's constitution following its recapture in 1672. In the same way, local regulations were often ignored if they interfered with the appointment of Williamite choices for political office. In England also, retaining as much control as was politically possible over the law's functioning was an unstated, but very real, aim. As an example, one of the original proposals within what became the Declaration of Rights had been that judges should be appointed during good behaviour rather than at the king's pleasure. This measure was approved by both Houses of Parliament in 1692 only to be vetoed by the king- the first instance of William using this power during the reign. The veto does not seem to have been widely criticised, a contrast with later reactions to its use.[48] Burnet suggested that William was persuaded by the judges themselves to veto the bill: 'it was represented to him, by some of the judges themselves, that it was not fit they should be out of all dependence on the court.'[49] As an additional reason, Horwitz suggested that the judges advised William to use his veto because judges' salaries would have become a fixed charge upon the hereditary excise and 'its (the bill's) sponsor, Sir Walter Yonge, had neglected to secure prior

[48] For example, in 1694, after the veto of the place bill, a committee of the House of Commons resolved that whoever had counselled the veto was 'an enemy to their Majesties and the Kingdom.' CJ, xi, p.70. The use of the veto is analysed in J.J. Carafano, 'William III and the Negative Voice', *Albion,* 19/4 (1987), pp.509-25.
[49] Burnet, *History,* iv, p.149.

royal leave for the inclusion of this provision.'[50] Neither of these reasons seems particularly compelling, and, certainly by the end of the reign, when the measure was finally passed, they did not hold weight.[51] It may be of more relevance that, as Burnet again wrote at the time, 'The king was also believed to be so tender, in every point that seemed to relate to his prerogative, that he could not well bear any thing that was a diminution of it.'[52] The desire to make good behaviour the rationale for judicial tenure had been one of the main aims of the opposition to James II in 1688. In the early years of the reign, with the threat of external invasion still very real, the lack of dissent to the use of the royal veto to prevent the implementation of the change in practice is significant. It indicates a balance of power between king and Parliament which was to shift over the course of the reign.

For practitioners of the law and politics at both the local and national levels, the importance of adherence to the rule of law was extensively recognised even if the understanding of that concept and the reasons for belief in it varied. Paul Halliday's study of partisan politics at the local level has shown that factional behaviour lessened in ferocity during the 1690s.[53] He concluded that the experience of previous regimes had made apparent the potentially counter-productive dangers of extreme factionalism: with the political nation split in its party allegiance, using the law to eradicate the opposition came to be acknowledged as unachievable. Instead, the

[50]Horwitz, *Parliament*, p.76.
[51] The measure was finally passed into law as part of the Act of Succession in 1701.
[52] Burnet, *History*, iv, p.148.
[53] P. Halliday, *Dismembering the Body Politic: partisan politics in England's towns, 1650-1730* (Cambridge, 1998), pp.263-303.

law was still regarded as a potential weapon but one whose rules needed to be respected in order for it to be used as a means to arbitrate peacefully between parties, a means which would be lost if it came to be seen as too overtly biased. Profound ideological differences remained between parties, and those differences, often stoked by significant personal animosity and the existence of outstanding disputes over the charters, led to the law courts becoming the arena within which those differences were settled. Courts regularly based their judgements on purely procedural grounds as a means of reducing tension still further and by 1702, only one (small) town council- Dunwich – remained completely split, having refused to accede to the judgement of the King's Bench concerning its charter.[54] The experience of the chaos occasioned by the rapid changes in council membership as James II oscillated in his preferred alliance partners had had the effect of making factional parties at the local level more amenable to outside adjudication.

This recognition of the need for the law courts to be seen to be politically neutral spaces was replicated to a degree at the national level. The more extreme manipulation of legal process which was believed to have occurred in the previous two reigns was not repeated. The law remained an essential vehicle through which to preserve the State, but its application was commonly regarded as needing to conform to the perceived standards of the past before the unacceptable exploitation undertaken by Charles and James II. For Whig politicians especially, many of whom

[54] Halliday, *Dismembering*, p.300.

had been involved in the struggle to introduce the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 and in the politically charged trials of the Exclusion Crisis, the need to protect the Stuart-Orange regime through the mechanism of the law could be especially problematic both philosophically and pragmatically: for example Sir Robert Clayton, the former Lord Mayor of London, eventually supported the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, but only after stating that 'had it not been for (that) Act, there had not been many of us here now; we had been dead and rotten in prison.'[55] Personal experience of the dangers which tampering with the legal process for political purposes could cause made many anxious that their own behaviour should not be seen in the same light. Commenting upon Roger Whitley's efforts to use the courts to Whig advantage in the dispute over Chester's charter, the Whig Secretary of State Sir John Trenchard wrote to Whitley: 'if you should be mistaken in the legal part, the attempt would probably prejudice the party that attempts it.'[56] This realisation that too overt an attempt to manipulate legal process could be counterproductive politically is perhaps the most telling indicator of how respect for the rule of law had assumed a central place in mentalities. Failure to manipulate judicial verdicts, by indicating the independence of the judicial system (as occurred in the Lancashire Treason Trials and the dispute over Chester's charter), may have contributed more than suspect convictions to preserving and legitimising the new regime. As Tim Harris and Stephen Taylor noted,

[55] William Cobbett, *Parliamentary History of England* (32 vols, London, 1806-12), v, p.156.
[56] Trenchard letter to Whitley, June 1693. Rylands Library, Mainwaring Papers (part 5), nos. 73 and 74. Quoted in Halliday, *Dismembering*, p.283. The Secretary of State, Sir John Trenchard, had fled abroad and subsequently been imprisoned in the Tower of London under suspicion of treasonable activity during the Exclusion Crisis.

'Ruling according to the law had come to be seen as a powerful validation of a regime'.[57]

Contemporary criticism of the manipulation of the courts for political gain by the king was surprisingly muted. An analysis of the subjects for which the regime received censure in the approximately five hundred topical verse satires printed in the *Poems on Affairs of State* for 1698-97 contains few allusions to this topic. Even the Fenwick case received limited literary comment. Foreign favourites, corruption and military ineptitude are much more common subjects of criticism in the volume. The one poem critical of Somers concentrates on his personal life rather than his legal activity. [58] Few echoed Bartholomew Shower's complaint from 1692 of the unwarranted suspension of Habeas Corpus: 'Five hundred Persons to one have been committed more than ever were tried'.[59] There are exceptions, but it is significant that the competence of the judiciary to dispense justice fairly is not something which features regularly in printed Jacobite attacks on the Stuart-Orange regime.

Before analysing the use of legal precedent in the debates over the validity of the land grants, it is worthwhile summarising the conclusions to which this brief overview of Stuart-Orange legal thinking and practice have led. Firstly, it is difficult to overestimate the importance which senior political figures attached to the use of law.

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[57] T. Harris and S. Taylor, 'State Trials and the Rule of Law under the Later Stuarts and Early Hanoverians', in Cowan, *State Trials*, p.37.
[58] 'Father's Nown Child', probably 1694, *POAS,* v, p.422.
[59] Bartholomew Shower, *Reasons for a New Bill of Rights. Submitted to Parliament* (London, 1692), p.9.

The degree to which their respect for the rule of law was genuine, and the extent to which it was acknowledged as a sometimes unfortunate but always necessary attribute with which to be seen to comply, will have differed amongst participants. But a reputation for the treatment of the law as no more than a tool in an absolutist agenda, as was perceived to have occurred under the previous regime, was something which all were anxious to avoid. William seems to have understood this- it is perhaps why he took such care over the appointment of his judges and relinquished control only when, in Somers, he perceived an individual to whom he could delegate responsibility with confidence. That there were more than six hundred trials for criminal sedition over the course of the reign bears testimony to the reliance which William and his ministers placed upon the law courts to protect the new regime. Mary also acknowledged the usefulness of the law courts as bulwarks of the regime. She refused clemency to the Jacobite plotter John Ashton on the grounds that 'the necessities of affairs were such I must let the law take its course.'[60] Viscount Preston, on the other hand, was spared as a result of his willingness to provide useful information to the regime. Secondly, William and Bentinck, his closest adviser upon English politics, perhaps lacked a realisation of the depth of belief amongst the elite of the strong historical foundation of the place of what might be termed good law in the establishment of balance within the polity. To use Tim Harris's phrase again, it may have been a 'self-deluding belief' amongst that elite, but that did not matter. There was a substantial degree of common ground between Whig and Tory

[60] Mary, *Memoirs*, p.40.

concerning the need to refer to legal precedent which predated the depredations of William's Stuart predecessors. Its correct interpretation was the key to restoring the difficult balance between absolutism and chaos. There was a large degree of consensus in Whig and Tory interpretations of how the law should be used for political purposes: both Tory and Whig ministries oversaw the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act for example. It was only in trials for seditious libel that a factional bias could perhaps be discerned in judicial outcomes. Paul Monod has concluded that those convicted under a Tory ministry tended to be more leniently treated, stating that 'Their ambivalent feelings towards the exiled King ... made Tories less likely to pursue a vigorous repression of the Jacobite press.'[61] He cited the example of Richard Stafford who pleaded insanity and was committed to Bedlam in 1690 after being convicted of writing a Jacobite condemnation of the Convention. In contrast in 1693, against the backdrop of an increasingly Whig influenced ministry, William Anderton was executed for his printing of Jacobite literature. Collectively, the regime, together with its Whig and Tory supporters, used the courts in a politically astute manner, aided by shared implicit biases amongst executive, judges and the majority of the nation's elite.

The emphasis upon the correct observance of legal procedure can be seen as a means of deflecting criticism away from the regime's use of the courts whilst enabling its judges to develop and employ what now seem deeply inequitable

[61] P.K. Monod, 'The Jacobite Press and English Censorship,1689-95', in E. Corp (ed.), *The Stuart Court in Exile and the Jacobites* (London, 1995), p.130.

methods and precepts: the denial (eventually removed by the provisions of the 1696 Treason Act) of a pre-trial copy of the indictment to treason trial defendants, for example, or Holt's ruling that a libel did not have to be printed.[62] The result was in many ways an ideal combination for the regime. The law provided it with an effective support, which, because its more inequitable aspects were used against a shared enemy, proved acceptable to the majority of the nation's elite. Belief in the need to respect legal precedent including the necessity of following correct legal procedure suffuses both the general attitude to the work of the law courts and the arguments for and against the Williamite land grants. It is to those arguments which I will now turn.

By 1695, a shift in the balance of power between king and Parliament was becoming apparent, as shown by the parliamentary response to another event where the interpretation of legal precedent was a significant element in the content of the debate- William's first attempt to use substantial land grants to reward his favourites. Land grants from Crown estates had been made earlier in the reign but not on such a scale- for example only small parcels of land had been allocated to participants in the Irish campaign either in lieu of unpaid wages or as reward for exceptional service.[63] Parliament had also attempted on at least six occasions before 1695 to legislate concerning both responsibility for and methods of allocating forfeited land:

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[62] Artley, *Law and Politics*, p.165.

[63] Ginkel, Commander in Chief of the Williamite army in Ireland after William's departure, was granted forty thousand acres also. This compares to the figure of over one million acres which was granted to William's favourites after 1695. J.G. Simms, *The Williamite Confiscation in Ireland, 1690-1703* (London, 1956), p.89.

a combination of disagreement between the Commons and Lords and royal use of the right to prorogue sessions had prevented any legislation being passed. In these debates, Parliament was more attentive to the monarch's interests than it was later to prove, regularly providing that a third of the forfeited Irish land should be allocated for the use of the monarch.[64] William will have been aware of the potentially divisive nature of grants to favourites. In his uncle's reign, awards of pensions to Charles II's mistresses had been the cause of much criticism.[65] In addition, the granting of land to favourites was not something of which he had prior experience- no land had been available to grant in the United Provinces by the Stadhouder, even after the recovery of territory following the French invasion of 1672. However, the authority to reward with complete freedom those whom he considered to have served him well was an area of his prerogative in England which William was determined to use. Why did he wait until 1695 to attempt to reward his favourites? It is difficult to say with certainty. The seemingly increased strength of his ministry in Parliament and the improving war outlook after the successful siege of Namur may have been factors. So too may the recent death of Queen Mary, depriving him of a source of sound advice in a country where his sense of the politically possible was inhibited by his lack of experience of English custom.[66] I will outline the background to the Welsh and Irish land grants

[64] For example, the 4th Attainder Bill in 1690 contained a clause reserving part of the Irish forfeitures for the King's disposal. It failed its second reading. Simms, *Williamite Confiscation*, p.82.
[65] 'In the last four years of the reign she seems to have collected a pension worth £20,000 a year.' S.M. Wynne, 'Kéroualle, Louise Renee de Penancoet de (1649-1734)', *ODNB* (Oxford, September 2004), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/15460 (25 July 2024).
[66] Mary's death also stripped him of legitimacy, making opposition to the land grants even more likely.

separately, concentrating upon their nature and intended recipients. I will then look at the arguments put forward in support of, and opposition to, their conferral.

The intended grant of land in 1695 to William Bentinck, Earl of Portland was concentrated on the borders of England and Wales, from where the initial protests against its award emanated. The author of *Gloria Cambriae: or The Speech of a Bold Britain in Parliament against a Dutch Prince of Wales,* the main pamphlet written to oppose the grant, was widely believed to be Robert Price, Welsh MP and a Justice of the Court of Common Pleas.[67] Price asserted that the land, which stretched for thirty miles, had not been forfeited, but, according to the author, had historically been part of royal estates allocated by the monarch to the Prince of Wales.[68] The first surviving reference to the grant is an entry in the Calendar of Treasury Books for May 7, 1695 which records a 'Royal Warrant to the Attorney or Solicitor General for a great seal for a grant to William, Earl of Portland, of all those lordships or manors called Denbigh and Bromfield and Yale in North Wales and all the rights, members and appurtenances thereof.'[69] Price wrote that he was 'casually informed' of the grant

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[67] *Gloria Cambriae: or The Speech of a Bold Britain in Parliament against a Dutch Prince of Wales* (London, 1702).

[68] Price does not trace the allotment of these lands to the Prince of Wales prior to the reign of Queen Elizabeth I. The work of B.P. Wolffe in *The Royal Demesne in English History: The Crown Estate in the Governance of the Realm from the Conquest to 1509* (London, 1971) has shown that the March lands were not consistently part of the lands granted to the Prince of Wales. For example, in the reign of Henry IV, they were in the possession of the son of the Duke of Arundel. Price's assertion that the March lands historically belonged to the Prince of Wales could have been contested on two main grounds: firstly, that they were inalienable from the Prince of Wales; and secondly, on more general grounds, that the King had no right to give away Crown land without the assent of parliament. In Wolffe's words, 'An occasionally heavy but infrequent charge upon the king's landed patrimony occurred when he wished to establish or strengthen a stake in his realm for his most trusted political and military supporters as a reward for services rendered.' Wolffe, *Demesne*, p.59.

[69] Entry Book: May 7, 1695, in *CTB, x, 1693-1696*, ed. W.A. Shaw (London, 1935), *British History Online* https://www-british-history-ac-uk.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/cal-treasury-books/vol10/pp1043-

and was given leave to appeal to the Treasury, but only after the grant had already been approved by the Treasury.[70] It was at this point that he raised the issue in the House of Commons and Portland, together with members of the Junto ministry, began to discuss by letter the legality and feasibility of the grant. Opinion was divided. At the end of June, Henry Guy wrote to Portland that he thought the grant was legal and could go ahead.[71] However, Sidney Godolphin, the First Lord of the Treasury, advised against proceeding: 'we are all of one opinion in not thinking this a seasonable time, either in respect to his Majesty's service or your Lordship's advantage to presse the finishing of this grant.'[72] In spite of the divided assessment, the Junto continued to press ahead with the grant through the summer of 1695. For example, the Herefordshire MP Robert Harley was asked by Guy to help in smoothing local opinion about the matter.[73] Portland also wrote to Somers to ask his opinion, enquiring somewhat insouciantly whether there might be 'quelque obstacle' of which he might be aware.[74] Unfortunately, Somers's reply, if there was one, has not survived.

When Parliament reconvened, Price presented the House of Commons in early 1696 with a petition which 'tho' subscribed by few hands, yet has the Sense and

1059 (30 July 2024). The Junto ministry may have been aware of the potential for opposition to the grant but attempted to keep it secret for as long as possible to present it as a fait accompli. If that is right, it was a misjudgement.

[70] *Gloria Cambriae*, p.2.

[71] Henry Guy letter to Portland, June 28 1695. NUL, PwA 504.

[72] Godolphin letter to Portland, July 9 1695. NUL, PwA 474.

[73] Henry Guy letter to Portland, July 15 1695. NUL, PwA 506.

[74] Portland letter to Somers, October 25 1695. Surrey History Centre, John Somers Papers, 371/14/K/7.

Approbation of Thousands, who are not influenc'd by their own Interest, but by the Honour they have for the Crown, and the Welfare of the British Nation.'[75] His address which accompanied the Petition described Portland as 'quasi a Prince of Wales ... I suppose this Grant of the Principality, is a forerunner of the Honour too.'[76] This, along with similar supporting speeches by other Welsh MPs in Parliament, helped to persuade the Commons to petition the king to stop the passing of the grant. In response, William capitulated and found other means to reward Portland. David Onnekink has calculated that within a year of his backing down over the Welsh grant, William had bestowed on Portland multiple geographically diversified small parcels of land which were collectively worth over £3000 annually, more than the value of the initial gift.[77] These grants failed to attract the notice of Parliament. In addition, the nearby forfeited estates of William Herbert, Jacobite Marquess of Powis, had recently been allocated without protest to the Dutch courtier Count Frederick van Nassau Zuylestein, whilst Somers was the beneficiary of the gift of Powis House in London- again without receiving attention in Parliament.[78]

Why did Portland receive such attention when other grants were ignored? Much of the reason must relate to Portland's character and his close relation with the king. In the informal allocation of responsibilities which William employed to spread the

[75] 'The Speech of a Member of the House of Commons in 1696, for the Repealing a Grant made to Min Heer Benting, of several Lordships belonging to the principality of Wales', printed in *A choice collection of papers relating to state affairs; during the late Revolution* (London, 1703), pp.523-30.
[76] Ibid., p.526.
[77] Onnekink, *Royal Favourite*, p.187, citing BL, Egerton MS 1708, fo. 277v.
[78] Victor Stater, 'Herbert, William, styled First Marquess of Powis (c.1626-96)', *ODNB* (Oxford, September 2004), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/13060 (27 July 2024).

management of the many territories under his control, Portland acted as principal adviser upon English and Scottish politics as well as having a significant role in the coordination and logistical organisation of the confederate army.[79] His influence over the king had been the subject of unfavourable comment as early as 1689: 'Then Benting uplocks/ His King in a box,/ And you see him no more till supper.'[80] In return, Bentinck expected to be well rewarded. His will reveals the worth of his English property alone was more than £900,000 in 1709.[81] Over the summer and early autumn of 1695, it was Portland who had coordinated the discussions amongst the ministry relating to the Marches grant and continued to explore the possibility of its being effected when others had sensed the degree of opposition to it.[82] In 1696, when offered Lord Clancarty's estates as part of the Irish forfeitures' grants, Portland wrote to Henry Capel, commissioner in Ireland, to ask not about the legality of the grant but whether he should receive his reward in land or an equivalent sum of money.[83] The combination of greed, foreign nationality, and seeming monopoly of the king's counsel in what to some seemed an unnatural relationship made him prey to jealousy on the part of those who sought to bring him down as a means of protest not only against Bentinck personally but also the regime for which he stood.

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[79] 'It seems clear that Portland did not devise policy or strategy, but acted rather as an executive to whom the King delegated substantial power and room for manoeuvre.' Onnekink, *Anglo- Dutch Favourite*, p.262.
[80] Fleetwood Sheppard, 'A Description of a Hampton Court Life.' *POAS*, v, p.56. Sheppard was Gentleman Usher to the king.
[81] BL, Egerton MS 1708, fos. 277-80.
[82] Sunderland letter to Portland, August 18 1695. NUL, PwA 1249.
[83] *Correspondentie van Willem III en Bentinck*, ii, p.56.

The arguments put forward by Price to the House of Commons in opposition to the grant of the March lands were derived from numerous sources. This makes it difficult to assess which of the strands of his reasoning was most convincing to his audience. It may be that different elements were meant to appeal to different segments of the House. His arguments can be divided into the following categories: contractual; historical; economic; geographical; dynastic; and personal- the latter in itself possessing multiple strands including large elements of xenophobia and homophobia. The evidence of Price's speeches and voting behaviour in the House of Commons, together with his close association with Carmarthen, mark him as a Tory. However, along with many other colleagues in the House of Commons, he was also a practising lawyer and in *Gloria Cambriae* he argued in distinctly Whiggish terms that the grant was contractually unlawful: 'I should not have you forget another Contract.. which is the Foundation of our present Government, I mean the Bill of Right and Liberties.' [84] Price's interpretation of this document was that it had made it impossible for 'His Majesty ... without the Consent of Parliament (to) give away the Inheritance as an Absolute Fee of the Crown Lands.' [85] He added that William's Coronation Oath also made the grant illegal: 'By the King's Old Law it was part of the Coronation Oath of the Kings of England, not to Alien the Ancient Patrimony of the Crown without Consent of Parliament.'[86] The legal precedents created by the Bill of

[84] Price, *Gloria Cambriae*, p.7. Price had been Attorney General for Wales in James II's reign and became a baron of the Exchequer in 1701- Cobbett, *Parliamentary History*, v, p.979. He held no official position for much of William's reign, which may have prompted his opposition to the grants.
[85] Price, *Gloria Cambriae*, p.7.
[86] Ibid., p.4.

Rights and the Coronation Oath are very much open to interpretations other than those fashioned by Price: neither specify the monarch's rights and duties concerning land grants and the nature of Parliament's right to debate those grants.[87] There had been an inalienability clause in the English Coronation Oath since 1154. What that clause meant and to what parts of the Crown's possessions it applied were never defined and have remained subjects of debate ever since.[88] The principal historian of the Royal Demesne, B.P. Wolffe, commented that 'Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century politicians and lawyers, followed by nineteenth-century historians, appear to have created a powerful and tenacious myth around the functions of the royal demesne.'[89] He particularly took issue with the notion that under no circumstances was the king permitted to alienate Crown land, citing numerous examples of unopposed royal land grants between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries.[90]

Price's economic argument had two elements: it was improvident for the monarch to alienate lands which were required for the support of the royal household; and, as a consequence, the country as a whole was further burdened to support that

[87] The ambiguity of how the *Declaration of Rights* was to be applied was compounded by William's reception of the document. He certainly did not explicitly agree to its terms when assuming the Crown. The nature of its practical application only came to be determined later in the resolution of disputes such as those concerning the land grants.

[88] The subject is treated extensively by Gaines Post in his *Studies in Medieval Legal Thought- public law and the state, 1100-1322* (Princeton, 1964), esp. ch. 8- 'Status Regis: 'L'Estat du Roi in the Statute of York'.

[89] Wolffe, *The Royal Demesne in English History,* p.10.

[90] Wolffe emphasized the recognised right of the monarch to reward his followers with grants of land. 'In the eyes of contemporaries such alienations… could provide a much more valuable dividend in service and support than any lost potential contribution.' Wolffe, *Demesne*, p.59.

household at a time of extreme economic hardship.[91] This was an assertion of the centuries-old desire for the king to live of his own, a sentiment which was to resurface repeatedly in the literature protesting at the king's Irish grants. Historical research also led Price to assert that the March lands could only be granted to the Prince of Wales - he concluded from a reading of the work of Sir Robert Cotton that in Elizabeth I's reign the same territory had been granted to another royal favourite, Robert, Earl of Leicester, leading to a Welsh revolt.[92] The connection between the two events seems to have been tenuous.[93] Representing Bentinck in the guise of a foreign favourite who had by underhand means diverted the crown's resources from their rightful beneficiary seems to have struck a chord with the Commons. In their petition to the king to withdraw the grant, Bentinck is referred to undiplomatically as 'Lord Portland, who had thought to have been Prince of Wales.'[94] This dovetailed with the notion that William was diverting resources away from the true Prince of Wales- effectively Princess Anne's son the Duke of Gloucester in the proposed line of the

[91] The most severe effects of the expense of the continental war together with the coinage crisis were being felt in 1695 and 1696.

[92] 'Sir Robert Cotton says in Queen Elizabeth's time, there was a grant to Earl Leicester of lands in Wales, which occasioned frays, murders, and many indictments, and made him surrender to the Crowne in his life time.' *Calendar of Treasury Papers, Volume 1, 1556-1696*, ed. Joseph Redington (London, 1868), *British History Online* https://www-british-history-ac-uk.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/cal-treasury-papers/vol1 (19 December 2024), xxxii, April 26, 1695, pp.436-38. The *ODNB* entry for Leicester ascribes the revolt to Leicester's reorganisation of his estates rather than his taking on of the estates in the place of a true Prince of Wales. Simon Adams, 'Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester (1532/33- 1588)', *ODNB* (Oxford, September 2004), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/8160 (26 July 2024).

[93] The inference of Price was that both Leicester and Portland had achieved control by duplicitous means of lands which belonged by right to the Prince of Wales. In both cases, Price concluded that their grants were illegal and had/would cause political and economic difficulties. This is not the reading of Simon Adams in his *ODNB* article on Leicester.

[94] Richard Edge letter to Roger Kenyon, 21 January 1696. HMC *Fourteenth report: appendix. part iv, The manuscripts of Lord Kenyon* (London, 1894), p. 396.

Protestant succession or James II's son in Jacobite eyes.[95] There was a substantial Jacobite following in the Marches. In addition to Powis who had been Steward and Recorder of Denbigh, the other major landowner in the area was the Duke of Beaufort whose Jacobite leanings were well known and were soon to lead to suspicion of his involvement in the Assassination Plot.[96] Sir Thomas Grosvenor, MP for Chester and one of the petitioners against the grant, owned profitable mines in Denbighshire and also allowed his house to be used as a Catholic meeting place.[97] William Williams, another of the Petitioners, had been one of those tried and found not guilty of treason in the previous year at the Lancashire Treason Trials. Price himself was a regular correspondent with both Beaufort and Powis.[98]

That Price's arguments do not seem to have been refuted in Parliament by the Whig Junto is significant. Unlike in the case of the Irish forfeitures, Somers did not attempt to use either Statute Law or other historical sources to defend the grant's legality. However open to interpretation they may have been, the combination of arguments contained in Price's speech managed to unify opposition to the extent that William, responding to that opposition, in 1696 abandoned attempts to continue with the

[95] The Duke of Gloucester's shared interest with William in martial pursuits, together with his importance to the continuance of the Protestant Stuart dynasty, would suggest that William had no interest in disinheriting his heir. The descriptions of William's pleasure when reviewing his nephew's command of troops of boy soldiers would seem to confirm this: Jenkin Lewis, *Memoirs of Prince William Henry, duke of Glocester, from his birth, July the 24th, 1689, to October 1697* (London, 1789), p.20 and p.103.
[96] Molly McClain, 'Henry Somerset, first Duke of Beaufort (1629-1700)', *ODNB* (Oxford, October 2013), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/26009 (26 July 2024).
[97] Eveline Cruickshanks, 'Sir Thomas Grosvenor (1655-1700)' *HOP 1690-1715*.
[98] He had acted as legal counsel for Beaufort in the 1680s. Stuart Handley, 'Price, Robert (1655-1733)', *ODNB* (Oxford, May 2007), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/22763 (26 July 2024).

Welsh land grant.[99] This could reflect a realisation on William's part of the compelling nature of the Commons's use of legal and historic precedent, a use which it would have been inadvisable to oppose. It more likely represents the pragmatism of Sunderland within the Junto and his ability in 1695/6 to steer overall ministerial policy. Sunderland's influence was certainly lacking during the events of the Irish Forfeitures crisis when the fractured nature of the Whig Junto in 1698 made it even less likely for William to be able to defend his grants against the demands for resumption emanating from the House of Commons.[100] Other, less sensitive, rewards were available in 1696 to reward Portland- why provoke the House of Commons unnecessarily? William's (rare) speech of capitulation to Parliament is strikingly conciliatory but does not admit error: 'I should not have given him these lands, if I had imagined the house of commons could have been concerned; I will therefore recall the Grant, and find some other way of shewing my favour to him.'[101] It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that members of the House of Commons had chosen to use the issue of the Marches Grant as a means of asserting the House's right to limit monarchical authority. On William's part, it is valid to question his realisation of the depth of parliamentary commitment to the concept of legal precedent as a guide to monarchical behaviour.

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[99] BL, Add. MS 17677, fo.222v; Cobbett's *Parliamentary History,* v, pp.986-7; Onnekink, *Anglo-Dutch Favourite*, p.187.

[100] By 1698 Sunderland had resigned his ministerial positions and ostensibly withdrawn from politics. He had become disillusioned with the ability of the Junto to remain united and wary of the policies William was pursuing. Kenyon, *Sunderland,* pp.297-302.

[101] CJ, xi, p.409.

That lack of awareness was replicated in William's attempted grant of forfeited Irish lands to reward a select group of his favourites in the years after 1696. His decision to persevere with the grants in the face of parliamentary opposition caused a constitutional crisis between king, Commons and Lords.[102] The dispute was fought using many of the arguments which had been employed by Price in 1695. A major difference emanated from the forfeited nature of the land. This led to complex legal and historical arguments being deployed concerning both the nature of the original conquest of Ireland by Henry II in 1170 and the rights of Parliament to apportion the forfeited land as a result of its original responsibility for the financing of the campaign. The depth and sophistication of the arguments used on both sides was bolstered by the contributions of John Somers in support of the grants and Charles Davenant in support of their resumption.

The scale of the grants was even greater than that attempted by William in the Welsh Marches. Of the million square acres granted, sixty percent was allocated to seven recipients of whom the two royal favourites, Portland and Albemarle, along with the Countess of Orkney, William's former mistress, were the prime beneficiaries.[103] Albemarle and the Countess of Orkney were also distinguished from the other recipients of the grants by having had no personal involvement in the reconquest of Ireland, consistently one of Parliament's requirements in the early 1690s regarding

[102] William threatened to leave England in 1698, disillusioned by the country's perceived lack of gratitude for his part in its preservation from Catholicism and Louis XIV.
[103] Simms, *Williamite Confiscation in Ireland,* ch.8.

the allocation of the land.[104] Smaller grants were given to individuals such as Ruvigny, Commander in Chief in Ireland in 1691, and the surviving relations of individuals who had featured prominently in the campaign.[105] Allocation was mainly by estate- for example Portland was allocated the estates of the Earl of Clancarty, Elizabeth Villiers was granted those of the Duke of York. William ignored previous attempts by Parliament to become involved in the Irish forfeitures' allocation, and, indeed, his own response to those attempts. On 5th January 1690, William had used these words in his address to Parliament: 'And I do likewise think it proper to assure you, that I shall not Grant any of the Forfeited Lands in England, or Ireland, till there be another Opportunity of settling that matter in Parliament in such manner as shall be thought most expedient.'[106] Despite this statement and despite the evidence of Parliament's previous attempts to pass legislation confirming its right to involvement in the allocation of forfeited land, William ploughed ahead with his attempts to grant land to his favourites.

Although better known as a political economist, Charles Davenant had been elected MP for Great Bedwyn in the Tory interest in 1698.[107] Persistent monetary troubles had made him willing to apply previously for positions in both Whig and Tory administrations, but a constant theme of his written output is sympathy for Country

[104] For example, the 1692 Forfeitures Bill stated that one third of the land forfeited should be granted 'to such military officers and soldiers who actually served in the wars in Ireland in person'. Simms, *Williamite Confiscation in Ireland,* p.85.
[105] For example, to John Baker, son of the governor of Derry, Henry Baker, who was killed during the siege. Simms, *Williamite Confiscation in Ireland*, p.89.
[106] Cobbett, *Parliamentary History*, v, pp.652-3.
[107] Julian Hoppit, 'Davenant, Charles (1656-1714)', *ODNB* (Oxford, September 2004), https://doi-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/7195 (27 July 2024).

party ideology, including suspicion of monarchical government. *A Discourse upon Resumptions* is consistent with the stance which he took on other issues, such as that relating to a standing army, which dominated parliamentary debate in the last years of William's reign. The main themes of the *Discourse* are: wars have historically been more successfully executed if approved and funded by the people; the people through their representatives in government should have the use of any lands conquered in the course of a successful war; parliament has the right to call for the resumption of land if the Crown's finances are weak; and the grants of excessive favours to the sovereign's ministers are illegal and should be reversed.[108] Although Davenant cites examples from across time and geography including the Romans and Goths, his focus is upon the history of England. Here, he uses statute law extensively to make his case. For example, to assert the need for monarchical restraint in making land grants, he cites a statute from the reign of Henry IV which stated that 'The Commons Pray the King, That no Lands to be Conquer'd from the Welch, should be granted away in a Quarter of a Year, from the time such Lands should be taken in: The King among other things Answers, That he will not grant any such Lands till he is inform'd of their Value.'[109] From the same reign he refers to a statute of 1410 which stated that, 'The Commons Pray, That for ever hereafter no Grant may be made of any

[108] For example, to prove that, historically, wars were more successfully waged if approved and funded by the people, Davenant wrote: the Romans 'made almost every Foreign Expedition bear its own charge.' Charles Davenant, *Discourse upon grants and resumptions* (London, 1700), p.42. To demonstrate the investigative powers of parliament, he wrote 'that the Legislative Power has had an uncontested Right to look into those Grants, and to make them void whenever they were thought exorbitant. And therein wise kings have given way,' Davenant, *Discourse,* p.279.
[109] Davenant, *Discourse*, p.160, citing a statute from 'Anno 7&8 Henry IV'.

Hereditament,... till the King shall be quite out of Debt... to which the King agrees, directly, without Reservation, till his Debts be paid.'[110] Overly generous monarchical grants of land are commonly attributed to the harmful influence of often foreign favourites such as Piers Gaveston whose unfortunate ends are cited as evidence that too close reliance upon a small number of advisers is ultimately bad for monarch, favourite and nation.

John Somers wrote *Jus Regium* in 1701 as a response to Davenant's work. He used a similar methodology to Davenant, combining examples from history along with evidence from English statute law to prove his case. He took the task seriously, informing his readers that he spent much time in the Tower of London looking through the rolls of statute law from previous reigns. Going back to 'Gothick' times, the main substance of Somers's argument is that the revenue of the Crown is 'not of his Subjects Gift, but his own Acquisition.'[111] Rulers from King Alfred to Henry VIII are cited as having had the right to confer land as they wished without the need to gain parliamentary consent. This right belonged to the monarch through his conquest of the land. It had not been granted to him by the people: 'When the Country was subdued, the Acquisitions belong'd to the Prince, and he always distributed and granted the Lands as he pleased.'[112] In addition, Somers asserted that the Treason

[110] Davenant, *Discourse*, p.145, citing a statute from 'Anno 11. Hen. IV'. The prevalence of reference to the past in Davenant's writing is illustrated by D.A.G. Waddell in 'Charles Davenant- a Historical Sketch', *Economic History Review*,11 (1958-9).
[111] John Somers, *Jus Regium, or, The King's right to grant forfeitures* (London, 1701), p.23.
[112] Somers, *Jus Regium,* p.27.

Act of 1351 established that 'all Estates forfeited for Treason also vest in the King.'[113] The conclusions from Somers's arguments are similar to those which he reached in his adjudication of the Case of the Bankers in the Court of Exchequer in 1696.[114] In his summation of that case, he gave the opinion that 'the whole Court held that, generally speaking, the King can alienate or charge any part of the public revenue.'[115] Somers concluded *Jus Regium* with arguments from the laws of Nature. His assertion that 'an innocent Person must not suffer' was made to take account of the potential economic loss accruing to tenants on the lands which had been given away because of the expense they had incurred in the improvement of that land.[116]

In Parliament, Somers's attempts as a member of the King's ministry to prevent the passing of the Resumption Act relating to the grants of the Irish forfeitures failed, the bill passing in April 1700. Rather than substantial discussion of their legal and historic validity, the most effective form of opposition to the grants' revocation came through an attempt to extend the time span of the examination of monarchical grants back to the start of the reign of Charles II.[117] The effect of the Act was to annul almost all land grants made by William in Ireland, even those to soldiers who could by no means be defined as royal favourites, and in the case of Ginkel to an individual whose grant had

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[113] Somers, *Jus Regium,* p.21, referring to 25 Edward III, c.11.
[114] This related to the attempt to conclude the disputes emanating from Charles II's Stop of the Exchequer in 1672.
[115] *The Case of the bankers in the Court of Exchequer… June 23d, 1696, With notes by Francis Hargrave Esq.* (London, 1791), p.2. Having found for the Crown in its right to grant land, Somers went on to dismiss the case on a technicality, thereby saving the Crown expense in the short term.
[116] Somers, *Jus regium*, p.36.
[117] Cobbett's *Parliamentary History of England,* v, p.1215. The extension of the duration of the examination of the sovereign's land grants would have led to scrutiny of a number of grants made to members or relatives of members sitting in Parliament.

been approved by the Irish Parliament.[118] The grant to the Countess of Orkney was also revoked, despite its provenance as part of the lands of the Duke of York rather than directly as part of the Irish forfeitures. The House of Commons, in similar fashion to its treatment of the Welsh land grants, used the issue of the Irish land forfeitures to further its executive authority at the expense of the monarch. The rationale used was highly contentious from a legal perspective.

The land grant debates in Parliament and their associated literature can easily be interpreted as evidence that late seventeenth-century English attitudes to history and its laws were purely pragmatic. Instead of displaying an unbiased interest in the evidence of the past, those searching historic records for political purposes could be argued to have been solely concerned with finding evidence to support their cause irrespective of context or competing authentications, however strong. Sometimes the compulsion to fit the evidence of the past to the conviction of the present led to what might now be seen as surprising levels of oversight or even falsification of records. For example, neither Somers nor Price appear to have commented upon Coke's summation of the arguments made in the so-called *Prince's Case* regarding the illegality of giving away Crown land designated for the Prince of Wales, despite that judgement having a direct bearing on the legality of the King's land grant in the Marches to Portland.[119] Even more surprisingly, Somers correctly dismissed one of

[118] Simms, *Williamite Confiscation in Ireland*, p.88.

[119] *The Prince's Case* involved land which had been given away by Elizabeth I to two followers of Robert, Earl of Leicester: Gellio Meyrick and Henry Lindley. The land (West Taunton, Trelowis and Landalph) had formed part of the estates bestowed on the Duke of Cornwall (traditionally also the Prince of Wales). James I initiated legal proceedings to reclaim the land for his eldest son, Prince Henry, from

Davenant's arguments simply because the Statute on which it was based (in Davenant's opinion from 11 Hen IV) did not exist.[120] However, to conclude cynicism alone can account for such behaviour in the employment of the evidence of the past is too simple a judgement. Somers and Davenant were assiduous in their attempts to use the evidence of history in order that they might more readily contribute to the debate over the composition of their own polity.[121] Their works on the subject of the Irish land grants run to hundreds of pages, containing multiple descriptions of historic legal practice. They would have agreed with Pocock's summation of the beliefs of Robert Brady, the historian employed by Charles II: he believed 'the law was timeless; its principles were the same in all ages; the past was a storehouse, not of mere examples, but of authoritative "precedents."'[122] The importance of possession of the evidence of the past as a guide to contemporary governance was underlined by the removal of the Tory, Robert Brady, in 1689 as custodian of the records in the

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Meyrick and Lindley. Coke argued the case for James and won on the grounds that the land could not be given away for the use of anyone but the Duke of Cornwall. Somers was aware of Coke's work and quoted him extensively. For example, in defence of the King's right to grant his land, he wrote, 'And so it is that my Lord Coke tells us, That all Lands and Tenements in England in the hands of Subjects are holden mediately or immediately of the King, and that we have not in the Law of England property Allodium.' Somers, *Jus Regium,* p.33. However, he seems not to have referred to the case when asked his opinion about the Portland land grant. Price may not have referred to the case because Coke does not include in his summary of those lands owned by the Prince of Wales any mention of the March properties.

[120] Davenant claimed to have found it in the Tower of London. The statute Davenant quoted from is purported to have said: 'The Commons Pray, That for ever hereafter no Grant may be made of any Hereditament,..., till the King shall be quite out of debt... To which the King agrees'. Davenant, *Discourse*, p.145. It may well be a fabrication on Davenant's part. The *Statutes of the Realm 11 Hen IV, printed by command of His Majesty King George III* (London, 1828), pp.162-166, include no such statute. Although commentators often made errors regarding the reign to which they were referring, there are no such entries for that year in the reigns of Henry V or VI either.

[121] Somers collected sixty quarto volumes of MSS relating to historic legal cases. Foss, *Judges,* vii, p.363.

[122] J.G.A. Pocock, 'Robert Brady, 1627-1700. A Cambridge Historian of the Restoration', *Cambridge Historical Journal* 10 (1951), p.186.

Tower of London and his replacement by the Whig, William Petyt. The magnitude of the belief in the need to refer to historic precedent will have differed amongst individuals, but it cannot be regarded as anything other than genuine.[123] That the Revolutionaries believed they were attempting to restore the constitution to its previous state is perhaps the ultimate validation of their belief in the importance of the past and the need to study it, however erroneous that study proved to be. In Parliament, arguments based upon Common Law precedent often became mixed with notions of equity in the thinking of its members. Within the context of the debates over William's land grants, the result was a strong belief in the historic and legal justification of their cause amongst members with Country party leanings: history was repeating itself as a badly advised monarch was rewarding favourites disproportionately whilst his subjects endured needless economic hardship.

The arguments used by the supporters and opponents of the revocation of the grants cast significant light upon two further issues: the degree to which it was considered appropriate that late seventeenth-century use of evidence from the past should be adapted to contemporary circumstance; and the extent to which parliamentary, and in particular the House of Commons's, assertions of its rights tallied with opinion outside Westminster.

[123] There is now a substantial body of scholarly literature which considers the variety of reasons why History was read in the Seventeenth Century, and the uses to which that reading was put. See especially, D.R. Woolf, *Reading History in Early Modern England* (Cambridge, 2000), pp.104-132.

John Somers, along with his near contemporaries Lord Chief Justice Holt and Sir Matthew Hale, was convinced that the evidence of the past should be adapted to contemporary usage. To Somers, 'That Act (referring to a Statute of Henry IV), such a one as it is, could only respect the circumstances of that time.'[124] Most Acts of Resumption had 'passed either when a Usurper Succeeded the Right heir, or when the Right Heir Succeeded a Usurper' and were therefore of no relevance to the Irish Forfeitures.[125] Hale considered custom 'to be both created and creative in a legal context.'[126] 'Will any man say that it is now with us, as it was with the People in King Stephen's days?'[127] Conversely, both Price and Davenant considered the evidence of legal precedent to be of use because it dated from times when the constitutional polity was better ordered. As such, that evidence needed to be strictly observed and enforced. They would have agreed with the view of Coke expressed by Nenner that 'Parliament's proper role, as a High Court, was to correct the unfortunate divergences from the common law that had mistakenly been made in the past.'[128] Such behaviour was a means of returning 'towards our Antient constitution... which all sides will agree to have been form'd with admirable Gravity and Wisdom.'[129] Those wishing to preserve the rights of the king were more flexible in their use of the evidence of the past than those looking to uphold the rights of Parliament. Even

[124] Somers, *Jus Regium*, p.18.
[125] Somers, *Jus Regium,* p.18.
[126]Introduction to Sir Matthew Hale, *The Prerogatives of the King,* ed D.E.C. Yale (London, 1976), p.xl.
[127] Sir Matthew Hale, *A treatise of the just interest of the kings of England in their free disposing power, and the validity of their grants made to any subject* (London, 1703), p.75.
[128] H. Nenner, *By colour of law: legal culture and constitutional politics in England, 1660-1689* (Chicago, 1977), p.17.
[129] Davenant, *Resumptions*, p.428.

though convinced at the time of the veracity of its interpretation of the past, it was the House of Commons which was using the evidence of history to assert the prerogative of Parliament in ways which led to the events of 1688 taking on a revolutionary aspect in the more recent understanding of that term. William Speck wrote that the Declaration of Rights 'assumed that there was a rule of law, that kings were subject to it, and that the legal position was crystal clear.'[130] What that clarity was, and whether it should remain constant, remains a source of debate today: 'a decision of even a final court, when pronounced, has only begun its life as a constituent of the full corpus of the law.'[131]

Assertion of its right to decide the destination of the Irish forfeitures also led the House of Commons into conflict with the House of Lords and the Irish Parliament. In both 1699 and 1700, the lower House, having passed the Resumptions Bill unopposed, attempted to push the Bill through the Lords by tacking it to money bills on which the Lords by precedent did not vote. Deadlock between the two Houses was only averted by the Lords eventually backing down on instruction from the king. William seems to have been concerned that if the Resumptions Bill was not passed, the Commons would begin Impeachment proceedings against his foreign servants, Portland and Albemarle.[132] At the same time, the controversy over the Irish forfeitures' grants coincided with renewed debate about the exact relation between the Irish and

[130] W. Speck, *Reluctant Revolutionaries: Englishmen and the Revolution of 1688* (Oxford, 1989), p.148.
[131] Lord Radcliffe, quoted by J.H. Baker in *The Law's Two Bodies: Some Evidential Problems in English Legal History* (Oxford 2001), p.7.
[132] Vernon, *Letters*, iii, pp.19-24. Horwitz, *Parliament,* pp.266-68.

English Parliaments.[133] In Ireland, Bishop King and William Molyneux had voiced opposition to the Forfeitures Commission due to the lack of Irish Parliament involvement in its establishment. For example, Molyneux, although protesting that 'I am in no wise Interested in the Forfeitures or Grants,' asserted in *The Case of Ireland's being bound by Acts of Parliament in England*, that the agreement over Ireland's governance had been made between the King of England and the people of Ireland and that 'These recent Acts of the English Parliament which have not been ratified by the Irish are innovations.'[134] Appealing to history again, Molyneux argued that 'the precedents of the last thirty seven years should not supersede the previous five hundred years.'[135] His conclusion was that the people of Ireland should be responsible for deciding how their allies should be repaid for their help in the reconquest of Ireland. This advice was not heeded, and the Irish Parliament took no part in the allocation of the forfeited estates, continuing, in Coleman Dennehy's words, 'its evolution into a colonial institution.'[136] Although many Irish MPs had

[133] This is not the place for detailed analysis of the place of the land grants within the context of the subject of late seventeenth-century Irish identity. The subject has been explored extensively and is not core to the argument of this Chapter. For a full discussion, see D. Hayton, *Ruling Ireland, 1685-1742: politics, politicians and parties* (Woodbridge, 2004), ch.2. The same applies to the issue of Welsh identity, although the subject has been less fully covered elsewhere and certainly deserves further consideration. Price refers to a Welsh preference to be 'under the King than under a foreign lord.' *Gloria Cambriae*, p.9. However, perhaps in his desire to maximise support, he also appeals to English and British readers for their support in protesting against the grant to Portland.

[134] William Molyneux, *The Case of Ireland's being bound by Acts of Parliament in England, stated* (Dublin, 1698), p.115.

[135] Ibid., p.101.

[136] C. Dennehy, *The Irish Parliament, 1613-89. The evolution of a colonial institution* (Manchester, 2019). There is now an extensive literature concerning the Irish parliament in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries: J. Kelly, *Poynings' Law and the Making of Law in Ireland. The operation, practices and procedures of the Irish House of Commons from 1692-1730* (Dublin, 2007); G. McKee, 'The operation, practices and procedures of the Irish House of Commons from 1692-1730' (Ph.D. thesis, King's College London, 2017); C. McGrath, *The Making of the eighteenth-century Irish Constitution: Government, Parliament and the Revenue, 1692-1714* (Dublin, 2000).

bought forfeited land from its original donees and could therefore have been economically disadvantaged by the Resumptions, they did not venture on open criticism of the English Parliament or of the Act of Resumption. Edward Southwell, for example, stated that 'everybody spoke with the greatest deference to England, declaring that they did not hereby intend to reflect on what had passed, though the Act had been very severe.'[137] When complaints were made in the Irish Parliament about the Resumptions, they tended to concern the overvaluation of the original grants by the Forfeitures Commissioners and the 'unwarranted reflections on the Protestants of Ireland' which some of the Commissioners were considered to have made.[138]

The degree to which the House of Commons's assertion of its rights over the land grants replicated public sentiment in England can also be questioned. Price's statement regarding the Marches land grants that 'tho' subscribed by few hands, yet (his work) has the Sense and Approbation of Thousands, who are not influenc'd by their own Interest, but by the Honour they have for the Crown, and the Welfare of the British Nation' is not supported by evidence and has a slightly hopeful ring.[139] No pamphlets seem to have survived which comment on this issue. The extent of the interest in the Irish forfeitures outside Parliament may also be questioned. In the

[137] *The journals of the House of Commons of the kingdom of Ireland* (31 vols, Dublin, 1782-94), 28 September 1703, ii, p.321.
[138] This was the reason given for the expulsion of one of the Forfeitures Commissioners- Francis Annesley- from the Irish Parliament.
[139] 'The Speech of a Member of the House of Commons in 1696, for the Repealing a Grant made to Min Heer Benting, of several Lordships belonging to the principality of Wales', printed in *A choice collection of papers relating to state affairs; during the late Revolution* (London, 1703), pp.523-30.

opinion of Davenant's biographer, 'The Discourse, selling in great numbers, effectively paved the way for the resumption bill.'[140] That opinion was countered at the time by the Secretary of State, James Vernon: 'Dr. Davenant's book is abroad, and publickly sold, but I hear more of Smith.'[141] The degree to which the actions of the House of Commons replicated the public mood is questionable. By the time of the controversy over the Kentish Petition, where the House of Commons attempted to restrict the right to petition of the people whom it represented, Parliament was considered by many to have overstretched its authority.[142] In the period between 1697 and 1702, a number of the issues which the *Declaration of Rights* had left unsettled were resolved, mostly, but not all, in favour of the House of Commons.

William III has left little indication of the degree to which he engaged with the complexity of the arguments raised for and against his land grants, if he did so at all. As with other issues where he felt his honour and rights had been disregarded, his response was silent withdrawal from public engagement.[143] William's initial threat to

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[140] Waddell, *Davenant*, p.283.

[141] James Vernon to Shrewsbury, December 2 1699. Vernon, *Letters*, ii, p.373. The reference is probably to Smith the Informer who had provided evidence against those involved in the Assassination Plot. He subsequently published pamphlets with veiled references to Shrewsbury's involvement in the Plot. Having failed, in his estimation, to be adequately bought off by the Ministry, Smith wrote a book at this time complaining about his treatment.

[142] The Kentish Petition of 1701 was signed by some of the leading citizens of Kent. It asked for the House of Commons to vote a bill of supply to allow William to build a standing army against France. On presenting their Petition to Parliament, the Petitioners were arrested for 'tending to destroy the constitution of Parliaments, and to subvert the established government of the realm.' Daniel Defoe, *The History of the Kentish Petition* (London, 1701), p.8. The petitioners were freed after Defoe led a delegation to the Commons to demand their release. Their subsequent procession through the streets of London to a banquet at the Guildhall was widely celebrated. To Defoe, imprisoning the Kentish Petitioners had violated the Law of Nature and could lead to the dissolution of government.

[143] Stephen Baxter attributed William's behaviour to old age: 'Probably, like many ageing people, he was becoming shy and frightened of a world he no longer felt a part of.' Baxter, *William III,* p.364.

leave England as a result of the way he felt he had been treated over the Standing Army and Land Grant issues was not acted upon. However, he remained angry, particularly as he believed some of his ministers, Somers included, were more interested in saving themselves than pursuing his interest.\ The evidence of William's surviving correspondence is interesting: in his letters to Bentinck between 1695-1700, there are no references to the land grants.[144] There are occasional complaints about the small mindedness of the English political nation, but the main focus is upon European politics.[145] This is a reminder of the breadth of William's concerns and the comparative unimportance in a European context of the land grants.

The parliamentary reaction to his grants was difficult for William to understand. He genuinely wished, and believed he had the right, to reward those whom he considered to have served him well. He considered opposition to the grants displayed ingratitude for all that he had achieved for the Protestant religion and the preservation of England, reinforcing a mutual suspicion between Crown and Parliament. The coherence of William's vision concerning both his rights as monarch and his means of engaging with Parliament to defend those rights is difficult to discern, especially in the latter stages of the reign when Parliament increasingly asserted its rights. His *Declaration* before the 1688 invasion that he wished to restore the rights of the English people by having 'a free and lawful Parliament assembled as

[144] N. Japiske, *Correspondentie van Willem III en van Hans Willem Bentinck, Eersten Graaf van Portland* (5 vols, The Hague, 1926).
[145] 'Pour les particuliers chaqu'un ne songe qu'à se sauver.' William, letter to Portland, 18 February 1698. *Letters of William III and Louis XIV,* i, p.175.

soon as possible' to address the nation's grievances has often rightly been regarded as conveniently ambiguous, attracting more elements of the opposition to James II than would have been possible with a more detailed formulation of grievances and solutions.[146] It may also reflect a lack of detailed thought on William's part as to what it should mean to be king of England. Beyond a somewhat hazy desire to rule in the manner of his uncle Charles II in the early years of his reign, William has left little evidence of a coherent vision of kingship. 'Trimming'- William's preferred method of dealing with competing parliamentary factions in the early years of the reign- was a policy which deliberately attempted to blend what he considered to be the best of competing visions of the polity rather than sanction one over the other. In like manner, Stuart-Orange ministries' control of the press was effective at prosecuting unacceptable political ideology. It was not used to explain in detail a vision of how the monarch should rule in alliance with Parliament.[147] The Stuart-Orange regime's effective use of the visualising of Protestant monarchy does not sit comfortably with this perhaps deliberate absence of coherent strategy regarding both the definition of and means of preservation of its rights. William's actions are often reactive to the actions of others. When he does attempt to impose his will, his means of implementation are often flawed. Piecemeal allocation as a means of granting land

[146] *The Declaration of His Highnes William Henry... Prince of Orange, Of the Reasons Inducing him to Appear in Armes in the Kingdome of England* (The Hague, 1688).

[147] For example, Mark Goldie has examined the political pamphlets written at the start of the reign concerning the nature of their subjects' allegiance to the new monarchs: M. Goldie, 'The Revolution of 1689 and the Structure of Political Argument', *Bulletin of Research in the Humanities*, 83 (1980), in which he concluded that 'William and his servants... deliberately instigated popular doctrines... proponents were rewarded, antagonists proscribed', p.519. However, there was no work which set out the monarchs' vision in coherent terms.

to favourites, as occurred with Portland eventually, would have been a less confrontational means of achieving his aims. The lesson was not learnt, and he continued with the same policy of large-scale grant giving in Ireland. Such highly visible assertions of monarchical authority in contested areas gave the House of Commons the opportunity to object and to fashion the Revolution Settlement in ways which favoured its vision of the polity. To preserve monarchical authority, the allocation of oversight for some areas of governmental responsibility would have been better left unresolved.

Julian Hoppit wrote of William that 'He was, so to speak, easier to love as an idea than as a man.'[148] What that idea was will have differed amongst many Englishmen and opportunities for a full appraisal of William's vision of kingship had been limited by the shared preoccupation of monarch and people with the successful execution of the war against Louis XIV. That changed after 1697. The disputes over the Land Grants formed part of the means by which Parliament asserted its vision of the role of the monarch. Harris wrote of the Declaration of Rights that 'further reforming legislation would follow once a legal parliament had been called into existence.[149] It took longer than that, but it did occur.

[148] J. Hoppit, *A Land of Liberty? : England 1697-1727* (Oxford, 2000), p.135.
[149] Harris, *Revolution*, p.145.

Conclusion

This thesis has investigated William and Mary's patronage practice, concentrating upon appointments to the most important offices within the polity, to establish how those appointments were used to influence the construction of the Revolution Settlement. The breadth of Crown patronage rights ensured that the means and direction of appointment allocation was the new regime's most material channel of interaction with the elites. Those rights of appointment for the most part remained unchanged over the course of the reign and were subjected to limited parliamentary scrutiny. The successful preservation of the Protestant state and religion was the principal reason for the lack of challenge. This limited the degree to which disillusion with the regime could be channeled into criticism of its employment practices. A further reason for the lack of challenge emanated from the widely held belief within Parliament that its primary function was to act as the protector of the nation's rights in response to executive missteps by the monarch, rather than to act as the executive itself. This perspective was supported by a generally affirmative attitude amongst the elites to the Stuart-Orange regime's qualifications to allocate position. Patronage methods and the identities of those selected for office were mostly endorsed, as were the monarchs' qualifications to appoint- acknowledgement of William's diplomatic and military expertise and Mary's outstanding piety. A further reason for the lack of challenge may have emanated from the realisation amongst the elites of the tenacity with which William wished to preserve the rights of the Crown, including those of patronage. This motivation may have

diminished when the likelihood of an even less palatable alternative- the return of James II- declined after 1697.

The widely recognized need for unity acted as a powerful suppressant of discontent with the new regime. Nevertheless, the judgement required by William and Mary to maintain that unity whilst also preserving their own rights within the polity as the practical details of the Revolution Settlement were established should not be underestimated. The regime's use of patronage to further its aims was for the most part effective, a combination of laissez-faire in areas lacking strategic importance and piecemeal reform where change was considered necessary.

The court itself was used to display the legitimacy, power, and splendour of the new regime, whilst also being adapted to suit William's need for a setting in which to engage undisturbed with a small circle of trusted advisers. The patronage rights of senior court officers were retained- an acknowledgement of the opposition which withdrawal of those rights could have occasioned. The level of criticism directed at William and Mary due to their disregard of the substantial profits made by senior court members from the sale of office was limited and may have encouraged the regime to retain the practice. This was despite the incongruity with the court's advocacy of moral reform which such inattention displayed. Monarchical response to the practice resulted only when the level of profit was considered excessive- as occurred in the case of the Earl of Dorset. Even here, Dorset's replacement by the Earl of Sunderland does not suggest a complete change of view concerning the competing claims of expediency and morality.

The use of patronage in a parliamentary context was less successful. The Whig Junto's effective distribution of office and monetary reward in exchange for votes contributed to the achievement of outcomes which William and the Junto desired. William's overly ambitious demands for the size of the standing army in peacetime and his stubborn insistence on his unrestricted right to allocate the Irish land forfeitures contributed to the Junto ministry's dissolution and it was never satisfactorily replaced. The scale of William's parliamentary defeat over these issues resulted from his inability to work within the framework of factional politics. His preference for trimming, in which office and rewards were distributed across party lines, was unworkable and led to a greater challenge to the royal prerogative than would otherwise have occurred. The policy of divide and rule which worked well in the United Provinces was unsuited to an environment where William needed to rule through a Parliament split across Whig-Tory lines. William struggled to adapt his political tactics to the permanence of faction. He considered that the model of co-operation with the Whig party engineered by Sunderland excessively diminished his authority.

In the army, a compromise was struck between the need to have in place a loyal officer corps trained in modern methods of warfare and one which fulfilled the employment desires of the British elite. The overall effectiveness of the officer corps was gradually improved over the course of the reign- a necessary contrast with the more drastic measures implemented by William after his assumption of command of the Dutch army. William's attitude to naval appointments was consistent on both sides of the North Sea. The navy did not interest William as much as the army, despite its strategic importance. At the start of the reign, his direct involvement in naval affairs was deliberately limited by his delegation of responsibility

for less senior naval appointments and his appointment to fleet command of commissions of admirals. William's eventual recognition of Mary's abilities together with her greater interest in the navy led to the queen's increased involvement in naval administration. In this, she was aided by Nottingham. They formed an effective partnership which monitored the aptitude and behaviour of the navy's officers. The combination of the replacement of Nottingham, the death of Mary and Russell's increased use of naval patronage for personal and factional gain led to an increased involvement by William in naval administration, including appointments of its officers.

The expertise and religious beliefs of William and Mary combined well in the field of church appointments, the High Church preferences of Mary blending with William's Calvinist leanings to produce an ecclesiastical bench which was known for its piety, and also reflected Church of England divisions to the extent that neither Latitudinarian nor High Church elements within it could feel completely excluded. This was trimming in successful action and contributed to the comparative calm over religious matters which characterised much of the reign after 1690. Mary's involvement in church preferment was substantial. Her diligence of enquiry into the characters of candidates for clerical office contrasted strongly with William's delegational style. Mary's willingness to let it be known that church preferment was an area of court activity which was in her purview will have been facilitated by William's public acknowledgement of that delegation. William's interventions in clerical appointments at the end of the reign, often in opposition to the recommendations of the Ecclesiastical Commission which he had established, contributed to an unnecessary increase in religious discord.

The regime's judicial appointments, made mostly at the beginning of the reign, were generally well received. The justice dispensed can be summarised as fulfilling the twin purposes of for the most part adhering to a rule of law which fulfilled the requirements of the bulk of the elite, whilst also doing much to provide judicial protection for the regime. The disputes between king and Parliament concerning the Williamite land grants in the Welsh borders and Ireland, however, reveal the depth of difference which existed between William and many amongst the elite concerning the nature of the royal prerogative. William was adamant that he retained the right to dispense the Irish forfeitures as he chose. In resisting that right, the Country party within Parliament appealed to English legal precedent in order to oppose (in their view) a foreign, badly advised king. Their interpretation of English statute and common law was highly questionable. That it prevailed says much about how a shared, if flawed, view of the English past contributed to the forging of the Revolution Settlement.

William's oversight of patronage in the years after 1697, years when he should have been able to use the credit associated with his deliverance of the twin benefits of peace and reduced taxation, was marked by an increase in conflict in almost all areas of court patronage allocation. The period was characterised by a lack of flexibility in William's political manoeuvring which contrasted strongly with the more malleable stance adopted in the United Provinces before 1688. Nevertheless, the overall effect of the regime's direction of the offices in its remit over the course of the reign was positive, contributing significantly to its ability to integrate within the society over which it presided. This was a substantial achievement in light of the highly fractured nature of that society and the complexity of the patronage practices which it was necessary to assimilate and adapt.

The framework of patronage techniques and channels through which Stuart-Orange appointments to senior positions were determined was subject to numerous influences and consequently defies neat categorisation. The core of that framework came from a deliberate imitation of the practices and scale of Charles II's court and the reemployment of several of its most senior officers. There was, for example, no justification for the increase in size of the Stuart-Orange court other than to use it as a means of bolstering the new monarchs' association with Charles II whilst simultaneously distancing the new regime from the reforms initiated by James II. Nevertheless, the construction of the new court also replicated some of the features with which William and Mary were familiar from their establishment in The Hague. Membership of the grouping which surrounded William was for the most part consistent throughout the reign and transcended national boundaries- many of the same figures attended the king at court in England and The Hague as well as on campaign and on his Dutch hunting expeditions.

Some of those court officers were also assigned wider duties within the informal network of responsibilities overseen by William. The methods employed and the expectations placed on those to whom control was delegated were again similar on both sides of the North Sea. Within the often narrowly assigned areas of authority, William was more concerned with the results produced rather than the methods used. The delegation of responsibility was inevitable in the light of the wide-ranging extent of William's geographic control. Those methods of delegation were not unequivocally well received. There were accusations of over dependence upon a limited number of close associates and dissatisfaction on the part of others, such as Carmarthen, with their exclusion from their perceived role as the monarchs'

natural advisers. The nature of the delegation was also contentious. Very few of William's advisers were given the opportunity to act as what might be termed general advisers to the king. Such a relationship was not sought by William except in a few, select cases. William's aversion to the possibility of becoming overly dependent upon a single adviser extended to his practice of placing strategic posts in the law and navy in commission. One of the effects of this policy of diffusion of responsibility was to limit the scale of his advisers' patronage networks. Compared with the diverse areas over which Buckingham in James I's reign exerted control, William's closest advisers' ability to establish wide-ranging separate power bases was constrained.

Mary was one of the small number of individuals to whom William entrusted responsibility for patronage allocation. The initial doubts which William displayed concerning the queen's political ability were characteristic of his cautious, naturally distrustful nature and he seems to have been little concerned by the potential effect of his public musings over her suitability as Head of the Regency Council during his absences abroad. William's eventual recognition of Mary's administrative capability, bolstered by Mary's consistently deferential behaviour towards him, extended to a reliance upon her ability to oversee court patronage. Mary's style of queenship, including her methods of patronage, incorporated a level of cooperation between monarch and subject rarely practiced by William. In her deliberations over those to whom to offer employment, she sought opinions from multiple sources. Her collaboration with Nottingham was particularly important. Manifestations of her inclusive and indeed generous style of queenship included her more open court, open even to known opponents of the regime such as the Earl of Ailesbury. Despite significant differences in character, the

political partnership between Mary and William was effective. Mary assumed responsibility only in areas where William permitted and where she was interested- the Church and Navy. She was anxious to emphasize William's primacy, always backing down without public complaint when William intervened in her areas of responsibility.

William's delegational patronage style can be viewed as a necessary response to his wide-ranging areas of responsibility. It was also well-suited to his temperament. He often appeared aloof to all but his closest associates. There are elements within his patronage approach which are far removed from the methods employed by Mary, differences which point to the dangers of the use of catch-all phrases such as that of 'Stuart-Orange patronage practice.' There are also dangers in constructing a narrative of their differences in patronage technique which overemphasizes the contrasts between Mary's more open style, a style which resembles that of her uncle, and the more secretive approach favoured by William. That approach, with its emphasis upon the compartmentalisation of roles and its results-based methods of assessment has resonances with more modern forms of employment practice. This contrast in styles should not be exaggerated. William himself was often slow to adopt new practices. Other stadhouders had gone much further in their delineation of the requirements which they placed upon those offered employment- William Frederick for example had drawn up 'contracts of correspondence' to outline the employment relations between the stadhouder and 'at least ten prominent Friesian regents in the years 1657 to 1663.' [1] William, either in his capacity as stadhouder or king, did not employ such

[1] Janssen, *Princely Power*, p.170.

instruments- perhaps he did not want to be constricted by a specific contract. Nor did William attempt to transfer the examination-based criteria for officer selection employed by the British navy to the army, despite its proven usefulness in a naval context and the pressing need to improve the quality of the army officer corps. He instead relied on his own observations and those of a few trusted confidantes to guide his decision-making. His own judgement was heavily influenced by the perceived gentility of an individual- he continued to assume that individuals of lower-birth were less likely to display the quality of bravery necessary in an army officer.

In contrast with the coherent certainties portrayed in the visual representation of the Stuart-Orange regime, the practical application of its rule was somewhat less consistent.[2] This reflects the pragmatic attitude of William and his sharp focus, if not obsession, with the need to find the means to defeat Louis XIV. In the pursuit of that aim, William was frequently accused of displaying absolutist tendencies. It is difficult, from a study of his patronage practice, to judge the extent to which William's professed respect for the rights of Parliament was a consistently used subterfuge concealing a conception of a balance of power between monarch and people which was tilted far more towards the monarch than was envisaged by the bulk of the English elite. He was certainly assiduous in the preservation of his perceived rights as king and, as in the United Provinces, consistently employed a policy of probing to see how far he could extend his areas of authority. He was

[2] Julie Farguson, for example, has used the phrase 'Orange Kingship' to describe the ceremonial and representational practices associated with William III after the death of Mary. Farguson, *Visualising Protestant Monarchy,* pp.148-180.

often dismissive of the abilities of the English to rule themselves.[3] In the case of the Irish land grants at the end of the reign, his refusal to take account of either the opposition to his previously attempted land grant to Portland or the parliamentary determination consistently shown in previous years to be involved in the Irish forfeitures' distribution, is indicative of a lack of regard for parliamentary rights and ability. The return of war and William's death in 1702 prevented further confrontation.

This thesis has deliberately concentrated on William and Mary's appointment practices relating to the most important offices within their remit. William focused his attention on the correct bestowal of patronage to these positions in the belief that the appointees would in turn use their patronage powers to extend the regime's control and influence further within society. Linda Levy Peck analysed the patronage networks constructed by Buckingham and Northampton during the reign of James I and it would be useful to conduct a similar exercise for some of the Stuart-Orange regime's leading political, ecclesiastical and military figures.[4] The papers of, and relating to, for example, Gilbert Burnet and John Cutts could be used to explore how ecclesiastical and military patronage networks were constructed. In addition, the study could be extended to subsequent reigns, exploring the processes by which patronage rights were gradually assumed by Parliament and how the allocation and use of those rights were influenced by the rage of party.[5]

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[3] 'Matters in Parliament here are taking a turn which drives me mad.' William, letter to Heinsius, 6 January 1699. *Letters of William III and Louis XIV*, ii, p.233.
[4] Levy Peck, *Court Patronage and Corruption,* esp. pp.47-106.
[5] The mechanics of the distribution of patronage within Parliament have been explored by G. Holmes, *British Politics in the Age of Anne* (London, 1967), particularly chs.6 and 11.

The methods used to preserve the Protestant state and religion were effective partly because the Stuart-Orange regime was successful in coordinating and making use of the resources at its disposal. This included its use of its rights of patronage: William and Mary were generally astute in the methods and choices of those to whom to delegate responsibility in the main areas of the polity. The complexity of this task should not be underestimated in view of the fractured nature of the society over which the new monarchs came to rule. Wallace MacCaffrey wrote of 'the difficult task of mastering an established political elite, of securing their loyalty and co-operation, for it was through these men that he would be able to govern England.'[6] MacCaffrey was referring to the task awaiting James VI and I on his accession to the English throne. The phrase could be applied equally to William and Mary. The Revolution Settlement was a messy compromise, worked out in piecemeal fashion. Although Stuart-Orange patronage practice often contained internal contradictions and much ambiguity within its areas of application and between its representation and reality, those contradictions were mostly acceptable to both monarchs and elites. Much responsibility for patronage allocation remained with the monarchs. William was generally adept at both allocating office in areas where he maintained personal control and delegating responsibility elsewhere to individuals with the expertise to fulfil that role effectively. One of those individuals was Mary. Her oversight of ecclesiastical patronage contributed to the comparative political calm which marked the middle years of the reign. This was also aided by the effective coalition engineered by Sunderland and Portland

[6] W. McCaffrey, 'Patronage and Politics under the Tudors', in L. Levy Peck, *The mental world of the Jacobean Court* (Cambridge, 1991), p.21.

between William and the Whig Junto. The breakdown of this coalition and the withdrawal of its architects from active involvement in English politics deprived William of important sources of political advice. William's disregard of the determination upon the part of the House of Commons to control the Irish forfeitures' distribution indicates a lack of consideration of parliamentary sentiment. His insensitivity intensified the conflict between ruler and ruled which marked William's final years, contributing to a further step in the relocation of power from monarch to Parliament.

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