

## **Two of the same kind?**

### **The rise of the AfD and its implications for the CDU/CSU**

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## Two of the same kind?

### The rise of the AfD and its implications for the CDU/CSU

**Abstract.** In 2017, the AfD became the first party explicitly positioned to the right of the CDU/CSU to enter the *Bundestag* since 1957. As the AfD was founded by former CDU members and rose against the backdrop of Merkel's European and refugee policies, the AfD may appear as primarily a threat to the CDU/CSU. I argue that this view is overly simplistic. Analyzing the AfD's platform, survey data and factionalism, I find: 1) While the AfD started as a conservative challenger to the Christian Democrats, it moved away from this platform toward becoming a populist radical right party. 2) This transformation is reflected in its vote base which includes characteristics associated with social conservatism but also encompasses nativist, populist and even left-wing elements. 3) The AfD has so far been unable to integrate these different positions and stop forces pushing it away from being an option for discontent Christian Democrats.

**Keywords.** AfD, CDU/CSU, 2017 German election, political parties, party manifesto, voting behavior, factionalism

#### To the right of the CDU/CSU...

By more than doubling its 2013 result and winning 12.6 percent of the votes at the 2017 federal election, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) put an end to an era. For the first time since 1957, a party that had explicitly positioned itself to the right of the CDU and CSU had succeeded in entering the *Bundestag*. It has been a new climax in the party's development after it had already entered parliament in 13 of Germany's 16 states (sometimes with startling results, Table 1).

The AfD's rise has occurred against the backdrop of the increasing alienation of many conservatives from the CDU leadership around Angela Merkel. While Merkel has been holding

the chancellorship for the Christian Democrats since 2005, many issues important to conservatives, like support for conscription and nuclear energy, have been abandoned under her watch. She was consequently criticized for gradually eroding the CDU's ideological distinctiveness and thereby creating the demand for a conservative party.<sup>1</sup> When Merkel agreed to bailout EU membership countries affected by the Eurozone crisis, a group of former CDU members around Bernd Lucke and Alexander Gauland ultimately formed the AfD.<sup>2</sup> They thrived on the fierce opposition of parts of the German public against Merkel's response to the refugee crisis in 2015 and 2016.

The context of the AfD's surge lends itself to considering the party a primary threat to the Christian Democrats. This impression is reinforced by the fact that the success of right-wing challengers in other European countries, like Austria, the Netherlands and France, has put enormous pressure on their respective mainstream center-right parties.<sup>3</sup> It also corresponds to the intuition we may derive from spatial theories of party competition. They make us expect a right-wing party to be a more serious competitor for the electoral basis of center-right rather than center-left or left-wing parties.<sup>4</sup> However, it is also well-known that the support base of right-wing challengers is often not adequately captured in spatial terms.<sup>5</sup> Assessing to what extent the AfD has primarily been a threat to the CDU and CSU does not only speak to this debate. It is also particularly relevant at a time when the Christian Democrats have been debating how to respond to the AfD's success in 2017. The CSU and the CDU's Land branch in Saxony have promoted shifting the parties' appeal to the right in order to reconquer the space lost to the AfD, whereas others have warned against abandoning the moderate course adopted under Merkel's leadership.<sup>6</sup> Assessing the extent to which the AfD has threatened the CDU/CSU is key for informing the lessons the latter will draw from the 2017 *Bundestag* election.

I argue that while CDU and CSU have suffered from the advent of the AfD, considering the latter a primary threat to the Christian Democrats ignores the complexity of the party's platform, electorate and internal factionalism. In a first step, I argue that the AfD has substantially transformed its initial party platform over the past four years which made the party appeal to a heterogeneous electoral basis. Comparing the AfD's 2016 basic program and 2017 election manifesto to findings on the party's earlier programs, I show that the AfD transitioned from being a conservative challenger to the Christian Democrats toward becoming a populist radical right party. This transformation, I proceed to outline, is reflected in the AfD's vote base in the 2017 election. It represents, as survey data underlines, the coming together of strange bedfellows: conservatives who voted Christian Democrat in the past and a group of protest and nativist voters that also includes supporters of far-left ideas. The AfD has so far been unable to integrate such diverse groups and stop its move toward the far right, as I demonstrate in a final step by discussing the party's internal factionalism. I conclude that it is therefore dubious whether the AfD will succeed in remaining an option for discontent Christian Democrats. Appeals to move the CDU/CSU to the right to fight off the AfD may therefore be premature.

Table 1: AfD election results since 2013

[Table 1 here]

Data: Federal and Land returning officers.

### **The AfD's shift from fiscal and social conservatism to the populist radical right**

#### *The AfD's entry as a conservative challenger to the CDU/CSU*

Since Merkel became chancellor in 2005, she has been criticized for gradually eroding the CDU's ideological distinctiveness and thereby creating the demand for a new party to the right of the political center.<sup>7</sup> While this view finds only limited empirical support when analyzing the CDU's programs and manifestos,<sup>8</sup> the perceived "social democratization" of the party was

stimulated by its departure from some core positions.<sup>9</sup> This included moving away from its support for mandatory military service, nuclear energy, a skeptical view of immigration and a traditional family definition.<sup>10</sup> This development attracted substantive media attention and was seen as steps toward the CDU's ideological indistinctiveness.

It was in this perceived ideological gap that the AfD entered party competition in 2013.<sup>11</sup> While the Merkel government's handling of the European debt crisis provided the trigger for party formation, the AfD leadership around Bernd Lucke, Konrad Adam and Alexander Gauland aimed at occupying the space previously dominated by the Christian Democrats.<sup>12</sup> While campaigning for a far-reaching reorganization of the EU in 2013,<sup>13</sup> the AfD politicized Merkel's bailout policies as evidence that the CDU/CSU had lost their economic and fiscal competence and their identity as the defender of Germany's social market economy. On socio-cultural grounds, the AfD endorsed positions of traditional morality. They promoted family-oriented welfare policies, an understanding of marriage as being exclusively between a man and a woman and a more restrictive stance on immigration. Consequently, its 2013 election manifesto included many views Merkel has been criticized for having abandoned.

### ***The AfD's transformation into a populist radical right party***

The AfD maintained some of its initial positions that resembled those of the CDU/CSU's conservative wing in its Political Guidelines from May 2014.<sup>14</sup> Similarly, the AfD's basic program from 2016 and its manifesto for the 2017 election still expressed support for social market economy, subsidiarity and opposition against the Euro and the EU in their current format.<sup>15</sup> They also included traditionalist views on family policies, opposition to abortion, and social policies aimed at supporting families with multiple children.<sup>16</sup> The AfD promoted Germany's selective secondary and higher education system, the abolishment of gender quotas, the reintroduction of conscription, the use of nuclear energy and classic law and order

positions.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, and most importantly, by adopting a strong anti-immigrant stance, the AfD provided an option for those dissatisfied with the CDU/CSU's policies during the European refugee crisis. Merkel's inclusive response to the arrival of over one million asylum seekers in Germany since 2015 had provoked major opposition from outside and inside her own party.<sup>18</sup> The two sister parties CDU and CSU turned "into distant relatives."<sup>19</sup> Merkel also faced severe opposition from CDU state leaders. Julia Klöckner (Rhineland-Palatinate), Reiner Haseloff (Saxony-Anhalt) and Guido Wolf (Baden-Wuerttemberg) promoted a more restrictive stance on the refugee issue and openly criticized Merkel's policies in their respective election campaigns in 2016.

However, fiscal and social conservatism were increasingly side-lined in the AfD's platform by a populist radical right appeal based on authoritarianism, populism and nativism.<sup>20</sup> The AfD has thereby markedly moved away from competing for a similar political space as the Christian Democrats. Already the campaign slogan for the 2014 European Parliament election ("Courage for Germany"; *Mut zu Deutschland*) indicated the beginning of the party's shift toward the populist radical right.<sup>21</sup> The alleged threat Islam and immigration posed for Germany's society and welfare system as well as anti-establishment rhetoric ultimately took hold in the party's platform in the run-up to the state elections in Eastern Germany in late 2014.<sup>22</sup> The AfD also started forging ties with far-right organizations, like the anti-Islam and xenophobic Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident (*PEGIDA*) which Gauland characterized as the AfD's "natural ally."<sup>23</sup>

The AfD's 2016 program and 2017 election manifesto included a strong authoritarian element. It reflects a "belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely."<sup>24</sup> The AfD wants to toughen the punishment for assaults against law enforcement forces, only apply adult criminal law to any suspect of 18 years of age or older, lower the age of criminal liability from 14 to 12 years, put offenders suffering from a mental

illness into preventive detention rather than psychiatric hospitals and deport any foreign nationals found guilty of a criminal offense.<sup>25</sup> Similar positions are expressed in the 2017 manifesto.<sup>26</sup>

While the respect for social order and hierarchy has also been traditionally shared by many conservative Christian Democrats, the AfD and CDU/CSU differ in their degree of authoritarianism. The AfD has been located closer to the authoritarian pole of the party system than the Christian Democrats.<sup>27</sup>

More importantly, the AfD has given up its initial image as the CDU/CSU's "conservative conscience" by endorsing an anti-system position in relation to all parties.<sup>28</sup> It presented itself as the defender of an exploited and disfranchised people against a fraudulent and power-hungry political elite. This antagonism, defining populist rhetoric,<sup>29</sup> was the dominant theme of the party's basic program in 2016. It guides the party's remarks on a wide range of policy fields, including education, finances and taxation, immigration, inner security, energy and European policies. The so-called "political class of career politicians", "secret sovereign" or "political cartel" is blamed for undermining the rule of law and freedom of speech and deceiving "the people" for its own material advantages.<sup>30</sup> While figuring less prominently, populism remained a pillar of the AfD's election manifesto in 2017.<sup>31</sup>

The most visible departure from the AfD's conservative beginnings, however, lies in the rise of nativism. Nativism postulates that "states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state."<sup>32</sup> The AfD draws a picture of a German nation whose inner security, welfare system and identity are threatened by the spread of Islam and mass migration.<sup>33</sup> The EU's external frontiers would therefore need to be closed. Controls along Germany's borders with its European neighbors would have to be reintroduced.<sup>34</sup> Moreover,

the AfD demands to keep asylum seekers away from German territory in so-called “protection and asylum centers” that are “regionally and culturally close” to their countries of origin.<sup>35</sup> Endorsing welfare chauvinism, the AfD argues that most asylum seekers and migrants would come to Germany to freeride on its welfare provisions. Their access to social support, the AfD claims, must therefore be restricted.<sup>36</sup> Refugees would be denied paths toward citizenship or a permanent residence permit.<sup>37</sup> If these measures do not reduce Germany’s net migration rate to zero, the AfD demands a minimum annual deportation quota.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, the party wants to limit Muslims’ right to practice their religion.<sup>39</sup>

In comparison to its 2016 program, the AfD expressed its nativist positions even more bluntly in its 2017 election manifesto. In its section on asylum policies and immigration, the party stated: “The aim is the self-preservation, not self-destruction of our state and people [*Volk*].”<sup>40</sup> The party “want[s] to leave our descendants a country that is still recognizable as our Germany.”<sup>41</sup> When outlining its proposed family policies, the AfD warned against the “shrinkage of our native population” and presented itself as the political force that “braced itself against this trend toward self-abolition.”<sup>42</sup> In fact, Germany would require a paradigm shift toward “national demographic policies” which aimed at increasing the birth rate of the “native population.”<sup>43</sup> The preservation of Germany’s “constitutive people” (*Staatsvolk*) should be included in the German constitution.<sup>44</sup> Such nativist language has usually not been used by political parties in Germany apart from the extreme right because of its association with the country’s Nazi past. The fact that the AfD openly included it in its manifesto emphasizes the transformation of the party’s platform.

Hence, the AfD started off with a platform that aimed at representing positions previously abandoned or neglected by the CDU/CSU. While such positions are still visible in the AfD’s programmatic platform, they have been sidelined given the party’s endorsement of

authoritarian, populist and nativist positions. The AfD thereby competes for a very heterogeneous electorate that does not equal that of the Christian Democrats.

### **The AfD's vote base as a coalition of strange bedfellows**

Regardless of the AfD's transformed platform, a first glance on the results of the 2017 election still seems to suggest that the CDU/CSU and AfD are two sides of the same coin. Although the CDU remained the strongest party and, together with the CSU, will continue to be the largest parliamentary group in the *Bundestag*, the Christian Democrats suffered massive losses (-8.6 percent compared to 2013). In contrast, the AfD improved its 2013 vote share by almost eight percent. It made particular gains in Bavaria and Saxony (Southeast) (opaque areas in Figure 1.2). These were not only traditional strongholds of the CSU and CDU respectively but also the constituencies in which both parties lost most votes (opaque areas in Figure 1.1). For example, the CDU suffered its highest losses in the constituency *Sächsische Schweiz-Osterzgebirge* in Saxony (-20.3 percent), whereas the AfD increased its 2013 vote share by 27.6 percent in the same district. The three direct mandates the AfD secured in Saxony by winning most constituency votes (*Erststimmen*) under Germany's mixed electoral system had also previously been held by the CDU.<sup>45</sup>

Figures 1: Change in vote share by constituency in 2017

Figure 1.1: CDU/CSU

[Figure 1.1 here]

Data: Second vote (*Zweitstimme*), Federal returning officer.

Figure 1.2: AfD

[Figure 1.2 here]

However, although there is much geographical overlap between the CDU/CSU's losses and the AfD's gains, the overlap is not perfect. The Christian Democrats also lost substantively in some constituencies in Baden-Wuerttemberg (Southwest) and parts of North Rhine-Westphalia (West) where the AfD gains were relatively less striking. Moreover, the AfD gains in Eastern Germany were often much higher than the losses suffered by the CDU. Gains by the AfD in the East were, in turn, accompanied by (at times substantive) losses for the socialist Left Party (*Die Linke*). It declined in all Eastern German constituencies outside of Berlin, while increasing its vote share in almost all of Western Germany (Figure 2). This seems to encourage to move from macro- to micro-level data to analyze vote shifts between parties.

Figure 2: Change in vote share by constituency in 2017, Left Party

[Figure 2 here]

Data: Second vote (*Zweitstimme*), Federal returning officer.

Individual-level data on vote shifts, based on estimates by Infratest dimap, shows that the AfD's vote base was indeed quite diverse in 2017. While the group of former CDU/CSU voters accounts for more than a quarter of the AfD's gains, the party drew substantive support from former non-voters, other minor parties (including right-wing extremist parties, like the NPD), the Social Democrats and the Left Party (Table 2).

Table 2: Vote shift toward AfD in 2017

[Table 2 here]

Data: Infratest dimap, "Wählerwanderungen Bundestagswahl 2017". percent rounded to nearest integer.

Just because the AfD gained the largest number of voters from the Christian Democrats compared to other established parties does not mean that the AfD was primarily a threat to the CDU/CSU. To make such an assessment, we need to take a party's baseline vote share into account because a loss of 10,000 votes, for instance, is more severe for a party that had previously gained 20,000 votes than for a party of 100,000 votes. To compare which party lost most of its electorate to the AfD, I calculate the relative losses of each party to the AfD in all elections since 2013 (Table 3). The table reads: In 2013, the CDU/CSU lost two percent of the voters who had voted for them in the 2009 federal election to the AfD.

Table 3: Share of voters lost to the AfD by party, in percent

[Table 3 here]

Data: Infratest dimap; Federal and Land returning officers. The data refers to both CDU and CSU in nation-wide elections but excludes the CSU for all Land elections shown above because it only competes in Bavaria. I have used the party-list vote (*Zweitstimme*). Bremen 2015 is not included because each voter has up to five votes which makes it impossible to derive a party's number of voters. Two largest losses in bold.

Table 3 illustrates that, in terms of the proportion of voters lost to the AfD, the latter has not been a primary challenge to the Christian Democrats. Instead, and with the partial exception of the Greens, the AfD has gained from all parties, thereby not allowing to derive a clear ideological pattern. While the CDU lost a larger proportion of its previous electorate to the AfD than the SPD, the difference between both parties has often been quite marginal. More importantly, the parties that, in relative terms, lost most voters to the AfD were other small parties, including the Pirates and the far-right NPD, and the Left Party (in bold in Table 3). At least temporarily, former FDP voters were also more receptive to vote AfD than former CDU voters. The results therefore suggest that the AfD's rise cannot be sufficiently explained by the defection of discontent Christian

Democrats. This corresponds to the development of the party's platform outlined in the previous section of this article.

The heterogeneity of the AfD's electoral gains encourages some further exploration on what characterizes AfD voters in contrast to non-AfD voters. For this purpose, I use the pre-release of the GLES 2017 Post-election Cross-Section dataset.<sup>46</sup> Of the 2,115 people who were interviewed for this survey between 25 September and 30 November, I focus on the 2,036 people who were eligible to vote in the 2017 federal election.

I use a logistic regression model. My dependent variable is *AfD vote choice* in the 2017 election. It contrasts people who said they had voted AfD in the 2017 election with those who said they had not (including those who casted an invalid ballot and those who did not turn out). The proportion of AfD voters in the sample, bearing in mind that non-voters and casting an invalid ballot have been coded as non-AfD voters to make maximum use of the information available in the data, is 8.5 percent. While this is a relatively small share, it is still well beyond the threshold specified by King and Zeng who have suggested adjusting estimation techniques for binary variables with a proportion of positive cases under 5 percent.<sup>47</sup>

The key independent variables seek to capture the ideological vote base of the AfD. Given its origins as a conservative challenger to the Christian Democrats, I include variables usually associated with the CDU/CSU's conservative wing. They include items asking respondents how religious they would consider themselves, whether they feel that Angela Merkel represents the values and political ideas of the CDU/CSU and whether they think same sex marriage should be legal. While the latter had been legalized just before the *Bundestag* went out of session in 2017, it is a good item to include given the recent salience of the topic in the public discourse. The model also includes a question on whether respondents are in favor of or against the introduction of an

upper limit for the yearly intake of refugees. This has been a highly controversial topic during the refugee crisis. Many conservatives have favored an upper limit. Yet, it is also unlikely to be opposed by voters holding nativist attitudes. I also include an item that asks respondents how much they fear the refugee crisis. As an alternative measure, I include a question that investigates whether respondents perceive immigration as a threat to German culture. To measure populist attitudes, I use an item asking about the satisfaction with the way democracy has been realized in Germany. This fits what we know about populist radical right parties which, rather than opposing democracy, criticize that it has been deprived of its true meaning by the political elite.<sup>48</sup> I also include an item for subjective deprivation which asks whether respondents think that their own economic situation has deteriorated over the last one or two years. Finally, given the losses of the Left to the AfD shown above, I also include a dummy seeking to measure pro-socialist attitudes. It asks whether respondents either fully or partially agree that socialism is a good idea that has only been badly implemented. I also include controls for gender and age group.

Most attitudinal variables have been dichotomized for the purpose of this study. This strategy comes at the cost of some nuance. However, the theoretically most meaningful and unambiguous cut-off point is between those who tend to or fully hold conservative, populist, nativist and socialist views respectively and those who do not (including the “neither nor”/“undecided” response category). “Refused”, “No response” and “Don’t know” were coded as missing and excluded from the analysis.

Table 4 presents the respective odds ratios for different specifications of the model. My results correspond to the development of the AfD’s platform over the past years and underline the party’s heterogeneous basis. Despite the decreasing sample size due to listwise deletion, the results are robust across specifications without any major shifts in the size or direction of the effects.

Corresponding to previous research, I find a substantive gender gap in accounting for AfD support.<sup>49</sup> Men are twice as likely as women to have voted for the AfD in the 2017 election. Moreover, the odds of voting AfD are twice to three times as high for middle-aged respondents compared to 18- to 29-year-olds. These results hold across all eight specifications.

Regarding the AfD's appeal to a traditionally conservative and Christian democratic electorate, the results show an interesting ambiguous picture. Respondents expressing disagreement with the legalization of same sex marriage and see Angela Merkel as not representing the values and political positions of the CDU/CSU are significantly and substantively more likely to be AfD voters than those not holding such views. This points toward the AfD having gained traction among voters holding views that have been associated with the criticism against the alleged erosion of the Christian Democrats' political identity. At the same time, however, the odds of voting AfD decrease the more respondents identify as religious. Those stating that they are somewhat or very religious are only half and 25 percent as likely to vote AfD respectively than people saying that they are not at all religious. Again, these results hold across all eight specifications. This suggests that the AfD's support base does not equal the CDU/CSU's right wing. The latter has upheld conservative views but also been characterized by a high level of religiosity and an emphasis on the "C" in CDU/CSU.<sup>50</sup>

Table 4: Determinants AfD vote in 2017, Odds ratios

[Table 4 here]

Data: GLES 2017 Post-election Cross-Section dataset. Results are odds ratios for a logistic regression (standard errors in parentheses), rounded to two decimal places. Independent variables are categorical, with smallest value as reference category. \* $p_z < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p_z < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p_z < 0.001$ .

Attitudes regarding the refugee crisis and immigration are a second important set of variables. Adding them to the model almost doubles the pseudo- $R^2$ . Respondents favoring an upper limit for the yearly intake of refugees are three to four times as likely to vote AfD than those who do not. This most likely includes former CDU/CSU voters who have been dissatisfied with Merkel's moderate stance on immigration. Yet, this view is also shared by voters on the far right. The nativist element in the AfD's electorate is further highlighted by voters who see immigration as a threat to German culture being almost 4.5 times more likely to vote AfD than those who do not share this view. Moreover, respondents who say that the refugee crisis scares them a lot are substantially and significantly more likely to be AfD voters than those who are not at all scared by it. While including these variables in the same model may make us expect multicollinearity, tests indicate that the level of multicollinearity is very low (for the full model, the mean VIF equals 1.18; 1.38 for upper limit, 1.46 for fear of refugee crisis). We may thus be looking at a quite different electorate – one more conservative and one more nativist in nature.

Interestingly, the effect of feeling very scared of the refugee crisis disappears when we control for pro-socialist attitudes. The odds of respondents who consider socialism a good idea that has only been poorly implemented to vote AfD are more than twice as high as those of people who disagree with this statement. This correlation underscores the heterogeneity of the party's support base and likely reflects the losses of the Left Party to the AfD in Eastern Germany.

Finally, AfD voters are characterized by a sense of dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction is not rooted in a negative development of their own economic situation as the respective effect is undistinguishable from zero. Instead, being dissatisfied with the way democracy has been realized in Germany makes people more likely to vote AfD.<sup>51</sup>

The AfD's electoral basis therefore corresponds to the findings presented above regarding the transformation of its programmatic platform. It may have started as an alternative for social and fiscal conservatives but has transformed into a populist radical right party, attracting support from social conservatives, protest and nativist voters as well socialists.

### **The importance of holding the party together**

The AfD's track-record of internal conflicts and splits casts doubts on whether it will succeed in holding the strange coalition together that has been the basis of its electoral success.

Initially, the AfD seemed to be in relatively good shape to establish itself as a serious challenger to the Christian Democrats. For a new party, the AfD could rely on an impressive amount of resources and organization.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, the party's initiators Lucke, Gauland and Adam had all a CDU background. They attracted other former Christian Democrats with an expertise on economic issues, like Gerd Robanus and Joachim Starbatty.<sup>53</sup> They also gained the support of Hans-Olaf Henkel who had been president of the Federation of German Industry. Together, they appealed to two distinct groups of discontent Christian Democrats. While Lucke and Henkel wooed market-liberal voters, Adam, Frauke Petry and Alexander Gauland reached out to social conservatives.<sup>54</sup>

However, defecting to the AfD quickly became an unappealing option for dissatisfied Christian Democrats as the AfD disintegrated into factional competition. Lucke and his supporters, while agreeing to the diversification of the party's program beyond Euroscepticism, wanted to continue emphasizing the AfD's economic positions and prepare it for joining governing coalitions. In contrast, the group around Gauland and Petry envisioned the AfD as a populist radical right and relational anti-system party.<sup>55</sup>

The AfD proved unable to integrate these competing positions within its organization which resulted in the party's first split in 2015. Many economic-liberals and moderate conservatives had already been leaving the AfD since 2014 as the internal balance of power was shifting toward Petry and Gauland. After Petry was elected party leader at the AfD's national congress in May 2015, Lucke and most members of his faction broke away from the AfD. They founded the *Alliance for Progress and Renewal* (ALFA), which was later renamed into *Liberal Conservative Reformers* (LKR), and adopted a program that placed it between the Christian Democrats and the AfD on the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimension.<sup>56</sup>

The split, however, did not put an end to the infights within the AfD which underlines that it has so far lacked essential mechanisms to resolve internal conflicts. Conflicts emerged between a group behind Petry, promoting more national-conservative positions, and proponents of a far-right course, including Alexander Gauland and Björn Höcke. Again, many moderate members, whereby moderate now designated the group behind Petry, left the AfD. In addition, numerous MPs defected from the party's group in many state parliaments, including in Baden-Wuerttemberg, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and North Rhine-Westphalia.<sup>57</sup>

A second party split ultimately occurred only three days after the 2017 federal election. At a press conference together with Gauland and the AfD's top candidate for the election, Alice Weidel, Petry, who had won her constituency seat, suddenly declared that she would not join the AfD *Bundestag* group.<sup>58</sup> Shortly thereafter, she and other members left the AfD and formed a new party, called The Blue Party (*Die Blaue Partei*).<sup>59</sup>

Thus, the AfD has lost large parts of its initial membership and split twice in the five years of its existence. It has been incapable of containing the centrifugal forces that have pushed the party further and further to the right. Given its internal instability, it seems questionable whether it will

succeed in consolidating the heterogeneous electoral basis that was responsible for the party's surge in the 2017 federal election.

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion, it would be too simplistic to consider the AfD a primary threat to the Christian Democrats. The latter are therefore best advised to not dramatically alter their profile. This article has come to this conclusion by analyzing the development of the AfD's programmatic platform, its electoral basis in the 2017 election and its internal integrative strength (or rather the lack thereof).

The AfD was only in its beginnings a conservative challenger to the Christian Democrats. Very quickly after its formation, it started moving toward the populist radical right. Fiscal and social conservatism were thereby sidelined by authoritarianism, populism and nativism.

This programmatic transformation was reflected in an electoral basis that is best described as a coalition of strange bedfellows. On the one hand, the CDU/CSU did lose ground to the AfD. The latter has attracted support from voters in the 2017 election who express socially conservative views and regard Merkel as not representing traditional CDU values. On the other hand, however, the AfD gained importantly from almost all parties and, in particular, from other minor parties, including those on the far right, and the Left Party. In the literature on party competition and voting behavior, such heterogeneous shifts that do not display a clear ideological pattern have often been characterized in terms of protest voting. This seems to be supported in the case of the AfD whose voters tend to express dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in Germany.

Yet, the refugee issue blurs the boundaries between these groups. Opposition to Merkel's refugee policies has been widely shared by many conservative Christian Democrats. The strong correlation

between support for an upper limit for the yearly intake of refugees and AfD vote in 2017 thus seems to primarily concern the CDU/CSU. While the latter most likely lost many voters to the AfD because of this issue, AfD voters are also more likely to consider immigration, in general, as a threat to German culture which points toward Mudde's conceptualization of nativism.<sup>60</sup> In combination with the populist and pro-socialist attitudes found to affect the odds of voting AfD, we can therefore conclude that the AfD electorate is not simply flesh from the flesh of the Christian Democrats. Instead, it also upholds views associated with the radical right and left.

Finally, the AfD's track-record of internal conflicts and splits has shown that the party has so far been unable to integrate these different positions within its ranks. After the ordo-liberal and conservative faction around Bernd Lucke had left the AfD in 2015, another conflict between a national-conservative and a far-right faction erupted. The former around Frauke Petry broke away from the AfD shortly after the 2017 *Bundestag* election. The tension between different views on how far to the right the AfD should be has also led to fissions within the AfD's parliamentary groups in the German state parliaments. Given its inability to mediate between competing positions, the party does not appear to be well-equipped to maintain its support base.

Hence, demands to move the CDU/CSU to the right to fight off the AfD does not sufficiently consider the complexity of the AfD's platform, electorate and internal factionalism. Giving into such demands may entail a similar fate for the German Christian Democrats as the one suffered by the SPD when confronting the Left Party in the early 2000s or by other European center-right parties in the face of a right-wing challenger. They tried to absorb more extreme positions but failed to stop the rise of their respective rivals while losing voters on the political center. The result was, in many cases, a decline from which these parties have not yet recovered. Future research would benefit from analyzing the trajectory of the AfD and CDU/CSU in such comparative terms.

Table 1: AfD election results since 2013

Year	Election	Vote share
2013	Federal	4.7
	Hesse	4.1
2014	European parliament	7.1
	Saxony	9.7
	Brandenburg	12.2
	Thuringia	10.6
2015	Hamburg	6.1
	Bremen	5.5
2016	Baden-Wuerttemberg	15.1
	Rhineland-Palatinate	12.6
	Saxony-Anhalt	24.3
	Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	20.8
	Berlin	14.2
2017	Saarland	5.9
	Schleswig-Holstein	6.2
	North Rhine-Westphalia	7.4
	Federal	12.6
	Lower Saxony	6.2

Data: Federal and Land returning officers.

Table 2: Vote shift toward AfD in 2017

Absolute numbers	Share of AfD gains in percent
1,200,000 from non-voters	31
<b>980,000 from CDU/CSU</b>	<b>26</b>
690,000 from minor parties	18
470,000 from SPD	12
400,000 from Left	11
40,000 from FDP	1
40,000 from Greens	1
Total: 3,820,000	100

Data: Infratest dimap, “Wählerwanderungen Bundestagswahl 2017”, percent rounded to nearest integer.

Table 3: Share of voters lost to the AfD by party, in percent

Year	Territory	CDU to AfD	SPD to AfD	Green to AfD	FDP to AfD	Left to AfD	Others to AfD	Non- voters to AfD
2013	National	-2	-2	-2	<b>-7</b>	<b>-7</b>	.	-1
	Hesse	-2	-1	-3	-5	<b>-6</b>	<b>-20</b>	.
2014	Europe	<b>-6</b>	-3	-1	-2	<b>-6</b>	.	.
	Saxony	-5	-4	-3	<b>-10</b>	-4	<b>-23</b>	-1
	Brandenburg	-7	-3	-1	<b>-17</b>	-5	<b>-27</b>	-2
	Thuringia	-5	-6	-2	<b>-14</b>	-6	<b>-24</b>	-1
2015	Hamburg	-1	0	0	<b>-2</b>	0	<b>-5</b>	-1
2016	Baden-Wuerttemberg	-10	-8	-6	-7	<b>-16</b>	<b>-55</b>	-8
	Rhineland-Palatinate	-8	-6	-2	-10	<b>-21</b>	<b>-38</b>	-7
	Saxony-Anhalt	-12	-9	-4	<b>-16</b>	-12	<b>-48</b>	-10
	Meckl.-Vorpommern	<b>-14</b>	-6	-5	.	-13	<b>-23</b>	-8
	Berlin	-11	-6	-2	<b>-15</b>	-7	<b>-23</b>	-7
2017	Saarland	-2	-2	0	.	<b>-5</b>	<b>-13</b>	-3
	Schleswig-Holstein	<b>-3</b>	-1	-1	<b>-3</b>	.	<b>-19</b>	-1
	N. Rhine-Westphalia	-2	-2	-1	-4	<b>-5</b>	<b>-32</b>	-4
	National	-5	-4	-1	-4	<b>-11</b>	<b>-21</b>	-7
	Lower Saxony	-3	-1	0	-2	<b>-9</b>	<b>-48</b>	-3
Average		-5.8	-3.8	-1.9	-7.8	<b>-8.3</b>	<b>-28.0</b>	-4.3

Data: Infratest dimap; Federal and Land returning officers. The data refers to both CDU and CSU in nationwide elections but excludes the CSU for all Land elections shown above because it only competes in Bavaria. I have used the party-list vote (*Zweitstimme*). Bremen 2015 is not included because each voter has up to five votes which makes it impossible to derive a party's number of voters. Two largest losses in bold.

Table 4: Determinants AfD vote in 2017, Odds ratios


Variable	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8
Gender (1= male)	2.33*** (0.42)	2.16*** (0.39)	1.87*** (0.35)	1.81** (0.36)	2.23*** (0.48)	2.08*** (0.44)	2.33*** (0.51)	2.43*** (0.55)
Age group								
30 to 44	2.38** (0.73)	2.41** (0.74)	2.37** (0.74)	2.35* (0.79)	2.74** (1.02)	2.67** (0.99)	2.92** (1.12)	2.98** (1.17)
45 to 59	2.26** (0.66)	2.50** (0.74)	2.24** (0.67)	2.58** (0.84)	2.19* (0.77)	2.17* (0.77)	2.30* (0.84)	2.17* (0.81)
60+	1.42 (0.43)	1.64 (0.50)	1.19 (0.38)	1.42 (0.48)	1.21 (0.44)	1.15 (0.42)	1.38 (0.51)	1.29 (0.49)
Identifying as religious								
Not very		0.53* (0.13)	0.46** (0.12)	0.49** (0.13)	0.55* (0.16)	0.46** (0.13)	0.61 (0.18)	0.57 (0.18)
Somewhat		0.45*** (0.09)	0.38*** (0.08)	0.38*** (0.08)	0.38*** (0.09)	0.34*** (0.08)	0.45** (0.11)	0.45** (0.11)
Very		0.26*** (0.10)	0.18*** (0.07)	0.19*** (0.08)	0.21*** (0.09)	0.18*** (0.07)	0.25** (0.11)	0.24*** (0.10)
Against SSM			3.69*** (0.74)	3.72*** (0.77)	2.49*** (0.56)	2.49*** (0.56)	2.41*** (0.56)	2.33*** (0.55)
Merkel not CDU values Upper limit				3.54*** (0.78)	3.31*** (0.85)	3.14*** (0.80)	2.55*** (0.68)	2.34** (0.64)
					3.85*** (1.20)	4.59*** (1.39)	3.89*** (1.23)	3.45*** (1.12)
Fear of refugee crisis								
2					0.55 (0.40)		0.66 (0.49)	0.66 (0.49)
3					0.62 (0.43)		0.70 (0.50)	0.71 (0.51)
4					1.23 (0.73)		1.32 (0.79)	1.23 (0.75)
5					1.84 (1.06)		1.81 (1.06)	1.44 (0.85)
6					2.38 (1.37)		2.53 (1.48)	1.76 (1.05)
7					6.02** (3.41)		4.51** (2.59)	2.91 (1.71)
Cultural threat						4.49*** (0.92)		
Economically worse off							1.49 (0.39)	1.39 (0.37)
Dissatisfied w. democracy							3.60*** (0.76)	3.24*** (0.70)
Socialism is a good idea								2.51*** (0.57)
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.03	0.06	0.10	0.13	0.25	0.26	0.29	0.31
N	1,908	1,894	1,854	1,802	1,772	1,768	1,764	1,759

Data: GLES 2017 Post-election Cross-Section dataset. Results are odds ratios for a logistic regression (standard errors in parentheses), rounded to two decimal places. Independent variables are categorical, with smallest value as reference category. \* $p_z < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p_z < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p_z < 0.001$ .

Figures 1: Change in vote share by constituency in 2017

Figure 1.1: CDU/CSU

Sheet 1




Map based on average of Longitude and average of Latitude. Color shows sum of Cdu/Csu. Details are shown for Polygon ID and Sub Polygon ID.  
-20.30 -1.50

Data: Second vote (*Zweitstimme*), Federal returning officer.

Figure 1.2: AfD

Sheet 1




Map based on average of Longitude and average of Latitude. Color shows sum of AfD. Details are shown for Polygon ID and Sub Polygon ID.



Data: Second vote (*Zweitstimme*), Federal returning officer.

Figure 2: Change in vote share by constituency in 2017, Left Party

Sheet 1



Map based on average of Longitude and average of Latitude. Color shows sum of Left. Details are shown for Polygon ID and Sub Polygon ID.



Data: Second vote (*Zweitstimme*), Federal returning officer.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Michael Geiss, “Beschlossen und Beschwiegen,” *Die Zeit*, 14 July 2011, 3; Heribert Prantl, “Kanzlerin des Ungefähren,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 17 May 2010, available at <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/cdu-parteitag-kanzlerin-des-ungefahren-1.792349>; Volker Rensing, *Die Kanzlermaschine. Wie die CDU funktioniert* (Freiburg, 2013), 149.

<sup>2</sup> Simon Franzmann, “Von AfD zu ALFA. Die Entwicklung zur Spaltung”, *MIP* 22 (2016): 23-37, here: 27-28, 34.

<sup>3</sup> Compare Noam Gidron, “Many ways to be right. The unbundling of European mass attitudes and partisan asymmetries across the ideological divide,” (PhD diss., Harvard University, Cambridge, 2016).

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Downs’ seminal study. Anthony Downs, *An economic theory of democracy* (New York, 1957).

<sup>5</sup> Kai Arzheimer and Elisabeth Carter, “Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist party success”, *European Journal of Political Research* 45, no. 3 (2006): 419-443, here: 438-439, doi 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00304.x; Cas Mudde, *Populist radical right parties in Europe* (Cambridge, 2007), 229.

<sup>6</sup> N.a., “Tillich will CDU nach rechts rücken”, *Die Welt*, 30 September 2017, available at [https://www.welt.de/newsticker/dpa\\_nt/infoline\\_nt/brennpunkte\\_nt/article169194793/Tillich-will-CDU-nach-rechts-ruecken.html](https://www.welt.de/newsticker/dpa_nt/infoline_nt/brennpunkte_nt/article169194793/Tillich-will-CDU-nach-rechts-ruecken.html); n.a., “Kauder will nicht nach rechts rücken,” *Der Spiegel*, 05 October 2017, URL: <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/cdu-fraktionschef-volker-kauder-lehnt-rechtsruck-ab-a-1171314.html>.

<sup>7</sup> Geiss, “Beschlossen und Beschwiegen,” 3; Prantl, “Kanzlerin des Ungefähren”; Rensing, *Die Kanzlermaschine*, 149.

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<sup>8</sup> Marc Debus and Jochen Müller, “The programmatic development of CDU and CSU since Reunification. Incentives and constraints for changing policy positions in the German multi-level system,” *German Politics* 22, no. 1-2 (2013): 151-171, here: 161-2, 167, doi 10.1080/09644008.2013.787594; Petra Hemmelmann, *Der Kompass der CDU. Analyse der Grundsatz- und Wahlprogramme von Adenauer bis Merkel* (Wiesbaden, 2017), here: 334-42.

<sup>9</sup> Jan Dams, Carsten Dierig and Nikolaus Doll, “Die schleichende ‘Sozialdemokratisierung der CDU’”, *Die Welt*, 25 October 2016, available at <https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article158994860/Die-schleichende-Sozialdemokratisierung-der-CDU.html>.

<sup>10</sup> Clay Clemens, “Modernization or disorientation? Policy change in Merkel’s CDU,” *German Politics* 18, no. 2 (2009): 121-139, here: 132-134, doi 10.1080/09644000902870859; Hemmelmann, *Der Kompass der CDU*, 403-416; Joyce Marie Mushaben, “Wir schaffen das! Angela Merkel and the European Refugee Crisis,” *German Politics* 26, no. 4 (2017): 516-533, here: 517-518, doi 10.1080/09644008.2017.1366988.

<sup>11</sup> Franzmann, “Von AfD zu ALFA”, 27-28, 34.

<sup>12</sup> Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck, “Euro-Kritik, Wirtschaftspessimismus und Einwanderungskepsis. Hintergründe des Beinah-Wahlerfolges der Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) bei der Bundestagswahl 2013,” *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 45, no. 1 (2014): 94-112, here: 95-97, doi [10.5771/0340-1758-2014-1-94](https://doi.org/10.5771/0340-1758-2014-1-94); Franzmann, “Von AfD zu ALFA”, 27, 34.

<sup>13</sup> Schmitt-Beck, “Euro-Kritik”, 96-97; Robert Grimm, “The rise of the German Eurosceptic party Alternative für Deutschland, between ordoliberal critique and popular anxiety,” *International Political Science Review* 36, no. 3 (2015): 264-278, here: 265-266, doi 10.1177/0192512115575384.

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<sup>14</sup> Simon Franzmann, “Calling the ghost of populism. The AfD’s strategic and tactical agendas until the EP election 2014”, *German Politics* 25, no. 4 (2016): 457-479, here: 465-466, doi 10.1080/09644008.2016.1201075.

<sup>15</sup> Alternative für Deutschland, “Programm für Deutschland. Das Grundsatzprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland,” available at <https://www.afd.de/grundsatzprogramm/> (accessed at 21 February 2018), 15-22, 67, 74, 76; Alternative für Deutschland, “Programm für Deutschland. Wahlprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland für die Wahl zum Deutschen Bundestag am 24. September 2017,” available at <https://www.afd.de/wahlprogramm/> (accessed at 21 February 2018), 7, 12, 14, 50-51, 53, 69.

<sup>16</sup> Alternative für Deutschland, “Grundsatzprogramm”, 30-32, 36-37, 40-41, 44; Alternative für Deutschland, “Wahlprogramm”, 37-40, 51, 56.

<sup>17</sup> Alternative für Deutschland, “Grundsatzprogramm”, 25, 52-54, 56, 83; Alternative für Deutschland, “Wahlprogramm”, 19, 24-25, 43-44, 63, 66.

<sup>18</sup> Mushaben, “Wir schaffen das!”, 529.

<sup>19</sup> Schäuble quoted in Mushaben, “Wir schaffen das!”, 529.

<sup>20</sup> Mudde, *Populist radical right parties*, 22-31.

<sup>21</sup> Rüdiger Schmit-Beck, “The ‘Alternative für Deutschland in the electorate’. Between single-issue and right-wing populist party,” *German Politics* 26, no. 1 (2017): 124-148, here: 140, doi 10.1080/09644008.2016.1184650

<sup>22</sup> Grimm, “The rise of the German Eurosceptic party Alternative für Deutschland”, 273; Schmitt-Beck, “The ‘Alternative für Deutschland in the electorate’”, 140.

<sup>23</sup> Grimm, “The rise of the German Eurosceptic party Alternative für Deutschland”, 273;

<sup>24</sup> Mudde, *Populist radical right parties*, 23.

<sup>25</sup> Alternative für Deutschland, “Grundsatzprogramm”, 26.

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- <sup>26</sup> Alternative für Deutschland, “Wahlprogramm”, 23-24.
- <sup>27</sup> Simon Franzmann, “Die Programmatik von ALFA in Abgrenzung zur AfD. Droht Deutschland eine Spirale des Populismus?” *MIP* 22 (2016): 38-51, here: 42.
- <sup>28</sup> Giovanni Capoccia, “Anti-system parties. A conceptual reassessment”, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 14, no. 1: 9-35, here: 15.
- <sup>29</sup> Mudde, *Populist radical right parties*, 23.
- <sup>30</sup> Alternative für Deutschland, “Grundsatzprogramm”, 6, 8, 11, 12, 14, 24, 47, 49, 54-5, 58, 64, 75, 79, 81.
- <sup>31</sup> Alternative für Deutschland, “Wahlprogramm”, 8-10, 40-41, 45, 53.
- <sup>32</sup> Mudde, *Populist radical right parties*, 19.
- <sup>33</sup> Alternative für Deutschland, “Grundsatzprogramm”, 47-49, 59-61, 63; Alternative für Deutschland, “Wahlprogramm”, 28-29.
- <sup>34</sup> Alternative für Deutschland, “Grundsatzprogramm”, 59-60; Alternative für Deutschland, “Wahlprogramm”, 28, 30.
- <sup>35</sup> Alternative für Deutschland, “Grundsatzprogramm”, 59-60; Alternative für Deutschland, “Wahlprogramm”, 30.
- <sup>36</sup> Alternative für Deutschland, “Grundsatzprogramm”, 58-9, 60-61, 63; Alternative für Deutschland, “Wahlprogramm”, 29-30.
- <sup>37</sup> Alternative für Deutschland, “Grundsatzprogramm”, 59; Alternative für Deutschland, “Wahlprogramm”, 31.
- <sup>38</sup> Alternative für Deutschland, “Wahlprogramm”, 28, 31.
- <sup>39</sup> Alternative für Deutschland, “Grundsatzprogramm”, 48-50; Alternative für Deutschland, “Wahlprogramm”, 33-35, 45.
- <sup>40</sup> Alternative für Deutschland, “Wahlprogramm”, 28.

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- <sup>41</sup> Alternative für Deutschland, “Wahlprogramm”, 28.
- <sup>42</sup> Alternative für Deutschland, “Wahlprogramm”, 37.
- <sup>43</sup> Alternative für Deutschland, “Wahlprogramm”, 37.
- <sup>44</sup> Alternative für Deutschland, “Wahlprogramm”, 37.
- <sup>45</sup> Viola Neu and Sabine Pokorny, “Bundestagswahl in Deutschland am 24. September 2017.” Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, September 2017, 16-17.
- <sup>46</sup> Sigrid Roßteutscher, Harald Schoen, Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck, Bernhard Weßels, Christof Wolf, Aiko Wagner, “Nachwahl-Querschnitt (GLES 2017).” GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln: ZA6801 Datenfile Version 1.0.0, doi: 10.4232/1.12954.
- <sup>47</sup> Gary King and Langche Zeng, “Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data”, *Political Analysis* 9, no. 2 (2001): 137-163, here: 157.
- <sup>48</sup> Mudde, *Populist radical right parties*, 23, 31.
- <sup>49</sup> Holger Lengfeld, “Die „Alternative für Deutschland“: eine Partei für Modernisierungsverlierer?” *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 69 (2017): 209-232, here: 224; doi 10.1007/s11577-017-0446-1; Schmitt-Beck, “Euro-Kritik”, 104;
- <sup>50</sup> Compare Viola Neu, “Die Mitglieder der CDU,” Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2007, here: 41.
- <sup>51</sup> The published version of the article includes a further test that shows that these results are robust to including sampling weights to correct for the oversampling in eastern Germany. Please see Table 5 in the published article.
- <sup>52</sup> Oskar Niedermayer, “Eine neue Konkurrentin im Parteiensystem? Die Alternative für Deutschland” In *Die Parteien nach der Bundestagswahl*, ed. Oskar Niedermayer (Wiesbaden, 2015): 175-208, here: 173-184.
- <sup>53</sup> Grimm, “The rise of the German Eurosceptic party Alternative für Deutschland”, 266.
- <sup>54</sup> Franzmann, “Von AfD zu ALFA”, 34.

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<sup>55</sup> Franzmann, “Von AfD zu ALFA”, 31, 34-35.

<sup>56</sup> Franzmann, “Von AfD zu ALFA”, 32-34.

<sup>57</sup> Rüdiger Soldt, “Spaltung der AfD-Fraktion”, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 05 July 2016, available at <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/spaltung-der-afd-fraktion-im-landtag-baden-wuerttemberg-14325303.html>; Stefan Tomik, “Das sind die AfD-Abtrünnigen”, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 November 2017, available at <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/nicht-nur-frauke-petry-das-sind-die-afd-abtruennigen-15259984.html>; n.a., “AfD-Abgeordneter will zur CDU wechseln”, *MDR Sachsen-Anhalt*, available at <https://www.mdr.de/sachsen-anhalt/landespolitik/afd-abgeordneter-jens-diederichs-tritt-aus-landtagsfraktion-aus-100.html> [21 February 2018]; n.a., “Landtagsfraktion der AfD zerbricht”, *Die Zeit*, 25 September 2017, available at <http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2017-09/mecklenburg-vorpommern-afd-spaltung-neue-fraktion>.

<sup>58</sup> N.a., “Erst verlässt sie die Fraktion, dann die Bundespressekonferenz”, *Die Welt*, 25 September 2017, available at <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article168998281/Erst-verlaesst-sie-die-Fraktion-dann-die-Bundespressekonferenz.html>.

<sup>59</sup> N.a., “Bundeswahlleiter bestätigt Gründung einer Blauen Partei”, *Die Zeit*, 11 October 2017, available at <http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2017-10/frauke-petry-die-blaue-partei-afd-bundeswahlleiter>.

<sup>60</sup> Mudde, *Populist radical right parties*, 22.