

INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE TO GERMAN RULE
IN THE PACIFIC COLONIES OF SAMOA, PONAPE
AND NEW GUINEA, 1884 TO 1914.

A thesis submitted for the degree of D. Phil.


by

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Abstract

This study of resistance in the Pacific Islands is an attempt to achieve both a wider and deeper understanding of colonization as it impinged on the Pacific peoples and as it was perceived by their German rulers. The thesis is by no means another imperial history. The major focus is on the Pacific Islander himself, the processes of change in local society under the impact of European expansion and a western cash economy, and on the way the colonial relationship functioned at the level of the individual island administration. It emphasizes the power and ability of the Pacific Islanders to make their own adjustments - of interest and ideology - to the new culture and its demands and does so through the comparison of three cultural regions within the one historical dimension, a method which Pacific historians have barely exploited at all. It represents the first intensive history of German Ponape in particular, using original documentation, while it opens up totally unexplored areas of that 'forgotten imperialism' which was such a critical phase in the modern histories of the new states of Samoa and New Guinea.

The thesis is divided into two parts. Part One consists of three 'case studies' of colonial contact and interaction. In each case the pre-German period has been examined for a broader historical background. The modes of adaptation achieved in this earlier period largely determined the pattern of Pacific Island response under German rule.

For more than two decades before 1900, Europeans and Samoans had been engaged in a constantly fluctuating struggle for the right to control the group's economic and political destiny. The Samoan district factions often encouraged this conflict in an effort to have their various candidates recognized as the paramount chief of the Samoan Islands, but they were also capable of offering solid opposition when Europeans interfered in their

political affairs above certain limits. The history of Samoan response to German rule after 1899 details the struggle between the older chiefly elites and the Governor, Wilhelm Solf. The chiefs, under the orator Lauaki, campaigned shrewdly to have their traditional political authority and prerogatives institutionalized as part of the German system of colonial rule. Though Solf, whose objectives were diametrically opposed to the traditional political dynamics of the group, was at first forced to compromise with the chiefs, he thwarted their campaign in the end by exploiting inherent weaknesses in the political structure and relying on his growing paternal authority with the mass of the people.

In Ponape for the first seven years of German rule, Imperial administrators laboured under Berlin's fears of resistance and expense. They refrained from making any colonial demands which might lead to an insurrection along the lines which caused so much trouble to the Spanish rulers of the island before 1899. With the establishment of the German Colonial Office in 1907, plans were implemented to bring the Ponapeans under closer administrative control and prepare the way for eventual economic self-sufficiency. Poor communications, lack of continuity in local German leadership, the inadequacies of individual officials and the mixed feelings of fear and independence among the Ponapeans were the elements contributing to a steadily deteriorating situation in the wake of this new programme. In 1910 the Sokehs district rose up against the German administration but the rebellion ended quickly with the rebels' abject capitulation in the face of a massive military operation mounted by the Germans.

The colonial relationship in New Guinea was of a vastly different quality, with peculiar problems of scale and geography. In the first phase of European settlement the New Guineans controlled the pattern of relations with traders, planters and missionaries. Developing trade and plantation agriculture brought increasing pressure to bear on indigenous

resources, particularly land. Those New Guineans who resisted were suppressed by a series of erratic reprisals and wars, or at least persuaded that the white man could not be driven out.

After the abortive period of Chartered Company rule, when constructive government was sacrificed to all-out exploitation of local resources, an Imperial administration was installed. Under Governor Hahl, it set out to pacify and open up the protectorate so that the population would be made accessible to the rapidly expanding plantations as labour and be progressively drawn into a European wage economy. Certain regional groups refused to cooperate with these plans, concentrating on improving their living standards and independence by trade and agriculture for the copra market. Others resisted more fiercely. Hahl, like the officials on Samoa and Ponape, was hampered in his efforts to assert German sovereignty by budgetary restrictions. By the end of German rule, with the New Guineans only partly surrendering their self-sufficiency, the Germans controlled a largely thin coastal frontier throughout the protectorate, much of it due to mission activity not government presence.

Part Two of the thesis is an attempt to draw these three studies together through a number of common themes relating to the resolution of conflict between groups in the context of the colonial situation. It argues first of all that a few large-scale plantation and trading firms were all-important in the priorities given to German colonial policy in the Pacific. Individual administrators, whatever their attitude to the ends and methods of economic imperialism, were obliged to let these interests take precedence in the running of the colonies. Nevertheless, because of metropolitan disinterest, the exigencies of distance and isolation within the Pacific empire, as well as the social expectations of the Pacific Islanders, the individual colonial official still played a crucial role in relations with the people. An examination of the range of possibilities open to these individuals leads on to a judgment about the effectiveness of the three regimes in achieving the ends laid down in policy.

The Pacific Islander lies at the heart of this assessment. In the small scale of Pacific society and colonial administration, his initiatives and responses carried particular force in cultural interaction. Basically receptive to the presence of the wealth-laden European, the Islander's attitude towards the new culture and its demands oscillated between conservatism and innovation. His was a selective response with elements of opposition which did not necessarily denote rebellion. Rebellion occurred at the point where deprivation and its costs vastly outweighed the compensations brought by the Europeans. A number of variables completed the equation at such a juncture - the possible alternatives to losses suffered, the differential effect of colonial rule on regional groups, the disruption caused by structural changes in the society.

Physical resistance is also shown to result from certain internal features of Pacific Island life such as inherent political divisions, social expectations and community sanctions. These acts were not necessarily anti-German, nor anti-European. Only a few minor cases emerge where the rejection of European rule and civilization was complete and uncompromising; for the rest there were many gradations of hostility and opposition. Nowhere did opposition to the Germans take the form of nationalist movements of liberation from colonialism.

The author also examines the most important organizational aspects of political and economic opposition in the colonies. While Europeans brought increasing inter-regional communication and cooperation which enabled certain groups to make more effective responses to European demands, internal divisions limited the extent to which group cooperation succeeded in all three colonies. There were no revolutionary masses, no nationalist ideologies: the two major instances of opposition - in Samoa and Ponape - failed because their organizers could not mobilize sufficient manpower or commitment in their societies. The most successful instances of opposition

occurred where Islanders were able to move between collaboration and resistance, adapting their policies according to the needs of the occasion and never totally rejecting German rule.

In the final analysis, much depended on the quality of indigenous leadership: on the ability of individual elites to resolve immediate conflicts between their societies and the Germans by limited resistance and/or compromise, and to recognize the long-term implications of colonial rule. The thesis assesses the leadership qualities of those Pacific Islanders most prominent in political and economic activity during German rule and points up examples of constructive direction. It highlights the men who could adapt and modernize, accepting inevitable and beneficial change without jettisoning all the old ways and old values.

A singularly compact, if voluminous set of European documentation (the Reichskolonialamt records) has been the basis of this study but it was employed with the firm awareness that European comment on occurrences within Pacific Island societies was at times incomplete and inaccurate. Nonetheless, using as many different types of sources as possible (missionary, trader and planter as well as administrative) and a large body of anthropological research on the Pacific, the author believes he has overcome the major obstacles and achieved a balance between a history of strictly European activities in the Pacific and 'decolonized history' - the study of changes in indigenous society over the period of colonial rule. Thematically, the concept of 'resistance' was found to have many more ramifications than those originally anticipated by the author: the following is less a history of 'resistance' as such than a study of Pacific Island response to European civilization and overrule, with opposition to the manifestations of German colonialism running like a central thread throughout.

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To a number of individuals I am most deeply indebted: to Dr. John Moses who gave the initial impetus and direction to my historical interests; to Stewart Firth; and Dr. Colin Newbury, my supervisor: the topic was largely their inspiration and their constant encouragement, criticisms and close interest stimulated me beyond words. Stewart Firth cheerfully shared the results of his prodigious research and in large measure made this study possible. Paul Kennedy also gave moral encouragement for which I am grateful. Finally to my wife, who helped with the research, typed the thesis and kept us both sane during the past three years I owe the deepest debt of all.

Abbreviations.


AAKA	Auswärtiges Amt, Kolonial Abteilung.
BA	Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
BA/MA	Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, Freiburg.
D.H.P.G.	Deutsche Handels- und Plantagen Gesellschaft der Südsee Inseln zu Hamburg.
D.S.G.	Deutsche Samoa Gesellschaft.
HJM Archives	Archives of the Herz Jesu Mission (M.S.C.), Münster.
HWNA	Hamburger Weltwirtschaftsarchiv.
KMM Archives	Archives of the Kapuziner Mission (Rhein Westfalen Provinz), Münster.
LMS	London Missionary Society Archives, London.
NK Archives	Archives of the Neuendettelsau Mission, Neuendettelsau, Franken.
NZNA	New Zealand National Archives.
RKA	Reichskolonialamt.
RMG Archives	Archives of the Rheinische Missions Gesellschaft, Wuppertal-Barmen.
STAH	Staatsarchiv, Hamburg.

Translations.

Unless otherwise stated, all translations of German material are the author's own.

Orthography.

Spelling of Ponapean names follows the orthography adopted by American anthropologists, in particular by Saul Riesenberq in his Native Polity of Ponape (Washington 1968).



**ÜBERSICHT
DER
DEUTSCHEN BESITZUNGEN
IM
STILLEN OZEAN**

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Landesgrenze — Festung — Kabel — Telegraph
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
**DIE DEUTSCHEN
SAMOA-INSELN.**




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- Reichspostdampfschiffahrt: Königsberg-Hankow-Singapur-Sourabaya
- Singapore-Neu-Guinea-Rahau und zurück
- Jubatigschiffahrt in Hamburg: Hamburg-Singapur-Sourabaya-Singapur-Hankow
- Bremer-Hankow-Singapur-Sourabaya-Singapur-Hankow

Arafura-See
Friedrich-Heinrich-F.
Aru-F.
Tenimber-F.







DER NORDÖSTLICHE TEIL
DER
GAZELLE-HALBINSEL

1 : 300 000
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 Reservate für Eingeborene □
 Straße ——— Pfad



(K)

Atalikun-B.
(Weber-Hfn.)



Urara

In late 1905 the Governor of German East Africa attempted to rationalize the recent Zulu rebellion by arguing:

'Kolonialpolitik has always been the politics of conquest and nowhere in the world does the occupation of a land by a foreign people succeed without conflict'.¹

His opinion would have been endorsed by the majority of Germans living in the Pacific colonies before 1914. The image of the 'noble savage' which the earliest explorers conceived had been rapidly dispelled under the influence of intensive contact and the calvinistic teachings of Christianity.² The Samoan group, for instance, was avoided for almost twenty years at the end of the eighteenth century because of the reputation for ferocity which its inhabitants acquired by their attack on La Perouse. Their propensity for decapitating prisoners caught in battle hardly enamoured them to a later generation of European residents at the end of the nineteenth century. The Melanesians, for their part, were regarded with even more abhorrence as savage black cannibals; they were the very essence of ignobility and treachery. Violence and conquest quickly became established features of cultural contact in the Pacific, not least in the minds of Europeans, who anticipated physical resistance to the loss of local autonomy and the demands of a colonial relationship. Most secular European settlers tended to operate on the assumption that the indigenous peoples wanted to rebel against foreign hegemony and must be constrained from doing so, if necessary (and paradoxically) by force.

Present day research into the nature of those early cultural interactions sometimes reflects this rather naive conception: in studies of colonial rule in Africa, Rotberg and Mazrui have attempted to categorize

1. In 'Denkschrift über die Ursachen des Aufstandes in Deutsch-Ostafrika 1905', Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstages II Legisl. II Session 1905/06, Bd. 217: Anlageband 4, p 3080.
2. For a penetrating discussion of the development of European conceptualizations about the Pacific, see B. Smith, European Vission and the South Pacific, 1768-1850, a Study in the History of Art and Ideas (Oxford 1960).

the opposition of colonized peoples as either 'resistance' or 'rebellion' according to the particular pattern of foreign rule.¹ It is one of the aims of this study to show that 'resistance' in the German Pacific empire was a great deal more subtle in its meaning and manifestation. In a wider sense this is a study of culture contact, by which is meant the interaction of individuals and groups within an established structure which is itself undergoing change.² The sources of conflict in this set of circumstances, and the degree of its resolution, are the focus of this work. In particular, it will attempt to show that the responses of Pacific Islanders to the demands of European civilization and German rule were comprehensible in terms of either their cultural mores and assumptions about Europeans or the developing pattern of relations between the two communities. Furthermore a section will be devoted to an analysis of the organization and techniques by which the Islanders sought to manipulate the German regime or remove its control.

There is also the other side of the colonial coin to consider. It may be, as Balandier suggests, that a 'colonial situation' represents the basis for a new and autonomous society combining both facets of the relationship.³ Too much emphasis on cultural isolation would therefore be misplaced. It is certainly essential to the theme of this study to seek an understanding of the image which the Germans had of their role in the Pacific and the way in which the German Pacific administration functioned, since the sorts of attitudes, policies and methods which Germans brought as foreign rulers had a great influence in shaping Pacific Island initiatives and reactions. The wider questions of imperialism will, however, concern this study only in so far as they establish a pattern of norms and policy

1. Protest and Power in Black Africa, R.I. Rotberg and A.A. Mazrui (eds) (New York 1970) XVIII.
2. A.R. Radcliffe Brown, quoted in H.I. Hogbin, Social Change (London 1958) p22
3. G. Balandier, The Sociology of Black Africa. Social Dynamics in Central Africa. Trans. D. Garman (London 1970) p 21.

considerations which became particular features of colonial rule under the Germans. A separate analysis of missionary impact in the German Pacific will be given in an appendix, for the missionaries were in one sense very special competitors of western secular culture in a race to win the loyalty and resources of the Pacific Islanders. Not only did they play a significant role in the history of conflict and social change, but their records provide some of the most intimate and detailed documentation for the study of race relations.

Intensive studies of the German Pacific have been, until recently, few and far between. One of the impediments has been the difficulty of access to the major body of official German records in Potsdam. The small scale, isolation and fragmentation of the Pacific colonies, as well as the ephemeral nature of the German contribution seen from the 1970's have also militated against a steady programme of investigation into this seminal period of Pacific Island history since contact. Past studies have tended to concentrate on the primary stages of imperial expansion - the determinants of foreign policy, Great Power rivalries and the process of annexation. The history of the colonized societies has been analysed, less as the record of the indigenous communities themselves than as a function of a foreign presence, with the emphasis very much on the European initiative and the ordering of basically anarchic societies.¹ Pacific historians have helped to correct this bias in recent years but mainly on a microcosmic scale, for small individual island groups. Gilson's work on Samoa is probably the closest one could come to a definitive study from 'the island end' on the

1. See for example, M.E. Townsend, Origins of Modern German Colonialism 1871-1885 (New York 1921); S. Masterman, Origins of International Rivalry in Samoa 1845-1884 (London 1934); J.I. Brookes, International Rivalry in the Pacific Islands 1800-1875 (Berkeley 1941); J.M. Ward, British Policy in the South Pacific 1786-1893 (Sydney 1950); J.P. Morrell, Britain in the Pacific Islands (London 1960) and A. Ross, New Zealand Aspirations in the Pacific in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford 1964) among others.

period of contact up to 1900.¹ A similar appreciation of the fourteen years of German rule immediately following is lacking or at best only sketchy.² The main works on New Guinea and Ponape are anthropologically based and there are no far-reaching historical studies of the German period in either area using major German documentation.

This project has benefited from direct access to official German records and mission, commerce and private sources in Europe, as well as a great deal of social science research already undertaken on Pacific Island societies. Unfortunately because of the nature of German colonial rule, there are lacunae in our knowledge of the facts which will be reflected in this thesis. For instance, the German period in New Guinea was one largely of discovery and exploration and much of the contact with the local inhabitants was non-continuous. Documentation about this period consequently remains fragmentary and is of populations rather than of individual peoples, except in the area of densest white settlement. Moreover, the extent of local records is still uncertain: the ravages of climate and war have taken their toll in New Guinea and Ponape while caches of known documents from early periods of Samoan history are still not extant.³

Methodologically, comparative work on the Pacific has been the forte of social scientists rather than of historians. The latter have concentrated on in-depth studies of individual societies or regions, though a case like New Guinea, with its numerous sub-cultures, already invites considerable comparative analysis. It is an assumption of the present study that research on the Pacific since European contact has reached the stage where a broader comparative approach would not only underline the cross-

1. R.P. Gilson, Samoa 1830-1900. The Politics of a Multi Cultural Community. (Melbourne 1970).
2. See for example, F.M. Keesing, Modern Samoa (London 1934) and J.W. Davidson, Samoa mo Samoa. The Emergence of the Independent State of Western Samoa (Oxford 1967).
3. Dr. J.A. Moses of Queensland University has recently discovered some local German records in the old Vaimea prison in Samoa but these are still being processed by the New Zealand National Archives, Wellington.

cultural regularities but also enlarge our understanding of the responses of island societies under varying conditions of stress. In keeping with the two-sided focus of the study, a comparative analysis also helps to reveal the infrequently treated relationship between colonial rule as it was conceived at home and the way it worked in the Pacific itself. The fact that the three island societies concerned were under German dominion provides a common denominator which gives added weight to the comparative method. The following is not simply three separate histories of European contact but an attempt to highlight the distinctive features of indigenous response to foreign rule in the Pacific Island environment, as well as to investigate a number of common themes relating to the resolution of conflict and social change. The method adopted was not designed to construct an abstract model about social relationships which would have universal validity whatever the historical context. The hope is to establish a level of generalization sufficient to enable a first tentative theory of Pacific Island resistance to be generated.

The Three Island Societies.

At this point it would be profitable to place the three island colonies in their cultural and social context within the Pacific. The Südsee was regarded by the Germans as a unity in a way that Africa never was. If the treatment of Ponape seems to exaggerate its importance within the Pacific empire it is because it probably remained the most troublesome spot to the Germans in terms of the formulation of policy. Moreover it affords several convenient bases of comparison with Samoa: both islands possessed superficially similar cultures and presented similar problems of scale to the German administrations. Both had relatively small, homogeneous populations enjoying comparable economic standards, while they could boast of well developed political systems which had a long familiarity with European civilization. Despite the fact that they were nominally 'pacified' territories experiencing a more intensive level of contact with the regime than most of

New Guinea, Samoa and Ponape offered the greatest threats to local German control of her Pacific islands. Of course there were differences between all three colonies, in geography, topography, population size and political scale, which were more important than the similarities because they provide us with the raw material for a good case study of comparative 'culture contact'.

The following descriptions of the social and political structures of the three societies are made in the realization that they represent an idealization which may differ in some respects from their actual historical manifestations. While the institutions of the three societies are generally agreed upon, there is, and must be some dispute as to their operation at the time of the historical events to be recounted. However the German colonies, at least in the Pacific, were fairly well served with a body of contemporary scientific observation and in all three colonies there were administrative officials and missionaries who, in a professional capacity as lawyers and reformers made detailed ethnographic studies of local societies in order to be able to mobilize the people in support of their goals. With the aid of this corpus of knowledge it is possible to attain to an historical approximation.

Samoa is a group of three large and several small islands lying 14° south of the equator and 1600 miles north north east of Auckland, New Zealand. The islands are of volcanic origin with the highest mountain peak rising 6000 feet while several are over 1000 feet high. The rugged nature of the land and the thick tropical jungle restricts habitation to the coasts, the majority of the population living in the north west of Upolu, the second largest island, with an area of 400 sq. miles. Upolu has always been the commercial and social centre of Samoa, despite the fact that its major anchorage, at Apia, has no especial virtues and can be quite dangerous in the hurricane season with wind from the north west quarter. Savaii is the largest island of the group with an area of 700 sq. miles, but it has no good harbours and is only sparsely populated. During the late nineteenth century

and the German period, there were about 34,000 people inhabiting western Samoa, which comprises Upolu, Savai'i and the much smaller islands of Apolima and Manono. Tutuila, with an area of fifty sq. miles, lies 60 nautical miles east of Upolu and has remained an American dependency since 1899.¹

Samoan social structure consists of a number of ranked lineages within which a chain of command subordinates lesser chiefs and groups to greater, on the basis of inherent societal rank.² Samoan descent groups are not unilineal but have a patrilineal bias. They consist of people born or adopted into localized households as well as their descendants outside the village of the household, and every adult member of a village has a network of relations elsewhere with whom he has frequent communication in a variety of ceremonial and social activities; the ties of kinship and descent can radiate to the outer barriers of the geographical region.

The unit of political control at the local level is the village, which consists of several extended families joining together to deal with common problems. At the head of each household is a chief or matai who controls the domestic tasks of its members and plays an important part in village organization. Decisions affecting such issues are taken in the formal village councils, the fono fa'alenu'u. Only the matai possess a seat and a voice in its proceedings and their authority and influence are related directly to their seniority of position within the village hierarchy. The constant acts of rebellion against councils in the past are evidence that decisions were not made on a majority basis. Rather the authority of one or of several high ranking matai was the deciding factor, though family heads

1. Pacific Islands, Volume II, Eastern Pacific. Geographical Handbook Series, B.R. 519A, Naval Intelligence Division (London, 1943) pp 582-591.
2. For contemporary and later accounts of Samoan social and political structure see E. Schultz, Die wichtigsten Grundsätze des samoanischen Familien und Erbrechts. 1st ed. (Apia 1905) and his Samoanische Familien - Immobilien - und Erbrechts. 3rd ed. (Apia 1911); W.F.H. Stanner, The South Seas in Transition (Sydney 1953); M.D. Sahlins, 'Poor man, Rich man, Big man, Chief: Political Types in Melanesia and Polynesia', in Readings in Australian and Pacific Anthropology, eds. H. Hogbin and L.R. Hiatt (Melbourne 1966) pp 160-180; Gilson, Samoa 1830-1900, Chapters 1 and 2.

possessed a quasi-consultative vote through discussion of the problem prior to an assembly.

In the nineteenth century there was no central political institution exercising control over all Samoans. The problem of maintaining order in the complex of cross-cutting associations fell to the village, which jealously guarded its independence and acted vigorously against transgressors of its residence rules. Because of the far-flung relationships involved in Samoan social and political life, such action by village units inevitably concerned people in other places and hence increased the likelihood of retaliation; it was at the village level that most Samoan conflict originated. Villages were linked in loose, ascending gradations of political association, but the main inter-village activities were restricted to ritual and ceremonial relations. Sub-districts, composed of villages of common locality and lineage affiliation, with a joint hierarchy and council of chiefs, did develop, but they were less stable organizations than the village, always subject to factionalism and disintegration.

Above this level district organizations did emerge but they were rarely distinct and permanent entities. Their existence was only possible where most or all of the village or sub-districts were associated with the same maximal lineage and took part in supporting the same senior chiefly title. Districts exhibiting this cohesion in the nineteenth century and thus enjoying relatively fixed boundaries were Atua, Tuamasaga and A'ana in Upolu; the combination of Manono, Apolima and Mulifanua; and Fa'asaleleaga in eastern Savai'i.

District functions were not administrative; they were concerned largely with questions of family prestige, important marriage alliances and war. The politics of their leading chiefs revolved particularly around the pursuit of Samoa's highest chiefly titles, possession of four of which all at once gave one a claim to the paramount chieftaincy and nominal ascendancy throughout the group.

Every Samoan chief had a 'title' or name belonging to his descent group, held on that group's behalf and with its approval. The titles, which were graded in terms of kinship and village status, conveyed authority over permanent groupings. There were no prescriptive rules like male primogenitive governing title succession, so that on the death of a chief his title must be newly conferred by his descent group, the choice depending on criteria such as the testament of the dying chief, the personal qualities of candidates and the exigencies of marriage and other alliances.

Chiefs were divided into two specialized and interdependent categories, the ali'i and the tulafale. The former possessed a personal sanctity in Samoan tradition which brought them exclusive privileges and the right to be shown special deference. The tulafale or 'talking chiefs' were the original manifestations of the family head in the village assembly. Their role consisted in proclaiming the will of the ali'i on public occasions, supervising ceremonial delivery of food and exchange goods and other operations of a 'personal assistant' nature. As 'speakers' and skilful orators the tulafale were in a position to involve themselves in all sorts of political affairs, and to exercise influence in areas where they had no formal rights. Shrewd and energetic talking chiefs were thus able to transcend the ostensible relationship of assistant to the ali'i and arrogate independent power to themselves. In general however, neither type of chief had supreme power, for in most spheres of activity the two were interdependent on each's traditional status and role.

The tulafale's most influential role was in the distribution of mats, an event which possessed special ceremonial and ritual value for Samoans and served to represent a means of payment. This distribution took place on numerous family and public occasions, but the most important event was the bestowal of titles on a chief. The award of four special titles, Tui Atua, Tui A'ana, Gatoaitete and Tamasoali'i - designating the highest-ranking chief in Samoa, the Tafa'ifa - was the highest manifestation of the

act of distribution and lay in the hands of groups of tulafale representing confederations of districts. The first two titles were controlled by orator chiefs in the districts of Atua and A'ana in Upolu, the others by Tuamasaga, also in Upolu; the term 'Tumua' was applied loosely to this confederation. Tulafale in the Savai'i districts of Fa'asaleaga and Sale'aula were called 'Pule' and this grouping maintained important links with the island of Manono and parts of Tuamasaga district.¹ Contention for the paramountcy was to become the most disruptive feature of Samoan district politics in European eyes. Because of the wide extent of eligibility, the complex district control of the titles and the inherent instability of district organization, resort to war was an inevitable part of the process. But even when this resulted in the emergence of a party stronger than all the others (the Malo), a new level of stability was not necessarily guaranteed. The Malo itself was only an alliance of convenience, with no commitment to principle or 'party' government and interference in the local affairs of its members rapidly led to its dissolution. The defeated party, or Vaivai, was harassed at every level and it invited further conflict and war if it chose to resist the pretensions of the Malo. Such was the prestige of the Tafaiifa title that the eventual achievement of a peaceful solution only inaugurated a new round of disputes and intrigues by competing chiefs to secure it for their various districts.

By contrast with Samoa, Ponapean social and political structure is much more regular and more authoritarian though in some areas probably more flexible than the Samoan.² Ponape is the largest island of the Carolines group, north of New Guinea, and lies 6° 54' north of the equator.

1. J.W. Davidson, 'Lauaki Namulau'ulu Mamoe', in Pacific Islands Portraits, (eds) J.W. Davidson and D. Scarr (Canberra 1970) pp 267-270.
2. The description of Ponape and its social structure is based on A. Hahl, 'Rechtsgewohnheiten und Sitten der Eingeborenen auf Ponape' Ethnologische Notizblatt, 1900; W.R. Bascom, Ponape: A Pacific Economy in Transition, Anthropological Records, Vol 22 (Berkeley 1965); S. Riesenbergs, The Native Polity of Ponape (Washington 1968); The Trading Voyages of Andrew Cheyne (ed.) D. Shineberg, (Canberra 1971), pp 166-193; P. Hambruch, Ponape. Ergebnisse der Sudsee Expedition 1908-1910. II. B. Bd. 7, Vols I and II. (Hamburg 1932).

A towering basalt island with an area of 120 sq. miles, Ponape's unique isolation is emphasized by the fact that its largest island neighbour, Kusaie, is 307 miles away to the south east. From San Francisco the distance is 4641 miles, from Manila 2363 miles and from Yokohama 1998 miles. Ponape is roughly pentagonal in shape. Mangrove swamps fringe the inner reef around the island and a narrow strip of level land lies between them and the foothills. The interior is extremely mountainous, with eleven peaks rising above 2000 feet, and is generally uninhabited. The terrain, together with the warm, wet climate which enables most tropical plants to grow luxuriantly, makes overland travel very difficult. Most Ponapeans use shallow canoes for transport though low tide on the inner reef restricts movements in many places. The main harbours are at Langar, in the north, where the Spanish built 'Kolonias', the first large settlement, at Madolenihmw in the east, and at Ron Kiti in the south. The Japanese built a second large town on the eastern edge of Ponape, near the mouth of the Lethan river, but during the Spanish and German periods 'Kolonias' remained the centre of European occupation. There were probably no more than fifty Europeans in Ponape at any time during German rule, while the Ponapean population then numbered about 3500.

The indigenous inhabitants, like most of the Carolinians, were divided into eighteen exogamous, matrilineal clans distributed throughout five major districts: Madolenihmw, Uh, Kiti, Sokehs. and Not. No clan chiefs existed: the descent groups were divided into sub-clans ranked by seniority within the clan, with the senior individual of each as its chief. Political power at district level was based on these sub-clans.

As for the districts, each was exactly demarcated territorially from the others and each acted independently in all aspects of social, political and economic life. Ponapean legends refer to a time when the whole island was united under a single ruler (the Sauteleurs) but that era ended with the conquest of the island by the culture hero Isokelokel, when the various states of modern Ponape were founded. Despite their individual

autonomy, it would be misleading to describe the districts or states as 'tribes', because each has a series of cross-cutting kinship ties with the others and precedents exist for a pattern of inter-district descent group activity.

Each of the districts was subdivided into a number of geographical sections which in turn were composed of several farmsteads occupied by separate households. The section, which usually comprised fewer than 100 persons, was not a village as such. The houses belonging to it were scattered along the shore and separated from each other by the land holdings of each farmstead. The relationship between all members of these units was strictly authoritarian in descending order of rank, analogous to a medieval feudal relationship. Each district had at its apex two principal chiefs who appointed section heads, these latter having a similar relationship with the head of the farmstead. As the head of the local unit of political control, the section chief was required to keep an eye on the productive abilities of his various farmsteads as well as regulate tributary offerings and distributions and report to the High Chief.

In each district there was a theoretically identical series of ranked titleholders in two chiefly lines, with a Nahmwarki and a Nahnken at the head of each.¹ In theory particular clans monopolised the first twelve titles of each line and since these clans were different in each district, political power in Ponape was traditionally shared by ten ruling sub-clans. A very loose analogy with the two lines of Ponspean titles would be the European concepts of royalty and nobility. Outside these two special strata, only commoners existed and they were bound to a particular section chief by ties of obedience, tributary labour and war service. The common people had originally no legal right of land tenure, holding it at the will, ultimately,

1. Until late German times the High Chief of Sokehs was called the Wasai and his counterpart in Not, Lap. There is a list of the chiefly titles in each line for the various districts in Riesenber, Native Polity Ponape, pp 10-11, 12-13.

of the High Chief of the district. Hahl declares that when a land tenant died, the land went back to the High Chief who then reissued it as he pleased.¹ Riesenberg however believes that this is a statement of the ideal rather than the reality of land inheritance. In fact people could be dispossessed, and sometimes were, even during their period of tenancy, but this occurred in only a minority of cases and only for some unforgiveable misdeed. Generally, matrilineal rules of inheritance to land operated and confirmation of heirs was fairly automatic.²

Succession to chiefly titles was also in theory automatic by the principle of matrilineal seniority in the sub-clan. But again, in fact, the inheritance principle was modified by several considerations: personality, relative age, physical disabilities, martial exploits, industry and obedience to the Nahnwarki could all produce differential rates of promotion and the structure of authority was in consequence more flexible than its rigid principles suggest. Certain institutionalized forms of tribute and respect to High Chiefs were also exploited by aspirants to titles in a form of competition for prestige. The effect was a degree of social and political mobilization probably greater than the less rigid structurally but more socially conservative Samoan system. It is fairer to see rank in Ponape as a continuum, within which an individual's position depended on both hereditary and achieved status, rather than as discrete hereditary classes which determined the rank of all their members.

The relationship between the Nahnwarki and Nahnken affords another basis of comparison with Samoa. The Nahnken in particular has been likened to the 'talking chief' of Samoa in that he had a greater measure of communication with the ordinary people of the district. But because the Nahnwarki was even more remote and holy than the Samoan ali'i, the Nahnken

1. Hahl, 'Rechtsgewohnheiten und Sitten', p 97.

2. Riesenberg, Native Polity Ponape, p 33. Also personal communication Riesenberg 4 Dec 1972.

possessed a much greater share than his Samoan counterpart in the actual administration of district affairs. He was however prevented from becoming an autocratic ruler by his close relationship to the High Chief and a delicate state of balance in district government existed which seldom erupted into open discord between the two men. Great social pressures encouraged political conformity, and in public affairs the two High Chiefs presented a united visage to the world.

Within the district the Nahnwarki remained the ultimate repository of power and authority and his will generally decided what was right, without any distinction between civil and criminal law. Failure to preserve proper etiquette, to respond to a call for service, or a deliberate disregard of the traditional authoritarian relationship could result in the confiscation of land, the removal of titles or banishment. Theoretically chiefs, especially highly-ranked chiefs, had an unconditional right of appropriation or confiscation of goods and property belonging to commoners, but frequent abuse of this power could be firmly checked by the efficacy of a united protest of the people through their section heads. The Germans made it one of their first tasks when they took over the colony, to channel and restrict the more autocratic powers of the chiefs over the people.¹

Between the various districts, disputes and collisions were usually the product of political vainglory: the attempt to emphasize a districts' power and independence and have them acknowledged by the other districts. There are references to wars as 'games' and 'manly sport', and before the German period the new appointee of a title occasionally waged a war in gratitude to his overlord. By the time of German annexation particular hostilities had been largely fixed by tradition, for example, the northern districts of Sokehs and Not against the southerners. There was much less

1. Deutsches Zentral-Archiv, Potsdam, Reichskolonialamt records, Volume 5009, leaf 11: Hahl to Reichskolonialamt 6 July 1909 (hereinafter cited in the form: Hahl to RKA 6 July 1909 RKA 5009:11).

contact between clan members of different districts than in Samoa. For a commoner, travel into another district was always dangerous unless a message had been sent ahead by his Nahmwarki; royal visits were always accompanied by displays of men and equipment because of the delicate nature of peace between the wars.

Ponapean political life centred round the pursuit of enhanced status, the capture of titles and personal competition. The major cause of conflict was the inherent contradiction between the rules of matrilineal seniority and the principles of personal performance incorporated into the political system. To maintain law and order, the German administration found it necessary to pick its way carefully between the various protagonists as well as to maintain the delicate balance of power between the different areas.

German New Guinea represented a completely different dimension to the Germans in terms of geographical size, climate, population and its distribution, and the extreme diversity of sub-cultures and languages within its bounds. It would be impossible within the compass of this thesis, as well as unnecessary, to attempt a comprehensive description of the area in terms of its physical and cultural characteristics. We shall confine ourselves first to an outline which will establish the scale of effort required by the Germans to colonize New Guinea and then to a description of the general social and political features which had the greatest bearing on relations between the two cultural communities.

The 'old protectorate' of German New Guinea consisted of the north east quadrant of the mainland of New Guinea together with about 600 islands stretching east through the Bismarck Archipelago to the western fringes of Polynesia. With its most northerly point less than 50 miles from the equator, the protectorate ran south to the border with Papua and the British Solomon Islands Protectorate and from the Dutch border in the west to Nukumanu in the Tasman Islands - 400 nautical miles from the northern extremes to the southern, and 1100 miles from west to east. Its total land

area was 91000 square miles, with a million square miles of sea bordering its shores.¹

The mainland, or Kaiser Wilhelmsland as the Germans christened it, is 70000 square miles in area and extremely mountainous, a feature it shares with most other parts of the protectorate. The Bismarck, Krätke and Finisterre ranges rise to over 10000 feet and a massive cordillera covered with thick tropical jungle lies between the thin coastal belt and the Highland plains to the west. Extensive plains on the coast are few, concentrated around the lower reaches of the Sepik and the Ramu Rivers, on the Astrolabe/Maclay coasts and in the lower Markham River valley. The Sepik and Ramu were the only navigable rivers during German times. Nearly a quarter of the total population of the old protectorate lived in the Sepik area; the rest of the coast was only populated in patches and the Germans never reached the western Highlands where almost a million people dwelled.

Of the archipelago islands, New Britain is the largest with an area of 13000 square miles. Still active volcanoes pit its surface, around Willaumez Peninsula in the west and at Blanche Bay on the east coast of the Gazelle Peninsula where over half of the island's population lives and which was the major centre of German settlement. The Gazelle is 50 miles from north to south and from east to west and consists of undulating hill country rising from the east coast to the Baining Mountains (4300 feet) in the north west. The Tolai, the largest single population group in the Gazelle Peninsula, are comparatively light-skinned Melanesians inhabiting the coasts and hinterland in the north and east. In the Bainings dwell a racially distinct group, perhaps the original coastal dwellers who were driven into the mountains by the Melanesians emigrating from New Ireland. During German times they lived in small, dispersed hamlet groups in the mountains and practised a backward,

1. The Commonwealth of Australia. Report to the League of Nations on the Administration of the Territory of New Guinea, July 1921 to 30 June 1922, pp 5-23.

shift-and-burn type of agriculture. They were held in a dependent relationship by the people of the north coast who attacked them from time to time to capture slaves.¹ New Ireland, Bougainville and the Admiralties are the other large islands to which the Germans devoted their economic attention. New Ireland is almost all occupied by mountains. There are large level plains in the north east where most of the people and most of the German enterprises were concentrated. In the extreme south, the mountains run much closer to the coast, particularly in the west, but European plantations did develop on the south east coast. Bougainville follows the same pattern but with higher, densely wooded mountains while the major alluvial plain is in the south west.

The main island of the Admiralties group is Manus, 50 miles long and 20 miles broad, which is mountainous and well-forested. The Germans came in contact with two major ethnic groups in the Admiralty Islands, the Manus who lived on the shores and on the out-islands and built lavishly constructed houses on piles in the water, and the Usiai who lived in the interior and were considered by the former to be dependent, inferior and dangerous. A third group, the Matankol, was concentrated in beach settlements throughout the islands, but it seems to have been merely an offshoot of the Manus. No regular pattern of distribution of the three sub-cultural groups existed but wherever the Germans encountered the Admiralty Islanders they found that each group maintained a distinct identity from the others in terms of its economy, building styles and self-image. There seems to have been a sort of symbiotic relationship between the Manus, who were fishermen, and the agriculturally-oriented Usiai.²

The social and political scale of population groups throughout New Guinea is the most obvious point of difference with the systems of Micronesia and Polynesia. Ordered entities in the areas of New Guinea with

1. See F. Bürger, Die Küsten und Bergvölker der Gazellehalbinsel (Stuttgart 1913) pp 45-78.
2. See H. Nevermann, Die Admiraltäts Inseln. Ergebnisse der Südsee Expedition 1908-10. Hrsg. G. Thilenius (Hamburg 1934) pp 18-27, 48-60.

which the Germans came into intensive contact were rarely above 100 people in size and comprised mainly lineage, clan or moiety forms of structure varying between matrilineal and patrilineal rules of succession. Local kinship-residential groups were common and consisted of a small village or a cluster of hamlets which were economically self-governing and equal in political status.¹ Within these there was a great array of political forms ranging through patrilineal descent groups, cognatic groups, men's clubhouses, secret ceremonial societies or a combination of all these, while authority was generally diffused through the particular body.

Ethnographic work on social authority and leadership in those societies with which the Germans had most dealings is very limited in extent. German sources, both official and unofficial, are also deficient in comprehensive documentation about New Guinea leadership. Nonetheless certain features can be characterized: there were definite individuals in local groups who were recognized as wielding greater powers of initiation and organization than others, but their positions were not of an institutionalized kind. They were men who, through martial renown and/or economic enterprise were able to attract a personal following and manipulate this to aggrandize power and resources for themselves and their group. By paying bride price for younger men, by debt collecting or cultivating new land and dependents, such men were able to establish a coterie of lesser followers and mobilize their production for prestige building through public distribution of resources. They became the 'big men' of their societies. The social range of these 'big men's' influence was however very limited: they had only a small policy-making role within the society and no judicial authority. Their main social roles seemed to be to act as the focal distributors of wealth, to initiate large-scale economic activities and act as spokesmen for inter-

1. Sahlins, 'Poor man, Rich man, Big man, Chief', p 162. Much of the following section relies on Sahlins, and P. Lawrence, 'The State versus Stateless Societies in Papua New Guinea', in The Fashion of Law in New Guinea, (Ed.) B.J. Brown (Sydney 1969) pp 15-35. See also H. Schnee (Hrsg.) Deutsches Kolonial Lexikon, Bd. 1. (Leipzig 1920) pp 332-9, plus maps.

village affairs.

Tolai leadership is perhaps the best documented within the old protectorate.¹ Successful Tolai leaders during the German period tended to be natural products of the traditional social system, exhibiting from the beginning the customary indices of high status - land, wealth and clan eminence. Yet personal initiative also played an essential role in the attaining of an authoritative position: prowess as a warrior, a dynamic personality and a sense of commercial acumen were all important requisites. Those who aspired to such a position were required to work within the existing framework of social sanctions, and use established avenues of organization and advancement. In particular this involved finding a sponsor from the already-established ranks of leadership and influence, who would not only support the aspirant's claim but also teach him the managerial and ritual techniques essential to an executive position. Pacific Island leadership is a most important factor in the history of indigenous response to German rule, and also influenced significantly the type of control policy which the Germans attempted to impose in the Pacific. It will receive due prominence in the analysis which is to follow.

Imperial Expansion and the Structure of Colonial Administration.

The beginnings of European enterprise in the Pacific are obscure. Precious stones, metals and the whale were the objects of the earliest voyages. The exploitation of tropical products began relatively late, German participation in it even later. The Hamburg firm of J.C. Godeffroy und Sohn had been trading in Latin America since the 1830's and by the 1850's it had established a network of commercial agencies around the rim of the Pacific, in Chile, California, South East Asia and Australia. In 1855 the company's agent

1. See for example, R. Parkinson, Dreissig Jahre in der Südsee (Stuttgart 1907); G. Brown, Melanesians and Polynesians (London 1910); F. Bürger, Die Küsten und Bergvölker der Gazelle-Halbinsel; R.F. Salisbury, Vunamami. Economic Transformation in a Traditional Society (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1970); T.S. Epstein, 'The Tolai "Big Man"', New Guinea, Vol 7, Nr.1, 1972.

in Valparaiso, August Unshelm, was sent out into the South Pacific to capture for Godeffroys a share in the coconut oil trade, for which there was a rapidly expanding market. Unshelm chose Apia in Samoa as the base of operations and with the firm's wide variety of ships plying the Pacific, Godeffroys very soon succeeded in seizing the bulk of the trade in the south-west. By the time of Unshelm's death in 1864, forty-six stations had been established throughout the islands, as far north as the Marshalls and the Caroline Islands.¹

Godeffroy's real expansion took place under Unshelm's successor in Apia, Theodor Weber, a man who was to acquire great notoriety in Samoa as an empire builder, but who was a merchant and innovator of the highest order. Weber is credited with the discovery of the greater commercial potential of copra over coconut oil and he established the first large-scale plantations in Samoa in 1865. Under him the company tightened its grip on trade in the Marshalls and Carolines and moved into the New Guinea islands with a trading post at Matupi in 1874. Here they were joined by Robertson and Hemsheim, a small trading firm with its base in the islands north of New Guinea.²

Such was the extent and strength of German trade by 1875 that German warships were thereafter regularly despatched to the Pacific to provide official support for the growing commercial empire. Treaties of friendship and commerce were concluded between 1876 and 1879 with various island groups: Tonga, the Gilbert, Ellice and Marshall Islands, parts of the Society Islands and Samoa. In 1878 the harbours of Makada and Mioko in New Britain were purchased on the initiative of the German naval commander, von Werner, in order to reinforce the claims of Germany's traders in the area.³ By 1879

1. K. Schmack, J.C. Godeffroy und Sohn: Kaufleute zu Hamburg (Hamburg 1938). In the absence of the Company's records which were destroyed by fire, Schmack and an earlier work, R. Hertz's, Das Hamburger Seehandelshaus J.C. Godeffroy und Sohn (Hamburg, 1922) remain the last word on the famous firm.
2. The first Godeffroy agents in Matupi were actually driven out shortly after their arrival and it was Hemsheim who succeeded in establishing the first permanent trading settlement in New Guinea.
3. B. von Werner, Ein deutsches Kriegsschiff in der Sudsee (Leipzig, 1889) p 407.

official sources claimed that German business houses were currently exporting over six million Marks worth of products from the South Seas.¹

In Germany in the late 1870's agitation was growing from economists and publicists in favour of overseas expansion for the Reich and a number of associations were founded to promote the idea of colonies. In the light of the country's economic problems Bismarck was concerned to secure foreign markets for Germany's expanding industry but he was not at first prepared to go as far as colonization, which he regarded as a pursuit of dubious value.² The Chancellor looked to German commercial enterprise to create a free-trade empire overseas without formal colonial attachments. Bismarck's change of heart and the reasons behind the burst of colonial expansion after 1884 have been discussed time and time again in a debate which shows few signs of faltering.³ It is only necessary to state here that Pacific commerce played a prominent role in the effective pressure which was brought to bear on Bismarck to advance German interests by colonization.

Despite the external image of prosperity which German Pacific enterprise conveyed in the late 1870's, there were a number of seeming threats to its position. Already in 1874 the Spanish had tried unsuccessfully to obstruct German traders in the Phillipines and the Carolines by demanding customs duties while in the same year most of the land held by Germans in Fiji was confiscated by the British government when it annexed that group; in 1875 the United States obtained a privileged position over German commerce in the Hawaiian group and in 1881 the French annexed the Society Islands where a subsidiary of Godeffroys, the Société Commerciale de l'Océanie had been enjoying a large share of business. Then in 1879 Godeffroy's European investments deteriorated and new capital could not be raised for a company

1. Verhandlungen des Bundesraths des Deutschen Reichs. (Printed Collection) Session 1879. Bd 2. Denkschrift XXIV-XXVI.
2. Townsend, Origins of Modern German Colonialism, p 17.
3. The ablest, most recent account is H.-U. Wehler's, Bismarck und der Imperialismus (Koln 1969).

to take over Godeffroy's Samoan interests. Bismarck, with an eye to the present and future potential of the Pacific trade, came forward to support the idea of a guaranteed government dividend for a new firm to replace the projected successor to Godeffroys, the Deutsche Handels - und Plantagen - Gesellschaft der Südsee Inseln zu Hamburg (D.H.P.G.). But in a celebrated confrontation in 1880, between the Government and its enemies in the Reichstag, the Samoan Vorlage was defeated¹ and the D.H.P.G. was only rescued when Berlin and Hamburg financiers agreed to reconstruct it with private capital.

Though it continued to dominate trade in Samoa, the D.H.P.G.'s difficulties were not removed after 1880. Its plantations in Samoa itself suffered from the constant civil wars between rival Samoan factions over the paramountcy question while there was the added threat that its sources of labour were gradually drying up from increased competition. Furthermore there was strident agitation from New Zealand interests for annexation of the group, which was only compounded in the eyes of the Germans by the English preferences of the reigning chief Malietoa.² New Guinea, the D.H.P.G.'s main centre of labour recruitment, an increasingly important trade and plantation area itself, was also the object of German fears concerning British annexation because of Australian agitation. Adolf von Hansemann, head of the giant financial consortium, Diskonto-Gesellschaft, petitioned Bismarck in November 1880 to make New Guinea a German colony and he outlined a scheme for a Reich sponsored development of German interests in the area.³ Bismarck was however not prepared to involve the Government actively while he did not have the support of a national parliament. Over the next four years information

1. See Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstages, IV Legisl., III Session 1879, Bd.II, pp 858-896, 946-959.
2. There is a good account of D.H.P.G. problems and German politics in Samoa in P.M. Kennedy, 'Bismarck's Imperialism': the Case of Samoa 1880-1890' The Historical Journal, Vol XV, Nr.2, 1972, pp 266ff.
3. Von Hansemann, 'Denkschrift', Nov 1880 in Sammlung der Officiellen Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Gegenwart (Leipzig 1885) Vol 44, pp 160-1.

flooded in from Imperial representatives and private interests in the Pacific emphasizing the significance of German enterprise and urging annexation of Samoa and New Guinea to remove the existing hindrances to rapid and orderly development.¹

Concern for Germany's Pacific investment was prominent in Bismarck's colonial venture after April 1884. In August he promised state protection for Hansemann's renewed project to colonize North East New Guinea; annexation of the mainland and the offshore islands took place in November 1884. In early 1885 the Marshall Islands were annexed and the Carolines group was to be included, but indignant protests from Spain over prior ownership induced Bismarck to submit the question to an international arbiter, Pope Leo XIII, who decided in favour of the Spanish claim. Bismarck also entertained the hope of acquiring Samoa through negotiations with the British in the late 1880's but the excesses of his consular representatives in the group and the stubborn resistance of the United States prevented this;² he had to be satisfied with a co-protectorate arranged with Britain and the United States at the Berlin Conference of 1889. It was not until 1899, with the complete breakdown of European control and the advent of a particularly ferocious civil war, that the three Powers were able to agree on a realistic solution to the imbroglio; the islands were delivered into German hands. The same year Germany purchased the Caroline, Palau and Mariana Islands from Spain in the wake of the Spanish-American war and the German trade and plantation empire in the Pacific was finally formalized.

In the Pacific, Bismarck had not pursued an offensive Kolonialpolitik in the sense of staking out new spheres of influence for Germany. The colonial empire was based on already-existing trade and plantation

1. Sammlung der Officiellen Aktenstucke zur Geschichte der Gegenwart, Vol 43, pp 322-350; ibid., Vol 44, pp 170 ff.

2. Kennedy, 'Bismarck's Imperialism', 1972, pp 269-277.

holdings and Bismarck wished to engage the government as little as possible in its administration, believing that colonies should be commercially independent and as far as possible, politically so. The Chancellor looked to the Hansa cities to promote further material and political development overseas, through Freibriefen or Charters for private enterprise on the model of the British North Borneo Company. He even tried to enlist Hamburg merchants as colonial directors in a new Imperial bureau which would remove responsibility from the Foreign Office. The Hamburg Senate however rejected the idea: its free trade principles were more sacred than control of the colonies and the merchants declared themselves ready to act only in an advisory capacity to the Berlin authorities.¹

Bismarck's concept of colonial administration did become reality in the Pacific when the New Guinea Company, founded by Hansemann in 1884, was awarded a far-reaching charter on 17th May 1885 to administer the new protectorate of North East New Guinea. On condition that it erect an administrative apparatus at its own cost, the Company was given the exclusive right to regulate the internal administration of the colony, to levy taxes and duties, to take possession of all unowned land and to conclude contracts over land and labour with the local inhabitants.² By treaty with Britain in 1886, demarcating the respective spheres of influence in the south west Pacific, the northern Solomons was included in the New Guinea Company's protectorate and a new Charter conferred in December. Only three years later the Company surrendered the reins of government to the Reich while it continued to pay the costs. It resumed control in September 1892 but was never able to overcome the conflict of demands made by the administrative and commercial goals. Its expenditures increased steadily without any proportional return as a number of subsidiary companies rose and fell in the Astrolabe Bay. In

1. For a detailed examination of Hamburg's attitude to Bismarck's overtures, see H. Washausen, Hamburg und die Kolonialpolitik des deutschen Reiches 1880-1890 (Hamburg 1968) pp 115-117.
2. See M. von Koschitzsky, Deutsche Colonialgeschichte, Part II, (Leipzig 1887) pp 228-9.

1895/96 the New Guinea Company entered into negotiations for the permanent transfer of control to the Reich, and this finally took place. after some domestic opposition to the terms of the treaty, in April 1899. Up to that time the Company had lost a total of nine million Marks in New Guinea.¹ Later in the same year Britain was given the easternmost islands of the protectorate, Germany retaining only Buka and Bougainville.

In only one area of the Pacific was Bismarck's model of Charter government successful: the island sphere north of New Guinea. The D.H.P.G. and the firm of Robertson and Hermsheim, both of which controlled trade in the Marshalls (as well as in the Carolines under Spanish rule), founded a joint company in late 1887, the Jaluit Gesellschaft, which was given an Imperial Charter for the Marshalls on the 21st January 1888. The treaty gave the firm the right to take possession of all unowned land in the Marshalls, Brown and Providence Islands and to extract their guano deposits. The actual administration remained in the hands of an imperial commissioner (from 1893 onwards, a Landeshauptmann) whose costs were borne by the Jaluit Gesellschaft.² After the Carolines became part of the empire in 1899, the company was in addition granted a trading and plantation monopoly there.³ The smallest of the privileged firms in Germany's colonies, the Jaluit Gesellschaft was also the longest lived and most successful. In 1906, when the company became a purely private business concern, it was already paying out a dividend of twenty per cent.⁴ It was in that year that the separate status of the Marshalls protectorate was abolished and it was united with that of the

1. H.H. Kraft, Chartergesellschaften als Mittel zur Erschliessung kolonialer Gebiete. (Hamburg 1943) p 157; See also S.G. Firth, 'The New Guinea Company, 1885-1899: A Case of Unprofitable Imperialism', Historical Studies, Vol 15, Nr. 9, pp361-377. The New Guinea Company's failure will be treated at greater length in Chapter 3b).
2. W. Treue, 'Der Erwerb und die Verwaltung der Marshall-Inseln: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Jaluit Gesellschaft'.(Berlin, phil.Diss.,1940,)pp 89-91. I am indebted to Dr. S. Firth for access to this thesis.
3. See page 97.
4. See W.Treue, 'Die Jaluit Gesellschaft', Tradition, April 1962, pp 108-122. Also Washausen,Hamburg und die Kolonialpolitik, pp 63-7.

Carolines, Palau and Mariana Islands, which had been administratively a part of the New Guinea protectorate since their incorporation into the empire.

Concurrently with these events, the structure of colonial administration at the domestic level was undergoing alterations which had an important bearing on the policies adopted in the Pacific. In the early years Bismarck's open dislike of government involvement in the colonies kept policy-making within the political section of the Foreign Office: the activities of Imperial representatives like the Samoan consuls tended to endorse his fears of excessive bureaucratization and local European despotism. A Colonial Department, under Director Kayser, was finally established in 1890 but it remained within the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office and was under the direct responsibility of the Chancellor. In its policy deliberations, particularly where colonial finance was concerned, the Colonial Department always had to reckon with articulate public discussion of colonial issues and pressure exerted by the Reichstag. Unlike most countries, the Department was required by the Financial Law of 1892 to submit a separate colonial budget to the Reichstag for its approval, which gave the latter body virtual control over every detail of administration. As an important weapon in its struggle to strengthen parliamentary control over Germany's political life, the Reichstag guarded this right jealously. Moreover, because the various parties represented large-scale pressure groups, those interests with the most patronage in the colonies or in Berlin exerted a great deal of influence on colonial politics.¹ With the parties of the Right gaining increasing power in the Reichstag, particularly after the elections of 1907, the interests of right wing pressure groups, identical with commercial interests in the

1. The best accounts of the balance of power in domestic party politics in Germany are to be found in J. Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule, 1905-1912, (Cambridge 1969); K. Hausen, Deutsche Kolonialherrschaft in Afrika: Wirtschaftsinteressen und Kolonialverwaltung in Kamerun vor 1914 (Zürich 1970) and H. Pogge von Strandmann, 'The Kolonialrat, its Significance and Influence on German Politics from 1890 to 1906' (Oxford, D.Phil. thesis, 1970).

colonies, commanded even greater authority in colonial policy making.

The reform of colonial administration in 1907 and the elevation of the Department to the status of a ministerial office did not alter this state of affairs. If anything the trend was reinforced. Bernhard Dernburg, the new State Secretary for Colonies, was a Berlin banker who knew little about colonies as such. He carried out far-reaching reforms to the financial structure of colonial administration and to the links between Germany and her colonies but at heart Dernburg remained a mercantilest. His objectives were primarily material: he saw the colonies chiefly as sources of raw materials and outlets for investment capital.¹ His reciprocal programme of bringing civilization and technology to the colonized peoples was curtailed in extent and depth by the opposition of the large colonial interests who would not accept radical interference with their commercial objectives. Dernburg initiated an economic take-off in Germany's colonial empire but the consequent material growth and intensifying pressure on the indigenous populations posed enormous difficulties for those responsible for a humane native policy.²

There were numerous elements of conflict in Europe which went to make up the framework of German colonialism in its metropolitan assumptions. Though these placed great restraints on colonial policy at the local level, the peculiar isolation of the Pacific and its insignificance in the German empire permitted a few individuals, through talent, or ignorance, or simply fortuitous circumstance, to overcome them. It is the aim of this work to show how the three-cornered conflict between metropolitan objectives of colonial rule, local administrative possibilities and the aspirations of Pacific Islanders was handled in the three Pacific colonies themselves.

1. B. Dernburg, 'Zielpunkte des deutschen Kolonialwesens' in Deutsches Kolonialblatt, 1907, pp 106-112.

2. Hausen, Deutsche Kolonialherrschaft, pp 30, 118, 197.

PART I

Chapter 1

SAMOA

a) European Contact and the Establishment of German Rule in Samoa, 1830 to 1904:

When the Imperial German flag was raised in Mulinu'u on 15 March 1900, Europeans and Samoans had been already engaged for more than two decades in a constantly fluctuating struggle over the right to control the group's political and economic destiny. Samoan affairs had dissipated a disproportionate amount of diplomatic energy in the capitals of the western Powers as the islands became a cockpit of imperial rivalry in the late nineteenth century. European familiarity with Samoa dates back to 1722 when the Dutchman Jacob Roggeween first sighted the island. He described the inhabitants as 'a harmless, good sort of people, and very brisk and likely, for they treated each other with visible marks of civility and had nothing in their behaviour that was wild or savage...'¹ Subsequent visitors were to rue the words of Roggeween.

There were in succeeding years a series of sporadic and largely disastrous contacts² until 1830 when John Williams and Charles Barff of the London Missionary Society arrived off Savai'i. The fortuitous circumstances of their appearance, in that Malietoa Vai'inupo had just won a decided triumph over a rival for the paramountcy, combined with the polytheistic and practical leanings of the people, served the missionaries well and the Samoans took readily to the formal structure of religious observances and the new education.³ Already by 1860 there

1. Quoted in J.R. Holmes, 'Aboriginal and Modern Samoa: A Study of Cultural Change based upon London Missionary Society Journals 1830 to 1840'. (Wichita State Univ. M.A. Thesis 1967) p 4.
2. In 1787 eleven of La Perouse's expedition were massacred on Tutuila by Samoans visiting from Upolu.
3. The best accounts of this early period of Samoan history are in E. Turner, Nineteen Years in Polynesia (London 1861) and Gilson, Samoa 1830 to 1900. The catholic Marist Fathers arrived in 1845 and the Wesleyans, who had actually preceded the LMS in Samoa but withdrew to Tonga, returned soon after.

were over 5000 adherents contributing £1200 each year to the upkeep of the mission. Upwards of a thousand individuals had been directly influenced by the teaching seminary established at Malua in 1844. In following decades the Samoan voluntarily adopted compulsory schooling so that by 1905, twenty five per cent of the population had enjoyed an education from the London Missionary Society alone.¹

The Christian revolution was however neither wholehearted nor complete. Samoans were not necessarily prepared to accept all the western religious sanctions which the missionaries attempted to superimpose on indigenous life, and in the absence of a monopoly of foreign influence, the latter were forced to acquiesce in what amounted to an exchange of religious cultures, as the Samoans institutionalized their own interpretations of Christian doctrine. Without recourse to western military power the growing community of beachcombers and itinerant traders also had to accept traditional authority, for the Samoans refused to compromise their standards of propriety regarding the behaviour of foreigners nor the sanctions imposed for transgressions of the social and political code.²

With the growth of Samoa as an entrepot of trade and a plantation centre, the balance of physical power tended to swing in favour of the European community. The advent of consular representatives of the Powers brought expectations of western support and intervention and the European navies began to provide the means of intimidating the local populations. Island chiefs soon found themselves competing with the consuls and the navies for the loyalty of beach residents. It was only a short step for the Europeans to begin treating the Samoans as a second-class race, a hindrance to the development of commerce and an exploitable commodity.

European interests soon began to attempt to dictate the

- 1 Turner, Nineteen Years in Polynesia p110, 127; Solf to Auswärtiges Amt: Kolonial Abteilung (hereinafter AAKA) 15 Sept. 1907 RKA 2953:36-56.
2. C. Ralston, 'The Pattern of Race Relations in 19th Century Port Towns'. Journal of Pacific History Vol.6, 1971 pp 43,50

outcome of Samoan district rivalries in a way most favourable to the foreign community. The London Missionary Society and the consular representatives interfered in 1869 in the Tafai titles dispute between Malietoa Talavou and Malietoa Laupepa. The inevitable inter-district war lasted until 1873 when, once again by mission entreaties and consular intervention, an uneasy peace was secured and an oligarchic regime of the Tumua and Pule installed. There followed, in quick succession, an abortive republican experiment under an American premier and, from 1876 to 1881, a new war between Laupepa and Talavou.

The exigencies of warfare led to the growth of a vigorous arms trade operated by the planters and land speculators now crowding into Apia. Ridiculous amounts of land were alienated from the Samoans for guns and ammunition, and fraudulent practices were the order of the day on both sides. By 1880 the old Godeffroys firm laid claim to 150000 acres of the best land on Upolu, only one quarter of it purchased with cash (largely debased Chilean dollars); the rest was acquired in guns and kind at enormously inflated prices. American and British interests claimed a further 450000 acres between them.¹ Theodore Weber, whose methods were perhaps more methodical if no less scrupulous than those of his competitors, was careful to reinforce title by effective occupation and he founded large copra and cotton plantations in north-western Upolu, importing native labour from the Gilberts and Melanesia since the Samoans could not be induced to work for an 'economic' wage rate.

By the 1880's, Germany was the power least trusted by the Samoans. Godeffroys' cynical alienation of land, the use of German

1. New Zealand National Archives, Wellington, German Consular Papers (hereinafter NZNA/GCP), pp 19-23,38: Report on D.H.P.G. assets 21 Jan 1880 enclosed in Consul General Zembsch to Auswartiges Amt (AA) 26 Jan 1880; Zembsch to AA 23 May 1880. Typescript extracts from these records were kindly lent by Dr. J.A. Moses, University of Queensland. See also J.L. Kelly, The South Seas Islands: Possibilities of Trade with New Zealand (Auckland 1885) p 26.

gunboats to overcome resistance to occupation, the dependence of the islanders on Company credit, and the importation of Melanesian labour were all objects of Samoan resentment. The Germans' political capital was not improved when they appropriated two island harbours in 1879 in order to extract a 'treaty of friendship and commerce' from the Samoans. A similar treaty had already been signed voluntarily with Britain. There had always been an historical and perhaps temperamental preference for the English, and Apia was all but a British colony in appearance, composition and manner. The Germans, despite their commercial preponderance, gave the impression of being outsiders. Very few considered Apia their home; most were employees of 'the Firm' intending to leave Samoa as soon as they had made some money.¹ The Americans, for their part, were also congenial to the Samoans for they represented an ideal of freedom and independence on which the islanders could rely in their struggle against encroaching German interests.

In 1879, the establishment of a Municipality in Apia added a new dimension to the increasing inter-communal conflicts. It signified that the chiefs must finally relinquish their nominal authority over both races for there were now two distinct centres of power.² The relations between both racial communities were thereafter largely determined by the conflict of interests within each. The governing ability of the oligarchy of consuls which now assumed authority over the foreign community, was regularly impeded by the incompatibility of instructions and the tendency of the incumbents to take matters into their own hands.

Throughout the following decade, settlers and consuls added the weight of their support to whichever party seemed most capable of

1. NZNA/GCP, pp 29-31, Zembsch to AA 29 April 1880

2. Gilson, Samoa 1830 to 1900 pp 367ff

bringing a semblance of order into indigenous affairs. Misconstruing the essentially delicate balance between the paramountcy and the power of chiefly groups in the various districts, the Europeans contrived to establish a centralized monarchical regime which would be able to control all Samoans. To strengthen one of the parties sufficiently to hold the others in order, arms were constantly dispensed to the warring factions by different national interests. For their part, the Samoan district factions encouraged this competition in seeking to install their separate candidates in power as the paramount chief of the group. It is impossible to determine the exact numbers of firearms in the possession of Samoans in these years, but the DHPG admitted in 1886 that it had supplied 467 rifles to the islanders between January and October and declared that it could have been thousands more had the company not had the peace of the group at heart. Non-German firms were supposed to have sold 700 rifles to Samoans during the same year¹ in full view of the Municipality while many more were smuggled in through outlying harbours. Various attempts were made in the 1880's and 1890's to regulate the flow of arms into Samoa but most foundered on the mutual suspicions of the three Powers.

In November 1884, the German consul Stuebel forced upon Malietoa Laupepa a treaty designed to give Germany overriding power in the conduct of native affairs. When Laupepa ignored the treaty, as was Samoan custom with agreements which hedged their fundamental political freedoms, Stuebel used it as a pretext to drive him from the seat of Samoan government at Mulinu'u and raise the flag of the empire. His coup was repudiated by Bismarck who was hopeful of obtaining the group in projected negotiations with the other two Powers. A firm negative stand by America however thwarted this hope and together with continuing damage

1. Consul Travers to Bismarck 3. Jan 87 RKA 2546:89-94.

to German interests through Samoan fighting, provoked Berlin into approving unilateral action by her local representatives. War was declared on Laupepa and he was deported by a German warship. In his place the Germans installed Tamesese Tupua, who had accepted the alliance as an effective means of checking the aspirations of a new contender for the Tafaifa title, Mata'afa, also of the Sa Tupua lineage.

Tamasese's regime, under the tutelage of a former employee of the DHPG, Eugen Brandeis, was very soon discredited in the eyes of Samoans and non-German Europeans by the methods it used to eliminate political opposition and impose the demands of a centralized government apparatus on the essentially decentralized islanders. A revolt, with Mata'afa at its head, broke out which the German navy found impossible to quell. In an attempt by German marines in December 1888 to disarm a party of rebels near Vaialele plantation, sixteen Germans were killed and over thirty wounded in a well-executed ambush by Mata'afa's forces.

This event rather upset all the preconceptions which Germans in particular took for granted concerning Samoan powers of resistance. The field-commanders and eye-witnesses wrote bewildered reports about the apparently 'un-Samoan' action of firing on Germans. They tended to rationalize the ferocity of Mata'afa's attack by blaming 'a white American' at the head of the native troops for firing the first shot and encouraging the Samoans to do likewise.¹ It contributed greatly to the movement towards resolution of the international conflict by negotiation, which finally issued in the Berlin Conference of 1889. This whole exercise was a diplomatic rather than a realistic solution to the ethnic and political confusion in Samoa. In essence it simply converted the

1. Bundesarchiv: Koblenz (hereinafter BA), Private Papers of von Wolffersdorf 1895-1899: 'Elf Jahre in Samoa', File 161, p 78; Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv: Freiburg (hereinafter BA/MA) File 5078: Kommandeur SMS Adler to Admiralität 4 Jan. 1889, with enclosures.

dangerous imperialist rivalries of the three Powers into a delicate balance of interests.¹ The fiction of an autonomous Samoan kingship was preserved and the tribunal of consular rule replaced by another tribunal of specially created international officials. Practically the arrangement was meant to function as a tridominium, but the retention of a monarchical concept for which Samoa was not well suited only perpetuated the political confusion and provided the leverage by which the various Samoan factions continued to exploit European power in their own interests.

The sequence of Samoan initiative and European response continued when Mata'afa was deported in 1893 for rebellion against the established regime of Malietoa Laupepa. His adherents, the real 'kingmakers', carried on the struggle in his name, skilfully manipulating the shifts of power and alliance within the European community, and growing stronger and more uncontrolled. While the navies of the Powers in conjunction probably prevented the disquiet from boiling over into a general conflagration involving both races, the measure of their control was strictly limited, extending little further than the range of their deck artillery. It was generally acknowledged by the Germans that the Samoans need only withdraw to the bush, where they could live off the land and move with a facility which eluded European troops, for the tenuous control of the naval forces to vanish completely.²


This was brought home vividly in 1898 when, after the death of Laupepa, Malietoa Tanu and the newly returned Mata'afa contested the vacant title. The weight of Samoan preference clearly lay with Mata'afa but in a surprise move the European Chief Justice of the tripartite administration declared Tanu king. At this point all European pretensions

1. Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus, p 400.
2. BA/MA, 7577, Vol.1: Kommandeur SMS Bussard to Admiralität 11 Sept 1894; ibid. Kdr. Scheder's contingency plan for the pacification of Samoa, enclosed in Scheder to Admiralität 30 Oct 1894.

to control of the situation broke down. Mata'afa's huge body of supporters, including the districts of Atua, A'ana and half of Savai'i, rose up against the Tanu party in a civil war of unequalled ferocity. Mata'afa was fighting for a decade of lost rights, spurned by the very Powers who claimed to be preserving Samoan autonomy. His ability to marshall a large force behind him was due in great measure to the support of the leading orator chief of Safotulafai, and thus the virtual spokesman for Savai'i, Lauaki Namulau'ulu Mamoe. Lauaki was traditionally a supporter of the Sa Malietoa lineage, but in despair at the apparent indecisiveness of Britain which had time and time again refused to give a water tight guarantee to the Malietoa regimes despite their basic sympathy for England, he switched his allegiance to Mata'afa as the only hope for uniting and stabilizing Samoa in the face of foreign intervention.¹

The American navy led the operations on behalf of the legally constituted monarch, Tanu, while Germany, in a defensive bid to arrest the decline of her influence in the group, threw its weight behind Mata'afa.² Open engagements with the Anglo-American forces were studiously avoided. However when the Americans pounded the Mata'afan villages with artillery fire, the rebels did attack the European lines in Apia itself and killed three sailors. In addition, when a party of troops departed from their customary strategy of sweeping along the coasts and on 1 April 1899 attempted to pursue Mata'afa into the interior, they were ambushed and, in a hasty and disorganized retreat, three officers and several men

1. London Missionary Society Records (hereinafter LMS), South Seas Box 45/3B: Memo concerning interview of LMS native pastors with Lauaki, 20 March 1899 in Newell to Thompson 22 March 1899; Davidson, Pacific Islands Portraits, pp 287-8
2. For a detailed account of the finale to three Power rule in Samoa see P.M. Kennedy's 1971 Oxford D.Phil thesis: 'The Partition of the Samoan Islands 1898-99'. Also his 'The Royal Navy and the Samoan Civil War 1898-1899', Canadian Journal of History Vol.v. No.1. March 1970



No. 1.

Mo lona afoga

Josefo Mata'afa Faife'au,

were killed and decapitated. It was an indication of what might be expected if a guerrilla war between the Samoans and Europeans were allowed to develop. During this time the mission societies in general maintained a discreet neutrality and concentrated on providing refuge for non-combatants and medical services for the wounded of both sides. Native pastors of the London Missionary Society appealed to Lauaki to use his considerable influence in the cause of peace but Lauaki refused: 'We have not been a party to war with the Powers,' was his reply. 'We do not wish to resist. But we have the right to claim the privilege of free men and ask to be told plainly what is to be our future status.'¹

A move in this direction was made when a three Power Commission was despatched to Samoa in 1899. It brought about a temporary cease-fire while both Tanu and Mata'afa were persuaded to renounce permanently future claims to the Kingship, though their acquiescence was more a gesture of good will than a renunciation of traditional political dynamics. Meanwhile Britain and Germany were conducting negotiations concerned with tidying up loose ends of empire. Influenced by a recent naval assessment of the greater strategic importance of Tonga, Britain agreed to waive her claims to Samoa in favour of Germany. Subsequently America agreed to the German annexation of Upolu, Savai'i and Manono with Tutuila becoming an American dependency. The solution was greeted with great joy in the Reich where Samoa had been elevated to the status of a test-case of the new Weltpolitik and the islands were considered an indispensable jewel in the crown of German prestige.

The solution to the international destiny of Samoa did not exorcise the difficulties which Germany faced in Samoa itself. The

1. LMS, South Seas Reports Box 5/1, pp 3-4: Newell to Thompson 22 March 1899 and Report of J.W. Sibree, Savaii 17 July 1900.

islanders had at first shown signs of resenting the independent partition of the group. A high chief of the Malietoa line sent a petition of protest to the Kaiser, and the chiefs of Safotulafai - significantly enough, Lauaki's political base - refused to hold a fono to greet the news in the mistaken belief that the United States was about to veto the agreement.¹ By early 1900 however these initial reservations had been overcome and the Tanu and Mata'afa parties declared their acceptance of German dominion.

On the part of Mata'afa and his adherents, there was a great deal of sympathy for Germany in 1899-1900, but it was rooted in gratitude for its support in the recent civil war rather than in an inherent predilection for German culture and hegemony. The chiefs of the party reasoned that Germany's capacity to help during the war had been restricted by the provisions of the Berlin Act. Now that Samoa was German, there was nothing to stop her from recognizing Mata'afa as Tupu Sili or supreme sovereign and his faithful band of chiefs and speakers as the Malo, the government of Samoa.² There was no doubt that Mata'afa was the Chosen One of the majority of Samoans. Since the late 1880's he had been the focus and inspiration of a purely Samoan movement in opposition to the candidates favoured by the Powers. Despite his own renunciation of the monarchy, his chiefs and speakers had never relinquished their right to choose, more exactly to create a King of Samoa according to recent tradition and to have their creation installed in Mulinu'u. Accordingly, before the German flag was raised, Mata'afa, under the tutelage of Lauaki, called an assembly of the Tanu people to effect a reconciliation and a government was set up with Mata'afa and thirteen chiefs claiming

1. Petition of Malietoa Fa'alogoiai to Kaiser 1899 in RKA 3057: 196-7; Consul Grunow to Reichskanzler 21 Dec 1899 RKA 3057:211-12.
2. Solf to AAKA 19 April 1900 RKA 3059:64-6

widespread executive powers. Residing in Mulinu'u and styling themselves 'the rulers of Samoa', this band proceeded to collect taxes and issue regulations concerning Samoans and Europeans alike.¹

There was little Germany could do. In 1900 the Mata'afa party still represented the strongest military force in the group and it was in a state of perpetual mobilization, armed to the teeth with western firearms. The Germans possessed one small cruiser which occasionally visited the group and two decades of erratic naval intervention had diminished considerably any deterrent effect such a war-ship could hope to have on the local population. There were no colonial troops beyond a largely decorative force of thirty Samoan police (Fitafita) designed to keep order within the Municipality. The Samoans had not been cowed by half a century of European penetration, nor did the traditional culture and its reinforcing values undergo any radical dislocation. The traditional power elites were still very much in control of social and political activities at village and district level and were extremely jealous of their prerogatives. Germany was faced with the problem of establishing a colonial relationship with a people who had never really accepted the premise of subjection as Europeans conceived it. As Meyer-Delius, local head of the D.H.P.G. advised, it was a situation requiring freedom for the Samoans in their own administration and a governor who was not only purposeful in his methods but experienced in handling the islanders.²

The man whom the Colonial Department chose for the task was Wilhelm Solf, currently head of the provisional government instituted by

1. Grunow to Reichskanzler 24 Jan 1900 RKA 3058: 81-1;
LMS Archives, South Seas, Box 46/1: Newell to Thompson 19 April 1900;
Davidson, Pacific Islands Portraits, p 292.
2. Meyer Delius to AAKa 29 Jan 1900 RKA 3057:243.

the three Powers in 1899.¹ Solf was a distinct departure from the norm of the German colonial official. Better educated than the majority of his service colleagues, a man of the world familiar with British colonial policy as well from his experience in India, Solf felt himself altogether superior to the more middle-class, nationalistic, somewhat pettifogging German administrator. He brought with him to Samoa a natural respect for the intrinsic value of exotic cultures and a readiness to deal with the Samoans on their own terms. Above all he renounced force as a means of imposing his policies on the Samoan people: 'All radical measures are evil. Time and goodness and justice are the best means of governing in Samoa', was his firm conviction.² Together with the qualities which Samoans associated with leadership - an imposing presence, paternal interest, the power of rhetoric - Solf's attitude was well suited to the social and political conceptions of the inhabitants.

Solf was convinced, as had been the International Commission before him, that nothing short of a radical transformation of the traditional political system would guarantee the peaceful development of the group. If the customary system of factional rivalries continued to operate independent of the German government, then a constant state of uneasy peace would degenerate into civil war at Mata'afa's death, with disastrous results to plantation agriculture and trade, already at a low ebb after two decades of unrest. Solf set himself three immediate objectives: to reconcile the opposing parties, to abolish the Kingship, and to break the

1. Solf was born into a comfortable business family in Berlin on 5 October 1886. Educated in Eastern Studies at various universities in Germany he joined the Foreign Office in 1888 and worked for two years in India where he made intensive contacts with the indigenous peoples and led a cosmopolitan existence. He went back to study law in 1891 and in 1898 was appointed a judge in Daressalam from where he was despatched to Samoa. See E. von Vietsch, Wilhelm Solf: Botschafter zwischen den Zeiten (Tubingen 1961) pp 19-36.

2. Quoted in Vietsch, Wilhelm Solf p 65.

power of the chiefs and speakers presuming to speak as the government of Samoa. His long-term aim was to shift gradually the concentration of indigenous political interest from national to local level and in this way undermine the durability of political parties. It was based on a vision of an ancient system of Samoan 'parish' organization and politics which Solf possessed and which he believed would eliminate the unstable influence of the Samoan districts.¹

In the early months of 1900 however, Solf was powerless to implement these plans in the face of the superior power and influence of Mata'afa and his thirteen chiefs in Mulinu'u. In the weeks following the flag-raising they badgered Solf with questions about the date and formation of a new government, and led by Lauaki, pressed for a one-party administration of Mata'afans.² It was clear that 'the Thirteen' considered Solf to be a high chief sent out by the Kaiser to complete, together with Mata'afa and them, the governing power, Malo o Samoa. There was a definite groundswell of Samoan opinion in favour of acknowledging Mata'afa's sovereign position, and Mata'afa himself warned Solf that a failure to recognize him as Tupu would be construed by his followers as 'disregard of a long-established right' and could endanger the peace.³ In such a situation Solf adopted delaying tactics while he waited for instructions from Berlin. When they had not arrived by April, he was forced to compromise with the Mulinu'u chiefs lest further inactivity should provoke their disloyalty. Accordingly, on 11 April Solf announced the institution of a new Samoan

1. BA, Private Papers of Wilhelm Solf, File 20, p 276: Solf to AAKA 4 Sept 1900; von Bülow to Schanz 14 Nov 1903 with Solf's minuting, enclosed in Solf to AAKA 4 Dec 1903 RKA 2949: 177-180.
2. NZNA, A.L. Braisby, 'A documentary Record and History of the Lauati Rebellion in Western Samoa, 1909'. A collection of documents compiled from original Native Office records. Vol I, pp 9-14: 'The Thirteen' to Solf 11 April 1900 and note by Solf 8 April 1900.
3. BA, Solf Papers, 20:209: Copy of Solf despatch 9 April 1900.

government with the Kaiser as Tupu Sili, Solf as his paramount delegate in Samoa and Mata'afa as Ali'i Sili, paramount chief, and 'the channel through which the wishes and orders of the government are conveyed to the Samoans'.¹ During the following months Solf set up a bi-partisan council of advisors to Mata'afa - the Faipule - which was to contain chiefs of both royal lineages and district representatives, Lauaki being one of the appointees. The existing Samoan judicial establishment was retained and provision was made for indigenous administrative officers at district and village level, from district chiefs to village policemen.²

The position of Ali'i Sili and a central government in Mulinu'u had no part in Solf's ideal plan for Samoan politics; nor for that matter, did a local administration based on the districts, the historic centres of mobilization for political intrigue. The London Missionary Society was particularly disgusted at the appointment of 'all the old rowdies' to the new government.³ Solf harboured plans to abolish all of these institutions when the time was right. He anticipated difficulties, especially from 'that body of indolent intriguers' as he called the Tumua and Pule chiefs who were constantly scheming over the Tafa'ifa titles issue,⁴ and they did not disappoint him as they became aware of his real political intentions. In the meantime, Solf was able to consolidate his administration by capitalizing on the widespread satisfaction with peace after decades of unrest and on the first flush of cooperation which followed his apparent submission to the political desires of the Mata'afan party. In May 1900 the Colonial Department accorded him a great deal of freedom 'to determine

1. Ibid:211: Governor's address to the Chiefs 11 April 1900.
2. Samoa'sches Gouvernements Blatt, Bd3 Nr4, 5 Sept 1900; NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' I:2: Solf to Samoan Chiefs 17 Aug 1900; Davidson, Pacific Islands Portraits p 293.
3. LMS, South Seas Box 46/1: Hockett to Cousins 11 June 1900
4. Solf to AAKA 6 Feb 1901 RKA 3060:125-6.

the manner in which the question of native administration will be best solved while maintaining peace and order.'¹

The most urgent problem was the disarmament of the population. None of the attempts made by the three Powers to control the number of arms in the possession of the Samoans had been successful until the International Commission in 1899 recommended the principle of financial compensation for arms surrendered. The first experiment took place the same year and netted 3410 firearms, the cost to be met by the three Powers.² No one doubted that there were considerable quantities of firearms still retained by the islanders, nor that a complete restructuring of the customs system was necessary if shipments of arms were to be prevented from reaching the Samoans in the future. The promised compensation money for 1899 (about \$41000) finally arrived in 1900 but Solf delayed its distribution until December, by which time he had carried through the necessary reforms and had the arms trade under control. Shortly afterwards, Solf announced that all further arms and ammunition were to be surrendered against payment by 31 January 1901. It was a discerning move designed to exploit the momentary euphoria of the Samoans at receiving the promised money after so long. By mid February a further 1500 firearms were delivered up and it was generally agreed that these represented almost the entire remaining hoard.³

A number of other elements of colonial control and development were introduced without resistance in the first two years of

1. AAKA (Rose) to Solf 31 May 1900 RKA 3059: 92;
2. G. Jaap, 'Die Kolonialpolitik des deutschen Imperialismus zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts auf Samoa'. (Humboldt Univ., Berlin, Staatsexamenarbeit, 1967) p 26. I am indebted to Professor Helmut Stoecker of the Humboldt University for allowing me to see this work.
3. Solf to Reichskanzler 24 Dec 1899 RKA 2550: 191-198; Solf to AAKA 10 Feb 1901 RKA 3060:122f. Also BA/MA, 5121; Government Proclamations 25 Dec 1900 and 28 Dec 1900 RKA 2551:116-118, 120-121; Deutsches Kolonialblatt: Beilage 1902: Jahresbericht über die Entwicklung der deutschen Schutzgebiete im Jahre 1900/1901: Denkschrift über die Entwicklung der deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und in der Südsee. Berichtsjahr 1900/1901 p 101 (hereinafter cited as Annual Reports).

German rule. In August 1900 Solf promulgated an ordinance directing every Samoan 'landowner' (the matai) to plant fifty coconuts annually on unused land, in order to overcome the decline of production accompanying the civil unrest of previous decades. Samoan 'plantation inspectors' were appointed to supervise the process.¹ Samoans were also obligated to maintain the public roads in their localities with tools supplied by the government and were legally restricted in the customary rights of eviction which one party held over another in various districts.² A head tax was projected for the 1901 budget but because of the open Samoan mistrust of whites with regard to money matters there was some hesitation in 1900 about risking its introduction. In the event Solf was able to inaugurate a levy on 27 January 1901, but only after conceding to Mata'afa and the Faipule that it would be used solely for the upkeep of the native administration.³ Adult males were required to pay five Marks annually and the tax yielded over \$10000 (or 40000 Marks) the first year.⁴ For the next four years the amount collected was linked closely to the Samoan administrative system for the size of official salaries was dependent on the head tax revenue. Upwards of 300 appointments were made for the eleven districts under German control.⁵

It was not long before the political difficulties which Solf had predicted began to emerge. The mandatory distribution of fine mats by Mata'afa to districts which had supported him in his bid for power (Te Toga) revealed that the customary system of conflict and choice between districts was still capable of upsetting the general political equilibrium. The Te Toga was traditionally the arena in which the victorious party

1. Annual Reports 1900/01 p 102.
2. Annual Reports 1901/02 p 115; Deutsches Kolonialblatt 1 Nov 1902, p 516.
3. AAKA Denkschrift 25 May 1903 RKA 2767:51.
4. Schnee to AAKA 15 April 1901 RKA 2767:7.
5. Protocol of Solf's trip to all districts on Upolu and Savai'i, October 1901. RKA 2948:74ff; Samoanische Zeitung 30 May 1903.

reinforced its sense of supremacy over the vanquished, and Solf had deliberately delayed it as long as he dared until a measure of reconciliation had been achieved. The distribution finally took place in June 1901 but Solf was forced to intervene when the districts of Palauli and Satupaitea rejected their share as inadequate. Only threats and a display of anger from Solf were able to overcome the obstruction and sullen obstinacy which seemed likely to cause a serious rupture of relations.¹

More serious trouble threatened in 1901 and 1902 as the Tumua and Pule chiefs of the Faipule assembly began to realize the divergence between the form of political power conceded to them and the real intentions of the German administration. Lauaki was one of the first to read Solf's purpose and he began to warn the Mulinu'u assembly that the Germans intended to deprive the Samoans of all higher government offices, including the position of Ali'i Sili. He was also accused by Solf of directing the people of his district not to obey the 'papalagi' (governor).² Solf did not dare at this stage to move against Lauaki who was the most powerful figure on Savai'i. In fact the constant fear of passive, if not active Samoan resistance induced the administration to act with extreme delicacy in handling relations with the central government. When the Malo ordered a group of Samoan road workers to strike for better pay and food in June 1902, Acting Governor Schnee punished no one for fear of disaffecting the powerful chiefs and speakers.³ The Malo chiefs also attempted to use Solf's absence in 1902 to extract a salary for themselves from Schnee and thus strengthen their claim to the status of imperial officials. When

1. See separate accounts of fono during Solf's Savai'i trip July 1901, by Samoan official and British Vice Consul Trood RKA 3061:52ff and RKA 3062: 13-17; Samoanische Zeitung 22 June 1901 and 14 Aug 1901.
2. NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record', I:21-2: Protocol of conference between Mata'afa and Solf 27 Nov 1903; Davidson, Pacific Islands Portraits p 293.
3. S.G. Firth 'German Recruitment and Employment of Labourers in the Western Pacific before the First World War'. (Oxford D.Phil.thesis 1973) p 246.

Schnee refused, they threatened to dissolve the the high assembly and disperse to the districts, a prospect which left Schnee unmoved since he was aware that this was in any case Solf's ultimate objective.¹ It was not until 1903 that Solf risked his first major confrontation with the old Malo when he exiled two orator chiefs to Herbertshöhe, the one for preaching the hope of British annexation, the other for inciting his people to murder. His decision was generally accepted since it was clear that both cases were facets of a local dispute involving two districts only.²

Extraneous tensions began to influence relations between Solf and the chiefs as Solf found himself contending with pressures from the white community, which the Samoans were not averse to exploiting for their own ends. In the earliest days of the new colony Solf had already clashed with a German naval commander on questions of disarmament, security and general competence. A vehement defender of his own status and prerogatives, Solf resisted the concession of wide ranging authority to naval officers in the colonies. He suspected that the military authorities would welcome any opportunity to arrogate colonial power to themselves from the civil services.³ But a new threat arose from a different quarter in 1902 - the white settler community. In that year the white population of Samoa increased dramatically and a number of emigrants from Germany with very limited capital, several retired military officers among them, arrived to try their hand at plantation agriculture.⁴ They had been directly influenced by one Richard Deeken, a young artillery officer in the German reserve who visited Samoa briefly in 1901 and on this basis

1. BA, Solf Papers, 131:Schnee to Solf 28 April 1902.
2. Solf to AAKA 31 March 1903 RKA 3063:71; Annual Reports 1902/03 p 118.
3. BA, Solf Papers, 20:134:Solf to Deutscher Botschafter Washington 22 Feb 1900 .
4. The population went from 347 to 381 in 1902/03. Annual Reports 1902/03 p 119.

wrote an extravagant and superficial account of the opportunities awaiting the small settler with moderate capital.¹ The effect of his fertile imagination was reinforced by mounting propaganda in Germany in favour of occupying the colonies with small capital holdings. Deeken himself founded a plantation company, the Deutsche Samoa Gesellschaft (D.S.G.), to compete with the D.H.P.G. and in August 1902 he returned to Samoa as its director.

The new settlers were quickly disillusioned. They had been led to expect abundant land ideal for growing cocoa. The reality was much less hopeful. At Solf's invitation, an agricultural scientist, Dr. Wohltmann, came out to Samoa in 1902/03 to assess its proper agricultural potential. Wohltmann found that Samoan soil was already considerably worked out and that only four per cent of it was suitable for cocoa cultivation, of which half was being used by the Samoans for their own crops. A prospective settler would need at least 50000 Marks and must still cope with high land prices and labour costs.² In addition settlers had to meet the formidable competition of the D.H.P.G. which already possessed 200 acres of cocoa in 1900 besides its lucrative thousands of acres of mature coconut plants from the 1880's.³ The old firm's most telling advantage lay in its privileged access to cheap Melanesian labour from the Bismarck Archipelago. On top of all this, the first settlers had to endure a drought in 1902 and try to acquire leasehold land from the Samoans who were withholding leases in the hope of inflated prices. It is little wonder that Wohltmann in 1903 found twenty-five of forty-six small planters urgently in need of government aid.⁴

They received scant sympathy from the Governor who had done

1. R. Deeken, Manuia Samoa. Samoanische skizzen und Beobachtungen (Oldenburg 1901).
2. Samoanische Zeitung 16 May 1903, 5 Sept 1903, 12 Sept 1903, 3 Oct 1903.
3. K. Cumberland in J.W.Fox and K. Cumberland (eds.), Western Samoa (Christchurch 1962) pp 243-4; Firth 'German Recruitment' p 241.
4. G.R. Lewthwaite in Fox, Western Samoa p 151.

his best to correct the fanciful impressions of a colonial planting life in Samoa. As their early expectations were disappointed and their capital depleted, the small settlers became increasingly chauvinistic and militant and turned on the government. Deeken, who was also discovering that the land and labour monopoly of the D.H.P.G. was virtually impregnable, gathered the dissidents around him in a Planters' Society (Pflanzerverein) which was founded in January 1903. Deeken used his position as president to launch a campaign against Solf's administration for being too soft with the Samoans and insufficiently attentive to the demands of colonial development. He was also able to mobilize considerable influence in Germany through close contacts in the catholic Centre Party (Zentrumspartei) and a press attack was orchestrated against Solf alleging that he had done nothing for the small planters since the flag-raising, that he was pandering to the political whims of the Samoans and to the desires of the D.H.P.G., and that the administration was extravagant in its expenditure and excessively bureaucratic. Furthermore Solf was accused of planning the deportation of twelve colonists with their families from Samoa. Deeken urged that his regime be replaced by a military one which would implement a more energetic programme of development.¹

It did not take long for the unrest in the white community to percolate through to the Samoans. Deeken had inspired a resolution in the Pflanzerverein compelling the Samoans to work for Europeans at least eight months of the year. The chiefs of the old Malo petitioned Solf in June 1903 to save them from its implications since it was Samoan custom 'that no one on these islands should perform servile labour'.² It aroused in Solf fears of an increase in inter-communal tensions and he

1. Kölnische Zeitung, 7 May 1903; Der Tag, 20 April 1904; Samoa'sche Zeitung, 27 June 1903, 14 Nov 1903; O. Riedel, Der Kampf um Deutsch Samoa (Berlin 1938) p 190; Firth 'German Recruitment' p 252.

2. Taimua and Faipule to Solf 25 June 1903 RKA 3063:81-2; BA, Solf Papers, 24: Solf to AAKA 9-12 July 1903.

predicted that 1904 would bring further discontent in view of the projected poor copra harvest and sinking world prices. This would be grist to Deeken's mill.¹

By now Solf was bitterly antagonistic towards Deeken and his clique of small planters. His liberal cosmopolitan paternalism conflicted violently with the pan German entrepreneurial philosophy of colonial exploitation which moved Deeken. The latter conceived colonies simply as economic appendages to the fatherland, whose resources and manpower should be utilized in favour of industrious settlers. Solf, on the other hand, while he did not despise the economic ethic, hated its apotheosis. He regarded colonial development as a balanced process of evolving prosperity along with the preservation and encouragement of the indigenous races. Solf refused to treat the Samoans as an exploitable commodity. Not only were their cultural achievements worthy of respect, but a reading of Samoan history persuaded him that the Islanders could not be bullied into subjection. Increasingly, Solf was convinced that through a non-militant policy of maintaining close contact with the Samoans at the local level and manipulating opposing interests, he could guide the Samoans in the direction he desired. Foolishness, irresolution or excess would only lead to passive resistance and general anti-white hostility.²

Deeken was a direct threat to the patriarchal authority which Solf was assiduously building up with the Samoans, as well as to Solf's image in Berlin. In late 1903 Solf, warning the Colonial Department of the dangers which an opposition of 'catholics, pan Germans, the disillusioned and the dissatisfied' presented in a young colony, pleaded with the Department to put pressure on the Deutsche Samoa Gesellschaft to have

1. BA, Solf Papers, 24:Solf to AAKA 20 Aug 1903.
2. See Solf's so-called 'Decennial Programme' for the future development of Samoa, despatched to the Colonial Department in sections.1906/07, BA, Solf Papers, 27:65-90; RKA 2953:103-120; Also BA, 28:Solf to Passarge 29 Oct 1906.

Deeken removed. Solf even declared himself prepared to resort to deportation if the occasion warranted. In the face of Deeken's influence in Reichstag quarters, Berlin remained extremely cautious about this solution.¹

Solf continued to work for Deeken's removal. His chance came early in 1904 when Deeken was involved in suspicions of fraud concerning the D.S.G.'s first shipment of Chinese coolies to arrive in Samoa as plantation labour; Solf revoked the company's recruiting permission.² Shortly afterwards, when some of Deeken's coolies complained to Solf of maltreatment, Deeken insinuated that the Governor had been inciting his workers against him. Solf immediately brought a libel action and in addition charged Deeken with brutality to his coolies. There followed a series of legal manoeuvres, smear attacks, calumnies and intimidations as Deeken attempted to wriggle out of the process, but he was finally brought to trial and in June 1904 convicted on two counts of assault and one of slander. He was sentenced to two months imprisonment.³

It was during this period that contacts between the settler opposition and certain sections of the Samoan community came to light. In June the British and American consuls reported rumours that the Samoans were demanding from Solf that Mata'afa should countersign all ordinances and that the Malo be paid a monthly salary as well as being furnished with quarterly balance sheets showing the details of government revenue and expenditure. Their experience convinced them that such demands could only be inspired by whites and they feared the outbreak of 'unrest', for the Samoans were in 'a dubious frame of mind'.⁴ The local newspaper even printed the rumour that the islanders had refused to pay the head

1. Ibid. 24: Solf to AAKA 9-12 July 1903 and 20 Aug 1903; Vietsch, Wilhelm Solf, p 72.
2. Firth 'German Recruitment' p 253.
3. AAKA to Kaiser 21 July 1905 RKA 2951:236-9; Solf to Rose 2-3 July 1904 RKA 2950:188; Samoanische Zeitung 7 May 1904, 18 June 1904.
4. BA, Solf Papers, 25: Trood to Solf 8 June 1904 and Heimrod to Solf 8 June 1904, enclosed in Solf to AAKA 11 June 1904.

tax.¹ Solf tried to calm them. He admitted the existence of a letter from the Faipule in Mulinu'u making imperious demands and he agreed that it was inspired by whites, more specifically by Deeken who wished to discomfort the government.² Deeken was probably closer to the point when he suggested to Solf that the Samoans 'follow proceedings among the whites with the closest attention and use them for their own purposes'.³ Solf had failed to consider the possibility that as the local native bureaucracy consolidated its own influence, the central government in Mulinu'u might seek to exploit the dissatisfaction in an effort to offset its increasing loss of influence with the mass of Samoans. The petition was an attempt to reassert its position and it is possible that the Mulinu'u chiefs encouraged the rumours of unrest in order to wring concessions from the administration. Solf would not be bluffed. He told the British consul that only a few of the Faipule - Lauaki at their head - would dare to go so far; Mata'afa and the majority had no heart for the matter.⁴ Solf demanded an apology from the body or they would be dismissed. He got his apology.⁵ He was also able to dissuade the foreign consuls from reporting trouble to their governments as it was obvious that the general populace had remained completely unaffected by the Malo's conduct. The visiting German naval representative endorsed Solf's new view in September 1904: 'I gained the impression anew', he wrote,

that loyalty, confidence in the government and attachment to the present representatives of the government are deeply

1. Samoanische Zeitung, 18 June 1904.
2. BA, Solf Papers, 25:Solf to AAKA 11 June 1904; Also RKA 2950:125ff; Fono of Malo to Solf 18 May 1904 RKA 2950:154-7.
3. Deeken to Solf 31 May 1904 in Solf to AAKA 11 June 1904 RKA 2950:133.
4. Solf to AAKA 11 June 1904.
5. Tumua and Pule to Solf 8th June 1904 RKA 2950:158; Samoanische Zeitung 18 June 1904.

rooted in the hearts of the Samoans; that they are contented with their lot and that they will not hear of rebellion and disturbance unless they are misguided and led on.'

The Deeken saga was far from finished with his conviction for he was released immediately on appeal and the old intrigues began once again. Supported by the older planters and by Mata'afa who realized that the interests of the Samoans and those of the white opposition were essentially incompatible, Solf pressed the Home Government to make Deeken serve his sentence in Germany.² When the Deutsche Samoa Gesellschaft and Deeken's uncle in the Reichstag sought a full pardon for him, the Kaiser intervened personally and refused to grant it. Instead his sentence was commuted to two months confinement in the fortress at Koblenz-Ehrenbreitstein.³ Deeken managed to alienate most of the fortress personnel during his stay there in 1905 and in June 1907 he was back in Samoa where he again took up the reins of the campaign to discredit the 'Solf system'.

b) Samoa Response to German Rule, 1904: the Oloa movement

In the last months of 1904, it rapidly became evident that reports of general Samoan passivity and contentment were premature. The activities of the settler opposition clique had significantly altered the equilibrium of relations between the two racial communities. New rumours were already circulating in September that Solf was in disgrace and was about to be recalled while Deeken was being regarded by the Samoans as a powerful figure because he continued to go free in spite of his calumnies.⁴

On top of this came the deterioration of the islanders'

1. NZNA, Braisby. 'A Documentary Record' I:33: Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Condor 23 Sept 1904.
2. Mata'afa to Solf 7 May 1904 RKA 3131:118; Solf to AAKA 6 Nov 1904 RKA 2951:187-8
3. DSG to Kaiser 9 Dec 1904 RKA 2951:211-214; Copy of Wilhelm II's cabinet order 27 July 1905 RKA 2952:48.
4. BA/MA, 630 and NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' I:29f: Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Condor 23 Sept 1904.

economic prospects which Solf had predicted in 1903. Copra produced by the Samoans was the backbone of the export trade in Samoa and through it the Samoans were able to satisfy their growing demands for European consumer goods, as well as pay the administration's head tax. They produced well over half of the 7614 tons of copra exported from the colony in 1903/04, but a slump in the world market price of copra in those years reduced their copra income from eight or nine Pfennigs a pound to five Pfennigs.¹ When the Mulinu'u chiefs, through Lauaki, made an application to Solf that the price of copra in Samoa be stabilized at nine Pfennigs a pound, it was rejected.²

This only inflamed discontent, particularly among the Tumua and Pule chiefs in Mulinu'u, who regarded the diminution of their power with growing bitterness. Thus when a young half-caste on Savai'i, Pullack, began mooting the idea of a general copra producing and marketing company run by Samoans themselves, with its own shipping facilities and guaranteeing a high, stable price for copra, they seized on the idea.³ Not only would it solve the present copra crisis and help to update the industry but it was also an opportunity to acquire the economic power which, from their observations of European commercial enterprise and colonial practice, they conceived as the sine qua non of political power. The Malo immediately began spreading propaganda in favour of the idea and ordered that every male Samoan was to contribute between four and eight Marks (Lafoga Oloa) to provide the capital with which to start the project, which became known as the Cumpani or Oloa. To mobilize the widest possible amount of sentiment, the plan for the Cumpani was flown under the flag of patriotism

1. Annual Reports 1902/03, p 122; 1903/04, p 113.
2. Schultz to AAKA 18 Feb 1905 RKA 3063: 131-143; Davidson, Pacific Islands Portraits, p 294.
3. Pullack was the son of a former German Customs Officer and had received an elementary European education in San Francisco. It seems he claimed to be able to offer 16 Pf. a pound for copra. NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' I: 37,41; see also BA, Solf Papers, 30: Statement by Lauaki to Richard Williams 27 Feb 1909.

(lotonuu) and it was put abroad that the cooperative would emancipate the Samoans from their 'slavery' to the white copra traders. Since manifold abuses and deceptions were practiced on the Samoans by European traders this approach was calculated to bring results.¹

The government became fully aware of the significance of the scheme about December as there was a drastic drop in copra cutting by the local populace.² For several reasons Solf determined to put a stop to the Oloa: In common with most other Europeans in the colony he was convinced that the Samoans did not possess the commercial knowledge and managerial expertise to make the scheme viable; moreover, it was a challenge to the raison d'être of colonization - the white trader and the European monopoly of commerce - to which Solf at heart was committed. But Solf also recognized that it was a bid by the corporation of chiefs and speakers to make a resolute stand against his projected native policy.³ By institutionalizing its power in the cooperative, the central government might have succeeded in regaining its former influence over the activities of the Samoan districts while the Lafoga really amounted to a form of direct taxation which would give it a lever over against the German administration. The propaganda in terms of lotonu'u was designed to achieve a united front of Samoans which was essential if the Cumpani was to have any impact at all.

Solf reacted quickly and in early December he journeyed round the districts with his officials trying to persuade the people that the plan was utopian. Pullack, who was suspected of preparing a major swindle, was deported. However, the Malo remained defiant and the district fonos revealed that the idea of a cooperative made a broad appeal to the mass

1. Schultz to AAKA 18 Feb 1905 RKA 3063. Solf reports how European merchants asked exorbitant prices for trade goods and used false weights in measuring copra, BA, Solf Papers, 25:Solf to von Koenig 30 April 1904; Firth 'German Recruitment' mentions that Samoans were often deceived by 30 to 50 lbs. in every 100 lbs. of copra they traded. p 245.
2. Samoanische Zeitung 3 Dec 1904.
3. BA, Solf Papers, 26:Solf to AAKA 4 Aug. 1905

of Samoans including Mata'afa, so Solf did not dare to risk a frontal assault.¹ He did strictly prohibit the paying of any Lafaga and attempted to break the united front of the Mulinu'u chiefs by forbidding all native officials of the administration to participate in any way, under the threat of dismissal. Lauaki was even pressured into a promise to 'assist the government in keeping peace and tranquility' by using his influence as recognized leader of the Pule to turn the movement into more amenable channels.² By the end of December 1904, these dividing tactics had succeeded in detaching many officials and their localities and slowing the flow of funds to the movement. Solf, confident that the affair would soon become a laughing stock as the inherent district factionalism asserted itself, embarked on a voyage to New Zealand.

His departure was the signal for the revival of the movement. Rumours began circulating that Solf was involved in a conspiracy with the white traders against Samoan copra growers, that he was in disgrace and had been recalled by the Kaiser.³ The pent-up frustration of the Mulinu'u chiefs at Solf's obstructionist tactics finally came into the open. Perhaps inspired by a recent petition of the Tutuila natives against the American administration, the chiefs addressed a petition to the Kaiser complaining that Solf was discriminating against a legal Samoan venture and reiterating their demands for recognition as the official organ of native government.⁴ A new campaign to solicit funds for the Cumpani was led by Lauaki's brother Namulau'ulu who claimed that the Governor and his

1. NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' I:42,50: Solf to Malo 12 Dec 1904, Mata'afa to Fa'amasino Tuala etc. 14 Dec. 1904; Schultz to AAKA 18 Feb 1905 RKA 3063; Samoanische Zeitung 10 Dec. 1904.
2. NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' I:49,46: Solf to Lauaki 25 Dec 1904 Solf Proclamation 14 Dec 1904.
3. Ibid, I:53 Memo by Schütz 19-20 Jan 1905; Schultz to AAKA 18 Feb 1905 RKA 3063.
4. Petition to Mata'afa and Malo 9 Jan 1905 RKA 3063:168-174; Samoanische Zeitung 14 Jan 1905.

deputy were in favour of the scheme. At a large fono in Fa'asaleleaga on 5 January 1905, one of Solf's appointed village mayors, Malaeulu, went so far as to threaten that if Solf did not consent to the Oloa, the Samoans 'must scrape his body with pipi shells', and the decision was taken to restart the Cumpani.¹

The situation looked desperate to Erich Schultz, the Imperial magistrate and Lands Commissioner who was Solf's deputy in his absence. Aware that he could not risk forceful suppression of the movement because of the danger of Samoan resistance, he was equally afraid that unless he made an example of the ringleaders, the authority of the German administration would be effectively subverted by the Malo. Schultz decided to arrest Malaeulu and Namulau'ulu and on 26 January they were put in Vaimea prison on charges of disturbing the peace, spreading false reports and insulting the Governor, charges which were, Schultz was cautious to emphasize, fa'a Samoa liable to punishment.²

The Faipule in Mulinu'u presumed that the two chiefs had been imprisoned for being members of the Oloa and Schultz's action was construed as an unfair belittlement of the Pule, to which both chiefs belonged. Mata'afa sent a letter requesting the release of the two men since they were only doing the will of the Malo. He protested that it was unjust to imprison Samoans for such offences: 'When a white man has been sentenced for any violation of the law, his sentence is different; the white man remains at liberty and his sentence is not executed'³ - an obvious reference to Deeken's case. Before Schultz could reply, several chiefs broke into Vaimea prison on 31 January and freed the prisoners, as a gesture of the independence of

1. Schultz to AAKA 18 Feb 1905 RKA 3063; BA, Solf Papers, 132: Schultz to Solf 2 Feb 1905; NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' I: 58-9: Memo by Schultz 31 Jan 1905. In Samoan terms, Malaeulu's utterance represented a mild insult to the Governor.
2. Schultz to AAKA 18 Feb 1905 RKA 3063; NZNA, 'A Documentary Record' I: 55: Memo by Schultz 19-20 Jan 1905.
3. Mata'afa and Malo to Schultz 28 Jan 1905, enclosed in Schultz to AAKA 18 Feb 1905 RKA 3063: 147.

of the Samoan government and an attempt to reinforce a sense of solidarity.¹

In actual fact the unity of the Oloa movement had been dissolving under internal stresses. The non-Mata'afan members among the Faipule suspected that the adherents of Mata'afa were seeking to establish the superiority of their party through the Cumpani and they made it clear that any attempt to raise taxes for it by force would be met with resistance. The Vaimea incident only had the effect of increasing the tensions between the two rival parties and Schultz began to receive declarations of support from the non-Mata'afans.² Mata'afa and the majority of the chiefs immediately regretted their action and in a meeting with Schultz the day after, agreed to return Malaeulu and Namulau'ulu to prison, which they promptly did. With the solidarity of the whole movement breaking down around them and the rumour of Solf's recall proving untrue, they feared for the consequences of their actions on Solf's return and hoped to appease him by their repentance. Pleading that 'all is due to ignorance on our part', they pressed Schultz for a full pardon for the two chiefs.³ However Schultz was fully aware of Solf's hopes to seize an opportunity to remove the Mulinu'u government, so, not wishing to weaken the Governor's position, he freed only Namulau'ulu and left the Oloa to its own devices. Schultz was still not completely optimistic about the future. Though he discounted the possibility of a Samoan revolt against the whites, the danger of an outbreak of the old indigenous party rivalries remained. Worst of all, Schultz considered the entire episode as clear evidence that Solf's carefully cultivated authority with the native community had been 'shaken to its roots'.⁴

By the time Solf returned in mid March, the Cumpani had

1. To 'break into' Vaimea was no great feat since the prison consisted simply of a compound of fencing wire with a simple lock at the entrance.
2. Schultz to AAKA 18 Feb 1905 RKA 3063.
3. NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' I:73-4: and Tamasese to Solf 21 Feb 1905.
4. BA, Solf Papers, 132: Schultz to Solf 2 Feb 1905

virtually shipwrecked itself and the 'patriotism' of the movement was a dead issue. Solf set about trying to restore his own authority and break permanently the influence of the chiefs and speakers in Mulinu'u. He was assisted by the eagerness of Mata'afa and the chiefs to salvage some of their prestige. Solf ostentatiously disdained the festive welcome which the Malo had prepared for him and likewise rejected the ceremonial act of self-humiliation (Ifoga) which they performed before him in April.

Accompanied by the captain and officers of SMS Condor, Solf then made a speech in Lufilufi, the foremost political centre in Samoa, in which he ridiculed the actions of the chiefs in fables transparent to every Samoan. He confronted Mata'afa with his 'deceit' in encouraging the events connected with Vaimea and styled the guilty chiefs as 'treacherous rebels' fit only for deportation. It was a shrewd strategy of intimidation which was most efficacious in the cultural circumstances of Samoa. Ridicule and loss of face, particularly before the public in a hallowed place like Lufilufi, were dreaded sanctions among Samoan elites, so that in June, when Solf issued an order that Mulinu'u be vacated, the chiefs complied; they had expected much worse.¹ Solf followed up with an assembly on 14 August in which he explained the necessity to dissolve the central government of chiefs and speakers because 'they had proceeded against the decrees of the regime whose allies they were',² and imposed a series of punishments for individuals' misdemeanours: Moefaauo and Lauaki, as chief representatives of the Tumua and Pule were to be deported, though Lauaki was later placed on probation along with other ringleaders. Those responsible for the Vaimea incident were dismissed from their government posts and fined 1000 Marks; Malaeulu lost his position as village mayor while Namulau'ulu was

1. BA, Solf Papers, 26: Solf to AAKA 4 Aug 1905 plus enclosures; Samoanische Zeitung 19 Aug 1905, 13 Jan 1906.

2. BA/MA. 5186, Vol 11: Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Condor 23 Oct 1905.

reimprisoned for two months. These individual penalties were accompanied by a general purge of the Samoan judiciary and certain native commissions.¹

Solf also took the opportunity to inaugurate a new-style Samoan government which would be entirely in the hands of the administration. A new salaried council of the lower house (Faipule) was instituted, consisting of twenty-seven deputies who were to reside in their districts and assemble at Mulinu'u only twice a year, while several new official posts at the local level served as the regime's eyes and ears. Solf was careful to appoint members of both major parties and establish a parity between Protestant and Catholic officials. By limiting the numbers of orator chiefs in the new council to a maximum of seven, Solf was able to restrict their influence at the 'national' level; furthermore, by 'promoting' former district chiefs to deputies and making appointments to localities which did not traditionally hold power, he reduced the political importance of the districts as such and created a nucleus of collaborators dependent on him for their positions.² Solf's one error of judgment in terms of his control policy was to allow Lauaki to remain in Samoa on the representations of Schultz and his district administrator in Savai'i, both of whom Lauaki was able to convince that he did not deserve deportation. Lauaki had figured prominently in the renewed Cumpani movement after Solf's departure and in the petition to the Kaiser. Some confusion exists regarding his role in the Vaimea incident but since Namulau'ulu was his brother, it is likely that Lauaki supported, if he did not directly encourage, the freeing of

1. BA, Solf Papers, 26: Copy of Solf's speech to assembly; Samoanische Zeitung 19 Aug 1905
2. Jaap, 'Die Kolonialpolitik Samoa' pp 48-51; Davidson, Pacific Islands Portraits p 295.

the prisoners.¹ Lauaki had consistently championed the conservative cause against Solf and had demonstrated more than once a basic dislike for the papalagi. But when retribution appeared in February-March 1905, in the form of the supposedly disgraced Solf, Lauaki deftly retraced his steps and began working against the continuation of the cooperative idea, successfully weaning a whole district away from it.² His about-face only increased the confusion in the Samoan camp and contributed to the rapid disintegration of Oloa solidarity which had set in before Solf even returned. In almost prophetic words, Lauaki's colleague Moefaauo, on the eve of his deportation, warned Solf to get rid of Lauaki while he could, vehemently claiming:

'He is the root of all evil in Samoa. He has a sweet tongue and (is) a slippery man at that - the papalagis don't understand him as well as the Samoans do'.³

Yet Lauaki's apparent repentance was so convincing that in 1907 Solf reinstated him in the new Mulinu'u council.

Though Mata'afa was highly implicated in the train of events, Solf refused to sacrifice him to the reaction from the white community which followed the affair. Solf blamed Deeken for leading Mata'afa astray and the settler clique was also accused of being behind the original rumour of Solf's disgrace, as well as the Malo's petition to the Kaiser and the subsequent Vaimea incident.⁴ Nothing could be proved against Deeken but there was ample evidence of contacts between his group and the leading chiefs in

1. Schultz claimed that Lauaki had argued in favour of negotiating with him about the release of the two chiefs rather than the use of force, yet the 'reliable' chief Laufa of Safotu testified that Lauaki had been one of the main instigators of the break-in. NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' I: 60-1, 63-4; Schultz Memos 31 Jan 1905 and 15 Feb 1905; See also BA, Solf Papers, 30; Lauaki statement to Williams 27 Feb 1909, and Davidson, Pacific Islands Portraits p 295.
2. Schultz to AAKA 11 March 1905 RKA 3063:152-4.
3. Moefaauo's statement 29 July 1905 enclosed in Solf to AAKA 4 Aug 1905 RKA 3064:63.
4. Schultz to AAKA 18 Feb 1905 RKA 3063:141; NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' I:62: Memo by Schultz 5 Feb 1905.

Mulinu'u. Schultz was not prepared to admit direct contacts between Lauaki and Deeken but he was convinced that Lauaki was clever enough to use the latter for the Samoans' own purposes, which tended to be corroborated by the fact that Deeken was regarded by the majority of the Malo as prospective manager of the Cumpani in succession to Pullack.¹

Deeken's group of disaffected small planters led the white reaction to the Vaimea incident. In a petition to the Chancellor, purporting to represent the majority of business opinion in Apia, the opposition presented the affair as evidence of the complete shipwreck of Solf's control policy. The European population was now 'completely at the mercy of the Samoans' and it was essential to act with the mailed fist - to send naval cruisers, to deport chiefs and to establish a garrison of colonial troops.² The petition received short shrift from the Colonial Department which had no intention of increasing administrative, let alone military involvement in the Pacific in the face of the demands made by the recent Herero rebellion in South West Africa. Solf's success, not only in maintaining peace and security, but also in breaking the power of the corporation of chiefs and speakers in Mulinu'u without the use of force of any kind, was the strongest possible vindication of his policy.³ By the end of August 1905, Solf seemed once more to be master of the situation; at least the Samoanische Zeitung declared jubilantly that there were then better grounds 'for anticipating a lasting peace for Samoa than have previously existed within the memory of living men'.⁴

1. BA, Solf Papers 132: Schultz to Solf 2 Feb 1905; NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' I:63: Memo by Schultz 15 Feb 1905; Schultz to AAKA 11 March 1905 RKA 3063:153
2. Printed in Deutsche Zeitung 28 March 1905; See also Samoanische Zeitung 4 March 1905 and 11 March 1905.
3. AAKA to Solf 10 May 1905 RKA 3068:188; AAKA to Solf 3 June 1905 RKA 3063:205; draft article for National Zeitung by Fr. Rose of AAKA: RKA 2951:258-265
4. 26 Aug 1905.

c) Samoa Response to the Solf System, 1905-1914: O le mau Lauaki.

The three years 1905 to 1908 were a period of relatively peaceful development. Trade and agriculture took an upward turn and in 1906 Samoa achieved a favourable balance of trade for the first time. From 1908 onwards, the administration was able to prepare its annual budgets without relying on a Reich subsidy. For their part the Samoans were enjoying an increase in purchasing power as copra prices began to rise once more in 1905. With the regulation of Samoan copra production through the ordinance of 1900 and the administration's struggle to improve its quality through legislation and closer supervision, the Samoan community was able to maintain its high degree of participation in the export economy: between 1905 and 1908 it produced on average two thirds of all the copra exported from Samoa. Moreover, encouraged by the example of several new plantation companies in these years, Samoans had planted 1362 ha. of the new cash crop, cocoa, by 1906.¹ They also continued to meet the fiscal demands made on them by the head tax (1908: 105,000 Marks), but were showing a greater interest in the way the taxes were being employed.²

In the wake of the political changes of 1905, the Samoans were now being governed by an unrestrained patriarchal regime founded squarely on Solf's authority and his conviction that 'a tactful Governor can rule the natives without laws'.³ Solf was determined that his rule should provide a preferable alternative to the 'para-administrative' organization which the various mission societies had come to represent to the Samoans by their longer history of contact. Solf had maintained consistently good relations

1. Annual Reports 1904/05 - 1907/08; See also G.R. Lewthwaite in Fox, Western Samoa pp 150-154.
2. Schultz to Reichskolonialamt (RKA) 9 Oct 1908 RKA 2768:16; also Schultz to RKA 17 Aug 1911 RKA 2768:157-162.
3. BA, Solf Papers, 27: Draft of Solf Memorandum, 'Die Entwicklung des Schutzgebeits. Programm' ca.1906.

with the missions since 1900 and was careful to avoid any confrontation between church and state because of the indisputable respect with which mission activities were regarded by the Samoan community. There had been a number of controversies - with the London Missionary Society over the extent of their annual district collections (Me) and their puritan regulation of Sunday activity, and over the Marists' privileged influence with Mata'afa - but they had been only in the nature of temporary unpleasantnesses. Solf was realistic enough to concede that the Samoans could not be expected automatically to transfer their primary allegiance from the one form of western discipline which they had known for fifty years to a still largely unfamiliar regime. He was prepared to work patiently to awaken the peoples' trust in the German government.¹ By 1905, indeed by 1900, the conversion of the Samoan islands was complete and the missions were now concentrating on trying to meet the demands which the Samoans made on their educational facilities. In 1906 the London Missionary Society could count 24808 Samoan adherents, or two-thirds of the population; 6022 Samoans were Catholics while the remainder were spread among a number of small Christian societies and sects. There was an elementary school in every one of the London Missionary Society's villages, as well as a series of district high schools and the Malua seminary. In all, 299 schools of various denominations existed in Samoa in 1906, with 470 teachers and nearly 10000 pupils. In the following year the government began its own public school.²

It was the Samoans' avidity for education, as well as their economic activity, which moved Solf to respond to their appeals for a permanent prohibition on the further sale or leasing of Samoan land to whites.

1. Solf to AAKA 19 Oct 1901 RKA 2601:60-2; Solf to RKA 1 Nov 1907 RKA 2953:72ff; see also LMS, South Seas Boxes 47/1 and 48/1: Hills to Thompson 24 July 1901 and Sibree to Thompson 7 March 1903.
2. Solf's report on Schulwesen in Samoa, in Solf to RKA 15 Sept 1907 RKA 2953:36-56; Annual Reports 1905/06. Anlage G IV p 377.

The Berlin Conference of 1889 had established the principle of prohibiting the sale of Samoan land to foreigners and of restricting leaseholds, but with the advent of new plantation companies after 1900 there had been widespread pressure on the German government to re-introduce sales of land or at least to allow long-term leases. However Samoans with insight had long been arguing that the Europeans overestimated the area of cultivable land in the group and their arguments were supported by Wohltmann's analysis in 1902/03. Wohltmann claimed that only half of Upolu's area and one fifth of Savai'i's was suitable for cultivation and he advised that at least 50000 ha. must be reserved to the Samoans for their own needs. The whites had already alienated more land than was safe in the circumstances (61000 ha.).¹ The question was discussed at length between Solf and the Faipule in the August 1907 meeting of the council in Mulinu'u with the result that on 30 November 1907, an ordinance was promulgated providing that in future land could be transferred by sale or lease only in the 'plantation district' in the immediate vicinity of Apia; outside these limits land could be leased by foreigners only through the government and on the condition that Samoan cultivable lands were not diminished to less than 1.29 ha.(3 acres) per capita.² Since the D.H.P.G. possessed the only considerable land holdings in the hands of Europeans, the new regulations patently favoured it over smaller firms and Solf once more drew bitter criticism from small planters for his apparent discrimination.

The settler opposition to Solf was reinforced during these years by the return of Richard Deeken to Samoa in early 1907. Deeken arrived this time with instructions from his company to keep out of Solf's way but it was not long before the two men clashed openly over an attempt by Deeken

1. Solf to RKA 1 Nov 1907 RKA 2953:104-109; Samoanische Zeitung 3 Oct 1903; Riedel, Der Kampf um Deutsch Samoa, p 210.
2. Samoanische Zeitung 7 Sept 1907, 30 Nov 1907; Lewthwaite in Fox, Western Samoa, p 149.

to deceive several supporters of the Governor into thinking Solf wanted him on the Governors Advisory Council.¹ Solf's critics in the colony and abroad did not waver in their opposition to his policies. What really affronted them was Solf's independence and reliance on his own authority with the Samoan community rather than 'positive' force. He had to endure sometimes powerful condemnation of his entire philosophy and attitude to the colonial relationship as insufficiently imperialist and deutsch-national. He was urged to implement a more direct mobilization of Samoan man-power in order to ease the critical shortage of plantation labour and to use forceful repression if the islanders resisted. But Solf adamantly refused; 'I will not be the gravedigger of the colony which I have helped to baptize', he retorted.² Both he and Schultz were men sensitive to the ethics and history of the Samoans and they were determined to maintain the balance of interests between opposing indigenous groups in the colony as the only guarantee of prolonged stability.³ Solf does seem to have been hypersensitive to criticism of his methods and occasionally reacted petulantly and self-righteously to the snipings of the planters' clique. In October 1907 he even went so far as to offer his resignation because of the incident with Deeken over the Advisory Council but he relented after old and established members of the European community pleaded with him to reconsider.⁴ Notwithstanding the difficulties with which Solf had to contend in the pursuit of his control policy, reports from visiting naval vessels suggested that the islanders themselves were quite content with the system while the Colonial Office was prepared to report to the Reichstag that Solf's authority was not shaken by any means.⁵

1. Goldstücker to Deeken 25 May 1907 RKA 3131:141; Friedlander to D.S.G. 30 Jan 1908 RKA 3131:137ff; NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' II: 230-2; Solf to RKA 4 June 1909.
2. Quoted in Riedel, Der Kampf um Deutsch Samoa p 222.
3. See correspondence between Solf and Prof. Passarge in Berlin in late 1906 for a good example of the sorts of criticism of the 'Solf system', BA, Solf Papers, 28.
4. Ibid: Parkhouse to Solf 28 Oct 1907.
5. BA/MA, 5121 and 5186, Vol 11: Militärpolitische Berichte SMS Condor 31 Dec 1906 and 24 Sept 1907; BA, Solf Papers, 27: Draft of AAKA submission to Reichstag 1906-07, 7 May 1905

Towards the end of 1908, the focus of attention swung back dramatically to indigenous politics. Mata'afa, at seventy-six years of age, was becoming increasingly senile and a series of illnesses in 1908 raised in the minds of Samoans the question of succession to the paramount chieftaincy. There were four candidates for the position, Malietoa Tanu, Tamasese, Fa'alata and Tuimalealiifano - two from each of the royal lineages - and efforts were being made by the influential chiefs to have Mata'afa prepare a political testament in which he would designate his successor.

Alongside this purely Samoan movement sprang up another in opposition to Solf's administration, with Lauaki as its leader. Lauaki had been a consistent defender of the traditional prerogatives and powers of the chiefs and speakers institutionalized in the Tumua and Pule corporation. In particular he resented Solf's suppression of the Tumua and Pule's powers and what he regarded as the devious way in which Solf had undermined the Oloa movement and dispersed from the sacred seat of government the chiefs who had been given a clear mandate in 1899. In addition, Lauaki was, at heart, committed to the service of the Sa Malietoa lineage through the traditional affiliations of Safotulafai district, whose leading orator he was. His support for Mata'afa in 1898-99 had been in the nature of an expedient, to bring peace and unity to the islands. It did not, in Samoan eyes, impose the obligation of unqualified loyalty and Lauaki looked to the day when a Malietoan should succeed to the apex of Samoan politics and Lauaki would take his place beside him.¹ Mata'afa's present condition and the fact that Solf went on leave in mid-1908 provided him with the opportunity to fight for the revival of the Tumua and Pule as a corporation as well as ensure the success of his candidate Malietoa Tanu, in a newly constructed central government.

1. NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' III:360-1: Lauaki to Coerper 26 March 1909; Davidson, Pacific Islands Portraits, pp 267-296.



No. 10. Lauati Namulaulu, der Sprecherhäuptling von Safotulafai.

Lauaki began making propoganda for the Tumua and Pule in August 1908, after the close of the fono of Faipule in Mulinu'u. As with the Oloa, he realized that he must create a united front among Samoans if he was to have a lever against Solf. His plan was to organize a mass demonstration of thousands of Samoans to greet Solf on his return in November, and after the welcoming ceremonies, to present Solf with a list of petitions urging that the old upper house, the Taimua, be reinstated as salaried advisors to the Samoan government which should be henceforth permanently resident in Mulinu'u; that the four contending 'princes' be appointed as salaried officials at Mulinu'u; that the Samoans be furnished with records of administrative revenue and expenditure and that the head tax be eased.¹ The first two demands concerning the Taimua and Faipule were designed to achieve the restoration of the traditional political structure at the 'national' level which Solf had toiled so hard to dismantle, while the third would safeguard the principle of continuity to the paramountcy by the presence of the royal candidates in Mulinu'u. By ostensibly supporting everybody's candidate for the succession, Lauaki was able to recruit support throughout Upolu districts as well as in Savai'i. His real objective was to prevent Mata'afa from declaring unilaterally who his successor should be until Lauaki had secured Tanu's prospects; then the question of the reinstitutionalization of the Tumua and Pule's role would be introduced. The aging Mata'afa himself was brought on side by demands for suitable external honours for his position. The remaining demands reflected the prevailing Samoan suspicion of money matters where Europeans were concerned. In particular, the easing of the head tax was included to appeal to the politically indifferent masses with the argument that the

1. BA, Solf Papers, 30: Solf to RKA 10 May 1909 and Anlagen zum Lauaki Bericht; Saga to Solf 3 March 1909; Schultz to RKA 4 May 1909 RKA 3069: 112. Solf's very extensive report of 10 May and his draft of an article 'Der Aufstand auf Samoa' n.d. (BA,30) are important sources for the sequence of events which follow.

tax made Samoans into slaves of the whites who wanted to force the youth to perform 'coolie labour' on the plantations.¹ The parallels with the Cloa movement are obvious. There is no indication that, at this stage, Lauaki intended open rebellion against the Germans; indeed he consistently denied such a purpose.² The massive demonstration was planned as an act of political intimidation to move Solf to grant their requests. Lauaki was probably unclear as to what would then follow. The visit in August 1908 of sixteen ships of the United States battle fleet may have induced him to think that the Powers would step in to the Samoans' aid.

It was not until November, on the eve of Solf's return, that Deputy Governor Schultz learned of the movement. By that time Lauaki had managed to mobilize the most important political districts of Samoa, Soleaula and Safotula in Savai'i and Leulumoega and Lufilufi in Upolu. The combined support of these districts, which represented the power of the chiefs of the Tumua and Pule, theoretically put him in a formidable position.

Schultz could not afford to let the demonstration take place. He realized at once the meaning of the petitions and knew that Solf's response must be negative. Not only could the presence of so many Samoans create difficulties for the government, but a refusal might provoke the spread of passive resistance to subsequent administrative demands. Schultz immediately sent letters round the Upolu and Savai'i districts forbidding all but those officially connected with the welcome for Solf to congregate in Apia, while the administrations' most trusted local officials journeyed round the islands arguing against the Apia demonstration.³ However Lauaki maintained his

1. Solf to RKA 10 May 1909; von Bulow to RKA 31 May 1909 RKA 3130:141.
2. See for example, statement by Lauaki to Richard Williams, Resident Commissioner in Savai'i 27 Feb 1909: NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' II:275-300; Lauaki speech Safotulafai 18 Dec 1908 pp 323-3.
3. Schultz to RKA 4 May 1909 RKA 3069:112ff; NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' II:177; Schultz to Leulumoega, Lufilufi etc. 10 Nov 1908.

determined stance and with twenty-two boats of Savai'i supporters, he moved to Manono and the district of A'ana in Upolu, seeking some excuse to go to Apia 'to bring forward their opinions'.¹ At this point Mata'afa left the movement, realizing that Lauaki was seeking a confrontation with the Governor, and he began instead to support Schultz's efforts to keep the people in their districts. In the face of this pressure Lauaki finally submitted to Schultz's injunction and remained absent from Apia on 19 November, when Solf arrived with his newly-wedded wife. The demonstration failed to take place.

Solf now embarked on a tour of Upolu and Savai'i during which he reminded the chiefs of their duties and warned them of the consequences of disloyalty. He confronted Lauaki at his base in Safotulafai but in the presence of so many followers of the orator chief, he was powerless to do more than warn Lauaki of 'the vengeance of the German eagle'. Lauaki retorted that there was no rebellious intent among the chiefs of the Pule and, declaring that he was appointed by the people to guard 'the sons of old Samoan Kings and the darlings of the Nation', he beseeched Solf to allow again the 'Faipule Kaiserlika' to assemble in Mulinu'u.²

Despite the fact that the local press was prepared to consign the rumours of local unrest to the realm of fable as a result of Solf's visit,³ it was just at this stage in late December that the movement got under way again and began to take on rebellious overtones. Schultz's original refusal had had serious repercussions for Lauaki. Fa'a Samoa he had lost face and exposed himself to Samoan ridicule in the failure of his demonstration. He would not see his plans so easily thwarted. After Solf's

1. NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' II:169: Excerpt from Taumei speech 22 Dec 1908.
2. Ibid., III:23-4: Lauaki's speech Safotulafai 18 Dec 1908; BA, Solf Papers 30, Anlagen zum Lauaki Bericht: Solf speech Safotulafai 18 Dec 1908.
3. Samoanische Zeitung 26 Dec 1908.

departure from Savai'i, Lauaki began to spread the story that he had humbled Solf in their encounter. He also sent his aide, the chief Jiga Pisa, to Tutuila to make contact with the United States regime and seek its political support in case Lauaki found himself in difficulties. Lauaki was clearly directing the movement, which now acquired the names mau e pule or o le mau, against the Germans' grip on Samoan powers of decision. While some chiefs in Solf's Mulinu'u council chose to wait and see if Lauaki would be successful, others, as well as many ordinary Samoans followed Lauaki because of his authority as a traditional leader and his rhetorical powers, though they were probably unsure of his ends.¹

Externally, Solf appeared to be in an invidious position, faced with a developing opposition front of the Tumua and Pule with the masses at their heels, while he lacked any sort of military support with which to assert his authority. As in the early stages of the Oloa, Solf could not simply break the movement by imprisoning its leader. Lauaki had been careful to organize o le mau along the lines of a legitimate, fa'a Samoan form of protest and opposition; direct suppression would have been construed by the majority of Samoans as tyranny and injustice. However, cracks were already appearing in the alliance of districts which Lauaki had constructed. Upolu chiefs were always suspicious of political initiatives which did not originate in their districts and the relationship between the Tumua and Pule chiefs was often attended by covert distrust. In Savai'i, Lauaki found that even some of the Fa'asaleleaga villages would not join him while one of the most powerful chiefs of Safotulafai was his committed opponent.² Solf set about shrewdly exploiting the inherent instability of these political relationships. At a fono of chiefs and speakers of the Upolu districts in

1. BA, Solf Papers, 30: Solf to RKA 10 May 1909; ibid: Anlagen zum Lauaki Bericht: Taumei to Solf 29 Dec 1908 and record of conversation Chief Mauga, Tutuila, and Jiga Pisa 30 Jan 1909; NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' II:174: Draft of Solf report 7 Jan 1909.
2. Davidson, Pacific Island Portraits p 296.

mid January 1909, Solf carefully painted a picture of Lauaki installing himself in Mulinu'u with his Savai'i adherents, at the cost of Lufilufi and Leulumoega, the districts which represented the majority of the Tumua: 'Your glory is gone', he taunted them,

'for Lauaki is the maker of kings. He confers the high honours, not you. He anointed Mata'afa. He will anoint himself - as Tafaifa he will go with his queen Sialataua to Mulinu'u and will be lord over you fools'.¹

So successful was he in persuading them that Lauaki's plans did not include them in the final victory (which was not altogether devoid of truth) that the Tumua chiefs immediately began making preparations for war against the Pule. Lauaki himself later claimed that the chiefs had unanimously voted that he be hung as a 'mischief maker'.²

Solf summoned Lauaki to Apia for a private interview on 16 January. When Lauaki landed in Upolu and became aware of the Tumua's attitude, he instructed his Savai'i followers to accompany him and as he made his way to Apia, a thousand of his men lodged themselves in Vaiusu and in the sympathetic Tuamasaga district. At the meeting between the two men, Solf refused to negotiate with Lauaki until his 'army' had dispersed. Lauaki claimed they were simply supporters who wished to farewell him in case he was apprehended and hung.³ A few boats were despatched in the next few days, but only as far as Manono on the pretext of bad weather. Lauaki himself remained in Vaiusu. The different confederations of districts were now preparing for a full-scale war, a prospect which Solf could not regard with any satisfaction. A Samoan war meant not only the plunder of Apia and the German plantations, and the possible ruin of the cash-cropping industry, but also probably acts of violence against Europeans. It would signify a return to the confusion and bitterness of the last century and make illusory any

1. NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' II:132: Copy of Solf's speech.
2. Ibid., II:289ff: Statement by Lauaki to Richard Williams 27 Feb 1909.
3. Statement by Lauaki 27 Feb 1909; BA, Solf Papers, 30: Solf to RKA 10 May 1909.

progress which the administration had achieved since 1900. To forestall an outbreak Solf sent his most trusted and influential Samoan officials, the secretary Saga and the chief Taumei, to dissuade the Tumua from taking up arms.

Meanwhile on 18 January two letters arrived in Solf's office. One was what Solf termed 'an open declaration of war' from Lauaki, in which he declared that if he was forced to take a 'holiday' to Tonga and Fiji as Solf had requested in their recent interview, 'on that day when I set foot upon the steamer, the Samoans will fight'. He was determined to stay and watch the Samoans fight it out anyway. The other letter came from the corporation of chiefs representing Savai'i and Manono, the Pule and Aiga, and reiterated the demands that Samoans be given responsibility for their own monies. These letters were followed almost immediately by the information that Lauaki had assembled his forces in Vaiusu, while the D.E.P.G. reported from Vaitele that Samoans, painted for war and armed, were headed for Apia.¹

After a hasty consultation with his deputies, Solf decided that the only course of action to prevent hostilities breaking out was to confront Lauaki in Vaiusu and try to dissuade him from violence.

The Vaiusu meeting had the air of a traditional Samoan confrontation between the leading warriors of both sides preliminary to the commencement of hostilities. In particular, it was an object lesson in the political skills which had preserved Lauaki throughout his long career of political activity. The size and temper of Lauaki's gathering so intimidated Solf and his European aide that both men were convinced they stood on the knife-edge of a rebellion similar to that of the South West African Herero in 1904.² After Solf refused to give Lauaki his hand, the latter launched into an impassioned speech lasting more than an hour in which he begged the Governor's

1. Solf to RKA 10 May 1909; BA, Solf Papers, 30:120-3: 'Der Aufstand auf Samoa' n.d. pp 120-3; Statement by Lauaki 27 Feb 1909.
2. BA, Solf Papers, 131: Solf to Schnee 3 June 1909.

pardon for his obstinate conduct and swore on the Bible that Mata'afa was the 'evil genius' behind all the Samoan disturbances since 1904.¹ It was a speech which transferred the moral onus squarely to Solf's shoulders. Lauaki, by accusing Mata'afa, had answered the accusations of conspiracy upon which the Governor had built the basis of enquiry against him. Since Mata'afa, in his reply the same day, made no attempt to repudiate Lauaki's allegations, Solf was faced with the possibility that there were now two guilty chiefs and it would not have accorded with the Samoan concept of justice to punish one and free the other. To raise the question of Mata'afa's disloyalty at the time might only have hastened the prospect of civil war; at the same time it was clearly impossible to take Lauaki from his followers and examine him in court. Solf's only alternative was to grant Lauaki the pardon which he had requested but he did so on two conditions: firstly, that Lauaki retire immediately with his supporters to Savai'i and cease his agitation, secondly, that Lauaki was not guilty of sending political ambassadors to Tutuila for American aid.²

The next day, January 19, found Lauaki on Manono where, again using the weather as a pretext, he remained. The conflict was obviously unresolved, particularly when Solf's investigation revealed that attempts had been made to draw in the United States to the aid of the dissidents. Tension between the Samoan parties and between the Samoans and the European community increased steadily. The first reports of unrest since late December now appeared in the local press; rumours of war and general animosity to German rule flooded in and out of Apia; Solf was continually beseeched by the Tumua chiefs to supply them with weapons to capture Lauaki and defeat his followers. At a fono of Faipule at the end of January there was strong pressure on Solf to begin military action against Lauaki and only

1. BA, Solf Papers, 30: Solf to RKA 10 May, 1909.

2. Ibid.; See also NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' II:138.

four chiefs spoke against dismissing Lauaki from the assembly and deporting him.¹ As the crisis heightened it was evident that not even Solf's Samoan allies were free from the traditional Samoan ambition of asserting a particular district's supremacy over old rivals. It was discovered that certain A'ana district chiefs, under the guise of punishing Lauaki for his behaviour at Vauisu, planned to use the government weapons to suppress Lauaki and the Savai'ians, loot their villages and then lay claim to priority, if not a monopoly, in the allocation of native government posts - a certain prelude to the resumption of old feuds.²

Solf managed to withstand the pressure of the Upolu chiefs while he worked to prevent a panic among the whites. As the government's more loyal collaborators, Saga, Taumei and a few of their colleagues, canvassed the districts, testing the attitudes of their countrymen and arguing in the councils against taking up arms, Solf hid the colony's explosives, and immobilized the weapons in the magazine, at the same time giving strict instructions to the Europeans not to resist any attempt by the Tumua forces to seize the weapons lest this provoke them to an attack on the European quarter. 'In all cases we must try to keep the peace', he argued, 'even on the condition that Lauaki restores peace in Savai'i'.³

Lauaki seemed to have no intention of restoring the peace anywhere in the group. Though by this time he had returned to Savai'i, his agitation continued unabated. He helped to spread a new crop of rumours that Solf had sworn on the Bible against his deportation and that the Governor had agreed in principle to all the orator's original demands. From Lauaki's allies in Manono came the particularly ominous threat that

1. BA, Solf Papers, 30: Solf to RKA 10 May 1909 and Protokoll der Fono 25 Jan 1909.
2. NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' III:328-9: Memo by Charles Taylor of conversations with A'ana chiefs 22 Feb 1909.
3. Ibid., 331: Note by Solf 3 Feb 1909.

every German in Samoa would be killed if Lauaki were deported.¹ In the face of these mounting events, Solf finally lost hope that he alone could stabilize the situation. On 5 February 1909 he telegraphed Berlin for the urgent despatch of military support. Six weeks of anxious waiting ensued during which Solf was reduced to inaction against Lauaki. He concentrated on restraining the Upolu chiefs from taking action on their own initiative and on calming the Europeans. On 18 March a German cruiser, SMS Leipzig, from the East Asian Squadron in Kiautschou, arrived under the command of Rear Admiral Coerper and by 26 March a further two cruisers and a supply ship were anchored on the Apia roadstead.²

Solf now dropped his pretence and returned to the initiative. His plan was to avoid military action at all costs and rely on the moral impression made by the largest naval detachment Samoa had ever seen since the civil war of 1898-99. Resort to physical force would only provoke Lauaki to take to the bush where, as history showed, European forces were at a serious disadvantage; a long, bloody and costly guerilla war would then be necessary to dislodge the rebels. There was the added danger that eventually the loyal Samoans would make common cause with their countrymen in a liberation crusade against colonial rule. Solf found a staunch ally for his policy in Coerper, who deferred completely to the Governor's discretion.³

On 22 March Solf sent an ultimatum to Savai'i ordering Lauaki to report for deportation by 29 March along with eight other ringleaders: Letasi Tuilagi, Namulau'ulu, Malaeulu, Tagaloa, Tevaga Matafa, Asiata Taetoloa, Asiata Ma'agaolo and Jiga Pisa. It was accompanied by a letter

1. LMS, Personal Box 4: Newell to daughter 2 April 1909; BA, Solf Papers 30: Statement by Lauaki to Richard Williams 27 Feb 1909; NZNA, Braisby, 'A Documentary Record' III:196: Taumei to Solf 30 Jan 1909.
2. BA, Solf Papers, 30: Solf to RKA 10 May 1909 and 'Der Aufstand auf Samoa' pp 131ff.
3. BA/MA, 3431a, Vol 2: Coerper to Kaiser 9 April 1909; *ibid*, 4346: Solf to RKA 3 May 1909.

from Mata'afa urging obedience for the sake of the islands' peace.¹ When these messages reached Lauaki the confrontation entered its most critical phase. Lauaki and his two deputies, Letasi and Namulau'ulu, replied the following day, protesting that the Pule and Aiga had been pardoned and declaring that they would rather fight and die than be deported.² As Lauaki's supporters on Savai'i began conveying their goods into the bush and stockpiling provisions, the navy moved in to blockade the island and confine any revolt to Savai'i alone. Rumours that the Melanesian police-soldiers accompanying the vessels were to be released 'like dogs' on the Samoans and that the 'rebels' were to be hung from the yard-arms only hardened resistance in Lauaki's villages and made loyal Samoans uneasy. Coerper immediately repudiated all such stories and at a fono on 27 March made a personal appeal to the movement's leaders to surrender, promising that no force would be used if Solf's directions were obeyed.³

At this juncture, Rev. John Newell of the London Missionary Society, perhaps motivated by accusations from the settler community that he had been sending letters of encouragement to the disaffected districts offered his services to try and persuade Lauaki to surrender without violence and bloodshed. When Newell reached Savai'i on 27 March, he found that the whole west of Savai'i as well as Palauli, Sapapalii, Saleaula and Matautu were actually opposed to Lauaki and he was greeted as the harbinger of peace.⁴ However feelings of defiant solidarity were still strong in Lauaki's own villages and in a last-ditch effort to retrieve the situation Lauaki appealed to the British Vice-Consul in Apia, Thomas Trood, to call in the 'three Powers' to the protection of Samoa. On 28 March Trood replied

1. NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' II:207:Solf Proclamation 22 March'09.
2. Ibid, III:338-340: Lauaki to Solf 23 March 1909, and letters of colleagues.
3. BA, Solf Papers, 30: Solf to RKA 10 May 1909; Schultz to RKA 4 May 1909 RKA 3069:118; Samoanische Zeitung 3 April 1909.
4. LMS, Personal Box 4: Newell to daughter 2 April 1909; See also LMS Personal: Newell diaries 32/1909 and passim.

shortly that Samoa was now under German rule and there could be no redress from the other Great Powers.¹

The first break in Lauaki's immediate circle of support came when Newell persuaded one of the ringleaders, Asiata Taetoloa, to surrender. The administration's moderate and humane treatment of him induced others to follow suit. Namulau'ulu, in a public meeting presided over by Newell, declared that he was prepared to surrender if it meant avoiding war for Samoa. A subsequent letter of some belligerence from Solf, full of dire threats against the dissidents, nearly undid all Newell's work, but after a new round of discussions, Lauaki finally sent Newell a message on 29 March saying that he and the Safotulafai chiefs would give themselves up on 1 April once they had organized their affairs and taken leave of their friends. Solf and Coerper agreed to extend the deadline of the ultimatum. As Coerper and Solf steamed towards Savai'i on 1 April to take up positions for a possible military assault, they received a message that Lauaki and five chiefs had presented themselves punctually on board the cruiser SMS Jaguar.² Lauaki had been convinced finally by Newell's arguments that rebellion would only lead to Samoans fighting Samoans and 'the opening of the flood gates of misery that might last for years and years'. In addition Newell had extracted a promise from Solf that the conditions of banishment would be as light as possible and that Lauaki's surrender would mitigate the punishment to be imposed on the rest of his followers.³ On the same day, Lauaki, the eight chiefs and their families left Apia on one of the cruisers, bound for Saipan, in the Caroline Islands, where they were to spend their exile. Solf began the task of fining errant villages and purging the ranks of Samoan officials.

1. BA, 30, Anlagen zum Lauaki Bericht: Pule and Aiga to Trood 27 March 1909 and Trood's reply 28 March 1909.
2. BA/MA, 3431a, Vol 2: Coerper to Kaiser 9 April 1909; LMS, South Seas Odds Box 4: Mss. on Samoa 1909, A. Hough.
3. LMS, Personal Box 4: Newell to Solf 29 March 1909.

There was however no extended witch-hunt or harsh retaliation: Some land was confiscated, matai were forced to pay a thirty Mark fine each and Solf forbade any discussion of the Alii Sili issue until after Mata'afa's death. However because of the fear of Samoan resistance and its efficacy, Solf refused to alter the lines of his native policy and studiously avoided any action which might make military intervention inevitable in the future.¹ Instead Solf vented his anger on Deeken's planter clique which, he was convinced, had been exploiting the incident for its own ends. Throughout the campaign he had received reports from several chiefs that European influences were mixed up in Lauaki's movement and the local press was confident that the Samoan petitions relating to public money could only have been inspired by whites. Solf even accused the American planter and trader H.J. Moors, of encouraging Lauaki to believe the United States would give him assistance.² In fact, the small settler opposition group did figure in false rumours that Solf had sworn on the Bible in Vaiusu to pardon Lauaki and fulfil all his demands, and it also seems to have leaked news of unrest and rebellion to the Australian and New Zealand press long before most Europeans in Apia were aware of the nature of developments, but there is no concrete evidence to suggest that Deeken and his friends were deliberately inciting Lauaki.³ As Rev. Newell pointed out, the Samoans were quite capable of twisting anything the whites said or did independently to buttress their own demands.⁴

The Lauaki affair inspired the Pflanzerverein to rear its head

1. BA/MA, 5186, Vol 13: Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Condor 21 June 1909; Samoanische Zeitung 3 April 1909.
2. NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' II: 230-4: Solf to RKA 4 June 1909; ibid.:188,203-5: Taumei to Solf 29 Dec 1908 and Saga to Solf 3 March 1909; Samoanische Zeitung 20 Feb 1909.
3. See Berliner Tageblatt 11 April 1909 and Berliner Neueste Nachrichten 13 April 1909; Testimony of Bishop Broyer in Solf to RKA 20 Sept 1909 RKA 3070:40. Samoanische Zeitung 20 Feb 1909.
4. Testimony of Newell in Solf to RKA 20 Sept 1909 RKA 3070:38.

again in a new attack on Solf's policies. It was linked closely to the government's failure to settle the still-pressing labour question, for the Chinese government was making difficulties over the conditions for further shipments of coolies to Samoa. The small planters' bitterness against Solf was exacerbated by their belief that his native policy was to blame for the difficulties with China. His forbearance of the Samoans was regarded as encouraging the Chinese to be obdurate and unreasonable in their demands concerning conditions of employment.¹ Another campaign was initiated in Germany to prove the inadequacy of Solf's administration. Solf was accused of moving too fast in destroying indigenous organs of government and stripping old and experienced chiefs of their powers. Deeken in a petition in June 1909 addressed to the Kaiser, argued that the establishment of a garrison of colonial troops after the Oloa movement in 1904-05 would have forestalled the recent unrest and submitted that the only guarantee of peace for Samoa was 'a consistent policy to some extent based on the customs and traditions of the Samoans, but with force at hand'.² He influenced his uncle in the Reichstag, Trimborn, to urge the Colonial Office for a permanent military presence in Samoa, while his firm, the Deutsche Samoa Gesellschaft, harassed it with petition after petition in 1909 and early 1910 demanding that a naval vessel should be stationed constantly in Samoa along with a garrison of Melanesian troops.³

The Colonial Office remained unimpressed and made no secret of its disinclination to alter the existing line of policy on Samoa or put restrictions on Solf's security decisions. An article in the semi-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine in mid 1909 dismissed the question of militarization as too expensive and too dangerous. Not only was Samoa not worth the two

1. Firth, 'German Recruitment' pp 265-281.
2. Deeken petition to Kaiser 1 June 1909 RKA 3131:73-80; Die Deutschen Kolonien 31 May 1909; Samoanische Zeitung 22 May 1909.
3. DSG to RKA 30 April 1909, 11 Aug 1909, 19 Feb 1910 RKA 3069:90,261 and RKA 3070:53.

million Marks which would be needed to maintain a battalion in the islands, but a garrison would also be a constant source of disturbance for whites and the native people. Pressure for a military establishment came from whites who had little knowledge of the Samoans themselves, it argued, from whites who saw themselves as absolute masters and 'natives' as subjects without rights. The article concluded:

'Such a people (as the Samoans) can not be ruled with the mailed fist, but only with benevolence, justice and considerable attention to their laws and customs'.¹

The Colonial Secretary, Dernburg, replied personally to Trimborn that the Reich must 'come to terms' with the Samoans because they could never be cowed by colonial troops without great expense, while the Deutsche Samoa Gesellschaft was informed flatly that troops were not 'absolutely necessary' since a second cruiser had just been approved for the Pacific.² In Samoa itself the majority of Europeans, in particular the veteran settlers, ranged themselves on Solf's side. Thomas Trood, who could speak for the non-German population as a whole, remarked that 'even if England had got Samoa', it could not have guaranteed nine years of peace in the group as Solf had done without the employment of 'humane repression'.³ The leaders of the Samoan community had already likened Solf to the prophet Moses who had freed his people from bondage to the old ways, and they regarded him as destined to lead Samoa to a government of peace.⁴

With this vote of confidence both in the colony and at home, Solf could affirm to the Samoans in August 1909 that he would continue to govern them 'with love and peace and no tyranny will be exercised'.⁵ But Solf was still faced with the political issue which had originally inspired

1. Quoted in Samoanische Zeitung 10 July 1909. The Colonial Office thought this article important enough as an indication of official policy to have it re-published in the Deutsches Kolonialblatt.

2. RKA to DSG 9 March 1910 RKA 3070:57; Dernburg to Trimborn 31 March 1909 RKA 3069:58-9.

3. BA, Solf Papers, 30, Anlagen zum Lauaki Bericht: Trood to Solf 6 Feb 1909.

4. Ibid: Protokoll der Fono 29 Jan 1909.

5. Ibid., 31: Solf speech, Fono of Malo Kaiserlika 11 Aug 1909.

Lauaki's movement and with which the Samoans continued to thwart Solf's control policy - the position of paramount chief and the question of succession after Mata'afa's death. By December 1909 Solf had devised a formula which, he was convinced, would complete German control over the Samoan political structure while honouring the political sensitivities of the islanders. He guaranteed to preserve peace among the Samoans if he was furnished with a proclamation from the Kaiser as Tupu Sili that it was his will for no more Ali'i Sili to be appointed after Mata'afa's death because of the implied discrimination against the just claims of both royal families. Instead Solf suggested that two advisors of the governor (Fautua) should be named, one from each royal lineage. In this way, he hoped to cut the ground from under the feet of the campaigning candidates while catering to the strong general sense of attachment to the two royal families.¹ After some initial hesitation about the effectiveness of such a solution, the Colonial Office finally acceded to his request, though it was emphasized that the Governor must accept full responsibility for the safety of the colony.²

But Solf was to be denied the final, personal triumph over the Samoans' political activities. Late the following year, with Mata'afa still very much alive, Solf departed from Samoa; his old enemy, Deeken, had already left in February. In December 1911, Solf, shrewdly using his political opportunities, was appointed State Secretary for colonies in succession to Lindequist who had resigned in protest at a treaty which the Foreign Office had negotiated with France over the transfer of the French Cameroons.³ Solf never returned to Samoa.

His successor as Governor was his deputy and constant companion since 1902, Erich Schultz, whose experience was forged throughout the

1. Solf to RKA 12 Dec 1909 RKA 3065:36-9.

2. RKA to Reichskanzler 10 March 1910 and RKA to Solf 13 April 1910 RKA 3065:40-2,64.

3. Vietsch, Wilhelm Solf pp 101-104.

crises of 1904 and 1908-09. Schultz was an ardent supporter of Solf's style of government and he openly sympathized with the problems which the Samoans had to deal with under intensifying contact with western civilization. He had already achieved an understanding with the islanders through his cautious observance of their ethical and ceremonial values and he accepted easily the mantle of patriarchal authority bequeathed by Solf. As Mata'afa became ever more senile Schultz had to contend with increasing pressures on the old chief from different Samoan groups seeking a definitive expression of his political will. In his tours around the districts the Governor continued Solf's prohibition on the discussion of the succession question in assemblies, emphasizing that the final decision was the prerogative of the Tupu Sili in Berlin. In November 1911, supported by SMS Cormoran, he was forced to resort to banishment for two chiefs from Falefa who had aroused public excitement by extracting from Mata'afa a declaration in favour of Tuimalealiifano.¹ Finally, on 6 February 1912 Mata'afa died, amid great demonstrations of grief from the people over whose political fortunes he had presided for more than two decades.

Schultz's damping policy and his deterrence of political agitation seemed to have the desired effect for he encountered no excited indignation when he declared at Mata'afa's funeral: 'The clouds have burst asunder, the titles have fallen to pieces'.² He waited patiently for the time of mourning to pass and was confident enough of the peace and security of the group to make a trip to Germany at the end of 1912 to work out with colonial officials the final details for a public abolition of the paramountcy. The event took place on 12 June 1913, at a fono in honour of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Kaiser's accession to the throne. Tanu

1. BA/MA, 5187, Vol 16: Militärpolitische Berichte SMS Cormoran 22 Nov 1911 and 7 Dec 1911; Schultz to RKA 24 June 1911 RKA 3066: 138-145 and Schultz to RKA 10 Jan 1912 RKA 3067: 17-19.
2. Samoanische Zeitung 10 Feb 1912.

and Tamasese were appointed as the Fautua and the occasion passed off in ostensible harmony in the shadow of SMS Cormoran. The navy had been unable to provide the East Asian Cruiser Squadron but a visit was planned for August, to drive home the appropriate moral impression.¹

Schultz dared to look to the future with cautious hope. The new political system had still to be tested. Although the term Fautua carefully avoided any connotation of an independent power of decision, no one could say how the new advisory positions would develop. But the Governor had no doubt about the 'undeniable administrative gifts' of the Samoans and he put great faith in the peoples' essential vitality (Lebenskraft), to enable them to make a significant contribution to the future prosperity of the colony.² Economically they certainly seemed to be in a position to do so.³ The population returned quickly to copra and cocoa production after the Lauaki episode and throughout the last five years of German rule, the Samoans still supplied the overwhelming proportion of export copra for the colony. In 1909/10 experts put the number of coconut palms belonging to Samoans at 800,000, with an annual rate of increase of 25-30000 trees. Samoan stands of coconuts covered three times the area of European copra plantations. Moreover, because of the labour shortage, Samoans were able to earn the very high wage of three Marks a day plus food working casually on European plantations. European industry also prospered, though not uniformly. None of the small German plantations were a success. Deeken's own firm lost 253,000 Marks on cocoa in 1913 alone and never paid a dividend. The D.H.P.G. remained preeminent in Samoa, protected by its land and labour monopoly. It acquired forty-nine

1. RKA to Admiralstab 13 Nov 1912 RKA 3067:60-1 and BA/MA,699, Vol 2a: Admiralstab to Reichs Marine-Amt (RMA) 6 Dec 1912; Schultz to RKA 4 July 1912 and 10 July 1913 RKA 3067: 46,85.
2. Schultz to RKA 10 July 1913 RKA 3067.
3. See Annual Reports 1909/10 to 1912/13; G.R. Lewthwaite and K.B. Cumberland in Fox, Western Samoa pp 154-160, 243-44; Firth 'German Recruitment', pp 241-283.

percent of all copra produced by Samoans between 1902 and 1913 and its annual turnover in copra alone amounted to two million Marks. Furthermore its extensive plantations enabled it to maintain consistently higher profits over smaller firms which relied on trade copra. Nevertheless the general base of European industry did expand with the development of cocoa and rubber plantations and by 1914 these represented forty-five percent of all cultivated European-owned land. German exports quadrupled between 1900 and 1912 though copra remained the staple. There was even a pineapple canning industry by 1914.

But despite these external manifestations of peaceful development, there were signs that socially the colonial relationship between the Europeans and the Samoans was undergoing subtle but considerable change in the last years of German rule. Exile and old age had removed the stronger elements of traditional leadership by 1912, which helps to explain the passivity of the Samoans towards the government's final solution to the Ali'i Sili question. The indigenous authority structure was experiencing some distortion as a new, more literate and westernized generation of Samoans came of age; chiefs were complaining that they had increasing difficulty asserting their authority over ordinary Samoans. Schultz was also worried at what he described as 'advancing democratization', for he believed that proper control of the Samoans was only possible if the social structure was preserved and the administration was able to control the rate of social change.¹

An incident in 1914 confirmed Schultz in his view that Samoa was on the verge of a radical transformation in racial attitudes. In February, four previously loyal members of the small Samoan police force (Fitafita) deserted the corps and in a seemingly senseless, unmotivated rampage, killed two German planters and engaged in a fierce gun battle

1. Schultz to RKA 11 March 1914 RKA 3067:145-6.

with a group of Europeans before three of them were killed. Schultz suggested the incident was a strange pathological phenomenon, attributable partly to the effects of western cinema and close contact with Apia and its way of life. It was, he argued, born of frustration with the strict norms of social control in Samoan society in a situation where the men were in constant contact with the papalagi's world and its individual liberties.¹ However there were also indications of race hatred and communal jealousies. The whites had been very quick to take up arms against the Fitafita and the latter had fought to the end refusing to surrender. When Samoans tried to intervene to stop the battle, the four desperados had told them to go away. They wanted to die this way, killing as many 'slave-makers' as possible.²

It was not the first such incident to occur in German Samoa. There had been a strikingly similar precedent in May 1906 when a Samoan by the name of Sitivi had 'run amok' and carried out a campaign of threats, burglaries and assaults on white officials which ended in the murder of a German planter. Sitivi was himself shot by the Samoans but not before he had received shelter and support from his kinsmen and the local districts had been mobilized by Solf to capture him. Racial overtones were also present in this affair, for Sitivi had left several manifestoes declaring his hatred of the white man and of the German in particular.³

These new developments in the Samoan community were matched by a corresponding deterioration of racial attitudes among European administrative staff. In one of his last private letters to Solf before the outbreak of war, Schultz remarked that his higher officials were now

1. BA, Solf Papers, 132: Schultz to RKA 8 April 1914; Schultz to RKA 11 March 1914 RKA 3067; E. Schultz-Ewerth, Erinnerungen an Samoa (Berlin 1926) pp 136-9.
2. BA, 132: Schultz to RKA 8 April 1914.
3. Solf to AAKA 6 July 1906 RKA 3064:110-122; Samoanische Zeitung 2 June 1906; Schultz, Erinnerungen, pp 131-5.

mostly old Africa men, distinguished by 'mental laziness, complacency and a defective capacity for comprehension and adjustment'. They assumed a 'master race' attitude towards the Samoans, not understanding 'to be familiar, but by no means vulgar' and the Governor got bare support for his accommodative native policy. In the context of the Fitafita killings such an attitude was particularly dangerous: the Samoans laid great stress on outer forms, honour and mutual respect in inter-communal relationships. Without them Schultz argued, an isolated instance like the Fitafita affair could become a mass phenomenon.¹ All the signs of an approaching crisis of significant proportions for the Germans existed in 1914.² The attempts of 1904 and 1908 to mould a 'Samoan community' in opposition to that of the Europeans and the burgeoning racial confrontation already foreshadowed the Mau of the 1930's.

Lauaki and his fellow exiles in Saipan were provided with land, seed, livestock, fishing gear and household utensils and expected to procure their own subsistence, as well as participate in the labour corvee organized by the local German administration. They were given no idea of the length of their exile though there seems to have been some expectation that it would last no longer than two years. Solf remained firmly opposed to the return of the chiefs until Lauaki's death but he left the decision to Schultz. Namulau'ulu died within the first year of banishment. The others were finally picked up on the orders of the New Zealand administration in Samoa in late 1915 and arrived back in Apia on 18 December. Lauaki was not among them: he had caught dysentery while on the voyage home and was

1. BA, Solf Papers, 132: Schultz to RKA 8 April 1914.
2. There is also a case for arguing that, with repeated depressions after 1914, a drastic fall in rubber prices, the continuing uncertainty of labour and the spread of agricultural pests and disease, the Germans would also have faced a serious economic crisis in Samoa. See G.R. Lewthwaite in Fox, Western Samoa p 160.

landed at Tarawa, in the Gilbert Islands, where he died four days later. His body was later removed to Samoa and buried at Fagapoa, Savai'i. By 1919 none of the originally exiled chiefs was alive. Some died shortly after their return, others in the influenza epidemic of 1918.¹

1. See Stationsleiter Kern, Saipan to Solf 10 Oct 1909 plus Solf reply RKA 3070: 44-5, 63-4; NZNA, Braisby 'A Documentary Record' II:315-6; LMS, South Seas Odds Box 4: Mss., A Hough; Davidson, Pacific Islands Portraits, p 298.

Chapter 2

PONAPE

a) Ponapeans and Colonialism : The Pattern of Spanish and German Rule, 1887 to 1906:

European knowledge of the island of Ponape began with Ferdinand de Quiros who sighted the high volcanic bluff of Sokehs in December 1595, but did not land. Regular contacts were not made until the early nineteenth century but they multiplied so quickly that by 1850 an average of twenty-nine ships were putting in at Ponape annually, most of them whalers from the northern Pacific whaling grounds seeking fresh provisions and recreation.¹ When the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (or Boston Missionary Society) founded its first station on the island, in the district of Kiti, in 1852, the Ponapeans were already well accustomed to Europeans and their civilization. Luxury goods had replaced iron as the most sought after item of trade and a fair-sized community of beach residents existed, consisting of ships' deserters, mutineers and escaped convicts. Andrew Cheyne mentions a white population of sixty in this 'rogues' paradise' when he arrived at Ponape as a trader in 1842 and they combined to frustrate his attempts to found a trading empire on Ponape based on tortoise-shell, beche de mer and various tropical plants.² While the beachcombing community formed a considerable acculturative influence on the islanders, it never possessed the productivity or the power to challenge successfully the domination of the district chiefs.³ Commerce on the island remained generally in chiefly hands and the European was required to function as trading agent or resident artisan and perhaps buy

1. Riesenbergs, Native Polity Ponape, p4.
2. The Trading Voyages of Andrew Cheyne 1841-1844, ed. D. Shineberg (Canberra, 1971) Introduction pp 10-15; pp 156-173 and Chapters 9 and 10; See also Cheyne's, Islands in the Western Pacific Ocean (London 1852).
3. A. Tetens, Among the Savages of the South Seas : Memoirs of Micronesia, 1862-1868. Translation from the German by F.M. Spoehr (London 1958). Manuscript in the Staatsarchiv, Hamburg.

protection with a proportion of his earnings. It was probably this independence which acquired for the Ponapeans an early reputation for ferocity and duplicity.

The Boston Mission encountered difficulties initially because of Ponapean independence. No assistance was forthcoming from the chiefs, attempts at isolated conversions were singularly unsuccessful and there were moves by the High Chief of Madolenihmw to assimilate the missionaries into the social system by demanding tribute of them.¹

The missionaries steadfastly resisted all such impositions. They were determined to set themselves apart from both the Ponapean and the beach community and provide a social alternative to 'pagan' society. Their medical skills and inoculations against European-introduced diseases gave them their first opening and by 1860 the mission could count three converts. However this did not terminate its difficulties. The deliberate campaign which the mission undertook, to subvert chiefly authority, destroy traditional sanctions and instil the virtues of individual freedom and independence into the islanders aroused the enmity of different High Chiefs and the mission had to struggle to hold onto the bases which it had established in Kiti and in Oa, in Madolenihmw. Through the introduction and distribution of European goods and techniques, as well as its educational activities, the Boston Mission built up a 'Party of Advance' as a counter to the feudal authority of the chiefs and by the 1870's, under the shadow of the United States Navy, the Christian party was the strongest minority on the island, capable of and ready to defend itself as a distinct social unit, physically if necessary.

1. I. O'Brien, 'The Impact of Missionaries on Ponape' B.A. Hons. thesis A.N.U. Canberra, 1971. p 10. I am greatly indebted to Mrs. O'Brien for permission to use and quote from her thesis. Most of the following history of the Boston Mission on Ponape is taken from it. See also A. Gulick, 'Evolutionist and Missionary: John Thomas Gulick portrayed through documents and discussions' (Chicago 1932).

There was already a German presence in the Carolines by this time. In 1866 Alfred Tetens established an agency for Godeffroys in Yap, in the western Carolines and this was followed by stations on Kusaie and Ponape. By 1885 eighty per cent of the Carolines trade, and indeed most of the commerce of the entire island sphere north of New Guinea, including the Marshalls and the Marianas, were in German hands.¹ When, in the same year, Bismarck announced his intention of actively annexing the Caroline Islands to Germany he encountered strong resistance from the Spanish government which claimed the islands as part of the Spanish Pacific empire, though no official regime was installed there. Bismarck referred the ensuing dispute to the arbitration of Pope Leo XIII, who decided in favour of Spain in October 1885.² In March 1887, the Governor of the Eastern Carolines, Capt. Posadillo, arrived in Ponape with fifty soldiers, twenty-five convicts, and five Capuchin monks to actualize the imperial presence.³

The Spanish seem to have taken little trouble to ascertain the state of affairs on Ponape or the nature of the people with which they were dealing. They assumed immediately the role of colonial masters and confiscated land from the chief, Lap en Not, for a colony fortress on the north-western shores of Ponape, under the scarp of Sokehs island. This brought them into conflict with the Boston Mission which, by the arrival of the Spanish, had achieved the construction of a para-state organization among its adherents, with innovations such as individual homestead ownership

1. K. Hassert, Die neuen deutschen Erwerbungen in der Sudsee : die Karolinen Marianen und Samoa-Inseln (Leipzig 1903) p5.
2. M. von Hagen, Bismarcks Kolonialpolitik (Berlin 1923) p 555.
3. Records of the Kapuziner Mission (Rhein-Westfalen Provinz), Münster, West Germany (hereinafter cited as KKM Archives), File 58: Spanische Missions Chronik 1887 pp 4-5, German translation of the original Spanish; The Book of Luellen, (eds). S. Riesenber, M. Whiting, J.L. Fischer, Ch. 66. This is a work by a Ponapean named Luellen who died in 1946. Excerpts from the typescript which is soon to be published by A.N.U. Press, Canberra, were very kindly provided by Mr. S. Riesenber with the permission of the publishers. Both the above documents are unusually good eye-witness sources for the Spanish and German periods in Ponape.

and private property, and the missionaries and High Chiefs functioning as executive heads. To missionaries who were also fired with the ideals of American democracy and who considered Spain's catholic state apparatus as the epitome of feudal decadence, there was a great deal to lose. When the Rev. Doane protested that the new regime was encroaching on land to which the missions had already acquired legal title, he was imprisoned for disrespect to the Governor and sent to Manila on charges of inciting the natives. However the charges were not pressed and Doane was returned to Ponape.¹

Meanwhile the Spanish regime was enjoying a short honeymoon with the Ponapeans, whom they called upon to provide working parties to assist in the construction of the colony. At first the islanders complied willingly, but as time went on and they were repeatedly embezzled out of their wages by three unscrupulous European interpreters, they became increasingly resentful. When, in July 1887, the Wasai (High Chief) of Sokehs refused point blank to send any more working parties to the colony, the Governor sent a military detachment to the island. There is conflicting evidence about what happened next but it appears that when the Wasai and his deputies refused to leave their house of assembly, the Spaniards fired into the air to persuade them otherwise. This was the signal for general consternation and the Sokehs natives grabbed the party's firearms and shot them down. Excited to fever pitch, they followed up with a concerted attack on the new colony in which Governor Posadillo and a further eighty soldiers were killed.²

A new governor, Don Luis Cardaso, arrived at the end of October with three cruisers and 700 soldiers, but the only action taken was to send

1. German Ambassador Madrid to Bismarck 30 Sept 1887 RKA 2582; O'Brien 'The Impact of Missionaries' pp 49-56.
2. Ms: 'Geschichte der Spanier in Ponape'. Written by a Ponapean and translated by P. Hambruch 1910, enclosed in Hambruch to Oswald 22 Dec 1910. RKA 3009: 169-172.

three of the suspected killers to Manila for trial. To the rest of the Sokehs people the Governor offered an amnesty and by the beginning of 1888 relations seemed, at least externally, to be on an even keel once more.

Comparative peace reigned until 1890. The Nahnwarki of Kiti had already shown himself willing to accept a catholic missionary in the district and in June 1889 a mission station had been founded at Aleniang. There was however a great deal of general coolness towards Don Luis' plan to lay roads to the catholic mission centres and establish military outposts in close proximity so as to extend gradually an integrated network of Spanish control over the districts. The Capuchin fathers were understandably perturbed at the likelihood of their work being identified with military rule and when a road was cut from Aleniang into the stronghold of Protestantism at Oa in Madolenihmw in May 1890, they warned that the people would not stand for this two-fold infringement of their independence and their religious affiliation.¹ On 25 June as a party of forty soldiers arrived to occupy the site for the garrison, they were attacked by the Madolenihmw natives and cut down to a man. A further forty sent the same day met the same fate. In the following months the Spanish mounted a series of punitive expeditions involving several gunboats and hundreds of soldiers imported from the Philippines which led to more serious reverses and heavy loss of Spanish life before Oa was taken and the rebellion broken.²

Among the northern districts of Not and Sokehs, traditionally hostile to the people of the south, there had been much more contact with the Spanish regime since 1887 and the catholic mission had been able to make several converts. The revolt in Madolenihmw and the barely disguised distaste of Kiti and the other southern tribes for the Spanish, caused anxiety in the northern camp and forced it ever closer to an alliance with

1. KMM Archives 58: Spanische Missions Chronik, pp 26-36; Aus den Missionen der Kapuziner. Missionszeitschrift. Jahresbericht 1911, p 12.
2. Ms: 'Geschichte der Spanier in Ponape' RKA 3009:174-185; Book of Luelen, 66: 187-8.

the administration and the mission. In consequence indigenous feuds took on more and more the outward appearance of a confessional war between the catholic north and the protestant south, despite the fact that the Boston Mission's position had deteriorated after the 1887 trouble and it had been virtually forced to leave Ponape altogether in 1890.¹

Throughout the 1890's a state of confrontation existed between the Spanish and the islanders, especially in the south. Intermittent skirmishes and assassinations of soldiers took place as successive Spanish governors tried in vain to reassert the imperial presence by road-building projects or schemes to disarm the population. On occasions, the regime did gain the upper hand in military engagements only to lose it immediately by a policy of appeasement. Reports from German naval vessels visiting the island in these years suggest that the colony lived under the threat of siege. A buttressed wall with artillery emplacements encircled the entire area of European settlement while the land beyond was cleared to a breadth of 500 metres to provide a clear line of fire. None of the 300 strong garrison dared to venture outside this fortress for fear of being shot down and the men seemed to spend most of their time drinking in taverns. In addition the administration paid a salary or 'tribute' to the various High Chiefs of about 100 Marks a month, to induce them to keep the peace; the indigenous leader of the Protestant party, Henry Nanpei of Kiti, received 3000 Marks a year.² None of these measures altered the situation in favour of the Spanish. The Ponapeans maintained their military effectiveness by means of the arms continually smuggled into the island by American whalers. Indeed so low had the Spanish authorities sunk in the islanders' estimation that the trade was carried on under the nose of Spanish gunboats which had

1. O'Brien, 'The Impact of Missionaries' p 56.
2. BA/MA, 7577, Vol 1: SMS Falke to Kdr. Admiral 15 Dec 1895; *ibid.*, 697, Vol 6: SMS Arcona to Kdr. Kreuzergeschwader 16 Oct 1898; see also Nanpei's testimony in Girschner's report 18 March 1914 RKA 2590:150.

strict instructions to avoid provoking Americans in any way because of the international differences between the two countries.¹

It was the Spanish-American war of 1898-99 which proved to be the nadir of Spain's abortive colonial regime in the Carolines. A dispute between the catholic sub-district of Auak in the north and the Protestant party in 1898 over the Spaniards' acquittal of an Auak chief on a charge of murder of a protestant was made the occasion of a general uprising by protestants from Mant Island, Madolenihmw and Kiti. Politics and religion were inextricably linked in the affair. On the part of the Protestant party the insurrection was designed to vanquish the northern tribes and thrust the Spanish from the island as a prelude to American occupation. The northern chiefs bore a particular antipathy towards the nominal leader of the protestants, Henry Nanpei, whom they suspected of ambitions to make himself the first King of Ponape.²

Nanpei was perhaps the most exceptional Ponapean of his generation. He had acquired the largest landed fortune on the island through his father, Nahnku, the former Nahnken of Kiti district. Nahnku had established a reputation for hospitality and assistance to visiting Europeans and in return the father of Nahnku's wife, an Englishman by the name of James Headley, left him in 1863 a testament which he had obtained, ceding the full rights over a large area of land, including several offshore atolls, to the Nahnken and his direct heirs rather than to the conventional successor to his title.³ This document to private landed title was later honoured by both the Spanish and the German regimes. Henry Nanpei continued his father's tradition of generous disbursement and built up a considerable estate through trading and planting. He founded the first Ponapean-owned

1. Berg to AAKA 6 Aug 1903 RKA 2552:57.

2. KMM Archives, 58: Spanische Missions Chronik pp 1b - 8b.

3. Hahl to RKA 19 Dec 1912 RKA 2584:102; Bascom, Ponape p 34, Riesenber, Native Polity Ponape p 31; Book of Luellen 66: editors' footnotes.

store, purchased more land and planted it with coconuts and ivory nuts. An Englishman visiting Kiti in the late 1890's remarked with surprise on the substantial wharf, boathouse and storing facilities which Nanpei had built at the mouth of the Ronkiti River and on his 'countless' planted coconuts which flourished in the river valley.¹

Nanpei received an education from the Boston missionaries and under their auspices travelled to China, Hawaii and California where he was exposed to western ways and American democratic ideas. When the mission left Ponape in 1890 he became head and protector of the Protestant party. Indeed it seems that he was the very life and soul of Protestantism on Ponape in the declining years of Spanish rule; without him it was virtually an atrophied form of observance.² Nanpei performed a number of services for the Spanish in mediating peace, and on one occasion rescuing catholic monks from attack, and he was decorated twice with imperial insignia as well as receiving a substantial stipend. Nevertheless his overt sympathy for the United States made him in the end an enemy of Spain and he was the inspiration of the protestants in their revolt of 1898. For all his assimilation of western ways and values, Nanpei was firmly committed to the traditional structure of kinship and power. He had made enemies among the Ponapeans because of his unconventional initiatives and his non-conformity to traditional rules of inheritance and he was engaged in a struggle, not only for the survival of the Protestant party and his position of eminence in it but also for the confirmation of his claim to a position within the traditional district 'aristocracy'.

In March 1898 the southern forces, many hundreds strong, attacked Auak and the forces of Sokehs and Not which had come to its assistance. This first action was suppressed by the intervention of a Spanish gunboat but

1. F.W. Christian, The Caroline Islands (London 1899) p 64-5.

2. Hahl to AAKA 23 Aug 1900 RKA 2585:8.

fighting broke out again a month later. Nanpei was arrested as the instigator of the disturbances but the process against him was delayed in the confusion occasioned by news of the progress of the war between Spain and America. It was a time of uncertainty for the administration, besieged on all sides and expecting every day the arrival of an American naval force, and its indecisiveness led to the conflict with the islanders dragging on into 1899, while Spanish rule became ever more discredited. At last in September 1899, a warship arrived with the news that Ponape and the Carolines group were to be ceded to Germany.¹

Germany had never relinquished her interest in the Carolines and Bismarck's unsuccessful annexation bid had not impeded the activities of German traders in the group during the Spanish period. Indeed the agreement signed with the Spanish government in 1887 had specifically guaranteed freedom of trade and equality for German merchants in the Carolines and Marianas.² Since German companies had already built up extensive trading links by this date, the status quo was virtually shifted in favour of the new German combine, the Jaluit Gesellschaft, also founded in 1887, and it continued to dominate the market. The single Spanish firm, Factoria Espanola, did not develop to any extent during Spanish rule and the main American traders in Kusaie and the western Carolines posed no threat to German predominance. In 1899 the Jaluit Gesellschaft was exporting three quarters of the copra produced in the group and it was urging the Foreign Office to corner the Carolines from the Americans as a going concern.³ With the Pacific empire breaking down around it, the Spanish government considered groups like the Carolines liabilities and by treaty in June 1899 they were

1. KMM Archives, 58: Spanische Missions Chronik, p 9b-55b; Book of Luellen, 66: 189.

2. Protokoll 17 Dec 1885 in Sammlung der offiziellen Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Gegenwart (Leipzig 1885 onwards) Vol. 46:179.

3. 'Denkschrift betreffend die Inselgruppen der Karolinen, Falau und Marianen' in Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags, 10. Legisl. 1. Session, 1898/1900, Bd.174, Nr. 394 pp 2504-5.

sold to Germany, along with the Marianas, for 17,250,000 Marks. On 12 October a German expedition from New Guinea took formal possession of the group and brought the period of Spanish rule to an end.

The new German administration was forced simply to take up where the Spanish left off. The Spanish retreat did little to change the prevailing circumstances and the Germans were faced with a situation which had never advanced much beyond a crude frontier confrontation. In October 1899 there were a thousand practiced Ponapean warriors at hand in the five districts, as well as large caches of modern arms and ammunition.¹

Though the executive officers of the island sphere were given as much freedom and independence as possible to cope with the problem of isolation from New Guinea and the rest of the empire, official policy towards Ponape in the next seven years was influenced decisively by the Colonial Department's consciousness of the island's unsettled past. Department officials were convinced that any false move or indiscreet demands on the part of the local regime would lead to a Ponapean rebellion which, considering Spanish experience, only a full-scale naval and land operation could hope to suppress.² Ponape itself was not worth such a risk. It was an insignificant corner of the colonial empire, undeveloped and possessing only very modest potential as an economic or strategic asset. Though by far the largest island of the Carolines, it contained only eight per cent of the total population of the group (40000), while the European population never rose above fifty during the entire German period, and was usually very much fewer. Ponape's high volcanic nature diminished its plantation potential for there was only a narrow belt of level land between the mangrove-fringed reefs and the mountains, with a thin layer of topsoil lacking a coral base. This militated against the rapid growth of coconuts in particular, while

1. Hahl to AAKA 2 Dec 1899 RKA 2999:218.

2. AAKA to Berg 26 Feb 1902 RKA 3001:151ff.

the constant heavy rainfall hampered copra production; moreover the mountainous terrain of the interior made clearing and planting arduous and expensive. Markets were a long way off and freights dear and there was the ubiquitous problem of labour. Because of the demands of yam cultivation associated with the competition for prestige in Ponapean society, the islanders had little inclination to work for Europeans as wage labourers. No large plantations existed when the Germans arrived in Ponape. Henry Nanpei and a Portugese settler owned small, irregularly planted areas of coconuts but they yielded an inferior copra crop.¹ Though three times the size of the neighbouring Marshall Islands, the Carolines supplied much less copra in 1899, amounting to about 2000 tons. A few new plantations were established by Europeans in subsequent years but their rate of development was slow. In 1904, six European plantations in the eastern Carolines employed only seventy-eight labourers.² The Jaluit Gesellschaft was awarded a concession in June 1901 to develop the coral atolls of the eastern Carolines but Ponape was not part of the concession and the firm based its industry in the Truk Archipelago where there was a much larger population and better prospects for expansion of coconut plantings. It also requested exemption from any taxation of its plantation enterprises for at least ten years because of the problems associated with the slow development of the Carolines.³

With such a questionable asset the colonial authorities were at pains to avoid any policy which might cause unrest or provoke a hostile response from the Ponapeans, even to the point where they were prepared to sacrifice the extension of close administrative control and the economic mobilization of the islanders for the sake of inter-communal peace. The man whom they chose to lead the administration in the Carolines did not stray

1. Annual Reports 1900/01 p87; 1902/03 p 106; 1903/04 p 100; Bascom, Ponape, pp 3-4, 33, 78.
2. 'Denkschrift betr. die Inselgruppen der Karolinen, Palau und Marianen' in Stenographische Berichte 1898/1900 Bd174, Nr 394, p 2505; Firth, 'German Recruitment' p 292.
3. Annual Reports 1901/02 p 100; Denkschrift Jaluit Gesellschaft, Jan 1900. RKA 2765:8-15.

from this conception. He was Albert Hahl, Imperial Judge in the old protectorate of New Guinea since 1896, who was appointed Deputy Governor of the island sphere in July 1899.¹ Hahl was well aware of the difficulties facing him on arrival in Ponape: 'We arrive in the protectorate with naked cheeks ' he wrote to a colleague in 1899,

'and are supposed immediately to build houses (and) drill people whom we don't understand and who don't understand us.... From the Spanish we'll learn nothing and will have nothing to take over; the ground is indeed chosen, but not sowed; at best with blood.'²

Hahl drew up a list of administrative priorities which centred on curbing the powers of the chiefs over their subjects, balancing the interests of the clans and keeping the missions out of indigenous politics but he abandoned any ideas of economic reform or administrative innovations like head taxes and compulsory labour for the immediate future. The Ponapeans he regarded as 'distrustful, treacherous and apathetic' and the political situation decidedly too delicate for positive measures.³

Hahl's administration thus assumed from the start a relaxed posture. He arrived with virtually a skeleton staff consisting of a doctor, a police master, a harbour master and a mixed police force of forty-six Melanesians and Malays, which led the departing Spanish governor to urge that Hahl should leave immediately with him lest his tiny force be massacred within the first week.⁴ However Hahl considered militarization as a major cause of provocation in Ponape and he put the islanders off their guard by taking walking tours around the districts without a military escort

1. Born in 1868 in Lower Bavaria, Hahl was educated at Freising and the University of Wurzburg where he studied law. Hahl joined the Colonial Department from the Bavarian Civil Service in 1895 and in January 1896 he arrived in New Guinea as Imperial Magistrate. After 1918 Hahl became a Director of the NGC and was prominent in the later Reichskolonialbund, though his Nazism was only nominal. See P. Biskup, 'Dr. Albert Hahl - Sketch of a German Colonial Official', Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol 14, Dec 1968, pp 342-357.

2. Hahl to Geheimrath in AAKA 23 June 1899 RKA 2998:33-4.

3. Hahl to AAKA 3 Dec 1899 RKA 2999:218-9; Hahl to Bennigsen 8 May 1900 RKA 2765:29-30.

4. A. Hahl, Couverneursjahre in Neuguinea (Berlin 1937) p 106.

No attempt was made to disarm the warriors, whether by intimidation or persuasion, or to impose administrative taxes and labour demands on the people. Instead Hahl concentrated on settling old disputes and trying to regulate the division of authority in the colony.

This policy, or lack of it, succeeded in maintaining stability in Ponape for the first five years of German rule. There was in the beginning an anxious moment for the new regime when the Spanish fortifications were torn down and the gates of the colony opened to provide unrestricted access for the islanders. A horde of armed Ponapeans stormed in to try and capture the Spanish armoury and appropriate the arms and ammunition still stored there, and they had to be beaten back by the Melanesians with their spears and clubs. Hahl immediately sank the ordinance in the harbour.¹ The Governor also had to deal with an existing dispute in the largely protestant district of Uh over the question of the succession of a catholic or protestant Nahmwarki, and with a case of traditional banishment in Not, but he was able to resolve both conflicts with a judicious mixture of threats and cajolery.² By making it clear that the Germans would not prosecute any offences committed by the Ponapeans during the Spanish period, Hahl was soon able to reconcile the districts to the presence of the new government, particularly the recently turbulent Protestant party. In line with his declared aim of upholding the traditional Ponapean 'constitution', Hahl concluded contracts with the High Chiefs delegating to them local police and judicial powers in minor criminal and civil matters while leaving more important cases to the judgment of the Deputy Governor in concert with them. Regular assemblies for consultations with the High Chiefs were also instituted, though initially these took place under armed guard because of the mutual suspicions of the district heads.³

1. A. Hahl, Gouverneursjahre. p 110.

2. Hahl to Irmer 23 June 1900 and 26 June 1900 RKA 3000:115; Hahl, Gouverneursjahre, pp 110, 119, 125; Riesenber, Native Polity Ponape pp 54-5, 57.

3. Text of contract with Ponape chiefs 27 Jan 1900 enclosed in Hahl to AAKA 8 March 1900 RKA 3000:45-7; Annual Reports 1901/02 p 97; Hahl, Gouverneursjahre p 110.

The key measure in Hahl's programme to defuse the situation in Ponape was to have the navy patrol the islands against the gun-running activities of American whalers and Japanese traders. In January and February 1901 detachments of marines were stationed at strategic points on the southern foreshores of Ponape and after a number of the more notorious whalers were searched and their weapons registered, the message spread quickly to other whalers that Germany was seriously asserting her control over the group. In September 1901 the last Japanese gun smuggler was expelled from the Carolines and Japanese traders were not readmitted until 1905.¹ At the end of 1901, when Hahl had left Ponape for the Governorship of New Guinea, the Germans could at least claim to have won the trust of the Ponapeans, which was indicated by the peoples' spontaneous participation in the celebration of the Kaiser's Birthday. Hahl had made some attempt to raise the island from economic stagnation by experimenting with possible export crops like coffee, cocoa and cotton and improving indigenous dairy herds with cattle imports from New Guinea; the islanders were also required to begin the regular planting of coconuts, ten nuts per farmstead per month. By 1902 exports from the group had grown from 187,000 Marks in 1900 to 365,000 Marks and the Jaluit Gesellschaft had agreed to link Ponape with its Sydney to Hong Kong shipping route three times a year.²

Hahl's successor in Ponape was Victor Berg who came direct from German East Africa. Within his first two months on the island he set the Colonial Department in an uproar with a rashly worded despatch which implied that he was preparing to adopt a more militant attitude towards the Ponapeans and assert imperial authority more forcefully, if necessary

1. BA/MA, 2016, Vol 5: Militärpolitische, Bericht SMS Cormoran 1 March 1901; Hahl to AAKA 5 Feb 1901 RKA 2551:127; Hahl to German Ambassador Tokyo 22 June 1901 RKA 2551:157; Annual Reports 1901/02 p 96; Berg to AAKA 24 May 1905 RKA 2765:121.
2. Annual Reports 1901/02 pp 101f; Hambruch, Ponape I: 283; Book of Luelen, 67:191.

overcoming local resistance with 'relentless' reprisals.¹ What seemed to Berlin like a dangerous excess of zeal earned Berg severe censure and he was threatened with immediate recall if any unrest occurred during his administration.² In actual fact Berg had been guilty merely of overstepping the bounds of discretion in administrative reporting. Thereafter, in both report and action, Berg remained faithful to the official conception of his duties, which was to follow the lines of policy laid down by Hahl. Aware that the present peace depended solely on the 'moral influence' exerted by the regime, and that nine or ten years must elapse before any serious demands were made of the islanders, Berg devoted himself, like Hahl, to learning the language and customs of the people, cultivating the friendship and support of the chiefs and balancing the claims of opposing native parties in land and title disputes.³

Berg's greatest achievement during his five year period of office was the eventual disarmament of the Caroline Islanders. Despite Hahl's successful surveillance of whaling ships in 1900-01, an illegal whaler trade in consumer goods and arms did continue on in Ponapean harbours into 1902 and 1903. After the farcical attempts of the Spanish to stop the arms trade, American whalers had obviously acquired a nimbus of superiority over warships in local eyes and not even prison sanctions against people found trafficking with them seemed to deter the islanders. Lacking manpower and restricted by poor communications (it could take six to eight hours for a report to reach the colony from the southern harbours), the administration could only rely on occasional patrols by visiting naval vessels.⁴

1. Berg to AAKA 24 Oct 1901 RKA 3001:139-147.
2. Telegram AAKA to Consulat Hong Kong 12 Feb 1902, forwarded to Berg RKA 3001:148, and AAKA to Berg 26 Feb 1902 RKA 3001:150-153.
3. Berg to AAKA 8 June 1902 RKA 3002:16-18; Berg to AAKA 22 Sept 1902. RKA 2765:74; Berg to AAKA 11 Oct 1902 RKA 3002:43; Deutsches Colonialblatt 15 April 1902 pp 178-9.
4. Berg to AAKA 27 March 1902 and 6 Aug 1903 RKA 2552:24-6, 57; Wahlkampf to AAKA 23 Feb 1904 RKA 3002:100-103.

This was not the case with other islands in the group where the issue had been already discussed with chiefs, and the administration was making plans for a disarmament operation in the Truk Archipelago, Kusaie etc. once naval cruisers were available for the task. SMS Condor arrived in the group in October 1904 and Berg decided immediately to begin with Truk where the density of population was much higher than in Ponape (12000 people occupied one third the area of Ponape) and there were known large stocks of firearms. Using the Samoan precedent of financial compensation for each weapon, Berg, supported by SMS Condor, was able to collect 436 guns and over 2000 cartridges by the end of December for the cost of 9164 Marks. He was careful to publicize the event widely in Ponape with the hope that after a few years, the Ponapeans too would be amenable to voluntary disarmament once they appreciated that the Truk people suffered no deterioration in their treatment by the government.¹

Berg was to be presented with his opportunity within the next few months. On Maundy Thursday in April 1905, a typhoon broke over Ponape and left a disastrous trail of destruction in its wake; forty six islanders were killed throughout the eastern Carolines, over 300 injured and four million Marks worth of damage inflicted on property, plantations and subsistence crops. At one stroke the economic potential of the area was set back years and although the threat of famine was avoided, there was for a time an alarming scarcity of all but the basic foodstuffs.²

Berg immediately divined that the state of affairs offered him some leverage over the native community and he decided to combine the task of reconstruction with a calculated offensive against the armament problem in Ponape. His decision was strengthened by the fact that Henry Nanpei, Ponape's most independent chief and articulate spokesman, was out of the way on a

1. Hahl to Bennigsen 16 March 1901 RKA 3001:79; Telegram Berg to AAKA 7 Jan 1905 and Berg to AAKA 29 Dec 1904 RKA 3002:148,156-7. Annual Reports 1904/05 p 74.
2. KEM Archives, 58: Spanische Missions Chronik pp 69b-71b,75b: Annual Reports 1905/06 p 117.

trip to Germany. Discussions were held with the various High Chiefs in which Berg urged a voluntary surrender of firearms against immediate financial compensation or the supply of much-desired European foodstuffs. Capitalizing on the Ponapeans' sense of enterprise, he offered thirty five Marks per weapon, ten more than that paid in Truk, or rice and tinned meat to an even higher value of forty eight Marks.¹ His tactics worked. In May 1905, three days after his discussions with the chiefs, the first weapons were delivered and they continued almost every day until mid July, by which time the administration had possession of 254 firearms and 1532 cartridges, most of them from the southern districts of Madolenihmw and Uh. When rumours began circulating in the more suspicious areas, Sokehs in particular, that the Germans were planning to fall upon the defenceless districts once all the arms had been given up, Berg discreetly slowed the tempo of his campaign and called assemblies of chiefs to quash the rumours.²

Weapons continued to be brought in over the next nine months and by May 1906 Berg was confident that the great bulk of Ponape's stock of firearms was now in German hands. The 545 guns which the administration had by then obtained from the Ponapeans represented one for every six people, a proportion even higher than that in Samoa. Berg was not wholly sanguine about the political future of the island even then and he believed that a tougher, more positive policy of colonial development than hitherto must still be deferred for some time, but in July 1906 he felt able to report that to all intents and purposes the eastern Carolines had been cleared of firearms and there would be no further need of annual anti-whaler patrols by German cruisers.³

1. Hambruch, Ponape, I:283.

2. Berg to AAKA 6 July 1905 and 9 Sept 1905 and 14 Nov 1905 RKA 3003:80-1, 115, 120-3.

3. Berg to AAKA 21 July 1906 RKA 2552:111; Berg to AAKA 17 May 1906 RKA 3004:13-15; Berg to AAKA 10 Aug 1905 RKA 3112:4-6.

On 30 April 1907, still in office, Victor Berg collapsed and died of heat stroke while out surveying land on Ponape. The last years of his administration had not been free from all recrimination, in spite of his cautious methods and his solution of the arms question. For the first time since the Boston Mission left the island in 1890, the government in 1905 encountered a challenge to official policy from missionary activities. Some measure of confessional balance had been regained in 1899 when the Boston Mission returned to Ponape, but Kusaie remained the centre of its operations and only one or two missionaries were stationed in Ponape. In 1907 its work in the Carolines was taken over by the Liebenzeller Mission, an arm of the German evangelical Jugendbund für entscheidendes Christentum, by which time there were over 1000 nominal adherents of Protestantism in Ponape. The Spanish Capuchins' sphere of activity in the islands, in which forty missionaries were engaged in 1900, was transferred to the Rhein-Westfalen province of the Capuchin Order and the first German monks arrived on Ponape in 1903. The last of the Spanish Capuchins did not however depart until 1907.¹

Relations between the administration and the missions were cordial during the first five years of German rule. Hahl in particular remained on friendly terms with the Spanish missionaries during his short stay and they regarded him as 'a sensitive and noble person'.² Though he believed that Protestantism was 'virtually a 'lost cause' in Ponape, Hahl was careful to demonstrate a strict impartiality in his treatment of the two confessions for he was acutely conscious of the fact that the religious dichotomy of the island reflected the political differences between the districts and would keep step with them.³ It was under Berg that an issue

1. German Ambassador Madrid to Reichskanzler 27 Oct 1900 RKA 2586:3: KMM Archives, 58: Spanische Missions Chronik p 666; Annual Reports 1903/04. p 98, 1904/05, 1906/07 p 82.
2. KMM Archives, 58: Article by P. Jose in Spanische Missions Chronik pp 58b-62b.
3. Hahl to AAKA 12 Jan 1900 and 23 Aug 1900 RKA 2585: 7-9, 49.

was raised which had been evaded hitherto: the question of competitive proselytism.

In early 1905 the new German Superior of the Capuchin Mission, Father Venantius, and his deputy, Father Fidelis, came to Berg to inform him that they wished to expand into the Takiau area where the people, mostly heathens and protestants, had declared themselves prepared to accept a catholic station. Takiau was widely regarded as a traditional preserve of the protestants which led the missionary, Mr. Gray, to protest to Berg. When Berg, who had already concluded that religious disputes were a major cause of unrest in the Ponapean community, appealed to the priests to enter into negotiations with the protestant mission over a demarcation of their respective areas of operation to avoid the risk of a local war, he encountered stubborn resistance. 'When there are converts to be won', Fidelis is reported to have retorted, 'not even a bloody conflict is out of the question'.¹ Fidelis later denied that he had suggested war was immaterial to the mission as long as converts were made,² but this was in one sense the effect of the mission's refusal to accept a restriction on its evangelizing activities.

Worse was to come in 1906: In mid year the mission found itself in conflict with the Nahmwarki of Kiti when it tried to found a school for twenty isolated converts in the Kiti sub-district of Palikalau. The protestant High Chief responded by physically removing the school equipment and stripping the local headman, who had agreed to help the mission, of his land and titles for violation of his fief. In the same year, Lap en Tolomar, a chief in the protestant district of Madolenihmw, who wished to become a catholic, was brought before the Nahmwarki of Madolenihmw and ordered to renounce his plan. When he refused, he too lost his land and titles and

1. Quoted in Berg to AAKA 9 May 1905 RKA 3006:15-16; See also KMM Archives, 58: Spanische Missions Chronik, p 73b..

2. KMM Archives, 69: P. Fidelis to P. Venantius 17 Sept 1909.

his relatives were forbidden to bring him food.¹

Both these incidents made inevitable a new confrontation between the mission and Berg. The Capuchins took the side of the dispossessed chiefs, protesting that they had been denied the basic right of freedom of religion. For Berg the issue was not so simple. Though he recognized the injustice of the proceedings by western standards and could sympathize with the plight of the catholics, he was under strict instructions from the Colonial Department to maintain the status quo, to protect the traditional social system and to do nothing which might introduce new and dangerous tensions. In a native assembly in October he had no other choice but to sanction the actions of the two High Chiefs. His stand outraged the catholic missionaries who considered the two episodes, with some justification, as a protestant plot aimed at maintaining the religious exclusiveness of the southern districts, and they suggested that since Berg had a mistress among the daughters of a powerful Madolenihmw chief, his decisions could be informed only with the basest motives.²

From 1906 onwards relations between the administration and the catholic mission became increasingly strained as the Capuchins ostentatiously refrained from seeking the assistance of the regime in any of their further activities. Yet on Berg's death they were prepared to admit privately that he had been a sound administrator who knew how to handle the Ponapeans prudently and had won considerable influence.³

1. KMM Archives, 58: Spanische Missions Chronik pp 77bf; ibid. 59, Deutsche Missions Chronik 1906, pp 24-5.
2. Ibid., pp 26-7; P. Kilian Müller to Hahl 21 Dec 1910 RKA 2589:38-41.
3. KMM Archives, 59: Deutsche Missions Chronik 1907, p34.

b) Colonial Reform and the Sou en Kiti Affair, 1907 to 1908.

Berg's death coincided with the reorganization of the Colonial Department as an independent ministerial office and with the new administrative priorities of Secretary Dernburg: colonial self-sufficiency and coordinated economic and social development. This pressure made itself felt on Hahl in New Guinea who was ultimately responsible for the island sphere.

Hahl had always projected far-reaching reforms of the rigid social systems not only in Ponape but throughout the entire group as a prerequisite for stimulating indigenous production and raising the group's economic output.¹ In particular he regarded the system of fiefs and tribute on Ponape as a definite hindrance to local enterprise, for the activities of the 'commoners' were geared largely to the service of their section heads and High Chiefs and the theoretical insecurity of tenure removed any incentive to improve the land or increase productivity. There was, Hahl felt, a need to develop a 'happy, useful people with purchasing power', a people who would assimilate the European values of individual ambition and regular work. All this was impossible without security of land tenure and production for the individual. Moreover the arbitrary nature of 'feudal' rule, with the expulsion of tenants, the banishment of dissidents, the disputes among noble families over tenure, tribute and advancement, was an inexhaustible source of district conflict which the Germans found difficult to control because of the widely scattered nature of Ponapean settlement, the lack of roads and the dependence on slow boats for transport.² Both security and the new pressure for colonial development dictated positive

1. See for example Hahl to AAKA 2 Dec 1899 RKA 2999:215-9; Hahl to V. Bennigsen 7 June 1900 RKA 2266: 120-2; Hahl to Irmer 10 June 1900 RKA 3000:115.

2. Staatsarchiv, Bremen, Deutsche Sudsee Phosphat Papers. Vol 1: Hahl to AAKA 8 Feb 1907 in Hahl to Wiegand 16 April 1908; I am indebted to Dr. S. G. Firth for access to this document.

action of Hahl in 1907.

The Governor undertook a tour to Ponape in September 1907 while the island was still without an executive administrator. On 23 September he announced to an assembly of chiefs the Reich's intention of converting the system of feudal tenure into freehold possession of land and he managed to extract from the High Chiefs a written agreement that they would in the meantime refrain from dispossessing their present tenants of land which was under cultivation. Without offering any further information Hahl then departed. When the new district officer in Ponape, Georg Fritz, finally arrived many months later, in April 1908, he found the Ponapean community in uncertain mood. In the absence of a strong hand to control the situation after Hahl's departure rumours had begun circulating in the districts that the Germans were planning to impose new personal taxes and heavier customs duties on the favourite consumer goods of the Ponapeans, as well as institute compulsory labour and appropriate native land for the use of the whites.¹

Fritz was an ambitious man who had just completed a successful tour of duty as administrator of the Mariana Islands. There, among a passive and peaceful race of Chamorros and Micronesians, he had experienced little difficulty in setting up a head tax structure, regulating the planting activity of the people and introducing a system of compulsory labour for the administration. Fritz was an official in the true colonial mould, eager to plant the seed of civilization among the Naturvölker, patronizing, but anxious to be fair, impartial and understanding. Highly conscious of the need to uphold the honour and prestige of the Reich among 'native races', he was equally aware of his own status among his peers and sensitive about

1. 'Reise mit dem Dampfer 'Seestern' nach den Karolinen und den Marschall Inseln' in Hahl to RKA 8 Nov 1907 RKA 2992:185; Annual Reports 1908/09; Missionsbote. Berichte der Liebenzeller Mission Nrl. Jan 1909, p4.

his esteem in local eyes.

Fritz came to Ponape with instructions from Hahl to make some headway with the economic development of the island. He was in essential agreement with the Governor that things could no longer be allowed to drift; both men considered that the seat of administration might as well be shifted to another, more prosperous centre in the Carolines unless some economic progress was accomplished in Ponape along the lines desired by the new Colonial Office.¹ Fritz himself foresaw the extension of his Marianas work to Ponape, with the levying of personal taxes and the introduction of corvee labour, but it was to be discreetly organized to avoid the obdurate resistance of the islanders. He did not take kindly to Hahl's method of procedure, regarding the Governor's reform project of September as 'immature and unjust' and its disclosure in Ponape premature.² In February 1908 he had already informed Hahl of a scheme of his own which would transform the social system and involve the islanders throughout the Carolines in the tasks of development:³ In areas where the chief and his tenants agreed, the absolute right of the chief over the land of the commoner was to be abolished, as well as the constant obligations of tribute in produce and labour. In return the main chiefs were to be compensated financially through a system of compulsory work which the emancipated tenant was to perform for the government. The tenant, who would acquire the freehold possession of his land to be handed down thereafter to his heirs, would be obligated to work on government projects for fifteen days a year at the wage rate of one Mark per day. Half this wage would be distributed to the chiefs as recompense for their lost income and privileges.

1. Fritz to Hahl 21 July 1909 RKA 3005:93-4.
2. G. Fritz, Ad Majorem Dei Gloriam! Die Vorgeschichte des Aufstandes von 1910/11 in Ponape (Leipzig 1912) p 59.
3. Fritz to Hahl 26 Aug 1908 RKA 3005:100-3; Fritz, Ad Majorem Dei Gloriam p 41.

the rest would fall to the administration's treasury. Fritz anticipated that, as the traditional leaders were incorporated into the administrative apparatus as local officials and overseers of the public works, the chiefly 'pension' would be phased out gradually and the tax of fifteen work-days by each islander would accrue to the administration. It was a subtly disguised system of mass taxation and corvee labour which was designed, at one stroke, to reduce the independence of the chiefs, accustom the people to ordered work and enable the island to be opened up at minimal cost. Its longer term aims were to stimulate indigenous production of tropical products and provide openings for wage labour on European plantations of the future. Fritz later estimated that, with the extension of the scheme to the rest of the group but with the added innovation of a direct cash or copra tax on the low copra-yielding atolls, the island sphere could generate 100,000 Marks in cash annually.¹

Though in June 1908, Hahl and Fritz were able to gain the approval of the new regime in the Colonial Office for the reforms, as essential to law and order in Fonape and to make the colony pay, the circumstances on the island were too precarious in mid 1908 for the plan to be implemented immediately. Not only had the latent dissatisfaction, sparked off by Hahl's visit, spread throughout the native community, but Fritz was also becoming unavoidably embroiled in a major dispute between two Kiti chiefs: Henry Nanpei and Sou en Kiti.

Its origins lay in pre-German times. Through his patrimony and his acquisition of the protestant leadership, Nanpei had built up a power base in Ronkiti to rival even that of the Nahnmwarki. In so doing he had created many enemies in the royal line of chiefs, one of whom was Sou en Kiti. Sou en Kiti was a member of the ruling clan (Dipwinimen),

1. Fritz to Hahl 25 Jan 1909 and 20 Feb 1909 RKA 2766:13-20; Annual Reports 1908/09.

and of the sub-clan Soun Kiti which made him titular high priest of the old cult of the goddess Naluk, which languished with the introduction of Christianity. The title still carried with it a preemptive right to certain areas of land in Kiti district, among them parts of Ant Island. Nanpei contested these rights, for his father's original testament of 1863 had included Ant Island, rich in coconuts and marine products, in the estate handed down to him, and Nanpei had developed the atoll as a major base of his business through coconut planting. Though Nahnku's legacy strictly contradicted the traditional system of inheritance by title, there were cases when a fief might be transferred into private property with the consent of the district chiefs and both the Spanish in 1896 and Hahl in 1899 had recognized Nanpei's claim.¹

The issue was revived in 1907/08 with Hahl's announcement of the projected changes to the social system. It seems that Nanpei in particular feared that the reforms meant the loss of all existing chiefly titles to land and the possible repudiation of his claim to Ant and his inherited estates in favour of traditional custom represented by Sou en Kiti's titular right.² At the same time a new element was introduced to complicate the dispute and aggravate Nanpei's dilemma: Sou en Kiti was not a catholic but he possessed clan relations in the catholic districts of the north and was sympathetic to the catholic mission. The latter appears to have courted Sou en Kiti to provide land in his section for a school

1. Hambruch, Ponape, I:286-8; Book of Luellen, 66:199 footnote 5.

2. KEM Archives, 76: Copy of Girschner to Hahl 27 Nov 1909.

and church.¹ To Henry Nanpei this represented a serious threat: not only could Sou en Kiti count on the Capuchins for active support in any campaign against Nanpei's estates, but a catholic intrusion into Kiti would undermine Nanpei's position and considerable influence as protestant leader. Moreover, it would imply a certain triumph for the northern districts who identified themselves with the catholic cause and treated Sou en Kiti as an ally. The district chiefs of Sokehs and Not were particularly wary of Nanpei and his activities. They continually suspected him of deliberately augmenting his landed estate and personal power and prestige so that he would be in a position to demand recognition as the most powerful man in Ponape and thus strengthen the southern districts over against the north. The German administration repeatedly seemed to these chiefs to be favouring Nanpei by seeking his company and advice and taking him as interpreter and mediator on tours around the Carolines.²

Their suspicions hardened when, after Hahl's visit in September 1907, Nanpei reconstructed a group of his supporters which had operated in the Spanish period as the vanguard of American rule and democratic ideas. The group paraded itself before Fritz on his arrival as a new democratic movement which had sprung up ostensibly in response to the social reforms.

1. KMM Archives, 70: P. Venantius to P. Kilian Müller 20 June 1910; P. Kilian Müller to Hahl 21 Dec 1910 RKA 2589:42; Hambruch, Ponape I:288. It is possible that the Capuchins believed that Sou en Kiti would be the next High Chief of Kiti district and would thus create the opening for the conversion of the whole area. Various German sources suggest that the dispute really centred round the High Chieftaincy of Kiti. Sou en Kiti was supposed to be the next in line in order of hereditary succession while Nanpei was a candidate in terms of his wealth, power and prestige. The sources argue that Nanpei had to reckon with the possibility that if Sou en Kiti became Nahmwarki then Nanpei would be driven from his estates and his special position in Kiti destroyed, while Nanpei is supposed to have wanted Sou en Kiti out of the way because he stood between Nanpei and the High Chieftaincy. Riesenbergh however maintains (Personal Communication 12 April 1972) that neither man could become Nahmwarki, Nanpei because he was not a member of the ruling clan and had made many enemies, Sou en Kiti, because while a member of the royal clan he was not a member of the ruling sub-clan and would have had to wait until it died out before succeeding (which did not occur till 1947); See Hahl to RKA 30 Sept 1908 RKA 3005:163-4; KMM Archives, 70: Copy of Fritz to Hahl 30 Oct 1908 and Denkschrift P. Crescentius July 1908.
2. KMM Archives, 59: Deutsche Missions Chronik 1908 pp45-6; ibid., 70: Venantius to P. Kilian Müller 20 June 1910, Book of Luellen 67:190-193.

Its plan was to have three chiefly representatives from each of the five districts elected, with Nanpei as 'chairman', to act as an advisory council to the administration in native affairs.¹ The northern districts regarded this with open animosity as a bid by Nanpei and his southern supporters to break the traditional power of the High Chiefs and themselves succeed to a preeminent position as allies and protectors of the German regime. The Superior of the Capuchin Fathers believed that Nanpei was out to set up a new ruling line whereby he and his descendents would become in effect hereditary deputy Governors of Ponape.²

By July 1908 relations between the southern and northern districts were polarized while the still inexperienced Fritz was confused by his ignorance of the complexities of the dispute. In May he had begun the construction of a road through the island to Kiti with paid outislander labour in the hope of gaining some measure of influence over events on the southern foreshores of Ponape. The road had not gone more than 1000 metres when, on 17 July, the road labourers received a threat that they would be attacked if they did not stop work. Fritz was already engaged in the investigation of an incident which had occurred five days earlier when people from Poipoi and Palia-Ralon (Kiti) had raided Sou en Kiti's land in Tomoralon, destroying coconut and bread fruit plants and damaging some canoes and a house.³ He sent the protestant missionary, the Rev. Wiese, to the south to make enquiries while he himself went to the scene of the roadworks. Through Wiese, Nanpei now sent Fritz a message that the catholic areas of Sokehs, Not and Auak were in a rebellious mood after the rumours of taxes and enforced land changes and planned to attack the European colony, as well

1. Fritz to Hahl 26 Aug 1908 RKA 3005:100-2; Hahl to RKA 30 Sept 1908 RKA 3005:162-4.
2. KEM Archives, 70: Denkschrift P. Crescentius July 1908; P. Kilian Müller, Ponape im Sonnenlicht der Öffentlichkeit (Ehrenbreitstein 1913) p 40.
3. Missionsbote Nr.1. Jan 1909.

as Nanpei because he was a friend of the Germans. Fritz was totally disconcerted by this turn of events and retreated to Nanpei's base in Kiti where he believed himself to be secure, at the same time despatching messages to the colony to prepare its defences, and to the Capuchin Mission asking it to use its good offices to pacify the northerners. It was to reassure the chiefs that no taxes were being imposed and that alterations to present land tenure customs would only be made when and where the chiefs approved.¹

For their part the northerners were genuinely perplexed by the whole affair and increasingly indignant at what they saw as a smear campaign by Nanpei. On 19 July the chiefs of Sokehs and Not gathered before Fritz in a demonstration organized by the Capuchin Fathers to profess their loyalty and obedience to the Reich, and it was repeated in an assembly of all the northern chiefs two days later when, in the face of protests against the projected land reforms, Fritz reiterated his promises about administrative innovations but emphasized that no commoner tenant was to be deprived of his present tenure.²

None of these measures really lanced the crisis or reduced the tension and when letters continued to arrive in the colony warning against a northern attack, Fritz, nervous about a more positive policy in the absence of any military support, called a general assembly of Ponapean chiefs on 4 August. To the northern chiefs in particular it was a disappointment for Fritz made no attempt to pass judgment on the incidents just past. Instead he welcomed the chiefs' queries about the administrations' policies and accepted the principle of Nanpei's advisory council which would comprise the five High Chiefs, section heads and one or two other representatives from the districts to assist in the tasks of native

1. Fritz to Hahl 21 July 1908 RKA 3005:91-3; KMM Archives, 59: Deutsche Missions Chronik 1908 pp 48-50.

2. Fritz to Hahl 21 July 1908 RKA 3005: Hambruch, Ponape, I:294-6.

administration.¹

This proposal was greeted with suspicious silence, for the northern chiefs saw in it the triumph of a campaign carefully orchestrated by Nanpei. Both mission societies as well as Fritz agreed that Nanpei was behind the series of false alarms in the previous few days.² The devastation of land and property was an old, if unofficial Ponapean custom whereby a chief expressed his dissatisfaction with a rival and threw down a challenge to him. Nanpei appears to have paid the Poipoi people, regarded as the 'drones' of the island, to damage Sou en Kiti's land so as to divert suspicion from himself and at the same time incite Sou en Kiti to retaliation. Nanpei would then be able to denounce his opponent as a troublemaker and have him removed by the Germans, thus eliminating his nearest rival to the estates inherited from Nahnku.³ Likewise the unrest on the roadworks in mid July was Nanpei's work and enabled him to implicate the northern districts, Sou en Kiti's allies, with the hope that the administration would take action against them and the catholic mission. It is possible that by drawing Fritz to him in Kiti, Nanpei hoped to provoke a dispute between the Capuchin Mission and Fritz by convincing the former that Fritz was favouring Nanpei and the Protestant party.⁴ Through these manoeuvres, Nanpei would be able to manipulate circumstances to his advantage: Sou en Kiti would be removed, catholic pretensions in Kiti would be thwarted and German support would be enlisted for Nanpei's claims and his future position. Fritz's August assembly seemed to confirm his success.

A few days after the assembly a new occurrence dashed all

1. KMM Archives, 59: Deutsche Missions Chronik 1908 pp54-7.
2. Fritz to Hahl 21 July 1908 RKA 3005; KMM Archives, 59: Deutsche Missions Chronik 1908 pp51,60.
3. KMM Archives, 70: Denkschrift P. Crescentius July 1908; ibid.: Venantius to P. Kilian Müller 20 June 1910; Hambruch, Ponape I: 291-3.
4. Hahl to RKA 30 Sept 1908 RKA 3005:164.

Fritz's hopes of regaining peace and stability by negotiation. It was imperative for Sou en Kiti that he receive compensation for the destruction of his land and property if he were not to lose face to Nanpei: traditionally the victim himself extracted it by reciprocal force or intimidation.¹ In this case however there was the danger of a major district collision which might plunge the island into civil war, so when the catholic mission heard rumours that Sou en Kiti was preparing to take action against Nanpei it stepped in and encouraged him to seek redress from the administration. Fritz was anxious to avoid any accusations of partiality but a secret meeting was arranged with Sou en Kiti in Auak at which Fritz promised that the government would compensate the chief financially for the damage done by the Poipois. Sou en Kiti expressed himself satisfied. However the Capuchin Mission now received a garbled version of the encounter which claimed that Sou en Kiti was highly dissatisfied because he had received no written assurance that the administration would settle his case or take his land under protection. Extremely nervous about the implications of this for the peace of the Ponapean community, the Capuchins demanded that Fritz give Sou en Kiti the required document. Fritz refused to do so.² He was convinced from his reading of Ponape's past that the rivalry between the two Christian confessions on Ponape was the real heart of the district disputes and he was therefore very sensitive of his position as representative of the colonial government. 'I want to remain independent and stand above the parties', he wrote in his dairy in 1908.³ Fritz was afraid that any written agreement might be used by the catholic districts to incite the protestants and he told the missions so. There followed an acrimonious correspondence in which the

1. Riesenbergs, Native Polity Ponape p 53.

2. Fritz to Hahl 26 Aug 1908 RKA 3005:112-116; KEM Archives, 59: Deutsche Missions Chronik 1908 pp 60-9.

3. Quoted in Fritz to Hahl 26 Aug 1908.

catholic mission disclaimed all responsibility for the future behaviour of its adherents and Fritz accused the Fathers of trying to enlist the administration in a religious campaign against the protestants, and specifically against Nanpei.¹ The estrangement became more complete when two letters, inspired by Nanpei, arrived from the protestant High Chiefs in the south begging Fritz to curb the activities of the catholics and restrict them to the northern districts.² By mid August relations between the government and the mission were virtually broken off and passions were so inflamed that Fritz felt it necessary to send for a naval vessel and extra police to forestall the outbreak of fighting.

The cruiser SMS Condor sailed in on 2 September, cleared for action and some days later 100 Melanesian police-soldiers from New Guinea were landed. Fritz had already warned the Ponapeans of the impending visit and the quick and punctual arrival of the forces had a salutary effect. A sullen peace prevailed when Hahl arrived in mid September and he grasped immediately that the previous passivity of the island population was gone; now there was a fundamental uneasiness among the Ponapeans. In early October he telegraphed for a second cruiser and requested in addition a further 100 soldiers, with the object of maintaining a garrison on the island until the tension had eased.³ Some weeks later the gunboat SMS Jaguar arrived from Kiautschou.

With the Melanesians Fritz was able to resume work on the road to the south, an urgent project now in view of the unrest and in the next six months, a twenty kilometre road was cut through the island into Kiti and one southwest into Palikir. At the beginning of March 1909 the landing corps of the Condor and a detachment of the Melanesians marched ceremoniously

1. KMM Archives, 69: Mission Fathers to Fritz 12 Aug 1908, Fritz to Mission 16 Aug 1908. P. Crescentius to Fritz 20 Aug 1908, also RKA 3005:115,117-123; Fritz, Ad Majorem Die Gloriam pp 43-9, 59ff.

2. Hambruch, Ponape I:289-290.

3. Hahl to RKA 7 July 1908 RKA 3005:71.

from the colony to Kiti district to demonstrate the administration's new capacity for mobility. The journey took twelve hours. During these months the district chiefs were all collected on board the German ships to witness their range and firepower and their ability to attack close inshore. A number of troublesome half-caste survivors of the Spanish period were transported to New Guinea and arrangements were made to remove to the Marianas over 600 outislanders who had been on Ponape since a typhoon in 1907 had destroyed their atolls and who were in danger of being used as mercenaries in the district conflicts.¹

These measures restored some of the moral authority of the German regime but they also heralded a new phase in its relations with the islanders. The era of temporization was over. The administration was committed to a policy of positive economic and social development and to a more rigorous control over the political activities of the Ponapean districts. It was evident that the Germans had been only tolerated until now. Hundreds of firearms were still being hoarded in various parts of Ponape and it was the general feeling that serious disorder could occur at any time because of the increased pressures on the people. Fritz, who considered the Ponapeans to be a mercurial, unpacified people torn by class conflicts, inter-district envy and religious strife, instituted armed patrols for men working on government projects while the defence forces of the European colony were kept constantly mobilized in case of trouble.² The Germans were approaching the stage which the Spanish had reached two decades before.

Fritz and Hahl were of one mind that there was no going back from this position. The honour and reputation of Germany, and incidentally

1. BA/MA, 5121: Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Condor 6 Sept 1908 and 27 Oct 1908, and Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Jaguar 10 April 1909; Fritz to Hahl 13 Oct 1908 RKA 3005:197: Annual Reports 1908/09.
2. Fritz to Hahl 26 Aug 1908 RKA 3005:124; Fritz to Hahl 7 Jan 1909 RKA 3006: 10-12. See also Hahl to RKA 30 Sept 1908 and Missionsbote Nr.1 Jan 1909.

of her local officials, depended on the successful completion of the new social and economic tasks. They both therefore pressed the Colonial Office for funds to establish a proper peace-keeping force in the Carolines to ensure that all the reforms were carried through. A naval vessel stationed in Ponape waters, 200 soldiers and a network of roads were the prerequisites they envisaged. To offset the cost of constructing the roads with voluntary labour, since the planned public corvee was momentarily out of the question, Fritz argued for an extra fiscal grant of 40000 Marks over the next two years.¹

However the recent unrest had begun to raise doubts in Berlin about the wisdom of an aggressive forward policy which involved the risk of native rebellion on an island which in any case possessed so little value for the Reich. Ponape was the least opened up of any of the Caroline Islands in 1908 and could only expect a very modest absolute rate of economic growth. In the circumstances, the State Secretary for Colonies, Dernburg, was willing to consider the withdrawal of the administrative apparatus from Ponape but he was deterred by Hahl's argument that unless Ponape was pacified, there was a real likelihood of disturbances spreading to other, more populous islands in the group.² Germany had no choice but to stay. Dernburg's solution to the dilemma was to refuse Fritz's request for extra finance, order the withdrawal of the troops still there and in December 1908 to instruct Fritz to follow Hahl's own original procedure and 'hold the ring', leaving the process of development to the Ponapeans themselves. The naval authorities had already advised that a second cruiser was due to be appointed to the Pacific in 1909/10 which should ease the patrolling strain on SMS Condor.³

1. Fritz to Hahl 26 Aug 1908; Fritz to Hahl 21 July 1908 RKA 3005:94; Hahl to RKA 30 Sept 1908 RKA 3005:166-7; Fritz to Hahl 7 Jan 1909 RKA 3006:10-12
2. Hahl to RKA 5 Nov 1908 and 17 Nov 1908 RKA 3005:156,211; Also RKA to Hahl 15 Oct 1908 RKA 3005:76.
3. Dernburg to Hahl 14 Nov 1908 and Dernburg to Hahl and Fritz 9 Dec 1908 RKA 3005:171,173-4.

During the next nine months the island colony stagnated as the administration resumed a defensive posture. In February and March 1909, Fritz was able to obtain the grudging consent of Kiti, Madolenihaw and then Uh to the proposed alterations in land tenure. The chiefs were won over partly by the thought of the relatively large compensation which they would share (an average 1000 Marks for each High Chief and another 700 Marks to be distributed among the main chiefs of each tribe),¹ but the continued presence of SMS Jaguar and Nanpei's persuasions also played a prominent role. A surveyor was brought in to begin the registration of land holdings and the first compulsory work periods got under way. Although the three southern tribes completed their obligation for 1909, as well as Not, which accepted the reforms hesitantly later in the year, the results were not encouraging. Anxious not to provoke the natives and the wrath of the Colonial Office, Fritz let the work proceed in a haphazard fashion, with no European supervision and with workers coming and going virtually whenever they liked. The projects lacked any serious coordination or direction and Fritz made hardly any headway with the public works after the 1909 series was finished.²

While the commoners of the northern district of Sokehs were not unsympathetic to the German land innovations a number of the chiefs refused to accept them in 1909. The dissidents were led by the leading trader and warrior of the district, Soumadau en Sokehs, a section chief of the ruling clan, Kawäth, whose prestige, energy and influence so eclipsed that of the weak and vacillating High Chief (Wasai) that Soumadau was the effectual chief executive of the district. Soumadau was the embodiment of Sokehs' fiercely independent reputation. The district had long

1. Annual Reports, 1908/1909.

2. Boeder to Hahl 15 April 1910 RKA 2763:150; KEM Archives, 76: 'Der Aufstand auf Ponape' n.d., P. Kilian Müller; ibid., 70: P. Venantius to P. Kilian Müller 20 June 1910.

considered itself the foremost among the five on the island and was the scene of the first revolt against the Spanish in 1887. Though later forced onto the side of the Spaniards in distrust of the south, Sokehs continued to retain a sense of superiority over Europeans and jealously guarded its isolation on the small island of the same name, separated from the mainland by a narrow channel. It was Sokehs which resisted Berg's disarmament campaign in 1905; Soumadau was even supposed to have been behind a plot in early 1908 to kill the visiting administrator Stückhardt because he had confiscated several firearms from the Sokehs people during his short stay.¹ Soumadau was known as a steadfast defender of traditional Ponapean life (Lamalam en Ponape) and he opposed the German reforms because they would mean a loss of traditional chiefly privileges and income as well as destroying the clan control of land.²

The majority of the northern chiefs were suspicious of the changes because they imagined them to be the inspiration of Nanpei, who they saw as benefiting from the new land distribution. Convinced that Nanpei sought to make himself the most powerful chief in Ponape, the leaders of Sokehs regarded Nanpei's collaboration with the Germans as a bid to strengthen his own position at the expense of other Ponapean chiefs. Nanpei himself had spread the rumour that the Germans had made an agreement with him to take the cultivation of the land in every district into his hands.³ With such misgivings in Sokehs, Fritz was unable to move them to accept the German plans for 1909 and he was in no position to force them since he had not only promised that the reforms would be subject to district approval but he was also without military support to assert German rule. However, after the mediation of the catholic mission, which assured the Sokehs chiefs that the

1. Hambruch, Ponape, I:292-3.

2. KMM Archives, 75: 'Die Ursachen des Aufstandes der Jokaschleute', 27 Nov 1910; Bascom, Ponape, p 13; Riesenber, Native Polity Ponape, pp 27,28, 71,78.

3. KMM Archives, 59: Deutsche Missions Chronik 1908, pp 47-8.

reforms were 'a government affair' and nothing to do with Nanpei, they were persuaded to consider a work period for 1910 and let the survey of their land holdings go ahead.¹

Suddenly in October 1909 Fritz was transferred to Yap, to take over the government of the western Carolines, and Ponape received its fifth imperial administrator in ten years. He was Carl Boeder and he came directly from Daressalam in East Africa with a record of long and valuable experience in colonial administration.

c) The Sokehs Rebellion and the Sunset of German Rule, 1909 to 1914:

When Boeder arrived in Ponape on 14 December 1909 a cloud of lethargy enveloped the island. The absence of real rapport between natives and government, a chronic lack of finance, and continual changes in official personnel had brought most administrative activity to a virtual halt. Boeder found himself in a difficult position, inhibited by the negative attitude of the Colonial Office towards an energetic policy of development and yet saddled with the reform initiative taken by Hahl and Fritz. His personality was probably ill-suited to the monotonous life of a small close-knit island community isolated from the rest of the world; his experience in Africa was certainly no guarantee of success in dealing with Pacific Islanders. A correct and rather distant man, Boeder tended to assume that his personality and authority would ensure peaceful solutions to any problems which might arise between the two cultural communities. Towards native problems he possessed a basic good will but he was authoritarian and demanding, and he brought with him from Africa the conviction that the rod was a legitimate and effective method of instilling 'colonial discipline' into fundamentally

1. P. Kilian Müller to Karlowa 28 Jan 1911 RKA 2589:61; KGM Archives, 75:
P. Kilian Müller to Zentrumsfraktion 9 Feb 1911.

primitive peoples. With these attitudes, and despite the warnings of his predecessor, Boeder set out to reinvigorate the German presence on his own initiative.

The new administrator was rather contemptuous of what he conceived as Fritz's lack of firmness with Sokehs and with the other districts over the compulsory labour question, and his first objectives were to renegotiate the issue of Sokehs' approval of the reforms as well as make the system of labour more efficient. Throughout February 1910 Boeder put pressure on the chiefs of Sokehs, mainly through the irresolute Wasai, to begin their work period at once, arguing that the Ponapeans could only enjoy increasing prosperity if they all worked hard and obeyed the government's orders. At an assembly on 16 March the reforms were publicly accepted, albeit under duress, with Boeder exhorting the district to show its industriousness and avoid punishment.¹

The compulsory labour periods got under way in April with the retracing of old roads to Kiti and Sokehs. Of Fritz's road through the island to the south coast only one and a half kilometres were still passable, the rest overgrown and fallen into disrepair. Boeder aimed to recut the road but only to convey an impression of continuity of policy for he had already decided that the road was economically and militarily of no use since it took more than ten hours to travel its length to Kiti. His plan was then for a new road to touch most of the sections around the coast and one along the foreshores of Sokehs Island, which would give easier access to its interior.² Once the work began the Ponapeans found themselves suddenly subjected to the new, distasteful regimentation of supervision by

1. Report on discussions Sokehs chiefs 15 Feb 1910 and Record of approval by Sokehs people 16 March 1910. Nachlass Boeder: RKA 3009:197-200; Boeder to Hahl 15 April 1910 RKA 2763, 148-151.
2. BA/MA, 5186, Vol 13: Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Condor, 30 Dec 1909; Boeder to RKA 12 July 1910 RKA 3006:115.

a European by the name of Hollborn, a former employee of the Jaluit Gesellschaft who had recently joined the administration. Soumadau made it clear that Sokehs in particular resented this; perhaps it awakened memories of the Spanish period. To quieten the chief Boeder appointed him as a second overseer, to work in conjunction with Hollborn, at the rate of two Marks a day.¹ Its effect was only temporary. At the end of April the Sokehs chiefs were informed unexpectedly that they had also agreed in the February negotiations to work a second period of fifteen days in 1910 to make up for the one which they had refused to perform under Fritz in 1909. Soumadau, the Wasai and the Nahnken protested bitterly that they had not understood this part of the negotiations and were not in agreement with the new imposition. The three chiefs remained unimpressed by the argument that they would gain a significant pecuniary advantage from a second period: they feared that the people would balk at the demand and refuse to pay tribute any longer to the chiefs.²

This aspect of the reforms was causing general dissatisfaction in Ponape. The chiefs began to resent the fact, now made clear to them for the first time, that they had to forfeit tribute from the people permanently with the implementation of the new order. Tributary labour and the first fruits from tenants' harvests were the only sources of income for some chiefs and consequently the money to be divided after the work periods among only the main chiefs was small compensation for the majority. Boeder began to encounter resistance to the scheme, not only from the chiefs but from the common people also who supported the chiefs' appeal to halve the amount of compensation and allow tribute to go on being paid.³ Boeder refused

1. KMM Archives, 75: 'Die Ursachen des Aufstandes', Hambruch.
2. Hollborn to Boeder 21 April 1910. Boeder Nachlass: RKA 3009:214-217.
3. Boeder to Hahl 8 July 1910 RKA 3006:120; Record of discussion with Wasai of Sokehs 18 May 1910. Boeder Nachlass: RKA 3009:222: Ms:Hambruch KMM Archives, 75: 'Die Ursachen des Aufstandes', Hambruch.

to allow this and in addition he made it clear that voluntary acceptance of the reforms did not mean that the islanders could withdraw at will. Boeder's vision of a quickly constructed network of roads for Ponape began to fade as natives refused to work outside their districts and the organization of work faltered in consequence.¹

The most persistent resistance came from Sokehs which took great offence at the exaction of a second labour period. Boeder had ignored the fact that his predecessor, Fritz, had waived the fulfillment of the 1909 obligation for Sokehs and he seemed deliberately to be provoking the district by ordering that the second work period be used to build the projected road around the island, thereby compelling the people to destroy their coveted isolation and expose Sokehs to unwanted influences from the mainland.² Throughout May protests and complaints about the administration's injustice continued to be made by Soumadau and the Wasai and the smouldering unrest was manifest on the roadworks where Sokehs natives carried long knives and Hollborn had difficulty in extracting obedience. At one time he even threatened to have Soumadau punished if he continued to obstruct him in his duties.³ The Sokehs people, led by Soumadau, completed their first fifteen days ill-humoredly and demanded a month's interval to attend to their crops before beginning the second period. The administration could not even get voluntary day-labourers to maintain the works until Soumadau's wage was raised to four Marks a day. Soumadau however seems to have encouraged the discontent and by the end of May there was a definite groundswell of opinion against Boeder and his subordinates.⁴

1. Boeder to Hahl 15 April 1910 RKA 2763:150-1.
2. KMM Archives, 76: 'Der Aufstand auf Ponape', P. Kilian Müller, p 2.
3. Hollborn to Boeder 30 April 1910 Boeder Nachlass. RKA 3009:219-220
4. Boeder to RKA 10 July 1910 RKA 3006:122ff; KMM Archives, 75: 'Die Ursachen des Aufstandes', Hambruch; 'Tagebuchblätter von P. Ignatius, Ponape', in Aus den Missionen. Jahresbericht 1911, p 21.

Boeder was aware that something was afoot in Sokehs but he discounted its importance, feeling secure enough to embark on an official tour of the Carolines at the end of May with half of the fifty Melanesian soldiers. No sooner had he left the colony, than the Superior of the Capuchin Mission hastened to Boeder's young deputy, the Secretary Brauckmann, to inform him that the Not people had warned of a plot by Sokehs, Soumadau at its head, to attack the colony on 31 May. Simultaneously the people of Auak arrived to defend the colony and the police master Kammerich was mobilizing his little band, having also heard of a plot. Brauckmann however gave little credence to the Capuchin Father's report. Relations between the administration and the catholic mission had never fully recovered since the latter's collision with Fritz over the Sou en Kiti affair. Brauckmann ordered Kammerich to release the police for normal duties and went straight to Sokehs where he found everything in order. With some relief he told the mission that he felt the matter was all 'idle talk'.¹

In the days that followed Ponapeans began appearing in the colony with their long knives or lurking around the perimeter, while the Uh people, fearful of a revolt, came to remove their relatives from the government hospital. Though Brauckmann had since heard from different sides that an assembly took place on Sokehs in late May, in which the question of attacking the Europeans was aired, he took no action beyond ordering the arrest of any native seen in the colony with a knife. The few who were apprehended he let go again immediately.² Brauckmann was handicapped by his lack of experience of the Ponapean situation, his ignorance of the language and the fact that he was dependent on an interpreter who apparently kept the Sokehs people informed of all that went on in the administrative offices. There does seem to have been a plot constructed by Soumadau, which failed to come off because

1. Brauckmann to RKA 30 May 1910 Boeder Nachlass: RKA 3009-113; Note by Brauckmann 31 May 1910 Brauckmann Nachlass: RKA 3009:225.
2. Notes by Brauckmann 5 June 1910 and 6-7 June and 18 June 1910. Brauckmann Nachlass: RKA 3009:225-7.

the High Chief and the Nahnken were against it and the Not people, traditional allies, refused to help. Kammerich's vigilance and the fortuitous appearance of a Jaluit Gesellschaft schooner also helped to discourage the ringleaders.¹

Boeder returned on 24 June but like Brauckmann he refused to take the matter seriously, declaring that the unrest was simply 'the empty talk and bragging of some hotspurs' who were discontented with roadwork. Rather than act against the 'hotspurs' in Sokehs Boeder thought it 'politically more astute' to threaten them with naval intervention if they created trouble. A visit by the East Asian Cruiser Squadron was already scheduled for early July but Boeder deliberately kept it a secret from the islanders so as to give greater efficacy to his threats. The squadron arrived promptly on 2 July but contrary to the expectations of Boeder's staff and the rest of the European community, the administrator made no effort to punish those responsible for the growing agitation on Sokehs. Instead Boeder was satisfied with the 'moral impression' which the collection of vessels was supposed to have on the Ponapeans, encouraging them to visit the ships and arranging for parades by the 400 members of the Squadron's landing corps. Boeder does not seem to have considered that the mere external display of size and power might already be an outdated sanction in the circumstances of Ponape or that his self-conceived leniency might be taken as proof of weakness by the dissidents of Sokehs. At the end of the banquets, the manoeuvres and the parades, Boeder once more felt master of the situation and was able to declare: 'I believe that in the foreseeable future there is nothing to be feared from the natives'.² So confident was he that he decided not to go ahead with the reinforcing of the island's police troop as he had been planning.

1. Notes by Brauckmann 31 May 1910 & 18 June 1910; Hambruch, Ponape. I:299.
2. Boeder to RKA 10 July 1910 RKA 3006:122ff; See also Militärpolitische Bericht Kreuzergeschwader (Guhler) 23 July 1910. Copy in RKA 3006:154-8; KLM Archives, 75: 'Mitteilungen über den Aufstand auf Ponape 1910/11', P. Gebhardt, 15 Feb 1911.

Unfortunately for Boeder's optimism the difficulties with Sokehs began all over again when they were told they must now complete their second work period. Soumadau and the leading chiefs kept up their complaints and queries while the road labourers continued to disobey Hollborn. In August, at a time when there was not a ship of any kind in Ponape and the island was effectively cut off from the outside world, the Wasai of Sokehs, inspired by Soumadau, demanded from Boeder an increase in the day wage of the road labourers. Boeder refused, threatened the Wasai with deportation and threw him bodily out of his office.¹

Such actions increasingly excited the hostility of all Ponapeans. After July Boeder introduced corporal punishment as a punitive sanction against anyone guilty of lying, insubordination or 'shameless behaviour' towards whites. His innovations also included a special convicts' uniform for Ponapeans in prison and the shaving of their heads, regarded as a particular insult by the sensitive islanders.² Despite the fact that there were, from that point on, clear warnings that beatings would cause the Ponapeans to rise up against the Germans, Boeder seems to have made no concessions to indigenous sensibilities. He began to acquire a reputation for cruelty and contempt: a tradition exists that he would use a drawn revolver to interrogate natives during a trial and occasionally shoot it off in their faces to frighten them; if he stumbled on a stone or a coconut while on an expedition he would fly into a rage and threaten to beat his guides and bearers.³

Then in September Boeder had the first thrashing administered, to a Kiti man who had lied to the authorities. The ethnologist, Paul Hambruch, at that time travelling round the island, reported to Boeder that a secret society was now being mobilized in all the districts with Soumadau

1. Boeder to Hahl 19 Sept 1910 RKA 3006:180-1; Girschner to RKA 20 Nov 1910 RKA 3009:111.

2. Hambruch, Ponape, I:300.

3. Bascom, Ponape, p 13; See also KMM Archives, 76: P. Ignatius report 27 Dec 1910; Nanpei to Mr. Antonio Saipan 11 Dec 1910 in RKA 2589:95.

as its leader, dedicated to the Lanclam en Ponape, and planning the overthrow of white rule.¹ Boeder seemed oblivious of any danger and disregarded the persistent warnings of the catholic mission itself that Soumadau was the main troublemaker and should be deported for the peace of Sokehs and Ponape. SMS Cormoran came and went in September without any action being taken. On 17 October 1910, when one of the Sokehs labourers, Nan ponpei Maluk, was reported by Hollborn for insubordination, Boeder had no hesitation in ordering ten strokes with a wire-lined rubber hose.² It was the spark to ignite the tinder. That night an emotional meeting took place on Sokehs island at which the marks of the beating were exhibited. There existed by now two parties among the Sokehs: the one was led by the Nahnken and advocated compromise and cooperation with the German regime; the other was led by Soumadau and his brother, Naumatonore, who had great influence over the Wasai. Theirs was the stronger.³ Nan ponpei Maluk was a member of the clan Kawäth, Soumadau's and the Wasai's own, and Soumadau called for war to make away with the Germans as had been done with the Spanish. Regional loyalties and the demands of clan vengeance ranged the district behind Soumadau in the heat of the moment.

Early the next morning when Hollborn and the recently-arrived road engineer, Häfner, came to Sokehs to begin work, Soumadau and his followers refused point-blank to take up their tools and began to converge on the two men.⁴ They immediately took refuge in the nearby catholic mission quarters, realizing that something was seriously wrong. While the angry Sokehs people surrounded the building shouting for Hollborn's blood, messengers were despatched to the colony to raise the alarm. The first party was turned back and it was not until three o'clock in the afternoon

1. KMM Archives, 75: 'Die Ursachen des Aufstandes', Hambruch; Hambruch, Ponape, I:300.
2. Bascom, Ponape, p 13; KMM Archives, 75: P. Venantius to P. Kilian Müller 26 Dec 1910.
3. KMM Archives, 75: 'Mitteilungen über den Aufstand' Gebhardt.
4. The following is from a description by an eye witness: KMM Archives, 75: 'Mitteilungen über den Aufstand'; Also Girschner to RKA 20 Nov 1910 RKA 3009:103ff; Hambruch, Ponape, I:302.

that three mission helpers were able to get through. Boeder immediately rowed over to Sokehs with Brauckmann and five Mortlock Islanders. He brusquely refused Kammerich's plea that a troop of Melanesian police soldiers be allowed to accompany him, thinking perhaps that a military response would only further provoke the natives;¹ he certainly assumed that the dissidents would recognize his authority and submit to talking.

Boeder arrived on Sokehs about four o'clock where he was met by Hollborn, Häfner and the mission fathers who had managed to slip out of the house. They were amazed that he was without military escort and tried to persuade him of the danger. Waving them away, Boeder went up towards the Ponapean settlement to confront the Wasai. He had gone only 200 metres when he was shot twice in the stomach; a frenzied crowd rushed on the other whites. Brauckmann, Hollborn and Häfner were hacked down with knives or shot as they attempted to escape in Boeder's boat and four of the five Mortlock Islanders were also killed. Boeder, who had not been killed outright, was finished off by Soumadau and his body mutilated by the people after the old Ponapean fashion of dealing with a hated enemy. All the bodies were then thrown into the sea. Only the two Capuchins, Fathers Gebhardt and Venantius, were saved when they took refuge in the church and a group of loyal women prevented an attack on them.²

The insurrection, though decided upon the previous evening, was almost spontaneous in its execution, and the main objects of their hatred removed, the passions of the Sokehs people quickly subsided. It was this spontaneity and the immediately ensuing feeling that the crimes against the district had been expiated which probably saved the colony. The most senior German official remaining, the local doctor Girschner, set out by boat for Sokehs as soon as the first confused reports reached him. Half-way there he encountered the two Capuchin Fathers, who had been allowed

1. Kammerich to Bezirksamtman 15 May 1911 RKA 3010:24.

2. 'Tagebuchblätter P. Ignatius', Aus den Missionen, 1911, p 17.

by the rebels to depart in a canoe. Advised by the priests that the people were in 'a raging fury' and that there was nothing he could do, Girschner returned to the colony to organize its defences.¹ No attempt was made by the rebels to shoot Girschner in his boat, though it would have been an easy matter and would have left the colony at their mercy.

The Europeans were in a critical plight. There were less than fifty of them in a settlement with a two kilometre perimeter and no walls, protected by only fifty police soldiers. The rebels numbered at least 250 and it was quickly learned that ninety rifles and new ammunition appeared among them, as well as an old cannon and a case of dynamite stolen from the roadworks.² Furthermore the other districts on the island were as yet an unknown quantity and no ship was scheduled to arrive in Ponape for at least six weeks.

In these circumstances Girschner took a gamble. He had lived on the island for ten years and had managed to acquire the respect and affection of the Ponapeans for his medical care and sympathetic attitude towards them. Now he called on the other districts to show their loyalty and come to the defence of the colony. Within twenty four hours, about 450 Ponapeans from Madolenihmw, Uh and Kiti, as well as Not and Auak, traditional allies of Sokehs, were encamped in the colony and around its perimeter. Stone walls were built, barbed wire erected, the ground cleared and sentries posted. Girschner even distributed 100 rifles to parties of the loyalists in order to counter the firepower of the Sokehs rebels. These measures did not meet the unanimous approval of the remaining Europeans: some expected all the islanders to make common cause against the whites at the earliest opportunity.³ However Girschner's policy capitalized on

1. Girschner to RKA 20 Nov 1910 RKA 3009:105.

2. Kpt.Lt. Gartzke, 'Der Aufstand in Ponape und seine Niederwerfung durch SM Schiffe Emden, Nurnberg, Cormoran und Planet', Marine Rundschau 1911 6. Heft (Sonderabdruck). pp 6-7.

3. Dulk to Bezirksamtman 20 May 1911, Jahn to Bezirksamtman 16 May 1911 and Kammerich to Bezirksamtman 15 May 1911. RKA 3010:24.

the enmity which had grown up between Sokehs and the southern districts, and by offering an opportunity to the southern districts in particular to take up arms against Sokehs, it probably localized the revolt to the one district, at least for the time being. That Hot and Luak hastened to the side of the administration was due largely to the influence of the catholic mission in those areas, and it demonstrated conclusively that the religious dichotomy between the north and the south had nothing to do with the revolt.

There were ample signs that the heat of the insurrection had been fanned and maintained by only a few among the Sokehs, that it was an explosion of frustration more in defence of the kinship principle than a wholehearted general rejection of foreign hegemony. In the days and weeks which followed the rising, no concerted assault was made on the colony. The rebels confined themselves to nocturnal snipings and foraging raids which in most cases were directed against Ponapeans of the loyal districts rather than Europeans. A party of outlander labourers and their Spanish overseer, based at the Sokehs roadworks, were allowed to return to the colony unscathed and a half-hearted demand for the surrender of the colony's weapons was sent by Soumadau. When Girschner enjoined the Sokehs to disarm and pleaded with those who had not participated in the murder to surrender, he was sent a letter declaring: 'Thank you for your goodness, but we cannot come; we fear that we have committed too great a sin'.¹ The Wasai explained in a message that the uprising was the result of abuses by Boeder and Hollborn and specifically of the beating on 17 September. Prison or exile might have been tolerated with resignation but they would rather die before they let themselves be treated 'like pigs'.² The Sokehs proceeded to dig themselves in on the inaccessible twin peaks of the island. They cleared a line of fire, erected fortifications and waited fatalistically for invasion

1. Quoted in 'Tagebuchblätter P. Ignatius', Aus den Missionen 1911, p 24.
2. Girschner to RKA 20 Nov 1910 RKA 3009:107. See also HII Archives, 75: 'Die Ursachen des Aufstandes', Hambruch; Bascom, Ponape, p 13.

by the Germans.

They had to wait a long time. Not until the end of November did the post vessel, Germania, touch at Ponape and carry the news to New Guinea. It was 26 December before Berlin heard. Meanwhile Deputy Governor Oswald, administering New Guinea in Hahl's absence in Europe, sent 172 native police to relieve the beleaguered colony and remove the necessity of its being defended by other Ponapeans. He also requested a fleet of cruisers from the East Asian Squadron, marines, and a new district administrator to take Boeder's place and direct operations. The requests were granted immediately for the assumption had ruled in New Guinea and in the Colonial Office from the beginning that only a long and full-scale marine assault could hope to restore Germany's authority in a situation such as now existed in Ponape.¹ Not only did the authorities expect the most bitter resistance from the Sokehs rebels but they believed, from the history of the Spanish period, that any attempt at appeasement or reconciliation with them would simply add fuel to the fire. The official response to the revolt had important repercussions for Germany's future ability to do anything with the island so the Ponapeans, whether rebellious or loyal, were to be left no doubt that Germany was master of Ponape and the Carolines and meant to carry off her colonial plans. It was therefore generally agreed that the rebel leaders should be executed when caught and the entire district banished from the group.²

By 10 January 1911 the cruisers Emden, Nürnberg, Leipzig and Cormoran, together with SMS Planet from New Guinea and the armed schooner Orion, were all anchored in Ponape's north western harbour, with over 300 German marines on board, inexperienced but enthusiastic. In the following days they proceeded to shell the heights of Sokehs Island while Captain

1. See pages 96-7.

2. Telegram Oswald 26 Dec 1910 RKA 3009:6; Oswald to RKA 29 Dec 1910 RKA 3009: 125-132; Girschner to RKA 20 Nov 1910.

Vollerthun of SMS Emden worked out the plan of operations with the newly-arrived administrator, Dr. Kersting, who had insisted that he be given supreme authority in the organization of the campaign as well as in maintaining responsibility for relations with the native community.

On 13 January, the marines made a completely unopposed landing on the northern foreshores of Sokehs Island, and prepared themselves for a struggle of several days to drive the Sokehs from the fortified heights of the island. But on the same afternoon Kersting arrived in the front lines and prevailed upon the senior officer to make an immediate attack on the enemy's main position, the Apalberg, arguing that surprise was the only hope of overcoming the stolid resistance of the islanders. Before the main contingent of troops had been landed, and with the help of the Melanesian police who had to be prodded upwards step by step, the Apalberg was stormed and taken under heavy fire. The other peak of the island was captured soon after.¹

The speed with which this initial victory was achieved surprised the Germans but they did not alter their opinion about the difficulty of the task which still lay before them. Only two of the Sokehs defenders had been killed and none were captured. More urgently, if once the rebels were able to reach the mainland they would be in a position to wage an almost endless jungle war with the German troops.

To forestall this possibility, a land and sea blockade of the little island had been set up at the beginning, consisting of the police troops, half the marines and the ships Nürnberg and Planet. They were all to no avail for in the week following the conquest of the peaks, Sounadau and most of his band slipped through the cordon at night. Search parties combed the island for a week, seeking out probable hiding places, and managed to catch thirty men and eighty four women and children, but none

1. Jahn to Bezirksamtmann 16 May 1911 RKA 3010:24; Gartzke, 'Der Aufstand in Ponape', pp 12-15.

had played a significant role in the revolt.¹

Meanwhile the administration, under Kersting, proceeded to organize the logistical support for the operations. His first task was to ensure that the unrebelling districts remained firmly in administrative control and were given no opportunity to consider throwing in their lot with Sokehs. Despite their ostensible loyalty in coming to the colony's defence on 18 September, the Ponapeans, while there, had not conducted themselves without blemish. There had been cases of robbery and pillage of stores, and quarrels between the districts, while rumours abounded that strong links existed between the 'loyalists' and the rebels. This was one reason for their dismissal after the arrival of the first Melanesian reinforcements and it had been accompanied by a sigh of relief from the European community.² Kersting, who was anxious to avoid any impression that the Germans were weak and irresolute, now ordered the chiefs of the other four districts to provide supplies for the troops, guides and interpreters, bearers and canoes. He warned them that their only hope of preventing the war from ravaging their farms and possessions lay in cooperating with the regime in reporting rebel movements and delivering any whom they caught to the government.³ In this way Kersting managed to set up, if by duress, a workable intelligence service on which the manoeuvres of the German troops were based. He also constructed camps near the colony where captured Sokehs people could be detained, and arranged medical and general welfare services for them through the missions. For the later stages of the campaign, Kersting, largely on his own initiative, formulated a strategy whereby small detachments of troops would be stationed in various parts of Ponape and billeted on the loyal natives, to search for and constantly

1. BA/MA, 3438, Telegram Emden to Admiralstab 31 Jan 1911.

2. Dulk to Bezirksamtman 20 May 1911 RKA 3010:24; 'Tagebuchblätter P. Ignatius', Aus den Missionen, pp 26,28.

3. Kersting to Gouverneur Rabaul 10 June 1911 RKA 3010:24.

harass the enemy. Kersting's experience in African bush wars in Togo had taught him that the only way to success in such a campaign was to take guerilla tactics to his opponents.¹

In the last two weeks of January, the sorties on Sokehs Island were extended to the mainland and the Germans occupied the sub-district of the Palikir people, who had pledged their support to Sokehs. By 25 January there were 250 Sokehs men, women and children in German hands, among them only five men directly involved in Boeder's murder. On the 26 January the entire group of prisoners was transported to Yap. The districts of Palikir and its neighbour Tomara were then shelled by the waiting cruisers and the farms razed to the ground so as to deny the enemy any secure home base for his activities.²

Suddenly, on 25 January, the Superior of the Capuchin Mission received information from the High Chief of Not district that Soumdau and his remaining followers had entrenched themselves in the interior at Nankiop, where an old Spanish fortress was built on the side of a cliff. Nankiop was the symbolic centre of the Kawäth clan, its legendary place of origin. It was also an exceptionally difficult position to attack, with a tower and stone walls from which to fire, protected by almost sheer drops on three sides and with a high cliff at its back. It seems that the Sokehs people were making ready for a final, organized stand.³

Next day two companies of marines and Melanesians were sent to make a frontal assault while the landing corps of SMS Emden worked its way round by a secret path to attack the rebels on their most unexpected flank. Unfortunately the Emden corps became lost on the way and arrived three hours late, by which time the main force had suffered heavily from

1. Kersting to Vollerthun 11 Jan 1911 and 24 Jan 1911 RKA 3009:321-2; Kersting to RKA 15 Nov 1911 RKA 3010:112-121.
2. Amtsblatt für das Schutzgebiet Neuguinea. Rabaul 15 Feb 1911 pp 19ff.
3. Bascom, Ponape, p 13.

accurate Ponapean fire. At 5 p.m., as darkness was falling, the fortress was finally stormed, but at the decisive moment Soumadau and his men retreated up the cliff behind them without a single casualty and leaving three Germans dead and eight wounded.¹ The authorities were more concerned than surprised at this rather pyrrhic victory. If Soumadau were to repeat his Nankiop tactics at every encounter he could take a heavy toll of German life and remain virtually untouched.² They were not to know that the Sokehs rebels had been virtually demoralized by this defeat at the traditional clan home and their cohesiveness as a fighting force had been destroyed. From now on, they were split into small groups which wandered aimlessly around seeking food and shelter and trying to avoid the German troops.³

Kersting's harassment strategy had been by this time put into operation and detachments of sixty men each were placed in Kiti, Tomoro, Palikir and Nankiop. In addition Kersting had the loyalist Ponapeans harvest all the crops in the areas of fighting so as to gradually starve the rebels into submission. These procedures hastened the dissolution of the smaller and smaller bands of Sokehs, and as hunger, sickness and the denial of solace from the other districts took their effect, surrenders became more frequent. By 8 February another 137 persons had been delivered to the administration, leaving a core of about thirty or forty young and committed supporters of Soumadau.⁴

Two days after Nankiop, Soumadau had been traced further inland to Impeip, where he had established camp. For a week the German forces quietly deployed themselves in a ring round the area to prevent his escape but when, on 2 February, they closed in, Soumadau and his followers

1. BA/MA, 3438, Telegram Emden to Admiralstab 18 Feb 1911; Kersting to Gouverneur Rabaul 9 Feb 1911 RKA 3009:336; Amtsblatt Neuguinea 1 March 1911 p 27.
2. Kersting to Gouverneur Rabaul 10 June 1911 RKA 3010:24.
3. KSM Archives, 76: P. Ignatius to Provinzial 13 Feb 1911.
4. Amtsblatt Neuguinea 1 March 1911 pp 27-8.

were found to have as quietly disappeared.¹ The ease with which the rebels had eluded the combined German forces since the storming of Sokehs Island was proof that Soumadau possessed the potential to fight a long and effective guerrilla war but it soon became evident that most of his followers lacked the tenacity and endurance, not to mention the commitment, to suffer the constant hardships which such a campaign involved. After Impeip the remaining group was reduced to a nomadic existence in a futile attempt to tire the European troops. Disenchantment with their cause grew and by 12 February only Soumadau and his closest accomplices were still at large. Kersting suspected that those who had surrendered lately were induced to throw themselves upon the mercy of the Germans by evidence of the 'honourable and occasionally compassionate treatment' which captured rebels had hitherto received. He was convinced however that since Soumadau and the ringleaders knew they could expect no mercy, they would fight to the end.²

Consequently the administration was genuinely surprised when, on 13 February, Soumadau and five of the ringleaders gave themselves up to the chief Nos en Not; the rest followed suit within a few days. By 22 February the last of the Sokehs warriors was in German hands and the military operations could be declared officially at an end.³

A court-martial was convened on 23 February and representatives from the two missions and the trading community joined with Kersting, Girschner and a naval member to try summarily those accused of the murder of Boeder and his companions. Though each of the leading Sokehs figures was given a full opportunity to defend himself, European arguments throughout the proceedings laid stress, less on the justice of the result, which was already to them a foregone conclusion, than on the necessity to make an

1. Gartzke, 'Der Aufstand in Ponape', p 28.

2. Kersting to Gouverneur Rabaul 10 June 1911 RKA 3010:24.

3. BA/MA, 3438: Telegram Emden to Admiralstab 4 March 1911.

effective example which would deter malcontents in the future. The bulk of the evidence revealed that there had been deep dissatisfaction in Sokehs with Boeder's treatment of them and there were no regrets that he was dead. It also became clear that most of those who participated in the murder and the subsequent revolt, even Soumadau's closest companions, had given no real thought to the implications of their action.¹ A rather naive belief that the Germans could be driven out as had been the Spanish seemed to have strengthened the decision in favour of violent revenge against Hollborn and Boeder and the belief was no doubt encouraged by the fact that none of the districts had ever really experienced the strong hand of Germany until Boeder's arrival. As Deputy Governor Oswald had concluded when he first heard of the uprising:

'In the final analysis they didn't fear us and didn't believe we were earnest in our threats..... We suffered from the mistakes of the Spanish. Perhaps if we had begun energetically this would have been avoided'.²

The trial lasted only a day and the court agreed finally that seventeen of the ringleaders would be immediately executed, several others would be sent to prison with hard labour at the Angau phosphate works, where they would help to relieve the pressing labour shortage, and the remainder of the district would be banished en masse to one of the underpopulated atolls of the Palau group. Only the representative of the navy offered any strong resistance to the decision to execute so many of the rebels and the 'deterrence' arguments of the missionaries and traders, as well as Kersting's concern for consistency of punishment, easily won the day, though Kersting himself was persuaded to acknowledge that Sokehs had suffered under Boeder.³ On 24 February, in front of the assembled inhabitants of the four loyal districts at Kumunlai, an old cemetery and cult place,

1. 'Gerichtsprotokoll des summarischen Verfahrens gegen die Mörder von Boeder und seine Kameraden'. Ponape 23 Feb 1911 RKA 3010:27-101.
2. Oswald to RKA 29 Dec 1910 RKA 3009:132.
3. KMM Archives, 76: P. Venantius to P. Kilian Müller 4 April 1911.

the executions were carried out by firing squad. Soumadau was not permitted to make a speech to the expectant crowd but as he went to his death he quietly asked the bystanders to greet everyone from him and tell them that he and his companions were dying for their sins. The Superior of the Capuchin Mission reported that the convicted all died 'very composed'.¹

With the ending of the Sokehs uprising, the German occupation of Ponape had a little over three years to run. It was a period in which the administration capitalized on the subdued temper of the Ponapeans and on its own new-found reputation for determination and organization. Though there were calls from various quarters for a tougher line towards the islanders and more internal security precautions the Colonial Office took no notice of them, obviously satisfied by the total suppression of the rebellion and the outward acquiescence of the remaining Ponapeans. The new administrator was a man who showed every sign of respecting the indigenous people and their sensitivities and combined an authoritative presence with paternal compassion for the plight of the 'semi-civilized' islanders under European rule. The Pacific cruiser SMS Cormoran was detailed to remain at Ponape until Kersting had taken up the reins of civil administration and 130 police soldiers from New Guinea continued to garrison the colony, but this was to be only a temporary measure and the second cruiser appointed to the Australian station since 1910 was deemed sufficient to deal with any difficulties which might arise. There were however still eighty police in Ponape when war broke out in 1914.²

Kersting wasted no time in reasserting the regime's original priorities and he set about implementing the reform plans of his predecessors

1. 'Tagebuchblätter P. Ignatius', Aus den Missionen, 1911, p34; Hambruch Ponape, p 309.
2. Haber to RKA 2 June 1914 RKA 2996:93; BA/MA, 3438: Telegram Emden to Admiralstab 4 March 1911; Kersting to Gouverneur Rabaul 9 Feb 1911 RKA 3009:337-8.

in a way which would excite least distrust and resistance. Time was extremely important: if the organization of the scheme were allowed to drag on there was the danger of its objectives being diverted along the way or of increasing the likelihood of resistance. Kersting thus discarded the plans for an initial comprehensive survey of Ponapean land holdings. Instead he instituted 'commissions' of the Ponapeans themselves to make maps, set off the limits of each farmstead and erect boundary markers of basalt rock. Written deeds were then issued by the administration which transferred ownership from the chief to the present tenant.¹

Hand in hand with the reform of land tenure went the regulation of inheritance rights. The Germans did not like the traditional system of matrilineal inheritance whereby land fairly automatically went to the descendants of the mother's brother after the death of a tenant or was divided up among several matrilineal descendants. The new German land deeds provided that land should go to the oldest male heir of the tenant and all landless male, as well as female relatives were expected to farm it for the profit of the entire group. In this way the government hoped to eliminate the multiplication of small, uneconomic, scattered pieces of land. Each family was also required to plant 100 coconuts on its farmstead before the new land deed was issued and a cash tax of seven Marks was introduced as an alternative to the annual compulsory labour period.²

All these measures were intended to give the individual Ponapean a greater stake in his own productivity and the incentive to improve it. In addition Kersting tried to restrict the demands which High Chiefs could traditionally make on the time and resources of their commoner tenants. Instead of the customary twenty two feasts, and the offerings of first fruits and special canoes, which a section was expected to make to the

1. BA/MA, 5187, Vol 15: Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Cormoran 23 July 1911; Annual Reports 1911/12 p 149.

2. Bascom, Ponape, pp 67,69.

Nahnwarki and the Nahnken each year, the land deeds stipulated that only one feast, a 'Feast of Honour' need be given annually by a section to the Nahnwarki; all further feasts were non-obligatory. Moreover, a High Chief could only call on a commoner to provide one day's work twice a year. The tax replaced all other forms of tribute and the High Chief was now required to work his own farm, though he was still paid a 'salary' from the proceeds of the annual work periods. Kersting refused to abolish these chiefly annuities arguing that they were an absolute precondition for continuing good relations between government and people.¹

Kersting's methods helped to make foreign overrule more acceptable and offset resistance to the changes, and he was careful to preserve the traditional basis of social control and intra-district stability. It was emphasized that the new autonomy and economic freedom of the individual islander did not eliminate his duty of submission to traditional social sanctions or the lawful demands of his section chief and High Chief. And indeed the traditional patterns of social behaviour continued to operate despite German attempts to alleviate their more demanding aspects. Thus the people continued to offer first fruits and special gifts to the High Chiefs while feasting on a large scale remained an integral part of district relationships and the chiefly prestige competition.

By the end of 1911 Ponape seemed, externally, to have entered an unprecedented era of peace and development. Nine hundred farmsteads had already been measured out and their deeds confirmed, while 400 to 500 labourers had helped to finish the construction of a road to Sokehs. Moreover a road to Oa in Madolenihmw, the infamous site of a Ponapean revolt in Spanish times, was begun without difficulties, and completed in 1912, the people also performing their 1913 work tax period in order to do so. The island of Sokehs was resettled with outislanders from unproductive

1. Kersting to Hahl 21 Jan 1912 RKA 2763:198; Bascom, Ponape, pp 75-7; Riesenbergs, Native Polity Ponape, p 77.

atolls throughout the Carolines and they brought to Ponape specialist skills in fishing, canoe-building and navigation which became recognized economic assets to the island.¹

But evidence had also emerged by the end of 1911 that internally, not all inter-communal conflict had been resolved. In the second half of the year a series of clubs originated among the youth of Madolenihmw and Kiti districts, dedicated to the memory of the Sokehs rebels, especially those executed by the Germans. In secret meetings which apparently developed at times into orgies of debauchery, the Ponapean 'martyrs' were glorified and their deeds recounted. Whether the new phenomena were a political response to the changes now striking deeply into the lives of the islanders and an indication of the dislocation which individuals experienced as more and more Ponapeans were freed from the tight feudal bonds of old, is difficult to say. There seem to have been traces of a reaction against the Liebenzeller Mission's strict prohibitions on tobacco, beer drinking and Sunday entertainment while it is also possible that the clubs were an attempt to revive the old age-grade activities which had faded away before the coming of the Germans.²

Kersting however feared that such a movement nurtured the seeds of incipient revolt. The leading chiefs of Madolenihmw and Kiti were also hostile to it because they regarded such licence as a menace to their authority and the good order of the district communities. Kersting therefore, on their request for intervention, arrested twenty-one of the youths involved and sent them off to New Guinea, from where Hahl later despatched them to the Angau phosphate mines.³

1. Kersting to RKA 15 Nov 1911 RKA 3010:122; Annual Reports 1911/12 p149; 1912/13 p 195; Bascom, Ponape, p 36.
2. Extract from letter of Jaluit Gesellschaft representative Ponape, 28 Sept 1911 in RKA 3006:230-1; BA/MA, 5187, Vol 16: Militärpolitische Bericht SMJ Condor 13 Nov 1911; Hahl to RKA 15 Jan 1913 RKA 2584:107; Bascom, Ponape, p 29.
3. Hahl to RKA 16 Jan 1912 RKA 3007:18.

It was however religion which most raised the prospect of communal unrest and threatened to weaken the island's newly-won stability. Now that the southern districts' main rival in the north had been removed, the old power struggle between north and south more and more took the form of a personal confrontation between Henry Nanpei and the catholic mission. Nanpei had significantly strengthened his position since the Sokehs rebellion. With his land holdings and businesses secured under the new German regime, Nanpei was able to devote himself to his trading enterprises and plantations and hand on a considerable, very prosperous estate to his son Oliver. However he regarded the catholic mission as the one danger to his position. His proposed advisory council of 1907/08 had come to nothing in the changes of German administrative personnel and the subsequent insurrection. Nanpei's access to power as leader of the Protestant party was therefore considerably more exposed to any renewed mission campaign to extend the catholics' influence. With the hold which the mission traditionally asserted over its adherents, especially through the chiefs, it was recognized by Nanpei as a particularly 'subversive' political force if it gained a foothold in the protestant districts.

For this reason, and because they were connected with everything which in the past had stood in his way, Nanpei vigorously opposed the intensified expansion campaign which the Capuchins inaugurated after the suppression and exile of the Sokehs rebels. Nanpei carried his attacks into the protestant press on his second visit to Germany in 1912 and even went so far as to bring a libel action against the mission in late 1913.¹ In all this he managed to enlist the sympathy of Kersting, who respected the chief as a man of unusual enterprise and worldly sophistication, and whose own relations with the catholic mission were growing strained. The

1. Kersting to RKA 15 Feb 1913 and 17 Jan 1914 RKA 2584:110-111, 123; Missionsbote Nrs. 10 and 11, 1912; Aus den Missionen. Jahresbericht 1912 pp 16ff.

Capuchins felt that the rebellion of Sokehs was the perfect argument against confessional demarcation on the island. They viewed it as proof of their oft-repeated arguments in the face of administrative suspicion, that religion was not the cause of major unrest in Ponape and therefore there could not be now any objection to peaceful and indiscriminate proselytism.¹

Kersting disagreed for he was conscious of the fact that the protestant chiefs feared for their influence and he was concerned that this might spark off a new explosion against the Europeans. Moreover he had rather extravagant plans, as self-styled 'Chief of the Island Sphere', for the state to take the education of the islanders into its hands and build a new generation dedicated to material improvement. Kersting saw catholic mission education as too partisan and narrow to be of use in his grand scheme.² His relations with the Capuchins worsened to the point of estrangement as the reputation of the mission took a downward turn after 1911 and it resorted to ever more petulant actions in defence of its prestige. By 1912 a libel action which Georg Fritz in 1908 had brought against the then Superior, Father Venantius, was finally decided against the latter and he was fined 900 Marks. On top of this, Kersting was forced to pursue an investigation of charges that one of the priests had committed adultery with a Kiti woman, while there were mounting complaints against Father Fidelis in Auak that he was encouraging the people to lie to their chiefs.³ How much the latter two incidents were inspired by the hostility of the protestant chiefs is difficult to assess, but in the eyes of the whole community, which included the catholic islanders as well as the administration, the moral authority of the mission was increasingly weakened.

1. KMM Archives, 59: Deutsche Missions Chronik 1911, p 103; ibid, 70: P. Venantius to Provinzial 25 March 1911.
2. Hamburger Weltwirtschaftsarchiv (hereinafter HWWA): H. Kersting, 'Organization und Ziele der Verwaltung im Inselgebiete'. Ponape, 8 May 1912. Typescript deposited within the Alter Länder literature, pp 3, 14-17; Kersting report of 28 March 1911 in RKA 2589:166; Kersting to RKA 15 Jan 1914 RKA 2590:80.
3. KMM Archives, 59: Deutsche Missions Chronik 1911/12, pp 109-111; Kersting to Hahl 21 Dec 1912 RKA 2584:130.

The mission fathers for their part were hostile to any attempts to subjugate the mission to secular control. In response to what they saw as a conspiracy to degrade the mission in the eyes of the islanders, they ostentatiously disdained to cultivate relations with the rest of the European community. When the new Bishop of the island sphere came to Ponape for the first time in November 1913 the mission deliberately refused to issue invitations to Kersting and the other Europeans to attend the visit; even the officers and crew of the visiting SMS Cormoran were ignored.¹ In such a situation only personal talks between the New Guinea and Church authorities in 1914 prevented an open break and restored a measure of sanity to relations between the parties in Ponape.²

In the final years of German rule no one connected with the administration of Ponape and the rest of Germany's island empire was especially sanguine about their future. Kersting in particular felt that the northern Pacific islanders remained as distant from their colonial rulers as at the beginning of Germany's occupation. They were, he warned, ill-suited to any 'coolie' role as itinerant labour in the German Pacific empire because of their strong inclinations towards political and economic self-sufficiency. The only hope for peace under German rule, particularly in Ponape, was to devise a solution to imperial overrule which allowed sufficient scope for local feelings of independence and powers of initiative.³

But such ideas had no time to take root. In May 1914 Kersting left Ponape on leave. On 14 July the East Asian Squadron, under Graf Spee, sailed in without warning and stayed for several weeks, reprovisioning. It was to be Ponape's only contribution to the coming German war effort. On 6 August, with war declared, the Squadron cleared for action and steamed away. Exactly eight weeks later Ponape, like the rest of the Carolines and Marianas, was occupied by the Japanese.

1. KMM Archives, 59: Deutsche Missions Chronik 1913 pp 115-117; Kersting to Hahl 14 Nov 1913 RKA 2584.
2. Hahl to Kersting 29 Jan 1914 RKA 2590:212; KMM Archives, 102: Record of discussion Dep. Gov. Haber and Apostolic Vicar 27 April 1914.
3. HMNA, Kersting 'Organization und Ziele', pp 14-29.

Chapter 3

NEW GUINEA

a) Bismarck Archipelago, 1875 to 1899: The Expanding European Economy and New Guinean Resistance.

It was not until the 1870's that traders began to exploit on a large scale the rich coconut groves and the large concentrated populations of the island coasts of the Bismarck Archipelago for the copra trade, or the abundant marine products such as bêche de mer and pearlshell. German traders were among the first. When Eduard HERNSHEIM, a Hamburger attempting to set up his own trading empire in the south west Pacific, anchored in Port Hunter, Duke of York group, in October 1875 to establish an agent there, he found the native inhabitants well accustomed to the visits of white traders and some could understand pidgin English.¹ HERNSHEIM was not the first to choose Port Hunter as the logical site for a first settlement: the Rev. George BROWN had already arrived in August to begin work for the Australasian Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society.²

European penetration of the islands of New Guinea developed from these foundations. An indication of the speed with which European influence spread in the next few years is the fact that barely two years after his arrival, BROWN had established seven mission stations on the Duke of Yorks, eleven on New Britain and five in New Ireland, although some were very precarious holds and none were situated away from the coast.³ In this earliest phase of permanent settlement, the New Guineans dictated the pattern of relations and the rate of development. Local groups on the coast were particularly jealous of their traditional economic relationships with inland tribes. Some coastal 'big men' were able to reinforce their own power within their residential groups and even subject inland neighbours through the

1. Staatsarchiv, Hamburg (hereinafter STA), Familienarchiv HERNSHEIM No.1: 'Lebenserinnerungen von Eduard HERNSHEIM' n.d., p 43.
2. From 1903 on, all the methodist missions in Australasia were grouped under the title 'The Methodist Missionary Society of Australasia'.
3. G. BROWN, George Brown D.D., Pioneer Missionary and Explorer: an Autobiography (London 1908) pp 112, 130, 228.

monopoly over European goods which they acquired and the introduction of fire-arms which, as in Samoa, became an integral feature of the early copra trade. European traders were restricted to the lowest type of barter commerce in order to acquire copra. Large quantities were impossible to buy in any one place since the New Guineans generally refused to prepare it themselves, and it was left to the individual agent not only to collect the coconuts but to cut and dry them as well.¹

In the event of a collision with local interests, there was little redress for the individual trader. Each came as an individual, with his own economic status and goals, and each was forced to live on local terms, making individual adjustments for the specific area and circumstances in order to ensure his safety and a livelihood. In terms of security it was every man for himself, with only the dictates of his own conscience and the instructions of his firm or mission to guide him. Collisions occurred frequently, many due to a European's disregard of local customs and some the result of mutual misunderstanding. Language was a problem in those early days while New Guineans followed their traditional custom and frequently took revenge for a European's indiscretion on the next white man to appear. In a tense situation, both sides had recourse to arms at the slightest notice. Ten of the twelve European agents employed by the Godeffroys firm in the area came to a violent end in those earliest years of the late 1870's.²

The most violent clashes occurred when the newcomers tried to move inland. In April 1878, four Fijian teachers of Brown's mission, recently installed inland from Ratavul in Blanche Bay, were murdered and eaten, because the local Tolai 'big man', Talili, feared that he would lose his monopoly over the supply of European trade goods to the interior.³ For the six to seven

1. STAHL, 'Lebenserinnerungen Hemsheim', p 68; T.S. Epstein, Capitalism, Primitive and Modern (Canberra 1968) p 34; Also Epstein, 'The Tolai "Big Man"', p 44.
2. Denkschrift betreffend den Archipel von Neu Brittanien', enclosed in Stübel to Bismarck 20 April 1884 RKA 2791:130; S.W. Reed, The Making of Modern New Guinea (Philadelphia 1943) p 119.
3. Brown, George Brown D.D., p 256.

whites, including George Brown, scattered around the immediate coasts of the northern Gazelle Peninsula and the Duke of York islands, the event was of more significant proportions. They were convinced it heralded a general assault against European occupation, and in fear at their isolation, they organized a punitive expedition under Brown himself. Brown was able to secure the support of those coastal New Guineans at Nodup, Matupit, Malagunan and Kabakada who were already, to some extent, bound to the European presence by the ties of the exchange trade, or who were traditional enemies of Talili, and the 'big man's' area was attacked, a number of hamlets burnt down and ten to twelve New Guineans killed.¹

This reprisal and the formal peace which subsequently Brown was careful to conclude, broke Talili's hold over the interior in the north west of Blanche Bay and heralded a new phase of expansion and European influence, both by Brown's missionaries and European entrepreneurs. By 1880 the first two mainland converts had been baptized at Vunamami, to the south east of Blanche Bay, and the first Tolai preacher had also been appointed. In 1881 there were forty praying sites, fifty-five converts and 514 school pupils. By 1886 the number of converts to Methodism in the Gazelle Peninsula and the south of New Ireland had risen to 4000. The local mission was by then divided into three circuits, each supervised by a white missionary and operating a school for prospective New Guinean teachers. Brown had left in 1881 and by that time the traditional hostilities of many contiguous coastal districts around Blanche Bay had already been broken and the people were mixing freely, at least under the shadow of the mission's presence.²

Commercial competition was becoming very keen and was centred on the Gazelle Peninsula. Five firms were active in the area by 1880. The two main trading companies, Hemsheim and the D.H.P.G., successor to Godeffroys, set up a network of agencies along the coast of the Gazelle, from Vlavo to

1. Brown, George Brown D.D., p 257-278.

2. Ibid, pp 378, 401; H. Schnee, Bilder aus der Südsee (Berlin 1904) p 74; Deutsches Kolonialblatt, 1 Feb 1905; Salisbury, Vunamami p24,27.

Kiningunan. Hensheim alone set up thirteen between the years 1877 and 1883 as well as nine on New Ireland and several on smaller island groups to the north and east. By 1884 these two firms were supposed to be exporting between 1350 and 2000 tons of copra from the Archipelago.¹ They did not have business relations with the New Guineans all their own way. The rates of exchange for tropical produce rose sharply in these years: where, in 1875, a length of tobacco would secure twenty-five to forty coconuts, by 1880 it was only fifteen, and knives, axes and firearms had replaced red cloth, glasspearls and empty bottles as the most sought after items of trade.² Firearms were particularly coveted by ambitious 'big men'; there were said to be 700 in Tolai hands by 1887.³ New Guinean traders were also increasingly demanding amounts of native money in exchange for their produce and Europeans were forced to finance trips to Nakanai to buy the raw material from which it was made.⁴

The most important economic and social development of this stage of relations between European and New Guinean was the opening up of the Kokopo coast south of Blanche Bay, and the establishment of the first plantation at Ralum by Emma Forsayth and her business partner, Thomas Farrell.⁵ The alienation of large amounts of land formed a new and progressively crucial point of contention in the eastern Gazelle Peninsula. Land within the boundaries of the

1. Robertson and Hensheim to Bismarck 18 Aug 1884 RKA 2791: 157; Schnee, Bilder aus der Südsee, p 350; B. Danks, In Wild New Britain (ed.) W. Deane (Sydney 1933) p 151.
2. O. Finsch, 'Über Naturprodukte der westlichen Südsee, besonders der deutschen Schutzgebiete', Deutsche Kolonialzeitung 1887, 17:525-6; 'Denkschrift betr. den Archipel von Neu Britannien' RKA 2791: 131-2.
3. Epstein, Capitalism Primitive and Modern, p 39.
4. Ibid, p 35, Tambu or Diwarra, as the Tolai currency was called, consists of small Nassa callosa shells strung on rattan lengths and stored by wrapping fathoms, a unit equivalent to 2 arms' lengths, on larger bamboo coils.
5. Emma Forsayth (née Coe), the daughter of an English father and a Samoan mother, came to Melanesia in the early 1880's with Thomas Farrell. A woman of shrewd business sense, Emma ran the plantation under the name of E.E. Forsayth & Co. and gained the name Queen Emma for the way in which she presided over the business and social life of the Gazelle Peninsula. Ralum plantation was the single most prosperous entity in the Bismarck Arch. It was sold to the Hamburg company, H.R. Wahlen AG in 1909, reportedly for a sum near £1 million Sterling. See R.W. Robson, Queen Emma (Sydney 1965). Emma was patron and sister in law to Richard Parkinson, planter and ethnographer extraordinaire, who made the first detailed study of Tolai life and customs. See R. Parkinson, Dreissig Jahre in der Südsee (Stuttgart 1907)

local residential group (a series of hamlets) was controlled by the senior (lualua) of the matrilineage on which residence was based and any individual member of the descent group had a claim to land not in use. The lualua was not only genealogically senior within the group but was also a man of enterprise and leadership. Particularly strong lualua, who were also 'big men' through their entrepreneurship and warrior skills, would occasionally act arbitrarily by selling unused land belonging to the matrilineage to Europeans, in order to acquire firearms for campaigns against other local groups or goods to be distributed for the purposes of building up support for their positions of influence. The prevailing uncertainty about a 'big man's' power or potential and the comparative lack of interest in land in the days of plenty, increased the opportunities which a shrewd New Guinean possessed of carrying off such a transaction over the heads of his fellows. It only became clear later that group rights had been infringed on a large scale. The conception of possession seems to have extended only as far as the land was utilized and rights reverted to the descent group once the land went fallow. Nor did transfer of land to an outsider necessarily remove use rights of the original owners to fruits and trees planted there or include sections with particular cultic importance to the group.¹

Eduard Hemsheim describes a typical land purchase procedure as consisting of signifying to the nearest natives the plot in question, measuring it out, then distributing suitable trade goods and getting the natives to mark a contract paper which was witnessed by a European.² Such a process obviously begged numerous questions concerning the true ownership of the land the right of the vendors to sell and their understanding of the contract. Nevertheless it seems that most of the early land acquisitions in the Gazelle were made in this way. Farrell claimed to have 'bought' 5000 acres of land

1. For discussions of Tolai land tenure see Nachrichten über Kaiser Wilhelmsland und den Bismarck Archipel. 1897, pp 71-85; Salisbury, Vunamami, pp67-105; Land Tenure in the Pacific (ed) R. Crocombe (Melbourne 1971)pp295ff; P. Sack, 'Early Land Acquisitions in New Guinea: the Native Version', Journal of the Papua and New Guinea Society Vol 3, Nr. 2, 1969.

2. STAHL, 'Lebenserinnerungen Hemsheim', p 80.

extending along the coast and inland from Cape Gazelle to Ralum point for £50 in trade goods, as well as other areas on the north coast and inland from Port Weber. Richard Parkinson, the German-English planter and ethnographer who moved to the Archipelago from Samoa in the early 1880's after marrying Emma's sister is supposed to have purchased the entire districts of Kalil and Vairiki in October 1884 for just \$50 in trade.¹ Farrell and Emma were careful to draw up written agreements and have them endorsed by the natives; some of their purchases at least were concluded on board British warships with the Captain as witness. By 1884 Ralum had thirty acres of cotton and copra under cultivation and was employing hundreds of labourers.² The plantation was to expand dramatically in the next few years, gradually taking over land on which originally no occupational claim had been made from the group who had sold it. Besides Ralum, Hemsheim had 4000 acres on the Duke of York islands, 8000 acres in the north of New Ireland and a further 1900 acres in the Hermits group; the D.H.P.G. also laid claim to nearly 2000 acres in the Duke of Yorks.³

The Bismarck Archipelago and the north-eastern mainland of New Guinea were annexed to the German Empire in November 1884 but this did not inaugurate a new state-ordered pattern of security and economic development for the Archipelago. The New Guinea Company, which had received an Imperial Charter to open up and administer the protectorate, saw its greatest potential for development and profit on the mainland, or Kaiser Wilhelmsland, where it hoped to act as land broker and advisor to thousands of imaginary German small settlers drawn from the homeland and the Australian colonies.⁴ In the

1. Copy of 'indenture' between Parkinson and the 'chiefs and rulers' of Kalil and Vairiki 10 October 1884 in RKA 2572:82-3; 'Aufzeichnungen betreffend die Verhältnissen auf Neu Brittanien' enclosed in Stübel to Bismarck 6 Aug 1883 RKA 2787:159-160.
2. 'Denkschrift betreffend die deutsche und fremden Interessen in dem Archipel von Neu Brittanien', enclosed in Stübel to Bismarck 20 April 1884 RKA 2791:160.
3. 'Denkschrift betr. die deutschen und fremden Interessen', RKA 2791:139.
4. See pages 174-5.

Archipelago a magistrate was placed at Kerawara, a small island off the coast of the northern Gazelle, and a bewildering array of legislation was introduced governing every facet of civilized life from customs and excise to criminal matters. However no attempt was made to impose effective imperial control through an administrative staff, a police force or a communications network. The administration of the Bismarck Archipelago existed in name only and continued to do so well into the 1890's.

There was a certain measure of informal and arbitrary control at the centre of permanent white settlement around Blanche Bay where European settlers were able to take matters into their own hands. Richard Parkinson mediated in disputes between groups of coastal Tolai and in some cases dictated peace with the aid of his own police force - 150 Buka natives drawn from Ralum plantation.¹ Punitive expeditions were mounted swiftly and carried out with severity when New Guineans attacked a European in the area.² Yet in the post-annexation period of the late 1880's, relations between the coastal Tolai and the growing European planting community entered a new phase of mutual accommodation and economic advantage. The Tolai were quick to recognize the need of the plantations for large quantities of native foodstuffs to feed their labour lines and they began intensifying their garden cultivation. The precontact market system among the coastal and inland Tolai groups was now extended to non-Tolai labourers and expatriates. There are several striking descriptions of the markets held every third day on Ralum when 100 to 200 women would gather from as far away as twelve miles to sell yams, taro and bananas.³ In 1886 Ralum was supplied in this way with 350,000 lbs. of taro and yams and local gardens were being extended

1. R. Parkinson, Im Bismarck Archipel (Leipzig 1887) pp 138-9.
2. As in the case of the murder of a German collector, Kleinschmidt, in retaliation for which twenty New Guineans were shot. Ibid., pp 18-21.
3. W.D. Pitcairn, Two Years among the Savages of New Guinea, (London 1891) p 176; H. Cayley-Webster, Through New Guinea and the Cannibal Countries, (London 1898) p 87.

regularly as the labour force increased.¹ Even this was insufficient to meet the needs of the plantation and Emma was forced to send boats along the coast to buy more produce. The copra trade was also proving a source of ample profit to the New Guineans and native copra production had risen from zero in 1870 to 1350 tons in 1884.² By and large this represented the available surplus of coconuts and the Tolai in particular were not concerned to increase drastically the planting of coconuts since the market gardening and coconut collection already provided them with a rising standard of living. They were also unwilling to offer themselves as wage labourers to the plantations. In 1890, when 1044 recruits were obtained from New Ireland, only 130 New Britain natives offered themselves.³

The same year saw the first major encounter between the coastal Tolai and the plantations over land on the Kokopo coast. In 1889 the New Guinea Company had purchased 600 to 700 hectares of land (about 1700 acres) to the east of Ralum, next to a plot owned by a Belgian trader, Mouton, while the Methodist Mission already had several pieces of land along the coast.⁴ Ralum was by now systematically occupying its land holdings to the west and east, linking them by roads. In March 1890, Moses, a Filipino overseer on Ralum plantation, was murdered by a group of Tolai as he supervised the construction of a road from an outstation to Kokopo, the site of the New Guinea Company's holdings. Despite warnings, the road was being built along the foreshore, to cut through a local landing area and a men's sacred cult place (Duk Duk). The Tolai resented this infringement of their fishing rights and feared that their cultic secrets would be subverted by the intrusion.⁵ Four major districts along the coast and in the hinterland - Vunamami, Keravi, Bitarebarebe, and Tingenavudu - formed a coalition in late

1. Deutsche Kolonialzeitung 1887, 22:694.

2. Epstein, Capitalism Primitive and Modern, p 37.

3. Nachrichten, 1891, p 14. For a full treatment of the Tolai share in labour recruiting see Firth, 'German Recruitment'.

4. Salisbury, Vunamami, p 29.

5. Schmiele to Rose 2 April 1890 RKA 2979:18.

March and attacked Ralum. They were narrowly beaten off. Two large European reprisals followed, in which five whites and over eighty foreign labourers took part, and they succeeded in driving the Tolai forces into the interior, destroying some sixty native hamlets in the process and killing eight warriors.¹ Peace was finally negotiated in April with the exchange of pigs and shell money but the leader of the conspiracy, To Ruruk, was not captured and executed until a year later.

Although district fishing rights were safeguarded in the negotiated agreement of April and various local complaints were corrected, 1890 marked the beginning rather than the end of confrontation between the Tolai and the Gazelle Europeans over land. The Tolai had been prepared to make peace in this instance because they had been promised compensatory rights and because they recognized the growth of the New Guinea Company plantation at Kokopo, now called Herbertshöhe, as offering them new economic opportunities in the marketing of produce and copra.² However the 1890 clash in effect resulted in the loss to local Tolai groups of all the coastal land between Malapau (a western outstation) and Ralum in favour of the plantation and by mid 1893 Emma had under cultivation 580 acres of cotton and 860 acres of coconuts. By this time the New Guinea Company possessed about 250 acres of cotton and 150 acres of coconuts and was occupying land in the districts of Malagunan and Tingonavudu.³ The effect of this pressure on previously unaffected areas was exacerbated by the behaviour of imported labourers who harassed local women and forcefully appropriated market produce from them, while there was general resentment at the action of the German station manager at Herbertshöhe in closing down the native market at Kokopo plantation, thus depriving local Tolai of their regular trading income.⁴

1. Museum für Völkerkunde, Hamburg, Ms: Tagebuch, R. Parkinson, 28 March to 4 April 1890; Schmiele to Rose 8 April 1890 RKA 2979:19-21.
2. Schmiele to Rose 21 April 1890 RKA 2979:21-2.
3. Nachrichten 1893, p 24; 1894, pp 16, 20-1.
4. Schmiele to Neu Guinea Compagnie (NGC) 26 Dec 1893 RKA 2983:141; Frankfurter Zeitung, 25 Nov 1893.

By early July 1893 tension had reached a peak and the first reports of clashes between villages and Company police began to come in. It was at this moment that an enterprising sorcerer further inland, in Ulagunan, claimed to have discovered an ointment which could repel bullets and turn them against the person shooting.¹ In a situation where Tolai villages were susceptible to occasional alliances through intermarriage, and trading and ritual links, and where common feelings of uncertainty existed, the 'bullet-proof' ointment (mailang) served to draw together the districts behind Herbertshöhe. The 'big men' from the affected areas hastened to Ulagunan to pay the 1000 fathoms of shell money which the sorcerer was demanding for the ointment and by mid July a conspiracy to attack Herbertshöhe and subjugate the whites had been fashioned. Attacks on New Guinea Company labourers on 18 July were followed in September by a major assault of some 300 warriors from the districts of Malagunan, Tingenavudu, Ulagunan, Bitarebarebe, Biretava and Vairiki. Under the New Guinea Company station manager, Kolbe, the Germans barely managed to repel the Tolai. They repeatedly mounted punitive raids into the districts and inflicted heavy casualties (over forty Tolai were killed) but the fanatical ardour of the warriors was in no apparent way dampened. Smearing with the magic ointment and singing a ritual chant, the Tolai flung themselves at the plantation, rooting out cotton trees as they went and offering fierce resistance to the troop columns of New Irelanders under European control.²

In October the New Guinea Company's Governor, Georg Schmiele, arrived from Kaiser Wilhelmsland to try to negotiate a settlement with the Tolai, since the disruption of the native food markets caused by the war was having serious consequences on the Company's labour force at Herbertshöhe. Meetings were arranged with the 'big men' of the leading districts and

1. Archives of the Herz Jesu Mission, Münster (hereinafter HJM Archives), Ms: Tagebuch, Br. J. Weber, Vol 1, p 467.

2. Kolbe to Schmiele 31 July and 18 Sept 1893 RKA 2983:62-3, 65-71.

nominal amounts of tambu demanded as a traditional surety, but at the last moment the negotiations broke down because the Tolai feared betrayal. Skirmishes subsequently continued on into November while rumours circulated that the entire coastal area south of Blanche Bay was awaiting the final defeat of the white men. The hitherto peaceful villagers between Herbertshöhe and Ralum began to stir and the Europeans' last line of defence, the imported labourers on the plantations, were increasingly disconcerted at the fanaticism of the enemy.¹

On 29 November the small German cruiser, SMS Sperber, arrived and Schmiele made a last attempt to bring about a negotiated settlement. It too failed; only Bitarebarebe district, well inland from Herbertshöhe and comparatively unaffected by European expansion in 1893, was willing to consider conciliation. The other offending districts were not prepared to cease hostilities and declare their submission until a combined expedition of German marines, European settlers and New Ireland labourers had been launched on them in mid December. Although the New Guinea Company and most of the settlers subsequently attributed ultimate success to the Sperber expedition and the accompanying artillery bombardment, both explanations are highly unlikely. The expedition was a fiasco from the beginning: Kolbe's party got lost in the bush and accidentally fired on both Schmiele's and the Sperber's detachment, while the Tolai managed to evade a decisive battle altogether.² In addition the captain of the Sperber reported that the bombardment was hardly likely to have been successful since all the target villages were behind a hill and the only casualty seems to have been a man who dislocated his neck in shock at the whistling shells.³ Tolai sources better explain the change of heart: A lualua by the name of To Bobo, from Vunabalbal, managed to obtain some of the magic ointment and took it to the

1. Schmiele to NGC 9 Nov 1893 RKA 2983:88-9; Nachrichten 1894, p 18.

2. Disziplinarstrafbescheid, Schmiele to Kolbe 26 Dec 1893 RKA 2411:87-91; Frankfurter Zeitung 23 Feb 1894.

3. Kdr. SMS Sperber to komm. Admiral 26 Jan 1894, copy in RKA 2983:117-118.

German forces who smeared themselves with it before going into battle. Not only did it strengthen the resolution of the Germans' Melanesian soldiers but in the eyes of the enemy it also made them invulnerable and so the Tolai sued for peace.¹ Moreover, as Schmiele recognized, if the Company's need for food supplies forced it initially to seek peace rather than total victory, then the Tolais' growing economic dependence on the whites was a powerful motive for them in the end to seek it too.²

The war of the 'bullet-proof' ointment was an important watershed for the destiny of the Tolai after 1893. On one side it inaugurated a new phase of expansion in the European economy of the area. By 1897 European plantations in the eastern Gazelle had increased their planted areas to 3158 acres. Ralum alone was said to 'own' almost the entire districts of Kabaga, Ravalien, Ulagunan, Tingenavudu, Bitarebarebe, Malagunan and parts of Kabakaul and Kiningunan.³ The plantation had been able to export 900 tons of copra during 1893 despite the war, while the two other large trading firms, the D.H.P.G. and Hemsheims had collected over 1100 tons between them. By 1897 the amount of copra exported by these three companies had risen slightly to 2367 tons.⁴ Most Europeans manifested little understanding of the resentments of the Tolai against the growth of settlement. Even the normally sensitive Emma Forsayth felt that peace in the Gazelle would only be guaranteed by giving the Tolai 'a sound thrashing and drive them away from our lands'.⁵ However within the local Tolai community on the Kokopo coast there were leaders who already appreciated that the whites could not be driven out and who were looking for a compromise solution to the problem of coexistence. One of the most important of these men was To Bobo, who had virtually secured the defeat of the confederated Tolai districts in 1893 by

1. Salisbury, Vunamami, p 80.

2. Schmiele to NGC 9 Nov 1893 RKA 2983.

3. Bishop Couppé to Direktor NGC 5 Aug 1894 RKA 2571:175-182; Nachrichten 1897, pp 24, 45.

4. Emma Forsayth to Rose 21 Nov 1893 RKA 2983:84; Nachrichten 1897, p 46.

5. Emma Forsayth to Rose 21 Nov 1893 RKA 2983:82.

procuring 'bullet-proof' ointment for the German forces. In 1894 he became head of the Vunabalbal clan after the death of his elder brother, the 'big man' who had unified the area against the Herbertshöhe plantation. Traditionally alliances of districts for the purposes of war tended to disintegrate once the fighting had ceased, but because of the gradual political and economic consolidation which mission activity and the penetration of European traders and planters was imposing on the Gazelle Peninsula, the confederation of districts behind Herbertshöhe, based on the Vunamami district, was not destroyed with the end of the 1893 war. As a methodist preacher and 'big man' in his own right through accumulated wealth and renown, To Bobo came more and more into prominence as virtual leader of the old Vunamami confederacy and a man who sought peaceful adjustment with the expanding European economy.¹

Georg Schmiele was one of the few Europeans to appreciate the problems which leaders like To Bobo faced, and he urged the setting up of reserves and the appointment of 'trusted agents' among the Tolai to act as intermediaries and encourage cooperation between the racial communities.² Schmiele was unable to tackle these problems himself as he died of fever in the East Indies on his way back to Germany in 1895. They remained unsolved until the arrival, in January 1896, of the Imperial judge Albert Hahl. He arrived as negotiations were taking place in Germany to transfer permanent political control of the New Guinea protectorate to the Reich; the New Guinea Company had already surrendered temporarily its right to govern between 1889 and 1892.

Hahl immediately revealed himself as a man of immense energy and practical mind, yet with sufficient farsightedness to set about defining the goals of the administration and establishing its priorities. He saw the protectorate's future in its contribution to the economy and prestige of the Reich, and immediately recognized that further economic development depended on educating the New Guineans in the service of European capital and strengthening their purchasing power by incorporating them into an ordered

1. For a character sketch of To Bobo, see Salisbury, Vunamami, pp 315-17.

2. Schmiele to NGC 26 Dec 1893 RKA 2983:140-2.

administration.¹ Hahl refused to have as little to do as possible with the native community but moved among the people from the very start in an effort to understand their customs and languages and win them for the ideal of German colonialism.

Within three months of his arrival, Hahl could converse with the New Guineans on the Gazelle Peninsula, where he was based, and this stood him in good stead, for he was quickly besieged by Tolai leaders anxious to arrest the further encroachment of plantations on village land.² Hahl appreciated that many indigenous groups had not been aware of the implications of land purchase contracts and certainly did not anticipate European settlement and plantation agriculture on the scale it had reached. To Bobo in particular was able to persuade Hahl that Vunamami hamlets should be allowed to hold on to their extensive coconut stands as well as subsistence land. The Governor then agreed to negotiate with the owners of Ralum for the establishment of a reserve for Vunamami villagers currently occupying Ralum ground despite the plantation's legal claim to the area. Hahl was also able to dissuade Emma, not without a struggle, from carrying through a plan to resettle the inhabitants of nine further hamlets on non-Ralum land in the interior in order to take up already-purchased land for new plantings. He recognized that such a move would not only disrupt the traditional basis of the local economy but also remove a vital source of food supplies for the plantations. The most important motive however, was the Governor's fear of a new wave of resistance in the area south of Blanche Bay as the populations of the interior came under unwarranted pressure from new, bitterly anti-white refugees from the coast.³ As a result of Hahl's efforts Vunamami was left with 360 acres of land (out of 700 acres of original Vunamami territory), an area not inequitable in terms of 1896 land use.⁴

1. Hahl, Gouverneursjahre, pp 20-1.

2. Hahl, Gouverneursjahre, pp 24-5.

3. Hahl to Landeshauptmann 22 July 1896 and 22 March 1897 RKA 2276:34-36, 43-46.

4. Salisbury, Vunamami, p 115.

With land for present subsistence and future growth needs secured to them local Tolai groups like that of To Bobo's were enabled to redirect their energies towards a new, more viable relationship with white settlers and the German administration. The reserves were not gained without conditions: Hahl decided that they would revert to their European 'owners' after fifty years if the New Guineans had not planted coconuts or populated the area more densely in that time. To Bobo met these conditions for Vunamami by reducing bride prices by fiat in order to lower the age of marriage and raise the birth rate and he led the way in the regular planting of coconuts and their processing into copra. For the rest of the German period, and indeed up to the present day, the Tolai were in a position to supply eighty percent of all native produced copra in the Bismarck Archipelago and about fifteen percent of New Guinea copra exports, while they enjoyed a steadily rising per capita income.¹ At the same time they strove to remain largely independent of the European wage economy by refusing to enlist for wage labour on the plantations where they were regarded as chattels and not as voluntary employees. A few did enter service for the government or the police force where, under Hahl, the relationship was more reciprocal and they could retain a sense of economic and social partnership.²

Land problems, both around Blanche Bay and on the north coast, were one facet of Hahl's concern to provide the security necessary for trade and plantation agriculture to flourish. A second requisite was control of existing native trade routes from the interior and the construction of new roads at strategic points. The Tolai possessed a very extensive system of markets running inland but the mutual suspicions and hostilities of local settlements made it vulnerable to sudden disruption. Hahl hoped that by keeping the major routes open constantly he would stimulate New Guinean trade and facilitate plantation development by drawing native produce from as large

1. Epstein, Capitalism Primitive and Modern, p 38: Table 1 and notes;
See also Salisbury, Vunamami, pp 115-118, 316.

2. Salisbury, Vunamami, pp 81, 121, 163.

an area as possible; in addition a network of roads was the first stage in any future taxation project. Capitalizing on the Tolais' attraction for increased market access and economic gain, and with the aid of shell money, iron and Wesleyan mission influence, Hahl induced local villages to build a road from Herbertshöhe to Baravon Point (Raluana) and at the end of 1896 he could claim to have achieved his first object of securing trade from the hinterland to the Kokopo coast.¹ By the end of Company rule in 1899, roads or riding paths had been constructed around the rim of Blanche Bay to Simpsonhafen (the later site of Rabaul), from Simpsonhafen to Nodup on the north east coast, from Malagunan across the Rata vul pass to Vlavolo on the north coast and from Herbertshöhe south west to Vunakokor, ten miles from the coast in the Varzin mountains. Hahl did not find the same ease in moving the Tolai to maintain the roads; that required constant supervision, and in 1898/99 he was using New Guinean prisoners to complete much of the work.²

The final element in Hahl's security programme was the appointment of native agents proposed by Schmiele and approved by the New Guinea Company in 1894.³ Control by reprisal was an inadequate policy, even if at times it was the only way for the skeleton administration to exercise its authority. In August 1896, in areas of the Gazelle Peninsula and the Duke of York islands where the Wesleyan mission in particular exercised a decisive influence for peace, Hahl nominated the first individuals to represent his wishes to groups of hamlets; To Bobo was among them.⁴ The new officials, called originally lualuas after the Tolai name for a matrilineage elder,⁵ were given limited administrative and police powers to supervise road construction in their districts and adjudicate in small, local disputes. They were empowered to impose fines up to twenty five Marks or ten fathoms of tambu but their

1. Nachrichten, 1896, pp 33-4; 1897, pp 49-50.

2. Annual Reports 1898/99, p 166; Hahl, Gouverneursjahre, pp 61, 82.

3. NGC to Reichskanzeler 31 March 1894 RKA 2411:50.

4. Hahl, Gouverneursjahre, p 35; Salisbury, Vunamami, p 316.

5. After about 1900, the officials were called either luluais, after the Tolai name for the war leader of a district, or nambawan, the Pidgin equivalent of 'boss' or 'manager'.

decisions could be appealed against to the Imperial judge in Herbertshöhe.¹

The lualuas were designed merely to encourage the peaceful solution of difficulties and to act as a lever through which the government could 'draw' New Guineans to work within the colonial economy as road builders, labour recruits and later, taxpayers. A more autonomous chiefly role as indirect ruler was impossible to delegate, as the Germans soon found out when they had to deal with numerous complaints of lualuas overstepping the bounds of their traditional authority. Moreover, as the system expanded and single villages were given lualuas, the new appointees were not always the natural 'big men' of their districts and they experienced difficulty in exerting the newly ascribed authority.² By 1900 Hahl had appointed forty four of his new officials in the Gazelle and twenty three on the Duke of York islands, the only areas which his administration could reach effectively.³

The gradual stabilization of relations in the Gazelle Peninsula after 1893 cannot be attributed simply to more positive control measures by the German administration. Mission activity had been constant throughout the period after 1880 and was at least indirectly responsible for an improvement in racial relations, though the mission societies too were involved in disputes over land. When the war of the 'bullet-proof' ointment began, the Wesleyans were permanently entrenched throughout the northern Gazelle, the Duke of York islands and southern New Ireland. Three white missionaries and forty four Pacific Island assistants, including the first New Guineans, were ministering to over 5000 followers in fifteen churches and forty schools.⁴ By 1899 and the end of Company rule, the number of New Guineans regarded as being supporters of the Methodist Mission had risen to 10419. The mission occupied ninety five outstations (over fifty in the Gazelle Peninsula) run

1. Annual Reports, 1899/1900, p 185.

2. Annual Reports, 1899/1900, p 185; Epstein, 'The Tolai "Big Man"', p 44.

3. Annual Reports, 1899/1900, p 185.

4. Deutsches Kolonialblatt 1892, Beilage: Das deutsche Schutzgebiet der Neuguinea Compagnie 1892, p 71.

by twenty-nine Polynesian and sixty six New Guinean assistants. A major seminary for the training of local teachers was established on Ulu Island in the Duke of York group and the missionaries were providing a fundamental education and new agricultural techniques while promoting economic and political cooperation among the Tolai village groups.¹ At the level of the hamlet the Wesleyan mission probably exercised greater influence in the 1890's than did the other mission society, the Herz Jesu Mission (Mission of the Sacred Heart or M.S.C.), which had been present in the Gazelle Peninsula since 1880.

The first M.S.C. priests arrived with the ill fated Marquis de Rays expedition² to New Ireland but when that experiment failed to get off the ground, the remaining priest settled in Vlavolo on the north coast of the Gazelle. He was driven out by sickness and local resistance after a short time and the mission to New Britain did not begin in earnest until 1882 when two more French priests settled at Nodup. After a series of setbacks a foothold was secured once again in Vlavolo in 1884 but in 1891 the headquarters of the mission was transferred to an area of land east of Herbertshöhe, to which the name Vunapope ('seat of the Bishop') was given. At that time the Mission of the Sacred Heart had its own Bishop of New Britain, Ludwig Couppé, a Frenchman of indomitable spirit and tireless energy, while five priests, six lay-brothers and five nuns were working on the island.³

In the same year the Colonial Department officially separated the areas of activity of the two missions, the Methodists to the north and west of Cape Baravon, the M.S.C. to the east and south, but within a few years the

1. Annual Reports 1898/99, p 168.

2. In 1880 a party of French colonists arrived at Likiliki in southern New Ireland to begin what they anticipated as France's first planned colony in New Guinea. The men were simply landed at the fringe of the coastal jungle, supplied with steam cranes, bricks and agricultural implements and expected to lay out a city along French lines. A good account of their trials and tribulations and the abandonment of the project can be found in Brown, George Brown D.D., pp 354ff.

3. Salisbury, Vunamami, p 30.

demarcation was recognized by most parties to be 'an absurdity'.¹ The Mission of the Sacred Heart found only a small and scattered population in its sector and continued to operate in areas destined for the Wesleyans. There were at least thirteen M.S.C. churches in Wesleyan areas by 1897; at Vlavolo the rival churches were only 400 metres apart. The Sacred Heart mission claimed 3700 baptized adherents in the Methodist sector.² In April 1899 the official division of activity was finally removed.

The catholic mission, with its exclusively European staff and small numbers was not free in the early days from confrontations with New Guineans over land, especially on the north coast at Vunakamkabi where the natives demanded back land which the mission had transformed into an 150 hectare plantation. Nevertheless it soon managed to gain acceptance as the inhabitants came to recognize that missionaries were different from white planters who were in New Guinea for profit. Through its efforts to mitigate the hardships of villages involved in the 1893 war it was permitted to expand inland from Vunapope to Takabur and the district of Tingenavudu. It also intervened on behalf of To Rogdiat, the 'big man' who was leading the resistance to the plantation on the north coast, and when he was sentenced to death after a war with the administration, the catholic mission managed to secure a pardon.³ This paved the way for the conversion of the district. At the end of 1897 the Sacred Heart mission could claim eight stations both on the coast and in the hinterlands of the north and eastern Gazelle, with a staff of forty Europeans. Over 4000 New Guineans had been baptized and two native catechists trained.⁴

Through its resources and strongly centralized character, the catholic mission was able to exert a certain measure of physical control

1. Hahl to AAKA 25 Aug 1896 RKA 2573:135.

2. Couppe' to Direktor NGC RKA 2571:175-182; Couppe to Hahl 12 March 1897 RKA 2574:59.

3. HJM Archives, Mss.: Tagebuch, Weber, Vol 1:461-6; 'Erinnerungen von H. Muller', p 20; Couppe' to Hahl 7 July 1898. RKA 2987:24-6.

4. Nachrichten 1897, pp 66-8.

before the German administration was in a position to do so. The first road on the Gazelle Peninsula was actually built under Couppé, from Vunapope to Takabur in 1896 while in 1897 on the north coast the mission had armed its own labourers with private firearms to defend the Vunakankabi plantation.¹ Couppé was also the spirit behind Hahl's raids in the late 1890's on the north coast districts of Massawa, Massikonapuka and Ramandu to break the indigenous slave trade which centred on the primitive and largely defenceless Baining people who lived in the ranges of the same name. Many of the freed victims were delivered to the catholic mission for rehabilitation while land was confiscated from the slave traders and they were driven out of the region.² It was Couppé's plan of conversion to collect as many of these former slaves as possible and educate them in catholic orphanages. They would later be settled in self-supporting villages in the interior, and through inter-marriage and instruction, provide the core of a new Christian people in New Guinea.³

That the mission, rather than the administration, was able to take the initiative in controlling inter-communal relations in the 1890's was due to the impotence of the imperial representative in the face of the New Guinea Company's disregard for the essentials of colonial development. The Company refused to provide either its own administrators in Kaiser Wilhelmsland, or those of the Reich with a boat large and fast enough to transport the police force quickly to areas of unrest, and it refused to admit any responsibility for the safety of Europeans living away from the centre of white settlement on the Gazelle Peninsula.⁴ The police force in the Archipelago was nothing more than a token gesture to the problem of security. The thirty six Solomon Islanders of whom it consisted were equipped with antiquated Mauser

1. Hahl to AAKA 25 Aug 1896 RKA 2985:144; HJM Archives, Tagebuch, Weber, pp 468-471.
2. P. Matthäus Rascher, M.S.C. und Baining Land und Leute. Mitteilungen der Missionare vom heiligsten Herzen Jesu; Bd.1. (Münster 1909) pp 141-298.
3. Gott will es. Heft 4, Feb 1893.
4. New Guinea Company to AAKA 23 Aug 1890 RKA 2979:59-61.

rifles and, as employees of the New Guinea Company, were forced to work for most of the day in the Company plantation.¹ In such a situation, without finance, sufficient administrative personnel and a proper police corps, Hahl's power extended only so far as his whale boat could take him.

At the fringes of contact away from the Kokopo coast, the New Guineans remained totally in control through to the end of the century. Despite his road into the Varzin mountains, Hahl could not establish German influence there because of the power and hostility of the 'big man' To Vagira, who was in the habit of spearing anyone who tried to acquire European goods. On the north coast, in Kabaira, the local 'big men' resisted successfully any attempt to punish them for attacks on whites, including a major naval expedition as early as 1886 when three ships and five hundred German marines tried to subdue the district but failed.² Fourteen Europeans were killed in Kabaira over the succeeding years and as late as 1899 the people were still resisting European encroachment.³ The slave traders of the north also continued their predatory raids on the Baining people despite Hahl's actions and unrest continued here into the early years of the new century. In the end, the situation away from the east coast of the Gazelle was the same as it had been two decades before when whites first settled the area: it fell to each individual to ensure his own safety, a task which many undertook with more belligerence than diplomacy.

New Ireland:

Nowhere were the limitations of the administration more clearly visible than in New Ireland before 1900. Hostile relations had existed between the islanders and Europeans since the late 1870's, caused mainly by the depredations of the labour trade. Besides forcible removals, occasional

1. Hahl Gouverneursjahre, pp 23, 33; Geheimes Staatsarchiv Berlin-Dahlem, Papers of Heinrich Schnee, File 22:2,8.

2. Knorr to Admiralität 21 June 1886 RKA 2976:88; Oertzen to Bismarck 21 June 1886 RKA 2976:75-7; Hahl, Gouverneursjahre, p 56.

3. Schnee to AAKA 8 April 1899 RKA 2987:90-2.

shootings and the general indifference of recruiters to returning ex-labourers to their proper destinations, the trade was carried on in arms and ammunition which only accentuated the conflicts.¹ The first trader to exploit the copra producing potential of northern New Ireland and the large off-shore island, Nusa, was Eduard HERNSHEIM and by 1880 he had at least seven stations in the north east, with 'schools' to teach the arts of copra production and smoking, so as to introduce a demand for trade tobacco and thus stimulate the copra trade.² He was joined by FARRELL in the 1880's and both men lost several agents in the ensuing years as the New Irelanders took revenge for their misfortunes on the nearest white to hand. Three Europeans were killed in various parts of the island in the last three months of 1885, another two were attacked and driven from their trading posts while all of Farrell's stations on the coast were plundered and burned.³ In September 1886 HERNSHEIM's agent, HERMANN, was murdered by the Kapsu people in revenge for an earlier trader's action in burning their huts while in a drunken rage. HERMANN's successor, HOPPE, shared the same fate in December 1888, while in the area around Tubtub a further three traders had been killed by March 1890.⁴

The trouble was due partly to the non-return of New Ireland recruits, who had either died on the plantations of Samoa or extended their contracts. Von OERTZEN, the Imperial Commissioner appointed in 1883-84 to protect German trading interests in the western Pacific, attempted to overcome this in 1886 by prohibiting further recruiting in north-west New Ireland until order had been restored, but he was thwarted in his object by New Guinea Company pressure on the Colonial Department, for the Company could not persuade the inhabitants of Kaiser Wilhelmsland to provide the continuous

1. Compare for example, W.T. Wawn, The South Sea Islanders and the Queensland Labour Trade (London 1893).

2. STAHL, 'Lebenserinnerungen HERNSHEIM', pp 80-4.

3. Oertzen to Kpt. SMS Albatross 13 Feb 1886 RKA 2976:31-7.

4. Rose to Bismarck 29 May 1890 RKA 2979:40-6.

labour needed for their expanding plantations.¹ Many of the incidents were motivated by the desire of the New Irelanders for firearms and ammunition with which to vanquish traditional tribal enemies. Several can be traced directly to excesses and acts of violence by traders. For the most part, the traders maintained friendlier relations with the New Guineans than did the plantation owners of New Britain. To live on tribal territory and secure the object of their trade, coconuts, these men were dependent on local good will and cooperation. Most took New Guinean wives, perhaps several wives, who then worked at drying copra. Traders' resources were few and the majority of them were agents for larger firms which provided house, boat, implements and the necessary provisions on credit. In return the agent collected his coconuts or pearl-shell quota to pay off his debts, hoping to make enough profit to be able to obtain more of the necessities of life in the tropics. They were often outcasts from their own societies, men of indiscipline and uncommon energy. Drunkenness and disregard for the local rules of social intercourse were the most frequent causes of conflict with New Guineans.

During the 1890's the deteriorating state of relations in New Ireland drove many of the traders out. By the end of 1891 only four were left on the north coast.² With the New Guinea Company abdicating its responsibility for their security, these men were forced to rely on the infrequent visits of German warships or take the law into their own hands. Resort to the latter expedient ironically could result in conflict with the New Guinea Company: thus after a group of traders in 1893 organized their own expedition against the troublesome inhabitants of Kabotteron Island, the Company promptly fined them each 100 Marks.³ But the German navy also proved to be an inadequate deterrent to the New Irelanders. Before Hahl's arrival, only one naval reprisal for the repeated attacks of the islanders was in any way

1. Amtliche Bekanntmachung. Von Oertzen 20 March 1886, copy in RKA 2298:107-8; AAKA to New Guinea Company 8 Sept 1887 RKA 2298:164.

2. Rose to Caprivi 7 Sept 1891 RKA 2980:161-3.

3. Frankfurter Zeitung 3 Aug 1893.

significantly effective. Either the detachments became lost, or never managed to find the right village, or the villagers fled into mangrove swamps where the Europeans could not follow them.

Despite the continual pressure of the New Ireland traders for a hard-line attitude, and the arguments of Imperial officers for a small police force to be stationed permanently in the north of the island,¹ nothing was done in these directions either by the Company or the Reich. Hahl led more frequent expeditions against recalcitrant islanders with some success, for between 1897 and 1899, no European was attacked in northern New Ireland. But this success was achieved at the cost of alienating the local population. By the end of 1898 the east coast inhabitants of New Ireland had broken off all relations with the administration and new local alliances were being formed to combat future white penetration.²

By the time the Imperial Government assumed full administrative responsibility for the New Guinea protectorate in 1899, the level of development achieved particularly in the Bismarck Archipelago demanded a more positive policy of control than the one Imperial magistrate on New Britain could hope to administer. The major European plantations in the Gazelle Peninsula covered a planted area of nearly 6300 acres; Ralum alone had grown to 2464 acres. Most of the New Guinea Company plantings were given over to cotton which yielded 80000 Marks in 1898. The same year the Company exported its first crop of plantation-grown copra (10 tons). The total of exported copra had risen to 3632 tons while over 300 tons of trepang and quantities of pearl and tortoise shell helped make up the export lists, which amounted to a value of 939,110 Marks. There was a European population of 200 in the Archipelago, the biggest percentage being traders spread throughout more than forty stations from the Solomon Islands to the

1. See for example, Rose to Reichskanzler 9 Sept 1891 RKA 2670:38-9; Rose Gutachten 3 Sept 1898 RKA 2943:85-93.
2. Hahl to Landeshauptmann 25 Oct 1898 RKA 2987:82; Schnee to AAKA 9 April 1899 RKA 2987:98.

Admiralty group.¹ Despite the insecurity of northern New Ireland it too was a major supplier of trade copra, and Nusa was the collecting centre for all of Hemsheim's agencies outside New Britain. Moreover this region provided by far the biggest proportion of recruits for plantations in New Britain and Samoa, 7732 between 1887 and 1903.² Albert Hahl foresaw a prosperous future for plantation agriculture in New Ireland itself once European life and property could be safeguarded.³

As Governor of the New Guinea protectorate from 1901 onwards, Hahl made it his primary object to provide the environment most conducive to the growth of the trading and plantation economy. This did not mean simply a programme to 'pacify' the New Guineans. By opening up the land and incorporating the people in an ordered administration Hahl hoped to mobilize them for the developing economy, either as labour for the plantations or copra processors for the traders. Events in the Archipelago in the previous two decades had demonstrated that this relationship could not simply be forced on the New Guineans: They resisted the expansion of the trading and planting economy where it threatened to subvert economic necessities and local social values and selected only those elements of European civilization which they could adapt most profitably to traditional life. Imperial administration after 1899 was not to alter this response significantly.

b) The Mainland, 1884 to 1899: New Guineans under Company Rule.

The north-eastern quarter of the island of New Guinea was known to European explorers at least two centuries before German settlement. Tasman, in 1643, Dampier, in 1700, and D'Entrecasteaux, in 1792-3. all

1. See Annual Reports 1898/99, pp 161-5; Deutsches Kolonialblatt 1899, pp 89, 405-06; M. Krieger, 'Über die Handelsunternehmungen in unseren Südsee-Kolonien', in Koloniale Monatsblätter I/1899, pp 44-6.
2. Firth, 'German Recruitment', Appendix, p 321.
3. Hahl to AAKA 25 Aug 1896 RKA 2985:141.

touched at various points on the coasts north of the Huon Gulf. In 1827, three years after the Dutch took possession of the western mainland, Dumont d'Urville entered Astrolabe Bay, which was named after his ship. Until 1871 nothing came of these early visits except for a temporary catholic mission station on Umboi Island.

In 1871 a Russian ethnographer, Nikolai Miklouho-Maclay landed at Bongu on the Rai coast and set up residence, remaining for three various periods of time between 1871 and 1883.¹ Maclay's initial reception was far from friendly, for the local inhabitants were fearful of his fair skin and clothes and of the power of the Russian cruiser which had brought him to the area. However the new material culture which the Russian possessed and his personal courage and courtesy in the face of repeated acts of intimidation finally earned him the respect of the people of Bongu and of all the districts along the Rai coast.

Maclay enhanced his acceptability by his readiness to make suitable gifts to the people and to engage in the local system of trade and exchange. Visitors from as far away as Karkar Island in the north came to trade for Maclay's stock of steel axes and adzes, nails, mirrors, cloth, paint and seeds for new plants. As a source of wealth and a possessor of new and apparently 'superhuman' knowledge, Maclay came to be revered as a semi-god. The New Guineans of Astrolabe Bay and the Rai coast seem to have had already some experience of white men before Maclay's arrival, for the people of Bongu and of Siar, further north, possessed an image of a land across the horizon called Anut, peopled by white men living in big houses, and owning iron axes and knives. Maclay was connected with Anut: the large majority of natives therefore concluded that he was one of its deities, come to give them the new material culture. Even after his departure, Maclay continued to exercise

1. The following account is taken from P.M. Worsley, 'N.N. Mikloukho Maclay', Oceania, 1952, pp 307-314; P. Lawrence, Road Belong Cargo (Manchester 1964) passim, and L. Werner, 'Geschichte des deutschen Kolonialgebietes Melanesien, 1866-1899', n.d. Typescript in possession of Prof. H. Stoecker, Humboldt University, Berlin.

the patriarchal role with which he had been invested, pleading with the British and Germans at the time of annexation that the Papuans of the Rai coast should be left independent.¹ At the time of his farewell in 1883 he had already warned the New Guineans about Europeans who might follow him, claiming that only those who identified themselves as his brothers could be accepted as 'good'.

The people of Astrolabe Bay were therefore ready for the visits of Otto Finsch in the early 1880's, who came as an exploring agent for the New Guinea Company, the newly-established consortium of Adolf Hansemann in Germany. Shouting 'Oh Maclay' everywhere he landed along the coast, Finsch was able to make friendly contact with people and buy land in the area, in particular much of the landing area at Bongu and a 360 acre forest section. In late November 1884 the German flag was raised in Madang harbour, discovered by Finsch, and a Company claim made to the land surrounding it, which appeared 'uninhabited, uncultivated and apparently no one's property.'² By this time Finsch had already explored much of the mainland coast, discovering and naming the Sepik River (Kaiserin Augusta Fluss), Dallmannhafen, Berlinhafen, Hatzfeldthafen and Finschhafen, and he had purchased plots of land for the New Guinea Company all over the fledgling protectorate. As a result of his enthusiastic reports and its prominence on the Huon Peninsula, Finschhafen was chosen by the Company as the site for its first settlement. The Company Directors had already decided to concentrate on the mainland rather than the Archipelago where rival companies had, by 1884, established an expanding base for their activities. Kaiser Wilhelmsland was to be the scene of a great experiment in planned colonization, with settlers flocking to the protectorate from the Australian colonies and the Company providing

1. See for example, BA/MA, 623, Vol 4: Buri to Caprivi 10 Jan 1885. Maclay sent the German Admiralty a telegram: 'Maclay coast natives reject annexation!'
2. Oertzen to Bismarck 3 Dec 1884 RKA 2797:80-4; O. Finsch, Samoafahrten, Reisen in Kaiser Wilhelmsland und Englisch Neu Guinea (Leipzig 1888) pp 28-69.

the land and amenities.¹

The first party arrived at Finschhafen on 5 November 1885 and consisted of five Europeans and thirty seven Malays. They received an enthusiastic welcome. One old man greeted the captain of the Company vessel as a long-lost friend and clasped him to his breast,² obviously mistaking the newcomers for manifestations of the local ancestor spirits. On this basis the whites immediately purchased land in the vicinity of the neighbouring village and put up their houses. With gifts they bought the patronage of the local chief or 'big man', Makiri, though the latter's authority was very circumscribed in his own tribe and extended only a few miles inland.³

The New Guinea Company was initially irrepressible in its optimism. The Directors in Berlin issued instructions to their first Governor (Landeshauptmann), Admiral Freiherr von Schleinitz, to set about opening up the land. Once coastal stations had been secured, expeditions were to penetrate into the interior of the island to determine its topography, note the amount of free, 'unowned' land and learn the language and customs of the inhabitants. Existing trade was to be protected and encouraged and a system of roads constructed to maintain communications for the planned network of inland stations. The Company anticipated no real difficulties from the New Guineans: they possessed 'neither the strength nor the will' to resist and the Directors envisaged a wholly peaceful occupation of the country and the willing cooperation of its residents.⁴

1. Firth, 'The New Guinea Company 1885-1899', p 362; E. Tappenbeck, Deutsch Neuguinea (Berlin 1901) p 28.
2. Nachrichten, 1885, II, p 9.
3. Knappe to Bismarck 4 Sept 1886, RKA 2977: 21-3.
4. Geschäftsbericht der Direktion der Neu Guinea Compagnie, 1888, 9:2; Neu Guinea Compagnie: Instruktion für Landeshauptmann, 1885, enclosed in RKA 2408:37; Notiz betreffend die bisherige Tätigkeit der Neu Guinea Compagnie 7 April 1885 in RKA 2801:8. So rugged is the interior of mainland New Guinea that Europeans did not gain access to its numerous Highland population until the 1930's.

The colony was soon overrun by an army of officials trying to administer numerous impracticable regulations derived from Prussian civil and criminal law. Traders in the Archipelago considered that struggling new economic enterprises would be wiped out within a year if the Company magistrate based on Kerawara had the means actually to put all his regulations into effect.¹ Bureaucratic absurdities and disorganization made tropical life more uncomfortable, not only for potential free settlers but for the firm's own employees. The pioneers in Finschhafen found that their tents could not be erected because vital parts had been left out of the cargo; neither had they been supplied with any cutlery. A huge machine to process china grass was sent out long before it was known whether china grass would prosper in New Guinea. It didn't. As early as January 1886 the price of copra had been fixed and Company regulations covered even the return of empty packing cases.² The land purchase regulations of the firm were particularly unrealistic: All land acquisitions, at predetermined prices, had to be approved first by the Berlin Directors and the whole affair could take six months; moreover the Directors insisted on retaining all subsoil rights. Land, and many more amenities, could be purchased in the Australian colonies at a much lower price and with easier credit. Those who came from Australia were mostly tradesmen seeking work with the Company rather than an independent existence as planters.³

No attempt was made to formulate a realistic native policy. The New Guineans were regarded from the beginning largely as economic assets, to be exploited with a minimum of outlay. Ordinances were drawn up in 1887 and 1888 to regulate relations with coloured labourers but these were designed less to protect the recruits than to facilitate their mobilization

1. STAHL, 'Lebenserinnerungen Hertsheim', p 144.
2. Firth, 'German Recruitment', p 88; Staatsarchiv, Berlin, Schnee Papers, 22:7; Werner, 'Geschichte des deutschen Kolonialgebietes', p 73.
3. Deutsches Kolonialblatt 1892, Beilage: Das deutsche Schutzgebiet der Neuguinea Compagnie 1892, p 63; Deutscher General Consul, Sydney to Bismarck 24 Oct 1888, in RKA 2997:6-7; Kölnische Volkszeitung 2 Jan and 16 Jan 1899.

as workers. The first draft of the disciplinary ordinance composed in New Guinea in 1887 was an unwieldy instrument of 185 provisions and Von Schleinitz explained away its heavy emphasis on corporal punishment with the observation that, from childhood, Pacific islanders, Malays and Chinese 'were accustomed to blows and other severe punishments'.¹ One of its compilers had suggested that up to 200 strokes a month be allowed for some infringements and the mandatory death penalty for many others.² The ordinance finally issued in October 1888 was tempered by Colonial Department reservations but it still allowed the reduction of food rations, confinement and floggings.³ Though the regulation was reformed in 1900, the attitudes which had informed it continued to find expression in the actions of white employers well into the period of Australian rule.

Mainland New Guineans refused to accept lightly the one-sided relationship which these plans and attitudes implied. At Finschhafen the local residents never provided more than occasional day labour, at first for the novelty of working with iron implements and then to acquire iron themselves in order to trade with inland tribes for traditional valuables like dogs' teeth. But within a couple of years of the Europeans' arrival they became reluctant to work for them at all, out of fear, Makiri claimed, that they were contributing to the growth of the whites' power and restricting their own independence.⁴ By 1890 local distaste of working for the Company had intensified to such a degree that a black recruiter was murdered in nearby Busum village. From October 1886 onwards the Company was forced to import labourers from the Archipelago.⁵ Increasingly harsh treatment from

1. Von Schleinitz to NGC 27 Aug 1887 in RKA 4781:63.

2. *Ibid.*, 64.

3. Firth, 'German Recruitment', pp 197-8.

4. *Nachrichten* 1885, II, p 81 and 1888, pp 233-4; Knappe to Bismarck 4 April 1896 RKA 2977:18-19. There were 100 officials of the Company living at Finschhafen in 1887, which must have made an intimidating impression on the small isolated groups of New Guineans. See BA/MA, 7555, Vol 2: Heusner to Admiralität 19 Dec 1887.

5. *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, 1887, 13:416; Archives of the Neuendettelsau Mission (hereinafter *MM Archives*), Letters of Johann Flierl: Flierl to Deinzer 23 July 1891.

Company functionaries helped to sour the association. There were repeated abductions of New Guinea women and plundering of native plantations by the imported labourers. One station manager, Julius Winter, gave particular offence. In 1890 he organized a raid against a mountain village of the Kai people when they resisted his attempts to obtain a concubine for his black personal servant. The resulting destruction helped to poison relations among tribes in the entire Finschhafen area.¹ Winter was finally removed at the end of 1890 when his brutal treatment of male and female New Guinea labourers threatened to undermine racial relations permanently.²

As early as January 1886 the whites in Finschhafen suspected a plot against them when the natives suddenly broke off all relations and a fleet of strange war canoes appeared in the harbour. The incident however came to nothing after the European community had taken strict defensive measures.³ Gradually the local residents pulled back away from the station and sold their land and houses to the Company. They continued to resist attempts by Europeans, including Lutheran missionaries, to penetrate the hinterland⁴ for they enjoyed traditionally a monopoly over trade with inland tribes and, since the arrival of the Germans, had become prosperous middle-men through the flow of trade goods into the interior.

The Company's original plan of development provided for stations along the coast of Kaiser Wilhelmsland at about sixty to one hundred mile intervals and by May 1886, two further settlements were established, one at Hatzfeldthafen (Bogia), where there was a good harbour on the coast south of Vulcan Island, and the other at Constantinhafen (Bongu), the site of Miklouho Maclay's residence a decade earlier. The Company presumed that most of the unsettled land in its protectorate was also unowned⁵ and its agents

1. NM Archives, Flierl letters: Flierl to Deinzer 23 July 1891.
2. Rose to Caprivi 5 Oct 1890, with enclosures RKA 2409:88-95.
3. Knappe to Bismarck 4 Sept 1896 RKA 2977; Sydney Morning Herald 10 April 1896; O. Schellong, Alte Dokumente aus der Südsee (Königsberg i.Pr.1934) p31.
4. See pages 190-1.
5. Geschäftsbericht der Direktion der Neu Guinea Compagnie, 1887, 3:13.

immediately began substantial purchases in the Astrolabe Bay area. One in particular, Ernst Kubary, seemed to be aided by the favourable impression which Finsch had created in 1884, for the inhabitants of Constantinhafen regarded the new settlers as relatives of Maclay who were looking after the cattle he had left behind.¹ Kubary, who was station manager at Constantinhafen from 1887 to 1895, succeeded in buying 5500 hectares (13420 acres) of land comprising the site of Madang (Friedrich Wilhelms Hafen) and its hinterland for a mere 257 Marks. The entire purchase was actually invalid, for the New Guineans who sold the land, the Bilibili and Yabob islanders in Madang harbour, possessed no absolute rights on the mainland and the true owners were never consulted. Kubary did not even go ashore to survey the area.²

Imperial Commissioners Oertzen, in 1887, and Friedrich Rose, who virtually ran the administration and the Company during the Reich's temporary assumption of sovereignty from 1889 to 1892, both suspected that the Company's methods of land purchase did not meet the high ideals of colonial rule set out in its Charter but they were powerless to rectify the situation beyond warning that the New Guineans would not accept passively the progressive alienation of their most important lands.³ By 1892 relations between white and black had already deteriorated to a point where the New Guineans on the coast south of Madang were taking the law into their own hands.

This area was opened up by the two subsidiaries of the New Guinea Company, the Kaiser Wilhelmsland Plantation Company and the Astrolabe Company, after it became evident that the expected land rush to New Guinea by German settlers was not going to materialize. Plantations soon became the central concern of the Company as it struggled to achieve a return on the massive investment it had already made in the colony, 4,110, 444 Marks by

1. Knappe to Bismarck 4 Sept 1896 RKA 2977.

2. Lawrence, Road Belong Cargo, p 41.

3. Oertzen to Bismarck 29 Jan 1887 RKA 2977:114; Rose to Caprivi 9 Sept 1891 RKA 2980:165-6.

April 1889.¹ The two plantation companies were based at Gorima and Erima respectively, and experiments were being made with the large-scale cultivation of tobacco. Here too, little care was taken with the purchase of plantation land, only a small proportion of the affected native villages being drawn into the negotiations. But relations were most consistently impaired by the unchecked raids on local plantations of Malay and Archipelago labourers who were dissatisfied with their austere rice ration. The trouble began at Erima in 1891 when a station labourer was clubbed to death by the local people for pilfering from a native plantation. The ensuing reprisal, which resulted in the shooting of a New Guinean and the destruction of a village and livestock, only spread the dissatisfaction north to Gorima where the same problems existed and where the people resented the expansion of the Company plantation inland. On 4 July 1891 the plantation's inland station was attacked and eight coloured labourers killed. Ludwig Kindt, manager of Gorima, led a war party through the offending districts as far north as the Gogol River and indeed wanted to destroy all native settlements between Gorima and Madang.² Kindt and the manager of the Erima plantation, Lutz, had already been responsible for much of the local hostility through cruel and systematic brutality to their labourers. Over half of Kindt's Malay labourers and several groups of New Irelanders had been driven to desert and many roamed the area in packs preying on the native inhabitants.³

Kindt was eventually dismissed by his company after great pressure from Commissioner Rose, and Lutz died during 1891. However peace was not restored to the area until Rose, through the mediation of the Bilibili and Bogadjim peoples, had fixed definitive borders between village and company

1. Firth, 'The New Guinea Company, 1885-1899', p 364.

2. Rose to Caprivi 27 July 1891 RKA 2980:64-8; Nachrichten, 1891, p 10; Kindt to Rose 9 July 1891 RKA 2980:107-08; Kindt Tagebuch, Auszüge, enclosed in RKA 2980: 126-131.

3. Rose to Caprivi 27 Jan 1891 RKA 2425:29-30; Rose to Caprivi 9 Nov 1892 RKA 2982:26-32.

land and agreed to negotiate further differences.¹ This did not end bad race relations in the area. Continuing abuses and the decimating effects of a series of epidemics brought by foreign workers - influenza in 1891-92 and smallpox in 1894 - helped to perpetuate local hostility to Europeans. By 1899 resentment had so hardened that the villagers around Erima and Stephansort were now collaborating with labour deserters in raids on the white settlements.²

The pressure of European settlement on the people of Astrolabe Bay increased in 1891 when Finschhafen was abandoned after a malaria epidemic which killed thirteen Company officials and more than thirty labourers within a few weeks.³ Finschhafen had never been more than the collecting point for an army of officials, and attempts at systematic agriculture had foundered on the hard, coral base of the soil. In the same year Hatzfeldthafen was abandoned. The New Guinea Company therefore began to take up the land around Madang which Kubary had 'bought' in 1887-88, although the sale was not yet registered. The local inhabitants at first accepted the newcomers as rentiers of the small area on which the first house was built, but when the latter began clearing great tracts of land in the vicinity, vigorous protests were made through the newly arrived Lutheran mission.⁴ It could do nothing against a commercial enterprise which also controlled the administration and was committed to a mandate of economic development. The Madang protests were overridden; the Company insisted on the authenticity of its claims; and the occupation of the harbour's entire foreshores was set in train. From this point on, the Germans quickly came to be regarded, not as MacLay's brothers from Anut, but as hostile deities from another area; only their superior material culture and their firearms dissuaded the Madang people

1. Rose to Caprivi 27 Nov 1891 RKA 2980:184-6.

2. Haesner to NGC 13 Sept 1899 RKA 2306:71-3.

3. Frankfurter Zeitung 13 May 1891.

4. See pages 196-7. Also Appendix pp 339f.

from rising against them.¹

Nevertheless they did continue to resist in their own way, contriving to remain independent of the European economy. Marketing of produce and artefacts brought them a satisfactory standard of living and they refused to enlist as plantation labourers, preferring work done in their own gardens at their own pace. They were able to prevent the Company from regulating the rates demanded for food supplies and ethnologica by exploiting new arrivals and visitors to the area who were willing to pay higher prices.² In a certain sense the European was economically the weaker in the 1890's, for he needed increasing supplies of native produce to feed his workers, yet he did not find a permanent, nor increasing demand for trade goods by the local inhabitants. A limited amount of iron and trinkets satisfied the New Guinean's needs and the surplus was used for personal-profit trading in traditional valuables with inland tribes. Moreover, since stands of coconut were very sparse on the coasts of the mainland, there were few resources on which to base a trading exchange of mutual advantage. By 1893 the Company had already abandoned the hope of developing an extensive trading relationship with the people of Kaiser Wilhelmsland, while it was also being forced to look elsewhere for its supply of contract labour. Between 1887 and 1894 only about 600 mainlanders recruited for work locally compared to the 2836 brought from the islands.³

This inability to mobilize a local labour force was a result of the Company's failure to extend its political control and bring the mainland populations within the framework of an ordered administration by direct rule. From the beginning the Berlin directors maintained that full responsibility for defence against internal unrest as well as external attack lay with the

1. Lawrence, Road Belong Cargo, pp 41,67. G. Pilhoefer, Geschichte der Neuendettelsauer Mission in Neuguinea, Vol 1 (Neuendettelsau, 1961) p 83.
2. M. Krieger, Neu-Guinea (Berlin 1899) p 250.
3. Firth, 'German Recruitment', p 108; Also pp 91-3, 107; Deutsches Kolonialblatt 1892, Beilage: Das deutsche Schutzgebiet der NGC 1892, p 62.

Reich, and they expected the navy to act as an executive arm of the administration, carrying out police actions and imposing control when and where Company officials indicated. Both the Foreign Office and the German Admiralty disputed this assumption. In April 1887 firm limits were set to the role of the navy in the colony after collisions between the Company Governor, Commissioner Oertzen and the commanders of several German warships over the right to make requisitions of the navy and have them carried out without question. Naval commanders were directed to give adequate notice of their arrival in the protectorate, while the Company Governor was required to make a formal, written requisition and to take all the preliminary measures necessary for any military action. Above all, the new regulations left to the warship captain the final decision as to whether military intervention was politically and physically feasible.¹ In the light of the New Guinea Company's continued failure to form an effective security force of its own, this last clause did not remove all conflict between Company representatives and the navy. As early as December 1887 a new dispute occurred when Admiral Heusner, of the East Asian Cruiser Squadron, refused to proceed as requested against a New Guinean community near Cape Lambert, because there was some doubt as to their guilt in the murder of a resident German trader. In addition, Heusner refused to lead a reprisal against natives near Hatzfeldthafen for the reason that it was probable that Europeans had been responsible for recent unrest, and because he considered the mountain-dwelling people impossible to punish with German marines.²

Hatzfeldthafen was a good example of the largely negative and incomplete manner in which the New Guinea Company dealt with clashes of

1. NGC to Bismarck 10 March 1887, with enclosures RKA 2057:3-14; Oertzen to Bismarck 5 Jan 1887, with enclosures RKA 2657:15-24; 'Instruktion für das Verhalten der Kommandanten der Kaiserlichen Kriegsschiffe in Schutzgebiet der Neu Guinea Compagnie' June 1887, enclosed in AA to NGC 6 June 1887 RKA 2657:42-8; BA/MA, 623, Vol 6: AA to Admiralität 9 May and June 1887, with enclosures.
2. BA/MA, 7555, Vol 2: Heusner to Admiralität 19 Dec 1887.

interest between itself and the New Guineans. Since its foundation in December 1885, the local inhabitants had wanted nothing to do with the newcomers and an uneasy state of tension had prevailed. In 1887 the Company transferred the station from a small off-shore island to apparently unoccupied ground on the mainland in order to encourage closer contact between the races and entice labourers to its local tobacco plantation. The New Guineans immediately responded with an attack on the Malay field workers, killing one. Although it was obvious that the natives had acted out of resentment at the sudden encroachment on their land, a violent but unsuccessful punitive expedition was carried out more than a month after the event. Unable to catch any of the participants in the attack, the party resorted to the 'holy vandalism'¹ of destroying what villages it could find. The Hatzfeldthafen people showed no desire for peace after this and between July 1887 and 1892, a further four attacks were made on Europeans in the area, culminating in May 1891 in the murder of three whites, two of whom were Lutheran missionaries, and fourteen Melanesian labourers. More than a dozen natives were killed in the continuous police raids which followed this incident. However the population remained uncowed and in November 1891 the Company finally decided to abandon the station because it was found 'too costly' to ensure the safety of its staff.²

The Company's penny pinching attitude to security continued to prevail through the interlude of Imperial administration, from 1889 to 1892. Friedrich Rose administered the colony during this time, at first from Finschhafen and then, after its abandonment, from Stephansort 120 miles up the coast. Rose felt acutely the need to start from scratch: roads to the interior must be cut, harbours and landing areas created. shipping

1. Schellong, Alte Dokumente aus der Südsee, pp 152-4; Nachrichten, 1887, III, p 192, Hansemann to Bismarck 18 Nov 1887.
2. Nachrichten, 1888, p 19; 1890, p 15; 1891, p 13; Archives of the Rheinische Missions Gesellschaft (hereinafter RMG Archives), Berichte der RMG: Monatsberichte 1887.

communications established and native relations improved. With the growing number of imported labourers and New Guineans with experience of Europeans, and with the increasing pressure on local resources through European expansion, Rose predicted more and more trouble throughout the protectorate but especially in Astrolabe Bay where the people 'feel themselves cramped; and ignorant of the existence of a regime which also protects their interests, they will be easily moved to arbitrary acts of violence in their distress'.¹ Sporadic retaliatory action against unrest was no longer enough to guarantee security. Proper race relations meant indigenous intermediaries in each local settlement along the coasts and in the interior bordering the mountains. Neither could police control any longer be left to the navy, for it was restricted to short visits and coastal sorties only. Rose argued that stability would only be secured through the provision of more administrative personnel, a sea-going vessel, and an increase in the twenty-four man police force established by the Company after the Hatzfeldthafen troubles.²

He also fought the Company for more equitable treatment of New Guineans by European settlers and officials. In addition to his pressure to have Ludwig Kindt removed, Rose was responsible for the dismissal from Finschhafen of Julius Winter, a man whom he regarded as having 'an unquenchable thirst for power';³ Rose's complaints about individual white traders in northern New Ireland were at times even more pungent. In the end Rose was fighting for the establishment of a permanent Imperial organization, with state administrators, whose presence he believed was a requirement for any large-scale competitive investment in New Guinea: only the state could overcome the temptation to partiality in dealing with competing firms and

1. Rose to Caprivi 9 Sept 1891 RKA 2980:165.

2. Ibid.; Rose to Caprivi 1 July 1890 RKA 2997:16-34; Rose to Caprivi 27 Feb 1891 RKA 2980:10-16; Rose to Caprivi 9 Nov 1892 RKA 2982:33-4.

tackle effectively the problems of security and development.¹

However neither the New Guinea Company nor the Reich was amenable to Rose's ideas in the early 1890's. The Company in particular continued to assert its belief that the German Government was responsible for providing protection against the New Guineans and Rose was left to rely on the good offices of the navy and his miniscule police force.² In April 1892 the Company once more took up the reins of administration, with plans for a certain amount of retrenchment. Kelana and Butaueng were added to the list of abandoned stations, as well as unprofitable plantations like Jomba behind Madang.³ The Company now turned to the north coast to exploit its recruiting potential and began to encourage more positively exploration of the interior.

In 1894 a German trader, Ludwig Kärbach settled in Berlinhafen (Seleo), 275 miles north of Madang, to harvest the trepang reefs and grow coconuts. The New Guinea Company took over this station on Kärbach's death in 1897 when the station was already exporting eighty two tons of trade copra annually. Land was bought on the mainland and the off-shore islands and ten new trading agencies opened in the next twelve months, while Norddeutsche Lloyd linked the north coast to the rest of the protectorate by calling at Seleo on its way from Sydney to Hong Kong.⁴ At first relations with the inhabitants of Berlinhafen were peaceful enough, though further inland the Mallol people maintained a hostile front towards both the coastal dwellers and the Germans. The first collision on the coast occurred in April 1897 when a surveying party from the small naval vessel SMS Moewe, was attacked by the people of Aly Island in Berlinhafen for cutting down a sacred tree in a grove of coconuts. Though no one was killed in the incident, the captain of the Moewe considered the honour of the German navy to be impugned

1. Rose to Caprivi 1 July 1890 RKA 2997.

2. NGC to AAKA 22 Dec 1891 RKA 2980:176-9; AAKA to Rose 29 Dec 1891 RKA 2980:180.

3. Deutsche Kolonialzeitung 1894, 6:77-8; Krieger, Koloniale Monatsblätter 1899, pp 34-6.

4. Nachrichten, 1897, p 23; Krieger, Koloniale Monatsblätter 1899, pp 41-2.

and he mounted a series of assaults on Aly Island and the nearby mainland, where most of the inhabitants had taken refuge. Sixteen islanders were killed in the ensuing conflict and the remainder of the population driven from point to point along the mainland, with the result that white settlement in the area was endangered for the next two years by plots for revenge.¹ By 1899 the New Guinea Company was having very limited success in recruiting labour from the area, and even that was due to the influence of the recently arrived catholic mission in Berlinhafen.²

Exploration of the mainland had been an integral element of the Company's programme from the beginning. According to its 1885 instructions, the fundamental aim of scientific expeditions was to observe if conditions in New Guinea allowed Europeans to settle and work the land and 'what modifications to domestic life in housing, clothing, nourishment and other matters would be made necessary'.³ Explorers were ordered blithely to establish the inland borders of German New Guinea and cover as much intervening land as possible, choosing sites for a network of inland stations. Exact diaries, in which daily entries on everything noticed along the way had to be made, were to be kept in duplicate.

To those entrusted with the task these demands were easier made than met. Von Schleinitz managed to travel up the Sepik River in 1886 to a point above Ambunti, but little else the Company attempted was successful. The official Schrader expedition the same year, organized to report on the 'geographical, botanical, social and economic situation of New Guinea' was a complete failure from the start because the party could not obtain New Guinean

1. Kdr. SMS Moewe to komm. Admiral 20 April 1897, enclosed in RKA 2986:93-4; Lucker to Skopnik 15 June 1898 RKA 2986:193-4; NGC to AAKA 5 March 1899 RKA 2987:76; E. von Hesse Wartegg, Samoa, Bismarckarchipel und Neuguinea (Leipzig 1902), pp 21-2.

2. AAKA Notiz, Schmidt-Dargitz 8 June 1899, in RKA 2306:43-4.

3. 'Instruktion für wissenschaftliche Expeditionen', 1885, in RKA 2408:44.

guides and bearers to take them inland.¹ Because of the fragmentation of New Guinea societies, natives feared to venture more than a mile or two from their villages in case of attack by traditionally hostile neighbours. Those Europeans who overcame this problem often found their way inland barred by coastal groups who resisted the loss of their trade monopolies in European goods over tribes of the interior, while others were subdued by the sheer enormity of terrain and climatic difficulties. The ill-fated Otto Ehlers and his men were reduced to eating grass in their abortive attempt in 1895 to traverse New Guinea from the Huon Peninsula to the Papua Gulf, before Ehlers and his German companion were shot by their own bearers long before civilization could be reached.² Virtually the only significant expeditions carried out during the Company period were the navigating of the Sepik and the discovery of the Ramu plain by Lauterbach in late 1896. Lauterbach travelled from Stephansort to the Ramu and then down the river to its mouth, crossing a fertile, thickly populated plain well suited to agriculture on a grand scale and encountering fierce resistance near the river's head waters, from a people who manifested no knowledge, nor fear of firearms.³ Though considered to be of immense importance in terms of future colonization plans, the Ramu plain was still an uncontrolled and unsettled area at the end of German rule in 1914.

By 1896 the Company Directors had decided that it was impossible to carry out Bismarck's original idea of Kolonialpolitik under Chartered Companies,⁴ at least for New Guinea, and negotiations were begun for the permanent transfer of political control to the Reich. The original terms proposed gave the New Guinea Company 100,000 hectares in land, a seventy five year monopoly over economic development in the colony and four million Marks

1. Geschäftsbericht der Direktion der Neu Guinea Compagnie, 1887, pp 3-7; Knappe to Bismarck 4 Sept 1896 RKA 2977:17.
2. Kortum to NGC 24 Nov 1895 RKA 2363:10-11; Sydney Morning Herald 23 Nov 1895; 'Verlauf der Expedition', Rüdiger 13 April 1896 in RKA 2363:104-127; Hahl to Reichskanzler 1 Sept 1897 RKA 2363:176-8.
3. Lauterbach to AAKA 23 Oct 1896 and 12 Dec 1896 RKA 2369:49,56; See also RKA 2369-65-8.
4. See Introduction, pages 24-7.

in compensation if the monopoly were surrendered, but domestic opposition finally reduced these to a cash compensation of four million Marks and 50000 hectares of land to be taken up by 1902. Control was finally relinquished in 1899.¹ To that date the New Guinea Company's record, whether of profit or administration, was an unenviable one.

Economically the firm's achievements on the mainland were confined to the planting of some 60000 coconut trees, only a small proportion of which were bearing, and to the export of a small amount of copra and inferior tobacco, 150 tons and thirty tons respectively in the year to April 1899. This compared very unfavourably with the 3632 tons of copra exported from the Bismarck Archipelago the same year, which put the latter area a long way ahead in terms of development.² Indeed Heinrich Schnee, Imperial magistrate in the Archipelago from 1898 to 1900 claimed rather cynically that the Archipelago was the only place 'where the New Guinea Company got a plus': it invested 25000 Marks there and earned 50000 Marks in return.³

On the mainland the Germans had established a small foothold on the coast, concentrated in Astrolabe Bay where plantations had risen and fallen in the last decade. Except for one station on the north coast and a few on offshore islands, the Company had been driven from its other attempted settlements. Not 100 Europeans were yet settled in Kaiser Wilhelmsland. Of rivers, only the mouths of the Markham, the Gogol and the Ramu had been explored while the Sepik had been navigated but in no way utilized. In 1899 the interior was still a vast unknown: the Germans were ignorant of what lay more than one hour from most of their stations. Little or no attempt had been made to provide the prerequisites of development: there were no public roads, no health stations, no definitive maps of land or sea routes. Furthermore,

1. Firth, 'The New Guinea Company', 1973, p 376. .

2. Annual Reports 1898/99, pp 170-1; Krieger, Neu-Guinea, pp 222,243; Firth, 'The New Guinea Company', 1973, p 376-7.

3. Staatsarchiv, Berlin, Schnee Papers, 22:8.

the Company's land sale policy was a positive hindrance to development and there were more than isolated cases of indifference in its alienation from New Guineans. The New Guineans above all had been ignored in the scheme of development. The Company had failed to consider that they might reject regimented wage labour on the European plantations and refuse to assimilate European social and economic values. Between 1895 and July 1898 the Company's work force on the mainland dropped from 2000 to 735 and the majority of these were imported labourers from South East Asia; only 414 of 695 contract labourers in the mainland plantation district in 1898 were New Guineans and most were from the Archipelago.¹ In addition, European security was still an uncertain factor on the mainland in the face of indigenous resistance. Three instances of violence against whites, including the murders at Hatzfeldhafen in 1891, were still unpunished in 1899. It was partly local resistance and partly the reluctance of the Berlin financiers to invest in a programme to extend political control over the New Guinea population which made the New Guinea Company ineffectual as an organ of colonial administration.

With the end of Company rule, the Colonial Department was confident that the new Imperial administration would inaugurate an era of rapid development, undisturbed by major unrest. It shared with the New Guinea Company the assumption that security was a simple proposition, given adequate facilities - sufficient police and personnel, and a sea-going vessel. The linguistic and political fragmentation of indigenous society, the apparent sparsity of population and the inhabitants' basic 'good nature' and 'docility' were all expected to preclude the possibility of a united rebellion against German rule.² All this underestimated the degree to which New Guineans of the mainland were disillusioned with the presence of Europeans by 1900.

1. Firth, 'German Recruitment', pp 120,125.

2. 'Denkschrift betreffend Übergang der Landeshoheit der Neu Guinea Compagnie an das Reich', 1896, in RKA 2940:168-199.

The Missions in Kaiser Wilhelmsland:

By 1899 three Christian missions were operating on the mainland and in providing a dramatic contrast to the Company in terms of race relations and effectiveness of control, they deserve separate treatment.

Johann Flierl arrived at Finschhafen from Australia in July 1886 to found the Lutheran Neuendettelsau Mission to the new protectorate. Mission participation in the colonization of New Guinea was included in the Company's programme at an early stage but Flierl was the first, and for some years the only missionary to overcome the procrastinations of the Company and gain its support for his venture. After living for two months in Finschhafen with the firm's employees, Flierl established the first mission station at Simbang, four miles north of the settlement. His reception among the Simbang people was a mixed one: while they recognized the material advantages to be gained from the newcomer in the way of iron and various trade goods, they displayed the New Guinean's inherent fear of the stranger and the outsider. Moreover the people of Simbang had seen how the natives of Finschhafen were crowded off their land by the coming of the Company and they regarded Flierl's arrival as an extension of that process, particularly when, out of ignorance, he neglected to enter into any agreement with the owner of the land on which he settled himself.¹ Only after numerous protestations, gift exchanges and a light skirmish with a leading Simbang warrior, Ngakan, was the station able to be set up.²

The mission's troubles were far from over. Because of the recurring hostility of the local inhabitants, the continued existence of the Simbang station remained in doubt for the first year and only the close proximity of the Company saved Flierl from being driven out. The people

1. Pilhoefer, Geschichte der Neuendettelsauer Mission, I:71.

2. NM Archives, Flierl Letters: Flierl to Deinzer 22 Oct 1886; J. Flierl, Forty Years in New Guinea (Wartburg 1927) p 23.

showed a contemptuous indifference to his teachings, looking on him as either a trader or a rich philanthropist, and he suffered a great deal from theft of his belongings. Only very slowly, as Flierl adopted a conscious policy of distinguishing himself from Company employees and their actions, did he come to be regarded as a singular type of white man. Flierl went about unarmed; he eschewed trading for income; he diligently learned the local language; and he offered himself as advocate in the natives' disputes with the Company over land, labour and property. Normally sensitive to local mores and the fears which the New Guineans had of being pushed out by the white men, Flierl recognized Julius Winter as a direct threat to the possibility of coexistence with the Finschhafen New Guineans and he joined in the campaign to have him removed.¹ By the time the Company abandoned Finschhafen in 1891, Flierl and the three German companions who by now were with him, had gained acceptance among the people of the Finschhafen coast, though the latter had as yet manifested no desire for conversion.

Isolation after 1891 brought its own rewards. The mission's activities were no longer compromised by the presence of a commercial enterprise and the actions of men whose primary aim was profit. With a secure base on the coast, Flierl now attempted to expand into the hinterland of Finschhafen. His success was at first limited because of perennial local village divisions which prevented him from obtaining bearers willing to penetrate the interior of the Huon Peninsula.² In 1892 he did reach an inland plateau 2000 feet above sea level and some twelve miles north west of Simbang and here he established Sattelberg station, this time taking care to build well away from the local village so as to avoid arousing its resentment. Sattelberg too had to withstand the ordeal of acceptance, and thefts of Flierl's belongings grew to such proportions that he was forced to construct a

1. NM Archives, Flierl Letters: Flierl to Deinzer 23 July 1891.

2. Flierl, Forty Years in New Guinea, p 34.

palisade and equip himself with a rifle.¹ The new station was particularly resented by those people living between the coast and the plateau, since it destroyed their previous control over the movement of European goods into the interior, and they forced Flierl to find another, more difficult and circuitous route to Sattelberg by their constant raids on his supply trains.² On the other hand the inhabitants of Sattelberg quickly reconciled themselves to the station as a regular and more profitable pipeline for the supply of iron, beads and cloth, though Flierl knew that he was regarded as 'a good but stupid man, endlessly rich and, as a stranger, without any rights'.³ He gradually earned the respect of the New Guineans by insisting on reciprocity for every service he performed and by showing himself prepared to shoot anyone who attempted to burgle the station. Normally he rejected force as a legitimate weapon of persuasion but in this case Flierl was concerned to establish himself as a man of authority and determination. By 1893 so considerable had his influence become among the natives of Sattelberg that they were prepared to leave their weapons at home and trust in Flierl's rifle on mission trips to the coast.⁴

The mission's control however remained limited well into the 1900's. Its area of influence in the hinterland depended solely on the local toleration of its presence, on cooperation in providing bearers and guides, and it did not succeed for some time in preventing local wars and cannibalism, or countering the fear of sorcery. By 1900 the Neuendettelsau Mission could boast of only two adult converts but it was infiltrating villages near Sattelberg with New Guinean youths who had accepted work and limited instruction on the mission station and were carrying the mission's message back to

1. Pilhoefer, Geschichte der Neuendettelsauer Mission, I:95.
2. NM Archives, Flierl Letters: Flierl to Deinzer 13 Dec 1893 and 15 Aug 1894; A.C. Frerichs, Anutu conquers in New Guinea (Wartburg 1957) p 38.
3. NM Archives, Flierl Letters: Flierl to Deinzer 9 Oct 1894.
4. Ibid.: Flierl to Deinzer 3 May 1893. See also Nachrichten, 1896, p 65: As 'peace people' the missionaries were exempted from any blame for a smallpox epidemic which raged through the area in 1895.

the village.¹ It had also advanced much further into the territory and lives of New Guineans than had the New Guinea Company to that date.

For the other Lutheran mission in Kaiser Wilhelmsland, the Rheinische Missions Gesellschaft (Barmen Mission), New Guinea was a stumbling block for many years and relations with natives and Europeans were far from harmonious. The first missionaries, Thomas and Eich, arrived in Finschhafen in 1887 only after protracted negotiations with the New Guinea Company over the mission's entry. Eich surveyed Hatzfeldthafen as a site for a first mission settlement but the hostility of the New Guineans persuaded him to concentrate the mission's energies further south in Astrolabe Bay. In November 1887, Thomas acquired from the inhabitants of Bogadjim, south of Madang, fifteen acres of land and the first station was founded.² Now began a succession of tragedies which threatened to exhaust the mission's manpower, and its reserves of spirit: missionary after missionary arrived only to be struck down within months of beginning work. While the Neuendettelsau Mission went ahead with its work unaffected by deaths, ten Barmen missionaries died in Kaiser Wilhelmsland between 1887 and 1895, more than in all her other fields of activity combined. One drowned before he even reached Bogadjim, another shot himself accidentally, most died from fever.³

A second station was founded in 1889 on Siar Island, north of Madang, and a third in 1890 on Dampier Island. The latter was only occupied with some difficulty, for while the inhabitants valued the cases of goods accompanying the missionaries, they did not want to sell them land for a station.⁴ Dampier Island had to be abandoned in 1896 after an eruption by the local volcano.

1. Annual Reports 1898/99, pp 174-6; Pilhoefer, Geschichte der Neuendettelsauer Mission, I:107.

2. Frerichs, Anutu conquers in New Guinea, p 28.

3. Ibid. pp 28-35.

4. G. Kunze, Im Dienst des Kreuzes auf ungebahnten Pfaden, Vol 1: 'Schwierige Missionsanfänge auf einsamer Südsee Insel' (Barmen 1925) pp 19, 28ff.

From the beginning the Rhenish Mission was apprehensive about race relations in the Astrolabe Bay, particularly when it became the centre of European settlement after 1891. The deteriorating situation between the Company and the New Guineans soon reflected itself in local attitudes to the missionaries, and in their dealings with the people they were constantly identified less as missionaries than as white men seeking advantage for themselves and their compatriots on the plantations. Their preaching voyages to surrounding villages were seen purely as opportunities for profitable barter while the mission inevitably suffered from its association with the European community as the pressure on land and the competition for local products and labour increased.¹

The murder of missionaries Scheidt and Bösch at Hatzfeldhafen in 1891 was at least partly due to their identification with European expansion. The fact that they were accompanied by a Company official and sixteen Company labourers probably stigmatized them as supporters of the plantation settlement which had been causing so much trouble to the local residents and a report was later circulated that Bösch's own labourers had interfered with native plantations shortly before he was killed. It is also possible that Bösch had been indiscreet enough to display openly the large collection of trade goods he had brought:² resentment and covetousness were a consistent formula for New Guinea attacks.

It was Flierl's private opinion that the Rhenish Mission had been at fault in trying to expand too quickly.³ Whether true or not, the loss of manpower forced it to restrict its activity to a small crescent round Astrolabe Bay and consolidate its presence during the Company period. Attempts to expand inland from the Bay were thwarted by sickness and by the

1. Archives of the Rheinische Missions Gesellschaft (hereinafter RMG Archives Referate: Hoffmann 2 July 1902; *ibid.*, Stationen, Jahresbericht Ragetta 1899.
2. Rose to Caprivi 27 July 1891 RKA 2980:76; NM Archives, Flierl Letters: Flierl to Deinzer 23 July 1891.
3. NM Archives: Flierl to Deinzer 23 July 1891.

coastal New Guineans who refused to share their source of special wealth with inland tribes by guiding the missionaries into the interior. Thus by 1900, the mission had four stations between Madang and Bongu, with four schools for only 136 pupils.¹ As yet there were no converts: the people evinced no interest in the spiritual world of the white man, no sense of spiritual need. To them the missionary was a trader or doctor or advocate, or the rich man who loaned out his boat. Their attitude was summed up by a boy who declared to missionary Kunze that the missionary was there to teach strange songs and writing, and to bind wounds; it went no further than that.² It would go much further after 1900 when the New Guineans were forced to react to the mounting attacks of the missions on their secret cults and festivities which were an important element in reinforcing the sense of social solidarity of each local group.³

The third mission on the mainland was operated by the Catholic Society of the Divine Word (S.V.D. or known as 'the Mission of the Holy Ghost in Kaiser Wilhelmsland') which established itself in 1896 on Tumleo Island in Berlinhafen, at the invitation of Ludwig Kärnbach. After an initial struggle with the New Guinea Company over the amount of land to be sold to them, the mission of the Holy Ghost settled also on the mainland, and in November 1899, at Potsdamhafen in Hansa Bay.⁴ By 1900 there were six priests, six

1. Lawrence, Road Belong Cargo, p 53.

2. RMG Archives, Konferenzprotokolle, II: Konferenz Jan 1899.

3. Little is known about the forms of these pre-contact cults of the Papuans of Astrolabe Bay. Known by various names of deities, Asa in Bogadjim, Ai in Bongu and Mesiab in Siar - Ragetta, they seem to have been exclusively male fertility cults which accompanied a new planting season or harvest. The fields were stripped of their produce and weeks spent in using up enormous quantities of valuable food resources (pigs, taro, coconuts). The women and children were led to believe that the deity had eaten everything. The cults seem to have been an important mechanism to integrate the kinship groups in each residential complex. Compare Deutsches Kolonialblatt, May, 1905, p 331; Nachrichten, 1898, pp 72-4.

4. R. Wiltgen, 'Catholic Mission Plantations in Mainland New Guinea'. Paper given at the second Waigani Seminar, Port Moresby, June 1968 and kindly provided by the author.

brothers and four nuns on the north east coast of the mainland and three schools teaching over 100 pupils reading and writing in the German language. The mission baptized its first convert in March 1900¹ but at that time, the north coast was still an untamed frontier of European settlement.

All three missions had contributed more to the pacification of the mainland at the end of New Guinea Company rule than had the Company itself. The Mission of the Holy Ghost could claim with justice that the firm's recruiting attempts on the north coast would have been fruitless without its civilizing influence on the inhabitants, and it was probably responsible for the reconciliation of the Aly Islanders with the administration two years after the Moewe incident.² The Neuendettelsau Mission's influence on the relaxation of tension around Finschhafen had the same effect in encouraging recruitment, indeed the Yabim and Kai from the Huon Peninsula were the only mainland peoples to recruit regularly for the plantations of Astrolabe Bay.³ Through the mission the European presence had also been established further inland than by any Company station on the mainland by 1899/1900. Sattelberg dramatically increased the area in which European material culture - iron, cloth, beads etc. - was known and used as a medium of exchange and in this way contact with the interior was achieved comparatively quickly in the 1900's. Even in Astrolabe Bay the Rhenish Mission had tried to encourage the local people to engage in regular work on the plantations.⁴ More importantly the mission acted as a pressure valve for New Guinean society in its relations with the whites; part of its instructions were to press the Company to provide reservations for those villagers deprived of land and to police the treatment of indentured labourers on the plantations, while individual

1. Annual Reports 1899/1900, pp 202-3; Deutsches Kolonialblatt, June 1900, p 466.

2. Lucker to NGC 12 Jan 1899 RKA 2987:87-8; AAKA Notiz, Schmidt-Dargitz 8 June 1899, in RKA 2306:43-4.

3. AAKA Notiz, Schmidt-Dargitz 8 June 1899 RKA 2306.

4. Deutsches Kolonialblatt, 1899, p 87.

missionaries were even prepared to upbraid Company employees about their disregard for indigenous mores and expectations.¹

Because of the missionaries' primary concern for the quality of life of the New Guineans, there existed a basic conflict of interests between them and the Company which occasionally resulted in a break-down in cooperation. Both Lutheran Missions were at different times accused of hindering development by trying to dissuade their flocks from enlisting as plantation labourers. The missionaries were often dissatisfied with the actual conditions of indentured labour, and they were themselves occasionally endangered because the New Guineans associated them with the death of kinsmen on the plantations,² but as they pointed out this was ample reason for the New Guinean to refuse recruitment of his own accord and there was no discouraging or encouraging.³ The abuses practised during the recruiting process and on the plantations, such as deceptions about the length of contract, the brutality of overseers and particularly the frequency of sickness and death, were enough to arouse the antipathy of New Guineans. One naval report in 1896 claimed that in Stephansort workers were dying at the rate of eighty a month,⁴ while by 1898 forty to fifty Yabim people had died there. This figure represented one twentieth of the Yabim population.⁵ As for the natives of Astrolabe Bay, they were simply reluctant to emigrate. They possessed sufficient food and resources while a moderate standard of living could be assured by occasional trading with the Europeans.

The New Guinea Company's accusations were, in the final analysis, an unconscious tribute to the extent and effectiveness of the missions as a means of controlling and organizing the New Guineans. The new Imperial

1. RMG Archives, Conferenzprotokolle, I: Deputation RMG to Conferenz Neuguinea 13 March 1893.
2. In 1896 the Simbang mission station was threatened because more Simbang people had died in Astrolabe Bay than had people from Sattelberg. NM Archives, Flierl Letters: Flierl to Deinzer 12 March 1896.
3. Ibid., Neuguinea Anfänge: Deinzer to NGC 22 Feb 1899; RMG Archives, Referate: Hoffman 2 July 1902.
4. BA/MA. 666, Vol 2: Kdr. SMS Falke to komm. Admiral 12 Jan 1896.
5. Firth, 'German Recruitment', p 121.

administration, especially under Hahl, recognized that they provided a solid base on which to construct the model of development conceived for New Guinea.

c) The Bismarck Archipelago, 1900 to 1914: Imperial Rule and New Guinean Self-sufficiency.

In 1900 the Archipelago sector of German New Guinea was still a trading colony and more than half the copra exported still came from trade with the New Guineans.¹ Plantation agriculture was however expanding at a rate which would transform New Guinea into a plantation colony by 1914, the rate of development affected by two factors above all: New Guinean resistance and the availability of labour.

Albert Hahl, who became Governor of the colony in succession to Rudolf von Bennigsen in 1901, was aware that 'the Native question' held the key to the future of New Guinea. He saw the proper exploitation of the colony's resources as depending on the 'pacification' and control of the indigenous population, at least along the coasts, so as to attract investment and encourage expansion at the same time as making the New Guineans accessible to the labour recruiters. This, in turn, meant more than keeping existing areas of stability and recruitment open: it meant seeking out new sources of labour, opening them by 'pacification' and direct rule and providing an ever-increasing flow of labourers from the village to the plantations.²

Direct rule was a development of Hahl's original appointment of lualuas and was based on regional stations, where a European district official

1. As late as 1902-03, trading provided 2,200 tons out of the 2,800 tons of copra produced in the Archipelago. Firth, 'German Recruitment', p 135.
2. See Staatsarchiv Bremen, Deutsche Südsee Phosphat Papers, Vol 1: Hahl to AAKA 8 Feb 1907, enclosed in Hahl to Wiegand 16 April 1908; Annual Reports 1901/02, pp 82ff; Firth 'German Recruitment', p 134.

maintained a close liaison with the local inhabitants through nominated hamlet chiefs (luluais) and kept them under regular surveillance with the threat of retaliatory action in the event of violence. To give weight to his authority, and to impose an initial control by conquest where tribes were warring with each other or with resident whites, the district officer was provided with a complement of about fifty New Guinean police, drawn predominantly from the Solomon Islands area. The police force expanded dramatically after the end of Company rule and in 1903 there were already one hundred and fifty. By 1914 this had grown to 814 and included after 1911 a special expeditionary force of over a hundred men.¹

Organized public works were an integral element of the direct control process, in particular through roadworks, which were intended not only to link European settlements and facilitate military access to villages but also to be the first stage in mobilizing local populations by taxation. A corvee was introduced in November 1903 by a Government Instruction (Anweisung) which authorized officials to co-opt all able-bodied men in the areas of control for up to four weeks a year to assist in the construction and maintenance of roads, or work on government plantations.² This enabled the Germans to build a network of roads in the vicinity of their main settlements before 1914 though in all areas except the Gazelle Peninsula, the roads did not stretch very far into the interior but tended to follow the shoreline. By 1911 in the Gazelle there were 200 kms. of road between the Warangoi River and the Baining Mountains: a series running north and west of the Kokopo coast linked most of the inland districts and reached beyond the Varzin to Taulil in 1910, while a proper shoreline road was constructed between Herbertshöhe and

1. Hahl to RKA 24 May 1913 RKA 3108:10-12; Kölnische Zeitung 22 March 1904.
2. The only extant copy of this regulation is to be found in The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report to the League of Nations on the Administration of the Territory of New Guinea, Sept 1914 to 30 June 1921, Appendix B, p 40.

Rabaul. There was also a road from Rabaul to Talili Bay on the north coast over the Ratavul pass, and from Weberhafen to Massawa on the north west coast and into the Bainings.¹ These were not all constructed with the willing cooperation of the Tolai. The inhabitants had participated in the building of the first roads in the 1890's willingly enough because they were paid for it and because the roads increased their opportunities for marketing produce. But the use of the corvee and the occasional duress of the native police who often supervised the work,² as well as the mounting intrusion of the European presence which the roads brought to their homes, only aroused the resentment of the Tolai. When Hahl introduced a head tax to New Guinea in 1906, designed to push more villagers on to the European plantations to earn it and to act as an alternative to forced maintenance work on the roads, he delayed its introduction in the Gazelle at least six months after the first imposition in New Ireland in order to enable the completion of his comprehensive road-building programme in the Gazelle with free Tolai labour.³ He knew that Tolai resentment at the roads works was so strong and their cash reserves from trading so large, that they would gladly pay the head tax and leave him without sufficient manpower to carry out his projects.⁴ Hahl's prediction proved correct: the Tolai made no difficulties about the head tax when it was introduced in 1907; indeed even when the tax was doubled in many areas of the Gazelle in 1910 from five Marks a year for every adult male to ten Marks, it was paid willingly as a preferable alternative to road maintenance.⁵

1. Annual Reports 1909/10, p 177 and 1910/11, p 168; Epstein, Capitalism Primitive and Modern, p 56.
2. See for example, R Neuhauss, Deutsch Neu-Guinea (Berlin 1911) Vol I, pp452-3.
3. Hahl had actually drawn up a head tax ordinance in 1905. Though first levied in northern New Ireland in 1906, the ordinance was not officially promulgated until March 1907. It freed from the tax obligation those New Guineans who had been employed for ten months of the year by a 'non-native' or by a native who paid business tax, and it allowed up to ten per cent of the revenue to be paid to the local luluai or functionary who helped collect it. Defaulters could work off the tax by labouring for the administration at a fixed rate. See Hahl to AAKA 11 Dec 1905 RKA 2763:47 and Kopfsteuer Verordnung in RKA 2763:80-1.
4. Hahl to AAKA 30 May 1906 RKA 2763:53. There were some 400 Tolai engaged on road building projects for the administration in mid 1906.
5. Amtsblatt für das Schutzgebiet Deutsch Neuguinea. Simpsonhafen 1 April 1910, pp 56-7.

Throughout Imperial rule the Tolai remained a force with which Hahl had to reckon in his plans for stimulating the European economy and drawing the New Guineans into it as wage labour. When the Company period ended, the Tolai of the eastern Gazelle Peninsula still virtually controlled the copra trade through their insistence on receiving payment in tambu, and European traders had been unable to come to any agreement about the regulation of exchange rates.¹ Since tambu was hoarded for prestige reasons rather than spent on more consumer goods, traders began to suffer from a slackening demand in the Gazelle Peninsula in 1900. To counter this, a government ordinance in October 1900 forbade the use of shell money in trade between Europeans and New Guineans and included a decree prohibiting the sale of whole, uncut coconuts. Its avowed purpose was to encourage the natives 'to devote themselves to the production of really useful articles suitable for export, such as copra etc.'² This burst the Tolai currency boom but did not stop the use of tambu. In fact the regulations caused at first a considerable decline in trade with the Tolai, who continued to value their shell money as an index of power and prestige in this world and a means to secure an eminent position in the next.³

Nevertheless Tolai material prosperity continued to increase over the next decade and a half. European-style businesses and ventures began to proliferate as Tolai learned carpentry and bought horses and carts which were used for commercial transportation. Copra production rose steadily, especially after the plantings on reserves like Vunamami began to bear, and by 1909 there were 'big men' who received up to 300 Marks a month from the sale of copra. The Tolai continued to supply four fifths of the native copra produced in the Archipelago as well as being responsible for about one third of all consumer imports before 1914. European clothes, houses, cigarettes

1. Annual Reports 1899/1900, p 178.

2. Annual Reports 1900/1901, p 83.

3. Epstein, Capitalism Primitive and Modern, pp 26, 36.

and tinned goods quickly became status symbols and there seemed little difficulty in paying for them; there were reports of influential men who had managed to save up to 10000 Marks in silver one Mark coins. By 1913 the value of clothes and textiles purchased by Tolai amounted to £12000. The per capita income of a district like Vunamami, the central element of the old confederacy, trebled during the period, despite rapid population growth.¹

Progress and prosperity were not unaccompanied by continuing resistance to the European economy. The Tolai still refused to accept wage labour on a large scale unless it involved an elite position like domestic servant or policeman and a sense of partnership existed; only those on the inland fringe of Tolai settlement offered themselves as contract labourers, in order to share in the economic opportunities which were lacking on the frontier. By 1910 a mere ten per cent (or 1095) of the able bodied Tolai population were indentured as labourers or soldiers and 763 of these were employed close to home in the Gazelle Peninsula itself.² The head tax did not succeed in altering this pattern of behaviour, for the coastal Tolai at least were prosperous enough from their manifold economic enterprises to meet all the levies up to 1914.

Differences over land continued to occur as European plantations expanded their plantings. At the end of 1902 Europeans claimed 130,488 acres of land in the Gazelle, 13100 of which were planted with coconuts, coffee, cotton and capok. Land around Herbertshohe was worth £100 per acre in 1909.³ On the Vunamami reserve in Ralum, To Bobo had to face further encroachment from the plantation's owners and he pressured Hahl for an exact definition of the district's holdings. Hahl had the area surveyed in 1901 and concrete markers were erected, by which time reserves in Ralum already amounted to

1. See Annual Reports 1909/10, pp 170-173; Epstein, Capitalism Primitive and Modern, pp 39, 41, 44; Salisbury, Vunamami, pp 118, 242-243.
2. Firth, 'German Recruitment', p 175.
3. Annual Reports 1902/03, Anlage E IV, p 323; Epstein, Capitalism Primitive and Modern, p 40.

1000 hectares (2441 acres).¹ Pressure on the land did not however cease until well into the Australian period. Hahl had initially to fight plantation owners for every metre and every tree in seeking native enclaves in areas where wholesale alienation of land had occurred in Company days, and even when he was successful, the reserves established possessed no real legal basis, being subject to the continuing good will of the land's European owners. But in 1902 and 1903, Imperial ordinances were issued in Berlin which gave colonial Governors the authority to attach special conditions to the European right of ownership of native land and to expropriate legally acquired land from private persons in order to ensure to the local inhabitants the possibility of an economic existence.² By a regulation of July 1904, Hahl put the first of these into effect, probably using as a basis the agreement he had reached with To Bobo concerning the Ralum reserve in 1896.³ The conditions elaborated at that time, by which the Tolai were allowed to keep their reserves, thus became official policy and enabled the administration between 1903 and 1914 to set aside over 14000 acres of previously alienated land for the residence and use of New Guinean groups.⁴ However conflicts over land were not thereby eliminated altogether, for the rights of native users of enclosed land were not made hereditary or transferable, so that interests created by continued occupation failed to be preserved. Moreover, abuses continued to occur in the process of acquisition, especially in areas not under permanent government control. Officially, purchases of land for Europeans were made by the government after investigation of the potential customer's claim in relation to local needs. In practice, a company or group with a special interest in a

1. Gouverneur to AAKA 23 Jan 1901 RKA 2575:154; Salisbury, Vunamami, p 82.

2. F. Beaumont Phillips, 'Native Land: Its Acquisition under German and Australian Law (to the year 1930)' in Fashion of Law in New Guinea, (ed.) B.J. Brown (Sydney 1969) pp 242-4.

3. See page 160-1.

4. P.G. Irwin, 'Land Use and Tenure in the Blanche Bay District of New Britain' The Australian Geographer, Vol X, Nr. 2, Sept 1966, p 99; Also Salisbury, Vunamami, p 81.

particular area was allowed to make a prior agreement with the often inarticulate and helpless local New Guineans to sell them the land, and this claim was then in effect confirmed by the administration. The official investigation and government purchase were all too often a mere formality.¹

The last great war in the Gazelle Peninsula, in April and May 1902, can be traced directly to the omissions of German land policy. It occurred in the Varzin ranges, an area which, under To Vagira's influence had evaded German control and remained hostile to Europeans since the 1890's. Armed intervention was necessary in July 1898 and two more expeditions were carried out within twelve months of the Imperial takeover, after To Vagira had raided a neighbouring district and captured fifteen prisoners for a cannibal feast. None of the administration's attempts to subdue him were successful.²

A new kind of pressure was brought to bear on the Varzin as a sudden expansion of small plantations took place in the Gazelle in the first years of the new century. Because of the entrenchment of the large plantations on the Kokopo coast, this was centred on the north coast and the interior of the east coast beyond the borders of the New Guinea Company and Ralum. In October 1900 a German planter, Rudolf Wolff, settled at the foot of the Varzin near Paparatawa, about three walking hours from Herbertshöhe, on 500 hectares of land purchased from the local 'big man', To Kilan. For a while relations with his neighbours were good as Wolff inaugurated a prosperous exchange trade in copra with several inland districts, but in March 1902 To Kilan disputed the conditions of the original land sale. He claimed that Wolff was clearing land not included in the agreement, land which involved an old burial site on which To Kilan hoped to be buried.³

1. C.D. Rowley, The New Guinea Villager. The Impact of Colonial Rule on Primitive Society and Economy (New York/London 1966), p 117.

2. See page 167.

3. Assessor Wolff to AAKA 20 May 1902 RKA 2989: 110-111; Deutsches Kolonialblatt, August 1902, p 346; Hahl, Gouverneursjahre, p 151.

This was not the first case of New Guineans in the area claiming back land which they had sold in the recent past and in the next few weeks Wolff joined with the Mission of the Sacred Heart, which was fearful of impending unrest, in trying to have the dispute adjudicated by the administration.¹ The latter seems to have underestimated the urgency of the matter and a survey of the land in question was delayed. In the meantime, Wolff's New Guinean neighbours were becoming more and more antagonistic towards him for his failure to control his labourers' pilfering of local poultry and his mistake in firing his gun to frighten off a young warrior who was incidentally a relative of To Vagira.² By late March To Vagira was persuading To Kilan to join with him in a campaign of revenge against the whites. An ambush against Wolff himself failed to succeed, so on 3 April, 200 to 300 warriors from the districts of Paparatawa and Tomanariki surrounded his home while he was absent and fell upon his wife with their axes as she bargained with them over a pig. They then killed the planter's baby daughter and ransacked the house, taking with them thirteen rifles and 1000 rounds of ammunition. Wolff himself nearly shared his family's fate when he rode up to his house to investigate and found a solid wall of warriors brandishing their weapons. Only by charging his horse through their ranks did he manage to escape.³

The German administration, suddenly made aware of the general and acute resentment against whites in the area, responded with unusual ferocity. Some 1200 natives in the districts of Paparatawa, Tomanariki and Viviren were suspected of being involved in the insurrection while the Germans could not even be sure of a long-contacted district like Malagunan, which had gone to

1. P. Linckens to Rose 25 May 1902, in RKA 2989:87; Kölnische Volkszeitung, 28 May 1902; P. Kleintitschen, Die Küstenbewohner der Gazellehalbinsel (Hiltrup 1906) pp 282f.
2. 'Bericht betr. die Unruhen am Varzin im April, Mai und Juni 1902', Assessor Wolff 5 Aug 1902, in RKA 2989:126-7.
3. Kleintitschen, Die Küstenbewohner, pp 282f.

participate in the looting. No concentrated police raid was made on the guilty districts to bring the ringleaders to justice, as was the customary practice. Hahl was at the time incapacitated by an attack of black-water fever and the administration was being managed by a young magistrate, Wolff¹ who, in a mood akin to panic, armed and released 2000 labourers, offered by white planters, on to the Varzin districts. The result was a rekindling of old inter-group hostilities as coastal people fought inlanders and New Irelanders and Solomon Islanders invaded the territory of the Tolai. A general war of indiscriminate slaughter followed, in which innocent men and women were shot and missionaries threatened, and the hostilities penetrated far inland to the newly contacted Taulil people and reached back to pacified districts where the lives of whites and New Guineans alike were in fresh danger.²

The war lasted into May 1902, with no quarter given on either side. To Kilan and To Vagira resisted fiercely despite the superiority in firearms of the European forces. To Kilan was driven inland to the Taulil people, who ambushed him, killing his son and promptly cooking him, but To Kilan himself escaped and eventually fell in a battle with police near Paparatawa mission station. To Vagira, enemy of the white man to the last, continued to fight even when his own people were ready to surrender him up to the administration, and it was not until 18 May that he too was killed in a gun battle with the police. With To Vagira's death and over eighty casualties, the Varzin rebels were finally subdued; peace was formally sealed with the administration on the Empress' birthday, October 1902.³ With the placing of a police post at Paparatawa, the confiscation of half the district's land and the construction of a road from the Varzin to Weberhafen, the Germans were able to open up the

1. Assessor Wolff was no relation to the planter, Rudolf Wolff, whose family was killed on the Varzin.
2. Wolff to AAKA 20 May 1902 RKA 2989:113-114; 'Bericht betr. die Unruhen', RKA 2989:128; Report of P. Eberlein M.S.C. 10 Sept 1902 in Kölnische Volkszeitung, Jan 1903 (Nr.37).
3. Knake to AAKA 28 Oct 1902 RKA 2989:142.

ranges and incorporate the Varzin into their administrative organization. By 1904 they could claim to have the entire one-language area of the northern Gazelle Peninsula under their control, with 107 districts organized under government luluais.¹

Included in the areas of the northern Gazelle which enjoyed a permanent European presence in 1904, was the far north west coast and its hinterland, the Baining Mountains. Here on 13 August 1904 occurred an event which tended to make meaningless German claims to 'control' an area which was formally included in the regional organization. The New Guinea Company and the Mission of the Sacred Heart had opened up the north west sector in the late 1890's, the Company with an experimental plantation at Massawahafen and the mission with 500 hectares of land at Weberhafen.² The Sacred Heart Mission was heavily involved in the 'pacification' of the area in sponsoring Hahl's anti-slavery raids and by 1900 the coast was ostensibly peaceful with four mission stations in the region. Among them was the settlement of St. Paul, an artificial native village among the Baining people, some hours inland from Massawahafen and the furthest point of German contact from the north coast. The mission was already making demands which brought it into conflict with the local inhabitants: at Mandres (Weberhafen) it excited the hostility of the Livuan people because the mission plantation tended to divert supplies of taro from the Bainings to itself rather than to the Livuan who were traditionally dependent on trade with the inland people.³ In 1901 a police expedition had to be despatched to the area to deal with threats of violence against the mission.⁴

St. Paul was founded as the Sacred Heart Mission's first

1. Annual Reports 1902/03, pp 94-7, and 1903/04, p 90; Kleintitchen, Die Kustenbewohner, pp 302f; Hahl, Gouverneursjahre, p 172.
2. Hahl to AAKA 2 Aug 1899 RKA 2987:71.
3. Hahl to AAKA 5 Nov 1904 RKA 2577:64-6.
4. Von Bennigsen to AAKA 3 May 1901 RKA 2988:230-233; Deutsches Kolonialblatt, August 1901, p 560.

'industrial village' whereby slave orphans adopted and educated at Vunapope were gathered together in communities with land and tools, and expected to function as cells of Christian peasant-farmers and artisans amongst their heathen compatriots. Among their number in St. Paul was a Baining man, To Marias, who in 1904 found himself at loggerheads with the mission's European Christian goals and the director of the St. Paul station, Father Matthew Rascher. Though married to a mission convert, To Marias desired the wife of another man and when Rascher refused to sanction a divorce and remarriage, the two lovers fled to To Marias' father, 'big man' in a nearby village. Rascher had the two brought back to St. Paul on the end of a rope and proceeded to beat To Marias; one of the sisters meted out the same treatment to To Marias' consort.¹ The incident brought to the boil the simmering disaffection among a group of To Marias' colleagues, who resented the mission's presumption in returning them to the scene of their former slavery.

This group was highly dissatisfied with the new and unfamiliar life style which it was expected to adopt - European-style dwellings, the precepts of Christian morality and the ideals of the European work ethic - and with the paternal direction which the mission exercised over their lives. Rascher's personality in particular seems to have alienated not a few, for he was given to administering beatings for all sorts of failings in his little flock. The fact that he also organized the much disliked labour on the roads can only have added to the feelings of antipathy towards him by some of the Bainings.² Rascher seems to have been an autocratic man who did not gladly suffer fools nor accept opposition. Among his own mission confreres he provoked strong contrary feelings and clashed with Bishop Couppé several times, not least over his friendliness with Hahl.³ The Governor admired

1. HJM Archives, Collection of Johannes Braam: Report of Br. L. Dörfler 25 April 1926; Hahl to AAKA 15 Oct 1904 RKA 2991: 59-62.

2. Hahl to AAKA 15 Oct 1904 RKA 2991; HJM Archives, Braam Collection: Collectanea Rascher I:5-6; Deutsches Kolonialblatt, Jan 1901, p 44.

3. HJM Archives, Braam Collection: Report L. Dorfler 25 April 1926, P. Bley to Braam 10 Jan 1926, P. Brenninkmeyer to Braam 5 Nov 1928.

Rascher because of his energy and the work he had put into learning the Baining language and customs, but he also considered him rather too complacent about his own authority with the New Guineans, for Rascher dismissed Hahl's offer of police help when the first rumours of a plot against his life were reported to him by one of his loyal parishioners.¹ In the grammar of the Baining language which he had written, Rascher had described the people as 'more unwarlike, more irresolute, more untalented and undeveloped than the coastal inhabitants'.²

To Marias was able to capitalize on this underestimation of the Baining people to fashion a conspiracy against Rascher. The 'industrial village' represented to him personal pain and humiliation, but it was also an aberration from the traditional existence of Baining society, in which the people lived in a sort of symbiotic relationship with the coastal dwellers, exchanging taro, pigs and slaves for fish and trade goods. It is possible that he saw Rascher as a powerful and rival 'big man' who had to be eliminated if he was to stake his own claim to authority over the area. Certainly the whites, specifically the catholic mission, stood in the way of his ambition and of freedom and independence according to the old ways. On 13 August To Marias asked for, and received as usual, Rascher's rifle with which he normally shot pigeons for the mission's kitchen. On this occasion he crept up to Rascher's window and shot him in the stomach as the priest, feeling unwell, lay on his bed. It was the signal for his band of conspirators to fall upon the rest of the European staff and the entire complement of missionaries, three brothers and five sisters, was cut down with axes as they went about their daily tasks, while about the same time a Trappist monk,

1. Hahl to AAKA 6 Nov 1904 RKA 2577:55; Hahl, Gouverneursjahre, pp 183-4. Various sources mention 'gerichtliche Untersuchungen' which were held later and which attributed the Baining incidents to missionary failings but no record of these investigations has been found.
2. Quoted in Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Moewe 28 Aug 1904, BA/MA, 5186, Vol 11.

Father Rutten,¹ was murdered on his lonely mission station at Nacharunep, some miles west of St. Paul. Those native members of the settlement who were regarded as particular supporters of the mission were also killed, though several managed to escape to the coast and raise the alarm.²

The entire episode exposed the tenuous control which the Germans exercised over New Guineans in the early 1900's, whether at the centre or on the fringes of contact. When the report reached Herbertshöhe on 14 August, Hahl and most of his executive officers and police were absent on patrolling duty throughout the protectorate; only twenty police were left at Herbertshöhe.³ The immediate despatch of sixteen of these to the north west coast left the virtual centre of the colony without any administrative leadership or security forces. At the same time natives on a European plantation on the north east coast gave an indication of the uneasiness between whites and New Guineans at large when, on learning what had occurred, they wanted to cease work in the plantation 'because all the whites were dead'.⁴ Even when Hahl returned and could divert more police to the Baining Mountains the situation was not immediately corrected. It took a month of regular expeditions into the Kara range and the Krau valley, where the insurrection was centred, before the rebels were suppressed. Many came from the village of To Marias' father and at least fifteen were killed in encounters with the administration's forces, among them To Marias himself whose head was taken triumphantly to the coast. Seven of the participants in the massacre were eventually hanged while more than twenty were given long prison sentences.⁵

1. It was Father Rutten who had dragged the hapless To Marias and his lover back to St. Paul on the end of a rope when they had eloped.
2. P. Matthäus Rascher M.S.C. Mitteilungen, pp 416ff; Daily Telegraph 16 Sept 1904.
3. P. Matthäus Räscher M.S.C. Mitteilungen, p 433.
4. HJM Archives, Ms.: Tagebuch Weber, Vol 1: 436-9.
5. Hahl to AAKA 12 Sept 1904 RKA 2990:195; Knake to AAKA 15 Sept 1904 RKA 2991:44; Hahl to AAKA 15 Oct 1904 RKA 2991; Annual Reports, 1905/06, p 69; P. Matthäus Rascher M.S.C.. Mitteilungen, p 438.

In the following years relations between the New Guineans and the mission in the area continued to suffer from the indiscretions of mission policy. The 'industrial villages' still caused discontent among the Baining people while there was a revival of hostility in 1905 when some missionary fathers took away local children to school without their parents' knowledge or consent. In 1911 the mission was once more threatened by a local 'big man'.¹ Several further cases of military intervention by the government thus took place up to 1914 to counter these difficulties and to punish instances of local feuding, but by and large the north west Bainings area was much more tightly organized by 1914 and sufficiently opened up for 200 natives to be working on government projects and several on private plantations.²

With the resolution of the Bainings revolt in 1904, the last big collision in the Gazelle Peninsula, the question of labour became a more urgent one than security for the European planting community in the Gazelle and Hahl turned more and more to the problem of exerting control over proven recruiting grounds and opening new ones.

New Ireland and other areas of the Archipelago:

A steady expansion of the German administrative presence took place after 1899 though at first it was concentrated on the Bismarck Archipelago rather than the mainland. Berlin officials and the Imperial administration had already decided that the Archipelago had a prior claim to their efforts and scant resources because of its more advanced state of development. Moreover it was considered that the large plantation companies which dominated on the mainland could for some time effectively carry out the opening up process there with their white officials and European staff.³

1. Hahl to AAKA 15 April 1905 RKA 2577:193; Frankfurter Zeitung 3 May 1905; F. Bürger, Aus Neupommerns dunklen Wäldern. (Minden 1925) p 17.
2. Annual Reports 1912/13, pp 172-3; BA/MA, 5121: Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Planet 9 Dec 1907; Hahl to Forsayth G.m.b.H. 29 Sept 1912, RKA 2313:18-19.
3. Rose Gutachten 3 Sept 1898 RKA 2943:85-93. Rose was at the time German consul in Samoa but after 1900 he became Pacific advisor at the Colonial Department.

The north east coast of New Ireland was the obvious first choice for a new government settlement outside the Gazelle Peninsula, since it was second only to the Gazelle as a major centre of European trade and plantation potential. There were already sixteen trading stations run by four firms in northern New Ireland at the end of the century, with two small plantation concerns producing 1000 tons of copra a year.¹ However European life and property, and by extension the supply of indentured labour, were not yet secured so the first regional station was established at Kaewieng in early 1900, under Franz Boluminski and a handful of New Guinean police. Within five years Boluminski had achieved a remarkable transformation in northern New Ireland, unprecedented in its rapidity and depth. Peace was quickly established between the feuding New Irelanders and European traders and by the end of 1902 most of the tribes had surrendered their firearms and were choosing their luluais in assemblies inspired by Boluminski. Seven combined districts had been already set up on the north and north east coast comprising a total population of 5683.² Barely two years later the number of organized districts had risen to thirty six and the inhabitants were supplying village labour willingly for Boluminski's proudest boast - a wide road with coral foundations running down the east coast and furnished at convenient intervals with 'rest houses' for travelling officials. In 1904 the road reached Pinubit, ninety six miles south of Kaewieng and before Boluminski's death in late 1913, northern New Ireland was virtually connected to the Gazelle Peninsula by a road which was suitable for wagons and even automobiles.³

The Germans' hold over the northern New Irelanders was significantly tightened through Boluminski's activities. The peace which he

1. Annual Reports 1898/99, p 165; 'Bericht des kaiserlichen Stationschef Boluminski über den Bezirk Neu Mecklenburg' in Deutsches Kolonialblatt Feb 1902, p 133.

2. Annual Reports, 1901/02, p 87.

3. Ibid., 1903/04, p 90, and 1911/12, p 169; E. Clay, 'Traditional Settlement Patterns in New Ireland', Oceania, Sept 1972, p 49.

strove to establish encouraged the population to turn to increased copra production and trade with the financial result that New Ireland was the first place where the native head tax was levied; it produced over 15000 Marks in the first year, 1906.¹ Peace also made it easier to draw the New Irelanders to work for the Europeans: by 1914, seventy per cent of the adult male population had at some time recruited for European service.² Peace and the availability of local labour gave a particular fillip to European economic enterprise in the area. At the end of 1902 there were already ten plantations occupying 7788 acres, with 1712 acres under cultivation and 210 labourers.³ By 1914 the area occupied by plantations had risen to 48800 acres with 17080 acres under cultivation worked by at least 3000 local recruits. Even the administration was cultivating its own plantation, experimenting with bananas, maize, sweet potatoes and taro. By 1910 it covered 1146 acres. There were by 1914 forty seven whites resident in the area.⁴

This extraordinary achievement was not brought about as the result of extended military campaigns and police rule. Admittedly when Boluminski arrived in 1900, a great many of the able-bodied warriors in the area had been already recruited away, but this is insufficient to explain the change to an area which had virtually broken off relations with the administration in 1899. It was Boluminski's personal administrative presence and methods which were largely responsible for the transformation. He deliberately refrained from using force or intimidation to settle local disputes, except as a last resort, and instead visited every district within his compass, proposing to the native communities a practical programme of cooperation. In return for the surrender of firearms and the performance of limited tasks for him, he would

1. Krauss to AAKA 28 Nov 1906 RKA 2763:73.

2. Stübel to Gouverneur 12 April 1914 RKA 2313:333.

3. Annual Reports 1902/03, Anlage E IV, p 323.

4. BA/MA, 5186, Vol 14: Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Condor 15 March 1910; Stübel to Gouverneur 12 April 1914 RKA 2313:334.

with his police provide protection against local enemies, whether they be neighbouring tribes or dishonest European traders.¹ It was a blatantly personalized approach, based less on the administration's performance than on his own, and his cultivation of this relationship was probably the single most important factor in the pacification of the area. For their part, the northern New Irelanders were quick to recognize the advantages in the scheme. Interference and maltreatment by white traders had been the greatest obstacle to ordered coexistence with the European while the ending of native wars and the access to European wealth which accompanied Boluminski's patrolling and road building were of themselves welcome advances. Boluminski's reciprocal programme fitted neatly into the local New Guinean concept of the correct relationship which should exist between a 'big man' and his people.

The success of the Kaewieng station reinforced Hahl's conviction that permanent government presence was the key to development for New Guinea and it encouraged the Berlin authorities to provide more funds for the establishment of regional stations in other areas.² In 1904 and 1905 respectively, two were founded on the frontiers of control in already proven recruiting districts: Namatanai in southern New Ireland and Kieta in the northern Solomon Islands. The subsequent pacification process in both areas proved to be much more arduous and bloody than at Kaewieng.

In central and southern New Ireland, age-old feuds between the coastal and inland peoples required constant intervention by the thirty police under district officer Wostrack. The coastal villages, once subject, exploited the German presence by calling in government troops whenever they wanted assistance against traditional enemies in the mountains. The Meiji district in the north and the thickly populated bay from Mimias to Siara in the south

1. 'Bericht des kaiserlichen Stationschef Boluminski', Deutsches Kolonialblatt Feb.1904, pp 130-134.
2. Hahl, Gouverneursjahre, pp 159, 183.

were particularly troublesome, and coastal collaboration with the administration only provoked the mountain peoples to counter-attacks. South of Muliama the mountain 'big man' Gāgas rose up against the coastal peoples under direct rule and raided their villages for cannibal flesh. His power was finally broken by Wostrack in March 1906.¹ By 1907 the area north to Cape St. Maria and south to Mimias and Morkon was nominally pacified with roads or riding paths along the coastline and 168 luluais installed. By 1910 there were 250 luluais in the Namatanai sphere of influence, helping to mobilize over a hundred organized district groups. The same year the region yielded 20312 Marks from the head tax.²

As in the north, pacification also gave the initial stimulus to rapid economic development. The first European plantation began operations in 1907/08 and by 1911 there were seven along the southern coast ranging in area from about 300 acres to 3400 acres. Fifteen Chinese planters had also settled on smaller plots of land leased from the government. Even New Irelander 'big men' were planting coconuts regularly and systematically with a view to raising their future trading income and meeting the demands of the head tax without having to participate in road maintenance.³ Increasingly labourers for the New Ireland plantations were procured locally, often on a day-to-day basis, and though there was a steady rise in the absolute numbers of New Irelanders recruiting away to other areas, the relative percentage of labour recruited from New Ireland for European plantations elsewhere decreased over the whole period.⁴ It was the need to tap new sources of labour for the insatiable demands of planters in the old areas which led the government to try and open up the mountains of southern New Ireland in 1913 and which

1. Wostrack to Gouverneur 24 March 1906 RKA 2992:23-31; Hahl, Gouverneurs-jahre, p 189; Annual Reports 1904/05, p 69.
2. Annual Reports, 1905/06, p 109 and 1909/10, pp 154-164.
3. BA/MA, 5187, Vol 15: Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Cormoran 23 July 1911.
4. Firth, 'German Recruitment', pp 152, 163.

resulted in a major insurrection involving twenty five villages as well as a new wave of resistance throughout the protectorate.

The Kieta station was located on the north east coast of Bougainville, to bring under control what was considered to be the most valuable catchment area for the future labour needs of the Archipelago, and Samoa. The island had a long tradition of recruiting: as far back as 1885 there were 200 Solomon Islanders working in German New Guinea alone.¹ Recruiting however continued to be impeded by the mountainous terrain, constant indigenous feuding and the opposition of the large mountain populations which had lost considerable manpower on malarial coastal plantations throughout the protectorate.² Under district officer Döllinger, the new administration took a long time to make any headway against such a situation. Right at the beginning, the mountain people of Tsimo, inland from Taboroi, attacked and slew any groups who agreed to work on the road construction for the Germans, while seven separate battles had to be fought with the Nasioi people before they were willing to submit themselves to direct rule. Although ten large district groups were organized by 1907, with 178 villages incorporated, the lack of traditionally recognized tribal heads hampered the installation of luluais and those who were appointed found great difficulty in exerting any authority. The physical hindrances of mountainous terrain and impenetrable jungle added to Dollinger's limited power and fourteen days of government labour were substituted for the cash head tax in order to get necessary paths made and to overcome the peoples' relative poverty; Dollinger's lack of personnel however prevented him from mobilizing many inland villages for this work. By 1911 the station had control of indigenous relations in its vicinity but it was still unable to do

1. Oertzen to Bismarck 10 Nov 1885 RKA 2335:48.

2. Firth, 'German Recruitment', p 154.

anything about the countless feuds far away in the centre of Bougainville.¹

Despite these limitations, recruiting and plantation enterprises flourished with the consolidation of Kieta. From 562 Bougainville and Buka people recruited for the Archipelago and Samoa in 1905, the number rose to an annual average of 1074 between 1910 and 1913, but here too the relative percentage in terms of the total number of recruits secured from all over New Guinea suffered a decline in these years.² Plantations were soon established by the firm of W. Mertens & Co., already in southern New Ireland and Samoa, with 4880 acres at Kieta, and by an Australian group which had leased 1200 acres from the administration. Both enterprises profited from the abundant supply of day labour and from the 220 kms. of road which were in existence in Buka and Bougainville by early 1913. In early 1914 a naval expedition assisted by the police expeditionary troops was sent into southern Bougainville to subdue and open up the previously inaccessible interior but the process had hardly advanced before war broke out.³

With these two areas under direct rule and at least formal control, Hahl's attention after 1906 swung to the western half of the protectorate and the undeveloped investment and labour potential of Kaiser Wilhelmsland.⁴ This left the Admiralty Islands as the only large group in the Archipelago still without a permanent regional organization, a deliberate decision on the part of the government because of the untenable position it inherited here in 1900. The inhabitants of the Admiralty Islands were a highly cultured and artistic people, but extremely independent and ferocious. Cannibalism here was reported to be the worst in the Pacific⁵ and blood feuds

1. Annual Reports 1906/07, pp 3-4; 1907/08, pp 6-7; 1910/11, p 154; Hahl, Gouverneursjahre, p 203.

2. Firth, 'German Recruitment', pp 155, 163.

3. BA/MA, 5186, Vol 14: Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Condor 2 Feb 1910; ibid., 5069: Auszüge aus mitilärpolitische Berichte: Rabaul, 3 March 1914; Annual Reports 1912/13, p 194.

4. See part d), pp 228f.

5. BA/MA, 630: Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Condor 12 April 1904.

among various island groups and between the coastal Manus and the inland Usiai endangered the security and livelihood of every European trader.

The Forsayth concern was the first to establish a trader in the group, in 1881, and Hearnheim and other private traders followed in the 1890's.¹ However whites were not accepted, or more accurately, their presence was exploited simply for the arms and ammunition it brought, and the islanders specialized in cutting off European schooners close inshore and massacring the crew to get to the weapons store. Those who obtained firearms imposed a reign of terror over other indigenous groups, often extorting trade goods from newly supplied tribes as a livelihood. The victims in their turn, desperate to retaliate or at least to possess a deterrent, took to acquiring arms by the same method of preying on Europeans.² Six Europeans were murdered one after another in the decade before 1900; in 1899 alone there were three punitive expeditions to punish attacks on whites.³ When the Imperial authorities took over the protectorate the question whether the Admiralties group should be taken in hand depended on its economic potential and Berlin's budgetary restrictions. At the time only two German and three Scandinavian traders resided in the islands and there was every chance that they would soon be murdered or driven out. Hahl, for his part, was confident that two officers and fifty police could pacify the group in three years if a permanent station were established, but the absence of ready investment capital for the area, the negligible number of labour recruits being procured and the wildness of the inhabitants dissuaded the Germans in the beginning from extending direct rule there.⁴

1. Nevermann, Admiralitäts Inseln, pp 7-9.
2. Report by Wostrack, enclosed in Hahl to AAKA 26 July 1901 RKA 2989: 42.
3. Compare list of New Guinean acts of violence before 1899 in Werner, 'Geschichte des deutschen Kolonialgebietes'; also Nevermann, Admiralitäts Inseln, pp 9-12.
4. Hahl to AAKA 26 July 1901 RKA 2989: 37-8; Staatsarchiv Bremen, Deutsche Südsee Phosphat Papers, Vol 1: Hahl to AAKA 8 Feb 1907, in Hahl to Wiegand 16 April 1908; Deutsches Kolonialblatt, 1900, p 212.

For the greater part of the ensuing period, the administration sought merely to contain unrest by occasional repression, a policy which proved more and more inadequate with the passage of time. The first visit by the new Governor, von Bennigsen, in July 1899, set the pattern. Although he made friendly contact with the people of Great Mok Island, force had to be used against the inhabitants of St. Patrick for repeated attacks on Europeans. Within three months of his departure, another three white traders and several New Guineans had been killed, as well as a schooner plundered. A subsequent reprisal for these acts resulted in the deaths of forty six islanders from Manus and Mok-Mandrian but failed to stop the predatory raids of these groups on Europeans and on local tribes.¹ Until 1911 there was a major expedition to the Admiralties at least every eighteen months to punish the people for some misdemeanour; another three Europeans were killed during that period, besides several Chinese and Malay traders and their Melanesian assistants. Continued bombardments, police raids and the destruction of property had no lasting effect. When a warship appeared, a cunning system of signal fires warned of its approach and guilty villagers immediately ferried themselves and their valuables to safer places.

In the early days Hahl tried stationing troops temporarily in the group but it did not work. The more belligerent local groups, like the Mok-Mandrian, the Rubal, Ferri, Pittisee and Pak peoples in the east of the islands, banded together to attack tribes which betrayed friendly feelings towards the presence of the Germans: they killed 100 natives in a single raid on Ponam. If the centre of European trading, Komuli, could not be damaged while troops were present, trade itself could be hindered by terrorizing friendly tribes in the vicinity.²

1. v. Bennigsen to AAKA 8 Aug 1899 and 24 Sept 1899 RKA2987:109-121, 131-140; v. Bennigsen to AAKA 26 Feb 1900 RKA 2987:186-205; v. Bennigsen to AAKA 14 April 1900 RKA 2988:25-6.
2. v. Bennigsen to AAKA 24 Aug 1900 RKA 2988:149-50; Wostrack report in Hahl to AAKA 26 July 1901 RKA 2989:39-49; Karlowa to Hahl 10 March 1906 RKA 2992:22.

The Admiralty Islander's facility for organization, originality and sophisticated resistance is reflected most strikingly in the confrontation between the administration and Po Minis, a 'big man' among the Papitalai people. Po Minis was the son of a leader of his people and in the early days of European contact was one of the few who recruited for Herbertshöhe as a labourer. There he became acquainted with the catholic mission, offered himself as a convert and was educated, becoming a catechist. Later he was returned to the Admiralties where he began evangelization in Papitalai, built two schools and set out to educate his village. But in the early 1900's his group was attacked by its traditionally hostile neighbours for cannibal flesh and Po Minis felt compelled to lead his people in a retaliatory raid as a future deterrent measure. From that point on, he found himself in conflict with the European establishment, accused by traders and naval commanders of organizing and leading raids on schooners, and of practising cannibalism himself.¹ In 1904 he was ordered to go to Herbertshöhe to have his case examined but refused and retired into the interior. Finally captured by a police party, he was tried and exiled by Hahl to Kaewieng for ten years. At this point the catholic mission intervened, for Po Minis' alleged activities were being blamed on its proselytizing policies. Bishop Couppé used his contacts within the German Centre Party to have the case re-opened and after a new investigation it was discovered that his trial had been conducted in a highly irregular fashion and that no concrete proof of his crimes existed.² Po Minis was released after only a year of his sentence and returned to the Admiralties in October 1906 where he became a valuable spokesman for his group in clashes with other Admiralty Islanders and an important contact

1. Die Katholischen Missionen, 1907/08, Nr. 3, p 69; Hahl to AAKA June 1904 RKA 2990:155.

2. RKA to Hahl 5 Oct 1908 RKA 2993:25-6; Hahl to RKA 21 April 1908 RKA 2993:19-20; BA/MA, 630:Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Condor 12 April 1904.

for visiting Europeans.¹

The increasing disorder in the Admiralties and the need to compensate for the exhaustion of traditional recruiting grounds hastened the extension of direct rule. Indeed the first luluais were appointed in 1909, two years before a permanent government station was erected at Secadlerhafen, on Manus Island. The turning point, at least in the eastern out-islands, probably came after 1905: at the end of that year the Pak Island people took the administration's law into their hands and captured and killed three Buka labourers who had murdered the German trader, Schlehan, because the Pak people feared the Germans would blame them for the murder and retaliate.² It is significant that two of the first government chiefs were appointed here in 1909 and that the inhabitants were soon selling their weapons to Chinese traders. The known number of firearms in the group dwindled from a high of eighty in 1904 to four in 1910.³ By mid 1911 European enterprises had already taken a firm grip. Hemsheim owned over 2400 acres in the group and had nearly 1200 acres under cultivation. There were also a boat building business and a pearling industry operating. Hahl's original predictions about the time necessary to pacify the group, at least on the coasts, was roughly accurate: the fiercest fighting was over by 1914 and the number of recruits had jumped from seventeen in 1905 to 823 in 1913.⁴

When the war rudely shattered the colonial enterprise in New Guinea, the Germans had reached a critical stage in its development. A colonial frontier was established, albeit a slender and irregular one.

1. 'Bericht des Bezirksamtman Herbertshöhe über eine Reise nach den Admiralitäts Inseln', 25 Dec 1907 in RKA 2992:238-242; Klug to Hahl 11 July 1909 RKA 2993:154; Nevermann, Admiralitäts Inseln, p 14.
2. Annual Reports 1905/06, p 109; Hahl to Kdr. SMS Cormoran 22 Sept 1909 in RKA 2993:201.
3. Hahl to Kdr. SMS Condor 12 March 1904 in RKA 2990:76-7; Amtsblatt Neuguinea, 15 March 1910, pp 49-50; Klug to Hahl 11 July 1909 RKA 2993:155.
4. Firth, 'German Recruitment', p 172; BA/MA, 5187, Vol 15: Militär - politische Bericht SMS Cormoran 31 Aug 1911.

European businesses held more than 185000 hectares (451000 acres) of land, 34190 hectares of which were plantations under cultivation with a total labour force of 17500 labourers. The export of copra had risen from a little over 3000 tons at the beginning of Imperial rule to 14526 tons in 1914.¹ Hahl was making headway in creating the conditions necessary for development: there were eight main stations supported by about 110 officials and more than 800 police; a network of roads was being expanded around the main centres of settlement; and ever more New Guineans were being incorporated, at least formally, into an ordered system of administration. In ten years Hahl hoped to have the colony independent of Reich subsidies, if he was given more finance to open up and pacify recruiting areas.² New Guinean resistance was still hampering the Germans in several places in the Archipelago while New Guinean self-sufficiency was proving a hindrance to the model of colonial progress as Hahl, and the planters, had conceived it. Figures produced in 1913 showed that in an area like Kaewieng more than fifty per cent of the male population had already recruited for work in European service and in other major recruiting areas the percentage was significantly high.³ Yet this was not so much an index of those already assimilated into a European plantation economy as an indication of the economically active population which was participating in the economy and then withdrawing to the local area. Plantations in the Gazelle Peninsula were in 1913/14 suffering from the preference of people in old recruiting areas to work locally. In 1913, three quarters of all the recruits from northern New Ireland worked on local plantations and this area, like southern New Ireland, the Solomons and New Britain, experienced a relative decrease over the years in the numbers of

1. Firth, 'German Recruitment', Appendix, pp 325-6; Annual Reports 1912/13, pp 185-6.
2. BA/MA, 5187, Vol 16: Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Condor 15 Feb 1912; Annual Reports, 1912/13, Statistische Teil, pp 28-9.
3. Hahl to RKA 10 Feb 1913 RKA 2313:67-8.

recruits it contributed to the total labour force. People in the Gazelle Peninsula were still choosing their own pattern of service for the Europeans and New Irelanders were planting coconuts regularly to enlarge gradually their trading incomes and obviate the necessity of recruiting away to earn cash for the head tax.¹

The labour question was increasing the likelihood of a general confrontation between the New Guineans and the European community in 1914. The large companies with considerable influence in Hamburg and Berlin were pressing Hahl to remove all restrictions on the recruiting process and to increase the pressure on the New Guineans to provide plantation labour while Hahl was struggling with New Guinean resistance and signs of depopulation in some areas brought about by excessive recruiting. Because of the influence of the large established firms in the Gazelle, Hahl was able to close only northern New Ireland and Nusa to the recruitment of women in 1909/10 instead of the entire protectorate as he had wished. Moreover he was unable to undermine the D.H.P.G.'s privilege of recruiting in the Archipelago for its Samoan plantations.²

The rebellion of 1913 in southern New Ireland was particularly significant in the context of the labour issue for it was the largest movement in a new upsurge of unrest in controlled and partially-controlled areas throughout New Guinea as the administration allowed recruiting pressures to intensify in areas already affected by labour migration.³ These acts indicated that a German 'frontier of control' existed largely on the sufferance of New Guineans.

1. Amtsblatt Neuguinea, 1 Dec 1911, p 257; Stübel to Gouverneur 12 April 1914 RKA 2313:334; Firth, 'German Recruitment', p 163.
2. RKA to Hahl 7 July 1913 RKA 2313:132-4; Hahl to RKA 25 Oct 1908 with enclosures RKA 2311:50ff; Hahl to RKA 19 Jan 1910 RKA 2312:21; 'Denkschrift über die Arbeiter Verhältnisse im Schutzgebiet Neuguinea', Sept 1913, in RKA 2313:200-225.
3. Annual Reports, 1912/13, pp 172-3; Hahl to RKA 19 Jan 1914 RKA 2996:58.

d) The Mainland, 1900 to 1914: Race Relations on the Coastal Frontier.

Despite the initial sense of optimism which prevailed when Imperial rule replaced that of the New Guinea Company in 1899, the economic and political situation on the mainland gave little cause for satisfaction. In particular little accommodation existed between New Guineans and Europeans in Astrolabe Bay and Madang itself had become almost a no-man's land for the original inhabitants. A traveller there in 1899 reported that there was hardly a native to be seen and most appeared to be driven back away from the coast.¹ The lack of rapport continued in the early years of the new century. The only time New Guineans in the Madang area offered themselves for plantation work was during a drought in 1902, and it was always for the more remote stations. They openly rejected a mark of submission to German rule such as enforced government labour and the local roadworks were continually disrupted in the first years by people absconding, and then refusing to pay the fines. In 1900 and 1903, police troops had to be quartered in Siar village before its inhabitants would comply with government orders to help on public works.²

Resentment of the Europeans in Astrolabe Bay reached fever pitch in 1904 and every village from Siar to Bongu had grievances relating to the effects of European contact. With its reversion to a private enterprise, the New Guinea Company claimed all the land which it had taken up around Madang in absolute ownership leaving the local inhabitants no rights or privileges except by sufferance. Though the Company's ownership was based on illegal contracts, Hahl was reluctant to dispute it in court lest he thereby hinder the colony's progress and incense the concern's influential circles in Berlin. In 1904 the administration finally accepted the Company's titular

1. H. Chewings, Amongst Tropical Seas, (Adelaide 1900) p 14.

2. RMG Archives, Stationen: Jahresberichte Siar 1900 and 1903; Annual Reports 1903/04, p 336.

ownership of the 5500 hectares (13420 acres) comprising the site of Madang, subject to the survey of native reserves.¹ Thus between 1900 and 1904 the firm's land-clearing operations were intensified: the Scheering Peninsula and Kalibob were cleared and planted and by 1904 plantations at Madang and nearby Yomba (which had reopened in 1900/01) reached an area of 648.74 hectares (1583 acres).² This probably represented the loss of almost the entire land resources of groups in and around Madang harbour (especially the Bilia and Siar people) and forced them to rent garden plots from affines in other groups. There was general resentment at the enforced road works, the repeated punishments for transgressions of the white man's law and the desecration of totemic objects by road-building or plantation development. The attacks which the Lutheran mission carried out against their secret cults also alienated the people. The final aggravation was the rumour that the Germans were about to intensify their regimentation of local life by appointing district chiefs as their agents.³

The peoples of Siar, Graged, Yabob and Bilibili islands finally combined in a conspiracy to attack and kill the whites in Madang and retrieve their land. The ringleaders were the Siar and the Bilibili islanders, the latter the 'patricians' of Astrolabe Bay, who particularly resented the fact that the expansion of the Europeans had destroyed their traditional pottery monopoly upon which the economic life of the local coast had been based. The movement also included the mainland villages of Ragetta, Bogadjim and Bongu, though the latter two decided to wait on the success of the attack and in the end defected, as did the Yabob and Bilibili people.⁴

1. Lawrence, Road Belong Cargo, p 41. Compare Stückhardt to Hahl 28 May 1903 RKA 2280:84. The survey of the reserves was still uncompleted in 1914.
2. Annual Reports, Anlage E III, p 341.
3. RMG Archives, Konferenz Protokolle II: Vorstand to Deputation 29 Aug 1904; Lawrence, Road Belong Cargo, p 67; I. Moses, 'German Assessment and Treatment of the NE New Guineans and their Reaction to it as reflected in German contemporary Literature'. Paper read at ANZAAS Congress, Port Moresby, 1970, p 28.
4. RMG Archives, Stationen: Jahresbericht Ragetta 1904; Ibid., Monatsberichte Letter of Hanke, Dec 1904; Neuhauss, Deutsch Neu Guinea, I:185; Finsch, Samoafahrten, p 81.

The plan was for the Siar, Graged and Bilibili islanders to cross over to Madang in their canoes and seize the armoury of the native police. The whites, including the Lutheran missionaries, were then to be despatched by a corps of former police soldiers among the rebels. The plot was well organized and included a contingent plan whereby each group was to play upon the humane sympathies of local missionaries and plead for their intercession were the conspiracy discovered prematurely. News of the projected uprising did leak out to the Rev. Hanke at Bongu in January 1904 but at first he gave no credence to the report.¹ When it was repeated in February, Hanke notified the Madang district officer, Wilhelm Stückhardt, but so well was the secret kept that he could find no confirmation and the only action taken was to arm the police on duty in Madang. When the revolt did at last come, on 16 July, it took the European community completely by surprise. Eighty armed men managed to cross over to Madang without detection and since there were only twenty six whites in the town, they would very likely have succeeded in their object if, at the last moment, the plot had not been betrayed by a Bililia man. Stückhardt was able to secure the police firearms before the insurgents reached the armoury and he very quickly restored order, sending the islanders fleeing in their canoes with one of their number shot. Even then most of the Europeans remained unaware of what had occurred.²

Since no European had been injured and because he had no idea of the cause of the attempted coup, Stückhardt proceeded cautiously with an investigation of the affair. The fortuitous arrival of the naval survey vessel, SMS Moewe, put added authority at his disposal and by mid August he was able to negotiate the surrender of several Siar and Ragetta ringleaders,

1. RMG Archives, Stationen: Jahresbericht Bongu 1904.

2. Hahl to AAKA 5 Aug 1904 RKA 2990:220-1; Stückhardt to Hahl 23 Oct 1906 RKA 2992:91; RMG Archives, Konferenz Protokolle II: Vorstand to Deputation 29 Aug 1904.

who were promptly transported to Herbertshöhe. The Bilibili people had fled en masse to the Rai coast. At this stage the European community was still rather dazed at the swiftness of events and took some little time to adjust to their significance. The settlers and officials lived and worked in the area on the assumption that the local New Guineans were incapable of such organization and secrecy. The realization that anti-European resentment was so intense, and that the plot likely encompassed the coast as far south as Bongu threw the settlers into a state of panic. In mid August New Guinea Company officials circulated a petition over Stückhardt's head urging Hahl to take sterner measures against the guilty peoples. Deputy Governor Knake arrived in Madang on 16 August and after being subjected to further pressure from the settler community, he declared a state of martial law. The full facts were now dragged from the people, the complicity of Bongu, Bogadjim and Bilibili was established, and Knake there and then had six of the leading figures executed.¹ It was a denouement which particularly disconcerted the Rhenish Mission. The missionaries had initially refused to believe that the Madang people intended them to be included in the massacre and the Bongu and Bogadjim peoples had encouraged them in this belief in the ensuing month by protestations of their innocence. Suddenly their parishioners' treachery was revealed. The Rev. Weber on Siar learned that his boat had been drawn high up on the shore on the day of the revolt in order to prevent his escaping; the missionaries at Bongu and Ragetta were to be likewise struck down on their stations. Such was the demoralization at these disclosures after so many years of hardship and labour that the mission petitioned its headquarters to give up New Guinea as an unprofitable and thankless field of activity.²

1. 'Bericht des Bezirksrichters Knake' 13-20 Aug 1904, enclosed in Hahl to AAKA 3 Sept 1904 RKA 2991:19; Stückhardt to Hahl 23 Oct 1906 RKA 2992: 91-2; Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung 21 Oct 1904.

2. RMG Archives, Konferenz Protokolle II: Vorstandssitzung 27 Aug 1904 and Vorstand to Deputation 29 Aug 1904; ibid., Stationen: Jahresberichte Ragetta and Bongu 1904.

The Madang revolt exposed the fallacies which governed the attitude towards relations with the New Guineans in the previous four years of Imperial rule. The people were not necessarily as docile and good-natured as at first hoped and the large plantation companies, far from guaranteeing security, had actually undermined it through their uninhibited pressure on native resources. Direct rule was thus extended to Madang at the end of 1904 with the organization of the first village groups and the appointment of luluais. By 1907 there were eleven in the Madang district and the head tax was introduced the same year.¹ Administrative attention was also focussed on the north coast where the thickly populated coasts, with villages of 400 to 500 people, represented a valuable potential source of plantation labour, and where local acts of resistance had coincided with the Madang revolt. In October 1906 a full district station was established on the west side of Berlinhafen, at a place named Aitape and Hans Rodatz was given the judicial and police authorities of a district officer. The coastal tribes in the immediate vicinity of the station resisted this new invasion so sternly that in August 1907, Hahl had to send police reinforcements.² In the following two years, Rodatz extended the government's pacification programme east along the coast to the Sepik in sometimes brutal encounters with independent villages, so that even the New Guinea Company was aroused to protest at the baleful effects on the native population.³ Although the Aitape coast was technically subjugated by mid 1911, control remained incomplete and the administration's programme could at any moment suffer a reverse; Hahl was as yet unable to consider the imposition of the head tax in the area. It was a situation Hahl found himself forced to accept for the rest of German rule because of the lack of finance for a more ambitious programme.⁴ One dividend which the

1. Annual Reports, 1907/08, p 7; Lawrence, Road Along Cargo, p 43.

2. Hahl to RKA 29 Aug 1907 RKA 2992:145.

3. RKA Denkschrift 15 May 1908 RKA 2993:8.

4. Annual Reports, 1910/11, p 155; Firth, 'German Recruitment', p 164.

Germans secured in the area around Aitape was the number of new labour recruits: already in 1907/08, 710 entered the Aitape lists and in 1913, the last full year of recruiting, 1057, or ten per cent of the new recruits came from this area.¹ But the mountain hinterland remained closed to the recruiters for in the constant state of feuding between the two areas, where a trip to the coast could result in abuse, theft and murder, few inland inhabitants could be enticed to try the German labour lines.

Further to the east at Dallmannhafen (Wewak) and in Hansa Bay, the small enclaves of European settlement were struggling to survive against local hostility. Both the Mission of the Holy Ghost (S.V.D.) and the New Guinea Company were extensive landholders in the area by 1904. The mission had acquired 500 hectares of land at Bogia, east of Potsdamhafen, to complement its holdings in Berlinhafen and was converting it into plantations for its own support. With new purchases approved by Hahl in the same year, the mission's land holdings had grown to 2700 hectares (6588 acres) by 1905 and the value of European assets on the north coast, including the New Guinea Company's enterprises, had reached 300,000 Marks.²

The pressure which this measure of European investment exerted on the local inhabitants was soon revealed in attacks on the foreign establishments. At Nubia in Hansa Bay, the Awar people threatened the neighbouring New Guinea Company plantation while the Arop people drove off and wounded one of the Company's Chinese traders. Representatives of the mission were also threatened and attacked when they attempted to coerce New Guinean children into attending the school or the medical dispensary.³ At

1. 'Bericht über die Aussichten der Arbeiteranwerbung im Bezirk Eitape'. Rodatz 31 March 1908 enclosed in Hahl to RKA 8 May 1908 RKA 2310:211; Amtsblatt Neuguinea, 6/8:15 April 1914, p 133.
2. Hahl to S.V.D. 9 May 1903 RKA 2576:156-8; Hahl to AAKA 21 Dec 1904 RKA 2577:49-50; 'Entwurf zum État für das Schutzgebiet Neuguinea auf 1906' Neu Guinea Compagnie, copy in RKA 3103:75; Wiltgen, 'Catholic Mission Plantations', p 14.
3. Hahl to AAKA 21 Oct 1904 RKA 2991:66; Hahl to AAKA 1 March 1905 RKA 2991:95-6; BA/MA, 5186, Vol 11: Hahl to Kirchhoff 11 Feb 1905 enclosed in Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Condor 5 April 1905; Hahl, Gouverneursjahre, p 185.

Beukinhafen, near Wewak, the mission was involved in land disputes when it bought from the Juo islanders land which was claimed by the nearby mountain village of Momoken. Hahl attributed this latter confrontation to the mission's lack of shrewdness and subtlety in its dealings with New Guineans,¹ and this certainly seems to have been the most consistent cause of collisions. Around Mouumbo, for instance, clumsy campaigns against the local customs of polygamy, abortion and female infanticide so outraged the inhabitants that the mission was largely responsible for a local conspiracy in February 1910 to kill all the whites between Potsdamhafen and Hansa Bay.

The insurrection was planned to begin in the neighbourhood of Hatzfeldthafen with the murder of the Madang district official, Scholz, who at the time was exploring the unpenetrated coast between Potsdamhafen and Madang. Once he and his police troops were despatched by the local people, signal fires on an offshore island would initiate the slaughter of the European population further north.² The movement was forestalled by the defection of a Zepa chief, Laindepa, and it convinced the government that the only way to secure the north-east coast in the absence of finance for another station was to effect an overland connection with Madang by incorporating the intervening tribes within the system of direct rule.³

Accordingly, district officer Berghausen led an expedition in July 1910, which traversed the coast selecting candidates for language training in Madang who would be sent back as luluais or their assistants. Berghausen also issued orders that the coastal populations were to begin planting coconuts regularly, twenty a year for every adult male.⁴ Since the abandonment of Hatzfeldthafen in 1891, no white settlement had existed on

1. Hahl to Kdr. SMS Condor 15 Dec 1908 RKA 2993:85-6. See also Full to Hahl 7 Jan 1909 RKA 2993:102-4.
2. Scholz to Gouverneur 30 March 1910 RKA 2994:16-19.
3. Oswald to RKA 31 May 1910 RKA 15; Berghausen to Gouverneur 29 April 1910 RKA 2994:23.
4. Antsblatt Neuguinea, 1 July 1911, pp 142-3.

the coast between Cape Croiselles and Potsdamhafen. The area had remained closed to recruiters and administrators alike, and head-hunting and inter-tribal feuding had remained the pattern of New Guinean relations. Berghausen's tour thus had only superficial success: the coastal population continued to hold itself aloof from recruiting attempts while most of the New Guineans taken to Madang to learn the white man's ways disappeared a few days after their arrival. From villages in the hinterland of Hatzfeldthafen Berghausen had encountered unyielding resistance to European contact. The villages of Tombenan, Kaiten and Dugumor had stubbornly rejected any compromise with white men for twenty years and their lethal attacks had been the main cause of Hatzfeldthafen's closing down. As late as 1908 a Malay Bird-of-Paradise hunter was slain by Tombenan and Kaiten, and it was the warriors of Tombenan who had been organized to set in motion the 1910 uprising by cutting off Scholz and his men. Although a formal peace was concluded in the wake of Berghausen's expedition through the mediation of neighbouring chiefs, the hinterland of Hatzfeldthafen remained an uncertain element in the Germans' administrative organization.¹ Indeed, in a situation where supervision was only possible on occasional foot expeditions, the Germans in 1914 could not really claim to control the north-east coast at all.

Further south, at Madang, permanent government presence was also proving to be of itself, an inadequate solution to the questions of pacification and peaceful racial relations. Far from inaugurating a new era of accommodation and cooperation, the failure of the 1904 revolt and its accompanying executions resulted in a phase of passive resistance by the Madang peoples. The vindictive attitude of the settlers following the affair and the New Guineans' failure to affect official land policy in the area beyond precipitating long range plans for surveying natives reserves,²

1. Amtsblatt Neuguinea, 1 July 1911, pp 141-4; 15 July 1911, pp 150-6.

2. See Annual Reports, 1906/07, p 3.

embittered the largely dispersed groups in the neighbourhood of Madang and in their distress they turned to one of their creation myths to explain the defeat, exorcise its effects and strengthen their resolve to redress the situation.

In a subtly modernized form, the myth explained that Europeans were human beings to whom a special deity had given a superior material culture, including the firearms which had been used to overcome the New Guineans in 1904. It made it clear that in the beginning the New Guineans themselves had been offered first choice of the new culture and had voluntarily rejected it in favour of their canoes and spears, but it also held out the hope of a better future, when the deities would return to distribute the 'Cargo' more equitably and enable the indigenous peoples to fight the Europeans.¹ In a separate version reported by the Rhenish Mission, the deity had assured the New Guineans that the whites had misused the guns and bullets given to them. The people needed only to shake their heads or have a certain catholic priest 'make a paper' for the whites to disappear from their lands.²

Thus between 1904 and 1912, the Madang people met continuing indifference and deprivation by obeying the government where necessary but obstructing it whenever they could. People from the coastal villages from Sek (north of Madang) to Bongu and from Dampier and Bagobag islands, which were drawn into the administrative system in 1908/09, had to be forced to complete their labour on the roads even after the head tax was introduced, and there were many cases of mass absconding and 'wearying' police expeditions to round them up.³ The government luluais, of which there were

1. Lawrence, Road Belong Cargo, pp 69-72 explains the substance and significance of this belief which he obtained from fieldwork in the southern Madang district, 1953 to 1958.
2. RMG Archives, Stationen: Jahresberichte Ragetta 1905 and Bongu 1905; Annual Reports 1905/06, Anlage EII, p 320. The use of confessional rivalry in this version is an interesting extension of the New Guineans' feelings of oppression. See Appendix.
3. Annual Reports 1907/08, p 7 and 1908/09; Lawrence, Road Belong Cargo, p72.

sixty seven in the Madang district by mid 1911, found it almost impossible to have their authority recognized or German instructions carried out, and most had to be provided with two police assistants in order to get anything done.¹ One such luluai was Nalon of Bilia, the New Guinean who had betrayed the 1904 plot to the whites. His action at that time had been simply opportunist, if enterprising, for the planned uprising had threatened to destroy his privilege of riding to the Rai coast on the New Guinea Company schooner in order to trade. Nalon had possessed no status within his own village, nor had his collaboration with the Europeans met with the approval of the Bilia people themselves, who had been thrown off their land by the Company. They made it clear that they hated the whites and their contempt for Nalon forced the administration to appoint another in his stead.² Unlike Nalon, most of the Madang inhabitants avoided contact with the European economy and continued to reject wage labour for the European plantations which occupied their lands: in 1906 only twenty six of the 534 mainland recruits of the New Guinea Company came from Madang and two years later the number had fallen to eight out of 497.³ By that time it was an open secret that 'away with the white man' was the dominating catch phrase of the New Guinean around Madang.⁴

Included among the white men in the minds of the Madang natives were the Lutheran missionaries who, despite their disappointment at the events of 1904, remained to carry on their work. Yet their influence grew only slowly and their successes remained modest. It was the end of 1903 before the mission had its first convert and by then its four schools had enticed

1. Annual Reports 1907/08, p 7 and 1910/11, p 155.

2. Stückhardt to Gouverneur 23 Oct 1906 and Stückhardt to Krauss 12 Nov 1906, enclosed in Krauss to AAKA 28 Nov 1906 RKA 2992:88-97.

3. Firth, 'German Recruitment', p 156.

4. RMG Archives, Korrespondenz Präses Neuguinea: Hanke to Barmen 27 Jan 1906.

only an additional six pupils in four years; no converts came forward in the year of the revolt.¹ After 1904, the Rhenish Mission was hemmed in from the north by the S.V.D. mission's occupation of Alexishafen, while lack of manpower prevented it from breaking out of the coastal crescent from Bongu to Madang. By 1908, the mission's 63 converts compared very unfavourably with the Neuendettelsau Mission's 1300 and the S.V.D.'s 1062 while in 1910/11 the mission's number of converts actually declined from 109 to 83.² The year 1906 had seen a dramatic turning point in villages away from Madang proper, where there were reports of a strange 'man from heaven' (or Himmelsmann) who encouraged villagers to burn the images and instruments associated with the traditional pre-contact cults.³ Bongu, Bogadjim and Bilibili, which had returned to the Astrolabe coast the same year, joined in the movement, which seemed to indicate a local decision by people who had not suffered to the same extent as the actual native occupants of Madang, to seek the white man's power and affluence by assimilating his religion.

However, at the very centre of Madang, the people maintained a belligerent opposition to mission teaching and its attempts to eliminate the influence of the male cults. It is significant that the new 'cargo' belief after 1904 had affirmed the intrinsic value of these cults by referring to a deity who claimed to have 'bought' the cults and their secrets from the New Guineans and to actually practice them himself.⁴ The Christian missionaries and the few converts were harassed at every opportunity. At Ragetta, together with Siar the centre of the most bitter antipathy, sorcery was used to try and

1. Annual Reports 1903/04, Anlage E II, p 336 and 1904/05, Anlage D II, p 256.

2. RKA Denkschrift: 'Stand der Missionen Deutsch Neu Guinea', Krauss, 10 Nov 1908, in RKA 2565:16-26. Annual Reports 1910/11 p 161; 1911/12 p 158

3. Historical sources referring to this movement are fragmentary. Compare RMG Archives, Konferenz Protokolle II: Protokoll 17 March 1907 and Deputation to Konferenz 12 Aug 1907; ibid., Referate: Hanke 8 Nov 1912; ibid., Korrespondenz Präses Neu Guinea: Helmich to Barmen March 1907.

4. RMG Archives, Stationen: Jahresberichte Ragetta 1905 and Bongu 1905; Annual Reports 1905/06, Anlage E II, p 320.

induce the death of the leading convert, a man called Malai. The leader of this campaign was a former convert and luluai, Sabu, who finally forced the Germans to remove Malai to Herbertshöhe for his own good, while in 1909 he tried to have the site of the village removed altogether from the vicinity of the mission station.¹

The Madang people were astute in playing mission and government off against one another. If services were regularly attended, it was only to maintain the friendship of the missionaries in case of a confrontation with the regime which they themselves could not handle. Yet the New Guineans were quick to complain to Hahl on his occasional visits of mission coercion to abandon their cult festivities and of physical abuse by individual missionaries. These were not always devoid of truth for the Rhenish Mission suffered more than once from serious indiscretions by its members. The Rev. Helmich was guilty on one occasion in 1907 of flogging several Ragetta villagers who were trying to undermine the mission's position and at another time he outraged the inhabitants by using an old Mesiab cult instrument to chase pigs.² The permanent ill-will against the mission at Siar was due largely to the behaviour of the Rev. Weber who, until his dismissal by the Society in 1909, was accustomed to beating Siar natives for misdemeanours, including on one occasion a woman, as well as disparaging the administration and its activities in the presence of his congregations.³ Such action was not only foolhardy but dangerous in a situation where the local people were only awaiting the right moment to reassert themselves.

Events finally came to a head once more in 1912. Plantation clearing had been carried on uninterrupted since 1904 and by 1912 the Madang

1. RMG Archives, Stationen: Jahresberichte Ragetta 1907; ibid., Korrespondenz Präses Neu Guinea: Helmich to Hahl 28 Aug 1907.

2. Ibid.

3. Scholz to Hahl 27 May 1909, enclosed in Hahl to RKA 8 July 1909 RKA 2569:38.

peoples felt overwhelmed by the weight of European interests. North of Madang Sarang plantation had been purchased in 1910/11 and the Mission of the Holy Ghost was now very solidly entrenched at Alexishafen with a plantation of over 1000 hectares employing 520 labourers. The mission had also developed the harbour facilities, possessed its own sawmill and was constructing an extensive road system.¹ South of Madang, around Bogadjim, so much land had been alienated by Europeans that villagers had to walk one or two hours to reach their gardens, which were often plundered by plantation labourers.² Madang itself remained the area of fastest growth by European enterprises. In 1911 alone three new plantation businesses were opened in the area and preparations were being made to divide the Meiro plains among another four in 1912 as well as occupy the island of Siar.³ All this made the Madang people increasingly surly, and when the administration began the survey of native reserves on the Gum-Gogol plain, they regarded this as a new threat and a deception to drive them off the land completely.⁴

Nothing was ever substantiated about what occurred next, but it appears that a new, wide ranging plot to kill the Madang Europeans began to be discussed about June. The lines of the new conspiracy resembled those of the old with the addition of some cunning calculations: this time the New Guineans would wait for the night of the departure by the steamer 'Koblenz', because the whites all would have drunk so heavily that they would be sleeping fast. The government headquarters would then be attacked and the arms seized; once that was done the Europeans could be despatched systematically, area by area.⁵

1. RKA Denkschrift: 'Stand der Missionen', 10 Nov 1908, in RKA 2565:16-26; Wiltgen, 'Catholic Mission Plantations', p 14.
2. Firth, 'German Recruitment', p 169.
3. Amtsblatt Neuguinea, 15 Nov 1911, p 242; Scholz to RKA 3 Sept 1912 RKA 2995:78.
4. Lawrence, Road Belong Cargo, p 72.
5. Testimony of tultul Tagari from Bilibili 23 Aug 1912, enclosed in Scholz to RKA 3 Sept 1912 RKA 2995:80-2.

Whether the movement ever got beyond discussion is difficult to say, for the authorities began to get suspicious in August when the male cults were being performed with an unaccustomed vehemence and local natives showed an increased interest in the disposition of settlers' living quarters.¹ Extra sentries were posted on Cutter Island and Bilia and the main watch on the administration building strengthened, all of which quietened down the Madang people. But the European community had lived since 1904 with the conviction that the New Guineans would try again, and the first sign of uncertainty tended to panic them. There was a false alarm on 21 August when the Europeans armed themselves, the police troops were made ready and suspects were rounded up.² From this point, German sources rely entirely on native witnesses who suddenly began to testify that there had been a plot and that several groups were involved. Ironically enough, the alleged ringleaders in this instance were the Bilia people, but the Siar, Fanutibum, Ragetta and some Bilibili people were also accused of complicity. A court was convened and a great deal of conflicting evidence brought forward, but in the end the board of officials, which included representatives of the Lutheran mission, concluded that there was sufficient evidence of a substantial plot against the whites.³ Pressed on by the nervous European settlers and anxious to remove once and for all the last obstacle to local security and economic expansion, the district officer, Scholz, banished the accused groups from the area, some to the north coast behind Cape Croiselles, the others to the Rai coast, while sixteen of the suspected ringleaders were transported to Herbertshöhe.⁴ It signalled the final disarray of the Madang people and the triumph of the planting and trading community.

1. Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Condor 28 Sept 1912, copy in RKA 2995:101-110.
2. Scholz to RKA 3 Sept 1912 RKA 2995; Deutsches Kolonialblatt, Oct 1912, p 994.
3. RMG Archives, Korrespondenz Präses Neu Guinea: Protokoll des Bezirksgericht und Berater 13 Sept 1912.
4. Hahl to Kdr. SMS Condor 27 Aug 1912 RKA 2995:111; Lawrence, Road Belong Cargo, p 72.

The only exception to the state of racial confrontation which prevailed on the mainland coast during these years lay in the Huon Peninsula. On its coasts and in the immediate hinterland, the local New Guineans and the only Europeans in the area, the Neuendettelsau missionaries, had managed to cultivate over the years a tolerant relationship based on mutual respect and reciprocal behaviour. From its two mainland stations and its two converts in 1899, the mission had been permitted by 1908 to expand to eleven stations, 1300 baptized converts and 4000 to 5000 nominal adherents, while communal peace had been established from Cape King William to Samoahafen and deep into the Herzog ranges. In addition, the mission followed the example of the catholics in the north of Kaiser Wilhelmsland and in 1908 purchased the New Guinea Company's plantation of 200 hectares at Finschhafen, a move as much designed to keep white settlers out as to contribute to the mission's upkeep.¹ The absence of large scale European enterprise in the Huon Peninsula after 1892 had been responsible for much of the success which the Neuendettelsau Mission enjoyed in race relations; its evangelical success was based largely on a bold approach to conversion introduced after 1899. The Rev. Christian Keysser realized soon after his arrival the same year that a policy of individual conversion was counter-productive, for the indigenous culture and social relationships were integrally connected with the traditional religion and an individual convert to Christianity would experience ostracism and social and spiritual isolation. In the end he would be unable to withstand the pressures from the community and would fall back into the old ways. Keysser's solution was to move out into the villages and concentrate on substituting an entire social organization based on the gospel for the old social and religious life. By building Christianity into the new society, no

1. RKA Denkschrift: 'Stand der Missionen', 10 Nov 1908, in RKA 2565; Flierl, Forty Years in New Guinea, p 93.

individual should feel isolated. There would be a minimum of dislocation and, hopefully, a more fundamental metanoia.¹

The immediate result of this approach was a mass movement around Sattelberg in 1904 when, amid scenes of the greatest drama, villagers brought cult objects and burnt them in piles and veteran sorcerers came forward to confess their past deeds. A severe earthquake in September 1906 rendered fortuitous assistance to the missionaries' campaign on behalf of the supernatural. Crowds of 700 to 800 attended the baptisms as the movement spread and strong millennial expectations accompanied it.²

Until 1907 the administration did not concern itself with the southern mainland because of the absence of commercial enterprise and the good relations between mission and New Guineans in the Huon Peninsula. But attention began to be focussed on the border with Papua after clashes on the Waria River between local people and Australian gold prospectors who, since 1906, had been coming up from Papua to work alluvial deposits in the Waria valley.³ Hahl finally erected a district station at Morobe (Sinogu) in 1909 in order to pacify the New Guineans and control the prospectors in case a gold-mining industry developed. Since Morobe possessed an extensive and well-populated hinterland there were also hopes for the area as a new source of migration labour. It took some time for the local officer, Klink, to overcome the coastal inhabitants' jealousy of their regular inland trade routes, but within two years he succeeded in opening up the Waria valley and contacting several Biawaria tribes at the river's headwaters. Fifty five

1. NM Archives, Papers of Christian Keysser: 'Die Seele der Papua Christen in der ersten Generation', Parts 1 and 2; Pilhoefer, Geschichte der Neuendettelsauer Mission, I:232; P. Lawrence, 'Lutheran Mission Influence on Madang Societies', Oceania, XXVII, 1957, pp 75-6.
2. Pilhoefer, Geschichte der Neuendettelsauer Mission, I:126, 131-139.
3. Hahl to RKA 8 April 1908 RKA 2993:37-8; Hahl to Kdr. SMS Condor 22 Jan 1909 RKA 2993:93; Klink to Hahl 8 March 1911 RKA 2994:171-4; Hahl, Gouverneursjahre, p 223.

recruits were obtained from Morobe in 1910 and between 1911 and 1913 an average of 258 men were enlisted.¹ After 1911 the Neuendettelsau Mission possessed one station on the coast and one inland among the Zia people as well as an additional foothold further up the coast at the mouth of the Franziska River (Salamaua).²

In the Huon Peninsula itself, the mission had created a secure base in the hinterland from which to open up the far interior and the valley of the Markham River, particularly after the establishment of Lae station in 1910. But its way inland had been consistently barred by the predatory activities of the Lae Womba, a warrior tribe of almost legendary ferocity who terrorized the lower valley of the Markham and preyed upon the Lae, Logamo and Labo peoples. In view of the reluctance of the coastal New Guineans to recruit away unless their homes were protected, a government police expedition ventured up the Markham in mid 1905 to make a demonstration of European power, but it was attacked by the Lae Womba as it bivouaced overnight and had to withdraw with three Europeans and three police soldiers seriously wounded.³ This encouraged the Lae Womba to intensify their raids, striking ever closer to the coast, and in three attacks on scattered Logamo villages in 1907 they were responsible for over 100 deaths. The Logamo were finally reduced to sleeping on the beach at Cape Arcona and refused to return to their villages, which they described as 'place belong plenty fight'.⁴ Two further punitive expeditions were organized by the Germans in the wake of the Lae Womba attacks but their power of retaliation was restricted by the modest size of the mainland police resources and the demands being made on them by

1. Amtsblatt Neuguinea, 15 Dec 1911, p 270; Firth, 'German Recruitment', p166; Annual Reports 1911/12, pp 146, 148 and 1912/13, p 171.
2. Pilhoefer, Geschichte der Neuendettelsauer Mission, I:164-171.
3. Stückhardt to Hahl 24 June 1905 RKA 2991:120-1; Frankfurter Zeitung, 25 July 1905.
4. Flierl to Hahl 13 Aug 1907 and Lehner to Hahl 14 Dec 1907, in RKA 2993: 10-11, 13-14; Bezirksamtman Madang to Hahl 20 Sept 1907 RKA 2992:155-8; O. Fröhlich, 'Durch das Innere von Kaiser Wilhelmsland', Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten, (Supplement to Deutsches Kolonialblatt) Vol 21, 1908, p 201.

simultaneous unrest in Aitape and the north east coast. A permanent station in the area was out of the question in 1907/08 because of budgetary limits.

The Neuendettelsau Mission, whose interests in the security of the area were the most immediate, was meanwhile striving to make peaceful contact with the Lae Womba and in May 1909 it finally achieved success when the Lae Womba accepted an exchange of goods with the Rev. Mailänder and Professor Neuhauss during an expedition by the latter.¹ In the next two years Europeans gained increasing access to the Markham Valley and in 1911 the Neuendettelsau Mission founded its first station among the Lae Womba.² However, while attacks on the coast ceased, unrest in the Markham Valley itself continued and repeated clashes occurred between the Lae Womba and the Azera, an offshoot of the same tribe. In January 1911, a European Bird-of-Paradise hunter, Richards, was killed when he inadvertently stumbled upon a village which was celebrating a secret ancestral feast. Much further into the Markham Valley, on a tributary west of the river, New Guineans who had never seen a white man attacked and killed the German explorer and prospector Dammkohler.³

Hahl refused to send a punitive expedition to avenge Dammkohler's death since he did not have the finance to intervene where there were no prospects of properly controlling an area for some time,⁴ but further to the east the lower valley of the Markham seemed ready, by 1911, to be incorporated within the regime's permanent sphere of influence. The expedition sent in retaliation for Richards' death consisted of two Europeans, twenty eight soldiers and 400 armed Buang warriors, and was obviously intended to conquer and subdue the Lae Womba once and for all. For their part the Lae Womba

1. R. Neuhauss, Unsere Kolonie Deutsch Neu Guinea (Weimar 1914) p 96; H. Böttger, Friede auf Erden, (Neuendettelsau 1912) pp 5-8.

2. Pilhoefer, Geschichte der Neuendettelsauer Mission, I:172.

3. Amtsblatt Neuguinea, 1 Nov 1909, p 157; NM Archives, Keysser Papers: 'Die Seele der Papua Christen', Part 1, Chapter 2.

4. Hahl to RKA 26 Oct 1909 RKA 2441:19.

probably assumed that the invasion was a deliberate act of aggression against their tribe, perhaps to annex the territory. The major battle which ensued saw the Lae Womba warriors making repeated frontal assaults on the government troops but after three hours of hand-to-hand fighting they were finally defeated and the first administrative contacts were made.¹ In 1914 a government station was placed at Lae in order to influence relations in the inner Markham valley.

In the closing years of German rule on the mainland, the Huon Gulf was the only region where the Germans could boast of a limited control further than eight to ten miles inland. By 1914 the Neuendettelsau Mission had pushed its way to the 3000 metre high Cromwell Mountains deep in the Huon Peninsula and it was making preparations for a mission presence among the cannibalistic Azera people, seventy miles from the Huon coasts.² North of the peninsula, German dominion in the hinterland regions was still unacknowledged and even their control of the coastline north to Aitape was only nominal. There were only three secure enclaves of European settlement: Aitape, Potsdamhafen - Monumbo, and after 1912, Madang. Racial relations at Madang altered dramatically after the exile of the 1912 conspirators. Having achieved nothing by either active or passive resistance the local New Guineans turned to a limited cooperation with the new permanent culture. Towards the Lutheran mission in particular, which the New Guineans began to regard as an influential ally, a new, more forthcoming attitude manifested itself and the attempt at a modus vivendi was reflected in a startling increase in recruitment for European plantations, from 619 in 1910 to 1955 in 1913.³ This was to lead, after 1914, to a deeper commitment to European culture, and to the religion which the New Guineans conceived as the ritual equivalent of their

1. Berghausen to Vize Gouverneur 8 Feb 1911 RKA 2994:102-3.
 2. Pilhoefer, Geschichte der Neuendettelsauer Mission, I:175.
 3. Firth, 'German Recruitment', p 170.

own and the means to acquire the wealth of the Europeans.

The nominal peace on the coasts of the mainland in the final years could still be disrupted through invasions by mountain tribes. In fact it was one of the unforeseen effects of coastal pacification and the recruitment of able-bodied warriors that they should encourage increased aggression from inland or mountain tribes which the Germans, restricted to their coastal stations, were hard put to counter effectively. The hinterland of Aitape, the territory inland from Potsdamhafen and Hatzfeldthafen, the Rai coast ranges and the Huon Peninsula were the most troublesome areas. Lack of finance prevented Hahl from retaliating effectively at Aitape but an effort was made to influence the Sepik interior by establishing a staging point for recruitment drives at Angoram on the lower Sepik in 1913. On the Rai coast the regime made an attempt to stop the mountain people preying on coastal villages in a series of fiercely fought battles in 1910 but the final effect was only to drive the offending tribes deeper into the Finisterre Range.¹

Only at one point in Kaiser Wilhelmsland did the colonial administration attempt a comprehensive pacification programme away from the coast. It occurred at Kagam, five hours inland from Hansa Bay, where the inhabitants, disturbed by the increasing intrusion of strangers and the exploitation of the valued Bird-of-Paradise, killed three Chinese hunters and eleven New Guinean assistants in June 1912.² Pressing reasons existed for the regime to bring this area under control: first, if the culprits remained unpunished the movement might easily spread to the coast, the weakened coastal tribes be attacked and the welfare of white settlers east of Hansa Bay endangered. The fact that the Kagam people were inveterate head hunters, and had taken ten rifles and ammunition from the hunters only accentuated the dangers.³ Second, the authorities probably also feared that the proximity of

1. Berghausen to Vize Gouverneur 31 Oct 1910 and 8 Dec 1910 RKA 2994:64-6,94-5.

2. Hahl to RKA 5 Aug 1912 RKA 2995:58.

3. Scholz to Hahl 24 July 1912 RKA 2995:73.

these tribes to the mouth of the Ramu River jeopardized that important route into the interior where the Germans hoped to acquire more labour recruits and develop large-scale agriculture on the Ramu plain.

The Kagam expedition which arrived in the area in August 1912 represented a new approach to colonial control by the Germans. It saw the first use of the special expeditionary troop which had been formed in 1911 under an active military officer, Commander Prey, to act as an instrument in opening up new country slowly and with a minimum of force. Its operations in Kagam were a hint of the difficulties which the German regime would have experienced in opening the interior of New Guinea had Germany retained the colony after 1918. Prey, who had been specifically ordered by Hahl to use negotiation and eschew punitive tactics, was unable to comply since the Kagam tribes unconditionally rejected discussion.¹ Undoubtedly an earlier reprisal carried out on the private initiative of a German settler, Wilhelm Gramm, had unduly provoked them for it resulted in the death of a child, the wounding of many people by shotgun pellets and the destruction of villages. During the four months in the area Prey was involved in a series of skirmishes which cost the lives of twenty six New Guineans without succeeding in the capture of any of the original offenders.²

Prey did strive to lower racial tension in the area: he carefully followed a policy of non provocation himself, refusing to fire villages or use auxiliary New Guinean troops from areas hostile to the Kagam people, and he kept his own police, of which there were 113, under a tight disciplinary rein, ensuring that hostages taken were well treated before being sent back to their tribes with gifts. By November, when demands in other areas and

1. Hahl to Prey 30 July 1912 RKA 2995:205-207; 'Einführende Bericht der Kagam Expedition', enclosed in Prey to Hahl 9 May 1913 RKA 2995; Annual Reports 1911/12, p 144; Hahl, Gouverneursjahre, p 241.
2. 'Einführende Bericht' in RKA 2995: 247,257; Gramm to Bezirksamt 22 June 1912, enclosed in Scholz to Hahl 4 July 1912 RKA 2995:70-1; Testimony of P. Vormann S.V.D. 17 July 1912 in RKA 2995:209.

the onset of the wet season forced the removal of the troops, the Kagam people were venturing into the base camp to trade foodstuffs for iron and tobacco.¹ However the continuing presence of the people in the district in a sense confirmed the impotence of the Germans to curtail the independence of hinterland peoples. As Prey acknowledged, if the Kagam New Guineans had been convinced that he could have subdued them, they would have withdrawn permanently further inland.²

The Kagam expedition also revealed that German influence in the so-called 'secured' sectors of the mainland coastline could be deceptively shallow. Most of the tribes between the mouth of the Ramu and Potsdamhafen were still engaged in head-hunting expeditions during Prey's visit and they refused to provide him with bearers for his sorties inland, despite the fact that some of them were so far 'pacified' as to be already paying the government head tax.³ Prey also discovered that the catholic missionaries at Potsdamhafen were living in constant fear of attack by their coastal neighbours: already in early 1912 the latter had tried to spear the missionaries because they were suspected of murdering twelve missing labour recruits.⁴ Further to the west, on the Aitape coast, there was a new upsurge of resistance in 1912/13 as the administration, unable to entice increasing numbers of recruits from the oldest sources of labour, allowed recruiters to intensify their operations in recently opened territories. In the near vicinity of the government station in those years, a luluai's assistant and a native police overseer were murdered and police expeditions met stubborn defiance from villagers protesting against mounting pressure from recruiters.⁵

1. 'Einführende Bericht' RKA 2995: 216-269.

2. Ibid.: 239.

3. Ibid.: 233.

4. Amtsblatt Neuguinea, 1 Feb 1912, p 36.

5. Annual Reports 1912/13, p 172; Amtsblatt Neuguinea, 1 Dec 1913, p 261.

In the final analysis these incidents, along with the similar manifestations occurring in southern New Ireland,¹ pointed to a considerable potential crisis for the German administration in 1914. The New Guineans were not about to accept passively the effects on their societies if development were permitted to continue along the old lines, with the large plantation companies setting the pace in labour recruitment and the occupation of New Guinea land, while the administration lacked the metropolitan support and finance to organize the protectorate through permanent presence at the same rate as the land was 'pacified'. While they yearned for the European's psychological sense of power and superiority and for what he brought in the way of technological improvements, comforts and ornaments, the indigenous people also demanded security for their basic resources, freedom of movement and equitable treatment for themselves. Without them they could, and did offer effective resistance to the advance of German rule.

1. See Chapter 3 c), p 223.

Chapter 4

THE NATURE OF GERMAN CONTROL

a) The Determinants of German Policy in the Pacific.

The preceding histories of Pacific Island response to European rule have provided us with sufficient data to make a comparative analysis of the colonial relationship in the German Pacific Empire. In all three colonies it was the implicit aim of the various administrators to impose the consequences of imperialism on the local societies by the pursuit of law and order and the mobilization of the people to assist in the process of economic development. What resulted was actually a trilateral compromise between metropolitan assumptions about the Pacific, the capabilities of individual administrators and the nature of Pacific Island response. It is this compromise with which we shall be concerned in this section. By no means will it be an exhaustive analysis of German administration in the Pacific. Our attention will be concentrated on those aspects which determined the demands made on the Pacific peoples and on the way in which Europeans handled the conflict inherent in the 'colonial situation'.

Colonial policy as it emerged in Berlin was fashioned largely by the necessities of German political life and the influence which Grosskapital interests exercised on the Wilhelmstrasse. In a situation where the Director of the Colonial Department was responsible to a Reichstag which guarded jealously its right to examine the budget, the government's first concern was for economy of administration in the colonies. It was particularly reluctant to underwrite expansion in the Pacific where the colonial empire was so insignificant in size and economic potential. Berlin refused to garrison Samoa and Ponape even after repeated instances of unrest and the local administrators possessed nothing but the merest moral authority to sustain their regimes for most of the period. In New Guinea, Hahl had to wrestle with large financial deficits right up to 1914 and the parsimony of the home authorities prevented him from asserting more than nominal sovereignty over the greater part of the old protectorate.

With the concentration of development capital in the hands of a few merchants in Hamburg, Bremen and Berlin, and the identity of class interests between these and government policy makers, it was inevitable that the large commercial concerns in the Pacific should also play a significant role in policy deliberations and thus decisively influence relations between the local regimes and the Pacific Islanders. Of course the weight of merchant influence depended on their willingness to invest in the colonies, as the history of the New Guinea Company demonstrated. Despite the award of a Charter to the firm which gave it virtual carte blanche with regard to its activities in the protectorate,¹ the Company's major investment was restricted to purely commercial projects which offered an immediate financial return. Von Hansemann's financial consortium refused to finance the infrastructural prerequisites of effective political control where the dividends took much longer to mature.²

The result was a very negative period of abortive experimentation, in which constructive administration was sacrificed to all-out exploitation. There is no doubt that the climate and topography of the mainland were very real impediments to development, as was the sparseness of the population in the areas which the Company settled, but its lack of experience in Charter imperialism, its ill judged alienation of land, particularly around Madang, its indiscriminate and erratic retaliation against New Guineans and its refusal to establish a viable system of internal security all played a larger part in the Company's failure. Most of all it ignored the New Guineans themselves as a variable in the equation of profits. Because the Berlin directors considered the native conversion to the philosophy and expectations of European civilization as automatic and inevitable there was no defined

1. See Introduction page 24.

2. For an analysis of colonial investment incentive see H. Pogge von Strandmann, 'Domestic Origins of Germany's Colonial Expansion under Bismarck', Past and Present, Nr. 42, Feb 1969.

programme to encourage an economic alliance through a coordinated trading network or by redressing local grievances. It was a short-sighted policy, for in the final analysis profits depended on the availability of labour which in turn presupposed the acquiescence of the New Guineans in a cash economy. By passive and active resistance, the local inhabitants helped to foil the New Guinea Company's ambitions on the mainland.

The firm remained the major factor in race relations in Kaiser Wilhelmsland even after 1900. The treaty transferring sovereignty to the Reich, finally agreed to by the Reichstag in 1898, whittled down the Company's privilege considerably but still left it the right to alienate 50,000 hectares of land by 1902. This explicit predominance was reinforced by the Colonial Department's initial assumption that only large-scale capital enterprise could carry out the rationalized economic development of the mainland and by its decision to concentrate on the Archipelago in the first years of imperial rule, leaving security on the mainland largely to the New Guinea Company. In effect the firm retained its exploitative privilege without being as fully responsible for the political consequences of its commercial activities. Its influence is clearly evident in Hahl's refusal to sanction litigation against Company land claims in the Madang area and in the way the intensified occupation of land which precipitated the 1912 unrest in Madang was endorsed by the administration as absolutely essential if all further development were not to be abandoned.¹ By 1913 the greater part of the 72,000 hectares of land alienated by European plantations on the mainland was in the hands of the New Guinea Company.²

The New Guinea Company's power was complemented in the Bismarck Archipelago by the capital resources and influence of other large companies - Hertsheim & Co., Rudolf Wahlen AG, D.H.P.G. etc. - and by the growing number

1. Annual Reports 1912/13, p 171.

2. Ibid., p 186.

of German settlers. New Guinea and Samoa saw the growth of a class of small-capital, pan-German planters essentially opposed to the philosophies, policy goals and methods of the Governors. Theirs was a very unsubtle philosophy of economic colonization: to them the 'native' was a negligible quantity, a commodity to be exploited for profit; colonies belonged to the immigrant settler and it remained the government's first priority to protect him and do all in its power to facilitate the achievement of his ends. The size of these white settler communities, their ability to organize and mobilize metropolitan support for their sectional interests over against those of the administration generally determined the degree if not the kind of exploitation of colonial resources. In New Guinea the German population numbered more than a thousand by 1913. Three hundred and fifty were in business as traders and planters and the vast majority of these were concentrated around the centres of government activity in the northern Gazelle Peninsula and New Ireland.¹ A branch of the German Colonial Society had been functioning since December 1903 and a Planters' Society (Pflanzerverein) since mid 1904, while the Governor's Council set up in April 1904, though subject to Hahl's appointments and possessing no legislative powers, did provide an additional pressure group.²

With the support of the larger plantation concerns and exploiting every avenue of access to the home authorities, the small-settler group limited Hahl's ability to protect the New Guineans from the effects of European economic penetration. The hysterical reactions to New Guinean resistance on the Varzin in 1902 and at Madang in 1904 and 1912 were largely the product of pressure from vocal settler groups, and in 1909/10 they frustrated Hahl's attempts to close the whole protectorate to the recruitment

1. Annual Reports 1912/13, p 177 and Statistische Teil pp 28-9.

2. Firth, 'German Recruitment', p 202. For an examination of one important domestic pressure group see H. Pogge von Strandmann's Oxford D. Phil. thesis, 1970: 'The Kolonialrat, its Significance and Influence on German Politics from 1890 to 1906.'

of women. In 1913 it was the settlers' unceasing demands for labour and the chronic shortage of finance which forced Hahl to renew the recruiting drive in already hard-pressed areas with the resulting outbreaks of violence in New Ireland and Aitape.¹ Hahl was also caught between the conflicting pressures of competing colonial groups. Even when the smaller settlers found themselves on the Governor's side against the interests of large-scale capital enterprises, the latter usually triumphed, as when Hahl failed to have abolished the continued privileged access of the New Guinea Company to labour resources on the mainland or to curtail the right of the Samoan firm, the D.H.P.G., to recruit its labour in the Archipelago.²

In Samoa the situation was almost the reverse. Solf and the D.H.P.G. had quickly achieved a compromise between each other's goals and methods and their relationship was characterized by mutual respect and support for most of the period. The D.H.P.G. was the heir to the oldest company in Samoa, Godeffroys, and had operated an extensive trade and plantation enterprise in Samoa throughout two decades of civil war. Its metropolitan directors all possessed considerable personal experience of Samoa and were familiar with the Samoans, their personality, intrigues and the limits of their tolerance. By 1900 the major conflicts between the Company's exploitation and its social concern had been resolved and the pattern of Solf's rule was strengthened by the friendship of men who had spent decades trying to establish orderly community relations in the group. It was Meyer-Delius, foreign director of the D.H.P.G., who warned the Colonial Department in 1900 that the Samoans must be allowed as much freedom as possible in the conduct of their own affairs and suggested Solf as a sufficiently resolute yet flexible administrator;³ the D.H.P.G. also opposed decidedly any militaristic posture in Samoa throughout the German period.

1. See pages 223, 245.

2. Firth, 'German Recruitment', pp 203-210.

3. See page 37.

Solf was careful to support the firm's monopoly of land, labour and trade against local enemies and the attacks of his colleague Hahl and in return he could count on the D.H.P.G.'s support for his protective native policy, in particular his refusal to coerce the Samoans into providing wage labour for the plantations. With privileged access to the recruiting grounds of Melanesia, the D.H.P.G. was only interested in the Samoans as trading partners, not as workers.¹

This intimate collaboration between Solf and the D.H.P.G. was a constant source of provocation to Deeken's clique of small-capital planters who desired a militant policy of direct mobilization of the Samoans in support of their economic ends, and they kept up a running battle against the 'Solf system'. The influence which Deeken exerted through his contacts in the German Centre Party was responsible for the caution with which his activities were handled by the Colonial Department. Not only was he able to avoid deportation in spite of Solf's pleas; his appeal against sentence in 1904 may well have been upheld but for the Kaiser's personal intervention.² Solf however was able to regain the initiative in the end because he had the support of the D.H.P.G. and the large foreign settler community. Moreover the German government resisted adamantly Deeken's pressure to have the island garrisoned because of the expense involved, and in the light of the repeated vindication of Solf's non-militant policies on the occasions of unrest, it was natural that Berlin should be well disposed towards the Governor's regime.

Deeken's opposition was not without its influence on relations between the Germans and the Samoans. Solf was convinced that Deeken was behind the rumours of his disgrace in 1904 and the idea of the Samoan copra cooperative, not to mention the Vaimea incident. He also accused Deeken of figuring in Lauaki's attempted coup in 1908/09, though there is no evidence

1. Firth, 'German Recruitment', p 314.

2. See page 51.

of his encouraging the orator chief, only of leaking reports of unrest to the New Zealand press.¹ In actual fact the Samoans were quite capable of using anything the whites said or did to reinforce their own demands. What seemed a European initiative was in many cases Lauaki and the old Malo making astute use of the divisions between factions in the white community. For instance it is certain that the Malo, on its own initiative, was endorsing Deeken's activities in 1904 in order to discomfort Solf and dispose him in favour of its demands. Its intention of appointing Deeken as prospective manager of the Oloa was more than a purely business manoeuvre designed to exploit Deeken's expertise: if he proved more powerful than Solf and the latter were really disgraced, it obviously made sense to support Deeken and commit him to the future of the scheme. The petition of 1904 and the maus of 1909, both of which demanded greater Samoan responsibility in the administration of the group, were unlikely to have been inspired by Deeken, for they were directly opposed to his philosophy of colonial control. They are rather an example of the Samoans' ability to assimilate progressive ideas from the European community and of their desire to create a more balanced colonial relationship through the employment of western political and economic mechanisms. At no time did the Samoans openly commit themselves to Deeken's cause. In fact they opposed strenuously his campaign to institute compulsory plantation labour for the Samoans and considered it an affront that he should retain his freedom of movement in Samoa despite his conviction in 1904.²

Both Ponape and New Guinea provide parallel cases of the islanders ability to exploit tensions within the European community for their own ends: Nanpei recognized the latent hostility between the administration and the Catholic mission and made shrewd use of it in 1908 and again under Kersting to check the Capuchins' proselytizing assault on the southern tribes; in both

1. See page 77.

2. See page 55.

cases the unfortunate missionaries were the victims of Ponapean deception. In New Guinea the Madang natives were also adept at playing off the administration against the Lutheran mission in order to retard the penetration of traditional pagan strongholds by the latter.¹

Despite the significance of domestic politics and the interests of large-scale capital and vocal settler groups in the formulation of colonial policy, the evidence suggests that the individual executive officer of the administration played perhaps the most prominent role in the functioning of the Pacific colonial administration. The isolation of the island colonies from each other and from the mother country, their insignificance in the larger German empire, the relatively moderate level of investment at stake - all these factors resulted in a minimum of technical control from home and more freedom of action for local administrators. There is in the records a striking absence of instructions from the Colonial Department to Solf in Samoa. Berlin obviously regarded the new colony in 1900 as a windfall - a ready-made, productive going concern and beyond the general parameters of colonial policy, Solf was left a free hand to determine the system and the methods which would be employed.² Hahl too was officially accorded a great deal of room to manoeuvre though he had to be careful of the interests of the large commercial concerns and the pressure of the settler groups expressed in the Governor's Council and colonial organizations. At first sight the situation in Ponape would seem to be the opposite: administrative policy for the island was determined much more by Berlin's fear of resistance and the Sokehs revolt should have been the least likely such occurrence to take place. The Colonial Department had taken the precaution of insisting on a policy of control which would in no way provoke the reputedly dangerous islanders, particularly in 1902 when it reacted with marked alarm to Berg's apparent manifesto of positive administration.³ Yet in the end the initiative

1. See page 235.

2. See page 41.

3. See page 100-101.

remained basically with the individual officer in Ponape: it was at the local level that the disarmament of the Carolines group was planned and carried out; the reforms of 1907/08 emanated not from Berlin but from the deliberations of Fritz and Hahl; it is also significant that for nine months Boeder was able to act virtually in contravention of guidelines laid down by Hahl and Fritz as well as by Berlin. An aggressive and ambitious administrator, he seems to have been a self-willed and arrogant man, and he lacked the creative touch of a Solf or a Hahl. He quickened the tempo of change without considering the consequences of the resulting unrest and was highly inconsistent in his attitudes towards the islanders. Boeder allowed the Sokehs malcontents to go unpunished during the July visit of the Cruiser Squadron, yet he had no compunction about forcing the district to complete a second work period or introducing corporal punishment. In refusing to make concessions to a colonized people, in dismissing the Ponapeans' sense of self-respect and in dishonouring his predecessors' agreements, he overstepped the bounds of moderation. That he could do so without censure from Berlin demonstrates that, in the final analysis, Ponape was too far from New Guinea, let alone Europe, for the actions of its executives to be supervised in detail.

Within the colonies themselves, isolation threw much greater responsibility onto individual officers and often dictated the pattern of racial relationships. Nanpei was able to create the illusion of a northern rebellion in 1908 and draw Fritz on to his side because the latter's isolation in the small settlement on the northern shores of Ponape prevented him from discovering what exactly was happening in the southern districts; in the absence of roads through the island it took up to seven hours to reach Kiti harbour by boat from the colony. It could take five hours to sail from Upolu to Savai'i in Samoa: Lauaki's isolation on Savai'i was without doubt a major factor in his ability to organize the mau e pule in Solf's absence in 1908 and to maintain the momentum of the movement there during its critical phase. In New Guinea administrative stations were often isolated from the main

trading and planting communities (for example, Aitape, Morobe, Admiralties, Kieta) and communication was dependent on desultory visits by the one government steamer or the occasional recruiting ship. District officers were thus left very much to their own devices. They were not required to seek headquarters approval before opening up new country or taking militant action against local populations, and the tendency to one-man rule was reinforced by the absence of European subordinates, the personalized loyalty of the coloured police troops and the local New Guinean preference for social relationships of a personal and reciprocal nature.¹ The consequent effect of the individual officer on race relations is a major feature of New Guinea administration throughout the German period: Rose was largely responsible for taking the heat out of relations between the plantation companies and the people of Astrolabe Bay in the 1890's; the employment of irregular forces in the Varzin in 1902 and their unrestrained behaviour was the trademark, not of Hahl who was incapacitated with black-water fever at the time, but of the assistant magistrate Wolff, a man generally respected for his energy but whom the Colonial Department confessed to be 'injudicious' in his actions;² the transformation of northern New Ireland after 1900 can be ascribed largely to Boluminski's handling of the situation.³ In fact the record of peace and development in the vicinity of all the stations depended on the approach of each individual officer - Rodatz in Aitape, Klink in Morobe, Döllinger in Kieta, Wostrack in Namatanai.

Hahl exerted a particularly strong influence on New Guinean relations even though his sphere of action was culturally heterogeneous and geographically very far-flung. As imperial magistrate he created a

1. Rose describes how New Guineans felt such strong personal ties to their commanders that they could not easily be transferred from station to station, preferring to identify themselves as 'Kubary's police' or 'Piering's police'. Rose to Reichskanzler 9 Sept 1891 RKA 2670:38-9.

2. AAKA Denkschrift. Rose 27 Feb 1904 RKA 2990:27-8.

3. See pages 212-214.

tradition (which he maintained as Governor) of direct, personal and dynamic administration through constant travelling, initiating contact with outlying communities, leading expeditions and police tours and resolving local disputes. As early as the 1890's Hahl had personally created a new level of security in the Gazelle Peninsula with his small band of police, while it was he who mobilized the Tolai to build roads and negotiated with plantation owners for the provision of land reserves for the people.¹ Throughout New Guinea the Governor was known personally to the people as 'Dota Hahl'.

In a compact and homogeneous colony such as Samoa, the degree of direct involvement between the indigenous community and the chief executive was even greater. Strong personalities such as Solf, with a positive conception of their role and a good knowledge of and sympathy for local customs and expectations virtually determined the pattern of inter-communal politics. Solf brought with him to Samoa a natural respect for the intrinsic values of Samoan culture and a readiness to treat the people in their own terms. Yet he was never afraid to confront them in a moment of crisis to negotiate as the representative of the Kaiser, the Tupu Sili of Samoa. His ability to slip easily into a patriarchal role suited well the social and political conception of the Samoans.

It was executive awareness of the real inter-communal issues, an appreciation of the ambiguity of the Pacific Islanders' attitude to imperial rule and European civilization which enabled the Germans to avoid a repetition of the Sokehs rebellion in Samoa and New Guinea. Hahl, and particularly Solf, were concerned not to impose a preconceived pattern of colonialism on the Pacific peoples, but to resolve conflict, for they recognized that the colonial situation was in reality a series of antagonistic groups whose interests must be balanced.² Of necessity they were

1. See pages 160-162.

2. Compare Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule, p 7; and Balandier, Sociology of Black Africa, pp 32-3.

better aware of this than the Berlin authorities whose chief concern in the circumstances was to satisfy the interests of the most powerful pressure groups in the Reichstag. Solf was clearly superior in understanding local aspirations and the limits to which the Samoans were prepared to be pushed. It was manifest in his refusal to bully the Samoans into subjection to the economic ends of European colonialism and in his defence of the paid native bureaucracy as a delicate balance between German and Samoan sovereignty and the old and the new chiefs. Solf could still claim to have sympathy for the Samoans after the abortive Oloa movement. His only regret was their loss of naivete through decades of contact with western civilization. Mata'afa's complicity in the affair he could especially excuse, for the old chief had a special claim to clemency: Solf appreciated the fact that Mata'afa's whole life had been filled with struggle for the supreme position of Samoan sovereign. When, at the age of sixty-five, he was finally awarded the Tupu title by the majority of Samoans, it was taken from him by the decision of a white man. Then he had to be content with the title of paramount chief when Germany took over the group.¹ It was only natural that, as the white opposition to Solf installed itself in 1903/04, Mata'afa should interpret this to mean that Solf's authority was weakening, and work to regain his own authority with his people. Mata'afa was neither the particular enemy of Germany, nor the friend of England; for him there was nothing beyond his own islands. If Solf could be generous to such a 'neutral' he could also be unusually magnanimous with a chief like Lauaki, whom he regarded as 'a grand, eloquent speaker' with 'many followers'.² Against Lauaki Solf's grasp of affairs and essential self-restraint were highlighted in the most serious crisis of all in 1909 when he relied solely on a political strategy right up to the brink of civil war and total bankruptcy of his administrative conception. The appointment

1. Solf to AAKA 4 Aug 1905 RKA 3064:17-19.

2. Davidson, Pacific Islands Portraits, p 295.

of Solf as Colonial Secretary was a measure of his superiority in internal colonial politics, as well as his ability to manipulate power at the domestic level.

In this context, it is significant that the closest thing to a philosophy of colonialism in the German Pacific comes from Solf. With his cosmopolitan background and outlook, his comparative humanism, Solf in particular found it necessary to offer some form of ideological rationale for his involvement in Germany's Kolonialpolitik, with its blatantly imperialistic ends and often brutal consequences. It was in his Decennial Programme of 1906/07 that Solf articulated his concept of colonialism and the reasons for his method of administration. Basically Solf had decided in favour of the Samoans: that they would be focus of his programme, and specifically that they should have their land secured to them. Germany possessed the legal and moral obligation which she had accepted at the flag-raising in 1900, to create for the Samoans 'better and more rational conditions of life than they themselves in the narrowness of their hearts and minds could create.'¹ Solf moreover pointed to the achievement of a people which outlaid M150,000 a year for educational purposes and argued that a society which made such enlightened sacrifices justified man's highest hopes and could not be allowed to suffer unduly from foreign rule. The Samoans were not, to Solf, a corpus vile. He regarded them as wild, truculent, superstitious children whom Germany must instruct and enlighten. Yet he was keenly aware that the Samoans could not be forced along the road of development: they might be led, but only led successfully if their guides and mentors were prepared, like Solf, to ground themselves in the emotions and thought processes of the island people. For Solf the resulting ideal would be development with and through the Samoan, not in spite of him.²

1. Solf to RKA 1 Nov 1907 RKA 2953:109.

2. Ibid., 104-120; Solf to RKA 15 Sept 1907 RKA 2953:47-56; W. Solf, Kolonialpolitik. Mein politisches Vermächtnis (Berlin 1919) p 42.

Solf's philosophy helps to explain his laissez faire attitude to the participation of the Samoans in the colonial economy. His policy was to stimulate the use of land and increase Samoan production by indirect methods - regulating the coconut planting activity of the people, legislation to protect them against false weights and measures and the levying of a head tax to pay for the local native government.¹ The administration interfered in the 'fa'asamoan hinterland' only when a breakdown in law and order was imminent² or when indigenous economic activity clashed with the vital interests of European commerce as the Oloa did.

Governor Hahl's programme made much more positive demands on the New Guineans. It was not designed merely to cow the population, or simply to maintain peace and let development find its own course, but to open up the protectorate so that the New Guineans would be made accessible as labour to the rapidly expanding plantations and be drawn progressively into a wage-labour economy. The concept was not as well articulated as Solf's nor founded on a particular moral image of the New Guineans as a whole. Yet it would be unfair to conclude that Hahl did not possess a basic compassion for the inhabitants of the protectorate. He appreciated that they had a claim to just and sympathetic treatment and a certain protection against the consequences of radical social change, and in recognition of his attention to local grievances Hahl was accorded special status as an adopted member of many local groups.³ In particular he strove to regulate the processes of labour recruitment so that population balance and local economic activity would not be permanently disrupted by premature depletion of manpower.⁴

Yet despite his essentially ad hoc attempts to procure equitable

1. See page 42-3.

2. D.H. Pitt, Tradition and Economic Progress in Samoa (Oxford 1970) p 22.

3. There is an account of Hahl's promising to provide six goats for the Kâte people near Finschhafen in 1912, and then forgetting about it in the pressure of business. The Kâte were greatly upset: fulfillment of a promise was an integral principle of social relationships, and while they were willing to accept that a 'white man' would make a false promise to them, it was inconceivable that 'Dota Hahl' could do so. NM Archives, Keysser: 'Die Seele der Papua Christen', Part 2.

4. See page 223.

treatment for New Guineans and his efforts to conserve the population into the future, Hahl was, at heart, one with the imperialist objectives of settler-entrepreneurs. Though he could claim in his farewell speech in 1914 to have recognized the importance of the relationship between the races,¹ it was not a claim based on an ideal of equality for New Guineans in their own land. Rather it was an admission, and a warning, that the future prosperity of the colony lay in the Germans' ability to tap the manpower of the population by creating an ordered existence. Hahl warned that New Guinea life and thought must be assimilated to that of the German people if the Reich's national objectives were not to be subverted.² Such ideas make it easier to understand Hahl's emphasis on 'pacification' of New Guinea societies and his assumption that violence was a natural and inevitable part of the process.³

It is indisputable that in this sense Solf was also a man of his age. While he may not have subscribed to the Social Darwinism current in European intellectual circles, his sympathy for the Samoans was based on a feeling that Germany, as the leading Kulturstaat, had a duty to civilize such a society. The Samoans possessed the right to exist less of themselves or for themselves than as deserving servants of the colonizing intelligence. Solf interpreted his task as that of preparing a seedbed: another generation would reap the benefits of his cultivation of the Samoans who would be the engines of development in the future. It was therefore impractical politics to exploit the people ruthlessly. Solf also approved the English disdain for over familiarity with the coloured races of their colonies. In the final analysis he believed firmly that to achieve anything in the colonies, Germany must maintain a strict standard of race pride and purity.⁴

1. Amtsblatt Neuguinea, 15 April 1914, p 123.

2. Ibid.

3. Hahl to RKA 21 Oct 1912 RKA 2995:118-9.

4. Solf to RKA 1 Nov 1907 RKA 2953. See also W. Solf, Eingeborene und Ansiedler auf Samoa, (1908) pp 28-9.

In all three colonies the local administrations and private commercial interests had much the same objective: the commercial utilization of the colony for the benefit of Germany, and as a corollary, for the individual enterprises. A parting of the ways occurred only when the Imperial officials realized that it was counter-productive to capitalize on local labour potential or land resources without considering the long-term effects on the colonial society. Ruthless exploitation only exhausted the reservoirs of labour and alienated the people who, in the end, were the essential factor in the development of the colony. The administrations were in consequence committed to a programme of conservationist utilization and protection of the indigenous populations which often brought them into conflict with entrepreneurs who saw their freedom of movement and their profits threatened.

b) The German Pacific Administration in Operation.

It would be opportune at this point to examine the functioning of the German Pacific administration and consider its contribution not only to the sources of conflict inherent in the colonial relationship, but also to its resolution.

There was no 'system' of German rule in the Pacific in the sense of a standard pattern of administrative actions based on an abstract theory and predetermined by long experience. The New Guinea Company's administrative effort in Kaiser Wilhelmland extended to erratic retaliation against New Guineans who refused to accept the unregulated exploitation of their resources. The Company made no attempt to provide a proper police force, to cultivate native intermediaries or to maintain regular communication between the mainland and the archipelago. To each individual was left the task of guaranteeing his own security and negotiating his own compromise with the local inhabitants, while the German navy was expected to act as company police force in the event of violence. Even the Imperial judges Rose and Hahl were given no real facilities to assist them in imposing order on inter-communal relations in their separate, confined spheres of action. Any progress which was made to provide the security prerequisites of development was the work of these individuals drawing on their own skills and resources.

In 1900 in New Guinea Hahl was forced to start from scratch. Through progressive 'pacification' and the extension of permanent government presence, Hahl sought to subject the whole territory to a uniform pattern of order and growth. The perennial shortage of finance and personnel limited the extent to which he was successful in this, as did the problems of scale, the topographical hindrances which made populations difficult and costly to organize, and the continual resistance of New Guineans. Cost in particular forced Hahl to concentrate on the areas of heaviest white settlement and the

established sources of labour and try to contain unrest in other areas by military reprisals. However, reprisal was not control. It was no more than a means of punishment and could never achieve the New Guineans' preservation or elevation, or make them productive in European terms.¹ Indeed it could help to incubate further resistance as at Hatzfeldthafen or Madang and its inadequacy hastened the imposition of direct rule at Hatzfeldthafen in the Admiralty Islands and in the Markham valley among the Lae-Womba. But in areas completely outside the government sphere of influence, where direct rule was not likely for some time, Hahl continued to accept as unavoidable the murder of individual white men and the predatory activities of local tribes.²

Even permanent presence was no guarantee of complete German control. Though it was basically a system of direct rule in which luluais were little more than levers through which police action could be initiated or taxation and forced labour levied, it fell short of even these modest goals in many areas. Not all luluais were able to gain the respect of their groups, as was evident around Madang where each appointee had to be provided with two policemen to uphold his authority.³ The Germans had to deal with many cases of 'partiality, excessive zeal and ignorance' in their agents.⁴ At the root of the problem was the fact that these managerial positions were generally the first institutionalized political offices in indigenous society and cut across the customary categories of leadership and power. Leaders of local groups in traditional New Guinea were not the basis of social control and possessed a very limited influence and policy making role. As Lawrence points out: 'they could not be expected, in the name of abstract authority, to sacrifice the interests of individuals on whose daily cooperation they

1. Protokoll der Sitzung des Gouverneursrat. Amtsblatt Neuguinea, 1 May 1910, p 68.

2. Annual Reports 1903/04, p 89. Hahl's reaction to Dammkohler's murder in 1909 is a case in point: see page 241.

3. See page 233. See also C.D. Rowley, 'Native Officials and Magistrates of German New Guinea 1897-1921', South Pacific Vol 7, Nr. 8, 1954, pp 772-5.

4. Annual Reports 1902/03, p 95.

depended for survival in society'.¹ Astute 'big men' tended to avoid the office anyway because of the dangers of being associated with unpopular government demands. Those who were appointed were often New Guineans without any prior claim to leadership status, like Nalon of Bilia, who hoped for some personal advancement through collaboration.

The other instruments of colonial mobilization - compulsory road work and head taxes - were also of limited efficacy in achieving the administration's ends. The Germans were able to construct a network of roads of varying quality in the immediate vicinity of the main areas of settlement and administration, but they encountered resistance to more comprehensive projects which offered local populations no immediate advantages like better market access. Roadworks were only successful where there was European supervision and this was ordinarily hampered by the shortage of personnel and geographical difficulties away from the coasts. The people tended to resent roads of a purely military nature and the disruption of the village economy which mobilization of the able-bodied men over a two to four week period entailed. The use of native police as supervisors also led to abuses like the illegal extension of the legislated period of compulsory labour, with the inevitable result of bad blood and active opposition.² Madang and Bougainville in particular were the scenes of frequent resistance to corvee demands which were also partly responsible for the Bainings massacre of 1904.³ Even the Tolai, who had otherwise adapted themselves to the growing demands of a colonial economy, had to be forced to maintain the roads built before 1900 and their distaste for the work was the main reason why they welcomed the introduction of the head tax in 1907. Although it did not remove all corvee obligations, the head tax was paid willingly by them for the remainder

1. Lawrence in Fashion of Law in New Guinea, p 35.

2. Neuhauss, Deutsch Neu Guinea, I:452-3.

3. See pages 208, 216, 232.

of the period.

General reluctance to do road work was probably the reason why the head tax did not elicit widespread hostility anywhere in New Guinea. Even the Madang people were glad to pay it in order to escape the labour demands.¹ There are no official figures as to the exact extent of its imposition nor the total annual yield, but isolated statistics do give the impression that large numbers of people paid it without any trouble. For instance, 40,683 Marks was collected in the Gazelle Peninsula and Duke of York Islands in 1909, and the southern New Irelanders, with a taxable population of approximately 7,000 people, paid 20,000 Marks in head taxes in 1910, an increase of 5000 Marks on the previous year. Moreover, that same year, when the head tax in some areas of the Gazelle and northern New Ireland was increased from seven to ten Marks per person, the New Irelanders alone paid in an extra 20,000 Marks without any resistance.² However the tax was not generally achieving the ends designed for it, namely to incorporate ever larger numbers of New Guineans into the plantation economy by forcing them onto the wage-labour market. The coastal Tolai had no trouble meeting the tax from their expanding trade incomes while on New Ireland the people in both north and south were engaging in day-labour at local plantations to earn the tax and then returning to subsistence gardening and coconut cultivation in their own villages. In fact the head tax encouraged the New Irelander to plant more coconuts so that eventually he would be able to meet the payment from his copra revenue.³ In inner areas of the Gazelle the imposition of the tax induced some groups to retreat into more inaccessible areas.⁴

Micronesia and Polynesia were, in theory, much more penetrable types of society than Melanesia and lent themselves to positive direction

1. BA/MA, 5187, Vol 15: Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Condor 19 Nov 1910.

2. Annual Reports, 1910/11, p 154; Amtsblatt Neuguinea, 1 April 1910, p 56.

3. Protokoll der Sitzung der Gouverneursrat, Amtsblatt Neuguinea, 1 Dec 1911, p 257.

4. Amtsblatt Neuguinea, 1 April 1910, p 56.

through manipulation of their hierarchical structures of authority. In Ponape however, discontinuity of leadership and the fear of resistance prevented any systemization of control policy and deterred the Germans from attempting such a process until late in the period. Until 1907 Hahl and Berg were confined to the rather negative policy of trying to reduce the sources of social and inter-communal conflict by restricting the judicial powers of the chiefs, curbing the gun-running activities of whalers and partially disarming the islanders. Regular consultations with the more important chiefs gave the Germans some knowledge of the tenour of relations but by and large the Ponapeans were left to themselves with the mission societies as the real representatives of European rule at the local level. In the event the relations between missionaries and administration were the cause of the major disputes of the period.

The reforms introduced in 1908 were intended to give the Germans some control over the ultimate power of the district leaders as well as to mobilize the people in support of basic administrative tasks. They were to inaugurate a much more positive phase of administration in which the chiefs would be more closely involved in the process of colonial control. However the growing unrest dealt this incipient system a damaging blow. The Ponapeans were able to retain the initiative in committing Fritz to the principle of an indigenous advisory council and in forcing him to virtually suspend the programme of social and administrative innovations after the disturbances of 1908. But the failure of Fritz and Boeder to impose a definite pattern of control was not due to the unworkability of the reforms themselves. It was both men's personal inadequacies and their inability to recognize the true source of conflict in Ponape politics which exacerbated the situation to the point of revolt. Both men allowed themselves to be led astray by what were essentially inter-district intrigues disguised as religious sectarianism. Only in the post-revolt period was a new balance of power achieved. Kersting was able to capitalize on the new image of resolution and power which the

regime derived from the successful repression of the Sokehs revolt and his use of the islanders themselves to implement the land reforms was an original method of evading the conflict which inevitably accompanied social change. There were threats to stability in the period 1911 to 1914 from the youth movement in Madolenihmw and Kiti, and from the missionary zeal of the Capuchin Mission, but the seeds of peaceful development were also being sown and it is significant that a later generation of Ponapeans regarded the German period in retrospect as the most innovative of the island's modern history.¹

Of all three colonies Solf's regime in Samoa comes closest to achieving the bureaucratization of indigenous power and the establishment of a workable system of control. Yet neither feature is the manifestation of an idealistic scheme methodically constructed by the Governor. The Solf period, for all its appearance of monolithic, inevitable progress towards a political ideal, was really one in which experiment prevailed and pragmatic solutions to current problems were sought. In his Decennial Programme of 1907 Solf explicitly refused to commit himself to rigid theories and schemes of colonial rule.² Indeed the programme itself was the product of his increasing awareness that the Samoans would not lightly accept a dictatorial method of foreign government.

From the very beginning Solf had to compromise with those who wielded power, and to gain acceptance for the German regime, he was forced to concede the continuation of the Malo style of government: a central native administration controlled by the chiefs and orators of the victorious party; the dictatorship of the strong. The indigenous local government apparatus which he set up was a two-fold solution to this problem: it diverted political attention to the local areas as well as counteracting the power of the Tumua and Pule by giving a certain independence to lower chiefs and speakers of both

1. Bascom, Ponape, p 13.

2. Solf to RKA 1 Nov 1907 RKA 2953.

parties. Nevertheless it too represented a delicate balance between Samoan and German power: for not only did Solf pay the incumbents salaries as a kind of indemnity for the prerogatives they surrendered when Samoa became a German colony, but he was obliged to use officials familiar to the local villagers, as the people would not obey a stranger.¹ In effect this meant that the traditional power of village elites was hardly inhibited and the colonial government could exercise relatively little control over them, particularly as wages were not enough to provide an effective sanction and dismissal might only alienate the villagers.²

This essential balance of interests continued to operate right to the end of German rule: a subsidiary feature of the administrative system like the head tax had to be negotiated with the Samoan elites rather than imposed;³ Solf found himself forced to maintain the political fiction of the paramountcy long after he had succeeded in undermining the Oloa movement and abolishing the Malo; finally Lauaki's movements remained unrestricted up until late 1908 despite his consistent championship of campaigns to reinstate the old elites in power, and it was this freedom which gave him the opportunity to launch the mau e pule. Even when Solf commanded the superior military power in March 1909 he could not afford to use a military offensive for fear of provoking a general rebellion. The final compromise between the two political cultures was the appointment in 1912 of two advisors to the administration as the solution to the Ali'i Sili question: this time it was an adjustment of interests between the royal families and the administration. Solf's policies of indirect government and cautious manipulation of opposing interests in Samoa were generally successful in maintaining order during the German era, but by 1914 there was evidence that the local conception of colonial rule

1. RKA Denkschrift 1910. RKA 3065:101.

2. Pitt, Tradition and Economic Progress pp 114-5.

3. See page 43.

was undergoing considerable transformation. The incidents of racial violence involving Sitivi and the four Fitafita, as well as the growth of a generation of worldly, articulate and self-confident Samoans, to which Schultz testified,¹ indicate that in Samoa, the Germans were fast approaching a point of departure in 1914.

The Military Apparatus:

A consistent feature of the limitations of German control in the Pacific was the weakness of its military backing. Berlin's reluctance to increase government expenses by militarization left all three administrations with more moral authority than physical power and the impotence of the Ponape and Samoa regimes in particular was an additional reason for the emphasis on the resolution of conflict, the pursuit of compromise, and the adoption of a 'lead not drive' policy. In New Guinea financial stringency condemned Hahl to the inadequate policy of control by reprisal.

None of the three colonies was occupied by colonial troops (Schutztruppen) during the German period. They all possessed indigenous police forces but only New Guinea's was of effectual size. The number of Melanesian police in New Guinea had grown to more than 800 by 1914 and included a special expeditionary troop of 113 men, trained and led by a German officer on active duty. The troop had been developed out of the existing police force as an instrument to open up new territory and lay the groundwork of control for later civilian administrations and its worth was proved in the first combined operation in the Kagam area of the northern mainland, where the troop made an important contribution to the lowering of racial tension.² There were however many more occasions which revealed how inadequate the numbers of police in New Guinea were, particularly when unrest broke out in different areas simultaneously: In 1904 the Bainings

1. See page 73.

2. See page 244.

massacre and its repercussions among New Guineans highlighted the ease with which a surprise New Guinean attack might overcome even a major centre of European settlement in a situation where a station's complement of forty or fifty police was absent on security duties in other areas; the Madang revolt the same year very nearly succeeded in spite of the fact that the police force was on active sentry duty.¹ Again, in late 1910, when news of the Ponape insurrection reached New Guinea, most of the better-trained police were in Morobe, Madang or Aitape, or on the Anglo-German border expedition, and less than 100 of the newest recruits and inferior soldiers could be mustered as reinforcements for the besieged colony.² The most serious deficiency however was revealed in 1913 when the entire expeditionary force had to be mobilized to deal with the uprising in southern New Ireland and many of the local police contingents were also drawn in, leaving the rest of the protectorate practically bereft of military protection. The inadequacy of numbers was overcome in individual cases by recruiting local auxiliaries to assist in punitive operations. They played an important role in the 1893 war in the Gazelle Peninsula, in Bougainville and in various campaigns on the mainland but their employment was always a risk since they could not be effectively controlled in the jungle and genocide and permanent ill-will were the occasional results.³ In 1913 Hahl was considering the possibilities of a limited conscription to supply the military and labour needs of the regime but the war intervened before any sort of colonial army could be developed.⁴ It is in any case doubtful whether the Reichstag, or the Australian government, would have viewed with approval any attempt to create a standing army, however limited its size and functions.

1. See pages 210, 226.

2. Oswald to RKA 29 Dec 1910 RKA 3009:125.

3. As in the case of the Varzin war of 1902 when 2000 labourers and eighty police equipped with 200 rifles were unleashed on the districts. 'Bericht betr. die Unruhen am Varzin', Wolff, 5 Aug 1902, in RKA 2989:126-9.

4. Hahl to RKA 24 May 1913 RKA 3108:10-15.

Limited personnel was only one of the impediments to the construction of an effective security force for New Guinea. The Germans found that the Melanesian also possessed inherent combat limitations. While he was valued for his ability to move freely in the jungle, the New Guinean's fighting qualities and powers of endurance in situations of crisis were generally suspect. The Melanesian was accustomed to small, hamlet encounters where blood was spilt only to the extent it satisfied clan or territorial vengeance. There was no premium on bravery, the ambush and the tentative offensive being the preferred fighting methods, and the records are full of complaints about Melanesian hesitancy and indiscipline. The performance of those Melanesians seconded to Ponape provide a good example.

Until the insurrection in 1910 the permanent security forces on Ponape consisted of forty or fifty New Guineans and Malays. The former seemed to have made little more than a derisory impression on the Ponapeans: Hahl reported on his arrival with New Guinea police in 1899 that the islanders turned up their noses at the 'niggers' which deeply offended his small band.¹ Melanesian police accompanied the German marines sent to Ponape in January 1911 and in the storming of Sokehs Island on 13 January they had to be virtually driven up the hill by their police officers, though in the event they took the heights without substantial assistance from the naval forces. Other accounts tell of their wild and inaccurate firing, their irresolution in battle and their tendency to run away when in difficulties. Kersting's final judgment of them was however favourable for they proved themselves very mobile and adaptable and it seems that they were no less competent than many of the inexperienced German marines.²

If New Guinea's 800 police and Ponape's fifty appeared totally inadequate in the circumstances, then the thirty-man group of Samoans who

1. Minute in Bennigen to AAKA 26 April 1900 RKA 2671:64.

2. See Kammerich to Bezirksamtman 15 May 1911 RKA 3010:24 and Kersting to RKA 15 Nov 1911 RKA 3010:112-125.

comprised the police force for a population of 34,000 in Samoa was nothing short of ludicrous. The Fitafita, as it was called, was hardly more than a decorative adjunct to the regime and was employed in a representational capacity, as well as for certain mechanical tasks of the administration. Drawn from the young men of the more important families, the Fitafita was regarded by the ordinary Samoans as a symbol of their interdependent relationship with the Germans but pan-German settler groups kept up a constant battle to have the force replaced by a garrison of Melanesian troops which would be more effectual. The argument that the corps was economically important to the colony,¹ which both Solf and Berlin raised in its defence, was a rather specious one but in the context of the Fitafita's possible replacement with non-Samoans it did have political significance.

In the state of latent confrontation which prevailed in Samoa, and indeed in Ponape, fear of provoking resistance from the islanders was a very important motivation for the German government to maintain a non-militant posture and refuse to garrison the islands. As early as 1899 the wider European community in Samoa had rejected the proposal of the German consul and the naval representative that a volunteer European corps be established to protect the settlers from the Samoans, for they were convinced that the best guarantee of security in the islands lay in the fact that the European residents were not armed for war; mobilization would only incite the Samoans.² From then on Solf had to contend with campaigns by the pan-German settler clique in the wake of the Oloa and the mau e pule to move Berlin to send troops and naval cruisers to preside over Germany's reign instead of the Fitafita. Solf was in every case victorious because the Colonial Office, staffed with men of Samoan experience for much of the period, shared his view that to substitute a band of Melanesians

1. See Schultz to AAKA 2 Sept 1906 RKA 3105:137; RKA Denkschrift 18 Jan 1909 RKA 2673:34-6; Samoanische Gouvernements-Blatt, 3 May 1913, Vol IV: 44.

2. Solf to RKA 11 April 1910 RKA 3010:44-5.

for the Fitafita would be considered an unforgiveable affront by the Samoan people. This assessment was corroborated by the resentment which followed the rumour in 1909 that Coerper was planning to release the Melanesians 'like dogs' on Lauaki and his followers.¹ To have done so may have been the spark to ignite the whole of Samoa.

In a situation where the land based security forces of an essentially maritime empire had obvious shortcomings, the Pacific administrations leaned heavily on the German navy as their most powerful sanction. Because of the chronic shortage of finance and the extensive perimeters of the island colonies, the civilian administrators also expected a more positive role from the navy, as an executive arm of the regime. Yet each side jealously guarded its own prerogatives of authority so that the exact function of the navy within the structure of colonial rule in the Pacific was the subject of frequent disagreement at both local and metropolitan levels.

The operations of the German navy in the Pacific really began with the era of Bismarck's 'gunboat diplomacy' in the 1870's when cruisers were sent to Samoa to encourage and protect German commerce by their presence. In the isolated situation of Samoa, and with the growth of international rivalry, naval commanders were inexorably drawn towards more overt political roles as major levers of influence in attempts to dictate the pattern of Samoan politics in favour of one nation.²

By 1899 the naval commander had become an indisputable element in the decision - making process of the consular representatives in Samoa and was accustomed to sharing in political decisions. With the establishment of a civilian authority in Samoa and the presence of a strong-minded personality like Solf it was inevitable that naval personnel should find

1. See pages 75-6.

2. See pages 29-30.

their acquired authority on their occasional visits considerably hedged about with restrictions. Solf suspected that the navy wanted to supercede the authority of the Foreign Office in the colonies, and he vehemently opposed awarding wide-ranging powers to naval officers.¹ When he encountered an equally strong-minded naval representative, with powerful friends at the Wilhelmine court and a militaristic attitude to the problems of internal security, as happened in 1900, then a clash was certain. The naval commander was Captain Emsmann of SMS Cormoran who had presided at the inauguration of the German regime in Samoa and whose belief that a hard-line policy of military domination was the only answer to ruling the Samoans was in direct conflict with Solf's growing conviction that only a subtle policy of manipulation could guarantee peace. It was Solf who gained the verdict from the home authorities in this contest and it resulted in the stricter definition of the relations which both the Colonial Department and the Admiralty expected of the Samoan Governor and naval vessels in the Pacific.²

It was not always the case that naval commanders represented the most right-wing, militant viewpoint in relations with the Pacific Islanders. Admiral Coerper was in complete agreement with Solf's political strategy against Lauaki in 1909 and he went to great pains to convince the Samoans of his preference for a peaceful solution.³ In New Guinea under Company rule, Admiral Heusner refused to accept requisitions for punitive actions without firm evidence that they were justly founded, while in Ponape, it was the navy alone which objected to the decision to execute so many Cokoheh rebels in 1911 on the grounds of humanity.⁴

Heusner's action in New Guinea, or lack of it, was another instance of the conflict which could be engendered between the naval and civil arms of the Pacific administrations over the former's proper functions.

1. See page 45.

2. AAKA to Admiralstab, end 1901. RKA 3062:122.

3. See pages 75-6.

4. See pages 139.

Not only humanity but also a firm refusal to recognize the New Guinea Company's interpretation of its executive authority was at the heart of Heusner's attitude. Unlike Samoa, here it was the civil administration which had the more far-reaching conception of naval duties. To the Company the navy was a sort of roving police force whose activities while in New Guinea were to be directed by Company officials. The Foreign Office instructions of 1887, which regulated relations between Company and navy in the colony,¹ went some way towards resolving the conflict, but since the Company continued to dispute the assumption that it was responsible for internal security and failed to accelerate a programme of political control, individual officials in New Guinea like Rose, Schmiele and Hahl, were forced to rely on naval intervention more than they desired. In addition the 1887 directives failed to satisfy warship commanders themselves or define their exact role. In spite of the fact that the final decision on a requisition was left to the military judgment of the commander, he was still made responsible for the consequences of intervention.² The result was that naval officers continued to judge administrative requests from a political, instead of a purely military standpoint. After 1900 however there seems to have been very little discord between naval representatives and Hahl's regime, though Captain Kranzbühler of the Pacific cruiser, SMS Condor, did complain in 1910 that the warships were still being used on occasions as nothing more than a means of government transport.

In one sense the navy was little suited to any other role for it proved to be a rather ineffective means of punishing violence or enforcing obedience in the Pacific. It suffered an almost traumatic shock in Samoa in 1887 when sixteen German marines were killed by Mata'afa's forces in

1. See Pages 181-2.

2. 'Instruktion für das Verhalten der Kommandanten der Kaiserlichen Kriegsschiffe im Schutzgebiet der Neu Guinea Compagnie', in AA to NGC 6 April 1887 RKA 2657:42-3.

attempting to disarm a rebel camp,¹ and naval policy thereafter was influenced by a more circumspect assessment of the Samoans' quality of resistance. It was evident in 1909 in the reluctance of Solf and Coerper to initiate a naval offensive against Lauaki for both men were well aware that the German marines would be at a great disadvantage in the Samoan bush. A semi-official view in Berlin by this time was that not even a crack battallion of regular German soldiers could hope to repress a Samoan rebellion.²

In Ponape the navy does not appear to have deserved the credit for the quick and successful completion of the 1911 campaign which its public relations bureau claimed for it.³ Sokehs Island was stormed and taken by a few officers and the Melanesian police before the major contingent of German marines had even been landed and the rebels had little difficulty in slipping through the naval cordon around their island to escape to the mainland. They successfully eluded the troops on the mainland for over a month, in the process escaping again from Nankiop and from Impeip where the marines were deployed in a circle around the camp. Kersting admitted that it was the quantity of German soldiery (eight to ten times the numbers of Sokehs warriors) and not its quality which intimidated the Ponapeans.⁴ Such was the awkwardness of the troops in the bush and their profligate use of ammunition, that jokes about the German navy became currency among the loyal Ponapeans during the operations. With a few isolated exceptions, the European soldiers were unable to take prisoners, and they seemed to have a singular capacity for getting lost in the jungle. Kersting contended that it was the work of the administration in organizing support facilities and

1. See page 33.

2. Norddeutsche Allgemeine article reprinted in Samoanische Zeitung 10 July 1909.

3. Compare Gartzke's article, 'Der Aufstand in Ponape und seine Niederwerfung', in Marine Rundschau, 1911, Heft 6.

4. Kersting to RKA 15 Nov 1911 RKA 3010:112-125.

mobilizing the other islanders which put the greatest pressure on the rebels.¹ Certainly it was Kersting's own initiative which brought off the assault on Sokehs Island as well as the plans to bombard Palikir and encircle Impeip, while the Nankiop campaign was undertaken at the suggestion of the Superior of the Capuchin Mission. In the face of criticisms of the naval forces from the civil authorities however, it is as well to remember that there was some rivalry during the Ponape campaign as to who commanded the ultimate executive authority. Like civilian administrators in the other colonies, Kersting was not prepared to relinquish his authority over the native community, even for temporary military purposes. He won his point but a certain amount of inter-service jealousy did affect relations between the administration and the navy before the operations were over.²

The situation in New Guinea perhaps most of all exposed the limitations of naval intervention. Some of the earliest confrontations with New Guineans were bloody affairs, in one case so bloody that Bismarck suppressed its publication for fear of political repercussions.³ But only rarely did marines operating on land inflict serious losses on New Guineans. In most cases they had difficulty even making contact, as at Kabaira in the Gazelle Peninsula, where in 1886 over 500 marines searched the district over several days to catch hostages in retaliation for attacks on Europeans, yet only once did they contact the local inhabitants at close quarters, without managing to capture any.⁴

One of the problems in bringing the power of the navy to bear on the populace was the relative immobility of European-trained soldiers in

1. Kersting to RKA 15 Nov 1911 RKA 3010:112-125.
2. A serious conflict threatened on one occasion when Kersting was accidentally fired upon by patrolling marines while reconnoitring in a boat. See Kersting to Gouverneur 7 Feb 1911 RKA 3010:185-191.
3. Twenty six New Irelanders were killed and several marines wounded during a series of punitive raids by SMS Albatross in early 1886. Admiralität to Bismarck 11 April 1886, plus Bismarck's minutes, RKA 2976:3-4.
4. Oertzen to Bismarck and Knorr to Admiralität 21 June 1886 in RKA 2976:75-7 and 88.

very rugged country and tropical jungle, where movement was only along narrow paths susceptible to ambush and the New Guineans avoided large concentrations. Jungle fighting by European troops was still an undeveloped military skill in the late nineteenth century and marines were consistently hampered by their uniform and cumbersome equipment, while military formations which were more suitable to large-scale movements in open spaces were employed.¹

Formidable difficulties accompanied the organization of naval expeditions in New Guinea: native bearers were impossible to hire for more than a few days at a time; whites with an adequate knowledge of an area to act as guides and interpreters were scarce; above all it was impossible to keep secret the preparations for an extensive campaign, for the report of a warship's arrival spread like wildfire and the people who were the object of the exercise were immediately on the watch. Furthermore, even if a naval raid were launched inconspicuously, the ship was usually so large and so slow that it was sighted quickly and the victims had ample time to escape to the jungle with their valuables. In the Admiralties, naval expeditions were consistently unsuccessful because of the system of signal fires which the islanders used for communication; night raids were prevented by the dangers of off-shore reefs and the impossibility of moving in the jungle after dark.² New Guineans lost their initial awe of warships very quickly; not even artillery bombardments were a major source of concern. Around Aitape the people collected unexploded artillery shells after bombardments and reworked them into sago pounders and if villages were hit by shells

1. As late as 1914 German marines were sent into the interior of Bougainville with white uniforms, woolen blankets and heavy packs, and armed with rifles, sabres and bayonets. BA/MA, 5069: Auszüge Berichte SMS Schiffe im Ausland 3 March 1914; Amtsblatt Neuguinea, 1 May 1914, pp 162-3.
2. Oertzen to Kaiserl. Kommando der Südsee Station 15 July 1886 RKA 2977:87; BA/MA, 630: Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Condor 12 April 1904.

they could be easily rebuilt.¹ Perhaps the epitome of local contempt for the punitive efficacy of the German navy is best expressed in the words of a New Irelander:

'What name you speak belong man-war. Man-war he all same one bloody fool, he no save kill 'em kanaka. He make fire house, never mind. He no save go bush. Kanaka he no 'fraid belong man-war. Man-war he come, Kanaka he go bush alright'.²

Though the relative impotence of the navy in land-based exercises was an important argument against using it in a police role and the infrequency of naval visits precluded regular patrols, the Pacific administrations remained very dependent on naval support right up to 1914 because of stringent budget provisions.³ Each of the chief executives considered it to be an essential element of his security programme: Solf and Schultz were not willing to proceed with the abolition of the paramountcy by fiat unless it was accompanied by a naval demonstration, and the Colonial Office supported their decision.⁴ In the event the East Asian cruiser squadron was on its way to Samoa in 1913 when fresh outbreaks of unrest in China forced it to abandon the cruise. A second visit projected for the following year was forestalled by the declaration of war in Europe.⁵ In New Guinea the navy played a prominent part in Hahl's policy of containment by reprisal, especially in the Admiralties. The establishment of the expeditionary troops in 1911 did not eliminate the importance of the navy in contributing to security in all parts of the protectorate: as mentioned, it was the navy which was sent into Bougainville in 1914 to open up its southern half to administrative control. On Ponape it remained an important sanction against a repetition of a revolt.

1. Rodatz to Hahl 13 July RKA 2993:80.
2. Testimony of Capt. Stalio, enclosed in Rose to Bismarck 29 May 1890 RKA 2979:40-6.
3. It is difficult to form an accurate picture of naval cruising patterns but each of the colonies hardly saw a larger warship more than two or three times a year.
4. RKA to Admiralstab 4 Jan 1909 and Solf to RKA 15 Nov 1909 RKA 3065: 20 and 24; Schultz to RKA 14 Dec 1910 RKA 3066:2-3.
5. RKA to Admiralstab 31 July 1913 and RKA to Schultz 9 May 1914 RKA 2660: 44

The declaration of war in 1914 in fact revealed where the scope of German naval activities lay. Germany had two small, slow cruisers in the Pacific while Britain and her dominions could deploy at least three large armoured cruisers, six cruisers of smaller classes and two gunboats.¹ But the relative impotence of the German Pacific navy was actually a reflection of metropolitan policy. The Pacific simply did not fit into Admiral Tirpitz's strategy for a battlefleet in the northern Atlantic to neutralize the British. The navy's main role in the Pacific was as an internal support, for protection against Pacific Islanders themselves, rather than as a safeguard against external attack. Berlin had already decided that the Pacific colonies would be abandoned in the event of war.²

In 1914 the three colonies stood at very different stages of development. Colonial rule had been consolidated in Samoa with the solution of the paramountcy question. The colony itself was virtually self-supporting as Samoa enjoyed a favourable balance of trade and new cash-crops were finding outlets on world markets. The Samoans themselves experienced little dislocation under the change of chief executives in 1911 for Schultz followed faithfully the guidelines laid down by Solf for the proper treatment of the islanders. Indigenous prosperity was increasing at a regular rate: the Samoans were producing more than three-fifths of the copra exported in 1914 while occasional day-labour was earning them the extremely high wage of three Marks a day plus food.³ From this they were able to pay increasing amounts of head tax and support their local mission institutions without complaint. Samoa was a prosperous and peaceful corner of the German Empire, at least economically.

Colonial rule in Ponape had been stabilized by 1914, but not

1. 'Memorandum on Imperial Defence, Nov 1909', Copy in BA/MA, 5519, Vol 2.
2. Kennedy, 'The Partition of the Samoan Islands', pp 346-356.
3. Annual Reports 1912/13: 199ff.

consolidated as in Samoa. The land reforms were finally implemented but it was too early in 1914 to say whether they had really removed the sources of social conflict to any degree; in terms of economic development Ponape was not much further advanced than it had been in 1908. The construction of roads was suffering from the same inhibitions of the administration about security while the monopolistic grip of the Jaluit Gesellschaft on trade and agricultural production restricted any increase in Ponapean productivity or entrepreneurial incentive. The Germans were committed, by their fear of the repercussions of withdrawal, to an island base which possessed very little economic potential.

In New Guinea the government could not even claim to have stabilized its hold over the inhabitants. It is difficult to assess the situation here other than in regional terms for we are dealing with different sub-cultural groups and varying degrees of contact. In these terms the Archipelago seems to fare better than the mainland: the Gazelle Peninsula (excluding the region beyond the Varzin and the outer Bainings) and northern New Ireland were, to all intents and purposes, areas where physical security was no longer the first consideration of settlers and administration. They were being organized in large district confederations which were concentrating on the demands of economic development - public works, education, agricultural experimentation and improvement, and indigenous technological innovations like copra-driers, wagons and horses. Elsewhere in the Archipelago, a rather crude frontier confrontation still prevailed in 1914, where the occasional murder of careless Europeans was accepted: the worst was over in the older areas of endemic conflict like the Admiralties and northern Bougainville, but security of life and of the property of settlers could not yet be guaranteed; this also became dramatically clear in southern New Ireland in 1913. Meanwhile there were vast areas in New Britain and southern Bougainville which were completely

uncontacted at the outbreak of war.

On the mainland, a virtual stalemate seemed to apply. The Germans claimed a nominal control over the entire coastline but in few places did this amount to more than formal contact and a thin veneer of direct rule. The Huon Peninsula was an exception, and around Madang the exile of 1912 had finally broken the passive resistance of the people, disposing them to cooperation, though the war intervened before the Germans benefited from this. The Sepik district, with nearly one-quarter of the total population of German New Guinea, was quite uncontrolled except for the immediate vicinity of the Aitape station. As for the north-east coast, it was still an unknown quantity in 1914, and hostile tribes had only been pushed back into the mountains while the Germans occupied the coast. Moreover the administration was faced with a new pattern of inter-regional relationships which had developed since European penetration, namely, the harassment of the coastal peoples by the inland and mountain tribes and this had been far from solved by 1914. In Kaiser Wilhelmsland the Germans had all the problems of control and development still to come. They had reached a stage of partial control best defined by a later Australian military observer as:

'when the luluais will respond to a summons to appear at a government station but where it is not altogether advisable for traders and others to wander about without protection, where tax payments are made only here and there, and at irregular intervals, and where the people are prone to disregard orders received from the D.O. (District Officer) through their luluais'.¹

In the final analysis, the state of relations between New Guineans and whites remained balanced on a thin line between uneasy peace and open war. Where every village was a law unto itself and few if any larger regional ties existed, the Germans could not be sure of any areas except the very oldest coastal settlements occupied by the planters and missionaries (the Gazelle Peninsula, northern New Ireland and the southern

1. L.P. Mair, Australia in New Guinea (London 1938) p 32.

mainland). Security depended on the acquiescence of New Guineans in the presence and activities of the Europeans. Even in a place like the east coast of the Gazelle Peninsula, peace was less the function of superior German technology than the voluntary realization by the inhabitants that they stood to gain most, with minimal discomfort, from economic cooperation with the colonial economy.

Chapter 5

THE NATURE OF PACIFIC ISLAND RESISTANCE

CONCLUSIONS

a) Indigenous Response: Conservatism and Innovation.

To contemporary Europeans, violence and conquest were inevitable features of colonialism. In the Pacific, even a man like Governor Hahl could dismiss repeated collisions with New Guineans as the unavoidable product of the conflict between 'civilization' and 'the wilderness'.¹ The German regimes in the Pacific were confronted with island societies which in the pre-German period had demonstrated emphatically their capacity to resist European intervention beyond definable limits, and the islanders were consequently viewed with apprehension as potential threats to the German Pacific Empire. In a situation where the authorities were unwilling to accept any essential compromise of their imperial power or to concede the islanders' own terms with regard to foreign sovereignty, any form of opposition was interpreted as wholesale disobedience and total rejection of German rule. It is the object of the following chapter to show that Pacific Island response to German rule in reality ranged through varying degrees of accommodation and opposition which were dictated by a number of significant considerations, and which only in a few isolated cases amounted to rebellion against German hegemony.

The three island societies with which we have been dealing were basically receptive to the presence of Europeans, and even to foreign direction. Philip Mason has suggested that people of pre-industrial societies tend to depend on a few who exhibit overt power: they are attracted to superior force and the aura of authority for the ancillary material benefits they believe will accrue from them.² In these terms unequal societies like Ponape and Samoa should have found it relatively easy to exchange foreign masters. It is certain that the societies

1. Hahl to RKA 21 Oct 1912 RKA 2995:118-119.

2. P. Mason, Prospero's Magic. Some thoughts on Class and Race (London 1962) pp 107ff.

preferred some sort of accommodation and made an attempt to find the basis for a coexistence of mutual profit. Beach communities flourished in all three Pacific sectors long before the Germans arrived.¹ Later colonists also found acceptance and, depending on their willingness to acknowledge the validity of local norms of belief and behaviour, an acceptable level of adaptation was usually worked out, as with the London Missionary Society in Samoa before 1900. In New Guinea the owners of Ralum were assimilated into the Tolai pattern of relationships because they acted out the local expectations of a 'big man', giving occasional feasts and dances and providing trade goods for coconuts; the mutually profitable market system which resulted was a significant factor in Ralum's ability to expand so quickly, at least before 1890. Similarly the northern New Irelanders showed after 1900 that they would accept the demands of colonial rule once the government (embodied in Boluminski) was prepared to strike a bargain with them and not make the one-way demands which traders in the 1890's had been accustomed to. Even the Madang people may have conceded German dominion after 1904 if Stückhardt had been allowed to proceed with his policy of moderate response to their attempted coup and had made an effort to redress local grievances. In Ponape too, the island leaders had searched for a compromise. Initial Spanish demands were met readily enough and the Kiti Chief was even prepared to accept catholic monks in the district, but he balked when the Spanish tried military coercion.² As for the revolt of 1910, though there was resentment at the German land and social reforms, it is unlikely that it would have reached flashpoint but for Boeder's excesses. Moreover, the fact that there existed in Sokehs itself a party in opposition to Soumadau's attempts to incite revolution throughout 1910, which only crumbled in the face of the September affront,³ indicates that someone was

1. See pages 29, 87-8, 147-9.

2. See page 91.

3. See page 129.

almost always ready to compromise with the German regime.

Accommodation did not always preclude attempts to bargain with the colonial regime, nor the deliberate political tactic of calculated opposition, without implying the rejection of German sovereignty. Acceptance of European civilization was not wholesale for the Pacific Islanders were not automatically converted by western values. Their attitude was essentially an ambivalent one: the desire for material goods, new technology and institutional improvements was balanced by a distaste for European laws, morality and living patterns. In many cases the actions which Germans interpreted as laziness, deceit or wilful obstruction, were efforts by local elites to control change, to create a balance between new demands on the socio-political order and established patterns of political life, status and social solidarity. For example, the movement for a Samoan copra cooperative cannot be explained as 'very little other than a manipulation of the Samoan national trait to periodically rise in political upheavals every five or ten years', as one interpreter put it,¹ nor as a simple economic response to shifts in the world market. It was precipitated by the corporation of chiefs and orators in Mulinu'u who continued to assert that they were the kingmakers with a mandate to carry out the affairs of the Samoan administration under the direction of Mata'afa. Their express purpose was to restore the traditional system of political dynamics. Lauaki's mau e pule was in this sense an extension of the Oloa: it was essentially a conservative rearguard action by a minority (Lauaki and other political elites) who longed for the old days when they were the strongest power in the land manipulating Samoa's political fortunes at will. In similar fashion, the unrest which Nanpei engineered on Ponape in 1908 was designed to make Fritz slow the pace of social reform so as to strengthen his own position and prestige at the expense of Sou en Kiti within the traditional structure of power in Kiti.

1. NZNA, Braisby, 'A Documentary Record': Compiler's note, p 37.

But to see these events as conservative movements with the purpose of perpetuating traditional bases of power and independence is to see only one side of the coin. They are also examples of creative realignment of institutions and behaviour patterns, of an endeavour to synthesize old values with new ones. Through the Oloa, the Samoan elites were trying to adapt the native copra industry to the vagaries of the world market. Copra production had been a critical feature of the indigenous economic life for more than a decade. Throughout the entire German period the vast bulk of copra exported from Samoa continued to come from Samoa plantings which represented more than fifty per cent of the planted area of the group;¹ copra sales enabled the Samoans to pay head taxes and mission contributions consistently without resorting to wage labour for Europeans. The importance of the industry explains why falling copra prices in 1903/04 should so concern Samoans at large and attract them to the idea of their own cooperative. In seeking to compete with modern European commerce in terms of western market mechanisms the Cunpani would allow Samoans to shape their own economic life.

Nanpei's 1908 campaign is not without its forward-looking elements. The political party based on a more far-reaching distribution of power through district chiefs which he formed to act as an advisory council to the administration was a unique political innovation intended to secure a greater share of political power under the new regime. Furthermore opposition in 1908 led to the strengthening of the principle of district consensus as a precondition for the implementation of the land reforms, so that the overall effect was to modify more favourably the position of the Ponapeans in relation to the colonizing society. It was this tendency towards a more equitable political relationship which Boeder in his sense

1. K.B. Cumberland in Fox, Western Samoa, p 243.

of racial superiority, condemned as 'leniency'.¹ In New Guinea, the coastal Tolai refused to participate fully in a planters' wage economy but they did develop enthusiastically an incipient system of cash-cropping which enabled them progressively to rationalize copra production along western lines.² There is even a case for arguing that what Europeans took for a rebellion at Madang in 1912 was actually an embryonic Cargo cult, designed to remove the white men who had been responsible for their loss of land and freedom but to retain the European order of existence and access to its wealth: it is significant that the apparent 'conspiracy' involved redistributing among local elites the exclusively European roles of police master and magistrate, while individuals were chosen to live in the white mens' houses and 'marry' the white women.³

What these various examples indicate is that different groups of Pacific Islanders, at differing times and according to their resources, made conscious acts of selection and rejection of European political, economic and social culture. Local creativity becomes as important a category of explanation as European dynamism. Proto-cooperatives, political parties, cash-cropping, payment of head taxes, even Cargo cults, signify new, non-traditional responses to colonial rule. Yet there are as many convincing examples of the hold of tradition on societies undergoing social change: the Tolai refused to jettison their respect for shell money (tambu) as a status indicator amongst themselves despite their immersion in a cash economy;⁴ the Ponapeans continued to make regular votive offerings to their High Chiefs even after the German reforms had released them from the obligation and the sacrifices it entailed;⁵ all three societies refused to accept the European

1. See Page 122-3.

2. After 1914 the Tolai led the way in the installation of their own copra driers, as well as the development of commercial transport services. See Salisbury, Vunemami, Parts 2 and 3.

3. Copy of Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Condor 28 Sept 1912, in RKA 2995:105-6. The action of 'making a paper', which was incorporated in one version of the Cargo Belief after 1904 is an example of the sort of ritual connected with later, more sophisticated Cargo cults. See page 332.

4. See page 201,

work ethic: only a minority of Melanesian labourers adopted wage-labour as a permanent way of life and the Samoans looked on regular plantation work as fit only for serfs.

If these assertions of the right to contribute to a changing society took the form of militant discontent, intimidation and force, it was because no other course existed in a situation where the Germans refused to recognize a political relationship of equality. There were no institutionalized organizations for protest and opposition. The local government structures set up in each colony were designed to transmit executive orders to the people, and only incidentally operated in the opposite direction. Expedients like the Vaimea incident, the mau e pule, and Nanpei's 1908 campaign were all designed to frighten the regime into conceding compromise. Nanpei's was the most obviously successful for Fritz was forced to defer the building of roads and accept in principle Nanpei's plan for an advisory council. If the Samoan gambits were not as effective they did at least convince the German government that the Samoans were a potential threat to their rule and should be treated respectfully. Resistance in this sense was simply an extension of the political process, a calculated tactic with limited objectives.

None of this is to deny that there were instances of rebellion against colonial subjection, of outright refusal to submit to the Germans. Herbertshöhe, Madang, the Varzin Mountains and the Baining ranges were all the scenes of large-scale violence directed against whites in New Guinea, while it must be remembered that the situation in Ponape did deteriorate to the point of insurrection. By and large these acts were the product of overwhelming frustration at German pretensions to rule and exploit resources without reference to the people affected, or without offering any compensating benefits. Many local groups in New Guinea were prepared to accept German sovereignty on their own terms; it was the European assumptions of colonialism, that the colonies and their inhabitants existed

for untrammelled profit-making which they refused to admit. Europeans made revolutionary demands on New Guineans: they deprived them of their land, pursued their labour, proscribed certain economic, religious and sexual customs, and yet in return the New Guineans were treated as an Untouchable Caste, their freedom of action restricted and only the most trivial compensation offered them from the vast material wealth in the white man's possession.

At first glance deprivation would then seem to explain the history of race relations in New Guinea and the wider Pacific. However the evidence, on closer analysis, suggests otherwise. Deprivation is a relative term which depends very much on the horizon of expectations of the people concerned and there is no simple correlation between the number of demands made by the German administrations in the Pacific and the instances of rebellion. The nature of indigenous response would seem to depend on a 'cost-benefit analysis' by the leadership of each group as well as the compensatory resources possessed. For instance, Ponape was not subject to many of the pressures which caused friction in the other colonies - labour recruitment, the acquisition of large areas of native land, a sizeable and vocal white settler community - yet the most violent reaction against the Germans occurred here. The same reforms and demands were accepted relatively quickly by the southern districts as were opposed by the north. They were obviously to the advantage of a landowner and enterprising politician like Nanpei, the virtual spokesman for the southern districts, while the Sokehs chiefs feared that the reforms would subjugate them to their traditional enemies.

Samoans at the village level suffered minimum deprivation through the imposition of a colonial economy after 1900, despite the existence of an aggressive German settler community and steadily increasing head taxes. Land alienation was prevented, the Samoans were not under any

severe compulsion to provide wage labour or expand their economic effort, and capital inflow remained small.¹ Moreover the demands of the head tax were accepted with equanimity because the prosperous indigenous copra industry made them easy to meet. Much was due to Solf's deliberate policy of protecting institutions at the local level in order to divert attention from 'national' politics.

For their part, New Guineans experienced a differential rate of colonial development and exploitation which was determined by their proximity to major European settlements and the consequent ability of the regime to mobilize them in support of its demands. But even in different areas of dense white settlement, where administrative demands were similar, the response of the local populations could differ significantly. Both the coastal Tolai and the Madang people were subject to significant land alienation and the obligations of direct rule. The Tolai experienced little trouble reconciling themselves to this state of affairs: not only were they able to acquire defined land reserves but they also possessed an abundance of coconuts and good transport and marketing opportunities so that they enjoyed an increasing cash income along with a rising standard of living. For the Madang people there were few, if any compensations: they had lost most of their land in the expansion of company plantations while as Europeans themselves admitted, they had few resources to sell so that no permanent trading economy could develop.² Even wage labour gave them negligible purchasing power. With no infrastructural compensations like security of land tenure, the existence of cash crops and transport and marketing facilities there were no prospects for advancement through adaptation to the European order, and so the optimum conditions existed for recourse to

1. Stanner, South Seas in Transition, p 316.

2. See page 181.

physical resistance and later, a cult response.¹

Likewise opposition to road building, a major feature of Hahl's development effort, only occurred in general where the inhabitants saw no immediate advantage accruing (for example, in Bougainville) or where it was part of a wider and deeper protest against white presence flowing from dislocation and wholesale loss of land resources (for example, around Madang). The Tolai and northern New Irelanders recognized that roads gave them better access to markets and made the institution of new markets possible in the hinterland by contributing to the pacification of local groups. Attitudes changed in the Gazelle after 1900 when the Tolai were being used to extend the road network simply for the military purposes of the regime and their growing distaste for roadwork disposed the Tolai toward the introduction of a head tax in 1907.²

Land is customarily treated as a source of local grievance in colonies, but except in cases of wholesale deprivation in New Guinea in the Company period and the abuse of land devoted to sacred purposes (for example, Ralum 1890, Varzin 1902), it does not seem to have been a major issue in the Pacific colonies at least during the German period. Land certainly receives remarkably little attention in the records, which would indicate that the major conflicts over land, except for New Guinea, had been largely resolved by the German period. The Three Power land commission set up in Samoa in 1893 confirmed only 130,000 acres³ of the land which Europeans claimed to have 'legally' purchased in the 1880's and Solf's 1907 ordinance reinforced the commission's restrictions on the foreign ownership and leasing of Samoan land. Yet despite the apparent need for protective legislation, Samoans rarely seemed to have been the losers in the struggle by Europeans for

1. Ruth Finney has shown how even today the Madang people suffer from the same relative lack of opportunities for development, and that it has perpetuated their bitterness towards European expatriates. R. Finney, 'Would-be Entrepreneurs? A Study of Motivation in New Guinea' New Guinea Research Bulletin, Nr. 41, May 1971.
2. See page 200.
3. Deutsche Kolonialzeitung 11 Jan 1886 Nr.2 p 12. This represented only three percent of British claims, seven percent of American and sixty percent of

Samoan land. In the 1880's there were more cases of Samoans defrauding Europeans in land deals than the reverse and Samoans were able to finance successful wars from their profits. An indication of Samoan accomplishments in land transactions is the fact that most European claims rejected in 1893 were done so on the grounds that the sale was not made by the rightful owner.¹ During the German period profits continued to be made by the Samoans through clandestine land sales or leases.

In Ponape there was no significant land alienation by foreigners because the island was ill suited to a major plantation industry. Planting was only possible on the narrow coastal strip and the lack of a coral-based soil inhibited the growth of coconuts. Moreover, markets were a long way off and freights expensive so that Ponape remained an unimportant trading colony for the entire period with a European population which never exceeded fifty and a negligible number of expatriate settlers. The largest single plantation entities, each 1000 hectares, were held by a Portugese settler and the Jaluit Gesellschaft but it was a Ponapean, Henry Nanpei, who owned the biggest percentage of bearing coconuts.²

It was in New Guinea that land was to prove the politically most contentious issue, though in the German period not to the extent it has been since 1914, and especially since 1945. A recent student of traditional New Guinea land customs suggests that we must revise our preconceptions about the attachment of the people to their land and the extent to which they considered it fraudulently alienated.³ His work has revealed that early land purchases did not become an urgent political issue to New Guineans until the Land Restoration proceedings under the Australians, and even then the question of their return was a matter of political compromise rather than

1. Pitt, Tradition and Economic Progress, p110.

2. Bascom, Ponape, pp7, 34.

3. P. Sack, 'Early Land Acquisitions in New Guinea: The Native Version', Journal of the Papua and New Guinea Society, Vol 3, Nr. 2, 1969.

legal justice. Pre-contact systems of land tenure in New Guinea were singularly flexible, and in a situation of land plenty, powerful 'big men' could sell land belonging to a descent group without incurring the violent hostility of their fellows.¹ In any case it appears that most New Guineans had a better knowledge of what they were doing in selling land to Europeans than has been traditionally presupposed. They were often most resentful at the non-fulfillment of contracts, as for example, when a missionary purchased land 'to build a church and school' and then went away leaving the land undeveloped.² The scatter of European settlement, and the resultant low pressure on land resources kept conflict over land at a relatively low level of intensity.

Of course there are two areas in German New Guinea - Madang and the eastern Gazelle Peninsula - where these arguments do not hold to the same extent, where wholesale alienation has created the deep anxiety and resentment which are the basis of precarious race relations in these areas today. Madang was probably the worst affected in German times. The New Guinea Company must bear much of the blame for the racial collisions in 1904 and 1912 by its off-handed occupation of large areas of land along the entire Madang coast but these incidents were also in one sense the product of Hahl's unwillingness to challenge the conditions under which the Company expanded its plantations. The alienation and cultivation of New Guinea land was an economic expedient, which would seem to be reflected in the absence from the official records of really comprehensive documentation on land problems. The Tolai experienced a similar process in the eastern Gazelle. The war of 1893 was a direct consequence of the pressure on Tolai villagers to move inland as the plantations expanded after 1890. Yet the Tolai were able to voice articulate opposition to the wholesale alienation of their land

1. See page 151 . See also Crocombe, Land Tenure in the Pacific, p 296.

2. Sack, 'Early Land Acquisitions in New Guinea', p 14.

resources and move Hahl to negotiate the provision of reserves within the boundaries of European plantations.

It was the Imperial ordinances of 1902 and 1903 which gave Hahl the effective authority to safeguard the settlement rights of New Guineans on land acquired from them.¹ The specific provisions for the establishment and retention of reserves which Hahl promulgated in 1904 probably owed a great deal to insistent Tolai pressure, as well as to the impact of the Varzin and Madang uprisings, and by 1914 the government had proclaimed 70 'native reserves' totalling 32000 acres. By that time 700,000 acres, or a little over one percent of the total land area, had been alienated by Europeans in German New Guinea.²

These figures mean very little however, either in the context of the German period or of that following. The question whether a land problem existed depends on the actual amount of arable land in the areas involved and the differential pressure of foreign occupation on various territorial groups. One author claims that only one fifth of all the land in both Papua and New Guinea is capable of cultivation because of the terrain,³ and in the oldest areas of European settlement all the choice land had been taken up by the end of German rule. By 1912 the Tolai had lost nearly forty percent of their arable lands and the population was compressed to a density of sixty four to the quadrat kilometer (sq.km.).⁴ On the Madang coast by 1914 some 33000 hectares (80520 acres) had been officially alienated between Sarang and Saidor (south of Bongu), though little more than 3900 hectares (9516 acres) were actually occupied by them.⁵ In other areas where the concentration of European settlement was not as heavy, land alienation was

1. See pages 202-3.

2. Crocombe, Land Tenure in the Pacific, pp 311, 313.

3. Rowley, The New Guinean Villager, p 116.

4. Annual Reports, 1910/11, p 157.

5. Lawrence, Road Along Cargo, p 40. There is no clear figure of the population of Madang and its coastal environs during the German period but isolated statistics suggest that the population may have been about 8000.

the cause of disputes, as has been shown,¹ but not always of violent resistance. It was, after 1914, with the development of cash cropping and communication, with the improvement in health standards and population increase that land taken out of permanent village use by white settlers assumed a critical importance to the New Guineans, and overlaid with racial prejudices, became the most important problem between the races.²

Land alienation is one of the forces for social change which altered the social and economic structure of Pacific Island societies. Not all structural changes accompanying European penetration, however, necessarily gave rise to violence. For example, the Ponape land reforms removed land possession from direct dependence on the political structure and in effect subverted traditional authority. Because of this they were initially unpopular, not only with the district chiefs who seemingly had most to lose, but also with the ordinary people who for centuries had taken comfort in a state of dependence and service within the social and political hierarchy. Yet the reforms were not of themselves the cause of the Sokehs revolt, nor did they move the other districts to a similar act. The leaders of Sokehs, by their acceptance of the principle of district approval of the reforms,³ had acknowledged that they might be instituted at a later date by negotiation with the administration, while they even attempted to make the best of the situation when Boeder forced the reforms on them in 1910. This was clearly evident in Soumadau's readiness to accept the position of overseer on the government labour projects and the demands for local supervision and improved wages.⁴

It was not so much the work period itself as Boeder's injustice in foisting a second period on them which aroused discontent in Sokehs. Violence was precipitated not by the reforms but by the timing and manner

1. See pages 229f.

2. Compare Rowley, The New Guinea Villager, p 123.

3. See page 122.

4. See pages 123-6.

in which they were enforced, and by the claims of clan loyalty at a moment of crisis.

In Samoa, structural changes did provoke resistance as the traditional holders of political power, embodied in Lauaki and the old Malo, saw authority shifting to a new set of elites working for the German government. Likewise in New Guinea hostility and violence resulted when Europeans tried to move inland from coastal settlements and threatened traditional economic relationships between local groups. In a situation where local economic structures were static, possessing no inbuilt alternatives to the basic subsistence practices, there was adamant resistance from local groups to the destruction of trading monopolies which they customarily held over inland peoples. New Guineans also reacted with hostility to the depopulation of their villages through recruiting, the enforced relocation of settlements such as at Madang or Herbertshöhe and the subversion of their cults and social sanctions by the missionaries. Yet other structural innovations, such as luluais and the head tax, did not lead to widespread resistance, and missionary struggles to change the pattern of indigenous life did not provoke violent clashes in all areas.¹ This reinforces the argument that the term 'deprivation' must be used with some caution in trying to explain the causes of Pacific Island resistance.

Much of the resentment of Germans which did issue in violence was a reaction against overt racial arrogance and actions stemming from it. The record of continual desertions from plantations, hostility to recruiters and the prominence of ex-labourers in attacks on white people all testify to the enmity which the abuse of indigenous labour aroused in New Guineans; the New Guinea Company's disciplinary ordinance in 1887/88 reflects its conceptions of the New Guinean as a brutish, almost subhuman primitive; antagonism was also evoked by the sense of moral superiority which some

1. The paradoxical influence of missionaries in the history of Pacific Island resistance is treated at greater length in the Appendix.

missionaries asserted and the Bainings massacre, as well as the conspiracies against the missions at Madang and on the north coast of the mainland demonstrate that New Guineans would not accept these pretensions lightly. Disproportionate responses by Europeans to clashes with local inhabitants had the same effect: indiscriminate repression as in the case of the Aly Islanders in 1897 only further damaged race relations and its effects took years to overcome; at Madang local bitterness was accentuated after 1904 by the severe punishment the group had suffered for its attempted coup and the obvious indifference of the whites to its grievances.

Ponape is of course the best example of the emotions which German excesses could arouse. By forcing the leaders of the Sokehs not only to accept the reforms but to work a second tax-period in 1910 to make up for their refusal in 1909, Boeder was ignoring Fritz's promises that the reforms would only be implemented with district approval and that the 1909 tax-work period would be waived.¹ Furthermore Boeder's action in throwing the High Chief of Sokehs bodily out of his office, as well as his disregard of Ponapean sensibilities in having the Sokehs labourer thrashed, point to a definite contempt for the colonial population. Stories of his alleged brutality were still circulating in the Ponape districts after the second world war.²

It is significant that almost nine months elapsed between the time the German programme was forced on Sokehs and the uprising of October. Resort to violence was in many cases in the Pacific due to the failure of the German authorities to respond to local protests against abuses by whites or against intolerable deprivation. Repeated protests had been delivered by the Sokehs chiefs and efforts made by them to mitigate the effects of German policy before the situation became untenable.³ In a

1. See pages 122f.

2. Bascom, Ponape, p 13.

3. See for example, pages 123-8.

similar fashion the attack on the Wolff plantation which precipitated the Varzin war of 1902 occurred only after To Kilan had exhausted the avenues of non-violent protest without gaining any review of the problem from the administration.¹ The same can be said for the Madang people before 1904. The protests which they made through the Rhenish Mission against the land transactions upon which the New Guinea Company based its occupation were ineffective because Hahl refused to sanction litigation against the Company even though the district administrator favoured it.²

Beyond these largely external features of Pacific Island response to German rule, there is another level on which the opposition of the islanders, whether physical or political, can be explained: what the Germans tended to interpret as rebellion against their hegemony, unprovoked aggression, was often the operation of internal social and political forces largely independent of the Germans themselves.

Firstly, militant action against whites was occasionally the expression of traditional community sanctions. Europeans living in or near indigenous communities and entering into the local system of relationships were treated severely if they violated taboos and canons of social behaviour. Several of the murders of lone traders in the New Guinea islands before 1900 can be traced to such a cause. One later example was an uprising on the French Islands in 1903 against the Danish planter Peter Hansen, whose 'great need of women' and use of young girls as concubines enraged the inhabitants.³ The next year the German trader Reimers had a spear thrust down his throat by the Durour Islanders for disinterring precious artefacts from old and sacred graves.⁴ The disregard of Tolai cult areas which caused

1. See page 204-5.

2. See page 224.

3. Hahl to AAKA 23 Dec 1903 RKA 2990:46-7.

4. Berliner Nachrichten, 16 Sept 1904.

the attack on Ralum in 1890 has already been recounted as has the murder of coloured labourers south of Madang in the 1890's for raiding local village plantations. Among New Guineans death was usually an automatic sanction against stealing from subsistence gardens.

The universal practice of 'blood revenge' on behalf of a wronged descent group or residential complex was responsible for a share of European deaths, especially in New Guinea. In cases where an integrated body of people considered a serious wrong had been done to it and no close social relationship existed with the perpetrator's social group, then any member of the latter was liable to be attacked in retaliation; hence the apparently indiscriminate murder of a white man if the local people had suffered from the visit of an earlier European or if his visit coincided with the death of a tribal member. A close parallel is the rebellion on Fonape which was, in large measure, an act of solidarity of the Kawath clan against the abuse of one of its members. Descent group fellowship was the integrative mechanism which rallied them most effectively behind Soumadau, if only temporarily.

Finally, the fear of the outsider informed the actions of many New Guinea hamlet or village groups in contact with Europeans. Most initial attacks on advancing Europeans took place at the hamlet rather than the regional level and they were often intended, however unnecessarily, as acts in defence of the residential group. The murder of Dammkohler in the Markham in 1909 and of Richards, the Bird of Paradise hunter, in 1910 can best be explained in these terms. Richards in particular was the victim of his own mistiming, for the village in which he sought overnight accommodation was in the process of celebrating the feast of the ancestors. The villagers regarded Richards as an intruder and a harmful spirit since he neglected to offer a friendly gift on his arrival. The logical conclusion in terms of their own culture was to cancel out his influence by killing him.¹ The Ria

1. NM Archives, Keysser: 'Die Seele der Papua Christen', Part I, Ch. 2.

people behind Morobe consistently attacked white expeditions sent to contact them because the latter always approached from the direction of the tribe's traditional enemies and were therefore also the enemies of Ria.¹ Europeans constantly affronted villagers by their curiosity about the living habits of the people and the nature of village life. The New Guineans feared that the whites would use this knowledge to gain power over them by sorcery. Traditionally, people not belonging to the local territorial unit, even friends and allies, were the object of distrust and they were expected to conduct themselves with decorum and reserve while in the village.²

The second internal explanation of opposition to the Germans is to see it as an extension of pre-existing local divisions.³ The unrest on Ponape in 1908 was actually an episode in the struggle between the two chiefs of Kiti, Sou en Kiti and Henry Nanpei, which was carried over to their relations with the Germans. These were skilfully manipulated by Nanpei with the dual intention of intimidating the administration, yet enlisting its support against Sou en Kiti.⁴ Local enmities also played an important part in the uprising in 1910, for the chiefs of Sokehs were convinced that the reforms were the inspiration of Nanpei and that he had formed an alliance with the Germans against the northern districts. Fritz's acceptance of Nanpei's advisory council, as well as Boeder's general aggressiveness, seemed to confirm this view.⁵

Likewise in Samoa the mau e pule was in one sense an extension of the old factions in Samoan politics. Alongside the restoration of the Tumua and Pule, Lauaki aimed to have his faction's candidate succeed to Mata'afa as paramount chief, and thus ensure his own position at the apex

1. Amtsblatt Neuguinea, 1 Jan 1912, p 7.

2. Compare Krieger, Neu Guinea, p 193 and H. Vogel, Eine Forschungsreise im Bismarck Archipel (Hamburg 1911) p 26.

3. T.O. Ranger has made this point in his study of the Shona and Ndebele risings in southern Rhodesia: Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-97 (London 1967) pp 346f.

4. See pages 111-117.

5. See pages 115.

of Samoan politics. The belligerent phase of the movement followed Solf's success in splitting the Upolu chiefs from the Lauaki front; it was largely the product of the orator chiefs frustration at Solf's strategy. In particular the so-called 'declaration of war' which Lauaki made in January 1909 was directed less at the Germans than at Lauaki's Samoan enemies, the Tumua chiefs of Upolu.¹ There are examples of the same process in New Guinea. What the German administration regarded as an infringement of colonial peace and order in the Admiralties when Po Minis led his village in a preventive war against his neighbours was in reality an extension of traditional hostilities with no implications of rebellion.² A rebellious element did exist in the hostility of the southern New Irelanders to German rule in 1913 but this too was an extension of local relationships, namely the hatred between the mountain and the coastal people. The latter had been incorporated within the administrative network for some years and had used the German advance into the mountains as an opportunity to deal a blow to their traditional enemies with the support of government troops.³ When renewed pressure from government and recruiters began to impinge on them in 1913 the mountain people feared that it would lead to their ultimate subordination to the coastal tribes and rose up against the prospect.

Notwithstanding these explanations of resistance in terms of local, cultural factors, one cannot ignore the fact that, on the New Guinea frontier, many attacks on whites were the result of simple avarice. In New Ireland before 1900 the temptation to plunder often proved too great for the people where traders were isolated and left in charge of large caches of trade goods. The same was true of the Solomons and the Admiralties, where the off-shore islanders were particularly adept at pirating European vessels. There were always groups, even friendly to the administration, who were prepared to indulge in looting, as did Malagunan in the 1902 attack on Wolff's house in the Varzin.⁴ Many European accounts of colonial pioneering

1. See page 71.

2. See page 220.

3. See page 214.

4. See page 205-6.

express exasperation at the New Guinean's propensity for appropriating anything left lying around. Flierl recounts how the Sattelberg people brazenly warned him that his goods would be legitimate booty for them unless they were closely guarded and he claimed that the covetousness of the Simbang people could easily have caused a murder at Finschhafen in the early days.¹

The desire for European material wealth and the violence it could generate were not necessarily anti-German or anti-European manifestations. Indeed one could argue that with very few exceptions, and all of them in New Guinea, none of the uprisings against German rule or expressions of hostility towards it can be classified as total rejection of Europeans and their civilization. While there may have been present a longing for a simpler past, for the certainties of the old ways, the Pacific Islanders were not committed to reaction for its own sake, nor necessarily were their hostile actions designed to expel the whites once and for all. Lauaki's campaign of 1908/09 was directed against the whites insofar as the old Samoan denominations and classifications were to be revived and the Germans made to realize that the traditional elites were still of consequence and still had a say in settling important questions like the Alii Sili. But no intention of rebellion or violence existed at the outset.

The district officer of Savaii, Williams, was basically correct in characterizing Lauaki's projected demonstration in November as diplomacy by intimidation; to claim however that Lauaki remained throughout essentially loyal was going too far.² The movement generated its own momentum: Schultz's action in prohibiting the demonstration on Solf's arrival frustrated Lauaki's strategy, reducing his options and virtually forcing him into overt opposition to the administration. When he sent a courier to the Americans in Tutuila, Lauaki cut himself off from the Germans, but it was not until

1. NM Archives, Flierl letters: Flierl to Deinzer 8 April 1893.

2. BA, Solf Papers, 30: Williams to Solf 3 April 1909.

he learned that Solf had turned the Tumua chiefs against him that the affair became an explosive situation of rebellion: suddenly the planned anti-German front was transformed into rival camps engaged in a traditional feud. Even at this stage there is little evidence to suggest Lauaki sought an open break with the regime or that he intended using violence against the whites. It has been already mentioned that the 'declaration of war' was aimed at the Tumua rather than at the Germans;¹ in addition the decision to go to civil war remained contingent on Solf's response at Vauisu. The compromise achieved there indicates that Lauaki was reluctant to cross the thin line between intimidation and violence. In the end it was his fear of the repercussions of violence for Samoa which induced him to surrender.²

Major instances of unrest in New Guinea also lack a sense of uncompromising animosity to the white man's presence. For instance the war of the 'bullet-proof' ointment was not designed to remove the European presence from the Gazelle but to ease the pressure on native land, subdue the white man and restore the earlier, more favourable relationship of coexistence and economic equity. The Bainings massacre of August 1904 was an act carried out by a small group of Baining people and directed specifically against the Mission of the Sacred Heart, not against all white men. It is significant that a private white settler living in the area, who was married to a New Guinean woman, was left alone in the ensuing unrest. The New Guinea Company plantation at Massawahafen was attacked, but that was because the station manager, Meisterfeldt, was a known supporter of the catholic mission and therefore associated with the oppression which To Marias and his band felt.³ The attempted insurrection of the Madang people the same year was in all truth a markedly tentative affair. After the rather hesitant beginning, with its contingency plans in case of failure, the would-be rebels fled in

1. See page 304.

2. See Page 76.

3. Compare Hahl to AAKA 27 Aug 1904 and Buri to von Bulow 23 Sept 1904 RKA 2991:7 and 36-8; Daily Telegraph 16 Sept 1904.

a panic once they were found out, without offering even token resistance. Thereafter they resorted to appeals to the Lutheran Mission to evade retribution. The second attempt in 1912 is still an enigma. There is no first-hand evidence of a definite plan to attack the whites. It is possible that the activities and ceremonies which so unnerved the European population were actually the manifestations of cult practices in line with the already-developed Cargo myth. The reapportionment of European roles among the New Guineans has already been mentioned in this context.¹

One of the few racially motivated campaigns in New Guinea was the Varzin war of 1902. Despite the fact that To Kilan had initially sought redress from the administration, in the end he rejected coexistence with Rudolf Wolff because he did not want to be buried on land which a white man was working.² His ally and fellow 'big man', To Vagira, was notorious for his antagonism towards the whites and he had consistently refused to make any concessions to the European presence;³ it is notable that Wolff's home and furniture were almost totally demolished in the frenzy of the warriors' attack. The Europeans for their part aided and abetted the unusually severe and indiscriminate reprisal because the slaughter of a white woman and her child represented the ultimate desecration of the white race. Even the catholic mission was drawn into the fighting when the war threatened to envelop its stations in the more settled districts. Perhaps the most interesting indicator of the racial nature of the affair was the solidarity displayed by pacified Tolai living in reserves between Herbertshöhe and the Varzin in signalling troop movements to the rebels with war drums.⁴

However when the Sokehs revolt on Ponape is analysed, the

1. See page 290.

2. 'Bericht betreffend die Unruhen am Varzin', Wolff, 5 Aug 1902 RKA 2989:126.

3. See page 167.

4. 'Bericht betreffend die Unruhen am Varzin' RKA 2989:129; HJM Archives, Mss: 'Erinnerungen von H. Müller', p 69 and Tagebuch, J. Weber, I:410.

general point re-emerges that, in general, Pacific Island resistance was limited in extent, and commitment to total insurrection, if it existed, was only lukewarm. The murder of Boeder and his companions was not the product of the reforms themselves but of frustration at the mistakes of German policy and of fear of the southern districts, while it was the demands of clan solidarity which precipitated the violence. Yet if the thrashing on 17 October and the murder the following day brought the two opposition parties in Sokehs together, they were not enough to sustain the district in a protracted war against the Germans. Once the objects of their resentment were removed the people became sensible of the magnitude of their action and a general air of fatalism prevailed even as the rebels indulged in an erratic campaign of harassment against the colony.¹

The extent to which this holds true is evident in the rapidity with which their resistance dissipated once the German forces arrived: the rebels were pushed off Sokehs Island easily enough and lost their most effective stronghold when they retreated at Nankiop. In the end, although the Sokehs warriors were never really vanquished in any encounter, surrender was quick and total. Samuel, the last of the rebel chiefs to give himself up, admitted to Kersting about the revolt: 'we felt wretched and furious and we did not much think, we are somewhat dark (ignorant)'.² They had conceded the struggle to the Germans 'so that our souls would be tranquil'.³ To claim that this represents proto-nationalism in the Pacific would be greatly overstating the case; it was decidedly not the stuff of which fanatical liberation movements were made.

1. Compare pages 129-132.

2. Quoted in Kersting to Hahl 28 Feb 1911 RKA 2584:108.

3. Ibid.

b) The Social Dynamics of Pacific Island Resistance.

The hesitancy and lack of tenacity of local opposition movements is one reason why there are no spectacular successes in the history of Pacific resistance to the Germans. Indeed the only impressive challenges were the Tolai war of 1893, Lauski's mau e pule and the Sokehs insurrection, none of which succeeded in achieving its ends and in the two cases of physical resistance, failing even to meet the Germans' military expectations. Yet, paradoxically, one of the most remarkable facts about the relations between the Germans and their Pacific subjects was the degree to which the fear of resistance affected German policy.¹ This was no doubt due to the record which the Samoans and Ponapeans in particular had established in the pre-German period. The skirmishes in Samoa in the 1880's and 1890's and the Spanish losses in Ponape convinced the metropolitan government at least that the islanders would not accept colonial rule passively and that they could mount effective opposition.

In the case of Ponape, fear of resistance explains why official handling of the Sokehs revolt was directed from Berlin rather than New Guinea. It was the logical consequence of the assumption that had prevailed at the Colonial Office since the beginning, namely, that if once the Ponapeans rose against the Germans, only a massive military operation could hope to restore Germany's authority.² Hence the fact that no effort was made to negotiate a surrender with the rebels, except by Girschner on his own initiative in the immediate aftermath of the events of 18 October; hence too the despatch of four cruisers and 300 German marines to deal with 250 warriors armed with less than 100 rifles. The campaign was more than a punitive expedition; it was a positive act of policy designed to establish once and for all Germany's rule over the group. The New Guineans never held the same fear

1. The point has already been argued in John Iliffe's Tanganyika under German Rule. He claims that German policy in the wake of the Maji Maji rebellion was determined largely by Berlin's fear of the changes taking place among Africans.

2. See pages 96, 98-100.

for the Germans; it was assumed that the inherent fragmentation of local social and political groups would prevent New Guineans from offering any united challenge. German fear of resistance in the beginning meant that the islanders were treated gingerly by the incoming administrations, and while no essential compromise of imperial power was contemplated, apprehension dictated an initial indulgence.

Island groups were thus in a position to make a more advantageous adaptation to colonial domination than if they had not established a reputation for mischief when necessary. In Samoa it meant that the traditional form of political institutions continued to survive at first under Solf while he courted the matai and set up his own clique of chiefly supporters. Moreover Solf studiously avoided subjecting the Samoans totally to the colonial economy. He argued for instance that any attempt to impose forced labour on the Samoans would lead to their boycotting white traders, copra cutting would cease and the people would revert to subsistence agriculture.¹ In a situation where the export/import economy depended on their production and consumption, such a campaign would financially ruin the whites. The Ponapeans for their part were left virtually alone for the early period of German rule and few demands were made on them. This enabled the chiefs in particular to reconcile themselves to a hegemony which they had not accepted easily before 1900.

Pacific Island groups which, through astute leadership and limited resistance, succeeded in checking European colonialist pretensions were able to move into modern politics much more rapidly and easily. Nanpei's activities and the Tolai campaign against further land alienation are cases in point: Nanpei was able to moderate the pace of social reform through his resistance in 1908 but more importantly, in accepting the changes and

1. BA, Solf Papers, 28: Solf to Passarge 29 Oct 1906.

helping others to accept them he was able to fashion an alliance with the administration which assured him and the southern districts in general of German support and assistance during the remainder of German rule. The German land reforms have also been the basis for a more individualistic participation of the population in Ponapean politics today. Tolai resistance and compromise resulted in new alliances of permanence and a heightened degree of political and economic consolidation which paved the way for the negotiation of land resources and the development of cash-cropping.

In contrast, groups whose challenge to the Germans was absolute and abortive lost their place in local society and their chance to adapt and develop new kinds of opposition. Lauaki and his accomplices, the Sokehs district, the Madang people: all were physically removed from the possibility of influencing the nature of the colonial relationship with Germany after their total opposition had failed. In this section the organizational characteristics which determined the nature and effectiveness of these different local responses to German rule will be examined. Three factors of crucial importance — the degree of integration and ideological commitment, the flexibility of strategy and the character of the Pacific Island leadership — determined the nature and effectiveness of these responses, whether they involved insurrection or a mixture of limited resistance and collaboration designed to modify and shape German policy.

1) Integration:

The forms of integration and mobilization for colonial opposition vary from colony to colony, according to the socio-political structure, regional patterns of political activity and the extent of the European impact. For example, the coastal Tolai in 1890 and 1893 were able to capitalize on pre-existing tendencies to cooperation through trading and ritual alliances to a degree which most other groups in German New Guinea lacked. These cohesive tendencies were reinforced by the effects of

European penetration: the growth of European trade and the work of missionaries consolidated previously hostile hamlets into village units, bringing village heads into greater prominence. Trading networks and the pattern of social relationships were thus gradually extended beyond the narrow confines of the residential complex; intermarriage, economic partnerships to monopolize trade with inland areas and ritual alliances all widened the political horizon of local groups. In a crisis situation the people most affected were therefore able to draw on support from larger groupings.

Political consolidation brought by the Europeans was an important factor in integrating the general response to imperial rule in all the colonies. The detente encouraged by Hahl and Berg in Ponape made district disputes capable of peaceful resolution during their respective tenures of office. The common consultations of High Chiefs which they organized played an important role in persuading all the districts except Sokehs to accept the administration's land reforms and they no doubt facilitated the districts' coordination in defence of the colony against Sokehs, irrespective of their traditional political affiliations. In Samoa, Solf's insistence on a bipartisan local administration, along with the gradual moderation of the earlier polarity of district parties which occurred with the growth of peace and prosperity, enabled the Samoans to construct a united front in 1904 to consider a Samoa-wide cooperative and again in 1908, though in both instances the fronts were fragile units.

In the Gazelle Peninsula the process of political consolidation continued after 1893: the Tolai war did not destroy the confederacy based on Wunamami and it was established as a permanent grouping in 1897 when Hahl appointed the first government lualuas. Peace and unification not only gave To Bobo increased access to the higher levels of German authority (invaluable in setting in motion the reserves question) and generally widened the channels of communication between the two communities, but they also meant that economic innovation was more likely to succeed. The rationalized use of

new technology in agriculture and communications, and the growth of general prosperity, were only possible in the context of political unity. In the Huon Peninsula, unification under the aegis of the Neuendettelsau Mission enabled a veritable revolution in living patterns to take place through the mission's sensitive approach to communal Christianity. By 1911 the Kate people in the vicinity of Sattelberg had introduced new legal procedures and sanctions into their social system and they were attempting an equitable redistribution of tasks among the larger, corporate body which had been formed.¹

However internal divisions in all three colonies compromised the possibility of organizing large regional groupings or entire island populations as a political lever against German colonial policy. Samoan politics suffered from an inherent instability - the fragmentation of district groups and continual factional intrigue - which was accentuated by the activities of the Europeans before 1900. The traditionally dominant party, the Malo, was only a loose structure of convenient alliances, seldom recognized for any length of time by the defeated group. The Europeans, by concentrating sovereign power in the person of the potential Tafaifa to the detriment of the lineage question, only added another factor of instability to political life.² It was this fluctuation of political loyalties which caused the Oloa front to break down under pressure and which gave Solf such an effective lever against Lauaki's mau.

In Ponape there was no precedent for an island-wide integration of resistance against an external enemy. While it is probably that the 'loyal' districts were waiting to see whether Sokehs could prevent the Germans from gaining victory in 1910/11, the circumstances of minimal communication between the areas diminished the possibility of general

1. NM Archives, Keysser: 'Die Seele der Papua Christen', Part 2. See also Appendix.

2. See pages 31-2.

mobilization against the Germans, especially as mutual suspicion formed part of the motivation for the uprising.

Other factors also operated to inhibit the integration of Pacific Islanders in opposition to the Germans. Colonial rule had a differential impact on social groups within Pacific island societies and so elicited a variety of responses. German control created a new set of elites in Samoa committed to Self in order to retain their positions, as opposed to the old elites whose power and prerogatives were being deliberately whittled away. As for the general populace, they experienced an improvement in their lives under the Germans; peace was secured, they were protected from labour and land demands and their copra production was regulated so as to provide a steadily rising standard of living. All this made them less susceptible to the political intrigues of their traditional political leaders.

Peace in Ponape after 1899 brought the same sort of order and in particular benefited a trader and planter like Nanpei. Not only could his enterprises develop without disturbance but the German-introduced reforms could help to consolidate his landed fortune and strengthen his theoretically uncertain position within the hierarchy of Kiti chiefs. Nanpei thus had a vested interest in cooperation with the colonial regime, even if he was cautious in the extent he was prepared to go. In contrast, German rule seemed to bring only a reduction of power and influence to the Sokehs chiefs: their much-prized independence seemed to be under assault from both the regime and the southern districts after 1907. Yet again the impact of German rule on the 'commoner' class was significantly different, and the fact that the ordinary people of Sokehs were obtaining an inherent advantage from the new land reforms probably diluted the vigour of their commitment to revolt in 1910.

In New Guinea, colonial rule most seduced the very people who were the strength of any mass movement - the youth. The spread of trade and the

system of indentured labour tended to remove control of a young man's productive powers from the hands of his kinship seniors to his employers' or his own, and they also helped to weaken the structure of traditional sanctions for conduct.¹ Mission education intensified this process, reinforcing the sense of new needs and new wants in the individual. It particularly antagonized the tribal elders who, at least on the mainland, decided important community questions concerning traditional rites and ceremonies, marriage, land and possessions. These men decried the disintegration of the old ways and the abandonment of traditional social sanctions. In areas of intensive contact they even had to accept the emergence of new patterns of authority for as the number of young men with experience of new techniques, European language and external relations increased, so wider powers of decision making accrued to them, decision making which was radically affected by broadened horizons. Unfortunately the 'generation gap' is one aspect of culture contact which is not well documented in the records, however it was official opinion in New Guinea that the unions of elders in Kaiser Wilhelmsland were the worst enemies of the Europeans.² In this context it is significant that the 1912 movement against white domination in Madang was precipitated when an old man at a community burial on Ragetta Island accused the younger men assembled of cowardice for their willingness to tolerate the encroachments of the whites on Madang land.³

In general local responses were shaped by individual calculations of interest and the pursuit of immediate objectives as well as the more particular variations of length of contact and the resources at the disposal of an individual or society. Without this differing response, without a body of collaborators at each crisis point, the Germans would have been unable to

1. R. Firth, Social Change in Tikopia (London, 1958) pp 345-6.

2. Annual Reports 1907/08, p 7.

3. Militärpolitische Bericht SMS Condor 28 Sept 1912, copy in RKA 2995:104.

overcome the challenges to their politics. Lauaki and Soumadau, To Vagira and To Marias represented only one strand of resistance, the conservative elements of their societies which could only conceive of recourse to traditional sanctions. There were at the same time other more flexible strands of tactical resistance and accommodation. Saga and Taumei in Samoa, Henry Nanpei, To Bobo, and Nalon of Bilialia all helped the Germans to counter the conservative reactions, though from vastly differing motives and not necessarily with the conviction that all things European were superior. It is not too exaggerated to argue that, without the collaboration of leaders like Nanpei, To Bobo and Lauaki in the early days of German rule the Germans would have been unable to assert their domination, for these men possessed inherent skills and organizing abilities which enabled them to influence large sectors of their societies. That the German administrators realized this is implicit in the manner in which Hahl, Fritz and Kersting cultivated the friendship of Nanpei in Ponape while Hahl in New Guinea fought the large plantation companies for the definition of Tolai reserves and deferred the introduction of a head tax in the Gazelle Peninsula. Solf's attempt to enlist Lauaki's support against the Cumpani in 1904 and his refusal to deport him in 1905 reveal that Solf had the same awareness of Lauaki's importance to German rule.

Different reactions, widely divergent interests and cross-cutting objectives were then the prevailing features of Pacific Island politics during German rule. In these circumstances only the disaffection of the masses and the existence of a revolutionary ideology which transcended all sectional differences and subsumed every group's interests could have produced the conditions necessary for an effective challenge to the apparatus of imperial rule.

There were however no 'masses' in the three German colonies, no proletarianization of what were well-integrated pre-industrial societies.

The Samoans remained tied to their local descent groups and village organizations of production and distribution and they rejected any efforts to draw them into wage labour on a regular basis. The Ponape reforms emancipated the ordinary Ponapean from the uncertainties of the feudal system of land tenure without altering the traditional mode of production or the close-knit structure of loyalties and obligations within the individual districts.

In New Guinea of course there was much more mobilization of labour for the plantations and more radical social change consequent on European penetration. In May 1913, Hahl estimated that ten percent (or about 20000) of the contacted population was then engaged in the service of the non-New Guinean population in some capacity,¹ a high percentage for a colony in New Guinea's stage of development with a people fragmented by topographical, cultural and social factors. At the same time however, no recognized 'urban' work force, no permanent pool of wage labour existed. Employment with Europeans was in general a temporary experience; the majority of New Guineans returned to their villages after completion of contracts or casual labour and resumed subsistence gardening. Hahl's projected rate of development was thus being thwarted by the self-sufficiency of local groups all over New Guinea: the coastal Tolai of the Gazelle were refusing to engage in wage labour for Europeans on a subservient basis; the northern New Irelanders were becoming increasingly disinclined to recruit away from the local area as trade and credit secured them the goods they desired; the people of Madang were notorious for resisting work on the local plantations.

The explanation for this state of affairs lies partly in the comparative weakness of the colonial economy and its subordination to the imperial economy. The constraining influence of the latter in failing to provide sufficient economic supports for rapid growth and the unwillingness of Grosskapital interests in Germany to invest large sums of money where

1. Hahl to RKA 24 May 1913 RKA 3108:10-15.

the return was not yet guaranteed, saved the German Pacific colonies from large-scale economic penetration and consequently helped preserve the local social structures. These in turn gave the colonial peoples shelter from the economic demands of the regime: a man could always choose between growing crops for market or for subsistence, or he could sell his labour. The local alternative, with its greater independence, was usually more preferable.¹ It depended of course on the availability of land: in an area like Madang, some of those who lost land were able to find shelter and support from neighbouring affines and still avoid wage labour, while in the Gazelle Peninsula and other areas reserves provided some guarantee of a local economic alternative to plantation labour. Instead of a growing proletariat the Germans had to deal with a moving labour frontier which receded further from the old areas of settlement as cash-cropping and other forms of economic opportunity were more widely diffused.²

If there was no mass movement of the dispossessed in the three colonies, neither was there any new vision of society capable of unifying all the old hostile groups. The only development in this sense was the appeal to patriotism (lotonuu) by the Samoan Malo in 1904 in order to mobilize the people in support of the copra cooperative. The lotonuu concept was however introduced as an astute manoeuvre to overcome the inherent factionalism of Samoan politics and the rapid disintegration of solidarity after the Vaimea incident reveals that it had little meaning for the population at large at that early stage.

In the two major movements of opposition to the German regime

1. Compare R.M.A. van Zwanenberg, 'Primitive Colonial Accumulation in Kenya, 1919 to 1939: A Study of the Processes and Determinants of the Development of a Wage Labour Force' (Sussex Univ., D. Phil. thesis, 1971).
2. Compare H.C. Brookfield with D. Hart, Melanesia: a Geographical Interpretation of an Island World (London 1971) p 264. Brookfield's and Hart's surveys reveal that even today throughout Melanesia the migratory labour pattern remains the norm and long term contract labour is declining. The 'true proletariat' is still very small and most urban workers are casually employed. pp 266-8.

(Lauaki's mau and the Sokehs rebellion) the social and ideological means used to mobilize people behind them were deficient in power and therefore insufficient to sustain revolutionary sentiment or create a permanent wider organization. Lauaki tried to capitalize on the traditional elite status of the orator chiefs as kingmakers along with his own status as high priest of the political citadel, and he appealed not only to the old ways and corporate political issues but also to the desire to have a Samoan command over the resources of the group. However he was unable to overcome his own and his followers' subjection to traditional political ambitions and dependence on district allegiances, nor did Samoan political organization and the distribution of authority encourage the emergence of charismatic leaders who might overcome these limitations. Moreover Samoan patterns of behaviour depended largely on imponderabilia like the peoples' ethical expectations and notions of duty and reciprocity: when the first chiefs to surrender in the troubles of 1909 were respectfully treated, the Germans did a great deal to legitimize their authority in the eyes of ordinary Samoans and the moral onus was thereafter on Lauaki, as a chief, to surrender and accept his fate.¹

The ideas to which Lauaki and Soumadau asked their followers to commit themselves in revolution were also not strong enough in the existing colonial situation. In Lauaki's case the importance of the Ali'i Sili question and the power of the Tumua and Pule had been effectively challenged by the quality of Solf's rule. Solf in particular had demonstrated that the activities of the Tumua and Pule were associated with the disruption of peace;² the population in 1908/09 had already experienced three years under the new Samoan administration and it had proved to be more functional and

1. BA, Solf Papers, 131: Solf to Schnee 3 June 1909.

2. For example in 1900, 1903 and 1904. See pages 44-5, 50, 52f.

efficient than the old Malo. By the same token Soumadau's appeal to the Lamalam en Ponape and the glories of the Sokehs' military past were actually reactionary in terms of the German reforms: the mass of the Sokehs were not unsympathetic to the changes in land tenure since they gave them permanent tenure, and the act of killing Boeder and his colleagues virtually exhausted their desire for clan vengeance. Kersting missed the point when he claimed that the early surrenders were due to the debilitation of the Ponapean character through continual contact with European civilization.¹ The hearts of the Sokehs people were just not in the subsequent struggle with the German forces. The long period of waiting for retribution helped to consume the emotional energy of mutual support, and the defeat at the Kawäth clan home of Nankiop delivered the final demoralizing blow. In the final analysis Lauaki and Soumadau succeeded in mobilizing only those people already susceptible to integration through the traditional social bonds of authority and solidarity.

In contrast, in a situation of pre-existing tendencies to cooperation such as occurred on the Gazelle Peninsula, a simple mechanism like the 'bullet proof' ointment of the 1893 war could serve to encourage temporary unification and integrate effectively several groups in opposition to the Europeans. The Ralum attack of 1890 had shown the Tolai that resistance was only feasible when they had something to fuse the different territorial groups together. The extent to which the ointment provided this is obvious from the rapidity with which resistance evaporated once the Europeans had acquired some. Moreover it must be remembered that at that early stage of colonial government all groups had suffered in much the same way - from the steady encroachment on land resources by the plantations. When we look at the situation in Madang, a rather exceptional type of integration emerges. The failure of the 1904 plot had resulted in the

1. Kersting to Gouverneur 10 June 1911 RKA 3010:24.

dispersal of a few groups and the execution of several ring leaders but not in the complete suppression of the population in the Madang area. Instead their resentment, exacerbated by the militancy of the settler population and the unabated exploitation of the local major resource, was channelled into a frame of magical belief which helped to rationalize the dislocation and insecurity in local New Guinean terms. Defeat led the people to see colonial rule as the product of a stronger magic ordained by the deities and the common belief expressed in the Cargo myth after 1904 maintained the area's passive resistance for eight years, its rejection of wage labour, the evasion of corvee labour and the independence from missionaries. The movement of 1912 developed from the myth and it even determined the local response after the second defeat - accommodation, conversion and gradually, in the post German period, secular political organization under a cult leader.¹ Although the Cargo myth was successful in keeping the Madang people in a state of readiness, almost of semi-mobilization for the coming of a millenium, continued defeat discouraged the persistence of positive resistance as a means of attaining it and emphasized the need for a gradual approach through accommodation.

ii) Strategy:

The most constructive adaptation to imperial overrule was made by those individuals and groups who did not respond inflexibly to the demands of the new order, who moved between cooperation and resistance as deliberate political tactics designed to shape German policy.

It was not necessarily a permanent choice: the 'collaborators' and 'resisters' are often the same men. For example, Lauaki demonstrated

1. The failure of the Cargo myth to gel into an active cult before 1912 was due to the lack of a decisive leader who could articulate the message to best advantage. A suitable figure, Yali, did not emerge until after 1945. See Lawrence, Road Belong Cargo, Chapter 5. For an example of the integrating power of a cult leader in Africa, see Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, pp 349-352.

in the period between 1904 and 1908 that he was extremely adaptable as a politician. At the beginning of the Oloa movement he cooperated with Solf in restraining the proselytizing zeal of the Malo chiefs yet he was largely responsible for the resuscitation of the scheme after Solf's departure in December 1904. Yet again when support of the Oloa no longer served his interests or those of his party, Lauaki reversed his position and chose to work against the movement. He gained important, if temporary victories in persuading Solf that he did not deserve deportation along with the other ringleader of the movement in 1905 and in getting appointed to the new Fono in 1907 despite the opposition of serving Faipule.¹ Even in the hopeless situation in which his movement found itself in early 1909 he managed to retain the initiative right up until the arrival of the German navy by never unconditionally rejecting German rule and changing his tactics to suit the relative positions of the contending parties. In the end his decision to accept exile was not a recognition of the hopelessness of his resistance, but the product of careful consideration of the repercussions of civil war for Samoa.²

Nanpei's judicious strategies of intimidation and collaboration were also determined by the changing balance of power between himself and the regime. Though he remained on the side of the Germans throughout 1910 and during the uprising, his continued cooperation depended on the Germans' ability to safeguard his political and economic interests. The same applied essentially to the chiefs of the other 'loyalist' districts. In view of their past record and their original distaste for the reforms, all the districts were potentially rebellious; Kersting had to force them to collaborate actively with the German marines in harassing the Sokehs rebels.³ The emergence in 1911 of a youth movement in Madolenihmw, dedicated to the

1. See pages 58-9.

2. See page 76.

3. See page 135.

memory of the defeated warriors, indicates clearly that dissatisfaction was not confined to Sokehs.

New Guinea provides a good example of conditional response in the Gazelle Peninsula Tolai who were willing to cooperate with the colonial economy before 1890 and between 1890 and 1893, yet in each case chose physical resistance when it seemed the only way to secure their interests. Once again after 1893 they entered into a sophisticated economic relationship with the plantations and copra traders, but not to the extent of submitting to whole-sale wage-labour. Similarly in the Admiralty Islands, Po Minis' choice of adaptation to European knowledge and skills did not denote his complete assent to European values. Instead he contrived to remain independent and was prepared to take measures for the good of his society which condemned him in European eyes.¹ One could also point to the Bilia people of Madang, who remained detached from the revolt of 1904 yet led the 1912 movement when the era of passive resistance produced no improvements. The Cargo myth and the cult flowing from it can be interpreted as a creative attempt to adapt and reform local institutions, to solve new problems posed by the structure of colonial society.² The northern New Irelanders before and after 1900 are, finally, also a good example of the ability of Pacific Island groups to adapt their strategy of response according to the advantage of their situation.³

There are, conversely, cases of unsuccessful adaptation to German rule where groups and leaders failed to appreciate the long-term significance of the colonial system. Lauaki's view of Samoa in 1909 as the cockpit of imperialist rivalries among the Great Powers was by then obsolete, and his two-fold appeal for foreign intervention was a very traditional response to a new situation;⁴ it had little to offer in the circumstances. Neither

1. See page 220.

2. Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound, p 251.

3. Compare pages 170, 212-214.

4. See pages 69,75.

Lauaki nor Soumadau, despite each's initial flexibility and astuteness, was able to appreciate the new configuration of power which German sovereignty represented. In the final analysis both were committed to a traditionalist view of life which clashed fundamentally with the meaning of colonial rule. New Guinea provides more extreme cases of conservatism in which there was a total and uncompromising rejection of coexistence: To Ruruk, To Vagira and To Marias were all killed violently resisting the Germans. Without denying that there was real provocation for their actions, it is evident that they were unable to appreciate the existence of more subtle means to retain at least the self-sufficiency of their societies. These were three men who could accept no compromise of their independence.

iii) Leadership:

The importance of the leadership element in determining a group's response to imperial rule is obvious from the preceding discussion. It is highlighted by the fact that we have been talking about primarily elitist movements, representing interactions between leaders of different groups and societies. Moreover, Pacific Island elites at this stage of colonial development did not possess specialized social roles to any great degree and therefore exerted influence on their societies in several spheres. Men like Nanpei, Lauaki and To Bobo played important roles not only in the political world but in the commercial and/or religious spheres as well. Unfortunately in the case of New Guinea there exists little ethnographic work on leadership in coastal societies which have had a long history of contact with the Germans.¹ Nonetheless this study has enabled certain conclusions to be drawn from a comparison of leadership in New Guinea with that in the two island colonies.

1. The main works are Parkinson's, Dreissig Jahre in der Sudsee; M. Mead's, Kinship in the Admiralty Islands (New York 1934) and Salisbury's, Vunamami. M.D. Sahlins (in Hogbin & Hiatt, Readings in Australian and Pacific Anthropology) has a list of studies on leadership in New Guinea coastal societies but most of the latter had little or no contact with the Germans.

Creative leaders were those who, in the short term, were able to resolve a crisis for themselves and the society brought about by contact, whether the deprivation of land, the curtailment of power, the transformation of the social and economic order, even military defeat. It involved the recognition of the need to compromise and the ability to employ subtler means of opposition than open rebellion. In practical terms this meant transcending the sectional divisions inherent in Pacific Island societies and mobilizing the enlarged body behind a programme initiated by the leader, or perhaps evolving new forms of organization and protest like Nanpei's 'political party', the Tolai confederacy or the Oloa.

Integration was probably the most difficult task in the three colonies, firstly because there were no inbuilt patterns of centralized leadership: Samoa and Ponape both possessed multiple leadership structures which consisted of parallel hierarchies of authority within segmented societies. Moreover the powers of chiefs, for example, in Samoa, were restricted by many conventions, and distinct limits were put on their personal right to the goods and services of those below them. The ability of village members to change their residence to another kinship area without any formality helped to temper a chief's conduct in social relationships with his subordinates and his most important prerogatives remained in the nature of courtesies granted to him in token gifts and the language of address.¹ As for the power of the Ali'i Sili, it was an artificially centralized position grafted on to Samoan political structure by the Europeans, and Mata'afa was too old in the German period to act as a dynamic leader or the focus of resistance.

In New Guinea the influence an individual could exert on his society varied from area to area and depended largely on the society's institutionalized patterns of group competition and decision making.

1. Pitt, Tradition and Economic Progress pp 115-117.

Authority was customarily widely diffused, through clan elders or ritual brotherhoods. Nowhere did leaders have the sort of influence which suitable individuals were able to exert in authoritarian political structures like the Ponapean districts or even Samoan politics.

Perhaps the closest thing to an indigenous elite with which the Germans came in contact in New Guinea were the ngala or 'big men', of the Tolai people in the Gazelle Peninsula but their social authority was based on the continued quality of their performance and their influence was normally circumscribed within their own groups.¹ Individual ngala were able to arrogate increased power to themselves with the coming of the Europeans, selling land on behalf of the matrilineage, cultivating support from one or the other mission and promoting inter-district solidarity through their monopolies of white man's goods and war alliances.² It was individual 'big men' who mobilized the districts of the Kokopo coast against Ralum in 1890 and Herbertshöhe in 1893, while a man like To Bobo could initiate social reform and promote economic innovation. Nevertheless the position of ngala never became permanently institutionalized; indeed even the establishment of the luluai system by the Germans could not significantly increase the quality of a 'big man's' control over his fellows since it avoided giving the appointees the enhanced status and the effective power of indirect rulers.³

If socially imposed limitations restricted the integrating power of Pacific leaders, so too did the differential impact of colonial rule on social groups, which has already been discussed.⁴ The non-emergence of inspired charismatic leaders can be attributed to this unequal pressure on Pacific Island societies. At first glance, the cases of men like Lauaki and Soumadau may seem to provide us with examples of 'charisma' in operation.

1. See Introduction, page 18-19.

2. R. Salisbury, 'Early Stages of Economic Development in New Guinea', Journal of the Polynesian Society, Nr. 71, 1962, pp 334f.

3. See page 163,265.

4. See pages 314-316.

They certainly possessed exceptional qualities - elite status in terms of their social roles, a natural ability to mobilize sentiment and a large measure of experience in political relationships. The energy of both men, their skill and enterprise made them leading exponents of their class; they not only possessed all the personal trappings of leadership but were also initiators and organizers of movements in opposition to the German regime. Yet for all that, as Worsley points out, 'charisma' is less an individual quality than a social relationship in which the message and the general movement are more important than the greatness of the man.¹ By and large it is a function of what the people round the leading figure think and how they act upon their recognition. Above all there must be a message which expresses the unsatisfied wants of its hearers: the truly charismatic leader is followed because he embodies and articulates values and aspirations in which his followers have an interest, and because he offers a realization of those values.

In these terms Lauaki was not of the charismatic mould and was unable to inspire such a movement because he did not embody a message with an urgent appeal to all Samoans. The fundamental ideas for which Lauaki was fighting - restoration of the Tumua and Pule and the political success of his paramountcy candidate - appealed only to his closest followers not the mass of the people, for his movement was calculated to institutionalize the triumph of one section of Samoan society over another, to reinforce traditional divisions instead of transcending them. Lauaki's unifying potential was frustrated by the traditional patterns of district conflict and his own subjection to them. He did manage to construct a fragile front initially in 1908 by agreeing to fight for each group's separate interests

1. Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound, pp 285-296, contains a perceptive criticism of the assumptions normally associated with 'charisma'. The subject can only be lightly touched upon in this study.

but he could not count on any general movement aspiring to change the state of society because the Samoans at large were enjoying ample prosperity and were experiencing few demands. If Solf had been constrained to use force against the orator chief and his followers in March 1909 it probably would have acted as a catalyst to form a general anti-German movement and would have provided the signs and martyrdom necessary to give Lauaki a genuinely charismatic role. Indeed Solf's restraint in those critical days can be traced directly to his appreciation of that probability.¹

In a similar way the values which Soumadau embodied were already somewhat obsolete in a situation where the mass of his followers was actually benefiting from the system against which he was fighting. Their support was mainly in the nature of kinship solidarity and it evaporated very quickly. Furthermore, Soumadau's leadership and the movement flowing from it were partly functions of the prevailing district conflict so that there was no prospect of his uniting all Ponapeans against the Germans. This severely limited the effectiveness of his rejection of German authority. In New Guinea, charismatic movements did emerge at a much later date in the form of Cargo cults but during German rule these were only of an incipient nature. It was not until the post-German period that the latent solidarity expressed in Cargo myths was converted by individuals into active ritual and political action and organizations were created to perform the cult functions.²

Integration and large-scale mobilization thus had to be achieved in other ways in the Pacific; some of them have been examined in an earlier section.³ Here we will deal with the initiatives taken by leaders to overcome the problem of scale. The 'bullet-proof' ointment of the Tolai war was a fairly common response to the problem, and an effective means of

1. See pages 72-6.

2. Compare Lawrence, Road Belong Cargo; Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound; and F. Steinbauer, 'Die Cargo-Kulte in Melanesien' (Nurnberg, phil. Diss., 1970).

3. See pages 311-321.

producing the minimum of discipline necessary in such a campaign.¹ The Tolai were able temporarily to oppose a morale based on traditional cosmological expectations to European self-confidence and superior technology;² the same sort of cosmological mechanism was present in the Cargo myth at Madang in 1912. In Ponape however it was completely lacking in any form: Sokehs morale was based on clan fellowship and an assumption of military superiority sanctioned by history, not the supernatural; very rapidly it was found to be wanting. A more constructive approach to the problem of creating an enlarged society was taken in Samoa with the Oloa scheme, designed to give Lauaki and the old chiefly elites economic power and numerical support. It is a good example of the adaptation of European organization and the use of new forms of protest to meet a frontal challenge. That it failed was due less to indigenous incapacity than to German opposition. Nanpei's 'political party' is another example: in a situation where the independence and power of the chiefs were being curtailed, it was an attempt not only to consolidate Nanpei's position but also to retain the society's self-sufficiency by securing a controlling share in the new order.³

This, in the long term, was the real measure of creative leadership: not only to recognize colonial rule as a revolutionary situation, but also to encourage the society to adapt to the structural changes and new patterns of development so as to bring about an increase in efficiency and

1. Compare similar manifestations in African resistance movements: Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule; T.O. Ranger, 'African Reactions to the Imposition of Colonial Rule in East and Central Africa', in Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960: The History of Politics and Colonialism, 1870-1914. (eds.) L.H. Gann and P. Duignan (Cambridge 1969) pp 293-324.
2. It is not certain the exact role played in the lead-up to the 1893 war by the sorcerer who 'discovered' the 'bullet-proof' ointment. He may have taken the initiative himself or been encouraged in his activities by more politically articulate Tolai elites. He certainly seems to have been an astute entrepreneur: there are stories that he retired to Ralum after 1893 and promoted another scheme whereby shell-money could be made to grow on trees if a special ointment were swallowed. Compare Cayley-Webster, Through New Guinea and the Cannibal Countries, pp 81-2.
3. See page 288-9.

secure control over the means, in terms of given ends.¹ The two outstanding leaders in this context were To Bobo and Henry Nanpei.

To Bobo could see beyond the immediate crisis in 1893 to the permanent significance of the changes going on around his people. His collaboration with the government in obtaining the magic ointment for the German forces brought about the first peace overtures in 1893. He himself became leader of the Vunamami confederacy when he succeeded to the headship of the Vunabalbal clan, and thereafter he devoted his energies to establishing the confederacy as a united and self-sufficient entity. He negotiated the definition of land reserves, lowered the bride price in order to increase the population and reinforce Vunamami claims to the land, and encouraged specialized copra production. All these innovations convinced his followers that he was acting for the common welfare and not just for his own ambition. They also enabled the confederacy to come to terms with the growing colonial apparatus and ensure it was in a position to contribute to the shaping of its future. In effect, To Bobo had grown beyond his traditional sponsors and the limits of the power structure, and found a new patron in Hahl. Since 1894 he had been a methodist preacher and in 1897 he became one of the first German lualuas and helped to supervise road construction.²

Henry Nanpei in Ponape had also grasped the long-term meaning of German hegemony. From an unorthodox background, with exceptional antecedents, Henry had augmented the fortune left to him by his father through trading and plantation agriculture. He was a shrewd businessman and owned the most prosperous plantation on Ponape during the German period, as well as the only herd of dairy cattle, which Hahl helped him to improve.³

1. Compare Firth, Social Change in Tokipia, p 352.

2. To Bobo is one of the few New Guineans about whose activities some detail has been uncovered. I am indebted to Salisbury's work on the Vunamami Tolai for much of the material in the text, though the conclusions are of course my responsibility.

3. See page 93-4, 98.

But Nanpei was also a capable politician, and his position was far greater than his district title and wealth suggested. The Spanish had decorated him twice, once for saving the life of catholic monks, and later employed him as harbour master at a salary of 3000 Marks a year.¹ By the time of German rule, Nanpei was the island's most acculturated chief, having spent some time in California and adopting European dress and housing. The knowledge of western political ideologies which he had obviously assimilated abroad and from the Boston Mission was employed in the alliance which he tried to cultivate with the German administration in 1908. This was designed to give some Ponapeans a controlling share in the new political order despite the formal loss of autonomy. Nanpei also used his influence to argue for the acceptance of the German reforms in the southern districts.

As the leading functionary of Protestantism on Ponape, Nanpei was also regarded by both the Spanish and the Germans as the commander of its forces in the south against the influence of Catholicism in the northern districts. He twice visited the headquarters of the Liebenzeller Mission in Germany, where he was feted as the 'Defender of the Faith' against the ambitions of Ultramontanism, and he even sent his sons to Germany to be properly educated.² With the standing which he possessed in the eyes of Fritz and Kersting, Nanpei gave all the appearances of a man aspiring to the ideals of European civilization and wanting to make Ponape part of the modern world.

Yet neither he nor To Bobo in New Guinea abandoned the traditional modes of thinking or the old values and commitments. Both men's attitudes to the Germans remained ambivalent during the period. To Bobo, for one, did not support the goals of German administrative policy under all circumstances: he encouraged independence of the colonial economy through

1. See page 92.

2. Personal Communication Rev. R. Walther, Bad Liebenzell, Sept 1971.

cash cropping rather than the adoption of regular wage labour for the plantations which Hahl favoured. Nanpei was not prepared to commit himself unconditionally to the demands of his new masters in spite of his recognition that the Europeans were a source of inevitable and beneficial change. With all his Spanish decorations Nanpei was still the inspiration behind the anti-Spanish rebellion of the southern districts in 1898. It was also he who incited unrest on the Kiti roadworks in 1908 and revived the band of dissenters which had functioned as the mainspring of opposition to the Spanish regime. While this quasi-political party was on one level a progressive response to the problem of shared power in a colonial situation,¹ it was also designed to overcome the encumbrances to Nanpei's position within the status hierarchy of Kiti which he encountered with the introduction of the German plans for reform. By parading himself as the ally and protector of the Germans, Nanpei could hope to enlist their support in the dispute with Sou en Kiti over his inherited estates.² Sympathy with the direction of social change did not preclude loyalty to the established patterns of political life. Furthermore, since Nanpei's chances of becoming High Chief of Kiti were slim, it is possible that he regarded the projected native advisory council as a means to overcome tradition and gain him a position of island-wide influence commensurate with his standing as Ponape's foremost land baron and entrepreneur.

No strong evidence exists however to support the accusation that he wished to break the power of the High Chiefs and make himself Overlord of Ponape. The suspicions of Nanpei's activity which flourished in all quarters indicate the ambiguity of his attitudes to European rule. Though he remained faithful to the German regime until the very end, it was probably because he was satisfied that it provided him with the best possible

1. See page 289.

2. Compare pages 111-113.

support for his position and influence in Kiti. The shrewdest assessment of Nanpei's priorities throughout German rule was made by Governor Hahl:

'His activities were designed constantly to assert his own claims, never those of the German regime. He certainly would have become a rebel, as in the Spanish period, if he had feared that we endangered his reputation or his possessions. In my opinion he relied (on us) with all possible caution'.¹

The combination of traditional commitment and progressive re-alignment was present in many Pacific Islanders who were in positions to influence their societies. Po Minis, the Admiralty Islander, consciously chose to accept mission tutelage and try to establish the white man's religion in his society. But in the face of social need and protection, where loyalty to European ideals was of no practical use, he was quite prepared to revert to the traditional method of security - a preventive war. In refusing to go to Herbertshöhe for adjudication of his case Po Minis was asserting his independence and rejecting Germany's right to determine what form leadership in his society should take. Another example is Sabu, the Ragetta chief who accepted appointment as a government luluai but rejected the establishment of a Christian mission in the village.² The fact that he was himself a former convert to Christianity reinforces the argument that the choice between collaboration and resistance was not a permanent one.

We have already discussed the inelastic strategies of the more conservative leaders like To Ruruk, To Vagira and To Matthias.³ It is indisputable that they possessed traditional leadership characteristics, for they were able to mobilize their local groups in large-scale actions against the Germans. However their policies in trying to resolve the crisis of colonial penetration through violence were short sighted: they did not appreciate that the white man could not be driven out of the Pacific Islands.

1. Hahl to RKA 19 Dec 1912 RKA 2584:102.

2. See pages 234-5

3. See page 324.

One is forced to conclude that Lauaki in Samoa and Soumadau in Ponape were also unsuccessful in adapting themselves to foreign domination. Paradoxically Lauaki showed many of the marks of an acculturated Pacific Islander: he was an adherent of the London Missionary Society; he accepted the benefits of a money economy; he mixed easily with Europeans; he even named his son Tivoli after a hotel which operated in Apia.¹ Yet in his political life Lauaki was generally guided by tradition. The whole life of the orator chief had revolved around political and agitational activity: he had made and broken 'kings' in the era of the Three Powers and had skilfully exploited the latter's rivalry to gain benefits for his party and candidate. Lauaki was no doubt aggrieved at the fall of the 'kingship', the subordination of the paramount chief and the decline of honour and respect for the old fa'a Samoa traditions. He certainly resented Solf's suppression of the orators' powers and was not prepared to accept the role of spectator forced upon him in 1905. The tactics which he employed in 1908/09 also show that he found it difficult to conceive of a permanent German presence in Samoa. It was perhaps the comparative isolation of his political base on Savai'i which encouraged this view: the consequences of European rule had really only made themselves felt on Upolu.

As for Soumadau, he is still something of an enigma. The records do not reveal whether he was a simple reactionary or a visionary and idealist fighting for an improperly understood idea of freedom. More than likely he possessed ulterior motives for his hostility, perhaps plans for personal power in Sokehs which were jeopardized by the German reforms and Boeder's behaviour. Like Lauaki, Soumadau's failure to adapt and compromise was compounded by a serious error of judgment in underestimating the power and authority at the disposal of the German regime, or its ability and determination to counter-attack when challenged.

1. Davidson, Pacific Islands Portraits, pp 267-8.

These considerations do not apply to the completely ineffectual leaders like Nalon of Bilia and the cohort of luluais whose official positions were little more than a reward for collaboration. Nalon is a good example, a man with no traditional claim to high executive status and virtually impotent despite his appointment as luluai. His defection in 1904 was the act of an individual out of step with his social group and his collaboration did nothing to solve the crisis facing the Bilia people, namely, the loss of all their land. Such men cannot be included in the categories of leadership at all.

In conclusion one can state that no Pacific Island leader during the German period revealed a deep 'nationalist' concern, or identified himself with the aspirations of the entire island territory in his policies towards German rule (with the possible exception of the Samoa Oloa movement in 1904-05), nor were there any liberation movements as such in the colonies we have been investigating. Lauaki's ultimate withdrawal from the brink of physical resistance in order to save Samoa was the most significant example of a loyalty wider than the immediate descent group or political unit, but while he was doubtless a patriot in such a crisis, Lauaki was not a radical nationalist fighting for freedom from colonial rule. The rudiments of a later nationalism were however present in his gesture, as well as in Nanpei's political movement of 1908. The Samoan chief's attitudes in particular retained a measure of relevance for the next generation of Samoans, for in the Mau movement of the 1930's, the people looked back to him not as a failure but as a pioneer in the colony's fight for self-determination.¹

The political horizons of Lauaki's opposition activities serve as a fitting conclusion to remind us that Pacific Island 'resistance' is not a simple notion signifying national rebellion against colonial rule. This

1. Compare the article by O.F. Nelson in New Zealand - Samoa Guardian 9 March 1934.

study has sought to show the distinctions which must be made between resistance to European pretensions or coercion, and attacks motivated by avarice or ignorance; between resistance for limited political ends (or collaboration for the same ends) and total rebellion against German rule, of which there are few instances in the German Pacific; between resistance to German rule or to white domination in general. It should be clear that the concept cannot be studied in its simplest, most militant form. It must take into account conventional categories of political intrigue, economic bargaining, non-cooperation and acts of political force or intimidation designed to modify the colonial relationship in a more equitable fashion.

In fact the idea of 'resistance' subsumes most aspects of the problem which Pacific Islanders faced in adjusting to colonial rule and this study has emphasized that they were not mere sounding boards for administrative policies devised in Europe. Political developments were often internally generated, through traditional Pacific institutions and values, while the Europeans struggled to make responses which accorded with their own image of themselves and their colonial objectives. The colonial relationship was never equal, and Pacific Islanders were seldom able to maintain their autonomy, but given the presence of sufficiently gifted individuals in influential positions, the societies themselves were dynamic enough to adjust of their own initiative and to a self-conceived level.

Appendix

Missionaries and the Pacific Islanders in the German Pacific

Although the compass of the foregoing study did not extend to a history of the Pacific missions, missionaries have emerged from the story as extremely significant people in the history of the developing relationship between the Pacific Islanders and the Germans. Not only do mission records provide the sort of direct and unofficial evidence which in many cases the government records lack, but missionaries themselves played important roles in provoking conflict or dampening it down. It is this dual impact which will be examined in the following pages.

To make a general statement about Pacific reactions to Christian missionaries during the German period is a difficult proposition since mission history had reached very different stages of advancement in all three colonies. The Ponapeans and Samoans had already reached an acceptable level of compromise with the Christian message and the presence of missionaries by the beginning of German rule, though this is not to say that all conflict had been resolved. The Boston mission had deliberately encouraged the creation of factions in Ponape between believers and non-believers. Superimposed on the political dichotomy of the island and skilfully manipulated by various chiefs, this factionalism continued to be a strong force in Ponape politics under the Germans. The message itself had been so modified that fundamentalist Protestantism at least was an atrophied form of observance by 1900.

Not so in Samoa. The flexible system of beliefs and ritual among the Samoans facilitated the early work of the London Missionary Society and it found ready acceptance of its teaching and ideals. The process was, however, more of an exchange of religious cultures than a one-way imposition of European values. The Samoans gave Christianity a Polynesian flavour, harbouring significant reservations about its moral

theology and maintaining a certain disregard for its more mystical elements. By 1900 the three Christian missions, the London Missionary Society, the Wesleyans and the catholic Marist Fathers had completed the conversion of the Samoan Islands and they were able to concentrate on ministerial work, education and care of the sick. By the same token the Samoan church had reached a stage where conflict was occurring over administrative direction of the local communities.

New Guinea is in many ways the most interesting area on which to focus attention. The missions were still in the first flush of contact in the German period and wrestling with the frontier problems of rejection and acceptance as an alien force. The range of sub-cultures and the variety of mission societies complicate a process which can be traced from its very beginning. Much of the following analysis will therefore concentrate on New Guinea.

Initially the missionary was regarded as just another white man, who had to buy his acceptance and sometimes survive an ordeal of intimidation. Flierl had to undergo a test of strength with a Simbang warrior who attacked him with a tomahawk the first day and he was forced to endure the people defecating around his hut to drive him away.¹ Acceptance at first was based on the fact that the mission represented the closest and most profitable trading post for the regular supply of iron, beads and ornaments, and although most missionaries deplored it they were prepared to accept this role as the only way to establish a channel of communication with the local inhabitants. The Boston Mission gained a firmer hold in Ponape than the foreign European community because it represented a steady source of supply as opposed to the occasional caches of goods imported by whalers; one missionary admitted that his success in the interior of the island was due

1. NM Archives, Flierl Letters: Flierl to Deinzer 22 Oct 1896; Frerichs, Anutu Conquers, p 25.

to his ability to open up a regular trading route to the isolated population.¹ The London Missionary Society in Samoa functioned as a similar funnel for consumer goods from Britain which were highly prized by the Samoans. Great Britain was thought to be the greatest power in the world and God's instrument for endowing the Samoans with the good things of life, and the Society's attractiveness was significantly related to its association with Britain.²

For their part the New Guineans were adept at exploiting the competition of missions in the same area in order to achieve maximum profit. In the Gazelle Peninsula in the 1890's before the official demarcation of mission activity, the Sacred Heart Mission made substantial inroads on previously Wesleyan preserves because the people were attracted by the greater influence and manpower resources of the Catholics.³ In local terms this meant better trade goods and more effective protection against tribal enemies and importunate white settlers. If missionaries suffered more from beggars and thieves than did traders or planters it was because they were regarded as rich philanthropists, who were able to live off their resources without cultivating land. On the other hand, this was often the reason why the missionary was tolerated where the trader or settler was not.

Acceptance, in the end, flowed from the elements which set apart the missionary from the white man who was in New Guinea for profit. Missionaries took upon themselves the functions of protector and advocate and quickly gained recognition as moderate men willing to participate in the exchange of goods and services and to work on the peoples' behalf. As aliens they played a valuable role in the resolution of conflict and were thus able to strengthen their acceptance in local society. Their intervention was a critical factor in preventing rebellion on Ponape in 1908 and during

1. O'Brien, 'The Impact of Missionaries Ponape', p 21.

2. Pitt, Tradition and Economic Progress, p 57.

3. Hahl to Direktor AAKA 25 Aug 1896 RKA 2985:143.

the Lauaki movement in Samoa.¹ In New Guinea the S.V.D. Mission was largely responsible for reconciling the Aly Islanders to the New Guinea Company at the end of the nineteenth century while the Neuendettelsau Mission's mediation between the Lae and the Lae Womba tribes effectively opened up the interior of the Huon Peninsula to mission and government influence.

At the point where a mission society was accepted as an ally of a local community, it became in effect a separate bureaucracy in the eyes of the people, competing with business and government for the loyalty and resources of the inhabitants. In fact throughout the German Pacific, the mission societies could command a legitimacy and assert an authority over the islanders which on one side could bring them into conflict with the secular regime, yet on the other ally them to it in the process of colonial control. In New Guinea missionaries comprised a steady twenty five percent of the European population throughout German rule. In some areas the missions exerted their own quality of control before the government had the resources or will to do so. It was the Sacred Heart Mission which first opened up the north coast of the Gazelle Peninsula in the 1890's and built the first road inland from the east coast in 1896.²

In Kaiser Wilhelmsland the missions purchased a pre-emptive right to influence over the mainlanders through their activities during Company rule. In the absence of any attempt by the firm to seek a rational hold over New Guineans within its jurisdiction, the three mission societies created a limited measure of control and made the only serious efforts to open up land away from pioneer settlements on the coast. Even after 1900 the Neuendettelsau Mission remained the ascendant power in the Huon Peninsula, particularly after it turned to organizing the peoples' whole way of life in order to maintain the impetus of conversion, and it could claim

1. See pages 75-6, 114-116.

2. See page 166.

a degree of acceptance unparalleled by the administration anywhere else in the protectorate. By 1913 the thirty-five New Guinean mission helpers of the Neuendettelsau Mission were virtually exercising secular authority in the Peninsula and there were even cases where luluais held courts which enforced mission rather than government law.¹ The predominance of mission influence was again demonstrated vividly in 1915 when several German planters in the Gazelle Peninsula were publicly flogged by the Australian military authorities for having thrashed the Rev. Cox whom they suspected of betraying German positions to the Allies. Local New Guineans regarded the punishment as a triumph, not for the English, but for the 'Wesleyans' against the 'Germans'.²

The latent sense of rivalry between missions and government which this incident documents was present in all three colonies during the German period. Hahl regarded Couppé's programme of slave purchases and industrial villages with covert hostility because it could give the mission control over a whole generation of New Guineans. Even the Neuendettelsau Mission's achievements in the Huon Peninsula were viewed with suspicion and the district officer of Madang, on a visit in 1913, described it as a 'state within a state'.³

The annual collections which the Wesleyans in New Guinea and the London Missionary Society in Samoa took from the local people also caused concern, not only in the colonies but in Germany as well. The London Missionary Society in particular, with two-thirds of the Samoan population its nominal adherents, could mobilize Samoan financial resources to an extent which occasionally embarrassed the government. The Society anticipated contributions totalling £3000 in 1914, simply for its own use. This did not

1. Rowley, The New Guinea Villager, p 142.

2. See anonymous report from New Guinea (probably by Deputy Governor Haber) in RKA 2568:82-3; also similar report dated 29 Nov 1914 (Rabaul) in BA, Kleine Erwerbungen, Nr.411.

3. NM Archives, Keysser: 'Die Seele der Papua Christen', Part II.

include the donations for pastors' salaries, district work and building construction which could more than double the sum again.¹ Self himself on several occasions expressed dissatisfaction at the demands which the mission made on the life-style of the people, alleging too many services at inconvenient times and a puritan attitude to the observance of the Sabbath. He was also indignant at the power which the catholic mission exercised over Mata'afa, whose piety led him to treat priests with more respect than government officials.²

The most acrimonious encounters occurred on Ponape where a direct confrontation between secular regime and mission soured relations not only in the Spanish period but under both Fritz and Kersting. The Boston Mission deliberately seems to have provoked a break with the Spanish regime by its aggressive attempts to maintain its power over the islanders,³ while the Capuchin Mission was needlessly aggressive in the exercise of its influence. Kersting's explicit accusations that the Fathers were trying to subvert the power of the administration and set up the mission as an alternative government were the most extreme examples of the conflict which the competitive power of the missions could engender.⁴

These disagreements between mission and government were in many cases the expression of a much wider polarity of ideologies. Where control at the local level was left to the individual mission societies, the administration's basic concern for law and order was bound to clash with the competitive proselytism of religious orders. Once again Ponape provides the most conspicuous example in Fr. Fidelis' refusal to restrain the mission's activities in a sensitive area when converts to the faith were at stake. Nor were the Capuchins prepared to accept that a High Chief possessed the

1. Records of offerings made to the L.M.S.: LMS Archives, South Seas, Boxes 5-7, especially 7/2.
2. LMS Archives, South Seas, Box 48/1: Sibree to Thompson 7 March 1903.
3. O'Brien, 'Impact of Missionaries Ponape', p 54.
4. See Kersting to RKA 15 Jan 1914 and 8 March 1914 RKA 2590:75-9 and 100-1.

authority to refuse a tribesman permission to exchange religions, even when insistence on the principle of freedom of religion could create dangerous tensions.¹

This fundamental potential for discord was compounded by the inter-confessional jealousy between missions. The controversies over their relative fields of activity in which the catholics and protestants in Ponape became embroiled not only strained relations within the European community but also helped to reinforce the political dichotomy between the northern and southern districts. The result was that Germany's administrators in particular tended to discount the traditional battle for political supremacy between the geographical areas. A similar situation of mission competition prevailed in New Guinea, though not to the same extent. There seems to have been a certain amount of bad blood between the Wesleyans and the Sacred Heart Mission in the Gazelle Peninsula, particularly as a result of the temporary demarcation of activities in the 1890's, ordered by the Colonial Department.² On the mainland the Lutheran missions resented the vigour with which the Mission of the Holy Ghost prosecuted its activities and they put pressure on Hahl unsuccessfully to prevent it from moving into the vicinity of Madang. In Samoa Solf studiously avoided being drawn into the occasional bouts of gamesmanship which took place between the London Missionary Society and the Marist Fathers. His explicit solution to the potential instability which mission rivalry could cause, was 'to rule better than they pray'.³

The foreign nature of the London Missionary Society in Samoa and the Wesleyan Mission in New Guinea also led to some concern about its implications for the security of the colonies. Both remained completely loyal to the German authorities throughout the period, though the Wesleyans

1. See pages 105-06.

2. See page 164.

3. BA, Solf Papers, 27: Draft of Decennial Programme (Amtliches und Politisches), 1906, p 75.

in New Guinea seem to have taken a strong political line against the Germans once New Guinea was invaded by the Australians. For its part the London Missionary Society had to endure continual allegations during German rule that it was basically hostile to the Reich. In 1904 pan-German critics seized on an innocuous article about the South West African rebellion in the mission's Samoan newspaper Sulu, and accused the Society of trying to incite the Samoans to disobedience. The Rev. Newell, Secretary of the Mission, apologized for the article and was rescued from an intimidating situation by Solf's calm objectivity,¹ but the same critics chose to use the mission as a scapegoat for Lauaki's mau e pule. Newell in particular was accused of sending letters of encouragement to the ringleaders,² but his work in persuading Lauaki to surrender offset any effect these rumours were intended to have.

In the context of competing missions, it was the catholic societies which possessed the superior resources and made the greatest external impression on Pacific Islanders. Numerically superior to the protestant missions in having brothers and nuns to assist the missionizing activities of the priests, they were also intellectually much more imposing institutions. Their priests in particular enjoyed an academic education, with generally broader horizons than the majority of lower middle class evangelical missionaries. The centralized systems of administration and the hierarchical structures of power which dominated the catholic societies also encouraged a ready respect for authority and a certain formalism from Pacific Islanders. This, together with their ability to call upon manpower with specialized skills in industry, agriculture and scientific research made the catholic missions formidable competitors of government and secular enterprises too.

1. LMS Archives, South Seas, Box 48/2: Newell to Thompson 8 April 1904.
2. LMS Archives, Personal, Box 32: Newell Diaries, entry 21 Dec 1908.

Catholic influence was exerted on colonial policy through the Zentrumspartei in the Reichstag. The records show for example that Fr. Kilian Müller, the metropolitan Secretary of the German Capuchin Mission had important contacts in the Reichstag and in the Colonial Office as well and it is possible that the comparative brevity of Fritz's administration of Ponape was the result of Müller's influence. Bishop Couppé in New Guinea was also able to influence Berlin in favour of mission policy, first against the confinement of the M.S.C.'s activities within the Gazelle Peninsula in the 1890's and then in 1905/06 in having the case of Po Minis reopened and dismissed.¹ Altogether the catholic missions were a substantial potential challenge to the colonial administrations and other missions through their command of resources, their centralization of authority and their commitment to the 'one, true, Apostolic Faith' and they inevitably tended to draw the more dedicated islanders into their fold.

By the same token, the catholics' conviction of the inspired nature of their mission and their rigid dedication to a natural law and absolute theology increased the likelihood of conflict with both other Europeans and Pacific Islanders. The trouble in Ponape over the right to proselytize has already been detailed; the islander community itself was dragged in as Nanpei made efforts to stop the Capuchins making inroads on his power base among the protestants. Solf too had trouble with Bishop Broyer over the latter's refusal to let catholic children acquire a purely secular education at the government school in Apia² while in New Guinea the strict authoritarian tradition of catholicism was notably instrumental in provoking To Marias to murder Rascher and his colleagues.

The competitive power and different ideals of government and mission did not mean that there was no identity of interests between them.

1. See page 220.

2. Vietsch, Wilhelm Solf, pp 878.

Despite persistent denials that he was a political emissary for European rule, the missionary's aims tended to be basically imperialist and eurocentric. The American missionaries in Ponape were very blatant about their determination to introduce American democratic ideals and practices to the island and in their zeal they attacked the authority of the High Chiefs and scorned the traditional rituals and supernatural sanctions. They even went so far as to establish a new style of government for their supporters, with the emphasis on elections, a judiciary and private ownership.¹ While the Capuchin Mission of the German period was not as aggressively eurocentric, its ideals of civilization were sufficiently in harmony with those of the regime for local administration at the local level to be left to it during the first eight years.

The same system operated in New Guinea where the government could not afford the immediate extension of its presence. In the Huon Peninsula, southern New Britain and Bougainville the various mission societies were used as virtual arms of the administration until the latter could capitalize on the work achieved. The missionary shared many of the settler's ethnocentric conclusions about the New Guinean's character. Working down from the European concept of morality, it was customary to consider the 'native' as immoral because he betrayed no guilt feelings, as a benighted slave to savage instincts which were the greatest hindrance to the spread of the Gospel. The civilizing aims of colonialism - to instil in the New Guinean a respect for the regimen of work and discipline and to persuade him of the superiority of European morality - were an integral part of the programme of mission work, almost a means to its evangelistic ends. Certainly the ideals of a 'civilized life' and an appreciation of the Gospel message went hand in hand.

Hence the missions in general cooperated with the

1. O'Brien, 'Impact of Missionaries Ponape', p 24, 42-4.

administration's attempts to open up the country, control the local populations and draw them into a money economy where they contributed to the tasks of development. Some developed their own plantations, saw-mills and skilled labour programmes as instruments to achieve these objectives, as well as to support themselves. The Wesleyans, M.S.C. and the S.V.D. missions pioneered these developments in the 1890's; the Rheinische and the Neuendettelsau Missions followed in the early years of the new century.

While the individual mission continued to draw its material and intellectual sustenance, its inspiration and ideology from Europe, there always existed a definite frontier between the missionary and the Pacific Islander. Even in Samoa, underneath the external harmony between the London Missionary Society and the Samoans born of long experience and progressive adaptation, a definite tension permeated the relations of the English missionaries and the Samoan pastors, who resented the Europeans' assumptions regarding foreign control. Such a frontier would not disintegrate until there were sufficient indigenous missionaries in the upper echelons of power to mediate between the two cultures and create a new, Pacific set of values and expectations. The presence of this barrier is highly significant for it signified that the acceptance of European missionaries into a local community did not denote their complete control of the inhabitants.

It must be added that the nature and solidarity of this frontier had a great deal to do with a particular mission's isolation from conventional colonial enterprises. Much of the Neuendettelsau Mission's potential for success can be attributed to the isolation it enjoyed in the Huon Peninsula. In fact it had the best of both possible worlds, for while its work benefited from the absence of competitors after 1892, the proximity of the Company's resources before that was a significant factor in its ability to establish itself in the face of hostility.

In contrast, the Rhenish Mission suffered very definitely from the restriction of its activities to the crescent of white settlement in

Astrolabe Bay. There are numerous complaints by Lutheran missionaries about the effect on the local inhabitants of the discrepancy between Christian teaching and the actual behaviour of European settlers.¹ The fact that settler attitudes dominated after the 1904 uprising and overcame the tempering influence of the administration only served to discredit the mission's message of brotherhood and love. Because of its proximity, the Rheinische Mission consistently found it difficult to overcome its identification with white interests in the minds of New Guineans, and its use of the police power of the government to impose a measure of compulsory schooling can only have added to this difficulty.²

To round off this discussion of the Pacific missions as separate colonial institutions, it is necessary to examine the most important social changes which they initiated. Neither the pioneering of new products and skills nor the literacy revolution which the missions inaugurated will be treated here. Instead we will concentrate on the permanent changes to the structure and mechanics of traditional society which radically influenced the relations between the Germans and the Pacific Islanders.

The mission societies played a prominent role in widening the avenues of social interaction and promoting the consolidation of enlarged economic and political units. For example from the first days of his arrival in the Gazelle Peninsula in 1875, the Rev. George Brown deliberately sought to break down the particularism of Tolai village centres and he succeeded in 1878 when his expedition destroyed the regional monopoly of the north-west confederacy, finally enabling traders to move inland; it also encouraged closer communication among the north-west settlements, since Brown established his teachers in the defeated villages as a condition of their

1. See page 197, footnote 1.

2. NM Archives, Flierl Letters: Flierl to Missions-Inspektor 10 Dec 1904.

pardon.¹ Likewise Flierl's move inland from Simbang to Sattelberg broke the monopoly which the Busum people traditionally possessed over the movement of goods (both normal marine products and European articles) from Simbang to the interior. A direct result was his constant harassment by the affected people. The regular channelling of goods to the interior through Sattelberg completely refashioned trade and social links between people on the coast and the plateau so that by the early 1890's Sattelberg inhabitants were prepared to go unarmed to the coast trusting only in Flierl's hunting rifle.² The Rhenish Mission arguably would have had the same effect in the hinterland of Madang, had its attempts to move inland not been hamstrung by the constant reduction of manpower through illness.

Salisbury mentions church-building as one of the factors increasing inter-hamlet intercourse, if not actual unification on a more permanent basis.³ Churches represented to New Guineans the cult houses of the new, richly endowed material culture of the missionaries, and villages vied with each other to have these centres of wealth among them. Everyone was eager to contribute to the construction of a church, even those who had no time for the mission's teaching, and the need for large numbers of helpers usually involved several local settlements.

The most dramatic and lasting consolidation under mission auspices occurred as patterns of authority in local communities shifted in favour of the missions, either to missionaries themselves or to converted local groups. The Kâte peoples' initiative in restructuring its social and economic organization in line with Christian precepts has already been mentioned as has the growth in influence of native mission helpers.⁴ Keysser recounts another case, not untypical in the Huon Peninsula, of the members

1. Brown, George Brown: An Autobiography, pp 146, 207, 267-9, 274.

2. See page 192.

3. Salisbury, Vunamami, p 339; Compare also MSC Archives, Ms: 'Erinnerungen eines alten Missionars', Bruder B.F., pp 5-7.

4. See pages 313, 341.

of a converted clan ostracizing one of their number for murdering his wife. Though they eventually pardoned him and allowed him to resettle in one of the villages, he was never received back into the community proper because he failed to show sufficient repentance.¹ The general influence for peace and order which the Neuendettelsau Mission exerted on the coasts and hinterland of the Peninsula during German rule resulted in this area's remaining the most stable and consistent supply of labour for European plantations in other parts of New Guinea.

Where missions were able to reinforce their position through this increasing stability in local relations, there usually followed certain modifications to the local structure, in particular the evolution of new leadership patterns. The more discerning aspirants to leadership recognized the mission society as a wealthy and powerful sponsor through which to gain more quickly a position of eminence. To Bobo and Po Minis are good examples of New Guineans who turned mission activity to their advantage. To Bobo was one of the first Wesleyan converts in the Gazelle, in 1875, and his work for the church complemented his reputation as a warrior of renown. After 1894 he became an active preacher, which reinforced his claim by descent to the headship of the Vunabalbal clan and leadership of the Vunamami confederacy. Po Minis, for his part, recognized the opportunity which the Sacred Heart Mission offered when he was a labourer in Herbertshöhe. His eventual education and training under the MSC enabled Po Minis to stake a much more convincing claim to leadership in his own society but it did not inhibit him from following traditional patterns of behaviour when the group was threatened by old enemies. The conversion of individuals, even leaders, did not guarantee that they would abandon the old life, or that the rest of the group would follow suit. The missions by and large accepted this. In many cases the sponsorship of elites was the only way to make contact with a

1. ND Archives, Keysser: 'Die Seele der Papua Christen', Part II.

community when a white man was not allowed to lead its ritual functions.¹

All the main Pacific missions had programmes for training elites which were avidly utilized by the islanders. In New Guinea by 1913 almost 200 indigenous students were studying at the Methodist seminary on Ulu Island and in its district high schools,² while local teachers were gradually replacing Fijians in the villages. Mission work was a unique road to power and affluence. In 1911 a Methodist assistant-teacher earned £6 a year, a senior catechist £13.50p. In addition a house was provided, land for a vegetable garden and offerings from the congregation.³ The Sacred Heart Mission was training 120 catechists by 1910 and its orphanages were providing the later intermediaries in local settlements.⁴ Even the Rhenish Mission had acquired nine assistant teachers from its small total of sixty-three converts in 1908.⁵

On Ponape, the 'missionary party' became an important avenue of social mobility in the 1860's. It was his ascent through the ranks of protestant leadership which reinforced Nanpei's claim to secular leadership, especially after 1910 and it provided him with the influence to enlist the support of the administration in his fight against the Capuchins.

In Samoa the ministry was regarded by the Samoans as the only path to a proper education and influence. The Malua Institute, founded in 1844, was the centre of the London Missionary Society's training programme and those who were lucky enough to secure places had prospects of an influential career. Besides the theological training and secular education provided, instruction was also given in such trades as carpentry and bricklaying. Moreover each student was allocated a plot of land for his own cultivation from the 300 hectare plantation attached to the seminary.

1. Hahl to AAKA 25 Aug 1896 RKA 2985:143.

2. Annual Reports 1912/13, p 183.

3. Salisbury, Vunamami, p 38.

4. Annual Reports 1909/10, p 170.

5. Ibid., 1907/08, p 76.

Even before Germany's assumption of power, over 2000 Samoans had been through Malua.¹ After completion of his course the graduate could expect appointment as a pastor or teacher at the village level, with a guaranteed source of income and considerable influence on village relations. An indication of the power which local pastors acquired among their compatriots can be gleaned from the ready access which they had to Lauaki and the Mata'afan party in the thick of battle in 1898-99 and their constant interventions on behalf of their congregations averted many crises;² again in 1909 they were able to bring Newell and Lauaki face to face. It is significant that Solofaga defended and supported the London Missionary Society in Samoa because of his apprehension that the power of the Samoan pastors would cause real difficulties for the government if the British missionaries were forced to leave the group.³

The Christian Revolution:

The Christian missions as imperial institutions was only one aspect of their impact on Pacific life and society. A second and deeper impact lay in the revolutionary content of their message, in the changes which they induced in the Pacific Islander's view of the world. Missionary aims and methods struck not merely at the economic and social structure but also at the cultural rationale for such a system. New Guinea provides the most striking expression of this process and its effects under the Germans; it had been already completed in the other two colonies by the time of German rule and a workable compromise was achieved. The rapid strides of the Christian mission in Samoa are in sharp contrast to the painful history of mission foundations in Melanesia. The Samoans were basically more

1. Kurze, Samoa, Land, Leute und Mission, pp 82-88.
2. See for example the record of their discussions with Lauaki in 1899: LMS Archives, South Seas, Box 45/3B: Memo Sibree to Newell 20 March 1899 enclosed in Newell to Thompson 22 March 1899; Also Box 45/4D: Newell to Thompson 6 Sept 1899.
3. LMS Archives, South Seas, Box 48/2: Newell to Thompson 29 April 1904.

receptive to the message because their need for comforting explanations and salvation rituals was less, while in New Guinea the harsh environment and the difficult struggle for survival engendered a more rigid dependence on a well-tried set of cosmological explanations. It is impossible to generalize about the latter manifestations on a New Guinea-wide basis since there are numerous regional variations in the interpretation of the world order. Two case studies however, Lawrence's on the southern Madang district and Keysser's on the Kâte and Hube, do give some indication of the attitudes and values with which two important groups imbued their world.

Lawrence points out that no 'native' society had any single word for 'religion' as a separate cultural component.¹ The world existed for man and he was master of it. In the vast majority of ritual activities, it was accepted that, provided he satisfied certain conditions, man could guarantee the cooperation of gods and spirits in achieving his ends. Deities were assumed to be the sole authentic sources of secular and sacred knowledge and myths were the basis on which all activities were built; the process of intellectual discovery was discounted. This did not mean that the people were highly mystical: indeed they did not acknowledge the existence of any separate spiritual entity, nor were there spiritual values. The cosmos was an exclusively physical realm and the imagined activities of deities were regarded as taking place on the same plane of existence as human social activities. Perhaps most importantly from the point of view of the missionaries' influence for change, the cosmic order was seen as a closed system, essentially changeless. Each element of culture had always had its present form; events of antiquity were events of the present and would be events of the future as well; relationships between men and deities within the cosmos were finally established and unalterable. In the last resort

1. Lawrence, Road Belong Cargo, p 12. The following description is a summary of Lawrence's ethnographic findings.

there was no need, indeed no room, for an independent intellect.

Keysser indicates the extent to which this closed conception inhibited the work of the Neuendettelsau Mission among the Kâte and Hube.¹ There was no universal God, only tribal deities. If there had been a supreme entity, argued the people, the ancestors would have known, and like them, he would be revealed in earthquakes, storms and totemic objects. The spirits and ancestors possessed the right to control the tribe for they had bestowed all the elements which went to make up its culture. To turn aside from the ancestral way would be a betrayal not only of the tribe's culture, but of the entire cosmic order, and the traitorous generation which tolerated or encouraged such a deviation would be doomed by the ancestors to an eternity of enmity and isolation in the land of the dead.

Christianity was seen as the religion of the strange white men with God as their leading tribal deity. To the New Guineans He was therefore irrelevant to their life. Keysser appreciated that to deny the existence of deities and ancestors, or even to attempt to convert individual natives was simply counter-productive: religion and the world were one seamless garment for the New Guinean. The descent group and the tribe were the basic units of life and action, neither of them subject to segmentation; each clan member was indissolubly linked to his fellow members and obliged to help and defend the clan. Individual conversion thus implied isolation and disintegration and was therefore resisted. There was also the fear that the rest of the group would reap the anger of the ancestors. Keysser proceeded on the basis that the people must not be encouraged to abandon the ancestors, nor their corporate social units. Instead the entire cosmic order must be incorporated within Christianity in a suitable synthesis.

This of course helps to explain the notable lasting success of the Neuendettelsau Mission in Christianizing the people of the Huon Peninsula and maintaining permanent good relations with them. Other missions in other

1. ND Archives, Keysser: 'Die Seele der Papua Christen', Parts I-V.

areas encountered the same attitudes with local variations, though most were unable to emulate the degree of success achieved by Keysser's methods. A significant objection to Christian teaching made by an old Sulka man in the Gazelle was the fact that no missionary would concede he had seen Christ, or had been in Heaven and Hell, both tests of the new God's reality. Moreover, he had no desire to live in a new heaven where he was unknown and would probably be killed as a stranger. At least in the traditional village of the dead he was familiar with all his ancestors.¹

A common feature in the thought system of many New Guinean societies was the importance of dreams or visions in revealing cultural truths. The Sulka man's most telling argument against Christianity was the fact that he had never dreamed of Heaven and Hell - a precondition of their existence.² The Lutheran missionaries around Madang documented the same fact. One noted that for local people one individual's dream could have a more potent effect than a long speech in determining a village's pattern of action. and it is notable that the turning point of missionary acceptance south of Madang accompanied the visionary appearance of a 'man from heaven'.³ There are also constant references to the part played by the secret male cults in the life of the Madang villages, cults which the mission regarded as the greatest obstacle to conversion, the 'bulwark of paganism'.⁴ The situation at Ragetta in 1907, where there were not only constant complaints to the administration about the mission's campaign against the cults but also attempts to neutralize by sorcery the influence of the leading Christian convert,⁵ demonstrates the accuracy of Keysser's observation on the tensions introduced into a traditional community by the conversion of a few individuals.

1. HJM Archives, Ms: 'Erinnerungen', Joh. Meier, pp 25-7.

2. Ibid.

3. RMG Archives, Referate: Diehl, 9 May 1907.

4. See for example, RMG Archives, Referate: Gemeindeordnung 1912; and Stationsberichte: Jahresbericht Bongu 1902 and Jahresbericht Bogadjim 1902.

5. See page 234-5.

The cultural demands which missionaries made of Pacific Islanders, particularly New Guineans, were really very fundamental, and there were few immediate tangible benefits. Missionaries sought to transform the traditional cosmology of the islander's world and replace the time-honoured cults and sanctions with a new and untried dogma which stressed reward in some future invisible life. If these demands to abandon the old ways were pursued in an imprudent fashion, with a complete misunderstanding of the local mind, then they could, and did kindle resistance.

The Lutheran mission at Madang seems particularly to have offended in this respect. Cult festivities, sometimes lasting for weeks, appeared a profligate waste of time to the Rhenish missionaries, and although the Parish Instructions (Gemeindeordnung) promulgated in 1912 emphasized the need to differentiate between acts hostile and indifferent to Christianity, they still declared the secret male cults, the festivities for ancestors and spirits, circumcision and traditional burial customs as anti-Christian because they involved 'sorcery'; even dancing was proscribed for converts because of the danger of pagan elements being involved.¹ 'Paganism' was treated as a malicious enemy of civilization and morality and more than once the Madang New Guineans were compared to a colony of amoral criminals.²

This conservatism and rigid intolerance of ritual practices was partly responsible for the Rhenish Mission's conspicuous lack of success before 1912 and for the New Guineans' intention to subjugate it along with the other whites in 1904 and possibly in 1912. The Madang revolt was in one sense a blow in defence of the traditional life, for some freedom to follow the ancestors' ways. While the New Guineans may have been prepared to accept the obvious technological advantages and material wealth of European culture, this did not necessarily extend to the Europeans' laws and outlook

1. RMG Archives, Referate: Gemeindeordnung 1912; Also Conferenz Protokoll: 8. Conferenz, 18-20 Jan 1899.

2. Ibid.; 21 Conferenz, 12-17 Jan 1913.

their Weltanschauung, and as a corollary, the 'Jesus talk'¹ of the missionaries. Basically the same attitude motivated the Baining rebels of St. Paul in 1904. The massacre of the ten catholic missionaries represented an emphatic rejection of enforced assimilation, planned living, compulsory work and interference with indigenous customs; Rascher and his colleagues were the victims of an unacceptable method of colonization. Rascher himself must also bear some of the responsibility for the rising because of his presumptuous behaviour in judging Tò Marias by the canons of Christian morality. In a situation where Christianity hung very lightly on New Guinean shoulders, more as a socio-economic alliance than the product of inner conviction, European determination to preserve the Catholic ideal of marriage was hardly likely to find acceptance.

It is pertinent to ask at this point how firm conversion to Christianity was in the Pacific Islands; whether a real metanoia of personality was involved. Without impugning the sincerity of Pacific Island Christianity, then and now, it is safe to argue that conversion and loyalty to a European religion were often choices of desperation designed to recover some of the equilibrium of social life which European penetration had disturbed. In an area like Madang, for instance, where ancestral lands were lost forever and pressures were felt on all sides from various representatives of European civilization, conversion could be seen as offering a new rallying point and creating a new hope. It was expected to give access not only to the white man's material wealth but also to his moral strength: it could also be a subtle and effective form of resistance. As John Guiart puts it:

'to desperate people it was a haven, a frame within which social cohesion could be reestablished. This "word of life" had for them exactly the same meaning we would put in it. It meant the refusal of social death, the hope of a better

1. RMG Archives, Conferenz Protokolle II: Vorstand to Deputation 29 Aug 1904.

deal, and the will to be considered something other than ignorant savages'.¹

In the absence of any assumption of equality on the part of the Europeans and of institutional means to offer an effective challenge to the European objectives of overrule, conversion perhaps represented the only means to overcome social dislocation.

It is significant in this context that most of the well-documented movements towards Christianity in the German colonies were communal rather than a series of individual conversions. The turning points for both the Lutheran Missions on the New Guinea mainland in their struggles for a change of heart in the local inhabitants were mass movements, in the case of the Rhenish Mission, the Himmelsmann affair, while the instances in the Huon Peninsula bear out Keysser's convictions on the importance of the collective factor. The Boston Mission in Ponape also made its break-through by concentrating on the mass (through the chiefs) rather than on the individual.²

Consequently there must be some doubt as to the reality of the Christian revolution in the terms assumed by the missionaries, though this is not the place to go into the question fully. The average number of regular church-goers in Samoa was a high proportion of the total population yet the depth of commitment to European Christianity was not generally great. Many were loyal to their denomination because it was dictated by descent group loyalty or ambition. The ministry was regarded by many young Samoans as a mere profession, albeit a lucrative and influential one; hence the fierce competition for places at Malua. Any other occupation within the sphere of mission activity was treated with some disdain. As one London Missionary Society official summed it up: 'there can be few places where

1. J. Guiart, 'The Millenarian Aspect of Conversion to Christianity in the South Pacific', in Millennial Dreams in Action, (ed.) S. Thrupp, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Supplement II (The Hague 1962) p 132.

2. O'Brien, 'Impact of Missionaries Ponape', pp 10ff.

religion is more a badge of respectability than in Samoa'.¹

In this sort of situation, missionary work had obviously succeeded in reducing the occasions of conflict within traditional life and encouraging a greater degree of cooperation with European rule. This was the overall effect of mission activity throughout the German Pacific. While it cannot be denied that Christian zeal and missionary methods helped to precipitate racial collisions in the German period, the missions played a larger role in averting conflict, solving crises and softening the impact of European contact. A great deal of work remains to be done on mission history in the Pacific, particularly on the differential impact which the various Christian sects and their diverse approaches had on Pacific mores. Yet one must always keep in mind the reverse side of the process: Pacific Islanders did not make simple, predictable responses to the stimuli of European contact nor were western cultural elements mechanically incorporated into the local patterns of life. Change was, in a sense, independent of both traditional and European society: by making their own orientation to what they perceived as European culture, its apparent virtues and vices, the Pacific Islanders began to create and develop an amalgam different from either the old or the new. The process continues today.

1. LMS Archives, South Seas, Box 47/2: Barradale to Thompson 9 Jan 1902.

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