

Globalization, media trust, and populism: A comparative study of the US and Germany

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Abstract:	<p>Globalisation is one of the key areas where supporters and non-supporters of left- and right-wing parties disagree in domestic and international policies. Populists see metropolitan elites as “corrupted” and oppose policies that encourage international trade (economic), immigrations (political) or multi-culturalism (cultural). Meanwhile, digital media play an important role in facilitating information on pro- or anti-globalisation media content, on both social media platforms and news media platforms. What political and media trust factors shape attitudes toward globalisation issues in the US and Germany? What are the roles of digital media in shaping public understanding of globalisation issues?</p> <p>We used a unique combination of large-scale web-tracking and cross-country survey data to study the interactions between populist party/leader support, anti-elitism, media consumption and trust in digital media, and globalisation in the US and Germany. We found country variances for different aspects of globalisation, particularly for the supporters of right-wing populist parties or leaders. Populist anti-elitism and a feeling of powerlessness in relation to influencing the country's politics are two important factors behind the backlash against globalisation. We also found that a higher level of public broadcasting media trust is associated with more supportive attitudes toward globalisation in the US and Germany.</p>

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Abstract

Globalisation is one of the key areas where supporters and non-supporters of left- and right-wing parties disagree in domestic and international policies. Populists see metropolitan elites as “corrupted” and oppose policies that encourage international trade (economic), immigrations (political) or multi-culturalism (cultural). Meanwhile, digital media play an important role in facilitating information on pro- or anti-globalisation media content, on both social media platforms and news media platforms. What political and media trust factors shape attitudes toward globalisation issues in the US and Germany? What are the roles of digital media in shaping public understanding of globalisation issues? We used a unique combination of large-scale web-tracking and cross-country survey data to study the interactions between populist party/leader support, anti-elitism, media consumption and trust in digital media, and globalisation in the US and Germany. We found country variances for different aspects of globalisation, particularly for the supporters of right-wing populist parties or leaders. Populist anti-elitism and a feeling of powerlessness in relation to influencing the country’s politics are two important factors behind the backlash against globalisation. We also found that a higher level of public broadcasting media trust is associated with more supportive attitudes toward globalisation in the US and Germany.

Keywords: globalisation, comparative study, digital media, webtracking data, populism

Introduction

In this paper, we examine online media content consumed by populist and non-populist supporters and how this relates to the topic of globalization. It has been argued that supporters of populist parties and leaders are against globalization: they oppose the external global economic forces of trade and also immigration and the influence of foreign cultures. It has also been argued that greater reliance on social media for news could be related to greater anti-globalization sentiment which could, in turn, be due to lesser trust in traditional media. This paper is part of a larger project in which we examine a digital media and populism in several countries (removed for review), but here we focus on the US and Germany. These two countries have quite different media systems and political systems, but populists have made major gains in support in both countries, both on the right and the left. We use a unique dataset which combines webtracking data for three months in the spring of 2019 combined with a survey of participants for a representative sample. By linking the websites visited with survey responses, including support for right- and left-wing populist parties and leaders, we identify how the online news website content consumed by supporters differs from that of non-supporters.

We expected to find general opposition to globalization among populist supporters but find subtler differences between the three groups (left-, right- and non-populist supporters) than expected. To anticipate our conclusions briefly, there are some differences in the views of globalization between those who trust and rely on public service media and social media in Germany on this topic, and otherwise right- and left-wing populist supporters are quite varied along the three dimensions of globalization which we examined – trade, immigration, and multiculturalism. These findings call for carefully distinguishing between various dimensions of anti-globalization backlash and taking different media systems into account when doing so.

The paper will proceed as follows: first, we review debates about populism and globalization and role of digital media, including previous literature on the topic. Next we give an account of the methods and datasets used. We then discuss the findings and implications for future research.

Literature review

Anti-globalisation and populism

In this paper we examine a number of issues related to globalization and how this relates to media and populism. In the rapidly growing field of populism research, a widely used definition is that by Mudde (2007), with the opposition between ‘corrupt elites’ and ‘the pure people’. There are right- and left-wing versions populism: the corrupt political elite and majority of native-born people in the right-wing version, or the economic elite and economically vulnerable workers in the left-wing version. A more general discussion of populism is out of place here, but in relation to the connection between globalization and populism, a number of positions have been counterposed: these include cosmopolitans versus locals, urban versus rural, metropolitan elites versus the ‘left behind’, and others. There are also a number of different dimensions in the opposition between support for globalization and anti-globalization, such as those focused on economic issues (trade, work migration, finance) as against those focused on cultural issues (immigration, but also cultural diversity or multiculturalism) (Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Steger and James, 2019). These dimensions can, of course, overlap. And there is in addition the political dimension, overlapping but also distinct, concerning the boundedness or otherwise of nation-states and the rights of citizens and non-citizens within it (removed for review).

Instead of a comprehensive review of the debates the different dimensions about globalization and populism, it will be useful to highlight a number of distinctive arguments and approaches that have been put forward and that relate to the dimensions that will be examined here. Koopmans and Zürn see an opposition between cosmopolitans and

communitarians: ‘We...define the political ideology of cosmopolitanism as the combination of a position that asks for open borders and a supranational level of regulation for transactions across borders. The political ideology of communitarianism, by contrast, is defined by the combination of a position that views justice as tied to specific communities and a belief in the nation state as the primary unit in which such circumscribed justice can be realized.’ (Koopmans & Zürn, 2019, p. 15). But, except on immigration, where communitarians are right-wing, otherwise communitarians and cosmopolitans can be found both on the right and the left (ibid, p.4-5). The research by Koopmans and Zürn was undertaken in order to gauge elite versus mass support for or against globalization, and others (working on the same project as Koopmans and Zürn) say that they ‘expect the coalition of winners under globalization to support cosmopolitan positions and the losers to join the communitarian club.’ (Strijbis et al., 2019), p.19). In this paper, we are interested in populists rather than communitarians, but the connection between globalization and elite or anti-elite sentiment will be important in what follows.

Much academic research on populist attitudes, including ours, relies on surveys of representative samples of the population, a quantitative approach. But it is worth mentioning that there also ethnographic accounts that address globalization and populism, at least for Germany and the US, the countries considered here. Mau (2019), in his book about a small town in the former East Germany, makes clear why, despite the fact that the town has seen few immigrants, the population can nevertheless be described as ‘rural’ or ‘losers’ of globalization. The strong support in this German town for the populist AfD (Alternative for Germany) shares some characteristics with the population examined in Cramer’s (2016) book about rural Wisconsin: resentful, anti-immigrant (and so pro-Trump – or at the time, Scott Walker), and feeling ‘left-behind’ or voiceless vis-à-vis urban elites. The importance of the two studies is that they show many similarities despite the quite different country settings,

and so provide an understanding of how some people think about political and economic elites. These accounts of the anti-globalization views of populist supporters also shed light on certain understandings that may be different from those of cosmopolitan academic researchers.

Yet another way of linking globalization to populism can be found in the recent work of Piketty (2020) who links populism to the emergence of a 'Brahmin' elite which is highly educated and mainly found in the professions - as against a 'merchant elite' of leaders in industry. The Brahmin elite, in Piketty's view, has recently abandoned the working class. In the US for example, workers used to support the Democratic party, which is now mainly supported by Piketty's Brahmins, and but it has defected to supporting the Republican party and especially Donald Trump. Piketty links this to how the working class is threatened by economic globalization while the Brahmin elite and the merchant elites favour globalization, from which they benefit. Lind (2020) has put forward a somewhat different argument for the US and Western democracies: he contrasts a metropolitan 'overclass' elite with an increasingly worse off working or middle class (as this group sees itself in America) majority: 'the center of gravity of the overclass is center-right (promarket) on economic issues and center left (anti-traditional) on cultural issues. In comparison, the center of gravity of the much larger working class is center left on economic issues and center right on social issues' (2020: 73). Note that leftism on this account means economic protectionism whereas social issues concern multiculturalism which is aimed against the 'intellectualism' of metropolitan elites (see also Judis, 2000, 2016).

So far, we have sketched arguments in relation to populism and globalization and elites. What about media? Cosmopolitanism versus localism has not been much tied to media, but Collins (2016) provides a starting point here, albeit for stratification in conversations rather than media: He argues that those with the most extensive and variegated networks –

cosmopolitans - have conversation topics that are more global than those with restricted and close-knit networks – locals - whose world is circumscribed. So, for example, ‘international politics...is real (if not accurately so) to upper class people, because they talk about it daily; it is a haze to lower-class who do not’ (2016: 98). This chimes well with Lind’s account, and could equally apply to abstract economic issues such as global labour markets or trade. This is also where media come in: Russell Neuman et al. (2014) drew on regular surveys of Americans that ask them about what they consider to be most important issues. Then they compared how those issues are covered in traditional media and in social media. They found that ‘social media are more responsive to public order and social issues and less responsive to the abstractions of economics and foreign affairs’ (2014: 199). In other words, the issues that are most salient to the public, which are more closely reflected in social media, are different from the issues in traditional media which are more closely tied to the concerns of media and political and economic elites. Be that as it may, it will be important for us to see if globalization in relation the openness of the economy and migration and culture are reflected in the media consumed by populists and non-populists.

Media trust and populism

As for trust in media, Fletcher (2020) has summarized data from the period of 2015-19 from the Reuters Digital News Report, noting that the ‘proportion that trust most news most of the time’ has declined in Germany from 63% to 47% though in the US it was practically unchanged over the same period at 32%. The backdrop here is that trust in news has generally decreased over time, though not in all countries (as with the US). Kalogeropoulos et al. (2019) looked more closely at the difference between traditional and digital-born sources of news as against the use of social media for news in 35 countries including the US and Germany, and found that ‘using social media as a main source of news is correlated with a lower level of trust in news’ (2019: 3682). Populists’ trust in media more

specifically was examined by Newman et al. (2019)n, who found those with populist attitudes are greater users of TV for news than non-populists but that populists are also heavy users of Facebook for news (2019: 43). They also found a complex relationship between populists, news uses and trust, whereby ‘people who do not find any news media that do not reflect their attitudes often trust all news media less (2019: 47). Fawzi (2019), in a study of Germany, further links this lack of trust to anti-elitism: ‘Citizens who are skeptical about the political elite clearly transfer this negative evaluation to the media, and the results indicate that this is the case because they perceive the media to be part of the political elite: Media and politics are seen as one conglomerate representing the same establishment, which holds for journalists from tabloid media as well’(2019: 158).

These findings and background considerations lead us to our main research questions: what do the website visits related to globalization reveal about the attitudes of (right- or left-wing) populists and non-supporters to key globalization issues? Are these differences evident in relation to globalization related issues or events? And how does trust in media, and perhaps by implication in elites, relate to the link between populism and globalization? Once we have reviewed our findings, we will come back to the connections between these topics.

Methods

Survey data

Dependent variables

We used eight globalization attitudes variables that measured four dimensions: trade, immigration, ethnic citizenship, and cultural diversity. Table 1 provides wordings of the survey questions and measurement of dependent variables on globalisation attitudes.

Independent variables

Three groups of independent variables were used in the regression models: political attitudes, media use and trust, and demographic variables. Political attitudes variables consist

of support for right- and left- wing populist parties or leaders. In this case supporters of the AfD or Donald Trump were coded as right-wing populist party support and supporters of Die Linke or Bernie Sanders were coded as left-wing populist party support. Left/right political orientation was measured with a range from 1 to 11 (1 = far left; 11 = far right). Political interest concerned the level of interest in politics (1 = not at all interested; 4 = very interested). Political efficacy is about the extent to which participants consider that they have the opportunity to influence politics (0 = no influence at all; 10 = a great deal of influence). We also used one dimension of Schulz's (2019) populist attitude scale, anti-elitism, to evaluate the level of anti-elitism among participants (see Appendix A for factor loadings of the confirmatory factor analysis of items on these scales and a scree plot that was used to decide the number of factors). We used component loadings for each factor as the factor scores for the new variable of an anti-elitism attitude, which is one of the three factors identified in Schulz's populist scale (the other two factors were 'sovereignty' and the 'homogeneity' of the people, for a discussion of populism scales, see xx [removed for review]). Factor scores were standardised before adding the regression models as an independent variable.

In addition to political attitudes, we were interested in exploring the relationship between media use, media trust, and attitudes toward globalisation. We measured the attention to social media for political news by surveying the importance of social media as a source of political news (1 = not at all important; 4 = very important). For attention paid to online news websites, we calculated the percentage of time spent on each type of news website in relation to the total time participants spent on visiting online news websites: Values of relative attention to each type of news website – which includes commercial broadcaster, digital-born news outlet, hyper-partisan media, public broadcaster, quality newspaper/magazine, and tabloid newspaper - were standardised and we used relative

attention to tabloid newspaper as a reference category for online news media attention to avoid structural multicollinearity (the sum of percentages of time spent on all types of media websites equals 1). Trust in social media and different types of news media for political news was also measured in the survey (1 = do not trust at all; 4 = trust a great deal).

Demographic variables were also included in the regression models to control the variance among different socio-economic groups. In addition to education, gender, religion, and income level, we also included residential region (1 = centre or outskirts of a metropolitan area; or 2 = non-metropolitan areas) because the existing literature suggests that there is a divergence in globalisation attitudes as between metropolitan elites and residents of rural areas or small towns. Table 2 and Table 3 show summary statistics of all independent variables in the US and Germany datasets. Table 4 shows wordings of the survey questions and measurements used as independent variables to account for globalisation attitudes.

[Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4 to be inserted here]

Web tracking data

To identify news visits in relation to issues concerning globalisation, we undertook a search for keywords related to trade, immigration, ethnic citizenship, and cultural diversity in the German and American datasets of news website visits. A news website visit is defined as related to globalisation if the URL contains the keywords in our list. Appendix B provides information on the keywords used in the study and the number of visits, distinct panellists, distinct website domains for each keyword. We identified 2504 and 2489 visits to globalisation-related news websites from the web tracking datasets for the US and Germany.

We first analysed the change of online attention to globalisation news by calculating average time spent on globalisation related websites per person per day in the US and Germany. We specifically focused on the dates where supporters or non-supporters of populist parties spent the longest time on globalisation news websites or the peaks of average

attention to globalisation news during our data collection period. We then returned to the web-tracking dataset to identify what news articles on the particular dates received the highest amount of attention among right-wing and non-right-wing audience. Different factors such as specific political events, the news media agenda, or online discourses of globalisation-related issues might have driven the rise of online attention to globalisation news. Comparison of what content attracts the most attention to globalisation news can reveal different media interests as between supporters and non-supporters of the populist parties or leaders.

In view of a descriptive analysis of the change of attention to globalisation websites, we can then explore what individual-level and media-level factors are associated with online attention to globalisation related news. We define attention to each globalisation URL as time spent on the visit. Three individual-level and three media-level factors are introduced to regress on online attention to globalisation related URLs: for the individual-level, we include support for populist party or leader, political interest, and Left-Right political leaning of the panellist. All three variables about panellists were collected in our survey and integrated with web-tracking data through matching unique panellist' IDs. As for media, we were interested in the topic of the URL identified by means of a keyword search within the URL and including international trade, immigration, citizenship, and cultural diversity. Media type, as mentioned in the previous section, was coded by team members of the research project [removed for review] included six media categories: commercial broadcaster, digital-born news outlet, hyper-partisan media, public broadcaster, quality newspaper or magazine, and tabloid newspaper. Finally, we also created a new variable - media Right-Left political orientation – by means of a unique combination of web-tracking and survey data: all news media in the news tracking dataset were calculated based on the mean values of the political orientations of panellists who visited the news domain, with a resulting value of media

political orientation ranging from 1 (far left) to 11 (far right). Inferred media political orientation will be examined in a future paper, but visualisations of the most visited news domains and media political orientation as inferred by their audience in the US and Germany is provided in Appendix C. Table 5 and Table 6 provide summary statistics of independent variables used in the regression analysis of online attention to globalisation websites in the US and Germany (it should be noted that there are three and four globalisation news website visits made by panellists who did not participate in the survey study in the US and Germany respectively, which we excluded from the analysis).

[Table 5 and Table 6 to be inserted here]

Survey analysis

Cross-country comparisons of globalization attitudes between the US and Germany

Before analysing which political or demographic variables are significantly correlated with anti-globalization attitudes, we first compare country differences between the US and Germany in anti-globalization attitudes. Table 7 shows the mean values for both countries on four globalization attitudes. We conducted independent t-tests to see if any country differences were statistically significant, with the higher values indicating more support among panellists in the country for globalization. We find that across four dimensions of globalization attitudes, American and German respondents are significantly different on all dimensions. American panellists are less likely to believe that trade is beneficial for individuals than their German counterparts ($t(df) = 7.55(2726)$, $p < .001$). Nevertheless, German panellists are less supportive of immigration than their American counterparts and to believe in the cultural ($t(df) = -10.18(2731)$, $p < .001$) and economic benefits ($t(df) = -6.93(2719)$, $p < .001$) of immigration. German panellists are also less likely than Americans to emphasise that being born ($t(df) = 6.18$, $p < .001$) or having ancestry in the country ($t(df) = 5.09$, $p < .001$) is important for granting citizenship rights. The issue of Islam is more complicated in our country comparison: although German participants are more likely than

Americans to see Islam as violent than other faiths ($t(df) = -3.83(2723)$, $p < .001$), they are more likely to agree that Islam is compatible with democracy ($t(df) = 17.56(2730)$, $p < .001$).

[Table 7 to be inserted here]

Regression models on globalisation attitudes in the US

We ran multiple linear regressions on the four dimensions of globalisation attitudes in the US, using political position variables, media attention and trust variables, and demographic variables as independent variables. Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4 show the visualisation of coefficients of political and media attention and media trust variables in the US models. Table 8 and Table 9 show summary tables of all regression models on globalisation variables in the US. Data analysis on the regression results on globalisation in the US suggest that, after controlling for demographic variables, support for populist leaders, the feeling of not being given opportunities to influence politics, and anti-elite populist attitudes play important roles in shaping globalisation attitudes toward trade, immigration, ethnicity and citizenship, and cultural diversity.

[Insert Figure 1 to Figure 4 and Table 8 and Table 9 here]

We find contradictory views toward trade and immigration among Trump supporters: on the one hand, Trump supporters are significantly more likely than non-supporters to believe that their families have benefited from trade financially ($B = 0.534$, $p < .05$). However, they are also less likely than non-supporters of Trump to see immigration as enriching the country's culture ($B = -1.592$, $p < .001$) or as being good for the country's economy ($B = -1.386$, $p < .001$). Supporters of Bernie Sanders show stronger support for more trade with other countries than non-supporters ($B = .586$, $p < .05$). Meanwhile, the feeling of being inadequately represented in the political system is significantly correlated with anti-trade and anti-immigration attitudes in the US. On the dimension of trade and immigration, anti-elitist sentiment is not significantly correlated with anti-globalisation. On

the other hand, we find that higher attention paid to commercial media is linked to lower support for the economic benefits of trade ($B = -0.315$, $p < .05$) while higher trust in news from publicly owned media is associated with higher support for more trade ($B = 1.145$, $p < .05$).

On the dimensions of citizenship and cultural diversity, we find that support for a right-wing populist leader (Trump) is strongly correlated with more conservative views on granting citizenship rights regardless of country of origin ($B = -.363$, $p < .001$) or ancestry history ($B = -.195$, $p < .05$) and on acceptance of the Islamic faith ($B = -.843$, $p < .001$) and culture ($B = -.668$, $p < .001$). Unlike trade, where we see a difference between Trump and Sanders supporters, on attitudes towards the compatibility of Islam with democracy, Sanders supporters are also more likely to consider that there is a natural conflict between Islam and democracy than non-supporters ($B = -.366$, $p < .05$). While the feeling of not being represented by political system is linked with stronger opposition to giving citizenship to people without ancestry in the country ($B = -.024$, $p < .05$), anti-elitist attitudes are associated with both dependent variables on Islam: the stronger the anti-elitist attitudes of panellists, the more likely is the view that Islam is more violent than other faiths ($B = -.122$, $p < .001$) and the belief that there is a conflict between Islam and democracy ($B = -.109$, $p < .001$). Meanwhile, more attention paid to public broadcast media and a higher level of trust in public broadcast TV and radio is related to stronger support for giving citizenship to people not being born ($B = .173$, $p < .05$) or not having ancestry ($B = .10$, $p < .05$) in the US and this is also associated with more favourable attitudes towards Islam as a religion ($B = .19$, $p < .01$) or as part of a democratic society ($B = .13$, $p < .05$). Trust in social media as a news source has the opposite effect: the higher the trust in social media as a source for political news, the more negative their views towards giving citizenship regardless of country of birth ($B = -.11$, $p < .05$) or ancestry history ($B = -.18$, $p < .001$) and towards the view of Islam as a

non-violent religion ($B = -.19, p < .001$) or as part of a democratic society ($B = -.15, p < .01$).

We found similar links between trust in news from privately owned media and citizenship and Islam, though not with respect to viewing Islam as incompatible with democracy.

Regression models on globalisation attitudes in the Germany

Table 10 and Table 11 show summaries of regression models on all four dimensions of globalisation in Germany and Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8 show visualisations of political and media coefficients in the regression models for globalisation attitudes in Germany. For trade and immigration, supporters of the right-wing populist party AfD and of the left-wing populist party Die Linke are both more likely to hold anti-trade or anti-immigration attitudes than supporters of other parties. Another noticeable difference between the US and Germany is that while the right-leaning political orientation in the US does not significantly correlate with anti-trade attitudes, in Germany, the more right-leaning the panellist, the stronger the opposition to international trade. Also, we find that political efficacy, or the feeling of having opportunities to influence politics, is strongly associated with support for trade and immigration. Nevertheless, similar to panellists in the US, anti-elitism attitudes do not significantly influence attitudes toward trade and immigration among German panellists. Attention to - and trust in - political news on social media are correlated with more negative views on trade and immigration. On the other hand, we find that higher trust in political news from newspapers is associated with more favourable attitudes toward international trade.

[Insert Figure 5 to Figure 8 and Table 10 and Table 11 here]

On the dimension of ethnic citizenship and cultural diversity, we find differences between supporters of the AfD (right-wing populist party) and Die Linke (left-wing populist party) in Germany: While AfD supporters are more likely to reject granting citizenship to people who are not born in Germany ($B = -.42, p < .01$) and to consider Islam incompatible

with democracy ($B = -.50, p < .01$), we did not find statistically significant evidence of similar support for Die Linke, though there are similar correlations for this party concerning more conservative attitudes toward ethnic citizenship and cultural diversity. On these two dimensions, we also find a significant correlation between anti-elitism and opposition to granting citizenship to people born in other countries ($B = -.15, p < .01$) or those do not have an ancestry history in Germany ($B = -.11, p < .05$) as well as negative attitudes against Islam ($B = -.39, p < .001$) and the compatibility of Islam with a democratic society ($B = -.27, p < .001$). Similar to trade and immigration, on ethnic citizenship, more attention paid to political news from social media is associated with less support for granting citizenship to wider ethnic groups. We also find a divide between trust in publicly owned and privately owned media: panellists who trust news from publicly owned media are more likely to support giving citizenship to people who are not born in the country ($B = .13, p < .01$) and panellists who trust news from privately owned media are less likely to support the broadening of ethnic citizenship ($B = -.13, p < .05$). An interesting and perhaps surprising result is that attention paid to hyper-partisan media and digital born media is linked to more support for giving citizenship to people born in other countries ($B = .15, p < .05$) or who have ancestry in other countries ($B = .13, p < .05$). This suggests a need not only to examine the use of different types of digital media - but also the content of alternative media platforms to understand their influence in shaping public attitudes toward ethnicity and citizenship (again, a topic for future work).

Web-tracking data analysis

Public attention to globalisation related news content online

The rise and fall of public attention to online news about social issues (i.e. climate change) is often influenced by offline events [removed for review]. Attention to globalisation related news websites was measured here by calculating average time spent on a globalisation

related news website per panellist. Before running statistical analysis of the individual, media, or societal factors that drive online attention to globalisation related news websites, we first visualise the overall change of online attention to globalisation in Germany and the US.

Figure 9 visualises the change of online attention to globalisation content in the US across three political groups – all panellists, non-right-wing and right-wing panellists. To identify the issues that might lead to the peaks of attention among non-right-wing and right-wing panellists to globalisation related news, we manually checked the dates when the two groups reached the highest average points in online attention. It appears that right-wing populist supporter's attention to globalisation peaked on April 26, when a hyper-partisan website, Western Journal (among others), reported a change in the Immigration and Nationality Act that would keep asylum-seekers detained while they wait for their cases to be heard in immigration courtsⁱ. Meanwhile, non-right-wing panellists' attention peaked on April 5, 2019 when a news story discussed the damage to the economy caused by Trump's trade warⁱⁱ.

[Insert Figure 9 here]

Figure 10 visualises the change in average online attention to globalisation related news websites among different political groups in Germany. Our data collection period covered the 2019 European Parliament election in Germany on May 26, 2019. We therefore highlight the election period (from one week before the election date to one week after the election date) in the plot. As shown in Figure 10, average attention to globalisation news websites among non-right-wing panellists in Germany peaked on May 14, 2019, exemplified by an article on the protection of refugee status against deportation even in the event of serious crimesⁱⁱⁱ. The peak of average attention to globalisation news among AfD supporters, during the election period on the other hand was on May 23, 2019, when there were stories

about a family that fled from Norway to seek asylum status in Poland for fear of losing the custody of their child to Barnevernet, the Norwegian child protection agency^{iv}. From this descriptive analysis of changes in attention to globalisation news in the US and Germany, it seems that right-wing populists and non-populists' attention is driven by different kinds of news coverage of globalisation: while right-wing supporters' attention peaks with news stories about stronger immigration controls or the side effects of immigration policies, non-supporters' attention peaks with stories about the negative impact of trade wars or greater protection for the rights of refugees.

[Insert Figure 10 here]

Individual, media, and societal factors shaping public attention to globalisation

Figure 11 shows the coefficients in the regression models about public attention to globalisation websites in the US and Germany. Summary tables for the two regression models is shown in Appendix D.

[Insert Figure 11 here]

In the regression model for online attention to globalisation websites in the US, we find that the online media-level factor (media type) is statistically significantly associated with attention to globalisation news websites online: users of commercial broadcaster channels are more likely to spend longer time on globalisation news content than visitors to quality newspapers or magazines ($B = -25.70, p < .001$) and digital-born news outlets ($B = -21.48, p < .01$). Visits to media outlets that have a right-leaning political orientation also tend to have a shorter attention span than other media outlets at a significance level of 0.1 ($B = -1.98, p < .1$).

We conducted a post-hoc analysis on media type to learn more about the differences across the different media types in online attention to globalisation-related content. Table E 1 in Appendix E compares the means for attention to globalisation-related content on different

types of media. In addition to commercial media, audiences for hyper-partisan media and tabloid newspapers also seem to pay lengthier attention to globalisation-related content than audience of quality newspapers or magazines. We also conducted Tukey's multiple comparisons of means across different media type for all news tracking data to see if similar differences are observed in all news content (see Table E 2 in Appendix E). The comparison suggests that in all news content, American consumers spend longer time on commercial broadcasters, hyper-partisan media, and tabloid newspapers than quality newspapers or magazines for general news consumption. Thus, the differences of attention to globalisation news content we observed is in line with the variances across media types in how much attention they attract from American news consumers.

Online attention to globalisation-related websites in Germany is associated with both individual-level and media-level factors. Right-wing populists spent a longer time with globalisation-related websites at a significance level of 0.1 ($B = 11.45$, $p < .1$). Unlike attention to globalisation-related news in the US which varies across media types, the significant differences of online attention to globalisation in Germany appears across different topics: We find that German panellists paid more attention to news about immigration and trade than to citizenship when it comes to globalisation-related content. Table E 3 shows the post-hoc test in differences in attention to globalisation related content across different topics. We find that website content on immigration receives more attention than content about citizenship or cultural diversity in Germany. Content related to international trade also attracts more attention than news stories about cultural diversity in Germany. We did not observe, however, significant differences in users' attention to globalisation website content across various media types in Germany, although there are statistically significant differences in users' attention to news websites (for all news content) across different media types in Germany (see Table E 4 in Appendix E).

Discussion and Conclusion

In this paper, we used a unique combination of web-tracking and survey data to study the interactions between populist party/leader support, anti-elitism, media consumption and trust in digital media, and globalisation in the US and Germany. We found country variances for different aspects of globalisation, particularly for the supporters of right-wing populist parties or leaders. It seems that American citizens are, in fact, more likely to believe in the benefits of trade for households than their German counterparts, and this may be because the benefits of international trade are more readily apparent in the US as it is a large and leading exporting and importing economy. Or perhaps the issue is of similar importance in Germany but regarded in a more critical light. Anti-immigration and anti-multicultural sentiment, on the other hand, are stronger in Germany than in the US, perhaps because the US has long been a nation of immigrants. These findings are nevertheless surprising, given President Trump's strong anti-immigrant rhetoric, and also since Germany, too, is a large exporting and importing economy. Further, as Ivaldi and Mazzoleni (2019) have documented, similar economic nationalist views can be found among American and European populists.

Our regression analysis of globalisation attitudes shows that it is important to distinguish between different types of anti-globalisation sentiment and to compare supporters of left- and right-wing populist parties or leaders in the US and Germany. Again, surprisingly, we found that contrary to the media portrayal of Trump supporters' strong resistance to global trade, they are more likely than non-supporters of Trump to acknowledge the benefits of international trade for individuals and households. Such a difference was not observed on issues such as immigration or multi-culturalism, where Trump supporters hold more negative views of globalisation. Also worth noting is the difference between left-wing populists in the US and in Germany in their attitudes towards whether or their countries should have more international trade with other countries: Bernie Sanders' supporters hold

more positive views of increased international trade than non-populists, while Die Linke supporters are less willing to support more trade compared to supporters of other parties. These findings suggest that left-wing European populist supporters are most strongly concerned with the harmfulness of trade, while the issue is less salient to other Germans and to Americans, who are more concerned with other issues.

In addition to support for populist parties and leaders, we also found that populist anti-elitism and a feeling of powerlessness in relation to influencing the country's politics are two important factors behind the backlash against globalisation. In both the US and Germany, panellists who believe that they are less fully engaged in political decision-making are more likely to hold anti-trade and anti-immigration attitudes than others. At the same time, the more strongly American and German panellists believe that elites are evil and corrupt, the more likely they are to consider Islam to be a faith that encourages violence or that is incompatible with Western democracy. These findings show a division between grassroots voters and political elites in attitudes to globalisation. A key step in breaking down this divide may therefore be to mitigate the feeling of lacking in political engagement in debates about globalisation and in policymaking among American or German citizens.

Traditional and digital media play important roles in shaping public understanding of globalisation issues. We found that a higher level of trust toward public broadcasting media or more attention to online news from public broadcasting media outlets is associated with more supportive attitudes toward globalisation in the US and Germany. High trust in social media as a news source for globalisation issues is also negatively associated with pro-globalisation attitudes. We therefore argue both that public broadcasters in positive direction and less exclusive reliance in social media can play a significant role in addressing the backlash towards globalisation.

When comparing individual- and media- level factors that shape online attention to online globalisation-related news content, we found that attention to globalisation content in Germany differ significantly across different topics, with immigration receiving more attention than news websites about citizenship or cultural diversity. No such statistically significant variations were found, however, for news related to globalisation in the US. This prolonged attention to immigration in Germany indicates which issues have the greatest potential to provoke an anti-globalization ‘backlash’. But any such cultural ‘backlash’ is clearly complex, as when Norris and Inglehart (2018) found that older and less educated citizens are more prone to Islamophobia than other parts of the population and they also found more support for populists among the economic ‘losers’ of globalization.

The broader issue, as discussed in the background and literature review section, are what drives anti-globalization views? Economic (‘losers’) and cultural (‘identity’) explanations have been put forward. And perhaps there are forces apart from right- and left-wing populism, even if left-wing populism has been associated more with economic factors and right-wing populism more with cultural factors (removed for review). We found mixed results for Germany and the US, but before we summarize these, it can be mentioned that perhaps globalization, both in its economic and immigrant and cultural dimensions, is just not an issue that publics pay much attention to in the media? This is hard to say on the basis of our data, though it has been shown, for example, that trade policy is a low salience issue for Americans unless it is tied (however tangential this is in practice) to job losses Guisinger (2017). One previous finding that our research has confirmed, however, is that some populist supporters trust social media more and traditional media less, which speaks to a critical stance towards globalization-related news and against elites. The finding that German populist supporters are more concerned about trade than American populists may nevertheless be a sign that Americans are less prone to pay attention to the issue in the media

(see Neumann et al., 2014), even if support for President Trump's populist opposition to trade and immigration - if judged by his approval ratings - has remained at high levels. Populist supporters in the US, like their German counterparts, do care about immigration and multiculturalism. And among left-wing populist supporters, only the German Die Linke stand out while trade is not an issue for Sanders supporters. In the German media system with public service media, the distrust in public service media and trust in social media stands out among populists, as does the attention to immigration issues.

Our results point to the fact that when measuring populism in relation to globalization-related news, online attention and the different issues that populist pay distinctive attention to paint a more complicated picture than the 'economic versus cultural' factors would suggest: perhaps certain populist supporters like left-wing German ones are concerned with trade, while others, such as American right-wing populist supporters, express anti-globalization sentiments more in survey responses than in their media behaviour. What is clear from the globalization-related events that all our panellists paid attention to is that they are animated by quite different issues. These findings indicate that political and media elites must hit the right notes in very targeted ways if an anti-globalization backlash is to be mitigated. And in terms of research, peoples' online attention should be examined further, and political differences in relation to globalization provide fertile ground for probing which issues they pay attention to.

Put differently, our findings present a complex picture, and suggest that populists, and publics generally, are more concerned with issues closer to home and trust media that are closer to their views and are less concerned about issues that are more distant and distrust the agenda set by elite media, using social media to follow these interests. Such findings point to new directions in the study of digital – and perhaps traditional – media.

Table 1 Summary of dependent variables: concepts, measurements, wordings, and values

Concepts	Measurements	Wordings	Values
Trade	Trade: hurt or helped individuals	Do you think this has hurt you and your family financially or has it helped your family's financial situation?	1 = Trade hurt me and my family 10 = Trade helped me and my family
	Trade: want fewer or more trade	Do you think the EU/US should have more trade agreements with other countries or have fewer trade agreements?	1 = EU/ US should have fewer trade 10 = EU/US should have more trade
Immigration	Immigration undermined or enriched the country's culture	Would you say that Germany/America's cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?	1 = Cultural life undermined 10 = Cultural life enriched
	Immigration bad or good for the economy	Would you say it is generally bad or good for Germany/America's economy that people come to live here from other countries?	1 = Bad for the economy 10 = Good for the economy
Ethnic citizenship	Importance of being born in the country for citizenship	How important do you think to have been born in Germany/America is?	1 = Very important 2 = Quite important 3 = Not important 4 = Not at all important
	Importance of having ancestry in the country for citizenship	How important do you think to have Germany/America's ancestry?	1 = Very important 2 = Quite important 3 = Not important 4 = Not at all important
Cultural diversity	Islam not more violent	Islam does not encourage violence more than other faiths.	1 = Strongly disagree 2 = Somewhat disagree 3 = Neither disagree nor agree 4 = Somewhat agree 5 = Strongly agree
	Islam is not in conflict with democracy	There is no natural conflict between Islam and democracy.	1 = Strongly disagree 2 = Somewhat disagree 3 = Neither disagree nor agree 4 = Somewhat agree 5 = Strongly agree

Table 2 Descriptive statistics of independent variables in the US survey dataset

Group	Variables	Valid	Missing	Freqs (% of Valid) / Stats
Political attitudes	Right-wing party support	1510	0	
	No			1162 (77.0%)
	Yes			348 (23.1%)
	Left-wing party support	1510	0	
	No			1375 (91.1%)
	Yes			135 (8.9%)
	Left-right orientation (1-11)	1505	5	6.4 (2.7)
	Political interest (1-4)	1509	1	2.6 (1)
	Political efficacy (1-11)	1263	247	5.5(3)
Media attention Media trust	Anti-elitism attitude	1449	61	-0.1(1)
	Social media attention (1-4)	1506	4	2.6(1)
	Commercial media attention	1111	399	0.4(1.2)
	Digital-born media attention	1111	399	0.3(1.2)
	Hyper-partisan media attention	1111	399	0.4(1.9)
	Public broadcaster attention	1111	399	-0.4(0.5)
	Quality newspaper/magazine attention	1111	399	-0.3(0.9)
	Trust of social media (1-5)	1507	3	2.5(1)
	Trust of public broadcasting tv or radio (1-5)	1508	2	3.1(1.1)
	Trust of private broadcasting tv or radio (1-5)	1506	4	2.8(0.9)
	Trust of newspaper (1-5)	1504	6	3(1)
Demographic variables	Age	1508	2	47.34 (14.7)
	Gender	1503	7	
	Female			920 (61.2%)
	Male			583 (38.8%)
	Education	1508	2	
	Low			70 (4.6%)
	Intermediate			927 (61.5%)

	High			511 (33.9%)
Total income		1510	0	
	Low			388 (25.7%)
	Intermediate			571 (37.8%)
	High			551 (36.5%)
Religion		1504	6	
	Yes			815(54.2%)
	No			689(45.8%)
Region		1506	4	
	Centre/outskirts of a metropolitan city			798 (53.0%)
	Non-metropolitan area			708 (47.0%)

Table 3 Descriptive statistics of independent variables in Germany survey dataset

Group	Variables	Valid	Missing	Freqs (% of Valid) / Stats
Political attitudes	Right-wing party support	1924	0	
	No			1730(89.9%)
	Yes			194(10.1%)
	Left-wing party support	1924	0	
	No			1737(90.3%)
	Yes			187(9.7%)
	Left-right orientation (1-11)	1918	6	5.6(2.1)
	Political interest (1-4)	1920	4	2.7(0.9)
	Political efficacy (1-11)	1584	340	4.2(2.2)
Media attention Media trust	Anti-elitism attitude	1643	281	-0.1(1)
	Social media attention (1-4)	1775	149	2.7(0.8)
	Commercial media attention	845	1079	-0.3(0.8)
	Digital-born media attention	845	1079	-0.2(1)
	Hyper-partisan media attention	845	1079	-0.1 (0.7)
	Public broadcaster attention	845	1079	0.1(1.1)
	Quality newspaper/magazine attention	845	1079	0.2(1.1)
	Trust of social media (1-5)	1909	15	2.6(1)
	Trust of public broadcasting tv or radio (1-5)	1919	5	3.5(1)
	Trust of private broadcasting tv or radio (1-5)	1916	8	3.2(0.9)
	Trust of newspaper (1-5)	1917	7	3.3(1)
Demographic variables	Age	1918	6	43.4(14.2)
	Gender	1916	8	
	Female			789(41.2%)
	Male			1127(58.8%)
	Education	1687	237	
	Low			504(29.9%)
	Intermediate			830(49.2%)

	High			353(20.9%)
	Total income	1844	80	
	Low			750(40.7%)
	Intermediate			647(35.1%)
	High			447(24.2%)
	Religion	1687	237	
	Yes			752(44.6%)
	No			935(55.4%)
	Region	1922	2	
	Centre/outskirts of a metropolitan city			795(41.4%)
	Non-metropolitan area			1127(58.6%)

Table 4 Summary of independent variables: concepts, measurements, wordings, and values

Concept	Variable	Wording of survey question / Calculation of the question	Range / Levels
Political attitudes	Right-wing	Did you support AfD [Germany] or Trump [US]?	1 = Yes 0 = No
	Left-wing	Did you support Linke [Germany] or Bernie Sanders [US]?	1 = Yes 0 = No
	Political orientation	Where would you place yourself on the political scale from left (1) to right (11)?	1 = Left 11 = Right
	Political interest	How interested would you say you are in politics	1 not at all interested 2 hardly interested 3 quite interested 4 very interested
	Political efficacy	To what extent does the political system in Germany/US give people like you the opportunity to influence politics?	1 not at all 11 a great deal
	Anti-elitism	-Members of Congress very quickly lose touch with ordinary people. -The differences between ordinary people and the ruling elite are much greater than the differences between ordinary people. -People like me have no influence on what the government does. -Politicians talk too much and take too little action.	1 Strongly disagree 2 Somewhat disagree 3 Neither agree nor disagree 4 Somewhat agree 5 Strongly agree
Social media use and trust	Social media consumption	Overall, how important are social media to you when it comes to keeping up with political news, debates and discussions?	1 not at all important 2 not too important 3 somewhat important 4 very important
	Social media trust	How much do you trust the information from social media	1 not at all 2 very little 3 somewhat 4 a lot 5 a great deal

Online news media use and trust	Online media consumption	Percentage of time spent on each media type in total time spent on online news consumption. Calculated from news tracking dataset, data aggregated on individual level -Commercial broadcaster -Digital-born news outlet -Hyper-partisan media -Public broadcaster -Quality newspaper/magazine -Tabloid newspaper	Standardised on values ranging from 0 to 100%
	Online media trust	How much do you trust the information from: -Public-funded TV or Radio -Private-funded TV or Radio -Newspapers	1 not at all 2 very little 3 somewhat 4 a lot 5 a great deal
Demographic variables	Education	What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?	1 Low education 2 Intermediate education 3 High education
	Gender	What is your gender?	1 Male 2 Female
	Religion	Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?	1 = Yes 2 = No
	Income level	What was your total family income from all sources, after taxes and other deductions?	1 Low income 2 Intermediate income 3 High income
	Residential region	Which phrase best describes the area where you live?	1 Centre or outskirts of a metropolitan city 2 Non-metropolitan area (including small cities, towns or rural area)

Table 5 Descriptive statistics of independent variables used in the integrated regression analysis of online attention to globalisation websites in the US

Group	Variables	Valid	Missing	Freqs (% of Valid) / Stats
Individual level	Right-wing party support	2501	0	
	No			1605 (64.2%)
	Yes			896 (35.8%)
	Left-right orientation (1-11)	2495	6	6.4 (3.4)
	Political interest (1-4)	2501	0	3.2 (0.9)
Media level	Topic	2501	0	
	Citizenship			531 (21.2%)
	Cultural diversity			346 (13.8%)
	Immigration			868 (34.7%)
	Trade			756 (30.2%)
	Media type	2501	0	
	Commercial broadcaster			535 (21.4%)
	Digital-born news outlet			222 (8.9%)
	Hyper-partisan media			529 (21.1%)
	Public broadcaster			24 (1.0%)
	Quality newspaper/magazine			1086 (43.4%)
	Tabloid newspaper			105 (4.2%)
	Media Right-Left political orientation	2501	0	6.1 (2.6)

Table 6 Descriptive statistics of independent variables used in the regression analysis of online attention to globalisation websites in Germany

Group	Variables	Valid	Missing	Freqs (% of Valid) / Stats
Individual level	Right-wing party support	2485	0	
	No			2123 (85.4%)
	Yes			362 (14.6%)
	Left-right orientation (1-11)	2485	0	6.4 (1.6)
	Political interest (1-4)	2484	1	3.7 (0.6)
Media level	Topic	2485	0	
	Citizenship			559 (22.5%)
	Cultural diversity			751 (30.2%)
	Immigration			771 (31.0%)
	Trade			404 (16.3%)
	Media type	2485	0	
	Commercial broadcaster			15 (0.6%)
	Digital-born news outlet			169 (6.8%)
	Hyper-partisan media			211 (8.5%)
	Public broadcaster			48 (1.9%)
	Quality newspaper/magazine			1888 (76.0%)
	Tabloid newspaper			154 (6.2%)
	Media Right-Left political orientation	2485	0	6.2 (0.9)

Table 7 Mean values of globalization attitudes in the US and Germany, and t-test results

Concepts	Variable	Germany	US	T-test
Trade	Trade: hurt or helped individuals	7.10	6.40	t = 7.55, df = 2726, p-value <.001
	Trade: want fewer or more trade	7.29	7.23	t = 0.65, df = 2726, p-value = 0.528
Immigration	Immigration undermined or enriched the country's culture	6.47	7.62	t = -10.18, df = 2731, p-value <.001
	Immigration bad or good for the economy	6.64	7.40	t = -6.93, df = 2719, p-value <.001
Ethnic citizenship	Importance of being born in the country for citizenship	2.68	2.43	t = 6.18, df = 2720, p-value <.001
	Importance of having ancestry in the country for citizenship	2.81	2.60	t = 5.09, df = 2717, p-value <.001
Cultural diversity	Islam not more violent	2.62	2.82	t = -3.83, df = 2723, p-value <.001
	Islam is not in conflict with democracy	3.54	2.71	t = 17.56, df = 2730, p-value <.001




Figure 1 Visualisation of political and media coefficients in the regression models on trade: US survey



Figure 2 Visualisation of political and media coefficients in the regression models on immigration: US survey




Figure 3 Visualisation of political and media coefficients in the regression models on citizenship: US survey




Figure 4 Visualisation of political and media coefficients in the regression models on Islam: US survey

Table 8 Summary table of regression models on trade and immigration variables in US

	Trade: hurt or helped me and my family	Trade: fewer or more trade	Immigration: undermined or enriched the country's culture	Immigration: bad or good for the economy
Right-wing Yes	0.534* (0.225)	-0.180 (0.213)	-1.592*** (0.237)	-1.386*** (0.244)
Left-wing Yes	0.280 (0.298)	0.586* (0.281)	0.363 (0.314)	0.478 (0.322)
Left-right	0.010 (0.034)	-0.051 (0.032)	-0.193*** (0.035)	-0.189*** (0.036)
Political interest	0.054 (0.102)	0.260** (0.097)	0.378*** (0.108)	0.458*** (0.111)
Political efficacy	0.117*** (0.032)	0.077* (0.030)	0.172*** (0.033)	0.175*** (0.034)
Anti-elitism attitude	-0.011 (0.087)	0.063 (0.082)	0.112 (0.091)	0.106 (0.094)
Social media attention	-0.012 (0.104)	0.106 (0.099)	-0.012 (0.110)	-0.018 (0.113)
Commercial media attention	-0.315* (0.123)	-0.048 (0.116)	-0.042 (0.130)	0.018 (0.134)
Digital born media attention	-0.001 (0.106)	0.040 (0.100)	-0.073 (0.112)	-0.030 (0.115)
Hyper-partisan media attention	-0.009 (0.055)	-0.021 (0.052)	-0.016 (0.058)	0.013 (0.060)
Public broadcasting media attention	0.063 (0.194)	0.062 (0.186)	-0.005 (0.205)	-0.007 (0.212)
Quality newspaper/magazine attention	-0.270+ (0.148)	0.063 (0.140)	-0.162 (0.156)	-0.154 (0.161)
Trust of news on social media	-0.055 (0.103)	-0.153 (0.098)	-0.063 (0.109)	-0.100 (0.112)
Trust of news on publicly owned media	-0.010 (0.113)	0.251* (0.107)	0.216+ (0.120)	0.258* (0.123)
Trust of news on privately owned media	0.058 (0.122)	0.103 (0.115)	-0.189 (0.129)	-0.113 (0.132)
Trust of news on newspaper	0.098 (0.117)	-0.108 (0.111)	0.208+ (0.124)	0.096 (0.127)
Age	-0.010 (0.006)	0.0004 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.007)
Gender Female	0.031 (0.176)	-0.520** (0.166)	-0.142 (0.186)	-0.203 (0.191)
Education Intermediate	-0.509 (0.447)	-0.512 (0.424)	0.319 (0.474)	-0.403 (0.493)
Education High	-0.072 (0.465)	-0.087 (0.441)	1.146* (0.492)	0.356 (0.511)
Religion No	0.110 (0.169)	0.171 (0.160)	-0.128 (0.178)	0.012 (0.184)
Income Intermediate	0.183 (0.209)	0.038 (0.198)	0.051 (0.221)	0.194 (0.227)

Income High	0.107 (0.221)	0.159 (0.209)	-0.013 (0.234)	0.131 (0.240)
Region Non-metropolitan area	-0.064 (0.165)	-0.064 (0.156)	-0.074 (0.174)	-0.101 (0.179)
Constant	6.046*** (0.723)	6.473*** (0.684)	6.633*** (0.764)	6.785*** (0.790)
Observations	866	868	872	866
R ²	0.075	0.116	0.258	0.237
Adjusted R ²	0.049	0.091	0.237	0.215
Residual Std. Error	2.318 (df = 841)	2.196 (df = 843)	2.454 (df = 847)	2.516 (df = 841)
F Statistic	2.860*** (df = 24; 841)	4.599*** (df = 24; 843)	12.276*** (df = 24; 847)	10.855*** (df = 24; 841)
<i>Note:</i> +p < .1, *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001				

Table 9 Summary table of regression models on citizenship and cultural diversity variables in US

	Citizenship: born in the country important or unimportant	Citizenship: have ancestry in the country important or unimportant	Islam: Islam does not encourage violence more than other faiths.	Islam: There is no a natural conflict between Islam and democracy.
Right-wing Yes	-0.363*** (0.098)	-0.195* (0.095)	-0.843*** (0.116)	-0.668*** (0.109)
Left-wing Yes	0.018 (0.130)	-0.115 (0.126)	-0.209 (0.152)	-0.366* (0.144)
Left-right	-0.091*** (0.015)	-0.097*** (0.014)	-0.129*** (0.017)	-0.109*** (0.016)
Political interest	0.149*** (0.045)	0.172*** (0.043)	-0.044 (0.053)	0.033 (0.049)
Political efficacy	-0.021 (0.014)	-0.025+ (0.014)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.015)
Anti-elitism attitude	-0.052 (0.038)	-0.030 (0.037)	-0.122** (0.045)	-0.121** (0.042)
Social media attention	-0.069 (0.045)	-0.029 (0.044)	0.018 (0.053)	-0.019 (0.050)
Commercial media attention	0.012 (0.054)	-0.049 (0.052)	0.099 (0.063)	0.028 (0.059)
Digital born media attention	-0.003 (0.046)	-0.062 (0.045)	0.014 (0.054)	0.036 (0.051)
Hyper-partisan media attention	0.028 (0.024)	0.001 (0.023)	0.007 (0.028)	-0.027 (0.027)
Public broadcasting media attention	0.173* (0.084)	0.087 (0.082)	0.040 (0.100)	0.017 (0.094)
Quality newspaper/magazine attention	0.006 (0.064)	-0.123* (0.062)	0.095 (0.076)	0.012 (0.071)
Trust of news on social media	-0.112* (0.045)	-0.177*** (0.044)	-0.192*** (0.053)	-0.150** (0.050)
Trust of news on publicly owned media	0.041 (0.049)	0.101* (0.048)	0.189** (0.058)	0.131* (0.055)
Trust of news on privately owned media	-0.112* (0.053)	-0.144** (0.052)	-0.113+ (0.063)	-0.096 (0.059)
Trust of news on newspaper	-0.034 (0.051)	-0.00002 (0.050)	0.056 (0.060)	0.040 (0.056)
Age	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
Gender Female	0.051 (0.077)	0.082 (0.074)	0.011 (0.090)	-0.064 (0.085)
Education Intermediate	-0.050 (0.195)	-0.128 (0.189)	0.003 (0.230)	0.215 (0.216)
Education High	0.162 (0.203)	0.105 (0.196)	0.178 (0.239)	0.359 (0.224)
Religion No	-0.078 (0.074)	-0.006 (0.071)	0.132 (0.087)	0.074 (0.082)

Income Intermediate	-0.034 (0.091)	-0.035 (0.088)	-0.020 (0.108)	0.025 (0.101)
Income High	0.193* (0.097)	0.144 (0.094)	0.051 (0.114)	0.054 (0.107)
Region Non-metropolitan area	-0.002 (0.072)	-0.040 (0.070)	-0.021 (0.085)	0.002 (0.080)
Constant	3.636*** (0.315)	3.670*** (0.306)	4.036*** (0.371)	3.613*** (0.348)
Observations	864	863	866	865
R ²	0.175	0.194	0.295	0.240
Adjusted R ²	0.152	0.171	0.275	0.218
Residual Std. Error	1.008 (df = 839)	0.976 (df = 838)	1.190 (df = 841)	1.118 (df = 840)
F Statistic	7.432*** (df = 24; 839)	8.399*** (df = 24; 838)	14.650*** (df = 24; 841)	11.043*** (df = 24; 840)
Note:	+p < .1, *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001			



Figure 5 Visualisation of political and media coefficients in the regression models on trade: Germany survey




Figure 6 Visualisation of political and media coefficients in the regression models on immigration: Germany survey




Figure 7 Visualisation of political and media coefficients in the regression models on citizenship: Germany survey




Figure 8 Visualisation of political and media coefficients in the regression models on Islam: Germany survey

Table 10 Summary table of regression models on trade and immigration variables in Germany

	Trade: hurt or helped me and my family	Trade: fewer or more trade	Immigration: undermined or enriched the country's culture	Immigration: bad or good for the economy
Right-wing Yes	-1.060** (0.359)	-0.796* (0.346)	-2.307*** (0.420)	-2.061*** (0.405)
Left-wing Yes	-0.780* (0.329)	-0.917** (0.318)	-0.529 (0.385)	-0.771* (0.371)
Left-right	-0.148* (0.060)	-0.218*** (0.058)	-0.418*** (0.070)	-0.363*** (0.067)
Political interest	0.385** (0.141)	0.332* (0.136)	0.404* (0.165)	0.495** (0.159)
Political efficacy	0.167*** (0.050)	0.218*** (0.049)	0.223*** (0.059)	0.165** (0.057)
Anti-elitism attitude	0.164 (0.109)	0.143 (0.105)	-0.239+ (0.127)	-0.096 (0.123)
Social media attention	-0.350* (0.141)	-0.042 (0.136)	-0.479** (0.164)	-0.322* (0.158)
Commercial media attention	-0.190 (0.143)	-0.110 (0.138)	0.097 (0.167)	0.082 (0.162)
Digital born media attention	-0.130 (0.134)	0.025 (0.129)	0.003 (0.157)	0.030 (0.152)
Hyper-partisan media attention	0.267+ (0.153)	0.150 (0.147)	0.160 (0.179)	0.181 (0.173)
Public broadcasting media attention	-0.042 (0.121)	0.052 (0.117)	0.131 (0.142)	0.138 (0.138)
Quality newspaper/magazine attention	-0.170 (0.135)	-0.202 (0.130)	0.140 (0.158)	-0.063 (0.154)
Trust of news on social media	0.065 (0.119)	-0.294* (0.115)	0.067 (0.140)	-0.045 (0.135)
Trust of news on publicly owned media	-0.097 (0.153)	-0.204 (0.148)	-0.145 (0.181)	0.090 (0.173)
Trust of news on privately owned media	-0.226+ (0.133)	-0.031 (0.127)	-0.259+ (0.155)	-0.176 (0.149)
Trust of news on newspaper	0.371* (0.155)	0.352* (0.149)	0.349+ (0.184)	0.345* (0.174)
Age	0.004 (0.007)	0.025*** (0.007)	0.0004 (0.009)	0.005 (0.008)
Gender Female	-0.087 (0.207)	-0.272 (0.199)	0.051 (0.242)	0.009 (0.233)
Education Intermediate	0.022 (0.238)	0.144 (0.229)	0.189 (0.278)	0.067 (0.268)
Education High	0.397 (0.286)	0.338 (0.276)	-0.047 (0.335)	0.094 (0.322)
Religion No	0.042 (0.198)	-0.334+ (0.191)	-0.227 (0.232)	0.171 (0.224)
Income Intermediate	-0.153 (0.231)	-0.472* (0.223)	-0.238 (0.271)	-0.170 (0.260)

Income High	0.077 (0.257)	-0.369 (0.248)	0.102 (0.301)	-0.069 (0.290)
Region Non-metropolitan area	0.174 (0.197)	0.210 (0.190)	-0.200 (0.231)	-0.093 (0.223)
Constant	7.011*** (0.854)	6.917*** (0.819)	8.719*** (0.995)	6.925*** (0.960)
Observations	496	496	496	496
R ²	0.156	0.222	0.303	0.267
Adjusted R ²	0.113	0.182	0.267	0.230
Residual Std. Error (df = 471)	2.106	2.028	2.463	2.375
F Statistic (df = 24; 471)	3.636***	5.600***	8.519***	7.151***
<i>Note:</i> +p < .1, *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001				

Table 11 Summary table of regression models on citizenship and cultural diversity variables in Germany

	Citizenship: born in the country important or unimportant	Citizenship: have ancestry in the country important or unimportant	Islam does not encourage violence more than other faiths.	There is no a natural conflict between Islam and democracy.
Right-wing Yes	-0.247 ⁺ (0.139)	-0.415 ^{**} (0.140)	-0.276 (0.173)	-0.496 ^{**} (0.165)
Left-wing Yes	-0.001 (0.136)	0.213 (0.138)	0.031 (0.169)	-0.212 (0.163)
Left-right	-0.117 ^{***} (0.023)	-0.094 ^{***} (0.024)	-0.137 ^{***} (0.029)	-0.114 ^{***} (0.028)
Political interest	0.131 [*] (0.057)	0.129 [*] (0.057)	-0.004 (0.070)	0.059 (0.068)
Political efficacy	-0.018 (0.019)	-0.033 ⁺ (0.019)	0.023 (0.024)	0.075 ^{**} (0.023)
Anti-elitism attitude	-0.146 ^{**} (0.046)	-0.112 [*] (0.046)	-0.390 ^{***} (0.057)	-0.266 ^{***} (0.055)
Social media attention	-0.117 [*] (0.056)	-0.222 ^{***} (0.056)	-0.009 (0.069)	-0.083 (0.067)
Commercial media attention	0.027 (0.060)	0.109 ⁺ (0.060)	-0.037 (0.074)	0.031 (0.071)
Digital born media attention	0.080 (0.053)	0.126 [*] (0.054)	0.083 (0.066)	0.044 (0.064)
Hyper-partisan media attention	0.129 ^{**} (0.049)	-0.056 (0.049)	0.063 (0.060)	0.054 (0.058)
Public broadcasting media attention	0.045 (0.050)	0.083 ⁺ (0.050)	0.013 (0.061)	0.049 (0.059)
Quality newspaper/magazine attention	0.045 (0.055)	0.098 ⁺ (0.056)	0.024 (0.069)	-0.033 (0.066)
Trust of news on social media	-0.033 (0.048)	-0.083 ⁺ (0.048)	-0.112 ⁺ (0.059)	-0.025 (0.057)
Trust of news on publicly owned media	0.145 [*] (0.061)	0.101 ⁺ (0.061)	0.086 (0.075)	-0.012 (0.073)
Trust of news on privately owned media	-0.131 [*] (0.053)	-0.104 ⁺ (0.053)	-0.062 (0.065)	-0.064 (0.063)
Trust of news on newspaper	-0.067 (0.063)	-0.045 (0.064)	-0.115 (0.078)	0.073 (0.075)
Age	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.014 ^{***} (0.004)
Gender Female	0.141 ⁺ (0.084)	0.008 (0.085)	0.104 (0.104)	0.023 (0.100)
Education Intermediate	0.203 [*] (0.095)	0.061 (0.096)	0.080 (0.117)	-0.133 (0.113)
Education High	0.279 [*] (0.119)	0.115 (0.120)	0.018 (0.147)	0.077 (0.142)
Religion No	0.072 (0.081)	0.069 (0.082)	-0.128 (0.100)	-0.120 (0.096)

Income Intermediate	0.033 (0.094)	0.091 (0.095)	-0.016 (0.117)	-0.062 (0.112)
Income High	-0.079 (0.105)	-0.072 (0.105)	0.147 (0.129)	-0.113 (0.124)
Region Non-metropolitan area	-0.129 (0.080)	-0.065 (0.081)	0.095 (0.099)	0.046 (0.096)
Constant	3.441*** (0.329)	4.073*** (0.332)	4.023*** (0.406)	3.813*** (0.392)
Observations	588	587	586	589
R ²	0.188	0.196	0.235	0.281
Adjusted R ²	0.153	0.162	0.203	0.250
Residual Std. Error	0.938 (df = 563)	0.945 (df = 562)	1.155 (df = 561)	1.115 (df = 564)
F Statistic	5.432*** (df = 24; 563)	5.723*** (df = 24; 562)	7.199*** (df = 24; 561)	9.175*** (df = 24; 564)
<i>Note:</i>			+p < .1, *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001	




Figure 9 Change of online attention to globalisation content in the US across three political groups – all panellists, non-right-wing and right-wing panellists between mid-March and mid-June




Figure 10 Change of online attention to globalisation content in Germany across three political groups – all panellists, non-right-wing and right-wing panellists between mid-March and mid-June




Figure 11 Visualisation of coefficients in regression models of online attention to globalisation websites in the US and Germany

Appendix A Factor loadings of populist attitudes items and a scree plot of factors*Table A 1 Factor loadings of populist attitudes items*

	Sovereignty	Homogeneity	Anti-elitism
anti1			0.816
anti2			0.668
anti3			0.606
anti5			0.766
sov1	0.911		
sov2	0.82		
sov3	0.798		
sov4	0.559		
hom1		0.736	
hom2		0.711	
hom3		0.828	
hom4		0.68	




Figure A 1 Scree plot of factors in the confirmatory factor analysis of populist attitudes item

Appendix B Keywords used to identify news websites that contain globalisation content

Table B 1 Summary statistics of news websites that contain globalisation keywords in the URLs in the US and Germany

Concept	English Keywords	German Keywords	US			Germany		
			# of visits	# of panellists	# of domains	# of visits	# of panellists	# of domains
International trade	Trade	Handel	27	15	9	268	107	16
	Trade war	Handelskrieg	84	52	21	34	14	8
	Sanctions	Sanktion	313	139	26	251	82	18
Immigration	Immigration	Einwanderung	400	188	37	67	37	9
	Migration	Migration	89	48	20	477	172	32
	Refugee	Flüchtling (fluechtlinge)	9	6	4	30	6	4
Citizenship	Citizenship	Staatsbürgerschaft (Staatsbürgerschaft)	422	196	38	230	105	22
	Sanctuary cities	Willkommenskultur	248	132	44	244	95	25
	Asylum seeker	Asylbewerber	46	24	12	474	188	24
	Deport	Abschieb	32	25	17	88	46	13
Cultural diversity	Islam	Islam	107	50	17	309	188	47
	Muslim	Muslim	554	274	52	11	6	5
	Islamophobi(a)	Islamophobi(e)	173	85	32	6	2	2
Total			2504	1234	329	2489	1048	225

Note: for websites containing Handel in the URLs, we excluded articles from the news website “handelsblatt”, which has “handel” in its name but not necessarily in the content of the articles.

Appendix C Visualisation of media political orientations of top ranked news domains in the US and Germany

Political orientations of news websites audience in the US

Only showing top 10 websites in each news category, ranked by the number of distinct panellists who have visited the website.
Dashed line represents the mean value (6.69) of the political orientation of visitors to all news websites in the US.





Figure C 1 Visualisation of media political orientation in the US

Political orientations of news websites audience in Germany

Only showing top 10 websites in each news category, ranked by the number of distinct panellists who have visited the website.
Dashed line represents the mean value (5.28) of the political orientation of visitors to all news websites in Germany.



Appendix D Summary tables of the regression models and Tukey’s test for post-hoc analysis on online attention to globalisation news in the US and Germany

Table D 1 Summary table of the regression models on online attention to globalisation news in the US and Germany

Level	Name of variable	Online attention to globalisation news in the US	Online attention to globalisation news in Germany
Individual	Right-wing	0.707 (6.092)	11.453+ (6.946)
	Political interest	-0.395 (2.302)	-11.625** (3.671)
	Left-Right orientation	0.274 (0.905)	2.600+ (1.406)
Media	Topic Cultural diversity	0.853 (6.057)	-9.296+ (5.153)
	Topic Immigration	0.648 (4.926)	14.082** (5.120)
	Topic Trade	-5.042 (5.041)	15.201* (6.239)
	Type Digital-born news outlet	-21.476** (6.957)	-29.370 (24.937)
	Type Hyper-partisan media	-0.232 (5.645)	-42.240+ (24.728)
	Type Public broadcaster	-3.559 (17.705)	-24.420 (27.094)
	Type Quality newspaper/magazine	-25.695*** (4.833)	-2.047 (23.784)
	Type Tabloid newspaper	15.149+ (9.113)	-6.182 (24.724)
	Left-Right media orientation	-1.982+ (1.148)	4.822+ (2.890)
	Constant	77.065*** (12.743)	57.194+ (30.639)
Observations		2,495	2,484
R ²		0.021	0.033
Adjusted R ²		0.017	0.029
Residual Std. Error		84.170 (df = 2482)	91.047 (df = 2471)
F Statistic		4.520*** (df = 12; 2482)	7.121*** (df = 12; 2471)

+p < .1, *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Note: Non-right-wing is the reference category for the variable right-wing. Citizenship is the reference category for the variable topic. Commercial broadcaster is the reference category for the variable media type.

Appendix E Tukey’s test on differences across media types in online attention to globalisation content

Table E 1 Tukey’s test on differences across media types in online attention to globalisation content in the US

	Diff	lwr	Upr	p adj
Digital-born news outlet-Commercial broadcaster	-19.93	-39.08	-0.79	0.04
Hyperpartisan media-Commercial broadcaster	-1.56	-16.26	13.14	1.00
Public broadcaster-Commercial broadcaster	-0.67	-50.71	49.37	1.00
Quality newspaper/magazine-Commercial broadcaster	-22.42	-35.09	-9.75	0.00
Tabloid newspaper-Commercial broadcaster	14.94	-10.66	40.54	0.56
Hyperpartisan media-Digital-born news outlet	18.37	-0.80	37.55	0.07
Public broadcaster-Digital-born news outlet	19.26	-32.27	70.80	0.89
Quality newspaper/magazine-Digital-born news outlet	-2.49	-20.15	15.18	1.00
Tabloid newspaper-Digital-born news outlet	34.87	6.47	63.28	0.01
Public broadcaster-Hyperpartisan media	0.89	-49.16	50.94	1.00
Quality newspaper/magazine-Hyperpartisan media	-20.86	-33.58	-8.15	0.00
Tabloid newspaper-Hyperpartisan media	16.50	-9.12	42.12	0.44
Quality newspaper/magazine-Public broadcaster	-21.75	-71.24	27.74	0.81
Tabloid newspaper-Public broadcaster	15.61	-38.65	69.87	0.96
Tabloid newspaper-Quality newspaper/magazine	37.36	12.85	61.87	0.00

Table E 2 Tukey’s test on differences across media types in online attention to all news content in the US

	Diff	lwr	Upr	p adj
Digital-born news outlet-Commercial broadcaster	-28.46	-29.81	-27.11	0.00
Hyperpartisan media-Commercial broadcaster	-7.46	-9.76	-5.16	0.00
Public broadcaster-Commercial broadcaster	13.36	9.58	17.14	0.00
Quality newspaper/magazine-Commercial broadcaster	-22.56	-24.37	-20.75	0.00
Tabloid newspaper-Commercial broadcaster	1.04	-1.80	3.88	0.90
Hyperpartisan media-Digital-born news outlet	21.00	18.76	23.24	0.00
Public broadcaster-Digital-born news outlet	41.82	38.08	45.56	0.00
Quality newspaper/magazine-Digital-born news outlet	5.89	4.17	7.62	0.00
Tabloid newspaper-Digital-born news outlet	29.50	26.71	32.28	0.00
Public broadcaster-Hyperpartisan media	20.82	16.64	25.00	0.00
Quality newspaper/magazine-Hyperpartisan media	-15.10	-17.65	-12.56	0.00
Tabloid newspaper-Hyperpartisan media	8.50	5.15	11.85	0.00
Quality newspaper/magazine-Public broadcaster	-35.92	-39.85	-32.00	0.00
Tabloid newspaper-Public broadcaster	-12.32	-16.82	-7.83	0.00
Tabloid newspaper-Quality newspaper/magazine	23.60	20.57	26.64	0.00

Table E 3 Tukey's test on differences across topics in online attention to globalisation content in Germany

	diff	lwr	upr	p adj
Cultural diversity-Citizenship	-11.91	-25.09	1.27	0.09
Immigration-Citizenship	13.65	0.54	26.76	0.04
Trade-Citizenship	11.91	-3.50	27.32	0.19
Immigration-Cultural diversity	25.56	13.46	37.65	0.00
Trade-Cultural diversity	23.82	9.26	38.38	0.00
Trade-Immigration	-1.74	-16.23	12.76	0.99

Table E 4 Tukey's test on differences across media types in online attention to all news content in the US

	Diff	lwr	Upr	p adj
Digital-born news outlet-Commercial broadcaster	-34.99	-39.28	-30.71	0.00
Hyperpartisan media-Commercial broadcaster	-22.82	-33.45	-12.18	0.00
Public broadcaster-Commercial broadcaster	7.59	3.89	11.29	0.00
Quality newspaper/magazine-Commercial broadcaster	-17.72	-21.22	-14.23	0.00
Tabloid newspaper-Commercial broadcaster	-6.89	-10.65	-3.12	0.00
Hyperpartisan media-Digital-born news outlet	12.18	1.52	22.83	0.01
Public broadcaster-Digital-born news outlet	42.58	38.82	46.34	0.00
Quality newspaper/magazine-Digital-born news outlet	17.27	13.71	20.83	0.00
Tabloid newspaper-Digital-born news outlet	28.11	24.28	31.93	0.00
Public broadcaster-Hyperpartisan media	30.41	19.97	40.84	0.00
Quality newspaper/magazine-Hyperpartisan media	5.09	-5.27	15.46	0.73
Tabloid newspaper-Hyperpartisan media	15.93	5.47	26.39	0.00
Quality newspaper/magazine-Public broadcaster	-25.31	-28.15	-22.48	0.00
Tabloid newspaper-Public broadcaster	-14.48	-17.64	-11.32	0.00
Tabloid newspaper-Quality newspaper/magazine	10.84	7.92	13.75	0.00

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ENDNOTE

- i https://www.westernjournal.com/ag-barr-just-dealt-major-blow-catch-release-new-interpretation-immigration-nationality-act/?utm_source=Email&utm_medium=WJBreaking&utm_campaign=breaking&utm_content=western-journal
- ii <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/17/business/trade-war-china-tariffs.html>
- iii <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article193465395/EuGH-urteilt-Selbst-schwer-straftaellige-Fluechtlinge-koennen-Abschiebung-entgehen.html>
- iv <https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/2019-04/flucht-norwegen-sorgerecht-asyl-fluechtlinge-polen-staatsaffaere>