Secularization as Sacralization: Religion and the Formation of Modern Chinese Nationalism and Nation-State, 1840-1939

Wei Leong Tay

St. Antony's College

A thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Faculty of Oriental Studies

Michaelmas Term 2019

Copyright

Wei Leong Tay, 2019

All rights reserved.

Contents

	Acknowledgments	v
	Abstract	vi
	Abbreviations	vii
	Introduction: The Problem of Religion	1
	Enter the Question of Religion	1
	Religion and the Modern Chinese State	6
	Key Research Questions and Thesis	10
	Chapters Overview	21
1.	Lost in Translation: Negotiating Religion in the Tianjin Treaties	27
	Negotiating with Imperialism, 1840-1850s	32
	The Issue of Translation	40
	Translating *Jiao* to Religion	47
	Negotiating Freedom of Christianity in Tianjin	57
	Lost in Translation: Chinese Understanding and Reaction	71
2.	Counteracting the Threat of Christian Conversion, 1860-1870	76
	From Toleration to Protection	79
	Politics of Heresy and the Threat of Conversion	90
	Crisis of Christian Conversation after the Opium Wars	102
	Counteracting the Christian Threat	107
	Imperium in Imperio	117
3.	China's Encounter with Secularization in the West, 1868-1895	123
	Chinese View of State and Church in the West, 1842-1865	128
	Missionaries and Sovereignty	135
	The Struggle Between the Catholic Church and Western Nation-states	141
	Protestant Polemics and Confucian Bias	144
	Civilizing Influence of the Church	149
	Establishing Sino-Vatican Relations	153
	Separating Church and Imperialism	154

Overcoming the Religious Protectorate 160

4. Religion and the Birth of Chinese Nationalism, 1895-1911 169
Protestantism and the Genesis of Chinese Nationalism 172
The Protestant Model and Kang's Confucian Reformation 178
Religionizing the Confucian Teaching 189
Imperialism, Religion, and The National Religion Proposal 194
Zhang Zhidong and the Separation of Education from Christianity 208
New Education System and the Creation of the Confucian Secular 213
Postscript: The Arrival of the Modern Discourse of Religion and Superstition 218

5. Republican Secularism and Nation-state Building 227
The Provisional Constitution and the Limits of Religion 230
Purifying Religion: Religion as a Tool of Governance 235
Emasculating Religion: Separation of Religion and Property 241
Separating Confucianism from Religion 246
Separating State Ritual from Religion 253
Constitutional Settlement of the Confucian Religion Question 264
The Fate of Confucian Religion and Confucius under the Beiyang Regime 270

Conclusion: State Secularization as Sacralization, 1912-1939 274
Religion of Nationalism 275
State Cult to National Cult 278
GMD Discourse of Confucian-Scientific Secular 281
Revival of the Confucius Cult and Appropriation of *Li* 286
National Tomb Sweeping Festival and the Cult of National Ancestors 291

Bibliography 295

Acknowledgements

The completion of this dissertation is thanks to the help and support of many people. First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis supervisor Professor Barend Ter Haar for his stimulating guidance and warm encouragement throughout the whole course of research and writing this dissertation. He is truly a great teacher and a good friend. I would certainly not have enjoyed my student life in Oxford as much as I did without his mentorship and friendship.

I would also like to thank Professors Henrietta Harrison and Robert Chard for their critical reviews and insightful comments on the proposal and the drafts of this dissertation. It goes without saying that all errors in this dissertation are my own.

My primary intellectual debt is to Professor Prasenjit Duara who taught me everything I know about the topic of Chinese nationalism and secularism. I am also very grateful to Professor Neo Pengfu for his motivation and kind support all these years since the time I was an undergraduate doing a course under him on ancient Chinese history and culture.

My research was supported by the Wai Seng Senior Research Scholarship, for which I thank the selection committee of St. Antony's college for the award and the benefactor, Mr. Adrian Fu for his generosity.

Special thanks to Dr. Giulia Falato for her encouragement and invaluable help in submitting the dissertation. Not to forget Professor Jakob de Roover and members of the India Platform of Ghent University for hosting me on numerous occasions at the beautiful city of Ghent. I would never forget the long hours of stimulating conversation about religion and the great times we had together.

Finally, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my family for their love and unwavering support. My elder sister, Hui Cheng has been very supportive and uncomplaining in taking over my share of supporting the family while I selfishly pursue my studies. My mum, Cheo Tee, whose greatest regret in life is not able to go to school, has sacrificed a lot and devoted her whole life to ensure that her children have a good education and realize their dreams. Sis and Ma, I hoped that I have made you all proud. This dissertation is dedicated to my family.

Abstract

This thesis investigates the nexus between religion and the formation of modern Chinese nationalism and nation-state. Recent scholarship has pointed out that the category "religion" is a crucial component of the secular project of modernization of the state and the enlightened elites outside the West. Being modern requires the state to separate itself from "religion," defines as personal belief and freedom, and the society to eradicate the irrational aspect of religion that is "superstition." The main focus in Chinese scholarship has been documenting the state-led secularization and forceful repression of Chinese religious life according to the alien hegemonic discourse of "religion," "superstition," "nation," and "science." Instead of uncovering the modern fate of Chinese religion, this study looks at the history of Chinese secularization from another angle, the perspective of the state. This thesis covers the period from 1858 to 1939 and seeks to address three questions: why is the modern concept of "religion" an issue for the Chinese state (imperial and post-imperial)? What is the role of "religion" in the formation of modern Chinese nationalism? What is the character of modern Chinese secularism and the nation-state? The study argues that the secularizing impulse of the Chinese state (imperial and early republican) was as much to do with the practical concerns of meeting the challenges posed by Christian missionary movements to state authority and the religious nationalisms of ethnic minorities in the borderlands as emanating from a coherent modernist project. It also discusses how the model of "religious citizenship" transmitted by Protestant missionaries and the State Shinto of Meiji Japan influenced the formation of modern Chinese nationalism and nation-state. Finally, the study argues that state secularization was at the same time a process of sacralization. Secularization is not simply a process of the triumph of science over religion but a creative as well as controversial boundary drawing exercise that involves defining certain ideology and practices as civil, hence public and mandatory, for the creation of the nation-state, and others as religious to be tolerated and protected by the state or superstitious to be criminalized and eradicated in the name of public order and progress.

Abbreviations

CESM	*Correspondence Relative to the Earl of Elgin's Special Mission to China and Japan, 1857-1858*. London: Harrisons and Sons, 1859.
JSB	*Changming kongjiao jingshi bao* 昌明孔教經世報 (Confucian religion promulgation and world ordering magazine). Beijing: Jingshi baoshe, Jan.1922-Apr.1927.
JWJAD	*Jiaowu jiaoan dang* 教务教案档 (Christian affairs and cases archive). Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindai-shi yanjiu-suo, 1974-81.
KJHZZ	*Kongjiao-hui zazhi* 孔教會雜誌 (The Confucian association monthly). Shanghai, 1913.
KYWQJ	*Kang Youwei Quanji* 康有為全集 (Complete works of Kang Youwei) 12 vols., edited by Jiang Yihua 姜義華 and Zhang Ronghua 張榮華. Beijing: Beijing renmin daxue chubanshe, 2007.
QMJA	*Qingmo Jiaoan* 清末教案 (Missionary incidents in late Qing) 5 vols., edited by Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996.
YWSM TZ	*Choupan Yiwu Shimo, Tongzhi-chao* 籌辦夷務始末 同治朝 (A Complete Account of the Management of Barbarian Affairs of the Tongzhi Era) 10 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2008.
YWSM XF	*Choupan Yiwu Shimo, Xianfeng-chao* 籌辦夷務始末 咸豐朝 (A Complete Account of the Management of Barbarian Affairs of the Xianfeng Era) 8 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1979.
ZFGB	*Zhengfu Gongbao* 政府公報 (Government Gazetteer), 1912-1916.

— INTRODUCTION —

The Problem of Religion

ENTER THE QUESTION OF RELIGION

In August 1844, French plenipotentiary Theodore M.M.J. de Lagrene (1800-1862) arrived unannounced at Macau with an imposing force of eight gunboats. Lagrene was dispatched to obtain a commercial treaty with the same privileges granted to the British and Americans by the Treaties of Nanjing and Wangxia from the Manchu Court. In October, Lagrene met up with his Chinese counterpart, Qiying 耆英 (1787-1858), the Manchu governor-general of Liangguang at Whampoa to negotiate for a treaty of commerce and friendship. Qiying accorded a warm welcome to the French mission and hoped to court France to their side against the British. Accordingly, the Chinese delegates readily extended to the French all privileges previously granted to the British and Americans. To the great surprise and horror of the Chinese officials, Lagrene was not satisfied with the offer and demanded the legalization of Catholicism in China.

The Chinese delegates replied that the request was impossible to concede as Catholicism was proscribed under the Qing penal code. Lagrene refused to budge and to press for his case he produced the Toleration Edict of Kangxi emperor that officially recognized Catholicism. Lagrene asked for an edict proclaiming the repeal of all anti-Christian laws and that Chinese Catholics can freely practice

their religion and congregate for religious worship. In addition, he requested the return of all Catholic properties confiscated after the prohibition.

Qiying memorialized the throne to acquiesce to the French request to prevent further squabbles and lose the friendship of France. He assured that Lagrene had no sinister motive in persisting for the legalization of Catholicism other than boasting his accomplishment to his monarch and neighbouring countries. Furthermore, Qiying averred, "It is my humble opinion that the Catholic religion, from the time of the late Ming when Li Ma-t'ou [Matteo Ricci] brought it to China, has not given us any trouble for over three hundred years. It is entirely different from the Pa-lien sect and the Pa Kua sect. During the recent years, cases of prosecution against Catholics in the outer provinces have not been many, and it made no difference whether there was a prohibitory law or not. It seems there is little danger that because we slightly relax the prohibitions for one day, it suddenly should spread (all over the country)."[1] Qiying assured the emperor that the Catholics who use their religion to gather people from near and far for treasonous and criminal activities; or other sectarians committing crimes under the cloak of Catholicism would be punished by the law. The Westerners would also not travel outside the five treaty ports to propagate their religion and mix with the Chinese in the interior.

The Qing state prohibited Catholicism not because of "religious" reason. The doctrine and rituals of the Western religion did not factor much in the consideration of Qiying and Emperor Daoguang in repealing the prohibition. The Qing government legalized Catholicism because it did not fit the classification of heretical sects (*xiejiao* 邪教) or what the imperial state labelled as "White Lotus teaching," which were strictly proscribed for their propensities to rebel against the state.[2] Another major condition for the Qing state to agree with the legalization of Catholicism was that the movement of the Westerners be restricted in the five treaty ports. The Qing authority feared that contact between

[1] Angelus Grosse-Aschhoff, *Negotiations Between Ch'i-ying and Lagrene, 1844-1846* (The Franciscan Institute and E Nauwelaerts, 1950), p.161.

[2] For the late imperial "White Lotus" millenarian movement, see Daniel Overmyer, *Folk Buddhist Religion: Dissenting Sects in Late Imperial China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974); Susan Naquin, *Millenarian Rebellion in China: The Eight Trigrams Uprising of 1813* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976) and *Shantung Rebellion: The Wang Lun Uprising of 1774* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); and Barend Ter Haar, *The White Lotus Teachings in Chinese Religious History* (Leiden: Brill, 1992).

foreigners and the Chinese population would cause problems in terms of ethnic conflict and possible collusion of the Chinese with the Western countries. The conversion of Chinese subjects to Catholicism was a great concern to the Qing government since religious identity and political loyalty were indistinguishable as one popular aphorism in late nineteenth century goes, "one more Christian, one less Chinese."

Talal Asad has shown that "religion," defined as private belief or inner faith, is not a natural or universal concept, but created out of the contingency of distinguishing secular power from sacred authority. Asad traces the genealogy of the modern concept of religion to the specific history of post-Reformation Europe.[3] At the end of the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, European rulers adopted *cuis religio, eius religio* as a general political principle for the settlement of the problem of religious diversity and conflict. What the Peace of Westphalia established was not secular states, but confessional states with established churches. Asad argues that "it is not the commitment to or interdiction of a particular religion that is most significant in this principle but the installation of a single absolute power —the sovereign state— drawn from a single abstract source and facing a single political task: the worldly care of its population regardless of its belief."[4] For Asad, the formation of the modern category of "religion" is inseparable from modern state formation in the West.[5] Asad noted how the universalization and essentialization of "religion" in the form of Natural Religion, abstracted as beliefs in an otherworldly supreme power, its worship, and ethics based on rewards and punishments in the afterlife, in the seventeenth century is connected with the emergence of a new European statecraft that sought to relocate the normative basis of power outside

[3] Talal Asad, *The Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp.27-51.

[4] Talal Asad, "Trying to understand French secularism" in *Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World* edited by Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan (N.Y.: Forham University Press, 2006), p.499.

[5] As Asad puts it "the categories of "politics" and "religion" turn out to implicate each other more profoundly than we thought, a discovery that has accompanied our growing understanding of the powers of the nation-state. The concept of the secular cannot do without the idea of religion. Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, and Modernity* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p.200.

of religion and establish a political order for the integration and peaceful co-existence of a religiously diverse and fervent population.[6]

The demarcation of the religious and secular became an issue for polities outside the West as a result of European imperial expansion and the surge in Christian missionary activities in the nineteenth century.[7] Trent Maxey, for instance, examines how the matter of religion became the "greatest problem" for the Japanese government (Tokugawa Bakufu and the Meiji states) as it was under great diplomatic pressures from Western powers to seek official recognition for the freedom of religion. The problem of religion seemed intractable for the Japanese government since it had no conception of church-state separation. In the perspective of the state, allowing Christian proselytization and conversion of the Japanese people meant compromising the spiritual-political unity of the national community (*kokutai* 国体). At the same time, the Japanese state was acutely aware that the proscription of Christianity could not continue because of its semi-colonial status and the reputation of "uncivilized nation" that it earned from the persecution of native converts. The Great Promulgation Campaign and the separation of Shinto and Buddhism (*shinbutsu bunri* 神仏分離) instituted in early Meiji was designed to win the

[6] Asad (1993), p.40. Asad's emphasis on the construction of "religion" by political power has led him to ignore the influence of religion in the creation of modern secular politics. In her study of political secularization in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Ingrid Creppell has shown how the political innovations of toleration, democracy, and national identity, which are conventionally identified as constituents of secular politics, are borne out of the religious violence and activism of the Reformation and post-Reformation periods. Toleration as a political principle arose out of the need of princes to consolidate power and gain acquiescement from religious minorities to his rule. Political ruler could employ force to consolidate his rule, as in the case of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV that protect the religious freedom of the Protestant Huguenots in his domain in 1685, however, this would be costly for long-term normative legitimation of state-building. This is especially so when religious communities were more vocal and agitated against the imposition of confessional uniformity by their rulers. Creppell argues that the demands for political protection of religion from political power in early modern Europe laid the foundation of democracy. Creppell points out that Hobbes' argument of an abstract and absolute sovereign based on social contract was derived from his fear of civil unrest created by a religiously aroused population. Lastly, she argues that early national identity of the Europeans was created when rulers such as Louis XIV used religion to pursue an exclusionary nationalist state-building policy. However, this intolerant religious nationalism created by confessional politics gradually gave way to a more inclusive form of civil nationalism under the influence of tolerant policies and democratization. See Creppell, "Secularisation: religion and the roots of innovation in the political sphere" in Ira Katznelson and Gareth Stedman Jones eds. *Religion and the Political Imagination* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp.23-45.

[7] Parallel to the creation of European empires in the nineteenth century was the creation of, what C.A. Bayly calls, "empires of religion." The global expansion of Christian missionary activities spurred the reformation and growth of other traditions into "world religions." Islamic, Buddhist, Christian, Hindu and Confucian religious movements emerged, and these religions developed global institutional networks by harnessing modern communicative and transportation technologies. C.A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914* (U.K: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2004), pp. 325-363.

hearts and minds of the Japanese for the imperial institution against the internal heresy of Buddhism and the external threat of Christianity.

These early attempts to deal with the "conversion crisis" threatened to embroil the imperial institution into an aggressive religious competition with Buddhism and Christianity, as well as into a diplomatic crisis with the western powers. [8] From 1860s to 1880s, Japanese intellectuals, policy-makers, and Buddhist clergies began to learn the grammar of religion and how church and state relations functioned in the West.[9] The separation of church and state and the enshrinement of religious freedom in the 1889 Meiji Constitution helped the state to settle the "greatest problem" and to shield imperial institutions, ideologies and rituals, centered on the Emperor and integral to imperial legitimacy and formation of the nation-state, from religious contestation. State Shintō (*Kokka Shintō* 国家神道), the ideological and ritual underpinning of the Japanese state, was separated from Sect Shinto and became, as one scholar describes, "a religion that was not religion."[10] The symbiotic relationship between the Japanese imperial state and State Shintō persisted till the end of the Second World War. [11] The Japanese case demonstrates the inseparability of the matter of "religion" and modern state formation in the non-western world. Similarly, the conclusion of the Sino-French negotiation in 1846 was a significant event, as it marked the beginning of the expansion of missionary activities in China and the political salience of religion in the diplomatic affairs and internal politics of the Qing Empire until its eventual demise in 1911.

[8] Trent Maxey, *The "Greatest Problem": Religion and State Formation in Meiji Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014) In a similar vein, Kiri Paramore argues that the opposition of the Tokugawa and Meiji states to Christianity was motivated by political concern rather than the difference in religious sensibilities or practices. See his *Ideology and Christianity in Japan* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).

[9] Maxey (2014), pp.55-92; and Hans Martin Krämer, "How 'Religion' Came to Be Translated as Shūkyō: Shimaji Mokurai and the Appropriation of Religion in Early Meiji Japan" in *Japan Review*, 25 (2013), pp.89-111.

[10] Sarah Thal, "A Religion That Was Not a Religion: The Creation of Modern Shinto in Nineteenth Century Japan" in Derek Peterson and Darren Walhof, eds., *The Invention of Religion: Rethinking Belief in Politics and History* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002), pp.100-114.

[11] Helen Hardacre, *Shinto and the State, 1868-1988* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989).

RELIGION AND THE MODERN CHINESE STATE

Prasenjit Duara is one of the earliest historians to consider the question of religion in the formation of the modern Chinese state in the twentieth century. In his first book, Duara discusses how the imperial state and (rural) society were linked by the "cultural nexus of power."[12] The cultural nexus of power was specifically a religious nexus since organizationally, as Edward Davis highlights, "however secular all these hierarchies, networks, and associations (within the nexus) may appear they converge and diverge among themselves around temples, altars and monasteries."[13] Ideologically, the state and society was connected through the diffusion of the religio-political idea of cosmic bureaucracy— human and supernatural bureaucracies interpenetrated and function as a holistic system— in all level of the cultural nexus.[14]

The transition from empire to secular nation-state is a watershed event in contemporary Chinese history as it destroyed the cultural nexus of power and pitted the state against society. Furthermore, secularization— the functional separation of religion from the secular spheres of politics, economy and science— was extremely disruptive since much of Chinese religion is "diffused" or embedded in all aspects of the life of people.[15] In another article, Duara illustrates how the violent campaigns against

[12] The nexus integrated a variety of organizational systems like nested hierarchies (e.g. markets and lineages), ascriptive-territorial hierarchies (e.g. local cults), voluntary organizations (e.g. crop watching and irrigation societies) and inter-personal networks (e.g. patron-client and master-disciples). Duara, *Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp.15-42.

[13] Edward Davis, *Society and the Supernatural in Song China* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), pp.202-203.

[14] Duara's concept of "cosmic bureaucracy" is derived from the conceptualization of anthropologist Arthur Wolf of Chinese popular religion. Chinese gods, Wolf points out, are often fashion after the image of the bureaucrats. For Wolf, the "imperial metaphor" in Chinese popular religion demonstrated the hegemony of the imperial state on popular mentality and culture. Wolf writes, "Historians and social scientists often emphasized the failure of most Chinese government to effectively extend their authority to the local level... [however] assessed in terms of its long-term impact on the people, it appears to have been one of the most potent governments even known, for it created a religion in its own image." See Arthur Wolf, "Gods, Ghosts and Ancestors" in Wolf ed., *Studies in Chinese Society* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978), p.145.

[15] C.K Yang, *Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and Some of Their Historical Factors* (Berkeley: University of California press, 1967), p. 20. Yang conceptually divide Chinese religion into two broad categories of diffused and institutional religions. Institutional religion such as monastic Buddhism and Daoism "has a system of theology, rituals, and organization of its own, independent of other secular social institutions." In contrast, diffused religion has "its theology, rituals, and organization intimately merged with the concepts and structure of secular institutions and other aspects of the social order." In imperial China, institutional religion had a marginal existence and Chinese religion was predominately diffused.

religion carried out by the modernizing state (late Qing, Beiyang and Guomindang) from 1900 to 1930 were motivated by the instrumental reason of appropriating economic resources of religious institutions for state-building, as well as by the ideological reason that religion constituted the backward elements of Chinese society, which had to be swept away to make way for the growth of scientific rationality and material progress for the Chinese nation.[16]

David Faure has also observed the religious dimension in state-society relations in imperial China and how this religious connection was tear asunder in the twentieth century with the coming of the modernizing state that is founded on secular nationalism: "When lay, urban political ideology defined the imperial civil society as 'superstitious' and 'feudal,' it radically denied the basis on which relations between the state and society had been founded in imperial China." In other words, as John Lagerwey succinctly summarized Faure's observations, "China is a religious state and Chinese society is a religious society."[17]

Following in the footsteps of Duara, other scholars began to examine the imported discourses behind the secularizing project of the modernizing state and elites, as well as and how state-building in the twentieth century affected a massive and violent change in the religious life of the Chinese people. Mayfair Yang argues that the intense hostility that the state and educated elites displayed towards Chinese religious traditions was caused by the shame of backwardness and under the influence of Western derived discourses of Protestantism, Enlightenment ideology, social evolutionism, and Marxism.[18] Scholars identified the emergence of the "question of religion" (*zongjiao wenti* 宗教问题) in 1898 as a result of the importation of the terms "religion" (Jp. *shūkyō*; Ch. *zongjiao* 宗教) and "superstition" (Jp. *meishin*; Ch. *mixin* 迷信) from Japan and the formation of the nation-state as part of the late Qing constitutional reforms. The secularization policy of the modern Chinese state consisted of

[16] Prasenjit Duara, "Knowledge and Power in the Discourse of Modernity: The Campaigns Against Popular Religion in Early Twentieth-Century China" in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 50.1 (Feb. 1991), pp. 67-83.

[17] John Lagerwey, *China: A Religious State* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010), p.1.

[18] Mayfair Yang, "Introduction" in Yang ed. *Chinese Religiosities: Afflictions of Modernity and State Formation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), pp.7-8.

"religionization"[19]and anti-superstition campaigns. Religionization created a distinct religious sphere in which only "religion", defined according to the Protestant normative model of rational private/inner beliefs, was legally protected by the freedom of religion in the Constitution. Using the normative model, Buddhists, Daoists, and Confucians tried to reinvent their traditions institutionally through the formation of national associations and rationalize their doctrines and ritual practices to gain legal recognition by the state as religion.[20] Religious organizations, movements, and specialists such as the local temple cults or "god-worshipping societies" (*shenming hui* 神明會), regional incense societies (*xianghui* 香會), sectarian groups, temple festivals (*miaohui* 廟會 or *saihui* 賽會), spirits mediums, and geomancers that were outside the normative model were proscribed and violently attacked in the state-led anti-superstition campaigns.

Historians are interested in documenting the impacts of state secularizing policy on Chinese religion and how non-state actors navigated the tectonic change in the post-1898 religious landscape. They demonstrate the tremendous and damaging changes in the religious life of local society, especially in Jiangsu and Guangdong where the Nationalist regime directly ruled and extensively carried out its ambitious social engineering projects from the 1920s to 1940s.[21]

While historians of religion are generally interested in the fate of religion in modern China and adopted a bottom-up approach in their studies, Rebecca Nedostup works "from the state out" in her study of the history of secularism in China.[22] Nedostup's account shows how "religion" became a problem for the Nanjing government because republican legitimacy was built upon secular nationalism

[19] Robert Weller, "Global Religious Changes and Civil Life in Two Chinese Societies: A Comparison of Jiangsu and Taiwan," *The Review of Faith & International Affairs*, 13.2 (2015), p.13.

[20] Vincent Goossaert, "Republican Church Engineering: The National Religious Associations in 1912 China" in Mayfair Yang ed. (2008), pp.209-232.

[21] See Vincent Goossaert, "The local politics of festivals: Hangzhou, 1850-1950," *Daoism: Religion, History & Society*, 5 (2013), pp.57-80; and "The Shifting Balance of Power in the City God Temples, Late Qing to 1937" in *Journal of Chinese Religions*, 43.1 (May 2015), pp.5-13; Poon Shuk-wah, *Negotiating Religion in Modern China: State and Common People in Guangzhou, 1900–1937* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2011); and Paul Katz, *Religion in China and its Modern Fate* (Lebanon: Brandeis University Press, 2014).

[22] Rebecca Nedostup, *Superstitious Regimes: Religion and Politics of Chinese Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2010), p.18.

and scientific modernity. The Nanjing government saw themselves locked in a battle for the "hearts-and-minds" of the Chinese people against an affective "superstitious regime" of religion that stunned the development of a scientific mindset among the masses and retarded the civilizational progress of the China.

The Nationalist state launched a two-pronged attack in its war against religion. On the one hand, the Nanjing regime imposed on society the categories of "religion" and "superstition" through legislations and sought the destruction of the latter through the appropriation of temple material resources; criminalization of redemptive societies (*jiusu tuanti* 救贖團體)[23] such as the Yiguandao 一貫道 and Tongshanshe 同善社 and religious specialists; and anti-superstition campaigns banning traditional and temple festivals, the use of lunar calendar and "superstitious products" such as joss paper. On the other hand, the GMD state planned to compete with and supplant the "superstitious regime" with its own affective regime of nationalism through the adoption of the Gregorian calendar and the invention of secular republican ceremonies that consecrate the nation-state. Nedostup's labelling of secular nationalism as another "superstition regime" is spot on.[24] In other words, secularization and sacralization go hand in hand in state-building.

The secularizing efforts of the Nationalist state did not destroy the "superstitious regime" because of the oppositions of local religious actors, the resilience of Chinese religious traditions, and most importantly, people's lack of emotional attachment to the effective regime of nationalism. As Nedostup astutely points out, "the ritual environment in China, centered as it was on the concept of

[23] The term "redemptive societies" is coined by Prasenjit Duara to refer to the new religious groups that arose in the turbulent early Republican era of 1910s and early 1920s. These religious groups were redemptive in the sense that they all advocated the salvation of individuals and the world as their main goal. Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowland & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 103-104.

[24] In his 1918 article "On Smashing the Idols," the Marxist intellectual Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀 (1879-1942) interestingly remarked that the nation-state (*guojia* 國家) is also a man-made idol, not dissimilar to the useless superstition of Buddha, ghosts, and ancestor that deceive the masses. Using a mixture of Marxist and Confucian concepts, Chen argues that the nation-state must be smashed because it is an instrument of oppression of the ruling class and the main cause of violent intentional rivalries, and the primary obstacle to mankind's advancement into the utopian stage of Great Harmony (*datong* 大同). Chen Duxiu, "Ou-xiang pohuai lun," *La Jeunesse* 5.2 (August 1918), pp.89-91.

efficacy, raised a very particular question regarding nationalist ceremony: what would it do?"[25] In the end, the state was not able to eradicate the "superstitious regime," and to the chagrin of the Nationalist government, secular symbols, rites and festivals of the state were often appropriated by the people in their "superstitious" practices.[26]

KEY RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND THESIS

This thesis examines the "religious question" in modern state-making and nation-building. Like Nedostup, I study the relationship of "religion" to nation-state formation from the state perspective as it was the state that first considered religion as a problem. The year 1898 is commonly argued by scholars to be the watershed in the emergence of Chinese secularism.[27] The catastrophic defeat by the Japanese in 1895 ignited the nationalistic feelings and fear of national survival among the intelligentsia class and propelled the Qing state toward constitutional reforms. This narrative has great merit in highlighting the seismic shift in state and society relationship, and the great violence, material and symbolic, on Chinese religious life in the course of radical secularization brought by the Chinese state and educated elites. Yet, unwittingly, by giving interpretative weight to external impact it has shifted our attention from the creative agency of Chinese actors in the translation, appropriation and employment of the imported knowledge and discourse. The adoption of the grammar of "religion" and the radical secularizing project of the Chinese educated class and the state was as much to do with practical concerns of nation building and state formation as emanating from a coherent modernist project.

[25] Nedostup (2009), p.284.

[26] Nedostup, "Civic Faith and Hybrid Ritual in Nationalist China" in Dennis Washburn and Kevin Reinhart eds. *Converting Cultures: Religion and Ideology, and Transformations of Modernity* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp.27-56; "Ritual Competition and the Modernizing Nation-state" in Mayfair Yang ed. (2008), pp.87-112.

[27] Vincent Goossaert, "1898: The Beginning of the End for Chinese Religion?" in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 65.2 (May 2006), pp. 307-335.

To highlight the pragmatic rationale behind Chinese impetus for secularization, I begin my study not at the end of the nineteenth century but with the signing of the Tianjin Treaties. I argue that the question of religion emerged first in Chinese history as a result of missionary challenge to the Chinese socio-political order in the form of demand for "religious freedom" under the support of Western imperial powers. The emergence of secularism in China that I am tracing was closely connected historically to the challenges of Christian missionization and the transition of the Chinese state from a multi-ethnic empire into a nation-state.

As was the case of the Meiji state studied by Trent Maxey, the expansion of missionary activities also pitted the Qing state against Christianity in a war of conversion for the loyalty of the Chinese subjects. The Qing state slowly evolved a secularist policy in response to the needs of protecting religious freedom that was demanded by the treaties and to shield the state from diplomatic incidents and local strife caused by religious conflict.[28] In the decades after 1860 anti-foreign sentiments among the Chinese population surged noticeably and transformed into anti-Christian behaviors. These anti-Christian disturbances vary in intensity and scale, ranging from vandalism of church properties to major unrests such as the Tianjing incident in 1870, the anti-foreign riots in 1891, and the catastrophic Boxer uprising in 1900. The literati-gentry elites often took the leading role in instigating the anti-Christian incidents through the production of anti-Christian propaganda and leading the masses in attacks on churches. The anti-Christian pamphlets and writings often contained overt Chinese racist discourse which portrayed foreigners as animals and beastly demons.[29] The great violence wrought by

[28] As we shall discuss later, the reaction of the Qing state to the "conversion crisis" created by the opening of the empire to Christian proselytism was different from the Meiji government. The Qing state did not attempt to create a state religion (*kokkyō* 国教) to fight the conversion of its subjects to Christianity like Meiji Japan. One reason is the multi-religious and multi-ethnic nature of the Qing empire, which made the creation of a single unifying religion difficult. Another reason is the disdain that the Confucian scholar-officials had of the clergy and teachings pertaining to the "way of the spirits" (*shendao* 神道). The ambassador to England and France Guo Songtao, for instance, praised the Meiji state for modernizing its governance through the emulation of Western political institutions. However, he deemed it to be ludicrous that the Meiji government imitated the Church of the West and set up a Ministry of Religion (*jiaobu*) to promulgate the theistic doctrine of Amateratsu. See Guo Songtao, *Lundun yu bari riji* (Yueli shushe, 1984), pp.260-261.

[29] On anti-Christian tradition in late imperial times see Paul Cohen, "The Anti-Christian Tradition in China" in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 20.2 (Feb. 1961), pp.169-180; *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Anti-Foreignism, 1860-1870* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963); and "Christian Missions and their Impact to 1900' in Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank ed. *Cambridge History of Modern China*, vol. 10 part 1 The Late Ching (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

these anti-Christian texts attested to the widespread of xenophobic sentiments immediately after the end of the Taiping rebellion. However, it is hard to ascertain whether the masses were motivated to violent actions because of their hatred of the foreign heresy like the literati class. Christian priests and converts were targeted for attack also because they were competitors in local struggle for power and resources[30] or simply because their foreignness, strange practices and high visibility made them easy scapegoats for Chinese fears and woes. [31]

The missionary incidents were the main cause of fiction between China and the Western treaty powers, especially France, the Protector of Catholic Mission in the Far East. At best, these incidents ended up in disgrace for the court and the dismissal of officials, and at worst, military defeat, indemnities and loss of territories. These incidents were also often exploited by foreign countries to further their imperialist aims in China. One notable example was the killing of two German Catholic missionaries in 1897 in Juye, Shandong. Germany swiftly took advantage of the incident and used it as a pretext to seize Jiaozhou. The Juye incident highlighted to the Qing state the need to de-politicize missionary incidents through the separation of religion and politics.

Like the late Qing state, a set of pragmatic concerns also animated the secularizing effort of the republican government that took power after the 1911 revolution. Separating the state from religion became more urgent as sovereignty shifted from the Emperor to the people in the twentieth century in the formation of the Chinese nation-state. Religion is seen by the nation-state as a threat on two fronts: as a destabilizing force threatening the integrationist inspiration of the state and as a dangerous obstacle to modernizing the people. Chief in the many concerns of the new republic was maintaining the

---

Europeans were often depicted as goats and Jesus as a licentious pig demon in these writings and illustrations, as the characters for "goat" 羊 and "pig" 豬 were homophonous to the characters "foreign" 洋 and "lord" 主. This was a conventional representation of foreign "barbarians" in Chinese racial discourse during the late imperial-era. See Frank Dikotter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* (London: Hurst & Co.1992), pp.1-14.

[30] One good example is the conflict between the Big Sword Society and local Catholics in Shandong, as shown by Joseph Esherick in his *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp.96-122.

[31] Barend ter Haar, *Telling Stories: Witchcraft and Scapegoating in Chinese History* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp.154–201.

territorial integrity of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious polity inherited from the Qing and building a unified nation-state. The border question (*bianjiang wenti* 邊疆問題) during the republican period was at once an ethnic issue (*minzu wenti* 民族問題) and a religious question since religious and ethnic identities overlapped in the borderlands of Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Tibet.[32] By maintaining its secularity through the constitution and assigning a non-political space for Islam, Buddhism, Christianity and Daoism as religions, the nascent republic nullified the religious nationalisms of the ethnic minorities.

The second objective of this dissertation is to draw attention to the connection of religion to the germination of Chinese nationalism. This is a neglected area since nationalism is deemed by scholars as a quintessential secular or modernist ideology that eschews any cosmological references or universalism, as it is based solely on the concepts of popular and territorial sovereignties and racial-cultural particularism. Moreover, in Chinese studies, scholars have noted the aggressively secular and progressivist character of Chinese nationalism. The militant attitude of the modern Chinese state (late Qing, GMD and Communist) toward religion that makes the Chinese case unique and fascinating as compare to other Asian nationalisms, such as the Hindutva movement in India and State Shinto in Japan, which perceived native religious traditions as the font of national culture and identity.

However, Chinese secularism as an ideology of the nation-state is not anti-religion. Contrary to what Rebecca Nedostup argued, secularism does not seek to undermine both religion and superstition. The nation-state is interested in confining religion to its own sphere and sees only superstition as the target for eradication. In other words, secularism constructs a trinary relation of secular-religion-superstition not a binary of secular-religion/superstition as argued by Nedostup.

Indeed, the nation-state often sees (Protestantized) religion as an important avenue in the creation of moral citizens and national subjectivity. The idea of "religious citizenship" was transmitted to China in the nineteenth century by Protestant missionaries. Protestant missionaries tried to persuade their Chinese audience that the secret to the wealth and power of the West lay in science and religion.

[32] Joseph Esherick, "How the Qing became China" in Esherick, Kayali and Young, eds., *Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), pp. 229-259.

The scientific knowledge provided the Western countries with military-technological strength in their conquest of others and religion promoted national cohesiveness and patriotism in the population. Protestant missionaries were also pioneers in the introduction of the symbols and rituals of the nation-state in China. Furthermore, Protestant missionaries also engaged extensively in education, social reforms and the combat of vices such as gambling, drinking, and opium smoking.[33]

The impact of the protestant model of religious citizenship in the formation of Chinese nationalism cannot be overstated. Many of the new elites of China were educated in the modern schools and colleges built by missionaries. Furthermore, although Christians made up less than 1 per cent of the population, 60 out of 274 members elected in the first national parliament between December 1912 and January 1913 were Christians. Protestant influence in the reform movement of other traditions was also notable. Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858-1927), the architect of the Confucian Religion (*Kongjiao* 孔教) movement in the late Qing and early Republic period, for instance, saw himself as the Martin Luther of Confucianism. I am particularly interested in how the categories of religion, race, and nation circulated by the missionaries were interpreted by the Chinese according to their own cultural-intellectual understanding. Protestantism shared many similarities with, what scholars called, "Confucian fundamentalism" in their emphasis on inner piety and morality, as well as anti-clericalism, and critical stance towards Buddhism, Daoism and popular religion. I argue that late imperial "Confucian fundamentalism,"[34] under the inspiration of the Protestant model of religious citizenship, was transformed into the Confucian nationalist movement and anti-superstitious campaigns of the late Qing and Republican era.

[33] Ryan Dunch, *Fuzhou Protestants and Making of a Modern China* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).

[34] Chow Kaiwing has characterized late imperial Confucian fundamentalism as purism, an impulse among the literati that sought to purge all heterodox elements from Confucian classics and rituals. Chow points out that late Ming literati stressed the performance of orthodox rituals, especially ancestral worship, to fight the intellectual trend of syncretism and reverse the decline of the Confucian order. The assertion of Chinese culturalism after the Manchu conquest had further fuelled the growth of purism and ritualism as ritual became a means by Qing litearti not only to counter Buddhist heterodoxy but also to assert Chinese identity. Building on Chow's insight, I argue that late imperial Confucian fundamentalism can be deemed as a form of proto-nationalism. Chow Kaiwing, *The Rise of Confucian Ritualism*: *Ethics, Classics, and Lineage Discourse* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp.8-9.

The last theme that this dissertation examines is sacralization of the nation-state. The secular nation-state and nationalism were developed historically out of and in antagonism to the Christian church and theology.[35] In the West, while the state was engaged in a power struggle against the Christian Church, it established the cult of the nation through borrowing or secularization of religious symbols, myths, ideas and practices.[36] In post-imperial China, sacralizing the state became a more pressing task when the new and weak Republican regime faced a "legitimacy crisis" as the notion of popular sovereignty was still foreign to the masses and as the country descended into chaos because of civil wars and Japanese imperial aggression from the 1920s-1940s.

The modern Chinese nation-state sought to sacralize the nation through the reinvention of state sacrifice (*jisi* 祭祀). The late Qing government discontinued the imperial state cult and radically refashioned a new ritual system that emphasized the role of Confucius and his teachings as the fount of Chinese civilization and morality. Under the new ritual scheme, the emperor was no longer the core mediator between the unseen cosmic-supernatural (*you* 幽) and the luminous human (*ming* 明) realms, but a part of the national body together with his subjects.[37] The Beiyang and Nanjing governments continued with ritual sacrifices to Confucius, the Yellow Emperor and other national heroes, but removed the religious-cosmic features such as the use of blood sacrifice and incense. At the same time, new civic ceremonies and festivals such as the commemorations of Sun-Yatsen and the revolutionary

[35] See Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Rise and Spread of Nationalism* (New York and London: Verso, 2006); Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* translated by Benjamin Schwab (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1985).

[36] Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann eds. *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).

[37] Kuo Ya-pei, "Redeploying Confucius: The Imperial State Dreams of the Nation, 1902-1911" in Mayfair Yang ed. (2008); and "The Emperor and the People in One Body" *The Worship of Confucius and Ritual Planning in the Xinzheng Reforms, 1902-1911*," *Modern China*, 35.2 (March 2009), pp.135-154.

martyrs, and the national tomb sweeping day were created. These newly invented ritual sacrifice and ceremonies were hybrids of religious ritual and political ceremonies.[38]

Nedostup considers the hybrid rituals created by the Nationalists as "traditionalesque" rather than "traditionalist." In other words, Nationalist endorsement of past ceremonial and symbolic forms was inauthentic and these hybrid rituals nothing but cunning "invention of traditions" to serve nationalist goals. [39] For instance, she argues that the Nationalists swept away all religious elements in the cults of the Yellow Emperor, Confucius and Sun Yatsen and turned them into symbols of the nation; and the newly invented civic ceremonies in turn derived their meanings from these symbols.[40] To substantiate her argument Nedostup refers to the ideas of social anthropologist Paul Connerton, who argues that in modern societies it is the content of the ritual that is primary not its form.

We will come back to the question of form and content in rituals later. Here I want to point out that Nedostup's interpretation is derived from her understanding that secularism meant the excising of the religious from the secular. However, this is too simplistic a reading of secularism. As Jason Ananda Josephson highlights, "the secular is not simply the subtraction of religion. Put in Hegelian terms, the secular results from an ongoing sublation (*Aufhebung*) of religion, which it simultaneously encapsulates, transforms and opposes."[41] Josephson highlights that in Europe Christian theological concepts were transfigured into secular notions undergirding the sovereignty of the state. In his study of Meiji secularism, Josephson argues that State Shintō was formed through the sublation of Shintō theological notions (divinity of the Emperor and national gods) and fusing it with scientism. Josephson argues that secularism and religion did not exist in a dichotomy but in negative trinary relation with superstition. For the state, religion is harmless and could be tolerated insofar it did not challenge the state truths and

[38] Sebastien Billioud and Joel Thoraval, *The Sage and the People: The Confucian Revival in China* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), see "Chapter 10: Between Religious Ritual and Political Ceremonial: Cosmology and National State," pp.238-287.

[39] Nedostup (2009), p.5.

[40] Ibid., p.264; Also see Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

[41] Jason Ananda Josephson, *The Invention of Religion in Japan* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), p.135.

rituals, and superstition, however, must be eradicated for it contradicts the scientism ideology of the state. Josephson's understanding of secularism is important in highlighting the agency of the Meiji political and intellectual elites in the invention of Japanese secular, religion, and supersitition. In a similar vein, Trent Maxey's historical survey of the ideological formation of the Meiji state shows how the government appropriated the categories of "religion" and "superstition" to construct State Shintō as the unifying secular doctrine of the nation and differentiating it from the "subjectified religions" of Buddhism, Sectarian Shintō, and Christianity.

Nedostup perceives nationalist secularism as consisting essentially of the dichotomous opposition of science and *ling* 靈 (efficacious magical power). This understanding creates some interpretative problems for her when she is confronted by contrary evidences such as the preservation of spirit tablets in Confucian temples by the nationalists. "Why keep the very loci of spiritual power? Were they (the spirit tablets of the Confucian sages and saints) simply to be museum pieces now?" Nedostup asks. In response to her own question, she argues, "It was probably a step too far to destroy them, even for cadres who happily decapitated City Gods images so that the party might assume the deity's role in the community. This was a party, after all, that had declined to comprehensively attack ancestral veneration, and in fact during the 1930s promoted it as an alternative to "superstition."[42] This analysis begs further question since the primary goal of the Nationalist regime was to destroy and replace the popular "affective superstitious regime" with the nationalist one.

Scholars of Chinese religion have shown that the sacred in Chinese context is more than *ling*. Kenneth Dean and Edward Davis argue that Chinese religion can be mapped conceptually in two poles- *sheng* 聖 (Confucian sagehood) and *ling*. Davis explains their differences, "Sheng is the 'embodiment of cosmic hierarchies' and the 'exemplification of moral conduct.' It seeks to channel all manifestations of material/spiritual power, including desire and sexuality in ren… Ren denotes that substance, or substantial connectedness, that subtends a vision of order and social regulation based on hierarchies achieved through ritual relationships (*li*) and exemplified in filial piety (*xiao*) and loyal devotion (*zhong*).

[42] Nedostup (2009), p. 266.

Ling, in contrast, is 'the imposition of supernatural power or efficacy into actualized resolutions.' These actualized resolutions are ritual events, including dramatic acts of spirit possession in which the priest or medium channels supernatural power and concentrates it in any spot in time and space, This 'any spot' is not a position relative to other positions within a hierarchy but a 'center appropriately oriented to a greater concentration of power on a transcendent plane.'" [43]

This thesis demonstrates how Chinese secularism as a nation-state ideology was formed in the late Qing and Republican eras through the synthesis of Confucian religiosity with Western scientism, or what I refer to as the Confucian-scientific secular. The marking of Confucian teachings as secular began with the seventeenth century Jesuits who presented to the Western audience the view that Confucius was a philosopher and Confucian rituals were civic or political not religious in nature. The later Protestant missionaries continued with this line of thinking and perceived Confucianism as essentially a body of "this-worldly" teaching concerning social ethics, created by Confucius through the rationalization of the ancient monotheism of *Shangdi* 上帝 (Lord on High) worship. Moreover, Protestant missionaries translated secular terms such as natural laws and science in neo-Confucian terms of *xingfa* 性法 (principles of nature) and *gezhi* 格致 (investigation of principles). It is not hard to conceive the Confucian tradition as secular since it did not have any reference of God/gods in its doctrines, nor a socially separate class of clergy or an institutional Church like monastic Buddhism and Daoism.

What the Confucian tradition provided to modern nation-state builders in China (as well as Meiji Japan) was the statecraft for the creation of a sacred community through rituals. Anthony Yu has shown that imperial power was based on two forms of sacred authority, that of Heaven and the ancestor.[44] Both sources of sacred power were claimed by the Emperor and expressed ritually through

[43] See Edward Davis, *Society and Supernatural in Song China* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), pp. 212-213; and Kenneth Dean, *Lord of the Three in One: The Spread of a Cult in Southeast China* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), p.26.

[44] Antony Yu, *State and Religion in China: Historical and Textual Perspectives* (Chicago and Lasalle, IL: Open Court, 2005).

sacrifices to Heaven and imperial ancestors (including the emperors of previous dynasties). Both sacrifices constructed the charisma of the Emperor as a sage-king by making him the paragon of Culture (*wen* 文) and filial piety (*xiao* 孝).[45] While the worship of Heaven was monopolized by the Emperor, sacrificial ritual for the ancestor was permitted for everyone in Ming dynasty under the influence of Neo-Confucianism. As David Faure shows in South China, the democratization of ancestral worship from the sixteenth century onwards created a ritual revolution in local society where rural villages became organized into lineages through the building of ancestral shrines and worship. The ancestral shrines were constructed in the center of the villages, pushing to the fringes, or in some cases even eradicating, the temples of territorial gods of Daoist origins. Lineage ideology and rituals, as Faure convincingly argues, were not state imposed, it was a common language used by both state and society to pursue the common benefits of order, taxation and economic prosperity.[46]

Lineage was increasingly emphasized by late imperial political thinkers as a statecraft tool for the state to accomplish its goals of enforcing internal peace and external security, as well as, teaching and nourishing the people (*jiaoyang* 教養). The fall of the late Ming state was attributed by Chinese literati as a result of bureaucratic over-centralization. Late imperial mandarins were well-aware of the "affection deficit" created by over-centralization of power and sought to inject feudal principles in their socio-political reforms to ameliorate the divide between state and society and the development of "iron-cage of rationality" associated with over bureaucratization. [47] In his study of the great eighteenth century statesman Chen Hongmou 陳宏謀 (1696-1771), William Rowe shows how Chen, as the governor of Jiangxi, even tried to infuse feudal principles in imperial governance by promoting the

[45] Angela Zito, *Of Body and Brush: Grand Sacrifice as Text/Performance in Eighteenth Century China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

[46] David Faure, *Emperor and Ancestor: State and lineage in South China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).

[47] Alexander Woodside, *Lost Modernities: China, Vietnam, Korea, and the Hazards of World History*. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp.52-55.

building of lineages and incorporating the lineage chiefs as semi-bureaucratic agents of the state with judicial and disciplinary authorities over their kinsmen.[48]

Ancestral sacrifice created a ritual *habitus* that connected the state and society and engendered a sense of cultural unity before the age of nationalism in late imperial China. Peter Perdue perceptively argues that our emphasis on ideology in the study of nationalism has obscured us to the fact that "practice led ideology not the other way round" in the development of Chinese nationalism.[49] In a similar vein, James Watson has argued that ritual standardization had produced a unified culture in late imperial China.[50] This emphasis of "ideology over practice" is what Nedostup did in her appreciation of Nationalist rituals. The idea of symbolic content as primary and form as secondary in rituals came from the sharp demarcation of the mind and body in Western-Christian understanding. Traditionally the prominent feature in Chinese conception of the body was its non-dualism. There was no sharp separation of the mind and body as in Cartesian dualism or privileging the mind/soul over the body. It is for this reason that Mark Elvin in his pioneering study of the Chinese body translates *shen* (身) as "body-person." The term transcends the object-subject dichotomy as it implies a lived, experienced and social body. Elvin illustrates how the mind-heart (*xin* 心), the moral-psychological attributes of a person, is understood in Chinese culture, not as the antithesis of the *shen*, but connects with the outer body-person in an intimate and mutually determining relation. [51]

In Confucian tradition, the body is seen as the site for moral cultivation (*xiushen* 修身). Thus the pedagogical practice of ritual is crucial to the creation of the inner state of sincerity (*cheng* 誠) and

[48] William Rowe, "Ancestral Rites and Political Authority in Late Imperial China: Chen Hongmou in Jiangxi," *Modern China*, 24.4 (Oct. 1998), pp.378-407.

[49] Peter C. Perdue, "Where Do Incorrect Political Ideas Come From?" in Joshua Fogel ed. *The Teleology of the Modern Nation-state in Japan and China* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), p.185.

[50] James Watson, "Rites or Beliefs? The Construction of a Unified Culture in Late Imperial China" in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim eds. *China's Quest for National Identity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.80-103.

[51] Mark Elvin, "The Tales of the Shen and Xin: Body-Person and Mind-Heart during the last 150 Years "in Thomas Kasulis, Roger Ames and Wimal Dissanayake, eds., *Self as Body in Asian Theory and Practice* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp.213-294.

external civilized social relations. It is not hard to see why Confucian ritual regime was valued by the modern Chinese state. For the modern state-builders, Confucian rituals could achieve much more than the political ceremonies imported from the West.[52] It not only could help inculcate national consciousness in the citizens, but also provided the state with a technology of disciplinary power for the creation of a moral and disciplined nation.

CHAPTERS OVERVIEW

Chapter 1 examines the arrival of religion through the Tianjin treaties signed by the Qing state with Russia, the United States, Britain, and France in June 1858. Religion entered East Asia as a diplomatic category as Western treaty powers sought to impose international laws, which include the rights of commerce, diplomatic representation, travel, and religion on China, Japan and Korea. Much labor in current scholarship has been spent on tracing the origins of the terminology of *zongjiao* 宗教. The term *zongjiao*, which was used in contemporary Chinese language to translate the term "religion," was a loanword introduced from Japan by Chinese intellectuals and diplomats at the turn of the twentieth century. The conclusion that is drawn from the genealogical study of the term is that there was no "religion" in China till the last decade of the nineteenth century. This chapter shows that the notion of religion, in fact, entered China in the mid-nineteenth century through the translation of the word into *jiao* 教 (teaching) in the Tianjin treaties in 1858. The Tianjin treaties in effect created, what Lydia Liu calls, the super-sign of *jiao*/religion. A super-sign is a hetero-linguistic sign that takes the appearance of the native word but with its meaning deferred to that of the foreign term it is made commensurate with. The act of translation involved in the Tianjin treaties was in fact a continuation of war with other means, with the aim of subjecting the Qing Empire to the rules of "international law." The chapter explains how the Qing state found it difficult to negotiate and resist the discursive violence of the Western imperial powers by developing its information of the west and linguistic competency of the

[52] On the impact of political ceremonies in the creation of republican identity, see Henrietta Harrison, *The Making of Modern Republican Citizens: Political Ceremonies and Symbolism, 1911-1929* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

foreign languages too late. The issue of the liberty of religion became a major issue of contention between the Qing and Western negotiators since the term *jiao* lacked the separation of politics and religious which was inherent in the foreign term religion. From the Chinese perspective, *jiao* was synonymous with governing and thus the prerogative of the state. The granting of religious freedom meant no less than allowing foreign missionaries to convert the loyalty of the Chinese subjects and create a state within a state. The opening up of the empire to missionary activities was particularly threatening to the imperial state since it was locked in a life and death armed struggle at that point against the Taipings, who rebelled under the inspiration of the foreign teaching.

Chapter 2 examines Qing policy towards Christianity from 1860 to 1870. The super-sign *jiao*-religion created great problem for the Qing management of the foreign religion in the 1860s as it masked the hidden changes in meaning of the term *jiao* for the Chinese. This had great political ramification since transgression of the principle of religious freedom would invite diplomatic squabbles, or worse, military actions from the treaty powers. In dealing with missionary activities, the Qing state was caught in between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, the Qing government was committed to honor the treaty obligations for western military aids against the Taipings, which were considered a more critical threat to the survival of the dynasty. On the other, the opening of the whole empire to Christianity created a crisis of conversion in the minds of the officials and literati elites. In the Chinese heartlands where the state, through its bureaucratic agents or local elites, had been imposing a uniform elite culture on the masses since the reign of Yongzheng, conversion to Christianity was akin to betrayal of one's ethnic and political identities. Missionary activities also threatened to tear asunder the religious harmony in the peripheral regions of Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet where the central state allowed local lords or *tusi* 土司 certain degree of autonomy and protected the integrity of local religious laws and customs. The Qing policy towards Christianity in the 1860s was to continue the earlier policy of covert containment of Christian activities. While the Qing state publicly recognized Christianity as an orthodox teaching (*jiao*) that aided the authority in the moral guidance of the people, it strove to limit the spread of the foreign teaching (*yangjiao* 洋教) and monitor the activities of the missionaries and native converts. The Qing authority was embroiled in a conversionary competition with the Christian

missionaries for the "hearts and minds" of its subjects through the promulgation of orthodox ideas among the population.

Chapter 3 discusses the introduction of the Qing state to the place of Christianity and the relationship between state and religion in Western nation-states through the journals of Qing ambassadors. In 1868, the Qing government sent its first diplomatic mission led by Anson Burlingame to Europe and the United States. In 1877, Guo Songtao 郭嵩燾 (1818-1891) was appointed as the minister to Britain (and later France). Guo's appointment was the beginning of China's diplomatic representation to the European countries, the United States and Japan. The primary objective of these diplomatic missions was to investigate the West, and the diplomatic representatives abroad were required by the Zongli Yamen to keep journals. From the 1860s to the 1900s, these journals occupied a central place in disseminating knowledge of the West. Religious affair was one major area of interest to the Chinese diplomats as the Qing state was increasingly pressured diplomatically by the Western powers, especially France, the protector of Catholic missions in China, for the "missionary cases" from the 1860s onwards. In the West, the Chinese diplomats encountered a different kind of church-state relations as compared to the one they were familiar with. In contrast to China where religious institutions were politically weak and subordinated to the will of the state, the states in the West struggled historically against a powerful Catholic Church. The Chinese diplomats recorded extensively about the curtailment of political power of the Vatican by European governments through policies such as *laïcité* in Republican France and *Kulturkampf* in Germany in search of a solution to their missionary problems at home. The Chinese observers were also cognizant of the use of religious disputes as a pretext by Western powers to further their imperialist agenda as in the case of the partitioning of the Ottoman empire. The political implication of Christian missions became increasingly apparent to the Chinese in the 1890s as the imperialist powers increasingly took advantage of religious incidents to extract concessions from the Qing government. From the late 1880s to the 1900s, the Qing state had attempted to separate religious and political affairs and dismantle the French religious protectorate by negotiating for direct diplomatic representation with the Vatican. What the Qing state tried to achieve here was a separation of the institutional spheres of government (*zheng*) and teaching (*jiao*), which in

traditional China encompassed the domain of religion, education, and culture. I argue that the institutional separation of government and teaching was not a novel approach, but a colonial technique of rule developed by the Qing state to handle its relations with the Tibetan-Buddhist Church and to encompass the religious minorities in Inner Asia into the empire.

Chapter 4 examines the connection between religion and the genesis of Chinese nationalism in late Qing. This chapter compares the ideas of Kang Youwei and Zhang Zhidong 張之洞 (1837-1909), the two most influential reformers in the last decades of the Qing dynasty. In late 1890s, Both Kang and Zhang perceived that the Qing empire was in danger of being partitioned by the imperialist powers, and consequently the enslavement of the Chinese race and the destruction of Confucian teaching by Christianity. During the 1898 reform, Kang proposed the creation a Confucian church and establishing the Confucian religion or what he referred to as "Kongjiao" 孔教 as the national religion of China. Kang's proposal was a response to what he perceived as a coordinated political and spiritual-cultural invasion by Western imperialist nations and Christianity. He calculated that the establishment of the Confucian church and its enactment of religious laws with the Christian church would ease imperialist pressures through the depoliticization of religious tensions. Another reason for making Confucian religion the national religion of China was Kang's conviction that a nation cannot exist without a national faith. In the nineteenth century, Protestant missionaries were the main intermediaries in transferring to China the model of "religious citizenship." Missionaries introduced civic rituals such as flag raising and the singing of national anthem and promoted the view that religion (Christianity) was crucial in the creation of a cohesive nation and moral citizens in the West. The Christian model of religious citizenship inspired Kang's national religion movement. Institutionally and ritually, the creation of empire-wide Confucian churches would serve to unite the ruler and subjects into one national body. The creation of a national church involves an overhaul of the state cult and ritual order of the empire. Kang proposed the destruction of all cults except for the worship of Confucius. Zhang Zhidong also proposed the destruction of temple cults and revamping the state ritual system with Confucius as the focus of worship. Unlike in Japan, the Qing emperor was not chosen to become the symbolic center for this state engineered nationalism is partly because of his non-Chinese ethnic origin and the relatively

short history of the Manchu monarchy. Contrary to Kang Youwei, Zhang Zhidong never thought of instituting Kongjiao as the national religion. Zhang's policy consisted of making Confucianism as the national teaching, crucial for the creation of patriotic citizens, and distinguished it from other theistic teachings of Christianity, Buddhism, Daoism, and Islam. The education reform in late Qing instituted by Zhang made Confucian ethics as the moral foundation of the new Qing nation-state that he was fashioning. At the same time, he sought to confine Christianity in the religious sphere by prohibiting the teaching of religion by missionary teachers in the new schools and imperial colleges. Zhang's secularizing education policy and nation-state model were inspired by the Meiji example of State Shintō. Kang and Zhang represent two different approaches in the nationalization of the Confucian tradition, one attempted to make Confucianism into a modern religion and the other tried to distant it from the category of "religion." These two different approaches came to a head after the fall of the imperial system and the transformation of the Qing Empire into a secular nation-state in 1912.

Chapter 5 examines Chinese republican secularism and the creation of the secular republic from 1912 to 1919. I show that Chinese republican secularism was motivated by two main imperatives in the Chinese political elites' project of nation-state building—to be accepted as a civilized member of the international community and to weaken the religious nationalisms and secession movements of the ethnic minorities in the borderlands. The Meiji model of secularism provided the nascent Chinese republican government with a working bureaucratic paradigm to draw the distinction between religion, superstition, and the secular. Like the Meiji Constitution, the Republican Constitution construed the principle of religious liberty rhetorically as freedom of inner belief. This abstract definition allowed the Republican government to regulate institutional religion and to prevent religious challenge to political authority and state appropriation of religious material resources. The legal category of religion was of vital importance in helping the republican policy-makers to define superstition and the secular. Religion was defined as a kind of supra-rational belief that inculcate moral courage and self-sacrificing spirit in the people. Beliefs, practices, and organizations that did not fit this description were banned as superstition, uncivilized and criminal pseudo-religions that inhibit the intellectual development of the nation or threaten the public order. This led to the radical reform of Chinese religious organizations and

practices to fit the new category of religion. At the same time, the Republican government under the presidency of Yuan Shikai excluded certain ideologies and practices from the category of religion to engineer a secular national faith for the nation-state similar to State Shintō of Japan. I show that Yuan was an important figure for the secularization of Confucianism in the early republican period. Yuan continued Zhang Zhidong's project of creating a national morality and ritual order out of Confucianism. He resisted the intense pressure of the state religion movement formed by powerful political elites and the newly created Confucian Association (*Kongjiao hui* 孔教會) to get Confucian religion constitutionally recognize as a religion and the national religion of the republic.

– 1 –

Lost In Translation:
Negotiating Religion in the Tianjin Treaties

On 20 May 1858, the Anglo-French force of 26 gunboats and several thousand troops stormed the Dagu forts in Tianjin, clearing the way to Beijing. The hostilities at Dagu forts represented the climax in the worsening of Sino-Western relations in the 1850s since the ascension of Emperor Xianfeng 咸豐 (r.1850-1861) to the throne. The young emperor's disavowal of the appeasement policy of his predecessor and the dissatisfaction of the westerners in obtaining treaty revision from the Qing government steered the Chinese empire and the western powers into a collision course. In 1856, the Arrow incident and the execution of French missionary Auguste Chapdelaine and Chinese converts for treason by the zealous magistrate of Xilin county provided the needed pretexts for the English and French governments to settle their grievances with the Chinese.

The Anglo-French force under the command of Lord Elgin (1811-1863) and Baron Gros (1793-1870) attacked and militarily occupied Canton on 28 December 1857, when Ye Mingchen 葉名琛 (1807-1859), the beleaguered governor of Liangguang ignored the ultimatum.[53] Ye was captured and

[53] John K. Fairbank, "The creation of the treaty system" in Fairbank ed. *The Cambridge History of China*, vol.10 part 1, the late Ch'ing 1800-1911(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 245-246. Ye's hands were tied at that time dealing with the general social disorder at that time of the Arrow incident in Canton with the Taiping rebellion spreading in the Pearl River delta region from the neighbouring Guangxi province. Ye adopted

exiled to Calcutta, and the city of Canton placed under foreign administration with the Mongol vice-governor Bogui 栢貴 (?-1859) as the puppet ruler. On 11 February 1858, Lord Elgin drafted a strongly worded diplomatic note to Beijing chastising Ye for denying British and French subjects their treaty rights and just compensation for the injuries they suffered in Guangzhou. The communication informed the Chinese government that military action would be temporarily suspended and requested for a plenipotentiary with "full powers" to meet and negotiate for a settlement at Shanghai by the end of March. Included in the note was a set of demands for negotiation, namely, residence rights for an ambassador in the capital; opening of more treaty ports; freedom of travelling for westerners in the interior; regulation of custom duties and transit taxes; suppression of piracy; and ending of Christian persecution.[54] These demands were repeated by Baron Gros in a separate and lengthier diplomatic note sent on the same day to Beijing.[55] The Russian and American envoys, Count Putiatin (1803-1883) and William Bradford Reed (1806-1876), who arrived in China as representatives of neutral nations for treaty revision, were in full agreement when shown the drafts by their British and French counterparts. They essentially expressed similar points in their respective notes sent simultaneously with the Allies' to demonstrate the unity of Western nations on the demands and exert pressure on the Qing government.[56]

At the broadest level, from the perspective of the Western powers (as well as the Chinese) the confrontation with China was a conflict over the standard of "Civilization." The standard of "Civilization" consists of the rule of law in general, and more specifically, respecting the basic inalienable "Natural Rights" of life, property, travel, commerce, religion and proselytizing of individuals. A state is considered civilized if it conforms to the norms and practices of the international

essentially a non-engagement policy toward British demands, which appeared to the British as a classic example of Chinese haughtiness and intransigence toward "foreign barbarians."

[54] *CESM*, pp.182-183.

[55] Henri Cordier, *L'expédition de Chine de 1857-1858: Histoire Diplomatique, Notes et Documents* (Paris, 1905), pp.271-276.

[56] *CESM*, pp.186-188; H.B. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire* (New York: Paragon Book, 1900), pp.506-508.

system evolved in Europe.[57] The concept of Natural Right (*Ius naturale*) as the foundation of civilizational standard and international law (*Ius gentium*) was derived from Christian theology and legal tradition, and from the violent history of colonial encounter between European Christendom and non-European states and people since the sixteenth century. Early European international jurists such as Francisco de Vitoria (1486-1546) and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) asserted that both Christian believers and non-believers alike are obliged to the "Natural Law" set by the divine Creator, and that violation of the natural rights of the Europeans constituted an injury, which could be used to justify war against the barbarous non-believers.[58] By the nineteenth century with natural law theories superseded by positivism, the "law of Christendom" became the standard of "Civilization" measuring and demarcating the society of "civilized" states of Europe and the outer spheres of "barbarous" and "savagery" polities and people.

The demand for religious liberty was also driven by certain pragmatic objectives of the Euro-American imperial powers. The religious question was of secondary importance to Great Britain and the United States as their chief objective remained breaking down Chinese barriers to trade. They took up the issue mainly to satisfy the religious lobby groups at home, which clamored for the protection of foreign missionaries and the opening up of China for missionary activities. It had been the long-standing policy of Whitehall not to mingle commercial interests with religious matters in case the latter interfered with the former. The Nanjing treaty is essentially, as John K. Fairbank aptly described, a "charter of rights for the merchants"[59] and British missionaries were given the legal right to practice and proselytize their religion in the five treaty ports only because it was included in the Sino-French Treaty of Bogue and due to the most favored nation clause. During the Arrow War, the British government first departed from their long-standing policy of religious non-intervention for two main reasons: to draw the support

[57] Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard of Civilization in International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).

[58] On the theological origin of international law, see Christopher A. Stumpf, *The Grotian Theology of International Law* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2006); and Anthony Pagden, "Dispossessing the barbarian: the language of Spanish Thomism and the debate over the property rights of American Indians" in Pagden ed. *The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp.79-98.

[59] Fairbank (1978), p.217.

of Christian leaders and laymen who opposed what they perceived as an immoral drug war, and to stand by the religious grievances of its French ally.[60] For the United States, the priority of the mission was to acquire similar commercial privileges as the other nations while respecting Chinese territorial integrity. The question of religious freedom was accorded secondary importance by Reed. Without the perseverance of his two missionary-interpreters, Samuel Wells Williams (1812-1884) and W.A.P. Martin (1827-1916), the American treaty of Tianjin would not have included a religious clause.[61]

The French and Russian governments saw the Christian mission as an aid to their political and economic agendas in the Far East. Through the unequal treaties in the nineteenth century the French installed a religious protectorate for the Catholic Church in China that lasted more than a hundred years. French consuls in China often used religious disputes to extract political and economic concessions from the Qing court.[62] Likewise, the Russian government also viewed the Russian Orthodox Mission in China as a complement to its diplomatic and political policies. The Russian Orthodox Mission started at the end of the seventeenth century to serve the spiritual needs of a small number of captured Russians in Beijing. It then evolved to become the diplomatic apparatus of the Russian government, responsible for gathering intelligence on the Chinese and managing Russian tributary trade with the Qing Empire.[63] The Russians were the only European power to have a diplomatic outpost in Beijing in 1858, it was partly because this that Lord Elgin was determined to have the right of legation established in the capital through the Tianjin Treaty.

---

[60] John Wong, *Deadly Dreams: Opium, Imperialism, and the Arrow War (1856-1860) in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.322.

[61] Frederick Wells William, *Life and Letters of Samuel Wells William, L.L.D.: Missionary, Diplomatist, Sinologue* (New York and London: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1889), p. 412. When Wells submitted his resignation for the Office of Secretary and Interpreter for the U.S. legation in Beijing in 1876, the Department of State wrote the following statement in praise of his contribution for negotiating and inserting the toleration clause in the American treaty. "Above all the Christian world will not forget that to you more than any other man is due the insertion in our treaty with China the liberal provision for the toleration of the Christian religion."

[62] For a recent study of the French religious protectorate in China, see Ernest P. Young *Ecclesiastical Colony: China's Catholic Church and the French Religious Protectorate* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[63] For a general history of Russian religious and diplomatic mission in China from the late seventeenth century to mid-nineteenth century, see Alexander Lamanov, "Russian Orthodox Mission" in R.G. Tiedemann ed. *Handbook of Christianity* vol. 2 1800-Present (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), pp.193-201; and Daniel H. Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China* (U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pp.209-215.

This chapter examines the entry of the concept of "religion" into China through the 1858 Tianjin treaties. Much attention in current scholarship has been devoted to tracing the origins of the term *zongjiao* 宗教. The expression *zongjiao* (Jp. *shūkyō*) entered the modern Chinese language via Japan as a loanword in the beginning of the twentieth century, together with other Japanese neologisms for western terms like government (Ch. *zhengfu* Jp. *seifu* 政府), politics (Ch. *zhengzhi*; Jp. *seiji* 政治) and hygiene (Ch. *weisheng*; Jp. *eisei* 衛生).[64] Though the expression *zongjiao* existed in classical Chinese vocabulary, it did not have a meaning equivalent to "religion" till Meiji scholars and diplomats coined it to translate the foreign phrase. The term "religion" emerged in East Asia, as Jason Josephson astutely observes, as a diplomatic and legal category "whose contours emerged through a process of negotiation"[65] between the Bakufu and the treaty powers. He argues that though the power relationship was asymmetrical during the treaty negotiations, the Japanese demonstrated tactical agency through the act of translation. The Bakufu official translators painstakingly translated word by word in the western language clauses and invented new terms when no equivalent existed in Japanese language to prevent the treaty powers from dictating the interpretations of the treaties they signed. They invented neologisms to translate the phrase "religion" to foil the plan of the treaty powers to remove the prohibition of Christianity in Japan and to limit the foreign teaching to the treaty ports and among the westerners.

Religion as a legal term arrived in China also through the unequal treaties but under different circumstances. The Tianjin treaties were a "treaty of defeat" imposed on the Qing government in the aftermath of military defeat while the treaties Japan signed at around the same time with the Euroamerican nations were "negotiated treaty," which the Bakufu could influence its formulation. [66]

[64] For the contribution of Japanese loanwords to modern Chinese language, see Federico Masini, *The Formation of Modern Chinese Lexicon and its Evolution toward a National Language: The Period from 1840 to 1898* (Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Project on Linguistic Analysis, 1993) and Lydia Liu, *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity-China, 1900-1937* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995).

[65] Josephson (2012), p.73.

[66] For a comparison between the unequal treaties of China and Japan, see Michael Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp.19-22.

Furthermore, the Qing negotiators were disadvantaged during the treaty negotiation because of their lack of competency in western languages and therefore became subjected to the discursive violence of French and British imperialism through forced translations. In the following, I would like to trace how religion entered the Chinese language through translation and the establishment of French and English linguistic hegemony in the Tianjin treaties, as well as how the term was (mis)understood by the Qing negotiators when it was translated as *jiao* 教 (teaching), which did not correspond in meaning with the western one. The unequal treaties, as James Hevia points out, were not merely legal documents, they were coercive political instruments utilized by the western imperial powers to destroy Qing sovereignty and put in place a system of Euroamerican domination in the name of "Civilization" and international law.[67] In this sense, the treaties were the continuation of war through other means. It was through the act of treaty negotiations and translation that the western powers subjected the Qing Empire to their discursive violence and imposed on the helpless victim its own discursive universe.

NEGOTIATING WITH IMPERIALISM, 1840-1850s

The primary objective of the Euroamerican powers in the first half of the nineteenth century was opening China up for greater political, economic and religious intercourses with the West. The First Opium War (1839-1842) was triggered by the confiscation and destruction of British opium by imperial commissioner Lin Zexu 林則徐 (1785-1850), yet the underlying motive for Great Britain in waging the war was to get rid of the restrictions of the government licensed Cohong monopoly in Canton, as well as to dismantle the tributary trade relation and replace it with an institutional structure of free trade between equal and sovereign nations.[68]

[67] James Hevia, *English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), see ch. 3 "Violence and the Rule of Law in China, 1856-1858."

[68] Immanuel Hsü, *China's Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phrase 1858-1860* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960).

The particular feature of Euroamerican imperialism in China that distinguished it from western encroachments in other countries in Africa and Asia such as India, the Philippines and Congo was the exercise of indirect control by the imperial powers rather than direct annexation.[69] China was never colonized by an imperial power and the "carving of China like a melon" into distinct spheres of foreign influence, which was widely believed to be happening at the last decade of the nineteenth century when the Qing empire reached its nadir, did not materialize in the end. The Euroamerican imperialist powers, with the exception of the Russian empire, did not contemplate the colonization of China as her enormous population size and landmass would make that a prohibitive if not impossible undertaking. Instead Western powers under the lead of Great Britain practiced a kind of "free trade" imperialism that sought informal control by tutoring the Chinese empire to the mores of a Western dominated international order through war and treaty making.[70]

The unequal treaties imposed on the Qing Empire served to install an informal empire in China by breaking down Chinese barriers to western penetrations and extending informal control through the infringement of Chinese sovereignty under the pretext of "international law." The 1842 Nanjing Treaty opened Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo and Shanghai as treaty ports for commerce; approved the stationing of British consuls in the five treaty ports; abolished the monopoly of the Cohong merchants; agreed on a uniform tariff; and ceded Hong Kong Island to Great Britain. The supplementary Treaty of Bogue signed in the following year further granted Great Britain the right to fix import and export taxes, and the most favored nation treatment. British nationals were also granted extraterritoriality and the right to purchase property in the treaty ports. The same privileges were extended to the United States and France by the treaties of Wanghsia and Whampoa in 1844. Furthermore, the Treaty of Whampoa overturned the proscription of Christianity since 1724 and legalized missionary work within the treaty ports. The significance of the Treaty of Whampoa for the history of Christianity in China is that it

[69] This point has been persuasively articulated in John Wong, "The Building of an Informal British Empire in China in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, 59.2 (1977), pp. 472-485.

[70] Hevia (2003).

provided the impetus for the "Catholic invasion" of China, a new era of Catholic militant assertiveness spearheaded by French missionaries and under the auspices of French gunboat diplomacy.[71]

Chinese dealing with Euroamerican imperialism was neither a utopian or unreflective imposition of the Sino-centric worldview nor a set of haphazard responses to western challenges. Qing relations and responses to foreign people, similar to previous dynasties, were varied and determined largely by historical/cultural connections as well as the particular security challenges of the frontier zone. Thus, as William Kirby observes, there was no single foreign policy or the need of a foreign ministry in imperial China, since bilateral relation with different foreign people were managed differently and pragmatically by a variety of institutions such as the Ministry of Ceremonies, the Court of Colonial Affairs (*Lifan Yuan* 理藩院), the Imperial Household Agency (*Neiwu Fu* 內務府) and the provincial officials of the respective frontier zones.[72] Scholars have also highlighted the contrast in Qing management of Inner Asia and the maritime zone of southern China. In Inner Asia, Qing foreign policy was marked by flexibility in ceremonial forms and aggressiveness in the collection of intelligence and in neutralizing competitors to Qing hegemony such as the Zunghars. In the coastal regions, however, the Qing "showed an astonishingly lack of curiosity"[73] of nations from the "Great Western Ocean" (*da xiyang* 大西洋) and insisted on the limitation and bureaucratization of trade under the tributary model. How do we reconcile this difference in Qing management of foreign affairs?

Rather than interpreting Qing attitude and behavior towards the foreign nations through the unchanging and over-generalized master-narrative of "Sino-centrism," it is more fruitful to understand the concrete strategic, diplomatic and political considerations of the Qing imperial government with regards to the different frontier zones. Indeed, the residence of Europeans in Macau, the Canton trade

[71] D.E. Mungello, *The Catholic Invasion of China: Remaking of Chinese Christianity* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015).

[72] William Kirby, "Traditions of Centrality" in Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh eds. *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p.17.

[73] John E. Wills Jr., "Ching Relations with the Dutch, 1662-1669" in J.K. Fairbank ed. *Chinese World Order* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p.247.

and the employment of Jesuit missionaries in the court during the Qing dynasty hardly fit the tributary-trade model of foreign relations. John E. Wills astutely proposes that "defensiveness" is better than "sinocentrism" as the master concept in understanding Ming-Qing maritime policy.[74] The Qing government, though uneasy about the superior naval power of the Europeans especially the British, did not view the maritime powers as an immediate threat due to the remoteness of the European nations. The Qing government also had faith in its ability to control the westerners through trade or repulse them militarily when the need arises, for instance in the 1834 Napier affair the Chinese forced the British to back down by closing the Canton trade.[75] The Qing maritime policy was defensive in the sense that it tried to restrict the contact with Europeans at Canton and Macau, allowing the desired European capital and expertise to flow through official and semi-official personnel (such as the Cohong traders) and kept physical and cultural contacts between the Europeans and the Chinese to a minimal level. The main security concern of the Qing state was the unruly Chinese coastal inhabitants, who might rebel against the imperial government when they come into contact with western capital, weaponry, and religion.

Qing's strategic thinking of the maritime powers shifted significantly during and in the aftermath of the 1839-1842 Opium War, when the naval and land forces of Great Britain with superior mobility and firepower quickly captured sections of Canton city and Xiamen in the southeastern coast. They put military pressure on Tianjin and the capital region, and at the same time, seized the Zhoushan Island, Ningbo, Zhenjiang, Shanghai, and endangering Nanjing city in the lower Yangzi region. As a result, the British chocked the traffic on the Grand Canal and threatened to cut the empire into two. British military action made the Qing government realized the vulnerability of its coastal defense, the technical inferiority of the imperial forces[76], and most importantly, the ever-present danger posed by

[74] John E. Wills Jr. ed. *China and Maritime Europe, 1500-1800*: *Trade, Settlement, Diplomacy and Mission* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p.4.

[75] Frederic Wakeman highlights that "On the eve of the Opium War (1839-42), Ch'ing foreign policy rested on three long-standing assumptions: China's superiority in warfare, her skill in 'civilizing' outsiders and her possession of precious goods to bring foreigners to accept tributary status." Wakeman, "The Canton Trade and The Opium War" in Fairbank ed. (1978), p.174. For an account of the Napier affair, see pp.175-177.

[76] Arthur Waley, *Opium War through Chinese Eyes* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p.185.

the "Chinese traitors" (*hanjian* 漢奸) to the dynasty.[77] The Opium War was pivotal in shifting the geopolitical thinking of the Qing officials and literati scholars on foreign affairs from a geographically localized frontier approach to a foreign policy model, a holistic approach that considers the security challenges of Qing extensive borders and the multiple geopolitical actors, both Asian and European, in toto. [78]

The war also ushered in a conciliatory approach in dealing with the western maritime powers, what James Polachek calls "Manchu diplomacy."[79] Qing military blunder in the war led to the fall from imperial favor of the hawkish Han Chinese faction. Lin Zexu was cashiered and exiled to Yili in September 1840 and his patron at court, Wang Ding 王鼎 (1768-1842) died shortly afterwards, many believed he committed suicide to protest the humiliating peace settlement in Nanjing. To salvage the thorny military situation, Emperor Daoguang 道光 (r.1820-1850) turned to the advice of a group of Manchu imperial clansmen— Mujangga 穆彰阿 (1782-1856), Yilibu 伊里布 (1772-1843), Qishan 琦善 (1786-1854) and Qiying 耆英—which advocated a conciliatory approach to deal with the British invaders. The Grand Councilor Mujangga in particular was influential in convincing the emperor, especially after the fall of Zhenjiang on July 23, 1842, that further military action against the British was not only futile but would endanger the security of the dynasty. The Manchu appeasement faction perceived negotiation with the British as the most viable option in dealing with the threat of the western barbarians when the military solution had proven to be a failure.[80]

---

[77] British attack of Canton and the weakening of imperial control that followed emboldened the robbers, pirates and secret societies in the delta region and led to a general state of lawlessness in Guangdong and Guangxi during and in the aftermath of the Anglo-Chinese confrontation. Ultimately the social disorder culminated into the great Taiping Rebellion that rocked the foundation of the dynasty. See Frederic Wakeman, *Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839-1861* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1966), pp.117-131. Qing military officers also tried to account to the emperor for the rapid and easy fall of many cities as due to the treachery of the "internal collaborators" (*neiying* 內應).

[78] Matthew Mosca, *From Frontier Policy to Foreign: The Question of India and the Transformation of Geopolitics in Qing China* (Stanford, C.A: Stanford University Press, 2013).

[79] James Polachek, *Inner Opium War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 1992).

[80] This point is revealed in Qiying's advice to the emperor during the Opium War crisis: "In settling the barbarian affairs this time, we are governed at every hand by the inevitable and we concede that the (appeasement) policy

Manchu diplomacy was part of China's strategic culture rooted in realpolitik. The imperial state would not shy away from violence to annihilate its enemies, however, it would choose negotiation if war was not a viable option.[81] Joseph Fletcher has perceptively observed that the unequal treaty negotiated with the British was based on Qing experience with Khanate of Kokand. In 1835, the Qing concluded a settlement with Khokand, what Fletcher referred to as Qing's "first unequal treaty," after it was defeated by the small but militarily powerful khanate at Altishahr. The Qing court realized that placating the Khokandis was more rational than incurring the cost of an expensive military campaign. Fletcher has pointed out that many of the Qing officials who oversaw the conclusion of the treaty with the Khokandis were also appointed by the Court to negotiate with the British later. These officials utilized the experiences they had in Central Asia when negotiating with the British.[82] The British was accorded the similar concessions that were given to the Khokandis in the Nanjing treaty of 1842. For the Qing, the treaty with the British was not "unequal" or fundamentally impinged on China's sovereignty as what the nationalists construed later; as it was in accordance with the time-tested "loose-rein" method (*jimi* 羈縻) of securing the acquiescence of unruly foreigners with minor concessions and friendship.[83] Moreover, the treaties the Qing signed with the maritime powers in the 1840s were not revolutionary in their impact. Though the Qing was forced to open its doors for greater exchange with the Western maritime powers, the Manchu negotiators successfully kept opium illegal and constrained

is the least commendable. What we have been doing is to choose between danger and safety, not between right and wrong." Wakeman (1978), p.210.

[81] See Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).

[82] Joseph Fletcher, "The Heyday of Ch'ing order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet" in Fairbank ed. (1978), pp.375-385. For a more recent and in-depth study of Qing management of Khokand, see Laura J. Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand, 1760-1860* (Leiden: Brill, 2006).

[83] Wang Dong, *China's Unequal Treaty: Narrating National History* (Lanham, M.D: Lexington, 2005). Wang points out that the term "unequal treaties" (Ch. *bupingdeng tiaoyue* 不平等條約) was not used by the Chinese throughout the nineteenth century and it came only in common circulation in the 1920s, during the height of Chinese nationalism, and became the rally cry for Chinese patriots of various political stripes against foreign imperialism. The notion of "unequal treaty," however, has its origins in contractual law and was employed by seventeenth and eighteenth centuries jurists of natural and international laws to differentiate between agreements and alliances made by unequal parties. It was not a perjogative term associated with foreign aggression and national humiliation as in the Chinese case of *bupingdeng tiaoyue*.

western commerce, travelling and religious proselytizing within the confine of the five coastal treaty ports away from the interior and the center of power in north China.

The Manchu negotiators called the Nanjing Treaty a "peace settlement for eternity" (*wannian heyue* 萬年合約) hoping that it would resolve the hostilities with the British once and for all. Manchu diplomacy did promote a period of peaceful relations between the Qing and the Western powers through the 1840s despite the occurrence of minor frictions such as the 1847 "Davis raid" in Canton and the Qingpu affair in Shanghai in 1848.[84] These crises, however, did not escalate to war because of the willingness of both sides to rely on negotiation as the means of conflict resolution. Manchu diplomacy faltered, however, in 1850 as Mujangga and Qiying fell from imperial grace with the ascension of the young and impetuous Emperor Xianfeng to the throne, and through the aggressive maneuvering of the Han Chinese literati-official faction which opposed the Manchu political dominance at court. Ironically, the British measured diplomatic stance after the war provided the needed ammunition for the political opponents of Mujangga and Qiying to argue that their conciliatory policy was nothing but a subterfuge to deceive the throne and ingratiate themselves with the foreigners.[85]

Yet, even after the dismissal of Mujangga and Qiying in 1850, the Qing court never contemplated abrogating the treaties signed with the Western powers. The frustrations that the British had in Canton in the post-war period with the fulfilment of the treaty terms were due to, as Polachek rightly points out, "the old problem of the lack of control (by the central government) — or, more accurately, lack of inclination to assert control— over the particulars of treaty implementation in the southeastern littoral as a whole."[86] This weakness was exploited by Cantonese gentry elites who through the use of persuasion and force continued to resist the entry of the "foreign devils" (*yang guizi* 洋鬼子) into Canton city in the post-war years. The local sentiments had to be taken into account by the local

[84] Fairbank (1978), pp.230-234.

[85] See Polachek's *Inner Opium War*, especially chapter 7, for an excellent analysis and narration of the court politics and decline of Manchu Diplomacy in the late 1840s.

[86] Ibid., p.240.

officials in their governance as Ye Mingchen, the newly appointed governor and imperial commissioner of trade of Guangzhou, explained to the throne in 1849 about his decision to resist the treaty provisions, "Foreign threat is of course worrying, but domestic rebellion is even more unnerving."[87] Thus, far from being a xenophobic monster, as what the British believed, Ye's diplomatic intransigence was motivated by the necessity of maintaining local peace and acquiescence, which was even more pressing with the Taiping rebellion engulfing the southern provinces in the 1850s.[88]

At the same time, British policy became more confrontational with the appointment of the more aggressive and adventurous Harry Parkes (1828-1885) and Sir John Bowring (1792-1872) as consuls. John Wong has persuasively shown that instead of intractable official conservatism or popular xenophobia of the Cantonese, Parkes and Bowring had a more direct role in the reopening of Anglo-Chinese hostilities in 1856. Parkes, with Bowring's acquiescence, manufactured the Arrow incident and used it as a pretext to stage a military showdown with the Qing. At home, the unauthorized bellicose conduct of Parkes and Bowring in Canton was censured by the Parliament. The head of government, Lord Palmerston (1784-1865), however, put his whole weight behind Parkes and Bowring on the undeclared "Arrow War" by dissolving the Parliament and appeal to electoral support for subsequent military action against China. Returned with a greater majority from the 1857 "China election," Palmerston government declared war on the Qing Empire and dispatched Lord Elgin as plenipotentiary and head of the expeditionary force.[89]

After a major show of force with the capture of Canton on 28 December 1857, the Anglo-French forces sailed north to Shanghai and demanded negotiation with representatives with full powers from the Chinese side. In April 1858, the allies proceeded to seize the Dagu forts and occupied Tianjin city when they were asked to return to Canton to negotiate with the imperial commissioner and new governor of Guangzhou, Huang Zonghan 黃宗漢 (1803-1864). This was perceived by the allies as a manifestation of traditional Chinese arrogance. The western powers were determined this time to make

[87] Wong (1998), p.119.

[88] Ibid., see ch. 5 for a detailed discussion of Ye's calculation of the situation.

[89] Ibid., pp.216-257.

China recognized their rights to free trade, religious liberty and equality in diplomatic relations. The Tianjin treaties, even more so than the Nanjing Treaty, were a diktat imposed on to the Chinese with little room for negotiations. The punitive terms of the treaties severely compromised the sovereignty of the Qing Empire and reduced it to a "semi-colonized" nation. The Qing court yielded its last line of resistance in the negotiations by allowing western interpreters to determine the translation and meaning of the terms. As we shall see, it was the establishment of western discursive hegemony through translation and the subjugating of Chinese language to the authority of English and French by the Tianjin treaties that "religion,"in the form of freedom for the Christian religion, entered China. The four treaty powers aimed at securing from the Qing government the legalization of the three main Christian denominations of Catholicism, Protestantism, and the Eastern Orthodox Church.

THE ISSUE OF TRANSLATION

James Hevia has astutely highlighted how translation acted as a special weapon for the British imperialists in their "decoding" and "reordering" of the Qing empire. British translators translated captured Qing documents from Canton to decipher or reaffirm their understanding of the Chinese mind and behavior as intransigent, xenophobic, cunning and haughty. This understanding in turn affirmed the prejudice among the British during the Arrow War that the most effective method to deal with a "degenerative race" like the Chinese was through the threat or actual use of violence. More importantly, it was through translation of the treaty terms that the British linguists tried to remove all ambiguities in meaning between the Chinese and English languages and to subject the former to the linguistic authority of the latter.[90]

Similarly, the issue of translation in the clash between the British and Qing empires has been given an illuminating and rigorous theoretical analysis by Lydia Liu. Liu argues that the confrontation between the two empires in the nineteenth century was as much semiotic as military due to the wide

[90] Hevia (2003), pp.57-61.

linguistic incommensurability of the English and Chinese languages. Building on her previous work on translingual practice, which is "the process by which new words, meanings, discourses, and modes of representation arise, circulate, and modes of representation arise, circulate, and acquire legitimacy within the host language due to, or in spite of, the latter's contact/collision with the guest language,"[91] Liu demonstrates how the British forcefully created the equivalence between the Chinese and English semantic fields through the act of coercive translation.[92] This was done through Article 50 of the English Tianjin treaty which states:

> All communications addressed by the Diplomatic and Consular Agents of her Majesty the Queen to the Chinese Authorities shall, henceforth be written in English. They will for the present be accompanied by a Chinese version, but it is understood that, in the event of there being any difference of meaning between the English and Chinese text, the English Government will hold the sense as expressed in the English text to be the correct sense.
>
> This provision is to apply to the Treaty now negotiated, the Chinese text of which has been carefully corrected by the English original. [93]

The English was not the only party interested in the imposition of linguistic dominance over the Chinese. The French treaty also contained an identical provision (Article 3) that was almost verbatim of Article 50.

The issue of translation was already a concern of the British during the First Opium War. The foreign minister Lord Palmerston instructed Charles Elliot (1801-1875), in a letter dated 20 February, 1840, to ensure that the Convention with the Chinese "adhere to English forms of expression; and in order to prevent any future doubts, all questions which may arise as to the correct interpretation of the

[91] Liu (1995), p.26.

[92] Lydia Liu, *Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp.5-29.

[93] Quoted by Liu, Ibid., pp. 32-33.

Treaty, must be determined by the English version." [94] Yet, there was no provision in the Nanjing Treaty and the Treaty of Bogue that enforce this understanding. This might be due to the trust the English Plenipotentiaries Charles Elliot and Henry Pottinger (1789-1856) had in the linguistic competency of Karl Charles Gützlaff (1803-1852), Robert Thom (1807-1846), and John Robert Morrison (1814-1843), who acted as interpreters for the British. A comparison of the Chinese and the English version of the two treaties shows the incommensurability in meaning of English terms and its Chinese translations, and often entire sentences in the English original that were untranslated and left out in the Chinese text.[95] The discrepancy in meaning of the English and Chinese versions of the two treaties was the underlying reason for the Anglo-Chinese squabbles after the war.

The subjugation of Chinese under the foreign languages mandated by provisions such as Article 50 and Article 3 of the English and French Tianjin treaties had the effect of creating, what Lydia Liu calls, super-signs. A super-sign, Liu explains, is "a linguistic monstrosity that thrives on the excess of its virtue of being exposed to, or thrown together with foreign etymologies and foreign languages."[96] Super-sign is a monstrosity as it forcefully forge the commensurality of the foreign term with the Chinese character, dissolving the meaning of the indigenous word, and at the same time, camouflages its foreigness through the unchanging appearance of the Chinese material signifier.[97] Liu brilliantly demonstrates how the word *yi* 夷, despite its varied meanings in Chinese, was made to conform in meaning with the word "barbarian" in the creation of the super-sign yi/barbarian through Article 50 and Article 51, which banned the use of the word *yi* in all official communications, external as well as internal.[98] Similarly, *jiao*/religion was also another super-sign created by the Tianjin treaties through

[94] H.B. Morse. *International Relations of the Chinese Empire* vol. 1, Appendix B.

[95] Qu Wenshen, "Zaoqi Zhongying tiaoyue de fanyi wenti," *Lishi yanjiu* vol.6 (2013), pp. 86-101.

[96] Liu (2004), p.13.

[97] Ibid, p.34.

[98] Ibid, pp.31-69.

the translation of "religion" as *jiao*. With the inception of the super-sign of *jiao*/religion, the Chinese term "jiao" increasingly take on the meaning of "religion" with Christianity as the prototype.[99]

The loss of linguistic authority of the Chinese in the negotiation of the Tianjin treaties is in stark contrast to the Japanese in their formulation of the treaties with Russia (1855), the Netherlands (1856), the United States (1858) and England (1858). Jason Josephson has shown that the Japanese negotiators saw translation as a tactical weapon in the containment of Christianity and missionary activities in Japan in their negotiation of the Dutch and American treaties. In Article 33 of the Dutch treaty, the term "christelijke godsdienst" (Christian religion) in Article 33 was translated as *Yasoshū* (literally Jesus sect) by the Japanese official translator. The choice of *shū* for the translation of religion betrayed the similarities the Japanese officials drew between Christianity and Japanese Buddhism as the term was coined to label the Japanese Buddhist denominations. In the minds of the Japanese officials Christianity was a foreign heresy (*jākyō*) not unlike the native heretical Buddhist sects. As a heterodox sect, the practice of the Christian religion was restricted to Dutch dwellings and cemeteries. In the later American Treaty of Amity and Commerce, the terms "religion" or "religious" were translated as *shūhō* (sect law) and *shūshi* (sect doctrine) respectively. The religious clause states that Americans in Japan are free to exercise their religion (*shūhō*) but they are prohibited from engaging in activities that will excite religious (*shūshi*) animosity. Through the distinction of religion and religious as *shūhō* and *shūshi* in their translation, Japanese officials granted religious freedom to the Americans but banned Christian proselytization among the Japanese people. [100]

Why the issue of translation was not a concern of the Qing government in its treaty negotiations with the western powers? During treaty negotiation at Nanjing in the hot summer of 1842, Zhang Xi 張喜, the person assigned by Qiying and Yilibu with the difficult task of negotiating a settlement with the

[99] Chen Hsi-yuan has pointed out that Confucianism was considered the archetypical *jiao* in late imperial China. However, by the last decade of the nineteenth century, the meaning of the indigenous term had been infected so much by the "religion" that Peng Guangyu, the government representative at the 1893 World's Parliament of Religion, made a point to clarify the meaning of *jiao*. Chen Hsi-yuan, "Confucianism Encounters Religion: The Formation of Religious Discourse and the Confucian Movement in Modern China," PhD thesis Harvard University, 1999, p.21-30.

[100] Josephson (2012), pp.78-91.

British, observed that the imperial plenipotentiaries did not raise any issue with the meaning of the Chinese translation of the treaty, except to ask for amendments of certain terms that sullied the dignity of the dynasty. [101] The Qing plenipotentiaries readily surrendered their rights to use their own translators and used the Chinese text translated from foreign language originals instead in the treaty negotiations with the Western powers in the 1840s as well as in 1858.

One reason for not using native translators is the lack of qualified native experts in foreign languages due to Qing policy of discouraging language exchange between the Chinese and foreigners. The Qing government strictly forbade the teaching of Chinese to the foreigners, except for the missionaries under employment in the capital, for the fear that that the linguistic skills gained would be used to gather military intelligence or forged connections with native rebellious elements. The Flint Affair of 1759 is a case in point. James Flint (Chinese name Hong Renhui 洪任輝), the first official interpreter of the British East India Company, was brought to China as a teenager and grew up proficient with mandarin Chinese. In May 1759, Flint sailed to Tianjin from Canton and submitted a petition to Emperor Qianlong expressing British discontents about the Canton trading system. Greatly angered by this transgression, the emperor imprisoned Flint in Macau for three years and ordered the public execution of his language teacher, Liu Yabian 劉亞匾 as a Chinese crook (*hanjian* 漢奸) in collusion with the barbarians. In the aftermath of the Flint Affair, the Qing government went into overdrive and enacted the "Precautionary Measures Against the Foreign Barbarians" (*Fangfan waiyi guitiao* 防範外夷規條), which placed stricter limits on Sino-foreign contacts in Canton and Macau.

On the eve of the Opium War, the number of Chinese who could speak foreign languages was very small in number, consisting of the merchants and compradors who discoursed with the foreigners with a simplified language called pidgin (the term is derived etymologically from Chinese pronunciation of the word "business"), and the converts of the missionaries who had a greater command of foreign languages. Pidgin was in fact the lingua franca in Canton used by Chinese merchants,

[101] Teng Ssu Yu, *Chang Hsi and the Nanking Treaty, 1842* (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago University Press, 1944), p.83.

linguists (*tongshi* 通事) employed by the Board of Finance as well as foreign traders and diplomats, who were prohibited to learn Chinese by imperial regulations. [102] During and after the first Opium War, there was a surge in interest among Qing littoral officials such as Lin Zexu, Wei Yuan 魏源 (1794-1856) and Xu Jiyu 徐繼畬 (1795-1873) in the translation of Western knowledge in order to understand the West and devise strategies against the European maritime powers. Yet the translations of these early experts of foreign affairs were rudimentary, consisting mainly of transliteration of geographical, technical and political terms. Furthermore, their works were not given much attention by the Court or the scholar-officials till the disastrous conclusion of the Tianjin treaties and the Beijing Convention. [103]

Other than the lack of linguistic experts and interest of the western nations, the imperial state also harbored a deep distrust of native interpreters, who learned the foreign languages through mingling with foreigners. Native linguists were often described in official documents at that time as dubious and greedy characters motivated solely by profits. During the Opium conflict, Lin Zexu, having no knowledge of the English language, employed Yameng 亞孟, Yuan Dehui 袁德輝 and Liang Jingde 梁進德 as his interpreting staff to systematically translate the English newspapers and magazines printed in Macau, Canton, and Singapore to decode British designs on China.[104] Yameng was born from Chinese father and Bengali mother and had studied in a British missionary school in Serampore, West Bengal. Yuan had studied Latin in a Roman Catholic school in Penang and English at the missionary-run Anglo-Chinese School in Malacca. Liang, the son of China's first Protestant convert Liang Fa 梁發, got his language training from the tutorship of American missionary, Elijah Coleman Bridgeman (1801-1861).

[102] Pidgin consisted of mainly Portuguese terms at first but was slowly replaced by English as the British became the major trading community in Canton. Masini (1993), pp.10-11.

[103] Ibid., pp.15-34.

[104] Lawrence Wang-Chi Wong, "Translators and Interpreters During the Opium War between China and Britain (1839-1842)" in Myriam Salama-Carr ed. *Translating and Interpreting Conflict* (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2007), p. 42.

Lin never trusted his interpreters to pass them official documents to read nor did he have much faith in their translating skills. Lin had in two instances, tried to test the linguistic competency of his interpreters. In the first occasion, he had his senior interpreter Yuan Dehui translate passages of Emmanuel de Vattel's *Laws of Nations* into Chinese and asked the American medical missionary Dr. Peter Parker (1804-1888) to translate the same passages for comparison to verify the accuracy of Yuan's translation. In the second case, Lin ordered his interpreters to translate his letter to Queen Victoria into English and had William Hunter (1812-1891) translate the text back into Chinese again to compare the shift in meanings from double translations. He also requested Dr. Parker to translate the letter to English to check on his interpreters' translation.[105] The translation staff of Lin Zexu was dismissed after his fall from imperial grace for his mishandling of the opium issue in Canton.

Another case in point is that of Bao Peng 鮑鵬 (1792-?). Bao Peng was a native of Xiangshan county, Guangzhou, and had worked as a comprador for an American merchant, and later for the English opium dealer, Lance Dent. He was also involved in the opium trade as a smuggler.[106] Bao learned English at a young age but he was never proficient in the language and could only speak the pidgin. In 1840, while hiding in the North to avoid arrest in the ongoing Qing crusade against opium trade, Bao was introduced to the governor of Shandong Qishan, who had just been appointed by the emperor as imperial commissioner and governor of Liangguang to replace the disgraced Lin Zexu in resolving the barbarian menace in the South. Qishan appointed Bao as his chief linguist and representative to negotiate with Charles Elliot at Macau, and as a result, concluded the abortive Convention of Chuenpi (Chuanbi) on 21 January 1841 which was unratified by both sides. Greatly enraged by the cession of Hong Kong to the British and the hefty indemnity agreed by the treaty, Emperor Daoguang ordered the death of Qishan, which was later commuted to banishment. Bao Peng was put on trial for the treasonous crime of spying for the British. According to Arthur Waley, Bao Peng was one of the eight Chinese spies under the employment of Karl Gützlaff, however the Chinese authorities had nothing concrete to

[105] Ibid., p.44.

[106] Julia Lovell, *The Opium War, Drugs, Dream and Making of China* (London: Picador-Macmillan, 2011), pp.125-126.

indict him for treason. In the end, Bao was banished to Xinjiang together with his master for the lesser crime of opium smuggling and "illicit intercourse with the foreigners."[107] After the Bao Peng incident, the Qing government gave up the use of their own interpreters entirely and relied on the translation provided by the foreign powers in later treaty negotiations.

TRANSLATING JIAO TO RELIGION

The term used by western negotiators to translate the term religion in the Tianjin treaties was "*jiao*." The phrases "Christian religion," "la religion Chrètienne" and "la doctrine Chrètienne" in the treaties were rendered as either "*Tianzhu jiao* 天主教 (Teaching of the Lord of Heaven) or "*Yesu shengjiao* 耶穌教," or both (Sacred Teaching of Jesus Christ) in their respective Chinese versions. The Chinese nomenclature "*jiao*" did not have the same semantic meaning as the term "religion" as we understood today, an entity separates from other spheres like politics or economy.

This point was forcefully brought across by Peng Guangyu 彭光譽 (1844-?) in the 1893 World's Parliament of Religions in Chicago when he was asked by the organizers to present on "Confucianism" as a world religion.[108] Peng participated in the Parliament as the *attaché* of the Chinese legation in Washington D.C. In defiance of the aims of the Parliament, which were to demonstrate the universality of religion and the superiority of Christianity, in particular Protestantism, over the other "religions" in the world, Peng sought to educate his Western audience on the point that the teaching of Confucius (*Kongzi zhi jiao* 孔子之教) was not a "religion." He started his lecture titled "On *Jiao*" (*shuojiao* 說教)[109] by discussing the meaning of the word in Chinese language:

---

[107] Waley (2006), pp.241-243.

[108] Judith Snodgrass, *Presenting Japanese Buddhism to the West: Orientalism, Occidentalism and the Columbian Exposition* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), p.1.

[109] Peng's essay was published in 1896 by the Zongli Yamen under that title. The title of Peng's Chinese article was changed by the missionary organizers of the Parliament to "Confucianism" instead in their English translation. For a comparison with the English version of the article, see John Henry Barrow ed. *The World's Parliament of Religions*, 1893 vol.1 (Chicago & C, 1893), pp.374-439.

> On the subject of discussion in this conference, what in the English is called *erlilijing* 爾釐利景 (religion) was what the Europeans translated into Chinese as *jiao* at the end of the Ming dynasty. In the Chinese language, however, the word *jiao* has the general meaning of the English word *tichi* 題赤 (teach) and the specific meaning is what is phonetically expressed as *yinshichulukeshen* 音司黜盧克慎 (instruction) in English. The term *jiao* is applicable to all activities that deal with the instruction of people with the knowledge of someone and occupational skills, from the lofty six arts at the top to the mundane myriad crafts at the bottom. However, it is not acceptable to name a *jiao* according to the name of a particular person or an occupation. In China, teaching is governing (*zheng* 政) and governing is teaching. Both teaching and governing come from the Son of Heaven. Imperial and Confucian teachings are both the teaching of ritual-propriety (*lijiao* 禮教). Outside the teaching of ritual-propriety [of the imperial state], there is no other pedagogical institution (*jiaohui* 教會) that commands universal submission of the people.[110]

The transliteration of "religion" as *erlilijing* meant, for Peng, that the term is not only alien phonetically but also foreign in meaning. It is clear from Peng's explanation, the semantics of *jiao* is pedagogical as having the general meaning of to "instruct" or "educate." Robert Campany notes that it is distortive to translate, say, *Fojiao* 佛教 as "Buddhism" (or *Rujiao* 儒教 as "Confucianism" and *Daojiao* 道教 as "Daoism") since in classical Chinese the term simply meant "the Buddha taught" and that the Chinese lacked the discourse of religions as discrete entities.[111] The emphasis of the expression *jiao* is "on the source of the teaching, the one who taught it, or else (in cases like *mingjiao* 名教 "the teaching of names") what it is a teaching about."[112] In his paper, Peng explains that the term *Rujiao* is coined by the followers of the Buddha and Laozi to form one of the three teachings, and is not an

---

[110] Peng Guangyu, *Shuojiao*, Zongli Yamen, 1896, p.3.

[111] Robert Ford Campany, "On the Very Idea of Religions (in the Modern West and Early Medieval China)" in *History of Religions*, 42.4 (May 2003), p.306.

[112] Ibid., p.307.

autonym of the Confucians (*ruzhe* 儒者). The Confucians, on the other hand, simply refer to the teachings of Buddha and Laozi as "heterodox learning" (*yixue* 異學) and followers of the *Huijiao* 回教 (Islam) label *Rujiao* as the "Great Teaching" (*dajiao* 大教).[113] Peng argues that these nomenclatures are invented by those who wished to differentiate themselves from the other *jiao*, however, the only one and acceptable teaching is the *lijiao* 禮教 (teaching of propriety) promulgated by the imperial state. Speaking from the perspective of the imperial government, Peng stresses that *lijiao* is nothing but the doctrine and social observation of the "three bonds and five relationships" (*sankang wulun* 三綱五倫) taught by the emperor (*dijiao* 帝教) and the only "uncrowned king," Kongzi (*shijiao* 師教).[114] This is what Peng mean teaching is governing and vice versa. The primary function of *jiao* is aiding the state in civilizing (*jiaohua* 教化; literally transformation through education) imperial subjects into moral beings and inducting them into the proper social relationships through rituals, and for non-Han Chinese, the adoption of Chinese dress and customs. [115] Thus, for the imperial state and the Confucian elites, the true meaning of *jiao* is nothing but *li*, which can be translated in general as proper conduct or narrowly as rituals.

Quoting the Webster's dictionary, Peng argues further that the meaning of "religion" is closer to *wu-zhu* 巫祝 (spirit mediums) than *jiao* in Chinese, as it has to do with "instructing people on obedience and paying obeisance to the spirits (*shen* 神), loving them, and the principle of serving the true divinities with a sincere disposition." He believes that the *puloufeite* 樸羅肺特 (prophet) and *pulisite* 樸鼙司特 (priest) in the West are the same as the spirit mediums in China. As the prophet is

[113] Peng (1896), p.3.

[114] Here Peng states in verbatim what Emperor Jiaqing (r.1796-1820) defined as *jiao* in his essay "*Yuanjiao*" 原教 (The true meaning of teaching) issued as an edict in the aftermath of the 1813 Eight-Trigram rebellion to exhort his officials to clarify the meaning of *jiao* to the common people. The essay is collected in *Daqing Renzong rui huangdi shilu* vol. 374 in the *Qing Shilu* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986).

[115] For the civilizational project of Qing imperialism, see Emma Jinhua Teng, *Taiwan's Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683-1895* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004); and Laura Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

defined as "a person who knows divine matters and the revelations of the spirits (and based on that) composes text foretelling future happenings" and the priest as "a person who performs the rites to gods and acts as mediator between men and the spirits." [116]

Thus, according to Chinese taxonomy, "religion" in the West can be classified under the "way of the spirits" (*shendao* 神道) together with the spirit mediums, and the Buddhist and Daoist traditions since they bear strong semblances in doctrines and worship. They are different from the orthodox teaching of ritual-propriety or *lijiao*, categorized under the "way of human relations" (*rendao* 人道), which does not speculate on supernatural matters or worship anthropomorphic spirits in pictures and images. Peng argues that what is known as "religion" in West exist in China in the form of *shendao*. According to him, it has never been considered a desirable thing in China since the teachings of the *shendao* corrupt social ethics and throughout history inspired cataclysmic social uprisings, the Taiping rebels being the most notable recent example. [117] Here we can see how "religion" or its synonym Christianity was received by the imperial state and the Confucian official-literati elites, revealing the roots of modern Chinese secularism, which is marked by intense hostility and violence against religion(s).

However, it is important to point out that the distinction of the *shendao* and *rendao* does not correspond to the binary of religion and the secular in Western culture. The meaning of *shendao* is more variegated than simply doctrinal as in the case of "religion." Campany criticizes Erik Zürcher's translation of *shendao*, which was employed by the officials Yu Bing and He Chong in 340 C.E in their court debate on the autonomy of the Buddhist church from political authority to refer to the whole corpus of practices, values and scriptures of the sangha, as "spiritual doctrine" or *Fodao* 佛道 as Buddhism[118] to be distortive because it masked how the metaphor *dao* 道 is deployed in Chinese

[116] Peng (1896), p.2.

[117] Ibid., p. 8b.

[118] For Zürcher's discussion of the term *shendao* and its use in medieval China to refer to the Buddhist tradition, see his *Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China*. Third edition (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp.105-106.

discourse. *Dao*, as Campany highlights, could be spoken of as paths —distinct ways human agents followed, advocated or strayed into, or as agents themselves, albeit in a weak and nonorganic sense, that rise and decline. [119] *Shendao* and *rendao* can then be rendered as two distinct paths—supernatural and this-worldly —or spatially as two separate realms —monastic and temporal realms (usually expressed in Chinese as *fangwai* 方外 and *fangnei* 方內) — without being mutually exclusive as in the case of the religious and secular. Peng Guangyu took pains to emphasize to his western audience that although Daoist and Buddhist clergies follow the *shendao*, they are still required under the imperial laws to participate in ancestral sacrifice.

In his discussion of the views of Peng Guangyu and other literati, Chen Hsi-yuan has shown that *Rujiao* was the prototype of orthodoxy in Chinese discourse of *jiao* in the nineteenth century.[120] The *Rujiao* was considered the archetypical *jiao* by the imperial state as it was purely a *rendao* teaching that foster moral values and a harmonious social order. Heterodoxy (*yiduan* 異端), on the other hand, was *shendao* teaching that contain "writings that are not from the sages, and those unclassical books which arouse mankind and alarm the populace, causing disorder and confusion of views and gnawing at the people and their wealth as corroding insects."[121] The *Fojiao* and *Daojiao* were heterodoxies when measured according to *Rujiao* but were tolerated because they were monastic traditions that did not challenge state authority, and their supernatural doctrines guide men to virtuous conduct through fear of divine retribution.[122]

---

[119] Campany (2003), p.305.

[120] Chen (1999), p.33.

[121] This is from the 1724 decree issued by Emperor Yongzheng, in which the monarch detailed the difference between orthodox teaching and heresy, and the reason for the toleration accorded by the imperial state to Buddhism and Daoism. This pronouncement was widely circulated in schools in all provinces for edification purpose and served as a basis for the persecution of "heretical sects." This sentence is quoted from C.K Yang's translation of the text in his *Religion in Chinese Society*, p.194. Yang argues that the rationale for the Qing's suppression of heterodoxy was motivated by "(p)ractical political interests rather than purely philosophical and religious considerations." However, this is not a fair judgement since the religious and the political were largely undifferentiated until the arrival of the concept of religion in mid-nineteenth century. I will discuss more on the Qing imperial discourse of heresy in the next chapter.

[122] The decree highlights the reason for state toleration of Buddhism and Daoism as follows: "The philosopher Chu Hsi says that Buddhism does not bother with the master universe but considers only the subject of the mind, and that Taoism merely aims at the preservation of spiritual essence of man. This fair statement from Chu Hsi

The Jesuits of the late Ming quickly understood, after their failed initial attempt to draw analogy between Christianity and the Buddhist teaching in presenting their religion to the Chinese, that the only way for a marginal foreign teaching to gain legitimacy in China was to model after *Rujiao*. They named Christianity as *Tianzhu jiao* and sought to create a Christian-Confucian synthesis in the syncretic religious environment at that time. The Jesuits started donning the robe of the literati and presented themselves as erudite scholars from the West (*xiru* 西儒) devoted to the cultivation of virtue and learned in "Heavenly Studies" (*tianxue* 天學), a practical knowledge comprised of subjects such as astronomy, mathematics, botany, military science and cartography.[123] To the literati whom they targeted for conversion, the Jesuits argued that Christianity was a complement to *Rujiao* by reinforcing the orthodox values and order. They drew explicit parallel between Christianity and the Confucian teaching by highlighting the civilizational achievements of the West to demonstrate that the civilizing influence *Tianzhu jiao* had exerted on Europe was not dissimilar to the transformative effect of *jiaohua* that *Rujiao* had on China. [124]

clarifies the fundamental objects of Buddhism and Taoism." The two teachings are objectionable to the state, however, when it went out of the monasteries and utilized as resources by lay persons to create religious sects that had subversive potentials: "But a class of loafers, with neither a livelihood nor an abode, have since come forth to usurp the name of these religions and corrupt the practical use of the same. The majority of them use (their doctrine about) calamities and felicity, misfortune and happiness to sell their foolish magic and baseless talk. They begin by cheating on goods and money to fatten themselves. Then they proceed to hold meetings for the burning of incense, in places where males and females mingle promiscuously. Farmers and craftsmen forsake their business and trades, and even engage themselves in talking about miracles. Worst of all, rebellious and subversive individuals and heretical miscreants glide in among them, establish parties and form leagues by taking membership oaths. They assemble at night and disperse in the daytime. They thus transgress their proper status and sin against their duty, mislead mankind and deceive the people." Ibid, p.195.

[123] The Jesuits first presented themselves to the court as learned men of astronomy during the calendrical crisis of late Ming and later introduced other fields of European science through translation and service to the imperial government. See Benjamin Elman, *On their own terms: Science in China, 1550-1900* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 2005), pp.61-222.

[124] The Confucian literati followers of the Jesuits were attracted to the stress in moral cultivation in the monotheism preached by their foreign teachers, which they perceived as complementing Confucian teachings. The Jesuits and the Chinese Christians brought both traditions into a harmonious system, which Erik Zürcher referred to as "Confucian monotheism." Erik Zürcher, "China and the West: The Image of Europe and its Impact" in Stephen Uhalley Jr and Xiaoxin Wu eds. *China and Christianity: Burdened Past, Hopeful Future* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), pp.43-62.

As cultural mediators between China and Europe, the Jesuits played a significant role not only in the fashioning of Christianity as a kind of monotheistic *jiao*[125] in China but also helped the germination of the modern concept of "religion" and how *jiao* was eventually translated as religion(s) in the West. In Jesuit's conceptualization, there were two types of religion — true and false. They considered Christianity the only true religion while the others false religions or idolatry. In China, the Jesuits encountered a civilization that was as advanced, if not more advance in certain aspects, as Europe but without the benefit of the Christian revelation. This threw the Jesuit's categories of "true" and "false religion" into question and they instead referred to the three *jiao* as "three sects" (Italian setta; Latin secta; or French secte). In the early seventeenth-century, the term sect did not have the pejorative connotation that was accrued later when it referred to heretical groups or dissenters that splintered from the established Church. The word sect, closely related in meaning to the Latin term *secta* (following), referred simply to the followers of a particular religious or philosophical teacher. While the Jesuits condemned the "sects of Buddha and Laozi" and the idolatry of the masses as false religions in their writings, to avoid the charge of heresy, *Rujiao* or *secta literatorum* (sect of the literati) was referred as a philosophical teaching originated from the ancient philosopher Confucius (Latinization of *Kong Fuzi* 孔夫子), and thus "non-religious." The Jesuit separation of *Rujiao* from the other teachings categorically as non-religious might be inspired by the Chinese demarcation of the three teachings into *shendao* and *rendao*.

The Jesuit framework of "three sects" had two implications for the European reconceptualization of "religion." First, China as a purported example of a civilization that can be moral and non-religious fired the imagination of Enlightenment thinkers of a society free from the irrationality of the Church or one that is informed by an enlightened civil religion. This had the effect of sharpening the already present categories of the "religious" and "secular," with religion increasingly consigned as irrational and private faith as opposed to reason/science and public civil rituals in Europe from the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. Second, the Jesuit claim that ancient Chinese were monotheists lent

[125] Erik Zürcher, "Confucian and Christian Religiosity in Late Ming China," *The Catholic Historical Review*, 83 (1997), pp.614-653.

credit to the idea of "natural religion," which is the notion that human could learn about God through the exercise of Reason. This called into question the claim of Christianity, a historical religion founded on revelation, as the only true religion, and helped to make "religion" into a universal social and anthropological category.[126]

While it is true that the Jesuits did not invent Confucianism (a religion in western sense), their terminology of the "three sects" greatly influenced the later translation of *sanjiao* 三教 as "three religions" by Western scholars, diplomats and missionaries in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[127] In his *The Middle Kingdom*, Samuel Wells Williams notes that there is no generic term for religion in China and "(t)he word *kiao*, which means 'to teach,' or 'doctrines taught,' is applied to all sects and associations having a creed or ritual; ancestral worship is never called a *kiao*, for everyone observes that at home just as much as he obeys is parents; it is a duty not a sect."[128] He describes Chinese religion as consisting mainly of the three *kiao* of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism, which are not mutually exclusive and whose religious beliefs are recognized by the rulers and people.[129] Similarly, William Edward Soothill, the celebrated missionary and later Oxford professor of Chinese spoke in 1913 about the existence of three recognized religions or isms of the "*san chiao*" but also acknowledged that the term "*chiao*" did not have the same meaning as "religion." He explained that the Chinese recognizing the need for a term for religion adopted the expression "*Tsung-chiao*" from Japan.[130]

---

[126] In his correction of Lionel Jensen's thesis of Jesuits manufacturing of Confucius and Confucianism, Nicolas Standaert demonstrates that the Jesuits did not coin the phrase Confucianism (a term that only appeared in the nineteenth century) to refer to the *Ru* but referred to it as sect or law of the literati. What the Jesuits invented, Standaert perceptively highlights, is the non-religion or secular which is essential for the creation of religion in Europe. See Lionel Jensen, *Manufacturing of Confucianism: Chinese Traditions and Universal Civilization* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997) and Nicolas Standaert, "The Jesuits did NOT manufacture 'Confucianism'," in *East Asian Science, Technology and Medicine*, 16 (1999), pp. 115-132.

[127] T.H. Barrett, "Chinese Religion in English Guise: The History of an Illusion" in *Modern Asian Studies*, 39.3 (2005), pp.509-533.

[128] S. Wells William, *The Middle Kingdom* vol.1 (New York: John Wiley, 1853), p.194.

[129] Ibid., p.193.

[130] W.E. Soothill *The Three Religions of China* (London, New York and Toronto: Hodder & Stoughton, 1913), p.6.

Foreign commenters in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were fully cognizant about the semantic gap between *jiao* and religion. The question then is why did western diplomats and translators use *jiao* to translate religion instead of creating a neologism to communicate its meaning fully to the Chinese during the treaty negotiation? Erik Zürcher argues that the only way for Christianity, a marginal religion of foreign origin, to gain legal recognition by the state is to fashion itself as a *jiao* congruous and complementary to *Rujiao*, the prototype of correct teaching or *zheng* 正, a term that encompasses both orthodoxy and orthopraxis.[131] The religious article of the four Tianjin treaties all emphasized the orthodox nature of Christianity by stating on the outset that it exhorts people to do good and practice virtue. The necessity of observing the Chinese "cultural imperative" was particularly salient in the 1850s and 1860s when the imperial state was embattled in suppressing the Taiping uprising, which was believed to be fomented by foreign missionaries and their Christian teaching.

However, the key objective of the treaty powers in the treaty negotiation was to induct the Chinese empire into Western institutions and practices. The treaty powers deliberately challenged Chinese protocols, such as demanding diplomatic residence in the capital, to break what they believed were haughty Sinocentrism. One reason why the western diplomat and missionary-negotiators in their formation of the Tianjin treaties did not see the need to come up with a new word to translate the western term is because the Chinese language text was seen as unimportant since the European language versions were established as authoritative. Thus, while the western diplomats negotiated the treaties with their Chinese counterparts in mandarin, they opted not to do a word for word translation of the treaty terms into Chinese language.

Another reason is their assumption that religion was a universal phenomenon that existed among all people. They saw the notion of *jiao* as similar to what religion was in Western society, a civilizing force within Christendom and a marker that distinguished the civilized Europeans from the barbaric others without. In the nineteenth century, "civilization" and "culture" were conceptualized by

[131] Erik Zürcher, "Jesuit Accommodation and the Chinese Cultural Imperative" in D.E. Mungello ed. *The Rites Controversy: Its History and Meaning* (Steyler Verlag, 1994), especially pp.36-37.

Europeans in the singular based on biblical and theological arguments of the unity of humanity. In their understanding, the only true Civilization was that of European Christendom, a geopolitical entity built by the moral-spiritual teachings and values of the Christian religion. Without the edifying impact of Christianity, other "heathen" nations became mired in primitivism and barbarianism after the Noahic flood. The conflation of Christianity with civilization and heathenism with barbarism was especially pronounced in missionary discourse.[132] Basic to missionary assumptions of civilization was the idea that "heathen" societies were culturally deprived in comparison to the civilized Christians because they are not exposed to the light of the true Religion of Christianity. Practices that missionaries found barbaric among the "savage" tribes of Amerindians, Africans and islanders of the Pacific such as cannibalism, incest and human sacrifices were attributed to their total ignorance of the natural laws revealed in the Gospel. In what was in their opinion "semi-civilized" societies, such as India and China, as Timothy Fitzgerald points out, missionaries "were quicker to abandon the language of heathen and barbarian to develop a new approach to the greater civility of Christianity. This was the world religion approach: there are positive aspects to 'the religions of the world' such as Hinduism, though they fall short of Christianity."[133] Missionaries deemed "perverse customs" like sati, footbinding, and other deficiencies in the "national character" of the Indians and Chinese as a reflection of the irrationality, superstition and weaknesses in moral teaching of the native religions.

The meaning of religion, however, differed in one crucial way from how the phrase *jiao* functions semantically in Chinese political context. As discussed above, *jiao* denotes a top-down indoctrinating process whereby the imperial state assigned itself the role of guiding its subjects to the observation of the ethical teaching of the three bonds through education and rituals. In the West, in contrast, from the end of the eighteenth century to the nineteenth century, religion had become increasingly divorced from the state as a privatized belief with the shift from confessional church-states to modern democratic nation-states. The enfranchisement of religious minorities, the loss in influence

[132] Lauren Pfister, "Attitudes towards Chinese culture(s): 1860-1900" in R.G Tiedemann ed. *Handbook of Christianity in China Volume Two: 1800 to the Present* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), p.405.

[133] Timothy Fitzgerald. *Discourse on Civility and Barbarity: A Critical History of Religion and Related Categories* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 308.

of national churches, and the rise of missionary societies and other voluntary missionary organizations during that period represented this development towards the separation of religion and politics in western societies. The secularization of western societies did not mean the decline of religious belief and political marginalization of religion, rather it indicated a shift in the place of religion from the state to the emerging public sphere. Evangelical churches set up and funded by laypersons created a myriad of evangelical institutions such as Sunday schools, Bible tract associations and missionary societies, which exerted an indirect moral force on society through the inner spiritual conversion of individuals.[134]

The lack of fundamental understanding of the Qing diplomats on the western category of religion and as well as linguistic expertise placed them at the mercy of the linguistic violence of the Western imperialist powers, which aimed to open China not only to Western commerce but to Christianity as well by introducing the binary of politics and religion through translation. This is demonstrated in the treaty negotiations in Tianjin in the summer of 1858.

NEGOTIATING FREEDOM OF CHRISTIANITY IN TIANJIN

Treaty negotiations officially began when the two imperial commissioners Guiliang 桂良 (1785-1862) and Huashana 花沙纳 (1806-1859) arrived in Tianjin on June 3rd in compliance with the demands of Lord Elgin to communicate with plenipotentiaries with full power. They were later joined by Qiying, the disgraced expert of barbarian affairs. Qiying was recalled to high office on June 4th and tasked by the emperor as the primary negotiator to "control and bridle" (*jimi* 羈靡) the barbarians. The imperial commissioners and the Euroamerican plenipotentiaries arranged their negotiations at the Haiguang Temple, 2 miles southwest of the city. The Qing imperial commissioners met Lord Elgin on the 4th, Baron Gros and Count Putiatin on the 6th, and Mr. Reed the following day. These initial meetings

[134] On the surge of missionary societies and the shift in location of religion in the West at the last decade of the eighteenth century, see Peter van Rooden, "Nineteenth-Century Representations of Missionary Conversion and the Transformation of Western Christianity" in Peter van der Veer ed. *Conversion to Modernities: The Globalization of Christianity* (New York and London: Routledge, 1996), pp.65-88; and Peter van der Veer, *Imperial Encounters: Religion and Modernity in India and Britain* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 34-41.

consisted mainly of ostentatious ceremonial displays, exchange of diplomatic courtesy and the verification of credentials. [135] The ministers did not meet again until the signing of the treaties as treaty negotiations were done entirely by their secretaries and interpreters.

In his *A Cycle of Cathay*, W.A.P Martin recalled that initially "Kweiliang named Pien, a shrewd, thin-visaged, thoughtful man, who had made some figure at the negotiations at Taku" to be the negotiator with the Americans. However, he replaced Pien with Chang, a viscount and adjutant-general of the Hankuin, after Reed complained of Pien's wanting in rank in comparison to Samuel Wells Williams, the chief negotiator and second man of the U.S. legation. [136] Partnering Williams in the negotiations was fellow missionary and sinologist, W.A.P. Martin. As his representatives, Lord Elgin delegated his brother Frederick Bruce (1814-1867), his principal Chinese secretary and famed sinologist, Thomas Wade (1805-1875), and Horatio N. Lay (1832-1898), a student of Charles Gützlaff and staff of the Shanghai Imperial Maritime Custom. Baron Gros sent his young secretary Contades and interpreter M. Marqués to negotiate with the Chinese. [137]

The neutral countries of Russia and the U.S. were the earliest to conclude their treaties with the Qing government. This was partly due to the fact that both countries were more restrained in their demands and conciliatory in their approach as they lacked the military means to compel the Chinese to acquiesce to their wishes; and partly a result of the readiness of the imperial commissioners to agree to their terms in order to pull the seemingly respectful and submissive Russian and American barbarians to their side to mediate with the arrogant and stubborn French and British barbarians.

Fully cognizant of thinking of the imperial commissioners and the situation at court through his informer Archimandrite Palladius, the head of Russian Orthodox Mission in Beijing, Count Putiatin cleverly exploited the situation to his advantage by falsely pledging Russian military aids and

[135] W.A.P. Martin, *A Cycle of Cathay* second edition (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1897), p.167; M. Moges, *Recollection of Baron Gros' Embassy to China and Japan, 1857-58* (London and Glasgow: Richard Griffith & Co., 1860), p.229.

[136] Martin (1897), p.169.

[137] Moges (1860), p.231.

diplomatic assistance to the Qing court against the British and French for treaty concessions on the one hand, and hiding Russian territorial demands over Manchuria from the other countries and maintaining a united front with his Western counterparts in their negotiations with the Qing government on the other.

The Russian treaty was concluded on June 13th and contained only 12 articles of little importance to the Russians. Russian territorial demands were satisfied in the Treaty of Aigun signed a fortnight earlier which effectively overturned the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk by transferring vast territories on the left bank of the Amur River, from the Aigun River to the mouth of the Amur, to the Romanov empire. Article 8 of the Sino-Russian Tianjin treaty stipulated the protection of Christianity in China. Putiatin was convinced that the British and French intended to extend their spiritual dominance over China by first guaranteeing the religious rights of Protestants and Catholics in their treaties and eventually convert the whole empire to Protestantism and Catholicism. Putiatin was resolute that the Russian Orthodox Mission should not fall behind the British and French in the religious race and must begin to establish its own religious influence in China before it was too late.[138]

The Russian treaty was the first among the four Tianjin treaties to contain the guarantee for Christians (native and foreign) to freely proselytize and practice their religion in China. Written in Chinese, Manchu, French and Russian languages, the treaty stipulated that Manchu would be the basis of interpretation in the event of any disputes regarding the meaning of the articles. The Chinese text of Article 8 reads "The principle of *Tianzhu jiao* is to do good; hereafter, those missionaries in China who abide by the law shall be accorded with understanding and protection. They shall not be insulted or subjected to torture, nor shall the practice and proselytizing [of *Tianzhu jiao*] by law abiding people be prohibited. If there is any Russian journeying to the interior from the border areas opened to foreign commerce for the purpose of proselytizing, the consular officer and local officials at the interior and the border regions will inspect the person's passport according to the fixed quota. If found indeed to be a

[138] Lamanov (2010), p. 201.

law-abiding person, he must be immediately released with an official stamp on his passport for the ease of future inspection."[139]

The fixed quota of passports for travel and missionary activities in Article 8 appears to be an adaptation of Article 5 of the 1727 Treaty of Kiakhta, which allowed 4 Russian priests (*lama* 喇嘛) and 6 laymen, including 2 language students serving as helpers to the clerics, to reside in the capital. The Russian mission combined both diplomatic and ecclesiastical roles, and it was the former that the Russian clerics in China focused their attention on. The priests learned Manchu and/or Chinese, dressed in local clothing, followed a policy of not mingling with the natives, and reserving religious conversion strictly to the small community of Albazinians (Russians captured by Qing forces in 1685 at the Albazin fortress in Heilongjiang and their descendants).[140] The religious clause appeared to be revolutionary from Western standpoint, yet to the Chinese side it was merely a continuation of old practice. In fact, the quota of Russian missionaries and laymen in China remained unchanged until 1864.

The complete ignorance of the Chinese in the issue of religious tolerance first brought up by the Russians during the treaty negotiation was keenly observed by Rev. Samuel W. Williams. According to Williams, the Chinese officials "expressed their willingness to allow missionaries to travel through the country, inasmuch as these could usually speak the language," which could help avoid trouble arising with the natives. In addition, "(t)hese officials knew the Russian priests in Peking to be quiet, industrious men, and were doubtless willing enough to admit them to further privileges, but they could give no opinion on the general toleration of Christianity, for they knew practically nothing of its peculiar tenets."[141]

---

[139] 天主教原为行善，嗣后中国于安分传教之人，当一体矜恤保护，不可欺侮凌虐，亦不可于安分之人禁其传习。若俄国人有由通商处所进内地传教者，领事官与内地沿边地方官按照定额查验执照，果系良民，即行画押放行，以便稽查。*Zhongwai jiu yuezhang daquan* 1689-1902 vol.1 (Beijing: Zhongguo haiguan chubanshe, 2004), p.267.

[140] Lamanov (2010), p.195; Bays, *A New History of Christianity in China*, pp.209-210.

[141] Williams (1889), p.270.

In contrast to the lukewarm attitude of Reed towards the religious clause, Williams and his missionary colleague, W.A.P. Martin viewed the obtainment of religious freedom as the highest priority in the treaty negotiation. In the first draft of the religious clause submitted to the Chinese, Wells and Martin attempted to specify the content of religious freedom that they desired from the Qing government. The article states:

> Hereafter it shall be lawful for any citizen of the United States, preaching the doctrines of Jesus Christ, or distributing the S.S. of the Old and New Testament, or other good books to pass freely without let or hindrance, through all parts of the Ta Tsing Empire, and therein to expound the said doctrines by word, or writings, being also allowed the privilege of residence and safe treatment and hereafter no Chinese who professes the said doctrines shall be punished or interfered with by the officers of the government on account of his faith. [142]

After the draft was rejected by the Chinese, Williams drew up another article based on the Russian religious clause when he obtained a Chinese copy of the article on the 14th, a day after the conclusion of the treaty between the Russians and Chinese. Though the new draft was similar in spirit to the Russian article, Williams modified the phraseology of the original text to suit his own purpose. Williams inserted the term "Sacred Teaching of Jesus Christ" (*Yesu jidu shengjiao* 耶穌基督聖教) to translate Protestantism to distinguish it from Catholicism for the Chinese audience and to ensure that religious protection was guaranteed for Protestants as well. He also added the phrase "to treat others as they would want others to treat them" to communicate, what he believed to be the principle tenet of Christianity, to the Chinese. Williams deliberately omitted the mention of missionary quota, passport and control of movement by consuls and Chinese officials in his new draft so as not to place any curbs on Protestant missionary work.

During the negotiation of the article, the Chinese deputies focused their discussion and objections solely on the free movement of missionaries in the interior. The religious article proved to

[142] S. Wells Williams, "The Toleration Clause in the Treaties" in *The Chinese Recorder* (May 1879), p.227.

be the most difficult clause to negotiate out of the 30 articles in the American treaty. The imperial commissioners deliberated the article for a day, granted it on the evening of the 17th but a few hours later quickly rescinded their agreement. The event was jotted by Williams in his diary: "About nine o' clock P.M., just as we had indulged in a triumph which I do not think was unpardonable, a note came from the officials addressed to Martin and me, withdrawing the privilege in the most decided terms. The note was accompanied by a draft of an article in which American missionaries were restricted to the open ports where they were to be placed under the semi-surveillance of the consuls and local authorities while they preached religion; the toleration to professors was granted as before."[143]

The note that Williams and Martin received explained that the article was rejected because unlike other missionaries, Protestant missionaries were not celibate and they tend to bring their wives with them to their missionary posts and carry out trade. [144] The primary concern of the imperial commissioners was the possible excitement and uproar that might occur when the people in the interior encounter married priests and foreign women, which were an affront to Chinese cultural sensibilities. W.A.P. Martin also highlighted the possible political motivation behind the rejection of the religious article: "When first proposed it (the religious article) appeared likely to pass unchallenged. But suspicion of what might be entering the Inner Land under the name of religion has led the commissioner to subject it to intense scrutiny. They fear that it may be made pretext for political interference. They have sense, too, to perceive that an element so antagonistic to the institutions of a pagan country as Christianity necessarily cannot be compatible with the continuance of the present state of things."[145]

Reed advised Williams and Martin to reject the Chinese counterproposal and told them that the treaty would be signed on the next day with or without the religious article. Williams believed that the Chinese was employing delay tactics to tire them out so that the religious toleration clause would be omitted entirely from the treaty. Determined to have the clause included, Williams changed the

[143] Williams, *Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams*, p.272.

[144] Ibid., pp. 270-271. Williams also believed that someone in the French legation had a hand in causing the first draft of the toleration clause to be rejected by the imperial commissioners.

[145] Martin (1897), p.181

wordings of the term to a form which he thought would be acceptable to the Chinese and after some minor modifications by Reed,[146] took the new version and together with Martin went to negotiate with the Chinese deputies at the eleventh hour.[147] The modified article in English and Chinese states:

> The principles of the Christian religion, as professed by the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches, are recognized as teaching men to do good, and to do to others as they would have others do to them. Hereafter, those, who quietly profess and teach these doctrines shall not be harassed or persecuted on account of their faith. Any persons, whether citizens of the United States or Chinese converts, who according to these tenets peaceably teach and practise the principles of Christianity shall in no case be interfered with or molested.
>
> 耶穌基督聖教，又名天主教，原為勸人行善，凡欲人施諸己者亦如是施於人。嗣後所有安分傳教習教之人，當一體矜卹保護，不可欺侮凌虐。凡有遵照教規安分傳習者，他人毋得騷擾。[148]

To their surprise, the Chinese accepted the draft with an unimportant change in the wording. The sudden change of mind of the Chinese was motivated, as WAP Martin perceptively observed, by fear. However, it was not limited to the fear that the western nations might turn their backs on the Qing and support the Taipings instead, as what Martin believed.[149] More immediately threatening for the Qing government was the starving and restive population of Tianjin and the outlaws in the region, who might stirrup trouble if the standoff with the westerners dragged on. Furthermore, the Chinese wished to pull the Americans to their side to isolate the obdurate and insolent British, who threatened to march to Beijing if all their demands, including the highly contentious issue of foreign legation in the capital, were not accepted.

---

[146] Williams recalled that "the word 'whoever' in my English version was altered by Mr. Reed to 'any person, whether citizen of the U.S. or Chinese convert, who—because he wished every part of the treaty to refer to U.S. citizens, and cared not very much whether it had a toleration article or not." Again the general lukewarm attitude of Reed toward the cause of Christianity is highlighted here by Williams. Williams (1896), p.271.

[147] Ibid., p.272.

[148] *Zhongwai jiu yuezhang daquan*, p.292.

[149] Martin (1897), p.183.

The religious clause was included as Article 29 in the American treaty. The wording of the article was vague in terms of the religious liberty accorded to the Christians and the mention of the rights of residence, movement, and proselytization of the foreign missionaries were omitted altogether. It was understood that the activities of American missionaries like all U.S. citizens would be restricted in the treaty ports according to Articles 12 and 14 of the American treaty. Article 12 stipulates that "(c)itizens of the United States residing or sojourning at any of the ports open to Foreign commerce shall be permitted to rent houses and places of business, or hire sites on which they can themselves build houses or hospitals, churches and cemeteries." Article 14 designated the ports and cities permitted to foreign commerce and residence as Canton and Swatow in Guangzhou, Amoy and Fuzhou in Fujian, Ningbo in Zhejiang, and Taiwan. [150]

The issue of religious liberty was not high in the aims of the British Mission. In fact, it was not even included in the five objectives specified by the foreign secretary, the Earl of Clarendon to Lord Elgin on 20 April 1857, before he embarked for China. The primary objectives of the British were namely to seek financial redress for the injuries suffered by British subjects, opening China up further for British commerce, and diplomatic residence in Beijing and direct communication with the high officials in the capital. This official ambivalence to the issue of religious freedom was also shared by Lord Elgin. On 29 March 1858, a group of Protestant missionaries in Shanghai and Ningbo submitted a petition to Lord Elgin requesting that he help secure the toleration of Protestantism and access to the interior for missionary work in his upcoming treaty negotiations with the Qing government. The missionaries highlighted that the French treaty of 1844 guaranteed religious toleration only for Catholicism not the Protestant religion. Hence, Protestant missionaries and converts were operating illegally in the empire and had been subjected to harassment and restrictions by the Chinese authorities. They asserted that because of the Taiping insurgents, who shared similar doctrines and books with them, the adherents of the Protestant religion, were "mistaken for abettors of rebellion, and treated as enemies of the State." Furthermore, the authors requested that lord Elgin use the term "Yay-soo-keaou (religion

[150] *Zhongwai jiu yuezhang daquan*, pp.284-285.

of Jesus)" to designate the Protestant religion in the treaty, to distinguish it from the "Teen-choo-keaou" (religion of the Lord of Heaven), the Chinese term for Catholicism.[151]

Lord Elgin replied that the desire of the missionaries to put all denominations in China on an equal footing was a reasonable one and agreed with their view that the Chinese government's rejection of Christianity was motivated by reasons of a political rather than religious nature, yet their demands involved "in some of their details and consequences, questions of considerable nicety." Lord Elgin was particularly critical about the abuse of extraterritoriality by the Westerners in China and how the Christian nations who obtained these privileges through the treaties made with the Chinese government failed to recognize their obligation to prevent that from happening. He was informed that there were "many vile and reckless men, protected by the privileges…and still more by the terror which British prowess has inspired, are infesting in the coasts of China. It may be that for that moment they are able, in many cases, to perpetuate the worst crimes with impunity, but they bring discredit on the Christian name, inspire hatred of the foreigner where no such hatred exists, and as recent instances prove, teach occasionally to the natives a lesson of vengeance, which, when once learnt, may not always be applied with discrimination."[152] Lord Elgin was judicious in his assessment of the situation and was not persuaded by the exaggerated view of the Chinese people and the state as inherently xenophobic or fanatic, which was prevalent at this time when tensions between the Chinese and the Western nations were running high. He empathized with the anti-foreign feelings and behavior of the Chinese people and state, which he reasoned was a result of the disturbances caused by western military actions in the coastal regions in recent years.

Furthermore, he warned about the delicate question of stipulating in the treaties the right of foreign nations to interfere on behalf of Chinese converts. "It is most right and fitting that Chinamen espousing Christianity should not be persecuted. It is most wrong and most prejudicial to the real interests of the Faith that they should be tempted to put on a hypocritical profession in order to secure

[151] *CESM*, p.252.

[152] Ibid., p.253.

thereby the advantages of abnormal protection."[153] Lord Elgin did not intend for Great Britain to take up the role of the protector of Protestant missionaries and converts as what France saw as her role for Catholicism in the Far East.

Formal negotiations between the British and the Chinese began on 6 June with Horatio Nelson Lay representing Lord Elgin and a team of 4 Chinese secretaries with Pieu as the chief spokesperson representing the imperial commissioners. Lay presented a set of 8 demands: 1) Resident Minister; 2) Compensation for war and losses suffered in Canton; 3) The Opening of the Yangzi River; 4) Permission for British subjects to travel to the interior under the passport system; 5) The tolerance of Christianity; 6) The appointment of a new commission to collect data and arrange tariffs; 7) Co-operation of the Chinese government in the suppression of piracy; 8) English as the official language of correspondence in the future between the British and Qing Empires. The demand for a resident minister to represent the Great Britain in Beijing was the most important demand on the British agenda, which Lay insisted that the Chinese acquiesce on the spot before the discussion of other propositions. This was vigorously rejected by Pieu who replied that the emperor would prefer war than to agree with having a foreign minister residing in the capital. In the following day, Guiliang beseeched Lay to withdraw the issue of resident minister or at least waive it for the time being as he would certainly be punished by the emperor if he acquiesced with the demand. Lay replied by requesting the imperial commissioner to consider the other propositions and communicate his honest opinions about them in the next meeting.[154]

During the next negotiation on 8 June, Lay was surprised to find all the other propositions rejected by the Chinese as well. After hours of debate with the Chinese secretaries, Lay communicated his wish to set aside the issue of resident minister and reparation and demanded an answer be given to the rest of the 5 propositions (excluding the commission on tariff). Guiliang went through each article carefully with Lay, asking general questions about them point by point. At the end, he pleaded with Lay

[153] Ibid.

[154] Ibid., pp.324-326 for the memorandum submitted by Lay on the outline of his meeting with Pieu and Guiliang on 6 June.

for more time, but the English negotiator insisted on a definitive answer in the form of an official letter address to Lord Elgin on the next day and threatened military action if that was not being complied. The two imperial commissioners verbally expressed assent to the 5 propositions on 10 June and drafted a letter under the advice of Lay. [155] On the issue of religious tolerance, the proposition that the imperial commissioners agreed to was worded as "That between us and persons of the British (sc., Christians) persuasion, in as much as these are not offensive, there shall be peace." On the Chinese meaning of the article communicated to Guiliang and Huashana, Lay explained that "I have translated this clause literally. I mean Christians do us no harm, and we will not harm them."[156] It is clear from this that during the negotiation, Lay did not communicate adequately the meaning of religious freedom to the imperial commissioners. On the Chinese side, the understanding they had gotten from Lay's translation was that the British people would be free as before to profess and practice their religion in the treaty ports unhindered by the Chinese government if they create no problem.

The British concluded their treaty with the Qing government on 26 June and the religious clause was included as Article 8 in the treaty. Article 8 of the British treaty was an abridged version of the American treaty, which like the American version was both novel and limited. It granted religious protection to the Protestant religion by distinguishing it clearly from Catholicism, but it did not guarantee the rights of Protestant missionaries to conduct religious work or build churches beyond the treaty ports. The article with its Chinese translation states:

> The Christian religion as professed by Protestants or Roman Catholics, inculcates the practice of virtue and teaches man to do as he would be done by. Persons teaching it, or professing it, therefore, shall alike be entitled to the protection of the Chinese authorities,

[155] Lay became impatient and acted insolently when he was requested by Guiliang to delay the communication on 10 June when he visited the commissioners' compound. He acted as a "fierce barbarian" by castigating the imperial commissioners and threatened to march to Beijing if the communication was not ready by mid-afternoon of the same day. The fury exhibited by Lay might be due to his temperamental personality, his genuine impatience with, what he perceived as, the stalling tactics of the Chinese, and the tactic of the "fierce barbarian" that he adopted from Lord Elgin, which he believed was the most effective method in dealing with the Qing officials. See Jack J. Gerson, *Horatio Nelson Lay and Sino-British Relations: 1858-1864* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp.89-92.

[156] Ibid., p.330.

> nor shall any such, peaceably pursuing their calling, and not offending against the Laws, be persecuted or interfered with.
>
> 耶穌聖教暨天主教原係為善之道，待人如己。自後凡有傳授習學者，一體保護，其安分無過，中國官毫不得刻待禁阻。[157]

The French began their negotiation with the Chinese officially on 15 June and took 6 rounds of discussion before signing their treaty on 27 June. During the preliminary session, the Chinese negotiator Pi-hen[158] vigorously rejected the French demand for the inclusion of a religious article (Article 13) in the treaty by arguing that the proscription of the Catholic religion had already been rescinded in the 1844 Treaty of Whampoa. In the next meeting, however, the Chinese side relented under French insistence that Christianity not only to be officially tolerated but legalized by the Qing state.[159] Article 13 of the French treaty was largely based on Article 8 of the Russian treaty, but it was more detailed in stipulating the rights of the Catholics in the practice of their religion and also clear in its phrasing that Christianity was legalized in the whole empire and not merely tolerated by an imperial rescript. Article 13 of the French treaty reads:

> La religion Chrétienne, ayant pour objet essential, de porter les hommes à la vertu, les membres de toutes les communions Chrétiennes jouiront d'une entière sécurité pour leurs personnes, leurs propriétiés, et le libre excercice de leurs pratiques religieuses; et une protection efficace sera donnée aux missionnaires qui se rendront pacifiquement dans l'intérieur du pays, munis des passeports réguliers dont il est parlè dans l'Article huit. Aucune entrave ne sera apportée par les autorités de l'Empire Chinois au droit qui est reconnu à tout individu en Chine d'embrasser, s'il le veut, le Christianisme et d'en suivre les pratiques, sans être passible d'aucune peine infligée pour ce fait.

---

[157] *Zhongwai jiu yuezhang daquan*, p.298.

[158] Pi-hen was likely the same person as Pien, whom W.A.P Martin identified as the chief representative of Guiliang in the treaty negotiations with the four countries. The identity of Pien, however, is unknown from the Chinese sources.

[159] Cordier (1905), p.430.

> Tout ce qui a été précédemment écrit, proclamé ou publié en Chine par ordre du Gouvernement contre le culte Chrétien, est complétement abrogé et reste sans valeur dans toutes les provinces de l'Empire.

The Chinese version of the article which was agreed by the Qing government is as follow:

> 天主教原以勸人行善為本，凡奉教之人，皆全獲保佑身家，其會同禮拜誦經等事概聽其便，凡按第八款備有蓋印執照安然入內地傳教之人，地方官務必厚待保護。凡中國人願信崇天主教而循規蹈矩者，毫無查禁，皆免懲治。向來所有或寫、或刻奉禁天主教各明文，無論何處，概行寬免。[160]

Below is my translation of the French Article 13 in English:

> The Christian religion having as its main aim to bring men to virtue, the members of all Christian sects will have full security of their persons, property and religious practices, and effective protection will be given to missionaries who peacefully go into the interior of the country, with passports of the kind mentioned in Article 8. The Chinese Empire will place no barrier in the way of Chinese individuals who decide to embrace the Christian faith and practice, and these individuals will suffer no punishment. All that was written and proclaimed against Christian worship in the past by the Chinese Government, or approved by it, is completely abrogated and now without effect in all provinces of the Empire.

A comparison of the French original and Chinese translation of Article 13 shows some interesting discrepancies. Like in the treaties of the other three nations, religious freedom in Article 13 of the French text is guaranteed for Christianity (la religion Chrétienne), all Christian denominations (les communions Chriétiennes), and all forms of Christian worship (la Christianisme et d'en suivre les pratiques). However, the term Christian religion was translated as *Tianzhu jiao* or the Catholic teaching in the Chinese translation of the article. Interestingly, in the first Chinese translation of the article submitted by the French for negotiation, the granting of freedom of conscience was included in it. Pi-hen asked the French secretary whether freedom of conscience was understood as applied to all

[160] *Zhongwai jiu yuezhang daquan*, p.320.

teachings in France. M. de Contades replied that one of the great principles in Europe was the observation of religious liberty for all religious sects (le culte). At present, he explained that the French government was only concerned with the freedom of Christian worship (la liberté du culte chrétien), which was currently proscribed in China. M. de Contades added that since France tolerated all religions, she demanded as her right that her own religion was permitted in other countries. Pi-hen agreed with the point made by the French secretary, but he explained that the term freedom of conscience in Chinese meant freedom for all teachings. M de Contades then offered to delete the term freedom of conscience, making it clear in the article that the freedom of religion was meant only for Christianity.

The Chinese secretary was agreeable with the new wording of the article, but he proposed that a clause be added to allow the punishment of missionaries for misconduct or for people guilty of impersonating missionaries. This proposition was flatly rejected by M. de Contades as it would be injurious to the character of the missionaries by doing so, since it cast them as bad elements. He argued that missionaries were people with strong moral character and they were ministers of religion (Fr. ministres d'une religion) who instructed people to follow the laws and in the practice of virtues. Furthermore, this would provide excuse for officials to prosecute missionaries, which could be observed from the many instances of anti-missionary actions perpetrated by local magistrates earlier on.

Another objection raised by the Chinese on Article 13 during the negotiations was the abolishment of all imperial edicts on the proscription of Christianity. Pi-hen considered it against the rites as well as a crime and a sacrilege to talk about abolishing an imperial decree issued by the emperor. M. de Contades argued that this clause was necessary since the imperial government had dared to proscribe Christianity. The French secretary offered a solution by not mentioning the person of the emperor in the wording of the clause. Pi-hen proposed using the phrase "all laws and ordinances against the Teaching of the Lord of Heaven would be abolished." M. de Contades rejected this proposition because the statement was ambiguous and might leave doubts in the mind of magistrates who are hostile to Christianity. He in turn offered to phrase the clause as "All that had been published in China by order of the Government against Christianity is abrogated and now without effect throughout the Empire." Pi-hen objected to the translation of the word "Government" as the "Emperor" in the Chinese text of

the article and requested that the phrase "by order of the Government" be omitted. M. de Contades replied that he could not acquiesce to this request as it must be clear in both the Chinese and French texts of Article 13 that what was to be abolished were the laws against Christianity from the Chinese government to prevent any ambiguity in meaning. He added that he could not cater to all the sensibilities of the Chinese language and since there was no term in Chinese that correspond to the word "Government" he proposed the alternative of "supreme order" in replacement of the term "Emperor" in the Chinese text. He then reminded the Chinese secretary that the wordings of the French text of Article 13 had been finalized and it would be regarded as the authentic version regardless of the Chinese text. Finally, both the French and Chinese negotiators settled for a wording in the Chinese text that did not give offense to the person of the emperor by omitting the mention of him altogether, but, at the same time, made it clear that officially the proscription of Christianity was officially abrogated through the insertion of the term "official decrees" (*mingwen* 明文).[161]

LOST IN TRANSLATION: CHINESE UNDERSTANDING AND REACTION

It has been the main aim of the chapter thus far to show how the concept of "religion" arrived in China through treaty negotiations and translation in Tianjin in 1858. The four western powers sought, through the religious article, to transpose the principle of freedom of conscience to China. The Tianjin treaties had essentially established for Christianity, both Catholicism and Protestantism, a religious realm that was outside of political authority, and placed the Qing state responsible for the observation of religious freedom under international law.

The meaning of the religious article was lost by the Qing negotiators who understood the term "religion" through its Chinese translation of *jiao*. In Chinese understanding, there was no *jiao* or teaching that was outside the purview of the imperial state as the emperor was the final arbiter of orthodoxy and orthopraxy. For the imperial state, *jiao* was the same as *zheng* (governance) as it was through moral instruction that the government established the cosmic-social order. There were two

[161] Cordier (1905), pp.429-434.

kinds of orthodox teaching: the Confucian teaching that "based its teaching on human relations" (*yi rendao shejiao* 以人道設教) and, Buddhism, Daoism, and other imperial sanctioned temple cults that "based its teaching on the way of the spirits" (*yi shendao shejiao* 以神道設教). What the Qing negotiators understood from the religious article was that they had agreed that Christianity (in the forms of the teachings of Jesus and Lord of Heaven) would be legalized as long as it served the state in promoting the moral betterment of imperial subjects and the stability of the social order.

Despite the legalization of Christianity, the Qing state and its officials still regarded the Christianity as a heresy that would disrupt the social order. The spread of the Taiping rebellion in the 1850s had caused a state of panic within the Qing bureaucracy and triggered a witch hunt against religious rebels (*jiaofei* 教匪) throughout the empire. Yet, the Qing government was cognizant of the need to accommodate Christianity because of the treaties they signed with the Western powers. On 17 April 1854, Guiliang, who was then the governor-general of Zhili, was instructed by the Grand Council to arrest and severely punish a certain criminal named Bao Shi, who happened to be a Catholic convert. Guiliang memorialized to the throne on the necessity of distinguishing those Christians who broke the law and the law-abiding ones in meting out punishment. This was in accordance with the tolerance edict issued during the Daoguang era. In addition, he feared that indiscriminate arrest of Catholics converts would cause panic and push them towards rebellion. Furthermore, Guiliang reported that from his secret investigation of Anshu and other counties, which had a sizeable Christian population, there were no signs that the Christians were in cahoots with the Taiping rebels or were they outlaws. He instructed his subordinates to closely monitor the Christians and to suppress them when necessary, and to release any convert who was found to be innocent of any crimes.[162] Around the same time, Guiliang also apprehended French missionary Joseph-Martial Mouly (1807-1868), who was travelling and proselytizing illegally within the province. He escorted the French missionary back to Canton in

[162] "Zhili zongdu Guiliang zouchen chuanxi tianzhu jiao ren ying qubie tuoban zhe," *QMJA* vol.1, p.155.

conformity with the 1844 Sino-French treaty after nothing subversive had been found in his possession or activities.[163]

The general policy of the Qing state toward Christianity before the signing of the Tianjin treaties was to tolerate the foreign religion but contain it within the five treaty ports and among foreign residents.[164] Through their negotiations with the westerners in Tianjing, the Qing negotiators realized that the Western powers would not agree to any restrictions on the exercise and propagation of Christianity. Yet, by signing the treaties they did not agree with the western notion of "freedom of religion" i.e. the demarcation of a religious sphere, independent from state control. The free profession and propagation of *Tianzhu jiao* and *Yesu jiao* were still subjected to the observation of imperial laws.

The Qing negotiators grudgingly acquiesced with the religious clause in the hope that the western powers would back down on their more objectionable demands such as resident minister and the opening of the interior for commerce, which would be damaging to the legitimacy of the imperial state and the economic livelihood of the people. This proved to be naïve thinking on the part of the negotiators. The opening of the whole empire to the foreign religion created a crisis of conversion within the official class. The objection of Christianity as a heresy and a subversive doctrine that could be used by the foreign nations to turn the Chinese subjects against the imperial state was repeatedly voiced by Chinese officials during the treaty negotiation. Yun Shilin 惲世臨 (1817-1871), a censor for the Shanxi circuit, memorialized the throne about the danger of permitting missionaries access to the interior to spread the Christian teaching. Yun explained that as a native of Jiangsu, he personally observed how droves of foreign barbarians flooded the city of Shanghai and built churches (*yiguan* 夷館) after the opening of Shanghai for commerce in Daoguang 24 (1844). The foreign barbarians proselytized *Tianzhu jiao* to the natives and gave a minimum sum of 20 taels of sliver annually to the Christian converts. "Poor people covet the monetary gifts of the foreigners and thus more and more people are infected (with the heresy) as the day passes." He warned that allowing the barbarians to set up churches

[163] "Zhili zongdu Guiliang zoubao Ansu xian xun panhuo fa jiaoshi Mengzhensheng pian," ibid., p.156.

[164] For Qing policy on Christianity between the First and Second Opium Wars, see Hu Jianhua, "Lun Xianfeng chao de xianjiao zhengche" in *Jindaishi yuanjiu*, vol.1 (1990), pp.66-83.

in Tianjin would have greater damaging effect on the "mind-hearts" of the people. He pointed out that local officials would not dare to suppress the spread of the foreign religion for fear of trouble. Since Tianjin was the gateway to the imperial capital, it would be calamitous if the foreign barbarians with beastly disposition launched false accusations and attacked Beijing, like what they did in Canton. He placed the blame for Anglo-French occupation of Canton squarely on Qiying, who lacked the foresight when he negotiated the treaties with the barbarians earlier on.[165]

Similarly, on June 23 a group of 23 high officials led by Zhou Zupei 周祖培 (1793-1867), President of the Board of Ceremonies, submitted a strongly worded memorial about the 8 dangers of permitting the entry of foreign barbarians in the capital to build embassies and churches. On the threat of Christianity, the memorial warns:

> In the past the construction of western buildings in the capital was only restricted for the purpose of astronomical calculation, there was nothing about religious proselytization. Now the foreign barbarians set up churches for the sole of purpose of spreading *Tianzhu jiao*. Lately, the coastal areas are bewildered by the teaching as the Cantonese rebels make use of Jesus to stirrup the "mind-hearts" of the people. The capital is the exemplary model for the whole empire, if we allowed it to be bewitched (by the foreign teaching) then the whole civilized nation would turn into bestial barbarians. This is the fifth harm.[166]

The Tianjin treaties established the super sign of *jiao*/religion through forced translation which created great problems for the Qing state as it had to learn to distinguish between the religious and "non-religious" in their management of "missionary cases" (*jiaoan* 教案) in the immediate aftermath of the conclusion of peace with the western nations after the signing of the Beijing convention in 1860. Furthermore, the fear of Christianity in converting the loyalty of the imperial subjects was heightened after the whole empire was opened fully to Christian missionizing. The Qing court had to protect

[165] *YWSM XF*, ch.25, pp.9b-10b.

[166] Ibid., ch.26, p.20b.

Christianity in compliance with the treaties it signed, and at the same time, sought to contain the spread of the foreign religion.

— 2—

Counteracting the Threat of Christian Conversion, 1860-1870

In their joint memorial of January 1861, the leaders of the newly established Zongli Yamen 總理衙門, Prince Gong (1833-1898), Guiliang, and Wen Xiang 文祥 (1818-1876) advised the throne to adopt a conciliatory foreign policy against the general mood of fear and hatred of the westerners that prevailed among the officials and population. They reasoned that unlike the barbarians in the previous dynasties, the western-ocean barbarians do not covet the territories of China. Furthermore, the barbarian menace would be manageable if the court follow the clauses of the treaties strictly and not allow the barbarians to go beyond them even slightly. In short, the policy was "showing sincerity and friendship on the surface but carrying on with the 'loose-rein' policy furtively."[167]

They pointed out that while the Russian empire, which shared a long border with China and had the ambition of slowly swallowing up the adjacent territories, could be likened to the "concern of the elbows and armpits" (i.e. a close threat), and the British, who acted violently in wanton disregard for human principles for the purpose of trade, were the "diseases of the limbs" (i.e. an irritant), however,

[167] *YWSM XF*, ch.71, p.18b.

the Nian and Taiping rebels were the "afflictions of the heart and stomach" (i.e. the real threat).[168] Using historical parable, the memorialists argued that the relationship of the Qing and the Western powers was similar to that between the Kingdoms of Shu and Wu during the three kingdoms era. Though Shu and Wu were antagonistic to each other, but circumstances dictated that they cooperated against their common foe, the Kingdom of Wei.[169] At this time, Prince Gong was persuading the emperor to accept foreign military assistances against the Taipings, which were again threatening the international city of Shanghai after its defeat in late 1860 by the mixed force of foreign and imperial troops. The Taipings came this time with a larger force of 600,000 under the command of the Loyal King, Li Xiucheng 李秀成 (1823-1864), and it was clear to Prince Gong that the aim of quelling the rebels in the Yangtze region without foreign assistance was impossible. It was with Western military aids that the Qing managed to defend Shanghai and eventually captured the strategic city of Anqing in September 1861 and turned the tide of war permanently against the rebels.

This chapter surveys the change in Qing policy toward Christianity and the political challenge the supersign *jiao*/religion presented to the Qing state in the 1860s. Christianity presented the Qing government with a conundrum. On the one hand, pragmatic political calculation dictated that the Qing court honor the treaties signed with the western power, to protect the foreign religion and open the whole empire for its propagation. On the other, the Qing government perceived Christian conversion of its people as a serious political threat. In the context of early Meiji Japan, Trent Maxey astutely highlights that "the very idea of conversion provoked significant anxiety, not because it was specifically 'religious' but because the determination and maintainence of identity and communal boundaries lay at the heart of national and communal politics."[170] In the absence of a definition of religion as interior faith which is vital for the modern demarcation of the "religious" and "secular," conversion is a political activity that entails the altering of one's communal identity and political loyalty. In the minds of the

[168] Ibid.

[169] Ibid., p.18a.

[170] Trent Maxey, "The Crisis of 'Conversion' and Search for National Doctrine in Early Meiji Japan" in Washburn and Reinhart eds. *Converting Cultures: Religion, Ideology and Transformation of Modernity* (Leiden, Brill, 2007), p.4.

Meiji leaders, Christianity was particularly threatening because it was a potent ideological weapon of the Westerners in capturing the "hearts and minds" of the indigenous people and turning them against the state. The creation and promulgation of a national doctrine (*kokkyō*) based on Shintō theology by the early Meiji state was motivated by the desire to counter Christianity in the conversionary competition.

The fundamental objection of the Qing rulers to Christianity was not because it was heterodox, as commonly argued by historians, but because they deemed Christian proselytization and conversion as an insidious means of European instrusion. Furthermore, conversion was menancing also because the legitimacy and stability of the Qing state was founded primarily on it being the patron and defender of the religions and cultures of the diverse people that it ruled over and maintaining the boundaries between them. The Qing state started to regard Christianity as an exogeneous threat in the early nineteenth century as they became increasingly warying of the colonial activities of the European maritime powers in Asia. After 1805, the Qing state put foreign missionaries in Beijing under strict surveillance and implemented capital punishments on missionaries uncovered in the interior for seditious activities to root out Christian proselytization.[171] The Tianjin treaties of 1858 and the Beijing Convention of 1860 had engendered a crisis of conversion in the imagination of the Qing officials and literati elites by legalizing Christianity and opening the empire up for Christian proselytization. The Qing state did not attempt to create a theistic national doctrine to compete with Christianity for the "hearts and minds" of its subjects, partly due to the disdain of the Confucian officials of the "Way of the Spirits," and primarily because the polygot Qing empire was founded on an universalistic imperial ideology that claimed impartiality over the religions of the diverse people that it ruled over. In order not to contradict its treaty commitments of allowing and protecting Christian proselytization, the Qing government chose to limit missionary activities covertly through strict interpretation of treaty terms, the *baojia* 保甲 system, and stepping up on the ideological indoctrination of the illiterate masses, who were most vulnerable to the lure of the alien religion.

[171] For the change from indigenious heresy to western instrusion in Qing state's conception of Christianity, see Laamann (2006), pp.101-108.

FROM TOLERATION TO PROTECTION

In the era of Sino-western rapprochement, the Qing policy in the post-1860 toward Christianity shifted from one of toleration that characterized the earlier Daoguang and Xianfeng periods (1820-1861) to the protection of Chinese converts, foreign missionaries, and missionary movements in accordance to the clauses of the Tianjin treaties and Beijing conventions. The Zongli Yamen accommodated with the demands of foreign nations regarding Christianity, especially France which had established itself through the Sino-French treaties as the sole protector of all Roman Catholic missions in China. France interests in the missions were mainly motivated by the desire to bolster French national prestige internally and externally, since unlike Britain and the United States, its commercial interests in China were negligible. French diplomats also hoped that more tangible interests of France in China could be furthered by the expansion of the influence of the Catholic Church in China.[172]

Catholic missionaries were quick to submit their appeals to the French minister immediately after the ratification of the treaties. Baron Gros sent a diplomatic note on 7 October 1860 requesting for the return of all seized Catholic properties in the provinces built during the Kangxi era. [173] On 4 November, the Zongli Yamen received a diplomatic note from the French plenipotentiary on behalf of Bishop Joseph-Martial Mouly (1807-1868) requesting for the return of the old Beitang and Nantang churches built in Beijing according to Article 6 of the Sino-French agreement of 1860. [174] Three days later, Gros sent another diplomatic note to Prince Gong hastening the return of the Beitang and Nantang,

[172] French motivation for the religious protectorate was highlighted in the address of the French minister to his legation in 1880: "It is important not to misunderstand the character of the protection we accord to the missionaries….In acting in this manner, the government does not have for its purpose religious propaganda, which would be contrary to the principles as to the rules that govern our present policies in particular. We intend only to employ for the benefit of France's position the connections and continuing advances accomplished by the missionaries among the Chinese population. Our commercial interests there, and we must recognize that, if we renounce the protection of Catholic missionaries, our role in the Celestial Empire would in reality be noticeably diminished." Quoted by Ernest Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony*, pp.43-44. Also see Cohen (1963), pp.65-68; and John J. Cady, *The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1954), pp.276-277.

[173] *JWJAD* vol.1, p.141.

[174] "Gong qinwang Yixin deng zou fashi suohuan nanbei ertang ji jiang laiwang zhaohui deng chenglan pian" in *QMJA* vol.1, p.180.

as well as requesting for the Dongtang and Xitang.[175] To prevent Gros from engaging in endless bickering and delay the withdrawal of French troops from Beijing, Prince Gong acted immediately to hand the titles of the Nantang property over to the French plenipotentiary, who passed them to Bishop Mouly. Prince Gong also swiftly sought out the sites of the other three old cathedrals, acquired the properties from the current owners and turned them over in December 1860.[176]

Next, to ensure the legal protection of Catholicism and missionaries in the interior, on 30 March 1861 Alphonse de Bourboloun (1809-1877), the French Minister to China sent a diplomatic communication to Prince Gong requesting the endorsement of an executive order (*yudan* 諭單) that he had drafted. The document contained Articles 8 and 13 of the Sino-French Tianjin Treaty and Article 6 of the Beijing Treaty which affirmed the right of travel by French nationals with passports, the protection of the right of religion, physical safety and properties of missionaries and converts, and the return of confiscated Catholic properties. He asked for 250 copies of the official order to be printed and distributed to the missionaries. Bourboloun reasoned that the document was necessary to "prevent and check the occurrence of disturbances and doubts" by local officials and the masses in the interior, who were unaware of the treaties signed between the two countries. [177]

Prince Gong seconded the French Minister's request to the throne in his memorial of 7 April because the document also stated clearly that the work of the missionaries was to persuade men to do good and they shall never be engaged in other activities, be it public or private affairs. He underscored in the memorial that the executive order could be utilized by the local officials to control the missionary leaders from interfering with public matters. Prince Gong warned of the undeniable harm caused by Christianity in inciting and confusing the rural ignoramuses. Furthermore, since missionization was completely legalized under the treaties, it would be inevitable that religious leaders (*jiaozhu* 教主) might

[175] "Gong qinwang Yixin deng zoubao fashi qingfu beitang bing qingjiang huzhao gaiyin deng shi pian," ibid., p.183.

[176] "Gong qinwang Yixin deng zouwei chaming dongxi tianzhu tang zhi pian," ibid., p.185.

[177] *JWJAD* Vol.1, p.2.

one day exploit their special legal status to intervene in official affairs. He singled out Bishop Mouly for his criticism. Prince Gong complained to Count Michel-Alexandre Kleczkowski (1818-1886), the acting French minister at that time about the pompous attitude of the Bishop, who repeatedly bragged to have French minsters do his bidding, and the various unlawful deeds of the missionaries. While Kleczkowski was greatly angered by what he heard, he was not agreeable to Prince Gong's suggestion of drafting a diplomatic communication to restrain the behaviours of the missionaries for the fear of offending the Bishop.[178]

The unlawful deeds of the missionaries that Prince Gong alluded to in his 7 April memorial also referred to the interference by Catholic missionaries on the collection of customary dues in Shanxi. In the fall of 1861, the Franciscan missionaries in Fengtai County, proposed to the governor of Shanxi Yinggui 英桂 (1821-1879) a five articles regulation that exempted the Catholics from customary dues on village sacrifices, temple maintenance, and festivals. The five articles were:

1) Non-Christians are not permitted to ask Catholics to contribute financially for opera, sacrificial offerings, and the construction and maintenance of temples as they are required by regulation of their religion to pay for the construction and repair of church buildings, ceremonies, and other fees.
2) Magistrates and prefects are not to accept cases on religious contributions brought to them by non-Christians against Catholics or to side the accusers.
3) For other public and private imposts that do not violate the church regulations, Christians shall not be coerced to contribute more than non-Christians.
4) If imposts in rural villages (*cunshe* 村社) include contribution to heterodox (*yiduan* 異端) activities, Christians will only pay for non-heterodox ones.
5) If the heads of each rural villages and temple associations extorted monies from Christians for useless undertakings and when they refused to comply despatched

[178] Ibid.

people to rob their properties or snatch and destroy their crops; the magistrates shall make them liable for any losses suffered by the Christians.[179]

Unlike the Rites Controversy of the 17th Century, there was no theological debate on the meaning of the ritual, the Franciscans simply instructed their converts not to pay for the fees and insisted that they be protected under the clause of religious freedom in the Sino-French agreement. In September 1861, the Zongli Yamen received a letter from Yinggui complaining about the unlawful act of the Franciscan missionaries Liangduoming 梁多明 and Fuandang 副安當 in devising their own five articles on customary dues for the Catholics. In his letter, Yinggui pointed out that the Sino-French treaty of 1860 only allowed French nationals to travel freely, construct buildings and proselytize in the hinterland, and made no mention of Catholics having exemption from monetary contributions to temple maintenance, rituals, and festivals. He protested that as private persons without official titles the Franciscan missionaries had no authority to draw up the regulations. Moreover, exempting Christians the payment of the customary dues would cause great unhappiness among the non-Christians and result in more social disharmony and lawsuits in the rural villages.[180]

The five articles were also forwarded to the French legation in Beijing by the Franciscans together with their complaint of maltreatment of Chinese Catholics by Shanxi officials. On 21 December 1861, Kleczkowski acting on the report of the Franciscans in Shanxi, sent a strongly worded diplomatic note to the Zongli Yamen protesting the religious discrimination and bullying that Chinese Catholics suffered in the province. Quoting the Franciscans, he complained that the Catholics in the province were forced to pay for "pagan activities" (translated as useless and heterodox or *wuyi yiduan* 無益異端). They were made to pay double the amount by the local officials when they refused to contribute and the converts of Yangqu county were even tortured by the local magistrates in retaliation for their non-compliance. Kleczkowski argued that the actions of Shanxi officials constituted a blatant

[179] Ibid., pp.687-688.

[180] Ibid., p.687.

violation of the Sino-French agreement. He also complained that missionaries were treated as criminals by the local magistrates and that the terms of the Sino-French treaty had not been posted on the official notice board in the province. Kleczkowski urged the Zongli Yamen to instruct the governor of Shanxi to treat "Christian subjects" (*jiaomin* 教民) well according to the treaty and to be impartial when dealing with the cases involving Christians in Yangqu and other places. Furthermore, he requested the Yamen to communicate with the officials in the other provinces to put in place the regulation designed by the Franciscans.[181]

The Zongli Yamen responded two days later with the promise that the governor of Shanxi would investigate the matter. The Zongli Yamen sent Yinggui a secret communication instructing him to comply with the request of the Franscicans and exempt the Christians from paying the customary dues. The Yamen stressed that the issue of religious imposts was a small matter and the main reason why the French were insistent on the issue was because they wanted to ingratiate themselves with the local Chinese. Yinggui was instructed to be flexible in handling issues concerning the Christians, however, he must also be judicious and not to give in to their demands all the time, in case this led to popular discontent.[182]

Bourboloun sent a communication to Prince Gong on 26 December to protest that the situation in Shanxi did not improve as Luigi da Castellazzo Moccagatta (1809-1891), the Bishop of Shanxi wrote repeatedly and even dispatched missionaries to the French legation in Beijing to complain about the ill-treatment of Christians. According to Bourdeloun, the situation had, in fact, worsened, after the Zongli Yamen informed the governor of Shanxi to manage the issue according to the treaties and the local officials became more highhanded in their treatment of Christians.[183]

---

[181] "Fashi wei Shanxi kedai jiaomin ji huan jiangzhou tianzhu tang shi zhi Yixin zhaohui," *QMJA* vol. 1, pp.206-209.

[182] *JWJAD* vol.1, p.691.

[183]"Fashi Buerbulong wei zaichen jinsheng kedai jiaomin gejie shi zhi Yixin zhaohui," *QMJA* vol.1, p.210.

On 18 January 1862, the French legation sent the Zongli Yamen a draft proclamation and demanded the central government to circulate the document to all governors-general and governors for implementation. The proclamation reiterated the religious freedom clause of the Sino-French treaty and alleged that the current disharmony in the provinces was due largely to the oppression of Christians, who were bullied to pay for opera and religious festivals against their religious conscience. The document also urged the local magistrates to be impartial in dealing with incidents concerning Christians and to forever remove the obligation of Christians toward "useless" activities and to punish whoever coerces them into compliance with the customary subscriptions. While the document reiterated the point that missionaries are not officials and should not interfere with private and public matters on behalf of the converts, it stipulated that local magistrates should treat the missionaries munificently to foster Sino-French friendship, and any petition (*bingcheng* 稟呈) received from the missionaries regarding religious matters, if justified, must be handled impartially without delay.[184]

The Zongli Yamen dispatched the draft proclamation to the governor-general of Liangguang on 19 January and the rest of the provinces three days later with a secret communication urging the various yamens to accommodate with the request of the French judiciously according to local situation and not to be overly accommodating as to cause local disturbances. On 7 February, under French pressure the Zongli Yamen made the draft into an executive order in verbatim to avoid incessant squabbling with the French over the phrasing of the document. Bourboloun further insisted that the Zongli Yamen memorialize the throne to seek imperial endorsement on the matter. Prince Gong sent a memorial to the emperor on 4 April and an imperial edict was issued endorsing his proposal the following day.

The legal category of "jiaomin" was officially endorsed by the Qing government in the imperial edict of 5 April[185] as a result of the memorial of Prince Gong and the others. The memorial wrote that "although the Christian converts (*xijiao minren* 習教民人) in the various provinces practice the *Tianzhu*

[184] *JWJAD* vol.1, p.690.

[185] "Zhe ge dufu zhao Zongli Yamen suoqing chiping banli jiaomin shijian shi shangyu" in *QMJA* vol.1, p.216.

jiao, they are still the subjects of China. Moreover, according to the French envoy Bourboloun, the teaching persuades people to respect the monarch and follow the laws of the state and nothing else. The state should treat the converts equally to demonstrate its impartiality. Furthermore, contributions for temple festivals and other activities are not the same as official corvée and levies (*gongfei* 公費), and if the Christian subjects refused to contribute, they should not be forced to pay in order to respect the popular sentiments."[186] The imperial state officially recognized the special rights of the "jiaomin," here referring to adherents of Catholicism, in the practice of their *jiao*/religion and regarding "religious" subscriptions. The same legal status and privileges were later extended to the Protestants as well.

In a secret communication that accompanied the 4 April memorial to the throne, the Zongli Yamen clarified the rationale behind its accommodative stance toward French demands:

> The reason why this memorial request for an imperial edict for local officials in all provinces on the management of French missionaries is because Shanghai is the revenue hub of the southern provinces. Since the fall of Zhejiang, Ningbo, and Hangzhou, Shanghai has been in a precarious condition. It is also a place where the locals and foreigners intermingle. Shanghai will definitely fall, if the long-haired rebels (i.e. Taiping) secretly collude with the foreign nations. If that happens, there will be no revenues and military supplies cannot be provisioned. This will endanger the entire military situation in the southeast…. That country [France] know very well that the middle-kingdom is in trouble. If we had not acquiesced to French requests, we cannot be sure that they would not ditch us for the rebels to achieve their plan [of being the protector of Catholicism]. After much deliberation, your servants think that it is impossible to defend Shanghai without the help of foreign nations. However, if we wish to borrow troops from the French, it is necessary to devise ways of restricting [their demands]. That is why on the matter of France using the pretext [of the Shanxi case] to force us to accept its request we tried to accommodate a little….Your servants know that the Teaching of the Lord of Heaven is heterodox and, though its proscription has been lifted, we should still secretly guard against it. Being

[186] "Gong qinwang Yixin deng zou wei qingzhi zaichi ge dufu chiping banli jiaomin shijian zhe," ibid., p.215.

> forced by the circumstance, we could not help but to devise our measures according to the situation and choose the lesser of the two evils. This is the bitter reason why your servants had no choice [but to accept the French demand] and this is what outsiders [of foreign affairs] could not understand. [187]

The January 1862 resolution that distinguished between "useless expenditures" and official levies had far-reaching implications as it created a distinction between "religious" and "secular" activities, which was implemented to the whole empire. This had a great disruptive influence on the social fabric of rural Chinese villages since temples functioned as the social glue that held local society together. Charles Litzinger shows that religious rites like rain-making ceremony and temple festivals were considered matters of public duty in local community (*xiangjian gongshi* 鄉間公事). In traditional China where the sacred and secular were undifferentiated, the attempt by Catholics to separate themselves on the basis of religious affiliation threatened to break up the local community and cast them into the ranks of village outsiders and traitors of the country.[188]

Litzinger's observation is reinforced in Roger Thompson's study of the conflict in Shanxi from 1862 to 1890s. Thompson shows that the division of local taxes into two categories of "useless" and official levies made little sense locally and remained the primary cause of friction between the Christians and non-Christians in Shanxi during the period. The pend up discontentment of the non-Christians and the outsider status of the Christians ultimately ended up in the bloody reprisal against the Christian population of the province during the Boxer uprising of 1901. More importantly, Thompson demonstrates that the sacred-secular distinction introduced by the Franciscan missionaries in 1862 led to the progressive desacralization of rural villages. He points out that the use of the terms of "useless" and "heterodox" to translate "pagan activities" by the missionaries and Kleczkowski

[187] *JWJAD* vol.1 p.15

[188] Charles Litzinger, "Temple Community and Village Cultural Integration in North China: Evidence from "Sectarian Cases" (chiao-an) in Chihli, 1860-1895." PhD Dissertation, University of California- Davis, 1983; and "Rural Religion and Village Organization in North China: The Catholic Challenge in the Late Nineteenth Century" in Bays ed. *Christianity in China from the Eighteenth Century to the Present* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp.41-52.

revealed their knowledge of Confucian hostility to popular religious practices.[189] What is implied and not elaborated in Thompson's analysis is that Chinese secularism might not be a derivative discourse as commonly thought. Indeed, there existed a tradition of elite hostility against popular religion.[190] However, it rarely led to an all out attack by the Confucian elites on the religious faith and expression of the masses because of the fear of possible social conflict as well as the effectiveness of supernatural beliefs in maintaining social morality and order.[191] Yinggui's objection to Christian exemption from customary fees was based on the fear of social conflict and popular discontentment that this pro-Christian policy would bring. There was also no attempt by Yinggui or the Zongli Yamen to defend the opera, sacrifice, and temple festivals against the missionary charge that these were "useless, wasteful, strange, and absurd" activities.

The disputes in Shanxi were the beginning of more violent incidents in the interior concerning foreign missionaries and Chinese Christians in the 1860s. In mid-March 1862, a series of anti-Christian riots erupted in Nanchang, Jiangxi. The riots were triggered by the arrival of French Lazarist Antoine Anot in the January of 1862 to claim back Catholic properties and restart the church in Nanchang. In early March, anonymous inflammatory placards began to appear in Nanchang indicting Christianity as heterodoxy and the missionaries for spying for the Taiping rebels and engaging in immoral activities such as abducting children and gouging their eyes. The anti-Christian charges provoked a mob to burn down and ransack the Catholic Church in Nanchang and forced Father Anot and the Christians to flee the provincial city. In less than a month after the outbreak of anti-Christian activities in Jiangxi, similar disturbances erupted in neighbouring Hunan, also a hotbed of anti-foreignism.[192] The fact that in both

[189] Roger Thompson, "Twilight of the Gods in the Countryside: Christians, Confucians, and the Modernizing State, 1861-1911" in Bays ed. (1996), pp.53-72.

[190] On late-imperial elite hostility against popular religion, see Donald Sutton, "From Credulity to Scorn: Confucians Confront the Spirt Medium in Late Imperial China," *Late Imperial China*, 21.2 (Dec.2000), pp.1-39.

[191] For the Qing policy against "immoral" temple cults, see Jiang Zhushan, "Tang Bin jinhui wutongshen: Qingchu zhengzhi jingying daji tongsu wenhua de gean," *Xin Shixue*, 6.2 (1995), pp.67-110; Vincent Goossaert, "The Destruction of Immoral Temples in Qing China". Unpublished paper presented in the Chinese University of Hong Kong on 9 March 2007, pp.131-153.

[192] The governor of Jiangxi Shen Baozhen believed that the inflammatory placards originated from Hunan and were spread to Jiangxi through multiple copying. He submitted with his brief investigative report to the Grand Council two anti-Christian placards in circulation in his province. One was titled "The Anti-Foreign Religion

Jiangxi and Hunan, the incidents occurred one after another and were triggered in the same way by anonymous placards at the opportune time when literati gathered at the provincial capitals for examination gives historians the impression that they were premediated by local gentry.[193]

The most serious missionary case in the 1860s occurred in Guizhou. The young and reckless governor, Tian Xingshu 田興恕 (1836-1877) deliberately ignored the edict for the protection of Christianity and instructed his subordinates to plunder churches and arrest Christians. Four Chinese Christians in Chaojia-guan village were arrested on 12 June 1861 and summarily executed. On 18 February 1862, the magistrate of Kaizhou Dai Luzhi 戴鹿芝 (1819-1863) arrested and executed four Christians and a French missionary Jean-Pierre Nèel (1832-1862) when they refused to participate in the dragon-boat festival.[194] French response to the anti-Catholic disturbances in Jiangxi, Hunan and Guizhou was disparaging and vindictive. Kleczkowski accused the officials in these three provinces of harbouring anti-Christian and anti-French sentiments and secretly plotting to disrupt Sino-French friendship. Kleczkowski submitted a set of stringent demands which included punishment for governors for the outbreak of anti-Christian incidents; heavy reparation for Catholic properties and lives loss; and Bishops Anot and Navarro be escorted back to the provinces and received with respect by the governors.[195] The French minister specifically requested that Tian and Dai be put to death to serve as a warning for other officials.[196] The French brought constant diplomatic pressures on the Zongli Yamen

Placard of Hunan Province" and the other "Copy of the Ten Evils of the Lord of Heaven Teaching." The placards describe the Europeans as half men and half beasts and the absurd doctrines and immoral practices of Christianity. The placards argue that Christianity is used by the Europeans to corrupt the morals and weaken the loyalty of the local population to make it easier for later military takeover. The colonization of Africa and India and the current diplomatic crisis in Japan caused by the missionaries are raised as examples to illustrate the point. "Jiangxi xunfu Shen Baozhen wei shengcheng faguo jiaotang bei hui shi zhi junji chu ziwen," *QMJA* vol. 1, pp.220-224.

[193] For instance, Paul Cohen argues that the local gentry elites were likely to be the instigators behind the riots, See Cohen (1963), pp.100-107.

[194] "Fashi Geshiqi wei guizhou dali lümin shi zhi Yixin zhaohui," *QMJA* vol.1, p.234.

[195] "Fashi Geshiqi wei Yunan zhaotong fu you ou jiaoshi shi zhi Yixin zhaohui," ibid., p.258.

[196] "Fashi Geshiqi wei chuli xianggan jiaoan shi zhi Yixin zhaohui," ibid., p.251.

to conclude the incidents swiftly and even hinted the use of military force if the matters were not satisfactorily resolved.[197]

The response of the Zongli Yamen to the disturbances in Jiangxi, Hunan and Guizhou was to try resolve the problems at the local level and prevent them from escalating into a diplomatic incident. The Zongli Yamen instructed the governors of Jiangxi and Hunan, Shen Baozhen 沈葆禎 (1820-1879) and Mao Hongbin 毛鴻賓 (1811-1867) to bring about a settlement speedily and impartially to placate the French but not at the expense of alienating the populace. In Hunan, Shen initially rejected or modified all the demands made by the French as he memorialized to the throne that not doing so would harm the national integrity (*guoti* 國體) and encourage the French to be greedier in the future. To break the deadlock, the Zongli Yamen eventually bypassed Shen to reach an agreement with the French consul. An edict was sent to Shen in April 1863 instructing him to empathize with the military difficulties that the court was facing at the moment, to deal with the incident impartially and to clearly instruct the local gentry and people not to make trouble.[198] In Hunan, Mao Hongbin complied with the orders of the court and swiftly compensated the Catholics and cashiered the local magistrates for the anti-Christian riots. In Guizhou, Tian Xingshu was quickly removed from his position and brought to Sichuan under custody to prevent him for causing more troubles. Tian was found guilty of the charges brought against him, but the court refused to execute him and Dai Luzhi for the fear that the dynasty would lose its legitimacy for cowing to foreign demands. Tian was exiled to Xinjiang in 1865 instead with the agreement of the new French minister Jules Berthemy (1826-1903).

[197] Kleczkowski warned the Zongli Yamen in a diplomatic note on the Guizhou incident that the neighbouring country of Annam had to cede three provinces and an island recently to make peace for the killing of several Frenchmen and three Spaniards. In December 1862, Kleczkowski sent another communication to the Zongli Yamen threatening that a fleet of gunboats was departing for China and it would only aid the imperial court in the suppression of the Taiping rebels if the incidents in Jiangxi, Hunan and Guizhou were satisfactorily concluded. He also threatened to send the gunboats to Nanchang instead. "Gong qinwang Yixin deng zou wei qingzhi jiang qianfu lingdiao tasheng mian zi shiduan zhe," ibid., p.247.

[198] Ibid., p.363.

POLITICS OF HERESY AND THE THREAT OF CONVERSION

The imperial government did not cease to view Christianity as a threat after it officially legalized the foreign religion in 1858. Why were the imperial government and its officials so hostile to Christianity? J.J.M. De Groot is the first person in western scholarship to explore the rationale behind the anti-Christian stance of the Chinese authority. In his seminal *Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China*, written in the aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion and in defense of the Christian missions, De Groot passionately criticizes the Chinese imperial state for knowing nothing about religious liberty and being "the most intolerant, the most persecuting of all earthly governments."[199] De Groot employs the terms "sect" and "sectarian" to label the popular religious groups banned and violently suppressed by the imperial government as he believes that they were essentially non-conformist in nature similar to the religious dissenters in Europe. Like the protestant sects, De Groot argues that the Chinese sectarian groups had been persecuted by the state for centuries as "heresy" because they held religious beliefs that were contrary to the state orthodoxy of Confucianism.

De Groot's thesis is further elaborated by Paul Cohen in his pioneering study of anti-Christian tradition in late imperial China. Cohen argues that though the words "orthodoxy" and "heterodoxy" have certain connotations derived from Western history, "etymologically and semantically they are similar enough to the Chinese terminology to justify their continued use."[200] However, Cohen also concedes that the Chinese concept of heterodoxy is much broader in its application as compare to how the term is applied in the West, which is limited to the religious-theological sphere. The term "heterodox" or "heresy" is expressed variously in Chinese terminology as "xie" 邪, "yin" 淫, "yiduan" 異端, and "zuodao" 左道. The word "xie" has the meanings of evil, perverse, vicious, and the demonic. The term "yin" connotes excessive, unethical or lewd behaviors. "Yiduan" and "zuodao" indicate broadly anything that is improper or contrary to the orthodox way (*zhengdao* 正道).

[199] J.J.M. De Groot, *Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China* vol.1 (Amsterdam: Johannes Müller, 1903), p.3

[200] Cohen (1963), p.5.

In traditional East Asia, the discourse of heresy functioned primarily to construct boundary and create otherness. In premodern Japan, Jason Josephson and Kiri Paramore have shown that the discourse of heresy was intertwined with the demonic and was ideologically employed by religious communities to discredit their opponents and the state to suppress religious movements that threatened its authority.[201] In premodern China, the term heresy or heterodoxy was also ideological and relative in its usage. Daoism, for example, was regarded as heterodox by Confucians with respect to Confucianism, and at the same time, treated as orthodox when juxtaposed with the "barbaric" teachings of Buddhism and Christianity.

Through his survey of anti-Christian literature, Cohen points out that Chinese opposition to Christianity since the arrival of Catholicism in the seventeenth century was rarely on doctrinal grounds, but primarily political and cultural. The foreign missionaries were often accused to be foreign agents spying for western countries and bewitching the population against the government through monetary enticements, evil magical arts (*yaoshu* 妖術), and perverse teachings. Christianity was also condemned as being incompatible with Chinese way of life or corrupting Chinese moral values. In the last decades of the nineteenth century with the intensification of imperialist pressure, Cohen highlights, the anti-Christian motive of the Chinese became "plainly subordinate to, and dependent upon, the anti-foreign."[202]

Building on the observations of Cohen, I suggest that Chinese anti-Christian discourse functions primarily as part of the essentialization of Chinese "culture" by the elites from seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. Two waves of anti-Chinese discourse occurred in late Ming to early Qing and mid-nineteenth century. In late Ming and early Qing, the opposition to Christianity has to be understood in the context of the turning of the Chinese literati away from the syncretic religious-intellectual outlook of the "unity of the Three Teachings" (*sanjiao heyi* 三教合一) that characterized the earlier period of

[201] See Josephson (2012), pp.22-42; and Paramore (2009).

[202] Ibid., p.59.

Ming.[203] Chow Kai-wing describes this intellectual change as a turn from conscious syncretism to putative purism. Chow argues that the purism of late imperial scholars was "not a clearly defined set of Confucian doctrines; rather, it was an aspiration, or an attitude, that fueled the persistent effort to purge heterodox elements from the Confucian classics and rituals."[204]

Confucian purists initially sought to recover ancient rituals unsullied from heterodox influences through philology to foster Confucian virtues and counter the breakdown of the social-moral order in late Ming. Later under the political domination of the alien Manchu regime, Chinese scholars devoted themselves to ritual exegesis as ritual practice, especially ancestral worship, became a powerful symbol of Chinese cultural identity and superiority. As Chow points out though the Chinese literati "had lost control to the Manchus in the political arena, but they were still able to live as Chinese and to show contempt toward the culturally inferior 'barbarians.' Military defeat was compensated by a sense of cultural superiority." [205] The second wave of anti-Christian discourse began in the mid-nineteenth century after the first opium war with the heightening political threat of western powers and the opening of China to Christian proselytization. The anti-Christian feeling among the literati broke out into riotous movements against foreign missionaries and Chinese converts from 1860 onwards. The hatred of the literati of the missionary movement was due to revolutionary challenge posed by the missionaries to traditional culture with their unyielding position that the only road for the national rejuvenation of China lay in the adoption of Western civilization.[206]

Pamela Crossley has maintained that the Confucian orthodoxy was the property of the Chinese literati and bureaucrats rather than the Manchu imperial court. The Qing imperial state manipulated Confucian rhetoric to buttress its rule, however it was not the only ideological source of legitimacy that

[203] See Judith A. Berling, "When They Go their Separate Ways: The Collapse of the Unitary Vision of Chinese Religion in Early Ch'ing" in Irene Bloom and Joshua A. Fogel eds. *Meeting of Minds: Interaction in East Asian Traditions and Thoughts* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp.209-237.

[204] Chow (1994), p.8.

[205] Ibid., p.91.

[206] Cohen (1978), pp.534-544.

it employed.[207] Scholars from the "new Qing history" school have in recent years significantly modified the earlier understanding of the Qing dynasty as "Confucian China," a view proposed by Chinese nationalists and popularized by the Fairbank School.[208] They demonstrate that by the Qianlong era (1735-1796) with the final subjugation and incorporation of Inner Asia into the imperial domain, the Qing rulers had articulated a new narrative of the empire as a "grand unity" (*da yitong* 大一統) of the five distinct culture blocs of Han Chinese, Mongols, Manchus, Tibetans, and Hui Muslims. The emperor served as the unifying center for his diverse subjects and the universalism of the Qing dynasty was not Confucian or Sino-Centric universalism but one that claimed the capacity to contain multiple distinct "worlds" within a domain. The Qing rulers portrayed themselves as "simultaneous," through religion, speech, rituals, architecture, and so forth, transcending the linguistic, ethnic, and religious differences of their domain and being impartial (*yishi tongren* 一視同仁) to the diverse imperial subjects that they were ruling. The Qing imperial ideology involved clarifying and vigilantly maintaining the ethnic boundaries through administrative structures, laws, pass system, walled cities, cantonments within cities, etc in case mixing of ethnic groups causes troubles.[209] This is the primary rationale behind Qing policy of physically confining the Western people, trade, and religion to the treaty ports.

C.K. Yang and others have also pointed out that the imperial state seldom persecute "heresy" because of doctrinal or theological disagreements as in the case of the inquisition of the Catholic Church. For the imperial state, the difference between orthodoxy and heterodoxy was more pragmatic—orthodoxy enhances morality and affirms the socio-political order and heterodoxy the opposite. Similarly, Hubert Seiwert argues that in imperial China "(t)he issue of orthodoxy and heterodoxy was essentially a political one, since the standards of what was acceptable were defined primarily by political

[207] Pamela Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial History* (Berkeley: University of California, 1999), pp.224-246.

[208] For a discussion of new Qing history, see James A. Millward, Ruth W. Dunnell, Mark C. Elliott, and Philippe Foret, eds., *New Qing Imperial History*: *The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengde* (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp.3-4.

[209] For a good discussion of Qing ethnic policy in the context of Xinjiang, see James Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp.194-231.

and not by clerical authorities. Certainly, there were internal differences and rivalries between the recognized religions, but as long as the state did not take sides these were not the matters of orthodoxy and heterodoxy.…What mattered was the social impact of religious groups."[210]

The state definition of heresy is well articulated in the 1727 edict issued by Emperor Yongzheng (r. 1723-1735). On May 28, 1727, Yongzheng took the occasion of the Buddha's birthday and the arrival of the Portuguese envoy Alexandre Metello Souza e Menezes (1687-1766) to issue an imperial edict to clarify his opinion of heterodoxy for his ministers.[211] The emperor believed that this was an apt time to discuss the issue since Buddhists and Daoist priests and Westerners had been vehemently attacking each other's teaching as heresies. Yongzheng censured the act of deprecating the others just because they were different as this was not the way how the sages would define heterodoxy. He argued, "All teachings, regardless whether from China or outside, if not used for the good, but become harmful of morality and human mind-hearts can be considered heretical teaching."[212]

The emperor then proceeded to describe in his opinion what was orthodox and heterodox about the Christians, Buddhists, Confucians, spirit mediums and medicine men (*wu* 巫, *diyi* 祇醫). On Christianity, he elucidated that the orthodoxy of Christianity was that it taught people to revere Heaven as the creator of all things in the world, which was no different from the way China worship Heaven. However, Christianity erred into heterodox when it preached that the metaphysical Heaven was incarnated into a human savior of mankind and used this idea to beguile the impetuous and foolish to follow its teaching. Here Yongzheng perceived the Christian idea of Christ incarnation as similar to the Maitreyism of Chinese millenarian tradition, which had inspired many rebellions since the end of Yuan. He deemed Buddhism to be correct in making immaculacy and effortless action (*wuwei* 無為) as its

---

[210] Hubert Seiwert, *Popular Religious Movements and Heterodox Sects in Chinese History* (Leiden: Brill, 2003) p.163.

[211] "Shizong Huangdi Shangyu Neige,"ch.56, pp.17b-20b; the document was translated by the diplomat and sinologist Thomas Watters into English. See his "A Discourse of Heresy by A Chinese Emperor" in *The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal* (Feb. 1, 1872), pp.225-226.

[212]凡中國外國所設之教， 用之不以其正， 而為世道人心之害者， 皆異端也。 *Shizong Huangdi*, ch.56, p.17b.

principle and enlightening of the mind-heart and revealing of human nature as its work. However, the heresy of Buddhism was its abandonment of the proper human relationships (*lunchang* 倫常), inciting the masses with the preposterous talk of calamity and blessing, and harboring of criminals within the monasteries. The Confucians, who held on to the way of the former kings and studied the books of the sages, were the exemplars of the masses, yet for Yongzheng, their wrong came from treating scholarship as a means to enter officialdom and building one's reputation, and in using hearsay and evil doctrines to incite others or composing alluring words and lewd songs to sway the mind-hearts of men. As for the spirit mediums and medicine men, Yongzheng admitted that these professions were not rejected by the sages but they were close to being considered heterodox. On the one hand, these two types of people were indispensable to the worship of gods and healing in the villages, yet on the other, they became heretical when they started seducing the masses or harming the lives of people. In sum, the emperor lectured that the founders of the teachings in and outside China all had the same objective of "making people loyal to the rulers and filial to the parents, encouraging good and punishing evil, prohibiting licentiousness and killing, and enlightening one's nature and correcting character," however, their teachings become heterodox when the later followers pay lip service to them and corrupt their original principles with ludicrous doctrines.[213]

Yongzheng's objection to Christianity was certainly not doctrinal but targeting the conversion of his subjects by the missionaries. Metello's mission to China was prompted by the edicts issued by Yongzheng between 1724 and 1726 on the proscription of Christianity, the confiscation of Catholic churches in the provinces and the expulsion of all missionaries other than those employed by the court to Macau. Metello requested Yongzheng to return the confiscated properties and for the freedom of proselytism. In the 28 May edict, Yongzheng stressed the point that "China has the teaching of China and the West has the teaching of the West. Western teaching not necessary have to be practiced in China,

[213]天下中外設教之意，未有不以忠君孝親獎善懲惡戒淫戒殺明已性端人品為本務者，其初創設之人自然非尋常凡夫俗子，必有可取方能令人久久奉行也，至末學後人敷衍支離而生種種無理悖謬之說，遂成異端矣，與其教有何涉乎? Ibid., pp.19a-19b.

just as Chinese teaching could not possibly be followed in the West."[214] Yongzheng specially raised the example of Urcen, the son of Sunu, and others in the imperial household who had converted to Christianity for condemnation. He censured them as wayward fools for abandoning the ancestral laws of the Manchus and for defying the imperial court through their religious conversion and their willingness to brave the tortures meted to them with the ludicrous belief that they could become the incarnate (*houshen* 后身) of the Lord of Heaven. Yongzheng also criticized those, most probably the Confucian officials at court, who raised doubts on state patronage of Tibetan Buddhism as shallow and narrow minded as they were ignorant of the fact that the Mongols were devoted Buddhists and to control Mongolia it was imperative for the state not to abandon the lama teaching.[215]

Yongzheng was more candid in explaining his reasons for opposing Christian proselytization and conversion of his subjects during the two audiences he granted to the missionaries on 1 July and 8 November 1724, shortly after he proscribed Christianity in his empire. During the 1 July audience, the court Jesuits begged the emperor to reconsider his expulsion of the missionaries from the provinces, highlighting that his predecessors were tolerant of Christianity and that their religion was not heterodox. Yongzheng acknowledged that the western religion was not seditious like the White Lotus teaching in inciting revolts against the government. In the *Sacred Edicts of Kangxi* (*Shengyu guanxun* 聖諭廣訓) of 1724, a text composed for propagation in the whole empire to counter heterodox teachings, Yongzheng explicitly added Christianity in the list of proscribed religious groups and declared to the people that they should be aware that the doctrines of the westerners were "non-canonical" (*bujing* 不經) but the court employed them only because of their technical skills. Eugenio Menegon points out that Yongzheng employed the term "non-canonical" rather than the more serious charge of "heretical teaching" (*xiejiao* 邪教), a term used for seditious groups, shows that the emperor had a good grasp of the doctrines of the westerners. This is due to the fact that he, like his father, had personal relations and

[214]中國有中國之教西洋有西洋之教，彼西洋之教不必行於中國，亦如中國之教豈能行於西洋。Ibid., p.19b.

[215]蒙古之人尊信佛教惟言是從，故欲約束蒙古則喇嘛之教亦不輕棄，而不知者輒妄生疑議，乃淺近狹小之見也。Ibid., p.20a.

dialogues with the Jesuits employed in the court. The Qing state faced a conundrum in the treatment of Christianity. On the one hand, the state required the expertise of the Jesuits in cartography, mathematics, astronomy, cannon manufacturing, diplomacy and language for state building. On the other, it deemed Christian proselytism as undesirable, contentious, and potentially subversive.[216]

Nonetheless, Yongzheng was apprehensive about the political danger of Christian proselytization and conversion. Countering the Jesuits criticism of his harsh policy against Christianity, Yongzheng retorted, "What would you say if I were to send a troop of bonzes and lamas into your country in order to preach their doctrines? How would you receive them?"[217] He told his court Jesuits that he was already uneasy when the Kangxi emperor permitted the missionaries to erect churches and spread the religion all over the empire, but he dared not speak up out of filial respect for his father. Yongzheng doubted the wisdom of his father in tolerating the spread of the foreign teaching in the empire as he was alarmed about the conquest of the Philippines by the Spanish and the Christianization of local population and the activities of the Portuguese in Macau. In the mind of the emperor, Christian conversion posed a grave threat since political and religious identities were indistinguishable:

> You wish to make the Chinese Christians, and this is what your law demands. I know this very well. But in this case what would become of us? Should we not soon become merely subjects of your king [i.e. the Pope]? The converts you have made already recognize nobody but you, and in a time of trouble, they would listen to no other voice other than yours. I know at present we have nothing to fear, but when foreign ships start coming in their thousands and tens of thousands, then it may be some serious disorders will arise.[218]

In the 8 November audience with Franciscan missionaries of the Propaganda, Yongzheng censured the missionaries for disturbing the multicultural order of the empire through religious

[216] Menegon, "Yongzheng's Conundrum. The Emperor on Christianity, Religions, and Heterodoxy" in Barbara Hoster, Dirk Kuhlman, and Zbigniew Wesolowski eds. *Rooted in Hope: China-Religion-Christianity* vol.1 (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon New York: Routledge, 2017), pp.311-335.

[217] Ibid., p.322.

[218] Cited and translated by Menegon, ibid., pp.318-320.

conversion and their uncompromising attack on other teachings. To make his point, Yongzheng explicitly compared the Christian missionaries to the Muslims in China, whom he protected against the call of his Chinese officials for the proscription of Islam:

> Among the sects to be prohibited they proposed to me the religion of the Muhammadans, so that I would proscribe it. But I replied that the accusers do not consider in fact that the Muhammadans never provoke any disturbance, they propagandize their sect only among their own descendants, and do not oblige anybody to follow it, they accommodate themselves to the customs of the empire, do not offer any cause for accusations, and do not impede the cult and the doctrine of Confucius.[219]

He highlighted the point that the literati were agitating against the missionaries mainly because of their attack of ancestral worship and Confucian teaching. He stressed that as the ruler of the Chinese, even though he was a Manchu, he could not abandon the cult of ancestors as what the missionaries persuaded him to do and had to observe the customs of the Chinese. During the Rites Controversy, his father Emperor Kangxi, who was friendly and tolerant of Christianity, expelled the Franciscan missionaries who rejected the accommodative stance of Matteo Ricci toward Chinese rites in 1705 and banned Christian missions in 1721.

Finally, Yongzheng resisted Christian conversion of the empire as he possibly equated that with political subjugation by the westerners, as he frankly told the missionaries, "Actually, if we all were to embrace the European religion as you desire, it would happen to us what happens to the Muscovites, who are even forced to shave their beards." The change in attire and hairstyle was common during dynastic change in China and the Manchu themselves imposed the shaved head and queue on the Chinese as a mark of political subordination. The emperor concluded the audience by warning the missionaries on the absolute authority of the monarch against the clergy in China: "You do not absolutely wish to be regarded as Buddhist monks. However, the empire cannot be controlled by

[219] Ibid., p.324.

Buddhist monks and lamas, and thus your issue is no less difficult. It is appropriate to proceed slowly, gently and cautiously."[220]

Through the testimonies of Chinese converts, Yongzheng alarmingly discovered that the Catholics were under the jurisdiction of the pope or literally in Chinese the "civilizing ruler" (*jiaohua-wang* 教化王) — a seditious term since the emperor is the only agent given the mandate by Heaven to morally order and transform his subjects. Yongzheng perceived the Christian religion as a fifth column and issued orders to his high officials, especially those in the capital and the coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, to strictly enforce the ban and monitor Catholic activities in the area under their jurisdictions. While there were isolated suppressions in Shandong and Zhejiang in 1729 and 1730, the persecutions in the two coastal provinces were systematic and persisted over a long period of time (Fujian in 1724, 1729 and 1733-1734; Guangdong in 1725 and 1732). The persecutions in Fujian were particularly severe due to the zealousness of the governors Zhang Boxing 張伯行 (1651-1725) and Liu Shiming 劉世明.[221]

The policy of Kangxi and Yongzheng toward Christianity had been consistent in opposing the proselytization of the religion, partly out of the necessity of upholding the Confucian orthodoxy of the literati and partly out of concern of the subversive potential of the foreign missionaries. The Kangxi's toleration edict of 1692 claimed that the missionaries come to China because they long admired the civilizing influence of Confucianism. It justified the existence of western missionaries in the empire by claiming that the missionaries are meritorious and loyal servants of the throne and that those in the provinces do not create troubles or spread heretical doctrines. There was no mention in the edict of the freedom of the missionaries to proselytize other than permitting commoners to freely go into the

[220] Ibid., p.325.

[221] On the state persecution of Catholicism from 1720s-1850, see Eugenio Menegon, *Ancestors, Virgins and Friars: Christianity as a local Religion in Late Imperial China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2010) Chapter 3 and Lars Peter Laamann, *Christian Heretics in Late Imperial China: Christian Inculturation and State Control, 1720-1850* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006) Chapter 7. Although both Menegon and Laamann's account differs on the intensity of state persecution in different regions, both scholars agreed that as a whole Qing anti-Christian action had the impact of severing the connection of local Catholic communities with the foreign Catholic church and contributed to the indigenization of Catholicism in China.

churches to worship and burn incense as what they would normally do in Buddhist temples and Daoist monasteries.[222] In other words, for Kangxi the Christian missionaries were not unlike Buddhist and Daoist clerics, who were subordinated to state control and were merely spiritual service providers to the masses in the syncretic religious milieu of China.

After the proscription of Christianity in 1724, the Qing state retained a small number of Jesuits in the capital for employment and allowed them to practice their religion among themselves within the confine of the churches. The churches in the provinces were appropriated and converted into public buildings (*gongshuo* 公所) and proselytization banned. The missionaries in the provinces were slowly evicted from the interior to Canton, to board western vessels back to Europe or expelled to Macau and monitored closely by the local Chinese authorities. Foreign missionaries found proselytizing illegally in the interior were escorted to Canton for expulsion.

Christian proselytization was proscribed even more severely under the Qianlong emperor (r.1735-1796). In 1746, in view of the uncovering of sectarian groups in several provinces and Christian communities in Fuan, Qianlong ascended to the recommendation of the Fujian Governor Zhou Xuejian 周學儉 to impose the capital punishment of strangulation for foreign missionaries found proselytizing clandestinely in the provinces.[223] This was a common sentence meted for people who confused the masses with "wicked words" (*yaoyan* 妖言) and formed seditious sectarian groups, a punishment that had not been imposed on foreigners previously. The Chinese converts uncovered by the state were tortured and forced to apostatize by tramping on Christian icons, an act called *fumi-e* which was presumably learned from Tokugawa Bakufu persecution of Christians.[224] Those recalcitrant ones were

[222]西洋人仰慕聖化，由萬里航海而來。現今治理曆法，用兵之際力造軍器火砲；差往俄羅斯，誠心效力，克成其事，勞績甚多。各省居住西洋人，並無為惡亂行之處。又並非左道惑眾，異端生事。喇嘛僧道等寺廟尚容人燒香行走，西洋人並無違法之事，反行禁止，似屬不宜。相應將各處天主堂俱照舊存留，凡進香供奉之人，仍許照常行走，不必禁止。The 1692 Kangxi toleration edict was collected by the Catholic Huang Bolu (1830-1909) in his edited volume, *Zhengjiao Fengbao* (Shanghai: Cimu tang, 1894), pp.117-118.

[223] Menegon (2009), pp.133-135 on Zhou Xuejian and Chapter 4 on the suppression of Christian communities in Fuan in the period 1723-1840s.

[224] The Catholic priest and historian Fang Hao argues that the suppression of Catholicism in China from late Ming to Qing was deeply inspired by what the literati-official class and the state learned about the threat of Christianity and the violent ban of the foreign religion among the natives from Japanese sources. However, Fang based his

made to wear the cangue and exposed to set as an example for the others and banished to Xinjiang to become slaves for the Muslim *Begs*.

As a policy, Qianlong strictly separated the foreign missionaries from the Chinese population. This stance was clearly communicated by Qianlong to McCartney in 1792 in his reply to the envoy's request for Christianity to be freely preached in the empire:

> As regarding the doctrine of the Lord of Heaven that is upheld in your country, it originally is the doctrine that is professed in all Western countries. Our Celestial Dynasty follows the doctrine and laws that since the beginning of time have been handed down and created by saintly rulers and wise kings; these are the constant principles followed by all our innumerable subjects who do not dare to be deluded by strange theories. As to the Westerners who are employed by us in the capital: they stay in their churches and are not allowed any intercourse with the Chinese people, lest they unlawfully propagate their doctrine. Strict indeed should be the distinction between Chinese and barbarians.[225]

With foreign missionaries expelled or went into hiding, Christianity underwent a period of indigenization and transformed into a local religion from the mid eighteenth century till 1840s. During this period, Christianity shifted from a national threat to an internal menace and suffered sporadic persecutions under the label of "heretical sects" (*xiejiao* 邪教) by local magistrates and provincial officials.[226]

---

thesis solely on the adoption of the Japanese practice of *fumi-e* by the Qing state in its prosecution of Chinese converts. See his "Qingdai jinyi tianzhu jiao suoshou riben zhi yingxiang" in Fang Hao ed. *Fang Hao Liushi Zhiding Kao* vol.1 (Taibei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1969), pp.147-171.

[225]至於爾國所奉之天主教，原係西洋各國向奉之教，天朝自開闢以來，聖帝明王垂教創法，四方億兆率由有素，不敢惑於異說，郎在京當差之西洋人等，居住在堂，亦不準與中國民人交接、妄行傳教，華夷之辨甚嚴。"Yingjili guo chishu" in Wang Zhichun ed. *Qingchao rouyuan ji* (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1989), ch.6.

[226] Laamann (2006), chapter 9. From late eighteenth century onwards, Christianity was indistinguishable from the seditious "White Lotus" sectarians in official perspective.

From the standpoint of the Qing government, Christianity was a foreign teaching incompatible with China culturally and the missionaries had sinister intention in converting the Chinese to their religion. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Chinese became more cognizant of Russian imperial ambition in the northern borders, Dutch expansion in the East Indies, and English subjugation of the Indian subcontinent. At the same time, missionary enterprise in China was starting to recover from the its nadir caused by anti-Christian persecutions, the decline of Spanish and Portuguese power in Asia, the dissolution of the Society of Jesuits in 1773, the decline in influence of the Catholic Church as a result of the Enlightenment, the Napoleonic Wars and the rise of nation-states in Europe. The turn of the nineteenth century witnessed a revival in religious energies not only in Catholic countries but also in Protestant nations such as Britain, the Netherlands and the U.S. The increasing presence of the western maritime nations and missions in China alarmed the Qing state and local officials of the potential of foreign missionaries and Chinese converts acting as the fifth column. [227]

The suspicion of Christian missions as the spiritual arm of Western imperialism was further confirmed in the eyes of the official-literati elites by the two Opium Wars, which legalized Christianity and open the whole empire for Christian proselytization. Wang Bingxie 王炳燮 (1822-1879), a fierce critic of Christianity and missionaries, argued that *Tianzhu jiao* was a dangerous heresy and fundamentally incompatible with the Chinese civilization (*jiao*) of the "three bonds and five constants." Furthermore, it could not be tolerated in the empire since unlike the teachings of the Muslims and the Yellow and Red sects of the Tibetans, the missionaries sought to convert the people to their teaching. [228]

[227] In 1805, the interception of a map of missionary influence in China of court missionary Adeodato di San Agostino intended for Rome triggered a suspicion within the administration of Europeans gathering intelligence for their governments and even the fear of a possible European invasion. The Board of punishment was instructed by Emperor Jiaqing to investigate the matter. As a result, the Qing authority uncovered the correspondences between missionaries in and outside the capital, the presence of Christian proselytization and communities in the provinces and Christian converts among the Bannermen. An intense period of persecution ensued and engulfed the capital and the provinces. In 1811 Jiaqing issued an edict with seven articles intending to place tighter control and scrutiny on the missionaries in the capital. Ibid., pp.68-70 and pp.72-73.

[228] See Wang Bingxie, "Zhengjiao" in *Wu ziqi shi wenji* republished in Shen Yunlong ed., *Jindai zhongguo shiliao congkan* (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1966), p.103.

Wang wrote a letter in 1863 to Woren 倭仁 (1804-1871), the Mongol grand-secretary and leader of the anti-foreign conservative faction in Court, to warn about the political dangers of Christian missionization. Wang highlighted the fact that "since the signing of the treaties and the legalization of Christianity, various places have started transmitting and practicing (Christianity) one after the other. The number of converts has increased steadily overtime to the point of being uncountable."[229] He argued that "the Western nations dared not take any territories despite their initial military successes at Tianjin in 1858 and 1860 because of their fear of the multitudes of Chinese people. This was why they insisted on signing the treaties so as to use commerce to exhaust China's material wealth and proselytization to secretly win over the mind-hearts of the Chinese people."[230] He cautioned that the ignorant masses could be easily won over and once they joined the teaching, they would only be obedient to their religious leaders and not the imperial laws. Moreover, the foreign religion was especially attractive to the criminals because the officials, in order not to run into trouble with the missionaries, always sided with the Christians whenever there was a lawsuit. Thus, honest people had no choice but to follow the foreign religion as they saw it as the only way to get justice done.

Wang believed that the threat of conversion was not limited to the common people. He asserted that within the literati class, only a very small number of scholars who possessed sagacious qualities could remain unwavering, while the rest were easily inveigled by the fad of Christianity. "(If Christianity is allowed) to spread unrestrained in the countryside, then those in the countryside will be converted; if authority is usurped from the state (by the Christian church), then those officials at court will become deluded."[231] He highlighted that in late Ming, although the political influence of Christianity was slight, there were already high officials at court converted to the teaching not to mention now if authority was given to the missionaries.[232]

---

[229] Wang Bingxie, "Shang xiekui woliangfeng zhongtang shu" in Wang Minglun ed. Fan yangjiao shuwen jietie xuan (qilu shushe, 1984), p.23.

[230] Ibid., p.27.

[231] Ibid., p.28.

[232] Ibid., pp.28-29.

A similar argument was forwarded by Woren in his 1867 memorial opposing the idea of sending presented scholars (*jinshi* 進士*)* and even Hanlin academicians to study in the College of Foreign Languages (*tongwen-guan* 同文館) with foreign missionaries forming majority of the teaching staff. Woren vehemently disputed the idea on the ground that foreign missionaries might use their position as teachers to convert the students and undermine their loyalty to the state and the sacred teaching. On the danger of Christian conversion, Woren argued:

> Since the conclusion of the peace, the Teaching of Jesus has been widespread and half of our ignorant people have already been incited and hoodwinked by it. We can only rely on the scholars to clearly expound the Confucian tenets (to the people), which can still maintain the hearts and minds of the people. Now if these brilliant and talented scholars, who have been trained by the nation and reserved for future deployment, would to change and follow the barbarians then the orthodox spirit will be stymied, and as a result strengthening the expansion of the evil spirit. After a few years there will be no stopping until the masses of Chinese people are all driven into allegiance with the barbarians.[233]

There was also the fear that the China would lose jurisdiction over its own people after they converted to Christianity. There were even rumors circulating among the people that local officials do not have authority over those who joined the "foreign sect."[234] The rumors arose because the Christians converts were exempted from payment of customary fees and labelled as "Christian subjects", a separate class from the rest of the commoners, by the Qing government. Moreover, local Christians involved in lawsuits were often supported by foreign missionaries, who had extraterritorial status and the diplomatic and military powers of the Westen nations behind them. To prevent local Christians

[233]議和以來，耶穌之教盛行，無識愚民，半為煽惑，所恃讀書之人。講明義理，或可維持人心。今復舉聰明雋秀，國家所培養而儲以有用者，變而從夷，正氣為之不伸，邪氣因而彌熾；數年以後，不盡驅中國之眾咸歸於夷不止。*YWSM TZ*, ch.47, pp. 24b-25a. For the debate between Prince Gong and Woren on the engagement of foreign missionaries as teachers in the Tongwen guan, see Knight Biggerstaff, *The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961), pp.113-120.

[234] For instance, in 1866 the Guanji county magistrate found a rumour circulating by "sectarian bandits" that joining Christianity would exempt them from state control. See "Guanji xian jina jiaomin yudan" in *JWJAD* vol.1, p.1017.

from enjoying the special legal status of the foreigners, the governor of Shanxi Qiao Songnian 喬松年 (1815-1875) submitted a memorial on 7 March 1866, beseeching the throne to prohibit Chinese people from proselytizing. Qiao argued that the majority of those who joined Catholicism were not law-abiding subjects. The situation was not yet severe since converts were commoners and under the control of local authorities. However, by permitting these bad local elements to become missionaries, they would take advantage of their special legal status to resist and undermine the authority of local magistrates. As a result, more instances of conflict between the Catholics and local government would happen and bring about immeasurable harm to the political order (*zhengti* 政體).[235]

Christian proselytism also threatened the ethnic boundaries and harmony of the empire, the cornerstone of Qing imperial rule. On 1 September 1861, the Manchu *amban* Manqing 滿慶 sent a memorial requesting that foreign officials and civilians be stopped from entering Tibet for travel and proselytizing. He explained that the Tibetan secular and monastic elites had been in a state of shock and suspicion ever since they learned that the Zongli Yamen had issued passports to a British expedition formed by Major Sorel, Captain Blackiston and Dr. Barton to travel from Sichuan through Tibet to India, as well as to two French missionaries, Charles Rene Alexis Ranou (1812-1863) and Jean-Charles Fage (1824-1883) for the purpose of missionization. Through the Manchu *amban* the Tibetan secular and monastic elites beseeched the emperor to "kindly consider that Tibet only revere Buddhism and has always been so, and its land surface is small unlike the interior. Therefore, to command Britain, France, the United States, and the Teaching of the Lord of Heaven not to bother to come into Tibet for travel and proselytism."[236]

The intense reaction of the Tibetan ruling class to Christian proselytism is unsurprising. Gary Tuttle has reminded us that "when considering relations between China and Tibet, one central fact about Tibet must never be forgotten: Buddhist institutions were and still are the cultural bedrock of the Tibetan

[235] "Anhui xunfu Qiao Songnian qingjin zhongguo minren wei waiguo chuanjiao zhe" in Wang ed. (1984), pp.320-321.

[236] "Zhuzang dachen Manqing deng zouqing quanzu waiguo guanmin ruzang youli chuanjiao zhe" in *QMJA* vol.1, pp.202-203.

cultural world…Whenever Tibetan Buddhist institutions have been threatened, the Tibetan elites have responded defensively; whenever they have been supported, the Tibetan elites have cooperated."[237] Tibetan Buddhism or what the Chinese call *lama jiao* was instrumental as the social-cultural scaffolding that linked the commoners and elites vertically in Tibetan society. To secure the acquiesce of Tibetan elites to Qing overlordship, Qing rulers traditionally acted as patrons of Tibetan Buddhism and they were careful in observing the cultural-religious integrity of Tibet and not forcing Chinese institutions and rule on the locals. The Qing state conducted its relationships with Tibet through the Imperial Household Agency (*neiwufu* 內務府) and the Colonial Office (*lifan yuan* 理藩院). Actual ruling of Tibet was conducted by the Dalai Lama under the council of his dGelukpa prelates, while the Manchu-Mongol *ambans* sent by the Court since the eighteenth century acted as the resident minister to oversee affairs.

The British expedition was cancelled as a result of Tibetan rejection of the passports issued by the Zongli Yamen. In protest to Tibetan obstruction of French missionary work, Kleczkowski wrote to the Zongli Yamen and emphasized that the Tibetans do not have to fear the French as unlike the British they have no imperial design on Tibet. In response, the Zongli Yamen argued that Tibet was a vassal state (*fanguo* 藩國）not under the direct jurisdiction of the Qing state and hence, it could not alter its closed-door policy. Furthermore, the Zongli Yamen pointed out that the Sino-French treaties only permit French travelling and missionary work in the Chinese hinterland (*neidi* 內地) and not elsewhere. The Qing government rejected the French demand not only because of Tibetan protest but also the actual security threat posed by the expeditions. In their investigative report on the British and French expeditions, the *ambans* warned that France and Britain were planning to use Tibet as a staging point for their invasion of China proper. They proposed that the court resolutely reject foreign demand for free traveling and proselytizing in Tibet to safeguard the borders and the territorial integrity of the empire.[238] As a result, the Qing state declared Tibet as a restricted zone (*jindi* 禁地) to foreigners.

[237] Gary Tuttle, *Tibetan Buddhists in the Making of Modern China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p.15.

[238] "Zhuzang dachen Manqing bangban dachen Enqing zou" in Wang ed. (1984), p.287.

Nevertheless, missionaries continued to cross the borders despite measures taken to prevent missionary activities. On 7 September 1864, Manqing sent a memorial to the throne specially requesting the prohibition of missionary activities in Tibet. The memorial was sent under the request of the Dalai Lama who complained about entry of western missionaries into Tibet under the guise of trade. [239]

COUNTERACTING THE CHRISTIAN THREAT

In preparation for the treaty revision that was scheduled to take place in 1868, the Zongli Yamen prepared a secret circular, which was sent out to 18 leading officials for deliberation through the Grand Council under the cover of an imperial edict on 12 October 1867. The yamen listed 6 chief issues that would most likely be raised by the western powers in the forthcoming negotiations.[240] The most menacing and intractable issue, as the Zongli Yamen saw it, was the expansion of missionary activities. This was so since missionary cases had been the main source of diplomatic friction between the Qing Empire and the western nations since the conclusion of peace in 1860. After 1863 there were increasing occurrences of missionary cases in Guizhou and Sichuan. Chinese apprehension of missionary activities also had heightened at that time because of the pressures asserted by foreign representatives on China for her handling of Christian affairs and the diplomatic crisis in Korea created by the expulsion of Christianity in 1866.

On 6 November 1865, Robert Hart (1835-1911), a British diplomat and inspector-General of the China's Maritime Custom Service, submitted a memorandum titled "Suggestions from a Bystander" (*pangguan lun* 旁觀論) to the Zongli Yamen offering his views and recommendations on the internal and external problems that China faced. On 5 March 1866, the yamen received another memorandum

---

[239] "Zhuzang dachen Manqing deng zouqing" in *QMJA* vol.1, pp.411-412.

[240] They are (1) the granting of imperial audience to foreign envoys and the ceremonial protocols (2) setting up of legations in countries with treaty relations (3) building of telegraphs and railways (4) establishing foreign warehouses outside the treaty ports and permitting steamships to navigate in inland waterways (5) allowing foreigners to engage in salt trade and coal mining (6) expansion of missionary activities. For the secret circular, see *YWSM TZ*, ch. 50, pp.30b-35.

from Thomas Francis Wade titled "New Proposals" (*xinlun* 新論) with supporting statements written by Rutherford Alcock (1809-1897) that had similar recommendations as the proposal sent by Hart.[241] In his memorandum, Hart emphasized that the external difficulties that China was facing at present was largely due to its domestic shortcomings. He argued that the Qing government suffered the military disasters of 1858 and 1860 because of its haughty attitude of treating Westerners like dogs and regarding the treaties with foreign nations as mere expediency. He reminded the Chinese government that the Western countries signed treaties to safeguard the 3 specific areas of Sino-foreign intercourse: borders, missionization and commerce.

On the matter of missionization, he explained that unlike Protestantism, which was undertaken and funded by private individuals, missionary activities in Catholicism was directed by the Pope, who was equal in status to the monarchs in Europe, and protected by Catholic countries that revered the religion as their national teaching (*guojiao* 國教). Hart warned that if China failed to honor the treaties, the Western treaty powers would certainly raise their armies to enforce the terms of the treaties: "If something happens at the borders, it would not be difficult for the Russians to occupy territories; if a religious incident is to occur, how hard would it be for the Catholics to be aided by (French) troops from the outside; if commerce is obstructed and the British send troops, all the other nations would certainly follow. Once a military conflict occurs, foreign nations have everything to gain and nothing to lose. This is what China must pay attention and avoid happening. "[242] Hart particularly raised the examples of Chinese obstruction to western entry of Chaozhou city and the delays in the conclusion of the Guizhou Christian incident, and the punishment of Tian Xingshu as potential flashpoints in Sino-foreign relations.[243]

On 24 June 1866, the yamen received a strongly worded diplomatic note from the French minister, Count Henri de Bellonet (d.1881) criticizing the non-cooperative attitude of Chinese

[241] For the memorandums of Hart and Wade, see *YMSM TZ*, ch. 40, pp.13b-22b and pp.24-36.

[242] *YWSM TZ*, ch. 40, p.17a.

[243] Ibid., pp.20b-22a.

provincial officials in the handling of Christian incidents. In his memorial to the throne about Bellonet's communication, Prince Gong reported that "In comparison to the earlier 'A Brief Outline of New Proposals' submitted by Englishman Wade and 'Suggestions from a Bystander' by Commissioner Hart, though are deceitfully sinister in their intention [to insidiously influence Chinese policy] and vague in their wording, they dare not act without discretion like this type of mad barking."[244] Indeed, in the letter the blunt Bellonet fervently attacked the governors and governors-general for stalling or turning a blind eye to the missionary cases that happened in the provinces under their jurisdiction. He demanded the removal of high-ranking officials such as Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 (1823-1901) and Luo Bingzhang 駱秉章 (1793-1867) for their ineptitude, haughtiness, and biasness against Christians, and the court to punish xenophobic gentry-officials for disrupting Sino-Western relations. Bellonet threatened that if the Qing dynasty did not quickly rectify its mistakes it would have to go to war with the foreign nations again within a few years. When that happen China would either be carved up by the foreign powers or suffer a dynastic change.[245]

The execution of eight French missionaries and many Catholics converts in Korea by the regent in 1865 and French aggressive response to it demonstrated to China the volatility of the Christian question. Bellonet found out about the persecution against Catholics in Korea in late June 1866 when three surviving French missionaries escaped to Tianjin via a fishing boat. Without consulting the foreign ministry in Paris, Bellonet sent a diplomatic note to the Zongli Yamen threatening war and occupation of Korea.[246] The consul sent a set of harsh demands to the Korean government and when they were rejected, he instructed Rear Admiral Pierre-Gustave Roze (1812-1883) to lead a punitive expedition against Korea on 11 October. The small French expeditionary force retreated shortly due to inadequate planning and stiff resistance. The Korean case was instructive for the Chinese on the political implication of the Christian issue. In his reply to the Zongli Yamen on the question of

[244] *YWSM TZ*, ch.43, p.28a.

[245] For Bellonet's diplomatic note, see ibid., pp.29b-32b.

[246] *YWSM TZ*, ch.42, p.54a-b.

expanding missionary activities, Zuo Zongtang 左宗棠 (1812-1885) commented that, according to his French consultant Prosper Francois Marie Giquel (1835-1881), the French merely used the killing of French missionaries as a pretext to invade Korea in 1866 for the gold and silver mines in the peninsular.[247]

The yamen circular began by acknowledging the fact that missionization was guaranteed by the treaties and impossible to prohibit. The document listed two problems posed by missionary activities to the state. The first was the challenge of Christianity, specifically Catholicism, to state authority. It pointed out that the Sino-French Treaty and the executive order of 1861 stipulated that Christians ought to be law-abiding and missionaries should not interfere in the business of local government. Missionary activities would be harmless if these regulations are followed. In reality, however, converts often used their religious status as legal protection and the foreign missionaries shielded Chinese Christians in legal altercations. Missionaries and converts were non-compliant to local officials causing immense problems for local governance. The yamen revealed that it had sent the consuls diplomatic notes requesting them to restrain their missionaries but found out that they had no direct authority over them. Moreover, the consuls often sided with the missionaries in disputes regarding Christians and engaged in endless squabbling with the yamen. As a stopgap measure, the yamen recommended the appointment of cleric officials to supervise Christian affairs similar to the Daoist and Buddhist Registries (*Daolu si* 道錄司, *Senglu si* 僧錄司), which the Qing state employed to administer monastic Daoism and Buddhism. This was to distinguish the missionaries from the general population in status and stop them from interfering in temporal affairs. On the other hand, they admitted that the idea was not without its flaw as it might give the impression that the state was endorsing the foreign religion and thus encouraging people to convert to Christianity.[248]

The second problem was the effect of Christian conversion on the loyalty of the people. The yamen wrote that "Those (officials) who are worried for the mind-hearts of the people and custom while

[247] *YWSM TZ*, ch.51, p.25.

[248] *YWSM TZ*, ch.50, pp.34b-35a.

harboring the thought of amending defects and remedying harm, could only frequently communicate with the gentry and common people, looking after the well-being of the people on the surface while secretly transforming them through guidance, either by awakening them to their errors or by exposing their evil." "This is the technique," the yamen added, "of proscribing (Christianity) without official proscription."[249] Here the yamen underscored the interconnectedness between religious allegiance and political loyalty and suggested how local officials could covertly counteract the threat of Christian conversion in their respective districts.

The two suggestions forwarded by the yamen were in fact adopted from the proposal of Zhili prefect Yang Tingxi 楊廷熙, which was submitted to the throne on July 8, 1867.[250] Yang's proposal was by no means novel since the Daoist and Buddhist Registries had been used by the imperial state as a mechanism to control the clerics since the Tang dynasty and the covert indoctrination of the commoners against Christianity was the policy devised during the Xianfeng era after the legalization of Catholicism. On 15 March 1851, the circuit intendant of Shanghai Lin Gui 麟桂 submitted a memorial warning that Catholicism was spreading among the hoodlums and drifters in the interior from the five treaty ports because of the missionary activities of the Catholic priests led by Bishop Xavier Maresca (1806-1855). Lin reported that Father Maresca tried to ingratiate himself with the converts and entice people to join the teaching by interfering in lawsuits. In addition, he memorialized that the foreigners were employing people in the interior and converts as their spies and precautionary measures should be taken.[251] On 11 June, the governor of Zhejiang Chang Dachun 常大淳 (1792-1853) also reported that the French had started to construct churches in Ningbo, and publicly declared that it was legal to practice Catholicism and started publishing heterodox books. The local officials found it difficult to publicly prohibit Catholicism, so they tried to remedy the situation by soliciting donations from the gentry and set up charity schools (*yixue* 義學) around the four city gates to promulgate the classics and the *Sacred*

[249] Ibid., p.35a.

[250] *YWSM TZ*, ch.49, pp.32b-33b.

[251] "Jiangsu susong taidao Lin Gui zouwei ying yanfang waiguo ren liyong jiaomin deng tanting neidi gongshi pian," *QMJA* vol.1, pp.113-114.

Edicts of Kangxi.[252] The superintendent of education (*xuezheng* 學政) of Zhejiang memorialized on 15 July to combat the influence of heterodoxy by promulgating the orthodox learning. He proposed instructing all education officials and stipend students (*shengyuan* 生員) to gather resources and set up charity schools in all rural and urban areas of the province with the hope that "with one more literatus, there is one less convert."[253] On 18 August, the Xianfeng emperor accepted the proposal of the governor-general of Liangjiang Lu Jianying 陸建瀛 (1792-1853) to "revere the orthodox teaching so as to expel heterodoxy" and instructed his personal copy of the *Sacred Edicts* to be printed and circulated by all officials in the provinces.[254]

Other than counteracting the threat of conversion posed by Christianity, the Qing state and its officials in the early 1850s also tried to secretly guard against the possibility of sedition by Christians. In 1853, the governor-general of Zhili Nergginge (1774-1857) proposed using the time-honored *baojia* system as a precautionary measure to register and monitor the Christians in rural society.[255] On the reason for the use of *baojia*, Nergginge explained:

> Catholics who do not create disturbances are exempted from punishment, nevertheless local officials cannot not know whether there are converts or not and about the converts in every prefecture and county. However, taking the census openly would give away the plan, while doing it secretly would easily result in omissions. The making and checking of *baojia* is the responsibility of all magistrates, and by utilizing the system for census taking, it is possible

[252] "Zhejiang xunfu Chang Dachun zoubao faren zai Ningbo shetang chuanjiao yishe fangzhi pian," ibid., p.125.

[253] "Zhejiang xuezheng Wu Zhongjun zou chakan yangren qingxing bing qing changming zhengxue guangli yixue pian," ibid., p.126.

[254] "Zhe neige wuying dian jiang xuanzong qinding shengyu guangxun tuoyin banxing tianxia shi shangyu," ibid., p.131.

[255] Hsiao Kungchuan describes the purpose of the *baojia* system as follow: "Its first function was the registration of the households and inhabitants in the neighbourhoods and villages. Superficially, it resembled a census system, for it recorded the names of all inhabitants of a given place- all persons who dwelt in households, temples, and hostels-kept track of all the movements of individuals and households, made periodic recounts of the local population, and brought their register to date. But it was more than a census system, for it imposed upon the person the persons registered and those who made the registration the duties of a sheriff or constable…The second and perhaps central function of the pao-chia was the detection and reporting of crimes-all acts that violated imperial law or disturbed local peace." Hsiao, *Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), p.45.

> to get an accurate number [of the Christians] as well as easy to know in the future whether there is any increase in their number or are there other sectarians disguising as Christians. [256]

The proposal of Nergginge was widely adopted by the state as a device for limiting the spread of Christianity and the surveillance of foreign missionaries and Chinese Christians. On 13 September, 1860, while the Allied forces were marching towards Beijing, the governor of Shaanxi Tan Tingxiang 譚廷襄 (?-1870) reported the arrest of an Italian missionary Gong Shanlin 龔山林, who had been proselytizing in the province illegally for a few years and made a couple of converts.[257] Tan ordered the missionary to be sent back to Guangdong and secretly instructed the local officials to make a list of Catholic families when they were checking the baojia. This was done, Tan wrote, to "make preparation for guidance later and for the gradual enlightening of the foolish and confused."[258]

The replies of the high officials were unanimous in their objection of the further expansion of missionary activities. Yet they all agreed with the Zongli Yamen that trying to limit missionary activities was impossible since it was guaranteed by the treaties and the foreign countries would not budge on the issue during the incoming treaty revision. The governor-general of Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Anhui, Zeng Guofan 曾國藩 (1811-1872) reasoned, "There are already many churches established in all counties and provinces at the moment and there is really no room for any more expansion (of missionary activities)." He suggested if the foreign countries still haggled non-stop over the issue during the negotiation, the Zongli Yamen could allow them to send request for the protection of Christian churches and missionaries as and when they want but not to add any more clauses to the existing treaties. [259]

---

[256] 天主教之不滋事者，雖經免治罪，而每州縣有無習教及習教者若干人，地方官不可不知。但顯查者事涉形跡，暗查則易有疏漏。惟編查保甲，乃地方官應辦之事，藉此按冊稽考，則既可得真實數，以後有無增添有無別教混跡， 不難分別妥辦。"Zhili zongdu Neerjinge zoubao zunzhi chaban Ansu deng shen chuanxi tianzhu jiao deng qingxing zhe," *QMJA* vol. 1, p.143.

[257] "Shu Shaanxi xunfu Tan Tingxiang zoubao panhuo yi jiaoshi Gong Shanlin qingxing bing ni jingyu jieyue zhe," ibid., pp.177-178.

[258] "Shu Shaanxi xunfu Tan Tingxiang qing minchi defang guan liuxin fangcha jiaomin hu pian," ibid., p.179.

[259] *YWSM TZ*, ch.54, p.4b.

The solution to the problem of Christian conversion lay not in limiting missionary activities but fighting for the hearts and mind of the people, as the provincial scholar Wang Baochen 王葆晨, whose opinion was submitted by Shen Baochen in his memorial, emphatically declared: "As for proselytization, it is dependent on whether our people believe (in the teaching) or not, not on whether they expand (the missionary activities) or not. Once we uphold the righteous spirit…their teaching can naturally be resisted without any deficiency. This is the job of good local officials."[260] All respondents were certain that Confucianism would defeat Christianity in the ideological battle since the foreign teaching was flawed and ludicrous like Daoism and Buddhism. Zeng Guofan argued that unlike the rise and fall of heterodox teachings like the annihilation of Buddhism by Islam in India and the splintering of Christianity into Catholicism and Protestantism, the sacred teaching of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius stood the test of time and aided China in refining its government and perfecting the customs of the people. If the *lijiao* was expounded there was no way that Christianity could grow in China. Zeng argued that Christianity lure people chiefly through money and profits and this was why it drew its converts exclusively from the poor.[261]

Zeng's view was widely shared by the other officials. The governor-general of Guangxi and Jiangsu Guo Boyin 郭柏蔭 (1807-1884), for instance, asserted that Christianity was no different from Buddhism and the population had not been misled en masse by the foreign teaching even though it had been in China for more than 2000 years. Not to mention that Christianity was even more absurd than Buddhism as it taught people to oppose their parents and be unkind to the spirits, which went against natural human feelings. The wrongs of Christianity were obvious to all who had even a slight understanding of human feelings and reason. This was why missionaries resorted to material enticements to attract people into the teaching. For Guo, this strategy would eventually fail since it was

[260] Ibid., ch.53, p.21b.

[261] Ibid., ch.54, p.4b.

not sustainable in the long run as the conversion was insincere and people would stop believing in the teaching once the carrots ran out.[262]

Many of the high officials believed that the destruction of churches and obstruction of missionary activities by the masses in many provinces pointed to the fact that the loyalty of the people and the literati to the dynasty was still strong and that the masses had not been befuddled by Christianity. The governor of Jiangxi Li Hanzhang 李瀚章 (1821-1899) opined that the literati was the main indicator of popular sentiments and their loyalty to the dynasty had remained unwavering despite the turmoil of the last three decades.[263] The high officials also fully concurred with the Zongli Yamen's suggestion of clandestinely fighting Christian conversion through the edifying effort of the local officials and the baojia system. The ideological battle against Christianity was part of the larger war the Qing state waged against heresy in the aftermath of the Taiping rebellion. In the reconstruction period, the Qing state forbade the repair of all temples destroyed by the Taipings, except for the Confucius temples (*wenmiao* 文廟) and those included in the register of sacrifice (*sidian* 祀典), and the banning of communal festivals in urban centers.[264]

Since many of the Christian converts were poor, Li Hongzhang, the governor-general of Hubei and Hunan, argued that the primary solution to the Christian problem lay in both educating and nurturing (*jiaoyang* 教養) the masses. He suggested that the governors and governors-general carefully select magistrates to "put in place the baojia to distinguish the good from the bad; revering rituals and explicating the Confucian teachings to aid in civilizing (*quanhua* 勸化) the people; and set up charity halls to succor the poor and needy."[265] Li also recommended that the state not to permit churches to be built in places where there was no previous Catholic presence to control the expansion of Christianity

[262] Ibid., ch.55, p.41a.

[263] Ibid., ch.52, p.36a.

[264] See Vincent Goossaert, "Starved of Resources: Clerical Hunger and Enclosures in Nineteenth-Century China," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 62.1 (Jun. 2002), pp.77-133; and Goossaert (2013), pp.57-80.

[265] *YWSM TZ*, ch.55, p.16.

in the interior.[266] A few years earlier in 1865, Li, who was then the governor-general of Jiangsu, vigorously resisted the attempt by missionaries to purchase land in Zhejiang by indicating that Article Six of the 1860 Sino-French Treaty did not mention the word *neidi* (hinterland). Li and the Zongli Yamen gave in eventually to the hot-tempered Ballonet on the matter, but they insisted on registering the church properties as "local public properties of the Catholic church" rather than under the names of the foreign missionaries in order not to surrender any territories to foreign control. [267]

As for the question of appointing officials to control the foreign missionaries and converts, most officials agreed with the Zongli Yamen that it might have the adverse effect of encouraging the growth of Christianity. Shen Baochen distinguished between Protestantism and Catholicism and asserted that the former, which preached the purification of worldly desires, could be treated like Daoism and Buddhism, the latter, however, was in fact a great menace with concealed malicious intentions. He argued that the Catholic church committed all kinds of evil, harboring criminals and fugitives, and challenging the authority of the magistrates. He surmised that the foreign nations would not allow Christian affairs to be oversaw by a Chinese official. However, if a foreign missionary was appointed as the supervisor, he would abuse his authority to protect the converts and entice more undesirable elements to join the teaching and cause immerse problem for state control.[268]

The tartar superintendent of trade of the three ports Chonghou 崇厚 (1826-1893) was the only high official approving of the scheme. In his memorial, Chong maintained that the Christian teaching was relatively harmless as it could only incite and draw together the rural ignoramuses, and could never infect the literati class, the backbone of the empire. Furthermore, the foreign missionaries, though, were largely made up of the vulgar and shallowly preposterous type, there were some among them who were peaceful and reasonable, and could be depended on to restrain and guide those fatuous converts. Thus, Chonghou argued that the best strategy for magistrates in dealing with the missionaries was not to ignore

[266] Ibid.

[267] Ku Wei-ying, "The Shaping of the Late Qing's Policy Toward Christianity" in Jeroom Heyndrickx ed. *Historiography of the Chinese Catholic Church* (Leuven: Ferdinand Verbiest Foundation, K.U. Leuven, 1994), p.109.

[268] *YWSM TZ*, ch.55, p.21a.

or rebuff them, as what many local officials were doing, but to harness them in guiding and soothing the Christians to prevent troubles or to resolve disputes when they occur. He rejected the idea that setting up an office on Christian affairs would encourage people to flock to the foreign teaching by citing the fact that this did not happen to Daoism and Buddhism even though the Daoist and Buddhist registries dotted the whole empire. Chong argued that the imperial state had always treated all teachings equally since the doctrines of Lamaism, Islam, Daoism, and Buddhism all pertained to the moral cultivation and improvement of human beings. He asked since the way of sacred transformation was all-inclusive, why would the state not include Christianity in its fold?[269]

IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO

The 1867 policy discussion among the high officials on Christian proselytization reveals the mind of the Qing state state regarding Christianity as a *jiao*. From the standpoint of the Qing government, Christianity, particularly Catholicism, could not be encompassed within the fold of state orthodoxy, as it was a heretical teaching (*xiejiao*) par excellence for gathering the criminal elements of the society, confusing the heart-minds of the population and turning them against imperial authority. The policy of the Qing state toward Christianity in the post-opium wars era was to contain the spread of the foreign heresy among the population. Under the new political context of the treaty system, the Qing state could not prevent the proselytization of Christianity or the construction of churches in the hinterland and had to combat the threat furtively through the *baojia* institution and the propagation of the *Sacred Edicts of Kangxi*, the two time-honoured weapons of the state against seditious sects.

Through its acceptance of the legal category "jiaomin," the Qing state grudgingly recognized Chinese Christians as the sixth culture bloc of the empire. For the state and their non-Christian neighbours, Chinese Christians had become "familiar strangers," borrowing the term coined by Jonathan Lipman to refer to the Hui people, after religious conversion as they disavowed Chinese and

[269] *YWSM TZ*, ch.54, p.21a.

communal practices such as ancestral worship and participation in village rites and temple festivals.[270] In face of the opposition from the xenophobic and conservative faction within the government, the notion of imperial impartiality was used by the Zongli Yamen to justify the protection of Christianity and Chinese Christians by claiming that though the converts followed a foreign teaching, they were still the "infants" (*chizi* 赤子) of the father-monarch (*junfu* 君父).

The thorniest diplomatic and political issue for the Qing government that had arisen with the opening of the hinterland for Christian proselytization was the outbreak of Christian incidents. These incidents involve conflicts over Christian assertion of religious freedom, such as the issue of customary dues in rural villages, disputes over material resources between non-Christians and Christians[271], and anti-Christian riots instigated by the literati-gentry class and inspired by popular fear of the "foreign devils" (*guizi* 鬼子). The anti-Christian riots were usually triggered by anonymous placards, pamphlets, and rumors depicting Catholicism as a beastly teaching with the foreign missionaries and converts engaging in all kinds of lewd and cruel practices, and urging the people to militantly cleanse China off the demonic heresy of Christianity and the "foreign devils."[272]

From 1868 to 1870, China witnessed a crescendo of anti-Christian violence in Yangzhou, Formosa, Guizhou, Sichuan and finally the most disastrous of them all, the mob killing of the French consul, Henri Fontanier (1830-1870) his wife, and 20 other Europeans, mostly French priests and nuns on June 21, 1870, an event referred to by the westerners as the "Tianjin Massacre." The widespread

[270] Jonathan Lipman, *Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China* (U.S.: University of Washington Press, 1994).

[271] In his study of the missionary cases in Jiangxi, Sweeten argues that main cause of conflicts between Christians and non-believers in rural society was over secular and personal matters such as competition over land and financial resources. These disputes were petty, non-violent, and local and the local magistrates could resolve them quickly. Alan Richard Sweeten, *Christianity in Rural China: Conflict and Accommodation in Jiangxi Province, 1860 -1900* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 2001).

[272] For a discussion of these nineteenth century anti-Christian literature, see Cohen (1963), pp.48-58; and Anthony Clark, "Rape, Baptism, and the "Pig" Religion: Chinese Images of Foreign Missionaries during the late Nineteenth Century" in Clark ed. *Beating Devils and Burning Their Books: Views of China, Japan and the West* (Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies Inc., 2010), pp.43-81. The dehumanization of foreigners as demons and advocacy of violence to expel the demonic influence in the anti-Christian literature is an integral element of the demonological paradigm in Chinese religious culture. See Barend Ter Haar, "China's Inner Demons: The Political Impact of the Demonological Paradigm," *China Information* 11, nos. 2/3 (Autumn/Winter 1996), pp.54-85.

opposition toward Christianity demonstrated to the Qing government the success of the policy of "proscribing without official prohibition." The authority calculated that the activities of the missionaries would be stemmed by popular antagonism and that Christianity would eventually die a natural death. In short, the conversionary war had already been won. The more enduring problems of Christian proselytism for imperial governance remained implementing the treaties in face of heightening xenophobia among the populace and the disobedience of foreign missionaries and Chinese converts to Chinese authority. Provincial officials often encountered intense opposition from the local populace when the missionaries attempted to construct churches or reclaim confiscated religious properties in the locality. They were often caught in between a rock and a hard place, trying to satisfy the demands of the foreigners on the one hand, and to avoid alienating the locals for being too accommodating on the other hand. The Zongli Yamen repeatedly instructed the provincial officials to be impartial in dealing with disputes involving Christians and missionaries. Yet this was easier said than done. Paul Cohen has shown that local authorities either accommodated to foreign demands or, more often, chose inaction since they had no jurisdiction over the foreign missionaries.[273]

In their reports to the Zongli Yamen on Christian incidents, local officials constantly voiced their concerns over missionary involvement in lawsuits of the converts and criminal elements joining the church to escape justice. Chinese officials widely regarded the occurrence of anti-Christian violence as a natural reaction and indignation of the people to missionary abuses and the wrong doings of the Catholic converts. In his investigation of the Tianjin incident, Ding Richang 丁日昌 (1823-1882) reported to the throne that while Protestantism and the people had lived in harmony, Catholicism was very much hated by the commoners. He pointed out that the Tianjin incident was caused by the piled-up grievances (*jiheng* 積恨) of the people against Catholic converts, who were mostly bad elements to begin with, and with the support of Catholic missionaries terrorized the local community.[274]

[273] Cohen (1963), pp.170-185.

[274] *YWSM TZ*, ch.76, pp.32a-33a.

Zeng Guofan was largely in agreement with Ding's viewpoint in the investigative report of the incident he submitted to the throne. He underscored that the various teachings such as Buddhism, Daoism, and Islam had been practiced peacefully among the populace for a long time, and even the newly arrived Protestantism cause no problem. It was only Catholicism that troubles repeatedly occurred. Zeng stressed that the chief problem with Catholicism was that the missionaries were indiscriminate in accepting converts and hence there were more wicked than good people in the church. Furthermore, converts who were involved in litigations or criminal activities were injudiciously backed by foreign missionaries and French diplomats. As a result, Zeng complained, that the "Christian converts acted as if they are not Chinese subjects."[275] He argued that the emphasis of the recent years was to protect Catholic proselytism and not on dealing with the negative consequences that had arisen from it. Thus, it was indispensable that additional regulations be added to the original treaty term on religious freedom for peace and Catholic proselytism to continue in China.[276]

Ding and Zeng's viewpoints and suggestions were reiterated in the circular letter sent by Prince Gong to all foreign representatives on February 9, 1871. The crux of the problem, Prince Gong maintained, was the abuse of extraterritorial status by foreign missionaries. The missionaries were hated by the commoners and gentry because they intervened in public matters and oppressed the people with their influence. Prince Gong pointed out that there were missionaries living in the various western countries and there had not been a single issue. This was so because he heard that the missionaries regardless of their nationality must obey the law and custom of the host country and never set themselves up as an autonomous entity (*zhili menhu* 自立門戶). The behaviors of the missionaries in China were very different from what he heard about the control of missionaries in the West. "It is as if in one country there are many hostile states, each acting arbitrarily and independently."[277]

[275] Ibid., p.41a.

[276] Ibid., pp.40-41.

[277] "Zongli Yamen zhi geguo gongshi shu" in Wang ed. (1984), pp.380-381.

Prince Gong might have heard about the treatment of missionaries in the West from Rong Hong 容閎 (1828-1912). Hong was the first Chinese student to study in the United States. After he came back to China, he first assisted Zeng Guofan at the Nanjing Arsenal and later served as an aide for Ding Richang in Shanghai. Rong was serving as Ding's interpreter in his negotiation with the Western powers during the 1870 Tianjin incident. In 1867, Rong had submitted four proposals for reform to Ding and one of them was for the state to assert control over the foreign missionaries. On the proposal, Rong writes:

> The encroachment of foreign powers upon the sovereignty of China has always been watched by me with the most intense interest. No one who is acquainted with Roman Catholicism can fail to be impressed with the unwarranted pretensions and assumptions of the Romish Church in China. She claims civil jurisdiction over her proselytes, and takes civil and criminal cases out of Chinese courts. In order to put a stop to such insidious and crafty workings to gain temporal powers in China. I put forth this proposition: to prohibit missionaries of any religious sect or denomination from exercising any kind of jurisdiction over their converts, in either civil or criminal cases. [278]

In the letter, Prince Gong also proposed eight articles to regulate missionary activities. Out of the eight articles, the third article concerning the subjection of western missionaries and converts to Chinese legal system was the most elaborated. This reflects the attention of the Chinese government in regulating foreign missionaries in China and asserting its sovereignty in domestic affairs. The article stated that since foreign missionaries reside in China, they must obey the laws and institutions of the land and not act autonomously or disregard the authority of Chinese officials. The missionaries are also prohibited from disparaging Confucianism and causing public anger. All missionaries are under the control of the local authorities. Citing the lama as an example, the article explained that though the lama is not someone from China he must obey Chinese law and the command of Chinese officials, and never did he act autonomously like the foreign missionaries. Furthermore, since converts are Chinese subjects they should behave appropriately like the rest of the population. They must pay the taxes and corvée

[278] Yung Wing, *My Life in China and America* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1909), pp.175-176.

labour due to the state or the rents owe to the landlords without any excuse. In the case of lawsuits involving converts, the missionary is not allowed to intervene and defy the magistrate on behalf of his proselytes. If the missionary is found interfering in lawsuits, the local magistrate can petition to the governor-general and Zongli Yamen and he will be repatriated back to his country. Chinese converts if found to engage missionary aid in their lawsuits will be punished severely by the magistrate.[279]

The British and American reply to the proposal was moderate in tone since the articles mainly aimed at the Catholic mission but rejected most of the articles as unacceptable and considered the Chinese concerns as exaggerated. The French vehemently denied the accusations of the Zongli Yamen of missionary misconducts as false and opposed the regulation entirely. Paul Cohen correctly identifies that Chinese and Western debate over the missionary problem after the Tianjin incident "revealed in the clearest terms the profound gulf still existing between Chinese and Western concepts of law, religious liberty, society, and man."[280] The reformers within the Qing court were certainly aware of this gulf. In fact, prior to the outbreak of the Tianjin crisis, the Qing court had sent two investigative missions to survey (*kaocha* 考察) the technology, culture, economy, laws, and political institutions of the West. Church and state relations in the West was also a major area of interest in Chinese study of the West.

[279] "Zongli Yamen zhi geguo gongshi shu" in Wang ed. (1984), pp.382-386.

[280] Cohen (1963), p.260.

—3—

China's Encounter with Secularization in the West, 1868-1895

In late 1867, the Zongli Yamen petitioned the throne to send China's first diplomatic mission to the West. The memorial explained the two primary functions of the mission as investigating the West and fostering Sino-Western understandings. On the necessity of studying the West, it highlighted the fact that the treaty powers had in the recent years learned everything about China while China remained appallingly ignorant about the realities (*qingwei* 情偽) of the West. The memorial also pointed out that the misunderstandings between China and the treaty powers occurred largely because there was no mutual exchange of diplomatic representatives. Foreign countries often took the words of their ministers in China as the truth and China had no way of direct communication with the foreign governments about the unreasonable behaviors of their diplomatic representatives.[281] The inspiration behind the memorial was Robert Hart, who considered representation abroad as of "paramount importance" to China and had forcefully and repeatedly urged the Yamen of the necessity of

[281] *YWSM TZ*, ch.51, p.27a.

establishing resident ministers in the court of all treaty powers.[282] Li Hongzhang was most supportive among the high officials of the idea of sending a mission abroad. Concurring with the yamen's position, Li believed that it was highly dangerous for China to be wholly ignorance about its opponents.[283] Li argued that the proposal had two great merits. First, in event of an impasse the Chinese minister could request the foreign governments to censure their headstrong diplomats in Beijing or cite western political system and laws as example to support Chinese position. Second, the mission could help study and bring back the superior military institution and technology of the West for the strengthening of the Qing state.[284]

For the Chinese government, the missionaries in the interior were a constant source of annoyance since they were intricately entwined with the delicate matter of foreign affairs.[285] Sir Rutherford Alcock, the shrewd British minister to China, and later Japan, perceptively observed that Catholic missions were objected in the East not because of the religious intolerance of the natives, a reason widely believed by the missionaries, but their threat to political authority. The real cause of hostilities of the Chinese and Japanese to missionaries, Alcock argued "is jealousy of a foreign rival to

[282] It was under the initiative of Robert Hart that China's first investigative tour of the West took place in 1866 when Hart took Bin Chun and a group of Zongli Yamen students on a study trip to Europe. Hart considered the issue of diplomatic representation as paramount in Chinese reform agenda as he "saw in it one of China's least objectionable ways of preserving freedom and independence" and "it would constitute a tie which should bind her with the West so firmly and commitment her to a career of improvement so certainly as to make retrogression impossible." Robert Hart, "Notes on Chinese Matters" in Frederick Wells Williams, *Anson Burlingame and the First Chinese Mission to Foreign Powers* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912), p.285.

[283] Xu Guoqi, *Chinese and Americans: A Shared History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014), p.40.

[284] *YWSM TZ*, ch.35, p.12b.

[285] Robert Hart accurately observed that foreign presence in China was bitterly tolerated only because of Chinese weakness. The missionaries were considered a menace by the Chinese authority as they were the main source of local disturbances in the 1860s and that their extra-territorial privilege made it difficult for the Qing government to control, what would be considered to the Chinese authority, unlawful and inappropriate behaviors of the missionaries. Prince Gong famously remarked to Hart, "Take away your opium and your missionaries, and all will be well!" Wen Xiang also exclaimed to him in one occasion, "Cancel your extra-territoriality clause, and merchants and missionaries may go anywhere and everywhere." Robert Hart, *These From the Land of Sinim: Essays on the Chinese Question* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1901), p.158.

the allegiance of the people, and a power which claims authority higher than any Sovereign's, and inimical to the free exercise of any power independent of the asserted spiritual dominion of a Church."[286]

Alcock drew parallels between the missionary problem in the East and the struggle of national governments in Europe with Ultramontanism. He explained, "The question of education— a subject of actual agitation here— in France and Germany at the moment, and the toleration of diverse creeds and forms of doctrine are both matters of essential importance that an uncompromising opposition in obedience to the Pope or Church of Rome might create a civil war, and rebellion against the National government." The rulers of Japan and China opposed Catholicism because it was "fatal to their authority and supremacy…just as the Emperor of Germany and the Queen of England resist all similar pretensions to the assertion of a power above the law." Furthermore, Alcock pointed out the wars fought by France over missionary quarrels in China, Korea, and Vietnam had convinced the Asians that the Catholic protectorate of France was "a mere mask for usurpation and invasions." Protestant missionaries, on the hand, were less open to these charges since Protestant nations did not provide them with the same protection for evangelism as that of the French protectorate for Catholic missions in the East.[287]

The sending of missions by China in the second half of the nineteenth century coincided with the secularization of European society. The process of secularization here refers to the privatization of religion and the differentiation between the religious and public sphere of politics, two of the three propositions of secularization outlined by José Casanova.[288] The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed a shift in the semantics of "religion" and "secular" (Ger. *weltlich*; Fr. *laïcité*) from complementary (spiritual and temporal) to oppositional concepts i.e. religious versus non-religious.[289]

---

[286] Rutherford Alcock, "Christian Missions in the East," *The Times* (London) Jan 29, 1873, p.10.

[287] Ibid.

[288] Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). The third proposition is the decline in the social significance of religion. In a similar vein, Charles Taylor defines 3 types of secularity namely 1) the expulsion of religion from the public sphere; 2) decline in religious belief and practices; and 3) the option of seeing reality exclusively through the "immanent frame" or the condition of disbelief. See his *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007).

[289] The term "secular" originated from the Latin word *saeculum* meaning an indefinite period of time. It was appropriated in Christian theology to denote a spatial and temporal world lived by the "secular clergy" to distinguish from the religious world of the monasteries lived by religious clergy. The "secular" eventually evolved after the Enlightenment to mean a domain devoid of religion in the nineteenth century. Jose Casanova, "The

This semantic change grew out of the assault on confessionalism by religious movements such as Dissenterism in England and Ultramontanism in Continental Europe that sought to clarify the "essence" of religion and assert the independence of religion from the state, the critique of the irrational and authoritarian tendencies of the church by republicans, socialists and liberals[290], as well as the desire of the European nation-states to incorporate the religious minorities at home and in the colonies within the national fold and to wrestle away the pedagogical power of the Church over their citizens.[291] After the defeat of the 1870 Franco-Prussian War, the French Third Republic embarked on a policy of *laïcité* – a strict separation of religion from the state and public education. Similarly, in the newly formed German nation-state, Bismarck began his *Kulturkampf* in the 1870s, which subjected the Catholic Church to stricter state control and excluded clergy participation in public education.

These events were of great interest to the Chinese envoys as the Qing government was searching for a long-term solution to the missionary problem. Imperial regulations obliged ministers abroad to keep personal journals and submit them monthly to the Zongli Yamen and they were central in disseminating knowledge about the West to China.[292] These journals recorded events and observations that the ministers thought as important, including the role of religion and the shift in state and church relationship in the West. However, the Chinese observers did not interpret the conflict between church and state in the West in a vacuum. They based it on the historical experience of the imperial state in

---

Secular, Secularizations, Secularism" in Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, and Antwerpen eds. *Rethinking Secularism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.57.

The term "secularism" was coined by the English freethinker George Jacob Holyoake (1817-1906) in 1851 to describe a positivistic philosophy "promoting human welfare by material means; measuring human welfare by the utilitarian rule, and making the service of others a duty of life." Holyoake, *The Principles of Secularism Illustrated* (London: Austin & Co., 1870), p.11.

[290] See Owen Chadwick, *The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

[291] Gauri Viswanathan, for instance, forcefully argues that the secularization of the metropole state and colonial government in India was closely related to the desire of the British government to integrate religious minorities at home and to acculturate the Indian subjects in colonial India. See Viswanathan (1998).

[292] Dong Shouyi and Wang Yanjing, "Chinese Investigative Missions Overseas, 1866-1907" in Douglas Reynolds ed. *China, 1895-1912: State-sponsored Reforms and China's Late-Qing Revolution* (New York: Routledge, 1996), p.15; Huangfu Zhengzheng, "Internalizing the West : Qing envoys and ministers in Europe, 1866-1893." PhD Dissertation UC San Diego, 2012, p.x.

dealing with powerful religious institutions. In China proper, the Chinese imperial state had since an early time prevented the development of independent religious authority by co-opting religious institutions as the "patron of all patrons" or by vigilantly and ruthlessly suppressing rival religious groups and movements.[293]During the long eighteenth century, the Qing state annexed vast territories in Inner Asia where Tibetan-Buddhism and Islam were prominent among the indigenous Mongol, Tibetan, and Muslim populations. The Qing rulers did not impose Confucianism on the newly conquered territories, rather, as in the case of European colonialism, they patronized (for Tibetan-Buddhism) or tolerated and protected (for Islam) the faith of the non-Han peoples.[294] In other words, unlike in China proper where governance (*zheng* 政) and teaching (*jiao* 教) were undifferentiated, the Qing deliberately separated both as a technique of colonial rule in Inner Asia.

In this sense, the high Qing witnessed the process of political secularization as outlined by Casanova and Creppell. It must be pointed out that the term *jiao* used in the context of Qing colonialism refers, in the broadest sense, to the beliefs, traits, and practices subscribed by a particular ethnic group.[295]

---

[293] On the roots of Chinese secularism, see Prasenjit Duara, *The Crisis of Global Modernity: Asian Tradition and a Sustainable Future* (U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp.167-175.

[294] Countering the claim predominant in Chinese nationalist historiography that the diverse peoples of the Qing dynasty were culturally assimilated and not conquered, Peter Perdue persuasively argues that the Qing was a colonial empire that ruled over a vast domain of diverse subjects through conquest, material enticements, and religious patronage. Peter Perdue, "Comparing Empires: Manchu Colonialism" in *International Review of History*, 20.2 (Jun. 1998), pp.255-262. Perdue compares the Qing with the other contemporaneous Mongol, Islamic, and Russian "gunpowder empires" that rose into greatness with superior firearms and cartographic technology. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Asia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Belknap Press, 2010).

On Qing emperors patronage of Tibetan Buddhism as a colonial technique of ruling the Mongols and Tibetans, see James Hevia, "Lama, Emperors, and Rituals: Political Implications in Qing Imperial Ceremonies," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, 16.2 (Winter 1993), pp.243-278; and Joanna Waley-Cohen, "Religion, War, and Empire-Building in Eighteenth-Century China" in International Review of History, 20.2 (Jun. 1998), pp.336-352.

For Xinjiang, the Qing ruled the region mostly indirectly through the native Muslim rulers known as *begs*. The cultural and historical connection between the Qing monarchs and the native rulers was weak. Since an infidel cannot rule as a legitimate patron of Islam, the native rulers justified their allegiance to the Manchu rulers, according to Hamada Masami, through the Turkic Muslim tradition of the "duty of the salt"(tuz/namak haqqi). The tradition stipulates that Muslims have the secular duty to serve rulers who paid their salaries (salt) and do not interfere with the fulfillment of their religious duties. Hamada Masami, "'Shio no gimu' to 'seisen' no aida de" (Between the "duty of salt" and "holy war") in *Toyoshi Kenkyu* (Research on Oriental history) 52.2 (1993), pp.135–138.

[295] Dru Gladney shows that "Hui" has an "ethno-religious" connotation rather than just functioning as a synonym for "Muslim" as commonly thought. See his *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic*

As I shall discuss below, Chinese officials drew direct parallel between the Catholic Church and the Tibetan-Buddhist monastic institution in their discussion of the conflict between Church and State in the West. Thanks to the Inner Asian example, the separation of *jiao* and *zheng* in the West was not novel for the Chinese diplomats, what they were most interested was to understand how Church and State relations was managed in the West and to employ that knowledge in their resolution of missionary cases in China.

CHINESE VIEW OF STATE AND CHURCH IN THE WEST, 1842-1865

The threat of Chinese maritime frontier by the Westerners stimulated the Chinese desire to understand the distant and unfamiliar West. Wei Yuan completed his *Haiguo Tuzhi* 海國圖志 (Illustrated treatise on the maritime kingdoms) four months after the signing of the Treaty of Nanjing.[296]He had prepared it during this period as an advisor to Lin Zexu, when the latter was dealing with the English in Canton. The book was later made a required reading by the court for officials managing foreign affairs for the next two decades.[297] While Wei's analysis focused on understanding the European maritime nations that had trading links with China and the motives behind Western commercial expansion, considerable attention was also given to Italy because it was the home country of the Catholic missionaries in China, and where the Roman Empire had originated.[298]

(Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp.113-115. David Atwill also shows in his study of the Panthay Rebellion that nineteenth century speakers employed "Mu-min" when they were referring to Muslims and the terms "Hui," "Hui-min," and "Hui-jiao" when speaking about Hui as an ethnic group. *The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856-1873* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), pp.155-159.

[296] Jane Kate Leonard, *Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime World* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1984), p.154.

[297] Earl Swisher, "Chinese Intellectuals and Western Impact, 1830-1900," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1.1 (Oct., 1958), p.29.

[298] Wei Yuan, "Daxiyang Ouluobazhou geguo zongxu" in *Haiguo Tuzhi* (Hunan: Yueli Shushe, 1998), p.1092.

Wei inferred from the sources available to him that the Roman Empire was the Daqin state recorded in Chinese sources, and it was a theocratic state like the Tibetan-Mongolian regime familiar to him. He noted that the Roman Empire was ruled by "a successive line of Popes (*jiaohuang*), who held on to political powers and morally transform the people on behalf of Heaven." After the fall of the Roman Empire, Europe had fragmented into several competitive states, however the religious authority of the Pope remained unabated. He noted that the Pope enfeoffed (*cefeng* 冊封) the monarchs of various European states and appointed the "dharma kings" (*fawang* 法王) to these states to be in-charge of religious affairs. Drawing parallel with Tibetan Buddhism, Wei Yuan maintained that the Pope was like the Dalai Lama, and the "dharma kings" like the Khutuktu lamas of Mongolia.[299]

From the information he gathered, Wei believed that *Tianzhu jiao*, which was also called *Kelishidun jiao* 克力斯頓教 (Christianity) in the West, was divided into the three sects of *Jiateli jiao* 加特力教 (Catholicism), *Poloteshidun jiao* 波罗特士頓教 (Protestantism), and *Geli jiao* 額利教 (Greek Orthodoxy). He explained that the hearsay of British antagonism to *Tianzhu jiao* was false as what they were opposing in fact was the *Jiateli jiao*, the old teaching of *Tianzhu jiao* that was still being practiced in Italy. He believed that fission within a teaching was common, citing the sectarian division and doctrinal squabbling in Confucianism, Mohism, Buddhism, and Daoism to illustrate his point. Thus, Wei argued that governing diverse peoples with very different customs required the government to transcend sectarian divides. He pointed out that though the imperial Qing could subjugate Xinjiang and Tibet-Mongolia, it could not force the people to abandon Islam or Tibetan-Buddhism for Confucianism. This was also why the Russian and British empires expanded their rule into Central and Southwest Asia without imposing Christianity on the conquered people.[300] Wei wrote, "This is what is meant by reforming their teaching and not altering their custom; unifying the administration and not abolishing what is applicable."[301]

---

[299] Ibid.

[300] Wei Yuan, "Nanyang xiyang ge jiaomen biao," *Haiguo Tuzhi*, pp.1814-1815.

[301] 故曰：因其教不易其俗；齊其政不易其宜。Ibid., p.1815.

Wei's statement provides the clearest expression of the imperial or statecraft logic behind the separation of rule and religion in Qing colonialism. The phrase comes from the chapter *"*The King's Regulations*"* (*wangzhi* 王制) from the *Record of Rites* and is also quoted by Qianlong emperor in the Chinese text of his quadrilingual proclamation titled "Pronouncement on Lamas" (*Lama-shuo* 喇嘛說). The proclamation was composed in 1792 following the Qing military success in expelling the Gurkha invasions of Tibet. It was later carved onto four steles in Manchu, Chinese, Tibetan, and Mongol languages and erected in Yonghe palace, the religious center of the dGelugspa (yellow sect) in Beijing. In the *Lama-shuo*, Qianlong articulated the rationale behind Qing policy of patronizing Tibetan Buddhism. Speaking in a sober, candid, and imperial tone, the emperor declared: "By patronizing the Yellow Church we maintain peace among the Mongols. This being an important task we cannot but protect this [religion]. [In doing so] we do not show any bias, nor do we wish to adulate the Tibetan priests as [was done during the] Yuan dynasty."[302] He explained that the tradition of supporting Tibetan and Mongol religious hierarchs began in the Yuan dynasty and had continued by the Ming and his dynasty. However, he stressed that unlike their Mongol predecessors, the Manchu emperors neither bestow the title of imperial preceptor (*dishi* 帝師) on the lamas and allow them to intervene in the governing of the empire nor grant them special legal status which exempts them from the "royal laws" (*wangfa* 王法) of the empire. Qianlong specially raised the example of the Drungpa Kūtuktu, the Jédrung Lobzang Danba, and four other lamas who were severely punished for abandoning the defense of Tibet in the winter of 1791-1792 and allowing the Nepalese invaders to pillage at will to illustrate his point.[303]

The proclamation was written more than to deflect the criticism of his Chinese officials on the emperor's interest in Tibetan Buddhism and bias towards the Yellow sect.[304] It was also, for the first

[302] Cited and translated by Patricia Berger, *Empire of Emptiness: Buddhist Art and Political Authority in Qing China* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003), p.35.

[303] Full text accessed from Zhou Runnian, "Beijing yonghe-gong yuzhi beiwen xiaolu kaoquan," *Xizang yanjiu* vol.3 (1991), p.91.

[304] In the Manchu version of the text, Qianlong frankly expressed his frustration over the doubt casted by the Chinese over his patronage of the lamas and Tibetan Buddhism. Berger (2003), p.36.

time, a declaration of authority of the Qing monarch over the Tibetan-Buddhist hierarchs of Mongolia and Tibet. The proclamation in a blunt and direct manner declared that the reincarnate lamas had no spiritual superiority over the Manchu monarchs and that the Qing dynasty had direct sovereignty over Tibet. In his proclamation, the emperor also introduced the Golden Urn lottery for the selection of reincarnate lamas to replace the traditional system of divination, which he condemned as mired in corruption. The imposition of Qing direct control over the political and religious affairs of Tibet by Qianlong was linked to the fiasco during the Gurkha invasions and his frustration with the corruption and ineptitude of the Tibetan Buddhist and ruling elites (the kalöns). As Max Oidtmann points out "the Qing government's ambition went much further than simply disciplining the reborn lamas of the Geluk school….Qianlong and his advisors ultimately found themselves arguing for the temporal rule by monastic authorities."[305]

For Wei Yuan, Qing jurisdiction over Tibet and its control over the mechanism of choosing the reincarnate lamas signified the final triumph of temporal power over religious authority in Inner Asia. Wei Yuan's *Record of the Grand Military Achievements of the Dynasty* (*Shengwu ji* 聖武記) contains the section "An account of the Dynasty's pacification of Tibet" (*Guochao fusui Xizang ji* 國朝撫綏西藏記). On the post-Gurkha invasion Tibetan government, Wei commented with pride and approval that this was the first time the two *ambans* were equal in power and prestige to the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, and that imperial laws were uniformly applied on the lamas. Wei praised the sagacious wisdom of the Qianlong emperor in reforming the lama selection mechanism, and retaining the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama as the spiritual leaders for civilizing the Tibetans and Mongol people.[306] He stressed that Confucian teaching had no effect in taming the ferocious and backward tribes of the borderlands as compare to Tibetan Buddhism, since they were long-time devotees of the dGe-lugs-pa and deeply believed in the supernatural (*shenyi* 神異). [307]

[305] Max Oidtmann, *Forging the Golden Urn: The Qing Empire and Politics of Reincarnation in Tibet* (N.Y: Columbia University, 2018), p.54.

[306] Wei Yuan, *Shengwu ji* (Taibei: Shijie shuju, 1962), ch.5, p.17b.

[307] Ibid, p.20a.

In asserting the absolute authority the Qing emperor had over the Tibetan Buddhist hierarchs, Wei even went as far as effacing any indication of teacher-student relationship between the two. He argued that the title "the great Manjusri emperor" (Ch. *Wenzhushili da huangdi* 文殊師利大皇帝) commonly used by the Dalai Lama to address the Qing monarch actually meant "the great Manchu emperor," as "wenzhu" was the transliteration of the word "Manchu" (Ch. *manzhou* 满洲).[308] It is perhaps not disingenuous on the part of Wei Yuan in disavowing the religious link between the Qing empire and Tibet as since the end of the eighteenth century, the Qing emperors and the resident *ambans* had stopped justifying their involvement in local affairs as supporting the Buddhist institutions while the Qing asserted sovereignty over Tibet and transformed Tibetans into native subjects of the empire.[309]

Xu Jiyu 徐继畬 was another pioneer in China's investigation of the West. His *Yinghuan Zhilue* 瀛寰志略 (A short account of the maritime circuits) published in 1848 was equally influential as the *Haiguo Tuzhi* in shaping Chinese understanding of the West, and was made a required text for the training of Qing diplomats by the Zongli Yamen from the 1860s onwards. [310] Xu also provided information on Christianity in his survey of the different European states. On Christianity, he wrote, "The various European states had followed Catholicism (*Tianzhu jiao*) since the Han dynasty. The Pope (*jiaowang* 教王) resided in Rome and held the authority in deciding the rise and fall of states. In the early Ming, a German named Luther established Protestantism (*Yesu jiao*), and thereafter half of the European states followed Catholicism and the other half Protestantism. Monarchs and their subjects hated and killed one another, and states attacked each other because of religious conflict."[311] Xu noted

[308] Ibid., p.20b.

[309] See Oidtmann (2018), Act I.

[310] As Fred Drake maintains, "Hsu Chi-yü became Marco Polo, Columbus, Balboa, Tasman, Cook, and Bering for many Chinese readers in the 1850s and 1860s." Drake, *China Charts the World: Hsu Chi-yü and His Geography of 1848* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), p.189.

[311] Xu, *Yinghuan Zhilue* (Shanghai: Shanghai Shudian chubanshe, 2001), ch.4, p.12b.

that there was no difference between Protestantism and Catholicism other than their different interpretation of the sacred text.[312]

Xu described Rome as a "clerical state" (*jiaozong guo* 教宗國). The term "jiaozong," as Tim Barrett and Francesca Tarocco have shown, has a Chan Buddhist provenance and was employed by Wei Yuan "to cover activities that were proper to Buddhist clergy…a sort of shorthand summary for the intellectual world of the religious professional."[313] Barrett and Tarocco argue that this usage was adopted by Protestant missionary Karl Gützlaff in his rendering of the Papal States, which was in turn picked up by Xu Jiyu.[314] Like Wei Yuan, Xu interpreted the Papal States as similar to the Tibetan Buddhist theocracy. Describing the Papal conclave, Xu wrote, "When the Emperor of teaching passed away, a council of religious leaders (*jiaozhu* 教主) is convened to select a wise old person to succeed the position. This is similar to the custom in Tibet of lamas sitting around the bed to appoint their successors."[315]

Xu held a low opinion of the Pope and the Catholic Church because of his heavy reliance on Protestant sources. For instance, on Catholic proselytism, Xu wrote, "Their religion spread to all the states. If there were some unwilling to follow it, they at once stirred up trouble, attacked with an army, and destroyed them. Or they taught the people to rebel against their rulers."[316] He noted that the power of the Popes had declined since Luther refuted the heretical teachings of Catholicism with his orthodox teaching (*zhengjiao* 正教) and half the states rebelled against the Church. In contrast to the civilized

[312] Ibid.

[313] Tim Barrett and Francesca Tarocco, "Terminology and Religious Identity: Buddhism and Genealogy of the Term 'Zong Jiao'" in Volkhard Krech and Marion Steinicke, eds., *Dynamics in the History of Religions Between Asia and Europe* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012), pp. 314-315.

[314] Ibid., p.315.

[315] Xu (2001), ch.6, p.29b.

[316] Drake (1975), p.123.

and orderly utopia that the earlier Jesuits painted of Italy, Xu described Italy as a wild and deserted place and its people lazy and many engaged in banditry for living. [317]

Protestant missionaries had been a major source of information for the Chinese on Europe.[318] Protestant missionaries sought to distinguish their religion, which they named variously as "zhengjiao," "xinjiao" (new teaching), and "Yesu jiao" (teaching of Jesus), to distinguish it from the false religion of "Tianzhu jiao" preached by the Catholic missionaries. Protestants portrayed the Pope as corrupted and the Catholic priests as unruly, and criticized the Catholic missionaries in China for forming cliques and encouraging the Chinese people to disobey authorities.[319] The Protestant anti-clericalism found natural affinity with the Confucian anti-clericalism of the Chinese scholar-officials. In a memorial submitted in the early 1860s, He Qiutao 何秋濤 (1824-1862), one of the foremost experts of foreign affairs, wrote:

> The Christianity is spilt into three sects and each of the three big European powers, France, England and Russia adopts one of them, and wants to spread their own sect in China. The Catholicism condemns Protestantism as unorthodox and the Protestantism charges Catholicism as heresy. Their dispute is quite intensive and the Chinese scholars are difficult to make sure which sect is right or which sect is wrong….The Catholic Church installed the Popedom and usurped political power from the kings of different kingdoms. All the peasants and merchants had to pay part of the profit to the Pope, and they were heavily taxed. Martin Luther, realizing the unreasonable overlordship of the Pope over the kings as well as ecclesiastical domination of the people, began to initiate Protestantism by returning the political and economic powers to the kings and the people respectively. This is why Protestantism became popular in Western Europe as the people thought it plausible. The superiority of the Catholic church over the kings in all aspects of the secular life is

[317] Xu (2001), ch.6, p.29b.

[318] Suzanne Wilson Barrett, "Protestant Expansion and Chinese Views of the West" in *Modern Asian Studies*, 6.2 (1972), pp. 129-149.

[319] Lü Shih-chiang, *Zhongguo guanshen fanjiao de yuanyin 1860-1874* (Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiu-yuan, jindai-shi yanjiu-suo, 1966), p.46.

quite unreasonable, and the Protestant accusation of Catholicism as heresy is understandable.[320]

MISSIONARIES AND SOVEREIGNTY

In 1868, the Zongli Yamen appointed American Anson Burlingame (1820-1870) as minister and Zhigang 志剛 and Sun Jiagu 孫家穀 as co-envoys, to lead the first diplomatic mission to Europe and America. With treaty revisions looming, the Zongli Yamen wished that the mission could show Chinese sincerity in conducting diplomatic relations with foreign nations, and to persuade the treaty powers not to pressurize the imperial government for more concessions or interfere in its internal affairs. The mission left Shanghai on February 25 for the United States, and from there it would cross the Atlantic and visited the European nations of England, France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Russia, Prussia, Spain and Italy. Zhigang, a Manchu undersecretary in the Zongli Yamen, kept a journal of the mission under the title *Chushi taixi-ji* 出使泰西記（An account of the first mission to the West).

In the United States, the Chinese mission discovered the international status of China as an uncivilized nation because she did not share the same religion as the Western nations. When the embassy reached the Chinatown in San Francisco on April 1, they were told by the Chinese immigrants that Chinese were discriminated by the U.S. government because they were heathens (*yi jiaotu* 異教徒). They were levied the foreign miners tax, which was exempted for other nationalities. The local authorities also would not handle Chinese grievances unless a white citizen was willing to testify or allowed the Chinese to be the witness in court since they were not Christians and could not be treated as trustworthy. The term "heathen" was long used as an epithet of racial and religious difference in the United States of the mid-nineteenth century. The Webster's American Dictionary of English Language defined the meaning of heathen not only as "pagan" but also "rude, illiterate, wild, uncivilized, barbarous, savage, cruel, (and) rapacious." The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, ratified in 1868 and 1870, granted citizenship and all its associated benefits to the Christianized African American men

[320] Lee En-Han, "China's Response to the Full-fledged Christian Challenge, 1800-1900: An Analysis of Chinese Anti-Christian Thought After the Mid-19th Century," *Asia Munhwa* 4 (1988), pp.77-78.

but not to the "heathen" men of Native and Asian American origins. Christianity, especially Protestantism, was what made the people American and civilized and differentiated them from the barbarous nations of the world.[321]

The complaint of religious discrimination led to the inclusion of a religious article by the Chinese mission in the Burlingame Treaty signed on July 28, 1868. The treaty was the crowning achievement of the mission as it was the first equal treaty the Qing government signed with a foreign power. It underscored the equal international status of China and recognized its sovereign authority and complete control in internal affairs. The religious article in the treaty explicitly stipulated that "Chinese subjects in the United States shall enjoy entire liberty of conscience and shall be exempt from all disability or persecution on account of their religious faith." The treaty was groundbreaking as, in the words of Burlingame, it "recognises China as an equal among the nations, in opposition to the old doctrine that because she was not a Christian nation she could not be placed in the roll of nations."[322] The treaty was the first equal treaty signed by China and the first achieved by a non-Christian nation with a western country. The drafters of the treaty, Burlingame and William H. Seward, the secretary of state, hoped that it would be used as a model by the other treaty powers in their treaty revision with the Chinese. Zhigang and Sun Jiagu, who were passive during the treaty negotiation, gave their full support to Burlingame on this objective.[323] In their memorial explaining the benefit of the treaty, the two co-envoys wrote, "with this (treaty) in hand and we would not be without a clue when we go to other countries, and it could become a strength in the resolution of issues."[324]

During the duration of the mission stay in Europe, the Yangzhou, Formosa and Tianjin incidents erupted. The British consuls sent gunboats to seek redress in the Yangzhou and Formosa incidents, and the Tianjin incident nearly developed into another war if not for the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian

---

[321] Joshua Paddison, *American Heathens: Religion, Race, and Reconstruction in California* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2012), p.1.

[322] Williams (1912), p.149.

[323] Xu (2014), p.58.

[324] *YWSM TZ*, ch. 68, p.18a.

War in 1870. News of the Yangzhou incident reached the mission while they were in London on September 20, 1868.[325] Burlingame inquired about the incident when the mission was officially received by Lord Clarendon, the new Foreign Secretary, at Windsor on December 12. Zhigang recorded that Lord Clarendon replied at ease that the matter would be simple to resolve.[326]

After his meeting with Clarendon on December 12, Burlingame drew up a report in Chinese, with the help of Zhigang, about his negotiations with the British for the Zongli Yamen. Burlingame reported that he communicated to Clarendon about the revised treaty with the U.S. and China's wish that Britain do not interfere in her internal affairs. Alluding to the missionary problem, Burlingame also highlighted that if the Chinese officials and people earnestly followed the treaty terms, any demand that was outside the treaty could be rejected. Zhigang remarked in his journal that this point was the most important since many involved in foreign affairs were ignorant about this and ended up being bullied and taken advantage of by the foreign representatives in China.[327]

The Chinese embassy received the official reply by Clarendon on 1 January 1869, which demonstrated the conciliatory approach of the British government to China after 1860. Clarendon emphasized that the British government "expect from China as an indispensable condition of their goodwill, the fullest amount of protection to British subjects resorting to her dominions." In return, he assured the Chinese that British consuls in China would act in cooperation with the Chinese government and cautioned "British subjects to pay due respect not only to the laws of the empire, but, as far as may be, to the usages and feelings of the Chinese people." The missionaries were advised not to travel and reside inland away from the treaty ports outside the protection of the consulate and war vessels. Consular and naval officers were only allowed to provide temporary protection or evacuation when British lives and properties were under threat by Chinese authorities or mobs. They were not allowed

[325] Zhigang, *Chushi Taixi ji* (Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1981), pp.51-52.

[326] Ibid., p.55.

[327] Ibid., p.54.

to deploy force without authorization from the Foreign Office to extract concession from the Chinese local authorities. [328]

Upon receiving the January 1 official communication from the Foreign Office, Zhigang noted in his journal that although Clarendon did not admit British wrongdoings in the Yangzhou incident explicitly, however, his response was a tacit acceptance of Chinese protest that British military action in Yangzhou was a violation of international law. Zhigang believed that the British Foreign Office censured its own agents in support of the Chinese position because Burlingame had successfully persuaded Clarendon that unwarranted military action would disrupt Sino-Western relations and derail British commercial interests in China. He especially took note of Clarendon's instruction that British subjects ought to comply with Chinese laws and live in harmony with the Chinese people as the control of foreign missionaries was the main issue confronting the Zongli Yamen. Zhigang believed that this statement was in accordance with international law and could be used to "soothe the hearts of the Westerners" in event of a dispute.[329]

Zhigang was, however, of two minds with regards to Clarendon's demand that the central government be responsible for the protection of British subjects and negotiation of religious conflicts. The advantage of this arrangement, as Zhigang saw it, was that the obstinate and unruly behaviours of the foreign consuls could be effective controlled. However, he was also aware that the Zongli Yamen was an interim bureau and did not possess the necessary institutional authority to control the provincial governors.[330] Furthermore, it had been the policy of the Zongli Yamen to localize the settlement of Christian incidents to prevent overburdening the central government with the cases and to give more rooms for the Zongli Yamen to mediate.[331] After weighing the pros and cons, Zhigang believed that burdening the Zongli Yamen was still better than to being held hostage by gunboats. He recommended

[328] The official reply was issued by the Foreign Office on 22nd December, the full document is contained in Williams (1912), pp.173-176. For Chinese translation, see Zhigang (1981), pp.55-56.

[329] Zhigang (1981), p.57.

[330] Ibid.

[331] Ku (1994), p.108.

that the court devise a national policy (*guoshi* 國是) by ordering the provincial governors and all court officials to discuss the plan negotiated with the British Foreign Office. By doing so, Zhigang believed it could make everyone aware of the nitty gritty of international negotiations so as to silence the conservative faction in the government and to spot the necessary human talents to carry out the programmes of the Self-Strengthening Movement.[332] Zhigang's suggestion is ultimately not taken up as the Zongli Yamen did not become a western style Foreign Office and the settlement of Christian incidents remained localized, with some provincial governors setting up specialized missionary affair bureau to handle religious disputes, an approach which lasted till the last decade of the Qing dynasty.

While the mission was in Paris they heard about the parliamentary session on the Formosa incident of 1868-1869. The Duke of Somerset queried Clarendon on the right possessed by Britain to send the missionaries to the interior and the reasonableness of the government providing military support to help the missionaries, whom he referred to as "rogues" and "enthusiasts," in religious propagation. Under Alcock's advice, Clarendon replied that only the French treaty allowed missionary settlement in the interior and thus it would be imprudent to press for it since only the Chinese text of the treaty contained the clause. Clarendon stressed that the government was not in favor of "proselytizing by the sword" and agreed with Somerset that the rash behaviors of the missionaries often put them in unnecessary danger.[333] The acting consul John Gibson, who acted belligerently in the Formosa incident of 1868-1869, was censured by Clarendon for his action and subsequently recalled from China and demoted. Gibson was also ordered to apologize to the local authorities and return the reparation he extracted forcefully from them. Zhigang saw Clarendon's handling of the incident as a gesture of British impartiality and evidence that China had found the solution to the unruly behaviors of the foreigners in China. He reiterated that these actions were motivated by their self-interest but

[332] Zhigang (1981), p.57.

[333] For the parliamentary exchange on the missionary question in China between Duke Somerset and Lord Clarendon on March 9, 1869, see *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates* 1868-1869 Vol. CXCIV (London: Cornelius Buck, 1869), pp.933-941.

unknown to the home governments, and unaware of this point, the Chinese also responded wrongly, either by being too harsh or too yielding.[334]

The Chinese embassy met with Napoleon III in Paris on February 22, 1869. Napoleon III told Burlingame that he wished that the friendship of the two nations would deepen over time. He asked the Qing government to protect the French people in China and in return, he would instruct them to abide by Chinese laws and to respect Chinese customs. Zhigang asked if that was the case, why were missionary incidents spreading like wildfire to many provinces? He reasoned that local officials and the yamen clerks often abused their positions and extorted money from the people. Catholic missionaries exploited the situation to lure people into the foreign religion with the promise of protection from state authority and taxation. The ignorant people saw that foreign missionaries could fend off the authorities and converted to Christianity because of that. The corrupted officials could not oppose the missionaries and extorted the tax share of the converts from the non-Christians instead. This resulted in more people converting to the Christian religion and tension to rise between Christians and non-Christians. For Zhigang, the Christians were foolish because the money they saved from paying the taxes all went into the Church and they became the subjects (*shuyi* 屬役) of the foreign countries by converting to Catholicism.[335]

Zhigang believed that the missionaries were the primary source of trouble in Sino-Western relations. He was once confronted by a Parisian who asked him why the Chinese did not raise their children and fed them to the dogs and pigs. Upon inquiry, Zhigang found that the rumor came from the French missionaries who had been to China. They went house to house in Paris soliciting funds from the people claiming that they wished to set up orphanages to save the children in China. He explained to the man that female infanticide did occur in China, but it was confined to the poor, and the authorities had long banned the practice. Zhigang was infuriated and thought that the missionaries were malicious to concoct such a terrible rumor about China. He highlighted angrily to the person that the missionaries

[334] Zhigang (1981), pp.65-66.

[335] Ibid., p.61.

in China had committed many mischiefs and provoked great indignation and hostilities from the masses, which was the main cause for the killing of Christians and burning of churches. He believed that the actions of the missionaries were motivated by greed as they risked their lives to extract tens of thousands taels of compensation from the Chinese government, and at home they cheated their own country-men with lies for financial gains.[336]

Zhigang recognized that the missionary problem seemed so intractable because of China's weakness. He met a Chinese Catholic who was trading tea in Paris. During casual chatting, Zhigang shared the unlawful behaviors of the missionaries in China and asked him about the root of the problem. The person replied that the crux of the issue was China's military weakness and pointed out that if the Chinese were strong enough, foreign missionaries naturally would never dare to cause troubles. "This is indeed the heart of problem," Zhigang noted approvingly.[337]

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND WESTERN NATION-STATES

Zhigang wanted to persuade the French government to follow the Clarendon principle, which was also accepted by Prussia, in dealing with missionary incidents. However, the plan was derailed by the outbreak of the Tianjin Massacre. The mission had learned about the incident on 7 July 1870 shortly after they arrived in Paris from a tour of Prussia, Russia, Belgium and Italy. Zhigang recorded in his diary of the surge in anti-Chinese sentiment among the Parisians as news of the horrific deaths of consul Fontanier and the other French nationals became known. Zhigang believed that the anti-Chinese feeling in France was fanned by the Catholic Church because it was afraid that it could no longer incite and confuse the French people if the affairs of China became increasingly known as Sino-Western interactions were deepening.[338]

[336] Ibid., p.62.

[337] Ibid., p.74.

[338] Ibid., pp.115-116.

On 22 July, Zhigang found out that the court had sent Chonghou on an apology mission to France.[339] Chonghou and his entourage arrived in Paris on the 24 January of the following year. During their stay in France, the mission witnessed the Franco-Prussian War, the fall of the Second Empire, the Paris Commune uprising and the founding of the Third Republic. The events in 1870-1871 are not only momentous politically but also represent the turning point in church-state relation in France as the new Republic embarked on the radical policy of *laïcité* in years to come. Zhigang noted that during the war France withdrew French troops protecting the Pope, after which the King of Italy took advantage of the situation to seize Rome and make it his capital. The clergy in Paris were uneasy about the situation and tried to escape out of the capital. Zhigang remarked sneeringly that France was most keen among the Western nations in protecting Catholicism, however, the Pope and his missionaries only made use of her to further their selfish interests. When the ruler of France was in trouble, they did not even come to her aid.[340]

Zhang Deyi 張德彝 (1847-1918), who was with the Chonghou mission, observed how the Paris Commune leaders and the Republican government treated the Catholic Church as the main enemy of the revolution and republicanism. During the chaotic months of Prussian siege and the rule of Paris Commune of Paris, Zhang wrote in his diary of the imprisonment of a hundred bishops and priests by the "red heads."[341] Zhang also found out from Wang Chengrong 王承榮, a Ningbo merchant based in Paris, about the new treaty signed between France and the Vatican. He selected 15 clauses from the treaty which he believed could be beneficial to China and jotted them down in his diary. He was especially interested in the clauses of the treaty that had to do with curtailing the political power of the Catholic Church and control of Catholic missionaries and converts by the state. For instance, Article 1 forbade the issue of proclamations, decrees, proscriptions, and so forth by the Vatican via missionaries

[339] Ibid., p.116.

[340] Ibid., p.120.

[341] Zhang Deyi, *Suishi faguo youzhi* (Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1982), p.140. Zhang referred to the National Guards as red heads because of the color of their headdress.

as well as the practice of canon laws in France; Article 4 forbade missionaries from privately signing treaty within French territory or in ecclesiastical fiefs in the provinces; Article 6 gave French authority the power to indict bishops and missionaries if they violated criminal codes, international treaties, and church laws; Article 8 stipulated that disputes between missionaries and non-Catholics be judged by civil authority; Articles 14 and 44 required state license for the building of churches and schools; and Article 41 forbade any other activities in churches other than religious affair. Zhang also recorded Articles 45 and 52 which forbade the practice of Catholic rites outside the Church and the disparaging of other religion.[342] Zhang's inclusion of the last two articles are certainly related to the refusal of Chinese Catholics to practice communal rituals such as ancestral worship and village temple cults, and missionary attack of Confucian doctrines, which were the two main resentments against Chinese converts and foreign missionaries.

News of the struggle between the national governments of Europe against the Catholic Church also reached China after 1872 via *Shenbao*, China's first western-style commercial newspaper founded by Englishman Ernest Major in Shanghai to provide Chinese readers with important news in the world. The newspaper reported on July 15, 1872 that the Pope declared his immense hatred of Italy after he was driven out of Rome following the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian war.[343] In September it carried the news of the expulsion of Jesuits from Prussia by the government because they frequently disobeyed the law and appropriated the authority of the state. [344] About the same time, an article on the Belfast riot published in the paper highlighted the problem of religion for political control. It reported the bloodshed and the burning of houses that resulted from the violence between the Irish Protestants and Catholics. The article referred to the riot as a "conflict among the sectarians (*jiaomen* 教門)." The term *jiaomen* was used in premodern East Asia to refer to the sectarian difference within Buddhism. The deployment of the term in the article demonstrates that the Chinese perceived the fragmentation

[342] Ibid., pp.249-250.

[343] "Luoma dianbao" *Shenbao*, July 15, 1872, p.3.

[344] "Puguo quzu da zhujiao," *Shenbao*, September 12, 1972, p.2.

within Christianity as similar to the splintering of the Buddhist teaching after the death of the founder, Shakyamuni. The article attributed the Protestant reformation and the bloody religious wars to the corruption of the Pope and the Catholic Church. [345]

The news about church-state struggle and religious conflict underscored to Chinese readers the challenge of Catholicism to state authority and order. On October 15, 1874, the *Shenbao* published a commentary in response to the news of Zongli Yamen's meeting with representatives of the treaty powers in Beijing to correct the article protecting religious proselytism. The author extrapolated that Zongli Yamen's action had to do with the interference of Catholicism to governance. As illustrations, he cited the centuries of religious wars in Europe and more recently, Bismarck expulsion of the missionaries and the disobedience of Catholic priests to state authority and law in Brazil. Furthermore, he pointed out that though the Catholic Church did not have military power, but it possessed the power to rouse the mind-hearts of the people through prognosticating God's will and administering the sacrament of confession. This was why state authority in Catholic countries became weak and their governments did not dare make enemies with the Catholic Church.[346]

PROTESTANT POLEMICS AND CONFUCIAN BIAS

In December 1876, Guo Songtao 郭嵩燾 was dispatched to England on an apology mission for the murder of A.R. Margary and to be China's first resident minister abroad. Guo was selected for the job because he was recognized as the foremost expert on foreign affairs. Guo was the only person among the proponents of the Self-strengthening Movement to understand the superiority of Western political institutions and civilization. Guo believed that China had to study and learn from the West rather than superficially adopting the Western technology if she wanted to attain wealth and power.[347] He watched

[345] "Jiaomen zhensheng," *Shenbao*, September 11, 1872, p.3.

[346] "Lun Zhongguo yi yinggeng gai huwei xijiao zhiyue," *Shenbao*, October 8, 1874, p.1.

[347] J.D. Frodsham, *The First Chinese Embassy to the West: The Journals of Kuo Songt'ao, Liu Hsi-hung and Chang Te-yi* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp.xxx-xxxv.

anxiously as Meiji Japan gradually strengthened through wholesale westernization while China remained arrogant and blind to her own backwardness. He was a keen learner of the West, meticulously observing and recording in his journal what he saw in London and Paris.

Like all high officials, Guo considered the missionary issue the most serious problem for local governance and diplomatic relations. In a memorial submitted to the throne on May 20, 1877, Guo pointed out the rise of anti-missionary violence in Fujian, Anhui, Sichuan, and Henan, and averred that local authorities had great problem managing the Christian incidents because they did not understand the origins of Christian missionization in the West. He traced the missionary movement to the competition among the various teachings in the West. All Western sects stemmed from the teaching of Moses, and the earliest was Catholicism (*Tianzhu jiao*) founded by Jesus. Catholicism became prominent during Roman time when its head was esteemed in Europe as the "Emperor of teaching" (*jiaohuang*).

Guo maintained that the "Emperor of teaching" fumed by the challenge of other teachings, decided to concentrate on missionary enterprise to persuade other states to establish Catholicism as the state orthodoxy for self-aggrandizement.[348] This led to the creation of confessional states and the political division of the West according to religious lines. "In the establishment of instruction in the West, each state has its own state teaching. The Germanic states, Italy and Spain located near Rome all practice Roman Catholicism; the other Germanic states, Switzerland and nations in West until England and the United States Protestantism. Turkey and the nations to its east Islam; and Russia at the most northern part of Europe the Greek Orthodoxy." Guo noted that religious boundaries were delineated sharply between states as well as between the ruler and the ruled within a polity. In countries where the ruler and the people were practicing different *jiao*/religions, compelling the subjects to convert would always cause trouble. Guo cited the example of Ottoman Turkey, which had great disturbances in

[348] *Guo Songtao zougao* (Yuelu shushe, 1983), p.369.

Catholic regions of the empire when the Muslim ruler tried to force the Catholic communities to follow Islam.[349]

Guo indicated that Western states would not permit foreign missionaries to practice and proselytize other teaching within their territories, however China could tolerate Christian propaganda since she did not discriminate against foreign teachings. Yet China should not allow Christian subjects to challenge to political authority and cause local unrests. Guo distinguished between Catholic priests (*shenfu* 神甫) and Protestant pastors (*mushi* 牧師) and identified the former as the main culprit of missionary incidents in China. He wrote, "Based on what your minister saw in the West, missionaries who proselytize and practice Catholicism are called priests and those proselytizing and practicing Protestantism pastors, the kind of people who are knowledgeable, talented, and constantly striving for goodness." Guo underscored that all missionaries in China were *shenfu*. The primary objective of Catholic missionaries was to gain as many converts as possible as the status of *shenfu* was awarded based on the number of converts made. Thus, the *shenfu* went around collecting followers indiscriminately and many scoundrels and hoodlums joined the foreign teaching for protection against the law that it provided and oppressed the common people. As a result, the common people detested the Catholic teaching and many instances of attack of missionaries and converts happened within the three decades of the legalization of Catholicism. He recommended that the Zongli Yamen negotiate with the foreign representatives to inspect the quality of *shenfu* and allow only those who are moral and law-abiding to proselytize in China.[350]

Guo's anti-Catholic bias was shaped by his own experience of the abuses of Catholic clergy in China and his reading of the *Haiguo Tuzhi* and *Yinghuan Zhilue*, as well as, the influence of his English

[349] Ibid, p.367. Guo arrived in England at the time when the war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire was looming, and the crisis attracted the attention of British politicians and public. Guo followed the debates in the British parliament on the Russo-Turkish war and the events in Turkey with great interest. Guo noted in his diary that the Christian dependencies of Turkey such as Romania, Serbia and Montenegro revolted against the Turks and attacked one another. Russia took advantage of the situation and used the protection of Protestantism (yesu jiao) in Bulgaria as a pretext to go to war with Turkey. Guo had made the mistake of identifying Protestantism instead of Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the cause of the Russo-Turkish conflict. See Guo (1984), p.423 and pp.430-431.

[350] *Guo Songtao zougao*, pp.370-371.

interpreters and interlocutors. The English Legation in Beijing, which insisted on the establishment of a Chinese embassy in London as part of the settlement for the Margary incident, aimed to influence the Chinese mission from the very beginning. Two Englishmen W.C. Hillier (1849-1927) and Halliday Macartney (1833-1906) were attached to the Chinese mission as foreign secretaries and interpreters. It was through the Protestant lens of his English interpreters that he learned about the Reformation and the origins of Christian missionization. In his journal, Guo recorded:

> The Pope held the religious authority of the various European states and furtively controlled state power through the clergy. The various countries gradually suffered because of his wanton indulgence. In 1500, during mid-Ming, an Englishman by the name of Wycliffe composed a book to censure the Pope. As a result, the German priest Luther established the teaching of Jesus or *poluotesi* (Protestant). What is meant by *poluotesi* is swearing never to follow the Roman teaching.…With the split of the two teachings, [the Pope] having the desire to abuse and win power, increasingly made use of the technique [of missionization] to flaunt his greatness. There were many privately established missionary societies which had their followers dispersed across the various countries of Asia to proselytize among their people. The various Catholic followers got together to lead and promote [these societies] for self-aggrandizement, however, in reality they were under the direction of the Pope. The Spaniard Ignatius Loyola established the Society of Jesus (what the French call Jesuit), and under its command Matteo Ricci came to China during the Ming dynasty to advance it. Thereafter, missionary societies proliferated and proselytized in many countries in the East. These societies sought the permission of the Pope, from whom they received the name of their societies, to evangelize in suitable countries. After lifting of the prohibition against Catholicism in China, the sects proselytizing in the capital belonged to the Lazarist Mission. The more Christianity fragmented the more fervent religious proselytization became. The English call the Roman teaching *jiateli* [Catholic] and the teaching of Jesus *poluote* [Protestant], however [the Reformation] was launched only to remedy the abuses of the Roman teaching. As the missionary activities of the Catholic missionaries became increasingly extensive in the East,

Protestants tried to imitate their methods, and as a result, Protestant missionary societies burgeoned as well.[351]

Guo noted that different Protestant missionary societies coexisted in the United Kingdom. "The official religion of England is call Episcopalian, the Scottish official religion Presbyterian, and both receive state funding. The ones that do not receive state funding are call independent. In between, there are many other private churches with different names such as Methodist and Baptist." [352] Through his conversation with an elderly pastor, he learned that Catholicism was not proscribed in England, but the clerical leadership was only recognized by the Catholics and not the state.[353]

Macartney explained to Guo that the Catholic missionary societies were similar to the clandestine White Lotus sectarians in China. This was so because organizationally it had leader and sub-leaders and regulations to maintain discipline among its members. And when members enter the sect, they must vow to serve their leader and obey his command even to the point of death. He pointed out to Guo that even the Catholic nations of France and Spain strictly forbade the entry of Catholic missionary societies in their countries because of the harm to social order that they posed. Macartney also told Guo about the decline in political authority of the Pope in recent years. The Pope loss the Papal states to the newly unified Italian state and lived in his palace in Rome as a puppet ruler under the protection of his own guards. Guo wrote that there was a priest by the name of Guersi 古爾錫 who had in recent years criticized the political power of the Vatican and argued that the Pope and his bishops

[351]教王既主各國教權而陰制其柄，因以肆志縱欲，諸國亦漸苦之。一千五百年間，當明之中葉，英人有味格裏弗著，始著書辟之。日耳曼教士路剔因之創立耶蘇教，謂之波羅特士。波羅特士者，誓不從羅馬教之謂也…既分立兩教，於是怙權爭勝之心，日挾其術以求逞。乃各私立會名，分布徒眾，蔓延於亞細亞諸國，以傳教為民。諸從羅馬教者相與導揚之，以廣己而造大，而教王又實為之主持。日思巴尼牙人名意格納希珥斯羅爾窩拉，創立熱索亦得會（法人語耶蘇曰熱索），明季利瑪竇奉之以行於中國。嗣是會名繁興，傳教東土各國，率請命教主，奉其教會名目以行於其所適之國。中國重開天主教之禁，而傳教京師者，又為拉薩立斯得會。教分，而其傳教亦愈切。英人名羅馬教曰加特力，名耶蘇教曰波羅特士，但當時求去羅馬教積弊而已。羅馬教傳之東土，日益加廣；波羅特士教亦相與仿而效之，於是耶蘇教會亦興。Guo, *Lundun yu bari riji*, pp.408-409.

[352] Ibid., p.409.

[353] Ibid., p.238.

should not rule over land and people. It was rumored that after the Pope passed away, his successor would be exiled from the Apostolic Palace to the British island of Malta.[354]

Guo also observed at close hand the attack of the secularizing state in France on the Catholic Church when he was appointed ambassador to France as well in February 1878. He wrote that the power of the Catholic clerics greatly diminished as France became a Republic in recent years. The year 1878 was the centenary anniversary of the death of Voltaire and the French celebrated the renowned philosopher by convening study societies and printing his works. He noted that Voltaire and his contemporary Rousseau had both been extremely critical of the clerics. Voltaire wrote books denouncing the priests at the time when the Catholic Church was powerful. Voltaire was incriminated and forced to flee and after he passed away his corpse was burned under the order of the Church leaders.[355] In addition, Guo observed that the Ministry of Education in Republican France administered matters regarding public education such as schools, museums and theatres, and the Catholic Church.[356]

CIVILIZING INFLUENCE OF THE CHURCH

For Guo, the way the West reverently worshipped the religious leader (*jiaozhu*), to the point of putting the entire country under his service and capturing the hearts of the whole nation, was perplexing. He tried to understand the centrality of *jiao*/religion in Western societies according to Confucian duality of *zheng* and *jiao*.[357] Unlike China whose civilization was created by the legendary sage-kings of the

[354] Ibid., p.344.

[355] Ibid., p.562.

[356] Ibid., p.555.

[357] For the relations between governance and moral teaching in Confucian tradition, see Chang Hao, "Zhengjiao yiyuan hai shi zhengjiao eryuan?: Chuantong rujia sixiang zhong de zhengjiao guanxi" in *Si xiang* (Reflexion) no. 20 (2012), pp.111-143. Chang traces the separation of political and doctrinal authorities in the Confucian tradition with the emergence of the Neo-Confucian movement during the Song. Song Neo-Confucian masters, most notably Zhu Xi, distinguished between the traditions of political rule (*zhengtong* 政統) and moral-truth (*daotong* 道統). They argued that political and doctrinal authorities were split after the ancient three dynasties ruled by the legendary sage-kings and the tradition of moral-truth was inherited by Confucius and transmitted to Mencius, and the Neo-Confucian scholars of Tang and Song. The separation of *zheng* and *jiao* was later, as we shall see, utilized by Kang Youwei to argue for a separation between Church and state, and by Zhang Zhidong for a separation between education and government.

three dynasties, who combined the roles of teacher and ruler, Western civilization was created by religious teacher like Moses and Jesus. "In the dawn of Western civilization, there was no unifying figure of teacher-ruler [like China], thus the person whom the people trusted was the one that they became subjects of. Moses, as a result of [instructing] the Israelites, became a king in the western land. Jesus succeeded him by declaring that he was expounding teaching on behalf of Heaven."[358] Jesus was brutally murdered by the rulers because he was appropriating monarchial power by declaring himself the son of Heaven and the universal ruler of the world. Guo noted that though Jesus was killed and so were many of his disciples for spreading his teaching, 1800 years later the people in the West still subscribed to his teaching and European monarchs obediently honored him as the only son of Heaven.[359]

Doctrinally, Guo did not think that the Christian teaching was remarkable in any way. The Bible was so uninteresting to Guo that he tried to read it many times but was unable to finish the book until he read it again in the company of the English missionary John Fryer (1838-1927) on his way back to China. He was of the opinion that Christian ideas about compassion, miracles, and life after death were a less sophisticated version of Buddhist ideas. Like many of his contemporaries, Guo believed that Christianity had Buddhist origins. For Guo, Jesus was merely a sorcerer (術士 *shushi*) who gathered followers with his supernatural power and salvationist doctrine. Thus, the historical importance of Christianity was not Jesus but the Church built after his death.

The Church became the civilizing center of the West after the Roman Empire adopted Christianity as the state religion. The priests were specialists in Latin script and law code and helped spread Roman literature and legal system to the various countries. As a result, Latin became the

---

The scholarship of the Song Neo-Confucians is closely connected to their political project of constructing a moral community in local society under the voluntarism and leadership of the Neo-Confucians. The fall of North China to the Jurchens and the failure of Wang Anshi's New Policies had made the literati disillusioned with the imperial state. Song scholars believed that they, not the political rulers, were the true inheritors of the Way of the sage-kings and sought to morally transform the world from the bottom-up by focusing on individual moral cultivation and reforming local society through institutions such as the lineage, private academy, and community compact. For Neo-Confucianism as a philosophy and social movement, see Peter Bol, *Neo-Confucianism in History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2010).

[358] Guo, *Lundun yu bari riji*, p.913.

[359] Ibid.

progenitor of European culture and education. In England, Christianity became prominent during the three centuries of Roman rule of the island. In this period, churches dotted the land and all facets of state-building such as laws and knowledge in farming, irrigation, medicine, alchemy, and handicrafts all originated from the priests. The clergy continued to be prominent from the time King Egbert established the Kingdom of England during the Tang dynasty until the present as they held the crucial knowledge in statecraft. Guo was later invited to visit Oxford University by the missionary-scholar James Legge (1815-1897). He discovered that the oldest colleges in England was established by Catholic priests such as New College and Christ Church College, which were founded by William of Wykeham, Bishop of Winchester and Cardinal Thomas Wolsey. He noted that the clergy remained influential in higher education as they formed the majority of school administrators and teachers in all universities in the United Kingdom.

From his personal observations and conversations with others, Guo saw the crucial role Christianity played in England, especially in the field of learning and moral education. On his visit to Christ's Hospital school, an elementary school in London that catered for poor and orphaned children, Guo observed that before and at the end of meals priests gave sermons and thereafter the students, in a kneeing position and with the bible in their hands, sang hymns accompanied by music. He asked about the meaning of the songs and was told that they were wishes for God's blessings for the ruler, the crown prince, the nobles, officials and the donors of the school. Guo was very much impressed by what he saw and likened the ceremony to the the employment of ritual and music by the ancient sages in China to harmonize the temperament of people and naturally foster the sentiments of loyalty and love in them.[360]

The State and Church in the West provided a stark contrast for Guo to the degeneration of both *zheng* and *jiao* in China. The Way had been established early in the Chinese history by the sage-kings of antiquity. Though the Way of the sage-kings had been split into the Ways of the Monarch and Teacher (*jundao*, *shidao* 君道, 師道) with the decline of the Zhou ruling house and the rise of the school of

[360] Ibid., pp.132-133.

Confucius and Mencius, however the Chinese civilization had not declined. The Ways of the Monarch and Teacher had degenerated with the unification of China by Qin and the subjugation of education officials by Han Wudi. As a result, China sunk into barbarism after the Qin-Han period. Politically, the history of China thereafter was nothing but violence as the Han and normadic peoples tried to subjugate one another by force. Intellectually and morally, the Confucian school experienced a revival under a couple of Song and Ming scholars but they had limited impact on the greater world. Guo blamed this on the conservative outlook of the sages in China who focused primarily on self-cultivation. He compared this unfavorably to the spirit of self-sacrifice of the Christian missionaries and their desire to save all sentient beings in the world.[361]

Guo greatly admired the Protestant missionaries as civilizing agents. In one conversation with Fryer, he asked what was primary in Great Britain's building and management of a vast empire. Fryer answered that the missionaries were the pioneers in the colonization of new land. Missionaries often traveled to faraway and isolated places to spread the Gospel. They learned the language of the natives and survey the terrains, and thereafter the merchants arrived to establish trading posts and residences. In event of conflict, the state would support its own subjects militarily and seize that opportunity to abolish the local ruler, annex the land, and impose British legal and political systems. After hearing that, Guo lamented, "Missionary proselytization and state policy mutually supported one another, and [the missionaries] caused the wild and stubbornly uncivilized custom of the natives to change and made them wealthy. The literary Confucians of China, on the other hand, learned from one another to speak impractical, arrogant and empty words. As if barking wildly in a dreaming and drunken stupor, they ignorantly proclaimed themselves as sages. The decline and the ultimate extinction of the Song and Ming dynasties to a large extent had to do with the theories of the various Confucian scholars."[362]

[361] Ibid., pp.627-628.

[362]教師傳教而與國事相因，亦使狉獉頑獷之習，一變而為富庶。中國章句之儒，相習為虛驕無實之言，醉夢狂呼，頑然自聖。宋、明兩朝之終於衰弱，澌然以盡，諸儒議論之力為多。Ibid., p.930.

By the late 1870s, the conflict between the European countries and the Holy See had been known to the Qing court through its diplomatic channels. The Chinese were aware that the Vatican was the sole legitimate authority over the Catholic missions and that it had diplomatic representation in the European countries. In 1881, Li Hongzhang, the leading person in Chinese foreign policy, decided to establish diplomatic relations with the Vatican as a solution to the judicial problem caused by Catholic missionaries in China and the abuses of the French protectorate over Catholic mission. Li approached Sir John Pope Hennessy (1834-1891), the Governor of Hong Kong and an Irish Catholic, to convey the idea to the Vatican.

Leo XIII, the new Pope, was favorable to the idea as he was eager to increase the international presence of the Vatican. During the outbreak of Sino-French hostilities in 1884-1885, Leo XIII sent a letter to Emperor Guangxu (r.1875-1908) expressing his gratitude for the protection of Catholic missionaries. Most importantly, the letter denied the French protectorate by highlighting the international character of the Catholic mission and that the sovereign authority over European missionaries and Chinese Christians belonged to China not France. He also stressed that the work of the mission was to propagate and safeguard the doctrine of Jesus Christ, and not involve in political matters. The letter was carried by the apostolic delegate Fr. Francesco Giulianelli (1831-1898) to China in 1885. The primary aim of the Giulianelli mission was to negotiate with the Qing government the establishment of diplomatic relation between China and the Vatican. [363]

Zeng Jize 曾紀澤 (1839-1890), the minister to France and England, wrote approvingly of the proposal. He noted that the French government treated its own Catholics poorly and the protection of Catholicism was just a ruse to encroach on other countries. The Pope controlled the Catholics of the various countries through the faith of the adherents in him while European governments managed their Catholic population through law and punishment. Zeng reasoned that having a papal representative in

[363] Gianni Griveller, "China, the Holy See and France. The Giulianelli Mission to the Chinese Emperor and Its Aftermath (1885-1886), *Yihetuan yundong yu zhongguo jidu zongjiao* (Taibei: Furen daxue chubanshe, 2004), pp.46-63.

China had the merit of removing the interference of imperial powers in religious disputes, especially their use of military coercion or the mixing of commercial issues with religious ones. Since the pope did not have an army, he could be made to bend through reasoning in case of religious dispute, which would make negotiations easier.[364]

After the Giulianelli mission, Li Hongzhang consulted with Robert Hart and appointed John George Dunn (1868-1937), an employee of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service, as his envoy to Rome to negotiate a treaty and the resettlement of the Beitang church in Beijing. The French government was fiercely opposed to the idea and made it known to the Vatican that the papal representative to China should not have diplomatic power and be subordinated to French authority, just like the apostolic delegate to the Ottoman empire. Nonetheless, in August 1886 the Vatican appointed Monsignor Antonio Agliardi as the nuncio to China. In retaliation, France threatened to break off diplomatic relation with the Vatican and to abrogate the 1801 Concordat, which would remove all state financial support to the Catholic Church. The first attempt of the Vatican and Qing court to establish diplomatic relation failed as Leo XIII eventually caved in to French pressure and Li Hongzhang did not agree with having a papal representative without full power. [365]

SEPARATING CHURCH AND IMPERIALISM

From 8 March 1890 to 27 May 1894, Xue Fucheng 薛福成 (1838-1894) served as the minister to England, France, Italy and Belgium. Xue was appointed at the time of "new imperialism," the scramble for concessions in Asia and African among the Euro-American powers and the emerging power of Japan beginning in the 1870s. In the preface of his diary, Xue wrote, "The trading of the English and the missionizing of the French have already spread all over the interior, their transactions with us have become numerous and competitive….The British and French colonies of Burma and Vietnam especially

[364] Xue Fucheng, *Chushi yingfa biyi siguo riji* (Yuelu shushe, 1985), pp.211-212.

[365] Young (2013), pp.57-59.

threatened our dependencies in the south. We cannot close our doors and resist them, and people should know! If people know it and do not plan for security, isn't it what is call to be mired in the old ways or to engage in sugarcoating or self-deceiving?" However, Xue was not pessimistic in China's ability to resist the encroachments of the foreign powers. He added, "In the past, the Netherlands and England repeatedly used commerce to besiege other countries and France and Russia instead frequently used *jiao*/religion to invade other countries, however, sometimes it is effective and sometimes not. Why is that so? In defense there are methods and in institutions there are ways. The foreigners have great advantages and also disadvantages. This is why the power of control is with us not with them."[366]

Xue's optimism was derived from the ability of the Qing court to gather accurate information of the West through first-hand and up to date accounts from its diplomatic corps and its success in fighting off foreign encroachments. The diplomatic victory of Zeng Jize in recovering Yili from the Russians with the signing of the Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1881, the thwarting of Japan's advance in Korea in 1884, and Qing's success in fending the French off militarily during the Sino-French war 1884-1885 are testimonies for the success of the Self-Strengthening Movement. While in Europe, Guo Songtao observed from the opinions of the French and English officials that China was no longer looked down upon by France and England as in the past, and that many would now consider her a worthy ally.[367]

Xue noted in his diary that in the last century Western countries interfered in the politics of other countries because of three reasons. First was to protect commercial interests, for example England against Russia in the Crimean War and the United States against Spain in the Latin American Wars of independence; Second was for the protection of *jiao*/religion, such as Russia going to war against Turkey for Bulgaria and; lastly, for strategic reasons such as the 1870 Franco-Prussian war. Xue took religious disputes to be a flash point in Sino-foreign relations and thus, read up and copied verbatim the records in the legation written by Guo Songtao and Zeng Jize on missionary incidents.

[366] Xue (1985), pp.61-62.

[367] Ibid., p.167.

Xue encountered his first diplomatic incident regarding missionaries in 1891. On 20 June, 1891, Xue first learned about the anti-missionary incident in Wuhu, Anhui.[368] The Wuhu incident was the beginning of a burst of anti-missionary riots in the Yangzi Valley between May and July of 1891. The outbreak of missionary violence in 1891, its intensification in the 1890s culminating to the catastrophic Boxer incident, was not unrelated to the rapid expansion and penetration of missionary enterprise in the interior, especially the Protestant evangelical groups, starting from 1890. Like the Tianjin incident, the anti-missionary riots of 1891 were triggered by rumors of kidnapping and the gouging of eyes of children to make medicine by Christians.[369] The inflammatory rumors were believed to be originated from a xenophobic Hunanese named Zhou Han 周漢.[370] On 5 July, Xue received another telegram from the Zongli Yamen detailing the outbreak of the riots, the number and nationalities of foreigners killed, and the countermeasures of the Qing government. Xue was instructed to communicate with the foreign office of the various nations of the situation and to prevent them from being swayed by the negative reports of their consular officials in China.[371] The ministers of England, France and Germany in Beijing had criticized the ineptitude of the Qing authority and threatened to sail their gunboats up the Yangtze to protect their own nationals. They successfully extracted from the Qing court an imperial edict on 13 June that instructed the various provincial governors to swiftly arrest the bandits involved, defend the foreigners and their properties, and cashier incompetent local officials.

On 11 July Sir Thomas Sanderson (1841-1923), the permanent undersecretary at the Foreign Office in London, censured Xue Fucheng through Macartney and threatened "that if public opinion once become alarmed and indignant in France and England, a cry for intervention might arise which would have very embarrassing and even serious consequences."[372] However, violence raged on in the

[368] Ibid., p.379.

[369] For an account of the events inspiring the Yangzi anti-missionary riots of 1891, see Ter Haar (2006), pp.178-195.

[370] Whitehall placed considerable diplomatic pressure on the Chinese government to apprehend Zhou Han, whom they believed was the main agitator of the riots. Edmund Wehrle, *Britain, China, and Anti-Missionary Riots 1891-1900* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966), p. 194.

[371] Xue (1985), pp.384-385.

[372] Wehrle (1966), p.33.

summer of 1891 with numerous missionary posts attacked and Christians killed. It was believed by the Qing officials and foreign ministers that the attacks were plotted by the Elder Brother Society (*gelao hui* 哥老會). The ministers in Beijing continued to threaten unilateral military actions. On August 12 and 25, ministers of nine countries (Belgium, France, England, Italy, Japan, Russia, Spain, Germany, and the U.S.) sent a joint diplomatic note to Zongli Yamen demanding adequate protection for foreigners and punishment for the culprits and incompetent officials. Xue telegraphed Li Hongzhang to caution him of the precariousness of the situation as it concerned the grievances of many nations.[373]

On July 16, Xue sent his report on the management of the diplomatic crisis to the Zongli Yamen. After the settlement of the incident, he suggested that the Zongli Yamen should use the fact of the chronic conflicts between Christians and non-Christians to negotiate with the foreign ministers in Beijing for a regulatory framework to control missionary activities in China. He pointed out that in the recent years Germany, France, Italy, and Austria had imposed legal restrictions on Christians in their own countries, and it was against international law for them to claim protection over Christians in China. In his journal, Xue had noted the conflict between the Vatican and the other European countries, and the dwindling of political power of the Pope. He also observed how France and Germany defeated the political challenge of the Catholic Church to state authority through the policies of *laïcité* and *Kulturkampf*.[374]

The rise of nation-states and secularization of politics in Europe after 1870 made the Chinese understand the changing relationship between *jiao*/religion and governance in the West. Qingchang 慶常, the attaché of the Chinese legation in Paris, wrote to Xue with his opinion on the anti-missionary incident. He pointed out that "(i)n the West politics and *jiao*/religion are two different matters which is why issues are easy to resolve. However, in China both are muddled together as one, and once any major incident occur the various nations would insert themselves as the mediator to take advantage of

[373] Xue (1985), p.419.

[374] Ibid., pp.301-302.

the situation and extort [the Chinese government].” He advised that China should negotiate directly with the churches in China which would have the benefits of reducing the compensations as well as preserving the reputation of the government. Qingchang argued that the churches would be easier to negotiate with since they rely on the Chinese government for protection and dare not make any unreasonable demands. Xue instructed Qingchang to secretly make contact with the various churches that were affected by the riots.[375]

Xu Jianyin 徐建寅 (1845-1901), who had been the attaché of the Chinese legation in Berlin and had conducted an extensive survey of France and England, wrote to Xue emphasizing the absolute sovereignty the Qing government had over Christians, including foreign missionaries, within its territories. Xu highlighted that the protection of missionaries was stipulated in the treaties and thus the Qing government had the power to control foreign missionaries in China since it had responsibility to protect them. He pointed out that the setting up of orphanages and other welfare institutions within the church was not stated in the treaties and should be reported to the local officials for approval. These Christian welfare institutions should keep records on their daily activities and submit them to the local authorities for official endorsement, supervision and ease of protection. Those that did not have official sanction could be made to close down.[376]

On 11 September, Xue submitted to the throne a memorial containing his recommendations for ending the anti-missionary incidents. In this proposal, Xue maintained that the temporary solution to the problem involved the usual method of punishing the culprits, paying compensation, and cashiering incompetent officials. The permanent solution to the problem would require the Qing state to officially recognize Christianity and negotiate a regulatory framework for missionary activities with the treaty powers after the settlement of the Yangzi riots to control the behavior of foreign missionaries and ministers in China. Xue argued that anti-Christian riots was commonly caused by rumors of missionary atrocities spread by roving brigands. Judging from personal observations in the West, Xue averred that

[375] Ibid., p.413.

[376] Ibid., p.415.

the activities of missionary societies were only charitable and there was no use of human organs in western medicine and chemistry. He asserted that only when the rumor was clarified could the doubts of local officials and ignorant folks be dispelled, bringing an end to the riots. Xue endorsement of Christianity was significant since majority of the officialdom held the opposite view as a result of the social unrest and diplomatic problem caused by missionary activities. Xue was quick to clarify that he did not mean that Christianity causes no harm, pointing to the abuse of power by the Pope in the past and the possibility that criminals in the religion might take advantage of extra-territorial protection to commit evil.[377]

Xue stressed the need to come out with regulations to control the Christians in China. He highlighted that in recent years European countries had instituted strict laws to control their Christian population and prevent the control over religion from falling into the hands of others. He underscored the fact that the control of native Christian population belonged to domestic affairs and not under the jurisdiction of foreign countries or the Vatican. However, Xue realized that China's semi-colonial status prevented her from exercising her full sovereign power. Still Xue pointed out that there were some articles in the abortive regulations proposed by Zongli Yamen in 1871 which would be agreeable to the Western powers. These include banning missionary criticism of Confucianism, inspection of churches by officials, notifying local authorities of the adoption of infants, and prohibiting missionary intervention in lawsuits. At present, China could introduce the articles that the western powers were agreeable to and slowly reason with them to implement the others in the future. Alternatively, as soon as China's military capability was ready and her relationship with other nations became strong, she could impose her will on the foreign powers and imitate the same restrictive policy in the West against Christianity.[378] The proposal of Xue Fucheng was adopted by Li Hongzhang who composed a ten articles regulation in 1892 for negotiation with the foreign powers. Xue focused his attention on the regulation and supervision of Christian orphanages in his discussion with the French and British foreign

[377] Xue Fucheng, "Fenbie jiaoan zhiben zhibiao zhi ji shu" in Wang ed. (1984), pp.391-392.

[378] Ibid., pp.392-394.

offices. However, the initiative amounted to nothing as France and England insisted that the riots were caused by anti-Christian pamphlets and placards and saw the regulation of orphanages as irrelevant.[379]

OVERCOMING THE RELIGIOUS PROTECTORATE

In the aftermath of the diplomatic crisis of 1891, Xue reflected on the management of anti-missionary incidents in China in a diary entry on 31 July, 1892. He began his reflection with the decline of the authority of the Pope with the Protestant Reformation. He singled out the Reformation as the most significant event in the overcoming of religious authority by the state:

> In the past, the various western countries were under the domination of the Pope. When the power and arrogance of the Pope was at its zenith, he held the authority of installing and disposing of the ruler of the western countries; and the people of these countries faithfully followed the Pope….Since the establishment of Protestantism as a separate entity and rivaling the Catholic Church, there had been many wars in the European countries due to the religious competition among the adherents of the different religions, causing tens of millions of lives and decades of unrest. As a result, the adherents of the two *jiao*/religions were allowed to practice their own faith separately so as to prevent mutual vilification and encroachment. Thus, both Protestantism and Catholicism counterbalanced one another and causing the Pope to lose his power. Eventually the devotion of the ignoramuses to the Catholic religion began to decline, and the monarchs and ministers of various European nations could cast off the benighted influence of the Church and strive to become strong and powerful. The teaching of the Pope could no longer muddle these countries nor could the strength of the church triumph them. Even Catholic countries such as France, Italy, Germany, and Austria, all created new laws to restrict their own catholic population. The Pope is well aware of the situation but cannot do anything about it. The missionaries are

[379] Xue Fucheng, "Lun banli jiaoan shanhou zhangcheng shu" in *Chushi gongdu* (1898), p.423.

intimidated by state authority and without fail obediently subject themselves to the regulations of the state.[380]

Xue's extremely negative view of the Pope and Catholic Church is shaped by his own Confucian anti-cleric bias and also by his own observations of state secularism in Europe. He observed that the power of the Pope had been greatly reduced due to the changing political situation in Europe since 1870.The defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian war led to the retraction of French troops from Italy that had been protecting the Pope. Subsequently, the King of Italy moved to Rome and made it his capital. He confiscated all the properties of the Pope and limited his power to only religious affairs. The Pope was outraged by the curtailment of his power but dare not say a single word. Furthermore, Bismarck had also implemented a number of policies aiming to control the Catholics in Germany, which was soon followed by France. Xue also noted that the Roman Catholics living in Southern Germany, who were not able to live peacefully with the state, sought to overthrow Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* after his retirement recently. In France, the anti-Catholic policy of *laïcité* was slightly relaxed after the retirement of Jules Ferry, the Minister of Public Instruction. After the forceful takeover of Rome, Italy had become an immortal enemy of the Pope and it was said that he had the intention of moving to another country if anything happens in Europe.[381]

In March 1891, Xue visited Rome to present his diplomatic credentials to the King of Italy Umberto I. He was told by the locals that Rome had emerged from the poverty and decay of the hundreds of years of Vatican rule and started to flourish ever since the King of Italy took control. Xue asked them why that was so and they replied that it was because the Pope did not have any policies that guide the people morally and nourish them economically (*jiaoyang zhi zheng* 教養之政). Xue

[380]從前西洋各國受制於教王，當教王勢焰最盛之時，幾操廢立各國君主之權。而各國之民信從教王，殆如水就下，如蟻附羶也。自耶穌教另樹一幟，以與天主教為敵，歐洲各國之民，因爭教而互相攻戰，互相殘殺至數十百萬人之多，搶攘不靖者數十年。繼乃定為各行其教，有不相菲薄、不相師之意。然天主、耶穌兩教，隱然勢均力敵，而教王之勢驟衰。邇來愚民信教之心，似不如前。而各國君相，亦能實事求是，力圖自強。教王之教不足以愚之，力又不足以勝之，即素崇天主教之國，如法、義、德、奧諸大邦，無不創立新法，限制教民，教王固熟視而無如何也。教士懾於國家之威，無不謹受約束，恪守準繩。*Xue Fucheng Riji* edited by Cai Shaoqing (Jilin wenshi chubanshe, 2004), p.733.

[381] Xue (1985), pp.301-302.

concurred with the statement as he commented that the Pope was the same as the Buddhist and Daoist clergy in China, an unproductive class that lived off the labor of the ignorant people and knew nothing about governance. The Pope governed the people in Rome by hoodwinking them with the residues of Jesus' teachings that he picked up. The successive generations of Pope had added their own selfish doctrines which went against Jesus' principles. Even those with slight intelligence were aware of the intentions of the Pope and they rose up to challenge him by coming up with the *Yesu jiao* (one of the terms of Protestantism), which caused him to greatly lose his influence. In response, the Pope imposed strict laws to defend himself against his own people and those outside of Catholicism were harshly suppressed and brutally treated. The Pope was narrow-minded and jealous of the recent great advances in learning. He did not pay attention to the techniques of commerce, farming, pastoral, mining, and manufacturing and suppressed science, astronomy and geology. For Xue, the actions of the Pope were no different from the dulling of the intellect of the people by the First Emperor of China. The rule of the Pope was why the people became impoverished and the custom deteriorated. As a result, two years ago, the people all revolted against the rule of the Pope and welcomed the King of Italy into Rome.

Xue correctly identified the French protectorate as the main reason behind the increasing struggle in China's management of anti-missionary incidents. He highlighted that France deliberately usurped China's power in the control of Catholic missionaries through the Sino-French treaty, so as to ingratiate herself with the missionaries and exploit the religious incidents to further her national interest in China. This emboldened the missionaries to ignore Chinese authority and abuse their status, provoking suspicion and hatred from the Chinese population and causing conflict to arise. He opined that the recent proposal of establishing direct diplomatic relation with the Holy See was a viable method of covertly removing the French protectorate. However, he cautioned that the Qing government should cautiously implement the proposal as it might result in the surrender of the control of its Catholic population to Rome instead.[382]

[382] *Xue Fucheng Riji* edited by Cai Shaoqing, p.734.

On 11 December, 1891, Li Hongzhang wrote to Xue that Bishops Pierre-Marie-Alphonse Favier (1837-1905) and Johanne Baptist von Anzer (1851-1903) of Zhili and Shandong proposed to him through Gustav Detring, an employee of the Maritime Customs Service, about the possibility of dismantling the French religious protectorate by setting up a Catholic hierarchy in China under the charge of the Pope's apostolic delegate.[383] In reply, Xue instructed Qingchang to communicate the matter with the nuncio in Paris and through him to the Vatican. He noted that the Catholic missionaries in Turkey had become more governable with the establishment of diplomatic ties with the Vatican and the conclusion of a treaty. He also ordered Qingchang to request a copy of the treaty from the Turkish minister in Paris to be sent to the Zongli Yamen for reference.[384] Like in the earlier instance, the negotiation ultimately fell through because of French opposition.[385]

There were again calls for diplomatic relations with the Vatican after the debacle of the Juye incident in 1896, when the Germans used the death of a German missionary in Shandong as a pretext to occupy Jiaozhou Bay. The censor Chen Qizhang 陳其璋 submitted a 10 articles proposal for the resolution of anti-missionary riots. In it he suggested the creation of the post of chief missionary in Beijing to manage all foreign missionaries and religious affairs in China.[386] Prince Gong commented that the idea was not feasible since there was no such title in the West other than the nuncio mandated by the Pope. He clarified that the Zongli Yamen was at two minds regarding the idea of receiving a nuncio in China. Although the proposal had the benefit of removing the imperial powers from the negotiation of religious conflict, however, the downside was that the Qing government would lose the jurisdiction over its own Catholic population. Furthermore, the foreign missionaries came from two different religions of Catholicism and Protestantism, and could not be unified under one single hierarchy.[387]

---

[383] Xue (1985), p.462.

[384] Xue, "lun banli jiaoan shanhou zhangcheng shu" in *Chushi gongdu*, pp. 421-422.

[385] Young (2013), pp.60-62.

[386] "Yushi Chen Qizhang zouchen banli jiaoan shitiao zhangcheng zhe," *QMJA* vol.2, p.630.

[387] Ibid., p.640.

In 1899, the Zongli Yamen came out with the proposal of absorbing the Catholic hierarchy into the Chinese bureaucracy, an idea rejected previously in the secret deliberation of 1867. The Qing government issued a decree granting quasi-official status to the Catholic priesthood and bestowing the clerics the right to call on Chinese officials of equivalent rank to negotiate religious affairs. The decree had the effect of recognizing the status of Catholic priests as the official representatives of Chinese Catholic population, a role that the foreign missionaries had long arrogated for themselves but bitterly resisted by the Qing state as a violation of the treaties. The historian George Steiger has rightly pointed out that the proposal was a long-standing instrument of controlling religious communities by making the "spiritual headman" responsible for their flocks. "Buddhist monks throughout the Empire; Mohammedan teachers in Yunnan, Kansu, and Turkestan; the Lama hierarchy in Tibet; all became absorbed into the 'non-political' government system."[388] This "non-political government system" is what Wei Yuan meant by utilizing the *jiao*/religion of the non-Han peoples in governing them, the fundamental principle of Qing colonialism. The 1899 decree demonstrates a radical shift in the perception of the Qing government of Christianity. The imperial state no longer deemed Christianity as a demonic heresy and accepted it into the fold of official orthodoxy.

This change is related to the government's improved understanding of the doctrines and history of Christianity fostered by the investigation of the West through its overseas missions, and the recommendation of its diplomats to officially recognize the foreign churches so that the state could exert control over the foreign missionaries and Chinese Christians. By the late nineteenth century, the Qing state was fully aware of the separation of religious and political affairs in the West and the French subterfuge of using the religious protectorate to impinge on its sovereignty over *jiao*/religion as guaranteed by international laws. The 1899 decree aimed to drive a wedge between the missionaries and the French consuls and separate religious and diplomatic affairs. The court also believed that the decree would help to deescalate the rising anti-Christian incidents by fostering closer cooperation

[388] G. Nye Steiger, "China's Attempt to Absorbe Christianity: The Decree of March 15, 1899," *T'oung Pao*, Second Series, Vol. 24, No. 2/3 (1925 - 1926), p.228.

between local officials and foreign missionaries. This was part of the Empress Dowager Cixi's policy of devolving power from central government to the provincial authorities after the abortive Wuxu reform of the previous year. Cixi made the provincial governors take on diplomatic responsibilities as well by making them members of the Zongli Yamen. The same privilege was extended to the Protestant missionaries but it was not taken up as they saw their mission as "spiritual" unlike their Catholic rivals.[389]

The Protestant missionaries were long cognizant of the fact that "Christianity, as presented by the Roman Catholic missionaries has been made to look like a political institution" [390] which was the ground for much Chinese agitation and suspicion against Christianity. In the 1890 Second Missionary Conference in Shanghai, Timothy Richard (1845-1919) presented a paper "The Relation of Christian Mission to the Chinese Government." Richard argued that there existed a deep prejudice and hatred among the Chinese officials towards Christianity and missionary work due to the wide circulation of inflammatory anti-Christian propaganda and went on to warn about the impeding wave of persecution against the Christians.[391] To dispel the suspicion and earn the goodwill of the Chinese government, Richard suggested adapting missionary methods and teaching to Chinese needs, preparing literature to educate Chinese literati on the benefits of true Christianity (i.e. Protestantism) to the progress of nations and the world, patient endurance of the injustice suffered by Christians, and to form a commission to explain the nature of the Protestant missions to the government.[392]

---

[389] While the American Department of State did not have any objection to the Chinese proposal, the British Foreign Office made it known that "where Bishops and Priests of British nationality are concerned, Her Majesty's government cannot allow their affairs to be subjected to the interventions of the officials of any Government other than the British Government, unless with the consent of Her Majesty's Diplomatic Representative in special cases." See Ibid., pp.237-246.

[390] Rev. J.S. Burden, "Causes of Hostilities to Missionaries" in *Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal* (March 1872), p.265.

[391] In his encounters with the official class, Richard had observed the deep animosity of the Christians even among the highest-ranking mandarins. For instance, he recounted the cold attitude of Zhang Zhidong in hearing of the murder of Chinese converts and missionaries in Wuhu, Anhui in 1892. See Timothy Richard, *Forty-five Years in China,* pp.242-243.

[392] Timothy Richard, "The Relation of Christian Mission to the Chinese Government" in *Records of the General Conference of Protestant Missionaries of China held at Shanghai, May 7-20, 1890* (Shanghai: American Presbyterian Press, 1890), pp.414-415.

The idea of setting up a commission was adopted after being heavily debated during the Conference.[393] The commission consisting of seven missionaries submitted a statement to the throne via the Zongli Yamen on November 19, 1895, with the following 4 main points: 1) To thank the Chinese government for the protection given to the Protestant missions; 2) To point out the false accusations against Christian missions and the serious consequences if they are not prohibited; 3)To beseech the government to ban the circulation of anti-Christian propaganda; 4) To state that the aims of the mission as inculcating loyalty, peace and charity and working for the best interest of China. [394] They also submitted a Chinese language memorial, "A Permanent Solution for the Anti-Missionary Incidents" (*yongxi jiaoan ce* 永息教案策), to explicate these points.[395]

In the memorial, the missionaries argued that it was a universal principle that government (*zheng*) and the Church/religion (*jiao*) benefit and complement one another. To dismiss the accusation of missionaries as agents of foreign governments, they emphasized that the Protestant missions were apolitical as they were working for peace, material improvement, and enlightenment of all races and nations in the world. The memorialists stressed that "foreign missionaries and converts pledge their allegiance" to the Qing government (the missionary authors even referred to themselves as "*chen*"臣!). They highlighted how Protestantism provided the techniques for "teaching and nurturing" (*jiaoyang* 教養) of the people in western countries, helped civilizing the cannibalistic tribes in the pacific islands, and aided the pogress of the backward nations of Japan and India. In the case of China, the missionaries translated useful western works, set up schools, hospitals, charities, and some even sacrificed their lives during the provision of disaster relief.

In his memorial to the throne, Prince Gong responded favorably to the overture of the Protestant missionaries. He stated that the Protestant missionaries had all agreed during their meeting to state

[393] *Report of the Missionary Conference Held in Shanghai, May 1890* (Shanghai: North China Herald Office, 1890), pp.34-35.

[394] "A Statement of the Nature, Work, and Aims of the Protestant Missions in China, laid before the Tsung-li Ya-men, Nov.14th, 1895, to be presented to the Emperor" in *The Chinese Recorder* (February 1896), p.62.

[395] Timothy Richard and John Wherry, *Yung hsi chiao an tse* (Kuangxue-hui, 1898).

regulation of missionary activities; namely, the creation of a register for Christian converts and churches, inspection of missionary facilities, excommunication of unlawful elements from the church, prohibiting missionary involvement in lawsuits, and deportation of recalcitrant foreign missionaries. He suggested that the court could make use of this opportunity to negotiate a regulatory framework for Protestant missions, and later extend it to the Catholic missions. Prince Gong also commended on the aid that the Protestant missionaries could render to the modernization and reform efforts of China. [396] The concordat of the Protestant missionaries and the Qing government eventually did not materialize due to the demotion of Wang Mingluan 汪鳴鑾 (1839-1907), the ardent supporter of the missionary proposal in the Zongli Yamen, and more importantly, the strong opposition of the French government to the idea that the missionaries could deal directly with the Chinese authorities.[397]

The Protestant missionaries were most influential in disseminating the Christian-secular model of the separation of church and state as two distinct domains in internal politics. As we have seen, Qing diplomats such as Guo Songtao and Xue Fucheng also noted in their observations of the model at work in the subjugation of authority of the Pope and the Catholic Church under the national governments in Europe. Yet their writings did not circulate beyond the Zongli Yamen. In the end, it was therefore through the publications of the Protestant missionaries on secular reforms and their proposals for ending religious conflict[398] that the Christian-secular model gained a wide audience among reform minded literati and officials. During the 1898 reform movement, Kang Youwei 康有為 proposed the creation of a Confucian Church to deal directly with the Catholic Church as a method of depoliticizing religious

[396] "Gong qinwang Yixin deng zou wei daidi yingmei yesu jiaoshi tiaochen zhongguo jiaowu zhe," *QMJA* vol.2, pp.620-622.

[397] Richard (1916), p.251.

[398] In 1903, a multi-national group of 85 evangelists including John Griffith (1831-1912), James A. Ingle (1867-1903), Gilbert G. Warren, and K. W. Engdahl submitted to the Tartar governor of Hubei Duanfang 端方(1861-1911) a seven-point proposal for the management of religious conflicts. They emphasized the non-involvement of the Church in official affairs and allowing the authorities to arbitrate the legal dispute between converts and non-Christians. The proposal also included the novel request that the Qing government drop the use of the term "jiaomin" in official proclamations and documents less people misunderstood that the Christians were no longer subjects of the empire. It assured that the Protestant churches would prohibit the use of the term by the converts in their petition to the officials in order not to claim special legal status. "Yingmei deng jiaoshi suoni jiaowu qiduan,"*QMJA* vol.3, p.621.

conflicts. Similarly, in 1902 the censor Jiang Shixing 蔣式瑆(1864-1933) proposed to the throne the plan of defusing anti-Christian conflicts through the mass printing of the Christian bible to educate the officials about Christianity, establishing diplomatic relations with the Vatican, and setting up of indigenous Churches run by Chinese religious personnel to wrestle back Chinese control of religious affairs from the foreigners.[399] The proposal was given to the newly created Foreign Ministry (*waiwu bu* 外務部) for deliberation and was rejected as unfeasible as it was apparent to the Qing government that they had signed away their sovereignty over the religious domain in the unequal treaties. [400] The Christian-secular model promoted by the Protestant missionaries was not only instrumental in the reconceptualization of the relation between *jiao* and *zheng* among the Chinese modernizers, but also in the creation of secular Chinese nationalism and state.

[399] "Yushi Jiang Shixing zouchen tuochou minjiao xiangan fa zhe," *QMJA* vol. 3, pp.265-267.

[400] "Waiwu bu zouwei zunyi yushi Jiang Shixing guanyu minjiao xiangan banfa pian," *QMJA* vol. 3, p.324.

— 4 —

Religion and the Birth of Chinese Nationalism, 1895-1911

The tide of nationalism swept the Chinese intellectual world following the shocking defeat of China by the smaller, historically inferior, but newly modernized Japan in the 1894-1895 war.[401] The event encouraged the partitioning of China by the imperial powers and produced a crisis among the Chinese elites due to the possible fall of the Qing dynasty and the extinction of the Chinese people under foreign pressure. On April 12, 1898, the leader of the reform movement Kang Youwei established the Nation Protection Society (*baoguo hui* 保國會) in Beijing. Murata Yūjirō identifies this momentous event as the starting point of modern Chinese nationalism. Murata points out that "(i)t was here, undoubtedly, that for the first time the image of a 'national community' in place of the dynastic system was publicly suggested."[402] The society's objectives of "protecting the state, race, and religion" (*baoguo, baozhong, baojiao* 保國，保種，保教) were controversial and even seditious in the viewpoint of the Qing dynasty

[401] Benjamin Schwartz has pointed that the swift and complete defeat of the numerical superior Chinese navy in the 1895 war against Japan had decisive altered intellectual opinion towards more fundamental reform. See his *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1962), p.41.

[402] Murata Yūjirō, "Dynasty, State, and Society: The Case of Modern China" in Fogel and Zarrow eds. *Imagining the People: Chinese Intellectuals and the Concept of Citizenship*, 1890-1920 (Armonk, N.Y and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p.114.

and conservative scholar-officials.[403] The protection of the "guo" referred to defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the "state"(*guojia* 國家) not the Qing court, protection of the "zhong" referred to safeguarding the forty million Chinese race-nation not the emperor, and protection of the sacred "jiao" referred to preserving the religion of Confucius (*kongjiao* 孔教) engineered by Kang not the state orthodoxy.

In Kang's mind, defending the Confucian religion took precedence over the protection of the Chinese state and race. He credited the Jewish religion and Hinduism for the preservation of the Jewish people and the Indian race even though they lost their states and were subjected to foreign rule. If nations are "imagined communities," as Benedict Anderson suggests,[404] Chinese nationalism was first conceived in religious term. Missionary projects and orientalism were crucial to the development of religious nationalisms in Asia and the Islamic world in the second half of the nineteenth century. The significance of missionary projects is less about converting the locals to Christianity but the conversion of the non-Western world to a religious conception of community and nationhood.[405] Orientalist scholarship essentialized the diverse cultures of the "Orient" in the form of "world religions" and helped to produce discursively the timeless civilizational essence of the nation in non-Western nationalisms.[406] This chapter discusses the missionary impact on Kang Youwei's reformation of Confucianism into a "religion" in his project of church building to unite the Chinese nation spiritually against foreign imperialism.

---

[403] Luke Kwong, *A Mosaic of the Hundred Days: Personalities, Politics, and Ideas of 1898* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp.142-146.

[404] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, revised edition (New York: Verso, 1996).

[405] "The colonial era," Peter van der Veer argues, "makes new imaginations of community possible" and that "the missionary societies are active in the heart of both colonialism and nationalism, the transformation of the religious domain." *Conversion to Modernities: The Globalization of Christianity* (New York: Routledge, 1996), p.7.

[406] The missionary-scholar James Legge was the most important person in the creation of "Confucianism" and "Daoism" as world religions through his corpus translation of Chinese classics for the Sacred Books of the East project he collaborated with Max Muller. See Norman J. Girardot, *The Victorian Translation of China: James Legge's Oriental Pilgrimage* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

Prasenjit Duara has argued that religion did not play a significant role in Chinese nationalism as compare to India and Japan, which adopted the confessional nationalism of the West, because of the difference in political circumstances. Duara suggests that since China was not under direct colonial rule, Chinese elites did not feel the same level of intense threat experienced by their Indian counterparts to their language, religion, and culture; thus, they did not see the need of protecting their religion or express their national identity in communal terms in opposition to Western imperialism.[407] Likewise, Duara argues that the Confucian religion figured prominently in the identity and nationalism of the Straits-born Chinese in colonial Southeast Asia as compared to mainland China also for the same reason.[408] In a recent book, Duara explains that China did not reshape the imperial cult into a cult of the nation centered on the emperor as in Meiji Japan since Chinese emperorship was not sacred and the cost of establishing a confessional state on the basis of Confucian religion or ritualism was too high considering that the Chinese state (late Qing and early Republican) was too weak to counter the secessionist movements of the non-Han borderlands.[409]

The Indian example could not explain why China did not embrace confessional nationalism as we have witnessed that the threat of colonialization was enough to convince Chinese scholars-officials like Kang Youwei that the Chinese state, race, and religion was at the brink of annihilation by the foreign powers. The multi-ethnic character of the Qing empire was indeed a hindrance for Chinese adoption of confessional nationalism based on Confucian religion and ritualism. This was especially so as the top echelon of the Qing ruling elites believed that religion (i.e. Christianity) was a source of great trouble as witnessed from the local unrest and diplomatic incidents created by Christian proselytization. The Qing state, however, did follow the example of the Meiji state in secularizing the imperial cult into a national cult centered on Confucius during the New Policies Reforms. This chapter will also examine how Zhang Zhidong 張之洞 (1837-1909), the principal architect of the late Qing reform, purged

[407] Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp.205-230.

[408] Prasenjit Duara, "Religion and Citizenship in China and the Diaspora" in Mayfair Yang ed. (2008), pp.54-63.

[409] Prasenjit Duara, *The Crisis of Global Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p.193.

Confucian teaching and imperial rituals of sectarian, cosmological, and religious elements to engineer an official secular nationalism to transform the ailing Qing dynasty into a modern nation-state.

PROTESTANTISM AND THE GENESIS OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

As a country not colonized by the imperial powers, ideas and institutions of the West were not imposed on China but largely transmitted through the missionaries in the second half of the nineteenth century.[410] The prominent role of Protestant missions in the political modernization of China has been noted by scholars. Protestant missions facilitated the growth of Chinese nationalism largely through their educational work, social reform programs, and institutions. Protestant missionaries were instrumental prior to 1895 in transmitting the knowledge of international law, western political institutions, geography, science and history through their translation of western works either as employees of official translation bureau or as journalists and editors of missionary-run journals. The new knowledge transmitted by the missionaries challenged the imperial ideology of the three bonds and *tianxia* Sino-centrism and nurtured the "incipient nationalism" of littoral intellectuals who were influential during the reform and revolutionary movements of the last decades of the Qing dynasty.[411] After 1877, the missions began to focus their effort on providing secular education. Secular schools were set up with the aim of educating Christian youth and, for progressive missionaries, as an evangelistic strategy in Christianizing Chinese society. These protestant education institutions helped to produce China's first entrepreneurs, professionals, reformers and revolutionaries and instilled a sense of patriotism in them of "China," a national state not an empire ruled by a dynastic house. Many of them became elected members of local assemblies at the end of the Qing and leaders of the 1911 revolution and the new republic.

---

[410] Jessie G. Lutz ed. *Christian Missions in China: Evangelists of What?* (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1965), p.vii.

[411] Paul Cohen, "Wang T'ao and Incipient Chinese Nationalism" in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 26.4 (Aug. 1967), pp.559-574.

However, Protestant missions has been assigned by scholarship an incidental role in the emergence of Chinese nationalism since religion is seen as "traditional" and "transcendent" and the opposite of nationalism, which is "secular", "immanent," and "modern." Joseph Levenson has famously argued that unlike the seventeenth century when Chinese literati opposed Christianity because it was "untraditional" (i.e unconfucian), Chinese intellectuals rejected the foreign religion in the modern era when Confucianism was dying not only because it was foreign, but also because it was unmodern.[412] This interpretation is collaborated by studies of the anti-Christian movement of the 1920s when Chinese students and intellectuals, under the support of the GMD-CCP united front, agitated against Christian influence in education and other cultural activities in the name of anti-imperialism and science.[413] According to one mission historian, Protestant ideology became irrelevant to the nationalist secular goal of an earthly paradise as Chinese nationalism came to age after the 1920s. [414]

Since Talal Asad's work on the genealogy of religion, scholars have become more sensitive to the ideological construction of religion. In their co-edited volume on nation and religion, Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann argue that "The dichotomy between religion and nationalism is an ideological element in the Western discourse of religion" and that both "are conceptualized as universal categories in Western modernity and that their universality is located precisely in the history of Western expansion." They critique the view influential in social sciences that nationalism, a unified culture or identity, is a product of Western modernizing process known as secularization, while other societies under the sway of backward "religious traditions" remain retarded in progress. In short, the dichotomy of religion and nationalism "functions not only in the Western perception of the Non-West, but also the

[412] Joseph Levenson, *Confucian China and its Modern Fate: The Problem of Intellectual Continuity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), pp.117-125.

[413] Yip Ka-che, Religion, Nationalism, and Chinese Students: The Anti-Christian Movement of 1922-1927 (Bellingham, Washington: Center for East Asian Studies, Western Washington University, 1980); Jessie G. Lutz, "Chinese Nationalism and the Anti-Christian Campaigns of the 1920s" in *Modern Asian Studies*, 10.3 (July 1976), pp.395-416; and *Chinese Politics and Christian Missions: The Anti-Christian Movements of 1920–28* (Notre Dame: Cross Cultural Publications, 1988).

[414] Lian Xi, "Western Missions and Chinese Nationalist Dream," *East Asian History* 32/33 (2006-7), p.215.

way the West understands itself."[415] They point out the vital role played by Protestant missions in the globalization of the model of religious nationalism in Europe and Asia. This model comprises of three interrelated elements, namely (1) the Old Testament biblical idea of a chosen people that incorporates the notions of race and a nation under God, (2) national awakening or salvation that involves the moral regeneration and material progress of the chosen race as a result of the redemptive spiritual power of religion, and (3) the messiah or savior who is destined by God to lead the people to national glory. [416]

Prasenjit Duara, Ryan Dunch, and John Fitzgerald are the few scholars in Chinese studies to problematize the religion/traditional and secular/modern dichotomy, and recognize the pivotal role played by Protestant missions in the genesis of Chinese nationalism. Duara has argued that Protestant missionaries were the transmitters of dominant models of religious citizenship in the West, which were instrumental in the subject formation of religious citizens at home and abroad.[417] In a similar vein, Fitzgerald has highlighted in his seminal study of Chinese nationalism, the dominance of the motif of awakening of the Chinese people as an autonomous and self-determining national subject (individual and collective) in Chinese nationalist discourse, and elsewhere, he demonstrates how it was devised from religious source, from the Protestant discourse of awakening the Chinese nation to the brotherhood of Christian nations.[418] In his *Fuzhou Protestants and the Making of Modern China*, Dunch argues against the picture prevalent in Chinese nationalist historiography of Chinese Christians as "pawns of foreign interests or an otherworldly minority of no particular political importance."[419] He elucidates that, for the converts, conversion to Protestantism was more than conversion of religious faith, but rather it

[415] Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann eds. *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia* (Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University Press, 1999), p.3.

[416] Ibid., pp.6-7.

[417] Duara (2008), pp.43-64.

[418] Fitzgerald, *Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996) and "'Lands of the East Awake!': Christian Motifs in Early Chinese Nationalism" in Huang Kewu and Zhang Zhejia eds. *Gong yu shi: xiandai zhongguo geti yu qunti congjian* (Nankang: Academia Sinica, Institute of Modern History, 2000), pp.362-410.

[419] Dunch, *Fuzhou Protestants and the Making of Modern China, 1857-1927* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), p.xvi.

was conversion to Protestant model of moral patriotism. Chinese Protestants were in the forefront of social reform and political movements in Fuzhou and the first to introduce symbols and ceremonies of nationhood, which allowed the Chinese to "imagine" themselves as part of a nation.

Another important impact that Protestant missions had on Chinese nationalism is the indigenous religious reform movements. Religious reform movements in colonial societies have been recognized by scholars as pivotal to the production of anti-colonial nationalist ideology.[420] These movements rose in response to missionary attack of local religious tradition as backward, irrational and superstitious, in other words, irrelevant in the modern world of science, capitalism and nation-states, as well as to combat the threat of Christian conversion of native populations. The reform movements, such as Brahmo Samaj, Arya Samaj, and Jama'at-Islami in India, and the Pali Text Society in Sri Lanka[421], were founded by middle-class colonial elites, who were painfully aware of the subjugation of their societies under colonialism and demanded equality vis-à-vis the colonizers. These leaders stressed the need to cleanse their religious traditions off barbaric superstitious elements and to revive the essences of "Eastern religions" such as "Hinduism," "Buddhism," and "Sikhism" constructed by Orientalist writings.

It is certainly not the case, as Edward Said argued in his seminal work *Orientalism*, that the Orient was passive patient of European representations in Orientalist knowledge.[422] These religious movements manipulated the essentialist discourse of Orientalism, in what James Ketelaar call "strategic Occidentalism," in the creation of their ideology and reverse the positional superiority of the west. This "strategic Occidentalism" was widely displayed at the World's Parliament of Religion when the

[420] For instance, see Peter Van der Veer, *Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994).

[421] The Pali Text Society was founded in Sri Lanka in 1881 by the great Orientalist scholar Thomas Rhys Davids to translate and edit Pali manuscripts to make the canons and commentaries of Theraveda Buddhism accessible to the English audience. Though the Pali Text Society was a British creation and remained largely a British institution, the scholarship produced by the society was appropriated by Buddhist reform leaders of Ceylon, Thailand, and Japan in their Buddhist revival movements and their presentation of Buddhism as a rational and scientific religion, to counter missionary criticism of Buddhism and exert the superiority of their religion against Christianity. For Thomas Rhys Davids' interpretation of the "pure" Buddhism of the Theravada tradition and its appropriation by Asian Buddhist reformers, see Judith Snodgrass, *Presenting Japanese Buddhism to the West: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and the Columbian Exposition* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), pp.4-10 and104-109.

[422] Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).

delegates of the reformed "Asian religions" asserted the superiority of the "spiritual" and "peaceful" civilization of the East over the "material" and "aggressive" Western civilization.[423]

Religion is the central artifice in anti-colonial nationalist imagination and its combat against colonialism. Partha Chatterjee has argued that the preoccupation of nationalism as a political movement for independence in scholarship has the effect of obscuring the ideological agency of the colonial nationalists and the inventiveness of nationalism in Asia and Africa, which "are posited not on an identity but *difference* with the 'modular' forms of the national society propagated by the modern West."[424] With great theoretical insights, Chatterjee perceptively argues that "anti-colonial nationalism creates its own domain of sovereignty within colonial society well before it begins its political battle with the imperial power. It does this by dividing the world of social institutions and practices into two domains— the material and the spiritual. The material is the domain of the 'outside,' of the economy and of state-craft, of science and technology, a domain where the West had proved its superiority and the East had succumbed. In this domain, then, Western superiority had to be acknowledged and its accomplishments carefully studied and replicated. The spiritual, on the other hand, is an 'inner' domain bearing the 'essential' marks of cultural identity. The greater one's success in imitating Western skills in the material domain, therefore, the greater the need to preserve the distinctiveness of one's spiritual culture."[425]

It was the desire to prevent the colonial state from encroaching on the inner domain that the religious reform movements adopted the Protestant model of religion, which defines religion as private faith separate from the public sphere of politics. This definition of religion as moral-spiritual belief makes religion better serve the role of unifying the heterogeneous population with diverse religious practices into a national community. Thus, "Protestantization" of Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam often

---

[423]James Ketelaar, "Strategic Occidentalism: Meiji Buddhists at the World's Parliament of Religions," *Buddhist-Christian Studies* Vol.11 (1991), pp.37-56.

[424] Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.5.

[425] Ibid, p.6. Similarly, Peter van der Veer in his recent book on the construction of "spirituality" in China and India also demonstrates the inventiveness of Asian modernity. See his *The Modern Spirit of Asia*: *The Spiritual and the Secular in China and India* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2013).

meant the creation of radical religious fundamentalism that stresses doctrinal purity and the authority of sacred scriptures over ritual practices. Rituals are dismissed as unnecessary accretions at best and "superstitious" corruption of the original teachings of the religious founder at worst. "Protestantization" also involves adopting the superior organizational and proselytizing techniques of the Protestant missionaries such as lay leadership, public preaching and distribution of vernacular catechism and tracts, seminary and Sunday schools, social reforms and services, church-like organizational structure, and the Sabbath.

Unlike colonized countries, the objective of nationalism in semi-colonial countries like China and Japan was not seeking political independence but to redress the "national humiliation" suffered in the hands of the Western imperial powers. There existed among Chinese and Japanese nationalists the desire to gain equality (hence respectability) with the West, through abolishing the unequal treaties, gaining national wealth and power, and attaining civilizational status. Religion, based on the Protestant normative model of rational and individualistic moral faith, was the sign of civilization and national sovereignty — state authority as founded on self-determination and individual natural rights with "oriental despotism" as the barbaric opposite. Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901), the leading Japanese intellectual and advocator of *bunmei kaika* 文明開化 (civilization and enlightenment) argued for Christianization of the Japanese ruling class as a strategy for modernization. He wrote "although I am personally entirely indifferent to religion, I believe that from the point of statesmanship we cannot avoid adopting the most influential creed of human society, *in order to give our nation an independent position among civilized countries* by boldly adopting their distinguishing characteristics."[426]

Yan Fu 嚴復 (1854-1921), who had the same status in China as Fukuzawa in Japan as the foremost translator of Western ideas, also recognized the civilizing effect of religion in the West. In his influential article "The Origins of National Strength" (*yuanqiang* 原强), Yan Fu argued that the source of western power and wealth were "citizen's strength, intelligence, and morality" (*minli*, *minzhi*,

[426] Fukuzawa, *Jiji shimpō* printed in Japan Weekly Mail, March 3, 1888 and quoted in Snodgrass (2003), p. 122. Emphasis added by author.

minde 民力、民智、民德).[427] Among the three, morality of the citizenry was the hardest to foster. He highlighted that the Western religion managed to achieve this through its superior "techniques of indoctrination" (*jiaoshu* 教術). People, from nobles to commoners, gathered on every Sunday to listen to moral admonitions. This was why, Yan stressed, that even the common folk in the West had the same moral standard as the literati-official class in China. [428]

THE PROTESTANT MODEL AND KANG'S CONFUCIAN REFORMATION

With regard to Chinese religious reform, there is a growing literature on the revivalist movements of institutional Buddhism and Daoism, as well as the "redemptive societies," which emerged in response to the religious challenge of Christianity and the secularizing policy of the modern state.[429] The state religion movement or what is known in Chinese historiography as the Confucian movement (*kongjiao yundong* 孔教運動*)* of Kang Youwei, however, received little attention as Confucianism has been considered a humanistic moral doctrine and Kang's movement a political reform program rather than a religious movement. For instance, on Kang Youwei's attempt to make Confucianism into a "religion," Hsiao Kungchuan comments "Confucianism was perhaps not totally devoid of religious implications. But it was essentially secular and widely separated from such religions as Christianity and Islam, which stressed human sinfulness and the omnipotence of a personal God."[430] Also, he points out the fact that

---

[427] Yan Fu, *Yan Fu ji* edited by Wang Shi, vol.1 (Zhonghua shuju, 1986), p.18.

[428] Ibid., p.30.

[429] For modern Buddhist reform, see Holmes Welch, *The Buddhist Revival in China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); Don Pittman, *Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism: Taixu's Reform* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001); and Francesca Tarocco, *The Cultural Practices of Modern Chinese Buddhism: Attuning the Dharma* (New York: Routledge, 2007). Daoism also experienced a period of reformation and revival in the late nineteenth and twentieth century, however, it did not develop into a massive lay-centered movement like Chinese Buddhism. See Vincent Goossaert, *The Taoists of Peking, 1800-1949: A Social History of Urban Clerics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007) and Liu Xun, *Daoist Modern: Innovation, Lay Practice, and the Community of inner Alchemy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009).

For a brief survey of current scholarship on the modern syncretic movement, see David Ownby, "Recent Chinese Scholarship on the History of Redemptive Societies," *Chinese Studies in History*, Vol. 44, Nos. 1–2 (Winter 2010–2011), pp.3-9.

[430] Hsiao Kung-chuan, *A Modern China and a New World: K'ang Yu-Wei, Reformer and Utopian* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), pp.119-120.

Kang sought to make Confucianism into a state-religion through state power and his lack of religious asceticism made the movement appeared to be nonreligious. "Thus the entire Confucian-religion movement to lacked emotional or spiritual appeal….Indeed one may hesitate to call it a religious movement at all."[431] Similarly, Chen Hsiyuan examines the six characteristics (progressivism, egalitarianism, altruism, encompassing, value of strength, and soul/spirit) listed by Liang Qichao in his teacher's religious reform and argues that "Kang's reform sounded more like 'worldly' concerns than 'religious' tenets." Being sensitive of the semantic difference between "religion" and "jiao", Chen maintains that "It might be more appropriate to say that Kang's reform was a reform of a 'teaching,'" the conventional *jiao* that covers the realm of learning (*xue* 學) and government (*zheng* 政).[432]

We can see that the evaluation of Kang's Kongjiao movement has been based primarily on Judeo-Christian yardstick of religion, that is, a sharp separation of the mundane and transcendence with salvation located in the latter. There has been effort to find Confucian equivalent to the Protestant ethics, indicated by Max Weber as the spiritual force behind Western capitalism, to account for the post-war economic success of East Asian economies.[433] Thomas Metzger, for instance, demonstrates that Neo-Confucianism possesses an inner transformative tension not unlike that of Protestantism. There are also attempts by scholars to depict Confucianism as a religious tradition. Tu Weiming has argued that for Confucian religiosity, self-transformation or personal salvation is just the beginning in Confucian quest for sagehood, express as "inner sageliness and outer kingliness" (*neisheng waiwang* 內聖外王). The ultimate goal of the sage is, however, the perfection of society and harmonization of the world, which is achieve through education and politics.[434] In other words, as Mary Evelyn Tucker puts it succinctly,

---

[431] Ibid., p.122. Hsiao's interpretation of Kang's Confucian movement is also shared by his student Wong Youngtsu, another important scholar of Kang Youwei and the 1898 reform movement. See his *Kang Youwei lun* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2006), pp.112-120.

[432] Chen (1999), pp.62-63.

[433] Arif Dirlik, "Confucius in the Borderlands: Global Capitalism and the Reinvention of Confucianism," *Boundary 2*, 22.3 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 229-273.

[434]Tu Weiming, *Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Confucian Religiousness* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).

"For the Confucian the ordinary is the locus of extraordinary; the secular is the sacred; the transcendence is in the immanent….This is not a tradition that seeks liberation outside the world. The way of immanence is the Confucian way."[435] Rodney Taylor has also argued that the core of the Confucian tradition is profoundly religious and centers on the relationship between Heaven and Man. Heaven, Taylor maintains, in classical Confucianism is often theistic and in the Neo-Confucianism of Song and Ming, rather than being an philosophical abstraction "principles of Heaven" (*tianli* 天理) "functions as the religious authority or absolute frequently monistic in its structure."[436]

I have argued elsewhere that the religious dimension is crucial in understanding Kang Youwei's thought and his Kongjiao movement.[437] The origins of the movement, as I would like to show in the following, came from the interreligious dialogue between Confucianism and Chinese Buddhism and between these two Chinese teachings and Protestantism at the end of the nineteenth century. According to his foremost disciple Liang Qichao, Kang was China's first religionist (*zongjiao jia* 宗教家) since China was not a religious country. He explained that his master had been a student of Confucian learning since young, he also delved passionately into Buddhist canons and became enlightened while on a retreat at Xiqiao Mountain, Guangdong, and later he encountered Christian books when he was on a tour around the country. This was why Kang was particularly strong in religious thinking and made explication of the teachings of Confucius, the Buddha, and Jesus, and salvation of the myriad beings in the world his mission. On the rationale behind Kang Youwei's effort to establish Confucianism as a religion, Liang elucidated "He thought that since he was born in China, he should first save China; to do that, it is necessary that he guide the Chinese people according to their history and custom. He also thought that the Chinese people lack civic virtues (*gongde* 公德), are disunited as a group, and would soon not be able to survive in the world. Thus, he wished to unite them, however, without something

[435] Mary Evelyn Tucker, "Introduction" in Tu and Tucker, eds., *Confucian Spirituality* (New York: Herder and Herder, 2003), p.1.

[436] Rodney Taylor, *The Religious Dimensions of Confucianism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), p.2.

[437] Wei Leong Tay, "Kang Youwei, the Martin Luther of Confucianism and his vision of Confucian Modernity and Nation," Haneda Masashi ed. *Secularization, Religion, and State* (Tokyo: UTCP, 2010), pp. 97-109.

that everyone respects and sincerely accepts, it is impossible to unite the people emotionally and enhance their original nature. This is why he saw the revival of Kongjiao as his primary task."[438]

From Liang Qichao's account, we can discern a messiah complex in Kang Youwei. It is not true, as Liang described, that Kang's salvationist impulse was first triggered after a period of intense study of Buddhist texts. What was treated cursorily by Liang, as Hsiao Kung-chuan points out, is the influence of Confucian learning. However, his inspiration was not from the messianic Gongyang school, as Hsiao argues, at this early stage in Kang's intellectual development. [439] Kang's early intellectual development and his ambition to be a sage came from the nurturing of his grandfather, Kang Zanxiu 康赞修 (1806-1877). Zanxiu educated his precocious grandson in the family tradition of the eighteenth century Song Learning, which focused on internal moral cultivation (*xiushen* 修身) and the substantive learning (*shixue* 實學) of statescraft for the ordering of society (*jingshi* 經世).[440] At 18 years old, Kang received the instruction of the distinguished Cantonese scholar-official Zhu Ciqi 朱次琦 (1807-1882), who also emphasized moral praxis in his teaching. However, Zhu was more eclectic in his scholarship, going beyond the Song Learning in drawing the canonical principles (*jingyi* 經義) in practical application. In addition, he placed great value in methodical scholarship to expound the great principles of former sages and in the learning of history for the practical lessons that it can offer for the world redeeming Confucians.[441] Zhu's inspiration on Kang in the practical significance of the Confucian

[438] Liang Qichao, "Nanhai Kang xianshen zhuan" in *Yinbing shi wenji dianxiao* vol.3 (Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001), p.1948.

[439] Hsiao, *A Modern China and a New World*, p.106. Hao Chang demonstrates that Kang's conversion to New Text teachings was a gradual process that occurred in his twenties till 1890. See *Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and Meaning, 1890-1911* (Berkeley: University of California press, 1987), p.33.

[440] Chen Hongmou was widely regarded by the statescraft scholars such as Wei Yuan and Gong Zizhen as the exemplar of substantive learning. In his magisterial study of Chen, William Rowe also detected the religious impulse within him not only to order society as a practical minded scholar-official but to save the world (救世 *jiushi*). See his *Saving the World: Chen Hongmou and Elite Consciousness in Eighteenth Century China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001). Hao Chang also discusses how in the social-moral paradigm of Song Learning, the "inner-personalist" and "outer-institutional," the moral perfection of the self and community are intimately connected. See Chang (1987), pp.15-18.

[441] Richard Howard, K'ang Yu-wei (1858-1927): His Intellectual Background and Early Thought," in Arthur F. Wright and Denis C. Twitchett, eds., *Confucian Personalities* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp.297-300. See also Liang, "Nanhai Kang xianshen zhuan," pp.1943-1944.

tradition was readily acknowledged by him: "At that time, as I received his [Zhu's] instructions, it was like a traveler finding a place of lodging and a blind man seeing light.… I then believed that it was possible for me to read all the books before I was thirty, that I alone could establish myself in life, and that I could remake the world. From this time on, I gave up writing examination-style essays and thoughts of becoming rich and exalted. I stood, towering and lofty, above the common people, associating myself with great and good men of the past. It is true that a man of great virtue can inspire other men."[442]

Kang's interest in Buddhism came after failing the provincial examination and shortly the death of his grandfather in 1877. The emotional anguish made him abandon the pursuit of examination success totally and began practicing Chan meditation in total seclusion with the aim of "resting his mind and establishing his destiny" (*anshen liming* 安身立命). At the end of the retreat, Kang's interest in Huayan Buddhism shifted from a concern of his personal intellectual and spiritual enlightenment to salvation of China and the world. He took on the persona of a self-sacrificing sage-bodhisattva, commiserating with the sufferings in the world and making the saving of society and all sentient beings as his life mission.[443] Buddhism was an undercurrent in the intellectual world of late Qing and popular among scholars from the New Text school. Buddhism was attractive to Qing intellectuals as a spiritual refuge or/and an ideological remedy for social ills.[444]

Kang perceived Buddhism as complementary to Confucianism in the edification of the people. In his *Kangzi neiwai pian* (Esoteric and Exoteric Essays of Master Kang) written in 1886, Kang paired

[442] Kang, "Chronological Autobiography of Kang Youwei,"in Lo Jung Pang ed. *Kang Youwei: A Biography and A Symposium* (Tuscon: The University of Arizona Press, 1967), p.31.

[443] Ibid., pp.41-42.

[444] Chan Sin-wai, *Buddhism in Late Qing Political Thought* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1985), pp.29-49; Ge Zhaoguang argues that for late Qing intellectuals, Buddhism served the function of critiquing Confucian teaching and a prism to understand Western religion and science. Ge points out that the re-evaluation of Buddhism among Chinese intelligentsia was also under the influence of the Buddhist renaissance in Japan. "Kongjiao, fojiao yi huo yejiao? 1900 nian qianhou zhongguo de xinli weiji yu zongjiao xingqu" in Wan Fansen ed. *Zhongguo xiandai sixiang shi zhuanxing shidai* (Liangjing chuban, 2007), pp.210-215.

the term governance with teaching (*zhijiao* 治教) and categorized all *jiao*/religions in the world according to two harmonizing archetypes- yin and yang:

> There are many *jiao/*religions in the present world. In China, there is Confucianism, or teachings of the sage-kings; in India, there is Buddhism, an indigenous religion; in Europe, there is Christianity; and among the Moslems, Islam. In addition, there are numerous splinter religious sects. But in my opinion, there are only two *jiao*/religions. All those which teach the establishment of states and governments; recognize the relationships between ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife, elder and younger brothers; authorize the occupations of the scholar, farmer, artisan, and merchants; maintain the customary rituals practiced by shamans and priests in connection with beliefs in deities and spirits; sanction the study of the *Book of Odes*, the *Book of History*, propriety, and music; and approve of the eating of vegetables, fruits, fish, and meat, are (essentially identical with) Confucianism. This is the tradition originated and passed down by Fu-hsi, Shen-nung, the Yellow Emperor, Yao, and Shun. None of the countries in the world can be (totally) excluded from this (system of thought and practice). Those which prohibits meat-eating; require celibacy, worship their respective founders by day and by night, and refrain from carrying out the four occupations; disapprove of the study of the *Book of Odes*, the *Book of History*, propriety, and music; repudiate the rules of supernatural beings; and transcend human feelings and desires, are (essentially identical with) Buddhism. Christianity, Islam, and other various religious sects invariably stem from it. Confucianism countenances human feelings and desires. It is a yang (or this-worldly) *jiao*/religion. Buddhism, on the other hand, does not tolerate human feelings and desires. It is a yin (or other-worldly) *jiao*/religion. [445]

Kang argued that there was no high or low between the yang and yin *jiao*/religions as both complemented and gave birth to one another. The *jiao*/religion of Confucius was in accord with the

[445] Quoted from Li Sanpao, "K'ang Yu-wei's Iconoclasm: Interpretation and Translation of His Earliest Writings, 1884-1887," PhD dissertation UC Davis (1978), with minor alterations. Li translated this part as "Christianity, Islam, and all the other various sects invariably stem from them (i.e., Confucianism and Buddhism)," pp.133-134.

"spontaneous self-so" (*ziran* 自然) principle of Heaven (*tianli* 天理), while Buddhist *jiao*/religion went against it with its negation of human relations and desires. The yang *jiao*/religion of Confucius was prominent during the beginning of human civilization and guided the progress of humanity to the zenith, and thereafter, the yin *jiao*/religion would rise to correct the corruptions and sufferings of humanity. The yang *jiao*/religion would then be revived after mankind become overtly simple and unsophisticated from the influence of Buddhism. For Kang, a sage is a person who carefully deliberates and choses the teaching to institute or synthesizes elements of the two *jiao*/religions according to the dictate of the time.[446]

Around the same time, Kang was also increasingly drawn to western learning after being impressed by what he saw in the colonial outposts of Hong Kong and Shanghai in the early 1880s. Kang's knowledge of the West was largely garnered through the books he purchased from the translation bureau of Jiangnan Arsenal and from the *Wanguo gongbao* (*The Globe*, previously known as *Church News*). Both were run by Protestant missionary-scholars such as John Fryer, Alexander Wylie (1815-1887), W.A.P Martin, Ernst Faber (1839-1899), Young J. Allen (1836-1907) and Timothy Richard. From these sources, Kang learned about western science, mathematics, technology, international law, international news, geography, history, religion and politics.[447] The *Wanguo Gongbao* under the editorship of Young J. Allen, in particular, was to play an influential role in the transmission of western knowledge to Kang. Kang was a subscriber and avid reader of the magazine. On the significance of missionary publication on his thought, Kang confessed, "I owe my conversion to reform chiefly on the writings of two missionaries, the Rev. Timothy Richard and the Rev. Dr. Young J. Allen."[448]

The impetus for Kang's Confucian reformation came from missionary critique of the conservatism and backwardness of Confucian doctrines. Young J. Allen, for instance, wrote: "The

[446] Ibid., p.135.

[447] Wang Lixin, *Meiguo chuanjiaoshi dui zhonggong de xiandai-hua: jindai jidu xinjiao chuajiao-shi zaihua shehui wenhua he jiaoyu yundong yanjiu* (Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1997), pp.355-368.

[448] He told this to the editor of the *China Mail* in Hong Kong after the failure of the Wuxu reform movement.

habit of conservatism of the Orient is enough to ruin the nation. China not only is a case in point, however, the Confucianism of China especially has many defects. Just like the clothing that people wore when young is unsuitable after they grew slightly in size, not to mention when they reach adulthood! Now China has already aged, however it continues to use the knowledge of an immature age to constrict the intellectual capacity of the people and to treat them as children perpetually….This is why for those who desire progress it is necessary to unshackle (people's intelligence); to do that it cannot be found within the old religion (of Confucianism)….China's sickness lies in religion and some people have already known this. Protestant Christianity is here for the liberation (of China), why not rush to receive it? The truth of Jesus is for the liberation of all mankind and not particularly for the intervention of state affairs. And as the standard of the people rises the nation will follow suit and progress as well."[449]

The person that had the most impact on Kang Youwei's formulation of a Confucian religion is undoubtedly the energetic Welsh Baptist missionary Timothy Richard. Richard was a regular contributor to the *Wanguo Gongbao*. In 1890 he became the editor and writer of the *Shibao* (The Times), a Chinese-language reformist newspaper under the invitation of Li Hongzhang. A year later, he took up the position as the secretary of the Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge among the Chinese (SDK), or better known to the Chinese as *Guangxue-hui* 廣學會, which took over the publication of the *Wanguo Gongbao* in 1889. Richard personally wrote and translated 100 out of the 250 works published by the SDK. His 24 years as the head of the society, according to one biographer, was "the most fruitful and influential period of his life" as "(f)or most of this time, he exerted a powerful influence on the direction of elite Chinese thought and politics, both directly and indirectly, through a host of publications."[450] In contrast to most of his protestant counterparts who understood missionary work traditionally as spreading the Gospel to the Chinese, Timothy Richard pursued a "maximalist" missionary approach, which consist of introducing the Chinese elites to "the

[449] Young J. Allen, "Lun rujiao yu jidujiao zhifen" *Wanguo Gongbao*, issue 182 (1902), pp.18-19.

[450]Eunice Johnson, *Timothy Richard's Vision: Education and Reform in China, 1880-1910* (UK: Lutterworth Press, 2015), p.48.

benefits of true Christianity" and promoting religious dialogue with Chinese religious leaders to allay their anti-foreignism and to plant Protestantism into indigenous religious soil.[451]

Richard represented Protestantism to his Chinese audience as the nation saving religion. Being involved in the humanitarian relief of the Great Famine of 1876-1879, Richard saw how the indifferent, and at times hostile, Chinese scholar-officials became receptive to the Christian message and interested in Western scientific knowledge and methods when traditional relief measures, including prayer for rains, failed to address the devastating drought.[452] Richard did not consider science as antithetical to religion, on the contrary, science serve religion by revealing the laws of God in Nature. From 1881-1884, Richard stayed in Taiyuan, Shanxi after the famine was over to continue his missionary work. He gave monthly lectures on science and demonstrations on scientific apparatuses to the scholar-officials as a conversionary strategy. He thought that "its [Western civilization] advantage over Chinese civilization was due to the fact that it sought to discover the workings of God in Nature, and to apply the laws of Nature for the service of mankind….I was convinced that if I could lecture to the officials and scholars and interest them in these miracles of science, I would be able to point out to them ways in which they could utilize the forces of God in Nature for the benefit of their fellow-countrymen."[453] Richard was well received by the official class in Shanxi and was invited to become the advisor of luminaries in Qing official class such as Li Hongzhang, Zeng Guoquan 曾國荃 (1824-1890), Zuo Zongtang 左宗棠 (1812-1885), and Zhang Zhidong.

From his experience in Taiyuan, Richard was convinced that that "the problem of the missionary in China…was not only how to save the souls of a fourth of the human race, but also how

[451] Lauren F. Pfister, "Rethinking Mission in China: James Hudson Taylor and Timothy Richard" in Andrew Porter ed. *The Imperial Horizons of British Protestant Missions. 1880-1914* (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.: Grand Rapids, MI, 2003), p.208; Peter Ng Tze Ming, "Timothy Richard: Christian Attitudes towards Other Religions and Cultures," *Studies in World Christianity*, 14.1 (2008), pp.73-92; and Gregory Adam Scott, "Timothy Richard, World Religion, and Reading Christianity in Buddhist Garb," *Social Sciences and Missions*, 25 (2012), pp.53-75.

[452] See Paul Richard Bohr, *Famine in China and the Missionary: Timothy Richard as Relief Administrator and Advocate of National Reform, 1876-1884* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972).

[453] Richard (1916), p.158.

to save their bodies from perishing at the rate of four millions per annum, and to free their minds, more crippled than the feet of their women, from a philosophy and custom which had lasted for many centuries and left them at the mercy of any nation which might attack their country." He was optimistic that "if the (Chinese) nation were liberated from the bonds of ignorance and harmful custom, and were to receive the light of education— scientific, industrial, religious— it might become one of the most powerful nations on earth." More concretely, the salvation of the nation "meant the uplifting of China in various ways, through better religion, better science, better means of communication, better international commerce, the institution of modern schools and colleges, the founding of a modern Press, the establishment of new industries and manufactures over a country as large as the whole of Europe."[454]

Richard maintained that Christianity, in particular Protestantism, which he translated as the "world redemptive teaching" (*jiushi-jiao* 救世教), was responsible for the progress of all nations in world not only China. The use of the term "jiushi-jiao" to describe Protestantism by missionary-reformers, such as Richard, Gilbert Reid, Young J. Allen, W.A.P Martin, and Ernst Faber, was deliberate to appeal to the literati-official class, who were hungry for useful western knowledge for domestic reform.[455]

Richard was once asked by Li Hongzhang about the good of Christianity. To prove his point, Richard drafted an elaborated reply in Chinese published in the *Wanguo Gongbao* under the title *jiushi jiaoyi* 救世教益 (Benefits of the world redemptive teaching) that detailed the material, intellectual, political, social, moral, and spiritual benefits of Christianity. Richard narrated how Christianity was responsible for the introduction of agriculture, clothing, commerce, industry, and education to the uncivilized people of Polynesia, Africa and America; fostering intellectual developments and just laws within and between European nations; ending immoral customs such as polyandry and polygamy; and

[454] Richard (1916), pp.7-8; Richard, *Conversion by the Million: Being Biographies and Articles by Timothy Richard* vol.2 (Shanghai: Christian Literature Society, 1907), pp. 176-179.

[455] Beside Richard, Gilbert Reid was also a prominent figure among the reformist officials and intellectuals. Reid essentially adopted the same "maximalist" missionary strategy as Richard. See Tsou Mingteh, "Christian Missionary as Confucian Intellectual: Gilbert Reid (1857-1927) and the Reform Movement in the Late Qing" in Daniel Bays ed. (1996), pp. 73-90.

strengthening the nation of India and Japan through educating their elites. He listed the 4 practical benefits of Christianity as fostering economic development (*yangmin* 養民), bringing peace (*anmin* 安民), moral renewal (*xinmin* 新民), and modern education (*jiaomin* 教民) to the nations of the world.[456]

In his publications, Richard painstakingly stressed to his Chinese audience the religious makeup of the globe and the present success and expansion of the "world redemptive teaching" in the world. According to Richard, the *jiao*/religion in the world with the largest number of followers was the *Jiushi jiao* (made up of Protestantism, Catholicism, and Greek Orthodoxy) with 450 million adherents; second the three Chinese *jiao*/religions of *Ru*, *Shi* and *Dao* with 400 million; third the *Huijiao* (Islam) with 125 million; and fourth the *Youtai jiao* 猶太教 (Judaism) with 7 million. In term of political influence, *Jiushi jiao* topped the rest of the *jiao*/religions by being the national faith of numerous nations in all five continents of the world, making up about eight-tenth of the world's landmass; next was *Rujiao* that commanded the Qing empire with a territorial span of one-tenth of the world; followed by *Huijiao* that was worshipped by the Arab (*tianfang* 天方) nations such as Egypt, Turkey and Persia which made up less than one-tenth of the world; and lastly the Theravada Buddhism (*Shijiao* 釋教) of Siam which was about one-thousandth of the world. The message of the statistics is clear— the foremost religion of the world was the *Jiushi jiao* and its success was no doubt because of the practical benefits that it conferred onto the various nations.[457]

The influence of Timothy Richard and other Protestant missionaries on Kang Youwei's Kongjiao programme is unmistaken. In his 1899 speech given to the Philosophy Society of Japan, Liang Qichao explained that Kang's philosophy consisted of two tasks, one concerning the reform of Chinese religion and the other the unification of world religions. With regards to the first task, Liang used the Japanese term *shūkyō kakumei* (religious revolution; Ch. *zongjiao geming* 宗教革命) to describe the reformation of Kongjiao as envisioned by his master. Liang had yet distinguished the religious and the

[456] Liti motai, "Jiushi jiao yi" in Li Tiangang ed. *Wanguo gongbao wenxuan* (HK: Sanlian shudian, 1998), pp. 108-123. It was also published in the Chinese Recorder from 1 Apr. 1890- 1 Nov. 1891 under the title *Historical Evidences of Christianity for China*.

[457] Pfister (2003), p.204.

secular in his employment of the term *shūkyō/zongjiao* as the Japanese did at that time. In the same way as how Protestant missionaries defined the function of religion, Liang maintained that religion was the panacea (*yaoliao* 藥料) for forging the mental substance of the citizens, the foundation of national strength. According to Liang, "The strength and weakness, rise and fall of a nation depend entirely on the intellect and abilities of its citizens. The progress and decline of intellect and abilities, on the other hand, depend entirely on the thinking of the citizens. The superiority and inferiority of thinking and their diffusion or obstruction, rest entirely on the [religion] that the citizens are accustomed to and have faith in. Thus, to establish the independence of the nation, it is essential to alter the thinking of the citizen; to alter the thinking of the citizens it is necessary to target the (religion) that they relied on by custom and faith, eliminating the old to make way for the new. This is the universal truth. The West achieved its current level of civilization due to religious reformation and the renaissance of ancient learning."[458]

RELIGIONIZING THE CONFUCIAN TEACHING

Summarizing the main arguments of Kang Youwei's *Xinxue weijing kao* 新學偽經考 (An Inquiry into the forgery of Classics in the Xin dynasty), *Kongzi gaizhi kao* 孔子改制考(Confucius the Reformer) written in the early 1890s, Liang lamented the fact that though the intellectual enlightenment of China happened early in history because of Confucius, however, China had degenerated for 2000 years since the Han dynasty because the main principles of Confucius written in the six classics had been twisted by vulgar scholars to flatter and serve the political needs of the sovereign and ministers. As a result, what was passed down through the centuries as Confucius teaching was the narrow Learning of Lesser Peace (*xiaokang* 小康) transmitted by Xunzi, while the true teaching of the transcendental sage or the Learning of Great Harmony (*datong* 大同) transmitted by Mencius and Zhuangzi remained hidden. In short, "the politics of 2000 years came from Xunzi. What is called learning is nothing more than Han

[458] Liang Qichao, "*Lun Zhina zongjiao gaige*" in *Yingbing-shi wenji dianxiao* vol.3, p.1334.

and Song Learnings, and these two branches have originated from Xunzi."[459] According to Liang, the Learning of Lesser Peace has four characteristics, which are 1) veneration of sovereign power, 2) exclusion of alien teachings, 3) punctilious observation of ritual-propriety (*liyi* 禮儀) rather than elaboration of "great principles," and 4) focus on textual studies and philological research which breeds conservatism.[460]

Liang elucidated that the true teachings of Confucius were contained solely in the *Book of Changes* and *Spring and Autumn*, the former consisted of his other-worldly doctrines (*chushi-fa* 出世法) and the latter his blueprint for ordering of the world (*jingshi-fa* 經世法). The *Spring and Autumn*, the only book authored by Confucius, was where his "arcane words" (*weiyan* 微言) lies. Liang argued that the remarkable book was full of signs and the primary concern of Chinese philosophy was to cipher the hidden messages and reveal the true face of Confucius teaching i.e. the Learning of Great Harmony. The Gongyang Commentary was an important guide in interpreting the esoteric messages of *Spring and Autumn*, but it was suppressed by the sovereigns because the doctrines of Great Harmony did not benefit their exercise of political control. Thus, the main task in Kang's religious revolution was to recover the six key isms (jp. *shūgi*; ch. *zhuyi* 主義) of the Confucian religion of Great Harmony. Liang contrasted the six isms to the other six opposing, but false, isms of the Learning of Lesser Peace. [461]

First, Kongjiao was a *jiao*/religion of progressivism not conservatism. Liang argued through the "Doctrine of the Three Ages" (Lesser Peace, Emerging peace, and Great Peace) that Confucius was a prophet and what he taught was a blueprint of progress for humans to develop from the barbaric age of the past, to the semi-civilized age in the present, and finally, to the utopian age of the future. Second, Kongjiao was a *jiao*/religion of egalitarianism not despotism. The Learning of Great Harmony advocated the rule of popular sovereignty (*minquan* 民權) and equality as opposed to sovereign

[459] Ibid, p.1335.

[460] Ibid.

[461] Ibid., pp.1335-1336.

authority and hierarchical relations insisted by the Learning of Lesser Peace. Third, Kongjiao was a *jiao*/religion of altruism not egoism. Liang explicitly drew the similarity between Kongzi and the Buddha and argued that that the former was also pursuing the "Way of the Bodhisattvas" as he wanted to save the people through his teaching. Liang urged Confucians to follow the example of their master and sacrifice their lives for the salvation of the world. Fourth, Kongjiao was a *jiao*/religion of self-strengthening and independence (*qiangli* 強立) not literary frailty (*wenruo* 文弱). Liang maintained that the six classics emphasized strength not feebleness. However, from the Jin-Tang period onwards,[462]with the exception of Wang Yangming, Confucians were all weak and cowardly. Qing scholars were even more so with the popularity of philological studies because the repressive environment and the desire to obey caused the literati to lose their courage and independent mind. Liang believed that with the principle of egalitarianism manifested the principle of self-strengthening and determination would follow suit. Fifth, Kongjiao was a *jiao*/religion of tolerance not exclusionism. Again Liang drew a comparison with Mahayana Buddhism, and argued that like the Huayan school, Kongjiao was a broad teaching that could encompass other religions. He argued that the nine school of thoughts in the Eastern Zhou period all descended from Confucius and the intellectual stagnation of China was caused by the lack of intellectual freedom due to the establishment of the Learning of Lesser Peace as the orthodoxy since the Han dynasty. Lastly, Kongjiao was a *jiao*/religion that emphasize the soul (*hun* 魂) not corporeal existence (*shen* 身). Liang did not elaborate on this point because it is related to the unification of world religions, which is not the main subject of his speech.[463] This topic, however, was given a more extensive treatment by Liang in his 1902 biographical essay on Kang Youwei.

In the essay, Liang argued that the *Yijing* 易經 (Classic of Change) was compiled by Confucius and it was a book on the realm of soul-spirit (*hunling-jie* 魂靈界). The main aim of Confucius was "to elucidate the Learning of the Soul, in order for people to know that the body is nothing but fortuitous

[462] Here Liang is reiterating his master's thesis of the falsification of Confucius' true teaching by Liu Xin in Han dynasty and later the corruption of Confucian teachings by Buddhism, Daoism and culture of the non-Han nomadic people during the long period of disunity after the fall of Western Jin.

[463] Liang, "*Lun Zhina zongjiao gaige*," pp.1336-1337.

and illusionary existence in the world, nothing to cherish and latch onto. This is how they grow great courage and to sacrifice themselves to save the world." Here again we can see the influence of Buddhist ideas on Kang's thoughts. According to Liang, Kang approached Huayan Buddhism through the Learning of the Mind-Heart of Wang Yangming. Unlike Zhu Xi, Wang maintained the non-duality of the metaphysical "heavenly principle" (*tianli*) and carnal "human desires" (*renyu* 人欲) in Confucianism was similar to the unity of the transcendental dharma realm (*fajie* 法界) and the material worldly realm (*shijie* 世界) in Mahayana Buddhism.[464] As Hsiao Kung-chuan rightly points out, Kang's conception of the "soul" was informed by the Confucian notion of *hun* as the seat of human virtue (*daode* 道德), in contrast to the based animal spirit (*po* 魄). He believed that the commonality of all *jiao*/religions was to cultivate the luminous spirit of human beings and promote virtuous conducts.[465]

In the introduction of the *Book of Great Harmony* (*Datong shu* 大同書), a treatise detailing his future Confucian utopia, Kang asserted that "Heaven is a single spiritual substance (*hunzhi* 魂質), and man too is also a single spiritual substance. Though different in size, they share the same vast energy (*haoqi* 浩氣) derived from the Great Origin….This spiritual thing is electricity, possessed of consciousness. As electric light, it can be transmitted everywhere and as divine energy, it can activate everything. Giving birth to the multitude spirits, deities and lords on high (*shendi* 神帝) and existence to Heaven and Earth….There is nothing devoid of this electricity and there is nothing devoid of this spirit. It is a conscious energy, a supernatural consciousness, an ethereal luminary, a spiritual intelligence, a brilliant virtue. Though these several names differ, the actuality to which they refer is the same."[466] According to Kang, this vast energy, comprised of metaphysical and physical forces, that creates and animates the whole world was humanness (*ren* 仁). Kang perceived *ren* as identical to the concepts of the compassionate mind in Buddhism (*buren zhi xin* 不忍之心) and agape (*aili* 愛力) in

[464] Liang, "Nanhai Kang xianshen zhuan," pp.1949-1950.

[465] Hsiao (1975), pp.156-157.

[466] Modified from Derk Bodde translation in *Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy Part II The Period of Classical Learning* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), p.685.

Christianity, or the magnetic force (*xishe zhili* 吸攝之力), a term he borrowed from missionary translation of western scientific knowledge.[467] Through his application of the Gongyang evolutionary idea of the Three Ages on *ren*, Kang endowed *ren* with cosmic and historical significance. Similar to the rational Spirit in Hegelian philosophy, *ren* evolves or matures progressively in time bringing the world to a higher stage of development in history. In its highest development, *ren* brings about the Age of Great Harmony by destroying the nine boundaries (*jie* 界) of nation, class, race, etc. that brought division and injustice, and hence sufferings to the myriad beings.[468]

Taking a leaf from the orientalism of his missionary mentors, by making *ren* the spirit of Confucian teaching Kang Youwei was able to transform it into a religion that can be made comparable to other "world religions." He subverted the superiority of Christianity in Protestant orientalism by claiming the completeness of Confucianism and its ability to encompass the other *jiao*/religions. Kang asserted that unlike religions like Buddhism, Christianity and Islam that focus solely on the cultivation of the soul or Daoism on the body, Confucianism emphasizes on both.[469] In addition, he argued that the *jiao*/religion of Buddhism could be equated with the virtues of Wisdom (*zhi* 智), Christianity with Humaneness (*ren* 仁) and Islam with Courage (*yong* 勇) in Confucianism.[470] In other words, for Kang, Confucianism is destined to unite the other partial world religions and become the true universal religion. This was especially so because these religions guide human through the "Way of the Divine" (*shendao* 神道) and not the "Way of Civilization" (*rendao* 人道), while the Confucian religion encompasses both. Using the discourse of evolutionism, Kang argued that *shendao* is archaic and more suitable to the past when the people were ignorant as it instructs people by means of divine authority (*shenquan* 神權), through the fear and respect of the supernatural beings. "Now as men's intelligence gradually develops,

[467] Kang Youwei, "Zhongyong zhu" in *KYWQJ* vol.5, p.371.

[468] Chan Wing-tsit, "Kang Yu-wei and the Confucian Doctrine of Humanness (Ren)," in Lo ed. (1967), p.357.

[469] Kang, *Lunyu zhu*, ch.8, p.2b.

[470] Lu Naixiang and Lu Dunkui, "Nanhai Kang xianshen zhuan" in Xia Xiaohong ed. *Zhuiyi Kang Youwei* (Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing, 2009), p. 57.

divine authority gradually loses its hold on them. Confucianism therefore suits the present world best."[471]

The most significant impact of Kang's innovation was to separate Confucian teachings from the ritual order, especially imperial worship, for it to become the trans-historical essence or soul of the Chinese nation (*guohun* 國魂) and the cosmic rational Spirit of the world. As we shall see in our discussion of the national religion movement in the following section, Kang's attempt to separate politics from culture (i.e. religion) was motivated by, on one hand, the imperative of preserving the national core at the last hour when full scale adoption of western institutions was crucial for the preservation of Chinese sovereignty, on the other hand, the fear of the extinction of Confucianism by the aggressive Christianity backed by Western imperial powers.

IMPERIALISM, RELIGION, AND THE NATIONAL RELIGION PROPOSAL

The most contentious part of Kang Youwei's 1898 reform programme is his proposal to make Confucius the religious founder (*jiaozhu* 教主) of Kongjiao and to institute a national church. His opponents accused him of "scandalizing Confucius and being rebellious" (*feisheng wufa* 非聖無法), and more gravely, having imperial pretentions by making himself the messianic "uncrowned king" (*suwang* 素王) or placing himself above the emperor as the Confucian Pope. Even supporters of Kang's reform programme such as Zhang Zhidong, Chen Baozhen 陳寶箴 (1831-1900), and Weng Tonghe 翁同龢 (1830-1904) strongly condemned his Confucian church initiative as being too radical.

The heart of the controversy lies in Kang's challenge to the model of universal kingship in imperial Confucianism, which represented the emperor as a charismatic sage-king and the cosmic pivot mediating between Heaven and the world at large. There is nothing mystical and charismatic in Kang's conception of emperorship. Under the influence of the social contract theory— a product of the

[471] Cited by Hsiao (1975), p.114.

separation of political and religious powers in the West— Kang argued in his *Shili kongfa quanshu* (Complete book of substantive truths and universal laws) that popular sovereignty was a universal principle and the ruler-subject relationship was not ordained by Heaven but a man-made institution. He explicated that it was an axiomatic truth that the ruler was a mediator (*zhongbao* 中保) established for the protection of individuals.[472] Kang claimed that using the birthdays of the various sages for calendrical record (*jinian* 紀年) was much better than the reigns of rulers, since it was a universal principle that calendar should start from the beginning of a civilization. Of course, Kang's claim of the universality of using religious founder for calendrical dating was derived from the Western/Christian example. He advocated the use of the birthday of Confucius (*kongzi jinian* 孔子紀年) rather than the conventional method of monarchial reign for calendrical dating in China. Kang argued this was because Confucius was the only divine sage-king and law giver (*jiaozhu* 教主), who received the mandate from Heaven to rule and create the Chinese civilization. The mythical sage-kings of antiquity were fictional figures created by Confucius to legitimize his institutional designs since he was merely a commoner.[473]

Here, Kang totally discredited the imperial claims of the emperor as a sage-king and recipient of the Heaven's mandate. The value that Kang saw in Chinese emperorship was the sweeping transformative power that the autocratic monarch wielded in the politically backward China. Citing the examples of Petrine Russia and Meiji Japan, Kang believed that the Qing emperor could become a reformist autocrat and brings about a revolution from above and reform the backward political system of China into a modern constitutional monarchy. Peter Zarrow has convincingly shown that the 1898 reform movement was a pivotal moment in the radical reconceptualization of the Chinese state according to the principle of popular sovereignty (*minquan* 民權), and the relationship of the monarchy to the state and the nation became a thorny and urgent issue for the reformers to resolve. As early as the mid-1880s, Kang had already argued for constitutional government and political equality as a universal principle and despotism as an aberration of this scientific axiom in his *Shili gongfa*. At the same time,

[472] "Shili gongfa quanshu" in *KYWQJ* vol.1, p.152.

[473] Ibid., p.154.

he presented in his *Kangzi neiwai pian* (*The Esoteric and Exoteric Essays of Master Kang*) the image of the monarch as one who wields absolute and transformative power. Kang' ideal monarch was a combination of a Confucian sage-king and a machevellian prince. He governs his realm with no selfish desires but only compassion and the welfare of his subjects on his mind. He possesses shrewd political judgement of the circumstances of his time and affects positive transformations through decisive leadership and actions. Kang believed that depotism belonged to the unenlightened age of the past and its the historical role of the Qing monarchy to remake China's outmoded insitutions and bring about constitutional rule just like the powerful western nations and Japan. [474] For Kang, the Qing emperor would ultimately become a transcendental figurehead and symbol of the nation, and as in all constitutional monarchy, he would be subjected to the law of the land and forming one collective national body with the rest of his subjects.[475]

It was also in the *Shili kongfa* that Kang first publicized his view of the separation of education-religion and government. He argued that matters of religion (*jiaoshi* 教事) and governance belong to two different spheres of authority and should not encroach on each other as both are different in nature. This axiom was derived from the universal principle and most beneficial for civilization (*rendao* 人道). Kang understood *jiao* as education and religion, pertaining to the cultivation of human intelligence, talent, and moral nature. He maintained that it was detrimental for teachers and clerics to interfere in the authority of state administrators and vice versa. He cited disapprovingly the example of missionary abuse of power. He believed that it was equally bad for the state to unjustly exert its control on matters concerning education and religion.[476]

---

[474] For a good discussion of Kang's New Text reconceptualization of kingship and the state, see Peter Zarrow, *After Empire: The Conceptual Transformation of the Chinese State, 1885-1924* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), pp.24-55.

[475] This point is forcefully put across by Kang in his "Xujun gonghe guo shuo" (A treatise on constitutional monarchy). Kang argued that "(The monarch) has the title of Emperor, (however) he is in reality merely an image made of mud and wood. Being a god and not a man is the reason why (the monarch) has nothing to do with human affairs and has no political responsibility; and thus, not able to commit evil." Tang Zhijun ed. *Kang Youwei zhenglu ji* vol.2 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1981), p.677.

[476] Kang, "Shili gongfa quanshu," *KYWQJ* vol.1, p.156.

Kang Youwei saw that intellectual freedom was obstructed and the true way of Confucius obscured for millennia in China as a result of political control on thought. As Chen Baozhen, the reformist governor of Hunan, perceptively observed in his memorial to the throne condemning Kang's proposal to make Confucius a religious founder:

> When China came into contact with the West after the removal of the maritime ban, Kang Youwei saw that the Emperor of *jiao* [Pope] is venerated by the European nations, and managing their politics, he thought that the strength of foreign nations is a result of this. On the other hand, China's jiao and politics are separated since the Zhou and Qin dynasties. Although there was Confucius whose wisdom matches Yao and Shun, and was unparallel in history, however the Way had not been carried out at that time and did not benefit the later ages. [As a result] The rulers and ministers are deemed noble while teachers and scholars regarded as based, coercive power thrived while moral authority declined. This is why the country has unorthodox rule, families have different customs, and the scholars and people are ignorant. Although Emperors Yinzheng and Yang Guang were despotic, their way could be implemented, while Confucius' *jiao* is disorganized and ill-disciplined. He sees this as a far cry from the political power wielded by the Emperor of *jiao* and his followers. Hence…he gives (Confucius) the title of the uncrowned king …and venerates Confucius as the founder of religion, wishing to counter the strength of Catholicism and Protestantism, and to enlighten the people and carry out Confucius' governance and teaching." [477]

Kang essentially saw the church model of the West as a way out of, what Wm. Theodore deBary calls "the trouble with Confucianism." De Bary identifies that one major contradiction within the Confucian tradition since Confucius is the dependence of the prophetic noble man (*junzi* 君子) on political power to make the Way prevail in the world. The noble man might criticize the self-serving and autocratic tendencies of the ruler and, in the case of Mencius, ask for his overthrown, yet there is no alternative center of power or institution that he could utilize to carry out the prophetic vision that

[477] Chen Baozhen, "zouqing lizheng xueshu zaojiu rencai ce," p.16.

he received from Heaven.[478] The Song-Ming Neo-Confucians such as Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (1610-1695), and Gu Yanwu 顧炎武(1613-1682) mounted their own scathing criticism of dynastic politics[479] and came out with original initiatives such as community compact (*xiangyue* 鄉約), charity schools (*yixue* 義學), and public lectures (*jiangxue* 講學) to realize their moral ideals. Yet without a power base of their own, the Neo-Confucians were vulnerable to cooptation by the imperial state, and this was especially so when they had to compete with the Buddhists and Daoists, who were influential at the grassroots level. Ultimately, Neo-Confucians were coopted by the late imperial state through the civil service examination and bureaucratic system.[480]

The church, for Kang, was an "escape out of the predicament"[481] of the Confucians in their constant frustrations in redeeming the world and their lack of means to do so. He considered Christianity a vulgar teaching and its main strength was its simple message and organizational strength. Unlike the parochial family or academies, pedagogical agencies traditionally favored by the Confucians, or the fragmented Daoist and Buddhist monastic institutions, the church is a structured organization that

[478] Wm T. De Bary, *The Trouble with Confucianism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991).

[479] The most scathing criticism of the Chinese monarchy came from the late Ming scholar Huang Zongxi in his *Mingyi Daifang Lu* (Waiting for the Coming of an Enlightened Monarch). This book was banned in the Qing dynasty for its harsh critique of the imperial institution and the radical reforms that it proposed. Despite Huang's negative view of the monarchy, he was still looking for the coming of an "enlightened" sage-king to carry out the Way of Heaven. See Huang Tsunghsi, *Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince. Huang Tsung-Hsi's Ming-I-Tai-Fang-Lu*, trans. Wm. Theodore de Bary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

Chang Hao has argued that the main difficulty for the Confucians to imagine a new order without the sage-king as the principal agent is because the monarchy functions as the lynchpin in the Confucian cosmological myth of the three bonds. Chang Hao, "Cosmological Myth and Neo-Confucian Transcendence" in Smith and Kwok eds. *Cosmology, Ontology and Human Efficacy: Essays in Chinese Thought* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1993), pp.11-34.

[480] James T.C. Liu, "How Did a Neo-Confucian School Become the State Orthodoxy?" in *Philosophy East and West*, 23.4 (Oct. 1973), pp.483-505.

[481] The predicament, according to Thomas Metzger, was the constant frustrations experienced by Neo-Confucians in correcting the moral failures of the outer realm and their lack of means in doing so. The arrival of the West in the nineteenth century brought about institutions and techniques of transformation such as science, democratic politics and industrial economy that offer Neo-Confucian modernizers the means for the ordering of the outer realm. For Kang Youwei, the introduction of the Church institution provided him with a novel organizational tool for the moral enlightenment and transformation of China and the world. Thomas A. Metzger, *Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's Evolving Political Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

focuses solely on the moral betterment of mankind at the national and international level. A fact that is not being paid enough attention in scholarship is that Kang had been experimenting with different organizational forms in building an indigenous Church prior to his involvement in the Confucian religion movement in 1898 and the early republican period.

In 1891, Kang Youwei established the Wanmu caotang, a private academy in Guangzhou and lectured on his ideas of reformed Confucianism. In the curriculum of the academy, Kang insisted on Lu-Wang Learning of the Mind-Heart (*Lu-Wang Xinxue* 陸王心學) as the essence (*ti* 體) and the learning of Chinese history and western knowledge for application (*yong* 用).[482] Kang considered the Lu-Wang Learning to be the true intellectual heir of Confucius' doctrine of Great Harmony transmitted through Mencius, and its focus on the moral mind and praxis as superior to the pedantic and narrow scholarly approach of Cheng-Zhu Learning. He also required his students to be dressed in uniform and participate in ritual worship devoted only to Confucius. It is probable, as Luke Kwong suggested, that Kang Youwei was emulating the outward appearance of Christianity in running his academy. [483] In 1895, Kang together with Liang Qichao set up the Society for the Study of Self-strengthening (*qiangxue hui* 強學會) in Beijing and Shanghai. The charter of the society specifies that other than purchasing books and holding lectures on the various branches of western knowledge, lecture halls are to be set up for the promulgation of the Confucian religion.[484] Liang Qichao also suggested that a Confucian temple be built within the society compound for the worship of the sage to foster group cohesion among the literati members of the society.[485]

[482] According to Liang Qichao, Kang Youwei was initiated into Lu-Wang philosophy by his teacher Zhu Chiqi between 1876 and 1878. Liang came in touch with Lu-Wang learning when he was taught by Kang Youwei in Wanmu caotang in 1890. Hsiao (1975), p.60. Liang Qichao remembered that the syllabus of wanmu caotang was heavily leaned toward moral cultivation with moral education (*deyu* 德育) forming 80% of the curriculum. Liang, "Nanhai Kang xianshen zhuan," p.1946.

[483] Kwong (1984), p. 107.

[484] "Shanghai qiangxue hui zhangcheng" in Tang ed. *Kang Youwei zhenglun ji* vol.1, p.175.

[485] Liang Qichao, "Bianfa tongyi" in *Yinbing shi wenji xiaodian* vol.1, p.40.

Inspired also by Christianity, another innovation in Kang's effort to create an institutionalized Confucian religion was his attempt to transform charity halls into Confucian churches. In 1897, Kang converted the Association for the Promotion of Humanness (*Guangren tang* 廣仁堂), a charity hall organized by gentry elites, in Guangdong and Guangxi into the Society for the Study of Confucius (*Shengxue hui* 聖學會). Kang complained that though charity halls practicising the Confucius' doctrine of humanness (*rendao* 仁道) were many, but they were eclectic in their religious worship and none venerate solely Confucius or bother to propagate his teaching. Moreover, the charity halls were situated in the urban centers, and as a result, many rural ignoramuses only knew unworthy gods such as Guandi and Wenchang and not Confucius. He also warned about the eclipsis of Confucianism with the increasing penetration and spread of Christianity in China. Kang conceived the Shengxue hui as a Confucian "civilizing" organization comprising of Confucian literati-gentry members and with the mission of spreading new knowledge and fostering talent like the Qiangxue hui, as well as a Confucian Church dedicated to the worship of Confucius and proselytizing the Confucian religion to combat Chinese popular religion and Christianity for the hearts and minds of the populace. For the activities of the Society, Kang proposed the worship and recitation of scriptures on every *gengzi* day (庚子日), the purchase of western books and scientific instruments, the printing of newspapers, and setting up of charity and technical schools. [486]

Prior to 1895 the main preoccupation of Kang Youwei and his disciples was promoting the worship of Confucius and propagating the true Confucian doctrine of Great Harmony. Kang's reinterpretation of the Confucian tradition and his Confucian religion activities are not secondary to his political reforms. In 1896, the Qiangxue hui in Beijing was abruptly closed by the court as an illicit private organization and Zhang Zhidong, a patron of the society, also shut down the branch in Shanghai because Kang replaced the reign of the emperor with the birth date of Confucius for dating in the society's publication. In the aftermath of the Qiangxue hui debacle, Liang Qichao wrote to his teacher reminding him that "we take the propagation of (Confucian) teaching as our chief preoccupation and

[486] Kang Youwei, "Liangguang guangren tang shengxue hui yuanqi" in *KYWQJ* vol.2, pp. 268-269.

the fate of the country has nothing to do with it." Liang advised that instead of political reforms they should focus their attention on lecturing and receiving students instead.[487]

In the letter written to Zhu Yixin 朱一新 (1846-1894) in 1891, Kang revealed the threat of Christianity to the Confucian teaching as the primary reason behind for his proselytization of Kongjiao and his subsequent involvement in the reform movement:

> Today in the four continents of the world, apart from Asia which still has the (the teachings of) Confucius, the Buddha, and the Hui muslims, the rest of the world has been conquered by Christianity. If our country could develop our technological arts earlier and having ships and trains able to travel out of China, we could have long made Europe, Mexico, Africa, and Australia follow our Confucian learning. The Christian religion is shallow and preposterous, how could we be converted by it? Not only are we unable to advance our technological arts earlier, we sat idle and allowed ourselves to be enticed by the Christian religion and let it to become increasingly powerful. This is the error of not propagating [the Confucian religion]. *Jiao*/religions are bound to clash when they meet one another, and the outcome of the encounter is dependent on their individual strength…. The Christian religion conquered everywhere it went….The Christian countries have yet subjugated Asia, however, should they change their national policy [of not converting the colonial subjects], they would not behave like the Mongols and Jurchens who did not have a state religion, and would certainly replace our *jiao*/religion with theirs….Using state power to propagate the Christian religion, they would definitely destroy our academies and transform them into churches and use the principles in our classics to expound their New Testament. Those who obey will be promised official careers and those who resist will suffer the sword and humiliation. Not even the burying of scholars in early Qin can

[487] *Zhongguo Jindaishi ziliao congkan- wuxu bianfa* vol.2 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1954), p.544.

compare to this [disaster]….This is why I anxiously and urgently involve myself in the affairs of strengthening the country. It is for the defense of our *jiao*/religion! [488]

Kang watched uneasily as the Western nations and the emerging power of Japan increasingly annexed China's neighbouring vassal states since 1880 and after 1895 threatened to carve up China like a melon. Kang observed that Christianity and the Western imperial powers often worked hand in hand in their conquest of other countries. Missionaries made use of the military power of their governments to break any resistance to Christian proselytization and the imperial powers took advantage of religious disputes to make war and use the church as a fifth column to subvert the country from within. The scramble for concession in China in the last decade of the nineteenth century coincided with rising religious tension at the local level between Christians and non-Christians. France and Germany, especially the latter who entered the "Great Game" of imperialism later the than rest, were eager to exploit Catholic grievances to further their national interests in China. Germany forcefully seized the Jiaozhou Bay under the pretext of punishing China for the murder of two German missionaries in the 1897 Juye incident. Liang Qichao took the destruction of Confucius' icon in Qingdao by German soldiers in January 1898 as a deliberate action to test the national resolve and unity of the Chinese people. Joseph Esherick argues that the Juye incident is a turning point in Sino-Western relations as it led to the frantic rush by the Western powers to carve up China and the outbreak of the Boxer movement in 1900.[489] In April 1898, Kang Youwei formed the Nation Preservation Society in Beijing as he saw that the fate of the Chinese state, race, and Confucian teaching hanging by a thread.

---

[488] 地球四洲，除亞洲有孔子與佛、回外，餘皆為耶所滅矣。使吾國器藝早精，舟車能馳於域外，則使歐、墨、非、奧早從孔學可也。耶氏淺妄，豈能誘之哉?吾既不能早精器藝，坐令彼誘之而坐大，此不宣揚之失策也。夫吾孔子之教，不入印度，而佛能入中國，豈孔學不及佛哉?傳與不傳異耳。此其明徵也。若教既交互，則必爭長，爭之勝敗，各視其力。先入為主，則國俗已成。尊奉既定，則難於改革。耶酥之教，所至皆滅，至於入土耳其、波斯及吾中國，則數百年猶格格不少行焉，所謂先入為主，難於改革也。然彼奉教之國未滅亞洲耳，若國步稍移，則彼非金、元無教者比也，必將以其教易吾教耳…以國力行其教，必將毀吾學宮而為拜堂，取吾制義而發揮《新約》，從者誘以科第，不從者絕以戮辱，此又非秦始坑儒比也…故仆之急急以强国为事者，亦以卫教也。"Yu Zhu Yixin lun xueshu du," *KYWQJ* vol.1, p.325.

[489] Joseph Esherick, *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising* (Berkeley: University of California, 1987), pp.123-124.

Kang first proposed making Kongjiao the national religion of China in his June 19, 1898 memorial *Requesting the Negotiation of Regulations on Religious Disputes, Rectifying the Structure of Civil Service Examination and Permitting the Establishment of Confucian Temples throughout the Empire*.[490] Kang began the memorial by outlining the grave consequences of religious disputes from the Guizhou incident of 1862 to the more recent Jiaozhou incident which had led to heavy reparations and loss of many territories to the foreign powers. He warned that the current situation was precarious since foreign churches had dotted the whole empire and a minor incident would be enough to create a great diplomatic storm, inviting foreign intervention, and cession of more territories. Kang proposed that the only solution to this thorny issue was to establish China's own Confucian Church and to set religious regulations with the Christian churches. He reasoned that since churches in the West were voluntary institutions unrelated to the state but under state protection, the logical solution was to extricate the Qing state from religious disputes by transferring its religious function to the Confucian Church. Kang pointed out that France was strictest among the western nations in the protection of Catholicism in China, however, the Pope would be much easier to negotiate since he had no army or warships. [491] Kang was not the first person to propose bypassing the imperial powers to negotiate with foreign churches on religious disputes. Many reformers and reformist officials had proposed establishing diplomatic relation with the Vatican, yet none of them was as radical as Kang to propose secularizing the imperial state.

Kang's plan was to make the Confucian Church a quasi-state institution. He explained in his memorial that the Church (*jiaohui* 教會) in the West had the function of the Ministry of Rites (*libu* 禮部) in China, as it was in-charge of education and moral edification. The Church was also called the Ministry of Doctrine (*jiaobu* 教部) in the Western countries and its managers, committee members, professors and education officers (*xuezheng jiaoguan* 學政教官) were all elected by the church

[490] The memorial is included in Kong Xiangji ed. *Kang Youwei bianfa zouzhang jikao* (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 2008), pp.256-261.

[491] Kong (2008), p.257.

members, which was different from the case of China where the court appoint all the professors and education officials of state schools from the provincial to the county level through the Ministry of Rites.[492]

The Protestant origins of Kang Youwei's state religion initiative has been pointed out by Kuo Ya-pei.[493] I argue that the Meiji model of State Shintoism was equally important as a source of inspiration for Kang Youwei. In his *Riben bianzheng kao* 日本變政考(A Study of Institutional Reforms in Japan) presented to Guangxu emperor during the 1898 reform, Kang noted the abolishment of the Ministry of Rites (*Jingishō* 神祇省) and its replacement with the Ministry of Doctrine (*Kyōbushō* 教部省) on 14 March, 1872, and on 23 March, the appointment of the minister of doctrine with authority on building and closing of shrines and temples, determining priestly ranks and privileges, ordination of all Shinto and Buddhist priests, forming of congregations and lecturing of religious doctrines, and arbitration of religious disputes. He commented, "The *Jingishō* is in-charge of sacrificial ritual and does not concern the governmental system (*zhengti* 政體). It is like our Ministry of Rites, which is an institution that really should be abolished. As school and civil service examination are the matters of *jiao*/religion thus it is appropriate at present to replace the Ministry of Rites with Ministry of Doctrine. It [the Ministry of Doctrine] is charge with expounding the Way of Confucius; instituting the Sabbath (*zhuri* 主日) to lecture on the principles of ruler-subject and father-son, and the way of loyalty and love for the country; fixing the regulations for forming congregations, propagation of doctrines, and the establishment of churches; and setting the laws governing the two *jiao*/religions (Confucianism and Christianity) and on the settlement of religious disputes. Conceivably, our teaching will become manifest and religious disputes easier to resolve by the day."[494]

[492] Ibid., p.258.

[493] Kuo Ya-pei, "Christian Civilization" and the Confucian Church: The Origin of Secularist Politics in Modern China," *Past and Present*, 218 (2013), pp.235–264.

[494] Huang Zhangjian ed. *Kang Youwei wuxu zhen zouyi* (Taibei: Institute of History and Philology, 1974), p.194.

The aims of the early Meiji state in creating the Ministry of Doctrine are manifold. Broadly, through the ministry the Meiji political ideologues sought to instill in the Japanese subjects a sense of loyalty and reverence to the nascent state and imperial institution and the removal of "evil" social customs for the attainment of "civilization and enlightenment." The ministry was tasked with determining a set of national doctrine (*kokkyō*), forming a body of doctrinal instructors (*kyōdoshoku*) drawn from the ranks of Shinto and Buddhists priests, and establishing a hierarchical network of churches (*kyōkai*) that extend to every village in the country. More specifically, the ministry was created to promote imperial rites and propagate the national doctrines against the internal and external religious enemies of Buddhism and Christianity in the conversionary competition.[495]

Kuo Yapei has highlighted that the Meiji leaders appropriated the binary of "religion" and "non-religion" to establish the supremacy of the state, while Kang Youwei used it to build an independent Confucian church. She also points out that both Kang Youwei and the Meiji leaders were very much aware of religion's entanglement with politics, and that the church-state separation was merely a functional divide that masked the true political reality in western countries. From Protestant and the Meiji examples, Kang learnt that church and state are institutionally separated but complementary in function. The state protects and supports the expansion of the church, and in return, the church serves the state in citizenry formation.[496]

Instead of making the Confucian church totally independent from the state, Kang proposed that the emperor order Duke Yansheng, the direct descendent of Confucius bestowed with a hereditary title by the imperial state, to perform sacrifice to Confucius in Qufu, establish the Confucian Church and serve as its director (*zongli* 總理). All people, from the nobility to commoners, would be allowed to join the Church, and those among them with the highest academic achievement and virtue be elected to serve as its superintendents and managers. Furthermore, the court would also permit people to establish Confucian churches throughout the empire in the name of the Duke. The Duke and the committee

[495] On the state engineered "Great Promulgation Campaign," see Hardacre (1989), pp.42-48; Maxey (2014), pp.18-54.

[496] Kuo (2013), p.261-262.

members of the Church would elect members with profound academic knowledge as well as good understanding of Chinese and foreign affairs to serve as delegates to negotiate religious regulations with representatives from the various protestant churches and directly with the Vatican in Rome. Organizationally, as the Confucian Church would be an extra-bureaucratic institution equal in status to that of the Ministry of Rites, just like the Grand Council (*junji chu* 軍機處) to the Grand Secretariat (*neige* 內閣) or the Zongli Yamen to the Lifan Yuan. Kang was quick to assure the emperor that though the churches would be independently established, it would still be under the supervision of the Duke, not unlike the independent official publishing bureaus (*guanshu ju* 官書局) established in the provinces by the semi-autonomous governors.[497]

Other than the resolution of religious disputes, more importantly, Kang Youwei saw the Confucian churches as a crucial institution in the production of moral and patriotic citizens. Kang argued that "The people begotten by Heaven have bodies, so they establish the ruler to unite them; they have moral mind-hearts, so they honor the teacher to instruct them. The ruler employs laws to order the masses while the teacher uses moral principles (*yili* 義理) to edify their mind-hearts. However, laws can only restraint the outer behaviors of the people, whereas *jiao*/religion can transform them from within. This is why the rise and fall or a nation hinges on whether its *jiao*/religion is thriving or not. If the *jiao*/religion is thriving then morals of people will be wonderful, and the ruler can rule effortlessly; if the opposite is true, the custom and morality of the people will be corrupt, and the country will follow suit. This is a universal truth that is true everywhere in the world, past and present."[498] Kang bemoaned how corrupt the morals and custom of China had fallen as his countrymen chose to profit or hide themselves during times of trouble for the country. This led Kang to complain bitterly about the low status of China in the eyes of the foreigners: "The Westerners say we are an uncivilized country and have degraded us into the rank of third-class barbaric state. This is why in recent years the foreign

[497] Kong (2008), p.258.

[498] Ibid., p.259.

diplomats in our country are all transferred from Africa, and the foreign countries attacked and humiliated us at will, like how they deal with savages."[499]

Kang lamented the fact that the Confucian religion was much more profound than the farcical teaching of Christianity, yet the foreign religion triumphed because it was more methodical in its propagation. He pointed out that in the West everyone, from the ruler to the commoners, gather together to worship and recite the scriptures every seven days. On the other hand, China venerated Confucius in name but not in reality. The worship of the sage was only allowed for the degree holders while the great majority of the people do not recite Confucian classics or pay obeisance to the image of the sage. Instead they sacrifice at licentious temples dedicated to the myriad ghosts and spirits, and even in the state sacrifice (*sidian* 祀典), the sage shared the same ceremony with the half spirit and half ghost Wenchang. Furthermore, the state education officers (*jiaoguan* 教官) only teach the literati not the masses, and Confucian temples existed only in major administrative centers and in small numbers, unlike the Christian churches that dotted the whole empire.[500]

Kang reserved his greatest criticism to the main means of propagating the Confucian teaching—the civil service examination. Kang criticized the eight-legged essay for contradicting its purpose of expounding the principles of the classics as structure take priority over content. The candidates were supposed to "establish the truth on behalf of the sages," yet in reality what the rigid eight-legged format of the examination did was to encourage clever words and inferior imitation in the form of model essays. For Kang, the examination was merely a literary exercise that could not select men of substance for employment since everything beyond the Qin-Han period, not to mention practical knowledge from the West, were left out. Moreover, Kang argued that since the examination function primary as a means for training and selecting officials for the state not for the promulgation and explication of Confucius' teaching, the scholar-official class produced by the system was predominately the selfish and immoral type of people who studied for the sake of an illustrious career in the bureaucracy. They hypocritically

[499] Ibid.

[500] Ibid., p.258.

belittled others, like Kang himself, who engage in the promulgation of Confucian learning (*jiangxue* 講學) as charlatans or criticized them as gathering crowd for personal motives. "This is why among the large population of 400 million people, those talents who shoulder the responsibility of (propagating) the Confucian teaching and could be entrusted with the matters of the state are sparse….And the reasons why the country is weak, and the people ignorant and custom depraved, are all due to the degeneration of the sacred teaching into selection for officeholders and the demise of the four books because of the eight-legged essay."[501] In an earlier memorial, Kang proposed to the emperor several measures to reform the civil service examination, and one of which was to introduce a new subject called "religious learning" (*daoxue* 道學). Candidates who excel in the subject would be appointed as ritualists and evangelists for the Confucian church. They would be sent abroad to preach to overseas Chinese and convert the western barbarians.[502]

ZHANG ZHIDONG AND THE SEPARATION OF EDUCATION FROM CHRISTIANITY

The humiliating defeat of the Sino-Japanese war made comprehensive reform an urgent task for the Qing state and concerned elites to save the country from extinction. At the forefront of late Qing reformism was Zhang Zhidong. Zhang was a strong advocate of reforms in the regions under his governorship and in the central government as a member of the Grand Council. He also gave initial political and financial backings to Kang Youwei's reform initiatives. Zhang perceived that the strength and wealth of the West came from their superior knowledge in the practical arts of science, agriculture, industry, commerce, military and government, and their educational system in encouraging such knowledge and the nurturing of talents. The weakness of China, on the other hand, was due to deficiency in new education (*xinxue* 新學) and the lack of specialized talents. He was convinced that educational

[501] Ibid., p.259.

[502] The idea of sending evangelists abroad was also mentioned in the "Shang qingdi dier shu" and "Shang qingdi disan shu." See Kong (2008), p.37 and pp.59-60.

reform would be the key to the strengthening of the Chinese state and nation. Zhang started the external chapters (*waipian* 外篇) of his *Exhortation to Learning* (*Quanxue pian* 勸學篇) with the importance of education for national salvation: "One's strength is born out of power, power is born out of intelligence, and intelligence is born out of education…. For an intelligent people, though weak, others cannot destroy their country, and for a country made of intelligent people, even at a precarious state, others cannot brutalize its race."[503] Zhang underscored the importance of learning from the West and pointed out that India, Africa, Kazakhstan, and Cuba had failed to do so, and thus their races remained ignorant and eventually got enslaved by the Western powers.

However, Zhang was adamantly against the whole scale adoption of Western education, which included secular knowledge and the ethical learning of Christianity, sponsored by the missionaries, who were the main private and official providers of western education in China. As Ji Zhe rightly pointed out, it was missionary dominance in modern education that provided the impetus for secularization in late Qing China. [504] Zhang Zhidong shared Kang Youwei's fear of the destruction of Confucian teaching by the joint forces of Christianity and imperialism. While Zhang rejected Kang's attempt to separate religion from politics through the creation of a Confucian church, he sought to separate education from Christianity through his education reform. In the *Quanxue pian*, Zhang laid down his famous guiding education principle of "Chinese learning as the foundation, Western learning for practical utility" (*zhongxue weiti, xixue weiyong* 中學為體，西學為用).

Zhang defined Chinese learning specifically as Confucian classics excluding Buddhism and the teachings of other Chinese philosophical schools, and Western learning as scientific education and western languages excluding religious instruction. The position between Chinese and Western learnings was not equal. Zhang made clear that Western learning was to supplement what was lacking in Chinese learning (i.e. the modern curriculum for national strengthening), and that students should first be

[503] Zhang Zhidong, *Quanxue pian*, waipian, ch. 1 "Yizhi diyi" (On improving education), p.1a.

[504] Ji Zhe, "Introduction: le jiao recompose. L' éducation entre religion et politique dans la modernité chinoise" in *Extrême-Orient, Extrême-Occident*, 33 (2011), pp.15-18.

proficient in the former before learning the latter. The reason for emphasizing Chinese learning as the foundation of new education was Zhang's belief in the superiority of Confucian moral learning, as well as his fear in the loss of cultural allegiance and the rise in the notion of popular sovereignty among the students when western learning became prominent. Zhang believed that the right of self-determination, which was in vogue among Chinese proponents of western theories, was ludicrous and the idea came from their misunderstanding and mistranslation of the concept of an autonomous individual soul and intelligence in Christianity. Zhang argued with little substantiation that Christianity also shared the notion of the "three bonds and five constants" to stress the universality of the Chinese concept. [505] Zhang's condemnation of Kang Youwei's "Confucianity" and his attempt to separate science from religion in his definition of Western learning was motivated by his staunch disapproval of the notion of popular sovereignty and his defence of the Chinese cultural essence of the "three bonds and five constants."

Douglas Reynolds has shown that the idea of *ti-yong* was meaningful for Qing scholars and reformers not merely because it was a way out of the intellectual crisis of value and history created by Western intrusion, but it was demonstrated to be viable by the success of Meiji Japan in grafting Western-style institutions onto a Confucian value system. Reynolds points out that behind the *ti-yong* question was Chinese inability to distinguish between Christianity and the rest of Western culture, thus creating a stumbling block for the modernization of China. "Japan, by contrast, had long recognized or, rather, insisted upon a sharp delineation between western learning and western religion." [506] The Tokugawa Bakufu and Meiji government had welcomed western scientific and medical knowledge, and at the same time ruthlessly expunged Christianity from Japanese soil. Furthermore, from Chinese perspective, the common culture and language (Ch. *tongwen*; Jp. *dōbun* 同文) shared by Japan and China made the Japanese modernization model a "coherent, readily accessible, and ideologically

[505] Zhang, *Quanxue pian*, neipian, ch.6 "Zhengquan diliu" (On the restoration of sovereignty), pp.16a-19b.

[506] Reynolds, *China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), p.142.

compatible" option.[507] In *Quanxue pian*, Zhang proposed translating Japanese books on Western learning into Chinese as the process would be much more effective than translating Western books directly, and also sending Chinese students to study in Japanese schools which was less costly than sending them to the West.

In 1898, Zhang Zhidong dispatched China's first educational mission to Japan under the leadership of Yao Xiguang 姚錫光 (1856-?). In late 1901 in the wake of the New Policies reforms, Zhang together with Liu Kunyi 劉坤一 (1830-1902) sent Luo Zhenyu 羅振玉 (1866-1940) and six educators on a special investigative mission to Japan. Luo was the founder of the Dongwen Xueshe 東文學社, a Japanese language teaching school with modern curriculum. Luo was also a close advisor of Zhang Zhidong for his education reform in Hubei during the 1898 reforms. Luo spent two productive months in Japan listening to lectures on Japanese education system and inspecting schools of every level. He brought back a large corpus of information on Japanese education system, school regulations, textbooks and theories. On the trip also was Chen Yi 陈毅 who served as an important aide to Zhang in his educational reform.[508] The Qing state had never made an investigative education mission to any foreign country other than Japan. Qing's interest in the Japanese education system was its ideological utility in encouraging loyalty to the monarch and honoring of Confucian values (*zhongjun zunkong* 忠君尊孔) as well as in shielding both, defined as *zheng* (government) and *xue* (education), from competition with the *jiao*/religions of Christianity, Buddhism, and Daoism.

Before ending this section, I would like to draw attention to the Meiji connection to the "building schools with temple property" (*miaochan xingxue* 廟產興學) campaign waged by late Qing reformers against temple cults and monastic Buddhism and Daoism. In *Quanxue pian*, Zhang Zhidong suggested appropriating 70% of the property of Buddhist and Daoism monasteries in all counties as funds for the building of schools, and the rest would be kept for the maintenance of the clerics. Kang

[507] Ibid., p.132.

[508] Ibid., p.135.

Youwei was also a strong advocate of using temple properties to finance a modern school system. In the July 10 memorial, he suggested "Other than the *jiao*/religions [of Christianity, Buddhism, Daoism, and Islam] that have been practiced for a long time, which could allow people the right of religious freedom (*fengjiao ziyou* 奉教自由), and those (cults) stated in the register of state sacrifices, the local officials shall order all immoral temples to be immediately demolished. They shall be converted to Confucian temples or schools to save on fatuous expenditures and to reform immoral teaching and custom."[509]

Acting on the advice of Zhang and Kang, Emperor Guangxu issued a temple confiscation edict during the short-lived hundred days reform. With regard to the "building schools with temple property" movement, many scholars have attributed it to the traditional Confucian bias against religious specialists and non-canonical religious practices and neglected the Meiji contribution.[510] Late Qing reformers were well informed of the Meiji religious policy known as "separation edicts" (*bunri rei*) which mandated the separation of Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples for the creation of a state religion centered on Shinto, and the mass confiscation of Buddhist property to finance the modernization efforts of the Meiji state.[511] The demonstrated success of the Meiji religious policy must have given impetus to Late Qing reformers to appropriate temple property at a national level.

Vincent Goossaert argues that Zhang Zhidong's plan to appropriate temple property operates from the discourses of Confucian fundamentalism and anticlericalism, while Kang Youwei's is a mixture of the two with the anti-superstition discourse derived from the West.[512] However, in the *Quanxue pian*, Zhang did not express disdain for the Buddhist and Daoist clerics as "social parasites"

[509] Huang (1974), p.469.

[510] For late imperial Confucian anti-clerical discourse, see Vincent Goossaert, "Anatomie d'un discourse anticlerical: le Shenbao. 1872-1878." *Extrême–Orient, Extrême-Occident*, 24 (2002), pp. 113-131; and Peter van der Veer, "Smashing Temples, Burning Book: Comparing Secularist Projects in India and China" in Calhoun, Juergenmeyer, and Antwerpen eds. *Rethinking Secularism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp.270-276.

[511] Ketelaar, *Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan*, pp.65-86.

[512] Vincent Goossaert, "1898: The Beginning of the End for Chinese Religion," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 65.2 (May 2006), pp.307-335.

nor did he condemn their practices as non-canonical and immoral. In fact, Zhang justified his seizure of monastic property on the pragmatic reason that Buddhist and Daoist temples owned considerable resources. Not only temple property, Zhang also included land of charity halls, fees for temple festivals, and lineage property as resources for the building of new schools. Zhang saw the Chinese *jiao*/religions of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism as being locked into a conversionary competition with Christianity. He justified his appropriation of Buddhist and Daoist monastic properties as a strategy to strengthen Confucianism, which would help to defend the two ailing teachings against the aggressive Christianity at the local level.[513]

Kang's movement, on the other hand, as Goossaert rightly pointed out, was primarily "a religious project aiming at improving China's spiritual conditions."[514] His project was a real exemplar of Confucian fundamentalism as it aimed at a radical transformation of state-society relation through the imposition of a Confucian state religion and the concomitant destruction of the thousands of territorial cults that formed the ideological bridge between state and society for centuries in imperial China. Kang's destruction of local cults, however, I argue, was not motivated by the foreign discourse of *anti-superstition*. It is true that, in contrast to Zhang Zhidong, Kang Youwei critique came from the outside of Chinese religion and he sought its destruction rather than improvement. Yet he condemned Chinese religion not for its irrationality but its inability to conform to the civilized standard of religion informed by Protestant monotheism.

NEW EDUCATION SYSTEM AND THE CREATION OF THE CONFUCIAN SECULAR

In 1903, the imperial government issued the *Guidelines for Schools and Educational Affairs* (*xuetang xuewu gangyao* 學堂學務綱要) drafted by Zhang Baixi 張百熙 (1847-1907), Zhang Zhidong and Rong Qing 榮慶 (1859-1917), which outlined its plan of an universal, compulsory education modelled

[513] Zhang, *Quanxue pian*, waipian ch.3 "Shexue disan" (On education reform), p.6a.

[514] Goossaert (2006), p.311.

after the Japanese educational system. The main objective of the new education system, as its authors envisioned, was the production of talents skilled in useful knowledge and patriotic citizens loyal to the monarch and the nation-state. The document stressed on the importance of classics reading (*dujing* 讀經) in the curriculum of elementary and secondary education for the promotion of patriotism. It states:

> There is a subject call *zongjiao* in the schools of foreign countries. The classics of China are the *zongjiao* of China. If the schools do not conduct reading of classics, then the Way of Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Kings Wen and Wu, Duke Zhou, and Confucius, what is known as the "three bonds and five constants", will perished entirely, and China will not be able to establish itself as a nation-state. When education loses its foundation there is no education. When politics loses its foundation there is no politics. Once the foundations are lost, then the hearts [of the people] that love their own country and race will be easily altered. [When that happens] how is there any hope for wealth and power? This is why regardless of what profession the students chose in the future, in school they must learn to read and interpret the classics.[515]

The term *zongjiao* mentioned above does not mean "religion" as in the case of the Japanese neologism. The *Guidelines* explicitly banned the use of unnecessary foreign neologism as "language (*wen* 文) also possesses utility for supporting politics." Other than scientific terms or neologisms that describe new things, all other new words from Japan that were not contained in the Chinese language were prohibited from use in school. The limitation placed on Japanese loanwords is calculated to prevent radical socio-political ideas from entering and influencing the students as what was happening to the Chinese students studying in Japan. Though the drafters were well-aware of the term *zongjiao*, their reluctance in adopting the Japanese neologism was probably due to the fear of allowing the freedom of religious belief, which was connected to the larger issue of popular sovereignty. The 1908 *Principles of Constitution* (*qinding xianfa dagang* 欽定憲法大綱) was directly modeled after the 1889

[515] 外國學堂有宗教一門。中國之經書，即是中國之宗教。若學堂不讀經書，則是堯舜禹湯文武周公孔子之道，所謂三綱五常者，盡行廢絕，中國必不能立國矣。學失其本則無學，政失其本則無政。其本既失，則愛國愛類之心亦隨之改易矣，安有富強之望乎？故無論學生將來所執何業，在學堂時，經書必宜誦讀講解。

Meiji Constitution. However, the freedom of religious belief that was contained in the Meiji Constitution was left out in the Qing Constitution as a right guaranteed to the Chinese citizens.

The term *zongjiao* used in the *Guidelines* can be rendered as ancestral teaching or national doctrine. In Chinese lexicon, *zong* refers to the main ancestral line and its meaning is inexplicable without the term *zu* 祖 (ancestor). In religious and intellectual contexts, *zong* is used to delineate a school of thought transmitted by a line of patriarchs. This usage is originated from medieval Chan Buddhists to demonstrate how their school (*chanzong* 禪宗) was formed through the "heart to heart" transmission of the dharma through the various Chan Buddhist patriarchs. Chan Buddhism is influential in inspiring the development of the concept of "Orthodox Tradition of the Way" (*daotong* 道統) by the Sung Neo-Confucians. In their "Daotong," the Neo-Confucians traced the intellectual lineage of the Confucian school from the ancient sage-kings of Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Kings Wen and Wu, and Duke Zhou to Confucius and Mencius, and from these two scholars to the Tang-Sung Confucian masters. Confucius was the pivotal figure in the Neo-Confucian orthodox tradition of "Daotong" for his role in expounding and transmitting the true principles of the ancient sage-kings.

The *Guidelines* made clear that the *zongjiao* of China was the "Daotong" of the Confucian school. The Chinese *zongjiao* of "three bonds and five constants" which was transmitted unbroken for centuries by the ancient sage-kings and the Confucian patriarchs was the foundation of the Chinese civilization and state. The *Guidelines* stipulated that foreign teachers were strictly not allowed to teach *zongjiao* in the classroom or interfere in the curriculum of the subject they teach. It stated specifically that western teachers of missionary background were not allowed to make use of lesson to give religious instruction or use religious terms in class. Those found violating the rule would be expelled from service.[516] The target of the restriction here are certainly Christian missionaries and Japanese teachers whom the state tried to prevent from proselytizing Christianity, Shinto and Buddhism to Chinese students.

[516] "Qingding xuetang xuewu gangyao" in Qu Xingui and Tang Liangyan ed. Zhongguo jindai shi jiaoyu shiliao huibian: xuezhi yanbian (Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 1991), p.521.

Like Kang Youwei, the drafters of *Guidelines* mapped *zongjiao* and *jiao* onto the traditional dichotomy of *rendao* and *shendao*, the former referring to the seen world of education and politics while the latter to the unseen world of the gods and spirits. Traditionally, the imperial state laid claims on the authority to order the worlds of the seen and unseen. The retreat of the imperial state from basing its legitimacy on the sacred-cosmic order reflected "a serious erosion and even a gradual dissolution of the legitimacy of cosmological kingship"[517] at the end of the nineteenth century as a result of feeble monarchs, political crisis, and the intellectual challenge of Western science, religion, and parliamentary system. The decline of state sacrifice during the last decade of the Qing dynasty demonstrated the resolve of the modernizing imperial government to shift away from representing power through "establishing instruction in the way of the gods" (*shendao shejiao* 神道設教). [518]

As part of an overhaul of its ritual system, the imperial state mandated the worship of Confucius in all schools, and in 1906 promoted the sage from the Middle Sacrifices (*zhongsi* 中祀) to the Grand Sacrifices (*dasi* 大祀) in the state cult. In her analysis on the changing status of Confucius worship during the New Policies reforms, Kuo Ya-pei shows how the imperial state tried to create its own legitimacy in the era of rising nationalism by engineering the nation through a new ritual order centered on Confucius. Confucius' elevation to the Grand Sacrifices is unprecedented in history since the foremost rites undergirding imperial authority were performed by the Son of Heaven only to the cosmological forces and imperial ancestors, never to a human worthy unrelated to the emperor's mandate to rule. The worship of Confucius was not the sole prerogative of the emperor, as was the case for rites performed in the Grand Sacrifice to the cosmological and imperial spirits. Rather he worshipped Confucius in the Grand Sacrifice as one single synchronized ritual body with the citizens who paid ritual homage to the sage in the new schools.[519] The 1904 education guidelines effectively dissolved the ritual boundaries between the state cult and nonofficial worship of Confucius (*sicai* 釋菜) by stipulating

[517] Chang (1987), p.5.

[518] Marianne Bastid-Bruguière, "Sacrifices d'Etat et légimité à la fin des Qing," *T'oung Pao*, 83 (1997), pp.162–273.

[519] Kuo (2008) and (2009).

that all students, with or without imperial degrees or titles, in new style schools were required to perform ritual obeisance to the spirit tablet of Confucius during his birthday, the first day of spring and autumn (*dingji* 丁祭), school events, and national festivals.[520] Confucius was to be worshipped not as a divine uncrowned king but as the national symbol and the fount of Chinese culture and morality.

The new ritual order reduced the importance of other Grand Sacrifices in the construction of the imperium and the emperor's role as the intermediary between the perceptible human world and the unseen world of the spirits. It also should be pointed out that elements related to the unseen world were excised from the ritual performed to Confucius in schools. Though spirit tablet of Confucius was used in the school rituals, the purpose was not for the participants to commune with the spirit of the sage as in the case of traditional sacrificial rite. Religious technicalities such as the duration of fasting for the worshippers, the number of vessels, and the type of sacrificial objects were not emphasized in the 1904 guidelines for school rituals. The feast at the end of the sacrifice was referred to by the document in a quotidian sense as feasting rather than the specialized ritual terms of "*fenzuo*" 分胙 or "*yunyu*" 餕餘, which refer to the sharing of sacrificial offerings among the worshippers in presence of the spirits.[521]

The aim of the New Policies state-builders was not to create a confessional state like what Kang Youwei suggested during the 1898 reforms, but what can be referred to as state Confucianism. Different from imperial Confucianism that served the function of buttressing the institution of cosmological emperorship,[522] state Confucianism sought to nurture patriotic citizens by engendering the Chinese national character that the Qing state claimed to represent.[523] The model that New Policies state-builders

[520]According to imperial regulations, official sacrifices or *sidian* can only be performed by officials and attended by those with imperial degrees. Stephan Feuchtwang provides a good description on the difference between official and unofficial worship in the context of the cult of city gods in late imperial China. See his "School Temple and City God" in Arthur Wolf ed., *Studies in Chinese Society* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978), pp.103-130.

[521] Kuo (2008), p.81.

[522] For a discussion of imperial Confucianism and its difference from other types of Confucianism, namely philosophical and popular Confucianism, see Donald Munro, "introduction," in *Constructing China: The Interaction of Culture and Economics* edited by Kenneth Lieberthal, Shuen-fen Lin, and Ernest Young (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1997).

[523] John Fitzgerald, "The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism," in Jonathan Unger ed. *Chinese Nationalism* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), pp.56-85.

emulated for their creation was the State Shintō (*kokka Shintō*) engineered by the Meiji state for the same purpose.[524] State Shinto consisted of the *kokutai* (national polity or essence) ideology of the divinity of the emperor and the immutable rule of the imperial house (*bansei ikkei*), and a set of national ceremonies (*kokka no sōchi)* performed together by the emperor and his subjects in the imperial and national shrines that produced the reality of the ideology and national collective. State Shinto was designated by the Meiji state as "non-religion," a form of national morality and public rites, which was compulsory for all citizens to participate, and opposed to the voluntary private belief of religion.[525] Josephson has termed State Shinto as Shinto secular as it brought about the separation of religion and the state by producing the political reality from which religion could be distinguished.[526] The state Confucianism of the late Qing reformers also had the same effect of creating the Confucian secular, a system of national doctrine and rites, which was foundational to the new Qing nation-state and separated from the other theistic teachings of Daoism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity.

POSTSCRIPT: THE ARRIVAL OF THE MODERN DISCOURSE OF RELIGION AND SUPERSTITION

Kang Youwei and Zhang Zhidong's use of the term *zongjiao* did not represent a semantic change. Both still understood the term in the traditional notion of "civic teaching" (*zhijiao* 治教). It should be emphasized that the term *zongjiao* is not a loanword from Japan, alien to the Chinese language.[527] From his search of the *Wenyuange siku quanshu* online database, Anthony Yu demonstrates that the compound term *zongjiao* was widely used in medieval China to refer to the foreign teaching of

[524] Murakami Shigeyoshi, "State Shinto" (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1970); and Hardacre (1989).

[525] Thal (2002), pp.100-114.

[526] Josephson (2012), pp.132-163.

[527] Federico Masini argues that *zongjiao* is a Japanese neologism that entered the Chinese language only about 1890. See his *The Formation of Modern Chinese Lexicon*, p.244.

Buddhism.[528] Similarly, Barrett and Tarocco have demonstrated that *zongjiao* was coined by the great Huayan scholar-monks Fazang 法藏 (642-712) and Zongmi 宗密(780-841) to differentiate the different intellectual lineages of Buddhist thought. They note that "The combination of *zong* and *jiao* appears to have remained a slightly ad hoc one, as is evidenced by the fact that in commentary we sometimes find the collocation *jiaozong* (教宗)… reversing what to us has become the normal order of the two components."[529] They point out that the term *zongjiao/jiaozong* had two broad meanings outside the Buddhist circle for nineteenth century Chinese intellectuals: a distinct doctrinal teaching transmitted by a lineage of religious patriarchs and, as we have discussed in the previous chapter on Wei Yuan and Xu Jiyu's description of the Roman Church, a short hand for the "clerical".[530]

Thus, as Tarocco pointed out, rather than being a *de novo* creation by the Japanese diplomats and intellectuals in a short time to understand the new concept of "religion," the roots of the term *zongjiao* can be traceable to Chinese Buddhist terminology.[531] It is the Buddhist origins of the term that has to be taken into consideration when we discuss its use to translate "religion" in East Asia. Anthony Yu postulates that the Japanese writers finally selected the term *zongjiao* after experimenting with other terms to translate the western word "religion", for them, synonymous with Christianity, is a result of their astute awareness of the history of the term's deployment to translate an earlier alien teaching.[532] To add on to Yu's observation, I believe that the choice of the term also stemmed from the Chinese and

[528] Yu (2005), pp.11-15.

[529] Barrett and Tarocco (2012), p.311.

[530] Ibid, p.314.

[531] Francesca Tarocco, "The Making of 'Religion' in Modern China" in Nile and Searle-Chatterjee eds. *Religion, Language and Power* (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp.44-45.

[532] Yu's position has been criticized recently by Jason Josephson for ignoring the radical shift in the meaning of the *zongjiao* in the modern era when the Japanese coined the term to translate the idea of "religion", which is entirely alien to non-Western societies that did not have the notion of the separation of the religious and secular spheres. See Jason A. Josephson, "The Invention of Religions in East Asia" in Bryan S. Turner and Oscar Salemink eds. *Routledge Handbook of Religion in Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2015), pp.20-21. To be fair to Yu, he did not argue for a total continuity in meaning between the medieval and modern concept of *zongjiao*. He admits that in their use of *zongjiao* to translate "religion" "the Japanese had certainly invested it with meaning that it did not possess in the prior Chinese context. See Yu (2005), p.14.

Japanese understanding that Christianity was derived from Buddhism due to their seeming doctrinal similarities.

Kang Youwei and Zhang Zhidong did not perceive the Japanese neologism of *zongjiao* as a novel concept. For Zhang, it seems that he might be aware of the meaning of the Japanese neologism as buttressing the movement of popular sovereignty and tried to suppress it. The understanding and deployment of *zongjiao* by both remained within the traditional East Asian semantic and epistemic frameworks. In the new context of the nation-state world order, Zhang interpreted *zongjiao* to mean a national doctrine propagated by the new education system, distinct from the teachings propagated by other religious institutions and nation-states. For Kang, *zongjiao* referred to a distinct doctrinal teaching established by a religious founder (*jiaozhu*)[533] and also a Church-like clerical organization separate from the state.

Kang and Zhang's interpretations of Confucianism as *zongjiao* were increasingly challenged in the first decade of the twentieth century as the meaning of the Japanese neologism became widespread among the Chinese intellectuals. In his 1902 article *Protecting the religion is no way to honor Confucius*, Liang Qichao attacked his teacher's idea of making Confucianism the state religion. According to Liang, "Those who advocate preserving the Confucian religion have several errors: first they do not know the truth of Confucius, second they do not know the definition of 'religion,' third they do not know the shift in religious influence from now on, and fourth they do not know the relationship between the politics of nations and religion."[534] He argued that Confucius was a philosopher and not a religionist as his teachings "specifically deal with the matters of the nation and the nature of ethics and morality; [In Confucian doctrines] there is no superstition (迷信 *mixin*), no rites, [they] do not prohibit skepticism, and exclude other teachings. This is why the Confucian teaching is different from other

[533] The term *zongjiao* appears in the the title of a section (*zongjiao men*) in Kang's *Bibliography of Japanese Books* (*Riben shu muzhi*) published in 1898 to introduce Chinese to the new knowledge of Japan. Commenting on the topic of *zongjiao*, Kang writes: "Among the numerous myriad people, there exist clever men who become teachers and instruct the others. [In the ancient past when the world was separated by] soaring mountains and great waves and had yet been connected by shipping, the nine great continents each had a sage who created their respective civilization as the religious founder." Kang Youwei, "Riben shumu zhi" in *KYWQJ* vol.3, p. 299.

[534] Liang, "Baojiao fei suoyi zunkong lun" in *Yingbing-shi wenji dianxiao* vol.3, p.1343.

religions."[535] He highlighted that the Christian Church had been a regressive historical force in the West for impeding intellectual growth. The influence of Christianity had been in decline and the sphere of "divine authority" (*shenquan*) being circumscribed with scientific advancement. The western states absolutely prohibited the encroachment of the Church and clergy into the spheres of politics and education. Liang argued that Protestantism was not a progressive force of modernity as what the missionaries claimed but the remnant of a dying institution.[536]

Adopting a secularist stance, Liang criticized the objectives of the state religion proponents to use the Confucian religion to counter the Christian spiritual invasion and to strengthen the Chinese state as essentially misguided since they did not understand that politics and religion are two different entities. "Politics belongs to this-worldly category (*shijian-fa* 世間法), while religion belongs to other-worldly category (*chushi-fa* 出世法)."[537] He argued that the true solution to the use of religion by imperialist powers to encroach on Chinese sovereignty lay not in the creation of a national Church, but to reform the political system to make the state transcend and in control of religion. He used the examples of Gladstone granting of equal rights to Irish Catholics and Bismarck's *kulturekampf* to illustrate his point. He pointed out that the legal recognition of religious freedom in the West was a solution to the bloody religious conflict that plagued Europe for centuries. Liang warned that instituting a state religion would not only restrict the intellectual freedom and growth of the Chinese nation, but also cause the emergence of religious conflict and costly foreign interventions.

Likewise, Zhang Zhidong's rendering of "zongjiao" as part of secular education was criticized. The reformer and educationist Jiang Weiqiao 蔣維喬 (1873-1958) wrote the article "Education and religion cannot be confused as one" in 1909 on the *Shenbao* as a critique of the late Qing education reform. He averred that the aim of education was to develop the body and mind through the teaching of ethics, technology and other subjects, while the objective of religion was devoting oneself

[535] Ibid., p.1344.

[536] Ibid., pp.1344-1345.

[537] Ibid., p.1345.

wholeheartedly to prayers and belief in the spirits. Thus, religion was highly critical of the challenge of new knowledge to its doctrines. Jiang pointed out that religion originated at a primitive time when human intellectual development was immature, and hence the sages used the "way of the spirits" to invent doctrines to restraint the evil nature of human beings. As a result, religion was often mixed up with politics and education like in Europe before the scientific age. He highlighted that in Europe, there were countries that taught religion as a subject of moral education in school or replaced it with the subject of ethics. There were countries such as England and the Netherlands that infused the teaching of moral and ethics in the subjects of humanities and citizenry education. According to Jiang, this showed the decline of religious influence in the West and the principle that religion should be voluntary and excluded from compulsory education. The mandating of one religion as a compulsory subject by the state would also infringe on the constitutional principle of religious freedom. He criticized the religious worship of Confucius in schools mandated by the Ministry of Education as ludicrous since it reflected the government's misunderstanding of the secular nature of Confucian teaching and obstructed the implementation of compulsory education.[538]

As we have seen from the discussion of *zongjiao* above, late Qing intellectuals used the loanword to translate "religion," and the term *zongjiao* was defined with Christianity as the archetype and paired with the pejorative term *mixin* 迷信 in discussing the negative influence of the Christian Church and religion in the West. Like *zongjiao*, *mixin* is also not a neologism created and imported from Japan. The traditional concept of *mixin* broadly means blind devotion or more specifically any beliefs or practices that contradict the Confucian cosmology of yin-yang and the five elements and ancestral worship. It was commonly used by Confucian elites to criticize the religious zeal displayed by the masses to the heterodoxies of Daoism, Buddhism, and popular religion.[539]

[538] Jiang Weiqiao, "Lun jiaoyu yu zongjiao buneng hun er weiyi" in *Shenbao*, November 17, 1909, p.2.

[539] Max Huang Kewu, "*Zhongguo jindai sixiang zhong de mixin*"in Suzuki Sadami and Liu Jianhui eds. *Higashi-ajia ni okeru shiteki kōryū* (Kyoto: Kokusai Nihon bunka kenkyū sentā, 2013), pp.187-190.

The historian Chu Pingyi has recently argued that *mixin* as a neologism was invented by seventeenth century missionaries and their Chinese converts.[540] He emphasizes the role of the European Jesuits, especially Ferdinand Verbeist (1623-1688), in the formulation of the neologism and largely left out in his discussion their Chinese literati interlocutors. He admits that the western missionaries were initially very cautious in attacking "pagan custom" as heresy and it was the Chinese convert Zhu Zhongyuan who started vehemently attacking the "blind beliefs" in Chinese culture.[541] In other words, the traditional concept of *mixin* is largely informed by Confucian fundamentalism. The association of *mixin* with the Confucian notion of heterodoxy was why Robert Morrison in his 1822 *A Dictionary of Chinese Language* translate "superstitious" as immoral worship (*yinsi* 淫祀) and "this means either that spirit worshipped does not exist; or that it is not the proper object to be sacrificed to by the particular worshipper."[542]

The Japanese language shared the same Chinese concept of *mixin* (Jp. *meishin*) and in the mid-1880s, Meiji intellectuals began to use the term to correspond to "superstition." The Japanese concept of *meishin* contains two essential meanings: 1) misguided devotion and 2) irrational beliefs that contradict scientific knowledge. The former is derived from Chinese source and the latter from Western. The translation of the term "superstition" into *meishin* in the 1880s by Japanese statesmen and intellectuals was related to the necessity of demarcating what was to be legally protected in Japanese spiritual tradition as "religion" in the formulation of the Meiji Constitution, as well as the debate on the value of religion associated with the Buddhist renaissance at that time.

During the Meiji modernization, intellectuals, clerics, and statesmen reconceptualized the native schema of the three teachings (*sankyō*) of Confucianism, Buddhism, and the teaching of the Gods (*shinkyō* 神教) according to the Western categories of religion, philosophy, and politics. Confucianism

[540] Chu Pingyi, "Against Prognostication: Ferdinand Verbeist's Criticism of Chinese Mantic Arts" in Michael Lackner ed. *Coping With the Future: Theories and Practices of Divination in East Asia* (Leiden, Brill Sinica Leidensia, 2017), pp.433-450.

[541] Ibid., p.446.

[542] Huang (2013), n.11, p.190.

was deemed a philosophy, Buddhism a religion, and *shinkyō*, which was renamed as *Shintō* 神道 to distinguish it from religion, a statescraft.[543] In their modernization of Buddhism, Japanese Buddhist reformers and intellectuals such as Shimaji Mokurai 島地黙雷(1838-1911), Inoue Enryō 井上円了 (1858-1919), and Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎(1855-1944) extracted beliefs of ghosts, demons, and ghosts and rituals from Buddhism to engineer it into an abstract doctrine to fit the hegemonic Protestant model of religion. They argued that Buddhism was a more superior form of religion in comparison to Christianity since it lacks irrational beliefs such as a creator God, Heaven and Hell, and contains superior philosophical truths. As a "philosophical religion," Buddhism could be utilized by the state to bring about spiritual unification and moral enlightenment in the people.[544]

Japanese discourse of religion in general and Buddhism in particular asserted a great influence on Chinese understanding of the social function of religion. Liang Qichao quickly revised his earlier negative assessment of religion as a backward social force that impeded intellectual progress after he became more exposed to the writings of Japanese intellectuals on the subject of religion.[545] He distinguished between the false belief of superstition and true faith (*zhengxin* 正信), the former was characterized by irrationality and the latter by supra-rationality (*chao lixing* 超理性). He argued that true religion was true faith and played an important function in political affairs (*zhishi* 治事), citing how

[543] Isomae Junichi argues that the character "tō" in the compound term Shintō came from the word "dōtoku". He observes that "By the 1880s, the word shūkyō 宗教 had become established for the purposes of the individual, private realm and for reference to the legal-rights question of religious freedom, whereas the word dōtoku (道徳 morality) expressed the public realm of the Japanese people or citizenry and came to be understood as relating to the public duty of the subjects of the state." Isomae, "Discursive Formations surrounding 'Religious Freedom'" in Eggert and Hölscher eds. *Religion and Secularity: Transformation and Transfers of Religious Discourses in Europe and Asia*, p.223.

[544] Inoue Enryo was the main intellectual figure in the making of Japanese Buddhism into a rational "philosophical religion." He was popularly known as "yokai hakase" or Doctor Specter for his writings against superstitious beliefs. On his role in the construction of modern Japanese Buddhism, See Kathleen M. Staggs, "'Defend the Nation and Love the Truth.' Inoue Enryō and the Revival of Meiji Buddhism,"*Monumenta Nipponica*, 38.3 (Autumn, 1983), pp. 251-281; Jason Josephson, "When Buddhism Became a "Religion": Religion and Superstition in the Writings of Inoue Enryō" *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies*, 33.1 (2006), pp. 143-168; and Gereon Kopf. "The 'Modern' Buddhism of Inoue Enryo," *International Inoue Enryo Research*, 1 (2013): pp. 25–36.

[545] For a detailed discussion of the shift in Liang's understanding of religion while he was living in Japan, see Marianne Bastid-Brugrière, "Liang Qichao yu zongjiao wenti" in Hazama Naoki ed. *Liang Qichao, Mingzhi Riben Xifang* (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2001), pp. 400-457.

true faith inspired great men such as Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658), George Washington (1732-1799), and Saigo Takamori (1828-1877) to accomplished extraordinary feats. According to Liang, truth faith was also indispensable in nation-building as it had the effects of suppressing the selfish desires and conflict of individuals and unifying them into one nation (*qun* 群); extinguishing evil and improving public morality; and instilling men with courage and a sacrificial spirit. Following the Japanese intellectuals, Liang believed that Buddhism was a philosophical religion based on true faith and inner enlightenment, He argued that the Qing state should use the spiritual power of Buddhism to instruct and unify the nation.[546]

Between August and September 1906, the article titled "On the Necessity of Religious Reform in China" written by the Grand Councilors Duanfang 端方 (1861-1911) and Dai Hongci 戴鴻慈 (1853-1910) was serialized on the *Shenbao*. The authors argued that the three essential elements for the building of a modern nation were politics, academic knowledge, and religion. They maintained that religion was crucial for public order (*qunzhi* 群治) and human progress as politics and academic knowledge could only improve external behaviors of the upper class and had no effect on the interiority of the people, especially the lower classes in China. Regarding the common criticisms of religion as stiffening intellectual development and as redundant in the scientific age, the authors argued that the current problem with China was not with the intelligentsia minority, but the masses of uneducated people mired in superstitions. Thus, the reform of Chinese religion was a necessary stage to remove the harmful effects of superstition, to improve the spiritual and intellectual condition of the Chinese population before China could progress into the higher stages of social development.[547]

Huang Kewu notes that the Japanese concept of *meshin* entered China at about 1897 and was synonymous with "religion." This was because for the Chinese intellectuals "religion" (i.e. Christianity) was indeed a form of misguided devotion according to traditional elite understanding. Huang identifies

[546] Liang Qichao, "Lun fojiao yu qunzhi zhi guanxi" in *Yinbing shi xiaodian* vol.3, pp.1350-1354.

[547] Duanfang and Dai Hongci, "Zhongguo zongjiao yinge lun," *Shenbao*, August 27, 1906, p.2.

1908 as the historical landmark in the conceptual differentiation of religion and superstition in China.[548] The timing was not fortuitous as it was the high point in late Qing constitutional reforms. The debate over the religious status of Confucius and the value of religion to nation-building in the last decade of the Qing dynasty became more intensive during the republican period with the new regime taking over the Qing project of building a modern secular nation-state.

[548] Huang (2013), p.192.

—5—

Republican Secularism and Nation-State Building

On 1 January, 1912, Sun Yatsen (1866-1925) announced the founding of the Republic of China in Nanjing and was inaugurated as the Provisional President. In his inauguration speech, Sun promised that "(a)fter the establishment of the provisional government, it would fulfill its responsibilities as a civilized nation so as to enjoy the rights accorded to one."[549] Four days later, Sun issued the "Manifesto to foreign nations" through his foreign minister Wu Tingfang 伍廷芳 (1844-1922), stating the reasons for the revolution and the aims of the Republican government. In the document, Sun condemned the Manchu dynasty for its despotism and oppression of the Chinese, and their xenophobia which brought about foreign interventions, national shame, and preventing China's entry into the family of nations. He assured the foreign nations that his government would honor all the treaty obligations, indemnities and loans incurred by the Manchus, and protect the lives and properties of foreign nationals. He also promised to carry out legal and fiscal modernization, abolish all trade and commercial restrictions, and guarantee religious liberty to the Chinese people. Appealing to the foreign powers, Sun professed "With this message of peace and good-will, the republic cherishes the hope of being admitted into the family

[549] *Sun Zhongshan quanji*, vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), p.2.

of nations, not merely to share its rights and privileges, but to co-operate in the great and noble task of building up the civilization of the world."[550]

In the very beginning, the provisional government recognized the importance of instituting a secular government, religious freedom, and other trappings of the modern nation-state to be accepted as legitimate and civilized by the international community. On March 11, the Nanjing government promulgated the Provisional Constitution. Article 5 states that "Citizens of the Republic of China are equal in law, without distinction of race, class and religion" 中华民國國民一律平等無种族階級宗教之區别 and Article 6.7 "Citizens have freedom of religious belief" 國民有信教自由. [551] Both articles enshrined the principles of free exercise of religion and state neutrality to religion.

Article 5 espoused the multiethnic political ideal of the new republic and was calculated by the Han leaders of the revolution to counter the religious nationalism of the ethnic minorities. Like their imperial predecessors, the Han leaders well understood that the lamas constituted the main rivals to Chinese control of Tibet and Mongolia, and "holy war" remained the most potent slogan to gravitate the Muslims in central Asia against Han rule.[552] Indeed, on December 11, 1911, shortly after the outbreak of the Wuchang uprising, Outer Mongolia declared their independence from the Qing empire and formed a theocracy under the leadership of the "living Buddha" Jebtsundamka Khutughtu, who was made the Bodg Khaan (Great Khan). The exiled Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa in 1912 and asserted Tibetan independence against the Chinese republic under the slogan of protecting Tibetan race and religion.[553] Even before the proclamation of the Provisional Constitution, the republican government had announced the seven-article "Treatment of the races of Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan and Hui" on February 8. Among the 7 articles contained a clause that guaranteed the free exercise of religion by the

[550] Herbert A. Giles, *China and the Manchus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1912), p.133.

[551] Wu Zongci, *Zhonghua minguo xianfa shi* (Beijing: falü chubanshe, 2012), p.151.

[552] Kim Hodong, *Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004)

[553] Uradyn E. Bulag, "Going into imperial: Tibeto-Mongolian Buddhism and Nationalisms in China and Inner Asia" in Esherick, Kayali and Young, eds. (2006), pp.260-295.

four races and it reads, "The native religions of the Manchus, Mongols, Hui, and Tibetans are permitted to be freely believed" 滿蒙回藏原有之宗教聽其自由信仰.

The provisional constitution of 1912 constituted for the first time in Chinese history a legal category of religion and at the same time the secular character of the state. Like other countries in Asia and Africa, Chinese secularism is a statist normative project undertaken by a small elite minority to create a modern nation-state.[554] The overriding concern of the nascent republican state was not the protection of the human rights of its citizens but to construct a cohesive national community out of the heterogeneous imperial subjects. On the connection of secularism and nation-state, Talal Asad has insightfully pointed out that "(s)ecularism is not simply an intellectual answer to an enduring social peace and toleration. It is an enactment by which a *political medium* (representation of citizenship) redefines and transcends particular and differentiating practices of the self that are articulated through class, gender, and religion."[555] Put differently, the reduction of religion to contingent private belief creates an all-inclusive social domain dominated by the transcendental state for the secular goal of making patriotic citizens.

This chapter surveys the drawing of the boundary between religion and the state through constitution and law making, and state policies toward religion in the early republican period. Vincent Goossaert and David Palmer have argued that Republican secularism was influenced by western paradigms of state-religion relations, or what they referred to as the Christian-secular normative model. In particular, they demonstrate how the Christian notion of Church-as-religion informed Chinese understanding of what constitutes legitimate "religion" and its conceptual opposite, "superstition." Similarly, Chen Hsiyuan demonstrates in his study of the early republican Confucian religion movement

[554] Chatterjee points out that "In the case of the countries of asia and africa, secularization is necessarily a normative project formulated and directed by an elite minority.The historical challenge before this elite is to steer the project by using the coercive legal powers of the state as well as the processes of reform of religious doctrine and practice—all within a global context where power must be legitimized by a large measure of popular consent. This is a task that is unprecedented in western history." Chatterjee, "Fasting for Bin Laden: The Politics of Secularization in Contemporary India" in David Scott and Charles Hirschkind eds. *Power of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and his Interlocutors* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), p.62.

[555] Tala Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2003), p.5.

that the neologism *zongjiao* had became the dominant paradigm, which even Confucianism, the official ideology and achetypical *jiao* in the imperial era, had to model itself with to survive in the new political reality.[556] What is missing in their analysis is the construction of the "secular" in modern China. In this chapter, I highlight the importance of Meiji secularism as a model for the republican state's secularizing project to engineer a modern nation-state. Since late Qing, the rising power of Japan had provided not only the constitutional model for China to emulate, but also translated the West in terms that were legible to the Chinese. Moreover, Japanese teachers and advisors had been hired in great number since the New Policies reform, and majority of the intellectual, military, and political elites of the early republic was educated in Japan. Thus, the role of Japan was not merely superficial, as in the provision of neologism such as *zongjiao* in its new meaning as "religion" and *mixin* for "superstition", but paradigmatic. It provided the Chinese republic with a successful bureaucratic model in limiting and policing religion and harnessing the material and ideological resources of religion to serve the nation-state. At the same time, the categories of "religion" and "superstition" helped the nascent republican government to constitute the secular sphere dominated by the modernizing state for the realization of its statist projects.

THE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION AND THE LIMITS OF RELIGION

The provisional constitution was an amendment of the earlier "Republic of China Provisional Government Organization Act", which did not stipulate the rights of the people.[557] Article 2 of the provisional constitution declares that sovereignty belongs to the people and Article 6 lay down the fundamental liberties of the people, including the free exercise of religion. Article 6.2 appears to be an abridged version of Article 28 of the 1889 Meiji Constitution that states "Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoyed

[556] Insert Chen hsiyuan "Religionizing Confucianism and the Re-orientation of Confucian Tradition in Modern China" in Marion Eggert and Lucian Hölscher eds. *Religion and Secularity: Transformations and Transfers of Religious Discourses in Europe and Asia* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp.231-256.

[557] Wu (2012), p.151.

freedom of religious belief (*shinkyō no jiyou* 信教の自由)." In fact, the content and phrasing of the articles in Chapter II of the republican provisional constitution are very similar to Chapter II of the Meiji constitution, which stipulates the rights and obligations of Japanese imperial subjects.[558] It is perhaps unsurprising that the Meiji constitution, despite imperial Japan being a constitutional monarchy, was used by the Chinese republicans as a model for the design of the provisional constitution since its chief architect Song Jiaoren 宋教仁 (1882-1913) had studied law in Japan and possessed a good grasp of the Japanese political system.

Jason Josephson has argued that the employment of *shinkyō* (belief and teaching) rather than the standard term of *shūkyō* (sect and teaching) for "religion" in the Meiji constitution was a deliberate attempt by the Japanese government to regulate both interior beliefs and external religious institution and practice. Josephson agrees with Talal Asad and Isomae Junichi that reducing religion to private beliefs allowed the secular state to depoliticize religion and extend its power. However, he has pointed out that the distinction between private belief and public practice maintained by the Meiji state was largely a rhetoric device. [559] Josephson maintains that "By using a nonstandard term for religion with belief in it, the Japanese state is producing a further distinction not quite as readily at hand in English. It distinguishes religion (*shūkyō*) understood in an institution or cultural sense as an external and religion understood in terms of internal belief or conviction….Leaving internal convictions rhetorically (but not actually) free, the Japanese state would then set out to regulate external religious affiliations as a matter of course."[560]

---

[558] Scholars of Chinese constitutional history have noted the influence of the American constitutional model on the early Republican constitutions. However, they have focus on the constitutional separation of powers and did not pay much attention to fundamental rights. Legal scholar Yao Chuanping argues that Articles 6 and 15 of the Provisional Constitution of 1912 are no doubt adopted from the Meiji constitution. He points out that the intellectual and political elites of the transitional period such as Liang Qichao and Yan Fu believed that the Japanese constitutional model, which places limitation on citizens' liberties, was more applicable for the reality of China. They argued that unrestricted individual freedoms would cause the breakdown of the socio-political order, furthermore, personal interests must necessarily be subordinated under the greater goal of state-building. Yao, "De yi falü xianzhi zhi: Lishi yuefa jiben quanli tiaokuan yuanliu kao," Peking University Law Journal, 25.4 (2013), pp.718-735.

[559] Josephson (2012), pp.233-234.

[560] Ibid., 236.

In other words, by regulating religion institutionally and ritually the Meiji state police beliefs as well. The Meiji constitution recognized as *shūkyō* those religious organizations that do not engage in criminal and anti-state activities or ideologically and ritually challenge State Shintō and the imperial institution.[561] The adoption of "*xinjiao*" to translate "religion" in the provisional constitution reflected the same intention of the Chinese republican leaders to regulate religion through its external manifestations.[562] Thus, as in the Meiji constitution, the provisional constitution also includes a limitation clause on the liberties of the people. Article 15 states that "The rights of the people set forth in this chapter have to be restricted by law if it is deemed necessary to promote public interest, maintain public security, or during times of emergency" 本章所載民之權利，有認為增進公益，維持治安或非常緊急必要時，得依法律限制之. However, the concern of the secular Chinese republic was less of deflecting challenge to the emperor centered national religion and state authority by institutional religions as in the case of Japan, but to eliminate superstition and heretical cults (*xiejiao*). Like during the imperial era, the term "heretical cults" mostly functioned as a political label used by the government to indict religious groups that it found as criminal or seditious in nature.[563]

The republican government recognized the religious liberty of the citizens as a constitutional right, but this privilege was restricted to only private beliefs and did not extend to the public realm of politics. This policy was exemplified most clearly in the election law enacted by the provisional government in preparation for the creation of the national congress in 1912. Article 6 of the law stipulates that Buddhist and Daoist clergies (*sengdao* 僧道) and other religionists (*zongjiao-shi* 宗教師)

[561] Sheldon Garon, "State and Religion in Imperial japan, 1912-1945," *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, 12.2 (1986), pp.273-302.

[562] Rebecca Nedostup has also noted that the Nationalists adopted the same approach towards religion during the Nanjing decade. The Nationalist government saw religious freedom as a fundamental right of the citizens, yet the exercise of this liberty had to be limited according to the laws. Religious groups and practitioners would be denied their religious freedom if they were found by the state to be seditious, criminal, or superstitions. See Nedostup (2009), pp.27-66.

[563] For the continuity in the imperial and modern political connotation of the "heretical cults," see David Palmer, "Heretical Doctrines, Reactionary Secret Societies, Evil Cults: Labeling Heterodoxy in Twentieth-Century China" in Mayfair Yang ed. (2008), pp.113-134.

do not have the rights to elect or stand for election.[564] The term "religionist" was referred by the government to any person who manage religious affairs within the religions of Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism. Lama was deliberately omitted from the restriction to avoid the charge that the republic attempts to destroy the lama leadership of the Mongol-Tibetan society. The Christian community immediately saw the legislation as targeting them and the Fujian and Hubei All Christian Confederations submitted a joint petition to the government to remove the term "religionist" from the law as a violation of the constitutional principle of religious equality. The government rejected the petition citing that the separation of state and religion was a universal principle and asserted that the political right of the Christian ministers would be restored once they step down from church authority.[565] Following the Meiji model, the Republican suspended the political rights of the clergies to prevent religious interference in national policy and to shield the government from being swept into sectarian conflict.[566]

The Buddhist Federation (*Zhongguo fojiao hui* 佛教會) founded in February 1912 in Nanjing by Ouyang Jian 歐陽漸 (1871-1943) and other lay persons was the first to register with the provisional government as a religious organization. Shortly after the promulgation of the provisional constitution, the Buddhist Federation sent Sun Yatsen its charter and an open letter requesting for official recognition and his clarification on the principle of religious freedom. The Buddhist Federation declared the exposition of Buddhist teaching and the promotion of all fine spiritual and secular dharma to bring about world peace and human happiness as its purpose.[567] The spiritual activities of the Federation listed in the charter comprise of research and propagation of Buddhist doctrines and its secular activities encompass a myriad of social progressive endeavors such as education, reform of customs, provision

[564] *ZFGB* no. 128, 5 September 1912, p.8.

[565] *ZFGB* no. 171, 19 October 1912, p.17.

[566] For a discussion of the exclusion of religion from parliamentary politics in Meiji Japan, see Maxey (2014), pp.194-201.

[567] Huang Xianian ed. *Minguo fojiao qikan wenxian jicheng* vol.1 (Zhongguo shudian chubanshe, 2008), p.277.

of charity and disaster reliefs.[568] In exchange for its work on the promotion of social morality and republicanism, the Federation demanded that the government recognize its autonomous status and its absolute authority in Buddhist affairs including the management of religious properties of all Buddhist organizations (*fojiao gongtuan* 佛教公團), adjudication of disputes among Buddhists, and the reform and consolidation of all Buddhist endeavors.[569]

While Sun endorsed the registration of the Buddhist Federation and all its demands, he stressed the need to emulate the "fine trend" (*meifeng* 美風) in the world of strictly separating religion and state.[570] He recognized the role of religion in promoting social morality and patriotism, however, the state, especially a multi-ethnic one like China, must be religious neutral for the fear of embroilment in sectarian conflict. The understanding of Sun and the leaders of the Buddhist Federation of what constitute as a "religion" underscores the prominence of, what Vincent Goossaert and David Palmer refer to as, the "Christian-secular normative model" among republican elites. The Buddhist Federation was the first among many church-like national religious associations that sprouted during the early years of the Republic to gain recognition and protection by the state as religion. These organizations were established by religious clerics or laity who "had grand plans to create hierarchical churches with countless bureaus for research, propaganda, education, and discipline as well as branches in every part of China and the world."[571] However, the grand plans of these national religious organizations remained unrealized and they were largely irrelevant during the early republican period. The activism of these national organizations demonstrates the importance of religious actors in the constitution of the religious sphere in modern China. The republican state largely left these religious associations alone unless they obstructed statist projects or threatened state authority.

[568] Ibid., pp.277-282.

[569] Ibid., p.292.

[570] Ibid., p.295.

[571] Goossaert and Palmer (2011), p.75.

PURIFYING RELIGION: RELIGION AS A TOOL OF GOVERNANCE

In June 1912, the government tabled to the parliament (*canyi yuan* 參議院) a draft bill to shift the Bureau of Religion and Rites (*lijiao si* 禮教司) from under the Home Ministry to the Ministry of Education. The bureau was to be renamed the Bureau of Social Education (*shehui jiaoyu si* 社會教育司) and tasked with the reform of religion. The government explained the rationale behind the move as follows. "Religion belongs to the realm of citizenry spirit, occupying a huge component of social education. This is why in the various European countries the Ministry of Education (*jiaoyu bu* 教育部) is known as the Ministry of Religion and Education (*jiaobu* 教部). The majority of what is considered ritual and custom is part of religion, and both are the matters of education." The government further clarified that though religious belief of the people was guaranteed by the constitution, but it did not mean that religion was beyond the authority of the state. On the need of religious reform, the government stressed that the religious condition of the country was extremely chaotic and people's conception of religion muddled and confused. Those religions that claimed to be Confucian and Daoist, for instance, were engaging in various kinds of "absurd and vulgar" (*huandan bilou* 妄誕鄙陋) practices that contradicted the main principles of religion.[572]

The government perceived religion to be of great value in the production of republican citizens, however before that it had to be purged of all harmful superstitious elements. The Education Ministry published its religious reform proposal on the *Shenbao* on 22 June. The document laid out the ministry's plan as comprising of two main themes and the object of reform was the native three teachings of Ru, Shi and Dao. The first theme was the assessment of doctrines to prevent "pseudo-religions" (*mingshi shifei zhi zongjiao* 名是實非之宗教) from surviving under the constitutional protection of religious freedom. The ministry assessed the doctrines of Confucius and Laozi as academic learning (*xueshu* 學術) and philosophy (*zhexue* 哲學) respectively and not religion. It condemned those that made Confucian learning a religion by infusing it with sacrificial and funeral creeds, and in the case of Daoism,

[572] "Jiaoyu bu shehui jiaoyu si guanli zongjiao zhi yijian shu," *Shenbao*, June 22, 1912, p.1.

the corruption of the pure philosophy of Laozi with "superstitious" practices such as charms, incantation, the ritual of *zhaijiao* 齋醮, spirit mediumship and seance. The second theme was the rectification of ritual and custom of religion according its main principles. It criticized the preoccupation of Buddhist monks in sutra-recitation instead of intellectual study and ethical cultivation, as well as the "extremely improper endeavors" of the Yellow and Red sects of Tibetan-Buddhism, and the various superstitious practices of popular Buddhist sects that needed rectification.[573]

During the first hearing of the bill, the main concern among the parliamentarians was whether the government was intending to propagate a state religion (*guojiao* 國教) through national education. This question was tabled to the representative of the president office and he answered that it was difficult to establish a state religion considering the fact that the five nationalities of the republic subscribed to different religious faiths. He maintained the neutral position of the state to religion by asserting that all religions followed by the five nationalities were considered by the government as China's religions. He revealed to the parlimentarians that the state council (*guowu yuan* 國務院) decided to shift the management of religion from the Home Ministry to the Ministry of Education because it believed that Buddhism had contributed greatly to the rise of Japan as a nation. Thus, like what the Japanese government did with Buddhism, the nascent republican state should adopt a strategy of religious activism, making use of religion to instill a strong national consciousness in the people.[574] The reply of the government representative betrayed the influence of Japan behind the state initiative to reform Chinese religions.

After reviewing the bill, the Legislative Affairs Committee recommended that religion be removed under the management of the Ministry of Education. The reasons were firstly, the reform of Chinese religions necessitated the establishment of a state religion to be the archetype but unlike the West, China had no uniform faith. Secondly, since the constitution guaranteed freedom of religious belief it was unlawful for the state to interfere politically in religion. Moreover, religious reform was

[573] Ibid.

[574] *ZFGB* no.47, 16 June 1912, p.12.

unnecessary as a crackdown on superstition, which could be done through police power, would suffice to improve education.[575]

The recommendation of the Committee was read out to the parliament during the first hearing of the bill for deliberation. Liu Guanxun 劉盥訓 (1876-1953), the representative and educator from Shanxi, opposed the recommendation and illustrated the importance of religion to nation building. He stressed that in the age of international competition, religion was indispensable for China's survival as it promoted the intellectual development of the people. Liu argued that religion, despite under challenge due to advancement in science (*lixue* 理學), was still the foundation of the strength of Western powers. This was why religion was taught in the school in the West while in China and Japan there was the subject of ethics. He stressed that "what is called religion (*zongjiao*) is not the worship of idols and what causes (people) to fall deeper into superstition. It is merely another name for faith (*xinyang* 信仰). A faithless person living in the world will be rudderless and as a result cannot compete and survive. A nation that cannot gather the faith of many individuals into a greater faith must become inferior and perish in this competitive age."[576] He lamented that Chinese people had no sense of community (*tuanti-xing* 團體性), adventurous spirit (*maoxian-xing* 冒險性), and group identity (*hequn-xing* 合群性) simply because the value of religion to the nation-state was unknown. Liu warned that China would be in a precarious position if the nation did not advance religion and allow the many superstitions to strive and confuse the unintelligent lower classes and result in disaster such as the Boxer incident. He thought that the state should advocate the Confucian religion (*kongjiao* 孔教), as well as other religions such as Buddhism and Islam among the lower classes to foster their faith. He argued that the state should adopt a two-pronged strategy, the proactive approach of studying and encouraging religion through the Ministry of Education and the passive approach of outlawing superstitions. The former approach should be primary and the latter supplementary.[577]

[575] *ZFGB* no.90, 29 July 1912, p.17.

[576] Ibid.

[577] Ibid., p.18.

The religion motion was debated intensely in the parliament during the second hearing of the proposed bill in August. The two primary points of contention were whether the state would be violating the freedom of religion through a proactive approach of promoting religion and was religion a progressive or regressive force for the nation. Yu Daoxuan 俞道暄, the representative from Anhui, pointed out that the major nations all adopted a passive approach toward religion (*zongjiao*) and that China should follow suit and let the Home Ministry manage religious affairs instead of promoting religion. The bloody religious wars in the West, according to Yu, demonstrated the danger of not separating politics from religion. It was because of the painful lesson learned from the religious conflict that the political and education authorities (*zhengquan, jiaoyu-quan* 政權, 教育權) of the state were strictly demarcated from the religious power (*jiaoquan* 教權) of the Church and clergy.

Moreover, he stressed that there was no religious war in China because there was no religion before the entry of Buddhism and Christianity. Confucius was not a religionist and the Confucian teaching of the literati was not a religion. What China had indigeniously that fitted the category of religion were merely sectarian groups such as the White Lotus Sect and Big Sword Society. In a pragmatic political sense, Yu argued that whether these groups were religion or not depended entirely on whether they were a threat to public order. Furthermore, he regarded religion as essentially an outdated form of irrational belief that could not be reformed and made useful for the modern world as what the Ministry of Education claimed. He asked "If the Buddhist theory of the eighteen levels of hell has been eliminated, could Buddhism still survive after the removal of this [essential] element?"[578] Yu distinguished the secular education of state such as national, citizenry and scientific studies from that of the otherworldly teaching of religion. He argued that the opposing nature of secular education and religious teachings made it impossible for the Ministry of Education to be in-charge of promoting both at the same time.

[578] *ZFGB* no 93, 1 August 1912, p.25.

The Hunanese representative Peng Yunyi 彭允彝 (1878-1943) concurred with Yu that religion (*zongjiao*) was a regressive force that should not be propagated by the state. He stressed that religion was not beneficial for the future of China and the country should instead promote national education to arouse the patriotic hearts of the people and technological education (*shili jiaoyu* 實利教育)[579] for the economic development of the nation. In addition, Yu asserted that the current situation in Tibet and Mongolia was precarious because the two regions were intellectually backward due to the overwhelming influence the lamas had on the local people. He pointed out that the Ministry of Education would have great difficulty in carrying out religious reform considering the existence of many religions in China, and the establishment of one among them as the state religion would violate the constitution guarantee of religious freedom. Instead of promoting religion, Peng suggested that the state should make the learning of one or two scholars (*xuezi* 學子) into a kind of ethical philosophy (*lunli xue* 倫理學) and propagate it among the lower classes to develop faith in them.[580]

Ding Shiyi 丁世嶧 (1878-1930), a native of Shandong, opposed Yu Daoxuan's viewpoint that China did not have any religion (*zongjiao*) and that religion was irrelevant in modern society. Ding listed Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, and Christianity as the four religions of China. Ding agreed that religion did contain superstitious element, however religion was related to morality and religious dogmas had a lot that concerned society. Moreover, compared to European Christianity, Ding argued that Chinese Buddhism and Daoism were endowed with characteristics that Western scholars referred to as philosophy. He maintained that it would be a mistake to equate Buddhism and Daoism with the contemporary actions of Buddhist monks and Daoist priests who only engaged in funeral rites. In the reform of religion, he recommended that the state rely on religious study associations such as the Buddhist Studies Society (*foxue yanjiu hui* 佛學研究會), which were begining to sprout in the Yangzi

[579] This term was coined by Cai Yuanpei in his "Duiyu xin jiayu zhi yijian" (my opinion on new education) published on *Linshi Zhengfu gongbao*, vol. 13 (11 February 1912), p.8. In this opinion piece, Cai argued that the wealth and power of a nation was built solely on technologies in production and military, and that had to come from technological education.

[580] *ZFGB* no 93, 1 August 1912, pp.26-27.

region, to extract the philosophical essences of Chinese religions and propagate them to the society. In addition, in making Buddhism and Daoism into religions, Ding suggested that Buddhist and Daoist clergies be removed from ownership of religious property just like the practice of Christianity in the West.[581]

Pursuing another line of argument was Hu Bicheng 胡璧城 (1868-1925) from Anhui, who opposed the management of religion by the Education Ministry because faith cannot be engineered artificially. Hu averred that the advocacy of religion in the West was a not a fact but a political strategy (*shouduan* 手段) that utilized religion for the attainment of state objectives, both domestic and foreign. He criticized the plan of the Ministry of Education to utilize Buddhism for national ends. He pointed out that the influence of Buddhism internationally was extremely weak in comparison with the other world religions of Christianity and Islam. The Japanese state made use of Buddhism because it had existed for centuries and exerted a strong influence on Japanese society, which was different from the Chinese situation.[582]

Arguing against Hu, the Hunanese senator Liu Yan 劉彥 (1880-1941) believed that religion was a very useful instrument of policy for the Chinese government. He underscored the fact that the Western powers had been utilizing Christianity as a means for the imperialist policy on China. If the state remained unconcern about the matter, the religions in China would easily fall under the control of foreign agencies. In addition, Liu urged the state to make use of the reform of religion to civilize the Tibetans, Mongols and Hui people. He argued that it would be impossible for the state to destroy the backward Lamaism and Islam of the non-Han ethnic minorities through the use of police power by the Home Ministry, and it had to be done through religious reform.[583]

The bill ultimately did not pass the second hearing as majority of the congress members agreed with the recommendations of the Legislative Affairs Committee. The failure of the bill was less to do

[581] Ibid., p.25.

[582] *ZFGB* no. 95, 3August 1912, p.26.

[583] Ibid.

with the violation of the constitutional separation of state and religion than the utility of religion in the fulfilment of state policy. Even for those who agreed that religion had a positive social function, it was hard not to notice that there was no institutional religion such as Christianity in the West and Buddhism in Japan that could exert a strong influence in China.

EMASCULATING RELIGION: SEPARATING RELIGION AND PROPERTY

The issue of temple property was the main source of conflict between the state and religion. On April 1, 1912, the General Buddhist Association of China (*Zhongguo fojiao zonghui* 中国佛教总会) was founded by monk Jing'an 敬安 (1855-1912) in reaction to the establishment of the Buddhist Federation. The aim of the association was to resist the control of monastic property by the laity led Buddhist Federation and confiscation by the government. The Buddhist Federation led by the anticlerical Ouyang Jian soon dissolved as a result of clerical opposition and the GBAC became the official representative of Chinese Buddhism. The Daoists swiftly followed the Buddhist example in the building of national associations to seek state recognition and protection against confiscation of monastic property. The Quanzhen priests founded the Daoist Association (*Daojiao hui* 道教會) and the rival Zhengyi leaders established the General Daoist Association of the Republic of China (*Zhonghua minguo Daojiao zonghui* 中華民國道教總會) in1912. Both Daoist associations were largely dormant and their influence limited to Beijing and Shanghai during the Republican period as they did not command the support of all Chinese Daoists. The more organized and united GBAC was the only religious association with the capacity to resist the nation-wide seizure of monastic property by local governments for secular purposes.[584]

In August 1912, Tan Yankai 譚延闓（1880-1930), the military governor of Hunan, telegraphed the central government objecting the interference of administrative authority by the GBAC. Tan, in a

[584] Goossaert and Palmer (2011), pp.79-86; and Goossaert, "Republican Church Engineering: The National Religious Associations in 1912 China" in Mayfair Yang ed (2008), pp.216-219.

Confucian anti-clerical fashion, wrote "Though there are enlightened ones within the monkhood, the vast majority of those in the dhama realm are debauched and arrogant in disposition. It is difficult to ensure that they will not use the association to obstruct local public interests." He especially pointed to article 18 of the association's charter, which gave the association the right of deposition to all property of Buddhist temples and nunneries, regardless of whether purchased privately or through public donations, as problematic. He found it erroneous for the association to claim jurisdiction over all temples and nunneries in the province since the clerics had no gainful employment and the properties were mostly purchased by local wealthy lineages or communities. Many of the temples, though they had monks as managers and were housing Buddhist statutes, could not be considered Buddhist as they were devoted to popular deities such as Emperor Guan and the Dragon King. Most importantly, temple properties and buildings were acquired as resources for local education projects by local self-governing bureaus and civil authorities, which was legitimate in accordance to the self-governing regulations promulgated in the last decade of the Qing dynasty. He warned that if the central government did not clarify who had jurisdiction over temple property, there would be endless conflict between the clerics and secular authority. Furthermore, the budding results of the education policy of local government would certainly be destroyed by the hindrance of the GBAC.[585]

In response, the Home Ministry decreed that the charters of all religious associations established before 1 August had to be rectified and resubmitted for approval to prevent abuses and social conflicts. The decree stated that many religious associations were hastily established after the founding of the republic and the granting of the freedoms of religion and association. However, all the charters submitted to the government for registration were mostly inappropriate. There were cases of transgression of administrative authority, of obstruction of local public projects, of central and branch charters being inconsistent, and even the use of religious calendar alongside the republican calendar for dating (indicating challenge to secular authority). The ministry argued that the charters were approved

[585] *ZFGB* no. 115, 23 August 1912, pp.6-8.

by the Nanjing government at a time when the legal system was still in the process of formulation and as the laws evolved the charters of the religious associations must follow suit. [586]

To clarify the jurisdiction over temple property, the Home Ministry introduced the distinction between private and public religious assets. In adjudicating the legal dispute between local civil authorities and the Buddhist clerics over the temple assets in Baoqing, Hunan, the ministry categorized religious assets that were garnered through public solicitation and donation as public assets and those purchased by Buddhist monks as private assets. The clerics had no right of ownership over public assets and the government only offered protection over religious property classified as private assets. The ministry also urged local civil authorities to evaluate the temples under their jurisdiction and those housing religious icons not recorded in Buddhist canons to be eliminated as "superstition and backward customs." At the same time, the ministry ordered a national census to be conducted on the Buddhist and Daoist shrine-temples and Catholic and Protestant churches in every province.[587]The survey of religious buildings was part of the drive of the modern Chinese nation-state to collect information on the nation and society for the purpose of control and nation-building.[588]

On 5 November, 1912, the Home Ministry issued to all provincial governors and civil executives the *Guideline on the protection of temple property* (*baohu miaochan panfa* 保護廟産辦法) for dissemination to local clerics. It stated unequivocally that "except for religious heritage (*zuzong yichan* 祖宗遺產) and assets purchased individually by the Buddhist and Daoist clerics are allowed to be disposed freely, however, for temple properties acquired through state and public funds the resident abbots possess only management rights and not ownership rights."[589] To prevent the abbots from seizing the public assets, the ministry ordered that clerics were not permitted to transfer properties individually, and had to turn over the management of the assets to the civil authorities once they

[586] Ibid., p.9.

[587] *ZFGB* no.171, 19 October 1912, pp.5-6.

[588] See Tong Lam, *A Passion for Facts: Social Surveys and the Construction of the Modern Chinese Nation-state, 1900-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).

[589] *ZFGB* no 188, 5 November 1912, p.5.

renounce religious life.[590] It is important to note, shortly after the promulgation of the *Guideline* the Home Ministry instructed the provincial authorities to strictly protect Confucian temples. The central government categorized Confucian temples as cultural heritage and emphasized their function in the "preservation of the national essence and maintaining the morals of the people" (*bao guocui xi renxin* 保國粹系人心).[591]

The *Guideline* established the principle of separating temple property from its tie to religion, thus limiting the scope of the constitutional protection of religion to only beliefs. The republican government also refused to acknowledge the claim of Buddhist and Daoist national religious associations as the sole legal representative of monastery assets, clerics, and lay adherents of the two religions. The Home Ministry rejected the re-registration of the GBAC in December 1912 for its claim to be the national Buddhist association, representing all Buddhists in China and having authority over the management of monastic assets. The ministry emphasized that "In the current situation of China, religious associations and religion do not mixed, religion and temples do not relate to one another. The association's desire to command religion with association and temples with religion, is disregarding the past custom and the provisional constitution."[592] The ministry argued that traditionally temple and religion (*zongjiao*) were not interrelated, as temples were seldom built out of devotion to a single religion or solely for religious purpose, hence the claim of the association over all monastic properties in the country would be using religion to seize property. Furthermore, the ministry construed the federation's claim of representing all Chinese Buddhists as a violation of the freedom of religion since it could be taken as an act of compelling those not in the association to join it. The ministry clarified the legal status of religious associations as private legal persons (*sifaren* 私法人), no different from private citizens, guaranteed with religious freedom but not accorded with preferential treatment, power, or special status, unlike the Daolusi and Senglusi of the Qing dynasty. In fact the ministry rejected the

[590] Ibid.

[591] *ZFGB* no.194, 11 November 1912, p.15.

[592] *ZFGB* no.201, 8 December 1912, p.13.

petition of the Central Buddhist Guild (*zhongyang fojiao gonghui* 中央佛教公會) at the same time to legally recognize Buddhist associations as non-profit charitable organizations (*gongyi sifaren* 公益私法人).[593] Religious associations were warned not to treat themselves as public juristic person, as equal in status with the state, and transgress secular authority.[594] The republican state denied the claim of Buddhist and Daoist national associations as the national churches of the Buddhist and Daoist communities as well as their aspiration to establish Buddhism and Daoism as the state religion of China.

The *Guidelines* was made into a law by the Republican government through the promulgation of the *Provisional Measure for the Control of Monasteries* (Simiao guanli zhanxing guize 寺廟管理暫行規則) in June 1913. Under the challenge of the Buddhists, the Home Ministry enacted a more comprehensive and restrictive law on the management of monasteries and clerics in 1915. The law required temples to pay taxes for their assets as well as set up schools that provide secular education. It also restored the imperial institution of ordination certificate as a means of controlling the clerics. In the making of public speeches, the clerics were required to notify the local authorities at least 5 days in advance and restrict the content to only religious doctrines, moral edification, and the promotion of patriotic thinking. The law gave the government extensive power in the discipline of the clerics. It stated that clerics not only were subjected to secular punishments for the transgression of civil and criminal laws, but they could be dismissed by local magistrates for violating monastic discipline.[595] This was interpreted by the Buddhist Sangha as an instrument of the state to remove the managing abbot from the monastery to facilitate state appropriation of temple property. The Buddhists vigorously opposed the new measure, as Holmes Welch rightly observed, because "it gave local authorities great power to restrict the monks and to encroach on religious property."[596] The opposition of the Buddhists prompted

[593] Ibid., pp.7-8.

[594] Ibid., p.13.

[595] For the 1913 and 1915 laws, see Qu Haiyuan, "Zhonghua minguo youguan zongjiao faling ji falü caoan huibian," in *Minzu-xue yanjiu suo ziliao huibian* no. 2 (1990), pp. 114-117.

[596] Welch (1968), p.138.

Yuan Shikai 袁世凱(1859-1916) to ban the GBAC in 1915, and the association did not recover from this political setback until it was resuscitated in 1929 with the coming into power of the Nationalist regime.

SEPARATING CONFUCIANISM FROM RELIGION

Shortly after the founding of the republic, the Education Minister Cai Yuanpei proposed abolishing sacrifice to Confucius and the study of Confucian classics in public schools, which were contained in the Qing education regulations. He reasoned that "loyalty to the monarch and veneration of Confucius" advocated by the Qing education system went against the spirit of republicanism and the freedom of religious belief. The abolishment of Confucian ritual and classics reading in school was an attempt by Cai to secularize the educational system. Cai did not perceive Confucius as a religious founder or the classics as equivalent to sacred religious scriptures. Cai thought that it was important to distinguish the terms *rujiao* 儒教 (the doctrine of the Ruist) and *kongjiao* 孔教 (the doctrine of Confucius), which were used after the passing of Confucius to label his teaching. *Rujiao* and *kongjiao* conveyed two different understandings of the sage: a scholar or mortal transmitter of classical learning and a divine messiah respectively. The latter understanding had been promoted by the faltering Qing state to engineer a national faith during the New Policies reform.[597]

In the National Education Conference held in July-August 1912, Cai submitted the proposal to abolish Confucian sacrifice in schools. He listed three reasons for abolishing Confucian worship: 1) it was inappropriate to worship the Confucius with religious ceremony since the sage was not a religionist; 2) the practice of religious rites in school went against the secular principles of Confucius and secular aims of education; 3) it violated the freedom of religion of citizens of other faiths.[598] During the conference, Zhong Rongguang 鍾榮光 (1866-1943), a Christian professor of the missionary-established

[597] Cai Yuanpei, "Duiyu xin jiaoyu zhi yijian," *Linshi Zhengfu gongbao*, vol. 13 (11 February 1912), pp.7-15.

[598] Deng Haoran, *Kongjiao conglu xuancui* (Hong Kong: Yuanda Chubanshe, 1968), p. 92.

Lingnan University in Guangzhou and the director of the Guangdong Education Bureau, had an education bill presented on his behalf. The bill proposed the removal of all religious icons in public schools for violating the freedom of religion.[599] The bill was attacked by critics as a Christian attempt to eliminate the influence of Confucianism in education, since the law only affected public schools while missionary private schools could continue their religious practices free from state intervention. Furthermore, the conference also proposed that the Ministry of Education appropriate land (*xuetian* 學田) belonging to Confucian temple to finance education.[600]

In an ordinance passed in September 1912, the Ministry of Education required schools to celebrate the birthday of Confucius as a commemorative day. The ministry allowed the schools to determine the format of commemoration, however, prostration and religious rituals were not permitted. Around the same time, the provisional president Yuan Shikai issued an order affirming the value of Confucian moral tenets as the foundation of the state. Yuan argued that the eight core virtues of filial piety, brotherly affection, loyalty, trust, decorum, righteousness, honesty, and dignity were not the laws of authoritarianism, but the "great constants of human civilization" (*rendao zhi dajing* 人道之大經) and what the Chinese nation was traditionally founded on. He declared that "though the political system has altered but human relations remained unchanged" and beseeched the people to observe these tenets at the critical moment of the founding of the republic when the social order was still unstable.[601] The Chinese traditionally conceived the state as part of a larger moral community comprising of the individuals, family and the world or *tianxia*. The secular view of the state as a social construct was inconceivable for the conservatives and traditionalists. On the necessity of the Confucian religion as the moral foundation of the new republic, Kang Youwei argued that "(r)elying solely on law in governance,

[599] "Yueren shengtao Zhong Rongguang feikong zhi gongan" in *KJHZZ* vol.1 no.1 (February 1913), pp.1-26.

[600] "Chi Beijing jiaoyuhui pohuai Kongjiao zhi zui" in *KJHZZ* vol.1 no.2 (March 1913), pp.1-17.

[601] *Zhonghua minguo shishi jiyao* (Taibei: Liming wenhua shiye gongsi, 1981), p.269.

the people will do evil within the law. Relying on politics in governance and the people will become corrupt within the political system."[602]

The first religious Confucian organization approved by the republican regime was the Confucian Association (*Kongjiao hui* 孔教會). The association was established on 7 October, 1912, the birthday of Confucius, in Shanghai by Chen Huanzhang 陳煥章 (1880-1933), a Columbia University PhD graduate and Kang Youwei's disciple, and twelve other persons. The association professed the promulgation of the Confucian religion and the relief of society as its mission. The Confucian Association quickly became the largest and most important Confucian organization in the nation with 130 branches established all over China and overseas in the short span of eighteen months. Chen Huanzhang, the main initiator and founder of the association, was adamant that Confucianism be recognized as a "religion" (*zongjiao*) for its survival under the new regime.

Chen Huanzhang claimed that the scale of suppression of Confucianism by the new republican government was comparable in history only to the "burning of books and the burying of scholars" witnessed in the Qin dynasty. Chen was dismayed at the banning of Confucian rites and classics in schools. He argued that since the Confucian religion (*kongjiao*) was a combination of religion and education, and that schools were at the same time churches (*jiaotang* 教堂), to remove Confucian rites and classics reading from education was nothing but an attempt by the government to abolish Confucianism. He predicted that Confucianism would be extinct in 30 years after ceasing the study of Confucian classics. [603] Furthermore. Chen highlighted that the status of Confucian religion was precarious as it was not granted the freedom of religion and legal protection like Buddhism, Daoism and Christianity by the state. He strongly condemned the ambiguous term of *kongdao* 孔道 (Confucius' Way) used by the government to refer to Confucianism, and the banning of Confucian worship and the

[602]Kang Youwei, "Kongjiaohui xu" in *KJHZZ*, vol.1 no.2 (March 1913), p.5.

[603] Chen Huanzhang, *Kongjiao lun* (Hong Kong: Kongjiao Academy, 1941), p. 51.

appropriation of Confucian properties by the Ministry of Education as a willful disregard of the religious freedom of the majority of Chinese citizens who were adherents of the Confucian religion.

Chen also criticized those who tried to defend the sacred teaching by secularizing Confucius into a teacher and scholar, and his doctrines into philosophy or scholarship with the terms *kongdao* and *kongxue* 孔學 (Confucian learning). "People now view *kongdao* as merely a theory, and not as encompassing as the term *kongjiao*. The term kongxue is even narrower (in meaning)."[604] He pointed out that the term *jiao* could variously mean *zongjiao*, *jiaoyu* 教育(education) and *jiaohua* 教化 (moral-civilizational transformation) and *kongjiao* encompassed all these aspects. "If Confucianism is not recognized as a religion," Chen warned, "though it might survive as *kongdao*, it merely exists as an empty theory; though it might survive as *kongxue*, it is merely a private scholarship. Even though the six Confucian classics are not extinct, people will just regard them as one learning out of the hundred schools of thought." The difference between secular scholarship and religion, Chen stressed, was that the latter inspired a deep sense of emotional reverence, loyalty, and faith in its adherents.[605]

Repeating his earlier claims in the 1898 reform, the spiritual leader of the Confucian religion movement, Kang Youwei equated Confucianism with the "national essence" or "national soul" (*guohun* 国魂). He argued that China after the revolution was in a degenerated state, where "there is anarchy at the top and people at the bottom are uncivilized"[606] because the nation was losing its soul. He criticized the misguided belief of those westernized leaders who thought that China would become strong if she imitated the West entirely, from political system and law to culture and religion.[607] Kang argued that China was weak in her political and economic systems, but not her moral-religious system.

---

[604] Chen Huanzhang, "Kongjiaohui zhi zhongyao" in *JSB* vol.1 no.1 (January 1922), p.44.

[605] Chen Huanzhang, "Kongjiao-hui xu" in Li Jian ed. Rujia zongjiao sixiang yanjiu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2003), p.60.

[606] Kang Youwei, "Zhonghua jiuguo lun" in *Buren zazhi* vol.1 (June 1912), p.25; Chen Huanzhang made the same argument in the article "Lun Feikong yu jin zhengju zhi guanxi," *KJHZZ* vol.1 no.5 (June 1913), pp.1-12.

[607] Kang Youwei, "Zhongguo dianwei wuzai qianfa Oumei er jing guocui shuo" in *Buren zazhi* vols.6 and 7 (July and August 1913), pp.1-42.

What China needed, therefore, was a reform of her outdated political institutions and economic industrialization, not a cultural revolution. Citing the example of the Mexico, Kang argued that the Mexican race, despite the Mexican people retaining their physical features, was in fact eliminated as a result of hispanization by the Spaniards. Kang cautioned that the Chinese nation and race would likewise be exterminated if the national soul was lost.[608] He argued that the only way to save China at present was to "restore the soul of China" (*huanhun* 还魂). This could only be done by establishing *kongjiao* as the national religion of the Chinese republic. [609]

The Beijing government did not recognize the Confucian Association as a religious organization as what its founders wished. It appears that the government deemed the Confucian Association to be a study or a cultural association. The official statements issued by the Ministries of Education and Interior noted that the aim of the association as "defending the Way" (*weidao* 衛道) and "conserving the national essence."[610] The attitude of the government toward the effort of the Confucian Association to promote Confucianism as a religion was also indifferent at best.

To canvass public recognition and support for the Confucian Religion, the association held the autumn sacrifice to Confucius at the Confucian temple of the old imperial college in Beijing on 3 September 1913. The autumn sacrifice was the first public sacrifice conducted for Confucius since the founding of the republic. It was revealed by Chen Huanzhang that the Ministry of Education initially declined the request of the Confucian Association on the ground that sacrifice to Confucius was traditionally a state ritual and without legal stipulation no private individual or organization could conduct it. However, the Ministry later relented after he pressed on with the request and admitted that "respecting Confucius arises commonly from the hearts of everyone." The Ministry approved on the condition that Chen Huanzhang submitted the request in his own capacity and not in the name of the

[608] Kang Youwei, "Kongjiaohui xu" in *KJHZZ* vol.1 no.2 (March 1913), p.9.

[609] Kang Youwei, "Zhongguo huanhun lun" in *Buren zazhi* vol.8 (November 1913), pp.1-8.

[610] "Jiaoyu bu pi" and "neiwu bu pi" in Xia Liangcai et al. *Kongjiao-hui shiliao* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), pp.28-29.

Confucian Association so as not to give the impression of official endorsement of the organization. However, the Ministry refused to loan out the ritual paraphernalia in the imperial college to the organizers, which prevented the performance of a complete sacrifice. [611]

The Confucian Association was intended by its founders to serve as a church organization representing and uniting the loose followers of the Confucian religion, as well as to campaign for constitutional recognition of the Confucian religion as the state religion of the republic. When the Constitution Drafting Committee convened at the Temple of Heaven on July 1913, the Confucian Association seized the opportunity and petitioned the Senate and the House of Representatives to enshrine Confucianism as the state religion within the constitution. On 23 September 1913, a day before the first national Confucian conference in Qufu, representative Zhao Binling 趙炳麟 (1876-1927) tabled the state religion bill for deliberation by the constitution drafting committee. The vice president Li Yuanhong 黎元洪 (1864-1928) and 19 military and civil governors cabled the central government in support of the state religion motion.

The state religion petition of the Confucian Association immediately generated intense public debates. The two key issues in debate were whether having a state religion would hinder religious freedom and was Confucianism a religion? The Christian associations in China were aghast when they heard of the petition, and they immediately protested to the central government. They argued that instituting Confucianism as the state religion would be against the principle of state-church separation and asked for the freedom of religion to be written into the Constitution. The disunited Catholic and Protestant Associations quickly organized themselves into the Society for Religious Freedom to lobby against the state religion proposal.[612] Prominent Christian politicians like Xu Shiying 許世英(1873-1964) and Ai Zhiming 艾知命 also protested strongly against the proposal for violating the cardinal

[611] "Jiaoyu bu pi" in *KJHZZ* vol.1 no.8 (September 1913), p.2.

[612] The Christians were the main oppositions against the Confucian Association's attempt to institute the Confucian Religion as the state religion. See Liu Yi, "Confucianism, Christianity, and Religious Freedom: Debates in Transformation Period of Modern China (1900-1920s)" in Yang Fenggang and Joseph Tamney eds. *Confucianism and Spiritual Traditions in Modern China and Beyond* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 247-276.

republican principle of equality and warned that instituting Confucianism as the state-religion would incite religious conflicts, destroy the current unity of the five races, and encourage the Tibetan-Buddhist and Muslim borderlands to secede from the republic.[613]

In defense, Chen Huanzhang stressed that the establishment of Kongjiao as the state religion did not contradict the principle of freedom of religious belief in the Constitution. He cited the example of the United States, the political model of the new Chinese republic, to prove his point. Chen illustrated that in the States, all public rituals, from the inauguration of presidents to the calendrical system, were all adopted from Protestant practices. Adherents of other religions such as the Catholics and Jews were granted the freedom of religious beliefs as long as they observed the public ceremonies derived from Protestantism. Chen also emphasized that in the States freedom of religious belief was only limited to issues of private concern and freedom of individuals had to be restricted in public matters. Chen saw no contradiction between having a state religion and the freedom of religion because he perceived *kongjiao* broadly as, not only a "religion" in western sense of inner belief, but also a civil religion. [614] Chen argued that Confucian state religion was a kind of supra-religion encompassing and tolerant of other religions:

> Different religions run in parallel and do not contradict one another. The lesser virtue is like small river streams and the greater virtue is seen in mighty transformations. The greater virtue and mighty transformations refer to [Confucianism], this is why the state-religion is elevated above the rest (独尊 *duzun*). The lesser streams refer to [other religions], this why there is freedom of religious belief. The state religion and principle of religious freedom run in parallel and do not contradict one another, and this is the greatness of the Confucian religion. [615]

[613] Xu Shiying, "Fandui kongjiao wei guojiao cheng" and Ai Zhiming, "Shang guowuyuan ji canyi liangyuan xinjiao ziyou buli guojiao qingyuan shu" in *Minguo jingshi wenbian* (*zhengzhi*) vol.39 (Taibei: Wenhai publisher, 1970), pp.58-59.

[614] Chen, "Lun Kongjiao shi yi zongjiao" in *Kongjiao lun*, pp.1-5.

[615] Chen Huanzhang, "Dingjiri guoxue jiangjing jieshao ci" in *KJHZZ* vol.1 no.8 (September 1913), p.3.

According to Wu Zongci 吳宗慈 (1879-1951), a representative of the constitution drafting committee and scholar of constitutional history, the state religion motion was the most discussed and hotly debated item out of the 113 articles of the Temple of Heaven Constitution. The debates revolved around the questions of the religiosity of Confucianism, the merit of a state religion, and whether it violated the constitutional freedom of religious belief. On 13 October, the state religion motion was voted down without securing two-third support. On 28 October, Wang Rongbao 汪榮寶 (1878-1933) proposed adding the statement "citizenry education shall be based on the religious doctrines of Confucius" 國民教育以孔子教義為大本 to Article 19. After a quick deliberation the committee decided on "Confucius' way shall be the foundation for moral cultivation in citizenry education" 國民教育以孔子之道為修身之大本 instead in order to avoid addressing the thorny problem of the religiosity of Confucianism. The proposal was quickly and reluctantly passed by the committee, as Wu Zongci recollected, because rumor was circulating that Yuan Shikai was planning to dissolve the national assembly after the Second Revolution. There was fear that if the committee rejected the state religion bill entirely, it might be used by Yuan as an excuse to suspend constitutional rule.[616]

SEPARATING STATE RITUAL FROM RELIGION

Yuan did swiftly abolish the national assembly after the completion of the Temple of Heaven draft. His action was motivated not by the failure of the state religion bill but from his desire to destroy the constitution, which was designed to curtail his presidential power, and the political challenge of the Guomindang dominated national assembly. Early scholarship has drawn a strong connection between Yuan Shikai's dictatorial and monarchial ambition with the Confucian religion movement.[617] Recent studies have shown, however, that Yuan was neither a supporter of the movement nor did he perceive

[616] Wu (2012), p.170.

[617] Chow Tse-Tsung, "The Anti-Confucian Movement in Early Republican China" in Arthur Wright ed. *The Confucian Persuasion* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp.288-312.

Confucianism to be a religion (*zongjiao*).[618] Yuan considered the Confucian religion movement a political liability considering the intense domestic oppositions that it had inspired from other religious organizations and the boost it might provide for the independence movements of the borderlands.

Chen Hsiyuan has pointed out that Yuan was in fact actively obstructing the movement and tried to prevent the promotion of Confucianism as religion by Confucian societies. He censured the charter of the Confucian society (*kongshe* 孔社) and made the organizers altered the term *shengjiao* 聖教 (Sage's teaching or religion) to *kongxue* 孔學 (Confucian learning) in the document to emphasize the secular character of the organization. He also personally changed the name of the Kongjiao hui 孔教會 (Confucian Religion Association) of Shandong to Kongdao hui 孔道會 (Way of Confucius Association) because the word *jiao* had religious connotation. [619] The association was ordered to alter the terms "monastery" (*shengdao yuan* 聖道院) and "preacher" (*xuandao shi* 宣道師), and to refrain from naming Qufu as the "holy land" (*shengdi* 聖地) in its charter so as not to be confused with religion.[620]

The new republican regime under the presidency of Yuan wished to make Confucianism the moral ideological underpinning of the state and it was imperative for the government to separate Confucius and his teaching from the category of religion, which was associated with the supernatural and sectarianism. In his congratulatory address on the founding of the Confucian society in March 1913, Yuan emphatically stressed that "Confucius originally had nothing to do with the supernatural way of religion. People who do not understand this fact, however, sought to venerate the sage in formality (*xingshi* 形式) and force it into the likes of Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, and Christianity; apparently losing the true meaning of honoring Confucius and, ironically, allowing itself to be constrained by the

[618] Huang Kewu, "Minguo chunian Kongjiao wenti zhi zhenlun, 1913-1917" in *Guoli Taiwan shifan daxue lishi xuebao* vol.12 (1984), pp.215-216; Chen (1999), p.167; and Han Hua, *Minchu kongjiao yu guojiao yundong zhi yanjiu* (Beijing: Beijing tushu chubanshe, 2007), pp.260-264.

[619] Chen (1999), pp. 170-171.

[620] *ZFGB* no.151, 28 September 1912, p.5.

Constitution. Isn't this foolish?"[621] The object of Yuan's criticism was of course the Confucian Association, which was at that time waging a massive national campaign to get Confucianism to be recognized as a religion publicly and legally as the state religion of the Han heartlands. Yet Yuan had to be discreet in his remark since the Confucian religion movement was enjoying great support among the prominent social, bureaucratic, and military elites. At the same time, Yuan denied the view that Confucian teaching belonged to the authoritarian age and was incompatible with the republican system. Employing the theory of Confucian evolutionism devised by Kang Youwei, Yuan argued that Confucius' teaching (*kongzi zhi jiao* 孔子之教) was a secular theory of human civilization (*rendao xueshuo* 人道學說) that covered both the authoritarian age of Lesser Peace and the democratic age of Great Harmony.[622]

Like Liang Qichao and Yan Fu, who joined the Confucian Association but denied the religious status of Confucianism, Yuan believed that the sage and his doctrines served as crucial cultural ballast and a unifying force at the critical transitional period when the new order had yet to emerge out of the rubbles of the old. Yuan's veneration of Confucius was part of his larger traditionalistic program of restoring the imperial cult. In 1913, Yuan increasingly drew from the ceremonial of the imperial past to prop up his declining political appeal. Yuan had confidence in the efficacy of the old state ceremonies in checking the moral decline and social disintegration of the nation. [623]

Instead of being an obstinate traditionalist, Peter Zarrow argues that Yuan was a pragmatist who shrewdly revived and manipulated imperial rites to buttress his own power and the legitimacy of the central government.[624] Zarrow discusses Yuan's restoration of imperial rituals against the nineteenth century background of the "invented ritual" of the monarchies in the West and Japan. In the era of

[621] *Kongshe zazhi* no .2 (March 1913), pp.109-110.

[622] Ibid., p.109.

[623] Ernest Young, *The Presidency of Yuan Shih-K'ai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), pp.201-205.

[624] Zarrow, "Political Rituals in Early Republic of China" in Chow, Doak, and Fu eds. *Constructing Nationhood in East Asia* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), pp.149-188.

nationalism and mass politics, the new nation-states of Europe and Japan attempted to forge a direct and strong bond between the citizens and the state through the figure of the monarch. The monarch was to act as a transcendental symbol of the nation, a unifying and stabilizing force, in a time of great social transformation. These meanings were conveyed through invented monarchical ceremonies, and the pageantry of these rituals were intended to engender national consciousness and patriotism in the dosmetic audience and impress foreign observers.[625] Zarrow argues that the Japanese influence on Yuan and other Chinese was almost certainly profound as they were most familiar with the Meiji-Taisho polity.[626] The Chinese witnessed how the Japanese had manage to construct a stable constitutional monarchy and a strong nation-state with the same ritual resources they shared. However, it was difficult to ritualize the Chinese nation-state through monarchial rites like Japan since the 1911 revolution had toppled the Chinese monarchy and put in place a republican system. In place of the emperor, Chinese conservative elites sought to make Confucius the unifying symbol of the nation and the object of poular devotion.

On 6 November, 1913, Yuan Shikai issued an ordinance ordering local authorities to offer sacrifice to revolutionary martyrs and the meritorious officials of the Qing in "honor of their virtues and recompense their service to the nation." The local authorities were to imitate the example of the State and Sect Shintō shrines in Japan and distinguish between shrines constructed with funds from the state or local government and privately erected ones. The former would be appropriated by the government for the conduct of official sacrifice.[627] At the end of the month, Yuan issued another ordinance for the veneration of Confucius citing the sage as "the teacher of ten thousand generations" and "Confucian learning (*kongxue* 孔學) assembles the essence of morality and establishing the highest standard of humanity." In addition, he ordered the relevant department to seek feedbacks for restoring the sacrifice

[625] For examples of Great Britain and Meiji Japan, see David Cannadine, "The Context, Performance, and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the Invented Tradition, c. 1820-1977" in Hobsbawn and Ranger eds. *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp.101-164; and Fujitani Takeshi, *Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

[626] Zarrow (2001), p.177.

[627] *ZFGB*, no.543, 7 November 1913, p.165.

for Confucius and the worthies.[628] On 24 December 1913, Yuan passed two special bills on the sacrifice to Confucius and worship of Heaven for consultation in the Political Conference (*zhengzhi huiyi* 政治會議), the puppet consultative and legislative body that he created.

On 14 January 1914, the Political Conference began its deliberation on the two bills. One member Xu Wei 徐霈 raised the doubt whether reviving the state cult of Confucius would cause resistance by members of the other religions, as this might be interpreted as making Confucianism the national religion. Speaking on behalf of Yuan Shikai, Sun Shuyun 孫毓筠 (1869-1924), senior adviser of the president office, answered that Yuan only wanted the Political Conference to deliberate on the appropriate format for the ceremonies and nothing else. Thus the representatives confined their discussion on ritual matters and largely avoided the issue of the religious nature of the rituals and Confucianism. The notable exception is the representatives Ma Xiangbo 馬相伯 (1840-1939) and Ai Zhiming 艾知命. Both were Christians and they passionately opposed the two bills on grounds that they violated the constitutional separation of state and religion, and the principle of equality of religions.

Ma maintained that the president should not personally preside at the sacrifices since it would muddle up the roles of the head of state and chief priest, and the distinct spheres of politics and religion. Ma pointed out that the president could appoint a delegate to conduct the sacrifice to Heaven, however it would be unwise for the state to worship Confucius, since it constituted an interference on the religious freedom of the people. Moreover, if the state mandated the schools to worship Confucius, those that refused to follow would be discriminated. Ma cautioned against the undesirable consequence of state discrimination in religious matters and interference in the religious faith of the people. Ai largely concurred with the view of his fellow Christian colleague and warned about the emergence of "religious disaster" (*jiaohuo* 教禍) in China like the religious wars that happened in European history if the state went ahead with its plan. In refutation, Sun Shuyun and Xu Dingling 許鼎林 argued that just like in missionary schools where the worship of Christ was not imposed on non-Christian students, students

[628] *ZFGB* no.563, 27 November 1913, p.591.

that refused to worship Confucius would not be discriminated. They stressed that the worship of Heaven and Confucius was a centuries old tradition of China, not a new invention, and thus would not result in religious conflict. [629]

After the bills were passed by the Political Committee, Yuan issued the ordinance on the worship of Confucius and Heaven on 7 February 1914. To fit the republican system, the worship of Heaven was declared to be collective ritual (*tongji* 通祭), which all citizens could partake in the sacrifice. The President would preside the sacrifice on behalf of all citizens at the altar of Heaven, the respective civil officials on behalf of the people under their jurisdiction, and private citizens freely conduct their own rites in any manner they deemed fit. The worship of Confucius was designated as Grand Sacrifice following the late Qing model. The ritual was to be conducted on the *ding* day of spring and autumn by the president in the Confucian temple at Beijing, and by the civil officials in the Confucian temples of their localities. Public schools would continue to perform obeisance to Confucius on his birthday and school opening. Yuan deliberately allowed the individual schools to determine the manner of the ceremony. This was to provide tacit approval for the worship of Confucius in schools and avoid the accusation that the government was interfering with the religious freedom of the people. Also anticipating the criticism of enshrining a national religion through the ordinance, Yuan issued another executive order in the following day and proclaimed:

> The freedom of religious belief is a universal law and our Republic of China is formed by the five major races of Han Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, the Hui, and the Tibetans. They have different histories, customs, and their own religions, and it is difficult to unify the religious belief and practice of the people. Therefore, it is inappropriate to specially establish a national religion and go against the sentiment of the masses. The seasonal sacrifice to the former sages and worthies, however, *is recorded in the law code of the former Qing dynasty and has nothing to do with zongjiao* (emphasis added).[630]

[629] "Zhengzhi huiyi taolun jitian sikong liangan jiwen" in *Shenbao*, January 19, 1914, p.2.

[630] *ZFGB* no. 631, 8 February 1914, p.232.

On 21 February, Yuan issued the "Regulations on worship of Confucius" (*chongsheng dianli* 崇聖典禮). The ordinance restored the hereditary titles of the descendants of Confucius and 20 major Confucian scholars that held the title professor of the five classics. They were to be paid a salary by the state as the ritual officials (*fengsi guan* 奉祀官) responsible for conducting the sacrificial rites for their respective forebears. The state would also finance the salaries of the ritual performers and specialists and cost of the sacrifice. The law also stipulated that one salaried ritual official be selected by local authorities and positioned in every Confucian temple in the nation.[631] The last regulation was related to the earlier ordinance passed by Yuan on the restoration of Confucian temples as government agencies of moral indoctrination. Yuan ordered the protection of Confucian temples from appropriation and occupation by civil and military authorities for secular uses. He instructed local magistrates to recommend candidates for employment as ritual officials in the Confucian temples. They were tasked not only to conduct rites and manage the temples, but also to organize the village libation rite and gather the locals on every Sunday to expound on ethics and morality.[632] Through his ordinances, Yuan had in fact realized the programs advocated by the Confucian Association, such as the restoration of state sacrifice for Confucius and the creation of Confucian churches, without enshrining Confucianism as the state religion.

Yuan convened the constititutional amendment meeting on 18 March, 1914 to finalize the Temple of Heaven draft Constitution. The Confucian Association saw this as another opportunity to advance their agenda of making the Confucian religion the state religion of the republic. Li Shipin 李时品 (1868-?), for instance, wrote to Yan Fu, a follow member of the Confucian Association and legislator of the constitutional amendment meeting, that though the state religion proposal had been voted down, it was still possible for the Confucian religion movement to develop further if the status of Confucianism as a religion (*zongjiao*) gained state recognition. He stressed that the legitimacy of the whole movement and the Confucian Asssociation hinged entirely on whether they could get the state to

[631] *ZFGB* no.642, 21 February 1914, pp.587-589.

[632] *ZFGB* no.636, 14 February 1914, p.389.

officially recognize the religious status of Confucianism. Li pointed out that the position of the state under Yuan was unclear on both the issues of state religion and the religious status of Confucianism. This was worrying as many had the misunderstanding that not instituting Confucianism as the state religion was the same as denying the religious status of Confucianism, and that in turn was used as the reason to ban the study of Confucian classics in private academies (*sishu* 私塾).

Li emphasized that protecting the study of classics was primary in the preservation of Confucian religion (*kongjiao*) and to do that the Constitution had to recognize its religious status and specified that the people had freedom to believe in the Confucian religion. To prevent the same intense opposition that the state religion legislation generated during the drafting of the Temple of Heaven Constitution, Li advised that the article be phrased as "The Confucius' way shall be the basis of moral education for the Republic of China" 中華民國以孔子之道為教化大本. This phrasing, according to Li, was no different from making Confucianism the state religion and at the same time avoid the attack of other religions for violating the principle of religious freedom. He also emphasized that the term "Confucian religion" must be included in the religious freedom article. He proposed phrasing the article as: "The citizens of the Republic of China have the freedom to believe in Confucian religion, Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, and Christianity" 中華民國人民有信孔教，釋教， 道教，回教， 耶教之自由.[633] Li reminded Yan Fu of the importance of including Confucian religion in the religious freedom article, as if not "(t)he other religions will be protected under the Constitution, while the Confucian religion suffer state interference and the ostracization of other religions, and had no protection to rely on."[634]

Though Yuan did not recognize Confucianism as a religion he had to placate the agitation of the Confucian religion interest group for constitutional protection of Confucianism. Article 7 of the Temple of Heaven Constitution was changed from "In accordance with the provisions of the statutes citizens shall have the freedom of religious belief and worship" 人民依法有信仰宗教之自由 to "In

[633] "Li Shipin zhi Yan Fu shu" in *Kongjiao-hui shiliao,* p.36.

[634] Ibid.

accordance with the provisions of the statutes citizens shall have the freedom of religious belief" 人民依法有信教之自由. The rationale for the change was given as follow:

> The two words of "zong" 宗 and "yang" 仰 are deleted in this bill because there are many among our nationals who honor and worship Confucianism [kongjiao], however, in the discussion among the academicians, there is a view that Confucianism is an ethical teaching of human relations (*mingjiao* 名教) not religion. If this view that Confucianism is not a religion (*zongjiao*) is valid then it will fall outside the boundaries of freedom of belief and worship. As people began to prohibit the worship of Confucianism, which is not against the Constitution, it shall generate a huge trend within the country [to overthrow Confucianism]. Thus, this bill deletes the two words of "zong" and "yang," then freedom of belief will encompass everything. Moreover, the word "zongjiao" is adopted from the Japanese term [shūkyō], however, Article 28 of the Japanese Constitution only contains freedom of religious belief (*xinjiao ziyou* 信教之自由) and not the term "zongjiao. For that reason the bill adopts it."[635]

Yuan's adoption of Article 28 of the Meiji Constitution was perhaps advised by his constitutional adviser, Ariga Nagao 有賀長雄 (1860-1921). Ariga had been a sympathizer of the state religion movement, and as a jurist and an eye-witness of the Meiji modernization, he also had an intimate understanding of the constitutional basis for the ritualization of the Japanese state. Yuan also restored the Qing worship of Chinggis Khan in May 1914 under the advice of the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. On 20 November 1914, Yuan approved the petition of the Ministries of Navy and Army for the joint sacrifice of generals Guan Yu and Yue Fei and the construction of martial shrines (*wumiao* 武廟), to honor their military service and inculcate reverence for national heroes. Yuan asserted that the martial cult that the state was instituting was no different in purpose from the construction of statutes for national heroes in the West or the Yasukuni Shrine in Japan, which was to

[635] "Yuefa huiyi jilü" in Shen Yunlong ed. *Jindai Zhongguo Shiliao Huibian* (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1968), pp.173-174.

honor the valiant and encourage loyalty and martial spirit in the people. Yuan accepted the recommendation of the Bureau of Rites that the martial cult should be patterned after the Martial Temple sacrifice of the Tang and Song, and canonized the various famous military heroes in Chinese history as ritual associates (*congsi* 從祀) in the worship of generals Guan and Yue. Yuan emphasized that the state was not showing favoritism to the Han race in its worship of Chinese military heroes, nor should the cult be mistaken for the superstition taught by the Buddhists and Daoists.[636]

Yuan certainly realized the problem of making generals Guan and Yue the national exemplars. While both generals are ethically Han Chinese, Yue Fei has been historically associated with Han ethnicism and resistance against foreign domination. During the 1911 revolution, the Han nationalists had manipulated Yue's symbolism in their racial struggle against the Manchus, which made it problematic for him to stand as a national hero for the multi-ethnic republic. [637] In his canonization of Yue Fei as a national hero, Yuan was essentially using the same strategy as the Mongol and Qing rulers, who downplayed the general's historical role as a Han defender and instead honored him as a paragon of the Confucian virtue of loyalty suitable for the emulation of all imperial subjects. Guan Yu, on the hand, posed a different kind of problem for Yuan. In comparison to the localized cult of Yue Fei, the cult of Guan Yu in late imperial time was heterogeneous and widespread geographically and socially. He was worshipped by the imperial state and literati as Emperor Guan or Guandi 關帝, a moral figure and protector of empire, the military as god of war and patron saint, the merchants as god of wealth, the Buddhist and Daoist clergies as a demon-queller and monastic guardian, and in local territorial cults as rain bringer and protector.[638] The imperial state allowed these different interpretations of the deity to

[636] *ZFGB* no.915, 21 November 1914, p.203.

[637] Marc Andre Matten, "The Worship of General Yue Fei and His Problematic Creation as a National Hero in Twentieth Century China" in *Frontiers in History of China*, 6.1 (March 2011), pp.64-94.

[638] For a historical survey of the Guan Yu cult, see Barend Ter Haar, *Guan Yu: The Religious Afterlife of a Failed Hero* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

exist while "superscribing" its own authoritative version over them. However, the religious interpretations of Guandi had to be rejected by the state to make Guan Yu into a secular national icon.[639]

With the institution of the martial cult, Yuan had restored the binary state cult of martial and Confucian temples, which had been defunct since the fourteenth century when the Ming founder abolished the martial temples.[640] The restoration of the two imperial state cults was done, however, not without alteration to their meanings. The Confucian and Martial temples were renamed by the Bureau of Rites as the temple of Confucius (*kongmiao* 孔廟) and temple of generals Guan and Yue (*guanyue-miao* 關岳廟) to stress their secular and republican nature.[641] These temples were dedicated to celebrating the secular national heroes of the republic not the ennobled spirits of the imperial state. The cult of Guan Yu and Yue Fei was ranked as a Middle Sacrifice, lower than that of Confucius. On 6 March 1915, the Ministry of War issued an order that made it mandatory for all officers and men in the armed forces to present themselves at the temple of Guan and Yue to take an oath of allegiance to the republic.

The religious nature of the state rites became a matter of controversy when Admiral Li He 李和 (1852-1930), the Vice-Minister for Navy and an elder of the Presbyterian church, publicly refused to partake in the rites at the Temple of Guan and Yue citing that the mandate violated his religious conscience and the church commandments. Li wired the President on the 5 May 1915 to resign from his post for disobeying the presidential order. To resolve the impasse, some suggested to the Minister of War that Christian servicemen be allowed to carry out the oath-taking at the Altar of Heaven using Christian ceremony.[642] American Presbyterian missionaries Gilbert Reid (1857-1927) and Edward

---

[639] Prasenjit Duara, "Superscribing Symbols: The Myth of Guandi, Chinese God of War," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 47(Nov.1988), pp.778-795.

[640] For the history of the Martial temples and its relations with the Confucian temple, see Huang Chin-shing, "The Rise and Demise of the Martial Temple, 7th-14th Centuries: A Political-Cultural Analysis" in *Shengxian yu shengtu* (Taibei: Yunchen wenhua, 2001), pp.181-224.

[641] *ZFGB* no.1035, 27 March 1915, p.292.

[642] "Haijun cizhang zhi qujiu wenti," *Shenbao*, May 10, 1915, p.6.

Waite Thwing (1867-1943) also tried to intercede with Yuan Shikai for Li. However, Yuan still ordered the dismissal of Li and two other Christian personnel in the Ministry of Navy on 16 May for violation of military discipline.[643]

CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFUCIAN RELIGION QUESTION

In June 1916, the new president Li Yuanhong reconvened the congress and ordered the deliberation of the aborted Temple of Heaven Constitution. The congress was officially resumed on the 5 September and its members began the task of finalizing the 1913 constitution. The state religion debate was rekindled with Kang Youwei, Chen Huanzhang, and other leaders of the Confucian Association petitioning the President, Prime Minister, Upper and Lower Houses to enshrine Confucianism as the state religion (*guojiao*) on 20 September. At the same time, the United League of Religions (*zongjiao lianhe qingyuan tuan* 宗教聯合請願團) was formed by Buddhist, Daoist, Islamic, Protestant, and Catholic associations to fight for freedom of religion and oppose the state religion legislation.[644]

During the first discussion, Wang Jingfang 王敬芳(1876-1933) recommended the amendment "The Republic of China is to make Confucius' teaching as the state religion, however not in violation of the right to freedom of religion of Article 11, and the equality of race, class, and religion according to law of Article 4." Cheng Dazhang 程大璋 (1873-1924) also proposed the amendment "The citizens of the Republic of China are to regard the Confucian teaching as the state religion, and to permit the freedom of religion that cannot be restricted except in accordance to law." [645] Chen Jingnan 陳景南 (1881-?), Zhang Qin 張琴, and Sun Guangqin 孫光庭 (1863-1943) supported the amendments giving the following reasons: (1) Laws could not function alone without the support of morality; (2) Confucius'

[643] "Li cizhang quzhi zhi yinguo," *Shenbao*, May 26, 1915, p.6; and "Ministerial Changes in Peking," *The North China Herald*, 22 May 1915, p.564.

[644] Liu Yi (2012), pp.260-261.

[645] Wu (2012), p.245.

teaching had won the hearts the people for centuries, though it had been made use of by the autocrats of successive dynasties, the republic could use it to gain people's loyalty; (3) Confucius' way has eternal and immutable elements that could be promoted; (4) Confucian doctrines which had been honored since the Han dynasty with Confucian temples and worship constituted in all counties without any incident, and it would also be the case for the republic; (5) The enshrining of a state religion was to fulfill the will of the majority, while legislating the freedom of religion was to prevent religious conflict, both were not in contradiction; (6) Not instituting Confucian teaching as the state religion would give the minorities a pretext to declare independence; (7) The nature of religion was individualism and Confucian teaching familism (*jiazu zhuyi* 家族主義) or what was called doctrine of human relations (*mingjiao* 名教), something that the people could not choose to do without; (8) Confucian teaching not only did not exclude other teachings but had the ability to encompass them; (9) Instituting of state religion and granting of religious freedom were akin to the adoption of both Western and Chinese dress codes at the same time (i.e. Chinese tradition and western legal system could co-exist); (10) Confucian doctrines were written in Chinese language, as compared to the foreign language written classics of Buddhism and Christianity, and thus, could be easily understood and used for the benefit of the country's education; (11) Confucius' way inspired spirit of sacrifice in the people which helped to defeat Yuan monarchial restoration; (12) Confucian doctrine concerned ancestral worship and not enshrining it as the state religion would cause people to neglect their forebears.[646]

The anti-state religion faction comprised of Lü Fu 呂復 (1879-1955), He Wen 何雯, Gong Huanzhen 龔煥真, and Wang Baozhen 王葆真(1880-1977) opposed the amendments based on 3 main reasons, namely 1) the Confucian teaching was not a religion; 2) Confucianism was an obsolete doctrine unsuitable for the modern republic; and 3) state religion was a thing of the past, and enshrining one in China would cause domestic religious conflict and international disputes. They largely agreed with their opponents that Confucianism was not a "religion," but reached different conclusion on the constitutional treatment of the traditional *jiao*. They argued that since the Confucian doctrine had been the "unspoken

[646] Ibid., pp.245-246.

state religion" of China for centuries, there was no need to enshrine it as one in the Constitution. The treatment of Confucianism as a private belief of "religion" would necessarily limit its scope. Moreover, Confucius modeled his teaching after the archaic knowledge of the previous three dynasties, and he had nothing to say about modern politics. They also maintained that state religion was more of a relic of European history, from a time when science was not developed, freedom of religion not observed, and politics and religion not separated. At present, most European nations had already abandoned their state religions, and for countries that still enshrined a state religion such as Russia, there were constant religious troubles. They asked why China would follow the negative aspect of European civilization and not their strengths. The establishment of a state religion in China would necessarily bring the religious conflict of the West to China and as provenance, they pointed at the domestic rise in religious agitations at present when the state religion amendments were proposed and deliberated in the Congress. They also warned about possible altercation with the treaty powers if the state religion issue resulted in bloodsheds concerning local Christians and foreign missionaries.[647]

From 5 September 1916 to 10 January 1917, the constitutional delegation met 24 times to discuss the state religion amendments and with no result as neither party could attain a two-third majority when their proposal was put to the vote. The lack of consensus among the discussants was, as Chen Hsi-yuan perceptively shown, due to the fact that both proponents and opponents in the debate were talking past one another since they had different understanding of the term "state religion" (*guojiao* 國教) along very similar lines as had been the case throughout the second half of the 19th century between Chinese officials and their Western counterparts when negotiating "freedom of religion." When the proponents used the term *guojiao*, they were referring to "national teaching" or "national ideology" rather than "state religion." In other words, as shown in their arguments above, the supporters of the state religion proposal shared only the view of Kang Youwei and Chen Huanzhang of the Confucian Association that Confucianism constituted the "national essence" of the Chinese nation, but

[647] Ibid.

not their assertion that "Confucius' teaching" (*kongzi zhi jiao*) was the same as "Confucian religion (*kongjiao*)."[648]

The state religion proposal went into the second reading and was intensively discussed between 2 and 9 February 1917. In one of the meetings, it was suggested that Article 11 and the second clause of Article 19 be combined for deliberation and that led to a heated row. The anti-state religion faction disputed this motion as they planned to pass the more straightforward Article 11 first and thereafter use that to oppose the second clause of Article 19. The motion was eventually passed in a vote. Also, during the second reading 9 different state religion amendments to Article 11 were being proposed.[649] They were as follow:

1. "Confucius' teaching is the national teaching of the citizens of the Republic, as for Manchus, Mongols, and Tibetans, the customary teachings that they have long practiced would be regarded as religion."
2. "Confucius' teaching is the national teaching of the citizens of the Republic according to history and custom."
3. "The Republic would institute its native Confucius' teaching as the national teaching, and the proselytization of other religions will be protected by law."
4. "Article 11, which is the article of the freedom of religious belief, shall be completely deleted."
5. "The citizens of the Republic have the freedom to believe in Confucius and the various religions, which cannot be restricted unless according to law. Ritual of Confucius worship will be regulated by another legislation."
6. The citizens of the Republic have the freedoms to venerate Confucius and to believe in religion, which cannot be restricted unless according to law.

[648] Chen (1999), pp.182-183.

[649] Wu (2012), p.257.

7. “The citizens of the Republic esteem the Confucian teaching as the national teaching. The other religions would be granted the freedom of belief provided they do not contradict the ethics of the national teaching.”
8. “The Republic is to enshrine Confucius’ teaching as the national teaching according to the traditional belief of the people, and permit those who believe in other religions to do so freely.”
9. “The citizens of the Republic have the freedom to believe in Confucius’ teaching and also religion, which cannot be restricted according to law.”[650]

Rather than the term “kongjiao,” most of the amendments used the term “Kongzi zhi jiao” (the teaching of Confucius) to differentiate Confucius and his teaching from the realm of “religion.” Cai Yuanpei, the ardent critic of Confucian religion and the state religion proposal, adamantly maintained “religion is religion, Confucius is Confucius, and state is state. Each has its own sphere and cannot be mixed together.” Cai took pains to point out that the doctrine of Confucius concerned education, politics, and morality, and not religion. He argued that the founding of a religion necessarily involved a messianic founder who established religious rituals and saw the attack of alien religions as its only aim. This was not found in Confucius and thus, Confucius and religion were two different matters and the term “Confucian religion” was a misnomer.

Another misnomer for Cai was the term state religion. He maintained that the state was a territorial entity made up of a group of people for the sole aim of promoting the physical survival and interests of the collective, whereas religion involved the incorporeal aspect of human lives and not the material world. As state and religion were two different spheres, different religions could exist within a state, and within one religion contained people from different states. Cai rejected religion as an archaic remnant of an unenlightened past, a theistic form of false consciousness that human had liberated themselves from as they progressively understood the nature of the social and physical worlds with the advancement of scientific knowledge. As people freed themselves from the shackles of religion, religion

[650] Ibid., p.257.

became an optional element for human beings and that was why the freedom of religious belief was enshrined in the constitutions of various nations. In fact, for Cai religion was unnecessary for the modern world since its moral edifying effect on human beings could be replaced with aesthetic education.[651]

All 9 amendments to Article 11 were all defeated in the voting process with Liu Enge's 劉恩格 (1888-?) proposal (The citizens of the Republic have the freedoms to venerate Confucius and to believe in religion, which cannot be restricted unless according to law) attaining nearly two-third of the votes for the legislation to pass. On 14 May, 1917, the amendments were submitted again to the constitution committee for deliberation and Liu's amendment was passed by winning 483 out of the 602 votes casted. The chairperson declared that the second clause of Article 19 would not go into voting and be automatically deleted.[652] Liu's amendment was passed because it provided the common ground that both proponents and opponents of the state religion legislation could agree on to break the constitutional deadlock. In his exposition of the amendment, Liu made clear that he did not agree with the view that Confucianism was a "religion," or the necessity of enshrining it as the state religion as the legislation would cause the five nationalities to be constitutionally unequal and potentially instituting the tyranny of the Han majority. He also opposed the second clause of Article 19 since it was not the function of the Constitution to dictate the education agenda and ambitious opportunists like Yuan Shikai might make use of the article to destroy the republican system. However, Liu argued that historically Confucius had been honored by the imperial government and everyone, even the uneducated, women, and children, held him as a great Sage and his teaching in high regard. Liu believed that the traditional respect that people shown to Confucius and his moral teaching needed to be preserved to act as the cultural foundation of the nation. To achieve this, he suggested that the issue of the Way of Confucius

[651] Cai Yuanpei, "Yi meiyu dai zongjiao," *La Jeunesse* 3.6 (August 1917), pp.1-5.

[652] Wu (2012), p.257.

(*kongdao*) must be avoided in the Constitution and separate law on the veneration and worship of Confucius be legislated instead.[653]

THE FATE OF CONFUCIAN RELIGION AND CONFUCIUS UNDER THE BEIYANG REGIME

The 1917 constitutional second reading settled once and for all the state religion controversy that had begun in 1913. The state religion proposal was never again raised in the national assembly. Though the constitution amendment settled the state religion issue but as in 1913, it was ambiguous on the religious status of Confucianism. For Chen Huanzhang, the defeat of the state religion proposal represented a deadly blow to the whole Confucian religion movement. He exasperatedly exclaimed that the defeat of the state religion legislation was akin to the termination (革命 *geming*) of the Confucian religion. He argued that the insertion of "Confucius" instead of "Confucius religion" (*kongjiao*) in the article effectively denied the status of Confucius as a religious founder and excluded Confucianism from the rank of religion, and hence constitutional freedom and protection. The expression "veneration of Confucius" used in the article rather than the "belief in Confucian religion" represented a denigration of the sacred status of Confucius. Furthermore, the granting of freedom for the veneration of Confucius without constitutionally stipulating the official sacrifice for Confucius, made the worship of Confucius and the reading of Confucian classics in schools optional rather than obligatory for all citizens.[654]

Nevertheless, Chen Huanzhang soldiered on after the defeat of the state religion bill to get Confucianism recognized as a religion. With the institutional detachment of Confucianism from the state, Chen realized that the survival of the Confucian religion hinged entirely on the ability of the Confucian Association to institutionalize itself as an organized church comparable to Christianity.[655]

---

[653] Ibid., pp.431-436.

[654] Chen Huanzhang, "Guohui xianfa huiyi duiyu kongjiao dageming jinggao guoren shu," in Ke Huang ed. *Kongjiao shinian dashi* vol.8, pp.34b-36a.

[655] This point has been astutely observed by the historian Chan Wingtsit, who commented that "All these arguments (from the advocates of Kongjiao), reasonable and factual as they are can only lead to the conclusion

Chen urged the people to build Confucian temples for the worship of Confucius and the propagation of his doctrines. This had to be done since the existing official Confucian temples no longer lecture on Confucian classics or perform the official sacrifices, and the temple properties were appropriated by the government for secular uses. As a result, the hearts of the people had nothing to adulate and the licentious cults and alien religions thrived among them.[656]

Chen concentrated his energy on the *World Ordering Magazine* (*jingshi bao* 經世報), the new mouthpiece of the Confucian religion movement, and the building of the Confucian head church and the Confucian university in Beijing. He saw the church and the university as one entity since in Confucianism the temple and the academy shared the same compound. The university served the purpose of preserving and propagating the Confucian classics and the church would act as the beacon of the Confucian religion, to stem the anti-Confucian tide of the New Cultural Movement and the growing influence of Christianity. After years of soliciting funds for the project, Chen finally inaugurated the Confucian university in 1923 on Confucius' birthday. However, the Confucian head church, which was planned to be constructed beside the university, was never completed due to financial difficulties.

The Confucian religion association was fighting not only against the onslaught of the New Cultural Movement but also the Anti-religious Campaign later in the 1920s. The Anti-Christian Campaign grew out of the wider anti-Religion Movement and both movements converged in the 1920s. In the Anti-Religion/Christian Campaign, Chinese nationalists condemned "religion" as unscientific superstition, an obstacle that had to be removed for society to progress to a higher stage of development.[657] The advocacy of Confucianism as a religion by the Confucian Association was met

---

that Confucianism is a religion, certainly not in the Western sense of an organized church comparable to Buddhism or Taoism." Chan, *Religious Trends in Modern China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), p. 16.

[656] Chen Huanzhang, "Quandao renmin duoli kongmiao shuo," *JSB* vol. 1 no.7 (July 1922), pp.19-21.

[657] See Jessie G. Lutz, *Chinese Politics and Christian Missions: The Anti-Christian Movements of 1920-28* (Notre Dame: Cross Cultural Publications, 1988), pp.27-54; and Yip Ka-che, *Religion, Nationalism, and Chinese Students: The Anti-Christian Movement of 1922-1927* (Washington: Center for East Asian Studies Western Washington University, 1980), pp.15-30.

with fierce resistance from both opponents and defenders of Confucianism.[658] The influence of the Confucian religion movement waned continuously throughout the 1920s and ended in 1930 when Chen Huanzhang departed China for Hong Kong where he continued his work of promoting the Confucian religion until his death in 1933.[659]

While Chen Huanzhang failed in his aim of making Confucianism into an organized religion, he did succeed in pushing for official veneration of Confucius through legislation. In 1918, Chen was nominated to become a member of the upper house and he proposed two legislations on the veneration of Confucius. In 1998, Chen proposed a bill for the celebration of Confucius' birthday as a national day of commemoration. He maintained that Confucius birthday should be commemorated and celebrated by the whole nation as the "Great Sage" (大聖 *dasheng*) and his teachings had asserted great influence on Chinese civilization, just like what Jesus and Christianity did for Western civilization. He deliberately named the holiday as "shengdan jie" 聖誕節, the same term used for Christmas, to draw that parallel. He also pointed out that the same level of reverence people in the West had for Jesus Christ could also be seen in how elaborated Oversea Chinese and the Cantonese celebrated the birthday of Confucius.[660]

In June 1919, Chen proposed the "Confucius Veneration Bill," which was largely based on the "Regulations on the Worship of Confucius" enacted during Yuan presidency. Like in the "Regulations," the first article of the bill declared that "The Republic of China will forever venerate Confucius as the teacher and exemplar of the citizens."[661] The content of the bill was largely similar to the "Regulations"

[658] See Chen (1999), Chapter 5.

[659] Hong Kong is the most successful example of the Kongjiao movement. The Confucian Academy successfully had Confucianism recognized as one of the official religions by the Hong Kong government. See John Makeham, Lost Soul: "Confucianism" in Contemporary Chinese Academic Discourse (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard-Yenching Institute Monographs 64, 2008), p. 306; For the contemporary importance of the Confucian Academy in the promotion of Confucianism, see Sébastien Billioud and Joél Thoraval: "The Contemporary Revival of Confucianism: Anshen Liming or the Religious Dimension of Confucianism," in *China Perspectives* 75 (2008/3), pp.100-103.

[660] "Shengdanjie an," *JSB* vol.1, no.3 (March 1922), pp.1-2

[661] "Zunkong faan zhi jingguo," *JSB* vol.1 no.5 (May 1922), p.2.

other than the addition of the Bureau of Libation, which was in-charge of managing all Confucian temples and ritual officials, and reimplementing the subject of classic reading in all public schools and the Peking University.[662] The bill mandated the performance of ritual sacrifice to Confucius in all schools. It declared the ritual as a tradition that had been practiced for millennia, and hence did not violate the principle of religious freedom.[663] In addition, the prostration use in the ritual was changed from the "three kneelings and nine prostrations" practiced in the Qing dynasty, associated by missionaries and revolutionaries as signifying religious and racial submission[664], to the Ming practice of "four bowings," performed to show respect to parents and teachers.[665] With the passing of the two bills, the secularization of Confucius and Confucianism which began in the beginning of the republican period was finally completed.

[662] Ibid., p.3 and p.7.

[663] Ibid., p.8.

[664] For Protestant missionary critique of Chinese ritual obeisance as "mindless", "idolatrous," and "submissive", see Eric Reinders, *Borrowed Gods and Foreign Bodies*: *Christian Missionaries Imagine Chinese Religions* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), pp.100-131. No study has been done on the affinities between missionary and revolutionary critiques of Chinese ritual obeisance, but I suspect that Chinese revolutionary discourse must have been deeply impacted by missionary writings since many revolutionaries were Christians or had studied in missionary schools.

[665] "Zunkong faan zhi jingguo," *JSB* vol.1 no.5 (May 1922), p.5.

— CONCLUSION—

State Secularization as Sacralization, 1912-1939

Writing in 1929 after the success of the nationalist revolution, Frank Rawlinson (1871-1937), the liberal American Protestant missionary and editor of the *Chinese Recorder*, noted that the "modern" era of Chinese history, the period beginning from1911, witnessed a revolution, an upheaval not only in politics and intellectual thoughts, but in religion as well. For Rawlinson, what was religiously modern about republican China was the separation of politics and religion, and the rising consciousness about religion among the Chinese people. He recounted the dismantling of the state religion of the imperial state and the subsequent advocacy of religious liberty by Christian and non-Confucian religions against the attempt of the Confucian Association to revive the state cult as the starting point of this religious revolution. "The Chinese mind," Rawlinson underscored, "is at present in the process of defining religious liberty for the first time in its history….a struggle over the right to be religious in one's own way and to believe and practise religion according to one's own conscience, and at this point the Chinese seem now to have arrived. This, also, is one of the striking features of the modern period; it is the sign of a new awareness of religion."[666]

[666] Frank Rawlinson, "Modern Revolution and Religion in China," *International Review of Mission*, 18.2 (April 1929), p.168.

Between 1911 and 1922, Rawlinson had observed that three religious movements emerged out of rising attention of the Chinese to religion. First was the Confucian and Buddhist revival movements started by the old intelligentsia to reassert the value of Chinese religious thoughts against the critique of the modernists and to compete with Christianity. Second was the revolt by modern intelligentsia against religion. The revolt against religion, as Rawlinson pointed out, was waged on the "foreign religion" of Christianity as the chief target. The criticism against Christianity was directed at its connection with foreign imperialism. The last religious movement was that of the "eclectic societies," or what scholars refer to as "redemptive societies," which grew rapidly in urban centers among old elites and common people. Interestingly, although Rawlinson did not discuss nationalism as a religious movement of the period, he described the "religion of nationalism" as the most vital and prominent force in the lives of the Chinese people.[667]

RELIGION OF NATIONALISM

The three religious movements identified by Rawlinson emerged out of the private and non-political sphere of religion created by the secularizing project of the early republican government. The principle of religious freedom was enshrined in all the constitutions promulgated between 1911 and 1927, and created a legitimate sphere for the development of religion. However, freedom of religion was granted only to religious institutions that fit the Protestant model of a church-like organization that was "'pure' (spiritual and ethical in nature), and well organized, as well as useful (patriotic and contributing to social welfare and progress)."[668] The republican leaders such as Sun Yatsen and Yuan Shikai favored the Christian church for supporting the state by enlightening the people through the provision of education and the combat of superstition. The state accepted the registration of a myriad of church-like religious associations, including "redemptive societies," as religion. Those Chinese religious traditions and organizations that did not fit the church-like model of religion were either considered non-religious,

[667] Ibid., p.168.

[668] Goossaert and Palmer (2011), p.58.

such as guild associations and lineages, or "superstition" such as temple festivals, the triads, and popular sectarianism to be eradicated for their backwardness and subversive nature.[669]

Following the Japanese example, the republican government only recognized the religious freedom of the citizens on the matter of beliefs and prosecuted religious organizations for challenging secular authority. The ban of the Chinese Buddhist Federation for obstructing the administrative power of the state was a case in point. Another example was the massive anti-superstition campaign against "redemptive societies" in the early 1920s for the disruption of social order.[670] The Beijing and Canton GMD governments saw the mission schools as an interference of Chinese sovereignty and national education. Christianity and foreign control of Chinese education became the focus of intense nationalist protest in the Anti-Religion Campaign of 1920-1922 and the Restore Educational Right Movement of 1924-1925.

Riding on the wave of anti-Christian nationalism, the Beijing and GMD governments passed their respective regulations on private schools in 1925 and 1926 to exert state monopoly of education, the sinicization of curriculum and management, and the prohibition of religious proselytization. By the 1930s, most of the mission schools were registered with the Ministry of Education in Nanjing as private schools and undergoing sinification and secularization. Mission school students no longer had to attend mandatory religious courses and service, and in replacement, the study of the Three People's Principles, and ritual obeisance to the portrait of Sun Yatsen and the flags of the republic and Nationalist party were made compulsory.

The legal definition of religion as voluntary private beliefs not only allowed the Republican state to marginalize organized religions politically, but also insulate the secular "religion of nationalism"

[669] Yuan launched an anti-superstition campaign against the subversive religious sects during the first year of his presidency.

[670] The nation-wide anti-superstition campaign was waged against redemptive societies in the wake of the "Datong hui incident." In 1923, the Society of Great Unity of the World Religions (*shijie zongjiao datong hui* 世界宗教大同會) founded by Tang Huanzhang 唐煥章 (1866-?) preached the imminent coming of the apocalypse and caused great social panic in Sichuan. The local authority quickly banned the society and a crackdown against redemptive societies ensued. Many redemptive societies with powerful patrons survived unscathed while some like the Worldwide Ethical Society (*wangguo daode hui* 萬國道德會) rebranded themselves as cultural associations to avoid being implicated.

from religious competition and disaffection. The Beijing and Nanjing governments, on the one hand, tried to weaken the religious nationalism of the ethnic minorities by making religious identity secondary to citizenship, on the other hand, they tried to engineer a set of national faith, festivals, and rituals to galvanize the separate, diverse and passive imperial subjects into patriotic citizens. In other words, state secularization is also sacralization. Citing the famous phrase that nation is "a soul and a spiritual principle" made by Ernest Renan in 1882, Thomas Dubois has highlighted that the archetypical citizen nationalism that developed in late eighteenth century France conceived of the nation as sacred in the very beginning and would tolerate no competition from other sacred authority such as the Catholic church or local religious allegiances. [671]

As the first Asian country to modernize herself into a strong and powerful nation-state, Japan was the model and source of inspiration for all nationalists in Asia. The utilization of state rites and sacrifices for the pseudo-sacralization of the nation-state in Japanese nationalism had been influential among the Chinese elites in their own national projects since they shared the same tradition of state ritualism. State rites and sacrifices had been the most important technique of rule in East Asian statecraft. The State Shintō created by the Meiji government was based on the idea of *saisei ichi* (unity of rites and government) developed by National Learning (*kokkugaku*) scholars, that states rites performed in shrines to the ancestral deities are capable of spiritually unifying the people and sovereign. Through State Shintō, the vision of the Meiji government was to create a national cult dedicated to the national deities — the ancestral deities of the imperial house declared as the divine ancestors of all Japanese people— and the emperor as the head priest. A hierarchy of national shrines (*kokkusha*) was established to impose the observation of the new national rites and calendar on the people who were made to register as their parishioners (*ujiko*). The cult of the war dead was later added to State Shintō, when the Yasukuni and other war memorial shrines were constructed to honor and worship the soldiers who fought and died for the imperial cause as national deities and heroes.[672] The State Shintō manufactured

[671] Thomas D. Dubois, "Hegemony, Imperialism, and the Construction of Religion in East and Southeast Asia" in *History and Theory*, 44.4 (Dec. 2005), p.117.

[672] Helen Hardacre (1989), pp.90-93; and *Shinto: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp.355-402.

by the Japanese state fits Renan's description of nation as a cult of the ancestors. Renan maintained that "The nation, like the individual, is the culmination of a long past of endeavours, sacrifice, and devotion. Of all cults, that of the ancestors is the most legitimate, for the ancestors have made us what we are. A heroic past, great men, glory (by which I understand genuine glory), this is the social capital upon which one bases a national idea."[673]

STATE CULT TO NATIONAL CULT

The early Republican state based its legitimacy solely on its claim as representing the will of the citizens and swept clean all the cosmic rituals of its imperial predecessor. The Qing dynasty was already displacing the imperial cult with the secularized sacrificial ritual to Confucius in the newly established national schools during the New Policies reforms. As discussed in the previous chapter, Yuan Shikai also tried to consolidate his power and stabilize the nascent republic through the reinvention of imperial rites, namely the grand sacrifices to Heaven and Confucius. Through the imperial rites, Yuan sought to claim for himself the two traditional loci of religio-political authority— Heaven and ancestor.[674] The worship of Heaven which was resuscitated in the winter of 1914 was quickly abandoned by Yuan as a result of intense and wide spread opposition to his monarchial ambition. Zarrow suggests that failure of the worship of Heaven to become a republican ritual was due to the fact that Heaven as a symbol was "remained lodged in a cosmos of Confucian universalism and hierarchy."[675] Yuan rejected the proposal to personify Heaven in the form of the Yellow Emperor as it did not fit the ideal of the republic as a political community constituted by the five races.[676]

---

[673] Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation" in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., *Becoming National: A Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.52.

[674] Angela Zito has demonstrated how the Qing emperors claimed both sources of sacred authority through the Grand Sacrifice to Heaven and imperial ancestors, which constructed the charisma of the Emperor as a sage-king by making him the paragon of Culture (*wen* 文) and filial piety (*xiao* 孝). Zito (1994).

[675] Zarrow (2001), p.175.

[676] Zarrow (2012), p.215.

In contrast to the failure of Heaven, Confucius, the Confucian worthies, and the military saints were successfully transmuted into republican symbols. As in the case of the revolutionary martyrs, it was through the sacrificial rite that Yuan was able to convert the sage teacher, the cultural and military heroes of Chinese history into his own and the nation's ancestors, from whom he could appropriate their charismatic power for himself (Yuan had even enshrined his Ming ancestor as a military hero). The making of political ancestors through ritual sacrifice, as Anthony Yu brilliantly demonstrates, was a staple of pre-imperial and imperial statecraft from the Shang to the Qing dynasty.[677] Ancestral worship, however, was not the prerogative of the state or the elites. The democratization of ancestral worship from the sixteenth century onwards, as David Faure traces in South China, created a ritual revolution in local society where rural villages became organized into lineages through the building of ancestral shrines and worship.[678] The success of the Yuan in politically appropriating the ancestral cult to constitute the axis of the nation-state was due to the fact that ancestral worship was a common and principal cultural norm of the Chinese and also because it shared the same objects of veneration as the cult of national ancestors and heroes in modern nationalist ideology.

Yuan Shikai was not the only person engaged in ancestor making. Since its capturing of power in Guangdong in the 1910s, the Guomindang had been sacrificing to the Seventy-two martyrs of Yellow Flower Hill to promote martial values and emphasize the credential of the nationalists in the toppling of the Qing and founding of the republic.[679] The death of Sun Yatsen in 1925 gave the Nationalist Party an important opportunity to construct a potent symbol of the party and nation-state to galvanize support for its campaign of national unification and provide legitimacy for nationalist rule after the establishment of the Nanjing regime in 1927. Drawing parallel with George Washington, the Nationalist Party declared Sun the founding father of the Chinese republic. A mausoleum was

[677] Yu (2005).

[678] Faure (2007).

[679] The seventy-two martyrs were the young revolutionaries who were killed in the abortive uprising staged by the Tongmenghui in Canton in April 1911. They were collectively buried at the Yellow Flower Hill in Canton. The seventy-two martyrs were important symbols for the nationalist movement and the model of the new soldier-citizen that the republican government wanted to fashion out of the population. See Henrietta Harrison, "Martyrs and Militarism in the Early Republic," *Twentieth-Century China*, 23.2 (1998), pp.41-70.

constructed in Nanjing to house the marble sarcophagus of Sun Yatsen and to be the ritual center of his cult engineered by the Nationalist government.[680]

The new government mandated that all schools and government institutions pay ritual obeisance to the Sun Yatsen in a weekly memorial ceremony, consisting of three bows to the party and national flags, and to the portrait of Sun, the founding father of the nation and party-state, the reading of his Will, and lastly, the observation of three minutes of silence. The commemorations of Sun had almost a religious character through the adoption of Confucian ritual forms and Christian imagery. Harrison suggests that the use of religious elements by the Nationalist Party was motivated by its belief in the effectiveness of Christianity in the construction of visible communities of committed believers. The Nationalists were explicit that the commemorations were not religious as it was against the scientific spirit promoted by the party-state. In differentiating themselves from religious rituals, the Nationalists maintained that the commemorations sought to produce inner faith or sincerity in the participants only and nothing else.[681]

The emphasis of inner state over ritual form and the definition of religious ritual as "magic" in Nationalist commemoration ceremony of Sun are not entirely informed by the post-Protestant and post-Enlightenment conception of religion, it also had neo-Confucian influence. John Lagerwey insightfully points out about the description of Confucian ancestral worship as civil rather than religious rites was not merely a deception of the sixteenth century Jesuits, but also a self-definition of their neo-Confucian interlocutors. Lagerwey argues that the separation of symbols and reality, the hallmark of secular modernity, was in fact observable in early Chinese history. Confucius had told his disciples to treat the ancestral spirits as if they were present during the rites and Xunzi had maintained primarily a functionalistic interpretation of ritual. Their Neo-Confucian followers in the sixteenth century

[680] Wang Liping, "Creating a National Symbol: The Sun Yat-sen Memorial in Nanjing," *Republican China* 21.2 (April 1996), pp.23-63.

[681] As one party commentary explains the rationale of the commemoration: "The emphasis is not on religious rituals such as those performed by any religion. Therefore we only ask that when (the weekly memorial ceremony) is performed ordinary comrades express to the PARTY LEADER their sincere feelings, and express an attitude of mutual affection and mutual respect for their comrades, and we do not make strict demands as to the length of time for the proceedings." Quoted and translated by Harrison (2000), p.149.

conceived of a rationalizing project to sweep away the gods and magical rituals of Buddhism, Daoism, and popular religion and replaced them with Confucian rites. This resulted in the late imperial ritual revolution Faure has described in detail in South China. The secularizing influence of the Neo-Confucian project, however, did not lead to the same outcome as the Protestant reformation in Europe as the Confucians did not object to the supernatural belief of the commoners to maintain social harmony and perhaps more because of their inability since the imperial state was as religious as the society it governed.[682] The secularizing rupture finally occurred at the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century under the impact of post-Protestant and post-Enlightenment discourse of religion and superstition.

GMD DISCOURSE OF CONFUCIAN-SCIENTIFIC SECULAR

Rebecca Nedostup argues that though the modern religion/superstition formulation bore similarity to the imperial-era dichotomy of orthodoxy/heterodoxy (*zheng/xie*), the republican era witnessed a radical conceptual change. She points out that the dichotomy of *zheng* and *xie* "operated within a closed system of mutual opposition and, therefore, mutual need….By contrast, although they made handy foils, *mixin* and *zongjiao* did not exist in the same kind of eternal combat as *zheng* and *xie*— perhaps because secularism stood to undermine them both, more inherently because the perfectibility of the modern self-conscious subject demanded that he be able to overcome superstition once and for all."[683] In a similar vein, Vincent Goossaert asserts that the imperial-era Confucian fundamentalism, characterized by anticlericalism and disapproval of the unrestrained religious expression of popular piety, was transformed into anti-superstition after 1898.[684] All religious beliefs and practices were measured by

[682] In his review of Lagerwey's book, David Palmer points out that "while the secularising tendency is always present in Confucianism, the secularising rupture is always absent." This, Palmer postulates, is because Confucian ritual theories did not discount the existence of the numinous realm, and due to the desire of Confucian elites to promote social harmony with the non-Confucian commoners. David Palmer, "John Lagerwey, China: A Religious State" in *China Perspectives*, 3 (2012), pp.86-87.

[683] Nedostup (2009), p.9.

[684] Goossaert (2006).

the standards of science, more accurately scientism,[685] including the imperial orthodoxy of Confucianism.[686]

Notwithstanding the influence of the hegemonic paradigm of religion-superstition in determining religious policy of the modern Chinese state and radically reconfiguring religious practices and groups, state secularization is at the same time a creative boundary drawing exercise that appropriates the alien categories in shaping of the "secular" in China. Peter Beyer has argued that Japan and China have been the "exception that proves the rule" in the global appropriation of the concept of religion as modern Japanese and Chinese elites refused "to imagine what they saw as their characteristic 'religious' traditions as religions."[687] The modernizing elites of China and Japan had constituted Confucianism and Shinto as "secular" national ideologies of their countries through the use of the opposing concept of "religion." The East Asian case might not be the exception to the rule as Beyer claims but the norm in Asia. Richard Madsen has pointed out that "the secular form of Asian political institutions often masks a religious spirit." He points out that the religiosity of Asian states is expressed in collective ritual of the cults of national heroes, leaders, and war dead.[688]

Keyes, Kendall and Hardacre have insightfully highlighted that the project of nation-building in Asia entails a different reaction to religion as compare to modernization. While modernization necessitates rationalization of the political system, nation-building demands commitment and moral

[685] D.W.Y Kwok defines scientism as "that view which places all reality within a natural order and deems all aspects of this order, be they biological, social, physical, or psychological, to be knowable only by the methods of science." *Scientism in Chinese Thought, 1900-1950* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965).

[686] Mayfair Yang, has pointed out during the twentieth century "the superiority of Chinese civilization gave way to new respect for Western science, technology, and culture" and "all religion in the world, including the old imperial Confucian cosmology, were made to revolve around the new sun of science." Yang (2008), p.15. The New Culture intellectuals had vehemently criticized many aspects of imperial-era Confucian orthodoxy as barbaric feudal "false beliefs" that must be eradicated for China to gain modernity. For instance, Hu Shi attacked the emphasis of women chastity in Chinese culture as an absurd kind of superstitious belief (*zhencao mixin* 贞操迷信). Hu Shi, "Zhencao wenti,"*La Jeunesse* 5.1 (July 1918), pp.5-14. On the development of late imperial chastity cult that the New Culture movement was rebelling against, see Janet M. Theiss, *Disgraceful Matters: The Politics of Chastity in Eighteenth Century China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

[687] Peter Beyer, *Religions in Global Society* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p.225.

[688] Richard Madsen, "Secularism, Religious Change, and Social Conflict in Asia" in Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, and Antwerpen, eds., *Rethinking Secularism*, p.249.

discipline from the citizens, which leads to an emphasis on religious faith and ritual actions.[689] As discussed previously, political elites of the early Republic secularized Confucian moral principles and rituals to serve the function of nation-building. The Confucian secular formulation of the early Republic was not discarded by the GMD regime. It was combined by the Nationalist government with the party's ideology of scientism into a new secular discourse.

The Confucian-scientific secular discourse of the GMD is given its most explicit elaboration in the "Standards for Preserving and Abolishing of Temples" (*shenci cunfei biaozhun* 神祠存廢標準) issued by the Nationalist government in 1928. The "Standards" was issued to provide a guideline for the arbitration of the incessant conflict between local party organs and the masses as a consequence of the anti-superstition campaigns against temples waged by GMD radicals in the late 1920s. Scholars have underscored the centrality of science in the "Standards" as the goal and criteria for the reform of Chinese religions— to identify backward (i.e. unscientific) "superstition" in Chinese religions for destruction to promote a scientific mindset in the populace. No enough attention, however, is paid to the role played by (Neo)Confucian rationalism in modern Chinese secularism as expressed in the document. The "Standards" classified Chinese temples into 4 main categories: "former worthies" (*xianzhe* 先哲), "religion" (*zongjiao*), "ancient deities" (*gushen* 古神), and "illicit cults" (*yinsi* 淫祀). Those temples that belong to the first two categories are considered legitimate and would be preserved and those of the last two categories be destroyed.

To be considered former worthies, according to the authors of the "Standards," historical figures must have one of the following four qualities: 1) had contributions to the progress of the nation; 2) with academic achievements that benefited the masses; 3) helped defend the state, society, and people against foreign humiliation, and those who removed ills and promoted the interest of the nation; 4) with virtues of loyalty, honor, filiality, or righteousness, capable of acting as moral exemplars for mankind.

[689] Charles Keyes, Laurel Kendall, and Helen Hardacre, eds., *Asian Vision of Authority: Religion and the Modern States of East and Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1994), p.5.

15 cultural and military heroes of the Chinese civilization such as Fuxi, Huangdi, Shennong, Confucius, Mencius, Yue Fei, and Guan Yu were listed together with their achievements for illustration.

Rebecca Nedostup argues that "Although the term 'former worthies' alluded to the tradition that arose during the Song of building shrines to honor exemplary local men, the "Standards" rewrote the category in terms of racial and national history, cleansing it of the taint of autocracy."[690] Nedostup has pointed out that many of the 15 worthies are mythical progenitors of Chinese civilization including the Yellow Emperor, the icon of Han nationalism, whose existence was disputed by the emergence of scientific history at that time, to perpetuate the myth-history of nationalism. Other than blood-lineage, the scientific accomplishments of the worthies were also highlighted by the "Standards" to demonstrate the advancement of Chinese civilization and that the worship of these popularly apotheosized figures does not constitute "superstition." The document provides a lengthy narration of how former worthies from Warring states to the Qing predated the present effort of the Nationalist government in the destruction of immoral sacrifice and superstition. The shrines for former worthies are considered by the document as part of the China's civil religion for preservation. The "Standards" instruct local authorities to actively identify any shrines in their jurisdictions that met any of the listed criteria and conserve them for the respect and admiration of the people.

Worship of the Confucian worthies was an important element of literati religiosity in late imperial China. In her study of shrines to local former worthies in Song, Ellen Neskar has shown that these shrines were novel as they belonged neither to the family nor the state, but were created by local elites and administrators as the focal point for the communal and individual religiosity of the literati. The shrines were built primarily to celebrate the Confucian virtues of the deceased worthies and to encourage literati to take them as moral exemplars in their own learning and moral cultivation.[691] Though the religious ceremonies and sacrificial ritual were not standardized in these shrines, great pains were taken to distinguish them from the rites of the popular religion. As Neskar explains, "the sacrifices

[690] Nedostup (2009), p.83.

[691] Ellen Neskar, "Shrines to Local Former Worthies" in Donald Lopez Jr. ed. *Religions of China in Practice* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp.293-305.

were offered by the community of elites as an act of thanksgiving and recompense: worthies were not asked to bestow favors or act as intercessors for the benefit of individual petitioners."[692] By the Ming dynasty, the shrines of local worthies had evolved into premortem shrines (*shengci* 生祠), celebrating the moral courage and virtues of living officials and legitimating political voice and participation of the literati-officials in the era of autocracy.[693] The non-theistic and ethical nature of the shrines to the Confucian worthies made them ideal in the eyes of the nationalists to be preserved and transformed for the inculcation of patriotism and virtues in the citizenry.

The second licit type of temples belonged to that of "religion." The "Standards" defined religion as theism (*shenjiao* 神教) according to the dominant definition of social science. It consists of the worship of one or many gods, a set of commandments and pure creeds that inspire faith and reverence in the people. The document stresses that the Nationalist party permit absolute freedom of religion and would preserve any temple that belongs to a religion. The "Standards" only recognizes Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and Daoism as religions. The first two monotheistic religions are approved as one of the world greatest religions without much comment, as for the latter two polytheistic religions, however, it highlights aspects of the two religions that do not conform to the definition of religion. Buddhism is criticized for the idolatrous worship of Buddha by the laity and the death rituals conducted by the clerics as uncanonical. Daoism, regarded as the native religion, is given most of the criticism among the two. The "Standards" maintains that because the true principles of the religion are not expounded, Daoism has degenerated into the practice of inner alchemy and the use of amulets and charms by unscrupulous persons to mislead the masses into rebellion. The White Lotus sect, Boxers, Big and Small Sword Societies, and the Red Spear are all attributed to the pernicious influence of degenerated Daoism. Daoist conduct of funeral rites is also condemned as ludicrous. The "Standards" critique of monastic Daoism and Buddhism reveals not only the Protestant bias of what constitutes "religion" (i.e. monotheistic faith

[692] Ibid., p.299.

[693] Sarah Schneewind, "Beyond Flattery: Legitimating Political Participation in a Ming Living Shrine," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 72.2 (May 2013), pp.345-366.

based on sacred books) but also Confucian objection of "teaching based on Way of the supernatural" (*shendao jiao*) as uncanonical, wasteful, irrational, and protentially subversive of the social order.

The two illicit categories of shrines are those based on irrational beliefs and harm the public good. The category of "ancient deities" comprises of a myriad of astral, natural, and territorial deities included in the sacrificial register of the imperial state. Shrines dedicated to "ancient deities" would not be preserved simply because science has rendered their worship superfluous since elements of the natural world were anthropomorphized and deified by humans in the past because the inner working of the nature was not understood. Like "former worthies," "illicit cults" is a Confucian term having varied meanings such as immoral, improper, and excessive. The "Standards" stresses that "illicit cults" is a chronic problem in China resulting from the weakening of political control, decline of education, and the crude state of people intelligence. While "illicit cults" in late imperial times referred to worship that subverted the moral order and orthodox values promoted by the state, the category is employed by the "Standards" as a catch-all label that include any religious practices that is unscientific, criminal or do not fit the category of "religion." According to the "Standards", "illicit cults" are those that fraudulently called themselves religion but have no real value; those with intent to defraud or mislead the masses into clandestine associations for subversive purpose; those animistic cults that conducts uncivilized worship; or those that have no classical textual basis and based on popular novels or legends. In the category of "illicit cults", we can see how the imperial discourse of "heresy" is combined with imported discourse of "superstition" in the post-imperial era.

REVIVAL OF THE CONFUCIUS CULT AND APPROPRIATION OF CONFUCIAN LI

As Nedostup maintains, the Nationalist government launched a thorough anti-superstition campaign during the Nanjing decade against "superstitious" practices of the masses to replace them with the reformed family rites and civil ceremonies that it designed.[694] The central component of the new GMD

[694] Nedostup (2009), pp.227-278.

ritual order was the commemorations of revolutionary martyrs and Sun Yatsen. As the key symbol of the GMD and the party-state, the Nationalist government went to great lengths to promote the cult of Sun. The government mandated weekly memorial ceremony for Sun was expanded from party organs to all government institutions, barracks, and schools. The Sun Yatsen mausoleum at Purple Mountains in Nanjing was merely the beginning of an ambitious monument construction plan of the new regime. The Nationalist government planned to have the local party-organs build memorial halls for the Party Leader and shrines for the fallen revolutionary heroes throughout the whole of China with the temples confiscated in the anti-superstition campaign. To make the figure of Sun Yatsen etched into the minds of the Chinese citizens, the party-state engineered numerous national holidays to commemorate the major events in Sun's political life.

The GMD initially saw Confucius as a symbol of China's autocratic past, and his rituals and teaching supported monarchial authority by restraining people's mind. Confucius, who was revered and sacrificed to by many warlords, was also perceived by Jiang Jieshi 蔣介石 (1887-1975) as a competitor to the ritual universe of the GMD centered on Sun Yatsen.[695] At the height of revolutionary fervent during the northern expedition, the Revolutionary Army, party and student activists banned sacrifices to Confucius and appropriated properties of Confucian temples during the campaign against feudal superstitions. A party activist even suggested in 1927 that all Confucian temples be converted into Sun Yatsen memorial halls.[696] In March 1928, the Ministry of Education officially abolished state sacrifices to Confucius for being antithetical to democratic principles. However, the "Standards" issued three months later stated that Confucius temples were to be preserved together with other shrines of the "former worthies." The shrines of the former worthies were not to conduct any religious worship or sacrifice. They were intended by Xue Dubi 薛篤弼 (1890-1973), the new minister of education, to be

[695] David Bowles, "Finding the Way: Guomindang Discourse, Confucius, and the Challenges of Revolutionary Traditionalism in China, 1919-1934," DPhil dissertation Oxford University, 2016, p.208

[696] Ibid., p.205.

preserved only as static-museums, dedicated to celebrating the national heroes and civilizational achievements of the Chinese nation, not religious sites.

The ritual to Confucius was revived by the Nationalist government in 1934 shortly before the launch of the New Culture Movement. Reversing its earlier neglect and even condemnation of Confucius, the Nationalist government honored the sage as the model educator and transmitter of the national culture and timeless moral virtues. The Nationalist government declared that the birthday of the sage on 27 August on the Gregorian calendar as a national holiday.[697] The sage's birthday was also later designated as Teacher's Day by the Nationalist government. The GMD celebration of Confucius was a response to the national crisis produced by the creation of the state of Manchukuo in 1932 and the loss of China's three northeastern provinces, Jehol, and parts of inner Mongolia to imperial Japan. From the very beginning, the state of Manchukuo was created by its Japanese state-builders not as a colony of the Japanese empire, but a nation-state established on the traditional Confucian moral-political principle of the "kingly way" (*wangdao* 王道). The Japanese imperialists appropriated the Confucian civilizational tradition to construct, what Duara calls the "regime of authenticity," to ideologically prop up the multi-ethnic state of Manchukuo and legitimize their imperial project in East Asia.[698] The Manchukuo state revived the state cult and sacrifice to Heaven and Confucius, as well as promoted popular Confucian piety such as the cult of filial tombs in Manchuria.[699]

To counter the ideological threat posed by the Japanese, the GMD also promoted Confucius and Confucianism as the symbol and principle of timeless Chinese authenticity. The chairman of the Executive Yuan Wang Jingwei 汪精衛 (1883-1944) explained that the government commemorated

[697] The holiday was set on the Gregorian calendar instead of traditionally on the lunar calendar as part of the government's strategy of reforming superstitious customs and changing the consciousness and lives of the citizens. Nedostup (2009), pp.229-240.

[698] See Prasenjit Duara (2003), pp.29-34.

[699] For a discussion of the state sponsorship of the cult of the filial tombs, see Thomas D. Dubois, "Manchukuo's Filial Sons: States, Sects and the Transformation of Gravesite Piety," *East Asian History*, 36 (Dec. 2008), pp.3-26; and *Empire and the Meaning of Religion in Northeast Asia: Manchuria 1900-1945* (U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp.164-186.

Confucius because he was the greatest teacher（先師 *xianshi*） and paragon of the five thousand years of Chinese civilization. He declared that the Japanese could conquer China militarily and politically but not culturally and academically, and the Chinese nation would rejuvenate itself and even conquer its enemies through the superiority of her Confucian civilizational essence.[700]

Responding to the widespread query on whether sacrifice would be performed, the Nationalist government answered in the negative and emphasized that the purpose of the holiday was to commemorate the sage and the proper way was to lecture on his deeds and teachings, and the connection between Confucius and the revolutionary thought of Sun Yatsen. The ceremonial format of Confucius commemoration was modelled after Sun Yatsen memorial. On that day, national flags were hung for celebration and commemoration for the sage held in schools, party organizations, government offices, military barracks, and other organizations. The commemoration comprised of singing of the party anthem, three bows to the flag of the party-state and the portraits of Sun Yatsen and Confucius, lectures, and singing of the memorial song for Confucius.[701] In 1934, the nationalist government sent representatives from the ministries and parliament to the Confucian temple at Qufu to officiate the commemoration ceremony. The ceremony was a traditional sacrificial ritual, with the use of spirit tablets and sacrificial animals, and invocation to the spiritual realm, performed by the Duke Yansheng, Kong Decheng 孔德成 (1920-2008) as the chief sacrificial officer. In following year, the Nanjing government appointed Kong Decheng as the "sacrificial officer to the Greatest Sage and Teacher" in lieu of his feudal title and made him responsible for the performance of sacrifice to Confucius on behalf of the government.

The GMD control over the ritual for Confucius was, however, limited to the Jiangsu region under its direct administration. In other places, sacrificial rite for Confucius was resurrected by the

[700] "Wang zhi yanci," *Ta Kung Pao* (L' Impartial), 28 September 1934. Reprinted in *Zhonghua Minguo Dangan Shiliao Huibian* vol. 5 (2) (Jiangsu chubanshe, 1997), p.546.

[701] "Sikong Banfa" in *Zhonghua Minguo Dangan Shiliao Huibian* vol. 5 (2) (Jiangsu chubanshe, 1997), p.531.

military governors to celebrate the sage's birthday,[702] and in some localities, government survey even found that spring and autumn sacrifices continued to be performed as during the imperial time. Sébastien Billioud and Joël Thoraval rightly point out that the cosmic "religious" ritual and "political" ceremonial constitute two poles in a continuum of ceremonies for Confucius and in between these two ideal types, "the twentieth century offered a whole spectrum of possibilities." [703] Billioud and Thoraval highlight that the connection between the cosmic and material realms can be maintained and reestablished through individual and community practices and emphasize the importance of the body in forging this connection. They cited the study of David Palmer on contemporary Qigong movements to show that the body is the medium for the cultivation of virtue and moral power and to experience spirituality and learn about religious truth.[704]

As an ardent follower of Wang Yangming, Jiang Jieshi was fully aware and appreciative of how proper behavior in everyday life could cultivate the right mental and bodily attitudes. It is with this understanding that Jiang launched the New Life Movement in 1934. While the revived worship of Confucius was influenced by the Japanese idea of *saisei ichi* in nation-building, the New Life Movment. as Jennifer Lee Oldstone-Moore brilliantly shown, was a religious movement informed by a this-worldly orientation and transformative power of *li* in traditional Confucian religiosity and imperial political Confucianism. She argues that in the New Life Movement, "Jiang makes a shift from a discourse which creates the cosmos to one that will recreate a glorious Chinese state but viable in the modern world. He does so with the same assumptions that underlie the imperial control of *Li*. *Li*, through their practice, accomplish the transformation of mind and body in both strength and virtue." [705]

---

[702] For instance, Chen Jitang, the military governor of Guangdong province, ignored the directive of the central government and performed the sacrificial rite according to imperial tradition. He also resurrected the sacrifice to Guan Yu and Yue Fei. See Poon (2011), pp.121-122.

[703] Sébastien Billioud and Joël Thoraval, *The Sage and the People: The Confucian Revival in China* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p.254.

[704] Ibid, pp.255-256. See David Palmer, *Qigong Fever: Body, Science, and Utopia in China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); and "The Body: Health, Nation and Transcendence" in David Palmer, Glenn Shive and Phillip Wickeri, eds., Chinese Religious Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp.88-106.

[705] Oldstone-Moore, "The New Life Movement of Nationalist China: Confucianism, State Authority, and Moral Transformation," PhD thesis Chicago Divinity School, 2000, p.189.

Oldstone-Moore highlights that *li* does not translate as ritual entirely as it also includes etiquette and quotidian practices. Drawing on the works of Angela Zito and Catherine Bell on Chinese ritual, she stresses that Chinese notion of *li* cut across western dichotomies of sacred/secular, mind/body, and self-community.[706] Jiang placed great emphasis on the Confucian virtue of *li*, more concretely the proper way of eating, clothing, walking and living a discipline life, to cultivate the moral spirit of the Chinese people and mold them into productive, discipline, and patriotic citizens. The New Life Movement also tapped into Japanese and Western discourses and practices in hygiene, physical training, and ceremonial forms to mold the minds and discipline the behaviors of the Chinese people.[707]

NATIONAL TOMB SWEEPING FESTIVAL AND CULT OF NATIONAL ANCESTORS

In 1935, the Nationalist government designated the Qingming festival as the National Tomb-Sweeping Day. In the same year, the central government and the GMD dispatched Deng Jiayan 鄧家彥 (1883-1966), Lin Sen 林森 (1868-1943), and Shao Yuanchong 邵元沖 (1890-1936) as representatives to the mausoleums of the Yellow Emperor and Kings Wen and Wu in Xian and Xianyang, Shaanxi to pay respect and perform sacrifice to the ancient sage-rulers. The nationalist government explained the purpose of the National Tomb-Sweeping Day as follow:

> What is the meaning of the National Tomb-Sweeping Day? Simply put, those sagacious kings and emperors such as the Yellow Emperor, Han Wudi, Tang Taizong, Ming Taizu, etc, and those famous officials and great generals such as Yue Fei, Qi Jiguang, etc, who had great achievements and made big contributions to the Chinese nation; we have all read their histories and harbor deep awe and respect for them, today (the national tomb

[706] For a good discussion of Chinese notion of *li* and the limitations of western ritual theories in understanding it, see Zito (1994); and "This is not a facade" in Bruno Latour and Peter Wiebel eds. Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), pp.70-85; also James Hevia, *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995), pp.15-24.

[707] Oldstone-Moore (2009), pp.193-196.

> sweeping day) is to express the reverent feeling of remembrance for the forebears and to sweep and perform sacrifice at their tombs and mausoleums on behalf of the whole nation. Especially at this grave period of national difficulties, we should always keep in mind how our forebears struggled and how they fought against foreign aggressors to protect the national soil; and how we the descendants should work hard to inherit their will and maintain their glorious histories, so as to continuously preserve the life of our nation. This is the true meaning of the National Tomb-Sweeping Day.[708]

The national tomb sweeping festival is not an "invented tradition."[709] Tomb sweeping is in fact an integral feature of the Qingming festival practice by all Chinese since the Tang dynasty. During the Qingming festival, which falls in early spring, families will sweep the tombs of their deceased ancestors and offer food, drinks, incense and paper money. The Beijing government under the suggestion of Sun Yatsen labelled the Qingming festival as the Tomb-Sweeping Day in 1915 while the revolutionary government in Canton celebrated the traditional festival as Tree-Planting Day. After 1928 the Nanjing government combined the two by keeping the name of Tomb-Sweeping Day and celebrated the event with the planting of trees.[710]

Local authorities were ordered by the Nanjing government to perform ritual obeisance to many emperors and heroes from various dynasties. Among the official ceremonies performed on the National Tomb-Sweeping Day, the sacrifice to the Yellow Emperor was the most elaborated and given the most attention by the Nanjing government. This is not surprising since the Yellow Emperor is the most potent symbol of Chinese ethnic nationalism since the first decade of the twentieth century. The mythical sage-king was invented as the progenitor of the Han Chinese race according to contemporary racial discourse by late Qing Han nationalists to construct an imagined community based on blood ties and racial descent.

---

[708] Zhou Junyu, "Minsu yu zhengzhi: Zhongguo Guomingdang zhengquan xia de Qingming jie zaizhi, 1912-2008" *Taiwan wenxian*, 63.1 (2012), pp.193-194.

[709] Hobsbawn has provocatively argued that many "traditions" in Europe, India, and Africa were in fact recent creations connected to the emergence of modern nationalist movements. See Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp.1-14.

[710] Zhou (2012), p.193.

[711] However, the symbol and cult of the Yellow Emperor were suppressed immediately after the founding of the multiethnic republic in 1912. The revival of the cult of the Yellow Emperor was calculated by the Nationalist government to increase the racial consciousness and unity of the Han Chinese against the Japanese invaders. The GMD veteran-politician Shao Yuanchong warned against the rise of narrow and bigoted Han nationalism and the risk of the disaffection of ethnic minorities if only Han Chinese heroes and histories were glorified. Taking the advice of Shao into account, the Nationalist government ordered the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission to perform religious rites for the Dalai Lama and Genghis Khan.[712]

With the forging of the Second United Front and the outbreak of the all-out war with Japan in 1937, the Chinese Communist Party also participated in the sacrifice at the Yellow Emperor mausoleum. From 1937 to 1939, the GMD and CCP jointly organized and performed sacrifice to the ancestors of the Han race three times as a show of national unity.[713] Beneath the cover of concord and solidarity, the relationship between the GMD and CCP was still as hostile as before. While both parties utilized the symbol of the Yellow Emperor to accumulate political capital during the time of rising Chinese nationalism, at the same time, they also tried to undermine each other politically. The GMD minimized the role and participation of the CCP in the worship in mainstream media reports,[714]and the CCP took advantage of the event to criticize the authoritarianism of the Nationalist government.[715] The Nationalist government continued to send delegates to perform the sacrifice to Yellow Emperor at Xian until they were not able to in 1948 when the CCP captured Shaanxi province. The government of the Republic of China in Taiwan persist in performing the sacrifice from afar to the Yellow Emperor (*yaoji*

[711] For the myth of the Yellow Emperor and the construction of Chinese ethnic nationalism, see Shen Chung-chiao "Woyi woxue jian xuanyuan: Huangdi Shenhua yu wanqing guozu jiangou," *Taiwan shehui yanjiu jikan* 28 (Dec. 1997), pp.1-77; and Dikötter (1992), pp.116-125.

[712] Li Junling, "Zhongguo Jindai Guojiao de lishi kaocha," M.A. dissertation Shandong Normal University, 2005, pp.158-159.

[713] Li Junling and Yin Dingquan, "Kangzhan shiqi de huangling jisi dianli" in *Journal of Yangzhou University* (Humanities &Social Sciences), 13.5 (Sept. 2009), pp.85-90.

[714] Zhou (2012), p.201.

[715] Li and Yin (2009), pp.86-87.

遥祭) from 1951 till this day as a testimony of their role as the guardian of Chinese culture and civilization.[716]

[716] Zhou (2012), pp.202-212.

Bibliography

"A Statement of the Nature, Work, and Aims of the Protestant Missions in China, laid before the Tsung-li Ya-men, Nov.14th, 1895, to be presented to the Emperor" in *The Chinese Recorder* (February 1896), pp.116-123.

Agamben, Giorgio. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998.

Ai Zhiming 艾知命. "Shang guowuyuan ji canyi liangyuan xinjiao ziyou buli guojiao qingyuan shu" 上國務院暨參眾兩院信教自由不立國教請願書 (Petition requesting the state council and the two houses of senate and representative not to establish a state religion for the sake of religious freedom). In *Minguo jingshi wenbian (zhengzhi)* 民國經世文編（政治） vol.39. Taibei: Wenhai publisher, 1970, p.59.

Alcock, Rutherford. "Christian Missions in the East," *The Times* (London), 29 January, 1873, p.10.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1991.

"Anhui xunfu Qiao Songnian qingjin zhongguo minren wei waiguo chuanjiao zhe" 安徽巡撫喬松年請禁中國民人為外國傳教摺 (Memorial from the governor of Anhui, Qiao Songnian requesting that the Chinese populace be prohibited from proselytizing for foreign nations). In *Fan yangjiao shuwen jietie xuan* 反洋教書文揭帖選, ed. Wang Minglun 王明倫. Jinan: Qilu shuju, 1984, p.320.

Asad, Talal. *The Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam.* Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993.

_____. "Religion, Nation-State, Secularism." In *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia*, ed. Peter van der Veer and Harmut Lehmann. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp.178-196.

_____. *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003.

Atwill, David. *The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856-1873*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005.

Auslin, Michael. *Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004.

Barnett, Suzanne Wilson. "Protestant Expansion and Chinese Views of the West." *Modern Asian Studies* 6, no.2 (1972), pp.129-149.

Barrett, Tim. "Chinese Religion in English Guise: The History of an Illusion," *Modern Asian Studies* 39, no.3 (2005), pp.509-533.

Barrett, Tim, and Francesca Tarocco. “Terminology and Religious Identity: Buddhism and Genealogy of the Term ‘Zong Jiao’”. In *Dynamics in the History of Religions Between Asia and Europe*, ed. Volkhard Krech and Marion Steinicke. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012, pp.307-319.

Bastid-Brugrière, Marianne. “Sacrifices d’etat et légitimité à la fin des Qing.” *Toung-pao* 83 (1997), pp.162-173.

_____. “Liang Qichao yu zongjiao wenti” 梁啟超與宗教問題 (Liang Qichao and the religious question). In. *Liang Qichao, Mingzhi Riben Xifang* 梁啟超.明治日本.西方, ed. Hazama Naoki 狹間直樹. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2001, pp.400-457.

Bayly, C.A. *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914*. U.K: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2004.

Bays, Daniel H., ed. *Christianity in China: From Eighteenth Century to the Present*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996.

_____. *A New History of Christianity in China*. U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012.

Berling, Judith A. “When They Go their Separate Ways: The Collapse of the Unitary Vision of Chinese Religion in Early Ch’ing.” In *Meeting of Minds: Interaction in East Asian Traditions and Thoughts*, ed. Irene Bloom and Joshua A. Fogel. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp.209-236.

Billioud, Sébastien and Joél Thoraval. “The Contemporary Revival of Confucianism: Anshen Liming or the Religious Dimension of Confucianism.” *China Perspectives* 75 (2008/3), pp.88-106.

_____.*The Sage and the People: The Confucian Revival in China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Biggerstaff, Knight. *The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961.

Berger, Patricia. *Empire of Emptiness: Buddhist Art and Political Authority in Qing China*. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2003.

Bohr, Paul Richard. *Famine in China and the Missionary: Timothy Richard as Relief Administrator and Advocate of National Reform, 1876-1884*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972.

Bol, Peter. *Neo-Confucianism in History*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2010.

Bowles, David. “Finding the Way: Guomindang Discourse, Confucius, and the Challenges of Revolutionary Traditionalism in China, 1919-1934.” DPhil dissertation, Oxford University, 2016.

Bulag, Uradyn E. “Going into imperial: Tibeto-Mongolian Buddhism and Nationalisms in China and Inner Asia.” In *Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World*, ed. Joseph Esherick, Hasan Kayali, and Eric Van Young. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006, pp.260-295.

Burden, J.S. “Causes of Hostilities to Missionaries.” *Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal* (March 1872), pp.263-266.

Cady, John J. *The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1954.

Cai Shaoqing 蔡少卿, ed. *Xue Fucheng Riji* 薛福成日記 (Xue Fucheng's diary). Jilin wenshi chubanshe, 2004.

Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培. "Duiyu xinjiaoyu de yijian" 對於新教育的意見 (My opinion on new education), *Linshi Zhengfu gongbao* 臨時政府公報, vol. 13 (11 February 1912), pp.7-15.

_____. "Yi meiyu dai zongjiao" 以美育代宗教 (Replacing religion with aesthetic education). *La Jeunesse* 3, no.6 (August 1917), pp.1-5.

Campany, Robert Ford. "On the idea of Religions in the Modern West and Early Medieval China." *History of Religions* 42 (May 2003), pp.287-319.

Casanova, José. *Public Religions in the Modern World.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

_____. "The Secular, Secularizations, Secularism." In *Rethinking Secularism*, ed. Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp.54-74.

Chadwick, Owen. *The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

Chan, Wing-tsit. *Religious Trends in Modern China.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1953.

_____. "Kang Yu-wei and the Confucian Doctrine of Humanness (Ren)." In *Kang Youwei: A Biography and A Symposium*, ed. Lo Jung Pang. Tuscon: The University of Arizona Press, 1967, pp.355-374.

Chang Hao. *Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and Meaning, 1890-1911*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.

_____. "Cosmological Myth and Neo-Confucian Transcendence." In *Cosmology, Ontology and Human Efficacy: Essays in Chinese Thought*, ed. Richard Smith and D.W.K. Kwok. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1993, pp.11-34.

_____. "Zhengjiao yiyuan hai shi zhengjiao er yuan?: Chuantong rujia sixiang zhong de zhengjiao guanxi" 政教一元还是政教二元?:传统儒家思想中的政教关系 (Unity of politics and teaching or the separation of politics and teaching?: the relationship of politics and teaching in Confucian intellectual tradition). *Si xiang* 思想 (Reflexion), 20 (2012), pp.111-143.

Chatterjee, Partha. *Nationalist Thought and Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*, Second Edition. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.

_____. *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Post-Colonial Histories*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993.

_____. "Fasting for Bin Laden: The Politics of Secularization in Contemporary India." In *Power of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and his Interlocutors*, ed. David Scott and Charles Hirschkind. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006, pp.57-74.

Chen Baozhen 陳寶箴. "Zouqing li zheng xueshu zaojiu rencai ce" 奏請立正學術造就人才策 (Memorial requesting for the rectification of scholarship and strategies for the nurturing of human

talents). In *Juemi yaolu* 覺迷要錄, ed. Ye Dehui 葉德輝. Reprint. Taibei: Tailian guofeng chubanshe, 1970.

Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀. "Ou-xiang pohuai lun" 偶像破壞論 (On smashing of idols). *La Jeunesse* 5, no.2 (August 1918), pp.89-91.

Chen Huanzhang 陳煥章. "Lun Feikong yu jin zhengju zhi guanxi" 論廢孔教與今政局之關係 (The connection between the abolishment of Confucianism and present political situation). *Kongjiao-hui zazhi* 孔教會雜誌 vol. 1, no.5 (June 1913), pp.1-12.

_____. "Dingjiri guoxue jiangjing jieshao ci" 丁祭日國學講經介紹詞 (Introductory speech for the lecture on national studies and the classics at the event of autumn sacrifice). *Kongjiao-hui zazhi* 孔教會雜誌 vol.1, no.8 (September 1913), pp.1-4.

_____. "Kongjiaohui zhi zhongyao" 孔教會之重要 (On the importance of Confucian Association). *Jingshi Bao* 經世報 vol.1, no.1 (January 1922), pp.41-50.

_____. "Quandao renmin duoli kongmiao shuo" 勸導人民多立孔廟說 (An exhortation to the people to construct more Confucian temples). *Jingshi bao* 經世報 vol.1, no.7 (July 1922), pp.19-22.

_____. *Kongjiao lun* 孔教論 (A treatise on the Confucian religion). Hong Kong: Kongjiao Academy, 1941.

_____. "Guohui xianfa huiyi duiyu kongjiao dageming jinggao guoren shu" 國會憲法會議對於孔教大革命警告國人書 (A warning to the public on the destruction of the Confucian religion by the parliamentary constitutional committee). In *Kongjiao shinian dashi* 孔教十年 vol.8, ed. Ke Huang 柯璜, pp.34-36.

_____. "Kongjiao-hui xu" 孔教會序 (Preface to the Confucian Association). In *Rujia zongjiao sixiang yanjiu* 儒家宗教思想研究, ed. Li Jian 李建. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2003, pp.57-62.

Chen, Hsi-yuan. "Confucianism Encounters Religion: The Formation of Religious Discourse and The Confucian Movement in Modern China." PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1999.

Choupan Yiwu Shimo, Tongzhi-chao 籌辦夷務始末 同治朝 (A Complete Account of the Management of Barbarian Affairs of the Tongzhi Era), 10 vols. Reprint. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2008.

Choupan Yiwu Shimo, Xianfeng-chao 籌辦夷務始末 咸豐朝 (A Complete Account of the Management of Barbarian Affairs of the Xianfeng Era), 8 vols. Reprint. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1979.

Chow, Kaiwing. *The Rise of Confucian Ritualism in Late Imperial China: Ethics, Classics and Lineage Discourse*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.

Chow, Tse-Tsung. "The Anti-Confucian Movement in Early Republican China." In *The Confucian Persuasion*, ed. Arthur Wright. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1960, pp.288-312.

Chu, Pingyi. “Against Prognostication: Ferdinand Verbeist’s Criticism of Chinese Mantic Arts.” In *Coping With the Future: Theories and Practices of Divination in East Asia*, ed. Michael Lackner. Leiden, Brill Sinica Leidensia, 2017, pp.433-450.

Clark, Anthony. “Rape, Baptism, and the ‘Pig’ Religion: Chinese Images of Foreign Missionaries during the late Nineteenth Century.” In *Beating Devils and Burning Their Books: Views of China, Japan and the West*, ed. idem. Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies Inc., 2010, pp.43-81.

Cohen, Paul A. “The Anti-Christian Tradition in China.” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 20, no.2 (Feb. 1961), pp.169-180.

_____. *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Anti-Foreignism, 1860-1870*. Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963.

_____.Wang T’ao and Incipient Chinese Nationalism.” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 26, no.4 (Aug., 1967), pp.559-574.

_____. “Christian Missions and their Impact to 1900.” In *Cambridge History of Modern China*, vol. 10 part 1, the late Ch’ing 1800-1911, ed. John K. Fairbank. London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp.543-590.

Connerton, Paul. *How Societies Remember*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Cordier, Henri. *L'expédition de Chine de 1857-1858: Histoire Diplomatique, Notes et Documents*. Paris, 1905.

Correspondence Relative to the Earl of Elgin’s Special Mission to China and Japan, 1857-1858. London: Harrisons and Sons, 1859.

Creppell, Ingrid. “Secularisation: religion and the roots of innovation in the political sphere.” In *Religion and the Political Imagination*, ed. Ira Katznelson and Gareth Stedman Jones. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp.23-45.

Crossley, Pamela Kyle. *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial History*. Berkeley: University of California, 1999.

“Chi Beijing jiaoyuhui pohuai Kongjiao zhi zui” 斥北京教育會破壞孔教之罪 (Condemning the Beijing education conference for its crime of destroying the Confucian religion). *Kongjiao-hui zazhi* 孔教會雜誌 vol.1, no.2 (March 1913), pp.1-17.

“Yingjili guo chishu” 英吉利國敕書 (An imperial decree to the country of England). In *Qingchao rouyuan ji* 清朝柔遠記, ed. Wang Zhichun 王之春. Reprint. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1989.

Davis, Edward. *Society and the Supernatural in Song China*. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001.

De Groot, Jan Jacob Maria. *Sectarianism and Prosecution in China*, vol.1. Amsterdam: Johannes Müller, 1903.

Dean, Kenneth. *Lord of the Three in One: Spread of a Cult in Southeast China*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998.

DeBary, Wm. Theodore. *The Trouble with Confucianism*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991.

Deng, Haoran 鄧浩然. *Kongjiao conglu xuancui* 孔教叢錄選粹 (Selected documents of the Confucian religion). Hong Kong: Yuanda Chubanshe, 1968.

Dikkotter, Frank. *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*. London: Hurst & Co., 1992.

Dirik, Arif. "Confucius in the Borderlands: Global Capitalism and the Reinvention of Confucianism," *Boundary 2* 2, no.3 (Autumn 1995), pp.229-273.

Dong, Shouyi and Wang Yanjing, "Chinese Investigative Missions Overseas, 1866-1907." In *China, 1895-1912: State-sponsored Reforms and China's Late-Qing Revolution*, ed. Douglas Reynolds. New York: Routledge, 1995, pp.15-34.

Drake, Fred. *China Charts the World: Hsu Chi-yü and His Geography of 1848*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975.

Duanfang 端方 and Dai Hongci 戴鴻慈. "Zhongguo zongjiao yinge lun" 中國宗教因革論 (On the necessity of religious reform in China). *Shenbao* 申報, 27 August 1906, p.2.

Duara, Prasenjit. *Cultural, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988.

_____. "Knowledge and Power in the Discourse of Modernity: The Campaigns against Popular Religion in Early Twentieth-Century China." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 50, no.1 (Feb.1991), pp.67-83.

_____. *Rescuing History from the Nation-state: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*. London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1995.

_____. *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowland & Littlefield, 2003.

_____. "Religious Approaches to Citizenship: The Traffic between Religious Orders and the Secular National Order." In *Chinese Religiosities: Afflictions of Modernity and State Formation*, ed. Mayfair Yang. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008, pp.43-64.

_____. *The Crisis of Global Modernity: Asian Traditions and a Sustainable Future*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Dubois, Thomas D. "Hegemony, Imperialism, and the Construction of Religion in East and Southeast Asia." *History and Theo*ry 44 (Dec. 2005), pp.113-131.

_____. "Manchukuo's Filial Sons: States, Sects and the Transformation of Gravesite Piety." *East Asian History* 36 (Dec. 2008), pp.3-26.

_____. *Empire and the Meaning of Religion in Northeast Asia: Manchuria 1900-1945*. U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Dunch, Ryan. *Fuzhou Protestants and Making of a Modern China*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001.

Elman, Benjamin. *On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005

Elvin, Mark. "The Tales of the Shen and Xin: Body-Person and Mind-Heart during the last 150 Years." In *Self as Body in Asian Theory and Practice*, ed. Thomas Kasulis, Roger Ames and Wimal Dissanayake. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993, pp.213-294.

Esherick, Joseph. *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising*. Berkeley: University of California, 1988.

_____. "How the Qing became China." In *Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World*, ed. Joseph Esherick, Hasan Kayali, and Eric Van Young. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006, pp. 229-259.

Fang, Hao. *Fang Hao liushi zhiding gao* 方豪六十自定稿 vol. 1 (self selected articles of Fang Hao in celebration of 60th birthday). Taibei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1969.

Fairbank, John K. "The creation of the treaty system." In *The Cambridge History of China*, vol.10 part 1, the late Ch'ing 1800-1911, ed. idem. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp.213-263.

"Fashi Buerbulong wei zaichen jinsheng kedai jiaomin gejie shi zhi Yixin zhaohui" 法使布爾布隆為再陳晉省苛待教民各節事致奕訢照會 (Diplomatic note from French minster Bourboloun to Yixin reiterating the abuses of Christian subjects in Shanxi province). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, pp.210-212.

"Fashi Geshiqi wei guizhou dali lümin shi zhi Yixin zhaohui" 法使哥士耆為貴州大吏慮民事致奕訢照會 (Diplomatic note from the French minister Kleczkowski to Yixin for the harassment of the populace by the high-ranking officials of Guizhou). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, pp.233-235.

"Fashi Geshiqi wei Yunan zhaotong fu you ou jiaoshi shi zhi Yixin zhaohui" 法使哥士耆為雲南昭通府有毆教士事致奕訢照會 (Diplomatic note from French minister Kleczkowski to Yixin for the attack of missionaries in Zhaotong prefecture, Yunan). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, pp.249-251.

"Fashi Geshiqi wei chuli xianggan jiaoan shi zhi Yixin zhaohui" 法使哥士耆為處理湘贛教案事致奕訢照會(Diplomatic note from French minister Kleczkowski to Yixin for the settlement of Christian cases in Hunan and Jiangxi). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, pp.255-260.

"Fashi wei shanxi kedai jiaomin ji huan jiangzhou tianzhu tang shi zhi Yixin zhaohui," 法使為山西苛待教民及還絳州天主堂事致奕訢照會 (Diplomatic note from the French minister to Yixin for the abuse of Christian subjects in Shanxi and the return of the Catholic church in Jiangzhou). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, pp.206-209.

Faure, David. *Emperor and Ancestor: State and Lineage in South China*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007.

Fletcher, Joseph. "The Heyday of Ch'ing order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet." In *Cambridge History of China*, vol.10 part 1, the late Ch'ing 1800-1911, ed. J.K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 351-408.

Feuchtwang, Stephan. "School Temple and City God." In *Studies in Chinese Society*, ed. Arthur Wolf. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978, pp.103-130.

Fitzgerald, John. "Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism." In *Chinese Nationalism*, ed. Jonathan Unger. Armonk, NY: M.E Sharpe, 1996, pp.56-85.

_____. *Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution*. Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 1996.

_____. "'Lands of the East Awake!': Christian Motifs in Early Chinese Nationalism." In *Gong yu shi: xiandai zhongguo geti yu qunti chongjian* 公與私現代中國個體與群體重建, ed. Huang Kewu 王克武 and Zhang Zhejia 張哲嘉. Nankang: Academia Sinica, Institute of Modern History, 2000, pp.361-410.

Fitzgerald, Timothy. *Discourse on Civility and Barbarity: A Critical History of Religion and Related Categories*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Fogel, Joshua, ed. *The Teleology of the Modern Nation-state in Japan and China*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005.

Frodsham, J.D. *The First Chinese Embassy to the West: The Journals of Kuo Songt'ao, Liu Hsi-hung and Chang Te-yi*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1974.

Fung, Yu-lan. *A History of Chinese Philosophy: Part II The Period of Classical Learning* translated by Derk Bodde. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973.

Garon, Sheldon. "State and Religion in Imperial japan, 1912-1945." *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 12, no.2 (1986), pp.273-302.

Ge Zhaoguang 葛兆光. "Kongjiao, fojiao yi huo yejiao? 1900 nian qianhou zhongguo de xinli weiji yu zongjiao xingqu" 孔教、佛教抑或耶教？ ——1900 年前後中国的心理危机与宗教兴趣 (Confucianism, Buddhism or Christianity? China's psychological crisis and interest in religion around 1900). In *Zhongguo xiandai sixiang shi zhuanxing shidai* 中国近代思想史的转型时代, ed. Wang Fansen 王汎森. Liangjing chuban, 2007, pp.201-240.

Gerson, Jack J. *Horatio Nelson Lay and Sino-British Relations: 1858-1864*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972.

Giradot, Norman. *The Victorian Translation of China: James Legge and his Oriental Pilgrimage*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.

Gladney, Dru C. *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic*. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1996.

"Gong qinwang Yixin deng zou fashi suohuan nanbei ertang ji jiang laiwang zhaohui deng chenglan pian" 恭親王奕訢等奏法使索還南北二堂及將來往照會等呈覽片(Memorial by Prince Gong Yixin and others reporting the French minister's demand for the return of the North and South Cathedrals and submitting the relevant diplomatic correspondences for imperial perusal). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, pp.179-181.

"Gong qinwang Yixin deng zoubao fashi qingfu beitang bing qingjiang huzhao gaiyin deng shi pian 恭親王奕訢等奏報法使請附北堂並請將護照蓋印等事片(Memorial by Prince Gong Yixin and others reporting the French minister's request for the addition of the North Cathedral and stamping of the passports). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, pp.181-184.

"Gong qinwang Yixin deng zouwei chaming dongxi tianzhu tang zhi pian 恭親王奕訢等奏為查明東西天主堂址片 (Memorial by Prince Gong Yixin and others reporting on the finding of the sites of the East and West Cathedrals). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, pp.184-185.

"Gong qinwang Yixin deng zou wei qingzhi zaichi ge dufu chiping banli jiaomin shijian zhe" 恭親王奕訢等奏為請旨再飭各督撫照總理衙門所請持平辦理教民事件事摺 (Memorial by Prince Gong Yixin and others requesting an imperial edict to instruct the various governors and governors-general to follow the request of the Zongli Yamen to be impartial in the management of Christian cases). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, pp.214-215.

"Gong qinwang Yixin deng zou wei qingzhi jiang qianfu lingdiao tasheng mian zi shiduan zhe" 恭親王奕訢等奏為請旨將黔撫另調他省免滋事端摺 (Memorial by Prince Gong Yixin and others requesting for an imperial edict for the transfer of the governor of Yunan to other provinces to avoid further troubles). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, pp.245-247.

"Gong qinwang Yixin deng zou wei daidi yingmei yesu jiaoshi tiaochen zhongguo jiaowu zhe" 恭親王奕訢等奏為代遞英美耶穌教士條陳中國教務摺 (Memorial by Prince Gong and others submitting on behalf of British and American missionaries their petition on religious affairs). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.2, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996.

Gong, Gerrit W. *The Standard of Civilization in International Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.

Goossaert. Vincent. "Anatomie d'un discourse anticlerical: le Shenbao. 1872-1878." *Extrême–Orient, Extrême-Occident* 24 (2002): pp. 113-131.

_____. "Starved of Resources: Clerical Hunger and Enclosures in Nineteenth-Century China." *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 62, no.1 (Jun. 2002), pp.77-133.

_____. "1898: The Beginning of the End for Chinese Religion?" *The Journal of Asian Studies* 65, no.2 (May 2006), pp.307-336.

_____. "The Destruction of Immoral Temples in Qing China". Unpublished paper presented in the Chinese University of Hong Kong on 9 March 2007, pp.131-153.

_____. *The Taoists of Peking, 1800-1949: A Social History of Urban Clerics*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007.

_____. "Republican Church Engineering: The National Religious Associations in 1912 China." In *Chinese Religiosities: Afflictions of Modernity and State Formation*, ed. Mayfair Yang. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008, pp.209-232.

_____. "The local politics of festivals: Hangzhou, 1850-1950," *Daoism: Religion, History & Society* 5 (2013), pp.57-80.

Goossaert, Vincent and David Palmer. *The Religious Question in Modern China*. Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 2011.

Giles, Herbert A. *China and the Manchus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1912.

Griveller, Gianni. "China, the Holy See and France. The Giulianelli Mission to the Chinese Emperor and Its Aftermath (1885-1886)." In *Yihetuan yundong yu zhongguo jidu zongjiao* 義和團運動與中國基督宗教. Taibei: Furen daxue chubanshe, 2004, pp.43-79.

Grosse-Aschhoff, Angelus. *Negotiations Between Ch'i-ying and Lagrene, 1844-1846*. The Franciscan Institute and E Nauwelaerts, 1950.

"Guanji xian jina jiaomin yudan" 廣濟縣教民擊拿諭單 (Executive order on the arrest of Christians in Guanji County). In *Jiaowu jiaoan dang* 教务教案档 vol. 1. Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiu-yuan jindai-shi yanjiu-suo, 1974-81, p.1017.

Guo Shunping 郭舜平, ed. *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 (Missionary incidents in Late Qing) 5 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996.

Guo Songtao zougao 郭嵩燾奏稿 (Memorials by Guo Songtao). Yuelu shushe, 1983.

Guo, Songtao 郭嵩燾. *Lundun yu bari riji* 倫敦與巴黎日記 (Diary of London and Paris). Yueli shushe, 1984.

"Haijun cizhang zhi qujiu wenti" 海軍次長之去就問題 (On the resignation of the Vice-Minister of Navy). *Shenbao* 申報, 10 May 1915, p.6.

Hamada Masami 浜田 正美. "'Shio no gimu' to 'seisen' no aida de" 「塩の義務」と「聖戦」の間で (Between the "duty of salt" and "holy war"). *Toyoshi Kenkyu* 東洋史研究 (Research on Oriental history) 52, no.2 (1993), pp.112-143.

Han Hua 韓華. *Minchu Kongjiao yu guojiao yundong zhi yanjiu* 民初孔教國教運動之研究 (A study of the Confucian religion and state religion movements in early republican China). Beijing: Beijing tushu chubanshe, 2007.

Hansard's Parliamentary Debates 1868-1869 vol. CXCIV. London: Cornelius Buck, 1869.

Hardacre, Helen. *Shinto and the State, 1868-1988*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989.

_____. *Shinto: A History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Harrison, Henrietta. *The Making of the Republican Citizen: Political Ceremonies and Symbols in China, 1911-1929*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

_____. "Martyrs and Militarism in Early Republican China." *Twentieth-Century China* 23, no.2 (April 1998), pp. 41-70.

Hart, Robert. *These From the Land of Sinim: Essays on the Chinese Question*. London: Chapman and Hall, 1901.

_____. "Notes on Chinese Matters." In Frederick Wells Williams, *Anson Burlingame and the First Chinese Mission to Foreign Powers*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912, p.285.

Hevia, James L. *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995.

_____. "Lama, Emperors, and Rituals: Political Implications in Qing Imperial Ceremonies." *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 16, no.2 (Winter 1993), pp.243-278.

_____. *English lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003.

Hobsbawn, Eric and Terence Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Holyoake, George J. *The Principles of Secularism Illustrated*. London: Austin & Co., 1870.

Hostetler, Laura. *Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.

Howard, Richard. "K'ang Yu-wei (1858-1927): His Intellectual Background and Early Thought." In *Confucian Personalities*, ed. Arthur F. Wright and Denis C. Twitchett. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962, pp. 294-316.

Hsiao, Kung-ch'uan. *Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972.

_____. *A Modern China and a New World: K'ang Yu-Wei, Reformer and Utopian*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975.

Hsü, Immanuel. *China's Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phrase 1858-1860*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960.

Hu Jianhua 胡建華. "Lun Xianfeng chao de xianjiao zhengche" 論咸豐朝的限教政策 (The anti-Christian policy of the Xianfeng Court). In *Jindaishi yuanjiu* 近代史研究 vol.1 (1990), pp.66-83.

Hu Shi 胡適. "Zhencao wenti" 貞操問題 (The issue of women chastity). *La Jeunesse* 5, no.1 (July 1918), pp.5-14.

Huang Bolu 黃伯祿. *Zhengjiao Fengbao* 正教奉褒 (Imperial commendations on the orthodox teaching of Catholicism). Shanghai: Cimu tang, 1894.

Huang Chin-shing 黃進興. *Shengxian yu shengtu* 聖賢與聖徒 (Sages and Apostles). Taibei: Yunchen wenhua, 2001.

Huang Kewu 黃克武. "Minguo chunian Kongjiao wenti zhi zhenlun" 民國初年孔教問題之爭論 1913-1917 (The debate on the confucian religion question in early republican China 1913-1917). *Guoli Taiwan shifan daxue lishi xuebao* 國立台灣師範大學歷史學報 vol.12 (1984), pp.197-224.

_____. "*Zhongguo jindai sixiang zhong de mixin*" 中國近代思想中的迷信 (The discourse of superstition in modern Chinese thought) In *Higashi-ajia ni okeru shiteki kōryū* 東アジアにおける知的交流, ed. Suzuki Sadami 鈴木貞美 and Liu Jianhui 劉建輝. Kyoto: Kokusai Nihon bunka kenkyū sentā, 2013, pp.185-200.

Huang Tsunghsi. *Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince. Huang Tsung-Hsi's Ming-I-Tai-Fang-Lu*, trans. Wm. Theodore de Bary. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

Huang Xianian 黃夏年 ed. *Minguo fojiao qikan wenxian jicheng* 民国佛教期刊文献集成 (Collection of Republican era Buddhist journals and magazines) vol.1. Zhongguo shudian chubanshe, 2008.

Huang Zhangjian 黃彰健. *Kang Youwei wuxu zhen zouyi* 康有為戊戌真奏議 (The authentic 1898 reform memorials of Kang Youwei). Taibei: Institute of History and Philology, 1974.

Huangfu, Zhengzheng. "Internalizing the West: Qing envoys and ministers in Europe, 1866-1893." PhD Dissertation, UC San Diego, 2012.

Isomae, Juni'ichi. "Discursive Formations surrounding 'Religious Freedom'". In *Religion and Secularity: Transformation and Transfers of Religious Discourses in Europe and Asia*, ed. Marion Eggert and Lucien Hölscher. Leiden: Brill, 2013, pp.217-230.

Jiang Weiqiao 蔣維喬. "Lun jiaoyu yu zongjiao buneng hun er weiyi" 論教育與宗教不可混而為一 (On why education and religion must not be confused as one). *Shenbao* 申報, 17 November 1909, pp.2-3.

Jiang Zhushan 蔣竹山. "Tang Bin jinhui wutongshen: Qingchu zhengzhi jingying daji tongsu wenhua de gean" 湯斌禁毀五通神--清初政治菁英打擊通俗文化的個案 (Tang Bin destruction of the Wutong cult: a case study on the attack of popular culture by political elites in early Qing). *Xin Shixue* 新史學 6, no.2 (1995), pp.67-110.

"Jiangsu susong taidao Lin Gui zouwei ying yanfang waiguo ren liyong jiaomin deng tanting neidi gongshi pian" 江蘇蘇松太道麟桂奏為應嚴防外國人利用教民等探聽內地公事片 (Memorial by the Prefect of Shanghai Lin Gui requesting strict measures to prevent the use of Christians by foreign nations to gather information on government affairs in the interior). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, pp.113-114.

"Jiangxi xunfu Shen Baozhen wei shengcheng faguo jiaotang bei hui shi zhi junji chu ziwen" 江西巡撫沈葆禎為省城法國教堂被毀事致軍機處咨文 (Communication to the Grand Council on the destruction of the French church in the provincial capital from the governor of Jiangxi Shen Baozhen). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, pp.220-224

Jiaowu jiaoan dang 教务教案档 (Christian affairs and cases archive). Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiu-yuan jindai-shi yanjiu-suo, 1974-81.

"Jiaoyu bu shehui jiaoyu si guanli zongjiao zhi yijian shu" 教育部社會教育司管理宗教意見書 (proposal by the social education bureau of the ministry of education on the management of religion). *Shenbao* 申報, 22 June, 1912, p.1.

Jensen, Lionel. *Manufacturing Confucianism: Chinese Traditions and Universal Civilization*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997.

Ji, Zhe. "Introduction: le jiao recompose. L' éducation entre religion et politique dans la modernité chinoise." *Extrème-Orient, Extrème-Occident*, 33 (2011), pp.5-34.

Jiang Yihua 姜義華 and Zhang Ronghua 張榮華, eds. *Kang Youwei Quanji* 康有為全集 (Complete works of Kang Youwei) 12 vols. Beijing: Beijing renmin daxue chubanshe, 2007.

Johnston, Alastair Iain. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Johnson, Eunice. *Timothy Richard's Vision: Education and Reform in China, 1880-1910*. UK: Lutterworth Press, 2015.

Josephson, Jason Ananda. "When Buddhism Became a 'Religion': Religion and Superstition in the Writings of Inoue Enryō." *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 33, no.1 (2006), pp.143-168.

_____. *The Invention of Japanese Religions*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012.

_____. "The Invention of Religions in East Asia." In *Routledge Handbook of Religion in Asia*, ed. Bryan S. Turner and Oscar Salemink. New York: Routledge, 2015, pp.17-29.

Kang Youwei 康有為. *Lunyu zhu* 論語注 (The Analects annotated). 1902.

_____. "Zhonghua jiuguo lun" 中華救國論 (A Treatise on the salvation of the Chinese nation). *Buren zazhi* 不忍雜誌 vol.1 (June 1912), pp.1-58.

_____. "Kongjiaohui xu" 孔教會序 (Preface to the Confucian Association). *Kongjiao-hui zazhi* 孔教會雜誌 vol.1, no.2 (March 1913), pp.1-14.

_____. 中國顛危誤在全法歐美而盡國粹說(China's crisis is a result of total emulation of the West and abandonment of national essence). *Buren zazhi* 不忍雜誌 vols.6 and 7 (July and August 1913), pp.1-42.

_____. "Zhongguo huanhun lun" 中國還魂論 (On resurrecting the soul of China). *Buren zazhi* 不忍雜誌 vol.8 (November 1913), pp.1-8.

_____. “Chronological Autobiography of Kang Youwei.” In *Kang Yu-wei: A Biography and A Symposium*, ed. Lo Jung Pang. Tuscon: The University of Arizona Press, 1967, pp.17-174.

_____. “Shanghai qiangxue hui zhangcheng” 上海強學會章程 (Charter of the Shanghai Self-strengthening Study Society). In *Kang Youwei zhenglu ji shangpian* 康有為政論集上篇, ed. Tang Zhijun 湯志鈞. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1981, pp.173-179.

_____. “Liangguang guangren tang shengxue hui yuanqi” 兩粵廣仁善堂聖學會緣起 (Origins of the Charity Hall for the Promulgation of Humanness and the Sage Learning Society in Guangdong and Guangxi). In *Kang Youwei zhenglu ji shangpian* 康有為政論集上篇, ed. Tang Zhijun 湯志鈞. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1981, pp.187-190.

_____. “Xujun Gonghe guo lun” 虛君共國和論 (A treatise on constitutional monarchy). In *Kang Youwei zhenglu ji* vol.2 康有為政論集下篇, ed. Tang Zhijun 湯志鈞. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1981, pp.677-678.

_____. “Shili gongfa quanshu” 實理公法全書 (A complete text on substantive truths and universal principles). In *Kang Youwei Quanji* 康有為全集 (Complete works of Kang Youwei) vol.1, ed. Jiang Yihua 姜義華 and Zhang Ronghua 張榮華. Beijing: Beijing renmin daxue chubanshe, 2007, pp.147-160.

_____. “Yu Zhu Yixin lunxue shudu” 與朱一心論學書牘 (Exchanges with Zhu Yixin on scholarship). In *Kang Youwei Quanji* 康有為全集 (Complete works of Kang Youwei) vol.1, ed. Jiang Yihua 姜義華 and Zhang Ronghua 張榮華. Beijing: Beijing renmin daxue chubanshe, 2007, pp.314-336.

_____. “Riben shumu zhi” 日本書目志 (A Bibliography of Japanese Books). In *Kang Youwei Quanji* 康有為全集 (Complete works of Kang Youwei) vol.3, ed. Jiang Yihua 姜義華 and Zhang Ronghua 張榮華. Beijing: Beijing renmin daxue chubanshe, 2007, pp.261-566.

_____. “Shang Qingdi dier shu” 上清帝第二書 (Second Memorial to the Qing Emperor) in Kong Xiangji ed. *Kang Youwei bianfa zouzhang jikao* 康有為變法奏章輯考 (A Study of Kang Youwei Reform Memorials), ed. Kong Xiangji 孔祥吉. Beijing: Beijing Tushuguan chubanshe, 2008, pp.19-47.

_____. “Shang Qingdi dier shu” 上清帝第三書 (Third Memorial to the Qing Emperor). In *Kang Youwei bianfa zouzhang jikao* 康有為變法奏章輯考 (A Study of Kang Youwei Reform Memorials), ed. Kong Xiangji 孔祥吉. Beijing: Beijing Tushuguan chubanshe, 2008, pp.48-73.

_____. “Zhongyong zhu”中庸注 (Doctrine of the Mean Annotated). In *Kang Youwei Quanji* 康有為全集 (Complete works of Kang Youwei) vol.5, ed. Jiang Yihua 姜義華 and Zhang Ronghua 張榮華. Beijing: Beijing renmin daxue chubanshe, 2007, pp.367-392.

"Jiaomen zhensheng" 教門爭勝 (Sectarian conflict). *Shenbao* 申報, 11 September 1872, p.3.

"Jiaoyu bu pi" 教育部批 (Approval of Ministry of Education). *Kongjiao-hui zazhi* 孔教會雜誌 vol.1, no.8 (September 1913), p.2.

"Jiaoyu bu pi" 教育部批 and "neiwu bu pi" 內務部批 (Approvals of the Ministries of Education and Interior). In *Kongjiao-hui shiliao* 孔教會史料, ed. Xia Liangcai 夏良才 et al. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974, pp.28-29.

Katz, Paul R. *Religion in China & its Modern Fate*. Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis University Press, 2014.

Ketalaar, James. "Strategic Occidentalism: Meiji Buddhists at the World's Parliament of Religions." *Buddhist-Christian Studies* 11 (1991), pp.37-56.

Keyes, Charles F., Laurel Kendall, and Helen Hardacre, eds. *Asian Vision of Authority: Religion and the Modern States of East and Southeast Asia*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1994.

Kim, Hodong. *Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-1877*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004.

Kirby, William. "Traditions of Centrality." In *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, ed. Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, pp.13-29.

Kong Xiangji 孔祥吉. *Kang Youwei bianfa zouzhang jikao* 康有為變法奏章輯考 (A study of Kang Youwei's reform memorials). Beijing: Beijing Tushuguan chubanshe, 2008.

Kongshe zazhi 孔社雜誌 (The Confucian Society magazine). Shanghai, 1913.

Kopf, Gereon. "The 'Modern' Buddhism of Inoue Enryo." *International Inoue Enryo Research* 1 (2013), pp.25-36.

Krämer, Hans Martin. "How 'Religion' Came to Be Translated as Shūkyō: Shimaji Mokurai and the Appropriation of Religion in Early Meiji Japan." *Japan Review* 25 (2013), pp. 89-111.

Ku, Wei-ying. "The Shaping of the Late Qing's Policy Toward Christianity." In *Historiography of the Chinese Catholic Church*, ed. Jeroom Heyndrickx. Leuven: Ferdinand Verbiest Foundation, K.U. Leuven, 1994, pp.105-124.

Kuo, Ya-pei. "Redeploying Confucius: The Imperial State Dreams of the Nation, 1902-1911." In *Chinese Religiosities: Afflictions of Modernity and State Formation*, ed. Mayfair Yang. Berkeley, LA: University of California Press, 2008, pp.65-86.

_____. "The Emperor and the People in One Body" *The Worship of Confucius and Ritual Planning in the Xinzheng Reforms, 1902-1911*." *Modern China* 35, no.2 (March 2009), pp.135-154.

_____. "Before the Term: 'Religion' as China's Cultural Other." *Comparativ – Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung* 20, no.2 (2010), pp.98-113.

_____. "'Christian Civilization' and the Confucian Church: The Origins of Secularist Politics in Modern China." *Past & Present* 218 (Feb.2013), pp.235-264.

Kwok, D.W.K. *Scientism in Chinese Thought*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965.

Kwong, Luke S. K. *A Mosaic of The Hundred Days: Personalities, Politics, and Ideas of 1898*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 1984.

Laaman, Lars Peter. *Christian Heretics in Late Imperial China: Christian Inculturation and State Control, 1720-1850*. London: Routledge, 2006.

Lagerway, John. *China: A Religious State*. Hong Kong. University of Hong Kong Press, 2010.

Lam, Tong. *Passion for Facts: Social Surveys and the Construction of the Chinese Nation-state, 1900-1949*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011.

Lamanov, Alexander. "Russian Orthodox Mission." In *Handbook of Christianity* vol. 2 1800-Present, ed. R.G. Tiedemann. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010: pp.193-201.

Lee, En-Han. "China's Response to the Full-fledged Christian Challenge, 1800-1900: An Analysis of Chinese Anti-Christian Thought After the Mid-19th Century." *Asia Munhwa* 4 (1988), pp.69-91.

Levenson, Joseph. *Confucian China and its Modern Fate: The Problem of Intellectual Continuity.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958.

Leonard, Jane Kate. *Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime World*. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1984.

"Li cizhang quzhi zhi yinguo" 李次長去職之因果 (Causes and consequences of the dismissal of Vice-Minister Li). *Shenbao* 申報, 26 May 1915, p.6.

Li Junling 李俊領. "Zhongguo Jindai Guojiao de lishi kaocha"中國近代的歷史考察 (A historical survey of the modern Chinese state). Shandong Normal University, M.A. dissertation, 2005.

Li Junling 李俊領 and Yin Dingquan 殷定泉. "Kangzhan shiqi de huangling jisi dianli" 抗戰時期的黃陵祭祀典禮 (Sacrificial ritual at the Yellow Emperor mausoleum during the anti-Japanese war). *Journal of Yangzhou University* (Humanities & Social Sciences) 13, no.5 (Sept. 2009), pp.85-90.

Li, Sanpao. "K'ang Yu-wei's Iconoclasm: Interpretation and Translation of His Earliest Writings, 1884-1887." PhD dissertation, University of California-Davis, 1978.

"Li Shipin zhi Yan Fu shu" 李世品致嚴復書 (Li Shipin's letter to Yan Fu). In *Kongjiao-hui shiliao* 孔教會史料, ed. Xia Liangcai 夏良才 et al. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974, p.36.

Lian Xi. "Western Missions and Chinese Nationalist Dream." *East Asian History* 32/33 (2006-7), pp.199-216.

Liang, Qichao 梁啟超. "Bianfa tongyi" 變法通議 (A general discourse of reforms). In *Yinbing shi wenji dianxiao* 飲冰室文集點校 vol.1. Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001, pp.18-31.

_____. "Lun zhina zongjiao gaige" 論支那宗教改革 (The religious reformation of China). In *Yinbing shi wenji dianxiao* 飲冰室文集點校 vol.3. Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001, pp.1334-1338.

_____. "Lun fojiao yu qunzhi zhi guanxi" 論佛教與群治之關係 (The relationship between Buddhism and nation-building). In *Yinbing shi wenji dianxiao* 飲冰室文集點校 vol.3. Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001, pp.1350-1354.

_____. “lun zongjiao jiao yu zhexue jia zhi changduan deshi” 論宗教家與哲學家之長短得失 (The strengths and weaknesses of the religionist and philosopher). In *Liang Qichao quanji* 梁啟超全集 vol.3. Beijing: Beijing renmin daxue chubanshe, 1999, pp.762-764.

_____. “Baojiao fei suoyi zunkong lun” 保教非所以尊孔論 (Protecting the Confucian religion is no way to honor Confucius). In *Yinbing shi wenji dianxiao* 飲冰室文集點校 vol. 3. Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001, pp.1343-1349.

_____. “Nanhai Kang xianshen zhuan” 南海康先生傳 (Biography of Mr. Kang from Nanhai), in *Yinbing shi wenji dianxiao* 飲冰室文集點校 vol.3. Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001, pp.1942-1961.

Lin Lezhi 林樂知 (Young John Allen). “Lun rujiao yu jidujiao zhifen” 論儒教與基督教之分 (A discussion of the difference between Confucianism and Christianity). *Wanguo Gongbao* 萬國公報, issue 182 (1902).

Lipman, Jonathan. *Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China*. U.S.: University of Washington Press, 1994.

Liti motai 李提摩太 (Timothy Richard). “Jiushi jiao yi” 救世教益 (Benefits of the world redemption teaching). In *Wanguo gongbao wenxuan* 萬國公報文選, ed. Li Tiangang 李天綱. HK: Sanlian shudian, 1998, pp. 108-123.

Litzinger, Charles. “Temple Community and Village Cultural Integration in North China: Evidence from “Sectarian Cases” (chiao-an) in Chihli, 1860-1895.” PhD Dissertation, University of California- Davis, 1983.

_____. “Rural Religion and Village Organization in North China: The Catholic Challenge in the Late Nineteenth Century.” In *Christianity in China from the Eighteenth Century to Present*, ed. Daniel Bays. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996, pp.41-52.

Liu, James T.C. “How Did a Neo-Confucian School Become the State Orthodoxy?” *Philosophy East and West* 23, no.4 (Oct. 1973), pp.483-505.

Liu, Lydia. *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity-China, 1900-1937*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995.

_____. *The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in World Making*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004.

Liu, Xun. *Daoist Modern: Innovation, Lay Practice, and the Community of Inner Alchemy in Republican Shanghai*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009.

Liu, Yi. “Confucianism, Christianity, and Religious Freedom: Debates in Transformation Period of Modern China (1900-1920s).” In *Confucianism and Spiritual Traditions in Modern China and Beyond*, ed. Yang Fenggang and Joseph Tamney. Leiden: Brill, 2012, pp.247-276.

Lovell, Julia. *The Opium War, Drugs, Dream and Making of China*. London: Picador-Macmillan, 2011.

Lu Naixiang 陸乃翔 and Lu Dunkui 陸敦騤. *Nanhai Kang xianshen shangpian* 南海康先生傳 (上篇) (Biography of Kang Youwei, Part 1). In *Zhuiyi Kang Youwei* 追憶康有為, ed. Xia Xiaohong 夏曉虹. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing, 2009, pp.30-78.

Lü Shih-chiang 呂實強. *Zhongguo guanshen fanjiao de yuanyin, 1860-1874* 中國官紳反教的原因 (The origins of the anti-Christian movement of the Chinese official-gentry class, 1860-1874). Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiu-yuan, jindai-shi yanjiu-suo, 1966.

"Lun Zhongguo yi yinggeng gai huwei xijiao zhiyue" 論中國議將更改護衛西教之約 (China should negotiate for the change in the treaty term for the protection of the Western teaching). *Shenbao* 申報, 8 October 1874, p.1.

"Luoma dianbao" 羅馬電報 (News of Rome). *Shenbao* 申報, 15 July 1872, pp.3-4.

Lutz, Jessie Gregory. *Christian Missions in China; Evangelist of What?* Boston, D.C.: Heath & Co., 1965.

_____.*Chinese politics and Christian missions: the anti-Christian movements of 1920-28*. Notre Dame, Indianna: Cross Cultural Publications, Inc., 1988.

Madsen, Richard. "Secularism, Religious Change and Social Conflict in Asia." In *Rethinking Secularism*, ed. Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergenmeyer, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp.248-269.

Makeham, John. *Lost Soul: "Confucianism" in Contemporary Chinese Academic Discourse*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard-Yenching Institute Monographs 64, 2008.

Martin, M.A.P. *A Cycle of Cathay*. Second Edition. New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1897.

Masini, Federico. *The Formation of Modern Chinese Lexicon and its Evolution toward a National Language: The Period from 1840 to 1898*. Berkeley: Project on Linguistic Analysis: University of California, 1993.

Matten, Marc Andre. "The Worship of General Yue Fei and His Problematic Creation as a National Hero in Twentieth Century China." *Frontiers of History in China* 6, no.1 (March 2011), pp.64-96.

Maxey, Trent. *"The Greatest Problem": Religion and State Formation in Meiji Japan.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014.

Menegon, Eugenio. *Ancestors, Virgins, and Friars: Christianity as a Local Religion in Late Imperial China.* Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009.

_____. "Yongzheng's Conundrum. The Emperor on Christianity, Religions, and Heterodoxy." In *Rooted in Hope: China-Religion-Christianity* vol.1, ed. Barbara Hoster, Dirk Kuhlman, and Zbigniew Wesolowski. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon New York: Routledge, 2017, pp.311-335.

Metzger, Thomas A. *Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's Evolving Political Culture*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.

Millward, James A., *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998.

Millward, James, Ruth W. Dunnell, Mark C. Elliott, and Philippe Foret, eds. *New Qing Imperial History*: *The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengde*. New York: Routledge, 2004.

"Ministerial Changes in Peking." *The North China Herald*, 22 May 1915, p.564.

Moges, M. *Recollection of Baron Gros' Embassy to China and Japan, 1857-58*. London and Glasgow: Richard Griffith & Co., 1860.

Morse, H.B. *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*. New York: Paragon Book, 1900.

Mosca, Matthew. *From Frontier Policy to Foreign: The Question of India and the Transformation of Geopolitics in Qing China*. Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 2013.

Mungello, David. *The Catholic Invasion of China: Remaking of Chinese Christianity*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015.

Munro, Donald. "Introduction." In *Constructing China: The Interaction of Culture and Economics*, ed. Kenneth Lieberthal, Shuen-fen Lin, and Ernest Young. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1997.

Murakami, Shigeyoshi. *State Shinto*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1970.

Murata, Yujiro. "Dynasty, State, and Society: The Case of Modern China." In *Imagining the People: The Chinese Intellectuals and the Concept of Citizenship, 1890-1920*, ed. Joshua A. Fogel and Peter G. Zarrow. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997, pp.113-141.

Naquin, Susan. *Millenarian Uprising in China: The Eight Trigram Rebellion of 1813*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.

_____. *Shantung Rebellion: The Wang Lun Uprising of 1774*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.

Nedostup, Rebecca. "Civic Faith and Hybrid Ritual in Nationalist China." In *Converting Cultures: Religion and Ideology, and Transformations of Modernity*, ed. Dennis Washburn and Kevin Reinhart. Leiden: Brill, 2007, pp.27-56.

_____. "Ritual Competition and the Modernizing Nation-state." In *Chinese Religiosities: Afflictions of Modernity and State Formation*, ed. Mayfair Yang. Berkeley, LA: University of California Press, 2008, pp.87-112.

_____. *Superstitious Regime: Religion and the Politics of Chinese Modernity*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Center, 2009.

Neskar, Ellen. "Shrines to Local Former Worthies." In *Religions of China in Practice*, ed. Donald Lopez Jr. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1996, pp.293-305.

Newby, Laura J. *The Empire and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand, 1760-1860*. Leiden: Brill, 2006.

Ng, Tze Ming Peter. "Timothy Richard: Christian Attitudes towards Other Religions and Cultures." *Studies in World Christianity* 14, no.1 (2008), pp.73-92.

Oidtmann, Max. *Forging the Golden Urn: The Qing Empire and Politics of Reincarnation in Tibet*. New York: Columbia University, 2018.

Oldstone-Moore, Jennifer Lee. "The New Life Movement of Nationalist China: Confucianism, State Authority, and Moral Transformation." PhD thesis, Chicago Divinity School, 2000.

Overmyer, Daniel. *Folk Buddhist Religion: Dissenting Sects in Late Traditional China.* Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1976.

Ownby, David. "Recent Chinese Scholarship on the History of Redemptive Societies." *Chinese Studies in History* 44, nos. 1–2 (Winter 2010–2011), pp.3-9.

Paddison, Joshua. *American Heathens: Religion, Race, and Reconstruction in California*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2012.

Pagden, Anthony. "Dispossessing the barbarian: the language of Spanish Thomism and the debate over the property rights of American Indians." *The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe*, ed. idem. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp.79-98.

Palmer, David. "Heretical Doctrines, Reactionary Secret Societies, Evil Cults: Labelling Heterodoxy in Twentieth-Century China." *Chinese Religiosities: Afflictions of Modernity and State Formation*, ed. Mayfair Yang. Berkeley, L.A.: University of California Press, *2008*, pp.113-134.

_____. *Qigong Fever: Body, Science, and Utopia in China*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

_____. "The Body: Health, Nation and Transcendence." In *Chinese Religious Life*, ed. David Palmer, Glenn Shive, and Phillip Wickeri. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp.88-106.

_____. "John Lagerwey, China: A Religious State." *China Perspectives* 3 (2012), pp.86-87.

Paramore, Kiri. *Ideology and Christianity in Japan*. London and New York: Routledge, 2009.

Pfister, Lauren. "Rethinking Mission in China: James Hudson Taylor and Timothy Richard." In *The Imperial Horizons of British Protestant Missions. 1880-1914*, ed. Andrew Porter. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2003, pp.183-212.

_____. "Attitudes towards Chinese culture(s): 1860-1900." In *Handbook of Christianity in China Volume Two: 1800 to the Present*, ed. R.G.Tiedemann. Leiden: Brill, 2010, pp.404-416.

Peng, Kwang-yu. "Confucianism." In *The World's Parliament of Religions,* 1893 vol.1, ed. John Henry Barrow. Chicago & C, 1893, pp.374-439.

Peng Guangyu 彭光譽, *Shuojiao* 說教 (A discourse of jiao). Zongli Yamen, 1896.

Perdue, Peter C. "Comparing Empires: Manchu Colonialism." *International Review of History* 20, no.2 (Jun. 1998), pp.255-262.

_____. *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Asia*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005.

_____. “Where Do Incorrect Political Ideas Come From?” In *The Teleology of the Modern Nation-state in Japan and China*, ed. Joshua Fogel. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005, pp.174-200.

Pittman, Don A. *Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism: Taixu’s Reform.* Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001.

Poon, Shuk-Wah. *Negotiating Religion in Modern China: State and Common People in Guangzhou, 1900-1937*. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2011.

Polachek, James. *Inner Opium War*. Cambridge, Mass..: Harvard University Asia Center, 1992.

“Puguo quzu da zhujiao” 普國驅逐大主教 (Prussia exile of Catholic Archbishops). *Shenbao* 申報, 12 September 1972, p.2.

Qu Haiyuan 瞿海源. “Zhonghua minguo youguan zongjiao faling ji falü caoan huibian” 中華民國有關宗教法令及法律草案彙編 (Collection of laws and draft legislations regarding religion in the Republic of China). In *Minzu-xue yanjiu suo ziliao huibian* 民族學研究所資料彙編 no.2 (1990), pp.113-139.

Qu Wenshen 屈文生. “*Zaoqi Zhongying tiaoyue de fanyi wenti*” 早期中英條約的翻譯問題 (The issue of translation for early Sino-British treaty). *Lishi yanjiu* 歷史研究 vol.6 (2013), pp. 86-101.

Rawlinson, Frank. “Modern Revolution and Religion in China.” *International Review of Mission* 18, no.2 (April 1929), pp.166-178.

Reinders, Eric. *Borrowed Gods and Foreign Bodies: Christian Missionaries Imagine Chinese Religion*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.

Renan, Ernest. “What is a Nation.” In *Becoming National: A Reader*, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp.42-56.

Report of the Missionary Conference Held in Shanghai, May 1890. Shanghai: North China Herald Office, 1890.

Reynolds, Douglas. *China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993.

Richard, Timothy. “The Relation of Christian Mission to the Chinese Government.” In *Records of the General Conference of Protestant Missionaries of China held at Shanghai, May 7-20, 1890*. Shanghai: American Presbyterian Press, 1890, pp.401-414.

_____. “Historical Evidences of Christianity for China.” *The Chinese Recorder* (1 Apr. 1890-1 Nov.1891).

_____. *Conversion by the Million: Being Biographies and Articles by Timothy Richard* vol.2. Shanghai: Christian Literature Society, 1907.

_____. *Forty-five Years in China: Reminiscenses*. New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1916.

Richard, Timothy, and John Wherry. *Yung hsi chiao an tse* 永息教案策 (A permanent solution to Christian cases). Kuangxue-hui, 1898.

Rowe, William T. “Ancestral Rites and Political Authority in Late Imperial China: Chen Hongmou in Jiangxi.”*Modern China* 24, no.4 (Oct. 1998), pp.378-407.

_____. *Saving the World: Chen Hongmou and Elite Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century China*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.

Said, Edward. *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.

Schmitt, Carl. *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* translated by Benjamin Schwab. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1985.

Schneewind, Sarah. “Beyond Flattery: Legitimating Political Participation in a Ming Living Shrine.” *Journal of Asian Studies* 72, no.2 (May 2013), pp.345-366.

Scott, Gregory Adam. “Timothy Richard, World Religion, and Reading Christianity in Buddhist Garb,” *Social Sciences and Missions* 25 (2012), pp.53-75.

Seiwert, Hubert. *Popular Religious Movements and Heterodox Sects in Chinese History*. Leiden: Brill, 2003.

Shen Sung-chiao 沈　松　僑. “Wo yi wo xue jian xuanyuan: huangdi shenhua yu wan Qing de guozu jian guo” 我以我血薦軒轅--黃帝神話與晚清的國族建構 (Using my blood to glorify the Yellow Emperor- the myth of the Yellow Emperor and the construction of the Chinese nation in late Qing). *Taiwan shehui yanjiu suo jikan* 台灣社會研究季刊 28 (Dec.1998), pp.1-77.

“Shizong Huangdi Shangyu Neige”世宗皇帝上諭內閣 (Imperial edicts of the Yongzheng emperor to the Grand Secretariat). In *Siku Quanshu, Shibu* 四庫全書　史部 (Complete library of the four treasuries, Historiography), ed. Shao Jinhan 邵晉涵. Reprint. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1965.

“Shu Shaanxi xunfu Tan Tingxiang qing minchi defang guan liuxin fangcha jiaomin hu pian” 署陝西巡撫譚廷襄奏請密飭地方官留心防察教民戶片(Memorial from the governor of Shaanxi Tan Tingxiang requesting a secret edict to instruct local officials to carefully guard against and investigate Christian households). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, p.179.

“Shu Shaanxi xunfu Tan Tingxiang zoubao panhuo yi jiaoshi Gong Shanlin qingxing bing ni jingyu jieyue zhe” 署陝西巡撫譚廷襄奏報盤獲意教士龔山林情形並擬經豫解粵摺 (Memorial from the governor of Shaanxi Tan Tingxiang reporting the capture and interrogation of Italian missionary Gong Shanlin, and the plan to escort him to Canton through Henan). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, pp.177-178

“Sikong Banfa” 祀孔辦法 (Proposal on sacrifice to Confucius). In *Zhonghua Minguo Dangan Shiliao Huibian* 中華民國檔案史料彙編 vol.5, no.2 wenhua. Jiangsu chubanshe, 1997, pp.530-531.

Snodgrass, Judith. *Presenting Japanese Buddhism to the West: Orientalism, Occidentalism and the Columbian Exposition*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003.

Soothill, W.E. *The Three Religions of China*. London, New York and Toronto: Hodder & Stoughton, 1913.

Staggs, Kathleen M. "'Defend the Nation and Love the Truth'. Inoue Enryō and the Revival of Meiji Buddhism." *Monumenta Nipponica* 38, no.3 (Autumn, 1983), pp.251-281.

Standaert, Nicolas. "The Jesuits did NOT manufacture 'Confucianism'" in *East Asian Science, Technology and Medicine* 16 (1999), pp.115-132.

Steiger, G. Nye. "China's Attempt to Absorbe Christianity: The Decree of March 15, 1899," *T'oung Pao*, Second Series 24, no. 2/3 (1925 - 1926), pp.215-246.

Stumpf, Christopher A. *The Grotian Theology of International Law*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2006.

Sweeten, Alan Richard. *Christianity in Rural China: Conflict and Accommodation in Jiangxi Province, 1860 -1900*. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 2001.

Sun Zhongshan quanji 孫中山全集 (A complete collection of Sun Yatsen sources) vol. 2. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981.

Sutton, Donald. "From Credulity to Scorn: Confucians Confront the Spirit Mediums in Late Imperial China." *Late Imperial China* 21, no.2 (2000), pp.1-39.

"Shengdanjie an" 聖誕節案 (Proposal legislation for the celebration of the sage's birthday). *Jingshi Bao* 經世報 vol.1, no.3 (March 1922), pp.1-11.

Tang Zhijun 湯志鈞, ed. *Kang Youwei zhenglu ji* 康有為政論集 (Political writings of Kang Youwei) 2 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1981.

Tarocco, Francesca. "The Making of 'Religion' in Modern China." In *Religion, Language and Power*, ed. Nile Green and Mary Searle-Chatterjee. New York: Routledge, 2009, pp.42-56.

_____. *The Cultural Practices of Modern Chinese Buddhism: Attuning the Dharma*. New York: Routledge, 2007.

Tay, Wei Leong. "Kang Youwei, the Martin Luther of Confucianism and his vision of Confucian Modernity and Nation." In *Secularization, Religion, and State*, ed. Haneda Masashi. Tokyo: UTCP, 2010, pp.97-109.

Taylor, Charles. *A Secular Age*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007.

Taylor, Rodney. *The Religious Dimensions of Confucianism*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990.

Teng, Emma Jinhua. *Taiwan's Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683-1895*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004.

Teng, Ssu Yu. *Chang Hsi and the Nanking Treaty, 1842.* Chicago, Ill.: Chicago University Press, 1944.

Ter Haar, Barend. *The White Lotus Teachings in Chinese Religious History.* Leiden: Brill, 1992.

_____. "China's Inner Demons: The Political Impact of the Demonological Paradigm." *China Information* 11, nos. 2/3(Autumn/Winter 1996), pp.54-85.

_____. *Telling Stories: Witchcraft and Scapegoating in Chinese History*. Leiden: Brill, 2006.

_____. *Guan Yu: The Religious Afterlife of a Failed Hero*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Thal, Sarah. "A Religion that was not a Religion: The Creation of Modern Shinto in Nineteenth Century Japan." In *The Invention of Religion: Rethinking Belief in Politics and History*, ed. Derek Peterson and Darren Walhof. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2002, pp.100-114.

Theiss, Janet M. *Disgraceful Matters: The Politics of Chastity in Eighteenth Century China.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.

Thompson, Roger R. "Twilight of the Gods in the Countryside: Christians, Confucians, and the Modernizing State, 1861-1911." In *Christianity in China from the Eighteenth Century to the Present*, ed. Daniel Bays. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996, pp.53-72.

Tsou, Mingteh. "Christian Missionary as Confucian Intellectual: Gilbert Reid (1857-1927) and the Reform Movement in the Late Qing." In *Christianity in China: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present*, ed. Daniel Bays. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996, pp.73-90.

Tu, Weiming. *Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Confucian Religiousness*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989.

Tu, Weiming, and Mary Evelyn Tucker, eds. *Confucian Spirituality* vol.1. New York: Herder and Herder, 2003.

Tuttle, Gray. *Tibetan Buddhists in the making of Modern China*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

Van der Veer, Peter. *Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.

_____. *Conversion to Modernities: The Globalization of Christianity*. New York: Routledge, 1996.

_____. *Imperial Encounters: Religion and Modernity in Britain and India*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2001.

_____. "Smashing Temples, Burn Books: Comparing Secularist Projects in India and China." In *Rethinking Secularism*, ed. Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan van Antwerpen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp.270-281.

Van der Veer, Peter, and Hartmut Lehmann, eds. *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Van Rooden, Peter. "Nineteenth-Century Representations of Missionary Conversion and the Transformation of Western Christianity." In *Conversion to Modernities: The Globalization of Christianity*, ed. Peter van der Veer. New York and London: Routledge, 1996, pp.65-88.

Visnawathan, Gauri. *Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity and Belief*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998.

"Waiwubu zouwei zunyi yushi Jiang Shixing guanyu minjiao xiangan banfa pian" 外務部奏為遵議御史蔣式瑆奏陳妥籌民教相安辦法片 (Memorial from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitting

its recommendations on censor Jiang Shixing's proposal on the resolution of conflicts between Christians and non-Christians). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.3, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, pp.265-267.

Wakeman, Frederic, Jr. *Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839-1861*. Berkeley: University of California, 1966.

_____. "The Canton Trade and The Opium War." In *Chinese History of China*, vol.10 part 1, the late Ch'ing 1800-1911, ed. J.K. Fairbank. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp.163-212.

Waley, Arthur. *Opium War through Chinese Eyes*. London and New York: Routledge, 2006.

Waley-Cohen, Joanna. "Religion, War, and Empire-Building in Eighteenth-Century China." *International Review of History* 20, no.2 (Jun. 1998), pp.336-352.

Wang Bixie 王炳燮. "Zhengjiao" 正教 (On orthodoxy) in *Wu ziqi shi wenji* 毋自欺室文集. Reprinted in *Jindai zhongguo shiliao congkan* 中國近代史叢刊, ed. Shen Yunlong 沈雲龍. Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1966.

_____. "Shang xiekui woliangfeng zhongtang shu" 上協揆倭良峰中堂書 (A letter to minister Woren). In *Fan yangjiao shuwen jietie xuan* 反洋教書文揭帖選, ed. Wang Minglun 王明倫. Qilu shushe, 1984, pp.23-29.

Wang, Dong. *China's Unequal Treaty: Narrating National History.* Lanham, M.D: Lexington, 2005.

Wang, Liping. "Creating a National Symbol: The Sun Yat-sen Memorial in Nanjing." *Republican China* 21, no.2 (April 1996), pp.23-63.

Wang Lixin 王立新. *Meiguo chuanjiaoshi dui zhonggong de xiandai-hua: jindai jidu xinjiao chuanjiao-shi zaihua shehui wenhua he jiaoyu yundong yanjiu* 美國傳教士對中國的近代化： 基督新教在華社會文化和教育運動研究 (American missionaries and China's modernization: a study of Protestant socio-cultural and education activities in China). Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1997.

Wang Minglun 王明倫, ed. *Fan yangjiao shuwen jietie xuan* 反洋教書文揭帖選. Jinan: Qilu shuju, 1984

"Wang zhi yanci"汪之演辭 (Wang Jingwei's Speech), *Ta Kung Pao* (L' Impartial), 28 September 1934. In *Zhonghua Minguo Dangan Shiliao Huibian* vol. 5 (2) (Jiangsu chubanshe, 1997), p.546.

Watson, James. "Rites or Beliefs? The Construction of a Unified Culture in Late Imperial China." In *China's Quest for National Identity*, ed. Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, pp.80-103.

Watters, Thomas. "A Discourse of Heresy by A Chinese Emperor." *The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal* (Feb. 1, 1872), pp.225-226.

Welch, Holmes. *The Buddhist Revival in China*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968.

Weller, Robert P. “Global Religious Changes and Civil Life in Two Chinese Societies: A Comparison of Jiangsu and Taiwan.” *The Review of Faith & International Affairs* 13, no.2 (2015), pp.13-24.

Wehrle, Edmund. *Britain, China, and Anti-Missionary Riots 1891-1900*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966.

Wei Yuan 魏源. *Haiguo Tuzhi* 海國圖誌 (A treatise on the maritime kingdoms). Reprint. Hunan: Yueli Shushe, 1998.

_____. *Shengwu ji* 聖武記 (Record of the grand military achievements of the Qing dynasty). Reprint. Taibei: Shijie Shuju, 1962.

Wolf, Arthur P. “Gods, Ghosts and Ancestors.” In *Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society*, ed. idem. Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 1974, pp.131-182.

Wong, John. “The Building of an Informal British Empire in China in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century.” *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 59, no.2 (1977), pp.472-485.

_____.*Deadly Dreams: Opium, Imperialism, and the Arrow War (1856-1860) in China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Wong, Lawrence Wang-Chi. “Translators and Interpreters During the Opium War between China and Britain (1839-1842).” In *Translating and Interpreting Conflict*, ed. Myriam Salama-Carr. Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2007, pp.41-57.

Williams, Frederick Wells. *Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams, L.L.D.: Missionary, Diplomatist, Sinologue*. New York and London: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1889.

Williams, S. Wells. *The Middle Kingdom* vol.1. New York: John Wiley, 1853.

_____. “The Toleration Clause in the Treaties.” *The Chinese Recorder* (May 1879), pp.223-227.

Wills Jr., John E. “Ching Relations with the Dutch, 1662-1669.” In *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations*, ed. J.K. Fairbank. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968, pp.225-256.

_____.*China and Maritime Europe, 1500-1800*: *Trade, Settlement, Diplomacy and Mission*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Wong Youngtsu (Wang Rongzu 汪榮祖). *Kang Youwei lun* 康有為論 (A study of Kang Youwei). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2006.

Woodside, Alexander. *Lost Modernities: China, Vietnam, Korea, and the Hazards of World History*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006.

Wright, Mary Clabaugh. *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The Tung-chih Restoration, 1862-1874*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957.

Wu Zongci 吳宗慈. *Zhonghua minguo xianfa shi* 中華民國憲法史 (A constitutional history of the Republic of China). Reprint. Beijing: falü chubanshe, 2012.

Xia Liangcai 夏良才 et al, eds. *Kongjiaohui shiliao* 孔教會史料 (Historical sources of the Confucian Association) Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1974.

Xu, Guoqi, *Chinese and Americans: A Shared History*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014.

Xu Jiyu 徐继畬. *Yinghuan Zhilue* 瀛寰志略 (A treatise on the maritime circuits). Reprint. Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2001.

Xu Shiying 許世英. "Fandui Kongjiao wei guojiao cheng" 反對孔教為國教程(Petition against instituting Confucianism as the state religion). In *Minguo jingshi wenbian (zhengzhi)* 民國經世文編 (政治) vol.39. Taibei: Wenhai publisher, 1970, p.58.

Xue Fucheng 薛福成. "Lun banli jiaoan shanhou zhangcheng shu" 辦理教案善後章程書 (Post-incident regulations on management of Christian cases) in *Chushi gongdu* 出使公牘 10 vols. Reprint. Taibei: Taiwan wenhua Shuju, 1969, pp.421-428.

_____. "Fenbie jiaoan zhiben zhibiao zhi ji shu" 分別教案治本治標之記述 (An analysis of the permanent and temporary solutions to the problem of Christian cases). In *Fan yangjiao shuwen jietie xuan* 反洋教書文揭帖選, ed. Wang Minglun 王明倫. Jinan: Qilu shuju, 1984, pp.390-393.

_____. *Chushi yingfa biyi siguo riji* 出使英法意比四國日記 (Diary on the diplomatic mission to England, France, Italy and Belgium). Yuelu shushe, 1985.

Yan Fu 嚴復. "Yuanqiang" 原強 (The Origins of Wealth and Power). In. *Yan Fu ji* 嚴復集 (Collected works of Yan Fu), ed. Wang Shi 王栻. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986.

Yang, C.K. *Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and Some of Their Historical Factors*. Berkeley: University of California press, 1967.

Yang, Mayfair Mei-hui. "Introduction." In *Chinese Religiosities: Afflictions of Modernity and State Formation*, ed. idiem. Berkeley, LA: University of California, 2008, pp.1-42.

Yao Chuanping. "De yi falü xianzhi zhi: Lishi yuefa jiben quanli tiaokuan yuanliu kao," 得依法律限制之：《臨時約法》基本權利條款源流考 (It must be restricted inaccordance with law: a study of the origins of the articles on fundamental rights in the Provisional Constitution), Peking University Law Journal 25, no.4 (2013), pp.718-735.

"Yingmei deng jiaoshi shuoni jiaowu qi duan" 英美等教士所擬教務七端 (A seven-point proposal on the management of Chrstian cases by British and American missionaries). In *Qingmo jiaoan* vol.3, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, p.621.

Yip, Ka-che. *Religion, Nationalism and Chinese Students: The Anti-Christian Movement of 1922-1927*. Bellingham: Center for East Asian Studies, Western Washington University, 1980.

Young, Ernest P. *The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1977.

_____. *Ecclesiastical Colony: China's Catholic Church and the French Religious Protectorate*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Yu, Anthony. *State and Religion in China: Historical and Textual Perspectives.* Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 2005.

"Yushi Chen Qizhang zouchen banli jiaoan shitiao zhangcheng zhe" 御使陳其璋奏陳辦理教案十條章程摺 (Memorial by censor Chen Qizhang submitting a ten-article proposal on the management of Christian cases). In *Qingmo jiaoan* vol.2, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, pp.630-632.

"Yushi Jiang Shixing zouchen tuochou minjiao xiangan fa zhe" 御史蔣式瑆奏陳妥籌民教相安法摺 (Memorial by censor Jiang Shixing submitting suggestions on the resolution of conflict between Christians and non-Christians). In *Qingmo jiaoan* vol.3, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, pp.265-267.

"Yu Zhongguo yinggai huwei xijiao zhiyue" 諭中國議將更改護衛西教之約 (China should alter the treaty cause on the protection of Christianity). *Shenbao* 申報, 8 October 1874, p.1.

"Yuanjiao" 原教 (A discourse on the meaning of orthodoxy). In *Daqing Renzong rui huangdi shilu* 大清仁宗睿皇帝實錄 vol.374, *Qing Shilu* 清實錄. Reprint. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986.

"Yuefa huiyi jilü" 約法會議記錄 (Meeting records of the constitution drafting conference). Reprinted in *Jindai zhongguo shiliao congkan* 中國近代史叢刊, ed. Shen Yunlong 沈雲龍. Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1968.

"Yueren shengtao Zhong Rongguang feikong zhi gongan"粵人聲討鍾榮光廢孔之公案(Cantonese condemnation of Zhong Rongguang for his destruction of Confucianism). *Kongjiao-hui zazhi* 孔教會雜誌 vol.1, no.1 (February 1913), pp.1-26.

Yung, Wing. *My Life in China and America*. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1909.

Zarrow, Peter. "Political Rituals in the Early Republic if China." In *Constructing Nationhood in Modern East Asia*, ed. Chow Kai-wing, Kevin M. Doak, and Poshek Fu. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001, pp.149-188.

_____. *After Empire: The Conceptual Transformation of the Chinese State, 1885-1924*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012.

Zhang Deyi 張德彝. *Suishi faguo youzhi* 隨使法國遊志 (A travelogue on the mission to France). Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1982.

Zhang Baixi, Zhang Zidong and Rong Qing 張百熙、張之洞、榮慶. "Xuetang xuewu gangyao"學堂學務綱要 (Guideline on schools and education affairs). Reprinted in *Zhongguo jindai shi jiaoyu shiliao huibian: xuezhi yanbian* 中國近代教育史資料彙編: 學制演變, ed. Qu Xingui 璩鑫圭 and Tang Liangyan 唐良炎. Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 1991, pp.233-522.

Zhang, Zhidong 張之洞, *Quanxue pian* 勸學篇 (Exhortation to learning). Zhejiang, 1898.

"Zhe ge dufu zhao Zongli Yamen suoqing chiping banli jiaomin shijian shi shangyu" 著各督撫照總理衙門所請持平辦理教民事件事上諭(An imperial edict instructing all governors and governors-general to follow the request of the Zongli Yamen to be impartial in the management of Christian cases). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, p.216.

"Zhe neige wuying dian jiang xuanzong qinding shengyu guangxun tuoyin banxing tianxia shi shangyu," 著內閣武英殿將宣宗欽定【聖諭廣訓】拓印頒行天下事上諭 (An imperial edict instructing the Grand Secretariat to print "The Sacred Edicts of Kangxi" for mass distribution). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, p.131.

"Zhejiang xuezheng Wu Zhongjun zou chakan yangren qingxing bing qing changming zhengxue guangli yixue pian" 浙江學政吳鍾駿奏查看洋人情形並請昌明正學廣立義學片(Memorial by Zhejiang education director Wu Zhongjun on the situation of the foreigners and requesting the promulgation of orthodox learning and building of charity schools). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, p.126-127.

"Zhejiang xunfu Chang Dachun zoubao faren zai Ningbo shetang chuanjiao yishe fangzhi pian" 浙江巡撫常大淳奏報法人在寧波設堂傳教已設防止片(Memorial by Zhejiang governor Chang Dachun on the precautionary measures taken against the building of French churches in Ningbo). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, p.125.

Zhengfu Gongbao 政府公報 (Government gazetteer), 1912-1916.

"Zhengzhi huiyi taolun jitian sikong liangan jiwen" 政治會議討論祀天尊孔兩案紀闻 (An account of the discussion of the bills on the worship of Heaven and veneration of Confucius in the political conference). *Shenbao* 申報, 19 January, 1914, pp.2-3.

Zhigang 志剛. *Chushi Taixi ji* 出使泰西記 (Diary on the diplomatic mission to the West). Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1981.

"Zhili zongdu Guiliang zouchen chuanxi tianzhu jiao ren ying qubie tuoban zhe" 直隸總督桂良奏陳傳習天主教人應區別妥辦摺 (Memorial by the governor-general of Zhili Guiliang suggesting that the Catholics should be treated separately from other sectarians). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, p.155.

"Zhili zongdu Guiliang zoubao Ansu xian xun panhuo fa jiaoshi Mengzhensheng pian" 直隸總督桂良奏報安肅縣訊盤獲法教士孟鎮升片 (Memorial by the governor-general of Zhili Guiliang reporting on the arrest and interrogation of French missionary Joseph-Martial Mouly in Ansu county). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, p.156.

"Zhili zongdu Neerjinge zoubao zunzhi chaban Ansu deng shen chuanxi tianzhu jiao deng qingxing zhe"直隸總督訥爾經額奏報遵旨查辦安肅等縣傳習天主教等情形摺 (Memorial by the governor-general of Zhili Nergginge reporting the investigation outcome on the practice of Catholicism in Ansu and other counties). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, pp.142-144.

Zhongguo Jindaishi ziliao congkan- wuxu bianfa 中國近代史質料叢刊：戊戌變法 (Historical sources of modern Chinese history series: the 1898 reform movement) vol.2. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1954.

Zhonghua minguo shishi jiyao 中華民國史事紀要 (Historical records of the Republic of China). Taibei: Liming wenhua shiye gongsi, 1981.

Zhongwai Jiu Yuezhang Daquan 中外旧约章大全 1689-1902 vol.1 (Complete collection of old treaties signed between China and foreign nations, 1689-1902). Beijing: Zhongguo Haiguan Chubanshe, 2004.

Zhou Junyu 周俊宇. "Minsu yu zhengzhi: Zhongguo Guomingdang zhengquan xia de Qingming jie zaizhi, 1912-2008" 民俗與政治： 中國國民黨政權下的清明節再製 (Popular custom and politics: the reinvention of Qingming festival under the rule of the Chinese nationalist Party). *Taiwan wenxian* 臺灣文獻 63, no.1 (2012), pp.189-228.

Zhou Runnian 周潤年. "Beijing yonghe-gong yuzhi beiwen xiaolu kaoquan"北京雍和宮御製《喇嘛說》碑文校錄考詮 (A textual analysis of the "On Lama" steles in Beijing Yonghe palace). *Xizang yanjiu* 西藏研究 vol.3 (1991), pp.87-98.

"Zhuzang dachen Manqing bangban dachen Enqing zou" 住藏大臣滿慶幫辦大臣恩慶奏 (Memorial by the Ambans of Tibet Manqing and Enqing). In *Fan yangjiao shuwen jietie xuan* 反洋教書文揭帖選, ed. Wang Minglun 王明倫. Jinan: Qilu shuju, 1984, p.286.

"Zhuzang dachen Manqing deng zouqing quanzu waiguo guanmin ruzang youli chuanjiao zhe" 住藏大臣滿慶等奏請勸阻外國官民入藏遊歷傳教摺 (Memorial by the Amban of Tibet Manqing and others requesting the prohibition of traveling and Christian proselytizing by foriegners in Tibet). In *Qingmo jiaoan* 清末教案 vol.1, ed. Guo Shunping 郭舜平. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, pp.411-412.

Zito, Angela. *Of Body and Brush: State Sacrifice as Text/Performance in Eighteenth Century China.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.

_____. "This is not a facade" in Bruno Latour and Peter Wiebel eds. *Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005, pp.70-85.

"Zongli Yamen zhi geguo gongshi shu" 總理衙門致各國公使書 (Communication from the Zongli Yamen to the ambassadors of England, France, Russia, and the United States). In *Fan yangjiao*

shuwen jietie xuan 反洋教書文揭帖選, ed. Wang Minglun 王明倫. Jinan: Qilu shuju, 1984, pp.379-387.

"Zunkong faan zhi jingguo" 尊孔法案之經過 (An account of the passing of the Sage veneration bill). *Jingshi Bao* 經世報 vol.1, no.5 (May 1922), pp.1-8.

Zürcher, Erik. "Jesuit Accommodation and the Chinese Cultural Imperative." In *The Rites Controversy: Its History and Meaning*, ed. D.E. Mungello. Steyler Verlag, 1994, pp.31-64.

_____. "Confucian and Christian Religiosity in Late Ming China." *The Catholic Historical Review* 83 (1997), pp.614-653.

_____. "China and the West: The Image of Europe and its Impact." In *China and Christianity: Burdened Past, Hopeful Future*, ed. Stephen Uhalley Jr and Xiaoxin Wu. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2000, pp.43-61.

_____.*Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China.* Third edition. Leiden: Brill, 2007.