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The Quality of Society and Happiness: Fairness, Trust, and Community in China

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Abstract

Adam Smith argued that 'moral sentiments' – the norms, customs and conventions that are developed in society - provide a benefit to society, improving both economic efficiency and well-being. We take our cue from this insight. Three important moral sentiments are a perception of fairness, a willingness to trust people, and a sense of community We analyse representative national socioeconomic surveys of the China Household Income Project (CHIP), conducted in 2002 and 2013. It contains information that is used to create a happiness score, a fairness score, a trust score, and a community score for each respondent.

Three main hypotheses are tested: that higher reported fairness, higher reported trust, and greater sense of community each raises happiness. In the first case there is strong evidence of a positive association in both rural and urban China. Moreover, we find that a higher sense of fairness ameliorates the adverse effect of reference group income on happiness, especially for the poor. Higher reported trust scores are also strongly associated with greater happiness in both rural and urban China. Average trust scores in the locality are positively associated with happiness, suggesting that a high level of trustworthiness in the community is also valued. Three measures of village sense of community are each associated with greater happiness. Attempts are made to ascertain whether the associations are causal; use of internal instruments provides some support. The possible determinants of reported fairness, trust, and community are investigated, some of which have policy implications. The evidence of the paper is generally consistent with the broader argument that an informal social contract constrains antisocial behaviour and improves wellbeing in ways little studied by economists.

Key words: China; Happiness; Fairness; Trust; Societal quality.

JEL classification: A13; D03; D69.

Words: 14,737

1. Introduction

Adam Smith (1776) is famous for his insight in *The Wealth of Nations* that the market – through its 'invisible hand' - ensures that the self-interested pursuit of profit benefits society. It is less well-known that he also argued in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* that 'moral sentiments', as opposed to market sentiments, provide a benefit to society (Smith, 1759). He defined moral sentiments as the norms which reflect the mutual sympathy of sentiments that are developed in society and create habits and principles of behaviour. They are embedded in tradition, institutions, culture, and trust. They emanate, he argued, from a human need to be well thought of and well regarded. Mark Carney (Carney, 2020) in his Reith Lectures makes a distinction between market and moral sentiments, and argues that in recent years, market sentiments, or market values, have become more important and have eroded moral sentiments, or moral values, to the detriment of well-being in society. We take our cue from these ideas.

The rapidly expanding research on the economics of happiness suggests a growing recognition that the promotion of people's subjective well-being should be an important – some would say, the overriding - ultimate objective of government policy. There is accumulating evidence from happiness functions estimated within countries, across countries, and over time that happiness can be well explained by economic, social and demographic variables. It is well established in the literature that happiness is influenced by many variables besides the economic variables that normally enter into economists' analyses of utility functions.

One such potential influence that deserves further research is the 'quality' of society. By that we mean, in part, the extent to which people can interact reliably and fruitfully with other people, and thus the degree of perceived trust in society. We also mean, in part, the extent to which people feel that their position relative to other people is justifiable, and thus the degree of perceived fairness in society. The quality of society can also be influenced by the extent to which people interact and cooperate beneficially with each other in the community.

History, culture, institutions, social norms, sense of identity, and, in particular, the framework of laws, govern the extent to which trust can be found in society, spanning both economic and personal relationships. Lack of trust is likely to increase the amount of insecurity that people feel and to curb actions and initiatives that would otherwise be in their interests, and so to restrict their well-being. The same variables and, in particular, state institutions and government policies, influence the extent to which people feel that life in their society, community, or economy is fair. Inequality of people's market value - opportunities, resources, income, or treatment, for which no justification seems possible - can give rise to perceptions of relative deprivation. Recognition of unfairness is likely to make people less happy.

It can be argued that feeling part of a community also contributes to the quality of society. That community might be broad, even national, or narrow, corresponding to a person's social network and its strength. Both forms of community can raise a person's perception of well-being by providing fellow-feeling and cooperation, a sense of identity and of belonging, self-esteem, and prospective support in adversity.[2]

Putnam (2000) analysed 'social capital', which he defined as social networks that give rise to norms of reciprocity and trust. He distinguished two forms: 'bridging' social capital (inclusive and outward-looking) and 'bonding' social capital (exclusive and inward-looking). The former helps people to 'get ahead' and the latter helps them to 'get by'. The distinctive, well-known, Chinese form of social capital is *guanxi*, i.e. bonds among relatives and friends. Whereas bonding social capital promotes reciprocity and trust within the group, it might do nothing for, or might even deter, such norms with people outside the group. By contrast, bridging social capital is likely to promote reciprocity and trust generally in society. Possession of either form of social capital can be expected to enhance the happiness of an individual.

There are other societal characteristics that might affect people's subjective well-being. One is the degree of security that they feel. Personal security is dependent on state institutions and policies, such as law and order, and social security on the extent to which the state provides communal insurance. To

[2] This was the main explanation provided for the evidence from a recent survey of ethnic minorities in rural China, that minority people, although poorer, are inherently happier than Han people (Knight et al., 2021).

some extent, trust and fairness will proxy a sense of security: personal security is likely to be reflected in trust, and social security might contribute to perceptions of fairness; both might strengthen feelings of community.

Section 2 explains our data, derived from the two national household surveys of the China Household Income Project, CHIP 2002 and CHIP 2013. Sections 3 and 4 estimate happiness functions to analyse the effect on happiness of fairness and trust respectively, distinguishing rural and urban China. Section 5 does the same for sense of village community. Section 6 is concerned to identify the causal effects of fairness, trust, and community on happiness. Sections 7=9 analyse the determinants of fairness, trust and community respectively. Section 10 concludes and reflects.

2. The data

We make use of the CHIP, a nationally representative household-based survey conducted every five or seven years and designed by an international team of researchers including one of the authors. Our main source of data will be the CHIP 2013 survey, drawing where necessary on the CHIP 2002 survey in various places. The CHIP 2002 survey contained a special module on happiness, which produced a flow of papers (for instance, Knight et al, 2009, Knight and Gunatilaka, 2010, and Knight and Gunatilaka, 2010a). The CHIP 2013 rural and urban survey questionnaires contain many of the same questions that are relevant to our analysis of the relationships between fairness and happiness, and between trust and happiness. The survey contains rich information on the sampled individuals, households, and communities. These are not only the conventional economic data but also social data and attitudinal data. The rural and urban questionnaires differ because of the economic and administrative differences and different ways of life in rural and urban China. For instance, rural people are at a great disadvantage in their income levels, in the degree of state support and social protection, and in the provision of public services (Knight and Song, 1995). Accordingly, we analyse rural and urban China separately.

Each sample was drawn from a representative sub-sample of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) nationally representative sample for its annual household survey. In addition to taking information directly from the logbooks of each house compiled by the NBS, further information was gathered for each

household using the usual NBS interviewers, much of it with research hypotheses in mind.

Both the rural and urban questionnaires contain a question that can be converted into a measure of happiness**.** It can be translated as: how happy are you nowadays? The choice of answers offered was: very happy, happy, so-so, not happy, not at all happy, or hard to say. Answers to this question form the dependent variable in much of the analysis. They can be converted into a cardinal variable ranging from 4 (very happy) to 0 (not at all happy); the small percentage that reported 'hard to say' is excluded from the analysis.

A total of 10,600 rural households were surveyed in 2013. The rural sample covered 14 provinces. Within each province on average 14.3 counties were sampled, and within each county on average 5.9 villages, each containing roughly ten observation households.[3] Rural respondents were also classified according to their answers to the question: how does your living standard compare with the average for your village: much below average, below average, average, above average, or much above average? This question generates a measure of 'comparator income' or 'relative income', i.e. own income relative to that of other households in the village.

Rural interviewees were asked about the people with whom they made comparisons: neighbours, relatives, people in the village, people in the township, people in the county, rural people, urban people, all of China? The answers indicate the nature and breadth of reference groups.

The same 14 provinces were covered in the 2013 urban sample, which contained 12,700 households, spread over 423 urban areas (towns, cities, and municipal districts).[4] The average number of observations in an urban area was 30 households. The urban questionnaire contained the same or very similar key questions as did the rural sample. The question intended to establish the main reference group distinguished people who were relatives or neighbours, in the same community or 'street', in the same district, in urban areas, in rural areas, in China as a whole.

[3] However, 7,277 rural households were analysed when villages with less than nine sampled households and observations with missing values were excluded.
[4] However, the number was reduced to 5,542 households when urban areas were excluded if less than nine households were sampled and when observations with missing values were omitted. The average number of households in these remaining areas was 37.

The CHIP 2002 and/or 2013 data sets contain variables that are direct measures of fairness, trust, and community, or variables that are assumed to be proxies for them. Although trust and fairness are different concepts, there is some overlap. For instance, a situation might be considered unfair partly because people are untrustworthy, or an unfair situation might give rise to untrustworthy behaviour. Accordingly, a couple of variables appear in the happiness equations testing trust and also fairness. The survey questions on fairness, trust, and community to be utilised in the analysis will be explained in the sub-sections setting out our hypotheses and their testing.

3. Happiness functions: the effect of fairness

3.1 Literature on fairness and happiness

There are two approaches to the concept and measurement of fairness (Knight, 2017). One is to rely on people's own perceptions of fairness or unfairness. These can be based on national household surveys, for instance, by exploring reported attitudes and their effects on subjective well-being. The other is to follow 'the idea of justice' that is developed by Sen in his book of the same title (Sen, 2009). His objective was to provide practical reasoning about how to remedy injustice, which he equated with unfairness. In order to identify unfairness, he adopted the appeal of Adam Smith (1759) to an 'impartial spectator' so as to avoid the influence of vested interests and entrenched attitudes. This approach requires the marshalling of evidence from which a value judgement can be formed. In this paper we make use of the perceptions criterion because we choose to place weight on people's subjective well-being, and because the CHIP surveys provide a ready measure of perceived fairness.

Of the few socioeconomic surveys which enquire about perceived fairness, most ask about the fairness of income inequality, although a couple have in mind a broader notion of fairness. We concentrate on the former. Economists tend to examine income inequality, often with the presumption that inequality is too high. There is little discussion in the economics literature of the distinction between 'fair' and 'unfair' inequality. This lack is probably related to the difficulties of conceptualising and measuring fair and unfair inequality. However, reflecting the distinction that ordinary people often have in mind, there is a groundswell towards making that distinction in research on inequality. For instance, Deaton (2019), in setting out his thoughts at the start of the five-year research programme entitled 'Inequality in the Twenty-first

Century' that he was to lead, observed: 'It is not inequality itself that is hurting people, but the mechanisms of enrichment'; and elsewhere, 'Inequality is not the same thing as unfairness, and to my mind it is unfairness which has incited so much turmoil in the world today'.

People in different societies might have different views on which sources of inequality are fair, and which unfair, and these differences might be rooted in history, culture, and institutions. For instance, Alesina et al. (2004) contrasted attitudes in Europe and the United States. They found that happiness is lower in both countries when inequality is higher, but that the effect is greater in Europe. Their interpretation, not directly tested, was that Americans have the perception (not necessarily the reality) that they live in a mobile society, whereas Europeans perceive that they live in an immobile one. This interpretation is consistent with the view that people in Europe tend to dislike inequality of outcomes whereas people in the United States tend to accept inequality of outcomes provided that they perceive sufficient equality of opportunities.

Researchers face the task of distinguishing between inequality that is fair and that which is unfair. One possible distinction is that inequalities are unfair if they are man-made and amenable to correction. Another is suggested by Roemer (1998), who observed that some income inequality is due to factors under the control of the individual and some is due to factors beyond their control, i.e. to circumstances and opportunities. If the individual cannot be held responsible for the latter inequality, this distinction can be the criterion for the fairness or unfairness of inequality. Roemer and Trannoy (2015) provided a survey of this literature.

There is evidence from neuroeconomics that people distinguish fair and unfair inequality. Cappelli *et al*. (2014) combined an experimental game and neural scanning to show that their subjects responded differently to income changes related and unrelated to work effort. Huang (2019), analysing a national sociological survey for urban China, concluded that belief about distributive justice had a significant effect on happiness. Asked whether their income was fair by comparison with their efforts, respondents reported the degree of fairness on a five-point scale: the greater the fairness, the higher the conditional happiness. Note that it was fairness in one's own treatment that counted, and not the fairness observable in society.

Two studies have found that the negative effect of inequality on happiness depends on their measures of perceived fairness and trust in society. Oishi *et al.* (2013) used reported measures of fairness and of trust provided in the United States General Social Survey. The authors found a negative time series relationship between inequality and happiness, and showed that lower values of fairness and trust in years of high inequality were responsible for this relationship. Bjornskov *et al.* (2013) analysed the *World Values Survey* covering 80 countries over the years 1990-2008, employing three measures of perceived fairness in society. Although the thrust of the paper was elsewhere, they found that higher inequality reduced happiness, that higher perceived fairness raised happiness, and that when inequality was interacted with fairness, higher perceived fairness weakened the effect of inequality on happiness.

Turning to China: when in 1978 China embarked on economic reform it had too much equality. The egalitarian arrangements in the communes and the factories stifled incentives and produced inefficiency. The new Chinese leadership recognised that greater income inequality was necessary to provide the incentives essential to an economy that was in the process of making the transition from a centrally planned to a market-driven system. Income inequality increased rapidly over the reform period as people acquired incentives for using talent, for effort, saving, investment in physical capital and in human capital, and risk-taking. However, some of the new inequalities cannot be justified by the criterion of economic efficiency. They might be better explained in terms of institutional segmentation of labour, rent-seeking, corruption, and abuse of power. A sociological survey conducted in 2004 examined Chinese people's attitudes to the degree of inequality and what inequality they regarded as fair (Whyte, 2010). It was found that Chinese people were not averse to inequality based on merit, effort, or risk-taking. Indeed, such inequality appeared to offer people incentives or other opportunities for improving their economic positions. By contrast, inequality based on unfairness in treatment or in access to opportunities was generally disliked.

Inequality of opportunity has been analysed in several China studies, most thoroughly by Yang et al. (2021), which uses CHIP surveys. Treating six characteristics as the controlling conditions, the authors find that inequality of opportunity accounts for a large minority of income inequality, but this has

declined as social and geographical mobility have risen. The most important conditions are *hukou* type at birth, and parents' education and occupation – these being a reflection of China's great rural-urban divide (Knight and Song, 1995) and the disadvantages imposed on rural-dwellers.

3.2 Hypotheses and hypothesis tests on fairness and happiness

The 2013 CHIP surveys contain no direct measures of fairness. However, it is possible instead to use the 2002 CHIP data set, which generates a basic equation that is very similar to the 2013 basic equation and includes more attitudinal variables that might provide better proxies for fairness.

Fairness can be regarded as fairness in society generally and fairness of income inequality. The latter can be explored using the 2002 urban questionnaire, which contains the direct questions: do you think the current income distribution nationwide is fair; do you think the current distribution in your city is fair? The permitted replies are: very fair, fair, not fair, not at all fair, no reply. Discarding the last one, we have four replies which can be valued from 3 (very fair) to 0 (not at all fair) and can be categorised in the happiness function. Because there are very few observations reporting very fair, the categories fair and very fair are combined together. Thus, we analyse three categories: fairness 1 (not at all fair), fairness 2 (unfair), and fairness 3 (fair or very fair). Whether it is fairness in the city or in China as a whole, it is startling that the mean fairness score in both urban and rural samples is low, being between not at all fair and unfair.

The same question is not available in the 2002 rural questionnaire but there are several possible proxies for fairness in broad or narrow society. Three questions might be relevant: are the relations among different village groups harmonious; do village cadres serve as spokesmen for the peasants; do village cadres do well in moderating conflicting interests among villagers? The permitted replies range from very much (or very high), relatively much, so-so, not very much, not at all (and hard to say). As proxies for fairness, the replies range from 4 (very much) down to not at all (0). The three chosen questions are analysed as a combined cardinal total, ranging from 0 to 15, and as categories derived from a combined score. The categories (fairness 1-4) correspond to scores 0-3, 4-7, 8-11, and 12-15 respectively.

Although it is plausible that perceived fairness will have a causal effect on happiness, it is possible that the fairness variable is endogenous. For instance, a respondent's personality might determine both happiness and perceptions of fairness: happy people might view life through rose-tinted glasses and report a greater sense of fairness. Unfortunately, there are no potential instrumental variables in the data set – variables which are associated with fairness but cannot plausibly affect happiness – so as to isolate the exogenous effect of fairness on happiness. However, it is possible to test for endogeneity using the method suggested by Lewbel (2012), which relies on instruments based on heteroscedasticity of errors.. This analysis of all three test variables is conducted in section 6.

Whereas our first hypothesis is that perceived fairness raises happiness, our second hypothesis is that perceived fairness ameliorates the negative effect of income inequality on happiness. Our innovation is to introduce interaction terms representing relative income x fairness. Do these terms weaken or eliminate the depressing effect of inequality on happiness? We build a matrix of interaction term coefficients to show the extent to which greater fairness reduces the harmful effect of inequality in urban China. We add to the usual parsimonious equation perceived position in the city income distribution and reported fairness. In addition to these terms, we include interaction terms, being the multiplication of the relative income categories and fairness categories.[5]

3.3 Analyses of the effect of fairness on happiness

Table 1 reports estimates of happiness functions designed to measure the effect on happiness of fairness, measured as a cardinal variable, in urban China in 2002. Column 1 shows the standard, parsimonious happiness function and confirms the conventional results for China and elsewhere: age bears a u-shaped relationship, men are less happy than women, marriage is good for happiness, health status has a powerful effect, and both income per capita and wealth per capita have a positive effect. All these coefficients are statistically significant; by contrast, ethnicity, education, and hours worked are not. Column 2 adds relative income: the respondent's perceived income quarter in the city. This has a powerful effect, ranging from 0 in the top, omitted, income quarter

[5] A similar analysis was attempted for rural China but the proxies for fairness, being unrelated to income inequality, failed to produce any pattern.

to -1.174*** in the bottom quarter. Its introduction also halves the coefficient on ln household income per capita, to 0.146***.

Various measures of fairness were tried in the happiness equation, all of which were statistically significant. For instance, combined fairness raises happiness, from 0 in the category fairness 1 to 0.182*** in fairness 2 and to 0.435*** in fairness 3 (not shown in the table). National fairness and city fairness each produces results very similar to that of the combined score (again not shown). Column 3 shows that the coefficient on combined fairness expressed as a cardinal value is 0.102***. This increase is large in relation to the mean combined fairness score (1.60) and its standard deviation (1.27). A cardinal score rising from unfair to fair increases the happiness score by 0.204. Higher fairness is associated with substantially greater urban happiness.

Table 2 conducts a similar analysis for rural China in 2002. Column 1 shows the standard, parsimonious, happiness function, with results similar to those in the urban case. One difference is that working hours now have a significant negative effect on happiness. Column 2 adds the perceived relative village income dummy variables. With having average village income being the omitted category, their coefficients fall monotonically and substantially as we move from much above to much below average village income, and the coefficient on ln income per capita is halved.[6]

It is relevant that the components of the combined score all relate to perceptions of fairness within the village. It is local fairness that matters for happiness. With lowest fairness (fairness 1) as the omitted category, happiness rises with reported fairness and the coefficient of the highest category, fairness 4, is 0.365*** (not reported in the table). When the fairness score is entered instead as a cardinal variable, the coefficient is positive and significant (column 2). With the average score being 8.15 and its standard deviation being (2.24), an additional unit in the possible range of 0 to 15 adds 0.062*** to the happiness score.

Summarising the results for the first hypothesis, Tables 1 and 2 show that higher reported fairness scores are strongly and significantly associated with greater happiness. Turning to the hypothesis two, we examine the interaction between income inequality and fairness in urban China, using CHIP 2002. Table

[6] Relative income effects and absolute income effects can be distinguished because of the great variation in average village income across the sample.

3 reports three sets of interaction terms, relating to the combined fairness score, fairness in China as a whole, and fairness in the respondent's city. It shows matrices of interaction terms, with the four income quarters shown across the rows and the three fairness categories down the columns. The top income quarter and the lowest fairness level are the omitted categories in the regression analysis, and thus the cell which combines them has a value of zero. Other cells indicate the departure of the conditional happiness score from the zero cell, and its statistical significance.

We begin with the combined fairness score. There is little variation in coefficients according to the fairness level when interaction terms are included in the estimated equation but when interaction terms are omitted from the equation the effect of fairness on happiness is large and positive: it is 0.182*** more in fairness category 2, and 0.435*** more in category 3, than in category 1 (Panel 4). If people perceive that the income distribution is fair or very fair, their happiness is raised in each income quarter other than quarter 1 (for which the coefficients are all set to zero by definition). Looking across the row for fairness 1 in Panel 1, the interaction terms are all zero, because this fairness category is the omitted dummy variable. However, when derived from the coefficients for income quarter in the full equation, happiness is lower by 1.471*** in the lowest income quarter than in the highest (Panel 4). Looking across the row for fairness 3 in Panel 1, the coefficient increases monotonically, being 0.642* in the lowest income quarter. The disparity across income quarters is significantly smaller if respondents are in the highest fairness category than in the lowest.[7] It appears that the poorest urban people, feeling relative deprivation most keenly, derive most additional happiness from regarding their relative income as fair or very fair.

The pattern of interaction coefficients is very similar in the analysis of fairness for China as a whole (Panel 2) and for the respondent's city (Panel 3) to that for the combined fairness measure. However, the ameliorating effect of fairness is somewhat greater for national fairness than for city fairness. For instance, the coefficient in the city income quarter 4, fairness 3 cell is 0.949** for the former and 0.677* for the latter.

[7] An alternative cardinal specification was estimated, involving mean city income per capita as the measure of relative income. The interaction term with the fairness score was negative, implying an ameliorating effect, but the coefficient was small and not significant.

To summarise the results for the second hypothesis, we have presented evidence that in urban China perceptions of fairness ameliorate the effect of perceived relative income position on happiness, and that this effect is strongest for people in the poorest income quarter. However, even those in the highest fairness category were still quite sensitive to their relative income within the community.

4. Happiness functions: the effect of trust

4.1 Literature on trust and happiness

According to the *World Values Survey*, the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) are among the countries of the world with the highest proportion of respondents who answer the survey question 'can most people be truste?' affirmatively. They also report happiness scores that are among the highest in the world. This positive association suggests the hypothesis that trust is an important determinant of happiness.

Churchill and Mishra (2017), analysing *World Values Survey* data for China, created their measure of trust on the survey questions 'can most people be trusted?' in various domains (family, neighbours, strangers, etc.) which were aggregated into a score. Trust in family, neighbours, people you know, and also the aggregate score, was found to raise happiness significantly, but not trust in general. Since the authors suspected reverse causation – not only does trust raise happiness but also happiness generates trust - an attempt was made to instrument the trust variable. The effect of trust on subjective well-being was not weakened.

Carattini and Roesti (2020) analysed three European surveys to show that the level of trust which maximises life satisfaction exceeds the level of trust which maximises income. They argued that trust induces cooperative and pro-social behaviour (such as making donations or voting) which in turn increases subjective well-being. Their various estimates produced coefficients on trust (on a ten-point scale) of between 0,07 and 0,13. Their results were robust to instrumenting trust with the (early-acquired and different) trust of respondents who had a migration background. They concluded that trust has a notable independent effect in raising life satisfaction.

Helliwell and Wang (2011) used the *World Gallup Survey* to distinguish various concepts of trust. They found strong microeconomic linkages between trust

(both trust in neighbours and also more general social trust) and subjective wellbeing. The authors cautioned, however, that the possibility of bidirectional positive effects cast doubt on the size of the causal effect on happiness.

Two questions can be posed about trust. One is whether a person reporting a higher level of trust enjoys greater happiness as a result; the other is whether living in a high-trust society generates happiness. Helliwell (2003), by using successive waves of the *World Values Survey*, is able to address both questions. In addition to many individual-level variables, he includes several country-level (or country-group-level) explanatory variables in his regression analysis – containing both individual trust and country average trust. Both variables have highly significant positive coefficients, with the latter being somewhat higher (table 3).[8]

The effect of individuals' trust in institutions within the EU was analysed by Hudson (2006) using Eurobarometer data. Trust depends on the perceived performance of the institutions as well as on the characteristics of individuals. He found that trust in various institutions increases subjective well-being: the institutions of the state, by improving the quality of society, can add to happiness.

Innes and Mitra (2013) conducted experimental games in the US and India that involved deception. They found that if people believe others to be predominantly untruthful, they are more likely to be untruthful: evidence that dishonestly is contagious. Their results suggest that there are societal tendencies to polarise on honesty or dishonesty, so possibly generating a two-hump distribution of social norms.

Another testable trust hypothesis emanates from Helliwell et al. (2020). It is that trust provides a buffer against adversity. The authors examined whether trust protects against the loss of subjective well-being caused by various forms of hardship. Their dependent variable was the happiness score and the explanatory variables included trust, expected to have a positive effect, and six proxies for hardship (including ill-health, low income, risk of crime, and unemployment), each expected to reduce happiness. The test variables were a set of interaction terms between trust and the hardship variables: their coefficients were hypothesised to be positive. Indeed, all the estimated

[8] However, the country average trust variable is excluded from the specification estimating robust standard errors, implying that its coefficient was not significant (table 6).

coefficients had the expected sign and were significant: trust makes hard times easier to bear.

In a well-known study Fukuyama (1995) argued that differences in trust levels among countries are important in determining country differences in economic efficiency and prosperity: trust in society improves the economy. More rigorously, Knack and Keefer (1997) found a cross-country effect of trust on economic growth. It is possible, therefore, that different national levels of trust influence happiness indirectly via different national levels of income. However, our analysis is confined to the direct effect of trust on happiness.

4.2 Hypotheses and hypothesis tests on trust and happiness

The 2013 rural and urban surveys contain two direct measures of perceived trustworthiness: would you say your relatives and friends are trustworthy; would you say that others (besides your relatives and friends) are trustworthy? The permitted answers are very trustworthy, trustworthy, so-so, not very trustworthy, not at all trustworthy, and no answer. Ignoring this last one, we have five replies which can be given values ranging from 4 (very trustworthy) to zero (not trustworthy at all) and entered as a cardinal score in the happiness functions. Kith or kin are viewed as more trustworthy than society in general: the median observation for both urban and rural trust lies between so-so and trustworthy in the case of relatives and friends, and between not trustworthy and so-so in the case of others.

We test two hypotheses. One is that an increase in the level of trust reported by the respondent raises their happiness. Both the dependent variable – the respondent's happiness – and the explanatory variables – including the respondent's trust score – stem from individual or household data. In testing hypothesis 1, it will be necessary to address the issue of potential endogeneity. There might be reverse causation, implying that people who are happier are more willing to trust others, Alternatively, the trust score and the happiness score might be influenced by some unobserved third variable which raises both trust and happiness. Social trust might have developed from a culture or set of social norms that contribute to a sense of community and fellow-feeling or to empathy, which in turn raises happiness. These are the most probable third variables - generated by positive social interaction such as reciprocal support. They might be summed up by the term social capital, which Putnam (2000:19)

defines as 'connections among individuals – social networks and the norms and reciprocity and trustworthiness that result from them'.

In that case, sense of community, fellow-feeling, and social capital might be the causal variable and trust is merely a component or a consequence. Trust should then be interpreted as a proxy for a broader notion of societal quality that is encompassed by social capital. It might be tested against other possible measures of social capital. The alternative method, one of instrumenting trust with variables that are well correlated with the trust variable but do not plausibly affect happiness, presents us with a research challenge. We shall attempt to meet it in section 6.

The second hypothesis is that a higher level of trust in the community generates greater happiness for the respondent. We add the mean value of trust in the community as another explanatory variable. The mean trust score in the province is included in all equations; in addition, the mean trust score in the town or city appears in the urban equations and the mean trust score in the village in the rural equations.

What is the relationship between the trust reported by an individual and the average trust reported in their community? There is likely to be a positive association between one's own trust in others and the average of other people's trust in others. If a person encounters trusting people, he or she is more likely to trust others. Those who live in a high- (or low-) trust society form their perceptions of the trustworthiness of others by three criteria: one's own personality, one's own experience, and general information about trust in society. There is variation in individual trust around the mean, reflecting individual personalities and experiences, but the important variable is the average level of trust. In a low-trust society there can be an exogenous increase in average trust as a result, for instance, of institutional changes that increase the risk of being found to be untrustworthy or of the associated penalty. This might in turn improve or strengthen the culture of trust in society, so further raising the average level.

The possibility of low-trust and high-trust equilibria – vicious and virtuous circles of trust - can be illustrated very simply in Figure 1. The proportion of the population *(p,* where $0 < p < 1$) who report trust (T_i where $T_i = 0$ or 1) depends linearly on the average level of trust in society ($\boldsymbol{T}$), i.e. $p = \boldsymbol{T}$. However, trust spreads through social networks in a non-linear way, with $\mathbf{T}$ being sensitive to

the proportion reporting trust over a range of *p* but only above or below critical mass levels of *p*, i.e. ***T*** *= f (p).* A small change in *p* might have little effect but a larger change, as it permeates social networks, might have an infectious effect on attitudes. ***T*** *= f (p)* can then be an S-shaped logistic function.[9] In that case there can be stable low- and high-trust equilibria at points *a* and *c* in the figure. Institutional change that discourages untrustworthiness might cause a vertical rise in the curve ***T*** *= f (p)*. This rise, from the low-trust point *a* to less than point *b,* drives the equilibrium towards point *b,* but an increase in *the* ***T*** curve beyond *b* generates a large disequilibrium and a cumulative move up to point *c*. Similarly, starting from the high-trust equilibrium at point *c*, the growth of individualism causing a vertical fall in the ***T*** *= f (p)* curve beyond point *d,* sets in motion a slide down to a low-trust equilibrium point *e.*

4.3 Analysis of the effects of trust on happiness

Table 4, relating to urban China in 2013, includes two notions of trust: trust score as a continuous variable ranging from 1 to 5, and four trust categories: not at all trustworthy plus not trustworthy (trust 1, combined together because of small numbers), so-so (trust 2, the omitted dummy variable), trustworthy (trust 3), and very trustworthy (trust 4).

Consider hypothesis 1. When the trust score is entered into the happiness equation, it has a significantly positive coefficient (0.147***) for trust in friends and relatives and a similar coefficient (0.140***) for trust in other people. Greater trust raises happiness: a move from regarding other people as untrustworthy to regarding them as trustworthy lifts the happiness score by 0.280 points. When the two forms of trust are combined, the coefficient is 0.105***. Because the range in this case is from 1 to 10, the conditional difference in happiness between not trustworthy (4) and trustworthy (8) is 0.420.

Trust categories were used to investigate the possibility of non-linearities. The results are shown from row 4 onwards. Happiness was higher by 0.635*** if other people were reported to be very trustworthy instead of so-so (the omitted category). However, trust 1 had a significantly positive coefficient (0.084*). The discrepancy between the trust score and the trust category results is likely to be due to the small number of cases reporting trust 1.

[9] Often used to illustrate the diffusion of an innovation though the spread of information.

The equivalent estimations for the rural sample (Table 5) produce similar results in most respects. However, it is notable that the coefficient of the trust score in the case of trusting friends and relatives (0.158***) is greater than in the case of trusting others (0.116***), whereas in urban China the corresponding values are 0.147*** and 0.140*** respectively. Being able to trust beyond one's *guan*xi, for which fewer sanctions are available in the city, might be more valuable than being able to trust within it. Again, reporting that friends and relatives are very trustworthy rather than so-so raises happiness substantially, by 0.553***.

The rural trust dummy variable results are very similar to those for urban China. Moving from combined trust 2 to combined trust 4 raises happiness by 0.56***. The positive coefficient on trust 1, denoting lack of trust, lacks a plausible explanation.[10]

Turning to hypothesis 2, Table 6 introduces the effect of trust in the locality on happiness. It is our measure of the trustworthiness of people in the community. Although it contains all the explanatory variables of Tables 4 and 5, it reports only the coefficients on individual trust and on average locality trust. Columns 1-2 are the urban and columns 3-5 the rural results. The table has three panels, relating to trust in relatives and friends, trust in others, and combined trust. The first row of a panel reports the sample mean trust score. In each panel rural trust is higher but it is notably so only for trust in others. There are likely to be more effective sanctions over duplicitous others in the village than in the city. Comparing Table 6 with Tables 4 and 5, the coefficients on the individual trust scores are reduced by the inclusion of the variables denoting mean trust in the locality. For instance, in the case of relatives and friends, the coefficient falls by 16% for cities and by 27% for villages. This implies a positive correlation between individual trust scores and scores in the locality – suggesting that trust in these localities is infectious.

Comparing the individual and the group trust coefficients, note that all fifteen individual trust coefficients are significantly positive. There is an interesting contrast between trust in relatives and friends and trust in others. In the former case, the city group trust coefficient is two-thirds of the individual coefficient,

[10] The fact that this occurs in both samples suggests that it is not due to the incorrect recording of some answers and might instead reflect either a real phenomenon or a systemic coding error.

and the village and county group trust coefficients are effectively equal to the individual coefficients. In the case of trust in others, the mean group coefficients are significantly positive in only one case, that of the village. It appears that trust is more infectious among friends and relatives than with others.

We conclude from Table 6 that the introduction of group mean trust scores in the happiness function reduces the coefficients on individual trust owing to their positive collinearity, and that the coefficients on group trust are significantly positive at city, village and county level. Indeed, in the last two cases, the group trust coefficient is no smaller than that on individual trust. As well as individual trust, the extent of trust in the locality can play an important role in the determination of happiness.

Cross-section evidence consistent with the model of trust in the community explained in Figure 1 would be a two humped frequency distribution of mean trust scores across localities (in static equilibrium) or wide variation in mean trust scores across localities (in dynamic disequilibrium). In the urban case there are indeed two trust score humps (6.0-6.3 and 7.0-7.3, mean score 6.9) and in the rural case a wide range of mean trust scores (from 6.0-6.3 to 7.5-7.8, mean 7.0). These results are weak but not inconsistent with the model implying that trust is infectious within a locality.

A positive association between individual trust and average trust in the locality is open to more than one interpretation. Our argument is that individual trust depends partly on the level of trust in the community, reflecting an infectious effect. However, the association might instead or as well represent unmeasured determinants of trust in the community. This is Manski's 'reflection problem' (Manski, 1993): the mean trust score reflects the unobserved characteristics of the locality that influence individual trust, other than the effects of mutual interdependence.

5.Happiness functions: the effect of community

5.1. Literature on social capital and happiness

Social capital can be interpreted in various, partly overlapping, ways, including the size and strength of social networks, the extent of trust, and the sense of community or degree of cooperation among people. Several attempts have been made to measure the effect of social capital on happiness. A common method is to include a number of variables in the measure of social capital,

combining them by means of principal component analysis in order to gauge their importance.

For instance, Portela et al. (2013), using the European Social Survey, employed a large set of 24 variables classified as networks (both social and formal), norms (both civic and political), and trust (both institutional and social). The factor analysis showed social networks, social trust and institutional trust to have the highest correlation with subjective well-being. Bjornskov et al. (2003) created a measure of social capital at country level for a sample of 32 countries. Their factor analysis produced an index combining generalised trust, civic participation, and perceived (lack of) corruption, which had a positive coefficient in the regression analysis predicting life satisfaction. The index was better than any one of its various components. The main conclusion reached was that high trust and cooperation for common causes raise happiness.

The research that is closest to ours is Yip et al. (2007) as it also concerns rural China, in this case three counties. The authors find that cognitive social capital is positively associated with subjective well-being, via pathways of social networks and support, at both the individual and the village level. Their measure is a composite index of twelve measures of trust, reciprocity, and mutual help., derived from factor analysis. One study dealt specifically with the role of community: Davidson et al. (1991), used a seventeen-item measure of sense of community and found that the estimated index was positively and significantly related to subjective well-being.

5.2. Hypotheses and hypothesis tests on social capital and happiness

The CHIP 2013 urban and rural and the 2002 urban questionnaires lack data on social capital, but the CHIP 2002 rural questionnaire contains several questions that can be used to measure sense of community and strength of cooperation at the village level. We are unable to make an encompassing study of the effect of social capital and its various components on happiness, as we have data only on the degree to which respondents have a sense of local community and cooperation. These data are used to test the hypothesis that this form of social capital increases happiness.

A set of six questions asks about the frequency of mutual help among relatives and neighbours. The options, ranging from very frequently to none or few, can be cardinalised as scores ranging from 4 to 0. We added each in turn to the basic

equation. A second set of six questions asks about the degree of importance of these six forms of mutual help. The options range from very important (4) to not important (0). We repeated the exercise for these questions. In none of the 12 equations was the test coefficient significantly positive. The likely reason for these results is a form of self-selection: respondents who are unhappy because they need help often report high support scores. We therefore concentrate on answers that relate to the village independent of the person.

A third set of six questions asks respondents to evaluate the village services provided to support household production, such as collective management of irrigation and machinery, and coordination of village activities such as disease protection or out-migration. The answers can range from very useful (4) down to not available (0).

There is a question asking about the degree of harmony in the village. Possible answers range from very harmonious (4) to not at all harmonious (0). The constructed cardinal variable is a measure of perceived village harmony. The median observation for the score denoting the degree of village harmony lies between so-so and harmonious. Finally, a question 'how many people have you made gifts to this year?', can be regarded as a proxy for the size of a person's *guanxi*, implying membership of a social network involving mutual obligations. This provides a test of whether one's size of social network raises one's happiness.

5.3. Analysis of the effect of social capital on happiness

Table 7 reports the results of our hypothesis tests for rural China in 2002. The aggregate public services score (0 to 24) has a coefficient of 0.0071*** when included on its own and 0.0063*** when the other two test variables are included. In the latter case, a rise in average score from not available to very useful adds 0.151 to the happiness score.

The coefficient measuring the effect of the degree of perceived village harmony on happiness is a significantly positive 0.1786*** (with all three test variables). An improvement from not at all harmonious to very harmonious raises happiness by no less than 0.714 points. The second last row shows that the number of gifts (mean 9.62, standard deviation 11.45) has a coefficient of 0.0033***. An increase in size of social network (measured as number of gifts) by one standard deviation raises the happiness score by 0.038.

We have been able to explore the role of social capital in a limited way, analysing only rural China and only three dimensions: the extent of village-provided services, the degree of village harmony, and the size of social network. In all three, we found significantly positive effects on happiness. These associations might not be causal effects. For instance, naturally happy people might have more friends, or natural happy villagers might promote village harmony, or there might be two-way causation. We turn to the issue of causality.

6.The causal effects of fairness, trust and community on happiness

Helliwell et al. (2018), using the World Gallup Poll for many countries, analysed the effect of social environment (measured in four ways, including support of friends and relatives and lack of corruption) on subjective well-being, using mean values at each national level. All four variables had a significantly positive effect. However, the authors recognised that both happiness and social environment are subjective perceptions, which might depend on each personality.

By employing the method of using city or village mean variables, we hope to reject the hypothesis that the associations we have found are due to individual personality. This result in itself would not establish causality but it would eliminate one explanation. Use of mean values of cities and of villages should reduce the role of personality because average personality is less likely to differ across villages and, especially, across cities.

Table 8 reports the test coefficients when village and city average data are used for the estimation. and compares them with the coefficients obtained by estimating the same models with individual data The coefficients on the average village or city variables are significantly positive in all cases and are higher than the corresponding coefficients in all but one case. It seems that individual personality is not responsible for the positive associations that need to be explained.

We proceed to instrument the test variables by means of internal instruments based on heteroskedasticity of the errors (Lewbel, 2011 and explained in Baum and Lewbel, 2019). We tried several external instruments but none was valid.[11]

[11] Including father's education (in years), parents' education, spouse's education CCP membership.

The validity of internal instruments can be judged by two main criteria listed in Table 9, which reports the coefficients of the suspect variables, fairness score, trust score, and village harmony score, both OLS and IV.

The table shows that in every case the test of homoskedasticity of the errors is rejected: the use of internal instruments is possible. In two cases, rural fairness and village harmony, the instrumented coefficient is positive, similar in size to the OLS coefficient, and significant. In two other cases, rural trust and urban trust, the IV coefficient is positive and similar to the OLS coefficient. However, identification is weak: the standard error is large, indicating that the coefficient could arise by chance. Our attempt to establish causality is suggestive but the evidence is not reliable.

7. The determinants of fairness

The empirical determinants of perceived fairness have not been much explored. Here we concentrate on the perceived fairness of income differences. Hvidberg et al. (2020) conducted a survey of adults in Denmark, a very equal society. They found that individuals' views on whether income disparities are fair are strongly related to their own position in the income distribution. Inequality within their reference group, in this case defined by education and occupation, is viewed as particularly unfair.

Bischoff et al. (2008) analysed the determinants of reported social fairness, using a survey for Germany. They distinguished proxies for fairness preferences, beliefs on the sources of economic success, as well as self- interest. The authors found that people are more willing to accept that social differences are fair if they are seen to be the result of fair procedures, but more so than if the income differences correspond to self-interest.

It is likely that a respondent will assess the degree of fairness according to their absolute and relative income in the relevant income distribution. Those with high income might feel that they deserved their income through effort or merit, as might those with high income relative to that in the village or city. People who have missed out on much education could feel that they have been unfairly treated. The effect of age could depend on achievement relative to aspirations, as appears to be often the case for happiness. Being self-employed instead of wage-employed might be regarded as unfair if self-employment status is not freely chosen. We expect minority status to have a negative coefficient if

minorities are discriminated against. People in poor health might feel that their condition, or their medical support, is unfair.

These hypotheses are tested by means of regression analysis in which the respondent's fairness score is the dependent variable and the individual characteristics mentioned above are the explanatory variables. We examine the combined fairness score, adding together the national and the city/village scores.

Table 10 indicates that the rural respondent's household income per capita improves their sense of fairness about the income distribution, as does net wealth in both rural and urban areas. Fairness is perceived to be significantly lower the lower is relative income in the city or the village. In both cases there is a monotonic fall in reported fairness. It is evident that perceptions of fairness involve a degree of self-interest. The less educated have a lower sense of fairness, at least in rural China. There is an interesting rural-urban contrast in the effect of age: in the cities the relationship is u-shaped but in the villages it is inverse-u-shaped. It is possible that older rural people feel that their life experiences have been unfair compared with those of younger rural people, who have had more opportunities. In rural China the self-employed report much lower fairness scores than the wage-employed. The rural ethnic minority dummy coefficient is significantly positive, a result that is difficult to explain. It does indeed appear that people in poor health feel that their condition, or their medical support, is unfair.

It is likely that perceptions of unfairness depend partly on society, on policy, and on local governance and local community Variation in peoples' experiences of factors such as these cannot be picked up in the individual characteristics analysed in Table 10; nor can variation in unobserved characteristics such as personality. In reporting fairness, respondents might have in mind the reasons for their differences in opportunities to get credit, jobs, income or education. The values of R-squared in the equations are understandably very low. Nevertheless, the results provide plausible explanations for the role of some of the personal characteristics included in the equations.

8. The determinants of trust

There appears to be little literature on the empirical determinants of trust. However, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) used the US General Social Survey to analyse the determinants of trust, measured by answers to the question 'can most people be trusted…?'. They found that low trust was caused by: a recent history of traumatic experiences; belonging to a group historically discriminated against; low education or income; living in a community with high income inequality.

Possible determinants of trust include income and wealth if economic security improves a person's willingness to trust. Perceived position in the village or city hierarchy might influence willingness to trust people: being or feeling lowly might make it easier to be exploited. Education might provide the information or the status to protect against cheating. It is possible that gender influences power relationships, putting women at a disadvantage. Age can reflect experience or worldliness. There can be a rural-urban distinction if, for instance, people have better sanctions against unscrupulous behaviour in village society. The self-employed are more likely than the wage-employed to be at a greater risk in their economic transactions. If ethnic discrimination makes people more vulnerable, minorities are less trusting of others. People in poor health might be less able to defend themselves against cheating.

We estimate a regression equation for both the rural and the urban samples in which the trust score is the dependent variable and the variables mentioned above – all available in the data sets – are the explanatory variables. We distinguish the three trust variables: trust in relatives and friends, trust in others, and the combined trust score.

Table 11 indicates that not many of our chosen variables have a consistent statistically significant effect on individual trust, but some patterns are evident. In rural China higher income increases trust in relatives in friends but decreases trust in others. There is a tendency for trust to fall as village and city relative income falls, most powerfully for the categories below and much below average income, significantly so in rural China. Years of education raise trust only for relatives and friends in the city. There is a curious contrast between urban and rural people in the effect of age on trust. In the urban sample the relationship is significantly u-shape in two of the three cases; in the rural sample it is inverse u-shaped for all three notions of trust. The former result – trust strengthening with age – is more understandable than the latter. As

expected, the urban self-employed are less trusting (except in the case of relatives and friends) than the urban wage employed, but there is effectively no rural difference – possibly because rural wage employees are ill-protected against duplicity. Minority people are generally less trusting in the cities but not in the villages. Being in good health appears to foster trust; the effect is significant among rural people.

The explanatory variables included in Table 11 all represent personal characteristics. It is plausible that trust is more influenced by characteristics of the community or the society. We have suggested that the extent of trust by an individual depends on the average extent of trust in the community. China has traditionally lacked a good commercial law system. For that reason, it has been important to develop trust within social networks, known as *guanxi.* This particular form of social network, involving mutual obligations, can be understood as an historical and cultural response to that lack. It might also produce a lack of fellow-feeling and cooperation beyond the *guanxiwen.* This helps to explain why trust in relatives and friends tends to be higher on average than trust in others (Tables 4 and 5). China's hierarchical distribution of power has at times meant that those with power over others have lacked accountability, with consequent feelings of mistrust among those who have experienced, or are aware of, abuse of power.

9. The determinants of village harmony

Our concern is to measure the determinants of village harmony in rural China in 2002. The dependent variable (ranging in principle from 0 to 4) has a mean village value of 2.82 and standard deviation 0.52. The median score lies between so-so and harmonious. The explanatory variables are either village characteristics or the mean village value of household (or household head) characteristics. Two specifications are reported: one with all possible explanatory variables of interest (column 2), and the other with only those showing statistically significant coefficients (column 3). Except for possession of a village clinic, none of these coefficients changes notably in size nor at all in significance when the other variables are excluded.

There are some surprisingly non-significant variables. None of the likely associations with village prosperity – income per capita, wealth

per capita, and average years of education – appear to raise village harmony. Nor do the predominance of a single surname in the village, nor a lack of migrants from the village

The significant correlates of village harmony concern the composition of village society, its social relations, its health and its terrain. The relationship between average age of respondent and village harmony is downward sloping over the relevant range. The implication is that village harmony declines as the village population ages. The greater the share of female respondents and the greater the share of ethnic minorities in the village population, the greater the positive association with village harmony. Living in a hilly or mountainous terrain is bad for harmony. The average social network score, measured by the number of gifts made, has an important positive association with village harmony. The two correlated variables, social network and village harmony, were both found to promote a sense of village community (Table 7)

The estimated coefficients are merely correlates of village harmony and do not establish causality. Nevertheless, the results suggest that indicators of village prosperity are not important for village harmony whereas some social relationships among villagers, such as networking and intermediation, might be harmonizing.

10. Conclusion and reflection

Economic analysis is generally conducted on the assumption that individuals (or households) maximise their welfare subject to constraints. These constraints are generally assumed to be economic, such as the availability of resources to the individual (or household). The economic approach is therefore individualistic, taking as given the social or community environment in which economic decisions are made. Economists tend to ignore such variables or to accept them without scrutiny. It might be argued in support that they are correct to play down socioeconomic variables which cannot be rigorously analysed or reliably quantified.

The counterargument might be that such neglect prevents a full understanding of variables about which economists are indeed concerned, such as wellbeing. The wider social context can be directly or indirectly important if it is an

exogenous or endogenous determinant of well-being. Institutions, culture, norms, and policies can help to promote fairness, trust and sense of community, and these can improve the 'quality' of society, and so can raise subjective well-being. Individual decision-making might be influenced by such contextual variables, which might in turn be adapted to the playing out of individual decision-making.

The paper provides empirical support for this general argument. There are seven main findings:

1. Higher reported fairness scores are strongly associated with greater happiness in both rural and urban China. Perceptions of fairness ameliorate the effect of perceived relative income position on happiness, and this effect is strongest for people in the poorest urban income quarter.

2. High reported trust scores are strongly associated with greater happiness in both rural and urban China, with trust in relatives and friends, rather than in others, particularly important in the villages. Average trust scores in the locality are also associated with greater happiness, suggesting that the general level of trustworthiness in the community is valued.

3. The strength of community at the village level in rural China – as measured by cooperative practices, perceived village harmony, and number of gifts – is strongly associated with greater happiness.

4. When the unit of analysis is city or village and not the individual, the coefficients of the test variables remain significantly positive: individual personality does not explain the association between the test variables and happiness.

5. Instrumenting the test variables by means of internal instruments creates coefficients that are positive and similar to the corresponding OLS coefficients, but the estimates might not be reliable.

6. Perceptions of fairness, trust, and village harmony are associated with individual or locality variables that can plausibly help to explain them.

7. Reported perceptions of our test variables are not high, particularly fairness and societal trust.

It is arguable that the nihilistic individualism and commodification which are sometimes observed in Chinese society[12] erodes fairness, trust and sense of community. Correction would involve policies and institutions to modify Chinese culture towards a set of moral sentiments that are better for society.

In their recent books, both Carney (2021) and Shafik (2021) argue that society relies on social norms and conventions – including perceptions of fairness, trust and community - for maintaining socioeconomic stability and economic efficiency. Stemming from self-interested mutual sympathy among people, society has engendered a sense of community and a social contract restraining harmful selfish behaviour – which, both authors aver, is now endangered in some market-obsessed economies. Our evidence that variables representing fairness, trust and community can raise happiness scores in China adds a brush stroke to that bigger picture.

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[12] For instance, by Wang Huning, an eminence grize who has the ear of the leadership.

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Table 1: The effect on happiness of measures of fairness, urban China, 2002

	Mean	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent variable				
Happiness score	2.50			
	(0.84)			
Personal variables				
Age (years)	46.35	-0.0482***	-0.0333***	-0.0276***
	(11.09)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Age squared	2271.27	0.0005***	0.0004***	0.0003***
	(1096.53)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Male (sex)	0.45	-0.0555**	-0.0551**	-0.0633***
	(0.50)	(0.0171)	(0.0129)	(0.0038)
Married	0.94	0.2151***	0.1271	0.1238
	(0.24)	(0.0079)	(0.1001)	(0.1043)
Divorced	0.01	-0.1826	-0.2640**	-0.2752**
	(0.12)	(0.1326)	(0.0226)	(0.0160)
Widowed	0.03	0.0075	-0.0613	-0.0661
	(0.16)	(0.9440)	(0.5453)	(0.5086)
Ethnic minority dummy	0.04	0.0376	0.0566	0.0628
	(0.19)	(0.4998)	(0.2875)	(0.2310)
Education (years)	10.98	0.0006	-0.0020	-0.0020
	(3.17)	(0.8661)	(0.5723)	(0.5756)
In good health	0.61	0.2590***	0.2091***	0.1971***
	(0.49)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Economic variables				
Log of per capita household income 2002 (Yuan)	8.87	0.2795***	0.1463***	0.1426***
	(0.59)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Net wealth ('000 Yuan)	3.05	0.0662***	0.0329***	0.0296***
	(1.27)	(0.0000)	(0.0005)	(0.0015)
Perceptions of relative income variables				
Perceived income in 2nd quarter of city	0.34		-0.3350***	-0.3204***
	(0.47)		(0.0044)	(0.0057)
Perceived income in 3rd quarter of city	0.56		-0.6585***	-0.6128***
	(0.50)		(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Perceived income in 4th quarter of city	0.10		-1.2658***	-1.1740***
	(0.30)		(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Fairness variables				
Combined fairness score	1.60			0.1018***
	(1.27)			(0.0000)
Constant		0.4767**	2.1672***	1.8898***
		(0.0428)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
R-squared		0.1058	0.1882	0.2108
Number of observations		5542	5542	5542

Source: CHIP 2002, urban survey. Notes: Columns 1-7 report coefficients from happiness equations. The omitted dummy variables are: female sex, marital status single, Han, not in good health, at average village income. Probabilities are reported in brackets below coefficients. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.

Table 2: The effect on happiness of measures of fairness, rural China, 2002

	Mean	(1)	(2)
Dependent variable			
Happiness score	2.70		
	(0.87)		
Personal variables			
Age (years)	45.30	-0.0068	-0.0110*
	(10.52)	(0.3076)	(0.0755)
Age squared	2162.86	0.0001*	0.0002**
	(984.24)	(0.0556)	(0.0127)
Male (sex)	0.76	-0.0785***	-0.0812***
	(0.43)	(0.0010)	(0.0003)
Married	0.95	0.1173	0.1199*
	(0.21)	(0.1044)	(0.0768)
Divorced	0.00	-0.6655***	-0.6189***
	(0.05)	(0.0008)	(0.0009)
Widowed	0.02	-0.2511***	-0.2006**
	(0.15)	(0.0083)	(0.0247)
Ethnic minority dummy	0.13	0.0932***	0.0625**
	(0.34)	(0.0011)	(0.0197)
Education (years)	7.22	0.0070*	-0.0021
	(2.55)	(0.0786)	(0.5839)
In good health	0.75	0.5218***	0.3992***
	(0.43)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Economic variables			
Log of per capita household income 2002 (Yuan)	7.67	0.1580***	0.0844***
	(0.66)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Net wealth ('000 Yuan)	1.12	0.0688***	0.0515***
	(1.58)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Working hours	17.09	-0.0028**	-0.0032***
	(9.23)	(0.0106)	(0.0015)
Perceptions of relative income variables			
Village income much above average income	0.02		0.2709***
	(0.13)		(0.0001)
Village income above average income	0.20		0.1896***
	(0.40)		(0.0000)
Village income below average income	0.19		-0.3891***
	(0.39)		(0.0000)
Village income much below average income	0.02		-1.0946***
	(0.15)		(0.0000)
Fairness variables			
Fairness score	8.15		0.0618***
	(2.24)		(0.0000)

Constant	0.9674***	1.4021***
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
R-squared	0.1297	0.2341
Number of observations	7273	7273

Source: CHIP 2002, rural survey. Notes: Columns 2 and 3 report the coefficients of the happiness equations. The omitted dummy variable categories are: female sex, marital status single, Han, not in good health, at average village income. Probabilities are shown in brackets below coefficients. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.

Table 3: The effect on happiness of interaction between perceived city income quarter and reported fairness category: combined fairness, national fairness, and city fairness, urban China 2002

	Quarter 1	Quarter 2	Quarter 3	Quarter 4
Panel 1: combined fairness				
Fairness 1	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Fairness 2	0.0000	0.3828	0.4487	0.3401
		(0.1762)	(0.1112)	(0.2392)
Fairness 3	0.0000	0.2394	0.3904	0.6424*
		(0.5050)	(0.2760)	(0.0949)
Panel 2: national fairness				
Fairness 1	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Fairness 2	0.0000	0.1194	0.2002	0.1183
		(0.6853)	(0.4947)	(0.6932)
Fairness 3	0.0000	0.4442	0.6052*	0.9487**
		(0.2140)	(0.0896)	(0.0129)
Panel 3: city fairness				
Fairness 1	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Fairness 2	0.0000	0.3908	0.4503	0.2947
		(0.1730)	(0.1144)	(0.3124)
Fairness 3	0.0000	0.2277	0.4040	0.6769*
		(0.5018)	(0.2321)	(0.0622)
	Quarter 1	Quarter 2	Quarter 3	Quarter 4
Panel 4: combined fairness with and without interaction terms				
Income quarter coefficients:				
Equation without interaction terms	0.0000	-0.3182***	-0.6107***	-1.1744***
		(0.0060)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Equation with interaction terms	0.0000	-0.5896**	-0.9371***	-1.4712***
		(0.0137)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)
		Fairness 1	Fairness 2	Fairness 3
Fairness coefficients:				
Equation without interaction terms		0.0000	0.1819***	0.4349***
			(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Equation with interaction terms		0.0000	-0.2364	0.0980
			(0.3990)	(0.7824)

Source: CHIP 2002. Notes: The perceived city income categories are top quarter (Q1), 2nd quarter, 3rd quarter, and bottom quarter (Q4). In the combined fairness equation, scores of 0-1 are fairness 1, of 2-3 are fairness 2, and of 4-6 are fairness 3. In the national fairness and city fairness equations, scores of 0 (not at all fair) are fairness 1, of 1(unfair) are fairness 2, and of 2-3 (fair or very fair) are fairness 3. There are only a few cases of very fair. Probabilities are reported in brackets below coefficients. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.



Figure1: Depicting low-level and high-level trust equilibria

Table 4: The effect on happiness of measures of trust, urban China, 2013

	Mean	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable					
Happiness score	2.73				
	(0.79)				
Trust variables					
Trust score relatives and friends	3.79	0.1470***			0.1149***
	(0.89)	(0.0000)			(0.0000)
Trust score others	3.03		0.1421***		0.0967***
	(0.82)		(0.0000)		(0.0000)
Combined trust score	6.82			0.1064***	
	(1.41)			(0.0000)	
Constant		1.2629***	1.2939***	1.0673***	1.0700***
		(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Adjusted R squared		0.1812	0.1757	0.1892	0.1891
Number of observations		4091	4091	4091	4091

Source: CHIP 2013 urban data. Notes: The specification included the usual control variables age, age squared, male, married, divorced, widowed, ethnicity, education years, perception of health status, log of per capita household income, log of financial assets, working hours and perceived city income categories. The friends and relatives trust and others trust variables are based on answers to the questions, "Would you say that your relatives or friends(others), are trustworthy? The possible answers to these questions were, (1) Not trustworthy at all; (2) Not very trustworthy; (3) So-so; (4) Trustworthy; (5) Very trustworthy; (6) Unsure/no answer. Those who selected 6 were excluded from the analysis. The responses were cardinalized, with scores ranging from 1 to 5.

Table 5: The effect on happiness of measures of trust, rural China, 2013

	Mean	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable					
Happiness score	2.58				
	(0.82)				
Trust variables					
Trust score relatives and friends	3.81	0.1583***			0.1363***
	(0.86)	(0.0000)			(0.0000)
Trust score others	3.20		0.1160***		0.0554***
	(0.82)		(0.0000)		(0.0000)
Combined trust score	7.01			0.0974***	
	(1.42)			(0.0000)	
Constant		1.3600***	1.5371***	1.2682***	1.2657***
		(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Adjusted R squared		0.2074	0.1931	0.2079	0.2098
Number of observations		9302	9302	9302	9302

Source: CHIP 2013 rural data. Notes: As for Table 4 but with perceived village income categories as control variables instead of perceived city income categories.

Table 6. The effect on happiness of trust in the locality, urban and rural China, 2013

	Urban			Rural	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable					
Mean happiness score	2.73	2.73			
	(0.79)	(0.79)			
Panel 1: Trust in relatives and friends					
Sample mean trust score	3.79	3.79	3.81	3.81	3.81
	(0.89)	(0.89)			
			Coefficients		
Individual trust score	0.1222***	0.1433***	0.1160***	0.1397***	0.1572***
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Locality mean trust score					
City	0.1143***				
	(0.0003)				
Province		0.2734**			0.0423
		(0.0194)			(0.4189)
Village			0.1172***		
			(0.0000)		
County				0.1423***	
				(0.0000)	
Adjusted R squared	0.1837	0.1821	0.2109	0.2099	0.2074
Observations	4091	4091	9302	9302	9302
Panel 2: Trust in others					
Sample mean trust score	3.03	3.03	3.20	3.20	3.20
	(0.82)	(0.82)			
			Coefficients		
Individual trust in others score	0.1204***	0.1412***	0.0992***	0.1122***	0.1163***
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Locality mean trust score					
City	0.0889***				
	(0.0063)				
Province		0.1064			-0.0096
		(0.4665)			(0.8687)
Village			0.0451**		
			(0.0198)		
County				0.0301	
				(0.2790)	
Adjusted R squared	0.1770	0.1756	0.1935	0.1931	0.1930
Observations	4091	4091	9302	9302	9302
Panel 3: Combined trust					
Sample mean trust score	6.82	6.82	7.01	7.01	7.01
	(1.41)	(1.41)			
			Coefficients		

Individual combined trust score	0.0913***	0.1050***	0.0779***	0.0904***	0.0975***
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Locality mean trust score					
City	0.0618***				
	(0.0009)				
Province		0.1069			-0.0033
		(0.1240)			(0.9131)
Village			0.0513***		
			(0.0000)		
County				0.0499***	
				(0.0010)	
Adjusted R squared	0.1912	0.1895	0.2097	0.2088	0.2079
Observations	4091	4091	9302	9302	9302

Source: CHIP urban and rural data sets. Notes: All the explanatory variables in Tables 4 and 5 are included in the estimation but not reported. The meaning and calculation of the trust score is explained in the text or table notes.

Table 7. The effects of three measures of community on happiness in happiness functions, rural China, 2002

	Mean	Coefficients				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable						
Happiness score	2.70					
	(0.86)					
Explanatory variables						
Age (years)	45.27	-0.0068	-0.0080	-0.0061	-0.0032	-0.0042
	(10.47)	(0.0066)	(0.0068)	(0.0065)	(0.0070)	(0.0071)
Age squared	2159.21	0.0001*	0.0001**	0.0001*	0.0001	0.0001
	(977.19)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Male (sex)	0.76	-0.0785***	-0.0825***	-0.0661***	-0.0722***	-0.0656**
	(0.42)	(0.0238)	(0.0246)	(0.0235)	(0.0250)	(0.0255)
Married	0.95	0.1173	0.1423*	0.1035	0.0483	0.0787
	(0.21)	(0.0722)	(0.0753)	(0.0711)	(0.0748)	(0.0767)
Divorced	0.00	-0.6655***	-0.6536***	-0.7006***	-0.7521***	-0.7660***
	(0.05)	(0.1990)	(0.2049)	(0.1959)	(0.2036)	(0.2067)
Widowed	0.02	-0.2511***	-0.2460**	-0.2753***	-0.3317***	-0.3327***
	(0.15)	(0.0951)	(0.0983)	(0.0936)	(0.0993)	(0.1009)
Ethnic minority dummy	0.15	0.0932***	0.0763***	0.0636**	0.0516*	0.0168
	(0.35)	(0.0285)	(0.0293)	(0.0281)	(0.0292)	(0.0296)
Education (years)	7.21	0.0070*	0.0073*	0.0053	0.0070*	0.0059
	(2.55)	(0.0040)	(0.0041)	(0.0039)	(0.0042)	(0.0043)
In good health	0.75	0.5218***	0.5208***	0.4831***	0.5211***	0.4837***
	(0.43)	(0.0225)	(0.0232)	(0.0222)	(0.0235)	(0.0240)
Log of per capita household income 2002 (Yuan)	7.66	0.1580***	0.1512***	0.1504***	0.1572***	0.1509***
	(0.66)	(0.0164)	(0.0170)	(0.0162)	(0.0173)	(0.0177)
Net wealth ('000 Yuan)	1.09	0.0688***	0.0664***	0.0659***	0.0693***	0.0637***
	(1.60)	(0.0067)	(0.0069)	(0.0066)	(0.0069)	(0.0071)
Working hours	17.06	-0.0028**	-0.0029***	-0.0029***	-0.0026**	-0.0030**
	(9.16)	(0.0011)	(0.0011)	(0.0011)	(0.0011)	(0.0012)
Aggregate public services score	4.91		0.0071***			0.0063***
	(6.49)		(0.0015)			(0.0016)
Extent of village harmony	2.85			0.1861***		0.1786***
	(0.77)			(0.0122)		(0.0132)
Number of gifts	9.63				0.0035***	0.0033***
	(11.50)				(0.0009)	(0.0009)
Constant		0.9674***	0.9951***	0.5508***	0.9242***	0.4844**
		(0.1850)	(0.1923)	(0.1841)	(0.1943)	(0.2015)
R-squared		0.1297	0.1320	0.1568	0.1336	0.1618
Number of observations		7273	6845	7273	6588	6196

Source: CHIP 2002, rural survey. Notes: Columns 1-5 report the coefficients of the happiness equations. The omitted dummy variable categories are: female sex, marital status single, Han, not in

good health, at average village income. Standard errors are shown in brackets below coefficients. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.

Table 8. Coefficients on mean and individual values of the test variables

	Means	Individuals
T 2013 Combined trust score		
Urban	0.1454***	0.1064***
Rural	0.1101***	0.0974***
F 2002 Combined fairness score		
Urban	0.0885	0.1018***
Rural	0.0656***	0.0618***
C 2002 Rural community scores		
Village harmony	0.2609***	0.1861***
Aggregate village services	0.0121***	0.0071***
The number of gifts	0.0029	0.0035***

Table 9: Estimates of the coefficient on the trust score, the fairness score, and the harmony score in the happiness function, OLS and internal IV

		OLS	IV
Combined trust 2013			
Urban	Coefficient	0.1197***	0.2967
	Standard error	(0.0132)	(0.2570)
	Heteroskedasticity test (p)		0.000
	Weak instruments test (F)		1.115
Rural	Coefficient	0.0964***	0.0821
	Standard error	(0.0000)	(0.0931)
	Heteroskedasticity test (p)		0.000
	Weak instruments test (F)		6.102
Combined fairness 2002			
Urban	Coefficient	0.1789***	-0.0643
	Standard error	(0.0218)	(0.1786)
	Heteroskedasticity test (p)		0.000
	Weak instruments test (F)		2.632
Rural	Coefficient	0.0616***	0.0784*
	Standard error	(0.0000)	(0.0445)
	Heteroskedasticity test (p)		0.000
	Weak instruments test (F)		6.054
Village harmony 2002			
Rural	Coefficient	0.2086***	0.2357*
	Standard error	(0.0000)	(0.0965)
	Heteroskedasticity test (p)		0.0013
	Weak instruments test (F)		2.785

Notes: Either all explanatory variables (except the constant term) or all continuous explanatory variables are used to create the internal instrument in each case. The White-Koenker p-test of heteroskedasticity of the errors and the Cragg-Donald-Wald test of weak instruments are employed.

Table 10. The determinants of reported fairness, urban and rural China, 2002

	Means		Coefficients	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Dependent variable			(1)	(2)
Mean fairness score	1.59	8.15		
	(1.27)	(2.24)		
Explanatory variables				
Ln per capita household income 2002 (yuan)	8.87	7.67	0.0415	0.1210***
	(0.58)	(0.66)	(0.2414)	(0.0071)
Income relative to city/village mean				
Income much above village average		0.02		0.4502**
		(0.13)		(0.0236)
City living standard at second 25%/ income above village average	0.34	0.20	-0.0830	0.0549
	(0.47)	(0.40)	(0.6513)	(0.4211)
City living standard at third 25%/income below village average	0.56	0.19	-0.3880**	-0.3592***
	(0.50)	(0.39)	(0.0348)	(0.0000)
City living standard at bottom 25%/income much below village average	0.10	0.02	-0.8327***	-0.3150*
	(0.30)	(0.15)	(0.0000)	(0.0724)
Net wealth ('000 Yuan)	3.04	1.12	0.0334**	0.0412**
	(1.27)	(1.58)	(0.0264)	(0.0238)
Education (years)	10.95	7.22	-0.0002	0.0419***
	(3.17)	(2.55)	(0.9743)	(0.0001)
Male	0.46	0.76	0.0656*	-0.1121*
	(0.50)	(0.43)	(0.0613)	(0.0938)
Age	46.63	45.30	-0.0543***	0.0271
	(11.21)	(10.52)	(0.0000)	(0.1120)
Age squared	2300.00	2162.86	0.0006***	-0.0001
	(1117.31)	(984.24)	(0.0000)	(0.5162)
Self employed	0.05	0.55	0.1544*	0.4642**
	(0.22)	(0.50)	(0.0586)	(0.0380)
Wage employed	0.63	0.44	0.0867*	0.7450***
	(0.48)	(0.50)	(0.0572)	(0.0010)
Ethnic minority dummy	0.04	0.13	-0.0638	0.4412***
	(0.19)	(0.34)	(0.4567)	(0.0000)
In good health	0.61	0.75	0.1147***	0.5357***
	(0.49)	(0.43)	(0.0008)	(0.0000)
Constant			2.5528***	4.9985***
			(0.0000)	(0.0000)

Adjusted R squared	0.0475	0.0362
Number of observations	5749	7273

Source: CHIP 2002 urban and rural data. The dependent variable is the combined trust score. The omitted dummy variable categories are: at average village income for the rural specification and living standard in top 25% for urban specification, female sex, marital status single, not employed, Han, not in good health. Standard errors are shown beneath coefficients. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.

Table 11. The determinants of reported trust, urban and rural China, 2013

	Means		Coefficients					
	Urban	Rural	Urban			Rural		
			Relatives and friends trust (1)	Others' trust (2)	Combined Trust (3)	Relatives and friends trust (4)	Others' trust (5)	Combined Trust (6)
Dependent variable								
Mean trust scores			3.79	3.03	6.82	3.81	3.20	7.01
			(0.90)	(0.82)	(1.41)	(0.86)	(0.82)	(1.42)
Explanatory variables								
Ln per capita household income (yuan)	10.03	9.17	0.0040	-0.0406**	-0.0366	0.0214**	-0.0294***	-0.0080
	(0.66)	(0.92)	(0.8490)	(0.0345)	(0.2688)	(0.0439)	(0.0034)	(0.6462)
Income relative to city/village mean								
Much above average	0.01	0.01	0.0072	-0.2018**	-0.1946	0.1125	0.1591*	0.2716*
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.9467)	(0.0415)	(0.2542)	(0.2438)	(0.0812)	(0.0861)
Above average	0.15	0.17	0.0623*	0.1198***	0.1821***	0.1083***	0.0472**	0.1556***
	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.0654)	(0.0001)	(0.0006)	(0.0000)	(0.0455)	(0.0001)
Below average	0.23	0.20	-0.0819***	-0.1380***	-0.2199***	-0.0718***	-0.0906***	-0.1624***
	(0.42)	(0.40)	(0.0047)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0021)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Much below average	0.05	0.04	-0.1499***	-0.2409***	-0.3908***	-0.1087**	-0.0856**	-0.1944***
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.0086)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0156)	(0.0439)	(0.0084)
Net wealth ('000 yuan)	10.34	9.20	0.0013	-0.0069	-0.0056	0.0005	-0.0005	-0.0000
	(1.82)	(2.75)	(0.8505)	(0.2818)	(0.6137)	(0.8879)	(0.8793)	(0.9988)
Education (years)	10.60	7.24	0.0139***	0.0068*	0.0207***	0.0060*	0.0002	0.0062
	(3.48)	(2.86)	(0.0005)	(0.0630)	(0.0010)	(0.0910)	(0.9601)	(0.2894)
Male	0.50	0.66	-0.0334	-0.0028	-0.0362	-0.0283	0.0459**	0.0176

	(0.50)	(0.47)	(0.1633)	(0.8978)	(0.3371)	(0.1593)	(0.0158)	(0.5940)
Age	48.88	50.60	-0.0069	-0.0070	-0.0139*	0.0086**	0.0161***	0.0248***
	(13.67)	(12.66)	(0.1767)	(0.1333)	(0.0838)	(0.0329)	(0.0000)	(0.0002)
Age squared	2576.16	2720.25	0.0001	0.0001**	0.0002**	-0.0001*	-0.0001***	-0.0002***
	(1408.11)	(1295.56)	(0.1697)	(0.0306)	(0.0334)	(0.0773)	(0.0007)	(0.0024)
Self employed	0.07	0.08	0.0449	0.0425	0.0875	-0.0857**	-0.0990***	-0.1847***
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.3562)	(0.3393)	(0.2541)	(0.0134)	(0.0025)	(0.0012)
Wage employed	0.52	0.36	0.0146	0.0562**	0.0708	-0.0688***	-0.0876***	-0.1565***
	(0.50)	(0.48)	(0.6335)	(0.0449)	(0.1425)	(0.0011)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Ethnic minority dummy	0.05	0.07	-0.1108**	-0.1012**	-0.2119**	-0.0253	0.0240	-0.0014
	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.0459)	(0.0459)	(0.0153)	(0.4660)	(0.4661)	(0.9805)
In good health	0.70	0.68	0.1275***	0.1075***	0.2350***	0.1248***	0.1000***	0.2248***
	(0.46)	(0.47)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Constant			3.6839***	3.4489***	7.1327***	3.2910***	2.9541***	6.2451***
			(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Adjusted R squared			0.0138	0.0178	0.0209	0.0126	0.0122	0.0144
Number of observations			5968	5968	5968	9321	9321	9321

Source: CHIP 2013 urban and rural data. The omitted dummy variable categories are: at average city/village income, female sex, marital status single, not employed, Han, not in good health. Standard errors are shown beneath coefficients. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.

Table 12. The determinants of reported village harmony, rural China, 2002

	Mean or proportion	Coefficients	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent variable	2.82		
	(0.52)		
Explanatory variables			
Mean age of village respondent	45.36	-0.0654**	-0.0552**
	(4.87)	(0.0283)	(0.0265)
Square of mean age	2171.82	0.0007**	0.0006**
	(454.56)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Share of male respondents	0.75	-0.1682**	-0.1394*
	(0.23)	(0.0775)	(0.0713)
Share of ethnic minorities in total village population	0.16	0.1495***	0.1457***
	(0.35)	(0.0512)	(0.0476)
Average self-reported health of respondents in village	0.74	0.3013***	0.2981***
	(0.24)	(0.0688)	(0.0656)
Hilly or mountainous region	0.51	-0.0705**	-0.0552*
	(0.50)	(0.0345)	(0.0316)
Average social network score	7.53	0.0947***	0.0941***
	(2.13)	(0.0076)	(0.0073)
Average log of per capita income in village	7.65	0.0207	0.0304
	(0.46)	(0.0473)	(0.0346)
Share of divorced respondents	0.00	-0.9611	
	(0.02)	(0.8178)	
Share of widowed respondents	0.02	-0.4136	
	(0.06)	(0.3845)	
Average years of education of respondents	7.10	-0.0008	
	(1.35)	(0.0132)	
Average net wealth ('000 Yuan)	1.12	-0.0042	
	(1.22)	(0.0169)	
Average working hours	16.99	0.0035	
	(5.58)	(0.0030)	
Share living in a suburb	0.08	-0.0111	
	(0.27)	(0.0611)	
Total village population end 2002 ('00s)	18.15	-0.0001	
	(11.77)	(0.0014)	
More than half of village households belonging to largest surnames	0.30	-0.0320	

	(0.46)	(0.0351)	
No clinic in village	0.09	-0.0662	
	(0.29)	(0.0585)	
No collective system of medical insurance	0.89	-0.0326	
	(0.31)	(0.0511)	
Constant		3.4224***	2.9268***
		(0.7024)	(0.6316)
R-squared		0.2171	0.2078
Number of observations		900	952

Source: CHIP 2002, rural survey. Notes: Columns 2-3 report the coefficients of the village harmony equations. The omitted dummy variable categories are: female sex, marital status single, Han, not in good health, at average village income. Standard deviations and standard errors are shown in brackets below the means and the coefficients. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.