‘The legitimate’ after the uprisings: justice, equity, and language politics in Morocco

Kaoutar Ghilani, University of Oxford

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ABSTRACT

Debates on languages have been omnipresent in the Moroccan public space since independence. This article examines the regimes of justification employed by language advocates to approach historically the norms of legitimacy, i.e., ‘the legitimate.’ It argues that a new discourse on languages has emerged in 2011 in Morocco employing *justice* and *equity* as the main legitimating principles in language politics. After the phases of *unity* (justifying the Arabisation policy, which replaced French by Standard Arabic in administrations, courts, and schools) and *recognition* (supporting the standardisation of Tamazight and its recognition as an official language), the discursive shift to *justice* and *equity* in 2011 marks the entry of Morocco in a third phase in language politics and points out a shift in the norms underpinning political legitimacy. The article highlights that the 2011 uprisings in Morocco, though seemingly unsuccessful, did nonetheless provoke an evolution of ‘the legitimate’ in Moroccan politics.

Keywords: Legitimacy, Arab Uprisings, Morocco, Language Politics, Justice, Equity

In February 2016, the Moroccan Ministry of Education decided to restore French as the language for teaching sciences in the technological track in high school, thus replacing Standard

Arabic which had been the language of instruction since the 1980s.[1] In December 2016, a Darija-Darija dictionary (Moroccan Arabic dialect) in the Arabic alphabet was published by a group of Moroccan linguists under the supervision of Noureddine Ayouch, the most vocal advocate of the use of Darija as a language of instruction in school.[2] Both the Ministry's decision to use French instead of Arabic in the technological track and the publication of the Darija-Darija dictionary have been lauded by some and highly criticised by others. The Ministry of Education's detractors described its move as neocolonial, placing independent Morocco in the realm of France's cultural hegemony.[3] The Darija-Darija dictionary opponents underlined what they considered to be an imperialistic project disguised as a scientific enterprise—as the first dialect dictionaries in the region were produced by orientalists to allow the colonial project to take root.[4] In December 2017, the Moroccan House of Representatives started studying a draft of an organic law aiming to implement the official status of the Amazigh language (Berber). This bill, promised in the 2011 Constitution, was received with severe criticism from Amazigh activists. They described it as insufficient in comparison to the promises of the Constitution as it only announced the steps towards the officialisation without clear directives

[1] Omar Brouksy, 'Le Maroc enterre trente ans d'arabisation pour retourner au français', *Le Monde*, February 19, 2016, http://lemde.fr/1Rc76LF (accessed May 17, 2017).

[2] Youssef Ait Akdim, 'Noureddine Ayouch, l'homme qui offre à l'arabe marocain ses lettres de noblesse', *Le Monde Afrique*, February 2, 2017, https://lemde.fr/2rrOXCG (accessed April 2, 2018).

[3] BBC Arabic, 'Tadrīs al-mawād al-ʿilmiyya bil-faransiyya yuthīr jadalan fī al-maghrib' [The Teaching of Science Subjects in French Causes Controversy in Morocco], March 1, 2016, https://bbc.in/2q2MXRg (accessed April 2, 2018).

[4] Hespress, 'Bath mubāshir: jadal bayna al-fuṣḥā wa-al-dārija' [Live streaming: Debate Between Literary Arabic and Darija], *YouTube*, December 29, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eMmSSKUt2jg (accessed May 17, 2017).

on how to implement them.[5] In June 2019, the organic law was passed in an atmosphere of dissatisfaction among Amazigh activists.[6] In July 2019, the framework law of education was adopted after months of tensed negotiations and debates concerning the language of tuition. Whereas the Ministry of Education pushed for the use of French as a language of tuition, the PJD (Islamists) and the Istiqlal party (nationalists) fought for the maintaining of Arabic as the only teaching language in school.[7]

These events are the latest in a long series of controversies about languages in Morocco since its independence from the French protectorate regime (1912-1956). At the time of independence Morocco was a linguistic mosaic.[8] On the one hand, different written languages were used: Standard Arabic, French, and Spanish (in the part of Morocco that was administered by Spain). On the other hand, there were multiple oral languages: Darija (Moroccan Arabic

[5] Tahar Abou El Farah, 'Le débat du projet de loi organique démarre sur fond de polémique', *Aujourd'hui le Maroc*, December 27, 2017, https://bit.ly/2HoZrLC (accessed April 2, 2018). Hespress, 'ʿAṣīd: mashrūʿ al-qānūn al-tanẓīmī lil-ʾamāzīghīyya mukhālif lil-dustūr' [Assid: the Draft of the Organic Law on the Amazigh Language Contradicts the Constitution], August 13, 2016, https://www.hespress.com/tamazight/317601.html (accessed May 17, 2017).

[6] TelQuel, 'Le projet de loi organique sur l'amazigh adopté au parlement', June 11, 2019, https://bit.ly/2mpes9u (accessed September 10, 2019).

[7] Abdelali El Hourri, 'Un événement : La loi-cadre de l'enseignement adoptée en commission parlementaire', *Medias24*, July 17, 2019, https://bit.ly/2ndn6Zn (accessed September 10, 2019).

[8] Adballah Koucha, 'La gestion de la politique linguistique dans un espace francophone : l'exemple du Maroc', in *La coexistence des langues dans l'espace francophone, approche macrosociolinguistique. Deuxièmes journées scientifiques du Réseau de l'AUF - Rabat 25-28 Septembre 1998*, ed. Pierre Dumont and Christine Santodomingo (Montreal: AUPELF- UREF, 2000), 279.

dialect), Tashelḥit, Tamazight, Tarifit (Amazigh dialects), and Ḥassāniyya (Arabic dialect).[9] This already complex picture is a simplification, for each dialect comprised regional variants. The combination of multilingualism and diglossia in a postcolonial context has made legislation on languages a delicate issue.

Laws, public life, public administration, and schools are all places where the state has to communicate and where the choice of one or more languages is inevitable. In other words, 'the state speaks'.[10] As it is the institution that regulates the use of languages in the public space, it is both the receiver of linguistic demands between which it arbitrates and is the holder of a linguistic performative power. *Language politics* refers to the domain in which language is a political object. It includes (i) language policy, i.e., the state's actions on collective language choices through institutional means, in particular by adopting linguistic legislation and by determining the language or languages of the public space, and (ii) demands put forward by non-state actors aiming to change the language policy.[11]

In this article, I examine the discourses on languages put forward by these actors. Instead of simply asking *what* the advocated linguistic policies are at a given time, I focus on *how* these policies are justified. I argue that the *regimes of justification* employed by language advocates constitute a domain in which different understandings of legitimacy can be identified. In other words, conceptions of what is legitimate underlie the justifications of linguistic demands.

[9] Gilbert Grandguillaume, *Arabisation et politique linguistique au Maghreb* (Paris: Editions G.-P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1983), 14.

[10] Astrid von Busekist, 'Justice linguistique,' in *Dictionnaire des inégalités et de la justice sociale*, ed. Patrick Savidan (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2018), 1694.

[11] Astrid von Busekist, 'Politics of Language', in *International Encyclopedia of Political Science*, ed. Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and Leonardo Morlino.

The literature on the concept of legitimacy largely falls into two categories: normative and descriptive. The normative concept of legitimacy 'refers to some benchmark of acceptability or justification of political power or authority', while the descriptive one 'refers to people's beliefs about political authority and, sometimes, political obligations'.[12] Moral and political philosophers try to define legitimacy normatively so as to tackle what legitimacy *should be*. On the other hand, social scientists define legitimacy descriptively in order to understand what legitimacy *is*.

On Morocco, the scholarship has mainly approached legitimacy in two ways: as a fixed feature of the regime resulting from the sources of its claim to authoritative rule, and as a resource used by the regime to gain popular adhesion through legitimation processes. The first strand of the literature has majorly highlighted the traditional and religious sources of legitimacy associated with the monarchy.[13] An in-depth investigation of the interplay between the claim to legitimacy through tradition and people's beliefs has been provided by anthropological accounts of the regime, chief among which is the seminal work of Abdellah Hammoudi.[14] Focusing on the mechanisms of submission to power, Hammoudi analyses the emergence and development of the master-disciple diagram, which, he argues, is the source of

[12] Fabienne Peter, 'Political Legitimacy', in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Summer 2017 Edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab - Stanford University, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/legitimacy/ (accessed April 2, 2018).

[13] See for example: Michael C. Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1977); Oliver Schlumberger, 'Opening Old Bottles in Search of New Wine: On Nondemocratic Legitimacy in the Middle East', *Middle East Critique* 19, no. 3 (2010); Driss Maghraoui, 'The Strengths and Limits of Religious Reforms in Morocco', *Mediterranean Politics* 14, no. 2 (2009).

[14] Abdellah Hammoudi, *Master and Disciple: the Cultural Foundations of Moroccan Authoritarianism* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997).

Moroccan authoritarianism. More recently, a new scholarship has moved away from the sources of legitimacy and explored the legitimation strategies used by the monarchy, through the use of women's rights and rituals of power.[15]

The Arab uprisings have invited scholars to rethink legitimacy in the region. The survival of the Moroccan regime has been attributed to either the traditional legitimacy attached to the monarchy,[16] or the legitimation strategies it adopted as a response to the unrest, notably by adopting a new constitution.[17] While informative about power dynamics, these accounts are solely concerned with one aspect of the interplay between legitimacy and the uprisings, namely the impact of the regime's legitimacy and legitimation strategies on the trajectory of the contestation movement. The other aspect of their interplay, that is the effect of the uprisings on legitimacy, is neglected by the scholarship. As Steven Heydemann's argues, 'much of what

[15] See for example: Mohamed Daadaoui, *Moroccan Monarchy and the Islamist Challenge: Maintaining Makhzen Power* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Julie E. Pruzan-Jørgensen, 'Analyzing Authoritarian Regime Legitimation: Findings from Morocco', *Middle East Critique* 19, no. 3 (2010); James Sater, *Morocco: Challenges to Tradition and Modernity* (London and New York: Routledge, 2016); Aili Mari Tripp, *Seeking Legitimacy: Why Arab Autocracies Adopt Women's Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

[16] See for example: Raymond Hinnebusch, 'Change and Continuity after the Arab Uprising: The Consequences of State Formation in Arab North African State', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 1 (2015); Jack A. Goldstone, 'Regimes, Resources, and Regional Intervention : Understanding the Openings and Trajectories for Contention in the Middle East and North Africa', in *Popular Contention, Regime, and Transition: Arab Revolts in Comparative Global Perspective*, ed. Eitan Y. Alimi, Avraham Sela, and Mario Sznajder (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2016).

[17] See for example: Marc Lynch, *The Arab Uprising: the Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East* (New York: Public Affairs, 212); Eitan Y. Alimi, Avraham Sela, and Mario Sznajder, 'The Arab Revolts in Comparative Perspective: From Theory to Empirics and Back', in *Regime, and Transition: Arab Revolts in Comparative Global Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2016).

changed as a result of the uprisings is all too easily overlooked, including […] fundamental shifts in conceptions of political legitimacy, citizenship, and state-society relations'.[18] One effect that the uprisings have had on legitimacy has been described with regards to Egypt and Tunisia where the new [discursive] category of 'revolutionary legitimacy' emerged as a result of the revolts.[19] Yet in Morocco, this category has not taken shape and the 'transition' operated by the regime, chiefly through the adoption of a new constitution, leaves us wondering as to the impact, if any, that the uprisings have had on the conception of legitimacy.

This article analyses the evolution of the ideational content of legitimacy in Morocco resulting from the 2011 uprisings. In doing that, it builds on both David Beetham's and Lisa Wedeen's critiques of Max Weber's oft-cited definition of legitimacy.[20] Domination is legitimate, Weber argues, when the relevant social agents involved in it, both dominant and subordinate, believe it to be legitimate.[21] Beetham and Wedeen critique Weber's boiling down of legitimacy to the belief in legitimacy. 'What is mistaken', Beetham argues, 'is to divorce people's beliefs about legitimacy from their *grounds* or *reasons* for holding them' (emphasis in original). In her work on the cult of president Hafiz al-Asad in Syria, Wedeen rightly points out that Weber's understanding of legitimacy does not permit to distinguish between genuine belief and public dissimulation of loyalty, the latter being a common practice under authoritarian regimes. In a similar vein, Beetham argues that 'a given power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be *justified in terms of* their beliefs' (emphasis in original). Drawing on these insights, this article studies the *regimes of justification*

[18] Steven Heydemann, 'Explaining the Arab uprisings: transformations in comparative perspective', *Mediterranean Politics* 21, no. 1 (2016) :194.

[19] Lynch, *The Arab Uprising*, 39.

[20] David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1991), 6.

[21] Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1978), 213.

employed by Moroccan language advocates in the wake of the uprisings to support the validity and rightfulness of their demands. My aim is to unpack 'the legitimate'—i.e., the historically contingent *norms* and *values* that underpin legitimacy—in post-2011 Morocco. Distinguishing legitimacy and legitimation from the legitimate, this article does not therefore seek to assess the legitimacy of the Moroccan regime, state, or institutions, nor to evaluate the efficiency of their legitimation practices.

Debates on languages are an ideal object of study in which one can identify the norms and values deemed legitimate in Morocco. They represent 'a site of struggle through which the social order is maintained, challenged, produced, and reproduced'.[22] Language advocates' arguments are based on an evolving set of ideas conveying a certain sense of legitimacy. Hence debates on languages have been since independence, metaphorically, a continuously updated archive of the regimes of justification believed to be powerful at a certain time. The question of languages is all the more vivid in the education system where colonial legacy, neoliberalism, and the struggles of postcolonial states render multilingual and diglossic situations more complex.[23] Discourses of students, teachers, and parents on 'Morocco's educational crisis' have recently attracted the attention of anthropologists and sociologists, all underscoring that the linguistic situation favours social reproduction, regional discrepancies, and provokes a general

[22] Raka Shome and Radha Hegde, 'Culture, communication, and the challenge of globalization', *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 19, no. 2 (2002): 172.

[23] Charis Boutieri, 'Arduous Journeys on Roads Not [Yet] Taken: Language, Neoliberal Work Skills, and the Exhausted Educational Dream', *Jadaliyya*, March 13, 2014, accessed 3 September 2020: https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/30347 (accessed September 3, 2020); Charis Boutieri, *Learning in Morocco: Language Politics and the Abandoned Educational Dream* (Indiana University Press: 2016).

sense of 'educational incoherence'.[24] While language advocates are the primary producers of discourses on languages in Morocco, their regimes of justification are yet to be examined. A discourse analysis of language politics, focusing on documents and statements circulated in the public space by language advocates, will allow us to study the changing character of the normative structure of legitimacy in Moroccan politics.

Two pivotal language policies have marked the history of language politics in independent Morocco. The first was the Arabisation policy, implemented in the first years of independence and consisting of the replacement of French with Standard Arabic in the civil service and schools. Advanced as an act of self-decolonisation, the regime of justification supporting the Arabisation policy was built around the norm of *unity*. Arabisation was supported by nationalists with a salafi approach, best represented by Allal al-Fassi. He called for Islam to be the basis of the post-independence project and for the exclusive use of Arabic as the language of instruction and Moroccan culture.[25] The monarchy promoted a Moroccan Arab identity, thus solidifying its religious claim to legitimacy.[26] On the left of the political spectrum, Arab nationalists, but also Marxist-Leninists, supported Arabisation with a general call for unity

[24] Boutieri, *Learning in Morocco*, 5; Aomar Boum, 'The Political Coherence of Educational Incoherence: the Consequences of Educational Specialization in a Southern Moroccan Community', *Anthropology and Education Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (2008); Charis Boutieri, 'Arduous Journeys on Roads Not [Yet] Taken'; Chloé Pellegrini, 'L'enseignement des langues à l'école publique au Maroc : Construction des savoirs, identités et citoyenneté' (PhD. diss., Université d'Aix-Marseille, 2019).

[25] Allal al-Fassi. *Al-Naqd al-dhātī* [A Self-Critique] (Cairo: Al-Maṭbaʿah al-ʿāmah, 1952).

[26] Gilbert Grandguillaume, *Arabisation et politique linguistique au Maghreb* (Paris: Editions G.-P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1983), 148-149; Charis Boutieri, *Learning in Morocco*, 14.

against imperialism.[27] Unity was the key norm legitimating political stances on language from independence until the early 1990s. The second major language policy was the standardisation and the recognition of Tamazight as an official language. In this second stage of language politics, the idea of *recognition* was promoted by the Berber Cultural Movement starting from the 1980s. Amazigh advocacy gained momentum in the late 1980s-early1990s as it placed the Amazigh cause within the framework of the international promotion of human rights, multiculturalism, and democracy.[28] Recognition became the central legitimate norm in the public discourse from the 1990s to the 2010s. Recognition has not effaced unity but has rather supplemented it. Indeed, the Amazigh advocates calling for the state's recognition of their linguistic identity have justified their claim by the necessity of recognition as being *the* condition for bringing about proper national unity. This is epitomised by the Amazigh activists' slogan: 'unity in diversity'.[29]

This article argues that Morocco has now entered a third stage in language politics that points out a shift in the norms underpinning political legitimacy. After the phases of *unity* and *recognition*, a new discourse on languages emerged in 2011 in Morocco employing *justice and equity* as the main legitimating principles. The relevant terms that political actors have been employing are '*ʿadāla*' and '*inṣāf*' in Arabic and '*justice*' and '*équité*' in French. In the *Oxford Arabic Dictionary*, '*ʿadāla'* is rendered as 'justice' and '*inṣāf*' as 'justice', 'fairness', or

[27] See for example: Mohammed Abed Al-Jabri, *Aḍwāʾ ʿalā mushkil at-taʿlīm bi-al-maghrib* [Lights on the Problem of Education in Morocco] (Casablanca: Dār al-nashr al-maghribiyah, 1974); Abdellatif Laabi, *Souffles* magazine (1966-1971).

[28] Stéphanie Pouessel, *Les Identités amazighes au Maroc* (Paris: Non-lieu, 2011), 109-110.

[29] *Charte d'Agadir relative aux droits linguistiques et culturels*, August 5, 1991, http://www.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca/afrique/maroc-charte_agadir-1991.htm (accessed May 17, 2017).

'impartiality'.[30] The English translations of '*justice*' and '*équité*' are evident. In Arabic, both may be translated as '*ʿadāla*' (or the close word '*ʿadl*') and '*inṣāf*', as per the *Al-Manhal* French-Arabic dictionary.[31] In short, the four terms serving as the principal norms legitimating distinct language politics advocacies in Morocco since the 2011 uprisings fall into a common semantic field—that of 'justice' and 'equity'.

The wave of the Arab uprisings was embodied in Morocco by the 20 February Movement. While protests existed in the Moroccan public space since the mid-2000s on diverse social and economic issues, the global and novel character of the 20 February Movement distinguished itself from the localised and sporadic nature of previous protests.[32] Initiated by young activists, students, and journalists, usually unknown to the public, the 20 February Movement relied on social media to organise demonstrations and politicised the discourse and demands of previous social movements in Morocco.[33] Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators from about a hundred cities and villages and from different social classes decried arbitrary power and corruption.[34] The main slogan of the movement was: '*ḥurriyya, karāma, ʿadāla ijtimāʿiyya*', i.e., 'freedom,

[30] *Oxford Arabic Dictionary*, s.vv. '*ʿadāla*', '*inṣāf*', https://premium.oxforddictionaries.com/arabic/ (accessed September 1, 2020).

[31] *Al-Manhal Dictionnaire Français-Arabe,* 7th ed., comp. Jabbour Abdel-Nour and Souheil Idriss (Beirut: Dār al-ʿilm lil-malāyīn and Dār al-Ādāb, 1983), s.vv. 'justice', 'équité'.

[32] Karine Bennafla and Haoues Seniguer, 'Le Maroc à l'épreuve du Printemps Arabe : une contestation désamorcée ?', *Outre-Terre* 3, no. 29 (2011): 145-146.

[33] Irene Fernández Molina, 'The Monarchy vs. The 20 February Movement: Who Holds the Reins of Political Change in Morocco', *Mediterranean Politics* 16, no. 3 (2011): 436; Karine Bennafla and Haoues Seniguer, 'Le Maroc à l'épreuve du Printemps Arabe : une contestation désamorcée ?', *Outre-Terre* 3, no. 29 (2011): 146.

[34] Fouad Abdelmoumni, 'Le Maroc et le Printemps Arabe', *Pouvoirs* 2, no. 145 (2013): 131, 133.

dignity, social justice/equity'. Scholars have variously translated the third part of the slogan as either 'social justice' or 'equity'.[35]

The 20 February Movement was politically variegated, gathering under the same banner leftists, Amazigh rights' supporters, but also Islamists from the anti-establishment organisation of Al-ʿAdl wa-al-Iḥsān (Justice and Benevolence).[36] The movement's main objectives were not specifically related to language politics but were rather concerned with freedom, real democracy, justice, and equity. Yet some actors within the movement, namely leftists, members of Amazigh associations, and human rights organisations, did formulate a language-policy demand—the recognition of Tamazight as an official language. In terms of political communication, Darija and Tamazight were the main languages used, starting from the first video calling for a peaceful demonstration on 20 February. Featuring young women and men speaking Darija and Tamazight, they all started their speeches with 'I am Moroccan, and I will go out on 20 February…', followed by one key issue they were going to protest against. They touched on topics related to nepotism, corruption, and democracy.[37] The movement's banners

[35] For example, Bennafla and Seniguer, 'Le Maroc à l'épreuve du Printemps Arabe', 147; Abdelmoumni, 'Le Maroc et le Printemps Arabe', 133.

[36] Lenie Brouwer and Edien Bartels, 'Arab Spring in Morocco: social media and the 20 February movement', *Afrika Focus* 27, no. 2 (2014): 8.

[37] Dominique Caubet and Catherine Miller, 'Quels enjeux sociopolitiques autour de la darija au Maroc ?', in *Langues et mutations sociales au Maghreb*, ed. Foued Laroussi and Cherif Sini (Rouen: Presses Universités de Rouen et du Havre, 2016), 5, https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01471125/document (accessed August 2, 2020); The video can be accessed here: mouvement20fevrier, 'Campagne 20 février: Sous-titrée - Subtitled', *YouTube*, February 13, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_LF0JqnMzw (accessed November 13, 2020)

were written in all the main languages known to the Moroccan public (Darija, Tamazight, Standard Arabic, French, and sometimes even English).[38]

As a response to the unrest, the king announced a constitutional reform expanding the prime minister's and the parliament's powers, guaranteeing more freedoms, and recognising Tamazight as an official language. The Moroccan regime's swiftness in introducing reforms, together with the internal struggles of a non-hierarchical movement gathering people from diverse political leanings and the regime's repression starting from April 2011 eventually put an end to the uprising.[39] In fact, scholars quickly identified the constitutional change as part of 'the classic reformist tradition of the Moroccan monarchy',[40] and soon declared that the Arab uprisings have failed.[41]

Nuancing the idea that the 2011 uprisings in Morocco represented by the 20 February Movement did not succeed in producing any substantial change**,** this article shows that a fundamental ideational novelty has emerged: the legitimate has changed.[42] The article does not consider a priori that there is 'one legitimate', a single norm that represents 'what is right,

[38] Adil Moustaoui Srhir, 'Le Mouvement 20 Février au Maroc entre l'autolégitimation et la délégitimation de l'État : une analyse critique du discourse', *Nómadas. Revista Crítica de Ciencias Sociales y Jurídicas. Volumen Especial: Mediterranean Perspectives* 39, no. 3 (2015): 21-22, https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/NOMA/article/view/48322 (accessed November 11, 2020).

[39] Bennafla and Seniguer, 'Le Maroc à l'épreuve du Printemps'.

[40] Fernández Molina, 'The Monarchy vs. The 20 February Movement', 437.

[41] Raymond Hinnebusch, 'Globalization, Democratization, and the Arab Uprising: the International Factor in MENA's Failed Democratization', *Democratization* 22, no. 2 (2015).

[42] For instance, see: Lenie Brouwer and Edien Bartels, 'Arab Spring in Morocco: Social media and the 20 February movement', *Afrika Focus* 27, no. 2 (2014): 19 and Taieb Belghazi and Abdelhay Moudden, '*Ihbat*: disillusionment and the Arab Spring in Morocco', *The Journal of North African Studies* 21, no. 1 (2016): 37.

justifiable'[43] in a historically defined context. The article starts from the following observation: how come language advocates changed their regimes of justification after 2011, all now emphasising the need for equity and justice? Especially, how is it that most of them changed the justifications of their positions while their positions did not change? This article argues that this is not a coincidence. Moreover, this article does not argue that justice and equity are the sole legitimating norms used by language advocates in Morocco after 2011. Different actors variously justify their positions with reference to such ideas as international competitiveness, quality education, and identity protection. It is justice and equity, however, that are the legitimating norms shared across the language advocacy spectrum and are increasingly so. I focus on debates on languages of instruction at school, as they constitute an arena in which advocates of Darija, Tamazight, Standard Arabic, French, and most recently English, battle. I argue that since 2011, the main language actors have utilised the same regime of justification based on the norms of *justice* and *equity* to support opposite positions in the debates on the language of tuition. 'Justice' and 'equity' will be understood in this article as units of discourse, not defined in substance but gaining their meanings from their users. The article studies the discourses of four actors, both institutional and non-institutional, defending four opposite linguistic policies yet all with reference to justice and equity. It focuses on (1) the state's promotion of French against Arabisation and on (2) the advocates of Standard Arabic decrying the state's language policy orientation. It then looks more briefly at the advocacy of (3) Darija promoters and (4) Tamazight activists.

[43] Oliver Schlumberger, 'Opening Old Bottles in Search of New Wine', 235.

1. Equity and justice through economic utility – *the state*

In 2011, the state's rhetoric about 'a good education system,' including 'a good linguistic policy' at school, changed drastically. Prior to this date, the reference text in the education sector was the National Charter for Education and Training of 1999, which proclaimed that the 2000-2009 decade would be 'the' decade of education and labelled it a 'national priority.'[44] The 1999 National Charter came to set in stone the conclusions of the National Council of the Youth and the Future (*Conseil National de la Jeunesse et l'Avenir*) of 1994. In a report entitled *Education/Training, the New Challenges*, the National Council set four aims that the Moroccan education system should achieve: (i) widening access to education and training to develop the nation's skills, (ii) improving the quality of education, (iii) increasing the performance of the education system, and (iv) opening the education system to its social, economic, and cultural environments.[45] As would be stated in the National Charter afterwards, the aim of education is to equip citizens with tools in order to serve their country.

The first part of the National Charter states the 'Fundamental Principles' that should govern the education system. The two first principles, presented as 'constant foundations,' specify:

> The education system of the Kingdom of Morocco is based on the principles and values of the Islamic faith. It aims to train a virtuous citizen, a model of rectitude, moderation and tolerance, open to science and knowledge, and endowed with the spirit of initiative, creativity, and enterprise.

[44] Fouad Chafiqi and Abdelhakim Alagui, 'Réforme éducative au Maroc et refonte des curricula dans les disciplines scientifiques', *Carrefours de l'éducation* 3, HS no. 1 (2011): 37.
[45] Ibid., 31.

> The education system of the Kingdom of Morocco respects and reveals the ancestral identity of the nation. It manifests its sacred and intangible values: the faith in God, the love of the homeland, and the attachment to the Constitutional Monarchy.[46]

According to the National Charter, the most important pillar of the Moroccan education system is the identity of the country. Emphasis is put on Islam and the Arabic language, the official language of the country, whose mastery is the duty of the education system. The learning of foreign languages is only complementary to that of Arabic. As regards Tamazight, it did not appear in the section on 'fundamental principles.' The insistence on the nation with its unified and unifying identity did not only appear in the definition of the basis of the education system but also in the statement of its objectives.

The aim of the education system is, as per the National Charter, to 'develop the country'. National welfare is put forward in the fourth and fifth 'constant foundations':

> The Moroccan education system contributes to the general development of the country, based on the positive conciliation between loyalty to traditions and aspiration to modernity. […]
>
> The education and training system aspires to move the country forward in the conquest of science and in the mastery of advanced technologies. It thus contributes to reinforcing its competitiveness and its economic, social, and human development, at a time characterised by openness to the world.[47]

In the National Charter, the education reform was intended to produce results at the level of the 'country.' The aims of the latter in terms of the pupils' individual development were

[46] Commission Spéciale Éducation Formation, *Charte Nationale d'Éducation et de Formation* (Rabat: 1999), 6.

[47] Ibid.

mentioned only later in the document. Both in the foundations and in the objectives of the education system as presented in the National Charter, 'unity' was the legitimate norm.

2011 marked a change in the regime of justification used by Moroccan officials in support of the state's linguistic policies. The new Constitution adopted in 2011 as a response to the uprisings provides in article 168 for the creation of a Higher Council for Education, Training, and Scientific Research which would be responsible for advising on questions of public interest related to education. The actual creation of the Higher Council came after king Mohammed VI's speech to the nation on 20 August 2013 in which he focused on the situation of the education system in the country:

> The education sector is facing many difficulties and problems. They are mostly due to the adoption of some syllabi and curricula that do not tally with the requirements of the job market. Another reason has to do with the disruptions caused by the change in the language of instruction from Arabic, at the primary and secondary levels, to foreign languages, for the teaching of scientific and technical subjects in higher education. […] Considering the current state of the education and training sector, we need to pause, assess achievements, and pinpoint shortcomings and inadequacies. […] I am indeed sad to note that the state of education is worse now than it was twenty years ago. As a result, and in spite of their limited resources, a large number of families are compelled to pay huge fees for their children to study in foreign schools or private education institutions in order to avoid the pitfalls of the state school and enrol their children in an efficient system.[48]

[48] King Mohammed VI, 'Speech of His Majesty the King to Nation on Occasion of 60th Anniversary of Revolution of King and People', August 20, 2013, https://bit.ly/2GitJOM (accessed March 29, 2018).

This highly publicised speech, qualified by many as 'historic,' put the hardship faced by *individual* citizens at the heart of a needed educational reform.[49]

The same approach is adopted by the Higher Council for Education in its road map for education reform, *The Strategic Vision 2015-2030*. Presented as the foundation of a profound reform of the education system, this text has become the reference of all policies related to education since it was issued in 2015. The preamble of the Strategic Vision calls 'the whole nation' to an 'objective examination of conscience' in order to understand 'why successive reforms did not [...] achieve the desired results', and whether the vision guiding these reforms was 'just'.[50] This vision aims to 'set up a new school whose main foundations are: equity and equality of opportunity, quality for all, and the promotion of the individual and society'.[51] The document adopts 'equity' as the major concept for educational reform, starting with the subtitle, *For a School of Equity, Quality, and Promotion*. 'Equity' is defined in the Strategic Vision as:

> the generalisation of access to education to all, i.e., to ensure a place at school for all, with the same quality and efficiency criteria, without any kind of discrimination due to geographical or social belonging, gender, disability, skin colour, language or beliefs.[52]

Although the ideas of improving the quality of education, generalising it to all, and enhancing its efficiency were at the core of the 1999 National Charter of Education, justified

[49] Slate Afrique, 'Maroc : un Discours Royal du 20 Août Révolutionnaire', March 22, 2013, http://www.slateafrique.com/357944/maroc-un-discours-royal-du-20-aout-revolutionnaire (accessed April 2, 2018).

[50] Conseil Supérieur de l'Éducation de la Formation et de la Recherche Scientifique (CSEFRS), *Pour une école de l'équité, de la qualité et de la promotion : vision stratégique de la réforme 2015-2030* (Rabat: CSEFRS, 2015), 8.

[51] Ibid., 11.

[52] Ibid., 93.

by the norm of 'unity', the Strategic Vision 2015-2030 reformulates the same objectives in accordance with the norm of 'equity'. Indeed, the word 'equity' is used forty-eight times in the Strategic Vision, as opposed to six times only in the National Charter. While 'justice' does not appear in the 1999 document, it is mentioned seven times in the 2015 Strategic Vision.

The choice of 'equity' as the main objective of school by the Higher Council for Education echoes the international discourse on education. For example, in its analysis of the Moroccan Education sector in 2010, the UNESCO's top two 'current main challenges facing the Moroccan education system' were 'equity in the system, [and] equitable access to basic education'.[53] More generally, the Strategic Vision employs other strands of the discourse promoted by international institutions, focusing on quality promotion, international competitiveness, and knowledge economy. These were the 'new challenges facing the education sector in the Middle East and North Africa' identified by the World Bank in a 2008 report.[54]

The Higher Council of Education that issued the Strategic Vision published a document in 2018 entitled, *A School of Social Justice: Contribution to the Reflection on the Development Model*.[55] The document opens with a quote from a 2017 Royal Speech in which Mohammed VI criticised the Moroccan development model for its inability to 'bring about social justice.'[56] 'Equity' is mentioned in the document thirty-one times and 'justice' forty-seven times. The

[53] UNESCO, *Education au Maroc : Analyse du* secteur (Rabat: UNESCO, Bureau multipays pour le Maghreb, 2010), 25.

[54] The World Bank, *The Road not Traveled: Education Reform in the Middle East and North Africa* (Washington DC: The Word Bank, 2008), 83.

[55] CSEFRS, *Une École de justice sociale : Contribution à la réflexion sur le modèle de développement* (Rabat: CSEFRS, 2018).

[56] Ibid., 1.

document refers to equity as the goal of achieving justice in the context of school and uses the expressions 'school of social justice'[57] and 'school of equity'[58] interchangeably.

At the level of language policy, 'the realisation of equity and equality of opportunity' is the first aim of the language arrangement proposed by the Strategic Vision. Its realisation necessitates:

> The capacity of the learner, at the end of the qualifying secondary education, to master the Arabic language, to communicate in Amazigh and to master at least two foreign languages, as part of a progressive approach that moves from bilingualism (Arabic + one foreign language) to plurilingualism (Arabic + two or more foreign languages).[59]

Thus, the Strategic Vision conceives an equitable language policy as one that educates plurilingual individuals, taking into account both their identity and their fair equipment in linguistic resources that are valued in the labour market.[60]

A major way in which the 'school of equity' is to be built, according to the Strategic Vision, comes through the concept of 'language alternation' between Standard Arabic and French. It is defined as 'an educational tool [...] in bilingual or multilingual education, to improve the acquisition of one or more languages by using them partially in the teaching of certain subjects'.[61] In 2011, the Ministry of Education convened a meeting of a small group of specialists with the objective of stopping offering mere 'palliatives' to the education system's

[57] Ibid., 1, 31, and 32.

[58] Ibid., 2, 25, and 37.

[59] CSEFRS, *Vision stratégique de la réforme 2015-2030*, 46.

[60] Ibid.

[61] CSEFRS, *Vision stratégique de la réforme 2015-2030*, 94.

profound problems.[62] They advocated 'language alternation' on the model of CLIL (Content and Language Integrated Learning).[63] CLIL is a learning approach adopted by the European Union to promote multilingualism in Europe. The Moroccan Ministry of Education was especially interested in the part of CLIL concerned with addressing the problem of language deficiency in 'neighbouring regions' such as the Alsace, where the French and German languages coexist.[64] In the case of the Alsace in France, German is considered a 'neighbouring language' that local inhabitants need to speak. CLIL is the concrete application of this understanding as it promotes 'language alternation' through the teaching of some subjects in a foreign language (in German in the case of the Alsace). In the Moroccan case, 'language alternation' is designed to teach school subjects in French. Thus, in the spirit of this committee as well as that of the authors of the Strategic Vision, the Moroccan student must speak French, a 'neighbouring language,' ignorance of which would be a handicap.

The introduction of 'language alternation' in the Strategic Vision was a clear halt to the process of Arabisation. Even though Standard Arabic remains the language of instruction in primary school, French has become in middle and high school a 'compulsory language [...] as a taught language and as a language of instruction of some contents or modules' in the short term.[65] English is intended to become a language of instruction at a later stage.[66]

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[62] Interview with Fouad Chafiqi, director of *curricula* at the Ministry of Education in Morocco, November 13, 2016, Rabat, Morocco.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Eurydice (European Commission), *Content and Language Integrated Learning (CLIL) at School in Europe* (Brussels: Eurydice 2006), 7. http://www.indire.it/lucabas/lkmw_file/eurydice/CLIL_EN.pdf (accessed December 15, 2020).

[65] CSEFRS, *Vision stratégique de la réforme 2015-2030,* 47-48.

[66] Ibid.

Plurilingualism, i.e., the competence of individuals in more than one language, has been put forward by linguistic and educational literature as an ideal that negates the monolingual nationalist ideology.[67] However, as Flores rightly notes, 'plurilingualism as a policy ideal parallels the production of a neoliberal subject', that is '[a] flexible worker and lifelong learner [able] to perform service-oriented and technological jobs'.[68] 'Lever nineteen' of the Strategic Vision, entitled 'Lifelong learning', corroborates Flores' argument. It calls for 'diversifying the range of education and training courses on offer, so as to ensure flexibility and mobility that allow learners to change or complete a course whenever they wish'.[69] This resonates with Foucault's qualification of the neoliberal subject as 'an entrepreneur of himself'[70] who is 'responsible for assessing a given situation and determining whether and when they require new skills'.[71]

Yet, this critical account of plurilingualism as a neoliberal practice, when analysed in the context of the Moroccan educational reality, displays a more complex picture. The most characteristic neoliberal policy in the education sector is privatisation, and the latter is tightly linked with plurilingualism in Morocco. Fouad Chafiqi, Director of Curricula at the Ministry of Education, maintains that 'the real difference between the public and private sectors is languages'.[72] By strengthening students' language skills and diversifying the languages of

[67] Nelson Flores, 'The Unexamined Relationship Between Neoliberalism and Plurilingualism: A Cautionary Tale', *TESOL* Quarterly 47, no. 3 (2013).

[68] Ibid., 501.

[69] CSEFRS, *Vision stratégique de la réforme 2015-2030*, 70.

[70] Michel Foucault and Michel Senellart, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 226.

[71] Flores, 'The Unexamined Relationship Between Neoliberalism and Plurilingualism', 512.

[72] Interview with Fouad Chafiqi, director of *curricula* at the Ministry of Education in Morocco, November 13, 2016, Rabat, Morocco.

instruction, the Strategic Vision places the public sector in competition with the private one over the market of plurilingual education. Simultaneously, however, the Strategic Vision describes the private sector as 'a partner of public education in the generalisation [of schooling] and the achievement of equity'.[73] The Strategic Vision has indeed not departed from the neoliberal promotion of private education advanced in the 1999 National Charter in which 'tax incentives' were put in place to 'encourage the private sector'.[74] While discursively putting the individual at the core of the educational project and promoting the concept of equity, the Strategic Vision remains nevertheless silent on the mechanism sustaining the lack of equity, i.e. the privatisation of education. The Higher Council for Education therefore uses discursive elements of the 20 February Movement while promoting a more confusing project in which the private sector is both financially encouraged and competed against on the market of linguistic competence.

The idea of redressing the social and linguistic injustices is also present in the communication of the Ministry of Education about the projects it launched after 2012. Access for all to foreign languages, and first to French, has been at the core of these new projects. Regarding these changes, Fouad Chafiqi, the director of *curricula* at the Ministry of Education, explains: 'This is not a 'return' to French, it is rather a solution that has emerged as the most appropriate to allow students in high school to acquire a good command of French. As French will become their 'language of use,' they will feel linguistically secure'.[75] Youssef Belqasmi, Secretary General of the Ministry of Education, highlights in an interview in 2016 the

[73] CSEFRS, *Vision stratégique de la réforme 2015-2030*, 26.

[74] Commission Spéciale Éducation Formation, *Charte Nationale d'Éducation et de Formation* (Rabat: 1999), 67-8.

[75] Interview with Fouad Chafiqi, director of *curricula* at the Ministry of Education in Morocco, November 13, 2016, Rabat, Morocco.

inconsistencies of the educational curriculum and insists on 'many projects undertaken in the past four years to correct all the mistakes made in the past'.[76] Belqasmi lists these projects: (i) the International Section of the Moroccan Baccalaureate with French, English, and Spanish options launched in 2013 allowing students to take their main courses in high school in their chosen foreign language; (ii) the 'Teach French Differently' programme aiming to improve the teaching of French; and (iii) the return to the instruction in French of mathematics and science in the technological track in 2016.[77] The Secretary General of Education justifies all these projects by a call for rationality and educational coherence. For him, there is no change of direction but rather a serious job that cares about the equality of all in the access to knowledge and employment.[78]

In 2018, the Higher Council for Education introduced the concept of 'linguistic justice' in its contribution to developing a new development model entitled *A School of Social Justice*.[79] Describing 'the first school injustice [as] linguistic',[80] the Council explains the language project of the Strategic Vision as that of linguistic justice:

> Moroccan children have the right to linguistic justice that reserves a special place for the two national languages, Arabic and Amazigh, with a mastery of the functional language, French, and a growing place for English, the language of globalisation and openness to the world. It is to respond to this linguistic justice that the Strategic Vision 2015-2030 recommended a redesign of the linguistic

[76] Interview with Youssef Belqasmi, Secretary General of the Ministry of Education in Morocco, October 25, 2016, Rabat, Morocco.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Ibid.

[79] CSEFRS, *Une école de justice sociale*, 36-37.

[80] Ibid., 36.

> architecture where each language finds its place in an equitable educational system.[81]

In 2019, the Commission of Education, Culture, and Communication at the House of Representatives adopted the framework law of education that was drafted and promoted by the Ministry of Education and that endorses the discourse promoted by the Strategic Vision. Intended to be a binding law that will oblige all governments, regardless of their political obedience, to implement the same vision and reform in the education system, it announces in its preamble:

> The core of this framework law lies in the establishment of a new school, open to all, that prepares human capital, based on the two pillars of *equity* and *equality of opportunity* on the one hand, and quality for all, on the other, with the ultimate goal of individual development and the advancement of society. And in order to achieve *justice* and *equality of opportunity*, it is necessary to base ourselves on the following principles...[82] (emphasis added)

The 2019 framework law iterates the same discourse of 'equity,' 'equality of opportunity,' and 'justice,' putting the individual at the centre of the education project. Among the changes necessary to put in place is 'language alternation', in which the emphasis is put in its definition on 'the teaching of some subjects, especially scientific and technical ones […] in a foreign language or languages'.[83]

Thus, since 2011 state institutions in charge of education have promoted the access to French through a discourse on social justice restoration, borrowing the concept of 'equity' from the international education discourse. The idea of restoration comes as a response to the

[81] Ibid., 37.

[82] *Framework law n°51.17*, Cherifian Dahir n°1.19.113, August 19, 2019.

[83] Ibid.

exclusive access of the elite to French language teaching, and thus to social reproduction. They have, since 2011, invested the vocabulary of the 20 February Movement in the education sector. Besides justice and equity, 'democracy' was used seventeen times in the 2015 Strategic Vision, as opposed to only twice in the 1999 National Charter. The state adopted the new 'legitimate' as a legitimating discourse in educational matters.

2. 'Linguistic Justice' – *Standard Arabic advocates*

The advocates of the use of Standard Arabic have modified their discourse by using 'justice' as the legitimate principle of their regime of justification. The following section will focus on the work of Abdelkader Fassi Fehri, a professor of Arabic linguistics and the former director of the Institute of Studies and Research on Arabisation. Fassi Fehri is a major reference in Arabic linguistics in Morocco and has been an active participant in the debate on languages since the 1990s. I will analyse the evolution of his rhetoric between 2003 and 2013, identifying the shifts in the principles of legitimacy underlying his linguistic project.

Abdelkader Fassi Fehri published in 2003 a collection of articles on language that had appeared in newspapers between October 1996 and November 2002.[84] The author's declared intent was to contribute to the public debate on languages in Morocco 'so that the state's language policy would become rational, modern, and efficient'.[85] The articles constitute, by and large, a pamphlet supporting the use of Standard Arabic which the author describes as 'the official and national [language] […], the language of esteem and history, the language of religious and positive sciences, the language of the scientific revolution (against *jāhiliyya*), the

[84] Abdelkader Fassi Fehri, *Al-lugha wa-al-bayʾa* [Language and Environment] (Rabat: Manshūrāt al-zaman, 2003), 4.

[85] Ibid., 52-53.

language of literature and of school'.[86] Standard Arabic, he maintains, is 'the language of unity'.[87]

Standard Arabic faces two types of challengers: foreign languages and non-standardised mother tongues. The first foreign language that Fassi Fehri rejects is French which he deems 'responsible for the pollution of our linguistic environment'.[88] However, he does not reject French outright, for he recommends that the Moroccan child should learn foreign languages, starting with French, *after* he has been immersed in Standard Arabic and has mastered it.[89] He thus agrees on this matter with Allal al-Fassi, a prominent Moroccan nationalist who was at the head of the Istiqlal party and was a fervent advocate of a 'Jacobin' Arabisation policy.

Fassi Fehri also rejects what he refers to as 'dialects' as languages of instruction. In response to those arguing that the use of mother tongues in school would eliminate illiteracy, he claims that the 'linguistic mosaic' that would result from such a move would only increase Moroccans' dependence on foreign languages. In short, abandoning Standard Arabic would jeopardise Moroccans vis-à-vis foreign linguistic domination.[90] Regarding Tamazight, Fassi Fehri's position is not clear in the collection. He affirms that 'it is natural that Tamazight should have a place within the education system' but does not specify more.[91]

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[86] Ibid., 54-55.

[87] Ibid.

[88] Pouessel, *Les Identités amazighes au Maroc*, 32.

[89] Fassi Fehri, *Al-lugha wa-al-bayʾa* [Language and Environment], 19.

[90] Ibid., 40-41.

[91] Ibid., 42. His position regarding the officialization of Tamazight, as became clear in an article published in 2011, was not supportive. See Abdelkader Fassi Fehri, 'Al-Thawra al-lughawiyya al-qādima fī al-maghrib' [The Coming Language Revolution in Morocco], April 27, 2011, https://www.hespress.com/opinions/30918.html (accessed September 10, 2019)

To summarise Fassi Fehri's argument, the language of instruction can only be Standard Arabic, the language of 'unity' against languages of 'diversity and specificity'.[92] Standard Arabic ensures, according to Fassi Fehri, the linguistic unity of Arabs against the power of global languages such as English and French. It provides for unity around the official language and prevents division along regional dialectal specificities. The author warns the reader not to be captivated by the seeming benefits of multilingualism and 'multidialectism' advocated in Europe, as such models would undermine 'the shared national base'.[93] Hence, in Fassi Fehri's writings from 1996 till 2002, it appears that the legitimate norm for political action is unity.

Since 2012, Abdelkader Fassi Fehri's regime of justification for Arabisation has progressively shifted from the idea of 'unity' to that of 'justice.' He first used the norm of justice in a press article published in 2012 in *Le Matin*, a newspaper close to the regime. Entitled 'Arabic in the New Constitution: A Paradigm of *Justice*, Democracy, Development, and Diversity Within *Unity*' (emphasis added),[94] the article articulates 'justice' as a step to achieve the aim of 'unity'. The theme of 'unity' has since disappeared from Fassi Fehri's work, as is clear in his book published in 2013 entitled *Language Politics in Arab Countries: In Search of a Natural, Just, Democratic, and Efficient Environment*.[95] Fassi Fehri was the first to conceptualise 'linguistic justice' for Arab countries, although almost exclusively focusing on

[92] Fassi Fehri, *Al-lugha wa-al-bayʾa* [Language and Environment], 7.

[93] Ibid., 18.

[94] Abdelkader Fassi Fehri, 'L'arabe dans la nouvelle Constitution : un paradigme de justice, de démocratie, de développement et de diversité dans l'unité' [Arabic in the New Constitution: a Paradigm of Justice, Democracy, Development, and Diversity within Unity], *Le Matin*, September 17, 2012, https://bit.ly/2lZLwol (accessed September 10, 2019).

[95] Abdelkader Fassi Fehri. *Al-siyāsa al-lughawiyya fi al-bilād al-ʿarabiyya. Baḥthan ʿan bayʾa ṭabīʿiyya, ʿādila, dīmūqrāṭiyya wa-nājiʿa* [Language Politics in Arab Countries: In Search of a Natural, Just, Democratic, and Efficient Environment] (Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-jadīd al-muttaḥida, 2013).

Morocco. Developed by contemporary Western political philosophers, the concept of 'linguistic justice' has been coined to address the challenge of proposing a language policy that would be at the same time democratic, efficient, and fair.[96] The main cases studied by these scholars have been Canada for its multilingual nature and the European Union for its being a fairly recent political structure gathering a multitude of peoples with different languages.[97] The most influential among them is Philippe Van Parijs to whom we owe the concept of 'linguistic justice'. Van Parijs argues that there is a need for a global language. As English is already a *lingua franca*, it should be promoted even more and taught to everyone. However, non-native English speakers would be disadvantaged as they would need to invest time and money to learn English. To compensate for this injustice, Van Parijs suggests two mechanisms. First, 'a language tax' should be paid by native English speakers to support the language learning efforts of non-native English speakers. Second, in order to preserve the 'parity of esteem' between all languages, a 'territoriality principle' should be applied. All inhabitants of a territory, including newcomers, would need to learn the language of this territory and use it in all its institutions. Making one language sovereign in each territory, Van Parijs argues, would rule out the danger of a status hierarchy among languages.[98] Fassi Fehri employs Van Parijs' 'territoriality principle', arguing that a territorial linguistic regime, with 'legislative laws [that] restrict the

[96] Astrid von Busekist, 'Justice linguistique,' in *Dictionnaire des inégalités et de la justice sociale*, ed. Patrick Savidan (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2018), 1693.

[97] The most prominents of these scholars are Philippe Van Parijs, Will Kymlicka, Abram Swan, Jean Laponce, Helder De Schutter, Allan Pattern, Astrid von Busekist, and Thomas Ricento, among others.

[98] Philippe Van Parijs, *Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

spontaneous or utilitarian choice of language within special territorial limits' is the way to ensure linguistic justice.[99]

Fassi Fehri's most articulated theoretical contribution to a specific definition of linguistic justice for Morocco can be found in a paper he first presented in 2013. Justice, he argues in the paper, is 'the first virtue of any institution', adding that 'any linguistic policy must aim at the just political management of the coexistence of various languages in one community, one space, or one territory'.[100] Drawing inspiration from John Rawls' *Theory of Justice* as well as from the works of Philippe Van Parijs, Abram Swan, Will Kymlicka, Helder de Schutter, and Allan Pattern on linguistic justice, Fassi Fehri lays down guidelines for a just linguistic policy in Morocco. Three dimensions of linguistic justice are for him fundamental to regulate Morocco's multilingual reality: (i) inter-linguistic justice, (ii) intra-linguistic justice, and (iii) global linguistic justice.

Inter-linguistic justice is related to the just organisation of languages in relation to each other. According to Fassi Fehri, in the Moroccan context languages are Arabic, Tamazight, French, English, and others. In other terms, he does not distinguish between standard languages and their dialectal variants. He defines two categories, 'identity languages' (i.e. Arabic and Tamazight) and 'foreign languages', the former being diminished by the latter. On Arabic, Fassi Fehri writes:

> It is unjust that the Arabic language be poorly treated during the early learning stages […], and that it be undervalued in employment, in social advancement […]. It is a matter of *dignity* and the citizen's *rights* that they

[99] Ibid., 167.

[100] Abdelkader Fassi Fehri, 'Pour une justice linguistique pluridimensionnelle au Maroc : Prolégomènes et ingrédients' (conference paper, *Bahrein's Conference on Literacy,* 2014).

> should be able to use and promote *their* language in the different domains (the language that the community sees not only as characteristic of their *personality* and *autonomy*, but also as a natural tool of *communication*, of *thinking*, but also of *life*).[101]

Fassi Fehri uses the same rhetoric for Tamazight without specifying, though, whether it should be a full-fledged language of instruction or simply a language that is taught at school. Inter-linguistic justice necessitates the use of what he calls 'identity languages' to counter the obvious appeal of foreign languages.

Intra-linguistic justice is about justice within languages, that is between standard languages and their dialectal variants. The author endorses the use of the standard languages, be it for Arabic or Tamazight, for the use of standard 'identity languages', he contends, preserves the *dignity* of the speaker. For Fassi Fehri, Arabic (Darija and Standard Arabic) should be regarded as a block, a unit, and the same goes for Tamazight (the three dialectal variants and the IRCAM-standard Tamazight). Thus, for every language unit, there is a specific dignity. By recognising Standard Arabic, he argues, the Arab dignity is respected.[102] Similarly, the recognition of standard Tamazight ensures the dignity of the Amazigh culture. In addition, the official character of Arabic and Tamazight allows the speaker, according to Fassi Fehri, to choose between these two languages, which guarantees their *autonomy*. As for *communication*, the author asserts that it is facilitated in a given large geographic space by the use of Standard Arabic, especially among speakers from different Arab countries. Standard Arabic is therefore more *efficient*, as it expands the market for Arabic cultural products and allows a reduction in education costs (teaching in one dialect would incur costs that are not shared by the Arab

[101] Ibid., 2.

[102] Ibid., 4.

community). *Political participation*, he adds, requires knowledge of Standard Arabic, for laws have been written in that language. Finally, employment, mobility, and access to markets, he underlines, are only open to standard languages. Intra-linguistic justice thus necessitates, according to Fassi Fehri, the use of Standard Arabic and Tamazight. As the latter is being standardised, standard Tamazight would be efficient yet still close enough to dialectal variants. As for Arabic, Fassi Fehri proposes 'a diglossic reorganisation allowing in particular an integration of Moroccan vocabulary in Arabic and a simplification of grammar'.[103] In sum, Fassi Fehri is in favour of Standard Arabic at national levels. This requires a reform of Standard Arabic that would infuse it with the dialect's 'vitality'.

The third dimension of linguistic justice explored by the author is that situated at the global and the global-local, or glocal, levels. In that respect, he contends that Standard Arabic is a powerful language on the international level and that no other global language should be prioritised over it. In other terms, using 'an international language,' i.e. English or French, to open up to the world is paradoxical because Arabic is a global language. For Fassi Fehri, Moroccans should start by learning Standard Arabic and turn to learning other global languages later, starting with English.[104]

Within a few years, Fassi Fehri has recast the regime of justification of his position within Morocco's language debate. His discourse now attributes legitimacy to 'justice' after having ascribed it to 'unity' earlier on. This shift has more recently been witnessed in the discourse of the National Coalition for the Arabic language in Morocco, the official and most vocal organisation advocating Standard Arabic. Created in 2013 to coordinate the action of multiple associations working on the promotion of Standard Arabic, the members of the coalition have,

[103] Ibid., 7.

[104] Al-siyāsa al-lughawiyya bi-al-maghrib [Language Politics in Morocco], *YouTube*, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_iTUkAzT3KU (accessed March 27, 2017).

since 2019, put forward the concept of 'linguistic justice.' This was especially the case during the 2019 Annual Conference for the Arabic Language in Morocco 'Towards a National Strategy for the Advancement of Arabic'.[105] Indeed, the first words of the president of the Coalition, Fouad Bouali, were: 'Ladies and gentlemen, I am happy to be part of this exceptional national event that is celebrating its sixth anniversary, an event with which we wanted to mark our continuing resistance to achieve a *linguistic justice* that ensures Moroccans' identity security, their sense of belonging to their history and soil, and their capacity to open up to the world' (emphasis added).[106] The slogan 'For a linguistic justice' also appeared in 2019 on the Coalition's posters.[107]

By changing the legitimating principle of their advocacy, neither Abdelkader Fassi Fehri nor the National Coalition for the Arabic language have changed their projects, which still favour the predominance of Standard Arabic in the education system and, consequently, in the other domains of the public space.

[105] The National Coalition for the Arabic Language in Morocco, 'Al-Muʾtamar al-waṭanī al-sādis lil-lugha al-ʾarabiyya, taḥta shiʿār: Naḥwa istrātījiyya waṭaniyya lil-nuhūḍ bil-lugha al-ʿarabiyya' [The Sixth National Conference for the Arabic Language Under the Banner: Towards a National Strategy for the Advancement of Arabic], March 15-16, 2019 (Rabat, Morocco).

[106] Ibid., Fouad Bouali's Opening Speech at the Sixth National Conference for the Arabic Language, March 15, 2019 (Rabat, Morocco).

[107] Safaa Kasraoui, 'Moroccan Coalition: Ditching Arabic in Schools for French is a Crime', *Morocco World News*, April 4, 2019, https://bit.ly/2U6zLrP (accessed September 10, 2019).

3. Justice and equity through the mother tongues – *Darija advocates*

While the promotion of Darija does not date from the 2010s, it did gain momentum at that time. Before the 2010s, most of the advocacy for the recognition of Darija as a language, and not simply as the Moroccan dialect of Standard Arabic, was *in vivo*, i.e. embodied in people's behaviours and not expressed as linguistic political activism. As opposed to *in vitro* actions in which actors consciously analyse linguistic situations and propose changes, *in vivo* linguistic actions consist of how people decide to speak and write and how they resolve their communication problems.[108]

At the beginning of the 2000s, a nascent urban musical scene, whose language is mostly Darija, started to gain more visibility by being broadcast on radio, television, and festivals.[109] 'Speaking the truth,' communicating with all generations, and overcoming the obstacle of illiteracy were the prominent justifications these musicians gave to justify their use of Darija.[110] Hoba Hoba Spirit, a leading group in the alternative music scene, has repeatedly taken up the themes of language and education.[111] The song '60%', referring to the literacy rate, links the general disregard for Darija to the poor state of education in Morocco.[112]

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[108] Louis-Jean Calvet, *La sociolinguistique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2013), 8.

[109] Dominique Caubet, 'Génération darija !,' *Estudios de dialectología norteafricana y andalusí*, no. 9 (2005): 233.

[110] Myriam Abouzaid, 'Politique linguistique éducative à l'égard de l'amazighe (berbère) au Maroc : des choix sociolinguistiques et didactiques à leur mise en pratique' (PhD diss., Université de Grenoble, 2006), 88.

[111] Ibid., 89.

[112] A member of the group confirmed that '60%' referred to the illiteracy rate in Morocco in 2008. The percentage, however, is exaggerated as, according to the World Bank, the illiteracy rate in Morocco in 2008 was 44.85%, https://bit.ly/2l7Xhcs.

In 2003, the advertising businessman Noureddine Ayouch testified about the use of languages in advertisements: 'I think it is a mistake to use Literary Arabic, because people do not understand; 90% of commercials are in Darija'.[113] At the beginning of the 2000s, the Zakoura Foundation, a non-governmental organisation created by Ayouch, put in place catch-up classes for out-of-school children. After experiencing the non-efficiency of teaching in Standard Arabic, Ayouch explains, the Foundation decided to teach in the local dialect, whether Darija or an Amazigh dialect.[114] Ayouch justifies the linguistic policy of the Zakoura Foundation by the experience it has in the education sector and the proven efficiency of the teaching in the student's mother tongue.[115] Ayouch thus underlines the inconsistency of forcing pupils to learn in Standard Arabic, which he considers a 'foreign' language for them.[116]

The *in vitro* linguistic actions in support of Darija in the decade 2000-2010 were mostly promoted by the weekly Moroccan French-language magazine *TelQuel*. Launched as a progressive and critical outlet, *TelQuel* published in 2002 an issue featuring the title, *Darija, National Language*.[117] On the front cover, one could read: 'Moroccan Arabic, our everyday language, is not taken seriously. Yet, it is the only language that unites us'.[118] Darija was presented as the *lingua franca* of Morocco and the only language of 'unity'. The advocates of Darija as a language of instruction referred to Arabisation in that issue as 'araBétisation'—a

[113] Dominique Caubet, 'Darija, langue de la modernité : Entretien avec Noureddine Ayouch', *Estudios de dialectología norteafricana y andalusí*, no. 7 (2003): 139.

[114] Mubāshara maʿakum [Live With You] Noureddine Ayouch and Abdellah Laroui. *YouTube*, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ad6bq5BbDs (accessed May 17, 2017)

[115] Caubet, 'Darija, langue de la modernité - Entretien avec Noureddine Ayouch'.

[116] Ibid., 138.

[117] Ziamari and De Ruiter, 'Les langues au Maroc : réalités, changements et évolutions linguistiques'.

[118] TelQuel, 'Darija, langue nationale', June 15-21, 2002.

contraction in French of '*Arabisation'* and '*bêtise*', meaning 'foolishness'.[119] In addition, 'AraBétisation' echoes '*alphabétisation*,' meaning 'literacy tuition', but presaging a bad prospect. In 2006, *TelQuel* journalist Ahmed Benchemsi published an editorial in which he called Moroccans to take their linguistic situation in hand: 'We must at all costs come out of this linguistic-identity fog. We must decide and keep it simple: our only common language is Darija. Some translate Darija as "Moroccan Arabic". I disagree with this translation, it is "Moroccan language", that's it'.[120]

The discourse on Darija has changed after 2011. Before this date, Darija was promoted as the language of Moroccan unity, efficiency, and natural communication. But the recognition of the Amazigh language as an official language in the 2011 Constitution, whereas Darija was not mentioned in the text, provoked a feeling of injustice amongst Darija advocates.[121] The debate on Darija has particularly been at the forefront of the public debate since 2013 after the king's speech to the nation in August when he called for a reform of the education system.[122] In October of the same year, the Zakoura Foundation organised an international conference entitled 'The Path to Success'.[123] The conference featured a panel on 'National Languages, Languages of the Future'. Almost all panellists referred to the principles of justice and equity in relation to the question of languages. Educational reform in Morocco, said one speaker, should seek 'greater equity in terms of equal opportunities among citizens'.[124] The Arabisation

[119] Pouessel, *Les Identités amazighes au Maroc*, 38.

[120] Caubet, 'Génération darija !', 234.

[121] Caubet and Miller, 'Quels enjeux sociopolitiques autour de la darija au Maroc ?', 4.

[122] Ibid., 11.

[123] Fondation Zakoura Education, *Actes du colloque international sur l'Education : Le Chemin de la réussite, 4-5 October 2013* (Casablanca: Fondation Zakoura Education, 2013).

[124] Ahmed Boukous, 'Quelle gestion pour le plurilinguisme dans l'école ?', in *Le Chemin de la réussite*, 127.

policy was pointed out in the conference as the source of a dual injustice. On the one hand, by teaching in Standard Arabic in public schools while the well-off send their children to private institutions teaching in foreign languages, the Arabisation policy favoured an unequal access to the language of the job market—French. On the other hand, Standard Arabic, presented as a foreign language to students, was said to be unconducive to a good immersion in the school environment. The Arabisation policy was thus argued to have 'short-changed the poor by creating more social injustice and perpetuating a system of inequality in the Moroccan school system and in Moroccan society at large'.[125] The words 'gap' and 'obstacle' were often used to blame the non-use of mother tongues (Darija, Amazigh dialects, and Ḥassāniyya) as languages of tuition in the early years of schooling as a major reason for educational failure. This paragraph, taken from the conference's proceedings, summarises this alleged causality well:

> We know today that if the children's languages are not used for learning to read and write, they are sentenced, as soon as they enter school, to become illiterate. In other words, successful learning to read and write requires it to be in the student's mother tongue. Any significant difference between the language of learning and the mother tongue is a promise of failure.[126]

Pre-schooling, in the student's mother tongue, was highlighted as a necessary condition for 'a more just school':[127]

> Pre-school in Morocco should be the outpost of education. Indeed, it receives the full impact of linguistic and social inequalities. For many Moroccan children, pre-schooling is the only and sometimes the last chance to establish just and healthy

[125] Mohammed Errihani, 'Relever le défi des langues étrangères', 173.

[126] Alain Bentolila, 'La politique linguistique, en finir avec les faux semblants', in *Le Chemin de la réussite,* 131.

[127] Ibid., 133.

> relationships between their different languages and the knowledge they are taught.[128]

'Efficiency', 'competence', and 'competitiveness' were other key discursive elements used by the participants in the conference. In his presentation 'Languages at the Service of Competence', Jamal Belahrach, director-general of the Moroccan branch of the global staff resourcing company Manpower, linked competitiveness and justice. By insuring the creation of jobs, he argued, businesses were at the heart of 'a just and sustainable development'.[129]

Basing their arguments on the expertise of international actors and organisations such as the UNESCO and the World Bank, the panellists claimed that introducing children to school in a language that is foreign to them amounts to committing injustice to them, to their education, and to their future.[130] The conference, which left a considerable public impression, resulted in nine recommendations, the first of which was to 'start the education of children at school in their mother tongue'.[131] Organised by Noureddine Ayouch, who is close to the palace, and attended by five former education ministers in addition to king's advisors, the conference placed Darija and its role in Moroccan schools at the heart of the public debate. In November 2013, a televised debate between Noureddine Ayouch and Abdallah Laroui, a renowned

[128] Ibid.

[129] Jamal Belahrach, 'Les langues au service de la compétences', in *Le Chemin de la réussite*, 140.

[130] Mubāsharah maʿakum [Live with You] Noureddine Ayouch and Abdellah Laroui. *YouTube*, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ad6bq5BbDs (accessed May 17, 2017).

[131] Catherine Miller, 'Évolution des pratiques, évolutions des représentations ? Petit retour sur le débat autour de la valorisation de la darija au Maroc', *Études et documents berbères*, 2016, http://bit.ly/2qMhL9d (accessed May 17, 2017).

Moroccan historian supporting Standard Arabic, broke the audience record of the popular public television channel 2M with five million viewers.[132]

In December 2016, Noureddine Ayouch published a Darija-Darija dictionary in Arabic characters, implying that Darija is not a degraded version of Arabic but a language as such. Produced by linguists, the dictionary presented Darija as an Arabic language, the mother tongue of Moroccan Arabic speakers, and the *lingua franca* in Morocco.

4. Equity and justice through 'proper' recognition – *Tamazight advocates*

The construction of the Moroccan nation-state along the lines of France's Jacobin model, allowing an identity—in this case, Arab—to trump all others, entailed legal and social occlusion of other identities, especially the Amazigh one. The Arabisation policy, described by Amazigh activists as a violent act of 'linguistic substitution', is one of the policies they have denounced most fiercely since the 1980s.[133] Until 2011, they promoted the principle of 'recognition' as the legitimate norm that should govern Morocco's language politics. The two fundamental texts of the Amazigh movement—namely, the 1991 Agadir Charter and the 2000 Berber Manifesto—call for the state's recognition of Amazigh identity, which they argue is a legitimate right. First, the Agadir Charter called for:

> the elaboration of a democratic linguistic and cultural policy based on the recognition and respect of the legitimate linguistic and cultural rights of all the

[132] Mubāsharah maʿakum [Live With You] Noureddine Ayouch and Abdellah Laroui.

[133] Stéphanie Pouessel, *Les Identités amazighes au Maroc* (Paris: Non-lieu, 2011), 94.

> components of the Moroccan people. This policy of openness can be seen as a premise in the perspective of building the national democratic culture.[134]

The same rhetoric was used in the Berber Manifesto published by the Amazigh historian and public intellectual Mohamed Chafik in 2000:

> It is high time that the recognition of our original national language—Tamazight (i.e. Berber)—as an official language be enshrined in the country's Constitution. Among the strangest things, in Morocco, is that the Amazigh language is not officially considered a language. One of the most embittering things for an Amazigh, in the 'independence era', is to hear some of his fellow citizens make a statement like the following: 'the official or national language is Arabic!… by virtue of the text of the Constitution!' He is provoked by the uttering of these words, on every occasion, along with the explicit mockery and haughtiness which accompany it. Thus, he feels persecuted in the name of the supreme law of the country. In this regard, one of the thinkers from the era of the Philosophy of Enlightenment said: 'The harshest persecution is the one practiced under the wing of the law and coloured with the colours of justice'.[135]

However, the creation of the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture in Morocco (IRCAM) in 2001, the standardisation of Tamazight with Tifinagh characters in 2003, and the recognition

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[134] *Charte d'Agadir relative aux droits linguistiques et culturels*, August 5, 1991, http://www.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca/afrique/maroc-charte_agadir-1991.htm (accessed May 17, 2017).

[135] Mohamed Chafik, *Le Manifeste berbère*, March 1, 2000, http://www.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca/afrique/berbere-manifeste-2000.htm, translation from: http://www.amazighworld.org/human_rights/morocco/manifesto2000.php (accessed May 17, 2017).

of the Amazigh language in the 2011 Constitution have not satisfied all Amazigh activists. Indeed, the official statuses of Arabic and Tamazight are not equal: while Arabic is 'the' official language, Amazigh is 'an' official language.[136]

In June 2011, the Amazigh Observatory of Rights and Freedoms issued a statement in which it explained its position regarding the new Constitution, highlighting the lack of equity committed against the Amazigh language in comparison with Arabic:

> (...) announcing the officialisation of Arabic and Tamazight in two separate paragraphs suggests that there is, definitively, a hierarchical relationship between a first official language, Arabic, and a second, Tamazight. As language is closely linked to identity, one concludes that, alas, the new Constitution divides Moroccans into two quite distinct categories: first-class citizens and second-class citizens.[137]

The statement concludes on a call for political action from '[c]ivil society and progressive political parties [to] continue their struggle for the construction of a truly democratic and modern society based on the principles of freedom, equality, justice and dignity and on a social contract that enshrines, once and for all, popular sovereignty'.[138]

Eight years after the officialisation of Tamazight, the organic law aiming to implement its official status was adopted in June 2019. This law, promised in the 2011 Constitution, was

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[136] Karima Ziamari and Jan Jaap De Ruiter, 'Les langues au Maroc : réalités, changements et évolutions linguistiques', in *Le Maroc au présent : d'une époque à l'autre, une société en mutation*, ed. Baudouin Dupret, Zakaria Rhani, Assia Boutaleb, et al. (Casablanca: Centre Jacques-Berque, 2015), http://books.openedition.org/cjb/1068.

[137] Fadma Aït Mous, 'Les Enjeux de l'amazighité au Maroc', *Confluences Méditerranée* 3, no. 78 (2011): 129.

[138] Meryem Demnati, 'Selon l'Observatoire Amazigh des Droits et Libertés au Maroc, Tamazight aurait une place secondaire malgré son officialisation', *Tamurt*, June 20, 2011, https://bit.ly/3lUV0M7 (accessed September 10, 2019).

received with severe criticism from Amazigh activists. Ahmed Assid, one of the founders of the Amazigh Observatory of Rights and Freedoms and member of the IRCAM, described the law as 'vague' for it neither specified the modalities of teaching Tamazight nor indicated how it should be used in the media.[139] He added: 'We are demanding a change of conception towards equality between the two official languages. But this is not the case, discrimination continues with this law'.[140]

Since 2011, changes have occurred in the discourse adopted by Amazigh advocates. In their call for the equality between Tamazight and Standard Arabic, the implementation of the constitutional character of Tamazight, its teaching, its visibilisation in the public space, and the protection of the Amazigh culture, references to the principle of 'recognition' have been overshadowed by those to the concept of '*inṣāf*' (equity, justice). The critics of the recognition offered by the Moroccan state to Tamazight are in line with Judith Butler's criticism of Axel Honneth's theory of recognition: recognition can be negative and non-benevolent. Recognising and 'taking care' do not necessarily go hand in hand.[141] 'Improper' recognition is experienced as injustice.

Amazigh activists have been increasingly calling for '*inṣāf*' since the official recognition of Tamazight in 2011. An overview of news articles covering their advocacy shows that they extensively refer to equity and justice in voicing their demands: 'A Moroccan association writes to Ban Ki-moon to "do justice" to the Amazigh language'; 'Tamaynut Organisation: a call to

[139] TelQuel, 'Le projet de loi organique sur l'amazigh adopté au parlement', June 11, 2019, https://bit.ly/2mpes9u (accessed September 10, 2019).

[140] Ibid.

[141] Judith Butler, 'Taking Another's View: Ambivalent Implications', in *Reification: a New Look at an Old Idea*, ed. Axel Honneth, Judith Butler, Raymond Geuss et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 97-120.

found an Amazigh front to do justice to Tamazight'; 'Teaching of Tamazight is taking place against the principles of equality, equity, and equal opportunities'; 'Officialisation of the Amazigh language: the context of the demand and the necessity for real equity'; 'The World Amazigh Congress asks the king to intervene to do justice to Tamazight'; 'Aourid: No democracy without doing justice to Tamazight'; and 'The Amazigh language is a fundamental component awaiting equity since the independence of Morocco', among many others.[142] The concept of 'linguistic justice' has also been introduced by some Amazigh activists. It is for

[142] Y. Chellabi, 'Jamʿiyya maghribiyya turāsil Ban Ki-moon li-"inṣāf" al- amāzīghiyya' [A Moroccan Association Writes to Ban Ki-moon to "Do Justice" to the Amazigh Language], *Febrayer*, 2015, https://www.febrayer.com/310553.html (accessed September 1, 2020); Abdellah Sabri, 'Munaẓamat Tamaynut: daʿwa li-taʾsīs jabha amāzīghiyya min ajl inṣāf al-amāzīghiyya' [Tamaynut Organisation: a Call to Found an Amazigh Front to Do Justice to Tamazight], *Azul Press*, November 9, 2015, https://azulpress.ma/?p=312105 (accessed September 1, 2020); Ahmed Assid, 'Taʿlīm al-amāzīghiyya yatim khārij mabādiʾ al-musāwāt wa-al-inṣāf wa-takāfuʾ al-furaṣ' [Teaching of Tamazight is taking place against the principles of equality, equity, and equal opportunities], *Souss 24*, May 27, 2015, https://www.souss24.com/160985.html (accessed September 1, 2020); Rachid al-Hahi, 'Tarsīm al-amāzīghiyya: siyāq al-maṭlab wa-ḍarūrat al-inṣāf al-fiʿlī' [Officialisation of the Amazigh Language: the Context of the Demand and the Necessity for Real Equity], *Ahdath Info*, March 7, 2016, https://ahdath.info/154534 (accessed September 1, 2020); Dalil Al-Rif, 'Al-tajammuʿ al-ʿālamī al-amāzīghī yuṭālib al-malik bi-al-tadakhkhul li-inṣāf al-amāzīghiyya' [The World Amazigh Congress Asks the King to Intervene to Do Justice to Tamazight], *Shabakat Dalil al-Rif*, September 27, 2015, https://dalil-rif.com/permalink/12640.html (accessed September 1, 2020); Montassir Ithri, 'Awrīd: lā dīmuqrāṭiyya dūn inṣāf al-amāzīghiyya' [Aourid: No Democracy Without Doing Justice to Tamazight], *Amadalamazigh Press*, May 12, 2018, https://bit.ly/3lT4eZk (accessed September 1, 2020); Addi al-Sibai, 'Al-amāzīghiyya mukawwin ʾasāsī yantaẓir al-inṣāf mundhu istiqlāl al-maghrib' [The Amazigh Language is a Fundamental Component Awaiting Equity Since the Independence of Morocco], *Medi 1 TV*, June 28, 2019, https://bit.ly/3554EpH (accessed September 1, 2020).

instance the case of the Amazigh Citizenship Network Azetta, which uses 'linguistic justice' in its declarations and public meetings.[143] Amazigh advocacy has indeed discursively switched, as a consequence of the instrumentalisation of Tamazight's recognition by the regime to survive the 2011 unrest, from demanding recognition to demanding equity and justice.

CONCLUSION

In this article I examined the discourse on the language of instruction in Morocco of four language actors. Since 2011, all language advocates have emphasised 'justice' and 'equity' in the regimes of justification supporting their demands. The two norms refer in the context of post-2011 language advocacy in Morocco to at least four different notions. State institutions employ them in the sense of economic equity and social justice that can be achieved by teaching more and better French in schools. Standard Arabic advocates use the concept of 'linguistic justice' to demonstrate that this language should maintain its privileged position because of its intrinsic characteristics. Darija promoters call for justice and equity through the use of mother tongues as the languages of instruction in the early years of schooling. Finally, Tamazight

[143] See for example: Azetta Amazigh, 'Déclaration annuelle du Réseau Amazigh pour la Citoyenneté "Azetta Amazigh" sur les situations des droits linguistiques et culturelles amazighs au Maroc durant l'année 2013 à l'occasion du 65ème anniversaire de la déclaration universelle des droits de l'Homme', *Amazigh World*, December 5, 2013, https://bit.ly/2R3l8Go (accessed September 1, 2020); Azetta, 'Sous le thème : "l'avenir de l'Amazigh à la lumière des expériences internationales : Quelles sont les solutions adoptées pour la bonne gestion de la diversité linguistique et culturelle afin d'assurer la transition démocratique et le respect des droits humains?"', *Amazigh World*, April 6, 2014, https://bit.ly/2ZdtjEF (accessed September 1, 2020).

activists resort to a discourse on justice and equity to demand the proper recognition of their language on an equal footing with Standard Arabic. The change in the regime of justification of language policy and the adoption of justice and equity as a new discourse is most apparent in the cases of the state and Standard Arabic advocates.

Since 2011, justice and equity, as a discourse, seem to be perceived as the most potent norms to support language politics stances. This ideational transformation adds to other more noticeable changes provoked by the wave of the Arab uprisings in Morocco. The widely accepted assumption before 2011 that the youth were 'apathetic [and] politically unconscious' has proved to be quite wrong.[144] In addition, 2011 crystallised a long-term alliance between An-Nahj Ad-Dīmuqrāṭī (The Democratic Path), a radical-left party close to the human rights association AMDH (Moroccan Association for Human Rights), and the anti-establishment Islamist association Al-ʿĀdl wa-al-Iḥsān. Both political groups have considered their starkly divergent ideologies to be less important than their common opposition to central power. Most importantly, 'the 20 February Movement', as a protester put it, 'has been a school of democracy!'.[145]

As shown in this article, language is at the heart of the political and moments of political effervescence only highlight this point. The intimate link between the linguistic question in Maghreb countries and political unrest is also salient in Algeria. The 2019 Hirak that started in opposition to Abdelaziz Bouteflika's candidacy for a fifth presidential term and evolved into a demand for radical political change came to be incarnated in the phrase 'Ytnaḥḥaw gāʿ', meaning 'remove them altogether'. While a journalist was reporting live from Algiers that

[144] Brouwer and Bartels, 'Arab Spring in Morocco: social media and the 20 February movement', 16.

[145] Cédric Baylocq and Jacopo Granci, '"20 Février". Discours et portraits d'un mouvement de révolte au Maroc', *L'Année du Maghreb* VIII (2012): 246.

Algerians were congratulating each other after Bouteflika retracted his bid for a fifth term, a young man contradicted her. He saw in this announcement nothing more than a change of 'pawn', and therefore said repeatedly 'Ytnaḥḥaw gāʿ'.[146] While he was making his statement, the journalist kept repeating 'Arabic! Arabic! Arabic! Arabic! Arabic! Arabic!', to which the young man responded 'I don't know Arabic; this is our Darija' and then walked away.[147] Uploaded to YouTube, the video went viral in social media and soon the face of the young man, Sofiane Bakir Torki, was drawn on banners held during protests. By his refusal to submit to the journalist's demand, he voiced the 'dignity and pride' of the Algerian people who experienced Bouteflika's fifth candidacy as an additional humiliation and deemed Standard Arabic to represent the language of power.[148] The theme of 'dignity', central to the 2019 Algerian Hirak, has also made its way into the discourse of the Ministry of Higher Education in Algeria. The Minister announced in July 2019 the replacement of French by English at the university level at a time of national debate on Algeria's history and the exploration by young protestors of its colonial past.[149] In Moroccan politics, although the 2011 uprisings constituted a brief interlude, an ongoing ideational change has nevertheless ensued, embedding justice and equity in the country's political culture as important principles by which action is legitimated, signalling a shift in the norms underpinning political legitimacy—i.e., in the legitimate.

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[146] 'Ytnahaw Ga3' [Remove Them Altogether], *YouTube*, March 15, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kYT-O4glR54 (accessed November 13, 2020).

[147] Ziad Bentahar, ''Ytnahaw gaʿ!': Algeria's Cultural Revolution and the Role of Language in the Early Stages of the Spring 2019 Hirak', *Journal of African Cultural Studies* (2020).

[148] Bentahar, ''Ytnahaw gaʿ!'', 8-11.

[149] Benjamin Stora, 'L'annonce du gouvenement sur l'anglais à l'université fait débat en Algérie', *RFI*, July 25, 2019, https://bit.ly/2H1dECE (accessed November 13, 2020).

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