- Abstract:
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In the classic Hotelling-Downs model of political competition, no pure strategy equilibrium with three or more strategic candidates exists when the distribution of voters’ preferred policies is unimodal. I study the effect of introducing two idealist candidates to the model who are non-strategic (i.e., fixed to their policy platforms), while allowing for an unlimited number of strategic candidates. Doing so, I show that equilibrium is restored for a non-degenerate set of unimodal distribution...
Expand abstract - Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
- Version:
- Publisher's version
- Files:
-
-
(pdf, 976.8kb)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1007/s11127-018-0556-y
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- Publisher:
- Springer Verlag Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Public Choice Journal website
- Volume:
- 176
- Issue:
- 3-4
- Pages:
- 389–403
- Publication date:
- 2018-05-23
- Acceptance date:
- 2018-05-04
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1573-7101
- ISSN:
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0048-5829
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:846481
- URN:
-
uri:1255702f-6b4a-4e1e-9282-81b5d7cf9019
- UUID:
-
uuid:1255702f-6b4a-4e1e-9282-81b5d7cf9019
- Local pid:
- pubs:846481
- Copyright holder:
- © Ronayne 2018
- Copyright date:
- 2018
- Notes:
- This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Journal article
Extreme idealism and equilibrium in the Hotelling-Downs model of political competition
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