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Extreme idealism and equilibrium in the Hotelling-Downs model of political competition

Abstract:

In the classic Hotelling-Downs model of political competition, no pure strategy equilibrium with three or more strategic candidates exists when the distribution of voters’ preferred policies is unimodal. I study the effect of introducing two idealist candidates to the model who are non-strategic (i.e., fixed to their policy platforms), while allowing for an unlimited number of strategic candidates. Doing so, I show that equilibrium is restored for a non-degenerate set of unimodal distribution...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Publisher's version

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Publisher copy:
10.1007/s11127-018-0556-y

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
Social Sciences Division
Department:
Economics
ORCID:
0000-0002-5616-1343
Publisher:
Springer Verlag Publisher's website
Journal:
Public Choice Journal website
Volume:
176
Issue:
3-4
Pages:
389–403
Publication date:
2018-05-23
Acceptance date:
2018-05-04
DOI:
EISSN:
1573-7101
ISSN:
0048-5829
Pubs id:
pubs:846481
URN:
uri:1255702f-6b4a-4e1e-9282-81b5d7cf9019
UUID:
uuid:1255702f-6b4a-4e1e-9282-81b5d7cf9019
Local pid:
pubs:846481

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