


‘Much Ado About Religion’

A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation of the
Āgamaḍambara,
a Satirical Play by the ninth century Kashmirian philosopher
Bhaṭṭa Jayanta

D. Phil. thesis

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**A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation of the *Āgamaḍambara*,
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Jayanta**

Submitted in Hilary Term 2004 for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
by Csaba Dezső of Balliol College, Oxford

This thesis contains a critical edition and annotated translation of the *Āgamaḍambara*, a four act play by Bhaṭṭa Jayanta. The *Āgamaḍambara* is a unique college-drama written by an eminent ninth century Kashmirian *naiyāyika* philosopher, which gives a comprehensive picture of the contemporary religious debates as well as the ‘Religionspolitik’ of the royal court.

The introduction provides an account of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s life and works, placed in the intellectual and historical context of his time. The question of conservative versus pragmatic attitude towards the heterodox religious schools is also dealt with.

The introduction next examines what makes Jayanta’s play so unique and unorthodox. It also considers the phenomenon of ‘philosophical plays’ in the light of the discussions on the nature and relation of poetry and *śāstra*, doctrinal or scientific literature. An analysis of the dominant aesthetic mood (*rasa*) of the play closes this section.

There follows a description of the sources consulted for the text of the *Āgamaḍambara*. These comprise two manuscripts in Jaina Devanāgarī script, and the *editio princeps*. The methodology of the edition of the Prakrit passages in classical Indian dramas in general and in the *Āgamaḍambara* in particular is also discussed.

Three registers of apparatus contain variants to the accepted text of the play, a Sanskrit translation (*chāyā*) of the Prakrit sentences, and testimonia from Jayanta’s *magnum opus*, the *Nyāyamañjarī*. In the notes to the translation the reader will find long quotations from various Sanskrit works. The aim of these quotations is to place Jayanta’s ideas in the intellectual context of his age and thereby to make their interpretation more accurate.

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Part I
Introduction

Chapter 1

Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's life

Although several details of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's life are lost for us, his personality takes a more distinct shape than that of many classical Indian poets and philosophers. His son, Abhinanda introduces his epitome of the *Kādambarī* with a short genealogy:¹

śaktināmābhavad gaṇḍo bhāradvājakule dvijaḥ|
dārvābhisāram āsādya kṛtadāraparigrahaḥ ||5||
tasya mitrābhidhāno 'bhūd ātmajas tejasām nidhiḥ|
janena doṣoparamaprabuddhenārcitodayaḥ ||6||
sa śaktisvāminam putram avāpa śrutaśālinam|
rājñāḥ karkoṭavaṃśasya muktāpīḍasya mantriṇam ||7||
kalyāṇasvāmināmāsyā yājñavalkya ivābhavat|
tanayaḥ śuddhayogarddhinirdhūtabhava kalmaṣaḥ ||8||
agādhahṛdayāt tasmāt parameśvaramaṇḍanam|
ajāyata sutaḥ kāntaś candro dugdhodadher iva ||9||
putram kṛtajanānandaṃ sa jayantam ajījanat|
āsīt kavivakṛtvaphalā yasya sarasvatī ||10||
vṛttikāra iti vyaktaṃ dvitīyaṃ nāma bibhrataḥ|
vedavedāṅgaviduṣaḥ sarvaśāstrārthavādināḥ ||11||
jayantanāmnaḥ sudhiyaḥ sādhusāhityatattvavit|
sūnuḥ samudabhūt tasmād abhinanda iti śrutaḥ ||12||

There was a *gaṇḍa* Brahman by the name Śakti, [born] in the Bhāradvāja family, who moved to Dārvābhisāra and married [there]. He had a son called Mitra, a treasury of majestic luster, whose rise was hailed by the people, roused due to the cessation of dangers, *like the sun* [Mitra] *whose rising is worshipped by the people who have woken at the end of the night*. He obtained a son, Śaktisvāmin,

¹*Kādambarīkathāsāra*, pp. 1f. Cf. BÜHLER 1873, pp. 103ff. Bühler identified this Abhinanda with the author of the *Rāmacarita-mahākāvya*. The latter poet, however, calls himself the son of Śatānanda (see *Rāmacarita*, p. 39.)

versed in the Vedas, the minister of king Mukṭāpīḍa of the Karkoṭa dynasty. He had a son called Kalyāṇasvāmin, who shook off the dirt of existence with wealth acquired by pure means, like Yājñavalkya, *who destroyed the stains of existence with the accomplishment of pure Yoga*. From that man of profound heart a beautiful son was born: Candra, an ornament of the Supreme Lord, *as the lovely moon [Candra], Śiva's ornament, was produced from the milk-ocean of unfathomable depth*. He begot a son, Jayanta, who made people happy, and who became poet and teacher as a result of his eloquence. Then to that wise man named Jayanta, who had a well-known second name 'The Commentator', was learned in the Vedas and the ancillary Vedic sciences, and expounded the meaning of all *śāstras*, a son was born, known as Abhinanda, conversant with the true nature of good literature.

From these verses it appears that Jayanta's ancestors were Gauḍa (Bengali) Brahmans who traced their descent back to the sage Bharadvāja. One of them, called Śakti, settled in Dārvābhisāra, a territory at the frontiers of Kashmir, which, as Stein pointed out, "comprised the whole tract of the lower and middle hills lying between the Vitastā and Candrabhāgā."² In the mid-ninth century a rich merchant, called Nara, set up his own throne there;³ a few decades later, as Kalhaṇa reports,⁴ the lord of Dārvābhisāra fled from king Śaṅkaravarman (883–902), who was leading a campaign against Gūrjara. Later the same Kashmirian king assassinated Naravāhana, the king of Dārvābhisāra.⁵

Reverting to Jayanta's ancestors, Śakti's son, Mitra, was held in great esteem by his contemporaries, while his grandson, Śaktisvāmin, gained influence on the political life of Kashmir: he became the minister of king Lalitāditya-Mukṭāpīḍa of the Karkoṭa dynasty (c. 724–761).⁶

Jayanta himself gives us valuable information about his grandfather in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (vol. I, p. 653):⁷

*asmatpitāmaha eva grāmakāmaḥ sāṃgrahaṇīm kṛtavān | sa iṣṭisamāp-
tisamanantaram eva gauramūlakam grāmam avāpa |*

²RT(S), vol. I, p.32 (note ad *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 1.180).

³*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 4.712.

⁴*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 5.141.

⁵*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 5.209. Nara and his son Naravāhana figure in the pedigree of the Kashmirian Lohara dynasty (see *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 7.1282).

⁶On the chronology of the Karkoṭa dynasty see RT(S), vol. I, pp. 66ff. Kalhaṇa does not mention Śaktisvāmin. He does however mention a minister of Lalitāditya called Mitraśarman (*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 4.137f.).

⁷It is remarkable how stubbornly some mistakes endure. Stein in his note to *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 8.1861 wrongly attributed the *Nyāyamañjarī* to Abhinanda (RT(S), vol. I, p. 144), but he corrected his mistake in the *Corrigenda et Addenda* (RT(S), vol. II, p. 555). One might think that after several publications of the *Nyāyamañjarī* its authorship is public knowledge, still Majumdar writes the following in his *Concise History of Ancient India* (New Delhi, 1983 [!], vol. III, p. 764): 'However, Abhinanda the author of the *Nyāyamañjarī* has quoted Vācaspati several times, and Abhinanda's son [!] Jayanta declares himself to have been Rājaśekhara's contemporary.' (This is all the more surprising since on pp. 695, 731, and 811 Majumdar refers to 'Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*'.)

'My own grandfather, desiring a village, performed the *sāṃgrahaṇī* sacrifice. Immediately after the completion of the sacrifice he obtained the village of Gauramūlaka.'

Gauramūlaka, as Cakradhara, the commentator of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, remarks, was Jayanta's ancestral village.⁸ According to Stein,⁹ Gauramūlaka or Ghoramūlaka was situated to the north of Rājapurī (Rajaurī), in the direction of the Rattan Pīr range. On the other hand, the state of Rājapurī was included in Dārvābhisāra.¹⁰ If my interpretation is sound, Abhinanda might refer to this improvement of Kalyāṇasvāmin's financial position in verse eight above.

Jayanta also mentions his father, Candra, in the *Nyāyamañjarī* with highly appreciative words: 'he filled the quarters with [his] fame, brilliant as the moon'.¹¹ Raghavan suggests that Candra was a devotee of Śiva,¹² on the other hand, the expression *paramēśvaramaṇḍanam* might refer to the fact that Candra rendered valuable services to the monarch.

From the information we have gleaned above it appears that Jayanta was born in a wealthy and respected orthodox Brahman family. He soon turned out to be a child genius: at a tender age he composed a commentary to Pāṇini's grammar and earned the name "(New) Commentator", (Nava-)Vṛttikāra.¹³ Later he made himself master of various *śāstras* and *āgamas*,¹⁴ distinguished himself in scholarly debates,¹⁵ and passed on his knowledge to a circle of students.¹⁶

Jayanta seems to have written three works on Nyāya, of which only two are extant: his *magnum opus*, the *Nyāyamañjarī* ("A Cluster of Flowers of [the] Nyāya[-tree]"), and the *Nyāyakalikā* ("A Bud of [the] Nyāya[-tree]").¹⁷ A Third work called *Pallava* (possibly *Nyāyapallava*, "A Twig of [the] Nyāya[-

⁸ *Granthibhaṅga*, p. 35: *gauramūlakākhyo granthakṛdabhijanagrāmah|*

⁹ RT(S), vol. II, pp. 144f. (note to verse 8.1861)

¹⁰ RT(S), vol. I, p. 33 (note to verse 1.180), vol. II, pp. 144f. (note to verse 8.1861); see also *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 8.1531.

¹¹ *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. II, p. 718: ... *vyāptadigantarasya yaśasā candrasya candratviṣā* ...

¹² *Āgamaḍambara* (ed. pr.), p. i.

¹³ See *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Four, verse 52: *bālakaver ... jayantasya; Āgamaḍambara*, Prologue: *śaiśava eva vyākaraṇavivarānakaraṇād vṛttikāra iti prathitāparanāmno bhāṭṭajayantasya*. Also *Kādambarīkathāsāra*, verse 11 (quoted above), *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. II, p. 718: *anvartho navavṛttikāra iti yaṃ śamsanti nāmnā budhāḥ|*

¹⁴ See *Kādambarīkathāsāra*, verse 11 (quoted above), *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Four, verse 52: *avalokitasakalāśāstrasārasya ... tattvavido bhraṣṭabhrānter jayantasya, Āgamaḍambara*, Act Two, ll. 405f.: *aśeṣabhavāgamapārage bhāṭṭajayante*.

¹⁵ See *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. II, p. 718: *vādeṣv āttajayo jayanta iti yaḥ khyātaḥ satām agrāṇiḥ*.

¹⁶ Jayanta's play was staged by his *śiṣyapariṣad*.

¹⁷ According to Steinkellner (1961, p. 159), '[d]ie veröffentlichte Nyāyakalikā ist kein Jayantawerk, sondern eine späte Kompilation von Jayanta-Sätzen' (note 16: 'Nach Angaben von V. Raghavan, Madras.') Marui, however, after careful consideration, is inclined to accept Jayanta's authorship (see MARUI 2000). A cursory glance at a manuscript of the *Nyāyakalikā* (Banaras Hindu University, 328405) made it clear to me that a critical edition of the text is a desideratum. According to Marui (p. 97; unfortunately the edition of Ganganath Jha, Allahabad, 1925, was not at my disposal) the *Nyāyamañjarī* and the *Nyāyakalikā* share the opening verse starting *namaḥ śāśvatikānanda*. . . . The BHU MS, however, does not contain this verse, and the text begins with the verse *surāsurasīroratnamarīcikhacitānighraye*. . . , which is the third verse at the beginning of the *Nyāyamañjarī*. Marui also quotes the closing sentences

tree]”) is quoted in the *Syādvādaratnākara*;¹⁸ Raghavan assumed that it was a ‘moderately sized metrical gloss on Gautama’.¹⁹ From the opening and closing benedictory verses of the *Nyāyamañjarī* we can presume that Jayanta was a devotee of Śiva,²⁰ while the fact that he thinks very highly of the Atharvaveda²¹ might indicate, as Raghavan pointed out, ‘that Jayanta belonged to the Atharvaveda’.²²

As we have seen Abhinanda admires his father's poetic talent,²³ and in one of the *maṅgala*-verses, instead of praising Bāṇa (the author whose work he epitomizes), he extols Jayanta's eloquence:²⁴

sarasāḥ sadalaṃkārāḥ prasādamadhurā girāḥ|
kāntās tātajayantasya jayanti jagatīguroḥ||

‘Victorious are the pleasing words of my father Jayanta, the teacher of the world, which are full of *rasas*, endowed with proper *alanikāras*, and sweet with lucidity, like beloved women who are full of feeling, wear beautiful ornaments, and are charming with graciousness.’

Though the style of the *Nyāyamañjarī* amply confirms Abhinanda's above quoted words, only one *kāvya* work of Jayanta is extant: the *Āgamaḍambara*, a play in four acts. Since a verse that is quoted in the play (Act Four, verse 53) as Jayanta's wise saying (*sūktam*) is also found in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (vol. I, p. 640), it seems probable that Jayanta wrote the *Āgamaḍambara* following his major work on Nyāya.²⁵

The *Āgamaḍambara* provides valuable details about Jayanta's political career. We learn that he was the adviser (*amātya*) of king Śaṅkaravarman (883–902), and played a great part in banishing the heterodox sect of the Black-Blankets from Kashmir.²⁶ The *nīlāmbaras* and their sad fate are also mentioned

of the *Nyāyakalikā*, which contain a lacuna in the edition. With the help of the BHU MS we can complete and improve the text: **ity etad aprabhāvitasvamatabhedam akṛtaparamatākṣepaṃ* (conj. : *ity apramāvita*^o MS, *ity etad* +++++ ed.) *ṣodaśapadārtha *tattvaṃ* (ed. : ^o *tattvāṃ* MS) **bālavvyutpattaye* (ed. : *vālavvyupattaye* MS) **kathitam|* (MS : om. MARUI 2000, ed.?) **ajāta* (ed. : *ajñāta*^o MS) *rasaniṣyandam anabhivyaktasaurabham| nyāyasya kalikāmātraṃ jayantaḥ paryadīdṛśat||*

¹⁸See STEINKELLNER 1961, p. 159; *Āgamaḍambara* (ed. pr.), p. v, note 8; MARUI 2000, p. 93.

¹⁹*Āgamaḍambara* (ed. pr.), p. v.

²⁰The first verse in the *Nyāyamañjarī* is addressed to Śambhu, the second to Bhavānī, the third to Gaṇapati. In the penultimate verse of his work Jayanta says that he composed the *Nyāyamañjarī* ‘meditating on the feet of [Śiva] whose diadem is the crescent’ (*candrakalārdhacūdacaraṇadhyāyī*), and in the closing verse he again pays reverence to Śambhu.

²¹Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 5: *tatra vedās catvāraḥ| prathamō 'tharvavedaḥ...*; in the section on *vedaprāmāṇya* Jayanta spares no pains to prove the Veda-status of the Atharvaveda, and he even asserts that it is actually the foremost of all the four Vedas (*Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. II, p. 626: *atharvaveda eva prathamah*).

²²*Āgamaḍambara* (ed. pr.), p. iii.

²³*Kādambarīkathāsāra*, verse 10, quoted above.

²⁴*Kādambarīkathāsāra*, verse 2.

²⁵Actually there are many more parallel passages in the two texts (without the indication of the source in the play), as the register of *testimonia* in the edition will show.

²⁶See Act Two, ll. 405ff.: *nanv asau rājā śrīśaṅkaradevaḥ| sa hi varṇāśramadharmamaryādācāryas tribhuvanarakṣādīkṣito devaḥ svata eva pratikriyām atra jānāti, viśeṣato 'śeṣabha-*

in the *Nyāyamañjarī*²⁷:

asitaikapāṭanivītāviyutastrīpumsavihitabahuṣṭam|
nīlāmbaravratam idaṃ kila kalpitam āsīd vitaiḥ kaiścit||
tad apūrvam iti viditvā nivārayām āsa dharmatattvajñāḥ|
rājā śaṅkaravarmā na punar jainādīmatam evam||

asitaika° em. ISAACSON : *amitaika*° ed; °*āviyuta*° Pāṭhāntaras and Śo-dhanas, at the end of vol. II. : °*āniyata*° ed. ('unrestrained')

'Some rakes, as we are told, invented this Black Blanket Observance, in which men and women wrapped together in a single black veil make various movements. King Śaṅkaravarman, who was conversant with the true nature of Dharma, suppressed this practice, because he knew that it was unprecedented, but he did not [suppress] the religions of Jains and others in the same way.'²⁸

vāgamapārage pārśvavartini tatrabhavati bhaṭṭajayante|; Act Three, ll. 34ff.: *dālūne khu lāe śaṅkalavamme| tado vi viśame śe bamhaṇe taśśa amacce dulāālayayante, jehiṃ te tavaśśiṇo nīlambalā vaḍia piṭṭiya vedavāhila tti laṭṭhādo nīvāsīdā|*; *ibid.* verse 8: *rājāsau bhuvaneṣu viśrutaguṇo dharmāikatānāsāyo, mantri sāstramahāṭaviviharaṇāśrānto jayanto 'py asau|*

²⁷ *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 649

²⁸This verse started an avalanche of misinterpretations. First Jacob made the following observation (JACOB 1911, p. 511): 'From the concluding words it would appear that the king was a Jain.' Then M. R. Kavi deleted Yaśovarman of Kanauj from the pages of history (KAVI 1940, pp. 45ff), and identified the Kashmirian Śaṅkaravarman, who is called Yaśovarman in the *Āgamaḍambara*, with the patron king of Bhavabhūti and Vākpatirāja (*ibid.* p. 50). The fact that 'Kalhaṇa devotes a vague and dark page in depicting this sovereign's [Śaṅkaravarman's] conquests and political career' induces Kavi to think that 'pages in Kalhaṇa's transcript were misplaced and several lines referring to Lalitāditya should come in the history of Śaṅkaravarman' (p. 47). To quote some more of Kavi's utterly unfounded assertions: 'All these characters [in the *Āgamaḍambara*] are real persons and may be assumed as contemporaries of Jayanta and Śaṅkaravarman' (p. 48); 'Viśvarūpa is spoken of in high terms in the drama and as a great mīmāṃsaka' (*ibid.*); 'Viśvarūpa is the same as the commentator of the Yājñavalkya Smṛti, who is also called Bhavabhūti; Umbeka is also called Bhavabhūti: therefore 'Umbeka, Bhavabhūti, Viśvarūpa [...] are the different names of the same person' (*ibid.*); 'Viśvarūpa of the drama can be suggested as his [Śaṅkaravarman / Yaśovarman's] court poet Bhavabhūti' (p. 49); 'Sāhaṭa, also called Dhairyarāsi is described as the guru of Jayanta' (*ibid.*); 'Mañjira, an officer of the king, was a poet representing one of the three schools of poetic composition as detailed by Kuntaka in his *Vakroktijīvitā*' (p. 50), etc. etc.

Now Hegde in his article about Bhaṭṭa Jayanta ingeniously combined Jacob's and Kavi's guesswork in the following way (HEGDE 1983, pp. 5f): 'The king Śaṅkaravarman, according to Mr. Ramakrishna Kavi who dates it on the basis of the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* of Kalhaṇa, lived about 850 A.D. (...) A certain prince of the name of Śaṅkaravarman is mentioned in the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*, who was a Jaina by religious practice. Mm. Gopinath Kaviraj notices that the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* has fixed the time of this prince in between 883 A.D. and 902 A.D. and also that he was worthless. Śaṅkaravarman alias Yaśovarman also was a Jaina. It is not possible to find out the relation between these two Śaṅkaravarmans, because that part of the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* is missing, or to think otherwise, not properly descriptive in nature. But the time gap between these two persons is only 30 to 50 years. Hence Śaṅkaravarman who lived between 883 and 902 A.D. might have been an immediate or the next successor of the king Śaṅkaravarman otherwise called Yaśovarman who lived in 850 A.D. Due to some failures in the statesmanship of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, Śaṅkaravarman, the prince, might have put him to jail. But as we do not observe even a single word of censure of the king Śaṅkaravarman from the pen of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, we can easily assume that the king was controlled by the prince Śaṅkaravarman who

We know from Abhinanda that Jayanta's great-grandfather, Śaktisvāmin, was a minister of the Kashmirian king Muktāpīḍa-Lalitāditya, who reigned between c. 724–761.²⁹ This information makes it probable that Jayanta was in his fifties-sixties at the end of the ninth century.³⁰

Kalhaṇa does not give a favourable account of the king whom Jayanta served as adviser. Having secured the throne for himself by defeating a rival *yuvarāja*, king Śaṅkaravarman embarked on a campaign against Gūrjara.³¹ Naravāhana, the king of Dārvābhisāra fled from the advancing army to the mountains.³² Śaṅkaravarman uprooted the king of Gūrjara, who handed over the Ṭakka-land to save his own country.³³ After his successful *digvijaya* the king of Kashmir founded Śaṅkarapura, and together with his wife, Sugandhā, the daughter of Svāmirāja, 'the ruler of the northern region' (*udakpathaprabhoḥ*), they built two Śiva-temples there: Śaṅkaragaurīśa and Sugandheśa.³⁴ As Kalhaṇa remarks with his usual malice: 'Poets and kings of these modern times augment their own work by plundering the poems or the property of others. Thus this ruler, who possessed but little character, had whatever was of value at Parihāsapura [the town built by Lalitāditya], carried off in order to raise the fame of his own city.'³⁵

Later Śaṅkaravarman came more and more under the sway of avarice and became 'master in exploiting his people'.³⁶ Since his campaigns had probably emptied the treasury, the king introduced fines, taxes, systematic forced labour, and established two new revenue offices.³⁷ He also deprived the temples from the profits they had from the sale of various articles of worship, simply 'plundered', as Kalhaṇa puts it, sixty-four temples through special "supervising" officers,³⁸ resumed under direct state management villages held as *agrahāras* by

brought the circumstantial force on the king to put Jayanta in an isolated dungeon. The verse in the *NM*: *rājñā tu gahvare 'sminn aśabdake ... etc.* supports the above argument positively.'

²⁹On the chronology of the Kārkoṭa dynasty see RT(S), vol. I, pp. 66ff.

³⁰Cf. HACKER 1951, pp. 110ff.

³¹*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 5.136 seqq. 'The name *Gūrjara* is preserved in that of the modern town of *Gujrāt*, situated in the Panjāb plain about five miles from the W. bank of the Cināb [...]. The name of the modern town is also used in an extended sense for the designation of the neighbouring territory, comprising the upper portion of the Doāb between the Jhelam and Cināb rivers to the foot of the Bhimbhar hills. [...] It appears that the older name *Gūrjara* had, at the time of the events here related, a much wider territorial application.' (RT(S), vol. I, p. 204, note ad vv. 143–144.)

³²*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 5.141; a few years later Śaṅkaravarman assassinated him, see *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 5.209.

³³*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 5.150.

³⁴*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 5.156–158. The ruins of Śaṅkarapura can be seen at the modern town of Paṭan (RT(S), vol. I, pp. 206f, note ad v. 156). 'Svāmirāja may be supposed to have been a ruler in the Dard territory, or in some neighbouring tract.' (RT(S), vol. I, p. 207, note ad v. 157.)

³⁵*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 5.160–161, tr. Stein in RT(S), vol. I, p. 207.

³⁶*prajāpīḍaṇapāṇḍitaḥ*, *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 5.165.

³⁷*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 5.167ff.

³⁸*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 5.168–169: *dhūpacandanatāilādivikriyottham samādade| draviṇam deva-veśmabhyah krayamūlyakalācchalāt|| pratyavekṣām mukhe dattvā vibhaktair adhikāribhiḥ| catuḥṣaṣṭim suragrhān mumoṣetarad añjasā|*

the temples, and manipulating the weight in the scales he cheated the temple-corporations (*parṣads*), reducing the allotment assigned as compensation for the villages.³⁹ The villages gradually sank into poverty under the fiscal oppression, while clerks, secretaries, and tax-collectors (*kāyasthas*, *diviras*) ruled.⁴⁰

Unlike his father Avantivarman, who showered honours and fortunes on scholars and poets,⁴¹ Śaṅkaravarman was not a liberal patron of arts: as Kalhaṇa says, it was due to him that the learned were not respected.⁴² The king was so afraid of spending money that he turned his back on the worthy, and as a result such eminent poets as Bhallaṭa had to live in penury,⁴³ while the low-born Lavaṭa, who was made treasurer (*gañjavara*), thrived.⁴⁴ Śaṅkaravarman himself, giving proof of his boorishness, refused to speak Sanskrit, and used *apabhraṃśa* instead, a language fit for drunkards in Kalhaṇa's esteem.⁴⁵

Jayanta gives a more favourable account of king Śaṅkaravarman in his *Āgamaḍambara*. He is said to be 'supremely devoted to Śiva', and 'merciful to all religious schools'.⁴⁶ The Śaiva Abbot also holds a high opinion of the king: 'The merits of this king are celebrated all over the world, and his attention is solely devoted to social and religious order';⁴⁷ 'As long as His Majesty Śaṅkaravarman righteously rules the country which has fallen to him, the kingdom belongs to the virtuous alone, but he supports it.'⁴⁸ In the fourth act the hero of the play, looking at the assembly of scholars, exclaims as follows: 'How wonderful! Now the kingdom looks exactly like Brahmā's heaven—the kingdom of His Majesty Yaśovarmadeva⁴⁹ of holy fame, whose heart is with the Destroyer of the Cities [of the demons, i.e. Śiva], an ocean of enviable virtues, who adorns his ear by listening to the valuable [advices] of the learned, and fulfils the wishes of every honest man.'⁵⁰

The two *sādhakas* in the play, however, who represent a more antisocial form of Śaivism, are not satisfied either with the king,⁵¹ or with the present state of the kingdom, because 'in every region, every single town, every village, everywhere the sound of Veda-recitation grates on the ear, the smell of ghee stings

³⁹ *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 5.170–170, see also Stein's notes in RT(S), vol. I, pp. 208f.

⁴⁰ *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 5.175ff.

⁴¹ *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 5.33f. Kalhaṇa mentions Mukṭākāṇa, Śivasvāmin (the author of the *Kapṣinābhhyudaya*), Ānandavardhana, and Ratnākara (who composed the *Haraviṅjaya*) as members of Avantivarman's *sabhā*.

⁴² *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 5.179: *nimittam sarvavidyānām anādare*.

⁴³ *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 5.204: *tyāgabhīrutayā tasmīn guṇisaṅgaparāṇmukhe| āsevantāvarā vṛttih kavayo bhallaṭādayaḥ|*

⁴⁴ *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 5.177, 205.

⁴⁵ *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 5.206.

⁴⁶ *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Three, ll. 159f.: *paramamāheśvaro hi rājā śaṅkaravarmadevaḥ, sarvāśrameṣu ca dayāluḥ|*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* verse 8a: *rājāsau bhuvaneṣu viśrutaguṇo dharmāikatānāśayo*.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* ll. 219f.: *śrīśaṅkaravarmani dharmeṇa medinīm samāgatām śāsati sādḥūnām eva rājyam, tasya paraṃ bhṛtiḥ|*

⁴⁹ Śaṅkaravarman used the same name on his Karkoṭa-style coins (see RAY).

⁵⁰ *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Four, ll. 76ff.: *aho bata puraharḥḍayasya spṛhaṇīyaguṇodadher vibudhaguṇākarṇanakarṇālaṅkārasya pūritasakalasādhujanamanorathasya puṇyayaśasaḥ śrīyaśovarmadevasya brahmalokanirviśeṣam evedaṃ drśyate rāṣṭram|*

⁵¹ *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Three, l. 34: *dāluṇe khu lāe saṃkalavamme*.

the nose, the smoke of sacrifice brings tears to the eyes'.⁵² They are particularly upset because the king, shoulder to shoulder with his 'rough' (*viṣama*) adviser, Jayanta, has 'nabbed the mendicant Nīlāmbaras, beat them to jelly, and expelled them from the kingdom, on the grounds that they were outside Vedic religion. And if any other mendicant is caught, who is outside Vedic religion, he'll be beaten up, killed, thrown in jail, [or] slain.'⁵³ And indeed a herald comes and proclaims the order of the king:⁵⁴

ye 'trānādi jagatpravāhapatitā nānāgamāḥ sādhas
te tiṣṭhantu yathāsthītāḥ svasamayādiṣṭās carantaḥ kriyāḥ|
ye tu prastutadharmaviplavakṛtaḥ pāpās tapopāyinas
te ced āśu na yānti ghātayati tān dasyūn iva kṣmāpatih|

Those virtuous people who have fallen into the beginningless stream of the world and belong to various religions—they should remain as they are, performing practices prescribed by their own religious discipline. Those criminal false ascetics, however, who devastate the established social and religious order—if they don't leave immediately, the king will strike them like thieves.

On the basis of the information gathered from Jayanta's play and the *Rājatarāṅginī* we can sketch the portrait of a king who kept a fast hold on his country. Śaṅkaravarman appears to have exercised tight central control over both fiscal and religious matters in Kashmir, and preferred his subjects to be dutiful and conformist. He certainly disliked the squandering of money, and a nobleman who organized lavish dinners for mendicants instead of offering his wealth and services to the king could surely expect the confiscation of his property.⁵⁵

In a verse in the *Nyāyamañjarī* Jayanta gives curious details about the circumstances among which he wrote his *magnum opus*:⁵⁶

rājñā tu gahvare 'sminn aśabdake bandhane vinihito 'ham|
grantharacanāvīnodād iha hi mayā vāsarā gamitāḥ||

'I had been transferred by the king to this forest, a wordless place of confinement. I have spent the years here with the pastime of writing a book.'

Cakradhara, the commentator of the *Nyāyamañjarī* supplements this rather enigmatic verse with the following information:⁵⁷

⁵²Ibid. ll. 81ff.: *viśae viśae ṇaale ṇaale gāme gāme thale thale vedajjhayaṇasaddheṇa tuṭṭamti kaṇṇā, ajjagamdheṇa tuṭṭadi ghāṇe, jaṇṇadhūmeṇa galaṇṭti aṣkṛi|*

⁵³Ibid. ll. 34ff.: *jehiṇ te tavaśśino ṇīlambalā vaḍia piṭṭiya vedavāhila tti laṭṭhādo ṇivvāsīdā|*
aṇṇe ya je vedavāhile tavaśśi labbhadi, se piṭṭiyadi māḷiadi baṇḍhādi ghallādi|

⁵⁴Āgamadāmbara, Act Three, verse 1.

⁵⁵Cf. Āgamadāmbara, Act Two, ll. 315ff. Śaṅkaravarman's policy in religious matters was revived by Yaśaskara (939–948), who restored order in Kashmir after the chaotic reigns of various debauched kings following the death of Śaṅkaravarman. Yaśaskara, himself a Brahman and elected as king by an assembly of Brahmans, was a champion of orthodoxy, and, similarly to Śaṅkaravarman, he was not favourably disposed towards anti-dharmic religious practices (cf. *Rājatarāṅginī* 6.108ff).

⁵⁶*Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. II, p. 199.

⁵⁷*Granthibhaṅga*, p. 167.

*kaśmīre kvacit khasadeśe cirakālam *atavyām asau* (conj., or possibly *āraṇye 'sau : āraṇyā[nyā]m asau* ed.) *śrīśaṅkaravarmaṇo rājña ājñayā sthitavān iti vārtā*

'The report runs that he spent a long time by His Majesty king Śaṅkaravarman's order in the forest, somewhere in Khasa-land in Kashmir.'

As Wezler has already pointed out,⁵⁸ it is unlikely that Jayanta wrote the *Nyāyamañjarī* as a political prisoner like Gandhi or Nehru. The territory of the *khasas* or *khaśas* was, according to Stein, 'restricted to a comparatively limited region, which may be roughly described as comprising the valleys lying immediately to the S[outh] and W[est] of the Pīr Panṭsāl range, between the middle course of the Vitastā in the W[est] and Kāṣṭavāta (Kīṣṭvār) in the E[ast].'⁵⁹ We also gather from the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* that the rulers of Rājapurī (Rajaurī) were *khaśas*, just like their troops.⁶⁰ On the other hand, the hill-state of Rājapurī was included in Dārvābhisāra,⁶¹ where Jayanta's forefathers had settled, and Ghoramūlaka or Gauramūlaka, Jayanta's ancestral village was, as Stein writes, 'probably situated to the north of Rajaurī in the direction of the Rattan Pīr range'.⁶² It appears that Jayanta was sent by the king to this hill-region of the *khaśas*, not very far from his homeland.⁶³ Since Śaṅkaravarman led his campaign through territories lying to the southwest from Kashmir, one might think that Jayanta was sent there with some kind of political commission.⁶⁴ The word *bandhana*, however, suggests that this may not have been a promotion, but it was not a life-long exile either since he seems to have returned to the circle of his students as their professor.

⁵⁸WEZLER 1976, p. 344.

⁵⁹RT(S), vol. I, p. 47, note *ad* verse 1.317.

⁶⁰Cf. e.g. *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 7.979, 1271, 1276 seqq., and Stein's note quoted above.

⁶¹*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 8.1531, RT(S), vol. I, p. 33, note *ad* verse 1.180.

⁶²RT(S), vol. II, p. 144, note *ad* verse 8.1861.

⁶³To the east from Rājapurī lies the valley of the upper Āns River, which was called *Pañcagahvara* and was inhabited by *khaśas* (see RT(S) vol. I, p. 47, note *ad* verse 1.317). Could the word *gahvare* in Jayanta's verse refer to this territory?

⁶⁴In fact Kalhaṇa makes mention of the son of a minister whom Śaṅkaravarman made 'lord of the Gate' (*dvārādhipa*), and who was killed at a place called Vīrānaka (*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 5.214). As Stein has shown, '[t]he term *dvārādhipa* [...] along with its equivalents, *dvārapati*, *dvāreśa*, *dvārādhiśvara*, *dvāranāyaka*, *dvārādhikārin* [...] designated the high officer who held charge of the passes leading into Kaśmir' (RT(S) vol. I, p. 213, note *ad* verse 214). In *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 7.217 we read about a *dvārādhikārin* who fell in a battle with the *khaśas*, while in 7.576 seqq. Kalhaṇa writes about another 'lord of the Gate' who led expeditions against Rājapurī.

Chapter 2

A champion of orthodoxy

The leading character of Jayanta's play is a young and dynamic Mīmāṃsaka who has just finished his Vedic studies and so become a 'graduate', *snātaka*. His ardour knows no bounds: he is eager to find someone who dares to be an 'enemy of the Veda' (*vedadvīṣ*), in order to stamp him flat with the ram of reasoning:¹

*svādhyāyaḥ paṭhito yathāvidhi parāmrṣṭāni cāṅgāni ṣaṇ
mīmāṃsāpi nirūpiteti vihitam karma dvijanmocitam|
nityādhūtakutarkadhūsaragirāṇ yāvāt tu vedadvīṣāṇ
nyakkāro na kṛtaḥ kṛtārtha iva me tāvan na vidyāśramah||*

'I have duly studied the Veda, mastered the six auxiliary sciences, and examined Mīmāṃsā as well. Thus I have performed the duties appropriate for a twice-born person. But until I humiliate the enemies of the Veda, who dirty their speech with incessantly brandished pernicious [or: faulty] argumentation, the efforts I made in my studies will be as if fruitless.'

The *raison d'être* of Nyāya, as delineated by Jayanta in the *Nyāyamañjarī*, appears to be remarkably similar to the Graduate's mission. According to Jayanta, the primary task of Nyāya is to protect the authority of the Veda (*vedaprāmāṇyarakṣā*).² However, as Kataoka pointed out,³ this *prayojana* does not tally with the statements of older Naiyāyikas, who proclaim that Nyāya provides us with the knowledge of the real nature of the objects of cognition (*prameyatattvajñāna*, and above all *ātmajñāna*), which results in liberation (*apavarga*), independently of the Veda.⁴ Vātsyāyana includes Nyāya in the traditional list

¹ *Āgamadambara*, Act One, verse 11.

² Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 7: *nyāyavistaras tu mūlastambhabhūtaḥ sarvavidyānāṃ vedaprāmāṇyarakṣāhetutvāt|*; ibid. p. 11: *yasya hi vedaprāmāṇye samśayānā viparyastā vā matih, taṃ prati śāstrārambhaḥ|*

³ KATAOKA 1999, pp. 5ff.

⁴ Cf. *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.1: *tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ; Nyāyabhāṣya* ad loc., p. 2: *ātmādeḥ khalu prameyasya tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ|*, ibid. p. 6: *iha*

of four sciences, identifying it with *ānvīkṣikī*.⁵ Each of the four sciences provides us with the true knowledge (*tattvajñāna*) of its own subject, and leads us to the appropriate benefit (*niḥśreyasa*). Accordingly Nyāya reveals the true nature of the Self, and thus it liberates us from transmigration.⁶

Beside fulfilling its particular purpose (*prayojana*), Nyāya also contributes to the other sciences, furnishing them with a valid method of argumentation. Says Vātsyāyana:⁷

*seyam ānvīkṣikī pramāṇādibhir vibhajyamānā—
pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānām upāyaḥ sarvakarmaṇām|
āśrayaḥ sarvadharmāṇām vidyoddeśe prakīrtitā||*

‘This *ānvīkṣikī*, which is divided into such categories as *pramāṇas* etc., is proclaimed in the treatment of sciences to be the light of all sciences, the means of all actions, and the substratum of all *dharmas*.’

We find the same verse in the *Arthasāstra*, in the section describing the four sciences.⁸

*ānvīkṣikī trayī vārttā daṇḍanītis ceti vidyāḥ|
(...)
tābhir dharmārthau yad vidyāt tad vidyānām vidyātvam|
sāṃkhyam yogo lokāyatam cety ānvīkṣikī|
dharmādharmau trayyām arthānarthau vārttāyām nayānayaḥ daṇḍa-
nītyām balābale caitāsām hetubhir anvīkṣamāṇā lokasya upakaroti
vyasane abhyudaye ca buddhim avasthāpayati prajñāvākyakriyāvai-
śāradyam ca karoti|
pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānām upāyaḥ sarvakarmaṇām|
āśrayaḥ sarvadharmāṇām śaśvad ānvīkṣikī matā||*

‘*Ānvīkṣikī*, the three Vedas, economics, and politics: these are the sciences. (...) The sciences are called *vidyās* since one can know (*vidyāt*) *dharma* and *artha* with their help. *Sāṃkhya*, *Yoga*, and *Lokāyata*: these [come under the heading] *ānvīkṣikī*. *Ānvīkṣikī*, inasmuch as it investigates with logical reasons [what is] religious merit and demerit in the three Vedas, profit and loss in economics, good and bad conduct in politics, and the strong and weak points of these [sciences], is of service to mankind, steadies the mind in bad and

tu adhyātmaavidyāyām ātmaviññānaṁ tattvajñānam, niḥśreyasādhigamo 'pavargaprāptir iti| Nyāyavārtika, p.10: param tu niḥśreyasam [= apavarga] ātmādeḥ prameyasya tattvajñānād bhavati| On the differences among Naiyāyikas regarding apavarga, see SLAJE, 'Niḥśreyasam...'

⁵ *Nyāyabhāṣya, p.2: imās tu catasro vidyāḥ pṛthakprasthānāḥ prāṇabhṛtām anugrahāyopadiśyante, yāsām caturthīyam ānvīkṣikī nyāyavidyā|*

⁶ *Nyāyabhāṣya, p.6: tad idaṁ tattvajñānaṁ niḥśreyasādhigamaś ca yathāvidyam veditavyam| iha tv adhyātmaavidyāyām ātmaviññānaṁ tattvajñānam, niḥśreyasādhigamo 'pavargaprāptir iti|*

⁷ *Nyāyabhāṣya, p.5.*

⁸ *Arthasāstra 1.2.1; 1.2.9–12.*

good luck, and makes one skillful in thinking, speaking, and acting. *Ānvīkṣikī* has always been accepted as the light of all sciences, the means of all actions, and the substratum of all *dharmas*.’

From Kauṭilya’s description it appears that the category of “investigative science” includes several schools of learning which are not necessarily rooted in Vedic orthodoxy. For Vātsyāyana, Nyāya fulfills the role of *ānvīkṣikī* inasmuch as it establishes and employs the method of logical inquiry; the results of this inquiry, however, must be in conformity with the information received from sense perception and scripture:⁹

kaḥ punar ayam nyāyah? pramāṇair arthaparīkṣaṇam| pratyakṣāgamāśritam cānumānam| sāvīkṣā| pratyakṣāgamābhyām īkṣitasyārthasyānvīkṣaṇam anvīkṣā| tayā pravartata ity ānvīkṣikī nyāyavidyā nyāyaśāstram| yat punar anumānam pratyakṣāgamaviruddham nyāyābhāṣaḥ sa iti|

‘But what is this Nyāya? The examination of things with the help of means of valid cognition. As for inference, it is based on sense perception and verbal testimony. It is the same as *anvīkṣā*. *Anvīkṣā* is a subsequent examination of something that has been examined by sense perception and verbal testimony. That [science] which operates with this [*anvīkṣā*] is *ānvīkṣikī*, alias the science of Nyāya, or the doctrine of Nyāya. That inference, however, which contradicts sense perception or verbal testimony is an illusive reasoning.’

Orthodox writers on *dharmaśāstra* also expressed the view that not every kind of reasoning is commendable. *Manusmṛti* 7.43 mentions *ānvīkṣikī* among the sciences a king should study. Medhātithi (ninth century) comments on this verse as follows:¹⁰

*ātmane yā hitānvīkṣikī sāvīkṣayā, tāṃ śikṣeta (...) yā tu buddhacārvākāditarkavidyā sāvīkṣā kṛtvā kvacid upayujyate| pratyutastikyam upahanti *tasya (conj. : om. ed.) yo nātinipuṇamatih|*

‘That *ānvīkṣikī* which is beneficial for himself is based on reasoning: he should study that. (...) That [*ānvīkṣikī*], however, which is the science of reasoning of Buddhists, Cārvākas, and other [heretics], is not useful anywhere at all, on the contrary, it destroys conviction in orthodox Vedic values¹¹ if one is not very intelligent.’¹²

⁹ *Nyāyabhāṣya*, p. 3.

¹⁰ JHA, vol. 2, p. 14. Medhātithi takes *ānvīkṣikīṃ cātmaavidyāṃ* belonging together, and interprets *ātmaavidyāṃ* in a slightly forced way.

¹¹ Cf. Medhātithi ad *Manusmṛti* 4.30 (JHA, vol. 1, p. 342): *haitukāḥ nāstikāḥ| nāsti paralokāḥ, nāsti dattam, nāsti hutam ity evaṃ sthitaprajñāḥ|*

¹² Cf. Medhātithi ad *Manusmṛti* 2.11 (JHA, vol. 1, p. 72): *hetuśāstram nāstikatarkaśāstram buddhacārvākādiśāstram yatra vedo ’dharmāyeti punaḥ punar udghuṣyate|*; Medhātithi ad *Manusmṛti* 12.106 (JHA, vol. 2, p. 485): *tarkeṇeti tarkapradhānā granthā laukikapramāṇanirūpaṇaparā nyāyavaiśeṣikalokāyatikā ucyante| tatra vedaviruddhāni buddhalokāyatikanairgranthādīni paryudasyante|*

According to Jayanta, Nyāya is not only in conformity with scripture but it is also “the main supporting-pillar of all sciences, because it is the means of the protection of the Veda’s authority”.¹³ It is Akṣapāda’s Nyāya which is referred to as *tarka* and *nyāyavistara* in the list of the fourteen sciences,¹⁴ and not any other doctrine.¹⁵

*yataḥ, sāmkyārhatānām tāvat kṣapaṇakānām kīdrśam anumāno-
padeśakauśalam| kiyad eva tattarkeṇa vedaprāmāṇyaṃ rakṣyate, iti
nāsāv iha gaṇanārhaḥ| bauddhās tu yady apy anumānamārgāvagāha-
nanaipuṇoddhurām kandharām udvahanti, tathāpi vedaviruddhatvāt
tattarkasya katham vedādividyāsthānamadhye pāṭhaḥ| anumānakau-
śalam api kīdrśam śākyānām iti pade pade darśayīṣyāmaḥ| cārvākās
tu varākāḥ pratikṣeptavyā eva| kaḥ kṣudratarkasya tadīyasyeha ga-
ṇanāvasaraḥ| vaiśeṣikāḥ punar asmadanuyāyina evety evam asyām
janatāsu prasiddhāyām api ṣattarkyām idam eva tarkanyāyavistaraśā-
bdābhyām śāstram uktam|*

For, what sort of skill do the mendicant Sāmkyas and Jains, to begin with, have in teaching reasoning? To what extent is the authority of the Veda protected by their *tarka*? Thus it does not qualify to take it into account here. As for the Buddhists, although they walk with their head high in the air because of their dexterity in delving deep into the ways of reasoning, nevertheless, because their *tarka* is opposed to the Veda, how could it be mentioned among the sciences headed by the Veda? And we shall also demonstrate at every step what the Buddhists’ skill in reasoning is like. As for the wretched Cārvākas, they must simply be discarded. What scope is there for counting their trifling *tarka* among [the fourteen sciences]? The Vaiśeṣikas, on the other hand, just follow us [Naiyāyikas]. Thus, even if this group of six *tarkas* is well-known among the people, it is this *śāstra* [of Akṣapāda] alone which is referred to with the words “*tarka*” and “*nyāyavistara*”.

Jayanta’s rigour with which he separates Veda-protecting Nyāya from heterodox *tarkas* will appear even more marked in the light of the works of some earlier Naiyāyikas. Bhāvivikta, who appears to have written a commentary on

Rājaśekhara in his *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā* (Third Adhyāya, p. 4) divides *ānvikṣikī* or *tarka* into two main categories: *pūrvapakṣa* (*prima facie* view) and *uttarapakṣa* (the established view). To the former type belong the heterodox schools of the Buddhists, Cārvākas, and Jains, while the latter comprises Sāmkyas, Nyāya, and Vaiśeṣika. Jayanta in the *sarvāgamaprāmāṇya* section of his *Nyāyamañjarī* (vol. I, p. 648) also rejects the teaching of Lokāyata on the ground that it is based on *pūrvapakṣa* arguments.

¹³ *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 7: *nyāyavistaras tu mūlastambhabhūtaḥ sarvavidyānām vedaprāmāṇyarakṣāhetutvāt|*

¹⁴ *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 8, quoting *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* 1.3 and another verse of unknown source. As Kataoka pointed out (KATAOKA 1999, pp. 17ff.), this fourteen-fold list enables Jayanta to limit the scope of all sciences to the transcendental (*adrṣṭa*), and to place the four Vedas (and not *trayi*) headed by Atharvaveda on the top of the hierarchy of *vidyās*.

¹⁵ *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, pp. 8f.

the *Nyāyabhāṣya* probably in the period between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti,¹⁶ was, according to Cakradhara, one of the “old Cārvākas” (*cirantanacārvākāḥ*)¹⁷ mentioned by Jayanta in his *Nyāyamañjarī*.¹⁸ Similarly Aviddhakarṇa, who also wrote a *Bhāṣyaṭīkā* before the time of Dharmakīrti, seems to have composed a Cārvāka *Tattvaṭīkā* as well.¹⁹ As Wezler observes,²⁰

‘Beide, Aviddhakarṇa wie Bhāvivikta, scheinen mir gute Zeugen dafür zu sein, daß sich das Nyāya-System nicht nur das Wort *ānvīkṣikī* als Selbstbezeichnung angeeignet hat, sondern daß sich seine Vertreter, zumindest in einer bestimmten Epoche, auch nicht der—gestellten oder selbst gewählten—Aufgabe entzogen haben, ein fremdes, aber ebenfalls *ānvīkṣikī* enthaltendes System mitzubehandeln, eine Aufgabe, die zu erledigen für sie vielleicht nicht wissenschaftlich interessant war, sich ihnen aber doch als gewinnbringend oder politisch ratsam empfohlen haben mag.’

Jayanta, far from making excursions to the field of heterodox *tarkas*, takes a strong line against “depraved logicians” (*duṣṭatārkikāḥ*) and their destructive speculations:²¹

*vedeṣu hi *tārkika*(Śāradā MSS as reported by Dr. Isaacson in an email of 2. vii. 2003. : *dustārkika*^o ed.)*racitakutarkaviplāvitaprāmāṇyeṣu śithilitāsthāḥ katham iva bahuvittavyayāyāsādisādhyam vedārthānuṣṭhānam ādriyeran sādhaḥ| kiṃ vā *tadānīm* (Śāradā MSS as reported by Dr. Isaacson in the above cited email : om. ed.) *svāmini parimlāne tadanuyāyinā mīmāṃsādividyāsthānaparijanena kṛtyam iti| tasmād aśeṣaduṣṭatārkikopamardadvārakadṛḍhataravedaprāmāṇyapratyayādhāyinyāyopadeśakṣamam akṣapādopadiṣṭam idaṃ nyāyavistarākhyam śāstram śāstrapraṭiṣṭhānanibandhanam iti dhuryam vidyāsthānam|*

For why would the pious take the trouble to perform what the Vedas teach, which can be accomplished [only] by spending a lot of money and [by exerting] a lot of effort etc., if their confidence in the Vedas, the authority of which has been ruined by the vile *tarka* invented by logicians, is shaken? Or, once the master has withered, what should then the attendants, Mīmāṃsā and the other sciences, do, who follow him? Therefore this *śāstra*, taught by Akṣapāda and called Nyāyavistara, which is able to teach reasoning that inspires a firmer confidence in the authority of the Veda through erasing all depraved logicians, is the support of the foundation of the *śāstras*, and thus it is the principle science.’

¹⁶Cf. STEINKELLNER 1961, p. 153; WEZLER 1975, p. 143.

¹⁷*Granthibhaṅga*, p. 197.

¹⁸*Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. II, p. 249.

¹⁹Cf. STEINKELLNER 1961, pp. 153ff.

²⁰WEZLER 1975, p. 145.

²¹*Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 7.

According to Jayanta, Mīmāṃsā, the science which could be regarded as the primary Veda-protector, has a different, more important task: the examination of the meaning of Vedic texts (*arthavicāra*).²² On the other hand, Mīmāṃsakas are “rambling on an illusive path on which progress is blocked by the multitude of thorns of faulty speculation” (*kutarkakaṇṭakanikaraniruddha-saṅcāramārgābhāsaparibhrāntāḥ*),²³ and thus their theories of *svataḥprāmānya* (“all means of cognition are valid by themselves”) and *apauruṣeyatva* (“the Veda has no author”) are inadequate to protect the Veda. It is only the Nyāya theory of *āptoktatva* (“verbal testimony is valid because it has been pronounced by a reliable person”, who is God himself in the case of the Veda) that is able to establish and defend the authority of the Veda,²⁴ which is, in Jayanta’s view, Nyāya’s principal mission.²⁵

Considering all this it may seem surprising that the leading character of Jayanta’s play, the crusader of Vedic orthodoxy, is a Mīmāṃsaka. In the first act Śaṅkarṣaṇa systematically refutes in front of distinguished and ‘unbiased’ umpires²⁶ the *bhikṣu*’s arguments about “Universal Momentariness” (*kṣaṇikatva*) and “Consciousness as the Only Reality” (*viññānavāda*). Thus he scores his first victory against the depraved logicians who try to undermine Vedic order,²⁷ and summons the Buddhists to stop deceiving themselves and others with the promise of a better afterlife for those who follow the Buddha’s doctrine. In the second act the Mīmāṃsaka lets another heterodox teacher, a Jain monk, slip, not considering him a significant threat to the established socio-religious order.²⁸ The debauched behaviour of the Black-Blankets, however, requires instant measures, as do the shady practices of the Śaiva adepts.

Problems start to emerge for our hero in the third act of the play, when he has to refine the circle of those sects whose presence in the kingdom is unwanted. In fact, the Mīmāṃsaka is ready to form an alliance with the Saiddhāntika Śaiva professor against the irreligious Cārvākas, represented by the arrogant Vṛddhāmbhi who outlines a clear program: ‘I am going to take this opportunity to do away with God, set aside the world-to-come, demolish the validity of the

²² *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 10.

²³ *Nyāyamañjarī*, ibid. Cf. KATAOKA 1999, pp. 26ff.

²⁴ Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 10, pp. 430ff, KATAOKA 1999, pp. 27ff.

²⁵ As for the true knowledge of *ātman* and the other *prameyas* provided by Nyāya, Jayanta certainly does not deny that it leads to liberation, but he adds that the *fact* that it leads to liberation is understood on the basis of scripture alone (*tasya tu prameyasātmāder apavargasādhanaṭvādhigama āgamaikanibandhanah*, *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 22). See KATAOKA 1999, pp. 23ff.

²⁶ One of them is called Viśvarūpa, whose name might echo that of a commentator of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* (cf. STEINKELLNER 1961, p. 158; WEZLER 1975, pp. 139ff.)

²⁷ The *bhikṣu* whom the Mīmāṃsaka defeats is called Dharmottara, just as one of Dharmakīrti’s most prominent followers, who, according to the *Rājatarāṅginī* (4.498), settled in Kashmir. His arguments are similar to those of Dharmakīrti on the one hand, and to the views of *viññānavāda* as presented by Kumāri. The Mīmāṃsaka in his refutation (just as Jayanta in the *Nyāyamañjarī*) draws upon Kumāri’s *Ślokavārtika*.

²⁸ As Jayanta reports, king Śaṅkaravarman also gave quarter to the Jains (*Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. 649). On the other hand, the Jain theory of *anekāntavāda* is not far removed from certain ideas expounded by Kumāri (cf. UNO).

Vedas, and thereby turn this king back from this wrong path and establish him on the right track, so that he, concentrating on worldly prosperity, can enjoy his kingship for a long time.²⁹ Now the question may arise whether the Cārvākas or Cārvāka ideas had a real influence on the Kashmirian monarch. According to Kalhana's account, Śaṅkaravarman was a king who 'concentrated on *artha*' above all, and he had no scruples about fleecing the temples in order to fill the treasury. On the other hand, as Jayanta shows in the *Nyāyamañjarī*, Lokāyata was not a long-forgotten philosophy in the ninth century. Apart from such "old Cārvākas" (*cirantanacārvākāḥ*) as Bhāvivikta,³⁰ Jayanta also had to deal with "well-educated Cārvākas" (*suśikṣitacārvākāḥ*), such innovators as Udbhaṭa,³¹ whom he simply calls "the shrewd Cārvāka" (*cārvākadhūrtah*).³² It is certainly tempting to identify this Udbhaṭa with the *sabhāpati* of king Jayāpīḍa (*Rājatarāṅgiṇī*, 4.495, 7.482, 8.2227) and / or with the *ālaṃkārika* author of the *Kāvyaḷaṅkārasārasaṅgraha*. The former would also indicate that a Cārvāka could occupy an influential post in the royal court at the end of the eighth century. Whatever may be the truth about the identity of these Udbhaṭas, the fact that Jayanta took the trouble to refute the ideas of the Cārvāka Udbhaṭa on several pages of the *Nyāyamañjarī* shows that this tradition was very much alive in his time, and a king like Śaṅkaravarman may well have been responsive to its anti-religionist ideas.

The Mīmāṃsaka and the Śaiva professor defeat their Cārvāka opponent with an exemplary division of labour. Dharmasīva proves the existence of the soul, transmigration, and God, while Saṅkarṣaṇa keeps his own counsel: it would indeed be strange if a Mīmāṃsaka brought up arguments in support of the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent Creator. But he immediately hurls himself into the fray when the authority of the Veda is to be established, while the Śaiva *ācārya* keeps in the background, perhaps because Śiva's scriptures are nearer to his heart, or because, as he himself points out to the Mīmāṃsaka, he would use the *parataḥprāmāṇya* argument ("validity is established through another cognition") instead of *svataḥprāmāṇya* ("the validity of a cognition is given by itself") to prove the validity of scripture. The moral is that, notwithstanding a few doctrinal differences, Mīmāṃsakas and Saiddhāntika Śaivas should join their forces to defeat the *nāstikas* and thereby prevent the king from ruling in an inordinately materialistic way.

The *viśkambhaka* preceding the final act makes it clear that Saṅkarṣaṇa has lost the trust of Vedic Brahmans:³³

śaivapāśupatapāñcarātrikāḥ sāṅkhyasaugatadigambarādayaḥ|

²⁹ *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Three, ll. 232ff. As Raghavan suggested, 'Vṛddhāmbhi is likely to be an echo of the ancient school of Arthaśāstra, cited by Kauṭilya as the Āmbhīyas' (*Āgamaḍambara* (ed. pr.), pp. xxiv f.). According to these Āmbhīyas, the prince should be tempted, in order to prove him, with hunting, gambling, alcohol, women, and suggesting him to seize power from his father. Kauṭilya rejects this theory (*Arthaśāstra*, 1.13).

³⁰ Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. II, p. 349, *Granthibhaṅga*, p. 197.

³¹ Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, pp. 94, 326, 451; vol. II, pp. 8, 348, 687; *Granthibhaṅga*, pp. 19, 197, 198.

³² *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 168; *Granthibhaṅga*, p. 43.

³³ *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Four, ll. 5ff.

sarva eva hi yathāsthita ime snātakasya dhig apārthakaṃ śrutam ||

Śaivas, Pāśupatas, Pāñcarātrikas, Sāṅkhyas, Buddhists, Sky-Clad Jains and other [heretics]: all of them have remained as they were. Shame on the useless learning of the Graduate!

This lamentation of the *ṛtvij* makes a sharp contrast to the entrance verse of the Mīmāṃsaka in the first act, in which he took an oath to humiliate all the enemies of the Veda, and thereby to make his learning fruitful. 'But, my friend,' explains the (perhaps older and more experienced) *upādhyāya* to the *ṛtvij*, 'he has become the king's man by now. And the king is supremely devoted to Śiva, so Saṅkarṣaṇa has to be completely focussed on propitiating Him. For in a monarch's vicinity [his] men keep repeating his words, but, eager to increase their own influence, they do not distinguish between good or bad, like echoes.'³⁴

Saṅkarṣaṇa is indeed in a great dilemma: either he should enter into a debate and prove the falsity of the teachings of the Bhāgavatas, an *āgama* supported by the queen and another member of the court, just as he did in the case of the *nāstikas*, or he should defend them, in which case he would completely lose his face before the Vaidikas. That the Bhāgavatas were indeed striving to achieve Vedic status for their *āgama* in Jayanta's time is also indicated by Cakradhara's following remark:³⁵ 'Bhagavat Puṣkarākṣa, the principal mendicant, who wrote a commentary to the *sūtras* of Bhagavat Bādarāyaṇa, accepted the view that the Pañcarātra and other [*āgamas*] are based on the Veda.' Saṅkarṣaṇa cannot resolve the tension between his devotion to Viṣṇu and his duty to reject all non-Vedic scriptures as a Mīmāṃsaka. It is the great *naiyāyika* scholar, Dhairyarāśi, who smoothes all differences away as the arbitrator appointed by the court in the debate between Vaiṣṇavas and Vaidikas. Saṅkarṣaṇa's only task is to give tacit support, which he happily accepts.

Dhairyarāśi's mission is not to enter into a controversy or to defeat anybody in a debate; on the contrary, he comes to pour oil on troubled waters. Accordingly he delivers a long lecture instead of discussing things, and his overwhelming authority gives even more emphasis to his words. He proves to be a real *sarvāgamaprāmāṇyavādin* ("one who holds the validity of all religious scriptures"), and his argumentation mirrors exactly the views presented by Jayanta in his *Nyāyamañjarī*.³⁶ In his *magnum opus* Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, the orthodox Brahman and *naiyāyika* philosopher, concludes the first part of his comments on the validity of scriptures with the following words: 'Any religion which is outside the Veda is nothing but deception.'³⁷ The circle of acceptable religions, however, is wider for Jayanta than for a Mīmāṃsaka such as Kumārila, since he also includes the Pañcarātra and the Śaiva *āgamas*, on the grounds that, firstly,

³⁴ *Āgamadambara*, Act Four, ll. 11ff.: *bho vayasya, nanu rājapurūṣo 'sāv adya samvṛttah| rājā ca paramamāheśvara iti tadārādhanaikatānabuddhinā tena bhavitavyam. yataḥ, samīpato bhūmibhṛtāṃ hi pūruṣās taduktam evānuvadanta āsate| svavṛddhilubdhās tu na sādhu asādhu vā vivecayanti pratiśabdakā iva||*

³⁵ *Granthibhaṅga*, p. 112: *bhagavadbādarāyanasūtravṛttikṛtā bhagavatpuṣkarākṣeṇa parivrā-jakamukhyena pañcarātrāder vedamūlatvam aṅgikṛtam|*

³⁶ *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, pp. 640ff.

³⁷ *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 639: *vedabāhyas tu yaḥ kaścīd āgamo vañcanaiva sā|*

their author, just as the author of the Veda, is a “reliable person”, namely God, and, secondly, they are not incompatible with the Veda.³⁸ On the other hand the Buddhists and the so called “liberators from transmigration” *samsāramocakas*, are still considered as *vedabāhya* and therefore not authoritative.

At this point Jayanta’s exposition about the validity of scriptures takes a surprising turn: ‘Others have accepted the validity of *all* scriptures because cognition without supersession [by a subsequent cognition] or uncertainty has arisen from all of them.’³⁹ He does not tell us explicitly who hold this peculiar view, nor if he supports or rejects *sarvāgamaprāmāṇya*. Still it is significant that he presents it as the concluding *pakṣa* in the context of the validity of religions, and he takes pains to enumerate arguments supporting this position. One has the impression that Jayanta must have suffered real pain, especially when he tries to find excuses even for Buddhism. He manages to show that the doctrine of *nairātmya* serves only ‘to induce the relaxation of the Self’,⁴⁰ and that the Knowledge that Buddhists strive after is ‘very similar to the Self because of its freedom and independence’.⁴¹ He also demonstrates that the Buddha is just as omniscient as Kapila and the other sages, and finally ‘as for the refutation of the doctrine of caste in Buddhist scriptures, its purpose is [only] to laud the high degree of [the Buddha’s] compassion that seeks to help all [creatures], and it should not be taken literally’.⁴² If one holds the view that God is the author of all valid scriptures, says Jayanta, then we may argue that only the body of the Buddha was the son of Śuddhodana, his soul was Lord Viṣṇu personally.⁴³ If one says that all valid *āgamas* must be based on the Veda, then assiduous experts are ready to find some Vedic grounds even for wearing red robes, or for smearing oneself with ashes and carrying a skull.⁴⁴

The key to Jayanta’s turnaround is given at the end of the section dealing with *āgamaprāmāṇya* in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (pp. 648–649). First Jayanta enumerates those criteria on the basis of which an *āgama* can be regarded as valid: it must have obtained celebrity with which nobody finds fault, many learned people should accept it, it should not appear to be unprecedented, its *raison d’être* must not be greed, etc., and finally it should not cause abhorrence among people.⁴⁵ Then Jayanta gives an example how these liberal principles can be

³⁸ *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 637: *ataḥ aptapraṇītātvaḍ vedāvīruddhatvāc ca na tayor [i.e. śaivapañcarātrayor] aprāmāṇyam*

³⁹ *Ibid.* p. 640: *anye sarvāgamānāṃ tu prāmāṇyaṃ pratipediṛe | sarvatra bādhasandeharahitapratyayodayāt ||*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* p. 641: *nairātmyavādināṃ tv ātmaśaithilyajanānāya tathopadiśanti |*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*: *svacchaṃ tu jñānatattvaṃ yat tair iṣyate, tat svātantryād anāśritātvaḍ ātmakalpam eva |*

⁴² *Ibid.* p. 643: *yad api bauddhāgame jātivādanirākaraṇaṃ tad api sarvānugrahapraṇāka-ruṇātīśayapraśaṃsāparaṃ na ca yathāśrutam avagantavyam |*

⁴³ *Ibid.* p. 644: *śarīram eva śuddhodanasypatyam nātmā. ataḥ pratiyugaṃ viṣṇur eva bhagavān dharmarūpeṇāvataratīty āgamavidāḥ pratipannāḥ.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* p. 647: *evaṃ raktapaṭaparigrahahasmakapāladhāraṇādīmūlam apy abhiyuktā labhanta eva |*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* p. 648: *naitad asty avigītāṃ ye prasiddhiṃ prāpur āgamāḥ | kṛtāś ca bahubhir yeṣāṃ śiṣṭair iha parigrahāḥ | adya pravartamānāś ca nāpurvā iva bhānti ye | yeṣāṃ na mūlaṃ lobhādi yebhyo nodvijate janāḥ | teṣāṃ eva pramāṇatvam āgamānām iheṣyate |*

put into practice: king Śaṅkaravarman suppressed the practice of the Black-Blankets, but he spared for instance the Jains.⁴⁶ Thus the criterion of validity is not so much the veracity of propositions in a given scripture, but rather the degree of its recognition and its inherent possibilities of overthrowing social order.⁴⁷ This was probably fitting in the broader 'Religionspolitik' of the king, which, as Wezler pointed out, could motivate Jayanta's whole exposition of the *sarvāgamaprāmāṇya*-theory in his *Nyāyamañjarī*.⁴⁸ That this was really the case is clearly demonstrated in the *Āgamadambara*, which, as Wezler observes, 'hat es im wesentlichen den Charakter eines, wie wir sagen würden, Dokumentarspiels, das jene religionspolitische Maßnahme König Śaṅkaravarmans, ihre Vorgeschichte und ihre Folgen zum Gegenstand hat'.⁴⁹

We should keep in mind that, while Dhairyarāśi is delivering his lecture, the Mīmāṃsaka sits in the audience and is supposed to agree fully to such ideas as 'Śiva, Paśupati, Kapila and Viṣṇu, Saṅkarṣaṇa, the Sage Jina, the Buddha, or Manu are one',⁵⁰ 'let all these sacred scriptures have no beginning, similarly to the Veda',⁵¹ etc. Dhairyarāśi declares that infatuation cannot be regarded as the cause of acceptance in the case of old-established religions, and 'if someone objects that we cannot know that there were Buddhists in former times, then the same suspicion may be raised concerning the Brahmans'.⁵² 'Or if you say,' continues Dhairyarāśi, 'that greed and the like are the visible source in this case, the heterodox will retort that the Veda is also a means of livelihood.'⁵³ And the Mīmāṃsaka applauds with enthusiasm.

When Dhairyarāśi makes the peroration of his most elaborate speech, Saṅkarṣaṇa bursts out in jubilation: 'Honourable Dhairyarāśi, be sure that, in a manner of speaking, we have been revived, beatified, purified, nourished, made to experience the goal of this worldly existence by this novel river of erudition which has risen from Your Honour. How wonderful!'⁵⁴ Then he manages to collect the remains of his former adumbrance and declares that the various religious traditions should remain clearly separated from each other, while those who spoil *śāstra* and *dharma* with their ill-conduct must be banished.⁵⁵

⁴⁶ *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 649, quoted above.

⁴⁷ On the ground of *sarvāgamaprāmāṇya* only anti-social sects and Lokāyata are rejected, the latter because its statements are based merely on *pūrvapakṣa* statements in Vedic texts (cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, pp. 647f).

⁴⁸ See WEZLER 1976, p. 340.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ *Āgamadambara*, Act Four, ll. 330f.: *ekaḥ śivaḥ paśupatiḥ kapilo 'tha viṣṇuḥ saṅkarṣaṇo jinamuniḥ sugato manur vā*; cf. how the hungry ascetic blurs the distinction between the Buddha and the Jina in Act Two.

⁵¹ Ibid. l. 405: *tenānādaya eva vedavad ime bhavantu āgamāḥ*

⁵² Ibid. ll. 442ff.: *vyāmohāc ca hi vartante kāmāṃ katipayair dinaiḥ| so 'yaṃ yugapadasthāyī vyāmoha iti vismayah|| purāpi saugatā āsann iti kenāvagamayate| purāpi śrotriyā āsann iti kenāvagamayate||*

⁵³ Ibid. l. 446f.: *lobhādi dṛśyamānaṃ vā yadi mūlam ihocyate| vedo 'pi jīvikopāya iti jalpanti nāstikāḥ||*

⁵⁴ Ibid. ll. 488ff.: *ārya dhairyarāśe, vayaṃ tāvad ucchvāsītā iva, śālītā iva, pavitrīkṛtā ivāpyāyitā jīvalokaphalam anubhāvītā iva bhavatprabhavayābhinavayā sarasvatyā| aho āścaryam!*

⁵⁵ Ibid. ll. 508ff.

And the right person to decide such delicate issues as 'which conduct is wicked enough to be suppressed', and 'what are the criteria of this wickedness', is the king himself, and those people in his service who put his orders into effect. Saṅkarṣaṇa's position in these questions, just as his career and livelihood as a married householder, depends on the will of his superiors, as Jayanta, who served king Śaṅkaravarman as his adviser, knew very well.

Chapter 3

A curious play (*kimapi rūpakam*)

Considering the fact that fate was not merciful to such celebrated and outstanding plays as Viśākhadeva's *Devīcandragupta*, and that whole dramatic genres such as the *vīthī* survive only in meagre quotations (apart from its late 'reincarnation' in an altered form),¹ we should be grateful to the Jains of Gujarat who preserved, thanks to their commendable diligence and curiosity, a unique college-drama written by a Kashmirian philosopher. The dramatic qualities of the *Āgamaḍambara* leave much to be desired by classical Indian standards of dramaturgy. As Raghavan remarks in his introduction, 'when he [Jayanta] made his debut on the stage with this new play of his, he knew he was making the pandits of Nāṭya Śāstra prick their ears.'² In this chapter we shall examine what makes Jayanta's play so unique and unorthodox. First we shall deal with the Prologue, which already reads as a parody of a traditional *prastāvanā*. A closer look will, however, reveal that although Jayanta was using the standard introductory devices in a novel way, his Prologue, in spite of all its strangeness, alludes elegantly both to the plot and the leading aesthetic relish of the play. Then we shall consider the phenomenon of 'philosophical plays' in the light of the discussions on the nature and relation of poetry and *śāstra*, doctrinal or scientific literature. Finally we shall study the predominant *rasa* of the *Āgamaḍambara*.

3.1

Indian dramatists had an excellent means with which they could gently introduce the spectators to the world of the play. The prologue (*prastāvanā*, *sthāpanā* or *āmukha*) of a classical Indian play provides information about the author, the

¹Cf. RAGHAVAN 1978, pp. 872ff.

²*Āgamaḍambara* (ed. pr.), p.viii.

story, the characters, and the main sentiment or savour the audience is going to relish during the performance. In usual practice the Director (*sūtradhāra*) enters the stage after the preliminaries (*pūrvaraṅga*) are over and the initial benediction (*nāndī*) has been recited. In the Bhāsa-plays he is just about to make an announcement when a sound coming from off-stage interrupts him and at the same time introduces the first character who is about to enter the stage. In other plays the Director has a chat with an actress (*natī*), who is also his wife, or the comic actor (*vidūṣaka*), or an assistant (*pāripārśvika*) about the actual occasion of the performance, the qualities of the sponsor, the author, and the audience, then sometimes about domestic matters, which turn out to be similar to the story of the play. The end of the prologue is always linked in a more or less direct way to the plot: the Director infers from some noise that one of the characters is about to enter, sometimes because he has overheard (and misunderstood, as in the *Mudrārākṣasa*) the words of the *sūtradhāra*.

The prologue can be defined in semiotical terms as one of the ‘rhetorical’ or ‘presentational’ devices that draw the attention of the audience to the theatrical and dramatic realities, to the fact that what is going on is actually a performance. Although they appear outside the theatrical frame, in fact they confirm it ‘by pointing out the pure facticity of the representation’.³ To employ another method of analysis,⁴ the prologue with the actor talking to another actor about the play to be performed and about (or to) the audience whose favour is to be gained, appears to belong to the actual world, as opposed to the world of the drama. At the end of the Sanskrit *prastāvanā*, the two worlds almost seem to merge: the action happening off-stage and already inside the drama-world, e.g. the crying of the *apsarases* because the demons have kidnapped Urvaśī, is *audible* for the Director, just as the words said by the *sūtradhāra*, e.g. reciting a verse about the eclipse of the moon (*candrasya grahaṇam*), can be *overheard* by a character belonging to the world of the play. This proximity of the two worlds ensures the smooth transition of the audience between the actual and the fictitious worlds, but in a way that the two worlds are kept separate: the Director exits before the *apsarases* or Cāṇakya enter.

‘But surely’, one might object, ‘the Director, the Actress, and the Assistant all say the words contained in their script, they also play rôles, how could they belong to the actual world?’ The objection is correct: the *prastāvanā* is certainly part of the play. In it the drama-world is disguised as the actual world. The *sūtradhāra* is a character just like Cāṇakya; he is never the actual referent but only a possible surrogate, even if he is played by the actual director.⁵ Abhinavagupta has already observed this with his usual acumen in his commentary to the Nāṭyaśāstra. He observes that one of the obstacles to aesthetic experience is ‘one’s emotional response to pleasure and pain even if it is restricted to another person’ (*paragatatvaniyamabhājām api sukhaduḥkhānāṃ saṃvedane*). The solution is the blurring of the actual identity of that ‘other

³ELAM 1997, p. 90. Other ‘presentational’ devices are e.g. the epilogue, the induction, the play-within-the-play, the aside directed to the audience, etc.

⁴ELAM 1997, pp. 99ff.

⁵Cf. ELAM 1997, pp. 109f.

person': the costume and other theatrical conventions hide the 'actor-ness' of the actors, which has, however, been revealed in the preliminaries and the prologue (*pūrvaraṅgānigūhanena prastāvanāvalokanena ca . . . naṭarūpatādhigamas*).⁶

So far so good. But why does Bharata describe the *prastāvanā* twice in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*: once as part of the *pūrvaraṅga*, and for the second time as part of the *bhāratī vṛtti* (the dramatic style in which the verbal aspect is predominant)? Abhinavagupta has the following answer:⁷

*dvividhā prastāvanā bhavati—pūrvaraṅgasyāṅgabhūtā anyasya vā| ta-
tra pūrvaraṅgāṅge *'syāṃ (GOS : 'syāḥ Parimal) kavir udāsīnaḥ|
sthāpaka eva svatanthro nirmā*tāstv (conj. : °tā tv eds.) anyo
vā kavir dhruvāgānādāv api| (. . .) sā dvitīyā yā vṛttibhedamadhye
paṭhitā| evaṃ prarocanādāv api mantavyam| yad āha—“tatra *kadācit
(conj. : kācit eds.) kāvyābhimukhaṃ nīyate pūrvaraṅgavidhiḥ tada-
bhimukhaṃ vā kāvyārambhas, tad bhavati sā dvividhā” *ityādi (GOS
: ityādiḥ Parimal)|*

The prologue is of two kinds: that which is part of the preliminaries, and [that which is part] of something else. Of these two, the poet is not involved in that one which is part of the preliminaries. The *sthāpaka* may be its independent composer, or another poet, as well as in the case of the *dhruvā*-songs. (. . .) The second kind [of prologue] is that which is mentioned among the varieties of dramatic style. The same should be held about the exciting of the spectators' interest, etc. As [someone] said: “There [in the prologue] sometimes the performance of the preliminaries is directed towards the play [i.e. the drama written by the playwright], or the beginning of the play [is directed] towards that [i.e. the preliminaries]. Therefore it [the *prastāvanā*] is of two kinds.”, and so forth.

Commenting on the second occurrence of the prologue in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Abhinava says:⁸

*evaṃ ca yadā sthāpako 'pi sūtradhāratulyaguṇākāro rāmādivad eva
prayujyate tad *eva (conj. : evaṃ eds.) kavikṛtam āmukhaṃ bhavati|*

And thus, when the *sthāpaka*, having similar qualities and bearing as the *sūtradhāra*, is also presented on the stage like Rāma and other [characters], that alone is the prologue written by the poet.

⁶ *Abhinavabhāratī* (Parimal), vol. I, p. 279; *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, p. 274; GNOLI 1968, pp. 15f., cf. also *Abhinavabhāratī* (Parimal), vol. I, p. 251; *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, pp. 244f.

⁷ *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, pp. 247f., *Abhinavabhāratī* (Parimal), vol. I, p. 254.

⁸ *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. III, p. 93, *Abhinavabhāratī* (Parimal), vol. III, p. 89; cf. *Nāṭyadarpaṇa*, p. 136: *kadācit tu sanāndīkaṃ raṅgam anuṣṭhāya viśrānte sūtradhāre tattulyaguṇākṛtiḥ sthāpaka āmukhaṃ anuṣṭhāt| tathā cānaṅgavatyāṃ nāṭikāyāṃ dṛśyate—pūrvaraṅgānte sthāpakaḥ| atra ca pakṣe āmukhānuṣṭhāne 'pi kaver vyāpārah, sthāpakasya sūtradhārānukāriṇo rāmānukāriṇo naṭasyeva kavinaiva praveśāt|*

What we have in practice is essentially the latter kind of prologue. All the existing Sanskrit (and Prakrit) plays begin with a *prastāvanā*, *āmukha*, or *sthāpanā*, and it is unlikely that any of these prologues preserve the impromptu (or precomposed) introduction by a director. But precisely because the actors appear *as actors* in the prologue, the audience perceives their performance *as if* it were part of the actual world. This enables the poet to address the audience through the Director: he can introduce (or even praise) himself and the merits of his play, or he can defend his work against its critics. Since the prologue has metadramatic functions, that is, it focuses the attention of the audience on the theatrical and dramatic realities, it also provides an excellent opportunity for the playwright to ‘talk shop’: he can define his position on dramaturgical questions, on the justification of dramatic art, or on the relation between the actual world and the drama-world. The *prastāvanā* of the Āgamaḍambara, however unusual it may seem at first sight, fulfills these functions of the prologue of a classical Indian play.

3.2

But at first sight it *is* a very strange prologue. At the beginning of an ordinary Sanskrit play, the Director usually enters the stage in high spirits. He feels happy and honoured to put on the most excellent play of the most excellent poet to the most excellent audience, not to mention the most distinguished sponsor. Certainly there are individual differences among the playwrights: Rājaśekhara has a particular weakness for self-admiration (*yad vā kiṃ vinayoktibhiḥ?*),⁹ while Kālidāsa vindicates a place for himself with proper pride by the side of his glorious predecessors. The criticisms against his art seem to cut Bhavabhūti to the quick, but he is confident that the merits of his plays are conceded by some people, or at least will be acknowledged in the future. The Director in Śyāmilaka’s *bhāṇa* summons the wet blankets and hypocrites to leave, because the wags want to enjoy the performance. A typical example of the *sūtradhāra*’s efforts to kindle the interest of the spectators in the poet and his work is found in the plays of king Harṣa:¹⁰

*śrīharṣo nipuṇaḥ kaviḥ pariṣad apy eṣā guṇagrāhinī
loke hāri ca vatsarājacaritaṃ nāṭye ca dakṣā vāyam|
vastv ekaikam apīha vāñcitaphalaprāpteḥ padaṃ kiṃ punar
madbhāgyopacayād ayaṃ samuditaḥ sarvo guṇānāṃ gaṇaḥ||*

The illustrious Harṣa is a clever poet, and this audience can appreciate the merits [of one’s art]. The story of King Vatsa has a grip on people, and we are experts in theatrical art. Each one [of the above] facts could be the cause of obtaining the desired result on the present occasion, how much more this whole group of merits which has arisen due to the accumulation of my good fortune?

⁹ *Bālabhārata*, verse 5.

¹⁰ *Ratnāvalī*, p. 327, also found in *Priyadarśikā* and *Nāgānanda*.

In glaring contrast with the confidence of an average *prastāvanā*, Jayanta's play promises to be a dead frost right in the beginning. The Director does not beam on the audience as usual, on the contrary, he is utterly fed up with his profession and tired of life in general. Moreover, he is supposed to stage a trashy play of a dilettante poet (Jayanta), and it is insufficient solace for him that the audience is equally dilettante (students of philosophy).

However if we examine the prologue of the *Āgamadambara* closely we shall discover that Jayanta achieved his highly unconventional *prastāvanā* by utilising entirely conventional techniques. The *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* mentions several established methods of transition from the (pseudo-real) world of the prologue to that of the drama. One of these methods is the *avalagita*, which is defined by some theoreticians as follows: 'doing something else having entrusted one's own occupation to another character'.¹¹ The example which is cited to illustrate this dramatic device is strikingly similar to what happens in the prologue of Jayanta's play:

*yathā kṛtyārāvaṇasyāmukhe—
sūtradhāraḥ (niḥśvasya)—ārye, nanu bravīmi,
vākprapañcaikasāreṇa nirviśeṣālpavṛttinā|
svāmineva naṭatvena nirviṇṇāḥ sarvathā vāyam||
tad gacchatu bhavatī putraṃ mitraṃ vā kamapi puraskṛtya kramā-
gatām imāṃ kujīvikām anuvartayitum|
tataḥ kramād āha—
parigrahorugrāhaughād gṛhasaṃsārasāgarāt|
bandhusnehamahāvartād idam uttīrya gamyate||
atra svajīvikām dāreṣu niḥśipyā paralokahetukāryakaraṇaṃ svayam
āśritam|*

As in the prologue of the *Kṛtyārāvaṇa*:

'DIRECTOR (*sighing*). Why, I'll tell you, my lady.

I have become completely disillusioned with [my profession of] being an actor, which only consists of verbosity and the moods of which are wishy-washy and trivial, as if with a boss *whose tongue is always wagging and who gives a small salary without any discrimination [among his employees]*.

So, my lady, please carry on with this wretched profession I inherited, and put at the head [of the troupe] anyone, [either] a son or a friend.'

Later on he says:

'Here I go ashore from the ocean of secular life in the household, which abounds in large crocodiles: the members of my family, and has great whirlpools: the affections for one's relatives.'

Here [in this prologue the director] entrusts his own profession on his wife and becomes himself engaged in an activity which is a means of [attaining a better] afterlife.

¹¹ *Nāṭyadarpaṇa*, p. 132: *kecit tu pātrāntare svavyāpāraṃ niḥśipyā yat kāryāntarakaraṇaṃ tad avalagitam ity āhuḥ|*

Judging from its fragments surviving in quotations, the *Kṛtyārāvaṇa* must have been a remarkable play. It was well-known in Kashmir, and Śāṅkuka quoted from its sixth act, which means that Jayanta might also have been familiar with it.¹² But already the prologue of king Harṣa's play, the *Nāgānanda*, contains a very similar scene. The director's wife tells her husband that his parents have renounced this world and left for the forest. The Director is deeply moved by this news and is ready to give up his inherited wealth (*tyaktvaiśvaryaṃ kramāgatam*) and follow his parents, just as Jīmūtavāhana, the hero of the play, relinquishes his kingdom to serve his parents in the forest. We can trace this motif back as far as the *Lokānanda*, a Buddhist play by Candragomin surviving only in Tibetan translation.¹³ The *Nāgānanda* is a play in which quietude (*śānta*) is the leading aesthetic relish, which is well suggested by the resigned, disillusioned attitude of the Director. The *Lokānanda*, apart from being also a *śāntarasa*-play, is called '*nāṭaka-śāstra*' (*zlos gar gyi bstan bcos*) in its colophon,¹⁴ that is a play in which a doctrinal subject (the Buddha's teaching in this case) is introduced. The *Āgamaḍambara* was perhaps the first classical Indian play which had *śānta* as its dominant *rasa* and which presented the teachings of various religions, but definitely not from the Buddhist perspective.

Apart from such introductory devices as the *avalagita*, the entire behaviour of the actors conversing in the Prologue foretells in many ways the story of the actual play. Sometimes the actors tell us explicitly which role they are going to take, and the Director often becomes the protagonist, as for instance in the *Priyadarśikā*,¹⁵ or one of the first characters who enter the stage.¹⁶ Therefore it is very tempting to imagine that in the *Āgamaḍambara* the Director re-enters after the Prologue as the Vedic graduate and the Assistant as the Boy, his sidekick. The Director gives up his profession with the resolution to 'strive to reach the highest goal of man' and to 'acquaint himself with holy places', starting with a Buddhist monastery. And this is more or less the agenda of the Graduate, with the exception that he already knows how worthless most teachings are and he is 'testing' them for the sake of demolishing their false doctrines. We might say that the Graduate is as uncompromising in doctrinal truths as the Director is in questions of dramaturgy. On the other hand, both the Assistant and the Boy represent a more conformist attitude: they also observe the rule of falsity in the world, but they do not consider it as their duty to lead a crusade against *māyā*, Universal Delusion. Everyone has to make a living somehow, either as an actor, or as a Jain monk. Are we entitled to ruin their

¹² *Abhinavabhāratī ad Nāṭyaśāstra* 19.88 (ed. Parimal, vol. III, p. 52), pointed out by Raghavan (Some lost Rāma plays, p. 30). On Śāṅkuka's date see p. xxxviii.

¹³ According to Hahn he is probably identical with the grammarian Candragomin, and can be dated to the fifth century A.D. (*Candragomin's Lokānandanāṭaka. Nach dem tibetischen Tanjur herausgegeben und übersetzt von Michael Hahn. Wiesbaden, 1974.*) See also STEINER, pp. 23ff.

¹⁴ Hahn's edition, pp. 196f; he translates it as 'lehrreiche Schauspiel'.

¹⁵ In the *Karpūramañjarī*, the Director and his wife are said to have taken the roles of the king and the queen.

¹⁶ E.g. in the *Mālatīmādhava* and the *Viddhaśālabhañjikā*. In the *Uttararāmacarita*, the Director turns into a resident of Ayodhyā already in the Prologue.

existence in the name of some Ultimate Reality? The Graduate permits the Buddhists to go on with their hypocritical conduct as a way of livelihood, but he asserts roundly that Buddhism is actually harmful for someone who hopes for a better afterlife. But what about the Jains, Śaivas and Vaiṣṇavas? Does one have the right to upset their beliefs? And what of the depraved practices of the *nīlāmbaras*? Should we persecute them, or should we just wave our hand in resignation and refer to general tendencies in the Age of Decadence? And what happens if our sponsor, may he be a king or the producer of a play, requires us to act against our principles?

We shall return to these questions, but first let us see what is exactly that makes this play so despicable for an actor who has turned grey in the honourable service of dramatic art.

3.3

According to Indian authorities on aesthetics, certain types of man are simply incapable of appreciating the beauties of poetry. It is pointless to test the veracity of poems, says Ānandavardhana, and if somebody had the impudence to employ for instance the methods of logic to prove that a piece of art is true or false, he would only make himself ridiculous.¹⁷ Such a person, as Abhinavagupta remarks in his commentary, is certainly not a connoisseur, but only 'a fellow who is hard-hearted because of the application of dry logic, and who is therefore unable to feel [aesthetic] delight'.¹⁸ Ritualists were considered perhaps the most hopeless cases in this respect. Uttuṅodaya at least, who wrote a commentary on Abhinavagupta's *Dhvanyālokalocana*, has a poor opinion of them: he mentions the *mīmāṃsakas* and the *śrotriyas* as the typical representatives of those who are quite incapable of art and honeyed phrases.¹⁹

The cobbler should stick to his last, and one should not apply *mīmāṃsaka* exegesis in the interpretation of poetry.²⁰ And what's more, one should not write a poem in the style of a scientific treatise. *Kāvya*, poetry, and *śāstra*, doctrinal or scientific literature,²¹ have always been regarded in Indian aesthetics as two distinct worlds. Bhāmaha, the ancient Kashmirian *ālaṅkārika*, holds a much

¹⁷ *Dhvanyāloka* 3.33+ (KRISHNAMOORTHY, p. 222; MASSON-PATWARDHAN 1970, vol. II, p. 179): *kāvyaṅyaviśaye ca vyaṅgyapratītinām satyāsatanirūpaṅasyāprayojakatvam eveti tatra pramāṇāntaravyāpāraparīkṣopahāsāyaiva sampadyate*

¹⁸ *Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 3.33 (quoted in MASSON-PATWARDHAN 1970, vol. II, p. 143): *nāyaṃ sahrdayaḥ kevalaṃ śuśkatarkopakramakarkaśahrdayaḥ pratītiṃ parāmarṣṭum nālam ity eṣa upahāsaḥ*

¹⁹ Uttuṅodaya's *Kaumudī ad Locana* (quoted in MASSON-PATWARDHAN 1970, vol. II, note 144): *adhikārī ca kāṣṭhāprāptasahrdayabhāvaḥ kaścid eva na sarvaḥ, mīmāṃsakaśrotriyādes tatprakāradarśanāt; anye tv iti| mīmāṃsakaśrotriyādīnām īdrśī cātūktiḥ durlabheti sahrdayānām ity uktam*

²⁰ This is why Abhinavagupta criticizes Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's way of analysing a poem (*Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 2.1, ed. *Kāvyaṃālā*, p. 77): *jaiminīyasūtre hy evaṃ yojyate na kāvye 'pi*

²¹ This category includes technical literature, law-books, and any kind of specialist book, but also manuals on ritual and philosophy, and even the Vedas themselves. We may say that *śāstra* is a treatise which contains teaching about the real nature of things.

higher opinion of a poet's work than pure scientific knowledge.²²

*adhanasyeva dātrtvam klībasyevāstrakauśalam|
ajñasyeva pragalhatvam akaveḥ sāstravedanam||
vinayena vinā kā śrīḥ kā niśā śāsinā vinā|
rahitā satkavitvena kīdrśī vāgvidagdhata|
gurūpadesād adhyetum sāstram jadadhiyo 'py alam|
kāvyam tu jāyate jātu kasyacit pratibhāvataḥ||*

If someone who is not a poet knows the *sāstras*, it is just as the munificence of a pauper, the dexterity of an effeminate in handling weapons, or the pretentiousness of a fool. What is wealth without self-control? What is night without the moon? What skill in speech can there be if one is not a true poet? Even a thick-headed person can learn *sāstra* following the teaching of his master, but poetry is born rarely and only for a few people who have inspiration.

Rājaśekhara also distinguishes these two genres, but he thinks that there are some channels of contact:

*iha hi vānimayam ubhayathā sāstram kāvyam ca| sāstrapūrvakatvāt
kāvyānām pūrvam sāstreṣu abhiniviśet| na hy apravartitapradīpās
tamasi tattvārthasārtham adhyakṣayanti| (...)
bhavati prathayann artham līnam samabhiplutam sphuṭīkurvan|
alpam analpam racayann analpam alpam ca sāstrakaviḥ||²³*

For here [in our system] literature is of two kinds: *sāstra* and *kāvya*. Because [the study of] *sāstra* must precede [the writing of] poetry, first one should delve into scientific works, for those who do not use a lamp cannot observe the multitude of real things. (...) The *sāstrakavi* is someone who exposes hidden things, makes obscure things clear, composes an extensive [treatise] out of a small [subject], and a concise one out of a vast [subject].

*pratibhāvvyutpattimāṃś ca kaviḥ kavir ity ucyate| sa hi tridhā| sāstra-
kaviḥ, kāvyakavir, ubhayakaviś ca| 'teṣāṃ uttarottarīyo garīyān' iti
śyāmadevaḥ| 'na' iti yāyāvarīyah| yathāsvaviṣaye sarvo garīyān| na
hi rājahaṃsaś candrikāpānāya prabhavati, nāpi cakoro 'dbhyaḥ kṣīro-
ddharaṇāya| yac chāstrakaviḥ kāvye rāsasampadam vicchinatti, yat
kāvyakaviḥ sāstre tarkakarkaśam apy artham uktivaicitryeṇa ślatha-
yati| ubhayakavis tūbhayor api varīyān yady ubhayatra param pravī-
ṇaḥ syāt| tasmāt tulyaprabhāvāv eva sāstrakāvya-kaviḥ| upakāryopakā-
rakabhāvam tu mithaḥ sāstrakāvya-kavayor anumanyāmahe| yac chā-
strasamskāraḥ kāvyam anugṛhṇāti sāstraikapraṇatā tu nigṛhṇāti|
kāvyasamskāro 'pi sāstravākya-pākam anuruṇaddhi kāvyaikapraṇa-
tā tu viruṇaddhi| tatra tridhā sāstrakaviḥ| yaḥ sāstram vidhatte, yaś
ca sāstre kāvyam samvidhatte, yo 'pi kāvye sāstrārtham nidhatte|²⁴*

²² *Kāvya-lāṅkāra* 1.3–5.

²³ *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, Second Adhyāya, pp. 2f., 5.

²⁴ *Ibid.* Fifth Adhyāya, p. 17.

That poet is called [real] poet who has imagination and learning. And he is of three kinds: the poet who writes *śāstra*, the poet who writes *kāvya*, and the poet who writes both. According to Śyāmadeva, the above order is also the order of their excellence. Rājaśekhara disagrees. Each of them exceeds [the other two] in his own field. For the swan is not able to drink moonlight, nor the Cakora bird to separate milk from water. As for the poet who writes *śāstra*, he ruins the harmony of aesthetic flavours in a poem; as for the poet who writes *kāvya*, he makes flaccid with the variety of diction in a technical work even a subject which is tough because of logical arguments. But the poet who can write both [*śāstra* and *kāvya*] is better than either of the other two if he is skillful in both fields in the highest degree. Therefore the poet who writes *śāstra* and the one who writes *kāvya* are of equal rank. We admit, however, that the poet who writes *śāstra* and the one who writes *kāvya* can mutually benefit each other. For education in *śāstra* benefits poetry, but exclusive proficiency in *śāstra* suppresses it. Education in *kāvya*, too, aids the perfection of sentences in a scientific work, but exclusive proficiency in *kāvya* suppresses it.

Of these two, the poet who writes *śāstra* is of three kinds: the one who composes a doctrinal or scientific treatise, the one who introduces poetry in a *śāstra*, and the one who puts a doctrinal or scientific subject into poetry.

This passage makes it clear that the word *kavi* could also be applied to writers of doctrinal and scientific works.²⁵ There also seems to have been a view, represented here by Śyāmadeva, which placed the writers of *kāvya* before the authors of *śāstra*, and preferred those who could stand the test in both fields. If we have a look at the history of Sanskrit literature, we do find examples of such 'crossbreeds' of a swan and a *cakora*-bird. Ānandavardhana is just one of these geniuses, who is not far removed from Jayanta's time and who was also his compatriot. Today he is best known for his highly influential work on aesthetics, but he composed several poems as well. Of these only a *citrakāvya*, the *Devīśataka* survives, but he also refers to his *mahākāvya*, the *Arjunacarita* (*Dhvanyāloka*, 3.10–14+) and a Prakrit poem called *Viṣamabāṇalīlā* (*Dhvanyāloka*, 3.15+). He must have had great confidence in his erudition in philosophy, which is proved by the fact that he ventured to interpret Dharmakīrtian ideas in a commentary on Dharmottara's *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (mentioned in *Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 3.47).

²⁵When Bhāmaha classifies poetry according to its subject matter, he does mention *śāstra* as a possible subject (*Kāvyaṭīkā* 1.17):

ṛttadevādicaritaśaṃsi cotpādyavastu ca|
kalāśāstrāśrayaṃ ceti caturdhā bhidyate punaḥ||

Then [*kāvya*] is [also] divided into the following four categories: that which relates the past feats of gods and other [heroes], that which has a fictitious story, that which is about art and that which is about doctrine or science.

Being such a versatile writer, it is natural that Ānandavardhana also took interest in the nature of relation between *śāstra* and *kāvya*. His work on this topic, the *Tattvāloka*, is unfortunately lost for us, but the following passage from the *Dhvanyāloka* and Abhinavagupta's commentary thereon throws some light on it:²⁶

Ānandavardhana: *tad evam anukramaṇīnirdiṣṭena vākyaena bhagavadvyatirekiṇaḥ sarvasyānyasyānityatām prakāśayatā mokṣalakṣaṇa evaikāḥ paraḥ puruṣārthaḥ śāstranaye, kāvyanaye ca tṛṣṇākṣayaparipoṣalakṣaṇaḥ śānto raso mahābhāratasyāṅgitvena vivakṣita iti supratipāditam*

So thus it has been well established that the sentence announced in the chapter of contents, which reveals that nothing is permanent except for the Lord, wishes to express that with regard to the *śāstra* aspect it is the single supreme goal of man, namely *mokṣa*, which is predominant in the *Mahābhārata*, and with regard to the *kāvya* aspect it is the aesthetic relish of quietude, which is characterised by the full development of the dying away of desires.

Abhinavagupta: *śāstranaya iti| tatrāsvādayogābhāve puruṣeṇārthyata ity ayam eva vyapadeśaḥ sādaraḥ, camatkārayoge tu rasavyapadeśa iti bhāvaḥ| etac ca granthakāreṇa tattvāloke vitatyoktam iha tv asya na mukhyo 'vasara iti nāsmābhir darśitam*

'With regard to the *śāstra* aspect.' Since it [i.e. the *śāstra* aspect] has no connection with aesthetic relishing, it is this term alone [i.e. "goal of man"] which is appropriate, inasmuch as "man strives to obtain it"; but when [in the *kāvya* aspect] there is a connection with aesthetic wonder, then the designation of *rasa* [is appropriate]: this is what he means. And the author has set this forth in detail in the *Tattvāloka*, but the present context is not the best occasion for [discussing] it, so I have not expounded it.

Some works could be regarded both as *śāstra* and as *kāvya*, depending on the way of approach. This was especially true in the case of literary pieces that also had a religious importance, such as, for instance, the *Mahābhārata*. Bhoja lists both *kāvyaśāstra* and *śāstrakāvya* among the varieties of *śravyakāvya*.²⁷ He mentions the *Bhāṭṭikāvya* and (extending the category to *drśyakāvya*) the *Mudrārākṣasa* as examples of *kāvyaśāstra*, that is a poetic composition in which a scientific or doctrinal subject is introduced (*yatrārthaḥ śāstrāṇām kāvye niveśyate*). *Śāstrakāvya*, on the other hand, is apparently a scientific composition written in the manner of poetry, e.g. the *Kāmandakīya-nītisāra*, and the *Rativilāsa*.²⁸ Put differently, *kāvyaśāstra* is essentially a piece of poetry which also teaches us some *śāstraic* subject, while *śāstrakāvya* is essentially a *śāstra*-treatise 'dressed up' as a poem. As Raghavan observed, among Rājasekhara's

²⁶ *Dhvanyāloka* ad 4.5 (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 278); *Locana* ad loc., Kashi ed. p. 533.

²⁷ RAGHAVAN 1978, p. 593.

²⁸ Ibid. pp. 607f.

śāstrakavis, the second type writes *śāstrakāvya*, and the third type writes *kāvyaśāstra*.²⁹

Nevertheless there are clear differences between poetic and scientific dictions, and if a Fachidiot *śāstrakavi* ventures to write pure poetry, the consequences, as Rājaśekhara pointed out, can be disastrous.³⁰ We have already met the view that the source of poetry is the poet's imagination or inspiration (*pratibhā*) rather than his erudition. In the opinion of Udbhaṭa, the eight-century Kashmirian rhetorician, poetry and science also differ in their domains:³¹

astu nāma niḥsīmārthasārthaḥ| kiṃtu dvirūpa evāsau, vicāritasusthaḥ, avicāritaramaṇīyaś ca| tayoh pūrvam āśritāni śāstrāṇi, tad uttaram kāvyaṇi|

Let there be a limitless multitude of subjects, but this [multitude] is only twofold: [either] well-established [even] after they have been analysed, or pleasing [only] as long as they are not analysed.³² Of these two, scientific works are concerned with the former, poems with the latter.

According to a certain Āparājiti, who is probably the same as Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, another Kashmirian living perhaps in the ninth century, only those things are worth including in a poetic composition which are 'tasty' in an aesthetic sense.³³

Rājaśekhara, however, considers the expressions of the poet more important in this respect than the chosen subject:³⁴

ām iti yāyāvarīyaḥ| asti cānubhūyamāno rasasyānugūṇo vigūṇas cārthaḥ, kāvye tu kavivacanāni rasayanti virasayanti ca nārthāḥ, an-vayavyatirekābhyāṃ cedam upalabhyate|

²⁹Ibid.: *yaś ca śāstre kāvyam saṃvidhatte, yo 'pi kāvye śāstrārtham nidhatte*, cf. above.

³⁰Bhāmaha put it clearly (*Kāvyaḷaṅkāra* 1.12):

nākavitvam adharmāya vyādhaye daṇḍanāya ca| kukavitvam punaḥ sākṣānmṛtim āhur manīṣiṇaḥ||

If someone is not a poet, this fact is not a sin, it does not result in disease or punishment. The wise say, however, that being a bad poet equals incarnate death.

³¹Quoted in *Kāvyaṃmāmsā*, p. 44. On Udbhaṭa see p. xx above.

³²The concept of *avicāritaramaṇīyatā* appears in Cārvāka context as well, e.g. in the conclusion of Jayarāśi's *Tattvopaplavasīṃha* (TUS (GOS), p. 125): *upapluteṣu eva tattveṣu avicāritaramaṇīyās sarve vyavahārā ghaṭanta iti*. Jayanta also quotes this Cārvāka view both in his *magnum opus*, and in his play: *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 317: *avicāritaramaṇīyataiva tattvam na tu lakṣaṇanīyamaḥ śakyakriyas tasyeti; Āgamaḍambara*, Act Three, ll. 324f.: *tad ayaṃ avicārita eva ramaṇīyo vyavahārah, etad eva ca tattvam iti tattvavidah*. As we have seen above (p. xx) Cakradhara, the commentator of the *Nyāyamañjarī* identifies the 'well-trained Cārvākas (*suṣikṣitacārvākāḥ*)' with Udbhaṭa and co. (*udbhaṭādayaḥ*), and the 'cunning Cārvāka (*cārvākadhūrtaḥ*)' with Udbhaṭa himself.

³³Quoted in *Kāvyaṃmāmsā* (Ninth Adhyāya, p. 45): *astu nāma niḥsīmārthasārthaḥ, kiṃ tu rasavata eva nibandho yukto na nīrasasya iti āparājitiḥ|* Āparājiti is probably another name of Lollaṭa, since the second one of the two verses following this sentence, also written by Āparājiti according to Rājaśekhara, is attributed to Lollaṭa by Hemacandra in the *Kāvyaṃnuśāsana*, p. 307.

³⁴*Kāvyaṃmāmsā*, ibid.

‘Amen’, says Rājaśekhara. Certain things that we perceive are congenial to aesthetic relish, others are uncongenial. In poetry, however, it is the expressions of the poet which do or do not possess aesthetic relish, and not the subject, and we ascertain this fact through positive and negative concomitance.

Perhaps the most important difference between *śāstra* and *kāvya* lies in their function. While we study the *śāstras* in order to receive instruction about the true nature of things, this does not seem to be enough reason to read poetry. Bhāmaha named proficiency (*vaicakṣanya*) in the four goals of man and the arts, pleasure (*prīti*), and fame (*kīrti*), as the threefold gift of poetry.³⁵ Later aestheticians, however, disagreed. Dhanañjaya and Dhanika felt strongly on this point:³⁶

*ānandanīṣyandiṣu rūpakeṣu
vyutpattimātram phalam alpabuddhiḥ|
yo 'pītihāsādivad āha sādhus
tasmai namaḥ svādūparānimukhāya|*

Homage to that holy fool, who has turned his back on charm, and who says that the only fruit in plays that drip bliss is learning, similarly to legends and the like.

Avaloka ad loc.:

*tatra kecit—dharmārthakāmamokṣeṣu vaicakṣanyam kalāsu ca| karo-
ti kīrtim prītim ca sādhu-kāvyanīṣevanam|| ityādinā trivargādivyutpat-
tim kāvyaphalatvenecchanti tannirāsenā svasamvedyaḥ paramānanda-
rūpo rasāsvādo daśarūpānām phalam na punar itihāsādivat trivargādi-
vyutpattimātram iti darśitam| nama iti solluṅṭham|*

In this context some people assert with verses such as the following that the fruit of poetry is learning the three goals of man, etc.: ‘Adherence to [i.e. reading and composing] good poetry bestows proficiency in *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma*, *mokṣa*, and the arts, and it also gives fame and pleasure.’ In order to refute this it has been shown that the fruit of the ten kinds of plays is the tasting of aesthetic relish, which everyone experiences in himself, and which is of the nature of the highest bliss, and [this fruit is] not just education in the three goals of man, etc., like in the case of legends, etc. The word “homage” is used ironically.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka expressed a similar opinion on this subject. He held that the major effect of poetry is the enjoyment (*bhoga*) of aesthetic relish, which enjoyment is similar to the Brahman-experience (*brahmāsvāda*). Any instruction a poem may give us is secondary (*vyutpattir nāma apradhānam eva*).³⁷

³⁵ *Kāvya-lāṅkāra* 1.2.

³⁶ *Daśarūpaka* 1.6.

³⁷ Quoted by Abhinavagupta in *Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 2.4.

Abhinavagupta also quotes Bhāmaha's verse to show that the audience can derive both instruction and pleasure from poetry, but then he remarks that of these two pleasure is the predominant result.³⁸ Then he relates one of his favourite allegories to illustrate that different literary genres teach us in different ways: the Veda (= *sāstra*) instructs in the manner of a master, we learn from the legends in the way we learn from our friends, and poetry teaches us after the fashion of a loving wife.³⁹ Abhinavagupta takes the view (following his teacher) that it is pointless to separate pleasure and instruction in poetry, since without delight coming from the tasting of *rasa* no lesson can enter the hearts of the connoisseur audience.⁴⁰ Accordingly drama, too, does not instruct us as a rigorous professor, but rather it 'increases our understanding.'⁴¹ Certainly the conduct of the hero is set as a good example to the spectators, but still before that their imagination is expanded through the savoring of *rasa*, which is an (at least) equally important side of instruction.⁴²

Poetic diction can facilitate the mastering of any kind of teaching. Princes, for instance, must be educated to become righteous kings. But, given their natural inclinations, they would be bored to tears while listening to the *sāstras*. Poetry, however, is an excellent way to engage their interest: 'entering into the hearts [of the princes, etc.],' says Abhinavagupta, 'is accomplished by the tasting of aesthetic relish alone.'⁴³ Reading a scientific treatise can be a painful experience for a *sahr̥daya*. It is like swallowing a bitter medicine, to use this ancient allegory, while reading poetry is almost equivalent to drinking ambrosia, which is sweet *and* healthy at the same time.⁴⁴ It is an ancient wisdom that if you don't want to frighten people away from your *sāstra*, the trick is to drip some poetic honey into bitter science.⁴⁵ 'How great is the weight put on the poet's shoulders!', sighs Bhāmaha. No wonder: all words and meanings, all arguments and arts, if they deserve their name, become the components of poetry.⁴⁶

³⁸The poet's happiness is provided by his fame (*Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 1.1.)

³⁹*Locana* ibid. (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 17): *tathāpi tatra pr̥tir eva pradhānam| anyathā prabhūsammitēbhyo vedādibhyo mitrasammitēbhyāś cetihāsādibhyo vyutpattihetubhyaḥ ko 'sya kāvyarūpasya vyutpattihetor jāyāsammitatvalakṣaṇo viśeṣa iti pradhānyenānanda evoktaḥ|* Cf. also *Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 3.10–14.

⁴⁰*Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 3.10–14.

⁴¹*Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.115. (ed. GOS, vol. I, p. 41): : *dharmyaṃ yaśasyam āyusyaṃ hitam buddhivivardhanam| lokopadeśajananaṃ nāṭyam etad bhaviṣyati|* Abhinavagupta *ad loc.*: *nanu kiṃ guruvad upadeśam karoti? nety āha| kintu buddhiṃ vivardhayati|*

⁴²*Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 2.4.

⁴³*Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 3.10–14 (ed. *Kāvyaṃālā*, p. 183): *hṛdayānupraveśaś ca rasāsvādamaya eva. Cf. Vakroktijīvita*, prose after 1.3 (ed. p. 10): *abhijātāḥ khalu rājaputrādayo dharmādyupeyārthino vijigīṣavaḥ kleśabhīravaś ca, sukumārāśayatvāt teṣāṃ| tathā saty api tadāhlādakatve kāvyabandhasya kr̥ḍanakādīprakhyatā prāpnotīty abhidhatte— dharmādisādhanopāyah|*

⁴⁴Cf. *Vakroktijīvita*, prose after 1.5 (ed. p. 15): *duḥśravadurbhaṇaduradhigamatvādidoṣaduṣṭo 'dhyayanāvasara eva duḥsahaduḥkhadāyī śāstrasandarbhastatkālakalpitaḥ kamānīyacamatkr̥teḥ kāvyasya na kathañcid api spardhām adhirohatīty etad apy arthato 'bhihitam bhavati| kaṭukaṣadhavac chāstram avidyāvryādhināśanam| āhlādy amṛtavat kāvyam avivekagadāpaham|*

⁴⁵Cf. *Kāvyaṃālā* 5.3: *svādukāvyarasonmiśraṃ śāstram apy upayun̄jate| prathamālīḍhamadhavaḥ pibanti kaṭu bheṣajam|*

⁴⁶Ibid. 5.4: *na sa śabdo na tad vācyaṃ na sa nyāyo na sā kalā| jāyate yan na kāvyāṅgam*

3.4

We can ascertain from the foregoing that, according to the standards of classical Indian aesthetics, it was not completely impossible to write a play introducing philosophical subjects, but it was apparently a daring enterprise, and the poet must have reckoned with the scathing criticism of the *sahṛdayas*.

When Jayanta composed his unique play, probably at the very end of the ninth century, studies in poetics and poetry itself had achieved a high standard in the kingdom of Kashmir. We have already met the name of Bhāmaha, the ancient *ālanikārika* (eight century or earlier). Udbhaṭa, who wrote a commentary on Bhāmaha's work, may be identical with the *sabhāpati* of king Jayāpīḍa (779–813) mentioned in the *Rājataranṅiṇī*. This king sponsored a remarkable circle of intellectuals: Kalhaṇa mentions the poet Dāmodaragupta and Vāmana (possibly the author of the *Kāvyaḷanikārasūtra*), who were also his ministers, and several other poets; the grammarian Kṣīra was the king's teacher, and the Buddhist philosopher Dharmottara also entered his kingdom.⁴⁷ About half a century later king Avantivarman (855–883) was a similar patron of literature. Kalhaṇa names four illustrious members of his *sabhā*: Ānandavardhana, Mukṭākāṇa, Śivasvāmin (the author of the *Kapphiṇābhyudaya*), and Ratnākara (who wrote the *Haraviḷaya*).⁴⁸ As we have seen, Avantivarman's successor and the king of Jayanta's play, Śaṅkaravarman (883–902), was more interested in military conquests than in literature: Bhallaṭa and other poets led a miserable existence during his reign, and *horribile dictu* the king himself spoke *apabhramṣa* instead of Sanskrit.⁴⁹ According to Kalhaṇa, Śaṅkaravarman put a certain Nāyaka in charge of the two new Śiva-temples.⁵⁰ It is very tempting to identify this Nāyaka with Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, the famous aesthete, who wrote his *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* in order to demolish the *dhvani*-theory.⁵¹ Another important source of aesthetic theory was certainly the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Its most famous commentary was written by Abhinavagupta, but his work was not unprecedented. He quotes among others three Kashmirian commentators: Udbhaṭa, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, and Śaṅkuka. We know from Abhinavagupta that Śaṅkuka contested the views of Lollaṭa.⁵² Kalhaṇa mentions a poet called Śaṅkuka, who composed a *kāvya* about the battle between the mighty Mamma and Utpalaka, which took place around 851.⁵³ On the other hand, we know about a Lollaṭa who commented on the

aho bhāro mahān kaveḷ||

⁴⁷ *Rājataranṅiṇī* 4.495 seqq.

⁴⁸ *Rājataranṅiṇī* 5.34.

⁴⁹ *Rājataranṅiṇī* 5.204 seqq.

⁵⁰ *Rājataranṅiṇī* 5.159.

⁵¹ On Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka see KANE, pp. 221ff. Abhinavagupta refers to him as one who uses *mīmāṃsaka* ideas in literary criticism (*Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 2.1, ed. *Kāvyaḷalā*, p. 77: *jāimīnīyasūtre hy evaṃ yojyate na kāvye 'pi*); and judging from a verse of invocation also quoted by Abhinavagupta he seems to have been a devotee of Śiva (*namas trailokyānirmāṇakavaye sambhave yataḷ| pratikṣaṇaṃ jagannāṭyaprayogarasiko janaḷ||*, *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, p. 6). Now the Nāyaka who was placed in charge of the two Śiva-temples is called both *caturvidyaḷ* and *vāgdevīkulamandiram* in the *Rājataranṅiṇī*.

⁵² *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, p. 266.

⁵³ *Rājataranṅiṇī* 4.703 seqq.

Spandakārikā of Vasugupta,⁵⁴ who was the teacher of Kallaṭa, who lived under Avantivarman (855/6–883).⁵⁵ Now certainly everything depends on the identity of the above Śaṅkukas and Lollaṭas, but it is at least not impossible that both were roughly of the same age and lived under the reign of Avantivarman. In that case Jayanta might have known their works.

That Jayanta was familiar with the *dhvani*-theory becomes clear from the *Nyāyamañjarī*:⁵⁶

etena śabdāsāmarthyamahimnā so 'pi vāritaḥ|
yam anyah paṇḍitaṃmanyah prapede kaṃcana dhvanim||
vidher niṣedhāvagatir vidhibuddhir niṣedhataḥ|
yathā
'bhama⁵⁷ dhammiya vīsatho', 'mā sma pāntha gṛhaṃ viśa' ||
mānāntaraparicchedyavasturūpopadeśinām|
śabdānām eva sāmartyaṃ tatra tatra tathā tathā||
athavā nedṛṣī carcā kavibhiḥ saha śobhate|
vidvāṃso 'pi vimuhyanti vākyārthagahane 'dhvani||
tad alam anayā goṣṭhyā vidvajjanocitayā ciraṃ
paramagahanas tarkajñānām abhūmir ayaṃ nayaḥ|
prakṛtam adhunā tasmād brūmo na bhāty anumānataḥ
tanur api satām arthāpatter viśeṣa iti sthitam||

By this greatness of the word's signifying power that so-called '*dhvani*' is also refuted to which another self-appointed scholar resorted. [When there is] the understanding of a prohibition from [hearing] an injunction, [and] the comprehension of an injunction from [hearing] a prohibition, as for example [in the verses beginning with the following words]: 'Walk confidently, pious man...', [and] 'Don't enter the house, traveler...', it is nothing but the signifying power of words [which operates] in all such cases in various [appropriate] ways—words that refer to the real nature [of things] which can be precisely determined with the help of other means of valid knowledge. Or rather it is not right [to open] such a discussion with poets. Even the wise go astray on the path which is hardly passable due to [the difficulties in explaining] the sentence-meanings. So let's finish at last this discourse which is suitable [only] for the wise. This highly impenetrable issue is beyond the reach of logicians. Therefore now I shall speak about the subject in hand: it is proved that sensible people do not see the slightest difference between inference and presumption.

It appears that Jayanta was not only acquainted with the *dhvani*-theory, but he probably knew the *Dhvanyāloka* as well, since the two verses he refers to

⁵⁴GNOLI 1968, p. xvii, note 2.

⁵⁵Cf. *Rājataranigīṇī* 5.66.

⁵⁶*Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 129f.

⁵⁷*bhama*] em. following *Dhvanyāloka* 1.4+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 8.) : *bhava* ed.

are the first two examples of *dhvani* cited by Ānandavardhana.⁵⁸ In this case the ‘self-appointed scholar’ may well have been Ānandavardhana himself,⁵⁹ and this attribute also betrays that Jayanta did not have a high opinion of him. On the other hand Jayanta probably knew that the refined aesthetes shuddered at the views of the ‘dry logicians’, so while he modestly (?) declines to deal with the impervious subject of words and their meanings, he also suggests that poets or literary critics are even less competent to handle the problem.

This does not mean, however, that Jayanta did not speak about poets with the greatest respect, provided that they stick to their last. ‘Kālidāsa’s beautiful expressions’, he says, ‘are, so to say, sprinkled with ambrosia, smeared with sandal, [and] washed by moon-beams. Bāṇa’s words bedazzle crowds of poets with the formidable / spacious arrangement of their letters, which is congenial to the aesthetic relish manifested [in the text].’⁶⁰ He was probably familiar with the poetry of his native land as well, and he does mention one famous Kashmirian *kāvya*: the *Kuṭṭanīmata* (cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 649).

But Jayanta was not just an appreciative reader of poetry. We find ample evidence in the *Nyāyamañjarī* of his poetic vein and gift for satire. He took care to mix the right quantity of honey into his *sāstra*, although in his opinion the *sūtras* of Gautama are already ‘the most excellent juice (*rasa*) extracted from the cluster of the medical plants of *nyāya*’.⁶¹ If we did not know the *Āgamaḍambara* and were to speculate which Indian philosopher might have endeavoured to write a play, Jayanta would be perhaps the most likely guess.

3.5

‘My friend,’ complains the Director to his Assistant in the Prologue of the *Āgamaḍambara*, ‘as is well known, I have exerted myself in the staging of the

⁵⁸ *Dhvanyāloka* 1.4+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 8). The second verse quoted by Ānandavardhana is actually a Prakrit poem which seems to be slightly different from the verse Jayanta refers to, but both illustrate the phenomenon of ‘*vidhibuddhir niṣedhataḥ*’. Perhaps Jayanta relied on his memory and recalled a verse very similar to the one in the *Dhvanyāloka*. It is interesting to note that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka also commented on these two verses. According to him it is not the *arthasāmarthyā*, that is the suggesting power of the content expressed by the words, which brings about the apprehension of the hidden intention, but the words themselves, when applied in a skillful way (*Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 1.4, ed. Krishnamoorthy, pp. 29, 31).

⁵⁹ Cf. *Granthibhaṅga*, p. 32: *etena paṇḍitaṃmanya ity ānandavardhanācāryaṃ dhvanikāram parāmrṣati*

⁶⁰ *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 582: *amṛteneva saṃsiktāḥ candaneneva carcitāḥ | candrāṃśubhir ivonmrṣtāḥ kālidāsasya sūktayāḥ | prakāṭarasānugūṇavikaṭākṣararacanācamatkāritasakalakavikulāḥ bāṇasya vācaḥ* | The invocatory verses of the *Nyāyamañjarī* and the *Harsacarita* resemble each other in many respects.

⁶¹ *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 3: *nyāyauśadhivanebhyo ’yam āhṛtaḥ paramo rasaḥ*. Jayanta placed a high value on correct and clear usage, and he could not refrain from mocking the wise Dharmakīrti who ‘could not put together correctly even a pair of words when he wanted to formulate a definition’ (*Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 259: *iti sunipuṇabuddhir lakṣaṇaṃ vaktukāmaḥ paḍayugalam apīdaṃ nirmame nānavadyam*). Both Cakradhara, the commentator of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, and Abhinanda, Jayanta’s son, praised the poetic qualities of Jayanta’s writings.

ten dramatic styles as taught by Bharatamuni. But today the circle of pupils of this honourable Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, who is also well known as the Writer of the Commentary because he wrote an exegetical work on grammar when he was just a child, has ordered me to put on the work of their teacher, a new, extraordinary play called Much Ado About Religion. So how shall I stage it, since it is not worldly, does not follow the dramatic rules, and has never been performed before? Therefore it is better just to give up this wretched livelihood.'

His last objection against the play, namely that there is no tradition of its performance the director could rely upon, is a well-known complaint since the time of Kālidāsa, although in the *Mālavikāgnimitra* the Director shows more solidarity with the author and actually defends the play against this charge. The first two objections deserve closer attention.

To begin with, why is it a problem if a play is 'not worldly'? Well, a refined connoisseur might say that if a play is riddled with disputes on utterly abstract topics such as, 'Can this pot be destroyed by a hammer, or are there only pot-phases perishing in every moment?', it might prove to be a trifle boring for the average audience (not to speak about the spoiled princes). After all the main purpose of drama is entertainment. Already the gods addressed Brahmā with the following words: 'we want something to play with, which has to be pleasing both to our eyes and our ears.'⁶² This 'plaything', says Abhinavagupta, 'is similar to a bitter medicine coated in sugar', a familiar concept, but 'the sole effect of which is the distraction of the mind'.⁶³ One should find pleasure in watching a play and in listening to it: it is not a means to generate religious merit (*na dharmasādhanam*, *Abhinavabhāratī ad Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.11). The diction of a play should be straightforward and agreeable (*śakyam*), and not for the most part ugly and harsh (*durbhagaparūṣaprāyam*, *Abhinavabhāratī* *ibid.*).⁶⁴ As Dhanañjaya observed with a sharp eye: 'The spectators amusing themselves with characters such as Arjuna are just like children playing with clay elephants: they relish their own zeal.'⁶⁵ A good performance holds the audience, diverts their mind from everyday miseries:⁶⁶

duḥkhārtānām śramārtānām śokārtānām tapasvinām|
viśrāntijananaṃ kāle nāṭyam etad bhaviṣyati||

This [thing called] drama will be the production of repose in the appropriate time for those who are tormented by suffering, fatigue, or grief, [and also] for ascetics.

⁶² *Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.11 (GOS, vol. I, p. 10): *krīdanīyakam icchāmo dṛśyam śravyam ca yad bhavet|*

⁶³ *Abhinavabhāratī* on *loc. cit.* (GOS *ibid.*): *gudapracchannakatukauṣadhakalpaṃ cittavikṣepamātraphalam.*

⁶⁴ Another interpretation of *dṛśyam śravyam ca* given by Abhinavagupta (GOS p. 11): *dṛśyam iti hṛdyam śravyam iti vyutpattipradam iti prītyvyutpattidam ity arthaḥ.*

⁶⁵ *Daśarūpaka* 4.41b–42a: *krīdatām mṛṇmayair yadvad bālānām dviradādibhiḥ| svotsāhaḥ svadate tadvac chrotīṇām arjunādibhiḥ||*; cf. *Nāṭyaśāstra* verses between 1.119 and 120 (GOS vol. I, p. 44, Abhinavagupta does not comment on them): *vinodakaraṇam loke nāṭyam etad bhaviṣyati|*

⁶⁶ *Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.114 (GOS vol. I, p. 40).

So even ascetics, who might be inclined to contemplate the ultimate questions of existence, would prefer to be entertained while watching a play and to forget about their self-afflicted tortures⁶⁷ (including the mental tortures of thinking about hammers approaching pots from various angles, our man of taste might add). As for those fortunate ones who are not familiar with suffering, for instance the spoiled princes, drama gives them useful instructions about the way of the world (*lokavṛtte*).⁶⁸

The objection that they do not please the general audience was brought up against *śāntarasa*-plays in general (and, as we are going to see, the *Āgamadambara* is such a play, if we can label it in any way at all). 'Even if it is not within everyone's range of experience,' says Ānandavardhana in defence of *śāntarasa* occurring in plays such as the *Nāgānanda*, 'just because of that it cannot be rejected as a special state of mind of illustrious persons who are different from the plebs.'⁶⁹ So even a philosophical play can be a hit, one just has to find the right audience. And that's the conclusive argument of the Assistant in reply to the hesitation of the Director: what could be a better audience than the devoted philosophy-students of professor Bhaṭṭa Jayanta? They'll just love the play.

But there are other problems, too, with the *Āgamadambara*. Some critics would say that actually it is too *laukika* in the sense that it is very closely linked with the time and place of the author. Abhinavagupta was an eminent promoter of the thesis that aesthetic experience is essentially supramundane, *alaukika*.⁷⁰ In his view, 'the heart [of the spectator] becomes similar to a spotless mirror because he forgets about his everyday life in the world due to the relishing of the appropriate songs and music'.⁷¹ 'Due to listening to the recitation [of the actors] and [watching] the entering of other characters', says Abhinavagupta, 'an apprehension arises [in the mind of the spectator]. [This apprehension] has as its object such [characters] as Rāma and Rāvaṇa, it is not embraced by the influence of any particular place or time, [and] it is not the domain of [any] reflection on whether it is to be regarded as a cognition which is correct, or false, or which is a doubt, or a supposition.'⁷²

Already Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka had pointed out that when we watch a Rāma-play, we do not regard Sītā as our own beloved, so the erotic *rasa* we relish cannot

⁶⁷Cf. *Abhinavabhāratī ad Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.114 (GOS vol. I, p.39): *tapasvinām anavara-takṛcchracāndrāyaṇādyācaraṇakalitadaurbalyātiśayaparikhinnahṛdayāṇām viśrāntijananaṃ dukkhaprasaraṇavighātakam*|

⁶⁸Abhinavagupta commenting on *Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.115 (*lokopadeśajananaṃ nāṭyam*) (*Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, pp. 40f): *ye na dukkhitāḥ sukhabhūyiṣṭhavṛttaya eva rājaputrādyās teṣāṃ lokavṛtte dharmādyupāyavarge upadeśakāry etan nāṭyam| lokaśabdena lokavṛttam| nanu kiṃ guruvad upadeśam karoti? nety āha| kintu buddhiṃ vivardhayati*|

⁶⁹*Dhvanyāloka* 3.26+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 182): *yadi nāma sarvajanānubhavagocaratā tasya nāsti naitāvātāsāv alokasāmānyamahānubhāvavacittavṛttiviśeṣaḥ pratikṣeptum śakyaḥ*|

⁷⁰Most of Abhinavagupta's predecessors did not consider *rasāsvāda* as something essentially different from our everyday experiences.

⁷¹*Abhinavabhāratī ad Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.107 (GOS vol. I, p. 36): *ucitagītātodyacarvaṇāvismṛta-sāmsārikabhāvatayā vimalamukurakalpībhūtanijahṛdayaḥ*.

⁷²*Abhinavabhāratī* *ibid.*: *pāṭhyākarnanapātrāntarapraveśavaśāt samutpanne deśakālaviśeṣāveśānālingite samyanimithyāsamaśayasambhāvanādijñānavijñeyatvaparāmarśānāspade rāmarāvaṇādiviśayādhyavasāye...*

be awakened by the actual *Sītā*. To say that each spectator remembers his own beloved during the performance might be correct (especially if the performance is boring), but it does not explain how the *play* contributes to our aesthetic experience. As for *Rāma*, we cannot actually recall his heroism since we have never witnessed his heroic deeds. If we learn them from some written testimony, this knowledge still does not guarantee that we can relish *vīrarasa*.⁷³ One of the key concepts of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's aesthetic theory is 'generalisation', *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*.⁷⁴ Words in poetry have a special function called *bhāvakatva* ("bringing into being") by Nāyaka, which gives rise to the aesthetic experience of *rasa* in the audience. This special operation must necessarily comprise the generalisation (or universalisation, depersonalisation) of the various factors which contribute to the arising of *rasa*, that is to say the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *vyabhicārībhāvas* (eliciting factors, indicatory symptoms, and ancillary mental states).⁷⁵ Now if we see king Udayana and Ratnāvalī on the stage, we can easily be convinced that they are not our personal acquaintances, the lovely garden in which they sit is not one particular garden in our city, and the heroin's oblique glances or blushing do not have any personal relationship with us, since they are more than the amorous gestures of just one particular girl. But what happens if the scene of the plot is the city we live in, the time is the reign of our king, and the events happening on the stage give us the strange feeling of *dejà vu*?

The factors that produce the *rasa* are also capable of shielding our aesthetic relish from various obstacles,⁷⁶ so if the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *vyabhicārins* do not function properly, we might expect that the "wonder" *camatkāra* of our aesthetic perception will be blocked. One of the major obstacles occurs when the spectators regard these factors as real, actual, and personal. The right way to counteract this obstacle is to employ the theatrical conventions (*nāṭyadharmins*), which include various dances, makeups, the stage, costumes, and other *alaukika* accessories. These conventions hide the identity of the actor (which was, however, revealed in the preliminaries of the play), and distance the performance from all actualities.⁷⁷ To sum up, they contribute to the aesthetic experience through the accomplishment of the state of generality, *sādhāraṇībhāva*.⁷⁸

Ānandavardhna held that Vālmīki's grief (*śoka*) felt upon the lamentation of the *krauñca*-bird was transformed into verse (*śloka*).⁷⁹ But Abhinavagupta

⁷³See *Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 2.4.

⁷⁴It was accepted by Abhinavagupta, and probably already by Tauta (Abhinavagupta follows his teacher when he writes: *nartakāntare 'pi ca rāmo 'yam iti pratipattir asti| tataś ca rāmatvaṃ sāmānyarūpam ity āyātam|*, *Abhinavabhāratī ad rasasūtra*, GOS, vol. I, p. 269; GNOLI 1968, p. 7).

⁷⁵*Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 2.4. See also *Kāvya prakāśa*, vol. I, p. 216ff; GEROW-AKLUJKAR, p. 86.

⁷⁶*Abhinavabhāratī ad rasasūtra* (GOS, vol. I, p. 274): *tatra vighnāpasārakā vibhāvaprabhṛtayaḥ|*

⁷⁷*Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS) *ibid*. The spectator's cognition cannot rest either in the actuality of the actor, or in the reality of the character.

⁷⁸*Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, p. 275.: *eṣa sarvo muninā sādhāraṇībhāvasiddhyā rasacarvaṇopayogitvena parikarabandhaḥ samāśritah|*

⁷⁹*Dhvanyāloka* 1.5+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 12): *tathā cādikaver vālmīkes sannihitasa-*

hastens to remark that it was rather *karuṇarasa* that was felt by the first poet and not actual grief, since in the latter case the poet would merely suffer, and he could in no way experience aesthetic pleasure which is indispensable for composing a poem.⁸⁰ The same observation holds good with regard to the audience of *kāvya*. According to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, if a performance produced sorrow in the spectators, they would never return to the theatre to watch a play in which *karuṇa* is the dominant *rasa*.⁸¹

It is easy to see that if, for instance, the Rāma-story had been presented to an average Indian audience, no spectator would have had any difficulty in distancing what was happening on the stage from the realities of his own life. But what would have happened if Rāvaṇa himself had been among the audience? This is precisely what occurs in the third act of Rājasekhara's play, the *Bālarāmāyaṇa*, when the king of the *rākṣasas*, who is pining for Sītā, sends for the troupe of Kohala to perform Bharata's brand-new play, called *Sītāsvayaṃvara*, in order to distract his mind. He could not have opted for a worse kind of entertainment. First he seems to enjoy the show, gloating over the princes' fiasco as they try to bend Śiva's bow in vain. He becomes a bit annoyed with the playwright when one of the characters remarks that even Rāvaṇa's arms would fail to accomplish this great deed. When king Śatruñjaya is introduced as a great hero who wishes to defeat Indrajit, Rāvaṇa draws his sword to protect his dearest son, and Prahasta, his general, has to remind him that they are just watching a play. But Rāvaṇa has entered too far into the dramatic world. When one of the contestants tries to carry away Sītā forcefully, his anger makes him spring up, just to realise within seconds that he has made a fool of himself again.

When all the other kings have failed to bend Śiva's bow, and the door-keeper is still musing if he should announce finally the young prince of the *sūryavaṃśa*, Rāvaṇa suddenly decides to act and rises to enter into the contest. 'My lord', says Prahasta, 'this is not Janaka's daughter, and this is not the bow of the moon-crested god.' 'What is it then?' asks Rāvaṇa at a loss. And Prahasta benignly informs him: 'It is a play.'⁸² Then Rāma enters and vows that either he will string the bow or the bow will break. 'This is indeed the thunder of an actor',⁸³ laughs Rāvaṇa, and when Rāma does start bending the bow he says, 'This is how an actor shows off'.⁸⁴ When the bow miraculously bursts in Rāma's hands, Rāvaṇa accuses the poet that he has given the reins to his imagination: 'This is the wish-granting speech-cow of poets, which gives birth

hacarīvirahakātarakrauñcākrandajanitaḥ śoka eva ślokatayā pariṇataḥ|

⁸⁰*Locana ad loc.* (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 39): *na tu muneḥ śoka iti mantavyam| evaṃ hi sati tadduḥkhena so 'pi duḥkhita iti kṛtvā rasilyātmateti niravakāśaṃ bhavet| na ca duḥkhasantaptasyaiśā daśeti|*

⁸¹Quoted in *Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 2.4. We might add that while Abhinavagupta would have no objection against the arising of *karuṇarasa* in the spectators, he would definitely oppose the arising of actual *śoka* in them.

⁸²*Bālarāmāyaṇa*, Act Three, verse 67+: PRAHASTAḤ: *deva! neyaṃ jānakī, na cedam aindusekharaṃ dhanuḥ|* RĀVAṆAḤ: *tat kim idam?* PRAHASTAḤ: *prekṣaṇakam idam|*

⁸³*Ibid.*, verse 74+: *idam tan naṭagarjitaṃ nāma|*

⁸⁴*Ibid.*: *iyam api sā naṭavibhīṣikā|*

[i.e. makes real] even to unreal things'.⁸⁵ But when king Janaka places Sītā's hand on Rāma's, Rāvaṇa loses his self-control, and exclaims: 'Ah, what?! This falsely and vainly sophisticated bug of a *kṣatriya*-boy is clutching Sītā's hand, although I, the lord of Lāṅkā, am present! So he is as good as dead.'⁸⁶ Prahasta cannot help laughing to himself, and remarks somewhat ironically: 'Lord of the *rākṣasas*! The performance is almost over. So please, Sire, consider the actors' talent in clever acting and the way they intensify the aesthetic relish.' Rāvaṇa pulls himself together and feels like an idiot: 'Why, this is a play. I've become enraged for no reason.'⁸⁷ Needless to say, his aesthetic pleasure is completely ruined, and the only thing he feels is fury.⁸⁸

The third act of the *Bālarāmāyaṇa* is an excellent study of the complete failure of a dramatic performance.⁸⁹ Rāvaṇa's is a typical example of a gross error in theatrical framing. 'The theatrical frame', writes Elam, 'is in effect the product of a set of transactional [actor-spectator] conventions governing the participants' expectations and their understanding of the kinds of reality involved in the performance. The theatregoer will accept that, at least in dramatic representations, an alternative and fictional reality is to be presented by individuals designated as the performers, and that his own role with respect to that represented reality is to be that of a privileged "onlooker".'⁹⁰ But there are cases when the operation of the dramatic and theatrical conventions (*nāṭyadharmins*) fails, the spectators mistake the performance for real-life activity, and they start collecting money for the liberation of a poor slave-girl they have seen in a soap-opera.⁹¹ But apart from such gross mistakes as running up to the stage and trying to change the course of events, the collapse of boundaries between real and fictional worlds in the mind of the spectator results in the failure of any kind of aesthetic experience, since the adequate emotional answer for something we perceive as actual can only be actual itself, that is, it cannot be *rasa*, only a *sthāyibhāva*.

There was a view current among Sanskrit aestheticians that if the aim of the poet is to satisfy his king, he may present the deeds of the latter in a play.⁹² Abhinavagupta, however, did not share this opinion, precisely because

⁸⁵Ibid., verse 77+: *seyam kavīnām vacanakāmadhenuḥ, yad asadbhūtam api sūte|*

⁸⁶Ibid., verse 84+: *āḥ, katham ayam alikadurvidagdhaḥ kṣatriyabatukīto mamāpi lankeśva-rasya purataḥ sītāyāḥ pāṇim pāṇinā pīdayati! tad eṣa na bhavati|*

⁸⁷Ibid., verse 85+: PRAHASTAḤ: *rākṣasapate! paryavasitaprāyaḥ prekṣāvidhiḥ| tad bhāvayatu caturābhinayām buddhiṃ rasavṛddhiṃ ca nartakānām devaḥ| RĀVAṆA (sasmaraṇalajjam ātmagatam): katham prekṣaṇakam etat| mudhā saṃrabdham asmābhiḥ|*

⁸⁸Ibid., verse 90: *yātaḥ padaṃ mama ruṣāṃ ca mṛṣaiḥ rāmaḥ|*

⁸⁹Other examples from Sanskrit literature are the third act of Harṣa's *Priyadarśikā*, and the seventh act of Bhavabhūti's *Uttararāmacarita*. See also BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, p. 148ff.

⁹⁰ELAM 1997, p. 88.

⁹¹As it actually happened in Hungary. 'Gross errors in framing,' observes ELAM (pp. 89f.), '[...] are less common in the theatre than with popular mass-media drama [...], since the conventionalized markers are much clearer. The legend of the cowboy spectator who shoots the stage villain is fairly apocryphal (although Goffman [...] reports an actual case of a drunken Virginian spectator shooting a "devil" represented by a mere puppet).'

⁹²This view is also represented in the *Nāṭakalakṣaṇaratnakośa* (p. 3): *vartamānam api nṛpater mahābhūtasya kavibuddhiprakarṣād āsāditabījabindvādikaṃ yadi bhavati, bhavaty eva nāṭakaviṣayam|* But cf. *Nāṭyadarpaṇa*, p. 25: *vartamāne ca netari tatkālaprasiddhibādhayā*

he reckoned the spectators should maintain a certain emotional distance from the performance:⁹³

'prabhuparitoṣāya prabhucaritam kadācin nāṭye varṇanīyam' iti 'yathā daityāḥ surair jitā' (Nāṭyaśāstra 1.57) ity etasmāl labhyata iti kecid āhuḥ| tad asat, daśarūpakalakṣaṇayuktivirodhāt| tatra hi kiñcit prasiddhacaritam kiñcid utpādyacaritam iti vakṣyate| na ca vartamānacaritānukāro yuktaḥ, vineyānām tatra rāgadveṣamadyasthatādīnā tanmayībhāvābhāve prīter abhāvena vyutpatter apy abhāvāt|

Some people assert that the view, according to which sometimes the deeds of a ruler may be presented in a play in order to satisfy the ruler, follows from the verse '[at the end of the *nāndī*, a representation was made of] how the gods defeated the demons'. That [assertion] is not correct, because it contradicts the definition of the ten dramatic genres. For, as it will be shown [in the following], in [these dramatic genres] sometimes the deeds of a well-known [hero], and sometimes the deeds of an invented [hero] [are presented]. But the imitation [in a dramatic representation] of the deeds of a contemporary person is not appropriate, since in this case the disciples [i.e. the spectators] could not identify themselves [with the presentation] because of their [various emotions] such as lust, hatred, or indifference; thus they would not feel pleasure, and therefore no instruction could take place either.

If an individual of the real world appears as a character in the dramatic world, their 'trans-world identity' can be the source of problems. Rolf Hochhuth's play *Soldiers* 'was banned in England because the central figure, "Churchill", was seen at once to refer to and to defame (through inventive elaboration) the *W_o* [real world] original. Arguments in favour of the autonomy of the dramatic world in this case were not persuasive.'⁹⁴ The main criterion in determining the 'trans-world identity' of a character in a play and a historical figure is, as Elam pointed out, 'to consider the culturally determined *essential properties* of the figure in question and to judge whether they are preserved in the world of drama'.⁹⁵ This question appears in the context of *prasiddhatva* in Sanskrit dramatic theory. Classical Indian plays can be divided into two broad categories on the basis of their plot. On the one hand there are those plays the story of which is the invention of the poet (*utpādyavastu*). Among the classical genres of Indian drama, *prakaraṇas* are the typical representatives of this group.⁹⁶ On the other hand the story of several plays can be traced back

rasahāniḥ syāt|

⁹³ *Abhinavabhāratī ad Nāṭyaśāstra 1.58 (tato brahmādayo devāḥ prayogaparitoṣitāḥ)* (GOS, vol. I, p. 27). Cf. GNOLI 1968, p. 64, note 1; BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, p. 128, note 212.

⁹⁴ ELAM 1997, p. 106.

⁹⁵ ELAM 1997, *ibid.*

⁹⁶ *Nāṭyaśāstra 18.45* (GOS, vol. II, p. 430): *yatra kavir ātmaśaktyā vastu śarīraṃ ca nāyakaṃ caiva| autpattikaṃ prakurute prakaraṇam iti tad buddhair jñeyam||*

to some well-known (*prakhyāta*) source, such as the *purāṇas* or the epics. The *nāṭaka* belongs to this category. As Bharata teaches in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*.⁹⁷

prakhyātavastuviṣayam prakhyātodāttanāyakam caiva|
rājarṣivamśyacaritam tathaiva divyāśrayopetam||

[That play is called a *nāṭaka*] the subject of which is a well-known plot, which also has a well-known, illustrious hero, which presents the deeds of those who belong to the families of sage-like kings, and which is endowed with [the motif of] divine assistance as well.

The above interpretation of *prakhyātavastuviṣayam* is roughly the same as that of Śaṅkuka.⁹⁸ Abhinavagupta (following his teacher, Bhaṭṭa Tauta) preferred a more precise definition of *prasiddhatva* (renown, celebrity), consisting of three factors: ‘A certain person acted in a certain way in a certain place’ (*amuka evamkārī amutra deśe*).⁹⁹ For example, everybody knows that the scene of king Udayana’s adventures is mainly Kauśāmbī, and if a poet continuously presented him as residing in some other place, without mentioning that he has some reason to be there, such a description would not be plausible and therefore it would ruin the aesthetic relish of the play.¹⁰⁰

This does not mean, however, that a poet cannot modify a traditional story in any way, or cannot expand it with freshly invented episodes. Since the dramatic world is always conceived as a ‘hypothetical variation’ of the actual reality, even when the two worlds are brought into contact, the characters in a play are only the possible varieties of their real counterparts, who serve as a model or a point of departure for the poet.¹⁰¹ In fact, sometimes he has to make some modifications in order to preserve the aesthetic unity of the play. Ānandavardhana put great emphasis on the autonomy of the poet in fashioning his own world of poetry.¹⁰² He lists several means which can assist a poetic work in the suggestion of *rasas* and the like. One of these means is as follows.¹⁰³

itivṛttavaśāyātām kathañcid rasānanugūṇām sthitiṃ tyaktvā punar
utprekṣyāpy antarābhīṣṭarasocitakathonnayo vidheyah|

Having left out a situation he met in the context of a narrative, which is in some way not in harmony with the *rasa* [of the poem or play], [the poet] should further introduce a story, even if he has invented it, which is appropriate to the *rasa* he has in mind.

⁹⁷ *Nāṭyaśāstra* 18.10 (GOS, vol. II, p. 412).

⁹⁸ *Abhinavabhāratī ad loc.* (GOS, vol. II, p. 411): *prakhyāte bhāratādau yad vastu tad viṣayo 'sya . . . iti śrīśaṅkukaḥ|* ‘“Its subject is a story [which is found] in a well-known [source] such as the Mahābhārata”, says Śrīśaṅkukaḥ.’

⁹⁹ *Abhinavabhāratī*, *ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *Abhinavabhāratī*, *ibid.*: *cakravartino 'pi hi vatsarājasya kauśambīvyatirikte viṣaye kāryāntaropakṣepeṇa vinā yan nirantaram nirvarṇanam tad vairasyāya bhavati, tatra prasiddhikhaṇḍanena pratītivighātāt, kā kathā rasacarvaṇāyāḥ|*

¹⁰¹ Cf. ELAM 1997, p. 109.

¹⁰² Cf. *Dhvanyāloka* 3.42+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 250): *apāre kāvyasaṃsāre kavir ekaḥ prajāpatih| yathāsmāi rocate viśvam tathedaṃ parivartate||*

¹⁰³ *Dhvanyāloka* 3.11+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, pp. 142f.)

But, as Abhinavagupta points out, some stories require too drastic modifications to become fit for dramatic representation. First of all, if a poet presents a deity as the main character of his *nāṭaka*, he has two options to choose from. He can invest his divine hero with human emotions, such as longing for the beloved, fear, or astonishment, but then his hero would become nothing more than a human being. On the other hand, if he stuck to the divinity of his hero, the attribution of mental anguishes to a god would contradict our knowledge about the nature of divine beings. The poet's other option would be to present his hero as a real god, free from all the painful and interesting human emotions, but then the play would lack any variety and therefore it would lose its attraction for the spectators' heart. And since the gods never suffer, how could we learn from their stories the means of obviating our painful experiences?¹⁰⁴

Roughly the same train of thought can be applied to the presentation of contemporary figures in *nāṭakas*. Although Ānandavardhana encourages the poets to get rid of any motif which could hinder the aesthetic experience and to insert freely invented stories, since after all their task is to write *kāvya* and not *itihāsa*,¹⁰⁵ still the more recent events are described in a story, the more difficult it becomes to alter any incident without running up against the incredulous indignation of the audience. And if we cling to the bare facts, what's the point in writing poetry? Says Abhinavagupta:¹⁰⁶

*ata eva pratītivighātasya vairasyadāyinaḥ sambhavo yatra, tan nā-
ṭake nopanibaddhavyam| tena vartamānacaritaṃ cāvarṇanīyam eva,
tatra viparītaprasiddhibādhayādhyāropasyākiñcitkaratvāt|*

For this very reason, if with regard to [some story or other motif in a play] there is a possibility of contradicting common knowledge, which could cause the lack of aesthetic relish, that [sort of story, etc.] should not be written in a *nāṭaka*. Therefore the deeds of a contemporary character should definitely not be related, since in such a case the attribution [of invented qualities to the character] could not succeed because of the opposition of the contradictory common knowledge.

Certainly it would not be fair to accuse Jayanta of crude naturalism. His play is rather a curious *mélange* of the real and the fictional. One could call it a *Dokumentarspiel*¹⁰⁷ inasmuch as its plot is based on the events of the

¹⁰⁴ *Abhinavabhāratī ad Nāṭyaśāstra* 18.10 (GOS, vol. II, p. 412): *yadi tu mukhyatvena-
iva devacaritaṃ varṇyate, tat tāvad vipralambhakarūṇādbhutabhayānakarasocitaṃ cen ni-
badhyate, tan mānuṣacaritaṃ eva sampadyate, pratyuta devānām *ādhyādhānaṃ* (conj. :
adhyādhānaṃ ed.) *prasiddhivighātakam| tatra cokto doṣaḥ| vipralambhādyabhāve tu kā
tatra vicitratā, rañjanāyā etat*prāṇatvāt|* (conj. RAGHAVAN : °*pramāṇatvāt* ed.) *ata eva
hṛdayasaṃvādo 'pi devacarite durlabhaḥ| na ca teṣāṃ duḥkham asti, yatpratīkāropāye vy-
utpādanaṃ syāt|*

¹⁰⁵ *Dhvanyāloka* 3.11+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy p.144): *kavinā kāvyam upanibadh-
natā sarvātmanā rasaparatanreṇa bhavitavyam| tatretivṛtte yadi rasānanugūṇāṃ sthitiṃ
paśyēt tāṃ bhañktvāpi svatantratayā rasānugūṇaṃ kathāntaram utpādayet| na hi kaver
itivṛttamātranirvahaṇena kiñcit prayojanam, itihāsād eva tatsiddheḥ|*

¹⁰⁶ *Abhinavabhāratī ad Nāṭyaśāstra* 18.10 (GOS, vol. II, p. 413).

¹⁰⁷ WEZLER 1976, p. 340.

playwright's recent past: Śaṅkaravarman and Sugandhā were a real royal couple ruling in the last decades of the ninth century, most probably the king did ban the sect of the *nīlāmbaras*, and the concept of *sarvāgamaprāmāṇya* seems to have been an important issue of that period. But we can be sure that for instance the two Śaiva *sādhakas* in the cremation-ground, or the servant who dupes the Jaina monk, were invented by Jayanta on the basis of his experiences, or rather his prejudices. The same is true about the Buddhist monk, whose name Dharmottara echoes that of the famous Buddhist philosopher, or the hero of the play, the Mīmāṃsaka Śaṅkarṣaṇa, who might represent a portion of Jayanta's own character.

The elusiveness of the *Āgamadambara* could be very disturbing for an expert in *nāṭyaśāstra*. Should one classify it as a *nāṭaka*, with the king as its real hero? This solution is not very plausible, since the king, apart from being *vartamāna*, does not even appear on the stage, even if his interests stand clearly behind the course of events. Is it then a *prakaraṇa*? Not quite, since its story is not entirely invented, and even if Bharata allows the poet to derive the plot and the characters of his *prakaraṇa* from a text which was 'not handed down by the ancient sages' (*anārṣa*), provided that he endows the events and characters with new qualities,¹⁰⁸ this only means, in Abhinavagupta's interpretation, that the playwright may borrow the plot from such collections as the *Bṛhatkathā* (e.g. the story of Mūladeva), or from the works of some earlier poet (e.g. the deeds of Samudradatta). He certainly cannot pick up a story from just anywhere he pleases (*tatra yo 'nutpādyo 'ṛśo na kutrastho grāhyaḥ*), and I doubt that Abhinavagupta would have rejoiced in a *prakaraṇa* which had a contemporary setting.¹⁰⁹

On the other hand, a *prakaraṇa* is taught to be a play which presents the stories of Brahmins, merchants, ministers, priests, officials, and travelling tradesmen, and such stories should be 'of various kinds' (*naikavidham*), which in Abhinavagupta's interpretation means, 'connected with various *rasas*' (*anekarasayuktam*).¹¹⁰ And Jayanta does introduce such characters: the hero of the play is a 'twice-born', who becomes later the subordinate of *amātya* Jayanta; we witness the complaints of two Vedic priests in the prelude before the last act, and even a rich merchant, who sponsors a huge feast for the ascetics, gets an important role in the second act (although he does not actually enter the stage). But are there servants, rakes, and courtesans appearing in the play?¹¹¹ Well, one could possibly say yes. The *ceṭa* in the prelude of the second act

¹⁰⁸ *Nāṭyaśāstra* 18.46 (GOS, vol. II, p. 430): *yad anārṣam athāhāryam kāvyam prakaroty abhūtaguṇayuktam| utpannabījastu prakaraṇam iti tad api vijñeyam||*

¹⁰⁹ *Abhinavabhāratī ad loc.* (GOS, vol. II, pp. 429f): *yatra samutpādyam na bhavati tatra yo 'nutpādyo 'ṛśaḥ na kutrastho grāhya iti darśayitum āha 'yad anārṣam' ityādi| 'anārṣam' iti purāṇādivyatiriktabrhatkathādyupanibaddham mūladevacaritādi| 'āhāryam' iti pūrvakavikāvyaḍ vāharaṇīyam samudradattaceṣṭitādi| Cf. SRINIVASAN, p. 73, which contains Schmithausen's emendations proposed for the rest of the passage.*

¹¹⁰ Cf. *Nāṭyaśāstra* 18.48 (GOS, vol. II, p. 431): *vipraṇāksacivānām purohitānām amātya-sārthavāhānām| caritam yan naikavidham jñeyam tat prakaraṇam nāma||*, and Abhinavagupta's comm. *ad loc.*

¹¹¹ *Nāṭyaśāstra* 18.50 (GOS, *ibid.*): *dāsaviśaśreṣṭhiyutam veśastryupacārakāraṇopetam|*

does not require further comment. The decadent life of the Buddhist monks is pretty close to a *viṭa*'s, and both the maidservants and the Jain nun (and the *ceṭa* disguised as a Jain nun) are all for amorous entertainment. But can, for instance, the lengthy lecture of the Naiyāyika professor at the end of the play be fitted into a *prakaraṇa*, or indeed into any kind of play?

The Director simply calls the *Āgamaḍambara* 'an extraordinary / strange play' (*kimapi rūpakam*), without any further specification, and I think we should reconcile ourself to the fact that this play is truly *aśāstrīyam*. Still, no Sanskrit drama can oppose the classical tradition to such an extent as not to have a predominant aesthetic flavour, and the nature of this *rasa* is well worth examining.

3.6

Already Raghavan observed that the *Āgamaḍambara* can be fitted in the tradition of 'philosophical plays' in classical Indian literature, other examples of which include the *Śārīputraprakaraṇa* of Aśvaghōṣa, and the *Prabodhacandrodaya* of Kṛṣṇamiśra.¹¹² He also pointed out that the dominant *rasa* of these plays is *śānta*, the aesthetic relish of quietude.¹¹³ *Śānta* is a relatively new arrival in the system of *rasas*, and its very existence was the subject of serious debate among Indian aestheticians.¹¹⁴ Nevertheless if we examine two early definitions of *śāntarasa*, the interpolated passage in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*¹¹⁵ and the verses of Rudraṭa,¹¹⁶ we find that several of its characteristics are found in Jayanta's play. True knowledge is essential to attain final liberation from the world of eternal rebirth: the Mīmāṃsaka hero of the play is convinced that he possesses this knowledge, and he is ready to defend it against deluded heretics who are completely mistaken about the real nature of things. The quest for liberation

¹¹² *Āgamaḍambara* (ed. pr.), p. viii.

¹¹³ RAGHAVAN 1975, p. 40.

¹¹⁴ Cf. MASSON-PATWARDHAN 1969, *passim*. The verses dealing with *śāntarasa* are clearly interpolations in the text of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, and already Abhinavagupta mentioned that they could not be found in all manuscripts (Abhinavagupta's comm. on these verses (*Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, p. 333: *cirantanapustakeṣu 'sthāyibhāvān rasatvam upaneṣyāma' ity anantaram 'śānto nāma śamasthāyibhāvātmake' ityādi śāntalakṣaṇam paṭhyate*). Cf. SRINIVASAN, pp. 51ff.

¹¹⁵ *Nāṭyaśāstra* after 6.82 (GOS, vol. I, pp. 326ff): *atha śānto nāma śamasthāyibhāvātmake mokṣappravartakaḥ| sa tu tattvajñānavairāgyāśayaśuddhyādibhir vibhāvaiḥ samutpadyate| tasya yamanīyamādhyātmadhyānadhāraṇopāsanasarvabhūtadayālīngagrahaṇādibhir anubhāvair abhinayaḥ prayoktavyaḥ| vyabhicāriṇaś cāsya nirvedasmṛtidhṛti-sarvāśramaśaucastambharomāñcādayaḥ| atrāryāḥ ślokāś ca bhavanti—mokṣādhyātma*samutthas (v.l. °nimittas) tattvajñānārthahetusamyuktaḥ| *naiśreyasopadiṣṭaḥ (v.l. niśreyasasamyuktaḥ) śāntaraso nāma *sambhavati (v.l. vijñeyaḥ)|| buddhīndriya-karmendriya*samrodhādhyātmasamsthītopetaḥ (v.l. °nirodhato 'dhyātmasamjñitāś caiva)| sarvaprāñi*sukhahitaḥ (v.l. °hitaḥ khalu) śāntaraso nāma vijñeyaḥ|| na yatra duḥkham na sukham na dveṣo nāpi matsaraḥ| samaḥ sarveṣu bhūteṣu sa śāntaḥ prathito rasaḥ||*

¹¹⁶ *Kāvyaśālikāra* 15.15–16 (quoted in RAGHAVAN 1975, p. 48): *samyagjñānaprakṛtiḥ śānto vigatecchanāyako bhavati| samyagjñānam viṣaye tamaso rāgasya cāpagamāt|| janmajarāmarāṇādītrāso vairāgyavāsanā viṣaye| sukhaduḥkhayor anicchādveṣāv iti tatra jāyante||* Rudraṭa flourished between 825 and 850 according to KANE 1971, p. 155), and was probably Kashmirian.

is incompatible with plunging into mundane pleasures, so no wonder that our hero is deeply shocked and disgusted when he witnesses the depraved practices of the Buddhists and the *nīlāmbaras*, but praises the asceticism of the Jains and the *śaivas*. He also betrays great compassion when he lets the Jain teacher beat a retreat. The sole obstacle for him in realising complete dispassion is his ambitious nature, but his initial zeal will much abate towards the end of the play.

But already the *nāndī* and the *prastāvanā* indicate clearly the *rasa* of the play. The opening benediction invokes Brahman 'by which beginningless ignorance is gradually destroyed', and 'at the very start of whose "descent" to the level of consciousness desires for the enjoyment of other pleasing objects cease (*śāmyanti*)'. Then in comes the Director whose disillusion with his profession and life in general does not seem to be completely out of place if we consider that *nirveda* was held by many to be the permanent mental state behind *śāntarasa*.¹¹⁷ Abhinavagupta attributed this view to Ānandavardhana,¹¹⁸ who actually preferred to use the expression 'bliss of the destruction of desires', *tr̥ṣṇākṣayasukha*.¹¹⁹

As we have already seen, Ānandavardhana believed that Vyāsa had a double objective in view with the *Mahābhārata*: on the level of *śāstra* he wanted to direct our attention towards *mokṣa*, and on the level of poetry he intended to compose an epic with quietude as its predominant *rasa*, and he achieved his goal by evoking dispassion in the reader. This becomes clear from the rather pessimistic conclusion of the *Mahābhārata*, 'which produces sadness by the cruel end of the Vṛṣṇis and the Pāṇḍavas'.¹²⁰ The great Bhīṣma's admonishing words are part of this concept.¹²¹

*yathā yathā viparyeti lokatantram asāravat|
tathā tathā virāgo 'tra jāyate nātra saṃśayaḥ||*

As the unsubstantial course of worldly things goes gradually amiss, so does disaffection arise with it by degrees, there is no doubt about this.

But the predominance of *mokṣa* and *śāntarasa* has already been suggested in the Contents (*anukramaṇī*) of the epic, namely in the following sentence: 'And the eternal Blessed Vāsudeva is glorified here' (*bhagavān vāsudevaś ca kīrtyate 'tra sanātanaḥ*, *Mahābhārata* 1.1.193). Says Ānandavardhana:¹²²

*anena hy ayam artho vyaṅgyatvena vivakṣito, yad atra mahābhārate
pāṇḍavādicaritaṃ yat kīrtyate, tat sarvam avasānavirasam avidyā-
prapañcarūpaṃ ca| paramārthasatyasvarūpas tu bhagavān vāsudevo*

¹¹⁷Cf. *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, p. 327: *tattvajñānotthito nirveda [śāntasya sthāyī] iti kecit|*

¹¹⁸*Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 3.26, 4.5.

¹¹⁹*Dhvanyāloka* 3.26+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 182): *śāntaś ca tr̥ṣṇākṣayasukhasya yaḥ pariṣoṣas tallakṣaṇo rasaḥ pratīyata eva|*

¹²⁰*Dhvanyāloka* 4.5+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 274): *vṛṣṇīpāṇḍavavirasāvasānavaimanasya-dāyīnīm. . .*

¹²¹*Dhvanyāloka* *ibid.*, cf. *Mahābhārata* 12.168.4.

¹²²*Dhvanyāloka* 4.5+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 276).

'tra kīrtyate| tasmāt tasminn eva parameśvare bhagavati bhavata bhāvitacetaso, mā bhūta vibhūtiṣu niḥsārāsu rāgiṇo, guṇeṣu vā nayavinayaparākramādiṣv amīṣu kevaḷeṣu keṣucit sarvātmanā pratiniviṣṭadhīyaḥ| tathā cāgre paśyata niḥsāratām saṃsārasyeti| amum evārthātiśayam dyotayan sphuṭam evāvabhāsate vyañjakaśaktyanugrḥitāś caśabdah| evaṃvidham evārtham garbhīkṛtam sandarśayanto 'nantaraślokā lakṣyante 'sa hi satyam' ityādayaḥ|

For by this [sentence] the following meaning is intended as the suggested one: 'Here, in the *Mahābhārata*, the deeds of the Pāṇḍavas and others, which are sung, are all tragic in their conclusion and are essentially the manifold manifestation of ignorance. But [in fact] the Blessed Vāsudeva, whose true nature is the ultimate reality, is glorified here. Therefore concentrate your thoughts only on that blessed Greatest God, do not hanker after unsubstantial riches, and do not focus wholeheartedly just on these few good qualities such as righteous conduct, discipline, valour, and the like. And thus behold in what follows the insubstantiality of the world.' The word "and", which is endowed with the power of suggestion, shines forth clearly, illuminating the same superior sense. The immediately following verses, beginning with 'for he is reality', are seen to reveal the same meaning, which is hidden within them.

It is the same revelation about the shadowy nature of our reality which is the wellspring of the Director's highly unprofessional behaviour. He realised that 'being an actor is indeed an extremely wretched means of supporting one's family, in which one is continuously practicing a display of utterly false behaviour', and he is not consoled by the fact that 'all this multitude of creatures, from Brahmā down to the animals, roams about in worldly existence through Illusion alone'. His disillusion (*nirveda*), which has reached its apex when he was asked to stage an utterly worthless play, turns him towards the highest goal of man, and provides the play the keynote of *śāntarasa*.

Nevertheless there was a significant opposition against the acceptance of *śānta* as the ninth *rasa*, and even those who acquiesced in its existence had serious doubts about the possibilities of its presentation on the stage. The *Daśarūpaka* refers to 'some people' who list *śānta* among the other *rasas*, but Dhanañjaya hastens to add that 'it cannot thrive in plays'.¹²³ Dhanika in his commentary mentions the radical view of those who deny *in toto* the possibility of a quietistic *rasa*, 'since it is impossible to destroy desire and hatred which reached [our present age] in a beginningless continuity of time'. Others include it in the heroic, or the repulsive, or other *rasas*.¹²⁴ 'However that may be', says Dhanika, 'we do not accept at all that quietude (*śama*) could be the permanent sentiment in *nāṭakas* and other [kinds of drama] the soul of which is performance,

¹²³ *Daśarūpaka* 4.35: *śamam api kecit prāhuḥ puṣtir nāṭyeṣu naitasya||*

¹²⁴ *Avaloka ad loc.*, p.202: *anye tu vastutas tasyābhāvaṃ varṇayanti, anādīkālapravāhāyātarāgadveṣayor ucchettum aśakyatvāt| anye tu vīrabībhatsādāv antarbhāvaṃ varṇayanti|*

since it is not suitable for performance because it consists of the cessation of all activities.¹²⁵ Therefore the permanent sentiment of the *Nāgānanda* cannot be *śama*, especially because the hero is in love and becomes the king of the *vidhyādharas*, neither of which facts goes well with quietude. The permanent sentiment of this play is fortitude (*utsāha*), and its *rasa* is the compassionate kind of heroism (*dayāvīra*).¹²⁶

This kind of criticism was already familiar to Ānandavardhana, who spoke up for the presence of *śānta* even in the dramatic genre. According to him, even if its permanent sentiment, that is the pleasure of the cessation of all desires (*tr̥ṣṇākṣayasukha*) 'might not be part of everyone's experience, still it cannot be rejected as the special mental operation of exalted persons who are not like the other people'.¹²⁷ It is not right to include *śānta* in *vīra*, since heroism necessarily contains some egoism, which runs counter with quietude.¹²⁸ Abhinavagupta adds that its equation with repulsion is equally misleading, since *jugupsā* is only the transitory ancillary sentiment of *śānta*. He also observes that even if the culmination of *śānta* cannot be presented because of the absence of indicatory symptoms (*anubhāvas*), its earlier phases can, through such signs as self-control, religious observances, and even bearing the yoke of a kingdom.¹²⁹

But even Ānandavardhana's eloquent justification was not enough to dispel all doubts about the aesthetic relish of quietude. The author of the *Candrikā* commentary on the *Dhvanyāloka* remarked that '*śāntarasa* should not be employed as the leading [relish of a poetic work]'.¹³⁰ Even Abhinavagupta admitted the following:¹³¹

*śāntabībhatsarasau tu caramapumarthayogāt, tatra ca sarvasya nā-dhi*kāre 'pi (conj. : °kāro 'pi ed.) kasyacid apaścimajanmano 'dhi-kārān nātake yady api tatphalapradhānatayā prādhānyam avalambeyātām, tathāpi nāsau pracuraprayoga iti tayoh puruṣārthapravara-prāṇitayor api vīrādirasāntarādhyāvāpenāvasthāpanam|*

But although the *rasas* of quietude and repulsion, because they are appropriate to the ultimate goal of man [i.e. liberation], and since some extraordinary people of excellent birth *are* qualified [for *mokṣa*], even if not everyone is qualified for it, could become predominant in a *nāṭaka* inasmuch as that [i.e. liberation] is the principally

¹²⁵ *Avaloka*, ibid.: *yathā tathāstu, sarvathā nāṭakādāv abhinayātmani sthāyitvam asmābhiḥ śamasya neṣyate, tasya samastavyāpārpravilayarūpasyaḥ abhinayāyogāt|*

¹²⁶ *Avaloka*, ibid., p. 203: *yat tu kaiścīn nāgānandādaḥ śamasya sthāyitvam upavarṇitam, tan malayavatyanurāgeṇāprabandhapravṛttena, ante vidyādharacakravartitvaprāptē ca viruddham| (...) ato dayāvīrotsāhasya tatra sthāyitvam...*

¹²⁷ *Dhvanyāloka* 3.26+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 182): *yadi nāma sarvajanānubhavagocaratā tasya nāsti, naitāvatāsāv alokasāmānyamahānubhāvācittavṛttiviśeṣaḥ pratikṣeptum śakyah|*

¹²⁸ *Dhvanyāloka*, ibid.: *na ca vīre tasyāntarbhāvaḥ kartum yuktaḥ, tasyābhimānamayatvena vyavasthāpanāt, asya cāhaṅkāraprasāmaikarūpatayā sthiteḥ|*

¹²⁹ *Locana ad loc.*

¹³⁰ *Locana*, ibid. (Kashi ed., p. 394): *ādhikārikatvena tu śānto raso na nibaddhavya iti candrikākārah|*

¹³¹ *Abhinavabhāratī ad Nāṭyaśāstra* 18.110 (GOS, vol. II, p. 451); cf. J.C. WRIGHT, 'Vṛtti in the *Daśarūpakavidhānādhyāya* of the *Abhinavabhāratī*' in: BSOAS 26 (1963), pp. 92ff.

intended result, still this is not an extensive practice. Therefore even if these two [i.e. quietude and repulsion] are animated by the best of the human goals, still they are employed with other *rasas* such as heroism mixed into them.

Before expounding his own ideas, Abhinavagupta refers to several theories about the *sthāyibhāva* of *sāntarasa*. Among those who held the opinion that it was *nirveda*, some made reference to the *Nyāyasūtra*.¹³² Others, however, adopted the belief that any of the eight permanent mental states can be the *sthāyī* of *sānta*.¹³³

*anye manyante| ratyādaya evāṣṭau cittavṛttiviśeṣā uktāḥ| tata eva ka-
thitavibhāvaviviktaśrutādyalaukikavibhāvaviśeṣasaṃśrayāḥ vicitrā eva
tāvat| tataś ca tanmadhyād evānyatamo 'tra sthāyī| tatra anāhatā-
nandamayavātmaṇiṣayā ratir eva mokṣasādhanam iti, saiva śānte
sthāyīnīti| yathoktaṃ, 'yaś cātmaratir eva syād ātmatṛptaś ca māna-
vaḥ| ātmany eva ca santuṣṭaḥ tasya kāryaṃ na vidyate||' iti| evaṃ
samastaviśayam vaikṛtaṃ paśyataḥ, viśvaṃ ca śocyam vilokayataḥ,
sāṃsārikaṃ ca vṛttāntam apakāritvena paśyataḥ, sātīśayam asam-
mohapradhānaṃ vīryam āśritavataḥ, sarvasmād viśayasārthād bi-
bhayataḥ, sarvalokasprhaṇīyād api pramadāder jugupsamānasya, apūrva-
svātmātīśayalābhād vismayamānasya mokṣasiddhir iti, ratihāsādīnām
vismayāntānām anyatamasya sthāyitvaṃ nirūpaṇīyam|*

‘Others embrace the following view: “It is delight etc. which are taught as the eight particular kinds of mental operations. It is they that first of all become very diverse when they are connected with special, supra-mundane eliciting factors (*vibhāvas*) such as the study of Scripture, which are different from the [already] mentioned eliciting factors. And therefore any one among just these [eight *vibhāvas*] [can be] its [i.e. *sāntarasa*’s] permanent [mental basis] *sthāyī*. Of these, delight which has as its object one’s own self which is full of unimpaired bliss, is a means of attaining liberation, so it is indeed a permanent mental state of *sānta*. As it is taught, ‘That man has nothing left to accomplish whose delight is in his Self alone, who is contented in his Self, and who finds complete satisfaction in his Self.’ (*Bhagavadgītā* 3.17) Likewise, that person succeeds in attaining liberation who notices that everything is grotesque, who considers the whole world lamentable, who notices that worldly affairs are harmful, who resorts to great heroism which is based on true insight, who is afraid of all the multitude of sense-objects, who is disgusted by women and the like, even if the whole world lusts after them, and who is astonished when he obtains the unprecedented excellence of

¹³² *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, p. 329: *nanu mithyājñānamūlo viśayagandhas tattvajñānāt praśāmyatīti duḥkhajanmasūtreṇākṣapādapādair vadadbhir mithyājñānāpacayakāraṇaṃ tat-
tvajñānaṃ vairāgyasya doṣāpāyalakṣaṇasya kāraṇam uktam| nanu tataḥ kim? nanu
vairāgyaṃ nirvedaḥ|*

¹³³ *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), *ibid.* (I am following the reading of RAGHAVAN 1975, p. 109.)

his self. Therefore any one of [the eight permanent mental states] beginning with delight, laughter, etc. and ending with wonder, can be seen as the permanent [basis of *sānta*].’

This could also explain why the *Āgamaḍambara*, an allegedly *sāntarasa* play, resembles a kaleidoscope of various sentiments. The Mīmāṃsaka hero is fully self-confident in his knowledge, which entitles him to enlighten and humiliate those who stray in darkness. He truly admires himself, but he is also capable of appreciating other people’s values, such as asceticism. The *baṭu* calls him ‘supremely compassionate’ when he refrains from beating up the Jains with a stick. He mocks the hypocrite behaviour of the Buddhists, is utterly disgusted and shocked by the eccentric ritual of the *nīlāmbara* couples, and is even unwilling to enter into a debate with them because of the dangers of their impurity. So is Saṅkarṣaṇa a true *sāntarasa* hero? I cannot help hearing a tone of gentle irony in the way Jayanta presents the Mīmāṃsaka. Saṅkarṣaṇa is too much of an idealist, who believes that it is his sacred duty to turn back to the right track all who deviated from it, even in the service of worldly authorities that (mis)use his zeal for their own purposes. He is too self-conceited, therefore he has to fail and realise that his knowledge was not yet adequate.

If we glance over the *Dhvanyāloka*-passages about the role of *sāntarasa* in the *Mahābhārata*, it appears that although Ānandavardhana did distinguish the doctrinal and the poetic aspects of the epic, he also held that the emotions awakened by the narrative can assist the reader in attaining liberation:¹³⁴

pāṇḍavādicaritavarṇanasyāpi vairāgyajananaatātparyād vairāgyasya ca mokṣamūlatvān mokṣasya ca bhagavatprāptyupāyatvena mukhyatayā gītādiṣu pradarsītatvāt parabrahmaprāptyupāyatvam eva paramparayā

Even the description of the deeds of the Pāṇḍavas and other [heroes], since its aim is to produce disillusion, since disillusion is the basis of liberation, and since liberation had been shown in the *Gītā* and other [sacred texts] to be the most important means of attaining the Lord, [therefore even this description] is indirectly a means of attaining the highest Brahman.

But the first theoretician who explicitly stated that there is an intimate relation between Brahman-experience and aesthetic relish in general appears to have been Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, whose ideas are condensed by Abhinavagupta as follows:¹³⁵

bhāvite ca rase tasya bhogo yo ’nubhavasmarāṇapratipattibhyo vilakṣaṇa eva drutivistaravikāsātmā rajastamovaicitryānuviddhasattvamayānījacitsvabhāvanirvṛtīśrāntīlakṣaṇaḥ parabrahmāsvādasavidhaḥ

‘And after the *rasa* has been produced [through the operation of the words called “*bhāvakatva*, bringing into being”], its enjoyment [becomes possible], which very much differs from [ordinary] cognitions

¹³⁴ *Dhvanyāloka* 4.5+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 278).

¹³⁵ *Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 2.4 (ed. *Kāvya-mālā*, p. 83, ed. Kashi, p. 183).

[whether] direct experience or memory, whose nature is melting, intensity, and expansion,¹³⁶ which is characterised by the repose in the beatitude of the true form of one's consciousness which is full of purity (*sattva*) blended with the variety of energy (*rajas*) and darkness (*tamas*), and which is similar to the experience of the highest Brahman.

Mammaṭa also summarises the theory of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka:¹³⁷

kāvyē nāṭyē cābhidhāto dvitīyena vibhāvādisādhāraṇīkaraṇātmanā bhāvakatvavyāpāreṇa bhāvīyamānaḥ sthāyī sattvodrekaprakāśānandamayāsamvidviśrāntisatattvena bhogena bhujyate—iti bhāṭṭanāyakaḥ

'In poems and in plays the permanent sentiment is transformed [into *rasa*] by the operation of "bringing into being" which is essentially the generalisation of the eliciting factors and [the indicative symptoms and the temporary mental states] and which is different from [the word's operation called] denotation, [and then *rasa*] is enjoyed with enjoyment which is the same in its essence as the repose in [one's] consciousness which is full of bliss and radiance due to the abundance of purity (*sattva*)'—this is what Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says.

If we review the opening benediction of the *Āgamaḍambara*, it might appear less puzzling now in the light of Ānandavardhana's and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's ideas. The invocation of the Brahman at the beginning of a *śāntarasa*-play seems natural. The Brahman's 'descent' to the path of consciousness might signify the prelude to the highest kind of mystical experience which must entail the arising of disillusion (*virāga*, *nirveda*) and the gradual awakening to the knowledge of reality. That this experience also involves bliss might sound perhaps unusual from the mouth of a Naiyāyika,¹³⁸ but we might say that someone who proceeds on the path leading to final liberation will rejoice as this radiant reality dawns upon him. And one station along this path may well be a play with quietude as its predominant *rasa* which distracts the spectator from the everyday world and directs his attention towards higher truths.

The fictitious world of drama offers an excellent analogy with the illusory nature of the world we live in. The world we call 'actual' 'is nevertheless a possible world in itself—that is, a construct deriving from the conceptual and textual constraints on the spectator's understanding.'¹³⁹ The poet has an almost divine autonomy in fashioning his poetic world. 'In the boundless world

¹³⁶Ingalls (-Masson-Patwardhan) translate *vistara* as 'expansion', and *vikāsa* as 'radiance' (*Dhvanyāloka*(HOS), p. 222), GNOLI (1968, p. 108) as 'enlargement' and 'expansion', respectively. *vikāsa* might also have the sense of 'cheerfulness'. Raghavan notes (RAGHAVAN 1978, p. 426, note 1) that in the *Daśarūpaka* the mental state of *vikāsa* corresponds to the erotic and the comic *rasas*, while *vistara* to the heroic and the marvellous.

¹³⁷*Kāvyaṭṭakāśa*, vol. I, pp. 217ff.

¹³⁸Jayanta (together with the mainstream *naiyāyikas*) held that the liberated state of the soul is not a blissful state, since it is equally without suffering and pleasure (cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. II, pp. 436ff). Bhāsarvajña represents another view among the *naiyāyikas*, namely that the liberated soul *does* experience beatitude (cf. *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, pp. 594ff).

¹³⁹ELAM 1997, p. 108.

of poetry', says Ānandavardhana, 'the poet is the only Creator. This whole universe revolves as he pleases. If the poet is amorous, a world full of flavour arises in the poem. If the same [poet] is disenchanted, all that world is without flavour. In a poem a good poet freely makes insentient things behave as sentient and sentient beings as insentient, as he pleases.'¹⁴⁰ A comparable idea is expressed in the words of semiotic analysis as follows: 'It should not be thought that the "accessibility" of dramatic worlds renders them always and necessarily realistically mimetic. On the contrary, it is precisely the constant assumption that W_D [the dramatic world] is defined in relation to W_O [the actual world] as a hypothetical variation which allows any number of invented and even fantastic elements to be introduced into the drama without destroying the audience's ability to recognize what is going on.'¹⁴¹

The actor also participates in the creation of the dramatic universe: he infuses life into the characters invented by the playwright or, put differently, he dissembles his real identity. As the Director says in the *Āgamadambara*:¹⁴² 'Shame, for shame, being an actor is indeed an extremely wretched means of supporting one's family, in which one is continuously practicing a display of utterly false behaviour. Hara, Viṣṇu, Brahmā, a sage, a king, a brutish fool, a rake, a coward, a hero, a happy man, a sad one: taking all roles the actor plays, feeling no shame before the people—in reality he is [just] resorting to craft to fill his belly.' But his Assistant reminds him that he is no exception: 'Who among gods, humans or animals has ever escaped from deceit and then reached the supreme goal? All this multitude of creatures, from Brahmā down to the animals, roams about in worldly existence through Illusion alone. Is your lot any worse?' Creative illusion rules the whole world.

Theatre and acting are excellent allegories of the world that surrounds us and the activity of the Creator who puts on the masks of worldly phenomena. In fact, Bharata says in the very first verse of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*: 'I shall teach the science of dramaturgy which was related by Brahmā as an illustration (*udāhṛtam*).'¹⁴³ Now it is certainly possible to take the word *udāhṛtam* simply to mean 'announced', but Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka understood this sentence as an allusion to the allegorical nature of drama. This is how Abhinavagupta presents Nāyaka's ideas:¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ *Dhvanyāloka* 3.42+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 250): *apāre kāvyasamsāre kavir ekaḥ prajāpatiḥ| yathāsmāi rocate viśvaṃ tathedaṃ parivartate|| śṛṅgārī cet kaviḥ kāvyē jātaṃ rasamayam jagat| sa eva vītarāgaś cen nīrasaṃ sarvaṃ eva tat|| bhāvān acetanān api cetana- vac cetanān acetanavat| vyavahārayati yatheṣṭaṃ sukaviḥ kāvyē svatantratayā||* Abhinavagupta hastens to add in his commentary *ad loc.* that an 'amorous' poet is not an actual womaniser (*strīvyasani*), but someone who is filled with the aesthetic relish of the Erotic.

¹⁴¹ ELAM 1997, p. 107.

¹⁴² *Āgamadambara*, Prologue, ll. 6ff.

¹⁴³ *Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.1 (ed. GOS, vol. I, p. 1): *nāṭyaśāstraṃ pravakṣyāmi brahmaṇā yad udāhṛtam (v.l. udīritam)|*

¹⁴⁴ *Abhinavabhāratī ad loc.* (ed. GOS, vol. I, pp. 5f). It seems likely (as already T. R. Chintamani observed in 'Fragments of Bhaṭṭanāyaka', *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, vol. I, p. 268.) that Abhinavagupta does not actually quote Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, but just elaborates an interpretation of what was probably the introductory verse of the *Sahṛdayadarpaṇa*.

*bhaṭṭanāyakas tu 'brahmaṇā paramātmanā yad udāhṛtam, avidyāviracitanissārabhedagrahe yad udāharaṇīkṛtam nāṭyaṃ tad vakṣyāmi| yathā hi kalpanāmātrasāraṃ tata eva anavasthitaikarūpaṃ, kṣaṇena kalpanāśatasahasrasahaṃ, svapnādivilakṣaṇam api suṣṭhutarāṃ hṛdayagrahanidānam, atyaktasvāmbanabrahmakalpanaṭoparacitam rāmarāvaṇādiceṣṭitam asatyam kuto 'py adbhutavṛtṭyā bhāti, tathā bhāsamānam api *caramapumarthopāyatām (conj. ISAACSON : ca pumarthopāyatām ed.) eti, tathā tādr̥g eva viśvam idam asatyanāmarūpaprapaṅcātmakam atha ca śravaṇamananādivaśena paramapumarthaprāpakam, iti lokottaraparamapurūṣārthasūcanena śāntarasopakṣepo 'yam bhaviṣyati, 'svam svam nimittam ādāya śāntād utpadyate rasaḥ' iti| tad anena pāramārthikam prayojanam uktam|' iti vyākhyānam sahrdayadarpaṇe paryagrahīt| yad āha 'namas trailokyanirmāṇakavaye sambhave, yataḥ| pratikṣaṇam jagannāṭyaprayogarasiko janaḥ||' iti|*

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, however, embraced the following interpretation [of *Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.1] in his *Sahrdayadarpaṇa*: 'Drama, that was presented as an example by Brahmā, the Supreme Self, that is to say that was made into an example of the grasping of insubstantial multifariousness created by ignorance—that is what I shall teach. For just as the fictitious story of Rāma, Rāvaṇa, and other [characters], which is essentially just fancy and therefore does not have a single, established form, [but] is accompanied by a vast number of fancies in every moment, which [story], though different from dreams, is the cause of rapture, [when it is] performed by the actors who have not abandoned their own identity and who are similar to Brahmā, appears in an extraordinarily wonderful way; [and] even while appearing as such, it becomes a means of [attaining] the highest goal of man, in the same way this whole world is exactly like that [drama], inasmuch as it consists of the diversity of names and forms, and it also leads us to the highest goal of man through reading the scriptures, reflection, and [meditation]. Thus, through referring to the highest goal of man which transcends this world, this [verse] may be an allusion to the aesthetic relish of quietude, on the basis of the verse "resorting to its respective cause [each] *rasa* arises from *śānta*".¹⁴⁵ Therefore by this [verse] the ultimate object [of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*] has been declared.' [Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka embraced this interpretation] when / for he said, 'Obeisance to Śiva, the poet who composes the triad of the worlds, thanks to whom people relish the performance of the world-play at every instant'.

So illusion is not that harmful after all, at least if we know how to handle it. It

¹⁴⁵One of the interpolated verses on *śānta*, *Nāṭyaśāstra* 6. (ed. GOS, vol. I, p. 329). The edition actually reads '*svam svam nimittam āsādyā śāntād bhāvaḥ pravartate*', something which for Abhinavagupta, who was very particular about the precise differentiation of *rasa* and *bhāva*, would clearly not have suited.

would be a mistake to look upon the imaginary world of theatre as something real or actual, and when we watch the characters on the stage being engaged in wooing or lamenting, their identity as actors always lurks in the back of our awareness. And as the actor's emotions are not 'real' so our emotional responses are different from our everyday sentiments: we savour these sentiments in a pure form while the fictitious world of the play enraptures us. Moreover, precisely through this rapture we also learn a lot about the real, unobscured nature of our mental attitudes: our understanding is augmented.

One of the various terms used to describe aesthetic experience is *viśrānti*, reposeful awareness, that is the cognition of the fundamental emotions in their pure, universalised form, free from all obstacles.¹⁴⁶ This 'mental repose' entails a higher stage of concentration, and it is also a blissful state¹⁴⁷ akin to the beatitude of mystical experience. To regard *śānta* as the basis of all other *rasas* seems to have been a logical step.¹⁴⁸ As Gerow observed,¹⁴⁹ 'Since all the dramatic *rasas* aim at a state of mental repose (*viśrānti*), the reductionist "insight" that all the *rasas* are fundamentally *śānti* is neither very daring nor very unexpected, particularly in the spiritual-devotional climate in which Abhinavagupta lived. *Śānta* was a *rasa* whose time had come—which, if it did not exist, would have had to be invented.' In Abhinavagupta's view the relishing of *śāntarasa* is a more conscious kind of aesthetic experience, since in it any emotion can be savoured in its universalised *rasa*-form as a temporary hue on the surface of the uniquely permanent Self.¹⁵⁰ This kind of aesthetic rapture can teach us the most about the true nature of any experience. But even if we regard *śānta* as essentially the artistic representation of disenchantment born from the realisation of the illusory nature of existence, it can still be regarded as occupying the highest rank among all *rasas* since it directs our attention towards liberation, the supreme goal of man.

The characters and their transactions we see on the stage are merely the products of the poet's and the actors' creative skills; still we are both delighted and taught by the play. According to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta, the same is true about the world outside the theatre. God likes to play. He disguises his real identity with a multitude of appearances, but we can cast a glance behind all these masks with the help of His scriptures and practising meditation. And when we have recognised the illusory nature of all worldly phenomena we still have the choice of being entertained by this illusion, as if watching an amusing performance.

The *Āgamaḍambara* begins with the complaints of an artist, who is fed up

¹⁴⁶ *Abhinavabhāratī ad rasasūtra* (ed. GOS, vol. I, p. 274): *tathā hi loke sakalaviḡnavinirmuktā saṃvittir eva camatkāranirveśarasanāsvādanabhogasamāpattilayaviśrāntyādiśabdair abhidhīyate*

¹⁴⁷ *Abhinavabhāratī* ibid. (ed. GOS, vol. I, p. 276): *aviśrāntirūpataiva duḡkham| tata eva kāpilair duḡkhasya cāñcalyam eva prānatvenoktaṃ rajovṛttitāṃ vadabhir ity ānandarūpatā sarvarasānām*

¹⁴⁸ *Abhinavabhāratī* on *śāntarasa* (ed. GOS, vol. I, p. 333): *tatra sarvarasānām śāntaprāya evāsvādaḡ, viśayebhyo viparivṛtṭyā*

¹⁴⁹ GEROW-AKLUJKAR, p. 81, note 6.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, p. 330.

with deceiving people. He wants Truth instead of Delusion, and he hopes to find it among the teachings of philosophies. But what happens if the venerable masters of various doctrines turn out to be more interested in making a good living than in Truth and Reality? What if being a monk or a Vedic priest is just an occupation, a job like being an actor? Or even if we suppose that the followers of these doctrines are not just cynical opportunists but they really believe in what they teach, what guarantees that all these religions are not just roles in the gigantic play of the Lord? Says Kṣemarāja, ‘The positions, i.e. the tenets of all doctrines beginning with [that of] the materialists, are the adopted roles of that Self like [those] of an actor, which it takes on at pleasure.’¹⁵¹ One possible attitude is to say that God fools the followers of all the *other* religions to a higher or lesser degree, but the world-view that *I* follow allows me to understand His real nature. Or one might arrive at an extremely liberal position and say that God takes on various roles to propound various teachings, and he does so not just for fun but out of compassion towards us, miserable creatures with limited capacities. So in fact all scriptures derive from God, each of them being adjusted to our particular needs and talents.

This latter view seems to be triumphant at the end of the *Āgamaḍambara*, but not with the active participation of the Mīmāṃsaka protagonist. He could not resolve the tension between his religion as a devotee of Viṣṇu and his duty to protect the Veda as a Mīmāṃsaka.¹⁵² Or rather, there was one solution for him: devotion to God and asking for his illuminating favour.¹⁵³ He visits the nearby Raṇasvāmī-temple where he sings praises to the Lord who ‘shows the right path to liberation’ (*vyañjate mokṣasanmārgam*). Unfortunately the manuscripts of the play are fragmentary at this place, but from the auspicious omen of the sound of a conch-shell we may safely infer that Viṣṇu dispelled the doubts of his devotee, as a result of which he was able to rejoice in the ultraliberal lecture delivered by the great Naiyāyika scholar.

At the beginning of the play we saw that art could not make the Director, a determined and uncompromising seeker after Truth, entirely happy. Learned scrutiny of the true nature of things may have given satisfaction to the *snātaka*, especially when he defeated his opponents, but ultimately it could not give him serenity and peace of mind. That direct experience of the Lord’s grace is superior to both aesthetic rapture and philosophical investigation was expressed by Ānandavardhana in the following beautiful verse:¹⁵⁴

*yā vyāpāravatī rasān rasayitum kācit kavīnām navā
dṛṣṭir yā pariniṣṭhitārthaviṣayonmeṣā ca vaipaściti*

¹⁵¹ *Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam* 8+ (ed. p.16): *sarveṣāṃ cārvākādidarśanānām sthitayaḥ siddhāntās tasyaitasyātmano naṭasyeva *svecchayā gṛhītāḥ* (em. SANDERSON : *svecchāvagrṛhītāḥ* ed.) *kṛtrimā bhūmikāḥ*

¹⁵² *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Four, verse 5: *ye viśvasthitisargasamḥṛtīdāsāparyāyasampādana-kṛdāsaktamater mataṃ bhagavato nārāyaṇasyāśritāḥ* | *taddrṣṭeḥ katham anyathātvam anayā brūmo vayaṃ jihvayā śakṣyāmaḥ kṛtinām trayīmayadhiyām sthātum katham vāgrataḥ* |

¹⁵³ *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Four, verse 7: *pathi vedavirodhadāruṇe nipuṇenāpi na śakyanirṇaye* | *kim ahaṃ karavāṇi hanta me śaraṇam śārṅgarathāṅgaśaṅkhabhṛt* |

¹⁵⁴ *Dhvanyāloka* 3.43+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 256.)

*te dve apy avalambya viśvam aniśaṃ nirvarṇayanto vayaṃ
śrāntā naiva ca labdham abdhīśayana tvadbhaktitulyaṃ sukham||*

That which is the extraordinary, fresh vision of poets, active in making the *rasas* tasteful, and that which is the [vision] of the wise, opening upon thoroughly ascertained things as its object: resorting to both, while I was ceaselessly observing the world, I became tired and I could not find bliss equal to devotion to you, O God resting on the sea.

Chapter 4

Sources

4.1 The Manuscripts of the Āgamaḍambara

Pā Pāṭan, Hemacandrācārya Jaina Jñānamandira MS 17472. Paper, Jaina Nāgarī. 18 folios of unknown dimensions (only a photocopy was at my disposal) with 16 lines to a side and approximately 53 *akṣaras* per line. Foliation is at the bottom right-hand corner of the rectos. Each page has a blank space in the centre and two double marginal lines on both sides. Undated.

Pu Pune, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, MS 437 of 1892–95. Paper, Jaina Nāgarī. 37 folios of unknown dimensions (only a photocopy was at my disposal) with 9 lines to a side and about 45 *akṣaras* per line. The title of the text appears as *ṣaṭmatanāṭaka* at the top left-hand corner of f. 1^v, and as *ṣa° ma° nā°* at the same place on the following folios. The act number is indicated as *aṅka 1* at the top right-hand corner of fols. 1^v and 2^v, and as *aṅka 2* on f. 16^v. There is foliation both at the bottom of the right-hand and at the top of the left-hand margin of the versos. Undated.

The two manuscripts have several common characteristics: *anusvāra* is used throughout in place of the homorganic nasal, the signs for *ca* and *va* are often hardly distinguishable, and *v* is frequently written in the place of *b* (especially in MS Pā). Both contain a few *propria manu* marginal corrections, insertion points are tagged with *kākapādas*, and *lacunae* are marked with raised dashes. Both manuscripts are written in a kind of Jaina Devanāgarī, but while Pā consistently uses *prṣṭhamātrās*, in Pu *e*, *ai*, *o*, and *au* appear mostly as top-strokes.

Both manuscripts show similarities with other Jaina Nāgarī manuscripts dated to the 15th century, e.g. MS A (dated VS 1541) and MS P (dated VS 1521) of the *Paūmacariu*, the Pāṭan MS (dated VS 1484) of the *Vijñaptilekhasaṃgraha*, and MS P of the *Kuvalayamālā* (undated, “but according to expert opinion [...] may be assigned to the 15th century A.D.”, p. 2).

Since Pā and Pu share the same *lacunae* in Acts Two and Four as well as

several errors, they plainly appear to be closely related. A relatively long passage in the Prologue (ll. 26f.: °*mārthe paryavasitaḥ? sarva evāyaṃ brahmādis tiryakparyanto jantugrāmaḥ saṃsāre māyayaiva parivartate| bhavataḥ kim adhi-kaṃ jātam?*) which is omitted by Pu alone makes it clear that Pā could not copy from Pu. On the other hand, while Pā often has the correct reading where Pu's reading is erroneous, there are a few instances where the situation is the opposite, e.g. Act One: l. 264: *sarvaṃ* omitted by Pā (haplography); l. 130: *ihāṃtar* Pu, *ihāṃbhar* Pā; l. 275: *apavarga°* Pu, *avarga°* Pā; Act Two: l. 184: *himsā nāsatyam* Pu, *himsā nāmasatyam* Pā; l. 271: *kvedaṃ* Pu, *kṣedaṃ* Pā; l. 290: *kiṃcid* Pu, *kiṃci* Pā; l. 302: *bhos tapo°* Pu, *bhos tvapo°* (?) Pā; Act Three: l. 219: *kāsmākam ākulatā* Pu, *kāsmākarmakulatā* Pā; l. 429: *evopalabhyate* Pu, *evopalabhyate* Pā; l. 530: *samayaḥ* Pu, *sasamayaḥ* Pā; l. 532: *eva tathā* Pu, *etathā* Pā; Act Four: l. 35: *bruvāṇās* Pu, *dhruvāṇās* Pā; l. 41: °*mātram* Pu, °*māvam* Pā; l. 105: *saharṣam* Pu, *rāhurṣam* Pā; l. 414: *na jana°* Pu, *jana°* Pā.

While it is not impossible that Pu copied from Pā and occasionally corrected its readings, it might be slightly more probable that both Pā and Pu derive (possibly independently) from the same manuscript. The fact that the title *Ṣaṇmatanāṭaka* figures on f. 1^v of Pu but is nowhere found in Pā perhaps also corroborates the above conclusion (though this title might actually have been invented by Pu's scribe). Furthermore in Act Two l. 166, while Pā clearly reads *jhāijjadi*, Pu indicates a *lacuna* and reads °*ijjadi*.

Written by a Kashmirian author, the *Āgamaḍambara* must have had Śāradā manuscripts. In fact some errors in the existing manuscripts point to a Śāradā archetype, e.g. confusing *śu* and *ā* in Act Three, l. 32.

4.1.1 The interpretation of some unusual *akṣaras*

⌘ A very similar letter appears in BÜHLER 1896, Table V. 'Nördliche Alphabete von ca. 800–1200 p. Chr.', XX (Jayaccandra 1175 p. Chr.) / 45, and also in Table VI. 'Alphabete aus nördlichen Handschriften', XVI (Deccan College 1880/1, Ms. no. 57, 1081 p. Chr.) / 49; in both cases it is interpreted as *jya*. The same letter in MS P (BORI No. 154 of 1881-82) of the *Kuvalayamālā* is read as *jja*, and the editors have the following remark about the scribe: "His *jja* looks like *dya* and is read by some as *jya*."¹ In the manuscripts of the *Āgamaḍambara* this *akṣara* occurs only in Prakrit words, and only once in MS Pu (Act One, l. 13: *ajja°* is written with this letter in both manuscripts). In Sanskrit words both Pā and Pu use the usual Devanāgarī form of *jya* and *jja* (e.g. Prologue, l. 55: *niyuḍyantām*; Act One, l. 347: *salajjam*; Act Three, l. 229: *sāmrāḍjya°*).

When we find this *dy*-like letter in MS Pā,
— in the majority of the cases Pu has the more or less ordinary Devanāgarī ligature *jj*: Act One, l. 72: °*sijjamte*; Act Two, l. 36: *ajjo*, l. 161: *pajjalīyam*, l. 166: *jhāijjadi*, *khavijjai*, l. 212: *kajjavelā*, l. 308: *caccijjamta*, l. 344: *pijjai*, l. 345: *bhumḍijjai*, *pāvijjai*, l. 346: *sosijjai*, *lamghijjai*, l. 348: *parisosijjai*;

¹ *Kuvalayamālā*, p. 2.

— but sometimes Pu writes the standard Devanāgarī *akṣara jy*: Act One, l. 172: *ujyānesu*; Act Two, l. 7: *pijadi*, l. 8: *ajya*, l. 65: °*ubbhijya*°, l. 105: *ajya*.

Finally there are instances when both Pā and Pu write the Devanāgarī ligature *jj* in Prakrit words: Act One, l. 41: *vajjadi*; Act Two, l. 7: *khajjadi*, l. 8: *kajjalaā*, l. 43: *nijjine*, l. 56: *lajjā*°, l. 85: *ajja*, l. 267: *ajja*, l. 281: *ajja*, l. 308: °*lakkhijjamta*°, l. 312: *ajja*, l. 356: *avijjā*°; Act Three, l. 57: *pajjalide*, l. 71: *laškiijamti*, l. 82: *ajja*°, l. 106: °*bhavijjamto*; Act Four, l. 134: *ajja*.

This *dy*-like sign is used in MS Pā as an equivalent of Sanskrit *dy* in Śaurasenī (*gy* in MS Pu) and Māgadhī (*gy* and *jj* in MS Pu), of Sanskrit *ry* in Śaurasenī (MS Pu has the same sign) and Māgadhī (*jj* in MS Pu), of Sanskrit *rv* in Mahārāṣṭrī (*jj* in MS Pu), and in passive forms with °*ijja*° in Śaurasenī, Mahārāṣṭrī, Apabhramśa (*jj* in MS Pu in these languages), and Māgadhī (*gy* in MS Pu).

We can also observe that when MS Pā writes this *dy*-like sign in Prakrit words other than Māgadhī, MS Pu has *jj*, except in Act One, l. 173 *ujyānesu*,² and in Act One, l. 13, where *ajja*° is written with the same *dya*-like sign in both manuscripts. In Māgadhī words, we find either *jj* or *gy* in MS Pu in places where MS Pā has this *dy*-like letter.

In transcribing this *dy*-like *akṣara* I have followed the readings of MS Pu, and indicated its occurrence in the manuscripts with an asterisk in the apparatus.

This *akṣara* occurs in both manuscripts. A very similar letter in BÜHLER 1896, Table VI. ‘Alphabete aus nördlichen Handschriften’, XVI (Deccan College 1880/1, Ms. no. 57, 1081 p. Chr.) / 23, is interpreted as *jjha*. In the *Āgamaḍambara* it appears once in a Sanskrit word: Act Two, l. 365: °*ojjhita*°, which makes it probable that it should be read as *jjha* in the Prakrit passages as well. Cf. Act Four, l. 134, where Pā writes °*majjhe* with this *gy*-like letter, while Pu uses the approximately standard-looking Devanāgarī ligature *jjh*. In some cases it is very difficult to distinguish this sign from the ligatures *bbh* and *st*.

This sign also occurs in both manuscripts. It looks like a Devanāgarī *ṣka* ligature, and in fact we find it in the Sanskrit word *āyuṣkāmaṃ* (Act Four, verse 48). It appears very frequently in Māgadhī words as the equivalent of Sanskrit *kṣa* (e.g. *luṣke* = Skt. *vṛkṣe*, Act Three, l. 12).

²Cf. VON HINÜBER, §249: “In der Kompositionsfuge unterbleibt die Palatalisation [...] wegen der Funktionsstärke des anlautenden *y*- [...]; Skt. *udyāna* > Aśoka, P[āli] *uyyāna* [...], Ś[aurasenī] (BHĀSA) *uyyāṇa* [...].”

एषा तद्वद्वत्तु विज्ञय दनाद्य विद्याद्याततोऽपुनरुदमं दनवानिन्दमंशं विद्या हतेराणां सुभव एवयजशाभ्यां तिकात विषयं तस्मि
 गंवांताभ नादोत सुस्वभरं आदभ आदनामटवे नाम जस्यभका प्रिततत सुस्तुत कपटया पाण्डेव उडं वपर एण पाण्डेव सा वि
 सुखस्वास्वनि र्वनिपया मरप सुवी ट्यानीस्तरा प्रसुदितम तिद्विभित्तति सुशस्वर्वाकारा विहर तिजाना निम्रपतया तादा व सुखिया
 इतरपरराण सिन्याराणः तद्वर भिमं ज्जिन्वा मन्वा फलमल्लुक्तवा मर्तत्राणकर सुपसं ह्यत्र क्वदविदात्राम किमपि पुनरुत्तन्न सुपासीनस
 क्लृप्तुः एवापर मंपर मं प्ररुयाथ्य भिनिगो उं य ति। शो विद्यश्या ताद्वृ मं कृपाण कं कृपाण उं कृत्तर मययि त्वागम्य ता म् उं य ता व
 त्ना क्य स व उं उं सुपुता व दाशरीं विज्ञा म्या प्रविष्याम्य
 दृश्यातोऽपुष्ठा म्या नो उ प सुष्ठा ता व किं उदं विषय म व द न
 य ति श उं य तं प व तो पा रि। अ न म स्था न नि नी र्वा द नो
 य र्य व सि त म् स व र्ण व र्णो उं स्था दि स्त्रि र्य का रं ता जं म्
 इं उं म न स्य वि च स्य ज्जा ता य था उ व ला रा न स शाय सि या स्मा कं त वि श्या तं सु स्व म् मारि षा य था द न ग वाना किं च य मो हा या श्र शं क्य
 नि वी हा उ म् मा की ना छा व ला रः। पारि। सा व क थ मि वी म् ज म् मारि षा य था द न ग वाना किं च य मो हा या श्र शं क्य
 चा न म व त भ शो चा व ए व ला कर ण वि व र ए क र णा कृ ति का र उ ति प्र शि ता प र ना म्ना उ द्वा र्य त स्य शि ष्या परि ष दा द मा हा। प्र य था स्म उ
 राः कृ ति र सि न व मा ग म डं व र्ण ना म कि म पि रू प क प्र या त्वा त मि ता त दि ट म लो कि क म ज्जा उ य म प्र सु क्त र्व वै र्य प्र उं ज म् हा त द
 श्याः चै डी वि ति का या ज प रू पा म व प्र य म् पा रि ना व म वं अ न त त्र म ए य शा स नाः र व च्च त्त र वे ता ह त्ति का र म् य वि श्रा य तु न र चा
 स्त्री य मि ति चो कः स त्त त्त कः प्र या उ र प र्थः का र्थं का र ति य क वि र रे ता प द श सु खं घा त स्य च त था प्र श र्य ति शि ष्याः समा ज्जि क स व
 त ए व त वा न्य दु र्भ म् य सु छि त य रि व दि ष्य ति किं ज्जा ना न्वा सु च्च म् कृ तं व ना प वा द नो प रि ता। किं रा ज प्र य मा श का सा सु च्चा सा स्मि तं त द

शय्य
म ३

Figure 4.1: MS Pā, folio 1^v

षट्सतनाट ॥ एषा तद्व्यवः क्रमविनयदनाद्यविद्युद्योतस्फुरदमेदनानितदम। सोऽथित्यगद्वैतशोभुसवयवत्राश्रुति
 क्ततविषयोत्तरनोपायोः। ताद्यतेसुश्रुतः। कोपिम तताद्यस्मत्त रकपटव्यापारडशकु
 दुवसरणोपायः। हरोविद्युर्बेह्यामुतिरवनिणः। पापरपश्रुतिं तोनीमः। सूरः। सुदित मतिदुः। खितइति। स्युज्ञानसर्वकारा
 नविहरतिजनोनिस्वयतयानालवतुचि। ताजस्रभरणोऽित्यज्ञाणः। तद्वरमिमं कुशिल्यमव्यफजमजयुक्तेनामति।
 अणकरमुपसें। इत्यकदादिदाश्रमेकिमपिपुमकुलमुपासीतः। सकलदुः। रतोपरमं परमं पुरुषार्थमनिगुंयतिष्य।।
 विमृश्यातद्वैतमकृपणकं कषाणश्रयंकु दृष्टसरमपेधिज्ञाणायताम्। अथतोवजोकासवतु अमुष्यतापदाश्रयिद्वि १
 सोऽथविद्युः। पारिणश्रुक्ः। सुश्रुतः। अथलोकाकिमयमथनिर्वेदपरिह्यानवदनद्वदृश्यते। पृच्छाम्येनोः। उपसृव्य
 सादिकं रुदं विषणवदनमास्यते। ननुक्षयनविनियुक्तोसिद्धि कारिभ्योः। सूत्र। प्रवीं कंशतिष्युत्तयं तपदति। एषिभिः।
 जमशुनोनिर्वेदेनकोनुषुलुदेयेपुमवुषेपुतिर्ये कुवाकण्टयणीपुनीयं परमाद्यविद्वद्यमानस्य वि श्रुतजगतोयथा २

Figure 4.2: MS Pu, folio 1^v

4.2 The *editio princeps*

The *Āgamadambara* was first edited by V. Raghavan and A. Thakur, two eminent Sanskrit scholars, in 1964, and was published as ‘Ancient text No. 7’ in the Mithila Institute Series. The edition was based on the same manuscript material (MSS Pā and Pu) that was available for myself. The book also contains an Introduction in which Raghavan discusses the life and works of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, the peculiar style of the play, its plot and characters, the various philosophical schools presented in the play, and its relation with the *Nyāyamañjarī*.

As Raghavan and Thakur point out in the Preface,³ ‘The nature of the manuscript materials at the disposal of the editors did not allow them to prepare a faultless text. Especially the Prākṛt portions were very defective and even after corrections and emendations they could not be made quite satisfactory. Dr. P. L. Vaidya, Dr. H. L. Jain and Dr. A. N. Upadhye very kindly read the Prākṛt passages and suggested many important emendations especially in the prākṛt [sic] dialogues and the Apabhraṃsa [sic] song of the Nīlāambaras towards the end of Act II.’ Despite these difficulties the editors succeeded in repairing the text in many cases, often suggesting plausible emendations both in the Sanskrit and the Prakrit portions. Their apparatus draws attention to parallel passages from the *Nyāyamañjarī* and other philosophical texts, and the various appendices (*ślokasūcī*, *upayuktāni vṛttāni*, *grathāntarasamvādaḥ*, *viśiṣṭaśabdasūcī*, *prākṛtasandarbhacchāyā*, *śuddhipatram*) also prove to be useful. On the whole we can say that the Sanskritists of today may consider themselves fortunate that the first edition of such a difficult text on the basis of such meager manuscript material was prepared by two most erudite scholars.

Nevertheless the *editio princeps* has its own shortcomings. Its careful collation with the manuscripts shows that the editors often resorted to silent emendations or conjectures (marked as “RT (em.?)” in the apparatus). In the Prakrit passages we can frequently observe an inclination on the part of the editors towards “normalising” the text on the basis of Prakrit grammars, while in other cases they leave “anomalous” Prakrit words unchanged. On the other hand it seemed to be possible to improve upon the text of the *Āgamadambara* with the help of further emendations, as the apparatus of my edition will hopefully demonstrate. There still remain a few passages where I could not make any useful amendments to the text of the first edition and had to employ crux marks to indicate my puzzlement. I am confident, however, that competent Sanskritists and Prakritists will suggest plausible solutions for these corrupt readings.

³ *Āgamadambara* (ed. pr.), pp. (2)–(3).

Chapter 5

A note on the edition and the translation

5.1 Conventions

The apparatus is fully positive. In the bottom register each entry consists of a lemma, followed by a lemma sign (|), followed by the sigla of the manuscript(s) (Pā, Pu) and / or the *editio princeps* (RT) that read the accepted text, followed by the variant readings separated by commas. In case neither the reading of the manuscripts nor the emendation of the *editores principes* are considered to be satisfactory, the lemma sign is followed by *em.* (i.e. “emendation”, indicating small repairs in the text) or *conj.* (marking bolder conjectures). The difference is of course subjective. The emendations and conjectures of others that I have accepted are attributed, as well as the emendations of the first editors (“*em. RT*”, or “*RT em.?*” when the emendation is silent). Other signs employed in the register of variants: A^{ac} = the reading of A before correction (*ante correctionem*), A^{pc} = the reading of A after correction (*post correctionem*); [[*xy*]] = *xy* written in the manuscript and then canceled ([[]]) = the effaced *akṣara* is not legible); ⊐ = gap in the manuscript or in the *editio princeps*; - - = *lacuna* in the manuscript (marked with the same signs in the main text of the edition; in the translation *lacunae* are marked as <...>); †*xy*† = *xy* is not interpretable for me, probably corrupt (marked with the same signs in the *textus receptus*); <*xy*> = *xy* is omitted in the manuscripts, and has been added as a conjecture (marked with the same signs in the main text).

The middle register of the apparatus (when there are three registers on a page, otherwise the one above the bottom register of variants) records *testimonia* and parallels, mainly from the *Nyāyamañjarī*, and only occasionally from other texts (quotations of parallel passages from other Sanskrit works will be found in the Notes to the translation). The topmost register contains the Sanskrit *chāyā* of the Prakrit sentences if there are any on the page.

5.2 Sandhi, punctuation, orthography

Sandhi has been normalised in the Sanskrit passages of the play. All punctuation is mine and I have not reported when I deviated from the manuscripts in this respect. In several cases I have silently changed the *anusvāras* of the manuscripts to homorganic nasals. Another feature of the manuscripts not reflected in the apparatus is the confusion of *b* and *v*.

5.3 The Prakrit passages

The *Āgamaḍambara*, just as the majority of classical Indian dramas, is multi-lingual. Śaurasenī is spoken by the Boy, the Disciple in the first act, the Jain Mendicant, the Nun, and the Ascetic in the second. One of the most remarkable features of Jayanta's play is the length of the Māgadhī passages: the words of the Servant in the second act, and the dialogue of the two Adepts in the third. The *nīlāmbara* couples sing in Apabhraṃśa, and a few verses of the play (e.g. verse 4 in Act Two) are written in Māhārāṣṭrī.

Editing the literary and artificial Prakrits of the dramas has many pitfalls. As Steiner pointed out,¹

The problem which an editor faces when dealing with the different Prakrits of a play is that, in contrast to Sanskrit, he is usually confronted with a relatively poor Prakrit textual tradition of less strictly normed languages. Moreover, our knowledge of Prakrit is far below the level attained in Sanskrit. With that the question is open whether, and to what degree, the playwrights actually followed the general rules of Prakrit, or, to what extent the original Prakrit of the plays had already been standardized.

Two extreme positions have been taken in this matter: Pischel and Hillebrandt were of the opinion that the texts should be normalised on the basis of the rules laid down by the Prakrit grammarians, even if this means going against the manuscripts, while Hertel and more recently Salomon expressed the view that the readings of the manuscripts are of greater importance than the grammars.² 'In order to be able to write a literary Prakrit different from colloquial language', writes Steiner, 'the playwrights themselves needed a Prakrit grammar which furnished them at least with the general rules.'³ The editor, however, has to face the fact that the available Prakrit grammars on Śaurasenī and Māgadhī often contradict each other. What would be the preferred course of action when, for instance, in Māgadhī Sanskrit *kṣ* is supposed to become *sk* according to Vararuci (11.8), *hk* according to Hemacandra (4.296), *śk* according to Rāmaśarman (2.2.15) and Puruṣottama (12.6), while in the manuscripts

¹STEINER 2001, p. 63.

²Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 63f.

³*Ibid.*, p. 67.

of the *Āgamaḍambara* we find either *šk* or *kkh* (the latter being the Śaurasenī equivalent of *ks*)?⁴ Gawroński's following observation seems to be appropriate:⁵

Die Frage also, ob alle Regeln der Grammatiker gegen die Handschriften durchzuführen sind, ist entschieden zu verneinen. Die Grammatiker bilden eine wichtige Quelle unserer Kenntnisse, aber sie stehen nicht über, sondern neben den Handschriften. Sie müssen immer zur Vergleich herangezogen werden, dürfen aber nie als das a priori richtige enthaltend angesehen werden. Und wenn die Regeln der Grammatiker mit unseren, aus den Handschriften deduzierten Regeln nicht übereinstimmen, wohl aber durch ihre Ungenauigkeit Zeugnis davon ablegen, daß die Praxis der MSS. schon zur Zeit jener mittelalterlichen Grammatiker ebenso inkonsequent war, wie sie heute ist, dann müssen wir unbedingt unseren Regeln eben in dem Grade Vorzug geben, wie man einem kritischen Verfahren vor einem kritiklosen Vorzug gibt.

On the other hand, as Steiner rightly points out, the assumption that 'each poet did in fact write (or dictate) Prakrit in an entirely precise and consistent manner is a problematic one. Was there ever a completely regular Prakrit and, especially, a consistent orthography? Is it not imaginable that the Prakrit speaking persons of a drama occasionally used different grammatical or phonetic forms of one and the same word?'⁶ Thus both *appā* and *attā* are used in the Śaurasenī and Māgadhī passages of Jayanta's play, and *pace* Pischel who gives *attā* as the correct form in these dialects,⁷ it is not inconceivable that the playwright did not bind himself to either of them.⁸ Finally one should also take into account the possibility that 'certain forms used by poets in individual cases could in fact be traced back to the grammarians.'⁹ Accordingly the Māgadhī word *ṇasti* (= *nāsti*) in the *Āgamaḍambara* can be connected with Hemacandra 4.289: *saṣoḥ saṃyoge so 'grīṣme*|¹⁰

Steiner examined the oldest available manuscripts of Harṣa's *Nāgānanda* (AD 1155/56) and discovered several Prakrit forms that appear to be irregular according to Pischel's grammar.¹¹ While editing the *Āgamaḍambara* I found many of these "irregular" forms in the manuscripts, e.g. *jāṇāmi* and *jāṇāvide*

⁴Another example is Sanskrit *tiṣṭhatu*, which in Māgadhī should become *ciṣṭhadu* (v.l. *ciṣṭa*^o, *ciṭṭa*^o) according to Vararuci (11.14), *ciṭṭhadu* according to Puruṣottama (12.33), and *ciṣṭhadu* (v.l. *ciṭṭha*^o) according to Hemacandra (4.298). The Manuscripts of the *Āgamaḍambara* have *ciṭṭhadu*.

⁵GAWROŃSKI, pp. 280f., quoted (approvingly) in STEINER 1997, p. 163.

⁶STEINER 2001, p. 70.

⁷PISCHEL §401.

⁸Another example is the occurrence of both *°ijjai* and *°iadi* as passive forms in Śaurasenī and Māgadhī.

⁹STEINER 2001, p. 70.

¹⁰Hemacandra is certainly later than Jayanta, but many of his rules may well go back to earlier Prakrit grammars. Cf. GAWROŃSKI, p. 280: 'wir haben ja allen Grund, zu vermuten ... daß sie [sc. die Grammatiker] zum großen Teil "Beispiele wie die Regeln von ihren Vorgängern" herübernahmen.' (quoted in STEINER 2001, p. 69, note 25.)

¹¹See STEINER 1997, chapter 9.

in Māgadhī, *ayya* used universally for Sanskrit *ārya*, *khū* after *e* and *o*, etc. Some of these “irregularities” occur already in the fragments of Aśvaghoṣa’s plays. These facts also confirmed that normalisation solely on the basis of Pischel’s grammar and the mediaeval Prakrit grammarians may not be the only true method of editing dramatic Prakrits.

To summarise, I have preserved many readings of the manuscripts even if these readings were not in perfect conformity with the rules laid down by the Prakrit grammarians (often contradicting each other) or in Pischel’s grammar.¹² On the other hand I emended the text when the reading of the manuscripts (often discrepant) went against the most fundamental rules of the given dialect, e.g. *s*, *r*, and *o* to *ś*, *l*, and *e* in the Māgadhī passages.

Finally the following observation of Steiner is well worth taking into consideration for the editors of Sanskrit dramas:¹³

One of the most important criteria for future critical revisions of play editions is the comparative reading of accurately (or at least more accurately) transmitted texts of the same literary genre as well as texts and manuscripts of the same age and place of origin.

5.4 The translation and the notes

Translating the *Āgamaḍambara* has proved to be a demanding enterprise. On the one hand the translator is supposed to transmit (at least to a certain extent) the literary qualities of the play, including Jayanta’s sense of humour and satire. On the other hand the reader expects a clear interpretation of the complicated arguments of the philosophical debates. Since I am not a native speaker of English, I could only make an attempt at producing a readable (and in some cases hopefully enjoyable) translation. As for the second task, I have tried to formulate even the more demanding arguments in a lucid way, using square brackets to add information that helps the understanding. Many excellent Sanskritists helped to polish my translation, all remaining shortcomings are due to my inadequacy.

The reader will find long quotations in the notes from various Sanskrit works. The aim of these quotations is to place Jayanta’s ideas in the intellectual context of his age and thereby to make their interpretation more accurate. The notes to the first act contain several extracts from the works of Dharmakīrti and Kumāriḷa, Jayanta’s two main sources in presenting and refuting the Buddhist theories of *kṣanikatva* and *viḷḷḷānavāda*. I have also quoted from satires directed against Buddhism in order to point out various patterns also used by Jayanta. The majority of the notes written to the second act treat the problems of editing the Prakrit passages, but the Jain doctrine of *anekāntavāda* and the mysterious sect of the *nīlāmbaras* are also dealt with. The annotation to the third act has quotations from Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika and Saiddhāntika Śaiva

¹²The reader will find references to these rules in the endnotes.

¹³STEINER 2001, pp. 71f.

works, showing their affinity in the questions of proving transmigration and the existence of God. Finally the most frequently cited texts in the notes to Act Four are Yāmuna's *Āgamaprāmāṇya*, which attempts to prove the authority of Pañcarātra, and Kumārila's *Tantravārttika*, which presents a strictly orthodox view of the validity of religious traditions, which is challenged by the more liberal and pragmatic theory of *sarvāgamaprāmāṇya*.

Part II
Sanskrit Text

तद् ब्रह्म वः क्रमविनश्यदनाद्यविद्य -
 मुद्योततां स्फुरदमन्दनवाभिनन्दम् ।
 संवित्पदे ऽवतरणोन्मुख एव यत्र
 शाम्यन्ति कान्तविषयान्तरभोगवाञ्छाः ॥ १ ॥
 ॥ नान्द्यन्ते सूत्रधारः ॥

5

अहो अहो नटत्वं नाम जघन्यः को ऽपि सतताभ्यस्तसूक्तकटकपटव्यापार-
 डम्बरः कुटुम्बभरणोपायः ।

हरो विष्णुर्ब्रह्मा मुनिरवनिपः पामरपशु -
 विटो भीरुः शूरः प्रमुदितमतिर्दुःखित इति ।
 स्पृशन् सर्वाकारान् विहरति जने निस्त्रपतया
 नटो वस्तुस्थित्या जठरभरणे शिल्पशरणः ॥ २ ॥

10

तद् वरमिमं कुशिल्पमल्पफलमलघुक्लेशमतित्रपाकरमुपसंहृत्य क्वचिदाश्रमे
 किमपि गुरुकुलमुपासीनः सकलदुःखोपरमं परमं पुरुषार्थमभिगन्तुं यतिष्ये ।

॥ विमृश्य ॥

तत् क्लेमं कृपणकं कृपापात्रप्रायं कुटुम्बभरमर्पयित्वा गम्यताम् ?

15

॥ अग्रतो ऽवलोक्य ॥

भवतु, अमुष्य तावदाशयं विज्ञास्ये ।

॥ प्रविश्य पारिपार्श्वकः सूत्रधारमवलोक्य ॥

किमयमद्य निर्वेदपरिस्नानवदन इव दृश्यते? पृच्छाम्येनम् ।

॥ उपसृत्य ॥

20

भाव, किमिदं विषण्णवदनमास्यते? ननु क्वचन विनियुक्तो ऽसि वृत्तिकार-
 शिष्यैः ?

॥ सूत्रं पूर्वोक्तं यतिष्य इत्यन्तं पठति ॥

॥ पारिं ॥

2 °मुद्योततां] em. RT, °दुद्योततां PāPu^{pc}, °दुद्योत° Pu^{ac} 3 संवित्पदे ऽव°] conj. De-
 zsó-Isaacson, संवित्परे ऽर्ध° RT (conj. ?), संचित्यरार्द्ध° Pā, संचित्यरार्द्ध° Pu 5 ना-
 न्द्यन्ते] PuRT, नाद्यन्ते Pā 6 अहो अहो नटत्वं नाम] Pā^{pc}Pu, अहो अदो नटत्वं नाम
 RT(misreading Pu?), अहोनामटत्वं नाम Pā^{ac} 6 °सूक्तक°] em. RT, °मुत्तर° PāPu
 7 °डम्बरः कुटुम्ब°] em. RT, °डंबरकुटुंब° PāPu 8 विष्णुर्ब्र°] PuRT, विष्णुर्ब्र° Pā
 9 भीरुः] PuRT, भीरु Pā 9 शूरः] PāRT, सूरः Pu 9 °मतिर्दु°] PuRT, °मति-
 दु° Pā 10 सर्वाकारान्वि°] PuRT, सर्वाकारावि°Pā 10 जने] conj. Isaacson, जनो
 PāPuRT 12 °पसंहृत्य] PāRT, °पसं[[]हृत्यं Pu 12 क्वचिदा°] em. RT, क्वदाचि-
 दा° Pā, कदाचिदा° Pu 15 तत्क्लेमं] em. RT, तत्क्षेमं PāPu 21 विनियुक्तो] em.,
 विनिर्युक्तो PāPuRT

अलमस्थाने निर्वेदेन । को नु खलु देवेषु मनुष्येषु तिर्यक्षु वा कपटचर्यामुत्तीर्य 25
परमार्थे पर्यवसितः? सर्व एवायं ब्रह्मादिस्तिर्यक्पर्यन्तो जन्तुग्रामः संसारे
माययैव परिवर्तते । भवतः किमधिकं जातम्?

मायाविडम्ब्यमानस्य विश्वस्य जगतो यथा ।

व्यवहारो न सत्यार्थस्तथास्माकं भविष्यति ॥ ३ ॥

॥ सूत्र० ॥

30

मारिष, यथाह भवान् । किं त्वयमीदृशो ऽप्यशक्यनिर्वाह आस्माकीनो व्यव-
हारः ।

॥ पारि० ॥

भाव, कथमिव?

॥ सूत्र० ॥

35

मारिष, भरतमुनिनोपदिष्टे दशरूपकप्रयोगे किल कृतश्रमा वयम् । अद्य चा-
त्रभवतः शैशव एव व्याकरणविवरणकरणाद् वृत्तिकार इति प्रथितापरनाम्नो
भट्टजयन्तस्य शिष्यपरिषदाहमाज्ञप्तो यथास्मद्गुरोः कृतिरभिनवमागमडम्बरं
नाम किमपि रूपकं प्रयोक्तव्यमिति । तदिदमलौकिकमशास्त्रीयमप्रयुक्तपूर्वं कथं
प्रयुज्महे? तदस्याः कुजीविकाया उपेक्षणमेव श्रेयः ।

40

॥ पारि० ॥

भाव, मैवम् । अनतिक्रमणीयशासनाः खल्वत्रभवन्तो वृत्तिकारस्य शिष्याः ।
यत् पुनरशास्त्रीयमिति शङ्कसे, तत्र कः प्रयोक्तुरपराधः?

काव्यं करोति स कविर्भरतोपदेश-

मुल्लङ्घ्य, तस्य च तथा प्रथयन्ति शिष्याः ।

45

सामाजिकास्तव त एव, भवान् प्रयुङ्गां

पार्श्वस्थितः परिवदिष्यति किं जनो ऽन्यः ॥ ४ ॥

37 Cf. *Kādambarikathāsāra* 1.11ab: वृत्तिकार इति व्यक्तं द्वितीयं नाम बिभ्रतः ।; NM II 718.6: अन्वर्थो नववृत्तिकार इति यं शंसन्ति नाम्ना बुधाः ।

26 f. °मार्थे...जातम्] om.Pu 26 f. संसारे माययैव] Pā, संसारमाययैव RT (em. ?)
28 °डम्ब्य°] PuRT, °डम्ब्य° Pā 29 भविष्यति] em.RT, भविष्यते PāPu 31 भवान्]
em.RT, भगवान् PāPu 31 °मीदृशो ऽप्य°] PāRT, °मीदृशो[[] Pu^{ac}, °मीदृशोप्य
Pu^{pc} 31 °शक्य°] Pā^{pc}PuRT, °श[[]य° Pā^{ac} 31 °ह आस्माकीनो] RT^{pc}, °हो
अस्माकीनो PāPu, °हो ऽस्माकीनो RT^{ac} 36 अद्य] Pā^{pc}PuRT, अ[[] Pā^{ac} 37 वि-
वरणकरणाद् वृ°] PāPu^{pc}RT, विवरणाद् वृ° Pu^{ac} 40 कुजीविकाया] em., कुजीविति-
काया PāPu, कुवृत्तिकाया em.RT 42 मैवम्] em.RT, मैवं PāPu 46 सामाजिकास्त°]
PuRT, समाजिकास्त° Pā 46 प्रयुङ्गां] em.RT, प्रयुक्तं PāPu

॥ सूत्र० ॥

कृतं जनापवादेन ।

॥ पारि० ॥

50

तत्किं राजभयमाशङ्कसे ?

॥ सूत्र० सस्मितम् ॥

तदपि नास्ति ।

॥ पारि० ॥

तत्किं विलम्बसे ? ननु नियुज्यन्तां तासु तासु सौगतार्हतादिभूमिकासु कुशी-
लवाः ।

55

॥ सूत्र० ॥

मारिष, न शक्रोम्येव दुर्वहमिदमुद्धोद्धुमिन्द्रजालमायाप्रायं नटवृत्तम् ।

अशास्त्रकं वास्तु तदन्वितं वा

काव्यं, जनः कुप्यतु रज्यतां वा ।

60

अहं तु निर्विण्णमनाः स्ववृत्ति-

मुत्सृज्य तीर्थानि चिनोमि तावत् ॥ ५ ॥

भवान्पुनः कृपणकमस्मत्कुटुम्बकं वा संवाहयतु, मामेव वानुगच्छतु ।
मया त्विदानीमेवास्मिन्महति विहारे वीतरागभिक्षुशतपरिगृहीते नातिदूरनि-
र्वाणमार्गदेशिनि तत्त्वबुभुत्सुना प्रवेष्टव्यम् ।

65

॥ इति निष्क्रान्तौ ॥

॥ प्रस्तावना ॥

58 दुर्वहमि०] RT(em. ?), दुर्वहमहमि० PāPu 60 रज्य०] PuPā^{pe}RT, रत्य० Pā^{ac}
61 तु] PāRT, नु Pu 61 निर्विण्ण०] PāRT, निर्विण्ण० Pu 63 वानु०] RT(em. ?),
चानु० PāPu 64 नातिदूर०] conj. Isaacson, नातिदूरे PāPuRT

॥ ततः प्रविशत्यासनस्थो रक्तपटसंवीतः शाक्यभिक्षुरुपासकश्चाग्रतः ॥

॥ भिक्षुः, सवैराग्यम् ॥

अनादौ संसारे स्थितमिदमहो मूढमनसां

जनित्वा जन्तूनां मरणमथ मृत्वापि जननम् ।

इयं सा दुःखानां सरणिरिति संचिन्त्य कृतिना

निधातव्यं चेतो जननमरणोच्छेदिनि पदे ॥ १ ॥

॥ उपा० ॥

भो भदंत, किं खु एदं जणणमरणववहारबाहिरं ठाणं? केण वा उवाएण एदं पावीयदि?

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

धीमन्, यदि शुश्रूषुरसि तदिह चतुरार्यसत्यपरिज्ञाने यत्नमाधेहि ।

॥ उपा० ॥

भो भदंत, काइं उण ताइं चत्तारि अज्जसच्चाइं?

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

धीमन्, दुःखं समुदयो निरोधो मार्ग इति चत्वार्यार्यसत्यानि ।

॥ उपा० ॥

भो भदंत, इत्तियमेत्तेण ण मे पवोहो उप्पण्णो । सवित्थरेण उवदिसदु भवं ।

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

आयुष्मन्, बोध्यसे—

स्वसंवेद्यं तावत् सुखविसदृशं दुःखमखिलं

यतस्तस्योद्भूतिः स तु समुदयो मोहमहिमा ।

निरोधो निर्वाणं सकलपरितापव्युपरम

8 f. भो भदन्त, किं खल्वेतज् जननमरणव्यवहारबाह्यं स्थानम्? केन वोपायेनैतत् प्राप्यते?

13 भो भदन्त, कानि पुनस्तानि चत्वार्यार्यसत्यानि? 17 भो भदन्त, इयन्मात्रेण न मे प्रबोध उत्पन्नः । सविस्तरेणोपदिशतु भवान् ।

3 ff. = NM II 424.9-12.

5 कृतिना] PāPuNM, कृतिभिर् RT(em.?) 6 जननमरणोच्छेदिनि] RT(em.?)NM, जननमरणोच्छेदिनि PāPu 8 जणण०] RT(em.?), जनन० PāPu 8 वा] PuRT, चा Pā 8 उवाएण] PāRT, उवाणण Pu 11 शुश्रूषुर०] PāRT, शुश्रूषुर० Pu 11 चतुरा०] PāRT, वतुरा० Pu 13 काइं] conj., किं PāPuRT 13 ताइं] conj., ते PāPuRT 13 चत्तारि] PāPuRT^{pc}, चत्वारि RT^{ac} 13 अज्जसच्चाइं] conj., अज्ज*सच्चा PāPu, अय्यसच्चा RT(em.?) 15 दुःखं] PāPu^{pc}RT, ज्ज(?)खं Pu^{ac} 15 समुदयो] em.RT, समुदायो PāPu 15 चत्वार्यार्यसत्यानि] em.RT, चत्वार्यसत्यानि PāPu 17 ०मेत्तेण ण] em.RT, ०मेत्तेण PāPu 17 उप्पण्णो] PāRT, उप्पणो Pu 22 ०व्युपरम] RT(em.?), ०व्युपरमः PāPu

उपायस्तत्प्राप्तौ कुशलमतिभिर्मार्ग उदितः ॥ २ ॥

(॥ उपा० ॥)

भो भदंत, केण दाणि उवाएण अप्पा णं दीहरपबंधपउत्तं मोत्तूण दुत्तरं दु- 25
क्खगहणं णिव्वाणे णिवसदि ?

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

साधो, न साधु बुध्यसे। न खल्वात्मा नाम कश्चिद् यो दुःखसङ्कटमुत्तीर्य
निर्वाणमधिगच्छति। ननु,

संसारकारागारस्य दारुणायासकारिणः।

30

अयमेव दृढः स्तम्भो यः स्थिरात्मग्रहो नृणाम् ॥ ३ ॥

तथा हि,

अयमहमिति पश्यतो हि जन्तो-

र्भवति ममेदमिति ध्रुवं प्रतीतिः।

अहमिति च ममेति चावगच्छन्

35

न हि विजहाति जडाशयः कुतृष्णाम् ॥ ४ ॥

अविप्रलुप्ततृष्णस्य दूरे वैराग्यभावना।

अनभ्यस्ते च वैराग्ये संसारतरणं कुतः ? ॥ ५ ॥

॥ उपा० ॥

भो भदंत, जदा दाव णत्थि य्येव को वि अप्पा, को दाणि संसारदुक्खं 40
अणुभवदि? को वा एदं उत्तरिअ णिव्वाणागारअं पडिवज्जदि ?

॥ भिक्षुः, सस्मितम् ॥

25 f. भो भदन्त, केनेदानीमुपायेनात्मैतद् दीर्घप्रबन्धप्रवृत्तं मुक्त्वा दुस्तरं दुःखगहनं नि-
र्वाणे निवसति? 40 f. भो भदन्त, यदा तावन् नास्त्येव को ऽप्यात्मा, क इदानीं
संसारदुःखमनुभवति? को वा एतदुत्तीर्य निर्वाणागारकं प्रतिपद्यते?

30 ff. NM II 298.5-10 (*bauddhapakṣa*): तस्मादुत्सृज्यतामेष मूर्धाभिषिक्तः प्रथमो मोह
आत्मग्रहो नाम। तन्नवृत्त्या चात्मीयग्रहो ऽपि विरंस्यति, 'अहमेव न, किं मम' इ-
ति। तदिदमहंकारममकारग्रन्थिप्रहाणेन नैरात्म्यदर्शनमेव निर्वाणद्वारमवलम्ब्यताम्। तस्य
च मार्गः क्षणिकपदार्थनिश्चयः। क्षणिकेषु हि सर्वभावेषु निराश्रयेषु ज्ञानस्याप्याश्रयविरहात्
कुतस्त्यमात्मकल्पनमिति।

24 (उपा०)] em. RT, om. PāPu 26 दुक्खं] em., दुःक्खं Pā, दुःखं PuRT 26 णि-
व्वाणे] RT (em. ?), णित्वाणे PāPu 30 °रका°] Pā^{pc}PuRT, °राका° Pā^{ac} 31 °ग्रहो]
em. RT, °गृहो PāPu 31 नृणाम्] RT^{pc}PāPu, नृणाम् RT^{ac} 36 विजहाति] em. RT,
विजहति PāPu 36 जडाशयः] RT (em. ?), जडासयः PāPu 38 वैराग्ये] Pā^{pc}PuRT,
वैराग्यै Pā^{ac} 40 णत्थि] PāPuRT^{pc}, नत्थि RT^{ac} 41 °दुक्खं अणु°] em., °दुक्खमणु°
em. RT, °दुःखम° PāPu 41 णिव्वाणागारअं] em. Isaacson, णिव्वाणागारए em. RT^{pc},
णिव्वाणागायए PāPu, निव्वाणागारए RT^{ac} 42 भिक्षुः] PāRT, भिक्षुः Pu

वत्स, निरोधो निर्वाणमपवर्गः समाप्तिरिति नित्ये ऽपि सत्यात्मनि सुतरा-
मघटमानम् । न हि नित्यस्य निरोध उपपद्यते । तस्माद् विज्ञानमात्रमेवे-
दं हर्षविषादाद्यनेकरूपरूषितमनादिप्रबन्धप्रवृत्तविचित्रवासनानुसारसमासादि- 45
तवितताकारभेदममुना नैरात्म्यादिभावनामार्गेण व्यपनीतविविधोपाधिपटलो-
पहितनानाकारकालुष्यममलसंविन्मात्रनिष्ठमवतिष्ठतां वा सन्तानात्मना, स-
न्ततिरेव वा विच्छिद्यतामित्ययमेव निर्वाणमार्गो नेदीयान् ।

॥ उपा० ॥

भो भदंत, यदि णत्थि थिरो अप्पा परलोए कस्स कम्मभोओ? इण्हं पि 50
कस्स सुमरणणिबंधणा होति ववहारा?

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

कुशलं बोध्यसे ।

अर्थक्रियासाधनतां न नित्याः

क्रमाक्रमाभ्यामुपयान्ति भावाः ।

नार्थक्रियां काञ्चिदसाधयन्तो

भवन्ति चैते परमार्थसन्तः ॥ ६ ॥

एवं हि वदन्ति नीतिविदः—

55

50 f. भो भदन्त, यदि नास्ति स्थिर आत्मा परलोके कस्य कर्मभोगः? इदानीमपि कस्य
स्मरणनिबन्धना भवन्ति व्यवहाराः?

44 ff. NM I 196.1-2: अत एवेदमपि न वचनीयम्—‘एकमेवेदं संविदूपं हर्षविषादाद्यनेका-
कारविवर्तं पश्यामः, तत्र यथेष्टं संज्ञाः क्रियन्ताम्’ (PVin I p. 70.9-11) इति I; also NM II
493.10-13 (*bauddhapakṣa*): द्वितीयस्याभावात् स्वच्छत्वाद् ज्ञानस्य कालुष्यमन्यकृतं युक्तमिति
चेत्, अविद्यावासनाकृतं तद्भविष्यति । स्वतः स्वच्छमपि ज्ञानमनाद्यविद्यावासनाविभवोपनत-
मनेकाकारकालुष्यरूषितवपुरिव प्रकाशते । 48 NM II 439.3-4: निर्वाणादिपदाख्येयमपवर्गं
तु सौगताः । सन्तत्युच्छेदमिच्छन्ति स्वच्छां वा ज्ञानसन्ततिम् ॥ 50 f. NM II 296.11-16:
निराश्रयेषु विज्ञानस्कन्धेषु क्षणभङ्गिषु । कथं स्मृत्यादिकार्यं वा परलोको ऽपि वा कथम् ॥
सत्यपि परलोके कथमकृताभ्यागमकृतविप्रणाशौ पराक्रियेते? येन हि ज्ञानेन चैत्यवन्दनादि
कर्म कृतं, तस्य विनाशान्न तत्फलोपभोगः । यस्य च फलोपभोगस्तेन न तत्कर्म कृतमिति—
नैष दोषः, कार्यकारणभावस्य नियामकत्वात् । 54 ff. NM II 300.1-4 (*bauddhapakṣa*):
भावानां हि सत्त्वं क्रमयौगपद्याभ्यां व्याप्तम् । नित्येषु च पदार्थेषु व्यापकानुपलम्भनात् (i. e.
क्रमयौगपद्यानुपलम्भात्) । तद्वाप्तमपि सत्त्वं हि बलात् तेभ्यो निवर्तते ॥

45 °रूषितम°] em. Sanderson, °रूषितम° PāPuRT 47 °मवतिष्ठतां] em. Isaacson,
°मपतिष्ठतां PāPu^{pc}, °तां Pu^{ac}, °मुपतिष्ठतां em. RT 50 णत्थि] PāPuRT^{pc}, नत्थि
RT^{ac} 50 कस्स] PāPuRT^{pc}, कस्य RT^{ac} 51 कस्स] PāPu, कस्य RT 51 °णिबंधणा]
PāPuRT^{pc}, निबंधना RT^{ac} 54 नित्याः] PāRT, नित्या Pu 55 क्रमाक्र°] Pā^{pc}RT,
क्रामाक्र° Pā^{ac}(?), क्रमोक्र° Pu 57 °सन्तः] em. RT, °मन्तः PāPu

यदेवार्थक्रियाकारि तदेव परमार्थसत् ।

इति । अपि च ,

नायं कुम्भो नश्वरात्मान्यथा वा

हेतोर्नाशं मुद्गरादेरुपैति ।

व्यर्थो वा स्यादक्षमो वा स हेतुः

कल्पे ऽप्यस्यानागमाद्वा न नश्येत् ॥ ७ ॥

तेनात्मलाभसमनन्तरमेव भावा

नश्यन्ति भान्ति तु तथा समसन्ततित्वात् ।

सन्तानवृत्तिमवलम्ब्य च कर्तृभोक्तृ-

स्मृत्यादिकार्यघटनापि न दुःसमर्था ॥ ८ ॥

॥ उपा० ॥

जदि सअलो खणभंगुरो भावसत्थो , णत्थि य्येव एदस्स बिइए खणे अवत्थि-

70 ff. यदि सकलः क्षणभङ्गुरो भावसार्थः, नास्त्येवैतस्य द्वितीये क्षणे ऽवस्थितिः, तत् कथमेष विज्ञानेन विषयीकर्तुं पार्यते? अर्थः खलु विज्ञानेन सहानु वा तेन प्रकाश्यते, विज्ञानं वा जनयन्नपि नो नियन्त्रणमाकारं वा अप्राप्तेन तेन विषयीक्रियते। अन्यथेदं प्रत्यक्षं क्षणभाविनो दुर्लभम्।

59 NM II 299.3-4 (*bauddhapakṣa*): सत्त्वं तावदर्थक्रियाकारित्वमुच्यते। यथोक्तम्—‘अर्थ-क्रियासमर्थं यत् तदेव परमार्थसत्’ इति। (cf. PV (Pandey) 2.3ab: अर्थक्रियासमर्थं यत् तदत्र परमार्थसत्।) 61 ff. NM II 306.3-13 (*bauddhapakṣa*): अतश्च क्षणभङ्गिनो भावाः प्रलयं प्रति हेत्वनपेक्षत्वात्। भावो हि स्वतो नश्वरात्मा भवेत्, तद्विपरीतो वा। विनश्वरस्वभावे ऽस्मिन् कृतं प्रलयहेतुभिः। अनश्वरस्वभावे हि कृतं प्रलयहेतुभिः॥ क्व तर्हि मुद्गरादीनां व्यापारः? विजातीयसन्ततिजन्मनीति ब्रूमः। अभावस्तु तज्जन्यो (i.e. मुद्गरादिजन्यो) न संभवत्येव प्रमाणविरुद्धत्वात्। भावो हि स्वरूपेण न भवति न त्वभावो ऽप्यस्य भवतीति। स्वरूपं तु तस्य (i.e. अभावस्य) भवनात्मकं चेत्, सर्वदैव भवेदेव न न भवेत्। अभवनात्मकं तु तदेव न भवेत्, परापेक्षाया अभावात्। न हि मुद्गरादिकारणान्तरसापेक्षः कुम्भादेर्विनाशो भवितुमर्हति, उत्पत्ताविव नाशे ऽपि समर्थासमर्थभिन्नाभिन्नोपकारकारिसहकार्यादिविकल्पकलापानपायात्।; also NM II 307.1-7 (*bauddhapakṣa*): अपि च यदापि तेन नष्टव्यं तदाप्यस्य न स्वरूपादतिरिक्तः कश्चन विनाशहेतुरवतरति। तच्च स्वरूपमाद्ये ऽपि क्षणे तस्य तादृशमेवेति तदैव वा नश्येत्, न कदाचिद्वा। अपमृत्योरपक्रन्तः तस्य चेत् प्रथमः क्षणः। अविनाशि-स्वभावत्वादास्तां युगशतान्यपि॥ न चैवमभ्युपगम्यते। तस्मादात्मलाभाविनाभावी भावानां विनाश इति सिद्धः क्षणभङ्गः। 67 f. NM II.296.15-197.3 (*bauddhapakṣa*): नैष दोषः, कार्यकारणभावस्य नियामकत्वात्। अनादिप्रबन्धप्रवृत्तो हि ज्ञानानां हेतुफलभावप्रवाहः। एष एव च सन्तान इत्युच्यते। तत्कृतश्चायं अनुसन्धानादिकार्यनियमः। सन्तानानादित्वात् तदविच्छेदाच्च परलोको ऽपि न क्लिष्टकल्पनः।

62 हेतोर्नाशं] em. RT^{pc}, हेतोर्नाशं PāPu, तोर्नाशं RT^{ac} 62 °रुपैति] PāPuRT^{pc}, °रु
□ ति RT^{ac} 63 वा] PuRT, चा Pā 63 °दक्षमो] PāRT, °दृक्षमा Pu 65 °व भा°]
Pā^{pc}PuRT, °वाभा° Pā^{ac} 66 सम°] em. RT, मस° PāPu 68 °नापि] em. (also
Pā^{pc} ?), °नादि Pā(ac?) PuRT 68 दुःसमर्था] PāPu, दुःसमर्थम् em. RT 70 णत्थि]
PāPuRT^{pc}, नत्थि RT^{ac}

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दी, ता कहं एसो विण्णाणेण विसईकादुं पारीअदि? अत्थो खु विण्णाणेण सह अणु वा तेण पकासिज्जदे, विण्णाणं वा जणेंतो वि णो णिअंतणं आआरं वा अप्पत्तेण तेण विसईकरीअदि। अण्णहा एदं पच्चक्खं खणभाइणो दुल्लहं।

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

आयुष्मन्, यदि स्फुटं पश्यसि तदर्थो ऽपि नाम न कश्चिद् विज्ञानस्य यो 75
विषयभावमुपयाति। ज्ञानमेवेदं नीलपीताद्याकारस्वचितमवभाति। कुतः?

आकारद्वितयाश्रितं न युगपज्ज्ञानार्थयोर्वेदनं

लोके ऽर्थश्च जडः प्रकाशवपुषा ज्ञानेन चेद् गृह्यते।

स्यादादौ ग्रहणं प्रदीपवदनाकारं च नो गृह्यते

ज्ञानं तेन तदेव भाति विविधाकारं कुतो ऽर्थो ऽपरः? ॥ ९ ॥

तस्मात् सर्वं शून्यं सर्वं क्षणिकं निरात्मकं सर्वम्।

80

77 NM II 488.4-13 (*bauddhapakṣa*): उच्यते—इदं तावत् परीक्ष्यताम्, यदेतत् प्रत्यक्षविज्ञानं 'नीलमिदं पीतमिदम्' इत्युत्पद्यते, तत्र किमेक आकारः प्रकाशते उत द्वितयमिति। यदि द्वितयमवभाति, 'अयमर्थो नीलम्, इदं तज्ज्ञानम्' इति, तत् किमत्र विचार्यते? जितं भवद्भिः। जितस्य यदापद्यते, तदस्मासु विधीयताम्। अथ एक एवायमाकारः प्रथते, तर्ह्यस्ति विचारावसरः। कस्यायमाकारः? किमर्थस्य किं ज्ञानस्येति? स चैवं विचार्यमाण आकारः यद्यर्थस्येति तद् भवन्तो जेष्यन्ति। ज्ञानाकारपक्षे तु वयं जेष्याम इति।; also NM II 492.15-493.3 (*bauddhapakṣa*): आकारद्वयप्रतिभासो हि नास्तीत्युक्तम्। अभ्युपगमे वा सुदुस्तरमनवस्थादूषणम्। अर्थाकारश्च प्रत्यक्षः तत्कृतश्च ज्ञानाकारः प्रत्यक्ष इत्युच्यमाने ऽर्थाकारस्तावत् साकारेण ज्ञानेन गृहीतः। स इदानीं ज्ञानाकारो ऽपि ग्राह्यत्वात् साकारज्ञानान्तरं भवेत्। तदपि साकारं ज्ञानान्तरं तथाभूतज्ञानान्तरग्राह्यमेव स्यादित्यनिष्टम्। 78 f. NM II 489.12-17 (*bauddhapakṣa*): अतश्च ज्ञानस्यायमाकारः। ज्ञानं हि प्रकाशकमप्रकाशस्यार्थस्य भवद्भिरभ्युपगम्यते। ततश्चार्थात् प्रथमतरमस्य ग्रहणेन भवितव्यम्, अगृहीतस्य दीपादेः प्रकाशस्य प्रकाशकत्वाददर्शनात्। उत्पन्नेष्वपि च घटादिष्वर्थेषु प्रकाशवैकल्याद् वा प्रतिबन्धवैधुर्याद् वा भवत्यग्रहणम्। ज्ञानस्य तूत्पन्नस्य सतो न किञ्चिद् ग्रहणे प्रतिबन्धकम् (: em. Isaacson, ed.: प्रतिबन्धकः)। न च प्रकाशकान्तरापेक्षणं स्वत एव दीपवत् प्रकाशस्वभावत्वात्। 79 f. NM II 490.15-17 (*bauddhapakṣa*): ज्ञानं च गृह्यमाणमाकाररहितं ग्रहीतुमशक्यमिति बलात् साकारमेव तद् ग्रहीतव्यम्। साकारे च ज्ञाने गृहीते सति द्वितीयकारणाभावात्कुतो ज्ञानातिरिक्तो बाह्यो ऽर्थः?

71 विण्णाणेण] PāRT, विण्णाणेण Pu 71 पारीअदि] em., पारिअदि PāPuRT 72 अणु वा तेण] em., अणुवावातेण PāPu, अनुवादेण RT^{ac}, अणु वा देण RT^{pc} 72 पकासिज्जदे] em. RT^{pc}, पकासिज्ज*ते Pā, पकासिज्जंते Pu, पकासिज्जते RT^{ac} 72 जणेंतो] conj., जिणित्तो PāPuRT 72 वि णो णिअंतणं] conj. Isaacson, विणाणिअत्तणे PāPu, विणा णिअंतेण RT (em. ?) 73 अप्पत्तेण तेण] conj., अप्पत्ते तेण PāPuRT 73 °करीअदि] PāPu, °करीयदि RT^{pc}, °करियदि RT^{ac} 73 पच्चक्खं] conj., चएक्ख PāPu, च पक्खं RT (em. ?) 75 पश्यसि] conj. Isaacson, पृच्छसि PāPuRT 76 °ताद्या°] conj. Isaacson, °तान्बरा° Pā, °तांब्वरा° Pu, °ताम्बरा° RT 76 °स्वचितम°] PuRT, °स्वचिनम° Pā 78 प्रकाश°] em. RT, प्रकाम° PāPu 79 च नो] em. Isaacson, मनो PāPuRT

सर्वं दुःखमितीत्थं ध्यायन् निर्वाणमाप्नोति ॥ १० ॥

॥ नेपथ्ये गण्डिकाध्वनिः ॥

॥ उपा० , श्रुत्वा ॥

भो भदंत, एसो खु सअलभिक्षुसंघसंघडणवेलापिसुणो गंडिसदो समुच्छलि- 85
ओ, ता एत्थभवं पमाणं ।

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

यद्येवं तद्यथा वेला नातिक्रामति तथा समाचरामः ।

॥ उत्थाय परिक्रम्य दिशो ऽवलोक्य ॥

एष खलु मृणालतन्तुधवलयज्ञोपवीतलाञ्छितश्यामवक्षःस्थलो वेणुयष्टिहस्तः 90
को ऽपि ब्राह्मणयुवा इतो ऽभिवर्तते । तद्यावदेष न वेलाविघ्नमुत्पादयेत्तावद्य-
थाप्राप्तमनुतिष्ठामः ।

॥ उपा० ॥

भो भदंत, को वि अ कालो एदस्स बम्हणजुवाणस्स इह द्विदस्स वट्टदि ।
जस्सिं य्येव खणे इमस्सिं रुक्खमूले भदंतो उवविट्ठो तस्सिं य्येव खणे एसो 95
इह पविट्ठो भदंतेण ण लक्खिदो । लदाजालंतरिदेण एदिणा सयलो य्येव
आयण्णिदो भदंतवण्णिदो उवएसो ।

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

यद्येवं ततः किं तथाविधेनैव वयमिदानीं वेलां लङ्घयामः ?

॥ इति सहोपासकेन निष्क्रान्तः ॥

॥ ततः प्रविशति यथानिर्दिष्टः स्नातको बटुश्च ॥

॥ स्नात० ॥

स्वाध्यायः पठितो यथाविधि परामृष्टानि चाङ्गानि षण्

मीमांसापि निरूपितेति विहितं कर्म द्विजन्मोचितम् ।

85 f. भो भदन्त, एष खलु सकलभिक्षुसङ्घसङ्घटनवेलापिशुनो गण्डिशब्दः समुच्छलितः ।
तदत्रभवान् प्रमाणम् । 94 ff. भो भदन्त, को ऽपि च काल एतस्य ब्राह्मणयून इह स्थितस्य
वर्तते । यस्मिन्नेव क्षणे ऽस्मिन् वृक्षमूले भदन्त उपविष्टः तस्मिन्नेव क्षणे इह प्रविष्टो भदन्तेन
न लक्षितः । लताजालान्तरितेनैतेन सकल एवाकर्णितो भदन्तवर्णित उपदेशः ।

82 दुःखमि०] RT (em. ?), दुःखमि० PāPu 82 निर्वाणमा०] PuRT, निवाणमा० Pā 90
०वक्षः०] PāPuRT^{pc}, ०वक्ष० RT^{ac} 95 रुक्ख०] em. RT, रुक्ख० PāPu 95 भदंतो]
PāPu, भदंत RT (em. ?) 96 लक्खिदो] PāRT, लक्खिदो Pu 96 एदिणा] PāPu,
om. RT 97 आयण्णिदो] em. RT, आयसिदो PāPu 97 ०वण्णिदो] PāRT, ०वण्णिदो
Pu 99 वेलां] PāRT, वेला Pu 100 निष्क्रान्तः] em., निष्क्रान्तः ॥ < ॥ विष्कम्भकः ॥
> em. RT, निःक्रान्तः PāPu^{pc}, निःक्रान्तः Pu^{ac} 103 स्वाध्यायः] RT (em. ?), स्वाध्याय०
PāPu

नित्याधूतकुतर्कधूसरगिरां यावत्तु वेदद्विषां

105

न्यङ्कारो न कृतः कृतार्थ इव मे तावन्न विद्याश्रमः ॥ ११ ॥

अग्याश्चैते वेदविप्रवृतां कुबुद्धयः शौद्धोदनिशिष्यकाः । तदेनानेव स्तेनानिव
तावन् निगृह्णीमः ।

॥ परिक्रामति ॥

॥ बटुः ॥

110

अय्य, उवणीदं मए एदं ण्हाणोवअरणं । ण्हादुं पत्थिदो अय्यो ।

॥ स्नात० ॥

किं चातः ?

॥ बटुः ॥

ण खु अणुऊलं उवचिट्टदि । विहारगामी खु एस मग्गजणो सयलो संचरदि ।

115

॥ स्नात० ॥

नन्वत्र विहारे भिक्षूनवलोक्य ततः स्नास्यामः ।

॥ बटुः ॥

जं अय्यो आणवेदि ।

॥ उभौ परिक्रामतः ॥

120

॥ स्नात०, अग्रतो ऽवलोक्य ॥

अहो विहारस्य रामणीयकम्! इह हि

प्रासादाः शशिरश्मिशुभ्रहिमवच्छृङ्गप्रतिस्पर्द्धिनः

स्निग्धान्याम्रवणानि शाद्वलचिता हृद्या लतामण्डपाः ।

उन्मीलद्विसकन्ददन्तुरशरद्वोमानुकारोदकाः

125

111 आर्य, उपनीतं मयैतत् स्नानोपकरणम् । स्नातुं प्रस्थित आर्यः । 115 f. न खल्वनुकूलमुपतिष्ठते । विहारगामी खल्वेष मार्गजनः सकलः सञ्चरति । 119 यदार्य आज्ञापयति ।

105 f. NM I 7.6-9: न्यायविस्तरस्तु मूलस्तम्भभूतः सर्वविद्यानां वेदप्रामाण्यरक्षाहेतुत्वात् । वेदेषु हि दुस्तार्किकरचितकुतर्कविप्रावितप्रामाण्येषु शिथिलतास्थाः कथमिव बहुवित्तव्ययायासादिसाध्यं वेदार्थानुष्ठानमाद्रियेरन् साधवः? 122 ff. cf. NM II 347.13-16: नास्त्यात्मा फलभोगमात्रमथ च स्वर्गाय चैत्यार्चनं, संस्काराः क्षणिकाः युगस्थितिभूतश्चैते विहाराः कृताः । सर्वं शून्यमिदं वसूनि गुरवे देहीति चादिश्यते, बौद्धानां चरितं किमन्यदियती दम्भस्य भूमिः परा ॥

106 न्यङ्कारो] em. RT, त्यङ्कारो PāPu 107 अग्याश्चैते] em. RT, अत्र्याश्चैते PāPu

111 अय्यो] RT (em. ?), आय्या PāPu 115 ण खु] PāPuRT^{ac}, ण क्खु RT^{pc} 115 °मी खु] PāPuRT^{ac}, °मी क्खु RT^{pc} 115 मग्ग°] PāRT, मग्ज° Pu 119 अय्यो] RT (em. ?), आय्या PāPu 122 रामणीयकम्] RT (em. ?), रमणीयकं PāPu 124 °न्याम्र°] RT (em. ?), °न्यास्र° PāPu 125 °बिस°] RT (em. ?), °बिस° PāPu 125 °शर°] Pā^{pc}PuRT, °शिर° Pā^{ac}

पद्मिन्यो विहरत्सरोरुहरजोरक्ताङ्गभृङ्गाङ्गनाः ॥ १२ ॥

॥ पद्मिनीं निर्वर्णयन् ॥

अधःशास्त्रैरूर्ध्वस्थितविततमूलैः कमलिनी-

जलं धत्ते लक्ष्मीं पुलिनतरुषण्डैः प्रतिमितैः ।

इहान्तर्दृश्यन्ते विटपविनिविष्टाः क्षितिरुहां

विहङ्गाः खादन्तः फलशकलमुत्तानवदनाः ॥ १३ ॥

॥ बटुः ॥

अय्य, पेक्ख एयाणं मउअपवणंदोलिअविचित्तधयवडमंडिअमेरुगंडिआणि-
द्विसेसपासादभंतरविणिवेसिदाणं कणअमइआणं पज्झरंतरणिरंतरपहावित्थार-
गसुंदरवण्णाभरणभूसिआणं बुद्धपडिमाणं चंदणघणसारघुसिणमअणाहिविलेव-
णकुसुमधूवोवहारसामिद्धी । अहो अच्छरिअं !

॥ स्नात०, निर्वर्ण्य ॥

न खलु तपस्विजनमठिकास्थानमिदं, राजोद्यानमेतत् । कष्टं भोः कष्टम् !

विटपथिकलुण्ठ्यमानैर्वन्द्ये पथि जातगहनदिङ्गोहैः ।

अस्थाने क्षिप्यन्ते विविधानि धनानि धनवद्भिः ॥ १४ ॥

किलाप्रमाणे ऽप्यस्मिन्नागमे विषयसुखपराङ्मुखमनसां समाधिभावनाभ्यासस-
क्तानां यथा तथा कल्पितप्राणवृत्तीनां किमेवंविधैरनुपशान्तजनोचितैर्भोगसाध-
नविभवैः ?

॥ बटुः ॥

133 ff. आर्य, पश्य एतासां मृदुकपवनान्दोलितविचित्रध्वजपटमण्डितमेरुगण्डिकानिर्वि-
शेषप्रासादाभ्यन्तरविनिवेशितानां कनकमयीनां प्रक्षरन्निरन्तरप्रभाविस्तारकसुन्दरवर्णाभरण-
भूषितानां बुद्धप्रतिमानां चन्दनघनसारघुसृणमृगनाभिविलेपनकुसुमधूपोपहारसमृद्धीः । अहो
आश्चर्यम् ।

127 पद्मिनीं निर्वर्णयन्] em., पद्मिनी निर्वर्णयत् Pā, पद्मिनी निर्वर्णयत् Pu, पद्मिनीं
निर्वर्ण्य em. RT 128 ०रूर्ध्व०] RT (em. ?), ०रूर्ध्व० PāPu 128 ०वितत०] Pā^{pc}PuRT,
०विततत० Pā^{ac} 130 इहान्त०] PuRT, इहांभ० Pā 130 ०विनिविष्टाः] RT (em. ?),
०विनिविष्टा PāPu 133 अय्य पेक्ख] PāRT, अय्या पक्ख Pu 133 एयाणं] PāPu, ए-
आणं RT 133 ०मंडिअ०] PāPuRT^{pc}, ०मण्डिअ० RT^{ac} 133 ०गंडिआ०] PāPuRT^{pc},
०गण्डिआ० RT^{ac} 134 ०णिविसेस०] PāPuRT^{pc}, ०निद्विसेस० RT^{ac} 134 पज्झरंतर०]
RT (em. ?), पञ्जरंतर० PāPu 135 ०णिरंतरपहावित्थारग०] em. RT^{pc}, ०निरंतरपहावि-
त्थारग० RT^{ac}, ०णिएंतरपहाविस्थब्ज० (?) Pā, ०णिएंतरपहाविस्थद्ग० Pu 135 ०वण्णा०]
RT (em. ?), ०वअणा० PāPu 136 ०कुसुमधू०] em. RT, ०कुसूधू० Pā, ०कुसुधू० Pu
136 ०वोवहार०] conj., ०पोपहार० PāPuRT 138 तपस्वि०] RT (em. ?), तपस्वि०
PāPu 139 ०गहन०] PāRT, ०गहत० Pu

अय्य, पेक्ख पेक्ख, एदस्सिं धवलहरसिहरे सुरहिकुसुमधूवगंधपब्भारणिब्भ- 145
रभरिददसदिसामुहे एदे वंदआ भोअणोम्मुह व्व दीसंति ।

॥ स्नात० ॥

साधु लक्षितम् । तत् कदाचिदावां दृष्ट्वा स्वव्यापारयन्त्रणामनुभवेयुरेते भिक्षवः ।
तदिहैव लतामण्डपे तावदेभिरनुपलक्ष्यमाणौ क्षणं पश्याव एषां व्यवहारम् ।

॥ तथा कुरुतः ॥

150

॥ स्नातः, सकौतुकमवलोक्य ॥

अये, केनचिदपि भिक्षुसङ्गभोजनोन्मुखेन नापि स्नातम् ।

॥ बटुः ॥

चिट्टु ण्हाणं, अंबरपरिवत्तणमेत्तं पि ण कदं !

॥ स्नात०, निपुणं निर्वर्ण्य ॥

155

आचमनकल्पो ऽप्येषां शूद्रनिर्विशेषः । कथं चत्वारो वर्णा वर्णसङ्करा अपि वा
सर्व एवैकस्यां पङ्क्तौ भुञ्जते ! अहो रम्यमाश्रमव्रतम् !

॥ बटुः ॥

अय्य, ण इत्तिअं य्येव एदं । पेक्ख एदाण परिविसंतीण भक्खदाणोम्मुहाण
थोरथणमंडलाण दासीण विविहविब्भमा कडक्खा भिक्खुवयणेसु णिवडंति । एदं 160
च किं पि णिम्मलकलसणिक्खित्तं पाणयं उवणीदं ।

॥ स्नात० ॥

पङ्करसशब्दनिहृतमन्यव्यपदेशमत्र मधुपानम् ।

145 ff. आर्य, पश्य पश्य, एतस्मिन् धवलगृहशिखरे सुरभिकुसुमधूपगन्धप्राग्भारनिर्भरभ-
रितदशदिशामुखे एते वन्दका भोजनोन्मुखा इव दृश्यन्ते । 154 तिष्ठतु स्नानम्, अम्बरप-
रिवर्तनमात्रमपि न कृतम् ! 159 ff. आर्य, न इयदेवैतत् । पश्य, एतासां परिवेषयन्तीनां
भक्ष्यदानोन्मुखीनां स्थूलस्तनमण्डलाणां दासीनां विविधविभ्रमाः कटाक्षा भिक्षुवदनेषु निपत-
न्ति । एतच्च किमपि निर्मलकलशनिक्षिप्तं पानकमुपनीतम् ।

145 °धूव°] conj., °धूय° PāPuRT 145 °गंध°] PāPuRT^{pc}, °गन्ध° RT^{ac} 146
f. °णिब्भरभरिद°] PāRT, °णिब्भभरिद° Pu 146 भोअणोम्मुह] em., भाअणोम्मुहो
PāPu, भोअणोम्मुहा em.RT 146 दीसंति] PuRT, दीसंति Pā 152 भिक्षुसङ्गभोज-
नोन्मुखेन नापि] conj. Isaacson, भिक्षुसङ्गभोजनो दुःखेनापि PāPu, भिक्षुणा सङ्गभोज-
ने दुःखेनापि RT(em.?) 154 अंबर°] em., अंबर° PāPuRT 154 °परिवत्तण°]
RT^{pc}(em.?), °पडिवत्तण° PāPu, °परिवत्तन° RT^{ac} 156 शूद्र°] PuRT, सूद्र° Pā
159 इत्तिअं] em., इत्तिअ PāPuRT 159 एदाण] PāRT, एहाण Pu 160 °म्मुहाण
थो°] PāRT, °म्मुहाणा था° Pu 160 कडक्खा] RT(em.?), कडक्ख PāPu 160 णि-
वडंति] em., णिवडंता PāPu, णिपडंता RT(em.?) 161 पाणयं उवणीदं] em., पाण-
यमुवणीदं RT(em.?), पाणयसुवणीदं Pā^{pc}Pu, पायण° Pā^{ac} 163 पङ्क°] PāRT, पक°
Pu 163 °मन्यव्यप°] em.RT, °मद्यव्यप° PāPu

मांसाशनं च कोटित्रयरहितमहो तपःकृच्छ्रम् ॥ १५ ॥

॥ बटुः ॥

165

अय्य, पेक्ख पेक्ख, एसो भिक्खू

तिसिओ वि पिअइ ण तहा जीहाइ भमंतकुवलअं पाणं ।

दिट्ठीहि जहा दासीण विआसिअलोअणं वअणं ॥ १६ ॥

॥ स्यात० ॥

भवतु, दृष्टो वीतरागाणामाश्रमसमाचारः ।

170

॥ बटुः ॥

उज्याणेषु णिवासो सुलहं पाणं च सुलहमण्णं पि ।

ण य किं पि णियमदुक्खं धण्णो वंदत्तणं लहइ ॥ १७ ॥

॥ स्यात० ॥

अलमिदानीं परिहासेन । एष स महापण्डितः प्रसिद्धो धर्मोत्तरनामा भिक्षुः
कृताहारः प्रासादादवतीर्य तरोरधश्छायायां शाद्वलभुवमध्यास्ते । तदुपसर्पाव
एनम् ।

175

॥ ततः प्रविशति यथानिर्दिष्टो भिक्षुरुपासकश्च ॥

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

आयुष्मन्, अपि गृहीतं तद् भवता हृदये दयानिधेर्भगवतो बोधिसत्त्वस्योप-
देशजातम्?

180

॥ उपा० ॥

पुणो वि भदंतो अणुग्गहं करिस्सदि ।

॥ भिक्षुः, अग्रतो ऽवलोक्य ॥

अयमसावद्यापि ब्राह्मणयुवा स्थित एव । विवक्षोरिवास्य मुखं पश्यामि ।

185

166 ff. आर्य, पश्य पश्य, एष भिक्षुः तृषितो ऽपि पिबति न तथा जिह्वया भ्रमत्कुवलयं
पानम् । दृष्टिभिर्यथा दासीनां विकासितलोचनं वदनम् ॥ 172 f. उद्यानेषु निवासः सुलभं
पानं च सुलभमन्नमपि । न च किमपि नियमदुःखं धन्यो वन्दत्वं लभते ॥ 183 पुनरपि
भदन्तो ऽनुग्रहं करिष्यति ।

166 अय्य, पेक्ख] PāPuRT^{pc}, अय्य, पेक्ख RT^{ac} 167 °कुवलअं] PāPu, °कुवलयं
RT (em. ?) 168 दिट्ठीहि] conj., दिट्ठीइ PāPuRT 168 विआसिअ०] PāPu, विअसि-
अ० RT (em. ?, unmetrical) 168 वअणं] RT(em. ?), चअणं PāPu 172 उज्याणेषु]
em.RT, उज्या*णेषु Pā, उज्याणेषु Pu 172 अण्णं] PāRT, अणं Pu 173 °दुक्खं]
RT(em. ?), °दुक्खं PāPu (unmetrical) 173 धण्णो] PāRT, धणो Pu (unmetrical) 176
°रधश्छा०] PuRT, °रधच्छा० Pā 176 °भुवम्] em.RT, °भुवनम् PāPu 178 °नि-
दिष्टो] PāRT, °निर्दिष्टो Pu 179 भिक्षुः] PāRT, भिक्षु Pu 185 ब्राह्मण०] PuRT,
ब्राह्मण० Pā 185 विवक्षोरिवास्य] em.RT, विवक्षो एवास्य PāPu

॥ स्नात० , उपसृत्य ॥

भिक्षो , कुशलिनो भवन्तः? कच्चिदविघ्नमुपपद्यत इयमाश्रमचर्या?

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

स्वागतम् । अनुपहतेयं शाद्वलभूमिः । उपविश्यताम् ।

॥ स्नातः , उपविश्य ॥

190

किं पुनरस्योपदिष्टमाचार्येण यत्रैवं ग्रहणं पृच्छते?

॥ भिक्षुः , उपासकमुद्दिश्य ॥

ब्रूहि , यदेष पृच्छति ।

॥ स्नात० ॥

केयमवज्ञा उपासक ब्रूहीति? बटो , शृण्वस्य यदयमाचष्टे ।

195

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

ब्राह्मण , शृण्वस्मादिति ननु वक्तुं युक्तम् ।

॥ स्नात० ॥

भो रक्तपट , न खल्वाख्यातोपयोग इत्यस्य विषय एवंविधाः प्रलापाः । हन्त , नटस्य शृणोतीत्ययमेवात्र न्यायो युक्तः ।

200

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

अहो मौखर्यं द्विजन्मनो यस्य त्रिभुवनैकगुरोः परमकारुणिकस्य भगवतो बुद्धस्य (शासनं) प्रलापः!

॥ स्नातः , उपासकमुद्दिश्य ॥

त्वमपि कथय तावत् , किमनेन पाठितो ऽसि ।

205

॥ उपा० ॥

णं चत्वारि मे अय्यसच्चाइ गुरुणा उवदिट्टाइ दुक्खं समुदओ णिरोहो मग्गो त्ति ।

207 ननु चत्वारि म आर्यसत्यानि गुरुणा उपदिष्टानि , दुःखं समुदयो निरोधो मार्ग इति ।

199 A 1.4.29.

187 °पद्यत इयमा०] conj. , °पद्यते त इयमा० em.RT , °पद्यत तेयमा० PāPu 191 यत्रै-
वं] RT(em. ?), यत्रैव PāPu 194 स्नात०] PāPu , स्नात० , (स्वगतम्) em.RT 195 °म-
वज्ञा] em.RT , °मवक्त्रा PāPu 195 ब्रूहीति] PāPu , ब्रूहीति । (प्रकाशम्) em.RT 195 ब-
टो] PuRT , वटो Pā 195 शृण्वस्य यदयमाचष्टे] conj. , शृणुस्वयमयमाचष्टे PāPu; शृणुष्व
यमयमाचष्टे em.RT 197 ब्राह्मण] PuRT , ब्राह्मण Pā 200 युक्तः] RT(em. ?), युक्ते
PāPu 201 भिक्षुः] PāPu , भिक्षुः (स्वगतम्) em.RT 202 द्विजन्मनो] PāRT , द्विजन्म-
यो Pu 203 (शासनं)] conj. Sanderson , om. PāPuRT 205 पाठितो] em.RT , पठितो
PāPu 207 मग्गो] RT(em. ?), मग्ग PāPu

॥ स्नात० , सस्मितम् ॥

इदं तत्परमकारुणिकशासनम्? अयं च न प्रलापो यत्र नैरात्म्यदर्शनं श्रेयो- 210
मार्ग इति गीयते?

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

द्विजाते, अग्नीषोमीयादिपशुविशसनं श्रेयःसाधनं साध्वित्येतद्दृष्टिभावनाक-
लुषितान्तःकरणानां भवद्विधानां प्रलाप इवायमाभाति परमार्थोपदेशः ।

॥ स्नात० ॥

215

कथमयं दुराचारः शाक्यो वेदवाक्येष्वपि विवदते । किं कुर्मः? कस्याग्रतो
ब्रूमः? पतितसङ्घसम्बाध एवायं विहारो वर्तते ।

॥ दिशो ऽवलोक्य , सहर्षम् ॥

अहो बतामी विहारोद्यानदर्शनदोहदिनो ऽतिबहवः पुण्यैरत्रभवन्तो विश्वरूप-
प्रभृतयो महाविद्वांसः प्राश्निका उपस्थिताः । भवतु , लब्धो ऽवसरः पापानां 220
निग्रहस्य ।

॥ ततः प्रविशन्ति यथाविभवं प्राश्निकाः ॥

(॥ प्राश्निकाः ॥)

एष स्नातकसङ्कर्षण एष च भिक्षुधर्मोत्तरो विवदमानाविव वदनलक्ष्म्यैव लक्ष्ये-
ते । हन्त , पश्यामस्तावत् । 225

॥ गोष्ठीं परिक्रामन्ति ॥

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

स्वागतमार्याः , इहोपविश्यताम् ।

॥ इति शाद्वलभूमिं निर्दिशति ॥

॥ प्राश्निकाः , उपविश्य ॥ 230

213 f. cf. NM I 642.9-12: या तु अग्नीषोमीयादिपशुहिंसेतिकर्तव्यतांशस्था , यस्यां ऋत्वर्थो
हि शास्त्रादवगम्यत इति वैधी प्रवृत्तिः , तस्यामपि कारुणिको लोकः सविचिकित्सो भवति ।
वदति च , 'यत्र प्राणिवधो धर्मस्त्वधर्मस्तत्र कीदृशः?' इति । न चैतावता वेदस्याप्रामाण्यम् ।

210 च] em. , स PāPuRT 213 °विशसनं] RT(em. ?), °विशसनं PāPu 213 °त्ये-
तद्दृष्टि°] conj. Isaacson, °तितेदृष्टि° Pā, °तितद्दृष्टि° Pu, °ति तद्दृष्टि° RT(em. ?)
214 प्रलाप इवा°] conj. Isaacson, प्रलाप एवा° PāPuRT 216 विवदते] PāRT, विव-
दति Pu 217 ब्रूमः] em. RT, ब्रवीमः PāPu 217 °सम्बाध] RT(em. ?), संवाध PāPu
219 बतामी] PuRT, वतामी Pā 219 ऽतिबहवः] PuRT, ऽतिवहवः Pā 222 प्रविश-
न्ति] RT(em. ?), प्रविशति PāPu 223 (प्राश्निकाः)] em. RT, om. PāPu 224 °धर्मोत्त-
रो] RT(em. ?), °धर्मोत्तरौ PāPu 224 वदनलक्ष्म्यैव] em. RT, दवदनलक्ष्यैव PāPu,
दवदहनलक्ष्यौ conj. RT 225 पश्यामस्तावत् । गो°] RT(em. ?), पश्यामः । तावद्गो° PāPu

किमिह प्रस्तुतम्?

॥ इति भिक्षुं पृच्छन्ति ॥

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

अमुष्य यज्ञोपवीतिनो बोधिसत्त्वोपदेशः प्रलाप इवाभाति ।

॥ स्नात० ॥

235

अयमहमेष च भिक्षुः परीक्षकाः कृतधियो भवन्त इति ।

सारासारविचारे कुतो ऽन्य एवंविधो ऽवसरः ? ॥ १८ ॥

॥ प्राश्नि० ॥

न्याय्यं चेदभिधीयते परिमितं सिद्धान्तबीजं वचो

हेयं चेच्छलजातिनिग्रहपदप्रायं कथाडम्बरम् ।

240

नैवेर्ष्या हृदि वाचि नो परुषता न भ्रूविभेदो मुखे

साधूनां यदि वाद एष तदिमे सर्वत्र सभ्या वयम् ॥ १९ ॥

॥ भिक्षुस्नातकौ ॥

एवमेतद् यथार्याः समादिशन्ति ।

॥ प्राश्नि० ॥

245

तत् को ऽत्रभवतोः प्रथमपक्षवादी ?

॥ स्नातकः ॥

कृत एव भिक्षुणा पूर्वपक्षोपन्यास उपासकं प्रबोधयता ।

॥ भिक्षुः, स्नातकमुद्दिश्य ॥

अपि श्रुतं तद् भवता ?

250

॥ स्नात० ॥

श्रुतम् ।

240 cf. NM I 27.13-28.3: यच् च निग्रहस्थानपरिगणिता अपि हेत्वाभासाः पुनरुपदिश्यन्ते, तद् वादे चोदनीया भविष्यन्तीत्याशयेन । छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानि जल्पवितण्डोपकरणानि । तेषामवधृतस्वरूपाणां स्ववाक्ये परिवर्जनं, क्वचिदवसरे प्रयोगः, परयुक्तानां च प्रतिसमाधानमित्यादि शक्यक्रियम् ।; also NM II 635.1-3: तत्त्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षणं जल्पवितण्डयोः प्रयोजनमुक्तम् । तदङ्गभूतानि छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानि । यद्यपि च वादे केषांचिदभ्यनुज्ञानमस्ति, तथापि जल्पवितण्डे एव तेषां प्राचुर्येण क्षेत्रम् ।

232 पृच्छन्ति] em. RT, पृच्छति PāPu 234 बोधिसत्त्वो०] PuRT, बोधिसत्त्वो० Pā
236 भवन्त इति] PāPu, भवन्तः । इति RT (em. ?, unmetrical) 237 ०विचारे कुतो]
em. RT, ०विचारकुतो Pā, ०विचारं कुतो Pu 241 नैवेर्ष्या] conj. RT, न द्वेषो em. RT,
मानैवैषो PāPu 241 परुषता] PāRT, परुषती Pu 242 सभ्या] em. RT, सत्या PāPu,
सज्जा conj. RT 244 ०र्याः] PāRT, ०र्या Pu 246 ०भवतोः] PāRT, ०भवतो Pu
248 उपासकं] PāRT, उसासकं Pu

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

यद्येवं तदनुभाष्यताम् ।

॥ स्नात० ॥

255

बाढम् । सङ्क्षेपत एवानुभाष्यते तावत् ।

दुःखं तस्य निमित्तं तदुपरमस्तदुपपत्तये मार्गः ।

नैरात्म्यदर्शनाख्यस्तत्सिद्धिः क्षणिकतासिद्धेः ॥ २० ॥

तत् क्षणिकत्वं सत्त्वान् नाशं प्रति कारणानपेक्षत्वात् ।

स्मृत्यादिव्यवहारः सन्ताने हेतुफलभावात् ॥ २१ ॥

260

क्षणिको ऽपि न बाह्यो ऽर्थः कश्चित् संवित्तिविषयतां याति ।

आकारनिचयस्वचितं चकास्ति विज्ञानमेवेदम् ॥ २२ ॥

तस्मात् सर्वं शून्यं सर्वं क्षणिकं निरात्मकं सर्वम् ।

सर्वं दुःखमितीत्थं ध्यायन् निर्वाणमाप्नोति ॥ २३ ॥

॥ भिक्षुमुद्दिश्य ॥

265

अपि भवत्येवम् ?

॥ भिक्षुः, सावज्ञम् ॥

आं भवति सङ्क्षेपम् ।

॥ स्नात० ॥

तदत्रेदानीं श्रूयताम् ।

270

॥ प्राश्नि० ॥

अवहिताः स्मः ।

॥ स्नात० ॥

अयं यथोक्तः क्षणभङ्गसिद्धौ

सत्यां भवेदप्यपवर्गमार्गः ।

275

विचार्यमाणास्तु न नैपुणेन

स्पृशन्ति भावाः क्षणभङ्गुरत्वम् ॥ २४ ॥

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

256 बाढम्] PuRT, वाढं Pā 258 °दर्शना०] Pā^{pc}PuRT, °दर्शनाना० Pā^{ac} 258 °ख्य-
स्तत्सिद्धिः] Pā^{pc}PuRT, °ख्यस्ततां । स्नात Pā^{ac} 258 °सिद्धेः] PāRT, °सिद्धिः Pu
259 कारणा०] RT(em. ?), करणा० PāPu 261 संवित्ति०] Pā^{pc}PuRT, संस्मात् सर्वं
शून्यं सर्वं क्षणिकं निरात्मकं सर्ववित्ति० Pā^{ac} 264 सर्वं] PuRT, om.Pā 266 भवत्ये-
वम्] em.Isaacson, भवत्येवम् PāPuRT 267 ff. भिक्षुः...श्रूयताम्] om.Pā^{ac}, inserted
on the margin Pā^{pc} 272 अवहिताः] Pā^{pc}PuRT, अविहिताः Pā^{ac} 275 °प्यपवर्ग०]
PuRT, °प्यवर्ग० Pā 276 नैपुणेन] PāPuRT^{pc}, नेपुणेन RT^{ac}

कुतः ?

॥ स्रात° ॥

280

हेत्वभावादेव ।

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

ननूक्तो हेतुः सत्त्वादिति ।

॥ स्रातः ॥

सत्त्वाख्यं यदवादि मानमलसदृष्टान्तवन्ध्यात्मनः

285

सम्बन्धग्रहणं न शक्यमृजुना मार्गेण धूमाग्निवत् ।

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

यद्येवं ततः किम्? व्यतिरेकमुखेनापि व्याप्तिग्रहो व्याप्तिग्रह एव ।

नित्येभ्यः क्रमयौगपद्यविरहाद् व्यावर्तमानं पुन-

स्तत् सत्त्वं निदधीत भङ्गिषु पदं गत्यन्तरासम्भवात् ॥ २५ ॥

290

॥ स्रात° ॥

नित्येभ्य इव तेनैव व्यापकासम्भवेन ते ।

क्षणिकेभ्यो ऽपि भावेभ्यः सत्त्वं व्यावर्ततेतराम् ॥ २६ ॥

पश्य ,

उत्पद्य काञ्चिदपि यद्ययमारभेत

295

भावः क्रियां क्षणिकतां न तथा सतीयात् ।

तस्यात्मलाभसमनन्तरमेव मृत्यु-

285 ff. NM II 303.14-304.3 (*baudhapakṣa*): अतो यद्यपि कार्यहेतौ धूमाग्न्योरिव, स्व-
भावहेतावपि वा ऋचिद् वृक्षत्वशिशपात्वयोरिव पूर्वमिह साध्यसाधनधर्मयोर्ग्रहणं धर्म्यन्तरे
न वृत्तम्, तथापि साध्यधर्मिण्येव व्याप्तिग्रहणमुपपत्स्यते विपक्षव्यावृत्तेः सुपरिनिश्चितत्वात् ।
सैव च विपक्षाद्वावृत्तिः, स एव चास्य हेतोः स्वसाध्येनान्वयः । न ह्येवं सम्भवति, नित्येभ्य-
श्च व्यावृत्तं सत्त्वं, क्षणिकेषु च न निविष्टमिति, तृतीयराश्यभावात्, निराश्रयत्वानुपपत्तेश्च ।
289 f. NM II 300.1-6 (*baudhapakṣa*) भावानां हि सत्त्वं क्रमयौगपद्याभ्यां व्याप्तम् । नित्येषु
च पदार्थेषु व्यापकानुपलम्भनात् । तद्वाप्तमपि सत्त्वं हि बलात् तेभ्यो निवर्तते ॥ न च राशि-
स्तृतीयो ऽस्ति तेन गत्यन्तरक्षयात् । क्षणिकानेव तान् भावान् सत्त्वं समवलम्बते ॥ 295 ff.
NM II 323.11-15: कार्यकारणभाव एष भदन्तसिद्धान्ते दुरुपपादः । परोत्पत्तावव्याप्रियमाणमेव
यदि कारणमुच्यते सर्वं सर्वस्य कारणं स्यात् । न चालब्धात्मनस्तस्य व्यापारः परजन्मनि ।
लब्धात्मनस्तु व्यापारे स्थितिः सिद्धा क्षणान्तरे ॥

283 ननूक्तो] em. RT, नमुक्तो PāPu 284 ff. ॥ स्रातः ॥ सत्त्वाख्यं ... गत्यन्तरास-
म्भवात्] conj. Sanderson, ॥ स्रातः ॥ 25abcd ॥ भिक्षुः ॥ यद्येवं ... व्याप्तिग्रह एव ।
PāPuRT 285 °वन्ध्या°] em., °वन्द्या° PāPuRT 288 किम्] em. RT, किमा PāPu
290 सत्त्वं] em. Sanderson, तत्त्वं PāPu, तत्त्वं RT 293 क्षणिकेभ्यो] PāRT, क्षणिको-
भ्या Pu 293 व्यावर्ततेतराम्] em. RT, व्यावर्त्तेतरां PāPu 295 उत्पद्य] PāPu, उत्पाद्य
RT (em. ?)

क्रोडीकृतस्य करणावसरः कुतो ऽन्यः ? ॥ २७ ॥

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

क्षणभङ्गिषु भावेषु नन्वियानेव कार्यकारणभावः । इदं प्रतीत्येदं प्रतीयत इति 300
प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादमात्रम् ।

॥ स्नातः ॥

अस्त्यत्रान्यदपि वक्तव्यम् । तदास्ताम् । इदं तु ब्रूमः । अस्मिन् मते कारणत्वमेव
न तात्त्विकं भावानां विशेष उपादानकारणत्वात् ।

तत्र स्वकर्मफलभोगसमर्थनादि

ज्ञानेषु हेतुफलभावकृतं समग्रम् ।

हीयेत, हेतुफलभाव इहास्तु को ऽपि

ज्ञानान्तरेषु परसन्ततिजेषु तुल्यः ॥ २८ ॥

॥ भिक्षुः, अधोमुखो भूमिमालिखति ॥

॥ स्नात° ॥

कार्यकारणभावे वा सिद्धे ऽपि परमार्थतः ।

ज्ञानान्यत्वानपायात् का स्वकर्मफलभोक्ता ? ॥ २९ ॥

300 f. NM II 324.1-3: अथ ब्रूयात्—‘इदं प्रतीत्येदं प्रतीयत इतीदंप्रत्ययतामात्रमेव कार्यका-
रणभाव’ इति—तथापि लब्धात्मनः क्षणस्य प्रतीतिरिति द्वितीयक्षणावस्थानमपरिहार्यमेव ।
304 f. NM II 322.1-6: अपि च क्षणिकत्वे पदार्थानामिदमत्रोपादानकारणं, इदं सहकारिका-
रणमिति विशेषो ऽपि दुरवगमः । तथा हि—किमिदमुपादानं नाम? किं स्वसन्तानविनाशेन
बीजादिवत् कार्यजनकमुपादानम्, उत स्वविशेषसमर्पणेनोत्पादकमिति । यदि पूर्वः पक्षः,
परलोकचर्चा चार्वाकवदुपेक्षिता स्यात्, ज्ञानसन्तानविनाशेन ज्ञानान्तरारम्भप्रसङ्गात् ।; also
NM II 343.5-14: किंच नाङ्गीकरोषि त्वमात्मानं पारलौकिकम् । उपैषि परलोकं च विदितं
ते बकव्रतम् ॥ कर्म सन्तानिना ऽन्येन यत् कृतं चैत्यवन्दनम् । ततो ऽद्य फलमन्येन भुज्यते
ऽकृतकर्मणा ॥ न च निर्वृत्तिरप्यस्य चैत्यवन्दनकर्मणा । ज्ञानक्षणेन नैकेन किञ्चित् कर्म समा-
प्यते ॥ कार्यकारणभावश्च यस्त्वयोक्तः स दूषितः । कार्यकारणभावे ऽपि न ह्यन्यत्वं निवर्तते ॥
अनैकान्तिकता चास्य सन्तानान्तरबुद्धिभिः । उपादानत्वरूपो ऽपि विशेषः प्राङ् निराकृतः ॥;
also NM II 344.1-6: कर्मानुवृत्तिरप्येषा न चैकस्यास्ति कस्यचित् । कार्यकारणयोर्भेदात्कार्पा-
सकुसुमादिवत् ॥ अन्यत्रैव हि कर्म स्यादन्यत्रैव च तत्फलम् । न च सन्तानभोगाय कश्चित्
कर्मानुतिष्ठति ॥ फलमस्मान् ममैव स्यादिति सर्वः प्रवर्तते । सर्वथा शाक्यभिक्षुणां परलोको
विसंश्रुलः ॥

298 करणा°] em., करुणा° PāPuRT 303 अस्त्यत्रान्यदपि] PāPu, अस्त्यन्यदपि RT
(em. ?) 307 °भाव इहास्तु] conj. Isaacson, °भावकृतस्तु conj. RT, °भावफलवस्तु
PāPu 308 तुल्यः] PāRT, तुल्य Pu

अपि च, क्षणिका भावाः सत्त्वादिति साध्यविपर्ययसाधनाद् विरुद्धो ऽयं हेतुः ।

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

कथमिव ?

315

॥ स्यात् ॥

उक्तं क्षणिकानां नार्थक्रियाकारित्वमिति । स्थास्रवस्तु भावाः सहकारिसन्निधाने क्रमेण युगपद्वा निर्वर्तयितुमुत्सहन्त एवेत्यर्थक्रियाकारित्वमिति तत्स्थैर्यसिद्धिः ।

॥ भिक्षुः, तूष्णीमास्ते ॥

320

॥ स्यात् ॥

आत्महानिश्च भावानां हेत्वधीनात्मलाभवत् ।

अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ हि सदृशावुभयोरपि ॥ ३० ॥

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

नन्वन्यथासिद्धौ विनाशहेतावन्वयव्यतिरेकौ तस्य विसभागसन्ततिनिमित्तत्वात् । उत्पत्तिहेतावन्वयव्यतिरेकौ कार्यान्तराभावान् न तथा भवितुमर्हतः ।

325

॥ स्यात्, सस्मितम् ॥

किमिच्छया द्वेषेण वा ? कार्यान्तराभावो ऽपि केषाञ्चिन् मते दुर्भणो ऽभिव्यक्त्यादेः सम्भवात् ।

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

330

नोत्पत्तिहेतून् विरहय्य दृष्ट-

313 ff. NM II 325.5-10: अथवा लब्धात्मनः पदार्थस्य परोत्पत्तौ व्याप्रियमाणत्वेन कारकत्वावधारणाद् द्वित्रक्षणस्थायित्वमवश्यमनन्तरनीत्या भवेदिति प्रत्युत सत्त्वादक्षणिकत्वसिद्धेः विरुद्धो ऽयं हेतुः । अतश्चैवं नित्यानामेवार्थक्रियाकारित्वोपपत्तेः समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तभेदेन त्रिविधा कारणसामग्री परस्परसंसर्गमागत्य यथासन्निधानं कार्यं प्रसूत इति कृतं क्रमयौगपद्यविकल्पैस्तावकैः । 322 ff. NM II 327.5-8: नश्चरानश्चरत्वादिविकल्पास्तु न साधवः । सामग्यधीनः प्रध्वंसः भावानामात्मलाभवत् ॥ मुद्गरादिसामग्या घटस्य किं क्रियते ? मृत्पिण्डादिसामग्या किमस्य क्रियते ? आत्मलाभ इति चेत्, अनयाप्यात्महानं करिष्यते । 331 ff. NM II 327.13-15: कारकव्यापारकार्यत्वदर्शनादपर्यनुयोग एष इति चेत्, विनाशे च समः समाधिः, उत्पत्तिवद्विनाशस्यापि कारकान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायित्वात् ।

313 सत्त्वादिति] em. RT, सत्त्वादिभिः PāPu 313 विपर्ययः] em. RT, विपर्ययः PāPu 313 विरुद्धो] PāPuRT^{pc}, वरुद्धो RT^{ac} 317 स्थास्रवस्तु] em. Isaacson, स्थास्र वस्तु PāPuRT 318 धाने] em., धानेन PāPuRT 318 निर्वर्तयि] em. RT, निवर्तयि PāPu 319 तत्स्थैर्यः] RT (em. ?), तस्थैर्यः PāPu 323 व्यतिरेकौ] RT (em. ?), व्यतिरेको PāPu 325 नन्वन्यथा] em. RT, नन्वयथा PāPu 326 हेतावः] PāPuRT, हेतोवः Pā^{ac} 326 कार्यान्तराभाः] RT (em. ?), कार्यान्तरभाः PāPu 328 वा] PāPu^{pc}RT, का Pu^{ac} 331 हेतून् वि] em. RT, हेतुर्वि PāPu

मुत्पद्यमानं क्वचिदेव कार्यम् ।

॥ स्नात० ॥

विनाशहेतून् विरहय्य दृष्टं

किं वा विनश्यत् क्वचिदेव कार्यम्? ॥ ३१ ॥

335

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

ननु विनाशहेत्वसन्निधानान् मन्वन्तरेष्वपि कश्चिन् न विनश्येद् घट इति नि-
र्यासो भवेत् ।

॥ स्नात० , सोपहासम् ॥

कष्टं भोः कष्टम्, नित्यत्वे घटस्य सति समाप्ता लोकयात्रा, उत्सन्नाः प्रजाः,
उपस्थितो जगतां घट एव नित्यमृत्युः । यस्य हि नास्ति विनाशकारण-
माकाशादेरिव भवत्वसौ नित्यः, किं जातम्? न च नास्ति विनाशकारण-
मवयविनामवयवविभागादेरवश्यंभावित्वात् । अपि च रे मूढ, भवत्पक्षे ऽपि
घटक्षणसन्ततिरनुच्छिन्ना तथैव किं न दृश्यते? आगतं चेदस्यां विसभागस-
न्ततिकारणं हन्त तर्हि विनाशकारणमपि मत्पक्षे तथैवागमिष्यतीति स समानः
पन्थाः । तदयमीदृशः क्षणभङ्गपक्षः ।

340

॥ भिक्षुः, सलज्जमास्ते ॥

॥ उपा० ॥

अरे रे दुष्टबम्हण, कथं भदंतं अधिकिस्ववसि?

349 अरे रे दुष्टब्राह्मण, कथं भदन्तमधिक्षिपसि?

337 ff. NM II 328.3-12: ननु सापेक्षाणां भावानां नावश्यंभाविता भवेदिति घटस्य विनाशहे-
तुर्नोपनिपतेदपि कदाचिदित्येवमसौ किं नित्य एव भवत्विति—अहो महान्प्रमादः, उत्सन्नाः
प्रजाः, पतितो महान्वज्राशनिः, दुष्परिहरो ऽयं दोष उत्थितः । यदि घटो नित्यो भवेत्,
एष कालाग्निरुद्र इव त्रिभुवनमपि भस्मीकुर्यात् । अपि च रे मूढ, सावयवस्याश्रितस्य का-
र्यस्य च नूनमवयवविभागाद् आश्रयविनाशाद् वा यदा कदाचिद् भवितव्यमेव विनाशेनेति
कस्तन्नित्यत्वशङ्कावसरः? तथा हि न रामाभिषेककलशमद्य यावदनुवर्तमानमीश्वरवेश्मन्यपि
पश्यति लोक इत्यवश्यंभावी तस्य विनाशहेतुः । तस्मात् सहेतुको विनाश इति न स्वत एव
विनश्चरा भावाः ।

337 °त्वसन्नि०] em.RT, °तुसन्नि० PāPu 337 मन्वन्तरे०] em.RT, मत्वन्तरे० PāPu
338 भवेत्] RT(em.?), भावत् Pā, भावत् Pu 339 सोपहासम्] PāPu, om.RT 341
विनाश०] RT(em.?), विनास० PāPu 342 °कारणमा०] RT(em.?), °कारणआ० Pā,
°कारणं आ० Pu 342 नित्यः । किं जातम्?] conj.Sanderson-Dezsó, नित्यः । किं जा-
तम्? न च नास्ति विनाशकारणआ (°णमा० RT) काशादेरिवभवत्वसौनित्यः । किं जातम्?
PāPuRT 343 °देरव०] em.RT, °दिरव० PāPu 343 च] PuRT, व Pā 344 विस-
भाग०] em.RT, विभाग० PāPu 345 मत्पक्षे] PāPu^{pc}RT, मत्पक्षे Pu^{ac} 345 समानः]
RT(em.?), समान० PāPu 349 °बम्हण] RT(em.?), °वम्हण PāPu 349 कथं] Pā,
कथं Pu, कहं RT

॥ बटुः ॥

350

अरे रे वण्णसंकरा, उवज्झाअस्स एवं वाहरसि ?

॥ उपा० ॥

कस्स एसो उवज्झाओ ? णवरं एअस्स उट्टमुहस्स ।

॥ बटुः सक्रोधमुत्तिष्ठन्नुपासकमुखे चपेटां पातयितुमिच्छति ॥

॥ स्नातकभिक्षुप्राश्निकाः ॥

355

अलमलमतिचापलेन ।

॥ इति निवारयन्ति ॥

॥ स्नात० ॥

अपि च स्थैर्यग्राहिण्या स एवायमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञया बाधितो ऽयं हेतुः । तिष्ठतु वा प्रत्यभिज्ञा, यदिदमनिमेषदृष्टेरत्रुटितसत्ताकपदार्थग्राहि प्रत्यक्षं तदपि बाधकमेव । तस्मिंश्च तादृशि प्रत्यक्षे सति, यत् केचिदविचक्षणाः क्षणग्राहि प्रत्यक्षमाचक्षते तदपि प्रतिक्षिप्तमेव क्षणस्य दीर्घकालतानुपपत्तेरिह च तथा ग्रहणात् ।

360

॥ प्राश्नि० ॥

कृतं विस्तरेण ।

365

आकर्णितः कर्णसुखप्रदो ऽयं

त्वद्वर्णितः स्नातक नीतिमार्गः ।

तेन व्युदस्तः क्षणभङ्गवादो

विज्ञानवादे त्वभिधत्स्व किञ्चित् ॥ ३२ ॥

॥ स्नात० ॥

370

भिक्षो, श्रूयताम् ।

351 अरे रे वर्णसङ्कर, उपाध्यायस्यैवं व्याहरसि? 353 कस्यैष उपाध्यायः? केवलमस्योष्ट्रमुखस्य ।

359 ad *pratyabhijñā* cf. NM II 329 ff. 360 ff. NM II 338.8-9: अपि चानिमेषदृष्टेरत्रुटितसत्ताकस्तम्भादिपदार्थग्राहि प्रत्यक्षमुपपद्यते । तत् कथं क्षणिकग्राहि कथ्यते? 371 ff. NM II 496.11-14: यद्यपि ज्ञानमिदमयमर्थ इत्येवमाकारद्वयप्रतिभासो नास्ति तथाप्ययमेको ऽप्याकारः प्रतिभासमानः प्रकाश्य एव प्रतिभाति न प्रकाशकः । इदं नीलमिति ग्राहकाद्विच्छिन्न एव ग्राह्याकारो ऽवभासते न त्वहं नीलमिति तदैक्येनावभासो ऽस्ति ।

351 वर्ण०] RT (em. ?), वर्ण० PāPu 353 उवज्झाओ] RT (em. ?), उवस्ताओ (?) Pā, उवज्झाउ Pu 353 एअस्स] em., एस PāPuRT 353 उट्टमुहस्स] em. RT, उट्टमुहस्स PāPu 355 स्नातक०] RT (em. ?), स्नात० PāPu 356 f. °चापलेन । इति] em. RT, °चापलेति PāPu 359 प्रत्यभिज्ञया] em. RT, प्रत्यभिज्ञाया PāPu 359 बाधितो] RT, बाधितो PāPu

ग्राह्यग्राहकयोर्द्वयोरवगतिर्मा भून् ननूद्योततां
 ज्ञानात्मा स किमात्मनः प्रकटयत्याकारमन्यस्य वा ।
 नाहं नीलमिति प्रतीतिरिदमित्येषा तु सङ्गच्छते
 विच्छेदावगतिः परत्र तदयं ग्राह्यो ऽस्ति बाह्यो ध्रुवम् ॥ ३३ ॥
 ॥ भिक्षुः ॥

375

यद्यस्ति किं न संवेद्यते?

॥ स्यात् ० ॥

क एवाह न संवेद्यत इति? ननु संवेद्यत एव नीलमिदमिति ।

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

380

साधो, ज्ञानावभासो ऽयं ज्ञानस्य प्रकाशात्मकत्वात्, नार्थस्यावभासो ऽयं
 तस्य जडात्मकत्वात्, उभयावभासश्च नास्तीति त्वयाप्युक्तम् ।

॥ स्यात् ० ॥

ज्ञानमपि प्रकाशमानमन्यप्रकाशात्मकमेव प्रकाशते नात्मप्रकाशात्मकम् । प्रका-
 श्यप्रकाशो ह्यसौ प्रकाशो न प्रकाशप्रकाश एव । अयमेव हि प्रकार उद्योता-
 नाम् । तदुक्तं,

385

त्रयः प्रकाशाः स्वपरप्रकाशा

381 f. NM II 497.5-11 (*bauddhapakṣa*): ननु नैव ग्राह्यग्राहकयोरन्यत्वमिति यो ऽयं ग्रा-
 ह्याभास इति भवता ऽभ्युपगतस्स एव ग्राहकावभासः । ग्राहकादन्यो हि ग्राह्यो जडात्मा
 भवेत्, ग्राहकस्तु प्रकाशस्वभावो ग्राहकत्वादेव, द्वयप्रतिभासश्च नास्तीत्युक्तम्, तत्रान्यतर-
 स्य प्रतिभासने जडप्रकाशयोः कतरस्यावभासितुं युक्तमिति चिन्तायां, बलात् प्रकाश एव
 प्रकाशते न जडः । निराकारश्च न प्रकाशः प्रकाशत इति तस्मिन् साकारे प्रकाशयमाने कुतो
 जडात्मा तदतिरिक्तो ऽर्थः स्यात्? 384 ff. NM II 497.17-498.5: चक्षुर्जन्यो हि प्रका-
 शो नाम ज्ञानमुच्यते, न चागृहीतः प्रकाशः प्रकाशं प्रकाशयतीति—सत्यम्—चक्षुर्जन्यः
 प्रकाशो ज्ञानमिष्यते । स तु प्रकाशो रूपादिविषयप्रकाशः, न प्रकाशप्रकाशः । न हि चक्षुषा
 प्रकाशः प्रकाशते, अपि तु रूपं प्रकाशते । तत्र यद् रूपमुच्यते, स विषयो ग्राह्यः, यत्
 तत् प्रकाशत इत्युच्यते, स प्रकाशो ज्ञानं ग्राहकम् । तदुत्पत्तिमात्रेण च रूपं प्रकाशितं भव-
 तीति न प्रकाशो ग्रहणमपेक्षते । 386 ff. cf. NM II 499.16-500.10: ननु ज्ञानशब्ददीपाः
 त्रयः स्वपरप्रकाशा इत्याहुः—तदयुक्तम्—शब्ददीपयोः स्वग्रहणे ऽर्थप्रकाशने च सामग्यन्त-
 रसव्यपेक्षत्वात् । शब्दो ऽर्थप्रकाशने समयग्रहणमपेक्षते, स्वप्रकाशने तु श्रोत्रम् । दीपो ऽपि
 चक्षुराद्यपेक्ष एव गृह्यते ग्राहयति चार्थम् । इयांस्तु विशेषः—घटादिग्रहण आलोकसापेक्षं
 चक्षुः प्रवर्तते, आलोकग्रहणे तु निरपेक्षमिति । नैतावता दीपस्य स्वप्रकाशता स्यात् । इत्थं
 च मार्जारादिनक्तंचरचक्षुरपेक्षया सर्व एव घटादयः स्वप्रकाशाः स्युः । ज्ञानस्य परप्रकाशक-
 त्वमेव दृश्यते, न स्वप्रकाशत्वम्, अर्थप्रकाशकाले तदप्रकाशस्य दर्शितत्वात् । मुधैव तस्माद्
 भणितस्त एते त्रयः प्रकाशाः स्वपरप्रकाशाः ।

372 ननूद्योततां] em. Isaacson, ननु द्योततां PāPuRT 374 ०त्येषा] PāRT, ०त्येषां Pu
 379 ननु] RT (em. ?), न तु PāPu 386 उद्योतानाम्] RT (em. ?), उद्योतानां PāPu

इति । न तु तदानीं तत्त्वतो ज्ञानं प्रकाशते । नीलाद्याकारो हि प्रकाशते , न तु ज्ञानं नीलाद्याकारम् , अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां तस्य गोत्वादिवद् बोधरूपत्वानवधारणादिति ।

390

॥ भिक्षुस्तूष्णीमधोमुखो महीमालिखति ॥

॥ स्नात० ॥

भो अत्रभवन्तः प्राश्निकाः , कथयत कतरः पक्षो विराजते ?

॥ प्राश्नि० ॥

किमस्मान् पृच्छसि ? भिक्षुणैव मौनमवलम्बमानेन समर्थितो भवत्पक्षः ।

395

॥ स्नात० ॥

तद् वयमिदानीं स्नानाय गच्छामः । अनुज्ञातुमर्हथ । भवद्भिरपि दृष्टं प्रेक्षणकम् । इदानीं यथाभिमतमनुष्ठीयताम् ।

॥ भिक्षुमुद्दिश्य ॥

यद्येष परलोकाय भिक्षवो भवतां श्रमः ।

400

स्थीयतां कृतमेतेन तद्विपर्ययकारिणा ॥ ३४ ॥

अथ कौरुकुचीकूर्चडम्बरालम्बनात्मकः ।

जीविकार्थः प्रयत्नो ऽयं तद्यथेष्टं विधीयताम् ॥ ३५ ॥

॥ इति निष्क्रान्ताः सर्वे ॥

॥ प्रथमो ऽङ्कः ॥

405

388 ff. NM II 508.11-12: न च ज्ञानत्वं नाम सामान्यं ग्राह्यग्राहकयोरनुगतं । गोत्वमिव शाबलेयादौ विभाति ।

388 न तु तदा०] RT(em. ?), ननु तदा० Pā^{pc}Pu, तदा० Pā^{ac} 389 ज्ञानं] PāRT, ज्ञानं Pu 389 अन्वय०] PāRT, अत्वय० Pu 389 गोत्वादि०] em.RT, गोत्रादि० PāPu 389 ०द्बोध०] PāRT, ०द्बोध० Pu 390 ०त्वानवधारणादिति] conj., ०त्वावधारणादिति PāPuRT 397 अर्हथ] RT(em. ?), अर्हत PāPu 399 ०मुद्दिश्य] PāRT, ०मुद्दीश्य Pu 400 श्रमः] em.RT, प्रेमः PāPu 402 कौरुकुचीकूर्चडम्बरालम्बनात्मकः] em., कोभक्तुचीकूर्चडम्बरालम्बनात्मकः PāPu, कौरुकुचीकूर्चडम्बरालम्बनाशया em.RT

॥ ततः प्रविशति चेटः । चेटः ॥

ण पिवीयदि शीयला शुला

ण अ दाशीइ शमं लमीअदि ।

शुलहं च ण मंशभोयणं

विशमे बम्हणवाशए इदो ॥ १ ॥

ता किं कलीअदि? णस्ति य्येव णियभष्टके पलिहलिअ अप्पणा गब्भदाशाण गदी । आणं पि तारिशं भष्टके अवेष्कदि येशु ण खज्जदि ण पिज्जदि । जदो अज्य आणत्ते भष्टकेण हगे — अले कज्जलआ, गश्च पेक्ख खवणयवशदीए किं जिणरष्किदभिक्खू अस्ति ण व त्ति । ण अ जानामि कहिं शा खवणअवशदी ।

॥ परिक्रम्य वीथीमवलोकयन् सवितर्कम् ॥

एशु विस्तिण्णलुं चिदलोमकिंशालुविशलशवलिदा एदे पंशुकणा लष्कीअंति । ता एशु य्येव लुष्कगहणे खवणअवशदीए होदव्वं ।

॥ कतिचित् पदानि गत्वाग्रतो विलोक्य सहर्षम् ॥

2 ff. न पीयते शीतला सुरा न च दास्या समं रम्यते । सुलभं च न मांसभोजनं विषमे ब्राह्मणवासक इतः ॥ 6 ff. तत् किं क्रियते? नास्त्येव निजभट्टकान् परिहृत्यात्मना गर्भदासानां गतिः । आज्ञामपि तादृशीं भट्टको ऽपेक्षते (ऽवेक्षते?) यत्र न खाद्यते न पीयते । यतो ऽद्याज्ञप्तो भट्टकेनाहम् — अरे कज्जलक, गच्छ पश्य क्षपणकवसतौ किं जिणरक्षितभिक्खुरस्ति न वेत्ति । न च जानामि कुत्र सा क्षपणकवसतिः । 11 ff. अत्र विस्तीर्णलुच्चितलोमकिंशारुविसरशबलिता एते पांशुकणा लक्ष्यन्ते । तदत्रैव वृक्षगहने क्षपणकवसत्या भवितव्यम् ।

1 चेटः । चेटः] PāPu, चेटः RT(eyeskip) 3 शमं] em.RT, शेमी Pā^{ac}, शमी Pā^{pc}, शमी Pu 5 विशमे] conj., विशंचते PāPuRT^{ac}(unmetrical), विशंचये RT^{pc}(unmetrical) 5 बम्हणवाशए] conj.RT, वंम्हणवाशीइ PāPu 6 णस्ति] PāPu, णत्थि RT(em.?) 6 य्येव णिय°] Pā^{pc}Pu, य्येवा णिय° Pā^{ac}, य्येव वणिअ° RT(dittography) 6 अप्पणा] em.Isaacson, अप्पणो conj.Bhat, प्पणा Pā, प्पणा PuRT 6 °दाशाण] RT(em.?), °दासाण PāPu 7 आणं] PāPu, अण्णं RT(em.?) 7 अवेष्कदि येशु] conj., आविष्कदियसु PāPu, आविक्खदियसु RT(em.?) 7 पिज्जदि] Pu, पिज्ज*दि Pā, पिज्जदि RT 7 जदो] em., जदे PāPu, जाउ em.RT 8 अज्य] Pu, अज्य* Pā, अज्ज RT 8 आणत्ते] PāRT, आणत्वे Pu 8 गश्च] em., गच्च PāPu, गच्छ RT(em.?) 9 जिणरष्किदभिक्खू] Pā, जिणरष्किदभिक्खु Pu, जिणरक्खिदभिक्खू RT(em.?) 9 अस्ति] em., अत्ति PāPu, अत्थि RT(em.?) 9 ण अ] em., णे अ PāPuRT 9 कहिं] PāRT, कहि Pu 9 शा] em., सा PāPuRT 11 विस्तिण्ण°] conj., विस्तीए PāPuRT 11 °लोम°] conj.RT^{pc}, °भोम° PāPuRT^{ac} 11 °शवलिदा] em.RT, °सवलदा PāPu 11 लष्कीअंति] PāPu, लक्खीअंति RT(em.?) 12 लुष्क°] PāPu, लुक्ख° RT(em.?) 12 खवणअ°] PuRT, खवण्णअ° Pā 12 °वशदीए] em., °वशईप PāPu, °वशईए RT(em.?) 13 सहर्षम्] PāRT, सहर्षी Pu

इअं य्येव शा खवणअवशदी, जदो एशु णिलंतललदापंजलंधयाले लुष्कमूले
कुविदं खवणिअं पशादेते एशे खवणए दीशदि ।

15

॥ क्षणं निरूप्य ॥

अदिकोवणा खु एशा दुट्टा खवणिआ या चलणपडिदं पि एदं खवणययुआणं
पलिहलिअ दूलं गदा । एशे वि तवशशी पलुशवअणे खवणए दीशदि ।

॥ ततः प्रविशति पिच्छिकाहस्तः क्षपणकः । क्षपणकः, सास्रम् ॥

हद्धी, परलोए दुरासाए पढमं खवणत्तणं मए गहिअं । खलिदस्स तत्थ इण्हिं
दिट्टादिट्टा खु मे णट्टा, जदो एसा वि दुट्टा तावसी चलणपडिदस्स वि मे ण
पसीददि ।

20

॥ अक्षिणी प्रमृज्य ॥

अइ दुट्टा बंधइ गच्छ तुवं । किं तए विसरिसं कं वि खवणिअं ण पाविस्सं ?

॥ चेटः, विचिन्त्य ॥

25

जाव एशे खवणए मं ण पेक्खदि ताव हगे खवणिआवेशं कदुय एदं खवणअं
उवहशिश्शं ।

॥ आत्मानं निरूप्य ॥

14 f. इयमेव सा क्षपणकवसतिः, यतो ऽत्र निरन्तरलतापञ्जरान्धकारे वृक्षमूले कुपितां
क्षपणिकां प्रसादयन् एष क्षपणको दृश्यते । 17 f. अतिकोपना खल्वेषा दुष्टा क्षपणिका या
चरणपतितमप्येतं क्षपणकयुवानं परिहृत्य दूरं गता । एषो ऽपि तपस्वी परुषवदनः क्षपणको
दृश्यते । 20 ff. हा धिक्, परलोके दुराशया प्रथमं क्षपणत्वं मया गृहीतम् । खलितस्य
तत्रेदानीं दृष्टादृष्टाः खलु मे नष्टाः, यत एषापि दुष्टा तापसी चरणपतितस्यापि मे न प्रसीदति ।
24 अयि दुष्टे बन्धकि, गच्छ त्वम् । किं त्वया विसृष्टीं कामपि क्षपणिकां न प्राप्स्यामि ?
26 f. यावदेष क्षपणको मां न प्रेक्षते, तावदहं क्षपणिकावेशं कृत्वैतं क्षपणकमुपहसिष्यामि ।

14 इअं] em., इअ PāPuRT 14 शा] em., सा PāPu, शे conj.RT 14 °वश-
दी] RT(em.?), °वसदी PāPu 14 णिलंतल°] em., णिलंभल° PāPu, निलंत-
ले RT(em.?) 14 °धयाले] em.RT, °धयाते PāPu 14 लुष्क°] PāPu, लुक्ख°
RT(em.?) 15 कुविदं] em.RT, कुविदंठ PāPu 15 पशादेते] em., एसादेतो PāPu,
पशादेतो RT(em.?) 17 अदि°] em.RT, अधि° PāPu 17 एशा] em., एसा PāPuRT
18 पलि°] PāPu^{pe}RT, पहेलि° Pu^{ac} 18 पलुश°] RT(em.?), पलुसे PāPu 19 क्षप-
णकः । क्षपणकः] PāPu, क्षपणकः RT(eyeskip) 19 सास्रम्] PāPu, सास्रम् RT(typo)
20 हद्धी] RT(em.?), हद्धी (?) PāPu 20 खवणत्तणं] PāPu, खवणअत्तणं RT(em.?)
20 खलिदस्स] RT(em.?), खलिदस्सं PāPu 21 तावसी] RT(em.?), भावसी PāPu
24 बंधइ] PāRT, वंधई Pu 24 तए] PāPu, तुए RT(em.?) 24 कं] em., का PāPu,
कां RT(em.?) 24 खवणिअं] PāPuRT^{pe}, णवणिअं RT^{ac} 26 जाव] em.RT, जाद
PāPu 26 एशे] RT(em.?), एसे PāPu 26 °वेशं] em.RT, °वेसं PāPu 27 उवह-
शि°] RT(em.?), उवहसि° PāPu 28 निरूप्य] Pā^{pe}PuRT, निरूप्यं Pā^{ac}

लंबकण्णे खु हगे । ण आणणे मइशुलोमा मे उब्भिण्णा । ण य खवणियाण वेणिबंधे शीशे शंभावीयदि । ता शुअले मे खवणिआवेशे ।

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॥ तथा करोति । निरूप्य ॥

पिच्छिआमेत्तशुण्णे शंपदं मे खवणिआलूए वट्टदि ।

॥ अग्रतो ऽवलोक्य सहर्षम् ॥

शाहु, खवणिआए शंधालिदपलिच्चइअं पिच्छिअं गेण्हअ उवशप्पिइशं ।

॥ तथा कृत्वा ॥

35

अय्य, पणमामि । पलिइशंत म्हि शंपदं । ता आचक्खशु मं अज्ज कहिं भट्टके जिणरक्खिदभिक्खू वट्टदि ।

॥ क्षप०, साश्वासमात्मगतम् ॥

ण एस अत्तपरंमुहो व्व मे देवो लक्खीयदि । अण्णा खु एसा तरुणखवणिआ उवणदा ।

40

॥ प्रकाशम् ॥

अइ बालतवस्सिणि किं तुज्झ जिणरक्खिदभिक्खुणा? परिस्संता खु दीससि । ता इह य्येव णिज्जणे सिसिरलदागहणे उवविसिअ वीसम मुहुत्तअं ।

29 f. लम्बकर्णः खल्वहम् । नानने श्मश्रुलोमानि म उद्भिन्नानि । न च क्षपणिकाणां वेणी-
बन्धः शीर्षे सम्भाव्यते । तत्सुकरो मे क्षपणिकावेषः । 32 पिच्छिकामात्रशून्यं साम्प्रतं मे
क्षपणिकारूपं वर्तते । 34 साधु, क्षपणिकायाः सन्धारितपरित्यक्तां (?) पिच्छिकां गृही-
त्वोपसर्पिष्यामि । 36 f. आर्य, प्रणमामि । परिश्रान्तास्मि साम्प्रतम् । तदाचक्ष्व मामद्य
कुत्र भट्टको जिणरक्षितभिक्षुर्वर्तते । 39 f. नैतदात्मपराङ्मुखमिव मे दैवं लक्ष्यते । अन्या
खल्वेषा तरुणक्षपणिकोपनता । 42 f. अयि बालतपस्विनि, किं तव जिणरक्षितभिक्षुणा?
परिश्रान्ता खलु दृश्यसे । तदिहैव निर्जने शिशिरलतागहने उपविश्य विश्राम्य मुहूर्तकम् ।

29 लंबकण्णे] em., लंबकण्णो PāRT, लंबकणो Pu 29 आणणे मइशु०] conj., आणसम-
स्सु ॥ PāPu, आणणे श्मश्रु० em.RT 29 उब्भिण्णा] RT(em.?), उब्भिणा PāPu 29 ख-
वणियाण] PāPu, खवणिआणं RT(em.?) 30 ०बंधे] em., ०बंधो PāPuRT 30 शुअ-
ले] em., शुअलो PāPuRT 32 ०शुण्णे] RT(em.?), सुण्णे Pā, सुणे Pu 32 शंपदं]
em., संपदं PāPuRT 32 वट्टदि] em.RT^{pc}, वट्टदि PāPuRT^{ac} 34 शाहु] em.RT, शाणु
PāPu 34 ०आए] RT(em.?), ०आले PāPu 34 शंधालिदपलिच्चइअं] RT(conj.?),
शंधयालिदापलिच्चइअ PāPu 34 ०शप्पिइशं] em.RT, ०शप्पिस्सं PāPu 36 अय्य]
PāPu, अज्ज RT(em.?) 36 पलि०] RT(em.?), पेलि० PāPu 36 शंपदं] em.,
संपदं PāPu, संपदं em.RT 36 अज्ज] conj., अज्जो* Pā, अज्जो PuRT 36 कहिं]
PāRT, कहि Pu 37 जिणरक्खिदभिक्खू] PāRT^{pc}, जिणरक्खिदभिक्खु PuRT^{ac} 37 वट्ट-
दि] em.RT^{pc}, वट्टदि PāPuRT^{ac} 39 देवो] PāPu, दइवो RT(em.?) 39 लक्खीयदि]
PāPu, लक्खियदि RT(typo?) 39 एसा] RT(em.?), एशा PāPu 42 बालतवस्सि-
णि] em.RT, बालतरम्मिणि PāPu 42 दीससि] em., दीसदि PāPuRT 43 णिज्जणे]
RT(em.?), णिज्जणे PāPu 43 वीसम] em.RT, वीस PāPu

॥ चेटः ॥

कुदो मे णिच्चदुक्खिदाए मंदभग्गाए वीशामे ?

45

॥ क्षप० , सस्नेहम् ॥

किं इमस्सिं बालभावे वि ते दुक्खकारणं ?

॥ चेटः , निःश्वस्य ॥

अय्य , चिट्ठु एशे मह डड्ढवुत्तंते । जिणरक्खिदभिक्खुपउत्तिं मे आचक्खदु भवं ।

50

॥ क्षप० ॥

बालिए , एसो खु जिणरक्खिदभिक्खू अब्भंतरे अत्तसिस्साण मज्झे वक्खाणअं करंतो णिअग्गोहरुक्खमूले चिट्ठदि । तुवं पुण खणं उवविसिअ वण्णेहि दाव अत्तणो णिव्वेअकारणं ।

॥ चेटः , उपविश्य निःश्वस्य ॥

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अय्य , किं एशु शंशालहदाए लज्जाणिहाणे वण्णीयदि ?

॥ रोदिति ॥

॥ क्षप० , अक्षिणी चेटस्योत्पुंसयन् ॥

बालिए , वण्णेहि । हिअअणिद्विसेसो खु एसो जणो बालिआए ।

॥ चेटः ॥

60

बालकुमालिक य्येव पव्वजिद म्हि मंदभाइणी ।

॥ क्षप० ॥

45 कुतो मे नित्यदुःखिताया मन्दभाग्याया विश्रामः? 47 किमस्मिन् बालभावे ऽपि ते दुःखकारणम्? 49 आर्य, तिष्ठत्वेष मम दग्धवृत्तान्तः । जिनरक्षितभिक्षुप्रवृत्तिं मे आचष्टां भवान् । 52 बालिके, एष खलु जिनरक्षितभिक्षुरभ्यन्तर आत्मशिष्याणां मध्ये व्याख्यानकं कुर्वन् न्यग्रोधवृक्षमूले तिष्ठति । त्वं पुनः क्षणमुपविश्य वर्णय तावदात्मनो निर्वेदकारणम् । 56 आर्य, किमत्र संसारहताया लज्जानिधानं वर्णयते? 59 बालिके, वर्णय । हृदयनिर्विशेषः खलु एष जनो बालिकायाः । 61 बालकुमारिकैव प्रव्रजितास्मि मन्दभागिनी ।

45 °दुक्खि°] PāPu, °दुःखि° RT (em. ?) 45 °भग्गाए] PāRT, °भगाए Pu 45 वीशामे] em., वीशामो PāPuRT 48 निःश्वस्य] RT (em. ?), निःस्वस्य PāPu 49 अय्य] PāPu, अज्ज RT (em. ?) 49 डड्ढवु°] conj., डड्ढहु° Pā(?) Pu, दुट्ठवु° em. RT^{ac}, दुक्खवु° em. RT^{pc} 49 °रक्खिदभिक्खु°] PāRT, °रक्खेदभिक्खु° Pu 52 °भिक्खु] PāPuRT^{pc}, °भिक्खु RT^{ac} 52 मज्झे] em. RT, मस्ते PāPu 53 णिअग्गोह°] PāRT, णिअग्गेहे Pu 53 वण्णेहि] PāRT, वणेहि Pu 54 अत्तणो] PāRT, अत्तणो Pu 54 णिव्वेअ°] PāRT, णिव्वेअ° Pu 56 अय्य] PāPu, अज्ज RT (em. ?) 56 एशु] PāPu, एशे em. RT 56 °हदाए] em. RT, °हदए PāPu 56 °णिहाणे] PāPuRT^{ac}, °णिआणे conj. RT^{pc} 57 रोदिति] PāPu, om. RT 59 वण्णेहि] Pā^{pc}RT, वण्णेहि Pā^{ac}, वणेहि Pu

तदो उण ?

॥ चेटः ॥

तदो ईशीशिउभिज्यंतविललजुव्वणलक्खणाए अणिच्छंतीए य्येव मे अशि- 65
क्खिदमअणलशाए केण वि तल्लुणखवणएण शीलखंडणा कदा ।

॥ क्षप० , सहर्षमात्मगतम् ॥

अमअणइ य्येव मे उवणदा ।

॥ प्रकाशम् ॥

बालिए , ईरिस य्येव संसारट्टिदी । तदो उण ? 70

॥ चेटः ॥

अय्य , तदो कालंतले शणिअं शणिअं मुणिअमअणलशं मं पलिहलिअ शे
खवणए अण्णशिशं डड्ढमुट्टीए वुड्ढखवणिआए पशत्ते ।

॥ क्षप० ॥

तेण हि संमुहादो †शीओ† । पंगुलअंधणाअं करेम्ह । 75

॥ इति चेटं कण्ठे गृहीत्वा बलाच्चुम्बति ॥

॥ चेटः कृतकलज्जमधोमुखमास्ते ॥

॥ क्षप० ॥

63 ततः पुनः? 65 f. ततः ईषदीषदुद्धिद्यमानविरलयौवनलक्षणाया अनिच्छन्त्या एव
मे ऽशिक्षितमदनरसायाः केनापि तरुणक्षपणकेन शीलखण्डना कृता । 68 अमृतनद्येव मे
उपनता । 70 बालिके , ईदृश्येव संसारस्थितिः । ततः पुनः? 72 आर्य , ततः कालान्तरे
शनैः शनैर्जातमदनरसां मां परिहृत्य स क्षपणको ऽन्यस्यां दृढमुट्ट्यां वृद्धक्षपणिकायां प्रसक्तः ।
75 तेन हि सम्मुखतः (?) †...† । पङ्गुलान्धन्यायं करवाव ।

75 cf. NM II 390.5-6 (quoting *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 21): पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थः कैवल्यार्थः तथा
प्रधानस्य । पङ्गुवन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगः तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥

63 तदो] em. RT, ततो Pā, ततौ Pu 65 उभिज्यंत०] em., उभिज्य*न्न० Pā, उभि-
ज्यन्न० Pu, उभिज्जंत० em. RT 65 ०विलल०] em., ०विरल० em. RT, ०मविरल०
PāPu 65 अणिच्छंतीए] RT (em. ?), अणिच्छन्तीए PāPu 66 अशिक्षिदमअणलशाए]
em., असिक्खिदमअणलसाए PāPuRT 66 तल्लुण०] em., तरुण० PāPuRT 68 अ-
मअणइ] PāPuRT^{pc}, ०णई RT^{ac} 70 ईरिस य्येव] PāRT, ईरिसा य्यव Pu 70 ०ट्टि-
दी] PāPuRT^{pc}, ०ट्टिदि RT^{ac} 72 अय्य] PāPu, अज्ज RT (em. ?) 72 कालंतले]
em., कालंतए em. RT, कोलंतए PāPu 72 शणिअं शणिअं] em. RT^{pc}, सणिअं सणिअं
PāRT^{ac}, सणिअं स० Pu 72 मुणिअमअणलशं] em. RT^{pc}, मुणिअमअणलसं PāPuRT^{ac}
72 पलिहलिअ] RT (em. ?), पलिहे □ लिअ Pā, पलिहेलिअ Pu 73 शे खवणए] em.,
शेशवनए RT (em. ?), शेषवणए PāPu 73 अण्णशिशं] em., अण्णशिशं Pā, अण्णशिशं Pu,
अण्णस्सिं RT (em. ?) 73 पशत्ते] em., पशत्ते PāPuRT 75 संमुहादो] conj., समुहादो
RT (em. ?), शमुहादो PāPu

बालिए, किं मं ण पेक्खसि ?

॥ चेटः ॥

80

कहं णु पेक्खिइशं ? तए वि मं पलिहलिअ अण्णदो गंतव्वं ।

॥ क्षप० ॥

बालिए, मा एवं भण । दासवत्तणिअं ते करइस्सं ।

॥ चेटस्य वक्षसि हस्तं निक्षिप्य ॥

किं अज्ज वि ते थणआ ण उब्भिण्णा ?

85

॥ चेटः, सलज्जम् ॥

किं हदाशा कलिइशं ?

॥ क्षप० ,

नाभिमूले चेटस्य हस्तं निवेश्य पुरुषलक्षणमस्योपलक्ष्य
सविलक्षं सकोपं च ॥

90

हद्धी हदास, दढं तए खलीकदो म्हि ।

॥ प्रहर्तुमिच्छति ॥

॥ चेटः ॥

अले ले तावशकामुआ, जदि किं पि आचक्खशि ता जिणरक्खिदभिक्खुणो
फुक्कलइशं ।

95

॥ क्षप०, क्षणं विमृश्य चेटस्य पादयोः पतित्वा ॥

ण तए एसो परिहासो कस्स वि पगासिदव्वो ।

॥ चेटः ॥

79 बालिके, किं मां न प्रेक्षसे? 81 कथं नु प्रेक्षिष्ये? त्वयापि मां परिहृत्य अन्यतो
गन्तव्यम् । 83 बालिके, मैवं भण । दासवर्तनिकं ते करिष्यामि । 85 किं अद्यापि ते
स्तनकौ नोद्भिन्नौ? 87 किं हताशा करिष्यामि? 91 हा धिक्, हताश, दृढं त्वया
खलीकृतो ऽस्मि । 94 अरे रे तापसकामुक, यदि किमपि आचक्षे तदा जिनरक्षितभिक्षोः
फुत्करिष्यामि । 97 न त्वयैष परिहासः कस्यापि प्रकाशितव्यः ।

81 पेक्खिइशं] em. RT^{pc}, पेक्खिस्सं PāPuRT^{ac} 81 मं] RT(em. ?), म PāPu 81 अण्ण-
दो] RT(em. ?), अण्णतो Pā, अणतो Pu 83 दासवत्तणिअं] em. Bhat, दासवत्तिणिअं
PāPuRT 83 करइस्सं] em., कलइस्सं PāPu, कलयिस्सं RT(em. ?) 85 थणआ]
PāRT, घणआ Pu 85 उब्भिण्णा] PāRT, उब्भिणा Pu 90 सविलक्षं] em. RT, स-
विलक्ष्यं PāPu 91 हद्धी] RT(em. ?), हद्धी PāPu 91 हदास] em., हदाश PāPuRT
94 तावशं] em., तावस० PāPu, तापश० RT(em. ?) 94 आचक्खशि] em., आ-
चक्खसि PāPu, आचक्खशि RT(em. ?) 95 फुक्कलइशं] conj., पुत्कलइस्सं PāPu,
पुक्कलयिइशं conj. RT, पकलयिइशं conj. RT 96 पादयोः] PāRT, पादयो Pu 97 प-
गासिदव्वो] RT(em. ?), पगासिदवो PāPu

किं मे उक्कोचं?

॥ क्षप० पिच्छिकामूलादुद्धृत्य किमपि ददाति ।

100

॥ चेटः ॥

कदे पलिहाशे । पाविदे कहावणए । अधिगया भिष्कुणो पउत्ती । ता शंपदं गदुअ भष्टके विण्णवेमि ।

॥ परिक्रम्याग्रतो ऽवलोक्य च ॥

अज्य दिट्ठिआ वड्ढशि । आगदा दे हिअअवल्लहा ।

105

॥ ततः प्रविशति यथार्थक्षपणिका ।

क्षपणिकावेषं चेटं निरीक्ष्य सेर्ष्याकोपम् ॥

अइ दुट्टतावसि, एदं पारक्कं पिच्छिअं गेण्हअ कहिं गमीअदि ?

॥ चेटः ॥

अय्ये, गेण्ह एदं पिच्छियं । हगे उण अणिच्छंति य्येव एदशिशं लदागहणे एदिणा खवणएण खलीकदा । ण मे दोशे ।

110

॥ इति निष्क्रान्तः ॥

॥ क्षपणिका, क्षपणकनिकटमुपसृत्य ॥

अरे रे दुट्टकामुअ तावसीलंपट, पिच्छिआ मे विसुमरिद त्ति जाव पडिणि-

99 को म उक्कोचकः? 102 f. कृतः परिहासः । प्राप्तः कार्षापणकः । अधिगता भिक्षोः प्रवृत्तिः । तत् साम्प्रतं गत्वा भट्टकं विज्ञापयामि । 105 अद्य दिष्ट्या वर्धसे । आगता ते हृदयवल्लभा । 108 अयि दुष्टतापसि, एतां पारक्यां पिच्छिकां गृहीत्वा कुत्र गम्यते? 110 f. आर्ये, गृहाणैतां पिच्छिकाम् । अहं पुनरनिच्छन्त्येवैतस्मिन् लतागहन एतेन क्षपणकेन खलीकृता । न मे दोषः । 114 ff. अरे रे दुष्टकामुक तापसीलम्पट, पिच्छिका मे विस्मृतेति यावत् प्रतिनिवृत्यागतास्मि, तावदेतस्मिन्नन्तरे क्षणमात्रकेणैवैतस्मिन् लतागहने ऽन्या क्षपणिकालिङ्गिता । तत् साम्प्रतमनुभवात्मनो विनयस्य फलम् ।

99 उक्को०] em.RT, उत्को० PāPu 100 पिच्छिका०] Pā, पिच्छिका० Pu, पिच्छिका० em.RT 102 पलिहाशे] PuRT, पलिहाशो Pu 102 कहावणए] conj., कशेवणए RT(em.?), कसेवतए PāPu 102 भिष्कुणो] PāPu, भिक्खुणो RT(em.?) 102 शंपदं] PāPu, शंपदं RT(em.?) 104 ०ग्रतो] PāRT, ०ग्रतौ Pu 104 च] PāPu, om.RT 105 अज्य] Pu, अज्य* Pā, अज्ज RT(em.?) 105 वड्ढशि] em., वड्ढसि PāPuRT 106 ०णिका] em.RT, ०णिकाः PāPu 107 ०वेषं] PāPu, ०वेशं RT(em.?) 107 सेर्ष्या०] RT^{pc}(em.?), सेर्ष्य० PāPuRT^{ac} 108 दुट्ट०] PāRT, दुट्टं Pu 108 पारक्कं] em., पारक्कअं PāPuRT 108 गमीअदि] em., गम्मेअदि PāPu, गम्मिअदि RT 110 अय्ये] RT(em.?), अय्य PāPu 110 एदशिशं] PāRT, एदशिश Pu 111 f. दोशे । इति] em., दोसो त्ति PāPu, दोशो । इति em.RT 113 क्षपणिका] RT(em.?), क्षप० PāPu 114 अरे रे] PāPu, अरे RT(eyeskip)

वडिअ आगद म्हि ताव एदस्सिं अंतरे खणमेत्तएण य्येव एदस्सिं लदागहणे 115
(अण्णा खवणिआ आ)लिंगिदा । ता संपदं अणुहवसु अत्तणो विणअस्स फलं ।
॥ इति पिंछिकादण्डेन प्रहरति ॥

॥ क्षप० ॥

मा एवं संभावेदु भोदी । चेडओ खु एसो इत्थिआवेसं कदुअ मं उवहसिदुं 120
आगदो । तेण हदासेण कोविदा भोदी । जंसच्चं, कोसं ते पिवामि ।

॥ इति क्षपणिकायाः पादयोः पतति ॥

॥ क्षपणिका ॥

कुदो दे मुहे सच्चं, जस्स एसो उवसमो ?

॥ क्षप० ॥

अण्णं पि खेडुअं दुट्टचेडओ एसो करेदि । ता एदु भोदी अण्णतो गच्छम्ह । 125

॥ ससम्भ्रमम् ॥

एसो खु बम्हणो को वि इदो आगच्छंतो दीसदि । ता तुवरदु भोदी ।

॥ निष्क्रान्तौ ॥

॥ ततः प्रविशति स्नातको बटुञ्च ॥

(॥ स्नात० ॥)

130

कृता तावद् गोष्ठी सपदि निपुणम्मन्यमनसां
मदोष्माणं तेषामरुणवसनानां शमयितुम् ।
इदानीमिच्छामः कृपणमतिभिः क्रीडितुमिमे
कृपापात्रप्रायैरपि हि सह नग्नक्षपणकैः ॥ २ ॥

119 f. मैवं सम्भावयतु भवती । चेटकः खल्वेष स्त्रीवेषं कृत्वा मामुपहसितुमागतः । तेन हताशेन कोपिता भवती । यत्सत्यम्, कोशं ते पिबामि । 123 कुतः ते मुखे सत्यं यस्यैष उपशमः? 125 अन्यामपि क्रीडां दुष्टचेटक एष करोति । तदेतु भवती, अन्यतो गच्छाव । 127 एष खलु ब्राह्मणः को ऽपीत आगच्छन् दृश्यते । तत् त्वरतां भवती ।

115 °णिवडिअ] RT(em. ?), °णिवडिअ PāPu 115 म्हि] RT(em. ?), ह्यि PāPu 115 अंतरे] PāRT, अतरे Pu 115 य्येव] em.RT, य्येवए PāPu 116 (अण्णा खवणिआ आ°)] conj., om.PāPu, (खवणिआ आ°) em.RT 116 विणअस्स] PāPu, अविणअस्स RT(em. ?) 117 पिंछिका°] Pā, पिछिका° Pu, पिच्छिका° RT(em. ?) 119 मा] em.RT, मो PāPu 122 क्षपणिका] RT(em. ?), क्षप° PāPu 125 पि] PāPu, वि RT(em. ?) 125 करेदि] PāPu, करोदि RT(em. ?) 125 अण्णतो] Pā, अण्णदो RT(em. ?), अणतो Pu 127 बम्हणो] PāPu, बम् ऽ णो RT(typo) 128 ॥ निष्क्रान्तौ ॥] PāPu, ॥ निष्क्रान्तौ ॥ (प्रवेशकः)em.RT 130 (स्नात°)] em.RT, om.PāPu 131 गोष्ठी] RT(em. ?), गोष्ठी PāPu 131 सपदि] em.RT, सपसि PāPu, सदसि conj. Goodall 132 मदो°] RT(em. ?), मदौ° PāPu 132 तेषाम°] PāRT, तेषां म° Pu

॥ बटुः ॥

135

अय्यस्स सा कीडा । ताण उण तवस्सीण सव्वस्सणासो ।

॥ स्यात० , सस्मितम् ॥

यथाह भवान् । गावः पुत्रदारं गृहं क्षेत्रं कृषिवणिज्ये सर्वमेषां विनश्यति । किं हि दिगम्बराणां भिक्षाभुजां वृक्षमूलवासिनां सर्वस्वम् ?

॥ बटुः ॥

140

णं भणेमि । परलोयस्स कदे दारुणं दुक्खपब्भारं ते तवस्सिणो अणुहवंति । ता अय्यस्स सरस्सईपवाहे णिवडंति । ता अस्सिं आगमरुक्खए णिप्फलो य्येव एदाणं सो पआसो ।

॥ स्यात० ॥

अहो कारुणिको भवान् । भवतु , भवदनुरोधान् मृदु तेषु प्रभविष्यामः । तदेहि । प्राप्ता वयमेषामाश्रमपदम् । प्रविशामस्तावत् ।

145

॥ परिक्रामतः । स्यात० , अग्रतो ऽवलोक्य ॥

अयं स न्यग्रोधतरुच्छायायामनेकशिष्यगणोपास्यमानः किमपि व्याचक्षाण इव जिनरक्षितभिक्षुरास्ते ।

॥ ततः प्रविशति यथानिर्दिष्टः क्षपणकभिक्षुः । (भिक्षुः) , स्वगतम् ॥

150

अहो दुरतिक्रमः संसारचक्रपरिवृत्तिक्रमः ।

निषिद्धं यत्नेनाप्यनुसरति तानेव विषया-

न्न तेषां वैषम्यं विमृशति विपाके बहुविधम् ।

न विद्यः किं कुर्मो विशति न शिवे वर्त्मनि मनो

न शाम्यत्येवैषा निरवधिरविद्या भगवती ॥ ३ ॥

155

॥ विचिन्त्य ॥

136 आर्यस्य सा क्रीडा । तेषां पुनः तपस्विनां सर्वस्वनाशः । 141 ff. ननु भणामि । परलोकस्य कृते दारुणं दुःखप्राग्भारं ते तपस्विनो ऽनुभवन्ति । तदार्यस्य सरस्वतीप्रवाहे निपतन्ति । तदस्मिन्नागमवृक्षके निष्फल एवैतेषां स प्रयासः ।

136 अय्यस्स] PāPu, अज्जस्स RT(em.?) 138 °दारं] em., °दारा PāPuRT 141 तवस्सिणो] PāRT, तवस्सिणे Pu 141 अणु°] Pā^{pc}PuRT, आणु° Pā^{ac} 142 अय्यस्स] PāPu, अज्जस्स RT(em.?) 142 सरस्सई°] PāRT, सरस्सइ° Pu 142 ता अस्सिं] conj., तस्सिं PāRT, तस्सि Pu 142 णिप्फलो] em.RT, णिष्फलो Pā^{pc}(?), णिष्फल्ये Pā^{ac}(?) Pu 143 सो] PāRT, से Pu 143 पआसो] PāRT, पेआसो Pu 145 कारु°] RT(em.?), कास° PāPu 147 परिक्रा°] PuRT, परिका° Pā 150 क्षपणकभिक्षुः । (भिक्षुः), स्वगतम्] conj., क्षपणकभिक्षुः । स्वगतम् PāPu, क्षपणकभिक्षुः (सशिष्यः) । भिक्षुः । आत्मगतम् । em.RT 153 °न्न] em.RT, °नु PāPu 153 वैषम्यं] em.RT, वैशद्यं PāPu 155 निरवधि°] PāPuRT^{pc}, निरवधि° RT^{ac}

तथापि यथाशक्ति तपस्विनो दिवानिशमनुशास्या एवामी भिक्षवः ।

॥ प्रकाशम् ॥

भो भिक्षवा,

पहरइ कयंतवाहो विसमा संसारवाउरापासा ।

कह तरउ जीअहरिणो पज्जलियं दुक्खरणमिणं ॥ ४ ॥

160

अहवा,

जिणचरणसुमरणोग्गयणिसग्गसुइपुण्णपुग्गलबलाणं ।

कुविदो वि किं करिस्सिदि असरणसूरो हयकयंतो ॥ ५ ॥

ता संपदं

झाइज्जदि जिणवअणं तवणियमेहिं खविज्जइ सरीरं ।

इत्तियमेत्तं गिण्हह उवएसरहस्ससव्वस्सं ॥ ६ ॥

165

॥ शिष्याः ॥

जं भट्टके आणवेदि ।

॥ स्नात०, उपसृत्य सविनयम् ॥

170

अपि कुशलिनः शिष्यपरिषदा सह भवन्तः ?

॥ भिक्षुः, सवितर्कं स्वगतम् ॥

अयमसौ स्नातकः सङ्कर्षणः सौगतानभिभूय साम्प्रतमस्मान् परिवुभूषुरिहागतः । तदपसरणमेवात्र श्रेयः । दुर्विषहमस्य पौरुषम्, अपूर्वेषा वक्तृशक्तिः प्रज्ञा च ।

175

159 ff भो भिक्षवः, प्रहरति कृतान्तव्याधो विषमाः संसारवागुरापाशाः । कथं तरतु जीवहरिणः प्रज्वलितं दुःखारण्यमिदम् ॥ 162 ff. अथवा, जिनचरणस्मरणोद्गतनिसर्गशुचिपूर्णं (पुण्य?) पुद्गलबलानाम् । कुपितो ऽपि किं करिष्यत्यशरणशूरो हतकृतान्तः ॥ 165 ff. तत् साम्प्रतम्, ध्यायते जिनवचनं तपोनियमैः क्षप्यते शरीरम् । एतावन्मात्रं गृहीतोपदेशरहस्यसर्वस्वम् ॥ 169 यद् भट्टक आज्ञापयति ।

157 °शास्या] RT(em. ?), °शाम्या PāPu 160 °वाउरा°] em.RT, °चाउरा° PāPu 161 पज्जलियं] PuRT, पज्ज*लियं Pā 161 °रण्ण°] PāRT, °रण° Pu 163 जिण°] PāPu, जिन° RT(typo) 163 °सुम°] Pā^{pc}PuRT, °सुह° Pā^{ac} 163 °णिसग्ग°] PāPuRT^{pc}, °निसग्ग° RT^{ac} 163 °पुण्णपुग्गलबलाणं] conj., °पुण्णपु[[व]]लवलाणं Pā, °पुण्णपुन्नवन्नाणं Pu, °पुण्णबलाणं em.RT^{ac}, °पुण्णपुण्णबलाणं em.RT^{pc} 164 करिस्सिदि] PāPu, करिस्सिदि RT(em. ?) 166 झाइज्जदि] RT(em. ?), झाइज्ज*दि Pā, - - - इज्जदि Pu (The lacuna is marked by one dash in the manuscript.) 166 °मेहिं] PāRT, °मेहि Pu 166 खविज्जइ] PuRT, खविज्ज*इ Pā 166 सरीरं] PāPuRT^{pc}, सरीरम् RT^{ac} 167 रहस्ससव्व°] PāRT, रहस्सव्व° Pu 172 स्वगतम्] RT(em. ?), स्वग] PāPu 173 स्नातकः सङ्कर्षणः] RT(em. ?), स्नातकसङ्कर्षण PāPu 173 सौग°] PāRT, सौग° Pu 173 °मस्मान्] em.RT, °मस्मात् PāPu 174 वक्तृ°] RT(em. ?), चक्तृ° PāPu

॥ प्रकाशम् ॥

स्वागतमार्यस्य । इत उपविश्यताम् । कुशलम् ।

॥ स्नात० ॥

किमत्र प्रस्तुतम्?

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

180

किमत्र संसारगहने प्रस्तूयते? यदि सन्तरणोपायः कोऽपि प्राप्यते ।

॥ स्नात० ॥

ननु गृहीत एवात्रभवद्भिरुपायः । तथा हि ,

न हिंसा नासत्यं न गृहधनवासव्यसनिता

न सक्तिर्व्यापारे क्वचिदपि भवानन्तरफले ।

185

तपश्चेदं तीव्रं व्रतनियमसम्बाधमनघं

ग्रहीतव्या कान्या सरणिरिह संसारतरणे ॥ ७ ॥

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

अनुकूलालापपेशलैव भवादृशां निर्मिता प्रजापतिना रसना ।

॥ स्नात० ॥

190

भिक्षो , तथाप्युच्यतां कः प्रदेशो व्याख्यातुमुपक्रान्त इति ।

॥ भिक्षुः ॥

महदत्र कौतुकम्? आर्हतानामनेकान्तवाद एव गृहकृत्यम् । स एव चेह प्रस्तु-
तः ।

॥ स्नात० ॥

195

भिक्षो , यदुच्यते ,

एको भावः सर्वभावस्वभावः

सर्वे भावा एकभावस्वभावाः ।

एको भावस्तत्त्वतो येन दृष्टः

सर्वे भावास्तत्त्वतस्तेन दृष्टाः ॥ ८ ॥

200

इति , तत्रेदमिह भवन्तं पृच्छामः ,

183 °भव०] PāPu^pRT, °वव० Pu^{ac} 184 हिंसा नासत्यं] PuRT, हिंसानामसत्यं Pā
184 °धन०] conj., °वन० PāPuRT 185 सक्ति०] conj. Isaacson, शक्ति० PāPuRT
185 क्वचिदपि] Pā^pPuRT, क्वदाचिदपि Pā^{ac} 185 भवान०] PuRT, भवने० Pā 187
कान्या] RT(em. ?), कात्या PāPu 189 अनुकूलालापपेशलैव] em. RT, अनुकूललाप-
पेशले च Pā^pPu, अनुकूललापे पेशले च Pā^{ac} 189 भवादृशां] PāRT, भवादृशां Pu
193 कौतुकम्] PāRT, कौतुकम् Pu 194 प्रस्तुतः] PāRT, प्रसृतः Pu 196 यदुच्यते]
em. RT, यमुच्यते PāPu 199 दृष्टः] PāRT, दष्टः Pu

एको भावश्चेत् सर्वभावस्वभावो

लोकः कार्यार्थी कुत्र कं वा नियुङ्गाम् ।

स्वे स्वे कार्ये चेदस्ति भावव्यवस्था

नैको भावः स्यात् सर्वभावस्वभावः ॥ १ ॥

205

रूपं यद्यपि भावानां तुल्यं किमपि दृश्यते ।

तथाप्यनन्यगाम्येषामस्ति प्रातिस्विकं वपुः ॥ १० ॥

एवं त्वनिष्यमाणे ऽस्मिन् पदार्थनियमे जनः ।

नादृष्टार्था न दृष्टार्थामारभेत क्वचित् क्रियाम् ॥ ११ ॥

॥ भिक्षुः संज्ञया शिष्यं निर्दिशति ॥

210

॥ शिष्यः, साकूतम् ॥

भष्टका, भिक्खवा विण्णवंति चिलायदि भष्टके, ता संपदं अम्ह पत्थुदकज्ज-
वेला अदिक्कमदि त्ति ।

॥ भिक्षुः, स्रातकं प्रति ॥

आर्य, भिक्षुकार्यमवसीदति । तद्भवन्तः प्रमाणम् ।

215

॥ स्रात० ॥

भिक्षो, यथामतमनुष्ठीयताम् ।

॥ भिक्षुः, शिष्यानुद्दिश्य ॥

अरे रे तुरिदतुरिदं गडुय भिक्खूणं भण, जहा अप्पमत्ता खणं तत्थ य्येव
विलंबध, एस आगदो म्हि त्ति ।

220

॥ निष्क्रान्तः सशिष्यो भिक्षुः ॥

॥ स्रात० ॥

212 f. भट्टक, भिक्षवो विज्ञापयन्ति, चिरायते भट्टकः । तत् साम्प्रतमस्माकं प्रस्तुतकार्यवे-
लातिक्रामतीति । 219 f. अरे रे त्वरितत्वरितं गत्वा भिक्षूणां भण यथाप्रमत्ताः क्षणं तत्रैव
विलम्बध्वम्, एष आगतो ऽस्मीति ।

203 नियुङ्गाम्] em. RT, नियुक्तात् PāPu 205 °भावस्वभावः] RT(em. ?), °भावः स्व-
भावः PāPu 207 °न्यगा०] Pā^{pc}PuRT, °न्यया Pā^{ac} 207 प्राति०] em. RT, प्रति०
PāPu 208 त्वनिष्यमाणे] PāPu, त्वन्विष्यमाणे RT(em. ?) 208 °नियमे] em. RT,
°नियमो PāPu 209 नादृष्टार्था न] conj. Isaacson, न दृष्टार्थेन PāRT, न दृष्टार्थेन Pu
211 साकूतम्] PāRT, साकूतम् Pu 212 विण्णवंति] PuRT, विण्णवंति(?) Pā 212 चि-
लायदि] em. RT, विलायदि PāPu 212 संपदं] PāPu, सपदं RT(typo?) 212 अम्ह]
PāPu, अम्हे RT(em. ?) 213 °कज्ज०] °कज्ज० PuRT, °कज्ज*° Pā 213 अदिक्क-
मदि] RT(em. ?), अदिष्कमदि PāPu 213 त्ति] RT(em. ?), त्ति । न PāPu 215 भिक्षु-
कार्यम०] em. RT, भिक्षुः । कार्यम० PāPu^{pc}, भिक्षुः । कार्यभ० Pu^{ac} 219 य्येव] PāPu,
य्येव RT(em. ?) 220 आगदो म्हि] RT(em. ?), आगदु म्हि PāPu

बटो, दृष्टमस्य भवता दिगम्बरस्य वैदग्ध्यम् ।

॥ बटुः ॥

अय्य, को तुज्झ वादसमरे संमुहो द्वाढुं सङ्कुणोदि? ता इमिणा ववएसपला- 225
यणेण रक्खिदो णेण अप्पा ।

॥ स्यात० ॥

किमस्माभिरस्य लगुडैः प्रहर्तव्यम्? वस्तु ज्ञातव्यम् । तच्च ज्ञातमेव । अस्मा-
भिस्तु त्वदनुरोधादेव नात्र कार्कश्येन व्यवहृतम् ।

॥ बटुः ॥

230

मउओ वि हडइ हिअअं वादब्भिडिआण अय्यवाहारो ।

मीणाण थलगयाण †ए भावो सिसिरे विस्तरस्स† ॥ १२ ॥

॥ स्यात० ॥

बटो, तत् क्लेदानीं गम्यताम्?

॥ बटुः ॥

235

णं ण्हाढुं कीस ण गमीयदि?

॥ स्यात० । सस्मितम् ॥

किं बुभुक्षितो वर्तसे?

॥ ऊर्ध्वमवलोक्य ॥

कः खल्वधुनैव स्नानस्य कालः? तद् वरमिहैवार्हतवसतिवनगहने मुहुर्विहरा- 240
मः ।

॥ बटुः ॥

एवं करीयदु ।

॥ उत्थाय परिक्रामतः ।

॥ स्यात० । अग्रतो ऽवलोक्य सविस्मयम् ॥

245

225 f. आर्य, कस्तव वादसमरे सम्मुखः स्थातुं शक्नोति? तदनेन व्यपदेशपलायनेन रक्षितो
ऽनेनात्मा । 231 f. मृदुको ऽपि घट्टते हृदयं वादनियुक्तानाम्(?) आर्यव्याहारः । मीनानां
स्थलगतानां †...† 236 ननु स्नातुं कस्मान् न गम्यते? 243 एवं क्रियताम् ।

223 ०मस्य भवता] Pā, ०मस्यभवतां Pu, ०मत्रभवतोem.RT 225 तुज्झ] PāRT, तुम्ह
Pu 225 इमिणा] PāPuRT^{pc}, इमिना RT^{ac} 225 ववएस०] em.RT, धवएस० PāPu
226 णेण] em.RT, णे PāPu 229 अस्माभिस्तु] em., अस्माभिस्त्व PāPu, अस्मा-
भिः । तत् em.RT 229 कार्क०] em.RT, काकी० PāPu 232 मीणाण] RT(em.?),
मीणेण PāPu 232 ०गयाण] RT(em.?), ०गायाण PāPu 236 कीस ण] conj., ण
कीस PāPuRT 236 गमीयदि] em., गम्मीयदि PāPuRT 237 स्यात० । सस्मितम्]
RT(em.?), स्यात । सस्यात । सस्मितं PāPu

अहो रम्यः प्रशमसमुचितो ऽयमुद्देशः । तथा हि ,
 घनस्रिग्धच्छायं वनमिदमिमाः शाद्वलभुवः
 पयश्चेदं पुष्पोत्करसुरभयो वायव इमे ।
 मृगाणामत्रामी विहरणविलासा बहुविधाः
 खगानां चानेकस्वरविसरभिन्ना विरुतयः ॥ १३ ॥

250

॥ विचिन्त्य ॥

इहारण्ये पुण्ये यदि भवति वेदान्तनिरतो
 निवृत्ताशीरात्मा नियमितमनोवृत्तिनिवहः ।
 दिनैरल्पैरेव व्यपगतभवाध्वमजवं
 ध्रुवं नित्यानन्दं किमपि परमं धाम लभते ॥ १४ ॥

255

॥ नेपथ्ये ॥

वेयंता दुत्तरंता तइकहियकहावित्थरा संकुलत्था
 अय्येहिं तत्थ चिंतीयदि गहणगदी अत्थि णत्थित्ति अप्पा ।
 दूरे चिट्ठंतु ते मे परिहरिदुमिदं घोरसंसारदुक्खं
 संक्खित्तं णिम्मलत्थं जिणमुणिभणित्तं आगमं आहरम्हा ॥ १५ ॥

260

॥ बटुः ॥

अय्य, एसो खु कासाअवसणो तावसो ईरिसं किं पि मंतंतो तुरिदतुरिदं
 परिक्कामदि ।

॥ ततः प्रविशति तापसः ॥

॥ तापसो वेअन्ता इति पठन् परिक्रामति ॥

265

॥ बटुः ॥

अज्ज वि जिणसासणे य्येव एयाण अहिणिवेसो ?

॥ स्यात् ॥

257 ff. वेदान्ता दुस्तरान्ताः, त्रयीकथितकथाविस्तराः संकुलार्थाः, आर्यैः तत्र चिन्त्यते ग-
 हनगतिरस्ति नास्तीत्यात्मा । दूरे तिष्ठन्तु ते मे । परिहर्तुमिदं घोरसंसारदुःखं संक्षिप्तं निर्मलार्थं
 जिनमुनिभणितमागममाधराम । 262 f. आर्य, एष खलु काषायवसनः तापस ईदृक् किमपि
 मन्त्रयन् त्वरितत्वरितं परिक्रामति । 267 अद्यापि जिनशासन एवैतेषामभिनिवेशः ?

248 पुष्पो०] RT(em. ?), पुष्पा० PāPu 252 भवति] भवति PuRT, सवन्ति Pā 254
 ०भवाध्व०] PāRT, ०भभाध्व० Pu 257 तइ०] em.RT, दुइ० PāPu 258 गहण०]
 RT(em. ?), गहन० PāPu 259 परिहरि०] RT(em. ?), परिहर० PāPu 260 आह-
 रम्हा] RT(em. ?), आहरंम्हा PāPu 262 ईरिसं] PāRT, इरिसं Pu 264 f. ताप-
 सः । तापसो] PāPu, तापसः । RT 267 जिणसासणे] RT(em. ?), जिणसासण PāPu
 267 अहिणिवेसो] em.RT, अहिणिविसो PāPu

बटो, तिष्ठत्वेतत् । किमनेन ? अन्यदेवैनं पृच्छामः ।

॥ तापसमुद्दिश्य ॥

270

भोस्तपोधन, क्लेदमाकुलाकुलमिव गम्यते भवता ?

॥ ताप० ॥

बम्हणो खु तुवं । ता किं अत्तणो भुक्खावेअणं ण आणासि ?

॥ स्नात० ॥

किं भवान् भोक्तुं प्रस्थितः ?

275

॥ ताप० ॥

अध इं ?

॥ स्नात० ॥

क उद्देशो गन्तव्यः ?

॥ ताप० ॥

280

णं इह य्येव जिणरक्खिदभिक्षुतवोवणे अज्ज महाभोअणं वट्टदि ।

॥ स्नात० ॥

महाभोजने को हेतुः ?

॥ ताप० ॥

केण वि भयवदो जिणगुरुणो सासणगदेण ठक्कुरेण अज्ज तहिं महाभोअणं उववादिदं, जत्थ पव्वइयसहस्साइं संघडिदाइं । ताण अ सत्तूण रासीओ, तेल्लघडिआ, कंचिअकुंभीओ, गुडकूडया, तेल्लपक्काण भक्खाण पव्वया उवणीआ ।

285

॥ स्नात० ॥

भोस्तपोधन, अथात्र मध्ये दधिक्षीरघृतादि नाम न किञ्चिद् गृह्णासि ?

290

273 ब्राह्मणः खलु त्वम् । तत् किमात्मनो बुभुक्षावेदनं न जानासि ? 277 अथ किम् ? 281 नन्विहैव जिनरक्षितभिक्षुतपोवने ऽद्य महाभोजनं वर्तते । 285 ff. केनापि भगवतो जिनगुरोः शासनगतेन ठक्कुरेणाद्य तत्र महाभोजनमुपपादितम्, यत्र प्रव्रजितसहस्राणि संघटितानि । तेषां च सत्तूनां राशयः, तैलघटिकाः, काञ्जिककुम्भयः, गुडकूटकाः, तैलपक्कानां भक्ष्याणां पर्वताः उपनीताः ।

269 अन्यदेवैनं] em. RT, अन्यदैवेनं PāPu 271 क्ले०] PuRT, क्षे० Pā 273 बम्हणो] PāRT, वम्हाणो Pu 273 तुवं] em. RT, तवं PāPu 281 महाभो०] PāRT, महभौ० Pu 281 वट्टदि] em., वट्टदि PāPuRT 285 सासण०] PāPuRT^{pc}, सासन० RT^{ac} 285 ०गदेण] Pā^{pc}RT, ०गदेन Pā^{ac}, ०गदेगे Pu 286 उववादिदं] em. RT, उदवादिदं PāPu 286 रासीओ] Pā, रासीउ Pu, रासीअ RT (typo?) 287 तेल्लपक्काण] em. RT, तैलपक्षणे PāPu 288 उवणीआ] RT (em. ?), ओवणीआ PāPu 290 मध्ये] PāPuRT^{pc}, मध्ये RT^{ac} (typo) 290 ०घृतादि] RT (em. ?), ०ष्टतादि PāPu 290 किञ्चिद्] PuRT, किञ्चि Pā

॥ ताप० ॥

अहह, तुम्हाणं बम्हणाण एदे समाआरा । अम्ह उण तवोहणा पाणिसंभवं किं
पि ण असणे ण पाणे ण वसणे ण सअणे ण आसणे ण अण्णत्थ कत्थ वि सरी-
रोवअरणे विणिवेसेम्ह । णं मम य्येव इमे रुक्खविदलणिम्मिदे उवाणहिण् किं
ण पेक्खसि? ता भोदु इमिणा कहावित्थरेण । भोअणसमओ मे अदिक्कमदि । 295

॥ स्नात० ॥

ममाप्यादेशय पन्थानम् । वयमपि तपोधनविभूतिं पश्यामः ।

॥ ताप० ॥

एवं करीअदु, एवं करीअदु । ता एदु भवं ।

॥ सर्वे परिक्रामन्ति ॥ 300

॥ स्नात० ॥

भोस्तपोधन, जिनशासनं प्रतिपन्नो भवान् कथं काषायवासाः? अपि सुगत
एव जिनो भवताम्?

॥ ताप० । सस्मितम् ॥

अम्हाणं अ सुगदो भअवं जिणगुरू । किं च जिणगुरू सुगदो होदि । अ- 305
हो भद्दा अम्हे आरहदा, के वि दियंबरा, के वि रुक्खविदलमेत्तवसणा,
के वि रत्तवासा, के वि सेअवडा । पेक्ख दाव । इदो इमे णिद्दयलुंचणप-

292 अहह, युष्माकं ब्राह्मणानामेते समाचाराः । वयं पुनः तपोधनाः प्राणिसम्भवं किमपि
नाशने, न पाने, न वसने, न शयने, नासने, नान्यत्र कुत्रापि शरीरोपकरणे विनिवेशया-
मः । ननु ममैवेमौ वृक्षविदलनिर्मितावुपानहिकौ किं न प्रेक्षसे? तद् भवत्वनेन कथाविस्तरेण ।
भोजनसमयो मे ऽतिक्रामति । 299 एवं क्रियताम्, एवं क्रियताम् । तदेतु भवान् । 305 ff.
अस्माकं च सुगतो भगवान् जिनगुरुः । किं च जिनगुरुः सुगतो भवति । अहो भद्रा वयमा-
र्हताः, के ऽपि दिगम्बराः, के ऽपि वृक्षविदलमात्रवसनाः, के ऽपि रक्तवाससः, के ऽपि
श्वेतपटाः । प्रेक्षस्व तावत् । इत इमे निर्दयलुच्चनप्रसङ्गलक्ष्यमाणलोममूलविगलत्प्रविरलतनु-
कशोणितकणाः दिगम्बराः । इतः खल्विमे †...† चर्च्यमानकोमलवल्कलाञ्जलाः चीरवसनाः ।
इत इमे तत्क्षणपञ्चकन्दूद्धृतशरावसदृशवर्णवसनाश्च ब्रह्मचारिणः तपोधनाः । इत इमे हंसप-
क्षपाण्डुरपवनलुलितपटपल्लवाः श्वेतपटाः । तदहो पुण्यभाजनं स ठक्कुरः यस्येमे ऽद्यानुग्रहं
करिष्यन्ति ।

292 तुम्हाणं] PāPu, तुम्हाण RT (typo?) 292 समाआरा] PāRT, समाआण Pu 292
अम्ह] RT^{ac} (em. ?), अम्हे RT^{pc}, अह्य PāPu 293 अण्णत्थ] PāRT, अणत्थ Pu
294 रुक्ख०] PāRT, कुरक० Pu 297 ममाप्या०] em. RT, समाप्या० PāPu 302 भो-
स्तपो०] PuRT, भोस्त्वपो० (?) Pā 305 अम्हाणं] RT (em. ?), अह्याणं PāPu 305 सु-
गदो] RT (em. ?), सुगदो Pā^{pc}Pu, मुदो Pā^{ac} 305 सुगदो] em. RT, मुग्गदो PāPu
306 भद्दा अम्हे आरहदा] conj., भद्दा आरहदा भावअम्हो आरहदा PāPuRT 306 के
वि] RT (em. ?), के चि PāPu 307 सेअवडा] em. RT, सेअवटा PāPu 307 णिद्दय०]
PāPuRT^{pc}, निद्दय RT^{ac}

संगलक्खिज्जंतलोममूलवियलंतपविरलतणुअसोणिअकणा दियंबरा । इदो खु
इमे चत्तुलवसूरचच्चिज्जंतकोमलवक्कलंचला चीरवसणा । इदो इमे तक्खण-
पक्ककंदुउद्धरिअसरावसरिसवणवसणा अ बम्हआरिणो तवोहणा । इदो इमे 310
हंसपक्खपंडुरपवणलुलिदपडपल्लवा सेअवडा । ता अहो पुण्णभाअणो सो ठक्कुरो
जस्स इमे अज्ज अणुग्गहं करिस्संति ।

॥ स्यात० । सस्मितमात्मगतम् ॥

पुण्यभाजनमुच्यते, नानर्थकारीति ।

न चिन्तयति दन्तिनं न तुरगं न कौक्षेयकं

न वर्त्म न करग्रहं न कटकाङ्गमुष्ट्रादि वा ।

इह क्षपितवित्तसारमवलुप्तसेवाविधिं

विधास्यति नराधिपो ध्रुवमिमं विभूतिच्युतम् ॥ १६ ॥

॥ प्रकाशम् ॥

अहो तपोवनस्य प्रशान्तरमणीयता !

शममयमिव दृश्यते जग-

न्नियममयीव चकास्ति मेदिनी ।

इह खलु भवपाशपङ्कयो

विशकलिता इव भान्ति देहिनाम् ॥ १७ ॥

॥ बटुः ॥

दिट्ठा दिअंबरा चीरवसणा कासायवासा सेअवडा । ता संपदं इदो इमे णीलंबरा
दीसंतु ।

॥ स्यात० । अग्रतो ऽवलोक्य सविस्मयम् ॥

अहो बतापूर्वमिदं तपः । एकनीलवसनावृताविमौ स्त्रीपुंसौ किमप्यतिपेशलं

326 f. दृष्टा दिगम्बराः चीरवसनाः काषायवाससः श्वेतपटाः । तत् साम्प्रतमित इमे
नीलाम्बरा दृश्यन्ताम् ।

308 °लक्खिज्जंत°] PāRT, °लक्खिज्जंत° Pu 308 इदो] PāPu^{pc}RT, ज्ज Pu^{cc} 309
चत्तुल°] PāPu, वत्तुल° RT(em. ?) 309 °ज्जंत°] PuRT, °ज्ज*त° Pā 309 °व-
क्कलं°] RT(em. ?), °वत्कूलं° (?) Pā, °वत्कूजं Pu 309 इदो इमे] PāPu, इदो खु इमे
RT(em. ?) 310 °पक्क°] em.RT, °पक्ख° PāPu 310 बम्ह°] PāPu, बह्म° RT(ty-
po?) 310 f. इदो इमे...सेअवडा ।] PāPu, om.RT 311 °पंडुर°] em., °पंडुर° PāPu
311 °लुलिद°] em., °लुलित° PāPu 311 पुण्ण°] PāRT, पुण° Pu 312 ठक्कुरो]
RT(em. ?), ठक्कुरो PāPu 314 °कारीति] em.RT, °कानीति PāPu 315 चिन्तयति]
RT(em. ?), चिंतयंति PāPu 320 तपोवनस्य] em.RT, तपोधनस्य PāPu 326 चीर°]
Pā^{pc}PuRT, चीरा° Pā^{cc} 326 णीलंबरा] PāPu, णीलंबला RT (em. ?) 329 °नावृ-
ता°] RT(em. ?), °नाधृता° PāPu

गायन्तौ सह विहरतः ।

330

॥ निपुणं निर्वर्ण्य ॥

कथम्? अनेकसङ्घान्येतानि दृश्यन्ते । भवतु, अतिविस्तृता पृथिवी, उत्सन्ना त्रयी ।

॥ तापसमुद्दिश्य ॥

भोस्तपोधन, विदितो ऽयं तव नवः को ऽपि तपसां प्रकारः ?

335

॥ ताप० ॥

अहं एदं ण आणामि को एसो चउरणियममग्गो । एदं खु तङ्केमि इध महा-
भोअणकिंवअंतिं सुणिअ भोयणमेत्तलालसा के वि एदे परिब्भमंति । ता भोदु
एदाणं वुत्तंतेण । समाणचरिआणं य्येव मज्झं वच्चामि ।

॥ इति निष्क्रान्तः ॥

340

॥ ततः प्रविशत एकनीलपटप्रावृतौ गायन्तौ स्त्रीपुंसौ,

विभवानुसारेण वा बहूनि तथाविधानि मिथुनानि गायन्ति ॥

जयइ मुणी णीलंबरणाहो जेण समिओ भवसंवरगाहो ।

जसु भअवं तुह सासण णोक्खं पिज्जइ किं पि रसाअणसोक्खं ।

भवे भुंजिज्जइ इत्थिअसुक्खं परलोए पाविज्जइ मोक्खं ।

345

सो सिज्जइ सरीरडा लंघिज्जइ संसारडा ।

तो अण्णे जे पुण आसमा ताण णिबंधहु आस मा ।

337 ff. अहमेतन्न जानामि क एष चतुरनियममार्गः । एतत् खलु तर्कयामि, इह महाभो-
जनकिंवदन्तीं श्रुत्वा भोजनमात्रलालसाः के ऽप्येते परिभ्रमन्ति । तद् भवत्वेतेषां वृत्तान्तेन,
समानचर्याणामेव मध्यं व्रजामि । 343 जयति मुनिर्नीलम्बरनाथो येन शमितो भवसंवर-
ग्राहः । 344 यस्य भगवन् तव शासनमपूर्वम्, पीयते किमपि रसायनसौख्यम् । 345 भवे
भुज्यते स्त्रीसौख्यं परलोके प्राप्यते मोक्षः । 346 तत् सिध्यति शरीरं लङ्घ्यते संसारः ।
347 अतो ऽन्ये ये पुनराश्रमास्तेषां निबन्धताशां मा ।

330 °पेशलं गा०] PuRT, °पेशलगा० Pu 332 °सङ्घान्येतानि] em.RT, °संख्या-
न्यस्तनि Pā, °संख्यन्येस्तनि Pu 337 आणामि] em.RT, याणामि PāPu 337 चउ-
र०] em.RT, चउ० PāPu 337 °मग्गो] PāRT, °मग्गे Pu 337 इध] em.RT, इव
PāPu 338 °किंवअंतिं] RT(em.?), °किंचअत्तिं PāPu 338 सुणिअ] RT(em.?),
मुणिअ PāPu 338 भोदु] em.RT, भोपु PāPu 339 वुत्तंतेण] RT(em.?), वुत्तन्नेण
PāPu 339 f. वच्चामि । इति] em.RT, वच्चामि त्ति PāPu 343 समिओ] PāPu,
समिउ RT(em.?) 344 पिज्जइ] PuRT, पिज्ज*इ Pā 344 °सोक्खं] em.RT, °मो-
क्खं PāPu 345 भवे] em.RT, भव PāPu 345 भुंजिज्जइ] PuRT, भुंजिज्ज*इ Pā
345 इत्थिअ०] RT(em.?), इत्तिअ० PāPu 345 पाविज्जइ] PuRT, पाविज्ज*इ Pā
345 मोक्खं] conj.RT, मड - - - PāPu (The lacuna is marked by two dashes in
the manuscripts.) 346 सो सिज्जइ] RT(em.?), सोसिज्ज*इ Pā, सोसिज्जइ Pu
346 लंघिज्जइ] PuRT, लंघिज्ज*इ Pā 346 संसारडा] PāPu^{pc}RT, संसाराडा Pu^{ac}

परिसोसिज्जइ देहडा मोक्खहि पुण संदेहडा ।
 सिक्खाजोए काइ विडप्पइ पुरुसु परव्वसु परिसम्मप्पइ ।
 गुण परिअज्जिअ जइ विसर सो वि उ पुरुसह भोअहर ।
 पमढिउ संगमु जेण इ एसो †तांहसोणिव्वलुसहजसहाउणिर - - - †
 इदि जइ जुअ जुअ विजाणि - - -
 पुणु भोअ ।
 सरीरेहि कं पएस भमंता कं पअं अज्जंति अणिट्ठिअजम्मा ।
 जइ परमप्पविवत्तु इउ जइ वा सद्दविवत्तु इउ ।
 तो वि अविज्जापसमे विणु कह इउ सअलु - - - ।
 †सत्तु† एम जे अण्णे वि आगम विहला सअल मुणेवि ।
 एत्थ परत्थ वि सुहु लहहु मुणिणीलंबर लेवि - - - ॥

350

355

348 परिशोष्यते देहो मोक्षे पुनः सन्देहः । 349 शिक्षायोगे किं विधाप्यते (= अर्ज्य-
 ते), पुरुषः परवशः परिसमाप्यते । 350 गुणानां पर्यर्जितो यदि विसरः, सो ऽपि च
 पुरुषाणां भोगहरः । 351 परिवेष्टितः संगमो येन हि एषः, †...† । 352 इति यदि युगं
 युगं विजानाति (?) - - - 353 पुनर्भोगं (?) 354 शरीरे कं प्रदेशं भ्रमन्तः किं
 पदमर्जन्ति अनिष्ठितजन्मानः । (?) 355 यदि परमात्मविवर्त इदं, यदि वा शब्दविवर्त
 इदं । 356 तदाप्यविद्यापशमेन विना कथमिदं सकलं - - - 357 f. †...† एवं ये अन्ये
 ऽप्यागमा विफलान् सकलान् ज्ञात्वा । अत्र परत्रापि सुखं लभध्वं मुनिनीलाम्बरं लात्वा -
 - - ॥

348 परिसोसिज्जइ] PuRT, परिसोसिज्ज*इ Pā 348 पुण] em.RT, पुरो PāPu 349
 सिक्खाजोए] PāRT, सिक्खाजोइए Pu 349 काइ] PāPu, काइ em.RT 349 विडप्पइ]
 em.RT, विडप्पइ PāPu 349 परिसम्मप्पइ] em.RT, परसम्मप्पइ PāPu 350 गुण]
 PāRT, गुणं Pu 350 परिअज्जिअ] em.RT, परिआज्जिअ PāPu 350 सो] conj., तो
 PāPuRT 350 वि उ] RT(em.?), चिउ PāPu 351 पमढिउ] conj.Sanderson, पढमं
 उ PāPu, पढमउ em.RT 351 संगमु] conj., संगंत PāPu, संगउ em.RT 351 इ
 एसो] PāPu, एइसो em.RT 351 तां ... णिर - - -] PāPu (The lacuna is marked by
 a dash in the manuscripts.), ता हंसो णिव्वलु सहजसहाउ निरेइसो conj.Sanderson, ता
 हंसो णिव्वलु सहजसहाउ निरासो em.RT 352 इदि] Pu, इदी PāRT 352 जुअ जुअ]
 PāRT, जुअ जु Pu 352 विजाणि - - - The lacuna is marked by nine lines of dashes
 in Pā and by nine lines of empty space in Pu. 354 पएस] conj., पएम PāPu, पाएम
 RT(em.?) 354 पअं] conj., पम PāPuRT 354 अज्जंति] conj., अजंति PāPuRT
 354 °जम्मा] conj., °जम्म PāPu 355 जइ] conj., जेइ PāPuRT 355 जइ] em.RT,
 जाइ PāPu 355 °वत्तु इउ] conj., °वत्तु इं PāPuRT 356 तो वि] conj., भोवि PāPu,
 भोदि em.RT 356 °पसमे] PāPu^{pc}, °पसमेइ Pu^{cc}, °पसमेइं RT(em.?) 356 कह
 इउ] PāRT, कदइउ Pu 356 - - -] conj. 357 अण्णे] RT(em.?), अण्ण Pā,
 अण Pu 357 मुणेवि] em.RT, मुणवि PāPu 358 परत्थ] RT(em.?), परत्त PāPu
 358 वि] PāPu^{pc}RT, विवि Pu^{cc} 358 °णीलंबर लेवि - - -] conj., °णीलंबलेवि
 PāPu, °नीलंबरवरे वि conj.RT

॥ स्नात० । चिरं गीतमाकर्ण्य ॥

बटो, गीतव्यपदेशमशेषदर्शनाक्षेपकं केनापि कल्पितं वादस्थानकमिदम् । अहं 360
तु प्रायश्चित्तभीरुर्न शक्नोम्येव कश्मलैरेभिर्वाचं मिश्रयितुम् ।

॥ स्त्रीपुंसौ पुनस्तदेव गायतः ॥

॥ स्नात० ॥

बटो, पश्य,

वाचः काचन नास्ति शुद्धिरवमः कायो ऽपि शौचोज्झित- 365

श्चेतो निर्विचिकित्सकुत्सिततरव्यापारनित्योत्सवम् ।

नो जाने परलोकनिर्भयधियः कस्यावदातं तप-

श्चर्याश्चर्यामिदं (न) कश्चिदथ वा पुंसामवद्यो विधिः ॥ १८ ॥

अपि च,

स्वच्छन्दं चर्च्यमानोच्चरति चिरमियं चर्चरीगीतगोष्ठी 370

पीयन्ते कान्तवक्त्रासवशवलरसान्यस्तशङ्कं मधूनि ।

तन्यन्ते तन्त्रवस्तुव्यवहितनियतप्रस्तुतान्योन्यशृङ्गै-

रङ्गैश्चेष्टा यथेष्टा व्रतमतिसुभगं सेव्यते केन नैतत् ॥ १९ ॥

(॥ बटुः ॥)

एवं णेदं जधा अय्यो मंतेदि । 375

॥ स्नात० ॥

मम चेयं सम्भावना (यन्) नूतनमद्यप्रवृत्तमिदं महाव्रतम् । अतिप्रसृते गाय-
माने ऽस्मिन्नतिमात्रं विप्रवते वर्णाश्रमसमाचारः । भवतु, भग्नमिव त्रयीवर्त्म
पश्यामि ।

इदं तपस्तरुणमनोभिनन्दनं 380

375 एवं न्वेतद् यथार्यो मन्त्रयते ।

360 °क्षेपकं] em. RT, °क्षेप° PāPu 360 कल्पितं] em. RT, कल्पित° PāPu 361 वाचं
मिश्र°] Pā^{re}RT, वाचं मिश्र° Pā^{ac}, वाचमिश्र° Pu 365 °वमः] RT (em. ?), °चमः
PāPu 365 शौचोज्झित°] RT (em. ?), शौचोज्झित° PāPu 367 नो जाने] conj., रा-
जानो PāPu, रे जन्तोः conj. RT 367 °निर्भय°] conj., °निर्दय° PāPuRT 367 कस्या-
वदातं] PuRT, कस्यावदातं Pā 368 (न)] conj., om. PāPu, (हि) conj. RT 368 °व-
द्यो] em. RT, °वद्या PāPu 370 चर्च्यमानोच्चरति] em., चर्च्यमानोच्चरति Pā, च-
र्च्यमानोच्चरति Pu, चर्च्यमाना चरति RT (em. ?) 372 तन्त्र°] conj., तत्त्व° PāPuRT
372 °शृङ्गै°] PāPu, °सङ्गै° em. RT 373 °सुभगं] RT (em. ?), °शुभगं PāPu 374 (ब-
टुः)] RT (em. ?), om. PāPu 377 चेयं सम्भावना (यन्) नूतनमद्य°] conj. RT, वेदां
सम्भावना । तेतममद्य° PāPu 378 विप्रवते] PāRT, विप्रवात Pu

विलोक्य हि व्यपगतसर्वयन्त्रणम् ।
पतिव्रता अपि कुलयोषितश्चिरं
स्थिरं पदं दधति न भर्तृवेश्मसु ॥ २० ॥

॥ बटुः । सस्मितम् ॥

अय्यस्स किं जादं? ण हु अय्येण अज्ज वि दारसंगहो कदो । अम्हे उण दूरे 385
दाव एसा कथा ।

॥ स्नात० ॥

नन्वार्या जनयित्री ते जीवत्येव ।

॥ बटुः ॥

सा खु संपदं अदो अणत्थादो उत्तिण्णा जा जीवंतमुदिआ वुड्ढिका वट्टदि । 390

॥ स्नात० ॥

कृतं परिहासेन । महानेष विल्लव उपस्थितः । तद् बटो, चिन्तय किमत्र
प्रतिसमाधानम् ।

(॥ बटुः ॥)

अय्य, ण मे पडिभादि । तुमं य्येव जाणासि । इण्हिं पुण पवड्ढंतो एसो 395
कलिजुओ । ता कुदो इत्थ ईदिसाण अणत्थाण पडीआरो ?

॥ स्नात० ॥

तथापि नानध्यवसायस्तिमितमासितुं युक्तम् ।

॥ विचिन्त्य ॥

भवतु, लब्धो ऽवकाशः ।

400

॥ बटुः ॥

385 f. आर्यस्य किं जातम्? न खल्वार्येणाद्यापि दारसंग्रहः कृतः । अस्माकं पुनर्दूरे तावदेषा
कथा । 390 f. सा खलु साम्प्रतमतो ऽनर्थादुत्तीर्णा या जीवन्मृतिका वृद्धिका वर्तते । 395 f.
आर्य, न मे प्रतिभाति । त्वमेव जानासि । इदानीं पुनः प्रवर्धमान एष कलियुगः । तत् कुतो
ऽत्रेदृशानामनर्थानां प्रतीकारः ?

381 विलोक्य] PāRT, विजोक्य Pu 381 °यन्त्रणम्] em.RT, °यन्त्रणां PāPu 382 अ-
पि कुल°] conj.RT, अपि खलु conj.RT, पि[[ले]]खेल Pā, पि खेल Pu 383 न]
PāRT, om.Pu 385 अय्येण अज्ज वि] RT(em.?), अय्येण अय्य वि PāPu^{pc}, अय्ये-
अणय्यवि Pu^{cc} 386 दाव] RT(em.?), भाव PāPu 388 जनयित्री] em.RT, जनित्री
PāPu 390 अदो] em.RT^{pc}, अतो RT^{cc}, अचो PāPu 390 वुड्ढिका] RT(em.?),
वुट्टिका PāPu 390 वट्टदि] em.RT^{pc}, वट्टदि PāPuRT^{cc} 393 °समाधानम्] em.RT,
°समाधाने PāPu 394 (बटुः)] RT(em.?), om.PāPu 395 पडिभादि] em., पडि-
भादि PāPuRT 395 जाणासि] PāPuRT^{pc}, जानासि RT^{cc} 395 एसो] PāRT, ण
सा Pu 396 पडीआरो] em.RT^{pc}, पदीआरो RT^{cc}, पदीआणु PāPu 400 ऽवकाशः]
RT(em.?), वकाशा PāPu

को उण एसो भविस्सदि ?

॥ स्रात० ॥

नन्वसौ राजा श्रीशङ्करदेवः । स हि वर्णाश्रमधर्ममर्यादाचार्यस्त्रिभुवनरक्षादी-
क्षितो देवः स्वत एव प्रतिक्रियामत्र जानाति, विशेषतो ऽशेषभवागमपारगे 405
पार्श्ववर्तिनि तत्रभवति भट्टजयन्ते । भवतु, तमेव श्रावयामः । न कालप-
रिपालनयोग्यो ह्यनर्थः । बटो, तदा त्वमप्येतौ भोजनाजिरोद्देशं प्रस्थापय
गायन्तौ स्त्रीपुंसौ ।

॥ बटुः ॥

भो तवस्सिणो, णं एत्थ तवोवणे भोअणकालो तुम्हाणं वट्टदि । ता कीस 410
अतिक्कमीयदि ?

॥ इति निष्क्रान्ताः सर्वे ॥

॥ द्वितीयो ऽङ्कः ॥

402 कः पुनरेष भविष्यति ? 410 f. भोस्तपस्विनः, नन्वत्र तपोवने भोजनकालो युष्माकं
वर्तते । तत् कस्मादतिक्रम्यते ?

404 राजा] RT (em. ?), राज PāPu 406 भवति] em. RT, भयाति PāPu 407 प-
रिपालनयोग्यो ह्यनर्थः] em. RT, परिवासयाग्याघनर्थ PāPu 407 तदा] em. RT, त्वदो
PāPu 409 बटुः] RT (em. ?), रेबटुः PāPu 410 तवस्सिणो] PāPuRT^{pc}, तवस्सिनो
RT^{ac} 410 णं] em. RT, णे PāPu 410 कालो] RT (em. ?), काला PāPu 410 व-
ट्टदि] RT^{pc}, वट्टदि PāPuRT^{ac}

॥ ततः प्रविशति साधकः । साधकः , सोद्वेगं दिशो ऽवलोक्य ॥
अस्तंगदे खु इण्हं शमए महेशलाणणं णवशशंके । शुण्णे अंधआले गअणे हि-
अए व्व अम्हाणं । शंपदं भोदि एशे पलाअणावशले । ता कहिं मे पिअवअशे
मशाणभूदी गदे जेण शमं पलाइशं ?

॥ परिक्रम्याग्रतो ऽवलोक्य च ॥

एशे मशाणभूदी इध य्येव आगञ्चंते लक्खीयदि ।

॥ ततः प्रविशति द्वितीयः साधकः । द्वितीयः साधकः ॥

एशे शे वअशशकंकालकेदुणो मढिआ । मए शे इमशिशं अंधयाले वि ईशीशि
दीशदि । ता उप्पेक्खिअ उप्पेक्खिअ पदाइ गमिशं ।

॥ परिक्रामति । कर्णं दत्त्वा ॥

पदशद्दे विअ । भअवं , मण्णामि णअललष्कआ इदो हिंडंति , ये शंपाविअ
चोल्लं ति शंकाए बंधणाआलं णंति , शूले वा णिष्किवंति , लुष्के वा पाशेन
उल्लंभंति । भोदु , भयवं भइलवणाथे शलणं ।

2 ff. अस्तंगतः खल्वस्मिन् समये महेशलाञ्छनं नवशशाङ्कः । शून्यमन्धकारं गगनं हृदय-
मिवास्माकम् । साम्प्रतं भवत्येष पलायनावसरः । तत् कुत्र मे प्रियवयस्यः श्मशानभूतिर्गतो
येन समं पलायिष्ये ? 6 एष श्मशानभूतिरित एवागच्छन् लक्ष्यते । 8 एषा सा वयस्य-
कङ्कालकेतोर्मठिका । मया सैतस्मिन्नन्धकारे ऽपीषदीषद् दृश्यते । तद् उत्प्रेक्ष्योत्प्रेक्ष्य पदानि
गमिष्यामि । 11 ff. पदशब्द इव । भगवन् , मन्ये नगररक्षका इतो हिण्डन्ति , ये सम्प्राप्य
चौर्यमिति शङ्कया बन्धनागारं नयन्ति , शूले वा निक्षिपन्ति , वृक्षे वा पाशेन उल्लम्बयन्ति ।
भवतु , भगवान् भैरवनाथः शरणम् ।

1 साधकः । साधकः] PāPu, साधकः । RT(em. ?) 2 णणं ण०] conj. Isaacson, णण-
ण० conj. RT, णण० PāPu 2 शुण्णे] PāRT, शुणे Pu 2 अंधआले] em. RT, णंधआले
PāPu 3 हिअए व्व] conj., हिअअ व्व PāPuRT 3 शंपदं] RT(em. ?), संपदं PāPu
3 पलाअणावशले] em. RT, धलाअलेवशले PāPu 3 पिअवअशे] RT(em. ?), विअ-
वअंग PāPu 4 भूदी] RT(em. ?), भूमी PāPu 4 जेण] PāPu, येण RT(em. ?)
6 भूदी] RT(em. ?), भूमी PāPu 6 इध] RT(em. ?), इव PāPu 6 आगञ्चंते]
em. RT, आगञ्चंते PāPu 6 लक्खीयदि] PāPu, लस्किअदि RT(em. ?) 8 मढिआ]
em. RT^{pc}, मढिआ PāPuRT^{ac} 8 मए शे] PāPu, मए एशे em. RT 9 उप्पेक्खिअ उप्पे-
क्खिअ] em., उप्पेक्खिअं २ PāPuRT 9 पदाइ] PāPu, पदाइ RT(em. ?) 11 पदशद्दे]
PāRT, पदशद्द Pu 11 मण्णामि णअललष्कआ] conj., माणमणअभालष्कआ Pā, मा-
णमणअ । भालष्कआ Pu, मण्णे णअललष्कआ conj. RT 11 ये] em. RT, य PāPu
11 शंपाविअ] RT(em. ?), संपाविअ PāPu 12 चोल्लं ति] PāPuRT^{ac}, चोल्लं ति RT^{pc}
12 बंधणाआलं] conj., वंधणप्पलं Pā, वंधणप्पलां Pu, वंधणस्तलं em. RT 12 णंति]
PāRT, णंति Pu 12 शूले वा] RT^{pc}, शूले वा PāRT^{ac}, शूले व Pu 12 णिष्कि-
वंति] em., निष्किवंति Pā, निशुष्किवंति Pu, निशुष्किवंति RT^{ac}, णिशुष्किवंति RT^{pc}
12 लुष्के] PāPu, लुस्के RT(em. ?) 13 उल्लंभंति] conj., उल्लअवेत्ति PāPu, उल्लअंवेत्ति
RT(em. ?) 13 भइलवणाथे शलणं] conj., भइलवणाथे शलणं conj. RT^{pc}, भइलवणाके
शलणं PāPu, भोइलवणाथे शलणं conj. RT^{ac}

॥ निपुणं निरूप्य ॥

वअशकंकालकेदुणो वृ वाहाले शुणीअदि ।

15

॥ समाश्वस्योपसृत्य ॥

वअश कंकालकेदू, तव य्येव शयाशं उपशंपत्ते । णअललष्कआण शंकिदे
म्हि ।

॥ प्रथमः ॥

अले मशाणभूदी तुमं? शोहणं तए कदं यं एशु तुवं आगदे । ता तुलिदं
हिंडाम । इमे अंधआले ण विलमदि याव, शमं य्येव पलाअम्ह ।

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॥ द्वितीयः ॥

किं चोलशंकाए णअललष्कआ मं मालेंति त्ति शंभावेशि ?

॥ प्रथमः ॥

ण एशा मे शंका । होंती अवि उवशमदि । अण्णे उण अणस्ते उवस्तिदे ।

25

॥ द्वितीयः, ससम्भ्रमम् ॥

कीश ?

॥ प्रथमः ॥

15 वयस्यकङ्कालकेतोरिव व्याहारः श्रूयते । 17 वयस्य कङ्कालकेतो, तवैव सकाशमुप-
सम्प्राप्तः । नगररक्षकाणां शङ्कितो ऽस्मि । 20 f. अरे श्मशानभूतिस्त्वम्? शोभनं त्वया
कृतं यदत्र त्वमागतः । तत् त्वरितं हिण्डावः । अयमन्धकारो न विरमति यावत्, सममेव
पलायावहै । 23 किं चोरशङ्कया नगररक्षका मां मारयन्तीति संभावयसि? 25 न एषा
मे शङ्का । भवत्यप्युपशाम्यति । अन्यः पुनरनर्थ उपस्थितः । 27 कस्मात्?

14 निपुणं] PāPuRT^{pc}, निपूणं RT^{ac} 15 वाहाले] em., वाहालो PāPuRT 15 शुणीअ-
दि] RT(em.?), शुणाअदि PāPu 17 तव] em., तुह RT(em.?), तध PāPu 17 णअ-
ललष्कआण] conj., णअलाभष्कआण PāPu, णअलभस्टआण RT(conj.?) 18 शंकिदे
म्हि] conj., शंकिद म्हि PāPuRT 20 मशा°] RT(em.?), मेशा° PāPu 20 तुमं]
conj., भुम्ब PāPu, तुम्ह em.RT 20 यं] em., य PāPuRT 20 तुलिदं] em.RT,
तुलिदं PāPu 21 हिंडाम] RT^{pc}, हिंडाव PāPuRT^{ac} 21 याव] conj.Isaacson, भा-
व PāPuRT 21 शमं] RT(em.?), समं PāPu 21 पलाअम्ह] Pā^{pc}PuRT, पलाअह
Pā^{ac} 23 चोल°] RT(em.?), णाल° PāPu 23 णअललष्कआ] conj., णअलल-
स्कआ] conj.RT, णअणालष्का PāPu 23 मं मालेंति त्ति] conj., म॥ मालेत्ति PāPu,
मालेदि त्ति conj.RT 23 शंभावेशि] RT(em.?), संभावेशि PāPu 25 एशा] RT(em.?),
एसा PāPu 25 होंती] conj.Isaacson, होन्ति Pā, होन्नि Pu, होदि RT(em.?) 25 अ-
वि] em.RT^{pc}, आवि PāPuRT^{ac} 25 अण्णे] PāRT, अणे Pu 27 कीश] em.RT, कोश
PāPu

अयि, अस्ति दाव, किं तए ण शुदा एशा किंवदंती? अण्णे य्येव शंपदं एशे दुष्टलष्टे वट्टदि।

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॥ द्वितीयः ॥

उत्तम्मदि मे हिअअं। ता तुलिदं आविष्कलेदु वअशशे।

॥ प्रथमः ॥

दालुणे खु लाए शंकलवम्मे। तदो (वि) विशमे शे बम्हणे तशश अमच्चे दु-
लाआलजयंते, जेहिं ते तवशिशणो णीलम्बला वडिअ पिट्टिय वेदवाहिल त्ति
लट्टादो णिव्वाशिदा। अण्णे य जे वेदवाहिले तवशशी लब्भदि, शे पिट्टीयदि
मालीअदि बंधीअदि घल्लीअदि। ता अम्हे वि ताण य्येव मज्झे गणणीअ
म्ह। शुलं पियम्ह, मंशं भक्खम्ह इत्थियं गश्चम्ह। णं अम्हे वि शव्वम्हयालिणो
णीलंबलाणं। ता शंपदं एदं शाधकवेशं आच्छादिअ तुलिदहिंडणेण इमशिशं
अंधयाले अलष्किदा गश्चम्ह।

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29 f. अयि, अस्ति तावत्, किं त्वया न श्रुतैषा किंवदन्ती? अन्यदेव साम्प्रतमेतद् दुष्टराष्ट्रं
वर्तते। 32 उत्ताम्यति मे हृदयम्। तत् त्वरितमाविष्करोतु वयस्यः। 34 ff. दारुणः
खलु राजा शङ्करवर्मा, ततो ऽपि विषम एष ब्राह्मणस्तस्यामात्यो दुराचारजयन्तः, याभ्यां
ते तपस्विनो नीलाम्बरा गृहीत्वा पिट्ट्वा वेदबाह्या इति राष्ट्रान् निर्वासिताः। अन्यश्च यो
वेदबाह्यस्तपस्वी लभ्यते, स पिद्यते, मार्यते, बध्यते, क्षिप्यते। तद् वयमपि तेषामेव मध्ये
गणनीयाः स्मः। सुरां पिबामः, मांसं भक्ष्यामः, स्त्रियं गच्छामः। ननु वयमपि सन्नह्य-
चारिणो नीलाम्बराणाम्। तत् साम्प्रतमेतं साधकवेशमाच्छाद्य त्वरितहिण्डनेनास्मिन्नन्धकारे
ऽलक्षितौ गच्छाव।

29 अस्ति] PāPuRT^{ac}, अत्थि RT^{pc} 29 दाव] conj. RT, दा PāPu 29 शुदा] RT
(em. ?), सुदा PāPu 29 किंवदंती] PāRT, किंवहंती Pu 29 अण्णे] em., अण्ण PāRT,
अण Pu 29 शंपदं] RT (em. ?), संपदं PāPu 30 दुष्टलष्टे] Pā, दुष्टजष्टे Pu, दुष्टल-
स्टे RT (em. ?) 30 वट्टदि] em. RT^{pc}, वट्टदि PāPuRT^{ac} 32 हिअअं] conj., हिदअं
PāPu, हिदयं RT^{ac}, हिययं RT^{pc} 32 आविष्कलेदु] conj., शुविष्कदु PāPu, आविष्कदु
conj. RT 34 दालुणे] Pā(?) RT, सलुणे Pu 34 (वि)] em. RT, om. PāPu 34 तशश
अमच्चे] em. RT, उशशयमच्चे PāPu 35 जेहिं] PāPu, येहिं RT (em. ?) 35 तवशिशणो]
RT (em. ?), नवशिशणो Pā, नवशिशणौ Pu 35 णीलम्बला] Pā, णालंबला Pu 35 वे-
दवाहिल त्ति] em. RT, वेदवाहिलद्वि PāPu 36 लट्टादो] PāPu, लस्टादो RT (em. ?)
36 णिव्वाशिदा] em., णिव्वाशिदे PāPuRT^{pc}, निव्वाशिदे RT^{ac} 36 अण्णे] PāRT, अणे
Pu 36 जे] PāPu, ये RT (em. ?) 36 लब्भदि] em. RT, लव्वदि PāPu 37 बंधीअदि]
conj., वंधअदि PāRT, बंधअदि Pu 37 घल्लीअदि] PāRT^{pc}, थल्लीअदि Pu, छल्लीअदि
RT^{ac} 37 गणणीअ] conj., गणीअ PāPu, गहीअ RT (em. ?) 38 शुलं] em. RT,
शुलं PāPu 38 पियम्ह] PāPu, पिअम्ह RT (em. ?) 38 इत्थियं] RT (em. ?), इत्तियं
PāPu 38 गश्चम्ह] RT (em. ?), गच्चम्ह PāPu 38 शव्वं] RT (em. ?), सव्वं PāPu
39 आच्छादिअ] em., अच्छादिअ PāPu, अश्चादिअ RT (em. ?) 39 तुलिदहिंडणेणं]
em. RT, तुलि। देहिंडजेण Pā, तुलिदे। हिंडजेण Pu 40 अलष्किदा] em., अलष्किदा
em. RT, अलिष्किदा PāPu 40 गश्चम्ह] em., गच्चम्ह PāPu, गच्छम्ह RT

॥ द्वितीयः । सभयम् ॥

एवं कलेम्ह !

॥ परिक्रामतः । द्वितीयः ॥

वअशश कंकालकेदू, कंहं पुण एशे अणस्ते उवणदे ?

॥ प्रथमः ॥

45

शुण अस्ति दाव शे शणादकबम्हणे शंकलिशणणामे जेण जिणलक्खिदभिक्खु-
वशदिकाणणे विहलंता गाअंता अशंखा णीलंबलमिहुणा दिष्टा ।

॥ द्वितीयः ॥

तदो ?

॥ प्रथमः ॥

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तदो तेण शे जअंते जाणाविदे । तेण अ लाए पवोहिदे ।

॥ द्वितीयः ॥

तदो ?

॥ प्रथमः ॥

तदो लाएण शे शणादकबम्हणे शंकलिशणे आणाविअ विवाहाविअ माणेहि
पट्टवंधेण शिलिशहेण अ शक्कलिअ शअलाए य्येव वशुंधलाए धम्मलष्काधि-

55

42 एवं करवाव ! 44 वयस्य कङ्कालकेतो, कथं पुनरेषो ऽनर्थ उपनतः ? 46 ff. शृणु, अस्ति तावत् स स्नातकब्राह्मणः सङ्कर्षणनामा, येन जिनरक्षितभिक्षुवसतिकानने विरहन्ति गायन्त्यसंख्यानि नीलाम्बरमिथुनानि दृष्टानि । 49 ततः ? 51 ततः तेन स जयन्तो ज्ञापितः । तेन च राजा प्रबोधितः । 53 ततः ? 55 ff. ततो राज्ञा स स्नातकब्राह्मणः सङ्कर्षण आनाय्य विवाह्य मानैः पट्टबन्धेन श्रीशब्देन च संस्कार्य सकलाया एव वसुन्धराया धर्मरक्षाधिकारे नियुक्तः । तेनैष प्रज्वालितो ऽग्निः ।

41 सभयम्] Pā^{pc}PuRT, ससंभ्रम Pā^{cc} 44 °लकेदू] PāRT, °ल । कदू Pu 46 शु-
ण] em.RT, सुण PāPu 46 अस्ति] em.RT, शुस्ति PāPu 46 दाव] conj. Isaacson,
दा जो PāPu, दाव यो em.RT 46 शणादकबम्हणे] RT(em. ?), षणादकवम्हणे PāPu
46 शंकलिशणणामे] em.RT, शंकलिशणामे PāPu 46 जेण] conj., येण RT(em. ?),
भेज Pā^{cc}, भेण Pā^{pc}Pu 47 जिणलक्खिदभिक्खुवशदि°] conj., जिणरक्खिदभिक्खु(-
सु-
Pu)वसदि° PāPu, जिणलस्किदभिक्खुवशदि° RT(em. ?), 47 विहलंता] RT(em. ?),
विहलत्ता PāPu 47 दिष्टा] conj., दिष्का PāPu, दिस्टा em.RT 51 तेण] em.RT, ता
एण PāPu 51 जअंते] RT(em. ?), षअंते PāPu 51 जाणाविदे] RT(em. ?), जाणाविदो
PāPu 55 लाएण] em.RT, लोएण PāPu 55 शणादकबम्हणे] RT(em. ?), षणादक-
वम्हणे PāPu 55 शंकलिशणे] RT(em. ?), शंकलिअणे PāPu 55 माणेहि] conj.RT,
मामेहि PāPu 56 पट्टवंधेण] conj.RT, षट्टवंधिण PāPu 56 शक्कलिअ] RT(em. ?), श-
त्कलिअ Pā, शक्कलिअ Pu 56 शअलाए] em.RT, शअलशद् PāPu 56 वशुंधलाए]
em., वसुंधलाए em.RT, वसुंधलए PāPu

आले णिउत्ते । तेण एशे पज्जालिदे अग्गी ।

॥ द्वितीयः ॥

णं दुलाआलजयंतेण पज्जालिदे त्ति आचष्क ।

॥ प्रथमः ॥

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अस्ति य्येव एदं । ता शंपदं कहिं गश्चम्ह ?

॥ द्वितीयः ॥

णं योगेशलीए कालग्गिशिहाए अग्गदो वच्चम्ह । तेशु एशे उवशग्गे कदा वि
ण बाधदि ।

॥ प्रथमः ॥

65

शा वि एशु काले पालीयदि ?

॥ द्वितीयः ॥

एवं शंकामि लाअशश पलमवल्लभाए शअलशुद्धंतशामिणीए शा इस्तिअ त्ति
कदा वि लञ्जीए शुयंधादेवीए लष्कीयदि ।

॥ प्रथमः ॥

70

शा वि लष्किज्जंती किं अम्ह लष्किदुं पालेदि ? भोदु , कशिशं पि गब्भलपेलंते
दूले दिअंतले गश्चम्ह ।

59 ननु दुराचारजयन्तेन प्रज्वालित इत्याचक्ष्व । 61 अस्त्येवैतद् । तत् साम्प्रतं कुत्र
गच्छाव ? 63 f. ननु योगेश्वर्याः कालाग्निशिखाया अग्रतो व्रजाव । तत्रैष उपसर्गः कदापि
न बाधते । 66 साप्यस्मिन् काले पाल्यते ? 68 f. एवं शङ्के राज्ञः परमवल्लभया सकल-
शुद्धान्तस्वामिन्या सा स्त्रीति कदापि राज्ञ्या सुगन्धादेव्या रक्ष्यते । 71 f. सापि रक्ष्यमाणा
किमावां रक्षितुं पारयति ? भवतु , कस्मिन्नपि गह्वरपर्यन्ते दूरे दिगन्तरे गच्छाव ।

57 धम्मलष्काधिआले] em. , धम्ममलष्कविआले PāPu, धम्मलस्कधिआले em.RT 57
पज्जालिदे] PāPu, पज्जालिदे RT (typo?) 59 णं] PāPu, om.RT 59 पज्जालि-
दे] conj. , पज्जालिद PāPu, पज्जालिद RT (typo?) 59 आचष्क] PāPu, आचस्क
RT (em. ?) 61 ता शंपदं] conj. , भागंपदं PāPu, भागपदं em.RT 61 कहिं] PāRT,
कहि Pu 61 गश्चम्ह] RT (em. ?), गच्छम्ह PāPu 63 योगेशलीए] em. , योगेशलए
PāPuRT 63 कालग्गि°] Pā, कालग्गी° PuRT 63 अग्गदो] conj. , अग्गमं PāPu,
अशशमं RT (em. ?) 63 तेशु] conj. , तसू PāPu, तशू RT 64 ण बाधदि] conj. ,
णिवाधदि PāPu, ण वाधेदि em.RT 66 शा वि] conj. , शा किं em.RT, शाधि PāPu
68 शंकामि] conj. , शंकेमि PāPuRT 68 लाअशश] em.RT, लोअशश PāPu 68 पल-
मवल्लभाए] RT (em. ?), परमवल्लभाए PāPu 68 इस्तिअ त्ति] em. , इस्तिअं ति PāPu,
इस्तिअं त्ति RT (em. ?) 69 लञ्जीए] conj. , लंचीए PāPuRT 69 लष्कीयदि] PāPu,
लस्कियदि RT (em. ?) 71 लष्किज्जंती] PāPu, लस्कज्जंती RT (em. ?) 71 लष्कि-
दुं] em. , लस्किदुं RT (em. ?), लष्किंतु PāPu 71 भोदु] em. , भो भोदु PāPuRT
71 °पेलंते] PāPu, °पेत्तंते RT (em. ?) 72 दिअंतले] RT (em. ?), दिअत्तले PāPu
72 गश्चम्ह] RT (em. ?), गच्चम्ह PāPu

॥ द्वितीयः ॥

यं आचष्कदि वअश्शे । ता याव पभादे ण पयट्टदि ताव तुलिदं हिंडम्ह ।

॥ तथा कुरुतः । प्रथमः ॥

अले मशाणभूदी, यथा मंतेशि । पभादे उण हिंडिदुं य्येव एशु कुलष्टे ण पालीअदि ।

75

॥ द्वितीयः ॥

कीश ?

॥ प्रथमः ॥

80

विशए विशए णअले णअले गामे गामे थले थले वेदज्झयणशद्देण तुट्टंति कण्णा, अज्जगंधेण तुट्टदि घाणे, जण्णधूमेण गलंति अष्कीइ । ता एशे कुलष्टे लअणीहिं य्येव लंघीयदु । दिअशा उण केशुचि वणगहणेशु अदिवाहीअंतु ।

॥ द्वितीयः ॥

एवं णेदं । शंकलिशणभएण वि लअणीशु य्येव अम्हेहिं हिंडिदव्वं । दिअशा उण अलण्णेशु अलष्किदेहिं णेदव्वा ।

85

॥ परिक्रामतः । प्रथमः ॥

74 यदाचष्टे वयस्यः । तद् यावत् प्रभातं न प्रवर्तते तावत् त्वरितं हिण्डाव । 76 अरे श्मशानभूते, यथा मन्त्रयसि । प्रभाते पुनर् हिण्डितुमेवात्र कुराष्टे न पार्यते । 79 कस्मात् ? 81 ff. विषये विषये नगरे नगरे ग्रामे ग्रामे स्थले स्थले वेदाध्ययनशब्देन त्रुट्यतः कर्णौ, आज्यगन्धेन त्रुट्यति घ्राणम्, यज्ञधूमेन गलतो ऽक्षिणी । तदेतत् कुराष्टं रजनीभिरेव लङ्घ्यताम् । दिवसाः पुनः केषुचिद् वनगहनेष्वतिवाह्यन्ताम् । 85 f. एवं न्वेतत् । सङ्कर्षणभयेनापि रजनीष्वेवावाभ्यां हिण्डितव्यम् । दिवसाः पुनररण्येष्वलक्षिताभ्यां नेतव्याः ।

74 आचष्कदि] PāPu, आचस्कदि RT(em. ?) 74 पभादे] Pā^{pc}(?) RT, पाभादे Pā^{ac}(?), प। भादे Pu 74 तुलिदं] PāPu, तुलदं RT(typo) 74 हिंडम्ह] PāRT, हिडम्ह Pu 76 भूदी] RT(em. ?), भूदी PāPu 76 यथा] RT(em. ?), यथा PāPu 76 मंतेशि] RT(em. ?), मंतेसि PāPu 76 हिंडिदुं य्येव] em., हिंडदु य्येव PāPuRT 76 कुलष्टे] PāPu, कुलस्टे RT(em. ?) 81 शद्देण] RT(em. ?), शद्देण PāPu 82 कण्णा] em.RT, कम्मो PāPu 82 घाणे] em., घाणो PāPuRT 82 अष्कीइ] em., इष्कीइ PāPu, अस्कीइ em.RT 82 कुलष्टे] PāPu, कुलस्टे RT(em. ?) 83 लअणीहिं] em., भेअणीहिं PāPu, लअणीम्हि em.RT 83 उण] RT(em. ?), ओण PāPu 83 अंतु] PāRT, अंतु Pu 85 एवं] RT(em. ?), एव PāPu 85 णेदं] Pu, णेदं PāRT 85 शंकलिशण°] conj.RT, संविलषण° PāPu 85 लअणीशु] RT(em. ?), लअणीसु PāPu 85 अम्हेहिं] em., अ अम्हेहिं PāPuRT 85 हिंडिदव्वं] PāRT, हिडिदव्वं Pu 85 उण] RT(em. ?), ओण PāPu 86 अलण्णेशु] RT(em. ?), अरण्णेशु Pā, अरणेशु Pu 86 अलष्किदेहिं] em., अलष्किंदेहि PāPu, अलस्किदेहि RT(em. ?)

अले मशाणभूदी पविभक्त वृ दिशाओ शअला । शणिअं गलंति णष्कत्ता । ताव
ओणदे पभादे । अम्हाणं किं णु कादव्वं ?

॥ नेपथ्ये पटहशब्दानन्तरम् ॥

90

भो भोः पौरजानपदाः, एष खलु महाराजशङ्करवर्मदेवराजाज्ञया भट्टश्रीसं-
र्षणः सर्वानेव युष्मान् बोधयति—

ये ऽत्रानादिजगत्प्रवाहपतिता नानागमाः साधव-

स्ते तिष्ठन्तु यथास्थिताः स्वसमयादिष्टाश्चरन्तः क्रियाः ।

ये तु प्रस्तुतधर्मविल्लवकृतः पापास्तपोपायिन-

95

स्ते चेदाशु न यान्ति घातयति तान् दस्यूनिव क्षमापतिः ॥ १ ॥

॥ उभौ श्रुत्वा सभयम् ॥

आगदे य्येव शंकलिशणववदेशेण जंगमे अम्हाण मच्चू । ता अण्णदो तुलिदतु-
लिदं गच्छम्ह ।

॥ निष्क्रान्तौ ॥

100

॥ ततः प्रविशति परित्यक्तस्नातकवेशो गृहीतगृहस्थराजपुरुषोचितवेशः

श्रीसङ्कर्षणो बटुर्विभवतश्च परिवारः ॥

॥ स्नात° ॥

बटो, अपि नीलाम्बरोत्सारणेन परिवदत्यस्मान् जनः ?

॥ बटुः ॥

105

अय्य, मा एवं संकटु भवं । दुराआरेहि अलीयतावसेहि अभिभविज्जंतो
पणट्टो य्येव पुणो अय्येण पइट्टिदो तईधम्मो ।

88 f. अरे श्मशानभूते, प्रविभक्ता इव दिशः सकलाः । शनैर्गलन्ति नक्षत्राणि । तावदुप-
नतं प्रभातम् । आवयोः किं नु कर्तव्यम्? 98 f. आगत एव सङ्कर्षणव्यपदेशेन जङ्गम
आवयोर्मृत्युः । तद् अन्यतस्त्वरितत्वरितं गच्छाव । 106 f. आर्य, मैवं शङ्कतां भवान् ।
दुराचारैरलीकतापसैरभिभूयमानः प्रणष्ट एव पुनरार्येण प्रतिष्ठितः त्रयीधर्मः ।

88 मशाण°] em.RT, असाण° PāPu 88 दिशाओ] RT(em. ?), दिसाओ PāPu 88
शअला] PāRT, शअ । ला Pu 88 णष्कत्ता] conj., णष्कंता Pā, णष्कंता Pu, णस्कंता
RT(em. ?) 89 ओणदे] RT(em. ?), ओणदो PāPu 89 अम्हाणं] RT(em. ?), अम्हाणं
PāPu 89 णु] PuRT, णु Pā 91 भट्ट°] PāRT, भद° Pu 93 ये] em.RT, यो PāPu
94 °दिष्टा°] conj.Isaacson, °विष्टा° PāPuRT 96 दस्यूनिव] em.RT, दस्यनिव Pā,
दस्यनिव (?) Pu 98 य्येव] PāRT, प्येव Pu 98 शंकलिशण°] em.RT, शंकसिघ-
ण° PāPu 98 मच्चू] em., मच्चू PāPuRT 98 ता] em., दा PāPuRT 98 अण्णदो]
PāRT, अणदो Pu 99 गच्छम्ह] PāPu, गच्छम्ह RT(em. ?) 101 °वेशः] PāRT, °वे-
श° Pu 106 मा] RT(em. ?), भा PāPu 106 अलीयतावसेहि] conj.RT, यभावसेहि
PāPu 106 अभिभविज्जंतो] conj., अभिभवज्जंतौ PāPu, अभिभवज्जंतो RT(em. ?)
107 पणट्टो] em.RT, पणंचे PāPu

॥ स्यात् ० ॥

ननु देवेन श्रीशङ्करवर्मणा प्रतिष्ठापित इति ब्रूहि । तत् किमन्ये न नीलाम्बर-
च्छायानुकारिण उत्सारणयोग्याः प्रचरन्ति पृथिव्यामलीकतापसाः ? 110

॥ बटुः ॥

अय्य, सेवववएसेण जं किं पि आयरंता इत्तिअकालं दिट्टा दुट्टा तावसा ।
संपदं पुण अगणिदा अय्यपदावेण ते वि पविरला होंति ।

॥ सङ्क ० ॥

साधूक्तम् । मयापि ते न न दृष्टाः । पात्रं ते निर्वासनस्य । तथा हि — 115

अपेयं किं तेषां ननु विरहितं यद् द्रवतया

अभक्ष्यं यत् तिक्तं दलयितुमशक्यं च दशनैः ।

अजाता प्रेता वा यदि परमगम्या स्तनवती

तपःस्थानं योग्यं किमिव यदि वा शौण्डिकगृहम् ॥ २ ॥

॥ बटुः ॥

जधा अय्यो मंतेदि ।

॥ सङ्क ० ॥

बटो, सो ऽपि नाल्पो विल्लवो वर्णाश्रमाणाम् ।

॥ बटुः ॥

ताणं पि सो कलंको य्येव माहेसराणं जाण ववएसेण ते ववहरंति । 125

॥ सङ्क ० ॥

बटो, सम्यगभिहितम् । तदुद्वासने ऽपि देवस्य युक्त एवावधानपरिग्रहः । तथा
च —

112 f. आर्य, शैवव्यपदेशेन यत् किमप्याचरन्त एतावत्कालं दृष्टा दुष्टास्तापसाः । साम्प्रतं
पुनरगणिता आर्यप्रतापेन (०प्रभावेन?) ते ऽपि प्रविरला भवन्ति । 121 यथार्यो मन्त्रयते ।
125 तेषामपि स कलङ्क एव माहेश्वराणां येषां व्यपदेशेन ते व्यवहरन्ति ।

112 ०ववएसेण] RT(em.?), ०चवएसेण PāPu 112 इत्तिअकालं] em., इत्तिअं कालं
PāPuRT 112 तावसा] RT(em.?), तापसा PāPu 113 अगणिदा] conj., अगणिद
अगणिद PāPu, अगणिदगणिदा RT 113 ०पदावेण] conj., ०पआवेण PāPu, ०पहावेण
em.RT 113 पविरला] em.RT, पविरल PāPu 114 सङ्क ०] PāPu, स्यात् ० RT(em.?)
116 ननु] Pā, न तु PuRT 116 यद् द्रवतया] RT(em.?), यद्द्रवतया PāPu 118 प्रेता
वा] em.RT, प्रोताया Pā, प्रेताया Pu 121 जधा] PāPu, यधा RT(em.?) 121 अ-
य्यो] PāRT, आय्या Pu 122 सङ्क ०] PāPu, स्यात् ० RT 125 ताणं] em.RT, त्राणं
PāPu 125 सो] PāPu, om.RT 126 सङ्क ०] PāPu, स्यात् ० RT 127 एवावधानं]
Pā^{pc}RT, एवाधां Pā^{ac}, एवावधानं Pu

शैवं शासनमाश्रिता वयमिति प्रख्याप्य नाम प्रभोः

शुद्धार्थेषु तदागमेषु कुधियः कुर्वन्ति ते विप्रवम् ।

तान् देवो विनियम्य सम्यगमले (मार्गे) यदि स्थापयेत्

तद् वन्द्ये क्षितिपालने यशसि वा का नाम तस्य क्षतिः ॥ ३ ॥

॥ बटुः ॥

जुत्तं णिमं ।

॥ सङ्क० ॥

ननु गृहीत एवात्र मया राजादेशः । तन् नियुज्यन्तामेते मार्गपालास्तदन्वेष-
णाय ।

॥ बटुः ॥

जं अय्यो आणवेदि ।

॥ इति निष्क्रम्य पुनः प्रविश्य च ॥

अय्य, पणट्टा रट्टादो । अण्णो पुण को वि पणिही संभंतो अय्यं अण्णेसंतो
आगदो । ता एत्थ अय्यो पमाणं ।

॥ सङ्क० ॥

आनीयतामसौ ।

॥ बटुः संज्ञया तमाह्वयति । प्रविश्य संभ्रान्तः पुरुषः ॥

जयदु भट्टके । जे णाम महेशला मंशशीधुदाशीववहालशीला णीलंबलकिंव-
दंतीं य्येव (शुणिअ ते) शअला लष्टादो पणष्टा । अण्णे उण शुद्धतवशिशणो पि

134 युक्तं न्विदम् । 139 यदार्य आज्ञापयति । 141 f. आर्य, प्रणष्टा राष्ट्रात् । अन्यः
पुनः को ऽपि प्रणिधिः संभ्रान्त आर्यमन्विष्यन्नागतः । तदत्रार्यः प्रमाणम् । 146 ff. जयतु
भट्टकः । ये नाम माहेश्वरा मांसशीधुदासीव्यवहारशीला नीलाम्बरकिंवदन्तीमेव श्रुत्वा ते
सकला राष्ट्रात् प्रणष्टाः । अन्ये पुनः शुद्धतपस्विनो ऽपि शङ्किताश्चलितुं प्रवृत्ताः । अत्र भट्टकः
प्रमाणम् ।

129 शैवं] PāPu^{pc}RT, शौवं Pu^{ac} 129 °श्रिता] PāPu^{pc}RT, °श्रीता Pu^{ac} (?) 131 (मा-
र्गे)] conj.RT, om.PāPu (unmetrical) 132 वन्द्ये] em.RT, वंदे PāPu 135 सङ्क०]
PāPu, स्नात० RT 136 °स्तद०] PāRT, °सद० Pu 139 f. आणवेदि । इति]
em.RT, आणवेदि ति PāPu 141 पणट्टा] em., पणट्टाओ PāPuRT 141 अण्णो]
PāRT, अणो Pu 141 पुण] PāPu^{pc}RT, पुणो Pu^{ac} 142 ता] RT(em.?), त PāPu
143 सङ्क०] PāPu, स्नात० RT 145 संभ्रान्तः] PuRT, संभ्रातः Pā 146 भट्टके] PāPu,
भस्टकेRT(em.?) 146 °शीधु०] PāRT, °शीधुं० Pu 146 °ववहाल०] RT(em.?),
°वचहाल० PāPu 147 °किंवदंतीं] RT(em.?), °किंवदंती PāPu 147 (शुणिअ ते)]
conj.RT, om.PāPu 147 लष्टादो] PāPu, लस्टादो RT(em.?) 147 पणष्टा] PāPu,
पणस्टा RT(em.?) 147 अण्णे] em., उण्ण PāPu, अण्णओ em.RT 147 शुद्ध०]
em.RT, शुद्धं० PāPu 147 पि] PāPu, वि RT(em.?)

शंकिदा चलिदुं पउत्ताओ । एशु भष्टके पमाणं ।

॥ सङ्क० ॥

बटो, साधून् व्यावर्तयितुं शीघ्रं नियुज्यन्तां प्रधानपुरुषाः सत्कारपूर्वम् ।

150

॥ पुरुषं प्रति ॥

त्वमपि रे मार्गमादेशयंस्तैरेव सह गच्छ ।

⟨ ॥ पुरुषः ॥ ⟩

यं भष्टके आणवेदि ।

॥ इति निष्क्रान्तः ॥

155

॥ बटुः ॥

अहो अय्यस्स पहावो उच्छलिदो ।

॥ सङ्क० ॥

बटो, न युक्तमेतद् यदनादिप्रबन्धप्रवृत्तसदागमानुगामिनः शङ्कितमासते । परममाहेश्वरो हि राजा शङ्करवर्मदेवः, सर्वाश्रमेषु च दयालुः । तदेहि वयमपि कुशङ्कोपशमाय श्रीधर्मशिवाश्रममेवाद्य गच्छामः ।

160

॥ बटुः ॥

जं अय्यो आणवेदि ।

॥ परिक्रामतः ॥

॥ नेपथ्ये ॥

165

किं शङ्किताः सभयमाश्रमिणः स्थिताः स्थ

देवो ऽखिलाश्रमगुरुर्न पराङ्मुखो वः ।

युष्मासु विप्लवमिवादधतो निरस्ता-

स्ते कृत्रिमव्रतवृताः परमेश्वरेण ॥ ४ ॥

॥ बटुः ॥

170

एदे खु अय्येण णिउत्ता पहाणपुरिसा उग्घोसंता गदा ।

154 यद् भट्टक आज्ञापयति । 157 अहो, आर्यस्य प्रभाव उच्छलितः 163 यदार्य आज्ञापयति । 171 एते खल्वार्येण नियुक्ता प्रधानपुरुषा उद्घोषयन्तो गताः ।

148 भष्टके] PāPu, भस्टके RT(em. ?) 149 सङ्क०] PāPu, स्रात० RT 150 शीघ्रं] em. RT, मित्रं PāPu 150 प्रधानपुरुषाः सत्कारपूर्वम्] em. RT, प्रधानपुरुषसत्कारः सत्कारपूर्वम् PāPu 153 (पुरुषः)] em. RT, om. PāPu 154 भष्टके] PāPu, भस्टके RT(em. ?) 154 f. आणवेदि । इति] em. RT, आणवेदि त्ति PāPu 157 पहावो] em. RT, आवो PāPu 157 उच्छलिदो] PāPu, उत्थलिदो RT(em. ?) 158 सङ्क०] PāPu, स्रात० RT 159 °गामिनः] RT(em. ?), °गामिनो PāPu 160 तदेहि] em. RT^{pc}, तदेह PāPuRT^{ac} 164 परिक्रामतः] PāPu, उभौ परिक्रामतः RT(em. ?) 166 °श्रमिणः] em. RT, °श्रमिणाः PāPu 166 स्थिताः] PāRT, स्थिता Pu

॥ सङ्क० ॥

बटो, सम्यगुपलक्षितं भवता । वयमपि सत्वरं ब्रजामः ।

॥ परिक्रम्य ॥

बटो, ननु प्राप्ता वयं श्रीधर्मशिवाश्रमम् । तथा हि—

175

एते धूलनभस्मधूसररुचो धूपाग्निसंधुक्षणे

दक्षास्तत्क्षणपीतपुण्यपुरजित्पूजार्थपुष्पासवाः ।

धन्याः कं न हरन्ति तापसजटाग्रन्थिस्त्रयीकारिणः

कन्थामन्थरलास्यदानरसिकाः शैवाश्रमे वायवः ॥ ५ ॥

॥ बटुः ॥

180

जधा अय्यो मंतेदि । पसंतरमणिज्जं तवोवणं इमं णो दीसदि ।

॥ सङ्क० ॥

तदेहि प्रविशावः ।

॥ प्रवेशमभिनीय ॥

कथं प्राङ्गन एवाभिवर्तते श्रीधर्मशिवो भट्टारकः । अहो अमुष्य सर्वातिशायिनी

185

तपोलक्ष्मीः । एष हि

भस्मस्मेराननश्रीः शुचिविबुधधुनीनीरनिर्धौतमूर्धा

धावद्भिश्चेटवृत्तैश्चटुलगणनिभैस्तापसैर्वन्द्यमानः ।

गौर्याजस्रं सुकीर्त्या शशधरसमया नन्द्यमानामलात्मा

श्रेयः श्रीकण्ठकल्पो जनयति जगतां दर्शनादेव नूनम् ॥ ६ ॥

190

अपि च,

आत्मानमाश्रमपदे च बहुप्रकार-

कालेयकल्मषविशेषमुषि प्रविष्टम् ।

सत्यं शपे शिवपुरस्थमिवाप्यवैमि

स्मेरस्मरारिनयनत्रयतर्प्यमाणम् ॥ ७ ॥

195

181 यथार्यो मन्त्रयति । प्रशान्तरमणीयं तपोवनमिदं नो दृश्यते ।

172 सङ्क०] PāPu, स्नात० RT 176 धूल०] Pā(?) RT, धूल० Pu 178 हरन्ति] em. RT, रहन्ति PāPu 181 जधा] em., जहा PāPuRT 181 पसंतरमणिज्जं] conj. RT, पसरंतरमज्जं PāPu, पसंतरं अज्ज conj. 181 तवोवणं इमं णो] conj., तवोवणमिणमो PāPuRT 182 सङ्क०] PāPu, स्नात० RT 183 प्रविशावः] em., प्रविशामः PāPuRT 185 एवाभिवर्तते] em., एवमभिवर्तते PāPuRT 185 शायिनी] Pā^{pc}(?) PuRT, शायिनी Pā^{ac}(?) 187 विबुध०] em. RT, विधुव० PāPu 188 श्चेटवृत्तै०] conj. Isaacson, श्चैरवेदै० PāPuRT 192 नमाश्र०] Pā^{pc}PuRT, नमैव Pā^{ac} 193 मुषि] em. RT, पुषि PāPu 194 शपे] conj., शिखे PāPu, शिवे em. RT 195 तर्प्यमाणम्] em. RT, तर्क्यमाणं PāPu

॥ बटुः ॥

अहं पि अत्ताणं उप्पतंतं बम्हभूयं पेक्खामि ।

॥ ततः प्रविशत्यासनस्थो यथानिर्दिष्टः श्रीधर्मशिवो विभवतश्च परिवारः ॥

॥ भट्टारकः, सवितर्कम् ॥

राजासौ भुवनेषु विश्रुतगुणो धर्मैकतानाशयो

200

मन्त्री शास्त्रमहाटवीविहरणाश्रान्तो जयन्तो ऽप्यसौ ।

नाहं कर्म यशोविरुद्धमनयोः शङ्के यथावस्थिता -

स्तिष्ठन्त्वाश्रमिणः किमाकुलतया किं वा भयं मादृशाम् ॥ ८ ॥

॥ अग्रतो ऽवलोक्य ॥

कथमयमिहैवायातः स्नातकः? सर्वं व्यक्तमिदानीम् ।

205

॥ सङ्क° ॥

तदेहि बटो, प्रणमामो भट्टारकम् ।

॥ उपसृत्य ॥

नमो भगवते प्रत्यक्षमहेश्वराय भट्टारकाय ।

॥ भट्टारकः ॥

210

स्वागतमार्याय । कुशलिनो भवन्तः? आसनम् ।

॥ स्नात° ॥

अलमासनेन, शाद्वलस्थल एवोपविशामः । भगवन्, अप्यविघ्नमुपपद्यते यथाप्रस्तुतस्तपोविधिः? को वात्र विघ्नः? भगवान् महेश्वर एवात्मानमात्मनार्चयति । तदमुना जनप्रवादेन यथा न मनागाकुलतां बिभ्रति तपोधनाः, तथैनानादेष्टुमर्हति भट्टारकः । तपोविघ्ना एव प्रतिहता राज्ञा । राजाप्यनुपदमागमिष्यत्येव भट्टारकं द्रष्टुम् ।

215

197 अहमपि आत्मानमुत्पतन्तं ब्रह्मभूयं पश्यामि ।

197 बम्हभूयं] conj., बलह्मभूयं PāPu, बलम्हभूयं RT (em. ?) 198 प्रविशत्या°] Pā°Pu RT, प्रविशत्यि° Pā°c 200 °नाशयो] conj., °नाश्रयो PāPuRT 201 °विहरणाश्रान्तो] em. RT, °विहरणाश्रान्तो PāPu 202 नाहं] PāPu, नेदं em. RT 202 शङ्के] conj., शङ्का PāPuRT 202 f. °स्थितास्ति°] PāPu, °स्थिता ति° RT (em. ?) 203 किमाकुलतया] conj., किमाकुल PāPu(unmetrical), किमाकुलमितः conj. RT 205 °यातः स्नातकः] RT (em. ?), °यातः॥ स्नातकः॥ PāPu 206 सङ्क°] PāPu, स्नात° RT 207 प्रणमामो] Pā°c RT, प्रणमामो Pā°c, प्रणमामो Pu 213 अप्य°] em. RT, जोय्य° PāPu 214 °विधिः] RT (em. ?), °विधेः Pā, °विधः Pu 214 को वात्र] PāPu, [अथ] को वात्र RT 214 एवात्मा°] RT (em. ?), एवात्सा° PāPu 215 °कुलतां] RT (em. ?), °कुलता PāPu 216 तथैनाना°] RT (em. ?), तथैनामा° PāPu 216 °हता राज्ञा] em. RT, °हतराजा PāPu 217 °पदमाग°] PāPu, °पदमेवाग° RT (em. ?)

॥ भट्टा० , सस्मितम् ॥

कास्माकमाकुलता, तापसानां वा? श्रीशङ्करवर्मणि धर्मेण मेदिनीं समागतां
शासति साधूनामेव राज्यम्, तस्य परं भृतिः। नैवादौवम्, चिरात् प्रभृत्येव- 220
मेवानुभवामः।

॥ प्रविश्यापटीक्षेपेण संभ्रान्तस्तापसः ॥

जयदु जयदु भट्टारको। एसो खु को वि वुड्ढको पंडिदो स्वगव्वं उव्वहंतो
अस्समं इमं उवहसंतो अणेअसिस्सपरिवारिदो †उग्गाहणकअणसंधंव† करंतो
इदो आगदो। ता इत्थ भट्टारको पमाणं। 225

॥ भट्टा० , सस्मितम् ॥

प्रविशतु तपस्वी। किमस्माकम्?

॥ ततः प्रविशति यथानिर्दिष्टो वृद्धाम्भिः। वृद्धाम्भिः ॥

अहो विस्मयः। अहो बत कियाननर्थकारी राजा शङ्करवर्मा यस्येदृ-
शी साम्राज्यलक्ष्मीरग्निहोतृभिर्वनस्थैर्यतिभिर्ब्रह्मचारिभिरेभिश्च शैवपाशुपत- 230
पाञ्चरात्रिकार्हतसाङ्घसौगतप्रभृतिभिरनर्गलं भुज्यते। तत्कथमेष चिरं जीवि-
ष्यति? तदद्य तावदयमेकवृक्षे मन्दारक इव दृश्यते। अस्मिन्नेवावसर ईश्वरं
पराकृत्य परलोकं निरस्य वेदप्रामाण्यं प्रतिक्षिप्य राजानममुममार्गादतो नि-
वार्य योग्ये वर्त्मनि स्थापयामि, येनायमर्थपरश्चिरं राज्यमनुभवति। अत्र च
शैवाश्रमे श्रुतं मया बहवः पण्डितमानिनः सङ्घटिता इति। तेषां समक्षमेनमेव 235
शैवाचार्यं निर्भर्त्सयामि।

223 ff. जयतु जयतु भट्टारकः। एष खलु को ऽपि वृद्धः पण्डितः स्वगर्वमुद्धहन्नाश्रममिममु-
पहसन्ननेकशिष्यपरिवारितः †...† कुर्वन्नित आगतः। तदत्र भट्टारकः प्रमाणम्।

219 कास्माकमाकुलता] PuRT, कास्माकर्मकुलता Pā 219 °वर्मणि] em.RT, °धर्मणि
PāPu 220 नैवादौवम्] Pā^{pc}PuRT^{pc}, नैवाधेवम् Pā^{cc}, नवादौवम् RT^{cc} 220 प्रभृत्ये०]
em.RT, प्रत्ये० PāPu 222 °पटीक्षे०] em.RT, °पक्षे० PāPu 222 संभ्रान्तस्ता०]
PāPu, संभ्रान्तरता० RT(typo) 223 भट्टारको] em., भट्टारक PāPuRT 223 पंडिदो]
em., पंडि PāPu, पंडिओ em.RT 224 करंतो] conj., कसंतोइ PāPu, करंतो em.RT
225 भट्टारको] em., भट्ट PāPu, भट्टए em.RT 229 विस्मयः] em., विस्मयम् PāPuRT
229 शङ्करवर्मा] em.RT, संकरवर्म PāPu 230 यस्येदृशी] em.Isaacson, यद्येदृशी PāPu,
य ईदृशी em.RT 230 °होतृ०] PāRT, °होत्र० Pu 231 °साङ्घ०] RT(em.?), °शा-
ङ्घ० PāPu 232 °मेकवृक्षे] conj., °मेकदेशे PāPuRT 232 अस्मि०] RT(em.?), त-
स्मि० PāPu 232 °वावसर] PāPu^{pc}RT, °वासर Pu^{cc} 233 वेदप्रामाण्यं] em.RT,
चेदप्रामाण्यं PāPu 234 °श्चिरं] PāPuRT^{pc}, °श्चिरं RT^{cc} 234 °भवति] em.Isaacson,
°भवतीति PāPuRT 235 इति] add.RT, om.PāPu 236 °चार्य] PāPuRT^{pc}, °चार्य
RT^{cc} 236 निर्भर्त्सयामि] PuRT, निर्भर्त्सयामि Pā

॥ परिक्रम्यान्वतो ऽवलोक्य ॥

अयं स शैवाचार्यः कणभक्षाक्षपादादिदर्शन [पारदृश्वा], एष च महामीमांसकः
सङ्कर्षणः, इमे चान्ये बहवो नानाशास्त्रविदः । भवतूपसर्पामि ।

॥ उपसृत्य ॥

240

कुशल्यसि तपस्विन्? भद्रं ते ब्राह्मण ।

॥ इति वदन् शाद्वल एव शिष्यैरुपविशति ॥

॥ भट्टा०, सस्मितम् ॥

कथमुपक्रम एवाक्षेपः?

॥ सङ्कर्षणस्य मुखं पश्यति ॥

245

॥ स्नात० ॥

भगवन्नेवमेतत् । पश्यामस्तावत् ।

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

किमित्थमनर्थशतदुःस्थमास्यते भवद्भिः?

तपांसि यातनाश्चित्राः संयमो भोगवञ्चनम् ।

250

अग्निहोत्रादिकं कर्म बालक्रीडेव लक्ष्यते ॥ ९ ॥

॥ भट्टा० ॥

किं कुर्मः? ईदृशे कर्मणि भगवतेश्वरेण प्रेरिताः स्मः ।

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

कः पुनर्भगवानीश्वरः?

255

मृगतृष्णाम्भसि स्नातः स्वपुष्पकृतशेखरः ।

एष वन्ध्यासुतो याति शशशृङ्गधनुर्धरः ॥ १० ॥

॥ भट्टा० ॥

अलमपभाषणेन । स हि भगवान्निश्चजगतः स्रष्टा संहर्तानन्तजन्तुग्रामवृत्ते-
र्विचित्रविपाकस्य कर्मकलापकस्य यथाविषयं विनियोक्ता नित्यानन्दः सर्वज्ञः
कृपालुः परमेश्वरः ।

260

260 cf. NM I 488.13: नानात्मगतशुभाशुभकर्मकलापापेक्षः स्रष्टा प्रजापतिरिति

237 °म्यान्वतो] em.RT, °म्यन्नयतो Pā^{pe}, °म्यान्नयतो Pā^{ac}, °म्य। न्नयतो Pu,
238 °र्यः कण०] em.RT, °र्यक्षण० PāPu 238 °भक्षा०] PāPu^{pe}RT, °भभभक्षा० Pu^{ac}
238 °पारदृश्वा] conj.RT, om.PāPu 239 °कः सङ्क०] Pā, °कसं० PuRT 239 °तू-
प०] em.RT, °त्वप० PāPu 241 f. ब्राह्मण। इति] em.RT, ब्राह्मणेति PāPu 242 वदन्
शा०] em.RT, वदञ्छा० Pā, वदन्वा० Pu 255 °वानीश्व०] RT(em.?), °वानेश्व०
PāPu 256 स्व०] PāRT, स्व० Pu 257 °धरः] RT(em.?), °धरः (°धरः?) PāPu
259 स हि] em.RT, स ह PāPu

॥ वृद्धाम्भिः, मन्दं विहस्य ॥

अहो भौतानां भक्तितमिरहता न किञ्चित् पश्यति मुग्धा दृष्टिः। कुत एवं भविष्यति? कथमिव हि कर्तृत्वमस्य सम्मंस्यते लोकः? तथा हि,

कृपेयं क्रीडेयं प्रभुरुचुरियं प्रेरणामिदं

265

स्वभावो ऽयं धर्मार्जनमिदमथाप्यार्जवमिदम्।

न जाने किं कृत्वा मनसि कृतकृत्यो मुनिरसौ

पुराणो नीरागः सृजति जगतीं संहरति च ॥ ११ ॥

करणादिकारणकलापनिःस्पृहः

सहकारिभिश्च रहितः कथं ब्रजेत्।

270

स्वपरप्रयोजन(विशेष)वर्जितां

जगतां स्थितिप्रलयसर्गहेतुताम्? ॥ १२ ॥

किं च,

एवमेव विधातापि धाता त्रीणि जगन्ति वा।

पुनर्नान्यानि भूयांसि सृजतीत्यत्र को विधिः ॥ १३ ॥

275

॥ भट्टा० ॥

कृतं दूषणोपन्यासायासेन।

प्रमाणशून्ये विफलं हि दूषणं

प्रमाणसिद्धे तदपास्तमेव यत्।

तदुक्तिमौख्यमपास्य मृग्यता-

280

265 ff. cf. NM I 508.11-509.6: यस्तु प्रयोजनविकल्पः किमर्थं सृजति जगन्ति भगवानिति सो ऽपि न पेशलः। स्वभाव एवैष भगवतः, यत् कदाचित् सृजति कदाचिच्च संहरति विश्वमिति॥ कथं पुनर्नियतकाल एषो ऽस्य स्वभाव इति चेत्, आदित्यं पश्यतु देवानांप्रियः, यो नियतकालमुदेत्यस्तमेति च। प्राणिकर्मसापेक्षमेतद्विस्वतो रूपमिति चेत्, ईश्वरे ऽपि तुल्यः समाधिः। क्रीडार्थे ऽपि जगत्सर्गे न हीयते कृतार्थता। प्रवर्तमाना दृश्यन्ते न हि क्रीडासु दुःखिताः॥ अथवानुकम्पयैव सर्गसंहारावारभतामीश्वरः। नन्वत्र चोदितम्, न तथाविधाः प्राणिनो ऽनुकम्प्या भवन्ति। केवलसुखस्वभावा वा सृष्टिरनुकम्पावता क्रियेतेति। सत्यं चोदितमनुपपन्नं तु, अनादित्वात् संसारस्य। 278 ff. cf. NM I 267.8-9: प्रमाणसिद्धे हतशक्ति दूषणं प्रमाणशून्ये ऽपि वृथा तदुक्तयः। निरस्य चोद्यव्यसनं तु मृग्यतामतीन्द्रिये वस्तुनि साधनं पुनः॥; also NM II 8.16: दूषणाख्यानमौख्यमस्माकमपवारितम्।

264 सम्मंस्यते] em. RT, संस्यते PāPu 269 °कारण°] RT (em. ?), °कारक° PāPu 270 °श्च र°] Pā^pcPuRT, °श्चरर° Pā^{ac} 271 °विशेष°] conj. RT, om. PāPu 275 पुनर्नान्यानि] PāRT, पुनर्नान्यानि Pu 278 प्रमा°] Pā^pcPuRT, प्रमा° Pā^{ac} 278 दूषणं] RT (em. ?), दूषणां PāPu 279 प्रमाणसिद्धे तदपास्तमेव] conj. Isaacson, प्रमाणीसिद्धे उदपास्तमेव PāPu, प्रमाणसिद्धावुदयास्तमेव em. RT 279 यत्] conj. Isaacson, तत् PāPuRT

मतीन्द्रिये वस्तुनि साधनं परैः ॥ १४ ॥

॥ वृद्धा०, सस्मितम् ॥

यद्येवमीश्वरसिद्धावभिधीयतां प्रमाणम् ।

॥ भट्टा० ॥

अनुमानमिति ब्रूमः ।

285

॥ वृद्धा०, सस्मितम् ॥

अनुमानं प्रमाणं चेति मनोरथः ।

अवस्थादेशकालानां भेदाद्भिन्नासु शक्तिषु ।

भावानामनुमानेन प्रसिद्धिरतिदुर्लभा ॥ १५ ॥

किं च,

290

हस्तस्पर्शादिवान्धेन विषमे पथि धावता ।

अनुमानप्रधानेन विनिपातो न दुर्लभः ॥ १६ ॥

अपि च,

यत्नेनानुमितो ऽप्यर्थः कुशलैरनुमातृभिः ।

अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैरन्यथैवोपपाद्यते ॥ १७ ॥

295

॥ भट्टा० ॥

अलं प्रपञ्चेन । प्रसिद्धमेव बार्हस्पत्यानां गृहकृत्यकमिदम् । इदं तु ब्रूहि । किं प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं तेषां प्रमाणम् ?

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

ओमित्युच्यते ।

300

॥ भट्टा० ॥

न तर्हि तेषां काचन कल्पते लोकयात्रा ।

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

किमिति ?

288 f. cf. NM I 314.1-4: देशकालदशाभेदविचित्रात्मसु वस्तुषु । अविनाभावनियमो न शक्यो वक्तुमाह च ॥ अवस्थादेशकालादिभेदाद्भिन्नासु शक्तिषु । भावानामनुमानेन प्रसिद्धिरतिदुर्लभा ॥ (Vākyapadīya 1.32) 291 ff. cf. NM I 316.9-15: अत एवानुमानानामपश्यन्तः प्रमाणताम् । तद्विस्मंभनिषेधार्थमिदमाहुर्मनीषिणः ॥ हस्तस्पर्शा*दिवान्धेन (em. : °दिना° ed.) विषमे पथि धावता । अनुमानप्रधानेन विनिपातो न दुर्लभः ॥ (Vākyapadīya 1.42) अपि च, यत्नेनानुमितो ऽप्यर्थः कुशलैरनुमातृभिः । अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैरन्यथैवोपपाद्यते ॥ (Vākyapadīya 1.34) 302 cf. NM I 317.4-5: अनुमानापलापे तु प्रत्यक्षादपि दुर्लभा । लोकयात्रेति लोकाः स्युर्लिखिता इव निश्चलाः ॥

॥ भट्टा० ॥

305

क्षुधाकुलत्वाद्दीनौदने प्रवर्तसे, न सिकतायाम् । अम्भांस्यपेक्षसे पिपासितो न विभावसुम् ।

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

यद्येवं ततः किम् ?

॥ भट्टा० ॥

310

सखे, प्रधानता नाम न खल्विन्द्रियगोचरः ।

सान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां भावानामवगम्यते ॥ १८ ॥

अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ च मुख्यं लिङ्गस्य लक्षणम् ।

यत्रस्थं दृश्यते लिङ्गं तस्य सा पक्षधर्मता ॥ १९ ॥

एत एव चानुमानस्य प्राणा अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ पक्षधर्मतेति ।

315

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

नन्वयं सुखदुःखसाधनतानिश्चयनिमित्तको व्यवहारस्तिरश्चामिव मनुष्याणामपि प्रतिभयैव भविष्यति ।

॥ भट्टा० ॥

मैवम् । अविदितनियतनिमित्तं हि ज्ञानं प्रतिभेत्युच्यते । इह च विदितमेव निमित्तमन्वयव्यतिरेकादि, न च स्वसंवेद्यस्य निह्नवो युक्तः ।

320

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

306 f. cf. NM I 317.6-8: प्रत्यक्षदृष्टमपि पदार्थजातं तज्जातीयत्वलिङ्गव्यापारेण सुखसाधनमितरकारणमिति वा निश्चित्य तदुपाददते जहति वा लौकिकाः । 320 f. cf. NM I 318.13-319.4: न च प्रतिभामात्रमानुमानिकी प्रमितिरिति वक्तुं युक्तम्, नियतात् कुतश्चिदेव वस्तुनः क्वचिदेव वस्तुनि (following the reading of *Pāṭhāntarāṇi* at the end of vol. I) प्रतीतिदर्शनादित्युक्तत्वात्, नियमश्च यद्यगृहीत एव प्रतीत्यङ्गं भवेन्नारिकेलद्वीपवासिभिरपि धूमदर्शनात् कृशानुरनुमीयेत । न चैवमस्तीति नियमग्रहणमपेक्षणीयम् । 320 on *pratibhā* see NM I 275.9-276.5: ननु प्रत्यक्षमपि मा भूत् (i.e. प्रतिभा), इन्द्रियानपेक्षत्वात्—मैवम्—मनस एव तत्रेन्द्रियत्वात् । पूर्वोत्पन्नचाक्षुषविज्ञानविशेषणस्य बाह्यस्य वस्तुनो मनो ग्राहकमिति नान्धाद्यभाव इत्युक्तम् । शब्दाद्युपायान्तरविरतौ च जायमानमनवद्यं ज्ञानं मानसं प्रत्यक्षं भवति, सुरभि केतककुसुमं मधुरा शर्करेति ज्ञानवदित्यप्युक्तम् । अत एव नानियतनिमित्तकं ज्ञानं प्रतिभेति वक्तव्यम्, प्रत्यक्षनिमित्तत्वात् ।

306 क्षुधाकुलत्वाद्दीनौदने] conj., क्षुधाकुशलत्वदीनौदने PāPu, क्षुधाकुलस्त्वं दीनौदने em. RT 307 अम्भांस्यपेक्षसे पिपासितो न विभावसुम्] em. RT, अंभं पास्य नेक्षसे पिपासितो विभावसुं PāPu 309 किम्] PāPuRT^{pc}, किम् RT^{ac} 311 प्रधानता] PāPu, प्रमाणता em. RT 312 सान्व०] PāPu, सान्य० RT(typo?) 317 सुख०] Pā^{pc}PuRT, साधन० Pā^{ac} 320 मैवम् । अवि०] RT(em. ?), मैवं । मावि० Pā^{pc}Pu, मैवां । मावि० Pā^{ac} 320 ०निमित्तं] em. RT, ०मित्तं PāPu

ननु विदितमपि न विदितमेव निमित्तम्, अविनाभावसम्बन्धस्य ग्रहीतुमश-
क्यत्वात्। तदयमविचारित एव रमणीयो व्यवहारः, एतदेव च तत्त्वमिति
तत्त्वविदः।

325

॥ भट्टा० ॥

आलस्यमिदं पादप्रसारिका वा। विचारयितुं वस्तूनि गृहीतक्षणा इमे विचक्ष-
णाः।

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

नन्वशक्यो ऽयं विचार आनन्त्याद् धूमाग्निव्यक्तीनामधूमानग्निव्यक्तीनां
च। दुरधिगमौ चासाक्षात्कृतसकलत्रिभुवनोदरवर्तिपदार्थसार्थैरिमावन्वयव्य-
तिरेकौ। सर्वविदां तु किमनुमानेन?

330

॥ भट्टा० ॥

अन्वयस्तावत्सामान्यमवलम्ब्य ग्रहीष्यते। व्यक्त्यानन्त्यमबाधकं धूमत्वस्यैक-
त्वादग्नित्वस्य च। भावसामान्यानुगमपुरःसर एव च तदभावयोरप्यनुगमो
ग्रहीष्यते। स एव च व्यतिरेकः।

335

भावयोः साहचर्यं यदन्वयं तं प्रचक्षते।

व्यतिरेकं तु मन्यन्ते साहित्यं तदभावयोः ॥ २० ॥

324 ff. cf. NM I 317.9-14: अथाविचारितरमणीयतैव तत्त्वं न तु लक्षणनियमः शक्यक्रियस्त-
स्येति लक्षणाक्षेपो ऽयमुच्यते सो ऽप्ययुक्तः। यतः, यं कश्चिदर्थमालोक्य यः कश्चिन्नावगम्यते।
कश्चिदेवाक्षिपत्यर्थमर्थः कश्चिदिति स्थितिः ॥ तत्र वस्तुस्वभावो ऽयमिति पादप्रसारिका। दृश्यते
ह्यविनाभूतादर्थान्तरं मतिः ॥ 330 ff. cf. NM I 314.5-10: भवन्नप्यविनाभावः परिच्छे-
त्तुं न शक्यते। जगत्त्रयगताशेषपदार्थालोचनाद्विना ॥ न प्रत्यक्षीकृता यावद् धूमाग्निव्यक्तयो
ऽखिलाः। तावत् स्यादपि धूमो ऽसौ यो ऽनग्नेरिति शङ्कते ॥ ये तु प्रत्यक्षतो विश्वं पश्यन्ति
हि भवादृशाः। किं दिव्यचक्षुषामेषामनुमानप्रयोजनम् ॥ 334 ff. NM I 319.11-12: न
च सकलत्रिभुवनविवरनिरुद्धधूमाग्निव्यक्तिसार्थसाक्षात्करणमुपयुज्यते ज्वलनत्वादिसामान्य-
पुरस्सरतया व्याप्तिग्रहणात्।; NM I 322.6-323.2: यद्यपि चानग्नित्वाद्यभावसामान्यं नास्ति
तथापि प्रतिषेध्याग्नित्वसामान्यानुगमसिद्धौ तदभावानुगमग्रहणं सिद्धति। सकलव्यक्तिवि-
ज्ञानमनङ्गं व्याप्तिनिश्चये। भावसामान्ययोर्यद्वत् तथैव तदभावयोः ॥ भावयोः साहचर्यं यदन्वयं
तत् प्रचक्षते। व्यतिरेकं तु मन्यन्ते साहित्यं तदभावयोः ॥

323 ०भावसम्बन्धस्य] RT(em.?), ०भावासंबन्धस्य PāPu 327 वस्तूनि] RT(em.?),
वस्तूनि PāPu 330 ०शक्यो] em.RT, ०शब्दो PāPu 330 ०र आनन्त्याद्] RT(em.?),
०र आनन्त्याद् Pā^{pc}Pu, ०रा आनन्त्याद् Pā^{ac} 330 ०नामधूमानग्निव्य०] conj.RT,
०नां धूमानग्निव्य० PāPu 331 ०गमौ] em.RT, ०गमा PāPu 331 चासाक्षा०] em.RT,
चासाक्षा० PāPu^{pc}, चासाक्षा० Pu^{ac} 332 सर्व०] PāRT, प्सर्व० Pu 335 तदभा०]
PāRT, तक्षदभा० Pu 335 ०गमो] conj.Sanderson, ०ग्रहो PāPuRT 337 भावयोः]
PāRT, भावाया Pu 337 ०चर्यं] Pā^{pc}RT, ०चर्या Pā^{ac}Pu 337 तं प्र०] PāPu, तत्
प्र० RT(em.?)

पक्षधर्मता तु तपस्विनी सुबोधैव निरधिकरणलिङ्गधर्मानवधारणादिति । तदेवं सुशक्तया निमित्तनिश्चयस्य विपश्चितामिव तिरश्चामपि प्रमाणैरेव व्यवहारः । यथाह भाष्यकारः , 340

तदेवमेभिः प्रमाणैर्देवमनुष्यतिरश्चां व्यवहाराः प्रकल्पन्ते । नातो ऽन्यथेति ।

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

ननु भवतु लोकसिद्धानामुत्पन्नप्रतीतीनाम्, (उत्पाद्यप्रतीतीनां तु) अतिदुर्घटो ऽयं प्रकारः । 345

न हीश्वरं पृथिव्यादेः कार्याद् धूमादिवानलम् ।

लौकिकाः प्रतिपद्यन्ते तार्किकैरप्रतारिताः ॥ २१ ॥

॥ भट्टा० ॥

नारीजनो ऽपि बालो ऽपि गोपालो ऽपि भवानपि ।

बुध्यते नियतादर्थादर्थान्तरमसंशयम् ॥ २२ ॥ 350

अविनाभावसामर्थ्याद् धूमेनेव विभावसोः ।

अनुमानं स्वकार्येण कर्तुः सिध्यति धीमतः ॥ २३ ॥

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

नन्वन्यदेव कुम्भादि कार्यं सम्भावितोदयम् ।

अन्यदेव हि शैलादि तयोर्हि महदन्तरम् ॥ २४ ॥ 355

॥ भट्टा० ॥

अन्य एव हि धूमो ऽसौ कृशजन्मा महानसे ।

अन्य एवायमद्रौ च व्याप्तव्योमदिगन्तरः ॥ २५ ॥

342 Nyāyabhāṣya ad Nyāyasūtra 1.1.7 344 ff. cf. NM I 326.7-327.2: सुशिक्षिततराः प्राहुः, द्विविधमनुमानम्, किञ्चिदुत्पन्नप्रतीति किञ्चिदुत्पाद्यप्रतीति । ईश्वराद्यनुमानं तूत्पाद्यप्रतीति । तत्र धूमानुमानादेः प्रामाण्यं केन नेष्यते । अतो हि साध्यं बुध्यन्ते तार्किकैरक्षता अपि ॥ यत् त्वात्मेश्वरसर्वज्ञपरलोकादिगोचरम् । अनुमानं न तस्येष्टं प्रामाण्यं तत्त्वदर्शिभिः ॥ ऋजूनां जायते तस्मान्न तावदनुमेयधीः । यावत् कुटिलितं चेतो न तेषां विटतार्किकैः ॥ 349 f. cf. NM I 317.2-3: अबलाबालगोपालहालिकप्रमुखा अपि । बुध्यन्ते नियतादर्थादर्थान्तरमसंशयम् ॥ 357 f. cf. NM I 494.1-5: उच्यते । यादृगिति न बुध्यामहे । धूमो हि महानसे कुम्भदासीफूत्कारमारुतसन्धुक्ष्यमाणमन्दज्वलनजन्मा कृशप्रायप्रकृतिरूपलब्धः । स यदि पर्वते प्रबलसमीरणोल्लसितहुतवहसुष्यमाणमहामहीरुहस्कन्धेन्धनप्रभवो बहुलबहुलः समण्डलमखिलमाक्रामन्नुपलभ्यते तत् किमिदानीमनलप्रमितिं मा कार्षीत् ।

339 °मानवधारणा°] PāPu, °मानधिकरणा° RT (em. ?) 342 प्र°] PuRT, प्रा° Pā
344 °मुत्पन्न°] PāPu, °मनुत्पन्न° em. RT 344 (उत्पाद्यप्रतीतीनां तु)] conj., om.
PāPuRT 347 °रप्र°] em. RT, °रप्रति° PāPu 349 °जनो] PāPuRT^{pc}, °जना RT^{cc}
351 °धूमेनेव] PāRT, °धूमोनव Pu 354 नन्व°] em. RT, नत्व° PāPu 355 शैलादि]
em. RT, शैलादि PāPu 358 °दिगन्तरः] em. RT, °दिगंबरः PāPu

किं चेदं रक्तपटोच्छिष्टं भुज्यते,

सिद्धं यादृगधिष्ठातृभावाभावानुवृत्तिमत् ।

सन्निवेशादि तत्तस्माद्युक्तं यदनुमीयते ॥ २६ ॥

इति ।

धर्मं नियतमालम्ब्य भवति ह्यनुमाक्रमः ।

ऋ वा सर्वात्मना साम्यं साध्यदृष्टान्तधर्मिणोः ॥ २७ ॥

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

नन्वन्यत्र वास्तवं सामान्यमिह तु शब्दसामान्यमात्रम्, न वस्तुसामान्यम् ।
शब्दसामान्ये चातिप्रसङ्गः ।

॥ भट्टा०, सस्मितम् ॥

कुतो बौद्धगृहे वास्तवं सामान्यम्?

बुद्धारूढं बहिष्ठं वा सत्यं सांवृतमेव वा ।

सामान्यमवलम्ब्यैषा लोकयात्रा प्रतीयते ॥ २८ ॥

न परस्परतः साम्यं कार्याणामपि भूयसाम् ।

तदिमे यादृगित्यस्य पदस्यार्थं न मन्महे ॥ २९ ॥

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

ननु विलक्षणमेवेदं क्षित्यादि कार्यम् ।

॥ भट्टा० ॥

ननु विलक्षणमेव कर्तारं कल्पयन्तु भवन्तः ।

360 cf. NM I 493.10-15: न हि पाण्डुतामात्रसाधारणत्वेन धूमादिवन् (*dhūmādivan*: MSS, *dhūmād iva*: ed.) मङ्कोलरजोराशेरपि (*makkola*:- em., *kakkola*:- ed) कृशानुरनुमातुं शक्यत इति । तदुक्तम्, सिद्धं यादृगधिष्ठातृभावाभावानुवृत्तिमत् । सन्निवेशादि तत्तस्माद्युक्तं यदनुमीयते ॥ वस्तुभेदे प्रसिद्धस्य शब्दसाम्यादभेदिनः । न युक्तानुमितिः पाण्डुद्रव्यादिव हु-ताशने ॥ इति ।; cf. *Pramāṇavārtika* (Pandey) *pramāṇasiddhi* 13-14. 363 ff. cf. NM I 494.6-14 अथ विशेषरहितं धूममात्रमग्निमात्रेण व्याप्तमवगतमिति ततस्तदनुमानं इहापि सन्निवेशमात्रं कर्तृमात्रेण व्याप्तमिति ततो ऽपि तदनुमीयताम् ॥ ननु सन्निवेशशब्दसाधारणमात्रमत्र (°*sādhāraṇamātram atra*: MSS, °*mātrasādhāraṇyam atra*: ed.) न वस्तुसामान्यं किञ्चिदस्ति । भिक्षो, धूमो (*dhūme*: MSS, *dhūmo* ed.) ऽपि भवद्दर्शने किं वस्तुसामान्यमस्ति । मा भूद्वस्तुसामान्यमाकाशकालादिव्यावृत्तिरूपं तु संव्यवहारकारणमस्त्येव । हन्त तर्हि प्रकृते ऽप्यसन्निवेशव्यावृत्तिरूपं भवतु सामान्यमाकाशकालादिविलक्षणरूपत्वात् पृथिव्यादेः । 377 cf. NM I 503.12-13: यथा चन्दनधूममितरधूमविसदृशमवलोक्य चन्दन एव वह्निरनुमीयते तथा विलक्षणात् कार्याद्विलक्षण एव कर्ता ऽनुमास्यते ।

363 °क्रमः] em. RT, °कमः PāPu 369 सामान्यम्] RT (em. ?), सामान्य PāPu 370 °ष्ठं] RT (em. ?), °स्थं PāPu 371 प्रतीयते] PāPu, प्रवर्तते RT (em. ?) 373 यादृ०] PāRT, याद० Pu 377 कर्तारं] PāRT, कर्तारं Pu

360

365

370

375

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

न कल्पयितुमप्रसिद्धं शक्नुमः ।

॥ भट्टा० ॥

380

वयमपि न कार्यमकर्तृकं वक्तुं शक्नुमः ।

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

किमत्र तर्हि कुर्मः ?

॥ भट्टा० ॥

कतरमत्र जहामः ? किं कर्त्रतिशयो दुःखावहः किं (वा) कार्यमकर्तृकं दुःखा-
वहम् ? तत्र दृष्टसिद्धये ह्यदृष्टं कल्प्यते, न तु दृष्टमुत्सृज्यत इति न्यायाद्वरं
कर्त्रतिशयः कार्यातिशयात् सह्यताम्, न तु कार्यताया एवोपेक्षणम् ।

385

॥ वृद्धाम्भिः, भूमिमालिखति ॥

॥ भट्टा० ॥

अपि च लवनक्रियया दात्रमिव च्छिदिक्रियया परशुरिव रूपोपलब्ध्या यत्
करणं लोचनमनुमीयते, तत्र नेत्रस्य दात्रपरश्वधाभ्यां किं साधर्म्यम् ?

390

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

तदपि मानुमायि, किं नश्छिन्नम् ?

॥ भट्टा० ॥

ननु चक्षुषा विना कथं रूपं द्रक्ष्यसि ?

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

395

भवतु तर्हि किमपि करणम् ।

॥ भट्टा० ॥

भवत्वेतर्हि को ऽपि कर्ता ।

386 cf. NMI 112.6: दृष्टसिद्धये ह्यदृष्टं कल्प्यते न तु दृष्टविघाताय । 390 f. cf. NMI 501.3-
7: श्रोत्राद्यनुमाने ऽपि यथोदाहृते शक्यमेवमभिधातुम् । यादृगेव लवनक्रियायां दात्रादिकरणं
काठिन्यादिधर्मकमवगतं तादृगेव श्रोत्रादि स्यात् । तद्विलक्षणकरणसाध्यतायां तु साध्यवि-
कलो दृष्टान्तः छेदनादिक्रियाणामतीन्द्रियकरणकार्यत्वाददर्शनादिति ॥ 397 ff. cf. NMI
501.8-10: अथ क्रियामात्रं करणमात्रेण व्याप्तमवगतमिति तावन्मात्रमनुमापयति, तदिहापि
सन्निवेशमात्रमधिष्ठातृमात्रेण व्याप्तमुपलब्धमिति तावन्मात्रमेवानुमापयतु ।

381 वक्तुं] conj., त्यक्तुं PāPuRT 385 कतर०] PāRT, करतर० Pu^{pc}, कररतर० Pu^{cc}
385 (वा)] em. RT, om. PāPu 386 ०सिद्धये] PāRT, ०सिद्धाय Pu 386 कल्प्यते]
em., कल्पते PāPuRT 388 ०लिखति] RT(em. ?), ०लिखेति PāPu 391 यत् करणं]
RT(em. ?), यत् कारणं PāPu 391 ०श्व०] RT(em. ?), ०स्व० PāPu 393 मानुमायि]
em. RT, मात्रमायि PāPu 393 नश्छि०] RT(em. ?), नश्छि० PāPu 399 ०त्वेतर्हि]
RT(em. ?), ०त्वितर्हि PāPu

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

400

न सह्यते कर्ता । करणं विना कथं क्रिया ?

॥ भट्टा० ॥

कर्तारं विना कथं कार्यम् ? कार्यमिति हि न डित्थादिवदभिधानम्, अपि तु क्रियत इति कार्यम् । क्रियते च कर्त्रा च विना केनेति न विद्यः । तदेवमिय-
मीश्वरानुमानशिरोर्तिरभैषज्या सह्यताम् । किं क्रियते ?

405

॥ वृद्धा०, भूमिमालिखति ॥

॥ भट्टा० ॥

अपि च परलोकवेदनामपि कष्टां सोढुमर्हति भवान् ।

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

न जीवन् सहिष्यते ।

410

॥ भट्टा० ॥

ननु क्षिप्रमेव मरिष्यसि ।

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

कथमिव ?

॥ भट्टा० ॥

415

चैतन्यमयावद्द्रव्यभावितया स्वसंवेद्यतया च न भूतधर्मा भवितुमर्हति । न च ज्ञानसन्ततिपक्षे कञ्चिदेकमनुसन्धातारमन्तरेण स्मरणेच्छादिव्यवहार उपपद्य-
ते ।

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

अस्तु तर्हि किमप्येवं प्रमातृतत्त्वम् । तत् पुनरूर्ध्वं देहदाहादस्तीति किमत्र
प्रमाणम् ?

420

416 ff. cf. NM II 277.14-278.6: ज्ञानेच्छासुखदुःखादि किलेदं लिङ्गमात्मनः । एकाश्रयतया ज्ञातमनुसन्धातृबोधकम् ॥ तथात्वेन च तज्ज्ञानमाश्रयज्ञानपूर्वकम् । ज्ञाते तत्राफलं लिङ्गमज्ञाते तु न लिङ्गता ॥ तस्मात् प्रत्यक्ष एवात्मा वरमभ्युपगम्यताम् । वृद्धागमानुसारेण संविदालोक-
नेन च ॥ अथ वाभिनिवेशेन किमनेन प्रयोजनम् । अनुमेयत्वमेवास्तु लिङ्गेनेच्छादिनात्मनः ॥
तदाह सूत्रकारः, इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखज्ञानान्यात्मनो लिङ्गम् (Nyāyasūtra 1.1.10) ।; also
NM II 289.4-5: चैतन्यशून्यं शरीरम्, शरीरत्वात्, भूतशरीरवत् । न शरीरधर्मश्चैतन्यम्,
अयावद्द्रव्यभावित्वात् ।

401 करणं] PāPuRT^{pc}, करण RT^{ac} 405 तदेवमियमी०] PāPu, तदेवमी० RT(em. ?)
405 ०मान०] PāPu, ०मानं RT(em. ?) 405 ०शिरोर्तिरभैषज्या] conj., ०शिरोर्ति-
भैषज्या PāPuRT 405 क्रियते] em. RT, क्रियति PāPu 406 ०लिखति] RT(em. ?),
०लिखेति PāPu 412 मरिष्यसि] PāPuRT^{pc}, मरिष्यति RT^{ac} 416 चैतन्यमयावद्द्रव्य०]
em. RT, चैतन्यमयाद्रव्य० PāPu

॥ भट्टा० ॥

साधो, न प्रमाणमन्यत्तत्रोपयुज्यते।

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

किमिति?

425

॥ भट्टा० ॥

स्वाभाविकविनाशभावो हि निषिद्धभावः। न च प्रमातुरुत्पत्तिर्वा विनाशो वा तत्कारणं वा कदाचिदनुभूयते। न च सावयवत्वादिना पटादेरिव तन्तुव्यतिषङ्गविमोचनादिना नाशः कल्पते। तदस्य प्रमातृतत्त्वस्य स्वरूपमेवोपलभ्यते नोत्पादविनाशावित्यस्ति चेत् प्रमाता नित्य एवासौ। नित्यश्चेत्, स एव परलोकी। किमिदमुच्यते चार्वाकैः,

430

परलोकिनो ऽभावात्परलोकाभावः

इति? अन्यदपि, बालस्य हर्षभयशोकादि स्तन्याभिलाषादि च न स्वाभाविकं नाकस्मिकं न प्रतिभामात्रकृतमिति वा वक्तुं शक्यमित्यतो ऽपि नित्यतात्मनो ऽनुमीयत एव।

435

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

नन्वीश्वरसिद्धिप्रसङ्गे परलोकचर्चया किमायातम्?

॥ भट्टा० ॥

इदमायातम्। परलोके सति नाकर्मनिमित्तो भूतसर्ग उपपद्यते।

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

440

ततः किम्?

॥ भट्टा० ॥

कर्मणामपि शरीरादिसर्गे हेतुत्वम्।

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

पुनस्ततः किम्?

445

॥ भट्टा० ॥

ननु कर्माण्यचेतनानि।

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

ततो ऽपि किम्?

428 कदाचिद०] PāRT, कदाचिद Pu 429 ०वोप०] PuRT, ०वोपप० Pā 433 ०दि च न] em., ०दिवन PāPu, ०दि वा न RT(em.?) 434 प्रतिभा०] em.RT, पतिता० PāPu 437 ०प्रसङ्गे] em.RT, ०प्रसंग० Pā, ०प्रसंग० Pu 437 ०चर्चया] em.RT, ०चर्चायाः Pā^pPu, ०चर्चायीः Pā^{ac}

॥ भट्टा० ॥

450

नन्वचेतनं चेतनानधिष्ठितं सन्न कारणतामेति ।

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

ननु चेतनास्तेषामेव कर्मणां कर्तारो ऽधिष्ठातारो भविष्यन्ति ।

॥ भट्टा० ॥

न भवितुमर्हन्ति भिन्नाभिप्रायाणां सम्मानानुपपत्तेः ।

455

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

कथं तर्हि तक्षणाम् ?

॥ भट्टा० ॥

किं तक्षणाम् ?

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

460

ननु ते बहवो ऽप्येकं मन्दिरमारभन्ते ।

॥ भट्टा० ॥

मैवम्, एकस्य स्थपतेराशयानुवर्तिनस्ते ।

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

कथं तर्हि परिषदि द्विजानां सम्मानम् ?

465

453 ff. cf. NM I 488.15-18: अथाचेतनानां चेतनानधिष्ठितानां स्रष्टृत्वमघटमानमिति तेषामधिष्ठाता चेतनः कल्प्यत इति चेत्—न—तदाश्रयाणामात्मनामेव चेतनत्वात् त एवाधिष्ठातारो भविष्यन्ति, किमधिष्ठात्रन्तरेणेश्वरेण?; also NM I 510.7-9: ननु तेषामेव कर्मणां कर्तार आत्मानश्चेतना अधिष्ठातारो भविष्यन्ति । यथाह भट्टः—'कर्मभिः सर्वजीवानां तत्सिद्धेः सिद्धसाधनम् ।' (Śloka-vārtika, sambandhākṣepaparihāra 75) इति । 455 cf. NM I 510.10-11: नैतदेवम्, नैते ऽधिष्ठातारो भवितुमर्हन्ति बहुत्वाद्विरुद्धाभिप्रायत्वाच्च । 457 ff. cf. NM I 510.11-511.4: तथा ह्येक एव कश्चित् स्थावरादिविशेषो राजादिविशेषो वा प्राणिकोटीनामनेकविधसुखदुःखोपभोगस्य हेतुः, स तैर्बहुभिरव्यवस्थिताभिप्रायैः कथमार*भ्येत (ms. kha : °भेत ed.), तेषामेकत्र सम्मानाभावात् । मठपरिषदो ऽपि क्वचिदेव सकलसाधारणोपकारिणि कार्ये भवत्यैकमत्यम्, न सर्वत्र । महाप्रासादाद्यारम्भे बहूनां तक्षादीनामेकस्थपत्याशयानुवर्तित्वं दृश्यते । पिपीलिकानामपि मृत्कूटकरणे तुल्यः कश्चिदुपकारः प्रवर्तकः, स्थपतिवदेकाशयानुवर्तित्वं वा कल्प्यम् । इह तु तत् स्थावरं शरीरं केषाञ्चिदुपकारकारणम्, इतरेषामपि भूयसामपकारकारणमिति कथं तैः सम्भूय सृज्यते? अनधिष्ठितानां त्वचेतनानामारम्भकत्वमयुक्तमेव । तस्मादवश्यमेकस्तेषां कर्मणामधिष्ठाता कल्पनीयः, यदिच्छामन्तरेण भवन्त्यपि कर्माणि न फलजन्मने प्रभवन्ति ।

451 °नानधि०] em.RT, °नाधि० PāPu 451 °तं सन्न] PāRT, °तसन्न Pu 451 कारण०] em., कारण० PāPuRT 453 ननु] RT(em.?), नतु PāPu 455 भिन्नाभिप्रा०] RT(em.?), भिन्नाप्रा० PāPu 455 सम्माना०] em., संगना० PāPu, सङ्गता० em.RT 457 तक्षणाम्] PāRT, तक्षणा Pu 463 मैवम्, एकस्य] RT(em.?), मैवमेकस्य PāPu 465 सम्मानम्] em., संगानां PāPu, सङ्गतानाम् em.RT

॥ भट्टा० ॥

तत्रापि कार्यकोविदस्य परिषत्पतेरेकस्याशयमनुरुध्यते परिषत् । इह पुना राजशरीरममात्यशरीरं वैकमेव प्राणिसहस्राणामुपकारापकारद्वारेण सुखदुःखसाधनमिति नूनं तत्कर्मभिः सम्भूय तदारभ्यते । न च येषां तद्राजशरीरं दुःखाय कल्पते ते तदारम्भनमनुमोदन्त इतीश्वर एव भगवांस्तस्य तावतः 470 कर्मराशेरधिष्ठाता नूनमेषितव्य इत्येवं परिसिद्धावीश्वरसिद्धिरप्रत्याख्येया । एवं च तिष्ठतु पृथिवीसागरहिमवदादि महत्कार्यमपरिमितम्, मादृशकृशशरीरादिकार्यमात्रकेणाप्यनेन क्रमेण शक्यो ऽनुमातुमीश्वरः । अनेन च नयेनाचेतनाचतुरशरीरादिसंयोजितसरित्पुलिनसैकतकूटादयो ऽप्यकृष्टजाता गिरिकन्दरवनगहनतृणलतावितानादयो वा जनस्य सुखदुःखकरतया तत्कर्माक्षिप्ता इति 475 कर्माधिष्ठानद्वारेण नाचेतनकर्तृका भविष्यन्ति ।

॥ वृद्धा०, भूमिमालिखति ॥

॥ भट्टा० ॥

आस्तामन्यत् स्थूलं वा कृशं वा कार्यम् । यो ऽयमस्मदादीनां कृषिसेवावाणिज्यादिव्यवहारः शयनासनविहरणाहारादिव्यवहारान्तः, एषो ऽपि भूयसां 480 प्राणिनामुपकारापकारकारणमिति सुखदुःखमुपजनयति । ततश्च सो ऽपि पूर्वनीत्या तत्कर्माक्षिप्ततया कर्मणां चाचेतनतया तत्कर्तृणां च भूयसां परस्परविरोधिनां सम्मानासम्भवेन भगवताधिष्ठितैः कर्मभिरेवारभ्यत इत्याह महात्मा पाराशर्यः,

अज्ञो जन्तुरनीशो ऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः ।

485 NMI 511.14-18: तिष्ठतु वा सर्गप्रलयकालः । अद्यत्वे ऽपि यथोक्तनयेन तदिच्छामन्तरेण प्राणिनां कर्मविपाकानुपपत्तेरवश्यमीश्वरो ऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, इतरथा सर्वव्यवहारविप्रलोपः । तदुक्तम्—‘अज्ञो जन्तुरनीशो ऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः । ईश्वरप्रेरितो गच्छेत् स्वर्गं वा श्वभ्रमेव वा ॥’ (cf. MBh 3.31.27) इति ।

468 वैक०] RT(em. ?), चैक० PāPu 468 ०मुपकारापकार०] RT(em. ?), ०मुपकारोपकार० PāPu 469 ०भिः] PāPu, ०मिः RT(typo) 470 तावतः] em., वावतः PāPu, यावतः RT (em. ?) 471 ०ष्ठाता] em. RT, ०ष्ठितो PāPu 472 ०मितम्, मा०] conj. Isaacson, ०मितमपितु मा० PāPu RT 473 नयेना०] em. RT, येना० PāPu 474 ०नाचतुर०] em. RT, ०नचतुर० PāPu 474 ऽप्यकृ०] PāPu, ऽकृ० RT(em. ?) 474 ०जाता] conj. Isaacson, ०जात० PāPu RT 475 ०दुःखकरतया] em. RT, ०दुःखतया PāPu 476 नाचेतन०] em. RT, नाचेत० PāPu 476 भविष्यन्ति] Pu RT, भविष्यति Pā 480 ०नासन०] em. RT, ०नासने PāPu 481 प्राणि०] PāPu RT^{pc}, प्राणी० RT^{ac}(typo) 482 चाचेतनतया] em., वाचेतनया PāPu, वाचेतनतया RT(em. ?) 483 सम्मानासम्भवेन] em., संगानासंभवे PāPu, सङ्गतासम्भवे em. RT

ईश्वरप्रेरितो गच्छेत् स्वर्गं वा श्वभ्रमेव वा ॥ ३० ॥

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

चर्चयिष्याम एतत् । गच्छामस्तावत् ।

॥ भट्टारकानुवर्तिनस्तापसा एनमुपहसन्तो बहुप्रकारं परिभवन्ति ।

भट्टा० , तान्निवार्यं वृद्धाम्भिं प्रति ॥

490

क्वेदानीं गम्यते? अद्याप्युद्धह क्षणं कर्मविषूचीम् । आगमप्रामाण्यादपीश्वरं प्रतिपद्यामहे ।

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

आगमः प्रमाणमिति साहसम् ।

॥ भट्टा० , स्नातकमुद्दिश्य ॥

495

श्रान्ता वयम् । तद् भवन्त एनं बोधयन्तु ।

॥ स्नात० ॥

यथा भट्टारक आदिशति । अस्माकं त्वागमप्रामाण्यसमर्थने प्रयास एव नोप-
युज्यते, निसर्गसिद्धत्वात् ।

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

500

निसर्गसिद्धं प्रामाण्यं किमेतदभिधीयते ।

न हि नित्यतया वेदः प्रामाण्यमधिगच्छति ॥ ३१ ॥

किं हि नित्यं प्रमाणं दृष्टमाकाशादि? प्रत्यक्षादि वा यदनित्यं तस्य प्रामाण्ये
कस्य विप्रतिपत्तिः?

॥ स्नात० ॥

505

साधो,

न हि नित्यतयास्माभिः प्रामाण्यमभिधीयते ।

501 ff. cf. NM I 442.11-14: अथ स्वतः प्रामाण्यं भवतीत्येष पक्ष आश्रीयते सो ऽप्ययुक्तः ,
कार्याणां कारणाधीनजन्मत्वात्, प्रामाण्यस्य च कार्यत्वात् । अस्ति च प्रामाण्यं, वस्तु च
तत्, न च नित्यमिति कार्यमेव तत् । कार्यं च कार्यत्वादेव न स्वतो भवितुमर्हति इति ।

486 °प्रेरितो] PuRT, °प्रेरिता Pā 486 वा...वा] RT(em. ?), चा...चा PāPu 488 ए-
तत् । ग०] em., एतत् । तद्ग० RT(em. ?), एततद्ग० Pā, एतद्ग० Pu 489 भट्टारका०]
conj., भट्टा० लोका० PāPuRT 489 परिभवन्ति] conj. Isaacson, परिक्रामन्ति PāPuRT
490 भट्टा०] PāPu, om. RT 490 °वार्यं] PāRT^{pc}, °वार्यं PuRT^{ac} 491 अद्या०]
PāPu, अथा० RT(em. ?) 491 कर्मविषूचीम्] RT(em. ?), कर्मविषूचीं PāPu 496 श्रा-
न्ता] PāRT, श्रान्ता Pu 496 °यन्तु] PāRT, °यन्तु Pu 498 °ण्यसमर्थने] em. RT,
ण्यासमर्थने PāPu 498 प्रयास] PāRT, प्रयास Pu 502 वेदः] RT(em. ?), चेद० PāPu
503 नित्यं] em., नित्य० PāPuRT 504 प्रामाण्ये कस्य वि०] em., प्रामाण्यमस्य वि०
PāPuRT

वेदस्य बोधकत्वात्तु तथाभावं प्रचक्ष्महे ॥ ३२ ॥

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

नन्वस्ति बाध्यमाने ऽपि शब्दे बोधकता क्वचित् ।

510

करेणुः करशाखायामिति केनाप्युदीरिते ॥ ३३ ॥

॥ स्रात० ॥

नैवान्विताभिधानं हि शाब्दमत्रापि बाधते ।

बाध्यते त्वभिधेये ऽर्थे प्रमाणान्तरदर्शनम् ॥ ३४ ॥

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

515

प्रमाणान्तरदृष्टे ऽर्थे ननु शब्दः प्रवर्तते ।

अतो विषयबाधेन बाधितः स्यात् स एव ते ॥ ३५ ॥

॥ स्रात० ॥

बाध्यतां विषयो यस्य प्रमाणान्तरगोचरः ।

चोदनाया नियोगात्मा विषयस्त्वन्यदुर्लभः ॥ ३६ ॥

520

स च मानान्तराक्रान्तेरभूमित्वान्निसर्गतः ।

अनुग्रहोपघाताभ्यां तत्कृताभ्यां न लिप्यते ॥ ३७ ॥

510 ff. cf. NM I 418.15-419.10: प्रकाशात्मनस्तु शब्दस्य वक्तृगुणदोषाधीने यथार्थेतरत्वे । अत एवाङ्गुलिशिखराधिकरणकरेणुशतवचसि बाधिते ऽपि पुनः पुनरुच्चार्यमाणे भवति विभ्रमः प्रकाशत्वरूपानपायात् । न त्वेष शब्दस्य दोषः ॥ पदार्थानां तु संसर्गमसमीक्ष्य प्रजल्पतः । वक्तुरेव प्रमादो ऽयं न शब्दो ऽत्रापराध्यति ॥ तदुक्तम्—प्रमाणान्तरदर्शनमत्र बाध्यते न पुनर्हस्तियूथशतमिति शाब्दो ऽन्वयः । पुरुषो हि स्वदर्शनं शब्देन परेषां प्रकाशयति । तत्र तद्दर्शनं चेद्दुष्टम्, दुष्टः शाब्दप्रत्ययः । अदुष्टं चेत्, अदुष्ट इति गुणवतः पुरुषस्यादुष्टं दर्शनं भवति, दोषवतो दुष्टमिति ।; also NM II 211.6-212.3: प्रकाशकत्वं शब्दस्य व्यापारो हि निसर्गतः । पुंसस्तु गुणदोषाभ्यां तस्मिन् सदसदर्थता ॥ क्रियाकारकसंसर्गबुद्धिरत्रापि [i.e. करशाखादिवाक्यादौ] शब्दजा । तादृश्येवायथार्था तु नरबुद्धिप्रमादतः ॥ तदुक्तं प्रमाणान्तरदर्शनमत्र बाध्यते इति ॥ अत एव प्रमाणत्वं शब्दे निष्प्रतिमं स्वतः । शब्दे कर्मणि तत्रापि बाधकानुपसर्पणात् ॥ तेनाङ्गुल्यग्रवाक्ये ऽपि शाब्दो ऽस्त्येव समन्वयः । (...) वस्तुतो ऽसंभवो यस्तु तुल्य एव स आवयोः । अयोग्यत्वेन संसर्गप्रतीत्यर्थनिबर्हणात् ॥ यदि तु शाब्दो ऽन्वयो न भवेत्, कचत्तटपादिवर्णनिर्देशमात्रमिदं स्यात्, दशदाडिमादिप्रलापतुल्यं वा स्यात् । अनन्विताभिधानाद्वाक्यत्वमेव न भवेत् । अस्ति तु वाक्यत्वम् । तेन मन्यामहे, अस्ति शाब्दो ऽन्वय इत्यत्राप्यन्विताभिधानं न विरुद्धम् । बाधकस्त्वन्यविषय एव न शब्दसंसर्गविषय इत्युक्तम् । 520 cf. NM I 664.7-8: वाक्यार्थ एव नियोगात्मापूर्वशब्दवाच्यः, धर्मशब्देन च स एवोच्यत इति प्राभाकराः कथयन्ति । 521 f. cf. NM II 212.3-5: अत एव स्वसामर्थ्यसिद्धनिर्निबन्धबोधकत्वव्यापारे शब्दे स्वतो वेदप्रामाण्यमनाकुलं निर्वक्ष्यति, अपौरुषेयतया विप्रवासंभवात् । स्वव्यापारस्य च स्वत एव शुद्धत्वमित्यलमतिप्रसङ्गेन ।

510 नन्वस्ति] PāPu, नत्वस्ति RT(em.?) 516 °दृष्टे ऽर्थे] PāRT, °दृष्टो ऽर्थ Pu 516 शब्दः] PāRT, शब्द Pu 516 प्रवर्तते] PāRT, प्रवर्तत Pu 517 स्यात् स] PāRT, सात्स Pu 521 °न्तराक्रा°] em.RT, °न्तरका° PāPu

अनुग्रहे ऽनुवादत्वमुपघाते त्वसत्यता ।
द्वयस्यानुपपत्तौ तु कथं स्यादप्रमाणता ? ॥ ३८ ॥

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

525

ननु सम्बन्धसापेक्षः शब्दो भवति वाचकः ।
स चैव पुरुषाधीनः कथं स्यात्तदगोचरे ? ॥ ३९ ॥

॥ स्नात० ॥

सम्बन्धो ननु शक्तिरेव वचसः सा चास्य नैसर्गिकी
पुंसा कर्तुमशक्य एव समयः शब्दैर्विना वाचकैः ।
व्युत्पत्तिर्व्यवहारतस्तु घटते चेष्टानिमित्ते नृणा-
मात्मन्येव तथा प्रथामुपगते शब्दैकगम्ये विधौ ॥ ४० ॥
कुर्यादिति पदस्यार्थस्त्रिकालस्पर्शवर्जितः ।
न कालविषयैरन्यैः प्रमाणैरवगाह्यते ॥ ४१ ॥

530

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

535

कथं तर्हि तत्र व्युत्पत्तिः ?

॥ स्नात० ॥

529 ff. cf. NM I 590.15-591.4: यदपि सम्बन्धकरणे पुरुषानपेक्षत्वमुच्यते—चित्रभानो-
रिव दहनशक्तिः, शब्दस्य नैसर्गिकी वाचकशक्तिः । व्युत्पत्तिस्तु वृद्धेभ्य एव व्यवहरमाणेभ्य
उपलभ्यत इति किमत्र पुरुषः करिष्यतीति—तदप्यघटमानम्, पुरुषपरिपाटितसमयसम्ब-
न्धव्यतिरेकेण शब्दादर्थप्रत्ययानुपपत्तेः ।; also NM I 691.7-12: अत्र केचिदाहुः—सर्वस्यैव
वेदस्य कार्ये ऽर्थे प्रामाण्यम् । तथा हि, गृहीतसम्बन्धः शब्दो ऽर्थमवगमयति । सम्बन्धग्रहणं
चास्य वृद्धव्यवहारात् । वृद्धानां च व्यवहारः 'पानीयमानय', 'गां बधान', 'ग्रामं गच्छ'
इति कार्यप्रतिपादकैरेव शब्दैः प्रवर्तत इति तत्रैव व्युत्पद्यन्ते बालाः । प्रयोजनोद्देशेन हि वृद्धा
वाक्यानि प्रयुञ्जते । 533 f. cf. NM I 270.11-271.8: ननु कर्तव्यतारूपस्त्रिकालस्पर्शवर्जितः ।
चक्षुर्विषयतामेति धर्म इत्यतिसाहसम् ॥ सत्यं साहसमेतत्ते मम वा चर्मचक्षुषः । न त्वेष दुर्गमः
पन्था योगिनां सर्वदर्शिनाम् ॥ यच्च त्रिकालानवच्छिन्नो यजेतेत्यादिलिङादियुक्तशब्दैकशर-
णावगमो धर्मः कथं ततो ऽन्येन प्रमाणेन परिच्छिद्यतामित्युच्यते—तदपि प्रक्रियामात्रम् ।
किमिव हि त्रिकालस्पर्शास्पर्शाभ्यां कृत्यम्? यथा वयं गमनादिक्रियाणां देशान्तरप्राप्त्यादिप्र-
योजनतां जानीमः, तथाग्निहोत्रादिक्रियाणां स्वर्गादिफलतां ज्ञास्यन्ति योगिन इति किमत्र
साहसम्? 536 cf. NM II 131.2-3: प्रमाणन्तरसंपर्कविकले भवतः कथम् । नियोगात्मनि
वाक्यार्थे व्युत्पत्तिर्व्यवहारतः ॥

530 समयः] PuRT, स समयः Pā 532 °न्येव तथा] PuRT, °न्येतथा Pā 533 °का-
ल०] RT(em. ?), °कालः PāPu 534 °रन्यैः] PāRT, °रन्यै Pu

ननूक्तमत्र, तन्न गृहीतं भवता । स्वात्मनि हि प्रेरकावगमपूर्विका चेष्टा दृष्टा । परस्यापि लिङ्गिभक्तिं श्रुतवतश्चेष्टादर्शनात्ततः प्रेरकावगमो जात इति कल्प्यते । कीदृगसौ प्रेरक इति स्वयमेवात्मवदुपलभ्यते । न त्वसावेवंरूप इति रूपवानिव परस्मै दर्शयितुं शक्यते । परो ऽप्येनमनुभवत्येव, न चान्यस्मै दर्शयितुं शक्नोतीति प्रमाणान्तरागोचरे ऽपि सिद्धा व्युत्पत्तिः । वृद्धस्यापि बालदशायामेषैव गतिरित्यनादिः संसारः ।

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

किमियतैव सिद्धं चोदनाप्रामाण्यम् ?

॥ स्नात० ॥

किं वा मृगयते भवान् ?

॥ वृद्धा० ॥

न प्रमाणान्तरानुग्रहरहितः शब्दः प्रमाणतामश्नुते । अभिधायक एव ह्यसौ नार्थतथात्वसमर्पकः ।

॥ स्नात० ॥

538 ff. cf. NM II 108.3-16: शब्दैकगोचरस्तु नियोगः, व्युत्पत्तिश्च तत्र सूपपादैव । यो हि 'यजेत' 'दद्यात्' 'जुहुयात्' इति लिङादिभ्यो विधिः प्रतीयते, कथमसौ लिङादीनामगम्य इष्येत? व्युत्पत्तिश्चास्य व्यवहारादवकल्पते । 'गच्छ' 'अधीष्व' इति शृण्वन् वृद्धश्चेष्टमानो दृश्यते । चेष्टा च स्वात्मनि प्रवर्तिकावगमपूर्विका दृष्टा । प्रत्यक्षदृष्टे चाम्रादौ सुखसाधनतयान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामवगते, तदनुस्मरणात् प्रवर्तमानः कस्मिंश्चिदात्माकूते समुपजाते सति भौतिकं व्यापारमारभते । स चात्मधर्म आत्मेव स्वसंवेद्यः । अहंप्रत्ययगम्यो ह्यात्मा नासौ परस्मै दर्शयितुं शक्यते । न च न चर्चयितुं शक्यते । एतावता नानुभूयत इति न शक्यते वक्तुम् । परो ऽपि ह्येनमहंप्रत्ययेनानुभवत्येव । तथायमपि भौतिकव्यापारहेतुरात्माकूतविषेशो न प्रमाणान्तरवेद्यो भवति । न च न वेद्यते, तत्संवेदने सति चेष्टाया दृष्टत्वात् । तस्मात् परमपि 'गच्छ' 'अधीष्व' इति शब्दश्रवणे सति चेष्टापन्नं दृष्ट्वा तस्यापि तादृक्प्रेरणावगमो ऽनुमीयते ।; also NM II 131.8-10: स्वात्मनि प्रेरणावगमपूर्विकां हि चेष्टामुपलब्धवतस्ते परत्र चेष्टादर्शनात् तदनुमानं सेत्स्यति । 549 ff. cf. NM I 692.3-8: अतश्च कार्ये ऽर्थे शब्दस्य प्रामाण्यम् । यतश्च कार्यरूपो ऽर्थः शब्दस्यैव विषय इति तत्र शब्दः प्रमाणतां लभते । सिद्धो ऽर्थः प्रसिद्धत्वादेव प्रमाणान्तरपरिच्छेदयोग्य इति तत्प्रतिपादने तत्प्रमाणान्तरसव्यपेक्षः शब्दो भवति, ततश्च तद्वाहिणः प्रमाणान्तरस्यैव तत्र प्रामाण्यं स्यात्, न शब्दस्य ।; also NM I 693.17-694.3: यत् पुनरभ्यधायि—कार्ये ऽर्थे प्रमाणान्तरनिरपेक्षतया प्रमाणं भवति शब्दः, भूतार्थे तु नेति—तदसत्—शब्दस्य प्रमाणान्तरसापेक्षत्वानपायात् । प्रमाणान्तरेणानवगते ह्यर्थे शब्दः प्रवर्तयितुमेव न शक्नोतीत्यवोचाम, वक्ष्यामश्च वाक्यार्थचिन्तायामपि । प्रमाणान्तरसापेक्षत्वं तस्य प्रत्युत प्रामाण्यमावहति न प्रतिहन्ति ।

538 ननूक्त०] em. RT, ननक्त० PāPu 538 °वगम०] em. RT, °वम० PāPu 538 दृष्टा] PāRT, दष्टा Pu 539 लिङ्गि०] RT (em. ?), लिङ्गि० PāPu 539 °गमो] PāPu, °ममो RT (typo) 541 °त्येव] RT (em. ?), °त्येवं PāPu 542 बाल०] RT (em. ?), चाल० PāPu 543 °नादिः] RT (em. ?), °नादि० PāPu 545 चोदना०] PāPu, वेद० RT (em. ?)

अभिधायको ऽपि बोधक एव । प्रमाणं हि सर्वं बोधकमेव भवति , न तु घटमिव कण्ठे रज्ज्वा बद्धा प्रमेयमर्पयति ।

प्रमाणान्तरसंवादसापेक्षां च प्रमाणताम् ।

वदन्तो नाधिगच्छेयुरन्तं युगशतैरपि ॥ ४२ ॥

555

बाधः कारणदोषो वा द्वयं मिथ्यात्वकारणम् ।

तच्चातिदुर्लभं वेद इति सिद्धा प्रमाणता ॥ ४३ ॥

॥ वृद्धा० , भूमिमालिखति ॥

॥ स्नातकानुचरा एनमुपहसन्ति ॥

॥ स्नातकस्तान्वारयति ॥

560

॥ भट्टा० ॥

येयमार्येण वेदप्रामाण्यवेणी दर्शिता किं सैवापेक्ष्या किं वा तद्वचनादाम्नायप्रामाण्यं मन्त्रायुर्वेदप्रामाण्यवच्च तत्प्रामाण्यमाप्तप्रामाण्यादित्येष साधीयान्पन्था इति स्वगृहकलहो ऽयमस्माकम् । अलं तेन । वेदद्विषो नास्तिकास्तावदेवंप्राया युष्माभिश्च निराकरणीया एव ।

565

॥ स्नात० ॥

यथा भगवानादिशति ।

॥ नेपथ्ये कलकलः ॥

॥ भट्टा० ॥

किमेतत् ?

570

॥ स्नात० ॥

राजागमशंसी नन्वयं कलकलः । तद्वयं राज्ञः प्रत्यनन्तरीभवामः । भवन्तो ऽपि स्वागमोचितमर्घ्यादि राज्ञे सज्जीकुर्वन्तु ।

॥ भट्टा० ॥

यथाह भवान् ।

575

562 f. cf. NMI 615.18-616.4: 'तत् प्रमाणं बादरायणस्यानपेक्षत्वात्' (Jaiminisūtra 1.1.5) इति य एष वेदप्रामाण्याधिगतौ जैमिनिना निरदेशि पन्थाः, यो वाक्षपादेन कणादेन च प्रकटितः 'तद्वचनादाम्नायप्रामाण्यम्' (Vaiśeṣikasūtra 10.2.9) इति 'मन्त्रायुर्वेदप्रामाण्यवच्च तत्प्रामाण्यमाप्तप्रामाण्यात्' (Nyāyasūtra 2.1.68) इति स चतुर्ष्वपि वेदेषु तुल्यः ।

552 °यको] Pā^pPuRT, °याको Pā^{ac} 552 तु] PāRT, नु Pu 557 तच्चाति०] em.RT, ततश्चाति PāPu 562 येयमा०] em., यो ऽयमा० PāPuRT 562 °वेणी] em.RT, °वेषी PāPu 562 किं] PāRT, किं Pu 562 सैवापेक्ष्या] conj.Goodall, सैव क्षेप्या PāPuRT 567 भगवाना०] em., भवाना० PāPuRT 572 प्रत्यनन्तरी] PāPu, प्रत्यन्तरी RT(typo) 573 °मर्घ्यादि] PāRT, °मर्घ्यादि Pu

॥ स्नात० ॥

इदं च पुनः पुनर्विज्ञाप्यसे भगवन्,
 न हि द्विष्मो देवं शिवमनुपमैश्वर्यविभवं
 स एवैको हेतुः स्थितिविलयसर्गेषु जगताम् ।
 स रुद्रः स ब्रह्मा स हरिरपरो वापि पुरुषः
 परस्तेभ्यस्तस्मिन् भुवनमखिलं संश्रितमिदम् ॥ ४४ ॥
 तदिमे शैवपाशुपतकालमुखा महाव्रतिनश्च यथासुखमासताम् ।
 गुरुविद्यापि भवतां भाति मोहापसारिणी ।
 सा त्वस्तु तावद्विषया यावत्येव व्यवस्थिता ॥ ४५ ॥

580

॥ भट्टा० ॥

585

यथा भवानाह ।

॥ निष्क्रान्ताः सर्वे ॥

॥ तृतीयो ऽङ्कः ॥

578 °मनुपमैश्वर्य°] em. RT, °समुपैश्वर्य° PāPu 580 °परो] PāPu^{pe}RT, °पोरो Pu^{ac}
 582 °श्च] PāRT, °अ Pu 583 भवतां] RT (em. ?), भवता PāPu 583 मोहापसा°]
 RT(em. ?), मोहासा° PāPu 584 सा त्वस्तु] em. , साध्यस्तु PāPuRT 584 तावद्वि-
 षया यावत्येव व्यवस्थिता] conj. , तावद्विषया याचत्येव व्यवस्थिता PāPu, तावद्विषयो
 याचत्येव व्यवस्थितिम् conj. RT

॥ ततः प्रविशत्यृत्विगुपाध्यायश्च ॥

॥ ऋत्विक्, सोद्वेगम् ॥

कष्टं भोः कष्टम् । अन्यदेव चिन्तितमन्यदेवोपनतम् । वेदबाह्यसकलागम-
तिरस्कारेणास्मिन् प्रसङ्गे सर्वमस्मद्भोग्यमेव भुवनं भविष्यतीति चिन्तितम् ।
यथाव्यासमेवाद्यापि बाह्यागमा वर्तन्त इत्युपनतम् । तथा हि,

शैवपाशुपतपाञ्चरात्रिकाः

साङ्ख्यसौगतदिगम्बरादयः ।

सर्व एव हि यथास्थिता इमे

स्नातकस्य धिगपार्थकं श्रुतम् ॥ १ ॥

॥ उपा० ॥

भो वयस्य, ननु राजपुरुषो ऽसावद्य संवृत्तः । राजा च परममाहेश्वर इति
तदाराधनैकतानबुद्धिना तेन भवितव्यम् । यतः,

समीपतो भूमिभृतां हि पूरुषा-

स्तदुक्तमेवानुवदन्त आसते ।

स्ववृद्धिलुब्धास्तु न साध्वसाधु वा

विवेचयन्ति प्रतिशब्दका इव ॥ २ ॥

॥ ऋत्विक् ॥

वयस्य, यथा मन्यसे । कः स्वार्थमवधीर्य मध्यस्थो धर्मैकतानबुद्धिर्भवति? किं
तु कथं वेदैकविषययाजनाध्यापनादिवृत्तिभिरस्माभिः कालो नेतव्यः?

॥ उपा० ॥

वयस्य, यथैवातिक्रान्तो नीतस्तथैवागाम्यपि ग्रासवसनमात्रसन्तोषिभिर्नेष्यते ।
यतः,

अदुर्जनगिरो गोष्ठ्यो वीतमानग्रहाः प्रियाः ।

पुण्यैर्विना न लभ्यन्ते निःसपत्नाश्च सम्पदः ॥ ३ ॥

॥ ऋत्विक् ॥

1 °त्यृत्वि°] PāPuRT^{pc}, °त्यृत्वि° RT^{ac} 4 °णास्मिन्] em.RT, °णास्मि PāPu 4
°स्मद्भो°] em.RT, °स्मभो° PāPu 5 °व्यास°] PāPu, °न्यास° em.RT 7 सा-
ङ्ख्य°] PuRT, शाङ्ख्य° Pā 9 स्नातकस्य] PuRT, स्नातकस्या Pā 11 राज°] em.RT,
राजा° PāPu 11 च] PāRT, चर Pu 15 स्ववृद्धिलुब्धास्तु] em.RT, स्ववृद्धिलुब्धास्तु
PāPu 16 विवेचयन्ति] RT(em.?), विचेचयन्ति PāPu 18 वयस्य] em.RT, वयस्यः
PāPu 18 धर्मै°] PuRT, धर्मै° Pā 19 कथं] em.RT, यथा PāPu 23 गोष्ठ्यो]
PāRT, गोष्ठ्यो Pu 24 °सपत्नाश्च] RT(em.?), °सपत्नाश्च PāPu

एवमेव । किं क्रियते ? किं त्विदमधिकं मे कर्णशल्यम् ।

॥ उपा० ॥

किमिव ?

॥ ऋत्विक् ॥

यदमी पाञ्चरात्रिका भागवता ब्राह्मणवद् व्यवहरन्ति । ब्राह्मणसमाजमध्य- 30
मनुप्रविश्य निर्विशङ्कमभिवादय इति जल्पन्ते । विशिष्टस्वरवर्णानुपूर्वीकतया
वेदपाठमनुसरन्त इव पञ्चरात्रग्रन्थमधीयते । ब्राह्मणाः स्म इत्यात्मानं व्यपदि-
शन्ति व्यपदेशयन्ति च । शैवादयस्तु न चातुर्वर्ण्यमध्यपतिताः श्रुतिस्मृतिवि-
हितमाश्रममवजहतः शासनान्तरपरिग्रहेणान्यथा वर्तन्ते । एते पुनरा जन्मन
आ सन्ततेर्ब्राह्मणा एव वयमिति ब्रुवाणास्तथैव चातुराश्रम्यमनुकुर्वन्तीति म- 35
हद्दुःखम् ।

॥ उपा० ॥

वयस्य, कियदिदं दुःखम् ?

याजने ऽध्यापने यौने सम्बन्धे ऽन्यत्र वा क्वचित् ।

दूरात् परिहृता एव श्रोत्रियैः पाञ्चरात्रिकाः ॥ ४ ॥

ब्राह्मणा इति तु व्यपदेशस्तेषां स्वसमयसंव्यवहारमात्रम् ।

॥ ऋत्विक् ॥

किमेतदल्पं दुःखम् ?

॥ उपा० ॥

कियद्वैतत् ? श्रुतिस्मृती अध्येतुं मीमांसां च, श्रौतं स्मार्तं च कर्मानुष्ठातुमेते 45
क्वचिदपि न लभन्ते । ब्राह्मणीं च काञ्चन शीलाच्च्युतामुपयच्छन्तः प्रातिलौ-
म्योदन्तेन योज्यन्ते । वेदाङ्गानि तु कानिचित् कियद्वाप्यधिगच्छन्तो ऽपि न
क्वचिन् निषिध्यन्त इत्यलमुद्वेगेन । तदास्तामेतत् । इदं तु श्रुतं मया ।

॥ ऋत्विक् ॥

किमिव ?

50

26 एवमेव] em. Isaacson, एवमेवम् PāPuRT 30 °हरन्ति] PuRT, °हरति Pā 31 ज-
ल्पन्ते] em. RT, जल्पन्त इति PāPu 33 च] PāRT, च Pu 33 श्रुति°] PāRT, सु-
ति° Pu 35 सन्ततेर्ब्राह्मणा] em. RT, सन्ततेर्ब्राह्मणा Pā, सन्ततेर्ब्राह्मणा Pu 35 ब्रुवा°]
PuRT, ध्रुवा° Pā 35 चातुराश्रम्य°] em. RT, चतुराश्रमस्य° Pā(?) Pu 39 याजने
ऽध्यापने] PāRT°, याजनेध्यापान Pu, याजनाध्यापने RT° 39 ऽन्यत्र] RT(em. ?),
त्यत्र PāPu 41 व्यपदेश°] RT(em. ?), च्यपदेश Pā(?) Pu 41 °मात्रम्] PuRT, °मा-
वं Pā 46 शीलाच्च्यु°] em. RT, शीलाच्च्यु° PāPu 47 °लौम्यो°] em. RT, °लौम्ये°
PāPu 47 कानिचित् कियद्वाप्य°] em. RT, कानित्कियस्था अप्य° Pā, कानिचित्कियस्था
अप्य° Pu

॥ उपा० ॥

अद्य खलु भागवतागमविचारमेव कर्तुं श्रीसङ्कर्षणो वैष्णवायतनं भागवतशत-
सहस्रसम्बाधं गतः । ब्राह्मणाश्च ब्रह्मद्वीपे विद्वांसः सहस्रसङ्घाः सङ्घटिताः । तत्र
महत्या गोष्ठ्या भवितव्यम् । तदेहि तत्रैव गच्छामः ।

॥ ऋत्विक् ॥

55

दृष्टः सङ्कर्षणप्रतापः, स हि सर्वागमप्रामाण्यवादी । राज्ञी च श्रीसुगन्धादेवी
तेष्वेव सानुक्रोशा श्रूयते । राजपुरुषोऽपि कश्चिदनुग्राहकः सात्वतानामस्तीति
वार्त्ता ।

॥ उपा० ॥

अलमसदाशङ्काभिः । न यथाप्रस्तुताद् व्यवहारादधिकं तृणमपि ते कुब्जीक-
र्तुमीशते । तदेहि बाह्यागमानां मीमांसकसरस्वतीसागरे निमज्जतामुन्मज्जतां
च विह्वलवेपितमनेकविधं द्रष्टुं तत्रैव गच्छामः ।

60

॥ इति (निष्क्रान्तौ) ॥

॥ ततः प्रविशति श्रीसङ्कर्षणो बटुर्विभवतश्च परिवारः ॥

॥ स्नात०, सोद्वेगम् ॥

65

बटो, सङ्घटे निपतिताः स्मः । यतः,

ये विश्वस्थितिसर्गसंहतिदशापर्यायसम्पादन-

क्रीडासक्तमतेर्मतं भगवतो नारायणस्याश्रिताः ।

तद्दृष्टेः कथमन्यथात्वमनया ब्रूमो वयं जिह्वया

शक्ष्यामः कृतिनां त्रयीमयधियां स्थातुं कथं वाग्रतः ॥ ५ ॥

70

॥ बटुः ॥

अय्य, अत्थि य्येव एदं । तह वि चिरादो पहुदि पउत्तो जहट्टिदो संववहारो

72 ff. आर्य, अस्त्येवैतत् । तथापि चिरात् प्रभृति प्रवृत्तो यथास्थितः संव्यवहारो रक्ष्यते ।
किमत्रार्यो विसंष्टुलः? तत् साम्प्रतं प्रेक्षतां पाञ्चरात्रिकप्रमुखमहापण्डितशतसहस्रसम्बाधमिमं
प्रदेशमार्यः ।

61 NM II 389.13: कर्तुं शक्नोति पूरुषस्तृणस्यापि न कुब्जताम् ।

52 भाग०] em. RT, भग० PāPu 54 गोष्ठ्या] RT(em.?), गोष्ठ्या Pā, गोष्ठ्या Pu
56 च] em., व PāPu, तु em. RT 57 °क्रोशा] RT(em.?), °क्रोशा PāPu 61 तदेहि]
em. RT, तदेति PāPu 61 °सरस्वती°] em. RT, °सारस्वती° PāPu 63 (निष्क्रान्तौ)]
em., (निष्क्रान्तौ ॥ विष्कम्भकः ॥)em. RT, om. PāPu 66 निपतिताः] em. RT, नप-
तिताः PāPu 69 कथ०] PāPu^{pc}RT, कम० Pu^{ac} 69 °मन्यया०] PāRT, °मन्यया०
Pu 69 जिह्वया] PāPu^{pc}RT, तिह्वया Pu^{ac} 70 शक्ष्यामः] RT(em.?), शक्ष्यामः Pā,
शक्ष्यामः Pu

रक्खीअदि । किं एत्थ अय्यो विसंठुलो ? ता संपदं पेक्खदु पंचरत्तिअप्पमुह-
महापंडितसयसहस्ससंबाधं इमं पदेसं अय्यो ।

॥ स्नात० , परिक्रम्याग्रतो ऽवलोक्य सविस्मयम् ॥

75

अहो महती परस्परस्पर्धानुबन्धप्रतन्यमानानल्पजल्पविकल्पकोलाहलाकुलि-
तदिगन्तरैषा पण्डितपरिषत् । अस्यां हि

इतो वाक्पेष्वालोचितविविधतात्पर्यगतय

इतो नामाख्यातप्रकृतिकृतयत्नाः पदविदः ।

इतो हेतुव्याप्तिग्रहपट्टुधियस्तर्ककुशला

80

इतश्चैते वृद्धाः स्मृतिनयपुराणादिनिपुणाः ॥ ६ ॥

अहो बत पुरहरहृदयस्य स्पृहणीयगुणोदधेर्विबुधगुणाकर्णनकर्णालङ्कारस्य पू-
रितसकलसाधुजनमनोरथस्य पुण्ययशसः श्रीयशोवर्मदेवस्य ब्रह्मलोकनिर्वि-
शेषमेवेदं दृश्यते राष्ट्रम् ।

॥ क्षणं विचिन्त्य स्वगतम् ॥

85

इह खल्वितरेतरविरुद्धाभिधायिबहुविधविबुधप्रबन्धसम्बोधनप्रशासनमनुरुध्य-
माने जने कथमिव मया वर्तितव्यम् ?

पथि वेदविरोधदारुणे

निपुणेनापि न शक्यनिर्णये ।

किमहं करवाणि हन्त मे

90

शरणं शार्ङ्गरथाङ्गशङ्खभृत् ॥ ७ ॥

भवतु , भगवन्तमेव तावत् सम्प्रति शरणं प्रपद्ये ।

॥ प्रकाशम् ॥

बटो , प्रत्यासन्नमितो भगवदायतनम् । तदत्र प्रविश्य भगवन्तमशेषजनशरणं
रणस्वामिनं प्रणिपत्य ततः सभामध्यमध्यासिष्ये ।

95

॥ बटुः ॥

73 अय्यो] em. , अय्य PāPuRT 73 विसंठुलो] em. , विसंठुलं PāPuRT 73 संपदं]
PāRT, संपदां Pu 73 पेक्खदु] RT(em. ?), पेक्खपु Pā, पक्खपु Pu 74 °संबा-
धं इमं पदेसं अय्यो] conj. , °संबाधमिसंपदेसमय्यो PāPu, °संबाधमिह संपत्तो सम-
य्यो em.RT 78 °गतय] RT(em. ?), °गतयः PāPu 79 पदविदः] em.RT, पद-
विदिः PāPu 80 हेतुव्याप्तिग्रहपट्टु°] em.RT, हेतुव्याप्तिग्रहपट्टु° PāPu 81 °निपुणाः]
em.RT, °निपुणैः PāPu 82 पुरहरहृदयस्य] conj.RT, पुरहतहृदयः PāPu, पुरुहूतहृ-
दयस्य conj.RT 82 °दधेर्वि°] RT(em. ?), °दधेवि° PāPu 82 °कर्णन°] em.RT,
°कर्णान° (?) Pā, °कर्णीन° Pu 83 °थस्य] PāPu, °थस्थ RT(typo) 83 °वर्म°]
PāPu, °धर्म° RT(em. ?) 86 °रेत°] Pā^{ac}PuRT, °रेर° Pā^{ac} 87 °रुध्यमाने]
PāRT, °राध्यमाने Pu

जं आणवेदि ।

॥ परिक्रामतः ॥

॥ स्नात० , प्रवेशमभिनीय भूमौ जानुनी निधाय ॥

नमः क्रमसमाक्रान्तचित्रत्रैलोक्यसदने ।

कुक्षिकोणैकदेशांशलीनविश्वाय विष्णवे ॥ ८ ॥

नमः करतलालम्बिकम्बुचक्राय चक्रिणे ।

व्यञ्जते मोक्षसन्मार्गं निर्मलानन्ददीपिने ॥ ९ ॥

नमः परमनिर्वाणकारणाय रथाङ्गिने - - - ॥ १० ॥

॥ (आकर्ण्य) सहर्षम् ॥

अमुना शङ्खध्वनिमङ्गलेन तर्कयामि - - -

(॥ मञ्जीरः ॥)

- - - महानेष वर्णाश्रमविरोधो वर्तते । तदत्रभवतो ब्राह्मणानानेतुं ब्रह्म - - - क्षम-
न्त्रिप्रवरप्रार्थिता देवी प्रहिताभूत् । तथा स आगत्य कथितः — तीर्थान्तराणां
त्रयीविदां चात्र विवादे स्थेयतया सर्वेषां सम्मतः प्रतीतगुणो महानैयायिको
धैर्यराशिरिति प्रथितापरनामा भट्टसाहटः , तमत्र विवादपदनिर्णेतारं कुर्विति
तैर्वयमभ्यर्थितास् +तद्वताथ+ - - - पगतं । ततो न भवान् गन्तुमर्हति । अत्रैव
विवादे सभावर्तिनमनुद्वाहयन्तमत्रभवन्तमिच्छामो वयमिति - - -

97 यदाज्ञापयति ।

101 °कोणैक°] em.RT, °कोणेक° PāPu 101 °लीन°] em.RT, °लीला° PāPu
101 विष्णवे] RT (em. ?), विष्णवे PāPu 102 °चक्राय] conj.Sanderson, °वक्राय PāPu
RT 103 °मार्ग] conj., °मार्ग° PāPuRT 103 °लानन्द°] conj.Sanderson, °ला-
वर्त° PāPuRT 103 °दीपिने] conj., °दीपिके PāPuRT 104 f. रथाङ्गिने - - -
(आकर्ण्य) सहर्षम्] conj., रथाङ्गिने राहुर्षम् Pā, रथाङ्गिने सहर्षम् Pu, रथाङ्गिने ॥ (आ-
कर्ण्य) सहर्षम् em.RT 106 तर्कयामि - - -] RT conjectured a lacuna at this point,
which is not indicated in the manuscripts. 107 (मञ्जीरः)] em.RT, om.PāPu 108 -
- - महानेष] conj., हपहानेष PāPu, अहह महानेष conj.RT 108 ब्राह्मणानानेतुं]
em.RT, ब्राह्मणानेतुं PāPu 108 ब्रह्म - - -] The lacuna is marked by an empty space
in the manuscripts. 109 स आगत्य] PāPu, समागत्य em.RT 109 कथितः] conj.,
कथितम् PāPuRT 110 प्रतीत°] em.RT, प्रतीति° PāPu 111 °टः, तमत्र] em.RT,
°टस्तेयत्र Pā, °टस्तेपत्र Pu 111 °पद°] RT (em. ?), °पदं PāPu 111 कुर्विति]
em.RT, कुर्वति PāPu 112 तद्वताथ - - -] PāRT, तद्वतथे - - - Pu, the lacuna
is marked by six dashes in the manuscripts. 112 गन्तुम°] conj., मन्युम° PāPuRT
113 अत्रैव] em.Sanderson, अत्रैक° PāRT, आत्रैक° Pu 113 °द्वाहयन्त°] em., °द्वा-
हयत्त° PāPu, °ग्राहयन्त° RT (em. ?) 113 वयमिति - - -] The lacuna is indicated
by seven dashes in the manuscripts.

॥ स्नात० ॥

सखे मञ्जीर तदेहि सहैव सभां प्रविशामः ।

115

॥ परिक्रामन्ति ॥

॥ नेपथ्ये ॥

वंशे क्वापि प्रकटमहिम(न्य्) - - -

- - - को ऽपि धन्यः ।

यस्यान्योन्यप्रतिहतदृशां सर्वसन्देहमोक्षात्

120

तुल्याकारा भवति विदुषां दृष्टिरुत्कृष्टतायाम् ॥ ११ ॥

श्रीसाहटो नाम ललामभूतो

जातो जगत्याः परमेष्ठिकल्पः ।

गुणैरनल्पैरधिकीकृतस्य

विरोधितां यस्य गतो न लोकः ॥ १२ ॥

125

॥ स्नात० ॥

आगच्छतो धैर्यराशेरेष स्तवः । अहो धैर्यराशिपक्षपाती लोकः । न चायम-
स्थाने लोकस्य पक्षपातः । ईदृश एवासौ । सखे मञ्जीर, भवदनुग्रहान् महतः
सङ्कटादुत्तीर्णा वयं यदेवंविधेषु कर्मसूदास्महे ।

॥ मञ्जी० ॥

130

आर्य, कुतस्तव यावज्जीवं जनानुग्रहमहाव्यापारस्य सङ्कटावतरणमजरामरे
परमेश्वरे ?

॥ बटुः ॥

अज्ज इदं सभामज्जे अय्यस्स उववेसणट्टाणं चिट्ठदि । ता पविसदु भवं ।

॥ स्नात० ॥

135

सखे मञ्जीर, प्रथमं प्रविश्य देवस्याज्ञां श्रावय सदस्यान् ।

॥ मञ्जी० ॥

134 अद्येदं सभामध्य आर्यस्योपवेशनस्थानं तिष्ठति । तत् प्रविशतु भवान् ।

114 स्नात०] em. , - - - वः । PāPu, - - - वः (स्नात०) em.RT 115 तदेहि] em.RT, तदेह PāPu 118 प्रकटमहिम(न्य्) - - -] conj. Sanderson, प्रकटसहित - - - The lacuna is marked by three dashes in the manuscripts. 120 °शां सर्व०] conj. , °शामप्य० PāPu, °शामन्य० em.RT 123 जगत्याः] PāPu, जगत्यां em.RT 124 °कृतस्य] PāRT, °कृ- तास्य Pu 128 भव०] conj. , Sanderson, भगव० PāPuRT 129 °सूदास्महे] PuRT, °स्तदास्महे Pā 131 °मजरा०] em.RT, °मंजरा० PāPu 134 अज्ज] PāPu, अय्य RT(em. ?) 136 देवस्याज्ञां] conj. , देवं PāPuRT 136 सदस्यान्] em.RT, सदद्यात् PāPu

एवं करोमि ।

॥ परिक्रम्य ॥

यथासन्निहिता विद्वांसः, श्रूयताम् ।

140

वक्ता तीक्ष्णमतिः सतां बहुमतो विद्यापगासागरो

विद्वत्संसदि पण्डितोत्तमतया प्राप्तः प्रतीतिं पराम् ।

तीर्थप्रार्थनया गतो ऽद्य स नृपादेशादिह स्थेयतां

स्वस्थाः सन्तु समुत्सृजन्तु विमतिं नन्दन्तु सर्वाः प्रजाः ॥ १३ ॥

॥ ततः प्रविशति यथानिर्दिष्टो धैर्यराशिर्विभवतश्च वादिसमाजः ॥

145

॥ धैर्यं, सविस्मयम् ॥

अहो विद्यासमागमः । चित्रम्, इहैव जम्बुद्वीपे भरतवर्षे च परमेष्ठिपुरं पश्या-
मः । तथा हि,

इह विनिहितं विद्यास्थानैश्चतुर्दशभिः पदं

स्थितमिह समाचारैश्चित्रैरितो विविधैर्व्रतैः ।

150

प्रकृतिविशदान्यत्र स्वैरं तपांसि च शेरते

नरपतिरपि ब्रह्मा साक्षाद् ध्रुवं किमतः परम् ॥ १४ ॥

॥ अग्रतो ऽवलोक्य ॥

कथमिहैव महर्षिनिर्विशेषः श्रीसङ्कर्षणः । भवत्वेनमभिवादये ।

॥ तथा (करोति) । स्नातं, गाढमेनं परिष्वज्य ॥

155

अयमप्रयाससुलभो ऽनुभूयते सकलतीर्थसलिलाभिषेकः ।

॥ सर्वं उपविशन्ति । स्नातं ॥

भो इहभवन्तस्तीर्थिका नन्विदानीमत्रभवतां छिन्नाः समग्राः संशयग्रन्थयः ।

एष हि साक्षादक्षपाद इवान्वीक्षिकीप्रजापतिरुपस्थितो नराधिपानुरोधेन धैर्य-
राशिः ।

160

॥ वादिनः ॥

तीर्थकरानुरोधेन यथा न तथा राजानुरोधेन ।

140 °सन्निहिता] conj. Isaacson, °संविहिता PāPuRT 140 विद्वांसः] PāRT, विद्वांस
Pu 142 °तोत्तमतया] em. RT, °तोरसतया PāPu 142 प्राप्तः प्रतीतिं पराम्] PāRT,
प्राप्तैः प्रतितिपरां Pu 143 °गतो] em. RT, °मतो PāPu 143 °देशां] RT (em. ?),
°देहां PāPu 149 °हितं विद्यां] em. RT, °हितविद्यां PāPu 150 °धैर्व्रतैः] PāRT,
°धैर्व्रतैः Pu 152 ब्रह्मा] em. RT, ब्रह्माविष्णुः PāPu 152 साक्षाद् ध्रुवं] RT (em. ?),
साक्षाद् ध्रुवं Pā, साक्षात् ध्रुवं Pu 154 °शेषः] RT (em. ?), °शेषं PāPu 155 (करोति)]
conj., om. PāPuRT 157 सर्वं] em., सर्वे PāPuRT 162 °रोधेन] PāRT, °सेधेन Pu

॥ स्नात० , धैर्य(राशि)मुद्दिश्य ॥

भो नैयायिकतिलका विदितवृत्तान्ता एव यथाप्रस्तुतवस्तुनि भवन्तः । तदुप-
क्रम्यतां स्वप्रतिभानानुसारेण यथोचितमभिधातुम् ।

165

॥ धैर्य० ॥

आर्य , विदितमेतावत् । पञ्चरात्राद्यागमाः प्रमाणमप्रमाणं वेति वादिनामिह
विप्रतिप्रत्तिः । अत्रभवत्सु पुनः सन्निहितेषु कीदृशो मादृशमभिधानाधिकारः ?
यदि परं भवदनुज्ञासृष्ट्या भवत्प्रसूता इव किमपि वक्तुं शक्यामः ।

॥ स्नात० ॥

170

किमेवमभिधीयते ? स्रष्टारो ऽत्रभवन्तः । सर्ववादिनां च त्वय्येव विश्वसिति
हृदयम् । तदभिधीयताम् ।

॥ धैर्य० , प्रवादकानुद्दिश्य ॥

भो भवन्त आर्याः , पक्षद्वये ऽपि युक्तयो भवदुक्ताः श्रुता गृहीताश्च निराकाङ्क्षा
अस्माभिः । ततो ऽविरतवचसि मयि नान्तरा किमपि वक्तुमर्हन्ति भवन्तः ।

175

॥ वादि० ॥

आर्य , यथा भवानाह । न किञ्चिदपृष्टाः सन्तो ऽन्तराले भवतां वचनमाक्षिप्य
ब्रूमः ।

॥ धैर्य० ॥

तदिदानीमवहितैः श्रूयताम् ।

180

॥ वादिनः ॥

अवहिताः स्मः ।

॥ धैर्य० ॥

मीमांसकैस्तावदवादि वेदः

स्वतः प्रमाणं किल बोधकत्वात् ।

185

185 NM I 430.10-11: स्वतः सर्वप्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यमिति गृह्यताम् । न हि स्वतो ऽसती
शक्तिः कर्तुमन्येन पार्यते ॥ = ŚV codanā 47 (v.l. in ŚV(V, M, T) प्रमाणमिति गम्यताम्,
कर्तुमन्येन शक्यते); ĀD Third Act: न हि नित्यतयास्माभिः प्रामाण्यमभिधीयते । वेदस्य
बोधकत्वात्तु तथाभावं प्रचक्ष्महे ॥

163 (०राशि०)] em. RT, om. PāPu 165 ०प्रतिभाना०] conj. Sanderson, ०प्रतिभा०
conj. Isaacson, ०प्रतिभासा० PāPuRT 168 ०भवत्सु] PāRT, ०भवत्स्यु Pu 169 ०प्र-
सूता इव] conj. , ०प्रसूता एव PāPu, ०प्रसूतमेव em. RT 172 ०सिति हृदयम्] em. RT,
०सितिः सहृदयं PāPu 174 भो] PāRT, तो Pu 175 ०काङ्क्षा अस्माभिः] PāPu,
०काङ्क्षैरस्माभिः em. RT 175 ततो] em. Sanderson, यतो PāPuRT 177 किञ्चिद०]
PāRT, किञ्चिदृ० Pu 180 ०वहितैः] Pu^oRT, ०विहितैः PāPu^o 184 ०स्तावद०]
conj. , ०स्तत्त्वम० PāRT, ०स्तत्तम० Pu 184 वेदः] em. RT, वेद PāPu

अनादितादर्भनिरस्तकर्तृ-

प्रमापवादद्वयपांसुपातः ॥ १५ ॥

तथा चाहुः,

सर्वे बोधाः स्वतो ऽमी समुचितविषयावेदकत्वात् प्रमाणं
नैषां बाधोपपातः करणकलुषताप्रत्ययो वा यदि स्यात् ।

190

नित्ये वेदे ऽपवादद्वयमनवसरं बोधकत्वं च सिद्धं

कार्ये वातीन्द्रियार्थे न भवति सुतरां बाधकस्यावकाशः ॥ १६ ॥

प्रत्यक्षगोचरे ह्यर्थे ग्रहीतुं शक्नुयुर्नराः ।

तथात्वमतथात्वं च, तेषां कातीन्द्रिये गतिः ॥ १७ ॥

तस्माद् बोधकत्वादपवादद्वयाभावाच्च स्वत एव वेदः प्रमाणम् ।

195

अत्र ब्रूमः, सरलसुगमः सत्यमेषो ऽस्ति पन्था-

स्तत्प्रामाण्ये न पुनरमुना चित्तमावर्ज्यते नः ।

शब्दे ऽर्थे वा क्व खलु रचना दृश्यते ऽपौरुषेयी

189 ff. NM I 434.9-435.5: किंत्वर्थबोधजनकत्वात् तस्य नैसर्गिके प्रामाण्ये सति पुरुषदोषा-
नुप्रवेशकारितः क्वचिद्धि विज्ञवः । तदुक्तम्, 'शब्दे दोषोद्भवस्तावद् वक्त्रधीन इति स्थितम् ।'
(= ŚV codanā 62ab, v.l. in ŚV(T) and ŚV(V): इति स्थितिः) इति । तत्र पौरुषेये वचसि
गुणवति वक्तरि तद्गुणापसारितदोषतया तत्प्रामाण्यमौत्सर्गिकमनपोदितं भवति । न तु गुणकृतं
तत्प्रामाण्यमनङ्गत्वात् प्रामाण्ये गुणानाम् । बोधकत्वनिबन्धनमेव तदित्युक्तम् । वेदे तु प्रणेतुः
पुरुषस्याभावाद् दोषाशङ्कैव न प्रवर्तते वक्त्रधीनत्वाद् दोषाणाम् । न च बाधकप्रत्ययो ऽद्य
यावद् वेदार्थे कस्यचिदुत्पन्न इति निरपवादं वेदप्रामाण्यम् । आह च, 'तत्रापवादनिर्मुक्तिर्व-
क्त्रभावाल्लघीयसी । वेदे तेनाप्रमाणत्वं न शङ्कामधिगच्छति ॥' (= ŚV codanā 68, reading in
ŚV(M, T, V): नाशङ्कामपि गच्छति) इति । 190 f. NM I 431.9-16: स्थिते चैवमौत्सर्गिके
प्रामाण्ये यत्र तस्यापवादः क्वचिद् भवति तत्राप्रामाण्यम् । अप्रामाण्ये चावश्यंभाव्यपवादः ।
द्विविध एवापवादः, बाधकप्रत्ययः कारणदोषज्ञानं च । तदुक्तं भाष्यकृता, 'यत्र दुष्टं करणम्,
यत्र च मिथ्येति प्रत्ययः, स एवासमीचीनः प्रत्ययः, नान्यः ।' (= ŚBh(F) ad MS 1.1.4
(p. 26), v.l. यस्य च दुष्टं) इति । वार्तिककारो ऽप्याह, 'तस्माद् बोधात्मकत्वेन प्राप्ता बुद्धेः
प्रमाणता । अर्थान्यथात्वहेतूत्थदोषज्ञानादपोद्यते ॥' (= ŚV codanā 53) 193 f. ĀD Third
Act: बाध्यतां विषयो यस्य प्रमाणान्तरगोचरः ।; also NM I 129.12-13: मानान्तरपरिच्छेदा-
वस्तुरूपोपदेशिनाम् । शब्दानामेव सामर्थ्यं तत्र तत्र तथा तथा ॥ 198 NM I 579.16-580.2:
भो भगवन्तः सभ्याः, क्लेदं दृष्टं क्व वा श्रुतं लोके । यद् वाक्येषु पदानां रचना नैसर्गिकी
भवति ॥ यदि स्वाभाविकी वेदे पदानां रचना भवेत् । पटे हि हन्त तन्तूनां कथं नैसर्गिकी न
सा ॥; also NM I 590.14: एवं च पदवाक्यरचनादौ तावद् वेदेषु पुरुषापेक्षित्वमुपपादितम् ।

186 °दर्भ°] conj. , °दर्प° PāPuRT, °दूर° conj. Isaacson, °पूर्व° conj. Kataoka 187
°प्रमापवाद°] conj. Isaacson, °प्रलापवाद° PāPuRT 191 सिद्ध] conj. , सिद्धे PāPuRT
192 वातीन्द्रियार्थे] conj. , वतीन्द्रियार्थे PāPuRT

स्वाध्यायो ऽपि प्रथमसमये संप्रवृत्तः कुतश्चित् ॥ १८ ॥

श्रुतेः को ऽसावाद्यः समय इति चेत्, कल्पय वरं

न हि व्यूहो नित्यो ऽयमवयवनित्यस्य घटते ।

ध्रुवान् वर्णान् कामं कथय, रचनानां पुनरिदं

न रूपं दृश्यं ते, ननु जगति ताः कर्तृवशगाः ॥ १९ ॥

द्वैपायनादिवदिह स्मरणं न कर्तु-

रस्तीति हन्त न भयावह एष दोषः ।

कर्ता विलक्षणतया हि न दृश्य एष

मादृक्षदृष्टिविषये स्मृतयो भवन्ति ॥ २० ॥

अपि च हिरण्यगर्भमनिशं कथयन्ति जना

जनकमुदारवैदिकवचोरचनासु चिरम् ।

200

205

199 ff. NM I 589.15-590.9: तस्मादेक एव कर्ता सर्वशाखानाम् । काठकादिव्यपदेशस्तु प्रकृ-
ष्टाध्ययननिबन्धनो भविष्यतीति भवद्भिरप्युक्तम् । अपि च यथा तरोर्विक्षिप्ताः शाखा भवन्ति,
न च कृत्स्नं पुष्पफलपत्रमेकस्यां शाखायां सन्निहितं भवति, किन्तु कस्याञ्चित् कस्याञ्चित्,
एवं वेदस्यापि शाखाः पृथगङ्गकर्मोपदेशिन्यो विक्षिप्ताश्च । तासां च वृक्षशाखानामेकस्माज्जन्म
बीजतः । तथैव सर्वशाखानामेकस्मात् पुरुषोत्तमात् ॥ कर्ता य एव जगतामखिलात्मवृत्तिकर्मप्र-
पञ्चपरिपाकविचित्रताज्ञः । विश्वात्मना तदुपदेशपराः प्रणीताः तेनैव वेदरचना इति युक्तमेतत् ॥
201 ff. NM 574.5-8: नापि परमाण्वनित्यतायामिव मूर्तत्वमप्रयोजकमिदं साधनम्, र-
चना *विशेषाणां (ed^{pc}: °व्यापाराणां ed^{ac}) कर्तृव्यापारसाध्यत्वावधारणात् । यथा धूमस्य
ज्वलनाधीन आत्मलाभः, ज्ञप्तिस्तु धूमादग्नेः, तथा कर्त्रधीना रचनानामभिनिर्वृत्तिः, प्रती-
तिस्तु ताभ्यः कर्तुरिति । 202 f. NM I 414.1: पदे नित्ये ऽपि वैदिक्यो रचनाः कर्तृपूर्विकाः ?;
also NM I 573.4-7: पदनित्यत्वपक्षे ऽपि वाक्ये तद्रचनात्मके । कर्तृत्वसंभवात् पुंसः वेदः क-
थमकृत्रिमः ॥ तथा च वैदिक्यो रचनाः कर्तृपूर्विकाः रचनात्वात् लौकिकरचनावत् ।; also NM
I 696.5-6: कार्यत्वात् पदरचनायाः पुरुषेच्छापूर्वकत्वमनुमीयते । 204 f. NM I 575.4-5:
ननु भारते कर्तृस्मृतिरविगीता विद्यते । यद्येवं वेदे ऽपि प्रजापतिः कर्ता स्मर्यत एव ॥; also
NM I 577.12-14 न पुनः परमार्थतः कश्चित् कश्चिद् वेदस्य कर्तारं स्मरति । तस्मादकृतका
वेदाः, अवश्यस्मरणीयस्यापि कर्तुरस्मरणात् । 206 NM I 503.12-13: यथा चन्दनधूममि-
तरधूमविसृष्टशमवलोक्ष्य चन्दन एव वह्निरनुमीयते तथा विलक्षणात् कार्याद् विलक्षण एव
कर्ता ऽनुमास्यते ।; also NM I 581.13-14: अपि च यद् विलक्षणेयं रचना तद् विलक्ष-
ण एव कर्ता ऽनुमीयताम् न पुनस्तदपलापो युक्तः । 207 NM I 583.1-5: कर्त्रस्मरणमेव
त्वप्रयोजकमसिद्धत्वात् । सिद्धमपि वा वेदे कर्त्रस्मरणमन्यथासिद्धम् । वेदकरणकालस्यातिद-
वीयस्त्वात् तत्प्रणेतुश्च पुंसः सकलपुरुषविलक्षणत्वान् नियतशरीरपरिग्रहाभावादिदन्तयास्य
पाणिनिपिङ्गलादिवत् स्मरणं नास्ति न तु स नास्त्येव । 208 NM I 575.4-5: ननु भारते
कर्तृस्मृतिरविगीता विद्यते । यद्येवं वेदे ऽपि प्रजापतिः कर्ता स्मर्यत एव ।

- स्मृतिरियमर्थवादजनितेति विशेषधियो 210
 न खलु भवान् प्रमाणकणिकामपि वक्तुमलम् ॥ २१ ॥
 किं च,
 यथाष्टकादिस्मृतिमूलभूता
 नित्यानुमेयाः श्रुतयस्त्वयोक्ताः ।
 नित्यानुमेयो ऽस्तु तथैव वेदे 215
 कर्ता विशेषो यदि वाभिधेयः ॥ २२ ॥
 ननु तेनानुमेयेन विना किमवसीदति ।
 श्रुतिवाक्यानुमानेन विना किमवसीदति ॥ २३ ॥
 स्मृतिश्चेन्नोपपद्येत, रचना नोपपत्स्यते ।
 स्मृतिः कार्यस्वभावा चेद्, रचनापि तथाविधा ॥ २४ ॥ 220
 मिथ्या ननु मनोर्वाक्यं भवेन् मूलश्रुतिं विना ।
 प्रयोजनानुरोधेन किं प्रमाणव्यवस्थितिः ॥ २५ ॥
 अथवा,
 मिथ्या सन्तु मनोर्वचांसि, न पुनः शाखाशताध्यायिना-
 मेकस्यापि मुखे क्व वाप्यपतिता शक्यानुमातुं श्रुतिः । 225
 कल्प्या वेदविदामथादरवशात् तन्मूलभूता श्रुतिः
 कर्ता वेद(पद)क्रमादिरचनायोगात् तथा कल्प्यताम् ॥ २६ ॥
 वेदस्याध्ययनं सर्वं गुर्वध्ययनपूर्वकम् ।

210 f. NM I 575.6-9: अथ वैदिकमन्त्रार्थवादमूलेयं प्रजापतिकर्तृत्वस्मृतिः, 'प्रजापतिना चत्वारो वेदा असृज्यन्त, चत्वारो वर्णाः चत्वार आश्रमाः' इति तत्र पाठादिति—उच्यते—हन्त तर्हि भारते ऽपि तत्रत्यवचनमूलैव पाराशर्यस्मृतिरिति शक्यते वक्तुम् ॥ 213 f. NM I 645.10-11: न च मन्वादिस्मृतीनां मूलभूता श्रुतिरुपलभ्यते । अनुमानेन तु तत्कल्पनमागमान्तरेष्वपि तुल्यम् । 215 f. NM I 500.11: तेनानुमानगम्यत्वान् न कर्तुर्नास्तिताग्रहः । 222 NM I 56.11: न च प्रयोजनानुवर्ति प्रमाणं भवति ।; also NM II 436 1-3: यदुक्तं तादृशो मोक्षः प्रेक्षावतां प्रयत्नविषयो न भवतीति—तद् अपि न साम्प्रतम्, प्रयोजनानुसारेण प्रमाणव्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः । न हि प्रयोजनानुवर्ति प्रमाणं भवितुमर्हति । 226 NM I 630.7-9: न तावन्मन्वादिदेशना भ्रान्तिमूलाः संभाव्यन्ते, बाधकाभावात्, अद्य यावदपरिस्नानादरैर्वेदविद्भिस्तदर्थानुष्ठानात् । 228 ff. NM I 574.12-15: 'वेदस्याध्ययनं सर्वं गुर्वध्ययनपूर्वकम् । वेदाध्ययनवाच्यत्वादधुनाध्ययनं यथा ॥' (= ŚV vākyaadhikaraṇa 366) इति नैतद् युक्तम्, एवंप्रायाणाम् प्रयोगाणामप्रयोजकत्वात् । न हि तच्छब्दवाच्यत्वकृतमनादित्वमुपपद्यते ।

210 °धियो] conj., °विता PāPu, °दिता RT 212 किं च] PāPu, om. RT 214 °ताः] RT (em. ?), °ता PāPu 215 °यो ऽस्तु] em. RT, °यास्तु Pā, °यास्तु Pu 220 °विधा] em. RT, °विधाः PāPu 227 कर्ता] em. RT, कान्ता PāPu 227 (°प-द°)] em. RT, om. PāPu 228 सर्वं] PuRT, शर्वं Pā

वेदाध्ययनवाच्यत्वादिति हेतुरसाधकः ॥ २७ ॥

अप्रयोजकता चैवंप्रायाणामुच्यते स्वयम् ।

230

स्वयं चैते प्रयुज्यन्त इति केयं विडम्बना ॥ २८ ॥

क्वचन चिरन्तनरचने ऽभ्रमजनितपरम्पराप्रथिते ।

अस्मर्यमाणकर्त्रिणि मूले कर्ता भवत्येव ॥ २९ ॥

वेदे हि पौरुषेये तत्कर्मसु विततवित्तसाध्येषु

पुरुषमननुस्मरन्तः कथमिव सन्तः प्रवर्तन्ते ॥ ३० ॥

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अनुमानेनापि मिते कर्तरि विदुषां प्रवृत्तिरुचितैव ।

स्मार्ते ऽष्टकादिकार्ये श्रुत्यनुमानाद् यथा भवताम् ॥ ३१ ॥

अतश्च नित्यानुमेयो वेदे ऽस्ति कर्ता ।

विश्वजित्युचितमश्रुतं फलं

कल्प्यते किमपि विध्यपेक्षया ।

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तत्र कस्य तदपेक्षिता भवे-

चेतनौ न खलु वाच्यवाचकौ ॥ ३२ ॥

234 ff. NM I 435.18-436.4: अदृष्टे तु विषये वैदिकेष्वगणितद्रविणवितरणादिक्लेशसाध्येषु कर्मसु तत्प्रामाण्यावधारणमन्तरेण प्रेक्षावतां प्रवर्तनमनुचितमिति तस्य प्रामाण्यनिश्चयो ऽवश्यकर्तव्यः । तत्र परत एव वेदस्य प्रामाण्यमिति वक्ष्यामः ।; also NM I 481.13-16: शब्दे पुनरदृष्टपुरुषार्थपथोपदेशिनि प्रामाण्यमनिश्चित्य महाप्रयत्ननिर्वर्त्यानि ज्योतिष्टोमादीनि न प्रेक्षापूर्वकारिणो यज्वानः प्रयुञ्जीरन्नित्यवश्यं निश्चेतव्यं तत्र प्रामाण्यम् । तच्च परत एवेति ब्रूमः ।; also NM I 576.6-8: एवं च सति उच्चावचकविरचितजरत्पुस्तकलिखितकाव्यवदस्मर्यमाणकर्तृकेण वेदेन व्यवहारानुपपत्तेरवश्यस्मरणीयस्तत्र कर्ता स्यात् ।; also NM I 583.13-584.2: अपि च कर्तुरस्मरणे सति सुतरां वेदार्थानुष्ठानं प्रेक्षावतां शिथिलीभवेत् । न ह्यकर्तृक एवोपदेशः संभवति । संभवन्नपि वा प्रामाण्यनिश्चयनिमित्ताभावात् कथं विसंभूमिरसौ भवेत् । बाधकाभावमात्राच्च न प्रामाण्यनिश्चयो वचसामित्युक्तं प्राक् । तस्मादाप्तप्रत्ययादेव निर्विचिकित्सं वेदार्थानुष्ठानं सप्रतिष्ठानं संभवति नान्यथेति । तस्मान्न कर्त्रस्मरणस्य रचनात्वप्रतिपक्षतयोपन्यास उपपन्नः । 239 ff. NM II 118.11-12: ननु विधेः फलापेक्षा नास्ति चेत्, किं तर्ह्यश्रूयमाणफलेषु विश्वजिदादिषु स्वर्गादिफलं कल्प्यते ?

230 °वंप्रा°] em. RT, °वंप्र° PāPu 232 क्क°] RT (em. ?), क्के° Pā, के° Pu 232 ऽभ्रमजनितपरम्पराप्रथिते] conj., भयजनितपरम्पराप्रथते PāPu, द्वयजनितपरम्परा प्रथते em. RT 233 °कर्त्रिणि] em. Sanderson, °कर्तृणि PāPu, °कर्तृणि RT (em. ?) 236 °षां] RT (em. ?), °षा PāPu 237 °मानाद् य°] em. RT, °मानाय° PāPu 241 °ता भ°] PuRT, °ता भा° Pā^{ac} (?), °त भ° Pā^{pc} (?) 242 °कौ] PāRT, (hardly legible syllables, probably deleted:) °कौ । अवगतिधर्मो (some more deleted syllables) कौ । Pu

अवगतिधर्मो ऽयं चेदवगतिरपि कस्य न स्वतन्त्रासौ

अस्माकं चेत् पुरुषप्रभवः प्राप्नोति वेदार्थः ॥ ३३ ॥

अवगन्तारो हि वयं बोद्धृतया कर्तुराशयं विद्यः ।

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इह कस्याभिप्रायः शब्दस्यार्थस्य वा नासौ ॥ ३४ ॥

यदाकाङ्क्षाबलादङ्गं फलं वा कल्प्यते क्वचित् ।

सो ऽस्य कर्तास्ति पुरुषः कस्याकाङ्क्षान्यथा भवेत् ॥ ३५ ॥

अतो नित्यानुमेयो ऽपि कर्ता वेदस्य विद्यते ।

न हि तेन विना को ऽपि व्यवहारो ऽवकल्पते ॥ ३६ ॥

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यच्च कर्ता न स्मर्यत इति भण्यते तत्रायं विवेकः ।

कर्तारो ये हि यान्ति स्मरणपथमिह व्यासवाल्मीकिमुख्याः

सर्वे मादृग्दृशां ते विनियततनवो गोचरे संचरन्ति ।

कामं व्योमैककायः श्रितविविधतनुर्निःशरीरो ऽथवासौ

देवो वेदस्य कर्ता कथमिव विषयत्वं प्रयाति स्मृतीनाम् ॥ ३७ ॥

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243 NM I 409.11-410.2: धूमादिभ्यः प्रतीतिश्च नैवावगतिपूर्विका । इहावगतिपूर्वैव शब्दादु-
त्पद्यते मतिः ॥ स्थविरव्यवहारे हि बालः शब्दात् कुतश्चन । दृष्टार्थमवगच्छन् तं स्वयमप्यव-
गच्छति ॥; NM I 596.17-597.2: न च तयोर् (i.e. शब्दार्थयोर्) अविनाभावो धूमाग्नोरिव
सम्बन्धः । तत्र हि सम्बन्धः प्रतीयमान एवं प्रतीयते, 'धूमो ऽग्निं विना न भवति' इति । इह
पुनः 'अयमस्मात् प्रतीयते' इति, एतावत्येव व्युत्पत्तिपर्यवसानम् । अत एवावगतिपूर्विकै-
वावगतिरिहेत्यनुमानात् शब्दस्य भेद उक्तः । 245 NM I 696.5-7: कार्यत्वात् पदरचनायाः
पुरुषेच्छापूर्वकत्वमनुमीयते । अर्थावगमपुरस्सरं च पुरुषवचनाद् विवक्षानुमानम् 'एवमयं वे-
द', 'एवमयं विवक्षति' इति । 251 NM I 576.8-13: न च कदाचन वेदेषु व्यवहारविच्छेदः
संभाव्यते येन तत्कृतं जरत्कूपारामादिष्विव तेषु कर्त्रस्मरणं स्यात् । तस्मादवश्यं स्मर्येत कर्ता ।
न च *स स्मर्यते (em. : संस्मर्यते ed.), स्मर्तुं शक्यते वा । स्मृतिर्हि भवन्ती तदनुभवमूला
भवति । न च मूले ऽपि कर्त्रनुभवः कस्यचिज्जातः सर्गादेरभावात् । भावे वा कर्तुरशरीरत्वेन
दर्शनयोग्यत्वाभावात् । 252 ff. NM I 586.3-13: शरीरपरिग्रहमन्तरेण प्राणिनामुपदेशस्य
कर्तुमशक्यत्वात् कदाचिदीश्वरः शरीरमपि गृह्णीयादिति कल्प्यते । नियतशरीरपरिग्रहाभावाच्च
व्यासादिवदसौ न स्मर्यते । ततश्च, अद्य सद्यः कविः काव्ये यथा कर्तेति मीयते । तथा
तत्कालजैः पुंभिः सो ऽपि कर्तेति मास्यते ॥ यथा परकृता शङ्का तस्मिन् काव्ये व्यपैति ते ।
वेदे ऽप्यन्यकृता शङ्का तथा तेषां व्यपैष्यति ॥ परोक्षमनुमानेन यच्च बुध्यामहे वयम् । प्रत्यक्षं
योगिनां तच्चेत्युक्तं प्रत्यक्षलक्षणे ॥ प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च तदेवं कर्तृतामितौ । मूलप्रमाणमस्तीति
स्मृतौ नान्धपरंपरा ॥

244 पुरुषप्र°] em. RT, पुरुषः प्र° PāPu 245 बोद्धृतया कर्तु°] em. RT, चोद्धृतया च दु°
PāPu 247 °बला°] em. Isaacson, °फला° PāPuRT 247 कल्प्यते] conj., कल्पते
PāPu 248 कस्याका°] em. RT, कस्य का° PāPu 250 °कल्पते] em. Isaacson, °क-
ल्प्यते PāPuRT 251 यच्च] em. RT, यश्च PāPu 251 भण्यते] em. RT, गुण्यते PāPu
252 कर्तारो] PāRT, कर्तारा Pu 253 गोचरे] PāRT, गोचार Pu 254 °कायः] PāRT,
°काया (?) Pu 255 कथमिव] PāRT, थथमिव Pu

अत एव च तत्र कर्तरि
प्रतिभानेकविधा विपश्चिताम् ।

परमार्थत एक एव स
त्रिजगत्क्षेमनियोजनक्षमः ॥ ३८ ॥

समानसङ्कल्पतयेश्वराणा -
मनेकता कल्पयितुं न शक्या ।

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विरुद्धसङ्कल्पितसिद्धभावा -
नूनं ततः केचिदनीश्वराः स्युः ॥ ३९ ॥

तस्मात् सर्वविदेक एव जगतो ऽधिष्ठातृभेदे पुन -
निष्पद्येत न तत् कृतं न च चिरं तिष्ठेत् कुराष्ट्रं यथा ।

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एकस्य स्थपतेर्मतानुसरणात् प्रासादसम्पादनं
भूयोभिः क्रियते नरैरिति भवेदेकप्रणीतं जगत् ॥ ४० ॥

व्यापारिभिश्च बहुभिः पुरुषैरिदं हि
शक्यं जगद्युगशतैरपि न प्रणेतुम् ।

एकस्तु निर्मलमतिः सहसैव सत्य -
सङ्कल्प एवमुपपादयतीति युक्तम् ॥ ४१ ॥

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उक्तं च ,

एकस्य कस्यचिदशेषजगत्प्रसूति -
हेतोरनादिपुरुषस्य महाविभूतेः ।

सर्गस्थितिप्रलयकार्यविभागयोगाद्
ब्रह्मेति विष्णुरिति रुद्र इति प्रसिद्धिः ॥ ४२ ॥

275

260 ff. NM I 587.17-588.11: अनेकेश्वरवादो हि नातीव हृदयङ्गमः । ते चेत् सदृशसङ्कल्पाः
को ऽर्थो बहुभिरीश्वरैः ॥ संकल्पयति यदेकः शुभमशुभं वापि सत्यसङ्कल्पः । तत् सिध्यति
तद्विभवादित्यपरस्तत्र किं कुर्यात् ॥ भिन्नाभिप्रायतायां तु कार्यविप्रतिषेधतः । नूनमेकः स्वसङ्क-
ल्पविहत्यानीश्वरो भवेत् ॥ एकस्य किल सङ्कल्पो राजायं क्रियतामिति । हन्यतामिति चान्यस्य
तौ समाविशतः कथम् ॥ राज्यसङ्कल्पसाफल्ये विहता वधकामना । तस्याः सफलतायां वा
राज्यसङ्कल्पविप्लवः ॥ तेन चित्रजगत्कार्यसंवाहानुगुणाशयः । एक एवेश्वरः स्रष्टा जगतामिति
साधितम् ॥ एवं जगत्सर्गवत् स एव वेदानामप्येकः प्रणेता भवितुमर्हति । 266 f. cf. NM I
510.11-511.4. 273 ff. NM I 636.8-11: एकस्य कस्यचिदशेषजगत्प्रसूतिहेतोरनादिपुरुषस्य
महाविभूतेः । सृष्टिस्थितिप्रलयकार्यविभागयोगाद् ब्रह्मेति विष्णुरिति रुद्र इति प्रतीतिः ॥

257 विपश्चि०] PāPuRT^{pc}, विपश्चि० RT^{ac} 260 ०णा०] PuRT, ०णां Pā 262 f.
०भावान्नु०] RT(em. ?), ०भान्नु० PāPu 270 सत्य०] PuRT, सत्प० Pā 273 एकस्य
कस्यचिद०] PāRT, एकस्यचिद० Pu 274 ०नादि०] PāRT, ०नाहि० Pu

विधाता विश्वात्मा सकलजगतामेष च यथा
 प्रणेता वेदानामपि (स हि) तथैवामलमतिः ।
 यथान्योन्याधीनस्थितय इह लोकास्त्रय इमे
 तथान्योन्यापेक्षानभिदधति वेदा अपि विधीन् ॥ ४३ ॥ 280
 सन्निवेशो हि यो ऽन्योन्यव्यतिषक्ते ऽवधार्यते ।
 अर्थे वा वाचि वा नासौ संभवेदिति कल्प्यते ॥ ४४ ॥
 वेदानामेक एवातुलकुशलपथादेशकानेकशाखा -
 विक्षिप्तानां विधाता कविरमलमतिः को ऽपि देवः पुराणः ।
 तद्वत् सर्वागमानां भवतु स भगवानेक एव प्रणेता 285
 नानात्वं कर्तुरित्थं न सुवचमिति हि प्रागुपन्यस्तमेतत् ॥ ४५ ॥

अहो ,

परस्परविरोधिनो ननु च सर्व एवागमाः
 समानमभिधेयमेषु न हि किञ्चिदीक्षामहे ।
 त एकनरनिर्मिता इति कथं नु मन्यामहे 290
 प्रमाणमितरेतरप्रतिहताश्च ते वा कथम् ॥ ४६ ॥

यत्तावद् ब्रवीषि परस्परविरोधे कथं प्रामाण्यमिति तत्रानुयुज्यसे ।

परस्परविरोधितां प्रतिकरोषि वेदे कथं
 स नित्य इति चेदहो गृहकथासु सक्तो भवान् ।
 विभागमवलम्ब्य कञ्चन विरोधितापास्यते 295

277 f. NM I 588.11-12: एवं जगत्सर्गवत् स एव वेदानामप्येकः प्रणेता भवितुमर्हति, नानात्वकल्पनायां प्रमाणाभावात्, कल्पनागौरवप्रसङ्गाच्च । 279 ff. NM I 588.17-589.1: अतश्चैककर्तृका वेदाः, यतः परस्परव्यतिषक्तार्थोपदेशिनो दृश्यन्ते । एकमेव हि कर्म वेदचतुष्टयोपदिष्टैः पृथग्भूतैरप्येकार्थसमवायिभिरङ्गैरन्वितं प्रयुज्यते । 285 f. NM I 644.1: अन्ये मन्यन्ते सर्वागमानामीश्वर एव भगवान् प्रणेतेति ।; NM I 644.6-7: अर्हन्निति कपिल इति सुगत इति स एवोच्यते भगवान् । नानासर्वज्ञकल्पनायां यत्नगौरवप्रसङ्गात् । 288 ff. NM I 640.9-10: यत् पुनरत्रोक्तम्, सर्व एवागमाः परस्परविरुद्धार्थोपदेशित्वादप्रमाणं स्युरिति...

277 च] em.RT, न् Pā, न Pu 278 प्रणेता] em.RT, प्रणाता PāPu 278 वेदानामपि (स हि) तथैवामलमतिः] conj.RT, वेवाज्ञामपि - - - तथैवामलमिति PāPu (the lacuna is marked by two dashes in the manuscripts) 280 °भिदधति वेदा°] em.RT^{pc}, °पि दधति वेदा° RT^{ac}, °पि दधमि वेवा° PāPu 281 °वेशो] RT(em. ?), °वेसो PāPu 282 कल्प्यते] RT(em. ?), कल्पते PāPu 284 °रमल°] em.RT, °नमन° Pā, °नम-म° Pu 285 °तद्वत् सर्वा°] PāPu^{pc}RT, °तद्वत्सर्वा° Pu^{ac} 286 हि] RT(em. ?), ही PāPu 286 °पन्य°] RT(em. ?), °पव्य° PāPu 288 सर्व] RT(em. ?), सर्वा PāPu 290 त] PāPu^{pc}RT, ए Pu^{ac} 292 °वीषि] em.RT, °वीमि PāPu 293 f. वेदे कथं स] conj., वेदं कथम° Pā, चेदं कथम° Pu, चेत्यं कथाम° em.RT

यदि श्रुतिषु सागमान्तरवचःसु तुल्या गतिः ॥ ४७ ॥
 श्रुतावायुष्कामं प्रति हि विहितः कृष्णलचरु-
 स्तथा सर्वस्वारः किल मरणकामस्य पठितः ।
 विरोधश्चैतस्यां यदि विषयभेदात्परिहृतो
 भवद्भिः सैव स्यात् सरणिरिह तीर्थान्तरगिराम् ॥ ४८ ॥
 एवं तावदितरेतरविरोधिनीष्वपि वेदचोदनास्विव (न) तीर्थान्तरदेशनासु दो-
 षः । अथवा
 परमं पुरुषार्थं प्रति न चागमानां विरोधिता काचित् ।
 आदिश्यते हि सर्वैः कैवल्यं तुल्यमेव फलम् ॥ ४९ ॥

300

297 ff. NM I 642.14-643.12: यत्त्वागमान्तरेभ्यः कौलादिभ्यः स्वेचरताद्यर्थसिद्धावपि निषि-
 द्धाचरणकृतः कालान्तरे प्रत्यवायो ऽवश्यंभावीत्युक्तम्, तदपि न युक्तम्, तस्यार्थस्य तदाग-
 मनिषिद्धत्वाभावात् । आगमान्तरनिषिद्धत्वे ऽपि वैकल्पिकत्वकल्पनोपपत्तेः । पुरुषार्थप्राप्त्युपा-
 यत्वाच्च तस्य तस्मिन् सिद्धे कुतः प्रत्यवायः? भवतु वा कालान्तरे प्रत्यवायः, तथाप्यधि-
 कारिभेदेन तत्फले कर्मणि चोद्यमाणे श्येनादाविव नागमप्रामाण्यमत्र हीयते । श्येनेनाभिचरन्
 यजेत इत्यत्राभिचरन्निति शता लङ्घितनिषेधमधिकारिणमाचष्टे । तस्य च श्येनयागः चोदि-
 तः । स च तत्प्रयोगात् कृतवधः प्रत्यवैत्येव न च वेदस्याप्रामाण्यम् । उक्तं च 'उभयमिह
 चोदनया लक्ष्यते ऽर्थो ऽनर्थश्च' (ŚBh ad MS 1.1.2) इति । अधिकारभेदाच्च विचित्रकर्मचोदना
 नानुपपन्ना । मरणकामस्य सर्वस्वारश्चोदितः आयुष्कामस्य कृष्णलचरुः । तस्मादेतदपि नाप्रा-
 माण्यनिमित्तम् । 301 f. NM I 640.12-14: विरोधमात्रं त्वकिञ्चित्करम् । प्रमाणत्वाभिमतेषु
 वेदवाक्येष्वपि परस्परविरोधदर्शनात् । पुरुषशीर्षस्पर्शनसुराग्रहगवालम्भादिचोदनासु वचना-
 न्तरविरुद्धमर्थजातमुपदिष्टमेव । 303 ff. NM I 640.15-641.3: किञ्चागमानां विरोधो ऽपि
 नातीव विद्यते *प्रधाने (Calicut MS : प्रमाणे ed.) पुरुषार्थे वा सर्वेषामविवादात् । नानाविधै-
 रागममार्गभेदैरादिश्यामाना बहवो ऽभ्युपायाः । एकत्र ते श्रेयसि संपतन्ति सिन्धौ प्रवाहा इव
 जाह्नवीयाः ॥ तथा ह्यपवर्ग उपेयः सर्वशास्त्रेषु निर्दिश्यते । तदुपायः सर्वत्र ज्ञानमुपदिश्यते ।
 ज्ञानविषये तु विवदन्ते । तत्रापि प्रायश आत्मविषयतायां बहूनामविप्रतिपत्तिः ।

296 श्रुतिषु] em.RT, शक्तिषु PāPu 296 °वचःसु] em.RT, °वचःश्रुत° PāPu 297
 f. विहितः कृष्णलचरुस्त°] em.RT, विहितकृष्णलमकस्त° Pu, विहितकृष्णलमकस्त° Pu
 298 सर्वस्वारः] em.RT, सर्वस्वारः PāPu 298 °कामस्य] RT(em.?), °कादस्य PāPu
 300 भवद्भिः] RT(em.?), भवस्ति Pā, भवस्तिः Pu 300 तीर्थान्तर°] PāPu^oRT,
 तीर्थारर° Pu^o 301 °चोदनास्विव] RT(em.?), °वोदनाष्विति Pā, °चोदनाष्विति
 Pu 301 (न)] em.RT, om.PāPu 301 °रदेश°] PāRT, °रादश° Pu 302 दोषः]
 em.Sanderson, दोषः PāPu, द्वेषः em.RT 304 तुल्यमेव] PāRT, तुल्यमेव Pu

मार्गभेदास्त्वनुग्राह्यसत्त्वबुद्धनुसारिणः ।

305

तत्र तत्रोपदिश्यन्ते विचित्रास्त्राणकारिणः ॥ ५० ॥

अमी हि चानेन पथा यथेष्टं

शक्याः शुभं प्रापयितुं मनुष्याः ।

इतीश्वरः सर्वविदेश पश्यन्

नानाविधानादिशति स्म मार्गान् ॥ ५१ ॥

310

प्रवेष्टुकामा बहवः पुमांसः

पुरे यथैकत्र महागृहे वा ।

द्वारान्तरेणापि विशन्ति केचित्

तथोत्तमे धाम्नि मुमुक्षवो ऽपि ॥ ५२ ॥

अत एव हि बालकवेरवलोकितसकलशास्त्रसारस्य ।

315

सूक्तमिदं तत्त्वविदो भ्रष्टभ्रान्तेर्जयन्तस्य ॥ ५३ ॥

नानाविधैरागममार्गभेदै -

रादिश्यमाना बहवो ऽभ्युपायाः ।

एकत्र ते श्रेयसि संपतन्ति

सिन्धौ प्रवाहा इव जाह्नवीयाः ॥ ५४ ॥

320

इति । यत् पुनरभिधीयते विरोधिनामागमानां कथमेककर्तृकत्वमिति तत्राप्यु-
क्तमेव —

वेदानामीश्वरोक्तत्वात् प्रामाण्यं न पुनः स्वतः ।

305 f. NM I 641.4-12: प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकज्ञानपक्षे तु प्रकृतेर्विविक्ततया पुरुष एव ज्ञेयः ।
नैरात्म्यवादिनस्त्वात्मशैथिल्यजननाय तथोपदिशन्ति । स्वच्छं तु ज्ञानतत्त्वं यत् तैरिष्यते
तत् स्वातन्त्र्यादनाश्रितत्वादात्मकल्पमेव । कूटस्थनित्यत्वे प्रवाहनित्यत्वे च विशेषः । एवं
प्रधानयोस्तावदुपायोपेययोरविवादः । क्रिया तु विचित्रा प्रत्यागमं भवतु नाम । भस्मजटा-
परिग्रहो वा दण्डकमण्डलुग्रहणं वा रक्तपटधारणं वा दिगम्बरता वावलम्ब्यताम्, को ऽत्र
विरोधः? वेदे ऽपि किमल्पीयांसः पृथगितिकर्तव्यताकलापस्रचिताः स्वर्गोपायाश्चोदिताः?
तस्मात् परस्परविरोधे ऽपि न प्रामाण्यविरोधः । 307 ff. NM I 644.1-4 अन्ये मन्यन्ते,
सर्वागमानामीश्वर एव भगवान् प्रणेतेति । स हि सकलप्राणिनां कर्मविपाकमनेकप्रकारमवलो-
कयन् करुणया ताननुग्रहीतुमपवर्गप्राप्तिमार्गं बहुविधमुत्पश्यन्नाशयानुसारेण केषांचित् क्वचित्
कर्मणि योग्यतामवगम्य तं तमुपायमुपदिशति । 317 ff. = NM I 640.17-18, cf. MBh
12.336.77 323 f. NM I 588.11-16: एवं जगत्सर्गवत् स एव वेदानामप्येकः प्रणेता भवि-
तुमर्हति, नानात्वकल्पनायां प्रमाणाभावात् कल्पनागौरवप्रसङ्गाच्च । तेन यदुच्यते, 'नन्वेकः
सर्वशास्त्रानां कर्तेत्यवगतं कुतः । बहवो बहुभिर्ग्रन्थाः कथं न रचिता इमे ॥' इति, तत् परिहृतं
भवति ।

305 °ग्राह्यसत्त्व°] em. Isaacson, °ग्राह्याः सत्त्व° PāPuRT 308 शक्याः शुभं] PāRT,
शक्याप्शुभं Pu 309 सर्व°] Pā^{pc}(?) RT, सर्वा° Pā^{ac}(?), सर्वे Pu 310 मार्गान्]
RT(em. ?), मार्गा Pā, मार्ग Pu 314 मुमुक्षवो] PāPu^{pc}RT, मुमुक्षुवो Pu^{ac}

न चेश्वरबहुत्वे ऽपि युक्तिः काचन विद्यते ॥ ५५ ॥
 कर्तृभेदव्यपदेशः पुनरन्यथासिद्धः । 325
 एको ऽप्यसौ सकलसत्त्वहिताय काय -
 मिच्छाविनिर्मितमनेकमुपादधानः ।
 नानागमानुपदिशन् विविधा बिभर्ति
 तास्ताः समस्तभुवनप्रथिताः समाख्याः ॥ ५६ ॥
 एकः शिवः पशुपतिः कपिलो ऽथ विष्णुः 330
 संकर्षणो जिनमुनिः सुगतो मनुर्वा ।
 संज्ञाः परं पृथगिमास्तनवो ऽपि काम -
 मव्याकृते तु परमात्मनि नास्ति भेदः ॥ ५७ ॥
 अन्यत्वे ऽपि नरो यः सातिशयो भवति को ऽपि नूनमसौ ।
 तेजो बिभर्ति भगवत इति हि द्वैपायनः प्राह ॥ ५८ ॥ 335
 यद्यद् विभूतिमत् सत्त्वं श्रीमदूर्जितमेव वा ।
 तत्तदेवावगच्छेस्त्वं मम तेजोशसंभवम् ॥ ५९ ॥
 इति ।
 यद्वा जिनप्रभृतयो बहवो भवन्तु
 भिन्नागमप्रणयनप्रवणा मुनीन्द्राः । 340
 पश्यन्तु ते ऽपि भगवत्प्रणिधानलब्ध -
 शुद्धाविनश्चरदृशः कुशलाभ्युपायान् ॥ ६० ॥

326 ff. NM I 644.5-6: स्वविभूतिमहिम्ना च नानाशरीरपरिग्रहात् स एव संज्ञाभेदानु-
 पगच्छति । 330 ff. NM I 644.6-7: अर्हन्निति कपिल इति सुगत इति स एवोच्यते
 भगवान् । 334 NM I 589.9-14: तत्रापि प्रथमस्यैव कवेस्तद्वस्तुदर्शनात् । तदभिप्रायवेदी
 तु सो ऽन्यस्तमनुवर्तते ॥ अन्यथानन्वितं काव्यं स्याद् विश्ववसुकाव्यवत् । अन्वितत्वे तु सा
 नूनमाद्यस्यैव कवेर्मतिः ॥ इहाप्येकाशयाभिज्ञद्वितीयेश्वरकल्पने । एकाभिप्रायतैव स्यात् किं च
 तत्कल्पने फलम् ॥ 336 f. = *Bhagavadgītā* 10.41. 337 °गच्छेस्त्वं] Kashmirian
 reading, Vulgate: °गच्छ त्वं 339 ff. NM I 633.9-11: सर्वं जानात्येव भगवान् । किञ्चित्
 स्वयमुपदिशति किञ्चित् परानुपदेशयति । ते हि तस्यानुग्राह्या भगवतः । तेषां च तदनुग्रहकृतैव
 तथाविधज्ञानप्राप्तिः ।

328 °दिशन् विवि°] Pā^{pc}PuRT, °दिशन् विवि° Pā^{cc} 329 समस्त°] PāRT, सम-
 स्तः Pu 331 °मुनिः] PāRT, °मुनि Pu 332 °स्तनवो] PāRT, °स्तनवा Pu 334 नू-
 नमसौ] conj. Sanderson, दूरमसौ PāPuRT 336 यद्यद्] PāRT, अद्य Pu 336 विभूति-
 मत्] Pā^{pc}PuRT, विभूतिमित् Pā^{cc} 337 तेजोश°] PuRT, तेजोस° Pā 339 जिन°]
 em. RT, जन° PāPu 341 भगवत्प्र°] PuRT, भगवन्प्र° Pā 342 °विनश्चरदृशः]
 RT (em. ?), °विनस्वरदृशः Pā, °विनस्वरदृशः Pu 342 °पायान्] RT (em. ?), °पायां
 PāPu

एष एव विशेषो हि योगिनां परमेश्वरात् ।
तस्य नैसर्गिकं ज्ञानं ध्यानयोगेन योगिनाम् ॥ ६१ ॥

एवं तावद् वेदमाप्तप्रणीतं

345

ये मन्वानास्तत्प्रमाणत्वमाहुः ।

स प्रत्येकं पञ्चरात्रादिशास्त्र-

प्रामाण्ये ऽपि न्यायमार्गः समानः ॥ ६२ ॥

एकस्तेषामीश्वरो वा प्रणेता

भिन्ना वाप्ताः सन्तु मार्गान्तरज्ञाः ।

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न प्रामाण्यात् सर्वथा तत्प्रणीता

ग्रन्था एते वेदवत् प्रत्यवेताः ॥ ६३ ॥

यदि वानादयो वेदाः स्वत एव प्रमाणताम् ।

यान्तु कामं तथैवैताः पञ्चरात्रादिचोदनाः ॥ ६४ ॥

कर्तृस्मरणमत्रापि न स्पष्टमुपलभ्यते ।

355

संकर्षणादयस्त्वासां प्रवक्तारः कठादिवत् ॥ ६५ ॥

ननु चत्वार एवैते वेदाः सुप्रथिता जने ।

इतिहासपुराणे ऽपि तदुक्तिरुपचारतः ॥ ६६ ॥

वेदो ऽयं ब्राह्मणो ऽयं सलिलमिदमयं वह्निरेषा महीति

स्पष्टे शब्दार्थबोधे प्रणिहितमतयो हन्त वृद्धाः प्रमाणम् ।

360

343 f. NM I 279.1-4: नन्वेकेन ज्ञानेन सर्वानर्थान् भूतभाविनः परोक्षानपि पश्यन्तो योगिनः कथमखिलत्रैलोक्यवृत्तान्तदर्शिनः सकलजगद्गुरोरीश्वराद् विशिष्येरन्? अस्ति विशेषः, ईश्वरस्य तथाविधं नित्यमेव ज्ञानं योगिनां तु योगभावनाभ्यासप्रभवमिति।; also NM I 633.14-634.2: न हीश्वरप्रत्यक्षस्य योगिप्रत्यक्षस्य च प्रामाण्ये कश्चिद्विशेषः। नैसर्गिकाहार्यकृतस्तु भविष्यति। 345 ff. NM I 636.7: तत्र [पञ्चरात्रे] च भगवान् विष्णुः प्रणेता कथ्यते। स चेश्वर एव।; also NM I 640.7-8: सर्वत्र वेदवत् कर्तुराप्तस्य परिकल्पना। दृष्टार्थेष्वेकदेशेषु प्रायः संवाददर्शनात् ॥ 357 ff. NM I 625.16-19 (on the validity of the Atharvaveda) : यत् पुनरभिधीयते, वेदशब्दस्त्रयाणामेव वाचकः, न चतुर्थस्येति, सो ऽयमत्युत्कटो द्वेषः। वृद्धव्यवहारो ह्यत्र प्रमाणम्। वेदो ऽयं ब्राह्मणो ऽयमिति तत्र तत्र वेदशब्द उच्चारिते चत्वारो ऽपि प्रतीयन्ते।

346 ये] PāRT, प्ये Pu 346 मन्वा°] RT(em.?), मत्वा° PāPu 347 प्रत्येकं] PāRT, प्रात्येकं Pu 348 समानः] em.RT, सामान्यः Pā, सामान्यः Pu 350 भिन्ना] PāRT, भिन्नो Pu 351 प्रामाण्यात् सर्वथा] RT(em.?), प्रामाण्यासर्वथा PāPu 351 तत्प्रणीता] em., तत्प्रणीताद् PāPuRT 352 प्रत्यवेताः] conj.Isaacson, प्रत्यवान्तः PāPu, प्रच्यवन्ते em.RT 353 वेदाः स्वत] Pā, वेदाः स्तत Pu, वेदास्तत RT(em.?) 354 कामं तथैवैताः] conj.Sanderson, कामातथैताः Pā, कामानथैता Pu, काममथैवैता RT^{ac}, काममथैवैताः RT^{pc} 354 पञ्च°] PāPu, पाञ्च° RT(em.?) 356 °स्त्वासां] RT(em.?), °स्त्वासां PāPu 357 सुप्रथिता] conj.Sanderson, सुकथिता PāPuRT

तत् को ऽस्मिन् पञ्चरात्रे शिशुरपि सहसा वेदशब्दं प्रयुङ्क्ते
 के वा तच्छासनस्थं मुनिसदृशमपि ब्राह्मणं व्याहरन्ति ॥ ६७ ॥
 वयमपि न वदामः पञ्च षड् वात्र वेदान्
 विदितनियतसंख्यास्ते हि चत्वार एव ।
 भवति तु बहुशाखाविस्तरस्तत्र चित्र -
 स्तदयमपि हि तेषामस्तु शाखाविशेषः ॥ ६८ ॥

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आह

ननु च सकलशाखाप्रत्ययं कार्यमेक -
 मभिदधति विधिज्ञाः सोमपञ्चादियागम् ।
 वदत यदि कदाचित् पञ्चरात्रानुषक्तं
 क्वचिदपि परिदृष्टं वैदिकं कर्म किञ्चित् ॥ ६९ ॥

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उच्यते

अनेकगुणयुक्तमेकमुपदिश्यते कर्म यै -
 बहून्यपि वचांसि तानि दधते समावेशिताम् ।
 ततस्य किल कर्मणः किमपि चोदितं शाखया
 कयाचिदभिधीयते भवतु सैव संसर्गिता ॥ ७० ॥
 नियतविषयं शास्त्रं शास्त्रान्तरेण न पृच्छ्यते
 विसदृशविधौ वेदे ऽप्येषा स्थितिर्न न दृश्यते ।

375

368 ff. NM I 620.14-621.2: यदेष न त्रयीप्रत्ययं कर्मोपदिशति न तत्सम्बद्धं किञ्चिदिति तदस्य त्रयीबाह्यत्वमिति, एतदपि न साधूपदिष्टम्, इष्टिपञ्चेकाहाहीनसत्रादिकर्मणां तत्रोपदेशदर्शनात् । सर्वशाखाप्रत्ययमेकं कर्म इति न्यायात् । त्रय्युपदिष्टे ऽपि कर्मणि सम्बद्धमथर्ववेदात् किमपि लभ्यत एव । 373 ff. NM I 588.18-589.4: एकमेव हि कर्म वेदचतुष्टयोपदिष्टैः पृथग्भूतैरप्येकार्थसमवायिभिरङ्गैरन्वितं प्रयुज्यते । तत्र हि हौत्रमृगवेदेन, यजुर्वेदेनाध्वर्यवं, औद्गात्रं सामवेदेन, ब्रह्मत्वमथर्ववेदेन च क्रियते । पैप्पलादिशाखाभेदोपदिष्टं च तत्तदङ्गजातं तत्र तत्रापेक्ष्यते । तत्र सर्वशाखाप्रत्ययमेकं कर्मेत्याहुः ।; also NM I 590.1-3: अपि च यथा तरोर्विक्षिप्ताः शाखा भवन्ति, न च कृत्स्नं पुष्पफलपत्रमेकस्यां शाखायां सन्निहितं भवति, किन्तु कस्यांचित् कस्यांचित्, एवं वेदस्यापि शाखाः पृथग्ङ्गकर्मोपदेशिन्यो विक्षिप्ताश्च । 378 ff. NM I 640.12-14: विरोधमात्रं त्वकिञ्चित्करम्, प्रमाणत्वाभिमतेषु वेदवाक्येष्वपि परस्परविरोधदर्शनात् । पुरुषशीर्षस्पर्शनसुराग्रहगवालम्भादिचोदनासु वचनान्तरविबुद्धमर्थजातमुपदिष्टमेव ।; also NM I 643.10: अधिकारभेदाच्च विचित्रकर्मचोदना नानुपपन्ना ।

361 पञ्चरात्रे] PāPu, पाञ्चरात्रे em.RT 361 ०युङ्क्ते] PāRT, ०युक्ते Pu 363 वयमपि] em.RT^{pc}, अयमपि PāPuRT^{ac} 363 षड् वात्र] em.Sanderson, षष्ठा(?)प्त० Pā, षड्भा(?)प्त० Pu, षड्वाप्त० RT 365 ०शाखा०] PāRT, ०शाशा० Pu 374 ०बहून्यपि] PāRT, ०बहून्यपि Pu 374 समावेशिताम्] em.Kataoka, समावेदिताम् PāPu, समस्यात्मतां RT 375 ततस्य] em.RT, तत्तस्य PāPu

इह हि नियता सौत्रामण्यां सुराग्रहचोदना
 ऋतुभिरितरैः संसर्गं सा न हि प्रतिपद्यते ॥ ७१ ॥ 380
 श्रुतिस्मृत्युदिता धर्माः पृथगाश्रमगोचराः ।
 अन्ये ऽपि प्रतिपद्यन्ते किं परस्परसंकरम् ॥ ७२ ॥
 साधारणं पुनरहिंसनसत्यवाद -
 सन्तोषशौचदमदानदयादिधर्मम् ।
 तीर्थेषु नित्यमखिलेष्वपि वर्णयन्ति 385
 सेयं श्रुतिस्मृतिसमन्वयतापि तेषाम् ॥ ७३ ॥
 यस्तु वेद इति (च) व्यपदेशः पञ्चरात्रवचनेषु जनानाम् ।
 सो ऽन्यगोचरतया, न च शक्यं वस्तु लोकवचनेन नियन्तुम् ॥ ७४ ॥
 किं वा सतासता वापि व्यपदेशेन, नन्वसौ ।
 आयुर्वेदधनुर्वेदप्रभृतिष्वपि दृश्यते ॥ ७५ ॥ 390
 तच्छ्वासनस्थे भगवत्प्रधान -
 कर्मान्तरावाप्तविशेषसंज्ञे ।
 सामान्यतो ब्राह्मणशब्दमात्रं
 ब्रूते परिव्राजकवच्च लोकः ॥ ७६ ॥
 न च जगति न प्रसिद्धा ब्राह्मणशब्दाभिधेयता तेषाम् । 395
 व्यवहरति जनः कामं सामान्यविशेषसंज्ञाभिः ॥ ७७ ॥
 ब्राह्मणत्वादिजातौ च विवदन्ते विपश्चितः ।
 वदन्तः शब्दमात्रेण चातुर्वर्ण्यव्यवस्थितिम् ॥ ७८ ॥

383 ff. NM I 641.8-9: एवं प्रधानयोस्तावदुपायोपेययोरविवादः । क्रिया तु विचित्रा प्रत्या-
 गमं भवतु नाम । 387 ff. NM I 626.2-3: सर्वथा तु सोपपद एवायुर्वेदादिषु वेदशब्द इति
 न तत्तुल्यकक्ष्यता ऽधिक्षेपक्षेत्रतामथर्ववेदो नेतव्यः ।

379 सौत्रा°] em.RT, सौप्रा° PāPu 379 सुरा°] em.RT, पुरा° Pā, मुरा° Pu 381
 °त्युदिता] conj.Isaacson, °त्युचिता PāPuRT 383 पुनरहिंस°] RT(em.?), पुनर-
 सिंह° PāPu 387 वेद] em.RT, वेदन PāPu 387 (च)] RT(em.?), om.PāPu 388
 सो ऽन्य°] conj.Sanderson, सार्य° PāPu, सो ऽर्य° RT^{ac}(em.?), सो ऽर्थ° conj.RT^{pc}
 391 °नस्थे] conj.Sanderson, °नस्थो PāPuRT 391 भगवत्प्र°] PuRT, भगवन्प्र° Pā
 392 °संज्ञे] conj.Sanderson, °संज्ञा Pā, °संज्ञ। Pu, °संज्ञः em.RT 394 °वच्च]
 conj., °वन्न PāPuRT 396 सामान्य°] em.RT, कामान्य° PāPu 398 °र्ण्यव्यवस्थि-
 तिम्] em.RT, °र्ण्यव्यवस्थितिः PāPu

गोत्वादिजातिवदियं प्रकटान्यथा वा
विप्रादिजातिरिति तत्त्वविचारणैषा ।

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अप्रस्तुता किमनयाखिलशास्त्रलोक-

सिद्धा स्थितिस्तु न कथञ्चन तर्कणीया ॥ ७९ ॥

तदास्तामियं जातिसदसद्भावचिन्ता । प्रकृतमनुसरामः ।

तेनानादय एव वेदवदिमे सर्वे भवन्त्वागमाः

कार्या एव हि वा न तेषु कलुषं वाच्यं वचो धार्मिकैः ।

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यच्चैषामपभाषणं कृशमपि स्याद् वेदनिन्दैव सा

प्रायश्चित्तिन एव ते हतधियो ये तेष्वसूयापराः ॥ ८० ॥

अथ वा पञ्चरात्रादिवाक्यानां वेदमूलता ।

प्रामाण्यहेतुर्मन्वादिवचसामिव वर्ण्यताम् ॥ ८१ ॥

कार्येण प्रतिनियतः स्वसिद्धिहेतु-

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धूमेन ज्वलन इव प्रकल्पनीयः ।

न ह्यर्थग्रहणमिदं विना स्मृतीना-

मुत्पादः क्वचिदवलोकितः श्रुतो वा ॥ ८२ ॥

न लोभमोहौ न जनप्रतारणा

399 f. NM I 552.3-7, 10-11: एतेन ब्राह्मणत्वादिसामान्यमपि समर्थितं वेदितव्यम्, उपदेशसहायप्रत्यक्षगम्यत्वात् । न चोपदेशापेक्षणादप्रत्यक्षत्वं तस्य भवितुमर्हति, गोत्वादिप्रत्ययस्यापि सम्बन्धग्रहणकाले तदपेक्षत्वदर्शनात् । उक्तं च—‘न हि यद् गिरिशृङ्गमारुह्य गृह्यते तदप्रत्यक्षम्’ (TV ad MS 1.2.2) इति । (...) अपि च उपदेशनिरपेक्षमपि चक्षुः क्षत्रियादिविलक्षणां सौम्याकृतिं ब्राह्मणजातिमवगच्छतीत्येके ।; also NM II 253.7-9: यथा हि ब्राह्मणत्वादिजातिरुपदेशसव्यपेक्षचक्षुरिन्द्रियग्राह्यापि न प्रत्यक्षगम्यतामपोज्झति । यथाह—‘न हि यद् गिरिशृङ्गमारुह्य गृह्यते तदप्रत्यक्षम्’ (TV ad MS 1.2.2) इति । 408 f. NM I 645.6-10: अपरे पुनर्वेदमूलत्वेन सर्वागमप्रामाण्यमभ्युपागमन् । यो हि मन्वादिदेशानां वेदमूलतायां न्याय उक्तः, ‘भ्रान्तेरनुभवाद्वापि पुंवाक्याद्विप्रलम्भनात् । दृष्टानुगुण्यसामर्थ्याच्चोदनैव लघीयसी ॥’ (cf. TV ad MS 1.3.2) इति स सर्वागमेषु समानः । 414 ff. NM I 635.9-13: तत्र शैवागमानां तावत् प्रामाण्यं ब्रूमहे, तदुपजनितायाः प्रतीतेः सन्देहबाधकारणकालुष्यकलापस्यानुपलम्भात्, ईश्वरकर्तृत्वस्य तत्रापि स्मृत्यनुमानाभ्यां सिद्धत्वात्, मूलान्तरस्य लोभमोहादेः कल्पयितुमशक्यत्वात् । न हि तत्रेदंप्रथमता स्मर्यते ।

399 गोत्वादि°] em. RT, सौत्वादि° PāPu 403 प्रकृतमनुसरामः] em. RT, प्रकृतिमनुसरां PāPu 404 °गमाः] em. RT, °गमा PāPu 405 वचो] PāRT, वाचा Pu 406 यच्चै°] em. RT, यच्चै° PāPu 407 प्रायश्चित्तिन] em. RT, प्रायश्चित्तिन PāPu 407 ये] Pā^{pe}PuRT, येष्व् Pā^{cc} 407 °पराः] em. RT, °परा PāPu 409 °ण्यहेतुर्मन्वा°] em. Isaacson, °ण्यहेतुमत्त्वा° PāPu, °ण्यं हेतुमद्वा° RT 411 °धूमेन] em., धूमेन PāPu, °धूमेण RT(em. ?) 411 इव] em., इति PāPuRT 414 °मोहौ] em. RT, °मोहो PāPu 414 न जन°] PuRT, जन Pā

न बीजशून्या नृवचःपरम्परा ।

415

अबाधिते वस्तुनि याति मूलतां

न चेह बाधा कृतिभिः परिग्रहात् ॥ ८३ ॥

अनादिवेदवादिभिर्न योगिबोधमूलता ।

विषह्यते स्म, तद्गिरामथावशिष्यते श्रुतिः ॥ ८४ ॥

नन्वत्र कर्तृसामान्यं न किञ्चिदुपलभ्यते ।

420

न च तेन विना युक्तमनुमानमिह श्रुतेः ॥ ८५ ॥

उच्यते,

प्रविभक्तकर्तृकतया कामं तुल्यप्रयोगता मा भूत् ।

कार्यं त्वनुगुणकारणकल्पनयोग्यं भवत्येव ॥ ८६ ॥

आह,

425

त्रैवर्णिकानामुपपद्यमानो

वेदान्वयः कल्पयितुं हि शक्यः ।

कार्यं पुनः कारणमात्रमूलं

तज्जायतामत्र यतः कुतश्चित् ॥ ८७ ॥

उच्यते,

430

धर्मे प्रमाणं श्रुतिरेव नान्य-

दित्येवमत्र श्रुतिमूलतोक्ता ।

न कर्तृसामान्यबलेन, योगि-

प्रत्यक्षवादो ऽप्यत एव नेष्टः ॥ ८८ ॥

तदिदं कर्तृसामान्यमस्तु मा वात्र सर्वथा ।

435

कार्ये ऽस्ति धर्मरूपे ऽस्मिञ् छूतेरेव हि मूलता ॥ ८९ ॥

इहैषां सर्वेषां जिनकपिलबुद्धादिवचसां

420 f. NM I 645.12-14: ननु चोक्तम्, 'अपि वा कर्तृसामान्यात् प्रमाणमनुमानं स्यात्' (MS 1.3.2) इति, तच्चेह नास्तीति कथं श्रुत्यनुमानम्? 422 ff. NM I 645.15-646.7: एकाधिकारावगमो न प्रामाण्ये प्रयोजकः । मिश्रानुष्ठानसिद्धौ तु कामं भवतु कारनम् ॥ न च पृथगनुष्ठीयमानमपि कर्म न प्रमाणमूलं भवति वर्णाश्रमभेदानुष्ठेयकर्मवत् । कर्तृसामान्यशून्यत्वादथ मूलान्तरोदयः । तदसत्, बाधकाभावाद् भ्रान्त्यादिप्रतिषेधनात् ॥ प्रत्यक्षमूलतायां तु गुर्वी भवति कल्पना । वेदस्त्वनन्तशास्त्रत्वाद् मूलं तत्र सुसंगतम् ॥

419 °मथाव°] em.RT, °मव° PāPu 421 श्रुतेः] em.Isaacson, श्रुतिः PāPuRT 428 पुनः] conj.Isaacson, पुरः PāPuRT 428 °मात्रमूलं] conj.Isaacson, °मत्र मूलं PāPuRT 429 यतः] em.RT, व्यतः Pā, च्यतः Pu 433 °बलेन] PuRT, °बले । न Pā 436 ऽस्ति] em.RT, ऽस्मि PāPu 436 छूतेरेव] em.RT, छूतेव Pā, छूते एव Pu

न योगिप्रत्यक्षं श्रुतिरपि न मूलं यदि भवेत् ।
 कथं स्याद् व्यामोहादनवधिरनेकार्यविदितः
 प्ररोहो, नन्वेषां क्वचिदपि च संवादबहुलः ॥ ९० ॥ 440
 व्यामोहाच्च हि वर्तन्ते कामं कतिपयैर्दिनैः ।
 सो ऽयं युगपदस्थायी व्यामोह इति विस्मयः ॥ ९१ ॥
 पुरापि सौगता आसन्निति केनावगम्यते ।
 पुरापि श्रोत्रिया आसन्निति केनावगम्यते ॥ ९२ ॥
 लोभादि दृश्यमानं वा यदि मूलमिहोच्यते । 445
 वेदो ऽपि जीविकोपाय इति जल्पन्ति नास्तिकाः ॥ ९३ ॥
 महाजनपरिग्रहाद् यदि पुनः श्रुतौ वार्यते
 बृहस्पतिमताश्रितप्रलपितो ऽपवादक्रमः ।
 स वारयितुमागमान्तरवचःसु शक्यस्तथा
 कृतः किल परिग्रहः कुशलधीभिरेषामपि ॥ ९४ ॥ 450
 यावांश्च कश्चन न्यायो वेदप्रामाण्यसिद्धये ।
 भवद्भिर्वर्ण्यते, सो ऽयं तुल्यस्तीर्थान्तरेष्वपि ॥ ९५ ॥
 न कदाचिदनीदृशं जगत्
 कथितं तत्रभवद्भिरेव यत् ।
 इतरैरपि तत् तथोच्यते 455
 सततं ते ऽपि बभूवुरागमाः ॥ ९६ ॥
 कृतमतिवाचालतया, द्वेष्या बहुभाषिणो भवन्ति जनाः ।
 तदिदमुपसंहरामो रसनायाश्चापलं विपुलम् ॥ ९७ ॥

441 NM I 648.11-12: अहमप्यद्य यत्किञ्चिदागमं रचयामि चेत् ॥ तस्यापि हि प्रमाणत्वं
 दिनैः कतिपयैर्भवेत् । 447 ff. cf. NM I.637.18-638.3: महाजनश्च वेदानां वेदार्थानु-
 गामिनां च पुराणधर्मशास्त्राणां वेदाविरोधिनां च केषांचिदागमानां प्रामाण्यमनुमन्यते, न
 वेदविरुद्धानां बौद्धाद्यागमानामिति कुतस्तेषामाप्तप्रणीतत्वम्? मूलान्तरं हि तत्र सुवचमज्ञा-
 नलोभादीत्येवमभिधाय वेदस्पर्धिनो बौद्धादयो निषेद्धव्याः ।; also NM I.644.14-645.2: ननु
 वेदसमानकर्तृकेष्वगमान्तरेषु कथं तादृशो महाजनसंप्रत्ययो नास्ति? एवं नास्ति । तेन व-
 र्त्मना भगवता कतिपये प्राणिनो ऽनुगृहीताः, येषां तादृश आशयो लक्षितः । वैदिकेन तु
 वर्त्मना निस्संख्याकाः प्राणिनो ऽनुगृहीता इति तत्र महानादरः, आगमान्तरेषु कृश इति ।
 453 f. NM I 491.13-14: न कदाचिदनीदृशं जगत् कथितं नीतिरहस्यवेदिभिः ॥

439 °दनवधि°] em.RT, °दनविधि° PāPu 440 प्ररोहो] PāRT, प्ररोहा Pu 446
 ऽपि] em., हि em.RT, प PāPu 448 °प्रलपितो] PāRT, °प्रलपितौ Pu 456 ब-
 भूवुरा°] conj.Isaacson, रघूदना° PāPu, बहूत्तमा° em.RT 458 रसनाया° em.RT,
 रसना° Pā, स्मना° Pu

सत्यंवदाप्तपुरुषोक्ततया प्रमाणं
तीर्थानि वेदवदनादितया स्वतो वा ।
आम्नायसंमिततया मनुवाक्यवद् वा
सर्वं प्रमाणमिति नीतिविदो वदन्ति ॥ १८ ॥

460

आह ,

ननु चैवमतिप्रसङ्गदोषा-
दतिमात्रं भुवि विप्रवेत धर्मः ।
ऋ नु नाम न शक्यमेतदित्थं
गदितुं यादृशतादृशे ऽपि वाक्ये ॥ १९ ॥

465

उक्तमत्र ,

अविच्छिन्ना येषां वहति सरणिः सर्वविदिता
न यत्रार्यो लोकः परिचयकथालापविमुखः ।
यदिष्टानुष्ठानं न खलु जनबाह्यं न सभयं
न रूपं येषां च स्फुरति नवमभ्युत्थितमिव ॥ १०० ॥

470

प्रमत्तगीतत्वमलौकिकत्व -

माभाति लोभादि न यत्र मूलम् ।
तथाविधानामयमागमानां
प्रामाण्यमार्गो न तु यत्र तत्र ॥ १०१ ॥
आप्तोक्तत्वमनादित्वमथवाम्नायमूलताम् ।
तत्रैव शक्नुमो वक्तुं न पुनर्यत्र कुत्रचित् ॥ १०२ ॥

475

464 ff. NM I 648.10-13: सर्वागमप्रमाणत्वे नन्वेवमुपपादिते । अहमप्यद्य यत्किञ्चिदागमं रचयामि चेत् ॥ तस्यापि हि प्रमाणत्वं दिनैः कतिपयैर्भवेत् । तस्मिन्नपि न पूर्वोक्तन्यायो भवति दुर्वचः ॥ 473 ff. NM I 648.17-649.2: नैतदस्त्यविगीतां ये प्रसिद्धिं प्रापुरागमाः । कृतञ्च बहुभिर्येषां शिष्टैरिह परिग्रहः ॥ अद्य प्रवर्तमानाश्च नापूर्वा इव भान्ति ये । येषां न मूलं लोभादि येभ्यो नोद्विजते जनः ॥ तेषामेव प्रमाणत्वमागमानामिहेष्यते । न मृष्यते तु यत्किञ्चित् प्रमाणं कुट्टनीमतम् ॥

459 सत्यंवदा०] PāPu, सत्यं तदा० em. RT 461 संमिततया] conj. RT, संबद्धतया PāPu
465 भुवि वि०] PāRT, भुवि० Pu 466 नाम न] em. RT, मामनु PāPu 469 अविच्छि-
न्ना] RT (em. ?), अवच्छिन्ना PāPu 469 सरणिः] em. RT, सरिणः PāPu 470 °ला-
प०] RT (em. ?), °लाभ० PāPu 471 यदिष्टानु०] em. RT, यदष्टानु० Pā, यदृष्टानु०
Pu 473 °गीत०] em. Sanderson, °गीति० PāPuRT 473 f. °मलौकिकत्वमाभाति]
em., °मलौकिकत्वं लाभादि em. RT, °मवलौकिकत्वमाभादि PāPu 477 आप्तोक्त०]
PuRT, आप्तोक्त० Pā 478 शक्नुमो] RT (em. ?), शक्नुमे PāPu

आदिश्यते किमपि कुत्सितमेव कार्यं

येषु त्वगम्यगमनाशुचिभक्षणादि ।

480

प्रामाण्यवर्णनमिदं तु तथाविधानां

एते तु वादिवृषभा न सहन्त एव ॥ १०३ ॥

॥ इत्युक्त्वा क्षणं च तूष्णीं स्थित्वा सङ्कर्षणं प्रति ॥

आर्य, यथाप्रतिभानमेतावदभिहितमस्माभिः । तदिदानीं यथासन्निहितं पृच्छ्य-
न्तामत्रभवन्तो वादिनः, अपि हृतं हृदयमेषामस्मद्वचसा न वेति ।

485

॥ सङ्क० । सहर्षम् ॥

आर्य धैर्यराशे, वयं तावदुच्छ्रवासिता इव, शालिता इव, पवित्रीकृता इवा-
प्यायिता इव जीवलोकफलमनुभाविता इव भवत्प्रभवयाभिनवया सरस्वत्या ।
अहो आश्चर्यम्!

सूक्ष्मा दृष्टिरहो अहो गतिरियं वाचामहो कौशलं

490

शास्त्रेष्वेतदहो मनः परिहृतं दोषैरसूयादिभिः ।

को ऽसौ वास्ति गुणो न यो ऽत्र परमां काष्ठां गतो वर्तते

लोको ऽनारतमाह साहटसमः सत्यं न जातो नरः ॥ १०४ ॥

एते ऽपि महाविद्वांसः सहृदया एव, कथं नावर्जिता आर्येण? अप्येनान्
पृच्छामि ।

495

॥ वाद्यभिमुखं स्थित्वा ॥

भो भवन्तो महाविद्वांसः, अपि भवतामावर्जितं धैर्यराशिवचसा हृदयम्?

॥ वादिनः ॥

आर्य, इयं तावदमानुषी ।

479 ff. NM I 638.16-18: ये ऽप्यन्ये केचिदशुचिभक्षणागम्यागमनादिनिर्विकल्पदीक्षाप्रकार-
मकार्यमनुतिष्ठन्ति ते ऽपि चातुर्वर्ण्यमहाजनभीताः तत् कर्म रहसि कुर्वन्ति न प्रकाशम् ।

479 f. कार्यं येषु] conj. Kataoka, येषु PāPu, येषु येषु em. RT 480 °शुचि°] RT (em.
?), °शुवि° PāPu 482 सहन्त] RT (em. ?), महन्त PāPu 483 च] PāPu, om. RT
484 °मेतावद°] em. RT, °वेतावद° PāPu 485 पृच्छ°] em. RT^{pc}, पृच्छ° PāPu RT^{ac}
485 हृदयमे°] RT (em. ?), हृतमे° PāPu 486 सङ्क°] PāPu, स्नात° RT (em. ?) 488
इवाप्यायिता इव] conj., इवाप्यायिता em. RT, इवप्यायिता Pā, इव । प्यायिता Pu
488 °भिनवया] PāRT, °भिनवयाभिनवया Pu 490 वाचामहो] PuRT, वाचामहा Pā
492 वास्ति गुणो न यो ऽत्र] conj., नास्ति न यो ऽत्र PāPu, वास्ति नयो न यो
ऽत्र conj. RT 492 परमां] RT (em. ?), परमा PāPu 493 ऽनारतमाह साहटसमः]
em. RT, नाहतमाह साहटसमं PāPu 494 एते] PuRT, एति Pā 497 भवतामावर्जितं]
em. RT, भवतावर्जित PāPu 497 °वचसा] RT (em. ?), °वचसां PāPu 498 वादिनः]
RT (em. ?), वो Pā, वोदि Pu 499 तावदमानुषी] conj. RT, तावमानुषा PāPu

⟨ ॥ सङ्क० ॥ ⟩

500

आभिः पुनरपरिमितनीतिधारावर्षिणीभिरसदृशगतिभिरपगतमात्सर्याभिरार्य-
धैर्यराशिवाग्भिर्ब्रह्मर्षिकल्पनिर्मलमनसः सर्वत्र भवन्तो वर्तन्ते । तथापि पुनः
पुनरिदमवबोध्यन्ते भवन्तः । द्वयमिदमवश्यरक्षणीयमार्यैः ।

॥ वादि० ॥

किमिव ?

505

॥ सङ्क० ॥

एतानि किल परस्परमसंकीर्णानि पृथक्प्रस्थानानि यथावस्थानि तीर्थानि । त-
देषामितरेतरसंकरपरिहारे सततमवहितैर्भवितव्यमार्यैः ।

॥ वादि० ॥

आर्य , यावानिह स्वे स्वे शासने समाम्नातः कश्चिदहिंसादिः साधारणो मान-
वो धर्मः , तत्र किमुच्यते ? तदतिरिक्तं तु नियतोपदिष्टविशिष्टक्रियाकाण्डसंकरं
स्वशास्त्रकथितप्रत्यवायभयात् परिहराम इत्येकं तावत् स्थितम् । अथ द्वितीयं
किम् ?

510

॥ सङ्क० ॥

भवदीयं नाम मुखे दत्त्वा दुराचारतया ये विल्लावयन्ति शास्त्रं धर्मं च , तेषां
स्वाश्रमेष्ववकाशो न देयः ।

515

॥ वादि० ॥

एतदपि सत्यमनुष्ठीयते । किं त्वयमर्थो नास्मदधीनः । आर्येण राजनियुक्तैश्च
निर्वाह्यो ऽयम् ।

॥ सङ्क० ॥

520

एवमेतद् । गृहीतक्षण एवात्र देवो वर्णाश्रममर्यादाचार्यः । भवद्भिरपि तथाविधे-
षूदासितव्यम् । न तेषां दयितव्यम् ।

500 (सङ्क०)] em. , (स्नात०) em. RT, om. PāPu 501 ०गति०] conj. Sanderson, ०म-
ति० PāPuRT 502 ब्रह्मर्षिकल्प०] conj. RT, ब्रह्मातिकल्प० PāPu 506 सङ्क०] PāPu,
स्नात० RT (em. ?) 507 परस्परमसंकीर्णानि] em. RT^{pc}, परस्परसंकीर्णानि PāPuRT^{ac}
507 यथावस्थानि] PuRT, यथाचस्थानि Pā 508 ०संकर०] PuRT, ०सकर० Pā 510
यावानिह] RT (em. ?), यावानेह PāPu 510 ०हिंसादिः] RT (em. ?), ०हिंसादि PāPu
510 साधारणो] em. RT, साधारो PāPu 511 मानवो] conj. , मानसो PāPuRT 512 द्वि-
तीयं] RT (em. ?), द्वितीय PāPu 514 सङ्क०] PāPu, स्नात० RT (em. ?) 515 भव-
दीयं] Pā^{pc} PuRT, भवदीयं मुखे Pā^{ac} 516 ०ष्ववकाशो] em. RT, ०ष्वावकाशो PāPu
516 देयः] PuRT, देया Pā 518 ०नियुक्तैश्च] PāRT, ०नियुक्तौश्च Pu 519 ऽयम्]
em. RT, यत् PāPu 520 सङ्क०] PāPu, स्नात० RT (em. ?) 521 वर्णाश्रम०] PāRT,
वर्णाश्रमधर्म० Pu 522 ०विधेषू०] Pu^{pc} RT, ०विधेष्व० PāPu^{ac}

॥ वादि० ॥

यथार्य आह ।

॥ सङ्क० ॥

525

तदिदानीमुत्थाय यथायथं गम्यताम् । आश्रमेषु च स्वेषु स्वेषु यथाव्यवस्थमा-
स्यताम् । आर्य धैर्यराशे , तदेहि वयमपीदानीं यथावृत्तं स्वामिने निवेदयामः ।

॥ इति निष्क्रान्ताः सर्वे ॥

॥ चतुर्थो ऽङ्कः ॥

525 सङ्क०] PāPu, स्रात० RT (em. ?) 527 यथाव्यवस्थमा०] em. RT, यथाव्यवस्था-
मा० PāPu 529 चतुर्थो ऽङ्कः] Pā, चतुर्थोङ्कः समाप्तम् Pu 529 Colophons: शुभं भवतु ॥
जिनशासनस्य कल्याणं भूयात् ॥ ० ० ॥ मंगलंमस्तु ॥ ० Pā, सपूर्णं ॥ श्री ॥ Pu

Part III

English Translation

Prologue

May that Brahman shine forth for you, by which beginningless ignorance is gradually destroyed; in which intense, fresh joy coruscates; at the very start of whose 'descent' to the level of consciousness¹ desires for the enjoyment of other pleasing objects cease. (1)

At the end of the benediction the DIRECTOR [says].

Shame, for shame, being an actor is indeed an extremely wretched means of supporting one's family, in which one is continuously practicing a display of utterly false behaviour.

Hara, Viṣṇu, Brahmā, a sage, a king, a brutish fool, a rake, a coward, a hero, a happy man, a sad one: taking all roles the actor plays, feeling no shame before the people² —in reality he is [just] resorting to craft to fill his belly. (2)

Better, then, that I should wind up this vile craft, which bears small fruit but which causes great trouble and yet more shame, attach myself to some household of a guru in some ashram, and strive to reach the highest goal of man, [which is] the cessation of all sufferings. (*reflecting*) So to whom should I consign this wretched burden of my family, which is hardly more than an object of pity, before I leave? (*looking ahead*) Well, let me first find out what he thinks.

Enter the ASSISTANT. He looks at the Director.

Why is his face haggard with disillusion today? I'll ask him. (*approaching*) Sir, why so sorrowful a face? Surely you haven't been engaged by the pupils of that Writer of the Commentary for some task?

The DIRECTOR repeats what he said above up to 'sufferings'.

ASSISTANT. Don't be disillusioned, there's no need. Who among gods, humans or animals has ever escaped from deceit and then reached the supreme goal? All this multitude of creatures, from Brahmā down to the animals, roams about in worldly existence through Illusion alone. Is your lot any worse?

Our conduct cannot be different from that of the whole world that is fooled by Illusion: not ultimately true. (3)

DIRECTOR. My friend, it is as you say. But even though our conduct is no worse than theirs, still I find it impossible to carry on with it.

ASSISTANT. Why, sir?

DIRECTOR. My friend, as is well known, I have exerted myself in the staging of the ten dramatic styles as taught by Bharatamuni. But today the circle of pupils of this honourable Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, who is also well known as the Writer of the Commentary because he wrote an exegetical work on grammar when he was just a child, has ordered me to put on the work of their teacher, a new, extraordinary play called Much Ado About Religion. So how shall I stage it, since it is neither worldly, nor does it follow the dramatic rules, and has never been performed before? Therefore it is better just to give up this wretched livelihood.

ASSISTANT. Sir, say not so. As you know, the commands of these honourable pupils of the Writer of the Commentary cannot be disregarded. As for your worry that it does not follow the rules, what blame is there in that for the director?

That poet makes a poem disregarding the teachings of Bharata, and his pupils propagate it in that way, too, [and] your audience are those same [pupils]. So just put it on. Why would someone else, a bystander find fault with it? (4)

DIRECTOR. I don't care about people's abuse.

ASSISTANT. So are you afraid of some danger from the king?

DIRECTOR (*smiling*). It's not that either.

ASSISTANT. Then why procrastinate? Assign the actors their various parts—the Buddhist, the Jain, and so forth.

DIRECTOR. My friend, I simply cannot carry on with this intolerable profession of acting full of trickery and illusion.

Let the poem flout the rules or follow them, let the people be angry or pleased—as for me, I am disillusioned: I shall quit my profession now and acquaint myself with holy places. (5)

As far as you are concerned, you can either support my indigent family, or follow me. But myself, since I am eager to know the truth, I have to go now into this great monastery nearby,³ where hundreds of monks, who have transcended passion, live, and which shows the path to final release.

*Exeunt ambo.*⁴

Notes to the Prologue

¹ *ex conj.* DEZSŐ-ISAACSON.

² *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

³ Dr. Isaacson's conjecture (*nātidūranirvāṇamārgadeśinī*), which is supported by the awkward position of *nātidūre*, would mean: 'which shows a relatively short path to final release' (cf. Act One, l. 48: *ayam eva nirvāṇamārgo nedīyān*). On the other hand, as Prof. Sanderson has also pointed out to me, *nātidūre* fits the context well: the Director, seeing the monastery nearby, decides to start his life as a wandering pilgrim there. Another argument defending the word '*nātidūre*' might be that it helps the transition to the first act the beginning of which is actually set *in the vicinity* of a Buddhist monastery.

⁴ A detailed interpretation of the Prologue can be found in the Introduction, Chapter 3.

Act One

*Then enter the Buddhist monk, seated on a stool and dressed in a red robe, and the lay disciple in front of him.*¹

MONK (*with dispassion*).

In this beginningless existence this is the way things are, alas: deluded creatures are born and then die, and dying they are born again. A wise man, seeing that this is the path of sorrows, should direct his thoughts towards the state in which birth and death come to a close.² (1)

DISCIPLE. O Reverend, what is this place which is outside the transactions of birth and death? And by what means is it reached?

MONK. My intelligent friend, if you are eager to learn, then strive to comprehend now the Four Noble Truths.

DISCIPLE. O Reverend, what are those Four Noble Truths?³

MONK. My intelligent friend, Suffering, the Cause of Suffering, the Cessation of Suffering, and the Path: these are the Four Noble Truths.

DISCIPLE. O Reverend, that much isn't enough to enlighten me. Please teach me the details.

MONK. Sir, I'll make you understand.

First of all, everything is Suffering, which is directly experienced and the contrary of happiness. That from which it arises is the Cause, the power of delusion. Cessation is Extinction, the end of all afflictions. [And] the Path is taught by the right-thinking to be the means to attain that. (2)

DISCIPLE. O Reverend, by what means does the Self⁴ leave behind⁵ these deep waters of suffering, which have been flowing continuously for a long time and which are difficult to cross, and then settle in Nirvāṇa?

MONK. Good fellow, you haven't got it right. In fact, there is no such thing as a Self which escapes the straits of suffering and arrives at Nirvāṇa. Surely,

It is this that is the firm pillar upholding the prison of existence, which causes terrible pain—people's obsession with a permanent Self.⁶ (3)

To explain,

A creature who thinks “this is me”, will inevitably be convinced that “this is mine”; and thinking [in terms of] “me” and “mine”, the dull-minded will surely not give up [his] wrong desires. (4)

For someone whose craving has not stopped, cultivation of dispassion is remote; and if dispassion has not been practiced, how can one cross over [the ocean of] existence? (5)

DISCIPLE. O Reverend, if no [permanent] self exists at all,⁷ then who experiences the suffering of existence? Or who rises out of it and arrives at⁸ the house of Nirvāṇa?

MONK (*smiling*). My child, cessation, Nirvāṇa, final beatitude, or completion would be all the more impossible if there were a permanent self. For what is permanent can never cease. Therefore this [i.e. everything] is just consciousness, contaminated by the various forms of joy, sorrow, etc., having a broad variety of aspects in accordance with the various latent impressions which have been operating in a beginningless continuum,⁹ — [when] by this path of the cultivation of there being no self etc. [it has become] grounded in pure consciousness alone, with its many kinds of defilements, caused by the mass of various adventitious properties, having been removed,¹⁰ let it remain in a stream, or let the stream itself be cut off: this is indeed the shortcut to Nirvāṇa.

DISCIPLE. O Reverend, if there is no permanent self, who enjoys the fruit of his actions in the next world? And in the present,¹¹ too, whose are these activities which are based on memory?¹²

MONK. I'll make you understand properly.

Permanent entities cannot have causal efficacy either gradually or instantaneously; and since they cannot have efficacy, they are not ultimately real.¹³ (6)

For so say the wise: “Only that which has causal efficacy can be ultimately real.”¹⁴ Furthermore,

This pot,¹⁵ whether perishable by nature or not, does not perish because of a cause such as a hammer. Either [, in the first case,] the cause would be useless, or [, in the second,] incapable; or because it [i.e. that cause] might not appear even in an aeon, it [i.e. the pot] might not perish. (7)

Therefore entities perish immediately after coming into existence, but they appear the same [as before] because they are in the same continuum. And because they exist in a continuum, the bringing about of effects [such as the illusion of a stable] agent [who is also the] enjoyer [of the fruits of the deeds of that agent, and] memory etc. are easy to account for.¹⁶ (8)

DISCIPLE. If all entities are momentary, [i.e.] do not remain for a second moment, then how can consciousness make them its object? It is quite clear that an

object must be revealed¹⁷ either together with consciousness or afterwards and by it. Or even if it produces¹⁸ cognition, it cannot be made its object without that [cognition] being restricted¹⁹ or taking on a form [of the object]. Otherwise we cannot account for the perception of something momentary.²⁰

MONK. Sir, if you see²¹ clearly then there isn't even such a thing as an entity which becomes the object of consciousness. It is consciousness alone that appears, inlaid with blue, yellow, and other²² forms. Why?²³

People do not have a simultaneous cognition, with two forms, of the cognition and its object.²⁴ And if the object, which is devoid of consciousness, is grasped by cognition whose nature is radiance, [then] grasping [i.e. cognition] would be [grasped] first, just as [the light of] a lamp [must be grasped first before one can grasp the object which it illuminates].²⁵ But cognition cannot be grasped without a form. Therefore it is only this [cognition] that shines with various forms. How could there be any other objective entity?²⁶

Therefore everything is empty, everything is momentary, everything is without an [enduring] essence, everything is suffering. Meditating thus one reaches Nirvāṇa. (10)

The sound of the wooden gong comes from behind the scene.

DISCIPLE (*listening*). O Reverend, that must be the sound of the wooden gong which indicates²⁷ the time for the whole community of the monks to come together. So it is for your Reverend to decide [what we ought to do].

MONK. In that case let's make sure that we are not late.²⁸ (*They stand up, walk about, and look around.*) Here comes a young brahmin, his dark chest marked by a sacred thread white as a lotus-fiber, and with a bamboo staff in his hand.²⁹ So let us take appropriate action lest he makes us miss the appointed time.

DISCIPLE. O Reverend, this young brahmin has been standing here³⁰ for quite a long time. At the very moment you sat down under this tree he came here, though Your Reverend did not notice him. Hidden by the net of creepers, he overheard the whole teaching Your Reverend gave.

MONK. In that case why should I be late now on account of such a person?

Exit [the MONK] together with the DISCIPLE.

Then enter the GRADUATE as described above, and the BOY.

GRADUATE.

I have duly studied the Veda, mastered the six auxiliary sciences, and examined Mīmāṃsā as well. Thus I have performed the duties appropriate for a twice-born person. But until I humiliate the enemies of the Veda, who dirty their speech with incessantly brandished pernicious [or: faulty] argumentation, the efforts I made in my studies will be as if fruitless.³¹ (11)

And these stupid students of Śuddhodana's son³² are the foremost among those who vandalise the Veda. So it is they whom I shall first punish like thieves.

He walks about.

BOY. Sir, I have brought the bathing things here. You were going to bathe, sir.

GRADUATE. So what?

BOY. The circumstances are clearly not favourable [to hold a debate]. All these people on the road must be going to the monastery.

GRADUATE. Let's rather have a look at the monks in this monastery [first], and then bathe.

BOY. As you command, sir.

Both walk about.

GRADUATE (*looking ahead*). O how charming is this monastery!³³ Since here

There are temple-towers rivaling the peaks of the Himavat, bright with moonbeams; cool mango-groves; delightful vine-bowers full of grass;³⁴ and female bees, their bodies reddened by the lotus-pollen, are roaming above the lotus-ponds, the water of which bristles with emerging lotus-shoots, and imitates the autumn sky. (12)

(*He looks at the lotus-pond.*)

The water of the lotus-pond is beautiful because of the groups of trees on the bank reflected with their branches downwards and their extensive roots upwards. Here inside [the water] birds are seen sitting on the boughs of trees, eating fruit-bits with their beaks open / turned upwards.³⁵ (13)

BOY. Sir, behold the abundance of offerings, consisting of flowers, incense, and anointments of sandal, camphor, saffron, and musk, [offered] to golden Buddha-images, from which dense, great effulgence is streaming forth, which are nicely coloured and adorned with decoration. [These images] are placed in the interiors of high temples, which are similar to Mount Meru and decorated with colourful flags trembling in the gentle³⁶ breeze. How wonderful!

GRADUATE (*looking*). Clearly this is not a seminary for ascetics, this is a royal garden! O tempora o mores!

The rich, being robbed by their rakish guides and having completely lost their way on a 'commendable'³⁷ path, throw away their various riches on unsuitable things. (14)

Even if this religion is not authoritative,³⁸ what is the use of this wealth of means of enjoyment which befit those who have not peace, for people who have allegedly turned away their mind from sensual pleasures, who are devoted to the repeated cultivation of meditation³⁹ and who sustain their life in whatever way?

BOY. Sir, look, look, in the tower of this whitewashed mansion, which completely fills the ten quarters with masses of fragrance of perfume, flowers, and incense, these [Buddhist] adherents seem⁴⁰ to be ready for the meal.

GRADUATE. Well observed. So perhaps these monks would feel that they should restrain their behaviour if they noticed us.⁴¹ So now we shall observe their practice for a second right here in this bower of creepers, unnoticed by them.⁴²

They do so.

GRADUATE (*looking full of expectation*). Goodness! None of them has even taken a bath, eager to have the meal of the convent.⁴³

BOY. Let alone bathing, they haven't even changed their clothes!

GRADUATE (*looking carefully*). Even their procedure for purification by sipping water is the same as that of Śūdras! Golly! People from the four *varṇas* and even those from the mixed *varṇas* are all eating in one and the same row! How pleasant is the observance in this ashram!⁴⁴

BOY. Sir, there is more than that! Look, these attending maidservants with their plump⁴⁵ breasts, who are ready to serve the food, cast their glances with various amorous gestures on the faces of the monks! And here some drink is being served in a spotless jar.

GRADUATE.

There is wine here concealed behind the name 'fruit-juice' [and] pretended to be something else,⁴⁶ and there is meat free from the three conditions [of impurity].⁴⁷ Oh, how painful is this asceticism! (15)

BOY. Sir, look, look, this monk⁴⁸

Although thirsty, is not drinking the beverage, in which a water-lily is whirling, with his tongue so much as [he is drinking] the open-eyed faces of the maidservants with his glances.⁴⁹ (16)

GRADUATE. All right, we have seen the monastic discipline of those who are free from passion.

BOY.

Living in pleasure-gardens, drink and food both easy to obtain, no trouble caused by restrictions: lucky are those who become adherents [of Buddhism]. (17)

GRADUATE. Enough of joking now. Here comes the famous great scholar called Dharmottara, the Buddhist monk; having finished his meal, he is descending from the palatial building and sits down on the grassy spot, in the shade under a tree. So let's approach him.

Then enter the Buddhist MONK as described above, and his DISCIPLE.

MONK. Sir, have you treasured up in your heart the teachings of the most compassionate Lord Bodhisattva?

DISCIPLE. Please, Reverend, favour me again [with your teaching].

MONK. This young brahmin whom we saw before is still [there]. I see that his face looks like that of someone who is eager to speak.

GRADUATE (*approaching*). Monk, how are you? I trust that your religious observance proceeds without impediments.⁵⁰

MONK. Welcome. This grassy spot is not impure. Please sit down.

GRADUATE (*sitting down*). But what have you, [his] mentor, taught to him about which you ask him now if he has mastered it?

MONK (*to his Disciple*). Reply to his question.

GRADUATE. What an insult: “disciple, reply”! Boy, listen to what he says.⁵¹

MONK. Brahmin, surely the proper usage is “learn from him” [what he says].

GRADUATE. O you red-robed fellow, ravings like this are not governed by the rule “[the noun denoting] the teacher [is in the ablative case] if there is a formal instruction”. Look, “he hears [e.g. the story] from the actor [‘actor’ is in the genitive case in Sanskrit]” is the only appropriate way of usage here.⁵²

MONK. O how abusive is this twice-born for whom the teaching⁵³ of the supremely compassionate Lord Buddha, the only master of the three worlds, is raving!

GRADUATE (*to the DISCIPLE*). As for you, tell me now what did he teach you.

DISCIPLE. Why, the master has taught me the Four Noble Truths: Suffering, the Cause of Suffering, the Cessation of Suffering, and the Way.

GRADUATE (*smiling*). That’s the teaching of the supremely compassionate one? This is not raving where the realisation of having no Self is celebrated as the path leading to salvation?

MONK. Brahmin! The teaching about Ultimate Reality seems to be raving⁵⁴ for the likes of you, whose minds are muddled by the cultivation of the doctrine that⁵⁵ the slaughtering of animals like the one [sacrificed] for Agni and Soma is a means to attain salvation!⁵⁶

GRADUATE. What? This depraved Buddhist finds fault even with Vedic sentences! What shall I do? In whose presence shall I speak? This monastery is crowded only with the community of renegades. (*He looks around [and says] delightedly.*) Great! As a reward of my good works, Viśvarūpa and these other many honourable professors, who are eager to see the garden of the monastery, have come handy [for me] as arbiters. All right, I’ve got the opportunity to punish [these] criminals.

Then enter as many ARBITERS as can be afforded.

ARBITERS. [Judging] just by the lustre of their faces, this graduate [called] Saṅkarṣaṇa and this Buddhist monk [called] Dharmottara appear to be quarrelling. Come, let’s have a look.

They make a few steps around the gathering.

MONK. Welcome, gentlemen, please take a seat here.

Saying this he points at the grassy spot.

ARBITERS. (*sit down and ask the MONK*). What is the subject of this discussion?

MONK. That person invested with the sacred thread regards the teaching of the Bodhisattva as if it were raving.

GRADUATE.

Here I am, and here is this monk; you are prudent arbiters; so where could there be another opportunity like this to consider the strong and weak points [in one's arguments]? (18)

ARBITERS.

If the speech you make is correct, moderate, [and] its source is the established truth; if [that kind of speech] which is full of Quibbles, Futile Rejoinders, and Vulnerable Points, with a noisy mass⁵⁷ of [bad types of] disputation, is to be avoided; [if] there is no envy at all in your heart, no roughness in your words, no frowning on your face; [in brief:] if this is a discussion among virtuous persons, then we are always ready to serve as assessors.⁵⁸ (19)

MONK AND GRADUATE. It will be as you command, gentlemen.

ARBITERS. So which one of you has put forward his thesis first ?

GRADUATE. The monk has indeed set forth the *prima facie* view while teaching the disciple.

MONK (*to the GRADUATE*). Have you heard it?

GRADUATE. Yes, I have.

MONK. If so, then repeat it.

GRADUATE. Fine. I'll repeat it now in a few words.

Suffering; its cause; its cessation; the path to attain it, called the Realisation of [having] No Self; it is established through the establishing of Momentariness. (20)

[Things are] momentary because they exist, [and] since [their] destruction does not require any cause. Activities such as memory [are possible] because of causal relations in the continuum. (21)

[But] no external thing, even if it were momentary, can become the object of cognition. It is only this consciousness which shines forth, studded with a multitude of forms. (22)

Therefore everything is empty, everything is momentary, everything is without an [enduring] essence, everything is suffering. Meditating thus one reaches Nirvāṇa. (23)

(*To the MONK.*) Is it OK like that?

MONK (*contemptuously*). Yes, briefly.

GRADUATE. So now listen [to my arguments] in this matter.

ARBITERS. We hang upon your lips.

GRADUATE.

Even if there might exist this aforementioned path to final beatitude, provided that Momentariness was established, still entities, when thoroughly examined, do not come in contact with Momentariness. (24)

MONK. Why?

GRADUATE. Simply because there is no logical reason [for it].

MONK. But surely the logical reason has been put forth: 'because of existence'.

GRADUATE.

The concomitance [with the probandum, i.e. 'momentariness'] of the proof 'existence' which is taught [by you, Buddhists] cannot be ascertained in a straight way, as in the case of smoke and fire, [since] no example appears [to support it] and [since therefore] it is useless.⁵⁹ (25)

MONK.⁶⁰ If so then what of it? Ascertaining the concomitance even by means of logical discontinuance is still an ascertainment of the concomitance.⁶¹

But that existence [which is nothing else but causal efficacy], being excluded from permanent things because of the absence of both gradual and instantaneous [efficacy], will set its foot in momentary entities, because it cannot go anywhere else.⁶²

GRADUATE.

Existence is all the more excluded even from your momentary things, just as from permanent things, because they, too, cannot have the invariably concomitant property [of gradual and instantaneous efficacy]. (26)

Look,

If this entity performed an action after it has arisen, in that case it could not be momentary. [Or,] if it is embraced by death immediately after coming into being, how could it have another opportunity to act?⁶³ (27)

MONK. But surely, causal relationship is only this much among momentary things: 'after cognising A, B is cognised', that is merely 'arising [of a cognition] after getting [a former cognition]'.⁶⁴

GRADUATE. There is more to be said in this matter, [but] let us leave it aside. However, I put forth the following: on the basis of this view the condition of being a cause is not real itself, since entities are material causes with regard to a particular thing.

In⁶⁵ that state of affairs [which you, Buddhists, assert (*tatra*)], all [operations], which are brought about by causality, such as the capability of [every individual] awareness [in a stream] to experience the results of its [past] actions, would fail. [Or] let there be some kind of causal relation here [i.e. among the cognition-phases belonging to the same continuum]: [it] would be the same with regard to other cognition-phases which have arisen in other streams.⁶⁶ (28)

The MONK draws on the ground with eyes downcast.

GRADUATE.

Or even if the causal relation is established as really true, because the otherness of the awarenesses remains, how could someone enjoy the fruits of his own actions? (29)

Moreover, [in the argument] 'things are momentary because of [their] existence', this logical reason is contradictory, since it proves the opposite of the property to be established.⁶⁷

MONK. How so?

GRADUATE. It has been stated that momentary entities cannot be efficacious. Permanent things, however, together with the assisting factors, are indeed able to act either gradually or instantaneously: this is causal efficacy, and in this way their stability is proved.

The MONK remains silent.

GRADUATE.

The destruction of things also depends on some cause, just as their coming into being, for the agreement in presence and in absence [of cause and effect] is similar for both [perishing and arising]. (30)

MONK. But surely, as for the cause of destruction, the agreement in presence and in absence [of cause and effect] is established in another way, since it [i.e. the assumed cause of destruction, such as a hammer] is the cause of a different continuum [, such as the continuum of shard-phases, and not of the perishing of the pot].⁶⁸ As for the cause of arising, the agreement in presence and in absence [of cause and effect] cannot be thus [i.e. cannot be otherwise accounted for], because there is no other [kind of] effect.

GRADUATE (*smiling*). Out of desire or aversion? Some people hold that we can hardly say that there is no other [kind of] effect, since manifestation and the like can [also] take place.⁶⁹

MONK.

No effect has ever been seen arising without the causes of arising. (31)

GRADUATE.

Have you ever seen an effect being destroyed without the causes of destruction?

MONK. Surely the outcome would be that no pot could be destroyed even with the passage of aeons if there was no cause of destruction present.

GRADUATE (*with a sneer*). Mercy on us! If the pot is eternal then worldly affairs are finished, people are extirpated, the eternal death of the world, which is nothing but a pot, is breathing down our neck! For let that thing be eternal

which has no cause to destroy it, like for example space: what's the problem with that? But composite entities do have a cause of destruction, because the separation of their constituents etc. must inevitably take place.⁷⁰ Moreover, you imbecile, don't you notice that, even accepting your position, the stream of pot-moments is not destroyed just as [the pot is not destroyed, as you claim, according to our position]? If a cause of a different stream has appeared in it [i.e. in the stream], well, then, according to my position, the cause of destruction will also appear in the same way: the course [of reasoning] is the same. So such is this position of momentariness.

The MONK, embarrassed, remains [silent].

DISCIPLE. Hey, you damned brahmin, how dare you insult the Reverend?

BOY. Hey, you cross-breed, that's how you speak to the tutor?

DISCIPLE. Whose tutor is this? Only this camel-faced feller's.

The BOY jumps up angrily and wants to slap the face of the DISCIPLE.

GRADUATE, MONK, ARBITERS. Keep your hair on!

They separate them.

GRADUATE. What's more, this logical reason is contradicted by recognition which grasps stable things, [when we think] 'this is that same thing [we have seen before]'. Or let us leave aside recognition. The perception of someone who does not wink, which grasps objects as having unbroken existence, that [perception], too, does undoubtedly contradict [the *hetu*]. And although there *is* such a perception, some ignoramuses claim that 'perception grasps [single object-]moments [or phases]': clearly this [claim] is also refuted, since a moment cannot last for long, and in this case [of the perception of someone who in not winking] grasping happens in that way.

ARBITERS. Don't go into further details.

We have listened to this course of argumentation expounded by you, Graduate, which delighted our ears. It has refuted the doctrine of momentariness. But say something about the doctrine of consciousness [being the only reality]. (32)

GRADUATE. Listen, Monk!

Let there be no [simultaneous] perception [of the form of] of both the object and [cognition] which grasps it. If you say, 'let the nature of cognition shine forth', [then] does it make manifest its own form, or [the form] of something else? There is no cognition in the form of 'I am blue'; rather this cognition of the other thing as different, namely 'that [thing is blue]', agrees [with the facts]. Therefore this external object of cognition must exist.⁷¹ (33)

MONK. If it exists, [then] why is it not experienced?

GRADUATE. Who on earth said that it is not experienced? Surely it *is* experienced [in the form of] 'this is blue'.

MONK. Good fellow, this is the appearance of cognition, since cognition is of the nature of light; this is not the appearance of an object, since it has an insentient nature; and even you said that there is no [simultaneous] appearance of both.

GRADUATE. Cognition, too, inasmuch as it shines forth, shines as the shining forth of something else, not as the shining forth of its own self, since this shining is the shining forth of what is to be shone on, and not just the shining forth of shining. For this is the way lights are.⁷² It has been said: 'The three lights [namely cognition, word, and fire] illuminate themselves and other things.'⁷³ But it is not really cognition that shines forth then [i.e. when the object is grasped],⁷⁴ for it is forms such as blue that shine forth. And forms such as blue are not 'cognitions', because they [i.e. forms such as blue] are not established by positive and negative concomitance to have the nature of cognition in the way that [speckled cows are established through positive and negative concomitance] to be cows.⁷⁵

The MONK draws on the ground in silence, with eyes downcast.

GRADUATE. O honourable Arbiters, tell us which one of the two positions is superior?

ARBITERS. Why are you asking us? The Monk himself supports your position by keeping silence.

GRADUATE. Then I am going to have a bath now.⁷⁶ Please excuse me. As for you, you have seen the spectacle, now do as you please. (*To the MONK.*)

Monks, if this effort of yours is for the sake of [a better] afterlife, then stop, enough of it, [since] it brings about the opposite result. If this exertion [of yours], namely resorting to masses of hypocrisy and humbug, is in order to make a living, then go on with it as you wish.

(34)

Exeunt omnes.

Notes to Act One

¹ The First Act of Jayanta's play begins with an introductory scene (*vi-śkambhaka*), which is set in the garden of a *vihāra*, most probably in or near Śrīnagara. The characters are: a Buddhist Monk, who is a distinguished scholar (his name, Dharmottara, echoes the name of the great logician of the 8th century, cf. *Āgamaḍambara* (ed. pr.), p. xxiv; *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 4.498.), well versed in the Teaching of the Buddha, confident in his knowledge, and his Disciple, who is ready to learn, although perhaps not blessed with great acumen. The Disciple speaks Śaurasenī.

² Jayanta used the same verse in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (II 424.9–12) to conclude his comments on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.19: *punarutpattiḥ pretyabhāvaḥ*, 'The state after death is rebirth'.

³ *ex conj.* The sentence as it stands in the manuscripts (*kiṃ uṇa te cattāri ajjasaccā*) is completely ungrammatical.

The conjunct consonants *jja* in the word *ajja*^o are written in the manuscripts with a letter which looks like *dya*. On the reading of this sign see the Introduction. In other cases our manuscripts write the Prakrit word *ayya* with the standard Devanāgarī ligature *yya* (cf. STEINER 1997, pp. 173ff.).

⁴ *appā* occurs in Māhārāṣṭrī, Ardhamāgadhī, Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī, and Jaina-Śaurasenī. The Śaurasenī (and Māgadhī) form of Sanskrit *ātmā* should be *attā* (PISCHEL §401, cf. Act Two, l. 39: *attaparammuho*).

⁵ *mottūna* is a Māhārāṣṭrī (and Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī) form of the absolute, (PISCHEL §586). In Śaurasenī (and Māgadhī) the prevalent absolute ending is *-ya* (PISCHEL §590).

⁶ The Buddhist opponent in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (vol.II, p. 298) calls the attachment to a Self 'the anointed, principal delusion' (*mūrdhābhiṣiktaḥ prathamō mohah*), the termination of which entails that the attachment to anything belonging to a Self (*ātmāyagraha*) also ceases. The realisation of having no self (*nairātmyadarśana*) is said to be the door to Nirvāṇa, and the way leading to it is to establish that all things are momentary, which helps one to realise that cognition, too, has no permanent substratum (*āśraya*) such as a Self.

The Monk's thoughts on *sthirātmagraha* have interesting parallels in the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Dharmakīrti held that *satkāyadrṣṭi* or *satkāyadarśana* ('the [false] notion [that the five constituents] form a Self or belong to a Self': *ātmadrṣṭir ātmāyadrṣṭir vā: Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* p. 281), which is nothing else but delusion or ignorance (*moha*, *avidyā*), is the fundamental condition behind all false mental attitudes (*kleśas*), all flaws (*doṣas*), and all stains of consciousness (*malas*). Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika with svavṛtti* (GNOLI) p. 111, v. 222:

sarvāsāṃ doṣajātīnāṃ jātiḥ satkāyadarśanāt|
sāvidyā tatra tatsnehas tasmād dveṣādisambhavaḥ||;

Pramāṇavārttika, pramāṇasiddhi 214c–215b (VETTER 1990, p. 112, v. 212):

*mohavirodhān maitryāder nātyantaṃ doṣanigrahaḥ|
tanmūlās ca malāḥ sarve sa ca satkāyadarśanam||*

(In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (loc. cit.) *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* is only one among many other *doṣas*; see VETTER 1990, p. 42, n.1.) As Dharmakīrti explains, the [false] notion of a Self results in the attachment to things belonging to this Self. These two notions generate affection towards *ātmā* and *ātmīya*, which in turn produces hatred and all the other flaws (*Pramāṇavārttika with svavṛtti* (GNOLI) p. 111.18–19: *ātmadarśanam ātmīyagrahaṃ prasūte| tau ca tatsnehaṃ sa ca dveṣādīn iti satkāyadarśanaḥ sarvadoṣāḥ|*). Dharmakīrti summarises his views on this issue in the following verses (*Pramāṇavārttika, pramāṇasiddhi* 219–221, VETTER 1990, pp. 117–119, vv. 217–219):

*yaḥ paśyaty ātmānaṃ tatrāsyāham iti śāśvataḥ snehaḥ|
snehāt sukheṣu tṛṣṇati tṛṣṇā doṣāṃs tiraskurute||
guṇadarśi paritṛṣṇan mameti tatsādhanāny upādatte|
tenātmābhīniveśo yāvat tāvat sa saṃsāre||
ātmani sati parasamjñā svaparavibhāgāt parigrahadveṣau|
anayoḥ sampratibaddhāḥ sarve doṣāḥ prajāyante||*

‘The one who sees a Self [apart from the constituents] has an eternal attachment towards this [Self] [because he thinks:] “[this is] me” . Because of this attachment, he desires things that cause pleasure, [and] desire conceals the faults [of these things]. He notices [only] the advantages, ardently longs for [things which he considers pleasant, and,] thinking ‘[these are / must be] mine’, lays hold of the means [with which he can obtain] them. Therefore as long as one clings to a Self, one transmigrates. When there is [the notion of] a Self, there is also the concept of the ‘other’. From the distinction between one’s self and something else, accepting and aversion [arise]. All [other] flaws come about firmly connected with these two.’

As Vetter pointed out (VETTER 1990, p. 126f., n.1.), Dharmakīrti claims that the *naiyāyika* methods of meditation on suffering are not much use if the notion of a Self remains unchanged, cf. *Pramāṇavārttika, pramāṇasiddhi* 228c–230b (VETTER 1990, p. 126, vv. 226–227):

*duḥkhabhāvanayā syāc ced ahidaṣṭāṅgahānivat|
ātmīyabuddhīhānyātra tyāgo na tu viparyaye||
upabhogāśrayatvena grhīteṣv indriyādiṣu|
svatvadhīḥ kena vāryeta vairāgyaṃ tatra tat kutah||;*
cf. *Nyāyabhāṣya* ad 1.1.9.

⁷ According to PISCHEL (§§ 95, 336), *eva* becomes *jeva*, *jevva* in Śaurasenī (*yeva*, *yevva* in Māgadhī), and its initial *j* (*y*) is doubled after short vowels, *-e*, and *-o*. Hemacandra (4.280) and Puruṣottama (9.28) teach that Sanskrit *eva* becomes *yveva* in Śaurasenī (Pseudo-Vararuci 12.23 prescribes *jevva* (v.l. *jjevva*), and Rāmaśarman 2.1.37 *jjevva* or *jevva*). Our manuscripts know only *yveva* (both in Śaurasenī and in Māgadhī), similarly to the old Nepalese manuscript of the Nāgānanda, in which the form *yveva* prevails (STEINER 1997, p. 200). Steiner draws our attention to the following facts: ‘Nun findet sich

yveva aber u.a. auch in den beiden nepalesischen Palmblatt-Mss A und C der COULSONSchen Mālatīm.-Ausgabe, von denen letzteres—wie das Nāg.-Ms A—auf das Jahr 1156 n. Chr. datiert ist. Das läßt vermuten, daß die Form *y(y)ev(v)a* auch noch im 7./8. Jh. in den Schauspielen gebraucht worden ist oder zumindest gebraucht werden konnte. (...) Das Nāg.-Ms A macht nach dem Gesagten jedenfalls wahrscheinlich, daß Harṣa die Form *yveva* (oder *yeva*) gebrauchte, wobei noch offen bleiben muß, ob es sich hier um eine lokale oder gar individuelle Besonderheit—etwa die Vorliebe für altertümliche Formen—handelt, oder ob wir mit *y(y)eva* die im Schauspiel-Prakrit auch noch des 7. Jh.s gebräuchliche Form vor uns haben. Die genannten Mālatīm.-Mss scheinen letzteres zu bestätigen. Ein weiteres Indiz für die Authentizität dieser Form könnte darin gesehen werden, daß das Nāg.-Ms A ausnahmslos das wohl jüngere *yveva*, nicht aber das ältere *yeva* überliefert hat. Dazu stimmt wiederum, daß auch Pu[ruṣottama], Namis[ādhu] und Hc. [= Hemaçandra] nur die Form *yveva* lehren.’ (STEINER 1997, pp. 205–207.)

⁸ Śaurasenī *paḍivajjadi* suggests *prativrajati* as its Sanskrit *chāyā* (see PISCHEL §197), but *pratipadyate* might also be possible (PISCHEL §280: Sanskrit *dya* > Śaurasenī *jja*).

⁹ Cf. *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I p.70.9–11, \simeq *Nyāyamañjarī* I.196.1–2: *ekam evedam samvidrūpaṃ harṣaviṣāḍādyaneḥkāravivartam paśyāmaḥ, tatra yatheṣṭam samjñāḥ kriyantām* | ‘We see that this [i.e. everything one directly experiences] is one, it has the nature of consciousness, it has many [illusory] modifications, such as joy, dejection, and the like: it can be labelled as one wishes.’

The Vijñānavādin’s position as it is presented in the Śūnyavāda section of Kumārila’s *Ślokavārttika* also offers interesting parallels: *Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyāṭkā*) *śūnyavāda* 15–17b:

matpakṣe yady api svaccho jñānātmā paramārthataḥ |
tathāpy anāḍau samsāre pūrvajñānaprasūtibhiḥ ||
citrābhiś citrahetutvād vāsanābhir upaplavāt |
svānurūpyeṇa nīlādigrāhyagrāhakarūṣitam (v.l. *-dūṣitam*) ||
pravibhaktam ivotpannam nānyam artham apekṣate |

‘In my view, although in reality the nature of consciousness is pure, still, in this beginningless existence, because of the disturbance [of consciousness] caused by latent impressions in accordance with their own character—impressions which are produced by former cognitions and are manifold because they have manifold causes—, [cognition] arises as if being divided, overlaid by [the forms of] ‘cogniser’ and ‘cognised’ such as ‘blue’, and it does not require any other [external] object [to appear variegated].’

¹⁰ Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika*, *pramāṇasiddhi* 207cd (VETTER 1990, p. 105, v. 205ab):
ukto mārgas tadabhyāsād āśrayaḥ parivartate |

‘The path has been stated. Through its practice the basis transforms.’

According to Manorathanandin, the ‘path’ has been defined as ‘the insight that there is no self’ (comm. *ad loc.*: *nairātmyadarśanalakṣaṇaḥ*), cf. *Pramāṇavār-*

ttika, pramāṇasiddhi 137c–138b (VETTER 1990, p. 42, v. 135). Prajñākaragupta explains the ‘transformation of the basis’ as follows (*Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam*, p. 142,30–31): *āśrayasya cittasantānasyālayasya vā parisuddhatvaṃ bhavati* ‘The stream of cognitions or the substratum consciousness becomes pure.’ In Manoranandin’s interpretation (comm. *ad loc.*): *tasyābhyāsād āśrayaḥ kleśavāsanābhūtam ālayavijñānaṃ parivartate, kliṣṭadaśānirodhāt kleśavisamṃyuktacittaprabandhātmanā pariṇamati* ‘Through its [i.e. the path’s] practice the basis, [i.e.] the substratum consciousness, which is basically the impressions of defilements, transforms, [i.e.] since the defiled state has been destroyed, it changes into a stream of cognitions which is disconnected from defilements.’ Dharmakīrti’s statement and its various possible interpretations are discussed in FRANCO 1997, pp. 82ff; VETTER 1990, p. 105, n.1; both referring to Schmithausen’s studies. As Franco observes (FRANCO 1997, p. 85), ‘in view of v. 208ab it seems that Dharmakīrti understood the transformation of the basis as the complete elimination of all the defiled *dharma*s which are not the own nature of cognition, but which are accidental to it; the cognition itself is pure and luminous’. Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika, pramāṇasiddhi* 210cd (VETTER 1990, p. 108, v. 208ab):

prabhāsvaram idaṃ cittaṃ prakṛtyāgantavo malāḥ

‘This consciousness is luminous by nature, the defilements are adventitious.’

Cf. also *Pañjikā ad Tattvasaṅgraha* 544: *teṣāṃ cāvidyādīnāṃ tattvajñānād vigatau satyāṃ yā nirmalatā dhyaḥ sā nirmuktir ity ucyate* | *yathoktaṃ, ‘cittam eva hi saṃsāro rāgādikleśavāsitaṃ* | *tad eva tair vinirmuktaṃ bhavānta iti kathiyata’ iti* ‘And when, after the disappearance of ignorance and the other [bonds] due to the knowledge of reality, the cognition becomes pure: this [purity] is called “liberation”. As it has been stated, “The world of transmigration is nothing but consciousness infused by defilements such as passion. And it is that same [consciousness], when free of those, which is said to be the end of existence”.

The same verse is alluded to in *Ālokaṃālā* v. 4 (LINDTNER p. 122):

rāgādimalinaṃ cittaṃ saṃsāras tadviviktatā

saṃkṣepāt kathito mokṣaḥ prahīṇāvaraṇair jinaiḥ |

‘The world of transmigration is [nothing but] consciousness dirtied by such [defilements] as passion. The Buddhas who have cast away the obstructions have taught in brief that liberation is the state of being separated from those [defilements].’ Lindtner (p. 123) also mentions other texts which quote the verse found in in the *Pañjikā*.

¹¹ According to PISCHEL (§144), *inhiṃ* is used in *Māhārāṣṭrī*, while it is ‘quite foreign to *Śaurasenī* and *Māgadhi*’.

¹² The Disciple’s question alludes to a well-known objection against the Buddhist position: if there is no permanent substratum, i.e. no Self, functioning as the basis of the stream of cognitions, the one who performs an action and the one who experiences its result cannot be the same person. This would entail the impossibility of karmic retribution and all other activities (e.g. memory) which require the permanence of the agent’s self-identity. Says Kumārila (*Ślokaṃvārtti-*

ka (with *Nyāyaratnākara*) *ātmavāda* 32–33ab):
nairātmyavādapakṣe tu pūrvam evāvabudhyate|
madvināśāt phalaṃ na syān matto 'nyasyātha vā bhavet||
iti naiva pravṛttiḥ syān na ca vedapramāṇatā|

‘But if the position of the doctrine of having no Self [were accepted], then one would think before [setting about something]: “Since I shall perish, there can be no fruit [of my action for me], or [the fruit] will fall to someone other than me”, so there would be no activity, and the Veda would have no authority.’ (See also *Ślokavārttika* (with *Nyāyaratnākara*) *ātmavāda* 3–4.)

But, as Jayanta remarks, even rich Buddhist devotees, for whom *vedaprāmāṇya* is not of crucial importance, would not see the point of giving donations and thereby increasing their own merit (*Nyāyamañjarī* II. p. 296).

Śabara already pointed out that remembrance is impossible if only the momentary constituent of consciousness exists (*Śābarabhāṣya*(F) *ad mīmāṃsāsūtra* I.1.5, p. 54: *kṣaṇike vijñānaskandhamātre smṛtir anupapanneti*). But, as the Buddhist opponent holds in the *Ślokavārttika* (*Ślokavārttika* (with *Nyāyaratnākara*) *ātmavāda* 103 seqq.), memory, just as desire, can be explained with the help of impressions (*vāsanās*) existing in the same continuum.

Kṛṣṇamiśra puts similar questions in the mouth of the Jain monk, who represents the *digambarasiddhānta* in the Third Act of *Prabodhacandrodaya* (a refreshing farcical interlude in an allegorical play, satirising the ‘heretical’ sects of Buddhism, Jainism, and Somasiddhānta), in order to demonstrate that Buddhist philosophy comes off second best even when compared with a practical way of thinking. ‘Tell me now,’ the *kṣapaṇaka* asks the *bhikṣu*, ‘for whose sake do you observe any vow if you perish in each moment?’ (*Prabodhacandrodaya* p. 188: *bhaṇa dāva khaṇaviṇāsiṇā tue kassa kae vadaṃ dhalīadi?*) The *bhikṣu*’s answer is in conformity with Buddhist doctrine: ‘Listen: someone who is characterised by consciousness, and is included in my continuum, will attain liberation, after the impressions (of his past perceptions) have been completely uprooted.’ (Ibid.: *are śrūyatām. asmatsaṃtatipatitaḥ kaścid vijñānalakṣaṇaḥ samucchinnavāsano mokṣyate.*) ‘O you fool,’ bursts out the Jain monk, ‘if someone will attain liberation in some age, what could he do for you who perish right now?’ (Ibid. p. 190: *ale mukkha, kassim pi maṇṇantale ko vi mukko bhavissadi, tado de saṃpadaṃ ṇatthassa kīrisaṃ uvaālaṃ kalissadi?*) Even a Jain monk can notice how ‘deeply illogical’ Buddhism is—at least, that is what Vedantist propaganda insinuates.

Similar subjects are dealt with in *Tattvasaṅgraha* 476–545, the section on *karmaphalasambandha* (involving the refutation of the objections of *kṛtanāśa* and *akṛtaprāpti*). According to the Buddhist position, the connection between actions and their results is established on the basis of causality alone, without any need for a stable Self (*Tattvasaṅgraha* 501). In fact, causality is possible only in the case of momentary entities, and this is precisely what the Monk is going to demonstrate.

¹³The Monk’s exposition of the doctrine of momentariness is based on two well-known arguments: *vināśītvānumāna* (‘the inference [of momentariness] from

the perishing nature [of produced entities]') and *sattvānumāna* ('the inference [of momentariness] from the existence [of things]'). (These two terms were used by Frauwallner in FRAUWALLNER 1935, p. 217, and attested by Mimaki in the works of Kaṇṇakagomin and Ratnakīrti (MIMAKI 1976, p. 233, n.110).) Modern scholars agree that *sattvānumāna* was established by Dharmakīrti in his *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (cf. STEINKELLNER 1968–69, YOSHIMIZU 1999, p. 231, n.4); it was already attributed to him by Arcāṭa in his commentary to the *Hetubindu* (quoted in MIMAKI 1976, pp. 235f, n.114).

In order to prove that existence and momentariness are invariably concomitant properties, Dharmakīrti uses the so-called *sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa*, 'a means of valid cognition which refutes the [possibility of the] opposite of the property to be proven [co-occurring with the proving property, i.e. the logical reason (*hetu*)]' (cf. YOSHIMIZU 1999, pp. 233f.), that is he proves that whatever is not momentary cannot really exist. Cf. *Hetubindu* p. 4*, 6f.: *yat sat tat kṣaṇikam eva, akṣaṇikatve 'rthakriyāvirodhāt tallakṣaṇaṃ vastutvaṃ hīyate* | 'Whatever is existent must be momentary. If it were not momentary, because [non-momentariness] contradicts causal efficacy, it would be deprived of the condition of being a real thing, which [=since this condition] has that [i.e. causal efficacy] as its defining mark.' More explicitly in *Hetubindu* p. 19*, 10–13: *śaktir hi bhāvalakṣaṇam, sarvaśaktiviraho 'bhāvalakṣaṇam| na cākṣaṇikasya kvacid kācic chaktiḥ, kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvīrahāt| tasmād yat sat tat kṣaṇikam eveti vyāptisiddhiḥ* | 'For capacity is the defining mark of an entity, [and] the absence of all capacity is the defining mark of a non-entity. And a non-momentary thing does not have any capacity with regard to anything, since [such a thing does] not [have] causal efficacy either gradually, or simultaneously. Therefore the invariable concomitance, namely "whatever exists is momentary", is established.' *Pramāṇaviniścaya* II p. 29*, 15–24 spells out the two alternatives of *krama* and *yaugapadya* (tr. of the Tibetan text in STEINKELLNER 1979, p. 93: 'Dieses Nichtaugenblickliche ist (nämlich) nicht imstande, einen Zweck zu erfüllen (**arthakriyā*), weil sowohl bei Allmählichkeit (**krama*) als auch bei Gleichzeitigkeit (**yaugapadya*) [seines Wirkens] ein Widerspruch besteht. Es ist (zunächst) nicht (imstande), allmählich (**kramaṇa*) (einen Zweck zu erfüllen), weil bei einem (Ding), wenn es (von Mitursachen) unabhängig bloß durch sein Vorhandensein Wirkendes ist, eine Verzögerung (**kṣepa*) (seines Wirkens) nicht am Platz ist. Ein (Ding), das früher nicht Wirkendes ist, könnte es nämlich auch später nicht sein, weil (sein) Wesen nicht veränderlich ist (**avikāra*). Wenn es aber (von Mitursachen) abhängt, (so) haben wir (diesen Fall schon oben) besprochen. (note 336: Der Verweis bezieht sich auf die obige Wiederlegung der Möglichkeit, daß die ewigen vedischen Wörter von Mitursachen abhängen könnten (18,24ff).) Es ist auch nicht gleichzeitig (**yaugapadyena*) wirkend, weil sein (in der einen Phase gegebenes, fähiges) Wesen auch später nicht nichtwirkend sein kann. Daher hat dieses jedweder Fähigkeit bare (Ding) das Merkmal eines Seienden überschritten.').

As Yoshimizu pointed out (pp. 237f, 246ff), in *Pramāṇavārttika*, *svārthānumāna* Dharmakīrti refutes the causal efficacy of permanent things in the larger context of establishing the non-eternity of Vedic words (cf. *Pramāṇavārti-*

ka with *svavṛtti* (GNOLI) p. 131, vv. 251–252 and comm., p. 113,20ff., 116,15ff., p. 130,3ff., p. 131,7ff.) which is a serious challenge for all *mīmāṃsakas*. Cf. also *Tattvasaṅgraha* 385–427, and Dharmottara's *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* (FRAUWALLNER 1935), p. 242, 256.

¹⁴Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika with svavṛtti* (GNOLI) p. 84, v. 166ab: *sa pāramārthiko bhāvo ya evārthakriyākṣamaḥ*;

Pramāṇavārttika, pratyakṣam 3ab: *arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārthasat*;

Pramāṇavārttika, pramāṇasiddhi 3: *pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam, arthakriyāsthitiḥ| avisamvādanam. . .*;

Hetubindu p. 19*,10–13: *śaktir hi bhāvalakṣaṇam, sarvaśaktiviraho 'bhāvalakṣaṇam*;

On the meaning of the term 'arthakriyā' see M. Nagatomi, 'Arthakriyā' in *Adyar Library Bulletin* 31–31, 1967–68, pp. 52–72.

¹⁵ In the following verses the Monk puts forward *vināśitvānumāna* ('the inference [of momentariness] from the perishing nature [of things]'). As an example of this argument we can quote the *Tattvasaṅgraha* (353–355):

tatra ye kṛtakā bhāvās te sarve kṣaṇabhaṅginah|
vināśam prati sarveṣām anapekṣatayā sthiteḥ||
yadbhāvaṃ prati yan naiva hetvantaram apekṣate|
tat tatra niyataṃ jñeyam svahetubhyas tathodayāt||
nirribandhā hi sāmagrī svakāryotpādane yathā|
vināśam prati sarve 'pi nirapekṣās ca janminah||

'Among those [entities] the ones which are made are all momentary, since none of them depends on [any other external cause] with regard to its perishing. If A does not depend at all on another cause to be B, then A must be regarded as necessarily [being] B, since it arises as such due to its own causes. For just as the aggregate [of causal factors] does not require any other cause to produce its effect, [in the same way] all things that have once arisen do not require [any other external cause] with regard to their perishing.'

We find a similar argument already in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (p. 193): *ākasmiko hi bhāvānām vināśah| kiṃkāraṇam? kāryasya hi kāraṇam bhavati, vināśas cābhāvaḥ| yaś cābhāvas tasya kiṃ kartavyam? so 'sāv ākasmiko vināśo yadi bhāvasyotpannamātrasya na syāt paścād api na syād bhāvasya tulyatvād|* 'For the perishing of things is spontaneous. Why? Because an effect has a cause, but perishing is non-existence. And what can be done with something that is non-existence? If a thing did not perish spontaneously as soon as it had arisen, it would not perish later either, since the thing would be the same [later as it was before, when it did not perish].'

If one postulated a cause for perishing, such a cause would not be able to achieve anything. As we read in the *Pañjikā* (ad *Tattvasaṅgraha* 383–384): *bhāvaḥ svahetor utpadyamānaḥ kadācit prakṛtyā svayaṃ naśvarātmaivotpadyate, anaśvarātmā vā| yadi naśvaras tasya na kiṃcid vināśahetunā, svayaṃ tatsva-bhāvatayaiva nāśāt| (. . .) athānaśvarātmēti pakṣas tadāpi nāśahetur akiṃcitkara*

eva| tasya kenacit svabhāvānyathābhāvasya kartum aśakyatvāt| tathā hi, yadi svabhāva utpādānantaraṃ na vinaśyet, tadā paścād api sa eva sthītidharmā svabhāvas tadavastha iti kiṃ nāśahetunā tasya kṛtaṃ yena vinaśyet? ‘When an entity is arising due to its own cause, is it perhaps produced as perishable by itself, or as not perishable? If it [arises as] perishable [by nature], then no cause of destruction could do anything to it, since it perishes by itself because it has that [i.e. perishing] as its inherent nature. (...) If [one holds] the [other] position, namely that [the entity arises] with a nature which is not perishable [by itself], in that case, too, the cause of destruction could not do anything, since nothing can make it [i.e. the entity] to have a nature other than its own inherent nature. To explain, if the inherent nature [of the entity] did not perish immediately after its coming into being, then later, too, the same inherent nature, whose characteristic is stability, would be in the same state, so what can be done to it by the cause of destruction so that it may be destroyed?’

Dharmakīrti also employed *vināśitvānumāna* in his works (see *Pramāṇavārtika with svavṛtti* (GNOLI) p. 98,4–100,24; *ibid.* p. 141,17–150,5; *Pramāṇaviniścaya* II pp. 26*–32* (together with *sattvānumāna*); *Hetubindu* pp. 7*–19* (together with *sattvānumāna*). See also Steinkellner’s analysis in STEINKELLNER 1968–69.) He also pointed out that if a pot had to wait for a hammer to be destroyed it might wait for eternity (*Pramāṇavārtika with svavṛtti* (GNOLI) 98,14–17, cf. *Pramāṇaviniścaya* II p. 27*): *yady api bahulaṃ vināśakāraṇāni santi, teṣāṃ api svapratyayādhīnasamnidhitvān nāvaśyaṃ samnidhānam iti kaścīn na vinaśyed api, na hy avaśyaṃ hetavaḥ phalavanto vaikalypatibandhasambhavāt|* ‘Even if there are many causes of perishing, they do not necessarily appear [together] in proximity [with the object], because they appear [together] in proximity [with the object] depending on their own causes. Therefore some thing might not even perish [at all], for causes do not necessarily have a result, because the [complex of causal factors] may be defective or an impediment might occur.’

The Buddhist concludes that things perish as soon as they have arisen, and their permanence is just an illusion. As Dharmakīrti says (*Pramāṇavārtika with svavṛtti* (GNOLI) 100,3–7): *uktaṃ cātra na vināśo nāma anya eva kaścīd bhāvāt, svabhāva eva hi nāśaḥ, sa eva hy ekakṣaṇasthāyī jāta iti| tam asya mandāḥ svabhāvam ūrdhvaṃ vyavasyanti, na prāk, darśane ’pi pātavābhāvād iti tadvaśena paścād vyavasthāpyate, vikāradarśaneneva viśam ajñaiḥ|* ‘And it has been stated with regard to this that there is no such thing called ‘perishing’, completely different from the entity, for the inherent nature itself [of that entity] is perishing, for it itself arises as existing for a single moment. The slow-witted ascertain this inherent nature of that [entity] later, not earlier, because, although they see it, [their sight] lacks sharpness. Therefore, thanks to this [imperfect vision] [the perishing nature of the entity] is ascertained later, just as ignorant people [ascertain] poison only having noticed the disease [caused by it].’

All kinds of causal relations can be explained with the help of *santāna*. Says Śāntarakṣita (*Tattvasaṅgraha* 543):

*keśāṃcid eva cittānāṃ viśiṣṭā kāryakāryitā|
niyatā tena nirbādhāḥ sarvatra smaraṇādayaḥ||*

‘The distinctive condition of being an effect or a cause is restricted only to particular cognitions [in the continuum]. For this reason remembrance and [enjoyment, recognition, etc. can take place] in all cases without any impediment.’ See also *Pramāṇavārttika, pramāṇasiddhi* 271c–272b (VETTER 1990, p. 161, v. 269):

anyasmarāṇabhogādiprasaṅgāś ca na bādhakaḥ|
asmṛteḥ kasyacit tena hy anubhūteḥ smṛtodbhavaḥ||

‘Such unwanted consequences as “someone else will remember [the thing that another person experienced]”, or “someone else will enjoy [the results of actions made by another person]” do not oppose [our position], for [there is] no ‘person’ [who] remembers. Therefore a memory arises from an experience.’

Therefore there is no need to postulate a ‘person’ as an agent (*Tattvasaṅgraha* 504):

karṭṛtvādivyavasthā tu santānaikyavivakṣayā|
kalpanāropitaiveṣṭā nāṅgaṃ sā tattvasaṃsthiteḥ||

‘But the condition of being an agent and [enjoyer, etc.] is accepted as a purely mental construction with the intention to refer to the unity of the continuum; it is not a component of the real nature of things.’ The same is pointed out by Kumāṛila’s Buddhist opponent (*Ślokaivārttika* (with *Nyāyaratnākara*) *ātmavāda* 35ab):

kartā ya eva santāno nanu bhoktā sa eva naḥ|

‘Surely, for us the same continuum [of cognitions] which is the agent [of actions that bear fruits] is also the enjoyer [of the results of these actions].’

¹⁶ One might find the compound *karṭṛbhokṭṛsmṛtyādikāryaghaṭanā* strained. As Dr. Isaacson points out in a letter of 5. xi. 2002, ‘what we expect is really *karmabhogasmṛtyādikāryaghaṭanā*, especially since he is summing up the answer to the *upāsaka*’s question: ‘*kassa kammabhoo . . . kassa sumaraṇanibamḍhaṇā hoṃti vavahārā*.’

¹⁷ *pakāsijjade* is a strange, one might even say impossible formation. In Śaurasenī one would expect something like *pakāsīadi*, while in Māhārāṣṭrī *pakāsijjai*, and in Jaina-Śaurasenī *pakāsijjadi* (see PISCHEL §535).

¹⁸ *ex conj.* *jīṇimto* or rather *jīṇamto* would suggest *jayan* as its Sanskrit equivalent (cf. PISCHEL §473), but the sense requires rather *janemto* (*janayan*).

¹⁹ *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

²⁰ The translation of the last two sentences is based on a reading that contains several tentative conjectures.

The Disciple’s question is a well-known objection against the theory of momentariness. We find it e.g. in *Tattvasaṅgraha* (490): *kṣaṇasthāyī ghaṭādiś cen nopalabhyeta cakṣuṣā| na hi naṣṭāḥ pratīyante cirātītapadārthavat||* ‘If the pot exists only for a moment then it cannot be perceived by the sense of sight, for [things] that have perished, just as things that vanished long ago, cannot be perceived.’

Dharmakīrti first establishes that the object must exist before its cognition (*Pramāṇavārttika*, *pratyakṣa* 246): *asataḥ prāg asāmarthyāt paścāc cānupayogataḥ| prāgbhāvaḥ sarvaḥetūnām nāto 'rthaḥ svadhiyā saha||* ‘Since that [thing] which does not exist before [its effect] is not capable [to produce the effect], and [that thing which exists] after [an effect] is of no use [for bringing about that effect], all causes exist before [their effects]. Therefore the object does not [exist] simultaneously with its cognition.’ Then he answers the above objection (*ibid.* v. 247, = *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I p. 60, v. 20): *bhinnakālaṃ kathaṃ grāhyam iti ced grāhyatām viduḥ| hetutvam eva yuktijñā jñānākārārpaṇakṣamam||* ‘If [the opponent objects:] “how can the object of cognition exist at a different time [from the subject]”, [then we answer that] Logicians mean by the condition of being the object nothing but the condition of being the cause which is able to imprint its form on cognition.’ It is this ‘imprint’ which is grasped by cognition and not the actual object: this is the theory of *sākāravijñāna*, ‘form-possessing cognition’. This position does not exclude the existence of an external object (accepted by the *sautrāntikas*), but it can easily be adopted by those who believe that nothing actually exists outside this multiform cognition (*vijñānavādin*s).

²¹ *ex conj.* ISAACSON. Instead of this conjecture one might consider *yadi tattvaṃ pṛcchasi* (see *Nyāyamañjarī* II 156.18).

²² *ex conj.* ISAACSON, supported by the frequency of expressions such as *nīlādi* in the same context.

²³ It is again the *Vijñānavādin* in the *Ślokavārttika* whose arguments are remarkably similar to those of the Monk in Jayanta’s play. According to Kumārila’s Buddhist opponent, we do not ascertain two separate forms: one belonging to cognition and the other to its object (*Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyaṭīkā*) *śūnyavāda* 6ab): *na cāpy ākārabhedena jñānajñeyāvadhāraṇā|*. Kumārila expounds the Mīmāṃsaka position as follows (*Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyaṭīkā*) *śūnyavāda* 10cd–12):

*ekam ākāravād vastu grāhyam ity adhyagīṣmahi||
tad yady ākāravān artho bāhyaḥ kalpyeta tasya ca|
grāhyatvam anyathā na syād iti grāhakakalpanā||
tenākāravataḥ klptād grāhyād ākāravarjitam|
vastvantaram pṛthak kalpyam (v.l. prakalpyam syād) grāhakaṃ niṣpramāṇakam||*
‘We hold that a single form-possessing thing is cognised. If that thing were postulated to be an external form-possessing object, then we should postulate a subject of cognition, since its [i.e. the external thing’s] condition of being an object of cognition would not be otherwise possible. Therefore one should postulate another thing as the subject of cognition, which would be separate from the postulated form-possessing object of cognition, [and which would also be] devoid of form, and lacking any proof [of its existence].’

After showing that it is more ‘economical’ to postulate a single, form-possessing cognition which has the aspects of both subject and object, the Buddhist advances another argument (*Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyaṭīkā*) *śūnyavāda*

21–22):

itaś cākāravaj jñānam, yasmāt tad vaḥ (v.l. tadvat) prakāśakam|
svayaṃprakāśahīnasya bāhyasyopāyasammataḥ||
na cāgrhīte jñānākhyaprakāśe (v.l. jñānākhye prakāśyo) 'rtho 'vadhāryate|
tadadhīnaprakāśatvād dīpābhāse yathā ghaṭaḥ||

(...) 31–32:

tasmāt pūrvagrhitāsu buddhiṣv arthopalmbhanam|
na copalabdhir astīha nirākārāsu buddhiṣu||
vivekabuddhyabhāvāc ca sākārasya ca darśanāt|
ākāravattayā (v.l. sākāravattayā) bodho jñānasyaiva prasajyate||

‘Cognition is form-possessing for the following reason as well: since you [also] accept that it [i.e. cognition], being an illuminator, is a means of [illuminating] the external object, which is not luminous by itself. But if the light called ‘cognition’ is not grasped, the object will not be ascertained, since its illumination depends on that [cognition], just as a pot [is cognised] after the shining forth of the light. (...) Therefore objects are apprehended after [their] cognitions have been grasped. And no apprehension is possible in this case if the cognitions are formless. Since we do not cognise any distinctness [i.e. two distinct forms], and since we see something which has form, it follows that it is cognition alone which is apprehended as the form-possessing entity.’

²⁴ Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya*(F) p. 28,14–16 (*bauddhapakṣa*): *arthajñānayoḥ ākārabhedam nopalabhāmahe| pratyakṣā ca no buddhiḥ| atas tadbhinnam artharūpaṃ nāma na kiṃcid astīti paśyāmaḥ|* ‘We do not perceive [two] separate forms: one belonging to the object and the other to the cognition. On the other hand, cognition is directly perceptible for us. Therefore we realise that there is no object-form separate from that.’

²⁵ Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya*(F) p. 28,20–30,1: *utpadyamānāivāsau jñāyate jñāpayati cārthāntaram pradīpavad itī yady ucyeta, tan na.* ‘If [the Buddhist] were to say that [cognition], precisely when it is coming about, is cognised and makes the object cognised, similarly to a lamp, then [our answer would be that] this is wrong.’

See also *Nyāyamañjarī* II 490.10 (\simeq *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I p. 96, v. 55cd): *apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadrṣṭiḥ prasiddhyati|* ‘For [a cognition] whose perceiving is [itself] not [directly] perceived, cannot cognise the object.’

Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya*(F) p. 30,3–5 (*bauddhapakṣa*): *nanu utpannāyām eva buddhāv artho 'jñāta' ity ucyate, nānutpannāyām| ataḥ pūrvam buddhir utpadyate, paścāj jñāto 'rthaḥ|* ‘Surely the object is said to be ‘known’ only after the cognition has arisen, [but] not when it has not yet arisen. Therefore first the cognition arises, and after that the object is cognised.’

²⁶ Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī* II 495.15–16 (\simeq *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I p. 86, v. 38; cf. *Pramāṇavārttika*, *pratyakṣa* 327):

nānyo 'nubhāvyo buddhyāsti tasyā nānubhavo 'paraḥ|
grāhyagrāhakavaidhuryāt svayaṃ saiva prakāśate||

‘There is nothing else [than cognition itself] to be ascertained by cognition. [On the other hand] it [i.e. cognition] is not ascertained by another [cognition], because [in that case, too,] the object and subject of cognition [each having distinctive features] would be wanting. [Therefore] it shines forth by itself [both as subject and object].’

Also *Pramāṇavārttika*, *pratyakṣa* 354 (= *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I p. 90, v. 45):

avibhāgo 'pi buddhyātmā (: reading in VETTER 1966, p. 90, n. 6, see also MIMAKI 1976, p. 288, n. 308 about other readings; the Pandeya-edition has *buddhyātma-*)
viparyāsitadarśanaiḥ

grāhyagrāhakaśaṃvittibhedavān iva lakṣyate||

‘Although the nature of cognition is undivided, those whose vision is faulty see it as being divided into object, subject, and consciousness.’

Also *Pramāṇavārttika*, *pratyakṣa* 328:

nīlādirūpas tasyāsau svabhāvo 'nubhavaś ca saḥ

nīlādyanubhavāt khyātaḥ svarūpānubhavo 'pi san||

‘Forms such as blue are its [i.e. cognitions] inherent nature, and this [nature] is ascertaining. Although it is the ascertaining of its own form, still, because forms such as blue are ascertained, it is called [‘the cognition of blue’ etc.]’

²⁷ The word *piśuna* also means ‘betraying, treacherous’, or as a noun, ‘informant’.

²⁸ ‘Delicious meals served in the *vihāra*’ were one of the main attractions of Buddhism according to satirical literature. In the *Bhagavadajjukīya* (probably the oldest Sanskrit comedy still extant), Śāṅḍilya, the pupil who pokes his nose into everything, relates how he tried out various religions just to find out where he could eat his fill. Buddhism seemed to be promising in this respect because monks get breakfast every morning, but Śāṅḍilya realised soon that he could not appease his hunger in the *vihāra*, because ‘these sons of slaves eat only once a day’ (*Bhagavadajjukīya*, p. 8). The commentary, which gives a philosophical / allegorical interpretation of the whole *prahasana*, takes the expression *dāsyāḥ putrāḥ* as referring to the unacceptable tenets of the Buddhists like *vedāpramāṇya*, *nairātmya*, etc., and *ekakālabhaktatva* as referring to *kṣaṇikatva* (ibid. p. 13).

Buddhism, as we are often told, equals *dolce far niente*, but is it possible to stop on a slope as slippery as this? The satirist’s answer is clear: when human weakness has once tasted pleasures, it asks for more. The Buddhist monk in king Mahendravarman’s comedy, the *Mattavilāsa*, first praises the wise solicitude of *buddhaśāsana*, which teaches living in palace-like buildings, sleeping in well-made beds, enjoying brunch in the morning, tasty juices in the afternoon, *pān* of the finest quality, and dressing in soft clothes (*Mattavilāsaprahasana*, p. 12: *bhoḥ paramakāruṇieṇa bhaavadā tahāgaeṇa pāsādesu vāso, suvīhīyasayyesu pajjañkesu saṇaṃ, puvaṇhe bhoṇaṃ, avaraṇhe surasāṇi pāṇaāṇi, pañca-sugandhovahīaṃ* (em. Shastri, also supported by the mss. used by Unni in his edition (*Mattavilāsa Prahasana* of Mahendravarman, ed. and tr. by Dr. N.P. Unni, Trivandrum, 1974, p.49.)) *tambollam, saṇhavasana-paridhāṇaṃ*

ti edehi uvadesehi bhikkhusaṅghassa aṇuggahaṃ karanteṇa...). But if the Lord is so provident, and especially if he is omniscient (that is, omniscient in the matters of both *mokṣa* and *sukha*), why has he omitted booze and women from his Teaching? (Ibid.: ... *kiṇṇu hu itthiāpariggaho surāvānavihāṇaṃ ca ṇa ditṭhaṃ? ahava kahaṃ savvajño edaṃ ṇa pekkhadi?*) Or is it possible that something went wrong in the course of the transmission of the text? Or rather the surly old monks envy the younger brethren these pleasures? As a conclusion the *bhikṣu* draws up a programme, which reminds us of contemporary debates about the original teaching of the Buddha (and even the efforts of modern philologists to find their own ideas reflected in ancient texts): ‘Let’s find the *codex archetypus* and let’s prepare a complete critical edition!’ (Ibid.: *kahiṃ ṇu hu avinattḥamūlapāṭhaṃ samāsādaeaṃ.*)

²⁹ Cf. *Manu-smṛti* 4.35–36.

³⁰ According to PISCHEL (§266), *iha* is a false form in Śaurasenī, although Hemacandra (4.268) permits it beside *idha*.

³¹ The Mīmāṃsaka’s career starts as a glorious campaign against heretics, but by the fourth act it will prove to be a complete failure for the representatives of Vedic orthodoxy (verse 1): *sarva eva hi yathāsthītā ime snātakasya dhig apārthakaṃ śrutam* [OFFICIANT.] ‘For all of these [heretic sects] have remained as they were. Shame on the useless learning of the Graduate!’

³² The Mīmāṃsaka looks upon the Buddha as simply the mortal son of a human king; cf. *Nyāyamañjarī* I 644.8: *nanu buddhaḥ śuddhodanasya rājño ’patyam, sa katham īśvaro bhavet?*

³³ The following description of a gorgeous Buddhist monastery might seem exaggerated, but we know from Kālhaṇa that several Kashmirian *vihāras* were very rich indeed owing to generous donations, e.g. the Rājavihāra, the foundation of Lalitāditya (*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 4.200), who also presented a glorious copper statue of the ‘Great Buddha’ (ibid. 4.203); his minister Caṅkuṇa also supported the building of a *vihāra* and a *stūpa*, and had golden Buddha-images made as well (ibid. 4.211). Another telling example is the beginning of the last chapter of Kṣemendra’s *Avadānakalpalatā*, which was actually written by his son, Somendra (*Avadānakalpalatā*, 108: *Jimūtavāhanāvadāna*). In the first verse Somendra muses upon the beautiful paintings depicting the Buddha’s glorious deeds. These paintings used to decorate ‘cavities (cells?, niches?) shining with gold’ (*kanakacitraguhāgrheṣu*) in a courtyard belonging to the Great Vihāra (*uruvihāra*). But in the following stanza Somendra tells us that his father composed the *Avadānakalpalatā* as a kind of substitute for these pictures, ‘lest mankind be agitated because of their loss’ (*mā bhūt tadvirahākulaṃ jagad iti*). The treasures of the Buddhist monasteries often aroused the interest of Kashmirian kings, who plundered and sometimes, just for good measure, even burnt down some of the *vihāras*. These atrocities became more frequent from the end of the 10th century according to the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*, e.g. in the reign of Kṣemagupta (6.171

seqq.), and especially that of king Harṣa (7.1097 seqq.). King Śaṅkaravarman, whom Jayanta served as an advisor (*amātya*), often resorted to confiscations in order to fill his treasury (*Rājataranṅiṇī* 5.165 seqq.), and *vihāras* like the one described by the *snātaka* and his pupil could easily become a choice morsel for the king. On the other hand, the high taxes introduced during his reign were probably very effective in holding back the rich from further donations.

³⁴As Dr ISAACSON pointed out to me, Vallabhadeva glosses *kuśavanti* in his commentary ad *Raghuvamśa* 14.28 as *sādvalacitāni*. The description suggests a place that is ideal for assignations.

³⁵This verse (very appropriate from the mouth of a Vedic graduate) must have brought to the audience's mind the well-known description of the Cosmic Tree (*Rgveda* 1.24.7, *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 6.1, *Bhagavadgītā* 15.1 seqq.), and the other famous Vedic image of the two birds nestling on the same tree (*Rgveda* 1.164.20, *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 3.1 seqq.).

³⁶*maūa* is a Māhārāṣṭrī form, Śaurasenī has *miu* for Sanskrit *mṛdu* (PISCHEL §52).

³⁷'Commendable' in an ironical sense. Or, as Dr Isaacson suggests in a letter of 5. xi. 2002, 'it might be possible to interpret the idea as being that the rich people are actually trying to follow a praiseworthy path, not that of Buddhism, but that of religion *überhaupt*, or of charity, donating to the religious. But despite this commendable intention they are led astray by the Buddhist *viṭas*.'

One might also consider emending the text to *vandhye*, 'fruitless'; cf. verse 25a where we have almost certainly a corruption in the manuscripts: °*vandyātmanah* for °*vandhyātmanah*. As Prof. Sanderson has pointed out to me, confusing unaspirated and aspirated voiced consonants is a common error of the Kashmirian manuscript transmission.

³⁸On the use of the particle *kila* at the head of a sentence, see GOODALL 1998, p. 169, n. 26, mentioning other occurrences, e.g. *Nyāyamañjarī* I 631.16–17: *kila dvividho vedaḥ śrūyamāṇaḥ anumāyamaṇāś ca* |.

³⁹On *samādhībhāvanā* see *Abhidharmakośa* 8.27 and *bhāṣya ad loc.* (ed. Pradhan, p. 451).

⁴⁰According to PISCHEL (§143, §336, see also Vararuci 12.24, Puruṣottama 9,29), '*via* is the single prevailing form in Śaurasenī and Māgadhī' for Sanskrit *iva*, while Māhārāṣṭrī, Ardhamāgadhī, and Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī have *va*, *vva* (PISCHEL §92, §143). In Hemacandra's grammar we find the following general rule (2,182): *miva piva viva vva va via ivārthe vā* |

⁴¹Brahmanical invective against Buddhism insinuates that as soon as Buddhist monks think they are out of the range of the pious Addbrahmins' severe sight, they fling themselves wholeheartedly into pleasures. Public censure is the only retarding force: the *bhikṣu* in the *Mattavilāsaprahasana* (who has already ex-

pressed his will to reform Buddhism in order to include more pleasure) is afraid to drink booze because ‘many people / great, exemplary people will see’, *mahājaṇo pekkhissadi* (p. 16).

⁴² The following denigrating description of life in a Buddhist monastery has many parallels in Sanskrit literature. A popular anonymous quatrain gives a kind of distillate of the stereotypical insinuations (‘heavy drinking, overeating, casual sex with ill-reputed women’) directed against Buddhist monks:

*bhikṣo kanthā ślathā te nanu śapharavadhe jālikaiṣātsi matsyāṃs
te ’mī madyāvadaṃśāḥ pibasi madhu samaṃ veśyayā yāsi veśyāṃ|
dattvārīṇāṃ gale ’ṅghriṃ kimu tava ripavo bhittibhettāsmi yeṣāṃ
cauras tvam dyūtahetoḥ katham asi kitavo yena dāsīsuto ’smi||*

‘Monk, your rags are loose!’ ‘Surely it serves as a net for killing carp.’ ‘You eat fish?’ ‘It is a side-dish to go along with wine.’ ‘You drink wine?’ ‘Together with whores.’ ‘You go to whores?’ ‘After putting my foot on the throat of my enemies.’ ‘You have foes?’ ‘Those in whose wall I’ve made a breach.’ ‘You are a burglar?’ ‘Because of gambling.’ ‘What? You are a gamester?’ ‘Since I am the son of a servant-maid!’

We find this verse in two Kashmirian texts, and in Haribhadrasūri’s *vṛtti* to the *Dasaveyāliya-sutta* (8th century). This latter commentary by a Jain author enframes the poem in a story about a false ascetic (see BOLLÉE 1974:39, n. 65. Unfortunately the text was not at my disposal.). The *Lokaparakāśa*, which was attributed to the Kashmirian polygraph Kṣemendra, but which is rather a ‘guide book for everyday transactions for people during the 17th century in Kashmir’ (*Lokaparakāśa*, p.1), places the stanza at the end of a section listing various kinds of rascals (ibid. p.57). An earlier Kashmirian text in which we find this verse denouncing a certain monk is the *hāsya*-section of Vallabhadeva’s *Subhāṣitāvali* (No. 2402, I was quoting the quatrain according to this source).

The hero of the poem declares, somewhat proudly, or at least as if speaking about the most natural way of life, that he has actually broken all the fundamental moral precepts (*pañcaśīlāni*; since he is a gambler, we can be quite sure that he often cheats and lies as well) that are compulsory even for *upāsakas*, not to speak of *bhikṣus*. And the way this ‘confession’ blossoms out is also very Buddhistic: the necessary concatenation of ‘meat—wine—sex—poker—villainy’ forms a mock-causal sequence parodying one of the pillars of Buddhist philosophy: the *pratītya-samutpāda* (as Siegel has already observed in SIEGEL 1989:211). Just as we arrive at *avidyā* as the ‘basic root’ of all other *nidānas*, in the same way, after peeling off the outer layers to get to the kernel, our *bhikṣu* finally announces the fundamental cause of all his vices: ‘I am the son of a slave’. The audience (naturally anti-Buddhist, and accepting the orthodox Brahmanical values such as *cāturvarṇya*) laughs at the *bhikṣu*: ‘Of course he is a rogue, what else can you expect from a lowborn?’ And what else could you expect from a religion that admits such lowborn rascals?

⁴³ *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

⁴⁴ It is the same ‘lack of restraint’ which horrifies the son of a Buddhist merchant in a story of the Kashmirian Somadeva’s *Kathāsaritsāgara*. The son despises his father and calls him ‘criminal’ (*pāpa*) for short, and when his father asks him why, the son launches an invective which is a typical example of orthodox Brahmanical aversion towards Buddhism (*Kathāsaritsāgara*, 6.1.18–20):

tāta, tyaktatrayīdharmas tvam adharmam niṣevase|
yad brāhmaṇān parityajya śramaṇān śaśvad arcasi||
snānādiyantraṇāhīnāḥ svakālāśanalolupāḥ|
apāstasaśikhāśeṣakeśakaupīnasusthitāḥ||
vihārāspadalobhāya sarve ’py adhamajātayaḥ|
yam āśrayanti kiṃ tena saugatena nayena te?||

‘My father, in that you disregard the *brāhmaṇas* and always honour Buddhist mendicants, you have abandoned the religion of the three Vedas and follow anti-religion. What has that doctrine of Sugata got to do with you, to which all kinds of low-caste men attach themselves, in order to fulfil their desire to live in a *vihāra* (or: in a place of pleasure), men who are devoid of restraints like bathing and the rest, who long to eat whenever they please, who feel content having discarded their loin-cloth and all their hair including the lock of hair [on the crown of the head]?’

Brahmanical criticism accused Buddhists of denying caste distinctions only to justify their illicit relations with low-caste women. The Jain mendicant in the *Latakamelaka*, a *prahasana* from the 11th century, tries to keep away from the *bhikṣu* who is ‘polluted by the touch of people belonging to improper castes’ (*asadisaḥjādīphamśadūsido*, p. 25). ‘O, you fool, there is no caste at all!’ replies the *bhikṣu*, so how could his favourite washerwoman sweetheart pollute him, especially if there is no permanent Self?

⁴⁵ *thora* is Māhārāṣṭrī for Sanskrit *sthūla*, in Śaurasenī one would expect *thūla* (PISCHEL §127).

⁴⁶ One might consider accepting the reading of the manuscripts (*pakvarasaśabdanihnuta-madyavyapadeśam*, ‘which is concealed behind the word “fruit-juice”, [but] the [real] name of which is booze’.

Satire insinuates not just that Buddhist monks run after women and drink wine, but also (what is even worse) that they pretend the opposite. Hypocrisy is one of the most important targets of satire, and especially that of the Sanskrit satirical monologue, the *bhāṇa*. When the *viṭa* in the *Padmaprābhṛtaka* notices a *bhikṣu* hurrying out of the courtyard of a courtesan, it is not Buddhism that he attacks in the first place, but the depraved behaviour of the monk: ‘O, how excellent is the Buddha’s teaching, which is being honoured day by day, even if such false, uselessly shaved monks spoil it! Or rather, the water of a sacred place is not spoiled because crows have drunk from it.’ (*Padmaprābhṛtaka*, p. 36 (23.5ff.): *aho sārīṣṭhatā buddhaśāsanasya, yad evaṃvidhair api vṛthāmuṇḍair asadbhikṣubhir upahanyamānaṃ pratyaham abhipūjyata eva. athavā na vāyasocchiṣṭaṃ tīrthajalam upahataṃ bhavati*. Although we might suspect a slight irony in the background, the real target here is the individual, and not reli-

gion as such.) The monk perceives him and tries to beat it, but the *viṭa* does not want to miss his chance: ‘He will not get off unhurt from the range of my word-arrows!’ (Ibid. 23.10: *mama vāksaragocarād akṣato na yāsyati.*) So he addresses the *bhikṣu*: ‘Hey, monastery-zombie, where are you going now, alarmed like an owl by daylight?’ (Ibid. 23.13: *aho vihāravetāla kvedānīm ulūka iva divā śāṅkitaś carasi?*) The monk gives the worst possible answer: ‘I am just coming from the *vihāra*.’ (Ibid. 23.14: *sāṃpratam vihārād āgacchāmīti.*) This is just fuel to the *viṭa*’s fire: ‘I know that your reverence’s frequenting the monastery (or: your addiction to pleasures, *vihārasīlatā*) is genuine!’ (Ibid. 23.15: *bhūtārtham jāne vihārasīlatām bhadantasya!*) The *bhikṣu* is still in denial: ‘I have come to comfort with the Buddha’s words Saṅghadāsikā, who is afflicted by the death of her mother.’ (Ibid. 23.18–19: *mātrvyāpattiduhkhitām saṅghadāsikām buddhavacanaiḥ paryavasthāpayitum āgato ’smīti.* Cf. SIEGEL (1989:212–213): ‘It is insinuatingly ambiguous as to just what “to comfort” means, just as it is ambiguous as to just how the girl “serves” the brotherhood. The equivocality between the incongruous spheres of experience, the religious and the erotic, creates the comic tension.’) ‘A monk who enters the courtyard of a courtesan, either out of [a moment of] delusion or even by accident, is of no account, like the OM used in the *sūtras* of Dattaka,’ (ibid. 24: *veśyāṅgaṇam praviṣṭo mohād bhikṣur yadṛcchayā vāpi| na bhrājate prayukto dattakasūtreṣv ivomkārah||*) remarks the *viṭa* with an edge. But the *bhikṣu* still shields himself with the Buddha’s teaching: ‘Forgive me, sir, but surely one should be kindly disposed towards all beings.’ (Ibid. 24.1: *maṛṣayatu bhavān nanu sarvasattveṣu prasannacittena bhavitavyam iti.*) Finally the *viṭa* becomes tired of such a great hypocrisy, especially when the monk tries to escape under the well-known pretext that he must not miss breakfast-time, because ‘one should also avoid eating at the inappropriate time’ (ibid. p.37 (24.8): *gacchāmy aham akālabhojanam api parihāryam iti.*). ‘Ha, ha! That crowns all!’ explodes the *viṭa*. ‘That’s all that was wanting: the meal-time of this monk is running out, although he has never transgressed the five precepts! Beat it!’ (Ibid. 24.9: *hī hī sarvaṃ kṛtam. etad avaśiṣṭam askhalitapañcaśikṣāpadasya bhikṣoḥ kālabhojanam atikrāmati. dhvaṃsasva.*) And the *bhikṣu* dashes off, perhaps with a sigh of relief.

⁴⁷See L. SCHMITHAUSEN, ‘Essen, ohne zu Töten. Zur Frage von Fleischverzehr und Vegetarismus im Buddhismus’ (in *Die Religionen und das Essen*, ed. Perry Schmidt-Leukel, Kreuzlingen: Hugendubel Verlag, 2000), pp. 151f.: ‘Das Tier ist also nicht eigens für den Buddha geschlachtet worden. Dies (und nicht der Kauf oder die Zubereitung) ist für den Buddha (bzw. die Redaktoren des Vinaya) das Entscheidende, und in diesem Sinne ist auch die abschließend formulierte Regel zu verstehen, der zufolge die Mönche Fleisch unter der Bedingung annehmen dürfen (oder sogar müssen?), daß es dreifach rein (*tikoṭi-parisuddha*) ist. Diese Bedingung ist erfüllt, wenn sie weder gesehen noch gehört haben, daß das Tier eigens für sie geschlachtet worden ist, noch auch einen begründeten Verdacht in diese Richtung hegen. Mit dieser Regel ist, nach Auffassung des Vinaya, der Mönch in den Augen der Gesellschaft (darum geht es hier!) ausreichend vor

Vorwürfen geschützt.' For further details about the 'three conditions' (*dr̥ṣṭam*, *śrutam*, *pariśaṅkitam*) see also Chandra Shekhar PRASAD, 'Meat-Eating and the Rule of Tikoti-parisuddha' in *Studies in Pali and Buddhism. A Memorial Volume in Honor of Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap*, ed. A. K. Narain, Delhi, 1979, pp. 289–295.

⁴⁸ The following two verses are in *Māhārāṣṭrī*.

⁴⁹ The faces of the maidservants corresponding to the beverage and their blue eyes to the water-lily (this interpretation was suggested by Dr. Benson).

⁵⁰ *ex conj.* The word *te* in this sentence looks superfluous, and can be explained by dittography.

⁵¹ *ex conj.* The Monk will clearly protest against the use of the genitive case.

⁵² The grammatical rule in question is *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.4.29: *ākhyātopayoge*. Patañjali's examples for the use of *śru-* with the genitive case-ending are (*Mahābhāṣya* ad loc.): *naṭasya śṛṇoti*, *granthikasya śṛṇoti* |

⁵³ *ex conj.* SANDERSON. Adding a word with a similar meaning to the sentence seems to be necessary.

⁵⁴ *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

⁵⁵ *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

⁵⁶ Jayanta remarks in the *Nyāyamañjarī* that animal sacrifices prescribed in the Veda often deter the tender-hearted who may say, 'What would impiety be [in a scripture] in which slaughtering living beings is a meritorious duty?' (*Nyāyamañjarī* I 642.11–12: *yatra prāṇivadho dharmas tvadharmah tatra kīdr̥śah?*)

⁵⁷ I supply again *vacaḥ* and take *kathāḍambaram* as a *bahuvrīhi*. Otherwise °*ḍambaram* (neuter) does not seem to be in the right gender; on the other hand, its emendation means that we have to emend *heyam* and °*prāyam* as well.

⁵⁸ Jayanta recommends the use of *vāda* in the *Nyāyamañjarī* as follows (*Nyāyamañjarī* I 27.1–3): *vāde tu vicāryamāṇo nyāyah saṁśayacchedanenādhyavasi-tāvabodham adhyavasitābhyanujñāṁ ca vidadhat tattvapariśuddhim ādadhātīti vītarāgaiḥ śiṣyasabrahmacāribhis saha vādaḥ prayoktavyaḥ* | 'In a discussion, however, the way of argumentation, inasmuch as it is examined, produces the realisation of what has been determined and the consensus in what has been determined through removing the uncertainties, and thus it brings about the faultless ascertainment of reality. On these grounds the wise who have subdued their passions should enter into discussion with their disciples and with their fellow-scholars.' But on certain occasions other kinds of debate may prove to be more useful (ibid. 4–6): *jalpavitaṇḍe tu duṣṭatārkikoparacitakapaṭadūṣaṇāḍambarsantrāsyamānasaralamatisamāśvāsanena taddhṛdayasthatattvajñānasamrakṣaṇā*

ya kvacid avasare vītarāgasyāpy upayujyete | ‘On some occasions, however, even the wise who have subdued their passions may find it suitable to use wrangling dispute and destructive criticism in order to protect the knowledge of reality which exists in the heart of the tender-minded, through fortifying them when they are frightened by the noisy arrogance of deceitful objections concocted by a vicious logician.’

⁵⁹ The Graduate’s objection asserts that the Buddhist *sattvānumāna* is not valid because of the fault of *asādhāraṇānaikāntikatā*, ‘the impossibility of drawing a conclusion due to exclusiveness [of the logical reason]’. The classical example of this fallacy is the fifth syllogism in Dinnāga’s *hetucakra: śabdo nityaḥ śrāvaṇatvāt* | ‘Sound is eternal because of its audibility.’ The problem with this syllogism is that the *hetu* (logical reason or middle term: ‘audibility’) belongs exclusively to the *pakṣa* (subject or minor term: ‘sound’), and therefore it is impossible to produce an example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) which is different from the *pakṣa*. In the case of *sattvānumāna* (‘everything is momentary because of its existence’), we face a similar problem, since all existing things are part of the *pakṣa*, and nothing else is left to serve as a similar instance (*sapakṣa*). On the other hand, the Buddhist cannot show a counterexample (*vipakṣa*) either, the thing which does not possess the *hetu* being non-existent in this case. (Compare with the standard Indian example of syllogism: ‘this mountain is fire-possessing, because it is smoke-possessing, like a kitchen (*sapakṣa*), unlike a pond (*vipakṣa*).’) Cf. MIMAKI 1976, pp. 46ff.

⁶⁰ The second half of verse 25 clearly contains Buddhist arguments, which are based on accepting *vyatirekavyāpti*, therefore Prof. Sanderson’s conjecture seems to be justified.

⁶¹ This means that it is possible to show the concomitance of *sattva* and *kṣaṇikatva* in the following way: ‘something that is not momentary, does not exist’.

⁶² The Monk replies to the Graduate’s objection by putting forward the *sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa*, ‘a means of valid cognition which refutes the [possibility of the] opposite of the property to be proven [co-occurring with the proving property, i.e. the logical reason (*hetu*)]’. In the case of *sattvānumāna*, this means to establish that the assertion ‘something that is not momentary, exists’ is not valid. Dharmakīrti formulates the argument in the following way (*Hetubindu* p. 4*,3–7): *anvayaniścayo ’pi svabhāvahetau sādhyadharmasya vastutas tadbhāvatayā sādhanadharmabhāvamātrānubandhasiddhiḥ* | *sā sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakapramāṇavṛttiḥ* | *yathā yat sat tat kṣaṇikam eva, akṣaṇikatve ’rthakriyāvirodhāt tallakṣaṇam vastutvam hīyate* | ‘As for the determination of the positive concomitance in the case of the inherent nature being the logical reason, it is proving that the [presence of the] property to be established is connected with the mere presence of the proving property, because [the property to be established] is in reality the inherent nature of that [thing which possesses the proving property]. This [proving] is the operation of a valid cognition which

refutes [the co-presence of] the logical reason in the case of the opposite of the property to be established. For instance: Anything that exists is momentary without exception. If it were not momentary, since [the condition of being non-momentary] contradicts causal efficacy, it would lack the condition of being an entity, which [condition] is characterised by that [causal efficacy].’ (Cf. YOSHIMIZU 1999, p. 234.)

⁶³ See note 20. Kumāṛila highlights the same problem when he claims that the theory of *vāsanās* is incompatible with the postulated momentariness of cognitions (*Ślokaṅkārttika* (with *Tātparyatīkā*) *nirālambanavāda* 181cd–185ab):
kṣaṇikeṣu ca citteṣu vināśe ca niranvaye||
vāsyavāśakayoś caivam asāhityān na vāsanā
pūrvakṣaṇair anutpanno vāsyate nottaraḥ kṣaṇaḥ||
uttareṇa vinaṣṭatvān na ca pūrvasya vāsanā
sāhitye ca (v.l. 'pi) tayoṛ naiva sambandho 'stīty avāsanā||
kṣaṇikatvād dvayasyāpi vyāpāro na parasparam
vinaśyac ca katham vastu vāsyate 'nyena naśyatā||
avasthitā hi vāsyante bhāvā bhāvair avasthitaiḥ

‘Since cognitions are momentary and since they perish without a trace, and since the one that receives the imprint and the other that imparts it do not exist simultaneously, there can be no impression. The subsequent [cognition-]phase, which has not yet arisen, cannot be imprinted by the preceding [cognition-]phases, and the preceding [cognition-phase] cannot receive any impression from the subsequent one, since it has already perished. And even if they existed simultaneously, there could be no connection [of any of the accepted types, e.g. *saṃyoga*, *samavāya*] between them, and thus there can be no impression. Since both [cognition-phases] are momentary, they cannot operate on each other. How could something which is being destroyed be imprinted by another [thing] which is [also] being destroyed? For [only] enduring entities are imprinted by [other] enduring entities.’

⁶⁴ The same objection is sprung on Śāntaraksita (*Tattvasaṅgraha* 500):

etenaiva prakāreṇa smṛtyādīnām asambhavaḥ
ekādhikaraṇābhāvāt kṣaṇakṣayaṣu vastuṣu||

‘In the same way [as we have shown that ‘bondage’ and ‘liberation’ is interpretable only if there is a single substratum: the Self,] remembrance etc. would also be impossible if things were momentary, since there would be no single substratum.’ (As Kamalaśīla points out in his commentary, Mr. Smith would experience something and Mr. Brown would remember it.)

The Buddhist, however, maintains that causality is sufficient to ensure such operations as memory (ibid. 501–503):

atrābhidhīyate sarve (: conj., ed.: sarva-) kāryakāraṇatāsthitau
satyām avyāhatā ete sidhyanty eva (: conj., ed.: evam) nirātmasu||
yathā hi niyatā śaktir bījāder ankurādiṣu
anvayyātmanaviyoge 'pi tathāivādhyātmike sthitiḥ||
pāramparyeṇa sākṣād vā kvacit kiñcid dhi śaktimat

tataḥ karmaphalādīnām sambandha upapadyate||

‘We answer this objection as follows: if the relation between effect and cause is present, then all these [operations such as memory] are truly established, without any hinderance, [even] if things do not have a Self. For just as the capacity of seeds etc. is restricted to [bringing about] sprouts etc., even if they do not have an [enduring] essence that could be connected [with both seed and sprout], the same is true about mental [operations]. For [only] a particular thing has the capacity [to cause a particular effect] at a particular time, either indirectly or directly. That is why relations such as that of action and result are possible.’

Ibid. 509–510:

atrocyate dvitīye hi kṣaṇe kāryam prajāyate|

prathame kāraṇam jātam avinaṣṭam tadā ca tat||

kṣaṇikatvāt tu tat kāryakṣaṇakāle na vartate|

vṛttau vā viphalam kāryam nivṛttam tad yatas tadā||

‘We answer [your objections] as follows: the effect follows in the second moment. In the first [moment] the cause arises, and then [i.e. at that moment] it does not perish. But since it is momentary, it does not exist at the moment of the effect. Or if it did exist, it would be useless, since the effect has already been accomplished by then.’

Ibid. 516–517:

na hi tat kāryam ātmīyam saṃdamśeneva kāraṇam|

gṛhītvā janayaty etad yaugapadyam yato bhavet||

nāpi gādham samāliṅgya prakṛtiṃ jāyate phalam|

kāmīva dayitām (: em., ed.: dayitā) yena sakṛdbhāvas tayoḥ bhavet||

‘For this cause does not produce that effect by seizing it as if with a pair of tongs, since this would mean that [cause and effect exist] simultaneously. Nor does the effect arise embracing closely its cause as a lover [embraces] his beloved, as a result of which they would exist at the same moment.’

Ibid. 521:

ya ānantaryaniyamaḥ saivāpekṣābhidyate|

kāryodaye sadā bhāvo vyāpāraḥ kāraṇasya ca||

‘It is the necessity of immediate succession that is said to be the ‘dependence’ [of the effect on its cause]. And the ‘operation’ of the cause with respect to the arising of the effect is always its [mere] presence / existence.’

We have already seen (note 20) that according to Dharmakīrti the condition of being the object of cognition is nothing but the condition of being the *cause* which imprints its form on cognition. In the *Svavṛtti* he provides a detailed analysis (p. 149,21–150,2): *ye kadācit kvacit kenacij jñātāḥ santo na jñāyante teṣāṃ sattānubandhī nāśa iti brūmaḥ| ta eva kṛtakā anityāḥ sādhyante| na hy ayam saṃbhavo ’sti yat te jñānanāsanāsvabhāvāḥ punar anaṣṭā na janayeyur apekṣeran vā param| tajjanāsanāsvabhāvasya niṣpatteḥ| na ca teṣv anapekṣeṣu kasyacit kadācit kiṃcij jñānaṃ nivarteta| na caivaṃbhūtaṃ kiṃcid asti| sarvasya kenacid kadācid jñānāt| jñānamātrārthakriyāyām apy asāmarthyē vastv eva na syāt| tathā hi tallakṣaṇam vastv iti vakṣyāmaḥ| tasya ca vināśāvyabhicārāt sa sattānubandhī|* ‘We say that the perishing of those things which, having been

cognised sometime somewhere by somebody, are not cognised, is attached to [their] existence. It is these things that are produced [and] are proved to be impermanent. For it is not possible that those things, which have the inherent nature of producing cognition, could, while not yet destroyed, not produce [cognition], or that they would require some other [assisting factor], since [their] inherent nature, which is producing that [i.e. cognition], is complete. And, since they do not require [some assisting cause], [theoretically] no cognition would ever cease for anyone. But nothing like that [actually] takes place, for everything is cognised by some particular person at a particular time. [Therefore these cognisable entities must perish.] If [something] were incapable even to perform the action of merely [producing] cognition, then it would not even be an entity. To explain, we shall teach that an entity is characterised by that [i.e. *arthakriyākāritva*]. And since this [entity] necessarily perishes, it [i.e. perishing] is attached to existence.’ (I am following Yoshimizu’s interpretation in YOSHIMIZU 1999, p. 244f.)

In Ratnakīrti’s *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa* we find a detailed illustration of the operation of causality in the stream of consciousness (118,14 in MIMAKI 1976, p. 164): *tathā hi upādānopādeyabhāvasthitacittasantatim apy āśrityeyaṃ vyavasthā su-stheti katham ātmānaṃ pratyujjīvayatu| tatra kāryakāraṇabhāvaprātītis tāvad anākulā| tathāpi prāgbhāvivastuniścayajñānasyopādeyabhūtena tadarpitasaṃskāragarbheṇa paścādbhāvivastujñānenāsmiṃ satīdam bhavātīti niścayo janyate|* ‘To explain, the determination [of the ascertainment of causality] is also well-established resorting to the stream of consciousness which consists in the relation between the material cause and its effect, so why should one resuscitate the Self? First of all, the ascertainment of causality in that [stream] presents no problem. Still [, to go into further details,] the determination [of positive concomitance] in the form of ‘when there is A, there is B’ comes about through a cognition of an object that exists subsequently [C^B], which [cognition] is the effect (*upādeya*) of [another] determining cognition [C^A , being the material cause, *upādāna* of C^B] of an object that existed previously [A], and which [cognition, i.e. C^B] contains the impression imprinted by that [i.e. C^A].’ (I am following Mimaki’s interpretation.)

⁶⁵ *ex conj.* ISAACSON. If one follows RAGHAVAN and THAKUR’s conjecture, the second sentence requires a masculine subject, and *bhoga* is the only candidate I could think of. One might also consider conjecturing *hetuphalabhāvavaśas tu ko ’pi*.

⁶⁶ Kumārila argues that causality does not work in the way the Buddhist imagines it (*Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyatīkā*) *śūnyavāda* 171cd–172ab): *santānāntaravac caisāṃ niṣedhyā hetusādhyatā| vāsyavāsakabhāvaś ca jñānatvād ekasantatau|* ‘The condition of being cause or effect and the relation between something that receives an imprint and something that imparts it must be rejected between these [cognitions in] the same continuum, since they are cognitions, just as [cognitions in] another continuum.’

Ibid. 176cd–177cd:

caitrajñānaṃ tadudbhūtajñānāṃśagrāhyabodhakam||
jñānatvān na bhaved yadvat tasya dehāntarodbhavam|

‘The cognition of Smith cannot ascertain an object of cognition which is a section of the cognition that has arisen in him, because it is a cognition, just as [a cognition] that has arisen in another body [cannot ascertain] it [i.e. Smith’s cognition].’

Later he shows that whether one denies or accepts the working of causality in the continuum of cognition-phases, this continuum cannot fulfil the role of a stable entity (*Ślokavārttika* (with *Nyāyaratnākara*) *ātmavāda* 33cd–34):

janmāntare ’bhyupete ’pi jñānamātrātmavādinām||
jñānānāṃ kṣaṇikatvād dhi karṭṛbhoktranyatā bhavet|
niṣkriyatvāvibhutvābhyāṃ na ca dehāntarāśritiḥ||

‘For even though rebirth is accepted [by the Buddhists], the one who acts and the one who experiences [the results of this action] would be different for those who hold that the ‘Self’ is merely [a stream of] cognitions, because of the momentariness of [the individual] cognitions [in this stream], and, since [the cognition-phases] are inactive and not omnipresent, they cannot attach themselves to another body.’

Ibid. 36–40:

karṭṛtvam eva duḥsādhaṃ dīrghakāleṣu karmasu|
satsu jñānasahasreṣu kulakalpopamaṃ hi tat||
vyatirikto hi santāno yadi nābhyupagamyate|
santāninām anityatvāt kartā kaścin na labhyate||
bhoktur atyantabhedāc ca prasajyetākṛtāgamaḥ|
kṛtanāśaṃ tu na brūmaḥ kṛtaṃ naiva hi kenacit||
santānānanyatāyāṃ tu vācoyuktyantareṇa te|
tatra coktam, na cāvastu santānaḥ karṭṛtām vrajet||
santānakṣaṇikatve ca tad eva, akṣaṇikas tv atha|
siddhāntahāniḥ, evaṃ ca so ’pi dravyāntaram bhavet||

‘In the case of activities which require a long time, it is impossible to establish that there could be any performer at all. For even though there might be thousands of cognition-phases, [if you say that they are the agent,] this would be like a ritual procedure [which is performed in stages over several generations] of a family. For if you do not accept that there is an [entity called] ‘stream’ [of consciousness] which is separate [from the individual cognitions], we find no agent because of the impermanence of the members of the stream. And since the one that experiences [the result of the action] is completely different [from the agent], it would follow that one would attain [the result of] an act one did not perform. As for the loss of [the result of one’s] action, we do not [even] mention it, since nobody has performed any action at all. [If you accept that the continuum is a real entity], if the continuum is not different [from the individual cognitions], then [you would be talking about] these [cognitions] using another expression, and I have already set forth the objection against this [position]. On the other hand [, if you say that the continuum is separate and permanent,] the continuum cannot become the agent, inasmuch as it is a non-entity [since only

momentary entities exist in your system]. If the continuum is momentary, then the same [objection would apply as in the case of momentary cognitions]. If it is not momentary [and still a real entity], then you would be giving up your own doctrine, and in this way it would also be a another substance [i.e. the *ātman*]. Ibid. 43–50:

santāno 'yaṃ sa eveti na tv abhedād vinā bhavet|
vāyudīpādisantāne vāyutvādir na bhidyate||
jñānatvenāpy abhinnatvaṃ sūnyavāde nirākṛtam|
tathaiva karmabhir veṣṭā phalārthaṃ cittavāsanā||
na cātra vāsanākālaṃ kiñcic cittam avasthitam|
avastutvāc ca santānaḥ karmabhir naiva vāsyate||
tatpāramparyajāte 'pi bhūñjāne karmaṇaḥ phalam|
tādātmyena vinā spaṣṭau kṛtanāśākṛtāgamau||
santānāntarajebhyaś ca yo hetuphalabhāvataḥ|
viśeṣaḥ so 'pi dussādhaḥ parihāro na cānayoḥ||
tasminn asaty api brūyāḥ parihāraṃ tvam anyathā|
samānapṛthivīvāsajñānatvādyaviśeṣataḥ||
samāna iti nāpy etad ekatvānugamād vinā|
tena yaccittajaṃ tasya santāna iti vo mṛṣā||
na hi yacchabdatacchabdau vartete bhinnavastuni|
tenaikātmakataiṣṭavyā tatsantānātmavādibhiḥ||

‘[If you say that] it is the same continuum [that performed the action]: it cannot be unless [these two] are not separate. In the case of [other] ‘streams’ such as wind or light, the condition of being ‘wind’ etc. is not different [from moment to moment]. As for [your claim that] it is not unchanging inasmuch as it is cognition: this was refuted in the [chapter on] *sūnyavāda*. And similarly the impression on consciousness which you postulate accounting for a fruit [produced] by actions [has also been refuted]. Furthermore, no cognition remains as long as the impression [exists, since cognitions are momentary]. And the continuum, since it is not a real entity [for you, inasmuch as it is permanent], actions do not leave their imprint on it in any way. Even if [you say that a cognition-phase] arisen in the same [uninterrupted] series experiences the result of the action [performed by another cognition-phase in the same series], without the identity [of the one who acts and the one who experiences the result, the unwanted consequences of] the loss [of the result] of something that has been done and the attainment [of the result] of something that has not been done are evident. Furthermore, it is also impossible to prove [that there is a] causality-based difference [of the cognition-phase that experiences the result] from [cognition-phases] arisen in other streams, and the two [above mentioned unwanted consequences] cannot be avoided. Even if there is no [difference caused by causality], you may say that [the above mentioned unwanted consequences] can be avoided in another way, [but then not just the agent cognition-phase and the experiencing cognition-phase would be connected by common characteristics] because [characteristics] such as being in the same earth, or having the same condition of being cognition can be equally applied [to cognitions in other continuums as well]. And to say that something is the ‘same’ is not possible without accepting

[its] 'oneness'. Therefore you are wrong [when you say] 'it is the stream of that [awareness] from which awareness [the agent-cognition] has arisen', since the words 'that—which' cannot refer to separate things. Therefore those who hold the theory that the Self is the stream of those [cognition-phases] have to accept that [these cognitions] have a single nature.'

⁶⁷ Note the similarity between the Buddhist *sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa*, 'a means of valid cognition which refutes the [possibility of the] opposite of the property to be proven [co-occurring with the proving property, i.e. the logical reason (*hetu*)]', and the Graduate's claim that 'the proving property [inheres in a locus that possesses] the opposite of the property to be proved', *sādhyaviparyayasādhana*. In other words, the Buddhist put forth an argument which refuted that non-momentary entities exist, while the Mīmāṃsaka proves that only those things exist which are non-momentary, since only permanent things have causal efficacy which is a defining characteristic of existence.

⁶⁸ The Buddhist certainly denies that perishing is an effect (see *Abhidharmaśāstra* p. 193, quoted in note 15). Dharmakīrti also points out that the so-called 'causes of destruction' actually produce a different entity (*Pramāṇavārtika with svavṛtti* (GNOLI) p. 141,25–142,3): *agninā kāṣṭham daṇḍena ghaṭa itī vināśahetavo bhāvānāṃ dr̥śyante| anvayavyatirekānuvidhānaṃ hetutadvator lakṣaṇaṃ āhuḥ| na| pūrvasya svarasanirodhe 'nyasya viśiṣṭapratyayāśrayeṇa vikṛtasyotpatteḥ|* '[Opponent:] We see that things have causes for their perishing, for instance a log is [destroyed] by fire, a pot by a staff. The defining characteristic of cause and effect is said to be [their] conformity in presence and absence [e.g. when fire is present, the log is destroyed, when fire is not present, the log remains]. [Buddhist:] You are wrong. For when the previous [thing-phase] perishes due to its own essence, another [thing-phase] arises which is different because it depends on the particular causes [of its coming into being].'
Also *Ślokaṅkārttika* (with *Nyāyaratnākara*) *śabdanityatādhikaraṇa* 24cd–29ab (presenting the Buddhist position):

*hetur yasya vināśo 'pi tasya dr̥ṣṭo 'nikurādivat||
vināśasya vināśas tu nāsti tasmād akr̥trimah|
bhavati hy agnisambandhāt kāṣṭhād aṅgārasantatiḥ||
mudgarādihatāc cāpi kapālam jāyate ghaṭāt|
svābhāviko vināśas tu jātamātrapratīṣṭhitah||
sūkṣmah sadṛśasantānavṛtter anupalakṣitah|
yadā vilakṣaṇo hetuḥ patet sadṛśasantatau||
vilakṣaṇeṇa kāryeṇa sthūlo 'bhivyajyate tadā|
tenāsadr̥śasantāno hetoḥ sañjāyate yataḥ||
tenaivākriyamāṇo 'pi nāśo 'bhivyajyate sphuṭah|*

'Something that has a cause [of its arising] is also observed to perish, just as a sprout [having a seed as its cause]. But perishing does not perish, therefore it is not produced. For from a log, as a result of contact with fire, a [new] continuum of embers comes into being, and from a pot, too, hit by a hammer for instance, shards come about. Perishing, however, is inherent, established

as soon as [the thing] arises, subtle, [and] unnoticed because it takes place in a uniform continuum. When a dissimilar cause affects the uniform continuum, because of the dissimilar effect [that is produced], then [perishing] shows itself to be gross. Thus it is a dissimilar continuum that is produced by the cause, and for this reason perishing, although it is not being produced, is clearly manifested by that very [cause].'

⁶⁹ Possible reference to the view of the Mīmāṃsakas who hold that when one pronounces the eternal *śabda*, it is only manifested, and not actually produced, so it is different from other effects.

Kumārila first shows that for the Buddhist the perishing of a pot is spontaneous, but since it is very subtle, we notice it only when the hammer operates upon it and produces shards (see note 68 above). Now this goes against the objection made in *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* I.1.6 (see *Śābarabhāṣya ad loc.* (ŚBh(Y) ad I.1.6, p. 60): *prayatnād uttarakālaṃ drśyate yataḥ, ataḥ prayatnānantaryāt tena kriyate* | 'Since sound *śabda* is perceived only after the effort [of its utterance], therefore, because it immediately follows the effort, it is produced by that [effort]', since just as perishing is only manifested (according to the Buddhist) by the so-called 'causes of destruction', in the same way the eternal sound (*śabda*) is only manifested, not produced, by utterance (*dhvani*) (see *Ślokavārttika* (with *Nyāyaratnākara*) *śabdanityatādihikaraṇa* 29cd–30ab). As Kumārila says (ibid. 42):

yathā ghaṭāder dīpādir abhivyañjaka iṣyate |

caḥsuṣo 'nugrahād evaṃ dhvaniḥ syāc chrotrasaṃskṛteḥ ||

'Just as a lamp for instance is accepted as the manifesting agent of things such as a pot through affecting the eye, in the same way utterance [manifests *śabda*] through its impression upon the ear.' (See also ibid. 394 seqq. on the eternal 'actions' (*kriyā*, *karma*) which are not always perceived due to the lack of manifesting agents, but are nevertheless always present in perceptible objects.)

⁷⁰ *ex conj.* Verse 38 in RAGHAVAN and THAKUR's edition is clearly unmetrical, as the editors have already suspected (p. 105: 'I.38 and III.42 are possibly no verse.'). In fact it seems that when the scribe wrote down the second *vināśakāraṇam* (after *na ca nāsti*), he jumped back to the first *vināśakāraṇam* (after *yasya hi nāsti*), and continued with repeating *ākāśāder iva bhavatu asau nityaḥ* | *kiṃ jātam? na ca nāsti vināśakāraṇam*.

⁷¹ *Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyatīkā*) *śūnyavāda* 71:

na cātra karaṇajñānagrāhakākāravedanam |

grāhyatvaṃ yena buddheḥ syād abhinnatve 'pi pūrvavat ||

'And in this case [i.e. when a form such as blue is being cognised] there is no ascertaining of the forms belonging to the instrument [of cognition], to the cognition [itself], and to the grasping agent, by which [ascertaining] consciousness could become the object of cognition, even though there was no difference [among the object, the subject, and the instrument of cognition], just as in the previous case [i.e. the case of the Self].'

Umbeka's comm. *ad loc.* (p.258): *na tv atra nīlānubhave 'nīlam aham' ity ātmatayā bhāsante nīlādayaḥ, 'nīlam' ity anātmatayā pratibhāsanāt* (...) *nātra nīlādau karaṇajñānagrāhakākāravedanam asti, yena buddhir eva nīlādibhāvena prakāśeta| ākāravedanam iti ca karaṇādiṣu pratyekaṃ sambadhyate| yadi nīlādayo grāhakatvenāvabhāsante grāhako vā nīlādigrāhyatayāvabhāsate* (: conj., °seta: ed.), *tadā pratibhāsabalenābhinnasyaiva prakāśyaprakāśakabhāvo bhavet* 'But in the case of the perception of [colours] such as blue, [these colours] such as blue do not appear [as if] they were [cognition's] own self, in the form of 'I am blue', because they become manifest as being different from [cognition's] own self, in the form of '[this is] blue'. (...) The ascertaining of the forms belonging to the instrument [of cognition], to the cognition [itself], and to the grasping agent are not included in [the cognition of forms] such as blue, due to which [ascertaining] consciousness alone would shine forth having the nature of [forms] such as blue. As for 'the perception of [their] form': this is connected one by one with the instrument [, the cognition, and the agent]. If [forms] such as blue appeared as the agent of grasping, or the agent of grasping appeared as the object of grasping such as 'blue', then, because of appearing [in that way], it would be an undivided [object-subject] that would [simultaneously] have the nature of the object that is shone on and the subject that shines on.'

Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya*(F) p. 28,17–30,13.

⁷² *Śloka-vārttika* (with *Tātparyatīkā*) *sūnyavāda* 184–187ab:

vyāpṛtaṃ cānyasaṃvittau jñānaṃ nātmānam ṛcchati|
tena prakāśakatve 'pi bodhāyānyat pratīkṣate||
īdṛśaṃ vā prakāśatvaṃ tasyārthānubhavātmakam|
na cātmānubhavo 'sty asyety ātmano na prakāśakam||
sati prakāśakatve 'pi vyavasthā dṛśyate yathā|
rūpādau cakṣurādīnāṃ tathātrāpi bhaviṣyati||
prakāśakatvaṃ bāhye 'rthe śaktyabhāvāt tu nātmani|

'And when cognition is engaged in ascertaining something else [i.e. the object], it does not reach itself. Therefore, although it is an agent which shines on [other things], it expects another [cognition] for being cognised [itself]. Or rather, such is its condition of being a light: it consists in the ascertaining of the object, but there is no ascertaining of itself, so it does not shine on its own self. Just as [sense organs] such as the faculty of sight, even though they do have the nature of shining on [other things], are seen to be restricted to [their objects] such as colour, it will be in the same way in this case, too [i.e. in the case of cognition]: its condition of being the agent of illuminating [operates] upon the external object, but not upon its own self, because it is not capable [of doing that].'

See also Umbeka's comm. *ad loc.* (p. 284): *anātmaviṣayaṃ caitasya prakāśakatvam, nātmaviṣayam, yato 'nīlam idam' iti pratibhāsaḥ, na punar 'nīlam aham' itīty āha 'īdṛśam' iti* 'Its [i.e. cognition's] condition of being the agent of illuminating has as its object things that are not [cognition] itself, [and] it does not have [cognition] itself as its object [or freer: its illuminating is directed towards what is not itself, not towards itself], since there is an appearance in the form of 'this is blue', and not in the form of 'I am blue'; that is why [Kumārila]

says “[Or rather], such is...”.’ (See also *Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyāṭikā*), *śūnyavāda* 65–67.)

⁷³ Cf. *Svopajñāvṛtti* ad *Vākyapadīya* I.12 (VP(V) 1966, p.43): *iha trīṇi jyotīṃṣi trayah prakāśāḥ svarūpapararūpayor avadyotakāḥ| tad yathā, yo ’yaṃ jātavedā yaś ca puruṣeṣv āntarah prakāśo yaś ca prakāśāprakāśayoḥ prakāśayitā śabdākhyah prakāśah|* ‘In this world there are three lustres, three lights which illuminate their own form and the form of other things: namely, that which is [called] *jātavedas* [i.e. fire], that which is the inner light inside men [i.e. consciousness], and that which illuminates both shining entities [that is all the three lights] and non-shining ones [e.g. pots], and which light is called ‘word’.

⁷⁴ Cf. *Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyāṭikā*) *śūnyavāda* 74:
yadā tu grāhyam ākāraṃ nīlādi pratipadyate|
na tadā grāhakākārā saṃvittir dṛśyate kvacit||
 ‘But when [consciousness] ascertains the form that is to be grasped, such as blue, consciousness, which has the form of the grasping agent, is seen nowhere.’

⁷⁵ *ex conj.* Similar sentence-structure in *Nyāyamañjarī* I 611.11–12: *nāpy anumānam, anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ trptibhojanayor iva svargayāgayoḥ sādhyasā-dhanasambandhānavadhāraṇāt|* Another possible conjecture was suggested by ISAACSON: *anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ tasya gotvādivad abodharūpatvāvadhāraṇād iti|*

This argument can be compared with the following passage in the *Śloka-vārttika* (*Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyāṭikā*) *śūnyavāda* 130–132):

atha saty api bhinnatve grāhyam jñānāntaram vadet|
jñānatve tasya kā yuktiḥ pūrvoktā yadi seṣyate||
jñānam jñānam itītham tu na dvayor anuvartate|
vyatiriktam ca sāmānyam tvayā nābhyupagamya||
vyatireke tayoś ceṣṭe (: this is the reading of three manuscripts as

Dr KATAOKA pointed out to me in an e-mail of 19. x. 2001;

Ślokavārttika (with *Tātparyāṭikā*) has *grāhyagrāhakayoś ceṣṭā*,
 while *Ślokavārttika* (with *Kāśikā*) reads *vyatireke tayor jñānān*)

na jñānātmakatā bhavet|
tadrūparahitatve ca jñānābhāvaḥ prasajyate||

‘If [the opponent] said that, even though [the subject and the object of cognition are] different, [still] the object is another cognition—what is the argument for that [i.e. the object] being cognition? If [the opponent replies that it is] the [reason] mentioned before [namely just a matter of usage], this [ground] is accepted. But we do not have a recurrent cognition [*anuvṛtti*] of both [object and subject and cognition] in this way: ‘[this one is] cognition [and the other one is also] cognition’; besides you do not assent to a general property which is separate. And [if the Buddhist accepted the existence of the general property of *jñānatva*, and] if he held that they [i.e. *grāhya* and *grāhaka*] are [completely] separate [from *jñānatva*], then [neither of them] could have the nature of cognition. And since [neither of them] has the character of [cognition], it follows

that cognition does not exist [at all].’ (In the following verses Kumāṛila refutes various attempts of his Buddhist opponent to connect *jñāna* with both *grāhya* and *grāhaka*.)

⁷⁶ As we shall see, the Graduate is going to postpone bathing again, because he cannot help entering into a discussion with potential opponents, which also means that he is postponing lunch, to the great regret of his pupil.

Act Two

*Then enters a SERVANT.*¹

SERVANT.²

One cannot drink chilled booze, neither can one make love to the servant-girls, nor is it easy to get a meat dish in this comfortless³ brahmin household.⁴ (1)

So what to do? A born slave has no⁵ recourse for himself⁶ if he turns his back on his ownmasters,⁷ that's for sure. And even the errands⁸ my master thinks out are such that⁹ one cannot eat or drink¹⁰ while [running] them. For just now my master has given me the order: 'Hey Sooty,¹¹ go¹² and see¹³ if the monk Jinarakṣita¹⁴ is in the abode of the Jain mendicants or not.' And I've no idea¹⁵ where that abode of the Jain mendicants can be. (*He walks about, looks at the road, and muses.*) These specks of dust here seem to be speckled by scattered¹⁶ tufts of plucked-out, awn-like hair.¹⁷ So the abode of the Jain mendicants must be right here in this forest. (*He takes a few steps, looks ahead [and says] joyfully.*) This must be the abode of the Jain mendicants, since¹⁸ here, under a tree, in the darkness of the dense net of vines, this monk seems to be appeasing an angry nun. (*He looks for a second.*) This harpy¹⁹ nun must be furious indeed: she's gone away shaking off this young mendicant, even though he threw himself at her feet. And this poor monk seems to have a grim visage.

Then enters a Jain MENDICANT, holding a broom made of peacock's tail-feathers.

MENDICANT (*weeping*). Poor me! Because of the vain hope in [a better] after-life, first I became a Jain monk. I have deviated from that [path of mendicancy], and now both the present and the future [life and their pleasures] have come to nothing for me, for this harpy nun, too, is not appeased even if I throw myself at her feet. (*He wipes his eyes.*) Hey you harpy bitch, get you gone! Can't I find another nun who is not like you?

SERVANT (*pondering*). Before this monk notices²⁰ me I'll assume the appearance of a Jain nun, and make fun of this monk. (*He looks at himself.*) To be sure,²¹ I have long ears, there are no beginnings of a beard on my face, and no-one would expect a Jain nun to wear a ponytail on her head. So I can easily assume the appearance of a Jain nun. (*He does so and looks.*) Now all I need²² is a

broom of peacock feathers²³ to look like a Jain nun. (*He looks ahead [and says] joyfully.*) Splendid! I'll take the nun's broom which she had been holding and then left behind,²⁴ and go closer. (*He does so.*) Sir, I bow to you. I am²⁵ very tired now, so please tell²⁶ me where is now the reverend monk Jinarakṣita?

MENDICANT (*cheering up, to himself*). It seems²⁷ my luck will not turn its back on me now. Here we have another young nun showing up. (*Openly.*) O my mendicant girl, what business do you have with the monk Jinarakṣita? You look very tired indeed. So sit down right here in this lonely, cool thicket of vines, and rest for a spell.

SERVANT. I've always been unhappy and I'm ill-fated, how could I have a rest?

MENDICANT (*with affection*). You are just a child, but you already have a cause for being unhappy?

SERVANT (*with a sigh*). Sir, let us not waste our breath²⁸ for my execrable²⁹ story. Please tell³⁰ me the whereabouts of the monk Jinarakṣita.

MENDICANT. Little girl, this monk Jinarakṣita is inside, delivering a lecture among his disciples,³¹ under the Nyagrodha-tree. But³² sit down for a second and tell me now the cause of your disillusion.

SERVANT (*sits down and sighs*). Sir, what point is there in relating now the piled up³³ shame³⁴ of a girl whom life has crushed? (*He cries.*)

MENDICANT (*wipes the SERVANT'S eyes*). Tell me, my moppet. This man here is not different from your heart, sweetie.

SERVANT. Ill-fated that I am, I turned a recluse³⁵ when I was just a little girl.

MENDICANT. And then?

SERVANT. Then,³⁶ as the delicate signs of my youth were becoming slightly visible, [but] I was still not familiar with the savour of passion, some young monk offended against my decency, entirely against my will.

MENDICANT (*joyfully to himself*). I've chanced upon a river of nectar! (*Openly.*) C'est la vie, sweetie. And then?

SERVANT. Sir, then later on, as I had gradually become conversant with the savour of passion, that monk dumped me and got stuck on another firm-fisted³⁷ old nun.

MENDICANT. †... †³⁸ Let's do as the lame and the blind in the proverb.

*He puts his arms around the SERVANT'S neck and kisses him forcibly.
The SERVANT feigns bashfulness and sits with eyes downcast.*

MENDICANT. Sweetie, why don't you look at me?

SERVANT. How could I look?³⁹ You too will dump me and go to another one.

MENDICANT. Sweetie, don't say so. I shall be your slave!⁴⁰ (*He puts his hand on the SERVANT'S chest.*) Your titties haven't come out yet?

SERVANT (*bashfully*). Poor me, what should I do?

The MENDICANT slides down his hand under the navel of the SERVANT, notices his genitals, and [says] with shame and anger.

MENDICANT. Dammit, you wretch, you've taken me in badly!

He wants to slap [the SERVANT].

SERVANT. Hey you ascetic lecher, if you say⁴¹ something I'll squeal on you⁴² to the monk Jinaraksita!

MENDICANT (*reflects for a second and throws himself at the SERVANT's feet*). You mustn't give away this joke to anyone!

SERVANT. What about my hush money?

The MENDICANT pulls out something from the root (?) of his broom of peacock feathers, and gives it [to the SERVANT].

SERVANT. I've made my joke, I've got a coin,⁴³ I've learnt the whereabouts of the monk. So I go now and report to my master.⁴⁴ (*He walks about and looks ahead.*) Now you've hit the jackpot!⁴⁵ Your sweetheart has arrived.

Then enters the real NUN. She perceives the SERVANT who has the appearance of a Jain nun, [and says] full of jealousy and anger.

NUN. Hey you ascetic wench, where are you going with someone else's⁴⁶ broom in your hand?

SERVANT. Take this broom, ma'am. As for me, I've been deceived by this mendicant in this thicket of creepers, entirely against my will.⁴⁷ It's not my fault.

*He exits.*⁴⁸

NUN (*goes close to the MENDICANT*). Hey you wretched lecher, who hankers after ascetic women! While I was on my way back, having returned because I'd left behind my broom, in the meantime you, in a matter of seconds, were embracing another nun.⁴⁹ So now reap the fruit of your discipline!

She hits [him] with the stick of the broom.

MENDICANT. Do not think so, milady. Can't you see that this is a servant who came here assuming the appearance of a woman to make fun of me. That wretch has made you angry. This is the sober truth, I swear it.

He throws himself at the NUN's feet.

NUN. How could the truth come out of your mouth, whose self-restraint is like this?

MENDICANT. This wretched servant will make yet another joke, so come, my lady, let's go somewhere else. (*With bewilderment.*) I see some brahmin coming right this way, so hurry up, my lady.

Exeunt ambo.

Then enter the GRADUATE and the BOY.

GRADUATE.

First I had a quick debate in order to damp the arrogant ardour of those red-robed fellows who fancy themselves clever. This time I want to play with the feeble-minded naked mendicants, too, who are little more than objects of pity. (2)

BOY. It is fun for you, Sir, but for those poor devils it means the destruction of everything they have.

GRADUATE (*smiling*). As you say, Sir. Cattle, family, house, estate, farming and trade: they lose all they have. What then is the 'everything' of the sky-clad Jain monks, who eat alms and live at the foot of trees?

BOY. Why, I'll tell you. Those poor devils undergo loads of severe austerities for the sake of [a better] afterlife. Then they fall into the stream of your honour's eloquence. So their efforts will reap no fruit at all from this religion-scrub.⁵⁰

GRADUATE. Well well! Aren't you compassionate! All right, to do you a favour I'll test my strength mildly on them. So come. We've arrived at their hermitage. Let's enter now.

They walk about.

GRADUATE (*looking ahead*). The Jain monk Jinarakṣita is sitting here in the shade of a Nyagrodha-tree, perhaps lecturing about something, while a group of several disciples worships him.

Then enters the Jain MONK as described above.

MONK (*to himself*). Oh dear! It's extremely difficult to go beyond the process of the turning of transmigration's wheel.⁵¹

Even if you hold it back by force, it hankers after the same sense-objects, [and] it does not consider their various drawbacks in [karmic] retribution—I don't know what to do: the mind does not take the auspicious path. This goddess of unending Ignorance just does not compose herself. (3)

(*reflecting*) Be that as it may, one just has to discipline these miserable monks day and night, to the best of one's ability. (*openly*) O monks,

Fate-hunter keeps shooting, the nooses of the transmigration-trap are dangerous. How can the soul-deer cross this burning forest of suffering?⁵² (4)

Or rather,

What can the wretched Fate, even if it were enraged, do to those in whom the power of the naturally pure 'perfect' soul has arisen through meditation on the blessed Jina[*'s teaching*]?⁵³ It bullies only those who are defenseless. (5)

So now,

Contemplating⁵⁴ the words of the Jina [and] mortifying the body with austerities and observances—that much is the entire secret of the Teaching: put it deep into your mind.⁵⁵ (6)

DISCIPLES. As your Reverend commands.⁵⁶

GRADUATE (*comes closer [and says] politely*). Is Your Honour and the circle of your disciples well?

MONK (*reflecting, to himself*). That graduate Saṅkaraṣaṇa has come here, being eager to humiliate us this time, after defeating the Buddhists. So it's better to back away on this occasion. His valour is intolerable, his oratorical power and his intellect are unheard-of. (*openly*) Welcome, Sir. Please take a seat here. Are you well?

GRADUATE. What is the chosen topic this time?

MONK. What is worth choosing⁵⁷ here, in the jungle of transmigration? Perhaps one can get hold of some means to cut across it.

GRADUATE. Why, you've certainly got hold of the means. To explain:

No violence, no lies, no attachment to house, property,⁵⁸ or clothes, no absorption⁵⁹ in any activity which has its immediate result in [worldly] existence, and this severe asceticism, faultless [and] full of vows and observances: what other path should be taken here to cross over the world of transmigration? (7)

MONK. The Lord of Creatures has fashioned a tongue for your ilk, Sir, which is very clever to say pleasing words.

GRADUATE. Monk, tell me none the less what subject you have started to lecture on.

MONK. Are you dying of curiosity? The Jains' Doctrine of Manysidedness is the speciality of our house, and precisely that has been introduced as the topic on this occasion.⁶⁰

GRADUATE. Monk, what is taught, namely—

'One thing has as its nature the nature of all things. All things have as their nature the nature of one thing. That person, who has seen one thing as it really is, has seen all things as they [really] are.'⁶¹ (8)

—now I ask you the following about this matter:⁶²

If one thing has as its nature the nature of all things, what would people who have some objective employ, and with respect to what? If things are arranged with regard to their respective effects, then one thing cannot have as its nature the nature of all things. (9)

Even if we see some kind of similar form that is shared among [different] entities, nevertheless each of them does have its own, unique essence. (10)

But if the scheme of things were in this way which we do not accept, people would never embark on any work, may it affect the afterlife⁶³ or this life. (11)

The MONK makes a sign to a DISCIPLE.

PUPIL (*with intention*). Reverend, the monks beg to inform you: 'The Reverend is late, so the time of our present duty is running out now.'⁶⁴

MONK (*to the GRADUATE*). Sir, the duty of the monks is being neglected. So please decide as you think proper.

GRADUATE. Monk, do as you please.

MONK (*to the DISCIPLE*). Hey you, run along and tell the monks that they should stay vigilant where they are for a second: here I come!

Exit the MONK with his DISCIPLES.

GRADUATE. Boy, you have seen the cunning of this sky-clad Jain monk.

BOY. Sir, who could stand his ground against you in the battle of debate? So he saved himself when he escaped under this pretext.

GRADUATE. Should I have given him the stick? One has to learn the facts, and we did learn them. But I have not taken a strong line in this matter purely out of regard for you.

BOY.

Gentle though they may be, your words, sir, hurt the heart of those who join issue [with you];⁶⁵ the fish that have been washed ashore †... †⁶⁶ (12)

GRADUATE. So where shall we go now, boy?

BOY. But why don't we go to bathe?

GRADUATE (*smiling*). Are you hungry? (*looking upward*) Why would it be bathing time right now? We should rather stay a little while right here, in the thicket of the Jain mendicants' abode.

BOY. Fine.

They stand up and walk about.

GRADUATE (*looks ahead [and says] with astonishment*). O, this place is so delightful and suitable for relaxation! For,

This wood gives thick and cooling shade; there are grassy spots and there is also water here; these winds are fragrant from bunches of flowers; the deer playfully gambol here in many ways, and the trill of the birds is blended with the swing of many tunes. (13)

(*pondering*)

If a soul devoted to Vedānta becomes in this holy forest one whose wishes have ceased and which has curbed the legion of mental activities, within just a few days it would surely reach an extraordinary, supreme, splendid state, which has eternal bliss and in which the haste and toils of the mundane path disappear. (14)

Behind the scenes.

One can hardly get to the bottom of Vedāntic teachings; the meaning of the verbose details of the stories told in the three Vedas is confused; the high-born speculate on the profound issue in them: 'Is there a Self, or isn't there?' Far be they from me! In order to cast off this excruciating pain of existence, let's hold on to the compact, lucid scriptures taught by the sage Jina.⁶⁷ (15)

BOY. Sir, here comes in hot haste a red-robed ascetic, jabbering something like this—

Then enter an ASCETIC.

The ASCETIC walks about reciting 'One can hardly get to...'

BOY. These folks still adhere to the Jina's teachings?

GRADUATE. Never mind, boy, what about it? I'll ask him something else. (*to the ASCETIC*) Good day to you, ascetic. Where are you going in such a frantic flurry?

ASCETIC. You are clearly a brahmin, so how come you don't know how it feels to be hungry?

GRADUATE. Have you set out to dine, sir?

ASCETIC. What else?

GRADUATE. Which place will you go?

ASCETIC. Why, just here, in the penance-grove of the monk Jinarakṣita there is a great feast today.

GRADUATE. What's the cause of the great feast?

ASCETIC. A certain nobleman, who had embraced the teaching of Master Jina, gives there a dinner party today, where thousands of ascetics have gathered together. And they are offered piles of groats, jars of sesame oil, vessels of sour gruel, small jugs of molasses, and mountains of edibles cooked in sesame oil.

GRADUATE. Tell me, ascetic, among [all] these [dishes] you won't get any curd, milk, ghee and the like at all?⁶⁸

ASCETIC. Oho! These customs are proper to you, brahmins. We, however, ascetics do not use⁶⁹ anything coming from animals either for eating, or for drinking, or for clothing, or for lying or sitting on, or in any other way of grooming the body. Can't you see these sandals of mine, made of bark? So enough of this chatter! I'll be late for the dinner.

GRADUATE. Show me, too, the way. I'll also have a look at the riches of the ascetics.

ASCETIC. Do so, do so. Please come then.

All walk about.

GRADUATE. Tell me, ascetic, you follow the Jina's teaching, so why do you wear red robes? Is your Jina the Sugata [i.e. the Buddha]?

ASCETIC (*smiling*). For us, too, the blessed Master Jina is Sugata ('one who has fared well'). Moreover, the Sugata [i.e. the Buddha] is⁷⁰ [also called] Master Jina.⁷¹ How fortunate are we, Ārhatas,⁷² some [of us] sky-clad, some wearing only bark-robos, others dressed in red clothes,⁷³ others in white robes. Observe! Here come the sky-clad ones, from the root of whose hair—visible due to their devotion to merciless plucking—scanty and small blood-drops are dripping.⁷⁴ Here come those who wear bark-rags, the border of whose garment, made of soft bark, is smeared with † . . . †.⁷⁵ Here come the *brahmacārin* ascetics, the colour of whose robes is similar to that of an earthen vessel which has been baked and was taken out of the kiln at this very moment.⁷⁶ Here come the white-robed ones, the lappets of whose garment, white as goose-wings, flutter in the zephyr. So how meritorious is that nobleman whom they will favour today!⁷⁷

GRADUATE (*smiling, to himself*). He is called 'meritorious', and not 'noxious'.

He does not care about elephants, or horses, or swords, or the roads, or levying taxes, or the division of an army,⁷⁸ or camels and the like. Since he squanders the cream of his wealth for such a cause and shirks the performance of his services [towards the king], I'm sure the sovereign will confiscate his property. (16)

(*openly*) How peaceful and charming is this penance-grove!

The world seems to me as if full of tranquillity, the earth appears as if practicing observances. Here the series of snares of existence [that bind] the embodied souls truly look to me as if they were broken into pieces. (17)

BOY. We've seen mendicants dressed in thin air, in bark, in red garments and in white robes. And now look at these black-blankets coming this way.

GRADUATE (*looks ahead [and says] with astonishment*). God bless my soul, this is a novel kind of asceticism! A woman and a man, wrapped up in a single black garment, amuse themselves singing some uncommonly charming song. (*looking carefully*) What? There seem to be legions of them! Sure enough: the earth is completely deluged, the three Vedas are uprooted. (*to the MENDICANT*) Tell me, ascetic, are you familiar with this new, extraordinary method of asceticism?

ASCETIC. I don't know⁷⁹ what's this lovely / ingenious method of religious observance. I am indeed inclined to think that some people have heard rumours about the dinner party and they hover about simply because they are eager to get some food. So enough said about their story! I'll join those whose conduct is similar [to mine]. (*Exits.*⁸⁰)

*Then enter a woman and a man, wrapped up in a single black robe and singing, or, if it can be afforded, many such couples singing [as follows].*⁸¹

Victory to the sage Nīlāmbaranātha, who has relieved the disease / obsession of keeping life within bounds.⁸²

One who follows your novel teaching, o Blessed Lord, drinks the unique bliss⁸³ of the elixir vitæ.

In this life he revels in [making love to] women,⁸⁴ in the next world achieves deliverance.⁸⁵

The body bears fruit,⁸⁶ transmigration is crossed over.

Have no faith in schools other than this: the body is completely emaciated, [and] liberation is still uncertain.

What is procured in the pursuit of training? Man is finished in someone else's grasp. (?)⁸⁷

If plenty of merits are gathered,⁸⁸ they, too, will surely deprive men of their pleasures.

One who wraps up this union †... †<...>⁸⁹

If every single couple knows thus<...>⁹⁰

In what region will they whose births are not yet consummated roam about in their bodies and what place will they reach?⁹¹

Either this [world] is the transformation of the Supreme Self, or this is the transformation of the Word.

Still, without the cessation of ignorance how could all this †... †<...>⁹²

†... †having thus learnt that all other religions are fruitless.

Obtain happiness both here and [in the world] beyond, following⁹³ the sage Nīlāmbara <...>⁹⁴

GRADUATE (*listening to the song at some length*). Boy, this is a cheap matter of disputation, invented by somebody to abuse all the philosophical systems under the pretext of a song. But I'm afraid of the penance, so I just cannot strike up a conversation with these rotters.

The woman and the man sing the same [song] again.

GRADUATE. Look, boy,

There is no purity in [their] words, [their] vile body also lacks cleanliness, [their] mind always delights in inconsiderate, utterly despicable behaviour. I do not know⁹⁵ who is that man, his heart unafraid⁹⁶ of the afterlife, to whom this meritorious, wonderful penitential practice belongs. Or is there no⁹⁷ disreputable human behaviour? (18)

Moreover,

This choral singing of *carcarī*-songs, repeated ad libitum, rings as the day is long. Shaking off all scruples, they drink sweet wine, the sap of which is mixed with the lover's saliva. Licentious movements are made with bodies whose steadily continued mutual arousal is concealed by the product of the loom. Who would not observe this extremely pleasant vow? (19)

BOY. It is just as you say, Sir.

GRADUATE. And I am inclined to think that this is a new, modern *mahāvratā*.⁹⁸ If this [doctrine] they are singing about becomes too widespread, the established conduct of social estates and life-periods will be ruined beyond measure. Sure enough: the path of the three Vedas appears to me as if gone to shivers.

For as soon as they see this 'penance', which is applauded by the greenhorn, and in which all restraints are abolished, even faithful housewives⁹⁹ will not sojourn long in their husbands' houses. (20)

BOY (*smiling*). Why does it bother you, Sir? You haven't married yet. As for me, that story is still far from me.

GRADUATE. But your venerable mother is still alive, isn't she?

BOY. She is definitely immune to this disaster by now, since she is a poor old woman, as good as dead.

GRADUATE. Stop joking. A great evil has arisen here. So think, boy, what is the remedy for this.

BOY. Sir, I have no idea. You must know it. But the Iron Age is getting stronger these days, so how could one counteract such disasters?

GRADUATE. Nevertheless it is not proper to sit petrified, without making any effort. (*reflecting*) Right, there is a way out.

BOY. And what will that be?

GRADUATE. Surely the king himself, His Majesty Śaṅkaradeva. For he, as the sovereign who is the preceptor of the lawful bounds prescribed for the social estates and life-periods, anointed to protect the three worlds, will naturally know the remedy for this case, especially since he has the honourable Bhaṭṭa Jayanta by his side, who has mastered all the scriptures of Śiva.¹⁰⁰ That's right! He is the one I shall inform. For a disaster permits no delay. Boy, as for you, push on these singing woman and man towards the dining arena.

BOY. Hallo, mendicants, I say, it is dinner-time for you in this penance-grove, so why should you be late?

Exeunt omnes.

Notes to Act Two

¹ The theme of the following *praveśaka* is not without parallels in Sanskrit dramatic literature. Among the dramatists preceding Jayanta one might think of two examples: Harṣa's *Nāgānanda* and Bhavabhūti's *Mālatīmādhava*. In Bhavabhūti's play *Makaranda*, in the disguise of Mālatī, is wedded to Nandana, and later he rudely repulses his impassioned 'husband' on the bridal night (Act 7). The third act of Harṣa's play provides a closer parallel which may well have served as a model for Jayanta. The drunken *viṭa* enters the garden to meet his ladylove. Meanwhile the *vidūṣaka* puts on a red garment to disguise himself as a woman in order to mislead the bees in the same garden. The *viṭa* naturally mistakes him for his sweetheart, embraces the *vidūṣaka* and offers him some chewed *pān*. When the unhappy *vidūṣaka* tries to get rid of his 'lover', the *viṭa* falls at his feet to conciliate 'her'. At this moment the *viṭa*'s real beloved appears and witnesses with astonishment that her man is lying at the feet of another woman. Then she quickly realises that that 'other woman' is actually the *vidūṣaka*, and decides to make fun of both of them. When the unlucky *vidūṣaka* unveils himself he is insulted by the *viṭa*'s servant who even breaks his sacred thread. And his tortures have not come to an end yet: the *viṭa*'s girlfriend demands him to bow at her feet, which the poor *vidūṣaka*, having lost his sacred thread and not being able to recall any Vedic mantras, cannot refuse to do on the strength of his brahmanhood.

² The Servant speaks Māgadhī, the Mendicant and the Nun speak Śaurasenī.

³ *ex conj.* Both the reading of the manuscripts (*viśamcate*) and RAGHAVAN and THAKUR's emendation (*viśamcaye, post correctionem*) is unmetrical. (The verse is in *viyoginī* metre.)

⁴ *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. The reading of the manuscripts (*vaṃ-mhaṇavāśī*, sing. gen./instr. fem.?) is unmetrical.

⁵ *nasti* (the reading of the manuscripts) is a correct form in Māgadhī (see PISCHEL §310, §498, Hemacandra 4.289.)

⁶ *ex conj.* BHAT. *appaṇo* occurs in Māhārāṣṭrī, Ardhamāgadhī, Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī, and Jaina-Śaurasenī. The Śaurasenī (and Māgadhī) form should be *attaṇo* according to PISCHEL §401 (as it is in lines 39 and 54), but *appā* has already been encountered in the First Act.

⁷ The correct Māgadhī form of Sanskrit *bhaṭṭakaḥ* should be *bhaṣṭake* according to Hemacandra 4.290 (see PISCHEL §271), *bhaṣṭake* according to Rāmaśarman 2.2.16, and it may be *bhaṣṭake* according to Puruṣottama 12.10.

⁸ *āṇā* seems to be an acceptable Māgadhī form of Sanskrit *ājñā* (cf. *āṇavedi*, PISCHEL §276).

⁹ *ex conj.* Sanskrit *kṣa* becomes *ska* in Māgadhī according to Vararuci 11.8, *hka* (with *jihvāmūlīya*) according to Hemacandra 4.296 (except for *peskadi* and *ācaskadi*, *ibid.* 4.297), *śka* according to Rāmaśarman 2.2.15 and Puruṣottama 12.6. Both Puruṣottama (12.8) and Rāmaśarman (2.2.15) remark that the consonants of Sanskrit *kṣa* are reversed in Māgadhī (i.e. it becomes *ska*). A parallel phenomenon which might be worthy of note is that the name of king Huiṣka sometimes appears as Huvakṣa or Huvikṣa in inscriptions (see SIRCAR 1991, No. 52, 53).

In our play the most frequent reading is *ška* in the Māgadhī sections, which may be explained as the transposition of the consonants of Sanskrit *kṣa*, even if strictly speaking it does not agree with any of the above mentioned Prakrit grammars. On the other hand, sometimes we find *kkha* in the Māgadhī passages, which is the Śaurasenī form of *kṣa*.

The word *eśu* seems to be used in the sense of *atra* in the Māgadhī passages, on the analogy of which I conjectured *yasu* > *yeśu* in this sentence.

¹⁰ The use of *pījjadi* as a passive form seems to be odd (and perhaps incorrect), especially since *pivādi* has already been used just a few lines above. PISCHEL §539 mentions *pījjai* as a Māhārāṣṭrī form.

¹¹ Instead of changing Sanskrit *jja* into *yya* in Māgadhī, one might apply the rule that in Māgadhī the palatalisation of the *cavarga*-consonants is distinct (Puruṣottama 12.13: *cuḥ spaṣṭatālavyaḥ*; Vararuci 11.5: *cavargasya spaṣṭatā tathoccarāṇaḥ*; Rāmaśarman 2.2.18cd: *cavargakāṇām upari prayojyo yukteṣu cāntaḥsthayakāra eva*).

¹² Sanskrit (and Śaurasenī) *ccha* becomes *śca* in Māgadhī (see Puruṣottama 12.11, Hemacandra 4.295, Rāmaśarman 2.2.18). In Śāradā script, *cca* and *śca* look very similar, which may explain the *gacca* reading of our manuscripts.

¹³ *pekkha* is a Śaurasenī form. One might consider emending to *peska*, the form prescribed by Hemacandra 4.297 (the way our manuscripts write *kkha* is hardly distinguishable from *ska*), or to *peṣka*, following the most frequent usage of our manuscripts.

¹⁴ *jīṇaraṣkidabhikkhū* is a half-Māgadhī half-Śaurasenī form. Later the Servant will refer to the Jain abbot as *jīṇarakkhidabhikkhū*, however the word *bhīṣkuṇo* (not in compound) will also occur once. Cf. STEINER 1997, pp. 16f.: '[D]ie stillschweigend zugrunde liegende Prämisse, nach der jeder Dichter tatsächlich in einer ganz genauen und konsistenten Weise Prakrit schrieb (oder diktierte), [ist] problematisch. Hat es jemals ein vollkommen reguliertes Prakrit und insbesondere eine konsequent durchgehaltene Orthographie gegeben? Ist es nicht vorstellbar, daß die Prakrit sprechenden Charaktere gelegentlich verschiedene grammatische und phonetische Formen ein und desselben Wortes gebraucht haben?'

¹⁵ The Māgadhī form of Sanskrit *jānāmi* should be *yāṇami* / *yāṇāmi* accord-

ing to the grammarians (Hemacandra 4.292, Vararuci 11.4, PISCHEL §§ 236, 454, 510), but in the old Nepalese manuscript of the *Nāgānanda* we find *jāṇadi* in a Māgadhī passage. As Steiner remarks, ‘Vermutlich beruht die Aufteilung der Formen Ś. *jāṇadi* und Mg. *yāṇādi* wiederum nur auf einer Fiktion.’ (STEINER 1997, p. 173.)

¹⁶ *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR accept the reading of the manuscripts (*vistīe*), but I am not sure that the *chāyā* they give (*vistṛtā*) is possible. *paṃśu-kaṇā* is also suspect since, as Prof. Sanderson has pointed out, ‘dust’ is more likely to be strewn with hair than ‘specks of dust’.

¹⁷ Pulling out the hair in five handfuls is part of the ceremony (*dīkṣā*) that initiates the aspirant into Jain mendicancy (see JAINI p. 245). Both Buddhist and Brahmanical authors frequently refer to this practice as the most striking example of the various ‘unnecessary’ austerities of the Jains. For example Prajñākaramati glosses the expression *sukhenaiiva sukhaṃ pravṛddham* in his commentary to *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 1.7 as ‘not with great pain, like pulling out the hair, etc.’, *na śiroluñcanādinā mahatā kaṣṭhena* (cf. GRANOFF 1992 p. 39, n. 3). But already Vasubandhu comments on *Abhidharmakośa* 4.73ab (*prāṇātipātaḥ sañcintya parasymbhrāntimāraṇam*, ‘taking away life is to kill another deliberately, not by mistake’) in a slightly satirical way: ‘*abuddhipūrvād api prāṇivadhāt kartur adharmah, yathā agnisamyogād dāhaḥ’ iti nirgranthāḥ| teṣāṃ *para-strīdarśanasamsparsāna* (v.l. *paradāradarśane ’py) eṣa prasaṅgaḥ, nirgranthaśiroluñcane ca kaṣṭatapodeśane ca śāstuh, tadvisūcikāmarāṇe ca dātuh|* ‘The Jains teach: one who takes away life is guilty, even if he has not resolved it beforehand, just as one gets burnt because of contact with fire. [But in that case,] when they [unintentionally] see or touch the wife of another, it carries the same consequence for them, and for [their] teacher when the Jains pull out their hair or when he gives instructions to practise hard austerities, and for the donor when they die of cholera (or indigestion, *ajīrṇa*, according to Yaśomitra) [because of the food he gave them].’

Jayanta also found it a ridiculous idea that extreme tortures can lead to salvation (*Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. II, p. 520.7–14):

kacaniluñcanadikpaṭadhāraṇa-

kṣitidharākramaṇakramapūrvakam|

kṣapaṇakās tv apavargam uśanty amī

hy atitarāṃ paramārthavidas tu te||

lomnāṃ nityam asaṃbhavāt khalatayo mokṣaṃ kṣaṇāt prāpnuyuh

(*nityam asaṃbhavāt em. : nityasambhavāt ed.*)

samśāroparāmo digambaratayā sadyas tiraścāṃ bhavet|

muktāḥ syuh giriśṛṅgavāsina ime śāśvattadārohaṇāt

jantūnām apavargavartma nikaṭaṃ kenedṛśaṃ darśitam||

‘As for these Jains, they hold that deliverance depends on the procedure of plucking out the hair, wearing the air as garment, and climbing mountains. Now they are indeed deeply knowledgeable about the ultimate reality! The bald would attain liberation in a flash since they can never have hair; transmigration

would immediately cease for the animals since they are sky-clad; those who live on the peaks of mountains would be liberated since they always mountaineer. Who showed the creatures such a shortcut to deliverance?’

¹⁸ According to the grammarians initial *ya* should be retained in Māgadhī (see Hemacandra 4.292, Puruṣottama 12.5, Rāmaśarman 2.2.14, PISCHEL §252). The manuscripts of the *Āgamadambara*, however, often have relative pronouns with initial *j* in their Māgadhī passages. Cf. note 15.

¹⁹ According to Hemacandra 4.289, Sanskrit *ṣṭa* should become *ṣṭa* in Māgadhī; *duṭṭha* is the Śaurasenī form (see PISCHEL §303). But cf. LÜDERS, *Bruchstücke*, p. 36, fr. 22a2: [i]ṭṭhā.

²⁰ Cf. note 13.

²¹ According to PISCHEL (§94), in Māgadhī and Śaurasenī *kkhu* (and not *khu*) should stand after *-e*, *-o*, and short vowels. In our manuscripts, however, we find *khu* both after *-e* and *-o*. Steiner points out the same phenomenon in the old Nepalese manuscript of the *Nāgānanda*, in the fragments of Aśvaghoṣa’s plays (see LÜDERS, *Bruchstücke*, p. 51) and in other texts as well (STEINER 1997, pp. 195f.), and draws the following conclusion: ‘Zusammenfassend läßt sich also sagen, daß die Schreibung der Aśvaghoṣa-Fragmente, der „Bhāsa“-Mss (in der überwiegenden Zahl der Fälle) und des ältesten Nāg.-Textzeugen A (ebenso wie die erwähnten Inschriften, und zumindest teilweise auch die Mālatīm.-Mss und die beiden Mudr.-Mss MN) die ursprüngliche Orthographie der Partikel *khu* wiederspiegeln dürften.’ (STEINER 1997, p. 198.)

²² According to Hemacandra (4.293), Sanskrit *sūnya* should become *śuñña* in Māgadhī; in the fragments of Aśvaghoṣa’s plays Sanskrit *ny* appears as *ññ* in Śaurasenī (LÜDERS, *Bruchstücke*, p. 48). Cf. PISCHEL §282, who also notes that in the manuscripts of the plays we find only *ṇṇ*.

²³ *picchiā* seems to be a Śaurasenī form, one might consider emending it to the more Māgadhī-looking *piściā*. Cf. however LÜDERS, *Bruchstücke*, pp. 35f, fr. 22.a.2: *vicchadd...*

²⁴ *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. I am uncertain both in the reading and in the interpretation of this sentence. *paliccaīa* seems to be an absolutive form (cf. PISCHEL §590), and the manuscripts suggest *śā ṇu khavaṇiā*, but I cannot interpret *leśamdhayālīdāpaliccaīa*.

²⁵ According to PISCHEL (§145, §498) the correct Māgadhī form of *asmi* is *smi*; *mhi* is in Śaurasenī.

²⁶ *ācakkhadu* is a Śaurasenī form. One may consider emending it to *ācaskadu*, the form prescribed by Hemacandra (the way our manuscripts write *kkha* is hardly distinguishable from *ska*), or *ācaṣkadu*, following the most frequent usage of our manuscripts.

²⁷ According to PISCHEL (§143, §336, see also Vararuci 12.24, Puruṣottama 9,29), 'via is the single prevailing form in Śaurasenī and Māgadhī' for Sanskrit *iva*, while Māhārāṣṭrī, Ardhamāgadhī, and Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī have *va*, *vva* (PISCHEL §92, §143). In Hemacandra's grammar, however, we find the following general rule (2,182): *mīva pīva vīva vva va via ivārthe vā*

²⁸ The Māgadhī form of Sanskrit *tiṣṭhati* is *ciṣṭhadi* (v.l. *ciṣṭa-*, *ciṭṭa-*) according to Vararuci 11.14, *ciṭṭhadi* according to Puruṣottama 12.33, and *ciṣṭhadi* (v.l. *ciṭṭha-*) according to Hemacandra 4.298. PISCHEL votes for *ciṣṭha-* (§483). Cf. note 19.

²⁹ *ex conj.* Cf. PISCHEL §222: Māhārāṣṭrī *dadḍha*, Śaurasenī *dadḍha*.

³⁰ Cf. note 26.

³¹ According to PISCHEL §370, Śaurasenī and Māgadhī 'except in verses, have only the form in *-āṇam*' as plur. gen.

³² PISCHEL writes in §184 that in Māhārāṣṭrī, Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī, Śaurasenī, and Māgadhī we find *uṇa* in the sense of 'now', 'however', and also after *anusvāra*.

³³ As RAGHAVAN and THAKUR point out (p.118), 'Pkt. *lajjānihāṇam* suggests *nidhāṇam*. *nidāṇam* gives better meaning.' Actually the MSS read °*nihāṇe*, masc. *nidhāṇam* means 'pile, hoard, mass', *nidāṇam* would mean 'cause'.

³⁴ Cf. note 11.

³⁵ Cf. Pischel's note ad Hemacandra 4.225: 'In der Māgadhī steht 114, 7. 8 [referring to *Mṛcchakatikā*, ed. Stenzler, Bonn 1847] *pavvajide* mit einfachem *j*, was sich zu Pāli *pabbajito* stellt und daher schwerlich anzufechten ist.'

³⁶ The Servant's speech is full of Śaurasenī forms. I have changed *s* to *ś* and *r* to *l*, but one might consider more radical emendations to get "proper" Māgadhī forms (°*vilala*°, °*yōvvaṇalaṣkaṇāe*, *aṇiścaṃtīe*, *aśiṣkidamaṇalaśāe*, *taluṇa*°). On the other hand, Servant may actually try to speak a kind of Śaurasenī in his rôle of a Jain nun, and a medley of the two languages is the result.

³⁷ I am uncertain of the meaning here. *dadḍhamuṭṭhīe* suggests *dagdhamuṣ-tyāṃ* as its *chāyā*, which I cannot interpret, perhaps it is some obscene expression. On the other hand, *drḍhamuṣṭī*, 'close-fisted' is a well-attested word, but it would become *dadḍha-* in Śaurasenī and Māgadhī (see PISCHEL §242; in fact a few lines below we shall read *dadḍham tae khalikado mhi*). I am inclined to read *dadḍha-* = *drḍha-* with the cerebralisation of the initial *da-*, which is common in Māhārāṣṭrī (see PISCHEL §222, although Pischel points out that 'in Śaurasenī [and probably in Māgadhī as well] the dental remains, except in the cases of transimposition of breath', so we should actually read *dadḍha*° = Sanskrit *dagdha*°).

³⁸ I cannot satisfactorily interpret this sentence. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR's *chāyā*, 'tena hi sammukhāgataṃ śivam' is not entirely convincing. *sammuhādo* could be taken as *sammukhataḥ*, but *śīo* remains a puzzle for me (*ś* is actually not allowed in Śaurasenī). Judging from the context, the sentence may mean something like 'So our lucky star has risen.'

³⁹ Cf. note 13.

⁴⁰ *ex em.* BHAT.

⁴¹ Cf. note 26, but in this case the manuscripts actually read *ācaṣk-*.

⁴² *ex conj.* Other possible emendations suggested by Prof. Sanderson: *pakāśa-iśśaṃ*, *pakādikalaiśśaṃ*.

⁴³ *ex conj.* The most plausible Māgadhī form of Sanskrit *kārṣāpaṇaka* is *kāhāvaṇae* or *kahāvaṇae* (see Vararuci 3.39, Hemacandra 2.71, PISCHEL §263), but I am not certain that this is the best way to emend the reading of the manuscripts (*kasevatae*).

⁴⁴ Cf. PISCHEL §366b: 'The form in -e is used in Mg. as acc. sing.'

⁴⁵ Cf. note 19.

⁴⁶ Another possible emendation might be *pārakeram*.

⁴⁷ One would expect *aniścamti* in Māgadhī.

⁴⁸ The first word (*tī*) of the stage direction is in Prakrit in the manuscripts, which brings to mind the fragments of Aśvaghoṣa's plays where, as Lüders notes, 'Die Bühnenanweisung wird in der Sprache der Person, auf die sie sich bezieht, gegeben. Dazu stimmen jedenfalls die meisten Fälle, in denen eine Nachprüfung möglich ist.' (LÜDERS, *Bruchstücke*, p. 34.)

⁴⁹ *ex conj.* The verb [*ā*]/*liṅg-* requires an object.

⁵⁰ I made a few conjectures in the Boy's speech to have a clearer sentence-structure.

⁵¹ From the Jain standpoint it seems that the monk has fallen victim to one of the *samyaktvadūṣaṇas* (attitudes that spoil the correct, i.e. Jain view), namely *vicikitsā*, which is defined by Hemacandra as follows (*Yogaśāstra* p. 188): *vicikitsā cittaviplavaḥ | sā ca saty api yuktyāgamopapanne jinadharme 'sya mahatas tapaḥkleśasya sikatākaṇakavalavan nisvādasyāyatyāṃ phalasampad bhavitṛ, atha kleśamātram evedaṃ nirjarāphalavikalam itī | ubhayathā hi kriyā drśyante saphalā aphalāś ca kṛṣṭivalādīnām iva |* 'Uncertainty is a confusion in the mind, and it appears in the following form: "Even though the religion of the Jina is well-established through reasoning and scripture, nevertheless this enormous trouble caused by the austerities, which is tasteless like a mouthful of sand-

grains—will it produce any result in the future, or is it just pure trouble, devoid of the fruit of immortality?” For we see two kinds of activities: some are fruitful, while others are fruitless, just as for instance [the labours] of peasants.’ (About the other interpretation of *vicikitsā*, see note 74.)

⁵² This verse seems to be in Māhārāṣṭrī.

⁵³ I am following RAGHAVAN and THAKUR in interpreting °*sumaraṇoggaya*° as °*smaraṇodgata*°, but °*smaraṇāvagata*° might also be a possible *chāyā*. The meaning of the second half of the first line is not entirely clear to me. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR’s conjectures (°*suipunṇabalāṇaṃ* = °*śucipuṇyabalānām* and °*suipunṇapunṇabalāṇaṃ* = °*śucipuṇyapūrṇabalānām*) both seem to be unmetrical. One might consider °*puṇṇaphalabalāṇaṃ* (‘for those who are strong as a result of their merits, which have arisen from remembering the blessed Jina[’s teaching], and which are pure by nature’), but it is also unmetrical, and the meaning is far from being satisfactory. Another possibility could be °*puṇṇapuggalabalāṇaṃ* (°*puṇya/pūrṇapudgalabalānām*), which is metrically correct, and it also refers to the Jain concept of *pudgala*, and possibly to the purification of the soul through meditating on the Jain teaching.

⁵⁴ *jhāijjadi* is a passive form in Jaina-Śaurasenī. In Māhārāṣṭrī the ending should be °*ijjai*, while in Śaurasenī °*iadi* (see PISCHEL §535).

⁵⁵ *gīṇhaha* is mentioned in PISCHEL §471 as a 2. plur. imperative in Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī.

⁵⁶ *jaṃ* is a Śaurasenī form (cf. note 15), while *bhaṣṭake* is in Māgadhī.

⁵⁷ In Sanskrit the pun is based on the double meaning of *prastuta*: ‘praised’ and ‘declared as the subject of discussion’.

⁵⁸ *ex conj.*

⁵⁹ *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

⁶⁰ *Anekāntavāda* was perhaps the best known concept of Jain philosophy for Brahmanical and Buddhist thinkers. It claims that every single entity possesses innumerable characteristics or natures, even mutually incompatible ones. The soul, for example, is eternal with respect to its qualities (which inhere forever in their substance), but it is non-eternal with respect to the modes of these qualities (which last only for a moment) (cf. JAINI p. 90; UNO pp. 423f.). Even existence and non-existence are present simultaneously in the object. Says Haribhadra (*Anekāntajayapatāka* pp. 36f.): *tatra yat tāvad uktam ‘katham ekam eva ghaṭādirūpaṃ vastu sac cāsac ca bhavati’, tad etad āgopālāṅganādiprasiddham anāśāṅkanīyam eva, yatas tat svadravyakṣetrakālabhāvarūpeṇa sad vartate, paradravyakṣetrakālabhāvarūpeṇa cāsac, tatas ca sac cāsac ca bhavati* | (...) *tathā ca tad dravyataḥ pārthivatvena sat, nābāditvena; tathā kṣetrata ihatyatvena, na pāṭaliputrakāditvena; tathā kālato ghaṭakālatvena,*

na mṛtṭpīṇḍādīkālātvena; tathā bhāvataḥ śyāmatvena, na raktatvādinā | ‘The first objection that is raised against this [theory of manysidedness] is as follows: “How can a single thing, which has the form of a pot for example, be both existent and non-existent?” This is a well-established fact for [everyone from scholars] to cowherds, women and the like, and it cannot be questioned in any way, since it is existent in the form of its own substance, place, time, and condition, and it is non-existent in the form of another [object’s] substance, place, time, and condition; and therefore it becomes both existent and non-existent. (...) To explain, it is existent with respect to [its] substance inasmuch as it is made of clay, not inasmuch as it is made of water, etc.; similarly, with respect to [its] place [it exists] inasmuch as it is here, not inasmuch as it is in Pāṭaliputra, etc.; similarly, with respect to [its] time [it exists] inasmuch as it is characterised by the time of the pot, not inasmuch as it is characterised by the time of the lump of clay, etc.; similarly with respect to [its] condition [it exists] inasmuch as it is black, not inasmuch as it is red, etc.’

Put differently, the pot is existent inasmuch as it is black, which also means that it is not red, blue, etc. On the other hand, the pot is non-existent inasmuch as it is red, blue, etc., that is not black. This means that the pot is characterised by all colours in a positive or a negative way, and the same can be said about its other attributes as well. This also explains why the knowledge of a single thing in all its aspects entails the knowledge of all things.

⁶¹ Apart from Jain texts (e.g. *Yogaśāstra* pp. 168f.), we find this verse also in the *Tattvopaplavasīṃha* (TUS(GOS) p. 79), in the *Spandapradīpikā* of Bhagavadutpala (p. 47), in Abhinavagupta’s *Mālinīvijayavārttika* (v. 641ab = the first two lines of the verse, labelled as *arhadvāda* and quoted in an assentient way), and also in Yogarāja’s *vivṛtti* to Abhinavagupta’s *Paramārthasāra* v. 26 (Yogarāja attributes the verse to Śrīśambhubhaṭṭāraka).

⁶² If we examine which philosophical schools criticised the Jain theory of *anekāntavāda*, we find that for instance Dharmakīrti considered it an obscene (*aśīla*) idea that curd may be camel from a certain aspect, while from another aspect it may not be camel (*Pramāṇavārttika with svavṛtti* (GNOLI), p. 89,24: *syād uṣṭro dadhi syān na iti*). If curd does not have a characteristic nature which clearly distinguishes it from a camel, then ‘why does not somebody who has been ordered to eat curd rush towards a camel?’ (*Pramāṇavārttika with svavṛtti* (GNOLI), v. 182cd: *codito dadhi khādeti kim uṣṭraṃ nābhīdhāvati*) If we admit that there is some special ‘plus’ in curd which makes it different and directs us to recognise it, then that very ‘plus’ is curd itself (ibid. v. 183: *athāsty atīśayaḥ kaścid yena bhedenā vartate| sa eva dadhi...*), for ‘curd is something the inherent nature of which is characterised by the condition of being the cause of its effect’ (ibid. p. 90,10–11: *tatphalopādānabhāvalakṣitasvabhāvaṃ hi vastu dadhi*); put differently, the inherent nature of an object is determined by its causal efficacy, *arthakriyākāritva*.)

Since the Graduate is a champion of *mīmāṃsā* we might expect that we’ll find the criticism of *anekāntavāda* in *mīmāṃsaka* sources as well. Therefore

it may seem surprising that some of Kumārila's arguments are actually quite similar to the Jain notion of 'manysidedness'. See for example *Ślokavārttika* (with *Nyāyaratnākara*) *abhāva* 12:

svarūpapararūpābhyāṃ nityaṃ sadasadātmake|
vastuni jñāyate kaiścid rūpaṃ kiñcit kadācana||

'With regard to an object, which is always both existent with its own form and non-existent with the form of another object, certain people cognise only certain form at a certain time.' (The cloth with its non-existent form inheres in the pot, and produces the cognition of its non-existent form in the pot.)

Also *Ślokavārttika vanavāda* 21–23:

vardhamānakabhaṅge ca rucakaḥ kriyate yadā|
tadā pūrvārthinaḥ śokaḥ prītiś cāpy uttarārthinaḥ||
hemārthinas tu mādhyasthaṃ tasmād vastu trayātmakam|
notpādashitibhaṅgānām abhāve syān matitrayam||
na nāśena vinā śoko notpādena vinā sukham|
sthityā vinā na mādhyasthyaṃ tena sāmānyanityatā||

'When a *vardhamānaka* [some kind of ornament] is melt down and then a *rucaka* [another kind of ornament] is made [out of the gold got from the *vardhamānaka*], someone who was interested in the former [ornament] becomes sad, while someone who is interested in the latter [ornament] becomes pleased; that person, however, who is interested in gold [alone] remains indifferent. Therefore an object has a threefold nature. If arising, continuance, and perishing were not there [simultaneously present in the same object], there would not be three [different] mental dispositions. There is no sadness without [the] perishing [of the object], no pleasure without [its] arising, and no indifference without [its] continuance; therefore the common characteristic ['gold'] is permanent.' (The *Āptamīmāṃsā*, which was composed in the 5th century by the Digambara *ācārya* Samantabhadra, contains a verse (v. 59) the content of which is remarkably similar: *ghatamaulisuvarṇārthī nāśotpādashitiṣv ayam| śokapramodamādhyasthaṃ jano yāti sahetukam||*; see also *Ślokavārttika* (with *Nyāyaratnākara*) *vanavāda* 75 seqq.)

Tomoyuki Uno showed in his recent article that 'Kumārila uses the assumption of many-sidedness to defend his theory of the soul', and that 'the very same doctrine is used by the Jaina authors to defend their theory of the soul' (UNO p. 420). As Uno pointed out, the soul must be permanent for Kumārila because the one who performs the ritual and the one who experiences its result must be the same person. On the other hand, the soul cannot be exclusively permanent, because an unchanging subject could not perform any action (see UNO p. 429).

The Jains themselves were aware of the close resemblance between *anekāntavāda* and the *mīmāṃsaka* theory of *bhedābheda*; see for example Vādidevasūri's *Syādvādaratnākara* (11–12th century), p. 833: *mīmāṃsakas tu prāyeṇa sarvatra jainocchiṣṭabhojī*; also Guṇaratna's commentary to Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* §385: *mīmāṃsakās tu svayam eva prakārantareṇaikānekādyanekāntaṃ pratipadyamānās tatpratipattaye sarvathā paryanuyogaṃ nārhanṭi*

⁶³ *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

⁶⁴ The pupil seems to speak a mixture of Śaurasenī (*bhikkhavā, saṃpadam, patthudakajjavelā*) and Māgadhī (*bhaṣṭakā, cilāyadi*).

⁶⁵ It is not clear to me why RAGHAVAN and THAKUR give *vādanīyuktānām* as the *chāyā* of *vādabbhidāna*.

⁶⁶ I cannot decipher the second half of this line. The whole verse seems to be in Māhārāṣṭrī.

⁶⁷ According to Bhāsarvajña (*Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p. 393) Jainism and other heretic religions first spread among the low-born, but later certain slow-witted and impoverished brahmins also showed interest in their teachings about the cessation of suffering (*duḥkhopakṣaya*).

⁶⁸ Jains distinguished ten *vikṛtis* (certain types of food that have changed their nature, or, according to the traditional interpretation, 'that by which the tongue is perverted'): *kṣīra* (milk), *dadhi* (curd), *navanīta* (butter), *ghṛta* (ghee), *taila* (oil), *guda* (molasses), *madya* (alcohol), *madhu* (honey), *māṃsa* (meat), *avagāhima* (first three cookings of rice in a pan filled with ghee or oil) (see WILLIAMS pp. 39f.). Four of these *vikṛtis* are considered as *abhakṣyas* (not fit to be eaten): the three 'm'-s (*madya, madhu, māṃsa*) and butter (see WILLIAMS p. 54, 110). Curd, milk, and ghee do not seem to have been forbidden.

⁶⁹ °*mha* belongs to the imperative, but sometimes it is used (wrongly according to Pischel) as an indicative ending (see PISCHEL §455).

⁷⁰ According to Pischel *hodi* is a false Śaurasenī form (PISCHEL §476), although Hemacandra teaches *bhuvadi, huvadi, bhavadi, havadi, bhodi, and hodi* as possible Śaurasenī forms of Sanskrit *bhavati* (Hemacandra 4.269).

⁷¹ These statements sound suspiciously like a parody of the Jain doctrine of *syādvāda* ('*syāt sugato jīnaguruḥ syān na, syāj jīnaguruḥ sugataḥ syān na*').

⁷² *ex conj.*

⁷³ In the *Harṣacarita* (p. 89) *kāṣāya* is associated with the followers of Sāṅkhya (*kāpilam matam*). *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 3.157, however, prescribes *kāṣāyadhāraṇa* for ascetics in general who strive after liberation.

⁷⁴ In the majority of texts written by the followers of Brahmanical religions we find a lack of comprehension and the expression of actual disgust with regard to Jain doctrine and practice. We have already seen how the practice of *keśaloca* was mocked by non-Jain authors (see note 17). In the *Mudrārākṣasa* Cāṇakya is delighted to hear that a Jain monk has sided with the enemy (p. 74). In the same play Rākṣasa considers it a bad omen when a *kṣapaṇaka* seeks an audience with him, and he orders Priyamvadaka to do something with the disgusting appearance of the mendicant before showing him in (p. 212). Bāṇa's description of a Digambara monk is also typical (*Harṣacarita*, p. 75): *kajjalāmaya iva*

bahudivasam upacitabahalamalapatalamalinitatanur abhimukham ājagāma śikhīpicchalāñchano nagnāṭakah | ‘A naked mendicant was coming towards him, looking as if made of lamp-black, his body dirtied by the cover of plenty of dirt that had accumulated on it during many days, holding the attribute of [his sect: a broom made of] peacock feathers.’

The Jains were certainly aware of this repugnance and its dangerous influence on the mind of the mendicants. One of the *samyaktvadūṣaṇas*, ‘attitudes that spoil the correct view’ is called *vicikitsā*, which can be interpreted as becoming doubtful about the effectiveness of the various self-mortifications with regard to the final goal: deliverance (see note 51), but it can also refer to the disgust that learned people feel towards Jain monks (*vidvajjugupsā*): *vidvāṃsaḥ sādhave viditasamsārasvabhāvāḥ parityaktasamastasaṅgās teṣāṃ jugupsā nindā, asnānāt prasvedajalaklinnamalatvāc ca durgandhivapuṣas tān nindati*, ‘*ko doṣaḥ syād yadi prāsukavāriṇāṅgaprakṣālanam kurvīran bhagavantah?*’ *iti* | ‘The loathing [and] rebuke of learned people, [that is] virtuous men who have become acquainted with the nature of the world and who have abandoned all attachments; one rebukes them [i.e. the Jain monks] because their body stinks since they do not bathe and since [their body is covered with] dirt which is moistened by sweat, saying “what sin would they commit if the reverends washed their body with *prāsukavāri* (?)?”’ (Siddhasenagaṇin’s comm. ad *Tattvārthadhigamasūtra* 7.18, p. 99; cf. *Yogaśāstra* pp. 188f.)

⁷⁵ I cannot interpret the reading of the manuscripts (*cattulavasūra*^o). RAGHAVAN and THAKUR read *vattulavasūracacciḥjāṃta*^o and give the following *chāyā*: *vartulavaśīra*-(*Achyranthis Aspera?*)-*carcita*^o.

⁷⁶ In the case of a Śaurasenī speaker one would expect forms such as *soṇida* and *uddharida* instead of *soṇia* and *uddharia*. On the colour of the *brahmācārin*’s garment see *Āpastamba-dharmasūtra* 1.1.2.41–1.1.3.1: *kaṣāyaṃ caike vastram upadiśanti* | *māñjiṣṭham* (dyed with munjeet) *rājanyasya* |

⁷⁷ The mendicant describes an immense crowd of ascetics, some naked, some wearing white, some red, others black robes (*nīlāmbaras*), but amalgamated into a single flock by the goal of their journey: the feast. There might be differences among these heretic sects concerning their tenets, but on the mundane level they are just part of the same ever hungry plebs—at least this is what the brahmin Jayanta insinuates.

While ‘Jains took great pains to establish and maintain an identity for themselves that was distinct both from Hindu society and from the Buddhists as well,’ observes Granoff (GRANOFF 1994 p. 258), ‘throughout classical and medieval times Jains and Buddhists had been closely linked together by all of their opponents.’ The *bhikṣu* and the *kṣapaṇaka* in the *Prabodhacandrodaya* prove to be equally fickle and easily seducible when they are embraced by the attractive *kāpālīnī* (impersonating the *somasiddhāntin śraddhā*, *Prabodhacandrodaya*, pp. 198ff).

But the Jains were well aware that mundane pleasures, such as a tooth-

some breakfast can be very seductive for ascetics who cannot afford them. This is illustrated by a moral story in the commentary of Devacandra Sūri (11th century) to the *Mūlaśuddhiprakaraṇa*. The story occurs twice in the text, once in the context of *samyaktvadūṣaṇa*, ‘things that detract from the pure faith’, as an example of *kutīrthikapraśamsā*, ‘praising ascetics who follow a false path’ (*Mūlaśuddhiprakaraṇa*, p. 71), and in the section dealing with the various *chiṇḍikās* or ‘temporary lapses’ (*Mūlaśuddhiprakaraṇa*, p. 72; see GRANOFF 1994 pp. 250ff). Jinadāsa, the pious Jain layman, loses the caravan he was travelling with and is unable to find food. Finally he meets a group of *bhikṣus* who promise him all kinds of pleasures if he joins them:

*mṛdvī śayyā prātar utthāya peyā
bhaktam madhye pānakam cāparāhne|
drākṣākhaṇḍam śarkarā cārdharātre
mokṣaś cānte śākyasiṃhena drṣṭah||*

‘Soft bed, rice-gruel after getting up in the morning, lunch at noon, drinks in the afternoon, some grape flavoured candy and candied sugar at midnight, and salvation in the end was envisioned by the Lion of the Śākyas.’ (The same verse occurs in Hemacandra’s *Yogaśāstra* (p. 188.) as an illustration of *kāṅkṣā*, ‘appetite’ for the pleasures provided by non-Jain religions, which belongs to the group of *samyaktvadūṣaṇas*.)

*maṇuṇṇam bhoyaṇam bhocā maṇuṇṇam sayāṇāsaṇam|
maṇuṇṇamṣi agāraṃsi maṇuṇṇam jhāyae muṇī||*

‘Having had a nice meal, sitting nicely on a couch, the sage in a nice house meditates upon nice things.’

Buddhism is presented as a religion which guarantees both *sukha* in this existence and *mokṣa* thereafter, an easy and therefore attractive way to attain deliverance. Poor Jinadāsa, remembering the Jain teaching that there might be times of distress when one may be forced to abandon true faith, accepts food from the *bhikṣus*, but, alas, the unusually rich meal causes indigestion, and he dies on the spot, full of repentance and praising the *arhats*. ‘It is a common theme of Jain stories,’ writes Granoff (GRANOFF 1994 p. 259.), ‘that Jains may be wrongly duped into becoming Buddhists, particularly because they are attracted to the lush life in a Buddhist monastery compared to the severity of life as a Jain monk. (...) Buddhists countered these Jain stories with their own stories in which they justified the Buddhist monastic practices and criticised the strict regimen of the Jain ascetic.’

⁷⁸ I am uncertain in the meaning of *kaṭakāṅga*. *kaṭaka* can mean ‘bracelet, zone, ridge of a mountain, army, camp’.

⁷⁹ Cf. PISCHEL §170: ‘... der Wurzel *jñā* ... hinter *na* sehr oft das anlautende *ja* einbüsst, in AMg. JM., wie im Inlaut, zu *ya* wandelt ...’

⁸⁰ Cf. note 48.

⁸¹ We know from the *Nyāyamañjarī* that King Śaṅkaravarman banned the sect of the *nīlāmbaras* (*Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 649.4–7):

asitaikapataṇivīṭāvīyutastrīpumsavīhitabahuṣeṣṭam|

(*asita*°: em. ISAACSON, ed.: *amita*°;

°*āvīyuta*°: in Pāṭhāntaras and Śodhanas, at the end of vol. II.,
ed.: °*āniyata*°, ‘unrestrained’)

nīlāmbaravratam idaṃ kila kalpitam āsīt vitaiḥ kaiścit||

tad apūrvam iti viditvā nivārayāmāsa dharmatattvajñāḥ|

rājā śaṅkaravarmā na punar jainādimatam evam||

‘Some pimps, as we are told, invented this Black Blanket Observance, in which men and women wrapped together in a single black veil make various movements. King Śaṅkaravarman, who was conversant with the true nature of Dharma, suppressed this practice, because he knew that it was unprecedented, but he did not [suppress] the religions of Jains and others in the same way.’

The same sect was extirpated by King Bhoja of Dhārā (1018–1060), as it is related in the *Purātanaprabandhasaṅgraha* (p. 19, *Nīlapatavadhaprabandha*): *śrībhojarājavārake nīlapatā darśanina āsan| te tu ekā strī ekaḥ pumān nīlīm doṭīm prāvṛtya madhye nagnībhūya vijahratuḥ| ekadā dhārāyām prāptās tatrā-pūrvān dṛṣṭvā sarvaḥ ko ‘pi teṣām samīpe yāti| te tu itthaṃ prarūpayanti— ‘vayam īśvarasya tathyāḥ santānina ardhanārīśvaratvāt|’ itas ca kautukād bhoja-putrī samāgamat| kartavyaṃ pṛṣṭam| tair uktam— ‘piba khāda ca cārulocane yad atītāṃ varagātrī tan na te| na hi bhīru gataṃ nivartate samudayamātram idaṃ kalevaram||’ tayā vyāhṛtam— ‘bhavanmatam aṅgikariṣye|’ nṛpam utkalāpayitum (: em., nṛpam mukta°: ed.) gatā| ‘tātāhaṃ nīlapatānām dharmam aṅgikariṣye|’ nṛpeṇa āhūtāḥ, pṛṣṭās ca— ‘sukhinaḥ stha?’ mukhyenoktam— ‘na nadyo madya-vāhinyo na ca māmāsamayā nagāḥ| na ca nārīmayam viśvam kathaṃ nīlapataḥ sukḥā|’ nṛpenoktam— ‘yūyam kiyantaḥ stha?’ ‘ekonapañcāśad yugalāni|’ nṛpenoktam— ‘sarvān apy ākārayata, ahaṃ tvadbhaktō bhaviṣyāmi|’ te sarve mīlītāḥ| nṛpeṇa puruṣāḥ sarve mārītāḥ, striyaś ca niṣkāsyā muktāḥ| atas teṣām bījam api nāsītam|*

‘In King Bhoja’s time the Black-Blankets attracted attention. These people, one woman and one man, covered themselves with a black *doṭī*, while under it they were naked, and amused themselves. Once they arrived in Dhārā. There everybody gathered round them because their sight was unprecedented. And they set forth the following teaching: ‘We are truly God’s issue, since we are Ardhanārīśvaras.’ And, out of curiosity, Bhoja’s daughter went there to meet them. [She] asked [them about] the duties [one has to do as a member of this sect]. They replied: ‘Drink and eat, lovely-eyed girl! Things that have passed are not yours, o girl with an exquisite body! For what has gone will not return, timid girl. This body is just an aggregate [of elements].’ (The same verse (with variants) appears in Haribhadra’s exposition of the Lokāyata doctrine in his *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, verse 81.) She said: ‘I shall adopt your doctrine.’ She went to ask for the king’s permission. ‘Father, I shall adopt the religion of the black-blankets.’ The king sent for them, and asked them: ‘Are you happy?’ Their leader said: ‘The rivers do not flow with booze, and the mountains are not made of meat, and the world is not made of women: how could a black-blanket be happy?’ The king said: ‘How many are you?’ ‘Forty-nine couples.’ The king said: ‘Summon all of them, I shall be your devotee.’ They all came together.

The king executed all the men, and having expelled the women he let them go. That's how even their seed was destroyed.'

Other sources mentioning the black-blankets are referred to in WEZLER pp. 346f. (E.g. the Ceylonese (c. 1400) *Nikāyasamgrahaya* writes about a depraved Buddhist monk of the *sammitīya* school who put on a blue robe, venerated prostitutes, an invigorating drink, and the god of love instead of the Three Jewels, and composed a *Nīlapaṭadarśana*. King Śrīharsa (of Kanauj? 606–647) studied this work, recognised how dangerous it was, and burnt it together with most of its followers.)

Some verses attributed to a certain *Nīlapaṭṭa* or *Nīlāmbara* have found their way to the *subhāṣita*-collections:

Saduktikarṇāmṛta 468 (= *Subhāṣitaratnakośa* 323, MSS 2670):

ayam sa bhuvanatrāyaprathitasamyamaḥ śāṅkaro

bibharti vapuṣādhunā virahakātarah kāmīnīm|

anena kila nirjitā vāyam iti priyāyāḥ karaṃ

kareṇa paritāḍayañ (v.l. °lālayañ) jayati jātahāsaḥ smarah|| (Nīlapaṭṭasya)

'“That Śāṅkara, whose austerity is celebrated all over the three worlds, is now carrying his beloved in his body, afraid of separation [from her]. They say that we've been defeated by him!” The god of love is victorious, who with these words gives his beloved a high five and bursts into a laugh.'

Saduktikarṇāmṛta 2362:

śīrāṃ pretah kaścid daśati daśanāgreṇa sarasāṃ

līkṣur mastiṣkaṃ kalayati ca mūrdhānam itarah|

karaṃ dhūtvā dhūtvā jvaladanaladīptāṅgulīśikhaṃ

citāsthālīpakvaṃ harati kuṇapakravayam aparah|| (Nīlāmbarasya)

'One of the ghouls bites into a juicy vein with the tip of his tooth; another one holds a head, eager to lap up the brain. Another one carries the flesh of a corpse, cooked in the cauldron of the pyre, shaking again and again his arm, the fingertips of which have been lighted by the burning fire.'

In the *Yaśastilakacampū* (p. 252) the Buddhist Sugatakīrti recites approvingly the following verse composed by *Nīlapaṭa*:

idam eva ca tattvam upalabhyālāpi nīlapaṭena—

payodharabharālasāḥ smaravighūrṇitārdheḥṣaṇāḥ

*kvacit salayapañcamoccaritagīta *jhaṅkāriṇīḥ (MS. Poona : °ḍaṅkāriṇāḥ ed.)|*

vihāya ramaṇīr amūr aparamokṣasaukhyārthinām

*aho jaḍimaḍiṇḍimo viphalā *bhaṇḍa (MS. Poona : °bhaṇḍī° ed.)pākhaṇḍinām||*

'And Nīlapaṭa, too, having comprehended the same truth, said: “How loudly those heretic buffoon losers trumpet abroad their own stupidity who, seeking for the bliss of another kind of deliverance, abandon these lovely women, languid with the weight of their breasts, their half-closed eyes rolling in love, and sometimes humming a rhythmic tune which ascends to the fifth note.” '

Padmanābhamiśra (16th century) also mentions the black-blankets as a division of the *digambaras* (*Setuṭīkā* in *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, Caukhamba Sanskrit Series 61, Benares, 1924–1931, p. 107): *digambarabhedā eva kṣapaṇakaśvetāmbārārhatanīlāmbārarakṭāmbārācarmāmbārābarhāmbārādayaḥ|* In the biography of Kṛṣṇācārya / Kāṇha we read about a black-robed Tīrthika who vener-

ates Maheśvara (see GRÖNBOLD p. 187). According to GRÖNBOLD the *nīlāmbaras* were Christian missionaries.

⁸² *gāho* can also stand for *gādhah*, 'desire, consequence'.

⁸³ *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.

⁸⁴ The reading of the manuscripts (*ittia*) suggests *iyat* or *etāvat* as its *chāyā*, but RAGHAVAN and THAKUR's silent emendation to *itthia*^o seems to make better sense.

⁸⁵ *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.

⁸⁶ Both the reading and the interpretation of this verse is highly tentative. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR silently emend *sosijjāi* to *so sijjhai* (*sa sidhyati*), and take *sarīradā* as an ablative form. On the other hand cf. TAGARE §80 (p. 110): "This *-dā* of nom. sg. is a special characteristic of WAp [Western Apabhraṃśa]." *so* can be a neutr. direct singular (see TAGARE, p. 225), which makes the following *chāyā* possible: *tat sidhyati sarīram*. The reading of the manuscripts, could also be interpreted as *śoṣyate sarīram*, which is parallel to the expression *parisosijjāi dehadā* below. Another possibility might be to take *sijjāi* as the Apabhraṃśa form of *svidyati*.

⁸⁷ I am following RAGHAVAN and THAKUR's reading and interpretation. *appaī*, however, suggests *arpayati* as its *chāyā* (cf. TAGARE p. 347), or one might read it as *appaīm*, i.e. *ātmanā*.

⁸⁸ The bare stem form without any ending can be used in plur. gen. (cf. TAGARE §86, p. 146).

⁸⁹ I cannot interpret the second half of this verse. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR give the following *chāyā*: *prathamah saṅgaḥ yena īdrśah tadā haṃsaḥ nirbalaḥ sahasvabhāvah nirāsaḥ*. Prof. Sanderson conjectured the following *chāyā* and translation: *pariveṣṭitaḥ saṅgamo yadedrśas tadā haṃso nirmalaḥ sahasvabhāvo nirīdrśah*, "When we wrap up and copulate like this [reading *eiso*], [ours] is the Haṃsa [the vibrating *paramātman*], spotless, unequalled, innate-and-spontaneous." The verse does not seem to be metrical. *tāhaṃ* could be interpreted as *teṣām* (or, reading perhaps *tahōṃ*, as *tasya*), followed by *so* (*saḥ*). *ṇivalia* (Deśī) can mean *jaladhauta*, *praviganita*, *viyukta*. I am not certain that the fragment *ṇira* belongs to the same verse.

⁹⁰ RAGHAVAN and THAKUR suggest the following *chāyā*: *iti yadi yuge yuge* (or, following P.L. Vaidya's suggestion, *prthak prthak*) *viññāyate*.

⁹¹ Both the reading and the interpretation of this verse are conjectural. I took *punu bhoa* belonging to the previous verse.

⁹² I have conjectured a lacuna at this point, since nothing seems to rhyme with *viṇu*. *satattu* may be the corrupted form of the rhyming word, or rather it may

belong to the next verse. I've made a few tentative conjectures to squeeze some meaning out of the words. The form *iṃu* instead of *imu* is arguably improbable.

⁹³ *ex conj.* *lā* in the sense of "take up".

⁹⁴ Again the rhyming word (possibly an imperative) seems to be missing.

⁹⁵ *ex conj.* The reading of the manuscripts (*rājāno*) clearly does not make sense. On the other hand, RAGHAVAN and THAKUR's conjecture (*re jantoh*) is not entirely convincing to me. Although one might argue that *jantoh* can be contrasted with *pumsām* in the following line, I would expect a vocative after the particle *re*. °*nirbhaya*° and *na* are also conjectures.

⁹⁶ *ex conj.*

⁹⁷ *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR conjectured *hi* as the syllable that is missing from this unmetrical line, but it is difficult to see what role this *hi* could possibly have in the sentence.

⁹⁸ *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. This is probably a reference to the *kāpālīka* ascetic observance of the skull (*kapālavrata*). On the other hand the learned *snātaka* might also allude to the ancient solemn Vedic ritual, which involved joyful singing, music, and dance, as well as an obscene altercation and sexual intercourse between a *brahmacārin* and a prostitute. (See DEZSŐ, pp. 15–41.)

⁹⁹ *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.

¹⁰⁰ I follow Prof. Sanderson's suggestion in interpreting °*bhava*° as 'Śiva'. I am not entirely certain, however, why is it necessary to mention here Jayanta's expertise in the Śaiva scriptures. One would expect a more general statement, and the following conjecture might be considered: *aśeṣabhuvanāgamapārage*, 'master of all religious doctrines in the world'.

Act Three

Then enters an ADEPT.¹

ADEPT (*looks around nervously*). The horned moon—the Great Lord's mark² has set by now. The sky is empty and dark, like my³ heart.⁴ No time like this to slip away. So where is my bosom friend, Crematory-Ash, with whom I shall run off? (*He walks about and looks ahead.*) Here is Crematory-Ash, he seems⁵ to be coming right this way.

Then enters the 2ND ADEPT.

2ND ADEPT. Here is comrade Skeleton-Banner's shelter.⁶ I can see it dimly even in this darkness. So I'll go watching⁷ my steps. (*He walks about and listens.*) I thought I heard footsteps. Good Lord, I think the city-guards⁸ are walking this way! If they come upon me they'll believe that I have robbed someone⁹ and they'll throw me into prison,¹⁰ or put me on the spit, or hang¹¹ me on a tree. Let that be! Lord Bhairava is my refuge.¹² (*He looks carefully.*) I thought I heard comrade Skeleton-Banner talking. (*He takes heart and goes closer.*) Comrade Skeleton-Banner, it's you I've stumbled upon! I was afraid it was the city-guards.¹³

1ST ADEPT. Hey, Crematory-Ash, is that you?¹⁴ Well done that you've come here. So let's move on quickly. Let's slip away together while¹⁵ it is still dark.

2ND ADEPT. Are you afraid that the city-guards will take you to be a thief and put you to death?¹⁶

1ST ADEPT. I have no such fear. Even if I have,¹⁷ it calms down. But another evil has arisen.

2ND ADEPT (*agitated*). How come?¹⁸

1ST ADEPT. Why certainly, there is this rumour, haven't you heard it? Nowadays this damned kingdom¹⁹ has completely changed.

2ND ADEPT. My heart²⁰ is going pitapat! Come on, comrade, spill it²¹ quick!

1ST ADEPT. King²² Śaṅkaravarman's cruelty is public knowledge. That brahmin, his²³ adviser, the wicked Jayanta is even rougher than him. They nabbed the mendicant Nilāmbaras, beat them to jelly, and expelled them from the kingdom,²⁴ on the grounds that they were outside Vedic religion. And if any other mendicant is caught who is outside Vedic religion, he'll be beaten up, killed, thrown in jail,²⁵ [or] slain. And we²⁶ can also be counted²⁷ among these very people. We drink²⁸ booze, eat²⁹ meat, have sex with women.³⁰ Surely we³¹

observe the same religious discipline as the Nīlāmbaras.³² So now let's hide our Adept-dress,³³ and move on with rapid steps, unnoticed in this darkness.

2ND ADEPT (*alarmed*). Let's do so!

They walk about.

2ND ADEPT. Comrade Skeleton-Banner, how³⁴ has this evil cropped up?

1ST ADEPT. Listen. To begin with, there is³⁵ that³⁶ graduate brahmin called Saṅkarṣaṇa, who saw³⁷ countless Nīlāmbara couples³⁸ singing and having fun in the grove which is the abode of monk Jinarakṣita.³⁹

2ND ADEPT. And then?

1ST ADEPT. Then he informed⁴⁰ that Jayanta. He in his turn briefed the king.

2ND ADEPT. And then?

1ST ADEPT. Then the king⁴¹ sent for that graduate brahmin Saṅkarṣaṇa, married him, granted him privileges, the right of wearing a turban⁴² and using the title 'Right Honourable', and appointed him to the position of superintendent over the religious matters of the whole country. He started this fire.

2ND ADEPT. You should rather say⁴³ that the wicked Jayanta started it.

1ST ADEPT. Anyway, things are like this. So where shall we go now?⁴⁴

2ND ADEPT. We must present ourselves before⁴⁵ Doomsday-Fire's-Flame, the sorceress. These bad times will hopefully not trouble⁴⁶ us there.⁴⁷

1ST ADEPT. Is she protected⁴⁸ these days?

2ND ADEPT. I suppose⁴⁹ that Queen⁵⁰ Sugandhādevī, the chief wife⁵¹ of the king,⁵² who is the mistress of the whole harem, will perhaps take her under her shelter, because she is a woman.

1ST ADEPT. Even if she is protected,⁵³ can she protect us?⁵⁴ I know! Let's go to some faraway region bounded by forests.⁵⁵

2ND ADEPT. You're right,⁵⁶ comrade. So let's move on quickly before the day begins to break.

They do so.

1ST ADEPT. Hey Crematory-Ash, you're right. But after daybreak one cannot even walk a step in this damned kingdom.⁵⁷

2ND ADEPT. Why?

1ST ADEPT. In every region, every single town, every village, everywhere the sound of Veda-recitation grates on the ear, the smell of ghee stings the nose, the smoke of sacrifice⁵⁸ brings tears to the eyes. So we must cross this damned kingdom strictly by night. The days, however, must be tided over in the depths of some forest.

2ND ADEPT. Quite right. We⁵⁹ must also move strictly by night for fear of Saṅkarṣaṇa.⁶⁰ The days, however, must be spent unnoticed in the woods.

They walk about.

1ST ADEPT. Hey Crematory-Ash, the quarters all seem to have parted, the stars are slowly waning. Now dawn has arrived. What shall we⁶¹ do?

Behind the scenes, after the sound of drums.

Listen here, citizens and villagers! By the royal order of His Majesty, King Śaṅkaravarman, the Right Honourable Bhaṭṭa Saṅkarṣaṇa notifies all of you:

Those virtuous people who have fallen into the beginningless stream of the world and belong to various religions—they should remain as they are, performing practices prescribed⁶² by their own religious discipline. Those criminal false ascetics, however, who devastate the established social and religious order—if they don't leave immediately, the king will strike them like thieves. (1)

BOTH (*listening, alarmed*). Our⁶³ walking death by the name of Saṅkarṣaṇa has truly arrived. So let's move on quickly somewhere else.

Both exit.

Then enter the Right Honourable SAṅKARṢAṆA, who has divested himself of his Graduate-garments and is dressed in garments becoming a married functionary of the king, and the BOY, and as many attendants as can be afforded.

GRADUATE. Boy, do people speak ill of us because we have driven away the Nīlāmbaras?

BOY. Have no such fear, Sir! You have re-established the religious order of the Three Vedas, which had been truly ruined, vanquished⁶⁴ by depraved false ascetics.⁶⁵

GRADUATE. You should rather say that King Śaṅkaravarman saw to it that it was established. So aren't there other false ascetics roaming at large in the country who, imitating the style of the Nīlāmbaras, deserve being driven away?

BOY. Sir, some depraved ascetics who fool around calling themselves Śaivas were seen up to this time. But now, having fallen into disrepute because of your ardour,⁶⁶ they have become very few.

GRADUATE. Well spoken! I have also noticed them indeed. They are worthy of banishment. For

What is not fit to drink for them? Surely that which is not liquid. That thing is not consumable which is bitter or which cannot be cracked by teeth. If there is any being with breasts at all which is not suitable to have sex with, then it must be unborn or dead. What in the world could be an appropriate place for asceticism? Perhaps a pub.⁶⁷ (2)

BOY. It is as you say, Sir.

GRADUATE. Boy, this is also a significant detriment for the social estates and life-periods.

BOY. It is certainly a disgrace for those followers of Śiva, too, abusing whose name they do their business.

GRADUATE. You're quite right, boy. The king certainly acts in the proper way when also he gives heed to their expulsion. Furthermore,

When they proclaim the Lord's name saying 'We follow Śiva's teaching' these wicked people are doing damage to His chaste religions. If the king subdued them in the right way and established them on the spotless path,⁶⁸ why should his laudable protection of the earth or his fame suffer any loss? (3)

BOY. Exactly.

GRADUATE. Be sure, I've got the king's decree in this matter. So let these patrolmen be ordered to search for them.

BOY. As you command, Sir. (*He exits and enters again.*) Sir, they have disappeared from the kingdom. But another excited courier has come looking for you. So it is for you, Sir, to decide in this matter.

GRADUATE. Lead him in.

The boy calls him in with a sign.

SERVANT (*enters, [says] excitedly*). Glory to the Master! Those followers of Śiva, who are addicted to eating meat, drinking booze, and having sex with maid-servants, disappeared from the kingdom to a man as soon as the rumour about the Nīlāmbaras reached them.⁶⁹ But other, chaste ascetics also grew alarmed and started⁷⁰ to leave. It is for you, Master, to decide in this matter.

GRADUATE. Boy, we must quickly appoint community-leaders after honouring them to turn back the virtuous. (*To the SERVANT.*) Hey, you go with those people and show the way.

SERVANT. As the Master commands. (*Exits.*)

BOY. Oh my, you have wavered in your resolution, Sir.⁷¹

GRADUATE. Boy, it is improper that those who follow the chaste religions that have come down to us with the beginningless continuum should be beset by worries. For King Śaṅkaravarmadeva is supremely devoted to Śiva, and he is merciful to all religious schools. So come, we shall go now straight to the ashram of the Venerable Dharmasīva in order to soothe needless worries.

BOY. As you command, Sir.

They walk about.

Behind the scenes.

Why are you worried and afraid, hermits? The king, master of all religious schools, is not hostile towards you. The Great Lord has banished those who, screening themselves with faked observances, had almost proved to be your ruin. (4)

BOY. These must be the community-leaders appointed by you, Sir, passing by, notifying the public.

GRADUATE. Well observed, boy. We shall quicken our pace. (*They walk about.*) Boy, we must have arrived at the ashram⁷² of the Venerable Dharmasīva, for—

Their colour is grey from the smearing-ashes, they are able to inflame the fires of incense, they have just drunk the pure nectar of flowers (5)

used for the worship of the One Who Conquered the [Three] Forts—whom do not enchant these blessed breezes in the Śaiva ashram, which loosen the knots in the matted hair of the ascetics, and delight in presenting a slow[, graceful] dance⁷³ of the mendicant-garments?

BOY. It is as you say, Sir. This penance-grove seems to me peaceful and charming.⁷⁴

GRADUATE. Come now, let's enter. (*They mime entering.*) What! The Reverend Abbot Dharmasīva comes forward in the very courtyard! How the splendour of his asceticism outshines everyone! For—

His beautiful face is smiling with ashes,⁷⁵ his forehead is cleansed by the holy water of the Ganges, he is worshiped by ascetics resembling the kind *gaṇas*, who bustle about and act as servants,⁷⁶ his spotless soul is constantly gladdened by his bright fame which is [white] like camphor, *just as Śiva is delighted by the well-praised Gaurī together with the moon*—he, resembling Śrīkaṇṭha, truly brings about salvation for the creatures merely by being seen. (6)

And what's more,

Having entered the ground of the ashram, which removes the various stains of the Iron Age, I also feel, upon my word,⁷⁷ as if I were in Śiva's heaven,⁷⁸ reanimated by the three eyes of Smara's smiling enemy. (7)

BOY. Me too, I see myself flying towards absorption into Brahman.⁷⁹

Then enters the Venerable Dharmasīva sitting on a stool, looking as described above, and as many followers as can be afforded.

ABBOT (*pensively*).

The merits of this king are celebrated all over the world, and his attention⁸⁰ is solely devoted to social and religious order. As for this adviser, Jayanta, he never grows weary of strolling in the great forest of *śāstra*. I don't think⁸¹ they would take [any] measures which would be contrary to their reputation. The hermits should remain as usual. Why worry?⁸² Or rather, what danger can there be for people of our breed? (8)

He looks ahead. What in the world! The Graduate has come right here! Everything is clear now.

GRADUATE. Come, boy, let's bow down to the Abbot. (*They approach.*) Obeisance to the Blessed Abbot, Maheśvara manifest in front of us!

ABBOT. Welcome, Sir. Are you well? Please take this seat.

GRADUATE. There's no need of seats, I'll just sit down on the lawn. Your Holiness, I hope the observance of religious austerities goes on free from impediments, as it has been established. Or rather, what kind of impediment could occur here? The Blessed Maheśvara worships himself by himself. So could Your Holiness

please advise the ascetics that they should not be worried in the slightest degree about this rumour among the people? The king has removed precisely the impediments of asceticism. And the king himself is also coming close behind us to visit Your Holiness.

ABBOT (*smiling*). Why should I or the ascetics be worried? As long as His Majesty Śaṅkaravarman righteously rules the country which has fallen to him, the kingdom belongs to the virtuous alone, but he supports it. And it is like that not just today; we have been experiencing the same for a long time.

AN ASCETIC (*enters with a toss of the curtain, excited*). Glory to the Abbot! Some elderly scholar has come here, showing off his arrogance, mocking at the ashram, surrounded by several disciples, making †... †⁸³ So it is for Your Holiness to decide in this matter.

ABBOT (*smiling*). Let the poor fellow enter, I don't mind.

Then enters VRDDHĀMBHI as described above.

VRDDHĀMBHI. Amazing! What a great disaster-maker king Śaṅkaravarman is, letting the great riches of his⁸⁴ kingdom be consumed without check by Vedic priests, hermits, renunciators, celibate students, as well as by these Śaivas, Pāśupatas, Pāñcarātrikas, Jainas, Sāṅkhyas, Buddhists and the rest. So how is he going to live long? He now actually looks like a heavenly tree in a place where there is nothing around it.⁸⁵ I am going to take this opportunity to do away with God, set aside the world-to-come, demolish the validity of the Vedas, and thereby turn this king back from this wrong path and establish him on the right track, so that he, concentrating on worldly prosperity, can enjoy his kingship for a long time.⁸⁶ Now I have heard that a lot of self-proclaimed scholars are gathered in this Śaiva ashram. I shall make this Śaiva professor a laughing-stock right in front of them. (*He takes a few steps and looks in another direction.*) Here is the Śaiva professor who is an expert⁸⁷ in the systems of Kaṇabhakṣa, Akṣapāda and others, and this here is Saṅkarṣaṇa, the great Mīmāṃsaka, and here there are many other scholars belonging to various branches of learning. All right then, I'll approach them. (*He approaches.*) Are you OK, ascetic? Hello, brahmin. (*While saying this he sits down right on the lawn with his pupils.*)

ABBOT (*smiling*). What? Disrespect right from the beginning?⁸⁸ (*He looks at Saṅkarṣaṇa's face [being curious how he will react].*)

GRADUATE. Reverend, you're right. Well, let's see.

VRDDHĀMBHI. Why do you live so miserably because of hundreds of useless torments?

[Your] asceticism is [just] a variety of tortures; [your] self-restraint is just a way to cheat yourself of pleasures;⁸⁹ [while your] sacrificial rituals such as the Agnihotra seem [to me] just like children's games.⁹⁰ (9)

ABBOT. What shall we do? The Lord God impels us to perform such actions.

VRDDHĀMBHI. But who is this Lord God?

Here goes the son of a barren woman,⁹¹ after bathing in the water of a mirage, with a wreath of sky-flowers on his head, holding a bow made of hare-horn.⁹² (10)

ABBOT. Enough abuse! For he is the Blessed creator and destroyer of the whole world; he supervises the mass of karmas, according to their appropriate scope, which [karmas] are active in the infinite mass of creatures and have various effects;⁹³ he is the eternally blissful, omniscient, compassionate Supreme Lord.

VR̥DDHĀMBHI (*laughing slightly*). Behold the foolish vision of idiots, obstructed by the blindness of devotion, sees nothing. How could it be thus? For how on earth can people accept that he [God] is the [supreme] agent? To explain,⁹⁴

It is compassion,⁹⁵ it is sport,⁹⁶ it is the Lord's whim, it is an impulse,⁹⁷ it is his nature, this is the way he earns merit, or rather it is [his] honesty⁹⁸ : who knows what that ancient, passionless sage, who has all he needs, has got into his head that he creates and destroys the universe? (11)

How could one who has no desire for the group of causal factors like the instrumental cause, and who is also deprived of assistant factors, enter the state of being the cause of the maintenance, destruction, and creation of the worlds,⁹⁹ which has no particular¹⁰⁰ benefit for himself or others? (12)

Moreover,

Even if he is the creator, what rule is there to ensure that he is going to create exactly in this way [as you say] and [only] three worlds, and he does not create other and more worlds? (13)

ABBOT. Stop exerting yourself in putting forward fault-finding arguments.

For, since fault-finding argument is pointless with regard to something which lacks [the support of a] means of valid knowledge, [while on the other hand,] with regard to what is proved by a means of valid knowledge, it [i.e. fault-finding argument] is totally discarded, [therefore] disputants should stop making noise with uttering those [fault-finding arguments] and seek positive arguments regarding [this] matter which is beyond the scope of the sense organs. (14)

VR̥DDHĀMBHI (*smiling*). If that's what you think, then please state a proof for establishing God.

ABBOT. I say that inference [proves His existence].

VR̥DDHĀMBHI (*smiling*). To say [that something is] an inference and [at the same time] a means of valid knowledge is wish[ful thinking].

It is extremely difficult to verify things with the help of inference since their capacities differ because of differences in condition, place, and time.¹⁰¹ (15)

Moreover,

One who relies on inference tumbles easily just like a blind man running by touch of hand on an uneven path.¹⁰² (16)

Furthermore,

Even if clever logicians infer something with great effort, other, extremely competent [logicians] account for [the same thing] in another way.¹⁰³ (17)

ABBOT. Enough of verbosity! We know all too well this 'speciality of the house' of the Bārhaspatyas [i.e. materialists]. But tell me this: is sense perception the one and only means of valid knowledge for them?

VRDDHĀMBHI. The answer is yes.¹⁰⁴

ABBOT. Then no everyday activity is possible for them.

VRDDHĀMBHI. How so?

ABBOT. If you suffer the torments of hunger,¹⁰⁵ my poor thing, you seek rice, not sand. When you are thirsty you look for water, not for fire.

VRDDHĀMBHI. If so, then what of it?

ABBOT.

My friend, the state of being the 'best thing' [for a particular purpose] surely does not fall into the scope of the sense faculties. It is ascertained through the positive and negative concomitance of entities. (18)

And positive and negative concomitance are the main defining characteristic of the inferential mark. [As for] the condition of being the property of the subject, that holds for any inferential mark seen in a particular subject. (19)

These are indeed the [very] life-breath of inference: positive and negative concomitance, and the condition of being the property of the subject.

VRDDHĀMBHI. Surely for humans, just as for animals, this [everyday] activity, which is based on determining what leads to pleasure and what to suffering, will take place merely through instinct.

ABBOT. Say not so. For instinct is defined as a knowledge the specific cause of whose [validity] is unknown. But in this case we do know the cause, [namely] positive and negative concomitance, and [the condition of being the property of a subject]. And one cannot deny something self-evident.

VRDDHĀMBHI. Surely even if we know the cause, yet we do not really know it, since we cannot comprehend the connection of being invariably related. Therefore this [everyday] activity is pleasant only if we do not examine it, and this fact alone is real: thus say those who know reality.¹⁰⁶

ABBOT. This is laziness, or you just don't want to yield an inch.¹⁰⁷ These scholars [are here because they] are taking the opportunity to examine things.

VRDDHĀMBHI. Surely this examination is impossible, because there are infinite individual instances of smoke and fire, and non-smoke and non-fire,¹⁰⁸ and people who have not perceived directly the multitude of all things existing in the three worlds cannot ascertain this positive and negative concomitance. As for the omniscient, what is the use of inference for them?

ABBOT. First of all, positive concomitance can be grasped resorting to universals. The infinitude of individual instances cannot invalidate [the inference] since smoke-ness is one and fire-ness is also one. And following precisely the accordance of positive universals, the accordance¹⁰⁹ of their absence can also be grasped. And that is exactly the negative concomitance.

The association of two things [i.e. *hetu* and *sādhya*] is taught to be positive concomitance. As for negative concomitance, it is considered to be the concurrence of their absence. (20)

As for *pakṣadharmatā* [the condition (of the inferential mark) of being the property of the subject], that poor thing, she can easily be understood, since we cannot ascertain the inferential mark as a property without it having any locus. Therefore, since the cause [of validity] is easily determined in this way, even animals, just like the wise, act only with the help of means of valid knowledge. As the Commentator says, 'Therefore the activities of gods, human beings, and animals are possible in this way, with the help of these means of valid knowledge, [and] not otherwise.'¹¹⁰

VRDDHĀMBHI. Surely this may be all right for [inferences of] things already established in the world, regarding which cognition has already arisen [through sense perception], but it is impossible for things regarding which cognition is [still] to be acquired.¹¹¹

For ordinary people, unless they are deceived by logicians, do not cognise God from effects like the earth, in the way [they cognise] fire from smoke. (21)

ABBOT.

Even womenfolk, even a child, even a cowherd, even you, Sir, comprehend one thing without doubt from some other specific [i.e. invariably concomitant] thing. (22)

Because of the power of invariable concomitance, one can successfully infer a sentient agent from his effect, just as [one can infer] fire from smoke.¹¹² (23)

VRDDHĀMBHI.

Surely an effect like a pot, the production of which is conceivable, is one thing, and a very different thing is, for instance, a mountain, for there is a great difference between them.¹¹³ (24)

ABBOT.

Indeed, this smoke having small beginnings in the kitchen is one thing, and a very different thing is that [smoke] on the mountain, permeating the main and intermediate directions of the sky.¹¹⁴ (25)

Moreover these are the leftovers of the red-robed [Buddhists] that you are eating:

‘When that particular kind of compositeness etc. is established to be in positive and negative concomitance with the [existence of the] controller,—it is fine that that [i.e. the existence of a controller] is inferred from that [kind of compositeness].’¹¹⁵ (26)

Depending upon a specific property [i.e. the *liṅga*] the process of inference does take place. Where is there ever a complete similarity between the thing that has the property in the major term and the one in the example?¹¹⁶ (27)

VṚDDHĀMBHI. Surely there is a real universal in other cases, but in this case the similarity is only nominal, not real. And [to apply inference] in the case of nominal similarity would be a fault of overextension.¹¹⁷

ABBOT (*smiling*). How could there be real universal in the house of a Buddhist?

We see that these everyday activities of people depend upon some universal, whether arisen from the intellect, or external, real or conventional. (28)

There are many [things] which, although they are [all] effects, do not resemble each other. Therefore I don’t see the point of the expression ‘that particular kind’.¹¹⁸ (29)

VṚDDHĀMBHI. But surely these ‘products’ such as the earth are quite special.

ABBOT. Surely, then, you should postulate a very special craftsman.¹¹⁹

VṚDDHĀMBHI. I cannot postulate something which is unknown.

ABBOT. And I cannot bring up¹²⁰ an effect that has no agent.

VṚDDHĀMBHI. So what can we do in such a case?

ABBOT. Which alternative shall we reject? Is it the extraordinary nature of the agent that is troublesome or is it the effect having no agent that is troublesome? Regarding these two, according to the general principle, ‘we postulate something unseen in order to account for something already seen, but we cannot deny something seen’, one should put up with the extraordinary nature of the agent because the effect is also extraordinary rather than disregarding the fact that something is an effect.

VṚDDHĀMBHI (*draws on the ground*).

ABBOT. Moreover when we infer the faculty of sight as the instrument from our perception of colours, just as [we infer] a scythe from the action of mowing and an axe from the action of cutting, in this case what kind of property does the faculty of sight have in common with the scythe and the axe?¹²¹

VṚDDHĀMBHI. Let that not be inferred either—why should it bother me?

ABBOT. But how could you see colour without your faculty of vision?

VRDDHĀMBHI. Let there be then some kind of instrument.

ABBOT. Let there be then [in the same way] some kind of agent.

VRDDHĀMBHI. I cannot put up with an agent. [But] how could there be action without an instrument?¹²²

ABBOT. How could there be an effect without an agent? For [the word] 'effect' is not just a name like 'Dittha', but something is an effect because it is made. Something is both made and [made] without an agent: by whom [then]? We do not know. So endure this inmedicable headache of inferring God.¹²³ What [else] can you do?

VRDDHĀMBHI (*draws on the ground*).

ABBOT. Furthermore you must also endure the severe pain of transmigration.¹²⁴

VRDDHĀMBHI. No living person will endure it.

ABBOT. Surely you will die very quickly.

VRDDHĀMBHI. How so?

ABBOT. Consciousness cannot be a property of the material elements because it does not exist for as long as the substance does and because it is aware of itself.¹²⁵ And if you hold the theory of the 'stream of consciousness', the activities of remembering, desiring, etc. are not possible without a single synthetiser.¹²⁶

VRDDHĀMBHI. Let there be then some such entity which is the cognising subject. But what proves that it exists after the cremation of the body?

ABBOT. My good fellow, no other proof is needed for that.

VRDDHĀMBHI. Why?

ABBOT. For the existence of the fact that the destruction of something is part of its nature is denied. In addition we never experience either the arising, or the perishing of the cognising subject, or any cause of these [i.e. arising and perishing]. Nor is it the case that its destruction [though never perceived] must be possible on the ground that it has parts, in the way that, for instance, a cloth [is destroyed], when, for example, the contact of its threads with one another disintegrates.¹²⁷ Therefore we perceive only the form itself of this real entity called 'subject' but not its arising or perishing. Because of this, if the cognising subject exists it must be eternal.¹²⁸ If it is eternal then it is the one which transmigrates. Why do the Cārvākas say, 'Because there is nothing which transmigrates therefore there is no transmigration'?¹²⁹ And there is a further consideration: the infant's joy, fear, sorrow, etc., and his desire for milk, etc., cannot be said to be either innate or accidental or produced merely by instinct. So because of this, too, the Self is indeed inferred to be eternal.¹³⁰

VRDDHĀMBHI. But what is gained by investigating transmigration in the context of proving [the existence of] God?

ABBOT. This is what is gained: if there is transmigration then the creation of the material world cannot but be caused by [individual] karmas.¹³¹

VRDDHĀMBHI. So what?

ABBOT. The karmas are also the causes of the creation of bodies, etc.¹³²

VRDDHĀMBHI. And then what?¹³³

ABBOT. Surely the karmas are unconscious.¹³⁴

VRDDHĀMBHI. And even then what?

ABBOT. Surely an insentient thing can only become a cause if it is presided over by a sentient being.¹³⁵

VRDDHĀMBHI. Surely the sentient agents will preside over those very karmas.

ABBOT. They cannot, since no accord is possible among those who have different intentions.

VRDDHĀMBHI. Then what about carpenters?

ABBOT. Why carpenters?

VRDDHĀMBHI. Surely they build one house although they are many.

ABBOT. That's not so. They follow the will of one architect.¹³⁶

VRDDHĀMBHI. Then what about the brahmins' agreement in an assembly?

ABBOT. In that case, too, the assembly adheres to the will of a single chairman who is expert in the matter. But in this case, the body of a king or the body of an adviser, a single thing, is the source of pleasure and suffering for thousands of living beings through helping or harming them, so surely it is produced by their karmas collectively. And those for whom the king's body causes suffering do not rejoice at its production.¹³⁷ Therefore it is the Lord God alone who must surely be accepted as the supervisor of such an immense heap of karmas [of so many people]. And so, once one has completely established [that there must be one overseer], the proof of God[']s existence] is irrefutable. And thus let us leave aside the great, immeasurable products like the earth, the ocean, the mountains, etc.;¹³⁸ we can infer God following the same steps even just from such insignificant products as, for instance, slender little bodies like mine. And in this way even heaps of sand, for instance, on a river-bank, constructed by insentient, unskillful bodies, or wild plants¹³⁹ such as grass, creepers, and bushes, in mountains-caves, forests, and thickets, are dependent on the karmas of people because they cause pleasure or pain to them.¹⁴⁰ Therefore, since the karmas must be presided over, the maker of these things cannot be insentient.

VRDDHĀMBHI (*draws on the ground*).

ABBOT. [But] let us leave aside other gross or subtle effects. These daily activities of people like us, for instance agriculture, service, or trade, down to lying, sitting, strolling, eating, etc., they are the cause of benefit or harm for many living beings, so they produce pleasure or suffering. Therefore, by the above reasoning, because these [activities] are dependent on the karmas of those [beings], and since the karmas are insentient, and since their agents are many and mutually opposed, and so cannot accord—they are also produced by [those] very karmas presided over by the Blessed Lord.¹⁴¹ That's why the illustrious Vyāsa says:

This creature is ignorant, and not master of his own pleasure and pain; impelled by the Lord, he may go to heaven, or he may go straight to hell.¹⁴² (30)

VRDDHĀMBHI. I will give some thought to the matter. Right now I am going.

The ascetic followers of the Abbot¹⁴³ laugh at him [i.e. at Vrddhāmbhi] and humiliate¹⁴⁴ him in many ways.

ABBOT (*holds them back and says to Vṛddhāmbhi*). Where are you going now? Endure right now for a moment the suffering caused by your karma.¹⁴⁵ We know the Lord also by the authority of Scripture.

VRDDHĀMBHI. Scripture a means of valid knowledge! That's bold.

ABBOT. (*to the Saṅkarsaṇa*). I am tired; will you please teach him.

GRADUATE. Just as the Abbot wishes. As for me, I don't even have to exert myself to corroborate the validity of Scripture, since it is established by nature.

VRDDHĀMBHI.

Validity [of Scripture] is established by nature? How can you say this? For the Veda is not authoritative [simply] because of its eternity. (31)

For is a permanent thing, such as space, found to be a means of valid knowledge? Or who would argue about the validity of sense perception and the like, which is not eternal?¹⁴⁶

GRADUATE. My good fellow,

Indeed I do not assert that the Veda is authoritative because it is eternal; I claim rather that it is like that since it creates awareness.¹⁴⁷ (32)

VRDDHĀMBHI.

Surely in some cases, even though the verbal expression is invalidated, it still creates awareness, like when somebody says, 'There is an elephant on my finger'. (33)

GRADUATE.

Indeed, even here [in this example], it is not the denotation of the words connected in a sentence which renders impossible the verbal [cognition]. It is rather that the finding of any other means of valid knowledge with respect to the sense that is conveyed is denied.¹⁴⁸ (34)

VRDDHĀMBHI.

Surely the verbal expression operates towards objects known by other means of valid knowledge.¹⁴⁹ Therefore by the invalidation of the object it itself[, too,] must be invalidated for you. (35)

GRADUATE.

Let that [verbal expression be admitted to] be invalidated the content of which is in the reach of another means of valid knowledge, but the content of an injunction, namely a command,¹⁵⁰ is hardly accessible to other [*pramāṇas*]. (36)

And since by nature it cannot be encroached upon by other means of valid knowledge, it is not touched by any help or harm caused by them.¹⁵¹ (37)

If [verbal testimony] is helped [by other means of valid knowledge] then it is only repetition,¹⁵² and if it is harmed it is false; but since both are [in this case] impossible, how could [the Veda] be not authoritative? (38)

VRDDHĀMBHI.

Surely a verbal expression necessarily requires the connection [of the expression and the object expressed] in order to be expressive, and that [connection] is dependent on a person.¹⁵³ But how could this come about in the case of something inaccessible to one? (39)

GRADUATE.

But connection is just the word's power,¹⁵⁴ and that [power] is innate in it.¹⁵⁵ A person cannot make a convention without words that are [already] expressive. As for learning [this connection]—it is possible with regard to an injunction [the content of] which can be reached only through verbal expressions, through usage, when the cause of a person's action has become manifest in oneself in the same way. (40)

The meaning of the expression 'he is to perform it'—[a meaning] which is not temporally bound—cannot be entered into by other means of valid knowledge the objects of which are temporal.¹⁵⁶ (41)

VRDDHĀMBHI. Then how is learning possible with regard to that [i.e. injunction]?

GRADUATE. Surely I've just told you, but you didn't get it. For one perceives in oneself that action is preceded by the cognising of an instigator. Because one observes that somebody else is also acting after hearing an optative ending, one postulates that the cognition of an instigator has taken place [for that other person as well] from that [optative ending]. And one perceives oneself, just as [one perceives] the Self, of what kind this instigator is. But we cannot show it to somebody else saying "It is like this", as [we can show something else] which has form. Others, too, do experience it, but they cannot show it to anyone else. Therefore learning [of the connection of word and meaning] is established even in the case [of injunction] which cannot be known by other means of valid knowledge. When old people were children, [they learnt] in the same way: so the world has no beginning.¹⁵⁷

VRDDHĀMBHI. Is that enough to prove the validity of Vedic injunction?

GRADUATE. What else are you looking for?

VRDDHĀMBHI. The words [of Scripture] cannot be valid if they are deprived of the support of other means of valid knowledge, for they are merely expressive, but they do not provide [a guarantee] that the object is thus.

GRADUATE. [Things which are] expressive can also, in fact, create awareness. For every means of valid knowledge just creates awareness; it does not deliver the object of cognition like a pot, tying a rope around its neck.¹⁵⁸

Those who claim that validity must depend on agreement with other means of valid knowledge couldn't reach the end [of the series of *pramāṇas*] even in hundreds of aeons.¹⁵⁹ (42)

There are two reasons of falsity: invalidation or a fault on the part of the causes [of cognition, e.g. the sense faculties].¹⁶⁰ And since neither of them can be found at all in the Veda, [its] validity is established. (43)

VR̥DDHĀMBHI draws on the ground. The followers of the GRADUATE laugh at him. The GRADUATE holds them back.

ABBOT. Whether this way of proving the validity of the Veda that you, Sir, have shown, should be relied on,¹⁶¹ or whether it is better to follow the train of thought that 'the sacred tradition is authoritative because it is His word',¹⁶² and 'it is valid because the trustworthy person [who revealed it] is authoritative, similarly to the validity of spells or texts about medicine':¹⁶³ this is a private quarrel among ourselves. Let us leave it aside. It is first the Veda-hating unbelievers of this ilk who must definitely be refuted by you, too.

GRADUATE. As Your Eminence commands.

Hubbub behind the scene.

ABBOT. What's that?

GRADUATE. Surely this hubbub indicates that the king is coming. So I'll go and meet the king. As for you, please prepare for the king the respectful offerings appropriate for his welcome.

ABBOT. All right, Sir.

GRADUATE. And, Your Eminence, you should be constantly aware of this:

We certainly do not hate the god Śiva, the power of whose majesty is incomparable. He alone is the single cause of the upholding, re-sorbing, and emitting of the worlds. He is Rudra, he is Brahmā, he is Hari, or he might be some other Person beyond them. This entire world rests in him. (44)

Therefore let these Śaivas, Pāsūpatas, Kālamukhas and Mahāvratins remain at ease.¹⁶⁴

The knowledge handed down by your teachers also seems to dispel delusion, but let its scope be limited to that with respect to which it is [justly] established.¹⁶⁵ (45)

ABBOT. Precisely, Sir.

Exeunt omnes.

Notes to Act Three

¹ ‘Worshippers in all these Śaiva cults [i.e. the Siddhānta, the Netranātha cult, the Svachandabhairava cult, the Trika, and the Krama] were of one of two kinds. This was a matter of individual choice and it determined both the form of initiation received and the form of the subsequent ritual discipline. On the one hand were those whose chosen goal was nothing but liberation (*mokṣaḥ*) from the bondage of transmigration (*saṃsāraḥ*). On the other hand were those who elected to pursue supernatural powers and effects (*siddhiḥ*) while they lived and—or at least—to experience fulfilment in the enjoyment of rewards (*bhogaḥ*) in a paradisaical world of their choice, either in this life through mastery of Yoga, or after death. So worshippers were either seekers of liberation (*mumukṣuḥ*) or seekers of rewards (*bubhukṣuḥ*).’ (SANDERSON 1995, p. 24.)

It is the second kind of worshippers we meet in the prelude of the Third Act. The *sādhakas*, “masterers [of powers]” (SANDERSON 1995, *ibid.*) or “mantra-masterers” (SANDERSON 1995, p. 79, n. 208) were characterised by antinomian behaviour in all Śaiva cults, from the Siddhānta which adapted itself to the orthodox norms of purity in the highest degree (see SANDERSON 1985, p. 565) to the more esoteric traditions.

As our two *sādhakas* appear to be worshippers of Bhairava, perhaps it is not inappropriate to take a cursory view of the presentation of the *sādhaka* in the *Svacchandatantra*, the authoritative text of the Mantrapīṭha division of the Tantras of Bhairava, and of the Svachandabhairava-cult, which incorporated the Kāpālika culture of the cremation grounds (SANDERSON 1988, p. 138). As Arraj points out, ‘though the older order of Śaiva ascetics became largely institutionalized as a hierarchy of masters catering to different grades of initiates, the active and ascetic option did not die out immediately but was integrated as another optional grade of the adept (*sādhakaḥ*), who still sought superhuman powers. And accordingly, in *Svacchandatantram*, the older rites have been collected under this nominal heading as the special entitlement of the adept.’ (ARRAJ 1988, p. 73.)

The consecration of the adept is described in *Svacchandatantra* 4.482–505ab (vol. I, pp. 298–310, ARRAJ 1988, pp. 165ff), and his practices are discussed in the sixth book (*Svacchandatantra*, vol. II, pp. 101ff, ARRAJ 1988, p. 181ff). He should worship Bhairava and make oblations using human flesh together with bdellium and bathed in ghee (v. 53: *nṛmāṃsaṃ purasaṃyuktaṃ ghr̥tena ca pariṣrutam*) in order to obtain different levels of magical powers. Various secondary rites are also described, resulting in such powers as subjugation (*vaśīkaraṇa*, vv. 58 seqq), scaring away one’s enemies (*uccāṭaṇa*, vv. 72 seqq), or killing them (*māraṇa*, vv. 85cd seqq). Book 13 (vol. 4 (part 2), pp. 89ff, tr. ARRAJ 1988, pp. 457ff) also contains *siddhi*-oriented rites taking place in the cremation ground and requiring such gruesome ingredients as ‘the dried head of a hero felled in battle with a sword [while he was] facing [to the] front’ (v. 9: *abhimukhakhadganipātitaśūraśiraḥ śoṣitam*, tr. ARRAJ 1988, p. 462), or

‘the rib from a dead woman that was hanged by her left foot’ (v. 12: *mṛtanāryā vāmapadād udbaddhāyās tu pāṃsulīm*, tr. ARRAJ 1988, p. 463).

In belletristic works *sādhakas* are usually depicted as evil magicians who practice the black art in the cremation grounds. In Bhavabhūti’s *Mālatīmādhava* Aghoraghaṇṭa and his disciple Kapālakuṇḍalā are ready to sacrifice Mālatī to the goddess Karālā, but Mādhava arrives just in time to save her. The horrid sight of the cremation ground is depicted in vivid colours (Act Five). The source of humour in the *Āgamaḍambara* is that although the two adepts should feel themselves at home in the *śmaśāna* and be busy scaring other people, they appear to be scared themselves, trying to sneak away from the police.

² *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

³ The Māgadhī form of *asmākam* should be *asmāṇam* according to PISCHEL §419.

⁴ *hrdayam* can be used in the masculine in Śaurasenī (see PISCHEL §357: *hiao*), which might support a *hiae* form in Māgadhī. Another possibility is to read *hīaam vva*, or *hīaam va* (cf. PISCHEL §143, where *via* is prescribed as the correct form in Śaurasenī and Māgadhī).

⁵ *lakkhīyadi* is a Śaurasenī form. One might consider emending it to *laskīyadi*, (the way our manuscripts write *kkha* is hardly distinguishable from *ska*), or to *lašīyadi*, following the most frequent usage of our manuscripts.

⁶ *eśe śe* (the reading of the manuscripts) seems to be in masculine (just as *śe* in the following sentence), while *maḍhīā* is a feminine noun. One might consider emending to *eśā śā* or to *maḍhie*. *maḍhikā* may also mean just a hut.

⁷ *uppekkhia* is a Śaurasenī form. One might consider emending to *uppeškia*, the form prescribed by Hemacandra 4.297 (the way our manuscripts write *kkha* is hardly distinguishable from *ska*), or to *uppeškia*, following the most frequent usage of our manuscripts.

⁸ *ex conj.*

⁹ *collam* suggests *cauryam* as its *chāyā*, though *cauraḥ* gives a better sense.

¹⁰ *ex conj.*

¹¹ *ex conj.*

¹² *ex conj.*

¹³ *ex conj.* *mhi* is a Śaurasenī form, according to Pischel (§§145, 498) one should read *smi* in Māgadhī.

¹⁴ *ex conj.*

¹⁵ *ex conj.* ISAACSON. *bhāva* is not used elsewhere by either of the Adepts.

¹⁶ *ex conj.* Karṇakagomin in his commentary to the *Pramāṇavārttika* associates different kinds of antisocial behaviour with different Tantras (ed. R. Sāṃkṛtyāyana, p. 578, quoted in SANDERSON 2001, p. 12, n. 10): *tathā kambukinītantrē steyācaraṇāt siddhir uktā*, ‘In the Kambukinītantras [“Tantras of the Robber Wives”] one is said to attain magical powers through the practice of robbery.’ This certainly does not mean that Skeleton-Banner was a follower of the Kambukinītantras, but his conduct could probably attract the attention of the police.

Kalhaṇa relates how Cakrabhāṇu (‘a Guru at this time in the lineage of the Krama, a tradition within the Kālīkula’, as Prof Sanderson points out in a letter of 10. ix. 2002, referring, among others, to Arṇasimha’s *Mahānayaṇaparakāśa*, NAK 5–358, f. 119v1–5, and to *Tantrāloka* vol. 3, Āhnika 4, p. 196, ll. 10–12.) was punished by the Kashmirian king Yaśaskara (939–948) for his Kaula practices (*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 6.108–112):

varṇāśramapratyavekṣābaddhakakṣyaḥ kṣitīśvaraḥ|
cakrabhāṇvabhidhaṃ cakramelake dvijatāpasam||
kṛtātyācāram ālokya rājā dharmavaśaṃvadaḥ|
nijagrāha śvapādena lalāṭataṭam anikayan||
tanmātulena tadroṣād vīranāthena yoginā|
sāndhivigrahakeṇātha sa svenaiva nyagrhyata||
pūrvācāryaprabhāveṇa svamāhātmyādhiropaṇam|
prakhyāpayadbhir gurubhiḥ śraddhayeti yad ucyate|
tat khyāpitaiva saptāhāt sa vipanna iti śrutih|
dīrghavyādhihate tasminn upapattiḥ katham bhavet||

‘ “The king [was ever] ready to exercise control over the estates and conditions of life [among his] subjects. On discovering that at *Cakramelaka* a brahmin-ascetic, Cakrabhāṇu by name, had departed from proper conduct, the king, in accordance with the law, punished him by having the mark of a dog’s foot branded on his forehead. Infuriated by this, the uncle of that [Brahman], the magician Vīranātha who was the king’s own minister of foreign affairs, then took revenge upon him.” This is confidently related by certain Gurus who by [referring to] the supernatural power of former masters would exalt their own greatness. Through them, too, the story has been propagated that he died in seven days. But how is this likely [in view of the fact] that he died by a lingering disease?’ (tr. STEIN)

Stein took the word *cakramelaka* as a local name, but, as Professor Sanderson points out to me (in the letter cited above) ‘it is much more probably the Tantric feast known as a *cakrayāgaḥ* or *mūrtiyāgaḥ* which a sponsor convenes for Vīras and Yoginīs, male and female Śākta adepts (see *Tantrāloka* 28.60c-61b). In *Tantrāloka* 28.7 the same is referred to as a *yoginīmelakaḥ* “a convening of Yoginīs”. In the *Vīratāṇḍavavidhi* chapter of the fourth *ṣaṭka* of the *Jayadrathayāmala*, which sets out the procedure for the celebration of an orgiastic ritual of this kind in the Kālīkula, the tradition to which Cakrabhāṇu belonged, it is termed a *vīramelāpaḥ* (syn. *vīramelakaḥ*) “a convening of Vīras”. (f. 206v,

v. 6–8). I have not noted the precise term *cakramelakaḥ* “circle convention” in any text of this tradition. However, it does occur in the sense I attribute to it in a story of the supernatural in the Kashmirian Ocean of Stories (*Kathāsaritsāgara*). There (18.4.213ab) a band of Yoginīs goes to a *cakramelakaḥ* in Cakrapura and returns from it in the last watch of the night (18.4.221).’

Branding on the forehead with the mark of a dog’s foot was a punishment for theft (see e.g. *Manusmṛti* 9.237). Professor Sanderson proposes (in the letter cited above) that ‘Cakrabhānu was punished for staging a religious event in which the Tantric participants, men and women, were given substantial sums of money by the *yajamānaḥ* who invited them. I presume that Cakrabhānu was held responsible as the chief celebrant, the *cakranāyakaḥ* /*cakreśvaraḥ*. I doubt that punishment would have been inflicted for mere participation, since such rituals were well established, however abhorrent to Vaidikas. The adepts and Yoginīs invited to the feast are given gifts and a sacrificial cash fee (*dakṣiṇā*), which should be not less than 4 Rūpakas in the case of a Guru (*Tantrāloka* 28.99–100). It was probably in this less strictly religious context that the charge of theft (or extortion) arose.’

Cakrabhānu’s uncle Vīranātha, alias Hrasvanātha, was probably his Guru as well (see Jayaratha ad *Tantrāloka* 4.173ab, p.196). As Professor Sanderson writes (in the above cited letter), ‘that Vīranātha was Yaśaskara’s Foreign Minister (*sāṃdhivigrahikaḥ*) underlines the fact that such practices were not confined to the sort of Prakrit-speaking marginals that Jayantabhaṭṭa gives us in Śmaśānabhūti and Kaṅkālaketu.’ The name *vīranātha* may also be descriptive. Professor Sanderson supplies (in the same letter) the following passage from the *Jayadrathayāmala* (*Mantraḍāmarikāpaṭala* of the 3rd *ṣaṭka*, women come forth from Pātāla drawn by the *sādhaka*’s mantra-recitation and address him): *ehy ehi vīranāthāśu pātālabhogasāgaram| sahāsmākaṃ ramaśvātra yāvad ābhūmisamplavam||* ‘Come, come quickly, o Lord of Adepts, to the ocean of pleasure in Pātāla, toy with us here until the earth becomes inundated.’

King Yaśaskara restored order in Kashmir after the chaotic reigns of various debauched kings following the death of Śaṅkaravarman. Yaśaskara, himself a brahmin and elected as king by an assembly of brahmins, was a champion of orthodoxy, and, similarly to Śaṅkaravarman, he was not favourably disposed towards anti-dharmic religious practices. During his reign, as Kalhaṇa says (*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 6.10–12),

na vipraguravaḥ sāma gāyanto madirām papuḥ|
na tāpasāḥ putradārapaśudhānyāny adhaukayan||
na mūrkhaguravo matsyāpūpayāgavidhāyinaḥ|
cakrire svakṛtair granthais tarkāgamaparīkṣaṇam||
nādrśyanta ca gehinyo gurudīkṣoṭthadevatāḥ|
kurvāṇā bhartṛśīlaśrīniṣedhaṃ mūrdhadhūnanaiḥ||

‘The Brahman Gurus did not drink spirits while singing their chants. The ascetics did not get children, wives and crops. Ignorant Gurus did not perform Matsyāpūpa sacrifice, and did not by texts of their own composition revise traditional doctrines. There were not seen house-wives figuring as divinities at the Guru-consecration, and by shakes of their heads detracting from the distin-

guished character of their husbands.’ (tr. STEIN) Stein remarks (in note 11 on p. 237, vol. I of his translation) that ‘the *Matsyāpūpayāga* is a complicated sacrifice occurring in the Tantric ritual and still known in Kaśmīr. It is mentioned in connection with Tantric Śrāddhas in the v. chapter of my MS. of the *Mṛtitat-tvānusmaraṇa*. Fish and cakes (*apūpa*) are offered at it.’ Professor Sanderson, however, informs me (in the letter mentioned above) that he has not found any reference to *matsyāpūpa* offerings in Kashmirian Paddhatis for the various Śaiva *srāddhas*, and that perhaps Kalhaṇa condemns Śaiva Tantric ritual in general, in which fish etc. are offered to the Bhairavas and other deities.

The expression *tarkāgamaparīkṣaṇam* is puzzling. It might be analysed as *tarkenā āgamaparīkṣaṇam*, meaning ‘examining [in order to refute] Scripture with the help of [destructive] reasoning’, but this may not be the most natural interpretation. Instead we might emend the text, as Professor Sanderson suggests (in the above mentioned letter), to *tantrāgamaparīkṣayam*, referring to ‘Gurus who were corrupting the teachings of the Tantras by propagating as Tantras texts that they themselves had composed’. (Stein also refers to the phenomenon of ‘newly concocted Paddhatis’, not unknown even in his time; see STEIN, vol. I, p. 237, n. 11.)

Another conjecture suggested by Professor Sanderson (in the same letter) instead of the unsatisfactory reading *gurudīkṣoṭthadevatāḥ* is ‘*gurudīkṣoktadevatāḥ*, “[personifying] the goddesses taught for the Gurudīkṣā, i.e. initiation performed by [Kaula] Gurus.” Their head-shaking alludes to the manifestation of the symptoms of *devatāveśaḥ* required of the participants in Kaula collective rites.’

¹⁷ *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

¹⁸ Another possible emendation, suggested by Dr Isaacson, is *ke śe*.

¹⁹ According to Hemacandra 4.289, Sanskrit *ṣṭa* should become *ṣṭa* in Māgadhi.

²⁰ Cf. note 4.

²¹ *ex conj.* *śu* and *ā* look very similar in Śāradā script.

²² According to PISCHEL §399, Sanskrit *rājā* becomes *lāā* in Māgadhi.

²³ *ta* and *u* look very similar in Śāradā script.

²⁴ See note 19. The change *ṣṭa* > *ṭṭha* occurs in Śauraseni (see PISCHEL §303).

²⁵ *ex conj.* *vahādi* (Skt. *vadhyate*) might make better sense (we would have three successive synonyms of ‘kill’).

²⁶ Cf. note 3.

²⁷ *ex conj.*

²⁸ *°mha* belongs to the imperative, but sometimes it is used (wrongly accord-

ing to Pischel) as an indicative ending (see PISCHEL §455).

²⁹ Cf. note 5.

³⁰ The Māgadhī form of Sanskrit *strī* (or rather *strīkā*) should be *istiā* according to PISCHEL §310.

³¹ Cf. note 3.

³² Until we reach the last book of the *Svacchandatantra* the adept appears as a solitary, celibate figure (book 13, v.4: *brahmacarye vyavasthitah*), but Book 15 (possibly interpolated and influenced by the Kaula cult, see ARRAJ 1988, pp.367ff) shows him from another angle. Among the code-expressions (*chummakāh*) listed in this book and used to conceal the adept's activity we find words for the female partners of the adept (v.3: *bhaginiyo baladarpitāh*, v.9: *dūtī samvāhikā*, v.13: *sakhī sarvārthasādhikā*), semen (v.5: *śukraṃ candraḥ*), penis and vagina (v.8: *liṅgaṃ samtoṣajananaṃ bhagaḥ prītivivardhanaḥ*), as well as alcohol and meat (v.3: *madyaṃ tu harṣaṇaṃ jñeyaṃ muditā tu surā smṛtā*, v.4: *matsyā jalacarā jñeyāḥ māṃsaṃ ca balavardhanam*) which were the regular ingredients of Kaula ritual. Later the text enumerates several secret gestures that a *yoginī* (a goddess or her incarnation as a female partner) may show to the adept (vv.24 seqq).

The cult of the Yoginīs had a central role in the Vidyāpīṭha division of the Bhairavatantras (see SANDERSON 1988 pp.138ff). The *Siddhayogeśvarī-mata*, a Tantra of the Vidyāpīṭha, contains a detailed classification of incarnate *yoginīs*, teaches the adept the appropriate signs to be exchanged when they meet these women (Chapter 29, tr. TÖRZSÖK 1999, p.175ff), and refers to the 'conversation' (*sambhāṣaṇa*, i.e. sexual intercourse) with a special *yoginī* who bestows the 'perfect substance' (*siddhadravya*, i.e. the mingled sexual fluids offered to the deity; see *Siddhayogeśvarīmata* 30.4, tr. TÖRZSÖK 1999, p.181).

³³ One might consider emending *sādhaka*^o to the more plausibly Māgadhī-looking *sāhaa*^o.

³⁴ *kadham uṇa* would be a more regular form in Śaurasenī and Māgadhī (see PISCHEL §184).

³⁵ *śu* and *a* look similar in Śāradā script.

³⁶ *ex conj.* ISAACSON. Another possible conjecture (closer to the reading of the manuscripts, but perhaps a less natural construction) could be *dāva je śe*.

³⁷ Cf. note 19.

³⁸ Pischel (§367) mentions *midhuṇā* as a nom. / acc. plur. in Śaurasenī.

³⁹ Cf. note 5.

⁴⁰ The Māgadhī form of Sanskrit *jānāti* should be *yāṇadi* / *yāṇādi* according

to the grammarians (Hemacandra 4.292, Vararuci 11.4, PISCHEL §§ 236, 454, 510), but in the old Nepalese manuscript of the *Nāgānanda* we find *jāṇadi* in a Māgadhī passage. As Steiner remarks, ‘Vermutlich beruht die Aufteilung der Formen Ś. *jāṇadi* und Mg. *yāṇādi* wiederum nur auf einer Fiktion.’ (STEINER 1997, p. 173.)

⁴¹ The form *lāeṇa* clearly shows that *rājan* is treated as an *a*-stem noun in this Māgadhī passage.

⁴² *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.

⁴³ Hemacandra in 4.297 prescribes *ācaska* as the correct Māgadhī form.

⁴⁴ *ex conj.*

⁴⁵ *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR silently conjectured *aśśamaṃ*, but I am not certain that one can speak about the ashram of a *yogeśvarī*.

As Judit Törzsök pointed out (TÖRZSÖK 1999, p. iii), ‘Yogeśvarī meaning ‘[female] master of Yoga’ denotes the same as Yoginī. (...) I think the word Yoginī or Yogeśvarī is not necessarily intended to convey that these sometimes witch-like female spirits or goddesses have any particular relation to certain classical yogic practices. Instead, the word probably refers to the similarity of supernatural effects traditional Yogins can obtain (such as being infinitely small, large, strong etc.) and powers the Yoginīs of this system [i.e. the Trika-Kaula] can bestow.’

The *yogeśvarī* appearing in Bhavabhūti’s *Mālatīmādhava* belongs to the more benevolent kind of witches. Saudāmanī once was the favourite disciple of the respected Buddhist mendicant nun Kāmandakī. Later she took up the Kāpālika Observance (*kāvāliavvadam*), achieved miraculous powers through the mastering of mantras (*samāsādidaaccariamantasiddhipahāvā*), and became a familiar sight for other Śaiva adepts and their female partners in the cremation grounds (*rattivihāriṇo ṇādidūrāraṇṇavāsīṇo sāhaassa muṇḍadhāriṇo aghoraḥaṇṭanāmadheassa antevāsīṇī mahāpabbāvā kavālakuṇḍalā ṇāma (...) tado iam paṭṭī*, Act I, v. 15+). But from her Buddhist antecedents she had preserved compassion towards those who suffer, and she hastened to Mālatī’s help who had been kidnapped by a revengeful *kāpālinī*. Then Saudāmanī saved the lives of those for whom life has lost its meaning without Mālatī, and even used her transporting magic (*ākṣepiṇī siddhi*, Act IX, v. 52) to reunite the two young lovers.

The two adepts in Jayanta’s play also think about relying on a *yogeśvarī*’s protective powers, but it seems that even such powers would be insufficient to counteract the forces of justice.

⁴⁶ *ex conj.*

⁴⁷ *ex conj.* *eśu*, *teśu*, *yeśu* seem to be used in the sense of *atra*, *tatra*, *yatra* in the Māgadhī passages.

⁴⁸ RAGHAVAN and THAKUR give *pārayati* as the *chāyā* of *pālīadi*, which is not entirely convincing to me. One would expect *pāledi* as a causative form, and °*īadi* seems to be a passive ending.

⁴⁹ *ex conj.* *śāṅkemi* seems to be Māgadhī for *śāṅkayāmi*, but the causative sense is perhaps not appropriate here.

⁵⁰ *ex conj.* Cf. Hemacandra 4.293, PISCHEL §276.

⁵¹ °*vallahāe* might be a better reading.

⁵² Cf. note 41.

⁵³ °*ijjamṭī* is a false Śaurasenī ending according to PISCHEL §535.

⁵⁴ Cf. note 3.

⁵⁵ RAGHAVAN and THAKUR read °*pettaṃte* and give °*pratyante* as its *chāyā*.

⁵⁶ Cf. note 43.

⁵⁷ Cf. note 19.

⁵⁸ According to Hemacandra 4.293, Sanskrit *jña* should become *ñña* in Māgadhī, but, as Pischel remarks (§276) in the manuscripts we find *jaṅṅa* instead of *yañña*.

⁵⁹ Cf. note 3.

⁶⁰ *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.

⁶¹ Cf. note 3.

⁶² *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

⁶³ Cf. note 3.

⁶⁴ *ex conj.* One would expect *abhi(ahi?)bhaviāṃto* as a Śaurasenī passive.

⁶⁵ Instead of RAGHAVAN and THAKUR's conjecture, one might emend to *durāārehi ya tāvasehi* (*durācārais ca tāpasaiḥ*).

⁶⁶ *ex conj.*

⁶⁷ In the *Mattavilāsa-prahasana* the *kapālin* compares the pub to a sacrificial ground (v. 9+). Prof. Sanderson suggested (in a letter of 15. xii. 2003) to emend *yadi vā* to *yadi no* in order to achieve the sense 'What in the world could be an appropriate place for asceticism but a pub?'

⁶⁸ *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. One might consider completing the otherwise unmetrical line with another word.

⁶⁹ *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. This seems to be the most plausible way to complete the sentence.

⁷⁰ The ending °āo is characteristic of Ardhamāgadhī, Māhārāṣṭrī, and Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī. According to Pischel (§367) it is wrong in Śaurasenī, but a similar ending, °āho occurs as a vocative form in Māgadhī (§372).

⁷¹ I am not certain if this is the correct interpretation of the sentence. Another translation, suggested by Dr. Kataoka, could be: 'Your power is too strong.'

⁷² The inscriptions of the Śaiva monasteries in the Kalacuri-Cedi country, whose ācāryas belonged to the Mattamayūra clan, provide important historical parallels to the following description of the āśrama (for more details about this clan see MIRASHI 1955). The Chandrēhē inscription (AD 973, in MIRASHI 1955, pp. 198ff.) gives the spiritual genealogy of Abbot Prabodhaśiva, who constructed the *matha*, and excavated a tank and a well. The serenity and peacefulness of the monastery is described with the following charming verses (ibid. p. 201, ll. 19–21):

*jaḍataramaruc choṇasyāmbhaḥkaṇair ayam āśramo
mṛgapatimahādhvānai rātrau pratidhvanitāmvarah|
śikhariśikharaṇāntapreṅkhaddvirephapayodharo
janayati jane vidyucchaṅkāṃ mahauśadhirocisā||
[cum]vanti vānaragaṇā mṛgaśatrupotān
simhāstanam pivati cātra śīsur mṛgasya|
vairam nijam pariharanti virodhino 'nye
sarvasya sāmyati mano hi tapovaneṣu||*

'This ashram, where the winds are very cool with the drops of the river Śoṇa, where at night the sky resounds with the loud roars of lions, and the clouds, [black] as bees, whirl around the edges of the mountain-tops—this ashram makes people to suspect lightning with the glimmering of its excellent herbs. Here the groups of monkeys kiss the lion-cubs, and the fawn sucks the teat of a lioness. Other hostile [animals] set aside their natural enmity, for everyone's heart calms down in the penance-groves.'

The fragmentary Kadwāhā-inscription (10th century, edited by MIRASHI-SHASTRI) gives us a telling picture about the relations between the rulers and the abbots of these āśramas. We are told that a certain king called Gobhaṭa came to the monastery with an army of elephants (ibid. p. 123, l. 12: *tatrājagāmonmadasindhurāṇāṃ valena bhūpaḥ kila gobhaṭākhyah*). In the next verse somebody dies, possibly killed by the king (ibid. l. 13: *[nṛ]peṇa parāgatāsuḥ sahasā papāta*). Abbot Dharmāśiva sheds tears for the dead person (ibid.: *tasyāvagamya sa kathāṃ karuṇāvīmukta*bāṣpaḥ* (em. MIRASHI : °vāḥpaḥ ep.)); then he flies into a rage, with a miraculously acquired bow, resembling Śiva himself, defeats the enemy (ibid. ll. 13–15: *kṣa[ṇam] tad anu kopavipāta[lākṣaḥ] . . . atha prabhāvāgatakārmu*keṇa* (em. MIRASHI : °kena ep.) *vāṇaiś ca dīptaiḥ sa dharāvṛṣāṃkaḥ| ātta[sva]līlas tripurāntakasya . . . sakalam api sa jītvā sātravam śarvvakalpaḥ|*), and finally ascends to heaven while ce-

lestial women shower flowers upon him (ibid.: *surapatiramaṇṇāṃ puṣpavṛṣṭyā-vakīrṇaḥ puram anupama...*). The same inscription tells us about the successor of Dharmasīva, who initiated the Pratihāra king Harirāja (ibid. p. 124, l. 24: *ācāryaḥ sa dadau samyag dīkṣāṃ kalyāṇakāriṇīṃ*). The king offered elephants in return, but, after repeated requests, the *ācārya* graciously accepted some villages instead (ibid. l. 27: *prārthito 'nekadā grāmāṇāṃ cakame smitādravadanaḥ sa ...*).

The Malkāpuram-inscription (13th century, ed. PANTULU) tells us about Viśveśvaraśambhu, the *ācārya* of the Golakī *maṭha*, who was the *dīkṣāguru* of the Kākatīya king Gaṇapatideva. The king and his daughter and heir Rudrāmbā granted two villages to the Abbot, who used the donation to establish an *agrahāra* called Viśveśvara-Golakī. The inscription gives various details about the inhabitants of the village and the new institutions: Viśveśvaraśambhu founded a temple, a *maṭha*, a choultry / refectory (*sattra*), a maternity home (*prasūtiśālā*), and a hospital (*ārogyaśālā*). He settled sixty Drāviḍa brahmin families, eight professors to teach the three Vedas, Grammar, Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, literature, and the Āgamas (p. 160, ll. 49–51: *ṛgyajussāmavedānāṃ samyag adhyāpakās trayah| padavākyapramāṇānāṃ sāhityasyāgamasya ca|| pañca vyākhyākṛto*), a doctor and an accountant as well (*vaidyakāyasthau*). Ten dancing-girls (*nartakyah*), various musicians, one Kashmirian of unnamed profession (*kāśmīradeśīyah*), and fourteen female singers (*gāyinyah*) were employed for the temple, two brahmin cooks (*pācakau dvijanmānau*) and several attendants (*paricārakāḥ*) for the *sattra* and the *maṭha*. Ten village-guards (*grāmasya rakṣakāḥ*) from the Coḷa country and twenty policemen (*bhaṭāḥ*) kept the peace, and the village was also provided with various craftsmen. The income of some lands was used to meet the needs of visiting Śaiva ascetics, Kālamukhas, students, and Pāśupatas, and to supply food to all from brahmins down to the *caṇḍālas* who came to Viśveśvara-Golakī (p. 160, ll. 70–73: *upeyuṣāṃ śaivatapodhanānāṃ kālānanānāṃ śivaśāsanānāṃ|| vidyārthināṃ pāśupatavratānāṃ apy annavastrādisamarpaṇāya| ārabhya viprān anivāritānāṃ caṇḍālaparyantam upāgatānāṃ|| annapradānāya ca*).

The Ranōd-inscription (10–11th century, edited by KIELHORN) gives the earliest genealogy of the Mattamayūra clan. We learn that king Avantivarman persuaded the sage Purandara to come to his country and to establish a *maṭha* in his capital, Mattamayūra (possibly identical with the modern Kadwāhā). Purandara initiated the king (on this initiation being Saiddhāntika Śaiva see SANDERSON 2001, p. 9f., n. 6), and established another *maṭha* at Aranipadra (modern Ranōd). The last *ācārya* of this *maṭha* mentioned on the inscription is Vyomaśiva (or Vyomaśambhu), who renovated the *maṭha* and excavated an impressive tank (the beauties of which are extolled in several verses). Vyomaśiva's asceticism was exemplary (p. 358, ll. 33–34):

*purā yoṣitsaṅgād anibhṛtanijākṣaṃ bhagavatā
vijigye yah kāmas tripuraripuṇāvīṣkṛtaruṣā|
niruddhākṣaḥ kṣāntyā tam ayam ajayat saṅgarahitaḥ
sucīrṇānāṃ syād vā kim iha tapasāṃ duṣka[ra]m iti||33||*

‘Long ago the Blessed Lord, the Enemy of the Three Forts, showed his anger and defeated Kāma by opening his [third] eye, because of the contact with a

woman: he[, Vyomaśiva,] has defeated him [i.e. Kāma] with eyes closed, with forbearance, avoiding contact [with women]. Or rather, what would be difficult for well-observed ascetic practices?’

On the other hand, the same Abbot was a great scholar, well-versed in various philosophical doctrines (ibid. ll. 36–38):

*siddhānteṣu maheśa eṣa niyataṃ nyāye 'kṣapādo munir
gambhīre ca kaṇāśinas tu kaṇabhuk śāstre śrutau jaiminiḥ
sāṃkhye 'nalpamatiḥ svayaṃ ca kapilo lokāyate sadgurur
vuddho vuddhamate jinoktiṣu jinaḥ ko vātha nāyaṃ kṛtī*||36||

‘He was truly the Great Lord in [the teachings of Śaiva] Siddhānta, the Sage Akṣapāda in Nyāya, Kanabhuj [= Kaṇāda] in the deep science of Kaṇāśin [= Kaṇāda], Jaimini in Vedic tradition, the intelligent Kapila himself in Sāṃkhya, a true master of Lokāyata, Buddha in Buddha’s doctrine, Jina in Jina’s teachings. Or rather, whom was this wise person not equal to?’

(pp. 358f., ll. 40–42:)

*samlīnaṃ mukha eva śākyakariṇām atyūrjjitaṃ garjjitaṃ
trāsād yasya ca jainajamvukaśatair ddurvyāhṛtaṃ samhṛtaṃ
soḍhaṃ jātu na jaiminīyahariṇair līlākṛtaṃ humkṛtaṃ
tasyānyad gaganeśakānanapateḥ kiṃ syāt stutaṃ prastutaṃ*||39||

‘Out of fear from him, the Buddhist elephants’ thunderous trumpeting died away already in their mouth, and hundreds of Jaina jackals subdued their inarticulate crying. The Mīmāṃsaka antelopes could never endure his playful roaring. What other deed of this lord of Śiva’s forest shall we praise?’

Vyomaśiva apparently does not fit into the picture of the “typical” *ācārya* of the Mattamayūra clan as it was drawn by Richard Davis (DAVIS, p. 135): ‘Like Tolstoy’s proverbial hedgehog, the Drunken Peacocks know only one thing [i.e. Śaiva Siddhānta], but they know it very well. The poets seldom praise the Śaiva sages for their mastery of other traditional Indian disciplines of knowledge like grammar, or for knowing other genres of religious texts such as the Vedas.’

It is certainly tempting to identify this learned Śaiva Abbot with the author of the *Vyomavatī*, a work on Vaiśeṣika philosophy. According to Walter Slaje (SLAJE, ‘Untersuchungen...’), Jayanta and the philosopher Vyomaśiva were contemporaries, while the date of the Abbot Vyomaśiva might also be settled around 900 AD. The following verse of another inscription (now in the Archaeological Museum, Gwalior), praising the same *ācārya*, might also support this identification (the inscription was not at my disposal; it is described in WILLIS, p. 113; the verse is quoted in PATHAK, p. 39, n. 4):

*munisūryeṇa nirastaṃ tīkālokena yena lokasya
prakatayateha padārthaṃ santam asac ca santamasam*||

‘... which sun-like sage dispelled the darkness of the world with the light of his commentary (i.e. the *Vyomavatī-ṭīkā* on the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*?) which revealed here both the existing categories and non-existence (*asat* = *abhāva*).’ (Prašastapāda omits *abhāva* and mentions six *padārthas*. Vyomaśiva explains why *abhāva* is subordinated to the other categories.)

In any case, we shall see that the God-proving arguments of the Śaiva *ācārya* in the *Āgamaḍambara* (just as similar arguments in the texts of the Śaiva

Siddhānta) are remarkably close to those found in the Vaiśeṣika Vyomavatī (and in several Nyāya texts as well).

⁷³ Instead of accepting the reading of the manuscripts one might conjecture °*manthanalāśya*°, ‘a [graceful] dance: the waving of the mendicant-garments’.

⁷⁴ *ex conj.* Another possible way of emending the text could be: *paśaṃtataram aḥḥa tavovaṇaṃ imaṃ ṇo dīsadi*, ‘This penance-grove seems to me most peaceful today.’ The correct Śaurasenī form of *ramaṇīyam* should be *ramaṇīam*, and not *ramaṇijjam* (see PISCHEL§138).

⁷⁵ The colour of laughter is white, like the ashes smeared on the ascetic’s body.

⁷⁶ *ex conj.* ISAACSON. I cannot interpret the reading *cairaveda* (*airaveda?*, *eraveda?*). The only meaningful word which resembles it is Ailavila or Aiḍaviḍa, a name of Kubera (cf. *Amarakośa* 2.73).

⁷⁷ *ex conj.* The conjecture is a tentative one.

⁷⁸ One could also consider reading *śivapuraḥstham*.

⁷⁹ *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR’s emendation, *balamha*, might also be a Prakrit form of *brahma*, although one would expect *baramha* in a Śaurasenī passage. Another possibility, suggested by Prof. Sanderson, is to understand the Prakrit as ‘*brahmabhūtam*’ (and perhaps emend the text to *bamhabhūdam*) and translate ‘I imagine myself ascending, merged with Brahman’.

⁸⁰ *ex conj.*

⁸¹ *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR, probably misreading the manuscripts, took *śaṅkā* agreeing with *yathāvasthitā*. The manuscripts however, read *yathāvasthitās*, agreeing with *āśramaṇaḥ* (which also seems to give a better meaning).

⁸² *ex conj.* One might consider emending this otherwise unmetrical line in another way.

⁸³ The manuscripts read *uggāhaṇakaṇḍhaṇḍhamva*, which was emended by RAGHAVAN and THAKUR to *uggakhaṇavaṇḍhamva*, for which they give the following *chāyā* (with a question mark): *ugrakṣaṇavacanabandham iva*. Although this conjecture is neither convincing nor interpretable for me, I cannot suggest anything better.

⁸⁴ *ex em.* ISAACSON.

⁸⁵ *ex conj.* The expression *ekavrkṣe* often occurs in Tantric context, indicating a suitable place for performing a ritual, see e.g. *Siddhayogeśvarīmata* 6.3. Another possible emendation, suggested by Prof. Sanderson, is ‘*marudeśe*’, ‘in the desert’.

⁸⁶ *ex em.* ISAACSON. *Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha (Cārvākadarśana)* p. 6: *lokasiddho rājā parameśvaraḥ* | ‘The [only] Supreme Lord is the king, who[se existence] is [well-]established among the people.’ (also p. 7: *lokasiddho bhaved rājā pareśo nāparaḥ smṛtaḥ* |) As Prof. Sanderson pointed out to me in a letter of 15. xii. 2003, ‘there may be an allusion here to the convention whereby religious texts constrain the king to support their institutions by promising him a long reign if he complies and a short one if he doesn’t’.

⁸⁷ *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. The adding of a word with a similar meaning seems to be necessary.

⁸⁸ The Cārvāka’s behaviour is disrespectful probably because he does not wait until he is offered a seat, or, as Prof. Sanderson pointed out to me in the above mentioned letter, ‘because he uses impertinently familiar forms of address to both the ascetic and Saṅkarṣaṇa’.

⁸⁹ Cf. *Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha (Cārvākadarśana)* p. 3: *aṅganādyālīṅganādijanyaṃ sukham eva puruṣārthaḥ* | ‘The only goal of man is pleasure produced by such [activities] as embracing women and the like.’ Ibid. p. 4: *yadi kaścid bhūrur drṣṭaṃ sukhaṃ tyajet tarhi sa paśuvan mūrkhō bhavet* | *tad uktam—*
‘tyājyaṃ sukhaṃ viśayasaṅgamajanma puṃsām
duḥkhopasṛṣṭam’ iti mūrkhavicāraṇaiṣā
vṛhīṇ jihāsati sitottamataṇḍulādhyān
ko nāma bhos tuśakaṇopahitān hitārthī |
‘If someone cowardly gave up the pleasure he had already experienced then he would be as stupid as a beast. It is said: “The idiots express the following opinion: ‘Men should give up pleasure arising from the contact with sense objects, [since it is] accompanied by pain.’ Who on earth, if he means well by himself, would throw away rice which is rich in white grains of the best quality, just because it is mixed with bits of husk?”’

⁹⁰ Cf. *Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha (Cārvākadarśana)* p. 5: *nanu pāralaukikasukhābhāve bahuvittavyayaśarīrāyāsasādhye ’gnihotrādau vidyāvṛddhāḥ kathaṃ pravartisyante iti cet, tad api na pramānakotiṃ praveṣṭum iṣṭe* | *anṛtavyāghātapunaruktadoṣair dūṣitatayā vaidikammanyair eva dhūrtabakaiḥ parasparaṃ karmakāṇḍaprāmāṇyavādibhir jñānakāṇḍasya jñānakāṇḍaprāmāṇyavādibhiḥ karmakāṇḍasya ca pratikṣiptatvena trayyā dhūrtapralāpamātratvena agnihotrāder jīvikāmātraprayojanatvāt* | *tathā cābhānakaḥ—*
agnihotraṃ trayo vedās tridaṇḍam bhasmaguṇṭhanam
buddhipaurusahīnānām jīviketi bṛhaspatiḥ |

‘Objection: “If there is no happiness which belongs to the next world, then why should those who are advanced in learning engage in [rituals] such as the Agnihotra, which can [only] be performed at great expense and physical labour?” This [objection] cannot enter the class of proofs either. For [rituals] such as the Agnihotra are good only for making a living, since [the Veda] is defiled by the faults of falsehood, contradiction, and superfluous repetition; and since the shrewd hypocrites who fancy themselves Vedic experts refute each other’s texts:

those who hold that [only] the ritualistic part of the Veda is valid reject its esoteric part, while those who hold that [only] the esoteric part is valid reject the ritualistic part; and since the three Vedas are just the ravings of rogues. As the [following] saying also [points out]: ‘The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the triple staff [of a renouncer], the smearing [of one’s body] with ashes are the livelihood of those who lack intelligence and manliness: thus [taught] Bṛhaspati.’

⁹¹ Cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* p. 8: . . . *eṣa vandhyāsuto yāti ityādivākyaajāta-syeva prāmāṇyābhāvāt. . .* ‘since it lacks validity like such kind of statements as “here goes the son of a barren woman”.’

⁹² Cf. *Bṛhaspatismṛti* (reconstructed by K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series LXXXV, Baroda, 1941) 2.12:
mamānena pradātavyam śaśaśṛṅgakṛtaṃ dhanuḥ|
asambhāvyaṃ asādhyam taṃ pakṣam āhur manīṣiṇaḥ||
‘“He must give me a bow made of hare-horn.” The wise say that this idea is inconceivable and not accomplishable.’

⁹³ Cf. *Parākhya Tantra* 1.92cd–94cd:
karmaṇā dehasaṃyogo vibhor api maheśvarāt||
aśaktatvāt svato nāsya sāmāthyam karmayojane|
paśutvaruddhacicchakteḥ svātantryam na paśor ataḥ||
karma cidrahitam tasmād yojakaṃ tad apekṣate|
yojakaḥ sa maheśānaḥ svecchayā balavān yataḥ|
‘The linking of the soul, though all-pervading, with a body because of action [comes about] through the [intervention of the] Lord. Because the soul is without power he does not of himself have the capacity for linking himself to [the consequences of his] actions, and so the bound soul, whose power of consciousness is blocked by impurity, has no autonomy. [And] action is devoid of consciousness and therefore it depends on something that links it [to those to whom it must accrue]. The entity that links it is the Supreme Lord, who does it by His will, since He has might.’ (tr. GOODALL)

⁹⁴ The following verses could also have been said from a *mīmāṃsaka* position. See for example *Āgamaprāmāṇya* pp. 34ff. (*mīmāṃsakapakṣa*):

kva vā deśe tiṣṭhann anavaratatrptaḥ kim iti vā
kadā vā niśśeṣaṃ janayati tad etad vimṛśatu|
kvacit tiṣṭhann iṣṭam kim api phalam uddiśya karaṇaiḥ
kadācid yatkiñcij janayati kulālādir akhilaḥ||
kṛtārthatvāt krīḍā na ca bhavati hetur yadi khalu
svabhāvaḥ svātantryam prakāṣitam aho samprati vibhoḥ|
abhipretaṃ kiñcid yad ayam asamīkṣyaiva kurute
jagajjanmasthanapravilayamahāyāsam avaśaḥ||
anukampāprayuktena sṛjyamānāś ca jantavaḥ|
sukhinaḥ kiṃ na sṛjyante tatkarmāpekṣayā yadi||
tataḥ svatantratāhāniḥ kiṃca tair eva hetubhiḥ|
upapanne ’pi vaicitrye kiṃ tatkālpanayānayaḥ||

‘Consider this: being where, when, and why does He who is constantly satisfied create that entire [universe]? Every [person], such as a potter, creates whatever [he creates] while being at a certain place, at a certain time, with regard to a certain result, [and] with [certain] instruments. And since He has fulfilled a purpose [when He created the world], [mere] sport cannot be the motive [behind His acts]; if the motive is [His] nature: by George, now you have demonstrated the independence of the Lord, since he helplessly makes the great effort of producing, sustaining, and creating the world without taking into account anything [He might have] wished for. If He produces the creatures stimulated by compassion, then why does he not produce them happy? If [you reply that] because [God] takes their karmas into consideration, then [His] independence will suffer a loss. Furthermore, if the variety [of worldly phenomena] is explainable with the help of those causes [i.e. karmas] alone, then why postulate Him in this way?’ (Cf. *Śloka-vārttika sambandhākṣepaparihāra* v. 52 seqq.)

⁹⁵ Bhāsarvajña examines similar alternatives in *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* pp. 458f.: *tathā-pi vicāryam etat, kimartham pravartate bhagavān iti? parānugrahārtham ity eke| (. . .) athavā svārtham eva pravartate| (. . .) athavā ādityavat svabhāvenaiva pravartate|* ‘Nevertheless we should examine for what purpose the Lord is engaged [in creation]. Some say that [he creates] in order to favour others. (. . .) Or maybe he is engaged [in creation] only for his own sake. (. . .) Or maybe he is engaged [in creation] just by his inherent nature, similarly to the sun [which shines because that is its nature].’

⁹⁶ Cf. *Kiraṇatantra* 1.5cd: *jaya nṛttamahārambhakrīḍāvīkṣobhadāruṇa||* ‘Victory, [you who are] fearsome because of the shaking [of the world] as a result of the vigorous playfulness of your dancing!’ (tr. GOODALL)

⁹⁷ The scriptures of Śaiva Siddhānta often refer to *preraṇā* as a characteristic act of God and the lords of mantras, on the different levels of creation, e.g. *Kiraṇatantra* 3.25cd–26:

īśvaro ’dhaṣṭhavidyānām patīn samprerayaty asau||

tena preritamātrās te kurvate ’dhastanaṃ jagat|

śuddhe ’dhvani śivaḥ kartā prokto ’nanto ’site prabhuh||

‘The Lord urges the overlords of the lower mantras [to act]. As soon as they have been urged by Him, they create the lower universe. In the pure path Śiva is the creator. Ananta is taught to be the lord in the impure [path].’ (tr. GOODALL)

Ibid. 14d: *yonim prerayate kṣaṇāt||* ‘[Ananta] immediately stimulates the matrix [of primal matter to generate from herself all that is material].’ (tr. GOODALL)

⁹⁸ It is not entirely clear to me why would God create out of ‘honesty’. The text may be corrupt here.

⁹⁹ Cf. *Kiraṇatantra* 3.9cd: *vaikaraṇyād amūrtatvāt karṭṛtvam yujyate katham||* ‘How is it possible for Him to be a creator, since He lacks the means and is not embodied?’ Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s *Kiraṇavṛtti ad loc.*: *karaṇānām abhāvo vaikaraṇyam, tasmād īśvaro jagataḥ kartā na sambhavati| karaṇābhāvād daṇḍa-*

cakrasūtrādirahitaḥ kumbhakāra iva kumbhe| tad idam uktaṃ jaiminīyair—‘na ca niḥsādhanāḥ kartā kaścit sṛjati kiñcana|’ (*Ślokavārttika*, *sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 50cd) ‘He lacks instruments, and because of this it is impossible that the Lord created the universe. Because of His lack of instruments He is like a potter who has no stick, wheel, thread or other instrument in regard to [creating] a pot. The same [point] is expressed by the Mīmāṃsakas: “And no creator ever creates anything without means to accomplish it.” (tr. GOODALL) As the verse quoted from the *Ślokavārttika* shows, this objection could also be made from a Mīmāṃsaka position.

¹⁰⁰ *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. One might consider completing the otherwise unmetrical line with another word.

¹⁰¹ *Vākyapadīya* 1.32, also quoted in *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. I, p. 314, *Tattvasaṅgraha* 1459, and *Syādvādaratnākara* p. 262. Bhartṛhari illustrates this assertion in his *vṛtti* (p. 89), e.g. *grīṣmahemantādiṣu kūpajalādīnām atyantabhinnāḥ sparśādayo dṛśyante*, ‘things such as water in a well feel and [look, etc.] very different in summer, in winter, or in other [seasons]’ (an illustration of *kālabheda*, which makes it impossible to infer the exact temperature of the water). Thus, as Vṛṣabhadeva notes, *tatra syād api kaścīd dhūmo yo nāgneḥ, yathā śālūkād api śālūkaḥ, gomayād api*, ‘among [all things in the world] there might exist such a smoke which does not arise from fire, just as some frogs are born from frogs, others from cow-dung’.

¹⁰² *Vākyapadīya* 1.42, also quoted in *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. I, p. 316. Bhartṛhari actually intended to emphasise the importance of scripture with this verse. As he explains in his *vṛtti* (pp. 98f.): *yasya hi sthālīpulākanyāyenaikadeśaṃ dṛṣṭvā śiṣṭe ’rthe pratipattiḥ so ’ndha iva viśame girimāрге cakṣuṣmantam netāram antareṇa tvarayā paripatan kaṃcid eva mārḡaikadeśaṃ hastasparsēnāvagamya samatīkrāntas tatpratīyād aparam api tathaiiva pratīpadyamāno yathā vināśaṃ labhate tadvad āgamacakṣuṣā vinā tarkānupātī kevalenānumānena kvacid āhitapratīyayo dṛṣṭādrṣṭaphaleṣu karmasv āgamam utkrāmya pravartamāno niyatam mahatā pratīvāyena samyujyate|* ‘For someone who, following the maxim of the cooking-pot and boiled rice, having seen a portion [of the whole thing] determines the rest of the thing [since he assumes it to be the same as the portion he has seen], just as a blind man, who runs on an uneven mountain path without a guide who can see, covers just a small distance while feeling it by touch of hand, and because of the knowledge (or confidence) [produced] by that he believes the remaining [part of the road] to be the same, perishes—in the same way that man, too, who, without the ‘eye’ of scripture, follows logic and, having attained partial knowledge (or confidence about certain things) with the help of inference alone, becomes engaged in actions that have visible and invisible results while he disregards scripture: [such a person] will necessarily meet great disaster.’

¹⁰³ *Vākyapadīya* 1.34, also quoted in *Tattvasaṅgraha* 1461, *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. I, p. 316.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. BHATTACHARYA, p. 605, III.1.

¹⁰⁵ *ex conj.*

¹⁰⁶ Cf. *Tattvopaplavasimha*, p. 125: *upapluteṣv eva tattveṣv avicāritaramaṇīyāḥ sarve vyavahārā ghaṭanta iti* ‘Only when the principles have been annihilated, all transactions take place pleasantly [as long as] they are not examined.’ The *ālamkārika* Udbhaṭa (who may or may not be the same as the Cārvāka Udbhaṭa who wrote a *Tattvavṛtti* according to *Syādvādaratnākara*, p. 265) classified subject matters into two groups: “well-established [even after] they have been analysed” (*vicāritasusthaḥ*) and “pleasing [only as long as] they are not analysed” (*avicāritaramaṇīyāḥ*). *Śāstras* deal with the former group, while *kāvya*s with the latter (quoted in *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, p. 44).

¹⁰⁷ Cf. JACOB 1909, who gives the following possible interpretations: ‘unduly extending one’s claim or one’s position generally’ (= *bhikṣupādaprasāraṇa-nyāya*), ‘to establish one’s self freely and fully: to extend one’s power far and wide’. Jacob also makes the following observation: ‘In the passages, however, in which I have met with the expression, it seems to employ a *dogged adherence to a position* in spite of previous failure, and when there is little prospect of further success.’ (Jacob quotes the *Upamitibhavaprapaṅcā Kathā*, the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍakhādyā*, and the *Nyāyamañjarī*.)

¹⁰⁸ *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.

¹⁰⁹ *ex conj.* SANDERSON.

¹¹⁰ *Nyāyabhāṣya ad Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.7 (p. 14).

¹¹¹ *ex conj.* The conjecture is supported by the parallel passage in the *Nyāyamañjarī*.

This was the view of the ‘sophisticated’ Cārvākas (*suśikṣitatarāḥ*, *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. I, pp. 326f.), who are identified by Cakradhara as ‘Udbhaṭa & co.’ (*udbhaṭādayaḥ*, *Nyāyamañjarī-granthibhaṅga* p. 19; on p. 43 Cakradhara also tells us that with the term ‘cunning Cārvāka’ (*cārvākadhūrta*) Jayanta also refers to Udbhaṭa).

Kamalaśīla ascribes this position to Purandara (*Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, introducing v. 1482): *purandaras tv āha— ‘lokaprasiddham anumānam cārvākair apīṣyate eva, yat tu kaiścil laukikaṃ mārgam atikramyānumānam ucyate, tan niśidhyate’ iti* ‘Purandara, on the other hand, says: “[That kind of] inference which is well established in everyday life is certainly accepted by the Cārvākas, too, but that [kind of] inference is rejected which some people assert going beyond the everyday path [of reasoning].”’

The *Syādvādaratnākara* quotes Udbhaṭa’s commentary on Purandara’s following sūtra (p. 265): *pramāṇasyāgaṇatvād* (em. : *pramāṇasya gaṇatvād* ed.) *anumānād arthaniścayo durlabhaḥ* ‘Since a [real] means of valid knowledge is not indirect, it is hardly possible to ascertain things on the basis of

inference.’ (The same sūtra is also quoted in *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. I, p. 312, and in *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* p. 210; in the latter text one should emend *arthadurlabhaḥ* to *arthaniścayo durlabhaḥ*. Bhāsarvajña glosses *agaṇatva* with *anupacarita- viṣayatva*.) Says Udbhata (*Syādvādaratnākara* pp. 265f.): *lokaprasiddheṣu api hetuṣu vyabhicārādarśanam asti, tantrasiddheṣu api tena vyabhicārādarśana- lakṣaṇaguṇasādharmyatas tantrasiddhahetūnām tathābhāvo vyavasthāpyata iti gaṇatvam anumānasya| avyabhicārāvagamo hi laukikahetūnām anumeyāvaga- me nimittam, sa nāsti tantrasiddheṣu iti na tebhyaḥ parokṣāvagamo nyāyyaḥ, ata idam uktam anumānād arthaniścayo durlabha iti|* ‘As for [those] logical reasons which are well established in the world, we do not see that they are erroneous; therefore, because of the apparent [but unreal] similarity of the property [called] “the non-perception of erroneousness” also with respect to [logical reasons] that have been established scientific works, it is determined that logical reasons es- tablished in scientific works are thus [i.e. non-erroneous]: this is the indirect nature of inference. For the ground of ascertaining the inferendum is the ascer- tainment of the non-erroneousness of ordinary logical reasons; this does not take place in the case of [logical reasons which are] established in scientific works: so it is not right to infer from them things that are beyond the scope of sense- perception. That is why it has been said: “It is hardly possible to ascertain things on the basis of inference”.’

¹¹² Cf. *Kiraṇatantra* 3.12ac:

*sthūlaṃ vicitrakaṃ kāryaṃ nānyathā ghaṭavad bhavet|
asti hetur ataḥ kaścit. . .*

‘[The universe is] gross, diverse, [and therefore] an effect, like a pot. It cannot be otherwise. And so there exists some [instigating] cause.’ (tr. GOODALL)

Commenting on this verse Rāmakaṇṭha distinguishes two positions regarding the origin of the universe. For the Sāṃkhyas and the Buddhists, the universe is an effect, but not for the Mīmāṃsakas, Jainas, and Cārvākas, who hold that ‘the universe was never not thus’ (*na kadācid anīdṛśaṃ jagad, Kiraṇavṛtti* p. 71.) The Tantra rejects the view of the latter group and establishes that the universe is a product. Says Rāmakaṇṭha: *yat sthūlaṃ tat kāryaṃ yathā ghaṭādi, sthūlaṃ caitad adṛṣṭakartrkaṃ bhuvanādi, tataḥ kāryam iti|* (ibid.) ‘Whatever is gross is an effect, like such things as pots. This [universe] that consists in the worlds and so on, and whose creator is not directly experienced, is also gross and therefore [it too is] an effect.’ (tr. GOODALL)

A few lines below Rāmakaṇṭha further expands on the subject (*Kiraṇavṛtti* p. 72): *yat kāryaṃ tad viśiṣṭajñānakriyāyuktakartrā vinā na siddhyatīti yathā ghaṭādi| kāryaṃ caitat sarvam eva jagat| atas tad api viśiṣṭajñānakriyāyuktana kartrā vinā na bhavati| yas tatkartā sa īśvaraḥ siddha eva|* ‘Whatever is an ef- fect cannot exist without a creator equipped of particular powers of knowledge and action, just as pots and such [cannot exist without such a creator]. So too this entire universe is an effect. And therefore that too cannot come into being without a creator equipped of particular powers of knowledge and action. And so its creator, God, is established.’ (tr. GOODALL)

Cf. *Matanigapārameśvara, vidyāpāda* 99cd–100ab (p. 226):

*nimittakāraṇaṃ tv īśo hy upādānaṃ tu śaktayaḥ||
samavāyi tathā māyā kāryam etaj jagat sadā|*

‘The Lord is the instigating cause, as for [his] powers, they are the material cause, and *māyā* is the inseparable cause; this world is always the effect.’ (Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha in his *vṛtti ad loc.* seems to interpret *upādāna* as *sahakārikāraṇa* and *samavāyin* as *upādāna*.)

Cf. also *Parākhyantra* 2.2–3:

*mūrtāḥ sāvayavā ye ’rthā nānārūpaparicchadāḥ|
sthūlāvayavaśiṣṭatvād buddhimaddhetupūrvakāḥ||
ato ’sti buddhimān kaścid īśvaraḥ samavasthitāḥ|
pratipannaḥ svakāryeṇa drṣṭeṇātrānumānataḥ||*

‘All things that are endowed with form, that are made up of parts, that have various forms, because they are distinguished by having gross parts must necessarily depend on a sentient cause. Therefore there exists some sentient [cause]. [And that is] proved to be the Lord. He is known, according to this system, by the inference that we draw from His effects, which we directly experience.’ (tr. GOODALL)

Ibid. v. 12ab (Pratoda’s objection):

kṣiter evamvidhaṃ rūpaṃ na kadācid anīdrśam|

‘The form of the earth is thus; it was never not thus. (tr. GOODALL)

Ibid. 2.29abc (from Prakāśa’s reply):

*nimittam īśvarākhyam yat tad drṣṭam sahakāraṇam|
upādānaṃ ca yat sūkṣmaṃ*

‘The instigating cause is called the ‘lord’; that which is the auxiliary cause is something seen [such as the stick, wheel, etc.]; that which is the material cause is subtle [matter].’ (tr. GOODALL)

The same arguments, establishing that composite entities like mountains must be products (which fact also serves to prove the necessity of God’s existence, since all effects require a cause, and special effects require a special cause), can be found e.g. in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (p. 453: *bhūbhūdhārādeś ca kāryatvaṃ sāvayavatvena pratīyate, sāvayavasya nityatvavirodhāt, khaṇanādinā caikadeśa-vināśadarśanāt|* ‘And we learn that the earth, mountains, etc. are products from the fact they are composite, for something which is composite cannot be permanent, and since we see that parts of it get destroyed through digging, etc.’), the *Nyāyavārttika* (pp. 433ff.) and also in two *Īśvarasiddhis* (one *vaiṣṇava* and the other *śaiva*): that of Yāmunācārya (pp. 158, 164.), and that of Utpaladeva (pp. 13ff.).

See also *Vyomavatī*, p. 70: *pṛthivī kāryam, avayavasanniveśaviśiṣṭatvāt| yad yad avayavasanniveśaviśiṣṭam, tat tat kāryam drṣṭam, yathā ghaṭādi| tathā cāvayavasanniveśaviśiṣṭā pṛthivī, tasmāt kāryeti|*; ‘The earth is a product, because it is characterised by the combination of [its] parts. If A is characterised by the combination of [its] parts then A is understood to be a product, like a pot. Accordingly the earth is characterised by the arrangement of [its] parts, therefore it is a product.’

Ibid. p. 101: *kṣityādīni kāryāni racanāvattvāt| yad yad racanāvat, tat tat kāryam, yathā ghaṭādi| tathā racanāvat kṣityādi, tasmāt kāryam iti|* ‘The earth and

[mountains and similar objects] are products, because they have arrangement. If A has arrangement then A is a product, like a pot. And the earth and [mountains and similar objects] have arrangement, therefore they are products.'

¹¹³ Cf. *Kiraṇavṛtti ad 3.9ab*: *nāpi rūpalabdhyādinā cakṣurādir iva pūrvokta-tanukaraṇabhuvanādikāryānyathānupapattilakṣaṇenānumānena tasya mahābhūtebhya evotpattidṛṣṭeh| yad āhuḥ saugatāḥ—'yasmin sati bhavaty eva yat tato 'nyasya kalpane| taddhetutvena sarvatra hetūnām anavasthitih||'* (*Pramāṇavārttika, pramāṇasiddhi 26*; Pandeya's edition reads *yeṣu satsu*) 'Nor [can we infer a creator God], in the same way as [we infer] the faculty of sight and other [sense faculties] by their effects, such as the perception of form, by an inference on the basis that we cannot otherwise account for [what must be the Lord's] effects, such as the bodies, instruments and worlds mentioned above, since that [body of effects] is known from experience to arise from the [five] elements alone. As the Buddhists say: "If something comes into being when another thing exists and one posits as the cause of the former some entity other than the latter, then there is an infinite regress of causes." (tr. GOODALL)

Also *Parākhyatantra 2.4* (Pratoda's objection):

*kāryakāraṇasambandho na gṛhīto yatas tayoh|
tena tatkāraṇābhāvān na khyāpyaṃ kāryadarśanam||*

'Since we do not perceive that there is a relation of cause and effect between them [viz. between God and the world we see], and [because] there is therefore nothing [that we know] to have caused this [world], therefore you should not proclaim that we have direct experience of [His] effects [since we do not know them to be effects].' (tr. GOODALL)

Yāmunācārya cites a similar objection in his *Īśvarasiddhi* (pp. 163f.): *mahī-mahādhārādī kāryaṃ na bhavati, prasiddhakāryavilakṣaṇatvāt, gaganavat, aśak-yadarśanopādānopakaranatvād vā vyatirekeṇa ghaṭādivat|* 'The earth, mountains and [similar objects] cannot be effects, since, like the air, they are different from well-known effects, or, unlike in the case of such things as a pot, it is impossible to see their material and instrumental causes.'

¹¹⁴ Cf. Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's *vṛtti ad Mataṅgapārameśvara, vidyāpāda 6.99cd-100ab* (p. 228) where he also refutes Dharmakīrti's objection (*Pramāṇavārttika, pramāṇasiddhi 13-14*) and then says: *anyathā mahānasavartino dhūmasyāgnikāryatvasiddhāv api parvatādivartinas tato 'nyatvād agnikāryatvāsiddheḥ, ghaṭagatasya kṛtakatvasyānityatvasiddhāv api śabdāsambandhino 'siddheḥ sarvatṛāsiddhatvasya sambhavāt sarvānumānābhāva eva|* 'Otherwise [i.e. if we accepted the Buddhist position], even though the smoke in the kitchen is proved to be an effect of fire, since the [smoke] on the mountain is different from the one [in the kitchen], we could not prove that it is [also] an effect of fire; [and] even though the artificiality of the pot is proved from its impermanence, [the artificiality] connected with sound could not be established; thus the possibility of not [being able to] draw a conclusion could occur everywhere, and so all inferences would be completely abolished.'

Cf. also Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's *Mṛgendravṛtti ad 3.6cd-7ab* (p. 110ff.).

¹¹⁵ Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika* (Pandey), *pramāṇasiddhi* 13: *siddham yādṛg adhiṣṭhātrbhāvābhāvānuvṛttimat| sanniveśādi tad yuktaṃ tasmād yad anumīyate||*

¹¹⁶ Rāmakaṇṭha also deals with this Buddhist objection in his *Kiraṇavṛtti* (pp. 72–73): *na ca kāryatvam atra tathābhūtaṃ na siddham ity āśaṅkanīyam| yad āhuḥ saugatāḥ— (Pramāṇavārttika, pramāṇasiddhi 13–14)*

‘siddham yādṛg adhiṣṭhātrbhāvābhāvānuvṛttimat|

sanniveśādi tad yuktaṃ tasmād yad anumīyate||

vastubhede prasiddhasya śabdāsāmyād abhedinaḥ|

na yuktānumitiḥ pāṇḍudravayād iva hutāsane||

iti| kāryamātrasya karṣmātreṇa ghaṭādau kṛtakatvamātrasyānityatvamātreṇeva vyāpteḥ siddhatvāt| anyathā tatrāpy anyatrāpi ca dṛṣṭāntasādhyadharmabhedena hetubhedakalpane sarvānumānābhāva eva| aviśeṣāt pāṇḍutvasya tu bhāvād dhūmābhāve ’pi himamakkolādiṣu ca taddarśanād vahnyanumāpakatvam ayuktam eva|

‘And it cannot be questioned that its being an effect in the same way is proved, as the Buddhists [do when they] say: “When that particular kind of compositeness etc. is established to be in positive and negative concomitance with the [existence of the] controller—it is fine that that [i.e. the existence of a controller] is inferred from that [kind of compositeness]. (N.B. The translation of this verse is mine.) But an inference in respect of some particular thing of something well-known from some [logical ground] which is similar [to that in some valid argument such as the one outlined above just] because the wording is the same is not correct. [It is] like [inferring the presence of] fire from [the presence of some] pale substance [simply because smoke can be called a pale substance].” [This objection does not hold] because it is established that every effect is invariably concomitant with an agent, as [we see] in the case of pots and such, just as being a product is invariably concomitant with impermanence. Otherwise both there and elsewhere, if one creates some [imaginary] differentiation of logical grounds by differentiating between the attribute that one wishes to prove and [that of] the example, then all inferences will be impossible. On the other hand, because it exists even where there is no smoke and because one sees it in snow and chalk, and the like, it would be wrong [to allow] that undifferentiated whiteness should be the basis for the inference of fire.’ (tr. GOODALL; cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, pp. 493–494, *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* pp. 480ff, Utpaladeva’s *Īśvarasiddhi* pp. 8f.)

See also *Vyomavatī*, p. 102: *atha dhūmasyāgnimātreṇa vyāpter upalambhāt yatropalambhas tatraivāgniḥprasādhakatvād viruddhatānavakāśa iti cet, ihāpi samānam, kāryatvasya buddhimatā vyāpter upalambhāt pakṣe tatsādhakatvam iti|* ‘If [you object that], because we cognise that [the presence of] smoke is pervaded by [the presence of] fire alone, where we perceive [smoke] there and only there [smoke] proves [the presence of] fire, and thus there is no scope of erroneousness, [the train of thoughts] is the same in this case, too: because we cognise that the condition of being a product is pervaded by [the presence of a] rational [maker], [the presence of product-ness] in the subject proves that [i.e. that it was made by a rational being].’ Later Vyomaśiva also quotes and refutes Dharmakīrti’s objection (*Pramāṇavārttika pramāṇasiddhi* 13–15 in *Vyomavatī*, pp. 106f.). He also

makes the same remark about ‘whiteness’ as Rāmakaṇṭha, and adds: *evam ca valmīkādāv api mṛdvikāratvaṃ na kulālapūrvakatve liṅgam, vyabhicārāt| tasya hi prākāreṣṭakādiṣv akulālapūrvakeṣv api sadbhāvāt|* ‘And thus, in the case of such things as ant-hills, too, the condition of being a modification of clay is not a logical reason which proves that [the activity of] a potter is a precondition [of their existence], because of the irregularity [of this logical reason], since it is also present in such things as walls or bricks, which are dependent on [the activity of somebody who is] not a potter.’

¹¹⁷ Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika*, *pramāṇasiddhi* 14, quoted above.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Rāmakaṇṭha’s refutation of Dharmakīrti’s objection (note 116). See also *Parākhya Tantra* 2.5:

*sambandho na gṛhīto vā kāryakāraṇatas tv iha|
kāryaṃ dr̥ṣtvā paroḥṣaṃ tat kāraṇaṃ gamyate sphuṭam|
tādṛgvidhena kāryeṇa kartā kāryasya mīyate||*

‘You may argue that a relation [of cause and effect] is not perceived, but because of the [connection between] effect and cause [that we directly experience] in the world, it is clear that when we perceive [what must be] an effect, we understand [that there must have been] a cause of it that cannot directly be perceived by us. Through such an effect the creator of the effect is known.’ (tr. GOODALL)

Cf. also Yāmunācārya’s *Īśvarasiddhi*, p. 164: *na cedṛśa eva sanniveśaḥ kāryo netara ity avayavasanniveśapratiniyatam rūpabhedam udīkṣāmahe|* ‘And we do not expect [to find] a difference in nature determined for each [particular case of] compositeness of constituent parts, in the form of “only this kind of compositeness is an effect, and not a different [kind]”.’

¹¹⁹ Cf. Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha’s commentary to *Mṛgendratāntra* 3.2 (pp. 103ff.): *tad evaṃ kāryatvahetunā jagato buddhimatkarṭṭpūrvakatvasiddhau yo ’sau tattadvaicitryasampādikecchājñānakriyāśaktiyuktaḥ, kartā sa ity asmadādikāryavilakṣaṇakṣityādīkāryaviśeṣajanakakāraṇaviśeṣāvagama yuktaḥ| na caitad aprasiddham yasmād*

’vaiśiṣṭyaṃ kāryavaiśiṣṭyād dr̥ṣṭam lokasthitāv api|’

(as Dr. Goodall informed me in July 2001, this verse seems to belong to the text of the Tantra, and it is indeed quoted as part of the *mūla* in Trilocana’s *Siddhāntārthasamuccaya* T.206 p. 62, T.284 p. 133)

lokavyavahāre ’pi viśiṣṭam kāryaṃ dr̥ṣtvā viśiṣṭam eva kāraṇam anumīyate, yathā vicitrabhavanādivastucitrālepādikalākalāpasāmukhyatām madhyatvam anupamaśāndaryasampadam ca dr̥ṣtvā, tattatkartur api tadgatavilakṣaṇyād vaiśiṣṭyam avasīyate| ataś ca

’yad yathā yādr̥śaṃ yāvat kāryaṃ tatkāraṇam tathā||’

(...) *evaṃ jagallakṣaṇakāryasya tattatprakārākāravaicitryam upalabhya tattadviśeṣaviśayaniratiśayaājñānakriyāśaktiyuktaṃ kāraṇam anumīyate|*

‘Therefore, having thus proved with the logical reason: ‘[the world] is an effect’ that the world is dependent on an intelligent creator, that person who is endowed with the powers of will, knowledge, and action, which [powers] bring about the

manifold diversity [of the world]—that person is the creator: this is the correct ascertaining of an extraordinary cause which creates extraordinary effects such as the earth, which are different from the effects [produced by agents] of our ilk. And this is a well-known fact, since—

“The particular nature [of the cause] is learnt from the particular nature of the effect in everyday life as well.”

In everyday transactions, too, when we see a particular effect, we always infer a particular cause. For example, when we see that in a collection of artifacts like paintings depicting palaces and various other things some are inferior, others are mediocre, yet others have unequalled beauty, we also determine the particular qualities of each [artist] who made these [artifacts] on the basis of the differences in [the qualities of] these [objects]. And for this reason,—

“The cause has the same aspects, qualities, and dimensions as its effect.”

(...) Thus, having ascertained the manifoldness of the various forms of the effect [in question], namely the world, we infer a cause which is endowed with unsurpassed powers of knowledge and action, which have as their object these various particularities [of the world].’

Cf. *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* p. 451: *yathā 'garukṛtadhūmaviśeṣāparijñāne 'pi tṛṇādikṛtadhūmaviśeṣebhyo vilakṣaṇam dhūmam upalabhamānas tṛṇādibhyo vilakṣaṇam *evendhanam (conj. : ivendhanam ed.) anumāya tatrāptād agarusaṃjñām pratyeti svayaṃ vā saṃjñāntaram karoti, tathāsmadādikṛtakāryaviśeṣebhyo vilakṣaṇam kṣityādikāryam upalabhamāno 'smadādibhyo vilakṣaṇam kartāram anumāya tatrāptād īśvarasaṃjñām pratyeti svayaṃ vā saṃjñāntaram karotīti* ‘Just as someone, even if he is not familiar with the particular smoke produced from [burning] *agaru*-wood, perceiving a smoke which is different from the particular smokes produced by [burning] grass etc., infers a fuel which is indeed different from grass etc., and then learns from a reliable person that this [fuel] is called *agaru* or himself gives it another name, in the same way when someone perceives such products as the earth which are different from the particular products made by our ilk, he infers a maker who is different from our ilk and then learns from a reliable person that this [maker] is called the Lord, or himself gives it another name.’

See also *Vyomavatī*, p. 102, where Vyomaśiva proves that the Creator must be an omniscient person.

¹²⁰ *ex conj.*

¹²¹ See *Vyomavatī*, p. 103: *athāgnidhūmayoḥ pratyakṣeṇa sambandhasiddher anumānapravṛttir yuktā, naivam atreti cet, na, ihāpi kāryatvasyādhiṣṭātrpūrvakatvena sambandhasiddher anumānam pravartata iti* | *athāgnir anumānād ūrdhvam api pratyakṣo maivam īśvara ity anumānam katham iti cet, na, atyantaparokṣasyāpi cakṣurāder upalabdhyanumeyatvāt* | *athātra sāmānyena kriyāyāḥ *karanakāryatvopalabdher (conj. : kāraṇa° ed.) anumānam, tarhi kāryatvasya sāmānyena karṭṛpūrvakatvopalabdher anumānam iti* | (...) *na ca sarve dṛṣṭāntadharmā dārṣṭāntike 'pi bhavanti, abhede dṛṣṭāntadārṣṭāntikavyavahāroccheda-prasaṅgāt* | *na hi chidikriyāyāḥ karaṇam kuṭhārādi dṛṣṭam iti rūpopalabdhyakri-*

yāyām api tathā bhavati| yathā cātrāpāstaviśeṣeṇa karaṇena kriyāyā vyāptatvād anumānam, evam īśvarānumāne 'pi 'If [you object that] we are right to make the inference because the connection between fire and smoke is established through sense-perception, [but] in this case [of inferring God] it is not so, [then I reply that your objection is] not [valid], since in this instance, too, the inference works because it is established that the condition of being an effect is connected with the condition of being dependent on a controller [of the production]. If [you object that] fire is also visible after the inference [has been made], [but] the Lord is not thus, so how could we infer [His existence], [then I reply that your objection is] not [valid], since the faculty of sight and [other sense-faculties] can be inferred from perception, even though they are completely invisible. If [you say that] in this case we make the inference from perceiving the fact that [any] action in general is the effect of an instrument, then [in the case of mountains etc.] we make the inference from perceiving the fact that an effect in general requires an agent. (...) And not all properties of the example belong also to the thing it illustrates, since, if they were the same, talking about example and exemplified would become impossible. For just because such things as an axe are observed to be the instrument of the action of cutting, it is not thus in the case of the action of perceiving colours. And just as in this case we make the inference from the fact that action [in general] is invariably concomitant with an instrument devoid of any particularities, [we make the inference] in the same way also in the case of inferring the Lord.'

Cf. note 113.

¹²² Cf. note 113.

¹²³ *ex conj.* The feminine pronoun *iyam* (omitted by RAGHAVAN and THAKUR) suggests that the subject of the sentence is *śirortih*. Instead of emending *bhaiṣajyā* to *abhaiṣajyā*, one might consider conjecturing *bhiṣajā* or *bhaiṣajyena*.

¹²⁴ The universe created by God must have a function: it helps the souls to gather the fruits of their actions through a long series of rebirths. But this theory comes to nothing if no eternal Self exists attached to our perishable body. Says Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's *Mṛgendravṛtti ad 6.1ab* (*atha viśvanimittasya prāptam lakṣaṇam ātmanaḥ*) (p. 149): *viśvasya jagato nimittam pravartana-hetur ātmā tadbhogasādhanāya tanukaraṇabhuvanādīnām utpatteḥ* 'The Self is the cause of the whole universe, [i.e. it is] the reason of its creation, since bodies, sense faculties, and worlds come into being so that it can experience [the fruits of its past *karmas*].'

The following verses of the Tantra further clarify why the universe must have been created for the souls (vv. 6.2–3ab):

*kāryam kṣityādi karteśas tat kartur nopayujyate|
na svārtham apy acidbhāvān nānarthyaṃ kartrgauravāt||
pāriśeṣyāt parārtham tat kṣetrajñāḥ sa paras tayoh|*

'The earth etc. are the product, [their] creator is the Lord. This [product] is of no use to the creator. Neither does it exist for itself, since it is unconscious. It

cannot be useless because of the gravity of the creator. Since there is no other alternative left, it must exist for the sake of another, [and] it is the knower of the field [i.e. the Self] which is that “other” [different] from those two [namely the creator and his creation].’

Then the Cārvāka objects the following (v. 3cd):

paro dehas tadarthatvāt parārthāḥ kṣmādayo nanu||

‘Surely that “other” is the body; earth etc. exist for the sake of something else in so far as they exist for its sake.’

Then we have the answer to this objection (v. 4ab):

kāyo ’py acittvād ānyārthyaṃ sutarāṃ pratipadyate|

‘The body, too, since it is insentient, certainly exists for the sake of something else.’

The Cārvāka then puts forth that the body itself is conscious, but the *siddhāntin* rejects this view (vv. 4cd–5):

cetanaś cet na bhogyatvād vikāritvāc ca jātucit||

bhogyā vikāriṇo dṛṣṭāś cidvihīnāḥ paṭādayaḥ|

yasmin sati ca sattvād vā na saty api śave citiḥ||

‘If you say that [the body] is sentient, [then my answer is:] never, because it is the object of experience [and not the subject], and because it changes. Things which are the objects of experience and which are subject to change, such as cloths, are seen to be devoid of consciousness. Or [if you say that the body is conscious] because the one [i.e. the soul] exists as long as the other [i.e. the body] exists, [this objection is also wrong, because] even if the corpse exists there is no consciousness [in it].’

In the *Mataṅgapārameśvara* first Mataṅga sets forth the Cārvāka position that there is no Self other than the body, and consciousness is just the result of some chemical process in the body (vv. 6.5cd–7ab). In his commentary Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṅṭha mentions some details of the materialist view, the final conclusion of which is well known from other sources as well (p. 138): *ata eva ca śarīravināśe draṣṭur api vināśāt paralokino ’bhāvāt paralokāsiddhir ity uktam— ’yāvajjīvaṃ sukhaṃ jīven nāsti mṛtyur agocaraḥ| bhaṣmībhūtasya śāntasya punarāgamaṇaṃ kutaḥ|| iti|* ‘And for this very reason, since there is no transmigrating entity because the experiencing agent also perishes when the body perishes, transmigration [itself] is [also] not established. Thus it is said: “Man should live happily as long as he is alive. There is no one who can avoid death. How could a dead man who has been reduced to ashes return [to life] again?”’ Cf. BHATTACHARYA, p. 610, śloka 7.

¹²⁵ Cf. *Kiraṇavṛtti ad 2.25ab* (p. 53): *ātmā svasaṃvedanena svaparātmaprakāśatayā pratipurusaṃ siddhyati kim anyena sādhanena|* ‘A soul is proved to exist in every man by one’s own experience as being manifest both to itself and to other souls. What need is there of further proof?’ (tr. GOODALL) See also *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa ad 1.5* (p. 14), and *Mṛgendratānta 6.5* (quoted above).

¹²⁶ Cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa ad 1.4* (p. 9): *satyam, ata evendriyādir iva kāryāt so ’picchātmakād anumīyata iti naiyāyikāḥ| (. . .) icchā hi pūrvānubhūta-*

sukhasādhanatvādyanusandhānasāmarthyasiddhatatsamānakartṛtvajñānasahabhāvinīti jñātrantarebhya iva śarīravijñānāntarādibhyo 'pi kāryatvena vyāvartamānā viśiṣṭaṃ jñātāraṃ sthīram anumāpayatīty ātmasiddhiḥ | 'Say the Naiyāyikas: "True [i.e. the Self is imperceptible]. For this very reason, just as such [invisible things] as the sense-faculties [are inferred from their effects], it [i.e. the Self] is also inferred from an effect, namely desire." (...) For desire will [necessarily] arise together with the cognition that it has the same agent [as the previous experience had], which [cognition] is established through the capacity of synthesizing, for instance, the formerly experienced fact that something is a means of accomplishing pleasure. Thus, inasmuch as it cannot be the effect of another cognition, the body, and the like, just as [it cannot be the effect] of other cognising subjects, [desire] induces us to infer a particular, stable cognising subject: this proves the [existence of the] Self.' Alex Watson has pointed out (WATSON, note 51, p. 63; p. 65) the close resemblance between the *naiyāyika* view as presented by Rāmakaṇṭha and Jayanta's arguments in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (vol. II, pp. 278f).

¹²⁷ Cf. Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's definition of *kārya*, quoted in note 136. See also *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* p. 114: *yatra yatra sāvayavatvaṃ tatra tatra kāryatā yathā ghaṭādau* | *yatra tu kāryatvaṃ nāsti tatra sāvayavatvaṃ nāsti yathātmādau* | 'If A is composite than A is an effect, like such things as a pot. But if A is not an effect then A is not composite, like such things as the Self.'

¹²⁸ Cf. Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary *ad Mataṅgapārameśvara vidyāpāda* 6.34–35 (p. 172): *grāhyopādhibhede 'py anāsvāditasvātmabhedah, kālatraye 'pi tiraskṛtasvagataprāgabdhāvapradhvaṃsābhāvo, nānāvidhapramāṇādyanekacittavṛttyudaya-samvedane 'py akampitatadgrāhakasthairyavedano, vṛttyantarāleṣv apy aviluptajyotiḥ, susuptādāv apy akhaṇḍitasvasaṃvit, satatam evārthāvagamakatvena bhāsanād ātmapadapratipādyah pratipurusaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddhah *sthira eva* (ed. MSS ū, ṛ, ṝ : *sthirabhāva* ed.) *iti kim atrānyena sādhanena?* '[The grasping subject] never experiences [any] differentiation in itself, even though the adventitious factors, i.e. the objects of cognition are different; [both possible forms of] its own [non-existence:] non-existence prior to production and non-existence after destruction are concealed from it in all three times; even though it cognises the arising of many conditions of the mind due to various means of knowledge and the like, it has an unshaken cognition of the stability of [itself as] the grasper of these [thoughts and feelings]; its radiance is unimpaired even in the intervals of the [mental] activities; its self-cognition is unbroken even in deep sleep and [similar conditions]; it is expressed by the word 'Self' because it always shines forth as the conveyor of knowledge about objects; it is established through self-cognition for each one of us as permanent: so what other proof is needed in its case?' The same sentence (with variations) is found in Rāmakaṇṭha's *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa ad* 1.5 (p. 14, see WATSON, p. 127ff), and *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* (p. 294 in *Aṣṭaprakaraṇam: Tat tvaprakāśa-Tattvasaṅgraha-Tattvatrayanirṇaya-Ratnatraya-Bhogakārikā-Nādakārikā-Mokṣakārikā-Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*, ed. Brajavallabha Dvivedī, Yogatantra-

granthamālā 12, Vārāṇasī, 1988).

¹²⁹ Cf. BHATTACHARYA, p. 605, IV.2.

¹³⁰ Cf. Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary (p. 18) on *Kiraṇatantra* 1.15 (*paśur . . . amūrto*): *kiṃ ca amūrtatvam asya prāgvad eva mūrtopalakṣitasparsāyuktamahābhūtākāraśarīrād anyatvaṃ tadgrāhakatayā prakāśanād ity anubhavaiva bhūtātmaniṣedhaḥ| ata eva bhūtodbhūtāc cāsyā vilakṣaṇatvenānubhavān na bhūtebhyaḥ samutpattiḥ| pratijanma pūrvatarajanmānubhavasamkārotpannasmaraṇapūrvaceṣṭādarśanato 'nāditvena nityatvena siddheś ca|* 'Moreover [the statement] that the soul is 'formless' means, as [has been said] before, that it is different from the body, which has the form of the coarse elements that are amenable to the sense of touch and that are characterised as 'having form', because it [i.e. the soul] manifests as that which perceives those [bodies and things made up of coarse elements]. Thus [the contention that] the soul [is] composed of the [coarse] elements is refuted by experience itself. From this it follows that it does not arise from the elements, since it is experienced as different also from all that arises from the elements and because it is established to be eternal, because it is beginningless, since we perceive in every birth actions that are dependent on memory arising from the mental traces of experience in previous births.' (tr. GOODALL)

¹³¹ Cf. *Nyāyasūtra* 3.2.60: *pūrvakṛtaphalānubandhāt tadutpattiḥ|* 'It [i.e. the body] comes into being due to the continuing existence of the fruits of the previously performed actions.'

Nyāyabhāṣya ad loc. (p. 210): *pūrvaśarīre yā pravṛttir vāgbuddhiśarīrārambhalakṣaṇā tat pūrvakṛtaṃ karmoktaṃ| tasya phalaṃ tajjanitau dharmādharmau| tatphalasyānubandha ātmasamavetasyāvasthānam| tena avasthitena prayuktebhyo bhūtebhyas tasyotpattiḥ śarīrasya, na svatantrebhyaḥ|* 'Previously performed action is said to be the activity [made] in the previous body, namely an effort made with voice, intellect, or body. Its fruits are merit and demerit produced by it. The continuing existence of its fruit [means] that [the fruit] stays inherently attached to the Self. The body comes into being from the elements which have been impelled by this staying [fruit], and not from independent[ly acting elements].'

See also Uddyotakara's commentary *ad loc.* (*Nyāyavārttika* p. 415): *puruṣa-guṇaviśeṣaprēritabhūtapūrvakam śarīram puruṣārthakriyāsāmarthyāt| yad yat puruṣārthakriyāsamartham tat tat puruṣaguṇaviśeṣaprēritabhūtapūrvakam drṣṭam yathā rathādi puruṣaguṇena prayatnena prēritair bhūtair ārabhyamānam puruṣārthakriyāsamartham drṣṭam| tathā ca śarīram|* 'The [creation of the] body depends on the elements which are impelled by particular human qualities, since [the body] is able perform actions fulfilling human purposes. Anything that is capable to perform actions fulfilling human purposes is seen to depend on the elements which are impelled by particular human qualities, as a chariot, which is made of the elements impelled by effort: a human quality, is seen to be able to perform actions fulfilling human purposes. The same is true about the body.'

As for entities other than the body, the objection is raised that their coming into being does not have any cause, since we see for example that thorns prick without any apparent reason (*Nyāyasūtra* 4.1.22: *animitto bhāvotpattiḥ kaṇṭakataikṣṇyādidarśanāt*) According to Vātsyāyana, the same argument that establishes *adrṣṭa* (i.e. merit and demerit caused by former actions) as the cause of the arising of the body can be employed to refute this objection as well (*Nyāyabhāṣya ad loc.*, pp. 229ff.) Uddyotakara remarks that we see that certain things which possess a particular kind of shape do have a cause of their coming into being. From this we infer that other composite things, such as thorns or bodies, are also produced by some cause, even if we never see them being actually produced (*Nyāyavārttika* p. 442). The preceding *nyāyasūtras* reject the assumption that God alone can be the cause of the world's creation, because 'if men do not have any karma [i.e. if they do not perform any action] then no fruit is produced' (4.1.20: *puruṣakarmābhāve phalāniṣpatteḥ*).

The texts of the Śaiva Siddhānta also take karma to be the cause of the variety of worldly phenomena (certainly not in itself, but under God's supervision). See *Parākhya Tantra* 2.8:

*sambandhāgrahaṇe karma hetutvena katham tanau|
drṣṭvā citraśarīrāṇi karmasattādhigamyate||*

'How [do we understand] past actions to be the cause of the body though we do not perceive the causal connection? After perceiving various bodies the existence of [the retributive force of] past action is understood.' (tr. GOODALL)

The soul's experiences are determined by its karma, and the worldly phenomena come into being in order to become the objects of these experiences. See *Svāyambhuvasūtraśaṅgraha*, *vidyāpāda* with the commentary of Sadyojotis (pp. 22f.):

bhogo 'sya vedanā puṃsaḥ sukhaduḥkhādilakṣaṇā|

tām samarthitacaitanyaḥ pumān abhyeti karmataḥ||1.12||

vedanā saṃvittir anubhavaḥ| sukhaduḥkhādibhir viṣayair uparaktatvāt tair eva lakṣyate viśiṣyate, sukhā vedanā duḥkhā vedanā mūḍhā vedaneti| tām ca pravṛttivat kalāsamarthitacaitanyaḥ kalayāvīyukta eva pumān abhyeti prāpnoti karmata ālambanāt| sukhaduḥkhamohabhāvena pariṇatam karma puṃsām vedanāyā ālambanam bhavatīti| karmataś ca śarīrāṇītyādi|

karmataś ca śarīrāṇi viṣayāḥ karaṇāni ca|

bhogasamsiddhaye bhoktur bhavanti na bhavanti ca||13||

śarīrādīnām yāv api bhāvābhāvau bhogasya nimittabhūtau tāv api karmato nimit-tād iti| sarvathā yat kiṃcid bhoganimittam tat sarvam karmata iti| tatrodāharaṇam putrānnādibhāvāḥ sukhabhoganimittam, ahikaṇṭakādibhāvo duḥkhabhoganimittam iti putrānnadyabhāvo duḥkhamohabhoganimittam, ahikaṇṭakādyabhāvāḥ sukhabhoganimittam|

' "Experience is the soul's sensation, which is characterised by such [feelings] as pleasure, pain, etc. The soul whose consciousness is empowered attains this [sensation] as a result of [its] karma." Sensation [means] cognising, experiencing. Since it is coloured by [its] objects such as pleasure and pain, it is characterised, [i.e.] particularised by them as "pleasurable sensation", "painful sensation", [or] "uncertain sensation". And, similarly to activity, only that soul attains it,

[i.e.] obtains it, whose consciousness is empowered by *kalā* (limited power of action), [i.e.] which is not separated from *kalā*, [and it has this experience] as a result of its karma which is [its] cause. For karma, having transformed itself into the [mental] states of pleasure, pain, and uncertainty, becomes the cause of the sensation of the souls. [The next verse is] “And as a result of karma bodies. . .” “And as a result of karma bodies, sense objects, and faculties [of cognition and action] do or do not come into being in order to accomplish the experience of the experiencing subject.” The verse says (*iti*) that the existence and non-existence of bodies and the like, which [existence or non-existence] are the causes of experience, also depend on karma as [their instrumental] cause. For in all circumstances everything that is the cause of experience results from karma. For example, the existence of sons, food, etc. is the cause of experiencing pleasure; the existence of snakes, thorns, etc. is the cause of experiencing pain; thus the non-existence of sons, food, etc. is the cause of experiencing pain or uncertainty, [while] the non-existence of snakes, thorns, etc. is the cause of experiencing pleasure.’

Also *Kiraṇavṛtti ad 3.7* (p. 66): *puruṣāṇām hi sarvadā śārīrabhogādivaicitryānyathānupapattyā karmanāḥ sattvaṃ sṛṣṭikāle ’pi paśumṛgapakṣisarīrpasthāvaramanuṣyādijanmavaicitryaśruteḥ* | ‘For *karman* exists at all times for souls, since the diversity of experience [mediated] through [different] bodies and so on could not otherwise be accounted for, for scripture tells us that even at the time of creation there was a diversity of births as domestic and wild beasts, as birds, creeping animals, plants, humans and so on.’ (tr. GOODALL) Cf. *Mataṅgapārameśvara 6.97cd* and Rāmakaṇṭha’s commentary *ad loc.* (pp. 224f), *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa ad 2.14* (pp. 139ff.), *Abhidharmakośa 4.1a* (*karmajaṃ lokavaicitryam*).

¹³² The body is defined as follows in the *Nyāyasūtra* (1.1.11): *ceṣṭendriyārthāśrayaḥ śārīram* | ‘Our body is the substratum of volitions, sense-faculties, and sense-objects.’ (Cf. *Nyāyavārttika ad loc.* (p. 65): *na hi gandhādayo ’rthāḥ śārīravṛttayaḥ, yat tu teṣāṃ kāryaṃ sukhaduḥkhopalabdhinimittatvam, tad nāsati śārīre bhavati, iti śārīrāśrayā ity ucyante* | ‘For sense-objects such as smell are not located in the body, but their function, namely the condition of being causes of feeling pleasure or pain, is impossible if the body does not exist: that is why they are taught to have the body as their substratum.’) Since our pleasurable and painful experiences are the results of our former deeds, the creation of our body, which is the *sine qua non* of these experiences, is also determined by karma (*Nyāyasūtra 3.2.60: pūrvakṛtaphalānubandhāt tadutpattiḥ* | ‘It [i.e. the body] arises as a consequence of the result [i.e. merit and demerit] of former deeds’), just as the conjunction of particular souls with particular bodies (*śārīrotpattinimittavat saṃyogotpattinimittam karma* |, *Nyāyasūtra 3.2.66*).

¹³³ Although Vṛddhāmbhi is a *cārvāka*, accepting the role of karma in the creation of the body does not seem to worry him very much. We would expect a die-hard *nāstika* to hold that the body arises from the elements which are independent of karma (cf. *Nyāyabhāṣya ad Nyāyasūtra 3.2.61 (pūrvapakṣa)*:

karmanirapekṣebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ śarīram utpannam).

¹³⁴ According to the Naiyāyikas, the fruition of karma alone is not enough to explain the creation of the world: an intelligent creator must also take an essential part in the process. Says Vātsyāyana (*Nyāyabhāṣya ad 4.1.21*): *puruṣakāram īśvaro 'nugrṇāti| phalāya puruṣasya yatamānasyeśvaraḥ phalaṃ sampādayatīti| yadā na sampādayati, tadā puruṣakarmāphalaṃ bhavatīti* 'God favours human effort, which means (*iti*) that God makes the result [of karma] come about for a man who strives to attain the result. This [also] means (*iti*) that when [God] does not make [it] come about then the person's karma becomes fruitless.'

Uddyotakara's commentary on the same *sūtra* (pp. 433ff): *yenaiva nyāyeneśvarasya kāraṇatvaṃ sidhyati, tenaivāstitvam iti| (...) pradhānaparamāṇukarmāṇi prāk pravṛtter buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitāni pravartante, acetanatvād, vāsyādivad iti| yathā vāsyādi buddhimatā takṣṇādhiṣṭhitam acetanatvāt pravartate, tathā pradhānaparamāṇukarmāṇy acetanāni pravartante| tasmāt tāny api buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitāni| (...) dharmādharmau buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitau puruṣasyopabhogaṃ kurutaḥ, kāraṇatvāt, vāsyādivad iti| ātmaivādhiṣṭhātā dharmādharmau bhaviṣyatīti cet, yasya tau dharmādharmau sa evādhiṣṭhātā bhaviṣyatīti na yuktaṃ, prāk kāyakaraṇotpattes tadasambhavāt| (...) yadi ca puruṣaḥ svatantraḥ pravartate, na duḥkhaṃ kuryāt| na hi kaścīd ātmano duḥkhaṃ icchatīti| yaś cātmano 'ngopaghātaṃ śiraśchedādi vā karoti, so 'pi tadvaikalye prāyaṇe vā hitabuddhiḥ pravartata iti| yadi punar dharmādharmaḥ evādhiṣṭhitāḥ paramāṇavaḥ pravarteran, na yuktaṃ idam, acetanatvāt| na hi kiñcid acetanaṃ svatantram adhiṣṭhāyakaṃ dr̥ṣṭam iti* 'The same argumentation which proves that God is a cause also proves that he exists. (...) The source of the material world, particles, and karmas become active when presided over by an intelligent cause before becoming active, since they are insentient, like such things as axes. Just as such things as axes become active when presided over by an intelligent carpenter, since they are insentient, in the same way, the source of the material world, particles, and karmas also become active [though they are] insentient, and therefore they are also presided over by an intelligent cause. (...) Merit and demerit bring about experience for man in as much as they are presided over by an intelligent cause, since they are instruments, like such things as axes. If [you object that] it is the Self alone that presides over merit and demerit, [then the answer is that] it is not proper that the same person will be the overseer to whom those merit and demerit belong, since this is impossible before the body and the sense faculties come into being. (...) Furthermore, if the soul acted at will, it would not create pain [for itself]. For nobody desires pain for himself. When somebody injures his own body or cuts off his own head etc., that man also acts in the belief that it is beneficial to mutilate that [body of his], or to die. On the other hand, if the subtle particles became active when presided over by merit and demerit alone, this would not be appropriate, since [merit and demerit] are insentient. For no insentient thing has been seen to be an autonomous overseer.'

See also *Nyāyabhāṣya* p. 452: *karmaṇo 'py acetanatvān na svataḥpravṛttir nāpi pravartakatvam, na hy acetano *hetur acetanānām (conj. : hetuś cetanā-*

nām ed.) *adhiṣṭhātā kaścīd aviśeṣād adrṣṭatvāc ca| adhiṣṭhātur acetanatve ca nirabhiprāyavyāpāratvāt tadadhiṣṭhitebhyo ghunādipadavinīyāsavan na deśādiniyatasvabhāvaṃ kāryam upapadyate|* (...) *buddhimadadhiṣṭhitebhya eva hi citra-lekhādyupādānopakaraṇebhyaḥ sthāvarajamgamajātiviśeṣākṛtiṣv avayavaracanā-viśeṣaniyamopalabdhīḥ|* ‘Since karma is unconscious, it cannot perform any action by itself, neither can it propel [other things], for no unconscious cause can preside over unconscious things, because it does not differ [from them], and because nobody has seen [such an unconscious overseer]. Furthermore, if the overseer were unconscious, because its activity would be unintentional, no effect whose nature is regulated through place, [time,] etc. would come into being from things presided over by that [unconscious overseer], just as in the case when a worm leaves its traces [in palm-leaf or wood, which may accidentally resemble letters]. (...) For one obtains the regularity of the particular arrangement of the constituents in the case of the shapes of particular species of animate and inanimate things only from those materials and instruments, such as a painting, which have been presided over by an intelligent [being].’

The authors of Śaiva Siddhānta expounded similar views. Says Rāmakaṇṭha in his *Kiraṇavṛtti ad 3.12* (p. 74):

atra parābhiprāyaḥ|

karma cet (12d)

anena hi prayogavacanena bhavadbhiḥ karṣṇmātraṃ sādhyam upakṣiptam| tac cobhayavādisiddham karmāstv iti śrāvaṇaḥ śabda itivat siddhasādhanatvād ayuktam etat| yad āhur jaiminīyāḥ (Ślokavārttika sambandhākṣepaparihāra 75)—kasyacid dhetumātrasya yady adhiṣṭhātṛteṣyate|

karmabhiḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ tatsiddheḥ siddhasādhanam||

iti| atra siddhāntaḥ|

na hy acetanam|| (12d)

na siddhasādhanam yasmāt karmācetanam iti| ayam arthaḥ| nāsmābhir atra karṣṇmātraṃ sādhyate 'pi tu viśiṣṭajñānakriyāyuktaḥ karteti kuto 'cetanaiḥ karmabhiḥ siddhasādhanam iti|

‘Here [follows] an opponent’s opinion:

“What if it is *karman* [that is the cause of the universe]?”

All that you have put forward to be proved with this syllogism [of yours] is [the existence of] some agent. Let that [agent] be *karman*, which is accepted by both sides in the dispute, and thus this [argument of the Saiddhāntika] is inappropriate, because the syllogism would then prove what is already well-established, just like the assertion ‘sound is audible’. As the Mīmāṃsakas assert, “If one requires just any cause to preside [over the creation of the universe, then let this role be performed] by [the fruits of past] actions, since they are proved to exist for all beings. [And in that case the fault of] proving what is already established [vitiates the argument].” In response to this [the view of] the Siddhānta is:

“No, because [*karman* is] insentient.”

This is not [a case of] proving what is already established, because *karman* is insentient. What is meant by this is that we have not sought to prove here simply that there must be an agent, but that there is an agent equipped with particular [powers of] knowledge and action. Why then should there be [the lo-

gical fault of] proving what is already established because of insentient actions [being all that is proved]?’ (tr. GOODALL)

Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha in his *Mṛgendravṛtti* (pp. 108ff.) also rejected the possibility that either karma (quoting *Ślokavārttika*, *sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 75) or *māyā* could be the agent of creation, on the ground that both are insentient. (The Vaiśeṣika Vyomaśiva also quotes and refutes *Ślokavārttika sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 75 in *Vyomavatī*, pp. 103f.)

See also *Parākhyantra* 2.12cd (Pratoda’s objection):

tanvādeḥ kāraṇaṃ karma kalpitena matena kim||

‘The cause of bodies and such is [the retributive force of] past action. Why trouble with some artificial theory?’ (tr. Goodall)

Ibid. v. 15ab (Prakāśa’s reply):

asya dr̥ṣṭasya hetur vā karmākhyo buddhimān bhavet|

‘Or [you might be forced to maintain that] the cause of this perceived [universe] that we call [the retributive force of] past action must be endowed with sentience.’ (tr. Goodall)

Yāmunācārya in his *Āgamaprāmāṇya* (p. 25) also argues against the agency of unconscious karmas: *cetanānadhīṣṭitāni tāni [i.e. karmāṇi] na kāryāṇi janayitum utsahante, acetanatvād vāsīvat| na hi cetanena takṣṇā ’nadhīṣṭhitā vāsī svayam eva yūpādīny āpādayitum alam|* ‘Those [karmas] are not capable of producing effects without being presided over by a sentient [agent], since they are insentient, like an axe. For an axe is not able to bring about such things as posts if it is not presided over by a sentient carpenter.’ (Cf. Uddyotakara’s commentary ad *Nyāyasūtra* 4.1.21, quoted above.)

¹³⁵ See *Vyomavatī*, p. 103: *sarvam acetanaṃ cetanādhiṣṭitaṃ pravartamānaṃ dr̥ṣṭaṃ, yathā tantvādi, tathā ca karmādi|* ‘All insentient things, such as threads etc., are seen to become active when presided over by a sentient [agent], and the same is true about karmas.’

¹³⁶ The Cārvāka’s objection may bring to our mind Maṇḍanamisra’s arguments against a single creator God, also quoted by Rāmakaṇṭha in his *Kiraṇavṛtti* (p. 73): *nāpi dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhano ’yaṃ viruddhaḥ| yathāha maṇḍanaḥ (Vidhiviveka, pp. 219 and 224)—*

sanniveśādimat sarvaṃ buddhimaddhetu yadyapi|

prasiddhasanniveśāder ekakāraṇatā kutaḥ||

rathādyavayavā nānātakṣanirmāpitā api|

dr̥ṣyante jagati prāya upakāryopakārah|

iti| yato rathādyavayavānām anekataṣṇanirmītanām api naikasthapatibuddhikriyābhyāṃ vinaikarathārambhakatvaṃ dr̥ṣṭam|

‘Nor is the [logical ground] contradicted as proving [some quality that is] the opposite of the nature of the subject of the argument, as Maṇḍana states: “Although everything that is composite and so on must have a sentient cause, how can one say that well-known composite things and so on have only one cause? Although the parts of something like a chariot are constructed by various craftsmen, generally one experiences that things in the universe which help to [bring

something about] require [in turn] to be helped [themselves].” [The counter argument above is wrong,] because although the parts of something like a chariot are [individually] created by various craftsmen, they are not seen to create a chariot without the knowledge and action of a single master craftsman.’ (tr. GOODALL) See also his *Maṅgavṛtti ad 6.99cd–100ab* (p. 229).

Maṅdanamiśra’s objection had already been quoted and rejected by Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇakaṅṭha in his commentary (p. 103) to the following verse of the *Mṛgendratāntra* (3.1): *athopalabhya dehādi vastu kāryatvadharmakam| kartāram asya jānīmo viśiṣṭam anumānataḥ||* Nārāyaṇakaṅṭha first establishes that everything that had been first non-existent and that was subsequently made existent is an effect; since the body is such, it is also an effect (p. 99: *abhūtvā bhāvitvam eva hi kāryatvam, tac ca dehasyopalabhyata eva|*). Another reason which proves that things such as the body are products is the fact that they are composite and impermanent (ibid.: *kiṃ ca sanniveśaviśeṣavattvād vinaśvaratvāc ca dehādeḥ kāryatvam apahnotum aśakyam| yad yat sanniveśaviśeṣavad vinaśvaram, tat tat kāryam yathā ghaṭādi|*). The next step in the argumentation is to show that every effect is dependent on a sentient agent (ibid.: *yad yat kāryam tat tad buddhimatkarṭṛpūrvakam drṣṭam yathā rathādi| yat tu naivamvidham, na tat kāryam yathātmādi|*). Wild plants, rice, forest trees are also part of the subject of the argument, since it has not been proved that they were not produced by an agent (p. 100: *na cāyam akṛṣṭajātaiḥ sālyādibhir vanadrūmādibhir vānaikāntikaḥ, teṣu kartrabhāvasyāniścayāt teṣāṃ ca pakṣībhūtatvāt|*). The Mīmāṃsakas might object that pots are made by potters, not by God (*Ślokaṅkāntika sambandhākṣepaparihāra 79* is quoted), but then it was the Lord who made the potters capable of making pots. Then follows Maṅdanamiśra’s objection and its refutation.

The Naiyāyika Bhāsarvajña also argues against the multiplicity of creators in his *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (p. 476, probably referring to Prajñākaragupta’s objection: *tathā bahubhir ekasya bahūnāṃ caikataḥ kriyā, Pramāṇavārtikālaṅkāra, v. 2.234, p. 37): nanu caikasyāpi kāryasyaikāḥ kartā bahavaś ca drśyante, tathā bahūnāṃ apy eko bahavaś ca| tat katham avagamyate—‘sarvasya jagata eka eśvaraḥ kartā na tu bahavo ’nīśvarā’ iti? uktam atra| yaḥ paridrṣṭāni kāraṇāni prayuṅkte, taiś ca na prayujyate sa svatantraḥ kartety ucyate| na cānīśvarasya paramāṇvadrṣṭādiṣu bhūbhūdharaśarīrābhyantarāvayavādiṣu ca paridarśanapūrvakam prayokṛtvam sambhavati| tatra bahavo ’nīśvarāḥ kṣityādeḥ kartāraḥ prāsādaviśeṣasyevāsaṅkhyātā api stanamdhayā iti| atheśvarā eva bahavaḥ kṣityādeḥ kartāra iṣyante, tathā saty apasiddhāntas te prāpnoti| ekanirākaraṇe ca bahū abhyupagamo ’niṣṭaparihāre ’tikauśalaṃ khyāpayati| kiṃ ca teṣāṃ īśvarāṇāṃ kim aiśvaryaṃ sarvajñatvam anuttamā śaktiś cāsti na vā? yady asti, tadānekeśvarakalpanayā kim? vaiyarthiyāt| atha nāsti, tadā teṣāṃ niyamitā kaścit prabhur asti, anyathā katham avirodhena sadā jagadutpattyādiṣu pravarterann iti?’* “But surely, we see that one product has [sometimes] one, and [sometimes] many makers, and similarly many [products can] also have one or many [makers]. So how can one ascertain that the whole world has only one creator: the Lord, and not many [creators] who are not gods?” We have [already] answered [this objection]. That person who employs the causes which he thoroughly knows

and who is not employed by them is said to be the autonomous agent. And someone who is not God cannot employ such things as particles and *adr̥ṣṭa* (the result of good and bad deeds), or for example the interior parts of the earth, mountains, and bodies, which employment requires the thorough knowledge [of these things]. To perform such a deed (*tatra*), the many creators of the earth, etc., who are not gods (*anīśvarāḥ*), are [just] babies, like the builders of an extraordinary palace who, countless as they be, are not masters (*anīśvarāḥ*). If one holds that the many creators of the earth etc. are indeed gods, then, if that is the case, you arrive at a conclusion that is opposed to your position. You get rid of one and then accept many: this proclaims how extremely clever you are in refuting what you do not accept. Furthermore, do those gods possess divine faculties, omniscience, and unsurpassed power, or do they not? If they do, then why postulate several gods? For [such a postulation] is useless. If they don't then they have a superior (*kaścit*) master as [their] governor. Otherwise how could they continuously engage in the creation of the world etc. without quarrelling?

Cf. *Vyomavatī*, p. 203: *na cāsmadādyātmaivādhiṣṭhāyakaḥ, tasya tadviṣaya-jñānābhāvāt| tathā cāsmadādyātmano na karmaviṣayaṃ jñānam indriyajam, nāpi paramāṇvādiviṣayam|* 'And the controller cannot be the Self of our kind, since it lacks the knowledge of that matter. And thus, on the other hand, the knowledge that the Self of our kind has, in as much as it arises from the senses, does not pertain either to the karmas or to such [invisible things] as the particles.'

¹³⁷ Therefore if it depended on them they would probably hinder its creation.

¹³⁸ *ex conj.* ISAACSON. Candrānanda in his commentary to *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5.2.2 points out that such phenomena as earthquakes occur in order to indicate good and evil for the creatures (*prajānāṃ śubhāśubhasūcanāya*), and thus they are especially caused by their *adr̥ṣṭa* (merit and demerit).

¹³⁹ *ex conj.* ISAACSON. The three kinds of wild plants correspond to the three kinds of uncultivated land.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* p. 479 (answering Prajñākaragupta's objection in *Prāmāṇavārtikālaṅkāra* v. 2.284cd, p. 39: *chāgādīnāṃ puriṣāder vartulīkaraṇena kiṃ||*): *chāgādīpuriṣāder vartulīkaraṇe prekṣāvataḥ kiṃ prayojanam iti cet, chāgādīnāṃ tādr̥śenaiva puriṣaviśeṣenotsargakāle sukhaṃ duḥkhaṃ vā bhavatīti tan-nimittakarmaphalasampādatvam eva prayojanam| etena badarīkaṇṭakamayūra-candrikādivaicitryakaraṇe 'pi prayojanam draṣṭavyam| tatrāpy avaśyaṃ kasyacit sukhaṃ duḥkhaṃ vā, darśanam sparśanam vā bhavatīty ato vicitram prāṇināṃ karmādhiṣṭhāya tadanurūpaṃ phalaṃ kurvataḥ katham apreṣāpūrvakāritvam?* 'If [you raise the objection:] "What purpose can a considerate [creator] have in making round such things as the droppings of goats and other [animals]?" [, then I give you the following reply:] goats and other [animals] feel pleasure or pain at the time of excretion precisely because of those particular droppings of precisely that kind, so the goal [of the creator] is nothing but to be the ac-

complisher of the results of the karmas which are the causes of that [pleasure or pain]. In the same way one should also see the purpose of creating diversity [in the form of] such [things] as the thorns of the jujube tree, the eyes in the peacock's tail, etc. In the case of these things, too, someone will necessarily feel pleasure or pain, [since someone will necessarily] see or touch [them]. So how could [the creator] act without consideration when he presides over the manifold karma of creatures, and produces a result which suits that [karma]?'

Cf. Śaṅkara's commentary to *Brahmasūtra* 2.1.34: *ataḥ sṛjyamānaprāṇi-dharmādharmāpekṣā viṣamā sṛṣṭir iti nāyam īśvarasyāparādhah* | 'Thus the creation is not uniform inasmuch as it is dependent on the merit and demerit of the created beings: this is not the Lord's fault.'

¹⁴¹ Cf. *Parākhyantra* 2.19:

svakarmāpekṣya jīvānām svapravṛttiḥ sahetukā

so 'pi karmēśvarākhyo 'smiṁ hetuḥ kāryeṇa gamyate |

'The activity of individual souls depends on their own actions, [and] it has a [further] cause; and that cause, who is called the Lord over action, is known here from [His] effect[s].' (tr. GOODALL)

¹⁴² *Mahābhārata* 3.31.27.

¹⁴³ *ex conj.* When the Cārvāka is silenced by the Snātaka's arguments, the followers of the GRADUATE (*snātakānucarāḥ*) will mock him in the same way.

¹⁴⁴ *ex conj.* ISAACSON. *parikrāmanti* does not give a satisfactory meaning.

¹⁴⁵ More precisely 'cholera of your karma'. One might consider emending the text to '*karṇe 'pi sūcīm*', meaning 'Endure still a needle in your ear, too, for a moment.'

¹⁴⁶ *ex em.* Cf. *Tātparyāṭikā* (*Ślokaṅkārttika* (with *Tātparyāṭikā*), p. 38): *tathā cāhur bhartrīśvarādayaḥ—kiṁ hi nityam pramāṇam dṛṣṭam? pratyakṣādi vā yad anityam tasya prāmāṇye kasya vipratipattiḥ?* I thank Dr. Kei Kataoka for this reference.

¹⁴⁷ Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya*(F) ad 1.1.2 (p. 16): *nanv atathābhūtam apy artham brūyāc codanā, yathā yatkiṁcana laukikam vacanam 'nadyās tīre phalāni santi' iti, tat tathyam api bhavati, vitatham api bhavatīti| ucyate, vipratīṣiddham idam abhidhīyate 'bravīti ca vitatham ca' iti| bravīty ity ucyate 'vabodhayati, budhya-mānasya nimittam bhavatīti| yasmimś ca nimittabhūte saty avabudhyate, so 'vabodhayati| yadī ca codanāyām satyām 'agnihotrāt svargo bhavati' ity avagamyate, katham ucyate, 'na tathā bhavati' iti? atha na tathā bhavati, katham avabudhyate? asantam artham avabudhyata iti vipratīṣiddham* | '[Objection:] But surely, an injunction may also say something which is untrue, just as an everyday statement of little importance, e.g. "there are fruits on the bank of the river", can be sometimes true, sometimes false. [Reply:] We answer [this objection] as follows: to say that "one states [something] and [what one states

is] false” is contradictory. “One states” means “one creates awareness, one is the cause for a person who cognises”. And if [someone] becomes aware of [something] when X is present as the cause, then X creates the awareness. And if we learn, when there is an injunction, that paradise results from the Agnihotra, [then] how can you say that it is not so? If it is not so then how can one become aware of it? To say that one becomes aware of a nonexistent thing is contradictory.’

¹⁴⁸ Cf. *Ślokavārttika* (with *Kāśikā*) *codanā* 52–53:

yadā svataḥ pramāṇatvaṃ tadānyan naiva mṛgyate|
nivartate hi mithyātvaṃ doṣājñānād ayatnataḥ||
tasmād bodhātmakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā|
arthānyathātvahetūtthadoṣajñānād apodyate||

‘When the validity [of a cognition] is given by itself, then no other [means of cognition] is sought for [to prove the validity of the original cognition], for the falsity [of the original cognition] is excluded without any effort through the non-cognising of any defect. Therefore the validity of a [false] cognition that has been learnt from the fact that it has the nature of [creating] awareness is annulled due to the [subsequent] cognising of the fact that the object is otherwise, or that some defect has arisen in the causes [of the first cognition].’

¹⁴⁹ Cf. *Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyatikā*) *codanā* 22:

pramāṇāntaradṛṣṭaṃ hi śabdo ’rthaṃ prāpayet sadā|
smṛtivac ca svayaṃ tasya prāmāṇyaṃ nopapadyate||

[Objection:] ‘For in all cases a verbal expression can convey a referent that has [already] been ascertained through other means of valid knowledge, and, just like memory, it cannot be valid in itself.’

¹⁵⁰ On the concept of *niyoga* see Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU, ‘Der Geltungsbereich der vedischen Weisung (*niyoga*) bei den Prābhākaras’, in *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* XXXVIII, 1994, pp. 485ff.

¹⁵¹ Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya*(F) *ad* 1.1.2 (pp. 16, 18): *yo hi janitvā pradhvaṃsate* ‘*naitad evam*’ *iti, sa mithyāpratyayaḥ| na caiṣa kālāntare puruṣāntare ’vasthāntare deśāntare vā viparyeti, tasmād avitathaḥ| (...) viplavate khalv api kaścit puruṣakṛtād vacanāt pratyayaḥ| na tu vedavacanasya mithyātve kiṃcana pramāṇam asti|* ‘For that is a false cognition which, after arising, becomes invalid, [as one establishes that] ‘this is not so’. This [cognition created by the words of the Veda], however, does not change into its opposite either at another time, or in another person, or among other circumstances, or at another place; therefore it is not false. (...) Though certainly there are some cognitions [arising] from man-made statements that become invalid, but there is no proof at all with regard to the falsity of a Vedic statement.’

¹⁵² Cf. *Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyatikā*) *codanā* 72:

tenetaraiḥ pramāṇair yā codanānām asaṅgatiḥ|
tayaiva syāt pramāṇatvam anuvādatvam anyathā||

‘Therefore Vedic injunctions are valid precisely because they have no association with other means of valid knowledge. Otherwise they would [only] be repetitions.’

In fact all means of valid knowledge operate independently when they produce cognition. Says Kumābila (*Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyatikā*) *codanā* 47–48):

svataḥ sarvapramāṇānāṃ prāmāṇyam iti gr̥hyatām (v.l. *gamyatām*)|
na hi svato 'satī śaktiḥ kartum anyena śakyate||
ātmalābhe hi bhāvānāṃ kāraṇāpekṣitā bhavet|
labdhātmanāṃ svakāryeṣu pravṛtṭiḥ svayam eva tu||

‘One should understand that all means of cognition are valid by themselves, for a capacity which is not inherently present [in a thing such as a *pramāṇa*] cannot be brought about by another [thing such as another *pramāṇa*]. For things may depend on some cause for their coming into being, but once they have come into being they operate independently with respect to [the production of] their own effects.’

¹⁵³ Cf. *Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyatikā*) *citrākṣepa* 60–61:

puruṣādḥīnavijñānas tebhyaḥ prāg anirūpitah|
yaḥ saṃjñāsaṃjñīsambandhaḥ sa ceṣṭas ced dhruvaṃ kṛtaḥ||
bhinnadeśādyadhīṣṭhānād yathā rajjughatādīṣu|
samaṃ nāsty anayoḥ kiñcit tenāsaṅgatā svataḥ||

‘The connection between the sign / name and the signified / named [object], the ascertainment of which depends on men [and which] has not been seen [to exist] before those [men]—if you accept that [connection], it must be artificial [and not inherent]. These two [i.e. the sign and the signified object] have nothing in common, just as a rope and a jar for example, since they occupy different places and [time periods]; therefore they are not joined by themselves.’

See also *Śābarabhāṣya* (F) pp. 36–38.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. *Ślokavārttika* (with *Nyāyaratnākara*) *sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 28a:
śaktir eva hi sambandho.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5: *autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena sambandhas tasya jñānam upadeśo 'vyatirekaś cārthe anupalabdhe, tat pramāṇaṃ bādarāyaṇasya, anapekṣatvāt* ‘Rather it is the innate connection of the word with its referent which is [the means of] its [i.e. *dharma*’s] cognising, [in as much as] it is instruction and not error, with regard to an object which is not ascertained [with the help of other *pramāṇas*]; it is a means of valid cognition according to Bādarāyaṇa, since it is independent.’

Śābarabhāṣya (F) *ad loc.* (p. 24): *autpattika iti nityaṃ brūmaḥ* (..) *autpattikaḥ śabdasyārthena sambandhas tasya agnihotrādīlakṣaṇasya dharmasya nimittam pratyakṣādibhir anavagatasya katham? upadeśo hi bhavati upadeśa iti viśiṣṭasya śabdasya uccāraṇam avyatirekaś ca bhavati tasya jñānasya na hi tad utpannam jñānam viparyeti yac ca nāma jñānam utpannam na viparyeti, na tac chakyate vaktum 'naitad evam' iti, 'yathā vijñāyate, na tathā bhavati;*

yathaitan na vijñāyate, tathaitad' iti| anyad asya hṛdaye anyad vāci syāt| evaṃ vadato viruddham idam avagamyate 'asti nāsti ca' iti| tasmāt tat pramāṇam, anapekṣatvāt| na hy evaṃ sati pratyayāntaram apekṣitavyaṃ puruṣāntaram vā| svayampratyayo hy asau| 'With [the word] "innate" we mean eternal. (...) The innate connection of the word with its referent is the cause of *dharma* characterised as *agnihotra* and the like, which [*dharma*] is not known through sense perception and other [means of cognition]. Why? Since it is instruction. "Instruction" means uttering a particular word. And that cognition cannot go wrong, since that cognition, when arisen, does not change into its opposite. And indeed one cannot say about a cognition which, having arisen, does not change into its opposite that "this is not thus", [or] "this is not thus as it is cognised", [or] "this is thus as it is not cognised". [If one were to speak in this way then] he would have one thing in his heart and speak something else. We find that the person who speaks thus makes this contradictory [statement]: "it is and it is not". Therefore it is a means of valid cognition, since it is independent. For in this case one should not wait for another cognition or another person, since it is a [valid] cognition in itself.'

Cf. also *Śloka-vārttika* (with *Tātparyatikā*) *citrākṣepa* 19cd–20ab

sambandho 'sti ca nityaś cety uktam autpattikādīnā|

mithyātvasya nirāsārthaṃ tat parair neṣyate dvayam|

'There is a connection [between the word and its referent], and [this connection] is eternal: this is taught in [the sūtra] beginning with "*autpattikas...*", in order to refute the falsity [of *śabda*]. Others do not accept either of these two [facts].'

¹⁵⁶ Maṇḍanamīśra in his *Vidhiviveka* (p. 35) gives a summary of the Prābhākara view on the nature of *vidhi*, 'Vedic injunction', which is remarkably similar to the Graduate's position: *pramāṇāntarāgocaraḥ śabdamaṅtrāḥ lambano 'niyukto 'smi' iti pratyātmavedanīyaḥ sukhādivad aparāmṛṣṭakālatrayo liṅādīnām artho vidhir' iti|* 'Vedic injunction is not accessible to any other means of cognition; it depends only on the Word [of the Vedas]; everyone experiences it in its own self, [realising that] "I have been enjoined", just as [one feels] pleasure and the like; it is not connected with any of the three times; and it is the referent of the optative and other [verbal suffixes, e.g. the imperative].'

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Vācaspati Miśra's *Nyāyakaṇikā* on the Prābhākara theory of *niyoga* as presented in the *Vidhiviveka*: (p. 35) *yato liṅādiyuktavākyaśravaṇasamanantaraṃ svargakāmādinā niyojyena 'niyukto 'smi' iti pratyātmavedanīyaḥ sukhādivat| yathā hi santāpadūnaś candanānulepanānantaram āntaram api manomātrapra-vedanīyam āmilitalocanaḥ sukhabhedam ananyapramāṇakam anubhavati, evaṃ niyogam api liṅādivākyaśravaṇānantaram ity arthaḥ|* (...) (p. 38) *kāryābhīdhā-yitā tāval liṅādīnām avagatācāryavākyeṣu 'mānavaka, samidham āhara' ityadiṣu| tathā hy etadvākyaśravaṇānantaram pravartamānaṃ samidāharaṇe mānavakam upalabhya pārśvastho vyutpitsur evam avadhārayati—'buddhipūrveyam asya pra-vṛtṭiḥ, svatantrapravṛtṭivāt, madīyapravṛtṭivat| yac cāhaṃ buddhvā pravṛttas tad evāyaṃ madaviśeṣāt| ahaṃ ca na kriyāmātrāvagamān nāpi phalamātrāvaga-mān nāpi phalasādhanatvāvagamāt, kintu kāryatāvagamāt| na khalv antato*

'rbhakaḥ stanapānādikām api kriyāṃ kāryatayā yāvan nāvagatavān *asti (conj. : asmi ed.) na tāvat tasyām api pravṛttiḥ| (...) ataḥ phalasādhanatātiriktakāryatābodhāt pravṛttir mameti māṇavako 'pi tadavabodhād eva pravṛtta' iti niścinoṭi| tadavabodhaś cāsyācāryavacanānantaram upajāyamānas tannibandhana eveti kāryābhidhāyitām śabdasya kalpayati| 'Since immediately after hearing a sentence which contains a verbal suffix such as the optative, everyone who, for example, desires heaven and who is to be enjoined can feel [*vidhi*] in himself [realising]: "I have been enjoined [to perform the sacrifice]", just as [one feels] pleasure and the like. For just as someone who is afflicted by heat, immediately after smearing sandal-paste [on his or her own body], also experiences, with eyes closed, a kind of internal pleasure, which can only be felt by [one's own] mind, and for which there is no other means of valid cognition [to ascertain it]—[one] also [experiences] the enjoinder in the same way, immediately after hearing a sentence [containing] a verbal suffix such as the optative: this is the meaning [of Maṇḍana's words]. (...) First of all one understands that such verbal suffixes as the optative express duty in such sentences of the teacher as "Boy, fetch the firewood". To explain, having seen that the boy becomes engaged in fetching the firewood immediately after hearing this sentence, the observer, who wants to learn, reasons in the following way: "This engagement of his is intentional, because he has acted at will, in the same way as I act. And he must have cognised the same thing that I cognise before I engage in something, since he is not different from me. And I [set about doing something] neither because I understand the action alone, nor because I understand the result alone, nor because I understand that [the action] is the means of accomplishing the result, but because I understand that it is something that must be done. Clearly, until the infant finally understands that even such actions as sucking are things that must be done, it will not set about doing even that. (...) Therefore, since I set about [doing something] because I know that it must be done, which is different from [knowing] that it is a means of accomplishing the result, the boy has also become engaged precisely because he had understood that [i.e. *kāryatā*]" — this is the conclusion [that the observer] reaches. And inasmuch as his [i.e. the boy's] understanding of that [*kāryatā*] arises immediately after the speaking of the teacher, it is caused by that [i.e. by the words of the teacher] alone: therefore he [i.e. the observer] postulates that the word has the function of expressing duty.'

On the two possible functions of *niyoga*, namely *prerana* (instigating) and *bodhana* (creating awareness) see the article of YOSHIMIZU (cited in note 150), who also deals with the interpretation of these two functions in Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa literature.

¹⁵⁸Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya*(F) (p. 38) and *Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyaṭīkā*) *citrākṣepa* 60–61, where fastening a rope on a pot is mentioned as an example of an artificial (*kṛtaka*) connection of two separate entities.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. *Ślokavārttika* (with *Kāśikā*) *codanā* 49–51: *jāte 'pi yadi vijñāne tāvan nārtho 'vadhāryate|*

yāvat kāraṇasuddhatvaṃ na pramāṇāntarād bhavet|
tatra jñānāntarotpādaḥ pratikṣyaḥ kāraṇāntarāt|
yāvad dhi na paricchinnā śuddhis tāvad asatsamā|
tasyāpi kāraṇe śuddhe tajjñāne syāt pramāṇatā|

(The reading of *Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyatikā*) is

tasyāpi kāraṇe 'śuddhe tajjñānasyāpramāṇatā)

tasyāpy evam itītham tu na kiñcid vyavatiṣṭhate|

'If an object is not ascertained, even if [its] cognition has arisen, until the correctness of the cause [of this cognition] is [established] from another cognition then, with respect to [the correctness of this cause] one should wait for the arising of another cognition from another cause. For correctness is as good as non-existent as long as it is not well established. And that [second cognition of the correctness of the cause of the first cognition] can be valid [only] if [its own] cause is correct [and] if there is a cognition of that [i.e. of the correctness of the cause of the second cognition]. (cf. *Kāśikā ad loc.*: *tasyāḥ śuddher aparicchinnāyā asatsamatvāt tasyāpi śuddhijñānasya kāraṇasuddhau satyām tasyāḥ śuddher jñāne ca sati pramāṇatā bhavati|* The reading of *Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyatikā*) might be interpreted as follows: 'And that [cognition] will also be invalid if the cause of its cognition is not pure.') And the same [can be said about the validity] of that [third cognition], so in this way one could never reach the end [of subsequent cognitions].'

¹⁶⁰ Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya*(F) (quoting the *Vṛttikāra*) *ad* 1.1.4a (p.26): *yasya ca duṣṭam karaṇam yatra ca mithyeti pratyayaḥ, sa eva asamācinah pratyayo nānya iti|* 'That, and only that cognition is erroneous the instrumental cause of which is defective, or with regard to which [another] cognition [has arisen which establishes that] "it is false".' See also *Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyatikā*) *codanā* 53 seqq.

¹⁶¹ *ex conj.* GOODALL. Another possible conjecture, suggested by Dr. Isaacson, is *saiva jyeṣṭhā*.

¹⁶² *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.1.3. Candrānanda's commentary *ad loc.*: *tad iti hiraṇyagarbhaparāmarśaḥ, hiraṇyam reto 'syeti kṛtvā bhagavān maheśvara evocyate|* *āptenoktatvasya satyatāvvyāptatvād ihāptena hiraṇyagarbhenoktatvād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam sādhyate|* *īśvaraś ca sādhitas tanubhuvanādīnām kāryatayā ghatādivad buddhimatkarṭṛkatvānumānena|* '[The word] "His" relates to Hiraṇyagarbha. Interpreting it as "his seed is golden" it is the blessed Śiva who is being referred to. Since [a statement] must invariably be true if it has been said by a trustworthy person, the validity of scripture becomes established since it was enunciated by Hiraṇyagarbha. As for the Lord, he has been proved [to exist] from the fact that such things as bodies and worlds are products, like pots and the like, with the help of inferring the fact that they have an intelligent maker.'

The sūtra is repeated as 10.21; Candrānanda's commentary *ad loc.*: *tanubhuvanādīkāryatayā vijñāto bhagavān īśvaraḥ, tatpraṇayanāc cāmnāyasya siddham prāmāṇyam|* '[The existence of] God has been realised due to the fact

that such things as bodies and worlds are products; and the authoritativeness of scripture is established because He composed it.'

¹⁶³ *Nyāyasūtra* 2.1.68.

¹⁶⁴ As Prof. Sanderson pointed out ("Hinduism", Handout 3, 22. ii. 1999) the same fourfold division of *śaivas* (Pāśupatas / Pāñcārthikas, Lākulas / Kālamukhas, Somasiddhāntins / Kāpālikas / Mahāvratins, Śaivas) also appears in Yāmuna's *Āgamaprāmāṇya* (p. 46.), in the *Śrībhāṣya* (ad 2.2.35), in the *Bhairavamaṅgalākalpa* (fol. 4v3-5), and in the *Kāraṇāgama* (I, 26.58c-59).

¹⁶⁵ *ex conj.* A similar idea occurs at the end of the play, when the Graduate warns against the confusion of various religious traditions.

Act Four

Then enter the Vedic OFFICIANT and the Vedic INSTRUCTOR.

OFFICIANT (*agitated*). What an awful blow! I had one thing in my mind and a completely different thing has happened. When all those religions outside the Veda are suspended, we'll have the opportunity to enjoy the whole country: this is what I had in mind. The heterodox religions are still just as widespread as they were before: this is what has happened. For,

Śaivas, Pāśupatas, Pāñcarātrikas, Sāṅkhyas, Buddhists, Sky-Clad
Jains and other [heretics]: all of them have remained as they were.
Shame on the useless learning of the Graduate! (1)

INSTRUCTOR. But, my friend, he has now become the king's man. And the king is supremely devoted to Śiva, so Saṃkarṣaṇa has to be completely focussed on propitiating Him. For,

In a monarch's vicinity [his] men keep repeating his words, but, eager
for their own advantage, they do not distinguish between good or
bad, like echoes. (2)

OFFICIANT. Right you are, my friend. Who would disregard his own interests and impartially focus his attention on Dharma alone? But how should we spend the time, whose profession—officiating at sacrifices, teaching, and the like—is concerned exclusively with the Veda?

INSTRUCTOR. My friend, we shall spend the future just as we have spent the past: content merely with something to eat and wear. For,

Without merit one cannot find assemblies exempt from villains' talk,
lovers immune from sulkiness, and treasure not claimed by another. (3)

OFFICIANT. Quite right.¹ What to do? But this other thing annoys me more.

INSTRUCTOR. What is it?

OFFICIANT. That these Pāñcarātrika Bhāgavatas adopt Brahmanical manners.² They mix with brahmins and have no scruples about using the form of greeting that only we may use to our equals. They recite the Pāñcarātra scriptures with a special pattern of accented syllables, as if they were taking the text of Veda as their example.³ 'We are brahmins': this is how they speak of themselves, and

demand that others speak of them in the same way. Take the Śaivas and their ilk: they are not part of the system of the four social estates, they give up the life-periods determined by the Veda (*śruti*) and the Smṛtis and they segregate by adopting a different doctrine.⁴ But these fellows say that 'We have been truly brahmins ever since our birth, for a long succession of ancestors',⁵ and in the same way they imitate the system of the four life-periods: this is a great torment.

INSTRUCTOR. How great is this torment, my friend?

In officiating, teaching, matrimonial relation, or in any other context, brahmins learned in the Veda give the Pāñcarātrikas a wide berth.⁶ (4)

As for the fact that they label themselves as 'brahmins': this is merely the usage of their own sect.⁷

OFFICIANT. Is this a small nuisance?

INSTRUCTOR. Why, how big is it? They will never get to study the Veda, the Smṛtis, or Mīmāṃsā, or to perform solemn or domestic rituals.⁸ And if they marry some brahmin woman who has strayed from the path of decorum, they will be given a reputation for having married 'against the grain'.⁹ No need to get upset that they will not be banned from some places, even if they learn just a few of the Vedic ancillary sciences to some small extent. Let's drop the subject. But this is what I've heard.

OFFICIANT. What is it?

INSTRUCTOR. Today indeed the Honourable Saṃkarṣaṇa went to the sanctuary of the Vaiṣṇavas, which is crowded with hundreds and thousands of Bhāgavatas, with the very purpose of scrutinising the religion of the Bhāgavatas. And thousands of brahmin scholars have assembled in Brahmadvīpa.¹⁰ There must be a great conference there. So come, we shall go right there.

OFFICIANT. We've seen Saṃkarṣaṇa's ardour, for he is an advocate of the theory that all religions are authoritative. On the other hand the Queen, Her Majesty Sugandhādevī, is reported to sympathise with these people of all. Rumour has it that there is a royal functionary who also supports the Sātvatas.

INSTRUCTOR. Don't always fear the worst. They couldn't even bend a blade of grass if this was beyond the established customs. So come, let's go right there to see the manifold and desperate floundering of the heterodox religions as they are ducked again and again in the ocean of the Mīmāṃsaka's streaming eloquence.

Exeunt ambo.

Then enters the Honourable SAṂKARṢAṆA, the BOY, and as many attendants as affordable.

GRADUATE. Boy, I've got into a tight corner, for

Those who follow the teaching of the Blessed Nārāyaṇa, whose mind is absorbed in the play of accomplishing the revolution of the states of the universe: [that is its] continuance, emission, and resorption—how shall I say with this tongue of mine that their world view is (5)

false? But if I don't, how shall I be able to stand before the learned whose intellect is completely occupied by the Three Vedas?

BOY. There is this [dilemma] indeed, Sir. Nevertheless¹¹ the customs that were set up long ago are being preserved as they are. Why are you uneasy about this matter, Sir? So now please take a look at this place which is thronged¹² with hundreds¹³ and thousands of Pāñcarātrikas and other great scholars.

GRADUATE (*walks about, looks ahead, amazed*). Good Lord! How big is this conference of scholars! It fills the quarters with a great row of dispute and disagreement spreading as a result of mutual emulation. For in this [assembly],

Here are those [Mīmāṃsakas] who have reflected on the ways of the various meanings in sentences; there are the grammarians who have scrutinised the roots of nouns and verbs; there are the experts in logic, whose minds are sharp in ascertaining the concomitance of the logical reason [with the major term (*sādhya*)]; and these here are the senior masters of the Smṛtis, Polity, Purāṇas, and the like. (6)

How wonderful! Now the kingdom looks exactly like Brahmā's heaven—the kingdom of His Majesty Yaśovarmadeva of holy fame, whose heart is with the Destroyer of the Cities [of the demons, i.e. Śiva], an ocean of enviable virtues, who adorns his ear by listening to the valuable [advice] of the learned, and fulfils the wishes of every virtuous man. (*He muses for a moment, [and says] aside.*) I wonder how should I behave among these people who adhere to the guidance and instructions of manifold scholarly works teaching mutually contradictory things.

What shall I do on a path which is rough because it opposes the Veda, [and] on which even an expert could not arrive at a decision? I know! My refuge is the God who Holds a Bow, a Discus and a Conch-Shell [i.e. Viṣṇu]. (7)

So be it! First I take refuge immediately with the Blessed Lord himself. (*Aloud.*) Boy, the Blessed Lord's temple is close by. So I'll enter there, do obeisance to the Blessed [Viṣṇu] Raṇasvāmin,¹⁴ who is the refuge of everyone, and then I shall occupy my seat in the assembly.

BOY. As you command.

They walk about.

GRADUATE (*mimes entering and kneels down on the ground*).

Homage to Viṣṇu, who is the abode of the diverse triple world which he stepped over with his steps, in the fragment of one part of the corner of whose belly the universe rests absorbed. (8)

Homage to Cakrin, in whose palms a conch-shell and a discus¹⁵ rest, who shows the true path of liberation and illuminates¹⁶ spotless beatitude.¹⁷ (9)

Homage to Rathāṅgin, who is the cause of final extinction <...>¹⁸ (10)

([He listens and says] *joyfully*) From this auspicious sound of a conch-shell I assume <...>

MAÑJĪRA. <...> this is a great opposition to the social estates and life-periods. So the Queen, solicited by the chief minister Brahma<...>kṣa, has been induced to summon these respected brahmins. After returning [from the meeting] she said to him:¹⁹ ‘ “Bhaṭṭa Sāhaṭa, this great Naiyāyika, also known by the name of Dhairyarāśi, is accepted by all as an umpire in this debate between those who are learned in the Three Vedas and the religious preceptors of other religions: please make him the arbitrator in the affair of this debate.”—this is how they requested me <...>’ So please do not leave,²⁰ Sir. It is in this debate that I would like Your Honour to be present in the assembly without adducing your view.²¹ <...>

GRADUATE. My friend Mañjīra, come then, we shall enter the assembly together.

They walk about. Behind the scenes.

In a distinguished family of well-known dignity <...> remarkably fortunate, who relieves those with mutually opposed views from all²² doubts, and thus the vision of scholars becomes uniform with regard to what is the most salutary. (11)

A true ornament of the world was born called the Honourable Sāhaṭa, nearly equal to the Highest Lord, whom people do not confront since no small virtues have made him superior. (12)

GRADUATE. This is the laudation of the approaching Dhairyarāśi. Indeed, people side with Dhairyarāśi! And their sympathy is not inappropriate. He is exactly like that. Mañjīra, my friend, thanks to Your Honour’s favour²³ I’ve got out of a bad fix, since I’ll stay away from such matters.

MAÑJĪRA. How could any difficulty arise for you, Sir, whose great undertaking is to benefit mankind while you live, when the Supreme Lord who is not subject to old age and death is there [by your side]?

BOY. Today there is this seat for you, Sir, in the assembly, so please enter.

GRADUATE. My colleague, Mañjīra, please enter first and announce the king’s order to the members of the assembly.

MAÑJĪRA. All right. (*He walks about.*) Scholars, who have been seated in the proper way, may I have your attention!

The sharp-witted speaker, highly esteemed by the virtuous, the ocean of the rivers of sciences, who has achieved great reputation in the society of scholars as the greatest pandit: upon the request of religious leaders, he became today the arbitrator in this matter by the king’s order. May all the people be at ease, may they give up their differences, and rejoice! (13)

Then enters DHAIRYARĀŚI as described above, and as large a gathering of disputants as can be afforded.

DHAIRYARĀŚI (*amazed*). What a confluence of sciences! Amazing! At this very place, on the continent of Jambu and in Bharata's country I see the City of the Supreme Being! For,

Here the fourteen branches of knowledge have set foot; various practices are present here; this way there are manifold observances, and here the naturally pure austerities are unhindered and at peace. As for the king, he is indeed Brahmā before our eyes: what can be more than this? (14)

(*He looks ahead.*) Well, well! The Honourable Saṃkarṣaṇa, the equal of legendary sages, is right here. All right, I greet him. (*He does so.*)

GRADUATE (*embraces him closely*). I enjoy now an easily obtained ablution by all the holy waters.

All sit down.

GRADUATE. Respectable Theologians, all the knots of your apprehensions are now as good as cut. For, by the king's order, the living Akṣapāda so to say, the Prajāpati of Philosophy is present among us: Dhairyarāśi!

DISPUTANTS. Upon the request of the religious leaders rather than upon the king's solicitation.

GRADUATE (*to Dhairyarāśi*). Ornament among Logicians, you must know the facts of the matter that is presently under discussion. So please begin your talk as you find proper, following your inspiration.²⁴

DHAIRYARĀŚI. Sir, I know this much: the disputants here disagree whether such scriptures as the Pañcarātra are valid or not. But when Your Honour is present, what sort of authority do people like me have to speak? If only you grant us your permission we are allowed to say something, like a child of Your Honour, so to say.

GRADUATE. Why do you say so? Your honour is the one who grants [the course of the discussion, who calls the tune]. And every disputant has placed his confidence in you alone. So please speak.

DHAIRYARĀŚI (*addressing the disputants*). Respected gentlemen, I have heard and understood the arguments put forth by you concerning both positions, and they require nothing [else to be complete]. Therefore please do not interject anything while I am delivering a continuous speech.

DISPUTANTS. All right, Sir. We shall not interject anything without being asked, interrupting your speech.

DHAIRYARĀŚI. So now listen carefully.

DISPUTANTS. We hang upon your lips.

DHAIRYARĀŚI.

To begin with,²⁵ the Mīmāṃsakas say that the Veda is a means of valid cognition by itself, since it creates awareness. The *darbha* grass²⁶ of beginninglessness has swept away its author and the dust-fall of both challenges to its validity.²⁷ (15)

They say accordingly—

All cognitions we have are valid by themselves because they give information about their appropriate object. [But they are] not [valid] if a refutation [in the form of a subsequent cognition] occurs, or if we realise that the instrument [of the cognition, e.g. the sense organs in the case of sense perception] is defective. In the case of the eternal Veda, both blames are out of place, and the fact that it creates awareness is established. Or rather, there is even less room for refutation in the context of something to be accomplished which is an imperceptible object²⁸ [i.e. heaven]. (16)

For people can ascertain about an object which is within the scope of sense perception that it is or is not thus [as the first perception has shown it]. What means do they have in the case of an imperceptible [object]? (17)

Therefore the Veda is a source of valid cognition by itself alone because it creates awareness and because neither of the blames [of validity] occurs.

I have the following to say in this matter. This path concerning its [i.e. the Veda's] validity is indeed straight and easy. Nevertheless it does not win my heart. Where can we see a non-human arrangement in the case of words and [their] meaning?²⁹ The recitation of the Veda also started from somewhere on the first occasion. (18)

If [you ask] what this “first occasion” of the Veda is, you'd better imagine it. For this arrangement of [the Veda] which is eternal in its components cannot be [itself] eternal. You may say that sounds are permanent, yet you cannot see this [permanent, eternal] nature of structures: they surely depend on a maker in our world.³⁰ (19)

[You may object:] “We do not remember an author in this case, as [we remember] Vyāsa and others [in the case of the Mahābhārata etc.]” Come now! This fault is not dangerous. For this maker is imperceptible because of his extraordinary nature. We have memories about [something or somebody that can be] an object perceptible by [ordinary] people like me. (20)

Furthermore, since ancient times people have always said that Hiranyagarbha was the author in the case of the rich compositions of Vedic words.³¹ [If you say:] “This tradition is a product of explanatory exegesis”: you cannot adduce even a morsel of proof for the ascertainment of this distinction.³² (21)

Furthermore,

Just as you say that Vedic texts are always to be inferred as the bases of such Smṛtis as [the one dealing with] the Aṣṭakā [ritual],³³ in the same way let there be an author in the case of the Veda who (22)

is always to be inferred, or else the difference [between the above mentioned two inferences] must be stated.

“But what fails without that [author] which is to be inferred?” What fails without the inference of Vedic sentences? (23)

If [you say that the] memory [i.e. Smṛti, of the prescribed ritual] would be an impossibility, [my answer is that] a composition will be an impossibility [without an author]. If [you say that] memory [i.e. Smṛti] has the nature of an effect, [then] a composition is also of that kind. (24)

“But Manu’s sentences would surely be false without a Vedic text as their basis.” Why you determine a source of valid knowledge according to [your] purpose? (25)

Or rather,

Let Manu’s propositions be false, but we cannot infer a Vedic text which is nowhere, not in the mouth of even one of those who have studied hundreds of Vedic recensions. If [you say that] out of respect for those who are learned in the Veda [and who follow Manu’s Lawbook], a Vedic text should be postulated as its basis, likewise we should postulate an author as a consequence of such structures as the sequence of Vedic words. (26)

‘The [regular] study of the Veda presupposes [its regular] study from [one’s] teacher, since it is referred to by [the expression] “the study of the Veda” ’:³⁴ this logical reason is indecisive. (27)

[You your]self say³⁵ that such [logical reasons] are not effective, and in the same time [you your]self use them—what is this fraudulence? (28)

In the case of an ancient composition that has become well-known due to a transmission the source of which is not error,³⁶ [even though] the memory of its author has not been retained, there is indeed an author at [its] origin. (29)

For, given that the Veda is the work of a person, how is it indeed that virtuous people who have no recollection of that person perform its rituals, which can [only] be accomplished with a lot of money? (30)

The effort of the wise [exhibited in performing Vedic rituals] is very much appropriate in that case, too, if the author [of the Veda] is inferred, just as your [effort to perform] such rituals as the Aṣṭakā ceremony enjoined in the Smṛtis [is suitable] on the basis of inferring a Vedic text [as the ground of that Smṛti]. (31)

And for the following reasons, too, the Veda does have an author, who is always to be inferred.

In the case of the Viśvajit sacrifice,³⁷ a particular fruit [i.e. heaven], (32)

[though] not stated [explicitly] in the Veda, is rightly postulated because of the expectation generated by the ritual injunction. In that case who could be the one who expects that [fruit]? The signified [sense] and the signifying [word] are surely not conscious.

If [you say that] this is a characteristic of comprehension [to expect an appropriate result]: then whose comprehension [are you talking about]? [For] it is not autonomous. If [you say that it is] ours, [then] it will follow that the Veda's meaning arises from human beings. (33)

Since whenever we understand [the meaning of an injunction], we become aware of the intention of the author [of that injunction], inasmuch as he is the one who knows [and communicates that meaning]. Whose is the intention here? Not the word's or the meaning's. (34)

On the strength³⁸ of whose expectation an ancillary or a result for a given [ritual] is postulated,³⁹ there is that person who created that [ritual injunction]. Whose expectation other than his could it be? (35)

Therefore there is an author of the Veda, even if he must always be inferred, for without him no activity [connected with the Veda] is possible.⁴⁰ (36)

And as for the statement that no author is remembered, we examine this matter in the following way:

Those authors who reach the path of recollection in this world, such as Vyāsa and Vālmīki, all have a limited body and so walk about in the range of sight of people like me. Maybe space alone is his body, or he might occupy various forms, or he may have no body at all: [in any case] how on earth could God, the author of the Veda, become an object of memories? (37)

That is exactly why the wise have various fanciful ideas about this author. In reality He is only one, able to secure the welfare of the three worlds. (38)

One cannot postulate a plurality of gods who [all] have the same intention. [On the other hand,] since opposed intentions cannot be [simultaneously] accomplished, some of them would clearly be non-gods. (39)

Therefore there is only one omniscient person. But if there were many supervisors of the world, it could not be created [at all], or being [somehow] produced it would not last long, like a misgoverned kingdom. The construction of a building is accomplished by many because they follow the instructions of one architect: so the world must have been created by one person. (40)

For many people bustling about could not create this world even in hundreds of aeons. But one pure-minded person whose intentions are [always] realised brings it about in no time: this is the right view. (41)

And it is taught:

‘Because of his association with the elements of his task, namely creation, maintenance, and dissolution, the unique, wonderful, unborn, supremely powerful Person, who is the cause of the emission of the whole world, is known as Brahmā, Viṣṇu, [and] Rudra.’⁴¹ (42)

And just as this Self of the universe is the creator of all worlds, in the same way He, the pure-minded one is indeed the author of the Vedas, too. Just as the condition of these three worlds is interdependent, in the same way the Vedas also proclaim interrelated injunctions. (43)

Since the arrangement which is perceived in interconnected topics or words would not be possible [otherwise], thus we postulate the following: (44)

The only creator of the Vedas, which show us the path to unequalled happiness and which are scattered in several recensions, is a pure-minded sage, a wonderful, ancient god. Likewise let the Blessed Lord be the one and only author of all scriptures, for, as it has already been stated, a plurality of authors is not easy to account for. (45)

‘Oho!

Surely all scriptures without exception are mutually contradictory, for we do not see any common subject-matter in them. How could we accept that they were created by one man? Or how could they be authoritative when they annul each other?’ (46)

First you will be examined about what you assert, namely: ‘How can there be validity if there is mutual contradiction?’

How do you prevent mutual contradiction in the case of the Veda? If [you say that] it is eternal: oho, you got stuck in your family tales. If the contradiction is averted resorting to some kind of differentiation in Vedic texts, the procedure is the same with regard to the texts of other scriptures. (47)

In the Veda, blackberry-oblation is prescribed for a man who wishes for a long life,⁴² and, as we learn, the Sarvasvāra ritual is recited for someone who wants to die.⁴³ If you obviate the contradiction in this [Vedic text] through the differentiation of the object of injunction, the course of action must be the same here, regarding the propositions of other religions. (48)

Thus, pro primo, there is no fault⁴⁴ in the instructions of other sacred texts, just as in Vedic injunctions, even if they are mutually contradictory. Or rather,

With regard to the highest human goal, there is no contradiction among scriptures, since the very same reward: deliverance is taught by all. (49)

Various kinds of salvific paths are taught, however, which conform to the intellect of the beings to be favoured.⁴⁵ (50)

This omniscient Lord taught various kinds of approaches when he saw: 'As for these people, they can be helped to reach beatitude in the way they prefer on this path'. (51)

Just as some people from a crowd that wants to enter a single fort or a big house also enter through another door, liberation-seekers also [enter] the highest abode in the same way. (52)

The following wise saying of Jayanta, the child genius, who has mastered the essence of all sciences, who knows reality, and who has shaken off error, refers to the same thing: (53)

'The many means taught by various scriptural approaches converge in the single summum bonum, as the currents of the Ganges [meet] in the ocean.'⁴⁶ (54)

As for the objection 'how can contradictory scriptures have one and the same author', this has also been dealt with:

The Vedas are authoritative not by themselves, but because they were pronounced by God. And, on the other hand, there is no argument for the plurality of gods. (55)

As for the reference to different authors, it is established in another way.

Though He is one, inasmuch as he assumes various bodies fashioned by his will and teaches all kinds of scriptures for the benefit of all beings, he bears all those diverse names which are celebrated in all the worlds. (56)

Śiva, Paśupati, Kapila and Viṣṇu, Saṃkarṣaṇa, the Sage Jina, the Buddha, or Manu are one, only these designations differ, and maybe [their] bodies as well, but there is no plurality in the undifferentiated Supreme Self. (57)

Even if he is different [from God], an extraordinary, eminent man clearly⁴⁷ bears the Lord's lustre. For thus taught Kṛṣṇa: (58)

'Whenever a being is powerful, thriving, or mighty, know that it has arisen from a particle of my lustre.'⁴⁸ (59)

Or let there be many illustrious sages, like Jina, who are devoted to propagate different religions: they, too, will recognise the means leading to beatitude inasmuch as they have a pure, imperishable vision acquired through devoted meditation on the the All-holy.⁴⁹ (60)

For only this much differentiates the yogins from the Supreme Lord: His knowledge is inherent, [while] the yogins' is [acquired] through the practice of meditation. (61)

At all events, those who believe that the Veda was composed by (62)

a trustworthy person assert its authority in this way. The course of reasoning is the same with regard to the validity of every single scripture, such as the Pañcarātra.

Their author may either be one, [namely] the Lord, or various trustworthy persons who know different approaches. In either case these texts composed by Him or them do not lose⁵⁰ their validity, any more than the Veda does.⁵¹ (63)

Or let us suppose instead that the Vedas have no beginning and that they become authoritative by themselves alone: very well, these injunctions of the Pañcarātra and [other scriptures may become valid] in the same way.⁵² (64)

We have no clear memory of an author in this case either. As for Saṃkarṣaṇa and others, they are the propagators of these [propositions], like Kāṭha and others [who propagated different Vedic recensions].⁵³ (65)

“But surely—one might object—these Vedas are well known⁵⁴ among the people to be only four. As for the Itihāsas and Purāṇas, in their case this name [i.e. the name ‘Veda’ is used] in a figurative sense. (66)

‘This is the Veda, this is a brahmin, this is water, this is fire, this is earth’: in this clear understanding of a word’s meaning the elders, whose minds are well-focused, are the source of authoritative knowledge. So who, even a child, will recklessly apply the word ‘Veda’ to this Pañcarātra? Or who will call the follower of that doctrine a brahmin, even if that person resembles a sage?”⁵⁵ (67)

I do not say either that there are five or six Vedas here,⁵⁶ for their number is well known to be limited: there are only four of them. But they diversely branch into many recensions, so let this [Pañcarātra] be one of their particular recensions.⁵⁷ (68)

[Someone may] object:

“But surely those who know the Vedic ordinances speak about a single duty that is learnt from all recensions, [namely] sacrifice, such as the Soma[-offering] or [the immolation of] animals. Tell me, if you have ever seen anywhere any Vedic ritual that was connected with the Pañcarātra.” (69)

We reply:

Those sentences which teach a single ritual action furnished with several components, though many, have a common applicability. Certain rules of [this] extended ritual action are, as we learn, prescribed in certain recensions: let precisely this [fact] be [their] connected nature. (70)

A doctrinal work with a determined object cannot be questioned by (71)

another doctrinal work.⁵⁸ We do see this state of affairs in the case of the Veda, too, in which there are diverging ordinances. For here the prescription of [using] beer-cups is specified to the Sautrāmaṇī [sacrifice];⁵⁹ it is certainly not connected with other rites.

As for other pious acts taught⁶⁰ in the Vedas and the Smṛtis which pertain to separate life-periods: are they mixed up with each other? (72)

On the other hand, people have always praised piety common to all sacred traditions, which consists of non-violence, sincerity, contentment, purity, self-control, munificence, compassion, and the like. This is also the point where these [traditions] are concordant with the Vedas and the Smṛtis.⁶¹ (73)

As for the designation 'Veda' that people apply to the texts of the Pañcarātra, it is [used] as referring to something else.⁶² And [in any case] the matter cannot be settled on the basis of vulgar usage. (74)

Or rather, why bother with the designation, be it true or false? Surely we also see it in such [names] as 'Āyurveda', or 'Dhanurveda'. (75)

People refer to the follower of this teaching⁶³ in general terms as a brahmin, [even though] he has a more specific designation⁶⁴ [i.e. Bhāgavata] derived from a different [i.e. non-Vedic] ritual devoted to Bhagavat, just as [people refer to] wandering mendicants [in general terms as brahmins].⁶⁵ (76)

And the fact that they are designated with the word 'brahmin' is common knowledge in the world. People use general and specific names as they please. (77)

The learned disagree about such caste universals as 'brahminness', [some] saying that the system of the four estates is arranged on the bases of words alone. (78)

"Are such caste universals as 'brahminhood' perceptible in the same way as the genus universal 'cowness', or in another way?"⁶⁶ : this deliberation of the true state of affairs is beside the point, it makes no difference. The status quo, which is established in all doctrines and for everyone, should not be speculated about in any way. (79)

So let us not worry about the existence or non-existence of castes. I shall continue with the present subject.

Thus let all these sacred scriptures have no beginning, like the Veda, or in fact let them be just products, the pious should not bad mouth them. And if they were reviled, however slightly, it would be the same as abusing the Veda. Those fools who are given to finding fault with them are guilty of a sin. (80)

Or rather one should say that the sentences of such [sacred texts] as the Pañcarātra, similarly to the words of Manu and [other Smṛtis],⁶⁷ are valid because they are based on the Veda.⁶⁸ (81)

An effect determines in each case the cause of its accomplishment, as smoke [determines] fire: one should postulate this cause, for without the perception of an object no memory [*smṛti!*] has been seen or heard of to arise about anything. (82)

Neither greed and delusion, nor deceiving people, nor a series of human utterances lacking any substance become the basis of an uncontroverted matter. And in this case there is no controverting factor, since competent people accept [the authority of the Pañcarātra]. (83)

Those who profess that the Veda has no beginning could not stand the idea that [the validity of scripture] is based on yogic perception. Then the Veda is left [as the basis] for its [i.e. the Pañcarātra's] words. (84)

“But surely, [one might say,] we do not perceive here any identity among the performers⁶⁹ [of the pious acts enjoined in the Veda on the one hand, and in the Pañcarātra on the other], and without that the inference of a Vedic text⁷⁰ [as the basis of Pañcarātra] is not correct in this case.” (85)

We reply:

Fine, the practice [of Vedic and Pāñcaratra religion] may not be similar, inasmuch as [Vedic and Pāñcarātra rites] have different performers, but an effect is undoubtedly fit for assuming an adequate cause. (86)

[Someone may] object:

‘The association [of a sacred text, e.g. the Manusmṛti] with the Veda can be assumed inasmuch as it is [theoretically] possible [and thus acceptable] for the members of the first three social estates. On the other hand, the source of an duty is just [any] cause,⁷¹ [and] in this case [i.e. the case of the Pañcarātra] it could have arisen for any reason whatsoever.’⁷² (87)

We reply:

With respect to piety, the Veda alone is the means of valid knowledge, nothing else: that’s why it has been said that the Veda is the source in this case, not on the strength of the identity of the performers. And the theory of yogic perception is not needed either for the same reason. (88)

So the performers may or may not be identical in this case. At any rate it is the Veda alone which is the source of this effect which has the nature of piety. (89)

Here [among scriptures] if neither yogic perception nor even the Veda were the basis of all these teachings such as that of the Jina, Kapila, (90)

or the Buddha, how could delusion be the cause of their unlimited pullulation, acknowledged by many Āryas? What's more, at some places it even meets their full accord.

For [these teachings] might last for a few days due to delusion, [but] that would be a fantastic thing [to say that] that delusion persists for eons. (91)

“Who knows if there were Buddhists in former times, too?” Who knows if there were brahmins learned in the Veda in former times, too? (92)

Or if you say that greed and the like are the visible source in this case,⁷³ the heterodox will retort that the Veda is also⁷⁴ a means of livelihood.⁷⁵ (93)

On the other hand, if the series of abuses jabbered by someone who follows the teaching of Br̥haspati [i.e. Lokāyata] is averted in the case of the Veda because it is accepted by exemplary persons, it can be beaten off with regard to the teachings of other scriptures in the same way: we are told that these, too, are accepted by intelligent people.⁷⁶ (94)

However many arguments of whatever kind you put forth in order to establish the authority of the Veda, they are equal in value with respect to other religious doctrines as well.⁷⁷ (95)

Your contention, namely that the world has always been as it is now, is also said by others in the same way. Those religions, too, have always existed.⁷⁸ (96)

But let's cut the matter short. People who talk too much incur odium, so I put a curb now on the excessive jabbering of my tongue. (97)

Religious scriptures are authoritative because they have been enunciated by a truthful, trustworthy person, or by themselves, like the Veda, inasmuch as they have no beginning, or because they are in harmony with Vedic tradition, like Manu's teachings. All [scriptures] are authoritative: thus speak the political scientists. (98)

[Someone may] object:

“But surely in this way, because of the logical fault of unwarrantable extension [of the category ‘valid scripture’] socio-religious order would be utterly ruined on earth. Tell me a case when one could not say this about any proposition in the same manner, however worthless it may be?” (99)

This [objection] has been answered [in the following way]:

If it takes an uninterrupted course acknowledged by all, if the Āryas are not averse to becoming familiar with and discussing it, if its accepted practice is neither antisocial nor dangerous, if its character (100–101)

does not appear to be newly arisen, if its basis does not seem to be the fact that it was proclaimed by a madman, or that it is unusual, or greed and the like: this path of validity is for such scriptures [alone], and not for any instance.⁷⁹

We can say only in their case that they have been enunciated by trustworthy persons, or that they have no beginning, [or] that they are based on Vedic tradition, but not in any instance whatsoever. (102)

But these masters among disputants will definitely not allow this claim of validity for any scriptures in which any contemptible duty⁸⁰ is taught, such as making love to women one must not have sex with, or eating impure things. (103)

Having spoken thus he remains silent for a second, and then [turns] to SAMKARṢAṆA.

Sir, I have said this much to the best of my intellectual capabilities. So now please ask these estimable disputants according to seating if our speech has captured their heart or not.

SAMKARṢAṆA (*delighted*). Honourable Dhairyarāśi, be sure that, in a manner of speaking, we have been revived, beatified, purified, nourished, made to experience the goal of this worldly existence by this novel river of erudition which has risen from Your Honour. How wonderful!

What a subtle intellect! What a fluent speech! What a skill in the *śāstras*! What a mind, exempt from such faults as envy! Or is there any virtue⁸¹ that has not reached its highest limit in this person? People have always been saying that truly no man has been born who is a match for Sāhaṭa. (104)

These professors are also very much capable of appreciation, so how could Your Honour not win them over? Shall I ask them? (*He turns towards the DISPUTANTS.*) Respected Professors, has your heart been won over by Dhairyarāśi's speech?

DISPUTANTS. Sir, this [erudition] is truly superhuman.

SAMKARṢAṆA. Besides your intellect will always be pure, like that of brahmin sages,⁸² thanks to these words of the Honourable Dhairyarāśi, which shower inexhaustible streams of political wisdom, which are uniquely fluent,⁸³ and immune from malice. Nevertheless you are reminded again and again of the following: there are two things that you, gentlemen, must by all means observe.

DISPUTANTS. What are they?

SAMKARṢAṆA. These religious traditions, as we are told, are not mixed up with each other, inasmuch as each of them has its respective scope, existing in the way they have been set up. So you, gentlemen, must always pay attention to prevent their intermixing.

DISPUTANTS. Sir, what can we say concerning all the universal piety taught by Manu,⁸⁴ such as non-violence, which is handed down here in everyone's own doctrine? Apart from that, however, we avoid the mixing of the specifically

taught, particular ritual sections, since we are afraid of acting against what is said in our own scriptures. Thus the first point has been settled. But what is the second one?

SAMKARṢAṆA. You must not admit into your religions those who take your name in their mouth and then overthrow both scripture and Dharma with their wicked behaviour.

DISPUTANTS. This is also carried out for sure. But this matter does not depend on us. It can be accomplished by you, Sir, and by the officers of the king.

SAMKARṢAṆA. You are right. His Majesty, the instructor in the established rules of social estates and life-periods, surely grasps the opportunity in this matter. As for you, you must separate yourselves from such people. Don't sympathise with them.

DISPUTANTS. As you say, Sir.

SAMKARṢAṆA. So now let us get up and go about our business. Let everyone adhere to his own religion according to the established customs. Honourable Dhairyarāśi, come now, we shall report to our master the events as they have happened.

Exeunt omnes.

Notes to Act Four

¹ *ex em.* ISAACSON. *evam evam* usually occurs after stage directions such as *karṇe* and stands for ‘whisper whisper’.

² Cf. *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p.11: *nanu tatrāpi śrutismṛtiprāptaśikhāyajñopavītādi dhārayadbhir bhāgavatabrāhmaṇair aharaḥaranuṣṭhīyamānārthatvena codanāmūlatve sambhāvyaṃ katham iva prāmāṇyapratyanīkabhūtā bhramavipralambhādayaḥ smaraṇakāraṇatayā kalpyante?* ‘But surely, when Vedic injunction is considered as the source of that [i.e. the Pañcarātra], too, due to the fact that Bhāgavata brahmins, who wear the lock of hair, the sacred thread, and other [attributes of brahmins] prescribed in the Veda and the Smṛtis, perform daily the rituals [enjoined in the scriptures of the Pañcarātra], how, I ask, can you postulate error, deception and the like, the enemies of validity, as the cause of [this] Smṛti [i.e. Pañcarātra]?’

The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer (ibid.): *śikhāyajñopavītādayas tu brāhmaṇādīnāṃ vidhīyamānā na tadbhāvam āpādayitum kṣamante, nāpy avagamayanti, duṣṭaśūdrādiṣu vyabhicāradarśanāt* ‘The lock of hair, the sacred thread and other [such attributes] that are prescribed for brahmins and others are unable to bring about the condition of that [brahmin, etc.], nor do they help us recognising it, since we see that delinquent Śūdras transgress [the rules concerning these attributes].’ (Cf. *Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.2.2.)

In his reply Yāmuna argues against the negative discrimination of the Bhāgavata brahmins (*Āgamaprāmāṇya* p.141): *iha vā kim aharaḥradhīyamānavājaneyaikāyanaśākhān vilasadupavītottarīyaśikhāśālino ’dhyāpayataḥ, yājajayataḥ, pratigrhṇato viduṣaḥ paśyanto brāhmaṇā iti nāvayanti? atha yājanapra-vacanapālāśadaṇḍādīnāṃ duṣṭaśūdrādiṣu vyabhicārasambhavād brāhmaṇyasiddhāvatkāreṇa pravṛtteś ca na tebhyo brāhmaṇyanirṇayaḥ, tad bhāgavatetaraviprāṇām api samānam* ‘And in this case, when people see learned people who recite daily the Vājasaneyā and the Ekāyana recensions [of the *Yajurveda*], wear clearly visible sacred threads, upper garments, and locks of hair, teach, officiate at sacrifices, and receive [fees due to priests]—don’t they consider them as brahmins? If you say that since the transgressive occurrence of officiating, teaching, [carrying] a staff made of *palāśa*-wood, etc. is possible among delinquent Śūdras and other [criminals], and since [these attributes and activities] are displayed as if the brahmin status [of those who display them] were as good as proved, one’s Brahman status cannot be determined on their basis—then the same applies to priests other than the Bhāgavatas, too.’

³ This might be a reference to the (now “lost”) *Ekāyanaśākhā* (belonging allegedly to the White *Yajurveda*) which was regarded by the Pañcarātrikas as the Vedic foundation of their religion, and which they found mentioned in the following passage of the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* (7.1.2): *ṛgvedam bhagavo ’dhyemi yajurvedam sāmavedam ātharvaṇam caturtham itihāsapurāṇam pañcamam vedānām vedam pitryam rāśim daivam nidhim vākovākyam ekāyanam . . .* ‘I have

studied the Ṛgveda, sir, as also the Yajurveda, the Sāmaveda, the Ātharvaṇa as the fourth, the corpus of histories and ancient tales as the fifth Veda among the Vedas, ancestral rites, mathematics, soothsaying, the art of locating treasures, the dialogues, the monologues . . .’ (tr. OLIVELLE). As Olivelle points out (p. 563), ‘[t]he original meaning of some of these entries is clearly uncertain, and the interpretations of later commentators are often anachronistic. (...) The meaning of *ekāyana* (lit., “point of convergence,” see C[hāndogya] U[paniṣad] 7.5.2) is uncertain. (Horsch [P.] 1966 [*Die vedische Gāthā- und Śloka-Literatur*. Bern: Francke Verlag.], 37). The commentator Śaṅkara’s interpretation as “statecraft” (*nītiśāstra*) is clearly anachronistic. I follow Faddegon [B.] ([“The catalogue of Sciences in the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad.” *Acta Orientalia* 4] 1926, 52) in taking the term as the opposite of *vākovākya* (“speech and reply” or “dialogue”); it would then mean an uninterrupted speech.’

⁴ Yāmuna emphasises that one should not judge Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava tantras by the same standard, just because they happen to share the name “tantra” (likewise we do not put an equals sign between killing a brahmin and performing a Horse Sacrifice just because both are “actions” (see *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 101). The Śaiva scriptures—and on this point Yāmuna shares the view of the Mīmāṃsakas—are indeed heretical (*Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 91):

na ca tantrāntareṣv eṣa nyāyaḥ prasaram arhati|
yatas tattannibandhṛṇām vibhramādy api sambhavi|| (...) *yathā māheśvare tantre viruddham bahu jalpitam|*

‘But this argument [about validity] cannot extend to other tantras, since error and other [defects] are possible with regard to their respective authors. (...) For instance, lots of contradictory prattles are found in the Śaiva Tantras. (... p. 96)

kim ca śaivādayo vedasiddhavarṇāśramād bahiḥ|
kalpayanty āśramādīni tato ’pi śrutibāhyatā|

‘Furthermore, the Śaivas and [Kāpālikas, Pāśupatas, etc.] posit life-periods and other [constituents of Dharma] outside the system of social estates and life-periods established in the Veda, and for this reason, too, they are excluded from Vedic religion.’

(... p. 97)

pramādo ’pi na cātyantaṃ rudrādiṣu na sambhavi|
yad vā mohaśāstrapraṇetrṭayāvagatatvād vyāmohayitum apīdṛśaśāstrapraṇayanam upapadyata iti nāvaśyaṃ pramāda evāśrayitavyaḥ| ‘The possibility of inadvertence, too, cannot be completely precluded in the case of Rudra, etc. Alternatively, from the fact that [Rudra, etc.] are known to be the authors of delusory scriptures, it is also possible that they composed such scriptures [i.e. Śaiva Tantras] in order to delude people. Thus it is not necessary to chose inadvertence of all [factors].’

⁵ Cf. *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 142: *atha matam—“anyeṣāṃ brāhmaṇyaṃ tad-asādhāraṇagotrasmaraṇād” iti, tad bhāgavatānām api samānam| smaranti hi bhāgavatāḥ—“vayaṃ bhāradvājāḥ, vayaṃ kāśyapāḥ, vayaṃ gautamāḥ, vayaṃ*

*aupagavāḥ” iti| na cedam gotrasmaranam nirmūlam sāmāyikam vā, sarvagotra-
smaranānām tathābhāvaprasaṅgāt|
sambhāvyamānadoṣatvād vaṁśānām yadi saṁśayaḥ|
tadbrāhmaṇye, tato lokam sarvam vyākulayed ayam||
jananījārasandehajātacaṇḍālasaṁśayaḥ|
nirviśaṅkaḥ katham vedān adhīṣe sādhusattama||
tena bhāgavatānām api avicchinnaparamparāprāptavicitragotrasmaranaparyava-
sthāpitam brāhmaṇyam anapoditam āsta iti na bhāgavatānām anyeṣāṁ ca brā-
hmaṇye kaścid viśeṣaḥ| yadi param, te paramapurusaṁ evāśritā ekāntinaḥ, anye
ksudradaivatakāḥ sādharmaṇā iti|*

‘If you hold that others are brahmins since they remember their specific *gotras*, the same applies to the Bhāgavatas as well. For the Bhāgavatas remember that they belong to the Bhāradvāja *gotra*, or to the Kāśyapa, or to the Gautama, or to the Aupagava. And this recollection of the *gotras* is neither without any basis nor is it based on convention [alone], since then everybody’s recollection of his own *gotra* would follow to be in the same way. If you had doubts in their brahmin status because it may be presumed that defects occur in the lineages, then this [sceptical view] would confuse the whole world. How can you study the Vedas without scruples, o best of the pious, when the uncertainty whether your mother had a lover or not raises the suspicion that you might be an outcast? Therefore the brahmin status of the Bhāgavatas, which is firmly established by the recollection of the various *gotras* received through an unbroken tradition, also remains undisputed, and thus there is no difference between the brahmin status of the Bhāgavatas and of others, unless the fact that they are devoted to a single [deity] only inasmuch as they worship the Supreme Person, while others are ordinary [brahmins] inasmuch as they have their own petty godlings.’

⁶ Cf. *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 15 (*mīmāṃsakapakṣa*): *api ca yadavalokanādāv api viśiṣṭās cāndrāyaṇādiprāyaścittāni vidadhati, katham tatparigrahaḥ śrutimūlatvam avagamayatīti sambhāvayāmaḥ? smaranti hi devalakāvalokane prāyaścittam| devalakās cāmī—‘devakośopajīvitvād vṛttyartham devapūjanāt|’* ‘Furthermore, when the élite perform such expiatory rituals as the *cāndrāyaṇa* even when they set eyes on them etc., how could we assume that the [Pāñcarātra’s] acceptance by such people gives us to understand that it is based on the Veda? For the Smṛtis prescribe expiation if one catches sight of a *devalaka*. And these [Pāñcarātrikas] are *devalakas*, “since they live on the wealth of God[’s temple] and since they worship God in order to earn a livelihood”.’

⁷ Cf. *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 12 (*mīmāṃsakapakṣa*): *na ca bhāgavateṣu brāhmaṇapadam a viśaṅkam laukikāḥ prayuñjate| bhavati ca bhedena vyapadeśaḥ—‘ito brāhmaṇā ito bhāgavatā’ iti|* ‘And common people do not apply the word “*brāhmaṇa*” to the Bhāgavatas without hesitation. And naming takes place with a differentiation: “these are brahmins, those are Bhāgavatas”.’

⁸ Cf. *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 14f. (*mīmāṃsakapakṣa*): *api cācāratas teṣāṁ abrahmaṇyaṁ pratīyate|*

*vṛttito devatāpūjā dīkṣā naivedyabhakṣaṇam||
garbhādhānādīdāhāntasaṃskārāntarasevanam|
śrautakriyānanuṣṭhānaṃ dvijais sambandhavarjanam|
ityādibhir anācārair abrāhmaṇyaṃ sunirṇayam||
smaranti hi vṛttito devapūjāyā brahmakarmasv anadhikārahetutvam, yathā—
'yeṣāṃ vaṃśakramād eva devārcā vṛttito bhavet|
teṣāṃ adhyayane yajñe yājane nāsti योग्यता||' iti|
(... p. 16.)*

*'vṛttyartham pūjayed devam trīṇi varṣāṇi yo dvijaḥ|
sa vai devalako nāma sarvakarmasu garhiṭaḥ||'*

'Furthermore, we also know from their conduct that they are not brahmins. Worshipping God to make a living, [Tantric] consecration, eating from the offering presented to the deity, observing abnormal sacraments from the rite before conception to cremation, neglecting the performance of solemn Vedic rituals, avoiding contact with the twice-born: with the help such and similar aberrant customs we can easily determine that they are not brahmins. For the Smṛtis teach that worshipping the deity in order to earn a livelihood is a cause of disqualification for Vedic rituals. For example, "Those who have been worshipping a deity to make a living for several generations are not entitled to study the Veda or to sacrifice for themselves or for others." (...) "A twice-born who worships a deity for three years is truly a *devalaka*, excluded from all [Vedic] rituals." '

⁹ I.e. having married a woman from a higher caste. Cf. *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 11 (*mīmāṃsakapakṣa*): *teṣāṃ traivarnīkatvam eva nāsti, dūre brāhmaṇabhāvaḥ|* (... p. 13.) *santi ca sātṭvatā nāma upanayanādīsaṃskārahīnā vaiśyavrātyānavayinaḥ avarajanmānaḥ kecit| yathāha manuḥ—
'vaiśyāt tu jāyate vrātyāt sudhanvācārya eva ca|
bhāruṣāś ca nijaṅgaś ca maitras sātṭvata eva ca||' iti|* (*Manusmṛti* 10.23)

'They do not even belong to any of the three higher estates, and far less to the brahmins. (...) And there are certain people called Sātṭvatas, devoid of such sacraments as the *upanayana*, descendants of Vaiśya *vrātyas*, of the lowest birth. As Manu teaches: "From a *vrātya* [of the] Vaiśya [estate] are born a Sudhanvan, an Ācārya, a Bhāruṣa, a Nijaṅga, a Maitra, and a Sātṭvata." '

¹⁰ As Kalhaṇa relates (*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 3.439ff.) the Raṇasvāmin-temple was built by king Raṇāditya. According to a legend the queen made a certain *siddha* called Brahman consecrate the images of the Raṇasvāmin and the Raṇeśvara temples. Having consecrated the *liṅga*, Brahman placed himself on the *pīṭha* of the Raṇasvāmin temple (*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 3.458: *sa svayaṃ pīṭham avātarat*). In honour of this *siddha* the queen built the splendid Brahmamaṇḍapa (ibid. 3.459), which might be connected with the Brahmadvīpa mentioned in our text.

¹¹ According to PISCHEL §113, the Śaurasenī form of Sanskrit *tathā*, *yathā* should be *tadhā*, *jadhā*, while *taha*, *jaha* are the corresponding forms in Māhārāṣṭrī, Ardhamāgadhī, and Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī.

¹² *ex conj.*

¹³ According to PISCHEL §448, the Śaurasenī form of Sanskrit *śata* should be *sada*, while *saa* or *saṃja* are the corresponding forms in Māhārāṣṭrī, Ardhamāgadhī, and Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī.

¹⁴ See note 10.

¹⁵ *ex conj.* SANDERSON.

¹⁶ *ex conj.*

¹⁷ *ex conj.* SANDERSON.

¹⁸ *ex conj.* It seems likely that *pādas* cd of this verse have been lost (they might have begun with *rāhu*^o).

¹⁹ *ex conj.*

²⁰ *ex conj.*

²¹ *ex conj.*

²² *ex conj.*

²³ *ex conj.* SANDERSON.

²⁴ *ex conj.* SANDERSON.

²⁵ *ex conj.* KATAOKA.

²⁶ *ex conj.* Cf. *Baudhāyana-dharmasūtra* 1.13.30 (prescribing purification with *darbha* grass and water, *darbhair adbhīḥ prakṣālanam*, at the Agnihotra and other rituals); also *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* 5.5.4.22.

²⁷ *ex conj.* ISAACSON. Another possible interpretation has been suggested by Dr. Kataoka: ‘The *darbha* grass of beginninglessness has swept away the dust-fall of both its author and its invalidation by another *pramāṇa*.’

²⁸ *ex conj.*

²⁹ *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 6.1.1: *buddhipūrvā vākyakṛtir vede* | ‘The composition of sentences in the Veda is preceded by cognition.’

Candrānanda’s commentary ad loc.: ‘*agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāma*’ ity evaṃ-
bhūtā racanā bhagavato maheśvarasya buddhipūrvā, sā tataḥ pramāṇam, āpta-
praṇītatvasya satyatāvyāpteḥ | ‘The Blessed Great Lord’s knowledge is a pre-
requisite of an arrangement [of words in] such [sentences] as “one who desires
heaven should perform the Agnihotra sacrifice”. That is why it is a means of
valid cognition, since if A has been composed by a trustworthy person then A
is invariably true.’

Vādīndra’s commentary ad loc.: *vākyakṛtir vākyaracanākrama iti yāvat* | *buddhi-*
pūrvā puruṣabuddhijanyā | *vedavākyakramah puruṣabuddhijanyaḥ, vākyakrama-*

tvāt, kālidāsavākyakramavat | ‘ “A composition of sentences” is as much as [to say] “a sequence of composing of sentences”. “Preceded by cognition” [means] produced from the cognition of a soul. [Expressed as a formal syllogism, the point made by the sūtra is that] the sequence of sentences in the Veda is one which was produced from the cognition of a soul, because it is a sequence of sentences [and all orders of sentences are produced from the cognition of souls], like the sequence(s) of sentences [produced by] Kālidāsa.’ (tr. ISAACSON)

Vaiśeṣikasūtra 6.1.2: *na cāsmadbuddhibhyo liṅgam ṛṣeḥ* | ‘And [the composition of sentences in the Veda can] not [have been produced] from the cognitions of [ordinary] people like us; [this fact is] the inferential mark of the ṛṣi.’

Candrānanda’s commentary ad loc.: *liṅgyate ’nenārtha iti liṅgam vijñānam* | *na hi yādṛśam asmadvijñānam vartamānāvya vahitasambaddhārthaviśayam tādrśam eva bhagavato vijñānam* | *ataḥ sambhavati bhagavato ’tīndriyārthaviśayam vijñānam* | ‘ “Mark” [means] “the object is marked by it”, [i.e.] “cognition”. For the Lord’s cognition is not simply like our cognition which has as its objects existing, not hidden, and related things. Thus the Lord can have a cognition which has as its objects things that are beyond sense perception.’

Vādīndra’s commentary ad loc.: *asmadādibuddhivākyajanakatvasya bādhitatvāt tadatīriktapurūṣabuddhau vedavākyam* (*liṅgam* | *sa ca*) *bhagavān ṛṣir īśvaraḥ* | ‘Since it is denied that cognitions of [ordinary] people [like us] can have produced the sentences [of the Veda] the sentences of the Veda are an inferential mark for [the existence of] a cognition belonging to a person different from [and superior to] such [ordinary people like us]. And this [different person] is the blessed ṛṣi [who in this case must be taken to be] God.’ (tr. ISAACSON)

Praśastapādabhāṣya p. 519ff: *śrutismṛtilakṣaṇo ’py āmnāyo vaktrprāmāṇyāpekṣaḥ, ’tadvacanād āmnāyaprāmāṇyam, ’liṅgāc cānityaḥ, ’buddhipūrvā vākyakṛtir vede, ’buddhipūrvō dadātīḥ’ ityuktatvāt* | ‘[The validity of] scriptures called Śruti and Smṛti also depends on the authority of the person who enunciated [them], since it has been taught that “the validity of scriptures is [established] because they are His [i.e. God’s] words” (*Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.1.3, 10.21), “from logical reason [we know that] it [i.e. scripture] is not eternal” (*Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 2.2.37), “the composition of sentences in the Veda is preceded by cognition” (*Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 6.1.1), “[the word] “gives” is preceded by cognition’ (*Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 6.1.3).”

Vyomavatī ad loc. (p. 168): *atha śabdasyānityatve saty āptoktatvena prāmāṇyam syāt, tat tu nāstīty āśaṅkyāha, ’liṅgāc cānityaḥ’* iti param pratyakṣeṇoc-cāraṇāt prāg ūrdhvaṃ cānupalambhād anityaḥ śabda iti pratīyate, liṅgāc ceti, tat tu vakṣyāmaḥ śabdaparīkṣāyām* | *vedānām cānityatve ’numānam, anityāni vedavākyāni vākyatvād ubhayābhimatavākyavat* | *tathā ’buddhipūrvā vākyakṛtir’ vākyaracanā ’vede’† vākyaracanātvād ubhayābhimatavākyaracanāvat* | (...) *evam vede‡ ’buddhipūrvō dadātīḥ’§ dadātīśabdaḥ dadātītyuktatvād ubhayābhimatada-dātīśabdavat* |

* ed. adds [*śabdaḥ*]

† ed. adds [*buddhipūrvā*]

‡ ed. (*vede?*)

§ ed. adds [*vede buddhipūrvo (sic)*]

‘ “Now, if the Veda (*Śabda*) were not eternal, it would be authoritative because it has been pronounced by a trustworthy person; this, however, does not hold true”—anticipating this objection [the *Sūtrakāra*] says: “from logical reason [we know that] it [i.e. scripture] is not eternal”. It is plainly recognised by sense perception that words (*śabda*) are not eternal, since we do not perceive them before and after their pronunciation, and [the same can] also [be proved] by means of a logical reason, but that we shall explain in the examination of *śabda*. Concerning the non-eternity of the Vedas [we set forth the following] inference: “the propositions of the Veda are not eternal, since they are propositions, just as propositions which both [disputants] hold [to be propositions and to be non-eternal].” Likewise “the composition of sentences”, [i.e.] the construction of sentences, “in the Veda is preceded by cognition”, since it is a construction of sentences, just as those constructions of sentences which both [disputants] hold [to be sentences and to be non-eternal]. (...) Thus in the Veda “gives”, [i.e.] the word “gives”, “is preceded by cognition”, since it is a statement saying “gives”, just as the word “gives” [in ordinary contexts], which is accepted by both [disputants to be such].’

³⁰ Kumāriḷa’s answer (*Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.12, TV(A) p. 237, TV^P p. 469):

*vedeṣu hi tāvad eva padavākyasaṃghātāt makatvādi hetvābhāsaḥ kṛtakatvabhrāntir bhavati, *yāvad (ms^B : yā tad eds.) bahiravasthānād vedarūpaṃ na drśyate | rksāmādisvarūpe tu drṣte bhrāntir nivartate | ādimātram api śrutvā vedānāṃ pauruṣeyatā | na śakyādhyavasātum hi manāg api sacetanaiḥ | drṣṭārthavyavahāreṣu vākyaḥ lokānusāribhiḥ | padaiś ca tadvidhair eva narāḥ kāvyāni kurvate | prapāthakacatuḥṣaṣṭinīyatasvarakaiḥ padaiḥ | lokeṣu apy aśrutaprāyair ṛgvedaṃ kaḥ kariṣyati |*

‘For, it is only as long as one does not realise the true nature of the Veda because of being an outsider that one erroneously regards the Vedas as products, due to such false logical reasons as the fact that they consist in the combination of words and sentences. But when the nature of Ṛgvedic verses, Sāmavedic hymns, and other [Vedic texts] has been realised, the [above mentioned] mistake ceases. No sensible person can believe in the slightest degree that the Vedas have an author as soon as he has listened just to their beginning. When people make poems about transactions with visible goals they only employ sentences that follow ordinary usage and words of the same kind. Who could make a Ṛgveda with words which have practically never been heard among ordinary people and whose accents are prescribed in sixty-four *prapāthakas*?’

³¹ Cf. *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 522: *yac cedam ‘asmāyamāṇakarṭṛkatvād’ iti, tad asiddham, ‘prajāpatir vā idam eka āsīn nāhar āsīn na rātrir āsīt, sa tapo ‘tap-yata, tasmāt tapasāś catvāro vedā ajāyanta’ ity āmnāyenaiva karṭṛsmaraṇāt* ‘As

for this [argument] saying “[the Veda is eternal] because no author of it is being held in our memory”, it is not established, since the Veda itself mentions the author in such passages as “This [universe] was Prajāpati alone, there was no day, there was no night. He practiced austerities, from those austerities the four Vedas were born.” ’

³² *ex conj.* The tradition that Vyāsa was the author of the *Mahābhārata* might also have been created by *arthavāda*.

³³ For a description of the Aṣṭakā (a domestic ritual honouring the ancestors), see e.g. *Āśvalāyana-grhyasūtra* 2.4, cf. *Manusmṛti* 4.119, 4.150. Śabara and Kumārila in their commentary to *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.1 refer to the Aṣṭakā as an example of a ritual which is prescribed in Smṛti texts but which is not enjoined in the Vedas themselves. According to the view of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, the Vedic texts from which such prescriptions derive had never actually been perceptible to the compilers of these Smṛti texts, but only always inferable (*nityānumeya*) on the basis of the acceptance of these Smṛtis by the moral majority (*mahājana*; see POLLOCK 1997, pp. 409f, quoting the *Prakaraṇapañcikā*). Kumārila disagrees and points out that if a Vedic injunction had never been pronounced then it would be impossible to ascertain its existence since no one could ever perceive it, and therefore Manu’s recollection (*smṛti*) of the Aṣṭakā would be as mistaken as a barren woman talking about her grandson (the missing son or daughter corresponding to the missing cognition of the Vedic proposition; see TV^P, p. 265, TV^A, p. 164).

³⁴ *Ślokavārttika, vākyādhikaraṇa* 366.

³⁵ Cf. *Ślokavārttika, anumāna* 13cd ff.

³⁶ *ex conj.*

³⁷ The Viśvajit is a one-day Soma-sacrifice (*ekāha*), which requires the sacrificer to pay extensive fees to the officiants (see MYLIUS, Glossar s.v., *ibid.* pp. 301, 357). As the name of this sacrifice suggests, it is performed ‘in order to conquer everything’ (*Taittirīya-saṃhitā* 7.1.10.4: *sarvasyābhijityai*).

³⁸ *ex em.* ISAACSON.

³⁹ *ex conj.*

⁴⁰ *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

⁴¹ Quoting *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. I, p. 636.8–11 (v.l. *pratīṭh* for *prasiddhih*).

⁴² Cf. *Kāthaka-saṃhitā* 11.4: *prājāpatyaṃ caruṃ nirvapec chatakr̥ṣṇalaṃ ghr̥ta āyuṣkāmaḥ*; *Maitrāyaṇī-saṃhitā* 2.2.2: *prājāpatyaṃ ghr̥te caruṃ nirvapec śatakr̥ṣṇalaṃ āyuṣkāmaḥ*

⁴³ Cf. *Tāṇḍyamahābrāhmaṇa* 17.12.1: *trivṛdagniṣṭomaḥ sa sarvasvāro, yaḥ*

kāmayetānāmayatāmum lokam iyām iti sa etena yajeta (commentary ad loc.: *anāmayatā āmayarahitenaiva dehena vyādhyādirāhityena*); *Śāṅkhāyana-śrautasūtra* 15.10.1: *sarvasvāro nāmaikāhaḥ| sa sarvagāyatro maraṇakāmasya yajamānasya bhavati| prayogāntare ca svargakāmasya|*

⁴⁴ *ex em.* SANDERSON.

⁴⁵ *ex em.* ISAACSON.

⁴⁶ Quoting *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. I, p. 640.17–18, cf. *Mahābhārata* 12.336.77.

⁴⁷ *ex conj.* SANDERSON.

⁴⁸ *Bhagavadgītā* 10.41.

⁴⁹ See *Yogasūtra* 1.23, 1.28–29, 2.1, 2.32, 2.45.

⁵⁰ *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

⁵¹ According to the Mīmāṃsaka position, when the heterodox proclaim that their scriptures have authors they necessarily admit that these scriptures cannot be authoritative. Says Kumārila (*Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.4, TV^P, p. 329; TV^Ā, p. 195): *pāratantryam tāvad eṣāṃ smaryamāṇapurūṣaviśeṣapraṇītatvāt tair eva pratipannam, śabdakṛtakatvādipratipādanādarāc ca pārśvasthair api jñāyate|* (...) *svadharmātikrameṇa ca yena kṣatriyeṇa satā pravakṛtvapratigrahaḥ pratipannau, sa dharmam aviṣṭam upadekṣyatīti kaḥ samāśvāsaḥ|* ‘First of all, the fact that these [scriptures] are not autonomous [i.e. that their validity depends on their author] because they were composed by particular persons whose memory is alive is admitted by [their followers] themselves, and it is also learnt by those who get close to them from the acceptance of the proving of such [theories] as the artificial nature of words. (...) And how could we believe that someone [i.e. the Buddha] who has transgressed the duties of his own estate and thus, while being a *kṣatriya*, vindicated the role of a teacher and the right of receiving gifts, is going to teach the undefiled Dharma?’

⁵² *ex conj.* SANDERSON. See *Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.11 (*pūrvapa kṣa*, TV^P, p. 459; TV^Ā, p. 234f):

*yenaivākṛtakatvam hi vedasya pratipādyate|
nyāyena tena śākyādigranthasyāpi bhaviṣyati||
bodhakatvāt pramāṇatvam svatas tasyāpi labhyate|
na ca saṃdihyate buddhir na viparyayate kvacit||
akarṣakatayā nāpi karṣṭvoṣeṇa duṣyati|
vedavad buddhavākyādikarṣmarāṇavarjanāt||
buddhavākyasamākhyāpi pravakṛtvānibandhanā|
tadṛṣṭatvanimittā vā kāṭhakaṅgirasādivat||*

‘With the help of the same argumentation which proves that the Veda is not a product [the same nature] of Buddhist and other scriptures can also be [established]. They are also found to be means of valid knowledge by themselves due

to the fact that they create awareness, and the cognition [they create] is neither questioned nor ever refuted. Furthermore, inasmuch as they have no author, they are not impaired by the faults of the author either, since, similarly to the Veda, the memory of the author of the Buddha's propositions and other [sacred texts] has been excluded. The origin of the label 'the Buddha's proposition' is the fact that [the Buddha was] the teacher [of these scriptures], or it is based on the fact that [these scriptures] were seen by him, by analogy with such [Vedic texts] as the *Kāṭhaka* and the *Āṅgīrasa* [which were taught / seen by Kaṭha and Āṅgīras].'

Kumārila's reply (*Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.12, TV^P p. 467ff, TV(A) p. 235ff):

pareṇa saha keṣāṃcid vākovākyāni jalpatām|

yuktayaḥ prātibhāsikyo jāyante paravākyataḥ||

(*yuktayaḥ* TV^{Apc} : *uktayaḥ* TV^{Aac}TV^Pms^B)

svasaṃvedyaṃ ca siddhāntam ātmīyam api jānatām|

chāyāṃ tathāpi rakṣanto jalpanti pratisabdakaiḥ||

yathā mīmāṃsakatrastāḥ śākyavaiśeṣikādayaḥ|

nitya evāgamo 'smākam ity āhuḥ śūnyacetasaḥ||

(°*cetasaḥ* ms^B : °*cetanam* eds.)

pradveṣād vedapūrvatvam anicchantaḥ kathamcana|

tanmātre 'pi ca bhūyiṣṭhām icchantaḥ satyavāditām||

bhūyasāṃ vedabāhyatvād buddhādivacasām amī|

ahimsādy apy atatpūrvam ity āhus tarkamāninaḥ||

tataś ca pauruṣeyatvād aprāmāṇyam atīndriye|

prāguktair vedanīyatvavāgābhāsair vimohyate||

(°*nīyatva*° TV^Ams^B : °*nīyatvam* TV^P)

yādṛśatādṛśamīmāṃsakair apy atīndriyaviśayapurūṣavacanaprāmāṇyanirākara-

*ṇād apauruṣeyatvādhyavasāyanirākṛtakāraṇadoṣā*śāṅka(eds. : °śāṅkā° ms^B)nir-*

apavādapramāṇyasiddhiṃ pratihantaṃ śākyāṃ manyamānā niruttarībhūtā bā-

*lānukaraṇavākyasadṛśaiḥ svavākyair vyava*līya(conj. : °likhya° eds. : °lipsa°*

ms^{Bac} : °listha° ms^{Bpc})mānaḥṛdayāḥ santo 'pi prakṣiṇakuhetuvacanaajālāḥ kanyā-

varaṇārthāgatamūrkhavaragotrāpraśnottaravat|

yad eva bhavatāṃ gotraṃ tad asmākam apītivat|

āhuḥ svāgamanīyatvam paravākyānukārīṇaḥ||

asmadīyam idaṃ vākyam bhavatām iti coditāḥ|

jalpanty asmākam evaitac chrutvā mīmāṃsakair hṛtam||

tyaktalajjam bruvāṇo hi vācoyuktim anarthikām|

kurvan parātisandhānaṃ aśrāntaḥ ko 'vasīdati||

tatra śākyaiḥ prasiddhāpi sarvakṣaṇikavāditā|

tyajyate vedasiddhāntāḥ jalpadbhir nityam āgamam||

(...) **sarva*(ms^B : *sarvadā* eds.)*padārthasaṃbandhānīyatvapratipādanāt tad-*

viparītam āgamanīyatvam abhyupagamyamānaṃ lokopahāsāspadamātram eva

bhavet|

'For some people, when they are having a debate with someone else, "reflex arguments" are born from the assertions of the opponent, and they prattle with echoed words while nevertheless they also keep up the appearance of someone

who considers his own doctrine as self-evident. As, for example, the Buddhists, Vaiśeṣikas (?) and others, afraid of the Mīmāṃsakas, mindlessly say: “Our scripture is in fact eternal”, admitting in no way, because of hatred, the precedence of the Veda, and holding that, even if that much is the case, [their scripture] still has the greatest truthfulness. Conceited with reasoning they say that, since most of the Buddha’s propositions are outside the Veda, even non-violence and other [precepts] are not dependent upon it. And thus the fact that [non-Vedic scriptures] are not authoritative with regard to imperceptible matters since they have authors is effaced with the above mentioned replicas of the statements about the Veda’s eternity. Since even an average Mīmāṃsaka can refute the validity of human assertions with regard to imperceptible matters, [the heterodox] think that it is impossible to counteract the establishing of validity if it is unobjectionable inasmuch as it has been freed from the suspicion of faults in the causes [which produce the cognition] through the determination of its independence from any person, and, dumbfounded, with their own assertions that resemble the imitative talk of children and using a tattered net of reasoning though their hearts sink with fear, they claim, imitating the statements of their opponents, that their own scripture is eternal, just as a foolish suitor, who has come to ask the girl’s hand, answers the question about his *gotra* like this: “My *gotra* is the same as yours” [which actually makes the marriage impossible]. And when they are told: “This statement of yours is [in fact] ours”, they prattle: “It is ours alone! The Mīmāṃsakas have overheard and then stolen it.” For why would someone give way who shamelessly speaks meaningless sophistries and spares no effort to deceive others? At that stage the Buddhists give up even their well-known adherence to the doctrine of the momentariness of all things when they prattle that their scripture is [also] eternal on the basis of the established truth of the Veda[’s eternal nature]. (...) Since [the Buddhist] have demonstrated the non-permanent nature of the connection of all words with their referents, the world would only laugh if they were to accept the eternal nature of scripture, which is contrary to that [doctrine of momentariness].’

When the language of non-Vedic scriptures is itself debased, how could their content be eternal and authoritative? Says Kumāṛila (*Tantravārttika*, *ibid.*):

asādhuśabdabhūyiṣṭhāḥ śākyajaināgamādayaḥ
asannibandhanatvāc ca śāstratvaṃ na pratīyate|| (...) *tataś cāsatyaśabdeṣu kutas teṣu arthasatyatā*
dr̥ṣṭāpabhraṣṭarūpeṣu katham vā syād anādītā|| (...) *(TV^P p. 238f, TV^A p. 470f.) śākyādigrantheṣu punar yad api kiṃcit sādhuśab-*
*dābhiprāyeṇāvinaṣṭabuddhyā prayuktam, tatrāpi prajñapti*viññapti(eds. : om.*
*ms^B) *paśyatā(eds. : °paśya° ms^{Bpc} : °paśyanā° ms^{Bac}) *tiṣṭhatādi(eds. :*
°tiṣṭhamādi° ms^B) prāyaprayogāt kiṃcid evāviplutaṃ labhyate| kim uta yāni pra-
siddhāpabhraṣṭadeśabhāṣābhyo ’py apabhraṣṭatarāṇi bhikkhave ity evamādīni, dvi-
*tīyābahuvacanasthāne hy *ekārāntaṃ (TV^Ams^B : ekārā taṃ TV^P) prākṛtaṃ*
padam dr̥ṣṭam, na prathamābahuvacane sambodhane ’pi| saṃskṛtaśabdasthāne
ca kakāradvayaśamyogaḥ, anusvāralopaḥ, ṛvarṇākārāpattimātram eva prākṛtāpa-
bhraṃśeṣu dr̥ṣṭam, na dakārāpattir api| so ’yaṃ saṃskṛtā dharmā ity asya sar-
*vakālaṃ svayam eva pratiśiddho *’pi (eds. : om. ms^B) vināśaḥ kṛtaḥ| (??)*

‘The Buddhist, Jaina and other [non-Vedic] scriptures mostly consist of sol-ecistical words, and, since they are bad compositions, their *śāstric* nature is not recognised. (...) And thus how could their subject be correct / real when their words are incorrect / unreal? Or how could they be beginningless when their form is visibly corrupt? (...) In the works of Buddhists and other [heterodox people], however, whenever something is used with the intention of [using] correct words and with a clear mind, even in that case we hardly find anything that is not spoiled due to such frequent usages as “*prajñāpti*”, “*viññāpti*”, “*paśyatā*” (read “*paśyanā*” or *vipaśyanā*?), “*tiṣṭhatā*” (? , read *tiṣṭhantika*?), etc. What shall we say about those [expressions] which are even more corrupt than the well-known corrupt vernaculars, such as “*bhikkhave*”? For a Prakrit word ending in *e* is seen to stand for the Accusative Plural, [but] not for the Nominative Plural, even in the case of a Vocative. And in the place of the word “*saṃskṛta*” we see the application of a double *k*, the elision of the Anusvāra, and only the change of *r* into *a* in Prakrit and Apabhraṃśa languages [i.e. *saṃskṛta* becomes *sakkaa* / *sakkada*], but not the change [of *t*] into *ḍ* as well. Thus [the Buddhists] themselves constantly destroy this [statement]: “*saṃskṛtā dharmāḥ*” [i.e. by the incorrect and therefore non-existent grammatical form: “*sakkaḍā*”], even if they deny its destruction [by asserting the eternity of the Buddha’s propositions].’

⁵³ Kumāriḷa sets up strict criteria on the basis of which someone can be regarded as a real propagator of Dharma (*Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.6, TV^P, p. 360; TV^Ā, p. 202):

vedenai vābhyanuñātā yeṣāṃ eva pravaktṛtā |
nityānāṃ abhidheyānāṃ manvantarayugādiṣu | |
teṣāṃ viparivarteṣu kurvātāṃ dharmasaṃhitāḥ |
vacanāni pramāṇāni nānyeṣāṃ iti niścayaḥ | |

‘Whose [Veda-] propagator status is acknowledged by the Veda itself, and who are always to be named in the Manvantaras, Yugas and other [aeons]: the statements of these people alone, who compose compendiums on Dharma whenever they are reborn, and not of others, are authoritative: this is the settled view.’

⁵⁴ *ex conj.* SANDERSON.

⁵⁵ Cf. *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 12, quoted in note 7.

⁵⁶ *ex em.* SANDERSON.

⁵⁷ Cf. Kumāriḷa’s argument concerning the Vedic basis of Smṛti texts containing apparently non-Vedic regulations (*Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.2, TV^P, p. 265; TV^Ā, p. 164): *yad vā vidyamānaśākhāgataśrutimūlatvam evāstu | katham anupalabdhir iti cet, ucyate—*

śākhānāṃ viprakīrṇatvāt puruṣāṇāṃ pramādataḥ |
nānāprakaraṇasthatvāt smṛter mūlaṃ na dṛśyate | |

‘Or rather let [their] source be nothing but a Vedic passage in the available recensions [of the Veda]. If you ask why don’t we find [this Vedic passage], my answer is as follows: The [Vedic] source of the Smṛti passage is not found since

the recensions [of the Veda] are scattered, since people are negligent, and since it is contained in separate sections [of the Veda].'

Using the above argument Dhairyarāṣi could claim that the source of the Pañcarātra is a Vedic text which is hidden from us in the countless branches of the Veda. Actually he goes one step further and asserts that the Pañcarātra itself is one of these Vedic recensions.

Kumārila also points out that, once the Smṛti status of the heterodox scriptures has been refuted, the *nāstika* dares to claim the same status for their own scriptures as the Veda has. The disastrous consequences are easy to foresee (*Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.11; TV^P, p. 455; TV^A, p. 230):

yad vā śākyādiśāstrāṇāṃ smṛtiśāstratvavāraṇāt
vedaśākhāsamānatvam āśaṅkyeha nivāryate||

(...)

tataś ca vedavan nityās te 'pi ced āgamā matāḥ
codanālakṣaṇo dharmas tadukto 'pi prasajyate||
kāmaṃ na pravīśed grāmaṃ vārīto daṇḍapāṇibhiḥ
spaṣṭaṃ mahāpathenaiva samprati pravivikṣati||

'Or rather, having refuted that Buddhist and other [heterodox scriptures] are Smṛti texts, in this [part of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*] the [possible claim of their] equality to the recensions of the Veda is anticipated and set aside. (...) Therefore if those [heterodox] scriptures are also accepted to be eternal like the Veda, it will follow that the Dharma taught by them will also have scriptural proposition as its defining characteristic [similarly to Vedic Dharma]. Though [the heterodox scriptures] cannot enter the village [of authoritativeness] because the [Mīmāṃsaka] policemen have kept them off [by rejecting their Smṛti status], now they want to enter openly on the High Street [of Vedic status].'

Cf. also note 3.

⁵⁸ Similarly, as Yāmuna argues, just because the Pāñcarātrikas follow the prescriptions of a different, but equally valid Vedic school, i.e. the Ekāyanaśākhā, it does not follow that they are not brahmins at all. See *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 169: *ye punaḥ sāvitryanuvacanaprabhṛtitrayīdharmatyāgena ekāyanaśrutivihitān eva catvāriṃśat saṃskārān kurvate, te 'pi svaśākhāgrhyoktam arthaṃ yathāvad anuṣṭhamānā na śākhāntarīyakarmānanuṣṭhānād brāhmaṇyāt pracyavante, anyeṣāṃ api paraśākhāvihitakarmānanuṣṭhānanimittābrāhmaṇyaprasaṅgāt|* 'Those who observe only the forty sacraments laid down in the Ekāyana Śruti while giving up the sacred duties found in the Three Vedas, such as the recitation of the Gāyatrī mantra etc., they too, inasmuch as they properly observe the rituals taught in the *grhyasūtras* of their own recension, do not become excluded from the brahmin status, since it would follow that others too would become non-brahmin because they neglect the observance of rituals laid down in other people's recensions.'

Ibid. p. 170: *vilakṣaṇās ca trayīvihitasvargaputrādiviṣayopabhogasādhanaindrāgneyādikarmādhikāribhyo dvijebhyaḥ trayyantaikāyanaśrutivihitaviññānābhigamanopādāne jyaṅgāprabhṛtibhagavatprāptyekopāyakarmādhikāriṇo mumukṣavo brāhmaṇā iti nobhayeṣāṃ apy anyonyaśākhāvihitakarmānanuṣṭhānam abrāhmaṇyam*

āpādayati| yathā caikāyanaśākhāyā apauruṣeyatvaṃ, tathā kāśmīrāgamaprāmāṇya eva prapañcitam iti neha prastūyate| ‘And there are liberation-seeking brahmins who are entitled to rituals laid down in the the crowning of the Three Vedas: the Ekāyana Śruti, which rituals—[acquiring] knowledge [about God], cleansing [the way leading to the image of the deity], preparation [of flowers etc.], making offerings, etc.—are the only means of attaining the Lord. These brahmins are different from the priests who are entitled to rituals laid down in the Three Vedas (e.g. the *aindrāgneya*) which are the instruments of enjoying heaven or a son, or similar sensual objects. On this ground, the fact that they do not observe the rituals laid down in each other’s [Vedic] recensions does not produce non-brahmin status for either of these two groups. And I have already expounded in [my work entitled] “The Validity of the Kashmirian Scripture(s)” in what way the Ekāyana recension [of the Veda] is not the work of a person, so I do not go into details now.’

⁵⁹ The Sautrāmaṇī is an expiatory sacrifice that involves a *surā*-offering. (See MYLIUS, Glossar s.v., *ibid.* p. 144; *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* 5.5.4.)

⁶⁰ *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

⁶¹ This might be true, says Kumāriḷa, but in all other respects they are at variance with Vedic tradition (*Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.4; *TV^P*, p. 329; *TV^A*, p. 195): *smṛtivākyam ekam ekena śrutivacanena viruddhyeta| śākyādivacanāni tu katipayadamadānādivacanavarjaṃ sarvāṅy eva samastacaturdaśavidyāsthānaviruddhāni, trayīmārgavyutthitaviruddhācaraṇaiś ca buddhādibhiḥ praṇītāni, trayībāhyebhyaś caturthavarṇaniravasitaprāyebhyo vyāmūdhebhyaḥ samarpi-tānīti* (eds. : *samarthitānīti* ms^B) *na vedamūlatvena sambhāvyaṅte|* ‘One sentence in a Smṛti text might contradict one Vedic proposition. Every single one of Buddhist and other [heterodox] propositions, however, except for a few statements about self-control, munificence and the like, contradict all the fourteen sciences, and they were composed by the Buddha and others whose conduct deviates from and contradicts the doctrine of the Three Vedas, [and] they have been taught to deluded people most of whom are excluded from the fourth estate [i.e. to outcasts]: thus their source cannot be the Veda.’

⁶² *ex conj.* SANDERSON.

⁶³ *ex conj.* SANDERSON.

⁶⁴ *ex conj.* SANDERSON.

⁶⁵ Cf. *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 12: *brāhmaṇeṣv eva kutaścid guṇayogāt sātत्वatabhāgavatādivyapadeśo, yathā teṣv eva parivrājakādīśabdā iti|* ‘Such names as *sātत्वata*, *bhāgavata*, etc. refer precisely to brahmins in some way, through the application of the secondary sense, just as words such as *parivrājaka* refer to the very same people [i.e. to brahmins].

Ibid. p. 154: *yat punar uktam, ‘samāne brāhmaṇye kimiti sātत्वatabhāgavataikān-*

*tikaśabdair eva eteṣāṃ niyamena vyapadeśa' iti, tat parivrājakanigadādivad ity adosaḥ| yathaiiva hi samāne brāhmaṇye *yajusṭve (corr., ed.: yayusṭve) ca kecid eva brāhmaṇāḥ kānicid eva yajūṃṣi parivrājakanigadaśabdābhyām adhīyante, 'tiṣṭhantu brāhmaṇāḥ, parivrājakā ānīyantām', 'yajūṃṣi vartante na nigadāḥ, nigadā vartante na yajūṃṣi' iti ca, tathehāpi bhaviṣyati| 'As for the objection, "Why are these people standardly named with the words *sāttvata* and *bhāgavata* alone, provided that their brahmin status is the same", there is nothing wrong in this matter, just as [names like] *parivrājaka* and *nigada* [are unproblematic]. For just as some brahmins and some mantras of the Yajurveda are called *parivrājakas* and *nigadas* [respectively] even though they are equally brahmins and Yajurvedic mantras, in such expressions as "The brahmins should stay, the *parivrājakas* should be fetched", and "The Yajurvedic mantras apply, not the *nigadas*", or "The *nigadas* apply, not the Yajurvedic mantras", the same goes for this case, too.'*

⁶⁶ See HALBFASS 1991, p. 363ff., referring to the discussion of this problem in the *Tantravārttika* (ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.2) and the *Nyāyamañjarī*.

⁶⁷ *ex em.* ISAACSON.

⁶⁸ Jayanta observes in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (vol. I, p. 645) that all of Kumārila's arguments proving that Smṛti texts are based on the Veda can be applied to other scriptures as well. Cf. *Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.2 (TV^P, p. 264f; TV^A, p. 163f): *manvādīnām cāpratyakṣatvāt tadvijñānamūlam adṛṣṭam kimcid avaśyaṃ kalpanīyam| tatra ca—*

*bhrānter anubhavād vāpi puṃvākyād vipralambhanāt| drṣṭānugūṇyasādhyatvāc codanaiva laghīyasī| sarvatraiva cādrṣṭakalpanāyām *tādrśam adṛṣṭam (ms^B : tādrśam eds.) kalpayitavyam, yad drṣṭam na viruṇaddhi na *cā(ms^B : vā° eds.)drṣṭāntaram āsañjayati| tatra bhrāntau tāvat samyañnibaddhaśāstradarśanavirodhāpattiḥ, sarvalokābhyupagatadrḍhaprāmāṇya*bādhaś (TV^A, ms^B : °vādaś TV^P) ca| *tadā(ms^B : idā° eds.)nīmtanaiś ca puruṣair api bhrāntir manvādīnām anuvartitā, tatparihāropanyāsaś ca manvādīnām ity *anekā(TV^A, ms^B : ekā° TV^P)drṣṭakalpanā| (...) puruṣavākya*paramparāpy (TV^P, ms^B : °parāpy TV^A) andhaparamparayā nirākṛtā, na hi niṣpratiṣṭhapramāṇātmalābho drśyate| tathā vipralambhe 'pi tatkalanā, vipralipsā prayojanam, lokasya ca tatra bhrāntiḥ, tasyāś ceyantaṃ kālam anuvṛttir ityādy āśrayaṇīyam| utpannasya ca drḍhasya pratyayasya prāmāṇyanirā*karaṇād drṣṭa(eds. : karaṇādrṣṭa° ms^B)virodhaḥ| tasmāt sarvebhyāś codanākalpanaiva jyāyasī, tatra hi *tanmātrādrṣṭā(TV^A, ms^B : tanmātradrṣṭā° TV^P)bhyupagamaḥ, śeṣās tu mahājanaparigrahādayaḥ sarve 'nuvidhīyante|*

'Since we cannot contact Manu and other [authors of Smṛti texts], we must necessarily postulate something imperceptible as the basis of their knowledge. And among [the various possible bases] it is the Veda which is simpler [to postulate] than error, or even experience, [other] people's assertions, [or] the intention to deceive, since it can be established in accordance with what we see. And in

all cases when we postulate something unseen, we must postulate such an unseen thing which does not contradict the observed [facts] and which does not entail another unseen thing. Among [the above mentioned assumptions], first, if [we supposed that] error [was the basis], this would contradict the fact that we see [that the Smṛtis are] properly composed texts, and [their] firm authority, which everyone accepts, would also be set aside. We should also postulate many unseen facts, namely that people of that age also followed Manu's and other [Smṛti authors'] error, and that a refutations of that [error] of Manu and other [Smṛti authors] have been put forth. (...) [The supposition that Smṛti texts are based on] a series of human assertions has also been refuted with the help of [the analogy to] a series of blind men, since we do not see that valid cognition arises without any foundation [i.e. humans cannot transmit knowledge about Dharma without relying on the Veda, just as blind men cannot hand down information about colour without the help of a sighted person]. Likewise in the case of deception we must resort to the following: the postulation of that [deception], the intention to deceive as purpose, people's mistake about that, the continuation of that [mistake] for such a long time, etc. And since it would annul the validity of a firm belief, it would contradict the visible [facts]. Therefore the postulation of Vedic propositions [as the basis of Smṛti] is better than all the other [assumptions], since in this case we admit that unseen thing alone. As for such facts as the acceptance [of Smṛti] by the moral majority, they are all in harmony [with this postulation].'

Kumārila thinks that heretics are unlikely to lay a claim to the support of the Veda (*Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.4, TV^P, p. 329, TV^Ā, p. 195): *vedamūlatvaṃ punas te tulyakakṣamūlatvākṣamayaiva lajjayā ca mātāpitṛdveṣiduştaputравan nābhyupagacchanti* 'On the other hand, since they cannot stand having [a scripture] of the same rank as basis, and because they feel ashamed, they do not acknowledge that their source is the Veda, just as depraved sons who hate their parents.' But even if they tried to establish a Vedic foundation, the heterodox scriptures are so inconsistent with the Vedas that their claim would be clearly nonsensical (see note 61).

⁶⁹ *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.2: *api vā karṭṛsāmānyāt pramāṇam anumānaṃ syāt* 'Or rather, since the agents [who perform works prescribed in the Veda on the one hand and in Smṛti texts on the other] are the same, the inference [of now unavailable Vedic texts being the basis of Smṛti regulations that do not directly correspond to Vedic injunctions] is a means of valid cognition.' (On the interpretation of this sūtra see POLLOCK 1997, pp. 404ff.)

Cf. also Śabara ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.2 (TV^P, p. 258): *granthas tv anumīyeta, karṭṛsāmānyāt smṛtividikapadārthayoḥ tenopapanno vedasaṃyogas traivarṇikānām* 'But a [Vedic] text [which is the basis of a ritual that is prescribed only in a Smṛti text but not in the Veda itself] can be inferred [though it cannot actually be perceived] on the ground that the performers of a ritual act [laid down] in a Smṛti text and [of another one laid down] in a Vedic text are the same. Therefore it is appropriate that those who belong to the three higher estates associate a Vedic text [with a purely Smṛti-based ritual].'

Cf. also *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 10 (*pūrvapakṣa*): *na caivam ācamanopanayanā-dīn iva śrutivihitāgnihotrādīpadārthānuṣṭhāyinaḥ tāntrikācārān upacarataḥ pa-syāmaḥ*|

pratyutaitān vigarhante kurvāṇān vedavādināḥ|

tasmād yat 'karṣṣāmānyāt prāmāṇyam' smṛtiśūditam||

naiva tat pañcarātrādibāhyasmarāṇam arhatī|

na hi traivarṇikās śiṣṭāḥ taduktārthān upāsate||

'And we do not see that those who perform the Agnihotra and other rituals laid down in Śruti texts observe Tantric customs in the way they observe *ācamana*, *upanayana*, and other [orthodox customs]. On the contrary, the adherents of the Veda despise those who follow these [Tantric customs]. Therefore what is taught with respect to the Smṛtis, namely "Because of the identity of the performers [they have] validity", does not apply to such heterodox Smṛtis as the Pañcarātra, for the educated members of the three higher estates do not recognise their teachings.'

The Pāñcarātrika certainly holds that the postulation of a Vedic basis is appropriate since the performers of these Tantric rituals are also brahmins. On the other hand, a Mīmāṃsaka would certainly never acknowledge even the twice-born status of the Bhāgavatas (see *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 11ff).

⁷⁰ *ex em.* ISAACSON.

⁷¹ *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

⁷² As Kumāriḥ points out, although such Smṛti passages as the one prescribing the Aṣṭakā ritual can be inferred to be based on lost Vedic texts, this fact does not mean that any scripture can be nominated for having a Vedic basis. See *Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.2 (TV^P, p. 265; TV^Ā, p. 164): *na caivam sati yatkiṃcit prāmāṇyam āpatsyate, śiṣṭatraivarṇikadr̥ḍhasmarāṇānyathānupapattīlabhyatvāc chrutyanumānasya*| 'And it is not the case that at this state of affairs anything can be a source of authoritative knowledge, since a Vedic text can [only] be inferred [as the basis of some other scripture] if the unbroken recollection of learned members of the three higher estates remains otherwise inexplicable.'

Though some heretic scriptures might contain Vedic elements, nevertheless their obvious anti-Vedic character must be emphatically declared. Says Kumāriḥ (*Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.4, TV^P, p. 328, TV^Ā, p. 194): *yāny etāni trayīvidbhir na pariḡrhitāni, kiṃcittanmiśradharmakāñcukacchāyāpatitāni lokopasaṃgrahalābhapūjākhyātiprayojanaparāṇi trayīviparītāsambaddhadṛṣṭasobhādīpratyakṣānumānopamānārthāpattīprāyayuktimūlopanibaddhāni sām̐khyayogapāñcarātrapāśupataśākyagranthaparīḡrhitadharmādharmānibandhanāni viśa-cikitsāvaśīkaraṇocchātanonmādanādisamarthakatīpayamantrauśadhikādācītkasiddhi-nidarśanabalenaḥiṃsāsatyavacanadamādādayādīśrutismṛtisamvādistokārthagandhavāsītajīvikāprāyārthāntaropa*deśīni* (eds. : °deśāni ms^B) *yāni ca bāhyatarāṇi mlecchācāramiśrakabhojanācaraṇanibandhanāni, teṣāṃ evaitac chrutivirodhahetudarśanābhyām anapekṣaṇīyatvaṃ pratipādyate*| *na caitat kva cid adhi-*

*karaṇāntare nirūpitam, na cāvaktavyam eva, gāvyādiśabdavācakatvabuddhivad
atiprasiddhatvāt*

*yadi hy anādareṇaiṣāṃ na *kathyetā (ms^B : kalpyetā^o eds.) pramāṇatā*

aśakyaiveti matvānye bhaveyuh samadr̥ṣṭayah||

śobhāsaukaryahetūktikalikālavaśena vā

yajñoktapaśuhiṃsādityāgabhrāntim avāpnuyuh||

‘This [sūtra, i.e. *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.4] teaches that the following [texts] should be discarded since they are opposed to the Veda and because we see [other] causes [of their coming into being]:

— texts on piety and impiety contained in Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pāñcarātra, Pāsupata, and Buddhist scriptures: they are not accepted by those who are learned in the Three Vedas, [though] they are placed in the shade of the gown of piety which is slightly blended with the [teaching of the Vedas], [but] their main concern is how to please the plebs, make profit, gain adoration and fame; they were put together on grounds that are contradictory to and unconnected with the Veda: sense perception such as visible splendour, and arguments consisting for the most part in inference, analogy, and presumption; and, while perfumed with the scent of a few things that are in accordance with Śruti and Smṛti, such as non-violence, truthfulness, self-control, munificence, and compassion, they teach other subjects which are mainly connected with making a living, using as corroboration the evidence of the random success of a few mantras and medical herbs that are able to cure poisoning, induce enchantment, ruin one’s enemy, causing madness, and the like;

— those completely alien texts which deal with the conduct of the barbarians, [such as?] dining in the company of others [who belong to the lower castes].

And this has not been taught in any other section [of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*], while it cannot be left unmentioned [just] because [the invalidity of such heterodox texts] is public knowledge, just as the [correct] view about the expressivity of such [ungrammatical] words as *gāvī* [should also be pronounced, even if it is well known]. For if they were disregarded and thus their invalidity was not asserted, thinking that [this assertion] cannot be made people would consider [these texts] equal [to the Manu- and other Smṛtis], or, because of the beauty, feasibility, or the argumentation [found in these texts], or due to the influence of the Iron Age, they would arrive at the erroneous conclusion that such acts as the killing of animals, which is taught in the context of Vedic sacrifice, should be given up.’

Kumārila also reckons with the possibility that any freshly established religion could derive itself from lost Vedic texts (*Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.4, TV^P, p. 329, TV^Ā, p. 194f): *yaiś ca mānavādismṛtīnām *apy* (eds. : *adhy^o ms^B*) *utsannavedaśākhāmūlatvam abhyupagatam, tān prati sutarāṃ śākyādibhir api śakyam tanmūlatvam eva vaktum* | *ko hi śaknuyād utsannānām vākya viṣayeyattāniyamam kartum* | *tataś ca yāvat kiṃ cit kiyantam api kālam kaiś cid ādriyamāṇam prasiddhim gatam tat pratyakṣaśākhāvisamvāde ’py utsannaśākhāmūlatvāvasthānam anubhavatulyakakṣatayā pratibhāyāt* | *ata āha— ’virodhe tv anapekṣam syād’* (*Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.3) *iti* | ‘And those who hold that the Smṛti texts of Manu and other [authors] are based on lost recensions

of the Veda can easily be told by the Buddhist and other [heterodox people] that [the Buddhist and other heretic scriptures] also have the very same basis. For who could impose a restriction on the limit of sentences and topics in lost [texts]? And thus anything whatsoever that has been cultivated by any people for any time and has become well-known, even if it were inconsistent with the available [Vedic] recensions, would appear as having a stable status inasmuch as it is based on a lost recension, since it would be looked upon in the same way [as the orthodox Smṛtis]. Therefore [the author of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*] says: “When there is a contradiction, [the text that contradicts the Veda] must be discarded.” (*Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.3)’

⁷³ As Kumāṛila himself says (*Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.4, TV^P, p. 330, TV^Ā, p. 195f):

lobhādikāraṇaṃ cātra bahv evānyat pratīyate|
yaśmin saṃnihite dṛṣṭe nāsti mūlantarānumā||
śākyādayaś ca sarvatra kurvāṇā dharmadeśanām|
hetujālavinirmuktāṃ na kadācana kurvate||
na ca tair vedamūlatvam ucyate gautamādivat|
hetavaś cābhidyante ye dharmād dūrataḥ sthitāḥ||

(*dharmād*: conj., *dharme*: TV^{Āpc},
dharmā: TV^P, TV^{Āac}, ms^B (or *dharmād*?))

eta eva ca te yeṣāṃ vāṇīmātreṇāpi nārcaṇam|
*pākhaṇḍino vikarmasthā *haitu(eds. : hetu^o ms^B)kāś caita eva hi||*

‘In this case [i.e. in the case of heterodox scriptures] we recognise many other causes [of their creation], such as greed and the like, and when we see that these are present there is no [need for] inferring another source. And the Buddhists and other [heretics], whenever they give instructions about Dharma, they never give it without a network of motivations. On the other hand, those who stand far removed from Dharma do not say, unlike Gautama and other [authors of Smṛti texts], that [their scriptures] are based on the Veda, and they put forth arguments. It is they to whom one should not pay reverence even by mere words, for it is no-one but they who are [referred to as] heretics, sinners, and sophists.’

⁷⁴ *ex em.*

⁷⁵ Cf. Yāmuna’s answer to the same charge (*Āgamaprāmāṇya* pp. 155f.):

na hi bhāgavatais sarvaiḥ vṛttaye ’bhyarcyate hariḥ|
dṛṣṭā hi bahavaḥ svārthaṃ pūjayanto ’pi sāttvatāḥ||
kecid yadi paraṃ santaḥ sāttvatā vṛttikarśitāḥ|
pūjayanti mahābhāgā vaiṣṇavā vṛttikāraṇāt||
na tāvataisāṃ brāhmaṇyaṃ śakyaṃ nāstīti bhāṣitum|
na khalv ādhvaryavaṃ kurvan jyotiṣṭome patiṣyati||
yadi na pratigṛhṇīyuh pūjaiḥ viphalā bhavet|
pūjāsādguṇyasiddhyartham atas te pratigṛhṇate||
’arcanānte hiraṇyaṃ ca tasmai deyaṃ svaśaktitaḥ|

anyathā pūjakasyaiva tatra pūjāphalaṃ bhavet||’ (*Paramasaṃhitā* 17.46–47)
‘hantya alpadaḥśiṇo yajñā’ (*Manusmṛti* 11.40) *ityādismṛtidarśanāt|*
ṛtvijā dravyalubdhena svayaṃ yācñāpurassaram||
yad ārtvijyaṃ kṛtaṃ karma tad eva hi niṣidhyate|
 (...)

śraddhāpūtadaḥśiṇādānaṃ tūbhayor api śreyaskaram eva|

‘Not all Bhāgavatas worship Hari to make a living, for many Sāttvatas are seen who also perform *pūjā* for their own sake. Even if some virtuous Sāttvatas, attracted to earn a livelihood, [but otherwise] being distinguished Vaiṣṇavas, perform *pūjā* because they want to make money, one cannot assert on the basis of this fact alone that they are not brahmins. [Likewise a priest] who acts as an *adhvaryu* at a *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice will certainly not be degraded. If they did not accept fees the *pūjā* itself would be fruitless: that is why they accept fees, so that the *pūjā* may be correct and [thus] successful. “And at the end of the worship one should give him gold to the best of one’s ability. Otherwise the priest who performs the *pūjā* may get the fruit of the *pūjā*”, since the Smṛti says among others: “[The organs of sense and action, honour, bliss in heaven, longevity, fame, offspring, and cattle] are destroyed by a sacrifice at which [too] small sacrificial fees are given.” (tr. BÜHLER) That officiating work alone is prohibited prior to which an officiant himself makes demands because of avarice. (...) A donation of fee, however, which is purified by reverence is certainly beneficial for both [the priest and the sacrificer].’

⁷⁶ Kumāriḥ points out that every anti-Vedic scripture must be explicitly rejected. It is not enough to show that the adherents of Vedic religion have always been the learned and the respectable, since the heretics can assert the same about their own followers (*Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.4 TV^P, p. 329, TV^A, p. 194):

*mahājanagr̥hītatvaṃ pitrādyanugamādi *ca* (eds. : *vā ms^B*) |

te ’pi dvīpāntarāpekṣaṃ vadanty eva svadarśane||

*tatra śraddhāmātram evaikam vyavasthānimittam sarveṣāṃ svapitr*pitā*(eds. : *mātā^o ms^B*) *mahādicaritānyūyitvāt|*

‘[The followers of heterodox scriptures] also say, referring to other continents, that their own doctrines are accepted by honorable people and have been followed and [handed down] by their fathers and [forefathers]. In this matter faith alone is the only basis of the settled order since everyone is disposed to follow the deeds of his own father, forefathers, and other [ancestors].’

According to the Vaiśeṣika commentator Śrīdhara, consentient acceptance by those who exercise correct judgement is a feature that sets apart the Veda from heterodox scriptures (*Nyāyakandaḥ*, p. 520): *atha puruṣaviśeṣapraṇīto veda iti kuta eṣā pratītir iti, sarvair varṇāśramibhir avigānena tadarthaparigrahāt| yatkimcanapurūṣapraṇītatve tu vedasya buddhādivākyavan na sarveṣāṃ parīkṣakāṇām avigānena tadarthānuṣṭhānaṃ syāt, kasyacid aprāmāṇyāvabodhena viśaṃvādapratīter api sambhavāt|* ‘If [you ask] how we know that the Veda was composed by an extraordinary person, [the answer is that we know it] because its contents are unanimously accepted by all, belonging to any social estate or life-

period. On the other hand, if the Veda had been composed by just any ordinary person, then not everybody who examines things carefully would unanimously put its contents into practice, as [not every discriminating person follows] the Buddha's and other [heterodox teachers'] propositions, because someone might realise that it is not authoritative and therefore adopt a dissenting view.'

⁷⁷ As the *pūrvapakṣin* says in *Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.11 (TV^P, p. 459; TV^A, p. 235):

*yāvad evoditam kimcid vedaprāmāṇyasiddhaye|
tat sarvaṃ buddhavākyānām atideśena gamyate||*

'Whatever has been put forth in order to prove the authority of the Veda, all of that can be applied by analogy to the Buddha's propositions.'

⁷⁸ *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

⁷⁹ This would certainly be an unacceptably generous view for Kumāriḷa, in whose interpretation *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.5–6 excludes such a liberal position (*Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.5–6, TV^P, p. 360–362, TV^A, p. 201–203):
*yat tarhi vedavihitam na bādgate, śiṣṭān vā vedavido na kopayati, viharārāma-
maṇḍalakaraṇavairāgyadyānābhyaśāhiṃsāsatyavacanadamādānadayādi, tad bu-
ddhādibhāṣitam *pramāṇatvenā (conj. : pramāṇenā eds., pramāṇatvaṇā ms^B) vi-
ruddham iti cet, 'na| śāstraparimāṇatvāt|' parimitāny eva hi caturdaś*āṣṭā (eds.
: °āṣṭāṣṭā° ms^B) daśa vā vidyāsthānāni dharmapramāṇatvena śiṣṭaiḥ parigrhītāni,
vedopavedāṅgopāṅgāṣṭādaśadharmasamhitāpurāṇaśāstraśikṣādaṇḍanītisaṃjñakā-
ni| na ca teṣāṃ madhye bauddhārhatādigraṇthāḥ smṛtāḥ *pratigrhītā (em. :
pratigrhītā ms^B : grhītā eds.) vā|
pratikañcukarūpeṇa pūrvaśāstrārthagocaram|
yad anyat kriyate tasya dharmam praty apramāṇatā||
(...)*

*tasmād yāny eva śāstrāṇi vedamūlānatikramāt|
avasthitāni tair eva jñāto dharmāḥ phalapradaḥ||
yathavānyāyavijñātād vedāl lekhyādipūrvakāt|
śūdreṇādhigatād vāpi dharmajñānaṃ na sammatam||
tathātikrāntavedoktamaryādāvvyavahāriṇām|
samvādiṣu api vākyeṣu neṣyate dharmaheturā||
smaryante ca purāṇeṣu dharmaviplavahetavaḥ|
kalau śākyādayas teṣāṃ ko vākyam śrotum arhatī||
yathā kṛtakakarpūrasuvarṇādiṣu dīyate|
yad bījaṃ tad api vyaktam agrāhyatvāt *pratīyate||
(TV^P, TV^{Aac}, ms^B : pratīyate TV^{Apc})*

*tena karmānurūpyasāmānyatodrṣṭārthāpatti*balāt (eds. : °vya/dyattvāt ms^B)
tadabhiprāyakalpita dharmābhāsamādhyaapatitam sanmūlam *apy ahimsādi (eds.
: atha hiṃsādi ms^B) śvadr̥tinikṣiptakṣīravād anupa*yogyā (eds. : bhogyā° ms^B) vi-
śrambhanīyaṃ ca| tanmātropalabdham bhavātīty avāśyaṃ yāvat parigaṇitadhar-
maśāstrebyo nopalabhyate, tāvad agrāhyaṃ bhavati|
yadā śāstrāntareṇaiva so 'rthāḥ spaṣṭo 'vadhāryate|*

*tadā tenaiva siddhatvād *itarat syād* (eds. : *itarasyād* ms^B) *anarthakam*||

‘One may have the following view: “Then those things mentioned by the Buddha and other [heterodox teachers] which are not at variance with what is enjoined in the Veda and do not incense the educated [brahmins] who are versed in the Veda—the construction of monasteries, gardens, and *maṇḍalas*, dispassion, meditation, exercise, non-violence, truthfulness, self-control, munificence, compassion and the like—are not at variance with authoritativeness.” [The answer of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (1.3.6) to this view is as follows:] “No, since the number of [authoritative] scriptures is limited.” For the only a limited number (14 or 18) of sciences is accepted by educated people as a source of valid knowledge about Dharma, namely the Vedas, the Upavedas [Āyurveda (Medicine), Dharmurveda (Military Science), Gandharvaveda (Music)], the [Veda-]Āṅgas [Śikṣā (Pronunciation) in the general sense, Chandas (Prosody), Vyākaraṇa (Grammar), Nirukta (Etymology), Jyotiṣa (Astronomy), Kalpa (Ritual)], the Upāṅgas [Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya], the eighteen Dharmasamhitās, the Purāṇasāstras, Śikṣā [with a special subject, e.g. the one written by Kātyāyana], and Daṇḍanīti [= Arthasāstra].[†] And Buddhist, Jain or other [heterodox] works are neither mentioned among them nor admitted [to this group]. If they do something different [from their real teachings] which belongs to the sphere of the above mentioned sciences, using it as a kind of armour / disguise [against the attacks of the orthodox], it does not have any validity with respect to Dharma. (...) Therefore only that Dharma yields fruit which has been mastered from scriptures which are well-established because they do not transgress their basis: the Veda. Just as knowledge about Dharma is not sanctioned if it derives from a Vedic text which has been mastered in an unauthorised way, which has previously been committed to writing and the like, or has been learnt by a Śūdra, likewise the propositions—may they be in accordance with [the Veda]—of those whose behaviour has transgressed the limits of propriety taught in the Vedas are not accepted as means of [learning] Dharma. And the Buddhists and other [heretics] are mentioned in the Purāṇas as those who bring about the ruin of Dharma in the Iron Age. Who could possibly listen to what they say? Just as a drop [of real camphor, gold, etc.], if put into fake camphor, gold, etc., will also dissolve, since it cannot be clearly grasped, thus such [virtuous principles] as non-violence, even though their basis is positive, are like milk put in the skin of a dog and being such they should not be neither adopted nor relied on, inasmuch as they have fallen into the middle of counterfeit Dharma that had been cooked up according to their [i.e. the heretics’] intentions by means of [analogy based on] the conformity of actions [“the fruit of a sacrificial action that causes pain to the victim will be pain for the sacrificer himself”], inference from a common property [“Vedic violence, just as everyday violence, is against Dharma”], and presumption [“since the experience of suffering is the result of sins formerly committed, the experience of various kinds of suffering brings about the destruction of sins”].[†] These [principles] are known only from those [Buddhist and other such scriptures], so they will necessarily be unadaptable as long as they are not known from recognised works on Dharma. If the matter was clearly learnt from another doctrinal work alone, then, since it would be established by that alone,

this other one [i.e. the Buddhist etc. scripture] would be useless.'

‡ I follow the *Nyāyasudhā*'s interpretation (TV^P p. 379f.).

⁸⁰ *ex conj.* KATAOKA.

⁸¹ *ex conj.*

⁸² *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.

⁸³ *ex conj.* SANDERSON.

⁸⁴ *ex conj.* Cf. *Manusmṛti* 10.63: *ahiṃsā satyam asteyaṃ śaucam indriyani-grahaḥ| etaṃ sāmāsikaṃ dharmam cāturvarṇye 'bravīn manuḥ|*

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