

Sex and the Party
Gender Policy, Gender Culture, and
Political Participation in Unified Germany

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Abstract

This thesis explores the relationship between gender policy, gender culture, and political participation in unified Germany. It investigates the extent to which political regimes shape citizens' attitudes towards gender roles and examines the effect of such attitudes on women's participation in politics.

The thesis is divided into three parts: The first part explores the differences in gender regime types between the former German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic of Germany during the Cold War period. Building on existing studies, the analysis considers how generations that were socialised in the divided Germany differ in their attitudes toward gender roles. It finds that citizens from West Germany are more socially conservative than citizens from the East. The second part of the thesis tests the effects of these traditional gender attitudes on citizens' participation, focusing on party membership. The analysis highlights that gender gaps in formal political participation in unified Germany still exist, but that these gaps are smaller in the new federal states. The investigation further shows that traditional gender attitudes exert a negative effect on women's political engagement beyond the predictive power of socio-economic and demographic factors. The final part of this thesis casts a critical look at the political controversy in Germany over the introduction of a new cash-for-care subsidy (the so-called *Betreuungsgeld*). It explores the normative assumptions and ideas about gender roles that have been promoted by Germany's main political parties throughout the policy negotiation process.

Using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, the research presented in this thesis draws on, and contributes to, studies on gender, welfare states, political socialisation, and political participation.

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List of Abbreviations

AfD	Alternative for Germany Party
BMFSJ.....	Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CSU	Christian Social Union
FDP	Free Democratic Party
FRG.....	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR.....	German Democratic Republic
MP	Member of Parliament
MdL.....	Member of the Landtag (regional state parliament)
SED	Socialist Unity Party
SPD	Social Democratic Party

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1 Introduction – The Culture Question

“The role of woman in the life of society, the degree of her political emancipation cannot be judged by the public achievement of a few selected women. A female head of state for example ... is not an expression of the general equality of women in a particular country. Genuine political equality of the women of a country can be measured only by the quantity and quality of their democratic participation in all spheres of public life.”¹

Perhaps surprisingly, the above statement is an excerpt from *Women in Socialist Society*, a factual book published 1976 in the German Democratic Republic. The source of the statement may be surprising as one could reasonably expect these words to be printed in any contemporary newspaper article, party manifesto, or research article. Moreover, notwithstanding its ideological bias, it is astounding that the statement is as relevant to women’s political participation today as it had been over 40 years ago at the time of its publication. This is especially true in the context of Germany, which at the time of this writing, is among the very few countries worldwide led by a female head of government.

For many, the occupancy of the top spot in German politics by Angela Merkel marked the realisation of gender equality in the country. Demands for greater women’s participation and representation have since been largely absent from public discourse. In the aftermath of the 2013 German General Election, not one major newspaper commented on the fact that female parliamentarians were yet again a minority in the German Bundestag. Indeed, for the past 10 years, the percentage of women in both the national and in regional state parliaments has stagnated in the low to mid-thirties and would probably be lower were it not for internal quotas adopted by most of the mainstream German parties.²

¹ Allendorf, Marlis, Michaelis-Jena, Ruth and Murray, Patrick T. (1976) *Women in socialist society*. Leipzig: Edition Leipzig. 138.

² Davidson-Schmich, Louise K. (2010). "Gender Quota Compliance and Contagion in the 2009 Bundestag Election." In: Langenbacher, Eric. *Between left and right: the 2009 Bundestag elections and the transformation of the German party system*. New York: Berghahn Books. 151-72. 151.

Similarly, significant gender gaps³ remain in the German economy. Fewer than 70 per cent of women in Germany work outside of the home and almost half of those only work part-time.⁴ The gender wage gap for full-time employees is above 20 per cent⁵ and the proportion of board seats held by women in listed German companies is lower than 5 per cent.⁶ The tensions arising from these and other gender gaps affect countries like Germany in a number of different ways: declining birth rates, shortages of high-skilled labour, deficiencies in the provision of social care (for children and the elderly), poverty, and social polarisation – are all frequently linked to gender inequality.

In academic jargon, differences in resources or in levels of participation are often described as structural inequality, a state in which valuable assets (such as in income, wealth, social capital, or political power) are disproportionately allocated between different sections of society.⁷ While structural inequalities exist between a variety of social groups (for example along racial, ethnic, or religious lines), gender inequality, the United

³ In this thesis, the term gender gap refers to the difference in ‘proportions of eligible men and eligible women’ engaging in a particular type of activity such as voting, party membership, or labour force participation. See for example: Stevens, Anne (2007) *Women, power, and politics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 55. The term is also frequently used to describe differences in resources between men and women such as in wealth or income. See: Baxter, Janeen and Kane, Emily W. (1995) "Dependence and Independence. A Cross-National Analysis of Gender Inequality and Gender Attitudes." *Gender and Society*. vol. 9: 193-215. 198. Ford, Lynne E. (2011) *Women and politics: the pursuit of equality*. United Kingdom: Wadsworth Cengage Learning. 85. I am mindful of the fact, that the term gender gap may also be used to describe the differences in men’s and women’s voting preferences, especially in the literature on voting behaviour. See for example Inglehart, Ronald and Norris, Pippa (2000) "The Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap: Women’s and Men’s Voting Behavior in Global Perspective." *International Political Science Review*. vol. 21(4): 441-63. The reader is advised to note that this is not the definition of gender gaps adopted in this thesis.

⁴ This figure is 13 percentage points above OECD average OECD (2011) "Employment Database." Dataset. *Employment, OECD Directorate for*. OECD (2012) "Gender Data Browser." Dataset.

⁵ This places Germany third worst behind Korea and Japan among OECD countries. See for example: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2013) "Gleiche Qualifikation, unterschiedliches Gehalt." 02.01. 2013. Available from: <http://www.faz.net/-hrd-75g6x>. Accessed: 03.01. 2013.

⁶ See also: Bekhouche, Yasmina, Hausmann, Ricardo, Tyson, Laura D. and Zahidi, Saadia (2013) "The Global Gender Gap Report 2013." Switzerland: World Economic Forum.

⁷ Stewart, Francis, Brown, Graham and Mancini, Luca (2005) "Why Horizontal Inequalities Matter: Some Implications for Measurement." *Crisis Working Paper*. Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity. vol. 19. 3. Bermeo, Nancy (2009) "Does Electoral Democracy Boost Economic Equality?" *Journal of Democracy*. vol. 20(4): 21-35. 21-22.

Nations notes, forms one of the most universal of social divides and one of 'the deepest and most pervasive of inequalities.'⁸

Unquestionably, most Western democracies have already made great strides in eliminating many forms of gender discrimination. Some commentators have suggested that we have witnessed a feminist or gender revolution. Considering the progress made in closing gender gaps over recent decades, it is likely, many believe, that eradicating the still-existing manifestations of gender inequality is simply a matter of time. Yet, available data indicate that gender inequality, particularly in the political domain, is no longer clearly diminishing. Indeed, in some countries, gender gaps appear to be widening again.⁹ In politics as in many other areas, the 'gender revolution' seems to have stalled.¹⁰

This situation is puzzling and invites a host of questions on the root causes of gender inequality and on the effectiveness of different measures in eradicating gender gaps. Existing research has explored these questions from a number of different perspectives (historical, social, economic, and institutional).¹¹ Some scholars have stressed the role of

⁸ Watkins, Kevin (2005) "Human Development Report 2005." New York: United Nations Development Programme.

⁹ For example, while Germany is generally considered to be a country with an exemplary track-record of gender equality, its progress in further reducing existing gender gaps has stagnated over the past 10 years, above all with regards to political empowerment. There has even been a gender gap increase between 2007 and 2008 on this indicator. While between 1987 and 2002, the share of female parliamentarians rose to reach more than 32 per cent in the Bundestag, since the September 2005 elections to the 16th Bundestag, the representation of women has stagnated with a share of a little less than that figure. Bekhouche, Hausmann, Tyson and Zahidi, "Global Gender Gap Report 2013", 12. The same trend has been observed at the level of *Länder* parliaments. See Nagel, Jeannette (2006) "Women in Germany in 2006." Wiesbaden: Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt). Also: Davidson-Schmich, "Gender Quota Compliance and Contagion", 151.

¹⁰ See for example: Esping-Andersen, Gosta (2009) *The Incomplete Revolution. Adapting to Women's New Roles*. Cambridge: Polity Press. 3, 11. Or: England, Paula (2010) "The Gender Revolution. Uneven and Stalled." *GENDER & SOCIETY*. vol. 24(2): 149-66.

¹¹ See for example: Pateman, Carole (1988) *The sexual contract*. Cambridge: Polity; Norris, Pippa and Lovenduski, Joni (1995) *Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in British Parliament*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 93ff; Norris, Pippa (1985) "Women's legislative participation in Western Europe." *West European Politics*. vol. 8(4): 91-101. Brady, Henry, Verba, Sidney and Lehman Schlozman, Kay (1995) "Beyond SES: A resource model of political participation." *American Political Science Review*. vol. 89(2): 271-94. Hoecker, Beate (1998) *Handbuch Politische Partizipation von Frauen in Europa*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Kenworthy, Lane and Malami, Melissa (1999) "Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis." *Social Forces*. vol. 78(1): 235-68. Norris, Pippa (2007). "New Feminist Challenges to the Study of Political Engagement." In: Dalton, Russell J. and Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 724-44. 730. Matland, Richard E. and Montgomery, Kathleen A. (2003). "Recruiting Women to National Legislatures: A General Framework with Applications to Post-Communist Democracies." In: Matland, Richard E. and Montgomery, Kathleen

political structures such as, for example, the type of electoral system or the effects of positive discrimination measures in increasing women's participation in politics. Others have focused on resource-based explanations, the socio-economic determinants that help predict political engagement (such as wealth, income, time, or access to networks). Researchers have also studied women's participation in politics by looking at the social dynamics of supply (the number of women putting themselves forward to stand for political office) and demand (the number of women chosen by parties or the electorate to hold positions of power).¹²

Yet despite this relatively broad body of insightful research at the macro- and micro level, and despite lip-service being paid to the importance of equal participation of women in political and public discourse, gender gaps in politics persist.¹³ Against this backdrop, scholars have become increasingly interested in the cultural factors that may influence women's political participation with regards to both demand and supply side factors. There has been growing recognition that one of the underlying barriers to closing gender gaps in politics and the economy may be the existence of an unfavourable gender culture – of traditional norms, attitudes, and beliefs about the role of men and women in public and private life.¹⁴ However, gender culture is a rather vague concept and thorough qualitative and quantitative research on its determinants and its ramifications remains scarce in mainstream political science discourse. It is the ambition of this thesis to offer a partial remedy to this cultural dearth in the literature. In particular, my research seeks to examine the institutional determinants of traditional gender norms and the impact of such norms on women's political engagement.

A. *Women's Access to Political Power in Post-Communist Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 19-42. 18. This literature will be reviewed in detail in chapter 2 of this thesis.

¹² Norris and Lovenduski, *Gender, Race and Class in British Parliament*. Norris, "New Feminist Challenges to the Study of Political Engagement", 730.

¹³ See for example: Jordan Brooks, Deborah (2013) *He Runs, She Runs: Why Gender Stereotypes Do Not Harm Women Candidates*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

¹⁴ Norris, Pippa and Inglehart, Ronald (2001) "Cultural Obstacles to Equal Representation." *Journal of Democracy*. vol. 12(3): 126-40. ; Inter-Parliamentary Union (2000) "Politics: Women's Insights." Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union. Arceneaux, Kevin (2001) "The "Gender Gap" in State Legislative Representation: New Data to Tackle an Old Question." *Political Research Quarterly*. vol. 54(1): 143-60. Inglehart, Ronald and Norris, Pippa (2003) *Rising tide: gender equality and cultural change around the world*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Paxton, Pamela Marie and Kunovich, Sheri (2003) "Women's Political Representation: The Importance of Ideology." *Social Forces*. vol. 82(1): 87-114.

Due to its recent history, unified Germany presents a unique case study for research of this kind. As Bauernschuster and Rainer point out,

‘the separation and reunification of Germany sets up a natural experiment of sorts concerning the influence of political regimes and social policies on attitudes about appropriate roles for women in the family and the compatibility of work and motherhood.’¹⁵

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Germany was infamously split into two opposed political, economic, and ideological regimes – the socialist, Soviet controlled German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and the Western allied social welfare democracy, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany).¹⁶ As divergent as their approaches to governing their states or regulating their economies were the two political regimes’ stances on gender roles.¹⁷ The dominant strategy of the conservative West-German government was to propagate a gender regime that idealised women as mothers and housewives.¹⁸ Employment, welfare, and childcare policies explicitly promoted a traditional gender hierarchy, which contributed to women’s underrepresentation and marginalisation in all areas of public life.¹⁹ The German Democratic Republic, by contrast, depended for its very existence on women’s participation in the labour

¹⁵ Bauernschuster, Stefan and Rainer, Helmut (2012) "Political regimes and the family: how sex-role attitudes continue to differ in reunified Germany." *Journal of Population Economics*. vol. 25(1): 5-27. 6. Robert Rohrschneider was among the first to suggest that unified Germany presents a unique case study to allow researchers to examine the impact of political institutions on citizens’ attitudes under ‘quasi-laboratory conditions.’ See Rohrschneider, Robert (1994) "Report from the Laboratory: The Influence of Institutions on Political Elites' Democratic Values in Germany." *American Journal of Political Science*. vol. 88(4): 927-41. Banaszak on the other hand must be credited for applying Rohrschneider’s approach of institutional learning to citizens’ attitudes towards gender roles in unified Germany. See Banaszak, Lee Ann (2006) "The Gendering State and Citizens' Attitudes toward Women's Roles: State Policy, Employment, and Religion in Germany." *Politics & Gender*. vol. 2(1): 29-55. See also: Alesina, Alberto and Fuchs-Schündel, Nicola (2007) "Good-bye Lenin (or Not?): The Effect of Communism on People’s Preferences." *The American Economic Review*. vol. 97(4): 1507-28. The authors studied how exposure to communism in the GDR shaped people’s preferences toward the economic system and towards economic redistribution.

¹⁶ Throughout the thesis, I use East and West Germany and new and old federal states interchangeably for stylistic variation. These terms refer to the geographical and political regions of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

¹⁷ Burdumy, Alexander (2013) "Reconsidering the Role of the Welfare State with the German Democratic Republic Political System." *Journal of Contemporary History*. vol. 48(4): 872-89. 874.

¹⁸ Budde, Gunilla-Friederike (1999). "How Long Did ‘Women’s Finest Hour’ Last? German Women’s Situation and Experiences between 1945 and 1995." In: Bridger, Sue. *Women and Political Change. Perspectives from East-Central Europe*. Hampshire: Macmillan. 43-59. 54-55.

¹⁹ Young, Brigitte (1999) *Triumph of the fatherland: German unification and the marginalization of women*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 22.

market.²⁰ Emancipation was engineered by socialist political elites through women's integration into the workforce and through the socialisation of childcare.²¹ As a result, over 90 per cent of East German women worked outside the home, compared to only 55 per cent of women in West Germany.²² Likewise, though the GDR was far from democratic, women's proportion in the East German parliament, the *Volkskammer*, was more than twice as high as that of women in the West German *Bundestag* throughout the Cold War period.

At the time of (re-)writing this introduction, Germany is celebrating the 25 year anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall. Much of the media coverage that has marked this anniversary indicates that while enormous progress has been made in the new federal states, significant differences remain between the two parts of the country in terms of economic performance, political participation, as well as in terms of citizens' social attitudes.²³ Part of this thesis explores to what extent the symbolic 'wall in the heads' pertains to Germans' attitudes toward gender roles and asks if such differences could indeed be traced back to citizens' different socialisation experiences during the country's separation, as some have claimed.

It is frequently pointed out that the proportion of women from the new federal states who are in paid employment and who are represented at the top echelons of power in politics and business is higher than that of women from the old federal states.²⁴

²⁰ Sandole-Staroste, Ingrid (2002) *Women in transition: between socialism and capitalism*. Westport, Conn.; London: Praeger. 6.

²¹ Dölling, Irene (1993). "Gespaltenes Bewusstsein." In: Helwig, Gisela and Nickel, Hildegard Maria. *Frauen in Deutschland 1945-1992*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. 26. This will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 3.

²² Einhorn, Barbara (1995) "Feminism in crisis or an opportunity for renewal? The east German women's movement and difficulties in east-west German communications." *East German Papers (University of Reading, Centre for East German Studies)*. vol. 1. 55. The same figure is also cited in Bennhold, Katrin (2010) "20 Years After Fall of Wall, Women of Former East Germany Thrive." *New York Times*. Available from: <http://nyti.ms/1PZEggS>. Accessed: 23.06. 2012. Note that the rate of full-time employment was also considerably higher in the German Democratic Republic.

²³ See for example: Die Zeit Online (2014) "Frauen bekommen 22 Prozent weniger Lohn als Männer." 18.03. 2014. Available from: <http://bit.ly/1yOToUO>. Accessed: 28.09. 2014. Decker, Markus (2014) "Sie sind von drüben, oder?" *Die Zeit*. 09.08. 2014. Available from: <http://bit.ly/1pdGNZ4>. Accessed: 09.08. 2014. Noack, Rick (2014) "The Berlin Wall fell 25 years ago, but Germany is still divided." *The Washington Post*. 31.10. 2014. Available from: <http://wapo.st/1G1ULoB>. Accessed: 3.11. 2014.

²⁴ See for example: Wesemüller, Ellen (2012) "Die Macht sei mit ihr." *Die Zeit*. 22.06. 2012. Available from: <http://bit.ly/1xGhS4z>. Accessed: 23.06. 2012. Or: Bennhold, "20 Years After Fall of Wall, Women of Former East Germany Thrive", online resource.

Particularly women who spent their formative years and early adult life in the GDR seem to have a stronger stand in public life compared to women of the same age group from West Germany.²⁵ In 2010, *The New York Times* noted that Eastern German women ‘are more self-confident, better-educated’ and more successful than their West German counterparts.²⁶ Chancellor Angela Merkel -raised and educated in the former GDR- is an often-cited example for this assertion.²⁷ This thesis considers such claims in more detail. Specifically, it explores the *effects* of gender role norms on women’s formal political participation in Germany in the post-unification period.

It is important to note that the objective of this thesis is not to analyse the differences in political participation or political culture in the new and old federal states more generally (though these aspects will also be considered), but that the focus is on differences in gender attitudes in the two regions, on gender gaps in formal participation, and on the institutional incentives that may lie behind these phenomena.

1.1 Research Design

Robert Putnam likens the solving of a research puzzle to ‘a detective tale’, which requires the use of different tools and the pursuing of different lines of inquiry.²⁸ My analysis of gender policy, gender culture and gender inequality in political participation utilises both quantitative and qualitative research methods and draws on a wide range of primary and secondary sources. Yet, I focus exclusively on Germany. Given the cross-national variation in structural factors that impact policy, culture, and participation, a multi-country study would make it difficult to ‘isolate the causal mechanism’ affecting the dependent variables I am interested in.²⁹ The fact that social policy legislation and formal

²⁵ Wesemüller, "Die Macht sei mit ihr", online resource.

²⁶ Bennhold, "20 Years After Fall of Wall, Women of Former East Germany Thrive", online resource.

²⁷ For example, the Quentin Peel argued in the Financial Times that, Merkel’s ‘upbringing in the east, and her scientist training, are the two elements which make her different, and so successful, as a politician.’ Peel, Quentin (2012) "Angela Merkel: a woman of power." 14.12. 2012. Available from: <http://on.ft.com/UMnbr9>. Accessed: 15.12. 2012.

²⁸ Putnam, Robert D. (1994) *Making democracy work: Civic transitions in modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 13.

²⁹ See Davidson-Schmich, Louise K. (Forthcoming) *A Glass Half Full: Gender Quotas and Political Recruitment*. Michigan: University of Michigan Press. cited from book manuscript.

participation (parties, elections etc.) are still primarily organised within nation-state boundaries further justifies a country-specific approach.³⁰

Nevertheless, my thesis also has many comparative elements: it contrasts and compares the policy regimes imposed on citizens in East and West Germany during the Cold War period and it analyses the persistent cultural and participatory differences between citizens from the two regions since unification. My research is premised on the assumption that the case study set up through the separation and re-unification of Germany allows me to examine not only the relative impact of different gender policies on gender attitudes, but also the relationship between gender attitudes and formal political participation (specifically party membership), while largely avoiding the causal inference problem that a comparative examination of two distinct countries would entail.

Throughout this thesis, I draw on both quantitative and qualitative data.³¹ My main primary sources are opinion survey data from the German General Social Survey³² and elite interviews, which I conducted with German politicians and civil servants in the summers of 2012 and 2013. Methodological information on the collection of my qualitative data is included in the appendix (see section 8.2.1). Two of my empirical chapters focus on an analysis of quantitative data from the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS). I chose this particular dataset because it contains a number of variables of interest on gender attitudes as well as on different forms of political participation. Moreover, unlike many other available datasets, ALLBUS surveys have been conducted biennially for over three decades from 1980-2012, with data from the

³⁰ Duncan, Simon (1995) "Theorizing European Gender Systems." *Journal of European Social Policy*. vol. 5(4): 263-84. 276. Hummelsheim, Dina (2009) *Die Erwerbsbeteiligung von Müttern: Institutionelle Steuerung oder kulturelle Prägung? Eine empirische Untersuchung am Beispiel von Belgien, West- und Ostdeutschland*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 32, 34.

³¹ In doing so, I adopt a method of triangulation Tarrow, Sidney (1995) "Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science." *The American Political Science Review*. vol. 89(2): 471-74. 473. For a discussion of method triangulation, see also: Jick, Todd (1979) "Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in Action." *Administrative Science Quarterly*. vol. 24(4): 602-11.

³² GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences (2014) "Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften/German General Social Survey German General Social Survey (ALLBUS/GGSS) 1980-2012." Dataset. In the earlier stages of my research for this thesis, I also looked at Eurobarometer data from 2009 in which interviewees were asked to report their general assessment or agreement levels on questions concerning the state of gender equality and gender roles in different European countries. See ICPSR, Inter-University Consortium For Political and Social Research (2009) "Eurobarometer 72.2: Nuclear Energy, Corruption, Gender Equality, Healthcare, and Civil Protection, September-October 2009." Dataset. *Papacostas, Antonis*.

new federal states being available from 1991. As such, the ALLBUS survey is superior to other comparable datasets for the purpose of this study. A more detailed discussion of the German General Social Survey is provided in chapter 4.

My work has been motivated by the writings of feminist political theorists and empirical scholars to which I was introduced during my Master's degree (see section 8.2.4 in the appendix).³³ My initial (and ambitious) aim was to find out why gender gaps persist in post-industrial democracies, despite seemingly favourable institutional environments. As my research focus narrowed, the literature I consulted, broadened. The research presented in this thesis has thus been informed by a wide range of secondary literature, including from the fields of gender studies, political socialisation, political participation and representation, welfare state and social policy analysis, and history. Throughout the thesis (but particularly in chapter 6), I have also worked with various primary sources such as newspaper articles, government reports, political speeches, and transcripts of parliamentary hearings.

Lastly, I should note that my work has been influenced not only by my beliefs as a feminist³⁴ but also by my own experiences of growing up in post-wall East Germany and by the numerous conversations with relatives, friends, and acquaintances I have had over the course of my studies.

1.2 Thesis Structure

Table 1 provides a summary of the research questions, core concepts, and types of data that are used in each chapter of my thesis. For greater reader-friendliness, the research hypotheses for quantitative analysis that correspond to my research questions will be discussed at the beginning of each of the relevant chapters.

³³ A more detailed discussion of feminist political thought and its methodological implications for my research are included in the appendix.

³⁴ To echo Lovenduski, I believe that gender inequality 'is morally wrong and politically unwise.' Lovenduski, Joni (1986) *Women and European politics: contemporary feminism and public policy*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf. xi.

Table 1 Overview of Research Questions and Approaches

Research Question	Dependent Variable (Level of analysis)	(Main) Explanatory Variable	Data	Chapter
What were the gender regime type differences between Cold War East and West Germany?	Social Policy (System level)	Cold War East and West Germany	Qualitative: analysis of political frameworks and elite interviews	3
What is the effect of gender policy on citizens' attitudes toward gender roles?	Attitudes (Individual level)	East and West Germany and birth cohorts	Quantitative: survey data analysis	4
Do traditional gender attitudes affect political participation?	Political Participation (Individual level)	East and West Germany and Gender Attitudes	Qualitative and Quantitative: analysis of elite interviews and of survey data	5
What are the ideas and assumptions about gender roles that are promoted by politicians in the negotiation process over a new social policy?	Policy (Elite level and System level)	Gender Culture	Qualitative: analysis of elite interviews and primary sources	6

Following this introduction is a review of the existing literature around the major themes and concepts with which this thesis operates, namely gender and gender culture (norms and attitudes), gender regimes (welfare states and social policy), and gender and political participation. The first empirical chapter (chapter 3) provides a historical overview of relevant institutional developments in East and West Germany over roughly the past century, focusing on the policies that shaped their respective regimes with regards to gender. Specifically, I discuss West Germany's 'Strong Conservative Male Breadwinner Model' in comparison to the 'Weak Dual Earner Model' of the German Democratic Republic. The chapter also reviews important developments in women's formal political participation during this period. In this context, it is important to bear in mind that the GDR was not a democratic state and that a comparison of developments in women's political participation in East and West Germany before the fall of the wall is far from straight-forward.

Chapter 4 turns in more detail to the relationship between gender regimes and gender culture (research question 2). A persistent problem in scientific research on culture is that of *endogeneity*. Do political institutions (such as welfare state policies) reflect and cater to the prevailing preferences of citizens or are these preferences themselves shaped and influenced through political institutions? In the case of post-war Germany, the political and social regime was imposed on citizens, especially those in the Eastern territory. The attitudinal differences between East and West Germans who grew up during the Cold War period, if they are shown to still exist, are therefore likely to be the product of institutional learning.³⁵ In order to test my hypothesis that citizens in the old federal states should hold more conservative gender attitudes than citizens in the East, and to see if these gender norm differences are especially pronounced for generations socialised in the heyday of the divided Germany, I analyse data from the German General Social Survey, using a scaled variable for traditional gender attitudes which combines six questions on participants' views on gender roles contained in the dataset.

Chapter 5 subsequently explores the effect of traditional gender attitudes on gender gaps in formal political participation. The chapter begins with an analysis of the reasons for women's lower political participation identified by the politicians, which I interviewed for this thesis. This is followed by a quantitative analysis of the ALLBUS data. To disentangle the relationship between the main dependent variable party membership and the explanatory variables identified both by my interviewees and in the established literature on gender gaps in participation, I run binary logistic regressions in which the summary variable for traditional gender attitudes (described above) functions as the main predictor. I expect traditional gender attitudes to be negatively correlated with women's political participation and the gender gap in participation to be smaller in East compared to West Germany. In attempts to deal with the endogeneity concern between reported gender attitudes and political behaviour, I also run instrumental variable regressions.

³⁵ The separation and re-unification of Germany has been used as a case study in a number of highly insightful research papers on institutional learning and its effects on economic attitudes and political preferences. See for example: Rohrschneider, "The Influence of Institutions on Democratic Values". Alesina and Fuchs-Schündel, "The Effect of Communism on People's Preferences". Neundorff, Anja (2012) "Growing up on Different Sides of the Wall – A Quasi-Experimental Test: Applying the Left–Right Dimension to the German Mass Public." *German Politics*. vol. 18(2): 201-25. Fuchs-Schündel, Nicola and Schündeln, Matthias (2015) "On the endogeneity of political preferences: Evidence from individual experience with democracy." *Science*. vol. 347(6226): 1145-48.

The final substantive chapter of this thesis returns to the topic of gender policy. It casts a critical light on one of the more recent policy disputes around unified Germany's welfare state regime. Specifically, I consider the political controversy over the introduction of a new cash-for-care subsidy (the so-called *Betreuungsgeld*) in 2012. The policy was fiercely debated in German parliament, the media, and in public, with critics arguing that it comprised a reversal to traditional family norms and a departure from the more progressive family policies, which had been introduced in Germany since the mid 2000s. I will analyse the political discourse around this policy in more detail to highlight the ideological narratives about gender and family norms that were formulated by political actors during the policy negotiation process. I will also consider whether the implementation of the policy indeed signalled a re-alignment of the German system toward a conservative gender welfare state model.

1.3 Key Contributions

In summary, the underlying ambition of this thesis is to better understand the relationship between social policy, gender culture, and women's political participation. Drawing on a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods, my research seeks to make three main contributions to existing research:

Firstly, my thesis aims to further investigate a novel perspective on the literature on institutional learning and political socialisation. The field has so far been dominated by studies on how institutional socialisation affects citizens' behaviour and attitudes toward the political system or the economy, but little (quantitative) work has been done on the relationship between political institutions and citizens' gender norms. In my thesis, I explore how different welfare state regime types influence the gender role attitudes that citizens adhere to, thus highlighting how cultural norms are shaped through political systems.

The second key contribution of my thesis relates to the literature on gender and political participation. Specifically, I attempt to isolate the cultural explanations for why gender gaps in political participation persist in modern democracies. The insights gained from this exercise have relevant implications not only for the study of gender and participation, but also for the study of political behaviour more generally, as they

highlight the often neglected aspect of how cultural norms may affect citizens' participation.

Thirdly, my research broadly contributes both to the study of post-communist transitions and to the field of welfare state regime analysis. Among the former Soviet satellite states, East Germany holds a special position because of its unique experience of democratisation through unification. While economic and bureaucratic assistance from West Germany facilitated the GDR's transition to a welfare democracy, citizens also experienced significant setbacks. Eastern women were particularly affected by high unemployment, underrepresentation in politics, restrictions in abortion rights, and significant cuts in social support and childcare availability. A number of qualitative studies published in the 1990s analysed these complex structural and cultural changes but a more contemporary perspective is yet missing. This thesis considers the persistent East-West differences in gender attitudes as well as in women's participatory behaviour from such a perspective. Finally, it examines recent developments in German welfare state regulations in order to determine if Germany still represents a conservative welfare state with regards to gender.

Overall, my thesis adds the body of institutionalist, behavioural, and gender politics literature with particular reference to studies on gender policy, gender culture, and political participation.

2 Sex and the Theory: Literature Review

2.1 Gender and Culture

The title of this thesis is a play-on-words of the popular American television series ‘Sex and the City’. In my thesis, however, sex does not refer to the sexual act, but rather to the biological category that signifies reproductive functions. The title is a reference to the fact that, as will be discussed in detail in chapter 5, sex is an important predictor of party membership. Yet, as the title’s subheading also suggests, the main analytical focus of this thesis lies not with the biological category of sex, but rather with the social meanings and expectations attributed to it.¹ These meanings and expectations are commonly referred to as *gender* - the socially constructed difference between the sexes.² Gender expresses the view that women’s and men’s status, roles, and behaviours are shaped to a significant extent through social and cultural influences rather than through pre-determined genetic traits or inherent characteristics that are associated to their sex.³

Despite the vast amount of scholarship published over the course of the past six decades scientifically dismantling common assumptions around biological determinism, questions over whether gender differences are primarily the product of social or of genetic factors remain subject to fierce debate. Taking a stance on either side of this debate has important ramifications for how scholars frame their research on gender inequality and gender behaviour. While this thesis cannot resolve the ‘nature versus nurture’ dispute on

¹ It is important to note that sex and gender are distinct concepts. See for example: Campbell, Rosie (2006) *Gender and the Vote in Britain. Beyond the Gender Gap?* Colchester: ECPR Press. 6. The use of the word ‘sex’ in the thesis and chapter titles serves mainly stylistic purposes.

² A seminal work on the social construction of gender is De Beauvoir’s ‘The Second Sex’ in which she famously argues that one is not born but becomes a woman. De Beauvoir, Simone (1953) *The Second Sex*. London: Jonathan Cape. See also: West, Candace and Zimmerman, Don H. (1987) "Doing Gender." *Gender and Society*. vol. 1(2): 125-51. 126. Firestone, Shulamith (1970) *The dialectic of sex: the case for feminist revolution*. New York: William Morrow and Company.

³ West and Zimmerman, "Doing Gender", 126. Judith Butler famously argued that it is impossible to detach “gender” from the political and cultural intersections in which it is produced and maintained.’ For Butler, gender is performed rather than innate. Butler, Judith (1999) *Gender trouble: feminism and the subversion of identity*. London: Routledge. 6. See also: Duerst-Lahti, Georgia and Kelly, Rita Mae (1995) *Gender Power, Leadership, and Governance*. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press. 16.

gender differences (see section 8.2.5 of the appendix for a short discussion), it is important to stress that my work is premised on the view that culture and socialisation constitute ‘far greater barrier[s] to equality than biology.’⁴ A growing body of interdisciplinary research has been produced to show that the genetic differences between men and women are too small to provide sufficient explanations for the gender differences in social behaviour and social outcomes between the sexes.⁵ Yet, as Lindsey points out, essentialism – ‘the belief that males and females are inherently different because of their biology and genes’ – presents a resilient case against gender equality ‘because it suggests that men and women are “naturally” suited to fulfil certain roles.’⁶

Gender thus expresses itself through people’s perceptions, their views on the ‘correct’ or ‘socially appropriate’ behaviour of men and women. By implication, it is also reflected in people’s opinions on marriage, family, motherhood, sexuality, abortion, and so on.⁷ Feminist theories of social constructivism hold that interpretations and meanings of gender vary according to different historical, cultural and socio-political contexts. Judith Butler influentially stated that it is impossible to detach “gender” from the political and cultural intersections in which it is invariably produced and maintained.⁸ In this context, it is also important to highlight that gender intersects with other identity markers such as class, age, and sexuality, ethnic, or religious affiliations, which create different dimensions of social stratification.⁹ In this thesis, I will focus in particular on the intersection between gender and region (i.e. being from East or West Germany).

⁴ Lindsey, Linda L. (2011) *Gender Roles. A sociological Perspective 5th Edition*. Boston: Pearson. 22-23.

⁵ For example, Goldstein finds that ‘the widely held notion that *testosterone* levels cause aggression has weak empirical support.’ Similarly, he rejects the claim ‘that *female* hormones make women more peaceful’ Goldstein, Joshua S. (2001) *War and gender: how gender shapes the war system and vice versa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 407.

⁶ Lindsey, *Gender Roles*, 22-23. Connell notes that, ‘the idea of natural difference is that of a passively suffered condition, like being subject to gravity. If human life were in its major internal structures – gender being one – so conditioned, human society would be inconceivable. For history depends on the transcendence of the natural through social practice.’ Connell, Robert (1987) *Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politic*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 76-77.

⁷ See: Davis, Shannon N. and Greenstein, Theodore N. (2009) "Gender Ideology: Components, Predictors, and Consequences." *Annual Review of Sociology*. vol. 35: 87-105. 89.

⁸ Butler, *Gender trouble*, 6. Butler argues that gender is performed rather than innate and is therefore radically independent of sex. See also: Duerst-Lahti and Kelly, *Gender Power, Leadership, and Governance*, 16.

⁹ On intersectionality, see: Thornton Dill, Bonnie and Kohlman, Marla H. (2012). "Intersectionality. A Transformative Paradigm in Feminist Theory and Social Justice." In: Hesse-Biber, Sharlene Nagy. *The*

Existing studies examining the links between gender attitudes and gender inequality operate with a number of concepts such as gender culture,¹⁰ gender ideology,¹¹ gender stereotypes,¹² gender role attitudes,¹³ feminist attitudes,¹⁴ or gender egalitarianism.¹⁵ The lack of a common terminology is indicative of both the topic's conceptual complexity and of its marginal status in the mainstream political science discourse. In this thesis, the above notions are used interchangeably to refer to,

‘the norms and values about the desirable “correct” form of gender relations [which form] a main reference point for the behaviour of actors—both at the level of institutions (like the welfare state and firms) and at the level of everyday life.’¹⁶

The idea that people's attitudes matter to political life is far from new.¹⁷ Almond and Verba's seminal work ‘Civic Culture’ was among the first to scientifically investigate the

Handbook of Feminist Research Theory and Practice. London: SAGE Publications. 154-74. Lutz, Helma, Vivar, Maria Teresa H. and Supik, Linda (2011) *Framing Intersectionality: Debates on a Multi-Faceted Concept in Gender Studies*. Farnham: Ashgate.

¹⁰ Pfau-Effinger, Birgit (1998) "Gender cultures and the gender arrangement—a theoretical framework for cross-national gender research." *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*. vol. 11(2): 147-66.

¹¹ According to Payne, gender ideology refers to ‘the beliefs, values, perceptions, and ideas about the roles of men and women and power relations between them’. Payne, Richard J. (2013) *Global Issues. Politics, Economics, and Culture*. Boston: Pearson. 196. See also: Paxton and Kunovich, "The Importance of Ideology". Davis and Greenstein, "Gender Ideology".

¹² According to Hofstede, ‘a *stereotype* (the word derives from the printing industry) is a fixed notion about persons in a certain category, with no distinctions made among individuals.’ Hofstede, Geert (2001) *Culture's Consequences 2nd edition. Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 14.

¹³ According to Rokeach, attitudes are defined as ‘a relatively enduring organization of beliefs around an object or situation pre-disposing one to respond in some preferential manner.’ Rokeach (1972) cited in Hofstede, Geert (1998) "Attitudes, Values and Organizational Culture: Disentangling the Concepts." *Organization Studies*. vol. 19(3): 477-92. 478. Bolzendahl, Catherine and Myers, Daniel J. (2004) "Feminist Attitudes and Support for Gender Equality: Opinion Change in Women and Men, 1974-1998." *Social Forces*. vol. 83(2): 759-89.

¹⁴ Schnittker et al. point out that it is difficult to adequately define ‘*feminist attitudes*’ because ‘the ideological components of a feminist identity remain a matter of debate, and the meaning of “feminist” itself is unsettled.’ Schnittker, Jason, Freese, Jeremy and Powell, Brian (2003) "Who Are Feminists and What Do They Believe? The Role of Generations." *American Sociological Review*. vol. 68(4): 607-22. 608.

¹⁵ Davis and Greenstein, "Gender Ideology", 88.

¹⁶ Pfau-Effinger, Birgit (2011). "Family Childcare in the Cultural and Institutional Context of European Societies." In: Pfau-Effinger, Birgit. *Care Between Work and Welfare in European Societies*. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 35-51. 50. She defines culture ‘as the “system of collective constructions of meaning by which human beings define reality. It includes stocks of knowledge, values and ideals – in sum: ideas.’

¹⁷ The idea that values matter in politics dates back to thinkers such as Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. For a brief discussion of Durkheim and Weber, see Ruggie, John Gerard (1998) "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge." *International Organization*. vol. 52(4): 855-85. See also: Marsh, David (1971) "Political Socialization: the Implicit Assumptions Questioned."

role of citizens' views on 'political objects' in different democratic systems.¹⁸ The authors studied social norms in terms of citizens' 'feelings and value orientations' toward the political system, parties, bureaucracies, as well as toward themselves as citizens.¹⁹ While Almond and Verba highlighted sex differences in political culture in general, they placed little emphasis on the underlying explanations for (and the gender biases of) their findings.²⁰ In this thesis, I apply the concept of political culture, defined by Dalton as 'a mix of attitudes and orientations' which 'tell citizens what is expected of them, and what they expect of themselves' and which 'shape citizens' political behaviour'²¹ to citizens' views on gender.²² Underlying this application is the feminist notion that the private is political, that citizens' attitudes not only toward 'political objects' but also towards gender might influence their political behaviour (see section 8.2.6 in the appendix for a short discussion). As such, gender culture gives expression to attitudes and norms regarding gender roles which shape citizens' social identities and expectations as well as their political behaviour.

I am particularly interested in the effect of *traditional* gender attitudes on citizens' participation. By traditional, I mean those views and beliefs, which are essentialist in character in that they assign certain traits or roles of responsibility predominantly to one sex.²³ In Western cultures for instance, it is often assumed that women should be the main carers for children, relatives, and the home, whereas men should secure the

British Journal of Political Science. vol. 1(4): 453-65. 456. Oorschot, Wim van, Opielka, Michael and Pfau-Effinger, Birgit (2008). "The Culture of the Welfare State: historical and theoretical arguments." In: Oorschot, Wim van, et al. *Culture and Welfare State. Values and Social Policy in Comparative Perspective*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 1-26. 3.

¹⁸ Almond and Verba define the term 'civic culture' as 'a participant political culture in which the political culture and political structure are congruent.' Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney (1963) *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 30. See also: Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney (1989) *The Civic Culture Revisited*. London: Sage. 26.

¹⁹ Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture Revisited*, 27.

²⁰ See Campbell for a detailed critique of Almond and Verba's analysis of sex differences in their work. Campbell, *Gender and the Vote in Britain*, 36-42.

²¹ Dalton, Russell J. (2008) "Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation." *Political Studies*. vol. 56(1): 76-98. 78.

²² There are many parallels between research on gender socialisation and the much older scholarly field of political socialisation. Both approaches assume that opinions and attitudes held by individuals impact 'the operation of a nation's government and political life.' Marsh, "Political Socialization", 456.

²³ Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences*, 280.

financial income of the family.²⁴ Equally, traditional images of masculinity are commonly associated with attributes such as strength, competitiveness, ambition, self-sufficiency, and rationality, while femininity is usually associated with emotions, sympathy, kindness, and dependency.²⁵

One of the domains in which traditional gender role attitudes come clearly into view is in people's and indeed government's expectations toward family and care work, parenthood, and sexuality.²⁶ As we shall see, analysing political structures such as welfare state policies on the basis of underlying gender role norms can be highly insightful because it reveals the ways in which legislation incentivises certain types of behaviour with regards to these activities. This highlights the social expectations towards men and women and the types of social arrangements that are valued most by governments. It is all the more surprising then that relatively few studies have tried to quantitatively investigate this relationship.

This is not to deny that a great amount of research exists on the determinants of gender ideology and gender attitude change in general (for a detailed discussion, see section 8.2.7 in the appendix).²⁷ However, studies have mostly focused on micro-level factors, such as sex, family background, education, employment, religiosity, media exposure, or age. Many questions on how gender attitudes evolve and why they may differ between

²⁴ Loc. cit.

²⁵ Robert Connell's work on 'hegemonic masculinity' constitutes an important study on masculinity among the many works focusing primarily on female constructions of gender. 'Hegemonic masculinity', according to Connell, consigns the ways in which ideal forms of masculinity are socially and culturally constructed in opposition to various devalued constructions of masculinities and femininities. Connell, *Gender and Power*, 186. See also: Heilman, Madeline E. (2001) "Description and Prescription: How Gender Stereotypes Prevent Women's Ascent Up The Organizational Ladder." *Journal of Social Issues*. vol. 57(4): 657-74. 662.

²⁶ Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, (2011) "Neue Wege - Gleiche Chancen. Gleichstellungsbericht von Frauen und Männern im Lebensverlauf. Erster Gleichstellungsbericht " Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag 17. Wahlperiode.

²⁷ See for example: Thornton, Arland, Alwin, Duane F. and Camburn, Donald (1983) "Causes and Consequences of Sex-Role Attitudes and Attitude Change." *American Sociological Review*. vol. 48(2): 211-27. Banaszak, Lee Ann and Plutzer, Eric (1993) "Contextual Determinants of Feminist Attitudes: National and Subnational Influences in Western Europe." *The American Political Science Review*. vol. 87(1): 145-57. Amato, Paul R. and Booth, Alan (1995) "Changes in Gender Role Attitudes and Perceived Marital Quality." *American Sociological Review*. vol. 60(1): 58-66. Baxter and Kane, "A Cross-National Analysis of Gender Inequality and Gender Attitudes". Moen, Phyllis, Erickson, Mary Ann and Dempster-McClain, Donna (1997) "Their Mother's Daughters? The Intergenerational Transmission of Gender Attitudes in a World of Changing Roles." *Journal of Marriage and Family*. vol. 59(2): 281-93. Bolzendahl and Myers, "Feminist Attitudes and Support for Gender Equality". Davis and Greenstein, "Gender Ideology". Seguino, Stephanie (2011) "Help or Hindrance? Religion's Impact on Gender Inequality in Attitudes and Outcomes." *World Development*. vol. 39(8): 1308-21.

citizens of different countries have not yet been exhaustively explored. In particular, little is known about the role of the political system and the long-term effects of institutions on gender culture and cultural change.²⁸ Indeed, there appears to be a gulf between qualitative macro-level studies on gender regimes and political structures on the one hand and quantitative micro-level studies on social, socio-economic, and demographic gender attitude determinants on the other. One of the main research questions of this thesis seeks to address this by testing existing research on both gender attitude determinants and on institutional approaches to studies of political behaviour.

2.2 Gender Regimes and Welfare State Typologies

Institutionalists²⁹ argue that citizens' attitudes, expectations, and behaviour are shaped by the political structures that surround them.³⁰ As Anderson elaborates in the Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour,

‘people do not live in a vacuum. They form attitudes and make choices in variable environments, which come in the form of formal institutional rules that govern people's behavior or in the form of differential economic, social, and political conditions that shape people's interpretations and actions.’³¹

Institutions or political structures are defined in this thesis as ‘any socially imposed constrain upon human behaviour.’³² While some scholars include in this definition informal constraints ‘such as widely accepted norms of behaviour,’³³ I distinguish

²⁸ Banaszak, "Citizens' Attitudes toward Women's Roles in Germany", 30, 34.

²⁹ The theory of institutionalism looks at the dynamics of political life ‘in terms of the formal political organizations, as well as the informal patterns of behaviour, that shape the perceptions and decisions of political actors that, in turn, influence the outcomes of political actions.’ Krook, Mona Lena and Squires, Judith (2006) "Gender Quotas in British Politics: Multiple Approaches and Methods in Feminist Research." *British Politics*. vol. 1(1): 44-66. 53.

³⁰ In his seminal work ‘Making Democracy Work’, Putnam, citing March and Olsen (1989), reiterates, that “‘institutions affect... the common aspirations of political community, the shared language, understanding, and norms of the community, and the meaning of concepts like democracy, justice, liberty, and equality.’” Putnam, *Making democracy work*, 17.

³¹ Anderson, J. Christopher (2007). "The Interaction of Structures and Voter Behaviour." In: Dalton, Russell J. and Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*. online resource. Oxford: Oxford University Press. no page number (online resource).

³² Loc. cit.

³³ Krook and Squires, "Gender Quotas in British Politics", 53.

between formal political institutions and norms, the latter being addressed through the concept of gender culture as defined above. Specifically, much of the analysis of institutions in this thesis will focus on social policies. Proponents of the idea of ‘political socialisation’³⁴ or ‘institutional learning’ argue that individuals adopt those ‘values and norms which a political system instils’ in them.³⁵ Not only do institutions influence people’s ways of thinking about society, they also determine citizens’ freedom of manoeuvre within it.³⁶

Political scientist Robert Rohrschneider was among the first to test the theory of institutional learning in the context of unified Germany. Rohrschneider interviewed East and West German political elites in the 1990s and showed that their democratic understanding and their attitudes toward the political system were shaped by the socialist and liberal democratic regimes through which they were respectively socialised.³⁷ The separation and re-unification of Germany has been used as a case study in a number of other insightful research papers on institutional learning and political socialisation.³⁸ Yet, like Rohrschneider’s work, many of the existing studies (on Germany and other countries) focus on the relationship between political institutions and political or

³⁴ Merelman defines [political socialisation] as “the process by which people acquire relatively enduring orientations towards politics in general and towards their own political system.” Cited in Neundorff, "Growing up on Different Sides of the Wall", 207.

³⁵ Verba (1965) cited in Rohrschneider, Robert (1996) "Institutional Learning versus Value Diffusion: The Evolution of Democratic Values among Parliamentarians in Eastern and Western Germany." *The Journal of Politics*. vol. 58(2): 422-46. 424.

³⁶ Henninger, Annette and Ostendorf, Helga (2005) *Die politische Steuerung des Geschlechterregimes. Beiträge zur Theorie politischer Institutionen*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 18. See also: Putnam, *Making democracy work*, 7-8. Powell, Bingham G. and Whitten, Guy D. (1993) "A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context." *American Journal of Political Science*. vol. 37(2): 391-414. Putnam and Powell and Whitten were among the first to show empirically how institutions affect citizens’ political attitudes and behaviour.

³⁷ Rohrschneider, Robert (1994) "Report from the Laboratory: The Influence of Institutions on Political Elites' Democratic Values in Germany." *Ibid.* vol. 88(4): 927-41. For other studies on institutional learning that utilise the case study of German unification, see also: Alesina and Fuchs-Schündel, "The Effect of Communism on People’s Preferences". Easterlin, Richard A. and Plagnol, Anke C. (2008) "Life satisfaction and economic conditions in East and West Germany pre- and post-unification." *Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization*. vol. 68(3-4): 433-44. Neundorff, "Growing up on Different Sides of the Wall".

³⁸ See for example: Finkel, Steven E., Humphries, Stan and Opp, Karl-Dieter (2001) "Socialist Values and Development of Democratic Support in the Former East Germany." *International Political Science Review*. vol. 22(4): 339-61. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündel, "The Effect of Communism on People’s Preferences". Neundorff, "Growing up on Different Sides of the Wall".

economic attitudes,³⁹ participation,⁴⁰ preferences,⁴¹ or ideological self-placement.⁴² In this thesis, I apply the institutional learning model to gender in order to further explore the degree to which social policies shape citizens' attitudes toward gender roles.⁴³

A number of scholars have investigated welfare state systems from a gender perspective.⁴⁴ The general argument they put forward is that welfare state policies (especially social, marriage, family, and labour laws) create institutional incentives for the division of paid and unpaid work between men and women, by regulating the labour market, education and healthcare, political and bureaucratic structures, and by determining how state resources are distributed among different sections of society.⁴⁵ Policies, these scholars suggest, therefore tell us much about how gender is defined and

³⁹ Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*. Rohrschneider, "Institutional Learning versus Value Diffusion". Neundorf, Anja (2010) "Democracy in Transition: A Micro perspective on System Change in Post-Socialist Societies." *Ibid.* vol. 72(4): 1096-108.

⁴⁰ Jackman, Robert W. (1987) "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies." *American Political Science Review*. vol. 81(2): 405-23.

⁴¹ Alesina and Fuchs-Schündel, "The Effect of Communism on People's Preferences"; Corneo, Giacomo and Grüner, Hans Peter (2002) "Individual preferences for political redistribution." *Journal of Public Economics*. vol. 83(1): 83-107. Fuchs-Schündel and Schündel, "On the endogeneity of political preferences".

⁴² Neundorf, "Growing up on Different Sides of the Wall".

⁴³ Banaszak as well as Bauernschuster and Rainer must be credited for having first explored this link in the German context. See: Banaszak, "Citizens' Attitudes toward Women's Roles in Germany". Bauernschuster, Stefan and Rainer, Helmut (2010) "From Politics to the Family: How Sex-Role Attitudes Keep on Diverging in Reunified Germany." *CE/SIFO Working Paper*. vol. 2957: 1-29. Bauernschuster and Rainer, "How sex-role attitudes continue to differ in reunified Germany".

⁴⁴ See for example: Esping-Andersen, *The Incomplete Revolution*, 14. Bussemaker, Jet and Van Kersbergen, Kees (1994). "Gender and Welfare States: Some Theoretical Reflections." In: Sainsbury, Diane. *Gendering Welfare States*. London: SAGE. 8-25. Daly, Mary C. (2000) *The gender division of welfare: the impact of the British and German welfare states*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lewis, Jane (2002) "Gender and welfare state change." *European Societies*. vol. 4(4): 331-57. ; Ostner, Ilona (1994) "Back to the Fifties: Gender and Welfare in Unified Germany." *Social Politics*. vol. 1: 32-59. Dackweiler, Regina-Maria (2005). "Die Konstruktion von Geschlechter-Wirklichkeit durch den Wohlfahrtsstaat." In: Henninger, Annette and Ostendorf, Helga. *Die politische Steuerung des Geschlechterregimes*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 75-92. 79. In Germany, the first national report on gender equality commissioned by the Federal Ministry for Family, Women, Youth, and Senior Citizens dedicated an entire chapter to relationship between gender role norms and political institutions. See: Bundesministerium für Familie, "Erster Gleichstellungsbericht", 53-84.

⁴⁵ As March and Olsen write, "actions taken within and by political institutions change the distribution of political interests, resources, and rules by creating new actors with criteria of success and failure, by constructing rules for appropriate behaviour, and by endowing some individuals, rather than others, with authority and other types of resources." March and Olsen (1989) cited in Putnam, *Making democracy work*, 17.

reinforced by the state and how social hierarchies between men and women are challenged or maintained.⁴⁶

Various typologies have been developed to define, analyse, and compare welfare states in this way. The most influential categorisations of so-called *gender regimes* emerged in the early 1990s through the feminist adaptation of Esping-Andersen's 'welfare regime typology'.⁴⁷ On its basis, and with reference to the main source of family income, Lewis and Ostner proposed a gender regime classification of strong, modified or weak male-breadwinner (or dual breadwinner) states.⁴⁸ According to Esping-Andersen, Lewis and Ostner, and others,⁴⁹ former West Germany constitutes a model of the conservative welfare state or male-breadwinner regime. Such systems, von Wahl points out, are typically characterised by 'low levels of women's employment, high rates of low paying part-time work, low involvement in care work by fathers, a severe lack of extended

⁴⁶ Lombardo, Emanuela, Meier, Petra and Verloo, Mieke (2009) *The Discursive Politics of Gender Equality*. Oxon: Routledge. 12-13.

⁴⁷ Esping-Andersen tried to determine how social policy frameworks differed between countries and what effects these differences had. He distinguished between three types of welfare regimes: the social democratic welfare regime (typical of Scandinavian countries), the conservative/corporatist welfare regime (for example Germany and France), and the liberal welfare state regime (United States). Esping-Andersen, Gosta (1990) *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Betzelt points out that 'while early conceptualisations [of welfare state regimes] only referred to welfare state regulations with respect to labour market participation and social security of women, (...) the gender regime approach (...) embraces non-state actors and other policy fields too, and apart from political institutions, economic and cultural factors are also included as components of gender regimes.' Betzelt, Sigrid (2007) "Gender Regimes: ein ertragreiches Konzept für die komparative Forschung; Literaturstudie." *Zentrum für Sozialpolitik (ZeS) Arbeitspapier*. vol. 12/2007. See also: Pfau-Effinger, "Family Childcare in the Cultural and Institutional Context", 148. And Sainsbury, Diane (1999) *Gender and welfare state regimes*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. xiv, 293 p.

⁴⁸ Lewis, Jane (1992) "Gender and the development of welfare regimes." *Journal of European Social Policy*. vol. 2(3). Lewis, Jane and Ostner, Ilona (1994) "Gender and the evolution of European social policy." University of Bremen: Centre for Social Policy Research. There exist a number of different classifications. For example, in his article 'Theorizing European Gender Systems', Duncan evaluates what he identifies as three ways in which European gender systems have been theorised in the literature: 'gendered welfare modelling' (which compares feminist critiques of welfare state analyses), 'differentiated patriarchy' (which takes account of national differences in gender inequality by applying the concept of patriarchy), and 'gender contract' (which seeks to account for persistent gender inequalities in countries where considerable advances have already been made with respect to gender progressive and women friendly welfare legislation). Duncan argues that the 'gender contract' approach is best suited for analysing gender systems. Gender contracts are specific to each society depending on the particular historical route each country has followed in the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society. Duncan, "Theorizing European Gender Systems", 265, 72.

⁴⁹ See for example: Hohnerlein, Eva Maria and Blenk-Knocke (2008). "Einführung." In: Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend. *Rollenleitbilder und -realitäten in Europa: rechtliche, ökonomische und kulturelle Dimensionen*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag. 13-18.

childcare infrastructure (...), and high poverty rates among single mothers.⁵⁰ The former GDR, by contrast, has been classified as a dual-breadwinner state, characterised by high female full time employment and an extensive state-subsidised childcare infrastructure. After unification, the West German welfare state model was largely rolled out to the East German states. Since then, consecutive German governments have passed various different policies supporting either the dual- or single-breadwinner models. The ideological justifications for (and the tensions arising from) this rather inconsistent policy strategy will be discussed in greater detail in chapters 3 and 6.

Gender regime classifications provide a useful analytical tool with which to frame the comparison of welfare structures in former East and West and in unified Germany. It is important to stress, however, that the relationship between institutions and gender norms is intricate and complex. Institutions mirror and ‘reinforce the societal norms and the ecological conditions that led to their establishment’⁵¹ and they evolve according to the needs and priorities of states and their citizens or in accordance with dominant ideological doctrines at particular points in time.⁵² As Pfau-Effinger argues, culture is both shaped by and reflected in these institutions.⁵³ This plausibly constitutes an important reason for why the analysis of gender culture and social policies is still relatively underdeveloped in the social sciences.⁵⁴ Many point out that it is difficult if not impossible to distinguish clearly the effects of gender culture from the historic, institutional and socio-economic environment in which gender culture is embedded, and

⁵⁰ Von Wahl, Angelika (2014) "Moving a Mountain: Women Voters, Women Leaders, and the Male Breadwinner Model in Germany." *Paper presented at the Max Weber Conference*. Center for European and Mediterranean Studies, New York University. Because the male breadwinner model assigns men the role of the single earner and women the responsibility for domestic house- and care work, women's financial autonomy is severely undermined, as is men's involvement in traditionally 'female' spheres of work. See: Hohnerlein and Blenk-Knocke, "Rollenleitbilder und -realitäten. Einführung", 13.

⁵¹ Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences*, 11. See also: Putnam, *Making democracy work*, 9.

⁵² Anderson writes, that while ‘formal and informal rules affect people's political behavior ... people's preferences, attitudes, and behavior [in turn] affect the establishment and functioning of such rules.’ Anderson, "Structures and Voter Behaviour", no page number given (online resource).

⁵³ According to Pfau-Effinger, it is therefore important not only ‘to systematically include culture’ into the analysis of gender inequality and social polarisation, but also to try to determine how public opinion on gender issues corresponds and relates to the political environment, particularly to social policies. Pfau-Effinger, "Family Childcare in the Cultural and Institutional Context", 148.

⁵⁴ See Oorschot, Opielka and Pfau-Effinger, "The Culture of the Welfare State", 1-2. Reichart-Dreyer, Ingrid (2005). "Relevanz vorherrschender Geschlechterbilder in der Programmarbeit der CDU." In: Henninger, Annette and Ostendorf, Helga. *Die politische Steuerung des Geschlechterregimes*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 57-74. 61.

to draw out how institutions, norms, and actors interrelate to produce certain social outcomes.⁵⁵ The argument put forward in this thesis is that the German case study allows us to disentangle this relationship, as two different gender regimes were imposed by political elites on otherwise similar populations through Germany's separation after World War II. The specific difference between the two systems with regards to gender norms will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. Though I cannot claim to address all problems associated with causal inference, the reliance on the German case nevertheless allows me to make considerable headway in this regard.

Before doing so, I want to turn to the concepts and literature related to my third main research question, which considers the relationship between gender culture and political participation.

2.3 Gender and Political Participation

The question of what constitutes politics and, related to this, political participation, has been the subject of much debate. The very act of defining politics, of specifying the actors, actions and issues associated to this notion, is in itself a political and ideological exercise.⁵⁶ In modern representative democracies, political participation most generally refers to acts of determining who will hold government positions (primarily by means of voting in elections) and of communicating the public's values and opinions to government officials (by means of party membership, participation in demonstrations, citizen initiatives etc.).⁵⁷ In this thesis, I adopt Burn et al.'s definition on political participation as the,

⁵⁵ Fernández highlights the 'difficulty in finding an approach that [is] capable of distinguishing the effects of culture from those of the economic and institutional environment (...).' Fernández, Raquel (2010) "Does Culture Matter?" *NBER Working Paper Series*. vol. 16277. 2.

⁵⁶ Ford, *Women and politics*, 7. Most scholars agree that politics is essentially about power – 'the ability to achieve a desired outcome.' See for example: Heywood, Andrew (2007) *Politics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 11. When we talk about gender gaps in politics, researchers are therefore often concerned about unequal access to decision-making power. Dahrendorf makes an explicit connection between power and social norms. He argues, that 'social stratification rests on power, and so does the entire system of social norms and of the sanctions accompanying them.' Dahrendorf, Ralf (1979) *Life Chances. Approaches to Social and Political Theory*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 48.

⁵⁷ Zukin, Cliff (2006) *A New Engagement? Political Participation, Civic Life and the Changing American Citizen*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3. Representative democracies operate, at least on principle, by

‘activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action – either directly, by affecting the making or implementation of public policy, or indirectly, by influencing the selection of people who make those policies.’⁵⁸

This rather broad definition is particularly suited for research on gender and political participation. It extends to political participation at both the elite and citizen level (i.e. citizen *participation* and elite *representation*),⁵⁹ and it incorporates traditional and non-traditional forms of political engagement. Thus, it caters both to the recent changes in the way mainstream political science conceives of political participation as well as to the more long-standing feminist critiques of the conventional, ‘male focused’ understanding of politics itself. Both are briefly discussed below.

Political participation in Western industrialised democracies has been in a process of transformation. The act of voting⁶⁰ and membership in political parties or party organisations (as well as to a lesser extent membership in voluntary associations) had constituted the principal forms of participation in politics throughout most of the twentieth century.⁶¹ These so-called conventional forms of participation have declined

aggregating ‘public preferences into binding collective decisions.’ Dalton, Russell J. and Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (2007) *The Oxford handbook of political behavior*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1 online resource (xvi, 992 p.). 13.

⁵⁸ Burns, Nancy, Lehman Schlozman, Kay and Verba, Sidney (2001) *The Private Roots of Public Action. Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Harvard: President and Fellows of Harvard College. 4. Also adopted by Ford, *Women and politics*, 91.

⁵⁹ A potentially confusing aspect in the study of gender and political participation is the inconsistent use of the terms *participation* and *representation*. In my thesis, political representation refers to membership and representation in political parties and in democratically elected parliaments (international, national, and regional). Political representation therefore forms a sub-category of political participation rather than a category distinct from it.

⁶⁰ Voting is undoubtedly one of the most important types of political participation in representative democracies. It constitutes the ‘essential source of legitimation for democratic governments.’ Kaase, Max (2007). "Perspectives on Political Participation." In: Dalton, Russell J. and Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 783-. 786. Historically, it was deemed unnecessary that women should have the right to vote, either because they were regarded to be politically disinterested, or because it was assumed that women would merely vote in accordance with their husbands or fathers. A common misconception was that women would not be informed enough to vote or that they would not want to vote at all (this argument being in line with women’s assumed lack of interest in politics which will be discussed later in this thesis). In the later part of the twentieth century, this view was eventually discarded as women turned out to vote in the same numbers as men, demonstrating identifiable political preferences.

⁶¹ Dalton and Klingemann, *The Oxford handbook of political behavior*, 14.

steadily over recent decades.⁶² Most notably, voter turnout and party membership have dropped by up to 10 per cent on average in Western democracies over the course of the past 20 years.⁶³ In Germany, turnout at national elections has dropped from over 88 per cent in 1983 to less than 72 per cent in 2009.⁶⁴ This trend, scholars argue, has been embedded in broader societal and structural changes. The postmaterial value shift⁶⁵ and the decline in 'social capital'⁶⁶ are just two ways in which these structural changes have been described in the literature.

While many observers argue that such downward trends in citizen participation pose challenges to democratic accountability, others suggest that the decline has in fact been counterbalanced by a rise in new or non-traditional forms of participation, such as citizens' involvement in informal local initiatives, internet campaigns and petitions, blogging and consumer boycotts, or participation in transnational advocacy networks.⁶⁷ This process has been described as a shift from conventional ('old') to non-traditional ('new') forms of engagement. While the former have been characterised by collective, ideological, loyalist, and elite-driven types of actions, the latter reflect individual, single-

⁶² Putnam, Robert D. (2000) *Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community*. New York ; London: Simon & Schuster.

⁶³ Blais, André (2007). "Turnout in Elections." In: Dalton, Russell J. and Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 621-36. 624. Moreover, compared to early 20th century levels, citizens in Western societies also appear to be less interested in politics and less likely to be members of unions, associations, or political parties. See: Weichs, Karl and Weßels, Bernhard (2011) "Demokratie und politische Partizipation. Auszug aus dem Datenreport 2011." Wiesbaden: Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt).

⁶⁴ Bundeswahlleiter (Federal Returning Officer) (2013) "Final result of the elections to the 18th German Bundestag." Available from: <http://perma.cc/MT66-KHF3>. Accessed: 29.10. 2013.

⁶⁵ The theory of postmaterialism assumes that when people live in economically prosperous and socially stable conditions, their priorities change from 'materialist' to 'postmaterialist' values. Postmaterialist values include concerns over personal autonomy, self-expression, quality of life, as well as a greater interest in issues such as environmental protection, animal rights, or nuclear disarmament. In postmaterialist societies, traditional views on social morals relating to (for example) marriage and sex are also often being challenged. Inglehart, Ronald (2007). "Postmaterialist Values and the Shift from Survival to Self-Expression Values." In: Dalton, Russell J. and Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 223-39. 223. See also: Heywood, *Politics*, 211.

⁶⁶ Putnam, *Bowling alone*, 19.

⁶⁷ Dalton and Klingemann, *The Oxford handbook of political behavior*, 14. Micheletti, Michele, Follesdal, Andreas and Stolle, Dietlind (2004) *Politics, products, and markets: exploring political consumerism past and present*. London: Transaction Publishers; Strømsnes, K. (2009) "Political Consumerism: A Substitute for or Supplement to Conventional Political Participation?" *Journal of Civil Society*. vol. 5(3): 303-14.

issue, and short-term types of participation.⁶⁸ Interestingly, there exist many parallels between non-traditional citizen engagement theories in mainstream political science and the arguments put forward by feminist political scientists past and present. Gender and feminist research in the 1980s and 90s advocated the need to expand the meaning of political participation 'beyond the traditional scope of electoral, party, or institutional behaviour' and to recognise a greater plethora of non-institutional political activities.⁶⁹ According to proponents of this broader view, women may not necessarily participate less than men (as conventionally assumed), they may merely engage in politics in different ways.⁷⁰ For example, while men are usually more likely to engage in traditional, collective participation (such as party membership or participation in demonstrations), women may be equally or even more likely than men to engage in private, individual types of participation (such as voting, signing petitions or engaging in political consumerism). An initial investigation of the ALLBUS data confirmed this view.⁷¹ Similarly, Montgomery found that women in Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s participated predominantly 'from below the national level and outside of formal arenas, via non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and behind the scenes in party hierarchies.'⁷² There is also often a distinctly gendered dimension to informal participation. For example, Norris and Inglehart observed that more women than men in the United States engage in voluntary and community associations related to traditional

⁶⁸ Dalton and Klingemann, *The Oxford handbook of political behavior*, 14. Strømsnes, "Political Consumerism", 303.

⁶⁹ Coffe, Hilde and Bolzendahl, Catherine (2010) "Same Game, Different Rules? Gender Differences in Political Participation." *Sex Roles*. vol. 62(5-6): 318-33. 330. Ford, *Women and politics*, 6. See also: Geißel, Brigitte (2008). "Partizipation im Kontext. Zur Gendersensiblen und Mainstream-Partizipationsforschung." In: Geißel, Brigitte and Manske, Alexandra. *Kritische Vernunft für demokratische Transformationen. Festschrift für Christine Kulke*. 15-36. 19.

⁷⁰ Stolle, Dietlind, Hooghe, Marc and Micheletti, Michele (2005) "Politics in the Supermarket: Political Consumerism as a Form of Political Participation." *International Political Science Review*. vol. 26(3): 245-69. 258. See also: Welch, Susan (1977) "Women as Political Animals? A Test of Some Explanations for Male-Female Political Participation Differences." *American Journal of Political Science*. vol. 21(4): 711-30. Coffe and Bolzendahl, "Gender Differences in Political Participation", 319. Sapiro, Virginia (1998). "Feminist Studies and Political Science - and Vice Versa." In: Phillips, Anne. *Feminism & Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 78. Hoecker, Beate (1998). "Zwischen Macht und Ohnmacht: Politische Partizipation von Frauen in Deutschland." In: Hoecker, Beate. *Handbuch Politische Partizipation von Frauen in Europa*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. 88.

⁷¹ When I ran regressions with basic socio-economic controls, this did not return statistically significant gender coefficients along a range of non-conventional participation variables (such as signing petitions, participating in boycotts or partaking in citizen initiatives).

⁷² Montgomery, Kathleen A. (2003). "Introduction." In: Matland, Richard E. and Montgomery, Kathleen A. *Women's Access to Political Power in Post-Communist Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1-18. 4.

female roles, such as healthcare, childcare, education, and environmental issues.⁷³ In West Germany, similarly, over 80 per cent of volunteers for social causes were female in the early 1990s.⁷⁴

In general however, there exists considerable disagreement over the ‘usefulness, success, and general implications for politics and society’⁷⁵ of the study of non-conventional types of political participation. Preliminary research suggests that only those who already engage in conventional political activities are also active through alternative forms of political participation. From this point of view, political participation has not undergone so much of a transformation as an expansion. Moreover, interesting and informative though the study of non-traditional forms of participation is, it is important to remember that, as Montgomery argues, political power in modern democracies still resides mainly ‘in formal institutions’.⁷⁶ Indeed, the most significant political decisions affecting states and their citizens are still made principally in parliaments by representatives who are chosen through popular vote. In most Western democracies, these representatives are primarily drawn from political parties, unified Germany being a pivotal case in point.

Germany is a party democracy (a *Parteiendemokratie* or *Parteienstaat*) in which the role of parties as the country’s principal political actors is constitutionally enshrined.⁷⁷ Coalition governments at both the state and national level are the norm.⁷⁸ In effect, this means that individuals wishing to influence political life or governmental decisions-making at the local, regional, and national level will almost necessarily have to join a political party. The same applies to citizens aspiring to a political career. This perception was strongly

⁷³ Norris, Pippa and Inglehart, Ronald (2006). "Gendering Social Capital: Bowling in Women's Leagues?" In: O'Neill, Brenda Lee and Gidengil, Elisabeth. *Gender and social capital*. New York; London: Routledge. 73-98.

⁷⁴ Cornelissen, Waltraud (1993). "Politische Partizipation von Frauen in der alten Bundesrepublik und im vereinten Deutschland." In: Helwig, Gisela and Nickel, Hildegard Maria. *Frauen in Deutschland 1945-1992*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. 321-49. 329.

⁷⁵ Micheletti, Follesdal and Stolle, *Politics, products, and markets*, xv.

⁷⁶ Montgomery, "Women's Access to Political Power in Post-Communist Europe", 4.

⁷⁷ Article 21 of the Basic Law states that, ‘political parties shall participate in the formation of the political will of the people. They may be freely established. Their internal organization must conform to democratic principles...’

⁷⁸ As Gallagher and colleagues point out, ‘the last occasion on which a single party secured an overall majority in the Bundestag was in 1957.’ Gallagher, Michael, Laver, Michael and Mair, Peter (2011) *Representative Government in Modern Europe*. New York: McGraw-Hill. 204.

reflected in the interviews with German members of parliament, most of whom considered interest in formal politics, voting, and party membership to be the defining and constitutive features of political participation in Germany ('I do think that political participation happens mainly through political parties').⁷⁹ Moreover, any scholarly interest in women's underrepresentation in parliaments is also fundamentally linked to party membership since parties are the main gatekeepers to political power. In the absence of binding quotas, women's underrepresentation at the party grassroots level translates into their underrepresentation as candidates in regional and national elections, in party positions, and finally, women's underrepresentation in parliaments themselves. Though it can be helpful to pay attention to how men and women participate in different political activities, existing gulfs in access to political decision-making power between men and women are therefore played out and come most clearly into view by looking at gender dynamics of political parties. This is where the focus of chapter 4 of this thesis lies. By way of reiteration, the overarching research question for this part of the thesis concerns the role played by traditional gender norms on women's likelihood to engage in politics.

Much of the existing literature on gender and political participation and representation has focused on trying to explain why women participate less or are represented in parliaments in fewer numbers than men. The following section provides a summary of the most commonly cited and studied reasons for these phenomena. In addition, there are a number of specific historical factors relevant to analysing political participation in unified Germany. These will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3.

Causes for gender gaps in politics have been variously categorised into social, economic, institutional, and cultural determinants, or in terms of demand and supply side factors.⁸⁰ Table 2 gives a general overview of the different theories and frameworks. It is important to note that they are not mutually exclusive and indeed often analysed jointly, and that it is often difficult to isolate the particular effects on which they focus:

⁷⁹ Interview 15, CDU, Male, East German, 2013. Original quote: 'Die politische Beteiligung denke ich schon, findet im Wesentlichen über die Parteien statt.'

⁸⁰ See for instance: Pateman, *The sexual contract*; Norris and Lovenduski, *Gender, Race and Class in British Parliament*, 93ff. Brady, Verba and Lehman Schlozman, "A resource model of political participation". Hoecker, *Handbuch Politische Partizipation von Frauen in Europa*. Kenworthy and Malami, "Gender Inequality in Political Representation". Norris, "New Feminist Challenges to the Study of Political Engagement", 730. Matland and Montgomery, "Recruiting Women to National Legislatures", 18.

Feminist political theorists propose that women’s exclusion from politics begins at an abstract level. Scholars such as Okin, Elshtain, and Pateman argue that politics — not only as a social practice but also as a school of thought – has historically been considered a male activity, marginalising women’s points of view and women’s stakes in politics.⁸¹ Indeed, Squires suggests that politics has ‘been the most explicitly masculine human activity of all.’⁸² This body of thought is known as feminist political philosophy (see Table 2).

Table 2 Theoretical Approaches to Studying Gender and Political Participation

Theories	Analytical Approach	Literature
Feminist Political Theories	Political thought and political institutions (parties and governments) draw on male pointed of view - politics defined as a male sphere of activity.	Okin 1980 Elshtain 1981 Pateman 1988 Phillips 1998
Institutional Theories	Type of electoral system (proportional/FPTP) matters Role of parties as gatekeepers to political power Role of positive discrimination measures (e.g. quotas or gender mainstreaming)	Rule 1987, 1994 Norris 1985, 2007 Matland 2003 Davidson-Schmich 2010
Socio-Economic Theories	Role of resources (e.g. time, money, social status, networks) to participate in politics (Gender specific division of work and women’s low socio-economic status prevents them from participating politically in equal numbers to men)	Welch 1977 Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 2001
Cultural Theories	Political cultures construct politics as male sphere of activity that requires male traits Role of gender socialisation and gender norms in de-incentivising women from participating politically	Sapiro 1983 Norris and Inglehart 2003 Paxton and Kunovich 2003

Source: Adapted from Geißel, “Partizipation im Kontext”, 23. With my own additions and alterations.

⁸¹ Okin, Susan Moller (1980) *Women in Western political thought*. London: Virago. Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1981) *Public man, private woman: women in social and political thought*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pateman, *The sexual contract*.

⁸² Squires, Judith (2000) *Gender in Political Theory*. Cambridge: Polity Press. 1.

Empirical research on gender gaps in political representation often highlights the dynamics of supply and demand.⁸³ Supply side factors relate to women's access to socio-economic resources and their effects on political engagement. They also refer to the cultural and sociological factors that can influence women's decision as to whether and how to participate in politics. Demand side dynamics on the other highlight the role of institutions and political structures, and the cultural context that makes it more or less likely for men and women to be encouraged (by family members, voters, or party leaders) or chosen (by the electorate) to participate in politics.⁸⁴ In this thesis, I am interested primarily in the relationship between traditional gender norms and their effects on the supply side.⁸⁵ However, as I just noted, it is not possible or even useful to keep demand and supply side approaches strictly apart and the reader is advised to view this differentiation as a logical aid rather than a rigid dichotomy. As Matland argues, 'it's the *interaction* of institutions, supply, and demand that ultimately determines how many women sit in parliament.'⁸⁶

A frequently cited prerequisite for political participation is a minimum level of political interest.⁸⁷ A number of studies suggest that women participate less in politics simply because of 'lower levels of political information, interest, and efficacy.'⁸⁸ Verba, Burns, and Schlozman for example argue that gender differences in participation disappear 'when differences in political interest, information, and efficacy are taken into account.'⁸⁹ Most research on the topic affirms that women are on average significantly less likely to be interested in politics than men.⁹⁰ Yet it is not sufficient to show that women

⁸³ See for example: Norris and Lovenduski, *Gender, Race and Class in British Parliament*. Norris, "New Feminist Challenges to the Study of Political Engagement", 730. See also: Matland and Montgomery, "Recruiting Women to National Legislatures", 18.

⁸⁴ Norris, "New Feminist Challenges to the Study of Political Engagement", 730.

⁸⁵ There are a number of interesting studies, primarily from the US, on the relationship between gender stereotypes and demand side factors in political representation (such as voter support). Recent research has found little or no evidence that women are disadvantaged in terms of their chances of being elected. See for example: Jordan Brooks, *He Runs, She Runs*.

⁸⁶ Matland and Montgomery, "Recruiting Women to National Legislatures", 26.

⁸⁷ Geißel, "Partizipation im Kontext", 24.

⁸⁸ Coffe and Bolzendahl, "Gender Differences in Political Participation", 320.

⁸⁹ Verba, Sidney, Burns, Nancy and Schlozman, Kay Lehman (1997) "Knowing and Caring about Politics: Gender and Political Engagement." *The Journal of Politics*. vol. 59(4): 1051-72. 1053.

⁹⁰ Ford, *Women and politics*, 96.

participate less in politics *because* they are less interested in it or because they impart less trust in governments, parties, or politicians. This is as insightful as demonstrating that women are less likely to be convicted of violent crimes because they are less violent. It has also been suggested that the relationship between (women's) political interest and political participation may not be as clear-cut and straightforward as most quantitative researchers imply. An important aspect often overlooked by data analysts is that the operationalisation of 'political interest' is rather vague and that the term is likely to be interpreted in different ways by male and female survey participants.⁹¹ Feminist scholars have argued that there exist underlying terminological biases, which negatively skew the perception and self-reported levels of political interest among men and women. Survey respondents, these scholars suggest, generally understand political interest to mean interest in institutional, traditional forms of politics.⁹² Citizens engaging in activities such as environmental or civic rights activism may therefore be less inclined to self-identify as politically interested.⁹³ When questions aimed at tapping levels of psychological engagement in politics are re-phrased into questions on respondents' concerns over specific social or political issues, gender gaps in responses have shown to decrease noticeably or even to disappear altogether.⁹⁴ This phenomenon would support the argument that part of the gender gap problem in politics is linked to perceptions and socialisation.⁹⁵ If women consider politics to be a 'male' activity or topic area, it would follow that they may simply not perceive their own interests and opinions to be 'political.' This would also decrease their likelihood to engage in formal politics as a means to address issues important to them. As such, women's reported lack of political interest should be viewed as a variant of the gender gap in political participation, rather than as one of its determinants.

Institutional theories are a second set of approaches to studying gender and political participation. They often emphasise the role of electoral systems. Many cross-country

⁹¹ Brady defines political interest as 'a standard measure of psychological engagement in politics.' This definition, however, does not specify what topics and issues count as 'political'. Brady, Verba and Lehman Schlozman, "A resource model of political participation", 271-72.

⁹² Sauer (1994) cited in Geißel, "Partizipation im Kontext", 24.

⁹³ Loc. cit.

⁹⁴ Lovenduski (1986) cited in Fuchs, Gesine (2000). "Feministische Partizipationsforschung." In: Braun, Kathrin. *Feministische Perspektiven der Politikwissenschaft*. München: Oldenbourg Verlag. 254-68. 156.

⁹⁵ Coffe and Bolzendahl, "Gender Differences in Political Participation", 319-20.

comparisons show that the type of the electoral system is one of the most consistently significant explanatory factors for women's representation in legislatures.⁹⁶ In particular, representational voting systems make a higher representation of women in parliaments most likely.⁹⁷ Simple majority or so-called first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems such as those in the United Kingdom on the other hand usually advantage the (often male) incumbents in re-election and therefore make it more difficult for women to enter parliaments in the short term.⁹⁸ On the national level, unified Germany operates with a mixed-member proportional voting system in which half of the seats in parliament are allocated to district representatives who are elected through a simple majority of votes (FPTP). The other half of parliamentary seats are allocated to candidates from state party lists proportionately to the votes received from each party in the respective state. Each voter thus casts two votes at German national elections. The importance of the type of voting system for the representation of women is highlighted by the fact in the two most recent German general elections alone, more than two thirds of all female MPs were recruited to the Bundestag through party lists (i.e. proportional representation).⁹⁹ In cross-national statistical analyses, it is therefore essential to control for the type of electoral system as it can account for a considerable proportion of variation in the data.

A further set of explanations for gender gaps in politics focuses on social structures and economic assets (supply side determinants). They highlight the effect of 'civic resources

⁹⁶ Montgomery, "Women's Access to Political Power in Post-Communist Europe", 5. See in particular: Norris, "Women's legislative participation in Western Europe". Rule, Wilma (1987) "Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors and Women's Opportunity for Election to Parliament in Twenty-Three Democracies." *The Western Political Quarterly*. vol. 40(3): 477-98. ; Rule, Wilma (1994) "Women's Underrepresentation and Electoral Systems." *Political Science and Politics*. vol. 27(4): 689-92.

⁹⁷ Stevens, *Women, power, and politics*, 83.

⁹⁸ Norris, "Women's legislative participation in Western Europe", 98-99. According to Rule, proportional representation systems provide political parties with an 'incentive to place women on their respective lists to broaden appeal. But in single-member districts where only one person is elected, political elites have a disincentive to risk backing a woman candidate.' Rule, "Women's Underrepresentation and Electoral Systems", 690. See also: Matland, Richard E. (1998) "Women's Representation in National Legislatures: Developed and Developing Countries." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. vol. 23(1): 109-25. 112-13.

⁹⁹ Matland and Montgomery, "Recruiting Women to National Legislatures", 26. See also: Rule, "Women's Opportunity for Election to Parliament", 485; Rule, "Women's Underrepresentation and Electoral Systems", 690. McKay, Joanna (2006) "Women in German Politics: Still Jobs for the Boys?" *German Politics*. vol. 31(1): 56-80. 58. Davidson-Schmich, *A Glass Half Full*. Matland and Montgomery further note that other factors such as district size can also affect women's chances to be elected into parliament: 'when district magnitude increases, the chances that a party will win several seats in the district increases. When a party expects to win several seats, party leaders are much more conscious of trying to balance their tickets.' Matland and Montgomery, "Recruiting Women to National Legislatures", 27.

of time, money, knowledge and skills' on political participation.¹⁰⁰ On the whole, these resources are unequally distributed between men and women. For instance, employment has been shown to be positively correlated with formal political participation in general,¹⁰¹ but fewer women than men are in full-time employment. If women do work outside the home, they are more likely to be employed in less prestigious and lower paid professions. In consequence, women experience less public exposure¹⁰² and have command of fewer economic resources – all of which have been cited as common prerequisites for institutional political participation.¹⁰³

At the same time, it has been argued that women also have fewer possibilities to participate in politics. Statistically speaking, women carry the main responsibility for domestic work and child rearing. They therefore often lack either the time or the flexibility needed to be politically active, especially if they also pursue paid employment. Local party politics, for instance, often takes place in the form of evening meetings when it is difficult for many women – if they have small children – to leave the home. Related to this, Schlozman and colleagues' found that an increase in hours of paid work decreases the likelihood of women to participate politically, while it has no negative effect on the likelihood of men's participation.

A number of other socio-economic factors have been identified to correlate with political participation. These factors include education, marital status, religiosity, ethnicity, partisanship, access to social networks, and parental background. Education has been shown to have a particularly strong positive effect on different forms of political

¹⁰⁰ Norris and Inglehart, "Gendering Social Capital", 78. These factors have been identified to correlate not only with *women's* participation, but also with citizen's participation in general. Yet, as Matland points out, women as a group 'typically have access to less power and fewer resources' than men. Matland and Montgomery, "Recruiting Women to National Legislatures", 22. See also: Brady, Verba and Lehman Schlozman, "A resource model of political participation", 271.

¹⁰¹ Brady, Verba and Lehman Schlozman, "A resource model of political participation". Togeby, Lise (1994) "Political Implications of Increasing Numbers of Women in the Labor Force." *Comparative Political Studies*. vol. 27(2): 211-40. Norris, "Women's legislative participation in Western Europe"; Rule, "Women's Opportunity for Election to Parliament".

¹⁰² Public exposure can refer on the one hand to exposure to political discussions, as Welch argues, but also to the visibility of women in public life. Welch, "Women as Political Animals", 715.

¹⁰³ 'Political elites tend to be drawn disproportionately from amongst highly educated, gainfully employed, professional people ... the proportion of such women within the general population determines the size of this 'social eligibility.' Stevens, *Women, power, and politics*, 81. See also: Schlozman, Kay Lehman, Burns, Nancy and Verba, Sidney (1999) "'What Happened at Work Today?': A Multistage Model of Gender, Employment, and Political Participation." *The Journal of Politics*. vol. 61(1): 29-53. 41-42.

engagement among both men and women. In general, the higher the level of education, the more likely individuals are to be interested in or to engage in politics.¹⁰⁴ However, in most Western democracies, overall education levels between men and women have equalised. Indeed, in Germany, women have begun to outperform men in secondary education.¹⁰⁵ As such, with regards to gender gaps in political participation, the explanatory power of education status in countries such as Germany is rather limited.

Two further frequently cited determinants of political participation are marital status and having children. Yet, they may affect men's and women's levels of participation differently. As Coffe and Bolzendahl summarise, marriage and parenthood usually 'have a stronger negative effect among women than among men, for whom marriage may indeed boost participation.'¹⁰⁶ Similar findings have been made with respect to the gender pay gap.¹⁰⁷ The so-called 'fatherhood bonus' and 'motherhood penalty', according to Coffe and Bolzendahl, are linked to traditional gender roles and to the fact that 'women's leisure time declines to a greater extent than men's' after marriage because women spend more time on reproductive work.¹⁰⁸ This argument is supported by the fact that increased reproductive work among women often has a particularly strong negative effect on collective, time-consuming forms of participation.¹⁰⁹ Other socio-economic factors such as living in an urban or rural area, social class, ethnicity or religious denomination have also been shown to correlate with political engagement though there are significant between-country variations in their effects on women.

An important aspect not contained in the list of factors impelling women's participation in politics (Table 2) is the role of individual or collective actors. The suffragettes are a notable example of how a group of individuals succeeded in challenging both institutions and dominant value systems to improve women's access to political power in the early

¹⁰⁴ Nie, Norman H., Junn, Jane and Stehlik-Barry, Kenneth (1996) *Education and Democratic Citizenship in America*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 35ff.

¹⁰⁵ In 2008, 71 per cent of women aged 18 to 26 compared to 63 per cent of men in the same age group had achieved a qualification at the *Hochschul-* or *Realschul-* level. Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office) (2010) "Frauen und Männer in verschiedenen Lebensphasen." Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt.

¹⁰⁶ Rotolo (2000) cited by Coffe and Bolzendahl, "Gender Differences in Political Participation", 321.

¹⁰⁷ Budig, Michelle J. (2014) "The Fatherhood Bonus & the Motherhood Penalty. Parenthood and the Gender Gap in Pay." *Third Way*.

¹⁰⁸ Coffe and Bolzendahl, "Gender Differences in Political Participation", 321.

¹⁰⁹ Loc. cit.

half of the twentieth century. By demanding women's right to vote, the first wave feminist movement undoubtedly brought about a radical change in the way citizenship was legally and popularly perceived at the time.

Arguably the most important collective actors in assisting women's participation in formal politics today are political parties. In Germany as in many other liberal democracies, parties are the main gatekeepers to political power. Without party affiliation and indeed party support, it is almost impossible to be elected to the German Bundestag or federal state parliaments.¹¹⁰ As such, parties are also 'the greatest obstacle to progress' for increasing parliamentary diversity along gender lines.¹¹¹

The most common pathway to the top of politics, particularly in Germany, is by 'working one's way up' within the party. What is also notoriously known as the *Ochsentour* (ox tour) describes the advancement through party ranks at the local, regional, and finally national level. A recent study of female political leaders in Europe found that the 14 women who have headed European states since the end of the World War II accumulated an average of 17 years political experience before taking up the top job.¹¹² Although both men and women have to gain similar levels of experience and go through the same political career stages, the entire process, as Hoecker observes, is nevertheless tailored to typically 'male' life paths, uninterrupted by maternity leave or care work.¹¹³

A number of scholars have also commented on the role of male networks in party politics, which are believed to directly or indirectly exclude women.¹¹⁴ To compensate for these networks and to encourage more women to participate in politics through formal political structures, many parties across Germany and Europe have introduced internal

¹¹⁰ Serving in the German Bundestag is, in practice, almost always conditional on membership in a political party. Although it is possible to stand for election without a party affiliation (though it requires signatures of at least 200 voters in the respective constituency), the last time a person was able to secure a direct Bundestag seat in such a way was in 1949. However, there are several cases of MPs quitting their party while serving in the German Bundestag.

¹¹¹ Stevens, *Women, power, and politics*, 93.

¹¹² CSR-News (2014) "Ministerium für Gedöns - Frauen in der Politik." *CSR-News.net*. 09.08. 2014. Available from: <http://perma.cc/B7QA-D8D4>. Accessed: 09.08. 2014.

¹¹³ Hoecker, "Zwischen Macht und Ohnmacht", 81.

¹¹⁴ For example, see Kreisky, Eva (2000). "Der Stoff, aus dem die Staaten sind. Zur männerbündischen Fundierung politischer Ordnung." In: Braun, Kathrin. *Feministische Perspektiven der Politikwissenschaft, Lehr- und Handbücher der Politikwissenschaft*. München: Oldenbourg.

quotas for placing women on party lists or for nominating women as party candidates.¹¹⁵ In the context of political parties, gender quotas usually refer to party internal agreements for retaining a certain proportion of places (be it party positions or election candidacies) for women, irrespective of the overall number of female party members. To date, internal quotas for women have been the most successful mechanisms for increasing women's representation in formal politics. However, as Davidson-Schmich points out, they have been unable to incentivise 'equal numbers of women and men to join political parties and to aspire to elective office in the first place.'¹¹⁶ This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.¹¹⁷

Crucially, even after controlling for the socio-economic or demographic differences reviewed above, researchers still cannot entirely account for the persistence of gender gaps in political participation. They therefore often refer to a final, *cultural*, obstacle for women in politics.

2.3.1 Gender Culture and Political Participation

'A democratic form of participatory political system,' Almond and Verba attest, 'requires ... a political culture consistent with it.'¹¹⁸ Cultural theories, Norris summarises, 'emphasise the attitudes and values that people bring to civic engagement, social networks, community activism, including prior motivational interests and ideological beliefs.'¹¹⁹ If certain gender characteristics or roles of responsibility are predominantly associated with certain types of activities, this is likely to create an environment in which men or women are more or less inclined to engage in them.¹²⁰ In analysing contemporary

¹¹⁵ See IDEA (2013) "QuotaProject: Global Database of Quotas for Women." *Stockholm University and Inter-Parliamentary Union*. Available from: <http://perma.cc/7K82-MDRT>. Accessed: 01.05. 2014.

¹¹⁶ Davidson-Schmich, *A Glass Half Full*, cited from manuscript. See also: Kolinsky, Eva (1991) "Political participation and parliamentary careers: Women's quotas in West Germany." *West European Politics*. vol. 14(1): 56-72. 69-70. Mckay, "Women in German Politics".

¹¹⁷ The focus of the second part of this thesis is on the underlying structural factors that make it more or less likely for women to join parties, rather than on the role of different parties in the political recruitment process.

¹¹⁸ Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, 3.

¹¹⁹ Norris and Inglehart, "Gendering Social Capital", 79.

¹²⁰ Frieze, Irene H., Parsons, Jacquelynne, E., Johnson, Paula B., Ruble, Diane, N. and Zellman, Gail L. (1978) *Women and Sex Roles. A Social Psychological Perspective*. London: W.W. Norton and Company. 345.

gender gaps, we must therefore critically engage not only with the political dimensions of gender discrimination, but also with the realm of ‘societal values’ and cultural practice.¹²¹ Social scientists have found evidence to suggest that citizens’ beliefs about gender roles correlate to women’s labour market participation, the share of women working part-time, the leadership gap in the private sector, the gender wage gap, and so on (for a brief summary of this literature, please refer to 8.2.8 in the appendix). However, as Inglehart and Norris point out, there is less ‘systematic evidence’ on the correlation between cultural gender attitudes and gender gaps in politics.¹²² Assessments like the following have been based, more often than not, on qualitative (or even merely anecdotal) rather than robust scientific evidence. For women, Sapiro argues,

‘entrance into politics is not a simple matter of taking up a new activity. Rather, it is participating in activities and institutions designed and populated primarily by men, people with a different set of social norms, rituals, language, dress, and values. (...) Politics is a rough-and-tumble world, involving competition, aggressiveness, power, independence, rational decision-making among hard choices, and corruption.’¹²³

One of the reasons for why the role played by gender culture has received relatively little attention in the political participation literature may be the difficulty in adequately capturing the effects of gender norms in a quantitatively verifiable way. Gender does not lend itself easily to quantitative analysis. Datasets including questions on gender attitudes as well as on political participation and political efficacy are far and few between. And, although there has been a surge in surveys being undertaken since the early 2000s, outside of the US, even less data are available that capture gender attitudes together with political participation figures over a longer period of time. Despite this, researchers often assume that psychological barriers caused by socialisation might not only be an

¹²¹ Bleiker, Roland (2000) "'We don't Need Another Hero!'" *International Feminist Journal of Politics*. vol. 2(1): 30-57. 52-53.

¹²² Existing evidence, the authors find, remains ‘scattered and inconclusive’. Inglehart and Norris, *Rising tide*, 9.

¹²³ Sapiro, Virginia (1983) *The Political Integration of Women: Roles, Socialisation, and Politics*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 30. Sapiro thus argues that, ‘the problem of [women’s political] integration (...) is largely one of norms, values, perception, expectations; the links among these; and the relationships between these and political behavior.’ loc. cit. See also: Squires who points out that politics has ‘historically been the most explicitly masculine human activity of all.’ Squires, *Gender in Political Theory*, 1.

important, but perhaps the most important cause for women's low participation in politics.¹²⁴

Although earlier research has suggested that 'women are socialised into a more politically passive role than men,'¹²⁵ Inglehart and Norris' work 'Rising Tide – Gender Equality and Cultural Change around the world' can be considered seminal among the existing body of studies on political participation and gender culture.¹²⁶ Using cross-national data from the World Value Surveys, the authors show that discriminatory attitudes toward women pose significant and substantial impediments to the effective eradication of uneven access to political power between the sexes in countries around the world.¹²⁷ Egalitarian attitudes toward women, the authors argue, have a 'powerful impact on political reality' because they are 'significantly associated with women being successfully elected into office.'¹²⁸ Earlier research by Rule and Zimmerman has come to a similar conclusion, showing that cultural norms limit 'women's opportunities to participate in politics ... despite the presence of favourable political systems.'¹²⁹ As Inhetveen argues, cultural values function as 'structural carriers of behaviour patterns into acceptance,' and in this way can slow down or speed up institutional innovation.¹³⁰ Other empirical studies such as by Norris, Kenworthy and Malami, Inhetveen, Burns et al., Arceneaux, or Paxton and Kunovich, all suggest that cultural attitudes toward women correlate in significant ways with existing political gender gaps.¹³¹ Indeed, Paxton and Kunovich argue that the effect of gender ideology is substantially *stronger* than the effects of political variables such as

¹²⁴ For instance Frieze, Parsons, Johnson, Ruble and Zellman, *Women and Sex Roles*, 347. For a more general overview of literature on women's political socialisation, see Welch, "Women as Political Animals", 713.

¹²⁵ Welch, "Women as Political Animals", 712.

¹²⁶ The authors compare cross-country aggregate data of sixty-one nations between 1995 and 2001 and rank them on a gender equality scale.

¹²⁷ Inglehart and Norris, *Rising tide*, 8.

¹²⁸ Loc. cit.

¹²⁹ Paxton and Kunovich, "The Importance of Ideology", 90. See also: Hoecker, Beate (2007). "Ist die Politik (noch) ein männliches Geschäft?" In: Holtz-Bacha, Christina and König-Reiling, Nina. *Warum nicht gleich? Wie die Medien mit Frauen in der Politik umgehen*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft. 52-65. 62.

¹³⁰ Inhetveen, Katharina (1999) "Can Gender Equality Be Institutionalized?" *International Sociology*. vol. 14: 403-22. 403-04.

¹³¹ Kenworthy and Malami, "Gender Inequality in Political Representation"; Norris, "Women's legislative participation in Western Europe". Burns, Lehman Schlozman and Verba, *The Private Roots of Public Action*. Arceneaux, "The "Gender Gap" in State Legislative Representation". Paxton and Kunovich, "The Importance of Ideology".

the presence of proportional representation systems. 'As negative attitudes increase,' they argue, 'the percentage of women in legislatures decreases.'¹³² Likewise, regressions run by Inglehart and Norris show that the relationship between women's representation in parliaments and a liberal gender culture remain significantly positively correlated even when other structural and institutional factors (such as the type of electoral system) are included as controls.¹³³

Negative cultural incentive structures are thought to operate in two ways: on the one hand, they predetermine the number of women who have the necessary aspiration to participate in politics (supply-side), but on the other hand, they also impact the way in which women are evaluated and judged by other political players and the electorate on their suitability and performance (demand-side, see also Table 2).¹³⁴ Culture affects very aspect of the demand side - supply side explanation spectrum for 'at each stage (...), women can face gender specific impediments.'¹³⁵ As previously mentioned, in this thesis, I examine primarily the effect of gender stereotypes on the supply side.

Socialisation roots and normalises stereotypes about men and women's innate personality traits, strengths, and weaknesses:

¹³² Paxton and Kunovich, "The Importance of Ideology", 101. Paxton and Kunovich show that a one unit increase in agreement with the statement 'men are better in politics' (which ranges from 1.59 to 3.22) 'results in a 19% decrease in women in politics.' loc. cit. However, in an earlier study, Norris conversely found that institutional factors were more important in predicting women's legislative participation than an egalitarian gender culture. See: Norris, "Women's legislative participation in Western Europe".

¹³³ Norris and Inglehart, "Cultural Obstacles to Equal Representation", 135.

¹³⁴ 'The decision to openly aspire for office is the calculation of a rational thinker ... They include an assessment of the costs in time, energy, and financial commitment to both run and serve if elected, and the benefits in terms of the attractiveness of the job with respect to remuneration, status and/or political power.' Matland and Montgomery, "Recruiting Women to National Legislatures", 21. For instance, women seeking political office are frequently confronted with questions from the public and the media about whether their children and family will suffer as a result. Lindsey, *Gender Roles*, 414. This was also stressed by several of the politicians I interviewed.

¹³⁵ Matland and Montgomery, "Recruiting Women to National Legislatures", 20. 'But at every point in the decision, both of the potential representative and of the other decision-makers upon whose choices her progress depends, are conditioned by more intangible factors, linked to cultural and ideological habits and assumptions (Duerst-Lahti 1998: 22-3; Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 21-2)' Stevens, *Women, power, and politics*, 86.

‘Women are socialized toward a gender role that is more passive, private, rule-abiding, and compassionate, while men are oriented toward leadership, public roles, autonomy and self-reliance.’¹³⁶

‘A traditional strong, patriarchal value system favours sexually segregated roles, and ‘traditional cultural values’ militate against the advancement, progress and participation of women in any political process.’¹³⁷

Gender socialisation also impacts styles of communication and behaviour of men and women and therefore, ‘their ability to make their desires known and influence others.’¹³⁸ Socialisation constructs politics as a domain suited to men.¹³⁹ This, observers argue, also affects how interested men and women are in politics, how competent they feel about participating, and how they judge their own ability and performance and that of others.¹⁴⁰ Voters and politicians, for example, may believe men to have greater competencies in handling hard politics such as defence policy or the economy, while they regard women to be better in soft politics such as ‘education, healthcare, and poverty’¹⁴¹ through recent US based studies suggest that women no longer face a disadvantage at the ballot box.¹⁴² Cultural explanations, Norris argues, thus also help us understand why certain types of organisations, such as political parties, labour unions, or professional associations, remain

¹³⁶ Coffe and Bolzendahl, "Gender Differences in Political Participation", 320. summarising the work of several authors.

¹³⁷ Shvediva, Nadazheda (2005). "Obstacles to Women's Participation in Parliament." In: Ballington, Julie and Karam, Azza. *Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers*. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 33-51. 44.

¹³⁸ ‘In settings including both women and men, women talk less than men do ... Men interrupt women more than they interrupt each other and more than women interrupt men.’ Sapiro, *The Political Integration of Women*, 115. In addition, ‘women’s language shows more uncertainty – particularly about themselves – and deference than does men’s. They use more personalisms (“In my opinion...,” “I think...”) and, especially, more personalisms that show self-doubt ...’ loc. cit.

¹³⁹ Matland and Montgomery, "Recruiting Women to National Legislatures", 22.

¹⁴⁰ Geißel, "Partizipation im Kontext", 26, 28. Matland and Montgomery, "Recruiting Women to National Legislatures", 24.

¹⁴¹ Huddy, Leonie and Terkildsen, Nayda (1993) "Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates." *American Journal of Political Science*. vol. 37(1): 119-47. 140-41.

¹⁴² See Dolan, Kathleen (2004) *Voting for Women: How the Public Evaluates Women Candidates*. Boulder: Westview Press. Jordan Brooks, *He Runs, She Runs*.

disproportionately male and why others, notably those providing welfare services for children, the elderly, or handicapped, are disproportionately run by women.¹⁴³

What these various approaches highlight is that context matters for individual choice and individual action. However, apart from being relatively dated, most existing research either draws on cross-national data (in which case micro-analysis is lacking), or it focuses exclusively on the United States. Few studies have been undertaken to explore quantitatively as well as qualitatively the relationship between citizens' gender attitudes and participation specifically from the supply side point of view. Chapters 5 and of this thesis go some way toward filling this gap.

To be clear, the assumption underlying the research question for this and the following chapter is that gender culture is an important and often neglected *additional factor* to the list of known determinants of gender differences in participation, rather than an *alternative* explanation. Based on the above insights, I expect that traditional gender attitudes encumber participation in formal politics in unified Germany beyond the predictive value of institutional and socio-economic variables alone.

¹⁴³ Norris found that organisations such as sports clubs, professional groups, or labour unions are usually dominated by men while 'associations related to traditional female roles, including those concerned with providing social welfare services for the elderly or handicapped', charities or religious groups, are usually dominated by women. Norris and Inglehart, "Gendering Social Capital", 74.

3 Sex and the State: Gender Regimes and Women's Political Participation in 20th Century Germany

In this chapter, I will introduce the German case study in more detail and explore the differences in gender regime types in the formerly divided country. I begin with a brief review of research on gender norms in the 19th and early 20th century before outlining the gender policy frameworks adopted by the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic after World War II, and, finally, by unified Germany after the end of the Cold War. The chapter will also give an overview of women's participation in formal politics during this period. Both of these aspects form the backdrop for the empirical analysis of gender attitudes and political gender gaps in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.

3.1 The 'Woman Question' – Gender in 19th and early 20th Century Germany

The 20th century notion of 'the family' and the formal distinction between public and private spheres, Frevert argues, are largely the product of ideas postulated by the enlightenment literature in the second part of the 18th century.¹ During this period, according to the historian, the family came to be defined as a social entity consisting exclusively of husband, wife, and children.² Among the middle and upper classes, childcare and domestic chores were assigned primarily to women.³ All matters relating to life outside the family on the other hand, became the prerogative of men. Leading public figures, intellectuals, and scientists proclaimed that 'menstruation, pregnancy, child-birth and lying-in', naturally prevented women from taking up public careers or political

¹ The distinction between gainful and reproductive work, between public and private spheres is deeply embedded in our modern view on politics and society. It is therefore perhaps surprising that the very word 'family' (*Familie*) was largely unknown in the German-speaking world until the 18th century. Frevert, Ute (1986) *Frauen-Geschichte. Zwischen Bürgerlicher Verbesserung und Neuer Weiblichkeit*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 17.

² Loc. cit.

³ Childcare and children's education was beginning to be viewed primarily as the prerogative of mothers rather than that of servants, maids, or relatives. Loc. cit.

power.⁴ This narrative was furthered in the course of the 19th century through the social and economic developments of the industrial revolution. The transformation from an agrarian to an industrial society, ‘from household to factory production’, established a further, physical distinction between productive and reproductive labour.⁵ Against this backdrop, the bourgeois male-breadwinner model came to play an important ideological role in attempts to deal with the social ills that characterised the industrial revolution.⁶ Poverty, housing shortage, malnutrition, and work-related illnesses plagued the ever-growing numbers of men, women, and children who moved from the rural to the urban areas to seek employment in the expanding cities.⁷

After Germany’s initial unification in 1871 and the establishment of a parliamentary monarchy, chancellor Otto von Bismarck consequently oversaw the implementation of the world’s first comprehensive social insurance programme, which later became a model for the 20th century welfare state. The debates around women’s role in society, which accompanied its introduction, highlight the political potency of the differing views on gender roles at the time. Catholics and Social Democrats stressed sexual difference between men and women and advocated that (married) women should be freed from factory work because their employment undermined “‘the institution of marriage’”, the “‘sanctity of the family’”, and thus “‘the entire Christian social order.’”⁸ By contrast, a government report of the 1870s argued that women had worked outside the factories “‘for decades, even centuries’”, and that banning them from factory work would be “‘harmful to natural relations.’”⁹ In this way, the so-called ‘social question’ (*Soziale Frage*),

⁴ As Frevert points out, ‘entire generations of medical practitioners endeavoured to prove that women were more excitable, capricious and sickly than men, and thus to deny them suitably for responsible roles in the labour market and in politics.’ Frevert, Ute (1989) *Women in German History: from bourgeois emancipation to sexual liberation*. Oxford: Berg. 318.

⁵ Kathleen Canning’s historical study of female factory work in 19th century Germany provides a well-researched overview of how industrialisation and the ensuing social question shaped ‘the sexual division of labor, the hierarchies of wage and skill, and the cultures of work in which men and women formed work identities.’ Canning, Kathleen (1996) *Languages of labour and gender: female factory work in Germany*. Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 17, 85. See also: Frevert, *Women in German History*, 310.

⁶ Women’s roles and social destinies at this time were firmly bound up with their class. Life for female workers, servants, middle- or upper-class women, differed fundamentally.

⁷ Canning, *Languages of labour and gender*, 17&85.

⁸ Wenzel cited by loc. cit.

⁹ Loc. cit. While for Bismarck and his allies, the ‘social question’ was a matter of economic and labour protection regulations, Catholics and Social Democrats regarded it as a *sittliche Kulturfrage* ‘encompassing the

‘came to constitute a discursive nexus where the relationship between state and citizenry, factory and family, production and reproduction, public and private, were defined, contested, and periodically reimagined.’¹⁰

Eventually, labour codes and reform bills passed in the 1870s and 1880s implemented protective measures for female workers through ‘maternity leave, reduced working hours, and the removal of women and youths from night work and employment mines.’¹¹ Such legislation, Canning argues, intended to ‘regulate women’s work so as to not detach them from their true calling as housewives or, where this has already occurred, to return them to it.’¹² In doing so, it institutionalised the distinction between paid employment outside the home on the one hand, and private, reproductive work inside the home on the other,¹³ thus also making women more economically and socially dependent on men. An entry on ‘the woman question’¹⁴ published in a German encyclopaedia in 1908, summarised this as follows:

‘The social status of the female sex will always be primarily dictated through marriage and family and the particular responsibilities that derive from them; and given the specific differentiation of the status between the sexes attributed by nature, an actual equality between the male and female sex will never be realised, however far we push formal legal equality ...’¹⁵

cultural, moral, and physical health of the nation.’ Canning writes that, ‘Catholics and Social Democrats shared with one another and with bourgeois social reformers this understanding of sexual difference, similarly delineating independent (male) workers from dependent women and children and distinguishing women’s contribution to state and nation from that of men.’ loc. cit. Bismarck by contrast believed that greater protection would have negative repercussions for workers and for the German industry at large. According to a government official of the time, “all limitations on the factory employment of adult women are unnecessary and harmful, for they would prevent the woman worker from earning the extra pennies she needs, only for the sake of principle and benevolence.” loc. cit.

¹⁰ Loc. cit.

¹¹ Loc. cit.

¹² Loc. cit.

¹³ Kolinsky, Eva and Nickel, Hildegard Maria (2003) *Reinventing gender: women in Eastern Germany since unification*. London: Frank Cass. xii, 284 p. 3.

¹⁴ In 1898, the Brockhaus encyclopaedia referred to the ‘woman question’ (*Frauenfrage*) for the first time as “the totality of problems and demands that have most recently been called forth by the transformation of society and of its ways of life, with respect to the position of the female sex among modern peoples” through the women’s movement. Cited in Frevert, *Women in German History*, 5-6.

¹⁵ Original quote: “Allerdings wird die soziale Stellung des weiblichen Geschlechts stets in erster Linie durch die Ehe und Familie und die hierdurch erwachsenden besonderen Aufgaben bestimmt bleiben müssen, und bei der spezifischen Verschiedenheit der von der Natur den Geschlechtern zugewiesenen

The rights and opportunities that were extended to men at the time were not equally extended to women. This was true for economic as well as for political rights. Up until 1914, women were not entitled to vote and up until 1908 they were also barred from membership in political parties (and by implication, from all political offices). Resistance to women's political exclusion expressed itself in the form of an emerging middle-class women's movement. Its birth was marked formally with the founding of the *Allgemeine deutsche Frauenverein* (General German women's association) in 1865 and later in 1894, with the *Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine* (Union of German Women's Organisations) which advocated, amongst others, women's right to political participation, paid employment and education.¹⁶ However, as Kolinsky points out, the movement's bourgeois proponents did not aspire to an equality of sameness, but rather regarded women as 'distinctly different [from men] in their physical and emotional make-up.'¹⁷ This was in contrast to the beliefs held by many working class women who joined the socialist movement, demanding equal rights, equal opportunities, and equal participation 'regardless of class, status or wealth.'¹⁸ The period thus saw the proliferation of a number of prominent female political thinkers and activists such as Rosa Luxemburg (1871-1919) or Clara Zetkin (1857-1933). However, due to the differences in experiences and priorities of women from the middle and working classes, the first wave German women's movement remained rather weak and fragmented. Nevertheless, the Weimar Constitution of 1919 eventually granted women in Germany formal recognition as citizens by giving them the right to vote.¹⁹ "Today German women are the freest in the world," a German socialist women's magazine proudly proclaimed in response to the

Stellung im Geschlechtsleben kann selbst bei noch so weit getriebener formaler Rechtsgleichheit eine tatsächliche Gleichstellung des männlichen und weiblichen Geschlechts niemals zur Verwirklichung gelangen (...)." Meyers Großes Konversationslexikon 1908 cited in Hausen, Karin (1983) *Frauen suchen ihre Geschichte: Historische Studien zum 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*. München: Beck. 1-7. 9-10.

¹⁶ Wolff, Kerstin (2008) "Die Frauenbewegung organisiert sich." *Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung*. 08.09. 2009. Available from: <http://perma.cc/4JDB-D5PA>. Accessed: 10.02. 2014.

¹⁷ Bäumer 1914 cited by Kolinsky, Eva (1989) *Women in West Germany: Life, Work and Politics*. Oxford: Berg Publishers. 8.

¹⁸ Loc. cit.

¹⁹ Some argue that the developments of the First World War compelled women to take up previously male dominated professions and therefore partly contributed to their being granted political rights in the new constitution. Loc. cit. The SPD (worker's party) was the first to demand women's right to vote in the Reichstag in 1895. See: Cornelissen, "Politische Partizipation von Frauen", 321.

introduction of female suffrage, “they have full, unconditional equality with men, they can vote for and be elected to all political bodies.”²⁰

In reality, women remained a marginalised group in German politics throughout the Weimar Republic’s short existence. Even though they turned out to vote in high numbers, women remained starkly underrepresented in the formal spheres of politics. Overall, they constituted an average of little more than 7% of members of the Reichstag throughout the republic’s existence (see Table 3).²¹

Table 3 Proportion of Women in the Reichstag of the Weimar Republic 1919-1933

Year of Election	Total Number of Members	Total Number of Women	Percentage of Women
1919	423	41	9.6
1920	463	37	8.0
1924	472	27	5.7
1924	493	33	6.6
1928	490	33	6.6
1930	575	42	7.3
1932	608	38	6.3
1932	582	36	6.2

Source: Boak, Helen (1990) "Women in Weimar Politics." *European History Quarterly*. vol. 20: 369-99.

Boak’s investigation of ‘Women in Weimar Politics’ gives an excellent and insightful overview of the difficulties faced by women during their first decade in parliament. Astonishingly, many of the issues encountered by female parliamentarians then still affect women in German politics today. They include a lack of ‘feminist ideology’²² among parliamentarians and the female electorate, the relegation of female MPs to ‘social welfare, youth, and education committees,’²³ women’s inexperience in political matters, their ‘feelings of inferiority and lack of ability,’ their disillusionment with ‘the reality of day-to-day life in the Reichstag,’²⁴ and the ‘parties’ failure to concern themselves with the

²⁰ *Die Gleichheit* (1918) 29(5), 33 cited by Boak, Helen (1990) "Women in Weimar Politics." *European History Quarterly*. vol. 20(3): 369-99. 369.

²¹ The new constitution moved from first-past-the post to proportional representation. The voting age was lowered to 20.

²² Boak, "Women in Weimar Politics", 390.

²³ Loc. cit.

²⁴ Loc. cit.

grass-roots political education of women.²⁵ Just as today, the number of women in national parliament largely depended on their inclusion on electoral lists, which were decided on by the parties themselves.²⁶ And like today, left-leaning parties generally included a greater number of women on their party lists and were 'willing to allow women some chance of playing an active role in politics.'²⁷ 'The further to the right the political pendulum swung' in the course of the Weimar Republic's existence therefore, 'the fewer women politicians there would be.'²⁸ Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, no woman was represented in the upper house, the *Reichsrat*, or in the cabinet. Women were unable to exert a lasting influence on political life in Germany. Despite all this, the 'Golden Twenties' also marked the cultural emergence of a 'new type of woman', which was characterised by a more confident, intellectual, and ambitious disposition. Women were becoming increasingly defiant of conservative gender roles.²⁹

Yet, things took a dramatic turn with the Nazi's coming to power in 1933.³⁰ According to Evans, it marked the beginning of 'one of the most violently antifeminist regimes of modern times.'³¹ 'National Socialism, Kolinsky relates, 'tried to recast the role of women in terms of motherhood, subservience to the state and giving service'.³² Loroff notes that, 'Nazi ideals on the role of women in society' were directly opposed to the 'cultural decays' of the Weimar republic, which had granted women new political and social

²⁵ Loc. cit. See also: Kolinsky, *Women in West Germany*, 10-11.

²⁶ As Boak explains, 'the Reich was divided into thirty-five electoral districts, with the electorate voting for a party, not an individual ... Each party drew up a list of candidates for election in the electoral districts (Landesliste) and at Reich level. Suggestions that women should make up 8 per cent of every party's seats in the Reichstag, and therefore 8 per cent of all Reichstag seats, were rejected as creating a privileged law for women. Women's chances of being elected to all political decision-making bodies depended, therefore, on the positions given them on the parties' election lists.' Boak, "Women in Weimar Politics", 371.

²⁷ Loc. cit.

²⁸ Loc. cit.

²⁹ An estimated 35 per cent of the labour force was female, with women working mainly as secretaries, steno-typists, or sales assistants. Vollmer, Hartmut (1998) *Liebes(ver)lust: Existenzsuche und Beziehungen von Männern und Frauen in deutschsprachigen Romanen der zwanziger Jahre*. Oldenburg: Igel-Verlag. 31-32.

³⁰ Boak argues that, 'the Nazi seizure of power in 1933 (...) bears witness to the failure of women politicians to bring about either moral regeneration of German political life or women's equality with men, and highlights the naivety of women politicians at the beginning of the Republic about what they could realistically expect to achieve.' Boak, "Women in Weimar Politics", 369.

³¹ Evans, Richard J. (1976) "Feminism and Female Emancipation in Germany 1870-1945: Sources, Methods, and Problems of Research." *Central European History*. vol. 9(4): 323-51. 326.

³² Kolinsky, *Women in West Germany*, 2.

freedoms.³³ The radical redefinition of gender roles, womanhood, and sexuality in accordance with the fascist ideology played a crucial part in Hitler's plan to establish a pan-German racial empire. Both Nazi policies and Nazi propaganda forcefully promoted a conservative ideal throughout the country in which women were defined primarily in terms of their fertility and motherhood and in accordance with their 'natural and rightful' habitat of '*Kinder, Küche, and Kirche*' (children, kitchen, and church).³⁴ After 1933, women were swiftly excluded from all aspects of political life. As Kolinsky points out, the Nazis categorically 'objected to women holding electoral political and parliamentary office.'³⁵ The types of gender role norms that were promoted during Hitler's dictatorship in line with Nazi notions of Aryan womanhood are well documented in the literature.³⁶

3.2 Gender and Politics in Cold War East and West Germany

After Hitler's defeat in 1945 and Germany's occupation by the allied forces, the country was split into two ideologically opposed political systems, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, founded on May 23, 1949), and the German Democratic Republic (GDR, founded on October 7, 1949). The formal establishment of the two countries, as Rohrschneider argued, marked 'the beginning of a monumental social experiment; for in both systems, the political culture had to be reconstructed to conform to the new regimes.'³⁷ 'When the Cold War split Germany in two', *The New York Times* observed, 'the country became a living experiment in social engineering.'³⁸ Crucially, the political elite of both regimes attempted to re-socialise (or re-educate) their citizens through political, educational, and cultural means, not only to break with the Nazi past, but also to enforce

³³ Loroff, Nicole (2011) "Gender and Sexuality in Nazi Germany." *Constellations*. vol. 3(1): 49-61. 50-51.

³⁴ Loc. cit. Kolinsky, *Women in West Germany*, 2.

³⁵ Kolinsky, *Women in West Germany*, 11.

³⁶ For further reading, see Bridenthal, Renate, Grossmann, Atina and Kaplan, Marion A. (1984) *When biology became destiny: women in Weimar and Nazi Germany*. New York: Monthly Review Press. or Stibbe, Matthew (2003) *Women in the Third Reich*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

³⁷ Rohrschneider, "The Influence of Institutions on Democratic Values", 928. As Harsch points out, in the GDR, 'antifascism, fear of war, and the desire for national unity' provided 'a mantle of legitimacy ... to transform East German society by massively reducing social privilege and elevating the working class with a new educational system.' Harsch, Donna (2007) *Revenge of the Domestic: Women, the Family, and Communism in the German Democratic Republic*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 61.

³⁸ Bennhold, "20 Years After Fall of Wall, Women of Former East Germany Thrive", online resource.

the new political structures.³⁹ The remainder of this chapter will show that gender norms and the role of women in the public sphere became an important and highly visible marker of ideological difference between the two German states.

3.2.1 West Germany 1949 -1989

Only 4 of the 65 members of the parliamentary council, which preceded the German Bundestag to draft the German Basic Law in 1949, were women. Tellingly, the mostly male authors only reluctantly agreed to include Article 3[2] on the equality of men and women into the founding document (parliamentarians Elisabeth Selbert and Friederike Nadig are said to have played a particularly important role in insisting on its inclusion). The Basic Law in its original format was based on conservative notions of family and gender roles.⁴⁰ Kessel argues that the establishment of a conservative gender regime in West Germany served as a symbol for the restoration of social order after the war. The retrenchment of women from those spheres of industry, which they had occupied during the war, heralded a return to 'normal' gender relations.⁴¹ In this setting, the family unit became the core for social stabilisation.⁴² The dominant strategy of legislators and the media of the 1950s and 60s was to propagate a family image that idealised men as breadwinners and women as mothers and housewives devoted to their 'natural' calling of motherhood and family life.⁴³ In part, this was made possible through the post-war economic boom as for the first time in decades, middle-class and even working-class families were able to live comfortably on one income. As Pfau-Effinger observes, the entire post-war West German welfare state (including employment, education, and

³⁹ According to Ehmman, the need for re-education was stressed by the allied forces but recognised and reiterated by the post-war German political elite, 'and particularly by politicians in the newly created political parties.' Ehmman, Annegret (2004) "Learning From History - Online: A Project of Civic Education in Germany." *NECE – Networking European Citizenship Education*. Santiago de Compostela Spain: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung. See also: Schmitt, Karl (1975) "Education and Politics in the German Democratic Republic." *Comparative Education Review*. vol. 19(1): 31-50. 31.

⁴⁰ For example, Article 6 of the Basic Law on the special protection of the family defined women primarily in relation to their husbands and children. See: Schissler, Hanna (1993) "Rebuilding West German Society: A Gender View." *Central European History*. vol. 26(3): 326-34. 328.

⁴¹ Kessel, Martina (2008). "Wandel und Kontinuität von Geschlechterrollen in Deutschland." In: Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend. *Rollenleitbilder und -realitäten in Europa: rechtliche, ökonomische und kulturelle Dimensionen*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag. 19-32. 21-22.

⁴² Loc. cit.

⁴³ Budde, "German Women's Situation and Experiences between 1945 and 1995", 54-55. There is a clear link to the 18th and 19th century family ideal described above.

childcare policies) was premised on a single earner arrangement - the male breadwinner family ideal, with married women being actively discouraged from working outside the home.⁴⁴ It was understood that women in West Germany should seek paid employment only if this did not interfere with their duties as mothers and wives.⁴⁵ Indeed, until the late 1950s, women could only take up paid employment with their husband's expressed permission. Even if women did work, the Civil Code maintained that their principal responsibility lay in supporting their family through domestic work. A federal government report on 'the situation of women in employment, family, and society' in 1966 illustrates this point aptly, stating that,

'Woman should be the carer and comforter; symbol of modest harmony, the element of order in the only dependable world which is the private; employment and civic engagements should only be pursued by a woman, if her responsibilities at home allows her to do so.'⁴⁶

Not only was women's participation in the labour market discouraged by West German political rhetoric in this way, other factors such as the limited availability of childcare facilities or unequal pay (so-called 'light-wages') often made it financially unfeasible for many women to work, especially when they had small children.⁴⁷ Most middle-class women therefore opted for being housewives and mothers or followed the typical three-phase model of working before marriage and childbirth, staying at home with young children, and re-entering the work force (often on a part-time basis) once their children

⁴⁴ Pfau-Effinger, "Gender cultures and the gender arrangement", 156. Pfau-Effinger writes, that 'neither the possibility for mothers to stay home and care for their children independent of a family breadwinner, nor the integration of mothers into the labour market, [was] actively promoted.' loc. cit.

⁴⁵ Schissler, Hanna (1993). "Women in West Germany from 1945 to the Present." In: Huelshoff, Michael G., et al. *From Bundesrepublik to Deutschland: German Politics After Unification*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 117-36. 122.

⁴⁶ 'Bericht der Bundesregierung über die Situation der Frau in Beruf, Familie und Gesellschaft' cited in Herfel, Christine, Saupe, Claudia and Kirschenlohr, Doris (1996) "Unsere Stadt braucht Frauen - Unser Kreis braucht Frauen." *Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg*. Available from: <http://perma.cc/DHU2-XGWS>. Accessed: 23.10. 2013. Original quote: "Pflegerin und Trösterin sollte die Frau sein; Sinnbild bescheidener Harmonie, Ordnungsfaktor in der einzig verlässlichen Welt des Privaten; Erwerbstätigkeit und gesellschaftliches Engagement sollte die Frau nur eingehen, wenn es die familiären Anforderungen zulassen."

⁴⁷ As Fulbrook writes, 'in West Germany, the comparative lack of sufficient pre-school provision was the major problem for mothers wishing to work. In 1982 there were over 500,000 employed women with a child or children under the age of three in West Germany, yet there were only 26,245 creche places.' Fulbrook, Mary (2002) *History of Germany 1918-2000 - The Divided Nation*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 194.

had reached a certain age. Only a small proportion of women pursued full-time professional careers.⁴⁸

For the German social security system, the 'standard biography of the male breadwinner' in continuous full-time employment served as the main reference point.⁴⁹ In the course of the late 1960s and 1970s, this changed only slightly, mainly through the coming into effect of the equality principle in civil law (*Gleichberechtigungsgrundsatz auf dem Gebiet des Bürgerlichen Rechts*, 1958) and the reform of marriage- and family law (*Reform des Ehe- und Familienrechts*, 1977).⁵⁰ At this time, gender gaps in secondary schooling and in vocational qualifications began to narrow.⁵¹ These and other improvements were achieved against the backdrop of the West German second-wave feminist movement whose protagonists created 'a public discourse about gender inequality and justice', in which the dominant male breadwinner - female housewife arrangement was being put into question.⁵² Over time, the female part-time worker and carer model became more common,⁵³ though little changed with regards to men's employment patterns or their contribution to domestic work. In general, therefore, Cold War West Germany constituted what Esping-Anderson later termed, a 'conservative welfare state' based on a male bread-winner norm and 'neo-conservative ... traditional family values.'⁵⁴

Women's Political Participation in West Germany

Throughout the 40 year separation, progress in West Germany with regards to increasing women's participation in institutional politics – 'in parliaments, governments or in the party organisation'⁵⁵ - was trivial at best. 'If there has ever been a truly man's world,'

⁴⁸ According to Schissler, the majority of women from the working class did in fact seek gainful employment outside the home (nearly 90 per cent between 1950 and 1982). Schissler, "Women in West Germany", 123&25.

⁴⁹ Pfau-Effinger, "Gender cultures and the gender arrangement", 156-57. See also: Pfau-Effinger, "Family Childcare in the Cultural and Institutional Context", 37.

⁵⁰ See also: Kessel, "Wandel und Kontinuität von Geschlechterrollen in Deutschland", 27.

⁵¹ Kolinsky, *Women in West Germany*, 5.

⁵² Pfau-Effinger, "Gender cultures and the gender arrangement", 155.

⁵³ Loc. cit.

⁵⁴ Genz, Stéphanie (2006) "Third Way/ve: The politics of postfeminism." *Feminist Theory*. vol. 7(3): 333-53. 335. Esping-Andersen, *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*.

⁵⁵ Kolinsky, *Women in West Germany*, 5.

Kolinsky wrote in 1989, West German politics in the post-war period came close to it.⁵⁶ Female representation in the Bundestag increased by less than 10 per cent between 1949 and 1987 (see Table 4). Indeed, only in 1983 did the percentage of women in the German Bundestag surpass the 9.6 per cent threshold which was set by the Weimar Republic's National Assembly of 1919. The first female minister in West Germany was appointed in 1961 when Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt headed the German Federal Ministry for Health. Until 1989, only one ministry per legislative period was led by a woman.⁵⁷

Table 4 Proportion of Women in the West German Bundestag 1949-1987

Year of Election	Percentage of Women
1949	6.8
1953	8.8
1957	9.2
1961	8.3
1965	6.9
1969	6.6
1972	5.8
1976	7.3
1980	8.5
1983	9.8
1987	15.4

Source: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (2011)

Women's numerical underrepresentation in parliament was also felt substantively. Young argues that German politics operated through 'male bonds,' which marginalised women and silenced feminist discourses in policy formulation processes.⁵⁸ One female interviewee who served in the German government during this period similarly reflected in an interview that up until the late 1980s, 'the topic of women was bothersome for men.'⁵⁹ Male networks operated successfully and the male-normed assembly culture

⁵⁶ Loc. cit.

⁵⁷ Cornelissen, "Politische Partizipation von Frauen", 345.

⁵⁸ Young, *Triumph of the fatherland*, 24.

⁵⁹ Original quote: 'Das Frauenthema war für Männer ein lästiges.'

remained largely unchallenged. The impracticalities of late-night meetings and the widespread expectation of having to work one's way up through party ranks constituted additional deterring factors for women's participation in West German institutional politics (see also, section 2.3, chapter 2). This combined with cultural stereotypes and outright sexism in parliament. Speaking of her own experiences of serving in the Bundestag in the 1980s, another female interviewee recounted that,

‘...when, during my days, women addressed the parliament about a topic which men considered not to be a women's issue, that is foreign policy, economic policy or the like, the number of comments increased and the quality of comments declined. ... When [a female MP] spoke on economic policy... [a male MP] once commented, “You look better than you talk”, and the entire parliament laughed.’⁶⁰

These various circumstances made politics a less than appealing career for women. Initiatives by women's groups such as the 1986 campaign with the tag line ‘More women to the Bundestag’ did not significantly change this status quo.⁶¹

Yet, there were also signs of gradual progress, not least in response to pressures exerted by the West German women's movement.⁶² Campaigns against paragraph 218 of the penal code on women's right to abortion⁶³ marked the beginning of a highly polarised public debate around women's issues. In 1972, the Ministry for Youth, Family, and Health was created to which responsibility for questions concerning women's issues was

⁶⁰ Interview 20, SPD, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: “Wenn sich Frauen in meiner Zeit zu einem Thema geäußert haben, das die Männer glaubten, dass es eigentlich kein Frauenthema wäre, also Außenpolitik, Wirtschaftspolitik und Ähnliches, dann nahm die Zahl der Zwischenrufe zu und die Qualität der Zwischenrufe ab. ... Anke Martini redet zu Wirtschaftspolitik, zu Verbraucherpolitik - Zwischenruf von Michael Glos: „Sie sehen auch besser aus als sie reden“ und das ganze Parlament lachte.” See also accounts by Ursula Kocher about her experiences as a female journalist during the Bonn Republic: Kosser, Ursula (2012) *Hammelsprünge: Sex und Macht in der deutschen Politik*. Köln: Dumont Buchverlag.

⁶¹ Cornelissen, "Politische Partizipation von Frauen", 342.

⁶² Overall, the German women's movement was rather weak and fragmented Wiliarty, Sarah Elise (2010) *The CDU and the Politics of Gender in Germany. Bringing women to the Party*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 5. According to a 1987 study, only 7.5 per cent of women born before 1945 and 15.5 per cent of women born after this date, identified with the women's movement. Cornelissen, "Politische Partizipation von Frauen", 327.

⁶³ Paragraph 218 stated that abortion was a criminal offence and could be carried out only in the exceptional circumstances of rape, foetal deformity, medical risks for the mother's well-being or social hardship. Cornelissen, "Politische Partizipation von Frauen".

formally entrusted. The same ministry expanded in 1986 to include 'women' in its title, highlighting the institutional recognition of 'women's issues' in politics.⁶⁴

One of the most important positive impulses for improving women's representation in institutional German politics during this period stemmed from the founding of the German Green party in 1979. Before the emergence of the Greens on the political stage, West German party politics was firmly dominated by three mainstream parties - the centre-left Social Democrats (SPD), the centre-right Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU)⁶⁵ and, to a lesser extent, by the centre-right Free Democrats (FDP).⁶⁶ While there were many ideological differences between the parties in terms of their economic and political orientations, the conservative gender and welfare state regime, according to Williarty, was endorsed by all mainstream political parties.⁶⁷ The Green party shook this West German political landscape, not only by giving a parliamentary voice to the feminist movement,⁶⁸ but also by being the first party represented in the Bundestag to introduce internal party quotas for women. By 1987, As Davidson-Schmich notes, Greens 'sent record numbers of women to the national parliament' with 57 per cent of its parliamentary group being female.⁶⁹ As was the case in other countries, the party's electoral success (first in 1983 and then in consecutive elections) put increasing pressure on the established mainstream parties to deal with the issue of women's underrepresentation in their own ranks.⁷⁰ At

⁶⁴ The various spheres of responsibility of the ministry included addressing gender equality issues, concerns over the integration of women into the labour market, the compatibility of work and family life, the social protection of women, and the improvement of the situation of women in the new federal states after unification. Hoecker, Beate (1998) *Lern- und Arbeitsbuch: Frauen, Männer und die Politik*. Bonn: Verlag J. H. W. Dietz. 211-13.

⁶⁵ The CDU/CSU can be best described as a party group. It consists of the Christian Social Union, which exists only in Bavaria, and the Christian Democratic Union, which exists in all other federal states.

⁶⁶ According to Xydias, the Social Democrats have historically viewed women's issues primarily in economic terms. Cited in Davidson-Schmich, *A Glass Half Full*, cited from book manuscript. The centre-right CDU/CSU can be said to have postulated a conservative, traditional view on gender roles and women's place in society. The FDP, though favourable to the principle of gender equality, has nevertheless opposed the idea of state intervention to achieve it loc. cit.

⁶⁷ According to Williarty, 'political parties... managed to cross class divides in order to institutionalise policies based on a male breadwinner model. (...) Across the twentieth century (...) in a wide variety of regime types, the SPD cooperated with conservative parties to reinforce women's economic dependence on men.' Williarty, *The CDU and the Politics of Gender*, 11.

⁶⁸ Frankland 1995 cited in Burchell, Jon (2002) *The evolution of green politics: development and change within European Green Parties*. London: Earthscan. 53.

⁶⁹ Davidson-Schmich, *A Glass Half Full*, cited from book manuscript.

⁷⁰ Matland, Richard E. and Studlar, Donley (1996) "The Contagion of Women Candidates in Single-Member Districts and Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Canada and Norway." *The Journal of*

this time, women were also increasingly seen as an important electoral target group.⁷¹ In 1988, the SPD became the second mainstream German party to introduce internal quotas, pledging to appoint 40 per cent of its political mandates and party positions to women. The CDU/CSU followed suit after German unification by adopting a non-binding 'party quorum' which recommended that one third of all party positions and party list seats should go to women. The FDP is the only mainstream German party to date which has not yet adopted any kind of female quota.⁷²

Overall, however, politics in West Germany during the Cold War was in theory and in practice the prerogative of men. According to a representative survey conducted in 1988 (cited in *Der Spiegel*), close to one third of West German citizens agreed that politics was 'Männersache' – a male domain.⁷³

3.2.2 The German Democratic Republic 1949 -1989

While in post-war West Germany, political elites across party lines propagated and reinforced the idea that women should be housewives and mothers, women in the GDR –whether single, married, or mothers- were expected to fully participate in the labour market. In part, this was vindicated through the ideological rhetoric of socialism. In *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884) Friedrich Engels argued that the reason for women's oppression was inextricably linked to the capitalist forms of production and the disparities in ownership of private property. Similarly, a 1976 East German publication on *Women in Socialist Society* argued that, 'the subordination of woman to the power of man can only be convincingly explained as the immediate result of the rise of private property.'⁷⁴ Hence, solving the 'woman question' was to be

Politics. vol. 58(3): 707-33. cited by Bay Brzinski, Joanne (2003). "Women's Representation in Germany: A Comparison of East and West." In: Matland, Richard E. and Montgomery, Kathleen A. *Women's Access to Political Power in Post-Communist Europe*. Online Publication: Oxford Scholarship Online. 64 - 80. 65.

⁷¹ Up until 1972, proportionately more women than men supported the centre-right CDU/CSU while more men than women voted for the center-left SPD. *Der Spiegel* (1988) "Entscheiden Frauen-Themen die Wahlen?". 46/1988. 104-09.

⁷² See also: Davidson-Schmich, *A Glass Half Full*, cited from book manuscript.

⁷³ *Der Spiegel*, "Entscheiden Frauen-Themen die Wahlen?", 109.

⁷⁴ Allendorf, Michaelis-Jena and Murray, *Women in socialist society*, 15.

accomplished through women's integration into the workforce and their release from the burdens of reproductive labour.⁷⁵

Notwithstanding the authoritarian and restrictive political structures of the GDR, legally speaking, women in the East were much better positioned than their West-German counterparts. The GDR constitution of 1949 postulated that,

‘men and women have equal rights. All laws and regulations which conflict with the equality of women are abolished.’⁷⁶

A new version of the constitution which came into effect in 1968 added that,

‘the promotion of women, particularly with regard to vocational qualification, is a task of society and the state.’⁷⁷

The political structures of the SED regime formally granted women the right to abortion, equal pay for equal work, and to education and paid employment. The introduction of the Mother- and Child Act (*Mütter- und Kinderschutzgesetz*, 1950), an independent family law (*Familiengesetzbuch*, 1966), and other family support policies (*Familienförderungs politik*) strengthened women's rights as mothers and workers. In stark contrast to West Germany, paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Mother- and Child Act stated that women should not be prevented from pursuing education or employment after marrying, even if that meant a physical separation from their spouses. Likewise, the care and responsibility for children was explicitly entrusted to both mother and father. Perhaps the most important difference between the GDR and West Germany in practical terms was the close to

⁷⁵ Dölling, "Gespaltenes Bewusstsein", 26. See also: Schroeder, Klaus (1998) *Der SED-Staat: Partei, Staat und Gesellschaft 1949-1990*. München: Carl Hanser Verlag. 527; Allendorf, Michaelis-Jena and Murray, *Women in socialist society*, 192. Matland and Montgomery, "Recruiting Women to National Legislatures", 36. Critics point out that socialism reinforced rather than dismantled the distinction between productive (paid/public) and reproductive (unpaid/private) work. According to Einhorn, socialism privileged the public sphere in much the same way as liberals Einhorn, Barbara (1993) *Cinderella goes to market: Citizenship, Gender and Women's Movements in East Central Europe*. New York/London: Verso. 10. See also: Gal, Susan and Kligman, Gail (2000) *The politics of gender after socialism: a comparative historical essay*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 45.

⁷⁶ 'Frauen und Männer sind gleichberechtigt. Alle Gesetze und Bestimmungen, die der Gleichberechtigung der Frau entgegenstehen, sind aufgehoben' (Article 7). See Schroeder, *Der SED-Staat*, 527.

⁷⁷ 'Die Förderung der Frau, besonders in der beruflichen Qualifizierung, ist eine gesellschaftliche und staatliche Aufgabe' (Article 20). Cited in Hampele, Anne (1993). "'Arbeite mit, plane mit, regiere mit' - Zur politischen Partizipation von Frauen in der DDR." In: Helwig, Gisela and Nickel, Hildegard Maria. *Frauen in Deutschland 1945-1992*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. 281-320. 283.

universal availability of public childcare in the East and other support mechanisms for working parents.⁷⁸ In contrast to welfare state legislation in West Germany, SED policy emphasised women being able to combine domestic and paid work. The idea of the working mother was also strongly propagated by the media. As a result, over 90% of East German women worked outside the home (usually on a full-time basis), compared to only 55% of West German women (usually half-time). At the same time, interestingly, over 90% of all women in the GDR had children compared to 74% in West Germany.⁷⁹ Through their near-equal participation in the labour market, women in the GDR enjoyed greater economic independence from men, they experienced less work-related discrimination and they were better qualified than women in West Germany. Therefore, as Sandole-Staroste observes,

‘... for those who were born and grew up in the GDR, opportunities were, ... significantly better’ than for women in the West.⁸⁰

However, the inclusion of women in the socialist workforce was arguably a product of economic necessity and state propaganda rather than of the state’s genuine desire to achieve gender equality.⁸¹ In the aftermath of World War II, the shortage of male workers combined with economic mismanagement and resource-loitering by the Soviet occupiers to create a situation in which women’s participation in the labour market was of vital importance for the post-war recovery of the East German regime.⁸² As one interviewee and former GDR citizen recounted during an interview,

⁷⁸ In West Germany free childcare was available for only 5 per cent of children under the age of three, but for up to 70 per cent for children of ages four to five (however, opening times of childcare institutions were often shorter than average working hours). Gerhard, Ute (1992) "German Women and the Social Costs of Unification." *German Politics & Society*. vol. 24-25: 13-34. 19.

⁷⁹ Einhorn, *Cinderella goes to market*, 55.

⁸⁰ Sandole-Staroste, *Women in transition*, 20.

⁸¹ Budde, "German Women’s Situation and Experiences between 1945 and 1995", 54. Trappe, Heike and Rosenfeld, Heike (2004) "How Do Children Matter? A Comparison of Gender Earnings Inequality for Young Adults in the Former East Germany and the Former West Germany." *Journal of Marriage and Family*. vol. 62(2): 489–507. 491.

⁸² Sandole-Staroste, *Women in transition*, 6.

‘The true motive of equality policy, even though this was never verbalised, was to make use of the labour potential of women. It was not to [emancipate] women in the spirit of Rosa Luxemburg or [Karl] Liebknecht that was only the rhetoric.’⁸³

Even in the GDR, women were paid lower wages and the more prestigious professions and the top positions generally remained in the hands of men.⁸⁴ This was also true, as we shall see, for political representation in the higher echelons of governmental power. Moreover, some argue that while women had entered the East German workforce in high numbers, traditionally female occupations were not equally taken up by men, many of whom reportedly remained less involved in childcare and household work.⁸⁵ State efforts to improve the compatibility of employment and childcare were often largely directed at women.⁸⁶ ‘Women were defined as workers *and* mothers,’ as Einhorn put it, ‘without any equivalent definition of men as workers *and* fathers’.⁸⁷

Women’s Political Participation in the GDR

When comparing women’s political participation in former socialist states to political participation in liberal democracies, it should be borne in mind that political participation in the modern, liberal-democratic sense did not exist in the former.⁸⁸ After all, the GDR was not a democratic state. The responses from East German interviewees (when asked what they understood political participation in the GDR to be) aptly reflect this,

⁸³ Interview 12, CDU, Male, East German, 2013. Original quote: ‘..die Gleichstellungspolitik [hatte] vor allen Dingen ihr, wenn auch unausgesprochenes Motiv darin, das Arbeitspotential der Frauen zu nutzen, gar nicht so sehr den Frauen also im Sinne von Rosa Luxemburg oder Liebknecht, also auch der in der sozialistischen Frauenemanzipationsbewegung namhaften Frauen, das war glaub ich eher Etikett. Der wesentliche Impuls war das Arbeitspotential der Frauen zu nutzen.’

⁸⁴ Dölling, Irene (1991) "Between Hope and Helplessness: Women in the GDR After the 'Turning Point'." *Feminist Review*. vol. 39(1): 3-15. Schroeder, *Der SED-Staat*, 527.

⁸⁵ Rudd, Elizabeth (2000) "Reconceptualizing Gender in Postsocialist Transformation." *Gender and Society*. vol. 14(4): 517-39. 519. However, at least one interviewee from East Germany stressed that there was a much greater degree of cooperation between men and women with regards to household chores in the GDR.

⁸⁶ The 1966 family law states that ‘Die Beziehung der Ehegatten zueinander so zu gestalten sind, dass dir Frau ihre berufliche und gesellschaftliche Tätigkeit mit der Mutterschaft verererbaren kann.’ Cited by Schroeder, *Der SED-Staat*, 527.

⁸⁷ Einhorn, *Cinderella goes to market*, 5.

⁸⁸ See for example: Hampele, "Zur politischen Partizipation von Frauen in der DDR", 281.

‘Well, the term [political participation] as such did not exist, or it did not play a role colloquially.’⁸⁹

‘The term [political participation] actually did not exist’ (laughs)⁹⁰

‘In GDR times, there was no political participation.’⁹¹

Many interviewees stressed however that while the notion of political participation as such had been irrelevant, the term civic engagement (*gesellschaftliches Engagement*) was very common. East German citizens were expected to participate in workers’ unions, civic or youth organisations (such as the FDGB or the FDJ), to ‘work together, plan together, govern together.’⁹² These organisations, of course, were subject to party control and did not permit genuine democratic participation, let alone the free formation and expression of opinions about political or social issues.

While the possibility to exert influence on political decision-making processes were therefore limited for both men and women,⁹³ streamlined rubberstamp types of political participation still existed in the GDR,⁹⁴ mainly in the form of voting at (staged) elections or by means of party membership in the Socialist Unity Party (SED) or one of the socialist bloc parties. Of course, neither party membership nor voting in the GDR represented truly democratic forms of participation as they are outlined in my definition in chapter 2. Although voting was not compulsory by law, it was compulsory in the sense that non-voters were ‘threatened with social sanctions’ if they did not participate.⁹⁵ Moreover, as Becker notes, ‘there was no real choice between alternative candidates and parties.’⁹⁶ A single list of SED and democratic bloc candidates was drawn up by the SED

⁸⁹ Interview 12, CDU, Male, East German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Also den Begriff [politische Partizipation] als solchen gab es gar nicht, jedenfalls hat er umgangssprachlich keine Rolle gespielt.’

⁹⁰ Interview 16, SPD, Female, East German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Den Begriff [politische Partizipation] gab es ja eigentlich gar nicht’ (lacht).

⁹¹ Interview 15, CDU, Male, East German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Zu DDR Zeiten gab es keine politische Beteiligung.’

⁹² Cited in Hampele, "Zur politischen Partizipation von Frauen in der DDR", 283.

⁹³ Loc. cit.

⁹⁴ Loc. cit.

⁹⁵ Becker, Rolf (2004) "Political efficacy and voter turnout in East and West Germany." *German Politics*. vol. 13(2): 317-40. 317-19.

⁹⁶ Loc. cit.

elite prior to elections and was ‘approved’ by voters by handing over an unmarked folded ballot paper.⁹⁷ For these reasons and due to the lack of reliable data, it is neither possible nor insightful to analyse gender gaps in voter turnout or vote choice in the GDR in the context of this thesis.

Examining party membership in terms of gender differences is similarly problematic. The SED was not a political party in the democratic sense. It understood itself as the ‘leading force in the socialist society’ and ‘of all workers’ organisations and workers.’⁹⁸ The Socialist Unity Party was a strictly hierarchical, despotic organisation, imposing severe punishments for deviations from party leadership orders.⁹⁹ As two of my interviewees pointed out, party membership and especially active party involvement, were conditional on an individual’s approval and endorsement of the socialist regime.¹⁰⁰ While many citizens joined the SED for practical reasons (such as better education or job prospects¹⁰¹) without being strongly committed to the communist ideology, those who chose to actively participate in state politics de facto consented to the political realities and the authoritarian character underlying the socialist regime. Overall, 2.3 million citizens - almost one fifth of the GDR electorate – were members of the SED.¹⁰²

Though it is not possible to establish any correlation between gender gaps in party membership and gender gaps in support for political regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, it is interesting to note that like today, fewer women than men joined the socialist parties. According to Randall, 31 per cent of SED members were women as of

⁹⁷ Among East German citizens, the election process was often tellingly referred to as ‘folding paper.’ ‘The distribution of seats and consequently the election results were laid down from the outset by the resolution of the Politburo.’ loc. cit.

⁹⁸ Schroeder, *Der SED-Staat*, 387.

⁹⁹ Loc. cit.

¹⁰⁰ Interview 12, CDU, Male, East German, 2013. Original Quote: ‘die zweite Seite war eben die, dass man mit dem gesellschaftlichen Engagement sich im Grunde genommen auch in die Machtstrukturen eingliederte.’

Interview 9, CDU, Female, East German, 2013. ‘Und man muss auch dazu wissen, die Frauen, die mussten ja erst mal 100 Prozent mit der Parteilinie übereinstimmen, das war das Erste.’

¹⁰¹ As one interviewee from East Germany told me, ‘it was an unwritten secret, if you want to have a career in the GDR, then you have to join a party at some point, preferably the SED.’ Original quote: ‘Es war ein ungeschriebenes Geheimnis, wenn du in der DDR Karriere machen willst, musst du dich irgendwann für eine Partei entscheiden, möglichst für die SED.’

¹⁰² Schmidt, Steffen (2013) "Mitgliedschaft und Aktivitäten in Parteien und Verbänden." *Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung*. 10.06. 2013. Available from: <http://perma.cc/SX5G-Q7QJ>. Accessed: 14.04. 2014.

1982.¹⁰³ The proportion of women in the GDR *Volkskammer* – the national assembly (yet with little to no influence on decision-making) - was similarly around a third (see Table 5).¹⁰⁴ Although the idea to introduce quotas for women in SED party positions had been formulated in a party statute in 1946, it was discarded only 4 years later and not raised again for the remainder of the SED's existence.¹⁰⁵

Table 5 Proportion of Women in the GDR Volkskammer 1954-1986

Year of Election	Total Number of Women	Percentage of Women
1954	128	27.5
1958	114	24.5
1963	137	27.4
1967	153	30.6
1971	159	31.8
1976	168	33.6
1981	162	32.4
1986	161	32.2

Source: Patzelt and Schirmer (2002), 392 cited by Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, (2005) "Gender Datenreport. Kommentierter Datenreport von Frauen und Männern in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland."

Some suggest that there existed a glass ceiling effect in the GDR - the higher one looked up the party-, industry-, or academic organisational ladders, the fewer women there were to be found.¹⁰⁶ The East German politburo, the executive committee of the socialist unity party and decision making body of the GDR, never had a single female voting member.¹⁰⁷ It is important to note, therefore, that the high participation rate of women in

¹⁰³ Randall, Vicky (1987) *Women and politics: an international perspective*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 56. See also: Harsch, *Revenge of the Domestic*, 69ff. According to Malycha, women's proportion in the SED was below 24 per cent in the 1960s. {Malycha, 2009 #847@414}

¹⁰⁴ Candidates for party lists were chosen by the National Front, an umbrella organisation of all approved existing parties (SED and block parties) in the GDR. {Schroeder, 1998 #971@415} As Montgomery points out, among the Eastern European communist states in general, 'the legislatures themselves served as rubber stamps for decisions made in the top echelons of party and state power places where women were notably absent.' Montgomery, "Women's Access to Political Power in Post-Communist Europe", 6.

¹⁰⁵ Hampele, "Zur politischen Partizipation von Frauen in der DDR", 286.

¹⁰⁶ Loc. cit. See also: Dölling, "Women in the GDR After the "Turning Point"".

¹⁰⁷ Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, (2005) "Gender Datenreport. Kommentierter Datenreport von Frauen und Männern in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland." Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend. Margarete Müller and Inge Lange were the only two female non-voting members of the Politburo. However, they were non-voting members. The

the labour market did not automatically translate to an equally high participation rate of women in GDR politics, as one interviewee observed.¹⁰⁸ There are various possible reasons for this, including a strongly inhibiting incumbency effect,¹⁰⁹ as well as the lack of an East German feminist movement or independent women's organisation (see section 8.3.1 in the appendix for a more detailed discussion).¹¹⁰

Yet, it must also be stressed that women's representation in the GDR was still considerably higher than that in West Germany, both at the national and local level (compare Table 4 and Table 5). A *Der Spiegel* article in 1969 pointed out that 1,172 of 9,021 cities and communes in the GDR were headed by female mayors compared to only 8 in 18,869 cities and communes in West Germany.¹¹¹ Compared to their West German counterparts, women in the GDR were also better represented in the justice administration.¹¹² In addition to formal political participation, women in the GDR were able to gain 'participatory experience' at their work place, in trade unions, and through

arguably most influential woman in the SED state was Margot Honecker, minister of education from 1963 to 1989.

¹⁰⁸ Original quote: 'Was wichtig ist, glaub ich, festzuhalten, ist, dass die sehr viel höhere berufliche Partizipation der Frauen in der früheren DDR und in Ostdeutschland dann auch fortgesetzt, nicht automatisch zu einer höheren politischen Partizipation in Ämtern geführt hat. Das ist glaub ich ein wichtiger Sachverhalt.'

¹⁰⁹ Incumbents of political mandates in the GDR who were appointed in the late 1940s often held on to their posts for many decades, meaning that fewer positions became available that could have been taken up by women.

¹¹⁰ Although there was a national women's organisation (the Democratic Women's Association, *Demokratischer Frauenbund Deutschlands (DFD)*, founded in 1946 and with over 1.3 million members throughout the 1950s), it was state run and did not allow for different versions of gender equality than that thought up and propagated by the state to enter the public discourse. Harsch notes that the DFD 'demanded considerably less time from members than did the SED but [was] engaged, nonetheless, in myriad activities that connected it to women as parents, students, housewives, consumers, and citizens. Harsch, *Revenge of the Domestic*, 71. As one former female SED member told me in an interview: 'the Democratic Women's Association, ... was more of an organisation of mums.... crocheting and knitting and such like, and giving women a space to chat. Original quote: '[der] Demokratischen Frauenbund, den DFD ... war eher so Mutti Organisation... häkeln und stricken, also solche Gesprächsmöglichkeiten für Frauen.' (Interview 17, The Left Party (Die Linke), Female, East German, 2013.) See also: Hampele, "Zur politischen Partizipation von Frauen in der DDR", 296-301. Neither the Democratic Women's Organisation nor other SED committees (tasked with drafting policies for women) truly represented women's interests. Instead, they had the symbolic function of representing the party line and of mobilise citizens. Loc. cit.

¹¹¹ Statistics exclude Lower Saxony, North-Rhein-Westphalia, and Rheinland-Pfalz (1969) "Natürliches Maß." 34/1969. 40-41. See also: Rueschemeyer, Marilyn (2003). "Women in Politics in Post-Communist East Germany." In: Kolinsky, Eva and Nickel, Hildegard Maria. *Reinventing Gender: Women in Eastern Germany since Unification*. London: Frank Cass. 231-49. 232.

¹¹² By 1953, Harsch observes, 'one third of *Volksrichter* were women Harsch, *Revenge of the Domestic*, 72. However, though the feminization of the justice system was impressive, it was largely a result of the thorough denazification of the judicial apparatus in the East. Loc. cit.

their work in collectives and neighbourhoods.¹¹³ The comparatively higher rates of civic and political engagement of women in the socialist state and the existence of social policy legislation that encouraged women's full participation in the labour force can be seen as positive exceptions to the rule of an otherwise oppressive and undemocratic regime.¹¹⁴

At the same time, it is important to stress once more the fundamental regime type differences between East and West Germany when comparing women's political participation during the Cold War period. As one interviewee put it,

‘The question [of why women participated less than men in GDR state politics], assumes a decision-making process, which as such only exists in a democracy.’¹¹⁵

Notwithstanding the many nuances that need to be taken into consideration when investigating the gender norm narratives and women's political participation in East and West Germany during the Cold War, the above assessment highlights that there existed distinctly different views on women's role in society between the former East and West German states. Throughout the 40 year period of separation, West Germany symbolised the conservative male-breadwinner model with its traditional family values.¹¹⁶ The GDR, by contrast, represented a dual-earner/state carer model, in which women were expected to fully participate in the labour market while the state assisted in the care for children through the provision of childcare.¹¹⁷ Although neither system was truly egalitarian, the GDR was nevertheless considerably less conservative with regards to women in the public sphere.

¹¹³ Rueschemeyer, "Women in Politics in Post-Communist East Germany", 232.

¹¹⁴ As Bennhold writes (citing an activist from East Germany) in the New York Times, “the Eastern regime mostly got it wrong (...) but on women, the East was ahead.” Bennhold, "20 Years After Fall of Wall, Women of Former East Germany Thrive", online resource.

¹¹⁵ Interview 12, CDU, Male, East German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Also die Frage unterstellt noch immer eine politische Partizipationsentscheidung, die eigentlich in der Demokratie nur so getroffen wird.’

¹¹⁶ Burdumy, "Reconsidering the Role of the Welfare State", 874. Trzcinski, Eileen (2000) "Family Policy in Germany: A Feminist Dilemma." *Feminist Economics*. vol. 6(1): 21-44.

¹¹⁷ According to Pfau-Effinger, ‘the dual breadwinner/state carer model is based on the idea of the full-time integration of both sexes into the employment system. Women and men are seen as individuals, who in marriage are both breadwinners who earn income for their own living and for that of their children. The task of caring for children is substantially seen as the task of the welfare state, not only of the family.’ Pfau-Effinger, "Gender cultures and the gender arrangement", 154.

As I will show in the next chapter, this left a mark on citizens' attitudes towards women and gender norms, with differences between citizens in the new and old federal states who were socialised during this period, still acutely felt today.

3.3 Gender and Politics in Unified Germany

The collapse of 'real existing socialism' and the merger of East and West Germany after the fall of the Berlin wall presented a unique opportunity for renegotiating the country's political structures.¹¹⁸ Attempts at unifying a market-based, democratic state with an economically centralised and socialist regime were unprecedented in modern political history. Likewise unprecedented, as Lemke remarks, was the merging of two countries in which women had assumed very different social and economic roles.¹¹⁹

Many scholars have stressed the complex and unique nature of the East German democratisation process through accession to the Federal Republic of Germany.¹²⁰ East Germany's transition itself was endogenous, the regime collapsed from within. Although the reunification treaty was a voluntary agreement, the transition through unification has been described by some as a 'democratic takeover' because the legal system of the former FRG was applied, with few exceptions, to the new federal states.¹²¹ The overriding emphasis propagated by the conservative political elites of West Germany was that of nationalism and unity. From the outset, this created an unfavourable context for the advancement of women's rights.¹²²

¹¹⁸ Young, Brigitte (1996) "The German State and Feminist Politics: A Double Gender Marginalisation." *Social Politics*. vol. 3(2/3): 159-84. 160.

¹¹⁹ Lemke, Christiane (1993). "Old Troubles and New Uncertainties: Women and Politics in United Germany." In: Huelshoff, Michael G., et al. *From Bundesrepublik to Deutschland: German Politics After Unification*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 147-66. 147.

¹²⁰ See for example: Offe, Claus and Poppe, Ulrike (2006). "Transitional Justice in the German Democratic Republic and in Unified Germany." In: Elster, Jon. *Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 239-75. 265.

¹²¹ Tucker, Avizier *ibid.* "Paranoids May Be Persecuted: Post-totalitarian Transitional Justice." 181-206. 182. One interviewee remarked that, 'there are many people who wished that it would have been a real unification and not a transfer of the West German system to the East.' Interview 16, SPD, Female, East German, 2013. Original Quote: 'Es gibt viele Menschen, die sich gewünscht hätten, dass es wirklich eine Vereinigung gewesen wäre und nicht nur eine Übertragung des westdeutschen Systems auf den Osten.'

¹²² Lemke, "Women and Politics in United Germany", 149. Brzinski writes that 'Germany's unification created very different party context for the recruitment of women compared to other East European states.'

Although many women were active in the citizens' movements that led to the fall of the Berlin wall (in East Germany, activist Bärbel Bohley was one of the most notable examples),¹²³ female representation in political life both at the institutional and at the grassroots levels dropped after the first free elections in East Germany.¹²⁴ Only 20.2 per cent of the first freely elected GDR parliament (which was in power between March and September 1990) were women.¹²⁵ On the whole, East German women's participation in formal decision-making processes leading up to the first unity treaty was therefore rather marginal. The same could be said for women's participation in the old federal states. As Young points out,

'neither the West German Ministry of Women nor the East German Ministry of Family and Women nor representatives of women's organisations and federations had been consulted' in the unification process.¹²⁶

Women in the East were also underrepresented in the political roundtable discussions and in the newly constituted trade unions, work committees, and management boards of new companies.¹²⁷ Not only the themes of unification, but also the final treaty that established the monetary, economic, and social union were therefore negotiated and signed mostly by men.¹²⁸

The unification treaty itself also paid insufficient attention to women on a substantive level. Only Article 19 of the final document (addressing the subject of 'unemployment insurance and employment promotion') explicitly referred to women and it did so in conjunction with disabled persons as two groups whose special needs had to be

The political institutions of the Federal Republic of Germany were largely retained in the united Germany, and many key political actors have also been retained.' Bay Brzinski, "Women's Representation in Germany", 64.

¹²³ According to Young, women organised in virtually every city. Catchphrases such as 'Without Women There is No State' or 'We want more than a fatherland' reflected their ambitions to increase female representation in the political unification process. Young, *Triumph of the fatherland*, 3 and 26-27. See also: Rueschemeyer, "Women in Politics in Post-Communist East Germany", 232-33.

¹²⁴ Dodds, Dinah Jane and Allen-Thompson, Pam (1994) *The wall in my backyard: East German women in transition*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 11.

¹²⁵ Einhorn, *Cinderella goes to market*, 151.

¹²⁶ Young, *Triumph of the fatherland*, 157-58.

¹²⁷ Beyer, Marina (1992) "The situation of east German women in postunification Germany." *Women's Studies International Forum*. vol. 15(1): 111-14. 112.

¹²⁸ Sandole-Staroste, *Women in transition*, 3.

considered.¹²⁹ With the coming into effect of the unification treaty, the less extensive West German family, labour and social protection regulations replaced the East German ones, which meant, among other things, that the East Germans' right to gainful employment was eliminated and that funding for state-sponsored childcare facilities was significantly decreased.¹³⁰ Indeed, nearly all of the socio-economic 'achievements' of the GDR, which had benefited women and facilitated women's participation in the economy were dismantled in the course of unification.¹³¹ Not only were women especially hard hit by the high unemployment rates that took hold in the new federal states, they also experienced restrictions in their previously liberal abortion rights. Rita Süßmuth, member of the CDU and former President of the Bundestag, concluded that, 'no one can deny that the reunification of 1990 will be associated with men and not women.'¹³²

Several reasons have been identified in the literature for why women were unable to exert greater influence on the unification negotiations and why were they unable to better represent their interests in the process. Some argue that women's numerical and substantive underrepresentation was due to the domination of the established West German political parties (the new parties in the new federal states were largely modelled after the established West German sister organisations¹³³). This facilitated the perpetuation of the exclusionary mechanisms in West German politics which combined with the remnants of the paternalistic aspects of communist political culture¹³⁴ to

¹²⁹ Fisher, Pamela L. (2005) "Abortion in post-communist Germany: The end of Muttipolitik and a still birth for feminism." *Women's Studies International Forum*. vol. 28(1): 21-36. 25.

¹³⁰ Berghahn, Sabine (1995) "Gender in the legal discourse in post-unification Germany: Old and new lines of conflict." *Social Politics Spring*. vol. 2(1): 37-50. 39.

¹³¹ Mushaben, Joyce Marie (1997) "Concession or compromise? The politics of abortion in United Germany." *German Politics*. vol. 6(3): 70-88. 70. Rueschemeyer argues that 'women's concerns and issues were defined by (male) politicians as secondary to "more important needs."' Rueschemeyer, "Women in Politics in Post-Communist East Germany", 233.

¹³² Cited in Sandole-Staroste, *Women in transition*, 4.

¹³³ West German political parties have historically been characterised by a 'relatively high member/electorate ratio (membership density), (...) permanent active and organisationally strong local branches, (...) a bureaucratic but increasingly electoral-professionalised apparatus, and finally by a relatively high influence of the extra parliamentary organisation (e.g. members, party conventions, the program) in internal decision-making.' Grabow, Karsten (2001) "The Re-Emergence of the Cadre Party?: Organizational Patterns of Christian and Social Democrats in Unified Germany." *Party Politics*. vol. 7(1): 23-43. , 25

¹³⁴ Lemke, "Women and Politics in United Germany", 159. Young, *Triumph of the fatherland*, 19-27; Maleck-Lewy, Eva (1995) "Between self-determination and state supervision: Women and the abortion law in postunification Germany." *Social Politics*. vol. 2(1): 62-75. 63. Matland argues that the patriarchal legacy of communism, which I discussed above, had a deterring 'hangover effect' on women's formal participation.

undermine the representation of women and women's issues during the policy-making stages that led to German unification and beyond.¹³⁵

One female East German interviewee and CDU member who fostered political ambitions during the 1990s told me how a party colleague had publicly argued that her being a mother undermined her political competency.¹³⁶ The same interviewee also told me about the deterring effects of male networks at the time. The governing CDU/CSU had not yet adopted internal quotas for women and only few safe party list seats or constituency mandates were given to female candidates.¹³⁷ Left leaning parties on the other hand, who put forward a greater number of female candidates, did not secure sufficient electoral support in the immediate post-unification years.¹³⁸ Scholars have also commented on the inability of women from the new and old federal states to formulate shared interests or to effectively campaign for them.¹³⁹ In light of the many economic and political challenges posed by the unification process, women or gender equality issues were simply not regarded a priority by most citizens or policy makers.¹⁴⁰

An alternative explanation for women's low participation in politics and the labour market after the end of the Cold War is that it simply reflected women's true preferences, that Eastern women actually rejected 'the gender equality policies of the previous regime' and welcomed the opportunity to return to the private sphere.¹⁴¹ As the analysis of gender attitudes in the following chapter will demonstrate, this argument is not

Matland and Montgomery, "Recruiting Women to National Legislatures", 38. He defines post-communist political culture as 'a culture that combines a strong patriarchal tradition with the residual effects of directive emancipation' Matland, Richard E. and Montgomery, Kathleen A. (2003) *Women's Access to Political Power in Post-Communist Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. iix.

¹³⁵ Young, *Triumph of the fatherland*, 157-58.

¹³⁶ Interview 9, CDU, Female, East German, 2013. Original quote: 'Also mein Parteifeind - wie man so schön sagt - der hat schon genau gewusst, wo meine Schwächen sind oder wie er seinen Anhängern klarmachen konnte, dass man eben als Frau und Mutter zum Beispiel nicht ministrabel war. So was haben die mir dann erzählt. Er hat ihnen eben klar gemacht, dass ich nicht so eine Karriere machen könnte wie er, sondern dass ich eben nur im Kern Arbeit machen würde und ob sie sich nicht eben lieber wünschten und so.... Und das hat auch geklappt damals.'

¹³⁷ Einhorn, *Cinderella goes to market*, 156.

¹³⁸ Loc. cit.

¹³⁹ Hampele, "Zur politischen Partizipation von Frauen in der DDR", 309.

¹⁴⁰ Loc. cit.

¹⁴¹ Einhorn, *Cinderella goes to market*, 148ff.

convincing, at least not with respect to East Germany, where the majority of women wanted to work.

‘Women from East Germany were seen as the disadvantaged ... They were told “you were forced to work.” But when ... the silence was eventually broken ... they explained that they *wanted* to work.’¹⁴² (emphasis added)

‘Only unification has forced [women] back into a different role. ... They had always worked, they have had jobs. Childcare was done on the side, without feeling bad about it.’¹⁴³

Another possible reason for East German women’s retrenchment from politics in the 1990s may be linked to the deep economic insecurities that affected East German citizens and especially women after unification.¹⁴⁴ Women from the former GDR are said to have experienced the most significant cut-backs as nearly all of the socio-economic ‘achievements’ of the GDR which had benefited them were being dismantled,¹⁴⁵ so much so that East German women were described as the ‘losers of unification’.¹⁴⁶ The rapidly

¹⁴² Interview 21, CDU, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Frauen aus Ostdeutschland als die Benachteiligten galten, die Rechtlosen, diejenigen, die eigentlich jetzt ins gelobte Land kamen. Die Frauen mit ihren Biographien, hatten aber andere Lebenserfahrungen. Da hieß es dann, „Ihr wart gezwungenermaßen berufstätig.“ Aber als sie dann aus dieser Dankeshymne, dem Schweigen, dann einmal raus waren – ich war so froh, als das Schweigen dann aufhörte – haben die dann erklärt, aber wir wollen auch erwerbstätig sein.’

¹⁴³ Original quote: ‘Als ich würde schon sagen, die Berufstätigkeit der Frauen, die Selbstverständlichkeit, das ist anders. Das sagen Ihnen auch die Frauen. Früher hatte ich nicht solche Berührungspunkte mit Ostdeutschland. Also das sehe ich schon, dass einfach die Frauen teilweise selbstbewusster sind. Und an sich eher erst durch die Wende wieder in eine andere Rolle gedrückt wurden. Aber so im Selbstverständnis selbstbewusster sind. Sie haben immer gearbeitet, sie haben bestimmte Berufe ausgeübt. Kinderbetreuung war nebenbei. Also das war auch ohne schlechte Gewissen. Würde ich schon sagen.’


¹⁴⁴ Rueschemeyer, "Women in Politics in Post-Communist East Germany", 234.

¹⁴⁵ Mushaben, "The politics of abortion in United Germany", 70. It should be noted however that public childcare was and still is far more widespread in East Germany than in West Germany. Nagel, "Women in Germany in 2006", 41.

¹⁴⁶ See for example: Dodds and Allen-Thompson, *East German women in transition*. Berghahn, "Gender in the legal discourse in post-unification Germany". Ferree, Myra Marx (1993) "The Rise and Fall of ‘Mommy Politics’: Feminism and Unification in (East) Germany." *Feminist Studies*. vol. 19(1): 89-115. Budde, "German Women’s Situation and Experiences between 1945 and 1995". Dölling, Irene (1999). "Structure and Eigensinn: Transformation Processes and Continuities of East German Women." In: Schmith, Patricia J. *After the Wall: Eastern Germany Since 1989*. Oxford: Westview Press. 183-202. Young, *Triumph of the fatherland*, 7. Nickel, Hildegard Maria (2000). "Employment, Gender and the Dual Transformation in Germany." In: Flockton, Chris, et al. *The New Germany in the East: Policy Agendas and Social Developments since Unification*. London: Frank Cass. 107-21. Rosenfeld, Rachel A. (2004) "Gender and Work in Germany: Before and After Reunification." *Annual Review of Sociology*. vol. 30: 103-24. Bennhold, "20 Years After Fall of Wall, Women of Former East Germany Thrive", online resource.

declining birth rates in East Germany (the so-called *Wendeknick*) in 1990s are often brought up as evidence for this appraisal.¹⁴⁷ Within one year of unification, birth rates in the East had halved, leaving the region with the lowest fertility rate in the world at that time.¹⁴⁸

Figure 1 Birth Rates in East and West Germany 1952-2010



Notes: The table shows the average number of births in East and West Germany per 1000 Women between 1952-2010. Source: Federal Institute for Population Research 2013 *from 1990 excluding Berlin; **from 1990 including Berlin.

However, Weidenfeld and Kort point out that there does not necessarily exist a causal connection between economic and demographic changes in East Germany after unification. Rather, they may be understood as ‘individual reactions to an unknown future’ and an assimilation to West Germany.¹⁴⁹ This may well have had an impact on

¹⁴⁷ Adler, Marina A. (1997) "Social Change and Declines in Marriage and Fertility in Eastern Germany." *Journal of Marriage and Family*. vol. 59(1): 37-49.

¹⁴⁸ However, it could also be argued that declining birth rates were due to the new opportunities and life choices that presented themselves to young East Germans at the time. See: Prützel-Thomas, Monika (1995) "The abortion issue since unification. Are women the losers?" *Debatte*. vol. 3(2): 105–20. 118. The figures by the Federal Statistical Office seem to confirm this interpretation - the strongest decline in the birth rates between 1990 and 1995 occurred among women in their early and mid- twenties.

¹⁴⁹ Weidenfeld, Werner and Korte, Karl-Rudolf (1999) *Handbuch zur deutschen Einheit 1949-1989-1999*. Frankfurt/Main: Campus. 525.

the capacity of women to participate politically.¹⁵⁰ As one female East German interviewee observed,

‘Many [women] were pre-occupied with themselves, they lost their jobs, had to create new means of existence, had to find a new future. In this instance, your family is closer to you than politics.’¹⁵¹

It must also be highlighted that political participation in general dropped among both men and women in the new federal states. For example, between December 1989 and May 1990, SED membership shrank from 1.4 Million to 400.000. Voter turnout too decreased significantly after the first free elections. Several scholars have attributed the declining rates of participation in the new federal states to political disillusionment. This disillusionment is thought to stem from two potential sources. The first is socialisation under an authoritarian, anti-capitalist regime. Becker notes that GDR socialisation led East Germans to be more reserved about ‘the Federal Republic’s political system’ and more distrusting ‘of its political institutions.’¹⁵² At the same time, the mockery of pro-forma participation in the German Democratic Republic may have led to a situation in which non-participation became an expression of East Germans’ newly gained freedoms. This was reflected in a number of interviews with politicians from the new federal states:

‘In my view, there is a connection between the traumatization through life in the GDR and what happens today. Some GDR citizens actually perceived it as a new gained freedom that they did not have any obligations or have to be part of a structure. And I think that the retreat which we see in the East today, is still characterised by this reflex.’¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ As Rueschemeyer rightly notes, ‘it is only an apparent paradox that people who lose economically also lose political voice.’ Rueschemeyer, "Women in Politics in Post-Communist East Germany", 234.

¹⁵¹ Interview 17, The Left Party (Die Linke), Female, East German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Es haben in den ersten Jahren ganz wenige Frauen kandidiert. Viele waren mit sich selber beschäftigt, sind aus dem Beruf rausgeflogen, mussten sich eine neue Existenz schaffen, mussten eine neue Zukunft finden. Da stand ihnen natürlich in vielen Fragen ihre Familie erst mal näher als die Politik.’

¹⁵² Becker, "Political efficacy and voter turnout in East and West Germany", 321.

¹⁵³ Original quote: ‘Aus meiner Sicht gibt es einen Zusammenhang zwischen der Traumatisierung durch die DDR Wirklichkeit und dem, was heute ist. Also, es war für den normalen DDR Bürger ... hat man’s manchmal direkt als einen Freiheitsgewinn betrachtet, dass man nicht durch irgendeine äußere Verpflichtung irgendeine Kontaktstruktur oder irgendetwas nachgehen muss. Und ich denke, dass der Rückzug, der sich ja im Osten dann feststellen lässt, noch immer von diesem Reflex gekennzeichnet ist.’

A second reason for political disillusionment is said to stem from the severe economic difficulties, high unemployment rates and cuts in social welfare provision, experienced by East German citizens after unification. This, it has been suggested, has thwarted their faith in a more prosperous economic future, which they expected to see realised by West German democracy.¹⁵⁴ As two East German interviewees remarked:

‘There was a certain resignation that things didn’t turn out the way one hoped they would ... many people experienced significant professional setbacks and disappointments through the decline and disappearance of industry ... I recently talked to people in my village. Most of them say, well why should I go [vote]? Nothing changes anyway. I don’t have the power to change anything.’¹⁵⁵

‘...there began to be frustration along the lines of ‘it doesn’t change anything anyway, whatever we vote, nothing changes, they are all in cahoots with each other, all of one opinion, they do whatever they like’. ... Euphoria very quickly turned into resignation and pessimism. And in such a situation, you can get almost nobody to join a party.’¹⁵⁶

I will return to a more detailed analysis of party membership and political participation among men and women in unified Germany in chapter 5.

¹⁵⁴ However, I would like to point out that this is by far not the only possible reason for eastern Germans’ lower levels of political participation. The federal commission for the new federal states for example argued that some eastern Germans have regarded it as a new kind of political freedom not to have to participate politically after the end of the GDR (see interview transcript in the appendix).

¹⁵⁵ Interview 17, The Left Party (Die Linke), Female, East German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Also es ist eine gewisse Resignation da, dass also vieles nicht so gekommen ist, wie man’s erhofft hat oder auch nicht so schnell gekommen ist, dass viele persönlich arge Rückschläge und Enttäuschungen erlitten haben, berufsmäßig gesehen durch die Zurückdrängung der Industrie, durch den Weggang der Bereiche und dass dann auch nicht neue Bereiche erschlossen worden sind. Diese Resignation ist da. ... Ich hab mich jetzt auch mal bei mir im Dorf mit Leuten unterhalten, ... die meisten sagen, ja, was sollen wir noch gehen, wir ändern ja sowieso nichts. Es ändert sich ja nicht. Ich habe ja keine Macht, was zu verändern.’

¹⁵⁶ Interview 5, Greens, Female, East German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Dann kam aber auch gleichzeitig die Frustration nach dem Motto, “das hilft sowieso nichts, egal was wir wählen, es ändert sich nichts, die stecken alle unter einer Decke, die sind alle einer Meinung, die machen sowieso was sie wollen.” ... Also die Euphorie kippte dann ganz schnell in Resignation und Pessimismus. Und in so einer Situation kriegst du natürlich fast niemanden in eine Partei.’

3.3.1 Unified Germany's Gender Regime

In the course of unification, political elites opted for the West German single breadwinner model over the dual earner model of the GDR.¹⁵⁷ With the exception of the political debate on abortion regulations,¹⁵⁸ gender policies played at best a marginal role in the political discourse of the 1990s. The West German single breadwinner model remained largely unchallenged during this decade. Yet in the new millennium, as Xydias points out, unprecedented debates about 'women's social roles and the state's responsibility to support a wider array of work and family choices' have proliferated.¹⁵⁹ Consecutive German governments have overseen a number of changes in social policies aimed, at least rhetorically, at improving gender equality and facilitating the compatibility of work and family life.¹⁶⁰ Von Wahl argues that this was largely the result of the increased presence of female 'critical actors' in parliament following the adoption of gender quotas by the main political parties.¹⁶¹ But many of the social policy reforms were arguably also aimed at counter-acting the decreasing birth rate trend in Germany.

One of the most important general provisions in the immediate unification period was the amendment of Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law on the gender equality principle (equality before the law) passed by national parliament in 1994. It mandates the government to actively promote equality of rights and opportunities between men and women and to take active steps to eradicate gender discrimination.¹⁶² In the early 2000s, this was followed by the passing of the 'Federal Act on Equal Opportunities between Women and Men in the Federal Administration' (*Gleichstellungsgesetz für die Bundesverwaltung*

¹⁵⁷ Ostner, "Gender and Welfare in Unified Germany".

¹⁵⁸ On the issue of abortion policy in unified Germany, See for example: Riemer, Jeremiah M. (1993). "Reproduction and Reunification: The Politics of Abortion on Unified Germany." In: Huelshoff, Michael G., et al. *From Bundesrepublik to Deutschland: German Politics After Unification*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 167-88.

¹⁵⁹ Xydias, Christina Vassiliki (2010) *Women Representing Women?: Pathways to Substantive Representation*. Doctoral Thesis. Submitted to the Department of Political Science. The Ohio State University. 32.

¹⁶⁰ This is usually referred to as 'women politics' (*Frauenpolitik*) or 'equality politics' (*Gleichstellungspolitik*) Hoecker, *Frauen, Männer und die Politik*, 209.

¹⁶¹ Von Wahl "Moving a Mountain: Women Voters, Women Leaders, and the Male Breadwinner Model in Germany", 72-85.

¹⁶² Article 3, paragraph 2 now reads: 'Men and women shall have equal rights. The state shall promote the actual implementation of equal rights for women and men and take steps to eliminate disadvantages that now exist.'

und die Gerichte des Bundes) in 2001 and the ‘General Equal Treatment Act’ (*Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz*) in 2006, promoting affirmative action and the compatibility of work and family life.¹⁶³ At the turn of the century, as Künzler observes, ‘most types of [direct] legal discrimination against women’ had been eliminated.

At the same time, however, German political structures continued to shape hierarchies between men and women through ‘incentives/disincentives and provision/non-provision of social services,’ based on a complex family and social policy framework.¹⁶⁴ With regards to family policy for example, Germany’s legislation is not only one of the most complicated, consisting of over 150 different benefit and social policy measures, it is also one of the most expensive by European standards (with family benefits alone costing German tax payers approximately 200 Billion Euro per year).¹⁶⁵ This is compounded by the German federal structure in which certain policies are decided at the national level, but have to be implemented and funded by the individual federal states, resulting in large discrepancies in implementation across German regions (see Table 6).

Table 6 Decision-Making over Family Policies at the Federal and State Level

Policy or Service	Federal Level	State or Local Level
Child Allowance and Benefit Payments (<i>Kindergeld</i>)	√	
Child Tax Breaks (<i>Kinderfreibetrag</i>)	√	√
Equal Opportunities Act (<i>Gleichstellungsgesetz für die Bundesverwaltung und die Gerichte des Bundes</i>)	√	
Equal Rights Act	√	
Marriage Tax Breaks (<i>Ehegattensplitting</i>)	√	
Parental Leave Allowance (<i>Elterngeld</i>)	√	
Provision of Public Playgrounds and Sport Facilities		√
Public Child Care and After-School Day Care		√
Schools and Education		√
Student Support and Loans (<i>Bafög</i>)	√	√

Source: Bujard, Martin (2011) "Geld-, Zeit- und Infrastrukturleistungen der deutschen Familienpolitik." Berlin: Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 3. And: Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia "Familienpolitik." Available from: <http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Familienpolitik>. Accessed: 03.03.2014. With my own alterations.

¹⁶³ Pfau-Effinger, "Family Childcare in the Cultural and Institutional Context", 45.

¹⁶⁴ Künzler, Jan, Walter, Wolfgang, Reichart, Elisabeth and Pfister, Gerd (2001) "Gender division of labour in unified Germany." Tilburg: WORC European Network on Policies and the Division of Unpaid and Paid Work.

¹⁶⁵ (2013) "Der 200-Milliarden-Irrtum." 6/2013. 22-29; Dettmer, Janko, Hülsen, Markus, Müller, Isabell, Neubacher, Peter, Sauga, Alexander and Tietz, Michael (2013) "Der 200-Milliarden-Irrtum." *Der Spiegel*. 04.02.2013. 22-29.

State funding for public childcare is a frequently cited example for these discrepancies. While in the new federal states, the average share of children under the age of three in day care is almost 50 per cent, it is lower than 20 per cent in the West.¹⁶⁶ Differences between states are also reflected in the fact that only some of the 16 federal states have ministries for families, women, or gender equality (or a combination of these) while others do not. During an internship at the ministerial division for the 'Reconciliation of Work and Family Life' at the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs in the first year of my studies for this thesis, I had the impression that there was little sense of responsibility for actually improving the compatibility of work and family life, because the responsibility for implementation ultimately lay with the respective federal states.¹⁶⁷

More importantly, however, it must be stressed that existing German gender and family policies currently support different kinds of gender and family structures which often 'work against the incentives of the other.'¹⁶⁸ As von Wahl puts it, many of the 'new policies do not express unitary but complex, sometimes contradictory, sometimes complementary interests by parties and coalitions clamouring for voters.'¹⁶⁹ There are, for example, many welfare provisions still supporting the West German conservative breadwinner model, chief among which is the so-called *Ehegattensplittung* – a system of joint taxation of married couples which aggregates the incomes of spouses and taxes it together, thereby benefitting a constellation in which one of the partners earns considerably more (or less) than the other. Thus, it incentivises a traditional division of labour and disadvantages two-earner couples of similarly high income.¹⁷⁰ More recently, the government passed the so-called *Betreuungsgeld*, a cash-for-care subsidy for families not enrolling their children (aged 1 or 2) in state-subsidised childcare facilities (this policy will be discussed in detail in chapter 6). Similarly, in 2013, the German parliament

¹⁶⁶ In part, this is also a legacy of the more extensive childcare infrastructure which existed in the former GDR.

¹⁶⁷ Interview 1, no party affiliation, Male, West German, 2012.

¹⁶⁸ Dettmer, Hülsen, Müller, Neubacher, Sauga and Tietz, "Der 200-Milliarden-Irrtum", 27.

¹⁶⁹ Von Wahl "Moving a Mountain: Women Voters, Women Leaders, and the Male Breadwinner Model in Germany", 72-85. Similarly, Xydias finds in her research on women's representation in the German Bundestag, that 'not all parties – nor all women – share an understanding of the role that the state might take in mediating these contested values.' Xydias, *Pathways to Substantive Representation*, 32.

¹⁷⁰ Künzler, Walter, Reichart and Pfister, "Gender division of labour in unified Germany", 18. *Ehegattensplittung* costs the German government approximately €20 billion per year in taxes. Dettmer, Hülsen, Müller, Neubacher, Sauga and Tietz, "Der 200-Milliarden-Irrtum", 28.

rejected a proposal by left-leaning parties to introduce mandatory quotas for women on boards of listed companies.¹⁷¹ Highlighting the contradictory strategy for gender equality in Germany, an almost identical proposal was eventually passed in late 2014 by the subsequent coalition government during Merkel's third term in office.¹⁷²

Germany has also passed several other laws and welfare provisions in recent years which signal a process of liberalisation aimed at 'promoting maternal employment' and the 'participation of fathers'.¹⁷³ These policies include the extension of paid parental leave through the introduction of the so-called Elterngeld in 2007, which incentivises both parents of a child to take at least some part of the state-subsidised parental leave based on time benefit and transfer payments.¹⁷⁴ More generally, the rights of fathers outside of marriage have also been strengthened.¹⁷⁵ In addition, there has been increasing recognition of the need of public childcare. As of 2013, parents of children aged 1-6 have a legal right to a place in a publicly funded childcare institution (between 1996-2013 this right only applied to children aged 3-6).¹⁷⁶

¹⁷¹ See for example: Mendelsohn, Tina (2013) "Kampf um die Frauenquote: Warum klappt das mit den Frauenrechten nicht?" 24.01. 2013. Available from: <http://www.faz.net/-gsf-75y39>. Accessed: 24.01. 2013.

¹⁷² Die Zeit Online (2014) "Schwarz-rot einigt sich auf Frauenquote." *Zeit Online*. 26.11. 2014. Available from: <http://bit.ly/1HFfn9gW>. Accessed: 26.11. 2014. Bryant, Chris (2014) "Germany backs quotas for women on boards." *Financial Times*. 26.11. 2014. Available from: <http://on.ft.com/1rux12U>. Accessed: 28.11. 2014.

¹⁷³ Von Wahl "Moving a Mountain: Women Voters, Women Leaders, and the Male Breadwinner Model in Germany", 72-85.

¹⁷⁴ Von Wahl summarises the policy as, 'a standard transfer payment in 2007 that replaces 67% of the previous net income for working parents (for those making between 1000 and 1200 EUR). A minimum benefit of 300 EUR and a maximum of 1800 EUR per month for up to 14 months allow parents to stay at home with appropriate financial support.' Prior to 2007, parents were paid a flat rate of 300€ per month 'for a period of up to 24 months.' loc. cit.

¹⁷⁵ Woods, Dorian R. (2005). "On the road to similar gender regimes? Social assistance for single mothers in the U.S. and Germany." In: Henninger, Annette and Ostendorf, Helga. *Die politische Steuerung des Geschlechterregimes*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 93-111. 109.

¹⁷⁶ Yet despite these more progressive trends, demand for childcare in Germany still far outstrips supply. Many parents (especially women) wish to return to full-time employment, but are unable to do so due to the lack of available and affordable childcare. According to a 2011 study carried out among German citizens by the Allensbach Institute (based on face-to-face interviews with 1.751 German citizens), over half (58 per cent) of all respondents expressed that it is still difficult to combine work and family life and 47 per cent of respondents stated that the compatibility of family and work life should be a policy priority for German governments. As such, this topic now fares as prominent as the Euro stabilisation or healthcare reform. Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach (2011) "Monitor Familienleben 2011: Einstellungen und Lebensverhältnisse von Familien. Ergebnisse einer Repräsentativbefragung im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Familie - Berichtsband -."

Overall, therefore, ‘substantial tension persists between more and less traditional conceptions of women’s roles [as well as family ideals and gender norms] in society’, as Xydias observes.¹⁷⁷ These tensions will be revisited in more detail in the final substantive chapter of this thesis.

¹⁷⁷ Xydias, *Pathways to Substantive Representation*, 32.

4 Sex and the Citizens: Gender Role Attitudes in Unified Germany

In 2011, Germany's first comprehensive gender equality report commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Family, Women, Youth, and Senior Citizens¹ acknowledged that expectations of the roles of responsibility towards family and professional life between women and men still differed in significant ways, with detrimental effects on women's 'decisions and life chances' in the economy, in politics, and at home.² One of the underlying questions that gender welfare state scholars seek to address in this context is whether governments merely draft policies in response to existing social attitudes or if governments themselves help create attitudes and preferences through the implementation of specific social policies. On the basis of the German case study, which I introduced in detail in the previous chapter, I now turn to investigate this complex relationship between institutions and citizens' gender attitudes.

Research by Banaszak and Bauernschuster and Rainer has been of particular import to the analysis presented in this chapter.³ Using data from the German General Social Survey (waves 1991, 1996, 2000, and 2004), Banaszak investigated both institutional and socio-economic explanations for citizens' attitudes towards gender roles in unified Germany, arguing that the former East and West German political regimes played a significant role in shaping citizens' views towards women, with 'enormous implications for women's political, social, and economic equality.'⁴ Four years later, Bauernschuster and Rainer published similar results on gender attitudes in post-unification Germany, likewise using ALLBUS data (although with the addition of the 2006 survey wave). Their findings reinforced Banaszak's conclusions that citizens in the new federal states are

¹ Bundesministerium für Familie, "Erster Gleichstellungsbericht". The report analyses social policy, gender roles, and gender gaps in education, the labour market, and gender differences in citizens' life courses.

² Loc. cit. The report also dedicates an entire chapter on the relationship between German law ('Recht' - broadly defined in the report as political institutions) and gender culture.

³ Banaszak, "Citizens' Attitudes toward Women's Roles in Germany". Bauernschuster and Rainer, "How Sex-Role Attitudes Keep on Diverging in Reunified Germany"; Bauernschuster and Rainer, "How sex-role attitudes continue to differ in reunified Germany".

⁴ Banaszak, "Citizens' Attitudes toward Women's Roles in Germany", 51.

more liberal in their views on gender roles than citizens in West Germany. Moreover, the authors found the East-West gap in gender attitudes to have widened since the 1990s.⁵ Like Banaszak, Bauernschuster and Rainer also linked the differences in gender role attitudes to the existence of two welfare state models in West Germany and the GDR during the Cold War. Using a number of different model specifications and including the most recently available ALLBUS survey data, I will test and on expand the work of these authors.

In order to attribute any existing gaps in attitudes toward gender roles in East and West Germany to the imposition of two different political systems, we need to be able to demonstrate that citizens in both parts of the country were in fact alike before the country's separation. Yet, quantitative data on citizens' gender attitudes before 1949 is virtually non-existent. There are, however, a number of qualitative historical studies on gender and family norms in 19th and early 20th century Germany, a number of which I reviewed in the previous chapter.⁶ The fact that these studies (and the historical sources they draw on) do not identify differences between Eastern and Western parts of country is an indicator for the lack of significant disparities in the two regions at that time. There are, in addition, other statistical proxies supporting this assertion. Banaszak, Bauernschuster and Rainer cite fertility-, marriage-, and female employment rates from the first half of the twentieth century, which largely match in the two German regions.⁷

⁵ Bauernschuster and Rainer, "How sex-role attitudes continue to differ in reunified Germany", 7.

⁶ See for example: Frevert, *Frauen-Geschichte*; Hausen, *Frauen suchen ihre Geschichte: Historische Studien zum 19. und 20. Jahrhundert.*; Tenfelde, Klaus (1992) "Arbeiterfamilie und Geschlechterbeziehung im Deutschen Kaiserreich." *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*. vol. 18(2): 179-203. The qualitative data analysed by these authors include women's magazines, diaries, etiquette books, political speeches and so on.

⁷ According to Bauernschuster and Rainer, 'data from the Statistisches Reichsamt (1936, pp. 322 and 334) indicate that female labor market participation did hardly differ between what is today's East Germany and West Germany. In 1935, 31% of all employed and unemployed were female in the regions of today's East Germany; in West Germany, this figure is only slightly lower (30.14%). As far as marriage behaviour and fertility is concerned, historical data again support our assumption that East and West Germans did not systematically differ before separation (Statistisches Reichsamt 1936, p. 36). The same is true for female working hours as compared with male working hours and female wages as compared with male wages (e.g., Statistisches Reichsamt 1936, p. 342).' Bauernschuster and Rainer, "How sex-role attitudes continue to differ in reunified Germany", 8. See also: Banaszak, "Citizens' Attitudes toward Women's Roles in Germany".

This would suggest, they reason, that there was ‘no substantial difference in gender-role attitudes’ at the time.⁸

However, there is at least one important distinction between the two regions, namely, religious affiliation. As a result of the protestant reformation movement under Martin Luther in the early 16th century, most of the eastern German territory has historically been protestant whereas in western German states, there has been a greater mix of protestant and catholic communities.⁹ This is important because Catholics are regarded as more socially conservative compared to Protestants.¹⁰ In response to these concerns, Bauernschuster and Rainer highlight that there also exist a significant number of protestant communities in West Germany. The mix of Catholicism and Protestantism in the region, they argue, means that the ‘associations between religion and gender-role attitudes’ is ‘rather modest.’¹¹ Indeed, as we shall see, the size of the regression coefficients of Catholics and Protestants on gender attitudes is almost identical, and controlling for religious denomination does not account for the differences in gender attitudes in the two regions.

4.1 Hypotheses

In chapter 3, I reviewed social policy legislation in East and West Germany before and after re-unification with regards to gender roles and women’s political participation. I showed that the dominant strategy of the conservative post-war West-German government was to propagate a gender regime that idealised women as mothers and housewives.¹² In socialist East Germany, by contrast, women were supported in their dual role as workers *and* mothers. On this basis, I am able to formulate hypotheses for testing the effect of political socialisation on East and West Germans’ gender role

⁸ Bauernschuster and Rainer, "How sex-role attitudes continue to differ in reunified Germany", 6. It is difficult to substantiate this claim however, because data on fertility and employment rates for the first part of the twentieth century are not easily available.

⁹ Ausschuss der deutschen Statistiker für die Volks- und Berufszählung 1946 (1949, 100–107) cited by Banaszak, "Citizens' Attitudes toward Women's Roles in Germany", 35-36. Bauernschuster and Rainer, "How sex-role attitudes continue to differ in reunified Germany", 14.

¹⁰ Seguino, "Religion's Impact on Gender Inequality".

¹¹ Bauernschuster and Rainer, "How sex-role attitudes continue to differ in reunified Germany", 14.

¹² Budde, "German Women's Situation and Experiences between 1945 and 1995", 54-55.

attitudes. To reiterate, proponents of the idea of political socialisation and institutional learning argue that individuals adopt those 'values and norms which a political system instils' in them.¹³ As Banaszak points out,¹⁴ the political socialisation or institutional learning model would thus predict that,

Hypothesis 1 Citizens in East Germany hold less traditional gender role attitudes than citizens in West Germany.

Moreover, if institutional socialisation has indeed had a significant effect on gender culture, then we could expect the difference in attitudes between East and West German citizens to be greatest among those individuals who were socialised longest under the former German regimes. My second hypothesis therefore states that,

Hypothesis 2 The difference between gender attitudes is greatest among citizens who were socialised longest in the German Democratic Republic and former West Germany respectively.

In light of the convergence of social policy in the new and old federal states in the course of unification, the institutional learning model would also predict that the difference in attitudes between East and West German citizens should gradually diminish over time. The third hypothesis explores this proposition, stating that,

Hypothesis 3 The differences in gender attitudes between citizens in East and West Germany is decreasing over time.

Finally, it is also possible that any existing gaps in gender attitudes between East and West Germans are in fact driven by the socio-economic differences in the new and old federal states. In order to better identify the effect of regime socialisation, it is therefore useful to control for a number of alternative explanations for gender attitude variation. The final hypothesis of this chapter does just this, stating that,

¹³ Verba (1965) cited in Rohrschneider, "Institutional Learning versus Value Diffusion", 424.

¹⁴ Banaszak, "Citizens' Attitudes toward Women's Roles in Germany", 35-36.

Hypothesis 4 The differences in gender attitudes between citizens in East and West Germany do not disappear after controlling for socio-economic micro-level characteristics.

Dependent Variable

To test the above hypotheses, I run OLS regressions on dependent summary measures capturing citizens' gender role attitudes. The following six statements included in the ALLBUS survey relate to citizens' attitudes toward gender roles:

- I. 'A working mother can establish just as loving and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who doesn't work'
- II. 'It is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself'
- III. 'A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works'
- IV. 'It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family'
- V. 'A child actually benefits from his or her mother having a job rather than just concentrating on the home'
- VI. 'A married woman should not work if there is a limited number of jobs and her husband is able to support the family'

For each statement, there are 4 possible response levels from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). Each variable was recoded so that 1 corresponds to egalitarian and 4 to traditional attitudes toward gender roles. Traditional attitudes are understood to be those, which view women's responsibilities to be primarily in the private sphere, i.e. agreement with statements II to IV, and VI, and disagreement with statements I and V. While Bauernschuster and Rainer run separate regressions on each of the six gender attitude question asked in the German General Social Survey (see Table 8), Mokken Scale analysis shows that responses for the above (recoded) statements can be grouped on a scale. A single variable for traditional gender attitudes was generated, taking values from 1 (most egalitarian outlook) to 19 (most traditional outlook). ($trad. gender. att_i = \sum_{j=1}^6 level_{ij} - 5$ where $level_{ij}$ denotes the response of respondent i to question j).

Data on gender attitudes are available for the following years 1991, 1992, 1996, 2002, 2004, 2008, and 2012.¹⁵

Independent Variables

The focus of the statistical analysis in this chapter lies on the explanatory variables region and cohort. Unfortunately, the place of birth of respondents was documented by ALLBUS for survey years 1991, 1992, 1994, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2010 only. Using this indicator as the main explanatory variable for region would mean that gender attitude data for survey years 1996, 2008, and 2012 would be excluded from the regression analysis. To retain the largest possible sample size and number of survey years, the explanatory variables East and West therefore refer to the region in which the interview was conducted rather than the place of birth of the respondent.¹⁶ This operationalisation creates concerns over the robustness of the findings, as it fails to control for East-West migration. Luckily, ALLBUS also contains a variable for the state in which the respondent grew up (waves 1991, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012 respectively). Pairing this variable with information on where the respondent was born and the state in which the interview took place, I am able to identify those respondents who moved from East to West after birth or after their childhood for all survey years in which information on gender attitude is available, with the only exception of survey year 1994. The data for survey years 1991-1994 and 2000-2012 include 310 respondents who were born or grew up in West Germany but who lived in the East at the time of the interview, and 1,115 respondents who were born or grew up in an East Germany and were interviewed in the West. These figures are reflective of the disproportionate number of citizens moving from the new to the old federal states after unification compared to those moving from the West to the East. Between 1989 and 2006 for example, 2.45 million East Germans migrated to the West compared to 1.45 million West Germans who migrated to the

¹⁵ In 2012, ALLBUS changed its question catalogue on attitudes toward gender roles. While half of the 3,298 respondents in this most recent survey answered the same questions as those surveyed in previous years (split B), the remaining half of respondents were given a new set of questions (split A). In order to better identify changes over time, the first half of this chapter will include only the responses from split B for survey year 2012.

¹⁶ We know that many more citizens migrated from the new to the old federal states after German unification rather than the other way around.


East.¹⁷ Based on the ALLBUS sample however, the number of observations for regional migrants included in the dataset are too small to significantly affect the overall results. The regression tables in the main text therefore use the variable East (place of interview) in order to retain a larger overall sample. Corresponding regressions tables excluding East-West and West-East migrants from the sample are listed in the appendix.

In addition, all regressions in the main text are duplicated using federal state dummies to control for regional variation between federal states. Figure 2 displays mean gender role attitude scores for each state¹⁸ by female employment rate (based on women's self-reported full-time and part time employment) from 1991 until 2012 showing that mean gender attitude scores differ consistently between but not among East and West German federal states. Due to the fact that the effects of federal states in East and West Germany respectively are so similar, the main text relies on regressions run with only the East dummy. Corresponding regression tables with federal state dummies are included in the appendix.

¹⁷ Fuchs-Schündeln, Nicola and Schündeln, Matthias (2009) "Who stays, who goes, who returns? East-West migration within Germany since reunification." *Economics of Transition*. vol. 17(4): 703-38. 704. According to the authors, these migration patterns amount to 16.6 per cent of the East German population moving to the West and 2.5 per cent of the West German population moving to the East during this period (relative to the overall population of both regions at the end of 1990).

¹⁸ East and West Berlin have been split.

Figure 2 Gender Attitudes and Female Employment Rate Scatterplot



Notes: The scatterplot displays mean gender role attitude scores (1 = most liberal, 19 = most conservative gender attitude score) for each federal state by female employment (based on women's self-reported full-time and part time employment) across the period from 1991 to 2012. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

The second main explanatory variable of interest in this chapter is cohort. A cohort is usually defined as a group of individuals with shared experiences based on similarities in their socialisation, especially during the formative years of childhood and adolescence. One of the most difficult aspects of studying generational effects as part of this analysis is justifying the distinction between cohorts.¹⁹ Identifying cohorts for testing both political and gender socialisation presents a particular challenge: while political socialisation research assumes that individuals 'start to recognise the political world' around them at about 14 or 15 years of age,²⁰ gender socialisation, as discussed in the

¹⁹ Most commonly, cohorts are operationalised by people's date of birth within 10 or 15 years of each other. Neundorff, Anja and Niemi, Richard G. (2013) "Beyond political socialization: New approaches to age, period, cohort analysis." *Electoral Studies*. vol.: 1-6. 2. Neundorff, "A Micro perspective on System Change in Post-Socialist Societies", 1100.

²⁰ Neundorff, "A Micro perspective on System Change in Post-Socialist Societies", 1101. Earlier research suggests that differences in political attitudes among girls and boys are often inconsistent and generally rather small and that adult socialisation may be a more crucial factor in determining women's political

appendix, is believed to start at infancy. The cohort distinctions chosen here presents a compromise between identifying groups of respondents born around the same time, groups of respondents affected by the same influential political events, and groups of respondents consisting of fairly equal numbers of respondents.

Table 7 Cohort Frequency Table

Birth Cohorts	West	East	Total
1. Born 1891-1930	3,244	1,675	4,919
2. Born 1931-1948	6,749	3,869	10,618
3. Born 1949-1961	5,910	3,555	9,465
4. Born 1962-1974	5,768	2,709	8,477
5. Born 1975-1992	2,732	1,351	4,083

Notes: The table reports frequencies of cohorts by year of birth and East and West. Source ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012 (Tabulation includes results from 1991 onwards).

The first cohort includes respondents who reached adolescence at the time the Cold War began (i.e. those who were 15 years or older at the end of World War II) and who were socialised in part both before and during the Cold War. Most members of cohorts 2 to 4 on the other hand were born or grew up or during the Cold War. These individuals could have reasonably been combined into a single cohort (indeed, this the distinction chosen by Neundorf in her analysis of democratic satisfaction among Eastern Europeans²¹), but are split into three in order to attain samples of similar observation sizes. Finally, cohort 5 consists of respondents who were socialised for most part of their lives in the post-unification era.

In addition to cohort, age is also often considered an important determinant of gender ideology. While many studies operating with data from only one survey year are forced to equate age and cohort effects, some research suggests that people's views and beliefs are influenced not only by the external environment which they share with their particular generation, but also by their own 'social experiences' throughout their life cycle.²² A

participation See Welch, "Women as Political Animals", 713-14. citing Andersen, Kristi (1975) "Working women and political participation, 1952-1972." Ibid. vol. 19(3): 439-54.

²¹ Neundorf, "A Micro perspective on System Change in Post-Socialist Societies", 1101.

²² Neundorf and Niemi, "Beyond political socialization", 2. People's interests and priorities may shift at specific stages in their life cycle (e.g. parents of young children may be more aware of difficulties in

descriptive analysis of the data showed that the effects of age by region are largely similar to the effects of cohorts (compare Figure 3 in this chapter with Figure 19 in appendix). This is not surprising given the high correlation between the two variables (cohort being a function of age and period). Controlling for socio-economic characteristics, I could detect no statistically significant effect of age in my regression models. The square of age showed to be statistically significantly positive at the 5 per cent level suggesting that *ceteris paribus*, people are more conservative in their twenties and thirties, and again when they enter pension age, while being comparatively more progressive in middle-age. On balance, however, taking the statistical significance of the coefficients, the proposed theoretical model, secondary literature, and empirical knowledge of the German case into consideration, I am primarily interested in the effect exerted by cohorts. The effects of age will therefore not be further considered in the results section.

In addition, the below regression models control for a number of other important factors which are commonly identified in the literature on gender ideology (see 0 in appendix). To summarise, it has been suggested that sex, education, employment, marital status, religious affiliation, age, maternal background, having children, media exposure, and place of residence (urban or rural) may all impact individuals' views on gender roles. In an ideal research scenario, I would like to include all of these variables in my regression specifications. Yet, due to the fact that data for these determinants have not been collected consistently throughout the years, there is a trade off between including various independent variables of interest and retaining a large sample size and survey year observations (see Table 42 in appendix for overview of independent variables by survey year). Hypotheses 1 to 3 are therefore analysed with a set of basic controls (allowing for all survey years to be included) while Hypothesis 4 is tested using a model of best fit, including more controls, but fewer observations (and survey years).

The controls included in the main models for hypotheses 1 to 3 are sex, age and its square (to account for non-linearity), education status, employment, occupation, income, religiosity, marital status, and survey year fixed effects. Sex is a binary dummy variable with women taking the value of 1. Education is coded as an ordinal variable from lower secondary education for those respondents with no qualification to medium education

combining work and family life at the point of parenthood compared to when they did not yet have children).

for those respondents with an education level equivalent to GSCE level (grade 10 and above), to high secondary education (*Abitur*- level and above). In order to control for the effects of being employed, full-time and part-time employment were merged, as were irregular and un-employment. In addition, all models control for personal income of respondents, coded in four bands (900€ or below, 900-1499€, 1500-2599€, and 2600€ and above). Religion is measured by regular church attendance and denomination, as well as interaction terms between the two (since religious Catholics may be different to religious Protestants). Lastly, the models also control for marital status, a dummy for those married or widowed compared to those single, divorced, or separated. The model of best fit (Hypothesis 4) further includes controls for growing up in a single parent household, having been brought up by a working mother (measured by whether or not the mother was in paid employment at the time the respondent was 15 years of age), place of residence (city, suburb, town, village or hamlet), and daily TV consumption (less than one hour a day, one to three hours a day, more than three hours a day). In the discussion of my results, mention of ‘effects’ of the explanatory variables refer to conditional correlation rather than causal inference.

4.2 Results

Table 8 displays the proportion of respondents agreeing (or disagreeing) with each survey question on gender role attitudes asked in the German Social Survey (the variables were recoded into binary response levels). Like Banaszak, we can see that,

‘those living in the five *Länder* of the former East Germany are more supportive of women’s employment, more opposed to women sacrificing for their husbands’ careers, less likely to think that young children or the family will suffer if women work outside the home, and less likely to agree that women should forgo employment during times when men may have difficulty finding work.’²³

With only two exceptions, there are statistically significant differences in mean responses between citizens of East and West Germany for each survey question and in each survey year. Moreover, gender attitudes in both East and West appear to gradually liberalise. In

²³ Banaszak, "Citizens' Attitudes toward Women's Roles in Germany", 37-38.

both regions respectively, the proportion of citizens agreeing with traditional gender role statements (and disagreeing with more egalitarian statements) are lower in 2008 compared to 1991. Interestingly, between 1991 and 2008, attitudes towards gender roles seem to liberalise at a faster pace in the new federal states. However, there is a clear break in this trend between 2008 and 2012 where there are significant changes in the West toward a more liberal gender culture across all six questions. At the same time, there is a slight increase (i.e. a move toward more traditional views) in three of the six gender attitude questions among East German respondents. I will consider these changes in attitudes over time more closely in the course of this analysis.

Table 8 Gender Role Attitudes in East and West Germany by Survey Year

	Year	Percentage of Respondents Agreeing or Disagreeing with Gender Attitude Questions			
		West Germans	East Germans	Difference between	
1) An employed mother can establish as loving and trustful relationship to her children as a mother who is not employed (% disagreeing).	1991	27.1	10.1	17.0	***
	1992	25.6	7.4	18.2	***
	1996	23.1	7.7	15.3	***
	2000	20.7	6.4	14.3	***
	2004	23.6	6.4	17.2	***
	2008	18.0	5.6	12.5	***
	2012	8.9	2.5	6.3	***
2) It is more important for a wife to help her husband with his career than to have her own career (% agreeing).	1991	32.3	30.4	1.9	
	1992	41.5	32.6	8.9	***
	1996	35.7	25.2	10.4	***
	2000	34.7	26.5	8.1	**
	2004	26.3	13.5	12.8	***
	2008	27.4	13.5	14.0	***
	2012	20.3	18.5	1.8	
3) A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother is employed (% agreeing).	1991	75.9	57.6	18.2	***
	1992	75.8	52.4	23.4	***
	1996	76.1	48.9	27.3	***
	2000	71.6	41.4	30.1	***
	2004	63.0	28.8	34.2	***
	2008	56.7	24.9	31.8	***
	2012	50.1	26.5	23.6	***
4) It is much better for everyone if the man is employed outside the home and the woman looks after the household and children (% agreeing).	1991	50.1	32.4	17.6	***
	1992	55.8	31.8	24.0	***
	1996	51.0	26.1	25.0	***
	2000	50.4	29.5	21.0	***
	2004	41.8	17.5	24.4	***
	2008	40.2	17.9	22.3	***
	2012	29.8	16.1	13.7	***
5) A child actually benefits from his or her mother being who is employed rather than just focussing on the home (% disagreeing).	1991	65.6	39.1	26.4	***
	1992	65.4	38.2	27.2	***
	1996	63.8	32.4	31.4	***
	2000	56.9	28.7	28.3	***
	2004	53.4	18.8	34.6	***
	2008	46.6	16.3	30.3	***
	2012	43.0	17.2	25.8	***
6) A married woman should forgo employment if there is a limited number of jobs and her husband is able to support the family (% agreeing).	1991	52.5	43.7	8.8	***
	1992	52.5	38.2	14.4	***
	1996	46.8	33.4	13.4	***
	2000	41.1	25.2	15.8	***
	2004	39.3	23.9	15.5	***
	2008	37.2	24.5	12.7	***
	2012	29.7	20.5	9.2	***

Notes: Percentage of respondents indicating traditional views toward gender roles. Combines respondents agreeing (or disagreeing) completely or somewhat with the statements. *Stars refer to significance of difference in proportion between East and West Germans. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

Hypothesis 1

Running OLS regressions for the summary measure for traditional gender attitudes as specified above confirms that there is a statistically significant difference in attitudes toward gender roles among citizens in the two the regions (see Model 1 in Table 9). Living in the new federal states decreases an individual's traditional gender attitude score by almost 3 units (controlling only for sex and survey year effects). By comparison, the effect of being a woman on traditional gender attitudes is much smaller (-1).

Table 9 Traditional Gender Attitudes: Socio-Economic and Cohort Effects

	Traditional Gender Attitudes (1-19)		
	I	II	III
East	-2.650*** (0.06)	-2.150*** (0.08)	-0.836*** (0.17)
Female	-0.981*** (0.06)	-1.413*** (0.07)	-1.419*** (0.07)
Cohorts ^A			
Born 1891-1930		2.242*** (0.17)	2.862*** (0.18)
Born 1931-1948		1.093*** (0.14)	1.525*** (0.16)
Born 1949-1961		0.085 (0.13)	0.270* (0.15)
Born 1961-1974		-0.117 (0.12)	0.024 (0.13)
East*Cohort Interactions			
East*Born 1891-1930			-2.920*** (0.23)
East*Born 1931-1948			-1.967*** (0.20)
East*Born 1949-1961			-0.793*** (0.20)
East*Born 1961-1974			-0.406** (0.20)
Education Status ^B			
Low Secondary Education		-0.413* (0.25)	-0.400 (0.25)
Intermediary Secondary Education		-1.361*** (0.25)	-1.468*** (0.25)
High Secondary Education		-2.525*** (0.26)	-2.532*** (0.26)
Still At School		-2.162*** (0.35)	-2.129*** (0.35)
Employed		-0.672*** (0.15)	-0.637*** (0.15)
Occupation ^C			
Agriculture		0.589 (0.40)	0.591 (0.40)
Academia		-1.199*** (0.31)	-1.193*** (0.31)
Self-Employed		-0.083 (0.21)	-0.113 (0.21)
Public Sector Employee		-0.803*** (0.20)	-0.803*** (0.20)

Private Sector Employee		-0.248 (0.15)	-0.248 (0.15)
Manual Worker		0.268 (0.17)	0.221 (0.17)
Other		0.050 (0.23)	0.039 (0.23)
Income ^D			
900-1499€		-0.423*** (0.08)	-0.464*** (0.08)
1500-2599€		-0.400*** (0.10)	-0.442*** (0.10)
2600€ or More		-0.482*** (0.15)	-0.532*** (0.15)
Religiosity ^E			
Protestant		0.807*** (0.08)	0.893*** (0.08)
Catholic		0.807*** (0.10)	0.898*** (0.10)
Other		2.113*** (0.41)	2.262*** (0.41)
Regular Church Attendance		0.817 (0.90)	0.789 (0.89)
Protestant* Regular Church Attendance		-0.000 (0.91)	-0.034 (0.90)
Catholic* Regular Church Attendance		0.156 (0.91)	0.088 (0.90)
Other* Regular Church Attendance		0.260 (1.04)	0.208 (1.03)
Marital Status ^F			
Married/Widowed		0.376*** (0.09)	0.370*** (0.09)
Separated/Divorced		0.051 (0.13)	0.039 (0.13)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	10.521*** (0.10)	10.515*** (0.30)	10.205*** (0.30)
R-squared	0.133	0.330	0.338
Observations	18571	16076	16076

Notes: The table reports OLS regression coefficients. All models control for survey year effects and are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ^A Cohort dummies: reference category is respondents born between 1974 and 1992. ^B Education dummies: reference category is no secondary education. ^C Occupation dummies: reference category is 'not applicable.' ^D Income dummies: reference category is monthly income of 900€ or less. ^E Religiosity: reference category is non-religious. ^F Marital Status: reference category is 'single.' Positive coefficients on the explaining variables are associated with more traditional gender attitudes ***1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

When I include additional control variables to test if they mediate the effect of sex and region (see column 2 Table 9), I find that the size of the East coefficients only decreases slightly. The negative effect of being a woman on traditional gender attitudes increases by roughly half a unit, suggesting that the gender gap in attitudes slightly increases when socio-economic characteristics are taken into consideration. Being married (compared to being single) appears to have the greatest reinforcing effect on traditional gender

attitudes, followed by being member of a (non-Christian) faith community. Although both Protestants and Catholics are more conservative than the non-religious control group, the difference in effect size is lower than one unit. Interacting religious denomination with regular church attendance yields no statistically significant results. The opposite is true for education levels. The higher the level of education, the more progressive a person is likely to be with regards their views on gender roles. This is largely consistent with the existing literature on gender ideology, which suggests that education helps to undermine sex stereotypes and to foster girls' ambitions (see section 0 in the appendix).²⁴ Employment and income are also significantly correlated with citizens' gender attitudes. As the scatterplot in Figure 2 (p.85) indicated, higher female employment rates correlate with more egalitarian gender attitudes.

Overall, the addition of a basic set of socio-economic controls almost tripled the R^2 in Model 2. Thus, the extended specification better predicts the variation in the dependent variable. After controlling for other compositional explanations, we can reject the null hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) that there is no statistically significant difference between citizens in East and West Germany with regards to their attitudes toward gender roles. Citizens from the new federal states are on average more progressive than citizens from the old federal states.

Hypothesis 2


According to the theory of institutional learning, we should expect to see significant differences in citizens' gender attitudes scores based not only on whether they are East or West German, but also based on for how long they were subject to Cold War socialisation in the former East and West German regimes.²⁵ Following the discussion of gender regimes in the previous chapter, I expect the difference between East and West Germans to be greatest among individuals socialised in the two Cold War regimes for

²⁴ Davis and Greenstein, "Gender Ideology", 94.

²⁵ Cohort or generational effects are defined as "enduring intercohort distinctions that are attributable to the common 'imprinting' of cohort members. With regard to attitudinal dependent variables, generational effects are often presumed to be the result of cohort members having shared similar socializing experiences, especially during late adolescence and early adulthood" (Markus, 1983: 718; cf. Mannheim, [1928] 1952; Ryder, 1965). cited in Neundorf and Niemi, "Beyond political socialization", 2.

longest (i.e. older cohorts). The attitude gap among younger cohorts (i.e. those socialised both during and after the Cold War) on the other hand, should be comparatively smaller.

Figure 3 Gender Attitudes by East and West Cohorts



Notes: The figure displays mean gender attitude scores by cohorts. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012 (using survey years 1991-2012 only).

Figure 3 displays the mean gender attitude scores by cohorts in the two regions. As expected, the East-West difference in gender attitudes is greatest among those cohorts socialised longest in the divided Germany and it is smaller among younger cohorts. Indeed, among those born after 1975, there is no statistically significant East-West gap in mean gender attitude scores at all. Figure 3 also highlights that the within-region differences between cohorts is greater for respondents from West Germany. This is consistent with the institutional learning theory, given that social policy legislation in West Germany has gradually bettered women’s legal status throughout the post-War period (see chapter 3).

To test my second hypothesis on the effects of institutional learning more thoroughly, I introduce cohort dummies as well as cohort and regional interaction terms to the regression models (see columns II and III in Table 9). The coefficients for the

Cohort*East interactions (Model 3, Table 9) are statistically significantly negative, demonstrating that ceteris paribus, being socialised in the GDR compared to being socialised in West Germany has had an added liberalising effect on gender attitudes. The Cohort*East interaction coefficient is greatest for cohort 1891-1930 which confirms the descriptive statistics in Figure 3.

Running separate regressions on East and West German samples likewise shows that ceteris paribus, older cohorts in West Germany are significantly more conservative than those born after 1975 while there is no statistically significant effect among cohorts socialised in the East. Indeed, cohorts 3 and 4 in the East German sample are statistically significantly less traditional than the base line group of those born after 1974.

Table 10 Traditional Gender Attitudes: Cohort Effects in East and West Germany

	Traditional Gender Attitudes (1-19)	
	East	West
Born 1891-1930	0.249 (0.26)	2.854*** (0.20)
Born 1931-1948	-0.149 (0.22)	1.498*** (0.17)
Born 1949-1961	-0.465** (0.21)	0.308** (0.15)
Born 1961-1974	-0.453** (0.19)	0.073 (0.14)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Constant	9.721*** (0.38)	10.128*** (0.37)
R-squared	0.217	0.314
Observations	6084	9992

Notes: The table reports OLS regression coefficients. All models control for survey year effects and are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Included as controls are sex, secondary education levels, employment status, occupation, personal income, religious affiliation, regular church attendance, marital status, and survey years. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Positive coefficients on the explaining variables are associated with more traditional gender attitudes. ***1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

I conclude from this that Cold War regime socialisation indeed mattered in shaping gender culture in East and West Germany. The differences in gender attitudes are most pronounced among the oldest cohorts and somewhat smaller among younger cohorts.

The results for the West German sample also reinforce the general insights from a number of studies on gender ideology change, namely, that older generations are generally more conservative than younger ones.²⁶ For the East German sample on the other hand, there is no statistically significant difference in mean gender attitude scores between those born before 1930 and those born after 1975 (see also Figure 19 in appendix). To some extent, this is a little surprising since those born between 1891-1930 were partially socialised during the strongly traditionalist and anti-feminist Nazi-regime and could thus be expected to adhere to more traditional gender role views. Yet members of this oldest cohort, Bauernschuster and Rainer argue, were also exposed to socialist policies for the longest time.²⁷ They received the full brunt of re-socialisation and de-nazification policies under the newly instated communist regime. From this point of view, it is plausible that this cohort should hold more progressive views on gender roles than its West German equivalent, as Bauernschuster and Rainer reason. As such, the results in Table 9 not only lend support for the political socialisation hypothesis,²⁸ they also suggest that the length of regime socialisation matters more than the age at which individuals are socialised.

Hypothesis 3

In the context of studying institutional learning through analysing gender attitude data from unified Germany, it is critical to consider the extent to which gender attitudes have changed among citizens in East and West Germany since unification. For citizens in the new federal states, the political (gender) regime dramatically changed with unification, as the GDR's social and family policies gave way for West German conservative welfare state structures.

At the same time, there have been several social policy reforms in unified Germany in the post-unification period, especially since the mid-2000s, which have indicated a more

²⁶ Most studies are based on data from Western (post-industrial) countries. See for example: Bolzendahl and Myers, "Feminist Attitudes and Support for Gender Equality", 759; Norris and Inglehart, "Cultural Obstacles to Equal Representation"; Brewster, Karin L. and Padavic, Irene (2000) "Change in Gender-Ideology, 1977-1996: The contributions of intracohort change and population turnover." *Journal of Marriage and the Family*. vol. 62: 477-67.

²⁷ Bauernschuster and Rainer, "How Sex-Role Attitudes Keep on Diverging in Reunified Germany", 10-11.

²⁸ As marsh points out, adult socialisation is often (and wrongly) neglected Marsh, "Political Socialization", 456.

liberal turn in gender and family policy more generally. Put together, we could expect attitudes among Eastern Germans to have become somewhat more conservative since unification and we could expect attitudes among Western Germans to have slightly liberalised in the same period (Hypothesis 3). Such effects of ‘the current political, economic, or societal situation’ or of ‘idiosyncratic events’ on the behaviour or attitudes of all age groups and cohorts are commonly referred to as ‘period effects’.²⁹ In statistical models, period effects can be tested through the inclusion of survey year dummies.

I first turn to the period effects on gender attitudes among citizens in East and West Germany respectively. This is fairly straightforward. Table 11 lists the survey year coefficients for East and West German samples. The reference category is survey year 1991.

Table 11 Traditional Gender Attitudes: Period Effects in East and West Germany

	Traditional Gender Attitudes (1-19)	
	East	West
Female	-0.972*** (0.09)	-1.551*** (0.08)
Survey Years ^A		
1992	-0.260* (0.16)	0.484*** (0.13)
1996	-0.810*** (0.16)	0.209 (0.13)
2000	-1.288*** (0.16)	-0.303** (0.13)
2004	-2.275*** (0.17)	-0.815*** (0.14)
2008	-2.668*** (0.17)	-1.101*** (0.14)
2012	-2.429*** (0.20)	-1.626*** (0.16)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Constant	9.721*** (0.38)	10.128*** (0.37)
R-squared	0.217	0.314
Observations	6084	9992

Notes: The table reports OLS regression coefficients. All models are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Included as controls are cohorts, secondary education levels, employment status, occupation, personal income, religious affiliation, regular church attendance, and marital status. ^ABase line year is 1991. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Positive coefficients on the explaining variables are associated with more traditional gender attitudes. ***1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

²⁹ Neundorff and Niemi, "Beyond political socialization", 2. For example, Germans' views on nuclear energy shifted after the Fukushima nuclear disaster caused by the Tsunami in Japan in 2011.

The survey year coefficients show that gender attitudes have become generally more liberal with each survey wave between 1992 and 2008 in *both* East and West Germany and that this process has been rather steady. As indicated by the descriptive statistics, gender role norms have liberalised more strongly in the new federal states during that time. Unfortunately, we do not have panel data to test the effects of specific social policies on the changes in attitudes of specific individuals over this time period.³⁰ As such, though we can see that *ceteris paribus* citizens' gender attitudes have generally become more liberal in the post-unification period, it is difficult to pin any changes in attitudes, particularly over such a short time period, to specific social policies without further qualitative investigation.

From an institutional learning perspective, the mean difference in attitude scores *between* citizens in the new and old federal should have diminished since West German social policy was transferred to the East German *Länder* through unification. The survey year coefficients in Table 11 however suggest that the East-West gap may in fact have increased since unification due to the faster rate of gender attitude liberalisation in the East. This finding is tested more thoroughly (following Bauernschuster and Rainer's example³¹) by interacting the East German dummy with each survey year. Table 12 displays the results for this exercise.

³⁰ Moreover, as I will argue in the final chapter, unified Germany's social policy with regards to gender is rather ill-defined, vague, and at times even contradictory.

³¹ Bauernschuster and Rainer, "How Sex-Role Attitudes Keep on Diverging in Reunified Germany", 11.

Table 12 Traditional Gender Attitudes: East*Survey Year Interactions

	Traditional Gender Attitudes (1-19)
East	-1.453*** (0.15)
Female	-1.405*** (0.07)
1992	0.478*** (0.13)
1996	0.171 (0.13)
2000	-0.367*** (0.13)
2004	-0.927*** (0.14)
2008	-1.229*** (0.14)
2012	-1.819*** (0.16)
East*Survey Year Interactions	
East1992	-0.685*** (0.21)
East1996	-0.919*** (0.21)
East2000	-0.711*** (0.20)
East2004	-1.044*** (0.21)
East2008	-1.082*** (0.21)
East2012	-0.052 (0.23)
Controls	Yes
Constant	10.359*** (0.30)
R-squared	0.331
Observations	16076

Notes: The table reports OLS regression coefficients. All models are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Included as controls cohorts, secondary education levels, employment status, occupation, personal income, religious affiliation, regular church attendance, and marital status. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Positive coefficients on the explaining variables are associated with more traditional gender attitudes. ***1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

In accordance with Bauernschuster and Rainer's findings, the results in Table 12 are indicative of an increase in the East-West gap in attitudes between 1992 and 2008. Both the coefficients for the East German dummy and for the interaction terms (from 1992-2008) are statistically significantly negative across these years. While East German citizens were already more liberal in the early 1990s, they 'follow steeper trend lines

toward even less traditional gender views, which ultimately leads to an increase in the East-West gap.³² This undermines the institutional learning assumption according to which gender attitudes would be expected to gradually assimilate in the two regions. Moreover, as Bauernschuster and Rainer note, signs of non-convergence also go largely against the insights from other studies, which found that attitudes between East and West Germans such as on government intervention or economic redistribution have been gradually assimilating over the past decade.³³

What could explain this phenomenon of non-convergence with respect to gender culture in unified Germany? Given that the regression model in Table 12 controls for individual characteristics of sex, education, income, occupation, religiosity and marital status, we can rule out that socio-economic differences between the new and old federal states lie behind this persistent gender attitude difference.³⁴

In order to get a better understanding of the underlying dynamics of this trend, Bauernschuster and Rainer run separate regressions by birth cohort samples. Accordingly, Table 13 shows that the East-West attitude gap is greatest among older cohorts. The statistically significant negative coefficients of the East and survey year interaction terms further indicate that the East-West gap upsurge over time is driven by older cohorts, i.e. those individuals socialised longest in the divided Germany.

³² Bauernschuster and Rainer, "How sex-role attitudes continue to differ in reunified Germany", 20.

³³ loc. cit.

³⁴ In addition, Bauernschuster and Rainer conducted robustness checks including controls for GDP per capita, employment rates, and availability of child-care spaces at the Länder level. None of these variables affected the East-West gap in gender attitudes over time.

Table 13 Traditional Gender Attitudes By Cohort (With Survey Year*East Interaction Effects)

	Traditional Gender Attitudes				
	Birth Cohorts				
	1891-1930	1931-1948	1949-1961	1962-1974	1975-1992
East	-2.536*** (0.35)	-1.583*** (0.29)	-0.883*** (0.30)	-0.896*** (0.32)	-0.984** (0.42)
East1992	-0.606 (0.50)	-1.317*** (0.37)	-0.447 (0.39)	-0.098 (0.42)	0.000 (.)
East1996	-1.881*** (0.51)	-0.901** (0.38)	-0.949** (0.40)	-0.373 (0.41)	0.124 (0.73)
East2000	-1.029** (0.50)	-1.123*** (0.37)	-1.019*** (0.38)	-0.352 (0.41)	0.000 (.)
East2004	-2.205*** (0.56)	-2.106*** (0.39)	-1.238*** (0.40)	-0.080 (0.43)	-0.900* (0.52)
East2008	-2.388*** (0.62)	-1.730*** (0.39)	-1.385*** (0.40)	-0.819* (0.42)	-0.408 (0.49)
East2012	-2.309 (1.44)	-1.181** (0.48)	-0.614 (0.44)	-0.055 (0.47)	0.402 (0.50)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	12.582*** (0.64)	12.082*** (0.58)	10.351*** (0.74)	10.748*** (0.71)	9.290*** (0.87)
R-squared	0.289	0.291	0.239	0.233	0.165
Observations	2094	4529	4211	3628	1614

Notes: The table reports OLS regression coefficients. All models control for survey year effects and are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Included as controls are cohorts, secondary education levels, employment status, occupation, personal income, religious affiliation, regular church attendance, and marital status. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Positive coefficients on the explaining variables are associated with more traditional gender attitudes. ***1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

In accordance with this observation, one possible explanation for the phenomenon of non-convergence might be that identification with the gender roles which were propagated by the previous regime reflect a feeling of nostalgia among East German citizens who lived in the GDR for large parts of their lives, or, as Bauernschuster and Rainer called it, ‘an identity-conserving behaviour.’³⁵ Indeed, it is possible that the growing East-West divide in gender culture is an expression of an ideological backlash, of ‘*Ostalgie*’ - a longing for the former GDR, among citizens of the new federal states, reflecting their dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the outcomes of German unification.³⁶ It has been argued elsewhere that the ‘democratic take-over’ experienced by East Germans accompanied by economic hardship and social welfare cuts in the post-unification period served to create a particular kind of social identity in the new federal

³⁵ Bauernschuster and Rainer, "How sex-role attitudes continue to differ in reunified Germany", 25.

³⁶ Cite Blum from endnote p. 133

states, a situation ‘in which Eastern Germans identify more strongly with the former GDR than with the Federal republic.’³⁷ According to a 2008 report, dissatisfaction is particularly pronounced among older and less affluent citizens.³⁸ From this point of view, East German citizens could plausibly identify more strongly with the gender ideology of their former political system, which is generally regarded as one of the few ‘positive achievements of the socialist regime.’³⁹ This interpretation of non-convergence would not necessarily undermine or contradict the argument that institutions matter in shaping attitudes. Rather, it would allow for a complementary narrative to enter the discourse on explaining differences in gender culture in East and West Germany.

It is difficult to test this interpretation with the ALLBUS data. While the dataset contains questions on democratic satisfaction as well as on the feeling of belonging to the former GDR (which can both be used as proxies for capturing dissatisfaction with unification), they are available only for three survey year waves for which gender attitude data have also been collected. Including these variables in the regression models does not considerably change the size of the 2000 and 2008 survey year coefficients in the East sample even though there is a statistically significant positive correlation between liberal gender attitudes and a sense of belonging to the former GDR in the new federal states (see Table 37 in appendix). Interacting a dummy for democratic satisfaction with being from the East or with birth cohorts similarly does not significantly change the findings. In other words, the inclusion of proxies for democratic satisfaction and feelings of belonging to the GDR cannot explain away the pace of gender attitude liberalisation in the East.

A second possible explanation for non-convergence lies with the federal structure of German politics. As briefly discussed in the previous chapter, responsibility for gender equality and family policies is divided between the national and state governments, which leads to differences in implementation of relevant policy measures between federal states.

³⁷ Lutz, Felix Philipp (2002) "Historical Consciousness and the Changing of German Political Culture." *German Politics*. vol. 11(3): 19-34. 31. See also: Mittman, Elizabeth (2007) "Gender, Citizenship, and the Public Sphere in Postunification Germany: Experiments in Feminist Journalism." *Journal of Women in Culture and Society*. vol. 32(3): 759-91. 762.


³⁸ The report found that dissatisfaction is especially prevalent among older cohorts. The majority of young women and men from the new federal states endorse unification. See Voss, Britta (2009) "Go west, young woman!" *EMMA*. Available from: <http://perma.cc/F7C6-SS2E>. Accessed: 22.03. 2010.

³⁹ Bauernschuster and Rainer, "How sex-role attitudes continue to differ in reunified Germany", 25.

It could therefore be the case that policies conducive to gender equality were more vigorously pursued in the new federal states, thus leading to a more rapid liberalisation of gender attitudes in the East. Unfortunately, running the regression with federal state dummies has no effect on survey year (or interaction) coefficients (see Table 36 in appendix). Moreover, Bauernschuster and Rainer run models controlling for childcare infrastructure in each federal state (which presents one of the most discernable markers of difference in family policy implementation) - similarly falling short of being able to account for the East-West gap and non-convergence.

A third approach to solving the puzzle of the East-West non-convergence presents itself through a closer look at the effect of survey year 2012, or rather the lack of it (Table 12). While the interaction effects between survey years and the East German dummy from 1992 to 2008 are statistically significant, Table 13 suggests that this is no longer the case in 2012. This may signal stagnation in the trend of gender attitude liberalisation in the new federal states. Indeed, plotting the mean gender attitude scores in East and West Germany over time illustrates that gender culture in East Germany has taken a conservative turn in 2012 compared to 2008 while gender norms in West Germany have continued to liberalise (see Figure 4).

Figure 4 Trajectory of Gender Attitude Change in East and West Germany



Notes: The graph displays mean gender role attitude scores (1 = most liberal, 19 = most conservative gender attitude score) by survey year in East and West Germany. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

If this trend were to continue, gender norms in East and West Germany could assimilate over the next several years. This would support the theory of institutional learning. While it would be hasty to draw concrete conclusions from the results of this last survey wave alone, future observations might show that length of time is an important factor in gender socialisation. Compared to changing people's political preferences or their attitudes toward or economic redistribution, changing people's gender role norms may take considerably longer.⁴⁰ Bearing in mind that gender is such an intrinsic part of our identities, this would not be surprising.

Two additional insights from the data analysis would support this argument. Firstly, the data have shown that there is no statistically significant East-West difference in mean gender attitude scores between those individuals who belong to the youngest cohort, i.e. those who were socialised longest (relative to their age) in unified Germany. Secondly, the data have demonstrated that there is a substantial and significant difference in gender attitudes between the oldest cohort, i.e. those individuals who were partially socialised before Germany's separation and could therefore have been expected to be more similar in their cultural norms. The findings therefore demonstrate that adult socialisation too matters with regards to shaping people's views on gender roles.

Hypothesis 4

The final hypothesis discussed in this chapter seeks to test if the East West gap in gender culture really cannot be explained by socio-economic characteristics alone. For this purpose, I run a regression of best fit, including additional regressors in my model specification (variables on age, whether the respondent has children, has been brought up by a working mother, has been raised in a single-parent household, the place of residence, average TV consumption, and left-right political self-identification).

⁴⁰ Alesina et al. find that preferences for welfare redistribution among East and West Germans have begun to converge between 1997 and 2002. See: Alesina and Fuchs-Schündel, "The Effect of Communism on People's Preferences". Likewise, Easterlin and colleagues observe that assessments of life satisfaction between citizens from East and West Germany have assimilated throughout the postunification period. Easterlin and Plagnol, "Life satisfaction and economic conditions in East and West Germany", 435-36. According to Hofstede, 'norm shifts will be gradual unless the outside influences are particularly violent' Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences*, 12.

Table 14 Traditional Gender Attitudes: Extended Model

	Traditional Gender Attitudes		
	I	II	III
East	-2.650*** (0.06)	-0.881*** (0.17)	-1.608*** (0.31)
Female	-0.981*** (0.06)	-1.433*** (0.07)	-1.497*** (0.13)
Age		0.021 (0.02)	-0.025 (0.05)
Age Squared		0.031** (0.01)	0.064 (0.04)
Cohorts ^A			
Born 1891-1930		0.040 (0.40)	0.648 (0.88)
Born 1931-1948		-0.335 (0.31)	-0.086 (0.68)
Born 1949-1961		-0.828*** (0.23)	-0.477 (0.51)
Born 1961-1974		-0.575*** (0.16)	-0.357 (0.36)
East*Cohort Interactions			
East*Born 1891-1930		-2.871*** (0.23)	-3.012*** (0.48)
East*Born 1931-1948		-1.962*** (0.20)	-1.931*** (0.35)
East*Born 1949-1961		-0.801*** (0.20)	-0.552 (0.34)
East*Born 1961-1974		-0.398** (0.16)	0.270 (0.35)
Education Status ^B			
Low Secondary Education		-0.378 (0.25)	-0.718 (0.63)
Intermediary Secondary Education		-1.396*** (0.25)	-1.757*** (0.63)
High Secondary Education		-2.458*** (0.26)	-2.652*** (0.64)
Still At School		-1.986*** (0.35)	-2.205*** (0.83)
Employed		-0.548*** (0.15)	-0.489* (0.27)
Occupation ^C			
Agriculture		0.627 (0.39)	0.743 (0.73)
Academia		-1.190*** (0.31)	-1.174** (0.48)
Self-Employed		-0.069 (0.21)	-0.358 (0.37)
Public Sector Employee		-0.750*** (0.20)	-0.584 (0.38)
Private Sector Employee		-0.206 (0.15)	0.002 (0.28)
Manual Worker		0.271 (0.17)	0.151 (0.32)
Other		0.052 (0.23)	-0.468 (0.47)
Income ^D			
900-1499€		-0.527*** (0.08)	-0.377** (0.17)
1500-2599€		-0.513***	-0.530***

		(0.10)	(0.20)
2600€ or More		-0.609***	-0.754***
		(0.15)	(0.27)
Religiosity ^E			
Protestant		0.873***	0.314*
		(0.08)	(0.17)
Catholic		0.890***	0.390*
		(0.10)	(0.20)
Other		2.247***	1.707***
		(0.41)	(0.64)
Regular Church Attendance		0.805	0.320
		(0.90)	(0.61)
Protestant* Regular Church Attendance		-0.074	0.198
		(0.91)	(0.67)
Catholic* Regular Church Attendance		0.044	0.335
		(0.91)	(0.65)
Other* Regular Church Attendance		0.194	0.274
		(1.04)	(1.06)
Marital Status ^F			
Married/Widowed		0.318***	0.130
		(0.09)	(0.22)
Separated/Divorced		0.008	-0.047
		(0.13)	(0.28)
Children			-0.198
			(0.18)
Raised in Single Parent Household			0.108
			(0.17)
Mother was Housewife			0.440***
			(0.13)
Residence ^D			
Suburb			0.210
			(0.22)
Town			0.170
			(0.17)
Village			0.400**
			(0.18)
Hamlet			0.673
			(0.44)
Daily TV Consumption ^E			-0.037
			(0.12)
Left-Right Identification (1-10 Scale)			0.193***
			(0.04)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	
2008			-0.508***
			(0.15)
East*2008 Interaction			0.051
			(0.22)
Constant	10.521***	10.126***	9.125***
	-0.1	-0.4	(1.13)
R-squared	0.133	0.341	0.301
Observations	18571	16076	3935

Notes: The table reports OLS regression coefficients. Results are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. ^ACohort dummies: reference category is respondents born between 1974 and 1992. ^B Education dummies: reference category is no secondary education. ^C Occupation dummies: reference category is 'not applicable.' ^D Residence dummies: reference category is city. ^EDaily TV Consumption measured as a categorical variable (1= less than an hour a day; 2= one to three hours a day; 3= more than three hours a day). Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Positive coefficients on the explaining variables are associated with more traditional gender attitudes ***1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

Results in Table 14 show that the addition of further controls actually increases the effect of both the East German dummy and the East-cohort interaction terms. There is hardly any change in the size or significance of those regressands which were previously included in the models (compare second and third columns in Table 14). The effect of being Protestant or Catholic diminishes slightly in both size and statistical significance and there is no longer any effect of being a Public Sector employee or of being married. Compared to those living in cities, village residents are somewhat more traditional, but there is no significant effect of living in a town or hamlet. The added control variables show that those respondents who were raised by a stay-at-home mother are on average slightly more conservative, which is in accordance with the literature on the influence of parental background on gender attitudes. However, there is no statistically significant effect on gender attitudes of having children, being raised in a single-parent household or high TV consumption according to the data. Identifying as politically right of centre correlates with traditional gender attitudes as would be expected since right-leaning political parties in Germany are also more socially conservative. Compared to column II, the R-squared value in column III is slightly lower which is likely to be the result of the decrease in the number of observations. In conclusion, although some socio-economic characteristics matter, they cannot explain away the differences in gender culture in East and West Germany.

Banaszak argues that socio-economic determinants of citizens' gender attitudes (what she terms compositional explanations) serve as *alternative* explanations to the institutional learning model. She reasons that while religiosity and women's labour market participation were influenced by the East German government, education, socio-economic status, left-right ideology, and other factors were 'beyond' the control of the regime.⁴¹ I oppose this view on the grounds that the two sets of explanations cannot be viewed as distinct and independent of each other. The socialist political elite of the GDR invested a great amount of financial and propagandistic effort into streamlining education, citizens' political identification,⁴² and even economic structures in accordance

⁴¹ Banaszak, "Citizens' Attitudes toward Women's Roles in Germany", 36-37.

⁴² Neundorff, "Growing up on Different Sides of the Wall".

with the socialist ideology. Rather than to regard the influence of political institutions as separate from these socio-economic determinants in the context of unified Germany, they should therefore be viewed as interdependent.

On the other hand, it is true that the new federal states have experienced significant socio-economic and demographic changes in the post-unification period. It is useful to control for this as best as possible in attempts to isolate the influence of socialisation on people's attitudes. As such, testing compositional determinants for gender attitudes is a worth-while undertaking. In the case of gender culture in unified Germany, I conclude that some socio-economic factors matter, but that a significant East-West gap remains above and beyond the socio-economic and demographic differences in the two regions. This gap is most likely the product of Cold War regime socialisation. Hence, though I cannot claim to address all problems associated with causal inference in this chapter, the German case has nevertheless allowed me to make considerable headway in this regard.

4.3 Discussion

It is important to stress that a number of criticisms can be levelled against the gender attitude proxies used for this investigation. Firstly, as Paxton and Kunovich argue, formal adherence to gender equality principles may be far removed from actual egalitarian attitudes.⁴³ This is to say that respondents may only claim to believe that married women should not give up their jobs when employment is scarce, because they consider this the socially most acceptable response. Part of the problem also lies with the nature of survey analysis itself. By relying on fixed questionnaire responses, it is impossible to establish how respondents reflect on, or interpret the questions that they are being asked. Generalisation and simplification of complex social processes is an inevitable bi-product of research based on survey analysis (see section 8.2.4 in the appendix for further discussion).

A second criticism relating specifically to the ALLBUS data is that the relevant questions capture gender role attitudes exclusively in relation to women and their role as mothers or wives. They arguably reflect the social concerns over working mothers that were

⁴³ Paxton and Kunovich, "The Importance of Ideology", 92.

pertinent to West Germany in the 1980s, when the male breadwinner model prevailed. These questions may be ill-suited to capture citizens' views on gender roles in 21st century Germany. Traditional gender stereotypes today may be better reflected in people's views on women's professional abilities or their opinions on the reasons for the persistent gender pay gap. In recent years, these facets of gender stereotyping have clearly come into view during public discussions over the introduction of binding quotas for women in the private sector.


In addition to the narrow scope of gender attitude questions included in the ALLBUS survey, a further limitation of the data is that questions relate exclusively to women. This only changed with the publication of the 2012 survey data. As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, in 2012, respondents were split into two groups, each being surveyed on their agreement levels on a different set of gender and family attitude questions. Split A was surveyed on the same set of statements included in the ALLBUS catalogue in previous years, while split B was presented with a new set of statements, as itemised below:

- I. 'The best division of work within a family is one in which both partners work part time and equally share the care work for home and children.'
- II. 'A man who works full time cannot adequately care for his children.'
- III. 'Even if both parents work, it is better if the main responsibility for household and children lies with the woman.'
- IV. 'A father working full time can establish just as loving and secure a relationship with his small child as a father who doesn't work.'
- V. 'In a family, the man can be responsible for household and children while the woman works full time.'

While it is commendable that the authors of the 2012 ALLBUS survey attempted to capture respondents' views on men's roles for the first time, the questions are nevertheless rather unsatisfactory. Of the 5 statements, II and IV are almost identical while statement V is phrased ambiguously (respondents may agree that men *can* in principle stay at home and look after household and children, but the crucial and rather more interesting question is whether they could think of living in such a family arrangement themselves).

With this in mind, are there notable insights to be gained from the descriptive statistics of the new gender attitude variables included in the 2012 ALLBUS data? The answer is a contingent ‘No.’ On the one hand, descriptive statistics of the data show that similar questions can yield rather different results depending on whether they relate to men or women (see Table 15).

Table 15 Attitudes towards Working Fathers and Mothers




Notes: The table displays the percentage of respondents disagreeing with the statements. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 2012.

While 13 per cent of East Germans and 23 per cent of West Germans disagree with the statement that a father working full time can establish just as loving a relationship with his small child as a father who doesn't work, only 3 per cent of East Germans and 8 per cent of West Germans believe that the same can be said for women. However, the result does not give any information on the normative expectations toward fatherhood, that is, the extent to which respondents expect fathers to establish such a relationship with their children.

Descriptive statistics for the remaining variables are similarly difficult to interpret (see Table 16). Though there exists an East-West gap in responses for 4 out of 5 statements, it is not easy to say which type of responses should be regarded as more traditional. Unlike gender role questions on motherhood and marital roles, the new questions on fathers and family arrangements cannot be grouped on a scale, which suggests that they are not capturing the same types of attitudes.

Table 16 Attitudes toward Fathers and Marital Roles



Notes: The table displays the percentage of respondents agreeing or disagreeing with the statements.
Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 2012.

In some instances, citizens from East Germany appear to express more traditional views than those from the West. More Eastern than Western citizens for example disagree with the statement that the best division of work is one in which both partners work part time and equally care for their children. Yet, it is impossible to say whether this is because Eastern Germans are more opposed to part-time work or whether they are opposed to equally sharing care work. Overall, due to the lack of additional information on respondents' understanding of the ALLBUS statements, it is very difficult to adequately interpret the descriptive statistics of the newly added gender attitude variables.

Despite these overall limitations, it is unwise to discount the usefulness of survey data analysis in general, and the benefits of working with ALLBUS data on gender attitudes specifically.⁴⁴ Surveys providing disaggregated information on individuals' beliefs about

⁴⁴ Baber, Kristine M. and Tucker, Corinna Jenkins (2006) "The Social Roles Questionnaire: A New Approach to Measuring Attitudes Toward Gender." *Sex Roles*. vol. 54(7): 459-67. 459.

gender roles offer a valuable opportunity to analyse quantitatively the determinants and consequences of gender culture.

Recent qualitative studies on unified Germany seem to support the general insights gained from the statistical analysis in this chapter.⁴⁵ For example, a report published by Federal Ministry for Women (BMFSJ) and the Federal Commissioner for the New Federal States found that even twenty years after unification, ‘there are considerable differences in cultural attitudes and social circumstances among citizens in the new and old federal states.’⁴⁶ The report noted that attitudes toward women among Eastern men were more progressive than those held by men from West Germany⁴⁷ and that partnerships between men and women in East Germany were more equal.⁴⁸ This difference in attitudes, the report found, was also reflected in the corporate environment, which in the new federal states is more accepting of working women and more conducive to the advancement of women’s careers.⁴⁹ More women in the East worked full-time, were financially independent,⁵⁰ and were able to combine having children with having a career.⁵¹

This sentiment was also reiterated by the politicians interviewed for this thesis. As one interviewee from East Germany remarked,

⁴⁵ See for example: Bauer, Uta and Dähler, Susanne (2010) "Frauen machen Neue Länder: Das volle Leben! Frauenkarrieren in Ostdeutschland." Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern. Or: Nagel, "Women in Germany in 2006".

⁴⁶ Bauer and Dähler, "Frauen machen Neue Länder", 8. Original quote: ‘Auch 20 Jahre nach der deutschen Einheit gibt es erhebliche Differenzen in den kulturellen Einstellungen und Lebensumständen der Menschen in den neuen und alten Bundesländern.’ The report draws on quantitative data from an online survey as well as on data from a study of a German women’s magazine (BRIGITTE) conducted in 2009. In addition, the authors of the report conducted 14 in-depth interviews with female representatives of the German academic, political, and business elite.

⁴⁷ Loc. cit. Original quote: ‘Das Rollenverständnis der Männer in den Neuen Ländern ist partnerschaftlicher als das der Männer im Westen.’

⁴⁸ Loc. cit. Original quote: ‘Die gleichberechtigte Partnerschaft ist im Osten Deutschlands nicht nur ein stiller Wunsch, sondern der „Normalfall”.’

⁴⁹ Loc. cit. Original quote: ‘Die Akzeptanz des gesellschaftlichen und unternehmerischen Umfelds für das berufliche Engagement von Frauen ist in den Neuen Ländern deutlich höher und erleichtert den Einstieg in Führungspositionen.’

⁵⁰ Loc. cit. Original quote: ‘Frauen in den Neuen Ländern leben ihre finanzielle Unabhängigkeit selbstverständlich und mit viel Pragmatismus, sie machen kein großes Aufheben darum’

⁵¹ Loc. cit. Original quote: ‘Junge Frauen in den Neuen Ländern machen keine Kompromisse – sie wollen Kind und Karriere ohne Einschränkung kombinieren.’

‘in the East, it goes without saying that women are self-sufficient, that they earn their own money are not dependent on men.’⁵²

Another one noted,

‘The question over how to plan your life and the importance of employment is answered differently [by women in East and West Germany]. And I assume that it is also different for my daughter compared to a daughter of one of my West colleagues. It is astonishing how these things have taken root.’⁵³

The findings should also be of interest to scholars examining the drastic decline in women’s employment across East Central Europe in the 1990s, for they suggest that the majority of women (at least in Eastern Germany) may not have exited the labour market by choice and that they did not, on the whole, consider paid employment under socialism to be ‘a state-imposed obligation.’⁵⁴

Yet, this is not to say that gender equality has been fully realised in the East either. For example, the above report also found that women in the new federal states still do the lion share of house work.⁵⁵ This would seem to align with the fact that efforts in the GDR to improve the compatibility of employment and family work were directed primarily at women. To recall Einhorn cited in the previous chapter of this thesis, ‘women were defined as workers *and* mothers, without any equivalent definition of men as workers *and* fathers’.⁵⁶

Nevertheless, it is undeniable that gender role norms and gender identities differ in significant ways in East and West Germany. The findings of this chapter confirm that more than 20 years after unification, citizens that were socialised in the German

⁵² Interview 13, The Left Party (Die Linke), Female, East German, 2013. Original quote: ‘im Osten ist es noch selbstverständlicher, oder es ist mehr noch selbstverständlich, dass Frauen eigenständig sind, ihr eigenes Geld verdienen und nicht von Männern abhängig sind.’

⁵³ Interview 9, CDU, Female, East German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Die Frage der Lebensplanung und des Stellenwertes der Erwerbstätigkeit bei Mädchen und Frauen. Das ist anders und ich nehme auch an, dass das bei meiner Tochter anders ist, als bei der Tochter meiner Westkollegin. Das ist sagenhaft, wie sich das eingepflanzt hat.’

⁵⁴ See: Einhorn, *Cinderella goes to market*, 162.

⁵⁵ Bauer and Dähler, "Frauen machen Neue Länder", 10. Original quote: ‘Frauen tragen auch in den Neuen Ländern den über- wiegenden Anteil häuslicher Aufgaben, erfahren aber etwas mehr Unterstützung durch ihre Partner.’

⁵⁶ Einhorn, *Cinderella goes to market*, 5.

Democratic Republic are (still) more liberal in their gender role views than citizens socialised in former West Germany, thus highlighting the lasting effect of political institutions on gender culture.

5 Sex and the Party: Gender Culture and Party Membership in Unified Germany

The previous two chapters explored the effects of gender policies on gender culture and the continuing differences in gender role norms between citizens from the new and old federal states in unified Germany. In the next part of this thesis, I will investigate if and why such differences in attitudes matter politically. As I noted in the introduction and literature review, I am particularly interested in studying the effect of traditional gender attitudes on women's political participation.

This chapter is divided into three parts. After a brief introduction, I will discuss the descriptive statistics of the main dependent variable party membership with reference to participation gaps across sexes and regions. This is followed by an analysis of the reasons for women's lower participation identified by German politicians interviewed for this thesis. Their assumptions combined with the factors identified in existing research (see section 2.3) are then tested quantitatively through regression analysis on ALLBUS data. While for the most part this chapter focuses on party membership, I will also consider other forms of participation and political interest.

Kohls Mädchen

In 2005, Angela Merkel was appointed the first female chancellor of Germany. This sent a strong message to women and men in the country. Gender equality in German politics seemed to have been achieved. But while Merkel's chancellorship undoubtedly presents a milestone for women's representation, her rise to power was in many ways exceptional, as the below comments suggest.

'She is called a *Machtfrau* in Germany – a woman of power – who has managed to get to the top as an outsider in a male-dominated world ...'¹

¹ Peel, "Angela Merkel: a woman of power", online resource.

‘It is stressed again and again that Germany has a female chancellor. But this has only been made possible because the men have found themselves in such an invidious situation.’²

‘The fact that Merkel has risen to power is due to a coincidence, the donation scandal. Suddenly, the fact that she was from East Germany meant that she wasn’t part of this.’³

‘It is more of an accident rather than a political statement that Merkel is the chancellor.’⁴

‘In general, women have particularly high chances when men think that we have already lost, then they let women have a go.’⁵

In 1999, it was revealed that the CDU had been involved in illegal donations and tax evasions during the Helmut Kohl administration. The scandal tarnished many high-ranking CDU party members and eventually forced the then party’s chairman Wolfgang Schäuble to resign. This paved the way for Merkel’s rise to power within the party.⁶ According to Willarty, three additional factors contributed to her success: the political disruptions of German unification, ‘an increased pressure for gender equity in politics’, and the specific ‘organizational structures within the CDU’.⁷ As Packer similarly observed in *The New Yorker*,

‘Among German leaders, Merkel is a triple anomaly: a woman (divorced, remarried, no children), a scientist (quantum chemistry), and an Ossi (a product of East Germany).

² Interview 21, CDU, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Es wird immer wieder betont, die Bundesrepublik hat eine Bundeskanzlerin. Diese Bundeskanzlerin ist aber auch erst möglich geworden, dass die Männer in einer so misslichen Lage sich befanden, dass das die große Chance einer Frau war.’

³ Interview 19, The Left Party (Die Linke), Male, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘dass die Merkel den Weg gegangen ist, lag an einem Zufall, nämlich einem Spendenskandal. Da war plötzliche die ostdeutsche Herkunft die einzige, die garantierte, dass sie keinen Zeh drin haben konnte.’

⁴ Interview 18, SPD, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Das ist eher ein Betriebsunfall, dass die Merkel Kanzlerin ist, als dass das irgendwie eine politische Aussage wäre.’

⁵ Interview 21, CDU, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Frauen haben in aller Regel dann besonders hohe Chancen, wenn Männer die Befürchtung haben, das haben wir verloren, lassen sie die Frauen ran.’

⁶ Sturm, Daniel Friedrich (2009) "Wie die CDU-Spendenaffäre Merkel den Weg ebnete." *Die Welt*. 04.11. 2009. Available from: <http://perma.cc/6Y4V-X9N9>. Accessed: 14.08. 2014.

⁷ Willarty, Sarah Elise (2008) "Chancellor Angela Merkel - a sign of hope or the exception that proves the rule?" *Politics & Gender*. vol. 4(3): 485-94. 492.

These qualities, though making her an outsider in German politics, also helped to propel her extraordinary rise.⁸

Merkel became Minister for Women and Youth after securing a direct seat in the German Bundestag in the 1990 elections. Being from East Germany meant that she was not expected to have had many years of political experience, as would have been the case for most West German ministers.⁹ Merkel also benefitted from the fact that, being a woman and citizen from the new federal states, she personified two minorities, which Helmut Kohl was keen to represent in the new government.¹⁰ Since the early 1990s, 'Kohl's girl' (*Kohls Mädchen*) - as Merkel was often referred to during her time in ministerial office under chancellor Kohl - has undergone a remarkable transformation. Formerly mocked for her unfeminine appearance and demeanour, she has since undoubtedly changed the public's view on women in politics.¹¹

However, Merkel herself has never been a keen promoter of women's interests in her role as chancellor. She does not consider herself a feminist,¹² usually avoids questions about her sex or 'female' leadership style, and has opposed a number of positive discrimination measures as the leader of the government (such as the introduction of quotas for women in private businesses).¹³ Even though she is the first German chancellor to have appointed a female defence minister, the overall proportion of women in her government is lower than that of Gerhard Schröder's outgoing administration (see Table 17).

⁸ Packer, George (2014) "The Quiet German." *The New Yorker*. 1.12. 2014. Available from: <http://nyr.kr/11OIEfi>. Accessed: 26.11. 2014.

⁹ '[Merkel] is an outsider who never worked her way up through the party system.' Langguth cited in Peel, "Angela Merkel: a woman of power", online resource.

¹⁰ According to Wiliarty, 'opportunities for Angela Merkel repeatedly opened up because the CDU needed to represent either women or easterners in the upper echelons of the party.' Wiliarty, *The CDU and the Politics of Gender*, 183.

¹¹ The media coverage of Angela Merkel during her first candidacy for chancellor in 2005 demonstrated that women were still scrutinised differently from men. See: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung (2009) "Politikerinnen-Bilder im internationalen Vergleich." Available from: <http://perma.cc/66LL-X88R>. Accessed: 24.08. 2014. See also: Holtz-Bacha, Christina and König-Reiling, Nina (2007) *Warum nicht gleich? Wie die Medien mit Frauen in der Politik umgehen*.

¹² Wiliarty, *The CDU and the Politics of Gender*, 184.

¹³ Zeeb, Victoria (2013) "Is Merkel's Success a Victory for Women?" *Counterpoint*. 24.09. 2013. Available from: <http://perma.cc/F9DK-97FV>. Accessed: 14.08. 2014.

Table 17 Proportion of Female Ministers since Unification

Year	Chancellor	Number of Female Ministers	Proportion of Female Ministers
1991	Helmut Kohl	4 of 20	20.0
1994	Helmut Kohl	3 of 18	16.7
1998	Gerhard Schröder	5 of 16	31.3
2002	Gerhard Schröder	6 of 14	42.9
2005	Angela Merkel	5 of 16	31.3
2009	Angela Merkel	5 of 17	29.4
2013	Angela Merkel	5 of 15	33.3

Source: Deutscher Bundestag (2013) and Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (2011). My own calculations.

As I pointed out in the introductory chapter of this thesis, progress in equalising the number of men and women in the German Bundestag and German state parliaments has been sluggish. The proportion of female members of the Bundestag (MPs) and of female members of German state parliaments (MdLs) is yet to surpass the 40 per cent threshold. Indeed, were it not for the existence of at least some type of quota among most of the major German parties, the proportion of women in the Bundestag and in government would probably be even lower. As one female MP of the Green party remarked about her own party,

‘There is no self-regulation... I think if the Greens didn’t have quotas, our party positions would look very different. Green men are not the better men [laughs], they have been trained well, but if you would let them [laughs], I think things would look very different. Quotas are still clearly important.’¹⁴

Another interviewee from the SPD concurred,

¹⁴ Interview 5, Greens, Female, East German, 2013. Original Quote: ‘Es ist kein Automatismus... ich glaube wenn die Quote bei den Grünen weg wäre, würden bei uns die Posten auch ganz schnell ganz anders aussehen. Denn die grünen Männer sind jetzt auch nicht die besseren (lacht). Sie sind zwar gut erzogen, aber wenn man sie lassen würde (lacht), ich glaube, da würde es schon anders aussehen. Also man merkt schon, dass es [die Quote] da sehr wichtig ist.’

'If we didn't have quotas, we would have fewer [women]. I am certain about that. You can see this in those parties that don't have quotas, they have a very low proportion of women [in parliament].'¹⁵

It is conceivable in principle, as one MP interviewed for this thesis argued,¹⁶ that people simply do not vote for women and that this is the main reason for why fewer women sit in German parliaments. Yet, empirically, there is little substantive evidence for such an assertion. Recent US studies have found no clear support for the claim that voters prefer male candidates.¹⁷ Indeed, Angela Merkel is now one of the most popular chancellors in German history, enjoying high approval ratings even in times of political crises.¹⁸ Many German parties are beginning to sense that women symbolise 'a new type of politician'¹⁹ and that putting women on the ticket is conducive to their overall electoral success.²⁰ Nevertheless, only a rough quarter (25.8 per cent) of all candidates for the 2013 German national elections were female, according to a report by the European Academy for Women in Politics and Business.²¹ Among the 5 major German parties, a mere 29.7 per cent of contenders for direct district seats and 37.8 per cent of state party lists candidates were women.²² Nevertheless, women made up 36.5 per cent of the final overall number of national MPs. Indeed, this means that the proportion of female MPs elected to the

¹⁵ Interview 3, SPD, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: 'Wenn wir die Quote nicht hätten, hätten wir weniger. Da bin ich fest überzeugt. Das sieht man ja an den Parteien, die keine Quote haben, dass die eine ganz geringen Anteil von Frauen nur haben.'

¹⁶ Interview 4, CDU, Male, West German, 2013.

¹⁷ For example, see Jordan Brooks, *He Runs, She Runs*.

¹⁸ Reuters (2014) "German government approval rating at record high." 07.08. 2014. Available from: <http://reut.rs/1uPXQnm>. Accessed: 09.08. 2014. Merkel's popularity is closely followed by that of CDU politician Ursula von der Leyen, who, according to Willarty, 'has consistently been the second most popular politician in Germany' Willarty, *The CDU and the Politics of Gender*, 182.

¹⁹ Keller, Claudia (2012) "Ein neuer Typ Politikerin." *Der Tagesspiegel*. 1.12. 2012. Available from: <http://bit.ly/1zOkj48>. Accessed: 5.12. 2013.

²⁰ Der Spiegel Online (2013) "SPD-Ministerinnen im Kabinett: Gabriels Frauenproblem." 02.12. 2013. Available from: <http://perma.cc/D9A5-4G6B>. Accessed: 05.12. 2013. Von Wahl argues that right-leading parties such as the CDU adopted quotas for women as a strategy for increasing their female voter share and that this allowed them to regain the 'majority of the female vote' during the 2005, 2009, and 2013 national elections. Von Wahl "Moving a Mountain: Women Voters, Women Leaders, and the Male Breadwinner Model in Germany", 72-85.


²¹ Chojecka, Julia and Lukoschat, Helga (2013) "Deutschlandreport. Eine Analyse der Aufstellung von Kandidatinnen und Kandidaten für die Bundestagswahl 2013 unter Gleichstellungsaspekten." Berlin: Europäische Akademie für Frauen.

²² Loc. cit.

Bundestag in 2013 was *disproportionately high*, given the share of female candidates who stood for election.

This is largely the result of gender quotas. More than half of all MPs sent to the 18th German Bundestag by the Green party and the Left Party (*Die Linke*) (which both operate with parity quotas) were women. By comparison, the percentage of female MPs from the CDU/CSU (which operate a flexible gender quorum of 33 per cent) was less than a third (see Figure 5).

Figure 5 Proportion of Female MPs elected in 2013 by Party



Notes: The table reports the proportion of female MPs according to party affiliation for the 2013 German Bundestag. Total number of MPs per party are given in parentheses. Source: Der Spiegel. "Bundestagsradar." 2013.

To date, gender quotas are the most effective mechanism for increasing the number of women in parliaments – in Germany as well as in other countries.²³ However, as the above citation suggests, they also attest to the fact that the proportion of women in parliament is still largely dependent on positive discrimination measures. Both the low proportion of direct constituency seats held by women (where quotas are not applied by most parties) as well as the comparatively low share of female MPs among parties that reject quotas altogether, arguably indicate how things would look without such measures

²³ Davidson-Schmich, *A Glass Half Full*, cited from book manuscript. See also: Kolinsky, "Women's quotas in West Germany".

in place. Despite the presence of a female chancellor, therefore, women in German politics still do not have an equal voice – neither in terms of numbers, nor in terms of influence. In this chapter, I investigate the likely factors contributing to this situation.

5.1 Gender Gaps in Party Membership

I argued in chapter 2 (section 2.3) that parties are the gatekeepers to political power and representation in Germany. As Tóka points out,


‘political parties are the central agents of democratic representation, and thus the influence of parties and party systems on the quality of democracy can hardly be overstated.’²⁴

A long-standing problem for democratic representation and gender equality in Germany and other party democracies has been the low proportion of female compared to male party members. In the 1950s and 60s, women made up fewer than 20 per cent of members in West German political parties.²⁵ Though there have been some improvements since, Figure 6 illustrates that throughout the past twenty years, party membership in Germany has been almost twice as common among men than among women.

²⁴ Tóka, Gabor (1997) "Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in East Central Europe." *Studies in Public Policy*. vol. 279: 1-67. 5.

²⁵ Cornelissen, "Politische Partizipation von Frauen", 333.

Figure 6 Party Membership in East and West Germany by Sex



Notes: Percentage of respondents who stated to be members of a party. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

As of 2012, a significant gender gap in party membership clearly persists. This is problematic not only because it means that women are underrepresented in party-internal decision-making processes, but also because lower female party membership contributes to women's underrepresentation in state and national parliaments. As one MP interviewed for this thesis argued,

[The under-representation of women] is a reflection of party membership. If there are fewer female members, then fewer women get elected.²⁶

Notably, there are considerable variations in the gender gap size in party membership between the new and old federal states. As highlighted in Figure 6, the gender gap is more pronounced in West Germany.²⁷ I indicated in chapter 3 that party membership in general is lower in the East and that throughout the post-unification period, political parties in East Germany (which were modelled after the established West German


²⁶ Interview 6, FDP, Male, East German, 2013. Original quote: 'Das ist ein Spiegelbild der Parteimitgliedschaft. Wenn wenige Frauen Mitglied sind, dann werden auch weniger Frauen gewählt.'

²⁷ A simple means comparison test on the descriptive ALLBUS data shows that there is no statistically significant difference in party membership between men and women in the new federal states for all survey years except 1991, 1994, and 1996, and 2002.

parties²⁸) have struggled to generate large-scale support. Whether the smaller gender gap in East Germany that we see today is a reflection of greater egalitarianism in the East or simply of men's depressed levels of participation is a question that will be addressed in section 5.3 of this chapter.

It is important to observe that there are significant differences between the main German parties in terms of female membership. As of 2011, the three parties with the highest proportion of female members in Germany are the parties on the left of the political spectrum – the Left Party (*Die Linke*), the Greens, and the SPD (see Figure 7).²⁹ For a long time, the East German PDS was the party with the highest percentage of female members in all of Germany. This only changed after the merger with its West German equivalent WASG under the new name *Die Linke* (the Left) in 2007.³⁰

Figure 7 Proportion of Female Members in Main German Political Parties



Source: Niedermayer, Oskar (2012) "Parteimitglieder in Deutschland: Version 2012. Arbeitshefte aus dem Otto-Stammer-Zentrum, Nr. 19." Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin. *Data missing for certain years and parties (as seen in graph).

²⁸ The main exception to this is the former PDS which established itself as the successor party of the SED in the new federal states.

²⁹ Bay Brzinski, "Women's Representation in Germany", 70.

³⁰ This was largely due to the high percentage of male party members in the West German wing.

One of the possible reasons for these discrepancies is that women are more likely to support (and therefore possibly join) left-leaning parties, as these usually pay greater attention to ‘women’s issues’ and are more progressive with regards to social policy legislation benefitting women and families (see section 6.1.2 of chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion of the main parties’ different positions). However, the literature on gender and party preference as well as analyses of German elections suggest that the relationship between sex and party preference may in fact be more complex and nuanced. For example, Inglehart and Norris found that while in most post-industrial societies, women on the aggregate were indeed more left-leaning than men toward the end of the 20th century, the traditional gender gap (that views women as being more conservative than men), persisted in many post-communist countries during the same period.³¹ In Germany, recent election polls indicate that women are more likely to support the conservative CDU/CSU and that men are more likely to support the social-democratic SPD (see also Table 40 in the appendix).³² It must also be borne in mind that vote choice and party preference are generally the product of a variety of different factors, such as education, occupation, income, religion, generational effects and age.³³ As such, it is very likely that there are other important determinants beyond left-right party ideology that account for the differences in women’s membership rates. After all, there had been a significant discrepancy in the male-to-female membership ratio of the East German PDS and West German WASG at the time of their merger in 2007, even though the two parties’ ideological outlook was sufficiently similar to justify the merger.³⁴

Another possible reason for the differences in female membership rates among parties is that left-leaning parties have implemented internal gender quotas more rigorously than

³¹ Inglehart and Norris, "Women’s and Men’s Voting Behavior in Global Perspective", 442-43.

³² According to an election poll conducted by *Der Spiegel* after the 2013 national elections, 44 per cent of women voted the CDU/CSU compared to 39 per cent of men. Der Spiegel Online (2013) "Bundestagswahl 2013: So wählten die Deutschen." Available from: <http://perma.cc/2B6Y-PUDG>. Accessed: 25.09. 2013. See also: Bundeswahlleiter (Federal Returning Officer) (2010) "Wahl zum 17. Deutschen Bundestag am 27. September 2009. Heft 5 Textliche Auswertung der Wahlergebnisse." Wiesbaden: Der Bundeswahlleiter.

³³ As Campbell usefully summarises: ‘what can look like sufficient evidence to undermine [or support] a theory needs to be tested and retested in the context of gender (...) because the sex variable intersects with a diverse and sometimes conflicting range of other variables ...’ Campbell, *Gender and the Vote in Britain*, 26.

³⁴ Data on female party membership rates broken down by party and federal state do not seem to have been compiled. However, I include a dummy for party preference in the below regressions to account for the possibility that the lower gender gap in party membership in East Germany is caused primarily by the greater popularity of the Left Party in the region.

parties on the right and that women are more likely to join political parties, which have a higher visibility of women in party and government positions. In Germany, the Left (*Die Linke*) and the Greens reserve at least 50 per cent of all party posts for women. The centre-left Social Democrats (SPD) have a near-parity quota, which stipulates that ‘no fewer than 40 per cent, and no more than 60 per cent’ of party candidates should be of a single sex.³⁵ The centre-right CDU/CSU by contrast operates only with a non-binding quorum of 33 per cent. The FDP – the party with one of the lowest proportions of female members and of women in party positions – has repeatedly rejected the implementation of quotas for women.³⁶

Notably, newly formed parties in Germany are characterised by a particularly stark underrepresentation of women. Of the two most successful and recently formed political parties in Germany (the AfD and the Pirate Party), both have considerably fewer female than male members and neither parties have internal gender quotas. For example, the proportion of women on state party lists of the ‘Alternative for Germany Party’ (*AfD, Alternative für Deutschland*) which was founded in 2013 and which only narrowly failed to surpass the 5 per cent threshold to gain seats in the Bundestag at the 2013 national elections, was at a mere 15.9 per cent. Similarly, the proportion of women on state party lists of the ‘Pirate Party’, which successfully claimed seats in several German state parliaments in 2012, was only 21.6 per cent as of 2013.³⁷

Several MPs interviewed for this thesis have justified either their personal or their party’s rejection of stringent quotas on the grounds that there are not enough female party members in the first place. As one MP remarked,

³⁵ Davidson-Schmich, *A Glass Half Full*, cited from book manuscript.

³⁶ An appeal by the FDP women’s association *Liberale Frauen* to introduce quotas has failed ‘spectacularly’ at a party conference in May 2013. Interview 6, FDP, Male, East German, 2013. Original quote: “Wir haben ja jetzt erst einen Bundesparteitag gehabt in Nürnberg, wo das auch wieder beantragt wurde und die Liberalen Frauen ja eine krachende Niederlage erlitten haben, was auch dafür spricht, dass die Liberalen Frauen sich relativ schlecht organisieren...”

³⁷ Chojecka and Lukoschat, "Analyse der Aufstellung von Kandidatinnen und Kandidaten für die Bundestagswahl 2013", 2.

‘The potential simply isn’t there... We first would need to have more female members before we should demand quotas for women in party positions.’³⁸

This statement highlights that surprisingly little appears to have changed since the times of the Weimar Republic, when, according to Boak, the lack of suitable female candidates to stand on parties’ election lists was ‘due in no small measure to the parties’ failure to concern themselves with the grass-roots political education of women.’³⁹

Initiatives on part of German mainstream parties to recruit new female members exist, but they operate primarily on the local level and appear to have had only moderate success this far.⁴⁰ Notable examples of such initiatives include mentoring programmes for women by the Left Party (*Die Linke*), the Greens, the SPD or the FDP or local initiatives such as *Politik braucht Frauen* (Politics needs women) or *Mebr Frauen in die Politik* (More women into politics).⁴¹ While all of the major German parties pro forma encourage their existing members to engage in recruitment activities, there are no major national campaigns - beyond those cited above - specifically targeted at women.⁴²

Overall, it would seem that the current proportion of women in the German Bundestag is determined to a significant extent by the electoral success of parties who have adopted quotas, as well as by the specific type of quota they operate with (e.g. 30 per cent or 50 per cent). Yet, Davidson-Schmich argues that while being successful in increasing parliamentary representation of women, party quotas have in fact not had an anticipated symbolic effect of enticing women to join political parties in the first place.⁴³ Indeed, Davidson-Schmich points out that ‘German parties now contain fewer women than they

³⁸ Interview 4, CDU, Male, West German, 2013. Original Quote: “Das Potential ist nicht da... Also eigentlich müssten wir zuerst mehr weibliche Mitglieder haben und dann könnte man auch zurecht sagen, dass man das Quorum anpassen müsste.“

³⁹ Boak, "Women in Weimar Politics", 389.

⁴⁰ See for example: Rotenburger Rundschau (2014) "Wenig Resonanz - noch?" 17.09. 2014. Available from: <http://perma.cc/SV9X-LEH2>. Accessed: 17.09. 2014.

⁴¹ See Kreykenbohm, Julia (2013) "Aus Dornröschen Kämpferinnen machen." Available from: <http://perma.cc/3XBM-P3LK>. Accessed: 07.08. 2014. and Bär, Luise (2014) *Fünftes Mentoring-Programm 2015 - Ziel: Mebr Frauen in der Politik*.

⁴² However, as mentioned above, party recruitment is generally done at the local and regional level.

⁴³ Davidson-Schmich, *A Glass Half Full*, cited from book manuscript. See also McKay who argues that while quotas ‘have increased the number of female politicians’ in Germany, they ‘do not automatically guarantee equal access to positions of power for both sexes.’ McKay, "Women in German Politics", 57.

did in the 1980s when quotas were first introduced.⁴⁴ Hence, the existence or non-existence of positive discrimination measures cannot explain the differences in female proportion of German parties either, nor the overall low levels of party membership among women in general.

We are left with the question of *why* fewer women than men join political parties in the first place. The remainder of this chapter will focus on this question. First, I will analyse the views and experiences of politicians that were interviewed for this thesis, paying special attention to the cultural expectations and normative justifications relating to gender roles imbedded in their responses. On the basis of their feedback as well as on the basis of the literature reviewed in chapter 2, I will then formulate my hypotheses for the subsequent statistical analysis.

5.2 Women's Participation and Gender Culture: An Elite Perspective

As part of the interview series, which I conducted with members of the Bundestag and the Saxony State Parliament, I asked each interview participants to name the possible reasons for women's lower participation in institutional politics. Initially, I did not draw their attention to the role of gender culture or gender stereotypes so as to not bias their responses.⁴⁵

The main explanations given by politicians can be broadly summarised into the following three issue areas: women's family responsibilities and their dual burden of paid and domestic work, the unappealing culture and structures of German politics, and the existence of male networks. In the following section, I will briefly elaborate on each of these issue areas, fleshing out the degree to which they relate to traditional attitudes and norms about women and gender roles in German society.

At the outset, there are three general observations about the interview responses that deserve highlighting. The first is that all interviewees referred exclusively to either party

⁴⁴ Davidson-Schmich, *A Glass Half Full*, cited from book manuscript. The author argues that 'quotas' lack of symbolic power stems from their inability to change Germany's recruiting environment and their limited impact on recruitment structures there.'

⁴⁵ See section 8.2.2. of the appendix. Interview questions relating to women's political participation are listed in 'Part II'.

membership or women's representation in state or national parliament (or a combination of both). Not one challenged the notion that women participated less or suggested that women may contribute to political life in different ways. Indeed, the majority of interviewees, including those whose party work was linked to gender equality and equal opportunities, were rather ill informed about the extent of women's underrepresentation both within parties and in parliament. Several MPs confessed that they did not know the percentage of women represented in the Bundestag or the female membership rates of their own parties. One male interviewee was surprised (yet little concerned) to learn that there was a gender imbalance in political participation at all.⁴⁶

A second noteworthy observation was that there seemed to be a substantive difference in responses between female interviewees from East and West Germany. East German respondents were especially likely to stress women's time constraints due to work *and* family commitments as reasons for existing gender gaps in politics whereas female MPs from the West were more likely to list a variety of different inhibiting factors. On the whole, East German male respondents seemed to be the least informed about women's lower participation in politics.⁴⁷

Thirdly, interviewees generally did not comment on the role of other socio-economic resources such as money or social status, which are often identified as contributing to women's underrepresentation in the prevailing literature. Only one female politician from East Germany argued that concerns over making ends meet prevented many women from engaging in politics at the local level.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Interview 15, CDU, Male, East German, 2013. In general, it seemed that both male and female politicians from left-leaning parties were better informed about the existence and extent of gender gaps in politics than members of parties on the right, which reflects the overall emphasis on gender equality issues among these former parties.

⁴⁷ This could be a reflection of the fact that in East Germany, the women's question was long considered to be solved.

⁴⁸ Interview 17, The Left Party (Die Linke), Female, East German, 2013. This may partly be due to politicians' concerns over political correctness. Moreover, it is fair to say that compared to countries such as the United States or the UK, politics in Germany is not primarily a profession taken up solely by the social elite. The most common types of jobs previously held by German MPs in 2009 included (next to lawyers and attorneys) teachers, social workers, farmers, sales people, and general administrators. Statista (2014) "Berufe (Top 25) der Bundestagsabgeordneten in der 16. Wahlperiode (2005 bis 2009)." Available from: <http://perma.cc/HY5U-Q76Z>. Accessed: 21.08. 2014. It is nevertheless surprising that none of the interviewees commented on socio-economic differences between men and women as contributing to women's underrepresentation.

Although the different responses from interviewees are insightful, I am hesitant to over-interpret them as they are derived from such a small sample.

5.2.1 The Role of the Family

The most commonly cited reason for women's lower participation in politics among interviewees concerned the deterring impact of family responsibilities and the perceived difficulties of combining family and professional life with politics. Thirteen out of nineteen interviewees who commented on the question of gender gaps in political participation stressed women's lack of time due their family commitments or due to the difficulties of simultaneously looking after their family and pursuing a professional career:

‘Women are simply busy with job and family in a very important phase of their life and little time is left to participate politically if you also want to do something in your leisure time.’⁴⁹

‘I think that women are more willing than men to take care of domestic tasks, in particular to take care of raising children.’⁵⁰

There was a noticeable gender divide in responses, with eight female respondents and only four male respondents citing women's family commitments as a reason for their overall lower participation. Female interviewees in particular pointed out that politics (both at the local and national level) was an occupation generally poorly compatible with family life:

‘It is simply not a family-friendly profession.’⁵¹

⁴⁹ Interview 8, Greens, Male, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Dass Frauen einfach in einer der wichtigsten Lebensphasen beschäftigt sind mit Beruf und Familie und von daher wenig Zeit bleibt, wenn man noch irgendwas in seiner Freizeit tun will um sich politisch aktiv zu beteiligen.’

⁵⁰ Interview 11, CSU, Male, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Also ich glaube, dass die Frauen eher bereit sind die häuslichen Aufgaben, insbesondere die Erziehung der Kinder, zu übernehmen, als dass die Männer [es] sind. Das kann daran liegen, dass das ein Rollendenken ist. Das kann aber auch ein wenig damit zu tun haben, dass die Frauen, wie ich vorhin schon sagte, einfach von der Natur her eine engere Bindung an den eignen Nachwuchs haben als der Mann.’

⁵¹ Interview 15, CDU, Male, East German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Das ist eben kein familienfreundlicher Beruf...?’

‘It is often not family-friendly and this is so at the expense of women. Women step back. For example, many meetings begin at 5 or 6 o’clock. That’s not a good time if you have a family.’⁵²

With regards to these responses, there are two factors at play, which (from the perspective of politicians interviewed) discourage women from participating in institutional politics in equal numbers to men. The first is that politics - both as a past-time activity and as a profession - is time-consuming and often requires extensive commitment outside of regular working hours. The second contributing factor is that in Germany, ‘the main responsibility for family and house work [still] rests on women.’⁵³ It is only in combination that these two aspects create a situation in which women are discouraged more than men from entering and participating in politics:

‘If you also have a family, then this is a triple burden, volunteering [in politics], job and family. I’m not even talking of a dual burden but of a triple burden. That’s of course particularly difficult.’⁵⁴

There are many parallels between the factors that prevent women from engaging in institutional politics and those that prevent them from having continuous full-time professional careers. This is aptly reflected in the following interview statement from a Social Democrat MP:

‘What we observe in women is that they are active in the Social Democratic youth group. Then when they are finished with studying, they see how they can settle in their professional lives, and try not to rely too much on politics in order to manage in their jobs. And when they then decide to have children, they try to keep up with their job. So really, to engage politically to the extent to which we did, that’s hardly manageable. And

⁵² Interview 9, CDU, Female, East German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Das ist an vielen Stellen familienfeindlich und damit geht es eben zu Lasten der Frauen ... Frauen treten dann zurück. Zum Beispiel viele Sitzungen beginnen um 17.00/18.00Uhr. Das ist doch für eine Familie eine Unzeit.’

⁵³ Interview 17, The Left Party (Die Linke), Female, East German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Die Hauptlast der Familie und der Hausarbeit lastet auf den Frauen.’

⁵⁴ Interview 3, SPD, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Wenn man dann noch eine Familie hat, dann diese Dreifachbelastung, Ehrenamt, Beruf, und Familie. Ich rede ja nicht mal von Doppelbelastung sondern Dreifachbelastung, dann wird es natürlich besonders schwer. Zumal die Sitzungszeiten in politischen Parteien und auch sonst nicht unbedingt familienfreundlich sind.’

then they come back when the kids are out of the worst. And then they start again in their 40s when they [the party] are looking for young men.⁵⁵

This story echoes the three-phase career model, which I described in chapter 3 as the typical life path followed by women in West Germany in the post-war period.⁵⁶ Given the prevalent expectation of working one's way up through the party ranks (the so-called *Ochsentour*), women who take a break from politics (or their career) to focus on their family (whether because they want to or because they have to) are particularly disadvantaged.⁵⁷ As one interviewee observed,

‘... women don't get leadership positions, because they have not taken the time to build up a career during a phase when it most matters.’⁵⁸

Even though there are also examples of women who have risen relatively quickly to the echelons of political power in Germany,⁵⁹ on the whole, the responses from interviewees reveal that not only professional but also political careers are still usually based on expectations which are tailored to the ‘standard biography of the male breadwinner’ - uninterrupted by childcare or other domestic responsibilities.⁶⁰ This assumption is reinforced by the fact that women among the German political elite usually have fewer

⁵⁵ Interview 18, SPD, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Und was wir halt bei Frauen beobachten ist, bei den Jusos engagieren die sich. Dann gucken die dann, wenn das Studium fertig ist, dass sie sich im Beruf setteln und sich nicht so sehr nur zu sehr auf das Standbein Politik verlassen sondern schon irgendwo den Anspruch haben auch ohne Politik Ihre Frau im Beruf stehen zu können. Und wenn die sich dann für Kinder entscheiden, dann gucken Sie, dass sie den Anschluss im Beruf halten können. Also dann wirklich in dem Umfang, wie wir das gemacht haben, mit sich politisch zu engagieren, das schafft man kaum. Und dann kommen die wieder, wenn die Kinder so aus dem größtem raus sind. Und dann heißt das immer, ja die Frauen, quasi wenn die mit 40 nochmal einsteigt, dann heißt es dann immer, die jungen Männer werden dann gesucht.’

⁵⁶ The three-phase model refers to a typical professional career path of women in which they work before marriage and childbirth, stay at home with young children, and re-enter the work force once the children have left the home. Schissler, "Women in West Germany", 123&25.

⁵⁷ Any family or career-related break from political party life puts women who foster political ambitions at a disadvantage, just as it handicaps working women who aspire to leadership positions in other professional careers.

⁵⁸ Interview 16, SPD, Female, East German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Ich denke, ... dass Frauen nicht in Führungspositionen gekommen sind, weil sie eben in der wichtigsten Phase, wenn Karrieren aufgebaut werden, sich dafür nicht die Zeit genommen haben.’

⁵⁹ Former president of the German Bundestag Rita Süßmuth and chancellor Angela Merkel are both considered political career changers (so-called *Quereinsteiger*). Both were appointed to high-ranking political offices soon after they entered party politics.

⁶⁰ Pfau-Effinger, "Gender cultures and the gender arrangement", 156-57. See also: Pfau-Effinger, "Family Childcare in the Cultural and Institutional Context", 37.

children than the national average or do not have children at all.⁶¹ At an average age of around 50 years, over 35 per cent of women in the German Bundestag do not have children compared to less than a fourth (20 per cent) of women aged 50-54 in Germany overall.⁶²

The anecdotal evidence from interviewees' responses indicates that women's experiences and perceptions regarding the difficulty to have a family (and work-) life and to be politically active, combined with the cultural expectations that women should look after home and children, may be an important factor explaining why gender gaps in party membership and political participation at the elite level persist. Whether these difficulties are 'merely' perceptions or whether they reflect the reality of political life is hard to verify through the qualitative data collected.⁶³ This question will therefore be re-visited later in this chapter.

5.2.2 The Role of Networks

A second common factor for women's lower participation identified by interviewees was that of male networks in political organisations, particularly in political parties and parliamentary groups. Although only three interviewees independently stated that networks among men hindered women's participation, when I prompted a specific

⁶¹ According to a 2011 study, female parliamentarians in the German Bundestag have on average 1.22 children (compared to the German average of 1.36). Male parliamentarians on the other hand have an average of 1.63 children. Die Welt (2011) "Viele Frauen im Bundestag bleiben kinderlos." 19.10. 2011. Available from: <http://perma.cc/KTY3-9VXA>. Accessed: 18.08. 2014. And my own calculations, based on figures from Deutscher Bundestag (2014) "Altersgliederung." Available from: <http://perma.cc/ZDA4-R3HE>. Accessed: 18.08. 2014.

⁶² Pöttsch, Olga, Weinmann, Julia and Haustein, Thomas (2013) "Geburtentrends und Familiensituation in Deutschland 2012." Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt. Overall figures refer to 2012 statistics.

⁶³ There are likely to be significant variations between parties, constituencies, and federal states in terms of the infrastructure provided by local councils and political parties. At least one female interviewee pointed out, that a number of measures had been introduced to support men and women with small children if they wished to participate in politics: 'Every municipality in my region compensates for childcare. Hence, you can solve this through being organised. [It might be] that they [women] just don't have the courage, that we need to make them fitter, so that they raise their hands.' Original quote: 'Und jede Kommune bei mir fordert eine Aufwandsentschädigung für Kinderbetreuung. Also das organisatorisch kann man auch lösen. Dass sie vielleicht eben nicht den Mut haben, dass wir sie fitter machen müssen, auch zu sagen, hier die Hand zu heben.'

question to the remaining respondents,⁶⁴ the majority (nine female and two male MPs) agreed that male networks existed in politics and that they were likely to deter women from entering and from advancing in politics:

‘Men can network better. They can more easily go for a beer. It is a different culture, although there are now many women who also go for a beer. But that doesn’t happen very often. There are other interests involved. And men support each other just like that, without asking critical questions. That’s definitely the case. It was like that in the past, it is like that today, and I think it will stay like this in the near future.’⁶⁵

‘I think that politics is still a man’s domain - and has been for years, decades, even millennia - like business too. ... To break into such a male domain is on the one hand strenuous and on the other it can also lead to a lot frustration and not even always be successful.’⁶⁶

The two quotations suggest that there might be a cultural dimension to the presence of male networks (and thus to women’s underrepresentation). Women, the interviewee stated, have ‘other interests’, a different way of interacting. This resonates with an assessment of Sapiro, which I cited earlier in this thesis (see chapter 2). For women, to recall Sapiro, ‘entrance into politics is not a simple matter of taking up a new activity. Rather, it is participating in activities and institutions designed and populated primarily by men, people with a different set of social norms, rituals, language, dress, and values.’⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Interview question: ‘In the 1990s, political scientist Eva Krisky argued that politics is a man’s club which is primarily based on male networks and male behaviour. Based on your own experiences, would you agree or rather disagree with this statement?’

⁶⁵ Interview 3, SPD, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Also, old boys networking, das ist schon auch wirklich vorhanden. Also das Netzwerken können Männer besser. Sie können es auch leichter, sie gehen ein Bier trinken. Es ist also eine andere Kultur, obwohl es mittlerweile auch viele Frauen gibt, die mal ein Bier trinken gehen. Aber das kommt nicht so häufig vor. Da sind andere Interessen im Spiel. Und ja, Männer unterstützen sich auch nur so, ohne große kritische Fragen zu stellen. Das ist auf jeden Fall so. Das war früher so, das ist heute so und das wird glaub ich auch in naher Zukunft so bleiben.’

⁶⁶ Interview 8, Greens, Male, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Ich glaube, dass Politik immer noch, wie es Jahre, Jahrzehnte, fast Jahrtausende war, eine Männerdomäne ist, wie es auch Unternehmen sind. ... In so eine Männerdomäne von außen einzubrechen ist zum einen anstrengend und zum anderen kann es auch zu viel Frustration kommen und es gelingt noch nicht einmal immer.’

⁶⁷ Sapiro, *The Political Integration of Women*, 30.

One interviewee linked the underrepresentation of women in her party specifically to the fact that it was ‘still perceived as a men’s party’.⁶⁸

Other interviewees noted that men did not always intentionally or knowingly form networks in order to exclude women.⁶⁹ Only two male MPs felt (or admitted) that male networks existed at all.⁷⁰ This is not necessarily surprising since gender stereotypes and prejudices, which foster their existence, often operate subconsciously. Moreover, several respondents observed that women themselves were less eager or willing to network:

‘But we women also contribute to that, because we don’t network. We are often more negative against each other.’⁷¹

‘Well, I had the impression that networks did exist, but I didn’t feel that women were consciously excluded from them. But it’s just not their style, they are less likely to sit together for hours on end over beer. Instead they say I want to sleep so that I look half decent tomorrow. Women have different needs and also often different responsibilities, which men don’t have.’⁷²

⁶⁸ ‘I’d say it’s maybe also down to the fact that we are still perceived as a men’s party. Sigmar Gabriel, Peer Steinbrück, Frank Walter Steinmeier, and [for] women we have Manuela Schwesig and Hannelore Kraft, but two women alone are not enough to counterbalance all the men.’ Interview 20, SPD, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Also ich sag mal, vielleicht liegt es auch ein bisschen daran, dass wir nach außen hin doch sehr als Männerpartei wahrgenommen werden. Also Sigmar Gabriel, Peer Steinbrück, Frank Walter Steinmeier und Frauen, da ist die Manuela Schwesig und die Hannelore Kraft, aber zwei Frauen alleine sind zu wenig um das große Männerübergewicht tatsächlich auszugleichen.’

⁶⁹ Interview 9, CDU, Female, East German, 2013: ‘Rather subconsciously, yes. I don’t want to claim [they do it] consciously.’ Original quote: ‘Eher unbewusst, ja. Bewusst, das möchte ich nicht behaupten. Aber ja, unbewusst ausgrenzen.’

⁷⁰ It is of course unlikely that men would admit to having formed networks to exclude women even if this was the case.

⁷¹ Interview 7, FDP, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Aber tragen wir Frauen auch dazu bei, weil wir uns nicht so vernetzen. Wir sind uns häufig negativer [gegenüber]. Ich komme auch mit Männern sehr gut hier auf der bundespolitischen Ebene klar, besser als mit Frauen, muss ich ganz ehrlich sagen.’

⁷² Interview 20, SPD, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Also ich hatte den schon, den Eindruck, dass Netzwerke bestehen, aber nicht den Eindruck, dass Frauen bewusst ausgeschlossen werden. Sondern es ist eben wieder die Art, also Frauen liegt es halt weniger, nach einer Sitzung noch stundenlang beim Bier zusammensitzen, sondernd die sagen, ich möchte schlafen, damit ich morgen früh einigermaßen anständig ausschaue. Also, Frauen haben anderen Bedürfnisse und häufig eben auch andere Arbeit, die Männer nicht haben.’

‘We still have to learn a lot strategically. ... They [women] have to realise that if I want to change something, I need influence. I have to win power to enforce something with my group, with my supporters.’⁷³

Not only are women perceived to be different from men in terms of their political behaviour, the last quotation also carries a value judgement in that it suggests women should behave more like men if they want to achieve certain desired outcomes.

Finally, several interviewees argued that while male networks existed in the past, they no longer had much bearing on political life at the elite level today.⁷⁴ Part of this change, they stated, had come about as a result of Angela Merkel’s chancellorship. Unlike her predecessors, Merkel was ‘not the type to decide things over a glass of beer’.⁷⁵ Although steadfast conclusions on women in politics cannot be extrapolated from Merkel’s leadership style alone, this last statement nevertheless indicates that individual actors may matter with regard to the way in which politics is done and perceived by different political actors. Further in-depth qualitative study or careful analysis of social networks might make quantifying their effects on women’s political participation at the elite level possible, but this is beyond the scope of this thesis.

5.2.3 The Role of Culture

Thus far, much of my discussion of interview responses presumed that women *want* to participate in politics and are discouraged or prevented from doing so by external factors or circumstances (such as family responsibilities or closed networks). According to those interviewed, however, it is not necessarily the case that women feel explicitly disadvantaged or excluded. Indeed, a number of interviewees argued that many women

⁷³ Interview 21, CDU, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Im Strategischen haben wir noch viel dazu zu lernen. ... Aber sie müssen sich klar machen, wenn ich was verändern will, gehört dazu auch immer Einflussnahme. Ich muss die Macht gewinnen um mit meiner Gruppierung, mit meinen Unterstützern, etwas durchzusetzen.’

⁷⁴ Interview 19, The Left Party (Die Linke), Male, West German, 2013: ‘No, this was probably true back then, but it’s certainly not true anymore. The structures have changed.’ Original quote: ‘Nein, das stimmte damals bestimmt, aber jetzt stimmt es nicht mehr. Die Strukturen haben sich verändert.’

⁷⁵ Interview 4, CDU, Male, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Und Angela Merkel ist dahingehend auch bezeichnend, weil sie nicht der Typ ist, der beim Glas Bier was regelt, wie es dem Kohl nachgesagt wurde, das er in einer gemütlichen Runde zusammensaß und da im Grunde viel entschieden hat und wer da mit dabei saß, der hat auch die Chance gehabt, irgendwann einmal eine verantwortliche Aufgaben zu bekommen. Da ist die Angela Merkel ein völlig anderen Typ.’

make the conscious decision not to participate, either because they do not consider it a priority, or simply because they do not want to:

‘But today I would say that it’s also down to women themselves, because many women don’t want to.’⁷⁶

‘I often hear women say, I work part-time, but family is really important to me, I don’t want to get involved. And this is where women differ from men, because they [women] simply say, I don’t have to sit on the city council, that’s not important to me. It’s important that I have a happy family and a good family life. And a man assumes that all is well and he can still be a council member. I hardly ever hear that family response from men. For them, the job is more important, [they may say] the job doesn’t allow for it. But with women, I often hear, I can’t do all of this and my family is more important to me.’⁷⁷

‘[Young women] need to struggle at work and often don’t have the energy, perhaps the will, to invest as much as is often necessary to achieve something [in politics]. I think that also plays a role.’⁷⁸

These interview excerpts suggest that many women prioritise family responsibilities over political engagement to an extent that men do not. This resonates with the gender norms around motherhood and marital roles which were analysed in the previous chapter. It is the cultural context that socialises women into prioritising their family responsibilities over other activities. As one interviewee put it, ‘and then I always think to myself, do

⁷⁶ Interview 7, FDP, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Aber heute würde ich sagen, es liegt auch an den Frauen selbst, weil viele nicht wollten.’

⁷⁷ Interview 4, CDU, Male, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Bei Frauen höre ich halt häufig, „Ich bin Teilzeit berufstätig, aber mir ist Familie so wichtig, ich möchte nichts machen.“ Und da unterscheiden sich Frauen von Männer, weil die einfach sagen, „ich muss nicht im Stadtrat sitzen für mich, das ist mir nicht wichtig. Mir ist wichtig, dass ich eine glückliche Familie habe und ein gutes Familienleben.“ Und ein Mann unterstellt das, dass alles gut ist und er trotzdem Gemeinderat sein kann. Also die Antwort kriege ich bei Männern ganz selten mit Familie. Bei denen geht es eher um den Beruf, die sagen ihre Beruf lässt es nicht zu. Aber bei Frauen höre ich häufig, „ich kann das nicht alles machen und da ist mir Familie wichtiger.“’

⁷⁸ Interview 3, SPD, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘[Junge Frauen] müssen sich abstrampeln im Beruf und haben oft gar nicht mehr die Power, den Willen vielleicht doch daneben sich auch nochmal so stark aufzureiben, wie das ja manchmal der Fall sein muss um eine Sache durchzusetzen. Und ich glaub, das spielt auch noch eine Rolle.’

men have nothing to do? Men also work, they also have children, how come they can take off an evening?’⁷⁹

However, not all women are mothers or responsible for the care of small children. As such, there are likely to be other possible factors - beyond those of marriage and motherhood – that make women less likely to join political parties.

As I pointed out earlier in this thesis, a number of studies suggest that women participate less in politics because they are simply less interested in it.⁸⁰ However, interviewees on the whole did not agree with this assertion. When I cited research suggesting that lack of political interest among women could be an underlying cause for gender gaps in politics, only two respondents felt that this was an accurate observation.⁸¹ The majority stressed that this was not reflected in their own experiences based on interactions with members of their constituencies or with other voters:

‘I don’t experience that at all. I experience a lot of dedicated, interested women.’⁸²

‘It’s not the case that women are less interested ... I think women are very interested, but they are also much more sophisticated sometimes I think, and they think differently. There was just recently a statistic that women are more interested in environmental issues than men for example. This is a sign, it could be a sign, that women are differently interested in politics. They are not as power focused as men, but more interested in the issue with the desire for change. This is an experience that I have had.’⁸³

⁷⁹ Interview 5, Greens, Female, East German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Und dann denk ich immer, ‚haben Männer denn nichts zu tun?’ Die Männer haben doch auch Arbeit, die haben auch Kinder, warum können die sich die Abende frei machen?’

⁸⁰ Verba, Burns and Schlozman, "Gender and Political Engagement", 1053. Ford, *Women and politics*, 96.

⁸¹ Typical interview question: ‘Based on your own experiences, do you have the impression that women are less interested in politics [or interested in different topics] than men?’

⁸² Interview 8, Greens, Male, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Ich erlebe das überhaupt nicht. Ich erlebe sehr viele engagierte, interessierte Frauen...’

⁸³ Original quote: ‘Es ist ja nicht so, dass sich Frauen weniger interessieren, ... ich glaub schon, dass Frauen sich stark interessieren, dass sie sich auch viel differenzierter manchmal denken, ganz anders denken auch. Es gab jetzt so eine Statistik, dass Frauen sich mehr für Umweltthemen zum Beispiel interessieren als Männer. Das ist so ein Zeichen, das könnte so ein Zeichen sein, dass man sich ganz anders interessiert politisch und auch nicht so machtorientiert sondern sachorientiert mit einem Veränderungswillen, das ist so eine Erfahrung, die ich gemacht habe.’

There are clearly several normative assumptions about gender included in this latter statement. Nevertheless, the citation resonates with the findings from research in gender and politics, which proposes that women are just as interested in politics as men once the spectrum of what constitutes political interest is broadened to encompass a wider range of topics (see also discussion in section 2.3, chapter 2).⁸⁴ A number of interviewees from different parties noted that women were particularly concerned with social issues such as childcare, health, or education.⁸⁵ This would support the hypothesis that there is a qualitative rather than a quantitative difference in political cognitive engagement among men and women. Norris and Inglehart link such gender differences in issue type interests to traditional gender role thinking.⁸⁶ The authors argue that these differences in turn can lead to both vertical and horizontal segmentation in associational membership (i.e. to differences in the density of men and women joining associations as well as to differences in the types of associations they join).⁸⁷ In other words, by the logic of *horizontal* segmentation, women enter political parties in fewer numbers because they do not perceive them as channels through which they can address or campaign for the issues which are important to them.

However, the interviewees of my study only commented on the possible negative consequences of *vertical* segmentation on women's political participation. Indeed, the second most cited explanation among interviewees for why women participate in formal politics in fewer numbers than men was that the 'male' manners, structures, and personalities were making politics unappealing for women:

I think politics is a relatively tough business which operates with, I would say, rather unrefined methods. And for women, whom are said to be more sensitive, this can possibly be a deterring factor.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ See for example: Fuchs, "Feministische Partizipationsforschung".

⁸⁵ See for example: Interview 4, CDU, Male, West German, 2013; Interview 7, FDP, Female, West German, 2013; Interview 10, FDP, Female, West German, 2013. See also: Vorsamer, Barbara (2013) "Links die Frau, rechts der Mann." *Süddeutsche*. 30.8. 2013. Available from: <http://bit.ly/1pb6AmV>. Accessed: 3.11. 2014.

⁸⁶ Norris and Inglehart, "Gendering Social Capital", 73.

⁸⁷ Loc. cit.

⁸⁸ Interview 6, FDP, Male, East German, 2013. Original quote: 'Ich glaub das Politik ein relativ hartes Geschäft ist und teilweise wird ja auch mit sehr, ich sag mal unfeinen Methoden, gearbeitet. Und für

‘I think that women don’t always necessarily find the way in which politics is done, appealing. That starts with the structures, which parties still have. Not every woman is willing to go to the local party meeting every month and to listen to all the rambling. From my point of view, the structures don’t reflect the needs that women in particular have.’⁸⁹

‘I think that politics is a very male-structured world, which maintains certain manners. The meeting marathons and the ways of image cultivation without a goal, I think that’s not the world of women. (...) The culture, the way things are done in politics, that creates inhibitions.’⁹⁰

‘Of course there is also always sexism and some deal with that better than others. And of course, this discourages women.’⁹¹

Sexism is a particularly distinct manifestation of a traditional gender culture. In the late 1990s and 2000s, a number of memoirs and autobiographical collections of former politicians and journalists were published suggesting that German politics, especially during the period of the Bonn Republic, had been an environment in which sexism and misogyny was commonplace.⁹²

But even today, German politics has not yet rid itself entirely of its misogynistic connotations. During the research stages of my thesis, a national debate ignited in Germany over the persistence of sexism in German politics and society at large.⁹³ It was triggered by the publication of an article by a young female journalist in a weekly German

Frauen, denen ja nachgesagt wird, dass sie etwas sensibler sind, ist das unter Umständen eher eine abschreckende Sache.’

⁸⁹ Interview 20, SPD, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: “Aber ich glaube, dass Frauen von der Art, wie Politik gemacht wird, sich nicht unbedingt immer angesprochen fühlen. Also das fängt an mit den Strukturen, die die Parteien nach wie vor haben. Nicht jede Frau ist bereit, jeden Monat einmal in die Ortsvereinssitzung zu gehen und sich jetzt also den ganzen Schmääh da anzuhören und die Strukturen spiegeln nicht die Bedürfnisse, die insbesondere Frauen haben in meinen Augen wider.’

⁹⁰ Interview 3, SPD, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Ich glaube, die Politik ist eine sehr männlich strukturierte Welt, die eine ganz bestimmte Umgangsform pflegt. Diese Sitzungsmarathons und die Selbstdarstellungsvarianten ohne Zielführung ist nicht, glaub ich, die Welt der Frauen. (...) Die Kultur, die Arbeitswelt in der Politik ist erst mal eine Hemmschwelle.’

⁹¹ Interview 13, The Left Party (Die Linke), Female, East German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Es ist natürlich eine Zeitfrage aber auch natürlich eine Frage des Stils teilweise. Natürlich gibt es immer wieder auch Sexismus und das ist ja etwas, was manche besser wegstecken und andere weniger. Und das schreckt natürlich auch Frauen ab.’

⁹² See for example: Kosser, *Hammelsprünge*.

⁹³ Parts of this paragraph are replicated from an article I wrote for *Free Speech Debate* project. See: Glatte, Sarah (2013) "Twitter, free speech, and sexism – an #outcry from Germany." *Free Speech Debate*. 26.06. 2013. Available from: <http://perma.cc/U LM7-DNAK>. Accessed: 22.09. 2014.

news magazine.⁹⁴ The article portrayed the then leading liberal politician Rainer Brüderle, alleging him of making inappropriate comments and sexual advances towards the journalist. Social media soon picked up the topic. Within 6 days, over 15,000 users had posted more than 49,000 comments about their own experiences of every day sexism on Twitter - a record for activity in Germany.⁹⁵ Major German TV outlets and newspapers soon followed suit by covering the issue.⁹⁶ The highly contentious nature of the topic was also reflected in the many irritated reactions of my interviewees when I questioned them on their own experiences of sexism in politics in reference to the article.⁹⁷

Overall, only five MPs confirmed that sexism existed in German politics, four of which were women:

‘Of course, absolutely. It starts with when a woman gives a speech in parliament and suddenly the noise level goes up a bit.’⁹⁸

‘Well, I mean sexist is perhaps an exaggeration, but when I was young MdL in the Berlin state parliament ... someone shouted, “she should learn to cook before she speaks in parliament!”’⁹⁹

‘When during my time women [in parliament] spoke on a certain issue that men believed wasn’t a ‘women’s issue, such as foreign policy, economic policy and the like, the number of heckles increased and the quality of heckles decreased.’¹⁰⁰

⁹⁴ Himmelreich, Laura (2013) "Der Herrenwitz." 01.02. 2013. Available from: <http://bit.ly/1s9x9VV>. Accessed: 04.02. 2013.

⁹⁵ With an estimated 2.4 million active users, Twitter exposure is relatively weak in Germany.

⁹⁶ See for example: Mühle, Melanie (2013) "Dirndl bei Jauch." *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 28.01. 2013. Available from: <http://www.faz.net/-hon-763kq>. Accessed: 29.01. 2013.

⁹⁷ Most interviewees of the CDU, CSU and FDP sharply criticized the article, its intent and its author. Several female politicians from left-leaning parties on the other hand welcomed the fact that the publication had initiated a debate on sexism in German society.

⁹⁸ Interview 18, SPD, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Natürlich, klar. Also das geht schon los, wenn eine Frau ans Rednerpult geht und dann der Lärmpegel dann plötzlich ein bisschen ansteigt.’

⁹⁹ Interview 13, The Left Party (Die Linke), Female, East German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Naja, ich meine sexistisch ist vielleicht übertrieben, aber als ich junge Abgeordnete im Abgeordnetenhaus war, ich war Fraktionsvorsitzende in Berlin, da rief jemand “die soll erst mal kochen lernen bevor sie hier im Parlament spricht.”’

¹⁰⁰ Interview 20, SPD, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Wenn sich Frauen in meiner Zeit zu einem Thema geäußert haben, das die Männer glaubten, das es eigentlich kein Frauenthema wäre, also Außenpolitik, Wirtschaftspolitik und Ähnliches, dann nahm die Zahl der Zwischenrufe zu und die Qualität der Zwischenrufe ab.’

One of the conceptual premises with which I began this thesis was that gender behaviour is to a significant extent socially constructed (see section 2.1, chapter 2). From this premise follows that men are not innately sexist and that women are not naturally more interested in domestic life, more ‘sensitive’ or ‘ambivalent to political power’ than men, but that these types of preferences and behaviours are reflections of traditional gender role norms. If dominant gender roles dictate that women are more suited to child-rearing, that they are more emotional, less rational or assertive, and that politics requires just these characteristics, then it is not surprising that women on the whole would be less likely to see themselves fit for it or that they should find politics in general less appealing. As one interviewee put it, ‘women in their traditional role still have a very ambivalent relationship to political power, a very sceptical one.’¹⁰¹ This sentiment is reinforced by the account of another female interviewee who told to me that she did not consider herself an able candidate for a constituency mandate until it was proposed to her that another woman would step in in her place:

‘The penny dropped with me when they said, well then, if not you, then her. And then I thought to myself – anything she can do, I can do better. [...] - I think this is also particular to women, that even when they are asked, do you want to do it, they reflect and they say, I can’t really do that. I am not good enough.’¹⁰²

Only by comparison to another female candidate, did this interviewee feel confident enough in her own abilities to stand for election.

In sum, the statements and personal experiences of politicians interviewed for this thesis indicate that there may indeed be an underlying cultural element, which contributes to the existence of gender gaps in formal participation. The responses suggest that gender role norms are likely to negatively affect women’s own perceptions, firstly with regards to whether they regard politics to be an appealing activity, and secondly, with regards to

¹⁰¹ Interview 21, CDU, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Das Zweite ist, dass Frauen nach wie vor in der traditionellen Rolle noch ein sehr ambivalentes Verhältnis zu politischer Macht haben, ein sehr skeptisches.’

¹⁰² Interview 18, SPD, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Aber das ist glaub ich auch nur Frauen eigen, dass man selber dann, wenn man gefragt wird, willst du das machen, dann in sich geht und sagt, das kann ich eigentlich nicht. Ich bin nicht gut genug dafür. Und klick hat es dann gemacht, als die dann sagte, ja was ist denn jetzt, wenn Du nicht, dann die. Und dann dachte ich, ja, was die kann, das kann ich schon drei mal.’

whether they consider themselves suitable for engaging in this activity. The following analysis seeks to establish if there is any quantitative evidence for this interpretation.

5.3 Women's Participation and Gender Culture: a quantitative analysis

As in chapter 4, the subsequent statistical investigation draws on biennial data from the German General Social Survey (1980-2012). ALLBUS is among the few datasets to include variables on both political participation and on gender attitudes. For the purpose of this analysis, I focus on party membership, which is coded as a binary variable and captures whether respondents were members of a political party at the time the survey was conducted.¹⁰³ At the end of this chapter, I will also present a brief statistical analysis of other forms of participation included in the German General Social Survey.

Independent Variables

As mentioned above, my elite interviewees did not identify socio-economic variables as factors influencing women's participation. Yet, drawing on the literature review on gender and political participation, there are nevertheless strong theoretical reasons for including a set of socio-economic controls in my regressions. The operationalisation of the standard regressors age, education, occupation, income, religiosity¹⁰⁴ and marital status in the following regressions is consistent with that in the previous chapter. In addition, I will also control for household size (1/5), party preference (respondents were asked which party they would vote for at the time of the survey would there be a general election), and democratic satisfaction (1/0).

According to my interviewees, one of the most significant deterrents for women's participation is lack of time due to family responsibilities. Unfortunately, data on the number and age of children of participants in the ALLBUS survey have only been

¹⁰³ As I pointed out in section 2.3, parties are Germany's principal political actors. Individuals wishing to influence political life at the local, regional, and national level will almost necessarily have to join a political party. Despite the fact that party membership rates have been steadily declining over the past decades, therefore, political parties are still the only channels through which women (and men) can gain political representation.

¹⁰⁴ I do not include interactions between Regular Church Attendance and religious denomination as there is no strong underlying theoretical reason to do so.

collected since 2000. Therefore, most of the following regressions include a variable for household size instead. The rationale behind this is that households with more than two members are likely to include children or individuals in need of care. Using household size as a proxy for children in this way allows me to work with a larger sample size and a greater number of survey years. To ensure that the proxy yields robust results, I will run an additional regression with a variable for respondents who have children below the age of 18. This will be briefly discussed as part of my examination of Hypothesis 5.

Party preference is included in the regressions to control for the possibility that the effect of traditional gender attitudes may simply reflect liberal or conservative political attitudes. Democratic satisfaction is a final additional control variable. As I elaborated in chapter 3, it has been suggested that political disillusionment may be an important factor depressing political participation among citizens in the new federal states. I attempt to account for this by including a binary variable recoded from responses on how happy survey participants were with democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany (original responses ranged from 1 – very unhappy to 6 – very happy) at the time of the survey. I also interact this Democratic Satisfaction dummy with the regional regressor to capture the particular effects of democratic disillusionments among citizens from the new federal states. The reader is advised to note that while there are strong theoretical reasons for including democratic satisfaction as a control variable, this is done at the expense of a significant drop in the number of observations (information on democratic satisfaction has been recorded in survey years 1991, 1992, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2008 only).

My main explanatory variables in this chapter are sex, region, and traditional gender attitudes (scaled from 1 most liberal to 19 most traditional). For information on coding of these variables, please refer back to chapter 4. As in the previous chapter, robustness checks using federal state dummies are included in the appendix.

5.4 Hypotheses

The research hypotheses for this section are derived from the insights of the literature review as well as from the comments from interviewees. Hypotheses 5-6 serve as preliminary investigations into the regional and sex differences in party membership while Hypotheses 8 and 9 concern the effect of traditional gender attitudes on my dependent variable. The following hypotheses are tested:

Hypothesis 5 Women are less likely to be members of a political party than men.

Hypothesis 6 The gender gap in party membership is smaller in East Germany than in West Germany.

Hypothesis 7 Those who hold traditional views on gender roles are less likely to participate in politics than those who hold liberal views on gender roles.

Hypothesis 8 Traditional gender attitudes have a greater negative effect on women's political participation than on men's.

I report results from logistic regressions as conditional marginal effects.¹⁰⁵ The regression tables display robust standard errors. As previously, any mention of 'effects' (prior to discussing instrumental variable regression) of the explanatory on the dependent variable refer to conditional correlations rather than causal relationships.

5.5 Results

Hypothesis 5

I first consider the effect of being a woman on party membership. Column I of Table 18 lists the logit marginal effects of the female dummy on the dependent variable, controlling only for survey years and East-West region. As expected, being a woman has a statistically significant negative effect on the predicted probability of party membership. The size of the effect is roughly 3 per cent. Considering the low baseline numbers of overall party membership in Germany (see Figure 6), the negative effect of being a woman on party membership is not only statistically but also substantially significant, with men being twice as likely to be members of a party compared to women. As noted in the literature review, a number of scholars point out that socio-economic and demographic differences between men and women may be at the root of observed

¹⁰⁵ The slight disadvantage of presenting my results as predicted probabilities is that the probabilities of participating politically across different types of activity are rather small. The average marginal effect values might therefore be somewhat misleading in the sense that they make the impact of explanatory variables seem substantially insignificant. For example, a decrease in probability of party membership of 3 percentage points appears to be only a substantively small change. Yet in relative terms, men are twice as likely to be party members.

gender gaps in participation. Column II in Table 18 therefore controls for factors usually cited in this context (age, income, education, religious affiliation, marital status and so on). The conditional marginal effect for the female sex dummy in this extended model shows that the gender gap in participation remains statistically significant, though the size of the effect of has decreased compared to model 1. Computing the odds ratio illustrates that men's odds of being member of a party are still almost twice as high as those of women (OR of 1.9).

Table 18 Determinants of Party Membership

	Party Membership			
	I	II	III	IV
Female	-0.030*** (0.00)	-0.019*** (0.00)	-0.023*** (0.00)	-0.007 (0.01)
East (Place of Interview)	-0.019*** (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.006 (0.01)	-0.006 (0.01)
Traditional Gender Attitudes (1-19)			-0.002*** (0.00)	-0.001*** (0.00)
Women*Trad. Gender Attitudes				-0.002*** (0.00)
Age		0.002*** (0.00)	0.002*** (0.00)	0.002*** (0.00)
Age Squared		-0.001*** (0.00)	-0.001* (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Education Status ^A				
Low Secondary Education		0.005 (0.01)	0.015 (0.02)	0.015 (0.02)
Intermediary Secondary Education		0.013 (0.01)	0.018 (0.02)	0.018 (0.02)
High Secondary Education		0.020** (0.01)	0.027 (0.02)	0.026 (0.02)
Still At School		-0.034 (0.02)	-0.032 (0.03)	-0.032 (0.03)
Employed		0.014*** (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)
Occupation ^B				
Agriculture		0.007 (0.01)	0.017 (0.01)	0.017 (0.01)
Academia		-0.011 (0.01)	-0.016 (0.01)	-0.014 (0.01)
Self-Employed		-0.003 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)
Public Sector Employee		-0.004 (0.01)	0.000 (0.01)	0.000 (0.01)
Private Sector Employee		-0.014*** (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)
Manual Worker		-0.028*** (0.01)	-0.026*** (0.01)	-0.025*** (0.01)
Other		-0.007 (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)

Income ^C				
900-1499€		0.003 (0.00)	0.006 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)
1500-2599€		0.012*** (0.00)	0.006 (0.00)	0.005 (0.00)
2600€ or More		0.019*** (0.00)	0.018*** (0.01)	0.016*** (0.01)
Religion ^D				
Protestant		0.005 (0.00)	0.007 (0.00)	0.006 (0.00)
Catholic		0.009*** (0.00)	0.010** (0.00)	0.010** (0.00)
Other		-0.004 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.006 (0.01)
Regular Church Attendance		0.005* (0.00)	0.006* (0.00)	0.006* (0.00)
Party Preference ^E				
SPD		-0.001 (0.00)	-0.004 (0.00)	-0.004 (0.00)
FDP		-0.011*** (0.00)	-0.012** (0.01)	-0.012** (0.01)
Green Party		-0.019*** (0.00)	-0.019*** (0.01)	-0.018*** (0.01)
Left Party		0.017*** (0.00)	0.020*** (0.01)	0.020*** (0.01)
Other		0.012* (0.01)	0.014* (0.01)	0.014* (0.01)
None		-0.050*** (0.01)	-0.044*** (0.01)	-0.043*** (0.01)
Satisfied with Democracy		0.001 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)
Satisfied with Democracy*East Interaction		-0.013*** (0.00)	-0.017*** (0.01)	-0.017*** (0.01)
Marital Status ^F				
Married/Widowed		0.002 (0.00)	0.004 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)
Separated/Divorced		-0.003 (0.00)	0.003 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)
Household Size ^G				
Two Person Household		-0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Three Person Household		-0.003 (0.00)	0.000 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
4 Person Household		-0.001 (0.00)	0.010 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)
Five or More Person Household		0.006 (0.01)	0.011 (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R-squared	0.031	0.084	0.092	0.094
Observations	37484	25458	12817	12817

Notes: The table reports conditional marginal effects from logistic regression for discrete changes of the dummy variables from 0 to 1. All models are weighted to adjust for regional and household oversampling. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ^AEducation dummies: reference category is no secondary education. ^BOccupation dummies: reference category is 'not applicable.' ^CIncome dummies: reference category is monthly income of 900€ or less. ^DReligion: reference category is non-religious. ^EParty Preference: reference category is CDU. ^FMarital Status: reference category is 'single.' ^GHousehold Size: reference category is 1 person household. ***1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

Moreover, the (pseudo) R-squared values more than tripled in model II compared to model I, which confirms that the addition of control variables considerably improves the predictive power of the regression. *Ceteris paribus*, age, earning more than 2600€ per month, being Christian, and having a left preference correlate positively with party membership - the conditional marginal effects on the predicted probability range from 0.2 to 2 per cent. Being a student or manual worker and having no party preference on the other hand correlate negatively with the outcome variable.

What about the effect of having children? According to politicians interviewed, it is particularly women with children who are discouraged from joining and participating in political parties due to the real or perceived difficulties of combining political engagement with family life. The regression models in columns II-IV control for household size, but none of the coefficients for these dummies are statistically significant. To ensure that this is not merely the result of household size being an imperfect proxy, I run separate regressions, replacing household size with a binary variable, capturing whether respondents had children below the age of 18 at the time of the survey. As I noted above, this variable is only obtainable for survey years 2000 and after.

Table 19 Determinants of Party Membership: Effects of Having Children

	Party Membership			
	Overall Sample		Female Sample	
	I	II	III	IV
Female	-0.028*** (0.00)	-0.016*** (0.00)		
East (Place of Interview)	-0.026*** (0.00)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.013*** (0.00)	-0.004 (0.01)
Children Under 18	-0.006* (0.00)	-0.005 (0.00)	-0.009* (0.00)	-0.010* (0.01)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Pseudo R-squared	0.029	0.099	0.011	0.097
Observations	20565	6466	10538	3191

Notes: The table reports conditional marginal effects from logistic regression for discrete changes of the dummy variables from 0 to 1. All models are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Additional controls are age, age², secondary education status, employment status, occupation, income, religious affiliation, regular church attendance, party preference, satisfaction with democracy (and its interaction with the East), marital status, and household size. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ***1% level of significance, **5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

Like household size, having children has no statistically significant effect on the predicted probability of party membership after controlling for other socio-economic factors (see column II). However, computing the same regression with only the female survey participant pool, the dummy variable yields a statistically significant negative coefficient, even if it is only significant at the ten per cent level. This lends support to research cited earlier in this thesis that having children may have a negative effect on women's political participation, but not necessarily on men's.¹⁰⁶ Yet, due to the fact that the explanatory dummy variable for having children is not statistically significant using the overall sample, and because the variable is only available for a limited number of survey years, the subsequent regressions revert back to using household size as a proxy for having children instead.

Hypothesis 6

In addition to giving us an insight into the extent of gender differences in party membership, Table 18 also contains information on the East-West gap in political participation. Controlling only for survey years and sex, being from the East (compared to being from the West) has a statistically significant negative effect on party membership. The baseline predicted probability is roughly 2 per cent lower in the new compared to the old federal states. This result is consistent with the insights from the secondary literature on political participation in unified Germany as well as with the expectations raised by the descriptive statistics.

I noted in chapter 3 that a number of scholars have attributed the comparatively lower levels of participation in the new federal states to the phenomenon of democratic disillusionment among citizens in the East, which results in part from the perceived setbacks of the unification process. The regression model in the second column of Table 18 controls for democratic satisfaction as well as an interaction term for democratic satisfaction and being from East Germany. We can see that the East dummy has indeed seized to be statistically significant. It is possible, however, that other socio-economic control variables rather than the proxy for democratic satisfaction drive this result. To

¹⁰⁶ I also tested if the interaction of being employed and having children returns statistically significant coefficients based on the previously discussed assumption that women's *dual burden* of motherhood and employment is preventing them from engaging in formal politics. Yet, the interaction coefficient was likewise statistically insignificant.

rule out this possibility, I ran a separate regression with the same set of controls, excluding only democratic satisfaction and its interaction term. Notably, this yielded a statistically significant East German coefficient ($dy/dx = -0.01$, significant at the 1 per cent level). This lends strong support to the argument that political disillusionment in the new federal states is an important driver for the lower levels of participation in the East.¹⁰⁷ Yet, other socio-economic characteristics clearly also play a role as they have reduced the size of the negative effect of the East German dummy. Overall, we can say that socio-economic differences between East and West Germans as well as differences in people's approval of the political system do a good job in explaining the lower baseline levels of formal participation in the East.

Yet, the rather more interesting question for the purpose of this analysis is whether being from the new or old federal states affects the size of the gender gap in the dependent variable. To test this, I interact the East German and female sex dummies (see Table 20).

Table 20 Determinants of Party Membership: East*Female Interaction


	Party Membership	
	I	II
Female	-0.031*** (0.00)	-0.021*** (0.00)
East (Place of Interview)	-0.023*** (0.00)	-0.006 (0.00)
Female*East	0.011** (0.00)	0.007 (0.00)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes
Pseudo R-squared	0.032	0.084
Observations	37484	25458

Notes: The table reports conditional marginal effects from logistic regression for discrete changes of the dummy variables from 0 to 1. All models are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Additional controls are age, age², secondary education status, employment status, occupation, income, religious affiliation, regular church attendance, party preference, satisfaction with democracy (and its interaction with the East), marital status, and household size. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ***1% level of significance, **5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

¹⁰⁷ Though the effects of the various control variables will not be discussed in greater detail here, it is worth highlighting that the level of education appears to have a particularly strong impact on the dependent variables, with high secondary education (compared to no secondary education) tripling the odds of being a party member.

Table 20 (column I) shows that the interaction term is positive and statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.¹⁰⁸ Graphing the marginal effects for both sex and region using the marginsplot command further illustrates that the gender gap in East Germany is indeed smaller (see Figure 8). Running the same regression on East and West samples separately yields the same results (see Table 46 section 8.5 of the appendix).

Figure 8 Party Membership: Female*East Interaction



Notes: Marginsplots correspond to marginal effects listed in columns I and II in Table 20.

However, looking at Figure 8, the reason for this seems to be not Eastern women's higher levels of party membership (compared to women in the West), but the lower

¹⁰⁸ Note that as Norton et al point out, 'the intuition from linear regression models' does not perfectly apply to evaluations of the interaction effects in non-linear models. Since 'the effect of the covariate is nonlinear, (...) the significance of the interaction can vary across different values of the covariate.' UCLA, Statistical Consulting Group "FAQ Stata: How can I understand a categorical by categorical interaction in logistic regression? (Stata 11)." Available from: <http://perma.cc/28TE-WGX2>. Accessed: 06.12. 2013.

levels of membership of East German compared to West German men. Indeed, the predicted probability of $Y=1$ is lower among women in the East compared to women in the West.

One of the initial assumptions with which I began the work on this chapter was that the more egalitarian gender culture in East Germany could be part of the explanation for the comparatively smaller gender gap in participation in this region. Based on this, we would expect the rate of party membership among women in the East to be greater compared to women in the West. Does the circumstance that the smaller gender gap in East Germany is determined mainly by men's lower participation undermine this initial supposition? There are several conceivable lines of interpretation:


On the one hand, it is possible that the reduced gender gap in East Germany is not due to cultural socialisation of women, but due to male behaviour. For example, a more egalitarian gender culture could depress participation among men. However, there is little indication in any existing theoretical or empirical work for why this should be the case.

Alternatively, it is also possible that the gendered patterns of East-West migration in the post-unification period matter. In 2007, the Berlin Institute for Population and Development found that a significantly greater number of women compared to men have moved from the new to the old federal states since unification.¹⁰⁹ Indeed, the resulting deficit of women compared to men in the East German region is unmatched in the whole of Europe.¹¹⁰ East German women below the age of 30 and those who are highly educated have been most likely to migrate over the past two decades.

¹⁰⁹ Kühntopf, Stephan and Stedtfeld, Susanne "Wenige junge Frauen im ländlichen Raum: Ursachen und Folgen der selektiven Abwanderung in Ostdeutschland." Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung. 'Hundreds of thousands [of women] have spread out across Western Germany', *The New York Times* writes, 'in search of job opportunities, challenging stereotypes by doing as their mothers did: having children, working and competing with the guys for the top job.' Bennhold, "20 Years After Fall of Wall, Women of Former East Germany Thrive", online resource.

¹¹⁰ Kröhnert, Steffen and Klingholz, Reiner (2007) "Not am Mann: Von Helden der Arbeit zur neuen Unterschicht? Lebenslagen junger Erwachsener in wirtschaftlichen Abstiegsregionen der neuen Bundesländer." Berlin Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung. See also: Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, "East-West migration within Germany since reunification". and Voss, "Go west, young woman!", online resource.

Figure 9 Number of Migrants from the New to the Old Federal States among 18-25 year olds by Sex



Notes: The graph reports the number of migrants from the new to the old federal states among those aged 18-25, excluding data for Berlin. Source: German Federal Statistical Office 2014.

In many rural East German regions, this has resulted in a surplus of men among citizens aged 18 to 29 of up to 25 per cent.¹¹¹ This female deficit could arguably depress an otherwise higher rate of female party membership in the new federal states. As one MP from East Germany observed: ‘clever women go to the West, the others go to the Right.’¹¹² Of those women who stayed, the same interviewee argued, many have simply been too preoccupied with day-to-day life to leave much time or energy to engage in politics. However, it is difficult to thoroughly test this ‘female deficit’ hypothesis.

A third and in my opinion most convincing interpretation for the observed variation in the gender gap in East and West Germany is that there is a higher overall baseline rate of political participation in the old federal states and that certain factors, such as traditional gender norms, reduce Western women’s participation from this naturally higher rate. We already know from our investigation of Hypothesis 5 that party membership is indeed

¹¹¹ Kühntopf and Stedtfeld, "Ursachen und Folgen der selektiven Abwanderung in Ostdeutschland", 2.

¹¹² Original quote: ‘Es gibt ja diesen berühmten Ausspruch: „Die Klugen Frauen gehen in den Westen und die anderen nach rechts.“ Weil sehr viele wirklich kluge und emanzipierte Frauen zur Berufsausbildung in den Westen gegangen sind. ... Wir haben dann eben sehr viele, die wirklich ums tägliche Überleben kämpfen. Also Verkäuferinnen, Friseurinnen, in den niedrig bezahlten Frauenberufen, im Pflegebereich, Pflegedienste.’

generally higher in West Germany. The same applies to other forms of participation, such as voting or union membership, or indeed political interest (see Table 22 below). Based on the results in Figure 8 (graph 2), we now also see that there is no statistically significant difference in party membership rates between men and women in East Germany, once we include socio-economic controls in the regression. However, there remains a significant gender gap in participation in West Germany.

Hypothesis 7

In order to test the hypothesis that underlying cultural differences partially drive this observed gender gap variation, I finally introduce a proxy for traditional gender attitudes to the regression models to see how its inclusion changes the effects of the sex dummy coefficients on the dependent variable. By way of re-iterating the rationale behind this exercise, I wish to determine whether men's and women's norms and expectations toward gender roles indeed influence the likelihood that they should engage politically. Specifically, I suppose that traditional attitudes toward women are an impediment to women's party membership.¹¹³

Column III in Table 18 displays the conditional marginal effects from logistic regressions for the traditional gender attitude proxy, coded from 1 (for most liberal) to 19 (for most conservative). *Ceteris paribus*, we see that there is a statistically significant negative correlation between traditional gender attitudes and party membership. In order to get a better understanding of the practical significance of this result, we can compute men's and women's predicted probability for participation at different gender attitude values. Doing so shows that, holding all other variables at their mean, women's predicted probability of party membership decreases from 4.4 per cent to 1.7 per cent along the gender attitude spectrum. We can therefore reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant correlation between traditional gender attitudes and political participation. Those who are less egalitarian in their views on gender roles are also less likely to join a political party.

¹¹³ See Kenworthy and Malami, "Gender Inequality in Political Representation". Paxton, Pamela Marie and Kunovich, Sheri (2003) "Women's Political Representation: The Importance of Ideology." *Ibid.* vol. 82: 87-114. ; Norris and Inglehart, "Cultural Obstacles to Equal Representation".

Hypothesis 8

At the crux of claims about the negative effects of gender culture on women's political participation is the assumption that traditional gender role attitudes affect women differently from men. The expectation is that conservative attitudes correlate in negative ways with women's political participation, but not necessarily with men's. Women, who believe that their main responsibilities lie at home, should be less likely to participate in the traditionally male sphere of politics. To test this hypothesis, I include an interaction term for traditional gender attitudes and women to the logistic regression (see column IV in Table 18). This interaction term is highly statistically significant.

Figure 10 Party Membership: Marginsplot after Female*Gender Attitudes Interaction




Figure 10 displays the graph which plots the probability of participation for men and women after the interaction. It illustrates that moving from egalitarian to traditional gender attitudes decreases the predicted probability of participation among women while it has a slightly positive effect on men. The confidence intervals of the slopes also show that there is no statistically significant difference in the predicted probability of

participation between those men and women with the most egalitarian gender attitude scores.¹¹⁴

Moreover, if we return to model IV in Table 18, we see that the inclusion of the interaction term has led the female sex dummy to become statistically insignificant. This demonstrates that *ceteris paribus*, once we control for the effect of traditional gender attitudes on women, the gender gap in party membership in unified Germany disappears.

5.5.1 Robustness Check: Instrumental Variable Regression

A potential concern regarding the results of the above regressions is the problem of endogeneity. I assume that traditional gender attitudes have an effect on political participation, but it is also plausible that engaging in political activities affects participants' views on gender roles. Moreover, since many of the predictors in the models are themselves correlated with gender attitudes, it is possible that the error terms are biased. In this section, I therefore attempt to isolate the effect of traditional gender attitudes on party membership by conducting instrumental variable regressions (IV). IV allows me to isolate the causal effect of a regressor on the dependent variable by including an instrument variable that affects the outcome variable endogenously through this regressor.¹¹⁵ The instrumental variable procedure operates in two stages. *Stata* first runs a regression on the exogenous regressor(s), and then on the predicted values of this first regression.¹¹⁶ The causal estimate is the second-stage regression coefficient. Key to

¹¹⁴ Once we control for socio-economic characteristics, there is a slight negative effect of traditional attitudes even among men (though the curve for women is significantly steeper). One possible explanation for this is that traditional values in general are negatively correlated with political participation. However, looking at overall membership numbers of the main German parties suggests that this is not the case. Both SPD and CDU (the main parties left and right of centre) have a membership of around 450.00 and membership numbers of the remaining parties are equally largely similar in size. It seems more plausible, therefore, to attribute this discovery to the particular kinds of attitudes recorded by the German Social Survey. That is to say, to the fact that they are only weak proxies because the survey questions are not strictly related to women in politics. Whatever the explanation, even if men's levels of participation and engagement in politics are negatively linked with traditional views on gender roles, we would still expect the negative effect to be greater for women than for men and this is indeed the case.

¹¹⁵ In linear regressions, IV estimates the average causal effect for those affected by the instrument.

¹¹⁶ Rassen, Jeremy A., Schneeweiss, Sebastian, Glynn, Robert J., Mittleman, Murray A. and Brookhard, Alan M. (2009) "Instrumental Variable Analysis for Estimation of Treatment Effects With Dichotomous Outcomes." *Practice of Epidemiology*. vol. 169(3): 273-84. 275. See also: Burgess, Stephen (2013) "Identifying the odds ratio estimated by a two-stage instrumental variable analysis with a logistic regression model." *Statistics in Medicine*. vol. 32(27): 4726-47. 11.

generating a reliable IV model is the existence of one or more appropriate instruments. Instrumental variables must fulfil two conditions: they must not be directly correlated with the error term of the regression and they must be correlated with the predictor.¹¹⁷

I identified two instruments for testing the causal effect of traditional gender attitudes on political participation. The first is the sex of the interviewer. While respondents' combined gender attitude scores are -lower (i.e. more egalitarian) when they were interviewed by a woman, the sex of the interviewer was randomly assigned. This creates exogenous variation in gender attitude scores. The second instrument for isolating the causal effect of traditional gender attitudes is the presence of the respondents' partner during the interview. I assume that the presence of a partner is equally exogenously determined. After each two-stage least squares instrumental variable regression, I ran the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (using `ivregress 2sls`) on unweighted data to test the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid.¹¹⁸ For IV-probit, I looked at the Wald test statistic to reject the null hypothesis that the error terms for the endogenous variable are correlated. For brevity, I only report the second stage regression results. Table 21 reports the iv-probit coefficients for two model specifications (including and excluding controls).

¹¹⁷ Foster, Michael E. (1997) "Instrumental Variables for Logistic Regression: An Illustration." *Social Science Research*. vol. 26(4): 487-504. 489.

¹¹⁸ The Sargan-Hansen test is not available after estimation with `pweights`.

Table 21 Traditional Gender Attitudes and Party Membership: Instrumental Variable Regression (2nd stage)

	Party Membership	
	I	II
Traditional Gender Attitudes	-0.169*** (0.02)	-0.264*** (0.03)
Female	-0.498*** (0.04)	-0.567*** (0.04)
East (Place of Interview)	-0.716*** (0.06)	-0.690*** (0.09)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes
Wald Test	0.000	0.000
Test of overidentifying restrictions	0.995	0.856
Observations	13034	9221

Notes: The table reports iv-probit coefficients. Models are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Additional controls are age, age², secondary education status, employment status, occupation, income, religious affiliation, regular church attendance, party preference, satisfaction with democracy (and its interaction with the East), marital status, and household size. ***1% level of significance, **5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

The test of overidentifying restrictions as well as the Wald test for endogeneity showed that instrumenting gender attitudes was possible. Moreover, the results of instrumental variable regression show that *ceteris paribus* traditional gender attitudes exert a negative and statistically significant causal effect on party membership. As such, there is reason to believe that there is indeed a causal link between traditional gender attitudes and party membership.

5.6 Other Forms of Participation

One of the advantages of working with the German General Social Survey is that it contains data for different types of political and civic participation as well as on cognitive engagement with politics (i.e. political interest). In the following section, I will try to determine if the above results on the effect of traditional gender attitudes on party membership are more generally applicable to other forms of participation. Specifically, I will consider the relationship between traditional gender norms and political interest, union membership, and voting. These variables arguably constitute only isolated examples of political and civic participation and of cognitive engagement in politics. As I noted in the literature review, a number of scholars, particularly feminist political

scientists, advocate that a broader approach to participation, one which considers a wider range of individual and collective political and civic activities, would help to better grasp the extent of gender inequality in political life because it lets us distinguish between the various types of participation that men and women engage in.¹¹⁹ Indeed, my preliminary analysis of the data confirmed that there is considerable variation in the size of gender gaps across different participation variables and that women are often as likely as men to participate in non-traditional and individual political activities.¹²⁰

Political interest¹²¹ and union membership are two variables for which a clear gender gap still exists. Although the same cannot be said for voting, I nevertheless wish to include it in the analysis because of the centrality of voting as an aspect of traditional political participation. Moreover, in contrast to most other remaining participation variables contained in the ALLBUS survey (such as partaking in demonstrations, political initiatives, petitions, or political consumerism), data on political interest, union membership and voting are available for each survey year since 1991 (with the exception of 1994 for voting and 1992 for union membership). This allows me to better compare the subsequent results to the findings on party membership.

Union membership and voting¹²² are coded as binaries by default. Political interest on the other hand is itemised in ALLBUS on a 1-5 scale from very strong to no political

¹¹⁹ In particular, this scholarship suggests that the size of gender gaps in participation may differ between traditional and non-traditional, collective, and private types of political activities. Coffe and Bolzendahl for example distinguish between collective types of activism (participation in demonstrations, party work, and initiatives) and private political participation (participation in petitions, boycotts, online activism, and political consumerism) Coffe and Bolzendahl, "Gender Differences in Political Participation", 320-22. As I suggested in the literature review, even mainstream political scientists have begun to advocate a more inclusive conceptualisation of political participation to account for the decline in formal political engagement as well as for the changes in the way citizens communicate their views and opinions to their representatives.

¹²⁰ In my initial investigation of the ALLBUS data, I found that there are no statistically significant differences between men and women across individual, low-intensity political activities (such as signing petitions or voting in elections - see appendix) once I controlled for a basic set of socio-economic characteristics. As I outlined in the literature review, it has been suggested that variations in gender gaps across different types of political participation may be rooted in existing socio-economic differences between men and women. Women may be less likely than men to participate in collective politics because this requires more time, money, and access to networks compared to private, individual types of participation which do not.


¹²¹ As I argued in chapter 2 (section 2.3), it may be useful to view political interest as an indicator of, rather than a determinant for, gender gaps in politics.

¹²² Survey respondents were asked to state if they had voted in the last general election.

interest. For consistency, I combined responses ‘very strong,’ ‘strong,’ and ‘middling political interest’ and ‘little’ and ‘no political interest’ into dummy variables.¹²³

A quick look at the descriptive statistics for political interest and union membership confirm, that there are clear differences along gender and regional vectors. Figure 11 illustrates that over the past twenty years, fewer women than men in both East and West Germany respectively have stated to be interested in politics. It also shows that on average, East Germans are less likely to identify as politically interested than West Germans.

Figure 11 Political Interest in East and West Germany by Sex



Notes: Percentage of respondents indicating strong to average interest in politics. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012. N=37,563.


As was the case with party membership, the East-West gap in political interest appears to be driven primarily by the differences among men in the two regions and the gender gap

¹²³ ‘Don’t Know’ was not given as an option in stating one’s political interest. In research on political knowledge, interest, or efficacy, it is often noted that women are more likely than men to pick the ‘Don’t Know’ option. This, it has been suggested, signifies lower levels of perceived political competence among women.

is more pronounced in the West. The gap in reported political interest among women in East and West on the other hand is rather small and largely statistically insignificant.

The descriptive statistics for trade union membership similarly indicate a pronounced East-West divide. Correspondingly, while there is a sizable gender gap in West Germany at an average of around 10 per cent, the membership difference between men and women in East Germany is statistically insignificant for most survey years. It is plausible of course, that the higher proportion of women in the East working full-time positively skew the pool of female workers with vested interests in joining trade union organisations. Whether the gender gap difference is indeed simply a reflection of the differences in female employment patterns in the two regions will be determined shortly.


Figure 12 Trade Union Membership in East and West Germany by Sex



Notes: Percentage of respondents who stated to be members of a trade union. The graph reports union membership for those respondents who states to be in full or half-time employment only. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

I pointed out in section 2.3 of chapter 2 that the difference between the number of men and women in Germany turning out to vote has been smaller than 2 per cent.¹²⁴ But while there are no notable gender gaps, there is a significant difference in voter turnout between the old and new federal states (see Figure 13).

Figure 13 Voter Turnout at German Bundestag Elections since 1990 by Sex



Notes: Percentage of respondents who stated that they voted in the last national election. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012. N= 29,667.

Since unification, participation in general elections in the East has been on average 5 per cent points lower than in the West. Becker reasons that the two German Cold War political regimes had ‘different effects on citizens’ expectations and assessments regarding electoral participation and voting behaviour.’¹²⁵ In contrast to citizens in West Germany, ‘citizens of the GDR had daily confirmation that their participation in elections did not have any effect on the policies of the government.’¹²⁶ Interestingly, however, voting apathy in the new federal states is particularly widespread not among Germans who grew up under authoritarian socialist state rule, but among Germans of

¹²⁴ Cross-tabulation and ttests between vote and sex using the ALLBUS dataset yield similar results. We report statistics from the National Returning Officer in the main text, because it provides a better indication of participation at each election (ALLBUS data contain self-reported participation rates at the most recent Bundestag election as of the time of survey).

¹²⁵ Becker, "Political efficacy and voter turnout in East and West Germany", 320.

¹²⁶ Loc. cit.

the post-Cold War generation, i.e. young eastern Germans in their twenties. With an average of around 53 per cent, participation in the 2009 general election among the 21 to 24 year olds in East Germany was the lowest compared to any other age group in East or West Germany.

We now test if the regional and gender gaps in participation (which are indicated in the descriptive statistics) persist after controlling for other factors. To this end, I run the same set of regression specifications on my new dependent variables as listed in Table 18 of section 5.3. The result of this exercise is displayed in Table 22 below.

Table 22 Determinants of Other Forms of Political Participation

	Political Interest				Union Membership				Voting			
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XII
Female	-0.151*** (0.00)	-0.122*** (0.01)	-0.126*** (0.01)	-0.096*** (0.02)	-0.100*** (0.00)	-0.044*** (0.01)	-0.051*** (0.01)	0.020 (0.01)	-0.019*** (0.00)	-0.006 (0.01)	-0.010* (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)
East (Place of Interview)	-0.051*** (0.00)	-0.042*** (0.01)	-0.062*** (0.02)	-0.062*** (0.02)	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.019** (0.01)	-0.026** (0.01)	-0.027** (0.01)	-0.038*** (0.00)	-0.011* (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)
Traditional Gender Attitudes (1-19)			-0.009*** (0.00)	-0.007*** (0.00)			-0.002** (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)			-0.003*** (0.00)	-0.002** (0.00)
Women*Trad. Gender Attitudes				-0.003* (0.00)				-0.010*** (0.00)				-0.001 (0.00)
Age		0.011*** (0.00)	0.010*** (0.00)	0.010*** (0.00)		0.010*** (0.00)	0.011*** (0.00)	0.011*** (0.00)		0.007*** (0.00)	0.008*** (0.00)	0.008*** (0.00)
Age Squared		-0.009*** (0.00)	-0.008*** (0.00)	-0.007*** (0.00)		-0.010*** (0.00)	-0.012*** (0.00)	-0.011*** (0.00)		-0.004*** (0.00)	-0.005*** (0.00)	-0.005*** (0.00)
Education Status ^A												
Low Secondary Education		0.107*** (0.02)	0.094*** (0.03)	0.094*** (0.03)		0.021 (0.02)	0.005 (0.03)	0.003 (0.03)		0.043*** (0.01)	0.025* (0.01)	0.024* (0.01)
Intermediary Secondary Education		0.213*** (0.02)	0.178*** (0.03)	0.178*** (0.03)		0.019 (0.02)	-0.001 (0.03)	-0.002 (0.03)		0.073*** (0.01)	0.054*** (0.01)	0.054*** (0.01)
High Secondary Education		0.319*** (0.02)	0.280*** (0.03)	0.279*** (0.03)		-0.011 (0.02)	-0.033 (0.03)	-0.034 (0.03)		0.117*** (0.01)	0.094*** (0.02)	0.094*** (0.02)
Still At School		0.283*** (0.03)	0.246*** (0.04)	0.245*** (0.04)		-0.134** (0.05)	-0.077 (0.06)	-0.081 (0.06)		0.036** (0.02)	0.012 (0.02)	0.011 (0.02)
Employed		0.026* (0.01)	0.044** (0.02)	0.044** (0.02)		-0.050*** (0.02)	-0.037* (0.02)	-0.035* (0.02)		0.014* (0.01)	0.040*** (0.01)	0.040*** (0.01)
Occupation ^B												
Agriculture		0.068 (0.04)	0.054 (0.06)	0.053 (0.06)		-0.036 (0.04)	-0.064 (0.06)	-0.066 (0.06)		0.042 (0.03)	0.098** (0.05)	0.098** (0.05)
Academia		0.009 (0.05)	-0.043 (0.06)	-0.043 (0.06)		0.000 (0.03)	-0.026 (0.04)	-0.024 (0.04)		0.005 (0.03)	-0.035 (0.03)	-0.035 (0.03)
Self-Employed		-0.002 (0.02)	-0.039 (0.03)	-0.039 (0.03)		-0.117*** (0.02)	-0.155*** (0.04)	-0.151*** (0.03)		-0.027** (0.01)	-0.059*** (0.02)	-0.060*** (0.02)
Public Sector Employee		0.038 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.03)	-0.011 (0.03)		0.169*** (0.02)	0.151*** (0.02)	0.145*** (0.02)		0.031* (0.02)	0.009 (0.02)	0.009 (0.02)
Private Sector Employee		-0.016 (0.01)	-0.018 (0.02)	-0.019 (0.02)		0.062*** (0.02)	0.048** (0.02)	0.045** (0.02)		0.006 (0.01)	-0.020 (0.01)	-0.020 (0.01)
Manual Worker		-0.072*** (0.02)	-0.091*** (0.02)	-0.090*** (0.02)		0.112*** (0.02)	0.102*** (0.02)	0.100*** (0.02)		-0.021** (0.01)	-0.044*** (0.01)	-0.044*** (0.01)
Other		-0.020 (0.02)	-0.059* (0.03)	-0.060* (0.03)		0.145*** (0.02)	0.135*** (0.03)	0.128*** (0.03)		-0.028** (0.01)	-0.069*** (0.02)	-0.069*** (0.02)
Income ^C												
900-1499€		0.024*** (0.01)	0.027*** (0.01)	0.025** (0.01)		0.064*** (0.01)	0.052*** (0.01)	0.043*** (0.01)		0.011** (0.00)	0.012* (0.01)	0.012* (0.01)
1500-2599€		0.070*** (0.01)	0.068*** (0.01)	0.066*** (0.01)		0.093*** (0.01)	0.088*** (0.01)	0.075*** (0.01)		0.028*** (0.01)	0.036*** (0.01)	0.036*** (0.01)
2600€ or More		0.077*** (0.02)	0.088*** (0.03)	0.087*** (0.03)		0.058*** (0.01)	0.056*** (0.02)	0.050*** (0.01)		0.029*** (0.01)	0.015 (0.02)	0.015 (0.02)
Religion ^D												
Protestant		-0.016** (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)	-0.009 (0.01)		-0.002 (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)		0.013*** (0.00)	0.018*** (0.01)	0.018*** (0.01)
Catholic		-0.018** (0.01)	-0.017 (0.01)	-0.017 (0.01)		-0.018*** (0.01)	-0.013 (0.01)	-0.013 (0.01)		0.007 (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)
Other		-0.082*** (0.02)	-0.044 (0.03)	-0.045 (0.03)		-0.023 (0.02)	-0.014 (0.03)	-0.017 (0.03)		-0.064*** (0.01)	-0.052*** (0.01)	-0.052*** (0.01)
Regular Church Attendance		0.043*** (0.01)	0.054*** (0.01)	0.055*** (0.01)		-0.009 (0.01)	-0.022** (0.01)	-0.021** (0.01)		0.034*** (0.01)	0.035*** (0.01)	0.035*** (0.01)
Party Preference ^E												
SPD		0.018** (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.000 (0.01)		0.075*** (0.01)	0.069*** (0.01)	0.067*** (0.01)		-0.016*** (0.01)	-0.018*** (0.01)	-0.018*** (0.01)
FDP		0.046*** (0.01)	0.030* (0.02)	0.030* (0.02)		-0.004 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)		-0.014* (0.01)	-0.017* (0.01)	-0.017* (0.01)
Green Party		0.060*** (0.01)	0.034** (0.01)	0.034** (0.01)		0.057*** (0.01)	0.065*** (0.01)	0.062*** (0.01)		0.000 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.01)
Left Party		0.060*** (0.01)	0.035** (0.02)	0.035** (0.02)		0.083*** (0.01)	0.082*** (0.01)	0.080*** (0.01)		-0.005 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)
Other		0.007 (0.02)	0.041 (0.03)	0.042 (0.03)		0.054*** (0.01)	0.044** (0.02)	0.045** (0.02)		-0.038*** (0.01)	-0.051*** (0.01)	-0.051*** (0.01)
None		-0.178*** (0.01)	-0.165*** (0.01)	-0.165*** (0.01)		0.025*** (0.01)	0.034*** (0.01)	0.034*** (0.01)		-0.194*** (0.01)	-0.181*** (0.01)	-0.181*** (0.01)
Satisfied with Democracy		0.013* (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)		-0.006 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)		0.012*** (0.00)	0.008 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)
Satisfied with Democracy*East Interaction		-0.003 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.02)	-0.004 (0.02)		0.004 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)		0.010 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)
Marital Status ^F												
Married/Widowed		0.017* (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)		-0.008 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.01)	-0.010 (0.01)		0.015** (0.01)	0.020** (0.01)	0.020** (0.01)
Separated/Divorced		0.011 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.02)	-0.003 (0.02)		-0.004 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.01)		-0.024*** (0.01)	-0.030*** (0.01)	-0.030*** (0.01)
Household Size ^G												
Two Person Household		0.044*** (0.01)	0.040*** (0.01)	0.039*** (0.01)		0.021*** (0.01)	0.013 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)		0.019*** (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)
Three Person Household		0.023** (0.01)	0.023* (0.01)	0.022 (0.01)		0.031*** (0.01)	0.016 (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)		0.023*** (0.01)	0.013* (0.01)	0.013 (0.01)
4 Person Household		0.032*** (0.01)	0.019 (0.02)	0.018 (0.02)		0.011 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)		0.024*** (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)
Five or More Person Household		0.019 (0.01)	0.017 (0.02)	0.015 (0.02)		0.004 (0.01)	0.010 (0.02)	0.005 (0.02)		-0.004 (0.01)	-0.017 (0.01)	-0.017* (0.01)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R-squared	0.030	0.132	0.135	0.136	0.031	0.138	0.152	0.158	0.013	0.297	0.300	0.300
Observations	37563	25483	12843	12843	28011	19634	9244	9244	29667	20390	10422	10422

Notes: The table reports conditional marginal effects from logistic regression for discrete changes of the dummy variables from 0 to 1. All models control for survey year effects (reference category is 1991) and are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ^AEducation dummies: reference category is no secondary education. ^BOccupation dummies: reference category is 'not applicable.' ^CIncome dummies: reference category is monthly income of 900€ or less. ^DReligion: reference category is non-religious. ^EParty Preference: reference category is CDU. ^FMarital Status: reference category is 'single.' ^GHousehold Size: reference category is 1 person household. ***1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

As expected, being a woman has a statistically significant negative effect on the probability of being politically interested, and on being a union member, but not on voter turnout (when controlling for basic socio-economic factors). The predicted probabilities for political interest are 15 per cent slighter for women compared to men and there is a negative correlation of roughly 10 per cent in terms of union membership. *Ceteris paribus*, the odds of men to be union members are 2.4 greater than women's. Interestingly, there even is a small significant difference between men and women for the dependent variable voting when controlling for survey years and being from East Germany only. However, this difference ceases to be statistically significant when additional socio-economic controls are included in the model. The conditional marginal effects of the female sex on the dependent variables political interest and union membership on the other hand, remain significant. Though the size of the effect has decreased for both, computing odds ratios shows that men's odds for being politically interested or for being member of a trade union are still up to twice as high as those of women. The correlation effects of the various control variables will not be discussed in greater detail here, but it is worth highlighting that age, being a manual worker, income and no party preference have a consistent statistically significant effect on the three dependent variables as well as on party membership.¹ The strongest overall predictor for political interest is education, with the effect on the predicted probabilities of those with high secondary education or those still at school (compared to those with no secondary education) being around 30 per cent. With regards to trade union membership, occupation and income have a particularly strong effect, as does party preference. As was the case with party membership, we see that the lower levels of political interest and union membership in Germany among women cannot be explained entirely by demographic or socio-economic differences alone (see columns II and VI).

¹ Computing a marginsplot for the continuous variable age shows that its effect on the predicted probabilities of the outcome variables differs. While there is a quadratic relationship between age and political interest as well as union membership (with younger and older individuals being less likely to be interested or to be union members than individuals between 40 and 60 years of age), the same cannot be said for party membership and voting. Although there is a slight downward trend for those 90 and older, younger citizens (between 18 and 30) are on average least likely to have voted and least likely to be members of a political party, everything else held constant.

Similar findings arise from the investigation of the East-West gap in interest and union membership. Controlling only for survey years and sex, being from the East (compared to being from the West) is negatively associated with political interest and voting, but not with union membership. Only after introducing the additional socio-economic regressors, do we find a statistically significant negative relationship for the East Germany dummy and union membership. In terms of voting, on the other hand, the East-West gap seems to be statistically significant once other socio-economic characteristics are controlled for (see column X). Overall, this suggests that the socio-economic differences between East and West Germans as well as people's attitudes toward the political system do a good job in explaining the lower baseline levels of voting (just as of party membership) in the East.

To investigate the gender gap differences in the new and old federal states, I again interact the East German and female sex dummies. The coefficients of the interaction terms for each dependent variable are given in Table 20.


Table 23 Determinants of other Forms of Political Participation: East*Female Interaction

	Political Interest		Union Membership		Voting	
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Female	-0.157*** (0.01)	-0.123*** (0.01)	-0.118*** (0.00)	-0.058*** (0.01)	-0.025*** (0.00)	-0.008 (0.00)
East	-0.069*** (0.01)	-0.045*** (0.01)	-0.039*** (0.01)	-0.045*** (0.01)	-0.051*** (0.01)	-0.014* (0.01)
Female*East	0.030*** (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.090*** (0.01)	0.059*** (0.01)	0.026*** (0.01)	0.006 (0.01)
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R-squared	0.029	0.142	0.035	0.147	0.016	0.301
Observations	37563	12596	28011	6705	29667	10034

Notes: The table reports conditional marginal effects from logistic regression for discrete changes of the dummy variables from 0 to 1. All models are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Additional controls are age, age², secondary education status, employment status, occupation, income, religious affiliation, regular church attendance, party preference, satisfaction with democracy (and its interaction with the East), marital status, and household size. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ***1% level of significance, **5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

The gender gap for political interest and union membership appears to be less pronounced in East Germany. Indeed, *ceteris paribus*, for union membership and voting, there is no significant gender gap at all.

Figure 14 Other Forms of Participation: Female*East Interaction Effect



Notes: Marginsplots correspond to marginal effects listed in columns II, IV, and VI in Table 20.


In addition, political interest and union membership are on average lower in East Germany. Yet again, this appears to be driven mainly by Eastern men’s lower participation rather than by a heightened participation of Eastern women.

With these preliminary observations in mind, I turn to analyse the role of traditional gender attitudes to establish how they affect political interest, union membership, and voting in unified Germany. Returning to columns III, VII, and XI of Table 22 we see that, *ceteris paribus*, there is a statistically significant negative relationship between traditional gender attitudes and political interest and union membership as well as

between traditional gender attitudes and voting. Those who are less egalitarian in their views on gender roles are also less likely to be politically interested, to be a member of a trade union or to vote at national elections.

The final columns in Table 22 display the regression coefficients for the added interaction term between women and gender attitudes so we may see if the negative effect of traditional gender norms on participation is greater for women than men. Figure 15 shows the corresponding marginsplot graphs for these regressions, which plot the probability of participation for men and women after the interaction (without additional controls).

Figure 15 Other Forms of Participation: Marginsplot after Female*Gender Attitude Interaction



Notes: Graphs display marginal effects after logistic regression (adjusted predictions of Female dummy with 95 per cent CIs). Source ALLBUS/GSS 1980-2012.

We can see that moving from egalitarian to traditional gender attitudes decreases the predicted probability of union membership and voting among women while it has a slightly positive effect on men. Moreover, the confidence intervals of the slopes shows that there is no statistically significant difference in the predicted probability of union membership and voting between those men and women with the most egalitarian gender attitude scores. The dependent variable political interest follows a somewhat different trend. Even though both slopes are directed downwards, it still seems that the negative effect of traditional gender attitudes is slightly greater for women than for men. Hence, we can say that traditional gender attitudes have a greater negative effect on women's political interest than on men's. Controlling for other socio-economic characteristics, only the gender gap for voting seems to be statistically significant.

To test the robustness of these results, I finally run the same set of checks on the three dependent variables that I used in the case of party membership. Though the test of overidentifying restrictions was rejected in each model, the test statistic for the Wald test of endogeneity showed that there is not enough information in the sample of the extended models (those including socio-economic controls) to reject the null hypothesis that there is no endogeneity for political interest and voting. This suggests that for these outcome variables, the regular regressions above are more appropriate and that we cannot completely rule out endogeneity.

Table 24 Traditional Gender Attitudes and Women's Political Participation: Instrumental Variable Regression (2nd stage)

	Political Interest		Union Membership		Voting	
Gender Attitudes	-0.069*** (0.03)	-0.156** (0.06)	-0.022 (0.03)	-0.176*** (0.06)	0.060* (0.03)	0.060 (0.12)
Female	-0.503*** (0.03)	-0.575*** (0.06)	-0.505*** (0.04)	-0.505*** (0.06)	0.039 (0.04)	0.091 (0.18)
East (Place of Interview)	-0.380*** (0.07)	-0.500*** (0.15)	-0.130 (0.09)	-0.537*** (0.15)	-0.058 (0.10)	0.139 (0.33)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Wald Test	0.342	0.129	0.793	0.047	0.016	0.575
Test of overidentifying	0.785	0.9254	0.555	0.307	0.5598	0.1169
Observations	13041	9218	13034	9221	9459	6841

Notes: The table reports iv-probit coefficients. All models are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***1% level of significance, **5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

For union membership, both tests showed that instrumenting gender attitudes was possible. Overall, the supplementary analysis of different forms of political cognitive engagement, associational membership, and voting provides additional support for the gender culture hypothesis. Although the instrumental variable test could not establish the presence of a causal link between traditional gender attitudes and political interest and voting, the marginsplot graphs demonstrated that those individuals who hold more conservative attitudes toward gender roles are also less likely to be politically interested. The clearest effects of traditional gender norms exist for the variables, which capture associational membership in political parties and unions. As such, the results presented in this chapter provide further evidence for the prevailing view that gender gaps persist particularly for high-intensity traditional forms of political participation.

5.7 Discussion

The purpose of this chapter was to shed more light on the relationship between gender culture and political participation. Specifically, it sought to address the gap in the literature with regards to the impact of traditional gender attitudes on gender gaps in institutional politics. Several conclusions may be drawn from my analysis of the German General Social Survey data. Firstly, my initial investigation of the data yields insights similar to those of a number of existing studies that the size of gender gaps in political participation vary greatly according to the type of activity under consideration. My initial investigation of the various types of political engagement included in the ALLBUS data showed that while there are still significant differences between the number of men and women engaging in formal and collective political activities – such as party or union membership, party work etc. - there are no longer significant gender gaps in participation across low-intensity, private types of participation, such as voting or signing petitions.²

² I also identified certain types of political activity in which women were significantly *more* likely to engage in than men, namely political consumerism.

The second main finding from the statistical analysis is that gender gaps in formal political activities are significantly smaller in the East and that this is largely driven by men's lower levels of participation. A likely explanation is that there is a naturally higher rate of participation in the West and that the less egalitarian gender culture in this region is at least a contributing factor to depressing women's participation from this natural rate. The analysis also demonstrated that contrary to the views of politicians interviewed for this thesis, having children does not have a significant negative effect on associational membership among women.

The main finding from this chapter stresses the effect of traditional gender attitudes on formal political participation. I was able to show that traditional gender attitudes are negatively linked with women's participation in political parties, trade unions, and even with their participation at national elections while there was no equally strong negative effect on men. This result is robust for party and union membership even if we deal with concerns of endogeneity between respondents' reported gender attitudes and past participation. Yet, the introduction of the gender attitude variable only marginally boosted the R-squared values of the regressions. Moreover, looking at the changes over time, there appears to be no significant progress with regards to closing gender gaps in the dependent variables.³ Statistically speaking, the explanatory power of gender attitudes (based on questions included in ALLBUS) with regards to gender differences in participation is therefore arguably limited.

I already remarked upon the shortcomings of the proxy for traditional gender attitudes at the end of the previous chapter, arguing that the quantitative variables utilised to capture traditional gender attitudes are far from ideal. With respect to the statistical findings in this chapter, I could expect to see clearer and stronger correlations for variables, which either relate directly to views on women in politics, or which capture traditional gender attitudes more accurately. At the same time, the shortcomings in operationalisation arguably attest to the strength of the findings. This analysis highlights that a statistically significant and robust relationship between political participation and traditional gender

³ I ran regressions with interaction terms for the Female and survey year dummies which did not return statistically significant coefficients.

attitudes exists, even if these attitudes capture aspects of gender culture that are seemingly unrelated to political participation. This underlines the complex implications of gender stereotypes and the potential damaging effects of a traditional gender culture on gender equality in general.

Overall, my findings provide important insights into the development and stability of political gender gaps in unified Germany, but their relevance stretches beyond the German context. It highlights an often neglected aspect of political gender gaps, namely how traditional cultural norms about gender adversely affect citizens' participation, especially women's.

6 Sex and the State Revisited: Germany's Family Policy in the 21st Century

This final substantive chapter returns to the topic of gender policy and welfare state regime analysis. In the spring of 2012, a heated national debate ignited in Germany over government-led plans to introduce a cash-for-care subsidy of around 100€ per month for families not enrolling their child aged one or two in state-subsidised childcare.¹ The policy, known in Germany as the *Betreuungsgeld*, has been widely criticised by experts, the public, and left-leaning political parties as a reversal to traditional family norms and as a departure from the more progressive family policies, which had been introduced in Germany since the mid 2000s. The political negotiations over the new cash-for-care policy proved so divisive that the continuation of the coalition government was openly put into question.²

Historically, a childcare policy would have been an unlikely candidate for threatening to break apart an otherwise stable German coalition government. The entire field had, according to von Wahl, traditionally not been regarded to be of crucial political importance.³ In 1998, chancellor Gerhard Schröder famously labelled gender and family policies as *Gedöns – fuss*.⁴ Yet, not least due to the steadily declining birth rates in Germany (which in 2014 were far below the rate of replacement), politicians have begun to take an increasingly keen interest in the success of family policies. Citizens too have become more invested in the topic. The rise in women's employment levels and the socio-demographic changes that have accompanied this process have made childcare regulations and policies promoting gender equality more pertinent than ever before. In this context, the passionate political debate fought over the *Betreuungsgeld* has exemplified

¹ SGB VIII - Eighth Book of the German Social Code.

² Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2012) "Seehofer droht mit Bruch der Koalition." 16.06. 2012. Available from: <http://www.faz.net/-gpg-70nwa>. Accessed: 17.06. 2012.

³ Von Wahl "Moving a Mountain: Women Voters, Women Leaders, and the Male Breadwinner Model in Germany", 72-85.

⁴ Wikiquote (2014) "Diskussion: Gerhard Schröder." Available from: <http://perma.cc/345Q-KUA5>. Accessed: 03.10. 2014.

the growing tensions between traditional and liberal ideas on family life, motherhood, and care work in Germany.

This chapter looks at this political debate in more detail, thus bringing together the different lines of inquiry pursued throughout this thesis. Its purpose is to highlight and reflect upon the normative assumptions and expectations about gender roles that have been promoted by political actors in the negotiation process over the introduction of a new child care policy.

It is worth reiterating the theoretical rationale behind this exercise: Institutionalists argue that welfare state policies create incentives for the division of paid and unpaid work between men and women. Welfare state policies and distribution of state funding therefore tell us much about how gender roles and social hierarchies are regulated or reinforced by the state.⁵ Consequently, as Wiliarty notes, these policies also have repercussions on ‘women’s labour market participation, the gender wage gap’, national fertility trends and so on.⁶

Against this background, there are two reasons for why the *Betreuungsgeld* is a particularly insightful policy for further analysis: Firstly, the policy counteracts other recent family reforms such as the legal entitlement to publicly funded childcare and the introduction of the *Elterngeld* which will be discussed in more detail below. This raises the question of whether the cash-for-care provision signals a re-alignment of German social policy towards a more conservative welfare state model. Answering this question may help determine if Germany still constitutes a conservative welfare state and male breadwinner regime, as Esping-Andersen and Lewis and Ostner observed in the 1990s, or if the political parameters of the German gender welfare state regime have changed.

The second reason for singling out the *Betreuungsgeld* as a case study for this chapter is the highly divisive nature of the political debate which was fought over its introduction.

⁵ Lombardo, Meier and Verloo, *Discursive Politics of Gender Equality*, 12-13.

⁶ Wiliarty, *The CDU and the Politics of Gender*, 14. See also: Lewis, Jane (2009) *Work-Family Balance, Gender and Policy*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 14. On the influence of childcare policies on fertility rates, see Bujard, Martin (2011) "Familienpolitik und Geburtenrate. Ein internationaler Vergleich." Berlin: Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend.

According to *The Economist*, few of the policy proposals put forward by Angela Merkel's second term government proved as contentious as the cash-for-care subsidy,⁷ with coverage of the issue dominating German national news for weeks.⁸ This extensive level of exposure provides us with a great number of observables to study the policy's ideational context.

By looking at political speeches, elite interviews, media reports, and expert assessments on this cash-for-care policy, I seek to highlight competing narratives about gender roles and the ideological justifications for this policy brought forward by different political actors during the negotiation process. Though the attitudes and beliefs of such actors are not necessarily representative 'of German society as a whole', as Xydias observes, they are nevertheless 'especially informative' and significant because they have direct implications for 'devising legislation' and because they shape the public debate around legislative issues.⁹

This chapter is exploratory rather than systematically analytical. It proceeds as follows: I first review the policy context in which the discussions around the cash-for-care policy took place. I then identify the practical and ideological arguments for and against its implementation. Finally, I consider whether the policy indeed signals a re-alignment of the German system toward a conservative gender welfare state model.

⁷ The Economist (2012) "Pay to stay at home." 05.05. 2012. Available from: <http://econ.st/1y1tiyz>. Accessed: 27.08. 2014.


⁸ Repeatedly, coverage of the *Betreuungsgeld* had been the leading story of the German national news programme 'Tagesschau' which is watched by up to 10 million viewers daily. See ARD (2012) *Tagesschau vom 25.04.2012 20.00Uhr*: YouTube; ARD (2012) *Tagesschau vom 24.09.2012 20.00Uhr*: YouTube; ARD (2012) *Tagesschau vom 09.11.2012 20.00Uhr*: YouTube; ARD (2012) *Tagesschau vom 21.09.2012 20.00Uhr*: YouTube. See also: Rossbach, Henrike (2012) "Zankapfel der Nation." *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. 21.04. 2012. Available from: <http://www.faz.net/-gqg-6zamd>. Accessed: 28.09. 2014.

⁹ Xydias, *Pathways to Substantive Representation*, 106.

6.1.1 The Cash-for-Care Reform and its Context

Von Wahn rightly points out that the political controversies over the *Betreuungsgeld* must be viewed in the context of wider demographic and socio-economic changes in Germany, chief among which is the steady increase in women's labour market participation (see Figure 16).¹⁰

Figure 16 Women's Employment Rate in Germany since 1996



Source: Federal Statistical Office 2012, Microcensus data for women aged 20-64.

The rise of women's employment has been particularly pronounced in West Germany. I noted in chapter 3 that full-time employment among women in the German Democratic Republic was the norm and that many women in the East only lost their jobs or were otherwise forced out of employment after unification. At the time of writing, half of all employed women in Germany work on a part-time basis, with the rate of female full-

¹⁰ Von Wahl "Moving a Mountain: Women Voters, Women Leaders, and the Male Breadwinner Model in Germany", 72-85.

time employment being slightly higher in the new federal states.¹¹ This reflects employment patterns of the Cold War period as well as the existence of a more extensive childcare infrastructure in East Germany. Significantly, almost half of all those women in Germany who currently work part-time have stated that they would like to work additional rather than fewer hours per week. The factors preventing them from doing so are usually linked to the lack of available and affordable childcare.¹²

From 2005, several family policy reforms have been implemented under the then family minister von der Leyen, which signalled a departure from the conservative welfare state system toward a more liberal social-democratic one.¹³ The most important of these reforms, according to von Wahn, were the introduction of the legal entitlement to publicly funded childcare for children under the age of three (passed in 2008 and effective from 2013) and the introduction of the *Elterngeld* (passed in 2006 and in effect since 2007). The *Elterngeld* ("parents' money") is a monetary allowance based on previous earnings¹⁴ paid to parents for up to 14 months after the birth of their child. It can be divided freely between parents, with each able to take at least two and at most 12 months of paid parental leave in total. Due to this regulation, the full parental leave allowance can only be claimed if both parents take at least some time off work. The policy reform was the first political initiative in Germany actively incentivising both parents to take parental leave after the birth of their child.¹⁵

It is worth pausing for a moment to reflect on the rate at which fathers have responded to this policy stimulus.¹⁶ According to Bujard, fewer than 5 per cent of those claiming

¹¹ Wanger, Susanne (2011) "Viele Frauen würden gerne länger arbeiten." Nürnberg: Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB) der Bundesagentur für Arbeit.

¹² Loc. cit.

¹³ Von Wahl "Moving a Mountain: Women Voters, Women Leaders, and the Male Breadwinner Model in Germany", 72-85.


¹⁴ The allowance covers 67 per cent of the previous monthly income, capped at a minimum of 300€ and a maximum of 1800€. Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, (2014) "Elterngeld." Available from: <http://perma.cc/CE9V-SM9V>. Accessed: 26.09. 2014.

¹⁵ Von Wahl "Moving a Mountain: Women Voters, Women Leaders, and the Male Breadwinner Model in Germany", 72-85.

¹⁶ Under the policy, the 12 month childcare benefit payments are extended for two additional months only if parental leave is split between both parents. The maximum time that can be claimed by one partner alone

parental leave support in 2006 (prior to the coming into effect of the reform) were men. In 2012, by contrast, this figure had changed to over 26 per cent.¹⁷ From 2008 onwards, the proportion of men among parents claiming the parental leave allowance has been steadily rising (see Figure 17).¹⁸

Figure 17 Proportion of Fathers claiming Elterngeld in Germany 2008-2012*



Notes: The figure displays the percentage of men claiming at least part of the *Elterngeld* allowance. Source: Institut für Arbeit und Qualifikation (2014) "Beteiligung von Vätern am Elterngeldbezug für Kinder der Jahrgänge 2008-2012." Available from <http://bit.ly/1HCb3VL>. Accessed: 20.09.2014

Although it is not possible to establish a causal link between the two based only on these statistics, it is generally assumed that more fathers take paid leave as a result of the policy

is thus 12 months. In other words, parents lose out on their entitlement to two months of benefit payments unless both partners take some time off work to look after their children.

¹⁷ Note that these two cited statistics are capturing different types of parental allowance (pre- and post policy reform). However, as Bujard notes, the figures nevertheless strongly indicate a changing trend. Bujard, Martin (2013) "Wie wirkt das Elterngeld?" Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

¹⁸ See also: Tichomirowa, Katja (2012) *Elterngeld bei Vätern immer beliebter*. Focus (2012) "Immer mehr Väter nehmen Elternzeit." 27.06. 2012. Available from: <http://perma.cc/E2FJ-4U6T>. Accessed: 25.10. 2014.

reform.¹⁹ If this should indeed be the case, it would be a further example of how welfare state legislation can affect the division of work between men and women.

At the same time, however, it should be noted that overall, men still take considerably less parental leave than women - an average of 3.3 of a possible 12 months.²⁰ The very fact that the *Elterngeld* has been dubbed father or daddy months (*Vätermonate*)²¹ illustrates that the concept of fathers taking paternity leave is still a novelty rather than a norm.²² Yet, in line with the findings on the effects institutional learning in chapter 4, it would be surprising to see more fundamental behavioural and attitudinal changes within such a relatively short period of time.

In addition to the *Elterngeld*, a second significant policy change has been the extension of the legal entitlement to publicly funded childcare to parents of children aged one and two, which was also introduced during the time Ursula von der Leyen headed the family ministry.²³ The policy came into effect in August 2013 amongst much media furore. While in principle, the idea behind the policy has been well received, it has frequently been pointed that its implementation is practically unrealistic as demand for public childcare still far outstrips supply, especially in Western parts of the country.

¹⁹ See for example: Der Spiegel Online (2008) "Familienpolitik: Vätermomente immer beliebter." 28.02. 2012. Available from: <http://perma.cc/M4ZZ-TZ2K>. Accessed: 23.08. 2014. Focus, "Immer mehr Väter nehmen Elternzeit", online resource. Die Welt (2012) "Immer mehr Väter nehmen sich Elternzeit." 22.11. 2012. Available from: <http://perma.cc/U3CJ-W8F2>. Accessed: 25.10. 2014.

²⁰ Bujard, "Wie wirkt das Elterngeld?", 6.

²¹ See for example: Süddeutsche (2010) "Vätermonate: Mehr Männer nehmen berufliche Auszeit." *Süddeutsche.de*. 10.05. 2010. Available. Accessed: 23.08. 2014; Focus (2011) "Elterngeld: Schröder will Zahl der Vätermomente erhöhen." *Focus Online*. 01.10. 2011. Available from: <http://perma.cc/4ZLP-NYX7>. Accessed: 23.08. 2014. Der Spiegel Online, "Familienpolitik: Vätermomente immer beliebter", online resource.

²² As Pfau-Effinger argues, cultural values and ideals influence parents' perceived 'range of options'. Pfau-Effinger, Birgit (2005) "Culture and Welfare State Policies: Reflections on a Complex Interrelation." *Journal of Social Policy*. vol. 34(1): 3-20. 12. It is also possible that the currently lower uptake among men is influenced by economic considerations (if women earn less money in the first place, it makes more financial sense that they should stay at home).

²³ Since 1996, this right applied to children aged three and above only.

The German Federal Statistical Office estimates that the demand for childcare for children under the age of three amounted to roughly 780.000 places in 2013.²⁴ Yet in 2012, only around 558.200 children of this age group (27.6 per cent overall) were enrolled in a state funded institution, creating a deficit of roughly over 220.000 places.²⁵ There are significant regional variations, with only 22.3 per cent of children aged three and under in West Germany enrolled in public childcare compared to over 50 per cent of children in this age group in East Germany (see Table 53 in appendix). While the overall demand for childcare is on average lower in the old federal states (37 per cent compared to 57 per cent in the East), the supply deficit there is nonetheless greater (13 per cent compared to 5 per cent – see Table 53 in appendix).²⁶ A complicating factor is that although the law on the legal entitlement to childcare has been passed by national parliament, it is the responsibility of local councils to ensure that the demand is being met. Yet, local governments argue that they lack the financial resources, space, and trained personnel to create additional childcare centres.²⁷

Nevertheless, the *Elterngeld* provision and the legal entitlement to childcare denoted important institutional changes from the traditional male-breadwinner-female-carer model toward a system in which ‘maternal employment’ and the ‘participation of fathers’ at home are encouraged through government incentives.²⁸ This is the backdrop against which the *Betreuungsgeld* was passed in 2012.

In many ways, this cash-for-care subsidy has been a ‘countervailing measure’ to the two

²⁴ Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2012) "Kindertagesbetreuung regional 2012. Ein Vergleich aller 402 Kreise in Deutschland " Wiesbaden: Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt).

²⁵ Based on figures cited in loc. cit.

²⁶ There are various reasons for the increased demand for childcare in West Germany such as the growing labour market participation of women and the fact that one income alone often no longer meets the financial needs of a family. Many women also want to work outside of the home. See Die Zeit Online (2010) "Mütter wollen nicht zu Hause bleiben." 28.01. 2010. Available from: <http://bit.ly/1upoZIr>. Accessed: 24.08. 2014. In addition, many more children now grow up in single parent households (90 per cent of which are headed by women) or so-called patchwork families, which often heavily rely on the income of single parents. See Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung (2012) "Alleinerziehende." 24.10. 2012. Available from: <http://perma.cc/M2YR-Z6RC>. Accessed: 24.08. 2014. Frankfurter Rundschau (2014) "Ein Drittel der Familien lebt nicht im klassischen Modell." *Frankfurter Rundschau*. 20.10. 2014. Available from: <http://bit.ly/1vBoaU6>. Accessed: 21.10. 2014.

²⁷ Hauser, Jan (2013) *Kommunen kritisieren Bund: Städtetag gesteht Lücken in Kinderbetreuung ein*.

²⁸ See for example: Hohnerlein and Blenk-Knocke, "Rollenleitbilder und -realitäten. Einführung", 13.

policies described above.²⁹ Officially, the policy has been advocated as a complementary care solution for parents of young children, aimed at facilitating choice between different forms of public and private childcare alternatives. The conservative government's official line was that the cash-for-care subsidy *complemented* the provision of state funded childcare – even if this provision is far from universal. From August 2013, the subsidy has been granted to parents of one to two year old children born on or after August 1st 2012 (subject to them not using publicly funded childcare). It consists of monthly payments of 100€ which from August 2014 were extended to payments of 150€ per month. Around 224.000 claims were made in the second quarter of 2014.³⁰ In the following section, I will analyse the practical and ideological justifications brought forward in debates leading up to the introduction of the policy.

6.1.2 The Family versus the State - an Ideological Debate

It is undeniable that the political discussions around the introduction of the *Betreuungsgeld* were highly ideologically charged. The minister president of Thuringia called it a struggle of cultures (*Kulturkampf*) while the speaker for women of the CSU claimed that opponents of the proposal had put on their 'ideological blinkers'.³¹ The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung's* editorial opined that the cash-for-care subsidy had become the nation's 'apple of discord'.³²

²⁹ Von Wahl "Moving a Mountain: Women Voters, Women Leaders, and the Male Breadwinner Model in Germany", 72-85.

³⁰ Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office) (2014) "Öffentliche Sozialleistungen. Statistik zum Betreuungsgeld Leistungsbezüge." Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt. According to the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, far fewer claims were made than were expected, the rate being higher in West Germany compared to the East. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2014) "Betreuungsgeld ist billiger als erwartet." 01.02. 2014. Available from: <http://www.faz.net/-gqg-7lx0y>. Accessed: 06.10. 2014. In the first quarter of 2014, 145.769 claims were granted. Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office), "Statistik zum Betreuungsgeld", 5. –

³¹ Dorothee Bär. Phoenix (2012) *Debatte zum Betreuungsgeld: VOR ORT Deutscher Bundestag vom 29.06.2012*: YouTube. Minute 11.27.

³² Rossbach, "Zankapfel der Nation", online resource.

In general, as Xydias points out, there exist ‘a wide variety of ideological positions’ in German parliament.³³ This is due to Germany’s hybrid electoral system which allows a relatively high number of parties to be represented in the Bundestag. ‘This diversity’, Xydias observes, ‘corresponds to a range of stances towards women and women’s issues’, family, and gender policies.³⁴

Among the main political parties, the CDU/CSU are located on the centre-right of the political spectrum.³⁵ The sister parties are characterised by a strongly family-focused political outlook³⁶ and are among the most conservative forces in mainstream German politics with regards to gender role- and family ideals. During one of my interviews, a member of the CDU conceded that the party’s views may indeed be perceived as somewhat out-dated:

‘Young women are quite different today. And it doesn't help when a 70-year-old CDU member says, "we also managed to bring up our own children." This no longer fits the pulse of the time. And then the party doesn't seem attractive anymore. When a woman asks, “what are you doing for me?”’³⁷

In the new millennium, the CDU/CSU has tried to shift its rhetoric toward stressing families’ freedom of choice. Former family minister Kristina Schröder (CDU) argued that, ‘the housewife is no longer the only model for Christian-liberal family policy.’³⁸ Yet, the party has been criticised for tending to downplay the existing socio-economic

³³ Xydias, *Pathways to Substantive Representation*, 27.

³⁴ Loc. cit.

³⁵ Loc. cit.

³⁶ “Die Familie steht bei CSU und CDU im Zentrum allen politischen Handelns.” Bär, Dorothee (2012) “Das Betreuungsgeld gibt den Eltern Freiheit.” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. Available from: <http://www.faz.net/-gpg-70m2x>. Accessed: 16.06. 2012.

³⁷ Interview 4, CDU, Male, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Da sind junge Frauen heute ganz anders. Da hilft es auch nicht, wenn ein 70jähriges CDU Mitglied sagt, „wir haben unsere Kinder auch selber erzogen.“ Das trifft nicht mehr das Lebensgefühl. Und dann wirkt die Partei eben auch nicht attraktiv. Wenn eine Frau sagt, „was macht ihr für mich?“’

³⁸ Schröder, Kristina (2013) *Die Hausfrau - weder Leitbild noch Feindbild*.

inequalities among and between parents that prevent such a choice from being made freely.³⁹

The SPD, Germany's second largest party in terms of voter share, is located on the centre-left of the political spectrum.⁴⁰ Since the late 1990s, it has adopted a more progressive stance on women and gender equality issues, favouring more 'extensive social security provisions'⁴¹ and calling for positive discrimination and labour protection laws.⁴² However, during its own time in government under Gerhard Schröder as well as during its grande coalition with the CDU/CSU, the party has taken a less than pro-active approach on these issues.

On the left and far left of the ideological scale are the Greens and the Left Party (*Die Linke*) respectively. Since its emergence on the party political stage in Germany, the Greens have offered the most comprehensive vision for gender equality legislation and family policy, which in part stems from its ties to the second-wave women's movement.⁴³ The party's explicit political goals include women's equal participation in politics and the economy through legally imposed positive discrimination measures, the eradication of traditional gender role thinking and stereotyping, and increasing awareness of women's and men's different social positions in German society.⁴⁴ The Left party has a similarly comprehensive party programme, which, like that of the SPD, is focused on women as workers, aiming to achieve the 'actual equality between women and men'.⁴⁵ By contrast, the liberal FDP is by far the least proactive party in terms gender equality and family

³⁹ Lewis, *Work-Family Balance, Gender and Policy*, 3.

⁴⁰ At the time the cash-for-care policy was passed, it was in the opposition. However, from 2005-2009 and again since the last election on 2013, the CDU/CSU and SPD have been governing jointly in a grand coalition.

⁴¹ Xydias, *Pathways to Substantive Representation*, 27.

⁴² Examples include the law on equal pay (*Entgeltgleichheitsgesetz*), or a law to guarantee new parents a return to full time time employment (*Rückkehrrecht auf Vollzeitarbeit*). Ferner, Elke (2013) "Moderne Frauenpolitik nur mit der SPD." Available from: <http://perma.cc/NL6C-VNZJ>. Accessed: 28.09. 2014.

⁴³ Xydias, *Pathways to Substantive Representation*, 28.

⁴⁴ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (2014) "LAG Frauen- und Geschlechterpolitik." Available from: <http://perma.cc/X3NF-CCWH>. Accessed: 28.09. 2014.

⁴⁵ Die Linke (2009) "Frauenpolitik auf einen Blick." Available from: <http://bit.ly/1HAvd2o>. Accessed: 28.09. 2014.

policy legislation. In line with its liberal economic outlook, it endorses a strategy of equal opportunities rather than of equal outcomes.⁴⁶

The cash-for-care policy itself has been said to be the brain-child of Edmund Stoiber, CSU politician and former minister-president of Bavaria.⁴⁷ With a political career beginning in the 1970s, Stoiber represents the old men's league of West German politics. His own family has exemplified the male-breadwinner-female-carer ideal. In 2007, Stoiber resigned as CSU party chairman, but his views on the *Betreuungsgeld* were taken forward by his successor Horst Seehofer (even though the latter is said to share traditional family values less vehemently than his predecessor).⁴⁸ Bavaria has traditionally been a catholic stronghold whose inhabitants generally adhere to conservative values, including traditional gender role attitudes (compare tables in 8.4 Appendix for Chapter 4). While the CSU and CDU are sister parties, the former has undoubtedly been the more conservative force among the two.⁴⁹ As one interviewee noted,

‘This is a deeply conservative bunch, they want to appear progressive, but they are conservative at heart.’⁵⁰

So why was the CSU so vehemently in favour of the cash-for-care policy?

The government's overarching argument has been that a monthly cash payment would bolster parents' freedom of choice between different public and private childcare

⁴⁶ At the time of the *Betreuungsgeld* debates, the FDP was the government's junior coalition partner. Yet, in the 2013 elections, it failed to surpass the 5 per cent threshold for the first time in West German post-war history.

⁴⁷ Der Spiegel (2012) "Die Zeitmaschine." 46/2012. 28-34. Horst Seehofer has a less traditional personal life than his predecessor. He divorced his first wife in the 1980s and subsequently re-married. In 2007, it was revealed that Seehofer would become father of an illegitimate child. Die Welt (2007) "Horst Seehofer bleibt bei seiner Familie." 09.07. 2007. Available from: <http://perma.cc/4AC6-Y7GM>. Accessed: 27.09. 2014.

⁴⁸ Der Spiegel, "Die Zeitmaschine", 33.

⁴⁹ The Local (2012) "Merkel's party revolts over childcare subsidy." 02.04. 2012. Available from: <http://perma.cc/ASZ9-BBAH>. Accessed: 28.08. 2014.

⁵⁰ Interview 18, SPD, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: 'Das ist ein konservativer Laden, die geben sich einen fortschrittlichen Anstrich, aber das ist ein erkonservativer Laden. (...).'

arrangements.⁵¹ Chancellor Angela Merkel, though believed to be in principle opposed to the policy, publicly endorsed the proposal as ‘an essential part of our policy of freedom of choice.’⁵² Von Wahl argues that the freedom of choice argument reflects an ideology of ‘familialism’, that is, an assumption that ‘families do not want to need public childcare.’⁵³ The *Betreuungsgeld*, she notes, caters to those conservatives in the party ‘who want to prove that the male breadwinner model is not dead.’⁵⁴

This position often (though not necessarily) encompasses the view that ‘small children are best cared for at home by their parents, especially their mothers.’⁵⁵ Precisely such attitudes were picked up on in the gender role questions posed in the ALLBUS survey, which I analysed in chapter 4. The generation of current West German politicians largely grew up in a system where the male earner female carer model was the norm. Questioned on the issue of the *Betreuungsgeld*, one male CDU politician from West Germany remarked that,

‘this is the way in which we were all brought up, at least in the West. Where I am from, twenty years ago, we had 2.5 per cent childcare coverage for those under the age of three, practically no-one. In my generation, I know no one who was in childcare when

⁵¹ This is stated in the 2007 coalition agreement. Original paragraph: ‘Um Wahlfreiheit zu anderen öffentlichen Angeboten und Leistungen zu ermöglichen, soll ab dem Jahr 2013 ein Betreuungsgeld in Höhe von 150,- Euro, gegebenenfalls als Gutschein, für Kinder unter drei als Bundesleistung eingeführt werden.’ Koalitionsvertrag der CDU, CSU und FDP zur 17. Legislaturperiode von 2009 bis 2013 (2009) "Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt." Available from: <http://bit.ly/1vbUCKD>. Accessed: 25.09 2014. See also: Boll, Christina and Reich, Nora (2012) "Das Betreuungsgeld - eine kritische ökonomische Analyse." *Wirtschaftsdienst*. vol. 92(2): 121-28. 122. Von Wahl "Moving a Mountain: Women Voters, Women Leaders, and the Male Breadwinner Model in Germany", 72-85. See also speeches by members of the CDU/CSU and FDP at Phoenix, *Debatte zum Betreuungsgeld: VOR ORT Deutscher Bundestag vom 29.06.2012.*, for example by Miriam Gruß (FDP): loc. cit.

⁵² The Economist, "Pay to stay at home", online resource.

⁵³ Von Wahl "Moving a Mountain: Women Voters, Women Leaders, and the Male Breadwinner Model in Germany", 72-85.

⁵⁴ Loc. cit.

⁵⁵ Loc. cit.

they were younger than three years old. (...) It therefore cannot be the end of Christian civilisation if you choose to look after your child at home.⁵⁶

In line with this assertion, the CDU/CSU repeatedly criticised the SPD for pursuing a family model whereby mothers should return to the labour market as soon as possible after giving birth, regardless of the preferences of the women in question.⁵⁷

An interviewee from East Germany expressed her frustration over debating childcare with West German politicians in this way:

‘Childcare, I say, that’s the most normal thing in the world. No one wants to force children who are younger than a year to be in childcare all day, as this is sometimes being suggested. But if you want to, I want the structures to be there.’⁵⁸

Many critics pointed out that there are several flaws in the argument that granting cash payments to parents who look after their children without the help of the state creates better choice between different childcare models. On the one hand, the problem with the *Betreuungsgeld* lies with the relatively small amount of money being paid out. A financial supplement of €100-€150 a month can rarely replace the salary of a working parent.⁵⁹ For those who choose public childcare only because they have to work, the *Betreuungsgeld* does not give them the freedom to stay at home. In addition, if the cash-for-care subsidy aimed to compensate for a foregone salary, it would have to be paid only to those parents who previously pursued paid employment and who have taken a break from work. This is not the case, however, as payments are granted independent of the

⁵⁶ Interview 4, CDU, Male, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Mir haben viele gesagt, die in der Situation leben, ich würde das als Dankeschön des Staates empfinden, dass ich auf Gehalt verzichte und sage bis zum zweiten Lebensjahr betreue ich mein Kind selber.’

⁵⁷ Schröder, *Die Hausfrau - weder Leitbild noch Feindbild*.

⁵⁸ Interview 5, Greens, Female, East German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Kinderbetreuung, da sag ich, das ist das Selbstverständlichste von der Welt. Niemand will die Kinder zwangsweise, wie es ja jetzt manchmal die Diskussion ist, mit unter einem Jahr ganztags in die Krippe geben. Aber wenn du es möchtest, möchte ich, dass die Struktur da ist.’

⁵⁹ Pabst, Franziska (2012) *Stellungnahme des Paritätischen Wohlfahrtsverbandes – Gesamtverband e.V. zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Einführung eines Betreuungsgeldes (Betreuungsgeldgesetz)*. Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, 3.

employment status of parents.⁶⁰ Therefore, it could be argued that the policy is in fact primarily targeted at the unemployed or at minimum wage earners.

It is also worth stressing that less than a third of children below the age of three were enrolled in public childcare at the time of the policy coming into effect, with many more parents (over 220.000) wishing to claim places than are available. As several hundreds of thousand of parents are unable to secure publicly funded childcare, it cannot be argued, as Boll puts it, 'that the introduction of a policy which supports parents to leave their children at home strengthens parental choice.'⁶¹ Indeed, in view of this situation, it seems that the *Betreuungsgeld* serves as a strategy for alleviating the pressure on the German public childcare infrastructure. By incentivising parents not to make use of the right to public childcare, the government may be in a better position to honour its commitment to those parents who insist on it and who may otherwise take their local councils to court.⁶² Critics of the policy argue that the money paid out in cash benefits would be better spent on further improving the quantity and quality of public childcare.

A second related ideological argument brought forward by those in favour of the *Betreuungsgeld* is that caring for young children at home is the most conducive to child wellbeing and to the development of children's emotional and cognitive capacities. In a hearing of the select committee for family, seniors, women and the youth in the autumn of 2012, invited experts presented evidence and assessments in favour and against the policy proposal. Among them, a paediatric specialist emphasised that 'by far the most important structure for early childhood development is the family.'⁶³ Many members of the CDU/CSU have publicly used this argument to defend the introduction of the *Betreuungsgeld*. For example, Bavarian education minister Christine Haderthauer (CSU)

⁶⁰ Boll and Reich, "Das Betreuungsgeld - eine kritische ökonomische Analyse", 123.

⁶¹ Loc. cit.

⁶² Steinpichler, Christian (2013) "So klagen Eltern den Kita-Platz für ihr Kind ein." 31.07. 2013. Available from: <http://perma.cc/H7RQ-5C42>. Accessed: 27.09. 2014.

⁶³ Böhm, Rainer (2012) *Stellungnahme des Herrn Dr. Rainer Böhm, Leitender Arzt Sozialpädiatrisches Zentrum, Bielefeld, zum Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und FDP - Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Einführung eines Betreuungsgeldes*. Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, 3.

defended the policy stating that the cash-for-care subsidy was an investment in children's education.⁶⁴

Other experts at the select committee hearing suggested, conversely, that scientific research on early childhood development has been inconclusive and that public childcare attendance did not mean that children are deprived of family life altogether. Moreover, as Boll and colleagues point out, it is not clear that the parental home is necessarily the only or best place for furthering child development or that recipients of the subsidy do not simply use it to pay for private childcare alternatives.⁶⁵ It has been noted that particularly children from families with migration or low-education and low-income backgrounds would benefit significantly from enrolment in childcare institutions.⁶⁶ Yet for parents from these socio-economic groups, cash payments may be a tempting alternative to sending their children to state-subsidised childcare centres.⁶⁷ For these reasons, the *Betreuungsgeld* has been variously termed a 'hearth bonus' or 'keep-your-kids-out-of-school money'.⁶⁸

An education report by the German federal states has warned against just these negative repercussions.⁶⁹ Former family minister and CDU member von der Leyen publicly stated that the *Betreuungsgeld* would be a 'catastrophic educational policy'.⁷⁰ More fundamentally however, as Boll et al. note, even if the parental home were the best place for children

⁶⁴ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2012) "Neuer Bildungsbericht warnt vor Betreuungsgeld." 20.06. 2012. Available from: <http://www.faz.net/-gpg-70r82>. Accessed: 21.06. 2012. See also: Bär, "Das Betreuungsgeld gibt den Eltern Freiheit", online resource.

⁶⁵ Boll and Reich, "Das Betreuungsgeld - eine kritische ökonomische Analyse", 124.

⁶⁶ Various authors cited in Gathmann, Christina and Sass, Björn (2011) "Female Labor Supply and Childcare: An Evaluation of Germany's New Childcare Subsidy." *Working Paper*. vol. 2.

⁶⁷ Boll and Reich, "Das Betreuungsgeld - eine kritische ökonomische Analyse", 124. The Local, "Merkel's party revolts over childcare subsidy", online resource.

⁶⁸ The Economist, "Pay to stay at home", online resource.

⁶⁹ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, "Neuer Bildungsbericht warnt vor Betreuungsgeld", online resource.

⁷⁰ Von Wahl "Moving a Mountain: Women Voters, Women Leaders, and the Male Breadwinner Model in Germany", 72-85.

below the age of three to be looked after full time, the cash subsidy would fall short of adequately enabling parents to do so.⁷¹

A third argument in favour of the policy is that it formally (i.e. financially) acknowledges the work of parents who choose to stay at home over pursuing a career. One member of the CDU interviewed for this thesis explained what might be called ‘the appreciation argument’ as follows:

‘I have been told by many who live in such an arrangement, that they would regard it as a token of gratitude from the state for foregoing a salary and for looking after their child themselves until it is three years old.’⁷²

One problem with this justification is that it is by no means certain that parents who do not use publicly subsidised crèches indeed care for their children exclusively at home. It is possible, for example, that they too outsource care to friends or other family members, or that they may enrol their child in privately funded day care centres.⁷³ More crucially however, the appreciation argument implies that parents in paid employment do not look after their children. This resonates with the West German concept of the *Rabenmutter* - the ‘raven mother’ who abandons her offspring. Most working parents would argue that even those children who are enrolled in publicly funded childcare are still primarily cared for by their own parents. In principle, every parent should therefore be entitled to receive the cash subsidy.

A further important point of contention between proponents and opponents of the *Betreuungsgeld* has been the argument of compensation. Considering the substantial state funding poured into the German childcare infrastructure, some argue, it is only fair that parents who do not use publicly funded childcare should be financially reimbursed for it.

⁷¹ Boll and Reich, "Das Betreuungsgeld - eine kritische ökonomische Analyse", 124.

⁷² Interview 4, CDU, Male, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Mir haben viele gesagt, die in der Situation leben, ich würde das als Dankeschön des Staates empfinden, dass ich auf Gehalt verzichte und sage bis zum zweiten Lebensjahr betreue ich mein Kind selber.’

⁷³ Rønsen, Marit (2000) "Impacts on Women's Work and Child Care Choice of Cash-for-Care Programs." Department of Social Statistics Norway.

One member of the CSU interviewed for this thesis, expressed this view in the following statement,

‘If I spend 1000€ a month for childcare for one and two year olds, then it is justifiable to pay 100€ or 150€ in recognition of those, who do not take up these services and to assist those financially who said that they do not want to put their small child in childcare. To say as the state, we accept and we support both models.’⁷⁴

Yet, critics of the policy point out that not using state subsidised services does not normally warrant financial compensation. There are countless services, which are partially or fully funded by the government (university education, theatres and liberal arts, and public transport systems to name a few) and in none of the cases are non-users entitled to receive remunerating cash payments.⁷⁵

The most critical problem with the new policy, however, concerns to the way in which it re-enforces a separation between paid and domestic work.⁷⁶ Paying parents for not using a public service, which aims to facilitate combining family life and employment, counteracts the incentives towards shared care and reproductive work which were put in place through the *Elterngeld* policy and the implementation of legal right to childcare. Although in principle, men are equally entitled to receive the *Betreuungsgeld*, it is predominantly women who stay at home. According to figures by the German Federal Statistical Office, over 94 per cent of recipients of the cash-for-care subsidy in the second quarter of 2014 were women.⁷⁷ For some families, this may be the more sensible

⁷⁴ Interview 11, CSU, Male, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Also, wenn ich pro Monat über 1000 Euro ausbehalte für eine Unter-Drei Betreuung, dann ist es auch vertretbar 100 beziehungsweise 150 Euro als Anerkennung und Unterstützung für die, die die Leistung nicht in Anspruch nehmen, zu geben, um ein bisschen diejenigen, die sagen, „ich möchte mein ganz kleines Kind nicht in eine Betreuungseinrichtung geben,“ denen auch einen Ausgleich finanzieller Art zu geben. Und auch als Staat zu sagen, wir akzeptieren und fördern beide Lebensformen.’

⁷⁵ Boll and Reich, "Das Betreuungsgeld - eine kritische ökonomische Analyse", 123.

⁷⁶ The *Betreuungsgeld*, the opposition argued in the first Bundestag hearing on the policy, is counterproductive to achieving gender equality. Phoenix, *Debatte zum Betreuungsgeld: VOR ORT Deutscher Bundestag vom 29.06.2012*, Minute 34.30.

⁷⁷ Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office), "Statistik zum Betreuungsgeld", 5.

economic option, given that, on average, German men still earn considerably more than their female partners.⁷⁸ As one SPD member argued in an interview,

‘The CSU pursued their ideology of paying for family work (...) that is, the woman gets a salary for staying at home. And it is usually women. Men wouldn’t give up their jobs for 150€.’⁷⁹

As suggested above, given the relatively small amount of the money being paid out, many experts fear that the temptation for women to interrupt their careers, ‘will be greatest for those who can afford it least.’⁸⁰

A second ideological factor contributing to a situation in which women are more likely to stay at home than men is the inherent assumption that children are best looked after by their mother, an assumption which conservative political elites all but obliterated in the political discussions that were held over the policy. In an article in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, the former speaker for family policy of the CSU, Dorothee Bär openly criticised opposing voices to the *Betreuungsgeld* as left ideological propaganda.⁸¹ While Bär was eager to stress that fathers also take care of small children and that their rights and responsibilities as parents should be recognised and valued, in the same article she suggested that, ‘whoever observed a new-born in the first weeks after birth, will have noticed the inseparability of mother and child.’⁸² It is such rhetoric from leading

⁷⁸ Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (2009) "Entgeltungleichheit zwischen Frauen und Männern in Deutschland." Berlin: Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend. Die Zeit Online, "Frauen bekommen 22 Prozent weniger Lohn als Männer", online resource. The Economist, "Pay to stay at home", online resource.

⁷⁹ Interview 3, SPD, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Die CSU hat da ihre Ideologie der Bezahlung von Familienarbeit weitergeführt. Die CDU/CSU, die haben ja immer das Familiengeld nach vorne getragen, das heißt die Frau kriegt ein Gehalt, dafür, dass sie zu Hause bleibt und das ist in der Regel die Frau, nicht der Mann, der wird für die €150 nicht seinen Job aufgeben. Da wird das in der Regel die Frau sein.’

⁸⁰ Allmendinger cited in The Economist, "Pay to stay at home", online resource.

⁸¹ Bär, "Das Betreuungsgeld gibt den Eltern Freiheit", online resource.

⁸² Loc. cit.

conservative politicians that caters to 'traditional ideas of motherhood,' as *The Economist* put it.⁸³

Some critics of the policy go as far as arguing that the inbuilt incentives for a traditional allocation of care and paid work between parents are a violation of the German constitution. An expert who participated in the select-committee hearing on the *Betreuungsgeld* emphasised the constitutional obligation of the German government to support and promote gender equality and to take steps to eliminate existing disadvantages.⁸⁴ Such an obligation, he asserted, should compel the government to reject the introduction of a cash-for-care benefit. The CDU/CSU on the other hand maintained that the constitution also obligates the German state to protect the family and that criticism on the grounds of gender inequality was unfounded since both men and women could claim the benefit. Yet, given the fact that over 90 per cent of recipients are female, it is women who are more likely to experience negative repercussions for their future employment and income. Studies from Norway, in which a comparable cash-for-care subsidy was introduced in 1999, found that the policy had indeed had a negative effect on the labour market participation of mothers⁸⁵ and that it increased the specialisation of work between couples.⁸⁶ Similarly, the German state Thuringia in which a cash-for-care policy was implemented in 2006 saw an increase of full-time parental childcare of around 20 per cent.⁸⁷ These concrete social repercussions must be taken into consideration in assessments of the policy. They show that the new policy incentivises

⁸³ The Economist, "Pay to stay at home", online resource.

⁸⁴ Basic Law, Article 3 (2).

⁸⁵ Rønsen, "Impacts on Women's Work and Child Care Choice of Cash-for-Care Programs". Schöne, Pål (2004) "Labour supply effects of a cash-for-care subsidy." *Journal of Population Economics*. vol. 17(4): 703-27. Both authors found that education status was an important factor in determining the policy's impact on women's labour market participation. However, while Rønsen that only women from lower and middling educational backgrounds were less likely to work after the introduction of the cash-for-care subsidy, Naz found that 'the labour force participation of highly educated mothers fell by more than that of mothers with less education.' Naz, Ghazala *ibid.* "The impact of cash-benefit reform on parents' labour force participation." vol. (2): 369-83. 369.

⁸⁶ Naz, "Cash-benefit reform and parents' labour force participation".

⁸⁷ Gathmann and Sass, "Germany's New Childcare Subsidy", 2. However, it should be noted that the current uptake of the *Betreuungsgeld* among parents falls far below the initially expected rate. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, "Betreuungsgeld ist billiger als erwartet", online resource.

the division of labour between parents and that it constitutes, in effect, ‘a state subsidy for traditional family structures’.⁸⁸

Having elaborated on the viewpoints of those in favour and those opposed to the introduction of the German cash-for-care subsidy, it is important to highlight that critics of the policy have been far more numerous than proponents among the public, the media, the business sector, and among parliamentarians themselves.⁸⁹ The Green party and SPD have vehemently opposed the policy.⁹⁰ The governing coalition party FDP first publicly criticised the plans⁹¹ and then stated that it would try to repeal the policy in future.⁹² Even many members of the CDU disagreed with its implementation. In March 2012, 23 CDU parliamentarians published an open letter to the chief party whip arguing against it.⁹³ Indeed, in addition to former CDU family minister von der Leyen (who called the *Betreuungsgeld* an ‘educational catastrophe’⁹⁴), it has been suggested that even Angela Merkel and the then governing family minister Kristina Schröder considered the policy to be imprudent.⁹⁵ According to opinion polls, the majority of German citizens were also opposed to it.⁹⁶

⁸⁸ The Local, "Merkel's party revolts over childcare subsidy", online resource.

⁸⁹ Loc. cit.

⁹⁰ See Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (2012) *Jürgen Trittin: Betreuungsgeld kein Kampf für Wahlfreiheit, sondern Wahlkampf für Bayern*: YouTube. and Renate Künast at Phoenix, *Debatte zum Betreuungsgeld: VOR ORT Deutscher Bundestag vom 29.06.2012*, Minute 37.30.

⁹¹ See ARD, *Tagesschau vom 24.09.2012 20.00Uhr*.

⁹² According to one member of the FDP I interviewed, ‘there was little love for this policy in the FDP, because we felt that the CSU’s *Betreuungsgeld* had little purpose and that it meant spending money without much reason behind it.’ Interview 10, FDP, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Also es gab in der FDP, in der Fraktion eigentlich dafür keine Gegenliebe, weil wir das *Betreuungsgeld* als Modell der CSU wenig zielführend und dann eben auch als Geldausgeben ohne Sinn und Verstand empfunden haben.’

⁹³ Rossbach, "Zankapfel der Nation", online resource.

⁹⁴ Der Spiegel, "Die Zeitmaschine", 33.

⁹⁵ Interview 20, SPD, Female, West German, 2013: ‘The CDU, family minister, and the chancellor considered it to be the wrong policy, but something had to be sacrificed on the altar.’ Original quote: ‘Weil auch die CDU, die zuständige Ministerin und die Bundeskanzlerin haben das also eher für falsch gehalten und da musste also wohl auf dem Altar von bestimmten Dingen etwas geopfert werden.’

⁹⁶ According to Müller, 59 per cent of Germans were opposed to the policy in 2012Der Spiegel, "Die Zeitmaschine", 29.

Nevertheless, the policy was passed in the Bundestag on November 11th 2012 with 311 to 282 votes (with only two members of the CDU and four members of the FDP voting against the party line⁹⁷). The majority of politicians interviewed for this thesis believed that the policy had passed for strategic, party-internal reasons, rather than on the grounds of strong ideological convictions held by the majority of parliamentarians. Specifically, many media reports as well as many of my interviewees argued that the introduction of the subsidy was inevitable because it had been incorporated in the 2007 coalition agreement between the CDU/CSU and FDP.⁹⁸ Once included in the agreement, the policy became a symbolic battleground in a struggle over authority between the sister parties CDU and CSU.⁹⁹ As one member of the CSU put it, ‘we said, this is a *casus belli* for us (...) This is our party discipline.’¹⁰⁰ *Der Spiegel* reasoned that Angela Merkel valued the cooperation with the CSU more highly than she opposed the policy. From this point

⁹⁷ Der Spiegel Online (2012) "Bundestagsradar: Betreuungsgeld." 09.11. 2012. Available from: <http://bit.ly/1vA8Vdl>. Accessed: 25.09. 2014. The first reading of the *Betreuungsgeld* in the Bundestag in June 2012 was ‘boycotted’ through a low attendance rate.

⁹⁸ The protocol of the coalition meeting reads that, ‘from 2013, monthly child-care payments will be introduced for those parents, who look after their children at home.’ Original sentence: “Ab 2013 soll für diejenigen Eltern, die ihre Kinder zu Hause betreuen lassen oder können, eine monatliche Zahlung (zum Beispiel Betreuungsgeld) eingeführt werden.” Cited in Der Spiegel, "Die Zeitmaschine", 32. According to one interviewee (Interview 4, CDU, Male, West German, 2013), ‘the *Betreuungsgeld* would certainly not have been implemented if the CSU hadn’t put it on the agenda. It then wouldn’t have appeared in our coalition agreement. As it was, the party loyalty and coalition loyalty was an important factor outweighing any reservations. Without the CSU, there would be no *Betreuungsgeld*.’ Original quote: “Also mit Sicherheit wäre das *Betreuungsgeld* nicht gekommen, wenn es die CSU nicht auf die Tagesordnung gesetzt hätte und wenn es damit auch nicht in der Koalitionsvereinbarung dadurch aufgetaucht wäre. Und so war halt Fraktions- und Koalitionstreue auch ein wichtiges Gut, Vorbehalte zurück zu stellen. Ohne die CSU wäre das also nicht gekommen.’ Another interviewee (Interview 6, FDP, Male, East German, 2013) similarly suggested that, ‘the initial decision on the *Betreuungsgeld* has been made during the coalition agreements. This is where the *Betreuungsgeld* has been agreed on. It’s like this in every coalition agreement, it is give and take and for this reason, there is nothing fundamental that could be changed on this policy.’ Original quote: “die Grundsatzungsentscheidung dazu ist viel eher getroffen worden mit dem Koalitionsvertrag. Dort ist das *Betreuungsgeld* vereinbart worden, das ist bei jedem Koalitionsvertrag so, das ist ein Geben und Nehmen und deshalb war an der grundsätzlichen Entscheidung für das *Betreuungsgeld* auch nichts zu machen.’

⁹⁹ Loc. cit.

¹⁰⁰ Interview 11, CSU, Male, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Die [Kritiker in unserer Partei] haben sich auch zähneknirschend unserer Argumentation zum Teil gebeugt, weil wir gesagt haben, das ist für uns ein *casus belli*. Also wir machen nicht mit. Und das ist unsere Fraktionsordnung.’ Another MP from the opposition argued that, ‘the CSU (...) would have let everything blow up in this instance. They didn’t have a choice, it was pure blackmailing what they did... Seehofer is bonkers, if he gets something in his head, he sees it through (...).’ (Interview 18, SPD, Female, West German, 2013). Original quote: “die CSU (...) hätte alles mögliche platzen lassen an der Stelle. Die hatten im Prinzip keine Wahl, das war pure Erpressung, was die da gemacht haben.... Der Seehofer ist meschugge, wenn er sich etwas in den Kopf gesetzt hat, dann rennt er da durch die Wand und wenn er sich den Kopf verbeult, dann ist das egal.’

of view, the *Betreuungsgeld* constitutes a political concession, the price that the CDU was willing to pay to keep peace with its sister party.¹⁰¹ The coalition partner FDP, whose members were in principle opposed to the policy, was reportedly compensated for its support through the overturning of the GP practice fee, which had existed in Germany to great public disapproval since 2004.¹⁰² *Der Spiegel* concluded that the *Betreuungsgeld* was partly a story of opportunism, as many members of the coalition who were opposed to the policy did not want to sacrifice their position in their party for the sake of voting against it.¹⁰³

While it is not the purpose of this chapter to determine *why* the policy passed despite significant opposition, it could be argued that its implementation attests to the strength of party affiliation and party discipline over a shared substantive interest of (female) legislators.¹⁰⁴ Indeed, when I asked interviewees whether a shared ‘women’s interest’ existed among female parliamentarians in the Bundestag (irrespective of party affiliation), most respondents were rather sceptical. Several pointed out that the passing of the *Betreuungsgeld* or the failure to legislate for quotas for women in business attested to the fact that there was no common denominator among female MPs or at least, that it was of

¹⁰¹ Der Spiegel, "Die Zeitmaschine", 33.

¹⁰² One member of the FDP I interviewed confirmed this account by stating that, ‘the CSU pushed the topic very hard and ultimately solutions were found at the top level where the *Betreuungsgeld* was an important factor for the CSU. At the same time, the GP practice fee for the FDP was stopped. It was a policy which we always heavily criticised and so we finally saw through its eradication.’ (Interview 10, FDP, Female, West German, 2013.)

¹⁰³ Der Spiegel, "Die Zeitmaschine", 34. Several interviewees stressed that the pressure exerted by the CDU/CSU on its parliamentarians was considerable. See for example: Interview 3 and Interview 20. MPs who would have voted against the policy, one interviewee suggested, would have risked their political careers. Original quote: ‘Dann ist die politische Karriere eben irgendwann zu Ende. Das wird nie so explizit so geäußert auch von einer Partei, aber wir erleben das ja an verschiedenen Stellen immer wieder.’ (Interview 8, Greens, Male, West German, 2013).

¹⁰⁴ The notion of shared ‘women’s interests’ is rather contentious. ‘The emphasis on sexual difference,’ Phillips points out, ‘threatens to legitimate precisely these notions of the “eternal feminine” that have so often served to close down questions about the inequity of political arrangements.’ Phillips, Anne (1998) *Feminism & Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 11. Various studies have demonstrated that there may be differences in left-right ideological placement as well as differences in issue preferences between male and female voters. However, the specific differences vary from country to country and often interact with other identity markers such as age, ethnicity, or religious affiliation. See for example: Campbell, Rosie (2004) "Gender, Ideology and Issue Preference: Is There such a Thing as a Political Women’s Interest in Britain?" *British Journal of Politics & International Relations*. vol. 6(1): 20-44. Chappell, Louise and Hill, Lisa (2006) *The Politics of Women's Interests. New comparative perspectives*. Oxon: Routledge. Xydias, *Pathways to Substantive Representation*.

little relevance in the policy-making process.¹⁰⁵ This is in accordance with research conducted by Xydias, who, studying female representation in the German Bundestag, found that,

‘there is a great deal of variation among women, both regarding the extent to which they believe that women share interests and regarding what they believe those interests to be. Further, there is much variation among female legislators’ activities (speaking, committee-work, etc.) on behalf of women as a group, including whether they do so at all.’¹⁰⁶

6.1.3 The Shape of Things to Come?

At the outset of this thesis, I argued that gender culture is partly shaped through social policy. I suggested that analysing welfare state legislation with view to underlying gender role norms can be highly insightful because it reveals the ways in which institutions incentivise certain types of behaviour over others. In light of this assertion, we may want to ask if the *Betreuungsgeld* has indicated a re-alignment of German social policy towards a more conservative welfare state regime. On balance, I would argue that the policy is the outcome of party internal trade-offs and of the pressure exerted by the Bavarian CSU on the rest of the government. I am inclined to draw this conclusion based on the insight that all left-leaning parties in German parliament, a considerable number of members of the CDU and FDP, and the majority of the German public were in principle opposed to

¹⁰⁵ Interview 3, SPD, Female, West German, 2013: ‘You experience it, but it has no practical relevance. If you take for example the issue of women quotas, people got together but it was without relevance.’ Original quote: ‘Also man erlebt es, aber es hat keine praktische Relevanz. Also, wenn man jetzt die Quotengeschichte erlebt, dass alle sich zusammen getan haben, ohne Relevanz.’ Interview 13, The Left Party (Die Linke), Female, East German, 2013: ‘Unfortunately, that’s not true [question: is there a shared interest among women in parliament?]. Well, that’s a nice illusion.’ Original quote: ‘Das stimmt leider nicht. Also, es ist eine schöne Illusion.’ Interview 18, SPD, Female, West German, 2013: ‘Unfortunately, we haven’t had this in recent years, to be honest. I find that regrettable.’ Original quote: ‘Wir hatten das jetzt leider in den letzten Jahre nicht mehr muss man ganz ehrlich sagen.’ Interview 7, FDP, Female, West German, 2013: ‘I realise that on the issue of women quotas, there are other ways of thinking, [this] divides us and that’s unfortunate.’ Original quote: ‘Aber ich merke dieses Thema Frauenquote, da sind andere Denkstrukturen, [das] entzweit uns und das ist bedauerlich.’

¹⁰⁶ Xydias, *Pathways to Substantive Representation*, 2.

the policy. Only the mostly male elite of CSU Conservatives insisted on its introduction. The *Betreuungsgeld*, according to *Der Spiegel*, therefore highlights the degree to which a political minority can leave its mark on German politics.¹⁰⁷ In the words of one interviewee, ‘the topic is an apt example of the limits of parliamentary democracy’.¹⁰⁸

More importantly, the *Betreuungsgeld* debate is an illustration of the fact that expectations and ideas around gender roles, family norms, and parenthood, are far from uncontested among political elites in Germany today.¹⁰⁹ Indeed, some commentators suggest that the policy field has become the new ideological battlefield of this time.¹¹⁰

The discussions over the introduction of the *Betreuungsgeld* epitomise the competing narratives of the conservative male-breadwinner-female-carer versus the dual-breadwinner-dual-carer welfare state models. It forms part of an ‘unfinished story of policy change,’ as von Wahl suggests.¹¹¹ It also highlights that there is a great amount of ambiguity over the gender and family welfare state principles that German social policy legislation has sought to promote in the 21st century. Consecutive governments under the leadership of Angela Merkel have failed to formulate a clear strategy with regards to family and gender roles, thus maintaining a cost-intensive welfare policy structure fraught with conflicting incentives.¹¹² While over the past decade, several policies have signalled a shift toward a more progressive, liberal understanding of family life and gender role norms in unified Germany – one which seeks to facilitate the combining of paid and domestic work for both sexes, many of the existing policies still incentivise a traditional separation of work and family life along gender lines, just like the *Betreuungsgeld*.

¹⁰⁷ Der Spiegel, "Die Zeitmaschine", 33. loc. cit.

¹⁰⁸ Interview 3, SPD, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Also das Thema ist ein gutes Beispiel, wo diese parlamentarische Demokratie eine Grenze hat’

¹⁰⁹ Xydias likewise argues in her thesis that ‘debates surrounding each of these legal shifts are evidence of disagreement over gendered norms’ Xydias, *Pathways to Substantive Representation*, 85.

¹¹⁰ Keller, "Ein neuer Typ Politikerin", online resource. Former family minister Kristina Schröder noted that few policy fields today are fought over so vigorously as the field of family policy. Schröder, *Die Hausfrau - weder Leitbild noch Feindbild*.

¹¹¹ Von Wahl "Moving a Mountain: Women Voters, Women Leaders, and the Male Breadwinner Model in Germany", 72-85.

¹¹² Dackweiler, "Die Konstruktion von Geschlechter-Wirklichkeit durch den Wohlfahrtsstaat". ; "Der 200-Milliarden-Irrtum". Künast, Renate (2013) *Zeit für einen Paradigmenwechsel in der Familienpolitik*. 10. Katharina Wrohlich cited in Tichomirowa, *Elterngeld bei Vätern immer beliebter*.

Conservative political rhetoric aspires to an *equality of sameness* while many of its welfare state policies tend to promote an *equality of difference*. In 2014, unified Germany is no longer a model of the conservative male-breadwinner welfare state, but it has not fully embraced the dual-earner, dual-carer system either. As Henninger and colleagues argue, the country would be well advised to agree on a shared ‘unifying principle that can assist in the formulation of future policies’.¹¹³

¹¹³ Henninger and Ostendorf, *Die politische Steuerung des Geschlechterregimes. Beiträge zur Theorie politischer Institutionen*, 24.

7 Conclusion

When I began research for this thesis, my ambition was to better understand why gender inequality in advanced democracies persists. My particular interest was to explore the role of gender culture – the rather elusive term, which describes norms, attitudes, and beliefs held by citizens about gender roles. Empirically, even though women’s participation in politics has been of extensive academic interest, research on gender culture and its implications for the perpetuation of gender gaps have remained a rather marginal topic in mainstream academic discourse. Based on the qualitative and quantitative research which I have presented in this thesis, I draw two main conclusions about the institutional determinants and the impact of gender culture on women’s political engagement:

Firstly, traditional gender norms – by which I mean conservative attitudes ascribing certain social and behavioural characteristics predominantly to one sex - are an impediment to eradicating gender gaps in politics. Women who hold traditional gender role attitudes are less likely to participate in formal political associational life, and by implication, they are also less likely to run for political office. It is particularly interesting that traditional gender norms need not relate to views on women in politics at all in order to exert a negative effect on participation. This highlights the complex ways in which gender norms influence individual behaviour. Furthermore, it attests to the importance of social attitude change for closing gender gaps in politics.¹

The second main conclusion of this thesis is that welfare state policies have an important role to play in changing attitudes.² Social policies do not merely mirror dominant societal norms, they also help to create and shape these norms. They have a subtle yet important effect on closing gender gaps in public life, in so far as they contribute to the formation of cultural ideals and expectations.

¹ Lovenduski, Joni (1997). "Sex equality and the rules of the game." In: Gardiner, Frances. *Sex Equality in Western Europe*. London: Routledge. 91-108. 100.

² As Orloff points out, ‘the character of public social provision affects women’s marital situations, shapes gender relationships, structures political conflict and participation, and contributes to the formation and mobilization of specific identities and interests.’ Orloff, Ann (1993) "Gender and the Social Right of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States " *American Sociological Review*. vol. 58: 303-28. 303-04.

In addition to these two general conclusions, my thesis has explored the trajectory of gender policy and women's political participation in Germany – from the country's separation after World War II and the subsequent imposition of two rival political regimes, to the most recent policy controversy over childcare benefit payments in the unified state. I analysed quantitatively and qualitatively how cultural differences concerning citizens' views on gender roles have been shaped and I considered the particular challenges women from East and West Germany have faced in the two parts of the country before and after unification. Finally, I explored the political discourse around a recent social policy issue, bringing to the fore the ideological narratives about gender roles and family norms in unified Germany.

In this concluding chapter, I will reflect on each of these constitutive parts of my thesis and emphasise the ways in which they contribute to existing fields of research.

7.1 Key Contributions

Gender and Political Socialisation

Second-wave feminists proposed that the private is political, meaning not only that concerns traditionally associated to private life should matter to politics, but that politics itself also has a profound impact on what happens in the private sphere (see section 8.2.6 in the appendix). Though it is often assumed that all legal hurdles to gender equality have been eradicated in Western democracies, subtle obstacles remain. They operate through conservative social policy legislation which incentivises 'gendered patterns of paid and unpaid work'.³ These patterns, according to Lewis, 'are fundamental to the problem of gender inequality' today.⁴

It has long been assumed that one of the underlying barriers to closing gender gaps in public life may be the existence of an adverse gender culture. The problem at the heart of

³ Lewis, *Work-Family Balance, Gender and Policy*, 15.

⁴ Loc. cit.

culture, Ford asserts, is that even when constitutions are based on the principle of gender equality, they cannot make men and women equal 'when people believe they are essentially and immutably different'.⁵ While I have argued in this thesis that traditional attitudes toward gender are indeed an impediment to equal participation of men and women in public life, I have also argued that these attitudes are far from fixed and that culture does in fact not exist independently of political context, as Ford's citation seems to suggest. Indeed, one of my central hypotheses has been that political institutions help to shape gender culture.

I have used unified Germany as a case study to test this hypothesis. As many scholars before me, I have premised my analysis on the assumption that the Cold War separation and subsequent re-unification of Germany has created a 'quasi-experimental setting' to analyse the impact of regime types on citizens' attitudes – be they political, economic, or social.⁶ I have compared the GDR's dual breadwinner model with West Germany's conservative male-breadwinner-female-carer model,⁷ showing that in the former context, women's full labour market participation was strongly encouraged and that motherhood was not seen as an impediment to a professional career – while in the latter context, the opposite was true. I then tested for the differences in gender role attitudes displayed by cohorts of citizens socialised in these two gender regimes.⁸ I found that citizens in the new federal states were considerably more liberal in their views on female employment, motherhood, and marital roles, compared to citizens in the old federal states. The effect was strongest for those cohorts that were socialised in the respective Cold War regimes for longest. This and the slow rate of gender attitude convergence between citizens in the

⁵ Ford, *Women and politics*, 9.

⁶ See Neundorff, "Growing up on Different Sides of the Wall". Rohrschneider, "The Influence of Institutions on Democratic Values". Bauernschuster and Rainer, "How sex-role attitudes continue to differ in reunified Germany".

⁷ While women in the GDR were expected to fully participate in the labour market, elite politics was still dominated by men (on top of being highly undemocratic). Although the proportion of women in the East German Volkskammer was more than three times higher than the percentage of women in the equivalent West German Bundestag, it was nevertheless never greater than 34 per cent.

⁸ I have built on work by scholars such as Banaszak, "Citizens' Attitudes toward Women's Roles in Germany". And Bauernschuster and Rainer, "How Sex-Role Attitudes Keep on Diverging in Reunified Germany".

new and old federal states after unification has highlighted that the length of socialisation matters, especially with regards to gender socialisation.

In my analysis, I have explored a highly interesting avenue of research in the literature on institutional learning and political socialisation, namely how institutions and political structures shape citizens' norms and values about gender roles and gender behaviour.

Gender, Culture, and Political Participation

The second key contribution of my research relates to the literature on gender and political participation. I began this thesis by stating that progress in closing gender gaps in formal political participation seems to have stagnated in many Western democracies such as in Germany in the new millennium.⁹ An initial investigation of the ALLBUS data showed that while women in Germany were equally likely to participate in individual, direct types of participation (such as voting, political consumerism and so on) in the post-unification period, they were still underrepresented in formal and collective political activities.¹⁰ In particular, party membership and political representation at the local and national level were shown to be two key areas in which gender gaps were still pronounced.¹¹

I explored the possible cultural factors that contribute to this situation. An initial analysis of elite interviews suggested that it was women's different priorities (particularly the tendency to prioritise family over public life) and a lack of appeal of politics in general that discouraged many women from engaging in associational political activities at the local or national level. A number of interviewees also suggested that women in Germany may simply not consider themselves well suited for politics, because they perceive

⁹ OECD (2014) "Women, Government and Policy Making in OECD Countries: Fostering Diversity for Inclusive Growth." OECD Publishing.

¹⁰ This is in line with a number of recent studies in the area of women's participation and representation which have suggested that there are variations in the size of gender gaps across different forms of participation.

¹¹ Since parties are the gatekeepers to political power in Germany, women's low membership also translates into their underrepresentation as candidates in national and regional elections.

themselves to be lacking the characteristics (assertiveness, power, self-confidence) that are usually associated with it. As one interviewee observed,

“The poor participation rates of women in politics, in positions of power and leadership, whether in the private or the public sectors, do not so much reflect a lack of opportunity as an at times negative attitude and a poor self-image on the part of women.”¹²

I argued that these phenomena were linked in significant ways to culture and gender norms.

In the subsequent quantitative part of the analysis, I tested the hypothesis that traditional gender norms affect women’s membership in political parties. The results of my statistical analysis showed that traditional gender attitudes were indeed negatively correlated with party membership, in that they decrease the predicted probability of participation among women. This result was robust for both forms of associational participation (party and union membership) considered, even after dealing with concerns of endogeneity between respondents’ reported gender attitudes and participation.

The research showed that a statistically significant relationship exists between political participation and traditional gender attitudes. These findings provide important insights into the development and stability of political gender gaps in unified Germany, but their relevance stretches beyond the German context for they highlight how traditional cultural norms adversely affect citizens’ participation, especially women’s.

Gender and Germany’s Welfare State

After exploring the links between political institutions and gender culture on the one hand, and gender culture and political participation on the other, the purpose of my final chapter was to revisit Germany’s gender policy framework from a contemporary perspective, thus bringing together the different lines of inquiry pursued throughout the thesis. I suggested that looking at the narratives around welfare state legislation with view

¹² Kaplan 1992: 145 cited in Trzcinski, "Family Policy in Germany: A Feminist Dilemma", 38.

to underlying gender role norms was insightful because it revealed the ways in which political actors (through social policy) incentivise certain types of behaviour over others.

Traditionally, policy fields around care, family, and gender equality have been viewed at best as marginally important issues. With the growth of female voters as a political target group, the introduction of gender quotas in political parties, the subsequent increase of female parliamentarians, and the growing social and economic problems associated with declining birth rates, the political environment has arguably shifted in Germany toward a status quo in which care and gender equality policies are taken seriously. Germany no longer constitutes the classic male-breadwinner-female-carer model. However, its current family and gender equality strategy is still contradictory. Many existing policies stem from the West German post-war period and support a conservative welfare state regime.¹³ Recent legislation such as the parental leave reform or the passing of the legal right to public childcare, by contrast, have signalled a partial move toward a more progressive (dual-earner-dual-carer) welfare state model. The introduction of the controversial cash-for-care subsidy illustrates that an overall vision for Germany's family and gender regime framework is missing.

7.2 Shortcomings and Avenues for Future Research

In their seminal work on *Gender Equality and Cultural Change around the World*, Inglehart and Norris argue that 'the combination of cultural shifts in attitudes and institutional reform' will help achieve the goal of political gender parity in the distant future.¹⁴ Based on the research presented in this thesis, I would argue that institutional and cultural change are not independent processes, but that institutional change can, over time, trigger cultural shifts in attitudes. As social psychologist Hofstede notes, the common

¹³ The gender role assumptions on which this regime was built clashed with the family and career expectations of citizens in the new federal states after unification as well as with the social realities of the increasing number of women in the old federal states in want or in need of paid employment.

¹⁴ Inglehart and Norris, *Rising tide*, 146.

view that 'value change has to precede behavior change' does not bear out in practice and 'neglects the contribution of the *situation* to actual behavior.'¹⁵

Though my thesis thus reinforces the argument that there exists a causal link between political institutions and gender norms, I am mindful that political institutions are far from the only influence on people's norms and beliefs (see section 8.2.7. in appendix). Moreover, I would also hesitate to claim that the relationship between social policy and gender culture is one-directional. After all, policies are formulated by social actors whose perceived 'range of options' are influenced by the 'cultural values and ideals' which they hold.¹⁶

One of the shortcomings of research of the kind attempted in this thesis is that such complex relationships as those between institutions, gender culture, and gender gaps in participation can never be explored thoroughly, because there are too many moving variables. Esping-Andersen has warned that holistic efforts to explain social phenomena such as that of gender inequality run the risk of merely yielding 'the unsurprising insight that everything is related to everything.'¹⁷ Germany's complex federal structure has presented an additional challenge as certain policies are decided on at the national level, but are implemented and funded by federal states, which results in significant variations across German regions. The nuances and differences between the 16 German *Länder* could not be discussed in further detail in this thesis, though such an analysis would undoubtedly be interesting and insightful.

A somewhat startling finding from the analysis in chapter 4 was the slow rate at which gender attitudes in East and West Germany seemed to have been converging since unification. Based on the theory of institutional learning, I expected gender attitudes in the two parts of the country to assimilate over time. Yet, only in the last survey year of 2012 could a converging trend be detected. This, I have argued, may partly be due to the relatively short period of time that has passed since unification and the fact that gender

¹⁵ Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences*, 12.

¹⁶ Pfau-Effinger, "Culture and Welfare State Policies", 12.

¹⁷ Esping-Andersen, *The Incomplete Revolution*, 3.

identities are more deeply rooted than other attitudes such as those toward the political or economic system. However, I am unable to verify this interpretation with the existing data. The analysis of future survey waves alone will allow me to test my assumption that convergence of gender attitudes between Eastern and Western Germans is likely to continue in future.

One of the major caveats to the quantitative analysis on the impact and implications of gender culture in my thesis has been that the quantitative proxies for gender norms I have used have been far from ideal. The six gender attitude questions contained in the German General Social Survey relate exclusively to marital roles, female labour market participation, and motherhood. Moreover, the questions were formulated in West Germany in the 1980s and arguably reflect a very narrow range of views on (female) gender roles which were prevalent at the time. The ALLBUS dataset also did not include any questions on citizens' attitudes toward women in politics – the area of gender inequality I have been particularly interested in.¹⁸ These are predicaments which most if not all quantitative studies on gender ideology and political participation share. Norms and beliefs are complex constructs and gender stereotypes can manifest themselves in various ways. Quantitative analysis is ultimately limited in capturing such nuances adequately. The fact that I could nevertheless identify a correlation between traditional gender role attitudes - however imperfectly captured - and political participation attests to the strength of traditional gender culture as a predictor for gender gaps in formal participation. With better proxies for gender norms relating to political activities, I could reasonably expect my results to be even stronger.

Due to the fact that the ALLBUS survey did not include data on respondents' attitudes on women in politics, I was also unable to explore the very interesting question of whether the successes of a female chancellor have changed the perceptions and expectations of the public toward female politicians in Germany. It is far from unreasonable to assume that Merkel's chancellorship has significantly altered the views of

¹⁸ It is possible, if unlikely, that citizens hold one set of beliefs about women's abilities as workers and mothers, but contrary views on women's abilities as politicians. The GDR exemplified that women could be expected to participate equally in the labour market while few (openly) questioned why women were underrepresented at the level of political elite.

German citizens in this respect. Merkel enjoys great popularity among the German electorate and is particularly popular among women. As Ferree suggests,

‘Even if not the beginning of the end of male-defined politics, [Merkel’s] chancellorship meant Germany joined the ranks of countries in which women could be assumed to be bale to lead, and where women’s insider roles in formal political institutions would shape future state policy.’¹⁹

Over recent years, a number of other key female political figures have also emerged on the German political stage.²⁰ Future research is required to determine if this signals a lasting or merely a temporary trend in the country’s political landscape. The example of Margaret Thatcher in the UK has demonstrated that one woman at the top of the political ladder may not suffice in order to fundamentally shift a male dominated political environment or the perceptions of those who are part of it. As the introductory quote of this thesis postulates, ‘genuine political equality of the women of a country’ cannot be measured ‘by the public achievement of a few selected women’ but only ‘by the quantity and quality of their democratic participation in all spheres of public life.’²¹

A final shortcoming of this thesis is that although my research set out to explore gender culture, much of my theoretical discussion and empirical analysis has focused primarily on women and on attitudes toward them. As such, I have looked at only one subset of the various avenues of gender research.²² One of my justifications for this narrow approach has been that women as a group are still underrepresented in many areas of public life (such as in politics).²³ A further contributing factor has been that the quantitative data with which I have worked included only questions on attitudes toward

¹⁹ Ferree, Myra Marx (2012) *Varieties of Feminism: German Gender Politics in Global Perspective. Kindle Version*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. cited from kindle version.

²⁰ See Keller, "Ein neuer Typ Politikerin", online resource.

²¹ Allendorf, Michaelis-Jena and Murray, *Women in socialist society*, 138.

²² It is often criticised that although gender refers to the social construction of sex in general, most studies on gender nevertheless focus primarily on women. See for example: Carver, Terrell (1996) *Gender is not a synonym for women*. Boulder, Colo ; London: Lynne Rienner.

²³ According to Sapiro, the fact that women as a group are still underrepresented and marginalised justifies that they should be paid special attention to by (feminist or gender) researchers. Sapiro, *The Political Integration of Women*, 33.

motherhood, marital roles, and female employment and that most of the existing literature on gender ideology and gender gaps in politics likewise focuses on women. Yet, there are an increasing number of studies which explore social constructions of masculinities and their societal implications.²⁴ Revisiting the different themes of this thesis from such a point of view would certainly be insightful and provide a valuable addition to this research project.

7.3 Policy Implications

What, if anything, is to be done to close persistent gender gaps in politics and other areas of participation?²⁵ Writing about gender regimes and gender equality in Germany, Henninger and Ostendorf suggest that measures benefiting women will prove to be most successful when the goals are small and do not aim to challenge underlying notions of gender inscribed within the system.²⁶ Yet, if the objective is to close political gender gaps, it seems necessary to do just that – to challenge the underlying traditional notions of gender inscribed within our political and our social structures. In this respect, the German government must realise its own role in perpetuating gender stereotypes.

Occupational gender segregation and traditional gender stereotyping are not only manifestations, but also contributing factors to structural inequality between men and women. Sociologist Johan Galtung has theorised the relationship between culture and social structures of inequality in his influential work on cultural violence. According to Galtung, cultural violence denotes those aspects of a society's cultural environment, which justify or legitimise the existence of structural violence - the systemic exploitation

²⁴ See for example: Brandes, Holger (2007) "Hegemonic Masculinities in East and West Germany (German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic of Germany)." *Men and Masculinities*. vol. 10(2): 178-96. Zulehner, Paul M. (2008). "Männerrollen im Wandel. Männer in Deutschland 2008. Zehn Jahre danach." In: Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend. *Rollenleitbilder und -realitäten in Europa: rechtliche, ökonomische und kulturelle Dimensionen*. Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlag. 33-42. For research on masculinity in general, see: Connell, Raewyn (1995) *Masculinities*. Cambridge: Polity.

²⁵ I am citing Schlozman, Kay Lehman and Verba, Sidney (2012) *The unbeavenly chorus: unequal political voice and the broken promise of American democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. here who have asked the identical question in their concluding chapter.

²⁶ Henninger and Ostendorf, *Die politische Steuerung des Geschlechterregimes. Beiträge zur Theorie politischer Institutionen*, 25.

by one class of people over another.²⁷ Cultural violence makes structural violence ‘look, even feel, right – or at least not wrong,’ thus rendering it acceptable in society.²⁸ As Galtung elaborates,

‘The culture preaches, teaches, admonishes, eggs on, and dulls us into seeing exploitation and/or repression as normal and natural, or into no seeing them (particularly not exploitation) at all.’²⁹

At the same time, however, Galtung reflects that ‘even if it were possible’, intervening in culture, or ‘cultural engineering’ as he calls it, might be a form of culture violence in itself, and thus ethically highly problematic.³⁰ The rhetoric of many (conservative) German politicians has echoed this sentiment, suggesting that politics should not dictate families how to organise their private lives and arguing that state intervention, ‘leads to an infiltration of public authority into the private sphere (...) and the socialisation of the family’.³¹ I disagree with such proclamations.

Chapter 3 has highlighted that, in Germany as elsewhere, social policy legislation has always incentivised certain ways of life and certain family constellations over others. Given that it is one of the central tasks of modern welfare democracies to alleviate structural inequalities through social policy legislation and given that the German

²⁷ According to Galtung, there are three inter-related forms of violence - *personal*, *structural* and *cultural* violence. While personal violence refers to instances of direct harm inflicted from one person onto another, structural violence refers to the systemic exploitation by one *class of people* over another. Galtung, Johan (1975) *Peace: Research, Education, Action. Essays in Peace Research*. Copenhagen: Ejlers 79-80.

²⁸ Galtung, Johan (1990) "Cultural Violence." *Journal of Peace Research*. vol. 27(3): 291-305. 291-92.

²⁹ Loc. cit. Confortini and Caprioli are among the scholars who have argued that Galtung’s concept of structural violence can, and should be applied to gender inequality. See: Caprioli, Mary (2005) "Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly*. vol. 49(2): 161-78. ; Confortini, Catia C. (2006) "Galtung, Violence, and Gender: The Case for a Peace Studies/Feminism Alliance." *Peace & Change*. vol. 31(3): 333-67. Caprioli posits that all four components of Galtung’s structural violence concept - exploitation, penetration, fragmentation and marginalisation (see Galtung, 1975, pp. 264–65) – apply to social gender hierarchies too. Caprioli, "The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict", 164. Moreover, she argues that, ‘structural violence is created and sustained by cultural norms.’ loc. cit.

³⁰ Galtung, "Cultural Violence", 301.

³¹ Udo di Fabio (former judge of the German constitutional court) cited in Lachmann, Günter (2002) "Lufthoheit über Kinderbetten." *Welt am Sonntag*. 10.11. 2002. Available from: <http://perma.cc/4SFX-QGNB>. Accessed: 29.10. 2014. See also: Phoenix, *Debatte zum Betreuungsgeld: VOR ORT Deutscher Bundestag vom 29.06.2012*.

parliament has a constitutional obligation to take active steps toward the eradication of existing instances of gender discrimination, it is not only inevitable but also indispensable that such policies should also have an impact on the cultural environment. This need not be problematic. In Germany, as Pfau-Effinger points out, 'the majority of the population' favours 'an intervening welfare state which diminishes social inequality'.³²

The claims that 'governments play an important role in creating the right policy framework' for gender equality and that state institutions are instruments capable of alleviating gender discrimination are not new.³³ However, in practice, the effect of social policy on culture and on the normative beliefs of citizens has often been overlooked. Moreover, both politicians and citizens often become too impatient with the slow outcomes of social and economic policy reforms. Attitude change as a result of political change is gradual at best, particularly when attitudes relate to gender.

Nevertheless, at the end of my three years of research, I am somewhat more optimistic about the future of gender equality in Germany than I was when I began work on this thesis. What was once cast aside as 'fuss' by the highest political representative in the country has now become a subject area important enough to create a political stalemate. Moreover, many recent developments such as the introduction of quotas for women on boards of listed companies indicate that the German government no longer shies away from progressive policy legislation that actively tackles gender inequality. These and other policies of recent years are only a first small step on a long path toward a truly progressive welfare state regime, which, in the light of social realities, would promote conditions in which men and women are equal and equally capable of assuming responsibilities in the labour market and at home. As Chzhen observes, the crucial task for (German) policy makers is to formulate and promote a dual-earner-dual-carer welfare state framework.³⁴ A comprehensive reform strategy to this effect is still missing in

³² Pfau-Effinger, "Culture and Welfare State Policies", 11.

³³ See for example: Hausmann, Ricardo, Tyson, Laura D. and Zahidi, Saadia (2011) "The Global Gender Gap Report 2011." Geneva: World Economic Forum.; Seemann, Birgit (1996) *Feministische Staatstheorie*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. 54. Ostendorf (1999) cited by Henninger and Ostendorf, *Die politische Steuerung des Geschlechterregimes. Beiträge zur Theorie politischer Institutionen*, 19.

³⁴ Chzhen, Yekaterina (2010) *Gender Differences in Earnings and Occupational Attainment in Europe*. Doctoral Thesis. Submitted to the Department of Social Policy and Work. University of York. 19. See also:

Germany and there is potential for many setbacks. But if future governments recognise that gender policies have an effect on women's participation in public life – not least because they strengthen cultural norms about who should participate – then Germany might, in future, arrive at a situation in which 'genuine political equality (...) in all spheres of public life'³⁵ has become a reality.

Hummelsheim, *Erwerbsbeteiligung von Müttern*, 24. Such a dual-earner-dual-carer welfare state model should also include institutional incentives for a greater involvement of men in previously female dominated domains.

³⁵ See introductory quote.

8 Appendix


8.1 Appendix for Chapter 1

Table 25 Proportion of Women in the German Bundestag 1949-2013

Election Year	Percentage of Women Elected
1949	6.8
1953	8.8
1957	9.2
1961	8.3
1965	6.9
1969	6.6
1972	5.8
1976	7.3
1980	8.5
1983	9.8
1987	15.4
1990	20.5
1994	26.2
1998	30.9
2002	32.8
2005	31.6
2009	32.6
2013*	35.7

Source: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung,
2011 *My calculations.

Figure 18 Proportion of Women in German State Parliaments



Source: Source: Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, (2012) "2. Atlas zur Gleichstellung von Frauen und Männern in Deutschland."

8.1.1 Why Gender Parity in Politics Matters

There are a number of reasons for why citizens, researchers, and policy makers should be troubled about inequality or underrepresentation in politics. First, in a pluralistic society, different opinions and view points should be incorporated in democratic decision-making to promote what Schlozman calls an ‘equal participation of interests.’¹ As one interviewee aptly put it,

‘Good politics arises only when many different life experiences influence the decision making process. If the life experiences of one sex are ignored, this leads to worse decisions being taken.’²

When certain sections of society disproportionately steer political processes, their views and opinions exert undue influence on political outcomes. This undermines democratic accountability and may ultimately lead to injustice and social tensions.³ Indeed, Schlozman writes that, ‘legitimizing democratic rule is among the most important reasons for wanting equal voice in democracy.’⁴ If crucial decisions regarding the governance of a country are made by individuals drawn from only a specific demographic (white, middle-class, elderly, male), it is likely that overt discrimination is taking place, that governments are less responsive to the needs of their population, and that the society is not being governed by the most able of its citizens.⁵ As such, ‘ensuring full membership in the polity’ and averting systematic and persistent imbalances in

¹ Schlozman and Verba, *The unheavenly chorus*, 98.

² Interview 20, SPD, Female, West German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Ja, und nur in einer Demokratie entsteht gute Politik, in denen möglichst viele Lebenserfahrungen in Entscheidungen einfließen. Und wenn also die Lebenserfahrung des einen Geschlechts ausgeblendet wird, dann sind die Entscheidungen schlechter.’

³ Burns, Lehman Schlozman and Verba, *The Private Roots of Public Action*, 24-25. Montgomery, "Women's Access to Political Power in Post-Communist Europe", 4. See also: Stokes, Wendy (2005) *Women in Contemporary Politics*. Malden: Polity Press. 3.

⁴ Schlozman and Verba, *The unheavenly chorus*, 100.

⁵ As Stoke argues, ‘the quality of input depends on who is included in the process, and it takes little imagination to see that the narrower the range of types of people, backgrounds, and experiences included, the narrower the vision of the policies.’ Stokes, *Women in Contemporary Politics*, 3.

participation and representation benefit 'both political equality and democratic performance.'⁶

In addition to the large body of literature on the importance of participation and representation of citizens of different classes, races, ethnicities, or religious groups,⁷ feminist scholars have sought to demonstrate why equal participation of *women* in politics matters.⁸ Their various positions have been summarised by Sarah Childs as the 'justice argument', the 'substantive argument', 'the style argument,' and the 'symbolic' argument.⁹ The justice argument, Stokes asserts, is the least controversial. It assumes that women and men are equally able and 'have an equal right ... to participate in public life.'¹⁰ Where this is not the case, the justice principle is violated and discrimination is likely taking place.¹¹ The substantive argument is rather more controversial because it suggests that women have particular views, interests, and opinions, which can only be represented by women.¹² While essentialist notions about specific male or female interests or abilities bear the risk of being turned into arguments against women's equal participation, it is difficult to deny that historically, women have tended to bring certain points of view to political processes which have differed from that of men. These different points of view stem from women's particular life experiences and their conventionally assigned fields of responsibility in society. These are often referred to as

⁶ Schlozman and Verba, *The unbeavenly chorus*, 98. Githens et al. 1994; Paxton et al. 2007; Waring et al. 2000 cited in Coffe and Bolzendahl, "Gender Differences in Political Participation", 319.

⁷ For a general discussion on inequality in politics and political participation, see for instance: Dalton and Klingemann, *The Oxford handbook of political behavior*. Schlozman and Verba, *The unbeavenly chorus*. Bartels, Larry M. (2008) *Unequal Democracy: the political economy of the new gilded age*. New York: Russel Sage Foundation.

⁸ See for example: Phillips, Anne (1993) *Democracy and Difference*. Lovenduski, "Sex equality and the rules of the game". Mansbridge, Jane (1999) "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 'Yes!'" *The Journal of Politics*. vol. 61(3): 628-57.

⁹ Childs, Sarah (2002) "Concepts of Representation and the Passage of the Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) Bill." *The Journal of Legislative Studies*. vol. 8(3): 90-108. 94. See also: Stokes, *Women in Contemporary Politics*, 22.

¹⁰ Stokes, *Women in Contemporary Politics*, 22.

¹¹ Phillips, Anne (1995) *The Politics of Presence: The Political Representation of Gender, Ethnicity, and Race*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 62–3. Kessel argues that in many Western countries, gender inequality is in fact not seen primarily as an issue of injustice, but rather as a problem of economic re-distribution or of market dynamics. Kessel, "Wandel und Kontinuität von Geschlechterrollen in Deutschland", 29.

¹² See for example: Campbell on gendered issue preferences in Britain Campbell, "Gender, Ideology and Issue Preference".

‘women’s issues’ and typically concern family and care work, reproductive rights, or education.¹³ The very fact that such policy concerns are termed ‘women’s issues’ demonstrates their marginal place in the political discourse. According to proponents of the ‘style argument,’ women moreover have a specific way of ‘doing politics,’ which is typically less aggressive, more consensual, and more consensus-driven than men’s.¹⁴ Proponents of the style argument believe that greater participation of women will enhance politics by counterbalancing male behaviour. Many contemporary proponents for women’s equal participation will shy away from this line of argument, however, as it risks reproducing the stereotypes that have excluded women from politics in first place. Finally, the symbolic argument states ‘that the presence of women is important for symbolic reasons.’¹⁵ As Childs elaborates, ‘it demonstrates that women are equally capable of participating in politics and enhances the legitimacy of political institutions.’¹⁶

¹³ See for example: Phillips, *The Politics of Presence*.

¹⁴ Stokes, *Women in Contemporary Politics*, 22.

¹⁵ Childs, "Concepts of Representation", 94.

¹⁶ Loc. cit.

8.2 Appendix for Chapter 2

8.2.1 Methodological Information on the Collection of Qualitative Data

I conducted 21 in-depth interviews with German politicians and civil servants in the course of my research. Representatives of all major German parties, male and female, and politicians from the new and old federal states were equally represented among the interviewees. With the exception of one telephone interview, all interviews were conducted face-to-face. The interviews were semi-structured based on a catalogue of questions, which slightly varied according to whether the interviewees held a political office at the time of unification, whether they were from the new or old federal states, or whether they had lived in the GDR.

The interviews were usually split into three parts. In the first part, respondents were asked about their personal motivation for entering politics, their understanding of political participation, and their personal views, experiences, and future ambitions as politicians. The second part of the interview focused on the interviewees' thoughts and experiences on women in politics. Questions in this section ranged from inquiring after the reasons for women's comparatively low rate of participation in formal politics in Germany, to politicians' own experiences with sexism during their time in office. The second section of the interview also included questions on perceived differences between MPs from the old and new federal states. In the final section of the interview, respondents were asked about specific policies and positive discrimination measures, such as the adoption of party internal gender quotas, the controversial debates around the possible introduction of gender quotas in the German business sector, or the successful introduction of childcare benefit payments (*Betreuungsgeld*) to parents of small children. A catalogue of my main interview questions is appended to this section. The length of the interviews ranged from 35 to just over 60 minutes.

Although the interview sample is made up of an equal number of men and women from East and West Germany representing each of the main German parties, the sample is not representative. Interviewees were drawn disproportionately from the Bundestag select

committee for Family, Seniors, Women, and the Youth. Any policies regarding gender equality and family policies are discussed and evaluated in this committee. The rationale for choosing my interview participants in this way was that these individuals would be more likely to agree to an interview relating to my field of study. However, their views and opinions are likely to be both more knowledgeable and more opinionated than that of the average German MP. Moreover, these MPs are also likely to have more experience in answering sensitive questions relating to women and gender concerns.

A second criterion on which I based the selection of potential interviewees was whether individuals were politically active at the time of unification or whether they had special knowledge on political participation in the former Democratic Republic. Among others, I interviewed the Federal Government Commissioner for the New Federal States at the Federal Ministry of the Interior as well as two members of the State Parliament of Saxony in addition to two members of the Left Party (*Die Linke*) who were members of the SED prior to unification. Finally, I also wrote to the members of parliament of my home constituency Dresden who had no special knowledge on women or gender issues, but who were likely to agree to an interview in their capacities as acting MPs for my constituency.

Overall, I contacted 49 potential interview partners by letter and email, 22 of which agreed to participate (see Table 27). One interviewee dropped out on short notice.

Table 26 List of Interviewees by Party, Sex, and Region

Interview Number	Party	Sex	East/West	Date of Interview	Place of Interview
Interview 1	n.a.	Male	West	23.08.2012	Berlin
Interview 2	n.a.	Male	West	23.08.2012	Berlin
Interview 3	SPD	Female	West	10.06.2013	Berlin
Interview 4	CDU	Male	West	11.06.2013	Berlin
Interview 5	Greens	Female	East	12.06.2013	Berlin
Interview 6	FDP	Male	East	12.06.2013	Berlin
Interview 7	FDP	Female	West	13.06.2013	Berlin
Interview 8	Greens	Male	West	13.06.2013	Berlin
Interview 9	CDU	Female	East	13.06.2013	Berlin
Interview 10	FDP	Female	West	13.06.2013	Berlin
Interview 11	CSU	Male	West	14.06.2013	Berlin
Interview 12	CDU	Male	East	14.06.2013	Berlin
Interview 13	Left Party	Female	East	15.06.2013	Dresden
Interview 14	n.a.	Female	West	17.06.2013	Telephone Interview
Interview 15	CDU	Male	East	19.06.2013	Dresden
Interview 16	SPD	Female	East	20.06.2013	Dresden
Interview 17	Left Party	Female	East	20.06.2013	Dresden
Interview 18	SPD	Female	West	24.06.2013	Berlin
Interview 19	Left Party	Male	East	24.06.2013	Berlin
Interview 20	SPD	Female	West	09.09.2013	Berlin
Interview 21	CDU	Female	West	09.09.2013	Berlin

Table 27 Number of Interviews by Party, Sex, and Region

	East (10)		West (11)		Total
	Women	Men	Women	Men	
CDU/CSU	1	2	1	2	6
SPD	1		3		4
Greens	1			1	2
Left	2	1			3
FDP		1	2		3
No Affiliation			1	2	3
Total					21

The contact letter stated that I was interested in the topic of women and political participation in unified Germany, but gave no further information on my research to avoid priming. Two of the 22 interviewees requested to be sent lead questions prior to the interview.

The fact that I was a female student with an expressed academic interest in women's political participation will have certainly influenced the answers given to me by the interviewees (research has documented that survey participants are likely to be influenced in their responses on gender sensitive questions by the sex of the person conducting the interview). While I got the impression that several of my male interviewees framed their answers in a more careful way, I also felt that interviews with female politicians were more personal and authentic, especially so if the interviewees were themselves from East Germany.

All of the interviews were recorded with the permission of the interviewee. Transcripts of all interviews are available upon request. While most of the interviewees were happy for their names to be cited in my research, several individuals preferred not to have their full names mentioned. For the sake of consistency, all interviews therefore appear in this thesis in an anonymised format, stating the interview number, the interviewee's sex and region of birth (East – West), party affiliation, as well as the year the interview was conducted. A list of the full names and positions of interviewees has been submitted to the examiners on a separate document.

8.2.2 Catalogue of Interview Questions

Part I

Politischer Werdegang - *Political Career*

- Was bedeutet für Sie politische Partizipation?
How would you define political participation?
- Was waren Ihre Beweggründe, einer politischen Partei beizutreten?
What were your motivations for joining a political party?
- Warum haben Sie sich für eine Mitgliedschaft gerade in Ihrer Partei entschieden?
Why did you decide to join your Party?
- Hatten/haben Sie einen politischen Mentor oder gab es Parteikollegen, die Sie in besonderer Weise unterstützt haben?
Did you have a political mentor at the time or did you have a party colleague who particularly supported you?
- Haben/hatten Sie ein politisches Vor- bzw. Leitbild? Wenn ja, welches?
Do you/did you have a political role model? If so, who?
- Welche (Karriere-) Ziele verfolgen Sie mit Hinblick auf Ihre politische Laufbahn?
What are your political ambitions for the future?

Part II

Participation and Political Life - *Partizipation, Politikleben und -alltag*

- Was ist Ihrer Meinung nach der entscheidende Grund für die momentan vergleichsweise niedrigere Beteiligung von Frauen in der institutionellen Politik?
What, in your opinion, are the main reasons for women's comparatively lower participation in institutional politics?
- In den 90er Jahren vertrat die Politikwissenschaftlerin Eva Kreisky die These, dass die Politik ein Männerclub sei, der auf männlichen Netzwerken bestehe und auf männlichen Verhaltensmustern basiere. Würden Sie aufgrund Ihrer bisherigen Erfahrungen im Bundestag dieser Einschätzung zustimmen oder widersprechen? Wenn JA: Haben Sie Beispiele dafür?

Eva Kreisky argued in the 1990s that politics is a 'men's club' which consists of male networks and male patterns of behaviour. Based on your own experiences, would you agree or disagree with this assessment?

- Ein gängiges Argument für eine höhere Repräsentation von Frauen in Parlamenten ist, dass Frauen eine ‚andere‘ politische Meinung vertreten als Männer oder einen ‚anderen Politikstil‘ verkörpern. Können Sie anhand eines Beispiels erläutern, ob diese Einschätzung Ihrer Meinung nach auch auf Frauen im heutigen Deutschen Bundestag zutrifft?
A common argument in favour of more representation of women in parliament is that women contribute different views to politics and that they do politics in a different way. In your opinion, does this argument also apply to the German Bundestag?
- Gab oder gibt es Ihrer Meinung nach parteiübergreifende Haltungen von weiblichen Abgeordneten zu frauenpolitischen Themen (wie zum Beispiel dem Betreuungsgeld oder der Quotenregelung) oder spielt die Parteidisziplin hier eine größere Rolle?
Do or did female MPs support certain issues across party boundaries (for example, with regards to family policies or quotas for women) or is party discipline more important?
- Im Januar dieses Jahres hat ein „Stern“- Artikel über anzügliche Bemerkungen des FDP Spitzenpolitikers Rainer Brüderle gegenüber einer jungen Journalistin eine deutschlandweite Debatte über Sexismus ausgelöst. Waren Sie in Ihrer politischen Laufbahn selbst schon einmal anzüglichen Bemerkungen oder ähnlich unangenehmen Situationen ausgesetzt?
In January of this year, a Stern article reported on improper advances made by leading FDP candidate Rainer Brüderle toward a young female journalist. This triggered a national debate on sexism. Have you ever experiences instances of sexism in your political career?
- Haben Sie, im Umgang mit Wählern Ihres eigenen Wahlkreises, den Eindruck, dass sich Frauen für andere Themen oder generell weniger für Politik interessieren als Männer?
When talking to your constituents, do you ever have the feeling that women are particularly interested in certain issues or that they are less interested in politics altogether?

Ost/West - East/West

- In den 90er Jahren wurden Frauen und vor allem Politikerinnen aus den alten und neuen Bundesländern oft als ‚ungleiche Schwestern‘ bezeichnet. Würden Sie aufgrund Ihrer Erfahrungen dieser Einschätzung zustimmen? Wenn Ja: Woran macht sich die ‚Ungleichheit‘ bemerkbar?
In the 1990s, women and female politicians from the new and old federal states were often called 'unequal sisters'. Based on your own experiences, would you agree with this assessment? If so, what are the markers of this difference?

- Gibt es Ihrer Meinung nach Unterschiede (z.B. im Auftreten, Argumentieren oder in der Schwerpunktsetzung, in Verhaltensformen, oder im Kommunikationsstil) zwischen Bundestagsabgeordneten alter und neuer Bundesländer? Wenn ja: haben Sie dafür Beispiele?
In your opinion, are there differences (such as in demeanour, style of speaking, or issue preferences) between parliamentarians from the new and old federal states? If so, could you give examples of this?
- Haben Sie das Gefühl, dass Ihre Herkunft aus Ostdeutschland im Politikalltag des Bundestages eine Rolle spielt?
Do you feel as though your background (coming from East Germany) matters in your political career?
- Wie erklären Sie sich, dass in der DDR Frauen zwar in fast gleichem Umfang wie Männer in den Arbeitsmarkt integriert wurden, auf allen politischen Ebenen jedoch deutlich unterrepräsentiert waren?
What do you think are the reasons that women in the GDR participated in equal numbers to men in the labour market, but were still underrepresented in GDR politics?

Part III

Gleichstellungsmaßnahmen- und Familienpolitik - *Gender Equality and family- policies*

- Ihre Partei hat eine überaus fortschrittliche innerparteiliche Frauenquote von 50 Prozent/30 per cent. Gibt es in der Partei auch kritische Stimmen zu einer solchen Quote?
Your party has /has not implemented a quota for women in party positions? Is there any criticism in your party about such this policy?
- Weitaus weniger Frauen als Männer sind Mitglieder in deutschen Parteien. Verfolgt die Linke bestimmte Maßnahmen, um wieder mehr Frauen in die Partei zu bringen?
German parties have far fewer female members than male members. Is your party pursuing any measures to increase its female membership?
- Anfang dieses Jahres wurde trotz vieler kritischer Stimmen aus der Bevölkerung und von Experten das Betreuungsgeld eingeführt. Warum konnte das Betreuungsgeld trotz großer Opposition den Bundestag passieren?
Despite much criticism from the public and experts, the cash-for-care subsidy was passed in parliament earlier this year. Why did the policy pass in the face of such vehement criticism?
- Im April dieses Jahres ist die Einführung einer gesetzlichen Quote für Frauen in den Aufsichtsräten von Börsenunternehmen gescheitert. Warum wurde die Quote trotz großer Zustimmung, selbst von Vertretern der CDU/CSU, dann doch abgelehnt?

In April of this year, the introduction of quotas for women in listed companies failed, even though many members of the CDU/CSU seemed to be in favour of it. In your opinion, why was the policy unsuccessful?

- Die Frauenministerin Kristina Schröder und andere Mitglieder der CDU/CSU Fraktion haben sich in der Vergangenheit von dem Begriff ‚Feminismus‘ distanziert und ihn als Kampfbegriff abgelehnt. Was verstehen Sie unter ‚Feminismus‘ und wie stehen sie dazu?
- *Minister for Women Kristina Schröder and other members of the CDU/CSU have rejected the term ‘feminism’ in the past on the grounds that it was antagonising. How would you define ‘feminism’?*
- Simone de Beauvoir hat die berühmte These aufgestellt, dass wir nicht als Frau oder Mann geboren sind, sondern dass erst unsere Gesellschaft uns dazu macht. Stimmen Sie dieser These zu?
- *Simone de Beauvoir has famously argued that ‘one is not born a woman but rather becomes a woman.’ Would you agree with this claim?*

8.2.3 Feminism and Feminist Political Thought

In its broadest sense, feminist political thought is a state of political consciousness.¹ It is a critical school of thought, which considers the arguments and ideologies of mainstream political science and highlights how they may justify or reinforce gender discrimination.² Some feminist theorists have argued that gender biases in political science are so fundamental, that new frameworks and approaches must be formulated to replace them. The ambition to re-invent political science is characteristic particularly of early feminist political science scholarship. However, the majority of feminist scholars now regard mainstream political theory as transformable. Core ideas and analytical approaches can, they argue, inform feminist scholarship and in turn add a gender perspective to mainstream theories and concepts.³ I endorse this latter, integrationist position. As Orloff argues, it is 'more fruitful to directly engage the conceptual frameworks of mainstream literature and propose amendments that will reflect what is already known about gender relations and the state.'⁴ The alternative of substituting political theory risks the exclusion of feminist work from the scholarly discourse. It seems removed from a

¹ Segal 2000, cited in Adams, Eike, Del Busso, Liliana, Foster, Nena, Majumdar, Anamika, Marzano, Lisa and Papadima, Maria (2007) "Being young feminists: Discussions and (dis)contents." *Feminism & Psychology*. vol. 17(3): 291-94. 292.; Thiessen, Barbara (2010). "Feminismus: Differenzen und Kontroversen." In: Becker, Ruth and Kortendiek, Beate. *Handbuch Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung. Theorie, Methoden, Empirie*. Wiesbaden: Springer. 37-44. 38. See also: Bryson, Valerie (1992) *Feminist political theory: an introduction*. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1. As Randall remarks, 'it is hardly possible to specify a core of beliefs that would not be contested by at least some of those who call themselves feminists'. Randall, Vicky (1991) "Feminism and Political Analysis." *Political Studies*. vol. 39: 513-32. 516. Liberal feminism, radical feminism, critical feminism, standpoint feminism, empirical feminism, postmodern feminism, poststructuralist feminism, cultural feminism, analytical feminism, difference feminism, normative feminism, and postcolonial feminism are among the many - at times overlapping - feminisms 'whose respective approaches either embrace women, reject their existence altogether, invoke the categories of gender, sexuality, patriarchy, or masculinism, or wish to repudiate all of these on the basis of their socially constructed nature' Jarvis, D. S. L. (2000) *International relations and the challenge of postmodernism: defending the discipline*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 112.

² While feminist increasingly speak relevantly about men's as well as women's lives, the very fact that women have been for so long systematically disadvantaged, they argue, justifies that they are paid particular attention through feminist research Burns, Lehman Schlozman and Verba, *The Private Roots of Public Action*, 25-26..

³ Sainsbury, *Gender and welfare state regimes*, 2.

⁴ Orloff, "The Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States", 305.

genuine attempt to generate change and to improve the situation of women and men in our society (see also 8.2.4).⁵

German Feminist Thought

In Anglo-American academia, influential journals and textbook publications now increasingly include chapters and articles on feminism in their volumes.⁶ By contrast, feminist contributions to the field of German political science (*Politikwissenschaften*) have been marginal at best.⁷ This is partly a result of West Germany's second-wave feminist movement which was in its initial stages strongly anti-institutionalist in outlook.⁸ Only by the mid-1980s did German feminists begin to take a greater scholarly interest in the established institutions and political dynamics of the country.⁹ By that time, the seminal works of the likes of Elshtain, Pateman or Okin had already laid the groundwork for political feminist theory; German scholars have mainly built on their ideas since.¹⁰ Bar a small number of exceptions (such as Kreisky), many of the criticisms identified by German speaking feminist theorists are thus analogous to those in the Anglo-American canon. Despite a now growing body of research on German social, educational, cultural,

⁵ The integrationist project has been contested on the grounds that 'women's exclusion from the political is not contingent in the construction of politics, but is integrally bound up with it, if not one of its central premises and preconditions' Squires, *Gender in Political Theory*, 17-18.

⁶ Lent, Adam (1998) *New Political Thought: an Introduction*. London: Lawrence & Wishart; Eatwell, Roger and Wright, Anthony (1999) *Contemporary political ideologies*. London: Pinter; Heywood, *Politics*.

⁷ See for instance: Kreisky, Eva (1995). "Gegen "geschlechtshalbierte Wahrheiten". Feministische Kritik an der Politikwissenschaft im deutschsprachigen Raum." In: Kreisky, Eva and Sauer, Birgit. *Feministische Standpunkte in der Politikwissenschaft. Eine Einführung*. Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag. 28; Seemann, *Feministische Staatstheorie*, 17, 21.. There is a dearth of publications on feminist political theory in the German language over the past decade. Moreover, while many German feminists refer in their work to the contribution of English-speaking scholars, references to German feminists in the English speaking literature are rare.

⁸ Seemann, *Feministische Staatstheorie*, 26.

⁹ Braun, Kathrin (2000). "Politische Theorie und Politische Philosophie." In: Braun, Kathrin. *Feministische Perspektiven der Politikwissenschaft, Lehr- und Handbücher der Politikwissenschaft*. München: Oldenbourg. 1-19. 13-14.. The change in West German feminist positioning was partly caused by mounting pressures such as those presented by the decline of the welfare state (with the negative consequences this had particularly on women). The emerging green party was one of the major channels through which feminists would seek to infiltrate the political system.

¹⁰ Loc. cit.

or welfare policy - commonly labelled *Frauenforschung* (women's research) or *Geschlechterforschung* (gender research)¹¹ - a scholarly deficit arguably persists.

8.2.4 Feminist Research and Methodology

My work has been informed by feminist political thought (see section 8.2.3 for a short discussion of the term). This body of literature is often (and sometimes justifiably) criticised or dismissed for being too ideologically driven or too narrowly focused on patriarchy or gender discrimination.¹² Esping-Andersen asserts that being an advocate of gender equality need not be motivated by feminism at all. By adopting 'a rational action perspective that aims, simply to identify superior pareto outcomes,' he argues, one arrives at 'the same kinds of precepts and conclusions' as feminists.¹³ I am mindful of the fact that the feminist label is likely to discourage some readers from engaging with my work. Nevertheless, I believe it important and indeed imperative to credit feminist scholarship in this thesis not only for making gender inequality a focus of scientific analysis, but also for introducing important analytical lenses to the study of inequality which have traditionally been neglected in the mainstream political science literature.

Among them, three have been of particular import to my work: firstly, feminist thought has highlighted the need to differentiate between biological sex and the social meanings attributed to it; secondly, it has questioned the common distinction drawn between the public sphere of politics and economics and the private sphere of family and household (see 8.2.6 in the appendix); and thirdly, feminist thought has stressed the need to critically reflect upon conventional research methods, theories, and approaches. While some argue that research informed by feminism may for these very reasons 'sit uneasily with some of the social-scientific conventions that have come to circumscribe the study of politics,'¹⁴ it

¹¹ See for instance: Henninger and Ostendorf, *Die politische Steuerung des Geschlechterregimes. Beiträge zur Theorie politischer Institutionen*.

¹² Esping-Andersen, *The Incomplete Revolution*, 3.

¹³ Loc. cit. For instance, higher levels of gender equality have been linked to higher economic growth, peace and prosperity across different societies. (CEC 2006a: Introduction).⁷ Lewis, *Work-Family Balance, Gender and Policy*, 14.

¹⁴ Bleiker, "'We don't Need Another Hero'", 32. Political science operates within the positivist research tradition. Its objective is to acquire 'scientific,' testable, impartial knowledge by building on established

is, as Orloff points out, both possible and desirable to do 'scientific' feminist research which 'directly engage[s] the conceptual frameworks of mainstream literature.'¹⁵

Like any critical researcher, feminists question 'the conventions of academic disciplines'¹⁶ and 'identify, scrutinise and criticise the selective criteria and the value judgements that enter [their] scientific analysis.'¹⁷ It is true that on the whole, feminist scholars tend to prefer qualitative research in the form of face-to-face in-depth interviews, ethnographic research, or critical analyses of academic, literary, and popular media sources.¹⁸ This is because qualitative research allows for a more open-ended process of investigation. The criticism levelled against qualitative research is that it often lacks firm standards of replicability, which makes it appear less scientific in an increasingly arduous academic environment.¹⁹

The predicament of using quantitative methods for feminist research on the other hand lies in the fact that often, quantitative datasets simply do not include the sort of information needed to meaningfully explore phenomena such as gender inequality.²⁰ The categories and variables included in the analysis must be defined before the data are

theories and methodologies. Some feminist scholars argue that no truly 'objective' knowledge exists, that neither theories nor research methods can be value-free Sapiro, "Feminist Studies and Political Science", 72. The insight gained by any research project, they posit, suffers if the theoretical and methodological partiality of the researcher remains unaccounted for. Randall, "Feminism and Political Analysis", 521.

¹⁵ Orloff, "The Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States", 305.

¹⁶ Krook and Squires, "Gender Quotas in British Politics", 45-46. Nagy Hesse-Biber, Sharlene and Leavy, Patricia (2007). "An Invitation to Feminist Research." In: Nagy Hesse-Biber, Sharlene and Leavy, Patricia. *Feminist Research Practice. A Primer*. London: SAGE Publications. 1-27. 4. Krook and Squires, "Gender Quotas in British Politics".

¹⁷ Frevert, *Women in German History*, 4. Interestingly, there are hardly any accounts of German feminist arguments in the English canon. Besides the scarcity of German material, perhaps the intellectual approach chosen by many German feminist researchers is partly to blame. Whereas English-speaking feminist scholars seem to direct their work at broad and diverse audience, German feminist scholars tend to converse only within a confined intellectual circle.

¹⁸ This is partly because research informed by feminist theory places particular emphasis on people's subjective experiences. Randall, "Feminism and Political Analysis", 520.

¹⁹ Moravcsik argues that the lack of precision in citation techniques, that is, the use of 'imprecise, vague, and secondary, rather than precise, annotated, and primary' citations has pushed political science into a 'self-imposed crisis'. Moravcsik, Andrew (2010) "Active Citation: A Precondition for Replicable Qualitative Research." *Political Science and Politics*. vol. 43(1): 29-35. 29.

²⁰ Geißel, "Partizipation im Kontext", 20.

collected.²¹ Moreover, quantitative analysis operates with finite numerical values.²² As Galtung points out, 'the either-or character of mathematical thought makes it an exciting game, but as a model for a highly dialectic human, social and world reality it is far from adequate.'²³ Over-generalisation and simplification of complex social processes cannot, by design, be avoided.

Despite these criticisms, it seems unwise that feminist research should discard the value of quantitative methods altogether. One of their most obvious advantages is that they can provide statistical substantiation for different dimensions of gender inequality that feminist researchers seek to highlight. Moreover, data from national and cross-national surveys that capture citizens beliefs about gender roles can be useful in providing a general idea and insight into some of the attitudes and views held by citizens on the aggregate.²⁴ Analysis of this data may not only facilitate the dissemination of feminist arguments to those sceptical of feminist research, it can also help identify 'the best course of action in implementing social change.'²⁵ Feminist scholars such as Jayaratne, have for a long time advocated the use of qualitative data in conjunction with quantitative resources, arguing that the appropriate use of both methods 'can help the feminist community in achieving its goals more effectively than the use of either qualitative or quantitative methods alone.'²⁶

Scientific research is often regarded as a process from formulating a research hypothesis to testing of scientific data (or evidence) to the formulation of scientific facts. In her lecture series on the history of science at Harvard University, Professor Sarah Richardson

²¹ Miner, Kathi N., Jayaratne, Toby, Personen, Amanda and Zurbrügg, Lauren (2012). "Using Survey Research as a Quantitative Method for Feminist Social Change." In: Nagy Hesse-Biber, Sharlene. *Feminist Research: Theory and Praxis*. London: SAGE. 237-63. 239.

²² Lovenduski, Joni (1998) "Gendering Research in Political Science." *Annual Review Political Science*. vol. 1: 333-56. 338. The World Value Survey, for example, provides merely five relevant questions on gender attitudes.

²³ Galtung, "Cultural Violence", 301.

²⁴ Baber and Tucker, "A New Approach to Measuring Attitudes Toward Gender", 459.

²⁵ Miner, Jayaratne, Personen and Zurbrügg, "Using Survey Research", 243.

²⁶ Jayaratne, Toby (1983). "The value of quantitative methodology for feminist research." In: Bowles, Gloria and Duelli Klein, Renate. *Theories of women's studies*. London: Routledge. 140-62. 141. See also: King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O. and Verba, Sidney (1994) *Designing social inquiry: scientific inference in qualitative research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Thornton Dill and Kohlman, "Intersectionality", 163.

argues that there is an inferential gap between scientific evidence and theory, which is filled by the researcher's explicit and implicit assumptions about the world. Overlooking that science is in this way a social practice (rather than a process from which the researcher can remove herself entirely), results in what Richardson calls 'scientific under-determination.'²⁷ The intention behind Richardson's observation is, I believe, not to discard the objective of scientific analysis (to be impartial, testable, and replicable), but to reflect upon one's own understanding of, and approach to, research, which is always undertaken in specific historical, cultural, and political contexts.

8.2.5 Difference and Feminist Constructivism

The question of how much significance should be attributed to biological differences between the sexes is one of - if not the - most controversial issue which fuels debates on gender equality.²⁸ Sapiro has usefully summarised these differences as follows,

It is certainly true that about half of the human species is born with at least one Y chromosome in the cells of its body and about half is not. The two halves differ physically in a number of respects. Most of those born without a Y chromosome are capable of bearing children and lactating for perhaps half the length of their lives. They have one more bone, fewer red blood cells, a greater ratio of fat to muscle, proportionally smaller shoulders and wider hips, smaller overall structure, higher pitched voices, and less susceptibility to a number of diseases that do those with a Y chromosome. Most of the physical differences between the two halves are differences in proportion. Most of the functional differences exist in the reproductive organs, which are extensions of the trunk of the body in those with a Y chromosome and are protected within an escament of muscle and bone in the trunk among those without.²⁹

²⁷ Richardson, Sarah (2014) *History of Science: Sex, Gender, and Evolution*. Spring Term Lecture Series at the Department of the History of Science: Harvard University.

²⁸ Indeed, sexual difference has long been contested even among feminists themselves. Maternalist feminist scholars, such as Pateman or Ruddick, have highlighted women's feminine values and have called for a type of politics that is guided by love, care, and compassion. In (West) Germany, for much of the 1970s and 80s, members of the so-called "mothers' movement" (*Mütterbewegung*) likewise championed the existence of female motherly qualities. See: Ruddick, Sara (1989) *Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace*. Boston: Beacon Press.

²⁹ Sapiro, *The Political Integration of Women*, 36.

Biologically deterministic arguments have been prevalent throughout history. As Frevert points out,

‘entire generations of medical practitioners endeavoured to prove that women were more excitable, capricious and sickly than men, and thus to deny them suitably for responsible roles in the labour market and in politics.’³⁰

Although the social and economic parameters of people’s lives have changed drastically over the past 100 years,³¹ women’s body functions still provide important justifications for assigning them ‘life-long responsibility for raising children and looking after the family household.’³²

I noted in the main text that a growing body of interdisciplinary research has been produced to show that the genetic differences between men and women are too small to provide sufficient explanations for the gender differences in social behaviour and social outcomes between the sexes.³³ As Fine suggests, our genes and hormones are not straightforward internal drivers that determine gendered behaviour. Rather, the relationship works in the opposite direction in that external stimuli in the environment can trigger neurological and hormonal changes.³⁴ From this point of view, ‘gender difference is the product of gender inequality, and not the other way around.’³⁵

Some feminists believe that ‘no universal biological essence of “sex” exists, but rather a complex system of potentials that are activated by various internal *and* external

³⁰ Frevert, *Women in German History*, 318.

³¹ For example, women now have fewer children on average and advances in technology have significantly reduced the time and effort required to complete most household tasks.

³² Frevert, *Women in German History*, 319. See also: West and Zimmerman, "Doing Gender", 128..

³³ For example, Goldstein finds that ‘the widely held notion that *testosterone* levels cause aggression has weak empirical support.’ Similarly, he rejects the claim ‘that *female* hormones make women more peaceful’ Goldstein, *War and gender*, 407. See also: On Peace, War, and Gender: A Challenge to Genetic Explanations, ed. Anne E. Hunter (New York: Feminist Press at CUNY, 1991)

³⁴ According to Fine, ‘the circuits of the brain are quite literally a product of our physical, social, and cultural environment, as well as your behaviour and thoughts.’ Fine, Cordelia (2010) *Delusions of Gender: the real science behind sex differences*. London: Icon. 87, 105.

³⁵ Kimmel (2008, 4) cited loc. cit.

influences.³⁶ Biology, by this logic, equips humans with different sets of abilities and skills, which are either suppressed or encouraged by cultural norms and other environmental factors.³⁷ Therefore, biology ought not to demarcate men's and women's place in society, nor justify the inscription of certain gender regimes in formal institutions.³⁸

All of the above reflections can be ascribed to what has been termed social constructionist or social/feminist constructivist thought (I use the two terms interchangeably). Although there is no single definition of social constructivism,³⁹ the term is likely to send shivers down the spines of political scientists who position themselves strongly in the positivist tradition. So as to not discourage readers from engaging with my research, a note of clarification seems necessary. Though my analysis draws on feminist social constructivist arguments, it is not the aim of my thesis to vindicate social constructivism as a universal theory for explaining political and social reality. Indeed, with the possible exception of the constructivist discourse in the school of international relations, there is no general theory of social constructivism, which would offer itself for such an endeavour.⁴⁰ Constructivists, as Locher and Prügl point out, much like feminists, 'subscribe to a diverse set of sometimes incompatible propositions' and disagree among themselves on 'core assumptions and philosophical foundations.'⁴¹ As such, 'constructivism remains more a philosophically and theoretically informed perspective on and approach to' the study of social processes rather than a fully-fledged political ideology.⁴² It is an approach that takes a critical stance toward knowledge, viewing our 'ways of understanding as historically and culturally relative,' and

³⁶ Goldstein, *War and gender*, 2.

³⁷ 'In fact, there is more difference between two individuals regardless of sex than there is between women and men on the average.' Frieze, Parsons, Johnson, Ruble and Zellman, *Women and Sex Roles*, 2. See also: Butler, *Gender trouble*.

³⁸ Connell, *Gender and Power*, 71.

³⁹ Burr, Vivien (2003) *Social Constructionism*. London: Routledge. 2.

⁴⁰ Ruggie, "The Social Constructivist Challenge", 856.

⁴¹ Locher, Birgit and Prügl, Elisabeth (2001) "Feminism and Constructivism. Worlds Apart or Sharing the Middle Ground?" *International Studies Quarterly*. vol. 45(1): 111-29. 114.

⁴² Ruggie, "The Social Constructivist Challenge", 856.

as ‘sustained by social processes.’⁴³ I believe that neither feminist nor social constructivist analysis is incompatible with the positivist tradition, nor with what are commonly understood to be scientific research methods. Hence, this thesis draws on social constructivism in so far as it analyses the meanings attached to gender roles, their possible political determinants, and their implications for women’s political engagement.

⁴³ As Burr explains, ‘therefore, what we regard as truth, which of course varies historically and cross-culturally, may be thought of as our current accepted ways of understanding the world.’ Burr, *Social Constructionism*, 4-5.

8.2.6 Public and Private

Second-wave feminists have raised important questions about the ways in which concerns traditionally associated to private life should matter to politics, and about whether the very distinction between public and private spheres can or should be maintained.⁴⁴ Feminist theorists have argued that enlightenment narratives and social contract theories inscribed the distinction between public and private spheres into the European social and political fabric.⁴⁵ As Hobson summarises,

‘male citizens were accorded rights and duties as rational beings capable of exercising them; women were codified as non-citizens outside the public sphere, set apart by their dependency, their lack of civil rights and political agency, and their relegation to the private world of the family and domestic life. Though women have gained many of the civil and political rights denied them in the past, the inequalities implicit in the demarcation between public and private remain.’⁴⁶

Büttner and Krell point out that the distinction between public and private spheres shapes not only the gendered patterns of social life, but also our understanding of scientific research, our scholarly interests and our research methods.⁴⁷ After all, Sapiro asks,

‘what would a “woman’s issue” be if the private world of the family and the public world of politics were not so split from each other or if men and women shared equally in both family and political concerns?’⁴⁸

Indeed, many issues associated with the private sphere, such as reproductive rights, childcare, domestic violence, or sexual abuse, have historically been neglected in political

⁴⁴ Phillips, Anne (1998) *Feminism & Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 7. See for example: Elshtain, *Women in social and political thought*. Okin, Susan Moller (1998). "Gender, the Public and the Private." In: Phillips, Anne. *Feminism & Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 116-38.

⁴⁵ See for example: Matthaei, Julie A. (1982) *An economic history of women in America: Women's work, the sexual division of labor, and the development of capitalism*. New York: Schocken. 10. Frevert, *Women in German History*. Or: Kreisky, "Feministische Kritik an der Politikwissenschaft", 38.

⁴⁶ Pateman, *The sexual contract*.

⁴⁷ Büttner and Krell 1991 cited in Seemann, *Feministische Staatstheorie*, 30.

⁴⁸ Sapiro, *The Political Integration of Women*, 7.

theory and political practice.⁴⁹ Particularly the division between paid labour and unpaid domestic work (the former a public, the latter a private activity), is seen as an underlying source for gender inequality. Many feminist scholars therefore argue that 'fundamental changes in the sexual division of labour' are an essential prerequisite for achieving equality between the sexes.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Einhorn, Barbara (2011). "Mass Dictatorship and Gender Politics: Is the Outcome Predictable?" In: Lim, Jie-Hyun and Petrone, Karen. *Gender politics and mass dictatorship : global perspectives of Mass dictatorship in the 20th Century*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 34-62. 42-43.; Lim, Jie-Hyun and Petrone, Karen (2011) *Gender politics and mass dictatorship: global perspectives of Mass dictatorship in the 20th Century*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 27.

⁵⁰ Lewis, *Work-Family Balance, Gender and Policy*, 1; Frevert, *Women in German History*, 5.

8.2.7 Gender Attitude Determinants

According to Bolzendahl and Myers, gender culture is the product of interest-based and exposure-based determinants. What follows is a brief literature review of these determinants. This review has informed parts of the statistical analysis in chapter 4, specifically, the choice of independent variables for the regression models.

Exposure-Based Determinants

Sociologists argue that our gender identities are shaped to a large extent by our social environment. The process by which individuals learn to acquire this identity, to behave like men and women, is described as *gender socialisation*.⁵¹ So-called ‘agencies of socialisation’ include family members (most importantly parents), friends, and teachers, as well as more broadly the mass media, popular music, film, Television and other social influences.⁵² Many believe that gender socialisation during the formative years of childhood and youth is particularly important.⁵³ From infancy, Ford argues, ‘girls and boys learn to differentiate between the sexes and act according to norms and expectations appropriate to their sex.’⁵⁴ Children are immediately include by their parents’

⁵¹ Lindsey, *Gender Roles*, 55. The process has also been described as sex-role acquisition Frieze, Parsons, Johnson, Ruble and Zellman, *Women and Sex Roles*, 107-10. Hofstede argues that ‘socialisation means that both girls and boys learn their place in society and, once they have learned it, the majority of them *want it that way*.’ Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences*, 298.

⁵² See Connell, *Gender and Power*, 33-34. Moen, Erickson and Dempster-McClain, "Intergenerational Transmission of Gender Attitudes". Bolzendahl and Myers, "Feminist Attitudes and Support for Gender Equality", 762. Holtz-Bacha and König-Reiling, *Warum nicht gleich? Wie die Medien mit Frauen in der Politik umgehen*, 13. Frieze, Parsons, Johnson, Ruble and Zellman, *Women and Sex Roles*, 109. Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences*, 280; Lindsey, *Gender Roles*, 56.

⁵³ In the process of attaining social knowledge, each child develops a social identity, which fits in with the cultural expectations and assumptions of its environment. Nissen, Ursula (2005). "Kindheit und Geschlecht - Eine fehlende Perspektive in der Forschung zur politischen Sozialisierung." In: Henninger, Annette and Ostendorf, Helga. *Die politische Steuerung des Geschlechterregimes. Beiträge zur Theorie politischer Institutionen*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 37-56. 40. See also: Vella, Francis (1994) "Gender Roles and Human Capital Investment: The Relationship between Traditional Attitudes and Female Labour Market Performance." *Economica*. vol. 61(242): 191-211. Inglehart and Norris, *Rising tide*, 38-40. Nissen, "Kindheit und Geschlecht".

⁵⁴ Ford, *Women and politics*, 98. This stage is also sometimes describes ad ‘primary socialisation’ which ‘allows the child to acquire necessary skills to fit into society, especially language learning and acceptable behaviour to function effectively in a variety of social situations.’ Lindsey, *Gender Roles*, 55. As Lindsey elaborates, ‘social control mechanisms that guarantee gender role compliance are often informal but very powerful,

behaviour through observational learning and imitation.⁵⁵ For example, it has been shown that children of working mothers hold more egalitarian views about gender roles in later life than children of housewives.

Cultural stereotypes are also created and reinforced in kindergartens,⁵⁶ schools⁵⁷ and even in career centres.⁵⁸ Researchers in the field of education and child development have found that cultural expectations and assumptions impact on children's self-assessment and subject-specific school performance.⁵⁹ Eccles and colleagues argue that in school as

such as ridicule, exclusion from peers, and loss of support from family and colleagues.' loc. cit. One does not have to look far for examples of such gender socialisation mechanisms: modern toy departments are segregated by aisles of pink and blue, 'where toys [for girls] revolve around beauty and domesticity, and ... toys [for boys] relate to building, action and aggression.' Sweet, Elizabeth (2012) "Guys and Dolls No More?" *The New York Times*. 21.12. 2012. Available from: <http://nyti.ms/1DKneec>. Accessed: 08.11. 2013. Lindsey too argues that, 'toys for girls encourage domesticity, interpersonal closeness, and social orientation. Boys receive more categories of toys, their toys are more complex and expensive, and they foster self-reliance and problem solving. Toys for boys are much more likely to be designed for leisure (race cars and trains); toys for girls are more likely to be designed for housework (ironing, cooking, sewing, cleaning) and beauty (hairstyling, cosmetics, glamorous clothing for dolls).' Lindsey, *Gender Roles*, 68.

⁵⁵ Frieze, Parsons, Johnson, Ruble and Zellman, *Women and Sex Roles*, 109. Parents also socialise their offspring more directly through positive reinforcement. Evidence from longitudinal studies show that parents attribute and evaluate their children's performance (such as in math or in sport) based on stereotypic notions of male and female strengths and weaknesses. Eccles, Jacquelynne S., Jacobs, Janis E. and Harold, Rena D. (1990) "Gender Role Stereotypes, Expectancy Effects, and Parents' Socialization of Gender Differences." *Journal of Social Issues*. vol. 46(2): 183-201. 183. In this way, 'parents' expectations become self-fulfilling prophecies.' Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences*, 300.

⁵⁶ Spörrle, Mark (2013) ""Das sind JUNGS!"" *ZEIT Online*. 08.01. 2013. Available from: <http://bit.ly/1vBnUDS>. Accessed: 09.01. 2013.

⁵⁷ Pritchard, Rosalind M.O. (2003). "Gender and Education in East Germany After Unification." In: Kolinsky, Eva and Nickel, Hildegard Maria. *Reinventing gender : women in Eastern Germany since unification*. London: Frank Cass. 78-99. 78. See also: Busch, Anne (2011) "Determinants of Occupational Gender Segregation: Work Values and Gender (A)Typical Preferences of Adolescents." *SFB 882 Working Paper Series From Heterogeneities to Inequalities*. vol. 2. 2.

⁵⁸ For example, career centres may target adolescent boys and girls differently with gender-segregated career options. See Ostendorf, Helga (2005). "Politische Steuerung durch Symbole und Verfahrensweisen - Die Mädchenpolitik der Berufsberatung." In: Henninger, Annette and Ostendorf, Helga. *Die politische Steuerung des Geschlechterregimes*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 116-38.

⁵⁹ For instance, self-assessment in maths ability differs significantly among German students according to sex, while in countries such as New Zealand and Iceland, girls and young women fare better than boys in math and science subjects. Jahnke-Klein, Sylvia (2005). "Chancengleichheit für Mädchen und Jungen im mathematisch-naturwissenschaftlichen Unterricht." In: Hellmich, F. *Lehren und Lernen nach IGLU - Grundschulunterricht heute*. Oldenburg: Didaktisches Zentrum. 117-32. However, gender differences in performance among German students have decreased noticeably over the past decade. Many argue that given a gender-neutral socialisation, there would exist no statistically significant performance difference between the sexes Becker, Lisa (2012) *Geschlechtergerechtigkeit: Mädchen lernen besser, Jungen steigen auf*. Frankfurt. There is also an influential study from America which shows that female undergraduate students perform worse at quantitative tests when their gender identity is activated. See Shih, Margaret, Pittinsky, Todd L. and

in later life, 'gender differences in self-perceptions of their abilities may lead females and males to select different educational training programs, and to aspire to different occupations.'⁶⁰ But even though schools themselves might be agents of traditional gender socialisation, education in general is usually positively correlated with individuals' egalitarian gender attitudes. The higher the level of education attained among women and men, the more egalitarian/non-traditional the sex attitudes.⁶¹ Indeed, Banaszak argues that, 'women's access to higher education is *the most important structural variable* relating to pro-feminist support by men and women.'⁶² On the other hand Brewster et al. find that the correlation between education level and egalitarian gender attitudes is much weaker for younger cohorts.⁶³ While there is a tendency in the socialisation literature to focus on the formative childhood years, it is important to note, therefore, as Marsh remarks in his seminal work on political socialisation, that the process of forming attitudes and opinions does not end with this period in a person's life.⁶⁴

Another exposure based determinant or agent of socialisation is the media (television, newspapers, the internet, film, radio, and advertising). The media impact on our understanding of current affairs in politics and society as well as our understanding of who and what matters,⁶⁵ providing not only information, but images, and role models which help define social norms and against which consumers measure their own sense of reality.⁶⁶ Heavy television viewing, research has found, 'is strongly associated with traditional and stereotyped gender views' with children being especially receptive and thus vulnerable.⁶⁷ As Holtz-Bacha and colleagues argue in their research on gender and the German media, the underrepresentation, marginalisation, and trivialisation of women

Ambady, Nalini (1999) "Sterotype Susceptibility: Identity Salience and Shifts in Quantitative Performance." *Psychological Science*. vol. 10(1): 80-83.

⁶⁰ Eccles, Jacobs and Harold, "Gender Role Stereotypes", 184.

⁶¹ Davis and Greenstein, "Gender Ideology", 94.

⁶² Banaszak and Plutzer, "Contextual Determinants of Feminist Attitudes", 156. *emphasis added*

⁶³ Brewster and Padavic, "Change in Gender-Ideology".

⁶⁴ Marsh, "Political Socialization", 456.

⁶⁵ Holtz-Bacha and König-Reiling, *Warum nicht gleich? Wie die Medien mit Frauen in der Politik umgehen*, 13.

⁶⁶ Kellner, Douglas (1995) *Media Culture: Cultural Studies, Identity and Politics Between the modern and the postmodern*. New York: Routledge. 1.

⁶⁷ Lindsey, *Gender Roles*, 73.

in media coverage of the economy, politics, sports, and other areas of public interest, affect women's behaviour and their likelihood and willingness to make a career in public office.⁶⁸

A final exposure based determinant of gender attitudes identified in the literature is religiosity. Strong religious affiliation is said to reinforce traditional attitudes toward men and women. Religious texts often portray women as subordinate to men and as naturally caring, gentle, pure, and innocent. Moreover, many religions seek to regulate rules and norms around reproduction and sexuality. In doing so, Diehl argues, 'they tend to legitimize inequalities and hierarchical relationships between the sexes both within religious institutions and within broader society.'⁶⁹ While religions act as significant socialising instruments when they prescribe world-views, which assign men and women specific roles of responsibility, it is important to note that the magnitude of the effect of religiosity is dependent on the religion that is practised.⁷⁰ Moreover, with increasing secularisation in Western states, the impact exerted by religions on gender culture is believed to have lessened.⁷¹

Interest-Based Determinants

The most commonly cited interest-based determinant of gender attitudes is sex itself. In western democracies, women are usually considered to be somewhat more liberal in their gender role views than men. This is not surprising given the perception that women have

⁶⁸ Holtz-Bacha and König-Reiling, *Warum nicht gleich? Wie die Medien mit Frauen in der Politik umgehen*, 10-13. Although it remains difficult to distinguish the impact of the media from other environmental factors, it is nevertheless important to keep in mind that the media acts as an important intervening variable in the study of gender culture and the modern gender gap. Gauntlett, David (2008) *Media, Gender and Identity: An Introduction*. Oxon: Routledge. 1, 287.

⁶⁹ Brinkerhoff and MacKie (1985) cited in Diehl, Claudia, Koenig, Matthias and Ruckdeschel, Kerstin (2009) "Religiosity and gender equality: comparing natives and Muslim migrants in Germany." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. vol. 32(2): 278-301. 281.

⁷⁰ Seguino, "Religion's Impact on Gender Inequality". Bolzendahl and Myers, "Feminist Attitudes and Support for Gender Equality", 766. Davis and Greenstein, "Gender Ideology", 94.

⁷¹ But while Christianity is in decline in Germany, other faith communities are growing in numbers as a result of increased immigration from Turkey and the Middle East. New sets of moral codes and attitudes toward women have entered the public debate as a result. See: Rostock, Petra and Berghahn, Sabine (2008) "The ambivalent role of gender in redefining the German nation." *Ethnicities*. vol. 8(3): 345-64. 347.

more to gain from achieving gender equality than men. It is not always possible to clearly distinguish between interest- and exposure-based explanations of gender attitudes. Labour force participation, for example, arguably constitutes a combination of the two. In general, economic development, modernisation, and a high rate of female employment are among the most common exposure-based and statistically robust explanations for egalitarian gender attitudes.⁷²

Women's labour force participation is believed to foster egalitarian gender attitudes among women because it exposes them 'to discriminatory situations which in turn lead them to acknowledge inequality.'⁷³ More generally, working women also serve to dispel harmful 'myths about women's capabilities to perform in the work place.'⁷⁴ The attitudinal changes stemming from women's increased labour market participation and the distinct social welfare needs that working women are likely to have can amplify differences in gender attitudes between those women who work, and those who choose to stay at home.⁷⁵ This is one of the reasons why gender politics can be most contentious in countries where great strides have already been made in terms of increasing women's employment.⁷⁶ At the same time, however, it is clear that the causal relationship between female labour force participation and egalitarian gender attitudes is far from straightforward. While many scholars have argued that female employment leads to a more liberal gender culture, others (such as Pfau-Effinger and Hummelsheim) suggest

⁷² Bolzendahl and Myers, "Feminist Attitudes and Support for Gender Equality", 762-63; Inglehart and Norris, *Rising tide*, 6. See also: Togeby, "Increasing Numbers of Women in the Labor Force", 227.

⁷³ Davis and Greenstein, "Gender Ideology", 94-95.

⁷⁴ Bolzendahl and Myers, "Feminist Attitudes and Support for Gender Equality", 762.

⁷⁵ Banaszak and Plutzer, "Contextual Determinants of Feminist Attitudes". An increase of women in the labour market is thought to have created a group of female voters with 'distinct political interests,' especially with regards to welfare state provision (e.g. better childcare facilities) and women's legal status. Rosenbluth, Frances, Salmond, Rob and Thies, Michael F. (2006) "Welfare Works: Explaining Female Legislative Representation." *Politics & Gender*. vol. 2: 165-92. 167; Davis and Greenstein, "Gender Ideology", 94-95.

⁷⁶ The heated debate in Germany over the introduction of cash-for-care payments for parents who do not use publicly funded childcare centres is a case in point.

that the effects work the other way around.⁷⁷ More research is needed to disentangle this complex relationship (see also section 8.2.8).

A final and often-cited variable for determining attitudes toward women and men, which does not easily fit into exposure- and interest-based categorisation, is age (in the gender attitude literature, age is often equated with cohort). Survey data indicate that gender attitudes have liberalised over the past decades as younger cohorts have gradually replaced older, more traditionally minded generations.⁷⁸ On this basis, it is often argued that achieving gender equality is simply a matter of time (i.e. cohort-change). Norris for example, suggests that, 'we can expect to see continued progress in female representation.'⁷⁹ At the same time, however, there are also signs that younger age cohorts may be returning to more 'traditional' value orientations.⁸⁰ Sociological and feminist research has termed this phenomenon a 'feminist backlash,' a resurgence of traditional attitudes towards women.⁸¹

As I discuss in chapter 4, scholars interested in studying political attitudes and behaviour have been paying increasing attention not only to cohort effects in general, but also to the differences between cohort, age, and period effects.⁸² While these determinants are highly correlated, their distinction can help to better draw out the effects of generational socialisation (cohort), life cycle effects (age), or of 'the current political, economic, or societal situation' on people's attitudes.⁸³

⁷⁷ See also Baxter who argues that, 'men's greater economic power in the household is associated with less egalitarian gender attitudes ...' Baxter and Kane, "A Cross-National Analysis of Gender Inequality and Gender Attitudes", 209.

⁷⁸ See for instance: Bolzendahl and Myers, "Feminist Attitudes and Support for Gender Equality", 759. Younger cohorts are, according to Davis, characterised by larger differences between men and women while variables such as education are having a smaller effect. Davis and Greenstein, "Gender Ideology", 92.

⁷⁹ Norris and Inglehart, "Cultural Obstacles to Equal Representation", 137.

⁸⁰ Klein, Markus and Ohr, Dieter (2004). "Ändert der Wertewandel seine Richtung? Die Entwicklung gesellschaftlicher Werteorientierungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zwischen 1980 und 2000." In: Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger, et al. *Sozialer und politischer Wandel in Deutschland*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 153-78. 153,55.

⁸¹ McRobbie, Angela (2004) "Post - feminism and popular culture." *Feminist Media Studies*. vol. 4(3): 255-64.

⁸² See for example: Neundorf, "A Micro perspective on System Change in Post-Socialist Societies".

⁸³ Neundorf and Niemi, "Beyond political socialization", 2.

8.2.8 Gender Culture and the Economy

This section briefly reviews the literature on the effects of traditional gender attitudes on women's labour market participation. Analysing data from the International Social Survey Programme and the European Social Survey and the German Socio-Economic Panel, Hummelsheim finds that dominant cultural attitudes toward the appropriate division of labour between the sexes exerts a statistically and substantially significant impact on women's labour force participation rate in Germany, greater even than the impact exerted by political institutions.⁸⁴ Pfau-Effinger too argues that the differences in gendered labour force participation as well as the take up rates of public childcare facilities across different European welfare states can be primarily explained by the differences in gender culture.⁸⁵ However, she finds that the impact of gender culture 'is mediated by the policies of institutions which may lag behind (or progress in front of) cultural change.'⁸⁶ A significant negative effect of gender attitudes has also been observed with regards to women's representation at the upper echelons of power in the economy and private businesses. Ford and colleagues show that stereotypes pose invisible barriers to the promotion of women to executive positions.⁸⁷ According to Heilman, 'gender stereotypes and the expectations they produce about both what women are like (descriptive) and how they should behave (prescriptive)' have a negative impact on the number of women in leadership positions, because they translate into actual devaluations or unfair judgments over women's and men's work performance.⁸⁸ Heilman reasons that sanctions for deviations from normed gendered behaviour are 'the root cause of the discriminatory treatment of women in organisations.'⁸⁹ Gender norms are also believed

⁸⁴ Hummelsheim, *Erwerbsbeteiligung von Müttern*, 22. See also: Thornton, Alwin and Camburn, "Sex-Role Attitudes and Attitude Change".

⁸⁵ Pfau-Effinger, "Gender cultures and the gender arrangement"; Pfau-Effinger, "Family Childcare in the Cultural and Institutional Context".

⁸⁶ Pfau-Effinger, "Gender cultures and the gender arrangement", 160.

⁸⁷ Ford, *Women and politics*.

⁸⁸ As Heilman elaborates, 'women who do not display "womanly" attributes and men who do not display "manly" attributes are judged less psychologically healthy and are evaluated less favorably than those who do.' Heilman, "How Gender Stereotypes Prevent Women's Ascent Up The Organizational Ladder", 658, 61.

⁸⁹ Loc. cit.

to influence the decisions taken by individuals in their private lives over the division of labour within the family, such as who should look after children, who should commit more of their time to household tasks, or even how many children a family should have.⁹⁰ Baxter and Kane for example show that traditional gender-attitudes are positively correlated with women's dependence on both their male partners and the state.⁹¹ In sum, previous research seems to suggest that a traditional gender culture does impact on existing economic gender gaps in the Western world.

⁹⁰ See for instance: Shelton, Beth Anne (1996) "The Division of Household Labor." *Annual Review of Sociology*. vol. 22: 299-322. Fernández, Raquel and Fogli, Alessandra (2006) "Fertility: The role of Culture and Family Experience." *Journal of the European Economic Association*. vol. 4(2-3): 552-61.

⁹¹ Baxter and Kane, "A Cross-National Analysis of Gender Inequality and Gender Attitudes".

8.3 Appendix for Chapter 3

Table 28 Female Representation in Various State Parliaments 1919-1932

Assembly	Year	Total number of delegates	Total number of women	Percentage Women
East German Territory				
Saxony				
Volkskammer	1919	96	4	4.1
Landtag	1920	96	5	5.2
Landtag	1922	96	7	7.3
Landtag	1926	96	5	5.2
Landtag	1928	96	5	5.3
Landtag	1930	96	6	6.3
Landtag	1931	96	7	7.3
Prussia				
National	1919	401	23	5.7
Landtag	1921	428	42	9.8
Landtag	1924	450	39	8.6
Landtag	1928	450	42	9.3
Landtag	1930	450	44	9.7
Landtag	1932	422	32	7.6
West German Territory				
Bavaria				
National	1919	180	7	3.8
Landtag	1920	158	9	5.7
Landtag	1924	129	4	3.1
Landtag	1928	128	5	3.9
Landtag	1930	128	6	4.7
Landtag	1932	128	4	3.1
Hamburg				
Bürgerschaft	1919	134	17	12.6
Bürgerschaft	1928	150	15	10
Bürgerschaft	1939	160	14	8.8
Bürgerschaft	1931	160	14	8.8
Bürgerschaft	1932	160	12	7.5
Hesse				
National	1919	70	5	7.1
Landtag	1927	70	3	4.3
Landtag	1930	70	5	7.1
Landtag	1931	70	3	4.3
Württemberg				
National	1919	150	24	8.6
Landtag	1928	80	3	3.8
Landtag	1930	80	3	3.8
Landtag	1931	80	4	5
Baden				
National	1919	107	9	8.4
Landtag	1921	86	9	10.5
Landtag	1925	72	6	8.3
Landtag	1929	88	6	6.8

Source: Jahrbuch des Bundes deutscher Frauenvereine: (1920), 27; (1932), 37, 86-90; Nachrichtenblatt des Bundes deutscher Frauenvereine, Vol. 12, No. 5 (May 1932), 47; Zeitschrift des bayerischen statistischen

8.3.1 Reasons for Women's Lower Political Participation in the GDR

There are several plausible reasons for why women in the German Democratic Republic did not participate in politics in equal numbers to men. Firstly, there was a strong inhibiting incumbency effect. As two of my East German interviewees pointed out, there was almost no democratic turnover (*demokratischer Wandel*).¹ Incumbents of political mandates who were appointed in the late 1940s often held on to their posts for many decades, meaning that fewer positions became available that could have been taken up by women. This combined with a situation in which 'men at every level of the party hierarchy protected *their* preserve from female interlopers.'² There was relatively little effort invested by political elites in recruiting women to party posts once they had joined the party.³ Rueschemeyer cites authors who claim that women in East Germany were simply less eager to enter politics because 'most of the demands which women hoped to advance by entering politics had been fulfilled – albeit imperfectly.'⁴ This claim exposes the mistaken assumption that women only enter politics to promote 'women's issues' (abortion, maternal leave, childcare etc.) and that they have no interest or stake in politics relating to other areas (such as foreign policy, finance, the economy etc.).

A second set of reasons for women's underrepresentation in politics identified by East German interviewees parallels the factors believed to be prevalent in post-unification

¹ Interview 19, The Left Party (Die Linke), Male, West German, 2013. Original Quote: 'Weil die alle schon seit 46 drin waren. Es gibt doch keinen demokratischen Wechsel. Verstehen Sie. Wenn das Politbüro aller zehn Jahre ausgewechselt worden wäre, dann hätte das auch ganz anders ausgesehen, aber so kamen dann immer mal welche dazu, aber die starben weg. Es gab einen einzigen Paul Ferner, der aus Gesundheitsgründen, wo es also nicht erfunden war, sondern der aus Gesundheitsgründen ausschied, das gab es sonst überhaupt nicht.'

² Harsch, *Revenge of the Domestic*, 69. emphasis in the original text

³ Loc. cit. However, anecdotal evidence found in secondary literature and the experiences of some of the East German politicians which I interviewed suggest that in the earlier party recruitment stages, women were indeed targeted.

⁴ Bergmann 2001 and Siklova 1999 cited by Rueschemeyer, "Women in Politics in Post-Communist East Germany".

Germany, namely the deterring effects of women's dual burden of paid employment and reproductive work and the incompatibility of political life with women's family responsibilities. These are aptly expressed in the following statements:

'I guess they are the same phenomena which also existed in the West, that women are simply busy with job and family in one of the most important phases of their life and that therefore there is little time left to do anything in your free time, [such as] to actively participate politically.'⁵

'My mother was in meetings for nights on end. This male dominated assembly culture, I would say, is something which we still criticise today. That is, late night meetings to discuss everything until everyone has said everything.'⁶

Women had to partake in everything ... they had to work well and the family was also organised in a way that women had to take care of most chores. ... It was simply much more difficult. Who would do that to themselves? There were very few.⁷

Harsch too notes that active party membership and the exercise of party functions 'demanded extraordinary commitment' with party members being expected to attend numerous meetings, which often ran late into the night.⁸ For women who seriously fostered political ambitions, the choice of partner and his willingness to support her ambitions was therefore a further crucial factor. According to one interviewee and former member of the SED,

⁵ Interview 16, SPD, Female, East German, 2013. Original quote: 'Ich vermute es sind die gleichen Phänomene, die auch im Westen es gegeben hat, dass Frauen einfach in einer der wichtigsten Lebensphasen beschäftigt sind mit Beruf und Familie und von daher wenig Zeit bleibt, wenn man noch irgendwas in seiner Freizeit tun will, um sich politisch aktiv zu beteiligen.'

⁶ Interview 17, The Left Party (Die Linke), Female, East German, 2013. Original quote: 'Meine Mutter, die ist nächtelang dann zu Versammlungen gewesen, also diese männerdominierte Versammlungskultur sagen wir mal, das tun wir ja heut auch noch bekritteln. Also, Sitzungen bis in die Nacht und dann alles diskutieren bis dann jeder alles gesagt hatte.'

⁷ Original quote: 'Und dann mussten [Frauen] auch alles andere mitmachen und das war eine Ochsentour. Die mussten super arbeiten, die Familie war auch größtenteils noch so organisiert, dass die Frauen alles gemacht haben. Es gab ja auch nicht so viel Unterstützung, dass man jemanden hatte, der im Haushalt half oder noch Technik, man hat doch vieles noch mit der Hand gemacht. Es war einfach viel schwerer. Wer hat sich das schon angetan? Es gab ganz wenige.'

⁸ Harsch, *Revenge of the Domestic*, 70.

‘If a woman said yes, she had the possibility to advance quickly [in the party]. Yet, it was really not only down to her, but also to her husband. I definitely had this impression in the GDR, that with all this equality, women were still very dependent on their men. If a man did not want his wife to have a political career, then she did not have one.’⁹

A final contributing factor to women’s underrepresentation in political life in the GDR may be that gender inequality was simply not addressed. The GDR publicised itself to its citizens and the outside world as a state that had solved the ‘woman question.’¹⁰ This sentiment was also reiterated in the interviews, which I conducted with former GDR citizens:

‘I felt ... that gender differences, the awareness and the orchestration of it, this almost played no role in the GDR. I only noticed it when I was involved with green politics and women’s politics [after unification]. ... Of course, I now say, the SK and the Politburo, they were all men. But in dealings and in everyday life, this wasn’t an issue.’¹¹

Indeed, the term feminism, one of the central concepts of the second-wave feminist movement in West Germany, was, according to one interviewee and former SED member, described as an illness in the political rhetoric of the socialist state. Although there was a national women’s ‘mass’ organisation (the Democratic Women’s Association, *Demokratischer Frauenbund Deutschlands*, founded in 1946 and with over 1.3 million

⁹ Interview 17, The Left Party (Die Linke), Female, East German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Wenn eine Frau Ja gesagt hat, hatte sie schnell die Möglichkeit aufzusteigen. Es lag wirklich aber nicht nur an ihr, sondern auch an ihrem Ehegatten. Also dieses Gefühl hatte ich in der DDR auf alle Fälle, dass die Frauen bei aller Gleichberechtigung sehr von ihren Männern auch abhängig waren. Wenn ein Mann nicht wollte, dass seine Frau politische Karriere macht, dann hat sie’s nicht gemacht.’

¹⁰ Böhm, Tatiana (1993). "The Women's Question as a Democratic Question: In Search of Civil Society." In: Funk, Nanette and Mueller, Magda. *Gender politics and post-communism : reflections from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union*. New York; London: Routledge. 151-59. 151. And: Hampele, "Zur politischen Partizipation von Frauen in der DDR", 285. See also: Pritchard, "Gender and Education in East Germany", 78, 79. As Dölling argues, ‘criticism of patriarchal gender relations would have constituted direct criticism of the political system itself’. Dölling, "Women in the GDR After the "Turning Point"', 10. See also: Watson, Peggy (1993) "Eastern Europe's Silent Revolution: Gender." *Sociology*. vol. 27(3): 471-87. 476. Ferree, "Feminism and Unification in (East) Germany", 92.

¹¹ Interview 5, Greens, Female, East German, 2013. Original quote: ‘Ich fand ja sowieso die Geschlechterunterschiede, das Bewusstsein und auch so das Inszenieren hatte in der DDR fast keine Rolle gespielt. Also das ist mir alles dann erst, als ich mit grüner Politik und Frauenpolitik zu tun hatte, aufgefallen. Das spielte keine Rolle. Natürlich, ich sage auch, klar, das SK und das Politbüro, das waren alles Männer. Aber so im Umgang, im Alltag, spielte das alles keine Rolle.’

members throughout the 1950s),¹² it was state run and did not allow for different versions of gender equality than that thought up and propagated by the state to enter the public discourse. Neither the Democratic Women's Organisation nor other SED committees (tasked with drafting policies for women) truly represented women's interests. Instead, they had the symbolic function of representing the party line and of mobilise citizens.¹³ Even if women in the GDR had not enjoyed such relatively liberal legislation (as had been the case in many other Eastern bloc countries) therefore, there was little they could have done to change the party's standpoint, 'as there was no political freedom for anyone to do so'.¹⁴ Combined with the choking security presence that made mobilisation outside the state apparatus almost impossible, women in the GDR arguably only enjoyed a 'paternalistic type of equality'.¹⁵

¹² Harsch, *Revenge of the Domestic*, 71. Harsch notes that the DFD 'demanded considerably less time from members than did the SED but [was] engaged, nonetheless, in myriad activities that connected it to women as parents, students, housewives, consumers, and citizens. Loc. cit. However, 'despite or perhaps because of [the] veritable smorgasbord of duties, the DFD gradually slumped into a kaffeklatsch existence in many locales...' loc. cit. As one former female SED member told me in an interview, 'The Democratic Women's Association, that was more of an organisation of mums.... crocheting and knitting and such like, and giving women a space to chat. Interview 17, The Left Party (Die Linke), Female, East German, 2013. Original quote: '[der] Demokratischen Frauenbund, den DFD ... war eher so Mutti Organisation... häkeln und stricken, also solche Gesprächsmöglichkeiten für Frauen.' See also: Hampele, "Zur politischen Partizipation von Frauen in der DDR", 296-301.

¹³ Hampele, "Zur politischen Partizipation von Frauen in der DDR", 293-94.

¹⁴ Berghahn, "Gender in the legal discourse in post-unification Germany", 46.

¹⁵ Loc. cit.

Table 29 Gender Policy Milestones in Germany before 1865-1933

1865	Founding of the German Women's Association (<i>Allgemeiner Deutscher Frauenverein</i>) in Leipzig
1891	SPD becomes first German party to include demands for women's right to vote in their party programme
1878	Labour Code Amendment: Reichstag bans female labour in mines and bars women from the workplace for the first three weeks after giving birth (without reimbursement for lost pay)
1894	Founding of the Association for German Women's Organisations (<i>Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine</i>)
1908	Women are granted the right to become members of a political party (175.000 women join the SPD between 1908-1914)
1918	Introduction of women's right to vote (82 per cent of women vote at the election for the National Assembly in 1919)
1919	41 women elected MPs to the National Assembly (9.6 per cent)
1933	Hitler comes to power: independent women's organisations are prohibited

Notes: For full list of sources see Table 31.

Table 30 Family- and Gender Policy Milestones in West Germany and the GDR 1945-1990

West Germany	Year	East Germany
	1947	Founding of the Democratic Women's Association (<i>Demokratischer Frauenbund</i>)
Equality Principle enshrined in the Basic Law (Article 3[2])	1949	Equality Principle enshrined in the GDR constitution (Article 7)
	1950	Law on the Protection of Children and Mothers (<i>Mütter- und Kinderschutzgesetz</i>): includes provision for investment in childcare, protection of the equality principle in marriage, and the promotion of women in the labour market
Maternity Protection Act (<i>Mutterschutzgesetz</i>): special provisions for mothers and expectant mothers who are in employment	1952	
Introduction of joint taxation aggregates for married couples (<i>Ehegattensplittung</i>)	1958	
Act on Equal Rights of Men and Women in Civil Law (<i>Gleichberechtigungsgesetz auf dem Gebiet des Bürgerlichen Recht</i>)		
	1966	Introduction of an independent family law (<i>Familiengesetzbuch</i>)
	1972	Introduction of maternity leave (<i>Babyjahr</i>): year-long maternity leave with a cash compensation payments equal to the level of sickness benefits
		Liberalisation of abortion legislation: free contraception and the right to abort, free of charge, within the first trimester of pregnancy
Fifteenth Criminal Law Amendment Act: makes abortion not punishable in cases of serious health risks for expectant mother, sexual crimes or serious social or emotional distress (subject to approval by two doctors, counselling and a three-day waiting period)	1976	
Reform of Matrimonial and Family Law (<i>Reform des Ehe- und Familienrechts</i>) - dispenses with principle of guilt in divorce trials which is superseded by principle of irretrievable differences	1977	
Founding of the Green Party: first party to adopt 50 per cent quota for women in party positions	1979	
Act on the Introduction of Maternity Leave (<i>Mutterschaftsurlaub</i>): employed mothers receive four months maternity leave and protection against dismissal	1980	
Labour Law EC Adjustment Act: enshrines the principle of equal treatment of women and men at the workplace and right to equal		

pay

Federal Child-Raising Benefit Act (<i>Bundeserziehungsgeldgesetz</i>): mothers or fathers who look after their children receive a child- raising benefit of 600 DM per month for ten months	1986
SPD adopts 33 per cent quota for women in party positions (raised to 40 per cent in 1998)	1988

Notes: For full list of sources see Table 31 below.

Table 31 Family- and Gender Policy Milestones in Unified Germany

Year	Policy
1992	1st Abortion Law Reform: Legalises abortion within the first trimester (subject to counselling and a three-day waiting period). Constitutional Court overrules abortion law reform in 1993
1993	Parental Benefit Reform (<i>Erziehungsgeld</i>): Benefit payments for parental leave extended from 18 months to 24 months
1994	2nd Equal Rights Act: Promotion of women and the compatibility of work and family life; provision for the protection of employees against sexual harassment Amendment of the Basic Law (Article 3[2]): Government commits to promote genuine equality of rights and opportunities between men and women and to abolish gender discrimination
1995	Pregnant Women and Family Assistance Amendment Act (2nd Abortion Law Reform): Implements the federal constitutional court's guidelines by declaring abortion illegal but not punishable by law within the first trimester
1996	Establishment of the right to publicly funded or subsidised (affordable) childcare for children from the age of 3 (<i>Rechtsanspruch auf Kindergartenplatz</i>)
2000	Amendment of Article 12a[4] of the Basic Law: Makes voluntary armed service by women constitutional and all segments of the armed forces accessible to women
2001	Act on Part-Time Work and Fixed-Term Employment Contracts (<i>Gesetz über Teilzeitarbeit und befristete Arbeitsverträge</i>): Provides for a legal right to part-time work Act on Registered Relationships for homosexual couples - enables gay and lesbian couples to have their relationship officially registered, spouses now being recognised as family members
2005	Law on Expansion of Publicly Subsidised Child Care Facilities (<i>Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz</i>)
2006	General Equal Treatment Act (<i>Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz</i>)
2007	Paternity Leave Reform (<i>Gesetz zum Elterngeld und zur Elternzeit</i>): reform of parental leave and parental leave allowance. 67 per cent of previous disposable income paid to parent for 12 months (minimum of €300 and capped at maximum of 1.800€), benefit payments extended to 14 months, if the other parent also takes at least two months parental leave
2008	Child Advancement Act (<i>Kinderförderungsgesetz</i>)
2009	Increase in Child Benefit Payments and establishment of legal right to childcare (<i>Familienleistungsgesetz</i>): extension of childcare infrastructures, establishment of right to publicly funded or subsidised (affordable) childcare for children below the age of 3 from August 2013
2013	Introduction of Cash-for-care Subsidy (<i>Betreuungsgeld</i>): monetary payments of €100-150 per month given to parents not using state- subsidised childcare

Sources: Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (2007) *Measures and Acts on Equal Opportunities Since 1949*. Flüter-Hoffmann, Christiane (2012) "Chronologie der Familienpolitik." *Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln*.; Ostner, Ilona, Reif, Michael and Turba, Hannu (2003) "Family Policies in Germany." Utrecht: Institute of Social Policy Goettingen.; Bielefeld University (2012) "Geschichte der Gleichstellung - Chronik." Available from <http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/gendertexte/chronik.html>. Accessed 23.10. 2012.; Herfel, Claudia Saupe, and Doris Kirschenlohr (1996) *Unsere Stadt Braucht Frauen - Unser Kreis Braucht Frauen*. Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg; Canning, Kathleen (1996) *Languages of Labour and Gender: Female Factory Work in Germany*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.; Harsch, Donna (2007). *Revenge of the Domestic*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cited years refer to year of implementation.

8.4 Appendix for Chapter 4

Table 32 Chapter 4: Variables by Survey Year

	1991	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012
East	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Female	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Age	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Secondary Education Level	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Employed	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Occupation	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Income	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Religious Affiliation Regular Church Attendance	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Marital Status	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Children	-	-	-	-	-	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Single Parent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	x	x	x	x
Housewife	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	x	x	x	x
Place of Residence	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	x	x	x
Left-Right Identification	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Satisfaction with Democracy	x	x	-	-	x	x	x	-	-	x	-	-
Sense of Belonging to the Former GDR	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-
Sense of Belonging to the Former FRG	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-
High TV Exposure	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	x	-	x	-	-
Gender Attitudes	x	x	-	x	-	x	-	x	-	x	-	x

Table 33 Chapter 4: Variable Summary Statistics

Variables	Mean	SD	N
East	0.20	0.40	37621
Female	0.51	0.50	37621
Age	48.10	17.45	37562
Age Squared	26.18	17.62	37562
Birth Cohorts			
Born 1981-1930	0.13	0.34	37621
Born 1931-1948	0.28	0.45	37621
Born 1949-1961	0.25	0.43	37621
Born 1961-1974	0.23	0.42	37621
Born 1975-1992	0.11	0.31	37621
Education Status			
No Secondary Education	0.02	0.13	37540
Low Secondary Education	0.42	0.49	37540
Intermediary Secondary Education	0.30	0.46	37540
High Secondary Education	0.25	0.43	37540
Employed	0.56	0.50	37579
Occupation			
Agriculture	0.01	0.08	37325
Academia	0.01	0.10	37325
Self-Employed	0.04	0.21	37325
Public Sector Employee	0.04	0.19	37325
Private Sector Employee	0.26	0.44	37325
Manual Worker	0.14	0.35	37325
Other	0.02	0.13	37287
Income	1150.53	1050.42	32626
Income Categories			
900€ or Less	0.38	0.48	37621
900-1499€	0.24	0.43	37621
1500-2599€	0.18	0.38	37621
2600€ or More	0.06	0.23	37621
Religiosity			
Protestant	0.38	0.49	37621
Catholic	0.34	0.47	37621
Other	0.02	0.14	37621
Atheist	0.25	0.43	37621
Regular Church Attendance	0.19	0.39	37344
Marital Status			
Married	0.69	0.46	37585
Divorced	0.08	0.28	37585
Single	0.23	0.42	37585
Children	0.70	0.46	21094
Single Parent	0.15	0.36	14533
Housewife	0.50	0.50	14425
Place of Residence			

Suburb	0.05	0.22	37621
Town	0.15	0.36	37621
Village	0.14	0.35	37621
Hamlet	0.01	0.09	37621
Left Right Identification (Scale)	5.20	1.76	35711
Satisfied with Democracy	4.15	1.26	19058
Satisfied with Democracy (Dummy)	0.68	0.47	36650
Sense of Belonging to the former GDR	0.58	0.49	3251
Sense of Belonging to the former FRG	0.70	0.46	4743
High TV Exposure (1-3)	2.36	0.57	8890
Gender Attitudes (1-19)	8.54	4.21	18571

Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

Table 34 Traditional Gender Attitudes: Differently Coded 'East' Variables

	Traditional Gender Attitudes (1-19)							
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
East ^A	-2.604*** (0.06)	-2.123*** (0.09)						
Born or Grew Up in			-1.961*** (0.07)	-1.493*** (0.09)				
Migrant (East to					0.036 (0.18)	0.167 (0.16)		
Migrant (West to							-1.187*** (0.32)	-0.752** (0.34)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Constant	10.382*** (0.11)	10.748*** (0.39)	10.529*** (0.10)	10.379*** (0.37)	9.887*** (0.10)	9.656*** (0.37)	9.895*** (0.10)	9.679*** (0.38)
R-squared	0.139	0.327	0.120	0.323	0.078	0.306	0.078	0.306
Observations	13544	11821	14459	12612	14252	12427	14252	12427

Notes: The table reports OLS regression coefficients. All models control for survey year effects and are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Included as additional controls are sex, secondary education status, employment status, occupation, income, religious affiliation, regular church attendance, and marital status. ^AEast dummy excludes German East-West and West-East migrants. Robust standard errors are given in parantheses. Positive coefficients on the explaining variables are associated with more traditional gender attitudes. ***1% level of significance, **5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GSS 1980-2012.

Table 35 Traditional Gender Attitudes: Socio-Economic and Cohort Effects with Federal State Controls


	Traditional Gender Attitudes (1-19)		
	I	II	III
West German States			
Schleswig-Holstein	-0.471** (0.19)	-0.211 (0.18)	-0.224 (0.18)
Hamburg	-1.788*** (0.26)	-1.003*** (0.25)	-1.021*** (0.25)
Lower Saxony	-0.689*** (0.14)	-0.598*** (0.13)	-0.599*** (0.13)
Bremen	-0.745** (0.38)	-0.598* (0.34)	-0.639* (0.34)
North Rhine-Westphalia	-0.197* (0.11)	-0.158 (0.10)	-0.175* (0.10)
Hesse	-0.542*** (0.14)	-0.311** (0.13)	-0.325** (0.13)
Rhineland-Palatinate	-0.113 (0.17)	-0.139 (0.16)	-0.164 (0.16)
Baden Württemberg	0.021 (0.13)	0.075 (0.12)	0.063 (0.12)
Saarland	-0.856** (0.40)	-1.138*** (0.37)	-1.139*** (0.36)
West Berlin	-1.920*** (0.24)	-1.114*** (0.23)	-1.114*** (0.23)
East German States			
East Berlin	-3.874*** (0.18)	-2.779*** (0.19)	-1.520*** (0.24)
Brandenburg	-3.136*** (0.13)	-2.498*** (0.14)	-1.238*** (0.21)
Mecklenburg W. Pomerania	-3.457*** (0.15)	-2.991*** (0.16)	-1.735*** (0.22)
Saxony	-2.801*** (0.11)	-2.195*** (0.13)	-0.936*** (0.20)
Saxony-Anhalt	-2.815*** (0.12)	-2.558*** (0.14)	-1.216*** (0.21)
Thuringia	-2.609*** (0.13)	-2.225*** (0.14)	-0.916*** (0.21)
Female	-0.978*** (0.06)	-1.418*** (0.07)	-1.424*** (0.07)
Cohort			
Born 1891-1930		2.265*** (0.17)	2.882*** (0.18)
Born 1931-1948		1.125*** (0.14)	1.552*** (0.16)
Born 1949-1961		0.111 (0.13)	0.293** (0.15)
Born 1961-1974		-0.113 (0.12)	0.021 (0.13)
East*Cohort Interactions			
East*Born 1891-1930			-2.905*** (0.23)
East*Born 1931-1948			-1.945*** (0.20)
East*Born 1949-1961			-0.777*** (0.20)
East*Born 1961-1974			-0.370* (0.20)

Education Status			
Low Secondary Education		-0.465*	-0.453*
		(0.25)	(0.25)
Intermediary Secondary Education		-1.371***	-1.478***
		(0.25)	(0.25)
High Secondary Education		-2.541***	-2.546***
		(0.26)	(0.26)
Still At School		-2.173***	-2.137***
		(0.35)	(0.35)
Employed		-0.690***	-0.655***
		(0.15)	(0.15)
Occupation			
Agriculture		0.563	0.563
		(0.40)	(0.40)
Academia		-1.193***	-1.188***
		(0.31)	(0.31)
Self-Employed		-0.122	-0.152
		(0.21)	(0.20)
Public Sector Employee		-0.785***	-0.787***
		(0.20)	(0.20)
Private Sector Employee		-0.247	-0.247
		(0.15)	(0.15)
Manual Worker		0.271	0.223
		(0.17)	(0.17)
Other		0.041	0.030
		(0.23)	(0.23)
Income			
900-1499€		-0.427***	-0.468***
		(0.08)	(0.08)
1500-2599€		-0.409***	-0.451***
		(0.10)	(0.10)
2600€ or More		-0.514***	-0.564***
		(0.15)	(0.15)
Religiosity			
Protestant		0.776***	0.862***
		(0.08)	(0.08)
Catholic		0.655***	0.746***
		(0.10)	(0.10)
Other		2.040***	2.192***
		(0.41)	(0.41)
Regular Church Attendance		0.741	0.716
		(0.88)	(0.88)
Protestant* Regular Church Attendance		0.017	-0.020
		(0.89)	(0.89)
Catholic* Regular Church Attendance		0.218	0.145
		(0.89)	(0.88)
Other* Regular Church Attendance		0.359	0.302
		(1.02)	(1.02)
Marital Status			
Married/Widowed		0.359***	0.354***
		(0.09)	(0.09)
Separated/Divorced		0.069	0.056
		(0.13)	(0.13)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	10.894***	10.893***	10.598***
	(0.12)	(0.30)	(0.31)
R-squared	0.143	0.335	0.342

Observations	18571	16076	16076
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Notes: The table reports OLS regression coefficients. All models control for survey year effects and are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Federal state dummies: reference category is Bavaria. ^A Cohort dummies: reference category is respondents born between 1974 and 1992. ^B Education dummies: reference category is no secondary education. ^C Occupation dummies: reference category is 'not applicable.' ^B Income dummies: reference category is monthly income of 900€ or less. ^E Religiosity: reference category is non-religious. ^F Marital Status: reference category is 'single.' Robust standard errors are given in parantheses. Positive coefficients on the explaining variables are associated with more traditional gender attitudes. ***1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

Figure 19 Mean Gender Attitude Scores by Age Group in East and West Germany



Notes: The figure reports mean gender attitude scores by age group in East and West Germany. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012 (using survey years 1991-2012 only).

Table 36 Traditional Gender Attitudes: Survey Year Effects with Federal State Controls

	Traditional Gender Attitudes (1-19)
West German Länder	
Schleswig-Holstein	-0.231 (0.18)
Hamburg	-1.010*** (0.25)
Lower Saxony	-0.591*** (0.13)
Bremen	-0.621* (0.34)
North Rhine-Westphalia	-0.161 (0.10)
Hesse	-0.308** (0.13)
Rhineland-Palatinate	-0.133 (0.16)
Baden Württemberg	0.074 (0.12)
Saarland	-1.103*** (0.36)
West Berlin	-1.131*** (0.23)
East German Länder	
East Berlin	-2.242*** (0.23)
Brandenburg	-1.886*** (0.20)
Mecklenburg W. Pomerania	-2.397*** (0.21)
Saxony	-1.580*** (0.19)
Saxony-Anhalt	-1.921*** (0.20)
Thuringia	-1.624*** (0.20)
Female	-1.425*** (0.07)
Survey Years	
1992	0.421*** (0.13)
1996	-0.087 (0.14)
2000	-0.853*** (0.14)
2004	-1.578*** (0.16)
2008	-2.083*** (0.17)
2012	-2.850*** (0.20)
East*Survey Year Interaction	
East1992	-0.657*** (0.20)
East1996	-0.872*** (0.20)

East2000	-0.624*** (0.20)
East2004	-0.983*** (0.21)
East2008	-1.042*** (0.21)
East2012	0.019 (0.23)
Controls	Yes
Constant	10.610*** (0.40)
R-squared	0.339
Observations	16076

Notes: The table reports OLS regression coefficients. All models are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Federal state dummies: reference category is Bavaria. Included as additional controls are birth cohorts, secondary education levels, employment status, occupation, personal income, religious affiliation, regular church attendance, and marital status. Results are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Positive coefficients on the explaining variables are associated with more traditional gender attitudes. ***1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

Table 37 Traditional Gender Attitudes: Democratic Satisfaction and Sense of Belonging to Former Regime

	Traditional Gender Attitudes	
	East	West
Survey Year ^Δ		
2000	-0.988*** (0.21)	-0.376** (0.16)
2008	-2.312*** (0.21)	-1.087*** (0.16)
Satisfaction with Democracy		
- pretty satisfied	0.120 (0.34)	0.726 (0.70)
- more or less satisfied	0.468 (0.33)	-0.058 (0.66)
- more or less dissatisfied	0.699** (0.33)	0.263 (0.66)
- pretty dissatisfied	0.908*** (0.33)	-0.182 (0.65)
- very dissatisfied	0.901* (0.53)	0.026 (0.68)
- don't Know	0.410 (0.47)	-0.603 (0.98)
Sense of Belonging to Former GDR	-0.844*** (0.14)	
Sense of Belonging to Former FRG		0.234* (0.14)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Constant	9.123*** (0.61)	9.731*** (0.87)
R-squared	0.273	0.284
Observations	2604	3612


Notes: The table reports OLS regression coefficients. All models weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Included as additional controls are sex, cohorts, secondary education levels, employment status, occupation, personal income, religious affiliation, regular church attendance, and marital status. ^Δ Reference category is survey year 1991. Results are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Positive coefficients on the explaining variables are associated with more traditional gender attitudes. ***1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

Table 38 Traditional Gender Attitudes: Other Explanatory Variables

	Traditional Gender Attitudes				
	I	II	III	IV	V
East	-2.254*** (0.12)	-2.433*** (0.12)	-2.359*** (0.10)	-2.385*** (0.11)	-2.712*** (0.14)
Female	-1.445*** (0.11)	-1.472*** (0.11)	-1.525*** (0.09)	-1.512*** (0.10)	-1.495*** (0.12)
Mother was Housewife	0.486*** (0.10)				
Raised in Single Parent Household		0.008 (0.13)			
Children			-0.281** (0.12)		
Place of Residence ^A					
Suburb				0.211 (0.16)	
Town				0.335*** (0.13)	
Village				0.451*** (0.13)	
Hamlet				0.866*** (0.29)	
TV Consumption					
One to Three Hours a Day					-0.071 (0.27)
More Than Three Hours a Day					-0.092 (0.28)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	9.794*** (0.51)	10.087*** (0.54)	9.802*** (0.38)	10.353*** (0.45)	10.014*** (0.62)
R-squared	0.289	0.285	0.303	0.298	0.282
Observations	6049	6043	8892	7139	4771

Notes: The table reports OLS regression coefficients. All models control for survey year effects and are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Included as additional controls are birth cohorts, education level, income, occupation, religious denomination, regular church attendance, and marital status. Results are weighted for regional oversampling. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ^A Place of residence: reference category is city. ^B TV Consumption: reference category is one hour of TV consumption a day or less. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Positive coefficients on the explaining variables are associated with more traditional gender attitudes. ***1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

Table 39 Descriptive Statistics: Difference in Gender Attitudes between East and West Germany



8.5 Appendix for Chapter 5

Table 40 Vote Preference at German Bundestag Elections by Sex 1953-2009*

Year	SPD		CDU		FDP		The Left		Greens		CSU		Other	
	♂	♀	♂	♀	♂	♀	♂	♀	♂	♀	♂	♀	♂	♀
1953	32.5	27.6	38.9	47.2	11.7	10.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	16.9	14.8
1957	35.3	28.9	44.6	53.5	8.6	7.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	11.5	10.2
1961	39.7	32.9	31.9	39.0	13.6	12.2	-	-	-	-	8.5	10.6	6.4	5.3
1965	44.0	36.2	33.5	41.3	9.7	9.2	-	-	-	-	8.6	10.4	4.3	2.9
1969	45.6	40.4	32.1	40.3	6.1	5.3	-	-	-	-	8.5	10.3	7.7	3.7
1973	46.9	45.7	33.8	36.3	8.8	7.7	-	-	-	-	9.2	9.7	1.3	0.6
1977	43.6	43.1	36.8	38.0	8.1	7.6	-	-	-	-	10.4	10.8	1.2	0.5
1981	43.1	43.9	34.0	33.5	10.5	10.8	-	-	1.6	1.2	10.2	10.2	0.6	0.3
1985	38.4	39.4	37.4	38.5	7.2	6.3	-	-	5.9	4.8	10.3	10.7	0.7	0.3
1989	38.5	37.8	33.2	35.1	9.2	8.3	-	-	8.3	7.7	9.3	10.0	1.6	1.2
1993	34.1	33.6	35.3	37.8	11.0	10.6	2.8	2.5	3.6	3.7	6.7	7.0	6.4	4.8
1997	36.7	40.2	30.1	28.9	8.1	6.7	4.3	3.7	8.2	8.9	9.1	8.9	3.5	2.7
2001	32.8	35.5	27.5	28.0	10.7	9.0	9.9	7.6	7.4	8.8	7.3	7.5	4.4	3.5
2005	23.0	23.1	24.8	29.6	16.1	13.1	13.3	10.6	9.4	12.0	6.2	6.8	7.3	4.8

Source: The Federal Returning Officer (Bundestagswahlleiter) "Representative Wahlergebnisse 2013" * Percentage of votes for party lists (*Zweitstimmen*). *From 1953 to 1987 results for West Germany only, for years 1953 and 1957, votes for CDU and CSU have been combined, from 1953 to 1990 postal votes are excluded from the summary.

Table 41 Distribution of Direct and Party List Seats for the German Bundestag by Sex 1949-2013*

	Women				Men				Overall
	Direct Seats		Party List Seats		Direct Seats		Party List Seats		
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	
1949	12	41.4	17	58.6	230	60.4	151	39.6	410
1953	9	20.0	36	80.0	233	50.2	231	49.8	509
1957	9	18.8	39	81.3	238	50.5	233	49.5	519
1961	7	16.3	36	83.7	240	50.2	238	49.8	521
1965	8	22.2	28	77.8	240	49.8	242	50.2	518
1969	6	17.6	28	82.4	242	50.2	242	50.2	518
1972	4	13.3	26	86.7	244	50.0	244	50.0	518
1976	7	18.4	31	81.6	241	50.2	239	49.8	518
1980	11	25.0	33	75.0	237	49.9	238	50.1	519
1983	10	19.6	41	80.4	238	50.7	231	49.3	520
1987	18	22.5	62	77.5	230	52.4	209	47.6	519
1990	40	29.4	96	70.6	288	54.8	238	45.2	662
1994	44	24.9	133	75.1	284	57.4	211	42.6	672
1998	76	36.9	130	63.1	252	54.4	211	45.6	669
2002	75	38.7	119	61.3	224	54.8	185	45.2	603
2005	69	35.4	126	64.6	230	54.9	189	45.1	614
2009	65	31.9	139	68.1	234	56.0	184	44.0	622
2013	63	27.5	166	72.5	236	58.9	165	41.1	630

Source: Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg. *Figures until and including 1987 refer to West Germany only.

Table 42 Chapter 5: Variables by Survey Year

	1991	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012
East	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Female	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Gender Attitudes	x	x	-	x	-	x	-	x	-	x	-	x
Age	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Secondary Education Level	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Employed	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Occupation	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Income	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Religious Affiliation	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Regular Church Attendance	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Party Preference	x	-	-	-	-	x	x	-	-	x	-	-
Satisfaction with Democracy	x	x	-	-	x	x	x	-	-	x	-	-
Marital Status	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Household Size	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Party Membership	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Interested in Politics	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Voted in Last General Election	x	x	x	x	x	-	x	x	x	x	x	x
Union Membership	-	-	x	x	-	x	x	x	x	x	x	x


Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

Table 43 Chapter 5: Variable Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	SD	N
Party Member	0.04	0.19	37484
Political Interest (Dummy)	0.73	0.44	37563
Voting at Last National Election	0.87	0.34	29667
Trade Union Membership	0.14	0.35	28011
Party Preference:			
CDU	0.24	0.43	37621
SPD	0.25	0.43	37621
FDP	0.07	0.25	37621
Green	0.09	0.29	37621
Left Party	0.03	0.18	37621
Other Party Preference	0.02	0.13	37621
No Party Preference	0.09	0.28	37621

Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

Figure 20 Histogram for Dependent Variables and Gender Attitudes



Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

Table 44 Determinants of Party Membership: Federal State Controls

	Party Membership			
	I	II	III	IV
Female	-0.029*** (0.00)	-0.019*** (0.00)	-0.022*** (0.00)	-0.007 (0.01)
Traditional Gender Attitudes (1-19)			-0.002*** (0.00)	-0.001*** (0.00)
Women*Traditional Gender Attitudes				-0.002*** (0.00)
West German States:				
Schleswig-Holstein	0.000 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.013* (0.01)	0.013* (0.01)
Hamburg	-0.021** (0.01)	-0.020** (0.01)	-0.036** (0.02)	-0.035** (0.02)
Lower Saxony	-0.001 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.003 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)
Bremen	-0.018 (0.01)	-0.014 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.02)	-0.012 (0.02)
North Rhine-Westphalia	-0.005 (0.00)	-0.004 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Hesse	-0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.003 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)
Rhineland-Palatinate	0.002 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)	0.008 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)
Baden Württemberg	-0.018*** (0.00)	-0.015*** (0.00)	-0.009 (0.01)	-0.009 (0.01)
Saarland	0.025*** (0.01)	0.025*** (0.01)	0.023** (0.01)	0.022** (0.01)
West Berlin	-0.014* (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)	-0.010 (0.01)	-0.009 (0.01)
East German States:				
East Berlin	-0.008 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.009 (0.01)	-0.009 (0.01)
Brandenburg	-0.018*** (0.00)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
Mecklenburg W. Pomerania	-0.021*** (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)
Saxony	-0.025*** (0.00)	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
Saxony-Anhalt	-0.030*** (0.01)	-0.012* (0.01)	-0.017* (0.01)	-0.017* (0.01)
Thuringia	-0.023*** (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R-squared	0.037	0.090	0.099	0.101
Observations	37484	25458	12817	12817

Notes: The table reports conditional marginal effects from logistic regression for discrete changes of the dummy variables from 0 to 1. All models are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Federal state dummies: reference category is Bavaria. Additional controls are age, age², secondary education status, employment status, occupation, income, religious affiliation, regular church attendance, party preference, satisfaction with democracy (and its interaction with the East), marital status, and household size. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ***1% level of significance, **5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

Table 45 Determinants of Party Membership: Children with Federal State Controls

	Party Membership			
	Overall Sample			Female Sample
Female	-0.027*** (0.00)	-0.015*** (0.00)		
Children Under 18 YoA	-0.006* (0.00)	-0.005 (0.00)	-0.009* (0.00)	-0.009* (0.01)
West German States				
Schleswig-Holstein	-0.003 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)
Hamburg	-0.025* (0.01)	-0.023* (0.01)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Lower Saxony	0.002 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)	0.001 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
Bremen	-0.024 (0.02)	-0.034 (0.03)	-0.007 (0.02)	0.000 (.)
North Rhine-Westphalia	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.006 (0.00)
Hesse	-0.000 (0.01)	0.000 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)
Rhineland-Palatinate	0.003 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)
Baden Württemberg	-0.015*** (0.01)	-0.014*** (0.01)	-0.010 (0.01)	-0.015** (0.01)
Saarland	0.028*** (0.01)	0.030*** (0.01)	0.022** (0.01)	0.028*** (0.01)
West Berlin	-0.027** (0.01)	-0.016 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)
East German States				
East Berlin	-0.012 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.016 (0.01)	-0.025 (0.02)
Brandenburg	-0.033*** (0.01)	-0.016* (0.01)	-0.033*** (0.01)	-0.032** (0.01)
Mecklenburg W. Pomerania	-0.023*** (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.020* (0.01)	-0.014 (0.01)
Saxony	-0.029*** (0.01)	-0.009 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
Saxony-Anhalt	-0.032*** (0.01)	-0.012 (0.01)	-0.016* (0.01)	-0.006 (0.01)
Thuringia	-0.030*** (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Pseudo R-squared	0.035	0.092	0.018	0.069
Observations	20565	14986	10403	7324

Notes: The table reports conditional marginal effects from logistic regression for discrete changes of the dummy variables from 0 to 1. All models are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Federal state dummies: reference category is Bavaria. Additional controls are age, age², secondary education status, employment status, occupation, income, religious affiliation, regular church attendance, party preference, satisfaction with democracy (and its interaction with the East), marital status, and household size. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ***1% level of significance, **5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

Table 46 Gender Gap in Party Membership: East and West Sample

	Party Membership			
	West	East	West	East
Female	-0.034*** (0.00)	-0.014*** (0.00)	-0.024*** (0.00)	-0.005 (0.00)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R-squared	0.030	0.017	0.080	0.149
Observations	24384	13100	16497	8863

Notes: The table reports conditional marginal effects from logistic regression for discrete changes of the dummy variables from 0 to 1. All models are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Additional controls are age, age², secondary education status, employment status, occupation, income, religious affiliation, regular church attendance, party preference, satisfaction with democracy (and its interaction with East), marital status, and household size. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ***1% level of significance, **5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

Table 47 Determinants of Party Membership: East*Female Interaction with Federal State Controls

	Party Membership	
	I	II
Female	-0.037*** (0.01)	-0.025*** (0.01)
West German States		
Schleswig-Holstein	-0.009 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)
Hamburg	-0.024* (0.01)	-0.022 (0.02)
Lower Saxony	0.001 (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)
Bremen	-0.030 (0.02)	-0.015 (0.02)
North Rhine-Westphalia	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)
Hesse	0.001 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)
Rhineland-Palatinate	0.019 (0.01)	0.023 (0.01)
Baden Württemberg	-0.026*** (0.01)	-0.022** (0.01)
Saarland	0.057** (0.02)	0.055* (0.03)
West Berlin	-0.026** (0.01)	-0.023 (0.02)
East German States		
East Berlin	-0.015 (0.01)	0.001 (0.02)
Brandenburg	-0.027*** (0.01)	-0.006 (0.01)
Mecklenburg W. Pomerania	-0.033*** (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)
Saxony	-0.041*** (0.01)	-0.015 (0.01)
Saxony-Anhalt	-0.042*** (0.01)	-0.021** (0.01)
Thuringia	-0.033*** (0.01)	-0.013 (0.01)
State*Female Interaction:		
West German States		
Schleswig-Holstein*Female	0.019 (0.01)	0.018 (0.02)
Hamburg*Female	0.005 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.02)
Lower Saxony*Female	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.01)
Bremen*Female	0.020 (0.02)	-0.007 (0.03)
North Rhine-Westphalia*Female	0.001 (0.01)	-0.006 (0.01)
Hesse*Female	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.018 (0.01)
Rhineland-Palatinate*Female	-0.031** (0.01)	-0.036** (0.02)
Baden Württemberg*Female	0.012	0.004

	(0.01)	(0.01)
Saarland*Female	-0.017	0.004
	(0.03)	(0.04)
West Berlin*Female	0.019	0.015
	(0.02)	(0.02)
East German States		
East Berlin*Female	0.009	-0.008
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Brandenburg*Female	0.015	0.004
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Mecklenburg W. Pomerania*Female	0.021**	0.006
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Saxony*Female	0.031***	0.020*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Saxony-Anhalt*Female	0.026***	0.023**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Thuringia*Female	0.018**	0.011
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	37484	25458

Notes: The table reports results from a linear probability model (LPM). All models are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Federal state dummies: reference category is Bavaria. Additional controls are age, age², secondary education status, employment status, occupation, income, religious affiliation, regular church attendance, party preference, satisfaction with democracy (and its interaction with the East), marital status, and household size. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ***1% level of significance, **5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

Table 48 Traditional Gender Attitudes and Party Membership: Instrumental Variable Regression (2nd stage) with Federal State Controls

	Party Membership	
	I	II
Traditional Gender Attitudes (1-19)	-0.165*** (0.03)	-0.258*** (0.03)
Female	-0.502*** (0.04)	-0.570*** (0.04)
West German States		
Hamburg	-0.627*** (0.22)	-0.575*** (0.20)
Lower Saxony	-0.090 (0.11)	-0.138 (0.10)
Bremen	-0.327 (0.27)	-0.455 (0.29)
North Rhine-Westphalia	-0.072 (0.10)	-0.082 (0.10)
Hesse	-0.022 (0.11)	-0.116 (0.11)
Rhineland-Palatinate	-0.006 (0.13)	-0.006 (0.12)
Baden Württemberg	-0.154 (0.11)	-0.124 (0.11)
Bavaria	0.022 (0.10)	-0.039 (0.10)
Saarland	0.389* (0.20)	0.119 (0.24)
West Berlin	-0.702*** (0.22)	-0.469** (0.19)
East German States		
East Berlin	-0.715*** (0.17)	-0.855*** (0.17)
Brandenburg	-0.786*** (0.14)	-0.844*** (0.15)
Mecklenburg W. Pomerania	-0.851*** (0.15)	-0.932*** (0.16)
Saxony	-0.693*** (0.12)	-0.640*** (0.13)
Saxony-Anhalt	-0.947*** (0.14)	-0.950*** (0.14)
Thuringia	-0.729*** (0.13)	-0.716*** (0.15)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Wald Test	0.000	0.000
Observations	13034	9221

Notes: The table reports ivprobit coefficients. Models are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Federal State dummies: reference category is Schleswig Holstein. Additional controls are age, age², secondary education status, employment status, occupation, income, religious affiliation, regular church attendance, party preference, satisfaction with democracy (and its interaction with the East), marital status, and household size. ***1% level of significance, **5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

Table 49 Determinants of Political Participation with Federal State Controls

	Political Interest				Union Membership				Voting			
	I	II	III	Iv	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XII
Female	0.151*** (0.00)	0.123*** (0.01)	0.126*** (0.01)	0.096*** (0.02)	0.100*** (0.00)	0.044*** (0.01)	0.049*** (0.01)	0.020 (0.01)	0.019*** (0.00)	-0.007* (0.00)	-0.010* (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)
Traditional Gender Attitudes (1-19)			0.009*** (0.00)	0.007*** (0.00)			-0.002** (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)			0.003*** (0.00)	-0.002** (0.00)
Women*Traditional Gender Attitudes				-0.003* (0.00)				0.010*** (0.00)				-0.001 (0.00)
West German States												
Schleswig-Holstein	0.014 (0.02)	-0.019 (0.02)	-0.016 (0.02)	-0.016 (0.02)	0.053*** (0.01)	0.035*** (0.01)	0.034* (0.02)	0.033* (0.02)	0.000 (0.01)	0.006 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)
Hamburg	0.076*** (0.02)	0.012 (0.03)	0.032 (0.04)	0.032 (0.04)	0.032* (0.02)	0.026 (0.02)	0.028 (0.03)	0.024 (0.03)	-0.001 (0.02)	-0.019 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.02)	-0.008 (0.02)
Lower Saxony	0.005 (0.01)	-0.022* (0.01)	0.001 (0.02)	0.001 (0.02)	0.052*** (0.01)	0.039*** (0.01)	0.039*** (0.01)	0.038*** (0.01)	0.013 (0.01)	0.006 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)	0.006 (0.01)
Bremen	0.108*** (0.04)	0.074* (0.04)	0.068 (0.05)	0.067 (0.05)	0.085*** (0.02)	0.078*** (0.03)	0.071** (0.03)	0.067** (0.03)	0.000 (0.03)	0.025 (0.02)	0.015 (0.03)	0.015 (0.03)
North Rhine-Westphalia	0.002 (0.01)	-0.017* (0.01)	-0.025* (0.01)	-0.025* (0.01)	0.036*** (0.01)	0.029*** (0.01)	0.023** (0.01)	0.022** (0.01)	0.006 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.006 (0.01)	0.006 (0.01)
Hesse	0.019* (0.01)	-0.015 (0.01)	-0.026 (0.02)	-0.026 (0.02)	0.034*** (0.01)	0.036*** (0.01)	0.038*** (0.01)	0.036*** (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.006 (0.01)
Rhineland-Palatinate	0.003 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.02)	-0.005 (0.02)	-0.005 (0.02)	0.008 (0.01)	0.006 (0.01)	0.020 (0.02)	0.018 (0.02)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)
Baden Württemberg	0.001 (0.01)	-0.027** (0.01)	-0.037** (0.02)	-0.037** (0.02)	0.014 (0.01)	0.016* (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)	0.020** (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)
Saarland	-0.006 (0.02)	0.006 (0.03)	-0.007 (0.04)	-0.007 (0.04)	0.104*** (0.02)	0.064*** (0.02)	0.075** (0.03)	0.073** (0.03)	0.012 (0.02)	0.014 (0.02)	0.024 (0.02)	0.025 (0.02)
West Berlin	0.046** (0.02)	0.016 (0.02)	0.001 (0.03)	0.002 (0.03)	0.047*** (0.02)	0.036** (0.02)	0.014 (0.02)	0.014 (0.02)	0.019 (0.02)	0.033** (0.02)	0.024 (0.02)	0.025 (0.02)
East German States												
East Berlin	0.078*** (0.02)	0.023 (0.02)	0.027 (0.03)	0.026 (0.03)	0.039*** (0.01)	-0.001 (0.02)	-0.025 (0.03)	-0.028 (0.02)	0.013 (0.01)	0.014 (0.01)	0.018 (0.02)	0.018 (0.02)
Brandenburg	-0.021* (0.01)	-0.034** (0.02)	0.061*** (0.02)	0.061*** (0.02)	0.020* (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.018 (0.02)	-0.019 (0.02)	0.037*** (0.01)	-0.009 (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)
Mecklenburg W. Pomerania	0.067*** (0.01)	0.065*** (0.02)	0.093*** (0.02)	0.094*** (0.02)	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.014 (0.02)	-0.015 (0.02)	-0.017 (0.02)	0.054*** (0.01)	-0.024** (0.01)	-0.017 (0.01)	-0.017 (0.01)
Saxony	0.029*** (0.01)	-0.037** (0.02)	0.059*** (0.02)	0.059*** (0.02)	0.033*** (0.01)	0.014 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.02)	-0.002 (0.02)	-0.015* (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)	0.011 (0.01)	0.011 (0.01)
Saxony-Anhalt	0.068*** (0.01)	0.063*** (0.02)	0.084*** (0.02)	0.084*** (0.02)	0.032*** (0.01)	0.017 (0.01)	0.010 (0.02)	0.008 (0.02)	0.051*** (0.01)	-0.018* (0.01)	-0.021 (0.01)	-0.021* (0.01)
Thuringia	0.090*** (0.01)	0.100*** (0.02)	0.107*** (0.02)	0.107*** (0.02)	0.028*** (0.01)	0.019 (0.01)	0.022 (0.02)	0.018 (0.02)	-0.020** (0.01)	0.000 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R-squared	0.032	0.133	0.138	0.138	0.035	0.141	0.156	0.162	0.014	0.299	0.302	0.302
Observations	37563	25483	12843	12843	28011	19634	9244	9244	29667	20390	10422	10422

Notes: The table reports conditional marginal effects from logistic regression for discrete changes of the dummy variables from 0 to 1. All models control for survey year effects (reference category is 1991) and are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Federal State dummies: reference category is Bavaria. Additional controls are age, age², secondary education status, employment status, occupation, income, religious affiliation, regular church attendance, party preference, satisfaction with democracy (and its interaction with the East), marital status, and household size. ***1% level of significance, **5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

Table 50 Political Participation: East*Female Interaction with Federal State Controls

	Political Interest		Union Membership		Voting	
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Female	-0.160*** (0.01)	-0.129*** (0.01)	-0.091*** (0.01)	-0.043*** (0.01)	-0.036*** (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)
West German States						
Schleswig-Holstein	-0.013 (0.02)	-0.042** (0.02)	0.060*** (0.02)	0.042* (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.006 (0.02)
Hamburg	0.071*** (0.02)	0.028 (0.02)	-0.010 (0.03)	0.008 (0.03)	-0.028 (0.02)	-0.046* (0.03)
Lower Saxony	0.011 (0.01)	-0.021 (0.01)	0.078*** (0.02)	0.061*** (0.02)	0.010 (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)
Bremen	0.049 (0.03)	-0.004 (0.04)	0.097* (0.05)	0.123** (0.06)	0.030 (0.03)	0.051* (0.03)
North Rhine-Westphalia	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.021* (0.01)	0.057*** (0.01)	0.051*** (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)
Hesse	0.013 (0.01)	-0.022 (0.02)	0.056*** (0.02)	0.064*** (0.02)	0.004 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
Rhineland-Palatinate	-0.019 (0.02)	-0.026 (0.02)	0.021 (0.02)	0.018 (0.02)	-0.019 (0.02)	-0.017 (0.02)
Baden Württemberg	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.030** (0.01)	0.035** (0.01)	0.031** (0.02)	0.006 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)
Saarland	-0.014 (0.03)	-0.002 (0.04)	0.175*** (0.04)	0.096* (0.05)	0.041* (0.02)	0.038 (0.03)
West Berlin	0.022 (0.02)	-0.004 (0.02)	0.021 (0.03)	0.028 (0.03)	-0.003 (0.02)	0.015 (0.02)
East German States						
East Berlin	0.067*** (0.02)	0.016 (0.02)	0.015 (0.03)	-0.029 (0.03)	-0.000 (0.02)	-0.002 (0.02)
Brandenburg	-0.034** (0.01)	-0.035* (0.02)	-0.029** (0.01)	-0.060*** (0.02)	-0.066*** (0.01)	-0.029* (0.02)
Mecklenburg W. Pomerania	-0.070*** (0.02)	-0.065*** (0.02)	-0.031* (0.02)	-0.048** (0.02)	-0.084*** (0.02)	-0.039* (0.02)
Saxony	-0.041*** (0.01)	-0.039** (0.02)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.016 (0.02)	-0.029** (0.01)	-0.013 (0.02)
Saxony-Anhalt	-0.081*** (0.02)	-0.079*** (0.02)	0.025 (0.02)	0.005 (0.02)	-0.072*** (0.01)	-0.042** (0.02)
Thuringia	-0.116*** (0.02)	-0.101*** (0.02)	-0.014 (0.02)	-0.025 (0.02)	-0.056*** (0.02)	-0.028 (0.02)
State*Female Interaction						
West German States						
Schleswig-Holstein*Female	0.051* (0.03)	0.047 (0.03)	-0.011 (0.03)	-0.004 (0.03)	0.022 (0.03)	0.018 (0.03)
Hamburg*Female	-0.008 (0.04)	-0.034 (0.04)	0.074* (0.04)	0.039 (0.05)	0.052 (0.03)	0.054 (0.04)
Lower Saxony*Female	-0.013 (0.02)	-0.000 (0.02)	-0.049*** (0.02)	-0.036* (0.02)	0.004 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)
Bremen*Female	0.085 (0.05)	0.120** (0.06)	0.002 (0.07)	-0.044 (0.08)	-0.061 (0.05)	-0.083* (0.05)
North Rhine-Westphalia*Female	0.008 (0.02)	0.013 (0.02)	-0.042*** (0.01)	-0.037** (0.02)	0.013 (0.01)	-0.006 (0.02)
Hesse*Female	0.009 (0.02)	0.017 (0.02)	-0.045** (0.02)	-0.050** (0.02)	0.006 (0.02)	0.005 (0.02)
Rhineland-Palatinate*Female	0.041	0.045	-0.029	-0.027	0.030	0.016

	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Baden Württemberg*Female	0.005	0.013	-0.044***	-0.034*	0.026	0.012
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Saarland*Female	0.015	0.011	-0.101*	-0.043	-0.059	-0.056
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
West Berlin*Female	0.039	0.029	0.051	0.025	0.039	0.036
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
East German States						
East Berlin*Female	0.008	-0.001	0.039	0.030	0.023	0.009
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Brandenburg*Female	0.025	0.004	0.092***	0.082***	0.047**	0.007
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Mecklenburg W. Pomerania*Female	-0.003	-0.008	0.057***	0.048*	0.035	-0.026
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Saxony*Female	0.022	0.003	0.072***	0.043**	0.024	0.016
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Saxony-Anhalt*Female	0.018	0.027	0.012	0.004	0.022	0.001
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Thuringia*Female	0.036	-0.011	0.078***	0.064***	0.064***	0.030
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	37563	25483	28011	19634	29667	20390

Notes: The table reports results from a linear probability model (LPM). All models are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Federal state dummies: reference category is Bavaria. Additional controls are age, age², secondary education status, employment status, occupation, income, religious affiliation, regular church attendance, party preference, satisfaction with democracy (and its interaction with the East), marital status, and household size. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ***1% level of significance, **5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

Table 51 Gender Gap in Participation: East and West Sample

	Political Interest				Union Membership				Voting			
	West	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West	East
Female	-0.153*** (0.01)	-0.141*** (0.01)	-0.119*** (0.01)	-0.138*** (0.01)	-0.118*** (0.00)	-0.029*** (0.01)	-0.055*** (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.024*** (0.00)	-0.000 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.01)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R-squared	0.030	0.020	0.131	0.138	0.039	0.023	0.151	0.114	0.009	0.016	0.293	0.314
Observations	24404	13159	16500	8983	18554	9457	12931	6685	19227	10440	13155	7235

Notes: The table reports conditional marginal effects from logistic regression for discrete changes of the dummy variables from 0 to 1. All models are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Additional controls are age, age², secondary education status, employment status, occupation, income, religious affiliation, regular church attendance, party preference, satisfaction with democracy (and its interaction with the East), marital status, and household size. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ***1% level of significance, **5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

Table 52 Instrumental Variable Regression (2nd stage): Traditional Gender Attitudes and Political Participation (Federal State Controls)

	Political Interest		Union Membership		Voting	
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Traditional Gender Attitudes (1-19)	-0.069*** (0.02)	-0.160*** (0.06)	-0.030 (0.03)	-0.180*** (0.05)	0.062** (0.03)	0.069 (0.12)
Female	-0.507*** (0.03)	-0.584*** (0.06)	-0.515*** (0.04)	-0.505*** (0.06)	0.039 (0.04)	0.103 (0.18)
West German States						
Hamburg	0.421*** (0.16)	0.162 (0.21)	-0.118 (0.16)	-0.265 (0.17)	0.630*** (0.19)	0.186 (0.28)
Lower Saxony	0.065 (0.08)	0.018 (0.10)	-0.022 (0.09)	-0.061 (0.10)	0.254** (0.10)	0.198 (0.14)
Bremen	0.279 (0.18)	0.196 (0.21)	0.259 (0.17)	0.168 (0.21)	0.140 (0.21)	0.122 (0.37)
North Rhine-Westphalia	-0.009 (0.08)	0.006 (0.09)	-0.089 (0.08)	-0.055 (0.09)	0.211** (0.09)	0.018 (0.14)
Hesse	0.069 (0.08)	-0.079 (0.10)	-0.079 (0.09)	-0.033 (0.10)	0.187* (0.10)	0.109 (0.15)
Rhineland-Palatinate	-0.031 (0.09)	0.062 (0.11)	-0.129 (0.10)	-0.076 (0.12)	0.122 (0.11)	-0.007 (0.16)
Baden Württemberg	0.002 (0.08)	-0.036 (0.09)	-0.184** (0.09)	-0.113 (0.10)	0.193* (0.10)	0.035 (0.14)
Bavaria	0.048 (0.08)	0.089 (0.09)	-0.223*** (0.09)	-0.150 (0.10)	0.217** (0.10)	0.087 (0.15)
Saarland	0.033 (0.16)	0.040 (0.19)	0.323* (0.17)	0.127 (0.20)	0.026 (0.20)	0.455 (0.28)
West Berlin	-0.002 (0.13)	-0.081 (0.15)	-0.130 (0.14)	-0.240* (0.15)	0.187 (0.15)	0.167 (0.25)
East German States						
East Berlin	0.147 (0.14)	-0.186 (0.22)	-0.292* (0.16)	-0.750*** (0.17)	0.401** (0.17)	0.441 (0.35)
Brandenburg	-0.318*** (0.11)	-0.510*** (0.19)	-0.299** (0.13)	-0.735*** (0.16)	0.110 (0.13)	0.237 (0.34)
Mecklenburg W. Pomerania	-0.462*** (0.12)	-0.649*** (0.20)	-0.388*** (0.14)	-0.795*** (0.19)	0.114 (0.15)	0.207 (0.41)
Saxony	-0.297*** (0.10)	-0.411** (0.17)	-0.220* (0.11)	-0.581*** (0.15)	0.255** (0.12)	0.393 (0.29)
Saxony-Anhalt	-0.415*** (0.10)	-0.517*** (0.18)	-0.257** (0.12)	-0.578*** (0.17)	-0.051 (0.13)	0.095 (0.37)
Thuringia	-0.476*** (0.10)	-0.603*** (0.16)	-0.212* (0.12)	-0.481*** (0.17)	0.191 (0.13)	0.232 (0.31)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Wald Test	0.312	0.065	0.977	0.02	0.012	0.481
Observations	13041	9218	13034	9221	9459	6841

Notes: The table reports ivprobit coefficients. Models are weighted to adjust for regional oversampling. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Federal State dummies: reference category is Schleswig Holstein. Additional controls are age, age², secondary education status, employment status, occupation, income, religious affiliation, regular church attendance, party preference, satisfaction with democracy (and its interaction with the East), marital status, and household size. ***1% level of significance, **5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. Source: ALLBUS/GGSS 1980-2012.

8.6 Appendix For Chapter 6

Table 53 Supply and Demand of Child Care for Children aged 1-3

	Supply	Demand	Deficit
West German Länder (excluding Berlin)	24	37	13
Schleswig-Holstein	24	35	11
Hamburg	36	45	9
Lower Saxony	22	35	13
Bremen	21	41	20
North Rhine-Westphalia	18	34	16
Hesse	24	38	14
Rhineland-Palatinate	27	40	13
Baden Württemberg	23	37	14
Bavaria	23	32	9
Saarland	22	35	13
Berlin	42	56	14
East German Länder (excluding Berlin)	52	57	5
Brandenburg	53	58	5
Mecklenburg W. Pomerania	54	60	6
Saxony	46	53	7
Saxony-Anhalt	58	61	3
Thuringia	50	54	4

Source: Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2012) "Kindertagesbetreuung Regional 2012. Ein Vergleich Aller 402 Kreise in Deutschland " Wiesbaden: Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt); Gamperl, Elisabeth. "Was Die Kita-Statistik Verschweigt" Zeit Online, Available from <http://bit.ly/1rcn5ed>. Accessed 06.10.2014.

8.7 Stata Do File

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***** Variable Recoding *****

set more off

*** Sex Dummies ***
recode V653 (1=0 "Male") (2=1 "Female"), gen(Female)
label var Female "Female"
recode V653 (1=1 "Male") (2=0 "Female"), gen(Male)
label var Male "Male"

*** East West Dummies ***
recode V5 (1=0 "West Germany") (2=1 "East Germany"), gen(East)
label var East "East (Place of Interview)"
* Exclude foreign nationals from data:
drop if V1181>1
* 289 observations deleted
drop if V1183>1
* 1165 observations deleted

* 'Q: In welchem Bundesland sind Sie geboren?'
recode V1192 (0=.) (1=0 "Born in West") (2=0 "Born in West") (3=0 "Born in West") (4=0 "Born in West") (5=0 "Born in West") (6=0 "Born in West") (7=0 "Born in West") (8=0 "Born in West") (9=0 "Born in West") (10=0 "Born in West") (11=0 "Born in West") (12=1 "Born in East") (13=1 "Born in East") (14=1 "Born in East") (15=1 "Born in East") (16=1 "Born in East") (17=1 "Born in East") (99=.), gen(BornInEast)
label variable BornInEast "Born In East Germany"

* Q: 'Wo haben Sie wahrend Ihrer Jugendzeit vorwiegend gelebt?'
recode V1221 (0=.) (1=0 "Spent Youth in West") (2=0 "Spent Youth in West") (3=0 "Spent Youth in West") (4=0 "Spent Youth in West") (5=0 "Spent Youth in West") (6=0 "Spent Youth in West") (7=0 "Spent Youth in West") (8=0 "Spent Youth in West") (9=0 "Spent Youth in West") (10=0 "Spent Youth in West") (11=0 "Spent Youth in West") (12=1 "Spent Youth in East") (13=1 "Spent Youth in East") (14=1 "Spent Youth in East") (15=1 "Spent Youth in East") (16=1 "Spent Youth in East") (17=1 "Spent Youth in East") (18=1 "Spent Youth in East") (95=.) (99=.), gen(YouthInEast)
label var YouthInEast "Spent Youth in East(ern) Germany"

gen East2=BornInEast
replace East2=YouthInEast if BornInEast==.
label var East2 "Born or Grew Up in East"

* V1194 (Born in East/West & Interview in East/West)
recode V1194 (0=.) (9=.) (2=1 "East-West Migrant") (else=0), gen(migrant_eastwest)
recode V1194 (0=.) (9=.) (3=1 "West-East Migrant") (else=0), gen(migrant_westeast)

* V1195 (Youth spent in East/West & Interview in East/West)
recode V1195 (0=.) (9=.) (2=1 "East-West Migrant") (else=0), gen(migrant_eastwest2)
recode V1195 (0=.) (9=.) (3=1 "West-East Migrant") (else=0), gen(migrant_westeast2)

gen migrant_EW=migrant_eastwest
replace migrant_EW=migrant_eastwest2 if migrant_eastwest==.
label var migrant_EW "Migrant (East to West)"

gen migrant_WE=migrant_westeast
replace migrant_WE=migrant_westeast2 if migrant_westeast==.
label var migrant_WE "Migrant (West to East)"
```

```

gen East_BOGIE = East*East2
label var East_BOGIE "East*Born/Grew Up in East Interaction"

*** Federal State Dummies ***
rename V1229 fedstates
label var fedstates "Federal States"
label define fedstates 10 "Schleswig-Holstein" 20 "Hamburg" 30 "Lower Saxony" 40 "Bremen" 50 "North
Rhine-Westphalia" 60 "Hesse" 70 "Rhineland-Palatinate" 80 "Baden Württemberg" 90 "Bavaria" 100
"Saarland" 111 "West Berlin" 112 "East Berlin" 120 "Brandenburg" 130 "Mecklenburg W. Pomerania" 140
"Saxony" 150 "Saxony-Anhalt" 160 "Thuringia"
char fedstates [omit] 90

*fvset base none fedstates
recode fedstates (112=1 "East Berlin") (120=2 "Brandenburg") (130=3 "Mecklenburg W.
Pomerania")(150=4 "Saxony-Anhalt")(160=5 "Thuringia")(140=6 "Saxony") (else=0), gen(EastStates)
char EastStates [omit]0

/*
recode fedstates (112=1 "East-Berlin") (else=0), gen(EastBerlin)
label var EastBerlin "East-Berlin"
recode fedstates (120=1 "Brandenburg") (else=0), gen(Brandenburg)
label var Brandenburg "Brandenburg"
recode fedstates (130=1 "Mecklenburg-Vorpommern") (else=0), gen(Mecklenburg)
label var Mecklenburg "Mecklenburg"
recode fedstates (140=1 "Saxony") (else=0), gen(Saxony)
label var Saxony "Saxony"
recode fedstates (150=1 "Saxony-Anhalt") (else=0), gen(SaxonyAnhalt)
label var SaxonyAnhalt "Saxony-Anhalt"
recode fedstates (160=1 "Thuringia") (else=0), gen(Thuringia)
label var Thuringia "Thuringia"
*/

*** Age Time Period Cohort Variables ***
rename V2 surveyyear
label variable surveyyear "Year of Survey"
char surveyyear [omit]1991

recode V651 (997=.) (999=.), gen(age)
label variable age "Age"
gen age2 = (age^2)/100
label var age2 "Age Squared"

/*
recode V555 (1=1 "18-29") (2=2 "30-44") (3=3 "45-59") (4=4 "60-74") (5=5 "75-89") (6=6 "90<") (7=.)
(8=.), gen(agegroup_6)
char agegroup_6[omit]3
recode V555 (1=1 "18-29") (2=2 "30-44") (3=3 "45-59") (4=4 "60-74") (5/6=5 "75 and Over")(else=.),
gen(agegroup_5)
char agegroup_5[omit]3
recode age (18/34=1 "18-34") (35/54=2 "35-54") (55/70=3 "55-70") (71/102=4 "71<"), gen(agegroup_4)
char agegroup_4[omit]2
recode age (18/39=1 "18-39") (40/64=2 "40-64") (65/102=3 "65-102"), gen(agegroup_3)
char agegroup_3[omit]2
*/

recode V649 (9997=.) (9999=.), gen(yob)
label var yob "Year of Birth"

```

```

recode yob (1891/1930=1 "Born 1891-1930") (1931/1948=2 "Born 1931-1948") (1949/1961=3 "Born
1949-1961") (1962/1974=4 "Born 1962-1974")(1975/1993=5 "Born 1975-1993"), gen(cohort_5)
label var cohort_5 "Birth Cohorts (5 Categories)"
char cohort_5 [omit]5

recode V652 (1=1 "18-29 Years") (2=2 "30-44 Years") (3=3 "45-59 Years") (4=4 "60-74 Years") (5=5 "75-
89 Years") (6=6 "89 Years or Older") (else=.), gen(agegroup)
label var agegroup "Age Group"

/* recode yob (1891/1930=1 "Born 1891-1930") (1931/1948=2 "Born 1931-1948") (1949/1963=3 "Born
1949-1963")(1964/1974=4 "Born 1964-1974")(1975/1985=5 "Born 1975-1985") (1986/1992=6 "Born
1986-1992"), gen(cohort_6)
label var cohort_6 "Birth Cohorts (6 Categories)"
char cohort_6 [omit]5

recode yob (1891/1930=1 "Born 1891-1930") (1931/1948=2 "Born 1931-1948") (1949/1974=3 "Born
1949-1974") (1975/1992=4 "Born 1975-1992"), gen(cohort_4)
label var cohort_4 "Birth Cohorts (4 Categories)"
fvset base non cohort_4
char cohort_5 [omit]5
*/

recode cohort_5 (1=1 "Born 1891-1930") (else= 0 "All else"), gen(cohort1)
recode cohort_5 (2=1 "Born 1931-1948") (else= 0 "All else"), gen(cohort2)
recode cohort_5 (3=1 "Born 1949-1961") (else= 0 "All else"), gen(cohort3)
recode cohort_5 (4=1 "Born 1962-1974") (else= 0 "All else"), gen(cohort4)
recode cohort_5 (5=1 "Born 1975-1993") (else= 0 "All else"), gen(cohort5)

recode surveyyear (1990=1) (else=0), gen(Year1990)
label var Year1990 "1990"
recode surveyyear (1991=1) (else=0), gen(Year1991)
label var Year1991 "1991"
recode surveyyear (1992=1) (else=0), gen(Year1992)
label var Year1992 "1992"
recode surveyyear (1994=1) (else=0), gen(Year1994)
label var Year1994 "1994"
recode surveyyear (1996=1) (else=0), gen(Year1996)
label var Year1996 "1996"
recode surveyyear (1998=1) (else=0), gen(Year1998)
label var Year1998 "1998"
recode surveyyear (2000=1) (else=0), gen(Year2000)
label var Year2000 "2000"
recode surveyyear (2002=1) (else=0), gen(Year2002)
label var Year2002 "2002"
recode surveyyear (2004=1) (else=0), gen(Year2004)
label var Year2004 "2004"
recode surveyyear (2006=1) (else=0), gen(Year2006)
label var Year2006 "2006"
recode surveyyear (2008=1) (else=0), gen(Year2008)
label var Year2008 "2008"
recode surveyyear (2010=1) (else=0), gen(Year2010)
label var Year2010 "2010"
recode surveyyear (2012=1) (else=0), gen(Year2012)
label var Year2012 "2012"

*** Marital Status ***
recode V845 (1=1 "Married") (2=2 "Seperated") (3=3 "Widowed") (4=4 "Divorced") (5=5 "Single") (6=.)
(99=.), gen(MarriageStatus_5)
label var MarriageStatus_5 "Marital Status"

```

```

char MarriageStatus_5 [omit]5

recode V845 (1=1 "Married/Widowed") (2=2 "Seperated/Divorced") (3=1 "Married/Widowed") (4=2
"Separated/Divorced") (5=3 "Single") (6=.) (99=.), gen(MarriageStatus_3)
label var MarriageStatus_3 "Marital Status"
char MarriageStatus_3 [omit]3

recode V845 (1=1 "Married/Widowed") (2=0 "Not Married") (3=1 "Married/Widowed") (4=0 "Not
Married") (5=0 "Not Married") (6=.) (99=.), gen(Married)
label var Married "Married/Widowed"
recode V845 (1=0 "Else") (2=1 "Separated/Divorced") (3=0 "Else") (4=1 "Separated/Divorce") (5=0
"Else") (6=.) (99=.), gen(Divorced)
label var Divorced "Separated/Divorced"
recode V845 (1/4=0 "Else")(5=1 "Single") (6=.) (99=.), gen(Single)
label var Single "Single"

recode V1346 (0=0 "No Children") (1/12=1 "Children") (else=.), gen(Children)
label var Children "Children"

recode V1347 (0=0 "No Small Children") (1/5=1 "Small Children") (else=.), gen(SmallChildren)
label var SmallChildren "Children Under 18 YoA"

recode V1332 (1=1 "One Person Household") (2=2 "Two Person Household") (3=3 "Three Person
Household") (4=4 "Four Person Household") (5/14=5 "Five or More Person Household") (else=.),
gen(household_5cat)
label var household_5cat "Household Size"

*** Education Status ***
recode V668 (1=1 "Without Qualification") (2=2 "Low Secondary Education") (3=3 "Intermediary
Secondary Education") (4=4 "High Secondary Education") (5=4 "High Secondary Education") (6/7=5
"Still at School/Other") (99=.), gen(SecondaryEducation_5)
label var SecondaryEducation_5 "Secondary Education Level"
char SecondaryEducation_5 [omit]1

recode V668 (1=1 "Without Qualification") (2/7=0 "Else") (99=.), gen(NoSecondaryEducation)
label var NoSecondaryEducation "No Secondary Education"
recode V668 (1=0 "Else") (2=1 "Low Secondary Education") (3/7=0 "Else")(99=.),
gen(LowSecondaryEducation)
label var LowSecondaryEducation "Low Secondary Education"
recode V668 (1/2=0 "Else")(3=1 "Intermediary Secondary Education") (4/7=0 "Else")(99=.),
gen(IntermediateSecondaryEducation)
label var IntermediateSecondaryEducation "Intermediary Secondary Education"
recode V668 (1/3=0 "Else")(4/5=1 "High Secondary Education") (6/7=0 "Else") (99=.),
gen(HighSecondaryEducation)
label var HighSecondaryEducation "High Secondary Education"

recode V580 (0=0 "No University Degree") (1=1 "University Degree") (6=0 "No University Degree")
(9=.), gen(University_Degree)
label var University_Degree "University Education"

*** Employment Status ***
recode V688 (1=1 "Full-Time Employment") (2=2 "Part-Time Employment") (3=3 "Irregular
Employment") (4/5=4 "Not Working") (7=5 "Housewife/husband") (6=6 "Other") (8/10=6 "Other")
(11=4 "Not Working") (12=6 "Other") (99=.), gen(EmploymentStatus)
label var EmploymentStatus "Employment Status"
char EmploymentStatus [omit]1

recode V688 (1/3=1 "Employed") (6=1 "Employed") (12=1 "Employed") (4/5=0 "Unemployed or not in
Labour Force") (11=0 "Unemployed or not in Labour Force") (else=.), gen(Employed)

```

```

label var Employed "Employed"

*recode V1046 (0=. ) (1/7=1 "Working Mother") (9=1 "Working Mother") (8=0 "Mother was not
Working") (91=0 "Mother was not Working") (95=. ) (98=. ) (99=. ), gen(MotherEmployed)
*label var MotherEmployed "Working Mother"

recode V690 (0=0 "Not Applicable") (1=1 "Agriculture") (9=1 "Agriculture") (2=2 "Academia") (3=3
"Self-Employed") (4=4 "Public Sector") (5=5 "Private Sector Employee") (6=6 "Manual Worker") (7/8=7
"Other") (9=7 "Other")(else=.), gen(occupation)
label var occupation "Occupation"
char occupation [omit]0

recode V690 (0=0 "Else") (1=1 "Agriculture") (9=1 "Agriculture") (2/8=0 "Else")(else=.), gen(agriculture)
label var occupation "Agriculture"
recode V690 (0/1=0 "Else")(2=1 "Academia") (3/9=0 "Else") (else=.), gen(academia)
label var academia "Academia"
recode V690 (0/2=0 "Else")(3=1 "Self-Employed") (4/9=0 "Else")(else=.), gen(selfemployed)
label var selfemployed "Self-Employed"
recode V690 (0/3=0 "Else")(4=1 "Public Sector") (5/9=0 "Else")(else=.), gen(publicsector)
label var publicsector "Public Sector Employee"
recode V690 (0/4=0 "Else") (5=1 "Private Sector Employee") (6/9=0 "Else")(else=.), gen(privatesector)
label var privatesector "Private Sector Employee"
recode V690 (0/5=0 "Else") (6=1 "Manual Worker") (7/9=0 "Else")(else=.), gen(manualworker)
label var manualworker "Manual Worker"
recode V690 (0/6=0 "Else") (7/8=1 "Other") (else=.), gen(employedother)
label var employedother "Other"

*** Income ***
rename V815 income
label var income "Net. Personal Income"
replace income=. if income>99996

/*
gen income2 = income/1000
label var income2 "Personal Income(per 1000€)"

gen log_inc = log(income)
*/

recode income (0/899=1 "Less than 900€") (900/1499=2 "900-1499€") (1500/2580=3 "1500-2599€")
(2600/60000=4 "2600€ or More") (99996/99999=.), gen(incomecat)
label var incomecat "Personal Monthly Income"
char incomecat [omit]1

recode incomecat (1=1 "Less than 900€") (else=0 "Else"), gen(income_1)
label var income_1 "Less than 900€"
recode incomecat (2=1 "900-1499€") (else=0 "Else"), gen(income_2)
label var income_2 "900-1499€"
recode incomecat (3=1 "1500-2599€") (else=0 "Else"), gen(income_3)
label var income_3 "1500-2599€"
recode incomecat (4=1 "2600€ or More") (else=0 "else"), gen(income_4)
label var income_4 "2600€ or More"

/*
gen deflator=.
replace deflator=79.47358952 if surveyyear==1990
replace deflator=81.92541313 if surveyyear==1991
replace deflator=86.3497748 if surveyyear==1992
replace deflator=92.02903966 if surveyyear==1994

```

```

replace deflator=94.47701575 if surveyyear==1996
replace deflator=95.28462237 if surveyyear==1998
replace deflator=94.82568626 if surveyyear==2000
replace deflator=97.26541049 if surveyyear==2002
replace deflator=99.38558642 if surveyyear==2004
replace deflator=100.3120125 if surveyyear==2006
replace deflator=102.73627 if surveyyear==2008
replace deflator=105.0234815 if surveyyear==2010

```

*Inflation=Consumer Price Index (adjusting income by the consumer price index)

```

gen inflation=.
replace inflation=75.91289886 if surveyyear==1991
replace inflation=79.76724731 if surveyyear==1992
replace inflation=85.59125278 if surveyyear==1994
replace inflation=88.32560017 if surveyyear==1996
replace inflation=90.82822321 if surveyyear==1998
replace inflation=92.6897422 if surveyyear==2000
replace inflation=95.87164233 if surveyyear==2002
replace inflation=98.47665405 if surveyyear==2004
replace inflation=101.5774292 if surveyyear==2006
replace inflation=106.6432306 if surveyyear==2008
replace inflation=108.1575626 if surveyyear==2010

```

```

gen adj_inc=income*(100/inflation)
label var adj_inc "Income"

```

```

gen ladj_inc=log(adj_inc+1)
label var ladj_inc "Log of Personal Income"

```

```

recode V708 (0=1 "No personal income") (1/4=2 "500€ or less") (5/8=3 "500-1000€") (9/14=4 "1000-2000€") (15/18=5 "2000-4000€") (19/22=6 "4000€ or more") (97=. ) (98=. ) (99=. ), gen(income_6)
label var income_6 "Monthly Income"
char income_6 [omit]1

```

```

recode V708 (0/4=1 "500€ or less") (5/12=2 "500-1500€") (13/22=3 "1500€ or more") (else=. ),
gen(income_3)
label var income_3 "Monthly Income"
char income_3 [omit]2

```

*** NB: Definition of poverty in Germany: those earning 920€ or less per month (including benefit payments)

*** Religion ***

```

recode V557 (1/5=1 "religious") (6=0 "not religious") (7=. ) (99=. ), gen(religBin)
label var religBin "Religious"

```

```

recode V654 (1=1 "Protestant") (2=1 "Protestant") (3=2 "Catholic") (4=3 "Other") (5=3 "Other") (6=4 "Not Religious") (7=. ) (9=. ), gen(religcat)
label var religcat "Religion"
char religcat [omit]4

```

```

recode religcat (1=1 "Protestant") (else=0), gen(protestant)
recode religcat (2=1 "Catholic") (else=0), gen(catholic)
recode religcat (3=1 "Other") (else=0), gen(other)
recode religcat (4=1 "Atheist") (else=0), gen(atheist)

```

```

recode V657 (0=. ) (1=1 "Regular Church Attendance") (2=1 "Regular Church Attendance") (3=1 "Regular Church Attendance") (4/6=0 "Irregular or No Church Attendance") (7=. ) (9=. ), gen(RegChurchAttend)

```

```

label var RegChurchAttend "Regular Church Attendance"

gen protestant_rca = protestant*RegChurchAttend
gen catholic_rca = catholic*RegChurchAttend
gen other_rca = other*RegChurchAttend

*** Other Control Variables ***

recode V1104 (1=0 "Raised in Nuclear Family") (2/3=1 "Raised in Single Parent Family") (else=.),
gen(singleparent)
label var singleparent "Raised in Single Parent Household"

recode V1159 (1/9=0 "Mother Worked Outside the Home") (91=1 "Mother was Housewife") (else=.),
gen(housewife)
label var housewife "Mother was Houswife"

recode V844 (0=.) (1=1 "City") (2=2 "Suburb") (3=3 "Town") (4=4 "Village") (5=5 "Hamlet") (9=.),
gen(residence)
label var residence "Place of Residence"

recode residence (1=1 "City") (else=0 "Else"), gen(city)
label var city "City"
recode residence (2=1 "Suburb") (else=0 "Else"), gen(suburb)
label var suburb "Suburb"
recode residence (3=1 "Town") (else=0 "Else"), gen(town)
label var town "Town"
recode residence (4=1 "Village") (else=0 "Else"), gen(village)
label var village "Village"
recode residence (5=1 "Hamlet") (else=0 "Else"), gen(hamlet)
label var hamlet "Hamlet"

recode V844 (0=.) (1=1 "Urban Resident") (2/5=0 "Not Urban Resident") (9=.), gen(urbanresident)
label var urbanresident "Urban Resident"

recode V478 (1=1 "Less than One Hour a Day") (2=2 "One to Three Hours a Day") (3/5=3 "More than
three Hours a Day") (else=.), gen(HighTVExposure)
label var HighTVExposure "Daily TV Consumption (1-3)"

recode V325 (0=.) (8=.) (9=.) (1=4 "strong sense of belonging to GDR") (2=3 "sense of belonging to
GDR") (3=2 "hardly a sense of belonging to GDR") (4=1 "no sense of belonging to GDR"),
gen(GDRBelonging)
label var GDRBelonging "Sense of Belonging to Former GDR"

recode GDRBelonging (3/4=1 "Feelings of Belonging to GDR") (1/2=0 "Hardly or No Feelings of
Belonging to the GDR"), gen(GDRBelongingBin)
label var GDRBelongingBin "Sense of Belonging to Former GDR"

recode V324 (0=.) (8=.) (9=.) (1=4 "strong sense of belonging to FRG") (2=3 "sense of belonging to
FRG") (3=2 "hardly a sense of belonging to FRG") (4=1 "no sense of belonging to FRG"),
gen(FRGBelonging)
label var FRGBelonging "Sense of Belonging to Former FRG"

recode FRGBelonging (3/4=1 "Feelings of Belonging to FRG") (1/2=0 "Hardly or No Feelings of
Belonging to the FRG"), gen(FRGBelongingBin)
label var FRGBelongingBin "Sense of Belonging to Former FRG"

```

```

recode V22 (0=. ) (9=. ) (1=6 "Very satisfied") (2=5 "Pretty satisfied") (3=4 "More or less satisfied") (4=3
"More or less dissatisfied") (5=2 "Pretty dissatisfied") (6=1 "Very dissatisfied") (8=7 "Don't Know") ,
gen(satisfiedwithdemocracy)

```

```

label var satisfiedwithdemocracy "Satisfaction with Democracy"

```

```

recode V17 (0=. ) (8=. ) (9=. ) (1=1 "Very satisfied") (2=1 "pretty satisfied") (3=1 "more or less satisfied")
(4=0 "more or less dissatisfied") (5=0 "pretty dissatisfied") (6=0 "Very dissatisfied"),

```

```

gen(satisfiedwithdemocracyBin)

```

```

label var satisfiedwithdemocracyBin "Satisfied with Democracy"

```

```

recode V935 (0=. ) (1/2=1 "Houshold Done by Woman") (3/6=0 "Household Done Jointly, by Man or
Cleaner") (else=.), gen(cleaning)

```

```

label var cleaning "Household Done by Woman"

```

```

recode V1521 (5=1 "Month of Mothers' Day") (0=. ) (99=. ) (else=0 "Other Month"), gen(May)

```

```

label var May "May"

```

```

recode V394 (0=. ) (97=. ) (99=. ), gen(importancefamily)

```

```

*** NB 1= not important; 7 = important

```

```

*label var importancefamily "Importance of Family (1-7 Scale)"

```

```

*recode V395 (0=. ) (97=. ) (99=. ), gen(importancejob)

```

```

*label var importancejob "Importance of Job (1-7 Scale)"

```

```

*recode V400 (0=. ) (97=. ) (99=. ), gen(importancepolitics)

```

```

*label var importancepolitics "Importance of Politics (1-7scale)"

```

```

recode V20 (0=. ) (8=. ) (9=. ) (1=6 "Very satisfied") (2=5 "pretty satisfied") (3=4 "more or less satisfied")
(4=3 "more or less dissatisfied") (5=2 "pretty dissatisfied") (6=1 "Very dissatisfied"),

```

```

gen(satisfiedwithgovernment)

```

```

label var satisfiedwithgovernment "Satisfaction With Current Government (1-6 Scale)"

```

```

recode V20 (0=. ) (8=. ) (9=. ) (1=1 "Very satisfied") (2=1 "pretty satisfied") (3=1 "more or less satisfied")
(4=0 "more or less dissatisfied") (5=0 "pretty dissatisfied") (6=0 "Very dissatisfied"),

```

```

gen(satisfiedwithgovernmentBin)

```

```

label var satisfiedwithgovernmentBin "Satisfied With Current Government"

```

```

recode V1687 (0=. ) (1=0 "Male Interviewer") (2=1 "Female Interviewer") (9=. ), gen(FemaleInterviewer)

```

```

label var FemaleInterviewer "Female Interviewer"

```

```

recode V1722 (0=0 "Partner Not Present") (1=1 "Partner Present") (6=. ) (9=. ), gen(partnerpresent)

```

```

label var partnerpresent "Partner present during interview"

```

```

*** Political Participation Variables ***

```

```

*** NB Coded so that 1/(higher) end values correspond to (higher) political interest or activity

```

```

recode V25 (0=. ) (1=5 "very strongly interested") (2=4 "strongly interested") (3=3 "interested") (4=2 "not
very interested") (5=1 "not at all interested") (9=. ), gen(polint)

```

```

label var polint "Interest in Politics"

```

```

recode V25 (0=. ) (1=5 "very strong political interest") (2=4 "strong political interest") (3=3 "average
political interest") (4=2 "little political interest") (5=1 "No political interest") (9=. ), gen(polint_5cat)

```

```

label var polint_5cat "Interest in Politics (1/5)"

```

```

recode V25 (0=. ) (1/3=1 "Interested") (4/5=0 "Not Interested") (9=. ), gen(polintBin)

```

```

recode V33 (1=1 "Voted in last General Election") (2=0 "Did Not Vote in last General Election") (else=. ),
gen(votelast)

```

```

label var votelast "Voted in Last General Election"

```

```

recode V1652 (0=0 "Not a Party Member") (1=1 "Party Member") (7=. ) (9=. ), gen(partymember)

```

```

label var partymember "Party Membership"

```

```

recode V1639 (2=0 "Not a Trade Union Member") (1=1 "Trade Union Member") (else=.),
gen(unionmember)
label var union "Trade Union Membership"

recode V128 (1=1 "Agree") (2=1 "Agree") (3=0 "Don't Agree") (4=0 "Don't Agree") (else=.),
gen(influenceonpolitics)
label var influenceonpolitics "People Like Me Don't Have an Influence on Government"
recode V129 (1=1 "Agree") (2=1 "Agree") (3=0 "Don't Agree") (4=0 "Don't Agree")
(else=.),gen(understandingofpolitics)
label var understandingofpolitics "Politics is too complicated for People like me to understand it"
recode V511 (1=0 "Agree") (2=1 "Disagree") (else=.), gen(efficacy)
label var efficacy "Most politicians are not interested in citizens' problems"

recode V24 (0=.) (1=1 "Left of Center") (2=1 "Left of Center") (3=1 "Left of Center") (4=1 "Left of
Center") (5=0 "Center") (6=0 "Right of Center") (7=0 "Right of Center") (8=0 "Right of Center") (9=0
"Right of Center") (10=0 "Right of Center") (97=.) (98=.) (99=.), gen(LeftBin)
label var LeftBin "Left of Centre"
recode V24 (0=.) (1=0 "Left of Center") (2=0 "Left of Center") (3=0 "Left of Center") (4=0 "Left of
Center") (5=0 "Center") (6=1 "Right of Center") (7=1 "Right of Center") (8=1 "Right of Center") (9=1
"Right of Center") (10=1 "Right of Center") (97=.) (98=.) (99=.), gen(RightBin)
label var RightBin "Right of Center"
recode V24 (97=.) (98=.) (99=.), gen(LeftRightScale)
label var LeftRightScale "Left Right Identification (Scale)"

recode V28 (0=.) (1=1 "CDU/CSU") (2=2 "SPD") (3=3 "FDP") (4=4 "Green Party") (6=5 "Left Party")
(5=6 "Other") (90=6 "Other") (else=.), gen(generalpartyreference)
label var generalpartyreference "General Party Preference (excludes no party preference)"

recode V29 (0=.) (1=1 "CDU/CSU") (2=2 "SPD") (3=3 "FDP") (4=4 "Green Party") (5=.) (6=5 "Left
Party") (20/90=6 "Other") (91=7 "None (Would Not Vote)") (else=.), gen(currentpartyreference)
label var currentpartyreference "Current Party Preference for National Elections"

recode currentpartyreference (1=1 "CDU/CSU") (else=0), gen(CDU)
label var CDU "CDU/CSU"
recode currentpartyreference (2=1 "SPD") (else=0), gen(SPD)
label var SPD "SPD"
recode currentpartyreference (3=1 "FDP") (else=0), gen(FDP)
label var FDP "FDP"
recode currentpartyreference (4=1 "Green Party") (else=0), gen(Green)
label var Green "Die Gruenen"
recode currentpartyreference (5=1 "Left Party") (else=0), gen(LeftParty)
label var LeftParty "Left Party"
recode currentpartyreference (6=1 "Other") (else=0), gen(otherpartyreference)
label var otherpartyreference "Other Party"
recode currentpartyreference (7=1 "Would not Vote") (else=0), gen(nopartyreference)
label var nopartyreference "Would not vote"

*** Available for survey years 1998, 2002, 2008:
recode V83 (0=0 "Not participated in initiative") (1=1 "Participated in initiative") (6=.) (9=.), gen(partininit)
label var partininit "Participation in Citizen Initiative"
recode V84 (0=0 "Not worked in a party") (1=1 "Worked in a party") (6=.) (9=.), gen(partywork)
label var partywork "Party Work"
recode V91 (0=0 "Not participated in demonstration") (1=1 "Participated in demonstration") (6=.) (9=.),
gen(partindemo)
label var partindemo "Participation in Demonstration"
*recode V54 (0=.) (1=1 "Participated in Boycott") (2/4=0 "Not Participated in Boycott") (else=.),
gen(partinboyc)
*label var partinboyc "Boycott"
recode V94 (0=0 "Not participated in petition") (1=1 "Participated in petition") (6=.) (9=.), gen(partinsig)

```

label var partinsig "Petition"

*** Only available for surveyyear 2008:

recode V96 (0=0 "Not participated in critical consumerism") (1=1 "Participated in critical consumerism") (6=.) (9=.), gen(partinconsumerism)

label var partinconsumerism "Participated in Political Consumerism"

recode V97(0=0 "Not participated in online protest") (1=1 "Participated in online protest") (6=.) (9=.), gen(partinonlinepro)

label var partinonlinepro "Participated in Online Protest"

gen collectiveactivism= (partininit + partindemo + partywork)

label var collectiveactivism "Participation in Collective Types of Political Activites"

gen privateactivism= (partinsig + partinonlinepro + votelast)

label var privateactivism "Participation in Private Types of Political Activities"

*** Available for 1998 and 2008:

recode V101 (0=0 "Not participated in initiative") (1=1 "Participated in initiative") (6=.) (9=.), gen(partininit_2)

label var partininit_2 "Participation in Citizen Initiative in past 2 years"

recode V102 (0=0 "Not worked in a party") (1=1 "Worked in a party") (6=.) (9=.), gen(partywork_2)

label var partywork_2 "Party Work in past 2 years"

recode V109 (0=0 "Not participated in demonstration") (1=1 "Participated in demonstration") (6=.) (9=.), gen(partindemo_2)

label var partindemo_2 "Participation in Demonstration in past 2 Years"

*recode V54 (0=.) (1=1 "Participated in Boycott") (2/4=0 "Not Participated in Boycott") (else=.), gen(partinboyc)

*label var partinboyc "Boycott"

recode V112 (0=0 "Not participated in petition") (1=1 "Participated in petition") (6=.) (9=.), gen(partinsig_2)

label var partinsig_2 "Signed a Petition in past 2 years"

*** Only available for surveyyear 2008:

recode V114 (0=0 "Not participated in critical consumerism") (1=1 "Participated in critical consumerism") (6=.) (9=.), gen(partinconsumerism_2)

label var partinconsumerism_2 "Participated in Political Consumerism in past 2 Years"

recode V115 (0=0 "Not participated in online protest") (1=1 "Participated in online protest") (6=.) (9=.), gen(partinonlinepro_2)

label var partinonlinepro_2 "Participated in Online Protest in Past 2 Years"

gen collectiveactivism_2= (partininit_2 + partindemo_2 + partywork_2)

label var collectiveactivism_2 "Participation in Collective Types of Political Activites in past 2 years"

gen privateactivism_2= (partinsig_2 + partinonlinepro_2 + votelast)

label var privateactivism_2 "Participation in Private Types of Political Activities in past 2 years"

*** Gender Attitude Variables ***

*** NB Gender Attitude variables recoded so that 1&2/0 refer to gender egalitarian and 2&3/1 refer to traditional gender attitudes

* 'A working mother can establish just as loving and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who doesn't work'

recode V332 (1=1 "strongly agree") (2=2 "rather agree") (3=3 "rather disagree") (4=4 "strongly disagree") (8=.) (9=.) (0=.), gen(v332)

recode V332(1=0 "Tend to Agree") (2=0 "Tend to Agree") (3=1 "Tend to Disagree") (4=1 "Tend to Disagree") (8=.) (9=.) (0=.), gen(v332Bin)

* 'It is more important for a wife to help her husband with his career than to pursue her own career'

```

recode V333 (1=4 "strongly agree") (2=3 "rather agree") (3=2 "rather disagree") (4=1 "strongly disagree")
(8=.) (9=.) (0=.), gen(v333)
recode V333 (1=1 "Tend to Agree") (2=1 "Tend to Agree") (3=0 "Tend to Disagree") (4=0 "Tend to
Disagree") (8=.) (9=.) (0=.), gen(v333Bin)

```

```

* 'A small child is bound to suffer if his or her mother goes out to work'
recode V334 (1=4 "strongly agree") (2=3 "rather agree") (3=2 "rather disagree") (4=1 "strongly disagree")
(8=.) (9=.) (0=.), gen(v334)
recode V334 (1=1 "Tend to Agree") (2=1 "Tend to Agree") (3=0 "Tend to Disagree") (4=0 "Tend to
Disagree") (8=.) (9=.) (0=.), gen(v334Bin)

```

```

* 'It is much better for everyone concerned if the man goes out to work and the woman stays at home and
looks after the house and children'
recode V335 (1=4 "strongly agree") (2=3 "rather agree") (3=2 "rather disagree") (4=1 "strongly disagree")
(8=.) (9=.) (0=.), gen(v335)
recode V335 (1=1 "Tend to Agree") (2=1 "Tend to Agree") (3=0 "Tend to Disagree") (4=0 "Tend to
Disagree") (8=.) (9=.) (0=.), gen(v335Bin)

```

```

* 'A child actually benefits from his or her mother having a job rather than just concentrating on the home'
recode V336 (1=1 "strongly agree") (2=2 "rather agree") (3=3 "rather disagree") (4=4 "strongly disagree")
(8=.) (9=.) (0=.), gen(v336)
recode V336 (1=0 "Tend to Agree") (2=0 "Tend to Agree") (3=1 "Tend to Disagree") (4=1 "Tend to
Disagree") (8=.) (9=.) (0=.), gen(v336Bin)

```

```

* 'A married woman should not work if there are not enough jobs to go around and her husband is able to
support the family'
recode V337 (1=4 "strongly agree") (2=3 "rather agree") (3=2 "rather disagree") (4=1 "strongly disagree")
(8=.) (9=.) (0=.), gen(v337)
recode V337 (1=1 "Tend to Agree") (2=1 "Tend to Agree") (3=0 "Tend to Disagree") (4=0 "Tend to
Disagree") (8=.) (9=.) (0=.), gen(v337Bin)

```

*** Mokken Scale Analysis ***

```

* go to help/search; find online: msp install
* ssc install msp
* msp v337Bin v333Bin v334Bin v335Bin v336Bin v337Bin
* msp v337 v333 v334 v335 v336 v337
*shows that these variables are on a scale

```

```

gen genderatt= (v332 + v333 + v334 + v335 + v336 + v337)-5
label var genderatt "Traditional Gender Attitudes (1-19)"

```

```

gen maritalroles= (v333 + v335 + v337)-2
label var maritalroles "Attitudes Towards Women's Marital Roles"

```

```

gen motherhood= (v337 + v334 + v336)-2
label var motherhood "Attitudes Towards Motherhood"

```

*** Interaction Terms ***

```

gen surveyyearEast=surveyyear*East
label var surveyyearEast "Survey Year* East"
gen surveyyearFemale=surveyyear*Female
label var surveyyearFemale "Female* Survey Year"
gen FemaleEast= Female*East
label var FemaleEast "Female*East"
gen FemaleWithChildren= Female*Children
label var FemaleWithChildren "Women with Children"

```

```

gen MarriedWomen= Female*Married
label var MarriedWomen "Married* Women"
gen EastGenderatt = East*genderatt
label var EastGenderatt "East*Traditional Gender Attitudes"
gen WomenGenderatt = Female*genderatt
label var WomenGenderatt "Women*Traditional Gender Attitudes"
gen WomenMaritalroles = Female*maritalroles
label var WomenMaritalroles "Women*Attitudes Toward Marital Roles"
gen WomenMotherhood = Female*motherhood
label var WomenMotherhood "Women*Attitudes Toward Motherhood"
gen SatisfiedEast = satisfiedwithdemocracyBin*East
label var SatisfiedEast "Satisfaction with Democracy and East Interaction"

```

```

gen EastCohort1 = East*cohort1
gen EastCohort2 = East*cohort2
gen EastCohort3 = East*cohort3
gen EastCohort4 = East*cohort4
gen EastCohort5 = East*cohort5

```

```

gen East1992 = East*Year1992
gen East1996 = East*Year1996
gen East2000 = East*Year2000
gen East2004 = East*Year2004
gen East2008 = East*Year2008
gen East2012 = East*Year2012

```

```

gen Women1992 = Female*Year1992
gen Women1996 = Female*Year1996
gen Women2000 = Female*Year2000
gen Women2004 = Female*Year2004
gen Women2008 = Female*Year2008

```

```

gen fem10= Female*_Ifedstates_10
gen fem20= Female*_Ifedstates_20
gen fem30= Female*_Ifedstates_30
gen fem40= Female*_Ifedstates_40
gen fem50= Female*_Ifedstates_50
gen fem60= Female*_Ifedstates_60
gen fem70= Female*_Ifedstates_70
gen fem80= Female*_Ifedstates_80
* Bavaria = basline
gen fem100= Female*_Ifedstates_100
gen fem111= Female*_Ifedstates_111
gen fem112= Female*_Ifedstates_112
gen fem120= Female*_Ifedstates_120
gen fem130= Female*_Ifedstates_130
gen fem140= Female*_Ifedstates_140
gen fem150= Female*_Ifedstates_150
gen fem160= Female*_Ifedstates_160

```

*** WEIGHTS ***

* V1740 - Weight to adjust for East Oversampling:

* Mit dem personenbezogenen Ost-West-Gewicht in V1740 können die ALLBUS-Personenstichproben der Erhebungsjahre 1994 bis 1996 und ab 2000 so gewichtet werden, dass gesamtdeutsche Auswertungen, die auf Personen als solche zielen, ohne Trennung zwischen Westdeutschland und Ostdeutschland möglich sind. D.h. die Überrepräsentation von Befragten aus den neuen Bundesländern (Oversample) wird aufgehoben. Die Haushaltsstichproben werden nicht transformiert.

* V1741 - Weight to adjust for East Oversampling and Household Size:
 * Da die ALLBUS-Daten in den Jahren 1980 bis 1992 und 1998 Haushaltsstichproben sind, ist bei Analysen, die auf Aussagen über im Sample befragte Personen zielen, eigentlich eine Transformationsgewichtung einzusetzen. Bei getrennten Analysen von West- und Ostdeutschen ist das hierfür entsprechende Transformationsgewicht V1739. Bei gesamtdeutschen Auswertungen von Haushaltsstichproben, die auf personenbezogene Aussagen zielen, ist das entsprechende Gewicht V1740, welches darüber hinaus auch die Überrepräsentierung von Befragten aus den neuen Bundesländern (Oversample) aufhebt. Rechnerisch ist V1740 das Produkt aus V1739 (Transformationsgewicht) und V1740 (personenbezogenes Ost-West-Gewicht). Da das konkrete Erhebungsgeschehen - nicht zuletzt wegen der Schwierigkeit, kleine Haushalte mit Erfolg zu kontaktieren - von dem idealerweise zu erwartenden Erhebungsgeschehen abweicht, ist aber bei vielen personenbezogenen Analysen von Haushaltsstichproben eher davon abzusehen, die entsprechende Transformationsgewichtung einzusetzen. Es empfiehlt sich aber, die Ergebnisse von gewichteten und ungewichteten Analysen auf größere Unterschiede hin zu vergleichen.

***** CHAPTER 4 *****

*** Descriptive Statistics ***

```
set more off
*** Descriptive and Univariate Statistics (Appendix Chapter 4)
tabstat East Female age age2 cohort1 cohort2 cohort3 cohort4 cohort5 ///
NoSecondaryEducation LowSecondaryEducation IntermediateSecondaryEducation
HighSecondaryEducation ///
Employed agriculture academia selfemployed publicsector privatesector manualworker employedother ///
income income_1 income_2 income_3 income_4 ///
protestant catholic other atheist RegChurchAttend Married Divorced Single ///
Children singleparent housewife suburb town village hamlet LeftRightScale ///
satisfiedwithdemocracy satisfiedwithdemocracyBin GDRBelongingBin FRGBelongingBin
HighTVExposure ///
genderatt [aweight = V1740] if surveyyear>1990, stats (mean median sd n) columns(statistics)

*** Descriptive Statistics for Gender Attitude Summary Variable
mean genderatt [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear)
mean genderatt if East==1, over(surveyyear)
mean genderatt if East==0, over(surveyyear)
mean genderatt if Female==1 [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear)
mean genderatt if Female==0 [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear)
mean genderatt if East==0, over(cohort_5)
mean genderatt if East==0, over(cohort_5)

* Q: 'A working mother can establish just as loving and secure a relationship with her children as a mother
who doesn't work'
mean v332 [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear)
mean v332 if Female==1 [pweight=V1740], over(surveyyear)
mean v332 if Female==0 [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear)
mean v332 if East==1, over(surveyyear)
mean v332 if East==0, over(surveyyear)
mean v332 if Female==0, over(surveyyear East)

proportion v332Bin [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear Female)
local years 1991 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
foreach year of local years {

by Year`year', sort : prtest v332Bin, by(Female)
}

proportion v332Bin, over(surveyyear East)
local years 1991 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
```

```

foreach year of local years {

by Year`year', sort : prtest v332Bin, by(East)
}

proportion v332Bin if East==1, over(cohort_5)
proportion v332Bin if East==0, over(cohort_5)
proportion v332Bin if East==1, over(Female)
proportion v332Bin if East==0, over(Female)
prtest v332Bin if East==1, by(Female)
prtest v332Bin if East==0, by(Female)

* Q: 'It is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself'
mean v333 [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear)
mean v333 if Female==1 [pweight=V1740], over(surveyyear)
mean v333 if Female==0 [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear)
mean v333 if East==1, over(surveyyear)
mean v333 if East==0, over(surveyyear)
mean v333 if Female==0, over(surveyyear East)

proportion v333Bin [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear Female)
local years 1991 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
foreach year of local years {

by Year`year', sort : prtest v333Bin, by(Female)
}

proportion v333Bin, over(surveyyear East)
local years 1991 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
foreach year of local years {

by Year`year', sort : prtest v333Bin, by(East)
}

proportion v333Bin if East==1, over(cohort_5)
proportion v333Bin if East==0, over(cohort_5)
proportion v333Bin if East==1, over(Female)
proportion v333Bin if East==0 & surveyyear>1990, over(Female)
prtest v333Bin if East==1, by(Female)
prtest v333Bin if East==0 & surveyyear>1990, by(Female)

* Q: 'A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works'
mean v334 if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear)
mean v334 if surveyyear>1990, over(surveyyear Female)
mean v334 if surveyyear>1990, over(surveyyear East)
mean v334 if Female==0, over(surveyyear Female East)

proportion v334Bin [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear Female)
local years 1991 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
foreach year of local years {

by Year`year', sort : prtest v334Bin, by(Female)
}

proportion v334Bin, over(surveyyear East)
local years 1991 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
foreach year of local years {

by Year`year', sort : prtest v334Bin, by(East)
}

```

```

}

proportion v334Bin if East==1, over(cohort_5)
proportion v334Bin if East==0, over(cohort_5)
proportion v334Bin if East==1, over(Female)
proportion v334Bin if East==0 & surveyyear>1990, over(Female)
prtest v334Bin if East==1, by(Female)
prtest v334Bin if East==0 & surveyyear>1990, by(Female)

* Q: 'It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman
takes care of the home and family'
mean v335 if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear)
mean v335 if surveyyear>1990 [pweight=V1740], over(surveyyear Female)
mean v335 if surveyyear>1990, over(surveyyear East)
mean v335 if Female==0, over(surveyyear Female East)

proportion v335Bin [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear Female)
local years 1991 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
foreach year of local years {

by Year`year', sort : prtest v335Bin, by(Female)
}

proportion v335Bin, over(surveyyear East)
local years 1991 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
foreach year of local years {

by Year`year', sort : prtest v335Bin, by(East)
}

proportion v335Bin if East==1, over(cohort_5)
proportion v335Bin if East==0, over(cohort_5)
proportion v335Bin if East==1, over(Female)
proportion v335Bin if East==0 & surveyyear>1990, over(Female)
prtest v335Bin if East==1, by(Female)
prtest v335Bin if East==0 & surveyyear>1990, by(Female)

* Q: 'A child actually benefits from his or her mother having a job rather than just concentrating on the
home'
mean v336 [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear)
mean v336 if Female==1 [pweight=V1740], over(surveyyear)
mean v336 if Female==0 [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear)
mean v336 if East==1, over(surveyyear)
mean v336 if East==0, over(surveyyear)
mean v336 if Female==0, over(surveyyear Female East)

proportion v336Bin [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear Female)
local years 1991 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
foreach year of local years {

by Year`year', sort : prtest v336Bin, by(Female)
}

proportion v336Bin, over(surveyyear East)
local years 1991 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
foreach year of local years {

by Year`year', sort : prtest v336Bin, by(East)
}

```

```

proportion v336Bin if East==1, over(cohort_5)
proportion v336Bin if East==0, over(cohort_5)
proportion v336Bin if East==1, over(Female)
proportion v336Bin if East==0 & surveyyear>1990, over(Female)
prtest v336Bin if East==1, by(Female)
prtest v336Bin if East==0 & surveyyear>1990, by(Female)

```

* Q: 'A married woman should not work if there is a limited number of jobs and her husband is able to support the family'

```

mean v337 [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear)
mean v337 if Female==1 [pweight=V1740], over(surveyyear)
mean v337 if Female==0 [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear)
mean v337 if East==1, over(surveyyear)
mean v337 if East==0, over(surveyyear)
mean v337 if Female==0, over(surveyyear Female East)

```

```

proportion v337Bin [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear Female)
local years 1991 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
foreach year of local years {

```

```

by Year`year', sort : prtest v337Bin, by(Female)
}

```

```

proportion v337Bin, over(surveyyear East)
local years 1991 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
foreach year of local years {

```

```

by Year`year', sort : prtest v337Bin, by(East)
}

```

```

proportion v337Bin if East==1, over(cohort_5)
proportion v337Bin if East==0, over(cohort_5)
proportion v337Bin if East==1, over(Female)
proportion v337Bin if East==0 & surveyyear>1990, over(Female)
prtest v337Bin if East==1, by(Female)
prtest v337Bin if East==0 & surveyyear>1990, by(Female)

```

*** Hypothesis 1 & 2 ***

```

set more off
eststo clear
eststo model1: xi: regress genderatt East Female i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740],
vce(robust)
eststo model2: xi: regress genderatt East Female i.cohort_5 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3
i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
eststo model3: xi: regress genderatt East Female i.cohort_5 EastCohort1 EastCohort2 EastCohort3
EastCohort4 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend
protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3 i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight =
V1740], vce(robust)
esttab using "H:\GenderAttitudes_RegressionTable_1.csv", cells(b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par fmt(2)))
starlevels( * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) r2 obslast title (Traditional Gender Attitudes: OLS Estimation) ///
nolines label legend constant ///
legend replace

```

```

set more off
eststo clear

```

```

eststo model1: xi: regress genderatt Female i.cohort_5 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3
i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & East==1, vce(robust)
eststo model2: xi: regress genderatt Female i.cohort_5 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3
i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & East==0, vce(robust)
esttab using "H:\GenderAttitudes_RegressionTable_EW.csv", cells(b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par
fmt(2))) starlevels( * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) r2 obslast title (Traditional Gender Attitudes: OLS Estimation)
///
nolines label legend constant ///
legend replace

```

*** Hypothesis 3 ***

```

set more off
eststo clear
eststo model1: xi: regress genderatt Female i.cohort_5 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3
i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & East==1, vce(robust)
eststo model2: xi: regress genderatt Female i.cohort_5 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3
i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & East==0, vce(robust)
esttab using "H:\GenderAttitudes_PeriodEffects_EW.csv", cells(b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par fmt(2)))
starlevels( * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) r2 obslast title (Traditional Gender Attitudes: OLS Estimation) ///
nolines label legend constant ///
legend replace

```

```

set more off
eststo clear
eststo model1: xi: regress genderatt East Female i.cohort_5 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3
i.surveyyear East1992 East1996 East2000 East2004 East2008 East2012 if surveyyear>1990 [pweight =
V1740], vce(robust)
esttab using "H:\GenderAttitudes_PeriodEffects.csv", cells(b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par fmt(2)))
starlevels( * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) r2 obslast title (Traditional Gender Attitudes: OLS Estimation) ///
nolines label legend constant ///
legend replace

```

```

set more off
eststo clear
eststo model1: xi: regress genderatt East Female i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3
i.surveyyear East1992 East1996 East2000 East2004 East2008 East2012 if surveyyear>1990 & cohort1==1
[pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
eststo model2: xi: regress genderatt East Female i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3
i.surveyyear East1992 East1996 East2000 East2004 East2008 East2012 if surveyyear>1990 & cohort2==1
[pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
eststo model3: xi: regress genderatt East Female i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3
i.surveyyear East1992 East1996 East2000 East2004 East2008 East2012 if surveyyear>1990 & cohort3==1
[pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
eststo model4: xi: regress genderatt East Female i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3
i.surveyyear East1992 East1996 East2000 East2004 East2008 East2012 if surveyyear>1990 & cohort4==1
[pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
eststo model5: xi: regress genderatt East Female i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3

```

```

i.surveyyear East1992 East1996 East2000 East2004 East2008 East2012 if surveyyear>1990 & cohort5==1
[pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
esttab using "H:\GenderAttitudes_PeriodEffects_Cohort.csv", cells(b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par
fmt(2))) starlevels(* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) r2 oblast title ("Traditional Gender Attitudes: OLS Estimation)
///
nolines label legend constant ///
legend replace

```

*** Hypothesis 4 ***

```

set more off
eststo clear
char surveyyear [omit] 2004
eststo model1: xi: regress genderatt East Female age age2 i.cohort_5 EastCohort1 EastCohort2
EastCohort3 EastCohort4 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat
RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3 Children singleparent
MotherEmployed i.residence HighTVExposure LeftRightScale i.surveyyear East2008 if surveyyear>1990
[pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
esttab using "H:\GenderAttitudes_Socio-economic controls.csv", cells(b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par
fmt(2))) starlevels(* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) r2 oblast title ("Traditional Gender Attitudes: OLS Estimation)
///
nolines label legend constant ///
legend replace
char surveyyear [omit] 1991

```

*** Chapter 4 Appendix ***

```

set more off
eststo clear
eststo model1: xi: regress genderatt East Female i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & migrant_WE==0 &
migrant_EW==0 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
eststo model2: xi: regress genderatt East Female i.cohort_5 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3
i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & migrant_WE==0 & migrant_EW==0 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
eststo model3: xi: regress genderatt East2 Female i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740],
vce(robust)
eststo model4: xi: regress genderatt East2 Female i.cohort_5 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed
i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
eststo model5: xi: regress genderatt migrant_EW Female i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight =
V1740], vce(robust)
eststo model6: xi: regress genderatt migrant_EW Female i.cohort_5 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed
i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
eststo model7: xi: regress genderatt migrant_WE Female i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight =
V1740], vce(robust)
eststo model8: xi: regress genderatt migrant_WE Female i.cohort_5 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed
i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
esttab using "H:\Appendix_GenderAttitudes_EastVariants.csv", cells(b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par
fmt(2))) starlevels(* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) r2 oblast title ("Traditional Gender Attitudes: OLS Estimation)
///
nolines label legend constant ///
legend replace

```

```

set more off
eststo clear
eststo model1: xi: regress genderatt i.fedstates Female i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740],
vce(robust)

```

```

eststo model2: xi: regress genderatt i.fedstates Female i.cohort_5 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed
i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
eststo model3: xi: regress genderatt i.fedstates Female i.cohort_5 EastCohort1 EastCohort2 EastCohort3
EastCohort4 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend
protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3 i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight =
V1740], vce(robust)
esttab using "H:\Appendix_GenderAttitudes_Fedstates.csv", cells(b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par fmt(2)))
starlevels(* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) r2 obslast title (Traditional Gender Attitudes: OLS Estimation) ///
nolines label legend constant ///
legend replace

```

```

set more off
eststo clear
eststo model1: xi: regress genderatt i.fedstates Female i.cohort_5 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed
i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.surveyyear East1992 East1996 East2000 East2004 East2008 East2012 if
surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
esttab using "H:\Appendix_GenderAttitudes_PeriodEffects_FS.csv", cells(b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par
fmt(2))) starlevels(* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) r2 obslast title (Traditional Gender Attitudes: OLS Estimation)
///
nolines label legend constant ///
legend replace

```

```

set more off
eststo clear
eststo model1: xi: regress genderatt East Female i.cohort_5 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3
i.surveyyear MotherEmployed if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
eststo model2: xi: regress genderatt East Female i.cohort_5 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3
i.surveyyear singleparent if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
eststo model3: xi: regress genderatt East Female i.cohort_5 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3
i.surveyyear Children if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
eststo model4: xi: regress genderatt East Female i.cohort_5 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3
i.surveyyear i.residence if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
eststo model5: xi: regress genderatt East Female i.cohort_5 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3
i.surveyyear i.HighTVExposure if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
esttab using "H:\Appendix_GenderAttitudes_OC.csv", cells(b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par fmt(2)))
starlevels(* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) r2 obslast title (Traditional Gender Attitudes: OLS Estimation) ///
nolines label legend constant ///
legend replace

```

```

set more off
eststo clear
eststo model1: xi: regress genderatt Female i.cohort_5 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3
i.surveyyear i.satisfiedwithdemocracy GDRBelongingBin if surveyyear>1990 & East==1, vce(robust)
eststo model2: xi: regress genderatt Female i.cohort_5 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend protestant_rca catholic_rca other_rca i.MarriageStatus_3
i.surveyyear i.satisfiedwithdemocracy FRGBelongingBin if surveyyear>1990 & East==0, vce(robust)
esttab using "H:\Appendix_GenderAttitudes_Satisfaction_GDRBelonging.csv", cells(b(star fmt(3)
label(Coef.)) se(par fmt(2))) starlevels(* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) r2 obslast title (Traditional Gender
Attitudes: OLS Estimation) ///
nolines label legend constant ///
legend replace

```

*** Descriptive Statistics ***

set more off

*** Descriptive and Univariate Statistics

```
tabstat partymember polintBin votelast unionmember CDU SPD FDP Green LeftParty
otherpartyreference nopartyreference ///
genderatt [aweight = V1740] if surveyyear>1990, stats (mean median sd n) columns(statistics)
```

*Party Membership

```
proportion partymember if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear Female)
local years 1990 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
```

```
foreach year of local years {
```

```
by Year`year', sort : prtest partymember, by(Female)
}
```

```
proportion partymember if surveyyear>1990, over(surveyyear Female East)
```

```
local years 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
```

```
foreach year of local years {
```

```
by Year`year', sort : prtest partymember if East==1, by(Female)
}
```

```
local years 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
```

```
foreach year of local years {
```

```
by Year`year', sort : prtest partymember if East==0, by(Female)
}
```

* Political Interest

```
proportion polintBin [pweight = V1740] if surveyyear>1990, over(surveyyear Female)
```

```
*** Command for one year: by Year1990, sort : prtest polintBin, by(Female)
```

```
*** Problem: doesn't allow weights
```

```
local years 1990 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
```

```
foreach year of local years {
```

```
by Year`year', sort : prtest polintBin, by(Female)
}
```

```
proportion polintBin if surveyyear>1990, over(surveyyear East)
```

```
local years 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
```

```
foreach year of local years {
```

```
by Year`year', sort : prtest polintBin, by(East)
}
```

* Differences in political interest between East and West among women

```
proportion polintBin if surveyyear>1990, over(surveyyear East)
```

```
local years 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
```

```
foreach year of local years {
```

```
by Year`year', sort : prtest polintBin if Female==1, by(East)
}
```

* Differences in political interest between East and West among men

```
proportion polintBin if surveyyear>1990, over(surveyyear East)
```

```

local years 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
foreach year of local years {

by Year`year', sort : prtest polintBin if Female==0, by(East)
}

* Differences in political interest between amd and women in East Germany
local years 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
foreach year of local years {

by Year`year', sort : prtest polintBin if East==1, by(Female)
}

* Differences in political interest between and and women in West Germany
local years 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
foreach year of local years {

by Year`year', sort : prtest polintBin if East==0, by(Female)
}

* Trade Union Membership
proportion union [pweight = V1740] if surveyyear>1990, over(surveyyear Female)

local years 1990 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
foreach year of local years {

by Year`year', sort : prtest union, by(Female)
}

proportion union if surveyyear>1990, over(surveyyear East)
local years 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
foreach year of local years {
by Year`year', sort : prtest union, by(East)
}

* Differences in union membership between East and West among women
proportion union if surveyyear>1990, over(surveyyear East)
local years 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
foreach year of local years {
by Year`year', sort : prtest union if Female==1, by(East)
}

* Differences in union membership between East and West among men
proportion union if surveyyear>1990, over(surveyyear East)
local years 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
foreach year of local years {

by Year`year', sort : prtest union if Female==0, by(East)
}

* Differences in union membership between amd and women in East Germany
local years 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
foreach year of local years {

by Year`year', sort : prtest union if East==1, by(Female)
}

* Differences in union membership between and and women in West Germany
local years 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

```

```

foreach year of local years {

by Year`year', sort : prtest union if East==0, by(Female)
}

*Vote
proportion votelast [pweight = V1740] if surveyyear>1991, over(surveyyear Female)
local years 1998 2002 2008
foreach year of local years {
by Year`year', sort : prtest votelast, by(Female)
}
proportion votelast if surveyyear>1991, over(surveyyear Female East)
local years 1998 2002 2008
foreach year of local years {
by Year`year', sort : prtest votelast if East==1, by(Female)
}

local years 1998 2002 2008
foreach year of local years {
by Year`year', sort : prtest votelast if West==1, by(Female)
}

/*
*Participation in Demonstration
proportion partindemo [pweight = V1740] if surveyyear>1991, over(surveyyear Female)
local years 1998 2002 2008
foreach year of local years {
by Year`year', sort : prtest partindemo, by(Female)
}
proportion partindemo if surveyyear>1991, over(surveyyear Female East)
local years 1998 2002 2008
foreach year of local years {
by Year`year', sort : prtest partindemo if East==1, by(Female)
}

local years 1998 2002 2008
foreach year of local years {
by Year`year', sort : prtest partindemo if East==0, by(Female)
}

*Participation in Citizen Initiative
proportion partininit [pweight = V1740] if surveyyear>1991, over(surveyyear Female)
local years 1998 2002 2008
foreach year of local years {
by Year`year', sort : prtest partininit, by(Female)
}
proportion partininit if surveyyear>1991, over(surveyyear Female East)
local years 1998 2002 2008
foreach year of local years {
by Year`year', sort : prtest partininit if East==1, by(Female)
}

local years 1998 2002 2008
foreach year of local years {
by Year`year', sort : prtest partininit if East==0, by(Female)
}
*Participation in Petitions
proportion partinsig [pweight = V1740] if surveyyear>1991, over(surveyyear Female)
local years 1998 2002 2008

```

```

foreach year of local years {
by Year`year', sort : prtest partinsig, by(Female)
}

proportion partinsig, over(surveyyear Female East)
local years 1998 2002 2008
foreach year of local years {
by Year`year', sort : prtest partinsig if East==1, by(Female)
}

local years 1998 2002 2008
foreach year of local years {
by Year`year', sort : prtest partinsig if East==0, by(Female)
}

* Participation in Online Protests
proportion partinonlinepro [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear Female)
prtest partinonlinepro, by(Female)
proportion partinonlinepro, over(surveyyear Female East)
prtest partinonlinepro if East==0, by(Female)
prtest partinonlinepro if East==1, by(Female)

* Participation in Boycotts
proportion partinboyc if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], over(surveyyear Female)
local years 1991 1992 2000
foreach year of local years {
by Year`year', sort : prtest partinboyc, by(Female)
}

proportion partinboyc if surveyyear>1990, over(surveyyear Female East)
*/

*** Histogram
histogram genderatt if partymember==1 & surveyyear>1990, percent title(Party Membership) xtitle(Gender
Attitude Scale) graphregion(color(white)) color(gs5)
graph save Graph "H:\Hist_party.gph"
histogram genderatt if polintBin==1 & surveyyear>1990, percent title(Political Interest) xtitle(Gender
Attitude Scale) graphregion(color(white)) color(gs5)
graph save Graph "H:\Hist_polint.gph"
histogram genderatt if votelast==1 & surveyyear>1990, percent title(Union Membership) xtitle(Gender
Attitude Scale) graphregion(color(white)) color(gs5)
graph save Graph "H:\Hist_union.gph"
histogram genderatt if union==1 & surveyyear>1990, percent title(Voting) xtitle(Gender Attitude Scale)
graphregion(color(white)) color(gs5)
graph save Graph "H:\Hist_vote.gph"

graph use "H:\Hist_party.gph"
graph use "H:\Hist_polint.gph"
graph use "H:\Hist_vote.gph"
graph use "H:\Hist_union.gph"

graph combine ///
Hist_party ///
Hist_polint ///
Hist_vote ///
Graph, ///
row(2) col(2) graphregion(color(white)) commonscheme xcommon altshrink

*** Party Membership

```

```

eststo clear
set more off
xi: logit partymember Female East i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a1
xi: logit partymember Female East age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat
i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a2
xi: logit partymember Female East genderatt age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a3
xi: logit partymember Female East genderatt WomenGenderatt age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5
Employed i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference
satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if
surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a4
esttab a* using "H:\Chapter5_partymember_all.csv", cells (b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par fmt(2)))
starlevels( * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) margin pr2 obslast title (Average Marginal Effects) nolines label legend
replace

```

*** Determinants of Party Membership (Controlling for Having Children)

```

eststo clear
set more off
xi: logit partymember Female East SmallChildren i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740],
vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a1
xi: logit partymember Female East SmallChildren age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a2
xi: logit partymember East SmallChildren i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & Female==1 [pweight =
V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a3
xi: logit partymember East SmallChildren age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & Female==1 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a4
esttab a* using "H:\Chapter5_Party_Children.csv", cells (b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par fmt(2)))
starlevels( * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) margin pr2 obslast title (Average Marginal Effects) nolines label legend
replace

```

*** Party Membership: East*Female Interaction

```

eststo clear
set more off
xi: logit partymember Female East FemaleEast i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740],
vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a1

```

```

xi: logit partymember Female East FemaleEast age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a2
esttab a* using "H:\Chapter5_Party_EastFeInt.csv", cells (b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par fmt(2)))
starlevels( * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) margin pr2 obslast title (Average Marginal Effects) nolines label legend

```

*** Party Membership: East*Female Interaction Marginsplot Graphs

*without controls:

```

logit partymember i.Female###i.East i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
margins Female, at((means)_all East==(0 1)) vce(uncond)
marginsplot, recast(scatter) xscale(range(-0.5 1.5)) title(Party Membership) graphregion(color(white))
graph save Graph "H:\party_EastFemale_NC.gph"

```

*with controls:

```

logit partymember i.Female###i.East age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat
i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
margins Female, at((means)_all East==(0 1)) vce(uncond)
marginsplot, recast(scatter) xscale(range(-0.5 1.5)) title(Party Membership) graphregion(color(white))
graph save Graph "H:\party_EastFemale_WC.gph"

```

```
graph use "H:\party_EastFemale_NC.gph"
```

```
graph use "H:\party_EastFemale_WC.gph"
```

```

graph combine ///
party_EastFemale_NC ///
party_EastFemale_WC, ///
row(1) col(2) graphregion(color(white)) commonscheme xcommon altshrink

```

* Party Membership: Effect of Female for East and West Sample Separately

```
eststo clear
```

```
set more off
```

```
xi: logit partymember Female i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & East==0 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
```

```
est store a1
```

```
xi: logit partymember Female i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & East==1 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
```

```
est store a2
```

```
xi: logit partymember Female age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat
i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & East==0 [pweight = V1740],
vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
```

```
est store a3
```

```
xi: logit partymember Female age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat
i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & East==1 [pweight = V1740],
vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
```

```
est store a4
```

```
esttab a* using "H:\Chapter5_Party_EWSamples_RC.csv", cells (b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par fmt(2)))
starlevels( * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) margin pr2 obslast title (Average Marginal Effects) nolines label legend

```

*** Party Membership: Female* Gender Attitudes Interaction Marginsplot Graph

```
eststo clear
```

```
set more off
```

```

logit partymember i.Female###c.genderatt [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
margins Female, at((means)_all genderatt==(1(1)19)) vce(uncond)
marginsplot, xlabel(1(3)19) ytitle(Effects on Prob. of Party Membership) recast(line) recastci(rarea)
graphregion(color(white))
graph save Graph "H:\partymember_NC.gph"

*** Party Membership: Instrumental Variable Regression

/*
After each iv regress, run Srgan-Hansen test:
ivregress 2sls partymember (genderatt = i.FemaleInterviewer i.partnerpresent), first vce(robust)
estat overid
The Sargan-Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions. The joint null hypothesis is that the
instruments are valid instruments,
i.e.uncorrelated with the error terms, and the the excluded instruments are correctly excluded.
*/
eststo clear
set more off
ivprobit partymember Female East i.surveyyear (genderatt = i.FemaleInterviewer i.partnerpresent) [pweight
= V1740], first vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a1
ivprobit partymember Female East age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat
i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear (genderatt = i.FemaleInterviewer i.partnerpresent)
[pweight = V1740], first vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a2
esttab a* using "H:\IVProbit_NC.csv", cells(b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par fmt(2))) starlevels(* 0.10 **
0.05 *** 0.010) margin pr2 oblast title (Marginal Effects from Instrumental Variable Regression for Party
Membership) nolines label legend replace

*** Other Forms of Political Participation ****

eststo clear
set more off
*Political Interest:
xi: logit polintBin Female East i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a1
xi: logit polintBin Female East age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat
i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a2
xi: logit polintBin Female East genderatt age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a3
xi: logit polintBin Female East genderatt WomenGenderatt age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed
i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin
SatisfiedEast i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740],
vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a4
*Union Membership
xi: logit union Female East i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)

```

```

estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a5
xi: logit union Female East age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat
RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast i.MarriageStatus_3
i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a6
xi: logit union Female East genderatt age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat
i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a7
xi: logit union Female East genderatt WomenGenderatt age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed
i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin
SatisfiedEast i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740],
vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a8
*voting:
xi: logit votelast Female East i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a9
xi: logit votelast Female East age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat
RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast i.MarriageStatus_3
i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a10
xi: logit votelast Female East genderatt age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a11
xi: logit votelast Female East genderatt WomenGenderatt age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed
i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin
SatisfiedEast i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740],
vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a12
esttab a* using "H:\Chapter5_otherpolpart_all.csv", cells (b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par fmt(2)))
starlevels( * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) margin pr2 oblast title (Average Marginal Effects) nolines label legend
replace

*** Political Participation: East*Female Interaction
eststo clear
set more off
xi: logit polintBin Female East FemaleEast i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a1
xi: logit polintBin Female East FemaleEast age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a2
xi: logit union Female East FemaleEast i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a3
xi: logit union Female East FemaleEast age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)

```

```

estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a4
xi: logit votelast Female East FemaleEast i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a5
xi: logit votelast Female East FemaleEast age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a6
esttab a* using "H:\Chapter5_otherpolpart_EaFeInt.csv", cells (b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par fmt(2)))
starlevels( * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) margin pr2 obslast title (Average Marginal Effects) nolines label legend

*** Female*East Interactions Graph
/*
*without controls:
logit polintBin i.Female###i.East i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
margins Female, at((means)_all East==(0 1)) vce(uncond)
marginsplot, recast(scatter) xscale(range(-0.5 1.5)) title(Political Interest) graphregion(color(white))
graph save Graph "H:\polint_EastFemale_NC.gph"

logit union i.Female###i.East i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
margins Female, at((means)_all East==(0 1)) vce(uncond)
marginsplot, recast(scatter) xscale(range(-0.5 1.5)) title(Union Membership) graphregion(color(white))
graph save Graph "H:\union_EastFemale_NC.gph"

logit votelast i.Female###i.East i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
margins Female, at((means)_all East==(0 1)) vce(uncond)
marginsplot, recast(scatter) xscale(range(-0.5 1.5)) title(Voting) graphregion(color(white))
graph save Graph "H:\vote_EastFemale_NC.gph"

graph use "H:\polint_EastFemale_NC.gph"
graph use "H:\union_EastFemale_NC.gph"
graph use "H:\vote_EastFemale_NC.gph"

graph combine ///
polint_EastFemale_NC ///
union_EastFemale_NC ///
vote_EastFemale_NC, ///
row(2) col(2) graphregion(color(white)) commonscheme xcommon altshrink
*/

*with controls
logit polintBin i.Female###i.East age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat
i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
margins Female, at((means)_all East==(0 1)) vce(uncond)
marginsplot, recast(scatter) xscale(range(-0.5 1.5)) title(Political Interest) graphregion(color(white))
graph save Graph "H:\polint_EastFemale_WC.gph"

logit union i.Female###i.East age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat
RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast i.MarriageStatus_3
i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
margins Female, at((means)_all East==(0 1)) vce(uncond)
marginsplot, recast(scatter) xscale(range(-0.5 1.5)) title(Union Membership) graphregion(color(white))
graph save Graph "H:\union_EastFemale_WC.gph"

```

```

logit votelast i.Female##i.East age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat
i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
margins Female, at((means)_all East==(0 1)) vce(uncond)
marginsplot, recast(scatter) xscale(range(-0.5 1.5)) title(Voting) graphregion(color(white))
graph save Graph "H:\vote_EastFemale_WC.gph"

graph use "H:\polint_EastFemale_WC.gph"
graph use "H:\union_EastFemale_WC.gph"
graph use "H:\vote_EastFemale_WC.gph"

graph combine ///
polint_EastFemale_WC ///
union_EastFemale_WC ///
Graph, ///
row(2) col(2) graphregion(color(white)) commonscheme xcommon altshrink

*** Political Participation: Effect of Female for East and West Sample Separately
eststo clear
set more off
*Political Interest:
xi: logit polintBin Female i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & East==0 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a1
xi: logit polintBin Female i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & East==1 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a2
xi: logit polintBin Female age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat
RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast i.MarriageStatus_3
i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & East==0 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a3
xi: logit polintBin Female age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat
RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast i.MarriageStatus_3
i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & East==1 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a4
*Union Membership:
xi: logit union Female i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & East==0 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a5
xi: logit union Female i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & East==1 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a6
xi: logit union Female age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat
RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast i.MarriageStatus_3
i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & East==0 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a7
xi: logit union Female age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat
RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast i.MarriageStatus_3
i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & East==1 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a8
* Voting:
xi: logit votelast Female i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & East==0 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a9
xi: logit votelast Female i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & East==1 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)

```

```

estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a10
xi: logit votelast Female age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat
RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast i.MarriageStatus_3
i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & East==0 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a11
xi: logit votelast Female age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat
RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast i.MarriageStatus_3
i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & East==1 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a12
esttab a* using "H:\Chapter5_PolPart_EWSamples_RC.csv", cells (b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par
fmt(2))) starlevels( * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) margin pr2 obslast title (Average Marginal Effects) nolines label
legend

```

*** Female*Gender Attitudes Interactions Graph

```

set more off
eststo clear
logit polintBin i.Female##c.genderatt [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
margins Female, at((means)_all genderatt==(1(1)19)) vce(uncond)
marginsplot, xlabel(1(3)19) ytitle(Effects on Prob. of Political Interest) recast(line) recastci(rarea)
graphregion(color(white))
graph save Graph "H:\polint_NC.gph"

```

```

logit polintBin i.Female##c.genderatt East age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
margins Female, at((means)_all genderatt==(1(1)19)) vce(uncond)
marginsplot, xlabel(1(3)19) ytitle(Effects on Prob. of Political Interest) recast(line) recastci(rarea)
graphregion(color(white))
graph save Graph "H:\polint_WC.gph"

```

```

logit union i.Female##c.genderatt [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
margins Female, at((means)_all genderatt==(1(1)19)) vce(uncond)
marginsplot, xlabel(1(3)19) ytitle(Effects on Prob. of Union Membership) recast(line) recastci(rarea)
graphregion(color(white))
graph save Graph "H:\union_NC.gph"

```

```

logit union i.Female##c.genderatt East age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
margins Female, at((means)_all genderatt==(1(1)19)) vce(uncond)
marginsplot, xlabel(1(3)19) ytitle(Effects on Prob. of Union Membership) recast(line) recastci(rarea)
graphregion(color(white))
graph save Graph "H:\union_WC.gph"

```

```

logit votelast i.Female##c.genderatt [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
margins Female, at((means)_all genderatt==(1(1)19)) vce(uncond)
marginsplot, xlabel(1(3)19) ytitle(Effects on Prob. of Voting) recast(line) recastci(rarea)
graphregion(color(white))
graph save Graph "H:\votelast_NC.gph"

```

```

logit votelast i.Female##c.genderatt East age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
margins Female, at((means)_all genderatt==(1(1)19)) vce(uncond)
marginsplot, xlabel(1(3)19) ytitle(Effects on Prob. of Voting) recast(line) recastci(rarea)
graphregion(color(white))

```

```

graph save Graph "H:\votelast_WC.gph"

graph use "H:\polint_NC.gph"
graph use "H:\union_NC.gph"
graph use "H:\votelast_NC.gph"

graph combine ///
polint_NC ///
union_NC ///
votelast_NC, ///
row(2) col(2) graphregion(color(white)) commonscheme xcommon altshrink

*** Robustness Check: Instrumental Variable Regression

/*
After each iv regress, run Srgan-Hansen test:
ivregress 2sls partymember (genderatt = i.FemaleInterviewer i.partnerpresent), first vce(robust)
estat overid
The Sargan-Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions. The joint null hypothesis is that the
instruments are valid instruments,
i.e. uncorrelated with the error terms, and the the excluded instruments are correctly excluded.
*/
eststo clear
set more off
ivprobit polintBin Female East i.surveyyear (genderatt = i.FemaleInterviewer i.partnerpresent) [pweight =
V1740], first vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a1
ivprobit polintBin Female East age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat
i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear (genderatt = i.FemaleInterviewer i.partnerpresent)
[pweight = V1740], first vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a2
ivprobit union Female East i.surveyyear (genderatt = i.FemaleInterviewer i.partnerpresent) [pweight =
V1740], first vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a3
ivprobit union Female East age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat
RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast i.MarriageStatus_3
i.household_5cat i.surveyyear (genderatt = i.FemaleInterviewer i.partnerpresent) [pweight = V1740], first
vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a4
ivprobit votelast Female East i.surveyyear (genderatt = i.FemaleInterviewer i.partnerpresent) [pweight =
V1740], first vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a5
ivprobit votelast Female East age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat
i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear (genderatt = i.FemaleInterviewer i.partnerpresent)
[pweight = V1740], first vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a6
esttab a* using "H:\IVProbit_otherpolpart.csv", cells(b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par fmt(2))) starlevels( *
0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) margin pr2 obslast title (Marginal Effects from Instrumental Variable Regression for
Different Forms of Political Participation) nolines label legend replace

```

***** Chapter 5 Appendix *****

```
eststo clear
set more off
xi: logit partymember Female i.fedstates i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a1
xi: logit partymember Female i.fedstates age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a2
xi: logit partymember Female i.fedstates genderatt age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a3
xi: logit partymember Female i.fedstates genderatt WomenGenderatt age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5
Employed i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference
satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if
surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a4
esttab a* using "H:\Chapter5_party_RC.csv", cells (b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par fmt(2))) starlevels( *
0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) margin pr2 obslast title (Average Marginal Effects) nolines label legend replace
```

*** Determinants of Party Membership (Controlling for Having Children)

```
eststo clear
set more off
xi: logit partymember Female i.fedstates SmallChildren i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740],
vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a1
xi: logit partymember Female i.fedstates SmallChildren age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed
i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin
SatisfiedEast i.MarriageStatus_3 i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a2
xi: logit partymember i.fedstates SmallChildren i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & Female==1 [pweight =
V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a3
xi: logit partymember i.fedstates SmallChildren age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 & Female==1 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a4
esttab a* using "H:\Marginal effects_Party_Children_RC.csv", cells (b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par
fmt(2))) starlevels( * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) margin pr2 obslast title (Average Marginal Effects) nolines label
legend replace
```

*** Party Membership: East*Female Interaction

```
eststo clear
set more off
xi: regress partymember Female i.fedstates fem* i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740],
vce(robust)
est store a1
```

```

xi: regress partymember Female i.fedstates fem* age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
est store a2
esttab a* using "H:\Chapter5App_Party_EaFeInt_RC.csv", cells(b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par fmt(2)))
starlevels(* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) margin pr2 obslast title (Average Marginal Effects) nolines label legend

*** Party Membership: Female* Gender Attitudes Interaction Marginsplot Graph
logit partymember i.Female##c.genderatt i.fedstates [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
margins Female, at((means)_all genderatt==(1(1)19)) vce(uncond)
marginsplot, xlabel(1(3)19) ylabel(Effects on Prob. of Party Membership) recast(line) recastci(rarea)
graphregion(color(white))
graph save Graph "H:\partymember_WC_RC.gph"

*** IV Probit
eststo clear
set more off
ivprobit partymember Female i.fedstates i.surveyyear (genderatt = i.FemaleInterviewer i.partnerpresent)
[pweight = V1740], first vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a1
ivprobit partymember Female i.fedstates age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear (genderatt = i.FemaleInterviewer i.partnerpresent)
[pweight = V1740], first vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a2
esttab a* using "H:\IVProbit_NC_RC.csv", cells(b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par fmt(2))) starlevels(* 0.10
** 0.05 *** 0.010) margin pr2 obslast title (Marginal Effects from Instrumental Variable Regression for
Party Membership) nolines label legend replace

*** Determinants of Political Participation (Other)
eststo clear
set more off
*Political Interest:
xi: logit polintBin Female i.fedstates i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a1
xi: logit polintBin Female i.fedstates age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat
i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a2
xi: logit polintBin Female i.fedstates genderatt age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a3
xi: logit polintBin Female i.fedstates genderatt WomenGenderatt age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5
Employed i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference
satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if
surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a4
*Union Membership
xi: logit union Female i.fedstates i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a5

```

```

xi: logit union Female i.fedstates age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat
i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a6
xi: logit union Female i.fedstates genderatt age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a7
xi: logit union Female i.fedstates genderatt WomenGenderatt age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed
i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin
SatisfiedEast i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740],
vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a8
*voting:
xi: logit votelast Female i.fedstates i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a9
xi: logit votelast Female i.fedstates age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat
i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a10
xi: logit votelast Female i.fedstates genderatt age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a11
xi: logit votelast Female i.fedstates genderatt WomenGenderatt age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed
i.occupation i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin
SatisfiedEast i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740],
vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a12
esttab a* using "H:\Chapter5_otherpolpart_all_RC.csv", cells (b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par fmt(2)))
starlevels( * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) margin pr2 obslast title (Average Marginal Effects) nolines label legend
replace

*** Other Forms of Participation East*Female Interaction
eststo clear
set more off
xi: regress polintBin Female i.fedstates fem* i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740],
vce(robust)
est store a1
xi: regress polintBin Female i.fedstates fem* age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
est store a2
xi: regress union Female i.fedstates fem* i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
est store a3
xi: regress union Female i.fedstates fem* age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
est store a4
xi: regress votelast Female i.fedstates fem* i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
est store a5

```

```

xi: regress votelast Female i.fedstates fem* age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation
i.incomecat i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear if surveyyear>1990 [pweight = V1740], vce(robust)
est store a6
esttab a* using "H:\Chapter5App_EaFeInt_RC.csv", cells(b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par fmt(2)))
starlevels(* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) margin pr2 obslast title (Average Marginal Effects) nolines label legend

* IV Probit
eststo clear
set more off
ivprobit polintBin Female i.fedstates i.surveyyear (genderatt = i.FemaleInterviewer i.partnerpresent)
[pweight = V1740], first vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a1
ivprobit polintBin Female i.fedstates age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat
i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear (genderatt = i.FemaleInterviewer i.partnerpresent)
[pweight = V1740], first vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a2
ivprobit union Female i.fedstates i.surveyyear (genderatt = i.FemaleInterviewer i.partnerpresent) [pweight =
V1740], first vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a3
ivprobit union Female i.fedstates age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat
i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear (genderatt = i.FemaleInterviewer i.partnerpresent)
[pweight = V1740], first vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a4
ivprobit votelast Female i.fedstates i.surveyyear (genderatt = i.FemaleInterviewer i.partnerpresent) [pweight =
V1740], first vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a5
ivprobit votelast Female i.fedstates age age2 i.SecondaryEducation_5 Employed i.occupation i.incomecat
i.religcat RegChurchAttend i.currentparty preference satisfiedwithdemocracyBin SatisfiedEast
i.MarriageStatus_3 i.household_5cat i.surveyyear (genderatt = i.FemaleInterviewer i.partnerpresent)
[pweight = V1740], first vce(robust)
estpost margins, dydx(*) atmeans
est store a6
esttab a* using "H:\IVProbit_otherpolpart_RC.csv", cells(b(star fmt(3) label(Coef.)) se(par fmt(2)))
starlevels(* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.010) margin pr2 obslast title (Marginal Effects from Instrumental Variable
Regression for Different Forms of Political Participation) nolines label legend replace

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