
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THE TREATISE DE LIBERIS EDUCANDIS ATTRIBUTED TO PLUTARCH



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ABSTRACT

PREFACE

The treatise Περὶ παίδων ἀγωγῆς (De liberis educandis)[1] is the only Greek work specifically devoted to the subject of children's training and education which has survived intact from antiquity.[2] It has come down to posterity in the corpus of Plutarch's Moralia, where it occupies first place in the order generally adopted by modern editions; but doubts about its authenticity, first recorded in the sixteenth century and given fresh impetus by the work of Daniel Wyttenbach at the beginning of the nineteenth, have increased to the point where few scholars now believe the work to be genuine.[3] The unknown author is referred to throughout the present dissertation by the letter P.

As regards its contents, the treatise has neither literary merit nor any great originality of thought or design to commend it; but from its very ordinariness and conventionality there is a a plausible inference that it reflects popular beliefs and opinions, and additional interest accrues from its preservation as the only remaining representative of its kind. This fortuitous uniqueness undoubtedly helped to make it at one time the most frequently read of all the Moralia.[4]

The aim of the present piece of work has been first and foremost to provide the De liberis educandis with a reasonably detailed commentary containing material of use to readers concerned to understand it in its ancient context. The Commentary therefore composes by design much the greater part of the thesis. There is also, however, a brief Introduction which contains a synopsis, an essay on the style of the work which pays special

attention to questions of authenticity, and a list of surviving manuscripts.

The fullest published commentary on the De liberis educandis is still, after 170 years, that of Wyttenbach (1810),[5] though there are more modern editions with notes by Montesi,[6] Zahn and Stegemann,[7] and Tsartsanos.[8] The most accessible English translations are those of Tucker and Babbitt.[9]

The text of the De liberis educandis which has been used throughout is the standard Greek text of W.R. Paton first published in the Teubner series in 1925 (Plutarchi Moralia I pp.1-27) and re-issued in 1974 with minor revisions, addenda and corrigenda by H. Gärtner. References in the Introduction and Commentary are to this text cited by the traditional numbers and letters which appear in the outer margins, with a further number added to denote lines elapsed since the original reference. Thus, for example, 2B1 is the line opposite which 2B appears in the margin, and subsequent lines are numbered in sequence until 2C1 begins the process again. The exception is section III of the Introduction, dealing with manuscripts, where for the sake of simplicity the references are to page and line of the Teubner text.

Thanks are due to several people who have rendered assistance of various kinds in the preparation of this thesis. In particular I am grateful for help and advice to my supervisors, Mr. D.A. Russell and Mr. N.G. Wilson; also to Dr. B.P. Hillyard and Mrs. Susan Hockey; and last but by no means least to Miss Sheila Paterson and Mrs. Kathleen Harkins who typed the final version.

NOTES

1) For brief surveys of the De liberis educandis see principally K. Ziegler in RE s.v. 'Plutarchos' (1951) cc.809-812, P. Blomenkamp in RAC s.v. 'Erziehung' (1964) cc.512-514.

2) Cf. A. Lesky, History of Greek Literature p.822 n.3: 'Plutarch did not write the treatise on the education of children, but it has some importance as the only extant Greek writing which deals specifically with the subject'; Dyroff p.238; Sizoo pp.1-2; Berry p.387.

3) Cf. e.g. Wilamowitz, Reden und Vorträge II, 4th edn. (Berlin 1926) p.247 n.3: 'Wer ihm heute noch diese Schrift zutraut, spricht seinem Verständnis Plutarchs das Urteil.'

4) Cf. Wilamowitz, loc. cit. n.3: 'Es ist aber bezeichnend, dass kein plutarchisches Buch so oft gedruckt und gelesen ist wie eins über Kindererziehung, das ihm nicht gehört'; H. Wegehaupt in BPhW 32 (1912) c.1599: 'Von keinem Stück der Moralia sind wohl so viele Hss. erhalten, von keinem so viele Sonderausgaben und Übersetzungen veranstaltet worden'.

5) D. Wyttenbach, Plutarchi Moralia V.1 (Oxford 1810) pp.29-156. Also sometimes useful is J.F. Heusinger, Plutarchi de liberorum educatione commentarius cum nova interpretatione Latina et adnotationibus Christ. Aug. Heumanni (Leipzig 1749), an edition with Greek text, Latin translation and notes.

6) Ilda Montesi, Plutarco dell' Educazione dei figliuoli (Florence 1916). Introduction, text and facing Italian translation with footnotes, indices.

7) F. Zahn and V. Stegemann, Plutarch über Kindererziehung (Munich 1925), second edn. 1947. Greek text with German translation and notes.

8) A. Tsartsanos, Περὶ παίδων ἀγωγῆς. Κείμενον, μετάφρασις καὶ ἑρμηνεία (Athens 1934). Not seen by me.

9) F.C. Babbitt, Plutarch's Moralia I (London and Cambridge Mass. 1927) pp.3-69. Greek text and facing English translation. T.G. Tucker, Selected Essays of Plutarch (Oxford 1913) pp.241-265.

INTRODUCTION

I SYNOPSIS

1A1-3 (1) Introduction
The subject of the treatise: how best to bring up free-born children to be sound of character.

1A4-D4 (2) Birth
Cohabitation with courtesans and concubines is not to be advised, since ill-birth makes children vulnerable and lacking in confidence. Anecdotes of Diophantus and Archidamus.

1D5-2A5 (3) Drunkenness at conception is also to be avoided if the offspring is not to grow up a drunkard. Remark of Diogenes.

2A5-3B9 (4) The efficacy of training
Three factors contribute to complete moral excellence: nature, reason and habit. All three are needed for perfection, but deficient natural gifts can be compensated for by attention to training. Examples. In fact, character is really just long-ingrained habit. Lycurgus and the two dogs.

3B10-F6 (5) Mothers, nursemaids and companions
Ideally, mothers should suckle their children themselves. If this is really not possible, nursemaids should be chosen with the greatest of care, since children at this age are very impressionable. Plato and Phocylides.

3F7-4A5 (6) The same applies to the choice of the young slave children who will be the child's servants and companions.

4A6-5C5 (7) Pedagogues and teachers
When the time comes, a good pedagogue should be appointed, and not, as all too often, a slave too useless for any other job. The teacher too should be a man of impeccable morals. Some contemptible

fathers appoint bad teachers through ignorance or favour, or even through sheer avarice: anecdotes of Socrates and Aristippus. They repent later on, however, when their sons grow up into wild and dissolute young men.

5C6-6A7 (8) Praise of paideia

The other good things which men prize -- good birth, wealth, fame, beauty, health and strength -- are no match for paideia, our only eternal and divine possession. (The primacy of intelligence and reason in human nature.) The value of paideia witnessed to by Stilpon and Socrates.

6A8-7B1 (9) Rhetoric

Ostentatious rhetoric is to be discouraged in the young, since pleasing the mob is suspect and those who do it are corrupt. ** Extemporary speech is also to be avoided as slovenly and lacking proportion; Pericles' and Demosthenes' refusal to indulge in it. Though occasionally necessary, extemporisation is not for minors; only long habit of premeditation keeps it in order. Anecdote of Apelles. The best style is a mean between the inflated and the pedestrian; speech should be strong and daring, and diversified to avoid monotony.

7C1-8B4 (10) Philosophy

Children should give some cursory attention to the encyclia, but philosophy must have pride of place. Bion's simile about the suitors of Penelope. Philosophy is the only cure for the ills of the soul; it teaches us our duties to others and self-control in good fortune and bad, pleasure and anger. The best sort of life is that which combines philosophy with action, as lived by Pericles, Archytas, Dion and Epaminondas.

8B5-9 Books

It is useful to make a collection of ancient writings, since books are a valuable educational tool.

8B10-D7 (11) Physical training

Boys should attend the trainer's school: fitness in youth is the foundation of a good old age. Exercise should not, however, interfere with lessons. Warlike sports are to have precedence; there is no place in war for men of soft physical condition.

8D8-E8 Education and the poor: an answer to criticism

To the charge that I am neglecting the education of the poor I reply that I am not to blame for their poverty and that they must do the best they can for their children's education.

8E9-9A9 (12) Corporal punishment, praise and reproof

Blows and ill-treatment, fit only for slaves, are not to be used on free children. Praise and reproof must take their place, to be used alternately as required. Praise, however, must never be so fulsome as to go to a child's head.

9A10-C8 (13) Rest and relaxation

Ambitious parents sometimes overwhelm their children with tasks; but the mind, like a plant, needs moderate nourishment to grow. Children need rest from work, and a pattern of activity and relaxation runs through the whole of life.

9C9-D7 Parental supervision of lessons

A parent's duties are not over when he has appointed a pedagogue and a teacher. He should monitor his children's progress every few days and keep the teacher alert.

9D8-F3 Memory training

Mnemosyne is justly called the mother of the Muses. Exercise of the memory will benefit both children with naturally good memories and those without. Memory is also a practical asset in everyday life.

9F4-11C8 (14) Miscellaneous moral advice

Unseemly language is to be discouraged in children and affability cultivated. More importantly, one should live free of arrogance and learn to control one's tongue, one's anger and one's hands. The

examples of Gylippus (theft), and of Socrates, Archytas and Plato (anger); imitation of such great men may be difficult, but it must be attempted. Control of the tongue: Sotades imprisoned by Ptolemy; Theocritus offends Alexander, and is killed by Antigonus for a witticism. Children must also be taught to tell the truth.

11C9-12A2 (15) Pederasty

Now a great dilemma: should boys' lovers be allowed access to them or not? Stern parents disapprove; but Socrates and Plato and their circle approved, and Euripides supports them. Lovers of the body are to be discouraged, but lovers of the soul accepted; the Theban, Elean and Cretan attitude is to be shunned, and the Athenian and Spartan approach adopted.

12A3-D2 (16) Youths

It is wrong to control children but let youths do as they please: in fact the latter need even more supervision than the former. Children's misconduct is trifling, that of youths more serious. Fathers must be specially vigilant at this time.

12D2-F7 (17) Pythagorean 'riddles'

Children should be kept away from bad company, as Pythagoras urged in riddles which I shall expound: (i) 'Don't taste black-tails'; (ii) 'Don't step over a yoke'; (iii) 'Don't sit on a quart-measure'; (iv) 'Don't give everyone your hand'; (v) 'Don't wear a tight ring'; (vi) 'Don't stir the fire with iron'; (vii) 'Don't eat the heart'; (viii) 'Have nothing to do with beans'; (ix) 'Don't put corn in a pot'; (x) 'Don't turn back at the boundary'.

12F8-13C5 Flatterers

Flatterers are a pernicious breed, ruining both fathers and sons. They urge sons to defy their parents and live for the present; they lead them into vices; their servility is disgusting. A prudent father will drive them away.

13C6-E9 (18) Parental tolerance

Fathers should not be invariably stern, but should temper severity with indulgence. They should sometimes turn a blind eye to their sons' faults and be ready to forgive their lesser misdeneanours.

13E10-14A2 (19) Marriage

Sons who are deaf to admonition should be found wives to settle them down. But it is a mistake to marry them above their own station.

14A3-C3 (20) Parental example and help

Fathers should set their sons a good example and practise what they preach, otherwise they have no moral authority. They should do all they can to guide them, like Eurydice in the epigram.

14C4-7 Conclusion

Though the practical realisation of all these precepts may be too much to hope for, with luck and care most can be attempted.

II THE STYLE OF THE DE LIBERIS EDUCANDIS

In form and presentation, the De liberis educandis may fairly be described as a popular treatise. Although the work clearly has a serious didactic purpose which the author pursues earnestly and sometimes even vehemently, the style in which it is written makes it equally evident that his intention was to please as well as to edify and instruct. Frequent quotations, allusions, anecdotes and sayings are the most obvious means by which he seeks to commend his writing to the taste of a popular audience.

Comparison with some of the more truly 'ethical' of the works in Plutarch's Moralia is irresistible, since they too handle serious subjects -- usually from the realms of popular ethics or philosophy -- in an attractive literary manner which employs many of the same ingredients. With the similarity of type, however, goes what can only be described as a difference of quality between the De liberis educandis and comparable works of the Moralia. To put it briefly, the De liberis educandis, considered as a literary composition, suffers from elementary defects which make it difficult, if not impossible, to believe that it can have been written by Plutarch[1].

1. ORGANISATION

Some of the most obvious and striking failings concern what may broadly be termed P's organisation of his work. On the largest scale, there is frequently some awkwardness in the placing of whole sections of the book. It is for example by no means readily apparent what a passage on the usefulness of books

is doing at 8B5-9, or how the author comes to be defending himself against an imagined accusation at 8D8-E8, or why at 12D4-E7 we are treated to an exposition of ten Pythagorean sayings of which only the first is relevant. These are only some of the more prominent cases; virtually every chapter has its own minor oddities of sequence and arrangement.

A related fault is P's lack of facility at linking the several parts of his work together. He has chosen, or is obliged by the nature of his subject, to treat a series of subjects rather than a single theme capable of organic development. Connections between topics are therefore a frequent necessity, and require to be managed with imagination -- a quality which P evidently does not possess. In the early chapters of the work, transitions between one subject and the next are austerely effected by a simple formal announcement that one is finished with and the next about to begin (1A4 βέλτιον δ' ἴσως ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως ἄρξασθαι πρῶτον ; 2A3-5 καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς γενέσεως τοσαῦτ' εἰρήσθω μοι , περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀγωγῆς καὶ δὴ λεκτέον ; 3B8-10 καὶ περὶ μὲν ἐθῶν καὶ βίων ἀρκείτω τοῦτο. περὶ δὲ τροφῆς ἑξόμενον ἂν εἴη λέγειν). But P soon abandons this device, perhaps rightly sensing the tedium likely to ensue from its continual repetition[2]. Unfortunately it rapidly becomes plain that he has nothing better to put in its place, for connections between topics are henceforth perfunctory, mechanical and often hopelessly feeble (cf. e.g. 5C6 συνελὼν τοίνυν ἐγὼ φημι; 8E9 κἀκεῖνο φημι; 6C2 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ; 8B5 πρὸς δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ; 6A8-11 and 7A3-6 ὥσπερ ... οὕτως αὖ πάλιν ; 9F4 καὶ μέντοι καί). A favourite stratagem is to herald a new subject with the declaration that it is the most important yet (4B6-8, 5D6, 7E5-6, 8C10-D1, 9D8, 10B1-2, 11C5). This is in essence just another transition formula, as is clear from the way in which P employs it on subjects which

patently do not warrant the emphasis[3].

Such a poor showing in a skill which is fairly basic to all types of literary composition is interesting and suggestive. Most of all perhaps, it suggests that we may be dealing with an author who has not had much practice at committing his thoughts to writing[4], and it is tempting to find confirmation of this in the highly self-conscious manner in which he constantly comments on his own operations as a writer (3A2-3, 4B6-8, 7A3-4, 7B5-8, 8C10-D1, 8E7-8, 10E7-8, 11A1-2, 11C9-D3, 12A4-6, 12D4-5, 12F8, 13C6-7, 14A3)[5]. These comments, though they often act as introductions to new subjects, are nevertheless, one senses, less for the guidance of the reader than somehow for the author's own benefit, and it is very tempting to see in this a symptom of inexperience.

2. ILLUSTRATIVE MATERIAL

Quotations, allusions, anecdotes, sayings and literary figures are an essential and prominent feature of the De liberis educandis[6]. They were doubtless a means by which P intended his work to appeal to the popular audience at which he clearly aimed it, as well as a mark of his own literary pretensions; at the Renaissance and after, borrowing and imitation proved them to be among the most attractive qualities of the work. They deserve and repay a little attention on their own account.

Quotations and allusions[7]

P employs literary quotations and allusions to illustrate and enliven his didactic passages, and also no doubt to establish an image of himself as an educated and well-read person. The most frequent source of poetic quotations is Euripides[8], whom P cites

five times in the course of his work, at 1B4-5 (Herc. 1261-62), 1C3-4 (Hipp. 424-425), 6B3-6 (Hipp. 986-989 minus the first part of 988), 10A9-10 (Protesilaus fr.654), and 11E8-9 (Theseus fr.388.1-2)[9]. P, unlike Plutarch, always quotes Euripides with unqualified approval, and honours him with the epithet σοφός at 10A7. From Hesiod come two much quoted lines at 9E7-8 (Op. 361-362)[10], and from Phocylides two half-lines at 3F5-6 (fr.13 Bergk, 15 Diehl)[11]. A line from Sotades at 11A4 (fr.1 Powell, Diehl) and the Eurydice epigram[12] at 14B9-C3 are less genuinely poetic adornments chosen by P to embellish his work than passages with a story attached which is relevant to his argument.

Among prose-writers Plato is the most frequently alluded to, in keeping with P's evident reverence for him[13]: cf. 3E9-F3 (R. II 377B: proposed censorship of the tales nursemaids tell to children), 8C9-10 (R. VII 537B: sleep and labour the enemies of learning), and possibly (though this passage falls under the suspicion of being an interpolation) 11E10-F2 (R. V 468B: only the brave deserves the fair). P also quotes Demosthenes[14] at 6D6-E2 (In Mid. 191), Xenophon[15] (without acknowledgement) at 8D3-4 (Cyr. II 3.2: the possessions of the vanquished are the prize of the conqueror), and Democritus[16] at 9F5 (VS 68 B 145: the word is the shadow of the deed).

A somewhat similar list of quotations could no doubt be compiled for many a work of the Moralia[17]. But in the manner of deploying and introducing quotations there is a striking difference between Plutarch and P[18]. There is a spontaneity in Plutarch's use of quotations which suggests irresistibly that they were a familiar part of his mental world and not just extraneous decorations inserted for the occasion; he weaves them completely naturally into his writing, and modifies, criticises, develops and

adapts them with a sure and expert touch. But all such deftness is absent from the De liberis educandis, where by contrast the introduction of quotations is almost always attended by some degree of awkwardness. P prepares the way for them with trite and standard introductions (almost always either by commending their originator or by citing him as a witness)[19], and uncritically invokes their authority, usually to set the seal upon an argument.

Anecdotes and sayings

As another form of illustration especially appropriate to a work of popular instruction, P makes frequent use of passages which describe the sayings or actions of famous men. These serve both as proofs of the correctness of his precepts and often also as examples to be imitated. A list will show just how many passages of this type there are: the saying of 'Diophantus' * (1C6-10); Archidamus fined by the Spartans for marrying a small wife* (1C11-D4); Diogenes' remark to a crazy young man (2A1-3); the saying of the Thessalian (2F4-5); Lycurgus and the two dogs (3A3-B8); Socrates rebukes the Athenians for thinking more of money than of their children's education (4D9-E5); Aristippus and the mean father (4F2-5A2); Diogenes' remark on the similarity of pleasures bought cheaply and dearly (5C1-5); Stilpon undismayed by the sack of Megara* (5F2-6); Socrates on the King of Persia's happiness (6A1-7); Pericles and Demosthenes refuse invitations to make impromptu speeches (6C9-D5); Apelles and the too-fluent painter (6F3-7A2); Bion's simile of the suitors of Penelope (7C8-D2); the theft of Gylippus* (10B8-9); Socrates' forbearance when kicked in public by a reckless youth (10C1-7) and mocked by Aristophanes in the theatre (10C7-D1); the self-control of

Archytas and Plato in punishing delinquent slaves* (10D1-8); the poet Sotades imprisoned for lampooning Ptolemy Philadelphus (11A2-7); Theocritus of Chios incurs Alexander's displeasure for a sarcastic remark (11A9-B5), and is put to death by Antigonus Monophthalmus for another ill-judged witticism* (11B5-C4); Eurydice learns letters late in life to assist her children's education (14B3-C3)[20].

Here too there is a superficial similarity with the Moralia; and indeed some of the sayings and anecdotes listed above (those marked with an asterisk) actually occur in Plutarch, though sometimes in slightly different versions[21]. But again P shows himself no match for Plutarch in the use of this type of material. Quite often there is an awkward match between the saying or anecdote and the point it is intended to illustrate (see for example commentary on 1C11-D4, 2A1-3, 14B3-C3), and in one case (2F4-5) the reader is left guessing as to the relevance of an anecdote.

Similes and metaphors

Comparisons of various kinds also abound in the pages of the De liberis educandis. P is especially fond of similes, and uses them everywhere to give vivid figurative embodiment to his many precepts: as in agriculture you need good land, a skilful cultivator and good seed, so in education you need natural talent, a good teacher and sound precepts (2B4-8); one should form and mould a child's mind as one would its body (3E1-4); children's minds are impressionable like wax to a seal (3E7-9); teachers use their precepts to make a child's character grow straight as farmers use stakes to support their vines (4C1-4); the man who entrusts his children to a bad teacher on a friend's recommendation

is like a sick man choosing a bad doctor to please a friend, or a man who chooses a bad ship's captain for the same reason (4D3-7); caring more for one's money than for one's children's education is like caring for the shoe and neglecting the foot (4E5-7); long practice helps an extemporaneous speech to keep its form in the same way as a prisoner long used to fetters will limp even when released (6E8-F2); as the body should be not just healthy but fit, so speech should be not merely free from defects but positively robust (7A7-9); one should try the encyclia but settle for the study of philosophy, just as it is good to travel widely but choose the best city to live in (7C6-8); as it is wise to prepare for storms while the good weather lasts, so one should make discipline and order in youth a standby for coming old age (8C4-6); as plants are nourished by moderate showers but drowned by a downpour, so mental capacities are fostered by proportionate tasks but swamped by excessive ones (9B6-9); as doctors mix their bitter medicines with sweet juices, so fathers should temper rebukes with mildness (13C10-D7).

Metaphorical ideas in many a phrase or sentence also contribute to the richness of P's imagery. Good birth is a fine treasury of free speech (1B6); common nurture is a tightening-peg(?) of goodwill (3D3-4); a good education is the fountain and root of virtue (4B10-C1); physical fitness in youth is the foundation of a good old age (8C3-4); good order and discipline are a viaticum for old age (8C5-6); rest is the sauce of labour (9C3-4); memory is the storehouse of education (9D9); students of philosophy are the hierophants and torchbearers of wisdom (10E4-5); adolescence is frisky and needs a bridle (12B9-10); flatterers entice their victims with the irresistible bait of pleasure (13A5-7); fathers should sometimes slacken the reins (13D4-5); frisky youth is

broken in by parental tolerance and forbearance (13E8-9).

3. SYNTAX

The typical sentence-structure of the De liberis educandis is a relatively uncomplicated one. Sentences are on the whole shorter than in Plutarch and less syntactically involved[22], with only the occasional more elaborate period, such as those at 12C2-7 and 13C10-D7[23]. There are, in addition, a number of differences in syntactical usage between the De liberis educandis and the typical practice of Plutarch.

Final clauses in the De liberis educandis are regularly introduced by the conjunction ἵνα. There are 13 instances of this[24] (3D1, 3E3, 3F1, 4A1, 4C4, 4E9, 8E7, 9C7, 10B6, 10F1, 11A6, 11A10, 14A6), as opposed to only one instance each of a final clause introduced by ὡς (4A8) or ὅπως (12E1, after προνοεῖν). There is some significance in this for the question of authenticity, since as Hein points out (p.162) ἵνα is much rarer in this function in Plutarch than ὅπως and ὡς; his figures (p.107) show a ratio of 247 occurrences of ὅπως and 92 of ὡς to only 70 of ἵνα. Another difference noted by Hein (pp.162-163) is that whereas in Plutarch ἵνα preceded by a verb in a secondary tense is almost always followed by a subjunctive, this may not hold true for P: of the five cases of ἵνα in secondary sequence three are followed by subjunctives (8E7-8 παρεφορτικέμην .. ἵνα .. συνάψω; 10F1-3 κατέδειξεν .. ἵνα .. μεταφέρωμεν; 11A6-7 ἵνα .. παρασχῇ .. ἐκλαύσειεν), but two are followed by the optative (3C9-D1 ἐνέθηκε .. ἵνα .. ἔχοιεν; 11A9-B1 Ἀλεξάνδρου .. κελεύσαντος .. ἵνα .. θύσειε).[25]

In consecutive clauses ὥστε occurs three times, always with

the indicative and never an infinitive (4E9-F1, 12B10-C2, 13C1-3)[26]. There are also three instances[27] of ὡς with the infinitive expressing result (8C7-8, 10C3-4, 13E1-2), a construction which Hein calculates (p.163) does not occur in the entire Moralia more than 15 times, though frequent in later writers. If his estimate is correct, the De liberis educandis would have a suspiciously high concentration of examples for a supposedly Plutarchan work.

Indirect statement is almost always introduced by ὅτι. There are over 20 occurrences of this, as against only four of ὡς (1C7, 1D3, 2A8, 9D6)[28]. Again Hein (p.162) points out a divergence from Plutarchan usage: his figures (p.84) show a slight superiority for ὡς in Plutarch, with 515 instances as compared with 487 of ὅτι.

It seems very likely that in conditional clauses P admits the un-Plutarchan construction of κἂν (= ἐάν) with the optative, which is post-classical and un-Plutarchan. In each case, however, editors have tampered with the text to bring it into line with the classical usage. Cases in point are 5A3-4, where the ms. reading κἂν προτείνειε should in all probability not be altered with Hertlin to κἂν προτείνῃ, and 6E8-9 where κἂν ⟨εἰ⟩ λυθεῖεν can stand without Hercher's supplement. Other possible instances occur at 3A1, where the mss. divide between ἄν τις λέγῃ and ἄν τις λέγοι, and 8D8, where despite Paton all mss. read τί οὖν, ἄν τις εἴποι (though more than one construction is possible here: see commentary).

On the general subject of optatives, it is interesting to note that there are over 40 in the De liberis educandis[29]. Hein (p.162) converts this into a ratio of 186 optatives to 100 (Sintenis) pages, which compares with an average for Plutarch of around 50 optatives to 100 pages. This is yet another significant difference between P's usage and that of Plutarch.

4. LANGUAGE AND VOCABULARY

Un-Plutarchan words and expressions

In the course of his argument against the authenticity of the De liberis educandis, Wyttenbach (pp.54-55) submits a list of over 40 words used by P which are not found in Plutarch. After removal of a few incorrect or doubtful cases[30], the following remain: χερσεύεσθαι (2D10), ἐξεργεῖσθαι (2E1), τελεσφόρος (2E6), πωλοδαμνεῖν (2E10-11, 13E8-9), σκληρανχήν (2F1), σινάμωρος (3A6), ἐπιτόνιον (3D4), ἐνκατατυποῦσθαι (3E9), περίτρωνες (4A1), κατοψοφαγεῖν (5B7), κατάπειθής (5C1), ἀλύμαντος (5E8), ἐλευθεριάζειν (6E7), παρατράγωδος (7A4), μονόκωλος (7B6-7), κατασκελετεύειν (7D2), ζωώδης (8A6), συνουσιαστής (8B3), γεωργώδης (8B7), κατάξηρος (8C7), παραφορτίζεσθαι (8E7), φιλοπροσήγορος (10A1-2), ἀμισής (10A3), ἀπαραχώρητος (10A4), καταπροίξεσθαι (10C6), χερσοῦσθαι (10D4), ἀδυροστομία (11C2), δικογνώμων (11C11), ὀρφανικός (11D8), νεκνισκεύεσθαι (12B4), ἀνοσοφθορία (12B7), κρουόληρος (13B1), σοροδαίμων (13B2), ἀποτομία (13D3), προσοργίζεσθαι (13D6), ἀποφλεγμαίνειν (13D7), δύσκωφος (13E1), βουκολεῖν (13E6), τριβάρβαρος (14B5-6), φιλοτεκνία (14B7). It would of course be rash to suppose that any given genuine work of Plutarch will not contain a certain number of words which are not to be found elsewhere in the surviving writings; but a concentration of 40 in a single work can hardly be explained in this way without straining credulity.

There are also expressions as well as single words which seem not to be Plutarchan[31]: ἤτοι ... ἤ (1D7), the demonstrative use of the article in τῶν ὅσοι (2C2), the exclamation Ζεῦ καὶ θεοὶ πάντες (4D7-8), the four consecutive duals δυεῖν ὄντοιν μεγίστοιν ἀγαθοῖν (8A1-2) and τῆδε κἀκεῖσε (11D1). Juxtaposition of τε and καί

occurs at 11A8, a collocation which Plutarch avoids[32]; and P has τῳ for τινι at 2C3 and 13C1 (both after εἰ), a usage of which there are apparently only two examples in the Lives (Brutus 36.2, Camill. 22.2) and only three in the Moralia (the two in De lib. educ. and, significantly, Cons.ad Apoll. 157D)[33].

Other words and expressions

Some of P's locutions not surprisingly reflect his reading of classical authors. Among them are not a few which have a Platonic ring, as one might have expected from P's evident respect for Plato. They include the following (see commentary for source references): καλὸς .. παρρησίας θησαυρὸς εὐγενείας (1B6), μεγαλαυχίας ἐμπίπλαται καὶ φρυάγματος (1C5-6), τραχυτέρᾳ τοῦ δέοντος (2E2-3), τὰς τῆς τροφῆς πηγάς (3D1-2), ταῖς τούτων ψυχαῖς ἁπαλαῖς ἔτι (3E5-6), ὡς ἐν φαρμάκου μοίρᾳ (6E4), χαυνοῦνται .. καὶ θρύπτονται (9A8-9), γέλωτα παρέχειν (11A6), ὑπερφυᾶ .. καὶ σκέτλια (12B5), ἐφεῖναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας (13D4-5). πολλάκις καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, which P uses twice (1C7 and 12F10-11), is Isocratean. The expression οὐδ' ἂν εἴ τι γένοιτο (2D5) is Demosthenic, as is ὡς ἡμῖν ἀκούειν παραδέδοται (6D1). A passage of Aeschines is recalled by 4A9-10 ἐπεὶ νῦν γε τὸ γινόμενον πολλοῖς ὑπερκατάγελαστον ἐστι, while ἀναλαμβάνειν is used in a sense of which Aeschines is fond at 5B4. It is quite possibly mere coincidence that P joins words which are found in Plutarch as a pair in at least two instances: φορὰ καὶ συνεργά (5C9) and διαλαβεῖσθαι καὶ φεύγειν (7A6).

5. HIATUS[34]

A reading of the De liberis educandis leaves no doubt as to P's sensitivity to hiatus and his determination, where possible,

to avoid it. Not only are harsh instances of hiatus comparatively rare, but it is possible on occasion to observe hiatus-avoidance at work in P's choice and positioning of words. Some cases in point are the following[35]: the placing of ἄνευ, δίκα and χωρίς at 2B2-4; the use of καθάπερ for ὥσπερ after words ending with a vowel at 3E7, 4C1, 8C4, and 13C10 (though after consonants at 7A7 and 7B10)[36]; the use of ταχύ before a consonant at 7A1 but ταχέως before a vowel at 13D6; ἀνθρώπινα at 3B1 but πραγματικά after a vowel at 2E3[37]; εἴπερ before a vowel at 4E1 (the sole instance), but εἰ elsewhere 21 times, never before a vowel; ἅπερ before vowels at 3D6, 7E8 and 12D5; likewise ὅπερ at 1D5, 11C5, 12F9 and 14B8 (though before consonants at 8C10 and 12F10); ἥτις before a vowel at 14B5; ἅτινες before a vowel at 9A6 (though only one of the 6 cases of οἵτινες occurs before a vowel, at 1D1); ἕνεκα before a consonant at 1D6 but ἕνεκεν before vowels at 7C4, 8C2 and 11A2[38].

Only in a handful of instances have harsh examples of hiatus escaped P's attention or resisted his attempts to remove them[39]: cf. e.g. ἔχοι εἰπεῖν (1A1), πάνυ ἀστείως (4F2), νέῳ ἐναλίῳτον (5D10), ποιῆσαι ἀποκρισιν (5F5), πάντη ἀνεπίμονον (7B8-9), ἡττᾶσθαι ἐπίστασθαι (10A5), τούτου Εὐριπίδην (10A7) and τύπου ἕνεκεν (11A2). Other apparent cases seem to be excused by the intervention of a pause, indicated by modern editors with punctuation marks, or by the junction of P's own prose with quoted material[40].

Since P's practice appears to be broadly in line with Plutarch's as far as concerns the avoidance of hiatus[41], there seems on the face of it not much chance of using hiatus-avoidance as part of the case against authenticity[42]. On a close examination, however, there do seem to be at least two differences of detail. The first concerns the way in which tolerance of hiatus is affected by the intervention of a pause at the end of

a clause or sentence between the two words concerned. In Plutarch's case the pause apparently makes no difference (Ziegler c.934)[43]. For P, on the other hand, it is clear that a pause excuses occurrences of hiatus which would not otherwise be tolerable: cf. e.g. 3A1, 5A7-8, 7B4, 8C6, 8D5, 10A4, 12A4, 13B10, 14B2, 14B2-3. The second difference consists in the fact that hiatus after ὅτι, avoided by Plutarch (cf. Ziegler c.934), is tolerated with some equanimity by P, to the extent that out of 30 instances in the De lib.educ. 11 are followed by words which begin with a vowel[44].

6. PROSE-RHYTHM AND CLAUSULAE

Prose-rhythm and clausulae in the De liberis educandis were investigated by Friedrich Bock in PhW 42 (1922) cc.68-71, as part of the search for objective evidence which could be used to settle the authenticity question. For the purposes of comparison he was able to use the data already compiled for Plutarch by A.W. de Groot in his Handbook of Antique Prose-rhythm I (Groningen 1919)[45].

Prose-rhythm

De Groot's researches had identified an aversion to unbroken sequences of long syllables as one of the chief characteristics of Plutarch's rhythmical style, with continuous runs of from 4 to 7 long syllables occurring less frequently than in any of the other writers examined[46]. Bock found this distinctive feature significantly absent from the De liberis educandis[47]. Thus, while ⏑ – ⏑ and ⏑ – – ⏑ were more frequent in Plutarch than in P (138.8 occurrences to 106, and 72.9 to 64.4 respectively per thousand syllables), sequences of 3 or more long syllables occurred more

often in P, the ratio rising with the length of the sequence as high as a superiority of four to one.

Unbroken sequences of short syllables were also on the whole more readily tolerated by P, though here Bock found the contrast less clear-cut, since sequences of 3 and 5 shorts were actually commoner in Plutarch (50.3 instances to 26, and 2.8 to 1.5 respectively per thousand syllables)[48]. Finally, as against de Groot's finding that Plutarch had -- significantly less often and ⏑⏑ significantly more often than the other writers in his survey, Bock calculated frequencies per thousand syllables of 325 (P) to 250 (Plutarch) for the first, and 166 (P) to 199 (Plutarch) for the second, showing P's practice in both cases to be nearer to the average.

Clausulae

In his investigation of clausulae, de Groot had identified 3 which Plutarch evidently seeks, and 4 which he seems to avoid, as follows:

sought		avoided	
1.	— ⏑ — ⏑̲	4.	— — — ⏑̲
2.	— ⏑ — — ⏑̲	5.	— ⏑⏑ — ⏑ ⏑̲
3.	⏑ ⏑ ⏑ ⏑̲	6.	— ⏑ — ⏑ ⏑̲
		7.	— — — ⏑ ⏑̲

Comparing his own results for the De liberis educandis with de Groot's for Plutarch[49], Bock found the incidence of no.2 much the same in P as in Plutarch, and nos. 4 and 5 avoided by P as by Plutarch (though not so carefully). Significantly, however, Plutarch's favourite clausula (no.1) was actually avoided by P (quotient -1.12)[50] in favour of more unusual and contrived rhythms apparently chosen to distinguish the clausula from the normal cadences of the sentence. Thus, in contrast with the predominance of long syllables in the sentence as a whole,

clausulae with a high proportion of short syllables were preferred. Only in the De superstitione among the Plutarchan works which he compared did Bock find so many instances of 5 shorts in the clausula (though -⏑⏑⏑⏑ seemed to be avoided, with a quotient of -1.53); and 4 longs were naturally enough avoided. The otherwise rare no.6, a clausula unmistakably avoided by Plutarch (quotients -3.3 in the 'early works', -2.2 in the Lives) was clearly sought by P (quotient +2); and no.7, again negative in Plutarch, seemed also to be sought.

A later study of prose-rhythm in the Moralia by F.H. Sandbach in CQ 33 (1939) pp.194-198 included the De liberis educandis in a selection of works for which the percentage frequencies of various clausulae were calculated and compared with de Groot's figures for the Lives. Against the great bulk of undoubtedly genuine works surveyed, in which Sandbach found a 'remarkably constant' distribution of clausulae, the De liberis educandis stands out as anomalous in several respects (see the table on p.197). Most notable of all is the low incidence of clausula no. 1 (16% as compared with de Groot's average of 29% for the Lives and a comparable average for the majority of Sandbach's selection of works from the Moralia); most interestingly, the other works which have a noticeably low count for this clausula are Aq.an ig., De mus., Cons.ad Apoll. and Tyrwhitt's fragments. It is also readily apparent from Sandbach's tables that clausula no. 6, with an incidence of 9% as compared with a Plutarchan norm of nearer 3 (only the De mus. shows a comparable figure) is definitely on the high side.

On the evidence of prose-rhythm then, which is a subtler test than most, the De liberis educandis shows some unmistakable divergences from Plutarchan practice. Both Bock and Sandbach

consider this convincing proof of its spuriousness[51].

NOTES

1) Cf. Porson, Tracts p.85: 'To us, we must own, notwithstanding the praises that have been given to it by respectable writers, it appears much inferior to Plutarch in force of reasoning, in spirit of language, and in the learning of the allusions'; Wyttenbach passim.

2) Only at 8B3-4 and 12A4-6 are there subsequent transitions reminiscent of the earlier type.

3) Cf. Dyroff p.293 'die von Wyttenbach mit Grund gerügten Überleitungsformeln, welche recht schülerhaft jedesmal versichern, jetzt komme das Wichtigste'.

4) This is the view of Glaeser, p.102: 'apparet ex nonnullis locis scriptorem non tam ornatus cultusque neglegentem, quam scribendi plane imperitum fuisse'. Cf. Dyroff p.293.

5) Note too the other appearances of the first person in the De lib. educ. Precepts are often introduced with an accompanying personal reference (1A5-7, 3B10-C2, 5C6-10, 6A8-11, 6E2-8, 7A3-6, 8E9-F2, 13C7-10); P also mentions personal opinions (2B8-C3, 7B1-2, 7E8-F1, 7F4-8A4) and experiences (6B7-9, 9A10-B1, 10F5-11A1, 12A7-8, 12F10-13A2); on occasion he also claims personal credit for a simile (4E5-7, 7C5-8).

6) Cf. Dyroff p.249: 'Als parainetische Schrift konnte sie [sc. the De lib. educ.] .. des dekorativen Beiwerks nicht entbehren'.

7) Lists of writers quoted or alluded to by P are given by Jones pp.34-35 (this list to be approached with a good measure of scepticism) and Berry p.390. For purposes of comparison, Plutarch's borrowings from other writers are listed in W.C. Helmbold and E.N. O' Neil, Plutarch's Quotations (American Philological Association 1959); cf. Ziegler cc.914-928.

8) The predominance of Euripidean quotations follows the normal pattern for post-classical writers, including Plutarch. (Wyttenbach's contention (p.44) that there ought to be more to accord with Plutarchan usage -- he has in any case missed one, and counts only four -- is hardly persuasive.) According to Ziegler (cc.917-918), Plutarch quotes Euripides twice as often as

Aeschylus and Sophocles put together. His favourite plays, in descending frequency of quotation, are the Phoenissae, the Hippolytus, and, equal in third place, the Bacchae and the Medea. See also S.G. Mitchell, An analysis of Plutarch's quotations from Euripides (University of Southern California 1968) (which I have not been able to consult).

9) It seems quite likely that P obtained his Euripidean quotations from anthologies rather than direct from the plays. All of the passages he quotes, except for Hipp. 986-989 (6B3-6), occur in Stobaeus (see commentary for references), and it would seem for example that the application of Hipp. 424-425 to δυσγένεια by Bion, P (1C3-4) and Stobaeus can only be explained by the circulation of those lines in isolation from their context.

10) Plutarch quotes the same two lines at De prof.in virt. 76C and fr.53 Sandbach. On Plutarch's quotations from Hesiod see Ziegler c.873; he wrote a commentary on the Works and Days, of which fragments survive (frs.25-112 Sandbach);fr.53 is commentary on Op. 359-362.

11) On Plutarch's quotations from Phocylides see Ziegler c.916.

12) On epigrams in Plutarch see Ziegler c.919: he quotes 24 (13 in the Moralia and 11 in the Lives), some of which are not otherwise known.

13) On this see Commentary, 11D7-F2n.

14) See Ziegler c.923 for the relative frequencies of Plutarch's quotations from the various speeches: De corona is the most quoted (12 passages), with In Mid. second (5 passages). Demosthenes is the only Attic orator with whom Plutarch is really familiar.

15) On Plutarch's quotations from Xenophon see Ziegler c.924.

16) On Plutarch's quotations from Democritus (whom Ziegler thinks he may have read in the original) see Ziegler c.920.

17) Absent from the list of P's quotations, for what this observation is worth, are two favourites of Plutarch, Pindar and Menander (on whom see Ziegler cc.916-917 and 872-873 respectively).

18) Cf. Wyttenbach p.53 on the difference between P and Plutarch in their use of quotations: 'Plutarcho est quaedam consuetudinis et familiaritatis facilitas, ut sententiae sponte ei et in mentem

venisse et in orationem influxisse videantur: in Pseudo-Plutarcho apparet novitas, quaerentis labor, et quasi vultus nitentis.'

19) Commendation of the cited authority: 1B2-3, 1C1-2, 3F3-4; appeal to a cited author as witness: 6B1-2 (where see commentary for examples of the technique in other writers), 10A7-8, 11E6.

20) The highest concentration of anecdotes (8 of the 23) occurs in Chapter 14, the long chapter of miscellaneous moral advice. The anecdotes are very variable in length, ranging from as few as two lines (e.g. 10B8-9, Gylippus) to 10 or 15 (e.g. 11B5-C4, Theocritus and Antigonus; 3A3-B8, Lycurgus and the two dogs).

21) References are as follows: the saying of 'Diophantus' (1C6-10): Plut. Them. 18.7, Cato maior 8.5, and the doubtfully genuine Reg. et imp.apophth. 185D; the Archidamus story (1C11-D4): Plut. Agesil. 2.6; the Lycurgus anecdote (3A3-B8): [Plut.] Apophth.Lac. 225F; Stilpo and the sack of Megara (5F2-6): Plut. Demetr. 9.8-9 and De tranq.an. 475C; the Gylippus story (10B8-9): Plut. Lys. 16-17.1, Nic. 28.4 and Per. 22.4; Archytas and the slave (10D3-6): Plut. De sera 551B; Plato and the slave (10D6-8): Plut. Adv.Col. 1108A; the story of Theocritus' clash with Antigonus (11B5-C4): Plut. Quaest.conv. 633C. Very often, however, there are discrepancies between P's and Plutarch's version; see commentary on individual passages for details.

22) The relative shortness of P's sentences is remarked upon by Heusinger in his preface, Wyttenbach p.57, and Bock PhW 41 (1921) c.796. On the length of Plutarch's sentences see Bernardakis, Moralia I p.LVI, Ziegler cc.937-938.

23) These two periods are analysed by Montesi, SIFC 20 (1913) p.22.

24) The instance at 5C4 occurs in a quotation, and another at 9B2 in a clause bracketed for deletion by Paton as probably intrusive or corrupt.

25) Hein (p.163) wrongly includes 4E9-F1, where there is indeed an optative, but the final clause stands in primary, not secondary, sequence. The reading βλαστάνοι at 4C4 (in primary sequence after ἵνα) originates with the Aldine and is not in the mss. as Hein believes (p.163 n.1); the mss. read βλαστάνῃ.

26) At 13C1-3 the indicative ἔστι is understood with ἐκδιωκτέον.

27) Hein (p.163) says 4 instances, but his example at 12E is mythical.

28) All four precede words beginning with vowels, and may therefore be explained in terms of hiatus-avoidance, though elsewhere (see section on hiatus) P frequently tolerates histus after ὅτι .

29) Hein (p.162) counted 42 optatives. I count 43, reading λέγοι at 3A1, προτείνειε at 5A3-4, and εἴποι at 8D8, but διώκοντες not διώξειεν at 6C2. See Hein passim and Ziegler c.932 on optatives in Plutarch.

30) I have removed 6 words from Wyttenbach's list of 46. φυτουργός (2B5) occurs at Plut. De am.prol. 495F, and χαμαιτύπη (5B6, 13B3), as Sizoo points out (p.83), at Antony 9.8. κιττοφορεῖν (5B9), μονῳδία (7B9), ἀνακωμῳδεῖν (10C9) and περικνίζειν (10E6) are all most probably corrupt. Professor E.N. O' Neil of the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, has kindly confirmed for me from the Plutarch index in preparation there that Wyttenbach is right about the other words on his list. Of those that remain, it should be noted perhaps that κρονόλιθος (13B1) and σεροδκίμων (13B2) are words put into the mouth of the flatterer and may not reflect P's own usage.

31) Many of these were pointed out by Weissenberger, II pp.7-8.

32) On Plutarch's avoidance of juxtaposed τε καί see K. Fuhr, RhM 33 (1878) pp.584 ff.

33) See H. Kallenberg, RhM 72 (1917-18) p.492.

34) On hiatus in the De lib.educ. see the following: G.E. Benseler, De hiatu in oratoribus Atticis et historicis Graecis libri duo (Freiberg 1841) p.422; J. Schellens, De hiatu in Plutarchi Moralibus (Bonn 1864) p.3 n.5; Sizoo pp.98-99.

35) Some of these are noted by Sizoo pp.98-99; cf. also Bock, PhW 41 (1921) c.797.

36) It has to be remembered that other factors too, such as prose-rhythm, may determine the choice made between synonyms. Note also that ὥσπερ stands after a vowel at 1C5 (where hiatus is not felt because of the pause between sentences, or is perhaps even thought appropriate in the transition from a quotation back to P's own words), and at 7C8 after ὅτι , a word which P elsewhere allows to be followed by vowels quite regularly.

37) It should be noted for what it is worth that πκκύ at 7A1 and κὐπίκκ at 3B1 occur in passages of quoted speech which may or may not be of P's own formulation.

38) Bock, PhW 41 (1921) c.797, also considers ἔφησεν for ἔφη (2A3, 10C10, 10D5, 10D7, 11B2, 11B10), and τούτοις for κὐτοῖς at 3C1 to be examples of hiatus avoidance. But in the first case P seems to have an absolute preference for ἔφησε(ν), since he uses ἔφησε four times where there is no question of hiatus avoidance; and in the second, οὗτος for κὐτός seems to be used by P even where there are no advantages to be had in terms of hiatus avoidance: see commentary on 3C1-2.

39) Benseler (p.422) lists 16 examples of harsh hiatus from the De lib.educ., of which, however, some are clearly permissible within the rules of ordinary usage (e.g. 6B8-9 πολλὰ ἀεὐτους, 12C1 τῇ ἀνοίᾳ), and others result from adherence to a faulty text.

40) For Plutarch's practice regarding hiatus in the neighbourhood of pauses and quotations see Schellens pp.20-23 and pp.23-26.

41) For Plutarch's practice with regard to hiatus generally see Benseler pp.314-548, Schellens op. cit., Ziegler cc.932-935.

42) Neither of course can a shared disposition to avoid hiatus be used to argue for Plutarchan authorship, as Schellens (p.3 n.5) and Ziegler (c.933) both point out.

43) Cf. Schellens pp.20-23, which is not, however, quite so definite on this point.

44) A Plutarch sample consisting of De aud., De glor.Ath., De tranq. an., De la.ips. and De superst. examined with the aid of computer-generated concordances produced 59 instances of ὅτι, not one of them followed by a word beginning with a vowel. Of the 11 examples from De lib.educ. (4A4, 4E1, 4E5, 5C7, 7C8, 9D11, 11B3, 11B10, 12E8, 12F2, 13C10) it should be noted that the one at 4A4 precedes a quotation, where both P and Plutarch often allow hiatus as a sort of punctuation between their own and the borrowed material (cf. Schellens p.21), and that the instances at 11B3 and 11B10 occur in passages of reported speech. The general conclusion that P tolerates hiatus after ὅτι much more readily than Plutarch is not however invalidated by the elimination of these cases.

45) See de Groot pp.42-45, as well as the Plutarch entries in his various tables. For more material on prose-rhythm in Plutarch see F.H. Sandbach, 'Rhythm and Authenticity in Plutarch's Moralia',

CQ 33 (1939) pp.194-203, and Ziegler's survey (dealing exclusively with clausulae), cc.935-936.

46) The other writers included in de Groot's survey were Thucydides, Xenophon, Isocrates, Demosthenes and Plato. The Plutarch data were derived from samples taken from 9 Lives: see CQ 9 (1915) p.232 for details. Before adopting them as a basis of comparison, Bock satisfied himself by random sampling from De Alex. Mag.fort., De superst. and De exil. that they could safely be taken as representative.

47) De Groot (p.12) had already commented upon its absence from the spurious Cons. ad Apoll.

48) Bock attempts (c.69 n.2) to explain this phenomenon in terms of an unconscious aversion to odd sequences, cancelled for corresponding numbers of longs by P's general predilection for long syllables. This theory should probably not be taken too seriously.

49) Bock first checked de Groot's findings for the Lives against the results of his own analysis of clausulae in a selection of works from the Moralia (cc.69-70). Since he was especially concerned to disprove Montesi's thesis that the De lib.educ. might be a work of Plutarch's youth -- in his view the only assumption upon which its authenticity might perhaps still be plausibly maintained -- the first group which he investigated consisted of works classified by Krauss as early: De fort.Rom., De Alex.Mag. fort., De glor.Ath., Aq.an ig., De superst. and De esu carn. The second, for balance, comprised five 'later' works: the three Pythian Dialogues, De exil. and De tranq.an. Despite differences between individual works, he concluded that all of them (leaving aside Aq.an ig., which showed marked peculiarities) shared a family resemblance with each other and with the Lives as analysed by de Groot.

50) On the significance of quotients see Bock's convenient summary, c.68 n.1. To say that a given clausula has a quotient of +2 means that the pattern of quantities which composes it occurs twice as often at the end of the sentence as elsewhere, showing that it is sought as a clausula. A quotient of -2 denotes a clausula which is avoided, its metrical pattern being twice as rare at sentence-end as elsewhere.

51) Bock c.71: 'Klausel und Rhythmus lassen uns in Ps.-Plutarch

eine ganz andere Persönlichkeit erkennen, ein ganz anderes Temperament, als in Plutarch -- vielleicht auch einen anderen Stilwillen, eine andere Mode.' Sandbach p.198: 'Since one still finds reputable scholars ... who continue to speak of them as genuine, it is satisfactory to observe that they [sc. De lib.educ., Cons.ad Apoll. and Tyrwhitt's fragments] are distinguished from Plutarch's work by their clausulae as well as by other features.'

LIST OF MANUSCRIPTS[1]

1. The oldest mss.: D C W M N.

*D Par.gr.1956, ff.173r-176r. 11th or 12th century. Text of De lib.educ. from 20.15 (10E8) μικρόν only, beginning on the top line of f.173r. Bernardakis Moralia I pp.xvi-xxiv, Mnem. 24 (1896) pp.377-396; Behr pp.57-60; Pohlenz p.xxii; Hillyard pp.36-37.

*C Par.gr.1955, ff.2r-16r. 11th or 12th century for the original part; supplement 14th century. Text of De lib.educ. originally from 13.11 (7B9) μονῳδίᾳ only, starting at the top of f.9r; the rest supplied later. Treu III pp.30-31; Behr pp.16-19; Pohlenz p.xviii; Hillyard p.6.

*W Vind.phil.gr.129, ff.1r-8v, 86r and v, 9r-10r; excerpts ff.248v-249r. About 1100 for the main text, 13th century for the excerpts. Text of De lib.educ. originally from 11.11 (6C2) καλόν only; supplement from 11.10 (6C1) ἢ τὸ σῶφρον in a later hand. Treu III pp.3-6; Behr pp.1-5; Pohlenz p.xix.

M Mosq.gr.501, ff.42r-56v. 12th or early 13th century. Behr pp.14-16; Pohlenz pp.xxi-xxii; Hillyard p.18.

N Mosq.gr.502, ff.3v-17r. 12th or 13th century. Behr pp.12-14; Pohlenz p.xxii; Hillyard p.18

2. Descendants of M (Planudeans): α ε χ A γ δ E β κ.

α Ambr.gr.859 (C 126 inf.), ff.1v-8r. About 1294-95. Treu III pp.10-12; Behr pp.62-63; Wegehaupt Philologus 27 (1914) pp.244-250; Pohlenz p.xxviii; A. Turyn, Dated Greek Manuscripts (Urbana and London 1972) I pp.81-87 and II plates 59-68; Hillyard pp.26-27.

ε Matrit.gr.4690 (N 60), ff.56r-66v. 14th century. Wegehaupt Philologus 27 (1914) p.251; Pohlenz p.xxix; Hillyard p.45.

X Marc.gr.250, ff.317v-323v. 14th century. Treu I pp.13-14; Wegehaupt pp.30-31; Behr pp.60-62; Pohlenz p.xx; Hillyard p.10.

A Par.gr.1671, ff.1r-4r. Subscribed July 1296. Treu I pp.3-11 (on A and E together); Behr pp.64-65; Pohlenz p.xxviii; Hillyard p.27.

γ Vat.gr.139, ff.2r-9v. Around 1300. Behr p.62; Pohlenz p.xxix; Hillyard p.27.

σ Marc.gr.248, ff.5v-10v. Subscribed February 1455. Behr pp.67-68; Pohlenz p.xxix; Hillyard p.27.

E Par.gr.1672, ff.437v-443r. 14th or 15th century. Treu pp. 3-11 (on A and E together); Behr pp.65-66; Pohlenz pp.xxviii-xxix; N.G. Wilson GRBS 16 (1975) pp.95-97; Hillyard p.28.

β Vat.gr.1013, ff.1v-6v. 14th century? Wegehaupt pp.23-24; Behr p.69; Pohlenz p.xxix.

κ Laur.80.5, ff.4r-11r. 14th century. Wegehaupt pp.27-28; Behr pp.66-67; Pohlenz p.xxix; Hillyard p.27.

(The first part of the text of De lib.educ. in C (above, section 1), ff.2r-8v as far as 13.11 (7B9) νομίζω is also Planudean and dates from the 14th century.)

3. Descendants of W: R J j.

*R Ricc.(Laur.)45, ff.2r-15r. 12th century for the original part; supplement 15th century. Text of De lib.educ. originally from 11.10 (6C1) ἢ τὸ σῶφρον only, starting at the top of f.7r; the rest supplied later. Treu I p.12; Behr pp.5-6; Pohlenz p.xix.

J Ambr.gr.881 (C 195 inf.), ff.2r-11r. 13th century. Treu III pp.15-30; Behr pp.6-8; Pohlenz pp.xxiii-xxiv; Hillyard pp. 10-11.

j New Coll.(Oxford)273, pp.2-18. 16th century. Paton JPh 21 (1892) p.16; Pohlenz p.xxiv; Hillyard p.11.

4. Zϕ b a n.

Z Marc.gr.511, ff.8v-13v. 14th century. Treu I p.14; Wegehaupt p.32; Behr pp.48-50; Pohlenz p.xxiv; Hillyard p.37.

ϕ Mutin.gr.145, ff.3r-11r. 15th century. W. Kalinka, Innsbrucker Festgruss (Innsbruck 1909) pp.178-181; Behr pp.51-52; Pohlenz p.xxiv.

b Bruxell,gr.40 (18967), ff.149v-173r. About 1330. Wegehaupt pp.33-36; Pohlenz p.xxiv; M. Wittek, Album de Paléographie Grecque (Gand 1967) pp.23-24 and plate 31; Hillyard p.37.

a Ambr.gr.689 (Q 89 sup.), ff.74r-86r. 15th century. Treu III p.13; Behr pp.50-51; Hillyard p.37.

n Neapol.gr.350 (III E 28), ff.83r-91v. 14th century. Wegehaupt pp.25-26; Pohlenz p.xxv; Hillyard p.37.

5. h i k.

h Harl.gr.5612, ff.1r-12v. 15th century. E.M. Thompson, CR 3 (1889) p.443; Treu III p.32; Pohlenz p.xxiii; Hillyard p. 18.

i Laur.56.4, ff.35r-46r. 15th century. Behr pp.33-34; Pohlenz p.xxiii; Hillyard p.18.

k Laur.80.28, ff.34r-51r. 15th century. Behr pp.32-33; Pohlenz p.xxiii.

6. S s υ .

S Vat.gr.264, ff.56v-71v. Beginning of 14th century. Wegehaupt pp.20-21; Behr pp.20-23; Pohlenz pp.xxii-xxiii.

s Vat.gr.1012, ff.108v-117v. 14th century. Wegehaupt pp.22-23; Behr pp.23-24; Pohlenz p.xxiii; Hillyard p.28.

υ Urb.gr.98, ff.2r-12r. 14th century. Wegehaupt pp.12-13; Behr pp.24-26; Pohlenz pp.20-21.

7. d f l q p r

*d Par.gr.2596, ff.140r-151v. 14th century and 1475. Text of De lib.educ. only as far as 22.12 (11E4) παιδείαν καί. Wegehaupt p.41.

f Laur.C.S.26, ff.3r-24v. Beginning of 14th century. See E. Rostagno and N. Festa, SIFC 1 (1893) pp.139-140; Wegehaupt pp.29-30, 38; Behr pp.27-28.

l Laur.80.25, ff.1r-17v. 15th century. Behr p.28.

q Vat.gr.1010, ff.2v-16v. 14th century. Wegehaupt pp.21-22; Behr pp.26-27; Pohlenz p.xxi; Hillyard p.19.

p Palat.gr.178, ff.2r-14r. 15th century. Wegehaupt pp.18, 42; Behr pp.31-32; Pohlenz p.xxvi.

*r Regin.gr.120, ff.234r-237v. About 1290-1320. Text of De lib. educ. only as far as 13.3 (7B1) ἔχων. Wegehaupt p.42; Behr pp.29-31.

8. y δ e x c x w o m g u v.

y Ross.gr.16, ff.359r-370r. 15th century. E. Gollob, SB Wien phil.-hist. 164 (1910) Abh.3 pp.43-65.

δ Par.gr.2080, ff.1r-16v. 16th century. Behr pp.39-40.

e Par.gr.2077, ff.1r-16v. 15th century. Behr p.39.

x Parmens.gr.2495, ff.103v-119r. 15th century.

*c Palat.gr.117, ff.184r-197r. 14th and 15th century. Text of De lib.educ. from 3.15 (2C7) ἴσως πολλοῦ only. Behr pp.38-39.

*z Vindob.phil.gr.12, ff.136r-146r. 16th century. Text of De lib.educ. from 3.15 (2C7) ἴσως πολλοῦ only.

w Vindob.phil.gr.36, ff.43r-54r. About 1500. Treu III p.7; Behr pp.44-45; Pohlenz p.xxvii; Hillyard p.18.

o Vratisl.Rhed.22, ff.252v-272r. 15th century. Behr pp.44-45.

m Monac.gr.490, ff.158r-170v. 15th century. Behr pp.45-46.

g Par.gr.2933, ff.207r-213r. 1474. Behr pp.41-42.

u Par.gr.1603, ff.306r-320r. 16th century. Behr p.42.

v Par.gr.1772, ff.322r-332r. 16th century.

9. Mixed mss.: G t.

G Barb.gr.182, ff.358v-368v. 1530. Wegehaupt pp.18-19, 42; Pohlenz pp.xviii-xix ; Hillyard p.10.

t Urb.gr.100, ff.8v-14v. Subscribed December 1401. Wegehaupt pp. 15-16, 41, Philologus 18 (1905) p.412; Behr pp.36-38; Hillyard p.45.

10. Other mss.

* Vindob.phil.gr.253, f.250v. About 1500. Contains only a small fragment of the De lib.educ., from 23.24 (12C7) δύο to 24.2 (12D2) ἀπεργάζεται .

* Ottob.gr.417, ff.9v-12r. 1530. Contains excerpts from the first third or so of the De lib.educ. Behr pp.47-48.

Addit.(British Museum) 39616, ff.1r-13v. Early 16th century.

* Barb.gr.116, f.12v. 16th century. Text of De lib.educ. only as far as 1.7 (1A4) ἄρξασθαι .

* Egerton(British Museum)2474, ff.1r-16v. 16th or 17th century. Text of De lib.educ. only as far as 25.1 (12F8) first letter of ἀνακάμψω. E.M. Thompson, CR 3 (1889) p.444.

Par.gr.2126, ff.1r-52v. 16th century.

* Par.gr.3025, ff.46r-50r. 16th century. Text of De lib.educ. from 18.13 (9E4) ἐπιρρώσομεν only.

Raudnitz.VI F.e.44, pp.129-178. 15th or 16th century. E. Gollob, SB Wien phil.-hist. 146 (1903) Abh.7 p.122.

Vallicell.gr.25 (B 120), ff.13v-31r. 16th century.

Leiden BPG 57B, ff.314r-516r. 1591-92.

Guelferb.August.fol.84.4 (2869), ff.2r-22v. 1600.

Editio princeps (?Florence 1496).

A text of the De lib.educ. is of course included in the Aldine edition of 1509 which is the editio princeps of the collected Moralia. But an undated volume containing Cebes' Tabula, Basil Leg.lib.gent., the De lib.educ. and Xenophon's Hiero is nowadays usually attributed on the evidence of its type to the Florentine press of Lorenzo di Alopa around 1496. This, if the attribution is correct, will be the editio princeps of the Greek text of the De lib.educ.[2]

NOTES

1) On the manuscripts of the De liberis educandis and their relationships see G. Behr, Die handschriftliche Grundlage der im Corpus der plutarchischen Moralia überlieferten Schrift Περὶ παίδων ἀγωγῆς (Freissing 1911). The list also cites references to the following other works which contain useful comparative material: M. Treu, Zur Geschichte der Überlieferung von Plutarchs Moralia, 3 parts (Waldenburg 1877, Ohlau 1881 and Breslau 1884); H. Wegehaupt, Plutarchstudien in italienischen Bibliotheken (Cuxhaven 1906); M. Pohlenz, Preface to Plutarchi Moralia I (Leipzig 1925); B.P. Hillyard, 'The medieval tradition of Plutarch, De audiendo', RHT 7 (1977) pp.1-56. The division of the list into groups of related mss. (except for groups 1 and 10 which are miscellaneous) is based upon collations and research into the text, details of which it has not been possible to include here. Behr examined 38 mss., and mentions 11 more which he had not seen. Of the 11, one (Bruxell.4306-17 = Bruxell.gr.58) in fact contains the De lib.educ. in the printed edition of 1519 which bears a prefatory notice by Melanchthon, and one (Par.gr. 2075) does not contain the De lib.educ. at all. Wegehaupt, BPhW 32 (1912) cc.1600-01, mentioned a number of other mss. unknown to Behr.

2) The likely status of this book as the editio princeps of the De liberis educandis seems not to have been recognised before. (Behr, for example, heads a section of his work 'Editio princeps (Aldina)'.) For further details of the book see Flodr, Incunabula Classicorum p.93 s.v. 'CEBES' 1; Catalogue of Books Printed in the XVth Century now in the British Museum (London 1930) p.668 with p.665.

COMMENTARY

ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΙΔΩΝ ΑΓΩΓΗΣ : This is the title of the work (often preceded by the genitive Πλουτάρχου) in almost all the manuscripts which supply one. It clearly reflects in abbreviated form the first sentence of the treatise (1A1-2, recalled later at 8D8-9), where P invites the reader to consider with him what there is to be said περὶ τῆς τῶν ἐλευθέρων παίδων ἀγωγῆς, though whether or not the author himself was responsible for formulating it is not ascertainable. The present work shared its title with a treatise by Theophrastus which has not survived (D.L. V 50) and possibly also with a lost work of Chrysippus used by Quintilian (see Colson on Quint. I 1.4, Dyroff pp.239-240; contra Sizoo pp.12-18).

(1) 1A1-3: Introduction.

1A1-3 'Come, let us consider what there is to be said about the training of free children, and what sort they should have if they are to turn out sound of character.'

P begins with a sentence which defines the scope of his intended composition and immediately gives the reader some important indications of what to expect from it.

We note at the outset that his subject is ἀγωγή, which denotes primarily the moral training of children, and that P's ideal is to bring them up to be morally sound (1A2 σπουδαῖοι τοῖς τρόποις). The primacy of moral over intellectual or academic considerations which this implies is thoroughly Greek and not belied by the rest of the treatise. 'Quand le Grec parle de «la formation de l' enfance», τῶν παίδων ἀγωγή, c' est d' abord, c'est essentiellement de la formation morale qu' il s' agit' (Marrou pp.328-329). No less rooted in Greek tradition is the restriction of the work's scope to the upbringing of free children (1A1-2 περὶ τῆς τῶν ἐλευθέρων παίδων ἀγωγῆς). By this reference in his opening sentence P gives notice that he subscribes to the ideals of a 'liberal' education appropriate to the sons of free citizens who are not subject to the necessity of training for a trade or occupation.

With the question of authenticity in mind it should be noted that the programmatic introductory sentence which forms this first section makes the De liberis educandis almost unique in the Moralia, Plutarch's usual practice being to introduce his subject much less directly and starkly, often with a dedication or an

urbane comparison. But the programmatic opening of the De virt. moral. makes it impossible to say that Plutarch never opens an essay in this way. Nor does the absence of a dedication constitute in itself a persuasive argument against the work's authenticity: Ziegler (cc.894-895) calculates that something under a third of Plutarch's works which might suitably have a dedication are in fact without one.

See Glaeser pp.15-17 on this opening section in general; and for Wyttenbach's curious theory about its origin see his pp.62-64.

1A1-3 Τί τις ἂν ἔχοι εἰπεῖν ... φέρε σκεψώμεθα: The indirect question followed by a jussive subjunctive is characteristic of treatise language: cf. e.g. the opening of Aristotle's Poetics, περὶ μὲν ποιητικῆς αὐτῆς τε καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῆς, ἥν τινα δύναμιν ἕκαστον ἔχει ... λέγωμεν. -- For τί τις ἂν ἔχοι εἰπεῖν cf. e.g. Isoc. 12.90 ὥσπερ ἀπορίας οὔσης τί ἂν ἔχοι τις εἰπεῖν περὶ τῆς ὠμότητος καὶ σκληρότητος τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων (cf. 15.207, 215). -- For the whole sentence cf. the opening of Hieronymus of Rhodes fr.19 Wehrli: δεῦρο δὴ καὶ σκεψώμεθα περὶ τῆς τῶν παίδων ἀγωγῆς, τίνα τρόπον διειλήφασιν οἱ πατέρες.

1A1-2 περὶ τῆς τῶν ἐλευθέρων παίδων ἀγωγῆς: For the reference to ἐλεύθεροι παῖδες in an educational context cf. e.g. the Milesian inscription which records Eudemus' gift of money εἰς παιδείαν τῶν ἐλευθέρων παίδων (Ziebarth, Aus dem griechischen Schulwesen pp.2-9); also IG II 420 (186/5 B.C.) ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ δῆμος τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς ἐλευθέρους καὶ τὸν διδάσκαλον αὐτῶ[ν]. P. shares the standard classical assumption that education properly so called can exist only for the free citizen (cf. Grasberger II p.3; Mauch pp.11-14; M. Pohlenz, Freedom in Greek Life and Thought, tr. C. Lofmark (Dordrecht 1966) pp.102-105). Education did indeed exist for slaves (see Marrou p.162 and pp.537-538 n.1), but hardly

education of a comparable kind; it took Epictetus to insist that the distinction between slaves and free men in matters of education was irrelevant (Diss. II 1.22; cf. Praechter Popularphilosophie p.6).

1A2 καὶ τίνι χρώμενοι : sc. ἀγωγῇ. -- For the double question (τί ... καὶ τίνι) cf. Almquist p.133 no.306 comparing Plut. De ad. et am. 52A, 69E, Conj. praec. 144A, Sept. sap. conv. 151A.

1A2-3 σπουδαῖοι τοῖς τρόποις ἂν ἀποβαίεν : Cf. 3F9 (the child's companions should be) σπουδαῖα τοὺς τρόπους. -- For the overwhelmingly ethical character of P's educational aims cf. ἀρετή (2A7), δικαιοπραγία (2A8), καλοκαγαθία (4B10), ἀρετή and εὐδαιμονία (5C9-10), all in contexts which show that they approximate to the ideal which P is pursuing. Elsewhere, he appears concerned with the desirability of 'a healthy and ordered life' (5A8-9), with εὐταξία and σωφροσύνη (8C5-6), εὐκοσμία and σωφροσύνη (11C10), εὐταξία and κοσμιότης (12A5), and σωφρονισμός (14B4); and it is to be noted that the results of parental neglect which he fears most (5A6-C5) are all in the category of moral misdemeanours. See further Glaeser pp. 15-17. -- For ἀποβαίνω in the sense of 'turn out' cf. LSJ s.v. II 4.a.

1A3 φέρε σκεψώμεθα : Cf. Plut. De cup div. 527A φέρε δὴ σκεψώμεθα, De superst. 167F φέρε δή ... σκόπει, and Wyttenbach's examples from Aristides: 2.222, 285 Behr, 36.41 Keil, Dindorf II pp.316, 344, 349.

(2) 1A4-D4: Birth.

Although P's declared subject is the education of children, a natural desire to begin with fundamentals leads him into a preliminary discussion of birth -- a topic strictly outside his scope.

1A4-B5 First, though, the question of birth. I should advise a man who wishes to have children of note not to set up house with unsuitable women such as courtesans and concubines, for low birth leaves an indelible stain on a person for life, and supplies his enemies with ready ammunition. The poet wisely warns of these dangers.

1B6-C6 Good birth is a fine possession which enables a man to speak his mind, a point which deserves close consideration by those who wish to have proper offspring. Those whose birth is suspect are apt to slip and be humbled, as the poet points out; whereas the sons of distinguished families are full of spirited self-confidence.

1C6-10 Themistocles' son Diophantus used often to say in public that his wishes ruled his mother, his mother's wishes his father, and his father's wishes all Athens.

1C11-D4 The Spartans too deserve commendation for fining their king Archidamus when he married a small woman, on the ground that he meant to present them with kinglets, not kings.

The motive which prompts P to devote a section of his work (Chapters 2 and 3) to the subject of birth is readily appreciable. He is aware that the circumstances of a child's birth (and even, he believes, its conception) can affect whether it starts off with a good chance in life or at an initial, and irrecoverable, disadvantage even before the work of education begins.

In Chapter 3 (1D5-6) P refers to coverage by previous

writers of the topic he is about to broach, and since his subject there is still γένεσις, it may be that it was customary for educational treatises of P's time and before to begin by offering some advice on birth. Such an arrangement would have been natural enough and in accordance with the γένεσις, τροφή, παιδεία progression used by Plato when discussing children's development (see 3B10 n.). (It is interesting in this respect to note that P devotes Ch.5 to τροφή and Chs.8-10 to παιδεία.) Unlike P, Quintilian begins his book after the birth of the child (I 1.1 'Igitur nato filio ...').

The composition of this first substantial chapter follows lines which become familiar as the work proceeds. The precepts are stated and literary references cited in support of them, in this case two Euripidean passages which very probably derive from anthologies; then come two illustrative anecdotes relating to historical figures. It is also unfortunately typical of P that neither of his anecdotes fits the context particularly well (see the relevant notes), so that the reader is left in some doubt as to their bearing on the subject in hand.

On chapters 2 and 3 see Glaeser pp.17-22; Kemper pp.81-91. Cf. also Jaeger, Paideia III p.246 and some interesting background material in W. Haedicke, Die Gedanken der Griechen über Familienherkunft and Vererbung (Halle 1936).

1A4-B5 -- First, though, the question of birth. I should advise a man who wishes to have children of note not to set up house with unsuitable women such as courtesans and concubines, for low birth leaves an indelible stain on a person for life, and supplies his enemies with ready ammunition. The poet wisely warns of these dangers. -- P is being rigorously practical in this passage. There is no hint of moral disapproval in his objections to cohabitation with ἑταῖραι and παλλακαί (nor is it

likely, to judge from 5B10-C5, that he felt any): it is simply that the children of such a mother will bear the stigma of their low origins and thus begin life at a disadvantage. Though these children would be illegitimate (at least under Attic law: see Harrison, The Law of Athens I p.61 with p.13), P is more concerned with the social than with the legal disabilities of the low-born. His point needs little amplification when one recalls how often allegations of low birth furnish orators and comedians with material for jokes and insults.

1A4 βέλτιον δ' ἴσως ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως ἄρξασθαι πρῶτον: βέλτιον signals a temporary departure from topicality, birth being strictly outside the scope of P's subject. The sentence suggests the deliberate and systematic style of the treatise: cf. e.g. Arist. EN I 1096a11 τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι, MM II 1208b7 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἴσως ἃ ἀπορεῖται καὶ ζητεῖται, βέλτιον διελθεῖν; Aristox. Harm. 30 βέλτιον ἴσως ἐστὶ τὸ προδιελθεῖν τὸν τρόπον τῆς πραγματείας τί ποτ' ἐστιν. For the tautologous πρῶτον with ἄρξασθαι cf. e.g. [Thphr.] Char. prooem. 5 ἄρξομαι πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῆς εἰρωνείας. -- For birth as the natural starting point for a writer who wishes to begin at the beginning cf. e.g. Critias VS 88 B32 ἄρξομαι δέ τοι ἀπὸ γενετῆς ἀνθρώπου; X. Lac. 1.3 αὐτίκα γὰρ περὶ τεκνοποιίας, ἵνα ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄρξωμαι...

1A5 τοῖς .. ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἐνδόξων τέκνων γενέσθαι πατράσιν: P addresses himself from the outset to the audience for which his work is intended, namely the fathers of children. For the expression cf. X. Lac. 1.8 εἰ δέ τις .. τέκνων .. ἀξιολόγων ἐπιθυμοίη. For ἔνδοξος used of distinguished birth cf. e.g. Plut. Cic. 6.2 ἔνδοξοι καὶ γεγονότες καλῶς, 17.1 γένους .. ἐνδόξου.

1A6 ὑποθείμην ἄν ἔγωγε: For other expressions with ἔγωγε cf. 4E5, 6B7, 6E4, 10F5-6, 13C7-8. P's interventions in the first person are collected by Montesi, SIFC 20 (1913) p.25.

1A6 μὴ ταῖς τυχούσαις γυναιξὶ συνοικεῖν : Cf. 3D9-E1 τὰς γε πίτθας καὶ τροφοὺς οὐ τὰς τυχούσας ... δοκιμαστέον ἐστι, 7F3-4 τὸ δ' ὀργῆς κατακρατεῖν ἀνδρὸς οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἐστι. -- The verb συνοικεῖν is morally neutral and used indifferently of any kind of cohabitation, including legitimate wedlock: see Harrison, The Law of Athens I p.2 and n.4; H.J. Wolff Traditio 2 (1944) pp.65 ff. and n.115 .

1A7 λέγω δ' οἷον ἑταίραις ἢ παλλακαῖς : λέγω δ' οἷον, 'I mean for example' (again at 5E2-3) is frequent in Aristotle (e.g. Pol. III 1283b1, VII 1325b39-40; Poet. 1462b2; De an. III 426b27; MM I 1181a28; APo. I 82a3-4; Pr. X 894a34). -- ἑταῖραι and παλλακαί are courtesans and concubines respectively. There is however no hard and fast distinction to be drawn between the two where each is envisaged as living with a man, and the mention of both here may be for reasons of style rather than of sense. Where a distinction is made, it consists in two main points. (a) A relationship with a παλλακή is more permanent and more exclusive than with a ἑταίρα , who does not normally give herself to one man for long, and may have several lovers at any given time. (b) Cohabitation with a παλλακή, while legally inferior to marriage, has a degree of respectability denied to relationships with ἑταῖραι . See Busolt II p.941 n.3; Harrison, The Law of Athens I pp.13-15; Gomme and Sandbach, commentary on Menander pp.30-31; Schmidt, Synonymik II pp.413-414 (παλλακή), 415-417 (ἑταίρα).

1A7-8 τοῖς γὰρ [μητρόθεν ἢ πατρόθεν] γεγονόσιν : The transmitted text is clearly unsatisfactory, since it provides nothing for μητρόθεν ἢ πατρόθεν to refer to except γεγονόσιν, and then only nonsense results. To remove the difficulty we must either get rid of the offending phrase altogether with Wilamowitz, or supply it with something to qualify. Three groups

of mss. already take the latter way out, and insert αἰσχίστους, ἀδόξους, or οὐκ εὖ before γεγονόσιν. The conjectures of Paton, Kronenberg and Stegmann approach the problem from the same angle, but Paton and Stegmann also bracket ἢ πατρόθεν; the logic behind this is doubtless that only the wrong choice of mother is here being considered: P necessarily assumes that his audience consists of suitable potential fathers.

1B1-2 πρόχειρα τοῖς ἐλέγχειν καὶ λοιδορεῖσθαι βουλομένοις: For πρόχειρος of abuse or slander that lies ready to hand Wyttenbach compares Pl. Ap. 23D τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα τοῦτα λέγουσιν; Plut. Cic. 5.2

1B2 καὶ σοφὸς ἦν ἄρ' ὁ ποιητής: 'The poet' here (and again immediately below at 1C1-2) is Euripides, though most often in Greek writers ὁ ποιητής means Homer (LSJ s.v. II), as e.g. at Plut. De virt.moral. 442D, De tranq.an. 475A, De garrul. 504D, 506A, 513D, Quaest.conv. 655A.

1B4-5 'ὅταν δὲ κρηπὶς μὴ κατάβληθῇ γένους / ὀρθῶς, ἀνάγκη δυστυχεῖν τοὺς ἐκγόνους': The quotation comes from near the end of Euripides' Heracles (1261-62). Heracles, discovered by Theseus beside the bodies of his children, whom he has slaughtered in a blind fit of madness, explains his ghastly misfortune in terms of retribution for inherited guilt: his father Amphitryon had married his mother Alcmene when already guilty of her father's murder. The original context, therefore, contains no reference to ill-birth in the conventional sense at all, and it may be that P is drawing upon some anthology where no context was given. It is interesting to note that Stobaeus includes these lines in his chapter Περὶ παίδων, IV 24a.7.

1B6-C6 -- Good birth is a fine possession which enables a man to speak his mind, a point which deserves close consideration by those who wish to have proper offspring. Those whose birth is

suspect are apt to slip and be humbled, as the poet points out; whereas the sons of distinguished families are full of spirited self-confidence. -- The curtailment of παρρησία for the low-born which P describes here is again the outcome of no legal sanction, but the inevitable result of their vulnerability to insult. A good illustration is the story (Ath. XIII 591F) of how Hyperides used Demeas' low origins -- he was the son of Demades by a hetaira -- to silence him in public. (See further 1B6 n. on the connection between παρρησία and good birth.) In the same way the diffidence of the δυσγενής and the self-confidence of the εὐγενής are probably to be understood as reactions to public attitudes towards them and not the results of any kind of genetic inheritance (cf. Dover's remarks, Greek Popular Morality p.93). κἂν θρασύπλαγχνός τις ᾖ in the first line of the line of the Euripides quotation (1C3), which seems to allow that an ill-born person might have some natural spirit, would be conclusive proof if there were not other instances of P's introducing a quotation which jars or even conflicts with the point he is trying to illustrate.

1B6 καλὸς οὖν παρρησίᾳ θησαυρὸς εὐγένεια: 'A sure fund of confidence for facing the world lies therefore in honourable birth' (Tucker). P may possibly have in mind Pl. Mx. 247B εἶναι μὲν γὰρ τιμὰς γονέων ἐκγόνοις καλὸς θησαυρὸς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπής. Although he has not used the word παρρησία before, the logical sequence is not hard to follow: low birth exposes a man to slander; such a man may find it difficult to hold his own in a public interchange of opinions; so good birth is a valuable prerequisite for free speech. On παρρησία see E. Peterson, 'Zur Bedeutung von Παρρησία', Reinhold-Seeberg-Festschrift I (Leipzig 1929) pp.283-297. The word denotes a man's right to speak his

mind freely; for its dependence on respectable birth cf. Peterson p.286 with n.4; Bion fr. 53 Kindstrand (= D.L. IV 51) τὴν δυσγένειαν (thus Menagius; δυσσέβειαν mss.) πονηρὸν ἔλεγεν εἶναι σύνοικον τῇ παρρησίᾳ · ' δοῦλοι γὰρ ἄνδρα, κἂν θρασύπλαγχνός τις ᾖ .' (E. Hipp. 424; cf. 1C3-4 n.) (see Hense, Teletis Reliquiae pp.LXXXV-VI, and Kindstrand pp.261-263 on the difficulty of believing that Bion, himself ill-born, really held this view); Libanius 1.7 ... εἰ δὴ καλὸν μὲν τὸ εὖν παρρησίᾳ ζῆν, ποιεῖ δὲ ταύτην οὐ τὰ αὐτῷ τινι βεβιωμένα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκείνοις ἐξ ὧν ἔφυ, ὡς πολλοὶ γε ἀμέμπτους σφᾶς αὐτοὺς παρασχόμενοι γονέων ἐπεστομίσθησαν ὀνείδεσι. -- For other instances of θησαυρός applied to what is especially prized cf. (apart from Pl. Mx.247B quoted above) [Isoc.] Ad Demon. 29 (χάρις ὀφειλομένη); Men. Mon. 810 (φίλοι); Theophilus fr. 5 (CAF II p.474) (μουσική); Petronius 46.8 ('litterae'); other Latin references in Otto, Sprichwörter p.347. Note too that an undesirable thing may be a bad θησαυρός: Hippocr. Lex 4 (ἀπειρίη); Men. Mon. 325 (γυνὴ κακή).

1B7 νομίμου παιδοποιίας : Cf. e.g. Iambl. VP 210 ἐπὶ τεκνοποιίᾳ σώφρονί τε καὶ νομίμῳ, and νόμιμος in Philo 24.43 (σύνοδοι), 30.70 (ἔρως); Musonius fr. 12 p.64.3, 12 Hense. The adjective means 'right and proper' (Tucker): cf. νόμιμος παιδεία (4B10-11, 5C8-9), οἱ νόμιμοι τῶν διδασκάλων (4C2), λόγων ἐπιδείξιών καὶ νομίμων (5A5).

1B8 τῶν ὑπόχαλκον καὶ κίβδηλον ἐχόντων τὸ γένος: Herodian Philet. 51 recommends the use of the two adjectives together: ἐρεῖς δὲ καὶ τὸν πονηρὸν οὕτως · κίβδηλος ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὑπόχαλκος. Both are metal- or coin-metaphors: ὑπόχαλκος (cf. e.g. Plut. De ad. et am. 65A) denotes an article whose exterior looks valuable (usually silver or gold), but which actually contains an

admixture or inner core of base-metal (bronze); κίβδηλος means more generally 'impure, adulterated'. This type of metaphor is natural and frequent in Greek as in other languages (cf. English 'mettle', originally the same as 'metal'; Dronkers p.75; πυρέσημος below 4C7 with n.), and it is hardly necessary to assume reminiscence of Pl. R. III 415A-B (ἔκγονος ὑπόχαλκος ἢ ὑποσίδηρος) (as e.g. Glaeser does, p.18), or of Hesiod's five races (Op. 109-201).

1C1 σφάλλεσθαι καὶ πεπεισθαι πέφυκε : Nikitin (pp.1-2) makes a strong case for emendation of the first infinitive to συστέλλεσθαι with many parallels for its use in close conjunction with πεπεισθαι : E. fr. 716.4; Pl. Ly. 210E; D.S. XX 18.3; D.Chr. 67.6; Plut. De ad. et am. 70D, De Is. et Osir. 366D, De la. ips. 544E-F, Agesil. 29.6, Alcib. 6.5, Cic. 32.5, Cimon 12.1, Gracchi 39.2; Antonius Melissa I 26 (PG 136 c.860B). σφάλλεσθαι however is not inappropriate to the context and should perhaps be allowed to stand.

1C1-2 καὶ μαλ' ὀρθῶς ὁ λέγων ποιητὴς φησι : For the word-order cf. Longinus 15.8 ὁ λέγων Ὀρέστης (followed, as here, by a quotation) with Russell's note. The reading is not to be altered to λέγων ὁ ποιητής.

1C3-4 ' δουλοῖ γὰρ ἄνδρα, κἂν θρασύσπλαγχνός τις ᾖ, / ὅταν συνειδῇ μητρὸς ἢ πατρὸς κακά' : In these lines from Euripides' Hippolytus (424-425) Phaedra explains her resolve to kill herself rather than confess her guilty passion to her stepson. It is to this, and to nothing remotely concerned with the shame of ill-birth, that μητρὸς ἢ πατρὸς κακά refers. Again (cf. 1B4-5 n.) a quotation has been taken out of context to make a point of which the original was innocent. P, however, seems not to have been the first to apply this passage to low birth. As we saw (1b6n.),

Bion cited line 424 in a context similar to the present one (if Menagius' emendation is correct) and Stobaeus includes lines 424-430 in his chapter Περὶ δυσγενείας (IV 30.11). Interestingly enough, Plutarch quotes 424-425 at De aud. poet. 28C as an example of the sort of passage from the poets which the public takes too uncritically.

1C5 ὥσπερ ἀμέλει : 'as for instance' -- a favourite phrase with Plutarch: see Sandbach CQ 33 (1939) p.200; cf. also e.g. Longinus 34.2.

1C5-6 μεγαλαυχίας ἐμπίπλανται καὶ φρυάγματος: The phrase has a Platonic ring to it: cf. e.g. Ly. 206A οἱ καλοί, ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐπαινῇ καὶ αὔξῃ, φρονήματος ἐμπίμπλανται καὶ μεγαλαυχίας, R. III 411C, VI 494D. φρύαγμα is properly the snorting of a spirited horse; figuratively (LSJ s.v. II) it means spiritedness, pride, or in a bad sense haughtiness and conceit: cf. e.g. Plut. Sept. sap. conv. 150A-B, Amat. 754A (of a mare and a mule, so only partly figurative), 754C, Aem. Paul. 27.5; Epict. Diss. IV 1.150; Lucian 19.26; Ael. NA II 10, VII 12; Aristaenet. II 12; Gow-Page, Hellenistic Epigrams II, commentary on 4482.

1C6-10 -- Themistocles' son Diophantus used often to say in public that his wishes ruled his mother, his mother's wishes his father, and his father's wishes all Athens. -- The reader is left to make his own links, but the point of having this passage here must presumably lie not so much in what Diophantus said as in the fact that he said it. The utterance is a spirited one (illustrating how μεγαλαυχίας ἐμπίπλανται καὶ φρυάγματος οἱ γονέων διαφήμων) and, told of himself, shows an appropriate self-confidence. For the anecdote see Plut. Them. 18.7, Cato maior 8.5, and the doubtfully genuine Reg. et imp. apophth. 185D. There are minor divergences among these other three versions, but all

differ from the present one in four important ways: (a) Themistocles tells the anecdote about his son, and not the son about himself; P has evidently had to alter this in order to make his point about the spirit of the well-born; (b) the argument proceeds by four stages, not three: the Athenians rule Greece, Themistocles rules the Athenians, his wife rules Themistocles, and the son rules the mother; (c) the point of the story is to prove that the son is the most powerful person in Greece; and (d) the son is not named. P calls him Diophantus, but no son of Themistocles with that name is known, and 'Diophantus' has generally been considered a mistake for Cleophantus, mentioned at Pl. Meno 93D, Plut. Them. 32.1, and in a proxeny decree of Lampsacus (Hill, Meiggs and Andrewes, Sources for Greek History (Oxford 1951) p.324 no.122). See Kroll in RE s.v. 'Kleophantos' 1; Kirchner, Prosopographia Attica I (Berlin 1901) pp.576-577; J.K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 BC (Oxford 1971) pp.217-218. The Plato passage referred to above (of which the Plutarch passage is a reminiscence) suggests that Cleophantus was not a good choice for P's purposes here, since Socrates there cites his case as an instance of how wise and virtuous fathers sometimes fail to pass on their good qualities to their sons.

1C7 πολλάκις ... καὶ πρὸς πολλούς: the same phrase occurs again at 12F10-11; cf. Isoc. 7. 74 καὶ τοῦτον εἴρηκα τὸν λόγον οὐ νῦν πρῶτον ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἤδη καὶ πρὸς πολλούς.

1C8 τῷ δήμῳ... τῷ Ἀθηναίων: ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων (not τῶν Ἀθηναίων or ὁ τῶν Αθηναίων) is the correct official terminology (see LSJ s.v. δῆμος III.1; cf. Dodds on Pl. Grg. 455E). Nevertheless, there is no real ms. support for the reading which Paton prints: only one late and very poor ms. has it, most probably by mistake, and SΦ, wrongly cited by Paton in the apparatus, have in

fact τῶν and not τῷ. Since there is no guarantee that P knew or wished to use the official designation, it may be that he wrote τῷ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, which is the reading of the great majority of mss.

1C11-D4 -- The Spartans too deserve commendation for fining their king Archidamus when he married a small woman, on the ground that he meant to present them with kinglets, not kings. -- This story illustrates the importance of choosing a suitable wife to bear satisfactory children, but its emphasis on the physical qualitites of the wife and of the likely offspring takes us away from the point of the chapter, which is the avoidance of low birth. It looks very much as if P is trying to work in illustrative material by hook or by crook, in defiance of strict relevance, or has let one anecdote suggest another (a Spartan story (cf. 1C11 καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους) to balance the Athenian one of 'Diophantus'?) without realising how far this carries him from his theme. -- The same story is found at Plut. Agesil. 2.6 on the authority of Theophrastus (fr.141 Wimmer): ὡς δὲ Θεόφραστος ἱστορεῖ, τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον ἐζημίωσαν οἱ ἔφοροι γήμαντα γυναῖκα μικράν· "οὐ γὰρ βασιλεῖς" ἔφασαν "ἁμῖν, ἀλλὰ βασιλείδια γεννάσει." and in a slightly different version at Athenaeus XIII 566A (here Archidamus is fined for preferring an ugly but rich wife to a beautiful one): διὸ καὶ φασιν περὶ Ἀρχιδάμου τοῦ βασιλέως, γυναικὸς αὐτῷ καλῆς φαινομένης, ἑτέρας δὲ αἰσχρᾶς καὶ πλουσίας, ὡς ἀπέκλινεν ἐπὶ τὴν πλουσίαν, ζημιῶσαι τοὺς ἐφόρους αὐτόν, ἐπιλέγοντας ὅτι "βασιλίσκους ἀντὶ βασιλέων τῇ Σπάρτῃ γεννᾶν" προαιρεῖται. The Archidamus of the story is Archidamus II (RE 3), king of Sparta 469? - 427/6 B.C. The wife referred to was his second, Eupolia the daughter of Melesippidas, and Agesilaus II (born 444 B.C.) was their son.

1C11 πάνυ δ' ἄξιον ἐπαινεῖν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους: For other phrases with ἄξιον in the De lib.educ. cf. 3F7 οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τοῦτο παραλιπεῖν ἄξιον ἐστιν , 8B10-C1 οὐ τοίνυν ἄξιον οὐδὲ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων ἀγωνίαν παρορᾶν, 9C9 ἄξιον δ' ἐπιτιμᾶν τῶν πατέρων ἐνίοις .

1D1-2 ἐζημίωσαν χρήμασιν: The other versions of the story (1C11-D4n. above) make it clear, as we should have expected, that it was the ephors who imposed the fine. For interference by the ephorate in the private lives of the Spartan kings, and its power to fine them, see e.g. A.H.M. Jones, Sparta (Oxford 1967) p.27.

1D2 μικρὰν τὸ μέγεθος γυναῖκα : The pleonasm is remiscent of Herodotus, who has σμικρὸς τὰ μεγάθεα (III 107.2) and μεγάθεϊ σμικρός (II 74, IV 52.3). The Herodotean dative in expressions of this sort was affected by rhetorical writers of Lucian's time (Schmid I p.312); but parallels for the use of the accusative do not seem to be forthcoming.

1D3 ἐπείποντες : This is Bachet de Meziriac's emendation, also found in one 15th century ms.; the majority have ὑπείποντες. ἐπιλέγειν is the proper word for offering comment on an action (cf. ἐπιλέγοντες in the corresponding passage of Athenaeus, above 1C11-D4n.). ὑπείποντες (the verb means to premise or suggest) has probably been generated by the immediately preceding ὑπέμεινεν.

1D3-4 ὡς οὐ βασιλέας ἀλλὰ βασιλείδεια παρασχεῖν αὐτοῖς διανοοῖτο : 'that he intended to provide them not with kings, but with kinglets'. βασιλείδια (or rather βασιλίδια) appears first in Fabricius and was adopted by Xylander; the mss. have οὐ βασιλέας ἀλλὰ βασιλίδας (or βασιλείδας), 'not kings but queens'. In view of the fact that both other versions have a disparaging diminutive (οὐ βασιλέας ἀλλὰ βασιλείδια in Plutarch, βασιλίσκους ἀντὶ βασιλέων in Athenaeus (though βασιλίσκους is Musurus's

emendation for βασιλικούς)), there is a natural temptation to emend here. Fabricius claimed to have found his reading 'in veteri libro manuscripto', though he admitted that it could have been conjectured from Plut. Agesil. 2.6; Stephanus and Wyttenbach adopt βασιλίσκους. It is however just conceivable that the transmitted text is what P really wrote. To suggest that a small woman will bear children of the weaker and less significant sex is, if not entirely logical, at least understandable as a piece of invective, and P may have known a version in which this was implied; less probably, he may have remembered the standard version wrongly.

(3) 1D5-2A5: Birth (continued).

The short third chapter focuses on a point of detail concerning the child's conception, which P specifically refers to as having received the attention of previous writers.

1D5-2A1 Next a point which has been made by other writers before me. A man should have little or no wine in him when he consorts with a woman to beget children, since otherwise the offspring tend to grow up addicted to drink.

2A1-5 Hence Diogenes' remark to a youth whom he saw behaving in an outlandish fashion: 'Young man, your father was drunk when he begot you'. But enough of birth, and on now to the subject of training.

P's concern in this chapter is still with γένεσις (cf. 2A3-4 καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς γενέσεως τοσαῦτ' εἰρήσθω μοι), but he now concentrates on a particular aspect of the subject. The identity of the predecessors to whom he refers at 1D5-6 is uncertain; the authors from whom parallels are forthcoming (1D5-2A1n.) are mostly philosophers or medical writers, but it may be that the circumstances of conception were a standard preliminary topic in educational treatises, now lost, with which P was familiar. It is no doubt legitimate to assume that in other parts of the treatise too, where no acknowledgement is made, P is often influenced by predecessors whose work has mostly not survived.

1D5-2A1 -- Next a point which has been made by other writers before me. A man should have little or no wine in him when he consorts with a woman to beget children, since otherwise the offspring tend to grow up addicted to drink. -- The belief that the circumstances of a child's conception can affect its character and later development appears in Greek literature as early as Hesiod (Op. 735-736, 783-786, 792-795, 812-813). The specific

advice to avoid drunkenness occurs in Plato Lg. VI 775B-E (e.g. 775C δεῖ μὴ τῶν σωμάτων διακεχυμένων ὑπὸ μέθης γίγνεσθαι τὴν παιδουργίαν); Aristoxenus fr.39 Wehrli μήτε τρυφῆς μήτε μέθης πλήρη τὰς γυναῖξὶν εἰς τὸ γεννᾶν ὁμιλεῖν , whence the similar passages in Ocellus Lucanus 52-57 and Iamb VP 209-213 (see E. Rohde, RhM 27 (1872) p.52 = Kleine Schriften (Tübingen and Leipzig 1901) pp.161-162); cf. Plut. Q. conv. 653D, 653F, 655A-B. Naturally enough, medical writers as well as philosophers had views on the subject: Hippocrates Vict. 85.2 recommends a certain type of patient ἀφροδισιάζειν ... ὅταν ὑποπίῃ ; and Soranus Gynaec. I 36, 38, 39, II 44 also warns against the practice, though naturally in women. There seems, however, to be no exact parallel to P's belief that children conceived in such circumstances are likely to grow up to be drunkards themselves (and it will be noted that the Diogenes anecdote which follows does not exactly confirm it: see 2A1-5n.); rather it is a less specific expectation of general inferiority which is entertained by those writers who attempt to justify their advice: Pl. Lg. VI 775D σπείρειν ... παράφορος ἅμα καὶ κακὸς ὁ μεθύων, ὥστ' ἀνώμαλα καὶ ἄπιστα καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθύπορον ἦθος οὐδὲ σῶμα ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων γεννῴη ποτ' ἄν, Aristoxenus fr.39 Wehrli οὐ γὰρ οἴεσθαι ἐκ φαύλης καὶ ἀωμφώνου καὶ παραχώδους κράσεως εὔρυθμα καὶ καλά, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀγαθὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν γίγνεσθαι. Soranus (Gynaec. I 39, II 44) believes that drunkenness in women at the time of conception can be responsible for deformations.

1D5 ἐχόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη τούτων εἰπεῖν: cf. 3B10 περὶ δὲ τροφῆς ἐχόμενον ἂν εἴη λέγειν. The phrase savours of treatise language, and has many parallels and near-parallels in Aristotle: cf. e.g. Pol. II 1262b37, III 1276b16, 1279a22, IV 1296b13, V 1307b27, EN V 1137a33, Rh. I 1368b1-3, 1375a22-23, II 1402a30-31, 1403b15,

Metaph. 1086a25-26, GA I 724a11, 729a35, II 736a24, IV 769b10, Sens. 436a2-3, PA II 652a24.

1D5-6 ὅπερ οὐδὲ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν παρῆλθε: This is P's only reference to predecessors, though he clearly depends upon previous writers for much of his material throughout the De lib.educ. For the acknowledgement of predecessors cf. e.g. Plb. I 1.1, Plut. De ad.et am. 62E ὡς γὰρ εἴρηται καὶ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν etc.

1D6 τὸ ποῖον; ὅτι τοὺς ἕνεκα παιδοποιίας etc.: On the use of the article with ποῖον in questions (again at 4C9) see K-G I pp.625-626, cf. Schmid II p.47. -- P has a certain fondness for self-answered rhetorical questions, and others occur at 2D8-9, 4C9, 5A6-7, 8C10, 9B1, and 11D4.

1D7-8 ἤτοι τὸ παρέπαν κοίτους ἢ μετρίως γοῦν ὀνωμένους ποιεῖσθαι προσήκει τὸν συνουσιασμόν: Weissenberger (p.7) points out that ἤτοι ... ἤ is foreign to the style of Plutarch. -- With ποιεῖσθαι .. τὸν συνουσιασμόν cf. other periphrases with ποιεῖσθαι in the De lib.educ.: πᾶσαν ποιεῖσθε σπουδήν (4E3-4), πρόνοιαν ποιεῖσθαι (5A4), συλλογὴν ποιεῖσθαι (8B7), ἀγωγὴν ποιεῖσθαι (8E5), εὐλάβειαν καὶ φυλακὴν ποιεῖσθαι (12A10-B1). -- συνουσιασμός (not found in Plutarch) is a very rare word: cf. LXX Si. 23.6, IV Macc. 2.3; Soranus I 61. συνουσία is much commoner in this euphemistic sense (LSJ s.v. I.4).

1D9-2A1 ὧν ἐν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς σπορᾶς οἱ πατέρες ἐν μέθῃ πεποιήμενοι τύχωσιν: This is a peculiarly ugly and clumsy clause, whose verbosity Wyttenbach (p.58) condemns as un-Plutarchan.

2A1-5 -- Hence Diogenes' remark to a youth whom he saw behaving in an outlandish fashion: 'Young man, your father was drunk when he begot you'. But enough of birth, and on to the subject of training. -- The anecdote is Diogenes fr.274 Mullach (FPG II p.326). In the only other surviving version the

attribution of the remark is to Zeno, not Diogenes, and the young man is Zeno's pupil Ariston of Chios (D.L. VII 18 = Zeno fr.302, SVF I p.67; Ariston fr.340, SVF I p.77): Ἀρίστωνος δὲ τοῦ μαθητοῦ πολλὰ διαλεγομένου οὐκ εὐφυῶς, ἔνια δὲ καὶ προπετῶς καὶ θρασέως, 'ἀδύνατον,' εἶπεν, 'εἰ μή σε ὁ πατὴρ μεθύων ἐγέννησεν.' As with the other citation of Diogenes in the De lib.educ. (5C1-5), the attribution may have been made on the strength of little more than the blunt directness of the quotation (see 5C1-2n.). It should be noted that the anecdote does not quite succeed in making P's point for him. His contention is that children conceived in drunkenness turn out φίλανοι καὶ μεθυστικοί (1D8-9); but although παραφρονεῖν can be used of the effects of drink among other things (see 2A1-2n.), there is no suggestion in either version of the story that this, rather than a general disposition to instability and weak-mindedness, was the cause of the young man's odd behaviour.

2A1-2 ἢ καὶ Διογένης μειρακίων ἐκστατικῶν ἰδὼν καὶ παραφρονούντων: Cf. 4F2 for another instance of ἢ καί introducing an anecdote; and see 12A5-6n. on μειράκιον. -- ἐκστατικός means 'beside oneself', whether with anger (cf. e.g. Arist. PA 650b34) or as a result of being deranged (cf. e.g. Arist. Pr. 935a22, of the madness of Ajax); coupled here with παραφρονούντων it more probably has the latter implication. For παραφρονεῖν see Schmidt, Synonymik IV pp.245-246. Note Hdt. III 34.3 νῦν ἄρα με φαίη πέρσαι σὺν προσκείμενον παραφρονέειν καὶ οὐκ εἶναι νοήμονα for its possible application to the effects of drink, but cf. 2A1-5n. above.

2A3-4 καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς γενέσεως τοσαῦτ' εἰρήσθω μοι: For this way of bidding farewell to a topic (3B8-9 is similar: καὶ περὶ μὲν ἠθῶν καὶ βίων ἀρκείτω ταῦτα) cf. e.g. Hdt. II 34.2 and elsewhere, Arist. Po. 1448b3, Rh. I 1337b11-12, Mete. I 341a12.

2A4-5 περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀγωγῆς καὶ δὴ λεκτέον: For καὶ δὴ λεκτέον at the end of a sentence cf. 10B2; and cf. Longinus 16.1 with Russell's n. for the postponement of καὶ δή.

(4) 2A6-3B9: The efficacy of training.

P has now come to the real subject of his treatise, ἀγωγή (cf. 2A4-5). After two chapters devoted to conception and birth we perhaps expect a discussion of the child's early years; and indeed just such a discussion does follow at 3B10 with the beginning of Chapter 5. But before that, as a preliminary to such practical matters, we have a lengthy chapter in which, by presenting an emphatic vindication of the efficacy of training and hard work as opposed to natural talent, P attempts a theoretical justification of the whole concept of education.

He begins by adopting and applying to the moral sphere a traditional formulation which identifies three factors as the necessary ingredients of consummate proficiency in any skill: natural talent, instruction and practice. The first part of the chapter is devoted to explaining this triad (with 2B4-8 an unfortunate digression which rather obscures the issue):

2A6-B4 Three factors, as in the crafts and sciences, must combine to produce complete moral excellence: nature, reason (or learning) and habit (or practice). Nature begins the process, learning helps it progress, practice prepares it for use; all three are necessary for perfection, and the result is impaired to the extent that any one is lacking.

2B4-8 (In agriculture you need a good soil, a wise cultivator and good seed; in education nature is the soil, the teacher is the cultivator, and his precepts are the seed.)

2B8-C3 I would contend that all these elements came together to inspire such famous men as Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato, and others who have won lasting renown.

Having outlined the theory, P is now ready to use it to make his point. The requirement for all three factors to be present is a counsel of perfection rarely to be fulfilled in practice. What matters is that learning and practice can to some considerable extent repair a deficiency in the third member of the triad, nature.

The statement of this idea occupies only three sentences (2C3-10), and the rest of the section to 2F5 is a series of illustrations:

2C3-10 Now it is good fortune indeed to receive all of these gifts by heaven's favour. But to assume that those born without much natural talent can do nothing to remedy the deficiency by suitable instruction and practice is to go far wrong. Teaching corrects defective talent, just as idleness destroys good talent; and while neglect lets even easy things slip, even difficult tasks are achieved by application.

2C10-D8 The effectiveness of application and hard work can be seen from many examples: (i) drops of water can hollow out stones; (ii) iron and bronze are worn away by the touch; (iii) chariot-wheels and (iv) the curved sticks which actors carry are bent, in defiance of nature, past hope of straightening.

2D8-F1 There are countless other examples of the power of application. (i) A good piece of land neglected goes to waste; an unpromising piece well-farmed becomes productive. (ii) Trees neglected become twisted and barren; cared for, they can be fruitful. (iii) Strong physiques decline with neglect and soft living; weak constitutions are strengthened by exercise. (iv) Horses well broken-in become obedient; unbroken, they remain wayward and spirited.

2F1-5 Why extend the list of examples, when we see even the wildest of beasts made tame and docile through labour? The Thessalian, asked which were the mildest of his countrymen, aptly replied: "Those who are finishing a war".

The thought that training can greatly benefit even those only modestly endowed with innate talent (2C3-10) is the idea at the heart of this chapter. To reinforce it, P ends by stating and illustrating an even bolder proposition -- that training can actually form character:

2F5-3A2 In short, character is really just long-ingrained habit, and it would not be wrong to call moral virtues the virtues of habit.

3A2-B9 One more example to illustrate this and I shall have done with the subject. The Spartan lawgiver Lycurgus took two pups of the same parentage and reared one as a hunter and the other as a glutton. Then one day at a gathering,

promising the Spartans a demonstration of the power of training, he set a hare and a dish of food before the pups and released them; one went for the dish and the other for the hare. Thereupon he explained to his puzzled audience the difference of character he had induced by different kinds of training.

The effect of this chapter is to emphasise from the outset the value and efficacy of all training, including the sort which P intends to advocate in the succeeding chapters. For this affirmation as a regular theme of popular philosophy see Praechter, Popularphilosophie pp.7-9. On the contents of this chapter in general see Glaeser pp.22-27, Kemper pp.63-75.

2A6-B4 -- Three factors, as in the crafts and sciences, must combine to produce complete moral excellence: nature, reason (or learning) and habit (or practice). Nature begins the process, learning helps it progress, practice prepares it for use; all three are necessary for perfection, and the result is impaired to the extent that any one is lacking. -- φύσις is the innate talent which makes a person naturally proficient at something; λόγος (equated with μάθησις, 2A9) is the rationale of learning how to do it; and ἔθος (equated with ἄσκησις at 2A10 and implicitly with μελέτη at 2A11) is the habit or practice which makes one good at it after (or even without) having mastered the theory. The triad is a traditional one in Greek thought; on its history and influence see P. Shorey, 'Φύσις, μελέτη, ἐπιστήμη', TAPA 40 (1909) pp.185-201; A. Büsse, 'Die Anfänge der Erziehungswissenschaft', NJP 26 (1910) pp 465-477; V. D'Agostino, 'I tre elementi del processo educativo secondo gli antichi scrittori', RSC 6 (1958) pp.190-197; Praechter, Popularphilosophie pp.12-13; B Appel, Das Bildungs- und Erziehungsideal Quintilians (Donauwörth 1914) pp.46-80; Mauch, DISCIPLINA pp.17-22; Beck, Greek Education pp.264-268; M.J. O'Brien, The Socratic Paradoxes and the Greek Mind (University of North Carolina 1967) pp.144-146 n.27; Lilla, Clement pp.66-68;

J. Cousin, Quintilien: Istitution Oratoire I (Paris 1975) pp.LXIV-LXV; Austin on Quint. XII 1.9; Russell on Longinus 2.1; further bibliography Mauch p.17 n.1. The triad seems to have originated with the sophists (cf. Gunning, De sophistis pp.93ff. and appendix pp.132-138 'De sophistarum triade paedagogica') and passed from them into the mainstream of educational thought; evidence of its influence is found in Plato (Phdr. 269D, quoted below, 2B1-2n.), Xenophon (O'Brien p.146n.), Isocrates (Burk, Die Pädagogik pp.18-20, 94-98, 212) Aristotle (Cousin p.LXV n.2 and cf. below, 2A9n.), Cicero (Cousin p.LXV n.5, Douglas on Brutus 22 and introd. p.xxviii), Philo (Lilla p.68; Wolfson, Philo II pp.196-198), Seneca (Cousin p.LXV n.4), Quintilian (Appel pp.56-58, Austin on XII 1.9, Cousin p.LXIV n.2), Maximus Tyrius (Lilla p.68) and Clement of Alexandria (Lilla p.66). Its ancestry, however, can be traced back to the ancient dispute between natural ability and training which may be regarded as the special form assumed in the field of educational thought by the wider conflict between νόμος and φύσις. The triad is obtained by analysing 'training' into λόγος (or μάθησις) and ἔθος (or ἄσκησις / μελέτη), its theoretical and practical aspects respectively; but the two-sided nature of the original debate still shows through constantly. From the start there were defenders of the old aristocratic valuation of natural gifts above all else (Hes. Op. 293; Thgn. 435-438; Pi. O. 2.86-88, 9.100ff., N. 3.40-43); but in eventually taking the opposite side as a partisan of training, P is also in good company (see 2C3-10n.). For the moment, however, he is concerned to maintain that ideally nature, reason and habit are all desirable, and this less controversial proposition has a large body of opinion behind it: Protagoras VS 80 B 3; Anon. Iamblichi VS 89.1; Pl. Phdr. 269D (quoted below, 2B1-2n.); X. Mem. III 9.2; Isoc. 15.187; Simylus ap. Stob. IV 18a.4; Hor. AP 408-411; Philo 21.167, 23.52-53, 24.1, 33.65; Epict. Diss. II 9.13.

2A7 τωὐτόν : P has also the more correct form of the neuter singular (3A7 τωὐτό). τὸ ὠὐτόν (or τωὐτόν), the form preferred by Attic writers of both prose and verse, appears in Attic inscriptions from 409 B.C. (Meisterhans 61.c.10, p.155). Note that hiatus-avoidance is not in question here (nor in Philostratus II, who uses the form frequently: see Schmid IV pp.472-473). See also K-B I p.606, cf. p.295.

2A8 εἰς τὴν παντελῆ δικαιοπραγίαν: δικαιοπραγία is here a virtual synonym for ἀρετή, as is evident from 2A7 (κατὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς) and 2B1-2 (κατὰ τοῦτ' ἀνάγκη χωλὴν γίγνεσθαι τὴν ἀρετήν). Strictly it means fair dealing or just action (Arist. EN. V 1133b30-31). Plutarch has the verb δικαιοπραγεῖν (135F, 439A, 776D, 791D, 818A, 964B, 1041B, Solon 5.5) and the noun δικαιοπράγημα (Stoic. rep. 1041A), but apparently not δικαιοπραγία.

2A9 φύσιν καὶ λόγον καὶ ἔθος: P's terminology matches that of Aristotle, Pol. VII 1332a38-40 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γε καὶ σπουδαῖοι γίγνονται διὰ τριῶν· τὰ τρία δὲ ταῦτα ἐστι φύσις, λόγος, ἔθος (cf. 1334b6, D.L. V 18). (At EN X 1179b20-21 the three elements are called φύσις, ἔθος and διδαχή; though note ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχή at 1179b23).

2A9-10 καλῶ δὲ λόγον μὲν τὴν μάθησιν, ἔθος δὲ τὴν ἄσκησιν: P glosses two of his Aristotelian terms with rather more standard vocabulary. ἄσκησις is a common term for practice as a member of the triad (see Mauch p.19 n.6). For μάθησις see Mauch p.19 n.2; the word is coupled with μελέτη by Xenophon at Mem. II 6.39 and Plutarch at De aud. 38E.

2A10-B1 εἰσὶ δ' αἱ μὲν ἀρχαὶ <τῆς φύσεως, αἱ δὲ προκοπαὶ> τῆς μαθήσεως, αἱ δὲ χρήσεις τῆς μελέτης, αἱ δ' ἀκρότητες πάντων: 'The first elements come from nature; progress, from instruction; the actual use, from practice; the consummation, from all combined' (Tucker). The supplement is Amyot's, recorded in the margin of his printed copy of the Greek text. A supplement is clearly needed to

complete the pattern of the triad; and it is equally clear that it must begin with τῆς φύσεως. For the continuation, a word with a sense intermediate between ἀρχαί and ἀκρότητες is required; a plural noun seems highly likely; and a feminine plural ending in -αι would match the other feminine plurals (ἀρχαί, χρήσεις, ἀκρότητες) and provide at the same time, in homoeoteleuton with ἀρχαί, a plausible explanation of how the omission came about. αἱ προκοπαί satisfies all these conditions admirably, and there must be a good chance that Amyot has restored what P originally wrote. -- Cf. a somewhat similar passage of Arius Didymus ap. Stob. II 7.13 (pp.116-117W) ὧν γὰρ ἐκ φύσεως ἀρχὰς ἔχομεν καὶ σπέρματα, τούτων τὰς τελειότητας περιποιεῖσθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι καὶ ταῖς ὀρθαῖς ἀγωγαῖς.

2A11 αἱ δὲ χρήσεις τῆς μελέτης: μελέτη has been silently substituted for ἄσκησις, but without much danger of confusion since it is a very common term for practice as a member of the triad (see Mauch p.19 n.7). P reverts to the use of ἄσκησις at 2B4.

2A11-B1 αἱ . . ἀκρότητες: For αἱ ἀκρότητες meaning 'consummation, perfection' cf. e.g. Philo 5.6, 10.81, 17.121 αἱ τελειότητες καὶ ἀκρότητες, 18.107, 22.60, 31.143.

2B1-2 καθ' ὃ δ' ἂν λειφθῇ τούτων, κατὰ τοῦτ' ἀνάγκη χωλὴν γίγνεσθαι τὴν ἀρετήν: The idea that a deficiency of any one of the three factors impairs the perfection of the overall result is absolutely standard in treatments of this theme: cf. Anon. Iamblichi VS 89.1.3 εἰ δέ τι ἀπέστη τούτων καὶ ἕν, οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν εἰς τέλος τὸ ἄκρον ἐξεργάσασθαι, ἐκόντος δὲ ἅπαντα ταῦτα, ἀνυπέρβλητον γίγνεται τοῦτο, ὅ τι ἂν ἀσκῇ τις τῶν ἀνθρώπων, Pl. Phdr. 269D εἰ μέν σοι ὑπάρχει φύσει ῥητορικῷ εἶναι, ἔσῃ ῥήτωρ ἐλλόγιμος, προσλαβὼν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ μελέτην, ὅτου δ' ἂν ἐλλείπῃς τούτων, τούτῳ ἀτελὴς ἔσῃ, Simylus ap. Stob. IV 18a.4.8-9 ἐν ᾧ γὰρ ἂν τούτων τις ἀπολειφθεὶς τύχῃ / οὐκ ἔρχετ' ἐπὶ τὸ τέρμα τοῦ προκειμένου, Philo 23.53. Other similar thoughts, though not in the context of the triad: Isoc. 3.48, 13.18, Libanius Or. 59.33

(quoted immediately below). -- For χωλός cf. (with Wyttenbach) Libanius Or. 59.33 ᾧ γὰρ θάτερον μὲν ὑπάρχει, θατέρου δ' ἡ κτῆσις ἄπεστι, τούτῳ χωλεύειν τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνάγκη καθ' ὁπότερον ἂν σπανίζοι, cf. 47.10 (χωλεύειν opp. εὖ πράττειν). The word is quite common in metaphorical usages denoting imperfection: cf. e.g. Pl. Phd. 71E, R. VII 535D; X. HG III 3.3; Plut. Lys. 22.11, Cimon 16.10. See also 4A4-5 n. and OLD s.v. 'claudere' 3, 'claudicare' 3.

2B2-4 ἡ μὲν γὰρ φύσις ἄνευ μαθήσεως τυφλόν, ἡ δὲ μάθησις δίχα φύσεως ἐλλιπές, ἡ δ' ἄσκησις χωρὶς ἀμφοῖν ἀτελές: The sequence ἄνευ, δίχα, χωρίς looks like deliberate variation (cf. 3B4n.), with the positioning of χωρίς doubtless governed by the need to avoid hiatus with ἀμφοῖν (cf. Bernardakis' remarks, Moralia I pp.LXI-LXII, on Plutarch's practice with regard to words meaning 'without'). On δίχα in this sense (tragedy, Xenophon, Philo, Josephus, D.Chr.) see Phryn. PS p.64.18-19 de Borries, LSJ s.v. II.1, Arndt-Gingrich s.v., K-G I pp.402-403, Schmid I pp.115-116. -- τυφλόν, ἐλλιπές and ἀτελές repeat the threefold variation. For the metaphorical use of τυφλός cf. Plut. fr.148 Sandbach ὅσα δ' ὀργῇ χρώμενοι πράττουσιν ἄνθρωποι, τοῦτ' ἀνάγκη τυφλὰ εἶναι καὶ ἀνόητα καὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἁμαρτάνειν, and (slightly different) De cup.div. 528A, Quaest.conv. 679B, Lyc. 10.3. ἐλλιπής and ἀτελής are used as a pair by Plut. De ad.et am. 49B; and Plato uses the latter adjective at Phdr. 269D (quoted above, 2B1-2n.). -- For the dual ἀμφοῖν cf. 8A1-2n.

2B4-8 -- In agriculture you need a good soil, a wise cultivator and good seed; in education nature is the soil, the teacher the cultivator, and his precepts are the seed. -- Here, for the sake of an agricultural analogy, P does violence to the sequence of thought by introducing a second educational triad (nature, teacher and precepts) which has no connection with the first. (The fact that one term, φύσις, is common to both only serves to increase the confusion.) The aberration is short-lived, since at 2B8 (see n.) he reverts to the original triad of nature,

reason and habit upon which all the rest of this chapter is based; and the section 2B4-8 is therefore firmly to be understood as parenthetical. It is however a little worrying to realise that the author is either unaware of the havoc its insertion creates, or unable to resist the temptation of a simile which he knows will confuse the issue. -- On other agricultural analogies for the process of education see 2D9-E3n. The present one has antecedents in the Hippocratic Lex 3 ἡ μὲν γὰρ φύσις ἠρέων ὁκοῖον ἡ χώρη· τὰ δὲ δόγματα τῶν διδασκόντων ὁκοῖον τὰ σπέρματα and in a fragment of the sophist Antiphon, VS 87 B 60, καὶ γὰρ τῇ γῇ οἷον ἂν τις τὸ σπέρμα ἐναρόσῃ, τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ ἔκφυρα δεῖ προσδοκᾶν· καὶ ἐν νέῳ σώματι ὅταν τις τὴν παίδευσιν γενναίαν ἐναρόσῃ, ζῇ τοῦτο καὶ θάλλει διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου. One is also reminded of the parable of the sower (Matthew 13.3-9, Mark 4.2-9, Luke 8.4-8), which itself has classical parallels (e.g. Sen. Ep. 38.2, 73.16; Quint. I 3.5): see H. J. Rose, 'Quintilian, the Gospels and Comedy', CR 39 (1925) p.17.

2B4 τῇ γεωργίᾳ : Paton's correction, dative after ὑπάρξαι (2B5). The main paradosis, τῆς γεωργίας, is difficult if not impossible to construe (genitive with γῆν, φυτουργόν and σπέρματα will hardly do); ἐπὶ τῆς γεωργίας, which is the reading of a minority of mss., may possibly be the true reading (cf. the use of ἐπὶ at 9C5, 9C6), but it may equally just represent an attempt to remove the difficulty by conjecture.

2B5 φυτουργόν : 'cultivator, gardener'. For the word, here synonymous with γεωργός which replaces it at 2B7, cf. Plut. De am. prol. 495F; Cyllenius (?1st cent. A.D.) AP IX 4.5; anon. AP XVI 255.5; Philo 11.157, 158; M.Ant. VI 16.3, XI 8. (Other meanings: (a) a poetic synonym for πατήρ, A. Supp. 592; S. OT 1482; E. IA 949, Tr. 481; cf. Julian 3.26 Bidez, Philostr. Her. p.216.16 Kayser., (b) 'creator', Pl. R X 597D; used of God by Philo 12.2 (twice), 73, 94; 15.61, 196.)

2B6-8 τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον γῇ μὲν ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις, γεωργῷ δ' ὁ παιδεύων, σπέρματι δ' οἱ τῶν λόγων ὑποθῆκαι καὶ τὰ παραγγέλματα : P has conflated two methods of drawing a comparison, (a) 'Just as A, B, C, so D, E, F', and (b) 'D is like A, E like B, and F like C', and says in effect 'Just as A, B, C so D is like A, E like B, and F like C.' -- Both ὑποθῆκαι and παραγγέλματα are words which P uses of his own precepts as set out in the present work: see 8D8-9n.

2B8-C3 -- I would contend that all these elements came together to inspire such famous men as Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato, and others who have won lasting renown. -- This section serves as a sort of foil to the next (2C3-10). Though the heights of achievement are scaled only by those rare men of genius in whom all three factors perfectly combine, the man of inconspicuous natural talent, P will go on to declare, can nevertheless achieve substantial results by dint of training and sheer hard work. Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato (for the three together cf. e.g. [D.Chr.] 37.32, Lib. Or. 15.28) represent famous men in general, but the choice is interesting. P singles out philosophers because he is considering the attainment of ἀρετή (2B1-2), and because he is himself a devotee of philosophy (7D2-F4, 10E4-6). Pythagoras is mentioned again only in Chapter 17 at 12D4, though the series of Pythagorean sayings there interpreted may betoken some serious interest in him; and the philosophers of the Socratic circle, Socrates and Plato in particular, clearly command P's greatest reverence and respect: see 11D7-F2n.

2B8-9 τῶτα πάντα διατεινάμενος ⟨ἂν⟩ ἔποιμι ὅτι συνῆλθε καὶ συνέπνευσεν : Common sense requires that τῶτα πάντα should refer to the original triad (nature, reason and habit), and not to the more recent one (nature, teacher and precepts), whose second term is not in any case a suitable subject for the twin verbs συνῆλθε and συνέπνευσεν (thus Dyroff p.274; cf. 2B4-8n.) -- For διατεινάμενος ⟨ἂν⟩ ἔποιμι (supplement by Emperius), meaning 'I

would contend', cf. LSJ s.v. διατείνω B I.1,2. -- Apart from more literal meanings (e.g. Plut. Arat. 24.6, M.Ant. VIII 54, AP VII 595.3), συμπνέω often has a meaning in the range 'be in harmony, agree, conspire, unite, combine' (e.g. D. 18.168; Pl. Lg. IV 708D; Arist. Pol. V 1303a26; D.Chr. 34.19, 24; Musonius fr. 13A, p.68.17 Hense; Plut. Numa 26.15, De tu.san. 133E; Philo 15.69, 24.176, 28.138), and something of the kind is no doubt what P means here. Some reference to 'inspiration' also seems to be intended, since εἰς τὰς ψυχάς has to be constructed with συνέπνευσεν as well as συνῆλθε.

2B9-C1 εἰς τὰς τῶν παρ' ἅπασιν ᾀδομένων ψυχάς: For τῶν παρ' ἅπασιν ᾀδομένων, 'of men whose names are on every lip', cf. e.g. Pl. Lys. 205C, Philo 8.114 τὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς ᾀδόμενον ἀγαθόν, Lucian 32.12 ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ... ἀκούεις ὡς παρὰ πάντων ᾄδεται, 37.21.

2C2-3 καὶ τῶν ὅσοι δόξης ἀειμνήστου τετυχήκασιν: For τῶν ὅσοι see K-G I pp.583-584 on the demonstrative use of the article with ὅσος, οἷος and ὅς (frequent examples in Plato, also found in Herodotus, Lysias and Demosthenes; for Homeric instances see p.578). Weissenberger (II p.7) identifies the usage as non-Plutarchan; it is apparently otherwise confined in the Moralia to the spurious De fato (573A). -- The phrase δόξα ἀείμνηστος occurs at Isoc. 14.53 (cf. 10.17), J. AJ II 205. The adjective is classical in both verse and prose: cf. e.g. A. Pers. 760; S. Aj. 1166, Tr. 108; E. IA 1531; Thuc. I 33.1; Lys. 2.20, 6.25, 26.4; Antiphon 5.79; Isoc. 4.157, 8.96, 9.4, 67; Plb. IX 9.10, XI 12.3.

2C3-10 -- Now it is good fortune indeed to receive all of these gifts by heaven's favour. But to assume that those born without much natural talent can do nothing to remedy the deficiency by suitable instruction and practice is to go far wrong. Teaching corrects defective talent, just as idleness destroys good talent; and while neglect lets even easy things slip, even difficult tasks

are achieved by application. -- Turning now from the pure theory, which requires both natural ability and training in an impartial mixture, P warms to the theme of what training can do in the absence of any conspicuous natural endowment. It is of course necessary for him, as a committed advocate of the value of education, to take this side of the argument. The same stand had been adopted by the sophists, whose claim to teach ἀρετή presupposed the possibility of its acquisition other than by the accidental privilege of birth; and many other writers agreed with them: cf. e.g. Periander VS 10 3.1 μελέτα τὸ πᾶν ; Epicharmus VS 23 B 33 ἀ δὲ μελέτα φύσιος ἀγαθᾶς πλέονα δωρεῖται , φίλοι (though contrast B 40 φύσιν ἔχειν ἄριστον ἐστι , δεύτερον δὲ ⟨μανθάνειν⟩); Critias VS 88 B 9 ἐκ μελέτης πλείους ἢ φύσεως ἀγαθοί ; Democritus VS 68 B 42 πλέονες ἐξ ἀσκήσιος ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται ἢ ἀπὸ φύσιος ; SVF III p.52, fr.225 οὐ γὰρ φύσει, μαθήσει δὲ οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ γίνονται ; Musonius fr.5 Hense.

2C3-4 εὐδαίμων μὲν οὖν καὶ θεοφιλὴς εἴ τῳ τοῦτο πάντα θεῶν τις ἐπέδωκεν: The element of the triad which depends most upon what P regards as the favour of heaven is of course φύσις: cf. Aristotle's remark in his discussion of the triad, EN X 1179b21-23 τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τινας θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει , and other passages referred to by Glaeser p.26. -- Wyttenbach rightly defends the neuter adjectives with such parallels as D.Chr. 80.3 ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν λαμπρὸν ἡγοῦμαι καὶ μακάριον , εἴ τις ἐν οἰκέταις ἐλεύθερος εἶναι δύναται . -- του and τῳ for τινος and τινι (cf. 13C1-2 ὥστε εἴ τῳ μέλει) fell increasingly out of ordinary usage and are not found in Attic inscriptions after 300 B.C. (Meisterhans 61 e.15, p.157). H. Kallenberg, RhM 72 (1917-18) p.492, finds only two cases of indefinite τῳ in Plutarch's Lives (Brut. 36.2, Camill. 22.2), and only three in the Moralia: the two instances in De lib.educ. and one in the pseudo-Plutarchan Cons. ad Apoll. 157D.

2C4 εἰ δέ τις οἴεται κτλ. : Cf. Musonius fr.17, p.93.7-10 Hense: εἰ δέ τις οἴεται ... κακῶς οἴεται. See 8D8 n. for other

instances of P's anticipation of the possible views of readers.

2C5 μαθήσεως καὶ μελέτης τυχόντας ὀρθῆς πρὸς ἀρετὴν : Cf. Arist. EN X 1179b31-32 ἐκ νέου δ' ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν καλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέντα νόμοις.

2C6 τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἐλάττωσιν εἰς τοὐνδεχόμενον ἀναδραμεῖν: For εἰς τοὐνδεχόμενον, 'as far as possible', cf. e.g. Hyperides 6.41, Epict. Diss. IV 11.24. The phrase does not seem to be Plutarchan, the nearest parallel being ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, Agis and Cleom. 59.10. -- ἀναδραμεῖν has here the rare transitive sense of 'compensate for, redeem': see LSJ s.v. ἀνατρέχω I.2, comparing Menander fr. 680 Körte, τὸ μὲν ἐξαμαρτάνειν ἅπασιν ἔμφυτον , / καὶ κοινόν , ἀναδραμεῖν δὲ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν / οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀνδρός, ἀλλ' ἀξιολόγου (cf. Souda s.v. ἀνατρέχω· ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀναλύω Μένανδρος), Lucian 31.4 ἀλλ' ἐνὶ τούτῳ μόνῳ πάντα ἐκεῖνα (sc. never having troubled about education) ἀναδραμεῖσθαι νῦν ἐλπίζεις, τῷ κτᾶσθαι πολλὰ βιβλία. These parallels make emendation, e.g. to ἀναλαβεῖν as favoured by Heusinger and Wyttenbach, unnecessary; although a change from ἀναλαβεῖν to ἀναδραμεῖν would be easily conceivable from a palaeographical point of view, corruption of the easier to the more difficult and unusual word seems unlikely.

2C7 ἴσως πολλοῦ , μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦ παντὸς διαμαρτάνων: Cf. 5E1 μαθέτω γνώμης διαμαρτάνων, and διαμαρτάνω with the genitive also at 8A8 and 10E8-9. The expression τοῦ παντὸς διαμαρτάνειν is frequent also in Plutarch (e.g. De tu.san. 134D; Aratus 48.2, Aristid. 11.6, 16.3; fr. 148 Sandbach), as Weissenberger observes (I p.26); cf. similar phrases at De tu.san. 136B, Brutus 20.2. -- For the correction of an expression to a more forceful one cf.8B5 πρὸς δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις χρήσιμον , μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐστι κτλ., and Kowalski pp.15-16 for Plutarchan examples.

2C7-9 φύσεως μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν διαφθείρει ῥᾳθυμία, φαυλότητα δ' ἐπανορθοῖ διδαχή : In this and the next sentence P's eagerness for antithesis (cf. again 2D9-F1) obscures the direction of the thought

a little. It is the δέ- clauses which (as often) bear the main emphasis and carry the thread of the argument. To bring this out, a good English translation will subordinate the μέν-clauses: e.g. 'For while neglect will ruin an excellent natural gift, teaching will correct an inferior one' (Tucker). -- For the thought that the gifted can destroy their talents by neglecting them, which P introduces here as the corollary and foil to his main thesis, cf. e.g. X. Mem. I 6.7 (quoted below, 2E6-9 n.); Isoc. 15.191: people who are not very gifted, but excel in practice and diligence γίγνονται κρείττους οὐ μόνον αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εὖ πεφυκότων, λίαν δ' αὐτῶν κατημελημένων; SVF III p.52, fr.225 οἱ κακῶς πεφυκότες πρὸς ἀρετὴν τῆς προσηκούσης παιδείας τυχόντες ὡς ἐπίπαν καλοκἀγαθίας ἤνυσαν· καὶ οὐ τὰ ἐναντία οἱ ἐπιτηδείως φύντες ἀμελείᾳ γεγόνασι κακοί; Clem. Al. Strom. VI 12.96.3 πάντες ... πρὸς ἀρετῆς κτῆσιν πεφύκασιν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἧττον πρόσεισι τῇ τε μαθήσει τῇ τε ἀσκήσει, διὸ καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐξήρκεσαν μέχρι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς, οἱ δὲ μέχρι τινὸς ἔφθασαν, ἀμεληθέντες δ' ὡς τινες, καὶ εἰ ἄλλως ἦσαν εὐφυεῖς, εἰς τοὐναντίον ἀπετράπησαν; Alex. Aphr. De An. II p.175. 29-32 Bruns: διὸ πολλῶν καλῶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν πεφυκότων φαυλότερόν τινες πεφυκότες ἀμείνους γίγνονται πολλάκις τὴν ἔνδειαν τῆς φύσεως ἰασάμενοι τῇ παρ' αὐτῶν ἐξουσίᾳ.

2C9-10 καὶ τὰ μὲν ῥᾴδια τοὺς ἀμελοῦντας φεύγει κτλ.: Cf. for the thought S. OT 110-111 τὸ δὲ ζητούμενον/ ἁλωτόν, ἐκφεύγει δὲ τἀμελούμενον (quoted, incidentally, by Plut. De fort. 98A). For the sense of ἁλίσκεται cf. e.g. Isoc. 15.209.

2C10-D8 -- The effectiveness of application and hard work can be seen from many examples: (i) drops of water can hollow out stones; (ii) iron and bronze are worn away by the touch; (iii) chariot-wheels and (iv) the curved sticks which actors carry are bent, in defiance of nature, past hope of straightening. -- In ἐπιμέλεια καὶ πόνος (2D1) we recognise without too much difficulty

ideas which are closely connected with the second and third elements of the educational triad; (the identification is made the surer by the fact that ἐπιμέλεια is more or less interchangeable with μελέτη in treatments of this theme: Shorey, op. cit. 2A6-B4 n., p.200). In this series of illustrations of their power, P is therefore plainly pursuing his theme of the achievements which are obtainable through training, irrespective of natural endowment. The significant feature shared by all his examples is that they show natural conditions successfully subverted by processes which involve labour or persistence (cf. 2D7-8 τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τῷ πόνῳ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐγένετο κρεῖττον): the nature of stone and metal is to be unyielding, yet they can be worn away; the nature of wood is to be resilient, yet it can be permanently bent. So too in education, P implies, natural dispositions can be transcended and overcome by the aid of training. -- The emphasis on labour and application in this section has sometimes been taken to indicate Cynic influence; but though πόνος was certainly a favourite Cynic virtue (cf. e.g. Dudley, History of Cynicism p.13), recognition of its value was widespread enough to make inferences of this sort invalid (cf. Glaeser pp.24-25, and Berry p.392 on πόνος in Xenophon).

2C10-D1 ὡς ἀνύσιμον πρᾶγμα καὶ τελεσιουργὸν ἐπιμέλεια καὶ πόνος ἐστιν : 'how complete is the success of persistent effort' (Tucker). The two adjectives are coupled by Plutarch at Gracchi 27.3. τελεσιουργός occurs also at 76D, 342F, 499D, 1056D; Aem. Paul. 8.3, Coriol. 1.4, Public. 26.5, Cato minor 1.4, Brut. 6.8; once only in Plato, Phdr. 270A; Plb. II 40.2. -- ἀνύσιμος occurs at 442C; Pl. Lg. IV 716D; X. Cyr. I 6.22; D.Chr. 39.8; nine times in Philo; Musonius fr. 5, pp.19.18, 20.4 Hense; Iamb. VP 174. -- For ἐπιμέλεια and πόνος together cf. e.g. X. Mem. II 1.28; Plut. De aud. 40B, Crass. 3.3.

2D2-3 -- (i) Drops of water can hollow out stones. -- The observation goes back, as a poetic image, at least as far as the

5th century epic poet Choerilus of Samos, fr. 10 (EGF p.271): πέτρην κοιλαίνει ῥανὶς ὕδατος ἐνδελεχείη ; cf. also Bion fr. 4 Gow: ἐκ θαμινᾶς ῥεθέμυγγος , ὅπως λόγος, αἰὲς ἰούσας / καὶ λίθος ἐς μικρὸν κοιλαίνεται . It caught the imagination of the Roman poets in turn (see Otto, Sprichwörter s.v. 'gutta' 2): Lucr. I 313, IV 1286-87; Tib.I 4.18; Prop. II 25.15-16, IV 5.19-20?; Ov. AA I 475-476, Pont. II 7.39-40, IV 10.5 (cf. I 1.70).

2D3-4 -- (ii) Iron and bronze are worn away by the touch. -- This phenomenon was cited by Melissus of Samos in the 5th century B.C. (VS 30 B 8.3) to challenge the reliability of sense-perception, and by Lucretius (I 311-318; ring, ploughshare, bronze statues) to argue for the existence of infinitesimal atomic particles. It appears quite frequently in the company of (i) as here. Cf. Ov. Am. I 15.31-32, AA I 473-474, III 91, Pont. II 7.43, IV 10.5-6; Otto, Sprichwörter s.v. 'anulus'. Slightly different is the other common image of iron slowly eaten away by rust (Otto s.v. 'ferrum' 2).

2D4-6 -- (iii) Chariot-wheels. -- Presumably P is thinking of the process by which straight pieces of wood were bent to make the felloes of a wheel, cf. e.g. Homer Il. IV 485-486. (In more recent times the practice seems to have been to cut them to the required shape: cf. G. Sturt, The Wheelwright's Shop (Cambridge 1923) pp.44-45.) No doubt P specifies chariot-wheels because they had spokes and felloes (E. Saglio in D-S s.v. 'currus' p.1635), whereas the ordinary cart-wheel was a solid disc of sawn planks (G. Lafaye in D-S s.v. 'plaustrum' p.505). The ἁρμάτειος τροχός turns up also in Anaximander (VS 12 A 21), who compared the sun to a chariot-wheel with hollow felloes.

2D4 οἱ δ' ἁρμάτειοι τροχοὶ τόρνῳ κεκμῶτες : τόρνῳ, recorded as Pohlenz's conjecture in Paton's apparatus, was in fact first proposed by H. Richards, CR 16 (1902) p.395. The great bulk of the ms. tradition has τόνῳ; a small minority read πόνῳ. -- To begin with the transmitted readings, πόνῳ seems at first sight to have

some plausibility. P has after all been discussing the power of πόνος and ἐπιμέλεια, and only a few lines below this he writes (2D7-8) τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τῷ πόνῳ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐγένετο κρεῖττον. Finally, π is so easily and so frequently mistaken for τ that the change from πόνῳ to τόνῳ would be all too easy, especially if a tolerable meaning resulted. However, the very plausibility of πόνῳ, on this hypothesis the true and original reading, might have been expected to protect it from alteration; and this gives rise to the suspicion that it is not the true reading, but an attractive variant for a more difficult word. -- Might that word have been the other, more strongly supported, reading, τόνῳ? LSJ s.v. offers a number of meanings for τόνος which deserve consideration. 'Stretching, strain, tension' might appropriately describe the process of forcing a straight piece of wood into the curved shape of a felloe; 'physical exertion, force' would be equally apt from a slightly different point of view. Finally, it seems that various pieces of equipment, from braces and the springs of ballistae to machinery used in the dockyards, were known as τόνοι; though a technical word seems less likely to be right for this passage, and there is no evidence from elsewhere that wheelwrights used such a device. -- Far from presenting us with the sort of impasse which has to be resolved by resorting to conjecture, the transmitted readings thus offer a choice of alternatives and a range of possible meanings. The case for Richards' and Pohlenz's τόρνῳ will therefore hardly be compelling unless it provides a strikingly superior sense -- which it does not. The conjecture is prompted by a presumed similarity between the present passage and Euripides' Bacchae 1066-67, where a tree bent by 'the stranger' until its top touches the ground κυκλοῦτο .. ὥστε τόξον ἢ κυρτὸς τροχός / τόρνῳ γραφόμενος περιφορὰν ἕλκει δρόμου. Unfortunately that passage itself is far from free of difficulties, as a glance at Dodds' long note will show. Dodds gives two possible meanings for τόρνος: (a) 'the

ancient equivalent of a pair of compasses' (as E. fr. 382), and (b) 'some ancient type of lathe' (as A. fr. 57.3, Pl. Phlb. 51C). The problem with trying to apply either of these meanings to the present context is how to reconcile them with the key idea of bending: neither a pair of compasses nor a lathe bends anything. In the Bacchae passage the problem is the same: the τροχός made or drawn with the τόρνος is a simile for a tree bent down to the ground; we expect an image, as Dodds says, 'to illustrate (as the bow does) the tension of the bent tree.' To meet this objection in the Bacchae passage, the conjecture has been advanced that the τόρνος there is a pole-lathe, a primitive device in which 'the tension of the driving cord or strap is provided by a spring beam in the form of a bough or young tree' (Palmer). But the fatal objection to this new line of approach both there and here is that in each case the illustration refers 'not to the spring of a lathe, or even to the lathe as a whole, but to the wheel in the process of manufacture' (Dodds). -- To sum up: τόρνος is far from easy to interpret in the Bacchae context, and it seems quite unjustifiable needlessly to import the difficulties of the Euripidean passage into the text of P. On the whole it seems most satisfactory to retain the majority ms. reading, τόνῳ, understanding it probably in the sense of 'force' or 'tension'.

2D5 οὐδ' ἂν εἴ τι γένοιτο : 'whatever happens'. The idiom is Demosthenic (e.g. 18.168, 20.134, 37.16); it is used also by other later writers such as Aristides (e.g. 4.34, 77 Keil) and Philo (e.g. 4.5, 6.70).

2D6-8 -- (iv) The curved sticks which actors carry are bent past hope of straightening. -- The καμπύλη (the feminine adjective is used substantivally) was a long staff with a curved handle like a bishop's crozier: see K. Schneider in RE s.v., E. Saglio in D-S s.v. 'baculum'. Pollux mentions it (IV 119) as part of the old man's costume in comedy; but Satyrus apparently credited Sophocles with

its invention (Vit.Soph. 6 = FGH III pp.161-162). In everyday life it was used by rustics and people of humble status. For two convenient illustrations (both scenes from New Comedy) see M. Bieber, The History of the Greek and Roman Theater (Princeton 1939) p.92 fig.324 and p.93 fig.327.

2D6 τὰς γε μὴν καμπύλας τῶν ὑποκριτῶν βακτηρίας: On γε μήν see Denniston pp.347-350, Blomqvist pp.68-71. The combination is used by Herodotus, Hippocrates, Plato, and most frequently of all by Xenophon; it becomes common once again in the prose of Imperial times, perhaps due to Atticist imitation (Blomqvist p.68). The function of γε μήν here, and elsewhere in De lib.educ. (5D7, 5E10, 9F5, 10C1), is progressive, introducing a new item or argument in a series (Denniston p.349, Blomqvist pp.69-70).

2D8-F1 -- There are countless other examples of the power of application: (i) A good piece of land neglected goes to waste; an unpromising piece well-farmed becomes productive. (ii) Trees neglected become twisted and barren; cared for, they can be fruitful. (iii) Strong physiques decline with neglect and soft living; weak constitutions are strengthened by exercise. (iv) Horses well broken-in become obedient; unbroken, they remain wayward and spirited. -- The examples in this second group introduce a variation on the theme: they illustrate how success depends not so much upon the possession of outstanding natural qualities as upon the cultivation of whatever qualities one has. The importance of cultivation is brought out by a series of contrasts whose significance harks back to the thought expressed at 2C7-9: φύσεως μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν διαφθείρει ῥᾳθυμία, φαυλότητα δ' ἐπανορθοῖ διδαχή; each example consists of two halves which contrast the success of poor material if properly treated with the failure of good material if neglected. Though the point of this antithetical arrangement is intelligible, it tends to obscure the progression of the thought a little. As at 2C7-10 it is helpful to remember that in each case

except the last, where the order is reversed), it is the second half which carries the greater emphasis.

2D8-9 καὶ μόνα ἆρα ταῦτα ...; οὐκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις: On P's self-answered rhetorical questions see 1D6n., and for this one cf. (with Wyttenbach) Aristid. 1.218 Behr: Ἆρ' οὖν ταῦτα καὶ μόνα τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκείνων ἔχομεν λέγειν; πολλῶν μεντἂν καὶ μεγάλων ἀποστεροίμεθα αὐτούς . -- For μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις cf. e.g. Pl. Lg. I 638E, III 676B, Sph. 259B, Tht. 155C; Aristides 32.40, 48.10 Keil; [Plut.] Cons. ad Apoll. 115E. P has μυρίους again at 10F5.

2D9-E3 -- (i) Land. -- Agriculture furnishes many natural analogies for human development and the cultivation of the mind. Cf. 2B4-8 above, 8B5-9 (context incomplete: a library should be assembled κατὰ τὸ γεωργῶδες) and the plant-similes at 4C1-4, 9B6-9. For the present passage cf. e.g. Cic. Tusc. II 13 'ut ager, quamvis fertilis, sine cultura fructuosus esse non potest, sic sine doctrina animus'; Quint. V 11.24' .. ut, si animum dicas excolendum, similitudine utaris terrae, quae neglecta sentes ac dumos, culta fructus creat', VIII 3.75 'illa vulgaria ... "ut terram cultu, sic animum disciplinis meliorem uberioremque fieri"'. The agricultural analogy leaves its mark on language in such dead metaphors as the word 'culture' ('cultura animi', Cic. Tusc. II 13).

2D10 χερσεύεται : 'it becomes barren'; a non-Plutarchan word (χερσεύειν in an entirely different sense, De soll. an. 982B); cf. χερσοῦσθαι at 10D4. In addition to the epigraphic and papyrological references in LSJ s.v., cf. Alex. Polyh. ap. Eus. PE IX 23 πολλὴν χερσευομένην (sc. γῆν) γεωργήσιμον ἀποτελέσαι . χερσεύειν occurs in similar senses at X. Oec. 5.17, 16.5; Philo 30.39.

2D10-E2 ὅσῳ τῇ φύσει βελτίων ἐστι, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἐξαργηθεῖσα εἰς ἀμέλειαν ἐξαπόλλυται : One might be tempted to think that here P's desire for formal antithesis has betrayed him into saying something which he does not really mean. But cf. e.g. X. Mem. IV 1.3-4 (a passage which offers another parallel to this part of the De lib.

educ., see 2E9-F1 n.) on Socrates' opinion that the most gifted stand most in need of training because without it they become quite exceptionally bad.

2E1 ἐξηργημένα : 'quite neglected' (a stronger equivalent of 2D10 ἀμεληθείσα); another word not found in Plutarch. The only available parallel seems to be S. Ph. 556: ἔργα δρώμεν', οὐκέτ' ἐξηργούμενα.

2E2-3 ἀπόκροτος καὶ τραχυτέρα τοῦ δέοντος : ἀπόκροτος means 'beaten or trodden hard', and is used naturally of terrain: Thuc. VII 27.5; X. Eq. 7.15; Pollux I 186. The Souda s.v. glosses ἀποκρότῳ in the Thucydides passage with τραχείᾳ . -- With τραχυτέρα τοῦ δέοντος cf. [Pl.] Clit. 406A ὥστε φαίνῃ πρὸς ἐμὲ ἔχειν τραχυτέρως τοῦ δέοντος. There may be some curious verbal echo here (P may have been familiar with the Clitopho: see 4D7-E7 n.), or it may just be sheer coincidence.

2E4-6 -- (ii) Trees. -- For the growth of plants as an analogy for human development cf. 4C1-4, 9B6-9. The comparison is enhanced here by a coincidence of terminology (παιδαγωγία : see 2E5n).

2E4 ὀλιγωρηθέντα .. στρεβλὰ φύεται : For στρεβλός of the growth of trees cf. Men. Comp. 45-46 μήποτε πειρῶ στρεβλὸν ὀρθῶσαι κλάδον/ ἐκεῖ νένευκεν οὗ φύσις βιάζεται.

2E5 τυχόντα δ' ὀρθῆς παιδαγωγίας : Cf. 2C5 μαθήσεως καὶ μελέτης τυχόντας ὀρθῆς πρὸς ἀρετήν. παιδαγωγία is used here of the culture or training of plants. No parallels for this usage seem forthcoming, but παιδεία is so used by Theophrastus, CP III 7.4 ἡ δὲ ἀναγωγὴ καὶ ἣν καλοῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν φυτῶν παιδείαν ἔστιν σχηματισμός ἐστι καὶ μόρφωσις τῶν δένδρων ὕψει τε καὶ ταπεινότητι καὶ πλάτει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις .

2E6 τελεσφόρα : 'fertile', used in this sense by Theophrastus (CP III 23.5) of χῶραι . The word is Homeric (once in Il., four times in Od., always in the phrase τελεσφόρον εἰς ἐνιαυτόν), but not

used by Plutarch, as Wyttenbach suspected.

2E6-9 -- (iii) Physique. -- The analogy between the training of the body and that of the mind is naturally a common one. Cf. e.g. Pl. Tht. 153B, Isoc. 15.210. There is an interesting parallel to the present passage at X. Mem. I 6.7 (noted by Berry p.392): οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι οἱ φύσει ἀσθενέστατοι τῷ σώματι μελετήσαντες τῶν ἰσχυροτάτων ἀμελησάντων κρείττους τε γίγνονται πρὸς ἃ ἂν μελετῶσι καὶ ῥᾷον αὐτὰ φέρουσιν ; cf. Cyr. VIII 5.75.

2E6 ἐξαμβλοῦται : 'miscarries, is abortive'. For the verb (no instances from Plutarch in Wyttenbach's Lexicon) cf. Ar. Nu. 139; E. Andr. 356; Pl. Tht. 150E; Thphr. CP IV 5.3; Ael. NA II 25; Phryn. 184.

2E8 τοῖς γυμνασαμένοις καὶ καταθλῆσαι : For καταθλέω meaning 'train' (again at 8D2, but transitive there) cf. Plut. Mar. 26.10.

2E9-F1 -- (iv) Horses. -- For horse-metaphors in educational contexts (very common in Greek) see 12B9-10n. Xenophon Mem. IV 1.3 uses the same analogy as P here to make the same point (and note the verbal parallels in θυμοειδεῖς and ἀδάμαστοι): Socrates used to admonish those who prided themselves on natural ability and scorned learning, ἐπιδεικνύων τῶν τε ἵππων τοὺς εὐφυεστάτους, θυμοειδεῖς τε καὶ σφοδροὺς ὄντας , εἰ μὲν ἐκ νέων δαμασθείεν, εὐχρηστοτάτους καὶ ἀρίστους γιγνομένους , εἰ δὲ ἀδάμαστοι γένοιντο, δυσκαθεκτοτάτους καὶ φαυλοτάτους. Cf. Aristippus fr. 12 Mannebach (= D.L. II 69) ἐρωτηθεὶς τίνι διαφέρουσιν οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων , ἔφη, " ὥσπερ οἱ δεδαμασμένοι ἵπποι τῶν ἀδαμάστων." Wyttenbach also compares Ad Herenn. IV 59: 'Neque equus indomitus, quamvis natura bene compositus sit, idoneus potest esse ad eas utilitates quae desiderantur ab equo, neque homo indoctus, quamvis sit ingeniosus, ad virtutem potest pervenire.'

2E9-10 πολυδαμνηθέντες : The same verb again at 13E8-9. The word is poetic in classical Greek (S. Aj. 549, E. Rh. 187, 624), but apparently at home in koine prose (X. Oec. 3.10), and used by

later prose-writers (e.g. Lucian 49.45). Cf. Pollux I 182.

2F1 σκληρεύχενες καὶ θυμοειδεῖς: σκληρεύκην is identified as a non-Plutarchan word by Wyttenbach (p.55). It is used of horses, as here, by Philo 4.136 (metaphorically 6.32, 18.61, 22.80, 184, 293) and Clem. Al. Protr. 89.3; otherwise it is rare. For θυμοειδής of spirited horses cf. e.g. Pl. R. V 467E; X. Mem. IV 1.3 (quoted above, 2E9-F1n.), Eq. 9.1; D.L. II 37.

2F1-5 -- Why extend the list of examples, when we see even the wildest of beasts made tame and docile through labour? The Thessalian, asked which were the mildest of his countrymen, aptly replied: "Those who are finishing a war ". -- For the taming of wild beasts as the culminating example (2F1-4) of the transforming power of effort and application of Isoc. 2.12, 15.213-214. The Roman poets too use the taming of ferocious beasts as a demonstration of the wonders wrought by time and perseverance: Tib. I 4.17; Ov. AA I 471-472, II 183, Trist. IV 6.1-8. On tamed wild animals in antiquity see E. Cougny and E. Saglio in D-S s.v. 'bestiae mansuetae, cicures'. -- The story of the Thessalian's reply about his fellow-countrymen (2F4-5), for which there are apparently no parallels, is a rather less happy illustration, whose point is not immediately clear. In the context, it can only be supposed that the Thessalians' mollification by the exertions of war is intended, like the taming of wild animals, as another proof of the transforming power of effort (cf. Sizoo p.69). But though it is possible to extract a sort of relevance from the anecdote by viewing it in this light, it keeps awkward company with the other illustrations and would really have been better omitted.

2F1-2 καὶ τί δεῖ πάλιν θαυμάζειν, ὅπου γε ...: Cf. 2F5-6 καὶ τί δεῖ τὰ πολλὰ λέγειν; immediately below, and see Russell on Longinus 4.4 ('an exceedingly common, indeed stereotyped, formula of transition') comparing D. 9.59, 22.15; D.H. Dem. 29, Is. 13,

Comp. 3.30. For expressions of this sort in Plutarch see Wyttenbach's note ad loc.; in his usage ὅπου καί predominates (e.g. 631F-632A, 769B, 782F, 800D, 966A, 1010D, 1099C, Pericl. 13.16); ὅπου alone occurs at 338B (but see apparatus ad loc.), 831F, 980D; the suspect Aq. an ig. 956D has ὅπου γε καί ; only 347D and 411E (but see apparatus) have ὅπου γε, as do P here, Longinus 4.4 and D.H. Comp. 3.30.

2F3-4 χειρούμενα τοῖς πόνοις : 'made tame by labour' (i.e. the labour of the trainer?). Some translators take τοῖς πόνοις as dative after χειρούμενα : thus, 'amenable to hard work' (Tucker), 'used to their labours' (Babbitt). But (a) although this commonplace (2F1-5 n.) often mentions animals like bulls which were originally tamed for the service of man, 'the wildest of beasts' (2F2) are not usually tamed to perform work; and (b) in a passage whose theme is the efficacy of πόνος and ἐπιμέλεια we expect πόνοι rather to be the agency by which the transformation is wrought. Xylander's 'cicures mansuetasque labore redditas' therefore seems much the better interpretation.

2F4 ὡς δὲ καὶ ὁ Θεττελός: For the anonymous Thessalian cf. e.g. anonymous Spartans in Plut. An virt.doc. 439F, De frat.am. 481F-482A.

2F5 οἱ πωόμενοι πολεμεῖν: πώομαι with infinitive instead of participle is a late prose usage (LSJ s.v. πώω I.4b). Cf. e.g. Plut. Quaest. conv. 635A πεπωμένων δὲ δειπνεῖν τῶν ἄλλων, Longus II 3.3 ἐξ οὗ νέμειν διὰ γήρας ἐπαυσάμην.

2F5-3A2 -- In short, character is really just long-ingrained habit, and it would not be wrong to call moral virtues the virtues of habit. -- This is P's culminating claim for the power of training: not only can it compensate in significant measure for deficiencies of natural endowment, but, through the forming of habits, it can also actually create character. The specific

identification of ἦθος with ἔθος is Aristotelian (see 2F6n. below); but the idea that habit or practice can create a second nature is a piece of conventional wisdom: cf. e.g. Euenus of Paros (5th cent. B.C.) fr.9 Bergk, Diehl φημὶ πολυχρονίην μελέτην ἔμεναι, φίλε, καὶ δή / τοῦτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι; Democr. VS 68 B 33 διδαχὴ μεταρυσμοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, μεταρυσμοῦσα δὲ φυσιοποιεῖ; Trag. Adesp. 516 Nauck: μελέτη χρονισθεῖσ' εἰς φύσιν καθίσταται; Arist. Pr. 949a27-28, Mem. 452a27-30; Thphr. CP II 5.5 τὸ γὰρ ἔθος ὥσπερ φύσις γέγονε; Cic. Fin. V 74 'consuetudine quasi alteram quandam naturam effici'; Plut. De tu.san. 132A τὸ ἔθος τρόπον τινὰ φύσις τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν γέγονεν; Quint. I 2.8 'fit ex his consuetudo, inde natura'.

2F5-6 καὶ τί δεῖ τὰ πολλὰ λέγειν; Cf. above, 2F1-2 καὶ τί δεῖ τἄλλα θαυμάζειν; similar phrases in Plutarch e.g. at Mor. 166F, 326A, 501E, 937B.

2F6 καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἦθος ⟨ἔθος⟩ ἐστι πολυχρόνιον : Xylander's supplement is assured by the parallels, and by ἠθικὰς and ἐθικὰς (restored by Fabricius) immediately below. The identification of ἦθος and ἔθος is hinted at by Plato, Lg. VII 792E κυριώτατον γὰρ οὖν ἐμφύεται πᾶσι τότε (sc. just after birth) τὸ πᾶν ἦθος διὰ ἔθος; but it is Aristotle who makes it explicit, EN II 1103a17-19 ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ (sc. ἀρετή) ἐξ ἔθους περαγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους, MM I 1186a1-2, EE II 1220a39-b1. Cf. also Arius Didymus ap. Stob. II 7.13 init.; Plut. De virt.mor. 443C, De sera 551E; and see Glaeser pp.25-26. In actual fact, the two words are etymologically cognate: see Frisk, Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch s.v. ἦθος.

2F6-3A2 καὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς ἐθικὰς ἄν τις λέγῃ, οὐκ ἂν τι πλημμελεῖν δόξειεν : For the form of the expression cf. Sen. QN II 34.3 'si dicas flammae maiorem vim esse quam fumi, non mentieris'. -- ἐθικάς, which Fabricius was the first to print, is a certain correction: cf. Arius Didymus (loc. cit. 2F6 n.) δι' ὃ καὶ τὴν

ἠθικὴν ἐθικὴν εἶναι καὶ περὶ μόνα τὰ ζῷα γίνεσθαι καὶ μάλιστα περὶ ἄνθρωπον. The ἐσικυίας of the mss. points to a mistake in a common ancestor copied from an uncial exemplar (confusion of Ⓜ and O). -- The mss. divide between λέγῃ and λέγοι. The latter is a possibility, since P probably does use ἄν (= ἐάν) with the optative elsewhere (see 5A3-4 n.), and would harmonise better with δόξειεν . -- With πλημμελεῖν cf. 8A8 πλημμελής, and 6C7 and 12B2 πλημμελήματα. For the music metaphor which lies behind these words, and for occurrences in Plutarch, see Dronkers p.41.

3A2-B9 -- One more example to illustrate this and I shall have done with the subject. The Spartan lawgiver Lycurgus took two pups of the same parentage and reared one as a hunter and the other as a glutton. Then one day at a gathering, promising the Spartans a demonstration of the power of training, he set a hare and a dish of food before the pups and released them; one went for the dish, and the other for the hare. Thereupon, he explained to his puzzled audience the difference of character he had induced by different kinds of training. -- The episode of Lycurgus and the two dogs occurs in a surviving fragment of Nicolaus Damascenus, FGrH 90 F56 (= Souda s.v. Λυκοῦργος), and also at [Plut.] Apophth.Lac. 225F; (in an alternative version at Apophth.Lac. 226A Lycurgus takes a house-dog and a hunting-dog, and trains each to behave in the manner which would normally be expected of the other). The story belongs to a tradition which sought to illustrate how Lycurgus had achieved his reforms at Sparta by the power of persuasion and example rather than by compulsion: see E. Kessler, Plutarchs Leben des Lykurgos (Berlin 1910) pp.27-28. It caught the imagination of posterity and was often re-told (cf. Erasmus, De Pueris 491F-492A 'nulli non decantatum exemplum Lycurgi'); see E. Rawson, The Spartan Tradition in European Thought (Oxford 1969) p.131, and cf. plate

3 (opposite p.148) for a 17th-century engraving of the scene (which follows the second Apophth.Lac. version, to judge by the appearance of the dogs). The significance of the story in the present context is clear. If differences in temperament and character can be induced in two creatures born to the same parents (and thus sharing the same inherited qualities), then training has potentially a greater formative influence upon character than natural dispositions; in effect, as P has said at 2F5-3A2, it has the potential to create character. (In the first Apophth.Lac. version Lycurgus is made to state the moral explicitly: ποιητικωτέρα τῆς φύσεως ἡ ἄσκησις πρὸς τὸ καλὸν τυγχάνει.) The question of nature versus training here shows signs of blending into the closely related one of heredity versus environment (for an interesting discussion of which see Dover, Greek Popular Morality pp.83-95, especially pp.88-95).

3A2-3 ἀπαλλάξομαι τοῦ [ἔτι] περὶ αὐτῶν μηκύνειν : Nikitin (p.7) proposes the deletion on grounds of hiatus. In addition, although the pleonasm of ἔτι μηκύνειν could easily be tolerated, the presence of an ἔτι already in the previous line casts suspicion on this second instance.

3A4 δύο σκύλακας τῶν αὐτῶν γονέων: Nicolaus more cautiously says ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς μητρός.

3A5 οὐδὲν ὁμοίως ἀλλήλοις ἤγαγεν: ἄγω ('rear, train') is used of dogs by Xenophon, Mem. IV 1.3 and possibly also Cyn. 3.11.

3A5-6 τὸν μὲν λίχνον ἀπέφηνε καὶ σώφρονα: For λίχνος, 'greedy', (again at 3B8, 4B3, 10D6) cf. e.g. E. Hipp. 913, Pl. R. I 354B, X. Mem. I 2.2; Plutarch has it of σκύλακες at De aud. 48B. Cf. Nicolaus τὸν μὲν κατ' οἶκον ὄψα τε διδοὺς καὶ τὴν ἄλλην λιχνείαν, ps.-Plut. τὸν μὲν εἴθισε περὶ λιχνείας οἴκοι

ἐλέσκε. -- σινάμωρος (a non-Plutarchan word, Wyttenbach p.55) normally means 'harmful, mischievous' (cf. σίνος): cf. e.g. Hdt. V 92.ζ.3; Hp. Art. 48 ὀλέθρια .. καὶ σινάμωρα. It thus seems at first sight to be an odd companion for λίχνος; but an Attic usage apparently makes it an exact synonym: Photius s.v. glosses it ὁ λίχνος καὶ ἀφίκορος; Et.M. s.v. σινέμωροι πολεμίζουσι θυρωρῷ (Anacr. fr.6 Page, PMG 351) has οἱ μὲν Ἀττικοὶ λέγουσι σιναμωρεῖν τὸ λιχνεύειν; and schol. on Ar. Pax 1009 τένθαις comments οὐκ ἡμεῖς σιναμώρους. On the orthography of the word (often spelt σινάμορος in mss., as by almost all here), see TGL s.v.

3A7 τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων εἰς ταὐτὸ συνειλεγμένων: Both Nicolaus and ps.-Plut. make a meeting of the ἐκκλησία the occasion of Lycurgus's demonstration. For similar appearances by Lycurgus before the assembled populace, cf. e.g. Musonius fr. 39, Plut. Lyc. 29.2-4.

3A7-8 μεγάλη τοι ῥοπὴ πρὸς ἀρετῆς κτῆσιν ἐστιν: For ῥοπή (again at 12D5-6 καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς ἀρετῆς κτῆσιν συμβάλλεται ῥοπὴν οὐκ ἐλαχίστην) cf. e.g. Arist. EN I 1094a23, 1098b6, 1101a29, X 1172a23-24. -- κτῆσιν is Wyttenbach's emendation for κύησιν, the reading of all the mss. πρὸς ἀρετῆς κύησιν, though perhaps hard to parallel exactly, is not impossible ('in engendering virtue' - Tucker; and cf. Wyttenbach's n. ad loc.); but ἀρετῆς κτῆσις is such a common phrase that the emendation seems virtually assured: cf. (apart from the later instance in De lib.educ. quoted above) Pl. Smp. 180B, Lg. IV 704D, VII 812C; Musonius pp.20.1, 43.6 Hense; Philo 2.104, 6.78, 7.27, 60, 11.121, 13.6, 94, 16.200, 20.14, 73, 75, 21.124, 43.186, 44.124, 45.198, 47.80.

3A9-B1 βίων ἀγωγαί: For the expression cf. Plb. IV 74.1,

74.4, XXIII 5.9, XXXI 25.8; J. BJ I 462.

3B2 προσαγαγὼν τοὺς σκύλακας διαφῆκε: In Nicolaus, Lycurgus has an assistant standing by with the dogs: καὶ ἅμα προσέταξε τῷ κυνουλκῷ μεθεῖναι ἀμφοτέρους ἐπὶ τὰ ἡτοιμασμένα.

3B2-3 κατιδὼν εἰς μέσον λοπάδα καὶ λαγωὸν κατευθὺ τῶν σκυλάκων: In Nicolaus, the live prey is a deer; ps.-Plut. has a hare, as in the present passage. For λοπάς, a shallow casserole used for boiling or stewing (often fish), cf. E. Pottier in D-S s.v. 'lopas, lopadion', B.A. Sparkes and L. Talcott, Pots and pans of classical Athens (Princeton, New Jersey 1958) fig.44; and for further material Handley, and Gomme and Sandbach, on Men. Dysc. 520. -- For κατευθύ (LSJ prefer κατ' εὐθύ) with genitive, meaning 'straight in front of', cf. e.g. Paus. V 11.3 πρὸ .. κατ' εὐθὺ τῆς ἐσόδου κανόνι, VII 23.10 ἐν .. οἰκήματι κατ' εὐθὺ τῆς ἐσόδου.

3B3-4 καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸν λαγωὸν ἦξεν, ὁ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν λοπάδα ὥρμησε: The variation of the verbs looks deliberate; cf. 2B3-4. Both Nicolaus and ps.-Plut. also use ὁρμᾶν.

3B4-6 τῶν δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων οὐδέπω συμβαλεῖν ἐόντων τί ποτ' ὢν τοῦτο δύναται: In this version of the story (and in ps.-Plut.) Lycurgus has deliberately withheld the vital clue until after the demonstration. In Nicolaus's account, he explains the background first, and only leaves the moral to be indicated afterwards. -- For τί ποτ' ὢν τοῦτο δύναται, 'what he meant by it', cf. LSJ s.v. δύναμαι II.3c, Pl. Cra. 429D ἆρα τοῦτο σοι δύναται ὁ λόγος; Trag. Adesp. 106 (=Com.Adesp. 1232) ἦ δεῦρ' ὁδὸς σοι τί δύναται νῦν, θεοπρόπε;

(5) 3B10-F6: Mothers and nursemaids

After birth (Chapters 2 and 3), the next stage in the chronological progression is the child's first years. In Chapters 5 and 6 we have P's discussion of this stage, organised around the principal figures among whom these early years will be spent: mother (3B10-D6), nursemaid (3D6-F6) and playmates (3F7-4A5).

He begins, naturally enough, with the mother:

3B10-C6 Next I come to the child's early years. In my opinion, mothers should take personal responsibility for suckling their offspring, since (i) they will bring to the task a sympathy born of deep-rooted affection, whereas the benevolence of nursemaids is artificial because motivated by payment.

3C6-D2 (ii) It is clear that nature intended this to be the normal practice from the fact that she has provided all female creatures with a supply of milk after parturition. (Providence also wisely gave women two breasts so that they should have two sources of nourishment in case of the birth of twins.)

3D2-6 (iii) Finally, the act of suckling increases mothers' love for their children, for common nurture raises the pitch of affection, and even wild animals separated from their feeding companions appear to miss them.

Next, if despite the above advice there turns out to be a need for one, the nursemaid:

3D6-E1 If physical weakness or the desire to have more children prevents mothers from doing their own suckling, nursemaids of the soundest possible character should be chosen. First and foremost, they should be possessed of Greek manners.

3E1-9 Children's characters, like their limbs, require to be moulded from the very beginning to grow straight. Children are easily influenced: lessons sink deep into their still tender minds, and leave an impression like seals in soft wax.

3E9-F6 Plato is therefore right to advise that nursemaids should not relate just any sort of stories to their charges, lest their minds should be filled with nonsense from the outset. And the poet Phocylides does well to urge that childhood is the time for noble conduct to be taught.

The background against which this and the next chapter are set is the young child's life before he is put in the charge of a pedagogue and begins to attend school, which happened generally around the age of 7 (see 4A6-7n). These years (on which see Girard pp.65-99, Marrou pp.218-220) were spent in the secluded and predominantly female environment of the home, and it is here only, in a work which refers and addresses itself so frequently to fathers, that mothers are mentioned.

It is possible to detect strands of various traditions in this chapter. The advice that mothers should suckle their own offspring appears in a small number of parallel passages (see 3B10-C6n. for details), and was clearly a theme which both philosophical and medical writers felt qualified to handle. It may not be mere coincidence that none of the parallels dates from earlier than the first century A.D. The second main topic of the chapter, the choice of a nursemaid, seems equally to have been common ground for medical and philosophical authors (see 3D6-E1n). Here however there is evidence from fragments of Chrysippus and Varro to suggest that a discussion of the qualities desirable in nursemaids may have established itself at a fairly early stage as a standard item in educational treatises. If so, the starting point will almost certainly have been Plato's recognition of their educational significance in a passage of the Republic which is clearly another strong influence on P's pronouncements in the latter part of this chapter (cf. 3E1-4n., 3E10-F1n.).

On Chapter 5 in general cf. Glaeser pp.27 ff.; Kemper pp.92-94

3B10-C6 -- Next I come to the child's early years. In my opinion, mothers should take personal responsibility for suckling their offspring, since (i) they will bring to the task a sympathy and care born of deep-rooted affection, whereas the benevolence of nursemaids is artificial because motivated by payment. -- The doctrine that mothers should suckle their own children, to which P devotes the first part of this chapter, has a small number of ancient parallels. (a) A chapter of Aulus Gellius (XII 1) represents Favorinus, the hermaphrodite philosopher and acquaintance of Plutarch, as strongly urging that the wife of a pupil should herself undertake to suckle her newly-born infant despite the exhaustion consequent upon a difficult delivery. His reasons are partly physiological, being founded on the belief that the milk which a child imbibes (which is merely the blood which nourished it in the womb in a different form (XII 1.12) -- cf. e.g. Arist. GA IV 777a7-8) goes on determining its physical, mental and moral development after it is born (1.14, 20) -- hence the danger of entrusting it to nursemaids who are often of a very inferior kind (1.17), and the explanation of cases where children fail to take after upright parents (1.19). But he has moral arguments too: nature gave women breasts for a function and not just for adornment (1.7), and suckling engenders affection between mother and child (1.21-23). (See further W. Schick, Favorin ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΙΔΩΝ ΤΡΟΦΗΣ und die antike Erziehungslehre (Leipzig 1911) for an interesting examination of the passage and its parellels, and much useful material on the whole topic. (b) The idea also receives qualified support from the medical writer Soranus of Ephesus (1st-2nd cent. A.D.) in his Gynaecia II 18 Ilberg (= I 87 Rose). His view is that if the mother should happen to

possess the qualities of a good nursemaid it is better that she should suckle her own children, both because she will be more sympathetically disposed and because it is more natural. But there is nothing wrong with the use of a good nursemaid if the mother wishes to recuperate or save her strength to have other children (II 18.4-6 = I 87 pp.259-260 Rose). There are clear similarities here with what P has to say on the subject. (c) Finally, much briefer references occur in other writers: cf. Musonius fr.3 (p.11 Hense), women should participate in philosophy, and one of philosophy's lessons is that toil should not be avoided, ὅθεν εἰκὸς εἶναι τὴν γυναῖκα τοῦτον καὶ αὐτουργικὴν καὶ κακόπαθον, εἴπερ ἃ μὲν ἂν τέκῃ τρέφειν μέλλῃ τῷ ἑαυτῆς ; Ambrose De Abr. I 76.3 (on Genesis 21.73) 'Moralis locus. Provocantur feminae meminisse dignitatis suae et lactare filios suos. Haec enim matris gratia, hic honos, quo se propriis commendent viris. Denique eos plus amare filios solent, quos ipsae matres lactaverint uberibus suis.' Later repetitions of the theme abound, from the Renaissance to Rousseau's Émile and beyond. See T. Hopfner in RAC s.v. 'Amme' c.382, and forthcoming RAC article s.v. 'Stillpflicht'; H. Herter, Kleine Schriften (Munich 1975) p.625 and n.30. -- In practice the Greeks seem to have employed wet-nurses, when they could afford them, from the earliest times (for guesses at why, see Herfst, op. cit. 3D9n., pp.61-62), though mothers are sometimes represented as suckling their own offspring (e.g. Il. XXII 83; Od. XI 448; Ar. Lys. 880-881; Lysias 1.9). At Rome, where wet-nurses came more gradually into fashion, the idea seems to have persisted that there was something meritorious in a mother's suckling her own children, and Roman imperial grave inscriptions sometimes mention the fact among the virtues of the deceased woman (e.g. CIL VI.3 19128 'Graxiae Alexandriae insignis exempli ac pudicitiae, quae

etiam filios suos propriis uberibus educavit', cf. 16592). Tacitus comments on the universality of the custom among the Germans (Germ. 20.1 'sua quemque mater uberibus alit, nec ancillis aut nutricibus delegantur') and makes one of the interlocutors in his Dialogus deplore its disappearance at Rome (28.4 'nam pridem suus cuique filius, ex casta parente natus, non in cellula emptae nutricis, sed gremio ac sinu matris educabatur'). The wife of Cato the elder, we are told (Plut. Cato maior 20.5) suckled not only her own son but also the children of her slaves (see 3D3-4n.). On nursemaids see further 3D9n.

3B10 περὶ δὲ τροφῆς ἐκόμενον ἂν εἴη λέγειν: For ἐκόμενον ἂν εἴη λέγειν cf. 1D5 and n. listing parallels from Aristotle. It sounds rather as though P were mentally recalling some conventional order. If so, it seems likely to be the γένεσις, τροφή, παιδεία progression familiar from Plato (e.g. Alc. I 122B, R. V 450C τροφῆς .. τῆς ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ χρόνῳ γιγνομένης γενέσεώς τε καὶ παιδείας, Lg. V 740A, VI 783B μετὰ γένεσιν τροφὴν καὶ παιδείαν, VIII 842E etc.), a natural sequence of topics which may perhaps have become standard in educational treatises. γένεσις was the subject of P's Chapters 2 and 3, and Chapters 8 to 10 will deal with παιδεία. τροφή in the fundamental sense of 'feeding' is by no means inappropriate to the subject-matter which follows; but the word has wider connotations which are also relevant here. Coupled with παιδεία (frequent examples from Plato collected by Stallbaum on Phlb. 55D) in a composite formula for 'education', τροφή stands partly for the domestic regime of the first seven years as opposed to the school education which follows, and partly for the satisfaction of the child's physical, as opposed to moral or intellectual, needs. Cf. Hermann and Blümner pp.286-287, Girard in D-S s.v. 'Educatio' p.466 n.68, Schmidt IV pp.98-100, Kemper p.22 n.2.

3B10-C1 ὡς ἐγὼ ἂν φαίην : Cf. 6E4 οὐ φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε.

3C1-2 τὰ τέκνα τρέφειν καὶ τούτοις τοὺς μαστοὺς ὑπέχειν : For ὑπέχειν as the vox propria in this context cf. 9A7 (καὶ τίτθαι) πάλιν τὸν μαστὸν ὑπέχουσι , Plut. Rom. 21.8 θήλην ὑπέχειν. -- τούτοις (= τοῖς τέκνοις) instead of αὐτοῖς is put down to hiatus-avoidance by Bock, PhW 41 (1921) c.797 (cf. Hartman, De Plutarcho p.8). But this use of οὗτος is a recurrent feature of P's style (other examples occur at 3D5, 3E3, 3F1, 3F8, 4D1, 6E7, 7C10, 10C5, 11D5, 11D6 and 14A6) which cannot always be explained in that way. Rather P seems to have a genuine preference for the demonstrative. For the same phenomenon in other writers cf. Mayser, Grammatik II.2 p.67 n.1, and A. Boulanger, Aelius Aristide (Paris 1923), who calls it 'confusion propre à la langue commune'.

3C2-3 συμπαθέστερόν τε γὰρ θρέψουσι καὶ διὰ πλείονος ἐπιμελείας : For the thought cf. Soranus Gynaec. II 18.4 (= I 87 pp.259-260 Rose) (noting the verbal parallel of συμπαθέστερα) ἄμεινον γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπ' ἴσης ἐχόντων τῷ μητρώῳ γάλακτι τρέφεσθαι τὸ νήπιον· τοῦτο γὰρ οἰκειότερον αὐτῷ, καὶ πρὸς τὰ γεννηθέντα συμπαθέστερα μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες γίνονται.

3C3-4 ἔνδοθεν καὶ τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον ἐξ ὀνύχων: 'from the heart, or, as the saying goes, "down to the fingertips"' (Tucker). For ἔνδοθεν in this sense cf. e.g. Plut. De ad.et am. 62C, De tranq.an. 477A, Plat.quaest. 1000C. For ἐξ ὀνύχων cf. Rufinus in AP V 14.4 τὴν ψυχὴν ἐξ ὀνύχων ἀνάγει, Plaut. Stich. 761 'perpruriscamus usque ex unguiculis', Apul. Met. X 22 'ex unguiculis perpruriscens', Lampe s.v. ὄνυξ 1b, Otto Sprichwörter p.355 s.v. 'unguiculus'. The expression is not to be confused with the much commoner ἐξ ἁπαλῶν ὀνύχων (erroneously introduced here by Fabricius, supposedly 'ex manuscriptis', and reproduced by Stephanus, Xylander and Wyttenbach). The latter phrase means

'from the time when the nails were tender' i.e. from earliest youth (Lampe s.v. ὄνυξ 1a, Otto p.356 s.v. 'unguis' 5): see A. Cameron, 'Tener unguis', CQ 15 (1965) pp.80-83 (p.80 on the confusion with ἐξ ὀνύχων; cf. Otto pp.356-357n.).

3C4 αἱ τίτθαι δὲ καὶ αἱ τροφοί : For τίτθαι and τροφοί cf. 3D9 where they are paired again, and see n. ad loc.

3C5 τὴν ὄντως ὑποβολιμαίων καὶ παρεγγράπτων ἐχουσαν : The two adjectives are used as a pair, as here, by Synesius Astrolab. 3. Each denotes a different variety of fraudulence, ὑποβολιμαῖος meaning properly 'suppositious', of children (again at 13B8 ὑποβολιμαῖα καὶ νόθα μέρη βίου), and παρέγγραπτος referring strictly to illegally registered citizens (cf. e.g. Aeschines 2.177).

3C5-6 ἅτε μισθοῦ φιλοῦσαι : P mistrusts the pecuniary motive, cf. 9B2-3 (of teachers) μὴ τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχειν ἐν μισθωτοῦ διαθέσει. On wet-nursing as a possible occupation of free women, which this clearly implies, see 3D9n. For the genitive μισθοῦ see K-G I p.378, and add D.Chr. 7.114 to the instances at Thuc. VII 25.7 and X. Cyr. III 2.7, 3.3.

3C6-D2 -- (ii) It is clear that nature intended this to be the normal practice from the fact that she has provided all female creatures with a supply of milk after parturition. (Providence also wisely gave women two breasts so that they should have two sources of nourishment in case of the birth of twins.) -- Favorinus (Gell. XII 1.13) also employs this argument from nature to urge suckling by the mother: 'Nonne hac quoque in re sollertia naturae evidens est, quod, postquam sanguis ille opifex in penetralibus suis omne corpus hominis finxit, adventante iam partus tempore in supernas se partis perfert, ad fovenda vitae atque lucis rudimenta praesto est et recens natis notum et familiarem victum offert?' Soranus too (II 18.2 = I 87 p.259 Rose)

is familiar with the argument that mothers should suckle their offspring from the start ὡς διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τῆς φύσεως τὸ γάλα ποιῆσαι πρότερον ἐνοικονομησάσης ἵν' εὐθὺς καὶ τὴν τροφὴν τὸ βρέφος ἔχοι, and though he has technical reservations about this, both he and Favorinus agree that suckling by the mother is 'more natural': Gynaec. II 18.4 (= I.87 p.260 Rose, following on immediately from the passage quoted at 3C2-3n.) καὶ ὡς φυσικώτερον πρὸ τῆς ἀποτέξεως, οὕτως καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀπότεξιν ὑπὸ τῆς μητρὸς τρέφεσθαι ; Favorinus ap. Gell. XII 1.6 'Quod est enim hoc contra naturam imperfectum atque dimidiatum matris genus peperisse ac statim a sese abiecisse?' -- Pease on Cic. N.D. II 128 (II pp.881-882) comments that 'the phenomenon of lactation is mentioned -- often as an illustration of divine providence -- by many authors': see his lengthy list of references. The teleological slant is introduced, as one might have expected, by Aristotle (GA IV 776a15-19), and is fairly standard in later versions of the commonplace: cf. e.g. Plut. De am.prol. 495D ἀρκεῖ δ' ἡ τοῦ γάλακτος ἐργασία καὶ οἰκονομία τὴν πρόνοιαν αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς φύσεως) ἐμφῆναι καὶ ἐπιμέλειαν. The relatively casual employment of teleological ideas by writers of all kinds suggests that their occurrence here and elsewhere in the De lib.educ. (3C9-D2, 9C1-3) should not be given undue significance. -- One teleological argument has evidently reminded P of another which deals with a kindred topic when he digresses briefly at 3C9-D2 (bracketed in the summary at the beginning of this note) to explain why women have two breasts. See commentary ad loc.

3C8 τὴν ἐκ τοῦ γάλακτος τροφὴν ἐχορήγησε : χορηγεῖν meaning ''provide' is a favourite Aristotelian word (see Gauthier and Jolif on EN I 1099a33), current also in Plb., D.S., D.Chr. and Aelian. See LSJ s.v. II.3, Arndt-Gingrich s.v.; and cf. 13E4-5 ἐφείσω ποτέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ χορήγησον.

3C9-D2 σοφῶς δὲ καὶ ἡ πρόνοια διττοὺς ἐνέδηκε ταῖς γυναιξὶ τοὺς μαστούς, ἵνα, κἂν εἰ δίδυμα τέκοιεν, διττὰς ἔχοιεν τὰς τῆς τροφῆς πηγάς: With this theory cf. the general observation that nature proportions the number of teats in animal species to the normal, or possible, size of the litter -- for which Pease (n. on Cic. N.D. II 128, II pp.882-883) produces the following references: Arist. HA II 500a22-30, PA IV 688a32-b1 (cf. Michael Ephes. in PA IV, p.87.19 Hayduck); Varr. R.R. II 4.17; Pliny NH XI 233-235; Galen UP VII 22 (III p.602 K); Nemes. De nat.hom. 4 (PG 40 c.612B); schol. Il. V 554. -- For the teleological implications of πρόνοια cf. above 3C6-D2n. -- τὰς τῆς τροφῆς πηγάς is a high-flown periphrasis borrowed, apparently, from Pl. Mx. 237E καὶ γύνη δήλη τεκοῦσά τε καὶ μή, ἀλλ' ὑπερβαλλομένη, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃ πηγὰς τροφῆς τῷ γενομένῳ, on which D.H., Dem. 28, comments οὐκ εἴωθεν τὸ γάλα σημεῖον εἶναι ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ πηγὴν τροφῆς αὐτὸ μετονομάζειν. Cf. Clem. Al. Paed. I 6.49.2 πηγὴ τροφῆς τὸ γάλα; and for the metaphor Favorinus ap. Gell. XII 1.8 'fontem illum sanctissimum corporis' Plut. De am.prol. 495F (also of milk) οἷον ἐννέας ἢ πέντε κρηνὰς νάματος ἐπιρρέοντος.

3D2-6 -- (iii) Finally, the act of suckling naturally increases their love for their children, for common nurture raises the pitch of affection, and even wild animals separated from their feeding companions appear to miss them. -- If the English summary of this section reads rather oddly, it is because it reflects an illogicality in the original: see note at 3D3-4 on the meaning of συντροφία. For the argument that suckling increases the mother's affection for the child cf. Favorinus ap. Gell. XII 1.21-23, especially 21 'vinculum illud coagulumque animi atque amoris, quo parentes cum filiis natura consociat'; Clem.Al. Paed. I 6.49.2, where milk is called the medium δι' οὗ καὶ φίλτρον εὐνοίας παραλαμβάνει (sc. ἡ μήτηρ); Ambrose De Abr. I 7.63 'Denique eos

plus amare filios solent, quos ipsae matres lactaverint uberibus suis'.

3D2 χωρὶς δὲ τούτων : The same phrase (again introducing an additional argument) at 14B1. Preuss's index lists nine instances from Isocrates; cf. also e.g. Alcidamas Soph. 32 (cf. 24), Thphr. Char. 17.9.

3D3 καὶ μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἐπεικότως : Cf. 6B9 καὶ νὴ Δι' εἰκότως, 8F1-2 μὴ μὰ Δία πληγὰς μηδ' ἀδικεμοῖς, 10C10 (in reported speech) μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἔγωγε. For instances in Plutarch see Kowalski pp.112-113, and cf. Weissenberger I p.4 on exclamations in Plutarch generally.

3D3-4 ἡ συντροφία γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐπιτόνιόν ἐστι τῆς εὐνοίας : ἐπιτόνιον appears to incorporate in substantival form one of the senses of the verb ἐπιτείνω, 'increase in intensity, augment, heighten' (LSJ s.v. I.2c). The meaning is that συντροφία (see below) serves to increase maternal affection (thus TGL s.v.). Elsewhere, ἐπιτόνιον is used of the tuning-peg of a stringed instrument (LSJ s.v. I.1) and the handle of a tap (LSJ s.v. II.1; cf. TLL and OLD s.v. 'epitonium'), and it may be that the present instance is a metaphor consciously formed from the first of these literal meanings (cf. Dronkers p.43). -- συντροφία, however, is something of a problem here. The context seems to demand a word to denote the relationship between the mother and child who is suckled; but συντροφία is instead the mutual relationship of young who are suckled (or more loosely, brought up, cf. 3F8-9 σύντροφα) together. In view of the fact that the text at 3D2-3 has suffered some corruption (εὐνούστερα is restored by Fabricius), it is tempting to consider emending to something like εὐνούστερα τὰ τέκνα γίνοιτ' ἂν καὶ φιλητικώτερα (Mr D.A. Russell's suggestion; though perhaps the addition of ἀλλήλοις would be necessary to make the meaning perfectly clear). There would then

be an interesting parallel with Plut. Cato maior 20.5, where we are told that in addition to suckling her own son, Cato's wife πολλάκις .. καὶ τὸ τῶν δούλων παιδάριον τῷ μαστῷ προσιεμένη, κατεσκεύαζεν εὔνουν ἐκ τῆς συντροφίας πρὸς τὸν υἱόν. It is rather less than certain, nevertheless, that such an alteration would be an improvement, since it restores the proper meaning to συντροφία at the cost of weakening P's case for suckling by the mother. After all, the same bond of mutual affection would presumably arise between infants suckled by the same nursemaid. On the whole, it seems best to tolerate the inconsistency and assume that in his eagerness to work in a thought borrowed from Xenophon (3D4-6n.) P has erroneously used συντροφία in an alien sense.

3D4-6 καὶ γὰρ τὰ θηρία τῶν συντρεφομένων ἀποστώμενα τοῦτα ποθοῦντα φαίνεται : The thought comes in all probability from Xenophon, Cyr. II 1.28, where we are told that Cyrus encouraged common messing because he observed καὶ τὰ θηρία τὰ συντρεφόμενα ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντα πόθον , ἢν τις αὐτὰ διαστῇ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. Cf. Mem. II 3.4 καὶ μὴν πρὸς φιλίαν μέγα μὲν ὑπάρχει τὸ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν φῦναι, μέγα δὲ τὸ ὁμοῦ τραφῆναι . -- On τοῦτα see 3C1-2n.

3D6-E1 -- If physical weakness or the desire to have more children prevents mothers from doing their own suckling, nursemaids of the soundest possible character should be chosen. First and foremost, they should be possessed of Greek manners. -- The same two circumstances in which P regards the use of a nursemaid as legitimate are mentioned by Soranus (see 3D7-9n.). The topic of choosing a nursemaid, like that of suckling by the mother, was evidently standard in both medical and philosophical literature, the criteria varying according to whether the writer was most concerned with the child's physical, moral or intellectual welfare. Chrysippus wanted nursemaids to be philosophically trained if

possible, or at least of the best available character (fr.734, SVF III p.184 = Quint. I 1.4; cf. frs.733, 735); Quintilian (I.1.4-5) adds that they should also speak correctly. Surviving fragments of Varro (frs.10-22 Müller) show that he too devoted some attention to nursemaids in his Logistoricus de liberis educandis; fr.11 shows some concern about their age: 'Eam nutricem oportet esse adulescentem. Anuis enim ut sanguis deterior, sic lac. Lac enim, ut quidam dicunt physici, sanguinis spuma'. Soranus's chapter περὶ ἐκλογῆς τίτθης (II 19-20 = I 88-89 Rose) gives the most detailed prescription of all, embracing considerations of age, physical condition, morals, temperament and nationality (for the mixture cf. Schick p.14); and some of the same stipulations occur in a letter attributed to Myia, the daughter of Pythagoras (Hercher, Epistolographi p.608; Thesleff, Pythagorean texts pp.123-124): τίτθην μὲν ἐκλέξασθαι τὴν ἐπιτηδειοτάτην καὶ καθαρίαν, ἔτι δὲ ἀδήμονα καὶ μὴ ὕπνῳ προσκειμένην μηδὲ μὴν μέθης . . . ἔστω δὲ μητ' ὀργίλα τιθήνη μήτε πρόγλωσσος μήτε ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἐδεστῶν λήψεσιν ἀδιάφορος, ἀλλὰ τεταγμένη καὶ ὥφρων, δουλικῶν δὲ ὄντων μὴ βάρβαρος ἀλλὰ Ἑλληνίς. Though Favorinus is implacably opposed to any use of nursemaids, and thus gives no prescription, he stigmatises the usual sort of wet-nurse as all too often 'serva aut servilis .. externae et barbarae nationis .. inproba .. informis .. inpudica .. temulenta'. The topic is also handled by Oribasius, Syn. V 2, Inc. 31, and by other later medical writers. Cf. Herzog-Hauser (op. cit. 3D9n.) c.1494.45ff., and see further on nursemaids 3D9n.

3D7-9 εἰ δ' ἄρ' ἀδυνάτως ἔχοιεν ἢ διὰ σώματος ἀσθένειαν . . . ἢ πρὸς ἑτέρων τέκνων σπεύδουσαι γένεσιν: Cf. Soranus, who believes that mothers will often fare better πρός τε τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἀνάκτησιν καὶ πρὸς τεκνοποιΐαν ἄλλων if a nursemaid is employed, since the effort of suckling can cause premature ageing and impair fertility (II 18.5-6 = I 87 p.260 Rose). We recall too that the

wife of Favorinus's pupil was to be excused from suckling because she had had a difficult delivery (Gell. XII 1.4-5). -- ἀδυνάτως ἔχειν often means 'to be weak, exhausted, ill' (cf. e.g. [Pl.] Ax. 364B; [Hdt.] Vit.Hom. 34; Plut. Ages. 27.3, Art. 11.8, Pyrrh. 15.8); but this, though it looks right at first sight, would be pleonastic here with the first of P's alternatives, and incompatible with the second; in this case, therefore, it looks as if the phrase must mean 'to be unable' (sc. to do her own suckling); cf. e.g. Anaximenes Rh.Al. 24.3.

3D9 ἀλλὰ τὰς γε τίτθας καὶ τροφοὺς κτλ.: For ἀλλά in the apodosis of a conditional sentence see Denniston pp.11-13 (and especially pp.12-13 on ἀλλά .. γε , where γε 'accentuates the notion of a pis aller'). -- On nursemaids in general see G. Herzog-Hauser in RE s.v. 'Nutrix' (also a short article by Mau s.v. 'Ammen') O. Navarre in D-S s.v. 'Nutrix' and P. Girard s.v. 'Educatio' pp.466a-467a; T. Hopfner and T. Klauser in RAC s.v. 'Amme'; Hermann and Blümner pp.286-291; Blümner pp.307-308; Girard, L' Éducation Athénienne pp.69-75; P. Herfst, Le travail de la femme dans la Grèce ancienne (Utrecht 1922) pp.57-63, 88, 109-111. Strictly speaking, the τίτθη was the wet-nurse who suckled an infant in place of its mother,and the τροφός the dry-nurse who amused it and generally looked after it (Herzog-Hauser c.1493; Hermann and Blümner p.288 n.1; Herfst pp.57-58). However, (a) in poor families, if they could afford a nursemaid at all, one woman no doubt had to perform both functions; and (b) the precise distinction seems to be lost in many writers. P has both words paired here and at 3C4, where he clearly means to concentrate on the wet-nurse, and τίτθαι alone at 3E10 and 9A5. Nursemaids were usually slaves (cf. e.g. IG II.3 3097, 3111; E. Med. 49, 65; Pl. Lg. VII 790A; Tac. Dial. 28.4), but not always (e.g. IG III.2 1457), and evidently not as envisaged here (cf. 3C5-6 ἅτε μισθοῦ

φιλοῦσαι , with Herfst p.88 n.1). Poverty sometimes forced free women to offer their services as paid τίτθαι : D. 57.35, 42; cf. D.Chr. 7.114.

3D10-E1 ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα σπουδαίας δοκιμαστέον ἐστί : For ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα cf. e.g. Plut. Mor. 75C, 140D, 547C, 976E, 1060B, 1116E, Ages. 16.6, Marcell. 3.6.

3E1 πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς ἤθεσιν Ἑλληνίδας: 'Id est, non solum patria sint Graecae, sed etiam moribus' (Heusinger); but perhaps rather it means versed in Greek ways whether of Greek nationality or not. (For the expression cf. e.g. D.Chr. 36.16 (of the Borysthenites) οὕτως ἦσαν φιλήκοοι καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ Ἕλληνες.) For the stipulation that nursemaids should be Greek cf. Soranus II 19.1 (= I 88 p.261 Rose) . . σωμασθῆ καὶ ὀξύγιστον, Ἑλληνίδα, καθάριον, enlarged upon later at II 19.15 (= I 88 p.264 Rose) Ἑλληνίδα .. χάριν τοῦ τῇ καλλίστῃ διαλέκτῳ ἐθισθῆναι τὸ τρεφόμενον ὑπ' ὠτὸς ; 'Myia' (loc. cit. 3D6-E1n.) μὴ βάρβαρος ἀλλὰ Ἑλληνίς; cf. Favorinus's complaint about nursemaids 'Plerumque .. externae et barbarae nationis' (Gell. XII 1.17), and note P's similar requirement for the child's companions, below 4A1. Nursemaids known from inscriptions and literature are of both kinds: e.g. Phrygian, Call. Epigr. 50; Egyptians and Thracians preferred by Oribasius, Herzog-Hauser c.1494.56-57; Corinthian, IG II.3 3097; Peloponnesian, IG II.3 3111; Spartan nursemaids especially sought after, Plut. Lyc. 16.4-5 (Alcibiades had one, Lyc. 16.5, Alcib. 1.3). -- πρῶτον μέν leads the reader to expect a second stipulation, which in fact never comes. It is possible, then, that something is missing from the text: Dyroff, p.267 n.1, suggests σπουδαίας ... πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς ἤθεσιν, ⟨ἔτι δ'⟩ Ἑλληνίδας, which however reads rather oddly; better would be some rather longer supplement, such as the following, suggested by Mr D. A. Russell by way of example: πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς ἤθεσιν ⟨σώφρονας ..., εἶτα τῇ

διαλέκτῳ μὴ βαρβάρους ἀλλ') Ἑλληνίδας. But equally, P's further thoughts on the subject may simply have slipped his mind, leaving us with an instance of μέν solitarium (on which see Denniston pp.380-384, especially p.382 on occurrences with πρῶτον or πρῶτα).

3E1-9 -- Children's characters, like their limbs, require to be moulded from the very beginning to grow straight. Children are easily influenced: lessons sink deep into their still tender minds, and leave an impression like seals in soft wax. -- This is the explanation of the great care to be exercised in choosing a nursemaid: it is vitally important that her influence on the impressionable mind of the growing child should be salutary and not corrupting. Cf. Sen. De ira II 21.9 'Pertinebit ad rem praeceptores paedagogosque pueris placidos dari: proximis adplicatur omne quod tenerum est et in eorum similitudinem crescit. Nutricum et paedagogorum retulere mox in adulescentiam mores'; Quint. I 1.5 'Has (sc. nutrices) primum audiet puer, harum verba effingere imitando conabitur, et natura tenacissimi sumus eorum quae rudibus animis percepimus'.

3E1-4 ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς ἀπὸ γενέσεως πλάττειν τῶν τέκνων ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν... τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ τῶν τέκνων ἤθη ῥυθμίζειν προσήκει: This physical analogy for the formation of moral character is Platonic(and indeed occurs in a passage to which P refers shortly below, 3E9-F1): R. II 377C .. καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τοῖς μύθοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερσίν (quoted in context, 3E10-F1n.); cf. Plut. An virt.doc. 439F πρῶτον γὰρ οὗτοι (sc. pedagogues) παραλαμβάνοντες ἐκ γάλακτος, ὥσπερ καὶ τίτθαι ταῖς χερσὶ τὸ σῶμα πλάττουσιν, οὕτω τὸ ἦθος ῥυθμίζουσι τοῖς ἔθεσιν; Quint. I 1.22 'ut corpora ad quosdam membrorum flexus formari nisi tenera non possunt, sic animos quoque ad pleraque duriores robur ipsum facit'. It was believed that the limbs of infants were soft and liable to distortion if

put under strain (Pl. Lg. VII 789E; Soranus Gynaec. II 54 = I 103 Rose; Aristotle quoted below), and massage was therefore practised to ensure that they grew straight (Pl. Alc. I 121D; details in Soranus II 32-34).

3E3 ἵνα τοῦτα ὀρθὰ καὶ εὐστρεβῆ φύηται : (τοῦτα = τὰ μέλη, cf. 3C1-2n.) For εὐστρεβής in this context cf. Arist. Pol. VII 1336a10-12 πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαστρέφεσθαι τὰ μέλη δι' ἀπλότητα χρῶνται καὶ νῦν ἔνια τῶν ἐθνῶν ὀργάνοις τισὶ μηχανικοῖς, ἃ τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖ τῶν τοιούτων εὐστρεπέστερον. Theophrastus uses the word of the timber of various types of trees: HP III 9.2 (twice), V 1.11, 2.1, 3.5 (twice), 5.2, CP II 9.1 (ὀρθὰ καὶ εὐστρεβῆ as here); Plutarch has it at Quaest.conv. 718E (of the surfaces of mirrors) and Ad princ. ind. 780B (of a rule). -- For ῥυθμίζειν meaning 'discipline' cf.e.g. Pl. Phdr. 253B (the only occurrence in Plato) τὰ παιδικὰ πείθοντες καὶ ῥυθμίζοντες ; Plut. Amat. 757F μειρακίων ... καὶ παίδων ἐν ὥρᾳ καὶ ἄνθει πλαττομένων καὶ ῥυθμιζομένων; Ael. VH I 34 παιδεύειν καὶ ῥυθμίζειν ; the word is a favourite with John Chrysostom.

3E5 εὔπλαστον γὰρ καὶ ὑγρὸν ἡ νεότης : For the pliability of youth cf. e.g. Pl. R. II 377A-B; Hor. AP 163 'cereus in vitium flecti'; Sen. Ep. 25.1 'Quadragenarium pupillum cogitas sub tutela tua continere? Respice aetatem eius iam duram et intractabilem: non potest reformari; tenera finguntur', cf. Clem. II 7.2 'aetatem .. emendabilem'. -- For εὔπλαστος cf. e.g. Pl. R. IX 588D, Lg. II 666C (the only two instances in Plato); Arist. Poet. 1455a33, GA III 761a34; Plut. De soll.an. 972F; Ael. NA XVII 9; Callicratidas ap. Stob. IV 28.18. For ὑγρός in the sense of 'pliant, supple' cf. Pl. Tht. 162B τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳ τε καὶ ὑγροτέρῳ ὄντι προσπαλαίειν ; Plut. De ad.et am. 51C, Mar. 28.1, Per. 5.3.

3E5-6 καὶ ταῖς τούτων ψυχαῖς ἁπαλαῖς ἔτι τὰ μαθήματα ἐντήκεται : (τούτων = τῶν παίδων understood from ἡ νεότης immediately preceding.) For the thought cf. e.g. Sen. Cons.Helv. 18.8 'altius praecepta descendunt quae teneris inprimuntur aetatibus', Quint. I 1.5 'natura tenacissimi sumus eorum quae rudibus animis percepimus'. -- For ψυχαῖς ἁπαλαῖς ἔτι cf. Pl. Tht. 173A ἔτι ἁπαλαῖς ψυχαῖς, Phdr. 245A ἁπαλὴν καὶ ἁβατον ψυχήν (cf. Iamb. ap. Stob. II 31.122); Cic. Leg. II 38 'animos teneros atque mollis', cf. I 47; Sen. Ep. 50.4 'teneri et rudes animi'; Quint. I 11.2 'mentem praecipue in aetate prima teneram adhuc et rudem', II 4.5 'teneras adhuc mentes'; Tac. Dial. 29.1 'virides .. et rudes animi'. -- ἐντήκεται means 'sink in' (literally of the infusion of molten metals): cf. S. El. 1311, Pl. Mx. 245D, D.H. VI 72 τὸ δέος ἐντετηκὸς ταῖς ψυχαῖς, D.S. I 83 ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐντέτηκεν ἡ δεισιδαιμονία , Julian Ep. 9 Hertlein (=37 Weis), Ael. fr.247 ἐντήξας αὐτῶν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἰσχὺν λόγων ἅμαχον.

3E6-7 πᾶν δὲ τὸ σκληρὸν χαλεπῶς μαλάττεται: P has characteristically included the obverse of his contention for the sake of completeness, rather to the detriment of the presentation.

3E7-9 καθάπερ γὰρ ⟨αἱ⟩ σφραγῖδες τοῖς ἁπαλοῖς ἐναπομάττονται κηροῖς, οὕτως αἱ μαθήσεις ταῖς τῶν ἔτι παιδίων ψυχαῖς ἐναποτυποῦνται : For the comparison cf. John Chrysostom In Io. hom. 3.1 ἁπαλὴ γὰρ οὖσα (sc. ἡ τῶν παίδων ἡλικία), ταχέως ἐναποτίθεται τὰ λεγόμενα, καθάπερ τινος σφραγῖδος τῆς ἀκροάσεως ἐν κηρῷ τῇ διανοίᾳ τῇ τούτων ἐντυπουμένης. The seal-and-wax image occurs as an illustration of the working of memory at Pl. Tht. 191C-D and Arist. Mem. 450a30-32 (cf. Quint. XI 2.4), and of sense-perception in Arist. De an. II 424a 19-21.

3E9-F6 -- Plato is therefore right to advise that nursemaids should not relate just any sort of stories to their charges, lest their minds should be filled with nonsense from the

outset. And the poet Phocylides does well to urge that childhood is the time for noble conduct to be taught. -- The first of P's classical allusions is to a passage (Pl. R. II 377B-C) which, in its recognition of the susceptibility of young children to the influence of those around them, and particularly nursemaids, is the ultimate source of P's viewpoint in 3E1-9 (cf. especially 3E1-4n., 3E5n.). Of the original context of the Phocylides fragment we know nothing (see West quoted 3F4-6n. for a conjecture). For P, however, it plainly encapsulates the message that since youth is impressionable, it is vital that the early influences brought to bear upon it should be good ones.

3E9-10 καὶ μοι δοκεῖ πλάτων ὁ δαιμόνιος : Cf. 5F2 for another sentence beginning with καὶ μοι δοκεῖ. For the epithet δαιμόνιος applied to Plato cf. Pease on Cic. N.D. II 32 (II p.620): 'Plato is in passages too numerous to cite designated as θεός, θεῖος, θειότατος, δαιμόνιος, ἱερός, ἱερώτατος, θεσπέσιος, divinus, or aetherius, particularly by the Neoplatonists and by various commentators on Aristotle, but frequently also in other authors down to the Renaissance.' Cf. 11D10-E2n. on P's admiration for the Socratic circle, especially Plato and Socrates.

3E10-F1 ἐμμελῶς παραινεῖν ταῖς τίτθαις μηδὲ τοὺς τυχόντας μύθους τοῖς παιδίοις λέγειν: The reference is to Pl. R. II 377B-C, where, at the beginning of a discussion of the early education of his Guardians, Socrates, having posed the question Ἆρ' οὖν ῥᾳδίως οὕτω παρήσομεν τοὺς ἐπιτυχόντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων μύθους πλασθέντας ἀκούειν τοὺς παῖδας; and received the expected negative reply, goes on to propose a censorship of the stories told to infants: πρῶτον δή ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιστατητέον τοῖς μυθοποιοῖς, καὶ ὃν μὲν ἂν καλὸν [μῦθον] ποιήσωσιν, ἐγκριτέον, ὃν δ' ἂν μή, ἀποκριτέον. τοὺς δ' ἐγκριθέντας πείσομεν τάς τροφούς τε καὶ μητέρας λέγειν τοῖς παισίν, καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς μύθοις τοῖς

μῦθοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερσίν· ὧν δὲ νῦν λέγουσι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκβλητέον. It is interesting that P has τίτθαι where Plato has τροφοί; given the distinction noted at 3D9n. it would more likely be the τροφοί who would tell stories to infants to amuse them or put them to sleep; this tends to suggest that P does not observe the technical distinction. For story-telling as a characteristic activity of old women and nursemaids see the references collected by Pease in his note on Cic. N.D. III 12 (II pp.997-998), Headlam on Herodas I 74 (pp.51-52), and Otto, Sprichwörter p.28 s.v. 'anus' 2.

3F1-3 ἵνα μὴ τὰς τούτων ψυχὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀνοίας καὶ διαφθορᾶς ἀναπίμπλασθαι συμβαίνῃ: This is P's own comment, and does not explicitly correspond to anything in the Plato passage. For P's awareness of the risk of moral contagion cf. below 4A1-3 (from playmates), 12D2-4 (from bad companions), 13C3-5 (from undesirable classmates).

3F3-4 κινδυνεύει δὲ καὶ Φωκυλίδης ὁ ποιητὴς καλῶς παραινεῖν: For the use of κινδυνεύω to express possibility or probability (common in Plato) see LSJ s.v. 4b, and for post-classical examples cf. e.g. Plut. De facie 940A, Cato maior 15.5, Lys. 17.5. -- On Phocylides, the Milesian gnomic poet, allegedly a contemporary of Theognis, see M.L. West 'Phocylides', JHS 98 (1978) pp.164-167. Only short fragments of his work survive, but Dio Chrysostom seems to have been familiar with it as late as the first century A.D. (Or. 36), and Plutarch mentions Phocylides at De aud. 45B and quotes a single line at 47E.

3F4-6 λέγων 'χρὴ παῖδ' ἔτ' ἐόντα καλὰ διδάσκειν ἔργα': This is fr.13 Bergk (Poetae Lyrici Graeci, 4th edn., II p.71), fr.15 Diehl (Anthologia Lyrica Graeca, 3rd edn., I p.60); cf. West art. cit. pp.165-166. West comments 'If Phocylides followed his own

advice, he addressed his instruction to a boy, and this fragment may come from an introduction in which he explained why he was instructing him.' The fragment consists of the end of a hexameter and the beginning of another. For unnecessary attempts to produce a single hexameter or pentameter see Bergk's critical notes; (West considers the evidence that Phocylides wrote elegiacs unreliable: refs. art. cit. p.164 n.2). Fabricius 'restored' παῖδ' ἔτ' ἐόντα χρεὼν δὴ καλὰ διδασκέμεν ἔργα, 'e vetustis libris', and was followed by Stephanus and Xylander.

(6) 3F7-4A5: Companions

Chapter 6, a short section on companions, continues the series of human agents whose influence upon the growing child must be monitored to ensure that it is beneficial.

3F7-4A5 The slave-boys who are to be the child's companions and servants must be morally sound, Greek, and clear of speech, so that there may be no question of corruption by contamination. As the proverb says, 'If you live beside a cripple, you will learn to hobble yourself'.

P is thinking here of the vernae, slave-children born into captivity and brought up with the master's own sons: cf. e.g. Jerome Ep. XIV 3.2 'illi cum quibus adolevisti, vernulae'; Blümner p.288; Bonner pp.35-37. That the suitability of these children as companions was regularly discussed by writers on education, like the selection of nursemaids, is a possible inference from the fact that Quintilian handles the same subject, though even more briefly than P: I 1.8 'De pueris inter quos educabitur ille huic spei destinatus, idem quod de nutricibus dictum sit'. (Cf. also Erasmus, De pueris 499A 'Hic etiam referre tradunt quos infantulus habeat collactaneos, quos collusores'.)

Like Quintilian, P has little to say about companions that he has not already said about nursemaids. There is the same concern for moral probity (3F9 σπουδὴν τοὺς τρόπους, cf. 3D10 ὡς ἐνὶ μάλιστα σπουδαίας) and for Hellenic culture (4A1 Ἑλληνικὰ, cf. 3E1 τοὺς ἤθεσιν Ἑλληνίδας). What is new is the emphasis on distinct pronunciation of language (4A1 περιτρανα λαλοῦντα). This is a concern which especially attracted the attention of oratorical writers: cf. Cic. De or. III 45, Brut. 210 'sed magni interest

quos quisque audiat cotidie domi, quibuscum loquatur a puero, quemadmodum patres, paedagogi, matres etiam loquantur'. Quintilian considers it in relation to nursemaids: I 1.4-5 'Ante omnia ne sit vitiosus sermo nutricibus ... Et morum quidem in his haud dubie prior ratio est, recte tamen etiam loquantur. Has primum audiet puer, harum verba effingere imitando conabitur, et natura tenacissimi sumus eorum quae rudibus animis percepimus ... Non adsuescat ergo, ne dum infans quidem est, sermoni qui dediscendus sit.'

On this chapter cf. Kemper pp.94-95.

3F7 οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τοῦτο παραλιπεῖν ἄξιον ἐστιν : a rather mechanical transition-formula; cf. the opening of Ch.11 (8B10-C1) οὐ τοίνυν ἄξιον οὐδὲ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων ἀγωνίαν παρορᾶν.

3F8 τοῖς τροφίμοις : On τρόφιμος = 'the master's son, the young master' see Gomme and Sandbach on Menander, Epitr. fr.1.

3F8-9 σύντροφα : 'their companions'. For σύντροφος cf. e.g. Plut. Agis and Cleom. 29.1, Lyc. 16.7, Pomp. 42.5; Arndt-Gingrich s.v.; 3D3-4n. on συντροφία .

3F9-4A1 πρώτιστα μέν ... ἔτι μέντοι : πρώτιστος , a superlative formed from πρῶτος which is itself effectly a superlative, belongs to the vocabulary of poetry and post-classical prose: see Lobeck on Phrynichus pp.419-420; H.J. Seiler, Griechische Steigerungsformen (Hamburg 1950) p.105; Schmid III p.62, IV p.614; K-B I p.573. -- For ἔτι μέντοι Wyttenbach conjectures εἶτα μέντοι , invoking the frequent confusion of ἔτι and εἶτα . Certainly ἔτι alone would be strange immediately after πρώτιστα μέν (usually it introduces a later item than the second in a series: cf. e.g. X. An. VI 6.13 πρῶτον μέν .. ἔπειτα δέ .. ἔτι δέ , cited by LSJ s.v. II.1); but it may in fact be μέντοι which is felt to answer μέν (cf. Denniston p.409), and ἔτι μέντοι may probably be left unchanged.

4A1 Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ περίτρανα λαλοῦντα: 'Greek and clear of speech'. The necessity for Paton's emendation λαλοῦντα for the mss.' λαλεῖν is open to dispute: since περίτρανος can qualify a personal object (as, e.g., in the Phld. passage referred to below), there seems at least a possibility of taking περίτρανα λαλεῖν (the neuter plural agreeing with τὰ παιδία) as a phrase of the same type as δεινὸς λέγειν (for which cf. K-G II pp.13-14; Schmid II p.57, III p.80). Tempting though the idea may be, it seems impossible to take Ἑλληνικά as well as περίτρανα in association with λαλεῖν (or λαλοῦντα), as Heusinger and Tucker apparently wish to do (the latter translates 'but also that they shall talk Greek, and talk it with good articulation'). -- For περίτρανος (περι - intensive and τρανός 'clear') cf. Antig. Mir. 45; Phld. I p.336 col.XXVII.4 Sudhaus; Porph. In harm. p.195.21 Düring; Synes. Regn. 14; Souda s.v. κομψόν; the adverb occurs in M.Ant. VIII 30, Et.M. 729.31 s.v. σπουδάσεσθαι. Plutarch does not use the word, though Wyttenbach notes the uncompounded adjective at De Is.et Osir. 378A, Quaest.conv. 736B and De Herod.mal. 863E, the adverb at Demosth. 15.6, and the noun τρανότης at Quaest.conv. 720D.

4A1-3 ἵνα μὴ ... ἀποφέρωνται τι τῆς ἐκείνων φαυλότητος : Cf. 12D3-4, where children are to be kept away from bad companions, ἀποφέρονται γάρ τι τῆς τούτων κακίας.

4A1-2 συναναχρωννύμενοι βαρβάροις καὶ τὸ ἦθος μοχθηροῖς : The participle means 'infected': cf. Plut. De soll.an. 975E (land animals affected by contact with man) συναναχρωννύμενα τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις ἤθεσιν. The middle has an active sense at Plut. Agis and Cleom. 10.5: Lycurgus expelled foreigners from Sparta, τοὺς βίους κρίνων καὶ τοὺς τρόπους δεδιώς, μὴ συναναχρωννύμενοι τοῖς πολίταις τρυφῆς καὶ μαλακίας καὶ πλεονεξίας ἐντέκωσι ζῆλον. The verb is quite a rare one. -- Linked with τὸ ἦθος μοχθηροῖς,

βάρβαρος has a clearly pejorative connotation which recurs at 4A8 below; cf. also τριβάρβαρος at 14B5-6. (Dyroff, however, oversteps the mark when he writes (p.292) of P's personal antipathy towards barbarians.) -- For P's awareness of the danger of moral contagion cf. 3F1-3 above (nursemaids), 12D2-4 (bad companions), and 13C3-5 (undesirable classmates); for the idea in general cf. with Wyttenbach Sen. De ira III 8.1, De tranq. 7.3-4, Ep. 7.7 and see passages quoted at 4A4-5n.

4A3 καὶ οἱ παροιμιαζόμενοι δέ φασιν : For οἱ παροιμιαζόμενοι meaning 'people who quote proverbs' cf. Pl. Tht. 162C, Hp.ma. 301C; Arist. EN V 1129b29; Plut. De garrul. 503F; [Plut.] Apophth.Lac. 239A; Lucian 70.69; Ath. X 427F. -- For καί ... δέ see Denniston pp.200-202.

4A4 οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου λέγοντες : 'and what they say is not beside the point'. For the phrase οὐκ (sometimes οὐδέν) ἀπὸ τρόπου cf. e.g. Pl. Phdr. 278D, Tht. 143C, R. V 470B; and (with Wyttenbach, n. on De aud. 45A) Plut. Mor. 45A, 636E, 671F, 738C, Caes. 57.4, Cimon 4.10 Lucull. 3.7, Marius 11.11; D.Chr. 36.57.

4A4-5 ἂν χωλῷ παροικήσῃς, ὑποσκάζειν μαθήσῃ : The proverb is preserved in at least three slightly different forms. (a) Apostolius II 94 (CPG II p.286) clearly derives his version from the present passage: ἂν χωλῷ παροικήσῃς, ὑποσκάζειν μαθήσῃ· ὅτι οἱ βαρβάροις καὶ μοχθηροῖς συναναστρωννύμενοι ἀποφέρονταί τι τῆς ἐκείνων φαυλότητος. (b) Macarius VI 90 (CPG II p.200) has παρὰ χωλὸν οἰκῶν κἂν ἐπισκάζειν μαθήσῃ (where Leutsch would read κώτους and μάθοις). (c) Schol. on Pindar Nem. 7.127c (Drachmann III pp. 134-135) has χωλῷ παροικεῖς, κἂν ἐνὶ σκάζειν μάθοις, which has been emended as follows: χωλῷ παροικῶν (Schott), κἂν ὑποσκάζειν μάθοις (Boeckh). For the figurative and metaphorical uses of χωλός see Headlam on Herodas 1.71, and cf. 2B1-2n. -- The influence upon him

of the company a man keeps is a common theme in Greek writers from early times: cf. e.g. Alcman fr.123 Page μέγα γείτονι γείτων ; Antiphon VS 87 B 62 οἴῳ τις ἂν τὸ πλεῖστον τῆς ἡμέρας συνῇ, τοιοῦτον ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι καὶ αὐτὸν τοὺς τρόπους ; E. fr. 609.1-2 ὁ γὰρ ξυνὼν κακὸς μὲν ἦν τύχῃ τεχνῶν/ τοιοῦσδε τοὺς ξυνόντας ἐκπαιδεύεται ; Men. Mon. 274 κακοῖς ὁμιλῶν αὐτὸς ἐκβήσῃ κακός, fr. 218 Körte φθείρουσιν ἤθη χρήσθ' ὁμιλίαι κακαί.

(7) 4A6-5C5: Pedagogues and teachers

Chapter 7 takes the child's educational development one step further with a discussion of the appointment of adults to take charge of him once he is old enough to go to school. A short section of the chapter is devoted to the pedagogue who will supervise his behaviour and escort him to and from school; a much longer chapter deals with the appointment of a teacher; finally P enlarges, in admonitory vein, on the consequences of parental neglect in these important matters of children's education.

First then the pedagogue:

4A6-B6 When children are old enough to require a pedagogue, great care should be taken, in appointing one, to avoid the mistake of entrusting them to a barbarous or worthless slave. By a ludicrous error of judgement, many parents employ their good slaves as farmers, captains, traders, stewards or moneylenders, and put their sons in the charge of a slave who is useless for any other occupation; whereas the good pedagogue should be like Phoenix, the pedagogue of Achilles.

Next the teacher:

4B6-C4 Most important of all, teachers should be chosen who are both morally impeccable and experienced. A sound education is the fountain and root of virtue, and a good teacher's precepts help a child's moral character to grow straight just as a farmer's vine-props help his vines.

4C4-D7 Some contemptible fathers, however, entrust their children to worthless teachers whom they have not vetted, either through ignorance and inexperience or, worse, in full awareness of the teachers' unsuitability, yielding to flattery or the importunities of friends -- an act as foolish as if a friend's urging were to cause a man to reject a doctor who could cure him of an illness and call in

a lethally incompetent quack, or to engage a bad captain in preference to a good one.

4D7-E7 Just imagine a father who would give the granting of a favour priority over his sons' education! No wonder Socrates of old wished to denounce the Athenians from the highest point of the city for devoting all their efforts to accumulating wealth while neglecting the sons who would inherit it. I would add that the action of such parents is like caring for the shoe and neglecting the foot.

4E7-5A5 Some fathers go so far in this penny-pinching neglect of their children that they actually appoint worthless teachers to save money, securing for their sons a cheap ignorance. Aristippus derided just such a witless father, who exclaimed that he could buy a slave for the price of the fee Aristippus demanded to educate his son: 'Then you will have two slaves', said the philosopher, 'your son and the one you buy.' In general, is it not outrageous to teach children the use of the right hand at table, but make no provision for them to hear right and wholesome discourse?

Finally the distressing consequences of neglect:

5A6-B10 And what are the results of this neglect? When the sons grow into undisciplined and dissolute young men, their fathers are visited by regret and dismay at their misconduct. Some of them take up with pernicious flatterers and parasites; others buy expensive courtesans out of service; others become gluttons or gamble and revel their way to ruin; some get into even more serious trouble, risking their lives in adulterous affairs.

5B10-C5 If however they had gone to school with a philosopher they might have learned, in line with Diogenes' advice, to buy the same pleasures at a cheaper price.

Teachers and schools play by modern standards a surprisingly

small part in the De liberis educandis; teachers, for example, are discussed only in this chapter and at 9C9-D7. The explanation is not difficult to find: it lies in the treatise's concentration in the true Greek tradition on moral education, for which the school was not the main focus (see Marrou pp.224-226).

It may be as well, then, to recall briefly the various stages of education which a Greek boy could expect to go through. The first master, to whom he went at the age of about seven (cf. 4A6-7n.), was the γραμματιστής, who presided over the ancient equivalent of the primary school and taught reading, writing and counting (see Marrou pp.218-242). As soon as he could read and write fluently, the child then moved on to the second stage of education, which consisted mainly of literary studies under the tuition of the γραμματικός (see Marrou pp.243-279). Finally he would proceed to the study of higher subjects such as rhetoric or philosophy (see Marrou pp.280-322) under the supervision of appropriate instructors.

Public provision for education being the exception rather than the rule, the arrangements for a child's schooling were normally left to the individual initiative of parents, and it is to them that P addresses his plea for a careful and sensible selection of pedagogues and teachers. Both the trend of his remarks and the other available evidence (cf. e.g. 4A6-B6n., 4C4-D7n.) suggest that fathers did not always discharge their responsibilities well in this respect, and P is at pains to warn them of the ill effects (characteristically analysed in moral terms) which are likely to result from a failure to heed his advice. His tone is one of earnest admonition throughout, rising at times to a higher emotional pitch which seems to indicate a significant measure of personal commitment to what he is writing (see e.g. 4A9-10,

4C4-7, 4D7-9, and cf. 4F3, 5A6-7).

4A6-B6 -- When children are old enough to require a pedagogue, great care should be taken, in appointing one, to avoid the mistake of entrusting them to a barbarous or worthless slave. By a ludicrous error of judgement, many parents employ their good slaves as farmers, captains, traders, stewards or moneylenders, and put their sons in the charge of a slave who is useless for any occupation; whereas the good pedagogue should be like Phoenix, the pedagogue of Achilles. -- The pedagogue (on whom see E. Schuppe in RE s.v. 'Paidagogos'; O. Navarre in D-S s.v. 'Paedagogus'; Marrou pp.220-221; Beck, Greek Education pp.105-109; Bonner pp.38-40) was a personal attendant who accompanied his charge to and from school (Schuppe c.2376) and exercised a general supervision of his behaviour both at home and in the public streets (Schuppe cc.2377-78). As with nurse-maid, playmates and teacher (below), P's concern is mainly with the pedagogue's moral qualities (contrast Quintilian I 1.8-9 on the desirable intellectual endowments). No doubt this is partly for the same reason as before: the impressionable age of the young child; but the pedagogue's additional responsibility for protecting the child's morals in public and for fending off unwelcome attentions (Pl. Smp. 183C, Kroll in RE s.v. 'Knabenliebe' c.902.23-28) made it especially desirable to appoint one who would not neglect or abuse his position of trust (cf. Petron. Sat. 85-86). Hence the importance, emphasised also by Plutarch, De amic.mult. 94C, of choosing carefully. In practice, however, as P and others complain, the choice of a pedagogue seems often to have been assigned a low priority by many fathers, whom economic motives made reluctant to appoint a slave who was fit for lucrative employment in another capacity (Schuppe c.2377, Navarre pp.272b-273a): cf. Pl. Alc. I 122A-B (Socrates speaking)

σοι δ', ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, Περικλῆς ἐπέστησε παιδαγωγῶν τῶν οἰκετῶν τὸν ἀχρειότατον ὑπὸ γήρως, Ζώπυρον τὸν Θρῆκα; Hieronymus fr.19 Wehrli διὸ καὶ τὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐργαστῶν ἀποδοκιμασθέντα, τοῦτον ἐπὶ παιδαγωγίᾳ καθιστάτωσαν, τὰ φύσει πρωτότατα τοῖς εὐτελεστάτοις διδόντες. ὅθεν καὶ Περικλῆς, οἰκέτου ποτὲ πεσόντος ἀπὸ ἐλαίας καὶ τὸ σκέλος συντρίψαντος· "νέος ἄρα," ἔφη "παιδαγωγὸς πέφυκεν", οὐκ ἀπιθάνως τῆς ὑπουργίας τὴν ἀτιμίαν σκώψας; Tacitus, Dial. 29.1 'at nunc natus infans delegatur Graeculae alicui ancillae, cui adiungitur unus aut alter ex omnibus servis, plerumque vilissimus nec cuiquam serio ministerio adcommodatus.'

4A6-7 ἐπειδὰν ... ἡλικίαν λάβωσιν ὑπὸ παιδαγωγοῖς τετάχθαι: Boys began to need a pedagogue when they started to go to school, and remained under his supervision until adolescence or early manhood (Schuppe c.2378.19-31; cf. 12A8-10). The pseudo-Platonic Axiochus (366D) gives the normal age of starting school as 7, which was the age under which, according to Quintilian (I 1.15-16), some writers were of the opinion that no application to lessons was to be expected. Plato (Prt. 325C) and Xenophon (Lac. 2.1) say merely that a child was sent to school as soon as he could understand what was said to him; though Plato also indicates (Prt. 326C) that the children of the rich began their schooling earlier and finished it later than the sons of poorer families. The reforming ideas of philosophers are something different. Plato's ideal of 10 (Lg. VII 809E) is clearly an innovation; Aristotle would expect no application from children under 5 (Pol. VII 1336a23-25), and assumes that they will not be allowed out of the home before 7 (1336b35-37); Chrysippus apparently wanted education to start at 3 or even before (fr.733, SVF III p.183 = Quint. I 1.16). Cf. generally Schuppe c.2375.43-64. -- For ἡλικίαν λαμβάνειν cf. periphrases

with λαμβάνω in LSJ s.v. A II.3.

4A7-8 τῆς τούτων κατασταίσεως : 'their appointment': see LSJ s.v. κατάστασις I.2. For τούτων cf. 3C1-2n.

4A8 ὡς μὴ λάβωσιν: sc. οἱ πατέρες, with change of subject.

4A8-9 ἀνδραπόδοις ἢ βαρβάροις ἢ πλημβόλοις : 'to slaves who are either uncivilised or rejects'. Translations usually make three categories (thus, e.g., Babbitt: 'to slaves taken in war or to barbarians or to those who are unstable'); but it seems hardly possible to take ἀνδραπόδοις on its own like this, since (a) the word can scarcely mean 'slaves' as opposed to free men here, since pedagogues were almost always slaves (for the rare exceptions see Schuppe c.2382.19-38), and there is no evidence that P wishes to challenge this convention; (b) though ἀνδράποδον is undoubtedly a less complimentary word than δοῦλος (Schmidt, Synonymik IV pp.126-127), the context will not support the meaning 'bad slave' as opposed to 'good slave', or even 'slave captured in war' as opposed to 'home-bred slave'. On the other hand, it is the word one would expect where the noun 'slave' is to be qualified by two derogatory adjectives. -- For βαρβάροις cf. P's requirements for nursemaids (3E1 τὰς ἤθεσιν Ἑλληνίσας) and playmates (4A1 Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ περίτροφα λαλοῦντα). Pedagogues were in fact often of barbarian origin (Pl. Lys. 223A παιδαγωγοί... ὑποβαρβαρίζοντες , cf. Aristid. 2.380 Behr; Hieronymus fr. 19 Wehrli: (fathers) βαρβάροις παραβαλόντες ⟨τοὺς παῖδας⟩ παιδαγωγοῖς καὶ τούτων ἀκούειν κελεύσαντες ἱκανῶς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι νομίζουσιν), and in artistic representations they frequently have barbarian features and dress (Schuppe c.2379.35 ff.; Navarre p.237a). -- πλήμβολος, applied to slaves, apparently has the semi-technical sense 'sold again and again' (because successive

owners wish to get rid of him), cf. Pollux III 125 (ὁ .. πολλάκις πραθείς), Harpocration s.v. (ὁ πολλάκις ἐμπολῇ μετεβεβλημένος). The word is also used in a more general sense, 'worthless': once only in Plato, Lg. IV 705A; Aeschin. 2.40; Men. fr.379 Körte; D. Chr. 31.36, 37; Plut. De gen.Socr. 595A, Alcib. 14.12, Crass. 21.1, Marius 30.2; Aristid. I p.665 Dind.; Them. 21.247B; Aristaenet. I 28.

4A9-10 ἐπεὶ νῦν γε τὸ γινόμενον πολλοῖς ὑπερκατεγέλαστόν ἐστι : This sentence seems to echo Aeschines 3.192 τὸ δὲ νυνὶ γινόμενον πρᾶγμα ὑπερκατεγέλαστόν ἐστιν as Heusinger noted. The adjective ὑπερκατεγέλαστος apparently occurs only in these two passages. -- For ἐπεί = 'nam' see Wyttenbach on De aud. 37E. νῦν here probably means 'as things are', contrasting the actual state of affairs with what ought to be; Wyttenbach is surely wrong to contend that it can have this and the temporal sense simultaneously. In addition to X. Mem. II 10.4; Isoc. 5.124, 7.54 quoted by him, cf. also 7.40, 15.143, 283 (all the Isoc. examples are of ἐπεὶ νῦν γε).

4A10-B2 τῶν γὰρ δούλων τῶν σπουδαίων τοὺς μὲν γεωργοὺς ἀποδεικνύουσι , τοὺς δὲ ναυκλήρους τοὺς δ' ἐμπόρους τοὺς δ' οἰκονόμους τοὺς δὲ δανειστάς: Good slaves are employed as farmers, captains, traders, stewards or moneylenders. Some of these are more familiar than others as slave-occupations. For farmers see W.L. Westermann, The slave systems of Greek and Roman antiquity (Philadelphia 1955), index s.v. 'agriculture'. The γεωργός would farm a plot of his master's land and live on it, often with a slave-wife. Captains and traders are closely similar: for the distinction, where one is made, see H. Knorringa, Emporos (Amsterdam 1926) pp.96-97; H. Bolkestein and E.J. Jonkers, Economic life in Greece's golden age (Leiden 1958) p.83 ' .. merchants sometimes established a slave in the cities where they carried on business to take care of their interests.

They naturally had a more independent position; they likewise often appointed a slave as a skipper and made him trade for them!, cf. pp. 88, 118. Lampis in Demosthenes 34 seems to have been a ναύκληρος of this type. The post of house- or estate-steward was commonly filled by a slave: cf. e.g. the negligent ἐπίτροπος whom Archytas takes to task at 10D3-6. Moneylending is a less familiar slave occupation, but not unknown: cf. e.g. IG 2^2 1554.69 (latter half of 4th cent. BC), Philo 34.35, Plut. De vit.a.al. 828F-829A. The slaves in most of the categories of employment which P mentions would be δοῦλοι μεθοφοροῦντες (see Westermann p.12, Schulthess in RE s.v. μεθοφοροῦντες) who enjoyed some measure of independence and responsibility and would undoubtedly be chosen from the better sort of slaves.

4B3 ἀνδρίποδον οἰνόληπτον καὶ λίκνον: οἰνόληπτος is apparently a hapax, coined on the analogy of θεόληπτος, φαρβόληπτος etc. (for other adjectives in -λημτος see Kretschmer and Locker, Rückläufiges Wörterbuch p.503). For λίκνος see 3A5-6 n.

4B4 φέροντες ὑποβάλλουσι : For the participle of φέρω with a finite verb cf. e.g. 5D4 φέρουσα προσήνεγκε, Longinus 36.2, 43.3, and instances from Plutarch collected by Wyttenbach in his note ad loc.

4B5-6 δεῖ δὲ τὸν σπουδαῖον παιδαγωγὸν τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὴν φύσιν οἷόσπερ ἦν ὁ Φοίνιξ ὁ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως παιδαγωγός: This sentence makes an abrupt and rather feeble end to the discussion of the pedagogue, much as if P were reproducing some passage from his reading in unseasonably abbreviated form. Homer's Phoenix at Iliad IX 442-443 describes his appointment by Peleus to teach Achilles to be 'a speaker of words and a doer of deeds' (a passage often referred to by later writers: cf. e.g. X. Smp.

8.23; Cic. De or. III 57; Quint. II 3.12, 17.8); and a little later (485-495) he recalls the close mutual affection which existed between himself and Achilles when the latter was a child, and all the services which he willingly performed for his young charge. P is thus able to use the example of Phoenix in support of his contention that a pedagogue should be a fit and reliable person for the job, and not a misfit suitable for nothing else. Cf. Dyroff p.291; Glaeser pp.38-39; Sizoo pp.37-38. See further on Phoenix articles by E. Wüst in RE s.v. 'Phoinix' 3 and Türk in Roscher's Lexicon s.v. -- For the anachronism of styling Phoenix Achilles' pedagogue (the word παιδαγωγός does not occur before Herodotus VII 75.1) cf. Pl. R. III 390E τὸν τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως παιδαγωγὸν Φοίνικα (where note Plato's unfavourable criticism of Phoenix); Plut. Alex. 5.8, 24.10; D.Chr. 2.15; Clem.Al. Paed. I 7.55.1 Ἀχιλλέως .. παιδαγωγὸν τὸν Φοίνικα φασὶ γεγονέναι .

4B6-C4 -- Most important of all, teachers should be chosen who are both morally impeccable and experienced. A sound education is the fountain and root of virtue, and a good teacher's precepts help a child's moral character to grow straight just as a farmer's vine-props help his vines. -- On teachers see Girard pp.241-252; Ziebarth pp.112-123; Marrou pp.222-224; Beck, Greek Education pp.111-126. P's overwhelming concern with the prospective teacher's morals and relative indifference to other qualifications (hinted at only in the passing reference to ἐμπειρίαι , 4B10) is in keeping with the primacy he gives to moral matters throughout the De liberis educandis. Nevertheless, it is clearly more than just a personal preference: Quintilian shares his preoccupation with the character of the teacher (I 2.5 'praeceptorem eligere sanctissimum quemque'; II 2.3 'sanctitas docentis'; II 2.5 'ipse nec habeat vitia nec ferat'), and in practice it seems that professional qualifications were not usually demanded (cf. Ziebarth pp.120-121; Marrou p.224 and

p.556 n.12).

4B6-8 τὸ δὲ πάντων μέγιστον καὶ κυριώτατον τῶν εἰρημένων ἔρχομαι φράσων: Cf. 8C10-D1 ἀλλ' ὅπερ πάντων ἐστὶ κυριώτατον τῶν εἰρημένων σπεύδω λέγειν, Plut. Lyc. 29.2 ὃ δὲ κυριώτατόν ἐστι καὶ μέγιστον. P may in fact have some justification for claiming an overriding importance for the remarks on teachers which follow: in terms of space taken up they certainly dominate the chapter; but all too often elsewhere he uses announcements of this kind as mere transition formulae, where the emphasis imparted is belied by the relative triviality of the new subject which follows: cf. e.g. 5D6, 7E5-6, 9D8, 10B1-2, 11C5; and see Dyroff p.293, Glaeser p.5 n.1. -- ἔρχομαι φράσων is Herodotean (I 194.1; II 11.1; III 6.1; VI 109.4), as are other periphrastic futures with ἔρχομαι: see K-G II p.61; Powell's Lexicon to Herodotus s.v. ἔρχομαι 6b; Ek, Herodotismen pp.45-47, to whose instances from later writers (Pl. Euthphr. 2C, Phd. 100B, Ion 533C, Tht. 180C, R. V 449A, VIII 562C; X. Ages. 2.7; Lucian 44.1, 59.18) may be added Pl. Tht. 198E; D.Chr. 38.6; Lucian 59.39, 70.15; Aristid. 26.42 Keil; Ael. NA IX 8.

4B8-9 οἳ καὶ τοῖς βίοις εἶεν ἀδιάβλητοι καὶ τοῖς τρόποις ἀνεπίληπτοι: These two stipulations add up to more or less the same thing: complete moral impeccability. For ἀδιάβλητος cf. e.g. Arist. EN VIII 1157a21, 1158b9. For ἀνεπίληπτος meaning 'blameless' cf. e.g. Philo 30.24; I Ep.Ti. 3.2, 5.7, 6.14; D.Chr. 11.66; Lucian 28.8, 45.81.

4B9-10 καὶ τοῖς ἐμπειρίαις ἄριστοι: This is the nearest P comes to mentioning the professional qualifications which a teacher should have.

4B10-C1 πηγὴ γὰρ καὶ ῥίζα κακοκαθίας τὸ νομίμου τυχεῖν παιδείας: Like most Greek writers, P is not afraid to mix his

metaphors; Philo (17.116) goes one step further and has πηγὴ καὶ ῥίζα καὶ θεμέλιοι . (For ῥίζα cf. the famous passage I Ep.Ti. 6.10 ῥίζα γὰρ πάντων τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν ἡ φιλαργυρία.) -- καλοκαγαθία is no doubt synonymous for P with the moral virtue which is his educational ideal: cf. e.g. Arist. EE VII 1249a16 ἔστιν οὖν καλοκαγαθία ἀρετὴ τέλειος , and Musonius' definition of philosophy as καλοκαγαθίας ἐπιτήδευσις (fr.4 p.19, fr.8 p.38 Hense). See J. Jüthner, ' article 'Kalokagathia' in Charisteria Alois Rzach zum achtzigsten Geburtstag dargebracht (Reichenberg 1930) pp.99-119, especially p.109. (For καλοκαγαθία as an educational ideal in its earlier classical sense see Marrou pp.84-86.) -- On the adjective νόμιμος see 1B7n. and cf. 5C8-9 and Philo 18.88 where it again qualifies παιδεία .

4C1-4 καθάπερ τὰς χάρακας τοῖς φυτοῖς οἱ γεωργοὶ παριστάσιν ...: The analogy of plants with growing children is a common and ancient one found in both poetry and prose: cf. e.g. LSJ s.v. ἔρνος II; Il. XVIII 56-57; Od. XIV 175; Hp. Nat.puer. 27; Lucian 37.20; Fuhrmann pp.120-121; 9B6-9 below. -- τὰς χάρακας , the reading adopted by modern editors since Fabricius, has no manuscript support (pace Fabricius and Paton). Rather it seems to be an emendation designed to bring τοὺς χάρακας, the unanimous reading of the mss., into line with the grammarians' rule that χάραξ is masculine when it means a stake in a palisade or fortification, but feminine when, as here, it means a vine-prop (Pollux I 162; Phryn. 43 and PS p.125 de Borries; Souda s.v.; Eust. 1390 on Od. I 53). Late writers, however, do not always observe this rule (Rutherford on Phrynichus, p.137; LSJ s.v. χάραξ , end), and there is thus no obligation to accept an emendation to P's text here.

4C2-4 οὕτως οἱ νόμιμοι τῶν διδασκάλων ἐπιμελεῖς τὰς

ὑποθήκας καὶ παραινέσεις παραπηγνύουσι τοῖς νέοις : P's choice of verb maintains the vine-prop metaphor: cf. Pollux I 224 κάρρα παραπήξασθαι ταῖς ἀμπέλοις. For the image cf. Plut. De aud. poet. 15D ὀρθῷ τινι λογισμῷ παρισταμένους καὶ κατασβέννυσι (sc. τοὺς νέους). -- On νόμιμος (cf. 4B10-C1 above: νομίμου παιδείας) see 1B7 n.; and on ὑποθήκας καὶ παραινέσεις 8D8-9 n.

4C4 ἵν' ὀρθὰ τούτων βλαστάνῃ τὰ ἤθη : τούτων = τῶν νέων, cf. 3C1-2 n. -- Cf. 3E1-4 on moral 'straightness'.

4C4-D7 -- Some contemptible fathers, however, entrust their children to worthless teachers whom they have not vetted, either through ignorance and inexperience or, worse, in full awareness of the teachers' unsuitability, yielding to flattery or the importunities of friends -- an act as foolish as if a friend's urging were to cause a man to reject a doctor who could cure him of an illness and call in a lethally incompetent quack, or to engage a bad captain in preference to a good one. -- Once again, but more vehemently this time, P takes issue with the way in which some parents neglect their children's educational interests or subordinate them to selfish and unworthy concerns. In the absence of public provision for schooling, which was the exception rather than the rule, engaging a teacher for his sons was entirely the father's own responsibility. Teaching as a profession was poorly paid, enjoyed scant respect, and was the proverbial resort of those who were down on their luck (Girard pp.241-245; Marrou pp.222-224; Beck, Greek Education pp.111-114; though cf. Ziebarth pp.116 ff.). Good teachers may therefore not always have been easy to find, and there were no doubt some parents who were distressingly casual about seeking one out. The particular vice on which P focuses here is the inability or refusal to select the best teacher for fear of hurting a friend's feelings. This is mentioned by Plutarch as one of the symptoms

of δυσωπία in his essay on the subject (De vit.pud. 532A), where, most interestingly, the example of the incompetent doctor also occurs, as here (4D4-6): καὶ γὰρ ἰατρὸν νοσοῦντες οὐ παρακαλοῦμεν τὸν ἔμπειρον αἰσχυνόμενοι τὸν συνήθη, καὶ πολὺ διδασκάλους ἀντὶ τῶν χρηστῶν τοὺς παρακαλοῦντας αἱρούμεθα. Some connection between the two passages seems not improbable, either directly or through some common source.

4C4-5 νῦν δέ τις κἂν καταπτύσειε τῶν πατέρων ἐνίων: Cf. 9C9 ἄξιον δ' ἐπιτιμᾶν τῶν πατέρων ἐνίοις. For the verb, indicating strong contempt, cf. Ar. Ra. 1179; D. 18.200 τίς οὐκὰν κατέπτυσεν ἂν σοῦ; Aeschin. 2.23, 3.73; Lucian 19.12, 24.30. Notice Cobet's conjecture (comparing D. 18.200) νῦν δὲ τίς οὐκ ἂν καταπτύσειε ..;

4C5 πρὶν δοκιμάσαι τοὺς μέλλοντας διδάσκειν : 'without first vetting the prospective teachers.' It emerges later that P favours not only a careful initial choice, but also a continuing check on the teacher's performance once he has been appointed (9D1-3).

4C7 ἀνθρώπους ἀδοκίμοις καὶ παρακιβδήλοις : παράσημος is properly used adulterated or counterfeit coinage: cf. e.g. D. 24.213, Plut. De ad. et am. 65B νόμισμα παράσημον, Pollux III 86. For its metaphorical application to people see A. Ag. 780; E. Hipp. 1115; Ar. Ach. 517-518 ἀνδρία μοχθηρά, παρακεκομμένα, / ἄτιμα καὶ παράσημα καὶ πρόξενα ; D. 18.242 παράσημος ῥήτωρ ; and cf. 1B8 n.

4C8 καὶ οὔπω τοῦτ' ἔστι κατάγελαστον : οὔπω is logical, not temporal: it contrasts the excusable error just mentioned with the really reprehensible case which follows. Cf. e.g. Musonius pp. 19.2, 39.15, 68.2 Hense.

4C9 ἐκεῖνο δ' ἐσχάτως ἄτοπον : 'but the following instance is completely outrageous'. For this meaning of ἄτοπος see LSJ s.v. 3, Lampe s.v. 2.

4C9 τὸ ποῖον ; The same question occurs at 1D6, where see note.

4C10 ἀκουόμενοι ἢ ἄλλων φασκόντων τοῦτο λεγόντων : ἀκουόμενοι ἢ ἄλλων is very plausibly restored by Wilamowitz and Wegehaupt in place of the impossible ἀκουομένοις μᾶλλον of the mss. The resulting contrast of autopsy and report is a common one in Greek.

4D1-2 ὅρα τούτοις ἐπιτρέπουσι τοὺς παῖδας : On τούτοις see 3C1-2n.

4D2-3 οἱ μὲν τῆς τῶν ἀρεσκευομένων ἡττώμενοι κολακείας : For the rare verb ἀρεσκεύεσθαι, meaning 'to be obsequious', cf. Clearchus fr.19, p.15.5 Wehrli; M.Ant. V 5, XI 14; Hsch. s.v. ἀρεσκομένων, from the much commoner ἀρέσκομαι, has predictably replaced it in all but a handful of mss.

4D3 ἄλλοι δ' οἱ καὶ δεομένοις χαριζόμενοι φίλοις : It is not clear whether the friends here (and the flatterers of 4D2-3) are would-be teachers trying to raise custom for themselves or just unofficial agents putting in a good word for some third party. That teachers went in for self-advertisement is clear from the Plutarch passage quoted above, 4C4-D7n., and the fierce competition for pupils which went on between academics in later antiquity is well documented (cf. e.g. A.F. Norman on Libanius Or. 1.16, pp.151-152).

4D3-7 παράλογον ποιοῦντες ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις κτλ.: By a device much favoured also by Plutarch and other writers the foolishness of a familiar practice is exposed by comparing it with a hypothetical parallel whose absurdity is more immediately apparent; cf. also 4E5-7, 5A2-5, and for the introduction παράλογον ποιοῦντες ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις cf. e.g. Isoc. 10.10, 15.2; [Isoc.] Ad Demon. 27. -- P is putting a very high premium on the choice of a teacher when he compares it to the selection of a

physician or a ship's captain, to both of whom one entrusts one's life and safety. These two, the doctor and the captain, occur, often together, in illustrations and analogies of all kinds. See Pease on Cic. Div. I 24, N.D. III 76; A.C. van Geytenbeek, Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe (Assen 1963) pp.36-37; and cf. Arist. Pol. VII 1324b29-31; SVF III 225; Cic. Cluent. 57; Sen. Ep. 75.6; Musonius fr. 2 (pp.6.18-7.3 Hense), fr. 5 (pp.20.6-21.2); Galen Protr. 2 (pp.104.22-105.2 Marquardt), 10 (p.118.12-15).

4D3-5 τὸν σὺν ἐπιστήμῃ δυνηθέντα εὖσαι : This is the only occurence of σύν in the De lib.educ., where its rarity corresponds with Plutarchan usage (cf. e.g. one instance each in De aud. (47D), De glor.Ath. (374C) and De tranq.an. (476F), none at all in De la.ips. or De superst.). Even in classical usage the preposition is practically confined to the tragic poets and Xenophon (K-G I p.467n.), the commoner word in comedy and prose being μετά.

4D5-6 τὸν δι' ἀπειρίαν ἀπολέσοντα [ἄν] αὐτόν : The deletion of ἄν was proposed by Wilamowitz; all mss. have the word, and a minority have the aorist participle ἀπολέσαντα instead of the future, which looks like a regularisation of an unfamiliar construction. In fact ἀπολέσοντα ἄν, which is both the most difficult reading and the main tradition, can and should be retained. Ἄν with the future tense (including participles) does occur even in late prose (e.g. Galen, Lucian) though it is somewhat rare. For the use with a participle see K-G I p.42; for ἄν with the future in general see also Schwyzer II p.352, and add to the periodical literature listed there M.D. Macleod, CQ 6 (1956) pp.102-111; A.C. Hulton, CQ 7 (1957) pp.139-142; A.C. Moorhouse, CQ 9 (1959) pp.78-79. Macleod (pp.110-111) thinks that Lucian and Galen may have picked up this usage from Plato;

the same might easily apply to P.

4D6-7 ἢ ναύκληρον τὸν ἄριστον ἀφεὶς τουτουῒ δοκιμάσειε: Cf. Teles fr. 3 (p.26.5-6 Hense) ὥσπερ εἰ τὸν ἄριστον ἰατρὸν ἀφέντες φαρμακοπώλην εἵλοντο. -- τουτουῒ (i.e. τὸν δι' ἀπειρίαν ἀπολέσοντα ἂν αὐτόν) is a conjecture of Paton's. Most mss. have τοῦτον; the τὸν χείριστον and τὸν ἀδόκιμον (with ἕλητκι for δοκιμάσειε) which others read look like conjectural attempts to supply the required sense. If the fault is merely corruption, Paton may be right; but if omission is involved as well, there can be little hope of recovering the true text.

4D7-E7 -- Just imagine a father who would give the granting of a favour priority over his sons' education! No wonder Socrates of old wished to denounce the Athenians from the highest point of the city for devoting all their efforts to accumulating wealth while neglecting the sons who would inherit it. I would add that the action of such parents is like caring for the shoe and neglecting the foot. -- As happens not infrequently in the De lib.educ., P's anecdote here is somewhat out of harmony with its context. He has exclaimed over the irresponsibility of fathers who put favours to friends before the best interests of their children's education. The Socrates episode is introduced as if it were meant to confirm the folly of such behaviour; but instead it directs attention to a new complaint, which P pursues down to 5A2, about fathers who give their children's education second place after the love of money. Thus although parental neglect of education remains his theme, there is some internal incoherence and inconsistency in the manner in which he handles it. -- P is drawing for the Socrates episode upon the (?pseudo-)Platonic Clitopho 407A ff., as is shown by similarities of wording and phrasing (note especially

the anastrophic πέρι). In that passage, Clitopho is addressing Socrates: .. καὶ μοι ἐδόκεις παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους κάλλιστα λέγειν, ὁπότε ἐπιτιμῶν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ μηχανῆς τραγικῆς θεός, ὕμνεις λέγων "ποῖ φέρεσθε, ὦνθρωποι; καὶ ἀγνοεῖτε οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων πράττοντες, οἵτινες χρημάτων μὲν περὶ τὴν πόλιν σπουδὴν ἔχετε ὅπως ὑμῖν ἔσται, τῶν δ' υἱέων οἷς ταῦτα παραδώσετε ὅπως ἐπιστήσονται χρῆσθαι δικαίως τούτοις, οὔτε διδασκάλους αὐτοῖς εὑρίσκετε τῆς δικαιοσύνης" κτλ. P's version, however, contains some puzzling distortions which suggest that he remembered his source only imperfectly. (i) In the Clitopho Socrates does not announce that he would like 'if possible' to rebuke the Athenians in the fashion described; Clitopho says that he had actually heard Socrates do so. (ii) The Clitopho passage affords no parallel whatsoever for the idea of going up to the highest point in the city. It is conceivable that the notion of height may have been generated by the recollection of Clitopho's comparison of Socrates to a deus ex machina (407A ὥσπερ ἐπὶ μηχανῆς τραγικῆς θεός), but if so, P has misunderstood the point of the simile, which refers to the manner of the pronouncement and not to the physical position of the speaker. (iii) Finally there is a strange assortment of peculiarities at 4D10-E2: the feeble εἴπερ ἄρα δυνατὸν ἦν , the construction ἔλεγεν ὅτι ... ἀνακράγειν , and the striking hyperbaton involving μέρος. There is another version of this anecdote at D.Chr. 13.16, which, however, throws no light on the problems of the present passage. Dio is apparently not drawing on the Clitopho: for conjectures as to his source see J.W. Cohoon in the Loeb edition II p.89 and von Arnim, Dio von Prusa pp.256ff. Cf. also Lib. Decl. 1.21, Stob. IV 26.29 for similar pronouncements by Socrates.

4D7-8 Ζεῦ καὶ θεοὶ πάντες : The exclamation is a measure of

the intensity of P's indignant exasperation. It is nowhere used by Plutarch: see Wytt. ad loc., Weissenberger II p.8; but cf. e.g. Antiphon 6.40 ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοὶ πάντες; D. 19.16 and Aristid. I p.578 Dindorf ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ πάντες θεοί; Aristid. 25.68 Keil Ζεῦ καὶ πάντες θεοί.

4D9-10 εἶτ' οὐκ εἰκότα πολλάκις Σωκράτης ἐκεῖνος ὁ παλαιὸς ἔλεγεν : For εἶτα introducing an indignant question see LSJ s.v. II. -- Σωκράτης is undoubtedly correct here, as the parallels show; yet the vast majority of mss. have ὁ κράτης, and only a handful of late mss. anticipate Wyttenbach's 'emendation' (Moralia I p. cxxxvii and n. ad loc.). Thus Crates is the subject of the anecdote in Guarino's translation, in Maffeo Vegio De educ. lib. I 2, Erasmus De pueris 493A-B and Lyly, Euphues I p.268 Bond, and Mullach makes the present anecdote Crates fr.39 in FPG II p.338. It is of course possible that P actually wrote ὁ Κράτης from a source which was already corrupt. For Σωκράτης ἐκεῖνος ὁ παλαιός (which Hartman, De Plutarcho p.8 finds incongruous for some reason) cf. Cic. De or. I 231 'veterem illum Socratem'; Plut. Cato maior 20.3 Σωκράτους .. τοῦ παλαιοῦ ; Them. 34.5 ὁ .. παλαιὸς ἐκεῖνος Σωκράτης.

4D10-E2 ἔλεγεν ὅτι ... ἀναβάντα... ἀνακραγεῖν : This curious construction is perhaps not quite impossible: the infinitive is sometimes found irregularly after ὡς and ὅτι , see K-G II pp.357-358. But note that here (a) ἄν would seem to be required, and that though it might perhaps have dropped out by haplography before ἀνακραγεῖν , (b) the whole passage is so strange both in sense and form (cf. the hyperbaton which displaces μέρος) that there may well be something wrong with the text. Hartman suggests that δεῖ or δέοι has dropped out; and Babbitt speculates as to whether μέρος conceals a word like πρέποι.

4E1-2 ἐπὶ τὸ μετεωρότατον τῆς πόλεως .. μέρος: Note the striking hyperbaton. For the expression cf. e.g. Thuc. III 72.3 τὰ μετέωρα τῆς πόλεως.

4E2-3 ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ποῦ φέρεσθε; The correct classical form is ποῖ, which the Clitopho has at the corresponding place; but ποῦ comes to replace it quite commonly in later Greek: cf. Phryn. 30; :LSJ s.v. ποῦ; Arndt-Gingrich s.v. ποῦ 2; K-G I p.545; Schmid I p.91. The mss. here are divided between the two alternatives, and there is no certain means of telling which P really wrote.

4E3-5 οἵτινες χρημάτων μὲν κτήσεως πέρι πᾶσαν ποιεῖσθε σπουδήν, τῶν δ' υἱέων, οἷς πάντα καταλείψετε, μικρὰ φροντίζετε: For denunciation of this order of priorities cf. e.g. Demetrius Eloc. 296; Juv. VII 186-188; Julian 7.22. -- The anastrophic preposition seems to derive from P's memory of the Clitopho passage quoted above, 4D7-E7n. -- With πᾶσαν ποιεῖσθε σπουδήν cf. P's other periphrases with ποιεῖσθαι listed at 1D8n.

4E5-7 τούτοις δ' ἂν ἔγωγε προσθείην ὅτι οἱ τοιοῦτοι πατέρες παραπλήσιον ποιοῦσιν, οἷον εἴ τις τοῦ μὲν ὑποδήματος φροντίζοι, τοῦ δὲ ποδὸς ὀλιγώρως ἔχοι: A homely simile which P introduces as a personal addition. For another shoe-and-foot simile cf. Plut. De trang. an. 466F: ὥσπερ οὖν τὸ ὑπόδημα τῷ ποδὶ συνδιαστρέφεται καὶ οὐ ταὐτὰ πάσχει, οὕτω τοὺς βίους αἱ διαθέσεις συνεξομοιοῦσιν αὐταῖς.

4E7-5A5 -- Some fathers go so far in this penny-pinching neglect of their children that they actually appoint worthless teachers to save money, securing for their sons a cheap ignorance. Aristippus derided just such a witless father, who exclaimed that he could buy a slave for the price of the fee Aristippus demanded to educate his son: 'Then you will have two

slaves', said the philosopher, 'your son and the one you buy.' In general, is it not outrageous to teach children the use of the right hand at table, but make no provision for them to hear right and wholesome discourse? -- With another slight shift of ground P now moves from the subject of fathers too concerned with accumulating money to bother about their children's education to fathers who are actually unwilling to pay for good tuition. On remuneration for teaching generally see O. Schulthess in RE s.v. μισθός cc.2083-84; C.A. Forbes, Teachers' pay in ancient Greece (Lincoln, Nebraska 1942); and cf. Bonner pp.146-162; Mayor on Juvenal VII 158. It was usually rather poor, consonant with the standing of teachers in society, and parental reluctance to pay well or regularly seems to have been all too common: see Marrou pp.223-224, Forbes pp.58-60 'Reluctance in payment', and cf. e.g. Aristippus frs.8A and 8B Mannebach, Pliny Ep. IV 13.5, and M.Ant. I 4 which suggest that the view that education deserved to have money spent on it had to be urged in the face of common practice and everyday habit. -- The Aristippus anecdote (fr.4A Mannebach) which P uses here by way of illustration is retailed also by Diogenes Laertius (II 72 = fr.4B Mannebach): συνιστάντος τινος αὐτῷ υἱὸν ἤτησε πεντακοσίας δραχμάς· τοῦ δ' εἰπόντος, "Τοσούτου δύναμαι ἀνδράποδον ὠνήσασθαι", "Πρίω" ἔφη, "καὶ ἕξεις δύο." (A similar retort is attributed to Isocrates by Plut. Vit. x or. 838A: πρὸς δὲ τὸν εἰπόντα πατέρα ὡς οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἀνδράποδον συμπέμψαι ⟨αἰτεῖ⟩ τῷ παιδίῳ "Τοιγαροῦν" ἔφη "ἄπιθι· δύο γὰρ ἀνθ' ἑνὸς ἕξεις ἀνδράποδα.") Aristippus was the first, followed by Aeschines (D.L. II 62) and Antisthenes (D.L. VI 4), to breach the Socratic rule that money should not be accepted by the philosopher from his pupils: testimonia frs. 4A-8B Mannebach; sources for the Socratic practice, Forbes op. cit.

pp.23-24. That P as an admirer of Socrates and Plato (11D7-F2n.) should side here with Aristippus is due partly no doubt to the unreflecting nature of his admiration, though partly also to the fact that his main concern is the payment of schoolteachers, who seldom taught for nothing (see Forbes p.31 for an exception). On payments to philosophers generally see Forbes pp.23-28.

4E7-8 πολλοὶ δ' εἰς τοσοῦτο τῶν πατέρων προβαίνουσι φιλαργυρίας ἅμα καὶ μισοτεκνίας : Another rather remarkable hyperbaton. For τοσοῦτο the great majority of the mss. have τοσοῦτον , which may indeed be what P wrote: see LSJ s.v. τοσοῦτος , end; Arndt-Gingrich s.v.; Schmid IV p.472; BDR p.51; and cf. 2A7 n. -- μισοτεκνία occurs again at 13D8-9 (opposite φιλοτεκνία 14B7); cf. e.g. Plut. Dem. 22.3; Philo (once only) 34.36. Heumann appositely remarks that it denotes here neglect rather than actual deliberate hatred of one's children.

4E9-F1 ὥσθ' ἵνα μὴ πλείονα μισθὸν τελέσειεν, ἀνθρώπους τοὺς μηδενὸς τιμίους αἱροῦνται : The optative in a final clause in primary sequence, though anomalous in classical writers (K-G II pp. 382-383), is common enough in post-classical authors: see Radermacher p.163; Schmid IV p.88; and Weissenberger I p.32 on Plutarch, who uses it regularly. -- A very few mss. anticipate Blass's conjecture by reading τοῦ μηδενὸς τιμίους , which may very well be right: cf. e.g. Hdt. VI 137.2 κακήν τε καὶ τοῦ μηδενὸς ἀξίην .

4F1-2 τοῖς τέκνοις εὐωνον ἀμαθίαν διώκοντες : 'seeking a cheap ignorance for their children' -- a rather striking compression of phrase.

4F2 ἢ καὶ Ἀρίστιππος κτλ.: For this introduction to an illustrative anecdote cf. 2A1.

4F2 οὐκ ἀκόμψως ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ ἀστείως : For similar polar

expressions cf. e.g. D. 21.83; X. Oec. 1.19, 21; Plut. De aud. 40E, De def. 426D, Anim.an corp. 500C, Crass. 23.8, Phil. 4.5.

4F3 πατέρα νοῦ καὶ φρενῶν κενόν: Cf. Plut. De garrul. 502E κενοὶ φρενῶν ἦκον δὲ μεστοί.

4F5 'χιλίας' ἔφησε 'δραχμάς': This was the sum usually demanded by the sophists: see Forbes p.25. The figure in Diogenes Laertius' version (above, 4E7-5A5n.) is 500 drachmae. The sum of a talent mentioned by Alexis fr.36 (CAF II p.311) is an exaggeration: see Forbes pp.24-25; von Arnim, Dion von Prusa pp.25-26.

4F5-6 τοῦ δ' 'Ἡράκλεις' εἰπόντος: The exclamation (for which cf. e.g. D. 9.31, 19.308, 21.66; X. Mem. I 3.12) conveys shocked surprise: see schol. on Lucian 21.32, MacDowell on Ar. V. 420.

5A1-2 'Τοιγαροῦν' εἶπε 'δύο ἕξεις ἀνδράποδα, καὶ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ ὃν ἂν πρίῃ': The implication is that an uneducated person is no better than a slave: cf. e.g. Stob. II 31.46 (Socrates) ἰδὼν πλούσιον ἀπαίδευτον, ἔφη· 'Ἰδοὺ καὶ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἀνδράποδον.' Sizoo suggests (Theses III) that the last seven words may be a gloss, and certainly there is no comparable expansion in either of the parallels (4E7-5A5n.). But it seems not implausible that P has added the explanation himself to make sure that his readers get the point (cf. e.g. 11B11-C1?).

5A2-5 τὸ δ' ὅλον πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον κτλ.; τὸ δ' ὅλον occurs again at 5D10 and 14A10. ἄτοπος may again perhaps mean 'outrageous' rather than 'strange': cf. 4C9n. For πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον; cf. e.g. Plut. Brut.rat.988E. -- For the comparison cf. perhaps Iamb. VP 203, where Pythagoreans are mentioned as asking τίνος ἕνεκα τοὺς παῖδας συνεθίζομεν προσφέρεσθαι τὴν τροφὴν τεταγμένως καὶ συμμέτρως if a knowledge of order and symmetry

is not going to be useful to them as adults. Here, however, we have a rather unhappy tail-piece, since there is no obvious connection between learning correct table-manners and listening to a teacher's instruction. In fact the comparison seems to depend only upon a rather feeble and inappropriate pun between τῇ δεξιᾷ ('the right hand') and ἐπιδεξίων ('clever'). The 'clever' discourses are by implication those of a good teacher whose services could be procured by a father willing to pay a decent fee.

5A2-3 τῇ μὲν δεξιᾷ συνεθίζειν [τὰ παιδία] δέχεσθαι τὰς τροφάς : A few mss. omit the bracketed words, but there is otherwise no good reason for suspecting them and they should probably be retained. -- Children were taught to take their meat with the right hand and hold their bread in the left: cf. Plut. De fort. 99D: τούς τε παῖδας καὶ ὑποδεῖσθαι καὶ περιβάλλεσθαι διδάσκομεν καὶ τῇ δεξιᾷ λαμβάνειν τοῦ ὄψου τῇ δ' ἀριστερᾷ κρατεῖν τὸν ἄρτον . See W. Deonna and M. Renard, Croyances et superstitions de table dans la Rome antique (Brussels 1961) pp.78-79; and cf. Plut. An virt. doc. 439F-440A for other refinements of table-manners taught by the pedagogue.

5A3-4 κἂν προτείνῃ τὴν ἀριστερὰν , ἐπιτιμᾶν : προτείνῃ is Hertlin's emendation for the προτείνειε of the mss. κἂν here = καὶ ἐάν , and ἐάν is regularly followed by the subjunctive in classical usage; but the construction with the optative does occur in later Greek, so that the transmitted reading can and should be upheld here, and should not be emended to conform with the classical norm. See Radermacher p.200; Schmid I p.244 (Lucian), II p.59 (Aristides), IV p.90; Weissenberger II p.7; Hein p.163. Emendation has been resorted to again, perhaps also without necessity, at 6E8-9; and cf. 3A1 and 8D8 with the

relevant notes.

5A4-5 μηδεμίαν δὲ ποιεῖσθαι πρόνοιαν τοῦ λόγων ἐπιδεξίων καὶ νομίμων ἀκούειν: (sc. such as he would hear as the pupil of a good teacher). ἐπιδέξιος has apparently been chosen for the pun with τῇ .. δεξιᾷ (5A2-3), rather inappositely from the point of view of sense, since the word means 'clever'. νομίμων coupled with it shows what P is really trying to say. -- For ποιεῖσθαι πρόνοιαν cf. e.g. Iamb. VP 211 and see 1D8 n.

5A6-B10 -- And what are the results of this neglect? When the sons grow into undisciplined and dissolute young men, their fathers are visited, too late, by regret and dismay at their misconduct. Some of them take up with pernicious flatterers and parasites; others buy expensive courtesans out of service; others become gluttons or gamble and revel their way to ruin; some get into even more serious trouble, risking their lives in adulterous affairs.-- For the remaining part of the chapter P enlarges on the disastrous consequences of omitting to follow his advice on the appointment of sound pedagogues and teachers. It is characteristic and consistent with the rest of the treatise that the products of parental neglect which he highlights are all in the moral sphere rather than the intellectual. To discuss them, P has to look forward to early manhood when all restraints will have been removed (cf. 12A8-10) and the vices acquired in youth will be free to flourish unchecked. This stage of development is the subject of Chapter 16, and there are not surprisingly resemblances there with what P says here, notably in the catalogue of youthful vices at 12B5-7: κύβοι and κῶμοι (5B7) turn up again together at 12B6; κατοψοφαγοῦσιν (5B7) matches ἀμετρία γαστρός at 12B5; and μοιχεύοντες (5B9) is paralleled by γυναικῶν διαφθοραί γαμετῶν at 12B7.

5A6-7 τί οὖν ωμβαίνει ..; ἐγὼ φράζω: This could also be punctuated as a single sentence, with τί... ωμβαίνει as an indirect question; but P's fondness for rhetorical questions, often self-answered (1D6 n.), suggests otherwise. -- For ἐγὼ φράζω compare with Wyttenbach D. 4.20; Philo 38.152; Lucian 59.4; Longin. 17.1; and add D. 14.25; 19.227; 21.199.

5A6-7 ἐπειδὰν κακῶς μὲν θρέψωσι κακῶς δὲ παιδεύσωσι τοὺς υἱεῖς : For repetition of the same word before μέν and δέ see Denniston p.370 and references there. Heumann's proposal to change the first κακῶς to καλῶς is misguided.

5A8 εἰς ἄνδρας ἐγγραφέντες : i.e. when their names are entered in the citizen list. For this event see Koch in RE s.v. δοκιμασία c.1269; Busolt II pp.943-945; Harrison, The Law of Athens II pp.205-207. It took place at the end of a young man's 17th year (or possibly his 18th: see Harrison II p.84 n.2), and after it he possessed the legal and political rights of a full citizen. -- For the phrase εἰς ἄνδρας ἐγγραφῆναι cf. D. 19.230.

5B1 ἑαυτοὺς κρημνίσωσι : 'hurl themselves'. The uncompounded verb is very rare (LXX Maccab. II 6.10; J. BJ II 49, IV 7), but Herwerden's proposal to emend it to the much commoner κατακρημνίζειν (actually read by a handful of mss.) is unnecessary.

5B1-2 τότε δὴ μεταμελοῦνται [τὴν τῶν τέκνων παιδείαν], ὅτ' οὐδὲν ὄφελος: For the form μεταμελοῦμαι see LSJ s.v. μεταμέλομαι, end; Veitch s.v. μεταμέλει ; TGL s.v. μεταμέλει . Ziegler accepts μεταμελεῖσθαι at Plut. Timol. 6.7, and μεταμελουμένους is a v.l. at Phoc. 16.6. The fact that μεταμέλομαι does not govern an accusative means that either the bracketed words must be excised as Paton proposes or another verb must be supplied to complete the sense. The mss. Ⓗn read προδεδωκότες before παιδείαν, but

the result is not very convincing and deletion may after all be the best remedy, even though the origin of the intrusive words is not clear. -- For the phrase ὅτ' οὐδὲν ὄφελος, meaning in effect 'too late', cf. e.g. Galen Protr. 2 (p.105.13 Marquardt), 8 (p.113.3).

5B2-3 τοῖς ἐκείνων ἀδικήμασιν ἀδημονοῦντες: 'dismayed by their wrongdoings'. The verb occurs twice in Plato (Phdr. 251D with dat.; Tht. 175D); once in Xenophon (HG IV 4.3); once in Demosthenes (19.197); D.H. I 56.5; III 70.3; VIII 85.4; three times in NT (Matt. 26.37; Mk. 14.33; Philipp. 2.26); twice in Josephus (AJ XV 211, 388); D.Chr. 8.6; Plut. 77C, 129C, 272F, Timol. 5.4 (with Holden's n.), Ant. 51.3; Ael. NA XIII 3, VH III 21; Alciphr. IV 9.2 Schepers.

5B3-4 οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὠνῶν κόλακας καὶ παρασίτους ἀναλαμβάνουσιν: For P's strictures on flatterers see 12F8-13C5. -- ἀναλαμβάνειν here means 'show favour to, entertain': cf. Pl. Ep. VII 329D; Aeschin. 1.43, 52, 53, 54, 58; Hesychius s.v. ἀναλαμβάνειν ξένον· δειπνίζειν. φιλοφρονεῖσθαι.

5B4-6 Note the veritable cascade of doublets in these 3 lines: ἀσήμους καὶ καταράτους ... ἀνατροπέας καὶ λυμεῶνας ... ἑταίρας καὶ χαμαιτύπας ... σοβαρὰς καὶ πολυτελεῖς.

5B4-5 ἀνθρώπους ἀσήμους καὶ καταράτους καὶ τῆς νεότητος ἀνατροπέας καὶ λυμεῶνας: ἀσήμους, 'insignificant', seems an insufficiently vehement word to be coupled with καταράτους, and Schneider's proposal to read παρασήμους instead (cf. 4C7n.) therefore has much to recommend it. -- For ἀνατροπέας and λυμεῶνας used in fairly close proximity cf. Plut. De comm.not. 1059A. The former is used by Antiphon 2.β.2; D.Chr. 37.32; Plut. Ant. 72.3; the latter by Soph., Eur., Xen., Isoc.: refs.

LSJ s.v. and add Philo 28.143, 37.144, 38.89, 92, 191; D.Chr. 59.8; Plut. Coriol. 35.5, Otho 5.9; Ael. NA III 21, V 15, fr. 39.

5B5-6 οἱ δέ τινες ἑταίρας καὶ χαμαιτύπας λυτροῦνται σοβαρὰς καὶ πολυτελεῖς : Others buy courtesans and prostitutes out of service. For this, the ambition of many an infatuated young man in comedy, see O. Navarre in D-S s.v. 'Meretrices' cc. 1825a-26b, H. Herter in RAC s.v. 'Dirne' cc.1170-73, and cf. e.g. Plut. Phocion 38.3-4. -- On ἑταίρα see 1A7n. The word χαμαιτύπη (which occurs again at 13B3) is a coarser synonym: see Schmidt, Synonymik II pp. 420-421. Cf. e.g. Theopomp. FGrH 115 F225b; Timocl. fr.22.2 (CAF II p.461); Men. Sam. 133 Körte (= 348 Austin, Sandbach), fr. 699 Körte; Philo 6.21, 12.106, 21.88, 24.43; D.Chr. 33.60; Plut. Ant. 9.8; Moeris p.377 Pierson. -- σοβαρός means 'haughty'. Plutarch also uses it of a courtesan at Q.conv. 706B σοβαράν τινα παιδίσκην , and of women at Lucull. 6.4, Ant. 73.2. For πολυτελής cf. Herter (loc. cit above) cc.1165-67 on the expense involved in associating with courtesans.

5B7 οἱ δὲ κατοψοφαγοῦσιν : 'others spend their time in gluttony'. The verb occurs once in Aeschines (1.95); once in Philo (35.55); Ath. V 186C; Lib. Decl. 33.31. Plutarch has the uncompounded verb at An virt.doc. 439D.

5B7-8 οἱ δ' εἰς κύβους καὶ κώμους ἐξοκέλλουσιν : 'some are wrecked upon dice and carousals' (Tucker). ἐξοκέλλειν means 'to run aground' of ships; the metaphorical use of the verb in prose is Isocratean (7.18; 15.268; Ep. 2.13); cf. also Plb. VII 1.1; XVIII 55.7; Aristid. II p.200 Dind.; Ael. VH IX 24; XII 24, 30; NA XIV 20; fr. 55.

5B8 ἤδη δέ τινες καὶ τῶν νεανικωτέρων ἅπτονται κακῶν : 'some go as far as to venture on the more daring vices' (Tucker). For νεανικός in its common meaning of 'vigorous, spirited' see

LSJ s.v. 2 (and 3 on bad senses), G. Björck in HERMENEIA, Festschrift O. Regenbogen (Heidelberg 1952) pp.66-70. The word is of course etymologically apt here in a passage about youthful vices.

5B9 μοιχεύοντες καὶ †κιττοφοροῦντες : 'committing adultery and wearing ivy'. The second participle is plainly nonsensical unless it can mean, as editors who retain it suppose, 'engaging in drunken revelry'. Though κιττοφορεῖν is found elsewhere only in Dioscorides AP VII 707.3 of a successful tragic poet, crowns of ivy were worn in the ritual of Dionysiac cults (see Ganszyniec in RE s.v. 'Kranz' cc.1592-93) and also by revellers at κῶμοι (ibid. c.1602); the adjective κιττοφόρος is found as an epithet of Dionysus (e.g. Pind. O. 2.31; Ar. Th. 988) and is used by Demosthenes 18.260 (unless the v.l. κιστοφόρος is preferred) in a sneer at Aeschines' supposed participation in orgiastic revelry. For the present passage it still remains questionable (a) whether even so the required meaning can be read into the verb without over-straining it, (b) whether, having mentioned κῶμοι already at 5B7, it is likely that P could now refer to them again in the more serious class of νεκνικώτερα κακά, and (c) whether adultery and revelling is not a strange mixture of the serious and the relatively innocuous. In short, this interpretation will not do. Wyttenbach saw correctly that whatever we read here must be a synonym for μοιχεύοντες. Apart from the appropriateness of creating a doublet in P's familiar style, there is one compelling argument for this. The sentence continues καὶ μὲν ἡδονὴν θανάτου τιμώμενοι, and this refers without doubt to the likely penalty for adultery (5B9-10 n.). Anything, therefore, which intervenes between μοιχεύοντες and this should not change the subject. -- Two conjectures have been

advanced along these lines: (a) Heumann's κοιτοφθοροῦντες, supported by Kronenberg (who would also read κοιτοφθορίαι for οἰκοφθορίαι at 12B7). Two minor mss. actually have κοιτοφοροῦντες (sic), though almost certainly by accident: the orthography of both is generally bad. The verb is not attested elsewhere; (b) Wyttenbach's οἰκοφθοροῦντες (with an eye on 12B7 γυναικῶν οἰκοφθορίαι γαμετῶν). Again the verb would be a hapax, though 12B7, Hesychius s.v. οἰκοφθόρους· μοιχούς, and P.Grenf. I 53.19-20 (4th cent. A.D.) suggest that it would be possible. Backed as it is by the stronger evidence, this seems the preferable solution.

5B9-10 καὶ μίαν ἡδονὴν θανάτου τιμώμενοι : 'and think death not too much to pay for a single pleasure' (Tucker). Cf. e.g. Diogenes quoted below, 5C1-2n. μοιχοῦ .. τὴν ψυχὴν ὧν δραχμῆς ὠνίων προιεμένου. P is referring to the possible fate of an adulterer, whose life the law of many Greek states allowed to be forfeit if he were caught in the act: see K. Latte in RE s.v. μοιχεία ; G. Delling in RAC s.v. 'Ehebruch' cc.669-672; Harrison, The Law of Athens I pp.32-36. For passages on the risks run by adulterers see 5C4-5 n.

5B10-C5 -- If however they had gone to school with a philosopher, they might have learned, in line with Diogenes' advice, to buy the same pleasures at a cheaper price. -- That P, for all his concern with morality, should here clearly imply that the good teacher will encourage his pupils to resort to brothels is apt to appear shocking at first sight. But we must remember (a) that in general the ancient world attached less stigma to the practice than the modern: see O. Navarre in D-S s.v. 'Meretrices' cc.1830-31; H. Herter in RAC s.v. 'Dirne' cc.1160-63; Austin on Cic. Cael. 48; and (b) that P is discussing

it as a preventive measure against the seduction of married women, in which context it was regularly regarded as a less harmful and dangerous alternative: cf. Eubulus (or Philippus) fr. 67 (CAF II p.187); Xenarchus fr. 4 (CAF II p.468); Philemon fr. 4 (CAF II p.479); X. Mem. II 1.5; Hor. Sat. I 2.31-35; M.Argentarius AP VII 403.7-8; H. Herter loc. cit. cc.1180-81.

5B10 φιλοσόφῳ δ' ὁμιλήσαντες : We perhaps expect P to continue '..they would have learned to avoid all the aforementioned excesses', but as often he has in mind only the most recent subject mentioned -- adultery. It is revealing that the teacher P has in mind is described as a philosopher. Cf. Praechter, Popularphilosophie pp.11 and 15 on the popular idea of the philosopher as the true educator; and Chapter 10 on the supremacy of philosophy in education.

5B10-11 τούτου ἴσως τοῖς προστάγμασιν ἑαυτοὺς ἂν κατακεισθεῖς παρέσχοντο : Paton's emendation (τούτου ἴσως τοῖς προστάγμασιν for the mss.' οὗτοι οὐ τοῖς ἴσοις πράγμασιν) gives excellent sense, and though it creates a rather harsh hiatus between τούτου and ἴσως, this is not quite unparalleled (cf. e.g. 11A2 τύπου ἕνεκεν). The ms. reading is retained by Cobet and Nikitin with only one small change apart from different word division, to produce οὐ τοιούτοις ἴσως πράγμασιν which is also a possibility. -- κατακεισθής, meaning 'obedient', occurs 13 times in Philo and 3 times in Josephus (AJ II 43, 281; XI 45), but is rare elsewhere and seems not to occur in Plutarch.

5C1-2 καὶ τὸ γε παράγγελμα τοῦ Διογένους ἔμοιγον ἄν: The advice of Diogenes which follows is not elsewhere attested, and may well, like so much other Diogenes material, be apocryphal: see A. Packmohr, De Diogenis Sinopensis apopthegmatis quaestiones selectae (Münster 1913) pp.8 ff.; F. Sayre, Diogenes of Sinope (Baltimore 1938) pp.9 ff. The content accords well

with Diogenes' celebrated Cynic ἀναίδεια (cf. 5C2-3 φορτικῶς.. τοῖς ῥήμασιν) and with his belief that importunate desires should be satisfied with as little fuss as possible; cf. e.g. another saying which is reputedly his, Stob. III 6.39: Διογένης οὐδὲν εὐνουστέρον εἶναι μοιχοῦ διωρίζετο τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν ὀρεχμῆς ὠνίων προιεμένου. But this may be interpreted with equal plausibility either as evidence of authenticity or as grounds for suspicion.

5C2-3 φορτικῶς μὲν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἀληθῶς δὲ τοῖς πράγμασι: i.e. the expression was vulgar, but the remark was to the point. φορτικῶς well describes the style of utterance expected of Diogenes. Another philosopher of whom the word is used is Bion: cf. Plut. Amat. 770B; D.L. IV 52; O. Hense, Teletis Reliquiae 2nd edn. (Tübingen 1909) pp.LXX-LXXI; Kindstrand's commentary pp.44, 51.

5C3 πραινεῖ καὶ φησιν : For the co-ordination of the two verbs where one would normally have been subordinated cf. Arndt-Gingrich s.v. καί I 1.e, BDR p.400.

5C3-4 εἴσελθε εἰς πορνεῖον παῖ : Cobet's emendation παῖ for που may well be right, since (a) που is somewhat otiose, and (b) παῖ would give us an addressee of the right age: it could be argued that ἵνα μάθῃς suggests a young man. Cobet's claim to confirmation from D.L. VI 88-89, however, (where Crates takes his son to a brothel on his coming of age) is hardly persuasive.

5C4-5 ἵνα μάθῃς ὅτι τῶν ἀξίων τὰ τιμία οὐδὲν διαφέρει: 'that you may learn that dear goods differ in no way from cheap'. Diogenes means that a visit to a brothel is cheap by comparison with adultery (which may cost a man his life if he is caught: cf. 5B9-10n.), yet the pleasure is the same. The fee paid by clients of brothels is variously recorded as one obol (Antisthenes fr. 182 Caizzi; Philemon fr. 4.13 (CAF II p.479))

and one drachma (Diogenes ap. Stob. III 6.39 (quoted above 5C1-2n.); Plut. Amat. 759E); cf. Eubulus fr.67.7 μικροῦ πρίασθαι κέρματος τὴν ἡδονήν. The risks run by adulterers are often mentioned: cf. e.g. Antisthenes fr. 182 Caizzi; X. Mem. II 1.5; Crates ap. D.L. VI 89; Xenarchus fr. 4.18-23 (CAF II p.468); Diogenes ap. Stob. III 6.39; D.Chr. 7.140; Plut. Amat. 759E. -- The true reading ἀξίων survives only in a very few relatively late mss. The others all read ἀναξίων, which results from ignorance of the fact that ἄξιος can mean 'cheap' in Attic (LSJ s.v. I 3.b).

(8) 5C6-6A7: Praise of paideia

After the practical preoccupations of the previous three chapters we return for a while in Chapter 8 to the realm of abstract concepts. The whole chapter is an extended eulogy of paideia, education or culture, whose supreme value is first emphatically stated, then upheld in comparison with possible rivals, and finally supported by the testimony of the philosophers Stilpon and Socrates.

5C6-10 In sum, I declare with all the certainty of an oracle that a sound upbringing and a proper paideia are of first, second and last importance in these matters, and are conducive to the attainment of virtue and happiness.

5C10-E4 By comparison with paideia, all other possessions prized by men are insignificant: good birth is not our own to boast of; the possession of wealth is uncertain, a target for evildoers, and common to the wicked as well as the good; fame is unsure; beauty is fleeting; health is changeable; strength is a prey to disease and age, and some animals far outstrip man in the exercise of it. Paideia is our only immortal and divine possession.

5E4-10 (Two things, intelligence and reason, are supreme in human nature, the latter subordinate to the former, being invulnerable alike to fortune, to crime, to illness and to age -- for only intelligence flourishes instead of declining with the years.)

5E10-F6 Paideia is the only possession which the torrent of war cannot sweep away. Hence the memorable reply of the philosopher Stilpon when asked by Demetrius whether he had lost anything in the sack of Megara: 'No, for war cannot make plunder of virtue'.

6A1-7 Similarly, Socrates refused to speculate on the happiness of the Persian king since he knew nothing of his state of virtue and paideia -- implying that happiness consists in these and not in the possession of fortuitous goods.

The flexibility of the Greek word paideia is a central clue to understanding this part of the De liberis educandis. To P as an educational writer it means primarily 'education' (especially intellectual education), and this is its sense in the great majority of instances where he uses it (for references see 5C6-10n.). Thus Chapters 9 and 10, dealing with rhetoric and philosophy respectively, also come under the broad heading of paideia, as is clear from 8B3-4 near the end of Chapter 10: καὶ περὶ μὲν παιδείας οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπη δεῖ πλείονα λέγοντα διατρίβειν. The eulogy in Chapter 8, however, is really of paideia in the common extended sense which denotes the summation of the truly educated person's intellectual and spiritual values, and whose nearest English equivalent is 'culture' (see further 5C10-E4n.). It is this paideia for which P is able to claim that it is 'our only immortal and divine possession' (5E3-4), though the ambiguity of the word allows him to transfer the credit to the narrower sort of paideia with which he is professionally concerned. Despite the common name and some logical connection, the two kinds of paideia are sufficiently distinct for this operation to suggest an element either of sleight of hand or of confusion in the author's mind.

In Chapter 8 generally, and especially the priamel at 5C10-E4, there are interesting reminiscences of the style of a protreptic (cf. Hartlich pp.315-316; Glaeser pp.14 n.1, 41 n.1). The same is true of Chapter 10, where the object of P's admiration is philosophy. As to content, the chapter contains nothing very original. Paideia was already numbered by classical writers among the most precious of human possessions (cf. e.g. Plato and Xenophon quoted at 5E3-4n.), and P's reverential treatment of it reflects a well attested Hellenistic attitude (cf. Marrou pp.158-160 'La religion de la culture'; M. Hadas, Hellenistic Culture

(New York and London 1959) p.69). The priamel follows standard lines familiar from not a few parallels; and P chooses as his closing illustrations two well known and much quoted episodes from philosophical tradition and literature respectively. Even the passage on intelligence and reason can probably be related to commonplace parallels, though it is harder to justify its presence here on logical grounds (see 5E4-10n.).

On Chapter 8 in general cf. Glaeser pp.40-43.

5C6-10 -- In sum, I declare with all the certainty of an oracle that a sound upbringing and a proper paideia are of first, second and last importance in these matters, and are conducive to the attainment of virtue and happiness. -- Paideia is clearly used here to mean 'education', the sense which predominates in the De lib. educ. (3A9, 4C1, 5B2, 5C8, 6A8, 7B6, 7D2, 8B4, 8B8, 8C8, 9D9, 9E10, 14B7) and to which we return at the beginning of Chapter 9 (6A8 τῆς παιδείας τῶν τέκνων). Elsewhere in this chapter, however, it has a wider and more universal meaning, for which see 5C10-E4n. and introductory note to the chapter. The previous chapter has shown P at pains to ensure, through his advocacy of care in choosing pedagogues and teachers, that children have the best possible chance of obtaining a good education. Now he pauses to explain why he considers education to be of such very great importance.

5C6 Συμβαλὼν τοίνυν: As often, the connection with the preceding chapter leaves something to be desired. The logical sequence, however, is as explained in the previous note.

5C6-7 ἐγὼ φημι ... ὅτι: The construction of φάναι with ὅτι instead of its usual accusative and infinitive is rate in classical prose (K-G II p.356, quoting Pl. Grg. 487D, X. An. VII 1.5), but becomes commoner in later usage: cf. BDR section 397.3; Schmid I p.242, III pp.80-81, IV p.620; and Weissenberger I p.30 on

instances in Plutarch.

5C6-7 (καὶ χρησμολογεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ πρανεῖν δόξειμ' ἂν εἰκότως): Perhaps the most likely interpretation of this somewhat cryptic parenthesis is that P is emphasising the absolute veracity of what he is about to say: cf. e.g. Cic. Ad Brut. 8.3 'Haec ex oraculo Apollinis Pythi edita tibi puta; nihil potest esse verius.' In popular belief and parlance oracles were associated with truth or infallibility: Ath. II 37F ἐκ τρίποδος λέγειν φάμεν τοὺς ἀληθεύοντας. Cf. Zenobius VI 3 (CPG I p.161); Diogenian. VIII 21 (CPG I p.308); Macarius VII 97 (CPG II p.213); Ju . VIII 126 with Mayor's note, and Mayor's further collection of passages in JPh 20 (1892) pp.271-272, to which add Plut. Dem. 29.3 "νῦν ... λέγεις τὰ ἐκ τοῦ Μακεδονικοῦ τρίποδος"; Lucr. V 111-112 'sanctius et multo certa ratione magis quam / Pythia quae tripode a Phoebi lauroque profatur'; Ov. AA III 789-790 'sed neque Phoebei tripodes nec corniger Ammon / vera magis vobis quam mea Musa canet'; Propert. II 21.3 'sed tibi iam videor Dodona verior augur'. See also Otto, Sprichwörter s.v. 'Apollo'.

5C7-8 ἓν πρῶτον καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευταῖον ἐν τούτοις κεφάλαιον ἀγωγὴ σπουδὴ καὶ παιδιὰ νόμιός ἐστι : For this expressive way of conveying the supreme importance to be attached to something cf. [D.] 25.8 πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα θηρία, ὧν μέσος καὶ τελευταῖος καὶ πρῶτος ἐστιν οὗτος , Philostr. VS II 26.2 τῶν Ἀπολλωνίου τοῦ Ναυκρατίτου ἑταίρων , ὧν πρῶτος καὶ μέσος καὶ τελευταῖος Μαρκιανὸς ἐξ ἐκ Δολίχης ἐγένετο. Cf. Demosthenes' assertion that delivery (ὑπόκρισις) mattered first, second and third to an orator: Phld. Rh. p.196 Sudhaus; Cic. De or. II 213, Or. 56, Brut. 142; Quint. XI 3.6; [Plut.] Vit. x or. 845B; Longin. Rh. p.195.5-9 Spengel-Hammer. -- For κεφάλαιον cf. Pl. Lg. I 643C κεφάλαιον ... παιδείας λέγομεν τὴν ὀρθὴν τροφήν. -- παιδιά coupled here with

ἀγωγή plainly means 'education' (see 5C6-10n.). For νόμιμος see 1B7n.; the adjective has already been used to qualify παιδεία at 4B10-C1.

5C9-10 καὶ ταῦτα φορὰ καὶ συνεργὰ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν φημί : The same pair of adjectives occurs at Plut. De comm.not. 1066C τὰ εὔχρηστα φορὰ καὶ συνεργὰ πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον ... τέλος. For φορός = συμφέρων cf. e.g. Plut. De Pyth.orac. 405E οὔρων τι καὶ φορόν ... πρὸς ποίησιν. The word is used literally of winds: cf. e.g. D.Chr. 46.1, 48.15; D.C. I 33.3. -- ἀρετή and εὐδαιμονία are two of the ethical goals of P's ideal education. For their juxtaposition cf. e.g. Arist. EN X 1172a23-25 ῥᾳστην ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετήν τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον.

5C10-E4 -- By comparison with paideia, all other possessions prized by men are insignificant: good birth is not our own to boast of; the possession of wealth is uncertain, a target for evildoers, and common to the wicked as well as to the good; fame is unsure; beauty is fleeting; health is changeable; strength is a prey to disease and age, and some animals far outstrip man in the exercise of it. Paideia is our only immortal and divine possession. -- It is clear from the context that P is now using paideia in the extended sense in which it stands not just for 'education' but for that combination of spiritual and intellectual qualities which together compose a familiar Greek cultural ideal. For this meaning of the word (found in De lib.educ. only in this chapter at 5E3, 5F2 and 6A6, and at 11E4 in Chapter 15) and its development from more primitive meanings see Marrou pp.151-160 (especially p.156); Jaeger, Paideia I pp. 286 and 303; Mauch pp.4-9. -- The device by which rival candidates are dismissed in turn as a preliminary to the triumphant vindication of the writer's own favourite is known as a priamel. See W.A.A. van Otterlo,

'Beitrag zur Kenntnis der griechischen Priamel', Mnemosyne 8 (1940) pp.145-176; U. Schmid, Die Priamel der Werte im Griechischen von Homer bis Paulus (Wiesbaden 1964); and other material cited by Nisbet and Hubbard in their commentary on Horace, Odes I, p.3. Since van Otterlo and Schmid concentrate mainly on the priamel in poetry, and almost exclusively on classical writers, it is to be noticed that the device is common enough also in prose and in authors of post-classical times. Some examples which afford parallels to the present passage are as follows: Cic. Am. 20; Philo 8.112, 23. 263-267, 24.130; [Isoc.] Ad Demon. 6; Iamb. Protr. 8; Basil Leg.lib.gent. 2. All of the rival candiates mentioned by P feature quite commonly in priamels (see index to Schmid, Die Priamel, s.vv. 'Adel, Reichtum, Ruhm, Schönheit, Gesundheit, Kraft', and notes on individual passages below), and all conform to popular notions of the summum bonum: cf. e.g. X Mem. IV 2.34, where Socrates characterises εὐδαιμονία as comprising in the popular estimation κάλλος, ἰσχύς, πλοῦτος and δόξα; or the skolion referred to at Pl. Grg. 451E (and elsewhere) which ranks health first, beauty second and wealth third among fortune's gifts (see Dodds' commentary, pp.200-201).

5C10-D1 καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνθρώπινα καὶ μικρὰ καὶ οὐκ ἀξιοσπούδαστα κεκτέσθαι: ἀνθρώπινος, often a complimentary word (as e.g. at 13C7, where see note), here takes on a depreciatory meaning from its context: the contrast is with παιδεία which is τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν μόνον ... κράτιστον καὶ θεῖον (5E3-4). Sizoo (p.70) gets this right; Wyttenbach (pp.46-47) makes much too heavy weather of it. The false reading οὐκ ἀνθρώπινα found in some mss. here plainly arises from a mistaken expectation that the adjective will always have a commendatory meaning.

5D1-2 εὐγένεια καλὸν μέν, ἀλλὰ προγόνων ἀγαθόν: For the thought cf. Galen Protr. 7 καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι σπάνει τῶν ἰδίων ἀγαθῶν

ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἥκουσιν ; Ov. Met. XIII 140-141 'nam genus et proavos et quae non fecimus ipsi / vix ea nostra voco'; Philo 23.265 πλοῦτοι δὲ καὶ εὐγένειαι προσορίζονται μὲν καὶ τοῖς φιλοτίμοις· εἰ δὲ καὶ μόνοις σπουδαίοις, ἐγκώμια προγόνων καὶ τύχης ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν ἐχόντων εἰσίν. Seneca HF 340-341 'qui genus iactat suum / aliena laudat'.

5D2-4 πλοῦτος δὲ τίμιον μέν, ἀλλὰ τύχης κτῆμα, ἐπειδὴ τῶν μὲν ἐχόντων πολλάκις ἀφείλετο, τοῖς δ' οὐκ ἐλπίσασι φέρουσα προσήνεγκε : For wealth as the uncertain gift of fortune cf. e.g. Apollodorus fr.16 (CAF III p.293) οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτῳ πεποίθασ· ἀργυρίῳ, πάτερ ; / ὁ καιρὸς ὁ τυχὸν τοῖς μὲν οὐ κεκτημένοις / ἔδωκε, τῶν κεκτημένων δ' ἀφείλετο ; Cebes Tabula 7.2 (Τύχη) παρ' ὧν μὲν ἁρπάζει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ἑτέροις δίδωσι· παρὰ δὲ τῶν κτωμένων πάλιν ἀφαιρεῖται παραχρῆμα ἃ δέδωκε καὶ ἄλλοις δίδωσιν εἰκῇ καὶ ἀβεβαίως; also Solon and Galen quoted below, 5D6-7n, and other passages collected by Kindstrand in his note on Bion fr.38A-C (p.246). -- Though τὸν πλοῦτον is easily understood from the previous line to supply τῶν ἐχόντων with an object, it is worth noting with Heusinger that οἱ ἔχοντες on its own can mean 'the rich': for a list of instances see van Leeuven on Ar. Eq. 1295. -- For the participle of φέρω followed by a finite verb in φέρουσα προσήνεγκε cf. n. on 4B4 φέροντες ὑποβάλλουσι. What makes the present case rather unusual is that the finite verb is itself a compound of φέρω.

5D4-5 καὶ ὁ πολὺς πλοῦτος σκοπὸς ἔκκειται τοῖς βουλομένοις βάλλοντα τοξεύειν, κακουργοῖς αἰκέταις καὶ συκοφάνταις: For the thought that wealth makes its possessor a target for the attentions of evildoers cf. X. Mem. IV 2.35 πολλοί ... διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον διαθρυπτόμενοί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλευόμενοι ἀπόλλυνται, Charmides at X. Symp. 4.30 ἐγὼ τοίνυν ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ὅτε μὲν πλούσιος ἦν πρῶτον μὲν ἐφοβούμην μή τίς μου τὴν οἰκίαν διορύξας καὶ τὰ χρήματα λάβοι καὶ αὐτόν τί με κακὸν ἐργάσαιτο , Philostr. VA VII 23. -- On

the use of the article with πολύς in the phrase ὁ πολὺς πλοῦτος see K-G I p.636. -- βαλλάντια τοξεύειν is a rather peculiar phrase, but the verb seems guaranteed by σκοπός, and a clear enough meaning results: evildoers make great wealth their target. For the metaphor cf. e.g. E. fr.850 ἡ γὰρ τυραννὶς πάντοθεν τοξεύεται / δεινοῖς ἐρωτιν; Hor. Od. II 16.17-18 'quid brevi fortes iaculamur aevo / multa?'; Plut. Aratus 15.5 πρὸς ... τοξευομένους ἔρωτι φιλίας βασιλέων καὶ τυράννων; Philo 15.48 πλοῦτον γὰρ ἢ δόξαν ἕκαστος ὡς σκοπὸν προτεθείμενος ἐπὶ τοῦτον ὥσπερ βέλη τὰς τοῦ βίου πράξεις ἀπάσας ἀφιεὶς ἰσόμοιρος ἁλίσκεται. On βαλλάντιον as an everyday object which tends to be mentioned in texts influenced by popular philosophy see Kindstrand on Bion fr.42A-B (p.250). -- For sycophants see Latte in RE s.v. συκοφάντης, and cf. Charmides again in Xenophon's Symposium (loc. cit. above) ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοὺς συκοφάντας ἐθεράπευον, εἰδὼς ὅτι πλεῖν μᾶλλον κακῶς ἱκανὸς εἴην ἢ ποιῆσαι ἑκείνους.

5D6-7 καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς πονηροτάτοις μέτεστι: The thought is 'How can riches be the supreme blessing when wicked men possess them as well as good?' Wealth (sometimes, like Fortune, represented as a blind deity: Thphr. fr.78; Plut. Lyc. 10.4; [Plut.] Apophth. Lac. 226E; Macarius VIII 60; Apostolius I 53) notoriously favours the evil no less than the virtuous: cf. Solon fr.15 Bergk (= 4.9-12 Diehl) πολλοὶ γὰρ πλουτέουσι κακοί, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πένονται· / ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς τούτοις οὐ διαμειψόμεθα/ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸν πλοῦτον, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἔμπεδον αἰεί, / χρήματα δ' ἀνθρώπων ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει; Euripides Aeolus fr.20 μὴ πλοῦτον ἔπῃς· οὐκὶ δωρεάζω θεόν / ὃν κἀκιστος ῥᾳδίως ἐκτήσατο (cf. fr.95); Pl. Lg. V 742E; [Isoc.] Ad Demon. 6 πλοῦτος δὲ κακίας μᾶλλον ἢ καλοκἀγαθίας ὑπηρέτης ἐστίν; Galen Protr. 2 (Fortune) πολλάκις τοὺς ἀχειρολόγους ἄνδρας παρερχομένη πλουτίζειν τοὺς ἀναξίους, οὐδὲ τούτους βεβαίως, ἀλλ' ὅσον δοκεῖν πάλιν αὖθις ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὰ δοθέντα; Cic. Tusc.

V 46 'omitto divitias, quas cum quivis quamvis indignus habere possit, in bonis non numero'; Philo 23.265 (quoted above, 5D1-2n); Sen. Ep. 87.15 'Quod contemptissimo cuique contingere ac turpissimo potest bonum non est; opes autem et lenoni et lanistae contingunt; ergo non sunt bona.' -- For phrases like καὶ τὸ μέγιστον in the De lib.educ. cf. 4B6-8n. -- Harłman (De Plutarcho p.9) proposes to read μέτεστι ⟨ν αὐτοῦ⟩ since the verb is usually impersonal and accompanied by a genitive; but in fact the text as transmitted may stand: see LSJ s.v. μέτειμι II.2.

5D7-8 δόξα γε μὴν σεμνὸν ⟨μέν⟩, ἀλλ' ἀβέβαιον: For the thought cf. Philo 23.264 δόξαι δὲ καὶ πρὸς κτῆμα σφαλερώτατον, ἐν ἀκρίτοις ἤθεσι καὶ πονηροῖς λόγοις ἀνεξετάστων ἀνθρώπων κειμένων, 24.131 τὰ πρωτεῖα τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀνωτάτω τιμαῖς ἐνεγκάμενοι μυρίοι πρὸς ἠμελημένων καὶ ἀφανῶν ἀδοξίαν μετέβαλον. -- For γε μὴν in P see 2D6n.

5D8 κάλλος δὲ περιμάχητον μέν, ἀλλ' ὀλιγοχρόνιον: For the thought cf. [Isoc.] Ad Demon. 6 κάλλος μὲν γὰρ ἡ χρόνος ἀνάλωτεν ἢ νόσος ἐμάρανε; Philo 8.112, 24.130 οὐ κάλλος μὲν ἐφήμερον, πρὶν ἀνθῆσαι μαραινόμενον; De prov. fr.2.15 Colson; Ad Herenn. IV 38 'formae dignitas aut morbo deflorescit, aut vetustate extinguitur'; Otto Sprichwörter s.v. 'forma' 1. For περιμάχητος cf. e.g. Plut. Agis and Cleom. 17.10, Aratus 15.5, 17.1; Philo too uses it of κάλλος, 10.150.

5D8-9 ὑγίεια δὲ τίμιον μέν, ἀλλ' ὠμετάστατον: For the instability of health cf. Philo 24.130 ὑγεία δὲ ἀβέβαιον διὰ τὰς ἐφέδρους ἀσθενείας.

5D9-10 ἰσχὺς δὲ ζηλωτὸν μέν, ἀλλὰ νόσῳ εὐάλωτον καὶ γήρᾳ: For the thought cf. Philo 8.112 ἰσχὺς δὲ καὶ εὐτονία σώματος; ἆρ' ἡ τυχοῦσα νόσος ἐξέλυσεν; 24.130 ἰσχὺς δ' εὐάλωτον νόσοις ἐκ μυρίων προφάσεων (note the use of εὐάλωτον, as here).

5D10-E1 εἰ δέ τε ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ σώματος ῥώμῃ φρονεῖ, μαθέτω γνώμης διαμαρτάνων: Cf. 2C4-7 εἰ δέ τις οἴεται ... ἴσθι πολλοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦ παντὸς διαμαρτάνων, 10E8-9 ... εἴ τε μικρὸν καὶ φαῦλον ὑπείληφε, πλεῖστον διαμαρτάνει τῆς ἀληθείας. Hirschig (followed by Hartman) proposed ⟨μέγα⟩ φρονεῖ; but in late prose φρονεῖν can stand for μέγα φρονεῖν (LSJ s.v. II.2b; cf. Porson, Tracts p.92): cf. e.g. Pausanias I 12.5. -- μαθέτω γνώμης διαμαρτάνων means 'he should know that he is wrong': cf. e.g. Hdt. I 207.7 ἦν γὰρ ἐγὼ γνώμης μὴ ἁμάρτω; Thuc. I 33.3 τὸν δὲ πόλεμον ... εἴ τις ὑμῶν μὴ οἴεται ἔσεσθαι, γνώμης ἁμαρτάνει, VI 92.1 οὐκ ἁμαρτήσεσθαι σῶν γνώμης; Philo 34.132 γνώμης οὐκ ἥμαρτε, 38.223 γνώμης δέ, ὡς εἰκός, διημάρτανε. In such phrases, γνώμη seems to mean 'good judgement', so that γνώμης διαμαρτάνειν means 'to be ill-advised'. See Headlam and Fraenkel on A. Ag. 1664.

5E1-3 πόσον γὰρ ἐστιν ἰσχὺς ἀνθρωπίνη τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ζώων δυνάμεως; λέγω δ' οἷον ἐλεφάντων καὶ ταύρων καὶ λεόντων : Cf. Boethius Consol. III 8 (in a priamel, as here) 'iam vero qui bona prae se corporis ferunt, quam exigua, quam fragili possessione nituntur! Num enim elephantos mole, tauros robore superare poteritis, num tigres velocitate praeibitis?' The superiority of animals over man in strength, swiftness and other physical endowments is a common idea. The moral, where one is drawn, is generally that man's sole possession of the faculty of reason more than redresses the balance (cf. 5E4-10). See A.O. Lovejoy and G. Boas, A documentary history of primitivism and related ideas in antiquity (Baltimore 1935) pp.389-420; S.O. Dickermann, De argumentis quibusdam apud Xenophontem, Platonem, Aristotelem obviis e structura hominis et animalium petitis (Halle 1909) pp.48 ff and p.82 n.1. Cf. Isoc. 3.5 (cf. 15.253); Philo 8.161, 23.266-267, De prov. fr.2.14; Seneca Ep. 15.2, 76.9 (in a priamel, as here), 124.22, Ben. II 29.1; Pliny NH II 145, VIII 10, X 191; Plut.

De soll. an. 963A-B; Galen Protr. 9, 13; Alex. Aphr. Fat. 27. -- Note Herwerden's proposal to read δυνάμεως ⟨μέρος⟩, since πόστος usually accompanies a noun. -- For λέγω δ' εἶον see 1A7n.

5E3-4 παιδεία δὲ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν μόνον ἐστὶν ἀθάνατον καὶ θεῖον : For other high valuations of παιδεία cf. e.g. Pl. Lg. I 644B πρῶτον τῶν καλλίστων τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἀνδράσιν παραγιγνόμενον , X. Ap. 21 περὶ τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ ἀνθρώποις , περὶ παιδείας , Men. Mon. 2 ἀναφαίρετον κτῆμ' ἐστι παιδεία βροτοῖς , 384. The attribution of immortality and divinity is regularly made in respect of other prized qualities, especially in protreptics : cf. e.g. [Isoc.] Ad Demon. 19 σοφία γὰρ μόνον τῶν κτημάτων ἀθάνατον; Plut. De aud. poet. 30F μόνον εἶναι τῶν ἡμετέρων θεοφιλὲς καὶ θεῖον ἀρετήν ; Galen Protr. 2 (λόγος) ᾧ μόνῳ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν κοινωνοῦμεν θεοῖς; Iamb. Protr. 8 οὐδὲν οὖν θεῖον ἢ μακάριον ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις , πλὴν ἐκεῖνό γε μόνον ἄξιον σπουδῆς, ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως· τοῦτο γὰρ μόνον ἔοικεν εἶναι τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀθάνατον καὶ μόνον θεῖον.

5E4-10 -- (Two things, intelligence and reason, are supreme in human nature, the latter subordinate to the former, being invulnerable alike to fortune, to crime, to illness and to age -- for only intelligence flourishes instead of declining with the years.) -- This section on nous and logos is a digression from the subject of paideia which P has left at 5E4 and to which he returns at 5E10. The reasons for its insertion here are obscure, but perhaps the most likely explanation is that the recent mention of the superiority of animals to man in physical prowess has tempted P to introduce the commonplace antithesis that only man possesses reason (cf. notes on 5E1-3 and 5E4-5). At any rate, he has been diverted for the moment from the main subject of his chapter in a rather unfortunate way. It is to be noted however that the qualities attributed to nous and logos are the direct

opposites of those which condemned the rejected rivals of paideia at 5C10-E4 (see 5E7-8 with n.). P may therefore have made some sort of mental identification between paideia on the one hand and nous and logos on the other -- perhaps going no deeper than the fact that they both belong to the intellectual sphere, in contrast with material attributes such as birth, wealth, glory, beauty, health and strength. If any such connection is intended, it unfortunately serves rather to increase the obscurity of the passage than to elucidate it. -- Further difficulties attend the attempt to sort out exactly what P understands by nous and logos here (see e.g. Glaeser's thoughts on the subject, pp.42-43). It seems fairly certain that nous is 'mind' and logos 'reason' (thus Carugno, GIF 9 (1956) pp. 345-347; most surprisingly Wyttenbach thought that logos here meant 'speech', and Glaeser considers this view). The two words occur quite frequently together as a sort of hendiadys standing for the rational principle in general (see 5E5n) and it is not surprising to find P apparently using them interchangeably when, having pronounced logos γήρᾳ .. ἀλύμαντος, he explains that only nous flourishes with age (5E8-10). But there is also an attempt to differentiate between the two at 5E5-7, where we are told that logos is the servant and subordinate of nous. The theory behind this postulated relationship is obscure and P makes no attempt to explain it; it simply adds one more element of confusion to the general picture. One is tempted to agree with Glaeser (p.43): 'Concedamus licet scriptorem eam distinctionem non de suo proferre, sed aliunde translatum ipsum non intellegisse'.

5E4-5 καὶ δύο τὰ πάντων ἐστὶ κυριώτατα ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, νοῦς καὶ λόγος : For the sentiment cf. e.g. Arist. Pol. VII 1334b15 ὁ δὲ λόγος ἡμῖν καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος, Philo 7.83

τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄριστον εἶδος ὁ νοῦς καὶ λόγος κέκληται , and for the conjunction of the two nouns in general Democr. VS 68 B 5.2.13, Philo 5.7, 16.51, 28.260. Plut. De tu.san. 124B, M.Ant. X 33.2. They are especially used to denote the faculty of reason which distinguishes man from the animals: cf. e.g. Philo 1.73 τὰ δ' (sc. ζῷα ἄλογα) ὅτι νοῦν καὶ λόγον ἐκτέτμηται οὔτ' ἀρετῆς οὔτε κακίας μετέχει , Philo 36.75 ψυχὴν δὲ ζῴων ἁπάντων, ἀνθρώπων δὲ νοῦν καὶ λόγον , Plut. De fort. 98C εἰ μὴ νοῦν μηδὲ λόγον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔσχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν διέφερε τῷ βίῳ τῶν θηρίων.

5E5-7 καὶ ὁ μὲν νοῦς ἀρχικός ἐστι τοῦ λόγου, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὑπηρετικὸς τοῦ νοῦ : What P has in mind here is thoroughly obscure (see latter part of 5E4-10n. above). If nous and logos are to be distinguished, one would have expected logos to be the rational principle in the abstract, and nous the faculty of reason in man; but this is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with the present statement.

5E7-8 τύχη μὲν ἀνάλωτος, συκοφαντίᾳ δ' ἀναφαίρετος, νόσῳ δ' ἀδιάφθορος, γήρᾳ δ' ἀλύμαντος : logos cannot be taken away by fate (unlike πλοῦτος , which was τύχης κτῆμα, 5D3), or by crime (again unlike πλοῦτος , which was a σκοπὸς ... κακουργοῖς οἰκέτῃς καὶ συκοφάνταις , 5D5-6); finally it is invulnerable to both disease and age (unlike ἰσχύς , which was νόσῳ ἀνάλωτον καὶ γήρᾳ, 5D10).

5E8-10 μόνος γὰρ ὁ νοῦς πελαιούμενος ἀνδρί, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τἆλλα πάντα ἀφαιρῶν τῷ γήρᾳ προστίθησι τὴν ἐπιστήμην: Cf. Menander fr.643 Körte: εἰ τἄλλ' ἀφαιρεῖν ὁ πολὺς εἴωθεν χρόνος / ἡμῶν, τό γε φρονεῖν ἀσφαλέστερον ποιεῖ . The idea that wisdom increases with age is a common one (cf. e.g. S. fr.603; E. fr.619; Pl. Smp. 219A, Lg. IV 715D), though the opposite contention is also maintained (e.g. Hdt. III 134.3). See generally B.E. Richardson, Old age among the ancient Greeks (Baltimore 1933) pp.15-30.

5E10-F6 -- Paideia is the only possession which the torrent of war cannot sweep away. Hence the memorable reply of the philosopher Stilpon when asked by Demetrius whether he had lost anything in the sack of Megara: 'No, for war cannot make plunder of virtue'. -- In two Latin accounts of this story (Cic. Paradox. 8, Val.Max.VII 2ext.3) the protagonist is Bias of Priene, and Jaeger (Paideia II p.70)thinks that this was the original version. Whatever the truth of this, versions which give the central role to Stilpon are much more common: cf. Sen. Const.sap. 5.6, Ep. 9.18; Plut. Demetr. 9.8-9, De tranq.an. 475C; D.L. II 115-116; Iamb. ap. Simpl. In cat. p.403.17-19 Kalbfl.; Them. De virt. (preserved only in Syriac) p.30 (= Teubner III pp.36-37 ed. R. Mach); Hesychius Illustrius fr.61, FHG IV p.175; Maxim.Conf. PG 91c.828B; Gnom.Vat. 515a-b; Appendix Vat. 103 p.79; Joh.Dam. Exc.Florent. II 13.153. The texts of these passages are conveniently collected by K. Döring, Die Megariker (Amsterdam 1972) pp.47-49 frs. 151A-I, commentary p.141. -- On Stilpon, the third head of the Megarian school, see Praechter in RE s.v.(cc.2532-33 on the present anecdote). Megara fell to Demetrius Poliorcetes in the summer of 307 B.C. after his expulsion of Demetrius of Phalerum from Athens and before his capture of Munychia from the Macedonian garrison: see Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, 2nd ed., IV.1 (Berlin and Leipzig 1925) pp.150-151. P is in fact wrong to say that he destroyed the city (see 5F3-4 n.), though the anecdote presupposes some plundering. Stilpon will have been in his seventies at the time.

5E10-F1 ὁ γε μὴν πόλεμος χειμάρρου δίκην πάντα σύρων καὶ πάντα φέρων μόνην οὐ δύναται παιδείαν περιελέσθαι : For war as a vicissitude (like illness and old age) to which the summum bonum must be invulnerable cf. e.g. Hipparchus fr.2.3-4 (CAF III p.273) τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα καὶ πόλεμος καὶ μεταβολαί / τύχης ἀνήλωτ', ἡ τέχνη δὲ σώζεται ; Vitruvius VI praef.2 'namque ea vera praesidia sunt vitae,

quibus neque fortunae tempestas iniqua neque publicarum rerum mutatio neque belli vastatio potest nocere.' -- On γε μήν see 2D6n. -- For some χειμάρρους similes (mostly of armies) cf. D. 18.153; Plut. Pompey 19.7; Aristid. Panath. 131 Behr. δίειν, though mostly a poetic and late prose word, occurs nine times in Plato. -- ῥεῖν and φέρειν are regularly used of the action of a fast-flowing torrent, though more often than not in compound with παρά: cf. Plut. Marius 23.4, De aud. 41C, De def. 432A; Anna Comnena Alexiad praef.1; and other passages collected by L. Sternbach, Eos 4 (1897) pp.59-60. (On the strength of his parallels Sternbach defends the reading παραφέρων found in some mss. here, and would even emend ῥῶν to παραρρῶν.)

5F2 καί μοι δοκεῖ : P begins another sentence like this at 3E9-10, and cf. the parenthetical μοι δοκεῖ at 6A3 below.

5F3-4 ὅτε Δημήτριος ἐξανδραποδισάμενος τὴν πόλιν εἰς ἔδαφος κατέβαλεν : P does not just exaggerate here: he commits errors of historical fact. Demetrius did not enslave the Megarians, nor did he raze their city. Strabo, writing 300 years after the event, expressly says (IX 1.8) πολλαῖς δὲ κέχρηται μεταβολαῖς ἡ τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλις, σωζομένη δ' ὅμως μέχρι νῦν. A clue to P's error emerges from a comparison of some of the other versions of the anecdote. Plutarch, De tranq. an. 475C begins his account with the words ὁ Δημήτριος τὴν Μεγαρέων πόλιν κατελαβών, and Diogenes Laertius II 115 has Δημήτριος ὁ Ἀντιγόνου καταλαβὼν τὰ Μέγαρα. It seems clear that, whether by his own misreading of a source or by use of a text already corrupted, P read καταβαλών for καταλαβών (or some other part of καταβάλλω for the relevant part of καταλαμβάνω), and expanded the resulting sense with εἰς ἔδαφος. Interestingly enough the same error seems to underlie Themistius' account of the Stilpon story (loc. cit. 5E10-F6n.): 'Stilpo homo erat Megarensis, Megara autem ab Antigono (sic) destructa est'.

5F4-5 ὁ δὲ τὸν Στίλπωνα ἤρετο μή τι ἀπολωλεκὼς εἴη : Other versions of the story make it clear (as one would have guessed) that Demetrius wished, out of respect for Stilpon, to make restitution for whatever the aged philosopher had lost. -- For ὁ δέ = idemque see K-G I p.658.

5F5 καὶ ὅς 'οὐ δῆτα' ἔφη : καὶ ὅς is an Atticism: see K-G II p.228; Schmid IV p.612; LSJ s.v. ὅς A II.1. A conjecture of Wilamowitz puts it into the text again at 11C3. -- On οὐ δῆτα see Denniston pp.274-276.

5F6 πόλεμος γὰρ οὐ λαφυραγωγεῖ ἀρετήν : 'war does not make plunder of virtue'. For the verb, which is rare, cf. Strabo VI 3.1; Philo 1.152; J. AJ XIII 385; Apollod. II 7.7.-- Note that it is now arete which cannot be alienated by war, whereas at 5E10-F2 it was paideia (πόλεμος ... μόνην οὐ δύναται παιδείαν παρελέσθαι). This is a good example of P's carelessness in matching his illustrations with the surrounding context. -- P's version of Stilpon's famous retort has no very close parallels in the other accounts of the story (references 5E10-F6n.). Nearest because it mentions arete) is the anthologies' version τὸν γὰρ λόγον καὶ τὴν παιδείαν ἔχω ... ἄλλως τε οὐδένα στρατιωτῶν ἀρετὴν ἐπ' ὤμων ἐκφέροντα εἶδον . Cf. Diogenes Laertius: παιδείαν γὰρ μηδένα ἐξενηνοχέναι , τόν τε λόγον ἔχειν καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ; Plut. Demetr. 9.9 οὐδένα γὰρ εἶδον ἐπιστήμην ἀποφέροντα ; De tranq. an. 475C καὶ ὁ Στίλπων ἔφη μηδέν' ἰδὼν 'πρὸ' (ἐπιστήμην Duebner; τὴν ἐπιστήμην Pohlenz) φέροντα ; Iamblichus: καὶ ὁ εἰπὼν ὅτι ' ἐπιστήμην οὐδεὶς φέρει ' ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐννοίας εἴρηκεν; Themistius: 'nihil meum raptum est, neque enim quemquam ex armatis tuis sapientiam mihi eripuisse vidi'; Seneca Const.sap. 5.6 'omnia mea mecum sunt'; Ep. 9.18 'omnia .. bona mea mecum sunt'. (Bias says 'omnia mecum porto mea' at Cic. Paradox 8, 'bona ⟨omnia⟩ mea mecum porto' at Val. Max. VII 2 ext. 3.)

6A1-7 -- Similarly, Socrates refused to speculate on the happiness of the Persian king since he knew nothing of his state of virtue and paideia -- implying that happiness consists in these and not in the possession of fortuitous goods. -- P is here recalling from memory (see 6A3n.) a passage from Plato's Gorgias. More evidence of his familiarity with that work is provided by a passage in Chapter 10 (see note on 7D2-7). At Grg. 470E Socrates is in conversation with Polus (not Gorgias: see 6A3n.), who is trying to persuade him that the lot of an unjust man can be enviable. Polus adduces the example of King Archelaus of Macedon, but Socrates declines to pass judgement on the happiness of Archelaus, since he has never met him. Polus then replies: Δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα γιγνώσκειν φήσεις εὐδαίμονα ὄντα. Socrates: καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἐρῶ· οὐ γὰρ οἶδα πῶς πεπαίδευται ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης. Polus: Τί δέ, ἐν τούτῳ ἡ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν; This episode from the Gorgias was much quoted by later writers: see Dodds' collection of testimonia in his edition ad loc.

6A3 ἐρωτήσαντος αὐτόν μοι δοκεῖ Γοργίου : P is relying on memory, and his diffident μοι δοκεῖ is fully justified, since in fact Socrates' interlocutor at Grg. 470E is not Gorgias but his pupil and admirer, Polus. Gorgias himself has had his say earlier in the dialogue (449C-461B).

6A5-6 'οὐκ οἶδα' ἔφησε 'πῶς ἀρετῆς καὶ παιδείας ἔχει': What Socrates actually says in the Gorgias is οὐ γὰρ οἶδα πεπαίδευται ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης. P has remembered the general form of the reply but not the exact words.

6A6-7 ὡς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐν τούτοις, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς τυχηροῖς ἀγαθοῖς κειμένης: Cf. Polus' question (context 6A1-7n.) Τί δέ, ἐν τούτῳ ἡ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν; Again it would seem that P has a vague recollection of Plato's wording.

(9) 6A8-7B11: Rhetoric.

The long section which forms Chapter 9 discusses an assortment of rhetorical topics. It begins with a warning against permitting children to practise the sort of oratory which seeks to win the favour of crowds:

6A8-B6 Education, then, is all-important, but it must be education of the right sort. Boys should not be permitted to indulge in displays of ostentatious rhetoric, since to please the mob is to displease the wise, as Euripides testifies.

6B7-C2 I note too that men who court the approval of the crowd generally turn out to lead profligate lives; and no wonder, since if they purvey pleasure to others regardless of morality they will scarcely be able to conquer their own inclinations to pleasure and luxury.

At 6C2 (see n.) there is damage to the text, and a portion of unknown dimensions has been lost. When the text resumes, the subject is extemporisation, a second type of rhetoric which P holds that children should not be allowed to practise:

6C2-9 It is a sound rule never to speak or act offhand; as the proverb has it, 'Good things come hard'. But extempore speaking is slack and slovenly, the medium of those who know neither where to begin nor where to end, and an inducement to immoderate profuseness. Premeditation, by contrast, preserves due proportion in a speech.

6C9-E2 Pericles, we are told, often refused invitations from the people to speak, saying that he was insufficiently prepared. Demosthenes did the same; and if we doubt the reliability of the tradition, a passage from his speech Against Meidias confirms it.

6E2-8 Not that I would wish to see extemporisation completely banned regardless of the circumstances, but its use should be confined to cases where it may have a medicinal effect. Before manhood it is not to be recommended, but once a person's powers are firmly rooted it may be employed if the occasion demands.

6E8-F3 Just as prisoners released from long confinement still limp from the effect of their chains, so speakers long used to premeditation retain an ordered style even if called upon to improvise. But to let mere children extemporise is to encourage the worst sort of empty babbling.

6F3-7A2 Apelles, invited by a wretched painter to admire a quick piece of work, replied that he could tell the picture had been painted in a hurry and only wondered why it had not been possible to produce more of that quality in the same time.

P next harks back to the earlier part of the chapter (6A8-C2). The type of rhetoric condemned there represents in stylistic terms an extreme between which and its opposite lies the best style to cultivate:

7A3-B1 To resume: I counsel avoidance not only of the histrionic and bombastic, but equally of a style which is too pedestrian: the former is unsuited to public life, the latter deficient in impact. Speech, like the body, should be not just healthy, but positively fit and strong; and while playing safe may win praise, daring wins admiration.

7B1-5 (The same, in my opinion, applies to the human personality, where too much boldness and too much humility are equally to be deprecated, the former as leading to shamelessness, the latter to servility. As always, the middle course is best.)

7B5-11 A final point before I pass on. I consider a completely uniform style to be (a) a mark of tastelessness, and (b) boring and unendurable in delivery. In this, as in all things, uniformity is tedious, while variety delights.

It is no accident that Chapter 8 on paideia is immediately followed by two chapters whose subjects are rhetoric and philosophy. Between these two disciplines primacy in higher education had been contested since the time of Plato and Isocrates (see von Arnim, Dio von Prusa pp.4-114; Marrou pp.314-316; Kennedy pp.321-330;

Clarke p.5). It is clear from Chapter 10 (7C5, 7D2-3) that P's allegiance lies on the side of philosophy in this dispute; nevertheless, he wishes children to have some acquaintance with the encyclia (7C1-5), among which rhetoric was numbered; and in recognising some sort of rhetorical training as a legitimate part of education he is by no means unique among writers of a philosophical persuasion, such was the pervasive influence of rhetorical culture (cf. Marrou pp.315-316; Kroll in RE s.v. 'Rhetorik' (Suppl. VII) cc.1089-90).

Even allowing for damage to the text at 6C2, the chapter contains an odd assortment of topics and shows no signs of effective co-ordination. The first two sections are predominantly negative, being warnings against types of rhetoric which P considers unsuitable, while the third part (unconvincingly presented as a continuation of the first) contains his positive recommendations. Here he displays some superficial familiarity with rhetorical theory, but beyond the recital of the theory he has really nothing very much to say. This section is a compound of 'palpably well-worn commonplaces' (T.W.H. Atkins, Literary Criticism in Antiquity (Cambridge 1934) II p.310) in which there are signs of not a little confusion.

Finally, the presence here at all of a chapter on rhetoric requires some comment. Rhetorical training was normally a part of higher education (cf. introduction to Ch.7), but P is quite clearly thinking of children at this point (cf. 6F2 ἔτι παῖδας ὄντας). The explanation may lie in the fact that some rhetorical instruction, originally the exclusive province of the ῥήτωρ, had in the course of time descended to the γραμματικός (cf. Quint. II 1; Marrou pp.243-244, 260; Clark pp.63-64). The instruction given at this level would consist of progymnasmata, the elementary exercises which formed the student's first introduction to rhetoric (see on

these Marrou pp.260-264; Clarke pp. 25-26, 36-38; Clark pp.179-212). See introduction to Ch.10 for the same problem of early starting as it affects philosophy. -- On this chapter see Glaeser pp.44-49, Kemper pp.112-124; and on rhetorical education generally Kroll in RE s.v. 'Rhetorik' (Suppl. VII) cc.1117-19; Marrou pp.292-307, Clarke pp.28-45, D.L. Clark, Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education (New York 1957).

6A8-B6 -- Education, then, is all-important, but it must be education of the right sort. Boys should not be permitted to indulge in displays of ostentatious rhetoric, since to please the mob is to displease the wise, as Euripides testifies. -- This section and the next are devoted to condemnation of a type of rhetoric which aims only to give pleasure to its audience, and thereby exerts a corrupting influence, in P's view, upon those who practise it; his disparaging name for it is πανηγυρικὸς λόγος (see 6A10-11n.). Its style, we learn later (7A3-7), is theatrical and bombastic, too inflated to be of practical use in public life. P objects principally, from his ethical standpoint, to the damage done to the integrity of the practitioner's character by the elevation of pleasure and ostentation above all else; as Glaeser points out (p.44), his attitude is governed by his allegiance to philosophy, which traditionally distrusted both the compromise of the truth involved in appealing to the crowd and the popular appeal itself (cf. e.g. Plato's Gorgias, and 6A11-B1n). It is worth noting, however, that the trend in the rhetorical schools towards ornament and display as ends in themselves drew condemnation, from the first century B.C. onwards, even from critics fundamentally more sympathetic to rhetorical training, who deplored the growing artificiality of declamation and its decreasing utility as a preparation for public life. See Clark pp.250ff., Clarke pp.40-45.

6A8-9 ὥσπερ ... οὕτως αὖ πάλιν : The transition is, as often,

rather clumsily managed. P. uses the same formula below at 7A3-4. For ὡς πάλιν cf. 7A4, 11E1, 13C7, 13D5.

6A8-9 ὥσπερ .. παρεινῶ τὴς παιδείας τῶν τέκνων μηδὲν ποιεῖσθαι προὐργιαίτερον : A reference to the contents of Chapter 8. Here, however, παιδεία has reverted to its normal sense in P of 'intellectual education' (cf. introd. to Ch.8 and 5C6-10n.).

6A10-11 τῶν .. πανηγυρικῶν λήρων: 'from the nonsense of ostentatious public discourse' (Babbitt). It is clear from the context that the target of P's criticism is a type of epideictic oratory in which the natural properties of the genre have become exaggerated and corrupted. Epideictic (cf. Clark pp.133-136) is characterised by ornateness of language and aims to delight its audience (Cic. Or. 37, Quint. II 10.10-11); P's πανηγυρικὸς λῆρος turns ornateness into bombast (7A4) and makes everything else subservient to the desire to please (6B7-C2). -- πανηγυρικός is a word with many shades of meaning: cf. Ziegler in RE s.v. 'Panegyrikos'. In the technical rhetorical sense the πανηγυρικὸς λόγος (see Ernesti s.v.; Kroll in RE s.v. 'Rhetorik' (Suppl. VII) c.1129) was a species of epideictic oratory, originally the sort composed for delivery at a festival or gathering. But in popular parlance the adjective came to mean 'showy, ostentatious' as applied to persons, dress, behaviour, life-style or display of any kind (see Ziegler cc.559, 563 and Wyttenbach's n. on the present passage for a collection of occurrences in Plutarch). There can be little question that P is using the word in the latter sense, with the added implication which it often has of integrity sacrificed to outward display; but there is no doubt also a hint of the technical term, given that P's subject is rhetoric. -- On λῆρος see Schmidt, Synonymik I pp.173-175, and note especially sense D on p.174: 'in verächtlicher Weise der

Unsinn, der hinter hochtrabenden und gewählten Wörtern oft verborgen ist'.

6A11 ὡς πορρωτάτω τοὺς υἱεῖς ἀπάγειν : Cf. 9F4 τῆς κιθαρῳδικῆς ἀπακτέον τοὺς υἱούς, 12F8-10 ἀπέχεσθαι... τῶν πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπάγειν δεῖ τοὺς παῖδας. Similar too is 12D2-3 καθόλου δ' ἀπείργειν προσήκει τοὺς παῖδας τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πονηροὺς ἀνθρώπους συνουσίας.

6A11-B1 τὸ γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν τοῖς σοφοῖς ἐστιν ἀπαρέσκειν : For the calculated symmetry of ἀρέσκειν and ἀπαρέσκειν cf. 9A10-B1 πατέρας, οἷς τὸ λίαν φιλεῖν τοῦ μὴ φιλεῖν κάκιον κατέστη. -- For the common philosophical view that the values of the crowd and of the wise man are incompatible cf. e.g. Epicurus fr.131 Arrighetti οὐδέποτε ὠρέχθην τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν· ἃ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἤρεσκεν οὐκ ἔμαθον, ἃ δ' ἤδειν ἐγὼ μακρὰν ἦν τῆς ἐκείνων αἰσθήσεως; Antisthenes fr.178c Caizzi (=D.L. VI 8) πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα "πολλοί σε ἐπαινοῦσι", "τί γάρ" ἔφη "κακὸν πεποίηκα;" Chrysippus fr.10 (SVF II p.4, = D.L. VII 182) ἀνειδισθείς ὑπό τινος ὅτι οὐκὶ παρ' Ἀρίστωνι μετὰ πολλῶν σχολάζοι, "Εἰ τοῖς πολλοῖς" εἶπε "προσεῖχον, οὐκ ἂν ἐφιλοσόφουν", Plut. Phocion 8.5, Sen. Vit. beat. 2.1, Ep. 29.11 'Quis enim placere populo potest cui placet virtus?', cf. 7.12, 99.17, 108.7.

6B1-2 μαρτυρεῖ δέ μου τῷ λόγῳ καὶ Εὐριπίδης λέγων etc.: P again introduces a quotation in this way at 11E6-7 μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτοις Εὐριπίδης οὕτω λέγων etc.; and cf. 10A7-8 ἔχω δὲ μάρτυρα τούτου Εὐριπίδην τὸν σοφὸν ἐπιγεγέσθαι λέγοντα etc. Cf. e.g. Hdt. IV 29 μαρτυρέει δέ μοι τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ Ὁμήρου ἔπος ἐν Ὀδυσσείῃ ἔχον ὧδε ...; X. Mem. II 1.20 μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ἐν τῷδε ... Plutarch, it seems, never uses this formula to introduce a quotation (Wyttenbach ad. loc.; Weissenberger II p.8). For instances of similar expressions in other writers (not

necessarily followed by quotations) cf. e.g. Hdt. II 18.1; X Cyr. VIII 8.27; D. 5.9; Philo 4.129, 9.17, 12.29, 15.44 and other frequent occurrences listed in Leisegang's index s.v. μαρτυρεῖν.

6B3-6 ἐγὼ δ' ἄκομψος εἰς ὄχλον δοῦναι λόγον, / εἰς ἥλικας δὲ κωλίγους σοφώτερος,' / ' οἱ δὲ ἐν σοφοῖς / φαῦλοι πρὸς ὄχλῳ μουσικώτεροι λέγειν.': The quotation is Hippolytus 986-989, minus the first part of 988. (P has already quoted lines 424-425 at 1C3-4.) Hippolytus, protesting to Theseus his innocence of any liaison with Phaedra, is disclaiming all skill at speech-making. Aristotle has this same passage of Euripides in mind at Rh. II 1395b27-31. -- Some editors of the De lib. educ. restore the beginning of line 988, ἔχει δὲ μοῖραν καὶ τόδ', but P has probably omitted these words deliberately to heighten the contrast (cf. Russell on Longinus 26.1 and his introduction p.1). The change from Euripides' οἱ γὰρ ἐν σοφοῖς to οἱ δὲ ἐν σοφοῖς was a necessary consequence of the omission.

6B7-C2 -- I note too that men who court the approval of the crowd generally turn out to lead profligate lives; and no wonder, since if they purvey pleasure to others regardless of morality they will scarcely be able to conquer their own inclinations to pleasure and luxury. -- P now raises another objection to the ostentatious type of rhetoric he is attacking, namely its deleterious effect on the character of those who practise it. The assumption of a connection between style and morals is a familiar one in ancient literature: cf. e.g. Pl. R. III 400D Τί δ' ὁ τρόπος τῆς λέξεως ... καὶ ὁ λόγος; οὐ πῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἤθει ἕπεται; Cic. Tusc. V 47 'qualis .. ipse homo esset talem esse eius orationem'; D.H. I 1.13 ἐπιεικῶς γὰρ ἅπαντες νομίζουσιν εἰκόνας εἶναι τῆς ἑκάστου ψυχῆς τοὺς λόγους; Sen. Ep. 29.11 'malis artibus popularis favor quaeritur. Similem te illis facias oportet: non probabunt nisi agnoverint'; 40.6; 114.1, 11 'ubicumque videris orationem

corruptam placere, ibi mores quoque a recto descivisse non erit dubium'; 115.2 'cuiuscumque orationem videris sollicitam et politam, scito animum quoque non minus esse pusillis occupatum'; Quint. XI 1.30 'Profert enim mores plerumque oratio et animi secreta detegit: nec sine causa Graeci prodiderunt ut vivat quemque etiam dicere'; Plut. Cic. 50.4 ἔστι δέ τις καὶ τοῦ ἤθους ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἑκατέρου διόψις ; Juv. IV 82 'cuius erant mores qualis facundia'; Aristid. 2.392 Behr οὐκ ἀποστατεῖ δὲ οὐδὲ ἡ παροιμία τούτων ἡ λέγουσα οἷος ὁ τρόπος, τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ τὸν λόγον· καὶ πάλιν τὸ ἕτερον ὡσαύτως; Otto, Sprichwörter p.257; further references in J.C. Bramble, Persius and the Programmatic Satire (Cambridge 1974) pp.23-24. As these passages show, style was more usually thought of as the reflection and product of character, whereas P here suggests that the adoption of a popular style can actually harm a person's character.

6B7 ὁρῶ δ' ἔγωγε : cf. 9A10 ἤδη δέ τινας ἐγὼ εἶδον πικρᾶς.

6B7-8 τοὺς τοῖς ωρφεπώδεσιν ὄχλοις ἀρεστῶς καὶ κεχαρισμένως ἐπιτηδεύοντας λέγειν : τοῖς ωρφεπώδεσιν ὄχλοις is contemptuous: 'crowds composed of rabble'; cf. Plb. IV 75.5 ἅμα δὲ καὶ συνδεδραμηκότος ὄχλου ωρφεπώδους, and for the adjective Plut. De coh.ira 454E, Lucian 45.83. -- The description ἀρεστῶς καὶ κεχαρισμένως ἐπιτηδεύοντας λέγειν of epideictic orators is no less than the truth, since it was an avowed aim of epideictic to please and entertain its audience (cf. e.g. Cic. Or. 37; Quint. II 10.11 'Si vero in ostentationem comparetur declamatio, sane paulum aliquid inclinare ad voluptatem audientium debemus'; III 8.7 'cum etiam in panegyricis petatur audientium favor'). But P from his philosophical standpoint takes a dim view of all such attempts (cf. 6B10n. below). -- For κεχαρισμένως cf. e.g. Pl. Phdr. 273E; Plut. Non posse 1098D, 1100D, 1102A, Brutus 6.12, Cimon 16.3;

Aristides 23.37 Keil. On participial adverbs in general see Schmid III p.77.

6B8-9 καὶ τὸν βίον ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἀκώτους καὶ φιληδόνους ἀποβαίνοντας : For ἀποβαίνω cf. 1A2-3, 2F1, 3B8. -- ἄκωτος means 'abandoned': cf. LSJ s.v. II; Plut. De aud. poet. 34D, De ad.et am. 55C, 57C, 60D, De cap.ex inim. 88F.

6B9 καὶ νὴ Δι' εἰκότως : Cf. 3D3 καὶ μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἀπεικότως.

6B10 ἢ γὰρ ἄλλοις ἡδονὰς παρασκευάζοντες ἀμελοῦσι τοῦ καλοῦ : As noted above (6B7-8n) the epideictic orator does try to give pleasure to his audience; but P here takes a totally unsympathetic view of the orator as merely a purveyor of pleasure to the masses which seems to owe something to Plato. Cf. e.g. Grg. 462C, where Socrates defines rhetoric as an ἐμπειρία κάμματός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἐπεργασίας ; and see further on Plato's attitude to rhetoric Kroll in RE s.v. 'Rhetorik' (Suppl. VII) cc.1054-57; G.M.A. Grube, Plato's Thought (London 1935) pp.208-215.

6B11-C1 σχολῇ γ' ἂν τῆς ἰδίας ἡδυπαθείας ὑπερόν τὸ ὀρθὸν καὶ ὑγιὲς ποήσαιντο : 'they could hardly be expected to place what is right and sound above their own personal enjoyment'. Note the correspondence between ἄλλοις ἡδονὰς παρασκευάζοντες and τῆς ἰδίας ἡδυπαθείας . ἡδυπάθεια (X. Cyr. VII 5.74, Oec. 5.1, Lac. 7.3) is common enough in Plutarch (see Wyttenbach's n. on De tu. san. 132C) and in Lucian (e.g. 25.36, 27.12, 36.25, 77.10.8). -- For σχολῇ γε introducing an a fortiori argument see LSJ s.v. σχολή B.2. -- ὑπερόν ποιεῖσθαι evidently means the same as περὶ πλείονος or προὐργιαίτερον ποιεῖσθαι . The preposition ὑπερόν occurs first in Aristotle HA III 513b32, but becomes common later: see P.T. Stevens, CQ 30 (1936) p.216, and Schmid I p.377 (claiming occurrences in Lucian, Polybius, Josephus, Plutarch, Aelian, LXX and NT). P has the word again at 10B4 τὸ τῆς ὀργῆς ὑπερόν γίγνεσθαι , where see note for further references.

6C2 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις .. τί ἂν τοὺς πλέθρους .... The two lacunae marked in Paton's text are preserved as blanks in a minority of mss.; other mss. offer a continuous text, with a supplement in some cases after πλέθρους to give the following: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τί ἂν τοὺς πλέθρους ⟨κρηστὸν ἕτερον διεξέλθωμεν, καὶ τίσιν ἀγαθοῖς ἐπιφύεσθαι παρασκευάζει;⟩ καλὸν γάρ τοι κτλ. M, the only ms. which marks both lacunae, assigns the space of 5 or 6 letters to the first and about 20 to the second; and although these may just be token gaps, from which no conclusions would be justifiable about the extent of the damage, a consideration of the context suggests that the loss may indeed be measurable in words or lines rather than whole sections or pages. It is true that when the text resumes at καλὸν γάρ τοι P is discussing another aspect of rhetoric; but rhetoric is still the subject, and πρὸς δὲ τούτοις perhaps even suggests that the transition came before the first lacuna. It is very difficult to see what the first lacuna requires in the way of restoration; the second, remedied, as we have seen, in some mss. by a makeshift addition whose ineptness betrays its origin, could be filled by a supplement as small as that suggested by Paton: τί ἂν τοὺς πλέθρους ⟨ὠφελήσειεν ἡ τῶν λόγων ἑτοιμότης⟩ (cf. 6E3 τῶν λόγων τὴν ἑτοιμότητα).

6C2-9 -- It is a sound rule never to speak or act offhand; as the proverb has it, 'Good things come hard'. But extempore speaking is slack and slovenly, the medium of those who know neither where to begin nor where to end, and an inducement to immoderate profuseness. Premeditation, by contrast, preserves due proportion in a speech. -- From 6C2 to 7A2, that is for a sizeable part of the chapter amounting to almost half, P's subject

is extemporisation, a second type of rhetoric which he holds that the young should not be allowed to practise. As we discover at 6E2-F3, he is willing to concede its use by adults, but even then in qualified terms which are so far from enthusiastic that it would be safe to assume in him a hostile attitude to speech without preparation in general. It is important to note that the kind of preparation which P favours is not written but mental, in the form of premeditation (σκέψις, 6C8). It seems likely therefore that the target of his criticism is the sort of exercise condemned also by Quintilian (II 4.15, quoted below 6E2-8n.), in which pupils delivered impromptu orations, with no opportunity granted for previous reflection, to the misguided delight of fond parents. -- Naturally enough, writers fundamentally more sympathetic to oratorical training than P had rather more to say in favour of extemporisation. Tacitus (Dialogus 6.6) makes Marcus Aper describe it as a supremely exhilarating exercise of the orator's skill. For Quintilian it is an accomplishment without which a man should not expect to make a career in public life (X 7.1), and a skill which can on occasion produce more dazzling results than any amount of preparation (X 7.13-14). But Quintilian is equally emphatic that the ability to extemporise well is the product of a long and laborious training (X 3.2, X 7.1), to be used with care (X 7.4 'neque enim hoc ago ut ex tempore dicere malit, sed ut possit') and never to be relied upon in preference to premeditation when time permits (X 7.20); he condemns those who make a game of launching into a speech without any preparation (X 7.21). Most important of all for the present passage, both Cicero and Quintilian consider that improvisation is not an exercise for learners (see 6E2-8n.). For an interesting survey of attitudes to extemporisation in the ancient world see Hazel L. Brown, Extemporary Speech in

Antiquity (Menasha Wis. 1914); the present passage is discussed at pp47-49.

6C2-3 καλὸν γάρ τοι μηδὲν εἰκῇ μήτε λέγειν μήτε πράττειν: The immediately preceding context is lost through damage to the text, but it is clear from what follows that speaking 'at random' is P's pejorative description of extemporisation. Alcidamas in his De sophistis, which is a spirited attack on written speeches such as those composed with such care by Isocrates, denies that to speak without a text is to speak εἰκῇ (Soph. 33); this is because he too, like P, recognises and advocates the benefits of premeditation.

6C3-4 καὶ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν 'χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά': The proverb occurs several times in Plato: R. IV 435C, VI 497D, Cra. 384A, Hp.ma. 304E. Cf. Hesychius and Souda s.v.; Apostolius XVIII 7; Zenobius VI 38; Gregorius Cyprius Cod. Leid. III 30, Appendix prov. V 22; and for the idea that nothing worthwhile is ever obtained without hard work cf. e.g. Hes. Op. 289-290, Epicharmus VS 23B 36, S. El. 945, Cic. Tusc. III 84, Hor. Sat. I 9.59-60, Otto, Sprichwörter s.v. 'arduus'. -- The thought here is elliptical, but can be expanded as follows: 'Worthwhile things are difficult; extemporisation is not difficult (cf. next sentence); therefore extemporisation is not worthwhile.' It is very interesting to note that Alcidamas produces a very similar argument to serve the purposes of his own rather different thesis (Soph. 3-5): πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐντεῦθεν ἄν τις καταφρονήσειε τοῦ γράφειν, ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ἐπίθετον καὶ ῥᾴδιον καὶ τῇ τυχούσῃ φύσει πρόχειρον ..... ἔστι δ' ἅπαντα τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ σπάνια καὶ χαλεπὰ καὶ διὰ πόνων εἰωθότα γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ τετριμμένα καὶ φαῦλα ῥᾴδίαν ἔχει (τὴν) κτῆσιν.

6C4-5 οἱ δ' αὐτοσχέδιοι τῶν λόγων πολλῆς εὐκερείας καὶ ῥᾳδιουργίας εἰσὶ πλήρεις: 'But extempore speeches abound with

slackness and slovenliness'. Both εὐκέρεια and ῥᾳδιουργία denote a reprehensible passivity in the presence of things which ought not to be tolerated; for the two words together see e.g. Plb. XII 25e.2 (cf. XVI 18.3).

6C5-6 οὔθ' ὅθεν ἀρκτέον οὔθ' ὅποι παυστέον ἐστὶν εἰδόσιν: The change from ὅποι to ὅπου would be a very easy one; but ὅποι παυστέον is defended by Hadjidakis, Ἀθηνᾶ 13 (1901) pp.635-640, with a list of parallels for πούομαι εἰς.

6C6-8 χωρὶς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων πλημμελημάτων οἵ ἂν ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα λέγωσιν, εἰς ἀμετρίαν δεινὴν ἐκπίπτουσι καὶ πολυλογίαν : For ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα meaning 'extempore' (again at 6E11-F1) cf. e.g. Pl. Smp. 185C, Cra. 399D, Cri. 107D; D. 1.1; Alcid. Soph. 33. P. uses also ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος (6E5-6) and ἐπὶ καιροῦ (6F2). For terms meaning 'extempore' in Plutarch see Jeuckens p.14. -- ἐκπίπτειν may be used in the sense 'run to excess' (LSJ s.v. 16); alternatively it may be a shipwreck metaphor (cf. e.g. Hdt. IV 138.1, VIII 13; Acts 27.17, 26; and a similar use of ἐξοκέλλειν at 5B7-8); or it may just mean 'degenerate, fall into' (cf. LSJ s.v. 11, citing Pl. R. VI 497B, Arist. Pol. VIII 1342b11). The word occurs again in an absolute usage at 9B4.

6C8-9 σκέψις δ' οὐκ ἐξ ἧς ἱκνουμένης συμμετρίας τὸν λόγον ἐκβαίνειν : 'but premeditation prevents a speech from exceeding its due proportions'. For σκέψις in this sense (again at 6D6 below, and cf. ἐσκέφθαι at 6D7) cf. Plut. Dem. 10.1 τὰς τοῦ Δημοσθένους σκέψεις καὶ παρασκευάς, [Plut.] Vit. x or.844F (of Demosthenes again) πρὸς τὰς τῶν καιρῶν ἐμβολὰς τὰς σκέψεις ποιεῖσθαι; Ernesti s.v. σκέπτεσθαι. On premeditation in general cf. Quintilian X 6. -- For ἱκνούμενος meaning 'proper, fitting' cf. Hdt. VI 84.3, 86.α.3; Thuc. I 99.3; oracle ap. D. 43.66; Arist. Pol. IV 1288b17, VII 1332b41, GA III 750b13, IV 772a8, Pr. XX 924b14; and for συμμετρία applied to discourse cf. e.g. [Plut.] Cons. ad Apoll. 114C.

6C9-E2 -- Pericles, we are told, often refused invitations from the people to speak, saying that he was insufficiently prepared. Demosthenes did the same; and if we doubt the reliability of the tradition, a passage from his speech Against Meidias confirms it. -- As often, P now appeals to classical precedents for support in his argument. (a) Pericles. We are not told elsewhere specifically that Pericles ever resisted popular demands for a speech on the ground of unpreparedness. His reluctance to speak extempore, however, is confirmed by Plutarch (Dem. 9.2 quoted below at 6D3n), who agrees with P that in this respect he served Demosthenes as a model; and we know too that he deliberately rationed his public appearances, holding himself in reserve for really important occasions (Plut. Per. 7.7, Praec. ger. reip. 811C-D, cf. 812C-D). Pericles was known as a careful speaker (περὶ τὸν λόγον εὐλαβής, Plut. Per. 8.6), and the story of his customary prayer, before he ascended the bema, that no inappropriate word should accidentally escape his lips (Plut. Per. 8.6, Praec. ger. reip. 803F, Aelian VH IV 10, Quint, XII 9.13), suggests that he had usually considered well what he wished to say, and left only its verbal expression to spontaneous inspiration. See H.L. Brown (op. cit. 6C2-9n.) pp.79-87; and on Pericles' characteristics as an orator A. Schmidt, Perikles und sein Zeitalter (Jena 1877) pp.25-28, F. Blass, Die Attische Beredsamkeit I pp.34-39. (b) Demosthenes. Demosthenes' commanding ability as an orator was widely agreed in antiquity to owe more to unremitting labour and practice than to natural genius (cf. Hermippus ap. Souda s.v. Δημοσθένης· ἐπιμελὴς μᾶλλον ἢ εὐφυής; Plut. Dem. 8.3; Quint. X 1.106; Blass, Die Attische Beredsamkeit III.1 pp.74-80; Brown pp.123-124), and Plutarch (Dem. 8.3) cites his refusal of invitations to speak extempore as bearing this out: ἐδόκει δὲ τούτου σημεῖον εἶναι μέγα καὶ τὸ μὴ

ῥᾴδιον ἀκοῦσαί τινα Δημοσθένους ἐπὶ καιροῦ λέγοντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθήμενον ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ πολλάκις τοῦ δήμου καλοῦντος ἀνεμνήστι μὴ προελθεῖν, εἰ μὴ τύχοι πεφροντικὼς καὶ παρεσκευασμένος. Plutarch also mentions that whereas Demades often rose to support Demosthenes in a sudden crisis, Demosthenes was never seen to return the favour (Dem. 8.7); and in advising the aspiring statesman to cultivate the art of thinking on his feet (Praec.ger. reip. 804A) he remarks that Δημοσθένης ἥλαττοῦτο πολλῶν, ὡς φασι, παρὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἀναδυόμενος καὶ κατοκνῶν. Demosthenes' own testimony seems to confirm that he preferred not to speak extempore: Plutarch reports him as saying that his speeches were neither wholly written nor wholly unwritten (Dem. 8.5), which suggests a mixture of preparation and improvisation; and he is said to have defended preparation of public orations as an obligation to his audience (Dem. 8.6; cf. [Plut.] Vit. x or. 848C). Nevertheless, the tradition which represents him as incapable of speaking extempore (perhaps founded on Aeschines' account (2.34) of his speechlessness in the presence of Philip) certainly exaggerates: see Brown P.127 n.267; A.P. Dorjahn 'On Demosthenes' ability to speak extemporaneously', TAPA 78 (1947) pp.69-76, and two supplementary articles in TAPA 81(1950) pp.9-15 and 83 (1952) pp.164-171. See generally on Demosthenes and extemporary speech Brown pp.122-133; Thalheim in RE s.v. 'Demosthenes' 6 c.182.24-39.

6D1 ὡς ἡμῶν ἀκούειν παραδέδοται : An urbane turn of phrase borrowed by P from D. 23.66.

6D2 λέγων ἀσύντακτος εἶναι : 'saying that he had not assembled his thoughts'; cf. 'οὐ συντέταγμαι' put into Demosthenes' mouth at 6D4-5 below. There would appear to be no exact parallel for this meaning of ἀσύντακτος, an adjective usually applied to the external physical appearance of crowds and armies (e.g. X. Cyr. VIII 1.45, HG VII 1.16; Philo 25.250, 37.35, 172; Plut. Artox. 7.4, Per. 12.5

Phoc. 13.2, Timol. 12.6). Theophrastus, however, appears to have applied it to speech (D.L. V 39): θᾶττον ἔφη πιστεύειν δεῖν ἵππῳ ἀκλίνῳ ἢ λόγῳ ἀσυντάκτῳ.

6D3 Δημοσθένης ζηλωτὴς τῆς τούτου πολιτείας γενόμενος: Plutarch too detects the influence of Pericles in Demosthenes' reluctance to extemporise (Dem. 9.2): ἀλλ' ἔοικεν ὁ ἀνὴρ τοῦ Περικλέους τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἡγήσασθαι, τὸ δὲ πλάσμα καὶ τὸν σχηματισμὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ μὴ ταχέως μηδὲ περὶ παντὸς ἐκ τοῦ παραυτομάτου λέγειν, ὥσπερ ἐκ τούτων μεγάλου γεγονότος, ζηλῶν καὶ μιμούμενος, οὐ πάνυ προσίεσθαι τὴν ἐν τῷ καιρῷ δόξαν, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τύχῃ πολλάκις ἐκὼν εἶναι ποιεῖσθαι τὴν σύνεσιν. πολιτεία here means 'political career': cf. e.g. Plut. De unius in rep. dom. 826C λέγεται δὲ καὶ βίος ἀνδρὸς πολιτικοῦ καὶ τὰ κοινὰ πράττοντος πολιτεία· καθὸ τὴν Περικλέους πολιτείαν ἐπαινοῦμεν κτλ., Dem. 3.1, 11.7. Most probably P does not mean to imply that Demosthenes took Pericles' political career as his model in any other respect than his practice regarding extemporisation. Cf. however A. Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, 2nd edn., II (Leipzig 1886) pp.303-305 and W. Jaeger, Demosthenes (Cambridge 1938) p.159 for parallels in the political careers of the two men.

6D3-4 καλούντων αὐτὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων σύμβουλον: The occasions referred to must have been ones on which a sudden or unforeseen development created a demand for instant comment and advice. Cf. Brown p.125 n.261.

6D4-5 'οὐ συντέταγμαι': 'I have not put my thoughts in order'. Cf. ἀσύντακτος at 6D2 above, and see LSJ s.v. συντάσσω I.2 for the nearest available parallels.

6D5-6 καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως ἀδέσποτος ἐστι καὶ πεπλασμένη παράδοσις: 'Now this may be anonymous and fabricated tradition' (i.e. it is anonymous and may be fabricated?). See LSJ s.v. πλάσσω V for the meaning 'fabricate'. For ἀδέσποτος of written or spoken

material from an unidentified source cf. e.g. Plut. Cic. 15.2, Dem. 5.7, Otho 4.7, D.H. XI 50.2; [Plut.] Reg.et imp.apophth. 188D; Cic. Ad fam. XV 17.3.

6D6 ἐν .. τῷ κατὰ Μειδίου : Plutarch too is familiar with this speech; he quotes from it at Plat.quaest. 1010E-F, 1010F-11A, and refers to it at Alcib. 10.4, Praec.ger.reip. 817C, Dem. 12.3-6, An seni 785C.

6D7-E2 φησὶ γοῦν ἐγὼ δ' ἐσκέφθαι μὲν ὦ ⟨ἄνδρες⟩ Ἀθηναῖοι φημι κτλ.: The quotation is from In Mid. 191, where Demosthenes is countering an anticipated accusation of professionalism from Meidias. Its defensive tone is explained by the fact that expertise was generally regarded as suspect in a pleader of law-suits, so that speakers were often at pains to disclaim it: see Dover, Greek Popular Morality pp.25-26.

6D8 ὦ ⟨ἄνδρες⟩ Ἀθηναῖοι : The supplement is Hercher's to bring the text into line with that of Demosthenes. (ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι is the usual form of address in Demosthenes, much less often just ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, and never ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι: see Rehdantz and Blass s.v. 'Anrede'.) But although it is true that ἄνδρες has been lost in the majority of mss., there are four which preserve here the compendium $\overset{\theta}{\omega}$, the correct expansion of which is ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι (see W. Wyse, The Speeches of Isaeus (Cambridge 1904) p.229; V. Gardthausen, Griechische Palaeographie, 2nd edn., II (Leipzig 1913) p.352. Incorrect interpretation of this compendium doubtless accounts for the loss of ἄνδρες in the other mss.

6D8-9 κοὐκ ἂν ἀρνηθείην καὶ μεμελετηκέναι : Paton, following earlier editors, has restored καὶ μεμελετηκέναι from Demosthenes; all mss. of the De lib.educ. have κατεμεμελετηκέναι, and this should perhaps be allowed to stand as having at least a chance of being what P wrote (though not of course what Demosthenes wrote);

κατημελετῶν is in itself a perfectly respectable and intelligible word. Corruption of καί to κατ- is of course palaeographically very easy (and helped here by the fact that καί is emphatic, not copulative); but the error may already have existed in P's copy of Demosthenes.

6E1 τοιοῦτε πεθὼν καὶ πάσχων: Demosthenes had been assaulted by Meidias while acting as choregus at the Great Dionysia of 349/348 B.C., but this was only the culmination of hostility and provocation stretching back over some 16 years. See further Thalheim in RE s.v. 'Demosthenes' 6 c.172; A.W. Pickard-Cambridge, Demosthenes and the last days of Greek freedom (London 1914) pp.211-212, 217-220; W.W. Goodwin, Demosthenes Against Meidias (Cambridge 1906) pp.130-138; Blass, Die Attische Beredsamkeit III.1 pp.328-341.

6E2-8 -- Not that I would wish to see extemporisation completely banned regardless of the circumstances, but its use should be confined to cases where it may have a medicinal effect. Before manhood it is not to be recommended, but once a person's powers are firmly rooted it may be employed if the occasion demands. -- Up to this point, P has written as if he disapproved unconditionally of all extemporary speech. Now, however, he concedes (a) that there are times when it may serve a useful purpose (this is the meaning of his reference to 'medicinal' use: see 6E4-5n.), and (b) that he objects principally to participation in it by the young, and not so much by experienced speakers. Although P does not elaborate on the first point, it seems likely that he means by it to recognise that sudden eventualities may require a speaker to improvise whether he likes to or not. This is conceded by other writers who are also, on balance, in favour of preparation whenever possible: cf. e.g. Plut. Praec.ger.reip. 803F-804A μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐσκεμμένῳ περὶ καὶ μὴ δικκένῳ τῷ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι

πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς μετ' ἀσφαλείας . . . δεῖ δὲ ὅμως πρὸς τὰς ἀπαντήσεις τὸν λόγον εὔστροφον ἔχειν καὶ γεγυμνασμένον. ἔξεις γὰρ οἱ καιροὶ καὶ πολλὰ φέροντες ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀίφνιδια ; and Quint. X 7.1-4 for illustration of the types of occasions which demand improvisation. On the second point, the unsuitability of extemporisation as an exercise for young learners of oratory, P has the agreement of both Cicero and Quintilian: cf. Cic. De or. I 150 'quam ob rem in istis ipsis exercitationibus, etsi utile est etiam subito saepe dicere, tamen illud utilius, sumpto spatio ad cogitandum paratius atque accuratius dicere'; Quint. II 4.15 'cum iam formam rectae atque emendatae orationis accipient, extemporalis garrulitas nec expectata cogitatio et vix surgendi mora circulatoriae vere iactationis est'. As we shall see (6E8-F3), P believes that extemporisation can be safely indulged in only by those who already have a sound basis in the discipline of premeditation.

6E3 τῶν λόγων τὴν ἑτοιμότητα : From the context this clearly means 'extemporary speech'.

6E4-5 ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν φαρμάκου μοίρᾳ τοῦτο ποιητέον ἐστί: In recommending the 'medicinal' use of extemporary speech P means to convey that, though normally harmful, it may occasionally be employed to beneficial effect. The concept originates with Plato's doctrine of the 'medicinal lie' (R. II 382C-D, III 389B, V 459D; cf. X. Mem. IV 2.17; Max.Tyr. XIX 3; Celsus ap. Origen Cels. IV 18; Clem.Al. Strom. VII 9.53.2), but comes by extension to be applied to any measure which, though ordinarily bad, may in exceptional circumstances be legitimately employed to bring about a good result (cf. e.g. Thphr. CP III 10.3, VI 12.7; Clem.Al. Paed. II 2.23.1, III 7.41.5; Euseb. PE I 5.3). -- The Platonic phrase is (ὡς) ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει (never μοίρᾳ, though he has it with other

nouns: Phlb. 54C, Lg. II 656B. ἐν φαρμάκου μοίρᾳ occurs however in Origen and Eusebius (refs. above). Theophrastus has ἐν φαρμάκου μέρει (CP III 10.3) and ἐν φαρμάκου λόγῳ (CP VI 12.7).

6E5-6 ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος : 'extempore'. For the phrase cf. e.g. Plut. Sept.sap.conv. 154A, Q.conv. 634D.

6E7 τῶν καιρῶν καλούντων : For καιρός as subject of καλεῖν cf. e.g. S. Ph. 466, D. 18.172, Carmina popularia 19 Page (PMG p.458), and for the personification of καιρός as subject of other verbs see J.D. Denniston, Greek Prose Style (Oxford 1952) p.32. Plutarch has καιροῦ καὶ πράξεως ἀπαιτούσης at De la.ips. 539E.

6E7 ἐλευθεριάζειν τοῖς λόγοις : From the context this clearly means 'to extemporise'. There seems to be no parallel for ἐλευθεριάζειν in this sense; normally it means 'to behave like a free man' or 'to be free' (from).

6E8 προσῆκεν : The imperfect occurs again at 7B3, 8C5, 11D6-7, 11F3, 12B8, 12E6, 12F3, 13A10, 14B4; cf. προσήκει at 1D8, 3E4, 12D2. On the use of the imperfect cf. K-G I 204 ff.; Schwyzer II p.308.

6E8-F3 -- Just as prisoners released from long confinement still limp from the effect of their chains, so speakers long used to premeditation retain an ordered style even if called upon to improvise. But to let mere children extemporise is to encourage the worst sort of empty babbling. -- This section explains why adults can be trusted to extemporise when occasion demands: their long training in premeditation will keep them, by force of habit, on the right lines. It is interesting to note that Cicero and Quintilian hold a similar view as to the effect of the habitual practice of writing on extemporary speech: cf.e.g. Cic. De or. I 152-153 (152 'qui a scribendi consuetudine ad dicendum venit, hanc adfert facultatem, ut, etiam subito si dicat, tamen illa quae dicantur similia scriptorum esse videantur'); Quint. IX 4.114

'satis igitur in hoc nos componet multa scribendi exercitatio, ut ex tempore etiam similia fundamus': cf. X 7.7 -- The simile of the released prisoners is intended to make the point that a style which has been disciplined by the restraint of premeditation will retain its disciplined form even when the actual restraint has been removed. It is difficult, however, not to feel (with Wyttenbach, p.51) that P has committed an error of judgement in choosing the deformity induced by fetters as a comparison for the ordered style which he wishes to recommend. Interestingly enough, Alcidamas uses precisely the same simile (Soph. 17) to illustrate his very different contention that the habit of writing seriously mars an orator's ability to speak fluently in public. Here, much more naturally, the deformities of the released prisoners are identified with the self-induced handicap of the speech-writers which is the target of Alcidamas' attack: ὥσπερ οἱ διὰ μακρῶν χρόνων ἐκ δεσμῶν λυθέντες οὐ δύνανται τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίων ποιήσασθαι τὴν ὀδοιπορίαν, ἀλλ' εἰς ἐκεῖνα τὰ σκήμματα καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς ἀποφέρονται μεθ' ὧν καὶ δεδεμένοις αὐτοῖς ἀναγκαῖον ἦν πορεύεσθαι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἡ γραφὴ βραδείας τὰς διαβάσεις τῇ γνώμῃ παρασκευάζουσα καὶ τοῦ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἔθεσι ποιουμένη τὴν ἄσκησιν ἄπορον καὶ δεσμώτην τὴν ψυχὴν καθίστησι καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοσχεδιαστοῖς εὐροίας ἀπείρους ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται. It seems beyond doubt that a connection of some sort, however indirect, underlies the use of this simile by both Alcidamas and P, but further than this it is hardly possible to go. A similar comparison occurs in a different context at Cic. Tusc. I 75, where the disability of the released prisoners becomes a symbol for the soul's immersion in the body, unless philosophy has accustomed it to contemplative withdrawal from physical things as a preparation for death: 'nam qui in compedibus corporis semper fuerunt, etiam cum soluti sunt, tardius ingrediuntur, ut ii qui ferro vincti multos annos fuerunt.'

6E8-9 κἂν ⟨εἰ⟩ λυθεῖεν ὕστερον : Hercher's addition of εἰ is probably unnecessary, since post-classical Greek tolerates ἄν (= ἐάν) with the optative even though classical usage does not (see (5A3-4 n.). Although κἂν εἴ ποτε ... δεήσειεν εἰπεῖν (below 6E11-F1) would seem to support the insertion of εἰ it may be that εἴ ποτε cohere so closely that the basic construction is still κἄν with the optative. Both examples would then be parallel with κἂν προτείνειε which the mss. read at 5A3-4.

6E10 ὑποσκελίζονται : For the verb, meaning 'trip' cf. e.g. Philo 11.76, 20.55, 21.11, 22.146; Plut. De ad.et am. 65D; active usages D. 18.138, 54.8; Plut. De frat.am. 478F; Aristid. 3.407 Behr, 33.38 Keil.

6E10-11 οἱ πολλῷ χρόνῳ τὸν λόγον σφίγξαντες: i.e. adults who have had long practice at premeditation, which οὐκ ἐξ ἧς ἰκνουμένης συμμετρίας τὸν λόγον ἐκβαίνειν (6C8-9). For the dative πολλῷ χρόνῳ denoting duration of time (contrast πολὺν χρόνον immediately above, 6E8) see BDR pp.163-164. For σφίγγω used of compressing or restraining speech cf. e.g. D.H. Dem. 19, Demetr. Eloc. 244, Plut. Plat.quaest. 1011E.

6E11-F1 κἂν εἴ ποτε ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα δεήσειεν εἰπεῖν : On the construction see 6E8-9n. above. For ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα cf. 6C6-8n.

6F1-2 τὸν αὐτὸν τῆς ἑρμηνείας χαρακτῆρα φυλάττουσι : 'they preserve the same type of style', i.e. the controlled style (cf. 6C8-9) acquired by long habituation to premeditation. For ἑρμηνεία meaning 'style' see Ernesti s.v.; W. Rhys Roberts in CR 15 (1901) pp.253-255 and Demetrius on Style (Cambridge 1902) p.282; G.M.A. Grube, A Greek Critic: Demetrius on Style (Toronto 1961) pp.139-141. χαρακτήρ can also mean style, especially denoting the various categories of style identified by rhetorical theory (cf. 7A3-B1n.): thus actually χαρακτῆρες τῆς ἑρμηνείας at Demetr. Eloc. 35, χαρακτῆρες passim and cf. Gell. VI 14.1 (see Ernesti s.v.

χαρακτῆρες and A. Körte, Hermes 64 (1929) pp.79-83 for this and other rhetorical uses of the word). Here, however, to avoid tautology, we must assume that χαρακτήρ has its ordinary non-technical sense.

6F2 ἐπὶ καιροῦ : 'extempore'. For the phrase cf. e.g. Plut. Dem. 8.3 (quoted above, 6C9-E2n.), Ant. 6.2, Artax. 5.1.

6F3 ματαιολογίας τῆς ἐσχάτης αἴτιον καθίστατει : Cf. e.g. Quintilian II 4.15, X 3.2 for the degeneration of extemporary speech into nonsense. For ματαιολογία, a fairly rare word, cf. I Ti. 1.6; Vett.Val. III 12 (p.150.24-25 Kroll), VI 8 (p.257.23), IX 16 (p.360.4); Porph. Abst. IV 16 (p.255.14 Nauck); Diogenianus ap. Euseb. PE VI 8.11. For αἴτιον καθίστατει cf. 9A10-B1.

6F3-7A2 -- Apelles, invited by a wretched painter to admire a quick piece of work, replied that he could tell the picture had been painted in a hurry and only wondered why it had not been possible to produce more of that quality in the same time. -- The moral of this anecdote, though not explicitly drawn, is nevertheless clear: mere fluency (in speaking as in painting) is not to be confused with quality; extemporisation, as P asserted at 6C4-6, is slovenly and careless, and the lack of care and attention is liable to show up in the result. -- On Apelles, the great 4th century painter, see Pliny NH XXXV 79-97, Rossbach in RE s.v. 13, G. Wustmann, Apelles Leben und Werke (Leipzig 1870), E. Pfuhl, Malerei und Zeichnung der Griechen (Munich 1923) II pp.735-746, and the useful collections of sources in J. Overbeck, Die antiken Schriftquellen zur Geschichte der bildenden Künste bei den Griechen (Leipzig 1868) pp.344-358 and A. Reinach, Recueil Milliet: Textes Grecs et Latins relatifs à l'histoire de la peinture ancienne I (Paris 1921) pp.314-360. The present story (Overbeck p.348 no.1843, Reinach p.328 no.420, cf. Wustmann p.92) is not found elsewhere, and the fact that it seems to be quite in keeping with Apelles'

characteristic candour ('fuit non minoris simplicitatis quam artis', Pliny NH XXXV 80) may as easily provide grounds for suspicion as evidence of authenticity. In the absence of details such as a name and a location, not even an intelligent guess is possible. Apelles was a figure of whom many anecdotes were current in antiquity (cf. Rossbach c.2689.47-56, Wustmann pp.79-93), among them one or two involving criticism of fellow-painters, as here. Cf. for example his observation, on viewing an over-meticulous work by his rival Protogenes, that in all other respects Protogenes was his equal, or even his superior, but that he (Apelles) knew when to take his hand away from a picture (Pliny NH XXXV 80); and his remark to a pupil who had painted Helen decked with gold: 'You couldn't make her beautiful, so you've made her rich instead' (Clem. Al. Paed. II 12. 125.3).

6F3-4 ζωγράφος φασὶν Ἄθλιος: φασίν is parenthetic: 'as they say'. Cf. Schmid I p.296, II p.164, III p.325, IV pp.238-239; and for the use of the 3rd person plural with no subject expressed (as at 9D10 ἐμυθολόγησαν) K-G I p.33, LSJ s.v. φημί II.1.

6F4-5 'τοῦτον' ἔφη 'νῦν ἔγραφα': νῦν has to be understood here as meaning 'only just now' (sc. within a very short space of time: Tucker translates 'at one sitting'); and to Apelles' rejoinder, θαυμάζω δὲ πῶς οὐχὶ τοσούτους πλείους ἔγραφες, we must mentally supply 'within the same short space of time'. These are not particularly easy or natural supplements to make, but they seem to be necessary. The point must be that the painting is so bad that the only wonder is that it took so long to paint.

7A30B1 -- To resume: I counsel avoidance not only of the histrionic and bombastic, but equally of a style which is too pedestrian: the former is unsuited to public life, the latter deficient in impact. Speech, like the body, should be not just

healthy, but positively fit and strong; and while playing safe may win praise, daring wins admiration. -- This passage is reminiscent of Aristotle's doctrine, at Rh. III 1404b1-4, that every good style is a mean between two faulty extremes: ὡρισθω λέξεως ἀρετὴ σαφῆ εἶναι (σημεῖον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ λόγος, ὃν ἐὰν μὴ δηλοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον) καὶ μήτε ταπεινὴν μήτε ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν. But indications at 7A6-7 (see n.) suggest that P is also influenced by the later rhetorical theory of the three styles, grand, plain and intermediate. Since they have in common a pair of opposites with a third member midway between them, the Aristotelian theory and the doctrine of the three styles are easily confused, as P appears to confuse them here; nevertheless, they are historically and logically distinct. For Aristotle, the mean is the single correct form of any style, flanked by two incorrect extremes; but the later scheme comprises three particular and equally correct styles, appropriate to different functions and occasions, among which the middle style enjoys no preferential status (except in the subjective judgement of some individuals: e.g. D.H. Dem. 34). On these two theories and the connection (or lack of connection) between them, see especially G.L. Hendrickson, 'The Peripatetic mean of style and the three stylistic characters', AJPh 25 (1904) pp.125-146, and 'The origin and meaning of the ancient characters of style', AJPh 26 (1905) pp.249-290. On the three styles see also W. Kroll in RE s.v. 'Rhetorik' (Suppl. VII) cc.1074-75; Austin on Quintilian XII 10.58; Russell, 'Longinus' On the Sublime (Oxford 1964) pp.xxxiv-xxxvi; R.Volkmann, Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer, 2nd edn., (Leipzig 1885) pp.532-551; Lausberg pp.519-525, Martin pp.329-345; further bibliography in H. Caplan's Loeb edition of Rhetorica Ad Herennium (1954) pp.252-253 note c, and Calboli's edition with commentary of the same work (1969), pp.287-289 note 31. -- The last two sentences of this section contain

rhetorical commonplaces (see notes, 7A7-9 and 7A9-B1) which P has inserted here without attempting to explain them or give them a context. Both emphasise the need to aspire to something more positive and exciting than a mere absence of defects; but apart from the fact that they are relevant in a general way to any discussion of style their introduction seems arbitrary and haphazard.

7A3-4 ὥσπερ τοίνυν ... οὕτως αὖ πάλιν : P has employed this infelicitous transition formula once already in this chapter: see 6A8-9.

7A3-4 ὥσπερ τοίνυν (ἐπανάγω γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοῦ λόγου πρόθεσιν) τὸ θεατρικὸν καὶ παρατράγῳδον: P is harking back to his earlier strictures on πανηγυρικοὶ λῆροι (6A8-C2), and τὸ θεατρικὸν καὶ παρατράγῳδον, corresponding to ἡ ὑπέρογκος (sc. λέξις) in 7A6, stands for the over-inflated style of that type of rhetoric. For θεατρικός in this context cf. e.g. D.H. Comp. 22 πανηγυρικῆς μὲν ἢ θεατρικῆς οὐδὲ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐφάπτεται χάριτος, Plut. Praec. ger. reip. 802E ὁ μέντοι λόγος ἔστω τοῦ πολιτικοῦ μήτε νεκρὸς καὶ θεατρικός, ὥσπερ πανηγυρίζοντος κτλ. For παρατράγῳδος, literally 'parodying tragedy' and hence 'bombastic', cf. Plaut. Ps. 707, Longinus 3.1, Pollux X 92, schol. on Ar. Ach. 1190, and see Kranz in RE s.v. 'Paratragodie'; P. Rau, Paratragoedia (Munich 1967) p.15. -- The phrase ἐπὶ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοῦ λόγου πρόθεσιν recurs at 12F8 (with ἀνακάμπω instead of ἐπανάγω), and in both places there is a v.l. ὑπόθεσιν. There are parallels for the phrase with both words, as Nikitin shows, p.7 (ἡ ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσις Arist. Rh. II 1392a3-4, APr. I 47a5, SE 183a34, and Plb. II 37.2; ὑπόθεσις Plut. De def. 423C, 431A); but, as Nikitin points out, ὑπόθεσιν would create hiatus with the preceding λόγου here and at 12F8, and this favours πρόθεσιν.

7A5-6 καὶ τὴν συντομίαν τῆς λέξεως καὶ τὸ τετανύειν παρὰ

διευλαβεῖσθαι καὶ φεύγειν : ἡ σμικρολογία τῆς λέξεως καὶ ταπείνωσις, corresponding to ἡ ἰσχνὴ λίαν (sc. λέξις) at 7A7, is the opposite vice to τὸ θεατρικὸν καὶ περιτράγωδον and denotes an excessively flat or pedestrian style. On the various meanings of (σ)μικρολογία see Steinmetz on Thphr. Char. 10; though it is not attested elsewhere in this sense, the addition of τῆς λέξεως makes it quite intelligible. For ταπείνωσις cf. Quint. VIII 3.48 'deformitati proximum est humilitatis vitium (ταπείνωσιν vocant), qua rei magnitudo vel dignitas minuitur', and ταπεινός as used, e.g., by Aristotle in the passage (Rh. III 1404b1-4) quoted at 7A3-Bln. -- διευλαβεῖσθαι and φεύγειν occur as a pair at Plut. De cap. ex inim. 90A.

7A6-7 ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπέρογκος ἀπολίτευτός ἐστιν, ἡ δ' ἰσχνὴ λίαν ἀνέκπληκτος: 'the over-inflated style is unsuited to public life, while the excessively flat style is lacking in impact'. P is doing here what he does again at 8A7-9 (on the relative advantages of the practical and contemplative lives), namely charging each of two opposites with some deficiency in order to make a case for a compromise or a middle course. Whether consciously or not, he has now dropped into the terminology of the threefold classification of style (see 7A3-Bln.), in which ἡ ὑπέρογκος and ἡ ἰσχνὴ λίαν (sc. λέξις) represent not faulty extremes on either side of a mean, but faulty varieties of distinct styles - the grand and the plain respectively. (For the theory that each of the three styles has its defective counterpart see Ad Herenn. IV 15-16 with Caplan p.263 note c, Calboli p.294 n.45, and Gell. VI 14.4-5.) ὄγκος ('weight, dignity') is a mark of the grand style (cf. e.g. S. OC 1162; Arist. Po. 1459b28; Plut. De prof. in virt. 79B; Longinus 3.3, 3.4; Lausberg p.522) and ὑπέρογκος denotes the grand style overdone: cf. Demetr. Eloc. 116,221. In the same way, ἡ ἰσχνὴ λίαν is the plain style overdone: ἰσχνός is actually one of the technical terms for the plain style: Tryphon Trop. p.201 Spengel (Rhet. III),

D.H. Dem. 33, Demetr. Eloc. 36, Quint. XII 10.58, Gell. VI 14.1. -- For ἀπολίτευτος cf. Plut. De glor.Ath. 349B, De Stoic.rep. 1034B, Non posse 1098D, Crass. 12.3, Lucull. 44.7, Lycurg. 29.8, Mar. 31.3; D.H. VI 80.4; Chio Ep. 13.3 (Hercher, Epistolographi p.201); and for the unsuitability of the epideictic style to the requirements of public life cf. e.g. Cic. De or. I 81, Or. 37-42, Brut. 37; Quint. X 1.79. -- ἀνέκπληκτος, here in the unusual active sense of 'unimpressive', has a certain appropriateness to the plain style, which was sometimes described as being close to the language of ordinary speech (Ad Herenn. IV 11, 14; D.H. Dem. 2.)

7A7-9 καθάπερ δὲ τὸ σῶμα οὐ μόνον ὑγιεινὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐεκτικὸν εἶναι χρή, καὶ τὸν λόγον ὡσαύτως οὐκ ἄνοσον μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄρωστον εἶναι δεῖ : This comparison (part simile, part metaphor, as at 9B6-9) has a striking parallel, suggesting a common source, in Tacitus, Dial. 23.4. There, as here, the point of the illustration bears upon the proper condition of eloquence: 'Porro ne in corpore quidem valetudinem medici probant quae animi anxietate contingit. Parum est aegrum non esse: fortem et alacrem volo. Prope abest ab infirmitate in quo sola sanitas laudatur.' The technical language of rhetoric in both Greek and Latin is rich in vocabulary and imagery drawn from the description of states of health and types of physique: cf. e.g. Ar. Ra. 939ff.; Ad Herenn. IV 15 (with Calboli's n.46, pp.294-295); Cic. Or. 76; Philo 12.157; Longinus 3.4; Quint. VIII Pr.19, X 1.33, 77; Pliny Ep. V 8.10; Tac. Dial. 21.8; and see C. Causeret, Étude sur la langue de la rhétorique et de la critique littéraire dans Cicéron (Paris 1886) pp.156ff. (and on 'health' in particular, p.158; cf. Ernesti s.v. 'sanus, sanitas').

7A9-B1 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀσφαλὲς ἐπαινεῖται μόνον, τὸ δ' ἐπικίνδυνον καὶ θαυμάζεται : Both thought and expression are so closely

paralleled by Longinus 36.1, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄπταιστον οὐ φέγεται, τὸ μέγα δὲ καὶ θαυμάζεται, that a common source seems certain (cf. Russell ad loc.). There is no real connection at all with what has gone before; P has simply slipped in another idea on the general theme of what makes for good style without introduction or explanation. The context has to be supplied from Longinus, for whom the maxim sums up the contrast (33-36) between faultless mediocrity and the uneven but magnificent performance of genius which, when it fails, fails in the attempt to achieve something splendid and exciting. The same thought is expressed by Pliny, Ep. IX 26.1-4 (e.g. 'frequentior currentibus quam reptantibus lapsus, sed his non labentibus nulla, illis non nulla laus etiamsi labantur. Nam ut quasdam artes ita eloquentiam nihil magis quam ancipitia commendant ... Sunt enim maxime mirabilia quae maxime insperata, maxime periculosa'); and a supplement proposed by John would restore a rather similar idea at Tac. Dial. 37.8. Cf also Quint VIII 5.32; and see Ernesti s.v. 'periculum'.

7B1-5 -- (The same, in my opinion, applies to the human personality, where too much boldness and too much humility are equally to be deprecated, the former as leading to shamelessness, the latter to servility. As always, the middle course is best.) -- This is a short digression from rhetorical matters, prompted by P's recognition that a mean is also the best solution in another sphere of human affairs. What he says here is rather reminiscent of another Aristotelian mean, αἰδώς: EE III 1233b26-29 αἰδὼς δὲ μεσότης ἀναισχυντίας καὶ κατα πλήξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδεμιᾶς φροντίζων δόξης ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ πάσης ὁμοίως κατάπλήξ, ὁ δὲ τῆς τῶν φαινομένων ἐπιεικῶν διάμεσος.

7B1 τὴν ⟨αὐτὴν⟩ δὲ τυχόντως γνώμην ἔχων κτλ.: Cf. e.g. Isoc. 7.73 τὴν αὐτὴν οὖν γνώμην ἔχω καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν. Hercher's supplement is essential, though since one ms. preserves a small

gap before the word τήν perhaps it should be written ⟨τὴν ὡ⟩τήν .

7B2-3 οὔτε γὰρ θρασὺν οὔτ' ἄτολμον καὶ κατάπληγα προσῆκεν εἶναι : θρασύς has its customary bad sense: cf. e.g. D. 8.68 θρασὺς .. καὶ βδελυρὸς καὶ ἀνάιδης and see Schmidt III p.546; for ἄτολμος see Schmidt III p.549. For κατάπληξ cf. e.g. Lys. 6.50; Arist. EE III 1233b28 (quoted above, 7B1-5n.); Plut. De la. ips. 545B, Praec. ger. reip. 814F, Fab. Max. 14.4, Per. 27.4; Ael. NA XVI 25 (p.403. 6 H).

7B3-4 τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἀναισχυντίαν , τὸ δ' εἰς ἀνδραποδωδίαν περίεστιν : boldness passes into shamelessness and meekness into servility.

7B4-5 ἔντεχνον δὲ τὸ τὴν μέσην ἐν ἅπασι τέμνειν ἐμμελές τε : This is a piece of advice which P himself follows in more than just the present passage: cf. e.g. 7F4-8B3, 11F2-12A2. The influence of the Aristotelian mean is no doubt somewhere in the background to this (see EN II 1106b27 with Gauthier and Jolif's n., and Lilla, Clement pp.64-65 on its influence) but the concept has become thoroughly vulgarised. Cf. e.g. Quint. IV 2.45, VII 3.17, XII 10.80 and see Otto, Sprichwörter p.216 s.v. 'aurea mediocritas'. -- For expressions like τὴν μέσην (sc. ὁδόν) τέμνειν see note on 13B2-3; and for this use of τέμνω see LSJ s.v. VI.2b, who compare e.g. Pl. Prt. 338A μέσον τι τεμεῖν , and Lg. VII 793A μέσον τινὰ (sc. βίον) τέμνειν ; cf. viam secare in Latin: Lucr. V 272; Verg. G. I 238, A. VI 899, XII 368; Quint. III 1.14.

7B5-11 -- A final point before I pass on. I consider a completely uniform style to be (a) a mark of tastelessness, and (b) boring and unendurable in delivery. In this, as in all things, uniformity is tedious, while variety delights. -- P's last word on the subject of rhetoric turns out to be a statement of his aversion to what he calls μονόκωλος λόγος. By the use of this term he most probably means to denote a flat uniformity of speech devoid of

stylistic ornament (see 7B6-7n.); and if we translate his affirmation of personal opinion into a precept, as P doubtless intends, it will be one which recommends the enlivenment of the spoken word by variety of all kinds designed to charm and hold an audience. This is a standard piece of stylistic advice for which parallels are not wanting: cf. e.g. Anaximenes Rh.Al. 22.2, Ad Herenn. IV 16, Cic. Inv. I 76 'variare autem orationem magnopere oportebit; nam omnibus in rebus similitudo mater est satietatis', D.H. Rh. 1.8 οὐ μονότροπον ταύτην (sc. τὴν τοῦ πανηγυρικοῦ λέξιν) συμβουλεύσειν' ἓν εἶναι ἀλλὰ ποικίλην καὶ μεμιγμένην, Comp. 12 (e.g. p.46 R δεικνύειν δὲ τὴν ταυτότητα φημι δεῖν μεταβολὰς εὐκαίρους εἰσφέροντα· καὶ γὰρ ἡ μεταβολὴ παντὸς ἔργου χρῆμα ἡδύ), Comp. 19 (a chapter devoted to the subject of variety), Quint. IX 4.43. See also Ernesti s.vv. ποικίλλειν, 'varius, varietas', Lausberg p.142, Calboli (op. cit. 7A3-Bln.) pp. 299-300 n.56. Since stylistic variety of all kinds was sought after as desirable, P's very brief and general observations need not be probed in search of more detail than they appear to contain. But it may be noted that the closest available parallels to his discussion concern the embellishment of speech with figures (σχήματα), on which see e.g. Ernesti s.v. σχήματα, 'figura'; Lausberg pp.308-455; Martin pp.270-315; Clark pp.89-94.

7B5-6 βούλομαι δ', ἕως ἔτι μέμνημαι τῆς παιδείας, ὡς ἔχω δόξης περὶ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν, ὅπ τὸν μονόκωλον λόγον κτλ.: In fact, P leaves the subject of παιδεία only at the end of Ch.10 (see 8B3-4 and introductory n. to Ch.8). -- Tucker p.295 and A.J. Kronenberg, Mnem. 51 (1923) p.436 propose ⟨ταύτης⟩ τῆς παιδείας, which would be an improvement; other attempts at emendation by Montesi (SIFC 20 (1913) p.20) and re-punctuation by Heusinger (followed by Sizoo, p.81) are less successful.

7B6-7 τὸν μονόκωλον λόγον : 'a completely uniform style'. In a chapter on rhetorical subjects it is tempting to assume that μονόκωλος will have the technical sense in which Aristotle (Rh. III 1409b13-17) and Demetrius (Eloc. 17) apply it to περίοδος, as a synonym for ἁφελής and ἁπλοῦς, to denote a period consisting of a single clause (cf. Ernesti s.v. ἁφελής, Lausberg p.463, Martin p.317; examples Demetrius loc. cit.). Thus Tucker translates 'a style consisting of single clauses', and Babbitt 'a discourse composed of a series of short sentences'. But μονόκωλος also quite frequently means just 'single' (with the literal meaning of the -κωλος suffix weakened or lost), in usages where the English translation has to be very flexible to suit the different contexts: e.g. Hdt. I 179.3 μουνόκωλα οἰκήματα ('in a single row'); Arist. Pol. VII 1327b35 some Greek peoples have τὴν φύσιν μονόκωλον ('one-sided'); Thphr. CP II 15.5, of a pear-tree ('without branches'); D.H. Thuc. 6 Thucydides differed from his historian predecessors κατὰ τὸ λαβεῖν ὑπόθεσιν μήτε μονόκωλον παντάπασι μήτ' εἰς πολλὰ μεμερισμένην καὶ ἀσυνάρτητα κεφάλαια ('monothematic' - Usher); and finally the passage which has the most interesting bearing of all upon the present case: D.H. Dem. 42 ἵνα μοι μὴ μονόκωλος ᾖ μηδὲ λυστηρὸς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ' ἔχῃ τινὰς εὐπαιδεύτους διεξαγωγάς. In this last example it seems clear from the contrast drawn that μονόκωλος means 'unrelieved by scholarly diversions', ie. 'uniform'; and 'uniform' (in some less well-defined sense) is almost certainly also what the word means in the present passage, where it is evident from what follows that uniformity (μονῳδία, or whatever we should read in its stead as the opposite of ποικιλία : see 7B9-10n.) is precisely the failing from which μονόκωλος λόγος suffers. The correctness of this interpretation is strongly supported by the use of μονότροπος, μονόσκηνος and μονειδής in passages very similar to the present one: for μονότροπος see D.H. Rh. 1.8

(quoted at 7B5-11n. above) and Ernesti s.v.; μονόσχημος and μονοειδής occur in Phoebammon and in the various Prolegomena to the rhetorical writings of Hermogenes: see the references cited at 7B8-9n. below.

7B7-8 πρῶτον μὲν ἁμουσίας οὐ μικρὸν ποιοῦμαι τεκμήριον : Cf. 13D8-9 τὸ γε δυσμενὲς καὶ δυσκατάλλακτον μισοτεκνίας οὐ μικρὸν τεκμήριόν ἐστι .

7B8-9 ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄσκησιν ἄψικορον καὶ πάντη ἀνεπίμονον εἶναι νομίζω : For the tedium of a uniform style which lacks σχήματα and (what P implies in his next sentence) the desirability of variety to avoid such tedium cf. besides the passages quoted at 7B5-11n. Phoebammon Fig. p.43 Spengel: one use of σχήματα is ἵνα μὴ ἁμαρτάνωμεν μονοσχήμονες καὶ προσκορῆ τὸν λόγον προσφέροντες, τὸ γὰρ ἀεὶ ὁμοίως ἔχον ἐμποιεῖ κόρον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ χρῆμα ἡδὺ καθέστηκε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡ μεταβολή, ὁ δὲ κόρος ἀηδίαν ἐργάζεται ; and the following passages from various Prolegomena to the rhetorical works of Hermogenes: Rabe, Prolegomenon Sylloge p.291. 6-11, p.303.5-8, p.389.16-21 τὸ δὲ γε ἡδὺ ἐκ τῆς ποικιλίας τῶν σχημάτων καὶ τῆς τῶν ἰδεῶν γνώσεως ἐργαζόμεθα· σκληρὸς μὲν γὰρ καὶ προσκορὴς ὁ μονοειδὴς λόγος, ἡδὺς δὲ καὶ πιθανώτατος ὁ ποικίλος καὶ πολυσχημάτιστος· μεταβολὴ γὰρ πάντων γλυκὺ κατὰ τὸν Εὐριπίδην (Or. 234). Cf. also Ernesti s.v. προσκορής. -- For ἄψικορος c f. [Pl.] Ax. 369A; D.Chr. 32.28; Plut. De aud. poet. 20B, De amic. mult. 93D, Amat. 752B, 759F, Non posse 1088B, Coriol. 4.1. ἀνεπίμονος must rather irregularly mean 'intolerandus' here, as Wyttenbach translates it in his Index (he cites no instances of the word from genuine Plutarch), not 'not enduring long' as LSJ.

7B9-10 μονῳδία γὰρ ἐν ἅπασίν ἐστι πλήρωμα καὶ πρόσωπα, ἡ δὲ ποικιλία τέρπνόν : It is clear from its opposition to ποικιλία ('variety') that μονῳδία ought to mean 'uniformity'; but in fact no such meaning for the word is attested. Instead, it

means (i) a solo performance, especially in drama (e.g. Ar. Ra. 849, 944, 1330; Pl. Lg. VI 764D, 765A); or later (ii) a lament or funeral oration (examples are Aristides 18 K, Himerius Or. 23 Colonna): see Maas in RE s.v. The case for emendation is therefore a strong one, and Radermacher (reported by Glaeser p.49 n.2) proposed μονο(κω)λία (apparently not attested elsewhere). But a better alternative is suggested by the parallels of the Prolegomena: μονοειδεία (cf. μονοειδής /-ως in the Prolegomena passages referred to at 7B8-9n.). Quint. XI 3.44 (where Quintilian is discussing pronuntiatio) can be cited in support of this: 'Ac ne quis pugnare inter se putet aequalitatem et varietatem, cum illi virtuti contrarium vitium sit inaequalitas, huic quae dicitur μονοειδεία, quasi quidam unus aspectus' (where, interestingly enough, the reading of ms. B is ΜΟΝΟΙΔΙΑ). Otherwise, μονοειδεία apparently occurs only at S.E. M. I 117 (as a synonym of ἁπλότης) and 226 (in the rather different sense of 'singularity'); but the adjective μονοειδής is constantly contrasted with ποικίλος : see, in addition to the passages referred to above, Hermogenes pp.222.3, 297.5 Rabe (and cf. p.320.4). — The general reflection that variety is pleasant and unformity wearying occurs in the same context at Cic. Inv. I 76 and D.H. Comp. 12 (both quoted 7B5-11n.), and in Phoebammon and one of the Prolegomena (p.389 Rabe) quoted 7B8-9n. Cf. also Arist. Rh. I 1371a25-31 (where Aristotle quotes E. Or. 234 μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ).

7B10-11 καθάπερ κἂν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν, οἷον ἀκούσμασιν ἢ θεάμασιν: καθάπερ κἂν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν seems a little awkward and redundant after ἐν ἅπασιν (7B9). For ἀκούσματα and θεάματα as a pair cf. e.g. Philo 28.174, 38.43, Socrates ap. Stob. II 31.44; θεάματα καὶ ἀκροάματα X. Smp. 2.2; ὁράματα καὶ ἀκούσματα Arist. EN X 1174b27-28, cf. Pol. VII 1336b2-3.

(10) 7C1-8P4: (a) Philosophy.
(b) Books.

P turns in Chapter 10 to philosophy, the rival of rhetoric for pre-eminence in education. The chapter divides naturally into three sections. First there is a passage on the place of the encyclia as compared with philosophy:

7C1-8 Free-born children must not be ignorant of any of the encyclia, but should learn in the passing only enough to get the flavour, while giving pride of place to philosophy. To use a comparison, it is good to travel widely but choose the best place of all to live in.

7C8-D2 Bion wittily remarked that those who study other subjects because philosophy is denied them are like the suitors who, disappointed in their hopes of winning Penelope, made do with her maids.

There then follows a longer passage in which P describes the functions and the lessons of philosophy in complimentary terms:

7D2-7 Philosophy, then, should occupy the principal place in education. To care for the body man has invented two sciences, medicine and gymnastics, the first giving health and the second fitness. But philosophy alone is the cure for the ills and sufferings of the soul.

7D7-E5 It is through philosophy that we are able to distinguish right from wrong, justice from injustice, what we should choose from what we should shun. It teaches us our duties to worship the gods, honour our parents, respect our elders, obey the laws, submit to rulers, show affection to our friends, behave with moderation towards women, love our children, and not abuse slaves.

7E5-F4 Above all, it teaches us self-possession in good fortune and bad, restraint in pleasures and in anger. These I consider the greatest benefits conferred by philosophy, for nobility in misfortune, conduct that excites no envy in prosperity, the conquest of pleasure by reason and the suppression of anger are achievements of no mean order.

Finally, P invokes the Aristotelian theory of the three types of life and declares a preference for a mixture of action and contemplation:

7F4-8B4 The complete man, in my view, is he who manages to combine public life with philosophy, thus securing the two great benefits of service to the community and the calm of philosophical contemplation. Of the three types of life, practical, contemplative and the life of enjoyment, the last is beastly, the practical is uncultured without philosophy, and the contemplative is lacking in practical effect. The ideal is to combine philosophy and politics as circumstances allow. This was achieved by Pericles, Archytas, Dion and Epaminondas.

A short and damaged section inappropriately tagged on to the end of this discussion urges the merits of assembling a library:

8B5-9 It is also useful, indeed essential, to make a collection of ancient writings, since books are a valuable educational tool giving direct access to the sources of knowledge.

The most significant parts of this chapter for our knowledge of P's educational ideas are 7C5 and 7D2-3, where he declares that philosophy is to have precedence over all other subjects. Coming after a rather critical section on rhetoric, these remarks leave no doubt as to where P stands in the dispute between the two subjects for pre-eminence in education (cf. introductory note to Chapter 9).

The central section 7D2-F4 reveals what P actually means by philosophy. It begins with a passage which reads like an extract from a protreptic (7D2-7: cf. Hertlich p.316, Glaeser p.14 and n.1), and proceeds to a commonplace catalogue of duties and virtues which for P are the lessons philosophy has to teach. The lack of any solid content to match P's enthusiasm for the subject, apart from

this thoroughly trite material, is very striking (see Glaeser pp.79-80; cf. Sizoo p.7). In the other two sections of this rather ill-assorted chapter, P has taken two standard philosophical debates, on the place of the encyclia and which sort of life is best, and has subjected them to a rather superficial and un-original treatment. The first discussion, at 7C1-D2, has at least the merit of being relevant to his subject, the education of children; but the second, at 7F4-8B4, has not, and is apparently indulged in for its own sake.

It is worth noting in conclusion the clear implication that P expects some participation in philosophy from children (cf. 5B10 φιλοσόφῳ .. ὁμιλήσωτες in Chapter 7). The normal age for beginning philosophical studies was adolescence (to which P comes only in Chapter 16), but there are parallels which confirm that an early start on the subject was not unheard of: see (despite Wyttenbach p.39) Grasberger II p.63; Praechter, Popularphilosophie p.16 n.3; Clarke p.6. On philosophical education in general see Marrou pp.308-322, Clarke pp.55-108.

See Glaeser pp.49-56 and Kemper pp.124-140 on the contents of this chapter.

7C1-8 -- Free-born children must not be ignorant of any of the encyclia, but should learn in the passing only enough to get the flavour, while giving pride of place to philosophy. To use a comparison, it is good to travel widely but choose the best place of all to live in. -- The encyclia (ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα, Latin artes liberales) were the standard subjects which contributed to the basic general education of the free man who was not under the necessity of being trained for a specific trade or occupation: see Marrou pp.266-267 with notes 2-5 on pp.568-569; Clarke pp.11-54; H. Fuchs in RAC s.v. 'Enkyklios Paideia'; F. Kühnert,

Allgemeinbildung und Fachbildung in der Antike (Berlin 1961); A. Stückelberger, Senecas 88 Brief über Wert und Unwert der freien Künste (Heidelberg 1965); and numerous other works listed in Fuchs' useful bibliography, cc.396-398. The encyclia were most often thought of as seven in number: grammar, dialectic and rhetoric (which became the trivium of the mediaeval universities), arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music (destined to become the mediaeval quadrivium); (for variations on this scheme see Kühnert pp.18-42 and the table at the end of his book). This syllabus is clearly a systematic organisation of some of the principal subjects in which the sophists had offered instruction (Kühnert pp.42-50), though the expression ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία occurs first only towards the end of the 4th century B.C. (references, Fuchs c.370). For theories as to the original significance of the adjective ἐγκύκλιος in this context see Fuchs cc.371-375, Kühnert pp.7-18. The proper place of the encyclia in relation to philosophy was an important question for the philosophical schools (see Fuchs cc.379-386, Kühnert pp.74-83, 99-105). The old Academy and the Peripatetics considered them an indispensable preparation for the study of philosophy (cf. Kühnert, index s.v. 'Propädeutik', Stückelberger pp.60-68), while Cynics, Cyrenaics and Epicureans because of their preoccupation with ethics, and Sceptics because of their reservations about the possibility of knowledge, attached no importance to them at all. The Stoics were sometimes closer to the second view (e.g. Zeno, at least in his Politeia: SVF I 259), sometimes to the first (e.g. Chrysippus SVF III 378, Posidonius). P's attitude to the encyclia, to judge from this passage, is mildly positive: he evidently sees some value in them and wishes them at least to be glanced at, but there is no evidence that he considers them necessary or even helpful as a preparation for the study of philosophy which is his main concern. On this section see Glaeser pp.49-54; Kemper pp.124-129.

7C1 τὸν παῖδα τὸν ἐλεύθερον : For the encyclia as subjects fit for the study of individuals of free status (cf. artes liberales) see Fuchs c.366, Stückelberger pp.46-52; and for free-born children as the object of P's interest in this treatise see 1A1-2n.

7C2 τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κκλουμένων ἐγκυκλίων παιδευμάτων : ἄλλων is perhaps best taken as meaning the other encyclia apart from rhetoric, which P has just been discussing in the last chapter (thus Kühnert p.34 n.3). A contrast with τὴν φιλοσοφίαν (7C5) would be rather more unusual, since philosophy, while often mentioned in their company, is not generally numbered among the encyclia (see Kühnert loc. cit., and p.35 with n.2); for exceptions however cf. Strabo XIV 5.13 and references given by Marrou p.315 n.19.

7C2-3 μητ' ἀνήκοον μητ' ἀθέατον ἐᾶν εἶναι : For the two adjectives in close proximity cf. X. Mem. II 1.31.

7C3-4 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐκ παρόδρομῆς μαθεῖν ὥσπερτὶ γεύματος ἕνεκεν : 'in the passing ... just to get a taste, as it were'. Detailed study of particular branches of knowledge is frequently condemned as the mark of the specialist and unworthy of a free man. Cf. e.g. X. Mem. IV 7; Arist. Pol. VIII 1337b15-17: ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐπιστημῶν μέχρι μέν τινος ἑνίων μετέχειν οὐκ ἀνελεύθερον, τὸ δὲ προσεδρεύειν λίαν πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἔνοχον ταῖς εἰρημέναις βλάβαις ; Pl. Amat. 135C-D: the philosopher must not ἑκάστην τῶν τεχνῶν ... ἐπίστασθαι ἀκριβῶς ὥσπερ αὐτὸν τὸν τὴν τέχνην ἔχοντα, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰκὸς ἄνδρα ἐλεύθερον τε καὶ πεπαιδευμένον. Not unnaturally, the same objection was sometimes raised to the detailed study of philosophy: e.g. Pl. Grg. 484C-D, Plut. Brutus 34.4; cf. Tac. Agr. 4.4 For further examples and discussion see Fuchs cc.368-369, Kühnert pp.144-146, Stückelberger pp.46-52 (on Seneca). -- For ἐκ παρόδρομῆς cf. e.g. Plb. XXI 34.2: Moagetes

οὐκ ἄξιος ἐστιν ἐκ παρόδρομῆς, ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐπιστάσεως τυχεῖν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης μνήμης, Arist. Pol. VII 1336b24 ἐν παρόδρομῇ ποιεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον. παρόδρομή is literally a rapid passage through something (thus, e.g., literally at Plut. Alex. 17.6). -- For γεύματος ἕνεκεν cf. e.g. Arist. HA I 491a7-8 ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον εἴρηται νῦν ὡς τύπῳ, γεύματος χάριν.

7C4-5 (ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ τὸ τέλειον ἀδύνατον): This is a thought with poetic parallels: cf. e.g. Il. XXIII 670-671: οὐδ' ἄρα πώς ἦν / ἐν πάντεσσ' ἔργοισι δαήμονα φῶτα γενέσθαι, E. Rh. 106-107: ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ὥστε πάντ' ἐπίστασθαι βροτῶν / πέφυκεν, V. Ecl. 8.63 'non omnia possumus omnes'.

7C5 τὴν δὲ φιλοσοφίαν πρεσβεύειν: For the verb, meaning 'give pride of place to' cf. e.g. Pl. Crito 46C, Smp. 186B; Plut. Lucull. 3.8.

7C5-6 ἔχω δὲ δι' εἰκόνος παραστῆσαι τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ γνώμην: A highly self-conscious introduction to the simile which follows. For δι' εἰκόνος cf. e.g. Pl. Lg. I 644C.

7C6-8 ὥσπερ γὰρ περιπλεῦσαι μὲν πολλὰς πόλεις καλὸν κτλ.: The comparison of study with travel, where more or less time may be spent at any given port of call, occurs elsewhere. Cf. Nicolaus Damascenus FGrH 90 F132.3, making a similar point to P's here: ἔφη δὲ Νικόλαος ὁμοίαν εἶναι τὴν ὅλην παιδείαν ἀποδημίᾳ· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ταύτῃ προσυμβαίνει τοῖς ἀποδημοῦσι καὶ μακρὰν ὁδὸν διεξιοῦσιν ὅπου μὲν ἐγκατάγεσθαί τε καὶ ἀναπαύεσθαι μόνον, ὅπου δὲ ἀναριστᾶν, ὅπου δὲ πλείους ἐνδημεῖν ἡμέρας, ἐνίους δὲ τόπους ἐκ παρόδου θεωρεῖν, ἀνελθόντας μέντοι ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ἐνοικεῖν ἑστίαις, οὕτω καὶ διὰ τῆς ὅλης παιδείας διερχομένους δεῖν ἐν οἷς μὲν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπὶ πλέον συνδιατρίβειν, ἐν οἷς δ' ἐπ' ἔλαττον· καὶ τὰ μὲν ὅλα, τὰ δὲ ἐκ μέρους, τὰ δ' ἄχρι στοιχειώσεως παραλαμβάνειν, καὶ τὸ ἐκείνων χρήσιμον κατασχόντας ἐπὶ τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς πατρῴαν ἑστίαν ἀνελθόντας φιλοσοφεῖν. Cf. also Sen. Ep. 2.2: 'Vitam in peregrinatione

exigentibus hoc evenit, ut multa hospitia habeant, nullas amicitias; idem accidat necesse est iis qui nullius se ingenio familiariter applicant sed omnia cursim et properantes transmittunt.'; and Epict. Diss. II 23.36 ff. -- The reader's natural expectation of a principal clause to follow the ὥσπερ-clause is disappointed. Bernardakis therefore assumed a lacuna after χρήσιμον (7C8). But the text is probably sound and complete, though elliptical. The sense is 'For (sc. it is good to study many subjects but concentrate on philosophy) just as it is good to visit many cities etc.'; in other words, ὥσπερ looks back to the preceding context, not forward to some missing apodosis. For this type of ellipsis with ὥσπερ Almqvist (p.46 no.41) compares Matthew 25.14: ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἀπιὼν ἐκάλεσεν ... (cf. Mark 13.34 ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἀπόδημος ... ἐνετείλατο); cf. also 10B8-9, Quint. I 1.5, and BDR sections 453.4, 482. -- περιπλεῦσαι presumably because sailing was the commonest form of long-distance travel away from home: cf. Ar. Ran. 534-535 ἀνδρὸς ... πολλὰ περιπεπλευκότος.

7C8-D2 -- Bion wittily remarked that those who study other subjects because philosophy is denied them are like the suitors who, disappointed in their hopes of winning Penelope, made do with her maids. -- This is Bion fr.3 Kindstrand, with full commentary pp.186-189. The attribution of this celebrated comparison is however very variable (see Sternbach-Luschnat, Gnomol.Vat. p.vii, Fuchs c.382, Kühnert pp.6-7, Stückelberger p.61 nn.38 and 39, Kindstrand pp.186-187), and only P cites Bion as its author. The other candidates are Gorgias (Sternbach, Gnomol.Vat. p.68 no.166 = Flor.Mon. 172), Aristippus (fr.23 Mannebach = D.L. II 79 = Arsenius, Violetum p.116 Walz), Aristotle (Elias, CAG 18 p.21.16-19 Busse), and Ariston of Chios (SVF I 350 = Stob. III 4.109 = Gnom.Par. 324). Of these five, Aristippus, Bion and Ariston are the serious contenders, but the true authorship still remains open to debate.

Since Aristippus is the oldest of the three and his version contains most detail, it is generally argued that his is the original and the source of the parallels in Bion and Ariston: see Hense, Teletis Reliquiae p.LXXX; A. Mayer, Aristonstudien (Philologus Suppl. 11 (1910))pp.131, 548; Kühnert loc. cit. above; Kindstrand p.187. Certainly the attempt to disqualify Aristippus (Mauch, DISCIPLINA p.11 n.3; Fuchs c.382) on the grounds that the term ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα/ παιδεύματα does not occur before the end of the 4th century is of doubtful validity, (a) because the date is arrived at in the first place by disregarding the attribution to Aristippus, and (b) because ἐγκύκλια παιδεύματα, though used by Diogenes Laertius in his report of the saying, may not have been the term which Aristippus himself used for the inferior subjects to which men turned instead of to philosophy (cf. e.g. 7D1 ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις παιδεύμασι, and αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι in the Aristotle citation). -- P quotes the saying here only to point up the superiority of philosophy to all other subjects. A possible further implication of the comparison, that the encyclia are the handmaids of philosophy, apparently forms no part of his thought. Philo, by contrast, has a fully-developed allegorical parallel from the Old Testament, in which Sarah stands for philosophy, and Hagar (her handmaid, Genesis 16.1) stands for ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία: see references in Sternbach p.68, Stückelberger p.61, Kindstrand p.188.

7C8-10 ὥσπερ οἱ μνηστῆρες τῇ Πηνελόπῃ πλησιάζειν μὴ δυνάμενοι ταῖς τῶνδε ἐμίγνυντο θεραπαίναις : The allusion is to the 12 disobedient maids from Penelope's household of 50 who slept with the suitors and whom Odysseus punished with death on his return to Ithaca (Od. XXII 417 ff. and especially 444-445). See Kindstrand pp.187-188.

7D2 ἑαυτοὺς κατασκελετεύουσι : 'wear themselves out'. For the verb cf. Isoc. 15.268; [Arist.] HA X 636a15; Longinus 2.1; Philo 7.34; 20.33; 24.101; 32.3, 193; 34.121; D.L. VIII 41.

7D2-7 -- Philosophy, then, should occupy the principal place in education. To care for the body man has invented two sciences, medicine and gymnastics, the first giving health and the second fitness. But philosophy alone is the cure for the ills and sufferings of the soul. -- It is clear that P owes an unacknowledged debt to Plato's Gorgias for the framework of this passage (cf. 6A1-7n. for another borrowing from the same work). At Grg. 464B-C, Socrates, in the course of explaining to Gorgias why he considers rhetoric to be a counterfeit art, identifies two genuine arts which look after the body (γυμναστική and ἰατρική as here), and two which look after the mind (νομοθετική and δικαιοσύνη). The first member of each pair is regulative and the second corrective in function (cf. 7D5-6n.); and each of the four has a spurious counterpart, rhetoric standing in that relationship to δικαιοσύνη. See Dodds' commentary on the whole passage, and cf. his helpful diagram on p.226. -- P has adapted the Platonic scheme to his own purpose, which is to make a case for the supreme value of philosophy; but the adaptation is singularly superficial and maladroit. What he does is to retain γυμναστική and ἰατρική, but replace νομοθετική and δικαιοσύνη by φιλοσοφία, apparently in order to contrive a flattering contrast between the duality of the sciences which cater for the body's welfare and the unique self-sufficiency of philosophy as the medicine of the soul (cf. 7D4-7 διττὰς ἐπιστήμας ... ἡ φιλοσοφία μόνη). Even on its own terms, however, this will not stand up to examination. P claims that philosophy is the only remedy (φάρμακον, 7D7) of the soul's ills; but there is equally only one corrective science which deals with

physical maladies in the Platonic scheme. To give his adaptation any semblance of credibility, P ought at least to have argued that philosophy unites in itself both a corrective and a regulative function, thus giving it indeed the equivalent importance of γυμναστική and ἰατρική combined -- but he makes no attempt to do this. -- It is worth noting that although the Platonic reminiscence is unmistakable, there is no close verbal correspondence between P and the text of the Gorgias. P's ἐπιστῆμαι (7D4), for example, are τέχναι in Plato, and for ἐπιμέλεια (7D4) Plato has θεραπεία. The obvious conclusion is that P is quoting from memory (cf. notes on 6A1-7).

7D2-3 διὸ δεῖ τῆς ἄλλης παιδείας ὥσπερ κεφάλαιον ποιεῖν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν: P has already advocated the primacy of philosophy at 7C5 τὴν δὲ φιλοσοφίαν πρεσβεύειν. For κεφάλαιον παιδείας cf. Pl. Lg. I 643C κεφάλαιον .. παιδείας λέγομεν τὴν ὀρθὴν τροφήν .

7D4 διττὰς εὗρον ἐπιστήμας οἱ ἄνθρωποι : For διττοί as a synonym for δύο (cf. 3C9, 3D1) see LSJ s.v. διχῇ II. Only two mss. have the article before ἄνθρωποι, and it may be therefore that what P actually wrote was simply ἄνθρωποι or ἄνθρωποι .

7D5-6 τὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ τὴν γυμναστικήν , ὧν ἡ μὲν τὴν ὑγίειαν , ἡ δὲ τὴν εὐεξίαν ἐντίθησι : The distinction is that ἰατρική restores health after it has been lost, while γυμναστική promotes fitness in those who are already healthy (for the contrast between health and fitness cf. 7A7-8 τὸ σῶμα οὐ μόνον ὑγιεινὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐεκτικὸν εἶναι χρή). In other words, the former has a corrective, the latter a regulative function.

7D6-7 τῶν δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρρωστημάτων καὶ παθῶν ἡ φιλοσοφία μόνη φάρμακόν ἐστι : The image of philosophy as the medicine of the soul is a very common one: cf. e.g. Cic. Tusc. III 6 'est profecto animi medicina, philosophia', Fin. II 22; Sen. Ep. 8.2, 117.33 'adsuescit animus delectare se potius quam sanare et

philosophiam oblectamentum facere cum remedium sit'; Plut. Plat. quaest. 1000D; Epict. Diss. III 23.30 ἰατρεῖόν ἐστιν, ἄνδρες, τὸ τοῦ φιλοσόφου σχολεῖον.

7D7-E5 -- It is through philosophy that we are able to distinguish right from wrong, justice from injustice, what we should choose from what we should shun. It teaches us our duties to worship the gods, honour our parents, respect our elders, obey the laws, submit to rulers, show affection to our friends, behave with moderation towards women, love our children, and not abuse slaves. -- This section and the next shed interesting light on P's conception of philosophy, which turns out to be anything but profound. Philosophy for P is simply what teaches us the difference between right and wrong (7D7-9), our duties to others (7D10-E5), and self-control in good fortune and adversity (7E5-F4). It is confined, in other words, to a few uncontroversial commonplaces of popular ethics. As it happens, this is not an uncommon restriction on the meaning of philosophy among later Greek writers: see A.-M. Malingrey, Philosophia (Paris 1961) pp.100-103 'Philosophia = art de vivre'; Marrou pp.312-313; Clarke p.96; Glaeser p.51 and n.1.

7D7-9 διὰ γὰρ ταύτην ἔστι καὶ μετὰ ταύτης γνῶναι τί τὸ καλὸν τί τὸ αἰσχρὸν κτλ. : For distinguishing between such pairs of opposites as part of the function of philosophy cf. e.g. Hor. Ep. I 2.3-4: (Homer) 'quid sit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non, / planius ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dicit', Musonius fr. 8 (p.33.1-3 Hense) ἀγαθὸν μέντοι καὶ κακὸν ἢ συμφέρον καὶ ἀσύμφορον ἢ ὠφέλιμον καὶ βλαβερὸν οὐκ ἄλλου του διαγινώσκειν ἢ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ἐστίν, fr. 10 (p.53.9-10) οἳ .. τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ὅ τι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐστὶν ἀγνοοῦντες (contrasted with the philosopher).

7D10-E2 πῶς θεοῖς πῶς γονεῦσι πῶς πρεσβυτέροις πῶς νόμοις [πῶς ἀλλοτρίοις] πῶς ἄρχουσι πῶς φίλοις πῶς γυναιξὶ πῶς τέκνοις

πῶς οἰκέταις χρηστέον ἐστί : For philosophy as the arbiter of correct behaviour towards different categories of people cf. (with Sizoo, p.53) Sen. Ep. 94.1: 'Eam partem philosophiae, quae dat propria cuique personae praecepta nec in universum componit hominem, sed marito suadet, quomodo se gerat adversus uxorem, patri quomodo educet liberos, domino quomodo servos regat, quidam solam receperunt.' Glaeser pp.51-52 quotes lists of the different categories of people rather similar to the present one from Musonius Ep. 8, Epict. Diss. II 17.31, III 21.5, D.Chr. 69.2, D.L. VII 108, 120, M.Ant. V 31, Hor. AP 312-313, Iamb. Protr. 20. -- The bracketed words [πῶς ἀλλοτρίοις] fall under suspicion of being intrusive because this is the only item not picked up below at 7E2-5 ὅτι δεῖ θεοὺς μὲν σέβεσθαι κτλ. The alternative is to postulate a lacuna at 7E3 after νόμοις πειθαρχεῖν (Thus Bernardakis, Glaeser p.52 n.1); but it seems on the whole more likely that πῶς φίλοις (7E1) suggested the insertion of its opposite to some scribe or reader.

7E2-3 ὅτι δεῖ θεοὺς μὲν σέβεσθαι, γονέας δὲ τιμᾶν : This is a very common pair of injunctions: cf. e.g. E. fr.853 θεούς τε τιμᾶν τούς τε φύσαντας γονῆς; X. Mem. IV 4.19-20; Isoc. Ad Demon. 16 τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς φοβοῦ, τοὺς δὲ γονεῖς τίμα ; Men. Mon. 322 θεὸν προτίμα, δεύτερον τοὺς σοὺς γονεῖς ; Plb. VI 4.4 θεοὺς σέβεσθαι, γονεῖς θεραπεύειν . For further passages and references see Van der Horst's commentary on Pseudo-Phocylides 8 (p.116). Glaeser notes (p.104 n.1) that this conventional passage is P's only mention of religion.

7E4 ἄρχουσιν ὑπείκειν : Cf. the New Testament parallels, Ep.Rom. 13.1, Ep.Tit. 3.1, I Ep.Pet. 2.13.

7E5-F4 -- Above all, it teaches us self-possession in good fortune and bad, restraint in pleasures and in anger. These I consider the greatest benefits conferred by philosophy, for

nobility in misfortune, conduct that excites no envy in prosperity, the conquest of pleasure by reason and the suppression of anger are achievements of no mean order. -- P reveals the full extent of his ethical bias here, in judging the virtues of self-control to be the chief lesson of philosophy. He returns to virtues of this kind (including the control of anger) at Chapter 14, where a long passage full of illustrations is devoted to them (10B1-11C4).

7E5-6 τὸ δὲ μέγιστον : For phrases of this kind in P see 4B6-8n.

7E6-7 μητ' ἐν ταῖς εὐπραγίαις περιχαρεῖς μητ' ἐν ταῖς συμφοραῖς περιλύπους ὑπάρχειν : Equal moderation in the face of good fortune or bad was a popular ideal which seems to have achieved proverbial status: cf. Pl. Mx. 248A (the self-reliant man) γιγνομένων χρημάτων καὶ παίδων καὶ διαφθειρομένων μάλιστα πείσεται τῇ παροιμίᾳ· οὔτε γὰρ χαίρων οὔτε λυπούμενος ἄγαν φανήσεται διὰ τὸ αὐτῷ πεποιθέναι; Arist. EN IV 1124a15-16: (the μεγαλόψυχος) οὔτ' εὐτυχῶν περιχαρ�ὴς ἔσται οὔτ' ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος; [Isoc.] Ad Demon. 42 νόμιζε μηδὲν εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων βέβαιον· οὕτω γὰρ οὔτ' εὐτυχῶν ἔσει περιχαρὴς οὔτε δυστυχῶν περίλυπος.

7E9 πάντων τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας περιγινομένων ἀγαθῶν: For the phrase cf. Plut. De aud. 44B: Pythagoras ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἔφησεν αὐτῷ περιγεγονέναι τὸ μηδὲν θαυμάζειν, with Wyttenbach's n. which compares D.L. II 68: Aristippus ἐρωτηθεὶς τι αὐτῷ περιγέγονεν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, ἔφη κτλ., and the same formula at V 20, VI 6. Cf. also Sternbach, Gnomol. Vat. p.156 no. 417, and Musonius fr. 3 (pp.9.18-10.2 Hense): φανεῖται γὰρ ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας τούτων ἕκαστον μάλιστ' ἂν αὐτῇ περιγινόμενον . These parallels show that Hartman was wrong to consider reading παραγιγνομένων.

7F1-2 τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐγενῶς ἀτυχεῖν ἀνδρός, τὸ δ' ἀνεπιφθόνως εὐθηνεῖν ἀνθρώπου : The two infinitives, as the text stands here, are conjectural emendations; the credit for the former belongs to

Meziriac, for the latter to Pohlenz. The mss. read τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐγενῶς εὐτυχεῖν ἀνδρός, τὸ δ' ἀνεπιφθόνως εὐηνίου ἀνθρώπου, though some of the oldest omit εὐηνίου, in two cases with a lacuna. Firm ground is difficult to find here, but some help can be obtained from a close examination of the context. In 7E6-8 P has enumerated what he takes to be philosophy's three principal lessons: (i) not to be too elated by success or too cast down by misfortune, (ii) not to be dissolute in pleasures, and (iii) not to be carried away by anger. In 7F1-4, after the doubtful passage, we are told that (ii) is the mark of a wise man, and that the achievement of (iii) requires no ordinary person. This creates a strong likelihood, amounting almost to certainty, that the corrupt part of the text said something about (i). The next question is how to emend the text to reflect this. A firm starting-point is provided by the two adverbs. Neither is in doubt, and each points to the sort of verb which should accompany it. εὐγενῶς (or γενναίως) is the standard description of the right way in which to bear misfortune (cf. e.g. Plb. I 1.2, D.Chr. 18.9, D.L. I 86) and must therefore qualify a verb of the opposite meaning to the εὐτυχεῖν assigned to it by the mss.; ἀτυχεῖν is the obvious candidate, and either the similarity of α and ευ in some hands or assimilation to εὐγενῶς would easily explain the corruption. ἀνεπιφθόνως equally plainly implies a verb meaning 'to prosper', but as the text stands it is left qualifying the same verb as εὐγενῶς, which is impossible. The suspicion therefore arises that εὐηνίου, which in any case looks a slightly odd word for the context, conceals the missing verb. Pohlenz's εὐθηνεῖν supplies a verb of appropriate meaning while retaining some semblance of the transmitted reading. A side-effect of this emendation, however, is to leave ἀνθρώπου unqualified -- a state in which it seems improbable that it can have the required complimentary meaning, unlike ἀνδρός in the other half of the

sentence which certainly can (see Dover, Greek Popular Morality p.102, and cf. e.g. Men. Monost. 15 ἀνδρὸς τὰ προσπίπτοντα γενναίως φέρειν). It may be necessary, therefore, to suppose that the corrupt εὐηνίου conceals an adjective as well as a verb.

7F3-4 τὸ δ' ὀργῆς κρατεῖν ἀνδρὸς οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἐστί : Cf. 10B9-C1 τὸ γε μὴν ἄοργητον ἀνδρὸς ἔστι σοφοῦ and the section devoted to this subject at 10B9-D8.

7F4-8B4 -- The complete man, in my view, is he who manages to combine public life with philosophy, thus securing the two great benefits of service to the community and the calm of phisosophical contemplation. Of the three types of life, practical, contemplative and the life of enjoyment, the last is beastly, the practical is uncultured without philosophy, and the contemplative is lacking in practical effect. The ideal is to combine philosophy and politics as circumstances allow. This was achieved by Pericles, Archytas, Dion and Epaminondas. -- On the topic of the different types of life see R. Joly, 'Le thème philosophique des genres de vie dans l'antiquité classique' in Mémoires de l'Académie Royale de Belgique 51 (1956) with bibliography of previous literature pp.9-11. The theory of the three lives which P adopts here originates with Aristotle: see EE I 1215a32-b5, EN I 1095b14-1096a5, and cf. Pol. VII 1324a25-b5. The three are πολιτικός, θεωρητικός and ἀπολαυστικός in the terminology of the maturer EN, to which P is nearer; in the EE the second life is called φιλόσοφος. (πρακτικός, which P has for the first type of life, is used interchangeably with πολιτικός by Aristotle.) For Aristotle, only the πολιτικός and the θεωρητικός merit consideration as possible ideals, the ἀπολαυστικός favoured by the vulgar being unworthy of attention (cf. 8A6-7n. below); and of the two his preference is for the θεωρητικός. A later development of the Aristotelian theory,

however, which is probably the work of the Peripatetics, replaces the ἀπολαυστικός with a new 'mixed' life combining the other two: see Arius Didymus in a review of Peripatetic doctrine at Stob. II 7.24 βίων δὲ τριττὰς ἰδέας εἶναι, πρακτικόν, θεωρητικόν, σύνθετον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν; [Plut.] Plac.philos. 874F (quoted below, 7F4n.). This mixed life, which is P's ideal in the present passage, was adopted by the Stoics as the object of their aspirations (Joly pp.145-146; cf. Chrysippus, SVF III 295 = D.L. VII 125 τὸν γὰρ ἐνάρετον θεωρητικόν τε εἶναι καὶ πρακτικὸν τῶν ποιητέων), and became the standard solution to the problem of the different types of life in later Greek writers (cf. Joly pp.171-177 'Auteurs grecs tardifs. Le triomphe de la vie mixte'). 'A peu près tout ce qui pense a cette époque' says Joly (p.171) (adopte ce même ideal', and he lists Philo, Cicero, Seneca (cf. e.g. Tranq. 4.8 quoted below 8A9-Bln., Ot.sap. 4.2 'natura nos ad utrumque genuit, et contemplationi rerum et actioni'), Plutarch, Maximus Tyrius, Albinus, Pseudo-Archytas, Themistius and Julian (Joly p.191). -- On this section see Glaeser pp.54-56.

7F4 τελείους δ' ἀνθρώπους ἡγοῦμαι κτλ.: For both expression and thought cf. [Plut.] Plac. philos. 874F (reporting the views of 'Aristotle, Theophrastus, and almost all the Peripatetics') ἀναγκαῖον τὸν τέλειον ἄνδρα καὶ θεωρητικὸν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων καὶ πρακτικὸν τῶν δεόντων.

7F5 τῷ φιλοσόφῳ: This seems to be a misprint for τῇ φιλοσόφῳ (sc. δυνάμει); cf. the apparatus. τῷ makes no sense and is not read by any ms.

8A1-2 καὶ δυεῖν ὄντοιν μεγίστοιν ἀγαθοῖν : This series of duals is noted by Weissenberger (II p.7) as testimony against Plutarchan authorship: 'Die Häufung des Dualis .. spricht völlig gegen Plut., da dieser Casus überhaupt nur 20 mal bei Plut. erscheint, meist bei Aufzählung zweiger enge zusammengehöriger

Dinge, z.B. τῷ χείρε , τῷ ὀφθαλμώ ' Cf. 2B4 and 11A1 for other duals in P; and for extended series of duals in classical writers cf. e.g. Pl. Grg. 464B δυοῖν ὄντοιν τοῖν πραγμάτοιν ; Isoc. 6.37 δυοῖν προτεινομένοιν ἀγαθοῖν ; D. 23.113 δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν ὄντοιν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις . By contrast cf. e.g. Plut. Cic. 14.6 δυεῖν ὡμάτων ὄντων .

8A3-4 τοῦ τ' ἀκύμονος καὶ γαλήνου (sc. βίου): Cf. with Wyttenbach Plut. De tranq. an. 465A πόθεν γε δὴ πρὸς ἀλυπίαν ψυχῆς καὶ βίον ἀκύμονα χρημάτων ὄφελος..; Galba 10.7 βίον ἀκύμονα καὶ γῆρας εἰρήνης καὶ ἡσυχίας μεστόν ; De exil. 602E ἀκύμονα τὴν νησιῶτιν ἡσυχίαν . For the metaphor 'waves' = 'business, troubles' which the adjective implies cf. LSJ s.v. κῦμα I.2b; Lucr. V 11; Hor. Ep. I 1.16, 2.22.

8A6-7 ὁ μὲν ἄκλυτος καὶ δοῦλος τῶν ἡδονῶν ζωώδης καὶ μικροπρεπής ἐστιν : ἄκλυτος καὶ δοῦλος τῶν ἡδονῶν is attributive (i.e. a periphrasis for ἀπολωστικός), while ζωώδης καὶ μικροπρεπής is predicative. -- P is following Aristotle in this outright condemnation of the life of pleasure, and ζωώδης is reminiscent of Aristotle's characterisation of the mass of mankind who pursue it: EN I 1095b19-20 οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ πρωτέλως ἀνδραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι. Cf. Arius Didymus ap. Stob. II 7.24 (p.144.17-18 Wachsmuth) τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀπολωστικὸν ἥττονα ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ; Cic. Am. 20 'beluarum hoc quidem extremum' (sc. voluptates).

8A7-9 ὁ δὲ πρακτικὸς ἀμοιρήσας φιλοσοφίας ἄμουσος καὶ πλημμελής, ὁ δὲ θεωρητικὸς τοῦ πρακτικοῦ διαμαρτάνων ἀνωφελής: For the technique of criticising two extremes for lacking some of the qualities of their opposite as a means of preparing the way for a compromise cf. 7A6-7 ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπέρογκος ἀπολίτευτός ἐστιν, ἡ δ' ἰσχνὴ λίαν ἀνέκπληκτος . -- On the contemplative life see Gauthier and Jolif's commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, pp.848-866; F. Boll, 'Vita Contemplativa' in SB der Heidelberger Akademie (1920) 8 Abhandlung.

8A9-B1 πειρατέον οὖν εἰς ἐύναμιν καὶ τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ παρεῖκον τῶν καιρῶν: For the thought suggested by κατὰ τὸ παρεῖκον τῶν καιρῶν cf. perhaps Sen. Tranq. 4.8 'longe itaque optimum est miscere otium rebus, quotiens actuosa vita impedimentis fortuitis aut civilitatis condicione prohibitur.' -- For other sentences in P which begin with πειρατέον see 8E5, 10D9, 13E10, 14B3, and cf. 3D6.

8B1-3 οὕτως ἐπολιτεύσατο Περικλῆς, οὕτως Ἀρχύτας ὁ Ταραντῖνος, οὕτω Δίων ὁ Συρακόσιος, οὕτως Ἐπαμεινώνδας ὁ Θηβαῖος: For similar lists of men who combined philosophy with a life of action see Joly p.175 n.6; the one which he mentions in Aelian VH III 17 contains all four of P's examples. (There seems to be no real foundation to Joly's claim, p.175 n.7, that the present list is related to that of Cicero in Off. I 155.) -- A glance at each of P's four instances shows that they are well-chosen. (i) Pericles' claim to renown as a practitioner of the life of action needs no elaboration. As for the life of contemplation, P is probably thinking of his long-standing connection with the philosopher Anaxagoras (Pl. Phdr. 270A, Plut. Per. 4 ff., etc.), which sufficiently demonstrates the statesman's interest in the things of the mind. See further F. Miltner in RE s.v. 'Perikles' cc.789-790; De Sanctis, Pericle (Milan and Messina 1944) pp.181-198. (ii) Archytas of Tarentum, the contemporary of Plato, was the leading Pythagorean of his day (mentioned later by P in an anecdote at 10D3-6). Though Archytas is remembered as a philosopher and mathematician, he also played a prominent part in the public life of his native city; quite in the vein of the present passage Athenaeus XII 519B describes him as πολιτικὸν ἅμα καὶ φιλόσοφον γενόμενον, cf. Ael. VH XII 15 πολιτικός τε καὶ φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ γενόμενος. He was seven times strategus (D.L. VIII 79, cf.10D4 στρατηγῶν δ' ἐτύγχανε) and never defeated in battle,

according to Aristoxenus (fr. 48 Wehrli). The sources on Archytas' life are collected at VS 47A1-12. (iii) Dion of Syracuse was brother-in-law to the tyrant Dionysius I of Syracuse, and a convert to the political philosophy of Plato. When Dionysius II succeeded his father in 367/6 B.C. Plato and Dion together made an ill-fated attempt to mould him in the image of their ideal philosopher-ruler, which ended in their expulsion from Sicily. Returning ten years later from Athens where he had spent his exile as an associate of the Academy, Dion seized Syracuse in Dionysius' absence; after several expulsions and returns he was assassinated in 354. See Niese in RE s.v. 'Dion' 2. (iv) The fame of Epaminondas is chiefly military -- as the great Theban general who brought about the short-lived ascendancy of Thebes by his decisive defeat of the Spartans at Leuctra in 371 B.C. and was killed at Mantinea in 362. He had however received a philosophical training from the Pythagorean Lysis of Tarentum (see Swoboda in RE s.v. 'Epameinondas 1' c.2676, M. Fortina Epaminonda (Turin 1958) p.5 n.15), and there remained in him an important element of the philosopher. Plutarch makes him one of the interlocutors in his De genio Socratis and more than once mentions his learning: in Ages. 27.6 he is (in 371 B.C.) ἀνὴρ ἔνδοξος ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ, στρατηγίας δὲ πεῖραν οὔπω δεδωκώς, cf. Pel. 4.1, 5.4; De gen. Socr. 576D, 585D; Fortina p.6 n.18. Hirzel remarks (Der Dialog (Leipzig 1895) II p.162 n.3) that Epaminondas 'das plutarchische Ideal einer Vereinigung von Philosophie und Politik in seiner Person erfüllt hatte'.

8B3 ὧν ἑκάτερος Πλάτωνος ἐγένετο συνουσιαστής: 'of whom each of the (last) two (i.e. Dion and Epaminondas) was a pupil of Plato'. This seems to be the only possible meaning of this clause, where ἑκάτερος ('each of two') irregularly follows a list of four. But although Dion was most certainly a pupil of Plato, there is no good

evidence that Epaminondas (the pupil of Lysis: see 8B1-3n.) ever studied with him. Either, then, P has his facts wrong, or the text is at fault. If we assume the former, there is nothing more to add. The awkwardness of ἑκάτερος, however, throws suspicion on the text, and emendation has been tried: (i) a number of mss. read ἕκαστος for ἑκάτερος in an apparent attempt to remove the anomaly of having ἑκάτερος following a list of four, but this reading creates historical nonsense; (ii) Wyttenbach's ὧν ἄτερος satisfies the demands of historical accuracy, but in other respects creates a no less cumbersome and unlikely expression than the original he emends. (iii) A different line of approach is that of Hercher and Nikitin, who would excise the whole clause as an incorporated gloss referring not to Dion and Epaminondas but to Archytas and Dion (for Plato's contact with Archytas see Pl. Ep. VII 338C); we could equally well assume with Richards that the clause is genuine and misplaced from after Συρακόσιος in 8D2, except that this rather breaks up and spoils the rapid fourfold repetition of οὕτως. On the whole, Hercher and Nikitin seem likeliest to be right. -- For συνουσιαστής in a philosophical context meaning 'pupil' see X. Mem. I 6.1; cf. also [Pl.] Min. 319E, D.H. Lys. 3. The word is not found in the genuine works of Plutarch.

8B3-4 καὶ περὶ μὲν παιδείας οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι δεῖ πλείονα λέγοντα διατρίβειν : P signals the end of his discussion of παιδεία, which began at the start of Chapter 8 (see the introductory note to that chapter). In fact, however, he proceeds immediately to mention the use of books as an ὄργανον τῆς παιδείας (8A8) -- an awkward fact which is best explained by supposing that the section 8B5-9 was an afterthought. -- For οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι δεῖ πλείονα λέγοντα διατρίβειν cf. similar formulae at D. 54.44; Isoc. 4.97, 106; 6.111; 14.7; 17.34; Ep. 2.24, 8.8.

8B5-9 -- It is also useful, indeed essential, to make a collection of ancient writings, since books are a valuable educational tool giving direct access to the sources of knowledge. -- This very brief section on the usefulness of a library has all the appearances of an afterthought. Apart from the fact that there is no very easily discernible logic in placing a discussion of this subject here, it is given away by its makeshift introduction (8B5 πρὸς δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις χρήσιμον ...) and the description of the use of books as an ὄργανον τῆς παιδείας (8B8) after P has professed himself unable to think of anything else which needs to be said about παιδεία (8B3-4). -- There can be little doubt that the ancient writings which P has in mind are the works of the philosophers (thus Glaeser p.69). For reading as a tool of philosophical education cf. e.g. X. Mem. I 6.14, IV 2.8; Philo 6.78 (= SVF III 739). On private libraries see Dziatzko in RE s.v. 'Bibliotheken' cc.408-409 and T. Birt Kritik und Hermeneutik nebst Abriss des antiken Buchwesens, 3rd edn. (Munich 1913) pp.335-336; and cf. Ziebarth pp.131-132 on school libraries. On this section generally see Glaeser pp.68-69, Sizoo pp.51-52.

8B5 πρὸς δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις χρήσιμον, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι : For the strengthening of the expression cf. 2C7 ἴσως πολλοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦ παντὸς διαμαρτάνων. The transition formula is very feeble.

8B6 ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν : Cf. 4E7 τοῦ δὲ πόδος ὀλιγώρως ἔχοι.

8B7 ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων ποιεῖσθαι συλλογήν : See 1D8 n. for P's periphrases with ποιεῖσθαι .

8B7 κατὰ τὸ γεωργῶδες: A number of mss. show a lacuna after these words, and it is plain that something has been lost, since (a) we naturally expect some expansion of κατὰ τὸ γεωργῶδες, and (b) τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον seems to introduce the second half of a simile

(cf. 2B6, 3E3-4, 6E10,9B7). The context makes it likely that the simile compared the tools of the farmer with books, the metaphorical tools of the educator. Paton restores, for the sake of example, ⟨καθάπερ γὰρ τοῖς κηπουροῖς ἐργαλείων δεῖ καὶ ὀχετῶν⟩ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον κτλ. Cf. Dyroff p.291; Glaeser p.69.

8B9 καὶ ἀπὸ πηγῆς τὴν ἐπιστήμην τηρεῖν συμβέβηκεν : P presumably means that the study of books permits first-hand access to the sources of knowledge. The verbs τηρεῖν and συμβέβηκεν are puzzling, however. For the former -- 'observe knowledge from the source' being a rather peculiar expression -- Wyttenbach once conjectured ἀρύτειν (n. ad loc., n. on De sera 551B; thus also Ruhnken), while Bury suggests ἀντλεῖν : both verbs mean 'to draw' and preserve the πηγή metaphor. Cobet ventured καὶ ⟨ὡς⟩ ἀπὸ πηγῆς τὴν ἐπιστήμην ῥεῖν συμβέβηκεν. Any of these (but preferably one of the first two) would be an improvement on the present text. -- συμβέβηκεν is odd and out of place. One can see why Heusinger suspected it and wished to excise it.

(11) 8B10-E8: (a) Physical training.
(b) Education and the poor: an answer to criticism.

P now devotes a short section to a subject which could hardly remain undiscussed in a Greek treatise on education: physical training.

8B10-C10 Physical training also requires attention. Boys should be sent to the trainer's school to acquire strength and co-ordination. Fitness in youth is the foundation of a good old age; and just as it is wise to prepare for storms while the good weather lasts, so it is prudent to make discipline in youth a provision for age. Exercise should not, however, be so strenuous as to produce exhaustion and incapacity for lessons. As Plato says, sleep and fatigue are inimical to learning.

8C10-D7 Above all, boys should be trained in exercises with a military application, such as the javelin, archery and hunting. In battle the goods of the vanquished are the prize of the victor. War has no place for men of soft physical condition, and the lean soldier accustomed to warlike sports is always superior to an enemy trained as an athlete.

Unexpectedly, this is followed by another brief section in which P defends himself against a possible accusation of neglecting the education of the poor.

8D8-E8 Some reader may accuse me of giving advice which only the rich can follow, and neglecting the education of the poor. My answer is that though I should like my precepts to be of use to all, the poor must blame not me but their fortune if their circumstances make this impossible. All parents, including the poor, must aim to give their children the best education possible; but failing that, they must do what they can. So

much by way of digression; now on to other aspects of giving children a sound education.

Physical education was an indispensable part of what Greeks of all periods understood by the training of the young. Letters, the lyre and the palaestra were the three constituent elements of classical education in Athens, and the other two remained basic to the concept of education when, in the course of time, music dropped out (see Marrou pp.212-217). Not surprisingly, then, the philosophers, whose example P is following, did discuss physical as well as intellectual training for the young: cf. Pl. R. III 403C-412B, Lg. VII 795D-796E, 813A-814D, and Aristotle's very brief discussion, Pol. VIII 1338b38-39b10. P's treatment of the subject reveals some confusion as to the aims of physical education. Its purpose is to give strength and co-ordination to the body, to ensure a healthy old age, or to render the citizen fit for warfare. It must not, however, be so intense as to interfere with lessons, which P evidently regards as the more important priority. -- On physical training as part of education see Grasberger I.2 pp.167-190, 244-403; Girard pp.185-220; Marrou pp.181-204; C.A. Forbes, Greek Physical Training (New York and London 1929); and on this part of the De lib. educ., Glaeser pp.57-59, Kemper pp.140-143.

As to the section 8D8-E8, it reflects rather badly on P's competence as a writer that we are reduced to guessing what prompts him at this point to be apprehensive of the kind of objection he describes. On the whole the most likely explanation is that he is conscious, though without mentioning it explicitly, of the expense involved in providing the training activities which he has just recommended; see 8D8-E8n. On this section see Kemper pp. 76-80.

8B10-C10 -- Physical training also requires attention. Boys should be sent to the trainer's school to acquire strength and co-ordination. Fitness in youth is the foundation of a good old age; and just as it is wise to prepare for storms while the good weather lasts, so it is prudent to make discipline in youth a provision for age. Exercise should not, however, be so strenuous as to produce exhaustion and incapacity for lessons. As Plato says, sleep and fatigue are inimical to learning. -- The mention of εὐρυθμία, which P classes with ῥώμη as one of the objectives of physical training, is reminiscent of classical ideals: cf. Praechter's observation on its appearance here, Popularphilosophie p.34 n.6 'ein Anklang an die althellenische Anschauung'. But the accompanying remarks on fitness and old age reflect an altogether more modern concern with exercise as a means of ensuring health and long life (Praechter op. cit. p.34). See T. Woody, Life and Education in Early Societies (New York 1949) pp.400-416 on the rise of 'health gymnastics'. P's remarks in the latter part of this section (8C6-10) betray an order of priorities in which physical training, though important, nevertheless takes second place to the mental disciplines. The mutual antagonism between physical and intellectual effort, for which P invokes the authority of Plato (R. VII 537B), is also noted by Aristotle in his observations on physical training (Pol. VIII 1339a7-10).

8B10-C1 οὐ πάνυ ἄξιον οὐδὲ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων ἀγωνίαν παρορᾶν : Cf. the beginning of chapter 6 (3F7) for a similar transition: οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τοῦτο παραλιπεῖν ἄξιον ἐστιν etc.

8C1 πέμποντας ἐκ παιδοτρίβου τοὺς παῖδας : The παιδοτρίβης was the trainer who supervised the physical education of boys as the διδάσκαλος conducted their intellectual education. On him

and the instruction he provided see J. Jüthner in RE s.v. 'Paidotribes', Die Athletischen Leibesübungen der Griechen I (Vienna 1965) pp.161-182; Girard pp.194-208; Forbes, Greek Physical Training pp.63-70. -- As πέμποντας ἐς παιδοτρίβου implies, the παιδοτρίβης usually had his own establishment quite separate from the schools where teachers taught. For the ellipse of an accusative with παιδοτρίβου, as in the idiom πέμπειν / φοιτᾶν εἰς διδασκάλων (X. Lac. 2.1; Pl. Prt. 326C), see K-G I p.269, Schwyzer II p.120.

8C1-2 ἱκανῶς ταῦτα διαπονεῖν: ταῦτα must refer to the τῶν σωμάτων of 8B10, despite the awkwardness of τῆς τῶν σωμάτων εὐρυθμίας ἕνεκεν later in the same line. See Wyttenbach on Plut. De Is. et Osir. 358B for a note on διαπονεῖν, and cf. e.g. X. Cyn. 4.10, Plut. Lyc. 14.3 for the verb with σώματα as object.

8C2-3 ἅμα μὲν τῆς τῶν σωμάτων εὐρυθμίας ἕνεκεν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ πρὸς ῥώμην: On εὐρυθμία see note on 8B10-C10 above. In [Isoc.] Ad Demon. 14, ῥώμη is explicitly rejected as an objective of physical training: ἄσκει τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα γυμνασίων μὴ τὰ πρὸς ῥώμην ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ὑγίειαν· τούτου δ' ἂν ἐπιτύχοις, εἰ λήγοις τῶν πόνων ἔτι πονεῖν δυνάμενος. Unlike the unknown author of the Ad Demonicum, P evidently sees no conflict between training for strength and training for health.

8C4-5 καθάπερ .. ἐν εὐδίᾳ τὰ πρὸς τὸν χειμῶνα προσῆκε παρασκευάζειν: εὐδία and χειμών, fair weather and foul (paired again at 9C2-3), correspond in this simile to νεότης and γῆρας. (For χειμών as a symbol for γῆρας cf. D.L. VIII 10, Socrates ap. Stob. IV 50.93, Eratosthenes ap. Stob. IV 50.78, Antiphanes in AP X 100, Ov. Met. XV 212, and Galen quoted below.) Related versions of the simile suggest that it should be viewed in a nautical context. Closest to the present passage is Galen Protr.

8: τὸ δὲ γῆρας, καθάπερ χαλεπὸν ἐφεδρεύοντα χειμῶνα, δεόμενον οὐχ ὑποδημάτων μόνον καὶ ἐσθῆτος ἀλλὰ καὶ οἰκήσεως ἐπιτηδείας καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων, παρασκευάζεσθαι πρὸς αὐτό, καθάπερ ἀγαθὸν κυβερνήτην ἐκ πολλοῦ πρὸς χειμῶνα; but cf. also Plut. De tu. san. 123E (of restraining self-indulgence before a celebration) οἷον ἐπιόντος ἀνέμου καὶ κύματος εὐσταλὲς τὸ σῶμα καὶ κοῦφον ἐν εὐδίᾳ παρασκευάζοντας, and Demophilus 24 (FPG I p.486) ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν εὐδίᾳ πλέοντες καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸν χειμῶνα ἔχουσιν ἕτοιμα· οὕτως οἱ ἐν εὐτυχίαις φρονοῦντες καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀτυχίαν ἑτοιμάζουσι βοηθήματα.

8C5 οὕτως ἐν νεότητι τὴν εὐταξίαν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην ἐφόδιον εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀποτίθεσθαι : ἐφόδιον (more commonly plural, ἐφόδια) means literally 'supplies for travelling, money and provisions' (LSJ; cf. Latin viaticum), hence in a frequent metaphorical sense simply 'means', or anything which helps a person who is making progress towards a goal or a destination. In its frequent connection with γῆρας, ἐφόδιον therefore means anything which stands a man in good stead for his old age. At 13B4, where the mercenary flatterer plunders τὰ τῶν πατέρων ἐφόδια τοῦ γήρως, the fathers' life-savings are evidently meant; cf. Ar. Plut. 1023-24, D. 49.67 διωμόσατο μὴ εἶναι αὐτῷ ἐφόδια τῷ γήρᾳ ἱκανά, τοσαύτην οὐσίαν κεκτημένος; Synes. Provid. I 16. A livelihood can also be so described, as in P.Lond. 48 (2nd cent. B.C.), where a mother congratulates her son on learning demotic: διδάξεις .. τὰ παιδάρια καὶ ἕξεις ἐφόδιον εἰς τὸ γῆρας. According to Diogenes Laertius (V 21), Aristotle κάλλιστον ἐφόδιον τῷ γήρᾳ τὴν παιδείαν ἔλεγε (cf. Stob. II 31.100, attributing the same opinion to Pittacus); and Musonius' answer to the question τί ἄριστον γήρως ἐφόδιον; was τὸ ζῆν ὁδῷ κατὰ φύσιν (fr. 17 Hense). For other metaphorical uses of ἐφόδιον cf.

e.g. Plut. De tranq.an. 472C, 476B. -- For ἀποτίθεσθαι meaning 'lay up, put by for oneself' see LSJ s.v. ἀποτίθημι 3.

8C7 τιμιώεσθαι τὸν τοῦ σώματος πόνον : For τιμιεύεσθαι meaning 'husband' see LSJ s.v. τιμιεύω II.4.

8C7-8 ὡς μὴ κατεξήρους γινομένους πρὸς τὴν τῆς παιδείας ἐπιμέλειαν ἀπαγορεύειν : The adjective κατάξηρος means literally 'dried up', and hence presumably here 'drained' or 'exhausted'. (LSJ s.v. proposes 'stale' for the present passage; but one becomes stale at lessons through working too long at them, not through over-indulgence in physical exercise). For other occurences of the word cf. Hp. Prorrh. 1.3 (of tongues, cf. Arist. De an. II 422b5); Galen In Hippocr. Epid. VI I 29 (θερμασία); an unknown writer, Alciphron Epistulae ed. Schepers p.156.14 (of physical appearance, 'wizened'?); Thphr. CP VI 18.3, Alciphr. II 33.1 (of soils); metaphorically (though none of these provides a good parallel to the present passage): LXX Numbers 11.6 ('but now our soul is dried away'); Alciphr. III 39.3 τὸ κατάξηρον τῆς ἐπιθυμίας; Souda: κατάξηροι ὄνειροι , μὴ ἔχοντες λαβάς. -- For ὡς with an infinitive expressing result, instead of the more usual ὥστε , see LSJ s.v. B.III, K-G II p.501, BDR pp.317-318, Schmid III p.85, IV p.87. The construction, rare in classical prose (cf. Hdt. IV 184.3, VII 24; Thuc. VII 34.6; X. An. III 5.7), is quite frequent in post-classical writers. It does not, however, appear to be very common in Plutarch: Hein (p.163) estimates that there are not more than 15 instances in the entire Moralia. The relatively high concentration of 3 occurrences in the De Lib. educ. (the other two are at 10C3-4 and 13E1-2) may therefore be suspicious, as Hein believed, from the point of view of authenticity. -- For ἀπαγορεύειν πρός , meaning 'to give up at the prospect of', cf. e.g. Plut. Caes. 17.1, Coriol. 2.2, 13.5;

Lucian 37.24, 70.23.

8C9-10 κατὰ γὰρ Πλάτωνα ὕπνοι καὶ κόποι μαθήμασι πολέμοι: The passage P refers to is R. VII 537B, though it should be noted that Plato's point there is rather different: far from urging moderation in physical exercise lest studies should suffer, Plato there accepts that during the 2 or 3 years of intensive physical training before their higher education begins at the age of 20, his aspiring philosopher-rulers will have no spare energy to devote to the pursuit of intellectual subjects. -- The Plato text has κόποι γὰρ καὶ ὕπνοι μαθήμασι πολέμοι ; the reversed order of the nouns here may be due to P's inadvertance (he may very well be quoting from memory) or to an idiosyncrasy of the text he used.

8C10-D7 -- Above all, boys should be trained in exercises with a military application, such as the javelin, archery and hunting. In battle the goods of the vanquished are the prize of the victor. War has no place for men of soft physical condition, and the lean soldier accustomed to warlike sports is always superior to an enemy trained as an athlete. -- In urging the practice of exercises which will prepare boys for their later role as soldiers P is following classical models: cf. e.g. Pl. Lg. VIII 832E ὅσα μὲν αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν ἀγώνων) πρὸς πόλεμον ἐστιν ἀγωνίσματα ἐπιτηδευτέον καὶ θετέον ἆθλα νικητήρια, ὅσα δὲ μή, χαίρειν ἐκτέον ; cf. VII 794C-D, VIII 829B and elsewhere. The contrast which he goes on to make between military and athletic training has as its background the rise of athletic professionalism in post-classical Greece (on which see e.g. E.N. Gardiner, Greek Athletic Sports and Festivals (London 1910) pp.78-79, 131-132, 186-192; Athletics of the Ancient World (Oxford 1930) pp.99-116; Jüthner I pp.94-97; Woody pp.351-362) and the widening gap

between the requirements of the athlete and the soldier: see further 8D4-7n. -- On the general subject of physical training as a preparation for warfare see W.K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War II (University of California Press 1974) pp.213-219, and cf. Jüthner's index s.v. 'Krieg und Sport'.

8C10-11 ὅπερ πάντων ἐστὶ κυριώτατον τῶν εἰρημένων: See 4B6-8n. for phrases of this kind in the De lib.educ.

8D1-3 πρὸς .. τοὺς στρατιωτικοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς παῖδας ἀσκητέον ἐν ἀκοντισμοῖς αὐτοὺς καταθλοῦντας καὶ τοξείαις καὶ θήραις: See 8C10-D7n. on classical precedents for P's emphasis on warlike sports. Of the three which he mentions, javelin throwing (on which see Girard pp.203-207, Marrou pp.188-189, Jüthner II pp.307-350) has an obvious military application; on archery see Helen Miltner in RE s.v. τόξον (especially c.1852) and E. Bulanda, Bogen und Pfeil bei den Völkern des Altertums (Vienna and Leipzig 1913) pp.123-128; and note that hunting too was widely considered an excellent preparation for warfare: cf. e.g. Pl. Lg. I 633B, VII 823A-824B; X. Cyr. I 2.10, 6.28-29, Lac. 4.7, Cyn. 1.18, 12.1; Arist. Pol. I 1256b23-25; further references in Pease's note on Cic. N.D. II 161 'exerceamur in venando ad similitudinem bellicae disciplinae'.

8D3-4 'τὰ' γὰρ 'τῶν ἡττωμένων' ἐν ταῖς μάχαις 'ἆθλα τοῖς νικῶσιν ἆθλα πρόκειται': The quotation comes verbatim from X. Cyr. II 3.2 where Cyrus addresses his troops: ἢν δὲ ἡμεῖς αὖ νικῶμεν, καὶ οὕτω τὰ τῶν ἡττωμένων ἀγαθὰ πάντα τοῖς νικῶσιν ἆθλα πρόκειται etc. (For the thought cf. Pl. Lg. I 626B πάντα δὲ τὰ τῶν νικωμένων ἀγαθὰ τῶν νικώντων γίγνεσθαι.) The connection of thought with what has gone before is not clear. Is the clue perhaps ἆθλα, bringing out the similarity between sports and war, in which the prize is the spoils of the vanquished? Or is P just

emphasising the need for military competence: if a community is defeated in war its goods are forfeit?

8D4-7 πόλεμος δ' ἐσκιατραφημένην σωμάτων ἕξιν οὐ δέχεται, ἰσχνὸς δὲ στρατιώτης πολεμικῶν ἀγώνων ἐθὰς ἀθλητῶν †καὶ πολέμων φάλαγγας διωθεῖ : This sentence evidently owes something to Pl. R. VIII 556D, where Plato is discussing how an oligarchy becomes a democracy. He pictures a poor man and a rich fellow-citizen side by side in the battle-line, facing a common danger. The poor man observes the rich man's unfit condition and begins to despise him and think of overthrowing the oligarchy: ὅταν ... πολλάκις ἰσχνὸς ἀνὴρ πένης, ἡλιωμένος, πρὸς ταχθεὶς ἐν μάχῃ πλουσίῳ ἐσκιατροφηκότι, πολλὰς ἔχοντι σάρκας ἀλλοτρίας, ἴδῃ ἄσθματός τε καὶ ἀπορίας μεστόν, ἆρ' οἴει αὐτὸν οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι κακίᾳ τῇ σφετέρᾳ πλουτεῖν τοὺς τοιούτους ; (cf. the verbal parallels in the present passage to ἰσχνός and ἐσκιατροφηκότι). The reminiscence is superficial, however, since here the contrast is between the lean, fit soldier and the pampered athlete, and instead of being in the same battle-array they are on different sides. The point P is making about athletic training is a fairly common one. With the increasing professionalism of athletes, their more and more specialised training came to be regarded as of negligible value for the purposes of war (cf. E. Autolycus fr.282.19-21; Pl. Lg. VII 796A; Lucan VII 270-272; Plut. Philop. 3.5) and we hear of athleticism being actively disliked and discouraged by military commanders such as Epaminondas (Nepos Epam. 2.4-5, [Plut.] Reg.et imp.apophth. 192C-D) and Philopoemen (Plut. Philop. 3.2-5). The difference between the athletic and military regimes is explained at Pl. R. III 404A-B and Plut. Philop. 3.4: the athlete required a lot of sleep, a continuous surfeit of food, and fixed periods of activity and rest; the soldier, on the other hand, had to

accustom himself to irregularity and constant lack of food and sleep. Athletes became fat, and their training developed sheer physical strength, while the soldier needed speed and agility (Nepos Epam. 2.4; cf. Pl. Lg. VIII 832E-833A). -- ἐσκιατραφημένος denotes the condition of individuals, distinguished by their pale complexions, who avoid, or are prevented from participating in, outdoor activities: cf. e.g. Pl. R. VIII 556D (quoted above), X. Oec. 4.2, D.Chr. 70.2; hence the word is often used of effeminates and intellectuals (cf. Dover on Ar. Nu. 103, Dodds on E. Ba. 458 for the idea). Here P has evidently borrowed the word from the Plato passage; if, as seems likely, he means ἐσκιατραφημένην σωμάτων ἕξιν to describe the condition of an athlete, the word presumably translates as something like 'pampered': an athlete would hardly lack exposure to the sun in a literal sense.-- No satisfactory sense is to be had from ἀθλητῶν †καὶ πολέμων or from the variant readings ἀθλητῶν καὶ πολεμίων and ἀθλητῶν ἐς πόλεμον. On the theory that corruption might conceal some adjective qualifying ἀθλητῶν, Chatzidakis and Wilamowitz conjectured ἀθλητῶν ἀπολέμων, while Paton ventures ἀθλητῶν ⟨ἀνασκήτων⟩ εἰς πόλεμον. Either of these would give good sense, as would Tucker's ἀθλητῶν κατατιμέλων and Babbitt's ἀθλητῶν πιμελώδων, for which cf. πολλὰς ἔχοντι σάρκας ἀλλοτρίας in the Plato passage above (though this is of the rich man, not an athlete), and πολύσαρκοι of athletes at [Plut.] Reg. et imp. apophth. 192C. -- φάλαγγας διωθεῖ: The verb means either 'thrusts a way through' (X. Cyr. VII 5.39 τὸν ὄχλον; Plb. XI 1.12 τὰς τάξεις) or 'repulses' (Hdt. IV 102.1). Either would be acceptable here.

8D8-E8 -- Some reader may accuse me of giving advice which only the rich can follow, and neglecting the education of the

poor. My answer is that though I should like my precepts to be of use to all, the poor must blame not me but their fortune if their circumstances make this impossible. All parents, including the poor, must aim to give their children the best education possible; but failing that, they must do what they can. So much by way of digression; now on to other aspects of giving children a sound education. -- The intervention here of the imaginary critic is unexpected to say the least, and the reader is left wondering what P has said to justify the objection against which he now proceeds to defend himself. On the assumption that the clue must lie somewhere in the immediately preceding context, it seems most likely that P is uncomfortably aware of the cost of the physical training he has just been recommending (thus Sizoo p.64). He has already strongly criticised the notion that economies can be made in the hiring of a good teacher (4E7-5A2); now he has recommended the engagement of a παιδοτρίβης, whose fee is unlikely to be less (Jüthner I pp.163-166; Forbes, Greek Physical Education pp.227-228, Teachers' Pay p.29). Then there is the added expense of the equipment needed for the specific activities mentioned at 8D2-3, of which hunting in particular involved considerable outlay (cf. X. Cyn. 2.1; Galen, Parv. Pil. 2). All this might carry the sort of training P describes beyond the means of poorer parents whose children, in general, received a shorter and less adequate schooling than their more fortunate contemporaries (Pl. Prt. 326C; cf. Isoc. 7.44-45). -- This passage is sternly disapproved of by Wyttenbach (p.43; cf. Dyroff p.293 and n.3); but Erasmus writes very much in the same vein at De pueris 508E.

8D8 τί οὖν, ἄν τις εἴπῃ · 'ὦ δὲ δή' etc.: All mss. (and all other printed texts examined) in fact read εἴποι, so that εἴπῃ is

either a misprint or an unnotified emendation. εἴποι may be read with the rest of the text as it stands (What if someone were to say ..?) since ἄν (= ἐάν) with the optative is a perfectly acceptable construction (cf. 5A3-4n.); but it is perhaps better to re-punctuate 'Τί οὖν; ' ἄν τις εἴποι, 'ὡ δὲ δή' etc. ('What?' someone may say, 'Do you ..?' etc.), especially since P continues at 8D11-E1 πρὸς οὓς οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀπαντῆσαι. -- For the anticipation of readers' reactions cf. 2C4-7, 10D8-9, 10E6-9.

8D8-9 περὶ τῆς τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀγωγῆς ὑποκείμενος παραγγέλματα δώσειν: P is referring to the opening sentence of his work (1A1-3). παραγγέλματα, which only three mss. preserve (the rest have παραδείγματα), is one of the words which P uses to denote the contents of his book (below 8E3-4 τοῖς ἐμοῖς .. παραγγέλμασι; cf. 2B8, 5C1-2); others are ὑποθήκαι (8D11, 14A3) and, if Stephanus' transposition at 14C4 is correct, παραινέσεις.

8D9-10 τῶν πενήτων καὶ δημοτικῶν: For δημοτικός denoting people of humble status cf. e.g. Plb. XV 35.2 ἐκ δημοτικῆς καὶ ταπεινῆς ὑποθέσεως ὁρμηθείς; XXIV 7.1 νέος .. καὶ ταπεινὸς καὶ δημοτικῆς ἀγωγῆς τετευχώς.

8D10-11 μόνοις δὲ τοῖς πλουσίοις τάμουσεῖς τὰς ὑποθήκας διδόναι: τάμουσεῖς is the majority reading of the mss.; ὁμολογεῖς is read by one ms. and the editio princeps. Clearly ὁμουσεῖς cannot stand, because it cannot govern διδόναι (despite Heusinger's attempt to make it do so in the sense of ὁμοιοῖς σεαυτῷ, 'in eadem sententia persistis'); ὁμολογεῖς can, and may perhaps serve, though any finite verb here is a little surprising: one more naturally expects another participle, co-ordinate with παραμελῶν (8D10) and governed like it by φαίνῃ (8D9). Were it not for the still greater difficulty of co-ordinating διδόναι with παραμελῶν, one would be strongly tempted to see in τάμουσεῖς the corruption of some predicative adjective agreeing with τὰς

ὑποθήκας and governing τοῖς πλουσίοις. Thus Heumann interpreted ὁμονοεῖς as the plural of the non-existent ὁμονοής; ὁμολόγους might have been attractive if it could have meant 'agreeable to, suitable for', which however seems doubtful; Bernardakis suggests ἐμμελεῖς. On the whole, ὁμολογεῖς seems best, though it could all too easily be a scribal emendation to replace the puzzling ὁμονοεῖς. -- On τὰς ὑποθήκας see 8D8-9 n. above.

8D11-E1 πρὸς οὓς οὐ καλεπὸν ἀπαντῆσαι : P has forgotten that his objector was singular (8D8 ἄν τις εἴποι) and should strictly have written πρὸς ὅν.

8E5 πειρατέον μὲν οὖν εἰς δύναμιν: Cf. 8A9 for a sentence which begins with almost identical wording.

8E5 τὴν κρατίστην ἀγωγὴν ποιεῖσθαι: See 1D8n. for periphrases with ποιεῖσθαι in the De lib.educ.

8E7-8 καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ τῷ λόγῳ παρεφορτικάμην, ἵν' ἐφεξῆς καὶ τἄλλα τὰ φέροντα πρὸς τὴν ὀρθὴν τῶν νέων ἀγωγὴν συνάψω: P is evidently conscious that his introduction of the section 8D8-E8 at this point is rather irregular and calls for some comment. παραφορτίζεσθαι , which apparently occurs only here and in Pollux II 139, means 'to cram as an additional load into'. If therefore we really have what P wrote, it would seem that the inelegant insertion of 8D8-E8 is matched by the grossness of the language in which P apologises for it. -- There is the further difficulty that the explanation which P purports to give is really no explanation at all. Larsen and Tucker propose to emend ἵν' ἐφεξῆς to νῦν δ' ἐφεξῆς ; but one is left with the uncomfortable feeling that P may indeed have written the text as it stands.

(12) 8E9-9A9: Corporal punishment, praise and reproof.

P next addresses the subject of corporal punishment, which he rejects in favour of a judicious mixture of verbal encouragement and admonition.

8E9-9A2 Children should be induced to do what is right by verbal encouragement and dissuasion, not by blows and ill-treatment, which are more appropriate to slaves than to the free-born and make children recoil with horror from their tasks. Praise and reproof are much more useful means of encouraging good behaviour and discouraging bad in free children.

9A2-9 These should be employed in subtle alternation: first rebukes when a child has done wrong, and then praise to rally him, just as nursemaids comfort infants with milk when they have made them cry. But praise should not be excessive so as to go to a child's head.

P here displays for the first time the sympathetic and humanitarian side of himself which we encounter again at 9A10-C8, where he argues for children to be allowed adequate relaxation, and at 13C6-E9 where he argues the necessity of parental tolerance.

Corporal punishment, often severe to the point of brutality, was common in ancient schools. Numerous representations in art show punishment scenes in which the teacher wields a sandal, a stick or a strap, or beats a boy hoisted on the shoulders of a companion (cf. Beck, Greek Education pp.328-329 nos.69-78 and plates 12-14, Album pp.44-46 and plates 49-53 nos.261-276b); and ancient writers habitually refer to teachers as tyrants and to schools as places of fear and pain: cf. e.g. X. An. II 6.12;

Teles fr.5 Hense; Hor. Ep. II 1.70-71; Mart. IX 68, X 62; D.Chr. 15.19; Plut. Caes. 61.3; Juv. I 15; Suet. Gram. 9; Lucian 33.13. Cf. Headlam on Herodas 3.3 (p.119); Hermann-Blümner p.307 nn.1 and 2; Girard pp.250-251; Marrou pp.240-242, 397-399; Beck, Greek Education pp.104-105; Bonner pp.143-145.

P's rejection of such methods, in company with Quintilian and some other writers (see 8A9-9A2n.), is symptomatic of a trend towards greater humanity (cf. Marrou p.600 n.16), though as noted above it may also reflect something of the author's own personality.

On this chapter see Glaeser pp.61-65, Kemper pp.144-146.

8E9-9A2 -- Children should be induced to do what is right by verbal encouragement and dissuasion, not by blows and ill-treatment which are more appropriate to slaves than to the free-born and make children recoil with horror from their tasks. -- This advocacy of persuasion as an alternative to physical coercion puts P in the company of a small number of writers who took a similarly enlightened view. Apart from the poets (e.g. Menander fr. 609 Körte οὐ λυποῦντα δεῖ παιδάριον ὀρθοῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πείθοντά τι ; Ter. Ad. 57-58 'pudore et liberalitate liberos / retinere satius esse credo quam metu'), cf. e.g. Seneca, Clem. I 16.3 'Uter autem praeceptor liberalibus studiis dignior, qui excarnificabit discipulos, si memoria illis non constiterit aut si parum agilis in legendo oculus haeserit, an qui monitionibus et verecundia emendare ac docere malit?' Quintilian also disapproves of corporal punishment despite the example of Chrysippus: I 3.14 'Caedi vero discentis, quamlibet id receptum sit et Chrysippus non improbet, minime velim, primum quia deforme atque servile est et certe (quod convenit si aetatem mutes) iniuria: deinde quod, si cui tam est mens inliberalis ut obiurgatione non corrigatur, is

etiam ad plagas ut pessima quaeque mancipia durabitur: postremo quod ne opus erit quidem hac castigatione si adsiduus studiorum exactor adstiterit.' Cf. also Himerius Or. 54.2 Colonna, Libanius Or. 58.1 (and on his practice in this matter see A.J. Festugière, Antioche Paienne et Chrétienne (Paris 1959) pp.111-112), John Chrysostom De inani gloria 30.

8E9 κακεῖνό φημι : In a work which has more than its share of weak connections between topics this must surely rank as one of the weakest.

8E9-F1 δεῖν τοὺς παῖδας ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἄγειν παρακλήσεσι καὶ λόγοις : παρακλήσεσι καὶ λόγοις, literally 'by encouragement and words', presumably means 'by verbal encouragement', rather than by physical duress (λόγοις can hardly mean 'reasoning', as both Tucker and Babbitt translate it). The phrase is perhaps a little strange, but there is no need to resort to Hartman's emendation παρακλήσεσι καὶ φόβοις, which, though perhaps superficially attractive (cf. 8F5 ἔπαινοι ... καὶ ψόγοι), introduces a distinction which only becomes relevant two or three sentences later. -- With ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων cf. 12C9-D1 πρὸς τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

8F1-2 μὴ μὰ Δία πληγαῖς μηδ' ἀδικήμασιν : For the exclamation cf. 3D3 μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἀπεικότως, 6B9 καὶ νὴ Δι' εἰκότως. -- ἀδικήματα means 'ill-treatment' with a strong attendant connotation of outrage (cf. ὕβρεις and ἀδικεῖσθαι in 8F5 below); P is thinking of the violence done to a free-born person's rights if he is subjected to beating: cf. next note.

8F2-3 ἔοικε γάρ που ταῦτα τοῖς δούλοις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις πρέπειν : Flogging was servile punishment to which free adults could not be subjected under normal circumstances: cf. e.g. D. 24.167, and see M. Fuhrmann in RE Suppl.9 s.v. 'verbera'

(especially cc.1596-97), W. Waldstein in RAC s.v. 'Geisselung'. But the exemption did not apply to children, and Plato for one has no qualms about sanctioning servile punishments in the case of a child who misbehaves: Lg. VII 808E ὡς δ' αὖ δοῦλον παῖς ὁ προστυγχάνων τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν κολαζέτω τόν τε παῖδα αὐτὸν καὶ τὸν παιδαγωγὸν καὶ διδάσκαλον. Later opinion was sometimes more sensitive on the matter, however: Seneca says of the child (De ira II 21.4) 'nihil humile, nihil servile patiatur'; and Quintilian's reasons for objecting to corporal punishment for schoolchildren begin with one which closely parallels P's argument here: I 3.14 (quoted more fully 8E9-9A1n.) ' ...primum quia deforme atque servile est et certe (quod convenit si aetatem mutes) iniuria'.

8F3-4 ἀπονάρκωσι γὰρ καὶ φρίττουσι πρὸς τοὺς πόνους : For the thought that fear prevents children from learning cf. Varro, Logistoricus de lib. educ. fr.25 Müller: 'Remotissimum a discendo formido ac nimius timor et omnis perturbatio animi. Contra delectatio protelat ad discendum'; Quintilian II 4.10 'Ne illud quidem quod admoneamus indignum est, ingenia puerorum nimia interdum emendationis severitate deficere; nam et desperant et dolent et novissime oderunt et, quod maxime nocet, dum omnia timent nihil conantur.' -- The two verbs vividly express the symptoms produced by the fear of being beaten. For numbness as one of the effects of fear cf. e.g. Lucr. III 981 'cassa formidine torpens'; and for the verb (in its rather commoner middle form) cf. Pl. R. VI 503D. For φρίττω with πρός cf. e.g. Lib. Or. 24.16.

8F4-5 τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὰς ὕβρεις : see note on 8F2-3 above.

8F5-9A1 ἔπαινοι δὲ καὶ ψόγοι πάσης εἰσὶν ἀκμῆς ὠφελιμώτεροι τοῖς ἐλευθέροις: ἔπαινοι and ψόγοι are natural opposites, and as such often mentioned as a pair: cf. e.g. Pl.

Crito 47B, R. VI 492C; Arist. EN III 1109b31, 1110a33; Plut. De ad.et am. 73E. For οἰκείως see note on 8F2-3 above.

9A1-2 οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ παρορμῶντες οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἀνείργοντες : Cf. the description of the function of ἐλπὶς τιμῆς and φόβος τιμωρίας at 12C9-D2: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὀρεκτικωτέρους πρὸς τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἡ δ' ἀκνηροὺς πρὸς τὰ φαῦλα τῶν ἔργων ἀπεργάζεται.

9A2-9 -- These should be employed in subtle alternation: first rebukes when a child has done wrong, and then praise to rally him, just as nursemaids comfort infants with the breast when they have made them cry. But praise would not be excessive so as to go to a child's head, -- This section contains P's explanation of how he envisages the twin instruments of praise and reproof being employed. The advice to use them alternately is rather like the recommendation to fathers at 13D2-5 to alternate severity with indulgence in dealing with adolescents.

9A2-3 δεῖ δ' ἐναλλὰξ καὶ ποικίλως χρῆσθαι ταῖς ἐπιπλήξεσι καὶ τοῖς ἐπαίνοις : ἐναλλάξ means 'alternately', and is further amplified in the next sentence. ποικίλως means 'subtly' (cf. LSJ s.v. ποικίλος III 3.c), by which P no doubt intends to convey that their use should be governed by some sensitivity as to when each is appropriate. ἐπίπληξις is synonymous with ψόγος, whose place it has taken; for the word cf. e.g. Plut. De aud.poet. 34D, De aud. 46C; Praec.ger.reip. 810A, Solon 3.4, Dio and Brutus 5.8

9A3-4 κἀπειδὰν ποτε σφαλῶσι, ταῖς ἐπιπλήξεσιν ἐν αἰσχύνῃ ποιεῖσθαι : The manuscripts at this point read κἀπειδὰν ποτε σφοδρῶς ἐπιπλήξωσιν ἐν αἰσχύνῃ ποιεῖσθαι, for which, on the basis of no discoverable manuscript authority, and therefore presumably by way of conjecture, the Aldine substitutes κἀπειδὰν ποτε εὐφρανῶνται ταῖς ἐπιπλήξεσιν ἐν αἰσχύνῃ ποιεῖσθαι. The need for

some emendation of the transmitted text is clear enough, since there seems to be no way of making sense of it as it stands. In particular, the unexpressed subject of a third person plural verb after καὶπειδὰν can really only be οἱ παῖδες , which rules out ἐπιπλήξωσι as the true reading. It is much more likely that P wrote ταῖς ἐπιπλήξεσιν ἐν αἰσχύνῃ ποιεῖσθαι (cf. 9A5 ἀνακαλεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐπαίνοις), and that σφοδρῶς either conceals a subjunctive verb or preceded one which has dropped out. Thus far the Aldine seems to be on the right lines; but εὐφρανῶντι does not recommend itself as a very probable conjecture for the missing verb. The search for a word to denote reprehensible behaviour more likely to justify rebuke prompts Wyttenbach's conjectures ἀφρανίνωσι or ὑβρίζωσι or φυλάττωντι or ἐκφέρωντι, Hercher's θρασύνωντι and Stegemann's σφοδρῶς ἀναισχύντωσι. Wilamowitz's σφαλῶσι is neater than any of the other conjectures and may well be right.

9A4 ἐν αἰσχύνῃ ποιεῖσθαι : 'put them to shame'; cf. e.g. D. 18. 136 ἐν αἰσχύνῃ ποιήσων τὴν πόλιν, Musonius p.54.4-5 Hense ἐν αἰσχύνῃ εἶναι , Philo 3.70 ἐν αἰσχύνῃ καὶ ὕβρει γίνεσθαι .

9A5 ἀνακαλεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐπαίνοις : 'rally them with praise'; cf. LSJ s.v. ἀνακαλέω II.4.

9A5 καὶ μιμεῖσθαι τὰς τίτθας : For the exhortation to emulate someone cf. 14A3-7n. μιμεῖσθαι occurs again at 10E6, ζηλοῦν in the same sense at 12A2, 14B5 and 14C5.

9A6-7 αἵτινες ἐπειδὰν τὰ παιδία κλαυθμυρίσωσιν, εἰς παρηγορίαν πάλιν τὸν μαστὸν ὑπέχουσι : For the picture cf. D.Chr. 4.74 καθάπερ αἱ τίτθαι τὰ παιδία, ἐπειδὰν αὐτοῖς πληγὰς ἐμβαλῶσι , πεφροντισμέναι καὶ κηδόμεναι μῦθον αὐτοῖς ὕστερον διηγήσαντο. Quintilian also uses nursemaids as a model, but to make a different point: II 4.5 'Quin ipsis doctoribus hoc esse curae velim, ut

teneras adhuc mentes more nutricum mollium alant, et satiari velut quodam iucundioris disciplinae lacte patiantur'. -- ἐπειδὰν τὰ παιδία κλαυθμυρίσωσιν means 'when they make the infants cry' (i.e. after they have made them cry); cf. κλαυθμυρί used of babies crying, Arist. Pol. VII 1336a35; [Pl.] Ax. 366D (an infant) λαλῆσαι μὲν οὔπω δυνάμενον ἃ πάσχει, κλαυθμυρίζόμενον δὲ καὶ τοῦτην τῆς δυσχερεστήσεως μίαν ἔχον φωνήν.

9A7 πάλιν τὸν μαστὸν ὑπέχουσι : Cf. the same phrase at 3C1-2, where see n.

9A7-8 δεῖ δ' αὐτοὺς μηδὲ τοῖς ἐγκωμίοις ἐπαίρειν καὶ φυσᾶν : On the detrimental effects of too fulsome praise on children cf. e.g. Sen. De ira II 21.5 'quotiens .. dignum aliquid laude fecerit, attolli non gestire patiamur: guadium enim exultationem, exultationem tumor et nimia aestimatio sui sequitur'; Quintilian II 2.6 'In laudandis discipulorum dictionibus nec malignus nec effusus, quia res altera taedium laboris, altera securitatem parit'.

9A8-9 κωνοῦται γὰρ ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς τῶν ἐπαίνων καὶ θρύπτονται : The use of the two verbs in close proximity is reminiscent, as Nikitin notes (p.1), of Pl. Ly. 210E οὕτω χρή, ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, τοῖς παιδικοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, ταπεινοῦντα καὶ ωστέλλοντα, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ ὦ κωνοῦντα καὶ διαθρύπτοντα.

(13) 9A10-F3: (a) Rest and relaxation.
(b) Parental supervision of lessons.
(c) Memory training.

The section of text which falls within the confines of the modern Chapter 13 has in fact no single theme, but contains material on three quite distinct and unrelated topics. First rest and relaxation:

9A10-B9 I have actually seen some fathers led by too much affection to be unkind to their children. How? By burdening them, in misguided eagerness for them to excel, with tasks beyond their powers, so that they are either overwhelmed and give up or become depressed and unreceptive to lessons. Just as plants are nourished by moderate watering but drowned by too much, so too the mind is developed by moderate exercise but swamped by an excess.

9B9-C8 We must therefore give children some respite from continual labours, bearing in mind that the whole of life is divided between activity and relaxation. This is why sleep was created as well as waking, peace as well as war, fair weather as well as storm, holidays as well as work. In sum, rest is the sauce of labour. Even inanimate objects like bows and lyres are unstrung when not in use.

Next comes a section on the necessity for fathers to maintain a personal oversight of their children's progress at their lessons:

9C9-D7 Some blameworthy fathers, having entrusted their children to pedagogues and teachers, take no personal interest in their tuition. This is wrong. In fact they should test their children every few days, and not depend on the reliability of hirelings. It will also keep the teachers up to the mark to be called to account in this way. As the groom said in the story, nothing fattens a horse like the king's eye.

Finally there is a section on memory, a faculty which P wishes to see cultivated and developed in all children:

9D8-E1 Most important of all is the exercise of children's memories, for memory is the storehouse of education, and Mnemosyne was made mother of the Muses in myth to symbolise the unique creative and nourishing functions of memory.

9E1-8 Both children who have naturally good memories and those who do not should undergo memory-training: the former will excel through the strengthening of their talent, while the latter will improve through the supplementing of their deficiencies. As Hesiod says, a little added often to a little soon mounts up.

9E9-F3 Fathers should also remember that in addition to its academic value memory-training has a practical usefulness which is not inconsiderable, since the memory of past actions serves as a guide to future conduct.

It is difficult to detect any common thread which would make this succession of topics more than a random sequence. P's discussion of the first subject, relaxation, displays some insight into the psychology of learning, though it clearly draws heavily in the section 9B9-C8 on commonplace material which belongs to a topos concerning activity and rest. The introductory section (9A10-B9), with its references to over-ambitious parents, most probably reflects the conditions of the first century A.D. and after.

The second topic, parental supervision of lessons, is another symptom of P's constant concern for the maximum possible involvement of parents in their children's education. Interestingly enough, it also reveals his lack of confidence in the teacher. In this section and the previous one there reappears a slight hint of the critical tone assumed towards

fathers in parts of Chapter 7 (cf. 9A10-B6, 9C9-D1).

The final section, on memory, involves parents much less closely, though their feelings on the subject are taken into account at 9E9-F3. P's message here is simply that memory-training is useful and will benefit all children regardless of their natural talent for remembering.

On Chapter 13 see Glaeser pp.59-61 (rest and relaxation), p.68 (memory); Kemper pp.146-151.

9A10-B9 -- I have actually seen some fathers led by too much affection to be unkind to their children. How? By burdening them, in misguided eagerness for them to excel, with tasks beyond their powers, so that they are either overwhelmed and give up or become depressed and unreceptive to lessons. Just as plants are nourished by moderate watering but drowned by too much, so too the mind is developed by moderate excercise but swamped by an excess. -- P's picture of over-ambitious parents tallies with other accounts of the same phenomenon from the first century A.D. onwards, when success and fortune could be the rewards of a good literary or rhetorical education. Cf. e.g. Sen. Prov. 2.5 'illi (sc. patres) excitari iubent liberos ad studia obeunda mature, feriatis quoque diebus non patiuntur esse otiosos, et sudorem illis et interdum lacrimas excutiunt'; Petron. 4.1-2 'Parentes obiurgatione digni sunt, qui nolunt liberos suos severa lege proficere. Primum enim sic ut omnia, spes quoque ambitioni donant. Deinde ad vota properant, cruda adhuc studia in forum ⟨im⟩pellunt et eloquentiam, qua nihil esse maius confitentur, pueris induunt adhuc nascentibus'; Juv. XIV 190-193 'post finem autumni media de nocte supinum / clamosus iuvenem pater excitat: "accipe ceras, / scribe, puer, vigila, causas age, perlege rubras / maiorum leges"'; Liban. Or. 25.47.

See also Clarke pp.44-45, Bonner pp.101-102.

9A10 ἤδη δέ τινας ἐγὼ εἶδον πικτέρας : P invokes personal observation, as at 6B7-9 ὁρῶ δ' ἔγωγε τοὺς τοῖς συφεταῖσδεσιν ὄχλοις ἀρεστῶς καὶ κεκαρισμένως ἐπιτηδεύοντας λέγειν καὶ τὸν βίον ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἀεώτους καὶ φιληδόνους ἀποβαίνοντας.

9A10-B1 οἷς τὸ λίαν φιλεῖν τοῦ μὴ φιλεῖν αἴτιον κατέστη : This conceit is not an original invention of P's own, but goes back apparently to Theophrastus, fr. 82 Wimmer κινδυνεύει τὸ λίαν φιλεῖν, ὡς φησι Θεόφραστος, αἴτιον τοῦ μισεῖν γίνεσθαι πολλάκις . Cf. Aristaenetus Ep. I 22 αἴτιον δὲ ἦν τοῦ βούλεσθαι μισεῖν τὸ λίαν φιλεῖν. P has clearly preferred φιλεῖν ... τοῦ μὴ φιλεῖν to φιλεῖν ... τοῦ μισεῖν for rhetorical effectiveness; cf. 6A11-B1 τὸ γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν τοῖς σοφοῖς ἐστιν ἀπαρέσκειν. -- For αἴτιον κατέστη cf. 6F3 ματαιολογίας ... αἴτιον καθίσταται.

9B1 τί δ' ἐστιν ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν; For P's self-answered rhetorical questions see 1D6 n.

9B2 [ἵνα τῷ παραδείγματι φωτεινότερον ποιήσω τὸν λόγον;]: Wilamowitz, to whom the Teubner apparatus gives the credit for the bracketing of these words, was anticipated by Hercher in Hermes 11 (1876) p.228. The clause falls under grave suspicion by having more than one thing clearly wrong with it. (a) First and most importantly, the promised παράδειγμα does not materialise (cf. Hartman, De Plutarcho p.12); nor in the context would we expect to find one. A didactic writer's παραδείγματα are his illustrations of assertions or precepts which he has first formulated in the abstract. Thus P uses the word of his Lycurgus anecdote at 3A2, and of the stories of Gylippus, Socrates, Archytas and Plato at 10B5. Here, however, he has just made a slightly cryptic statement which needs interpretation in order to be fully

understood. What follows ought therefore to be an explanation, and not an illustration. (b) The text offers τῷ παραδείγματι where the sense would demand 'with an example'. Certainly τῳ could easily be read for τῷ (as recommended by Heusinger, Schneider and Sizoo p.82), but this is hardly an attractive alternative (τῳ = τινι occurs otherwise only twice in P (2C3, 13C1), in both cases after εἰ : see further 2C3-4n). (c) φωτεινότερον looks wrong. The sense of the clause ought to be 'that I may make my meaning clearer'; but φωτεινός is 'bright', not 'clear', and there are no obvious parallels by which its use here could be defended. This last difficulty could be removed by reading φανερώτερον instead (cf. e.g. Pl. Lg. I 630B ποῖ δὴ τελευτᾷ ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος , καὶ τί φανερὸν ποτε ποιῆσαι βουληθεὶς λέγει πῶτε ;), but the others are less easily dealt with and Paton may be right to bracket the whole clause (on Wilamowitz' advice) for deletion as an intrusive addition. His comment in the apparatus 'locum lacunae quae satis magna erat occupant' goes rather further than the evidence warrants, since there is nothing in any manuscript to suggest a lacuna, let alone indicate its dimensions. The assumption of a lacuna seems a fair one in view of the fact that σπεύδοντες γάρ is hardly the way to begin a reply to the question τί ὲστιν ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν ; but insofar as what follows is perfectly intelligible in the context there seems no reason to suppose a very extensive gap. The two words ἐγὼ φράσω, as at 5A7, for example, would fill it quite adequately.

9B3 ἐν πᾶσι τάχιον πρωτεῦσαι : The form τάχιον , though rejected by Atticists, is common enough in late prose: cf. Phryn. 58 (with Lobeck's n. pp.76-77), Hdn. Philet. 18, LSJ s.v. ταχύς C I.3, Arndt-Gingrich s.v. τάχεως 4, Schmid IV p.25. P uses also the more correct form θᾶττον (13A3).

9B3-4 πόνους ... οἷς ἀπαυδῶντες ἐκπίπτουσι: 'tasks ... by which they are overwhelmed and come to grief'. For ἀπαυδᾶν with the dative cf. e.g. Babr. 7.8 τῷ κόπῳ ... ἀπαυδήσας, anon. AP V 168 ἀπαυδήσαντα πόνοις. For the absolute use of ἐκπίπτειν meaning 'fail, come to grief' cf. Ep.Rom. 9.6 οὐκ οἶον δὲ ὅτι ἐκπέπτωκεν ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ; and for a slightly different use see 6C8 with n.

9B5-6 καὶ ἄλλως βαρυνόμενοι ταῖς κακοπαθείαις οὐ δέχονται τὴν μάθησιν εὐηνίως: ἄλλως might perhaps mean 'vainly, closely qualifying βαρυνόμενοι (as Heusinger, for example, would have it); but perhaps more probably καὶ ἄλλως means 'or at all events', introducing a less catastrophic alternative to ἐκπίπτουσι.

9B6-9 ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ φυτὰ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις ὕδασι τρέφεται, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς πνίγεται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ψυχὴ ταῖς μὲν συμμέτροις αὔξεται πόνοις, τοῖς δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι βαπτίζεται: Cf. the very similar comparison put into Socrates' mouth by Xenophon at Smp. 2.25, where however the moral is the advisability of moderation in drinking: δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν σώματα ταὐτὰ πάσχειν ἅπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐν γῇ φυομένων. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνα, ὅταν μὲν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὰ ἄγαν ἄθρόως ποτίζῃ, οὐ δύνανται ὀρθοῦσθαι οὐδὲ ταῖς ὥραις διαπνεῖσθαι. ὅταν δ' ὅσῳ ἥδεται τοσοῦτον πίνῃ, καὶ μάλα ὀρθά τε αὔξεται καὶ θάλλοντα ἀφικνεῖται εἰς τὴν καρπογονίαν. -- There are interesting verbal similarities between ψυχὴ ταῖς .. συμμέτροις αὔξεται πόνοις and [Isoc.] Ad Demon. 12: τὰ μὲν γὰρ σώματα ταῖς συμμέτροις πόνοις, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ταῖς σπουδαίοις λόγοις αὔξεσθαι πέφυκε. It may well be that a common source lies behind both passages. -- See Com.Adesp. 358 for Kock's attempt to reconstruct two comic trimeters from this passage of the De lib.educ.

9B9-C8 -- We must therefore give children some respite

from continual labours, bearing in mind that the whole of life is divided between activity and relaxation. This is why sleep was created as well as waking, peace as well as war, fair weather as well as storm, holidays as well as work. In sum, rest is the sauce of labour. Even inanimate objects like bows and lyres are unstrung when not in use. -- In recognising that children need rest and relaxation, P is at one with Quintilian, I 3.8-9: 'Danda est tamen omnibus aliqua remissio, non solum quia nulla res est quae perferre possit continuum laborem, atque ea quoque quae sensu et anima carent ut servare vim suam possint velut quiete alterna retenduntur, sed quod studium discendi voluntate, quae cogi non potest, constat. Itaque et virium plus adferunt ad discendum renovati ac recentes et acriorem animum, qui fere necessitatibus repugnat.' The importance of rest for human beings in general is stressed by Aristotle (cf. e.g. EN IV 1128B3-4 δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ἀνάπαυσις καὶ ἡ παιδιὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον, X 1175a4-5 πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν, X 1176b34-35 ἀδυνατοῦντες... συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται), and by later writers (e.g. Sen. Ep. 15.6 'dandum est aliquod intervallum animo, ita tamen ut non solvatur, sed remittatur', Tranq. 17.5 quoted below 9C6-7n.).Cynic and Stoic philosophers especially seem to have developed the theme of rest and activity into a topos with a set of standard illustrations, and it is plain (especially from 9C1-3 and 9C6-7) that P is drawing upon this tradition. See K. Praechter, 'Der Topos ΠΕΡΙ ΣΠΟΥΔΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΙΔΙΑΣ', Hermes 47 (1912) pp.471-476; Gudeman on Tac. Dial. 28.6 (his 28.8).

9B10-C1 ἐνδυμουμένους ὅτι πᾶς ὁ βίος ἡμῶν εἰς ἄνεσιν καὶ σπουδὴν διήρηται : The thought is Aristotelian: See Pol. VII 1333a30-32 διήρηται δὲ καὶ πᾶς ὁ βίος εἰς ἀσχολίαν καὶ σχολὴν καὶ εἰς πόλεμον καὶ εἰρήνην (cf. οὐδὲ πόλεμος ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰρήνη at

9C2 below). Aristotle's point, however, is the quite different one that we choose the first member of each pair for the sake of the second.

9C1-2 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ μόνον ἐγρήγορσις ἀλλὰ καὶ ὕπνος εὑρέθη : This is closely akin to the idea that nature created day and night in recognition of man's need for alternate activity and rest, for which cf. e.g. Philo 29.100 (nature) τὸ ἐπίπονον καὶ καματηρὸν τοῦ γένους ἡμῶν ἐπισταμένη διένειμε τὸν χρόνον εἰς ἡμέραν τε καὶ νύκτα, τῇ μὲν ἐγρήγορσιν, νυκτὶ δ' ὕπνον πραγματεύουσα ; Sen. Ep. 3.6 'Et quiescenti agendum et agenti quiescendum est. Cum rerum natura delibera: illa dicet tibi et diem fecisse se et noctem'. Though P does not mention nature as the agent, his use of the verb εὑρέθη gives this sentence a teleological slant such as that implied at 3C6-D2 (the providential nature of lactation). Here, however, as there, it would be rash to assume that this reflects any deeply-considered view on the part of P; the parallels strongly suggest that the teleological element simply came as part and parcel of the commonplace. -- ἐγρήγορσις is common enough in Aristotle; cf. also e.g. D.Chr. 3.85; Aristid. 20.7, 48.32 Keil; Schmid I p.158, II p.217. In the Plutarchan corpus it occurs only in works of suspect authenticity: Cons. ad Apoll. 106F, Aqua an ign.958D, fr. 34 no.114 Bernardakis (VII p.163); cf. Sandbach CQ 33 (1939) p.200.

9C2-3 οὐδὲ χειμῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐδίᾳ : These are foul weather and fair (cf. 8C4-5 with n.) i.e. possibly winter and summer?). This pair seems slightly out of place among the rest, since it less obviously suggests circumstances which involve humans in activity or rest.

9C3 οὐδ' ἐνεργοὶ πράξεις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑορταί : For ἑορτή meaning

'holiday, rest, inactivity' cf. e.g. Thuc. I 70.8; Gow on Theoc. 15.26; Headlam on Herodas VI 17; and for the connection of festivals with relaxation cf. Pl. Lg. I 635C-D.

9C3-4 συνελόντι δ' εἰπεῖν : For the expression cf. e.g. Clearchus fr.16 Wehrli; Plut. Ant. 91.6, De ad. et am. 55A. ὡς συνελόντι εἰπεῖν occurs at X. An. III 1.38, HG VII 5.6, Mem. III 8.10; συνελόντι φράσαι D. 11.16; συνελόντι alone D. 4.7, Isaeus 4.22. See further on expressions of this kind Rehdantz-Blass p.69 s.v. 'Ellipse', and on the dative of the person who judges K-G I p.424. P has συνελὼν πόνου ἐγὼ φημι at 5C6.

9C4 ἡ ἀνάπαυσις τῶν πόνων ἐστὶν ἅρπυμα: 'rest is the sauce of labour'. For the metaphor cf. Plut. Lyc. 25.4 τὴν παιδιὰν ὥσπερ ἡδυσμα τοῦ πόνου καὶ τῆς δίαιτης ἐμβαλόντα κατὰ καιρὸν εἰς τὰ συμπόσια καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διατριβάς.

9C4-6 καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων μόνων τοῦτο ⟨ἂν⟩ ἴδοι τις γινόμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων: The same point is made by Quintilian, I 3.8 (quoted in context above, 9B9-C8n.): 'atque ea quoque quae sensu et anima carent ut servare vim suam possint velut quiete alterna retenduntur'. -- Since the great majority of mss. have nothing between ζώων and τοῦτο (a handful only have μόνον, the Aldine and subsequent printed texts μόνων), it is worth noting that οὐ ... ἀλλὰ καί is sometimes found: cf. e.g. Thuc IV 92.4; X. Mem. II 3.8; D. 23.49; K-G II p.261; Schmid III p.94; Lampe s.v. οὐ 5; Latin parallels collected by Pease on Cic. N.D. II 162.

9C6-7 καὶ γὰρ τὰ τόξα καὶ τὰς λύρας ἀνίεμεν, ἵν' ἐπιτείνωμεν δυνηθῶμεν: The analogy of the bow is a standard feature of the topos on activity and rest, as Praechter shows. Its original inspiration may perhaps have come from Hdt. II 173.3-4 (Amasis replies to censorious friends): τὰ τόξα οἱ ἐκτημένοι, ἐπεὰν μὲν δέωνται χρᾶσθαι, ἐντανύουσι, ἐπεὰν δὲ χρήσωνται, ἐκλύουσι. εἰ

γὰρ δὴ τὸν πάντα χρόνον ἐντεταμένα εἴη, ἐκραγείη ἄν, ὥστε ἐς τὸ δέον οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν αὐτοῖς χρᾶσθαι. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπου κατάστασις· εἰ ἐθέλοι κατεσπουδάσθαι ἀεὶ μηδὲ ἐς παιγνίην τὸ μέρος ἑωυτὸν ἀνιέναι, λάθοι ἂν ἤτοι μανεὶς ἢ ὅ γε ἀπόπληκτος γενόμενος. The same comparison recurs in an anecdote about Anacharsis (Sternbach, Gnomol.Vat. no.17 p.11): ἀστραγαλίζων καὶ ἐπιτιμηθείς, διότι παίζει, ἔφη· "ὥσπερ τὰ τόξα διὰ παντὸς τεταμένα ῥήγνυται, ἐπὰν δὲ ἀνεθῇ, εὔχρηστα γίνεται πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῷ βίῳ χρείας, οὕτω καὶ ὁ λογισμὸς ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν μένων κάμνει." (cf. Arist. EN X 1176b 33-35). Cf. also Ov. Her. 4.91-92 'arcus ... / si numquam cesses tendere, mollis erit'; Phaedrus III 14, and especially lines 10-13: 'cito rumpes arcum semper si tensum habueris; / at si laxaris cum voles erit utilis. / Sic lusus animo debent aliquando dari / ad cogitandum melior ut redeat tibi'; Greg.Naz. Or. 26.57-58 (PG 35 c.1237B) καὶ γὰρ πως εἴωθα τοὺς πόνους ἀεὶ ταῖς τοιαύταις διαλύειν ἀνέσεσιν. ἐπεὶ μηδὲ νευρὰ φέρει τὸ αὐτόνουν ἀεὶ τεινομένη, καὶ δεῖταί τι μικρὸν τῶν γλυφίδων ἐκλύεσθαι, εἰ μέλλοι ταθήσεσθαι πάλιν, καὶ μὴ ἄχρηστος ἔσεσθαι τῷ τοξότῃ, μηδὲ ἀνόνητος ἐν καιρῷ χρήσεως. For the bow and the lyre together cf. D.Chr. fr.5 χρὴ οὖν δεσπόζειν ἐπιεικῶς καὶ ἀνιέναι ποτὲ βουλομένοις ἐπιτρέπειν. αἱ γὰρ ἀνέσεις παρασκευαστικαὶ πόνων εἰσί, καὶ τόξον καὶ λύρα καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἀκμάζει δι' ἀναπαύσεως; Fronto De feriis Alsiensibus 3.4 (p.214 van den Hout, p.225 Naber) 'Quis arcus perpetuo intenditus? Quae fides perpetuo suo strictae sunt?'; cf. also Hor. Od. II 10.18-20, Stat. Silv. IV 4.30-33. -- ἵν' ἐπιτεῖναι δυνηθῶμεν: 'in order to be able to put them under strain (again)'; cf. Greg.Naz. (quoted above) εἰ μέλλοι ταθήσεσθαι πάλιν. The object of relaxation, in other words, is to promote more effective activity. This thought is standard in the topos: cf. e.g. Arist. EN X 1176b35-1177a1 οὐ δὴ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις. γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας; Ov. Her. 4.89-90 'quod caret alterna requie,

durabile non est; / haec reparat vires fessaque membra novat'; Phdr. III 14.12-13 'sic lusus animo debent aliquando dari, / ad cogitandum melior ut redeat tibi'; Sen. Trang. 17.5 'danda est animis remissio: meliores acrioresque requieti surgent'; D.Chr. fr. 5 καὶ γὰρ ἀνέσεις παρασκευαστικαὶ πόνων εἰσί; Quint. I 3.9 'itaque et virium plus adferunt ad discendum renovati ac recentes et acriorem animum'; Stat. Silv. IV 33-34 'vires instigat alitque / tempestiva quies; maior post otia virtus'; Lucian 13.1 προσήκειν μετὰ τὴν πολλὴν τῶν σπουδαιοτέρων ἀνάγνωσιν ἀνιέναι τε τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἔπειτα κάματον ἀκμαιοτέραν παρασκευάζειν.

9C7-8 καθόλου δὲ σώζεται σῶμα μὲν ἐνδείᾳ καὶ πληρώσει, ψυχὴ δ' ἀνέσει καὶ πόνῳ : P seems to be referring to some ill-defined medical doctrine. According to Hippocrates, Aph. 2.22, ἀπὸ πλησμονῆς ὁκόσα ἂν νοσήματα γένηται, κένωσις ἰῆται. καὶ ὁκόσα ἀπὸ κενώσεως, πλησμονή. But the whole context of the present passage suggests that P is thinking of normal diet, not cures for illness. For the conjunction of the two opposites ἐνδείᾳ and πλήρωσις Wyttenbach compares Plut. De tu. san. 128A, 134B, Quaest. conv. 686E, 732D.

9C9-D7 -- Some blameworthy fathers, having entrusted their children to pedagogues and teachers, take no personal interest in their tuition. This is wrong. In fact they should test their children every few days, and not depend on the reliability of hirelings. It will also keep the teachers up to the mark to be called to account in this way. As the groom said in the story, nothing fattens a horse like the king's eye. -- P has already insisted on the importance of a careful choice of pedagogues and teachers in Chapter 7. The present short section is a plea for the father's personal interest in his child's education to continue

even after that choice has been made. This is consistent with P's strong advocacy throughout of lively parental involvement in all aspects of children's education; but here there is the additional implication that the education of children is too important a matter to be left entirely to teachers. P's narrow distrust of school-teachers (cf. 9D2-3 μὴ τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχειν ἐν μισθωτοῦ διαθέσει), which is no doubt partly explained by the scant regard paid to them by Greek society as a whole, is contrasted by Colson (commentary on Quintilian I, p.xli) with Quintilian's much more generous and enlightened concept of the responsibilities of the teacher.

9C9 ἄξιον δ' ἐπιτιμᾶν τῶν πατέρων ἐνίοις : Cf. 4C4-5 νῦν δέ πως καὶ κατατύχοις τῶν πατέρων ἐνίων.

9D1 πλεῖστον τοῦ δέοντος ἁμαρτάνοντες : Cf. 10E8-9 πλεῖστον διαμαρτάνει τῆς ἀληθείας (v.l. τοῦ δέοντος).

9D1-2 αὐτοὺς γὰρ παρ' ὀλίγας ἡμέρας δεῖ δοκιμασίαν λαμβάνειν τῶν παίδων: At first sight τῶν παίδων is a little surprising, since it is the teacher whom we expect to be under scutiny from the parent. But apparently P proposes to test the teacher's competence by keeping a check on the progress the children are making under his tuition (cf. 9D3-5 below). In actual practice the difference between examining the children and examining the teacher would be minimal if the exercise took the form of a visit to the classroom to observe lessons, which is what αὐτόπτης and αὐτήκοοι at 9C11 suggest P has in mind. -- For δοκιμασίαν λαμβάνειν cf. e.g. Plb. III 31.8, and see 4A6-7n. on periphrases with λαμβάνειν.

9D2-3 ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχειν ἐν μισθωτοῦ διαθέσει: 'and not rest their hopes on the disposition of a hired person' (Babbitt). This is a disrespectful reference to the teacher which is rather hard to reconcile with P's description at 4B8-10

of the sort of man he should be; P seems to have reverted to the assumption that the teacher is unlikely to be a dependable person in the majority of cases. For the teacher's μισθός see 4E7-5A5n. It seems to be characteristic of P to suspect that a paid employee's interest in his work will be mainly pecuniary: cf. his comments at 3C4-6 on hired nursemaids: καὶ τίτθαι δὲ καὶ αἱ τροφοὶ τὴν εὔνοιαν ὑποβολιμαίαν καὶ παρέγγραπτον ἔχουσιν, ἅτε μισθοῦ φιλοῦσαι. -- διάθεσις here most probably means 'disposition', as Babbitt translates it (cf. 7B2, where the word certainly has this sense; LSJ s.v. II.1b). Less likely, but perhaps a possibility in the present context, is the meaning 'report' which occurs in P.Oxy. 52 line 13 (used of a doctor's written report): cf. LSJ s.v. I.5.

9D3-4 καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι πλείονα ποιήσονται τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν παίδων, μέλλοντες ἑκάστοτε διδόναι τὰς εὐθύνας: The teachers will benefit as well as the children, who are the primary objects of the scutiny, by being kept up to the mark.

9D5-7 κἀντεῦθα τὸ ῥηθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἱπποκόμου χάριεν, ὡς οὐδὲν οὕτω πικίνει τὸν ἵππον ὡς βασιλέως ὀφθαλμός: The saying of the ἱπποκόμος is familiar from Xenophon Oec. 12.20: ἡ τοῦ βαρβάρου λεγομένη ὑπόκρισις, ὅτε βασιλεὺς ἄρα ἵππου ἐπιτυχὼν ἀγαθοῦ πακύνει αὐτὸν ὡς τάχιστα βουλόμενος ἥρετο τῶν δεινῶν τινα ἀμφ' ἵππους δοκούντων εἶναι τί τάχιστα πακύνει ἵππον. τὸν δ' εἰπεῖν λέγεται ὅτι δεσπότου ὀφθαλμός; cf. Arist. Oec. I 1345a2-5 καὶ τὸ τοῦ Πέρσου καὶ τὸ τοῦ Λίβυος ἀπόφθεγμα εὖ ἂν ἔχοι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐρωτηθεὶς τί μάλιστα ἵππον πικίνει "ὁ τοῦ δεσπότου ὀφθαλμός" ἔφη· ὁ δὲ Λίβυς ἐρωτηθεὶς ποία κόπρος ἀρίστη, "τὰ τοῦ δεσπότου ἴχνη" ἔφη. This and kindred sayings became commonplace, especially in agricultural writers: see e.g. Cato Agr. 4 (cf. Pliny NH XVIII 31); Columella III 21.4, IV 18.1; Pliny NH XVIII 43;

similar thoughts, but without mention of the master's eye: Col. I 1.18; Pallad. I 6.1; Geoponica II 1. Cf. Phdr. II 8; La Fontaine IV 21. Cf. Strömberg, Greek Proverbs p.68.

9D8-E1 -- Most important of all is the exercise of children's memories, for memory is the storehouse of education, and Mnemosyne was made mother of the Muses in myth to symbolise the unique creative and nourishing functions of memory. -- By an abrupt transition we now come to a section on the exercise of the memory. Memorisation traditionally played a large part in ancient education, which commonly involved the learning by heart of long passages from the poets, and especially from Homer (cf. e.g. Pl. Prt. 325E, Lg. VII 811A; X. Smp. 3.5) with primarily a moral end in view. Here, however, P makes no mention of moral considerations and seems rather to regard memory-training as an end in itself. In much the same way Quintilian, with the needs of the future orator in mind, favours the cultivation of memory from an early age (I 1.36). See T. Klauser in RAC s.v. 'Auswendiglernen', especially cc.1030-32, 1034-35; Clarke pp.22-23, 27; Caplan, Of Eloquence pp.196-246, especially pp.204-206.

9D8-9 πάντων δὲ ⟨δεῖ⟩ μέλειτε τὴν μνήμην τῶν παίδων ἀσκεῖν καὶ συνεθίζειν: For this type of transition see 4B6-8n. As often, P fails to conceal the awkwardness of introducing a new topic unconnected with the last. -- πάντων δὲ ⟨δεῖ⟩ is Wilamowitz's reading: the mss. have πάντων δέ μοι or in some cases just πάντων δέ. Heusinger attempts to defend the transmitted versions by interpreting the infinitives as imperatival (cf. K-G II pp.20-22); but μοι looks suspicious and Wilamowitz's emendation seems much more likely to be on the right lines.

9D9 αὕτη γὰρ ὥσπερεὶ τῆς παιδείας ἐστὶ ταμεῖον: The image

of memory as a storehouse is a natural and common one: cf. e.g. Plut. Marius 46.2 (μνήμη) ἧς οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀνθρώπῳ ταμιεῖον ἀχθῶν βεβαιότερον; Chrysippus fr.56 (SVF II p.23) μνήμη θησαυρισμός .. φαντασιῶν; Ad Herenn. III 28 'thesaurum inventorum'; Cic. De or. I 18 'Quid dicam de thesauro rerum omnium, memoria?'; Quint. XI 2.1 'thesaurus eloquentiae', cf. II 7.4. See further on this and other metaphors for memory Caplan pp.214-216 with notes 109-118. -- For the form ταμεῖον see LSJ s.v. ταμιεῖον , end of article.

9D10 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μητέρα τῶν Μουσῶν ἐμυθολόγησαν εἶναι τὴν Μνημοσύνην: Mnemosyne (Memory) is the mother of the Muses in Hesiod, Th. 53-55, 915-917, Zeus being their father. Cf. Alcman 8.9, Eumelus 16, Solon 1.1, H.Merc. 429-430; further references in Pease's note on Cic. N.D. III 54; see also S. Eitrem in RE s.v. 'Mnemosyne' cc.2265-66, and W. Theiler in RAC s.v. 'Erinnerung' c.44. P's explanation of the genealogy is rather feeble (see next note); in fact the association, if not the precise relationship of mother to children, is illuminated by the close connection of the Muses from the earliest times with the faculty of memory. As West indicates in his note on Hes. Th. 54, they are invoked by the oral poet for aid in remembering the details of his narrative (e.g. at Il. II 488-492); in addition, Plutarch tells us (Quaest.conv. 743D) that in some places the Muses themselves were called Mneiai; and according to Pausanias (IX 29.2) one of the three original Muses of Helicon was named Mneme. -- For other allegorical interpretations of Mnemosyne's motherhood of the Muses cf. Heraclitus Homericus Q. Hom. 55 τὸ γὰρ ἀμνημονούμενον οὐκέτι ἀγγελθῆναι δύναται, διὸ δὴ καὶ μητέρα Μουσῶν Μνημοσύνην ἱστοροῦσι, τὰς προστατίδας λόγου θεὰς ἀπὸ μνήμης γεγενῆσθαι λέγοντες; Plut. fr.

215h Sandbach Ὅτι καὶ οἱ μητέρα τῶν Μουσῶν Μνημοσύνην εἰπόντες διὰ τοῦτο ἐνδείκνυνται· αἱ μὲν γὰρ Μοῦσαι τὸ ζητεῖν παρέχονται, ἡ δὲ Μνημοσύνη τὸ εὑρίσκειν; fr.217j Sandbach Εἰ ἡ μήτηρ τῶν Μουσῶν Μνημοσύνη, ὡς ἡ ἀδιάλειπτος μνήμη τῶν ζητήσεων αἰτία; Max. Tyr. X 9 Τοῦτο ἆρα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὴν Μνημοσύνην αἰνίττονται Μουσῶν μητέρα, Μούσας μὲν τὰς ἐπιστήμας ὀνομάζοντες, ἡγάθεον χορὸν καὶ ἔργον Διός, ὑπὸ Μνημοσύνης δὲ γεννωμένας καὶ συνταττομένας. -- Διὰ τοῦτο is taken up and explained by αἰνιττόμενοι and what follows. The unexpressed subject to be understood with ἐμυθολόγησαν is most likely just 'men' or 'people' (see K-G I p.33 and cf. 6F4 φασίν), but it could be οἱ ποιηταί (cf. the Max.Tyr. passage above).

9D11-E1 αἰνιττόμενοι καὶ παραδηλοῦντες ὅτι οὔτως οὐδὲν γεννᾶν καὶ τρέφειν ὡς ἡ μνήμη πέφυκε: P's attempt at an allegorical explanation suggests a reason why Mnemosyne should be depicted as a mother, but leaves us unenlightened as to why she should be mother of the Muses. No doubt partly for this reason (but also because an accusative would help the syntactical structure of the sentence), Wyttenbach wanted to read γνῶσιν or γνώμην ἐκτρέφειν for γεννᾶν καὶ τρέφειν; but γεννᾶν seems essential to the explanation of Mnemosyne as a mother, and we should probably just be reconciled to the deficiency of P's account. We can only guess at how P thought memory could be said to generate (γεννᾶν) or foster (τρέφειν) anything, though it is interesting to compare Quintilian I 1.36: 'in his de quibus nunc loquimur aetatibus (sc. young children), quae nihildum ipsae generare ex se queunt prope sola est (sc. memoria) quae iuvari cura docentium possit'.

9E1-8 -- Both children who have naturally good memories and those who do not should undergo memory-training: the former will

excel through the strengthening of their talent, while the latter will improve through the supplementing of their deficiencies. As Hesiod says, a little added often to a little soon mounts up. -- P accepts that memory is to some extent a natural gift, but maintains nevertheless that training will pay dividends both for those who have it in abundance and for those who do not. Very much the same view is taken in other ancient discussions of the faculty of memory: e.g. by the unknown author Ad Herennium III 28-29 (cf. 29 'Quapropter et naturalis memoria praeceptione confirmanda est ut sit egregia, et haec quae doctrina datur indiget ingenii'); Antonius at Cic. De or. II 356-357 (cf. 357 'verum tamen neque tam acri memoria fere quisquam est, ut, non dispositis notatisque rebus, ordinem verborum omnium et sententiarum complectatur, neque vero tam hebeti, ut nihil hac consuetudine et exercitatione adiuvetur'); Quintilian XI 2.1 'Memoriam quidam naturae modo esse munus existimaverunt, estque in ea non dubie plurimum, sed ipsa excolendo sicut alia omnia augetur'; Fortunatianus III 13 (Halm, Rhetores Latini minores p.128) 'Memoria qualis est? naturalis et artificiosa: quae in se ita mixtae sunt, ut naturalis arte servanda sit, artificiosa natura adiuvanda. Cur ita? quoniam utraque sine altera levis est'; Martianus Capella V 538 'nunc ordo praecepta memoriae subministrat, quam quidem constat esse naturalem, sed et arte adiuvari posse non dubium est'. -- The advocacy of training irrespective of natural endowment is reminiscent of Chapter 4 (see in particular 2C3-10n.).

9E1-3 καὶ τοίνυν πᾶσιν κατ' ἀμφότερ' ἐστὶν ἀσκητέον, εἴτ' ἐκ φύσεως μνήμονες ἦεν οἱ παῖδες, εἴτε καὶ τοὐναντίον ἐπιλήσμονες: Cf. Ad Herenn. III 29 'Quare et illis qui natura memores sunt utilis haec erit institutio ... et si illi, freti

ingenio, nostri non indigerent, tamen iusta causa daretur quare iis qui minus ingenii habent adiumento esse velimus esse'; and for the philosophy of making both the talented and the not so gifted undergo training cf. e.g. X. Mem. III 9.3.

9E4-5 καὶ οἱ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἔσονται βελτίους, οἱ δ' ἑαυτῶν : For the thought cf. [D.] 61.42 (the best natural talents benefit most from training): ταῖς μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν μόνον βελτίοσιν γίγνεσθαι, ταῖς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει διενεγκεῖν ; Lucian 37.20 (under the influence of παίδευσις and μαθήματα) τὰ τε εὐφυῶς διακείμενα βελτίω πρὰ πολὺ γίγνοιντο ἄν καὶ τὰ φαύλως ἔχοντα μετακοσμοῖτο πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ; the second half (οἱ δ' ἑαυτῶν) is a little reminiscent of Pl. R. VII 526B. -- For the comparative with a reflexive pronoun see K-G II pp.313-314.

9E5-8 τὸ γὰρ Ἡσιόδειον καλῶς εἴρηται : 'εἰ γὰρ κεν καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπὶ σμικρῷ καταθεῖο / καὶ θαμὰ τοῦθ' ἕρδοις, τάχα κεν μέγα καὶ τὸ γένοιτο': P means to indicate that for children not naturally endowed with good memories patient practice will slowly but surely expand their modest capacities. The quotation is Hesiod, Op. 361-362, a pair of lines much quoted by later authors from Plato onwards (see the testimonia in Rzach's edition, p.196). Plutarch quotes them at De prof. in virt. 76C (with εἴρηται καλῶς following closely) and in fr.53 Sandbach.

9E9-F3 -- Fathers should also remember that in addition to its academic value memory-training has a practical usefulness which is not inconsiderable, since the memory of past actions serves as a guide to future conduct. -- In this passage P advances an argument for memory-training which is designed to appeal to the instincts of utilitarian-minded parents. But the use of the argument he deploys involves either sleight of hand or, more probably, confusion of thought. μνήμη, in the sense in

which P is interested in it here, means the faculty of memory, whose exercise and development in children he considers important. But ἡ τῶν γεγενημένων πράξεων μνήμη (9F2) and the argument which goes with it have almost certainly been borrowed by P from a context in which it was not the individual's capacity for remembering, but something much more like the historical record of the past, which was meant (cf. LSJ s.v. μνήμη I.3, and 9F2-3n. below). This remains the only context in which the argument really makes sense, since the contention that formal memory-training is necessary to enable individuals to profit by the lessons of the past is patently ridiculous.

9E10-F2 οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν παιδείαν ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς τοῦ βίου πράξεις οὐκ ἐλαχίστην συμβάλλεται μοῖραν : Cf. the claim for the double usefulness of memory in Dissoi Logoi, VS 90.9.1: μέγιστον δὲ καὶ κάλλιστον ἐξεύρημα εὕρηται μνήμα καὶ ἐς πάντα χρήσιμον, ἐς τὰν σοφίαν τε καὶ ἐς τὸν βίον . -- For τὰς τοῦ βίου πράξεις cf. e.g. Musonius fr.6 (p.25.3-4 Hense) ἀναγκαίῳ πρὸς τὰς τοῦ βίου πράξεις ; Philo 15.48 (quoted 5D4-5n.); and for οὐκ ἐλαχίστην συμβάλλεται μοῖραν cf. 12D5-6 καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς ἀρετῆς κτῆσιν συμβάλλεται ῥοπὴν οὐκ ἐλαχίστην.

9F2-3 ἡ γὰρ τῶν γεγενημένων πράξεων μνήμη τῆς περὶ τῶν μελλόντων εὐβουλίας γίνεται παράδειγμα : The thought is a common one, cf. Arist. Rh. I 1368a30-31 ἐκ γὰρ τῶν προγεγονότων τὰ μέλλοντα καταμαντευόμενοι κρίνομεν, II 1394a5-8; [Isoc.] Ad Demon. 34 βουλευόμενος παραδείγματα ποιοῦ τὰ παρελθόντα τῶν μελλόντων; Isoc. 2.35 ἂν ... τὰ παρελθόντα μνημονεύῃς, ἄμεινον περὶ τῶν μελλόντων βουλεύσει, 6.59 εἴπερ χρὴ περὶ τῶν μελλόντων τεκμαίρεσθαι τοῖς ἤδη γεγενημένοις . It was also frequently employed by historians as giving a practical value to their art, and P may have derived the present passage from some such source.

This view of history (not held by Thucydides: see Gomme on I 22.4, II 48.3, III 82.2) recommended itself to Polybius (I 1.1-3, III 31); D.S. I 1; Livy Praef. 10; D.H. I 6.4, V 56.1, 75.1, XI 1.4; cf. D.Chr. 18.9, and Cic. De or. II 36, where history is called 'magistra vitae'. -- With ἡ ... τῶν γεγενημένων πράξεων μνήμη cf. Polybius' terminology for 'history': I 1.1 τῆς τῶν προγεγενημένων πράξεων ἐπιστήμης, III 31.2 τὴν τῶν προγεγονότων ἐπιστήμην.

(14) 9F4-11C8: Miscellaneous moral advice.

Chapter 14 is a passage of moral precepts with anecdotes by way of illustration. There is no real continuity with either the previous or the following chapter, and no obvious internal unity, except in the section 10B1-11C4.

9F4-5	Children must not be allowed to use unseemly language.
9F5-10A10	They should be brought up to be affable and prepared to yield in arguments where victory would cost them friends.
10B1-6	Even more important are the following: (i) to live a life free from arrogance, (ii) to control one's tongue, (iii) to control one's anger, (iv) to control one's hands. Examples will make this clearer.
10B6-9	(iv) Theft has destroyed the reputations of famous men in the past, like Gylippus who was exiled from Sparta because of it.
10B9-D8	(iii) Control of anger: Socrates showed complete equanimity (a) when kicked by a reckless youth, and (b) when attacked on the stage by Aristophanes; (c) Archytas was once too enraged to allow himself to punish a delinquent slave; (d) Plato, in similar circumstances, handed the punishment over to Speusippus.
10D8-E6	Naturally the example of such great philosophers is difficult to follow. Nevertheless, as devotees of philosophy, we must try to moderate the intensity of our anger by taking them as models.
10E6-11A2	(ii) Control of the tongue is no easy matter. The mysteries were instituted to teach the value of discreet silence, and no one ever regretted keeping quiet, while many have regretted speaking out of turn.
11A2-7	(a) An obscene verse on Ptolemy Philadelphus' marriage to his sister Arsinoe earned the poet Sotades years of imprisonment.

11A7-B5 (b) Theocritus of Chios earned the ill-will of Alexander the Great by a caustic observation on his preparations for a celebration;

11B5-C4 and (c) was put to death by Antigonus the One-Eyed for a barbed allusion to his disability, relayed to him by his envoy Eutropion.

11C5-8 Children should also be accustomed to telling the truth, since lying is a slavish and odious habit.

The chapter begins without much sense of direction, and ends lamely. In between, the section 10B1-11C4 coheres more convincingly: it has a certain unity of form, its outline being dictated by the programmatic preface 10B1-6, and a unity of theme since it discusses three virtues of self-control (for the lack of a development of (i) see 10B1-6 n.). It ought perhaps to be considered whether this whole section might not possibly be an insertion from a later stage of composition than the rest, dividing 11C5-8 from 9F4-10A10 which it originally continued.

The moral advice which the chapter contains is of the most commonplace kind, and calls for no comment here. It is worth noting, however, that though children are specifically remembered in 9F4-10A10 and again in 11C5-8, they are entirely lost sight of in the large middle section -- another point which differentiates the two parts of the chapter.

9F4-5 -- Children must not be allowed to use unseemly language. -- Possibly P remembers Aristotle, who also wishes to suppress αἰσχρολογία (Pol. VII 1336b3-6), and for the same reason: ὅλως μὲν οὖν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι, δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν (ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν ὁτιοῦν τῶν αἰσχρῶν γίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν εὐνεγγυς). Cf. Bryson Oec. 147 (tr. Plessner): 'Und es ist erforderlich, dem Knaben zu verbieten, von schimpflichen Dingen zu sprechen, und Vorsorge zu treffen, dass er sie nicht von einem anderen höre; denn das Sprechen von ihnen und ihr Anhören

lassen ihn sie begehen.'; Musonius fr. 26 ἀρχὴ τοῦ μὴ κατοκνεῖν τὰ ἀσκήμονα ⟨πράττειν⟩ τὸ μὴ κατοκνεῖν τὰ ἀσκήμονα λέγειν Plut. Quaest. conv. 707F; Clem. Al. Paed. II 6.52.1; Dyroff p.253.

9F4 τῆς ἀσκρολογίας ἀπαιτεῖν τοὺς υἱούς : Cf. 6Alln. for other phrases of this kind in P.

9F5 'λόγος γὰρ ἔργου σκιή' κατὰ Δημόκριτον: This is VS 68 B145. P's moral interpretation of the saying -- that a person's utterances are a good guide to his likely behaviour -- is certainly not what Democritus intended. For conjecture as to his possible real meaning see W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy II (Cambridge 1965) p.476 and n.2.

9F5-10A10 -- They should be brought up to be affable and prepared to yield in arguments where victory would cost them friends. -- On the first of these cf. [Isocrates'] advice Ad Demon. 20: τῷ μὲν τρόπῳ γίνου φιλοπροσήγορος ... ἔστι δὲ φιλοπροσηγορίας μὲν τὸ προσφωνεῖν τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας, Isoc. Panath. 31. -- The second has nothing to do with the modern idea of sportsmanship, despite W.H.S. Jones, CR 21 (1907) p.38 n.3. Giving way in argument is recommended specifically ἐν οἷς τὸ νικᾶν βλαβερόν (10A5-6), to avoid Pyrrhic victories (i.e. presumably where gaining one's point would be at the price of losing a friend). There is thus a strong explicit element of diplomacy and even self-interest which is foreign to the concept of being a good loser. (On the lack of any such concept in the ancient world see E.N. Gardiner, Athletics in the Ancient World (Oxford 1930) pp.70-71, and cf. perhaps Sen. De ira II 21.5 'in certaminibus aequalium nec vinci illum patiamur nec irasci', Quint. I 3.6 'mihi detur ille puer ... qui victus fleat'.)

9F5 εἶπε γε μήν : On γε μήν see 2D6 n.

10A1-2 ἐντευκτικούς ... καὶ φιλοπροσηγόρους: Both adjectives mean 'affable'. For the former cf. Plut. Alcib. 13.2 ἐντευκτικὸς

γὰρ ἰδίᾳ καὶ πλουσίους ἐδόκει (sc. Phaeax) μᾶλλον ἢ φέρειν ἀγῶνας ἐν δήμῳ δυνατός. For the latter cf. [Isocrates] quoted above 9F5-10A10 n., D.C. XLIV 19.3, Pollux V 137, VI 166.

10A2 ἀνέντευκτος : the opposite of ἐντευκτικός; cf. Plut. De Is.et Osir. 355A, De am.prol. 493B.

10A4 ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν : 'in arguments, disputes'. For this sense of ζήτησις cf. e.g. Acts 15.2 στάσεως καὶ ζητήσεως, 15.7; I Tim. 6.4 ζητήσεις καὶ λογομαχίας; J. AJ XIII 298 ζητήσεις ... καὶ διαφοράς, XX 132; further refs. Arndt-Gingrich s.v.

10A4 ἀπαραχώρητοι : 'unyielding, stubborn'; the word occurs first in Polybius I 61.3 (the adverb V 106.5); D.H. X 19, 54.

10A4-6 οὐ γὰρ τὸ νικᾶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι ἐπίστασθαι καλόν κτλ.: A consciously paradoxical thought; cf. A. Ag. 941 τοῖς δ' ὀλβίοις γε καὶ τὸ νικᾶσθαι πρέπει. It is immediately followed by ἐν οἷς τὸ νικᾶν βλαβερόν which, rather awkwardly, qualifies only ἡττᾶσθαι ἐπίστασθαι and not νικᾶν. Hartman proposed a period after καλόν and the next sentence to read ἔστι δ' ἐν οἷς τὸ νικᾶν βλαβερὸν καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς νίκη Καδμεία ; but while either of these would no doubt be an improvement, the transmitted text is not impossible, and may stand. -- Note Kock's reconstruction of a 'comic fragment' from this passage, Com. Adesp. 452 ἐν οἷς τὸ νικᾶν βλαβερόν, ἡττᾶσθαι καλόν.

10A6 νίκη Καδμεία : Proverbially a victory which costs the victor as much as the vanquished: Hdt. I 166.2; Pl. Lg. I 641C; D.S. XI 12.1, XXII 6.1-2; Paus. IX 9.3; Aristid. 26.44 Keil, I p.709, II p.190 Dindorf; Aristaenet. II 6 Mazal; Macarius IV 84; Zenobius IV 45; Apostolius IX 30; Gregor. Cypr. II 45. Plut. De frat. am. 488A refers the proverb to the mythical single combat of the Theban brothers Eteocles and Polynices; for other theories of its derivation see Paus. IX 9.3, Photius and Souda s.v. Καδμεία νίκη .

10A7 μάρτυρα ... ἐπαγέσθω : For this type of introduction to a quotation see 6B1-2 n. The phrase is used of a metaphorical summoning of witnesses to prove a point (the usual legal phrase would be μάρτυρας παρέχεσθαι): Pl. R. II 364C, Lg. VII 823A, Ly. 215C; Isocr. Helen 38; Arist. Metaph. 995a8; Plut. De fort. Rom. 318D.

10A9-10 The quotation is Euripides fr. 654, from the Protesilaus (Stob. III 19.3, without attribution III 3.40). For the sentiment cf. P's interpretation of the sixth Pythagorean symbolon at 12E4-6.

10B1-6 -- Even more important are the following: (i) to live a life free from arrogance, (ii) to control one's tongue, (iii) to control one's anger, (iv) to control one's hands. Examples will make this clearer. -- This list of four virtues to be practised by the young governs the structure of the section 10B1-11C4, which forms by far the greatest part of the chapter. In 10B1-6 they are enumerated programmatically; in 10B6-11C4 they are developed with examples in varying degrees of detail and in reverse order, all but the first (10B3 τὸ τὸν βίον ἀπήμονα ἄσκειν). This presents a problem. Two considerations are relevant: (a) At 10E6-8, when according to the programmatic list he has still (ii) and (i) to deal with, P apparently recalls only (ii): τὸ τοίνυν τῆς γλώττης κρατεῖν (περὶ τούτου γάρ , ὥσπερ ὑπεθέμην, λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν). This tends to rule out the possibility that we have lost a discussion of τὸ τὸν βίον ἀπήμονα ἄσκειν through a lacuna after 11C4, if P stuck to his reverse-order sequence. (b) Negligence is made the less likely by the reasonable assumption that in following this reverse order, P is referring back each time to his original list. All this creates a strong suspicion that τὸ τὸν βίον ἀπήμονα ἄσκειν was not in the list as P wrote it, and should be treated as

intrusive (thus Larsen, who considers it a gloss on τῶν εἰρημένων at 10B1). It may possibly be significant that τὸ τὸν βίον ἀτύφωτον ἄσκειν differs from the other three in not being so explicitly a virtue of self-control.

10B1-2 ἃ τοίνυν ... καὶ δὴ λεκτέον: a rather inept and unimaginative transition; cf. 4B6-8 n. καὶ δὴ λεκτέον occurs in the same position at 2A4-5, where see note.

10B3 τὸ τὸν βίον ἀτύφωτον ἄσκειν: ἀτύφωτον 'free from arrogance', E only; ἀτρύφητον 'free from luxury', all other mss. Reasons have been given (above 10B1-6 n.) for suspecting that this whole phrase may be intrusive; even if it is not, the absence of illustrative material would make it impossible to decide between the two adjectives. Neither is attested anywhere else, though βίον ἀτύφωτον would presumably mean the same as βίον ἄτυφον (De aud. 43B). (On τῦφος see D.R. Dudley, A History of Cynicism (London 1937) p.56 n.8, H. Box on Philo In Flaccum 4.)

10B3-4 τὸ τῆς ὀργῆς ὑπερᾶνω γίγνεσθαι: ὑπερᾶνω also at 6B11 where see note. Cf. for the present passage Ael. VH IX 7 λύπης ὑπερᾶνω πᾶσης καὶ φόβου κρείττων παντός, and for ὑπερᾶνω γίγνεσθαι Teles fr. 4A Hense pp.43.14-44.2 εἰ δὲ πάντων τις τῶν τοιούτων ὑπερᾶνω γένοιτο, Lucian 9.3 πάντων τούτων ὑπερᾶνω γενόμενος, S.E. M. IX 161, Eus. De mart. Palaest. IV 3 τῶν νεωτερικῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ὑπερᾶνω γενόμενος.

10B4 τὸ τῶν χειρῶν κρατεῖν: 'Control of the hands' means resistance to the temptation of stealing. Cf. the verse quoted Plut. Aristid. 4.3 (of Themistocles' embezzlements) σοφὸς γὰρ ἀνήρ, τῆς δὲ χειρὸς οὐ κρατῶν and the Catechism: 'To keep my hands from picking and stealing'. Cf. τὰς χεῖρας ... ὑποσκούπτες 10B7.

10B5-6 ἔστι δ' ἐπὶ παραδειγμάτων γνωριμώτερα: Cf. D.H. Comp. 15 ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο φανερὸν ἐπὶ τῶν παραδειγμάτων, and also 22, 23; ἐπὶ παραδείγματος Aeschin. 1.177, D.H. Comp. 7, 8.

10B6-9 -- (iv) Theft has destroyed the reputations of famous men in the past, like Gylippus who was exiled from Sparta because of it. -- The Gylippus story, which P merely alludes to in the briefest of terms, is told by Timaeus FGrH 566 F100 b.4 (= Plut. Nic. 28.4), D.S. XIII 106.8-9; Plut. Lys. 16-17.1; passing references Posidonius FGrH 87 F48 (=Athenaeus VI 234A), Plut. Per. 22.4. -- After accepting the surrender of Athens in the spring of 404 B.C., Lysander sent G. back to Sparta with a large sum of public money. On the voyage, G. surreptitiously opened the containers in which it was being conveyed, and removed some from each (30 talents out of 1,000 according to Timaeus, 300 out of 1,500 according to Diodorus), unaware that the contents of each had been recorded on a slip placed inside it. When he arrived in Sparta, the ephors detected his theft by this means (see Plut. Lys. 16.3 f. for the colourful anecdote of the 'owls' roosting under his roof-tiles); G. fled the country and was condemned to death. According to Posidonius he committed suicide. -- P follows the same tradition as Diodorus (possibly Ephorus, see RE s.v. Diodoros 38, c.681) if verbal similarities are any guide: with 10B8-9 τὰ σακκία τῶν χρημάτων παρελύσας cf. Diodorus XIII 106.9 τὰ μὲν σακκία παρέλυσεν and contrast Plut. Lys. 16.2 τὰς ῥαφὰς τῶν ἀγγείων κάτωθεν ἀνελύσας.

10B6 πρῶτον ἄρξωμαι: Cf. 1A4 ἄρξασθαι πρῶτον with n.

10B7 τὰς χεῖρας ... ὑποσχόντες λήμμασιν ἀδίκοις: τὴν χεῖρα ὑπέχειν means to hold out the hand to receive something, usually money (a bribe or charity). Cf. Men. fr. 225 Korte ὅστις ὑπέχει χρυσίῳ / τὴν χεῖρα, κἂν μὴ φῇ, πονηρὰ βούλεται, D. 19.255 προτείνας καὶ ὑποσχών (sc. τὴν χεῖρα), Plut. Cato maior 30.5 δημοσίᾳ τὰς χεῖρας ἐρύνῳ δι' ἔνδειαν ὑπέχειν, Julian 2.1 Bidez, Diogenian. III 12, commentators on Ar. Pax 908.

10B7-8 τινες ... τὸν προβεβιωμένον βίον ἐξέχειν: This is leading up to the reference to Gylippus, to whose life it applies

very aptly: cf. the remarks of other writers on his fate: D.S. XIII 106.10 οὗτοι μὲν οὖν (G. and his father, also disgraced by peculation), ἄνδρες ἱκανοὶ τάχα δόξαντες εἶναι , ταῦτα πράξαντες τὸν ἅλον βίον αὐτῶν κατήσχυναν , Plut. Per. 22.4 αἰσχρῶς ἐπὶ καλοῖς ἔργοις ἁλούς , Lys. 17.1 αἰσχρὸν οὕτως καὶ ἀγεννὲς ἔργον ἐπὶ λαμπροῖς τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν καὶ μεγάλοις ἐργασάμενος. -- βίον ἐκτεῖν confusingly and misleadingly suggests βίος in the sense of 'livelihood' (cf. e.g. Plut. De glor. Ath. 349B ἐπίσπειρμα τῶν ἐκκεκυμένων βίων).

10B9 παρελύσας : 'having undone secretly', cf. LSJ s.v. I 3, D.S. quoted above 10B6-9 n.

10B9-D8 -- (iii) Control of anger: Socrates showed complete equanimity (a) when kicked by a reckless youth, and (b) when attacked on the stage by Aristophanes; (c) Archytas was once too enraged to allow himself to punish a delinquent slave; (d) Plato, in similar circumstances, handed the punishment over to Speusippus.- For (a) and (b) cf. Seneca's De constantia sapientis and Musonius fr. 10 on the philosopher's obligation to be able to despise πληγαί and λοιδορίαι ; (c) and (d) both present a situation which is an important test-case for the control of anger, that of a master about to punish slaves in anger, where he has absolute authority and no accountability (cf. Plut. De coh. ira 459B). Cf. Sen. De ira I 15.3 'nihil minus quam irasci punientem decet', D.L. VIII 20 (Pythagoras never punished a slave in anger), Galen De aff. dign. 5. The control of anger was much discussed by ancient writers and thinkers. There are extant treatises on the subject by Philodemus, Seneca and Plutarch (who also wrote a lost Περὶ ὀργῆς, Lamprias Catalogue no. 93, fr. 148 Sandbach). See generally P. Rabbow, Die Therapie des Zorns (Leipzig 1914).

10B9-C1 τό γε μὴν ἀόργητον : On γε μήν see 2D6 n. -- For the neuter adjective used as substantive cf. e.g. 13D8 τὸ .. δυσμενές

καὶ δυσκατάλλακτον , 13D10-E1 τὸ τοῦ γήρως ἀμβλυώττον καὶ δύσκωφον.

10C1-7 -- (a) Socrates kicked by a youth. -- Versions of the same story are found at D.L. II 21 ... ὅθεν καὶ λακτισθέντα , ἐπειδὴ ἠνέσχετο , τινος θαυμάσαντος, εἰπεῖν , 'εἰ δέ με ὄνος ἐλάκτισε , δίκην ἂν αὐτῷ ἐλάγχανον;', Them. De virt. p.69 Mach (tr. Mach): 'Socrates autem, cum Aristocrates eum calcavisset, nihil aliud ei reddidit neque reprehendit, nisi quod praetereuntibus dixit: iste homo morbo mulorum afficitur.' Cf. Basil De leg. libr. gent. 7 for another story of Socrates' patient endurance of physical assault.

10C3 ἀγανακτοῦντας καὶ σφαδάζοντας : Cf. Them. 23 292B ἵνα μᾶλλον σφαδάζοιεν καὶ ἀγανακτοῖεν . σφαδάζω, here in the sense of χαλεπῶς φέρω , denotes primarily a restless or convulsive movement: thus often of horses, A. Pers. 194; S. fr. 848 Pearson; E. fr. 821.3, cf. 1020; of wounded or dying creatures, X. Cyr. VII 1.37; Plb. XXXIV 3.5; Athen. VII 283C; Plut. Ant. 76.11; metaphorically of eagerness or impatience, Plut. Caes. 42.3, Philop. 6.10; 1100A; of distress, Philo 16.156, 23.257, 32.128. On the case for spelling the word σφαδάζω see Pearson on S. fr. 848.

10C3-4 ὡς καὶ διώκειν αὐτὸν ἐθέλειν : For ὡς with the infinitive see note on 8C7-8. -- The Diogenes Laertius passage (above 10C1-7 n.: δίκην ἂν αὐτῷ ἐλάγχανον ;) raises the question whether P means διώκειν in its legal sense of 'prosecute' (thus Xylander, Tucker). This can hardly be so, since 'pursue' is a perfectly intelligible sense here, and one must assume that a word is used in its primary sense when nothing else supports a more technical meaning. Pursuit with a view to retaliation is probably what Socrates refers to with ἀντιλακτίσαι . In the D.L. version he exposes the attacker's action as irrational by dismissing legal redress as no more appropriate than if the injury had been inflicted by an ass.

10C5 ἀντιλακτίσαι : The pancratiast Ctesiphon actually did kick an ass back, according to Plutarch, De coh. ira 457A.

10C5-6 οὐ μὴν ἐκεῖνός γε παντελῶς κατεπροίξατο : παντελῶς (!)' comments Hartman, De Plutarcho p.13, and one sees what he means. -- κατεπροίξατο is Leonicus' certain correction for the mss.' κατεπράξατο. The verb is Ionic (Archil. fr. 200 West; Hdt. III 36.6, 156.3, V 105.1, VII 17.2) and frequent in the colloquial Attic of comedy (Ar. Eq. 435, Nu. 1240, Th. 566, V 1366, 1396). See Rutherford on Phrynichus 146.

10C6-7 πάντων δ' αὐτὸν... λακτιστὴν ἀποκαλούντων ἀπήγξατο : On ἀποκαλεῖν, the vox propria for calling someone by a nickname, see Holden on Plut. Gracchi 21.5 (his 21.3) and examples quoted there. -- For suicide by hanging as a result of remorse or disgrace cf. e.g. Hdt. II 131 (Mycerinus' daughter), VII 232 (Pantites), Matthew 27.5 (Judas), Plut. De ad. et am. 70F (a pupil of Pythagoras).

10C7-D1 -- Socrates attacked on the stage by Aristophanes. -- The Clouds, to which Plato makes Socrates refer at Ap. 19C, was first performed in 423 B.C. For accounts of Socrates' impassive reaction to its caricature portrayal of himself see Musonius fr. 10 Hense p.54.13-15: δημοσίᾳ λοιδορηθεὶς ὑπ' Ἀριστοφάνους, οὐχ ὅπως ἠγανάκτησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐντυχὼν ἠξίου αὐτὸν εἰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον βούλοιτο χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ (cf. D.L. II 36: ἔλεγε δὲ τοῖς κωμικοῖς δεῖν ἐπιτηδὲς ἑαυτὸν διδόναι· εἰ μέν γὰρ τι τῶν προσόντων λέξειαν, διορθώσονται· εἰ δ' οὔ, οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς), Sen. De const. sap. 18.5, De vita beata 27.2, Ael. VH V 8. Aelian has also the story (VH II 13) of how Socrates stood up in the theatre to show himself when some foreigners in the audience asked who Socrates was. For references in Plato and Xenophon to Socrates' treatment by the comic poets see W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy III (Cambridge 1969) pp.374-375. Later anecdotes of this kind doubtless come from the collections of Κωμῳδούμενοι, on which see J. Steinhausen, Κωμῳδούμενοι (Bonn 1910).

10C7-8 ὅτε τὰς Νεφέλας ἐξέφερε: ἐκφέρω, here used of producing a play, elsewhere applies usually to the publishing of books: e.g. Pl. Prm. 128E; Isoc. Evag. 74; Arist. Po. 1447b17; Plut. 402E, 1115C, Dem. 15.3.

10C8 παντοίως πᾶσαν ὕβριν αὐτοῦ κατασκεδαννύντος : Cf. Plut. Demetr. 24.1 τοσαύτην ὕβριν ... κατεσκέδασε τῆς ἀκροπόλεως , and see Wyttenbach's note ad loc. for the same verb with other nouns in Plutarch (1086E, 1110E, Cato maior 33.1, Per. 13.15).

10C9 κἂτα τοιαῦτα κωμῳδούμενος: Thus Paton, with some plausibility. The mss. have (κατὰ C^1, κἂτα C^2) τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνακωμῳδοῦντος. ἀνακωμῳδεῖν would be a ἅπαξ and the participle would have to be taken as a genitive absolute with τοῦ Ἀριστοφάνους understood. Wyttenbach had already conjectured ἅμα κωμῳδοῦντος, 'interea, eo ipso tempore, quum haec in scaena agitabat Aristophanes'.

10D1 ὡς .. ἐν συμποσίῳ μεγάλῳ τῷ θεάτρῳ σκώπτομαι: i.e. in a large gathering of friends, where it would be churlish not to be able to take a joke against oneself in good part. For the greater licence in joking permitted as symposia see Plut. Quaest. conv. 707E καὶ παῤῥησία πλείστη μετὰ παιδιᾶς ἀναμέμικται τοῖς λεγομένοις ἐν οἴνῳ καὶ πρασσομένοις , cf. 634E ὡς γὰῤ ὀῤγὰς καὶ μάχας τὰς ἐκ τῶν συμποσίων πρόσθεν φέρουσιν...

10D1-2 ἀδελφὰ τούτοις καὶ σύζυγα : Cf. 11A7-8 ἐνάμιλλα δὲ τούτοις καὶ σύζυγα for this rather pretentious type of introduction to a new example.

10D3 φανήσονται πεποιηκότες : Weissenberger II p.7 claims that Plutarch always uses the future middle φανεῖσθαι with an infinitive, though Sizoo p.89 finds φαίνεσθαι with a participle at An seni 807E. φανήσομαι is much the commoner form of the future in classical prose, though not in Hdt. and the orators: see Veitch p.663.

10D3-6 -- (c) Archytas is too angry to allow himself to punish a delinquent slave. -- This story occurs also at Iambl. VP 197 (= VS 58 D6); Cic. Tusc. IV 78, Rep. I 59 (whence Lact. De ira D. 18.4, Jerome Ep. 79.9); D.S. X 7.4; Val. Max. IV 1 ext. 1; Plut. De sera 551B (whence Proclus De decem dubit. 54). Iamblichus gives Spintharus as the source of the anecdote, and, Spintharus being Aristoxenus' father, it may have been Aristoxenus who transmitted it to posterity (see E. Rohde, RhM 27 (1872) p.51 = Kl. Schr. (Tübingen-Leipzig 1901) II p.160). Similar anecdotes are told of Socrates (Sen. De ira I 15.3), Plato (D.L. III 39, Stob. III 20.42), and Charillus ([Plut.] Reg. et imp. apophth. 189F, Apophth. Lac. 232C).

10D4 (στρατηγῶν δ' ἐτύγχανε): For Archytas' career as a military commander in the field see note on 8B1-3. Iamblichus loc. cit. specifies an expedition against the Messapians as the campaign from which he was returning.

10D4 ⟨τὴν⟩ γῆν καταλαβὼν κεχερωμένην: χερωῦσθαι, 'become barren', like 2D10 χερωέσθαι , is a non-Plutarchan word. Cf. LXX Prov. 24.31, Hermas Mand. 10.1.5 (ἀμπελῶνες) and papyrological refs. LSJ s.v., Arndt-Gingrich s.v.

10D5-6 ὤμωξες ἄν... εἰ μὴ λίαν ὠργιζόμην : Deliberate paradox, as again in Plato's corresponding utterance, 10D7-8.

10D6-8 -- (d) Plato, too angry himself to punish a slave, calls in Speusippus to do it for him. -- This story occurs also at Val. Max. IV 1 ext.2; Sen. De ira III 12.6; Plut. Adv. Col. 1108A; D.L. III 38; Stob. III 20.57 and Gnomol. Vat. 436a where see Sternbach's notes. (The last three substitute Xenocrates for Speusippus.). In a very similar story Plato raises his hand to strike a slave in anger, but checks himself and remains frozen in that posture: Sen. De ira III 12.5; Plut. De sera 551A-B (whence Proclus De decem dubit. 54); Them. De virt. pp.69-70 Mach; Gnomol. Vat. 436b where see Sternbach's notes. Cf. Euphrates in Philostr. VA V 39.

10D6 δούλῳ λίχνῳ: For the adjective see 3A5-6 n.

10D7 τὸν τῆς ἀδελφῆς υἱὸν Σπεύσιππον: Speusippus (RE 2), Plato's successor as head of the Academy (347-339 B.C.), was the son of his sister Potone (D.L. III 4, IV 1).

10D7-8 'τοῦτον' ἔφησεν ἀπελθὼν 'κρότησον': Platt's suggestion that ἀπελθών is part of what Plato said, and that only ἔφησεν should stand outside the quotation marks, is probably to be rejected. The tense of the participle is no obstacle to taking it with ἔφησεν (see e.g. Barrett on E. Hipp. 290), and had Plato joined an aorist participle to κρότησον, one might have expected it rather to be ἀπολαβών (conj. Nauck; cf. παρελαβὼν κόλαζε, Plut. 1108A; λαβὼν τοῦτον μαστίγωσον Stob. and Gnomol. Vat.). The point of the participle is presumably either that Plato does not trust himself not to change his mind if he stays or that he will not permit himself even the vicarious satisfaction of watching the offending slave's punishment. (It is interesting to note that Galen disapproves of the delegation of punishment: De aff. dign. 5.1 μητ' αὐτὸς διὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ χειρῶν οἰκέτην πλήξαι μητ' ἄλλῳ προστάξαι.) -- κρότησον is difficult. The verb denotes primarily noise, especially a rattling noise or the sound of repeated blows. LSJ s.v. II 1 give 'knock, strike' as a possible meaning, but in none of the passages which they quote is the idea of sound so irrelevant as here: Hdt. VI 58 (women beating cauldrons in mourning); E. Ba. 188 (beating the earth with a thyrsus); D. 54.9 (a man flapping his elbows against his sides to imitate a cock). In the present passage, the verb has to convey the sense of hitting or beating with no necessary reference to noise at all. The difficulty has invited conjectures: κόρρισον Salmasius, reported by Wyttenbach (but κορρίζω is not attested); κόλασον Heusinger, Cobet, more plausibly; ῥάπισον Hercher. There remains the possibility (Mr. D.A. Russell's suggestion) that κρότησον is a colloquialism ('make him rattle'),

otherwise unattested, for an action which generates many colourful synonyms.

10D8-E6 -- Naturally the example of such great philosophers is difficult to follow. Nevertheless, as devotees of philosophy, we must try to moderate the intensity of our anger by taking them as models. -- This section is in the nature of a footnote to reassure doubtful readers. It is wholly characteristic of P to be conscious always of the gap between an ideal and its attempted realisation in practice. Cf. 14C4-7 n.

10D9 φαίη τις ἄν : Cf. e.g. Plut. Dem. 9.1, and see 8D8 n. on expressions of this kind in P.

10D9-E1 πειρατέον οὖν εἰς ὅσον οἷόν τ' ἐστι : See notes on 8A9 and 14C4-7.

10E1 τούτοις παραδείγμασι χρωμένους: See 14A3-7 n. on the importance of examples in P's concept of education.

10E1-2 τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἀκρατοῦς καὶ μαινομένης ὑφιεῖν ὀργῆς: Cf. Plut. De sera 551B τὸ τραχὺ καὶ εφοδρὸν ἀπαρύτουσι τῆς ὀργῆς and 10B9- C1 n. on the neuter adjective used substantivally.

10E3-4 οὔτ' ἐμπειρίας οὔτε κακοκαγαθίας: For the first cf. 4B9-10 (teachers should be ταῖς ἐμπειρίαις ἄριστοι); for the second 4B10-C1n.

10E4 οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐκείνων : This should perhaps be taken with the ὥσπερ clause which follows, and the comma after ἐκείνων be deleted. Otherwise the combination of οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐκείνων and τοῖς μιμεῖσθαι ... ἐπιχειρῶμεν (where ἐκεῖνοι are the philosophers and τοῖς their actions) involves P in the logical absurdity of making the philosophers strive to emulate their own achievements. Possibly, however, this is over-subtle: in that case P has just conflated two ways of saying the same thing: 'we must strive no less than they' and 'we must imitate their actions'.

10E4-5 ὥσπερ θεῶν ἱεροφάνται καὶ δᾳδοῦχοι τῆς σοφίας ὄντες: a sudden elevation of tone. The ἱεροφάντης and the δᾳδοῦχος are officials of the Eleusinian mysteries. (For details of their respective duties and functions see K. Clinton, The Sacred Officials of the Eleusinian Mysteries (Philadelphia 1974) pp.10-47, 47-68.) Insofar as philosophy claimed to teach a view of things different from that of the ordinary layman, the terminology of the mystery cults had always suggested metaphors for the practice of philosophy (in Plato and elsewhere: see C.A. Lobeck, Aglaophamus (Königsberg 1829) I pp.127-130); but the explicit comparison of the philosopher with the officiating high-priest goes somewhat beyond this. Cf. e.g. Epict. Diss. III 24.65: Diogenes τοῦ Διὸς διάκονος, M.Ant. III 4.3 the philosopher ἱερεύς τις ἐστι καὶ ὑπουργὸς θεῶν, Galen Protr. 5 Socrates, Homer, Hippocrates, Plato καὶ οἱ τούτων ἑρασταί, οὓς ἴσα καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς σέβομεν, οἷον ὑπαρχοί τινες καὶ ὑπηρέται τοῦ θεοῦ.

10E5 ὅσαπερ ἐστιν ἐν δυνατῷ: See 14C4-7 n.

10E6 πάντα μιμεῖσθαι καὶ περικνίζειν ἐπιχειρῶμεν: περικνίζειν cannot stand. It means 'to scratch all round, keep nibbling at' (LSJ). Wyttenbach's interpretation 'circumscalpere, circumrodere, metaphorice pro imitari, suum facere, partes rei imitandae quasi circumcidere sibique addere' is totally unconvincing. Emendation is necessary: Xylander suggested περιχνίζειν 'vestigia sectari', which would be a new coinage; Wyttenbach conjectured ἀπεικονίζειν (frequent in Philo, mostly passive) meaning 'to represent, model'. This is an attractive solution, but the required sense would have to be 'represent in ourselves' (sc. by being like them), and one might doubt whether this meaning can be got from the word without undue strain. Most probably the true solution remains to be found. -- ἐπιχειρῶμεν, Larsen's conjecture for the mss.' ἐπιχειροῦμεν is an easy enough change, but perhaps not necessary. P may just be saying 'We, as philosophers, actually do try to imitate such actions.

10E6-11C4 -- (ii) Control of the tongue. -- This subject is illustrated by three anecdotes, told at some length and in some detail, which take up most of the rest of the chapter. (Contrast the brief, allusive treatment of the Gylippus story, 10B8-9.) For the subject cf. Plutarch's De garrulitate, but note that the people who figure in Plutarch's anecdotes there commit mostly accidental lapses of discretion, whereas Sotades and Theocritus seem to have been persistently, deliberately, and almost professionally sharp-tongued. Control of the tongue was another virtue which popular philosophy sought to inculcate: cf. e.g. Musonius fr. 8 Hense p.35.5 ἐθίζει (sc. ἡ φιλοσοφία) .. γλώττης κρατεῖν, D.L. I 69.

10E6-11A2 -- Control of the tongue is no easy matter. The mysteries were instituted to teach the value of discreet silence, and no one ever regretted having kept quiet, while many have regretted speaking out of turn.

10E7-8 (περὶ τούτου γάρ, ὥσπερ ὑπεθέμην, λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν): For the problem of τὸ τὸν βίον ἀτύφωτον ἀσκεῖν (10B3) which also remains to be discussed from the original list, see 10B1-6 n. -- ὥνπερ for ὥσπερ (Nikitin, Hartman) would be a decided improvement. The reference is of course to the programmatic list at 10B1-6.

10E8 εἴ τε μικρὸν καὶ φαῦλον ὑπείληφε: See 8D8 n.

10E8-9 πλεῖστον διαμαρτάνει τῆς ἀληθείας: Cf. 2C7 ἴσως πολλοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦ παντὸς διαμαρτάνων and note.

10E9-10 σοφὸν γὰρ εὔκαιρος σιγὴ καὶ παντὸς λόγου κρεῖττον: Cf. [Longinus] 9.2 ἡ τοῦ Αἴαντος ἐν Νεκυίᾳ σιωπὴ μέγα καὶ παντὸς ὑψηλότερον λόγου, [Isoc.] Ad Demon. 41 δύο ποιοῦ καιρούς τοῦ λέγειν, ἢ περὶ ὧν οἶσθα σαφῶς, ἢ περὶ ὧν ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ μόνοις ὁ λόγος τῆς σιγῆς κρείττων, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅμεινον σιγᾶν ἢ λέγειν, Aristid. II p. 306 Dind., (and a certain verbal similarity at Plut. De glor. Ath. 347D: τὸ μέγα καὶ παντὸς λόγου μεῖζον ἐκεῖνο ἔργον), G. Schnayder, De antiquorum hominum taciturnitate et tacendo (Breslau 1956) pp.42-44. Cf. also Pliny

Ep. VII 6.7 'Accepi enim non minus interdum oratorium esse tacere quam dicere.' -- For the neuter predicate in a gnomic sentence see K-G 360, I pp.58-60; Barrett on E. Hipp. 443-446.

10E10-F3 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ... τὰς μυστηριώδεις τελετὰς κτλ.: On the silence enjoined by the mysteries on initiates about what they had witnessed see O. Casel, De philosophorum Graecorum silentio mystico (Giessen 1919) pp.3-27. The idea of the mystic silence as a model for discretion in everyday affairs can be paralleled from Plutarch De garrul. 505F: τοῦ μὲν λέγειν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ δὲ σιωπᾶν θεοὺς διδασκάλους ἔχομεν, ἐν τελεταῖς καὶ μυστηρίοις σιωπὴν παραλαμβάνοντες, cf. Iamb. VP 72; P's point, however, is the rationalistic one that the cultivation of discretion was the purpose behind the institution of the mysteries.

10E10-F1 τὰς μυστηριώδεις τελετὰς οἱ παλαιοὶ κατέδειξαν: Cf. Ar. Ran. 1032 Ὀρφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετάς .. ἡμῖν κατέδειξε D. 25.11 ὁ τὰς ἁγιωτάτας ἡμῖν τελετὰς καταδείξας Ὀρφεύς, D.S. V 77.3 ὁ καταδείξας (sc. τὴν τελετήν) Ὀρφεύς. See LSJ s.v. 2, van Leeuwen on Ar. loc. cit., and Wyttenbach ad loc. (quoting e.g. Plut. 1141A, Crass. 17.10, Pomp. 24.7) on κατδείκνυμι as the vox propria for the action of someone who institutes a new custom or process.

10F2 τὴν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μυστηρίων πίστιν: 'discretion in the keeping of human secrets'. For this sense of μυστήριον cf. e.g. Pl. Tht. 156A, Men. Comp. I 45 μυστήριον σου μήποτ' εἴπῃς τῷ φίλῳ, cf. II 89; LSJ s.v. 3; Arndt-Gingrich s.v.

10F2-3 τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν μεταφερόμενον φόβον: Cobet's and Hartman's θείων for θεῶν is very attractive. The proper parallel to τὰ ἀνθρώπινα μυστήρια is τὰ θεῖα (μυστήρια), not οἱ θεοί, though one cannot entirely discount the possibility that P is writing loosely.

10F3-4 καὶ γὰρ οὐ σιωπήσας μὲν οὐδεὶς μετενόησε, λαλήσαντες δὲ πολλοὶ: The thought recalls a saying of Simonides about

himself, Plut. De tu. san. 125D ὁ Σιμωνίδης ἔλεγε μηδέποτ' αὐτῷ μεταμεληθῆναι σιγήσαντι, φθεγξαμένῳ δὲ πολλάκις, De garrul. 514F-515A; Ap. Ty. Ep. 81, cf. 82; attributed to Xenocrates, Val. Max. VII 2 ext. 6. Cf. Plut. De garrul. 505F οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὕτω λόγος ὠφέλησε ῥηθεὶς ὡς πολλοὶ σιωπηθέντες, Men. Comp. II 161-162.

10F4-5 καὶ τὸ μὲν σιγηθὲν ἐξεῖπεῖν ῥᾴδιον, τὸ δὲ ῥηθὲν ἀνελέσθαι ἀδύνατον: a fairly common thought. Cf. the continuation of the Plut. passage at De garrul. 505F: ἔστι γὰρ εἰπεῖν ποτὲ τὸ σιγηθέν, οὐ μὴν σιωπῆσαί γε τὸ λεχθέν, ἀλλ' ἐκκέχυται καὶ διαπεφοίτηκεν, E. fr. 1044, Hor. Ep. I 18.71 'semel emissum volat irrevocabile verbum', AP 389-390 'delere licebit / quod non edideris; nescit vox missa reverti'. See Otto, Sprichwörter s.v. 'verbum' 3.

10F5-6 μυρίους δ' ἐγὼ' οἶδ' ἀκούσας: For Plutarch's use of μυρίοι in rhetorical exaggeration see Kowalski pp.118-119. Cf. 2D9 μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις. For οἶδ' ἀκούσας Heusinger compares e.g. Hdt. I 20, III 117.6.

10F6 ταῖς μεγίσταις συμφοραῖς περιπεσόντας: Cf. 12C6 συμφοραῖς περιπεσόντων, Plut. De exilio 607F ταῖς μεγίσταις συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν διὰ τὴν ἀφροσύνην. The verb again at 14A8-9.

11A2-7 -- (a) An obscene verse on Ptolemy Philadelphus' marriage to his sister Arsinoe earned the poet Sotades years of imprisonment. -- On Sotades see 11A3 n. For the event and its consequences see P.M. Fraser, Ptolemaic Alexandria (Oxford 1972) I pp.117-118 with II p.210 notes 203-206, and M. Launey, 'L' exécution de Sotadès et l' expédition de Patroklos dans la mer Égée (266 av. J.-C.)', REA 47 (1945) pp.33-45. The other ancient source for the story is Hegesandrus fr. 12, FHG IV pp.415-416 (= Athenaeus XIV 621A): Sotades' son wrote a work about his father's poetry ἐξ οὗ ἔστι κατιδεῖν τὴν ἄκαιρον παῤῥησίαν τοῦ Σωτάδου, καίτοι μὲν ἐπόντος Λυσίμαχον τὸν βασιλέα ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ, Πτολεμαῖον δὲ τὸν Φιλάδελφον παρὰ Λυσιμάχῳ, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν βασιλέων ἐν ἄλλαις τῶν πόλεων· διόπερ τῆς δεούσης ἔτυχε τιμωρίας.

ἐκπλούσαντα γὰρ αὐτὸν τῆς Ἀλεξανδρείας, ὡς φησιν Ἡγήσανδρος ἐν τοῖς Ὑπομνήμασιν, καὶ δοκοῦντα διαπεφευγέναι τὸν κίνδυνον -- ἐρήκει γὰρ εἰς τὸν βασιλέα Πτολεμαῖον πολλὰ δεινά, ἀτὰρ καὶ τόδε, ὅτι τὴν ἀδελφὴν Ἀρσινόην ἐγεγαμήκει· ' Εἰς οὐχ ὁσίην τρυμαλίην τὸ κέντρον ὤθεις ' -- Πάτροκλος οὖν ὁ τοῦ Πτολεμαίου στρατηγὸς ἐν Καύδῳ (conj. Launey; Καύνῳ mss.) τῇ νήσῳ λαβὼν αὐτὸν καὶ εἰς μολύβδην κεραμίδα ἐμβαλὼν καὶ ἀναγαγὼν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος κατεπόντωσε.

Cf. Eust. 1069 on Il XVI 432. Sotades' offence is dated by Ptolemy's marriage to 276 or 275 B.C. His death in Hegesandrus' account is probably to be assigned to 266 or 265, when Patroclus was on his way to Greece with aid against Antigonus Gonatas. The two accounts of Sotades' punishment (imprisonment and drowning) are not necessarily irreconcilable. Launey reconstructs as follows: Sotades' death came ten years after his original offence. For most of that time, assuming that his arrest was immediate, he was in prison (this would tie in well with 11A5 πολλοὺς κατεσχηκὼς χρόνους); learning perhaps that Ptolemy was about to execute him, he managed to escape and sail north from Egypt, heading either for Crete (which if Launey is right was his home: see 11A3 n.) or for the protection of Antigonus Gonatas in Greece; but Patroclus came across him in Kaudos (a tiny island off the south coast of Crete: this depends on Launey's conjecture, for which see his article pp.34-42; the transmitted Καύνῳ has long been a problem) and had him drowned. -- One question remains for the reader of the present passage. If Sotades' insult eventually cost him his life, why does P miss the opportunity to say so and mention only the long years of captivity? If his source left him unenlightened about the poet's death was it perhaps because that source was written before the death occurred, between say 276 and 265? This is the theory advanced by Dyroff pp.282-283 (cf. Glaeser pp.85-86), who also notes that Sotades is the latest historical figure

mentioned by P. (But his notion that the source was Chrysippus must be discounted if Launey is right about the date of Sotades' death: Chrysippus was only about 15 in 265).

11A2-3 τοῦ .. Φιλαδέλφου γήμαντος τὴν ἀδελφὴν Ἀρσινόην: On Arsinoe II see RE s.v. 26, G.H. Macurdy, Hellenistic Queens (Baltimore 1932) pp.111-130. The marriage (see Fraser I p.117) took place in 276 or 275 B.C. Arsinoe was Ptolemy's second wife, and he her second husband. Pharaonic practice condoned marriage between full brothers and sisters in the royal family, and Ptolemy's marriage was no doubt contracted at least partly for political and propaganda reasons; Macedonian practice, on the other hand, did not (Paus. I 7.1), and the normal Greek reaction to such a union was one of horror and repugnance (πρᾶγμα ... λλόκοτον καὶ ἄθεμιτον, says Plutarch of this marriage, Quaest. conv. 736E). See Fraser II p.209 notes 200-201. Sotades, then, spoke for the majority of Greeks; but better-disposed or more tactful poets managed to turn the event to good account: cf. Call. fr. 392, Theoc. 17.131-134 (with Gow's note on 130), and the rhapsode (Plut. loc. cit.) who flattered Ptolemy with an adaptation of a verse from the Iliad (XVIII 356: Ζεὺς δ' Ἥρην ἐκάλεσσε καςιγνήτην ἄλοχόν τε).

11A3 Σωτάδης: On Sotades see Aly in RE s.v. 2; F. Susemihl, Geschichte der griechischen Literatur in der Alexandrinerzeit I (Leipzig 1891) pp.245-246; L. Escher, De Sotadis Maronitae reliquiis (Darmstadt 1913); A. Lesky, A History of Greek Literature p.747. Fragments: J.U. Powell, Collectanea Alexandrina (Oxford 1925) pp.238-245; E. Diehl, Anthologia Lyrica Graeca II^{2}.6 (Leipzig 1942) pp.186-195. The Souda entry on Sotades runs: Κρὴς , Μαρωνείτης, δαιμονιοθὲς , ἰαμβογράφος. ἔγραψε Φλύακας ἤτοι Κιναίδους διαλέκτῳ Ἰωνικῇ · καὶ γὰρ Ἰωνικοὶ λόγοι ἐκαλοῦντο οὗτοι (there follows a list of others who wrote in the same genre) εἰσὶ

δὲ αὐτοῦ εἴδη πλεῖστα· οἷον Εἰς Ἅιδου κατάβασις· Πρίηπος· Εἰς Βελεστίχην· Ἀμάζων· καὶ ἕτερα. Hephaestion supplies the names of two other works: Ἄδωνις (p.3.17 Consbruch) and Ἰλιάς (p.9.7). From Athenaeus XIV 620F we know that Sotades was written about by his son Apollonius and by Carystius of Pergamum. -- S., then, was a Cretan, if we can trust the Souda text (see Launey p.41 n.1 for Sotades as a Cretan name and the possibility of an ancient Maroneia in Crete); some scholars (e.g. Aly) would make him a native of Maroneia in Thrace, excising Κρής at the beginning of the entry as resulting from confusion with the Cretan athlete of the same name (RE 3). The surviving fragments of S's poetry are scanty - only some 10 or 11 lines, all in the metre with which his name became associated (see 11A4 n.); the 60 or so transmitted under his name by Stobaeus have generally been considered spurious on grounds of content and language (they are not written in Ionic dialect) since Meineke (Analecta Alexandrina (Berlin 1843) pp. 246-247); though see Escher's discussion of them, pp.38-96). The extant testimonia and fragments fill out the picture of S. as a writer of obscene and offensive verse often aimed at contemporaries. There are the Φλύακες or Κίναιδοι mentioned by the Souda, and the testimony of Athenaeus (above, 11A2-7 n.) that he had slandered Lysimachus, Ptolemy and others in the past. (The insult to Lysimachus is dated to before 281 by L.'s death in that year.) The Εἰς Βελεστίχην looks like a poetic onslaught on the mistress to whom Ptolemy erected a temple; and fr. 2 Powell is an attack on the flute-player Theodorus (cf. Ael. VH XII 17).

11A4 'εἰς οὐκ ὀσὴν τρυμαλίην τὸ κέντρον ὠθεῖς': The verse is fr. 1 Powell, Diehl, quoted also by Athenaeus (perhaps from Hegesandrus; see 11A2-7 n.). For the obscene sense of τρυμαλή cf. J. Henderson, The Maculate Muse (Yale 1975) p.142 note 40; in

ordinary senses the word is commonest in LXX, NT and Patristic literature: see Arndt-Gingrich and Lampe s.v. -- For κέντρον see Henderson p.122 and n.79. -- The Athenaeus mss. have either ὠθεῖ or ὦθει, while the mss. of P are unanimous in reading ὠθεῖς. ὠθεῖς (which both Powell and Diehl print) is suitably impudent, and ὦθει sounds improbable; but since the line survives in isolation there is no way of telling for sure which S. wrote. -- The dialect features bear out the ancient information that S. wrote in Ionic (Souda, quoted 11A3 n.; Ath. VII 293A ὁ τῶν Ἰωνικῶν ἐπῶν ποιητής is ambiguous). In metrical form the verse is a Sotadean, like all S.'s other fragments. See F. Podhorsky, De versu Sotadeo (Dissertationes Philologae Vindobonenses 5 (1895) pp.107-184), P. Masqueray, Abriss der griechischen Metrik (Leipzig 1907) pp.141-144. The verse consists of two cola, the first made up of two Ionics a maiore, the second of the same pattern but catalectic, with the last two syllables missing. The final syllable is anceps, and anaclasis can make any of the first three feet a ditrochee (as the third foot is here); resolutions are common. There is a diaeresis after the first dimeter, but it is often missing, as here. It is unlikely that S. invented the metrical form which bears his name; more probably it became associated with him because of his constant use of it (Podhorsky p.111). -- For later writing in Sotadeans, especially in Latin (Ennius, Accius, Varro, Petronius, Ausonius) see Aly loc. cit. 11A3 n. c.1208, Escher loc. cit. ibid. pp. 33-37.

11A5 ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ πολλοὺς κατεδὺς χρόνους : perhaps for ten years: see 11A2-7 n. πολλοὺς χρόνους ought perhaps to be translated 'for many years', since χρόνος comes to mean 'a year' in post-classical Greek: see Arndt-Gingrich s.v. and K. Dieterich, RhM 59 (1904) pp. 234-237. The change is perceptible in some literary texts from the first century A.D. and perhaps a little

earlier (cf. perhaps D.S. IV 13. 3 ἐκ πολλῶν χρόνων, Luke 20.9 καὶ ἀπεδήμησεν χρόνους ἱκανούς). -- Though 'to rot in prison' is a natural expression of long standing in English (see OED s.v. 'rot'), other examples in Greek do not seem to be forthcoming. Cf. however Epict. Diss. IV 10.20: a candidate for the consulship must πρὸς ταῖς ἀλλοτρίαις θύραις κατακαπῆναι , cf. II 23.41.

11A5-6 καὶ τῆς ἀκαίρου λαλιᾶς οὐ μεμπτὴν ἔδωκε δίκην : Cf. the slightly similar wording and sentiment in Athenaeus XIV 261A: τὴν ἄκαιρον παρρησίαν τοῦ Σωτάδου ... διόπερ τῆς δεούσης ἔτυχε τιμωρίας , and ἀκαιροπαρρησία used of S.'s outburst by Eustath. on Il. XVI 432.

11A6-7 ἵνα δὲ γέλωτα παρέσχῃ τοῖς ἄλλοις , αὐτὸς πολὺν χρόνον ἔκλαυσεν : Tucker suggests γέλωτα ⟨βραχὺν⟩, which would produce a neat threefold chiastic contrast: γέλωτα : βραχὺν : τοῖς ἄλλοις / αὐτὸς : πολὺν χρόνον : ἔκλαυσεν . One would like to think that this is what P wrote, but there is no guarantee that the neatness of the idea did not escape him. -- γέλωτα παρέχειν is a Platonic phrase (Grg. 474A, Tht. 174C, R. II 517A) which in Plato always seems to mean 'to cause amusement' at one's own expense. This makes one wonder at first sight whether P means 'S. sorrowed long to make others laugh (sc. at his foolishness)'; but on reflection ἵνα .. γέλωτα παρέσχῃ τοῖς ἄλλοις must refer to S.'s ribald comment on Ptolemy's marriage; there is presumably nothing to prevent a later writer from using a Platonic phrase in a non-Platonic sense. -- For the subjunctive after ἵνα in secondary sequence cf. Hein pp.62-63 (almost always in Plutarch), Schmid IV pp.87-88.

11A7-B5 -- (b) Theocritus of Chios earned the ill-will of Alexander the Great by a caustic observation on his preparations for a celebration. -- On Theocritus see 11A8 n. The present anecdote occurs also in a fragment of Phylarchus (FGrH 81 F41 =

Ath. XII 540A): ἔγραψεν δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἀλέξανδρος [καὶ] τοῖς ἐν Ἰωνίᾳ πόλεσιν καὶ πρώτοις Χίοις, ὅπως αὐτῷ πορφύραν ἀποστείλωσιν· ἤθελεν γὰρ τοὺς ἑταίρους ἅπαντας ἁλουργίδι ἐνδῦσαι στολάς. ἀναγνωσθείσης δὲ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς Χίοις παρὼν Θεόκριτος ὁ σοφιστὴς οὐκ ἐγνωκέναι ἔφη τὸ παρ' Ὁμήρῳ εἰρημένον (Il. V 83) 'ἔλαβε πορφύρεος θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα κραταιή.' Cf. Eust. 1213-14 on Il. XX 476; Schröder pp. 319-320. The differences between the two versions are minor, but note that in Phylarchus' account (a) Alexander wants the purple for his ἑταῖροι, and (b) we are told that the Chians were to bear the chief responsibility for providing it. The events recounted can be dated only within hopelessly loose limits. Chios, whose government had been wrested from the hands of a pro-Persian oligarchy in 334 and again with Macedonian help two years later after the oligarchs regained control, had a Macedonian garrison from 332 (see Berve, loc. cit. below 11A8 n. I p.247). Alexander was thus in a position to issue commands to the Chians from at least 332, two years after his army crossed into Asia. Diodorus and Justin (see 11A9-10 n.) place the distribution of purple to the ἑταῖροι after the visit to Alexander of the queen of the Amazons, which is supposed to have taken place about 330; but there is really no firm evidence to suggest when in the ten years between 332 and his death Alexander's demand for purple was made.

11A7-8 ἐναμίλλα δὲ τούτοις καὶ σύζυγα: Cf. 10D1-2 ἀδελφὰ τούτοις καὶ σύζυγα.

11A8 Θεόκριτος ὁ σοφιστής: On Theocritus of Chios see Richard Laqueur in RE s.v. 'Theokritos' 2; H. Berve, Das Alexanderreich (Munich 1926) II pp.176-177, no. 364; F. Schröder, NJPhP 139 (1889) pp.317-334; FHG II pp.86-87; FGrH 760 (= the Souda entry: Χῖος, ῥήτωρ, μαθητὴς Μητροδώρου τοῦ Ἰσοκρατικοῦ· ἔγραψε Χρείας· ἀντεπολιτεύσατο δὲ Θεοπόμπῳ τῷ ἱστορικῷ. φέρεται

αὐτοῦ ἱστορία Λιβύης καὶ ἐπιστολαὶ θωμάσιαι). -- Theocritus is called ὁ σοφιστής , as here, by Phylarchus (above, 11A7-B5 n.), Strabo XIV 1.35 and Clement of Alexandria Protr. X 97.1; the Souda (above) calls him a ῥήτωρ . In Chian politics he played a role opposed to that of the aristocratic pro-Macedonian Theopompus (Souda, Strabo loc. cit.), who complains of his opponent's rapid rise to wealth from humble origins in a surviving fragment addressed to Alexander (FGrH 115 F252). Like Sotades, T. evidently had a sharp tongue, which he used on Alexander and his entourage. We know that he attacked Aristotle (D.L. V 11; Plut. De exil. 603C, Didymus In D. c.6.43 ff.; cf. Schröder pp.330-332), and Anaximenes of Lampsacus, the teacher of Alexander (Hermippus fr.68, FHG III p.51; Stob. III 36.20; cf. Schröder pp.320-322). The works attributed to T. by the Souda (Eudocia p.132 adds λόγοι πανηγυρικοί) are in all probability not his. The Χρεῖαι may well have been a collection of anecdotes about T., possibly assembled by a certain Bryon (see Laqueur c.2025) whose Περὶ Θεοκρίτου was drawn upon directly or indirectly by both Didymus and Diogenes Laertius (the latter calls him Ambryon): see Laqueur c.2027, Schroder pp.328-329. The Souda's φέρεται αὐτοῦ may already indicate some doubt as to the correctness of the attributions.

11A8 εἶπέ τε καὶ ἔπαθε : This is the only instance of juxtaposed τε καί in this work (only b a have πλήσμον τε καὶ πρόσωπος at 7B10). For Plutarch's avoidance of juxtaposed τε καί see K. Fuhr, RhM 33 (1878) pp.584 ff. (p.586 on De liberis educandis).

11A9-10 Ἀλεξάνδρου ... πορφύρας ἔσθητας κελεύσαντος κατασκευάζειν τοὺς Ἕλληνας : Chios bore the brunt of Alexander's demand, according to Phylarchus (11A7-B5 n). (K. Schneider in RE and M. Besnier in D-S s.v. 'purpura' quote only this story as evidence for Chios as a producer of purple) For Alexander's extensive use

of purple, which he was the first to institutionalise among the Macedonians, see M. Reinhold, History of purple as a status symbol in antiquity (Brussels 1970) pp.29-30. On the distribution of purple to the ἑταῖροι in the Phylarchus version cf. D.S. XVII 77.5, Justin XII 3.9, and E. Neuffer, Das Kostüm Alexanders d. Gr. (Giessen 1929) p.38.

11B1-2 καὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν κατὰ κεφαλὴν εἰσφερόντων ἀργύριον: presumably to meet the expense of the gift of purple. For a κατὰ κεφαλήν (= poll-) tax cf. Arist. Pol. II 1272a13-15 ἐν μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαίμονι κατὰ κεφαλὴν ἕκαστος εἰσφέρει τὸ πεταγμένον . -- τὰ ἔθνη is often used to mean 'non-Greek peoples' in later Greek, or 'non-Jewish peoples' in Jewish writers (see Arndt-Gingrich s.v. ἔθνος 2; Schmid II p.217 and addendum p.316). Here it would most naturally refer to the peoples of Alexander's Asiatic empire; but (a) P has said at 11A9-10 κελεύσαντος κατασκευάζειν τοὺς Ἕλληνας , and (b) one perhaps rather expects a word denoting T.'s fellow Chians. The word is therefore puzzling, unless possibly we assume that two separate impositions are in question, a demand for purple from the Greeks and a monetary levy raised in Asia. Mr. D.A.Russell may be right to suggest that the word should be obelized. -- ἀργύριον C h i k; ἄργυρον other mss. ἄργυρος , uncoined silver in classical Greek, can in fact = ἀργύριον in later prose (LSJ s.v., Arndt-Gingrich s.v. 1), but apparently only when accompanied by χρυσός .

11B3-4 ὅτι ὁ πορφύρεος Ὁμήρου θάνατος οὗτος ἐστιν: Note Cobet's proposal to excise οὗτος and read ὅ,τι for ὅτι , and for the form of the sentence cf. his parallels from Aeschin. 2.40 and Eust. 1909 on Od. XXI 305. The reference is to Il. V 82-83 = XVI 333-334 = XX 476-477 τὸν δὲ κατ' ὄσσε / ἔλαβε πορφύρεος θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα κραταιή. The Homeric expression, as T.'s remark implies, was something of a puzzle even in antiquity, and variously

interpreted (schol. on Il. V 83 πορφύρεον θάνατον τὸν τοῦ ἐπὶ σφαγὴ πεπτωκότος ὁπλίτου, Hesych. s.v. ὁ μέλας. καὶ βαθὺς. καὶ παρακινδύνως, Eustath. 524-525 on Il. V 83 τὸν ἐκ μιᾶς πληγῆς (following Ael. NA XVI 1); possibly it refers to the colour of blood (another ancient explanation mentioned by Eustath. loc. cit.), cf. Il. XVII 360-361 αἵματι ... πορφυρέῳ, V. Aen. IX 349 'purpuream ... animam' with Henry's note, Aeneidea III (Dublin 1881) p.875, J. André, Étude sur les termes de couleur dans la langue latine (Paris 1949) p.97). Laqueur (loc. cit. 11A8 n.) c.2026 sees in T.'s remark the veiled expression of a desire to see Alexander die a violent death; but this is surely fanciful. T. is using θάνατος to mean something generally unpleasant, as did Diogenes who is supposed to have quoted the line when he saw a man caught stealing purple (D.L. VI 57; cf. Eustath. on Il. V 83), and the emperor Julian, who made the same allusion on his assumption of the imperial purple (Amm. Marc. XV 8.17).

11B5-C4 -- (c) Theocritus was put to death by Antigonus the One-Eyed for a barbed allusion to his disability, relayed to him by his envoy Eutropion. -- On Antigonus see 11B5 n. Plutarch and Macrobius have a slightly different account of the circumstances: Plut. Quaest. conv. 633C καὶ γὰρ Ἀντίγονος αὐτὸς μὲν ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἔκωπτεν ... Θεόκριτον δὲ τὸν Χῖον ἀπέκτεινεν ὅτι φήσαντος τινος 'εἰς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἂν βασιλέως παρρησίᾳ σωθήσῃ', 'ἀλλὰ μοι' εἶπεν 'ἀδυνάτου τὰ ὑπὲρ τὴν σωτηρίαν'. Macrobius Sat. VII 3.12 'Quippe Antigonus rex Theocritum Chium, de quo iuraverat quod ei parsurus erat, occidit propter scomma ab eodem de se dictum. Cum enim quasi puniendus ad Antigonum raperetur, solantibus eum amicis ac spem pollicentibus quod omni modo clementiam regis experturus esset, cum ad oculos eius venisset, respondit: 'Ergo impossibilem mihi dicitis spem salutis'. Erat autem Antigonus uno orbatus oculo, et importuna urbanitas male

dicacem luce privavit.' (Despite the textual problem in Plut., the meaning is clear, and Macrobius' version seems to derive from it with some additional elaboration). -- The date of Theocritus' clash with Antigonus is probably not ascertainable (thus Berve loc. cit. 11A8 n.; Droysen, Geschichte des Hellenismus^2 II.1 (Gotha 1878) p.317 and Wehrli (op. cit. 11B5 n.) p.135 mention it without attempting to put it in precise historical context); and the circumstances are obscure. The appearance of Antigonus I puts it in the age of the Diadochoi, somewhere in the twenty or so years following Alexander's death. The rest is open to speculation. Schröder (op. cit. 11A8 n.) pp.326-327, 333-334, attempts an imaginative reconstruction based on three conclusions which he draws from the three accounts of Theocritus' death about its historical context: (1) that there were now no Macedonian authorities in Chios with whom Antigonus could deal: he has to deal with Theocritus and (in the P passage) use Eutropion as an envoy; (2) that A. treats T. on equal terms as a political leader (inference from 11B8-9 λόγον δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν); and (3) that T. was on a war footing with the Macedonians (in the Macrobius account he is promised clemency or safe-conduct). Schröder concludes that Antigonus was personally planning the conquest of Chios, and assigns the events of the story to 319 or 318 on the basis of what is known of his movements. This in itself is quite a coherent account, but some of the basic assumptions must be questioned. (1) seems likely enough in part: Chios had presumably joined the other Greek states in throwing off the Macedonian yoke on Alexander's death. But it will not do to assume outright that A.'s business was with T. as a representative of the Chian state. This brings us to (2). We know that T. played a role in Chian politics (11A8 n.), and A.'s approaches may have been to T. as one of the leaders of the anti-Macedonian party now

presumably in the ascendant; but λόγον δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν is no kind of proof (see 11B8-9 n.), and A. may equally well have been dealing with T. as an isolated trouble-maker. (3) need only suggest that there was hostility between T. and A. as individuals (and this perhaps only in the Plutarch-Macrobius version: in P it is an open question as to whether there was antagonism between them prior to T.'s contemptuous response to Eutropion); hostility between Chios and Antigonus is not a necessary inference, still less that A. was himself in the area and attempting a re-conquest of the island.

11B5 Ἀντίγονον .. τὸν βασιλέα τῶν Μακεδόνων: On Antigonus I Monophthalmus see Kaerst in RE s.v. 'Antigonos' 3; H. Berve, Das Alexanderreich (Munich 1926) II pp.42-44, no. 87; C. Wehrli, Antigone et Démétrios (Geneva 1968); P. Briant, Antigone le Borgne (Paris 1973); O. Muller, Antigonos Monophthalmos und 'Das Jahr der Könige' (Bonn 1973). Antigonus was a Macedonian, a commander in Alexander's army, appointed satrap of Phrygia in 333 and commander of the army in Asia in 321, two years after Alexander's death. The last twenty years of his life were occupied with wars to preserve for himself the unity of Alexander's empire against the separatist commanders Ptolemy, Cassander, Lysimachus and Seleucus, who combined to defeat and kill him at the battle of Ipsus in Phrygia in 301. Antigonus and his son Demetrius (Poliorcetes) assumed the royal title in 306; (naturally 11B5 τὸν βασιλέα τῶν Μακεδόνων does not place the events of P's anecdote after this date: he is probably giving A. his later title with the knowledge of hindsight.)

11B6 τὴν πήρωσιν προφέρων: πήρωσις , though its primary reference is to maiming or disability in general, is often used of blindness (cf. πηρός below 11B11): see LSJ, Arndt-Gingrich s.v. -- For προφέρειν of casting something in a person's teeth, see LSJ

s.v. I 2 (common from Homer onwards). -- On the bad taste involved in joking about the loss of an eye see Cic. De or. II 246, Persius 1.128, and cf. Plut. Quaest. conv. 633C εἰς φαλακρότητα πρέπει φέρουσιν (sc. σκώπτομενοι), εἰς δὲ πήρωσιν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀηδῶς. Antigonus' one-eyedness is well known from ancient writers (Hieronymus of Cardia FGrH 154 F8 = Lucian 12.11; Plb. V 67.6; Pliny NH XXXV 90; Plut. Sert. 1.8; Ael. VH XII 43); evidently he was sensitive about other people's references to it, as Philip II was about an exactly similar affliction (Demetr. Eloc. 293, quoted below 11B10-11 n.). In other respects, if Seneca is to be trusted (De ira III 22), he was commendably tolerant of insults.

11B7-8 τὸν .. ἀρχιμάγειρον Εὐτροπίωνα: Eutropion is not otherwise known; nor is the name at all a common one (RE has only this Eutropion; Pape-Benseler quote only Nicet. Eug. 9.20 besides this reference); mss. other than Θn read Εὐτρεπίωνα, for which there are apparently no parallels at all. -- For cooks in the service of Hellenistic kings see E.M. Rankin, The role of the ΜΑΓΕΙΡΟΣ in the life of the ancient Greeks (Chicago 1907) pp.25-26, 30. It was not uncommon in post-classical times for wealthy or important personages to employ large numbers of cooks (Rankin p.68), and E. may simply have been the head of such a staff. On the other hand, the ἀρχιμάγειρος was sometimes an important court official in the retinue of eastern kings (LSJ s.v.; TLL s.v.; biblical and patristic references in Lampe: 'captain of the guard'; Latte in RE s.v. μάγειρος cc.393-395; cf. Potiphar in Genesis 37.36, Demosthenes in PLRE p.249 (4th cent. A.D.)). This would account for E.'s evident importance and his employment as the king's envoy on this occasion.

11B7-8 Εὐτροπίωνα πέμψας ⟨πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα⟩ γεγενημένον ἐν τάξει παραγενέσθαι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἠξίου: The supplement as marked is Paton's; but πέμψας is also a supplement, which does not appear

in the text of any ms. (though πεμψα- in the margin of j): the reading, adopted by Bernardakis, derives apparently from a 'codex' of Cardinal Rodolphus (Wyttenbach's critical note, and cf. his introduction p.cl). -- The transmitted text is certainly in need of repair here. (a) In the first place, the story makes it clear that it is Theocritus who is being sent for, and that it is Eutropion who is the messenger. Yet the mss. offer at 11B7-8 τὸν γὰρ ἀρχιμάγειρον Εὐτροπίωνα γεγενημένον ἐν τάξει παραγενέσθαι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἠξίου. This is clearly wrong. (b) Secondly, perhaps due to the damage which has evidently occurred to the text, it is by no means clear what significance γεγενημένον ἐν τάξει has here. The prime requisite for the solution of the first problem is a participle to govern Εὐτροπίωνα and remove it from the influence of παραγενέσθαι ... ἠξίου. The obvious choice is πέμψας or some compound of πέμψας. But the absence of an object for παραγενέσθαι ... ἠξίου is even so hardly tolerable, in view of the fact that the last mention of Theocritus was not recent enough to suggest τὸν Θεόκριτον to the reader's mind (indeed the natural mental supplement would be τὸν Εὐτροπίωνα). Something like Paton's ⟨πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα⟩ is therefore also essential, to enable the correct object to be understood. -- The interpretation of γεγενημένον ἐν τάξει, assuming it to be sound (but 'vix sanum', Paton), depends upon two things: the meaning of τάξις here, and the question of to whom the phrase refers. (This latter point is raised by the placing of the supplements in the Paton text -- with what interpretation in mind one cannot tell -- so as to divorce the phrase from Εὐτροπίωνα and make it go with τὸν ἄνδρα (i.e. τὸν Θεόκριτον). Previous supplements preserved the connection by being placed after ἐν τάξει.) (i) τάξις might mean 'rank, position'. Thus Tucker translates (Eutropion) 'who had become a person of importance'. Plainly this could apply either to E. as an ἀρχιμάγειρος (11B7-8 n.) or to T. on Schröder's hypothesis that he

was now a leading figure in the government of Chios (11B5-C4 n.) Cf. from among Wyttenbach's examples ad loc. [Aristid.] 35.7 Keil: πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν ἐν τάξει ἀπολεσάντες . (ii) The word might have a more specific reference to <u>military</u> rank. This meaning will apply only to E. Thus apparently Xylander 'qui munus aliquod gesserat' (though this sounds rather feeble). Babbitt thinks that E. had been demoted from officer to cook: he translates here 'who had been an officer in his (sc. Antigonus') army', and at 11C1 (ἀναδίζων) ὅτι μάγειρος ἦν 'for being <u>now</u> a cook' (my underlining). But this is wrong: E. was an ἀρχιμάγειρος and possibly higher in rank than a mere officer; and there is no hint of 'now' in the text at 11C1. (iii) ἐν τάξει can mean 'in battle array', cf. e.g. Thuc. IV 72.2. This could hardly be made to apply to E., but on Schröder's reconstruction of the historical setting (11B5-C4) it might apply to T.: T. and the Chians would be preparing to resist an attack by Antigonus when A. sent an envoy to T. to arrange a parley. It has been suggested however, that Schröder's picture of the scene is not to be relied upon. Tucker's translation mentioned under (i) is probably the most attractive of these alternatives; and the phrase should probably be applied to Eutropion as in his version. It seems a little unlikely to separate it from a noun which is in the text by the insertion of a supplement containing a new conjectural noun. This solution, however, cannot be depended upon with any great confidence to be the true answer. There remain other possibilities: that γεγενημένον ought to be taken with ἀρχιμάγειρον (cf. Wyttenbach ad loc.); that ἐν τάξει is corrupt (for ἐπέταξε ? -- Mr. D. A. Russell); that the whole phrase might be intrusive (part of a gloss on ἀρχιμάγειρον ?).

11B8-9 καὶ λόγον δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν: 'engage him in argument' (Tucker). The phrase is used of rational interchanges such as

arguments or debates; cf. e.g. X. Cyr. I 4.3, Oec. 11.22; D.H. V 52.1; Muson. fr. 8 Hense p.36.13; D. Chr. 46.11. It sounds as if A. was inviting T. to give an account of himself on some subject, or perhaps only to take part in a sophistic or philosophical debate. Certainly Schröder's conclusion (3) (11B5-C4 n.) is far from firmly based.

11B10-11 εὖ οἶδα ... ὅτι ὠμόν με θέλεις τῷ Κύκλωπι παραθεῖναι: Κύκλωψ was apparently an established nickname for Antigonus (Ael. VH XII 43) and not an invention of Theocritus' own. Nevertheless, the allusion was not complimentary. Demetrius De eloc. 293 informs us that Philip II διὰ τὸ ἑτερόφθαλμος εἶναι ὠργίζετο, εἴ τις ὀνομάσειεν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ Κύκλωπα ἢ ὀφθαλμὸν ὅλως. ὠμόν με θέλεις ... παραθεῖναι may be taken as a reference to the Cyclops Polyphemus' cannibal habits, with the additional point that ὠμόν τινα κατεσθίειν is proverbial of savage cruelty (LSJ s.v. ὠμός I 1). -- παρατίθημι is the vox propria for serving up food (LSJ s.v. A 1.b), and this completes the twofold insult by referring to E.'s status as a cook (T. is of course deliberately ignoring the fact that E. is an ἀρχιμάγειρος). For the low estimation of cooks which makes it possible for T. to goad E. about being one (11B11-C1 ὀνειδίζων ... ὅτι μάγειρος ἦν) cf. Thphr. Char. 6.5; Cic. Off. I 150; Livy XXXIX 6.9; Rankin (op. cit. 11B7-8 n.) pp.27-28 (quoting e.g. Ath. IX 405E καταφρονεῖς ὅτι μάγειρος ἐγώ ποτε ἦν); I. Opelt. Die lateinische Schimpfwörter (Heidelberg 1965) pp.109-110.

11C1-2 τοιγαροῦν ... τὴν κεφαλὴν οὐκ ἔξεις: "'Then' replied Eutropion 'it will be without your head'" (sc. that I serve you up), (Tucker). -- On τοιγαροῦν see Denniston pp.566-568. The participle stresses logical connection and is strongly emphatic. It should be able to be translated 'In that case ...' or 'That's why ...'. E., then, parries T.'s insult by accepting it and elaborating the idea in a way which will not be to T.'s taste. It may sharpen the point of his retort to remember that μάγειροι were sometimes butchers as

well as cooks (Rankin pp.64-66), and also that they sometimes officiated at sacrifices (ibid. pp.55-64). -- τὴν κεφαλὴν οὐχ ἕξεις is, as Wyttenbach remarked, a slightly curious way of saying τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀποβαλεῖς (Hdt. VIII 65.5) or ἀπολέσεις (Plut. Artox. 9.2). It is perhaps just possible that E. might be straining the language in order to achieve a pun. κεφαλὴ δείπνου was used of the 'pièce de résistance' (LSJ s.v. κεφαλή V 1: Alexis fr. 172.15, CAF II p.360; cf. 'caput cenae' Cic. Tusc. V 98, Mart. X 31.4). E. might therefore be punning on the two meanings: 'So I'm a mere cook am I? In that case (τοιγαροῦν) I can see to it that you don't get the principal dish / that you lose your head.' In all probability, however, this is too far-fetched.

11C2 τῆς ἀθυροστομίας ταύτης: For the word cf. Paul. Sil., AP V 252.6, patristic references in Lampe. It has a tragic flavour: cf. S. Ph. 188-189 ἀθυρόστομος Ἀχώ; Ar. Ran. 838 (tragic parody) ἀθύρωτον στόμα; E. Or. 903 ἀνήρ τις ἀθυρόγλωσσος.

11C3-4 καὶ ὃς μετεπέμψατο ἀνεῖλε τὸν Θεόκριτον: Most mss. have καὶ ὁ μὲν πέμψας; C has ὁ δὲ πέμψας, which looks like an easy correction. Note that πέμψας ἀνεῖλε is perfectly good Greek (Matthew 14.10, cf. 2.16); only ὁ μέν is problematic. Wilamowitz's καὶ ὃς μετεπέμψατο is both good sense and palaeographically probable, since μέν written with a compendium for -εν often looks much like μετά. The Atticism καὶ ὅς occurs also at 5F5, where see note.

11C5-8 -- Children should also be accustomed to telling the truth, since lying is a slavish and odious habit. -- This short section (assuming that not much has fallen out after ἱεροπρεπέστατον: see 11C5 n.) is introduced awkwardly, and seems likely to be either an afterthought or the continuation of 10A10 before the intervening section was inserted (see introd. to ch. 14). -- Bryson too warns against letting children fall into

untruthfulness (149). For the slavishness of lying cf. e.g. S. Tr. 453-454 ὡς ἐλευθέρῳ / ψευδεῖ καλεῖσθαι κὴρ πρόσεστιν οὐ καλή ; Stob. III 11.28 ψεύδεσθαι ἀνελεύθερον , ἀλήθεια γενναῖον ; Dover, Greek Popular Morality p.115: 'The freeman tells the truth because falsehood implies fear or need, and he should not be motivated by either.' Aeneas Silvius (De lib. educ. p.142.30-32 Nelson) imitates this passage: 'nam mentiri servile vitium est, a cunctis mortalibus odio insectandum.'

11C5 παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα , ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἱεροπρεπέστατον ..: For παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα cf. e.g. D. 20.160. ἱεροπρεπέστατον , 'a sacred duty' (Babbitt) is a little odd (Mr. D.A. Russell conjectures ἐλευθεροπρεπέστατον); but then the whole transition is decidedly feeble. For expressions like ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἱεροπρεπέστατον see 4B6-7 n. -- There is a lacuna after ἱεροπρεπέστατον in W M and α which presumably contained a finite verb to govern ἐθίζειν : Paton suggests ἀνάγκη or ἀεὶ δεῖ . Whether it contained much or indeed anything else is impossible to determine, but there is no need to suppose so.

11C6-7 τὸ .. ψεύδεσθαι δουλοπρεπές : Cf. 8F2-3 (corporal punishment more appropriate for slaves than for free children).

11C7-8 καὶ οὐδὲ μετρίοις δούλοις ὠγγνωστόν : Cf. Isoc. 7.49 ἐν καπηλείῳ δὲ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν οὐδεὶς οὐδ' ἂν οἰκέτης ἐπιεικὴς ἐτόλμησεν .

(15) 11C9-12A2: Pederasty.

With a remarkable change of tone, P now comes to the subject of pederasty, which presents him with a dilemma.

11C9-D7 So far, my advice has been offered with all possible confidence. Now, however, I come to a question which fills me with such doubt and indecision that I am equally reluctant to mention it or to pass it by. Still, it must be faced. It is this: should boys' lovers be allowed to keep company with them, or should they be kept away?

11D7-F2 The thought of stern and disapproving fathers outraged at the very idea of any such contact with their sons makes me hesitate to commend it; on the other hand, the example of Socrates, Plato, Xenophon, Aeschines, Cebes and their circle, who approved of pederasty and led young men to culture and leadership and moral virtue, changes my mind and inclines me to emulation. Euripides supports them with his description of a spiritual love which differs from the physical [and we recall that Plato suggested that the bravest in battle should have their choice of the fair to kiss.]

11F2-12A2 Those, then, who are drawn by physical attraction should be kept away but lovers of the soul should generally be accepted. The conventions observed with regard to such things in Thebes and Elis, and the Cretan practice of abdu⌣ction, are to be shunned, and the attitude prevalent at Athens and Sparta emulated.

The diffidence with which P approaches the subject of pederasty is very striking. A great display of relu⌣ctance precedes the very mention of the topic, and even when the problem has been discussed and a solution suggested the reader is invited to make the final judgement for himself (12A3-4). Nowhere else in the book does P, normally so dogmatic, appear so unsure of his

ground.

His problem is that for once his admiration for the great philosophers of the past seems likely to bring him into conflict with the fathers for whom he writes. Pederasty, which had roots far back in the tradition of Greek education (see Marrou pp.61-73), persisted as an ideal in philosophical circles, especially that which centred on Socrates (cf. 11D10-E6). Socrates and Plato valued pederasty an educative instrument, drawing the soul by stages to the contemplation of transcendant reality (Guthrie and Dover, refs. below), and both believed that its physical expression should be avoided (cf. e.g. Pl. Smp. 216C-219E, R. III 403B, Lg. I 636A-C, VIII 838E). Nevertheless, this aspect of the philosophical tradition was controversial in classical times and came to be less sympathetically regarded as time went on (cf. Lagerborg, op. cit. below, pp.54-60). P thus knows that if he recommends pederasty he runs a grave risk of exposing himself to criticism and disapproval; but his nostalgic admiration for Plato and Socrates proves stronger than his apprehension. It is much the same sort of feeling which leads Plutarch in his Amatorius to give a sympathetic hearing to the case for pederasty although his own clear preference is for conjugal love (cf. Ziegler c.939).

On pederasty in general see W. Kroll in RE s.v. 'Knabenliebe'; K.J. Dover, Greek Homosexuality (London 1978); bibliographies in Marrou pp.517-518, Dover pp.226-232. On the connection with philosophy, and with the Socratics in particular, see Kroll cc.904-905; Marrou pp.65-68, 69-70, 312; Clarke pp.97-98; Dover pp.153-170; Guthrie III pp.390-398; R. Lagerborg, Die Platonische Liebe (Leipzig 1926); H. Stenzel, Platon der Erzieher (Leipzig 1928) pp.191-248.

On this chapter see Glaeser p.57, Kemper pp.156-157.

11C9-D7 -- So far, my advice has been offered with all possible confidence. Now, however, I come to a question which fills me with such doubt and indecision that I am equally reluctant either to mention it or to pass it by. Still, it must be faced. It is this: should boys' lovers be allowed to keep company with them, or should they be kept away? -- This section contains a remarkable display of diffidence, in which P first describes his state of mind in detail and discloses only after half a dozen lines what it is that causes him such embarrassment. The contrast with his usual self-confident style is interesting and instructive.

11C9-10 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐνδοιάσας οὐδὲ μελλήσας περὶ τῆς τῶν παίδων εὐκοσμίας καὶ σωφροσύνης διείλεγμαι: This is P's description of what he has been doing in Chapter 14. For εὐκοσμία and σωφροσύνη see Glaeser pp.16-17, with references at p.16 n.2 to Grasberger I pp.173, 270, II p.72. Cf. εὐταξία and κοσμιότης at 12A5.

11C10-11 περὶ δὲ τοῦ ῥηθήσεσθαι μέλλοντος ἀμφίδοξος εἰμὶ καὶ διχογνώμων: For ἀμφίδοξος meaning 'doubtful' as a description of the person who doubts cf. e.g. E. fr.1117, Plut. De def. 434D. The word is more commonly applied passively to the object of doubt: e.g. Anaximenes Rh.Al. 15.1; ἐν ἀμφιδόξῳ Thphr. CP I 22.2; Plb. IX 4.4, XI 1.8, XV 1.12, XVIII 28.11; Plut. Fab. Max. 3.4, Pomp. 19.3. διχογνώμων is a hapax, though cf. διχογνωμονέω at X. Mem. 6.21 and elsewhere, and διχογνωμόνως Pollux VIII 154.

11D1-2 καὶ τῇδε κἀκεῖσε κλίνων ὥς ἐπὶ πλάστιγγος πρὸς οὐδέτερον ῥέψαι δύναμαι: The simile of the balance is a vivid and natural one for indecision from Homer onwards (e.g. Il. VIII 69-72, XXII 209-213; cf. XVI 658, XIX 223-224). Cf. especially

(with Wyttenbach) Philo 8.100, 16.148, 26.228 ἐπαμφοτερίζων .. τὴν γνώμην καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ πλάστιγγος ἀντιῤῥέπων , 26.248. For ἥδε κἀκεῖσε cf. e.g. Longinus 22.1, Philostr. Jun. Im. I 30.3, II 2.2.

11D2-2 πολύτ δ' ὄκνος ἔχει με καὶ τῆς εἰσηγήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀποτροπῆς τοῦ πράγματος : For the form of the expression cf. Sen. QN IV b 5.1 'Rem a nostris positam nec dicere audeo, quia infirma videtur, nec praeterire.'

11D3-4 ἀποτολμητέον δ' οὖν ὅμως εἰπεῖν αὐτό : On δ' οὖν (only here and at 14C7 in the De lib.educ.) see Denniston pp.460-468.

11D4-7 τί οὖν τοῦτο ἐστί ; πότερα δεῖ τοὺς ἐρῶντας etc.: On P's fondness for self-answered rhetorical questions see 1D6n. The questionmark after προσῆκεν at 11D7 should really be a period.

11D7-F2 -- The thought of stern and disapproving fathers outraged at the very idea of any such contact with their sons makes me hesitate to commend it; on the other hand, the example of Socrates, Plato, Xenophon, Aeschines, Cebes and their circle, who approved of pederasty and led young men to culture and leadership and moral virtue, changes my mind and inclines me to emulation. Euripides supports them with his description of a spiritual love which differs from the physical [and we recall that Plato suggested that the bravest in battle should have their choice of the fair to kiss.] -- In this section P comes to the heart of his dilemma: fathers will disapprove, but pederasty has the sanction of philosophers whom he greatly reveres. There is no mistaking P's special admiration for the Socratic circle (cf. Glaeser p.99), to which the five philosophers he mentions belong. Socrates and Plato form a trio with Pythagoras at 2C1-2 as men who have 'achieved everlasting fame', and Socrates figures in didactic anecdotes at 4D9-E5, 6A1-7, 10C1-7 and 10C7-D1. Plato,

hailed as ὁ δαιμόνιος at 3E9-10, is the subject of an admiring anecdote at 10D6-8; elsewhere his authority is expressly appealed to only at 3E9-F3 and 8C9-10, but his writings form the unacknowledged source or background for many other passages in the De lib.educ. (e.g. 4D9-E5, 6A1-7, 7D3-6 and 11F4-12A2 to list only a few of the more obvious) and his influence on P is plainly considerable. Xenophon is mentioned by name only here, but he is quoted at 8D3-4 and may have influenced 3D4-6 and 9D5-7. Aeschines and Cebes are rather less well known quantities, no doubt as much for P as for the modern reader, and their inclusion here probably reflects no more than the fact that they were generally recognised to have been members of the Socratic group.

11D7-E1 ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἀποβλέψω... ὅταν δ' αὖ πάλιν ἐνθυμηθῶ etc.: For the form of the expression cf. e.g. Isoc. 2.5.

11D7-8 τοὺς πατέρας τοὺς αὐθεκάστους καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὀμφακίας καὶ στρυφνούς: The three adjectives build up a picture of forbidding severity. αὐθέκαστος (first in Aristotle, EN IV 1127a23-24) denotes originally the straightforwardness of the man who calls a spade a spade, but develops in time from this neutral or complimentary sense to the meaning 'blunt' or even 'harsh'. See Gauthier and Jolif on Aristotle loc. cit. above, Gomme and Sandbach on Men. Samia 550 (=250 Körte), and Wyttenbach ad loc. for instances in Plutarch. ὀμφακίας, 'sour, harsh' is a masculine adjective formed from ὄμφαξ, an unripe grape. Properly it applies to a type of wine made from such grapes (Ath. I 26D, opposite γλυκάζων); for the expressive metaphorical use cf. Ar. Ach. 352 ὀμφακίαν.. θυμόν (which Phrynichus, PS p.94 de Borries, explains ὁ αὐστηρὸς καὶ ἄγαν σκληρός), and ὄμφαξ in Plato Comicus fr.32 (CAF I p.609) and Com.Adesp. 877 (CAF III p.561). στρυφνός ('harsh' again) is another word originally denoting taste, though

metaphorical uses are common: see LSJ s.v. II, and add e.g. D.Chr. 4.72 στρυφνῷ τῷ προσώπῳ.

11D8-9 οἱ τῶν τέκνων ὕβριν οὐκ ἀνεκτὴν νομίζουσι τὴν τῶν ἐρώντων ὁμιλίαν : Parents were naturally apprehensive about their sons' attracting the interest of would-be lovers, and pedagogues were instructed to avert such attentions: cf. e.g. Pl. Smp. 183C.

11D10-E2 ὅταν δ' αὖ πάλιν ἐνθυμηθῶ τὸν Σωκράτη τὸν Πλάτωνα τὸν Ξενοφῶντα τὸν Αἰσχίνην τὸν Κέβητα : For the connection of the Socratic circle with pederasty cf. e.g. Kroll cc.904-905; R. Lagerborg, Die Platonische Liebe (Leipzig 1926); Guthrie III pp.390-398; Dover Greek Homosexuality pp.153-170; and the list of references in Pease's note on Cic. ND I 79. The evidence for Socrates and Plato is too well known to need repetition, and P is probably thinking primarily of them. The others he mentions, Xenophon, Aeschines and Cebes, are most probably included just as members of the same circle and not because of any individual concern with pederasty. -- On Aeschines of Sphettus see Natorp in RE s.v. 'Aischines' 14, and the useful collections of testimonia in H. Krauss, Aeschinis Socratici Reliquiae (Leipzig 1911) pp.1-31, and H. Dittmar, Aischines von Sphettos (Berlin 1912) pp.247-265; the present passage is at Krauss p.12 test.XIII, Dittmar p.260. Aeschines is represented by Plato as present at Socrates' trial (Ap. 33E) and death (Phdr. 59B), and is often mentioned by later writers as a member of the Socratic circle. Seven Socratic dialogues, of which fragments survive, were recognised as genuinely his. -- Cebes the Theban (on whom see von Arnim in RE s.v. 'Kebes' 2) was a pupil of the Pythagorean Philolaus at Thebes (Pl. Phd. 61D-E) before becoming, with his compatriot Simmias, a companion of Socrates. He is one of the interlocutors in Plato's Phaedo, and is mentioned with Simmias at Cri. 45B as

one of those prepared to contribute money for Socrates' release from prison.

11E2-3 τὸν πάντα χορὸν ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν: 'the whole band of those famous men'. For this sense of χορός cf. e.g. Pl. Prt. 315B, Tht. 173B; Them. 34.5 ὁ γνήσιος Σωκράτους χορός (Cebes, Phaedo, Aristippus, Aeschines). For ἐκεῖνος referring to the famous cf. LSJ s.v. I.2.

11E3 οἳ τοὺς ἄρρενας ἐδοκίμασαν ἔρωτας: For the expression cf. e.g. Ps.-Phoc. 3 ἄρσενα Κύπριν, and see K-G I pp.261-262 on the use of an adjective instead of a noun in the genitive.

11E3-5 καὶ τὰ μειράκια προήγαγον ἐπί τε παιδείαν καὶ δημαγωγίαν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῶν τρόπων: For μειράκια see 12A5-6n. -- παιδεία here clearly has the meaning discussed at 5C10-E4n. -- In mentioning δημαγωγία (here in its original neutral sense of 'leadership', for which see e.g. Ar. Eq. 191, Thuc. IV 21.3 with Gomme's n. (pp.461-462), Newman on Arist. Pol. IV 1292a7) P is plainly thinking of the politicians produced by the Socratic circle. If we discount Xenophon and Cebes who are not known to have engaged in teaching activity, and Aeschines whose only two known pupils were Aristotle ὁ Μῦθος (D.L. II 63, V 35) and Xenocrates until he left to join Plato (Ath. XI 507C), this leaves only Socrates and Plato. Unfortunately Socrates' most famous pupils to achieve δημαγωγία, Alcibiades and Critias, were not good advertisements for his teaching (cf. Guthrie III pp.382-383); on pupils of Plato who were or became statesmen see P.M. Schuhl, 'Platon et l' activité politique de l' Académie', REG 59-60 (1946-47) pp.46-53.

11E6-9 μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτοις Εὐριπίδης οὕτω λέγων· 'ἀλλ' ἔστι δή τις ἄλλος ἐν βροτοῖς ἔρως / ψυχῆς δικαίας σώφρονός τε κἀγαθῆς.': For the use of μαρτυρεῖν in the introduction of a

quotation see 6B1-2n. -- The quotation is E. fr.388.1-2, from the Theseus (preserved also by Stobaeus, I 9.4b and III 5.61). Stobaeus preserves also the next three lines, which run as follows: καὶ χρὴν δὲ τοῖς βροτοῖσι τόνδ' εἶναι νόμον / τῶν εὐσεβούντων οἵτινες τε σώφρονες / ἐρᾶν, Κύπριν δὲ τὴν Διὸς χαίρειν ἐᾶν. The lines, here quoted out of context, were of course written to be spoken by a character on the stage; but P, in the usual manner of ancient writers (cf. Dover, Greek Popular Morality pp.14-15, feels no inhibitions about citing them as if they were evidence for the author's own views. In fact there is nothing explicitly pederastic about the context of the quotation, though its mention of ἔρως ψυχῆς prepares the way for the distinction P is about to make at 11F2-4.

11E10-F1 τὸ δὴ τοῦ Πλάτωνος σπουδῇ καὶ χαριεντισμῷ μεμιγμένον οὐ παραλειπτέον : What follows is an allusion to Republic V 468B. This sentence and the next (11F1-2) are bracketed as intrusive by Paton on the strength of their absence from a majority of the older mss. They may well be a scribe's or a reader's addition, and their relevance is suspect since (a) Plato's approval of pederasty has already been mentioned (11E1), and (b) the intervention of this passage separates 11F2-4 from the Euripidean quotation from which, in a sense, it seems to take its cue. -- For σπουδή and χαριεντισμός as opposites cf. e.g. D.H. Isoc. 12. The latter occurs at Pl. R. VIII 563A, Tht. 168D; Wyttenbach's Index contains no instances from genuine Plutarch. It should be noted that there is in fact no hint in the Plato passage that the suggestion is intended otherwise than completely seriously.

11F1-2 ἐξεῖναι γὰρ φησι δεῖν τοῖς ἀριστεύσασιν ἂν ἀνὴρ βούλωνται τῶν καλῶν φιλῆσαι : The speaker at R. V 468B is in fact

Glaucon. Assenting to Socrates' suggestion that a man who has acquitted himself best (τὸν ἀριστεύσαντα) in battle should be rewarded by being crowned by the young men and children, and be allowed to exchange kisses with them, he proposes a further rule: καὶ προστίθημι γε τῷ νόμῳ, ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ τούτοις ᾖ τῆς στρατιᾶς, καὶ μηδενὶ ἐξεῖναι ἀπαρνηθῆναι οὗ ἂν βούληται φιλεῖν, ἵνα καί, ἐάν τίς που τύχῃ ἐρῶν ἢ ἄρρενος ἢ θηλείας, προθυμότερος ᾖ πρὸς τὸ τἀριστεῖα φέρειν. No doubt it was recollection of the phrase ἢ ἄρρενος ἢ θηλείας which prompted the insertion of a reference to this passage at this point in the De lib.educ.; otherwise it has no special reference to pederasty.

11F2-12A2 -- Those, then, who are drawn by physical attraction should be kept away, but lovers of the soul should generally be accepted. The conventions observed with regard to such things in Thebes and Elis, and the Cretan practice of abduction, are to be shunned, and the attitude prevalent at Athens and Sparta emulated. -- This section presents the resolution of P's dilemma. In effect he defends the philosophical tradition by means of a hackneyed distinction between permissible and impermissible varieties of pederasty. To re-inforce the point that his approval is qualified, he adds some stipulations in a sort of literary shorthand which amount to a plea for a discriminating approach to the subject rather than a general blanket endorsement. P is plainly drawing directly upon his reading here, and his derivation, apparently in all seriousness, of practical injunctions from wholly insuitable material gives this passage a sense of unreality and a distinct air of the ridiculous.

11F2-4 τοὺς μὲν οὖν τῆς ὥρας ἐπιθυμοῦντας ἀπελαύνειν προσῆκε, τοὺς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐραστὰς ἐγκρίνειν κατὰ τὸ σύνολον: The

distinction upon which P seizes as the solution to his dilemma is a very well worn one which was frequently used by apologists for pederasty. Cf. e.g. Pl. Smp. 183D-E πονηρός .. ἐστιν ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἐραστὴς ὁ πάνδημος, ὃ τοῦ σώματος μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρῶν; X. Smp. 8.23 ὥστε δὲ καὶ ἀνελεύθερος ἡ συνουσία τῷ τὸ σῶμα μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγαπῶντι, νῦν τοῦτο δηλώσω, cf. 8.6, 30; Mem. IV 1.2 (Socrates) πολλάκις .. ἔφη μὲν ἄν τινος ἐρᾶν, φανερὸς δ' ἦν οὐ τῶν τὰ σώματα πρὸς ὥραν, ἀλλὰ τῶν τὰς ψυχὰς πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὖ πεφυκότων ἐφιέμενος; Lac. 2.13; [Plut.] Apophth.Lac. 237B-C ἐρᾶν τῶν τὴν ψυχὴν σπουδαίων παίδων ἐφεῖτο· τὸ δὲ πλησιάζειν αἰσχρὸν νενόμιστο, ὥστε τοῦ σώματος ἐρῶντας ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς; Lucian 27.15 (Socrates speaks) καὶ γὰρ οὐ τῶν σωμάτων ἐραστής εἰμι, τὴν ψυχὴν δὲ ἡγοῦμαι καλήν; Lucian 49.23 ψυχῆς γὰρ Ἔρωτα πλάττοντες καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἄμορφον αἰδούμενοι φιλεῖν ἀρετῆς καλοῦσιν αὐτοὺς ἐραστάς.

11F4-5 καὶ τοὺς μὲν Θήβησι καὶ τοὺς ⟨ἐν⟩ Ἤλιδι φευκτέον Ἔρωτας : The source of this pronouncement and its obverse (12A1-2 τοὺς δ' Ἀθήνησι καὶ τοὺς ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ζηλωτέον) is Plato, Symposium 182A-185C. The reference to the Cretan ἁρπαγμός (11F5-12A1) has been imported from elsewhere. At Smp. 182A-B, Pausanias distinguishes societies where the prevailing attitude to pederasty is one of straightforward approval (Elis and Boeotia) or straightforward condemnation (Ionia and other regions under barbarian domination) from Athens and Sparta where public attitudes are more complex (ποικίλος). In Elis and Boeotia, he suggests, it is sheer inarticulateness which prevents the inhabitants from formulating a more sensitive approach; in Ionia it is totalitarian fear of the noble spirit aroused by pederasty which has led the authorities to ban it, and spinelessness which makes the populace acquiesce in the prohibition (182B-D). See on

the whole passage K.J. Dover, 'Eros and Nomos', BICS 11 (1964) pp.31-42; and on Thebes and Elis cf. X. Smp. 8.34, Lac. 2.12, Kroll cc.898-901, Dover Greek Homosexuality pp.190-192. P evidently expected his readers to recognise the allusion. What he means, then, by his shorthand reference to Elis and Thebes, is that a simple blanket approval is not to be given to pederasty; see further 12A1-2n. on the implications of his approval of the Athenian and Spartan systems. -- It is to be noted that P has 'Thebans' where Plato has 'Boeotians'; so does Xenophon Smp. 8.34 (but 'Boeotians' Lac. 2.12). For the locative Θήβησι see LSJ s.v. Θῆβαι and cf. Lys. 23.15; Isoc. 12.173; Arist. Rh. II 1397b9, 1398b18; Plato Comicus fr.75 (CAF I p.622). Plutarch apparently uses ἐν Θήβαις (e.g. De Is.et Osir. 355A) which is the regular usage also in Xenophon and Demosthenes. The supplement ⟨ἐν⟩ Ἤλιδι is necessary since Ἤλιδι is not found on its own as locative.

11F5-12A1 καὶ τὸν ἐν Κρήτῃ καλούμενον ἁρπαγμόν: The Cretan custom of ἁρπαγμός is described by Ephorus, FGrH 70 F149.21 (= Strabo X 4.21). It was a sort of ritual abduction of a boy by an older youth. His friends forewarned and offering only token resistance (unless the lover was considered unworthy), the 'victim' was carried off to the abductor's house and presented with gifts, then taken into the country where two months were spent in hunting and feasting, in which the boy's companions also took part. When the time was up, they returned to the city, where the boy was released after receiving a number of customary gifts. Boys to whom this had happened were known as παρεσταθέντες, and were accorded privileges and distinctions which lasted into adulthood. The custom itself seems to have been some sort of archaic survival. See Kroll c.899; R. Willetts, Cretan Cults and Festivals (London 1962) pp.116-117, Ancient Crete: a social

history (London and Toronto 1965) pp.116-117 (sic); Dover, Greek Homosexuality pp.189-190. -- P is using the Cretan ἁρπαγμός as an extreme example of the unrestrained endorsement of pederasty; but his mention of it here as if it were a custom which might inspire imitation elsewhere can hardly be called anything but ridiculous.

12A1-2 τοὺς δ' Ἀθήνησι καὶ τοὺς ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ζηλωτέον: P reverts now to Plato (for the background see 11F4-5n. above). In the Symposium, after declaring his preference for the more complex attitude to pederasty which prevails at Athens (182D), Pausanias attempts to analyse and explain its complexities. (Sparta has apparently been lost sight of after 182A-B, but the implication is that the same applies there.) Athenian ambivalence is illustrated by the fact that on the one hand abject behaviour is tolerated by custom in lovers where no other excuse would be accepted, while on the other fathers instruct pedagogues to deflect the attentions of would-be lovers as if pederasty were something disgraceful (182D-183D). Pausanias' explanation is that a relationship of this kind is intrinsically neither good nor bad, but καλῶς μὲν πραττόμενον καλόν, αἰσχρῶς δὲ αἰσχρόν (183D). -- P's advocacy of the Athenian and Spartan attitude translates in practice, then, into commendation of a discriminating approach which takes the nature of the relationship fully into account.

12A2 [καὶ τῶν παίδων μιμητέον] : These words are unintelligible, and even καὶ τῶν παίδων ἕνεκα μιμητέον, which some mss. have instead, satisfies grammar rather than sense. The four words look intrusive; μιμητέον might suggest the remains of a gloss on the sentence which ends ζηλωτέον; or a marginal note containing τῶν παίδων might possibly have been connected with the fact that P is about to pass on from παῖδες to μειράκια (12A4-6).

(16) 12A3-D2: Youths.

With a final diffident farewell to the subject of the last chapter, P now moves on to the problems of dealing with youths.

12A3-B1 As to pederasty, let everyone decide for himself. Having spoken of the discipline of children, I now come to the subject of youths. I have often censured the foolish practice of appointing pedagogues and teachers for children but letting youths do as they please, whereas in fact the latter need even more supervision than the former.

12B1-C2 Everyone known that children's misdemeanours are trifling and easily corrected; but the misconduct of youths is often serious -- gluttony, theft from fathers, gambling, revelry, drinking, love affairs with girls and the seduction of married women. Strenuous efforts are required to check the excesses natural to young men, and fathers who fail to take a firm grip at this stage are unwittingly encouraging wrongdoing.

12C2-D2 Prudent fathers will be especially vigilant at this time, and ready to keep their sons on the right lines by instruction, threats, entreaties, advice and promises, and by examples of disaster brought on by love of pleasure and praise and renown won by self-control.

With Chapter 16 we take a further step forward in the chronological progression. P is no longer concerned, as he has been since Chapter 7, with boys of school age, but with youths who have left the care of their teachers and pedagogues. From now until almost the end of the treatise the focus is on these older children: Chapter 17 deals with the dangers of bad company, especially that of flatterers; Chapter 18 deals with the necessity for parental tolerance (with youths particularly indicated by

13E3-9); and Chapter 19 is about marriage as a means of settling young men down.

P's only substantial point in this chapter is that youths need if anything even more supervision than children and should not therefore be allowed to roam free and get into trouble as is commonly the case. This is a thought for which there is no lack of parallels in other writers.

On this chapter see Glaeser pp.71-72, Kemper pp.158-160.

12A3-B1 -- As to pederasty, let everyone decide for himself. Having spoken of the discipline of children, I now come to the subject of youths. I have often censured the foolish practice of appointing pedagogues and teachers for children but letting youths do as they please, whereas in fact the latter need even more supervision than the former. -- P's first recommendation with regard to youths is that their attainment of that age should not be regarded as the signal for a slackening of discipline: indeed, rather the reverse. Although he identifies himself closely with this piece of advice (12A7-8), the point is a relatively commonplace one. See e.g. Pl. La. 179A ἡμῖν οὖν τούτων δέδοκται ἐπιμεληθῆναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα , καὶ μὴ ποιῆσαι ὅπερ οἱ πολλοί, ἐπειδὴ μειράκιά γέγονεν, ἀνεῖναι αὐτοὺς ὅτι βούλονται ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ νῦν δὴ καὶ ἄρχεσθαι αὐτῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καθ' ὅσον οἷοί τ' ἐσμέν ; X. Lac. 3.1 (contrasting Lycurgus's wise provisions for Sparta with the general practice elsewhere) ὅτε γε μὴν ἐκ παίδων εἰς τὸ μειρακιοῦσθαι ἐκβαίνωσι , τηνικαῦτα οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι παύουσι μὲν ἀπὸ παιδαγωγῶν, παύουσι δ' ἀπὸ διδασκάλων, ἄρχουσι δὲ οὐδένες ἔτι αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' αὐτονόμους ἀφιᾶσιν ; Isoc. 7.37 (the Athenians of old) οὐκ ἐν μὲν ταῖς παιδείαις πολλοὺς τοὺς

ἐπιστκτοῦντκς εἶχον , ἐπειδὴ δ' εἰς ἄνδρκς δοκιμκσθεῖεν, ἐξῆν αὐτοῖς ποιεῖν ὅ τι βουληθεῖεν , ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτκῖς τκῖς ἀκμκῖς πλείονος ἐπιμελείκς ἐτύγχκνον ἢ παῖδες ὄντες; Iamb. VP 201-202 (reporting the views of the Pythagoreans) εἴς γε τοὺς πολλοὺς ἄτοπόν τε καὶ γελοῖον εἶναι τὸ συμβαῖνον. παῖδκς μὲν γὰρ ὄντκς αἰεσθαι δεῖν εὐτακτεῖν τε καὶ σωφρονεῖν καὶ ἀπέχεσθαι πάντων τῶν φορτικῶν τε καὶ ἀσκημόνων εἶναι δοκούντων, νεκνίσκους δὲ γενομένους ἀφεῖσθαι παρὰ γε δὴ τοῖς πολλοῖς ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται; and cf. Philo 24.43; Plut. De aud. 37Cff.

12A3-4 περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὅπως ἕκαστος αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν πέπεικεν, οὕτως ὑπολαμβανέτω: P's last word on the subject of pederasty is an invitation to his readers to make up their own minds. For this literary convention cf. Hdt. II 123.1, 146.1, III 122.1, V 45.2, and see Ek, Herodotismen pp.21-29 for instances from later writers: e.g. D.H. I 75.23 κρινέτω δὲ ὡς ἕκαστος τῶν ἀκουόντων βούλεται, 128.17, 211.10, 347.6, III 248.13; J. AJ I 108 περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὡς ἂν ἑκάστοις ἢ φίλον, οὕτω σκοπείτωσαν, II 349 περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὡς ἑκάστῳ δοκεῖ διειλημμανέτω, III 80.

12B4-5 ἐπειδὴ περὶ τῆς τῶν παίδων εὐταξίας εἴρηκα καὶ κοσμιότητος : It is difficult to tell whether P means by this to refer back to the whole of the preceding part of the treatise or just to the previous chapter or two. For εὐταξία and κοσμιότης cf. 11C9-10 ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ... περὶ τῆς τῶν παίδων εὐκοσμίας καὶ σωφροσύνης διείλεγμαι.

12A5-6 καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν μειρακίων ἡλικίαν ἤδη μεταβήσομαι: μειράκια are youths who have passed the stage of boyhood but are not yet men: cf. e.g. Pl. R VI 497E: μειράκια ὄντα ἄρτι ἐκ παίδων , Tht. 173B: εἰς ἄνδρας ἐκ μειρακίων τελευτῶσι , X. Smp. 4.17 παῖς .. μειράκιον .. ἀνήρ .. πρεσβύτης; Schmid IV pp.26-27; Porter on

Plut. Arat. 4.1 (on Plutarch's usage of the word); A. Amend, Über die Bedeutung von ΜΕΙΡΑΚΙΟΝ und ΑΝΤΙΠΑΙΣ (Dillingen 1893). See Amend pp.55-56 for examples of μειράκιον denoting the next stage after παῖς, as here. Hippocrates (ap. Philo 1.105) sets the age limits at 14 and 21, and though allowance must be made for the fact that he is constructing an artificially neat system based on multiples of 7, this cannot have been so divergent from current usage as to do violence to common sense. It is to be noticed, however, that in some schemes μειράκιον comes after ἔφηβος, a stage which began at 18 (cf. e.g. Men. fr.274 Körte παῖς γέγον', ἔφηβος, μειράκιον, ἀνήρ, γέρων, Ar. Byz. Περὶ ὀνομασίας ἡλικιῶν fr. 1 Nauck, Philo 24.127 βρέφος, παῖς, ἔφηβος, μειράκιον, νεανίας, ἀνήρ, γέρων, and cf. D.L. VIII 10 where the author applies an equation to an age-scheme of Pythagoras which would give μειράκιον limits of 20 and 40!). Porter on Plut. Arat. 4.1 notes instances of the word in Plutarch which can be checked, and which all fall within the range 14 to 21; on the other hand, Marius is a μειράκιον at 23 (Mar. 3.4), Demetrius is 'still a μειράκιον' at 22 (Demetr. 5.6 with 5.2), and Philopoemen is actually so described at the age of 30 (Philop. 6.13 with 5.1); cf. Amend pp.43-53. The list of misdemeanours at 12B4-7 would seem to rule out the possibility that P is thinking of the earlier part of the age-range; on the other hand, the individuals concerned are still envisaged as being amenable to parental influence; so it seems likeliest that he has in mind some such age-group as the late teens.

12A6 μικρὰ πανταχῶν προειπών: The participle is Vulcobius' emendation for the εἰπών of most mss. If this is right, then the preliminary remarks to which P refers perhaps take up the chapter as far as 12C2. Up to this point he is stressing the need for advice on the subject of dealing with adolescents; the

advice itself begins thereafter.

12A7-8 πολλάκις γὰρ κατεμεμψάμην τοὺς μαθητῶν ἐθῶν γεγονότας εἰσηγητάς : This sentence, taken at face value, appears to indicate some practical involvement and experience on the part of the author. Cf. 12F10-13A2 for another such reference: ὅπερ γὰρ πολλάκις καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς τῶν πατέρων διατελῶ λέγων, καὶ νῦν ἂν εἴποιμι. -- For εἰσηγητάς cf. 11D10 εὐλαβοῦμαι τούτῳ εἰσηγητὴς γενέσθαι καὶ σύμβουλος.

12A8-10 οἵτινες τοῖς μὲν παισὶ παιδαγωγοὺς καὶ διδασκάλους ἐπέστησαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν μειρακίων ὁρμὴν ἄφετον εἶχον νέμεσθαι: For criticism of this practice cf. the passages quoted at 12A3-B1 above. -- For ἐφίστημι as the vox propria for appointing teachers and pedagogues cf. e.g. Pl. Smp. 183C, Alc. I 122B (quoted at 4A6-B6n.), Plut. De aud. 37C. -- For ἄφετον ἐᾶν νέμεσθαι ('allow to range unchecked') cf. Pl. Protag. 320A (the sons of Pericles, well instructed in all teachable subjects) αὐτοὶ περιόντες νέμονται ὥσπερ ἄφετοι, ἐὰν που αὐτόματοι περιτύχωσιν τῇ ἀρετῇ, R. VI 498C (of old men free to study philosophy in retirement) τοτὲ ἤδη ἀφέτους νέμεσθαι. The literal application of the adjective is to herds turned loose to graze freely (Plut. Lys. 20.8, Cato maior 5.3, Agis and Cleom. 55.3), especially sacred herds (Pl. Critias 119D, Plut. Lucull. 24.4). For its use with ὁρμή cf. Philo 32.31 ἐλευθέροις καὶ ἀφέτοις ὁρμαῖς ; Plut. De aud. 38C-D τὰς .. ἐφ' ἡδονὴν ὁρμὰς ... ἂν ἐᾷ τις ἢ πεφύκασι χωρεῖν.

12A10-B1 δέον αὖ τοὐναντίον πλείω ποιεῖσθαι τούτων εὐλάβειαν καὶ φυλακὴν ἢ τῶν παίδων: For the thought that youths need even more careful watching than children cf. X. Lac. 3.2 (Lycurgus) κατιδὼν γὰρ τοῖς τηλικούτοις μέγιστον μὲν φρόνημα ἐμφυόμενον, μάλιστα δὲ ὕβριν ἐπιπολάζουσαν, ἰσχυροτάτας δὲ ἐπιθυμίας τῶν

ἡδονῶν παρεσκευάσε, τηνικαῦτα πλείστους μὲν πόνους αὐτοῖς ἐπέφερε, πλείστην δὲ ἀσχολίαν ἐμηχανήσατο ; and Iamb. VP 102 παισὶν δεῖσθαι τῶν ἡλικιῶν ταύτην πλείστης ἐπιμελείας.

12B1-C2 -- Everyone knows that children's misdemeanours are trifling and easily corrected; but the misconduct of youths is often serious -- gluttony, theft from fathers, gambling, revelry, drinking, love affairs with girls and the seduction of married women. Strenuous efforts are required to check the excesses natural to young men, and fathers who fail to take a firm grip at this stage are unwittingly encouraging wrongdoing. -- P proceeds to explain why it is that youths require even more control than children. In a word, it is because the mischief they are likely to create is of a much more serious kind. P subscribes fully to the Greek conviction that 'the characteristic behaviour of young manhood was compounded of extravagance, pugnacity, thoughtlessness, drunkenness and sexual excess' (Dover, Greek Popular Morality p.103); cf. 12B9-10 ἀταμίευτον γὰρ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ ἀκμὴ καὶ σκιρτητικὸν καὶ κλινοῦ δεόμενον, and the catalogue of youthful vices at 12B4-7. The whole subject was something of a commonplace: cf. Cic. Cael. 27-30 on the 'communis infamia iuventutis' (e.g. 29 'Dies iam me deficiat, si quae dici in eam sententiam possunt coner expromere; de corruptelis, de adulteriis, de protervitate, de sumptibus immensa oratio est.'

12B1-2 τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι τὰ μὲν τῶν παίδων πλημμελήματα μικρὰ καὶ πανταχοῦ ἔστιν ἰάσιμα: For τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ..; cf. e.g. Isoc. 13.12, Alcid. Soph. 9. For πλημμελήματα .. ἰάσιμα cf. ἰάσιμος used of ἁμαρτήματα in Philo 22.196, 25.58.

12B4-5 τὰ δὲ τῶν ἤδη νεανισκευομένων ἀδικήματα πολλάκις ὑπερφυᾶ γίνεται καὶ σκέτλια : Note that P uses the severer word ἀδικήματα

(again at 12C1-2 below) for the wrongdoings of youths, whereas those of children were merely πλημμελήματα. νεανισκεύομαι is a rare word, and Xenophontic (Cyr. I 2.15) as Pollux notes (II 20); νεανιεύομαι , which is commoner, usually has overtones of youthful rashness or insolence (LSJ s.v. II), and P has presumably avoided it because for the moment he wanted a neutral word. For ὑπερφυᾶ .. καὶ σκέτλια used in conjunction cf. e.g. Pl. Grg. 467B σκέτλια γε λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

12B5-7 ἀμετρία γαστρὸς καὶ κλοπαὶ πατρῴων χρημάτων καὶ κύβοι καὶ κῶμοι καὶ πότοι καὶ παρθένων ἔρωτες καὶ γυναικῶν οἰκοφθορίαι γαμετῶν: With this catalogue of youthful vices cf. the similar passage in Chapter 7 (5B3-10) where P is looking ahead to the results in later years of not entrusting children to suitable pedagogues and teachers. There is more than a little common ground between the two lists: cf. 5B7 οἱ δὲ κατοφαγοῦσιν with ἀμετρία γαστρός here, οἱ δ' εἰς κύβους καὶ κώμους ἐξοκέλλουσιν (5B7-8) with κύβοι καὶ κῶμοι καὶ ποτοί , and μοιχεύοντες καὶ πικτοφοροῦντες καὶ μίαν ἡδονὴν θανάτου τιμώμενοι with παρθένων ἔρωτες καὶ γυναικῶν οἰκοφθορίαι γαμετῶν . -- γυναικῶν οἰκοφθορίαι γαμετῶν requires some comment. οἰκοφθορία elsewhere (e.g. Pl. Phd. 82C) most commonly means financial ruin; here however it must mean the disruption of a household by the seduction of a married woman. There is of course no reason of etymology why this should not be so, and although there are no precise parallels, there are indications that this is a possible meaning: Hesychius (II p.741 Latte) has οἰκοφθόρους· μοιχούς , and at SVF III 729 (= Origen Cels. VII 63) φθείρειν τὸν ἄλλου ἀνθρώπου οἶκον is used of the effects of adultery (noted by Sizoo p.47). Cicero perhaps has the same vice in mind at Cael. 28 when he writes (of 'adulescentiae

cupiditates') 'Quae si ita erumpunt ut nullius vitam labefactent, nullius domum evertant, faciles et tolerabiles haberi solent.' -- γαμετή occurs again, on its own, at 13B4; accompanied by γύνη, as here, Pl. Lg. V 841D; Lysias 1.31; Plut. Lucull. 31.3, Conj. praec. 141C.

12B7-8 οὐκοῦν τὰς τούτων ὁρμὰς ταῖς ἐπιμελείαις δεσμεύειν καὶ κατέχειν προσῆκεν : For δεσμεύειν used of curbing youthful excesses cf. e.g. Plato quoted below 12B9-10n., and 13F1-2 (referring to the restraint imposed on wayward young men by marriage) δεσμὸς γὰρ οὗτος τῆς νεότητος ἀσφαλέστατος .

12B9-10 ἀτιμίευτον γὰρ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ ἀκμὴ καὶ σκιρτητικὸν καὶ χαλινοῦ δεόμενον : For ἀκμή meaning 'youth' cf. e.g. Plb. VI 37.9 where οἱ ἐν ἀκμῇ = 'young men', Souda s.v. (I p.83 Adler) where one of the definitions given is ἡ νεότης. The word is more commonly found with an accompanying genitive than in this absolute usage: cf. e.g. X. Cyr. VII 2.20 ἐν ἀκμῇ τοῦ βίου ἀπώλετο, Ath. VI 266C ὡς δὲ νέος εἶ, καὶ ἀκμὴν ἔχεις τοῦ ζῆν. -- For the adjective σκιρτητικός cf. Lucian 52.4; Corn. ND 20 (p.38.4-5 Lang), 27 (p. 49.16-17); Lampe s.v. It derives from the verb σκιρτᾶν meaning 'to frisk', for which cf. 13E8-9 οὕτω σκιρτῶσα νεότης πωλοδαμνεῖται. Since σκιρτᾶν can be used of young horses (e.g. Il. XX 226, 228; E. Ph. 1125), σκιρτητικόν is a good match for χαλινοῦ δεόμενον. For the metaphorical use of χαλινός cf. e.g. Pl. Lg. VIII 808E πολλοῖς αὐτό (sc. the child) ὄντων χαλινοῖς τισιν δεῖ δεσμεύειν. Horse metaphors are naturally used in Greek of the discipline of the young: cf. again (apart from 13E8-9 quoted above) 13D4-5 τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τῶν παίδων ἐφεῖναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας.

12B10-C1 οἱ μὴ τῆς ἡλικίας ταύτης ἐρρωμένως ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι: i.e. fathers who do not take a firm grip on their sons at this

stage. For τῶν ἡ ἡλικία meaning 'people of this age' see LSJ s.v. ἡλικία II, and cf. the similar use of 'aetas' in Latin.

12C2-D2 -- Prudent fathers will be especially vigilant at this time, and ready to keep their sons on the right lines by instruction, threats, entreaties, advice and promises, and by examples of disaster brought on by love of pleasure and praise and renown won by self-control. -- P comes at last in this section to his actual advice on how to cope with youths. It amounts to a recommendation to fathers to be especially watchful and to use any and every means at their disposal to keep them from going astray.

12C3-5 φυλάττειν ἐγρηγορέναι σωφρονίζειν τοὺς μειρακίσκους διδάσκοντας ἀπειλοῦντας δεομένους συμβουλεύοντας ὑπισχνουμένους etc.: The structure of this passage, with its three infinitives in asyndeton followed by six participles in asyndeton, is most striking (cf. Montesi SIFC 20 (1913) p.22 for an analysis), and emphasises P's earnest insistence that fathers should use every means in their power to influence their sons. -- For μειρακίσκος cf. e.g. Pl. Phdr. 237B, Thg. 122C, R. VII 539B; Schmidt, Synonymik IV p.29.

12C6-8 παραδείγματα δεικνύντας τῶν μὲν διὰ φιληδονίαν συμφορᾶς περιπεσόντων διὰ δὲ καρτερίαν ἔπαινον καὶ δόξαν ἀγαθὴν περιποιησαμένων: See 14A3-7n. on P's estimation of the importance of examples, and cf. Horace's account of how his own father used examples to instruct him as to good and bad behaviour, Sat. I 4.105 ff. (105-6 'insuevit pater optimus hoc me, / ut fugerem exemplis vitiorum quaeque notando'). -- With συμφορᾶς περιπεσόντων cf. Plut. De exil. 607F ταῖς μεγίσταις συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν , Muson. fr.8 (p.32.15 Hense) οἱ περιπίπτοντες τοῖς

κακοῖς.

12C7-8 δύο γὰρ ταῦτα ὥσπερεὶ στοιχεῖα τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστιν: στοιχεῖα means 'elements'; in ὥσπερεί P is apologising for the loose use of a slightly grandiose word.

(17) 12D2-13C5: (a) Pythagorean 'riddles'.
(b) Flatterers.

Chapter 17 sets out to advise that children should be kept away from bad company (12D2-4). But between the announcement of the subject and its discussion (12F8-13C5) there intervenes an extraordinary digression. Its starting-point is reasonable enough: P recalls a Pythagorean 'riddle' which, as he thinks, enjoins the avoidance of bad company. He quotes it, and gives his interpretation. But there follow 9 other 'riddles', each with an explanation like the first, none of which has the slightest relevance to the subject (unless we count (iv), whose relevance is surely accidental).

12D2-F7	Pythagorean 'riddles'
12D2-6	Children must be kept away from bad company, from fear of infection. Pythagoras made this clear in riddles which I shall quote and interpret.
12D6-8	(i) 'Don't taste black-tails': i.e. avoid bad company.
12D8-10	(ii) 'Don't step over a yoke': i.e. respect justice.
12D10-E1	(iii) 'Don't sit on a quart-measure': a warning against improvidence.
12E1-3	(iv) 'Don't give everyone your hand': a warning against too-easy familiarity.
12E3-4	(v) 'Don't wear a tight ring': an injunction to live a free (?) life.
12E4-6	(vi) 'Don't stir the fire with iron': a warning against provoking an angry man.
12E6-8	(vii) 'Don't eat the heart': a warning against corrosive anxiety.
12E8-F1	(viii) 'Have nothing to do with beans': i.e. don't engage in politics.
12F1-4	(ix) 'Don't put corn in a pot': i.e. don't offer wise converse to a wicked soul.
12F4-7	(x) 'Don't turn back at the boundary': i.e. accept death when it comes without despair.

P has either let himself be carried away to an amazing degree by his enthusiasm for exposition, or has deliberately (but not very skilfully or sensibly) engineered an opportunity to show off his learning. P mentions Pythagoras only once elsewhere, at 2C1-2 in company with Socrates and Plato, and there is no reason to suppose that he was himself a Pythagorean, though the present passage may perhaps show the influence of the Neopythagorean revival.

With a self-conscious apology for this remarkable deviation, P returns to his theme at 12F8, and sticks to it for the remaining half of the chapter, which is a diatribe against the menace of flatterers.

12F8-13C5	Flatterers
12F8-13A7	Flatterers are especially to be guarded against. With their pleasing attentions they are the ruin of fathers and children equally.
13A7-B5	They encourage sons to defy their fathers' wishes and advice and to snatch the pleasure of the moment; they speak disrespectfully of the fathers and get their sons into undesirable habits.
13B5-C3	Flatterers are a disgusting breed, fawning on their victims and falling in with their moods in a nauseating and slavish manner. Any parent who cares about his son's upbringing will get rid of these creatures.
13C3-5	The bad influence of undesirable class-mates is another threat which ought to be eliminated.

12D2-F7 -- Pythagorean 'riddles'. -- The short, enigmatic injunctions of which P here quotes ten are known by the technical name of ἀκούσματα or σύμβολα, on which see C. Hölk, De acusmatis sive symbolis Pythagoricis (Kiel 1894); F. Boehm, De symbolis Pythagoreis (Berlin 1905); A. Delatte, Études sur la littérature Pythagoricienne (Paris 1915) pp.269-312 (and especially pp.285 ff.); W. Burkert, Lore and science in ancient Pythagoreanism, tr. E.L. Minar Jr. (Harvard 1972) pp.166-192; some texts VS 58 C. (On the names ἀκούσματα and σύμβολα see Burkert pp.175-176). -- The

extant symbola are many and various, but Iamblichus VP 82 (probably following an Aristotelian classification: see Burkert pp.167-168) distinguishes three types, which answer three different kinds of question: τί ἐστι , τί μάλιστα and τί πρακτέον . Examples of each kind are readily identifiable in the surviving symbola. P's ten specimens clearly all belong to the τί πρακτέον category; and all ten are negative, not recommendations but prohibitions. It was the symbola of this third class which were most discussed in antiquity. Taken at face value, many of them are extremely bizarre, apparently amounting to nothing more than superstitious fads and taboos; and yet there is no doubt that they were meant to be understood literally. They are in essence 'ancient magical-ritual commandments' (Burkert p.177), which contain much primitive teaching, some of it certainly pre-Pythagorean. Some have close parallels in the ritual of ancient mystery cults and in the superstition of primitive peoples the world over; many reveal a preoccupation with demonology and the universal primitive fear of the dead. That Pythagoras should have propounded mere superstitious taboos was, however, unthinkable to later antiquity, which looked for and found esoteric meanings beneath the naive exterior. Cf. Iamb. VP 21 (Pistelli p.106.9-12): καὶ εἰ μή τις αὐτὰ τὰ σύμβολα ἐκλέξας διαπτύξειε καὶ ἀμώκῳ ἐξηγήσει περιλάβοι , γελοῖα ἂν καὶ ψαυώδη δόξειε τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τὰ λεγόμενα λήρου μεστὰ καὶ ἀδολεσχίας . Symbolic interpretations enjoyed a wide popularity. Most of the surviving ancient writers who interpret the symbola are late: Diogenes Laertius, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Hippolytus; but this type of exposition can be traced back to about 400 B.C. The Souda s.v. Ἀναξίμανδρος Ἀναξιμάνδρου Μιλήσιος (= VS 58 C6) states that the younger Anaximander of Miletus (see Hölk p.21) ἔγραψε συμβόλων Πυθαγορείων ἐξήγησιν, and mentions three which he handled, two of which are P's (ii) and (vi). Aristotle too wrote a book

about the Pythagoreans (Hölk pp.21-40) of which there remain fragments (frs. 194-197 Rose, but note Burkert's corrections p.166 n.4) showing that he discussed the symbola. Iamblichus evidently drew upon this Aristotelian material. But the later tradition relies most heavily on a Pythagorean writer called Androcydes (Hölk pp. 41-48) whose book on the symbola was in existence by the first century B.C., though his dates are by no means clear (Hölk loc. cit., Burkert p.167, 175 n.73). We come across his tracks in five of the present examples: (i), (ii), (iii), (vi), (ix). Only (ix) presents an exact verbal similarity, and in (i) P's interpretation differs from Androcydes'; nevertheless, a close connection has been assumed between the two (Burkert p.167 n.7).

12D2 καθόλου δ' ἀπείργειν προσήκει τοὺς παῖδας κτλ.: For καθόλου cf.2A6, 9C7 and for ἀπείργειν προσήκει τοὺς παῖδας τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πονηροὺς ἀνθρώπους συνουσίας cf. 9F4 n. and 12F9-10 below.

12D3-4 ἀποφέρονται γάρ τι τῆς τούτων κακίας : Cf. 4A1-3 μή ... ἀποφέρωνται τι τῆς ἐκείνων φαυλότητος. on τούτων see 3F1-3 n.

12D4-5 τοῦτο δὲ παρήγγειλε καὶ Πυθαγόρας αἰνίγμασιν ἅπερ ἐγὼ παραθεὶς ἐξηγήσομαι : The plural αἰνίγμασιν is misleading, since only the first of the ten symbola which P quotes is relevant. For παρατίθημι = 'produce, cite' see LSJ s.v. A 4, cf. B 5.

12D5-6 καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς ἀρετῆς κτῆσιν συμβάλλεται ῥᾳστην οὐκ ἐλαχίστην : Cf. 3A7-8 μεγάλη τοι ῥᾳστὴ πρὸς ἀρετῆς κτῆσιν ἐστιν with note, and 9F1-2 πρὸς τὰς τοῦ βίου πράξεις οὐκ ἐλαχίστην συμβάλλεται μοῖραν.

12D6-8 (i) 'μὴ γεύεσθαι μελανούρων', τουτέστι μὴ συνδιατρίβειν μέλαισιν ἀνθρώποις διὰ κακοήθειαν: This is Boehm no. 12. Cf. Androcydes ap. Tryphon (Spengel III p.194.3-5); Iamb. Protr. 21ε'. -- The μελάνουρος is a small striped fish akin to the bogue and the sargue: see D'Arcy Thompson, A glossary of Greek fishes (London 1947) s.v. Androcydes has a different allegorical interpretation from P: μελάνουρον μὴ ἐσθίειν ἀντὶ τοῦ ψευδῆ λέγειν

μὴ προΐεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ ψεῦδος ἐν ποῖς ἑκκαίδεκα μέρεσι μελαίνεται καὶ ἁμαυροῦται. In origin this symbolon was undoubtedly a straightforward food-taboo: black-tails were not to form part of the Pythagorean's diet. Though the Pythagorean rules of abstinence are notoriously confused, and some writers credit Pythagoras with a ban on the eating of all living things (Iamb. Protr. 21 λθ' ἐμψύχων ἀπέχου, cf. Porph. VP 7), fish are singled out by others as especially forbidden (Plut. Quaest. conv. 728D; Porph. VP 45; 'holy' fish D.L. VIII 34), and even, as here, particular types of fish. The τρίγλη, the ἐρυθῖνος and the ἀκαλήφη are frequently mentioned with the μελάνουρος in this connection: Arist. fr. 194; Plut. Quaest. conv. 670D; Iamb. Protr. 21λγ', VP 109; D.L. VIII 19, 33. The μελάνουρος may owe its inclusion to its sinister colour. Cf. too the version of the symbolon which appears in Iamb. Protr. 21ε': μελανούρου ἀπέχου· χθονίων γὰρ ἐστι βρῶν. There are interesting parallels with the mystery cults (see Burkert p.177); and cf. Herodotus' report that the Egyptian priests were not allowed to taste fish (II 37.4). Boehm regards this taboo as a religious survival of a once universal abstention from fish-eating, and traces this phenomenon to a primitive belief that fish are a type of snake, and that, like snakes, they can be entered and inhabited by the souls of the dead. Cf. Iamblichus quoted above.

12D7 τουτέστι : On this see Arndt-Gingrich s.v. εἰμί II.3, s.v. οὗτος 1b.ε ; BDR section 132.2.

12D7 μέλασιν ἀνθρώποις: For μέλας used of bad character see LSJ s.v. III 4, Arndt-Gingrich s.v., and cf. e.g. μέλαν ἦθος M.Ant. IV 18, 28; Arist. ap. D.L. VIII 34. Cf. too Latin 'niger', OLD s.v. 9.

12D8-10 (ii) 'μὴ ζυγὸν ὑπερβαίνειν', τουτέστιν ὅτι δεῖ τῆς δικαιοσύνης πλεῖστον ποιεῖσθαι λόγον καὶ μὴ τοὐλάττον ὑπερβαίνειν : This is Boehm no. 30. Cf. Souda s.v. Ἀναξίμανδρος Ἀναξιμάνδρου

Μιλήσιος; Androcydes ap. Tryphon (Spengel III p.194.1-2) = Apostol. VIII 340 (CPG II p.437); Demetrius of Byzantium ap. Ath. X 452D; Clem. Al. Strom. V 5.30.1; Porph. VP 42; D.L. VIII 18; Iamb. Protr. 21 ιγ'. -- A literal interpretation of this symbolon could only make it a superstitious fad, like the avoidance of walking under ladders. Not surprisingly, then, ancient writers looked for a symbolic meaning. Since ζυγόν, in the sense of the beam of a balance (LSJ s.v. IV), has obvious metaphorical associations with justice, there is quite close agreement on interpretation: Androc. ἀντὶ τοῦ δίκαιον μὴ παραβαίνειν; Demetr. ἀντὶ τοῦ πᾶσαν πλεονεξίαν φεύγειν καὶ στυγεῖν, ζητεῖν δὲ τὸ ἴσον; Porph. τουτέστι μὴ πλεονεκτεῖν; D.L. τουτέστι τὸ ἴσον καὶ δίκαιον μὴ ὑπερβαίνειν; Iamb. δικαιοπραγεῖν παρακελεύεται καὶ προτιμᾶν ἰσότητα καὶ μετριότητα.
As usual, however, the original meaning was doubtless literal, and ζυγόν has its primary meaning of 'yoke'. Warnings not to step over certain prescribed objects play a large part in magical practices, the fear being that to do so exposes the person or the object to the malevolent influence of demons. Another symbolon very similar to this one is Boehm no. 31 σάρον μὴ ὑπερβαίνειν, quoted by Plut. 290E, 727C and Hippol. Haer. VI 27.

12D10-11 (iii) 'μὴ ἐπὶ χοίνικος καθίσαι', ἤτοι φεύγειν ἀργίαν καὶ προνοεῖν ὅπως τὴν ἀναγκαίαν παρασκευάσομεν τροφήν: This is Boehm no. 32. Cf. Androcydes ap. Tryphon (Spengel III p.194.5-7) = Mant. prov. I 58 (CPG II p.753); Demetrius of Byzantium ap. Ath. X 452E; Plut. 281A, 290E, 354E, 703F, Numa 14.6; Porph. VP 42; D.L. VIII 18; Iamb. Protr. 21 ιγ'; Eustath. 1854 on Od. XIX 28. This is another much-quoted symbolon which was not likely to be taken literally. Since a χοῖνιξ (a unit of dry measure) was conventionally the amount of a day's ration of food (Hdt. VII 187.2; Ath. III 98E; D.L. VIII 18; cf. already Od. XIX 28 for the connection with τροφή), it was commonly interpreted as a warning not to neglect to make provision for the future. Thus Androc. μὴ

ἐπαναπαύεσθαι τῇ ἐφημέρῳ τροφῇ, ἀλλὰ πρεσβεύειν ; Demetrius ap. Ath. ἀντὶ τοῦ μὴ σκοπεῖν τὰ ἐφ' ἡμέραν , ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν ἀεὶ προσδέχεσθαι ; Plut. 703F ἀεί τι τοῦ παρόντος εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὑποτείνειν καὶ τῆς κύριον ἐν τῇ σήμερον μνημονεύειν; D.L. φροντίδα ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος · ἡ γὰρ κοινὴ ἡμερήσιος τροφή. φεύγειν ἀργίαν finds an echo in Porphyry's εἶναι μὴ ἀργὸν ζῆν. Some primitive superstitious belief lies behind this symbolon too, though its nature is not ascertainable. See Boehm pp. 38 ff.

12D10 ἐπὶ κοίνικος καθίζει: ἐπὶ κοίνικος (D alone) is the correct reading. ἐπὶ κοίνικα , the reading of the majority (ὑπὲρ κοίνικα MΠ) arises from assimilation to the following καθίζει . The same has happened at Ath. X 452E, where mss. A E have κοίνικα and C has κοίνικος . Androcydes, D.L. and Porphyry all have κοίνικος as far as one can tell. Iamb. has κοίνικι in one place and κοίνικα in another. Plut. has κοίνικος in all six places. -- For καθίζειν intrans. see LSJ s.v. II. Androc. and D.L. also use καθίζειν ; Porph. and Iamb. use καθέζεσθαι, Ath. and Plut. (and mss h i k here) καθῆσθαι.

12E1-3 (iv) 'μὴ παντὶ ἐμβάλλειν δεξιάν', ἀντὶ τοῦ προχείρως οὐ δεῖ συναλλάσσειν : This is Boehm no. 46 Cf. Plut. 96A; D.L. VIII 17; Iamb. Protr. 21 κη'. -- This is a less well known symbolon. It is mentioned by D.L. without an attempt at interpretation. Iamblichus' explanation is obscure: μὴ ἀνάσπα μηδὲ ἀνιμᾶν ἐπιχείρει δεξιὰν ὀρέγων τοῖς ἀνεπιτηδείοις καὶ ἀνοργιάστοις. Plutarch uses it to support the thesis of his De amic. mult. (quoting it as μὴ πολλοῖς ἐμβάλλειν δεξιάν): τουτέστι μὴ πολλοὺς ποιεῖσθαι φίλους μηδὲ πολύκοινον μηδὲ πάνδημον ἀσπάζεσθαι φιλίαν. Cf. Iamb. VP 257 μόνοις τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις τὴν δεξιὰν ἐμβάλλειν. Literal and metaphorical senses are closely intertwined in ἐμβάλλειν δεξιάν, since the gesture has natural and universal implications of friendship and good faith (cf. Dover on Ar. Nu. 81). Boehm refers

this symbolon to a primitive reluctance to have anything to do with strangers until certain ritual acts have been performed, the fear being that any such contact may expose one to evil forces.

12E3-4 (v) 'μὴ φέρειν στενὸν δακτύλιον', ὅπ δεῖ τὸν βίον ⟨ἐλεύθερον⟩ ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ μηδενὶ δεσμῷ προσκεῖσθαι [αὐτόν] : This is Boehm no. 22.Cf. Iamb. Protr. 21 κβ'. -- This symbolon is even rarer than the last. Iamblichus, the only other writer who mentions it (in the form δακτύλιον μὴ φορεῖ), adds a long explanation whose main point is as follows: ἐπεὶ δεσμοῦ τρόπον περίκειται τοῖς φοροῦσιν ὁ δακτύλιος, ἴδιον ἔχων τὸ μὴ ἀνέχειν μηδὲ κακοῦχεῖν ἀλλά πως ἐρρωσθαι καὶ προσφυῶς ἔχειν, δεσμὸς δὲ τοιοῦτός τις καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχει· τὸ οὖν δακτύλιον μὴ φορεῖ φιλοσοφεῖν φησιν ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ χωρίζειν τοῦ περικειμένου δεσμοῦ τὴν ψυχήν· μελέτη γὰρ θανάτου καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος ἡ φιλοσοφία. 'Rings on the fingers are often thought to act as spiritual impediments, apparently on account of their resemblance to fetters' (Fraser on Fasti loc. cit. below). At Rome the Flamen Dialis was not allowed by custom 'anulo uti nisi pervio cassoque' or to wear knots anywhere on his person (Fab. Pict. ap. Gell. X 15.6,9); and it was usual to remove rings from the fingers of the dying so as not to hinder the departing soul (Pliny NH XXXIII 27). For the prohibition of ring-wearing in the cult of Zeus Cynthius on Delos, the sacred law of Lycosura and the sleep cure at Pergamum see Burkert pp.177-178. See further Frazer on Ov. Fasti IV 658, The Golden Bough^{3} III (London 1927) pp.293-317.

12E3-4 τὸν βίον ⟨ἐλεύθερον⟩ ἐπιτηδεύειν : The adjective is Leonicus' supplement. An adjective or an adverb is certainly needed, and ἐλεύθερον must capture the right sense, whether or not it restores the true reading.

12E4 καὶ μηδενὶ δεσμῷ προσκεῖσθαι [αὐτόν] : Note L. Castiglioni's proposal to retain the bracketed word and write

αὐτὸν , which may well be right.

12E4-6 (vi) 'πῦρ σιδήρῳ μὴ σκαλεύειν', ἀντὶ τοῦ θυμουμένων μὴ ἐρεθίζειν : This is Boehm no. 33. Cf. Souda s.v. Ἀναξίμανδρος Ἀναξιμάνδρου Μιλήσιος ; Androcydes ap. Tryphon (Spengel III p.194. 7-8); Demetrius of Byzantium ap. Ath. X 452D; Hor. Sat. II 3.276; Plut. 281A, 354E, Numa 14.6; Lucian 14.28; Hippol. Haer. VI 27; Porph. VP 42; D.L. VIII 18; Iamb. Protr. 21η'. -- A common symbolon. σιδήρῳ is peculiar to P's version of it; the others have μαχαίρᾳ (or μαχαίρῃ , cf. Burkert p.167 n.7). Again a symbolic approach is universal and there is wide agreement on interpretation. Verbally similar to P's explanation is that of Androcydes: τουτέστι τὸν θυμούμενον λόγοις μὴ ἐρεθίζειν. Cf. Ath., ἀντὶ τοῦ πεθυμωμένον ἄνδρα μὴ ἐριδαίνειν· πῦρ γὰρ ὁ θυμός, ἡ δὲ ἔρις μάχαιρα ; Porph., μὴ τὸν ἀνοιδοῦντα καὶ ὀργιζόμενον κινεῖν λόγοις παρατεθηγμένοις ; Hippol., τὸν πεθυμωμένον ἀνθρωπον λόγων μὴ ἐρέθιε· πυρὶ γὰρ ἔοικεν ὁ θυμούμενος, μαχαίρᾳ δὲ λόγος. Diogenes Laertius gives the warning a slightly different slant by referring it to the irascibility of potentates (cf. Sen. De ira II 21.7, Dodds on E. Bacch. 671): δυνασπῶν ὀργὴν καὶ ἀδοῦντα θυμὸν μὴ κινεῖν. Fire is a natural metaphor for anger, so that the origin of this explanation is perfectly intelligible. The true meaning of the symbolon, however, must be the literal one. Fire is commonly regarded in superstitious belief as if it were alive. To stir it with iron or a knife is to risk disturbing or wounding the demons which reside in it.

12E5-6 οὐ γὰρ προσῆκεν, ἀλλ' ὑπεῖκειν τοῖς ὀργιζομένοις : This is a common piece of advice in the literature on the control of anger. Cf. also E. fr. 654, quoted by P at 10A9-10.

12E6-8 (vii) 'μὴ ἐσθίειν καρδίαν', μὴ βλάπτειν τὴν ψυχὴν φροντίσιν ἀώτην κατατρύχοντα : This is Boehm no. 15. Cf. Aristotle fr. 194 (= Gell. IV 11.11-13); Demetrius of Byzantium ap. Ath. X 452D; Aelian VH IV 17; Porph. VP 42; D.L. VIII 18, 19; Iamb. Protr.

21λ', VP 109. -- The verb in this symbolon is capable of either a literal or a metaphorical interpretation (the latter no doubt facilitated by the familiar Homeric metaphor of 'eating one's heart out' with grief or anxious care: e.g. Il. XXIV 129, cf. Od. X 379). The figurative meaning is favoured by Demetrius (ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀλυπίαν ἄσκειν), Porphyry (οἷον μὴ λυπεῖν ἑαυτὸν ἀνίαις), D.L. VIII 18 (μὴ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνίαις καὶ λύπαις κατατήκειν) and Iamblichus (σημαίνει τὸ μὴ δεῖν τὴν ἕνωσιν τοῦ παντὸς καὶ τὴν συμπνοίαν διασπᾶν, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ μὴ ἴσθι βάσκανος, ἀλλὰ φιλάνθρωπος καὶ κοινωνικός. ἐκ δὲ τούτου φιλοσοφεῖν παραινεῖ). But Pythagoras was undoubtedly credited with a literal prohibition on the eating of animals' hearts. Cf. Arist. loc. cit.: Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ μήτρας καὶ καρδίας καὶ ἀκαλήφης καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν ἄλλων ἀπέχεσθαι φησιν τοὺς Πυθαγορικούς; Aelian: προσέταττε δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς Πυθαγόρας καρδίας ἀπέχεσθαι; and D.L. VIII 19 (though cf. VIII 18 above) καρδίας τ' ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ κυάμων. Iamblichus says of Pythagoras ἐνομοθέτησε δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς καρδίαν μὴ τρώγειν, ἐγκέφαλον μὴ ἐσθίειν, καὶ τούτων ἔτι πάντας τοὺς Πυθαγορικούς; and an explanation follows: ἡγεμονικὰ γὰρ εἶει καὶ ἱκανὰ ἐπιβάθρα καὶ ἕδρα τινὲς τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τοῦ ζῆν. ἀφωσιοῦτο δὲ αὐτὰ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θείου λόγου φύσιν Cf. Plut. Quaest. conv. 635E: ὑπόνοιαν μέντοι παρέσχεν ... ἐνέχεσθαι δόγμασιν Ὀρφικοῖς ἢ Πυθαγορικοῖς καὶ τὸ ᾠόν, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι καρδίαν καὶ ἐγκέφαλον, ἀρχὴν ἡγούμενοι γενέσεως ἀφοσιοῦσθαι. This superstitious abstention proceeds from the belief that the heart and blood of an animal contain its spirit. Drinking its blood or eating its heart may transfer that spirit and its power to the recipient, but it also exposes him to the animal's demons, and is thus a highly dangerous process. (For the special role of the heart in Greek ritual see Burkert pp.181-182.)

12E8-F1 (viii) 'κυάμων ἀπέχεσθαι', ὅτι οὐ δεῖ πολιτεύεσθαι· κυαμευτικὴ γὰρ ἦσαν ἐμπροσθεν αἱ ψηφοφορίαι δι' ὧν πέρας ἐπεπίθεσαν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς: This is Boehm no. 11. Cf. e.g. Arist. fr. 195 (= D.L.

VIII 34); Call. fr. 553 Pf.; Cic. Div. I 62, II 119; Plut. Aet. Rom. 286D-E; Lucian 27.6, cf. 14.24; Hippol. Haer. VI 27; Porph. VP 43; D.L. VIII 19; Iamb. VP 109, Protr. 21λγ'. -- On this celebrated symbolon see A. Delatte, Faba Pythagorae cognata (Liège 1930), Olck in RE s.v. 'Bohne' cc.619-620, Burkert pp.183-185. Once again a dietary taboo was interpreted symbolically by many writers. The political explanation favoured by P can be paralleled from Aristotle, Lucian and Hippolytus. Aristotle: φησὶ δ' Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων παραγγέλλειν αὐτὸν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν κυάμων ὅτι ἀδαίοις εἰσὶν ὅμοιοι ἢ ὅτι Ἅιδου πύλαις * * * ἀγόνατον γὰρ μόνον· ἢ ὅτι φθείρει ἢ ὅτι τῇ τοῦ ὅλου φύσει ὅμοιον ἢ ὅτι ὀλιγαρχικόν· κληροῦνται γὰρ αὐτοῖς; the Pythagorean in Lucian 27.6 also offers several alternatives, but culminates τὸ δὲ μέγιον, Ἀθηναίοισι νόμος κυάμοισι τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρέεσθαι; Hippolytus offers only the political explanation: ἀρχὴν πόλεως μὴ ἀποδέχου· κυάμοις γὰρ ἐκληροῦντο τὰς ἀρχὰς κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον. Cf. App. Prov. III 27 (CPG I p.241), Apostolius XV 11 (CPG II pp.630-631), and see note on 12E9-F1 below. Already by Aristotle's time, then, there was a choice of interpretations; and indeed this symbolon generates more alternative explanations than any other: for an enumeration see Olck loc. cit., Pease on Cic. Div. I 62. Avoidance of beans was remarkably widespread in the ancient world (see Frazer on Pausanias VIII 15.4): among many others, Egyptian priests practised it (Hdt. II 37.5), and it was required of the initiates of the Eleusinian and Orphic mysteries, and of the Flamen Dialis at Rome. In looking for the origin of the taboo, Boehm, Delatte and Burkert are inclined to take seriously into consideration the disturbing effects of beans on the digestion (cf. Cic. Div. I 62 with Pease's note). The superstitious connections of the bean with the spirits of the dead may also have contributed.

12E9-F1 κυαμευτὰὶ γὰρ ἦσαν ἐμπροσθεν αἱ ψηφοφορίαι δι' ὧν πέρας ἐπετίθεσαν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς : Beans had a well-known function as the counters used in selecting magistrates by lot: see Olck (loc. cit. 12E8-F1 n.) c.620.53 ff.; J. Oehler in RE s.v. κύαμος; Ehrenberg in RE s.v. 'Losung' cc.1485-86; E. Stavely, Greek and Roman Voting and Elections (London 1972) pp.61-62; though they were superseded (cf. 12E9 ἔμπροσθεν) by the more sophisticated device of the kleroterion (Stavely pp.62 ff.). This is clearly what P ought to be referring to here, like the writers quoted at 12E8-F1 n. (he must be using ψηφοφορίαι, which ought strictly to refer to election by voting, rather loosely); yet what he actually says is: 'For beans were formerly used in the elections by which they put an end to the magistracies'. This is highly puzzling. Bernardakis tries to defend it against emendation (Symbolae Criticae et Palaeographicae in Plutarchi Vitas et Moralia (Leipzig 1879) pp.38-39): 'Locus sanus male est intellectus. Noster enim dicere non vult per suffragia fabis lata magistratus creari, sed proprie per suffragia f. l. magistratibus (veteribus) exitum imponi. Ταῖς ἀρχαῖς igitur idem vult ac: ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις ἀρχαῖς, i.e. ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς παλαιαῖς.' (for ἀρχαὶ = 'magistrates' see LSJ s.v. II.4). This, however, would be such an eccentric and unlikely way of describing the function of elections that the proposed interpretation lacks all credibility. Scarcely more attractive is the theory of Babbitt (see his footnote) that P refers to the process of dismissal known as ἀποχειροτονία (see Thalheim in RE s.v. ἀποχειροτονεῖν): apart from the fact that beans had nothing to do with that process, there is a psychological improbability in explaining a bean taboo as a warning against entering politics on the grounds that beans were used in ejecting magistrates from office. Not unnaturally, then, editors have been inclined to try emendation, though without really convincing results. (a) Wyttenbach proposed to alter πέρας to γέρας. But though he shows

in his note ad loc. that office was often thought of and referred to as a prize, this is not to say that 'prize' can intelligibly be substituted for 'office' in every context with no further explanation. Nor is it at all clear that ἐπιτίθεναι , which normally means 'to impose, inflict', could be used of conferring honours or office. Finally, πέρας ἐπιτίθεναι is a fairly common phrase (Bernardakis, loc. cit. above compares e.g. Plut. 1056C, 1088C, Numa 14.11, fr. 21 Sandbach), which might be thought to protect its integrity here. (b) Hercher wanted to read δι' ὧνπερ ἐπετίθεσαν τὰς ἀρχάς , 'by means of which they appointed the magistrates'. At first sight this looks an eminently attractive solution; but two considerations tell against it. The first is that in getting rid, like Wyttenbach, of πέρας ἐπιτίθεναι , Hercher exposes himself to the same suspicion of being wrong. Secondly there is a problem again with ἐπιτίθεναι : a disappointing lack of parallels for the required sense of 'appoint'. (c) Paton writes, in his apparatus: 'Nonne ἀρχαιρεσίαις ?'(i.e. instead of ἀρχαῖς). If he intends to make P say that sortition concluded the process of electing magistrates, one can only remark that the emphasis seems misplaced. It seems more likely, though, that he means to make P refer to the historical replacement of voting (ἀρχαιρεσίαι) by sortition (which took place for the appointment of Athenian archons in 487/6 B.C.). This is a possible way out of the difficulty, though open to question perhaps on the relevance of the piece of constitutional history, and the likelihood of P's possession of such information. A final depressing possibility has to be faced: that we do indeed have what P wrote, and that it is unintelligible because he himself misunderstood or failed to make sense of the facts presented to him in his source.

12F1-3 (ix) 'σιτίον εἰς ἀριθὸν μὴ ἐμβάλλειν ' ἐπισημαίνει γὰρ ὅτι εἰς πονηρὰν ψυχὴν λόγων ἐμβάλλειν οὐ πρόσφορον : This is

Boehm no. 50. Cf. Androcydes in Mant. prov. II 81 (CPG II p.770), where the symbolon and its explanation appear verbatim as here (but with προσῆκεν for πρεσῆκεν at 12F3). Androcydes, then, seems to be P's source here; no other surviving writer mentions this symbolon. -- The symbolon is quite a puzzling one. For the ἀμίς, a chamber-pot, see Mau in RE s.v. Burkert (p.175 n.70) thinks this symbolon may be an invention of Androcydes' own because, he alleges, it makes sense only when taken metaphorically. Boehm, however, finds a possible literal meaning for it by relating it to other symbola dealing with the treatment of nail-parings and hair-cuttings (his nos. 47, 48, 49). These things were believed to retain something of the owner's vitality and to offer ill-disposed people a magical hold upon him unless disposed of carefully; Pythagoreans were exhorted to spit on them as a precaution against this (Boehm no. 47). If we can assume that urine was similarly thought of (cf. Pliny NH XXVIII 38 'inter amuleta est editae quemque urinae inspuere'), the present symbolon may become more readily intelligible. Boehm (p.50 n.) explains: 'Omnia quae forte in matellam iniecta sunt, sicut cibus pecoris, vi daemonum quasi contagione quadam afficiuntur eisque qui edunt periculum fascinationis afferunt.'

12F2-3 εἰς πονηρὰν ψυχὴν ἀστεῖον λόγον ἐμβάλλειν οὐ προσῆκεν: 'clever speech ought not to be put into a wicked mind' (Tucker). This is thoroughly cryptic, either in Greek or in English. -- εἰς πονηρὰν ψυχήν: as symbolised by the ἀμίς. For the mind thought of in terms of a vessel or container see De aud. 48C.

12F3 ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος τροφὴ διανοίας ἐστι: 'speech is the food of thought' (Babbitt). The phrase τροφὴ διανοίας occurs in Philo 16.157, 20.165, 27.13. For τροφή of spiritual or intellectual nourishment see Arndt-Gingrich s.v. 2, Lampe s.v. 8 ff.

12F4-7 (x) 'μὴ ἐπιστρέφεσθαι ἐπὶ τοὺς ὅρους ἐλθόντας', τουτέστι μέλλοντας ἀποθνήσκειν ... φέρειν εὐκόλως καὶ μὴ ἀθυμεῖν: This is Boehm no. 43. Cf. Ath. X 452E; Hippol. Haer. VI 26;

Porph. VP 42; D.L. VIII 18; Iamb. Protr. 21ιδ'. -- Here P follows a popular interpretation: a man on the verge of death should not cling to life. Cf. Ath. ὅρια γὰρ καὶ πέρας ζωῆς ὁ θάνατος· τοῦτον οὐκ ἐᾷ μετὰ λύπης καὶ φροντίδος προσίεσθαι ; Porphyry, μὴ ἔχεσθαι τοῦ βίου τούτου ἀποθνήσκοντα ; Diogenes Laertius, παρήνει τοῖς ἀπαλλαττομένοις τοῦ βίου μὴ ἐπιθυμητικῶς ἔχειν τοῦ ζῆν μηδ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐνταῦθα ἡδονῶν ἐπάγεσθαι. Iamblichus' version of the symbolon, however, has a revealing addition: Ἐρινύες γὰρ μετέρχονται ; and Hippolytus too has a reference to the Erinyes. Their rationalising explanations are not important; what matters is the preservation of a part which the others seem to have rejected, and the insight to be gained from it into the original nature of the symbolon. Several superstitious elements are here combined: first the fear of spirits, which lies behind so many of the other symbola, for the Erinyes in primitive times are not yet the avengers of crime, but underworld spirits; secondly the superstitious fear of turning round in case such spirits should be following one: see Frazer's n. on Ov. Fasti VI 164, E. Rohde, Psyche, 8th ed. tr. W.B. Hillis (London 1925) pp.325-326 n.104; finally the concept of the boundary as a place, like thresholds, where the power of demons is at its strongest.

12F8-13C5 -- Flatterers. -- On the flatterer see O. Ribbeck, Kolax (Leipzig 1883), W. Kroll in RE s.v. 'Kolax', Thphr. Char. 2, Plut. De adulatore et amico, Stob. III 14. In this chapter P does not perhaps have the distinction between the flatterer and the parasite quite clear in his mind (cf. 13B10-C1); for the latter see E. Wüst and A. Hug in RE s.v. 'Parasitos' 2. The advice to steer clear of flatterers is common: cf. e.g. [Isocr.] Ad Demon. 30 μίσει τοὺς κολακεύοντας , Pythag. ap. Stob. III 14.18 ὡς .. ἐχθρῶν χείρονας ἐκτρέπου τοὺς κολακεύοντας.

12F8-13A7 -- Flatterers are especially to be guarded against. With their pleasing attentions they are the ruin of fathers and children equally.

12F8 ἀνακάμψω δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοῦ λόγου πρόθεσιν: Cf. [Longinus] 36.4 ἀνακάμπτει γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἡμῶν τοῦ ὑπομνήματος ἡ παραίνεσις and 7A3-4 ἐπανάγω γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοῦ λόγου πρόθεσιν , where see note for the v.l. ὑπόθεσιν which occurs here also. P is not surprisingly conscious that he had digressed.

12F9 ὅπερ ἔφην : The reference is to 12D2-3 καθόλου δ' ἀπεργεῖν προσήκει τοὺς παῖδας τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πονηροὺς ἀνθρώπους συνουσίας .

12F9-10 ἀπάγειν δεῖ τοὺς παῖδας : See 6A11n. for this sort of expression, and cf. Sen. De ira II 21.8 'longe itaque ab adsentatione pueritia removenda est'.

12F10-13A1 ὅπερ γὰρ πολλάκις καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς τῶν πατέρων διατελῶ λέγων: πολλάκις καὶ πρὸς πολλούς already at 1C7, where see note. This is one of the very few passages in the De liberis educandis which reveal anything about the author.

13A2 γένος οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἐξωλέστερον : For this use of γένος cf. e.g. S. Ant. 1255 τὸ μαντικὸν .. γένος , E. fr. 282 ἀθλητῶν γένος , Thphr. Char. 26.6 τὸ τῶν δημαγωγῶν γένος.

13A2-3 οὐδὲ μᾶλλον καὶ θᾶττον ἐκτραχηλίζον τὴν νεότητα τῶν κολάκων : τῶν κολάκων is a comparative genitive, rather inelegantly placed. -- θᾶττον : see n. on τάχιον , 9B3. -- ἐκτραχηλίζειν here means 'bring to grief, ruin', cf. D. 9.51; Lucian 41.10, 57.14; Alciphron II 38.3 Schepers; Porph. De abst. I 42. The literal meaning of the verb is 'to throw headlong': X. Cyr. I 4.8, Plut. De ad et am. 58F (horses throwing their riders); Plut. Brut. 31.4; in the passive it means to fall precipitately, or break one's neck: Ar. Nu. 1503, Plut. 70; Lucian 36.42.

13A4 προρριζοῦσι ἐκτρίβουσι : 'destroy utterly'. The phrase, a metaphor from the destruction of vegetation, occurs Hdt. I 86 δ, E. Hippol. 684, fr.1109.11 (= Rhesus prol. 11), Pollux V 80; πρόρριζος means 'root and branch': Il. XI 157, XIV 415, Hdt. I 32.9, III 40.3, A. Pers. 812, S. El. 512, 765. For ἐκτρίβειν meaning

'destroy' cf. Hdt. VI 37.1, 2, Herodas 6.27 (with Headlam's n.), Plut. Sulla 25.4, Eumenes 19.3, Aelian VH 6.13.

13A4-5 τῶν μὲν τὸ γῆρας ἐπίλυπον, τῶν δὲ τὴν νεότητα ποιοῦντες : It is questionable whether a flatterer can make the lives of both father and son ἐπίλυπος. If he distresses the father, it must be because of his influence on the son; and if he has influence with the son, his attentions must be welcome, at least for the moment. The run of the sentence makes it quite possible that some adjective has fallen out after νεότητα, as Schneider suspected. (Hartman credits him with a conjecture to fill the gap, namely ἐπονείδιστον; if so, the source is somewhere other than Schneider's edition ad loc.).

13A5-7 τῶν δὲ συμβουλευομένων δέλεαρ ἀφύλακτον προτείνοντες τὴν ἡδονήν : Coming after τῶν μέν (fathers) ... τῶν δέ (sons), this is very awkward. The easiest remedy is to excise δέ here (Heumann, following Xylander's translation); Hartman's ἀντί for δέ would also help the syntactical problem, but the resulting change in the sense is not for the better. -- For the bait metaphor cf. Pl. Tim. 69D ἡδονὴ μέγιστον κακοῦ δέλεαρ; Plut. De la. ips. 547C οἷον τι δέλεαρ μικρὸν ὠλογίας ὑποβάλλοντες, De sera 554F, Dronkers p.40. -- ἀφύλακτος means 'which cannot be guarded against' (LSJ s.v. II 2). Cf. Plut. 24A, 167A, Caes. 63.1.

13A7-B5 -- They encourage sons to defy their fathers' wishes and advice and to snatch the pleasure of the moment; they speak disrespectfully of the fathers and get their sons into undesirable habits. -- With this section, and particularly the passage of direct speech which it contains, cf. the words put into the mouth of the flatterer by Seneca, EP. 123.10-11, especially 10: 'Fluunt dies et irreparabilis vita decurrit. Dubitamus? Quid iuvat sapere et aetati non semper voluptates recepturae interim, dum potest, dum poscit, ingerere frugalitatem? ... Non amicam habes, non puerum qui amicae moveat invidiam; cottidie sobrius

prodis; sic cenas tamquam ephemeridem patri adprobaturus: non est istud vivere sed alienae vitae interesse.' The similarities are striking enough to suggest a common source for P and Seneca (see Glaeser pp.74-75 for speculation as to what it may have been).

13A7 τοῖς παισὶ [τοῖς πλουσίοις] : Wilamowitz' excision; neither τοῖς πλουσίοις nor τῶν πλουσίων (D only) sounds at all right with οἱ πατέρες immediately following, and τοῖς πλουσίοις has the further difficulty that 'rich children' is a peculiar way of saying 'the children of rich parents'. The removal of the bracketed words takes nothing essential from the sense; if in fact it was added at some stage in the course of transmission, the point may be that only the rich are bothered by flatterers: cf. 13B6.

13A9-10 σπιγμὴ χρόνου πᾶς ἐστιν ὁ βίος : For this thought cf. Simonides fr. 143 Page (= 196 Bergk, III p.523) τὰ γὰρ χίλια καὶ τὰ μύρια κατὰ Σιμωνίδην ἔστι σπιγμή πως ἐστιν ἀόριστος, μᾶλλον δέ μορίου τι βραχύτατον σπιγμῆς, Leonidas AP VII 472.3-4 (= Gow-Page, Hellenistic Epigrams 2445-46), Sen. Ep. 49.3 'punctum est quod vivimus, et adhuc puncto minus', Plut. Cons. ad Ap. 117E καὶ γὰρ ὁ μακρότατος βίος ὀλίγος ἐστὶ καὶ σπιγμαῖος πρὸς τὸν ἄπειρον αἰῶνα, M.Ant. II 17 τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου βίου ὁ μὲν χρόνος σπιγμή. -- The flatterer's conclusion is 'Let us therefore eat, drink and be merry' (13A10 below; cf. Seneca's flatterer, 13A7-B5 n.).

13A10 ζῆν οὐ παραζῆν προσήκει : 'We must live, not merely exist' (Babbitt). Cf. Sen. Ep. 123.10 'non est istud vivere sed alienae vitae interesse' (where Seneca may well be trying to render παραζῆν from a Greek source). Here ζῆν has the heightened sense 'live, savour life to the full' (LSJ s.v. II), as often 'vivere' in Latin (Fordyce on Catull. 5.1). παραζῆν by contrast means 'to exist, to live at second hand', cf. Anaxandrides fr. 2.4 (CAF II p.316) οὕτω παρέζων χρηστῶς οὐκ ἔζων τότε, Plut. Quaest. conv. 672D-E (of those who believe that the soul has no independent

sensations of its own) ἀλλ' ἀπεχνῶς τῇ σώματι παραζῶσαν αὐτὴν διαμένους τοῖς ἐκείνου συνεπιρεούσαις πάθεσι καὶ πάλιν αὖ σκυθρωπάζειν, ὥσπερ ἐκμαγεῖον ἢ κάτοπτρον εἰκόνας καὶ εἴδωλα τῶν ἐν σαρκὶ γινομένων αἰσθήσεων ἀναδεχομένην.

13B1-2 κρονέλπρος καὶ σαρδαίμων ἐστι: 'He's an old twaddler with one foot already in the grave' (Babbitt). Both adjectives belong to the language of comedy (see CAF Com. Adesp. 1392 for Kock's reconstruction of a comic fragment from 13A9-B3). -- For κρονόλπρος cf. Com. Adesp. 1052, from Pollux II 16 τὰ κωμικὰ σκώμματα (γερόντων); under this same heading in Pollux come also Κρόνος, κρονικός, πρεσβύτερος Κρόνου, which explain the first half of the compound (and cf. e.g. Ar. Nu. 929; Com. Adesp. 510, where a father imagines his son wishing ἀπαλλαγείην τοῦ Κρόνου τούτου ποτέ). -- For σαρδαίμων cf. Com Adesp. 1151 with the explanation ὁ ἄξιος ἐν σορῷ δαίμων εἶναι δι' ὑπερβολὴν γήρως. Cf. Com. Adesp. 1172 τυμβογέρων, and similar uncomplimentary terms for old men in Latin: 'sepulcrum' Plaut. Ps. 412; 'capuli decus' As. 892; 'capularis' Mil. 628; 'silicernius' Ter. Ad. 587.

13B2-3 καὶ μετέωρον αὐτὸν ἀράμενοι τὴν τακίστην ἐξοίσομεν: This evidently amplifies σαρδαίμων: 'and before long we'll take his coffin on our shoulders and carry him out' (Babbitt). -- For ἐκφέρω, the regular term for carrying a corpse out for burial, see LSJ s.v. I 2. -- τὴν τακίστην (sc. ὁδόν, X. An. I 2.20; Lucian 41.4; for the ellipsis with a feminine adjective see Rehdantz-Blass s.v. 'Ellipse', pp.68-69) means 'by the quickest route', and thus sometimes 'as soon as possible' (e.g. X. An. III 3.16); see LSJ s.v. ταχύς C II 3, and add to the references there D. 1.2; D. Chr. 36.25; Plut. Agesil. 38.5, Aristid. 8.3, 9.5, Artox. 7.3, Cato maior 22.7, Eum. 9.8, Marius 36.5, 41.3, Nic. 22.1, Solon 8.4, Them. 7.5, 16.4, Timol. 11.2.

13B3 καθῆκε δέ τις καὶ χαμαιτύπην: καθίημι has here a late sense, 'employ, suborn'; cf. e.g. Plut. Per. 7.7 τὰλλα φίλους καὶ

ῥήτορας ἑτέρους καθιεὶς ἔπραττεν , LSJ s.v. I 1, Lampe s.v. A 1. (Dyroff p.292 n.2 misunderstands the word). The flatterer uses subordinates to consolidate his hold over the young man. -- On χαμαιτύπη see 5B6 and note.

13B3-4 καὶ προαγώγευε γαμετήν : 'or prostitutes a married woman for him' (Babbitt). But possibly γαμετή = 'his own wife' (an even more advanced stage of depravity), cf. Plut. Am. 759F πολλοὶ .. ἀφροδισίων ἑτέρεις ἐκεινώσησαν , οὐ μόνον ἑταίρας ἀλλὰ καὶ γαμετὰς προαγωγεύοντες .

13B4-5 καὶ τὰ τῶν πατέρων ἐφόδια τοῦ γήρως ἐσύλησε καὶ περιέκοψε : by encouraging their sons to be extravagant. The passage conjures up many a situation in comedy (and cf. also e.g. Plut. De cup. div. 526E). For ἐφόδια τοῦ γήρως cf. e.g. Ath. IV 168C (young men ἐν νεότητι τὰ τοῦ γήρως ἐφόδια κατανα λίσκοντες) and 8C6 ἐφόδιον εἰς τὸ γῆρας and note. -- For περικόπτω = 'plunder' cf. e.g. D. 9.22 περικόπτειν καὶ λυποδυτεῖν, D.C. LV 16.4 and see LSJ s.v. 2, Arndt-Gingrich s.v. 2, Lampe s.v. 6.

13B5-C3 -- Flatterers are a disgusting breed, fawning on their victims and falling in with their moods in a nauseating and slavish manner. Any parent who cares about his son's upbringing will get rid of these creatures. -- In this section P reaches a climax of indignant denunciation. 13B5-C1 is really all one sentence, a long one by P's usual standards, comprising one verbal thrust after another against the detested flatterer.

13B5 μικρὸν τὸ φῦλον : Cf. n. on γένος above 13A2, Pl. Plt. 260D κηρυκικὸν φῦλον.

13B5-6 ἄγευστοι παρρησίας : The flatterer resigns the right to speak his mind when he undertakes to praise whatever his patron does, regardless of what he really thinks of it. (On παρρησία see 1B6 n.: it is a privilege of the free, and the flatterer has voluntarily abandoned the dignity of a free man:

13B9-10). ἄγευστος (for the metaphor see Dronkers p.14) is frequently found with nouns of like meaning to παρρησία : e.g. Pl. R IX 576A ἐλευθερίας .. καὶ φιλίας ἀληθοῦς τυραννικὴ φύσις ἀεὶ ἄγευστος ; Lucian 8.15 ἄγευστος μὲν ἐλευθερίας , ἄπειρατος δὲ παρρησίας ; [Longinus] 44.3 ἄγευστοι καλλίστου καὶ γενικωτάτου λόγων νάματος, τὴν ἐλευθερίαν .. λέγω. Similar metaphorical uses of the adjective: D. Chr. 33.7; Plut. 36D, 1091E; M.Ant. IX 2.

13B6 πλουσίων μὲν κόλακες, πενήτων δ' ὑπερόπται : Only the rich attracted flatterers, for obvious reasons; cf. Pl. Lg. V 729A.

13B6-7 ὡς ἐκ †λυρικῆς τέχνης ἐπὶ τοὺς νέους ἀγόμενοι : This is the most emended crux in the work. Its solution is made more difficult by the fact that although the corruption seems likeliest to be located in the adjective which qualifies τέχνης, the meaning of ἀγόμενοι is by no means clear either. There is thus no firm standpoint from which to work. Neither of the two meanings which Wyttenbach recognises for ἀγόμενοι looks convincing: (i) = ἀναγόμενοι , 'provehentes se contra adolescentes, oppugnantes eos', and (ii) 'instituentes se' (cf. ἀγωγή). It ought therefore perhaps to be considered whether the word is sound. Kronenberg (anticipated by C. Wolf, see Heusinger ad loc.) proposes to read ὡς ἐκ λυρικῆς τέχνης [ἐπὶ] τοὺς νέους ⟨ἐπ⟩αγόμενοι which makes better sense of the participle (he compares Plut. De ad. et am. 52B ὁ δὲ κόλαξ αὐτὸς ἑτέρους ἐπάγεται καὶ παλαίει, De aud. 46E κολάκων .. ἡδείας .. φωνὰς καταδόντων); but the reference he thinks λυρικῆς contains, to the fascination of music like that of Orpheus and Amphion, is surely too obscure as the text stands, and unlikely to suggest itself naturally to the reader. Most other scholars have concentrated on the search for a word to replace λυρικῆς. - κός is a very common adjectival ending, so that there are countless possibilities, some more likely than others. Wyttenbach suggested λογικῆς ('veluti rationali quadam arte ad adolescentes decipiendos instructi'), but his list of references

for the phrase λογικὴ τέχνη fails to provide the explanation why this particular art should best equip the flatterer. (He has however an interesting collection of passages where the flatterer is described as plying his trade with τέχνη in his note on De ad. et am. 50C: Isoc. Ad Nic. 28; D. Chr. 78.35.) Tucker idiosyncratically wanted to read νευροσπαστικῆς or νευρικῆς (in equivalent senses); he translates 'they are drawn to young men like puppets on a string'. This is an attempt to cope with ἀγόμενοι, but leaves τέχνη rather out of the picture. Richards suggested αὐλικῆς, the art of the courtier, which would square nicely with σεσηρότες κτλ. immediately following. Sizoo proposed ληρικῆς (which Bock supported); the adjective seems not to be attested, but would presumably mean 'the art of talking humbug'. Finally, Castiglioni conjectures δουλικῆς, again a good description of the flatterer's behaviour as subsequently described, though the adjective consorts a little oddly with τέχνη. If none of these remedial attempts convinces it may be partly because the nature of the case precludes certainty; and the possibility must be borne in mind that the corruption which has created the crux extends beyond one word.

13B7 σεσηρότες ὅθ' οἱ τρέφοντες γελῶσιν ἐκ φυκῆς: The readiness of the flatterer to fall in with and mirror his patron's every mood is a common observation: cf. e.g Plut. De ad. et am. 52B ff.; Juvenal 3.100-108; and for laughter in particular cf. Thphr. Char. 2.4 καὶ σκώψαντι ψυχρῶς ἐπιγελάσαι τό τε ἱμάτιον ὠσαι εἰς τὸ στόμα ὡς δὴ οὐ δυνάμενος κατασχεῖν τὸν γέλωτα, Juv. 3.100-101 'rides, maiore cachinno / concutitur' (and cf. Mayor's n.). Such behaviour might be condoned in a slave (Plaut. Amph. 959-961) or a lover enslaved by passion (Ov. AA II 198-202), but in a free man (cf. 13B9-10) it could only be disgusting. -- On

σκίρρω see Gow on Theoc. 7.19, Schmind, Synonymik 169.6 (IV pp.194-195). The word is an unpleasant one, implying 'malice, contempt, or mockery' (Gow) -- or, as here, insincerity, cf. e.g. M.Ant. XI 18.4 τὸ ὠμενὲς ἀνίκητον, ἐὰν μησίον ἢ καὶ μὴ σεσηρὸς μηδὲ ὑπόκρισις (with Gataker's n. on I 15.2), Max. Tyr. 14.1 Hobein (the κόλαξ) σεσηρώς, ὀρέγων δεξιάν, 35.7 κολάκων ἔσμοὶ καὶ θίασοι, σεσηρότων καὶ σαινόντων. -- ἐκ ψυχῆς is Paton's conjecture for the καὶ ψυχῆς of the mss. which produces καὶ ψυχῆς ὑποβολιμαίας or καὶ ψυχῆς ὑποβολιμαίας καὶ νόθα μέρη βίου (with μέρη understood ἀπὸ κοινοῦ with both adjectives), neither of which yields any adequate sense ('they counterfeit the possession of a mind' (Tucker); 'spurious claimants to any spirit' (Babbitt); both unconvincing). For ἐκ ψυχῆς cf. e.g. J. AJ XVII 177; Ephesians 6.6; Colossians 3.23; it contrasts the sincerity of the patron's laughter with the flatterer's feigned amusement.

13B8 ὑποβολιμαῖα καὶ νόθα μέρη βίου : (?) 'spurious and counterfeit members of society'. A difficult phrase. Wyttenbach (following Heusinger) offers a key to it when he states that βίος here must mean 'genus humanum' (LSJ s.v. III), like Latin 'vita' (LS s.v. II E). Herwerden, Mnem. 18 (1890) p.368, compares De aud. 43F ἐν τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς τοῦ βίου μέρεσι ('the real pursuits of life' - Babbitt), but this is of doubtful help for the present passage. -- On ὑποβολιμαῖος see 3C5-6 n.

13B9 πρὸς .. τὸ τῶν πλουσίων νεῦμα ζῶντες : Cf. e.g. Epict. Diss. IV 1.145 πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου νεῦμα καὶ κίνημα ζῶντες, III 24.34 πρὸς νεῦμα τοῦ στρατηγοῦ πράσσειν ἕκαστα ; Plb. V 26.13; cf. Latin 'nutus', OLD s.v. 2 b.

13B9-10 τῇ τύχῃ μὲν ἐλεύθερος, τῇ προαιρέσει δὲ δοῦλος : Fortune has given the flatterer his liberty, but he has voluntarily abandoned his rights as a free man (13B5-6 ἄγευστος παρρησίας).

13B10-C1 ὅταν δὲ μὴ ὑβρίζωνται, τοῦθ' ὑβρίζεσθαι δοκοῦντες, ὅτι μάτην παρατρέφονται: A rather forced conceit: 'Whenever they

are not treated with insult, they feel themselves insulted because they do not fulfil the purpose for which they are kept' (Babbitt). For the flatterer's happy tolerance of insult (another servile characteristic) see De ad. et am. 64E. -- παρατρέφεσθαι suggests a parasite rather than a flatterer (see 12F8-13C5 n., and cf. 13B7-8 οἱ τρέφοντες). It means 'to be kept, maintained, fed at someone else's expense'. Cf. e.g. D. 19.200 ἐν χορηγίοις ἀλλοτρίοις ... παρατρεφόμενον ; Men. fr. 207 Körte, cf. fr. 755; Plut. Artox. 4.2 (mercenaries, cf. Aem. Paul. 12.8), 27.2 (concubines); 980D (the symbiotic relationship of the τροχίλος with the crocodile); Lib. Decl. 32.6 ὥσπερ κηφῆνες ζῶντες ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων πόνων παρατρεφόμενοι .

13C1-2 εἰ τῇ μέλει : see note on 2C3.

13C2-3 τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα βρέμματα: For the disparaging sense of βρέμμα see Jebb on S. El. 622, and cf. e.g. D. Chr. 77.4. Kock (CAF Com. Adesp. 214) reconstructs a comic trimeter from this passage.

13C3-5 -- Undesirable class-mates are another bad influence which ought to be eliminated. -- For the corrupting influence of class-mates cf. Varro Logistoricus de lib. educ. fr. 24 Müller 'Et ut in grege opilio oves minus idoneas removere solet, quas reiculas appellant. Saepe enim unus puer petulans atque inpurus inquinat gregem puerorum'; Tac. Dial. 35.2 'deducuntur in scholas, in quibus non facile dixerim utrumne locus ipse an condiscipuli an genus studiorum plus mali ingeniis adferant'. There was in Quintilian's day a body of opinion against education in schools because of the dangers of bad company: see his discussion, I 2.1-8, and cf. Pliny Ep. III 3.3 'praeceptores domi habuit, ubi est erroribus modica vel etiam nulla materia'.

13C3-4 συμφοιτητῶν : For συμφοιτητής as the Attic alternative to ωεκσλάστης see Phrynichus 378.

13C4-5 καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι τὰς ἐπιεικεστάτας φύσεις ἱκανοὶ διαφθεῖραι εἰσί : Cf. Isoc. Areop. 47 παρὰ τούτοις .. διαφθείρεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἐπιεικεῖς τῶν φύσεων.

(18) 13C6-E9: Parental tolerance

Chapter 18 is a plea for understanding and leniency on the part of fathers in dealing with their sons' faults.

13C6-D9 Fathers should not be invariably stern and forbidding, but should often forgive less serious misdemeanours, remembering that they were once young themselves. Like physicians who mix sweet juices with their bitter medicines, they should temper severity with mildness, alternating strict control and indulgence. Ideally they should be tolerant of faults; failing that, they should at least be quick to lose their anger rather than of a brooding disposition.

13D9-E9 Sometimes fathers should turn a blind eye and a deaf ear to their sons' doings and pretend not to be aware of what is happening. They should tolerate sons' faults as they tolerate friends', overlook their drunkenness as they would that of slaves, be generous sometimes and forgiving, pardon their trickery, their drinking, their use of perfumes. This is how the frivolity of youth is tamed.

P exhibits the sympathetic side of himself again in this chapter, as he has before at 8E9-9A9 on the subject of punishments and at 9A10-9B9 on the need to protect children from the pressures imposed by ambitious parents. Chapter 18 provides a counterbalance to the sterner view of youthful misdeneanours and the call for parental vigilance at Chapters 16 and 17. There is no necessary contradiction between what P says there and the message of the present chapter; it is just that, as P declares here (13D2-5), fathers must know when to be stern and when to be lenient, and it is essentially the degree of seriousness of the

fault that determines which attitude should be taken.

On this chapter see Glaeser pp.72-74.

13C6-D9 -- Fathers should not be invariably stern and forbidding, but should often forgive less serious misdemeanours, remembering that they were once young themselves. Like physicians who mix sweet juices with their bitter medicines, tney should temper severity with mildness, alternating strict control and indulgence. Ideally they should be tolerant of faults; failing that, they should at least be quick to lose their anger rather than of a brooding disposition. -- Exhortations to fathers not to deal harshly with their sons are not uncommon: see e.g. Men. Mon. 635 πρὸς υἱὸν ὀργὴν οὐκ ἔχει χρηστὸς πατήρ ; Ps.-Phoc. 207 πατρὶν μὴ χαλέπαινε τέοις' , ἀλλ' ἤπιος εἶης (with Van der Horst's n., pp.247-248; and cf. Ep.Eph. 6.4 μὴ παροργίζετε τὰ τέκνα ὑμῶν , ἀλλ' ἐκτρέφετε αὐτὰ ἐν παιδείᾳ καὶ νουθεσίᾳ κυρίου ; Ep.Col. 3.21 οἱ πατέρες , μὴ ἐρεθίζετε τὰ τέκνα ὑμῶν (though the last two passages are strictly injunctions not to anger children).

13C6-7 ἃ δὲ μέλλω λέγειν, ἀνθρώπινα : In the context of a contrast with καλὰ καὶ συμφέροντα the adjective means 'human' in the sense of 'taking into account the frailties and imperfections of human nature', perhaps almost 'humane' (cf. Lampe s.v. C). Almqvist (p.86 no. 160) compares Ep.Rom. 6.19 ἀνθρώπινον λέγω διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκὸς ὑμῶν.

13C8 τραχεῖς καὶ σκληροὺς .. τὴν φύσιν : a good instance of a context where it would make nonsense to translate τὴν φύσιν 'by nature' (cf. Dover, Greek Popular Morality pp.92-93).

13C9 συγχωρῆσαί τινα τῶν πρώτερων ἁμαρτημάτων: The mss. have προτέρων , which looks as if it might stand (cf. e.g. II Clement 13.1 ἐξαλείψωμεν ἀφ' ἡμῶν τὰ πρότερα ἁμαρτήματα), but

Wilamowitz's ingenious emendation produces a distincly superior sense. The corrected text explains how P reconciles his previous strictures on juvenile misbehaviour (e.g. 5A8-C5, 12B4-D2) with his present indulgence: it is a matter of degree. Children are not to be harshly treated for small offences.

13C9-10 καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀναμιμνήσκειν ὅτι ἐγένοντο νέοι : There is an identical exhortation in Pliny Ep. IX 12.2, also urging humanity in a father's dealings with his son: 'cogita et illum puerum esse et te fuisse'. Cf. also Ter. Heaut. 213-222 and Catonis Disticha I 16 (p.52 Boas) 'multorum cum facta senex et dicta reprendas, / fac tibi succurrant iuvenis quae feceris ipse'.

13C10-D2 καὶ καθάπερ ἰατροὶ τὰ πικρὰ τῶν φαρμάκων τοῖς γλυκέσι χυμοῖς κατακιρνῶντες τὴν τέρψιν ἐπὶ τὸ ωφέλιμον πάροδον εὗρον : The unusually long and elaborate period from here to ἀποφλεγμῆναι at 13D7 is analysed by Montesi, SIFC 20 (1913) p.22. -- For the theme of sweetening the draught cf. Pl. Lg. II 659E (the context is the education of children): ... καθάπερ τοῖς κάμνουσιν τε καὶ ἀσθενῶς ἔχουσιν τὰ σώματα ἐν ἡδέσι τισὶν σιτίοις καὶ πώμασι τὴν χρηστὴν πειρῶντες τροφὴν προσφέρειν οἷς μέλει τούτων; Lucretius I 936-938 (cf. IV 11-13); D. Chr. 33.10; Quint. III 1.5; Jul. Caes. 13 (= 314C); Auson. Ep. 2; Them. 5 63B (quoted below), 24 302B; and on the bitterness of medicines Ov. AA II 335; Plut. Conj.praec. 141F, De garrul. 509C, Brut.rat. 986D. -- For τὴν τέρψιν ἐπὶ τὸ ωφέλιμον πάροδον εὗρον cf. Them. 5 63B νόμος γὰρ οὗτος φιλοσοφίας ... ἅπαντα χοῦ ... τῷ κεκραμένῳ τὸ ωφέλιμον κατακιγνύναι, ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἡπιώτεροι τὰ φάρμακα πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐπικρύπτοντες τοῖς ἡδύσμασιν. -- Note the triple homoeoteleuton.

13D2-3 οὕτω δεῖ τοὺς πατέρας τὴν τῶν ἐπιτιμημάτων ἀποτομίαν

τῇ πρᾳότητι μιγνύναι : For ἀποτομία in the late sense of 'severity' see Arndt-Gingrich s.v. (citing e.g. D.S. XII 16.3; D.H. VIII 61.2; Demetr. Eloc. 292; Philo 29.94, 37.95; Ep.Rom. 11.22) and G.M.A. Grube, A Greek critic: Demetrius on style (Toronto 1961) p.147.

13D3-5 καὶ τοτὲ μὲν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν παίδων ἐφεῖναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας, τοτὲ δ' αὖ πάλιν ἀντιτεῖναι : For the metaphor cf. e.g. Pl. Prt. 358A ἐφεῖναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας τοῖς λόγοις, and on other horse metaphors for the control of youth see 12B9-10n. -- The ἐπιθυμίαι of youths are frequently mentioned: cf. e.g. X. Lac. 3.2 (quoted at 12A10-B1n.), Isoc. 7.43, Plut. De aud. 37C, Iamb. VP 202.

13D6-7 προσοργισθέντας ταχέως ἀποφλεγμῆναι: For προσοργίζομαι (a rare compound in which the prepositional prefix seems to have no particular force) cf. e.g. J. BJ III 1, II 295 (v.l.). -- ἀποφλεγμαίνειν is elsewhere found only in medical writers of the subsidence of inflammation (Hp. Aph. 6.49; Galen XIX p.423 Kühn); Heumann compares Livy XL 8.9 'deflagrare iras' (and see OLD s.v. 'deflagro' 3).

13D7-8 μᾶλλον γὰρ ὀξύθυμον εἶναι δεῖ τὸν πατέρα ἢ βαρύθυμον: The contrast is the familiar one between the type of anger which flares up suddenly and dies away as quickly, and the sort which, though less uncontrolled, remains in the mind of the offended party as a brooding grudge. For ὀξύθυμος cf. e.g. Plut. Quaest. conv. 618F; for βαρύθυμος cf. e.g. Philo 6.32; Plut. Alex. 9.5, Artox. 6.8, M.Cato 26.3.

13D8-9 ὡς τὸ γε δυσμενὲς καὶ δυσκατάλλακτον μισοτεκνίας οὐ μικρὸν τεκμήριον ἐστι : Cf. 7B6-8 τὸν μονόκωλον λόγον.. χρονίας οὐ μικρὸν ποιοῦμαι τεκμήριον. For δυσκατάλλακτον cf. Ath. XIV

625B (apparently the only other instance of the word); on μισοτεκνίᾳ see 4E7-8n.

13D9-E9 -- Sometimes fathers should turn a blind eye and a deaf ear to their sons' doings and pretend not to be aware of what is happening. They should tolerate sons' faults as they tolerate friends', overlook their drunkenness as they would that of slaves, be generous sometimes and forgiving, pardon their trickery, their drinking, their use of perfume. This is how the frivolity of youth is tamed. -- This section is remarkable for the lively passage of short, sharp sentences in parataxis at 13E3-9, where P addresses his audience directly from 13E4 onwards. Many of the situations which he imagines in these lines are familiar from comedy.

13D9-10 καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἔνια τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων μηδ' εἰδέναι δοκεῖν : Cf. D. 25.58 οὕτω τοῦθ' ὁρῶσιν ὥστε μὴ δοκεῖν ἑωρακέναι ; E. Hipp. 119 μὴ δόκει τούτου κλύειν , with Barrett's n., which compares Hipp. 463 μὴ δοκεῖν ὁρᾶν , Med. 67 οὐ δοκῶν κλύειν; Ar. Eq. 1146 οὐδὲ δοκῶν ὁρᾶν, Pl. 837 κοὐκ ἐδόκουν ὁρᾶν μ' ἔτι .

13D10-E1 ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ γήρως ἀμβλυῶττον καὶ δύσκωφον ἐπὶ τὰ γινόμενα μεταφέρειν: For the verb ἀμβλυώττειν meaning 'to be short-sighted' cf. e.g. Pl. R. VI 508C, D, VII 516E, 517D, Hp.mi. 374D; Plut. De soll.an. 963B, 974B, 979E, Adv.Col. 1120E.

13E1-2 ὡς ἔνια τῶν πραττομένων ὁρῶντας μὴ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούοντας μὴ ἀκούειν: This is a proverbial expression for turning a blind eye and a deaf ear. Similarity of context suggests that P is recalling [D.] 25.88-89 τὸ τῆς πατρωνίας, ὁρῶντας μὴ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούοντας μὴ ἀκουεῖν, where the writer is comparing Athens to a household containing two adult generations, the older living in benevolent toleration of the younger. The Demosthenic passage is

recalled by Plut. Praec. ger. reip. 818B ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ νέων ἁμαρτήματα προσποιούμενον παρορᾶν καὶ παρακούειν. Cf. H.Merc. 92-93 καί τε ἰδὼν μὴ ἰδὼν ἔην καὶ κωφὸς ἀκούσας / καὶ σιγᾶν, ὅτε μή τι κατὰ βλάπτῃ τὸ σὸν κῶτον ; Philo 37.40 προσποιούμενος ἅ τε εὖρε μὴ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὧν ἤκουε μὴ ἀκούειν, 38.132; Aristides II p.246 Dind. μήτ' ἀκούοντας ἀκούειν τὰ δεινὰ μήθ' ὁρῶντας ὁρᾶν ; Lib. Or. 47.6 τῶν φυλάκων τῆς χώρας κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν τοὺς τοιούτους ὁρώντων καὶ οὐκ ὁρώντων; Plut. Lys. 27.6 μηθ' ὁρᾶν τινα Θηβαῖον μητ' ἀκούειν. The same type of phrase is used also of a failure to pay attention which is not deliberate, but culpable: A. Ag. 1623 οὐκ ὄρνις ὁρῶν τάδε ; (on which see Stromberg, Greek Proverbs p.15 and notes there), PV 447-448 βλέποντες ἔβλεπον μάτην, / κλύοντες οὐκ ἤκουον ; S. OT 413, fr. 837 N (=923 P); Plb. XII 24.6 πάροντας τρόπον τινὰ μὴ παρεῖναι καὶ βλέποντας μὴ βλέπειν ; Matthew 8.13 βλέποντες οὐ βλέπουσιν καὶ ἀκούοντες οὐκ ἀκούουσιν οὐδὲ συνιοῦσιν (cf. Mark 8.18); Philo 3.69, 4.183. Cf. Plut. Cor. 38.4. -- For ὡς with the infinitive instead of ὥστε see 8C7-8n.

13E3 φίλων ἁμαρτήματα φέρομεν· τί θαυμαστὸν εἰ τέκνων; Cf. Hor. Sat. I 3.43-44, arguing the other way round: 'at pater ut gnati sic nos debemus amici / si quod sit vitium non fastidire'.

13E3-4 δούλων πολλάκις κραιπαλώντων μέθην οὐκ ἐξελέγξαμεν: Here the inference, though suppressed, is easy enough to supply: ' .. so why should we censure it in our sons?' κραιπαλᾶν means to revel, to be drunk or to have a hangover, any of which meanings would do here. The word is a hapax in Plato (Smp. 176D) and Aristophanes (Pl. 298); Plb. XV 33.2; Plut. 126D, 128D, 652E, 975C (quoted below, 13E7 n.), 1016A, 1123F, Ant. 9.5, Dem. 7.2; Hdn. II 1.2. -- For ἐξελέγχω of censuring people's shortcomings cf. e.g. Plut. De tu.san. 131C ὥστ' οὐδὲν ἐξελεγχομένου πικρῶς

παντὸς ἁμαρτήματος, and see Wyttenbach on De tu.san. 137C.

13E4-8 ἐφείσω ποτέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ χορήγησον· etc.: Cf. for both sense and structure Ter. Ad. 117-121 (an indulgent father speaks of his son): 'opsonat, potat, olet unguenta: de meo; / amat: dabitur a me argentum dum erit commodum; / ubi non erit fortasse excludetur foras. / fores effregit: restituentur; discidit / vestem: resarcietur ...' -- For this type of rhetorical parataxis see Mayor on Juv. III.100, K-G II pp.233-234 with a collection of parallels. Examples are found in the forensic orators (e.g. D. 18.274 ἀδικεῖ τις ἑκών· ὀργὴν καὶ τιμωρίαν κατὰ τούτου. ἐξήμαρτε τις ἄκων· συγγνώμην ἀντὶ τῆς τιμωρίας τούτῳ, and cf. 117,198), but the lively and emphatic impression achieved by this syntactical device makes it at home in works of popular philosophy too: cf. e.g. Epict. Ench. 11 τὸ παιδίον ἀπέθανεν; ἀπεδόθη· ἡ γύνη ἀπέθανεν; ἀπεδόθη· 'τὸ χωρίον ἀφηρέθην.' οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦτο ἀπεδόθη; Plut. De tranq.an.467D-E. (As the punctuation of this last example shows, the 'protasis' can usually be interpreted as a question in this sort of sentence. For arguments against understanding it so, see K-G II p.234 n.) -- For χορήγησον see note on 3C8.

13E6 ἐβουκόλησε ποτε δι' οἰκέτου : 'He tricked you once through a slave'. The passage recalls innumerable scenes from comedy in which young men hoodwink their fathers with the aid of a resourceful slave. -- For this meaning of βουκολεῖν (LSJ s.v. II) cf. e.g. Men. Sam. 530, 596 Austin, Sandbach (596 = 251 Körte); J. BJ VII 380; SVF III 548; Athenagoras Περὶ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν 13; Aristaenet. I 5; Alciphr. III 2.3 Schepers (otherwise III 5.3); Porph. Marc. 6; (rejected in this sense at A. Ag. 669 and Ar. Ec. 81 by Fraenkel and Ussher respectively); see also Gow on Theoc. 11.80. -- If the lack of an object is felt intolerable, one can

easily write ἐβουκόλησε ⟨σε⟩ with Heusinger.

13E6 κατάσχες : This, and not the variant κάτασχε found in a large number of mss. is the correct form of the imperative: see K-B II p.434.

13E6-7 ἐξ ἀγροῦ ποτε ζεῦγος ἀφείλετο : ζεῦγος here will be a pair of animals for ploughing (LSJ s.v. I.1). The young man's motive for taking them can only be guessed at: perhaps to draw a carriage on some pleasure-trip?

13E7 ἦλθε ποτε χθιζὸς μέθης ἀποπνέων : For the adjective cf. e.g. V. E. 6.15 'inflatum hesterno venas, ut semper, Iaccho'; Mart. I 28 'hesterno fetere mero quis credat Acerram / fallitur', 87.1 'ne gravis hesterno fragres, Fescennia, vino'; Plut. De soll. an. 975C κρωπαλῶσι γὰρ ἔτι τὸ χθιζὸν καὶ βεβαπτισμένοις νήφων, ὡς ὁρᾷς, ὁ γεννάδας ἐκ παρασκευῆς ἐπιτεθείται. See Phrynichus 295 for strictures on χθιζός as a poetic word, and χθεσινός as the correct alternative to it. Plutarch has χθιζός again at 75E, 696E.

13E8 μύρων ὄζων : On the use of perfumes in antiquity see Hug in RE s.v. 'Salben'. The wearing of perfume by men was regarded in some quarters as effeminate (references collected by H. Herter in RAC s.v. 'Effeminatus' c.634; add X. Smp. 2.3; Zeno SVF I 318); its use by a young man (cf. Ter. Ad. 117, quoted above 13E4-8 n.) might indicate involvement in a love-affair (see Nisbet and Hubbard on Hor. Od. I 5.2), participation in revelry (Hug c.1855.31 ff.), or perhaps that he had been idling in a perfume shop with other indolent young men of a similar disposition (Hug c.1860.20 ff.).

13E8-9 οὕτω σκιρτῶσα νεότης πωλοδαμνεῖται : For σκιρτᾶν, meaning 'to frisk', cf. e.g. Pl. Lg. II 653E, IV 716B, R. IX 571C, Phdr. 254A; Luke 6.23; D.Chr. 19.3; Arndt-Gingrich and Lampe s.v.;

and σκιρτητικόν at 12B9 with note. For πωλοδαμνεῖν see 2E9-10n., and with the present passage cf. Lucian 49.45 βραχὺ τὴν νεότητα πωλοδαμνήσας. On horse metaphors for the control of the young see 12B9-10n.

(19) 13E10-14A2: Marriage.

The topic of marriage arises for P not as the logical next step in the chronological progression, but as an expedient for controlling unruly and disobedient sons.

13E10-F2 Sons who cannot resist pleasures and are deaf to admonition should be subjected to the yoke of marriage, which is the safest restraint for the young.

13F2-14A2 They should not, however, be married much above their own station or fortune, since it is wise, as the saying goes, to stick to your own kind. Those who marry above themselves become not husbands but slaves to the dowry.

P incorporates in this short chapter two thoughts which have the status of pieces of conventional wisdom: the settling effect of marriage on irresponsible young men and the error of marrying above oneself. Both are presented with the minimum of elaboration.

13E10-F2 -- Sons who cannot resist pleasures and are deaf to admonition should be subjected to the yoke of marriage, which is the safest restraint for the young. -- For early marriage as a means of subduing youthful excesses cf. e.g. Apuleius Met. VI 23 'tollenda est omnis occasio et luxuria puerilis nuptialibus pedicis alliganda'; Hdn. III 10.5 (Septimius Severus) ἠγάγετο .. τῷ (his son, Caracalla) γυναῖκα, γάμῳ σωφρονίσαι θέλων; Ach. Tat. I 8.1 "Γάμον" εἶπεν, "ἤδη σοι δίδωσιν ὁ πατήρ; τί γὰρ ἠδίκησας, ἵνα καὶ παιδαγωγῆς;"

13E10-F1 πειρατέον δὲ τοὺς τῶν ἡδονῶν ἵππους καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἐπιτιμήσεις δυσηκόους γάμῳ κατασχεῖν: Cf. 8A9-B1n. for sentences beginning with πειρατέον. -- For τοὺς τῶν ἡδονῶν ἵππους cf. e.g.

Thuc. III 38.7; Lys. 21.19; Pl. Clit. 407D, Prt. 354E, 355D, 357E. -- For γάμῳ κατεζεῦχθαι cf. e.g. Ael. VH IV 1 (p.61.4 Hercher), where κατεζευχθείσας means 'married'. The simple verb is also used in this sense, frequently for example in Euripides with γάμοις or γάμοισι: Ba. 468, El. 98-99, Hel. 1654, Ion 10, 949, IA 907, Phoen. 337-338, 1365-66.

13F1-2 δεσμὸς γὰρ οὗτος τῆς νεότητος ἀσφαλέστατος : Cf. 12B8 δεσμεύειν καὶ κατέχειν . For the metaphor cf. Apuleius ('nuptialibus pedicis alliganda') and Ach. Tat. (ἵνα καὶ πεδηθῇς) quoted above 13E10-F2 n., Arnobius Adv. nat. V 13 'Si Midas rex offenderat, qui uxore adulescentulum vinciebat ..' -- See Com. Adesp. 215 for Kock's attempted reconstruction of a comic fragment from this passage.

13F2-14A2 -- They should not, however, be married much above their own station or fortune, since it is wise, as the saying goes, to stick to your own kind. Those who marry above themselves become not husbands but slaves to the dowry. -- The desirability of marrying on one's own level is a very common idea in ancient writers, both Greek and Roman, the uxor dotata being a special object of aversion. See the useful collection of passages in Diggle's commentary on Euripides' Phaethon 158-159 (= fr. 775). He quotes A. PV 890-893; E. Andr. 1279-82 (cf. 152f.), fr. 464 (= El. 1097-99), fr. 502; Pl. Lg. VI 774C; Arist. Pol. II 1270a; Anaxandr. fr. 52.4-6; Antiph. fr. 329; Men. Epit. 8-11; the present passage; Plaut. Asin. 87, Aul. 475-535, Men. 766 ff.; Juv. VI 136-141. To these one might add Cleobulus VS 10κ.18; Chilon VS 10α.6; E. fr. 214; Men. fr. 333, 334, 579; Ov. Her. 9.32; Plut. Amat. 752E-753A; [Aus.] Sap. 5.2. Cf. Strömberg, Greek Proverbs pp.17-18.

13F3-4 τὸ γὰρ 'τὴν κατὰ σαυτὸν ἕλκε' σοφόν: For this

celebrated proverb see Callimachus Epigr. 1.12, 16 = AP VII 89, Gow and Page Hellenistic Epigrams I pp.70-71 with commentary II pp.205-207. The poem tells how a man came to the sage Pittacus of Mytilene to ask which of two possible wives he should take, one of his own standing or a social superior. Pittacus told him that his answer would come from some boys who were playing with whipping tops nearby. Standing near them, he heard them say 'τὴν κατὰ σαυτὸν ἔλα' ('whip your own top' or 'keep to your own course'). He took the message to heart and married the woman of his own station. See also Souda and Photius s.v. τὴν κατὰ σαυτὸν ἔλα, Diogenianus VIII 46 (CPG I p.314) and Apostolius XVI 55 (CPG II p.674) with notes, schol. on A. PV 887ff.; and cf. T. Sinko 'Ad Callimachi epigramma I (de uxore eligenda)', Eos 20 (1914-15) pp.5-12; Wilamowitz, Hellenistische Dichtung (Berlin 1924) pp.179-180. -- For commentary on τὴν κατὰ σαυτὸν ἔλα see Gow and Page II p.206. With τήν in the original boys' cry is understood βέμβικα ('top') or ὁδόν, or the feminine article may just be used absolutely with no specific noun understood at all (cf. Wyttenbach ad loc., Gow and Page loc. cit., Rehdantz and Blass loc. cit. 13B2-3n.).

13F4-5 οἱ .. μακρῷ κρείττους ἑαυτῶν λαμβάνοντες: For κρείττων in the sense of 'socially superior, of higher standing' cf. e.g. Cleobulus VS 10.κ.18 γαμεῖν ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων· ἐὰν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν κρειττόνων, δεσπότας, οὐ συγγενεῖς κτήσῃ; E. fr.502.1 γένει κρείσσους γάμους; Dodds on Pl. Grg. 488C-D. For λαμβάνω meaning 'receive in marriage' see LSJ s.v. II.1c.

13F5-14A2 οὐ τῶν γυναικῶν ἄνδρες, τῶν δὲ προικῶν δοῦλοι λανθάνουσι γινόμενοι: For the slavery endured by the husbands of uxores dotatae cf. e.g. E. fr.502 τὰ τῆς γυναικὸς γὰρ κρατοῦντ' ἐν δώμασιν/ δουλοῖ τὸν ἄνδρα, κοὐκέτ' ἔστ' ἐλεύθερος, fr.775 (=

Phaethon 158-159) ἐλεύθερος δ' ὢν δοῦλος ἐστι τοῦ λέχους, / πεπραμένον τὸ σῶμα τῆς φέρνης ἔχων, Anaxandrides fr.52.4-6 (CAF II p.158) ἡ γὰρ πένης ὢν τὴν γυναῖκα χρήμασι / λαβὼν ἔχει δέσποιναν, οὐ γυναῖκ' ἔτι, / ἧς ἐστι δοῦλος καὶ πένης, Nicostratus ap. Stob. IV 22.102.

(20) 14A3-C7: (a) Parental example and help
(b) Conclusion

Chapter 20 contains P's last thoughts on how fathers can help their children in the right direction. His advice is to set a good example for them to follow, and more generally to do everything possible for their improvement. A short concluding paragraph ends the treatise on a note of caution and realism: complete and perfect application of all P's ideals is an aspiration unlikely of fulfilment, but an attempt can be made to put most of them into practice.

14A3-C3	<u>Parental example and help</u>
14A3-7	Some final advice: fathers should set their children a good example by which to order their lives.
14A7-B3	Fathers who neglect to do so are in no position to criticise their slaves, let alone their sons, and actually thus encourage their children's misdemeanours.
14B3-C3	Parents should do everything possible to improve their children, like Eurydice, whose dedicatory epigram testifies to her care for the education of her children.
14C4-7	<u>Conclusion</u> Perhaps it would be idealistic to hope for the realisation in practice of all the foregoing recommendations, but most of them can be successfully attempted, given good luck and care.

A striking feature of this final chapter is the Eurydice epigram, cited to show a mother's devotion to her children. Maffeo Vegio (I 19) couples Eurydice with her inevitable parallel, the mother of the Gracchi: ' ... a quibus si vel Corneliae Gracchorum matris vel Eurydicis illius Hieropolitanae quamvis barbarae, quae filios et moribus et litteris praeclare instituerunt,

vestigia observarentur, melior certe eas institutionis suae fructus maneret quam qui eisdem etiam sibi verbis pronuntiatur.'

14A3-C7 Parental example and help

14A3-7 -- Some final advice: fathers should set their children a good example by which to order their lives. -- For imitation of the father's example cf. e.g. [Isoc.] Ad Demon. 9 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τὰς τοῦ πατρὸς προαιρέσεις ἀναμνησθεὶς οἰκείων καὶ καλῶν ἕξεις παράδειγμα τῶν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ σοι λεγομένων . -- The imitation of examples is an important idea in P's thinking. Cf. 4B5-6 (the good pedagogue should be like Phoenix); 9A5 (wet-nurses as a model in administering praise); 10E1 (Archytas and Plato to be imitated in their control of anger; cf. 10E6); 11E5-6 (the example of the Socratic circle inclines P to a permissive view of pederasty); 12A1-2 (the amorous conventions of Athens and Sparta to be imitated); 12C5-7 (fathers are to point out to their children examples of misfortune due to pleasure-seeking and fame won by endurance); and finally below, 14B5 (Eurydice as a model of devotion to her children's education).

14A3 βραχέα δὲ προσθεὶς αὐτοῖς περιγράψω τὰς ὑποθήκας : Cf. with Wyttenbach Porph. Abst. II 58 ὀλίγα δ' ἔτι προσθέντες ... τὸ βιβλίον περιγράψομεν , Eus. PE VI 10.49 ἑνὸς δὲ ἔτι μνησθεὶς περιγράψω τὸν λόγον (and intimations in the orators that a speech is about to end: e.g. Isoc. Areop. 77, Hyperides 3.40, 4.4). -- αὐτοῖς has no point of reference and must be replaced or emended. The parallels quoted above suggest that ἔτι , the reading of D alone, may be what P wrote. -- περιγράφω is used in the sense of 'conclude' (LSJ s.v. I.3); cf. the passages above and the formula with which Diodorus ends some of his books (e.g. III, IV, XI) περιγράψομεν τήνδε τὴν βίβλον . -- For ὑποθῆκαι as a description of P's work cf. note on 8D9.

14A6-7 πρὸς τὸν τούτων βίον ὥσπερ κάτοπτρον ἀποβλέποντες: 'by looking at their fathers' lives as at a mirror' (Babbitt). The simile is a strange one in English: we expect the point of a mirror-simile to have something to do with reflection or self-revelation. But the point of comparison in Greek mirror-imagery is sometimes quite different. In 'Das Bildwort vom Spiegel I Korinther 13,12', Reinhold-Seeberg-Festschrift (Leipzig 1929) I pp.315-342, J. Behm identified three main points (pp.328-335). He is followed by J. Dupont Gnosis (Louvain-Paris 1949) pp.121-133, and N. Hugedé La Métaphore du Miroir dans les Épitres de Saint Paul aux Corinthiens (Neuchâtel 1957) pp.97-137. The three main points are: (a) the mirror as a symbol of clarity, (b) the mirror as a means of self-knowledge, and (c) the mirror as presenting a reflection and not the reality. The present passage is plainly an example of type (a): all P means to convey is that fathers must set their sons a clear and unambiguous example (14A5-6 ἐνάργεις ἑαυτοὺς παράδειγμα τοῖς τέκνοις παρέχειν). Cf. especially Ter. Ad. 415-416 'inspicere, tamquam in speculum, in vitas omnium / iubeo atque ex aliis sumere exemplum sibi', Cic. De rep. II 69 '... ut ad imitationem sui vocet alios, ut sese splendore animi et vitae suae sicut speculum praebeat civibus.' Not quite so close are Alcidamas ap. Arist. Rhet. III 1406b12-13 τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον and Cic. Pis. 71 (Piso's verses) 'in quibus, si quis velit, possit istius tamquam in speculo vitam intueri'. For further examples of type (a) mirror imagery see Behm pp.328-329, Dupont pp.121-122, Hugedé pp.97-100. See also Fraenkel on A. Ag. 838-840, Nisbet on Cic. Pis. 71, J.H. Harrop JEA 48 (1962) pp.139-140, Barrett on E. Hipp. 428-430, E. Fantham Comparative Studies in Republican Latin Imagery (Toronto 1972) pp.68-69.

14A7-B3 -- Fathers who neglect to do so are in no position to criticise their slaves, let alone their sons, and actually thus encourage their children's misdemeanours. -- For the thought that those who do not practise what they preach have no moral authority cf. e.g. Cic. Verr. 3.4, Sen. Ep. 108.36, Epict. Diss. III 22.93,98, Plut. De Stoic. rep. 1033A ff., and further refs. Praechter Popularphilosophie p.11 n.3.

14A8-9 τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἁμαρτήμασι περιπίπτουσιν : see 10F6 n.

14A9 ἐπὶ τῷ ἐκείνων ὀνόματι : 'in their sons' name' (Babbitt) -- not an easy phrase to parallel, but cf. e.g. PRein. 44.13-15 (104 A.D.) ἐποίησεν τὰς ὠνὰς ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ υἱοῦ ὀνόματι.

14A10 τὸ δ' ὅλον : cf. 5A2, 5D10.

14A10-11 οὐδὲ τοῖς δούλοις παρρησίαν ἄγουσιν ἐπιτιμᾶν: παρρησίαν ἄγειν means to use one's right of παρρησία , i.e. to speak out frankly (cf. e.g. Plut. De garrul. 506C, D.S. XII 63.2, XIV 66.5, Josephus AJ XIX 138); but the required sense here is that fathers who misbehave do not have the right to admonish their slaves, which is παρρησίαν ἔχειν (Plut. Aem. Paul. 11.3, Agesil. 27.7, Cato minor 35.6, Camill. 39.2, Gracchi 25.6, Tit. Flam. 17.2). It is just possible that ἄγουσιν could be dative of the participle, agreeing with δούλοις , and that something has fallen out after it such as δίκαιοι εἰσιν (cf. Philo 17.6 πότε οὖν ἄγει παρρησίαν ἱκέτης πρὸς δεσπότην ;); but on the whole it seems better to emend to ἔχουσιν (Bongars, appr. Heumann; Platt). -- For the thought cf. Plut. De garrul. 506E τίς δ' ὅλως ἐκωπῷ παρρησίαν ἀπολέλοιπε κατὰ τοῦ μὴ σιωπήσαντος;

14A11 μή τί γε τοῖς υἱοῖς : On μή τί γε (sc. εἴπῃς , ὑπολάβῃς , νομίσῃς) see K-G 525.4a, II p.260; 598, II p.572; Schmid I p.187, IV p.565. K-G classify it as an equivalent of μὴ ὅτι found in the orators (e.g. D. 2.23, 21.148, 22.45, 53). μή τί γε δή is also found (according to Preuss's index Demosthenes uses this form too),

and so is μή τοι γε . The mss. here offer both of these as variae lectiones (μή τί γε δή Z φ b a n only); but μή τί γε is the consensus of the older mss.

14B1 χωρὶς δὲ τούτων : The same phrase at 3D2, where see note.

14B2-3 ὅπου γὰρ γέροντές εἰσιν ἀναίσχυντοι ἐνταῦθα ἀνάγκη καὶ νέους ἀναιδεστάτους εἶναι : An unacknowledged reminiscence of Pl. Lg. V 729B-C ... καὶ πάντων μάλιστα εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ποτέ τις αὐτὸν ἴδῃ τῶν νέων ἢ καὶ ἐπακούσῃ δρῶντα ἢ λέγοντά τι τῶν αἰσχρῶν, ὡς ὅπου ἀναισχυντοῦσι γέροντες , ἀνάγκη καὶ νέους ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ἀναιδεστάτους . The passage is alluded to or quoted more than once by Plutarch (71A-B, 144F, 272C). For the thought cf. (with Wyttenbach) Cic. Off. I 123.

14B3-C3 — Parents should do everything possible to improve their children, like Eurydice, whose dedicatory epigram testifies to her care for the education of her children.—On Eurydice see 14B5 n. P holds Eurydice up as a model for parents, and quotes her dedicatory epigram as evidence of her care for her children. As quite often, however, his illustrative material gives poor support, on examination, for the point he wishes to make. (a) He introduces the passage as follows (14B3-5): πειρατέον οὖν εἰς τὸν τῶν τέκνων σωφρονιστὴν πάνθ' ὅσα προσῆκεν ἐπιτηδεύειν, ζηλώσαντας Εὐρυδίκην ... Now σωφρονιστής applies to action in the moral sphere (and naturally enough, since it is clear that it is a moral lead which P wishes parents to give their children); but Eurydice's laudable action was taken in the academic sphere: she learned letters ἐπὶ τῇ μαθήσει τῶν παίδων(14B6). Such a slight discrepancy is perhaps of not much importance: after all, it is the attitude betokened by the action which really counts. But there is a more serious point to be made. (b) This is that we must doubt whether E. really did learn letters ἐπὶ τῇ μαθήσει τῶν παίδων (i.e. presumably to help them with their lessons) at all. The epigram does not support this

contention, and may even tell against it. Yet unless P had some other evidence that E. learned to read in order to help her children we must assume that it was an inference from the epigram which he quotes. Lines 3-4 (14C2-3) look like the source of the inference: μήτηρ γεγαυῖα παίδων ἡβώντων. E. learned to read when (already) the mother of children who had reached puberty. The point of this piece of information is surely to show that E. was already quite far on in life before she became literate; not only does it not suggest that she learned to read in order to help her children, but it makes it highly unlikely. Her children by that time would be past the stage when her literacy could be of much help to them. Finally, it is important to note that E. presents her learning of letters as the achievement of a cherished personal ambition: εὐκταῖον ψυχῇ ἐλπίδα πόθων (line 2; 14C1). This is no doubt the truth of the matter, and we must assume that P was misled by a careless reading of lines 3-4, which might in fact have dissuaded him from the conclusion which he used the epigram to support.

14B3 πειρατέον οὖν ...: For sentences which begin like this see 8A9 n.

14B5 βηλώσαντας Εὐρυδίκην: The recovery of the correct text of the first line of the epigram (below, 14B9-C1 n.) makes it certain that the Eurydice in question is Eurydice I of Macedonia (RE 14), wife of Amyntas III (reigned 393/2-370 B.C.) and paternal grandmother of Alexander the Great. (For previous speculations see Heumann and Heusinger loc. cit. 14B9-C3 n., Wyttenbach ad. loc. Heusinger suspected the truth (pp.188-189); Heumann (p.185), Wyttenbach and Preger (loc. cit. 14B9-C3 n.) opted for Eurydice RE 15, a wife of Philip II). On E.'s parentage and nationality see 14B5-6 n. In general see Kaerst RE s.v. Eurydike 14, G.H. Macurdy 'Queen Eurydice and the evidence for woman power in

early Macedonia', AJPh 48 (1927) pp.201-214, especially pp.207-212, Hellenistic Queens (Baltimore 1932) pp.17-23. Eurydice had a daughter Eurynoe and three sons: Alexander II (reigned 370-368 B.C.), Perdiccas III (reigned 365-359 B.C.), and Philip II (reigned 359-336 B.C.). A hostile tradition preserved by Justin VII 4-5 and a scholium on Aeschines 2.32 represents E. as an evil woman who plotted to overthrow her husband in favour of her son-in-law and lover Ptolemaeus of Alorus, and actually succeeded in having two of her sons (Alexander and Perdiccas) murdered. There are, however, alternative accounts: Diodorus (XV 71.1) and Plutarch (Pelop. 27) blame Ptolemaeus for Alexander's death, and Diodorus (XVI 2.4) states that Perdiccas was killed in battle. More importantly Aeschines -- much closer in time to E. than the other sources -- relates in De falsa leg. 26-29 how he reminded Philip in 343 of the occasion when, in the course of the troubled events which followed the death of Alexander, his mother Eurydice had invoked the protection of the Athenian general Iphicrates for her children (a real instance of her φιλοτεκνία!). Aeschines' appeal could hardly have been made in these terms if Philip's memory of his mother had really been the unpleasant one which the later hostile tradition assumes. Ptolemaeus, regent after Alexander's death and himself killed by Perdiccas on his accession, was perhaps related to the royal family illegitimately besides being the husband of Eurynoe (thus Diodorus XV 71.1, 77.5), and E.'s marriage to him after he had killed Alexander may have been for dynastic reasons.

14B5-6 Ἰλλυρὶς οὖσα καὶ τριβάρβαρος : 'although she was an Illyrian and an utter barbarian' (Babbitt): ὅμως in 14B6 shows that the phrase is concessive. Libanius Arg. orat. Demosth. 18 (Foerster VIII p.605.5) and Souda s.v. Κάρανος also call E. an Illyrian. Her mother was a Macedonian, daughter of the Lyncestian

king Arrhabaeus (Strabo VII 7.8, quoted below 14B9 n.), her father a man called Hirrhas (see 14B9 n.) whose exact identity is disputed. If E. could be called an Illyrian and her mother was Macedonian, her father ought to have been Illyrian. This is the view of O. Hoffmann, Die Makedonen (Göttingen 1906) pp.160-163; but Droysen made him the king of Elimea (an inference from Arist. Pol. V 1311b (cf. 14B9 n.)), and Beloch the king of Orestis. For discussion of the rival theories see Hoffmann loc. cit., F. Geyer Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps II (Munich 1930) pp.79-80. As for her Greek name, E. will either have been given that by her Macedonian mother, or have assumed it on becoming queen, like two other royal Eurydices (RE 15 and 13), the wives of Philip II and Philip Arrhidaeus (see Hoffmann p.218, p.162 n.68). -- P considers E. a barbarian because she was an Illyrian. Cf. the other peoples on the fringes of Greece whose claim to be considered Greek rather than barbarian was doubtful or disputed (J. Jüthner, Hellenen und Barbaren (Leipzig 1923) pp.28-33): Aetolians, Acarnanians, Epirotes, Ozolian Locrians, Thessalians and Macedonians (to whom the traditionalist Plutarch still refuses the title of Greeks: D. Babut, Plutarque et le Stoicisme (Paris 1969) p.357 n.6). -- With τριβάρβαρος (a hapax until Constantine Manasses in the 12th century) cf. Schmid's list of τρι - and τρις - compounds, IV pp.694-695. The use of such words is poetic and post-classical in prose: one instance in Xenophon (τρισάσμενος Anab. III 2.24), one in Demosthenes (τρισκατάρατος 25.82), one in Aeschines (τρισκακοδαίμων 1.59). Plutarch avoids them, with the exception of τριπέμπελος (De com. not, 1071C). Lucian has many: τρισάθλιος 22.24; τρισευδαίμων 30.2, 36.3; τρισόβητος 59.31; τρισόλβιος 8.1; τρισκατάρατος 19.4, 26, 28.25, 42.32.

14B6 ἐπὶ τῇ μαθήσει τῶν τέκνων : For doubts about this see note on 14B3-C3.

14B6-7 ὄψε τῆς ἡλικίας ἤρξατο παιδείας : For ὄψε τῆς ἡλικίας cf. Lucian 49.37, 58.14. E. was an ὀψιμαθής, here a matter for approval, though often a cause of reproach or ridicule: see commentators on Thphr. Char. 27, Aul. Gell. XI 7.3 and cf. ὀψιμαθής = ἀπαίδευτος at Pl. Sph. 251B, Isoc. 10.2, Timaeus FGrH 566 F156.4. -- Illiteracy in a person of E.'s standing is interesting but hard to evaluate in the absence of comparative material. Cf. Schachermeyr, op. cit. 14B9-C3 n., p.41, F.D.Harvey, 'Literacy in the Athenian democracy', REG 79 (1966) pp.585-635 (and on women pp.621-623), Beck, Greek Education pp.85-88, Album pp.55-58 nos. 349-373 with plates 69-75. No doubt E.'s sex and nationality both had something to do with it. Though analogy is dangerous, it is interesting to note with Harvey (p.622) that two princesses presented on the fifth century Athenian stage, Deianeira and Iphigeneia, are illiterate (S. Trach. 155-160, E. IT 584-585).

14B7 τὴν φιλοτεκνίαν : Cf. the opposite, μισοτεκνία , at 4E8, 13D8-9.

14B9-C3 -- Eurydice's epigram. -- The epigram is T. Preger, Inscriptiones Graecae Metricae (Leipzig 1891) no. 122 (pp.99-100), F. Jacobs, Anthologia Graeca IV (Leipzig 1794) no. 168 (p.151), with Animadversiones III.1 (Leipzig 1802) pp.381-382. See also Heumann ap. Heusinger pp.183-186, Heusinger pp.187-192, Hartman, De Plutarcho pp.3-5, (H. curiously believes that P made up the epigram himself), Wilamowitz Hermes 54 (1919) pp.71-72 = Kl. Schr. IV (Berlin 1962) pp.309-310, and F. Schachermeyr, Alexander der Grosse (Vienna 1973) p.654 -- Quoted by Thomas Magister (c.1270-1325 A.D.) De subditorum officiis 23 (= Migne PG 145 (1865) c.541A).

Lines 1-2 (14B9-C1) Εὐρυδίκη Ἴρρα πολήτισι ... / Μαίσσις : Ἴρρα re-instated as the right reading by Paton, πολήτισι Wilamowitz: the mss. have ἴρρα (ἴρρα) πολῆτις or ἱεραπολῆτις (Planudeans) --

the latter a vexed problem because no Hierapolis in Illyria was known of.

Line 1 (14B9) Εὐρυδίκη Ἴρρα : On the identity of Eurydice and her father Hirrhas see 14B5-6 n. The father's name is attested by Strabo VII 7.8 τούτου (sc. Arrhabaeus of Lyncestis) ὁ ἦν θυγατριδῆ ἡ Φιλίππου μήτηρ τοῦ Ἀμύντου Εὐρυδίκη, Ἴρρα δὲ θυγάτηρ and by Aristotle Pol. V 1311b12 κατεχόμενος ὑπὸ πολέμου πρὸς Ἴρραν καὶ Ἀρράβαιον (πρὸς Ἴρραν Wilamowitz loc. cit. 14B9-C3 n., πρὸς Σίρραν mss., whence Meineke 'emended' to Σίρρα δὲ θυγάτηρ in the Strabo passage). (Reporting Paton's restoration of the father's name, Wilamowitz (loc. cit.) spells it with a smooth breathing, as it appears in the mss. of Strabo. Paton himself, however, gives the word a rough breathing, and his apparatus ad. loc. ('Hirrhae filia') shows that this is intentional and not a printer's error. The mss. of P in the main, but not universally, support the rough breathing.)

Lines 1-2 (14B9-C1) πολίτισι ... / Μούσαις: 'to the Muses, her countrywomen' (πολίτισι Wilamowitz, πολίτις mss.). Pieria, the traditional birthplace of the Muses, is close enough to Pella to justify the epithet, and Queen Eurydice evidently considers herself an adoptive Macedonian. Cf. Μοῦσαι πολίτιδες in the first line of a poem by Posidippus of Pella, and H. Lloyd-Jones' note on it, JHS 83 (1963) pp.80-81.

Line 1 (14B9) τόνδ' ἀνέθηκε : The pronoun conveys only the gender of the object which E. dedicated. Whatever it was, the epigram was inscribed on it or attached to it, so that the naming of the object was superfluous. Compare (with Heusinger p.191) the epigrams cited by Dio Chrys. 2.11 (= AP VII 53) Ἡσίοδος Μούσαις Ἑλικωνίσι τόνδ' ἀνέθηκεν / ὕμνῳ νικήσας ἐν Χαλκίδι θεῖον Ὅμηρον (where the offering was a tripod), and Appian BC I 97 (Sulla) ἔπεμψε δὲ καὶ στέφανον χρύσεον καὶ πελέκων ἐπιγράψας τάδε· 'τόνδε σοι αὐτοκράτωρ Σύλλας ἀνέθηκ', Ἀφροδίτα ...' The impossibility of knowing what the object was has not prevented guesses from being

made: 'πίνακα, vel simile' Heusinger p.192; (Heumann ap. Heusinger p.186 emended the next line to produce a noun: Μούσαισι σπόλον); 'στέφανον vel simile quid' Preger p.100, Brunck ap. Jacobs Animadversiones III.1 p.381, Wyttenbach ad loc.; 'Num λίθον?' Hartman De Plutarcho p.4; even 'this shrine' Macurdy Hellenistic Queens p.20. Wilamowitz conjectured that the place of dedication was the Museum at Pella; Schachermeyr thinks it may have been Mieza.

Line 2 (14C1) εὐκταῖον φυγὴ ἐλαύνει πόθον: εὐκταῖον Wilamowitz: εὔιστον most mss. (εὐιστέον h i k^1; εὔειστον ed. pr.). εὔιστον, not otherwise attested, was defended by Brunck (ap. Jacobs Animadv. III.1 p.381) and taken with πόθον to mean 'pulcra cupiditas adipiscendae scientiae'; Heumann (ap. Heusinger p.186) emended the adjective out of existence (see last note); Wyttenbach defends it as = 'bene notum, celebrem'; J. Toup emended to εὔειστον or εὔλιστον ... πόνον 'quae laborem bene amatum animo suscepi'(sic.). Wilamowitz' conjecture, which assumes two stages of corruption, from εὐκταῖον to the commoner εὐκτόν, and thence to εὔιστον by misreading of κ as ις (easiest in uncial) is neat and very probable. -- For πόθος of the object desired and not the feeling of desire itself cf. Theocritus 2.143 καὶ ἐς πόθον ἤνθομες ἄμφω with Gow's note.

Line 3 (14C2) γράμματα ... μνημεῖα λόγων: cf. A. Pr. 460-461 γραμμάτων ... συνθέσεις, / μνήμην ἁπάντων, μουσομήτορ' ἐργάνην, Gorgias Pal. (= VS 82 B11a) 30 γράμματά τε μνήμης ὄργανον, Cic. Sull. 45 'litterae posteritatis causa repertae ... quae subsidio oblivioni esse possent', Livy VI 1.2 'litterae ... una custodia fidelis memoriae rerum gestarum', Quint. I 7.31 'hic enim est usus litterarum, ut custodiant voces et velut depositum reddant legentibus'.

Lines 3-4 (14C2-3) μήτηρ γεγαυῖα παίδων ἡρώων: see note on 14B3-C3.

14C4-7 Conclusion

14C4-7 -- Perhaps it would be idealistic to hope for the realisation in practice of all the foregoing recommendations; but most of them can be successfully attempted, given good luck and care. -- This short concluding paragraph expresses a consciousness which is very characteristic of P that ideals have inevitably to be modified in practice. Cf. 7C4-5 ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ τὸ τέλειον ἀδύνατον, 13C6-7 τοῦτα μὲν οὖν καλὰ καὶ συμφέροντα· ἃ δὲ μέλλω λέγειν, ἀνθρώπινα, 10D8-E6 with note, sentences beginning πειρατέον ... (see 8A9-B1n.)and many small phrases: ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα (3D10), εἰς δύναμιν (8A9, 8E5), ὅσαπερ ἐστὶν ἐν δυνατῷ (10E5). -- For Wyttenbach's curious theory that this final paragraph was Plutarch's comment appended to a pupil's essay see his note ad loc. Berry's view (p.397) that the treatise ends on a note of piety is wrong and based on a misunderstanding of εὐχῆς at 14C5 (see n. ad loc. for the correct interpretation).

14C4-5 τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσας τὰς προειρημένας συμπεριλαβεῖν παραινέσεις εὐχῆς ἴσως ἔργον ἐστί : This is the text as emended by Stephanus; the mss. have τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσας τὰς προειρημένας συμπεριλαβεῖν εὐχῆς ἴσως ἢ παραινέσεως ἔργον ἐστί , which (a) leaves τὰς προειρημένας without a feminine noun to qualify, and (b) requires the addition of μᾶλλον before ἢ παραινέσεως to yield any plausible sense. Bernardakis' view that some noun such as ὑποθήκας can be <u>understood</u> with τὰς προειρημένας is clearly untenable: here too an actual supplement would be required, and we need a noun which can be the object both of συμπεριλαβεῖν and ζηλῶσαι (a slightly odd pair). ὑποθήκας would do; Tucker suggested εὐμηρίας , and Babbitt ἐπιμελείας . But Stephanus' re-arrangement of the sentence gives excellent sense by providing παραινέσεις as object (cf. 4C3 τὰς ὑποθήκας καὶ παραινέσεις) and dispenses with the necessity of assuming that two words have dropped out. It should probably be adopted.

14C4 συμπεριλαβεῖν : The verb is awkward, but not really difficult. πάσας τὰς προειρημένας συμπεριλαβεῖν παραινέσεις, literally 'to include, encompass, all the above mentioned precepts' will mean 'to put all of them into practice' as opposed to striving to follow τὰς πλείους (14C5). Evidently the idea of total inclusiveness has eclipsed in the writer's mind the more natural idea of putting precepts into practice, and the result is a slightly odd choice of word.

14C5 εὐκτὸς ἴσως ἔργον ἐστι : 'is perhaps something to be hoped for (rather than expected)'. For εὐκτή used of aspiration to ideals see LSJ s.v. 2, England on Pl. Lg. 736D2, 841C7, A. Corlu, Recherches sur les mots relatifs à l'idée de prière (Paris 1966) pp.214-215, and with reference to the present passage Cobet, Mnem. n.s. 1 (1873) p.358. Hercher emended εὐκτὸς to τυκτὸς, no doubt on account of καὶ αὐτὸ μὲν εὐμοιρίας δεόμενον ἐστι (14C5-6) (cf. Glaeser p.100 n.1), but unnecessarily: perfection can only be aspired to, and even limited success requires good fortune.

14C6 εὐμοιρίας : 'good fortune', cf. e.g. D.H. Rh. 5.3, Hdn. II 5.1. The word is more often found with a genitive, meaning 'fortunate possession of': Lucian 41.8, 47.8, 75.72; Hdn. I 17.12; 15 times in Philo. Wyttenbach's Index gives no instance of the word from Plutarch.

14C7 ἄνιστον δ' οὖν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει καθέστηκεν: δ' οὖν occurs elsewhere in P only at 11D3. For μέν ... δ' οὖν see Denniston p.461. -- For ἀνθρώπινος cf. note on 13C6-7. -- Hartman, De Plutarcho pp.2-3, comments on the inept opposition of καθέστηκεν to ἐστι (14C6); καθέστηκεν is chosen, as he says, for the sake of the clausula.

NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS

A number of standard reference works are cited in the Introduction and commentary by abbreviated designations as shown below.

BDR	F. Blass and A. Debrunner, Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch, 14th edn. revised by F. Rehkopf (Göttingen 1976).
D-S	C. Daremberg and E. Saglio, Dictionnaire des Antiquités Grecques et Romaines (Paris 1877-1919).
K-B	R. Kühner, Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache (Elementar- und Formenlehre), 2 vols., 3rd edn. revised by F. Blass (Hannover 1890-92).
K-G	R. Kühner, Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache (Satzlehre), 2 vols., 3rd edn. revised by B. Gerth (Hannover and Leipzig 1989-1904).
KP	Der Kleine Pauly, ed. K. Ziegler, W. Sontheimer and H. Gärtner, 5 vols. (Stuttgart and Munich 1964-75).
LS	C.T. Lewis and C. Short, A Latin Dictionary (Oxford 1879).
LSJ	H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, 9th edn. revised and augmented by H. Stuart Jones (Oxford 1940).
OLD	Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford 1968-).
PLRE	A.H.M. Jones, J.R. Martindale and J. Morris, The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire AD 260-395 (Cambridge 1971).
RAC	Reallexicon für Antike und Christentum, ed. T. Klauser (Stuttgart 1950-)
RE	Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, ed. G. Wissowa, W. Kroll, K. Mittelhaus, K. Ziegler, W. John (Stuttgart 1893-).

SVF — H. von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, 4 vols. (Leipzig 1903-24).

TGL — H. Stephanus, Thesaurus Graecae Linguae, ed. C.B. Hase, W. Dindorf and L. Dindorf, 8 vols., 3rd edn. (Paris 1831-65).

TLL — Thesaurus Linguae Latinae (Leipzig 1900-).

VS — H. Diels and W. Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 3 vols., 8th edn. (Berlin 1956).

The abbreviations used by LS and LSJ have generally been adopted in referring to the works of ancient writers, and to collections of ancient texts or fragments (though references to Lucian use the numerical order of M.D. Macleod's edition (Oxford 1972-)). In references to periodicals the abbreviations are generally those used by L'Année Philologique.

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NOTE: The list given above contains only works which deal with the De liberis educandis as a whole. Books and articles relevant to parts only are cited in the Commentary on the relevant passages. There are also sections on the De liberis educandis in works by the following authors (see section II below for details): Babbitt, Blomenkamp, Dyroff, Faure, Gerini, Jentsch, Jones, Lechner, Montesi, Paton, Porson, Tucker, Ziegler and Wyttenbach.

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ABSTRACT

THE TREATISE DE LIBERIS EDUCANDIS ATTRIBUTED TO PLUTARCH

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The Greek treatise De liberis educandis has been preserved as part of the corpus of Plutarch's Moralia, but is not now generally believed to be the work of Plutarch. It is however of interest as the only complete ancient Greek work on the education of children which has survived.

By far the greater part of the present thesis consists of a line-by-line commentary on the Greek text designed to provide the reader with assistance of all kinds relevant to understanding the work in its ancient context. The commentary is preceded, however, by a brief introduction containing a synopsis, an essay on the style of the treatise, and a list of surviving manuscripts. The essay reviews the style of the work under the headings of organisation, illustrative material, syntax, language and vocabulary, hiatus, and prose-rhythm and clausulae. Since the question of authenticity depends almost entirely upon internal evidence, and predominantly on stylistic considerations, special attention is paid to comparisons with Plutarchan usage.

The De liberis educandis emerges from this study as a handbook containing advice for fathers on how to bring up their children, written by an author of philosophical inclinations but no great depth of thought or literary skill. The quality of the writing is generally inferior to that of Plutarch, with connections, quotations and illustrative material much less naturally and competently managed; and the case against Plutarchan authorship is further confirmed by neutral differences of detail in syntactical usage, vocabulary, the avoidance of hiatus and prose-rhythm. Internal evidence also suggests, however, that the treatise may date from around Plutarch's time, namely the first or second century AD.