

Arabic borrowing of the Hebrew word *menahēl* ‘manager’: Articulations and ideologies

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Abstract

Ideologies, or ways of understanding one’s relation to the world, impede or encourage, and affect the form of, language contact practices such as borrowing and codeswitching. This is illustrated by the pragmatic functions – informative or humorous – of the Israeli Hebrew word *menahēl* ‘boss’ in Palestinian Arabic.

1. Introduction

This chapter examines Arabic usages of the Hebrew word *menahēl* which means ‘manager’, ‘foreman’ or ‘boss’ when spoken by modern Israeli Hebrew speakers (Levy 1995: 175). This case of borrowing illustrates two patterns of linguistic practices within the field of Palestinian Arabic/Modern Hebrew contact. These patterns are linked to ways of thinking about the relationship, including relations of conflict and economic inequality, between the groups of speakers identified with these languages. The explanation for patterns of uses of Hebrew borrowings in Arabic will contribute to two intellectual projects of linguistic anthropology and ethnography by demonstrating, firstly, the role ideologies play in engendering language change (Kroskrity 2000), and, secondly, the usefulness of a social analysis of language in gaging power-inflected processes at work in societies (Rampton 2009). The framing of the contribution furthermore offers a characterisation of *ideologies* valuable for the examination of language in society, and a conceptualisation of the link between social practices, including linguistic practices, and ideologies, in the form of *articulations* (Hall 1980, 1996).

Usually, *menahēl* is borrowed by Palestinians to simply mean the manager of the workplace as an equivalent, for instance, to the Palestinian Arabic *ma‘allim* ‘foreman’. However,

evidence from the occupied West Bank (Hawker 2013: 90-2) and from the Egyptian Sinai (Holes & Abu Athera 2009: 15) shows that it can also be used by Arabic speakers to sarcastically denote a 'big-head' with connotations of misplaced authority and self-aggrandisement: a meaning that does not exist in the original Hebrew. The traces of the power relations in the Palestinian-Israeli context are evident in *menahēl*: there is the economics – it means 'boss' – and there is the politics – it comes from Israeli Hebrew, indexing the national identity of the dominant group. The explicitness of the context in the particular lexical item we are focusing on makes it imperative to integrate the context into the analysis, while acknowledging that the contexts are, at their particular and changing historical junctures, always mediated by ways of thinking about them: what is termed here *ideologies*.

Menahēl is just one example, albeit an interesting and poignant one, of two broad patterns of pragmatic functions of Hebrew loanwords. One, the pattern of interchangeable use of Arabic and Hebrew equivalents, whereby the Hebrew is minimised in the presence of out-group interlocutors, is associated with the speech of Palestinian day-migrant workers employed inside Israel or in the occupied West Bank's Israeli settlements, illegal under international law. The second pattern is 'ironic power humour', the witty narrative manipulation of Hebrew's association with Israeli power by using the Hebrew loanwords or codeswitched phrases in paradoxical situations. The identification of these patterns is based on the analysis of material (going beyond *menahēl*) collected during fieldwork in the West Bank in 2007-8 and in Israel in 2015 and can be applied also to material collected by other researchers.

The explanatory model links, or *articulates*, particular instances of language use with a pattern of linguistic practices, and an *ideology*, developed for understanding the experienced context which is captured in the language. There are more than two patterns and ideologies operative in directing Arabic speech towards the use or avoidance of Hebrew borrowings and codeswitching; only those relevant to the examples provided will be sketched out in this

chapter. The chapter will start with six examples of Arabic usage of words for ‘boss’. The sorting of the instances of *menahēl* into patterns will be supported by additional, selected, empirical evidence that will show the spread of the identified pragmatic functions. On the basis of the empirical linguistic material, and of knowledge of the Palestinian-Israeli contexts relevant to the language practices, the explanatory model involving *articulations* and *ideologies* will be laid out. In conclusion, the theoretical implications of *articulation* and *ideology*, including proposed definitions of these terms, will be offered as contributions not only to the fields of language contact research and linguistic anthropology and ethnography, but also to discourse analysis, political thought and Middle East studies.

2. *Who’s the ‘boss’? Ma’allim (Arabic) and menahēl (Hebrew loanword), and the speech of Palestinian day-migrant workers*

During peak years of labour migration to Israel after the 1967 military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, some 45 per cent of Gazan workers and nearly 30 percent of the West Bank workforce were employed in Israel (Farsakh 2005). In some refugee camps, 80 per cent of male refugees of employable age worked in Israel (Farsakh 2005). Palestine refugees were particularly disposed to becoming a floating source of manual labour since the vast majority of them had been peasants in pre-1948 Palestine and thus lost access to the land that had been the source of their livelihood (Pappé 2006).

The numbers of Palestinian migrant workers are now reduced due to a securitised regime incrementally formed from the beginning of the 1990s, involving periodic closures causing intermittent high unemployment, and an opaque system of travel and work permits, which, though justified officially on security grounds, grants, for instance, easier access to Israeli settlements in the West Bank than to Israel (Farsakh 2005). The restrictions are by-passed by

workers who have few other employment options, and therefore accurate current figures on employment of Palestinians in Israel are hard to come by, though they are estimated at around 110,000 migrant workers out of a West Bank workforce of 810,300 (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2015).

The remittance of wages earned in Israel had, in the past, been a significant source of Palestinian Gross Domestic Product increase, if this can be measured for a territory without defined borders (Fishelson 1992), though this labour had not contributed structurally to the development of the Palestinian economy. Rather, this labour was seen to enhance the standard of living of individual workers, who invested in family housing, but who also experienced reduced expectations of education and skilled training, especially for men, who were then unequipped to adapt when economic shocks hit the Palestinian workforce as a result of Israel's securitisation (Roy 1999).

Though employment in Israel continues to be a source of contact of Arabic speakers with Hebrew, this contact is inflected not only by economic considerations, giving rise for instance to a borrowed lexicon for tools, but also by the securitisation that dominates their access to work, reflected in terms relating to military control. Moreover, though employment in Israel, when it is possible, is a source of relatively high wages, it entails putting up with poor health and safety conditions and job precarity (Lewin-Epstein & Semyonov 1987; Alenat 2010).

These aspects of the context, and more, and the ways Palestinians think about them, are reflected in the instances of speech recorded in the following four examples. The speech is transcribed using academic Semitic orthography and Hebrew loanwords are in italics both in the original Arabic sentences and the English translations. Loanwords from other languages are in italics and underlined. The terms for 'boss', *ma'allim* or *menahēl*, are in bold.

Example 1: Palestinian speech using *ma'allim* 'foreman' (from a 2008 interview with a Palestinian man in Dheisheh Refugee Camp)

marra kān nfič fi hēt iṭ-ṭubār. ma mansūba is-*skāla* 'ala li-ḥbāl... ṭābik iṭ-ṭālīt, ana u uḥra 'āmil. w-eḥna nfič fi l-ḥēṭa fi *fibar*, haftat is-*skāla* aḥa bidha tika' min šakti u min šakta ṭābta. fa hū masač il-ḥabil, ana masačit fi l-*kutsīm* ḥadīd sitta mīli ṭāli' min il-ḥēt. masačit fī u hū nafs il-'iši masač fīhen u ṭle'na 'a l-ḥēt fa šāfna il-**ma'allim**.

'Once, we were stripping the formwork from a wall. The *platform* wasn't hanging on the ropes... We were at the height of the third floor, me and another worker. While we were stripping from the wall with the *grinder*, the *platform* slipped and was just about to fall on my side, but was steady on his side. So he grabbed the rope, I grabbed the six millimetre-strong metal *spikes* that were sticking out of the wall. I held on to them, and he did the same, he held on to them, and we climbed to the top of the wall, and the **foreman** saw us.'

The speech exhibits features typical of the rural Palestinian register, known as the *fellāḥi* 'peasant' variety, including the /č/ in *nfič* 'cutting, stripping' and *masačit* 'I held, I grabbed', the urban equivalent of which would be pronounced with /k/. This is significant in several sociolinguistic ways: we know the speaker to have been born and raised in Dheisheh Refugee Camp in the West Bank near Bethlehem. Despite his proximity to the Palestinian urban centre, where the Jerusalem urban dialect is the prestigious norm, he retains *fellāḥi* speech features, betraying the rural roots of his family's background in pre-1948 Palestine. His speech also indexes his position in the political economy: it can be inferred that the speaker is educated at a basic level, due to the absence of a formal register in the interview context where more educated speakers would borrow from prestigious urban or Standard Arabic, and that this absence is also a consequence of social, gendered, expectations of young men.

Young Palestinian women from equivalent socio-economic groups would be socially expected, in general, to receive higher levels of formal education (Jacobsen, 2004), giving them repertoires of a relatively more formal register commonly indexed in an interview.

The technical terminology is referred to casually in example (1), without explanation provided to the interviewer who is not a construction worker, in the breathless account of a dangerous incident which is the focus of the narrative. The focus is an indictment of the poor safety provisions as well as the anxious relationship with the *ma'allim* 'foreman' who is a Jewish Israeli, because this incident occurred on a construction site on Jabal Abu Ghneim where the Israeli settlement of Har Homa has been built since the 1990s. Several specialised terms for technical items pass unexplained, because their precise meanings are peripheral to the thrust of the narrative, such as *ṭubār* 'formwork' or *kutsīm* 'spikes', from the Hebrew *kotsim*, which are the metal bars used in the casting of reinforced concrete. Other technical terms in the speech, *skāla* (plur. *sakāyil*), 'construction platform', and *fībar*, 'disc grinder', are also not of Arabic origin and are found in Arabic speech in the region of the East Mediterranean. *Skāla* originates in the Italian for 'ladder', *scala*. The spread of Italian loanwords in this type of speech is another indicator of the political economy's role in spreading language change, since it has been proposed that the source of this vocabulary were migrant workers from southern Italy in the early 20th century (D'Anna 2016, this volume). The flows of movement of the manual workforce has been a feature of the industrialisation of the Mediterranean space (Beinin, 2001) which affected borrowing for vocabulary related to that type of work whereas vocabulary related to agriculture remained relatively stable.

Example 2: Palestinian speech using the plural of *menahēl*: *manahīl* 'bosses' (from a 2008 interview with a Palestinian man near Tulkarem)

NH: kīf ir-rātīb?

‘How’s the pay?’

Worker XX: wallāhi, hasa māši. hasa.

‘Well, now it’s ok. Now it is.’

NH: kār aswa’?

‘It was worse?’

XX: kār taḥt il-ḥadd il-’adna. fa aḍrabna. mā sme’ tūš?

‘It was below the minimum wage. So we went on strike. Haven’t you heard?’

NH: fa fuztu.

‘And you won.’

XX: ā. fa tadahḥalat il-*lēška* u ṭalabat rātib qānūni. fi l-mufāwaḍāt ma’ il-*manahīl*.

‘Yup. And the *bureau* intervened and demanded legal wages. In the negotiations with the *bosses*.’

The incident the worker is referring to, an industrial strike at an Israeli settlement-based factory known as Geshuri near Tulkarem in the northern West Bank in Autumn 2007, would have been known to local residents but the presence of a foreign interviewer served as a pretext to briefly recount the events for which Hebrew loanwords were usefully descriptive. Palestinian employment in Israeli settlements is not supported by Palestinian national institutions (and indeed has been made illegal since 2010) because the settlement project contravenes international law, generally furthers the seizure of Palestinian natural resources, and leads to a myriad of human rights violations. At the same time, Palestinian workers are considered to be outside the jurisdiction of Israeli labour laws. This situation was changing

during the course of the late 2000s under pressure from workers' actions supported by an Israeli non-governmental organisation, Kav LaOved, which raised awareness of workers' rights in Arabic (Alenat 2010). The self-organised Palestinian workers in Geshuri learnt specialised vocabulary from Standard Arabic such as *il-ḥadd il-'adna* 'minimum wage' in Arabic as evidenced in example (2), yet the institution that finally intervened in their favour was the 'bureau', pronounced *lišká* by Israelis (the acute accent indicates stress) and *lēška* by Palestinians. *Il-lēška* 'the bureau' (the Hebrew loanword is preceded by the Arabic definite article) refers to a body at the Israeli Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labour which is responsible for the enforcement of workers' rights according to Israeli laws. The Hebrew loanword here is representative of power relations that preclude Palestinian institutional support for workers employed by Israelis due to nationalist principles which have nevertheless failed to deliver a viable economic alternative for the workers.

Similarly to the most common loanword from Modern Hebrew into Palestinian Arabic, *maḥsōm* or *maḥsūm* 'checkpoint', *menahēl* has Arabic plural patterns applied to it: whereas the Hebrew plural of *menahel* (pronounced in Israeli Hebrew with a short vowel) is *menahelim*, and of *maḥsom* is *maḥsomim*, in Arabic the plurals follow one of the patterns for broken plurals to form *manahīl* and *maḥasīm* respectively.

Example 3: Palestinian speech using the feminine plural of *menahēl*: *menahelāt*
'women managers' (from a 2008 interview with a Palestinian woman in Tulkarem Refugee Camp)

Worker XY: štaḡalt sitte snīn *nekayōn*.

'I worked as a *cleaner* for six years.'

NH: fi dūr in-nās, willa...?

‘In people’s houses or...?’

XY: fi mustašfa a‘šāb, ya‘ni, ‘ind il-maḡanīn. šuḡul mrattab. aṭla‘ ‘ala sitte u ‘ala waḡde akūn fi dāri. u fi šahər āḡod alfēn šēkel.

‘At a psychiatric hospital, I mean, where the crazy people are. It was a well-organised job. I’d leave the house at six and by one I’d be back. And in one month I’d get two thousand shekels.’

NH: mā kuntiš ithāfi min il-marḡa?

‘Weren’t you afraid of the patients?’

XY: la’, humme baku yinaḡfu ḡurfethum laḡālhum... bištiḡlu, ya‘ni, kulši, byuḡrubūš ḡada. ana bakēt anaḡḡef bas ‘ind il-*menahelāt*, fi l-makātib. il-*menahelāt*, ya‘ni, zayyik.

‘No, they cleaned their rooms themselves. They work, I mean, [they do] everything; they don’t hit anyone. I was cleaning just the *women managers*’ offices. The *women managers* are, I guess, like you.’

Describing one’s job by using a Hebrew loanword, as *nekayōn* ‘cleaning’ or *binyan* ‘construction’, is typical for Palestinian day-migrant workers, though they also resort to the Arabic equivalents *tandīf* and *buna* respectively. However, some usages indicate that the Hebrew loanwords might be semantically more restricted as it only refers to the jobs of this kind in Israel, not in general. *Nekayōn* can never be used to describe cleaning one’s own home as a domestic chore, whereas *tandīf* can.

The speaker from Tulkarem Refugee Camp who spoke favourably of Israeli women managers and of psychiatric patients in example (3) took up waged employment in Israel

because the men in her family were either dead or in prison. The researcher's question regarding fear of the patients was motivated by a search for topics that would trigger affective speech or a longer stretch of narration from the interviewee in order to record the language practices resulting from contact with Hebrew, and does not reflect any genuine position toward psychiatry. XY stopped working at the hospital in Israel because of the movement restrictions imposed by the Israeli army in the Tulkarem area after 2002. Her positive opinion of the 'well-organised' cleaning job is based on the reported facts that she worked hours that suited her family commitments, and was paid regularly. What this worker could not abide, and what the Palestinian migrant workers complain of generally, is the securitisation of the access to work.

Example 4: Imagining a pleasant commute to work (from an interview in 2006 near Bethlehem)

bas lāzem yikūn ashal, il-murūr. kāwnu ya'ṭik *te'uda* min iš- šurta innak inte... fiš 'indak wala *nikuda*. inte 'indak ṭaṣrīḥ li l-'amal fi isra'īl, *ōke*, ḥalaṣ, šū il-muškilē? fiš muškilē. bišūf iṭ-ṭaṣrīḥ, yišūf il-bani ādam, il-hawīye tab'ato, *bevakaša*, tfaḍḍal.

'But it should be easier, the transit. If they give you an *ID card*, from the police, [certifying] that you don't have any *penalty points*, you have a permit to work in Israel, then *OK*, enough, what's the problem? There is no problem. He [an imagined helpful soldier at a checkpoint] sees the permit, sees the person, his ID card, *here you go*, welcome.'

Hebrew loanwords for military bureaucratic terms such as 'ID cards' and 'penalty points' (which proscribe the awarding of work permits), and for the politeness formula *bevakaša* accompanying a fictional pleasant commute through an army checkpoint, are only to be expected in a complaint about the problems faced by workers experiencing collective

restrictions on freedom of movement. Accepted precarity, appreciation of a low but regular wage, and demand for efficient access: these standards viewed as normal by the Palestinian migrant workers perhaps make them the ideal subjects of neoliberal economic models coupled with pervasive securitisation.

Examples (1-4) do not comprehensively treat the language practices of Palestinian migrant workers in Israel (for more, see Hawker 2013). It might seem that the context is given disproportionate weight in the descriptions of the speech excerpts. Furthermore, the excerpts themselves are relatively long, allowing the respondents to provide an account of the relations they experience and how they regard them in their own words. The contention of this chapter is that these elements – the context, and the stance of the speakers – are central to the analysis of even one loanword, *menahēl*. What is notable at this stage of the analysis is that the borrowed vocabulary has Arabic equivalents or approximations which can be used interchangeably or as glosses: *menahēl* can be substituted by *ma'allim* without any loss of meaning, *te'uda* 'ID card' is also referred to by the Arabic *hawīye* in example (4), *nekayōn* 'cleaning' is *tandīf*, and even the *kutsīm* 'spikes' in example (1) is described in such detail that an uninitiated interlocutor can understand without knowing the word that it is a thin metal element like a rod that protrudes from the wall and can be grasped by a human hand. The uninitiated interlocutor, in this case the researcher, is a factor in the analysis, representing the out-group with no experience of work in Israel, who requires translations and explanations in the immediacy of the conversation that are not necessary in communication among co-workers, and who may also, in the wider context, be aware of the nationalist principles and ideas of economic developmentalism that take a negative view of employment outside the Palestinian sector. This factor contributes to the de-emphasising of Hebrew loanwords in the speech of Palestinian day-migrant workers. This has to be contrasted with the perspective emanating from the workers own words – the necessity of waged work, the

different modulations of power relations with the bosses, and the difficult yet unavoidable securitised access – which pulls the speech practices towards some use of Hebrew.

The only Hebrew item in the preceding examples which would lose some of its meaning if it were rendered only in Arabic is *bevakaša* ‘here you go, welcome’, itself glossed by the Arabic *tfaḍḍal*, in example (4). The sentence ‘he sees the permit, sees the person, his ID card, *here you go, welcome*’ conjures the improbable image of a helpful polite soldier at a checkpoint, in contrast with the workers’ lived experience of receiving hostile orders. The incongruity of a soldier welcoming the Palestinian on his way to work with *bevakaša*, in this account, is an element of narrative humour: *tfaḍḍal* on its own would not have conveyed the irony, which brings us to the second pattern of use of *menahēl*.

3. *No kudos for the ‘big boss’: Menahēl in ironic power humour*

One woman used *menahēl* in conversation to describe the baseness of the behaviour of her brother-in-law who had had the impertinence of snubbing her sister (his wife) by marrying several wives in addition to her.

Example 5: The polygamous ‘big-head’ (from a 2007 conversation with a woman in Shuafat Refugee Camp)

tḡawwaz tintēn ‘alēha. u hūwe ustāz fi l-ḡāmi‘a! hūwe il-*menahēl* li-kbīr.

‘He married two women on top of her. And he’s a university professor! He thinks he’s the *big cheese*.’ (Literally: ‘He is the big *boss*.’)

The speaker is mocking the man by contrasting his status of university professor with the uncouth marital polygamy, and she has at her disposal one word that captures this irony:

menahēl. The English gloss is not as concise, requiring several approximations in example (5), unless one resorted to vulgarisms which would adequately convey the expressed stance towards polygamy. Palestinian native speakers of Arabic, when tested, have similarly struggled when asked to render this meaning with Arabic words. The reason why this is possible to do specifically with the Hebrew loanword relates transparently to the wider social, economic, political and indeed military power relations in the region. Taking the word for ‘director’ in the language of the dominant state, and then subverting its meaning to imply illegitimate, self-aggrandising authority, is a way of having a dig at the powers that be, even if this is the power of a man to engage in sexual behaviour forbidden to women.

A more explicitly political use of *menahēl* was recorded in a village near Nablus in the northern West Bank which had been demolished by the Israeli army in January 2010. The speaker, an elderly woman, was a shepherd and cheese-maker. The setting was a tent of plastic sheeting that had replaced her demolished dwelling, and the audience was primarily a group of younger women whom she was entertaining, though the presence of a foreign human rights researcher accompanied by the mayor who deferred to the speaker’s seniority had prompted this particular gathering.

Example 6: The demolition ‘gangmasters’ (from an interview in 2010 with a woman in a village near Nablus)

iğğat iğ-ğarrafāt u ana bakēt a‘mil fi ġ-ğibne. il-‘ummāl u ġ-ğunūd u l-*manahīl*
tabā’hum wikfu ḥawaley. ḥaçēt ilhum šū biddču, nitfet ġibne?

‘When the bulldozers came I was making cheese. The workers, the soldiers and their *so-called bosses* stood all around me. I told them, “What do you want, a bite of cheese?”’

The speech was delivered in the *fellāḥi* ‘peasant’ variety similar to example (1) but here it is sociolinguistically unremarkable since the speaker was indeed a villager and an older woman with very little formal education, unlike the young male construction worker living in the Bethlehem urban agglomeration. Another difference is that in example (6) the speaker had the charisma to rhetorically dominate the encounter and thus change the applicable linguistic norms: while an interview geared at obtaining a factual report might be expected to elicit short informative sentences in a relatively more formal register at least initially, the narrative performance in example (6) entertained an audience of fellow villagers. The account of the demolition was given in derisive tones and the speaker’s snubbing of *il-manahīl* ‘the so-called bosses’ was met with laughter. Using Arabic equivalents such as *ḍubbāṭ* ‘officers’, or *mudarā* ‘directors’ would have been factual, not funny, and the insertion of ‘so-called’ in the English gloss only approximates the ironic and irreverent connotations.

There is evidence that *menahēl* in its ironic sense has spread beyond direct Palestinian-Israeli contact in the use by a poet from the Sinai, Ḥusayn bin ‘Īd bin Ḥamad bin Miṣliḥ bin ‘Āmir al-Tayāhā.

Example 7: ‘foreign clever-dicks’ make good cars (from Abu Athera and Holes’ collection of Bedouin political poems)

wi l-*mārka* wi l-isim gālu tyūtah

ma yixill bak ṣan‘at *manāhīl* ḥēḥām

‘Toyota is her model and Toyota is her *make*,

The workmanship won’t disappoint: these *foreigners* don’t fake!’ (Holes & Abu Athera 2009: 15)

Ḥaḥam in Israeli Hebrew means ‘clever’. Holes and Abu Athera explain the use of *manāhīl ḥaḥām* in this poem, which praises the virtues of a powerful car similarly to the traditional subject of racing camels, as pointing to the foreign-ness and skilfulness, and ultimately the craftiness, of the manufacturers. Anyone who is not Bedouin is a priori suspect: the Japanese car-makers are, to quote the translators, ‘foreign clever-dicks’, and a sarcastic Hebrew loanword about the ‘bosses’ is a good way to express that.

Example 8: Israeli power and Palestinian irony (from a debate recorded in Hura in 2015)

Moderator (intervening in a loud exchange of opinions): riḡā’an. ya ḡamā’a. ya iḥwān. ya iḥwān. ya ḡamā’a. ya ’ustāz. la’ hēk mā rāḥ nkammil. riḡā’an. riḡā’an. iḥna mniḥki. ’ismahli. ’aḥ ‘abdallah. *ani kore leḥa seder pa’am šlišīt.*

‘Please. Gentlemen. Brothers. Brothers. Gentlemen. Sir. No we cannot go on like this. Please. Please. We are talking. Allow me. Brother ‘Abdallah. *I am calling you to order for the third time.*

‘Abdallah (sarcastically): yā šīdi.

‘Oh dear!’

Moderator: *bitaḥón!* hayhum iḡu wa ga’adu warāk.

‘*Security!* Here they are and they’re sitting behind you.’

The setting for this exchange was a political debate in a meeting hall of a Bedouin township, Hura, in the south of Israel. The debating group consisted of about twenty people, most of whom knew each other, as did the debate moderator and the speaker ‘Abdallah. The entire debate was conducted in Arabic, some of which was in Bedouin variety, and some of it,

particularly on the part of the moderator, with borrowing from Standard Arabic, such as *riġā'an* 'please', that indexes a formal register.

The irony of the situation is that, in this marginalised community, there are no security guards to keep the peace at the meeting hall. The moderator invoked the threat of the 'big bosses', the Israelis, by using a codeswitched phrase in their language *ani kore leḥa seder pa'am šlišit* 'I am calling you to order for the third time' with the purpose of silencing argumentative speakers, albeit in a humorous way. The target of this directive, 'Abdallah, understood it both to be a joke, and so replied sarcastically in kind *yā šīdi* 'oh dear [now I'm really in trouble]', and to be a serious demand, and so quieted down.

Some types of humour permit the suspension of conventions of politeness (Barbe 1995: 89). Using affronts or issuing directives in Hebrew can attenuate the offense or the loss of face by deflecting the butt of the joke to aspects of stereotypical Israeliness, as perceived by Palestinians, such as bossiness and illegitimate power, and humour is achieved by deploying this in paradoxical situations. Israelis, or generally some sort of despised authority, indexed by the use of Hebrew, are either directly or indirectly the butt of the jokes. Arabic cannot be a substitute in these situations because it does not index the relations of power that the Hebrew can. Moreover, using Hebrew for sarcastic humour not only suspends norms of politeness – it is not as vulgar as an expletive and not as rude as a command – it also suspends norms of language use. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict contributes to nationalist norms that regard Hebrew 'interference' as unpatriotic, in accordance with the language purism project that accompanied the promotion of Standard Arabic as a formal register. However, when Hebrew codeswitching and borrowing is employed to subvert the Israeli Hebrew meaning of 'boss', or poke fun at some stereotype of Israeliness, nationalist language purists face a quandary, because the function of using Hebrew in this way is actually aligned with nationalist ideology (for more examples of this type of humour see Henkin 2009, and Hawker 2013).

Humour is sometimes depicted as an outlet for resisting oppressive political power (Hodge & Mansfield 1985: 197). However, the irreverence of humour can also be tolerated by an oppressive power as a sanctioned limited arena for criticism that does not spill over into political change (Eagleton 1981). It is not the Israeli state that would find the humorous use of Hebrew subversive, if it recognised it; rather it would be those Palestinians who adhere to nationalist norms that frown on extensive borrowing from Hebrew, and this is somewhat ironic.

4. *An explanatory model for the uses of menahēl: articulations and ideologies*

The analysis of particular instances of Arabic uses of *menahēl*, from the Israeli Hebrew for ‘boss, manager, foreman’, allows us to identify two broad patterns distinguished by pragmatic function. One (seen in examples 1-4) is associated with the speech of Palestinian day-migrant workers and involves minimising Hebrew loanwords in interactions with Arabic-speakers who have no experience of work in Israel thanks to the possibility of substituting or glossing in Arabic. The other pattern (in examples 5-8) can be used by anyone with the rhetorical skills to achieve the balance of humour and irreverence that are elements of irony and sarcasm, conveyed by deploying Hebrew for its connotations of Israeli power in paradoxical situations. For this function Arabic cannot provide a succinct substitute.

In turn, the patterns thus summarised can be linked – or, *articulated* with – *ideologies* that mediate the experienced context. In the Palestinian-Israeli context, several ideologies are at play, and we give them descriptive labels for convenience. The Palestinian migrant workers’ stoicism, or pragmatism (sometimes termed ‘resilience’), is the rationalisation of what has to be done to make a living under the Israeli occupation that shapes the Palestinian economy and other aspects of daily life. This way of thinking is to some degree shared by all

Palestinians who carry an Israeli ID card, since it is necessary to get by, and the stoicism negotiates in specific ways with other ideologies: Israeli securitism that puts Israel's military objectives ahead of any other consideration, with the neo-liberal ideology that cheap unprotected labour is an economic asset, and with Palestinian nationalism that demands collective resistance and sacrifice.

The explanatory model posits that ideologies serve as tractors that are articulated with, by means of a metaphorical flexible hinge, one or more trailers which are social practices viewed in analytical categories, for example, linguistic practices, and can be thought of together (Hall 1980). In this case, securitism and economic neo-liberalism are hegemonic global ideologies which the Palestinian leadership itself has espoused at least during the 1990s in the form of the Oslo process, and to which there seem to be only marginal voiced alternatives (Turner & Shweiki 2014). Put crudely, *maḥsūm* 'checkpoint' and *menahēl* 'boss' are loanwords from Israeli Hebrew into Palestinian Arabic that are drawn into use by securitism and economic neo-liberalism. The flexibility of articulation, however, allows for the assignment of the same practices to another tractor, Palestinian stoicism, which acknowledges the negotiation with yet another ideology, Palestinian nationalism. Symbolic condemnation of work in Israeli settlements, denying institutional support for the workers' rights of Palestinian labour migrants, ineffectual official protest against the excesses of Israeli military operations, and disapproval of the use of loanwords from Hebrew, are articulated with Palestinian nationalism. Stoicism combines all these 'top-down' ideologies with comprehending how their contradictions play out in daily lived experiences. The outcome of the negotiation is a linguistic practice that incorporates loanwords but minimises their salience (thus indexing the contradictions) by substituting or glossing with Arabic in interactions outside of an in-group of migrant workers.

Palestinian nationalism and stoicism are negotiated with Israeli securitism differently when articulated with the linguistic practice of 'ironic power humour'. The success of the humour depends on the audience's shared experience of Israeli securitism, which the linguistic practice references, and also critiques, in paradoxical situations. The critique articulates with Palestinian nationalism, and the humour is a coping mechanism articulated with stoicism.

The analytical categories of the tractor-articulation-trailer metaphor allow to take instances of speech containing borrowing (the linguistic practice under examination) which are ordered according to pragmatic functions, link these to social practices (coping with living under Israeli control, working in conditions of precarity and securitisation, organising the social roles of gender), and link these to ideologies through a series of articulations. Nothing is clear-cut, the articulations are flexible rather than deterministic, yet the model provides a nuanced explanation that incorporates relations of power made intelligible through ideologies which pull the practices in certain directions. These nuances are needed in the field of Hebrew-Arabic language contact so as to move beyond explanations relying on national identities and conflict, which are categories produced by nationalisms and as such explain only one facet of the language contact phenomena.

5. Conclusion: Articulations *and* ideologies: *definitions and links to broader questions*

Work done in the field of linguistic anthropology and ethnography recognises the role of language ideologies in shaping the contours of the range of linguistic practices (Bucholtz & Hall 2005; Kroskrity 2000). Discourse analysis, pragmatics, sociolinguistics and conversation analysis have developed techniques to isolate specific linguistic phenomena in actually-existing linguistic practices that are particularly sensitive to the effects of language ideologies (Hasan 2004). The social recognition of the ideological sensitivity of a phenomenon, such as

Hebrew borrowing into Arabic, is *enregisterment* (Agha 2005), and the expression of an attitude toward such a phenomenon is *stance* (Jaffé 2009; Du Bois 2007). The explanatory model applied here to the case of *menahēl* ‘boss’ and other Israeli Hebrew borrowing or codeswitching in Arabic relies on this scholarship and has integrated these insights into the analysis in the preceding sections of this chapter. At this point in the chapter we broaden the scope by exploring what exactly is meant by *ideologies* and *articulations*.

The explanatory model posits that language ideologies are an integral part of ideologies generally, as has been demonstrated for instance in relation to monolingualism and nationalism (Silverstein 2000). What requires unpacking is the functioning of ideologies in the historically specific settings of the Hebrew-Arabic language contact at hand. A way of unpacking this that can be generalised to other settings would demonstrate the unique utility of analysing language practices for understanding other social practices in articulation with them and with ideologies (Rampton 2009).

What might not have been clear so far in the chapter is the concept of the tractor (ideology) and its articulations (configurations) with the trailers (practices). The tractor does not have a driver, for instance a powerful political group, such as Israeli military advisors ‘designing’ securitism. Nor is the tractor driverless, an (ideal) idea that can cause practices to occur, for instance to inspire people to avoid using Israeli Hebrew terms in conversations with uninitiated interlocutors. Nor is the tractor an ‘outlook’ that colours (distorts) in the minds of those who are looking (which is everybody) another, separate (‘alienated’), entity called ‘the world’. We are not talking of ideology as a ‘world outlook’ then, but rather offering the tractor as a spatial and vectoral representation of the ‘materiality of ideology’. With this oxymoron, Louis Althusser (1971: 155-156) sought to capture what ethnographers of language know by necessity: that *ideologies* are only ever found in *practices*. Ideologies are performed (Butler 1997), do not exist independently of that performance, and shape the

content of the performance: so that for instance both the soldiers' orders to present an ID card for inspection at a checkpoint, and the compliance with that order, are performances of securitism, which therefore exists materially in the shape of these practices. What we are saying here is not that orders and compliance are the same, neutralising relations of power, but that there is a common logic to both, and that logic pulls (like a tractor) the actors to perform in this way, in accordance with their ideas of the world, as observed ethnographically. This conception allows Althusser to arrive at the following definition of ideology: "What is represented in ideology is therefore not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live." (1971:155) And Althusser elaborates: "'Individuals' [...] live in ideology, i.e. in a determinate (religious, ethical, etc.) representation of the world [which] depends on their imaginary relation to their conditions of existence." (1971: 156) And furthermore: "The ideology of ideology [...] recognises, despite its imaginary distortion, that the 'ideas' of a human subject exist in his actions, or ought to exist in his actions, and if that is not the case, it lends him other ideas corresponding to the actions (however perverse) that he does perform." (1971: 158)

The flexibility of 'lending other ideas' is what leads us to think of the articulation between the tractor and the trailer as a hinge which can be unhooked and recombined. Thanks to this flexibility we can consider Palestinian stoicism, performed in the linguistic practice of alternating between Hebrew loanwords and Arabic equivalents, to be a negotiation of both Israeli securitism and Palestinian nationalism, as explained above. *Articulation* is Stuart Hall's resolution of the connection between agency and structure recognisable to all social scientists. *Articulation* overcomes problems of determinism but does not dissolve relations of power, and allows for reconfigurations, but nevertheless provides a linkage between various,

analytically convenient, distinctions of practices which can be thought of together (Hall 1980: 65).

In sum:

1. *Ideologies* are systems of ideas that represent subjects' understanding of their relation to the conditions in which they live, the subjects' actions are performances of this understanding, and therefore ideologies are materially evident in the actions;
2. *Articulation* is a conception of the flexible link between ideologies' pull and the various interconnected social practices of subjects;
3. *Language practices* are a particular type of social practice or action identified by empirical documentation of speech using ethnographic methods that also record participants' understandings of interactions, and that moreover discern patterns in and aspects of the practices that are not readily accessible in ordinary experience.

Linguistic anthropology and ethnography can make good on the promise, hinted at by the second meaning of *articulation* in the sense of voicing (Grossberg 1986), to introduce language into the 'materiality of ideology'. The case of the Israeli Hebrew loanword *menahēl* 'boss' in Palestinian Arabic provides material for an analysis that cannot but incorporate the ideologies that represent relations with the conditions of life in the Palestinian-Israeli context. These conditions include economic precarity for Palestinian day-migrant workers and military control over access and movement in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, combined with limited autonomy in the form of Palestinian institutions. Palestinians understand their relations to these conditions with combinations of stoicism and nationalism in negotiation with Israeli securitism and economic neo-liberalism. It might seem too obvious to apply this

explanatory model to *menahēl*, in its semantic field of power relations, but it's a place to start, not least so as not to annoy 'the boss'.

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