


Shadow of a Taxman:

How, and by whom, was the Republican Government financed in the Irish War of Independence (1919-21)?



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Short Abstract

The Irish War of Independence (1919-21) was a guerrilla war between the IRA, loosely under the command of the underground Irish republican government known as Dáil Éireann, and the forces of the British government in Ireland. Eager to project itself as a legitimate government, the Dáil decided to raise funds by selling war bonds. These bonds promised a return to subscribers only when British forces had left Ireland and an independent Irish Republic was internationally recognised. Known as the National Loan and External Loans, these bonds raised £370,165 in Ireland and nearly \$6m in America. This thesis explores the funding of Dáil Éireann during the Irish War of Independence, showing how its funds were solicited, collected, transmitted and safeguarded, as well as who the subscribers were and what might have influenced their subscriptions.

Section I explores the Dáil's fundraising in Ireland, while Section II covers the funds collected overseas. Chapter 1 introduces the National Loan, placing it in the context of previous nationalist fundraising in Ireland. Chapter 2 explores the organisational structure that underpinned the loan campaign and chapter 3 analyses the ways in which the loan was promoted. Using previously unknown archival material, chapter 4 investigates the identities of its subscribers. Section II begins with chapter 5, which gives an overview of the history of Irish nationalist fundraising in America. Chapter 6 outlines the organisational landscape in which the First External Loan was promoted. Its promotion is covered in chapter 7, and chapter 8 looks at the internal dynamics of the External Loan organisation. In chapter 9, attention is paid to the identities of subscribers to the First External Loan. Chapter 10 then focuses on the Dáil's Second External Loan, relating it to the Anglo-Irish peace negotiations. Finally, chapter 11 explores the Dáil's fundraising in Argentina.

Long Abstract

The 1918 UK general election resulted in a landslide victory in Ireland for the advanced nationalist Sinn Féin party, gaining 73 of the 105 Irish seats in Westminster. With a manifesto of abstention, the Sinn Féin representatives formed their own assembly, Dáil Éireann, in Dublin. They also set up a parallel judicial system and consular service, supported by an underground government with a skeleton staff. At the same time, the paramilitary Irish Volunteers, renamed as the IRA and reconstituted as the army of the Dáil, pursued a guerrilla war against the forces of British government in Ireland, principally the Royal Irish Constabulary. As a result of these actions, Sinn Féin, the IRA, and Dáil Éireann had all been declared illegal by the British Government by September 1919.

At first, this counter-state had neither international recognition nor territorial integrity, but as the war progressed it took on more and more of the characteristics of a legitimate government. Eager to project itself as such, the illegal and underground Dáil government decided to seek funding *via* the sale of war bonds. Issued in 1919, 1920 and 1921, these bonds promised a return to subscribers only when British forces had left Ireland and an independent Irish Republic was internationally recognised. Through these bonds, known as the National Loan and External Loans, the Dáil's Department of Finance raised £370,165 in Ireland and nearly \$6m in America.

This thesis explores the funding of Dáil Éireann during the Irish War of Independence, showing how its funds were solicited, collected, transmitted and safeguarded, as well as who the subscribers were and what might have influenced their subscriptions. It also highlights the importance of access to funds in shaping the balance of power within and between organisations during the war. The thesis is divided into two

sections: Section I explores the Dáil's fundraising in Ireland, while Section II covers the funds collected overseas. It is composed of eleven chapters, and proceeds as follows.

Chapter 1 briefly introduces the National Loan, the Dáil's principal means of fundraising in Ireland. Placing the loan in the context of previous nationalist fundraising campaigns, it demonstrates the importance of popular fundraising in gauging public opinion and engaging popular support. It also introduces the main players in the organisation of the loan, including Michael Collins, Minister of Finance.

Chapter 2 examines the organisational structure that underpinned the National Loan campaign. While legal and internationally recognised states issuing war bonds can rely on post office and retail bank branch networks to sell to the public, such an infrastructure was not available to the Dáil. Instead, it had to use the pre-existing organisational structures at its disposal: principally Sinn Féin and the IRA. As an illegal organisation without recourse to the law, the Dáil was vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour on the part of its fundraisers. As a disincentive to opportunism, the Dáil bureaucratized, strengthening its authority over Sinn Féin and the IRA. However, this bureaucracy was vulnerable to interception by the British authorities, as were the funds collected. External organisations such as the Catholic Church, and cover organisations, such as the Irish National Assurance Company and the National Land Bank, were vital in overcoming these challenges.

Chapter 3 explores the ways in which the National Loan was promoted, and how it was instrumentalised as a driver of public sentiment. Coordinated from Dublin, each locality followed a similar strategy. First, the most likely subscribers, who were loyal to the cause, relatively wealthy and carried local influence, were invited to attend a promotional meeting. The smaller subscribers were approached later, *via* a door-to-door canvas by local members of Sinn Féin and the IRA. Attempts to advertise in the press led to the suppression of 22 newspapers by the British government, leaving the

remaining newspapers reluctant to publish. Consequently, the loan relied on more direct forms of marketing, such as posters, leaflets, and graffiti. Open canvassing for the National Loan was risky and many collectors were arrested for doing so, but press coverage of the arrests resulted in free publicity that strengthened public sentiment in favour of the Dáil. This dangerous, anti-establishment image was tempered by endorsement from senior members of the Catholic clergy. Intimidation of potential subscribers, although strongly discouraged by the loan's organisers, was also a feature of the National Loan campaign, but this does not seem to have been widespread.

The National Loan closed in July 1920, having raised £371,849 from 140,000 subscribers. Chapter 4 analyses its results and, using previously unknown archival material, investigates the identities of subscribers. It draws primarily on three National Loan registers that were found in an archive and in the hands of a private collector. These registers list the names, addresses and subscriptions of 1,605 subscribers in South Monaghan, 2,927 in Longford, and 1,210 in East Tipperary. These registers were supplemented by 178 National Loan receipts for the parish of Doneraile, Co. Cork, and the names and addresses of 313 subscribers from across the country mentioned in Dáil debates. The combination of these five sources is a unique dataset containing the names and addresses of 6,233 subscribers to the National Loan. It was possible to positively identify 3,298 (52.9%) of the subscribers in the 1911 census of Ireland, unlocking information on their age, literacy, religion, and occupation. Further details were gleaned by cross-referencing with police intelligence reports, county directories, newspaper reports, previous fundraising lists, published and unpublished memoirs, and the testimonies of IRA veterans in their witness statements and pension applications.

The picture that emerges is a nuanced representation of public opinion at the time, confirming some elements of the historiography while challenging others. In contrast to the image of the youthful revolutionary, the subscribers were overwhelmingly

middle-aged, with 48 years as the median. Not surprisingly, the subscribers were overwhelmingly Catholic, although a significant amount of protestant subscribers could be identified in Longford. Only 12% of subscribers were women, ranging from 9% in Longford to 21% in the more urban East Tipperary. The vast majority of subscribers were farmers, more so than the general population. Roman catholic priests were also overrepresented among the subscribers, and were associated with the largest subscriptions. Publicans were associated with large subscriptions as well, as were shopkeepers. Subscribing to previous nationalist fundraising campaigns, in support of Home Rule in 1913, in sympathy for the rebels of Easter 1916, and in opposition to the imposition of conscription in 1918, all increased likelihood of subscribing to the National Loan. Linking cultural nationalism with support for independence, those residents of South Monaghan who filled out their 1911 census return in Irish could be expected to make subscriptions that were 9% larger than those who did not.

Section II begins with chapter 5, which gives a brief overview of the history of Irish nationalist fundraising in America. Irish nationalist politicians such as Charles Stewart Parnell and John Redmond had been raising funds in America for decades before the Dáil was established, and in that time a pattern emerged as to the relationship between homeland and diaspora. For logistical reasons, in order to access funds in America, Irish nationalist politicians had to cooperate with the leading Irish-American organisation of the time. As gatekeepers of Irish-American money, the leading Irish-American organisations had considerable bargaining power relative to the Irish nationalist politicians. However, the Irish-American organisations derived their legitimacy from their ability to provide an outlet for Irish nationalist sympathy in America. For this, they needed recognition from the leading Irish nationalist organisation in Ireland.

Chapter 6 introduces the key personalities of the First External Loan and the organisational landscape in which it was promoted. The Dáil mission to the US was led by Éamon de Valera, President of the Dáil, along with Harry Boland, Sean Nunan, J.C. Walsh, and James O'Mara. At this time, the predominant Irish-American organisation was the Friends of Irish Freedom (FOIF), under the leadership of John Devoy and Judge Daniel Cohalan. In line with the pattern discussed in chapter 5, in order to raise funds in the US the Dáil mission had to make an alliance with the FOIF. The FOIF branch network enabled the Dáil to reach potential subscribers across the country, but its reliance on the FOIF left the Dáil vulnerable to manipulation by Devoy and Cohalan.

The Dáil's First External Loan, or bond drive, was launched in January 1920. There followed a nine-month promotional campaign, and this is the focus of chapter 7. Promotional meetings, door-to-door canvassing, and press advertising were organised across the US, coordinated by the bond drive's head office in New York. The Dáil mission accepted nineteenth-century 'Fenian' bonds in exchange for its own bond certificates, linking the bond drive to the older tradition of advanced nationalist fundraising in America. It also accepted US Liberty Loan bonds from the First World War at par, implying parity of credibility between the Dáil's treasury and the US Federal Reserve while also linking the Dáil's aspirations with President Wilson's war aim of freedom for small nations. As with the National Loan, endorsements from senior Catholic clergymen were used to encourage people to subscribe, but this was tempered in the southern states where the 'Protestant Friends of Ireland' played a prominent role at promotional events. The bond drive's promotional campaign also had a bearing on the Dáil's relationship with the FOIF. In order to strengthen its bargaining position with the FOIF, the Dáil needed to be seen as the monopoly supplier of Irish nationalism. To do this, it needed to become synonymous with Ireland, and the use of bond certificates as a means of fundraising was crucial in this regard. The sale of bond certificates implied

exclusivity, suggesting that any other means of contributing to the Irish cause was in some way counterfeit.

Behind the scenes lay an organisation under strain, and this is the focus of chapter 8. Some difficulties were simply a function of the scale of the operation and the limited time available to organise. Others were caused by clashes of personalities within the Dáil mission. Others still were simply the result of weather conditions. But the main threat to the Dáil's success came from the FOIF leadership as they leveraged their bargaining position to protect their position as leaders of the Irish in America. At first, the Dáil mission was able to keep any infighting away from the public eye, but an interview in which de Valera suggested Britain might view Ireland in the same way as the US did Cuba, led Devoy to openly denounce the bond drive. De Valera's lobbying of candidates in the US presidential election generated a similarly barbed response from Cohalan. Nevertheless, de Valera managed to hold the Dáil-FOIF alliance together for the duration of the bond drive.

The bond drive closed for new subscriptions in October 1920, having raised \$5,151,800 from 276,219 subscribers. In chapter 9, attention is paid to the results of the First External Loan, combining a previously unknown register containing the names and addresses of 1,582 subscribers in Manhattan with qualitative material from around the country. Notwithstanding attempts to gain subscribers from across the country, the main centres of Irish population on the east coast dominated. New York raised 26% of the total, while another 20% came from Massachusetts. Although there were a number of non-Irish subscribers to the bond drive, and these garnered column inches in the Irish-American press, analysis of 327 subscribers in Manhattan that were matched to the US Federal Census of 1920 reveals that 71% were born in Ireland, while a further 17% had at least one Irish-born parent. Interestingly, their median year of immigration to America was 1904, which was before the radicalisation of public opinion in Ireland. In contrast to

the National Loan, subscribers in Manhattan were predominantly young, with a median age of just 36. Some 79% of subscribers in Manhattan were either renters or boarders, while 18% were reliant on their employers for accommodation. In line with contemporary stereotypes, domestic servants and manual workers were most numerous. In contrast with the National Loan, 40% were women.

Chapter 10 focuses on the Dáil's Second External Loan, relating it to developments in Ireland and the Anglo-Irish peace talks in London. With the First External Loan closed, the Dáil formally severed ties with the FOIF and created its own organisation, the American Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic. Meanwhile in Ireland, the autumn of 1920 and spring of 1921 saw a dramatic escalation in violence, establishing the IRA as a powerful force relative to the Dáil. Supply of funds was the Dáil's main means of controlling the gunmen, but this was dependent on public opinion in America. In late-1920, the IRA began extorting money from local farmers, which reduced the IRA units' reliance on the Dáil and also damaged the image of the movement in the eyes of the public. Meanwhile, in response to the escalating violence, a charitable organisation known as Acomri was established in America to send relief funds to Ireland. With the signing of the truce between the IRA and the British government in July 1921 and subsequent peace negotiations in autumn of that year, a new interlocutor came into the frame: the British government. The Second External Loan, launched in November 1921, was important in strengthening the Dáil's bargaining position in the peace negotiations, providing evidence that the Dáil had the means to fight if the talks broke down. For this reason, it was promoted on a state-by-state basis, beginning in Washington DC, to coincide with the Washington Naval Conference, and Illinois. However, having raised \$33,000 in Washington and \$499,150 in Illinois, the Second External Loan was cut short by the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty.

Although the vast majority of the Dáil's external funding came from the US, its fundraising efforts were not confined to that country. Chapter 11 surveys the Dáil's diaspora fundraising beyond the United States, including Britain, Australia, Canada, and South Africa. It focuses on Argentina, the only country other than Ireland and the US that the Dáil targeted with a bond drive of its own. The Dáil's Argentine Loan was spearheaded by Laurence Ginnell, who sought cooperation from wealthy Irish-Argentines and some non-Irish Argentine sympathisers. However, unlike the US, the Irish-Argentines lacked a unifying figure like Judge Cohalan, who could claim to be the undisputed leader of the Irish in that country. Although Cohalan turned out to be a rival to the Dáil in America, he did provide de Valera with a ready-made, consolidated sales network in the form of the FOIF, without which the bond drive would not have been possible. There was no such network in Argentina. Instead, Ginnell was presented with warring factions. He also had to contend with the reliance of wealthy Irish-Argentines on Britain as an export market and source of investment. The Argentine Loan was also cut short by the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, having raised only AR\$19,155 (\$14,328) from 20 subscribers.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AARIR	American Association for Recognition of the Irish Republic
ACII	American Commission for Irish Independence
Acomri	American Committee for Relief in Ireland
AIHS	American Irish Historical Society
AOHA	Ancient Order of Hibernians of America
BMH	Bureau of Military History
CCCA	Cork City & County Archives
DÉ	Dáil Éireann
DÉDF	Dáil Éireann Department of Finance
DD	Dáil Debates (sample of subscribers to the National Loan)
FJ	Freeman's Journal
FOIF	Friends of Irish Freedom
GAA	Gaelic Athletic Association
HBD	Harry Boland's Diary
HRF	Home Rule Fund
ICA	Irish Catholic Association
INAAVDF	Irish National Aid Association and Volunteers' Dependents Fund
INLA	Irish National League of America
INLLA	Irish National Land League of America
IPFA	Irish Parliamentary Fund Association
IPP	Irish Parliamentary Party
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IRASA	Irish Republican Association of South Africa
IRB	Irish Republican Brotherhood
IRLBA	Irish Republican League of Buenos Ayres
ISDL	Irish Self-determination League
KKK	Ku Klux Klan
LAAOHA	Ladies' Auxiliary Ancient Order of Hibernians of America
LDCA	Longford County Archives
LDRD	Liam de Róiste's Diary
MCM	Monaghan County Museum
MNR	Máire Ní Riada Collection
NAI	National Archives of Ireland
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration (US)
NLI	National Library of Ireland
NYPL	New York Public Library
PFI	Protestant Friends of Ireland
RIC	Royal Irish Constabulary
SJSU	San José State University
TD	Teachtaí Dála (Member of Dáil Éireann)
UCDA	University College Dublin Archives
UIL	United Irish League
UILA	United Irish League of America
UNIA	Universal Negro Improvement Association
VUA	Villanova University Archives

Introduction

Sean O’Casey’s play *Shadow of a Gunman* was the first major work of fiction based on the Irish War of Independence. Much like the realm of fiction, the historiography of this pivotal period in Irish history has focused on the romantic armed struggle personified in O’Casey’s eponymous gunman. As a result, a shadow has fallen over the financial side of the war of independence, leaving it neglected by historians and largely unknown to the wider world. The revolution had to be funded however, and the way in which it was funded is the focus of this thesis.

The organisation at the centre of this thesis is Dáil Éireann, the underground Irish republican government established by representatives of the advanced nationalist Sinn Féin party, following its landslide victory in the 1918 UK general election. The Dáil held its first session on 21 January 1919 and, on the same day two Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) policemen were shot dead in Co. Tipperary. The organisation responsible for this attack was the Irish Volunteers, a nationalist paramilitary group that, although autonomous, was loosely under the command of the Dáil. This incident is generally regarded as opening the Irish War of Independence, a major civil conflict with between 1,200 and 1,500 fatalities, many more casualties, and substantial damage to property. On one side were the Irish Volunteers, also known as the IRA, and on the other were the forces of the British government in Ireland, principally the RIC.¹

The Dáil selected a cabinet from its representatives; with ministries including Defence, Finance, and Foreign Affairs forming what historian Arthur Mitchell has termed a ‘counter-state’.² At first, this counter-state had neither international recognition nor territorial integrity, but as the war progressed it took on more and more of the characteristics of a legitimate government. Eager to project itself as such, the illegal and

¹ M. Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2002), p. 26

² A. Mitchell, *Revolutionary Government in Ireland: Dáil Éireann 1919-1922* (Dublin, 1995).

underground Dáil government decided to seek funding *via* the issue of war bonds. Issued in 1919, 1920 and 1921, these bonds promised a return to subscribers only when British forces had left Ireland and an independent Irish Republic was internationally recognised. Through these bond certificates, known as the National Loan and External Loans, the Dáil's Department of Finance (DÉDF) raised £370,165 in Ireland and nearly \$6m (*ca.* £1.5m) in America.³

This thesis aims to shed light on how the Dáil's funds were solicited, collected, transmitted and safeguarded, as well as who the subscribers were and what might have influenced their subscriptions. In so doing, it will make three broad contributions to the historiography of the Irish War of Independence. First and foremost, it will give a comprehensive overview of the financing of Dáil Éireann. Although crucial to understanding the war, this has received scant attention in the historiography. Second, by focussing on fundraising, this thesis will internationalise a war that has too often been treated primarily as a domestic history. Thus, it will add to a small but growing historiography on the role of the diaspora in the Irish revolutionary period.⁴ Finally, by focussing on subscribers, it will explore the role of civilian non-combatants in determining the outcome of the war, yielding fresh insights into popular support for Irish independence on the eve of its realisation. In this way, it builds on existing scholarship that has investigated the identities of members of the IRA at this time.⁵

This is not the first attempt to investigate the financing of the republican government in the Irish War of Independence. Most notably, in *Money for Ireland*, Francis

³ F.M. Carroll, *Money for Ireland: Finance, Diplomacy, Politics, and the First Dail Éireann Loans, 1919-1936* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), pp. 9 & 15.

⁴ M. Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora Nationalism* (Dublin, 2005), D. Brundage, *Irish Nationalists in America: The politics of exile 1798-1998* (New York, 2016), R. Schmuhl, *Ireland's Exiled Children* (Oxford, 2016), M. Nyhan-Grey (ed.), *Ireland's allies: America and the 1916 Easter Rising* (Dublin, 2016), D. Keogh, *La Independencia de Irlanda: La Conexión Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 2016).

⁵ D. Fitzpatrick, *Politics and Irish Life, 1913-1921: Provincial Experiences of War and Revolution* (Cork, 1977) ch. 6; P. Hart, 'The social structure of the IRA, 1916-1923', *Historical Journal*, 42 (1999), pp. 207-31; M. Coleman, *County Longford and the Irish Revolution, 1910-23* (Dublin, 2003); J. Augusteijn, 'Accounting for the emergence of violent activism among Irish revolutionaries, 1916-21', *Irish Historical Studies*, 35/139 (2007), pp. 327-44; G. Narciso & B. Severgnini, 'The Deep Roots of Rebellion: Evidence from the Irish Revolution', *TEP Working Paper* No. 2216 (2016).

Carroll made an opening salvo on the topic in 2002.⁶ However, although a welcome contribution, Carroll's book is limited in a number of ways. Only two chapters of *Money for Ireland* are devoted to the Dáil's fundraising, the rest of the book concerned with the legal complications that followed independence. Even within these two chapters, Carroll's work is lacking any quantitative analysis. Moreover, only providing aggregate amounts raised at county level, it completely overlooks the identities of the subscribers. Thus, *Money for Ireland* provides an introduction rather than an exploration of the Dáil's funding in the war of independence. Another contribution to the historiography has come from the sociologist Daniel Lainer-Vos. In *Sinews of the Nation*, he compares the Dáil's fundraising mission to the US in 1919-21 with the Israeli government's diaspora fundraising in 1951.⁷ Yet, as this is a comparative work, relatively little detail is provided on the intricacies of the Dáil's fundraising. More broadly, as a sociologist, Lainer-Vos is principally interested in the anthropology of gift giving, the interactions between diaspora and homeland, and the 'imagined communities' that were created and shaped by the donation of money. As with *Money for Ireland*, quantitative analysis is completely absent.

A second strand of relevant historiography can be found in biographies of the principal participants in the war of independence; particularly Michael Collins who, *inter alia*, served as the Dáil's Minister of Finance.⁸ However, although fundraising occupied the majority of Collins's day-to-day energies, most of these biographies deal with the military and intelligence roles he held alongside finance. On the face of it, one exception should be the very recently published *Michael Collins and the Financing of Violent Political Struggle*, by criminologist Nicholas Ridley.⁹ However, the title of this book is somewhat

⁶ Carroll, *Money*.

⁷ D. Lainer-Vos, *Sinews of the Nation: Constructing Irish and Zionist Bonds in the United States* (Cambridge, 2013).

⁸ e.g. P.S. Béaslaí, *Michael Collins, soldier and statesman*, (Dublin, 1926), Vol. I; P. Hart, *Mick: The Real Michael Collins* (London, 2005).

⁹ N. Ridley, *Michael Collins and the Financing of Violent Political Struggle* (Oxford, 2018).

misleading, as only two chapters are devoted to fundraising in the war of independence, and these are limited in archival research.

Biographies of Éamon de Valera, as President of the Dáil, also touch on his fundraising activities during the war of independence, most notably David Hannigan's *De Valera in America*.¹⁰ However, even though the collection of funds was one of the main motivations for de Valera's trip to the US, focus on fundraising, again, is peripheral. The most in-depth treatment of the Dáil's fundraising in the US comes from another biography: *Harry Boland's Irish Revolution* by David Fitzpatrick.¹¹ Following the activities of Harry Boland in America, this biography provides an excellent exploration of the relationship between the Dáil mission in America and its Irish-American interlocutors. It is also notable for the author's typically meticulous archival research. However, in common with the rest of the historiography, there is no quantitative analysis of the funds collected and, since it is a biography, the identities of the subscribers are completely absent.

Consequently, this thesis relies to a large extent on primary source material. The Dáil Éireann foundation collection, held by the National Archives of Ireland (NAI), forms the bedrock of the material available. The personal papers of the main players in the Dáil's fundraising campaigns, held in the National Library of Ireland (NLI), Cork City and County Archives (CCCA), University College Dublin (UCDA), New York Public Library (NYPL), American Irish Historical Society (AIHS), Villanova University (VUA), and San José State University (SJSU), were also invaluable, as were local archives in Monaghan (MCM) and Longford (LDCA). In the UK National Archives (TNA), the Dublin Castle and Foreign Office papers provide a view of the Dáil's fundraising from the other side, and the US Bureau of Investigation files (NARA) show the American

¹⁰ D. Hannigan, *De Valera in America* (Basingstoke, 2010).

¹¹ D. Fitzpatrick, *Harry Boland's Irish Revolution* (Cork, 2003).

perspective. Recently digitised material from the Bureau of Military History (BMH) and the Irish Newspaper Archive was also integral to this thesis, along with newspaper collections from the US, Britain, Australia and Argentina. This corpus was greatly enhanced by exclusive access to the 'Máire Ní Riada' (MNR) collection of National Loan local registers, held by a private collector, and the Dáil Éireann External Loan files, currently being catalogued by the NAI. Combined with census data from the NAI and Ancestry.com, this enabled identification of the Dáil's financial supporters.

A recurring theme running through this thesis is the nexus of money and power. Although largely overlooked by the historiography, access to funds was crucial in shaping the balance of power within and between organisations throughout the Irish War of Independence. The Dáil's ability to exert authority over Sinn Féin and the IRA, its bargaining power with the various Irish-American organisations, and finally in negotiations with the British government, were all contingent on establishing and maintaining control of the purse strings. This control would be worthless, of course, were it not for the thousands of Irish, Irish-Americans, and other supporters who were willing to empty their pockets in support of Irish independence. This thesis is arranged chronologically but, to allow the appropriate level of analysis of these dynamics, some concurrent events are treated separately. Thus, it is divided into two sections. Section I explores the Dáil's fundraising in Ireland, while Section II covers the funds collected overseas. It is composed of eleven chapters, and proceeds as follows.

Chapter 1 briefly introduces the National Loan, placing it in the context of previous nationalist fundraising in Ireland and laying out its terms. Chapter 2 explores the organisational structure that underpinned the National Loan campaign, highlighting the way in which it strengthened the Dáil's authority over Sinn Féin and the IRA. At the same time, it sets out the archival material left behind by the National Loan's bureaucracy. Chapter 3 introduces the National Loan's potential subscribers and explores

the ways in which the loan was promoted. It also shows how, by provoking the British government, the loan was instrumentalised as a driver of public sentiment. Chapter 4 turns to the results of the National Loan and, using previously unknown archival material, investigates the identities of its subscribers. Details such as age, gender, religion and occupation are revealed, confirming some elements of the historiography while challenging others.

Section II begins with chapter 5, which gives an overview of the history of Irish nationalist fundraising in America. In so doing, it introduces the particular dynamics that determined the bargaining position of Irish nationalists in Ireland relative to Irish nationalist organisations in the US. Chapter 6 introduces the key personalities of the First External Loan and the organisational landscape in which it was promoted. Its promotion is covered in chapter 7, with a particular focus on the Dáil's efforts to be seen as the legitimate government of Ireland, strengthening its bargaining position with the Irish-American leadership. Chapter 8 looks at the internal dynamics of the External Loan organisation, and how the Dáil mission vied with the Irish-American leadership for control of Irish nationalist fundraising in America. In chapter 9, attention is paid to the subscribers to the First External Loan, combining a previously unknown register containing the names and addresses of subscribers with qualitative material from around the country. Chapter 10 then focuses on the Dáil's Second External Loan, relating it to developments in Ireland and the Anglo-Irish peace talks in London. Bringing together several strands of the thesis, it looks at the role of fundraising in determining the bargaining power of individuals within the Dáil, between the Dáil and the Irish-Americans, the Dáil and the IRA, and the Dáil and the British government, all of which was contingent on the Dáil's relationship with American opinion. Finally, chapter 11 looks to the rest of the world. It surveys the Dáil's abortive attempts to raise funds

outside Ireland and the US, and focuses on Argentina, where a bond drive was launched but prematurely terminated with the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty.

Section I

Funds from Home

Chapter 1: Introducing the National Loan

The majority of the Dáil's funds in the Irish War of Independence came from America, but a significant minority came from within Ireland itself. This minority was made all the more significant by the difficulty of transmitting American funds back to Ireland to meet the Dáil's considerable cash flow demands. Requiring a functioning bureaucracy and accountable chain of command, the Dáil's fundraising in Ireland was also crucial in solidifying its organisational structure and asserting its supremacy over Sinn Féin and the IRA. Moreover, as a popular fundraising campaign, it was also a key driver of public opinion in Ireland, and was instrumentalised to marshal the civilian population in support of independence. As a result, the list of contributors to the Dáil's funds in Ireland provides a unique and valuable insight into those Irishmen and Irishwomen who supported independence.

Popular fundraising in Ireland is as old as Irish nationalism itself, serving the dual function of raising funds and engaging support. The United Irishmen, for example, distributed 'promissory notes' to the poor of Ireland, repayable after the 1798 rebellion. As well as raising funds, the intention was to give the people a vested interest in the outcome of the rebellion.¹ Yet, it wasn't until Daniel O'Connell rose to prominence with his 'Catholic Rent' of 1824-9 and 'Repeal Rent' of 1841-7, that the potential of popular fundraising was exploited to the full.² As well as providing O'Connell with the means to pursue his twin political goals of Catholic emancipation and repeal of the Act of Union, popular fundraising allowed him to connect with the masses in a way that was unprecedented, and thereby draw them into a national organisation. In the words of

¹ 'Left Hand' to Pelham and Cooke, 1797, SPOI Rebellion Papers, 620/30/211, in N.J. Curtin, *The United Irishmen: Popular politics in Ulster and Dublin, 1791-1798* (Dublin, 1998), p. 114.

² M. Keyes, *Funding the Nation* (Dublin, 2011), p. 6.

historian Michael Keyes, O'Connell's fundraising campaigns created 'a unique brand of inclusive popular politics'.³ Popular fundraising was also crucial to the other great titan of nineteenth-century Irish politics, Charles Stewart Parnell. With his Parliamentary Party and the Irish National Land League campaigning for home rule and land reform, it was vital that Parnell was able to raise funds and engage with his supporters. As will be shown in chapter 5, Parnell's party was mainly financed by funds from America, but he also raised funds within Ireland.⁴ Again, the value of this fundraising lay largely in its ability to engage the public in politics.

This tradition of popular political fundraising outlasted Parnell and continued under his successor, John Redmond. Indeed, the moderate nationalist Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP)'s domination of the Irish political landscape in the first decade of the twentieth century was founded on the ability of its grass roots organisation, the United Irish League (UIL), to raise funds from constituents. As with O'Connell and Parnell, the UIL's fundraising campaigns were not just important for raising funds. They were also an important means by which Redmond could engage with his supporters and gauge public opinion.

As noted by historian Dermot Meleady, the UIL's success in fundraising fluctuated in line with the likelihood of the IPP of achieving its goal of home rule. For example, when the first general election of 1910 delivered a Conservative government with the narrowest of margins, increasing the IPP's bargaining power, the UIL raised an impressive £21,000.⁵ The second general election of 1910 resulted in a hung parliament, with the IPP again holding the balance of power. Redmond's price for support in parliament was a commitment to introduce a home rule bill for Ireland, and on this basis he supported Asquith's Liberal government. The 'Third Home Rule Bill' was passed by

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, ch. 5.

⁵ Meleady, *Redmond*, p. 166.

the House of Commons but faced opposition in the Lords and, more vociferously, in majority Unionist Ulster. The IPP's response was another highpoint in Irish nationalist fundraising. To counter Unionist lobbying against home rule, it raised the 'Home Rule Fund' (HRF) through the UIL.⁶ Such times of crisis, when home rule was just within sight but not within reach, delivered the ideal climate for the raising of funds.

A more militaristic manifestation of the opposition to home rule came in 1912 with the formation of the paramilitary Ulster Volunteers (UVF). Nationalists responded in November 1913 with the formation of the rival Irish Volunteers. A 'Defence of Ireland Fund' was inaugurated in April 1914 to fund the Volunteers, and the women's Irish nationalist organisation 'Cumann na mBan' was established with the express purpose of raising money for it.⁷ The establishment of the Irish Volunteers and its subsequent growth were met with some apprehension from Redmond, who feared it could rival his position as leader of Irish nationalism. For this reason, during the Easter recess of 1914, he offered to supply the Volunteers with finances 'on condition of being given control' of the organisation.⁸ This offer was rejected, but Redmond 'again and again said that he could get money and give money to the Volunteer cause'.⁹ Eventually, in June 1914, the Irish Volunteer leadership accepted Redmond's offer, with the consolation that 'one result of our action would be financial solvency'.¹⁰ Not for the last time, access to funds was used as a means of exerting control.

The situation changed just two months later when Britain declared war on Germany. Redmond's support for the war and his endorsement of recruitment split the Irish Volunteers in two. Approximately 150,000 followed Redmond in forming the

⁶ M. Wheatley, *Nationalism and the Irish Party: Provincial Ireland 1910-1916* (Oxford, 2015), p. 173.

⁷ S. Pašeta, *Irish Nationalist Women, 1900-1918* (Cambridge, 2013), p. 136.

⁸ C.C. Tansill, *America and the Fight for Irish Freedom: 1866-1922* (New York, 1957), p. 158.

⁹ J. Devoy, *Recollections of an Irish Rebel* (New York, 1929), p. 413.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* On a personal level, this decision resulted in Hobson losing his job as a writer for the *Gaelic American*, his 'sole remaining source of income'.

National Volunteers while *ca.* 10,000 advanced nationalists remained with the original Irish Volunteers.¹¹ In the weeks leading up to the split, according to Irish Volunteers co-treasurer The O’Rahilly, there was ‘a most insidious and well designed plot to break and bankrupt the movement’.¹² Having committed the organisation to unsustainable liabilities, Redmond and his allies left with *ca.* £6,400 of Volunteer funds.¹³ However, in anticipation of the split, the advanced nationalist Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) had manoeuvred its members into all the main positions of financial responsibility in the organisation. As a result, most of the funds remained in advanced nationalist hands.¹⁴

The IPP’s fundraising went into abeyance during the First World War, and the next major nationalist fundraising campaign was launched by advanced nationalists. In Easter 1916, under direction of the IRB, the Irish Volunteers staged an insurrection in Dublin, in which they declared an independent Irish Republic. The insurrection lacked public support and was quickly put down by the British authorities, but the harsh treatment of the rebels turned the tide of public opinion in favour of Sinn Féin, the political party most closely associated with the rebellion.¹⁵ This change in mood was manifest in the fundraising success of the ‘Irish National Aid Association’ and the ‘Volunteers’ Dependents Fund’, which were set up in the aftermath of the Rising to provide relief for the families of those involved in it. They later joined forces to create the INAAVDF and, capitalising on public outrage at the British government’s treatment of the rebels, succeeded in raising £37,815 in Ireland.¹⁶ In addition to the funds raised, as

¹¹ P. Maume, *The Long Gestation*, (Dublin, 1999), p. 150.

¹² *O’Rahilly to Devoy*, 10 Nov. 1914, cited in Devoy, *Recollections*, p. 415.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ M. Tierney, *Eoin MacNeill: Scholar and Man of Action 1867 – 1945* (Oxford, 1980), p.141. Although The O’Rahilly was not an IRB member, neither was he a supporter of John Redmond.

¹⁵ F. McGarry, *The Rising* (Oxford, 2010), p. 134.

¹⁶ NLI/Ms. 23,43, *Summary of overseas subscriptions to the INAAVDF*, 1916-19.

will be shown in chapter 2, the INAAVDF proved a useful training ground for the individuals who would later construct the Dáil's counter-state.¹⁷

The next great milestone in the radicalisation of Irish public opinion was the conscription crisis of 1918. This too was marked by a popular fundraising campaign. Backed by Sinn Féin, the IPP and the Roman Catholic hierarchy, the 'National Defence Fund' raised *ca.* £250,000 to resist the imposition of conscription in Ireland.¹⁸ Popularly known as the Anti-Conscription Fund, the campaign succeeded in that conscription was averted in Ireland, but the general election that followed the armistice revealed Sinn Féin as the winner in political terms. As shown in Figure 1.1, from a peak of £6,380 in the fourth quarter of 1913, the UIL's quarterly income plummeted to just £1,609 on the eve of the 1918 general election.¹⁹ By contrast, in October 1918 Sinn Féin reported an annual income of £17,360.²⁰ This disparity was reflected in the polls, with consequences that changed the course of Irish history.

¹⁷ Hart, *Mick*, p. 24.

¹⁸ O. Rafferty, 'The Catholic Church and partition, 1918–22', *Irish Studies Review*, 5:20 (1997), p. 13.

¹⁹ TNA: CO/904/20, *RIC quarterly estimates of United Irish League funds*.

²⁰ *FJ*, 30 Oct. 1919, cited in M. Laffan, *The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn Féin Party, 1916–1923* (Cambridge, 1999), p. 179.




Figure 1.1. Quarterly contributions to the United Irish League, 1913-20.²¹

Sinn Féin’s victory in the 1918 general election was a watershed in the history of Irish political fundraising. The formation of a new parliament, Dáil Éireann, provided a new focus for nationalist fundraising. Although composed of many of the same people, the Dáil was organisationally distinct from both Sinn Féin and the IRA, with its own priorities and interests.²² Its establishment brought a new layer of bureaucracy, the financial requirements of which far exceeded those of a mere political party. In the first year alone, departments such as Foreign Affairs, Trade & Commerce, and Defence brought the total up to £80,709.²³ This figure grew, and by 31 December 1921 the Dáil had spent £696,966, £149,434 of which was on Defence.²⁴

The ‘seed capital’ for the Dáil’s counter-state came from a handful of private individuals and organisations: Anno O’Rahilly, sister of The O’Rahilly, lent £2,000;

²¹ TNA: CO/904/20, *RIC quarterly estimates of United Irish League funds*.

²² Laffan, *Resurrection*, p. 321.

²³ NLI/Ms.17,152(i), *Total outlay from home funds, 1919-24*, p. 9.

²⁴ NLI/Ms.17,152(i), *Total outlay from home funds, 1919-24*, p. 9.

Cumann na mBan member Sheila Humphreys lent £1,000; and another loan, of £1,300, came from Sinn Féin.²⁵ This was far short of the funds needed to realise the Dáil's ambitious programme for government however, and the need to make up the shortfall was vital to the counter-state's survival. In the words of Francis Carroll:

no money, no governmental functions; no governmental functions, no credibility; no credibility and the whole struggle to obtain independence was in danger of collapse, just as the Irish Parliamentary Party had collapsed when it lost credibility after 1914.²⁶

This undertaking fell to Michael Collins, who was appointed Minister of Finance on 2 April 1919.²⁷ An experienced administrator, Collins's formative years were spent as a clerk in the Post Office Savings Bank in London.²⁸ Within the republican movement, he had also been treasurer of INAAVDF and, allegedly, of the London chapter of the IRB.²⁹ This experience would be put to the test over the next two years, as he sought to raise funds of unprecedented magnitude.

At first, Collins hoped the Dáil could obtain the proceeds of the Anti-Conscription Fund, but it had a rival claimant in the form of the Catholic Church. The majority of the fund's proceeds were in the hands of local trustees, most of whom were parish priests. According to the RIC Inspector-General, £164,000 was returned to subscribers, or 'applied to ecclesiastical charities', £21,000 was with the Mansion House Committee (the custodian of the fund), and £50,000 was unclaimed.³⁰ This left only £17,000 for the Dáil's 'Self-Determination Fund', only £12,237 of which found its way into the Dáil's coffers by October 1919.³¹

²⁵ A. Mitchell, *Revolutionary Government in Ireland* (Dublin, 1995), p. 58.

²⁶ Carroll, *Money*, p. 4.

²⁷ Townsend, *Republic*, p. 90.

²⁸ Hart, *Mick*, pp. 26-9, p. 144.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

³⁰ Mitchell, *Revolutionary*, p. 58.

³¹ *Ibid.*; Carroll, *Money*, p. 4.

The most straightforward of the Dáil's fundraising schemes, the Self-Determination Fund was simply a receptacle for donations from supporters of the movement. However, mindful of public opinion, the Sinn Féin leadership considered that 'appeals for subscriptions for the work of An Dáil are not in accord with its dignity as the *de jure* and accepted Government of Ireland'.³² In this vein, there were initial hopes that the Dáil could raise money through taxation, and Collins set up a cabinet committee in May 1919 to work out how best this could be accomplished.³³ However, although a plan to raise income tax was developed, it was never put into effect. A major obstacle to its success would have been the demography of income tax in the country at that time. According to Arthur Griffith, then serving as the Dáil's Minister for Home Affairs, of the £6m raised from income tax in Ireland in 1918, some £4m came from people who were unsympathetic to Sinn Féin.³⁴ Also, in order to effectively collect income tax, the DÉDF would have needed a large bureaucracy and secure records, something that would have been impossible against the backdrop of a guerrilla war.³⁵ Moreover, the risk of public rejection was deemed too high, and rejection would undermine the legitimacy of the Dáil.³⁶

Besides taxation, a conventional state has two other means of financing its wars: debasement and debt. Of course, not being a conventional state, the Dáil had no currency of its own, so debasement was not an option. One Sinn Féin member suggested creating a currency, 'with the object of displacing the British currency in Ireland and for the purpose of facilitating direct trade between Ireland and America,' but this was quickly dismissed as impractical.³⁷ This left the Dáil with one option: to borrow.

³² NLI Ms. 8786 (i), *Ard Chombairle of Sinn Féin*, 20 Feb 1919, p. 2.

³³ Mitchell, *Revolutionary*, pp. 164-5.

³⁴ Mitchell, *Revolutionary*, p. 165.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ NLI Ms. 8786 (i), *Report on Twelfth Annual Ard Fheis*, 16th October 1919, p. 4.

The National Loan

The National Loan was first mentioned in April 1919, when the Dáil authorised Collins's Department of Finance to 'issue Republican bonds to the value of £250,000'.³⁸ Three trustees were appointed: Éamon de Valera, President of the Dáil; Dr Fogarty, Bishop of Killaloe; and James O'Mara, a Limerick businessman and member of the Dáil for Kilkenny South.³⁹ Collins formed a finance committee, composed of 16 members of the Dáil, with a view to 'establishing the machinery through which to issue the Loan and collect subscriptions'.⁴⁰ Including a journalist (Seán Etchingham), publican (W.T. Cosgrave), accountant/playwright (Terence MacSwiney), and lawyer (Éamonn Duggan), the committee could claim some breadth of expertise.⁴¹ It also included J.J. Walsh, a former chairman of the Cork county board of the Gaelic Athletic Association, who had played a significant role in extending the organisation throughout the county.⁴² Two other committee members, Éamonn Duggan and Michael Staines, had been instrumental in setting up the Irish National Assurance Company.⁴³ An example of the intersection between politics and commerce, the Irish National Assurance Company was set up by Irish Volunteers in 1918 with the aim of gaining a share of the Irish insurance market.⁴⁴ Collins also sought advice from outside the Dáil. Patrick Moylett, a businessman from Co. Mayo and prominent Sinn Féin supporter, was asked to devise a plan for organising the campaign.⁴⁵ Moylett's background was in retail; having trained in London at Harrods,

³⁸ C. Townsend, *The Republic: The Fight for Irish Independence* (London, 2013), p. 90.

³⁹ Carroll, *Money*, p. 5.

⁴⁰ IE/CCCA/U271, *DÉDF to each member of DÉ*, n.d.

⁴¹ Mitchell, *Revolutionary*, pp. 33-4; R.F. Foster, *Vivid Faces: the revolutionary generation in Ireland, 1890-1923* (London, 2014), pp. 413-4; P.J. Dempsey, 'Duggan, Éamonn John (Edmund)', in J. McGuire & J. Quinn (eds.), *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (Cambridge, 2009).

⁴² P. Maume, 'Walsh, James Joseph', in McGuire & Quinn (eds.), *Dictionary of Irish Biography*.

⁴³ IE/BMH/WS0510, *Frank Thornton*, pp. 47-51.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ IE/BMH/WS0400, *Richard Walsh*, p.74; IE/BMH/WS0767, *Patrick Moylett*, p. 18.

he set up and ran a network of grocery stores with shops in Galway, Mayo and London.⁴⁶ Collins also liaised with Henry Mangan, accountant to Dublin Corporation, as an adviser on municipal finance.⁴⁷

The Dáil approved the 'National Loan' prospectus on 19 June 1919, providing for the issue of £250,000 5% registered certificates in denominations of £1, £5, £10, £20, £50 and £100 (Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3). Interest was to be calculated 'from the date when the certificates are fully paid, but not payable until a date six months after the Irish Republic has received international recognition, and the English have evacuated Ireland.' The issue was priced at 100%, with 50% payable on application and the balance in two equal instalments on 1 February and 1 May 1920.⁴⁸ The target of £250,000 was viewed as ambitious by Stephen Gwynn of the IPP, recalling how when his party raised £10,000 'we thought that was a big achievement'.⁴⁹ In Gwynn's words, 'if this forecast proves to be true, Sinn Féin would need to be taken very seriously indeed. Money talks! It would mean that the peasant farmers are really in it'.⁵⁰

The 5% yield offered by the National Loan compared favourably interest rates on deposit accounts, which were just 2.5% at the Post Office Savings Bank and the TSBs at this time.⁵¹ However, as a shadow state with no history and a doubtful future, the nascent Irish Republic borrowed based on goodwill more than the promise of financial gain. Speaking in America, de Valera described it as 'a sentimental appeal and not an appeal to investors'.⁵² Indeed, with a yield comparable to those of sovereign states' war loans in the First World War, it could be argued that the Irish National Loan's rate

⁴⁶ IE/UCDA/P78, *Patrick Moylett Memoirs*.

⁴⁷ IE/BMH/WS0511, *Michael Lynch*, p. 171.

⁴⁸ IE/NAI/DE/1/1, *Minutes of D'É Ministry and Cabinet*, 19 Dec. 1919; IE/UCDA/P133/4, *Collins to Lalor*, 28 Apr. 1920.

⁴⁹ Gwynn cited in Mitchell, *Revolutionary*, p. 59.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ E. McLaughlin, 'Profligacy in the encouragement of thrift': Savings banks in Ireland, 1817–1914', *Business History*, 56/4 (2014), p. 573; D.K. Sheppard, *The growth and role of U.K. financial institutions, 1880-1962* (London, 1971), p. 6.


⁵² *Dundee Evening Telegraph*, 3 Dec. 1919, p. 5.

served more as propaganda, lending an air of respectability and authority to the venture.⁵³ Terms based solely on commercial considerations, taking account of the risk involved, would probably have been much higher and would have been an admission of how unlikely the establishment of an internationally recognised Irish Republic seemed at the time. A higher yield would also push the bounds of credibility of a newly formed state being able to service such a large debt. For this reason, the stipulation that the interest be calculated ‘from the date when the certificates are fully paid’ (as opposed to the withdrawal of British forces) drew sharp criticism from de Valera. However, by then it was too late to change the conditions, as the prospectus had already been published.⁵⁴ As noted by Hew Strachan regarding war loans in the First World War: ‘They had to offer a rate sufficiently high to ensure success, but not so high as to suggest financial desperation or to saddle the taxation system with an insupportable burden of interest payment.’⁵⁵

⁵³ M. Horn, *Britain, France and the Financing of the First World War* (Montreal, 2002), p. 79.


⁵⁴ Béaslaí, *Collins*, pp. 353-9.

⁵⁵ H. Strachan, *Financing the First World War* (Oxford, 2004), p. 116.



The image originally presented here cannot be made freely available via ORA because of copyright.

Figure 1.2. National Loan bond (observe).⁵⁶



The image originally presented here cannot be made freely available via ORA because of copyright.

Figure 1.3. National Loan bond (reverse).⁵⁷

⁵⁶ IE/BMH/CD184.1, *Papers of Daithi O'Donoghue*.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

A Notional Loan?

According to the historian and contemporary republican Piaras Béaslaí, few subscribers to the National Loan expected to see a return on their investment, and ‘It is doubtful whether any even asked to see the terms of the prospectus’.⁵⁸ This view is corroborated by a number of witness statements, including Michael McCoy, Captain of the Mullingar IRA, who recalled that at the time of issue ‘it looked a loan in name only, and the hopes of it ever being repaid were small indeed’.⁵⁹ When cast in this light, the National Loan looks more like a charitable donation, in which the benefit received by the donor amounts to what economist Todd Sandler has described as a ‘warm glow’.⁶⁰ Interestingly, the rather mercenary promise of financial return, which at the time would have seemed hollow to most subscribers, does not seem to have diminished the ‘warm glow’ effect.

More important than the interest rate in practical terms were the low denominations in which the National Loan could be subscribed. In de Valera’s words, the bonds were to be sold in ‘such amounts as to meet the needs of the small subscriber’.⁶¹ The goal was not simply to raise money, but to raise it from as many people as possible, an aspiration redolent of Daniel O’Connell’s fundraising campaigns of the 1820s and 1840s.⁶² When promoting the loan to his constituents, Collins stated that he would prefer 250,000 subscriptions at £1 each to 25,000 at £10 each.⁶³ The effect of low denominations can be overstated however, and the sacrifice necessary for buying a National Loan bond must not be overlooked. The scale of this sacrifice is clear when comparing it to the closest survey of retail prices in Ireland, which reveals that a pair of

⁵⁸ Béaslaí, *Collins*, pp. 349-50.

⁵⁹ IE/BMH/WS1610, *Michael McCoy*, p. 12; also IE/BMH/WS1146, *Eugene Kilkenny* p. 4; IE/BMH/WS1121, *Martin Fallon*, p. 4; IE/BMH/WS1194, *Bernard Sweeney*, p. 3; IE/BMH/WS1268, *Joseph Hardgaden*, p. 4; IE/BMH/WS1337, *David Daly*, p. 9; IE/BMH/WS1413, *Tadhg Kennedy*, p. 134; IE/BMH/WS1594, *Thomas Kiernan*, p. 3.

⁶⁰ T. Sandler, *Economic Concepts for the Social Sciences* (New York, 2001), p. 103.

⁶¹ Townsend, *Republic*, p. 90.

⁶² *Irish Independent*, 8 Aug. 1919, p.4; N. Sakiyama, ‘Dublin Merchants and the Irish Repeal Movement of the 1840s’, *Journal of International Economic Studies* (2010), No.24, 31-48 (39).

⁶³ *Irish Independent*, 8 Aug. 1919, p. 4.

boots cost £2 6s. in March 1922, and a man's overcoat £5 9s. 1d., both of which would have been long-term investments for the average consumer.⁶⁴ For this reason, it was necessary to break down the purchase of National Loan bonds into more manageable portions. The instalment scheme by which the bonds could be purchased was crucial in this regard, but the loan's organisers went one step further. The DÉDF encouraged "loan club" syndicates whereby cash-poor subscribers could contribute together on a weekly basis, in time accruing enough for a £1 subscription each.⁶⁵

As to the purpose of the loan, the stated aims were exclusively civilian, and reflected the Dáil's programme for national economic and cultural renewal. As set out by Collins in his announcement to the Sinn Féin *Ard Chomhairle*, they were:

1. To finance a Consular Service for which £10,000 has been voted by An Dáil for one year.
2. To develop and encourage Irish Sea Fisheries for which £10,000 has been voted by An Dáil.
3. To develop and encourage the re-forestation of the country. Under this scheme a Minister of Forestry will be appointed. £1,000 has been voted as a preliminary amount to help the project.
4. To develop and encourage Irish industrial effort. With a view to doing this effectively a Commission has been set up to inquire and report on the Industrial Resources and possibilities of this Country. Under this head £5,000 has been voted by An Dáil.
5. To establish a National Civil Service. In order to pursue a preliminary investigation on this subject An Dáil has voted £500.
6. To establish National Arbitration Courts.

(The Dáil has further decided to devote £1,000 to the work of saving the language in the Gaeltacht.)⁶⁶

Conspicuous by its absence was Defence, which constituted some 21% of the Dáil's outlays during the war of independence.⁶⁷ To be sure, the military implications of giving money to the Dáil during the war of independence cannot have escaped the attention of the National Loan's subscribers. However, while the subscribers may not have been

⁶⁴ Irish Free State Ministry of Economic Affairs, *Report on the Cost of Living in Ireland*, June 1922 (Dublin, 1922), p. 8.

⁶⁵ IE/UCDA/P150/1125, *Collins to Boland*, 10 Sept 1919, p. 2.

⁶⁶ NLI Ms. 8786 (i), *Annual Ard Chomhairle of Sinn Féin, 21 Aug. 1919, Resume of Proceedings*, p. 2.

⁶⁷ NLI/Ms.17,152(i), *Total outlay from home funds, 1919-24*, p. 9.

fooled by the official line set out in the National Loan's prospectus, it would have allowed them to maintain the fiction that subscribing to the loan was untainted by the blood of the IRA's victims.

Sinn Féin and the Irish Volunteers (also known as the IRA) had already been declared illegal by the British government by August 1919, and it was not long before the Dáil was too. After nine months of turning a blind eye, the British government responded to the Dáil's sedition by suppressing it.⁶⁸ This increased the difficulty of raising the National Loan, but also heightened the importance of doing so. When the loan was announced at the Sinn Féin *Ard Chombairle* on 15 August 1919, the delegates were told that 'their loyal cooperation' was 'earnestly requested' to make it a success.⁶⁹ 'Upon this Loan,' declared the party's secretaries 'the whole constructive policy of Dáil Éireann depends'.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Mitchell, *Revolutionary*, p. 61.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ NLI Ms. 8786(i), *Annual Ard Chombairle of Sinn Féin, 21 Aug. 1919, Report of Director of Elections*, p. 2.

Chapter 2: Organising the National Loan

In order to understand the National Loan campaign it is first necessary to examine the organisation that made it possible. While legal and internationally recognised states issuing war bonds can rely on post office and retail bank branch networks to sell to the public, such an infrastructure was not available to the Irish counter-state.¹ Instead, it had to use the pre-existing organisational structures at its disposal. Moreover, as a fledgling and as yet unrecognised state, it had to do this with the minimal funds available. The organisation of the National Loan campaign involved cooperation between the Sinn Féin party and the IRA under the coordination of the Dáil, which strove to assert its supremacy over the other two. The extent to which the Dáil could accomplish this was constrained by the actions of a fourth actor – the British Authorities. The following analysis of the National Loan organisation begins with the three internal actors: Sinn Féin, the IRA and the DÉDF. It then introduces the British Authorities. This lays the groundwork for the following chapter, which brings in a fifth actor: the loan's potential subscribers.

The threat from within: Coordination and Opportunism

In the absence of recourse to the law, subversive organisations such as the Dáil face a challenge in their ability to enforce contracts.² Essentially, in organising the National Loan the Dáil faced a 'free-rider' problem: it had to contend with the incentive for individuals to operate opportunistically in their own personal or local interest rather than

¹ Strachan, *Financing*, ch. 6.

² P. Collier, 'Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44/6, (2000) p. 843.

in the interest of the organisation as a whole.³ Moreover, in illegal groups such as the Dáil, where recruitment costs are high, the leadership needs to find a way of disciplining errant members without dismissing them altogether.⁴ The ways in which the Dáil overcame these problems through organisation and bureaucracy generated much of the source material used in this thesis.

At the apex of the National Loan's organisational structure was Michael Collins, as Minister of Finance, but much of the administrative burden fell to the secretary to the loan's trustees, Daithi O'Donoghue.⁵ Described by Mitchell as a 'bowler-hatted, formally dressed businessman', O'Donoghue was a Sinn Féin member with 20 years' experience as a clerk in the British civil service, and was instrumental in setting up and running the DÉDF.⁶ He was assisted by a small staff, the most senior of whom was George McGrath, who had a background in accounting and auditing, having worked at Craig Gardner & Co chartered accountants at the same brief time as Michael Collins.⁷ He was also Collins's predecessor as Secretary to the INAAVDF.⁸ Another head office stalwart was Joe O'Reilly. A friend of Collins's from his time in London, he worked for the civil service there before resigning in 1916 to take part in the Easter Rising.⁹

Collins appointed four full-time loan organisers, one for each of the four provinces of Ireland. These were Éamonn Fleming for Leinster; Éamonn Donnelly for Ulster; P. Ryan for Connaught; and P.C. O'Mahony for Munster.¹⁰ Collins's choice of provincial organisers highlights the extent to which the loan campaign latched on to pre-

³ J.N. Shapiro & D.A. Siegel, 'Underfunding in Terrorist Organisations', *International Studies Quarterly*, 51/2 (2007), pp. 405-29.

⁴ J.N. Shapiro & D.A. Siegel, 'Moral Hazard, Discipline and the Management of Terrorist Organisations', *World Politics*, 64/1 (2012), pp. 41-2.

⁵ IE/NAI/DE/1/1, *Minutes of DE Ministry and Cabinet*, 30 Jun. 1919.

⁶ Mitchell, *Revolutionary*, p. 56; IE/BMH/WS0548, *Daithi O'Donoghue*, p. 1.

⁷ IE/BMH/WS0548, *Daithi O'Donoghue*, p. 22; IE/NAI/DE/2/530/9, *G.H. Tulloch to Frank O'Connor*, 21 Jul. 1936.

⁸ Hart, *Mick*, p. 123.

⁹ D. Nelligan, *The Spy in the Castle* (London, 1968), p. 71.

¹⁰ Béaslaí, *Collins*, Vol. I, pp. 347-8; IE/BMH/WS0907, *Laurence Nugent*, p. 171; IE/BMH/WS0745, *P.C. O'Mahony*, p. 8.

existing organisational structures, as these men had previously been appointed provincial Chief Organisers of the IRA when it was reorganised earlier that year.¹¹ Since then, they had also been the provincial organisers for Sinn Féin.¹²

Below the provincial organisers were 43 sub-organisers, although this number varied over time.¹³ At first, men who had previously served as organisers for the IRA filled this role, but they were supplemented or replaced as circumstances dictated.¹⁴ The newer appointments could reflect relevant professional experience. Simon Moynihan for example, who operated in Co. Wicklow, was chosen as a sub-organiser due to his previous experience working in the Customs and Excise department of the British civil service.¹⁵ Cahir Healy operating in North Fermanagh was an experienced insurance salesman.¹⁶ In all cases, the appointments were made on the recommendation of the local TD (Member of Parliament of Dáil Éireann) or constituency executive.¹⁷ It was usual for the sub-organisers to carry out other political work alongside their work for the loan, and in some cases they had to reorganise the local organisation before they could start work.¹⁸

Moving from provincial and county level to constituency level, the DÉDF requested that the most prominent members of Sinn Féin in each constituency form a central committee, presided over by the TD. The TD would then form a collecting and advertising committee for every parish in their constituency.¹⁹ Each TD who was at liberty was requested to make himself responsible for raising a certain quota for the National Loan, while special arrangements were made for constituencies whose

¹¹ IE/BMH/WS0745, *P.C. O'Mabony*, p. 8.

¹² IE/NAI/DE/2/007, *DÉDF General File*, *DÉDF report for the period ending Oct 1919 and half year ending April 1920*, p. 4.

¹³ IE/BMH/WS0745, *P.C. O'Mabony*, p.8; IE/NAI/DE/2/007, *DÉDF report for the period ending Oct 1919 and half year ending April 1920*, p. 4.

¹⁴ IE/NAI/DE/2/007, *DÉDF report for the period ending Oct. 1919 and half year ending April 1920*, p. 4.

¹⁵ IE/BMH/WS1741, *Michael V. O'Donoghue*, Part 1, pp. 85 & 152.

¹⁶ IE/BMH/WS1770, *Kevin O'Sheil*, p. 117; IE/NAI, 1911 Census of Ireland, *Cahir Healy, Henry St, Enniskillen South*.

¹⁷ IE/BMH/WS0745, *P.C. O'Mabony*, p. 8; IE/NAI/DE/2/007, *DÉDF report for the period ending Oct 1919 and half year ending April 1920*, p. 4.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ NLI Ms. 8786 (i), *Annual Ard Chomhairle of Sinn Féin, Report of Director of Elections*, 21 Aug. 1919, p. 2.

representative was in prison. A letter from Collins dated 21 August 1919 reports that of the 69 TDs, six were in prison, eight were in the US, and two were in Paris.²⁰ In constituencies where Sinn Féin did not have a TD, their defeated candidate was called upon to promote the loan.²¹ In the four constituencies where the Sinn Féin candidate was withdrawn by agreement so as not to split the nationalist vote, the Sinn Féin candidates were requested to act as if they had been elected.²²

Territory was further divided within each constituency. The constituency of Mid-Cork for example was divided into five areas, each with its own sub-executive reporting to the constituency's central executive. Below the sub-executive level were the local Sinn Féin clubs, each of which reported to the sub-executive on the progress of its work. The clubs had their local committees, tasked with distributing literature, appointing collectors, and canvassing their districts.²³

At ground level it was the local IRA Volunteers, many of whom were also Sinn Féin members, who bore responsibility for actually collecting the money.²⁴ The Irish National Assurance Company was used as a cover in many parts of the country. Indeed, many of the company's agents were appointed as local collectors for the loan.²⁵ Curiously, in contrast with other war bonds of the time, there is no evidence of any widespread employment of women in either the organisation or promotion of the National Loan. While women can be found in prominent roles on the organising committees of the British WW1 bonds in Ireland, and formed the bulk of canvassers for the US WW1 'Liberty Loans', they are conspicuous by their absence from the National

²⁰ IE/BMH/CD264/23/3, *Letter from Collins Re: Organisation of Loan*, 21 Aug. 1919, p. 1.

²¹ IE/BMH/WS1770, *Kevin O'Sheil*, p. 863.

²² IE/BMH/CD264/23/3, *Letter from Collins Re: Organisation of Loan*, 21 Aug. 1919, p. 2.

²³ IE/NAI/DE/2/530, *MacSwiney to Collins*, 2 Oct. 1919.

²⁴ IE/BMH/WS1716, *Sean MacEoin*, pt. 2, p. 44; P. Hart, *The IRA and its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork, 1916 – 1923*, (Oxford, 1998), p. 232.

²⁵ TNA: CO 904, *DMP Intelligence file on the Irish National Assurance Company Ltd and its connection with Sinn Féin and DE*, 18 Feb. 1920; IE/BMH/WS0510, *Frank Thornton*, p. 51; IE/BMH/WS0806, *Mary Clancy*, p. 8.

Loan source material.²⁶ This is particularly surprising considering the central role played by women in previous Irish nationalist fundraising campaigns such as the INAAVDF.²⁷ Indeed, as noted in chapter 1, the raising of funds was part of Cumann na mBan's founding mission statement.²⁸

The organisational structure of the loan campaign illustrates the intersection between the IRA and Sinn Féin at this time. As noted by Hart, 'In much of their membership, the Volunteers were nearly indistinguishable from Sinn Féin.'²⁹ Nevertheless, for this organisation to work efficiently, some degree of centralisation was necessary. Although the local Sinn Féin committees were prepared to pay the organisers and sub-organisers for normal political work, they were less willing to pay them for loan work.³⁰ As a result, it became the responsibility of the DÉDF to pay the loan organisers a modest stipend. The four provincial organisers received £7 10s. per week and the 43 sub-organisers £4 per week.³¹ This compared favourably to the meagre £5 per month reported by one British secret agent as his allowance for recruiting informants.³²

In addition to the stipends paid to organisers, a grant of up to £25 was available from the DÉDF for constituencies to cover the expenses of collecting the loan, such as distributing leaflets, circulars and other such activities. In some specific cases, the Dáil cabinet voted for payments in addition to a constituency's £25 allowance.³³ All expenses

²⁶ J. Ott, *When Wall Street met Main Street: The quest for an investors' democracy* (Cambridge, Mass., 2011), p. 89; *Cork Examiner*, 9 Dec. 1918, p. 3.

²⁷ Pašeta, *Irish Nationalist Women*, pp. 201-10.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

²⁹ Hart, *IRA and its Enemies*, p. 232.

³⁰ IE/NAI/DE/2/007, *Report of the operations of the DÉDF and statement showing the receipts and expenditure for the period ending 31 Oct. 1919 and the half year ending 30 Apr. 1920*, p. 4.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

³² K. Strong, *Intelligence at the Top, the Recollections of an Intelligence Officer* (London: Cassell & Company, 1968), p. 1.

³³ IE/NAI/DE/2/007, *Letter from General Secretariat to Minister for Finance*, 11 Jun. 1920.

were to be vouched and it was stressed that no expenses be paid locally out of the money collected for the loan.³⁴

By taking financial responsibility for the loan campaign out of the hands of the local organisations, the Dáil asserted its supremacy over both Sinn Féin and the IRA. In effect, it bypassed local interests to create a single organisation. The collection of money for the National Loan also had the effect of crowding out any collections being carried out exclusively for the local organisations.³⁵ As the treasurer of the Sinn Féin *Ard Fheis* expressed in a letter to Michael Collins, ‘Poor old Sinn Féin is nearly bankrupt through your blooming Loan’.³⁶

In a number of cases, the loan organisers were dispatched by the Dáil with a secondary mission related to IRA activities, for example giving military training to local officers, reorganising brigades or, in one case, working to reconcile a feud that had developed within a brigade.³⁷ This has echoes of the United Irishmen in 1795-1796, whose subscription collectors were sent out to local clubs ‘to examine the societies and confirm them in their republican career’.³⁸ Again, we see the central authority using fundraising to assert its control over the regional and factional organisations.

The reporting lines made the loan organisers directly accountable to the Minister of Finance, acting as a disincentive to opportunistic behaviour. Although there is no evidence of the Dáil doubting the integrity of the organisers, the direct payments from the DÉDF can be seen as an incentive for them not to ‘take a cut’ of the money collected. As a further measure, in the example of Mid-Cork, each deputation of

³⁴ IE/NAI/FIN/1/3, *DÉDF Statements showing Receipts and Expenditure for the period ending 31 Oct. 1919 & the half year ending 30 Apr. 1920*, p. 4; Béaslaí, *Collins*, pp. 347-8; IE/BMH/CD/264/23/4, *Letter from Collins Re: constituency expenses related to the Loan, 30 Aug. 1919*; IE/NAI/DE/2/007, *Report of the operations of the DÉDF and statement showing the receipts and expenditure for the period ending 31 October 1919 and the half year ending 30 Apr. 1920*, pp. 3-4.

³⁵ IE/NAI/DE/2/530, *MacSwiney to Collins*, 21 Oct 1919, p. 2.

³⁶ O. Winter, ‘A Report on the Intelligence Branch of the Chief of Police, Dublin Castle from May 1920 to July 1921’ (PRO/WO/35/214), cited in P. Hart (ed.), *British Intelligence in Ireland 1920-21: The Final Reports*, (Cork, 2002), p. 88.

³⁷ IE/BMH/WS0901, *Seamus Finn*, p.8; IE/BMH/WS0845, *Tomas O Maoileoin (aka Sean Forde)*, pp. 31-4.

³⁸ N.J. Curtin, *The United Irishmen: Popular politics in Ulster and Dublin, 1791-1798* (Dublin, 1998), p. 108.

collectors was issued with a signed letter from the local TD, authorising them to carry out the collection.³⁹ This is not to say that the system was entirely watertight; the RIC County Inspector for Kerry reported that he was ‘satisfied that a large part of the money collected goes into the collectors’ pockets,’ adding, ‘From what I hear no receipts are given.’⁴⁰ However, this observation is exceptional and not representative of the body of evidence surveyed.

The reporting lines were also backed up by a bureaucracy, which supported a monitoring system that further restricted the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour. Once subscriptions to the loan had been collected locally, the local organisers issued the subscribers with temporary receipts, signed by the local treasurer. As noted by Collins, the receipts served the dual purpose of giving a good impression to subscribers and making the record keeping much easier from the organisers’ point of view.⁴¹ The loan organisers then filled out official application forms, on each of which were recorded the amount applied for, the amount paid, and the amounts payable at later dates. Then, the individual sums were entered in a cashbook.⁴²

Information on progress was fed back to the DÉDF in Dublin *via* weekly reports; the loan organisers were required to file these to Collins on progress made in all the districts for which they were responsible. The reports were scrutinised in Dublin and it was not uncommon for the organisers to receive inquiries by return if Collins had found an omission or inconsistency in them.⁴³ ‘Collins cracked the whip,’ according to biographer Frank O’Connor; ‘Many men in country parishes remember him only as

³⁹ IE/NAI/DE 2/530, *MacSwiney to Collins*, 2 Oct. 1919.

⁴⁰ TNA: CO 904/110/669, *RIC Kerry CI report*, Nov 1919.

⁴¹ F.J. Costello, *Enduring the Most: The life and death of Terence MacSwiney* (Kerry, 1995), p. 111.

⁴² IE/UCDA/P150/1125, *Collins to Boland*, 10 Sept. 1919, p. 2.

⁴³ Béaslaí, *Collins*, p. 350.

organiser of the Loan; and how they trembled before him. Alibis were vain; he knew the capacity of every townland.⁴⁴

The quality of these weekly reports varied dramatically, reflecting the backgrounds of the organisers. Terence MacSwiney, the Sinn Féin TD and loan organiser for Mid-Cork, was an accountant by training, and had previously worked closely with Collins for the INAAVDF.⁴⁵ A letter of his, accompanying Mid-Cork loan money sent to Dublin, noted not only the amount of money enclosed, but also the amount of cash on hand from Mid-Cork already held in Dublin.⁴⁶ But many of the collectors had no previous accounting experience, and were therefore prone to inaccuracies.⁴⁷ 'If you saw some of the particulars we were supplied with,' wrote Collins, 'they would simply drive you mad'.⁴⁸

As soon as a substantial amount had been raised in a constituency, the application forms were sent, along with lists and cash, to headquarters in Dublin.⁴⁹ To monitor progress, the DÉDF kept a separate account for each constituency.⁵⁰ On reconciling the lists of subscribers with cash received, the DÉDF entered the names, addresses and amounts in a 'primary register' of subscribers, giving each subscriber a unique numerical identifier.⁵¹ The DÉDF then issued official receipts for every subscription, and these were sent back down to the constituencies in tranches corresponding to local parishes.⁵²

⁴⁴ F. O'Connor, *The Big Fellow* (Dublin, 1964), p. 108.

⁴⁵ Foster, *Vivid*, pp. 413-4; Costello, *Enduring*, p. 109.

⁴⁶ IE/CCCA/PR4, *MacSwiney to Collins*, 25 May 1920, p. 1.

⁴⁷ IE/NAI/DE/2/530, *MacSwiney to Collins*, 1 Jan. 1920.

⁴⁸ IE/NAI/DE/2/530, *Collins to MacSwiney*, 5 Jan. 1920.

⁴⁹ IE/BMH/WS1610, *Michael McCoy*, p. 12; IE/NAI/FIN/1/2166/643, *McGrath to Brennan*, 9 Nov. 1922.

⁵⁰ Hart, *Mick*, p. 191.

⁵¹ DÉ Debate Vol. 24 No. 9, *Private Deputies' Business, DÉ Loan (Internal) 1919-20*, 22 June 1928; IE/NAI/97/17/60, *William Martin Papers*.

⁵² IE/BMH/WS1610, *Michael McCoy*, p.12; IE/NAI/FIN/1/2166/643, *McGrath to Brennan*, 9 Nov. 1922; IE/SFC/FOK, *Collins to O'Kennedy*, 13 Nov. 1920.

Although somewhat bureaucratic, this system ensured that the loan organisers were accountable both to the subscribers and the Minister of Finance, and constituted a significant disincentive to opportunistic behaviour. Moreover, and also consistent with other similar groups, Sinn Féin and the Dáil craved the level of credibility and respectability that necessitated record keeping ‘in order to silence adverse criticism and generate confidence in the management of the Organisation’.⁵³ It was also necessary from an internal organisational point of view that members believed in the integrity of those handling funds. On a personal level, Collins needed to appear whiter than white in order to guard against the kind of rumours that had arisen within the IRB suggesting financial delinquency in his stewardship of the INAAVDF.⁵⁴ This desire for accountability was exemplified by the Dáil’s decision early in the loan campaign to appoint Messrs O’Connor & Co as independent auditors, in addition to having their own internal auditor.⁵⁵ A trusted supporter, Donal O’Connor had previous association with the Sinn Féin movement, and had earlier recruited Collins as Secretary of the INAAVDF.⁵⁶

On top of the need for accountability, the Dáil had another, more chilling reason to bureaucratise. As argued by economists Jacob Shapiro and David Siegel, managers within seditious organisations are at high risk of capture or even death, and record keeping allows for institutional memory in the absence of predictable personal relationships.⁵⁷ Well aware of this threat, early in the campaign MacSwiney informed

⁵³ Shapiro & Siegel, ‘Moral Hazard,’ pp. 41-2; NLI, Ms. 8786, (i), *Sinn Féin Resolution for the issue of a detailed financial statement*, n.d.

⁵⁴ Hart, *Mick*, p. 144-5.

⁵⁵ IE/NAI/DE/1/1, *Minutes of DÉ Ministry and Cabinet*, 31 Oct. 1919; IE/BMH/WS0548, *Daithi O’Donoghue*, p. 22.

⁵⁶ Hart, *Mick*, p. 123.

⁵⁷ Shapiro & Siegel, ‘Moral Hazard,’ pp. 41-2.

Collins that his team were ‘laying our lines well so that if anything happens to the two of us, the work will go on successfully’.⁵⁸

But the monitoring challenges facing a subversive organisation create something of a paradox: they create the necessity for bureaucratic procedures that inevitably reduce security.⁵⁹ Earlier Irish nationalist groups, most notably the United Irishmen, avoided committing anything to paper, instead relying on messengers, and consequently encountered communication, monitoring and accountability problems as their organisation grew.⁶⁰ For a combination of the reasons outlined above, the Dáil leadership deemed that the security costs attached to a bureaucracy of this kind were outweighed by the benefits. When faced with this paradox they opted for more bureaucracy, not less, stressing the need for local records as well as ones at head office.⁶¹ Nevertheless, the security costs associated with maintaining such a bureaucratic footprint were considerable, and the DÉDF’s ability to maintain this bureaucracy was seriously restricted by the actions of the external actor, the British Authorities.

The threat from without: The British Authorities

As anticipated by Collins, the interference from the British government was considerable.⁶² Once the Dáil was declared illegal, anyone caught buying a National Loan bond could be accused of funding an illegal organisation.⁶³ As a result, many subscribers were reluctant to have their names recorded.⁶⁴ The loan collectors themselves could

⁵⁸ IE/NAI/DE/2/530, *MacSwiney to Collins*, 2 Oct. 1919.

⁵⁹ Shapiro & Siegel, ‘Moral Hazard,’ p. 41.

⁶⁰ Curtin, *United Irishmen*, pp. 113-5.

⁶¹ IE/UCDA/P133/4, *Fleming to Lalor*, 7 Dec. 1919, p.2; IE/NAI/DE/2/530, *Collins to MacSwiney*, 1 Jan. 1920.

⁶² IE/CCCA/U271, *DÉ Report of the Finance Department*, p. 2.

⁶³ Mitchell, *Revolutionary*, p. 61.

⁶⁴ Béaslaí, *Collins*, pp. 350-1.

expect up to three months' imprisonment with hard labour if caught by the authorities.⁶⁵ With a growing body of incriminating evidence, the National Loan's organisers had to proceed with caution.

Security of Documents

To avoid detection, local loan collectors entered the names of subscribers in small and easily concealable notebooks.⁶⁶ For the same reason, there was a practice of not entering the amounts of money subscribed beside the names of subscribers, but waiting until they were about to be sent to head office before adding the full details.⁶⁷ As a further measure, much of the money collected was sent to Dublin 'with particulars to follow', but this was no guarantee of security.⁶⁸ The General Post Office received a warrant from the RIC to detain any packages addressed to the Mansion House (seat of Dáil Éireann), excluding those addressed directly to the Lord Mayor or his family.⁶⁹ This prompted a circular from the DÉDF dated 27 September 1919, advising 'correspondence and subscriptions be sent in an inner envelope to some trusted friend in Dublin with a request that delivery be made *by hand* [original emphasis]'.⁷⁰ In this way, a number of private 'covering' addresses were used to receive correspondence ultimately destined for the DÉDF.⁷¹

The offices of the Irish National Assurance Company on Bachelor's Walk were used as the main depot for receiving loan money and documentation, before couriers from the DÉDF would pick them up for processing.⁷² In Cork, a subsidiary clearing

⁶⁵ IE/BMH/WS1010, *Laurence Redmond*, p. 4.

⁶⁶ IE/BMH/WS1770, *Kevin O'Sheil*, p. 865.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* p. 865.

⁶⁸ IE/NAI/FIN/1/2166/643, *McGrath to Brennan*, 18 June 1923.

⁶⁹ TNA: CO 904, *DMP Intelligence file regarding correspondence from Michael Collins Re the National Loan*, 12 Jan. 1920.

⁷⁰ IE/BMH/CD264.23.7 (a), *Circular Re: Precautions to be taken in sending in correspondence and subscriptions*, 27 Sept. 1919.

⁷¹ IE/BMH/WS0414, *Eithne Lawless*, p. 5; IE/CCCA/PR4, *Collins to MacSwiney*, 26 Apr. 1920.

⁷² IE/BMH/WS0510, *Frank Thornton*, p. 51.

house was set up under Sinn Féin TD and loan organiser for Cork City, Liam de Róiste. Located at 56 Grand Parade, subscriptions were received there before being forwarded to Dublin.⁷³ Here, we also see a collocation with the Irish National Assurance Company, whose Munster office, headed by the Dáil's Deputy Director of Intelligence Liam Tobin, was at 54 Grand Parade.⁷⁴ The connection between the National Loan and the Irish National Assurance Company was not lost on the RIC, who placed the company under observation in November 1919. They were particularly concerned when it acquired the former premises of the Leinster, Munster and Connaught War Savings Committee at 30 College Green, believing it would be used to promote the National Loan.⁷⁵ However, having carried out a comprehensive inspection of the surviving primary source material, it is notable that not once was the Irish National Assurance Company mentioned by either Collins or the DÉDF.

Further up the chain, even after the documents had safely reached the DÉDF in Dublin, they were still vulnerable to interception from the authorities. The DÉDF's offices at 6 Harcourt Street were first raided by British forces on 12 September 1919. While Collins was able to escape by climbing out through a skylight and crawling across several roofs, other senior figures were arrested and all the books and records were seized.⁷⁶ The raid was described on the front page of a provincial English newspaper the following day:

⁷³ IE/CCCA/U271, *Collins to de Róiste*, 30 Sept. 1919.

⁷⁴ IE/BMH/WS0510, *Frank Thornton*, p. 74; *Leitrim Observer*, 5 April 1919, p. 2.

⁷⁵ TNA: CO904/193/554-581, *The Irish National Assurance Company Ltd*; FJ, 16 Sept. 1919, p.6; Thom, A. (1920), *Thom's official directory of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland for the year 1920*, Dublin: Alex Thom & Co Ltd, p. 2054.

⁷⁶ R. Fanning, *The Irish Department of Finance, 1922-1958* (Dublin, 1978), pp. 16-17.

After spending nearly two hours inside, the police emerged under cover of a heavy guard with half a dozen parcels of various shapes, which they flung into one of the lorries and drove away. Later inspection revealed that a complete clearance had been made of all literature and documents from the building.

...all documents relating to the floating of the Sinn Féin loan were seized and taken away.⁷⁷

In response, the day after the raid, a member of the raiding party was shot dead outside police headquarters on Collins's orders.⁷⁸ Work then carried on, and less than a week after the raid the press reported:

A visit to Sinn Féin headquarters in Harcourt Street, Dublin, yesterday afternoon revealed a hive of activity. Huge parcels of documents had just arrived, apparently to replenish the stock recently taken away by the authorities.

... Everything points to a position of 'as you were'.⁷⁹

Other raids of Sinn Féin clubs and the houses of prominent Sinn Féin members took place in Waterford, Kilkenny, Nenagh, Skibereen, Belfast, Derry and Cork, including the regional loan office on Grand Parade.⁸⁰ These raids took place very early in the loan campaign, so it is reasonable to assume that there was not a huge amount of loan documentation available to be seized. However, as noted by Collins in correspondence with de Róiste, the burden of bureaucracy would only intensify as the number of loan applications increased.⁸¹

In response to the raid at No. 6, Collins secured permission from the Dáil Cabinet to acquire new premises at 76 Harcourt Street, and £1,130 was voted for the purchase.⁸² At a cost of £185 19s. 9d., it was fitted with a hiding place for documents, an alarm bell and a means of escape for Collins through the skylight.⁸³ On 11 November 1919, No. 76 was also raided; nine senior members of the organisation were arrested but

⁷⁷ *Nottingham Evening Post*, 13 Sept. 1919, p. 1.

⁷⁸ Béaslaí, *Collins*, pp. 341-2.

⁷⁹ *Aberdeen Journal*, 18 Sept. 1919, p. 5.

⁸⁰ *Dundee Courier*, 13 Sept. 1919, p. 5; *Cork Examiner*, 13 Sept. 1919, p. 5.

⁸¹ IE/CCCA/U271, *Collins to de Róiste*, 8 Oct. 1919.

⁸² IE/NAI/DE/1/1, *Minutes of DE Ministry and Cabinet*, 18 July 1919; IE/BMH/WS0414, *Eithne Lawless*, p. 4.

⁸³ IE/NAI/DE/1/1, *Minutes of DE Ministry and Cabinet*, 17 Oct. 1919.

Collins managed to escape through the skylight again and, thanks to the secret hiding place, no documents of any importance were taken.⁸⁴ Despite the loss of personnel, the survival of the documents ensured the institutional memory remained intact. Nos. 6 and 76 Harcourt Street were raided again in January 1920, at the same time as the Irish National Assurance Company offices on Bachelor's Walk, but the bureaucracy survived and the work continued.⁸⁵

As the campaign went on, at least three other central Dublin locations were used by the DÉDF.⁸⁶ One of these was an annex to the house of a veterinary surgeon on Upper Fitzwilliam Street, which was designated for two DÉDF staff to work on compiling the loan registers.⁸⁷ On 20 November 1920, after the loan campaign had closed, it was decided to move the registers to a slaughterhouse on Wexford Street for safekeeping. This was in anticipation of 'Bloody Sunday', which was to take place the next day in the vicinity of Fitzwilliam Street. The papers were moved back to Fitzwilliam Street once things had calmed down, only to be seized by British government forces in a raid shortly thereafter.⁸⁸

Examination of the surviving material shows that surprisingly little covert language was used in the Dáil's record keeping. The use of initials instead of names or Irish-language versions of names, and the use of Irish language with some correspondents could hardly be described as sophisticated code. Other codenames, including 'L' for the Dáil's London envoy, and 'Literature' instead of 'Arms', would have been similarly easily decipherable if intercepted.⁸⁹ The financial records were noticeably more covert in their language. Since very few people were required to understand the

⁸⁴ Béaslaí, *Collins*, pp. 373-4.

⁸⁵ *Kerryman*, 10 Jan. 1920, p. 1.

⁸⁶ Béaslaí, *Collins*, p. 351.

⁸⁷ IE/BMH/WS0356, *Milo MacGarry*, p. 9; IE/BMH/WS0548, *Daithi O'Donoghue*, pp. 14-5; IE/BMH/WS0826, *Maev MacGarry*, pp. 12-3.

⁸⁸ IE/BMH/WS0548, *Daithi O'Donoghue*, pp. 14-5.

⁸⁹ IE/CCCA/PR4; IE/NAI/DE/2/011; NLI/Ms.8430/2.

records, they were able to use a more comprehensive lexicon of codenames. Examples such as ‘T. Head’ for the President’s Department, ‘A. Holmes’ for the Dáil’s Minister of Home Affairs and ‘M. Silver’ for the Minister of Finance illustrate the logic behind the codenames used.⁹⁰

Perhaps the most potent form of protection against loss of information to the enemy was the difficulty of keeping extensive records in the first place. As Daithi O’Donoghue recalled, ‘A lot of my work was, in the first instance, done on scraps of paper and in small notebooks or pocket diaries. Then, when I had the leisure to do so, I dug out my books (such as they were) and made the necessary entries’.⁹¹ The makeshift nature of the Dáil’s record keeping was laid bare in a report by the British Chief of Intelligence in Ireland for the period May 1920 to July 1921. ‘In no office, of the many raided,’ he relayed, ‘has any card index system been found.’⁹² Indeed, it wasn’t until the late 1920s, when the Irish Free State government was endeavouring to honour the loan, that an alphabetical index of subscribers to the National Loan was compiled.⁹³ The Intelligence Chief went on to say:

No doubt, the unceremonious flitting of a Minister through a window, attired only in his night apparel, and the total abandonment of his Office to the depredations of the opposing forces is conducive neither to order nor method, and, if it is possible to extend sympathy to those who have been particularly devoid of it, then the seizure of the leader’s entire Office correspondence each successive month is, possibly, a worthy subject for it.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ IE/BMH/WS0548, *Daithi O’Donoghue*, p. 23.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 22-3.

⁹² Hart, *British Intelligence*, p. 86.

⁹³ DÉ Debate Vol. 24 No. 9, *Private Deputies’ Business, DÉ Loan (Internal) 1919-20*, 22 Jun. 1928.

⁹⁴ Hart, *British Intelligence*, p.86.

Security of Money

As the loan money came in, it was clear that it needed to be stored somewhere safe. Once collected at constituency level, the money was usually lodged in a district bank in the name of a local man, before being passed on.⁹⁵ Analysis of the backgrounds of local treasurers, summarised in Figure 2.1, is revealing. Based on a sample taken from correspondence seized by the British towards the end of the conflict, the most common profession was that of a priest, other professions represented being solicitors and local businessmen.⁹⁶




Figure 2.1. Occupations of National Loan treasurers.⁹⁷

The involvement of the Catholic clergy in fundraising for nationalist causes in Ireland stretches back to the days of Daniel O’Connell and his repeal fund, the so-called ‘penny

⁹⁵ Béaslaí, *Collins*, p. 349.

⁹⁶ TNA: CO904/24/3/M, *Epitome of documents seized at 5 Mespil Rd*, 1920; TNA: CO904/24/3/O.

⁹⁷ TNA: CO904/24/3/112-23; 1911 Census of Ireland.

rent', where the parish priests were called upon to organise the collection at parish level.⁹⁸ Parnell, too, used the Catholic clergy to administer funds collected for his anti-eviction fund in 1886.⁹⁹ More recently, priests played an important role in collecting for the INAAVDF in 1916 and Anti-Conscription Fund in 1918.¹⁰⁰ In the words of Fitzpatrick, the clergy were 'indispensible as local organisers, officers and subscribers to party funds'.¹⁰¹

The moral authority of the clergy would have militated against interference from the RIC, as well as accusations of impropriety from the subscribers, and the organisational backing of the Catholic Church would have acted as a further disincentive to police interference. Indeed, many IRA Volunteers disguised themselves as priests in order to evade arrest.¹⁰² Moreover, the clergy had experience of collecting money for parish funds and their parishioners were used to giving it to them, with all the trust that that implies. From the perspective of the priests, who were practically barred from joining the IRA due to their vocation, the National Loan was an outlet for acting on their republican sympathies.

Unlike the Anti-Conscription Fund, where money remained in local hands, the National Loan organisation demanded the centralisation of funds in Dublin, with amounts flowing in from around the country.¹⁰³ This centralisation was necessitated by the cash-flow requirements of the growing Dáil administration, but it also ensured that control would be held by the DÉDF. Centralisation of funds was not without its risks of course, and the transmission of funds constituted a significant security threat.

⁹⁸ N. Sakiyama, 'Dublin Merchants and the Irish Repeal Movement', *Journal of International Economic Studies*, 24 (2010), p. 40.

⁹⁹ M. Keyes, 'Parnellism: The Role of Funding in the Journey from the Semi-Revolutionary to the Purely Constitutional', in C. NicDháibhéid & C. Reid (eds.), *From Parnell to Paisley: constitutional and revolutionary politics in modern Ireland* (Dublin, 2010), ch. 1, pp. 27-8.

¹⁰⁰ C. NicDháibhéid, 'Irish National Aid Association and the Radicalisation of Public Opinion', *Historical Journal*, 55/3 (2012), p. 722; J. aan de Wiel, *The Catholic Church in Ireland, 1914-1918* (Dublin, 2003), p. 225.

¹⁰¹ D. Fitzpatrick, 'Ireland since 1870' in R.F. Foster (ed.) *The Oxford illustrated history of Ireland* (Oxford, 1989), p. 223.

¹⁰² T. O'Fiaich, 'The Catholic Clergy and the Independence Movement', *Capuchin Annual* (1970), p. 499.

¹⁰³ Aan de Wiel, *The Catholic Church*, p. 225.

If the local bank manager was willing to cooperate, drafts were forwarded to a branch of their bank in Dublin, where agents of the DÉDF would collect them.¹⁰⁴ In cases where the bank manager was not so amenable, the money was carried to Dublin by special messengers, sometimes in amounts of over £20,000.¹⁰⁵ This was a risky operation, as the messengers had to avoid widespread searches by troops and police at railway stations, crossroads and other locations.¹⁰⁶ For this reason, the job of transferring large sums of money to Dublin was often undertaken by young priests, who were less likely to be stopped and searched by the authorities.¹⁰⁷

This centralisation also constituted a security risk once the funds had arrived in Dublin. To avoid putting all its eggs in one basket, the DÉDF spread its finances around the city. Large amounts of loan money, once received by headquarters, were handed over to trusted friends of the organisation on the understanding that they would not be required to hand the funds back without ‘ample notice’. These holders of money would be liable for interest in the same way as banks for monies placed on deposit. Other large amounts of loan money were placed on deposit in banks, some of which had agreed to pay on demand or at very short notice in case of emergencies.¹⁰⁸ For added security, the funds were banked under the names of private, ‘respectable’ citizens, who were secret sympathisers of the cause.¹⁰⁹ As of 26 August 1920, the Dáil had £30,000 of loan money on deposit in the Hibernian Bank (College Green and Camden Street branches), £10,000 in the Munster & Leinster (Dame Street, O’Connell Street and Phibsboro), £20,000 held by Alderman P.W. Corrigan (an undertaker based on Camden Street), £5,000 by George

¹⁰⁴ Béaslaí, *Collins*, p. 349.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 349.

¹⁰⁷ IE/BMH/WS1770, *Kevin O’Sheil*, p. 866; IE/BMH/WS0826, *Maeve MacGarry*, p. 12.

¹⁰⁸ IE/BMH/WS0548, *Dáithí O’Donoghue*, p. 16.

¹⁰⁹ IE/BMH/WS0380, *David Nelligan*, p. 6.

Nesbitt (a Trustee of the Irish National Assurance Company), and £71,108 6s. 8d. in the National Loan trustees' accounts.¹¹⁰

However, funds held on deposit in retail banks made up a minority of the loan money that reached Dublin. Writing to Liam de Róiste in October 1919, Collins confided that the loan money would 'be safeguarded under the finest security in the world – land'.¹¹¹ As of 26 August 1920, £141,200 had been utilised as paid up capital to found and finance the National Land Bank, where a further £55,000 was held in deposit receipts.¹¹² Established in August 1919 and managed by the Oxford-educated Lionel Smith-Gordon at premises at 68 Lower Leeson Street, the Land Bank was a legally constituted company registered under the name Natland Co-operative Society Ltd.¹¹³ The Dáil held shares in the bank through a nominee named Arthur Clery, a Sinn Féin sympathising Professor of Law at University College Dublin, whose private address was used as the company's registered office.¹¹⁴ Using the Land Mortgages Association of Germany as a template, the Dáil set up the National Land Bank to provide loans to tenant farmers to discourage land seizures amid the lawlessness in much of the country.¹¹⁵ Such agrarian unrest would have had a destabilising effect and serve to discredit the Dáil, concerns that were reminiscent of Parnell, who set up the short-lived anti-eviction fund in 1886 with the same motivation.¹¹⁶ While a number of loans were granted to various agricultural and fishing cooperatives, the Land Bank's role in

¹¹⁰ IE/BMH/WS0511, *Michael Lynch*, p. 69; IE/BMH/WS0548, *Daithi O'Donoghue*, p. 22; IE/BMH/CD/184/3, *Loan statement up to 26 Aug. 1920*; *Leitrim Observer*, 5 April 1919, p. 2.

¹¹¹ IE/CCCA/U271/50, *Collins to de Róiste*, 8 Oct. 1919, p. 2.

¹¹² IE/BMH/CD/184/3, *Loan statement up to 26 Aug. 1920*.

¹¹³ IE/BMH/WS0979, *Robert C Barton*, p. 19; IE/BMH/WS0548, *Daithi O'Donoghue*, p. 19.

¹¹⁴ P. Quinn, D. Aylmer, D. Cantwell & L. O'Connell, *An Irish Banking Revolution* (Dublin, 1995), p. 14.

¹¹⁵ IE/BMH/WS1556, *Denis Cogan*, p. 1; IE/BMH/WS0979, *Robert Barton*, p. 19; IE/BMH/WS0548, *Daithi O'Donoghue*, p. 20; IE/CCCA/U271, *Explanatory Statement Re: Land Acquisition Scheme*, p. 2.

¹¹⁶ Keyes, 'Parnellism', pp. 27-8.

safeguarding Dáil funds was as important if not more so.¹¹⁷ Indeed Patrick Moylett, claiming responsibility for the initial idea, maintained this was its primary purpose.¹¹⁸

Unlike the Irish National Assurance Company, where any connections with the Dáil were of a personal nature, the Land Bank was institutionally linked to the Dáil Cabinet.¹¹⁹ The bank was managed under direct ministerial supervision and constitutionally 100% of its guaranteed stock was to be held by the Dáil government.¹²⁰ When the Land Bank met resistance from the ‘Banks Standing Committee’ in seeking admission to the bankers’ clearinghouse, Collins sent Daithi O’Donoghue to advise those identified as members of the Standing Committee that unless admission was approved they would be treated in the same category as the Black and Tans.¹²¹ O’Donoghue was reluctant to make such a threat, but Collins insisted.¹²² ‘I first went to the Hibernian Bank,’ recalled O’Donoghue, ‘I knew the manager well. He greeted me with smiles but I said I wanted to talk to him privately’.

I told him my orders. I have nothing to do with it he said. I told him that GHQ intelligence said he was there, then I left quickly [?] for the next bank before this one would close at three. That was a Friday. By Monday all Banks had agreed to co-operate.¹²³

Of course a financial institution so closely linked to the Dáil would not be a safe place to keep money. Instead, the National Land Bank’s funds, most of which derived from the National Loan, were held on deposit accounts spread over *ca.* 20 cooperatives, mainly in the North of England.¹²⁴ The choice of cooperatives made sense from a financial point of view, as interest rates paid on cooperative society deposits were higher than those paid

¹¹⁷ Quinn, Aylmer, Cantwell & O’Connell, *Irish Banking*, p. 10.

¹¹⁸ IE/BMH/WS0767, *Patrick Moylett*, p. 18.

¹¹⁹ IE/UCDA/P150/729, *Barton to de Valera*, 18 Jan. 1920.

¹²⁰ IE/CCCA/U271, *Explanatory Statement Re: Land Acquisition Scheme*, pp. 2 & 7.

¹²¹ IE/BMH/WS0979, *Robert Barton*, p.19; IE/BMH/WS0548, *Daithi O’Donoghue*, p. 20.

¹²² IE/UCDA/P17b/90, *Daithi O’Donoghue*, p. 21.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ IE/BMH/WS1556, *Denis Cogan*, p. 1; M. Walsh, *Bitter Freedom: Ireland in a Revolutionary World 1918-1923* (London, 2015), p. 139.

by joint stock banks. It also provided extra security, as it was believed that British Authorities would be averse to antagonising the English cooperative movement by interfering with its business.¹²⁵

As well as cash deposits, the Dáil also accumulated a gold reserve, the storage of which was described by Daithi O'Donoghue:¹²⁶

The gold coins were securely sealed in small tobacco tins, each one containing £500 or £250 depending on the size of the box. These boxes, when made up, were handed over to Mr Peter A. Corrigan, who at 'dead of night' buried them at their (Corrigan's) undertaking premises on Camden Street.¹²⁷

Sovereigns and half-sovereigns were still in circulation at this time, and some subscribers to the loan preferred to pay in gold. Then amounting to over £25,500, the gold was taken out and counted during the Truce of 1921, before being put back into storage, this time in a baby's coffin and some butter boxes, and brought to another safe house.¹²⁸

Another way of safeguarding the National Loan funds was to spend it. Once safely lodged in Dublin, the money had to be distributed among the various Dáil departments to cover their expenses. The *modus operandi* was that a list of estimates would be passed at a Dáil Cabinet meeting and then passed on to Daithi O'Donoghue in the DÉDF.¹²⁹ He would then, on a quasi-weekly basis, receive requisitions from the departments for amounts to be paid without delay.¹³⁰ These amounts were transferred in cash by a man named Seán (Paddy) McGrath, who went by the nickname "Banc ar siubhal" (The Walking Bank).¹³¹ Mitchell describes Banc as having an ordinary appearance, and he was able to carry large sums of money around Dublin without

¹²⁵ IE/BMH/WS1556, *Denis Cogan*, p. 4.

¹²⁶ IE/BMH/CD/184/3, *Loan statement up to 26 Aug. 1920*.

¹²⁷ IE/BMH/WS0548, *Daithi O'Donoghue*, p. 17.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p.14; IE/BMH/WS0889, *James Kavanagh*, p. 128.

attracting attention.¹³² According to Banc's witness statement, he lodged the money in these private bank accounts under the assumed name Isaac Fran.¹³³

I remember well how the manager looked at me when I was in the act of making the lodgement – he knew that I was not Isaac Fran but Bank managers in those days were circumspect and did not say or do more than was actually necessary.¹³⁴

Tellingly, Banc's statement continues with the crossed-out sentences 'I think this particular manager was under the impression I carried a gun and could use it. I may say he was mistaken in that'.¹³⁵ In recognition of his service, Banc ar Suibhal's signature later appeared on the Irish Free State's paper money.¹³⁶

'Pinching M.C.'s "war chest"'

With such a large flow of cash into and around an illegal organisation, it was only a matter of time before the forces of the British government reacted. They established a secret commission on 1 March 1920, and it summoned bank managers to appear before it with a view to tracking down the loan money.¹³⁷ A magistrate named Alan Bell, who earlier in his career had succeeded in locating funds belonging to the Land League, was recruited to lead the investigation.¹³⁸ David Nelligan, an IRA intelligence officer in the RIC, described him as 'a clever fellow' and 'one of the most dangerous men in the British regime in Ireland'.¹³⁹

According to the *Irish Independent*, bank officials were 'commanded to produce securities, telegrams, letters, books of accounts, ledgers, vouchers, bills, cheques, orders,

¹³² Mitchell, *Revolutionary*, p. 56.

¹³³ IE/NAI/DE/2/530/8, *Banc*, p. 2.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ Mitchell, *Revolutionary*, p. 56.

¹³⁷ C. Kostick, *Revolution in Ireland: popular militancy 1917 to 1923* (London, 1996), p. 99.

¹³⁸ IE/BMH/WS0380, *David Nelligan*, p. 5.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.5; Carroll, *Money*, pp. 9-10.

records, memoranda, notes of telephone messages sent or received, and all other documents' relating to transactions or dealings between the bank and Sinn Féin or Dáil Éireann.¹⁴⁰ Held in a room in the Dublin Police Court buildings, the meetings were highly secretive; each witness was interviewed separately, with only the magistrate and an official note taker present, and the press and the public were excluded.¹⁴¹

The Dublin correspondent of the *Evening Standard* claimed that Sinn Féin circles were aware of the establishment of the tribunal more than a week before its work began, and so would have been able to take steps to remove its money from the banks.¹⁴² Whether or not he had prior notice, Collins certainly took preventative measures once the inquiry was underway, postponing the lodgement of a \$200,000 draft from the Dáil's representatives in America 'owing to a certain Banking Inquiry'.¹⁴³

According to the *Irish Independent*, businessmen and bankers strongly resented the tribunal, seeing it as 'an unwarranted interference with the rights of the commercial community'.¹⁴⁴ The newspaper cited one bank manager saying he did not think his bank would disclose any information except under duress, an attitude confirmed in the official transcripts of the inquiry.¹⁴⁵

The first session was held on the morning of Monday 8 March 1920, when two officials from the Hibernian Bank were questioned.¹⁴⁶ Among the questions asked were the political leanings of some of the bank's depositors.¹⁴⁷ According to a reporter from the *Irish Independent*, although the bank officials were accompanied by a solicitor, he was

¹⁴⁰ *Irish Independent*, 9 Mar. 1920, p. 4.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ Hart, *Mick*, p. 196.

¹⁴⁴ *Irish Independent*, 9 Mar. 1920, p. 5.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*; TNA: CO 904/177(1).

¹⁴⁶ *Irish Independent*, 11 Mar 1920, p. 5; *Strabane Chronicle*, 13 Mar 1920, p. 3.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 11 Mar 1920, p. 5.

not allowed to represent them.¹⁴⁸ Once interviewed, each witness was asked to leave by a separate door so they had no opportunity of speaking to the other witnesses before they had been questioned.¹⁴⁹

The session only lasted two hours however, as the bank officials refused to disclose any information.¹⁵⁰ Members of the press waiting outside the Police Court building noted that the witnesses from the Hibernian Bank had not brought any account books or large documents with them.¹⁵¹ The bank officials, claiming privilege, declined to disclose the information sought.¹⁵² It was planned that the interviews would continue on the Tuesday and Thursday of that week, but they were suspended because of the officials' refusal to cooperate.¹⁵³

The interviews resumed on Thursday, when seven senior officials from various branches of the Munster & Leinster Bank were summoned for questioning.¹⁵⁴ However, none of the seven made an appearance at the tribunal.¹⁵⁵ Only one member of the bank's staff, whose attendance had not been requested, was present for questioning.¹⁵⁶ He was questioned about cheques that had been found during a military raid and that were drawn on his bank, but he did not give any information other than that they were drawn as part of the bank's ordinary business.¹⁵⁷

Notwithstanding the resistance of the bank officials, it was clear that Bell's investigation constituted a serious threat to the National Loan campaign, and it was decided that action must be taken. Members of 'The Squad', Collins's group of assassins,

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 10 Mar 1920, p. 5.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 11 Mar 1920, p. 5.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ *Cork Examiner*, 9 Mar 1920, p. 5.

¹⁵² *Irish Independent*, 10 Mar 1920, p. 5.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 11 Mar 1920, p. 5.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*; *Irish Independent*, 12 Mar 1920; p. 3; *Ulster Herald*, 13 Mar 1920, p. 5.

¹⁵⁵ *Irish Independent*, 12 Mar 1920; p. 3.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*; p. 3; *Cork Examiner*, 12 Mar 1920; p. 5.

waited to catch Bell as he made his way between Dublin Castle and the Four Courts. They had no means of identifying him until a photograph was published in the *Irish Independent*.¹⁵⁸ With a positive identification, they tracked him for a number of days, communicating his movements to each other by means of handkerchief signals from one street to the next.¹⁵⁹ After a couple of aborted attempts on Bell's life, on 27 March 1920 in broad daylight he was taken off a tram in Dublin and shot dead by Collins's men.¹⁶⁰ In June 1920, Collins coolly reported to the Dáil that the loan funds 'are perfectly safe, as the non-success of the bank inquiry will assure you all'.¹⁶¹ The only financial loss put down to the inquiry was £100, the result of interest earnings forgone.¹⁶² To put this in context, by the time of Bell's inquiry no less than £154,758 of loan money had been received in the DÉDF.¹⁶³

Bell's killing caused outrage in London. The *Daily Telegraph* ran the headline 'Cowardly Murder of an Irish Magistrate' and the event was raised at Prime Minister's Questions in the House of Commons.¹⁶⁴ The authorities offered £10,000 to anyone giving information leading to the arrest of Bell's killers but, as his successor put it, 'there was not a nibble at the bait'.¹⁶⁵ Moreover, according to Nelligan, the killing of Bell had the effect of deterring the bank managers from cooperating with future investigations.¹⁶⁶ By 30 August 1920, Collins was able to report to Carl Ackerman, correspondent of the *Public Ledger*, that only £29 had been seized from a loan collector by the British.¹⁶⁷

¹⁵⁸ IE/BMH/WS0663, *Joseph Dolan*, p. 8.

¹⁵⁹ IE/BMH/WS0423, *Vincent Byrne*, pp. 38-41.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-41; IE/BMH/WS0380, *David Nelligan*, p. 5.

¹⁶¹ IE/NAI/DE/2/007, *DÉDF report, period ending Oct 1919 and half year ending April 1920*, p. 2.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ IE/NAI/DE/2/007, *DÉDF Report of Operations showing receipts and expenditure for the period ending 31 Oct 1919 and the half year ending 30 Apr. 1920*, p. 1.

¹⁶⁴ *Daily Telegraph*, 27 Mar. 1920, p. 11; Hansard, HC Deb 29 Mar 1920 vol 127 cc870-1.

¹⁶⁵ Hart, *British Intelligence*, p. 73.

¹⁶⁶ IE/BMH/WS0380, *David Nelligan*, p. 5.

¹⁶⁷ US/AIHS/DFC/Bx.4/5, *Weekly News Bulletin*, 30 Aug. 1920.

The government forces unwittingly came close to intercepting some of the loan money on the night of 22 September 1920, when they entered the hotel room of John Lynch in Dublin. Lynch had travelled up to Dublin from Limerick East with £23,000 of loan money, to hand it to Collins at head office. The raid was conducted by a British intelligence officer named Angliss (*alias* “MacMahon”) who had apparently mistaken the man for Commandant Liam Lynch, the leader of an IRA division in Co. Cork. John Lynch was shot dead, but there is no record of the money being seized.¹⁶⁸

The British forces’ single significant success in their pursuit of the National Loan money came in October 1920, when a chequebook found by the RIC during a raid on Dáil offices led to a raid on the Munster & Leinster Bank on Dame Street. The *Irish Independent* described the scene:

...a section of the R.I.C. drove into Dame St. in a number of light lorries shortly before 4 o’clock, and at once drew cordons across the street at Parliament St. and near South Gt. George’s St. They all carried rifles and bayonets, and apparently were under the command of a man dressed in the uniform of an R.I.C. Head-Constable and wearing a Sam Browne belt.

...A good deal of excitement prevailed. Crowds collected around the cordons, and these were frequently scattered by a small armoured car which was in the vicinity while the raid was going on, and frequently made rapid dashes up and down the street...

...Two other armoured cars also drove into the street during the afternoon, one of them escorting some lorry loads of soldiers, but these did not remain long. On top of one building, an armed man kept watch on the crowds below, while the men on duty in the street displayed considerable vigilance.

...Shortly before 8.30 the forces left the building and the entire party withdrew to the Castle, being loudly booed by the crowd. A couple of shots were fired, causing a wild stampede.¹⁶⁹

According to Daithi O’Donoghue, the bank manager refused to give any information, and ‘only when the guns were jabbed into him did he hand over the keys to the strong room’.¹⁷⁰ Two of the bank staff were taken to Dublin Castle, claimed O’Donoghue, where ‘they suffered for refusing information’.¹⁷¹ The raid report stated

¹⁶⁸ IE/BMH/WS1770, *Kevin O’Shiel, Part VII*, pp. 1023-4.

¹⁶⁹ *Irish Independent*, 27 Oct. 1920, p. 5.

¹⁷⁰ IE/BMH/WS0548, *Daithi O’Donoghue*, p. 21.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

that no damage was done to the premises, and receipts were given to the bank officials in return for amounts seized.¹⁷² This raid was conducted by the new Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier-General Sir Ormonde Winter, described by Nelligan as ‘a dapper little fellow with a monocle’.¹⁷³ Winter boasted of his achievement that night, and the episode was vividly recorded in the diary of Mark Sturgis, Assistant Undersecretary at Dublin Castle:

O. came in this evening in a chestnut moustache and wig, trench coat, flannel trousers and bowler hat – looking *the* most complete swine I ever saw – he had been pinching M.C.’s ‘war chest’ from the Munster & Leinster Bank – quite illegally I expect – brought in about £4,000. £15,000 more to come.¹⁷⁴

It is clear that whether through sympathy or fear, pragmatism or professionalism, the bank officials would not cooperate with the British attempts to suppress Dáil funds. The Dáil accounts list just £21,265 as the total amount of central funds ‘stolen by the English’ in the course of the conflict.¹⁷⁵ After the Anglo-Irish Treaty, in 1922, the provisional Irish government had £22,275 2s. 11d. returned to it by the British government, including £1,009 19s. 7d. in interest.¹⁷⁶ The amount seized by the British amounted to just 6% of the total collected for the National Loan, and was an even smaller proportion of that collected by all the Dáil’s sources of revenue.

While the collection of the loan took place at the local level, it is clear that there was a great degree of centralisation, with the money and information flowing to Dublin and the expenses and stipends only to be paid out of the DÉDF’s central funds. This mirrors early modern examples of state formation, where the central authority bypasses local interests to assert its control at the national level.¹⁷⁷ The DÉDF harnessed the infrastructure of the Sinn Féin party and the manpower of the Volunteers, to build an

¹⁷² TNA: WO/35/70, GSI/53/360: *Raid report to Dublin District General Staff*, 27 Oct 1920.

¹⁷³ Hopkinson, *Irish War of Independence*, p. 60; D. Nelligan, *The Spy in the Castle* (London, 1968), p. 101.

¹⁷⁴ Hopkinson, *Irish War of Independence*, p. 60.

¹⁷⁵ NLI Ms. 17,152 (i) *Total outlay from home funds, 1919-1924*, Notes, p. 24.

¹⁷⁶ IE/NAI/FIN/1/2166/643, *McGrath to Brennan*, 22 Jan. 1923.

¹⁷⁷ J. Brewer, *The Sinews of Power* (Cambridge MA, 1988), pp. 88-134.

efficient, centralised network of revenue collectors. This strengthened the bond between the rebel organisations and bound the local Volunteers to the movement at the national level. The strength of this organisation was put to the test by the reaction of the British Authorities. As will be shown in the next chapter, so too was the organisation's effort to promote the loan.

Chapter 3: Manufacturing Dissent

Whereas the previous chapter dealt solely with the National Loan's organisation and its interaction with the British forces, this chapter introduces another crucial group: the loan's potential subscribers. Beyond its importance to the Dáil's funding, the National Loan campaign was also a vital tool in galvanising a majority of Irish people in opposition to British rule in Ireland. Like other war bonds, mass investment in the National Loan was a means of encouraging a widespread sense of identification with the war effort and with the nation itself.¹ As recalled by IRA member Joseph Lawless, 'As well as relieving the forces of the revolution of the petty restraints of poverty, it provided a means whereby sympathisers both at home and abroad could, by their contributions, become positively identified with the cause of Irish freedom.'² This chapter looks at the Dáil's strategy for promoting the loan and the British attempts to suppress it. At the same time, it develops the narrative of the National Loan campaign, running from August 1919 to September 1920.

The potential market for the National Loan can be divided into three segments: the Sinn Féin supporters, who could be relied upon to subscribe; the Unionists, who were extremely unlikely to subscribe; and the moderate nationalist IPP supporters, who might be persuaded to subscribe. When cast in this light, it would not have made sense to devote resources to persuading Unionists to subscribe to the loan, as the marginal return to such efforts would be so low. The same could be said for the Sinn Féin grass root supporters, who would subscribe without needing much persuasion. In this context,

¹ Ott, *Wall Street*, p. 55.

² IE/BMH/WS1043, *J.V. Lawless*, p. 284.

the key target for the Dáil's advertisement would be the IPP supporters, but before the advertisement came the 'low hanging fruit'.

Appealing to the base

The collection of subscriptions took place at a local level, but each locality followed a similar strategy. First, the most likely subscribers, who were loyal to the cause, relatively wealthy and carried local influence, were invited by their local Sinn Féin TD to attend a meeting at which the loan was promoted.³ The DÉDF's strategy for launching the loan was outlined by Kevin O'Higgins, loan organiser and TD for Queen's County, in a letter to a local loan collector in his constituency:

It is proposed to select eight or ten centres in the constituency and to invite 50 of the most substantial supporters of Sinn Féin to meet me at each of these centres at an hour and on a day to be fixed later. The hour of the meeting will in each case be selected with a view to covering as many centres as possible in a single day. I want you with the help of someone in your centre who can hold his tongue (I would suggest H. Fingleton, of the Rock) to make up a list of 50 supporters of Sinn Féin who are in your opinion financially strong and can be relied on to invest generously in the loan. You need not and indeed ought not to speak of this to any of the 50 men or in fact at all except Fingleton. On the day before I wish to meet them (which will probably be soon) these men will receive personal letters from me. That will be sufficient notice for them. The centre you are to get the names from is polling areas of Stradbally and Timahoe. Do not go outside these as we wish to avoid overlapping in the lists we receive. When you have your list complete send it without delay and by hand to Michael Sheridan, 6 Coote Street, Maryboro. We are relying on your energy and discretion. If the plan works out we hope to break the back of the loan work with one day's push, leaving only a few thousand to be collected through SF, Volunteers, etc. We can arrange place of meeting when we get list.⁴

Promotional meetings such as these varied in size. In Co. Donegal in October 1919, meetings addressed by Joseph O'Doherty TD drew crowds of 400 and 200 respectively, while another meeting addressed by P.J. Ward TD attracted 130.⁵ In

³ IE/CCCA/U271/Dáil Material/(a)/28, *Collins to de Róiste*, 5 Aug. 1919.

⁴ IE/MA/MSP34REF22570, *Attachment to Sworn Statement by James Ramsbottom before Advisory Committee*, 23 Jun. 1936. Similar pattern found in IE/BMH/WS0492, *John McCoy*.

⁵ TNA: CO 904/110/278, *RIC Donegal CI report*, Oct 1919.

Leitrim, also in October, James Dolan TD addressed a meeting of 700.⁶ As illustrated by Figure 3.1, the meetings tended to take place on Sundays, following the precedent set down by the Anti-Conscription Fund whereby meetings would be held directly after Mass.⁷ This would have taken advantage of an already-assembled crowd, possibly supported by the many priests who were involved in organising the National Loan campaign. However, it would also have excluded the Protestant population, suggesting an acknowledgement that approaching Unionists would be a waste of resources.




Figure 3.1. Amount of National Loan meetings by days of the week, as reported by the RIC.⁸

A window into the social strata targeted in these meetings is provided by the handwritten notes of Liam de Róiste, loan organiser for Cork city. In his notes, 20

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ TNA: CO 904/110-1, *RIC Inspector-General's and County Inspectors' confidential reports*, Sept. 1919 – Feb. 1920; IE/BMH/WS1079, *Patrick P Fitzgerald*, p. 6.

⁸ TNA: CO 904/110-1, *RIC Inspector-General's and County Inspectors' confidential reports*, Sept. 1919 – Feb. 1920

priests, 19 merchants and 14 doctors are mentioned by name, and perhaps more aspirationally a note is added to invite all solicitors, all barristers and all professors in the city.⁹ The resemblance it bears to the guest-list of a meeting in 1915 promoting British war bonds in the city, albeit without representatives of the British government or the banks, is striking.¹⁰ In the case of the National Loan, the RIC were uninvited guests.

The practice of initially targeting those wealthier, more influential and more likely to contribute was quite intentional, and was reminiscent of the rival UVF's fundraising tactics a few years earlier.¹¹ As observed by Sandler, a large initial contribution can encourage smaller potential subscribers to believe that the target amount is attainable.¹² Indeed, Kevin O'Higgins also exploited this effect at a micro-level. The meetings he summoned, which usually took place in barns or rooms of friendly shopkeepers, were each attended by a 'decoy duck', who would respond to O'Higgins's appeal by pledging £100.¹³ This tactic is observable in witnesses' accounts of other loan meetings. In Macroom, Mid-Cork, during a meeting addressed by Terence MacSwiney that raised £260, MacSwiney and his wife contributed £100.¹⁴ In Nenagh, North Tipperary, the first four subscriptions were for £25, £200, £100 and £50.¹⁵ In Dunmanaway, West Cork, Michael Collins subscribed £50 in his capacity as the Dáil's Minister for Finance, at the same time demonstrating the instalment system by which subscriptions could be made.¹⁶ The largest subscription found in the course of this research, for £250, came from Robert Barton, Sinn Féin TD for West Wicklow.¹⁷

⁹ IE/CCCA/U271/Dáil Material/(a)/28, *Collins to de Róiste*, 5 Aug 1919

¹⁰ *Cork Examiner*, 11 Sept. 1915, p. 5.

¹¹ IE/CCCA/U271, *Collins to de Róiste*, 5 Aug. 1919; T. Bowman & G. Brownlow, 'Patchwork Paramilitarism? Social and Economic Organisation in the Ulster Volunteer Force before 1918,' *Paper for ISNIE Conference*, (2011), p. 26.

¹² Sandler, *Economic Concepts*, p. 73.

¹³ T. De Vere White, *Kevin O'Higgins*, (London, 1948), p. 32.

¹⁴ *Cork Examiner*, 17 Sept. 1919, p. 2.

¹⁵ IE/BMH/WS1553, *Liam Hoolan*, p. 14.

¹⁶ IE/NAI/DE/2/530, *Ryan to Collins*, Sept. 1919.

¹⁷ IE/BMH/CD264/23/6, *National Loan receipt of Robert Barton*, Sept. 1919.

As was the case with the British war bonds, speakers at National Loan meetings were given briefing pamphlets, telling them how best to explain the terms of the loan.¹⁸ A direct mail advertising campaign was also undertaken. Each member of Dáil Éireann was asked to provide the names of at least one hundred likely loan subscribers in their constituency, so that the DÉDF could send loan prospectuses directly to them.¹⁹ In this way, some 50,000 letters were sent to targeted people.²⁰

It is clear that secrecy was vital in this atmosphere of suppression, but in some cases the organisers went further, spreading misinformation and creating decoys. For example, when the organisers in Mullingar, Co. Westmeath, invited the most prominent businessmen and farmers to attend a meeting in the Town Hall in November 1919, it transpired that the police had been informed and, at the given time, they surrounded the building. However, it was arranged that a crowd of people should gather at the Court House and try to enter, creating a diversion, while the real meeting was held in the churchyard, raising £300 for the loan.²¹ In Co. Galway, a loan organiser called Pádraig Ó Fathaigh, responsible for the south and east of the county, deliberately organised a meeting to take place in a Mountbellow pub owned by a man of the same name, the secretary of the local IPP branch, so that there would be confusion in the event of a raid.²²

Collins stressed to TDs that the promotional meetings should ‘not be confined to those who are active members of the Sinn Féin Clubs, but an endeavour should be made to secure the services of the supporters who may not, up to the present, have taken an

¹⁸ F.W. Beckett, *Home Front 1914-1918, How Britain survived the Great War* (London, 2006), p. 160; IE/UCDA/P133/4 *Fleming to Lalor*, 7 Dec. 1919.

¹⁹ IE/BMH/CD264.23.7 (b), *Covering letter to CD264.23.7 (a)*, 30 Sept. 1919.

²⁰ Carroll, *Money*, p. 7.

²¹ Béaslaí, *Collins*, p. 349.

²² T.G. McMahon (Ed.), *Pádraig Ó Fathaigh's War of Independence* (Cork, 2000), pp. 15 & 49.

active part'.²³ However, in practice this proved difficult.²⁴ The subscribers attending meetings were a loyal minority. In Mid-Cork, for example, only £314 of the £7,237 raised was derived from preliminary meetings.²⁵ In order to achieve the widespread support required to make the loan a success, it was necessary to target the more marginal subscribers. To a large extent, this meant the market segment composed of nominal IPP supporters.

Appealing to the masses

As collecting subscriptions for the National Loan was illegal, it had to be done as quickly as possible.²⁶ For this reason, it was particularly important that potential subscribers knew all about the loan before canvassers knocked on their door.²⁷ In some cases, householders were notified by leaflet a week in advance, so they would be expecting the collector to call. However, to do this on a large scale would have been impractical.²⁸ To really reach the masses, mass marketing was essential. Studying the mass marketing of US war bonds in the Second World War, Dorwin Cartwright identified three interrelated phases: becoming aware of the bonds; becoming motivated to buy the bonds; and acting on the motivation to buy the bonds.²⁹ Although not a war bond in the conventional sense, the same theory can be applied to the National Loan.

As noted by Maurice Walsh, 'the overlapping of the newspaper audience and the emergent electorate made press and politics evermore interlinked' in Ireland.³⁰ This was fully understood by the British government, who had deployed the press as a 'weapon of

²³ Béaslaí, *Collins*, pp. 348-9.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ IE/UCDA/P48b/298, *Mid-Cork DÉ Loan: Analysis of cash received and sent to Dublin to date*, 12 Feb. 1920, p. 1.

²⁶ Béaslaí, *Collins*, pp. 346-7.

²⁷ IE/NAI/DE/2/530, *MacSwiney to Collins*, 2 Oct 1919.

²⁸ NLI/ILB 300 p. 2, *Item 48: Leaflet from Desmond Fitzgerald to households in Pembroke constituency*, n.d.

²⁹ D. Cartwright, 'Some principles of mass persuasion: Selected findings of research on the sale of US war bonds', *Human Relations*, 2/3 (1949) pp. 253-67.

³⁰ M. Walsh, *The News from Ireland: Foreign Correspondents and the Irish Revolution* (London, 2011), p. 15.

warfare' during the First World War.³¹ This was also true of the war bonds, and mass marketing is a typical accompaniment to war bond campaigns.³² The National Loan was a special case however, as it was issued in a country whose entire territory, and the power to censor, was held by 'the enemy'. While conventional states issuing war bonds exert direct influence on the press, co-opting representatives of the newspapers into formal publicity committees, this option was not open to the illegal Dáil administration.³³

When the National Loan was announced in the press for the first time on Friday 12 September 1919, the police seized all copies of any newspapers advertising it.³⁴ The *Cork Examiner*, which printed a full-page advertisement for the National Loan (Figure 3.2), was treated particularly harshly. Its fate was vividly described in the English press:

Copies containing the "Dáil Éireann" loan prospectus advertisement were seized and, the electric current was cut off from the printing machines by military engineers, thus preventing publication.

...While the dismantling of the machinery was in progress a large crowd gathered and cheered.³⁵

The *Cork Evening Echo* and *Cork Weekly Examiner*, both produced by the *Cork Examiner*, were also suppressed.³⁶ The following Saturday, on 20 September 1919, the Dáil changed its advertisements to remove any reference to Dáil Éireann (Figure 3.3).³⁷ Even so, six Dublin weekly newspapers were suppressed that day, as well as the *Dundalk Examiner*. 'Police and military visited the printing works, seized all the copies found on the premises, broke up the type, and in some cases dismantled the machinery.'³⁸ According to press reports, all type of the following week's issues of the *Voice of Labour*

³¹ N. Ferguson, *The Pity of War* (New York, 1999), p. 212.

³² Ott, *When Wall*, p. 55.

³³ F.I. Ker & W.H. Goodman, *Press promotion of war finance* (Toronto, 1946), ch. 1.

³⁴ IE/UCDA/P150/1125, *Collins to Boland, 10 Sept. 1919*, p.2; Béaslaí, *Collins*, pp. 345-6.

³⁵ *Taunton Courier*, 24 Sept. 1919, p. 1.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Béaslaí, *Collins*, p. 351.

³⁸ *Driffild Times*, 27 Sept. 1919, p. 4.

and *The Republic* was melted down.³⁹ The Assistant Undersecretary at Dublin Castle later informed the Press Association special correspondent that the publications had been suppressed because they had published prospectuses of the National Loan.⁴⁰ On Wednesday 24 September, the *Kerry News*, *Kerry Weekly Reporter* and *Killarney Echo* were suppressed as well.⁴¹ The *Limerick Leader*, *Munster News*, and *Limerick Echo* were also suppressed that week for the same reason.⁴² According to the *Irish Independent*, the only paper left standing in Limerick was the *Weekly Unionist Journal*.⁴³ In total, 22 newspapers were suppressed for publishing advertisements in the course of the loan campaign.⁴⁴ As a result of this suppression, even nationalist dailies refused to advertise the loan in Dublin.⁴⁵

³⁹ *Western Daily Press*, 22 Sept. 1919, p. 7.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Exeter and Plymouth Gazette*, 25 Sept. 1919, p. 4.

⁴² *Aberdeen Journal*, 24 Sept. 1919, p. 5.

⁴³ *Irish Independent*, 25 Sept. 1919, cited in I. Kenneally, *The Paper Wall: Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland 1919-1921*, (Cork, 2008), p. 8.

⁴⁴ *Cork Examiner*, 9 Jul. 1920, p. 4.

⁴⁵ Carroll, *Money*, p. 7.

DAIL EIREANN LOAN.

YOU CAN RECOVER IRELAND FOR THE IRISH.

YOU CAN RE-PEOPLE THE LAND.

YOU CAN HARNESS THE RIVERS.

YOU CAN PUT HER FLAG ON EVERY SEA.

YOU CAN PLANT THE HILLSIDES AND THE WASTES.

YOU CAN SET THE MOOMS SPINNING.

ISSAECT DAIL EIREANN.

INTERNAL LOAN OF 1919.

DAIL EIREANN LOAN.

ISSUE OF
£250,000 5 per cent. REGISTERED CERTIFICATES.

The proceeds of this loan will be used for propagating the Irish Cause all over the World, for subsidizing the Foreign Commerce Committee's scheme to promote Irish Trade and Commerce; for developing and encouraging Irish Sea Fisheries; for developing and encouraging the Reclamation of this Country; for developing and encouraging Irish Industrial Effort; for establishing a National Civil Service; for establishing National Administration Courts; for the establishment of a Land Mortgage Bank with a view to the reoccupancy of Unsettled Lands; and generally for National Purposes as directed by Dail Eireann.

PROSPECTUS. (FOR HOME SUBSCRIPTION).

ISSUE OF
£250,000 5 per cent. REGISTERED CERTIFICATES.

Bearing Interest from the date when fully paid, at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum, payable half-yearly on the 1st January and the 1st July, subject to the reservations contained in this Prospectus.

- The Ministry of Dail Eireann is authorized by an Bill to issue the above Certificates to the public for subscription, and the Minister of Finance will receive applications until further notice.
- After the withdrawal of the English Military Forces, this Loan becomes the first charge on the Revenue of the Irish Republic.
- The Certificates will be issued in denominations of £1, £5, £10, £20, £50, and £100, and will bear interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum. The first dividend will consist of interest calculated from the date when the final payment is made, but will not be payable until a date six months after the Irish Republic has received International Recognition, and the English have evacuated Ireland. Thereafter, payment will be made half-yearly on the 1st January and the 1st July.
- The price of this issue is £100 per cent, payable as follows:—
50 per cent. on Application.
50 per cent. on 1st December, 1920.
- Applications for Certificates, together with the amount payable on application, may be lodged on or after the 1st August, 1919, with the Minister of Finance, for deposit with the Trustees.
- Every application will be supplied at the time of payment with a receipt, in which the amount of the purchase and the amount paid upon application will be recorded. The Registered Certificates will, when prepared, be issued in exchange for this receipt.
- Printed Form of Application, and Copies of this Prospectus may be obtained from the Minister of Finance, Dail Eireann; the Honorary Treasurers of Sinn Fein, and the Secretary of any Sinn Fein Club in Ireland.

KAMONN DE VALERA, President.
MICHAEL O GOILEAIN, Minister of Finance.

THIS FORM OF APPLICATION MAY BE USED.

1919 ISSUE (INTERNAL).

DAIL EIREANN LOAN

ISSUE OF
£250,000 5 per cent. REGISTERED CERTIFICATES.

Issued at par, and bearing interest at 5 per cent. per annum, payable half-yearly on the 1st January and 1st July, subject to the reservations contained in the Prospectus, but calculated from the date on which the final payment is made.

REDEEMABLE within Twenty Years of the International Recognition of the Irish Republic, at 105 per cent.

Date, 1919.

To the Minister of Finance,

In terms of the Prospectus, dated 15th August, 1919, I/we hereby apply for pounds (£.....) of 5 p.c. Government of the Irish Republic Certificates, and tender herewith pounds (£.....) in payment, being Fifty Per Cent. (50%) of the amount applied for.*

And I/we agree to pay the balance due from me/us by the instalments specified in the Prospectus, and as set out hereunder:—

25 per cent. on the 1st October, 1919.
25 per cent. on the 1st December, 1919.

..... Certificates of £1, £.....
..... Certificates of £5, £.....
..... Certificates of £10, £.....

..... Certificates of £20, £.....
..... Certificates of £50, £.....
..... Certificates of £100, £.....

£.....

Ordinary Signature,

Name in full

(State Mr., Mrs., Miss, or other title.)

Address,

Occupation,

*Cheques, British P.O., and Drafts, should be crossed and made payable to the Trustees of Dail Eireann.

YOU CAN SET THE HAMMER RINGING ON THE ANVIL.

YOU CAN ABOLISH THE SLUMS.

YOU CAN SEND HER SHIPS TO EVERY PORT.

YOU CAN GARNER THE HARVEST OF THE SEAS.

YOU CAN DRAIN THE BOGS.

YOU CAN SAVE THE BOYS AND GIRLS FOR IRELAND.

YOU CAN RESTORE IRELAND'S STRENGTH, HER HEALTH, HER BEAUTY AND HER WEALTH.

SUBSCRIBE TO-DAY TO:--DAIL EIREANN LOAN.

Send your Subscription to **TRUSTEES, DAIL EIREANN LOAN, 6, HARCOURT STREET, DUBLIN.**
Or hand it to your Local Member of the Dail, or his Representative in your parish.*

Figure 3.2. Press advertising for the National Loan, 12 Sept. 1919.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Cork Examiner, 12 Sept. 1919.

IRISH NATIONAL LOAN.

You can recover Ireland for the Irish.

You can re-people the Land.

You can Harness the Rivers.

You can put her flag on every sea.

You can plant the hillsides and the wastes.

You can see the looms spinning.

Ἡ ἸΡΙΑΝΑ ἸΣΤΟΡΙΑ ΤῆΣ Ἡ-ἈΣΙΑΤῆΣ ἩΣ ἸΑΣΑΔΑΤΑ
Ἡ ἸΣΤΟΡΙΑ ΤῆΣ ἸΡΙΑΝΑ ἸΣΤΟΡΙΑ ΤῆΣ Ἡ-ἈΣΙΑΤῆΣ ἩΣ ἸΑΣΑΔΑΤΑ

Ἡ ἸΡΙΑΝΑ ἸΣΤΟΡΙΑ ΤῆΣ Ἡ-ἈΣΙΑΤῆΣ ἩΣ ἸΑΣΑΔΑΤΑ
Ἡ ἸΣΤΟΡΙΑ ΤῆΣ ἸΡΙΑΝΑ ἸΣΤΟΡΙΑ ΤῆΣ Ἡ-ἈΣΙΑΤῆΣ ἩΣ ἸΑΣΑΔΑΤΑ

Ἡ ἸΡΙΑΝΑ ἸΣΤΟΡΙΑ ΤῆΣ Ἡ-ἈΣΙΑΤῆΣ ἩΣ ἸΑΣΑΔΑΤΑ
Ἡ ἸΣΤΟΡΙΑ ΤῆΣ ἸΡΙΑΝΑ ἸΣΤΟΡΙΑ ΤῆΣ Ἡ-ἈΣΙΑΤῆΣ ἩΣ ἸΑΣΑΔΑΤΑ

Ἡ ἸΡΙΑΝΑ ἸΣΤΟΡΙΑ ΤῆΣ Ἡ-ἈΣΙΑΤῆΣ ἩΣ ἸΑΣΑΔΑΤΑ
Ἡ ἸΣΤΟΡΙΑ ΤῆΣ ἸΡΙΑΝΑ ἸΣΤΟΡΙΑ ΤῆΣ Ἡ-ἈΣΙΑΤῆΣ ἩΣ ἸΑΣΑΔΑΤΑ

Ἡ ἸΡΙΑΝΑ ἸΣΤΟΡΙΑ ΤῆΣ Ἡ-ἈΣΙΑΤῆΣ ἩΣ ἸΑΣΑΔΑΤΑ

The Irish National Loan (1919)
of £250,000 is Now Open.

TRUSTEES: ARTHUR GRIFFITH, T.D. (for Eamon de Valera, T.D.),
MOST REV. DR. FOGARTY, Lord Bishop of Killaloe,
JAMES O'MARA, T.D.

The proceeds of the Loan will be used for propagating the Irish case all over the world; for establishing in foreign countries Consular Services to promote Irish Trade and Commerce; for developing and encouraging Irish Sea Fisheries; for developing and encouraging the Re-forestation of the country; for developing and encouraging Irish Industrial effort; for establishing a National Civil Service; for establishing National Arbitration Courts; for the establishment of a Land Mortgage Bank with a view to the re-occupancy of untenanted lands, and generally for National purposes as directed by the Elected representatives of the Irish People.

The Certificates will be issued in denominations of £1, £5, £10, £20, £50, and £100; and will bear interest subject to the conditions set forth in the Prospectus. The price of this issue is £100 per cent., payable as follows:

- 50 per cent. on application.
- 25 per cent. on 1st December, 1919.
- 25 per cent. on 1st February, 1920.

Applications for Certificates, together with the amount payable on application, may be lodged with the Director of Finance, Irish National Loan, for deposit with the Trustees.

Every applicant will be supplied at the time of payment with a receipt. The Registered Certificates will, when prepared, be issued in exchange for this Receipt.

THIS FORM OF APPLICATION MAY BE USED.

1919 ISSUE (INTERNAL).

THE IRISH NATIONAL LOAN.

ISSUE OF £250,000 5 per cent. REGISTERED CERTIFICATES.

Issued at par, and bearing interest at 5 per cent. per annum, payable half-yearly on the 1st January and 1st July, subject to the reservations contained in the Prospectus, but calculated from the date on which the final payment is made.

To the Director of Finance. Date, 1919.

In terms of the Prospectus, dated 15th August, 1919, I/we hereby apply for pounds (£.....) of 5 p.c. Irish National Loan Certificates, and tender herewith pounds (£.....) in payment, being Fifty Per Cent. (50%) of the amount applied for.*

And I/we agree to pay the balance due from me/us by the instalments specified in the Prospectus, and as set out hereunder:—

- 25 per cent. on the 1st December, 1919.
- 25 per cent. on the 1st February, 1920.

- Certificates of £1, £.....
- Certificates of £5, £.....
- Certificates of £10, £.....
- Certificates of £20, £.....
- Certificates of £50, £.....
- Certificates of £100, £.....

Ordinary Signature,

Name in full,

Address,

Occupation,

*Cheques, British P.O., and Drafts, should be crossed and made payable to the Trustees of the Irish National Loan.

You can set the hammer ringing on the anvil.

You can abolish the slums.

You can send her ships to every port.

You can garner the harvest of the seas.

You can drain the bogs.

You can save the boys and girls from Ireland.

**YOU CAN RESTORE IRELAND'S HEALTH.
HER BEAUTY AND HER WEALTH.
SUBSCRIBE TO-DAY TO IRISH NATIONAL LOAN.**

**Send your Subscription to TRUSTEES, IRISH NATIONAL LOAN, 76 HARCOURT ST., DUBLIN,
Or hand it to your Local Elected Member, or to his Representative in your Parish.**

Figure 3.3. Press advertising for the National Loan, 20 Sept. 1919.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Kerry Weekly Reporter, 20 Sept. 1919.

Promotion by suppression

It is crucial to note that, although promotion of the loan was illegal, the reporting of its suppression was not and, as a result, the policy of suppression generated a publicity of its own. Indeed, it has been suggested by Piaras Béaslaí that suppression proved the best possible advertisement for the National Loan.⁴⁸ Joseph Devlin, MP for the IPP, expressed this view in the House of Commons on 16 February 1920. Criticising the British policy of suppression, he claimed ‘You suppressed the Sinn Féin loan and it was trebled in amount.’⁴⁹ An experienced fundraiser for the constitutional nationalist cause, he knew the nature of public opinion in the face of suppression.⁵⁰

The *Connaught Tribune* laid bare the suppression and its likely effects in the following editorial:

On last Tuesday morning we received through a Dublin agency a full page advertisement for the Irish National Loan promoted by the Irish Republican Government and on Wednesday evening when we were ready to put the page containing it on the printing machine we got notice from Dublin Castle forbidding us publish it under pain of seizure and suppression. Such repressive methods are exasperating and senseless, and one effect of them will be to make the loan a great success.⁵¹

The suppression made waves across the Irish Sea, and was similarly ridiculed by a correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* who wrote, ‘A sufficient comment on the futility of the whole business is that the British Post Office is circulating the prospectus of the loan to what is described as a handpicked list under King George’s own stamps.’⁵² A letter to *The Times* from Bryan Cooper, the recently redundant censor of Ireland, was equally critical of the policy, and was reprinted in the conservative nationalist *Freeman’s Journal*.

⁴⁸ Béaslaí, *Collins*, pp. 346-7.

⁴⁹ Hansard, HC Deb 16 Feb 1920, vol. 125 c.607.

⁵⁰ Keyes, ‘Parnellism’.

⁵¹ *Connaught Telegraph*, 20 Sept. 1919, p. 2.

⁵² *Manchester Guardian*, 22 Sept. 1919, p. 7.

In the first place, it is futile. Sinn Fein has its secret printing presses, and the Prospectus of the Dail Loan is doubtless by now being passed from hand to hand all over Ireland. The Government have given it the best advertisement it could possibly desire. In the second place, this policy causes infinite irritation. Many a man who takes little interest in politics and regard the suppression of Sinn Fein meetings with apathy will be aroused to anger with the non-arrival of his favourite paper.⁵³

The ex-censor's second point was backed up by the RIC County Inspector for West Cork who, in his report for September 1919, wrote that the suppression of the *Cork Examiner* had caused much more sensation than did the proclamation of the Dáil.⁵⁴ As noted by the IPP's Jeremiah MacVeagh in the House of Commons, both the *Cork Examiner* and the *Freeman's Journal* were 'stalwart supporters of the constitutional nationalist movement in Ireland', and supported the policies of the IPP's John Redmond.⁵⁵ 'It seems ridiculous,' wrote Liam de Róiste in his diary, 'The loyal, Empire-upholding, partisan, anti-Sinn Féin *Examiner* suppressed!'⁵⁶

A subsequent request from Dublin Castle that all printers and publishers sign an undertaking not to publish anything promoting the National Loan drew similar criticism from the *Irish Independent*, repeated and endorsed in the *Meath Chronicle*.⁵⁷ Criticism of the policy, and in particular the arbitrary way in which it was applied, was voiced again by the *Freeman's Journal*, immediately after it was permitted to resume publication.⁵⁸ A possible explanation for Dublin Castle's heavy-handed response is that, although wartime censorship was discontinued in Ireland on 30 August 1919, the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) remained in place, leaving the press to implement DORA regulations with no censor to guide them.⁵⁹

⁵³ *FJ*, 27 Sept. 1919, p. 5.

⁵⁴ TNA: CO 904/110/201, *RIC Cork (West Riding) CI report*, Sept. 1919.

⁵⁵ Hansard, HC Deb, 16 Feb 1920, vol. 125 c.632.

⁵⁶ IE/CCCA/U271/A/28, *LDRD*, 17 Sept. 1919.

⁵⁷ *Meath Chronicle*, 11 Oct. 1919, p. 5.

⁵⁸ *FJ*, 30 Sept. 1919, p. 4.

⁵⁹ Kenneally, *Paper Wall*, p. 7.

The promoters of the National Loan were well aware of the benefits of suppression. Liam de Róiste, who claimed the suppression had brought him £500 in extra subscriptions, opened his diary entry with the words ‘Huroo, we are all suppressed!’ going on to say ‘the British government, *via* [Edward] Carson and Dublin Castle, can do the most wonderful things’.⁶⁰ The suppression of the press was also treated rather light-heartedly by Michael Collins, who began every day with a review of the press.⁶¹ In correspondence with de Róiste he wrote, ‘It was rather a good joke wasn’t it, the suppression of the “Examiner” and its children?’⁶² Could this optimism suggest some level of media manipulation on Collins’s part?

This was certainly the view of Darrell Figgis, Sinn Féin activist and editor of *The Republic*, who described in his memoirs what he saw as Collins’s marketing strategy:

All of us who owned journals were to be thrown cheerfully into the conflagration, the blaze of which would prove a much more successful advertisement than any mass of printed matter. The plan was characteristic of Collins.

...The result was that the Republican loan was advertised by the British Government with a military pomp and worldwide notoriety that the Irish Republican Government could never have hoped to achieve.⁶³

Based on a sample of 40 newspapers across Ireland, Figure 3.4 plots the amount of articles per week referring to the National Loan over the course of the loan campaign, distinguishing positive or neutral articles (blue) from those that report suppression of the loan (red). The first blue spike, the initial advertising of the loan, is dwarfed by the red spike that followed the suppression of newspapers that advertised it, and the reporting of suppression was sustained for the rest of the campaign. Despite suppression, of the 40 newspapers surveyed, 25 contained references to the National Loan over the period of

⁶⁰ IE/CCCA/U271/A/28, LDRD, 13 Sept. 1919.

⁶¹ IE/CCCA/U271, *Collins to de Róiste*, 25 Sept. 1919; F. O’Connor, *The Big Fellow* (Dublin, 1964), pp. 81-2.

⁶² IE/CCCA/U271, *Collins to de Róiste*, 25 Sept. 1919.

⁶³ D. Figgis, *Recollections of the Irish War*, (London, 1927), p. 278-9.

its promotion. Within this sample, 67.8% of articles referring to the loan did so either in a negative light or with reference to its suppression.⁶⁴




Figure 3.4. Press articles per week referring to the National Loan, 9 Aug. 1919 - 9 Aug. 1920.⁶⁵

It seems unlikely that the DÉDF would have been surprised by this suppression, nor had they any reason to take it seriously. A number of Sinn Féin newspapers were shut down and seized during the First World War, but only temporarily.⁶⁶ In one example, when the *Kilkenny People* was censored following the 1916 Rising, its editor publicised the fact by putting up posters around the city.⁶⁷

The choice of the *Cork Examiner* and the *Freeman's Journal*, both IPP-supporting papers, is also worthy of note. The heavy-handed suppression of these titles would have

⁶⁴ Based on a survey of 40 newspapers for which archives are available: *Anglo-Celt*, *Belfast Newsletter*, *Connacht Tribune*, *Connacht Telegraph*, *Cork Examiner*, *Derry Journal*, *Donegal Democrat*, *Donegal News*, *Evening Herald*, *Fermanagh Herald*, *Freeman's Journal*, *Irish Independent*, *Irish Times*, *Kildare Observer*, *Killarney Echo and South Kerry Chronicle*, *Kerry News*, *Kerry People*, *Kerry Weekly Reporter*, *Kerryman*, *Kilkenny People*, *Leinster Express*, *Leitrim Observer*, *Limerick Leader*, *Longford Leader*, *Mayo News*, *Meath Chronicle*, *Munster Express*, *Nationalist and Leinster Times*, *Nenagh Guardian*, *Nenagh News*, *Skibbereen Eagle*, *Southern Star*, *Strabane Chronicle*, *Sunday Independent*, *Liberator*, *Tuam Herald*, *Ulster Herald*, *Western People*, *Westmeath Examiner*, and *Wicklow News-Letter*.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Walsh, *News*, p. 120.

⁶⁷ NLI/Ms.26,182, *Confidential Report on the State of Public Opinion in Ireland*, Inspector-General, 6 Jun. 1916.

gone some way in persuading their readership that compromise with the British government, the basis on which Home Rule could be achieved, was unlikely. To quote Cartwright from his study of US WW2 bonds, 'To induce a given action by mass persuasion, this action must be seen by the person as a path to some goal that he has.'⁶⁸ In this case, the goal of Irish independence was beginning to appear more easily attainable by the path laid out by the Dáil, and the easiest way of supporting the Dáil was through subscribing to the National Loan.

The most literal manifestation of this effect can be found in the *Cork Examiner's* editorial of 22 September 1919, the day it resumed printing:

For the offence of publishing an advertisement which had already been printed in abbreviated form throughout the English-speaking world the authorities in Dublin Castle seized the chance of showing what 'strong' government is to mean which, in the presence and at the command of the Covenanters [*sic.*] of Ulster, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland promised us as our reward for the Irish blood that was spilled in the War. The victory that was to give freedom to the world has been achieved, and our share of spoil is a return to the methods of Mr Balfour, when in the late eighties he gave us a striking lesson of what British freedom means.⁶⁹

The editorial continues, giving this most evocative image:

It was an exhibition of Prussianism...that took the mind back to the time Von Bissing sat on the seats of the mighty in Brussels, and it was for this our splendid fellows went out to Flanders to fight for Ireland, relying on the sacredness of the word of the Englishman that when it was all over their country would be self-governed and free.⁷⁰

The PR blunder that was the suppression of the *Freeman's Journal* was noted by *The Times* in London, as was its likely effect on the loan's success: 'A few weeks ago, indications were strong that the drive would not be a great success. Now those who watch such things would not be surprised to see it produce considerable sums.'⁷¹ Although the *Freeman's Journal* and the *Cork Examiner* only make up 5% of the newspapers surveyed, they published 28.5% of the articles referring to the National

⁶⁸ Cartwright, 'Some principles of mass persuasion', pp. 253-67.

⁶⁹ Quoted in *Manchester Guardian*, 23 Sept 1919, p. 8.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *The Times*, 20 Dec. 1919, p. 12.

Loan. The addition of the IPP-supporting *Irish Independent* brings this proportion up to 37.5%.⁷²

Whether or not Collins and the DÉDF deliberately planned for the press to be suppressed, they certainly exploited it once it had happened. One promotional leaflet sent to households read, ‘the Dáil Executive is being deprived of the stimulating and informing power of press, placard and platform’.⁷³ More explicitly, another promotional poster stated:

- The military forces have banned the “Cork Examiner” for publishing the prospectus of the Dáil Éireann Loan.
- England does not want the Irish people to hear of the Loan.
- Why? Because she realises that the weapon forged by Sinn Féin will break Ireland’s bonds.
- The only answer worthy of Irishmen is to double the amount asked for.⁷⁴

Whatever about the marketing rationale for promoting by suppression, on a more practical level it served to reduce the Dáil’s advertising expenses. The lack of advertising was reflected in the DÉDF’s accounts, which show that of the initial advertising budget of £2,170 to cover a full-page advert in each of the provincial newspapers, only £980 had been spent by April 1920.⁷⁵ In all, only £1,714 2s. 5d. was spent on advertising the National Loan by that date.⁷⁶ Although information is lacking on the final cost of loan advertising, the instalment mechanism by which the loan was collected would suggest a frontloading of the advertising expenses, so it is reasonable to presume that this was not far from the final figure.

⁷² See notes to Figure 3.4 for details on sample.

⁷³ NLI/ILB 300 p 2, *Item 41: Leaflet from Richard Mulcahy to households*, Oct. 1919.

⁷⁴ IE/CCCA/U104/3/18, *Documents seized by RIC during raid on loan meeting in the Town Hall at Macroom, Co. Cork*, 14 Sept. 1919.

⁷⁵ IE/NAI/DE/2/007, *Report of the operations of the DÉDF and statement showing the receipts and expenditure for the period ending 31st October 1919 and the half year ending 30th April 1920*, p.4.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

The restrictions against indirect marketing, such as in newspapers, resulted in greater investment in more direct forms of marketing.⁷⁷ Some 400,000 copies of the Loan Prospectus were sent out from head office to the local organising committees, as well as three million leaflets.⁷⁸ For the Dublin constituencies, 20,000 flags were supplied by the DÉDF for promoting the loan.⁷⁹ The distribution of promotional material to local organisations had also been part of the Irish WW1 bonds strategy a few years earlier, but the DÉDF encouraged local organisers to supplement their material by additional printing at a local level.⁸⁰ Template advertisements were supplied to them in order to maintain consistency in the message and, according to Collins, some constituencies printed as many as 50,000 leaflets and circulars for themselves.⁸¹ The example of the Mid-Cork constituency's printing was used by Collins to persuade other rural districts of what was possible.⁸² In some cases, the Dáil would pay for constituencies' printing expenses, but much of the time they had to rely on their own resources or resourcefulness.⁸³ The local organisation in Mullingar, Co. Westmeath, for example, had applied for promotional material but never received any, so decided to break into a local printing office one night and print their own.⁸⁴ The incident was reported in the *Skibbereen Eagle* the next day, generating further publicity.⁸⁵ Most of the printing of loan literature was done in Dublin however, as local printers were reluctant to take the job

⁷⁷ As noted by Collins in IE/BMH/CD/264/23/8.

⁷⁸ IE/NAI/DE/2/007, *Dept. of Finance report for the period ending Oct 1919 and half year ending April 1920*, p. 4.

⁷⁹ IE/NAI/DE/2/007, *Dáil General Secretariat to Secretary for Finance*, 26 Mar. 1920.

⁸⁰ FJ, 24 Jul. 1915, p. 8; IE/BMH/CD.264.23.8, *Minister of Finance with drafts of suggested advertisements*, n.d.

⁸¹ IE/BMH/CD.264.23.8, *Minister of Finance with drafts of suggested advertisements*, n.d.; Béaslaí, *Collins*, pp. 414-16.

⁸² IE/NAI/DE/2/530, *Collins to MacSwiney*, 14 Jan. 1920.

⁸³ IE/NAI/DE/1/2, *Minutes of DÉ Ministry and Cabinet*, 10 Jun. 1920.

⁸⁴ IE/BMH/WS1610, *Michael McCoy*, pp. 15-6; NAI/DE/2/007, *Dept. of Finance report for the period ending Oct 1919 and half year ending April 1920*, p. 2.

⁸⁵ *Skibbereen Eagle*, 18 Oct. 1919, p.3.

on.⁸⁶ Surprisingly, much of this was undertaken at Dollard's printing house, near Dublin Castle.⁸⁷

For maximum impact, the posters were put up before dawn on Sunday mornings, ready to be seen by the local people on their way to church.⁸⁸ An RIC report from Cork, October 1919, provides a picture of how the loan was promoted and suppressed at the local level: "These leaflets were distributed by unknown cyclists. Posters in connection with the loan were found by the police posted in various places in the Riding during the month. The posters in each case were torn down by the police."⁸⁹ The same month, the RIC County Inspector for Kerry reported that nearly a thousand such notices had been destroyed by the police.⁹⁰ In November, the *Kerry Weekly Reporter* described similar scenes in Killarney and Tralee, while the *Cork Examiner* reported such events in Fermoy.⁹¹

Some more innovative tactics were used as well. Writing in a circular to organisers around the country, Collins directed the following:

It is urgent that you should get the painting squads who did such service during the General Election at work immediately on advertisements for the Loan. The dead walls, etc. should be covered with such inscriptions as "England Fears the Loan", "Buy Dail Eireann Bonds", "Put your money on Ireland", etc. The work must be carried out as efficiently and expeditiously in every town and parish in your district. England is putting every obstacle in our way and consequently the National effort to make the Loan a success should be all the greater.⁹²

According to the *Freeman's Journal*, the words 'Buy Republican Bonds' were painted with a stencil at prominent positions around Dublin. 'Letter boxes, telegraph poles, dead walls, and even the footpaths, bore the imprint, which is to be seen all over

⁸⁶ IE/NAI/DE/2/007, *Dept. of Finance report for the period ending Oct 1919 and half year ending April 1920*, p. 4.

⁸⁷ Béaslaí, *Collins*, p. 349; NAI/DE/2/007, *General Secretariat to Secretary for Finance*, 13 May 1920.

⁸⁸ IE/BMH/WS1610, *Michael McCoy*, p. 16; IE/BMH/WS0510, *Frank Thornton*, p. 71.

⁸⁹ TNA: CO 904, *RIC Inspector-General's Report, October 1919, Cork*; Part 2; p. 429.

⁹⁰ TNA: CO 904/110/447, *RIC Kerry CI report*, Oct 1919.

⁹¹ *Kerry Weekly Reporter*, 8 Nov. 1919, p. 4; *Cork Examiner*, Nov. 24 1919, p. 2.

⁹² NLI/Ms.22,600, *Circular from Collins, 1919*, n.d.

the city and outlying districts.⁹³ The same tactic was observed in counties Wicklow, Monaghan, Longford, Cork, Limerick, and Tipperary.⁹⁴ In the case of Longford, the graffiti was posted on the courthouse and on the walls of shopkeepers opposed to the Sinn Féin movement.⁹⁵ According to the *Longford Leader*, it took the RIC four days to remove the graffiti from the courthouse.⁹⁶

A more imaginative tactic was seen in Mullingar, where the canvas was a local donkey, released in the main street for the RIC to capture.⁹⁷ An equally inventive publicity stunt caught the attention of *Illustrated London News*, which with the caption ‘A Defiant Method of Advertising’ published a photo of a UK treasury note that had the words ‘Support Dáil Loan’ stamped on it (Figure 3.5).⁹⁸ A short film was made too, in which Michael Collins, seated behind a desk said to be the execution block of Irish republican patriot Robert Emmet, received donations from a line of well-known republican dignitaries.⁹⁹ The film, which cost £600 to produce, was shown unscheduled at cinemas between feature films.¹⁰⁰

⁹³ *FJ*, 3 Nov. 1919, p. 5.

⁹⁴ TNA: CO 904/110/374, *RIC Wicklow CI report*, Oct. 1919; TNA: CO 904/110/529, *RIC Monaghan CI report*, Nov 1919; Béaslaí, *Collins*, pp. 373-4; TNA: CO 904/110/340, *RIC Longford CI report*, Oct. 1919; *FJ*, 23 Mar. 1921, p. 5; *The Times*, 5 Jan. 1920, p. 13; *Clonmel Chronicle*, 19 Nov. 1919, p. 5.

⁹⁵ TNA: CO 904/110/340, *RIC Longford CI report*, Oct. 1919. In Youghal, Co. Cork, in March 1921, opponents of Sinn Féin replaced the words “Support National Loan” with “Support National Ruin” (*FJ*, 23 Mar. 1921, p. 5).

⁹⁶ *Longford Leader*, 21 Feb. 1920, p.2

⁹⁷ IE/BMH/WS1610, *Michael McCoy*, pp. 15-6.

⁹⁸ *Illustrated London News*, 29 Nov. 1919, p. 874.

⁹⁹ Walsh, *Bitter Freedom*, p. 139.

¹⁰⁰ Carroll, *Money*, p. 7; NAI/DE/2/007, *Report of the operations of the DÉDF and statement showing the receipts and expenditure, period ending 31st October 1919 and the half year ending 30th April 1920*, p. 4.

The image originally presented here cannot be made freely available via ORA because of copyright.

Figure 3.5. British treasury note advertising the National Loan.¹⁰¹

Of course there was a risk attached to open canvassing for the National Loan and capture was an occupational hazard for the loan organisers. However, as with the censorship of the press, while promotion of the loan was suppressed, the reporting of suppression was not, and the same tone as with censorship can be seen in reports of these arrests. For instance, in November 1919, the *Kerry Weekly Reporter* carried the story of a chemist in Castletownbere, West Cork, being sentenced to five months in prison for exhibiting the loan prospectus in his shop window.¹⁰² A story was relayed in the *Irish Independent* in November, regarding the arrest of several men for promoting the loan at an unlawful assembly in Tynan Chapel, Co. Armagh.¹⁰³ One of these men was Edward [Éamon] Donnelly, the provincial loan organiser for Ulster. Along with a Professor from Glasgow University, he was sentenced to three months' imprisonment.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ *Illustrated London News*, 29 Nov. 1919, p. 874.

¹⁰² *Kerry Weekly Reporter* 1 Nov. 1919, p. 6.

¹⁰³ *Irish Independent*, 14 Nov. 1919, p. 6.

¹⁰⁴ *Tamworth Herald*, 29 Nov. 1919, p. 2.

Later in November, the *Irish Independent* reported on the sentencing of James Dolan, the Sinn Féin TD for Leitrim, to two months in jail for advocating subscribing to the loan.¹⁰⁵ In December, the *Ulster Herald*, *Strabane Chronicle*, *Leitrim Observer* and *Derry Journal* reported in detail the arrest and trials of men found advocating subscriptions to the loan. The reports made reference to Joseph O'Doherty, Sinn Féin TD for North Donegal, evading arrest, along with the refusal of the others to recognise the court and their sentencing to prison.¹⁰⁶ The *Kerry Weekly Reporter* later reported on O'Doherty's release after serving a month in custody for collecting for the loan.¹⁰⁷ Another report came from the *Skibbereen Eagle*, describing the court case of a brewery worker found advocating the loan in Clonakilty.¹⁰⁸ The *Anglo-Celt* reported that a man was arrested for posting advertisements for the loan on trees in Longford and that, since he refused to recognise the court, he was sentenced to two months' imprisonment. According to the *Anglo-Celt*, he wore his hat and smoked a cigarette in court and, on his refusal to leave, was thrown out of the courthouse, falling on the flagstones outside.¹⁰⁹ When the C/O of the Longford Brigade of the IRA was tried for a similar offence, he attempted to eat his breakfast in the courtroom as his trial was in progress, spilling a cup of tea in the process. Sure enough, the proceedings were reported in the *Roscommon Herald* and the *Longford Leader*.¹¹⁰ The common theme in these reports is the disrespect shown for the court by the defendants, their refusal to pay bail, and the support they had from the crowds that gathered to watch. The focus on either elected representatives or seemingly harmless civilians, and the severity of the sentences is also worthy of note.

¹⁰⁵ *Irish Independent*, 22 Nov. 1919, p. 7.

¹⁰⁶ *Ulster Herald*, 20 Dec. 1919, p. 3; *Strabane Chronicle*, 20 Dec. 1919, p. 4; *Leitrim Observer*, 5 April 1919, p. 2; *Derry Journal*, 15 Dec. 1919, p. 8.

¹⁰⁷ *Kerry Weekly Reporter*, 7 Aug. 1920, p. 5.

¹⁰⁸ *Skibbereen Eagle*, 1 Nov. 1919, p. 1.

¹⁰⁹ *Anglo-Celt*, 15 Nov. 1919, p. 8.

¹¹⁰ IE/BMH/WS1716, *Sean MacKeon*, p. 56.

The arrests continued, and so did the press coverage. ‘The Castle people are playing right into our hands,’ wrote Liam de Róiste in his diary on 13 December.¹¹¹ In Donegal in December, a man was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment for advocating the loan.¹¹² In Cork in February 1920, a man was sentenced to two months’ imprisonment for soliciting subscriptions to it.¹¹³ Alex McCabe, the Sinn Féin TD for Sligo, was also arrested for soliciting subscriptions to the National Loan, and sentenced to three months’ imprisonment in April 1920.¹¹⁴ The arrest of a priest acting as treasurer for the loan in South Kilkenny also generated a great number of headlines, as did his sentencing by court-martial to two years’ hard labour in England.¹¹⁵

The Irish had become accustomed to a censored press by its experience in the First World War, and were used to reading between the lines for the hidden loaded meanings in articles.¹¹⁶ All of these examples generated free publicity for the loan and would have made the British Authorities seem increasingly unreasonable in the eyes of moderate nationalists. At the same time, such reports as appeared in the Unionist *Irish Times* might well have further alienated its readership from the republican cause.

The arrests of National Loan organisers and their consequences would have come as no surprise to the organisers of the National Loan, as the promotional meetings for the INAAVDF in which many of them had been involved a few years earlier, had generated the same result, in some cases with the same people arrested.¹¹⁷ Nor did they happen by accident. A study of the Dáil’s propaganda output reveals an orchestrated attempt to publicise the dangers of involvement with the National Loan.

¹¹¹ IE/CCCA/U271/A/28, *LDRD*, 13 Dec. 1919.

¹¹² *Devon and Exeter Daily Gazette*, 20 Dec. 1919, p. 1.

¹¹³ *Cork Examiner*, 12 Feb. 1920, p. 4.

¹¹⁴ *Donegal News*, 3 Apr. 1920.

¹¹⁵ *FJ*, 4 Jan. 1921, p. 5; *Derry Journal*, 20 Dec. 1920, p. 8; *Donegal News*, 25 Dec. 1920, p. 5; *Irish Independent*, 18 Dec. 1920, p. 7; *FJ*, 18 Dec. 1920, p. 5.

¹¹⁶ Walsh, *News*, pp. 122-3

¹¹⁷ C. NicDháibhéid, ‘Irish National Aid Association’, p. 724.

The *Irish Bulletin*, a regular publication issued by the Dáil's propaganda department, was launched in November 1919, just as the suppression of loan collection was gathering momentum.¹¹⁸ Detailing alleged outrages committed by the British forces in Ireland, including those related to the National Loan, this instrument of Dáil propaganda was circulated among newspaper offices in Ireland as well as foreign correspondents.¹¹⁹ Written in the style of an objective observer, it essentially provided press releases making it easier for editors looking to fill column inches. According to Frank Gallagher, the *Irish Bulletin's* editor, information on collectors arrested and newspapers suppressed was channelled directly from the DÉDF to the *Bulletin's* office.¹²⁰ Since many (if not most) of the *Irish Bulletin's* articles were themselves based on newspaper reports rather than the other way around, it is impossible to evaluate its effectiveness as a tool of propaganda. However, the fact that all 31 references made by the *Irish Bulletin* to the National Loan from September to December 1919 referred to instances of suppression demonstrates the strategy pursued by the Dáil and the image it wished to project.¹²¹

Regardless of the existence or effectiveness of the *Irish Bulletin*, the reaction of the press and the tone of its coverage should not have taken the British Authorities by surprise. As early as December 1918, the outgoing censor wrote, 'It may be assumed that practically every provincial newspaper correspondent of the Dublin newspapers is a Sinn Féiner, and that incidents... are deliberately reported in the light most unfavourable to the authorities'.¹²² But there was also a darker side to the republican movement's relationship with the press. According to RIC reports, an editorial in the *Cork Constitution* describing the killing of Alan Bell as a 'Brutal Deed by Human Brutes', resulted in the

¹¹⁸ Walsh, *News*, p. 113.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ D. Hogan (alias Frank Gallagher), *The Four Glorious Years*, (Dublin, 1953), p. 87

¹²¹ *Irish Bulletin*, Vol. 1 (Millstreet, Co. Cork, 2012).

¹²² TNA/CO 904/167/370-371, *Lord Decies, Report on Censorship for Dec 1918*, in Walsh, *News*, p. 122.

editor receiving a letter commanding him to ‘Prepare for execution’.¹²³ Another Cork newspaper was the subject of a boycott by Republicans in response to articles condemning the killing of policemen.¹²⁴ Nevertheless, it wasn’t until August 1920, by which time the National Loan was nearing completion, that the British Government appointed a former *Daily Mail* war-journalist to set up a ‘Public Information Branch’ in Dublin Castle, to counter *Irish Bulletin* propaganda.¹²⁵

One could argue that censorship of the press in time of war is commonplace, the First World War being a prime example, and that such censorship is generally accepted by the populations concerned. However, the dynamic in the Irish War of Independence was different: in this case, it was ‘the enemy’ who imposed the censorship. Indeed, a traditional lack of respect for British law in Ireland, combined with a swift decline in compliance following the 1916 Rising, would have added potency to the effect of suppression.¹²⁶ Moreover, by provoking the British Authorities into taking stern action, the rebels were able to gain an air of martyrdom, which, as is evident from the press reports, was something they displayed as a badge of honour.

¹²³ TNA: CO/904/148, *Outrages against the police 2 weeks ended 11 Apr. 1920*, p. 14.

¹²⁴ TNA: CO/904/148, *Outrages against the police, week ending 4 Jul. 1920*, p. 287.

¹²⁵ Walsh, *News*, p. 113; Kenneally, *Paper Wall*, p. 19.

¹²⁶ K.H. O’Rourke, ‘Property rights, politics and innovation: Creamery diffusion in pre-1914 Ireland’, *European Review of Economic History*, 11/3) (2007).

Celebrity endorsement

As noted by economists Laurence Iannaccone and Eli Berman, illegal organisations such as the IRA or the Dáil rely to some extent on a degree of ‘stigma’ (or milder social cost) to deter half-hearted recruits who could potentially be a security risk. However, this stigma increases the difficulty of gaining new recruits and would have been a distinct disadvantage for the promotion of the National Loan.¹²⁷ Although in principle there was an economic incentive to subscribe to the loan, as discussed in chapter 1, in practice it was viewed as a charitable donation rather than an investment.¹²⁸ In this context a social rather than economic incentive was key to the loan’s success; in order for the movement to have mass appeal, the stigma had to be minimised.

The DÉDF was not reliant solely on the overreaction of the British to persuade moderate nationalists to subscribe to the National Loan. They also used more positive powers of persuasion. In order to appeal beyond the grass roots of Sinn Féin, the National Loan organisers needed to minimise any stigma attached to supporting the movement, and its chief strategy in achieving this was celebrity endorsement.¹²⁹ The pursuit of endorsement was not a novel idea; the Wilson administration for example enlisted the support of Charlie Chaplin and others to bolster the US’s Liberty Loan campaign.¹³⁰ However the endorsements for the Dáil’s National Loan had a distinctly ecclesiastical flavour. As noted in chapter 1, the Bishop of Killaloe was one of the trustees of the loan, and two archbishops, of Dublin and Cashel, spoke publicly in favour

¹²⁷ L.R. Iannaccone, ‘Sacrifice and Stigma; reducing free-riding in cults, communes, and other collectives’, *Journal of Political Economy*, 100, (1992); E. Berman, ‘ Hamas, Taliban, and the Jewish underground: an economist’s view of radical religious militias’, *NBER working paper No. 10004* (2003); L.R. Iannaccone & E. Berman, ‘Religious extremism: the good, the bad, and the deadly’, *Public Choice*, 128/1, (2006) p. 116.

¹²⁸ Béaslaí, *Collins*, pp. 349-50; IE/BMH/WS1610, *Michael McCoy*, p. 12; also IE/BMH/WS1146, *Eugene Kilkenny* p. 4; IE/BMH/WS1121, *Martin Fallon*, p. 4; IE/BMH/WS1194, *Bernard Sweeney*, p. 3; IE/BMH/WS1268, *Patrick Hardgaden*, p. 4; IE/BMH/WS 1337, *David Daly*, p. 9; IE/BMH/WS1413, *Tadhg Kennedy*, p. 134; IE/BMH/WS1594, *Thomas Kiernan*, p. 3; E. MacLysaght, *Changing Times: Ireland since 1898*, (London, 1978), p. 112.

¹²⁹ As outlined in M. Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, (Cambridge MA, 1965).

¹³⁰ R. Sutch (2015), ‘Financing the Great War: A Class Tax for the Wealthy, Liberty Bonds for All’, *BEHL Working Paper*, 2015, p. 19.

of it.¹³¹ More explicitly, copies of a letter from the Archbishop of Dublin to Cardinal O'Connell in America, endorsing the loan, were used as advertising material.¹³² Notably, at one point in the National Loan's promotional film, the camera lingers on a letter from one of the bishops pledging £100.¹³³ This was a deliberate strategy, and the Bishop of Cork was also targeted and approached as a potential subscriber.¹³⁴ Michael Collins wrote to Terence MacSwiney in March 1920:

You will also appreciate my desire that you should lose no opportunity to have that interview with His Lordship. The point I made about the moral value we may get from same is becoming more and more obvious as the days go on.¹³⁵

MacSwiney was finally granted a meeting with the Bishop of Cork in April 1920, but it only resulted in a promise for a subscription that in the end never materialised¹³⁶ His frustration with the Bishop's lack of cooperation, testament to the value attributed to the endorsement, is apparent in the diary of Sinn Féin supporter P.S. O'Hegarty. On receiving a letter from MacSwiney on the matter, O'Hegarty recorded in his diary that a solution proposed by him 'seemed to me then to be fiendish, and indefensible and inadvisable from every point of view'.¹³⁷ F.J. Costello has speculated whether this refers to a threat that the IRA put pressure on the Archbishop.¹³⁸ In any case, such an action never came to pass.

The bishops' 'blessing' was of both symbolic and practical importance and, however ironic alongside the speculations of Costello, served to cleanse the movement of the whiff of terrorism. It was essential against the backdrop of an escalating guerrilla

¹³¹ Carroll, *Money*, p. 8

¹³² IE/UCDA/P133/4, *Archbishop of Dublin to Cardinal O'Connell*, 10 Nov. 1919.

¹³³ Walsh, *Bitter Freedom*, p. 139.

¹³⁴ IE/CCCA/PR4/5/91, *MacSwiney to Bishop of Cork*, 21 Jul. 1920.

¹³⁵ IE/NAI/DE/2/530, *Collins to MacSwiney*, 30 Mar. 1920.

¹³⁶ Costello, *Enduring*, pp. 126-7.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

campaign that the appearance of a just war became attached to the conflict. In addition, as there was an existing tradition of support from senior Catholic clergy for the IPP, their endorsement of Sinn Féin acted as a point of continuity, suggesting moral equivalence between the two parties.

The RIC fully appreciated the significance of clerical endorsement. A widely circulated series of letters from the Bishop of Limerick in 1916, denouncing the British reaction to the Easter Rising, was credited by the RIC for shifting public support from the IPP to Sinn Féin, so Dublin Castle was well aware of the power of the church as an opinion former.¹³⁹ Now, similar letters endorsed the loan. ‘Bishop Fogarty’s letter to the press has had a very bad effect,’ complained the Clare County Inspector in his monthly report of December 1919, going on to complain about the local support for the loan from young priests of the county.¹⁴⁰

The National Loan was not unique among war loans for enjoying public support from the clergy. In First World War Britain, the Catholic Archbishop of Westminster addressed crowds in favour of the British war loan. Indeed, in 1915, the same Archbishop of Cashel who advocated the National Loan recommended transferring savings held in Government consols to the British war loan.¹⁴¹ Cardinal Logue, the most senior member of the Catholic Church in Ireland, also spoke in favour of the Irish War Savings Committee, the body responsible for promoting British war bonds in Ireland.¹⁴² Demonstrating the same strategy as the National Loan organisers, the Irish War Savings Committee also proposed to circulate a pastoral letter from a bishop, in this case the Bishop of Meath, among the clergy and others.¹⁴³ Interestingly, the War Savings

¹³⁹ NLI/Ms.26,182, *Confidential Report on the State of Public Opinion in Ireland, Inspector-General*, 6 Jun. 1916. The Bishop died in 1917, so was unable to support the National Loan.

¹⁴⁰ TNA: CO 904/110/890, *RIC Clare CI report*, Dec. 1919.

¹⁴¹ *Irish Times*, 26 Jun. 1915, p. 7.

¹⁴² *FJ*, 27 Jul. 1915, p. 4.

¹⁴³ NLI/Ms. 26,157, *Memo of interview between Brennan and O’Conor Don*, n.d.

Committee was also in correspondence with the same Bishop of Cork who would be targeted by Terence MacSwiney three years later, and a press report covering a rally for British war bonds in Cork city listed him as one of the invitees who sent his apologies for not attending.¹⁴⁴

There were points of contrast however. While the Irish War Savings Committee used the bishops' endorsement to downplay any imperialism associated with the British war bonds, the National Loan organisers used them to downplay the radicalism of their movement. The National Loan was also unusual in the extent of its reliance on clerical endorsement relative to all others.¹⁴⁵ Other than figures known solely for their prominence in Sinn Féin, the bishops are the only high-profile supporters of the National Loan to be found in the source material. Perhaps to downplay this over-reliance, appeals explicitly to Catholic solidarity, a tactic used by the Irish War Savings Committee complementary to their 'Save Catholic Belgium' message, were absent from the National Loan's publicity literature.¹⁴⁶

Approval from the bishops, cast as moral authority, acted in much the same way as the disapproval of the British, cast as the enemy. Indeed it could be argued that these two moral incentives were mutually reinforcing. On occasion, they combined to create an even stronger message. A promotional leaflet sent by Richard Mulcahy TD to his Clontarf constituents cited a subscription for £75 from Bishop Fogarty being intercepted in the post as evidence of suppression.¹⁴⁷ Liam de Róiste noted in his diary how the support from the bishops for the loan 'aroused a flood of bigotry in the English press', some of which would have been read in Ireland.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ NLI/Ms. 26,166, *Correspondence between Irish War Savings Committee and Bishop Cobolan of Cork*, 1915-16; *Cork Examiner*, 11 Sept. 1915, p. 5.

¹⁴⁵ A. Gregory, *The Last Great War, British Society and the First World War* (Cambridge, 2008), p. 164.

¹⁴⁶ *FJ*, 27 Jul. 1915, p. 4.

¹⁴⁷ NLI/ILB 300 p 2, *Item 41: Leaflet from Richard Mulcahy to households*, Oct 1919.

¹⁴⁸ IE/CCCA/U271/A/29, LDRD, 10 Dec. 1919.

Closing the sale

Cartwright found in his study of US WW2 bonds that it is not enough for a potential subscriber to be aware of a bond campaign and to be persuaded that becoming a subscriber is a good idea; they must also be induced to act on that idea at a specific time.¹⁴⁹ For this reason, the interaction leading to the sale is particularly important.

In contrast to the British war bonds sold in Ireland during the First World War, where sales were in the main made at local post offices, the bulk of the National Loan subscriptions were gained in a systematic fashion by Volunteers using parliamentary registers to canvas voters door-to-door.¹⁵⁰ While this approach was necessitated in part by the illegality of the National Loan, it also had benefits from a marketing point of view. Cartwright's research on the sale of US war bonds showed that fewer than 20% of wage earners bought bonds in the absence of direct face-to-face contact, while the figure for those approached in person was 60%.¹⁵¹ This effect has been recognised by charitable organisations that increasingly use direct telephone or door-to-door solicitations that force the potential donor to say yes or no, on the spot.¹⁵² As with other similar groups including the UVF, the use of local people to collect the money would have served to reduce any uncertainty associated with buying the bonds.¹⁵³ Having an elected representative as the public face of the loan would have had a similar effect.¹⁵⁴

Of course the success of these tactics, which could be described as *soft coercion*, is contingent on the potential subscriber having already accepted the desirability of purchasing a National Loan bond. What if this condition had not been met? The Dáil's loan collectors certainly would not be unique in resorting to intimidation to extract

¹⁴⁹ Cartwright, 'Some principles of mass persuasion', p. 264

¹⁵⁰ *Kildare Observer*, 24 Jul. 1915, p.5; Béaslaí, *Collins*, pp. 346-7.

¹⁵¹ Cartwright, 'Some principles of mass persuasion', pp. 253-67.

¹⁵² R. Lee, R. Nisbett, M. Gladwell, *The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of social psychology* (London, 2011), p. 126.

¹⁵³ Bowman & Brownlow, 'Patchwork Paramilitarism?', p. 26.

¹⁵⁴ C.S. Andrews, *Dublin Made Me*, (Dublin, 1979) p.101, cited in Hart, *The I.R.A. and its enemies*, p. 232.

subscriptions from the population; there were reports of such coercion against German-Americans and ‘slackers’ during the US Liberty Loan campaigns of the First World War.¹⁵⁵ At the same time, from the point of view of the low-level National Loan collectors, it is easy to see how pressure from Dublin to meet certain fundraising targets could lead them to take drastic measures.

The door-to-door canvassing for the loan often took place after dark and using parliamentary registers as a guide, the Volunteers kept records of those who refused as well as those who subscribed.¹⁵⁶ Against the background of a guerrilla war and in the context of a tightly knit rural community, it is easy to see how this could be viewed as an intimidating situation. The RIC County Inspectors of South Tipperary, Kerry, Mayo and Cork all reported that the Volunteers were using intimidation to raise money for the loan in those counties.¹⁵⁷ The fact that loan collectors were recording the names of those who refused the loan as well as those who subscribed was noted by RIC in Cork.¹⁵⁸ The Mayo Inspector reported that ‘subscriptions to Dail Eireann Loan were wrung out by fear and terrorism rather than from love and devotion and when all failed threats developed into concrete facts’.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, on studying documents seized in a raid, the British authorities were surprised to discover that the names of those thought to be loyal were among the lists of subscribers to the National Loan.¹⁶⁰ Similar accusations were made in the House of Commons on 20 May 1920, when Conservative MP Colonel Ashley claimed:

¹⁵⁵ J.J. Kimble, *Mobilizing the Home Front: War Bonds and Domestic Propaganda* (Texas, 1966), pp. 16-7, and S.W. Kang & H. Rockoff, ‘Capitalizing Patriotism: The Liberty Bonds of World War I’, *Financial History Review*, 22/1 2015, p. 47.

¹⁵⁶ Béaslaí, *Collins*, pp. 346-7.

¹⁵⁷ TNA: CO 904/110, *RIC Tipperary (South) CI report*, Nov. 1919; TNA: CO 904/110/669, *RIC Kerry CI report*, Nov. 1919; TNA: CO 904/110/624, *RIC Mayo CI report*, Nov. 1919; TNA: CO 904/110/888-9, *RIC Cork CI report*, Dec. 1919.

¹⁵⁸ IE/CCCA/U104, *Documents seized by Macroom RIC, Report of Dolan*, 6 Oct. 1919.

¹⁵⁹ TNA: CO 904/111, *RIC Mayo CI report*, Dec. 1919.

¹⁶⁰ Béaslaí, *Collins*, pp. 350-1.

We all know also that the Sinn Fein authorities send out armed bands, who proceed to collect what they call contributions for their Sinn Fein Loan under threat of death, people being assessed according to the amount of money they are supposed to have.¹⁶¹

Such allegations also made their way into the press. Stephen Gwynn wrote in his column in the *Observer*, 'I am told, a regime of forced levy is carried out, and producing large sums'.¹⁶² More specifically, the *Daily Telegraph* described a 'party of raiders who spread terror between Youghal and Killeagh, Co. Cork...demanding contributions for the Sinn Fein Loan and firearms'.¹⁶³

Failing to force open a door, two of them broke into Miss Griffin's bedroom through the windows... The intruders left by the window, after shouting for money, which was not forthcoming. At David Barrett's house they found the occupier in the kitchen, and demanded £3 as a subscription to the Republican Loan, and £2 as a fine for giving the raiders the trouble to call for it. The man was so terrified that he at once complied with their demand.¹⁶⁴

The final house call ended in a shoot out between the householder's son and the raiders, resulting in severe injuries for both parties but in particular for one of the raiders, who 'had a large hole in each hip, bled profusely, and was in great agony', and was reported to have died from his wounds the next day.¹⁶⁵ The newspaper report bares a striking resemblance to an RIC report of the same event, suggesting some level of information sharing.¹⁶⁶ According to the RIC report, none of the seven households raided that night were able to identify the raiders, and David Barrett, mentioned above, refused to give the police any assistance.¹⁶⁷ Considering the sectarian divisions in Ireland in 1920, it would be reasonable to presume that the targets of intimidation were Protestants. However, the 1911 census reveals that all five of the named victims were

¹⁶¹ Hansard, Fifth Series, Volume 129, Commons Sitting of Thursday, 20 May 1920, p. 1724

¹⁶² *Observer*, 30 Nov. 1919, p. 16.

¹⁶³ *Daily Telegraph*, 12 Apr. 1920, p. 6.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*; story also covered in *Cork Examiner*, 9 Apr. 1920, p.5, but with less prominence.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*; TNA: CO/904/148, *Outrages against the police, 2 weeks ending 11 Apr. 1920*, pp. 22-3.

¹⁶⁶ TNA: CO/904/148, *Outrages against the police, 2 weeks ending 11 Apr. 1920*, p. 21.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

Catholics who spoke both Irish and English, suggesting the intimidation was motivated by allegations of freeriding, or treachery, rather than sectarianism or otherness.¹⁶⁸

Clearly, sources hostile to the National Loan must be taken in context, but allegations of intimidation were not confined to the pages of RIC intelligence reports or the press. On being rebuked for his lack of success in collecting for the loan in Cork city, Liam de Róiste confessed to his diary: ‘I do not favour threatening people to subscribe, as, I regret to say, has been done in many cases through the country.’¹⁶⁹

Yet, the heavy hand of the IRA can be found working in the opposite direction. In one case, a farmer who subscribed to the National Loan but failed to pay his debts to a local merchant was harshly (though non-violently) disciplined by the IRA Volunteers in the district, for bringing the movement into disrepute.¹⁷⁰ The importance of reputation to the movement, supported by the bureaucracy outlined in chapter 2, was demonstrated by the words of the loan organiser for Leinster: ‘Better to have the Loan a failure than run the risks attendant upon making false or extravagant statements’ in support of it.¹⁷¹ It is reasonable to presume that these checks and balances served to discourage most collectors from engaging in intimidation, but it would be naïve to conclude that it was foolproof.

Unsurprisingly, there is no mention of intimidation in any surviving correspondence with the DÉDF. As with many aspects of the Irish War of Independence, it is likely to have varied from locality to locality. The lack of specifics in most reports of intimidation leaves this as an unanswered question, but to omit it from any account of the National Loan would be to gloss over an important part of the story.

¹⁶⁸ 1911 Census of Ireland, Returns for Pillmore, Co. Cork.

¹⁶⁹ IE/CCCA/U271/A/30, *LDRD*, 20 May 1920.

¹⁷⁰ *The Times*, 25 May 1920 p. 10.

¹⁷¹ IE/UCDA/P133/4, *Fleming to Lator*, 7 Dec. 1919, p. 2.

Chapter 4: Who subscribed to the National Loan?

For many Irish with republican sympathies, subscribing to the National Loan was the height of their involvement in the war of independence. Yet, as noted by Anne Dolan ‘the civilian experience is probably the most overlooked aspect of the war. It gets lost in the eagerness to examine the combatants’.¹ Consequently, the identities of the loan subscribers have been completely ignored by the historiography. Even those publications that purport to focus on fundraising have overlooked the people who supplied the funds.² Not only does this omission constitute a gap in the literature on fundraising in the war of independence, it contributes to the persistence of a limited understanding of public support for Irish independence. Combining previously unknown lists of the names and addresses of subscribers with returns from the 1911 census of Ireland, this chapter provides the first demographic analysis of non-combatant supporters of Irish independence on the eve of its realisation. Its findings complicate the narrative of the Irish War of Independence, presenting a more nuanced picture of the Dáil’s support base than that portrayed by the current historiography. By focussing on civilians rather than fighters, it also broadens the narrative to include women, and men outside fighting age.

¹ A. Dolan, ‘The War of Independence’, *Irish Independent*, 28 Apr. 2010, supplement: ‘Birth of a nation part 2’, cited in D. Ferriter, *A Nation and not a Rabble* (London, 2015), p. 94.

² e.g. Carroll, *Money*; Lainer-Vos, *Sinews*; Ridley, *Michael Collins*.

‘One of the most extraordinary feats in the country’s history’

When Collins finally closed the National Loan campaign, on 7 July 1920, it was hailed by Arthur Griffith as ‘one of the most extraordinary feats in the country’s history’.³ In recognition of this, a bonus of £25 was voted to Daithi O’Donoghue and each of the four provincial loan organisers.⁴ By this point the loan had been oversubscribed by £50,000, a fact publicised by the *Irish Bulletin* and reported in the press.⁵ Amounts continued to flow in from around the country, and by the end of July 1920 the amount received at Head Office stood at £355,000.⁶ Any amounts received thereafter, unless it could be proved that their application preceded the 7 July deadline, were credited to the Self-Determination Fund.⁷ At the final audit in September 1920, the total figure from applications made before the deadline was £371,849 15s. 2d. (including £11,719 collected in Britain and France).⁸ In other words, the campaign had surpassed its target by £121,849, an oversubscription of almost 50%. This dwarfed previous nationalist or republican fundraising efforts in Ireland. The INAAVDF, for example, raised only £37,815 in Ireland, while the Anti-Conscription Fund, with the explicit help of the clergy, reached just *ca.* £250,000.⁹ To put this in broader context, the ‘total amount applied as local taxation’ in Ireland was £6,855,056 for the financial year 1918-19, based on a rateable valuation of £16,144,221.¹⁰ Of more immediate concern to the Dáil, the

³ Béaslaí, *Collins*, p. 413.

⁴ IE/NAI/DE/1/1, *Minutes of DE Ministry and Cabinet*, 24th July 1920.

⁵ e.g. *Liberator*, 3 July 1920, p.1; *Connaught Telegraph*, 10 Jul. 1920, p.3; *Kerryman*, 10 Jul. 1920, p.7; *Irish Examiner*, 14 Jul. 1920, p. 5; *FJ*, 14 Jul. 1920, p. 3.

⁶ Carroll, *Money*, p. 9.

⁷ IE/NAI/DE/2/007, *Letter from General Secretariat to the Secretary of Finance*, 16th July 1920, p. 3.

⁸ IE/BMH/CD184.4, *Net amounts received at head office as of 14th September 1920, corrected to 27th September 1920*.

⁹ NLI/Ms. 23,43, *Summary of overseas subscriptions to the INAAVDF, 1916-19*; O. Rafferty, ‘The Catholic Church and partition, 1918–22’, *Irish Studies Review*, 5/20 (1997), p. 13.

¹⁰ *Returns of Local Taxation in Ireland for the year 1918 – 1919, collected and compiled by desire of his Excellency the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland*, Dublin: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, p. 855.

outlays for the RIC and Dublin Metropolitan police over the period, according to documents obtained by Collins, were £367,901 and £29,206 respectively.¹¹

Together with proceeds from the External Loans, to be discussed in Section II, this allowed the Dáil to increase its expenditure, with Defence seeing the biggest budget increase of the Dáil Departments (149%).¹² The practical effects of these funds were best summed up in the witness statement of Joseph Lawless, a member of the North Dublin IRA:

Now it became possible to attempt large scale purchases of arms abroad and to plan elaborate schemes for smuggling such arms into Ireland; also, the hitherto irritating financial strictures limiting the hire of premises for offices, stores and the like, the hire of cars for various operations... could now be undertaken without undue concern regarding necessary payments.¹³

The exact number of subscribers to the National Loan is unknown, but the Irish Free State's Department of Finance estimated it to be *ca.* 140,000.¹⁴ This compares somewhat favourably to 124,334, the figure estimated by the RIC to be Sinn Féin's membership in September 1920.¹⁵ Based on figures from the 1911 census, and presuming a household-by-household subscription, it would constitute 15.4% of families in Ireland, including the counties that would remain in the UK as Northern Ireland.¹⁶

However, as is clear from Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2, and Table 4.1, the geographical distribution of the National Loan's proceeds was far from even. Of the four provinces of Ireland, Munster was by far the biggest contributor (£172,533), followed by Leinster (£87,499) and Connaught (£57,977), with the majority Unionist Ulster predictably contributing the least (£41,319).¹⁷ Strikingly, the amount raised per capita in Munster was

¹¹ F. Costello, *The Irish Revolution and its Aftermath 1916 – 1923: Years of Revolt* (Dublin, 2003), p. 131; although these costs would rise by a factor of ten the following year.

¹² IE/NAI/DE/2/007, *Dáil General Secretariat to Secretary for Finance*, 11 Jun. 1920.

¹³ IE/BMH/WS1043, *Joseph V. Lawless*, p. 284.


¹⁴ DÉ Debate Vol. 24 No. 9, *Private Deputies' Business: DÉ Loan (Internal) 1919-20*, 22 Jun. 1928, p. 1303.

¹⁵ TNA: CO904/24/4, *Sinn Féin club organisation*.

¹⁶ Thom's Directory, 1922, p. 644.

¹⁷ IE/BMH/CD/184/4, *Net amounts received at head office as of 14 Sept. 1920, corrected to 27 Sept. 1920*.


more than double that of Leinster. The mean amount collected at constituency level was £4,283, but with a range of £32,086 between Limerick East (£32,285) and Down West (£119) the extent of the disparity becomes clear. Unfortunately, information on the quantity of subscribers at constituency level is unavailable and, with individual subscriptions ranging from £1 to £100, any meaningful quantitative analysis of the geographical variation is problematic. However, a number of general comments can be made.



Amount subscribed per constituency

£0 - £1,058	£2,458 - £4,227	£7,714 - £13,816
£1,059 - £2,457	£4,228 - £7,713	£13,817 - £32,285

Figure 4.1. Map of Ireland: Amount subscribed to the National Loan per constituency.¹⁸



Amount subscribed per 10,000 inhabitants

£20 - £279	£648 - £1,130	£1,968 - £3,598
£279.15 - £647	£1,131 - £1,967	£3,599 - £6,794

Figure 4.2. Map of Ireland: Amount subscribed to the National Loan per 10,000 inhabitants.¹⁹

¹⁸ *Ibid.* For corresponding table, see Appendix A.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*; *Thom's Directory*, 1921, pp. 115-7.

Table 4.1. Amount subscribed to the National Loan per province.²⁰

<i>Province</i>	<i>Amount subscribed</i>			<i>Percentage of total raised</i>	<i>Subscribed per 10,000 inhabitants</i>
	<i>£.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>		
Leinster	£87,499	2	6	24%	£753
Ulster	£41,319	4	2	12%	£261
Munster	£172,533	6	4	48%	£1,666
Connaught	£57,977	0	0	16%	£949

The success of the loan in Munster, which raised almost half of the national total, reflected republican activity more generally during the war of independence.²¹ This is replicated at the constituency level, with seven of the top 10 constituencies located in Munster. Limerick East was particularly impressive, raising £6,795 for every 10,000 inhabitants, while Limerick West and Limerick City were not far behind. As to the cause of the county's success, a number of explanations can be considered. As noted by Nicholas Ridley, the funding of Limerick Technical School was explicitly mentioned in National Loan advertising.²² The fact that the loan's trustees, Éamon de Valera, Bishop Fogarty and James O'Mara, had strong connections to Limerick might also have been a factor. Limerick's success might also be explained from the supply side. In July 1919, just before the launch of the National Loan, the RIC reported that all branches of the UIL in Limerick city and county had collapsed and that the majority of them had been converted into Sinn Féin clubs.²³ The fact that Limerick's conversion to Sinn Féin happened on an institutional level rather than a membership level meant that they simply had to retool their existing fundraising mechanism for the new cause. This would have

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ D. Fitzpatrick, 'The geography of Irish nationalism, 1910-1921', *Past and Present*, 78 (1978), pp. 113-44.

²² Ridley, *Collins*, p. 93.

²³ TNA CO/904/20/244, RIC *Crime Department Special Branch report on UIL, Revised Returns for Quarter ended 30 Jun. 1919.*

put Limerick at an organisational advantage to other counties, which had to create their new organisations from scratch.

The failure to raise funds in Ulster came as no surprise to the organisers of the National Loan, who only expected the loan to do well in the 80 Sinn Féin- and IPP-controlled constituencies.²⁴ Indeed, the targets for each constituency were calculated on that very basis.²⁵ The lack of National Loan activity in the counties that would become Northern Ireland is reflected in the reports of the RIC County Inspectors for Antrim, Tyrone and Derry, none of which made any reference to the loan.²⁶ Meanwhile, National Loan organisers in northern counties with a smaller Unionist population had to contend with a nationalist vote that was divided between Sinn Féin and the IPP. As noted by Kevin O'Sheil, who organised the loan in North Fermanagh, 'it was a doubly divided constituency, divided almost 50-50 between Catholics and Protestants, with the Catholics again divided sharply between the Hibernian [IPP] and Sinn Feiners'.²⁷

²⁴ IE/NAI/DE/2/530, *MacSwiney to Collins*, 5 Dec 1919.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ TNA: CO 904/110-1, *RIC Inspector-General's and County Inspectors' confidential reports*, Sept. 1919 – Feb. 1920.

²⁷ IE/BMH/WS/1770, *Kevin O'Sheil*, p. 864.

Who were the subscribers?

Based on a thorough audit of the archives, it is reasonable to conclude that the national register compiled for repayment of the National Loan has since been destroyed or is otherwise inaccessible. However, three local registers were found in the course of this research: one in an archive and another two in the hands of a private collector. These registers list the names, addresses and subscriptions of 1,605 subscribers in South Monaghan, 2,927 in Longford, and 1,210 in East Tipperary.²⁸ The South Monaghan and Longford registers are complete records, in typescript and in good condition, compiled after the war to facilitate repayment of subscribers. In contrast, the East Tipperary register is handwritten and in poor condition, but is nonetheless a rich source of information. A further 178 names and addresses were gathered from a bundle of temporary receipts for subscribers in Doneraile, Co Cork, deposited in an archive by the local collector (Figure 4.3).²⁹ For a sense of the broader national picture, the names and addresses of 313 subscribers from across the country were gleaned from Dáil debates on repayment of the loan in 1929-31.³⁰ Based on TDs' inquiries to the Minister of Finance, this sample includes subscribers from Cork, Kerry, King's, Galway, Limerick, Mayo, Queen's, Roscommon, Westmeath, and Wexford (Figure 4.4). The combination of these five sources is a unique dataset containing the names and addresses of 6,233 subscribers to the National Loan: the first of its kind in the historiography.

²⁸ IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL Register*; IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL Register*; IR/MNR/2/A, *East Tipperary NL Register*.

²⁹ IE/CCCA/PR6/70/2/180, *Seamus Fitzgerald Papers*.

³⁰ *DÉ debates on DÉ Loans and Funds Bill*, 20 Jun. 1928, 11 Oct. 1928, 6 Mar. 1929, 1 May 1929, 29 May 1929, 12 Jun. 1929, 20 Jun. 1929, 7 Nov. 1929, 5 Mar. 1930, 9 Apr. 1930, 14 May 1930, 4 Jun. 1930, 10 Dec. 1930, 18 Mar. 1931, 25 Mar. 1931, 27 May 1931, 21 Oct. 1931.



Figure 4.3. Map of Ireland: Constituencies for which National Loan registers are available.³¹




Figure 4.4. Map of Ireland: Subscribers to the National Loan mentioned in Dáil debates.³²

The three constituencies that form the focus of this chapter reflect the geographical diversity of the Irish War of Independence. South Monaghan was notably quiet at the time of the National Loan. Under the leadership of Owen O’Duffy, the Monaghan IRA’s activity was largely confined to raids on mail deliveries with the aim of depriving the enemy of food and information.³³ Among the constituencies that would later form the Irish Free State, South Monaghan was peculiar in its dependence on Belfast for trade.³⁴ It was also unusual for its large Protestant minority, constituting 17% of the total.³⁵ The National Loan in South Monaghan was organised by local

³¹ IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL Register*, IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL Register*, IE/MNR/2/A, *East Tipperary NL Register*, IE/CCCA/PR6/70/2/180, *Doneraile NL receipts*.

³² *DÉ debates on DÉ Loans and Funds Bill*, 20 Jun. 1928, 11 Oct. 1928, 6 Mar. 1929, 1 May 1929, 29 May 1929, 12 Jun. 1929, 20 Jun. 1929, 7 Nov. 1929, 5 Mar. 1930, 9 Apr. 1930, 14 May 1930, 4 Jun. 1930, 10 Dec. 1930, 18 Mar. 1931, 25 Mar. 1931, 27 May 1931, 21 Oct. 1931.

³³ NLI/Ms. 3,110, *Solemn covenant to resist Conscription*, annotation by Vincent McGahan, ref. Barney McNally.

³⁴ T. Dooley, *Monaghan: The Irish Revolution, 1912-23* (Dublin, 2017), p. 95.

³⁵ Census of Ireland, 1911.

businessman Bernard O'Rourke, with help from the firebrand priest Fr. Hackett, both residents of Inniskeen in the southeast of the constituency.³⁶

Longford by contrast was a hub of activity. With an active IRA under Sean MacEoin, the 'Blacksmith of Ballinalee', Longford was the most violent county outside Munster.³⁷ As for public opinion, according to Coleman, the majority of the population of Longford were in sympathy with Sinn Féin during the War of Independence, 'or at least passive'.³⁸ The National Loan in Longford was organised by Frank McGuinness, a draper who, like Bernard O'Rourke, had previously been a stalwart of the home rule movement in that county.³⁹

East Tipperary, along with the rest of that county, was under martial law for the duration of the National Loan campaign. Assemblies or public meetings such as fairs, markets, and GAA matches were prohibited from 20 September 1919.⁴⁰ It was the most urban of the constituencies under consideration, with the towns of Cashel, Clonmel, Carrick-on-Suir and Fethard home to 43% of the population, compared to 14% and 12% in the urban centres of South Monaghan and Longford.⁴¹ The National Loan in East Tipperary was under the direction of J.P. Cooney, a clerk by profession who in 1920 was serving on the council of Clonmel Corporation.⁴²

The 1,611 subscribers to the National Loan in South Monaghan subscribed £5,554.⁴³ The most successful constituency in Ulster, this was £1,271 more than the national mean.⁴⁴ As shown in Figure 4.5, there was a high concentration of subscribers

³⁶ Dooley, *Monaghan*, p. 74; NLI/Ms. 3,110, *Solemn covenant to resist Conscription signed at Castleblayney*, 21 Apr. 1918; IE/UCDA/P117/68, *Bernard O'Rourke Papers*.

³⁷ Coleman, *Longford*, p. 5.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.150.

³⁹ *Ibid.* pp. 42-3.

⁴⁰ *Clonmel Chronicle*, 20 Sept. 1919, pp. 3 & 5.

⁴¹ Census of Ireland, 1911.

⁴² IE/MNR/2/B, *Tipperary National Loan Correspondence*; A. Thom, (1920), *Thom's official directory of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland for the year 1920*, Dublin: Alex Thom & Co Ltd.

⁴³ IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL register*.

⁴⁴ IE/BMH/CD184.4, *Net amounts received at head office as of 14 Sept. 1920, corrected to 27 Sept. 1920*.

per capita in the area around Castleblayney in the north of the constituency, while Carrickmacross in the south was modestly represented. This is replicated to some extent in Figure 4.6, showing the amount raised per 100 inhabitants, albeit with a greater prominence for Inniskeen where two £50 subscriptions, from Bernard O'Rourke and Fr. Hackett, drove up the average.






Figure 4.5. Map of South Monaghan: Subscribers to the National Loan per 100 inhabitants.⁴⁵

Figure 4.6. Map of South Monaghan: Amount subscribed to the National Loan per 100 inhabitants.⁴⁶

The 2,979 subscribers in Co. Longford raised a total of £5,402.⁴⁷ It was the third most successful constituency in Leinster, surpassing the national mean by £1,119.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Ordnance survey of Ireland (OSI), *General map of Ireland, 1:253,440* (Dublin, 1917); IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL register*; 1911 Census of Ireland. Number of subscribers per 100 inhabitants at District Electoral Division level. For larger map, see Appendix B.
⁴⁶ *Ibid.* Amount subscribed per 100 inhabitants at District Electoral Division level.

Analysis of the Longford subscriber list reveals a distinct northern bias (Figure 4.7), consistent with Coleman's findings that republicanism was 'almost exclusively the preserve of the northern districts'.⁴⁹ Not surprisingly, the garrison town of Longford was poorly represented, while Edgeworthstown, called 'Little England' by Sean MacEoin, also delivered a poor result.⁵⁰ The scarcity of subscribers in Ballinalee is surprising as according to the RIC Inspector-General, it was 'the centre of badness in the county'.⁵¹ However, this could simply be due to some residents of Ballinalee, a small townland, giving neighbouring townlands as their address. Figure 4.8, showing the amounts subscribed per 100 residents, reveals a more geographically even spread. While the Dáil was obviously more popular in the north of the county, large subscriptions from the south, particularly in the Ballymahon rural district, meant it did not rely solely on the north for its funding.


⁴⁷ IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL register*. This figure is £400 short of the reported total received at head office, which presumably was sent direct to Dublin.

⁴⁸ IE/BMH/CD184.4, *Net amounts received at head office as of 14th Sept. 1920, corrected to 27th Sept. 1920*.

⁴⁹ Coleman, *Longford*, p. 5.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 153.


⁵¹ TNA: CO 904/113/631, *RIC Inspector-General's report*, Dec. 1920.



Subscribers per 100 inhabitants

0.00 - 3.08	5.21 - 7.46	10.30 - 15.40
3.09 - 5.20	7.47 - 10.29	

Figure 4.7. Map of Longford: Subscribers to the National Loan per 100 inhabitants.⁵²



Amount subscribed per 100 inhabitants

£0.00 - £5.38	£9.18 - £13.24	£20.60 - £30.58
£5.39 - £9.17	£13.25 - £20.59	

Figure 4.8. Map of Longford: Amount subscribed to the National Loan per 100 inhabitants.⁵³


The picture in East Tipperary is less well defined, but an eastern bias is discernable in Figure 4.9, with Carrick-on-Suir performing particularly well. The importance of Carrick-on-Suir is even more obvious in Figure 4.10, which maps the amount raised per 100 inhabitants. Another hotspot can be identified in the northwest, north of Cashel, but the significance of this region is diminished when the amount raised is considered. Elsewhere, other concentrations of subscription can be seen in Knockgraffon and Kiltinan. The garrison towns of Cashel and Fethard, and to a lesser extent Clonmel, performed particularly badly.⁵⁴ In so far as East Tipperary failed to raise

⁵² Ordnance survey of Ireland (OSI), *General map of Ireland, 1:253,440* (Dublin, 1917); IE/MNR/2/A, *East Tipperary NL Register*, 1911 Census of Ireland. Number of subscribers per 100 inhabitants at District Electoral Division level. For larger map, see Appendix B.

⁵³ *Ibid.* Amount subscribed per 100 inhabitants at District Electoral Division level.

⁵⁴ J. Ambrose, *Sean Treacy and the Tan War* (Cork, 2007), p. 116.


funds for the National Loan, this failure can largely be explained by the presence of these garrisons.



Subscribers per 100 inhabitants

0.12 - 0.55	1.36 - 2.06	4.21 - 9.97
0.56 - 1.35	2.07 - 4.20	

Figure 4.9. Map of East Tipperary: Subscribers to the National Loan per 100 inhabitants.⁵⁵



Amount subscribed per 100 inhabitants

£0.12 - £3.09	£7.17 - £13.32	£21.29 - £43.31
£3.10 - £7.16	£13.33 - £21.28	

Figure 4.10. Map of East Tipperary: Amount subscribed to the National Loan per 100 inhabitants.⁵⁶

The failure of the National Loan in Carrickmacross, Longford, Edgeworthstown, Fethard, and Cashel is consistent with the historiography of the war, as well as qualitative accounts from contemporaries. ‘Irish nationalism was above all a rural preoccupation,’ according to Fitzpatrick; ‘Its most violent manifestations... were concentrated in the countryside, where soldiers and police were less prevalent, neighbours more inclined to

⁵⁵ Ordnance survey of Ireland (OSI), *General map of Ireland, 1:253,440* (Dublin, 1917); IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL Register*; 1911 Census of Ireland. Number of subscribers per 100 inhabitants at District Electoral Division level. For larger map, see Appendix B.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* Amount subscribed per 100 inhabitants at District Electoral Division level.

shelter outlaws, and nights blacker.’⁵⁷ This view was also held by many of the IRA members themselves, who believed that the ‘country was always ahead of the towns’ when it came to republican activity.⁵⁸ Put simply by IRA officer and chronicler of the war Ernie O’Malley, ‘towns we could not rely on.’⁵⁹

As noted in chapter 1, when promoting the loan to his constituents, Collins stated that he would prefer 250,000 subscriptions at £1 each to 25,000 at £10 each.⁶⁰ The sample of National Loan subscribers suggests that he was successful in this aspiration. Overall, the median subscription from the 6,233 subscribers sampled was £1. This breaks down as £1 in both South Monaghan and Longford, and £2 in East Tipperary and Doneraile. In South Monaghan, 89.7% of subscribers paid £5 or less, making up 55.9% of the total funds raised there. Similar figures can be found in East Tipperary and Doneraile. In East Tipperary, 88.6% of subscribers paid £5 or less, making up 53% of the total funds raised. Some 88% of subscriptions in Doneraile were in subscriptions of £5 and less, accounting for 57.9% of the amount raised. The preponderance of small subscriptions was most striking in Longford, where 95% of the 2,979 subscribers contributed £5 or less, making up 74% of the total raised.⁶¹ This chimes with the comments of Irish Free State Finance Minister Ernest Blythe’s comments that the majority of the money was raised in very small sums. Of the £371,849 raised nationally, only £114,000 was raised by means of subscriptions of £10 and over, leaving £257,849 (69%) raised in denominations ranging from £1 to £5.⁶²

⁵⁷ Fitzpatrick, *Politics*, p. 130.

⁵⁸ Hart, *The IRA and its enemies*, p. 160.

⁵⁹ E. O’Malley, *On another man’s wound* (Dublin, 1979), p. 144.

⁶⁰ *Irish Independent*, 8 Aug. 1919, p. 4.

⁶¹ IE/MNR/1, *Longford National Loan register*.

⁶² DÉ Debate Vol. 5 No. 23, *The Postal Commission: DÉ Loan and Funds Bill, 2nd stage*, 13 Dec. 1923.

A Census of Subscribers to the National Loan

To analyse the subscribers in more detail, it was possible to match the names and addresses in the National Loan registers with the 1911 Census of Ireland. Naturally, there are a number of shortcomings in this approach, most obviously the nine-year time lag, leading to the problems of maiden names and migration.⁶³ Also, as noted by the Free State Finance Minister when reconstructing the National Loan register in 1928, it is quite common for a number of people to share the same name in one townland.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, it was possible to positively identify 3,298 (52.9%) of the 6,233 subscribers. This compares very favourably in both absolute and relative terms with Narciso and Severgnini's research, which identified only 709 IRA members in the 1911 census, a match-rate of just 17%.⁶⁵ The National Loan census-matches break down as 912, (56.6%) in South Monaghan, 1,657 (55.6%) in Longford, 518 (42.8%) in East Tipperary, and 102 (57%) in Doneraile. A further 109 subscribers from across the country were identified from the 'Dáil debates' sample of 313 names and addresses. A valuable exercise, this census matching unlocks information on subscribers' age, literacy, religion, and occupation. Further details were gleaned by cross-referencing with police intelligence reports, county directories, newspaper reports, previous fundraising lists, published and unpublished memoirs, and the testimonies of IRA veterans in their witness statements and pension applications.⁶⁶ The picture that emerges, summarised in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, is a nuanced representation of public opinion at the time, confirming some elements of the historiography while challenging others.

⁶³ Women made up 12.4% of subscribers, and 10.5% of subscribers identified in the census.

⁶⁴ DÉ Debate Vol. 24 No. 9, *Private Deputies' Business: DÉ Loan (Internal) 1919-20*, 22 Jun. 1928, p. 1304.

⁶⁵ Narciso & Severgnini, 'Deep Roots of Rebellion', p. 12.

⁶⁶ e.g. TNA: CO 904/108-11; Thom's Directory 1921; NLI/Ms.3,110, *Solemn covenant to resist Conscription, 21 Apr. 1918, annotated by Vincent McGabán*; E. O'Malley, *Rising Out* (Dublin, 2007); IE/MCM/1986/5N1, *Interviews with IRA veterans*; IE/BMH/WS, *Witness Statements*; IE/BMH/MA, *IRA military pension applications*.

Table 4.2. National Loan subscribers compared to general population in South Monaghan, Longford, East Tipperary and Doneraile.

	General Population of South Monaghan, Longford, East Tipperary and Doneraile		National Loan subscribers identified in census	
	Share (%)	Population	Share (%)	Population
National Loan subscribers (a)	4.73	131,703	NA	NA
National Loan subscribers identified in 1911 census	2.42	131,703	NA	NA
<i>Demographics</i>				
Roman Catholic	86.34	131,703	98.18	3,191
Female (b)	48.57	131,616	10.53	3,191
Literate	79.74	119,979	93.01	3,191
Urban	23.09	131,703	10.27	3,191
<i>Occupations</i>				
Roman Catholic Priest	0.11	131,703	0.75	3,191
Publican	0.80	131,703	1.10	3,191
Shopkeeper	3.33	131,703	3.40	3,191
Farmer, Grazier	44.37	131,703	73.90	3,191
Agricultural Labourer	10.28	131,703	4.54	3,191
Merchant	1.29	131,703	1.41	3,191
Craftsman	5.76	131,703	3.76	3,191
Teacher	0.65	131,703	0.81	3,191
Professional	1.05	131,703	0.56	3,191
Domestic servant	4.67	131,703	0.78	3,191
Non-classified	32.16	131,703	8.99	3,191
<i>Geography</i>				
South Monaghan	26.78	131,703	28.58	3,191
Longford	33.27	131,703	52.24	3,191
East Tipperary	35.12	131,703	16.11	3,191
Doneraile	4.83	131,703	3.07	3,191
<i>Ideology</i>				
Irish language in Census, South Monaghan only (c)	12.57	35,276	17.32	912
Home Rule Fund, some districts in Longford only (d)	2.08	21,988	10.25	790
INAAVDF, some districts in Longford only (e)	0.95	13,177	7.57	383
HRF and INAAVDF, some districts in Longford only (f)	0.39	9,775	2.15	233
Anti-Conscription Fund, Castleblayney only (g)	5.69	4,904	63.37	202
IRA, South Monaghan and Longford only (h)	0.33	79,093	1.43	2,579
IRA in household, South Monaghan and Longford only (h)	2.05	79,093	2.68	2,579

Table 4.3. Share of subscribers and size of subscriptions to the National Loan in South Monaghan, Longford, East Tipperary and Doneraile

	National Loan subscribers (%)		Subscriptions to the National Loan (£)					
	Share	Obs.	Mean	Median	S.D.	Min	Max	Obs.
<i>Demographics</i>								
Roman Catholic	98.18	3,191	2.67	1	4.86	0.5	100	3,133
Female (b)	10.53	3,191	3.25	1	7.27	0.5	100	337
Literate	93.01	3,149	2.75	3.75	5.07	0.5	100	2,929
Urban	10.27	3,191	6.65	5	10.08	0.5	100	329
<i>Occupations</i>								
RC Priest	0.75	3,191	14.33	5	17.88	1	50	24
Publican	1.10	3,191	7.41	5	11.72	1	50	35
Shopkeeper	3.40	3,191	5.99	5	10.17	1	100	119
Farmer, Grazier	73.90	3,191	2.11	1	2.97	0.5	50	2,358
Agric. Labourer	4.54	3,191	1.68	1	1.73	0.5	10	145
Merchant	1.41	3,191	6.56	5	8.9	1	50	46
Craftsman	3.76	3,191	3.18	1	5.71	0.5	50	121
Teacher	0.81	3,191	2.06	1	2.18	1	10	27
Professional	0.56	3,191	2.51	1	2.71	1	10	48
Domestic	0.78	3,191	2.21	1	1.74	1	5	24
Non-classified	8.99	3,191	3.96	1	6.99	0.5	50	279
<i>Geography</i>								
South Monaghan	28.58	3,191	3.33	1	5.21	1	50	912
Longford	52.24	3,191	1.77	1	3.27	0.5	50	1,667
East Tipperary	16.11	3,191	4.27	2	7.37	0.5	100	514
Doneraile	3.07	3,191	3.09	2	3.09	1	20	98
<i>Ideology</i>								
Irish language in Census, South Monaghan only (c)	17.32	912	4.92	3	6.43	1	50	158
Home Rule Fund, some districts in Longford only (d)	10.25	790	4.46	1	9.01	1	50	81
INAAVDF, some districts in Longford only (e)	7.57	383	6.93	5	5.94	1	20	29
HRF and INAAVDF, some districts in Longford only (f)	2.15	233	13.2	20	9.42	1	20	5
Anti-Conscription Fund, Castleblayney only (g)	63.37	202	6.59	5	6.88	1	50	128
IRA, South Monaghan and Longford only (h)	1.43	2,579	2.84	1	8.11	0.5	50	37
IRA in household, South Monaghan and Longford only (h)	2.68	2,579	2.67	1	5.64	0.5	50	95

Notes and Sources	
(a)	IE/UCDA/P117/68, <i>South Monaghan NL register</i> ; IE/MNR/1, <i>Longford NL register</i> ; IE/MNR/2/A, <i>East Tipperary NL register</i> ; IE/CCCA/PR6/70/2/180, <i>Doneraile NL receipts</i>
(b)	Figure given refers to females identified in the census. In the subscriber list 12% are women.
(c)	Irish language census returns were widespread in South Monaghan only
(d)	Districts: Abbeylara, Aghaboy, Ardagh East, Ballymuigh, Breanrisk, Bunlahy, Caldragh, Cashel East, Cloondara, Cloonee, Coolamber, Corboy, Creevy, Crosagstown, Dalystown, Drumlish, Edgeworthstown, Firry, Granard Rural, Granard Urban, Kilcommock, Killow, Knockanbaun, Ledwithstown, Longford Urban, Longford Rural, Moatfarrell, and Newgrove. <i>Longford Leader</i> , 26 Jul. 1913, p.1; <i>Longford Leader</i> , 27 Dec. 1913, p.6; <i>Longford Leader</i> , 6 Dec. 1913, p.1.
(e)	Districts: Ardagh West, Bunlahy, Caldragh, Cloonee, Coolamber, Corboy, Dalystown, Foxhall, Gelshagh, Granard Rural, Granard Urban, Longford Rural, Longford Urban, and Mullanaghta. <i>Longford Leader</i> , 5 Aug. 1916, p. 1.
(f)	Districts: Bunlahy, Caldragh, Cloonee, Coolamber, Corboy, Dalystown, Granard Rural, Granard Urban, Longford Rural, Longford Urban. <i>Longford Leader</i> , 26 Jul. 1913, p. 1; <i>Longford Leader</i> , 27 Dec. 1913, p. 6; <i>Longford Leader</i> , 6 Dec. 1913, p. 1; <i>Longford Leader</i> , 5 Aug. 1916, p. 1.
(g)	Districts: Caddagh, Carrickaslane, Carrickatee, Castleblayney Rural, Castleblayney Urban, Church Hill, Clontibret, Inniskeen, and Mullyash. NLI/Ms.3,110, <i>Notes of Vincent McGahan</i> , 20 Jan. 1943.
(h)	IE/MCM/1986/5N1/5, <i>James Daly IRA membership lists</i> ; Coleman, <i>Longford</i> , Appendix 3

The first surprise comes in the ages of subscribers. Based on the 899 subscribers in South Monaghan for whom age could be determined, 48 years was the median. Analysis of the Longford register tells the same story, with a median age of 48 based on 1,429 subscribers.⁶⁷ Similarly, in East Tipperary the 459 identified subscribers reveal a median of 45 years old.⁶⁸ This profile of the middle-aged sympathiser is replicated in Doneraile, as well, with a median of 44.⁶⁹ Even in the nationwide sample, gleaned from questions in the Dáil about a decade after the National Loan closed, a median age of 45 was found. This is despite the likely mortality of older subscribers in the intervening years. Although consistent with recent findings from de Bromhead *et al* on Sinn Féin voters in the 1918 election, this result is at odds with most of the historiography of the revolutionary decade, which claims that the shift of support from moderate nationalism to Sinn Féin was a generational one.⁷⁰ Of course this is not to claim that Sinn Féin's support came exclusively from the middle aged. It is to be expected that middle-aged

⁶⁷ IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL Register*.

⁶⁸ IE/MNR/2/A, *East Tipperary NL Register*.

⁶⁹ IE/CCCA/PR6/70/2/180, *Doneraile NL receipts*.

⁷⁰ A. de Bromhead, A. Fernihough & E. Hargaden, 'Representation of the People: Franchise extension and the 'Sinn Féin election' in Ireland, 1918,' *QUCHE Working Paper Series* (2018); e.g. Hart, *IRA and its Enemies*, ch. 8; M. Coleman, *County Longford and the Irish Revolution, 1910-23* (Dublin, 2003), p. 53; Townsend, *Republic*, p. 43; RF. Foster, *Vivid Faces: the revolutionary generation in Ireland, 1890-1923* (London, 2015)

people had more money at their disposal than the young. Rather, the findings here show that support for radical politics in Ireland was not the sole preserve of the young. Here we see the benefit of focussing on civilian support rather than the active membership of the IRA.




Figure 4.11. Ages of subscribers to the National Loan in South Monaghan, Longford, and East Tipperary.⁷¹

Analysis of the ages of subscribers also sheds light on their level of education. As is clear from Figure 4.11, there was significant ‘heaping’ of ages in each subscriber list. The observation that respondents tend to round their ages to the nearest number ending in five or zero has been used by historians as a proxy for human capital, using the ‘Whipple index’ to determine numeracy.⁷² Here we see some variation between the three constituencies. The Whipple indices for subscribers in South Monaghan (169%) and East Tipperary (157%) are higher than the general populations in those constituencies (+7%

⁷¹ IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL register*, IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL Register*, IE/MNR/2/A, *East Tipperary NL Register*, 1911 Census of Ireland.

⁷² B. A’Hearn, J. Baten and D. Crayen, ‘Quantifying Quantitative Literacy: Age Heaping and the History of Human Capital,’ *Journal of Economic History*, 69/4 (2009).

and +4% respectively), but the index for Longford subscribers (154%) is significantly lower (-9%) than the constituency as a whole. This suggests that subscribers in South Monaghan and East Tipperary were slightly less numerate than the populations of those constituencies, while the Longford subscribers were more numerate than their average co-constituent. As for literacy, National Loan subscribers as a group enjoyed a higher rate of literacy than the general population in each constituency. In South Monaghan, 87.8% of subscribers were literate, compared to 75.9% of the constituency at large; 94.1% of Longford subscribers could read and write, compared to 80.5% of the constituency; and 97.5% of East Tipperary subscribers could read and write, compared to 80% of the constituency.

Unlike previous attempts to analyse the social composition of the republican movement during the war of independence, a study of National Loan subscribers enables inclusion of women. This is an aspect of the war that, although largely neglected by the historiography, has a growing body of scholarship.⁷³ Overall, just 12.4% of subscribers were women. There was some variation among the constituencies however, breaking down as 11.7% in South Monaghan; 9% in Longford; 21.2% in East Tipperary; 9.5% in Doneraile, and 15.3% of the Dáil Debates sample. The disparity between East Tipperary and the rest can partly be explained by the extent to which that county was urban; 21.7% of female subscribers in the three constituencies lived in urban centres, compared to just 9.2% of men. Notably, comparison with RIC estimates for Sinn Féin membership reveals an underestimation of female sympathy for the republican movement. Longford's 9% female share of the National Loan is far in excess of the 2% of Longford Sinn Féin members that the RIC estimated were female. The RIC's estimates of female members of

⁷³ e.g. A. Matthews, *Renegades: Irish republican women 1900-1922* (Cork, 2010); S. Pašeta, *Irish nationalist women, 1900-1918* (Cambridge, 2013); L. Gillis, *Women of the Irish Revolution 1913-1923* (Cork, 2016).

Sinn Féin in counties Monaghan and Tipperary South, just 9.5% each, also appear to have understated the level of support.⁷⁴

The role of sectarian division in the Irish War of Independence has been well documented, with the minority Protestant population less likely to support independence than their Catholic neighbours.⁷⁵ The data from the National Loan registers supports this assumption: 98% of subscribers in South Monaghan, Longford, East Tipperary, and Doneraile were Catholic, compared to 86% of the general population. South Monaghan had a large Protestant community, comprising 17% of the total, but only three Protestants could be identified in the constituency's National Loan register, just 0.44% of subscribers. The smaller Protestant minority of Longford had greater representation in the National Loan register, but as 10% of the population, the 34 Church of Ireland subscribers made up only 2.2% of the county's total. Meanwhile, Protestants were entirely absent from the East Tipperary sample.⁷⁶

The rarity of Protestants among subscribers to the National Loan is not surprising. As noted in chapter 3, National Loan meetings tended to take place after Mass at the local Catholic Church and, given the risks associated with soliciting for subscriptions, it is unlikely the Volunteers would waste their time approaching those deemed unlikely to subscribe. The larger representation from the smaller, more vulnerable, Protestant minority of Longford could be interpreted as an indication of coercion, but in the absence of explicit evidence this is mere speculation. Indeed, in her comprehensive study of Longford in the Irish War of Independence, Coleman found 'little evidence of any serious sectarian tensions' in the county.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Coleman, *Longford*, p. 185.

⁷⁵ Hart, *IRA and its Enemies*, ch. 12.

⁷⁶ IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL register*; IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL Register*; IE/MNR/2/A, *East Tipperary NL Register*; IE/CCCA/PR6/70/2/180, *Doneraile NL receipts*; 1911 Census of Ireland.

⁷⁷ Coleman, *Longford*, p. 157.

Turning to the occupations of subscribers, a number of professions have been singled out in the historiography for their importance as drivers of public opinion and providers of funds. As observed in chapter 3, the organisers of the National Loan particularly targeted those individuals who were likely to have an influence on others, and this is reflected in the National Loan registers. Table 4.4 shows the marginal effects of a probit model that regresses a binary outcome, whether or not an inhabitant of the constituencies under consideration subscribed to the National Loan, on occupational class. Using individual census data on 127,242 inhabitants of the constituencies under consideration, the model controls for gender, religion, age and district and constituency fixed effects.⁷⁸ Table 4.5 shows the results of an OLS model that regresses the log of the size of individual subscriptions on the same occupation classes as Table 4.4, with the same controls. It analyses only those 3,187 subscribers for whom relevant census data was available. The log of the amount subscribed was used to take account of heaping caused by the denominations in which National Loan bonds were subscribed.⁷⁹

At the top of the list of influencers were the clergy, whose role in organising and promoting the National Loan is clear from chapters 2 and 3. As noted by Fitzpatrick, ‘no fund-raising could hope to succeed without the blessing and, preferably, contribution by a priest’.⁸⁰ The prominence of the clergy in Irish politics is clear from the National Loan sample. As just 0.11% of the population, Catholic priests made up 0.75% of subscribers.⁸¹ As shown in Table 4.4, controlling for religion, gender, age, and district and constituency fixed effects, Catholic priests were 3.76% more likely to subscribe than other occupations. This effect was particularly strong in Longford, where priests were 6.7% more likely to subscribe.

⁷⁸ For results of probit model, see Table C.1, in Appendices.

⁷⁹ To take account of the nine years between the 1911 Census and the National Loan campaign, those inhabitants whose occupation was recorded as ‘scholar’ were assigned the occupation of the head of their household.

⁸⁰ Fitzpatrick, *Politics*, p. 75.

⁸¹ IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL register*; IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL Register*; IE/MNR/2/A, *East Tipperary NL Register*; IE/CCCA/PR6/70/2/180, *Doneraile NL receipts*; 1911 Census of Ireland.

Priests also stand out as those subscribers most likely to make a large subscription. Based on 3,187 observations from all constituencies, a priest could be expected to subscribe 28% more than other occupations (Table 4.5). Even when district and constituency fixed effects are taken into account, the priest's premium stands at 23%. The priest's premium was particularly strong in South Monaghan and East Tipperary, where they were associated with subscriptions that were 60% higher than others. There are a number of potential explanations for priests' propensity to make large subscriptions. Most literally, it could just be a measure of their sympathy for the Dáil. It could also be the case that some clergymen acted as trustees of funds contributed in smaller amounts by their poorer parishioners. Indeed, in the Free State parliamentary debates on repayment of the loan in 1928, it was suggested that clergy should act in this way for those bonds purchased by groups of parishioners.⁸² Their organisational involvement could also have led them to make large subscriptions, to set an example for others to follow. Disposable income must also be taken into account; clergymen had a regular stipend and few financial commitments, so were well placed to make a contribution. Regardless of their motivations, the disproportionate role played by the clergy is clear by the fact that, as just 0.11% of the general population, they contributed 4% of the funds.⁸³

Fitzpatrick has also noted the prominent position held by shopkeepers and publicans in Irish politics.⁸⁴ 'They were the first to hear local gossip,' according to Fitzpatrick, 'and the best able to spread it.'⁸⁵ Regularly in contact with the community at large, they would also have been sensitive to the changing sentiments of their customers. Most blatantly, Longford shopkeepers deemed antagonistic to the Dáil found their

⁸² DÉ Debate Vol. 24 No. 9, *Private Deputies' Business: DÉ Loan (Internal) 1919-20*, 22 Jun. 1928, p. 1318.

⁸³ IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL register*; IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL Register*; IE/MNR/2/A, *East Tipperary NL Register*; IE/CCCA/PR6/70/2/180, *Doneraile NL receipts*; 1911 Census of Ireland.

⁸⁴ Fitzpatrick, *Politics*, p. 74.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

premises covered in graffiti advertising the National Loan.⁸⁶ Shopkeepers and publicans also had more free time than most farmers or labourers, and the nature of their business meant they had ample cash to donate funds.⁸⁷ Analysis of the National Loan register shows that shopkeepers were 2% more likely to subscribe than other occupations, while publicans were 2.7% more likely (Table 4.4). Publicans' propensity to subscribe was particularly high in Longford. Based on the results in Table 4.5, publicans were associated with subscriptions that were 18% higher than other occupations, falling to 12.5% when geographical fixed effects are taken into account. This is largely driven by South Monaghan and Longford, where publicans were associated with subscriptions that were 33% and 30% higher than other occupations. Shopkeepers were associated with a 14% higher subscription, falling to 9% controlling for geographical fixed effects.

While priests, publicans and shopkeepers were notable for their large subscriptions and power to influence, the overwhelming majority of subscribers in the sample were farmers. Although farmers constituted just 44% of inhabitants, they made up 74% of subscribers (Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.13). This overrepresentation of farmers was apparent in each constituency, but particularly pronounced in East Tipperary, where as 28% of the general population they made up 57% of subscribers.⁸⁸ Across the constituencies, controlling for religion, gender, age, and geographical fixed effects, farmers were 2% more likely than others to subscribe to the National Loan. This prevalence of farmers, 'never too eager to subscribe to sentimental causes', was viewed by one Sinn Féin activist as 'further proof of the whole-hearted support of the people' for the Dáil.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, it contrasts with the historiography that claims that farmers

⁸⁶ TNA: CO 904/110/340, *RIC Longford CI report*, Oct. 1919.

⁸⁷ Fitzpatrick, *Politics*, p. 74.

⁸⁸ IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL register*; IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL Register*; IE/MNR/2/A, *East Tipperary NL Register*; IE/CCCA/PR6/70/2/180, *Doneraile NL receipts*; 1911 Census of Ireland.

⁸⁹ Edward MacLysaght, quoted in Mitchell, *Revolutionary*, p. 63.

in the main held aloof from the movement.⁹⁰ Of course the most straightforward explanation for this is economic; the fact that the National Loan was a financial contribution must be borne in mind. Still, it is clear in Figure 4.14 that the Dáil relied predominantly and disproportionately on farmers for its funding. At just 44% of the population, they were responsible for 59% of the funds raised.⁹¹

Meanwhile, agricultural labourers were underrepresented; as 10% of the general population they made up only 4% of subscribers. With the exception of Doneraile, this was the case for each constituency and, again, it was particularly pronounced in East Tipperary. Some 13% of East Tipperary's inhabitants were agricultural labourers, but only 2% of subscribers were.⁹² Across the constituencies, controlling for religion, gender, age, and geographical fixed effects, agricultural labourers were 1.27% less likely than others to subscribe (Table 4.4).

⁹⁰ e.g. Hart, *IRA and its enemies*, p. 143; Dooley, *Monaghan*, p. 81; D.G. Marnane, *3rd Brigade: A History of the Volunteers/IRA in South Tipperary, 1913-21* (Tipperary, 2018), p. 204.

⁹¹ IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL register*; IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL Register*; IE/MNR/2/A, *East Tipperary NL Register*; IE/CCCA/PR6/70/2/180, *Doneraile NL receipts*; 1911 Census of Ireland.

⁹² *Ibid.*




Figure 4.12. Occupations of the general population, share of inhabitants in South Monaghan, Longford, East Tipperary and Doneraile, based on Table 4.2.⁹³




Figure 4.13. Occupations of subscribers to the National Loan, share of total subscribers in South Monaghan, Longford, East Tipperary, and Doneraile, based on Table 4.2.⁹⁴

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*




Figure 4.14. Amounts raised by occupations of subscribers to the National Loan, share of total subscribed in South Monaghan, Longford, East Tipperary and Doneraile, based on Table 4.3.⁹⁵

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

Table 4.4. The effect of occupation on likelihood of subscribing to the National Loan.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	Whether subscribed to the National Loan (Yes, No): Marginal Effects						
	ALL (1)	ALL (2)	ALL (3)	South Monaghan (4)	Co. Longford (5)	East Tipperary (6)	Doneraile (7)
RC Priest	0.0376*** (0.0063)	0.0376*** (0.0063)	0.0371*** (0.0065)	0.0321 (0.0183)	0.0671*** (0.0135)	0.0215*** (0.0060)	-0.0958 (2.6472)
Shopkeeper	0.0191*** (0.0024)	0.0191*** (0.0024)	0.0194*** (0.0024)	0.0092 (0.0058)	0.0267*** (0.0059)***	0.0137 (0.0020)	0.0058 (0.0078)
Publican	0.0269*** (0.0041)	0.0270*** (0.0041)	0.0265*** (0.0042)	0.0197* (0.0101)	0.0633 (0.0097)	0.0090* (0.0039)	0.0219 (0.0117)
Merchant	0.0161*** (0.0036)	0.0161*** (0.0036)	0.0156*** (0.0036)	0.0193** (0.0071)	0.0200* (0.0102)	0.0072* (0.0033)	0.0199 (0.0117)
Craftsman	0.0064** (0.0022)	0.0064** (0.0022)	0.0060** (0.0022)	-0.0055 (0.0052)	0.0132** (0.0055)	0.0057** (0.0019)	0.0013 (0.0066)
Teacher	0.0231*** (0.0046)	0.0230*** (0.0046)	0.0294*** (0.0047)	-0.0012 (0.0110)	0.0477*** (0.0092)	0.0110* (0.0054)	0.0219 (0.0171)
Farmer, Grazier	0.0200*** (0.0015)	0.0200*** (0.0015)	0.0306*** (0.0013)	0.0072* (0.0031)	0.0312*** (0.0032)	0.0135*** (0.0016)	0.0215*** (0.0040)
Agri. Labourer	-0.0127*** (0.0021)	-0.0126*** (0.0021)	-0.0077*** (0.0020)	-0.0281*** (0.0048)	-0.0112* (0.0044)	-0.0117*** (0.0027)	0.0103* (0.0052)
Professional	0.0094 (0.0049)	0.0093 (0.0049)	0.0044 (0.0050)	-0.1875 (1.6629)	0.0140 (0.0128)	0.0103** (0.0034)	0.0032 (0.0146)
Domestic	-0.0038 (0.0037)	-0.0037 (0.0037)	-0.0062 (0.0038)	-0.0179* (0.0086)	-0.0278 (0.0155)	-0.0005 (0.0029)	0.0150* (0.0072)
Religion	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Gender	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Age	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Age squared	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
District FE	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constituency FE	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Observations	127,242	127,242	127,242	31,142	43,745	46,068	6,287
Method of est.	Probit - Marginal	Probit - Marginal	Probit - Marginal	Probit - Marginal	Probit - Marginal	Probit - Marginal	Probit - Marginal

Notes and sources

*p**p***p<0.01

IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL register*; IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL register*; IE/MNR/2/A, *East Tipperary NL register*; IE/CCCA/PR6/70/2/180, *Doneraile NL receipts*; 1911 Census of Ireland
The marginal effects are the average marginal effects based on the Delta-method.

Table 4.5. The effect of occupation on size of subscription to the National Loan.

<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
Log of individual subscription to the National Loan							
	ALL	ALL	ALL	South Monaghan	Co. Longford	East Tipperary	Doneraile
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
RC Priest	0.230** (0.048)	0.225** (0.048)	0.278** (0.055)	0.604** (0.153)	0.093* (0.053)	0.597** (0.140)	
Shopkeeper	0.091** (0.024)	0.092** (0.024)	0.140** (0.027)	0.094 (0.057)	0.131** (0.034)	0.120** (0.058)	0.373** (0.124)
Publican	0.125** (0.038)	0.126** (0.038)	0.179** (0.044)	0.334** (0.096)	0.295** (0.048)	-0.123 (0.112)	-0.050 (0.176)
Merchant	0.087** (0.035)	0.088** (0.035)	0.163** (0.039)	0.202** (0.065)	0.190** (0.058)	-0.009 (0.095)	0.340* (0.174)
Craftsman	-0.049** (0.023)	-0.048** (0.023)	-0.051* (0.027)	-0.069 (0.057)	-0.064* (0.033)	-0.050 (0.059)	-0.141 (0.119)
Teacher	0.006 (0.043)	0.007 (0.043)	-0.112** (0.050)	-0.139 (0.120)	-0.055 (0.049)	-0.192 (0.154)	0.107 (0.232)
Farmer, Grazier	-0.002 (0.015)	0.001 (0.015)	-0.118** (0.016)	-0.111** (0.031)	-0.133** (0.019)	-0.056 (0.041)	0.234** (0.060)
Agri. Labourer	-0.037 (0.023)	-0.033 (0.023)	-0.158** (0.025)	-0.133** (0.055)	-0.161** (0.027)	-0.101 (0.088)	0.141 (0.087)
Professional	0.004 (0.051)	0.005 (0.051)	0.006 (0.059)		-0.102 (0.076)	0.008 (0.098)	0.386 (0.232)
Domestic	-0.061 (0.045)	-0.061 (0.045)	-0.079 (0.052)	-0.150 (0.110)	0.077 (0.129)	-0.089 (0.098)	-0.022 (0.115)
Constant	0.320** (0.070)	0.318** (0.070)	0.428** (0.042)	0.389** (0.080)	0.397** (0.046)	0.556** (0.221)	0.477** (0.171)
Religion	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Gender	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Age	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Age squared	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
District FE	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constituency FE	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Observations	3,187	3,187	3,187	908	1,667	514	98
R ²	0.396	0.391	0.102	0.113	0.148	0.080	0.337
Adjusted R ²	0.366	0.361	0.098	0.100	0.141	0.054	0.235
Residual Std. Error	0.204 (df = 3036)	0.205 (df = 3037)	0.243 (df = 3172)	0.260 (df = 894)	0.181 (df = 1652)	0.300 (df = 499)	0.226 (df = 84)
F Statistic	13.247** (df = 150; 3036)	13.069** (df = 149; 3037)	25.650** (df = 14; 3172)	8.730** (df = 13; 894)	20.578** (df = 14; 1652)	3.090** (df = 14; 499)	3.292** (df = 13; 84)
Method of est.	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS

Notes and sources

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL register*; IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL register*; IE/MNR/2/A, *East Tipperary NL register*; IE/CCCA/PR6/70/2/180, *Doneraile NL receipts*; 1911 Census of Ireland

In contrast with British war bonds sold during the Great War, very few businesses subscribed to the National Loan.⁹⁶ Only two businesses subscribed in South Monaghan, and another three in Longford.⁹⁷ In East Tipperary, the loan organiser in Clonmel formed a ‘Commercial Committee’ to encourage local businessmen to subscribe, but the direct effectiveness of this committee is hard to discern.⁹⁸ An organisation called the ‘Management Society’ subscribed £20 in East Tipperary, but the precise nature of this society is not clear. Notably, 43 subscribers gave their address as O’Gorman Bros Coachbuilders, a large employer in Clonmel. Together, their contributions came to £104, and a further £50 came from the proprietor.⁹⁹ Curiously, at the same time as its owner and employees were funding the Dáil, O’Gorman Bros made repairs for the British soldiers fighting the IRA.¹⁰⁰ According to Richard Dalton, son of the National Loan organiser in Clonmel, one of O’Gormans’ employees was a member of the IRA, and information obtained from a loose-tongued soldier waiting for repairs was used to thwart a British attack in Thurles.¹⁰¹ Similar commercial duplicity can be found elsewhere in Clonmel: two subscribers in the town gave their address as Hearn’s Hotel, which included a British army officer among its guests.¹⁰² Again, staff in the hotel acted as informants, revealing the officer’s whereabouts to the IRA.¹⁰³ The presence of postal workers and their families in each of the registers also speaks to the IRA’s ability to intercept British intelligence.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁶ A. Gregory, *The Last Great War, British Society and the First World War* (Cambridge, 2008), p. 224.

⁹⁷ IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL register*; IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL Register*.

⁹⁸ IE/BMH/WS1116, *Richard Dalton*, pp. 1 & 5.

⁹⁹ IE/MNR/2/A, *East Tipperary NL Register*.

¹⁰⁰ IE/BMH/WS1116, *Richard Dalton*, p. 8.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² IE/MNR/2/A, *East Tipperary NL Register*; J. Armstrong, *Sean Treacy and the Tan War* (Cork, 2007), p.135.

¹⁰³ Armstrong, *Sean Treacy*, p. 136.

¹⁰⁴ IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL register*; IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL Register*; IE/MNR/2/A, *East Tipperary NL Register*; IE/CCCA/PR6/70/2/180, *Doneraile NL receipts*; 1911 Census of Ireland; NLI/Ms. 3,110, *Solemn covenant to resist Conscriptio*, ref. P. Daly; Armstrong, *Sean Treacy*, p. 138.

Bankers can also be found among the National Loan subscribers. In East Tipperary, Joseph McCan, accountant in the National Bank in Clonmel, subscribed £10, while in Co. Longford William Behan, manager of the Hibernian Bank's Granard branch, subscribed £5.¹⁰⁵ The former was the brother of Piers McCan, who had been elected Sinn Féin TD for East Tipperary but died from influenza in Gloucester jail in early 1919.¹⁰⁶ William Behan was also a Sinn Féin supporter, having subscribed 5*d.* to the INAAVDF in August 1916.¹⁰⁷ Whether or not Behan cooperated with the National Loan organisers in sending money to Dublin is open to speculation. As revealed in chapter 2, the Hibernian Bank in Dublin held National Loan funds on deposit, and Alan Bell's inquiry interviewed the managers of five branches to investigate.¹⁰⁸ Whatever Behan's activities, it appears his employment at the bank came into question in 1921, as the pro-Dáil urban district council in Granard passed a resolution urging the bank's directors to retain him in that position.¹⁰⁹

The Radicalisation of Public Opinion

Delving further into the history of these constituencies, it is possible to draw some comparisons with previous nationalist fundraising campaigns. Specifically, as noted in chapter 1, support for home rule, sympathy for the Easter Rising, and resistance to conscription can all be examined through the prism of popular fundraising. The records of these campaigns are fragmentary, prohibiting a comprehensive analysis, but they do point to certain trends. Covering various districts in Longford, the names of 823 subscribers to the HRF and 307 subscribers to the INAAVDF were published in the

¹⁰⁵ IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL Register*, IE/MNR/2/A, *East Tipperary NL Register, FJ*, 3 Mar. 1914, p. 4; Thom's Directory 1921.

¹⁰⁶ 1911 Census of Ireland; Mitchell, *Revolutionary*, p. 30

¹⁰⁷ *Longford Leader*, 5 Aug. 1916, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸ TNA: CO904/177(1)/278, *Alan Bell's investigation*.

¹⁰⁹ IE/LDCA/GTC/1/1, *Granard UDC minutes*, 11 May 1921.

Longford Leader.¹¹⁰ Archival material for the Anti-Conscription Fund is very scarce, but accounts for Castleblayney, South Monaghan, were uncovered in the course of this research. Containing the names and addresses of 539 subscribers to the fund, this document was considered so subversive that it was hidden under the floorboards of its owner's attic during the war of independence.¹¹¹ The names and addresses in these documents were matched to the 1911 Census of Ireland, achieving a match rate of 56% for the HRF, 41% for the INAAVDF, and 52% for the Anti-Conscription Fund.

Table 4.6 shows the marginal effects of a probit model that regresses a binomial outcome, whether or not someone subscribed to the National Loan, on their having contributed to the HRF, INAAVDF and Anti-Conscription Fund.¹¹² The model controls for religion, gender, age, district fixed effects and, as a rough proxy for wealth, the HISCAM international historical stratification scale.¹¹³ Table 4.7 shows the results of an OLS model limited to only those inhabitants who subscribed to the National Loan. It regresses the log of the size of individual subscriptions on having contributed to the HRF, INAAVDF and Anti-Conscription Fund, with the same controls as Table 4.6. In both models the population is restricted to those districts for which data is available.

According to the findings presented in Table 4.6, having subscribed to the HRF in Longford increased the likelihood of subscribing to the National Loan by 3%, while a donation to the INAAVDF increased it by 5%. In South Monaghan, having subscribed to the Anti-Conscription Fund significantly increased likelihood of subscribing to the

¹¹⁰ HRF: *Longford Leader*, 26 Jul. 1913, p.1; *Longford Leader*, 27 Dec. 1913, p.6; *Longford Leader*, 6 Dec. 1913, p.1; *Census of Ireland*, 1911. DEDs: Abbeylara, Aghaboy, Ardagh East, Ballymuigh, Breanrisk, Bunlahy, Caldragh, Cashel East, Cloondara, Cloonee, Coolamber, Corboy, Creevy, Crosagstown, Dalystown, Drumlish, Edgeworthstown, Firry, Granard Rural, Granard Urban, Kilcommock, Killow, Knockanbaun, Ledwithstown, Longford Urban, Longford Rural, Moatfarrell, and Newgrove; INAAVDF: *Longford Leader*, 5 Aug. 1916, p. 1. DEDs: Ardagh West, Bunlahy, Caldragh, Cloonee, Coolamber, Corboy, Dalystown, Foxhall, Gelshagh, Granard Rural, Granard Urban, Longford Rural, Longford Urban, and Mullanaghta.

¹¹¹ NLI/Ms.3,110, *Notes of Vincent McGaban*, 20 Jan. 1943. DEDs: Caddagh, Carrickaslane, Carrickatee, Castleblayney Rural, Castleblayney Urban, Church Hill, Clontibret, Innishkeen, and Mullyash.

¹¹² For results of probit model, see Table C.2, in Appendices.

¹¹³ P.S. Lambert, R.L. Zijdemans, M.H.D. Van Leeuwen, I. Maas & K. Prandy (2013), 'The Construction of HISCAM: A Stratification Scale Based on Social Interactions for Historical Comparative Research', *Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History*, 46/2, pp. 77-89.

National Loan, by as much as 10%. Turning to Table 4.7, having subscribed to previous nationalist funds also had a positive effect on the size of subscriptions to the National Loan. HRF subscribers' subscriptions to the National Loan were 10% higher than others, and INAAVDF subscribers' were 23% higher than others. However, most striking is the effect of having subscribed to both funds. The 30% of INAAVDF subscribers who had previously subscribed to the Home Rule Fund could be expected to make a subscription to the National Loan that was 54% higher than those who did not. Elsewhere, in South Monaghan, those who had subscribed to the Anti-Conscription Fund were associated with subscriptions to the National Loan that were 7% higher than those who had not.

Table 4.6. The effect of having subscribed to previous nationalist funds on likelihood of subscribing to the National Loan.

<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Whether subscribed to the National Loan (Yes, No): Marginal Effects			
	Home Rule Fund (a)	INAAVDF (b)	HRF and INAAVDF (c)	Anti-Conscription Fund (d)
Home Rule Fund (HRF), 1913	0.0291*** (0.0050)			
INAAVDF, 1916		0.0508*** (0.0072)		
Both HRF and INAAVDF			0.0225 (0.0126)	
Anti-Conscription Fund, 1918				0.1000*** (0.0067)
Religion	YES	YES	YES	YES
Gender	YES	YES	YES	YES
Age	YES	YES	YES	YES
Age squared	YES	YES	YES	YES
HISCAM	YES	YES	YES	YES
District FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	20,885	12,337	9,072	3,510
Method of est.	Probit - Marginal	Probit - Marginal	Probit - Marginal	Probit - Marginal

Notes and sources

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

- (a) Refers to the following districts in Co. Longford: Abbeylara, Aghaboy, Ardagh East, Ballymuigh, Breanrisk, Bunlahy, Caldragh, Cashel East, Cloondara, Cloonee, Coolamber, Corboy, Creevy, Crosagstown, Dalystown, Drumlish, Edgeworthstown, Firry, Granard Rural, Granard Urban, Kilcommock, Killow, Knockanbaun, Ledwithstown, Longford Urban, Longford Rural, Moatfarrell, and Newgrove.
Longford Leader, 26 Jul. 1913, p.1; *Longford Leader*, 27 Dec. 1913, p.6; *Longford Leader*, 6 Dec. 1913, p.1.
- (b) Refers to the following districts in Co. Longford: Ardagh West, Bunlahy, Caldragh, Cloonee, Coolamber, Corboy, Dalystown, Foxhall, Gelshagh, Granard Rural, Granard Urban, Longford Rural, Longford Urban, and Mullanaghta.
Longford Leader, 5 Aug. 1916, p. 1.
- (c) Refers to the following districts in Co. Longford: Bunlahy, Caldragh, Cloonee, Coolamber, Corboy, Dalystown, Granard Rural, Granard Urban, Longford Rural, Longford Urban.
Longford Leader, 26 Jul. 1913, p. 1; *Longford Leader*, 27 Dec. 1913, p. 6; *Longford Leader*, 6 Dec. 1913, p. 1; *Longford Leader*, 5 Aug. 1916, p. 1.
- (d) Refers to the following districts in South Monaghan: Caddagh, Carrickaslane, Carrickatee, Castleblayney Rural, Castleblayney Urban, Church Hill, Clontibret, Inniskeen, and Mullyash.
NLI/Ms.3,110, *Notes of Vincent McGaban*, 20 Jan. 1943.
- (e) The marginal effects are the average marginal effects based on the Delta-method.

Table 4.7. The effect of having subscribed to previous nationalist funds on size of subscription to the National Loan.

	Dependent variable:			
	Log of individual subscription to the National Loan (a)			
	Home Rule Fund (b)	INAAVDF (c)	HRF and INAAVDF (d)	Anti-Conscription Fund (e)
Home Rule Fund (HRF), 1913	0.100*** (0.023)			
INAAVDF, 1916		0.228*** (0.046)		
Both HRF and INAAVDF			0.544*** (0.130)	
Anti-Conscription Fund, 1918				0.069 (0.044)
Constant	0.388*** (0.088)	0.288** (0.115)	0.760*** (0.283)	0.271 (0.164)
Religion	YES	YES	YES	YES
Gender	YES	YES	YES	YES
Age	YES	YES	YES	YES
Age squared	YES	YES	YES	YES
HISCAM	YES	YES	YES	YES
District FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	760	363	217	198
R ²	0.370	0.431	0.411	0.274
Adjusted R ²	0.343	0.399	0.367	0.227
Residual Std. Error	0.174 (df = 727)	0.201 (df = 343)	0.241 (df = 201)	0.260 (df = 185)
F Statistic	13.370*** (df = 32; 727)	13.652*** (df = 19; 343)	9.359*** (df = 15; 201)	5.809*** (df = 12; 185)
Method of est.	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS

Notes and sources

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

- (a) IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL register*; IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL Register*; 1911 Census of Ireland.
- (b) Refers to the following districts in Co. Longford: Abbeylara, Aghaboy, Ardagh East, Ballymuigh, Breanrisk, Bunlahy, Caldragh, Cashel East, Cloondara, Cloonee, Coolamber, Corboy, Creevy, Crosagstown, Dalystown, Drumlish, Edgeworthstown, Firry, Granard Rural, Granard Urban, Kilcommock, Killow, Knockanbaun, Ledwithstown, Longford Urban, Longford Rural, Moatfarrell, and Newgrove. *Longford Leader*, 26 Jul. 1913, p.1; *Longford Leader*, 27 Dec. 1913, p.6; *Longford Leader*, 6 Dec. 1913, p.1.
- (c) Refers to the following districts in Co. Longford: Ardagh West, Bunlahy, Caldragh, Cloonee, Coolamber, Corboy, Dalystown, Foxhall, Gelshagh, Granard Rural, Granard Urban, Longford Rural, Longford Urban, and Mullanaghta. *Longford Leader*, 5 Aug. 1916, p. 1.
- (d) Refers to the following districts in Co. Longford: Bunlahy, Caldragh, Cloonee, Coolamber, Corboy, Dalystown, Granard Rural, Granard Urban, Longford Rural, Longford Urban. *Longford Leader*, 26 Jul. 1913, p. 1; *Longford Leader*, 27 Dec. 1913, p. 6; *Longford Leader*, 6 Dec. 1913, p. 1; *Longford Leader*, 5 Aug. 1916, p. 1.
- (e) Refers to the following districts in South Monaghan: Caddagh, Carrickaslane, Carrickatee, Castleblayney Rural, Castleblayney Urban, Church Hill, Clontibret, Inniskeen, and Mullyash. NLI/Ms.3,110, *Notes of Vincent McGahan*, 20 Jan. 1943.

The nexus of cultural nationalism in Ireland and the radicalisation of public opinion has been explored by R.F. Foster among others, particularly in relation to Irish language classes provided by the Gaelic League.¹¹⁴ In Foster's words, 'for most of the League's adherents, learning the Irish language was a necessary prelude to an independence that was implicitly political'.¹¹⁵ This is borne out in the National Loan. In East Tipperary, for example, the President and Vice President of the Clonmel Gaelic League subscribed £10 and £5 respectively.¹¹⁶ Elsewhere, in South Monaghan, a significant amount of subscribers to the National Loan had filled out their census returns in the Irish language. In an English-speaking constituency, this was a clear manifestation of cultural nationalism. It was also a minor act of rebellion, as Gaelic script would have confounded the British government's efforts to monitor the population. Some 17% of National Loan subscribers in South Monaghan fall into this category, compared with just 12% of the constituency at large.¹¹⁷ This manifestation of cultural nationalism was also associated with a higher subscription. Table 4.8 shows the results of an OLS model that regresses the log of the size individual subscriptions on a dummy variable assigned to subscribers who filled out their census return in Irish, controlling for religion, gender, and district fixed effects. The results suggest that a South Monaghan resident who had filled out their census return in Irish was associated with a subscription that was 9% higher than one who had done so in English.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ Foster, *Vivid Faces*, p. 48.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ IE/MNR/2/A, *East Tipperary NL Register, Clonmel Chronicle*, 24 Jan. 1920, Almanac Supplement.

¹¹⁷ IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL register*, 1911 Census of Ireland.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

Table 4.8. The effect of filling out 1911 census form in Irish on size of subscription to the National Loan in South Monaghan.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Log of individual subscription to the National Loan	
	(1)	(2)
Filled out 1911 Census in Irish	0.085*** (0.025)	0.143*** (0.024)
Constant	0.150* (0.077)	0.283*** (0.083)
Religion	YES	YES
Gender	YES	YES
Age	YES	YES
Age squared	YES	YES
District FE	YES	NO
Observations	908	908
R ²	0.360	0.056
Adjusted R ²	0.331	0.051
Residual Std. Error	0.224 (df = 868)	0.267 (df = 902)
F Statistic	12.521*** (df = 39; 868)	10.762*** (df = 5; 902)
Method of est.	OLS	OLS

Notes and sources:

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL register*; 1911 Census of Ireland

Of course the most committed manifestation of sympathy for independence was membership of the IRA. Based on a membership list compiled by Coleman, it was possible to identify 189 members of the Longford IRA in the 1911 census.¹¹⁹ Of these, only 16 – fewer than one in ten – subscribed to the National Loan. A further 19 volunteers lived with subscribers to the National Loan.¹²⁰ Meanwhile, the less-active IRA in South Monaghan was more represented in the National Loan register. Among the 75 volunteers identified in the census in South Monaghan, 21 subscribed to the National Loan, 28% of the total.¹²¹ A further 15 volunteers shared their household with a National Loan subscriber, but even allowing for the possibility of ‘donation by proxy’, just over

¹¹⁹ Coleman, *Longford*, Appendix 3; 1911 Census of Ireland

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*; IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL Register*.

¹²¹ IE/MCM/1986/5N1/5, *James Daly volunteer lists*; IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL register*; 1911 Census of Ireland

half of the South Monaghan volunteers sampled made no financial contribution to the loan at all.¹²²

It is clear that subscription to the National Loan was not a requirement, implicit or explicit, of IRA membership. This is unsurprising. As members of the IRA, the volunteers had no need to prove their patriotism. Moreover, by offering their time free of charge, the volunteers were already making a contribution in kind. Indeed, since much of the canvassing for the National Loan was undertaken by Volunteers themselves, they made a very direct contribution to fundraising without needing to put their hands in their own pockets. Viewing it from the other perspective, of the 1,551 Longford subscribers identified in the census who were not members of the IRA, only 41 (2.6%) shared a household with an IRA member.¹²³ Similarly, of the 890 non-IRA subscribers to the loan in South Monaghan, only 16 (1.8%) were identified as living with a volunteer.¹²⁴ In other words, popular support for the Dáil in Longford and South Monaghan extended well beyond those residents who had a direct link to the IRA.

Complicating the narrative

Simplistic narratives of the Irish War of Independence depict two sides entirely separated, but the reality, as shown in the National Loan registers, was more complex. Perhaps most surprising is the presence of RIC pensioners and their families among the subscribers. The RIC was the principal target for IRA attacks at this time and the Dáil publicly advocated an official policy of ostracising policemen and their families.¹²⁵ Death threats from the IRA to policemen and their associates were a common occurrence in all

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ Coleman, *Longford*, Appendix 3; 1911 Census of Ireland

¹²⁴ IE/MCM/1986/5N1/5, *James Daly volunteer lists*; 1911 Census of Ireland

¹²⁵ Fitzpatrick, *Politics*, pp. 10-11.

three constituencies.¹²⁶ In September 1919, concurrent with National Loan advertising, notices were posted around South Monaghan threatening anyone found speaking to the RIC with the death penalty.¹²⁷ Nevertheless, five RIC pensioners could be identified among the National Loan subscribers and a total of 14 had personal or familial relationships with the RIC. Most startlingly, the Longford register contains the wife of an RIC constable who was serving at the time of the National Loan.¹²⁸ Of course it is possible that the subscribers with links to the RIC contributed out of genuine support for the movement. Alternatively, perhaps they simply gave the collectors a pound each in order to ‘keep their heads down’. Whatever their motivations, it is ironic that RIC pensions funded the IRA.

A number of subscribers can also be identified with connections to the British military. In South Monaghan, one man who subscribed £10 had sons who served in the British army in the Great War.¹²⁹ In Co. Longford, two subscribers were identified as having sons who died serving in the Great War.¹³⁰ In Clonmel, a British army pensioner subscribed £1 to the National Loan, as did the son of another army pensioner in Co. Longford.¹³¹ More broadly, while the loan campaign was on going, two curates in East Tipperary who subscribed £10 each officiated at a requiem mass for soldiers who died in the Great War.¹³² One of them also served on the Clonmel War Pensions Committee.¹³³ This blurring of the boundaries could also take an intimate character. In one example, a woman whose mother subscribed £20 to the National Loan in Castleblayney, and was herself a member of Cumann na mBan, ended up marrying a Black & Tan who raided

¹²⁶ TNA: CO/904/148, *Outrages against police*, 1920.

¹²⁷ Dooley, *Monaghan*, p. 81.

¹²⁸ TNA: HO/184, *RIC service record no. 57059*.

¹²⁹ IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL register*; NLI/Ms. 3,110.

¹³⁰ IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL Register*; CWGC, Memorial 65, Lance-Corporal P.J. Barden, Connaught Rangers; CWGC, Memorial III.N.12B, Gunner John Amooty, Royal Field Artillery, cited in ‘Longford at War’, www.longfordatwar.ie, date accessed 20 Nov. 2017; 1911 Census of Ireland.

¹³¹ IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL Register*; IE/MNR/2/A, *East Tipperary NL Register*; 1911 Census of Ireland.

¹³² IE/MNR/2/A, *East Tipperary NL Register*; *Clonmel Chronicle*, 26 Nov. 1919, p. 5.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 10 Jan. 1920, p. 5.

the pub she was working in.¹³⁴ The daughter of another subscriber, ‘A fair-haired, extremely pretty girl’, married an Auxiliary officer stationed in Castleblayney Castle.¹³⁵

The raising of the National Loan was a significant achievement, and one that sustained the Dáil administration through a crucial period when money from America was slow to arrive. As well as funding the Dáil’s activities, it acted as a means by which the Dáil’s supremacy over the Sinn Féin party and the IRA could be asserted. They faced great challenges in organisation and accountability, and outside forces in the form of the British government served to exacerbate those difficulties. Other external organisations such as the Catholic Church, and cover organisations such as the Irish National Assurance Company and the National Land Bank were indispensable in overcoming these challenges. In promoting the National Loan, the Dáil was able to reach beyond its grass roots and prove its credentials as a mass movement. Again, the British Authorities posed a problem, but the innovative marketing strategy adopted by the Dáil turned such a liability into an asset. The Catholic Church was also invaluable in the promotion of the loan, offering the moral incentive for latent supporters to subscribe, and the involvement of its clergymen is clear from the subscriber lists discussed in this chapter.

The results of the National Loan were better than expected, and a remarkable achievement considering the conditions under which it was raised. These conditions were best summed up by Michael Collins in correspondence with de Valera, who was busy promoting the External Loan in the US:

¹³⁴ IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL register*, NLI/Ms. 3,110, *Anti-Conscription Fund*, annotation by Vincent McGahan.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

Advertising is impossible practically, meetings are impossible practically, movements of prominent Sinn Féiners are greatly interfered with, so that everything has to be done quietly, unassumingly, and with much labour.¹³⁶

Based in the US, de Valera was operating in a much freer environment than Collins, but the External Loan faced challenges of its own. While the National Loan was indispensable in funding the opening period of the War of Independence, as the conflict escalated the resources of the Irish diaspora were to play an increasingly vital role. This second pillar of the Dáil's finances is the focus of the following section.

¹³⁶ Cited in Fanning, *Irish Department of Finance*, p. 19.

Section II

Funds from

Abroad

Chapter 5: Diaspora Finance

As noted by Paul Collier, the charitable resources of emigrants in developed countries represent a particularly promising source of finance for rebel groups.¹ Diaspora communities often bear a grievance for having to leave their homeland, they are able to operate more freely in their adopted country than would be the case in their homeland, and their adopted country is often more prosperous than their homeland. As a result, this form of finance is observable in a number of twentieth-century separatist groups² The Dáil was no different in this respect and, as David Fitzpatrick has argued, 'Ireland's revolution was moulded, in its priorities and funding, by emigration.'³ This section explores the Dáil's overseas funding during the War of Independence, but first delves into the history of diaspora finance in Irish nationalist politics.

By the time de Valera arrived in New York in 1919, Irish nationalist groups had already established a long tradition of funding by remittance. Indeed, remittances from America had formed a significant source of funding for non-political purposes as well, and millions of dollars had been sent across the Atlantic from Irish immigrants to their families in the old country.⁴ Irish nationalist fundraising in the nineteenth century has been covered by Michael Keyes in detail far more granular than is required in this chapter.⁵ However, an understanding of the role played by American money in nineteenth century Irish politics is crucial in understanding the dynamics at play during the Dáil's fundraising mission of 1919-21.

¹ P. Collier, 'Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44/6 (2000), 44/6 (2000), pp. 839-53.

² M. Freeman, *Financing terrorism: case studies* (Burlington, Vt., 2012), p. 7.

³ D. Fitzpatrick, 'Ireland since 1870' in R.F. Foster (ed.) *The Oxford illustrated history of Ireland* (Oxford, 1989), p. 245.

⁴ K. Kenny, *The American Irish* (London, 2000), p. 140.

⁵ M. Keyes, *Funding the Nation: Money and nationalism in nineteenth-century Ireland* (Dublin, 2011).

As described by Keyes, Daniel O’Connell’s campaign for Catholic emancipation in the 1820s inspired ‘the first welling up of a spring that would sometimes trickle and sometimes flow through the Irish body politic’. Branches of the ‘Friends of Ireland’ sprang up across the US to support O’Connell and, while initial contributions were just 6% of the total ‘Catholic Rent’, an important precedent had been laid down.⁶ O’Connell also relied to some extent on money from America for his 1840s Repeal Fund. It was that reliance on American money that made his vocal opposition to slavery a key factor in alienating the ‘Young Irelanders’, who feared it would jeopardise funding from the Southern States.⁷ Not for the last time did interference in internal American politics undermine the success of Irish nationalist fundraising.

The first large-scale diaspora funding of an Irish-American nationalist organisation was conducted by the Fenian Brotherhood in 1866. An important historical precedent for the Dáil’s attempts at fundraising, the Fenians sought to raise capital for their war chest by issuing bonds. Just as they drew much of their manpower from veterans of the American Civil War, it is likely that the Fenians’ method of fundraising was influenced by the bond issues of the Southern Confederacy. However, the notion of a not-yet-existent state issuing war bonds in America was not a new one. A notable precedent with which the Fenians would have been familiar was the popular sale of ‘Hungary bonds’ by Louis Kossuth in the USA in 1852.⁸ Comparable to the Fenian bonds, the Hungary bonds promised repayment only ‘when Kossuth was safely returned to the governorship of an independent Hungary’.⁹ As with the Dáil’s bond drives, Kossuth recognised the propaganda value of raising small amounts of money from a

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 33.

⁷ P. Geoghegan, *Liberator: The Life and Death of Daniel O’Connell 1830-47* (Dublin, 2010), p. 210.

⁸ D.S. Spencer, *Louis Kossuth and Young America: A study of sectionalism and foreign policy, 1848-52* (Columbia, Missouri 1977), p. 58.

⁹ *Ibid.*

large number of people.¹⁰ Consequently, the bonds were issued in denominations of \$1, \$5, \$10, \$50 and \$100 (with the \$50 and \$100 signed by Kossuth himself).¹¹ Kossuth was not unique in this endeavour. Also in 1852, German émigrés from the failed Baden Revolution of 1848-9 sold German ‘national loan bonds’ in America, led by Gottfried Kinkel.¹² These bonds were to be honoured when a successful revolution had taken place in Germany and a Republican administration was installed in office.¹³ According to Kinkel, the use of bonds was intended to inspire confidence that the money would be well administered and that the trustees would be held accountable.¹⁴

By raising funds by means of bonds, the Fenians placed the Irish cause alongside those of the failed yet high-minded European revolutions of 1848. More importantly in practical terms, they also set an example for future Irish revolutionaries. Yet the Fenian bond issue is also a cautionary tale that highlights some of the perils associated with diaspora finance. Divergent goals between homeland and diaspora organisations, due to political ideology, local politics or internal dynamics, can motivate one side to impose its priorities on the other.¹⁵ The IRB, for example, were solely reliant on American money for any rebellion they would undertake in Ireland, but a powerful faction within the American Fenian ‘Senate’ wanted to spend this money instead on a diversionary invasion of Canada.¹⁶ This difference in priorities became apparent when the Fenian President John O’Mahony issued the ‘Bonds of the Irish Republic’ prematurely in order to come to the assistance of the IRB in Ireland, whose leader James Stephens had been imprisoned. He did this without the approval of the Fenian Senate, leading to considerable resentment. In response, the senate relieved him of the Fenian presidency and replaced

¹⁰ J.H. Komlos, *Kossuth in America, 1851-1852* (Cleveland, Ohio, 1973), p. 90.

¹¹ S. Freitag, *Exiles from European revolutions: refugees in mid-Victorian England* (New York, 2003), p. 173.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 166.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

¹⁵ Freeman, *Financing Terrorism*, p. 11.

¹⁶ Devoy, *Recollections*, p. 270.

him with a man in favour of action in Canada. O'Mahony responded in turn by seeking and obtaining official status from the IRB in Ireland as 'Representative and Financial Agent of the Irish Republic in the United States of America, Canada, etc.'¹⁷ The resultant split in the Fenian Brotherhood led to two rival organisations, each issuing their own separate bonds of the Irish Republic and each promoting their bonds by issuing public attacks on the other.¹⁸ As a consequence of the split, the remittances received by the IRB from America reduced to a trickle.¹⁹

In the view of IRB leader James Stephens, the 'treachery' of the senate could not have happened had the American Fenians remained under central control from Dublin.²⁰ As Michael Freeman has argued in his study of terrorist financing, in order to receive financial support from their diaspora communities on a reliable basis, groups such as the IRB must maintain control of them as well as access to them.²¹ The IRB's lack of control over the American Fenians, combined with its almost exclusive reliance on American money, left it wide open to manipulation from the other side of the Atlantic. This is a common problem with the diaspora model of fundraising and is clearly observable in subsequent attempts of raising funds from Irish diaspora organisations.²²

A Trans-Atlantic Partnership

The Fenian Brotherhood and the IRB were part of the same, advanced nationalist tradition, and so it is not surprising that one provided funding for the other. However, as is clear from the next high watermark of Irish-American fundraising, political opportunism can create strange bedfellows. A series of electoral reforms in the mid-

¹⁷ M. Ramón, *A Provisional Dictator: James Stephens and the Fenian Movement*, (Dublin, 2007), p. 196.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 198.

²¹ Freeman, *Financing Terrorism*, p. 11.

²² *Ibid.*

nineteenth century, in particular the increase of the electorate in 1850 and the introduction of the secret ballot in 1872, greatly increased the cost of campaigning for election in Ireland.²³ As noted by Keyes, rather than making specific bribes to particular people, ‘politicians were forced to spread their largesse among the wider electorate, supporting initiatives that benefitted supporters and non-supporters alike’.²⁴

Sympathy for home rule was lacking from the wealthy in Ireland, so for any aspirant Irish nationalist organisation to succeed, it needed access to money from America. In order to do this, it had to ally itself with whichever Irish-American organisation was dominant at the time. This had the dual purpose of not just tapping the American funds but also, by agreeing exclusivity, of preventing any rival nationalist organisations in Ireland from accessing them. By the same token, in order for an aspirant Irish-American organisation to justify its existence and maintain its dominance in Irish America, it needed to make common cause with the leading nationalist organisation in the home country, ideally gaining some sort of exclusive agreement with them. In essence, the dominant Irish organisation in America was gatekeeper of its community’s financial resources, while the dominant nationalist organisation in Ireland was the monopoly supplier of Irish nationalist credentials. This was the case not just at the organisational level but also for individuals within organisations. The individual within a nationalist organisation who could secure American funding was an indispensable asset to that organisation and, if he retained control of those funds, control of the organisation could follow. Similarly, as noted by Michael Doorley, appeals to Irish nationalism were a vital means by which Irish-American community leaders could gain popular support, either ‘political bosses’ looking for votes in their respective wards or religious leaders

²³ Keyes, *Funding the Nation*, p. 118.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

seeking donations from their congregations.²⁵ Establishing Irish nationalist credentials could also be important in gaining promotions within organisations dominated by Irish-Americans.

Following this rationale, when Parnell needed a source of funding for his Irish Parliamentary Party in 1879, the Irish diaspora was an obvious source. Indeed, technological advances since the Fenian bond issue meant that fundraising in America was more attractive than ever. The first widely used money transfer service, founded by Western Union in 1872, greatly reduced the cost of remittances, and the expansion of America's rail network enabled fundraising tours of much greater scope.²⁶ However, as well as technological infrastructure, large-scale fundraising required an organisational infrastructure. The growth in the Irish-American population had led to a growth and consolidation in Irish-American organisation and, for these reasons, a 'Trans-Atlantic Partnership' was essential.

It was in this context that Parnell made an alliance with the 'physical force' element in Irish politics, which at that time held the purse strings of Irish America. The organisation in question was Clan na Gael, the Fenian Brotherhood's successor organisation, which was established in 1867 to unite the two warring factions, and which by the mid 1870s was the preeminent Irish nationalist organisation in America.²⁷ Clan na Gael was a secret organisation, complete with rituals borrowed from the Masons and a secret code for written communications.²⁸ By 1874 the group had 7,000 members, growing to 11,000 by 1877, by which time it had gained recognition from the cash-strapped IRB and, in exchange for equal representation on a combined 'joint

²⁵ M. Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora*, p. 14.

²⁶ T. Standage, *The Victorian Internet: The remarkable story of the telegraph and the nineteenth century's on-line pioneers* (London, 1998), pp. 112-4.

²⁷ M.F. Funchion (ed.), *Irish American Voluntary Organizations* (Westport, CT, 1983), pp. 74-6 and xv.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

revolutionary directory’, it financed the importation of arms for revolution.²⁹ From this organisation emerged John Devoy, a figure who would dominate Irish-American politics for the next 50 years. Born in 1842, Devoy spent a time in the French Foreign Legion before becoming the chief Fenian organiser operating within the British Army in Ireland. He was arrested by the British in 1865, but was released under a general amnesty in 1871 on condition of exile to America.³⁰

Parnell sat down with Devoy at a meeting in Dublin in June 1879, and they agreed what was termed the ‘New Departure’.³¹ This was essentially a Clan na Gael leaders’ plan to exploit Parnell’s political profile to boost their own organisation.³² From Parnell’s side, the reward was money with which he was able to exert unprecedented power over his parliamentary party.³³ This marriage of convenience, matching Parnell’s respectability with the Fenians’ financial muscle, yielded immediate results for both sides. The value to the movement of Parnell’s public profile was clear when, on his 1880 tour of the US, he became only the third foreigner to receive an invitation to give an address to Congress.³⁴ The previous two speakers were the French revolutionary Marquis de Lafayette in 1825 and the Hungarian Louis Kossuth in 1851.³⁵ Substantial funds raised by Parnell’s tour of America, facilitated by members of Clan na Gael and some more moderate Irish Americans, were channelled into the newly formed Irish Land League, which campaigned for land reform in Ireland with Parnell installed as its President.³⁶ Later that year, the Irish Parliamentary party won 60 seats in the general election, with

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

³⁰ Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora Nationalism*, p. 15.

³¹ Funchion, *Irish American Voluntary Organizations*, p. 76.

³² Keyes, *Funding the Nation*, p. 119.

³³ M. Keyes, ‘Parnellism: The Role of Funding in the Journey from the Semi-Revolutionary to the Purely Constitutional’.

³⁴ E.M. Janis, *A Greater Ireland*, (Madison, Wisconsin, 2015), p. 36.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Funchion, *Irish American Voluntary Organizations*, p. 77.

the majority going to the more advanced wing headed by Parnell. Consequently, Parnell gained control of the party.³⁷

An affiliate of the Land League, the Irish National Land League of America (INLLA), was formed at roughly the same time. At first some Clan na Gael members were resistant to engaging with the new organisation, suspecting that it might undermine their own. However, with a shift in consensus the Clan leadership encouraged members to join the League with a view to controlling it.³⁸ The INLLA was dissolved after three years and replaced in 1883 by the Irish National League of America (INLA), established to support Parnell's campaign for home rule. Despite the fact that this new organisation was clearly dominated by the Clan, most moderate nationalists still gave their allegiance to it in support of Parnell.³⁹ The INLA lasted only a year however, before its leadership, also members of Clan na Gael, made public endorsements of the Republican candidate in the US Presidential Election.⁴⁰ Again, domestic US politics derailed an Irish American organisation. The resultant split led to the formation of the Irish Parliamentary Fund Association (IPFA), which was set up for the sole purpose of providing funds to pay the election expenses of the IPP.⁴¹ With support from the Devoy wing of Clan na Gael, it achieved significant success.⁴² Parnell's reliance on this source of funding, and by extension John Devoy, is clear from Figure 5.1.⁴³

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

⁴⁰ Funchion, *Irish American Voluntary Organizations*, p. 205.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Janis, *A Greater Ireland*, p. 45, with examples from 'Irish Milch Cow', *Punch*, 31 Dec. 1879, and 'Beware of Foreign Tramps', *Harper's Weekly*, 24 Jan. 1880.




Figure 5.1. Origins of funds raised for the Irish Parliamentary Fund, 1886-9.⁴⁴

The ‘New Departure’ was an example of the symbiotic relationship that could be achieved between Irish nationalist organisations and their Irish-American counterparts. As the decades went on, successor organisations would try to emulate the winning formula, but with success that would vary depending on politics and personalities. Internal divisions and competition from a domestic rival could weaken either partner in the relationship, strengthening the bargaining position of the other to assert its priorities. Issues such as these, and their effect on Irish politics, were apparent in the Irish-American nexus as the decades went on.

The 1880s were characterised by bitter disputes within the leadership of Clan na Gael, with John Devoy leaving to form a rival organisation of the same name in 1887. Devoy’s Clan na Gael gained recognition from the IRB in Dublin and the two Clans na Gael reunited the following year. But the enmity continued, resulting in the murder of a

⁴⁴ NLI/Ms.9,227.

key Devoy ally in 1889.⁴⁵ Meanwhile in Ireland, the naming of Parnell in the divorce proceedings of Captain William O'Shea and his wife Katherine led to a split of the IPP in December 1890. For most of the year leading up to the split, the IPP had been raising *ca.* \$1,000 a week from the US; within days of the split, this figure fell to just \$10.⁴⁶ As noted by Keyes, Parnell's success in Irish politics was heavily contingent on his ability to raise funds in America, so the cut in funding could be fatal.⁴⁷

Cognisant of this, Parnell sent a delegation to the US to shore up his financial support base. John Devoy warned him not to attempt to work with the Land League of America, arguing 'some new organisation was necessary'. The delegation from Ireland believed it was 'too big a job' though, and they would 'have to do the best they could with the material at hand'. As predicted by Devoy, due to the internal politics of Irish America, the delegation was a failure.⁴⁸ Indeed, the divisions already evident in Clan na Gael had only been exacerbated by the Parnell divorce scandal.⁴⁹

When Parnell died the following year, John Redmond replaced him as leader of the rump Parliamentary Party, while the anti-Parnellites formed their own party. At this point, the survival of each faction depended to some extent on its ability to secure financial support from America. The anti-Parnellite National Party, which in the 1892 general election returned 72 MPs to Redmond's nine, relied on funds from the Irish National Federation of America, a moderate offshoot of Clan na Gael. The IPFA also followed the majority of the Party following the split, supporting the anti-Parnellite side.⁵⁰ As a result, the years from 1895 to 1900 were a low-point for the finances of the

⁴⁵ Funchion, *Irish American Voluntary Organizations*, p. 76.

⁴⁶ Brundage, *Irish Nationalists*, p. 129.

⁴⁷ Keyes, *Funding the Nation*, p. 119.

⁴⁸ Devoy, *Recollections*, p. 345.

⁴⁹ Funchion, *Irish American Voluntary Organizations*, p. 81.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

IPP.⁵¹ Making matters worse, Redmond's proposed fundraising trip to the United States in 1898 had to be cancelled due to the Spanish-American War and, £1,000 in debt to the Hibernian Bank, his party was in serious need of funds.⁵² In this context, the need for US funds was clearly among the incentives for the reunion in 1900 of the IPP's Parnellite and anti-Parnellite factions.⁵³ The Party's reunification brought with it a recovery to its financial health. However, the growth in its membership coming from the lower middle class after 1900 resulted in a greater outlay for the salaries of parliamentarians who were not independently wealthy.⁵⁴ The IPP's need for funding was greater than that of the other parties in Westminster, as the cost of travel of their MPs from their constituencies to Westminster was itself greater.⁵⁵ This led Redmond to ask again for support from America.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, another reunion had taken place on the other side of the Atlantic. In 1899, leading figures in the anti-Devoy Clan na Gael found their leader had stolen some \$22,000 of the organisation's funds. His expulsion from the organisation paved the way for a merger with the Devoyite Clan na Gael the following year, making Devoy the leading Fenian in America.⁵⁷ Perhaps wary of diving into the cauldron of Irish-American politics, when Redmond was planning his fundraising tour in 1900, he decided not to be connected with the political associations there. Instead, he sought to appeal to 'the better class of Irishmen in New York'.⁵⁸ However, according to RIC reports, Redmond's fundraising tour of 1901-2 was a failure due to a resurgent Clan na Gael undermining his

⁵¹ J.R.R. McConnell, *The Irish Parliamentary Party and the Third Home Rule Crisis*, (Dublin, 2013), p. 196.

⁵² US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13/14, *Redmond to Bourke Cockran*, 4 May 1898; US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13/14, *Redmond to Bourke Cockran*, 28 Mar. 1904.

⁵³ Brundage, *Irish Nationalists*, p. 132.

⁵⁴ McConnell, *Irish Parliamentary Party*, p. 196.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13/14, *Redmond to Bourke Cockran*, 28 Mar. 1904.

⁵⁷ Funchion, *Irish American Voluntary Organizations*, p. 82.

⁵⁸ US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13/14, *Redmond to Bourke Cockran*, 31 Mar. 1900.

efforts.⁵⁹ It was clear that for a fundraising tour to be a success it was better to have the Clan inside the tent than outside. Although Redmond reported he had been approached to meet with Devoy ‘to discuss a possible arrangement’ in November 1901, such a rapprochement never came to pass.⁶⁰

American funds and the rise of Sinn Féin

Much has been written about the shift in Irish opinion in the years leading up to the 1918 general election; less about the shift in Irish America. The rise of Sinn Féin, culminating in its decimation of the Irish Party at the 1918 general election, was presaged by a shift in American funding which highlighted the IPP’s twin vulnerabilities: its reliance on electoral politics in Westminster and opinion in America. As noted in chapter 1, the general elections of 1910 left the IPP holding the balance of power in the House of Commons and, eager to capitalise on the Party’s success in Westminster, Redmond set off to America in September that year. Writing to IPP colleague John Dillon on 3 October, he was jubilant: ‘Things are first rate here. The \$150,000 will be realised. The Convention was magnificent. The Press quite friendly more so than ever – especially [William Randolph] Hearst’s papers’.⁶¹ On Redmond’s return to Westminster, the Conservative peer Lord Lansdowne was justified in referring to him as the ‘Dollar Dictator’.⁶²

However, a competitor was on the horizon in the form of Sinn Féin which, due to financial incentive from Clan na Gael, had been established in 1907 by the

⁵⁹ D. Meleady, *John Redmond: The National Leader* (Sallins, Co. Kildare, 2014), p. 25.

⁶⁰ NLI/Ms.6747/20, *Redmond to Dillon*, 30 Nov. 1901, cited in Meleady, *Redmond*, p. 25.

⁶¹ NLI/Ms.6,748/459, *Redmond to Dillon*, 3 Oct. 1910, cited in Meleady, *Redmond*, p. 179.

⁶² Meleady, *Redmond*, p. 185.

amalgamation of three like-minded groups hitherto competing for the Clan's funds.⁶³ Support for Fenianism had receded in Ireland following the reunification of the IPP, and it was only thanks to funds raised by Clan na Gael in America that the IRB remained solvent during this period.⁶⁴ As a consequence, the Clan's bargaining power was considerable. It is this power that can be seen behind the progress of Sinn Féin and the radicalisation of Irish politics.

By the time of Redmond's takeover of the Irish Volunteers, their treasurer, The O'Rahilly, had already approached John Devoy for funds from America.⁶⁵ Evidently, this request was answered, and was followed by a fundraising trip by Sir Roger Casement in June of that year.⁶⁶ At first the secretive Clan na Gael was suspicious of the Irish Volunteers' open membership and its association with Redmond.⁶⁷ According to Devoy, there was a noticeable drop in receipts from the Clan na Gael members within a month of the Redmond compromise.⁶⁸ Consequently, the arms imported in the Howth gun running of July 1914 were bought not with American money, but with personal contributions from Casement and Mary Spring-Rice.⁶⁹ This reluctance changed in August 1914, when Redmond's declaration of support for the British war effort split the Irish Volunteers in two.⁷⁰ The departure from the Volunteers of Redmond and his followers served to reduce Clan na Gael's suspicion of the organisation. With access to the American purse strings, the rump Irish Volunteers were able to survive.

Redmond's declaration had done great damage to his reputation in America, where the Irish community leaders were generally more hostile to Britain and used to

⁶³ McGarry, *Rising*, p. 27.

⁶⁴ Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora*, pp. 18-9.

⁶⁵ *Devoy's Post Bag*, vol. ii, pp.425-7, cited in Tansill, *America*, p.158.

⁶⁶ Brundage, *Irish Nationalists*, p.143.

⁶⁷ C. Townshend, *Easter 1916: The Irish rebellion*, (London, 2005), p.54.

⁶⁸ Devoy, *Recollections*, p.410.

⁶⁹ Townshend, *Easter*, p.54.

⁷⁰ P. Maume, *The Long Gestation*, (Dublin, 1999), p.150.

cooperating with German-Americans. According to Patrick Maume, support for Redmond evaporated far more rapidly in America than in Ireland.⁷¹ Most concretely, the leadership of the UIL of America (UILA), Redmond's support organisation in the US, threatened to close their organisation down and cease all fundraising.⁷² Its president warned Redmond that he believed nine-tenths of Irish-Americans were pro-German and would not stand for the policy.⁷³ The UILA's closure was averted, but the organisation still waned to such an extent that in 1915 Redmond had to subsidise it with funds from Ireland, rather than the other way round.⁷⁴ Just as importantly, Redmond's position on the war also led to the influential New York newspaper the *Irish World* switching its allegiance from the IPP to Clan na Gael.⁷⁵ By October 1915, an IPP representative observed:

...the few so-called Irish or Irish American papers in the United States, with the exception of the *Chicago Citizen*, seem all to have been captured by pro-German influence, and I find that they are filled, issue after issue, with the grossest misrepresentations with reference to the state of opinion in Ireland and with reference to all events of the war.⁷⁶

The Ancient Order of Hibernians of America (AOHA) also retracted their support for Redmond in response to his policy on the war.⁷⁷ A fraternal organisation of Catholics of Irish birth and descent, the AOHA had supported the IPP either actively or tacitly for the previous 14 years, despite attempts at subversion by Clan na Gael.⁷⁸

At the outbreak of the Great War the Irish Volunteers' American funds came principally from two sources. Redmond's Volunteers Fund, which had been raised *via* the

⁷¹ Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora*, p. 34; Maume, *Gestation*, p. 150.

⁷² Meleady, *Redmond*, p. 314.

⁷³ Michael Ryan, who was married to a German and had contributed \$100 to the German war fund (Meleady, *Redmond*, p.314).

⁷⁴ Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora*, pp. 34-5.

⁷⁵ Meleady, *Redmond*, p. 314.

⁷⁶ US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13/14, *Redmond to D. Boyle*, 13 Oct. 1915.

⁷⁷ Funchion, *Irish American Voluntary Organizations*, p. 59.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*; R. Johnston to Devoy, 6 Feb. 1907, cited in *Devoy's Post Bag*, vol. ii, pp. 357-8.

Irish World, only came to ca. £1,250 (\$5,000).⁷⁹ This is understandable though, as the fund was cut short by the Volunteer split. Moreover, even before the split, the expectation that the Volunteers would be incorporated into the British army acted as a brake on donations from moderate nationalists as well as advanced nationalists.⁸⁰ In contrast, Devoy's rival Irish Volunteer Fund reached ca. £12,500 (\$50,000), supplemented by a further ca. £12,500 (\$50,000) sent directly from the Clan to the IRB.⁸¹ However, a lingering suspicion towards the Volunteers meant that the Clan's funding came with the condition 'that Ireland should receive no money nor anything else but the arms'.⁸² Thus, the Clan's money for the Volunteers was sent directly to Germany to purchase the arms.⁸³ According to Townshend, just £5,000 (\$20,000) was provided in cash by Clan na Gael for the Rising, and this only arrived immediately before Easter week so was of limited use.⁸⁴

As the leaders of the Easter Rising were executed in the weeks following their defeat, sentiment in America began to harden.⁸⁵ Clan na Gael had already set up an open-membership organisation, the Friends of Irish Freedom (FOIF), in advance of the Rising, and it was holding meetings across the country to rally support.⁸⁶ With the change in public mood, money began to flood in through the FOIF for the INAAVDF.⁸⁷ The establishment of the FOIF was also supported by the AOHA, which was similarly active in collecting funds for the dependents of prisoners from the Rising.⁸⁸ With the support of both the Clan and the AOHA and its membership swelling, the FOIF became the

⁷⁹ Devoy, *Recollections*, p. 393, cited in Tansill, *America*, p. 159.

⁸⁰ IE/BMH/WS1698, LDRD, 24 Aug. 1914, p. 139.

⁸¹ Devoy, *Recollections*, p.393, cited in Tansill, *America*, p. 159.

⁸² Speech by Devoy in Boston, 8 Mar. 1921, cited in *Devoy's Post Bag*, p. 489.

⁸³ Townshend, *Easter*, p. 117.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁸⁵ Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora*, pp. 164-5.

⁸⁶ Funchion, *Irish American Voluntary Organizations*, p. 120.

⁸⁷ O'Doherty, *Assignment*, p. 18.

⁸⁸ Funchion, *Irish American Voluntary Organizations*, p. 59.

foremost Irish-American organisation, and claimed a mandate to speak for the entire Irish-American community.⁸⁹ The power of the FOIF, based on its access to funds, was clearly visible when an American delegation brokered the merger between the Irish National Aid Association and the Volunteers' Dependants Fund, creating the INAAVDF.⁹⁰ Although not as pronounced as with the Irish Parliamentary Fund, the importance of American money to the INAAVDF is clear from Figure 5.2.




Figure 5.2. Origins of funds raised for the INAAVDF⁹¹

By 1917, it was clear that the IPP faced a serious competitor for access to American funds. Anticipating a general election for which his party was woefully unprepared, on 2 May 1917 John Redmond sent a desperate letter to his most prominent Irish-American benefactors:

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

⁹⁰ NicDháibhéid, 'Irish National Aid Association'.

⁹¹ NLI/Ms/23,435, *Overseas subscriptions to the INAAVDF, 1916-19*.

The Sinn Féin party in Ireland has been supplied apparently with enormous funds from America, which they are using for electioneering purposes, and, in the present condition in Ireland, it is not possible for us to successfully appeal to the people for an Election Fund.

I need not impress upon you the disaster which would result to the National Cause if the Constitutional party were defeated at an election owing to lack of means to carry on contests, which, we are told, will be forced in every Nationalist constituency.⁹²

Showing remarkable prescience, he continued, ‘the inevitable result would be another insurrection’.⁹³ In the eyes of John Dillon, IPP MP T.P. O’Connor’s fundraising trip to America in 1917 was the only hope of saving the party.⁹⁴ However, unfortunately for O’Connor, he found public opinion there had changed dramatically since the 1916 Rising, in a way that was ‘far more violent even than Ireland’. According to Kevin Kenny, ‘Irish Americans united almost unanimously behind the physical force tradition’ after the Rising and subsequent executions.⁹⁵ O’Connor found it was pointless trying to raise funds from the rank and file Irish-Americans, relying instead on the more affluent and less political ones.⁹⁶

This mood changed again however, as America’s participation in the Great War made anti-British sentiment less socially acceptable, and O’Connor managed to raise £12,500.⁹⁷ The Clan and the FOIF, which had unabashedly declared their support for Germany in the war, had to keep their heads down for fear of accusations of disloyalty.⁹⁸ Enthusiasm for Sinn Féin in America was further dampened in November 1917 by the US Government’s publication of evidence connecting Clan na Gael with agents of Germany.⁹⁹ According to the IPP’s Honorary Secretary, Richard Hazleton, ‘So far as any open sympathy for Sinn Féin in Ireland is concerned, their friends on this side all over

⁹² NLI/Ms.15,236/2, *Redmond to American benefactors*, 2 May 1917.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ Meleady, *Redmond*, p. 421.

⁹⁵ K. Kenny, *The American Irish: A History* (New York, 2000), p. 195.

⁹⁶ Meleady, *Redmond*, p. 448.

⁹⁷ NLI/Ms.15,236/10, *Richard Hazleton to Redmond*, 5 Dec. 1917.

⁹⁸ Funchion, *Irish American Voluntary Organizations*, p. 121.

⁹⁹ *Skibbereen Eagle*, 17 Nov. 1917, p. 1.

the country are all out of business. They dare no longer face the rising tide of Americanism'.¹⁰⁰ As viewed by Hazelton, the real competitor for IPP funds in America at this time was the US Liberty Loans.¹⁰¹

The reprieve provided for the IPP by America's entry into the war was not to last however, and the Armistice of 11 November 1918 signalled a re-emergence of the FOIF from the shadows.¹⁰² President Wilson's doctrine of self-determination allowed Irish-Americans to justify displays of patriotism for 'the old country' and support for Irish self-determination in a way that did not conflict with their allegiance to America.¹⁰³ The Wilson doctrine also brought hopes that America could exert pressure on the British government during the Paris Peace Conference that began in January 1919.¹⁰⁴ It was into this atmosphere that de Valera arrived, by stowaway, to New York in May 1919.

¹⁰⁰ NLI/Ms.15,236/10, *Richard Hazelton to Redmond*, 5 Dec. 1917.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² Schmuhl, *Ireland's Exiled Children*, pp. 151-2.

¹⁰³ T.J. Meagher, *The Columbia Guide to Irish American History* (New York, 2010), p. 209.

¹⁰⁴ Hopkinson, *Irish War of Independence*, p. 165.

Chapter 6: Organising the External Loan

De Valera's tour of America was heralded by Harry Boland, Sinn Féin TD for South Roscommon and member of the IRB Supreme Council, who arrived as the Dáil's envoy in April 1919. Hidden in Boland's shoe were a declaration of independence and a Dáil Loan prospectus.¹ These two items, concealed for their seditious intent, encapsulated the twin aims of the Dáil's mission to America. Just as the National Loan was driven by the need for both money and mass-identification with the movement, the External Loan combined fundraising for the movement with the campaign for international recognition. The shell state constructed by the Dáil following the 1918 general election was designed with international recognition in mind, and a glance at the Dáil's expenses for its first year reveals the prominence of overseas embassies in this design.² The outlay from 'home funds' for Foreign Affairs was second only to Finance in the Dáil's expenses for the period 1 March 1919 to 30 April 1920.³

A key plank of Sinn Féin's 1918 general election manifesto was the winning of independence through the Paris Peace Conference, and the Dáil's chief instrument in this regard was the American Commission for Irish Independence (ACII). Led by chairman Frank P. Walsh, a prominent American lawyer, Democrat, and labour activist, the ACII travelled to Paris to lobby for a hearing for the Irish cause.⁴ Alongside Walsh were Edward F. Dunne, the former Governor of Illinois and Michael J. Ryan, the former President of the UILA who quit that organisation in response to Redmond's stance on

¹ D. Hogan (alias Frank Gallagher), *The Four Glorious Years*, (Dublin, 1953), p. 251.

² NLI/MS.17,152(i), *Total outlay from home funds, 1919-24*, p. 9.

³ *Ibid.*, p.8. This amount was supplemented by funds from the USA. No accounts were furnished by the Paris mission for its outlay up to 30 Apr. 1920, but a short memorandum was sent by a substitute while the person in charge was ill; it listed the mission's outlay £6,050. Total outlay for Dáil Mission to the Paris Peace Conference £21,173.

⁴ Carroll, *Money*, p. 19.

the Great War.⁵ With its large Irish population and President Wilson's doctrine of national self-determination, the US was the Dáil's obvious ally in any negotiations and the External Loan was the perfect vehicle for marshalling public opinion.

Laying the foundations

Before de Valera's arrival, he and Michael Collins instructed the four members of the Dáil already in the US – Harry Boland, Liam Mellows, Dr Patrick McCartan and Diarmuid Lynch – to lay the foundations for a bond of the Irish republic to be issued in America.⁶ Boland, Mellows and McCartan all fell into line but Lynch, who had fled Ireland after 1916 and was elected to the Dáil in absentia, declined on the grounds that his work as secretary of the FOIF, primarily involving growing its membership, was vital to the success of the entire movement, including the bond drive.⁷

Building on its experience raising funds for the INAAVDF, in February 1919 the FOIF launched the 'Irish Victory Fund', which succeeded in raising \$1,005,081 in just six months.⁸ The collection of the Victory Fund saw a dramatic increase in the size of the FOIF's membership, soaring from just 6,069 in February 1919 to 70,485 by the end of the year.⁹ The proceeds of the Fund allowed the FOIF to take over the financing of the Irish National Bureau and the offices of the Irish envoy, both of which had hitherto been funded by its smaller, more left wing rival, the Irish Progressive League, consolidating its position as the main voice for Irish nationalism in America.¹⁰

⁵ *Ibid.*; Melcady, *Redmond*, p. 314.

⁶ Carroll, *Money*, p. 16.

⁷ E. McGeough, *Diarmuid Lynch: A forgotten Irish patriot*, (Cork, 2013), p. 120.

⁸ Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 63.

⁹ Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora*, pp. 186-7.

¹⁰ M.F. Funchion (ed.), *Irish American Voluntary Organizations* (Westport, CT, 1983), p. 209.

As noted in chapter 5, the FOIF was founded by Clan na Gael, and behind the scenes the Clan directed the work of the FOIF in much the same way as the IRB did in the Irish Volunteers.¹¹ In fact, of the 17 members of the FOIF executive, 15 were members of Clan na Gael.¹² The most prominent among them was Daniel F. Cohalan, the acknowledged leader of Irish agitation in America at the time.¹³ A judge in the New York Supreme Court and former Grand Sachem of Tammany Hall, he was the driving force behind the FOIF.¹⁴ A close ally and fellow member of Clan na Gael was John Devoy, the same man who in 1878 had agreed the ‘New Departure’ with Parnell and whose presence had been felt in Irish politics ever since.¹⁵ Together, Cohalan and Devoy exercised a tight grip on the FOIF across America, centred on New York.

De Valera arrived in New York in May 1919 and travelled the breadth of the country, from east to west and back again, sounding out local Irish American organisations on the feasibility of raising funds.¹⁶ On his return to New York, he met with leading members of the FOIF to explain to them the plan for the bond drive. He pointed out that the object of the loan was not merely to raise money, but also ‘as evidence of the existence of the Republic’.¹⁷ Unfortunately for de Valera, the reaction from the leadership was less than enthusiastic.¹⁸ Judge Cohalan, in whose residence the meeting was held, stood firmly against de Valera’s plan to sell bonds, arguing that it was both impolitic and illegal.¹⁹ Instead, he suggested extending the Victory Fund.²⁰ US Senator Bourke Cockran, who had until recently been heavily involved in fundraising for

¹¹ K. O’Doherty, *Assignment: America: De Valera’s Mission to the United States* (New York, 1957), p. 43.

¹² S. Nunan, ‘President Eamon de Valera’s Mission to U.S.A.’, *Capuchin Annual*, (1970), p. 246.

¹³ P. Lavelle, *James O’Mara: A Staunch Sinn Féiner 1873 – 1948* (Dublin, 1961), p. 154.

¹⁴ Carroll, *Money*, p. 18.

¹⁵ Funchion, *Irish American Voluntary Organizations*, p. 76.

¹⁶ Carroll, *Money*, p. 20.

¹⁷ IE/UCDA/P150/1100, *De Valera’s recollections*, 19 Nov. 1962.

¹⁸ Lainer-Vos, *Sinews*, p. 75.

¹⁹ P. McCartan, *With de Valera in America* (Dublin, 1932), p. 142.

²⁰ IE/UCDA/P150/1125, *Boland to Collins*, 30 Jan. 1920.

John Redmond's IPP, claimed that 'the idea that a[n Irish] loan could be floated on normal financial grounds [is] preposterous'.²¹ The FOIF leaders also questioned the feasibility of the plan from an organisational point of view, arguing that to raise such a huge amount in such a small timeframe would be impossible.²² Only Joseph McGarrity sided with de Valera, the rest backing Cohalan's point of view.²³ Based in Philadelphia, McGarrity was an aspiring leader of the movement and led a faction within the FOIF that rivalled Cohalan and Devoy's.²⁴ De Valera sat and listened to their objections, before declaring, 'I have a mandate from my people and I intend to go ahead, whether I succeed or fail'.²⁵ He left the meeting disappointed, reporting to the members of the Dáil:

He [Cohalan] pooh poohed the idea of bonds in any shape – he called F.P. Walsh aside when he came here and suggested that I be sent home with $\frac{3}{4}$ million dollars – 'the biggest sum any Irish leader ever brought to Ireland'.²⁶

Clearly the use of bonds was a sticking point, and this was the first obstacle the Dáil mission had to overcome.²⁷ As the Irish Republic had not yet been recognised by the US government, and therefore did not exist in the eyes of the law, any bonds it sold would contravene the so-called 'blue sky statutes' which were designed to protect the American public from fraudulent investments.²⁸ Beyond the objections of the FOIF leadership, there was also a more concrete impediment to the Dáil's plan to raise funds *via* a standard bond issue. At first, de Valera planned to issue the bonds using a commercial bank, in the same way that any foreign government or corporation would. He and Collins instructed the Dáil mission to contact a bank for this purpose or, failing

²¹ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p.143; US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13/14, *Correspondence between Redmond and Bourke Cockran*.

²² Lainer-Vos, *Sinews*, p. 76.

²³ McCartan, *With de Valera*, p. 142.

²⁴ O'Doherty, *Assignment*, p. 19.

²⁵ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 44.

²⁶ IE/NAI/DE/2/245, *de Valera to members of the Dáil*, 10 Mar. 1920, cited in Lainer-Vos, *Sinews*, p. 76.

²⁷ Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 62.

²⁸ Carroll, *Money*, p. 17.

that, ‘some representative Irishman of high financial standing’.²⁹ De Valera himself met with bankers in Chicago to discuss the bond issue.³⁰ However, even bankers of an Irish background were reluctant to risk their reputations in this manner.³¹

In order to overcome these obstacles, it was decided the bonds were to be sold as ‘bond certificates’, to be exchanged for real bonds on the recognition of the Irish Republic.³² This solution, described by *The Times* as ‘one of the most ingenious ‘loan prospectuses’ on record,’ came from Joseph McGarrity and the New York lawyer Martin Conboy.³³ According to Longford and O’Neill, the plan was signed off by Franklin D. Roosevelt after a meeting with de Valera through his firm Emmet, Marvin and Roosevelt.³⁴ Roosevelt would comment on this connection when he met de Valera as US President in 1941.³⁵

Strict instructions were given to local organisers that the legal term ‘bond certificates’ must be adopted at all times and the terms ‘bonds’ or ‘bond sellers’ ‘must not be used’.³⁶ According to Carroll, the distinction between ‘bonds’ and ‘bond certificates’ was lost on the general public, which always referred to them simply as ‘the Irish bonds’.³⁷ Nevertheless, the legal distinction gave the Dáil sufficient cover and eventually, with the use of the term ‘bond certificates’, the FOIF agreed to go along with the loan.³⁸

With the legal issue resolved, the next step was to eliminate any competition for funds. In this context, writing to Arthur Griffith, de Valera described the existence of the

²⁹ O’Doherty, *Assignment*, p. 41.

³⁰ *The Sun (New York)*, 12 Jul. 1919, p. 16.

³¹ Lainer-Vos, *Sinews*, p. 77.

³² Carroll, *Money*, p. 17.

³³ *The Times*, 3 Dec. 1919, p. 14; Earl of Longford and T.P. O’Neill, *Eamon de Valera* (Dublin, 1970), p. 100, cited in Hannigan, *De Valera*, pp. 62-3.

³⁴ Longford and O’Neill, *Eamon de Valera*, p.100, cited in Hannigan, *De Valera*, pp. 62-3.

³⁵ IE/UCDA/P104/3585, no.144, *Dictated memorandum by Frank Aiken of his mission to the US*, 7 Apr. 1941.

³⁶ Carroll, *Money*, p. 17.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Lainer-Vos, *Sinews*, p. 76.

Victory Fund as ‘a bit disconcerting’.³⁹ In order to make way for the bond drive, he requested that the FOIF close their Irish Victory Fund early, by 31 August 1919.⁴⁰ Although leaders of the FOIF resented this, they agreed to de Valera’s request and the fund was closed by that date.⁴¹

De Valera’s next obstacle was organisational. ‘There is no close unit of organisation here as at home,’ he wrote to Arthur Griffith; ‘One must be created for the purpose’.⁴² Not trusting Cohalan and Devoy, he decided not to manage the bond drive through the FOIF but to co-opt the ACII instead.⁴³ The FOIF was to be used as a sales channel but not as the overseeing body.⁴⁴ Using the ACII as the vessel through which the bond drive would be promoted neatly connected the bond drive with the public struggle for the recognition of the Irish Republic. It also made use of the reputation already earned by the Commission’s well-publicised mission to Paris and subsequent testimony before the US Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee.⁴⁵ Moreover, having a former President of the UILA on board had obvious significance. Frank P. Walsh remained Chairman of the re-purposed ACII and Harry Boland was appointed secretary.⁴⁶

It was Joseph McGarrity who succeeded in securing premises to use as the bond drive’s head office.⁴⁷ The ACII occupied one third of a floor of 411 Fifth Avenue, which they sublet from the West Disinfecting Co., ‘a large Jewish concern known throughout the United States’. McGarrity presented himself as an agent for a steamship line when he arranged the lease, saying it was starting a connection between Montauk and

³⁹ IE/UCDA/P150/96, *de Valera to Griffith*, 9 Jul. 1919.

⁴⁰ Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 63.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² IE/UCDA/P150/96, *de Valera to Griffith*, 21 Aug. 1919.

⁴³ Carroll, *Money*, p. 19.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ IE/BMH/WS0355, *Kitty O’Doherty*, p. 45.

⁴⁷ McCartan, *With de Valera*, p. 142.

Queenstown, Co. Cork.⁴⁸ The owners of the building and the West Disinfecting Co. were not happy when they discovered the true purpose to which the office was put, but they decided to acquiesce 'as long as the Committee did not prove itself too obnoxious'.⁴⁹

Despite the resolution of these initial concerns, the first few months of the bond drive in America were characterised by stalling and indecision.⁵⁰ The first delay came as a result of the reluctance of ex-Governor Dunne to allow his name to go forward along with the other two ACII members on the bond certificates. He was eventually persuaded, but according to Frank P. Walsh this reluctance added a week to ten days to the preparations.⁵¹ Writing to Sean T. O'Ceallaigh on 22 August 1919, Walsh said he expected the bond drive to be launched within a week, but this turned out to be premature.⁵² He then hoped to launch the drive with the start of de Valera's planned tour, in mid-September, but this too proved premature.⁵³ It was then planned that the drive would be launched in November 1919, but even this turned out to be wildly optimistic.⁵⁴

A significant cause for delay at this stage was the search for a suitably qualified person to manage the bond drive. De Valera's first choice was the Limerick TD James O'Mara who, along with de Valera and Bishop Fogarty, was a trustee of both the National Loan and the External Loan, but he proved difficult to entice to America.⁵⁵ Into this vacuum came a recommendation from Judge Cohalan, who was keen to assert some control over the bond drive. He suggested Edward F. McSweeney, an active Knight of Columbus, who had been a leader in Catholic temperance and literary societies in

⁴⁸ US/NARA/M1085, *Case no. 202600-695, Report by Special Agent G.J. Starr*, 25 Jul. 1921.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 143.

⁵¹ US/NYPL/MssCol 3211/b.28, *F.P. Walsh to O'Ceallaigh*, 22 Aug. 1919.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 10 Sept, 1919.

⁵⁴ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 144.

⁵⁵ IE/NAI/DE/2/245, *de Valera to Griffith*, 21 Aug. 1919.

Massachusetts.⁵⁶ Well known for his fundraising efforts, he was hired by Grover Cleveland as a publicist for his successful presidential election campaign of 1892.⁵⁷ After a spell as the Grover-appointed Assistant Immigration Commissioner in New York, he returned to his native Massachusetts as editor of the *Boston Traveller*. Importantly in the context of the power dynamic being played out between the Dáil and the Irish-Americans, McSweeney became a leading member of the FOIF.⁵⁸ McSweeney met de Valera and Boland at the Waldorf-Astoria, but concluded ‘that there was no adequate systematization of the work, and no clear or definite idea of the handling of the mass of detail necessary for such a campaign as had been worked out during the War by the Red Cross, the United War Drive, the Liberty Loans, etc.’.⁵⁹ He later drafted a scheme for the bond drive on the train to St Louis, where de Valera and Boland were on tour, and presented it to them, recommending the start date be pushed back even further, to March 1920.⁶⁰ De Valera’s response was, according to McSweeney, ‘decidedly unfavorable’, as is evident by the fact that he placed Harry Boland in charge of the drive.⁶¹

As the enormity of the task became clear, Boland was clearly struggling in his role. According to Fitzpatrick, he had neither the experience nor the temperament to manage the External Loan, but perhaps this was unfair to him.⁶² In his memoirs, Dr Patrick McCartan recalls, ‘there seemed to be a studied effort to prove to Boland that the project was impossible’.⁶³ To make matters worse, Boland fell ill as he was about to make

⁵⁶ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 144.

⁵⁷ C.J. Kauffman, *Patriotism and fraternalism in the Knights of Columbus*, (New York, 1936), p. 61.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ US/AIHS/DFC/10/13, *Statement of Edward F. McSweeney*, n.d., cited in Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 144.

⁶⁰ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 144.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ McCartan, *With de Valera*, p. 142.

preliminary arrangements for the bond issue.⁶⁴ In the words of de Valera's secretary Sean Nunan, 'Harry's hair [was] falling out with worry'.⁶⁵ A close friend of Michael Collins, Boland made repeated requests to the Minister of Finance from late August to early October 1919 to set sail for America and join him in the undertaking. Collins's lucky escape from the raid on 6 Harcourt Street persuaded some in the Dáil cabinet that for the sake of his safety this might be a good idea, but Collins resisted, arguing that he was needed at home.⁶⁶ Needless to say, the importance of Collins's presence in the raising of the Nation Loan is clear from Part I.

The search continued for a director of the drive. De Valera asked Collins if Robert Barton could be sent over, but Collins stressed the importance of keeping 'some of the big guns' at home. Instead, he suggested Kevin O'Higgins, who was on the run at the time.⁶⁷ O'Higgins stayed in Ireland however, and as organiser for the National Loan in Queen's County proved himself equal to the task.⁶⁸

Instead, de Valera enlisted 'Colonel' Patrick Henry Callahan, who had previously organised a fundraising drive for the Knights of Columbus.⁶⁹ The proprietor of the Louisville Varnish Company and well known within Democratic Party circles, the Colonel had served as Chairman of the Knights of Columbus War Activities Committee and under him the Knights had gained a reputation for successful fundraising during the Great War.⁷⁰ By Armistice Day, with *ca.* 2,200 volunteers, they had raised more than \$14m for the war effort.⁷¹ As an organisation, the Knights also had the advantage of a membership that extended beyond Irish-Americans to encompass Catholic Americans of

⁶⁴ IE/NAI/DE/2/245, *de Valera to Griffith*, 21 Aug. 1919.

⁶⁵ IE/NAI/DE/2/292, *Nunan to Collins*, 3 Sept. 1919.

⁶⁶ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, pp. 158-9.

⁶⁷ IE/UCDA/P150/726, *Collins to de Valera*, 29 Aug. 1919.

⁶⁸ IE/BMH/WS.0807, *Rev. Patrick Doyle*; IE/BMH/WS1046, *Patrick Ramsbottom*; IE/BMH/WS0680, *Nicholas O'Dwyer*, p. 14.

⁶⁹ Lainer-Vos, *Sinews*, p. 79; IE/NAI/DE/2/292, *Nunan to Collins*, 17 Sept. 1919.

⁷⁰ Kauffman, *Patriotism*, p. 40 and pp. 55-6; T.J. Meagher, *The Columbia Guide to Irish American History* (New York, 2010), p. 118.

⁷¹ Kauffman, *Patriotism*, p. 57.

other ethnicities.⁷² Importantly in the context of post-war America, a main plank of the Colonel's work for the Knights was the fight against anti-Catholic sentiment and the emphasis of Catholic American patriotism.⁷³ According to Frank P. Walsh, the Colonel had 'a wider acquaintance among Americans of Irish blood than, perhaps, any other man in America'.⁷⁴ 'If he can't do it,' continued Walsh, it 'cannot be done'.⁷⁵ So when de Valera and Boland embarked on their 'Grand Tour of America' on 1 October 1919, they had ample reason to believe the matter had been settled.⁷⁶ Ten days earlier, de Valera had sent the following to the trustees of the FOIF:

The preliminary arrangements for the placing of the Bond-Certificates for subscription with the American public are now made. The intention is to spend the next two months, roughly, in completing the necessary organisation so as to be able to make an intensive drive not later than the first week of December.⁷⁷

This hope was misplaced however, and word quickly reached de Valera who was on tour in Bloomington Illinois at the time, that all was not well. His diary entry for 22 October 1919 reads, 'Hear that Bond Drive has not been properly organised. Joe [McGarrity] and [Charles] Wheeler impatient'.⁷⁸ Two days later, de Valera sent Harry Boland back to New York to investigate.⁷⁹

When the Colonel attempted to recruit potential organisers for the drive, his contacts (based on a Knights of Columbus directory from 1913) turned out to be out-of-date, and the majority of his letters were sent back undelivered.⁸⁰ As well as revealing a lack of readiness on Callahan's part, this highlighted the importance of a ready-made and current distribution network, as was available from the FOIF. Just as worrying as his lack

⁷² Meagher, *Columbia Guide to Irish American History*, p. 118.

⁷³ Kauffman, *Patriotism*, pp. 49-51.

⁷⁴ US/ NYPL/MssCol 3211/b.28, *F.P. Walsh to O'Ceallaigh*, 22 Sept. 1919.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 426.

⁷⁷ IE/UCDA/P150/962, *de Valera to FOIF trustees*, 20 Sept. 1920.

⁷⁸ IE/UCDA/P150/666, *Diary of de Valera*, 22 Oct. 1919.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 24 Oct. 1919.

⁸⁰ IE/UCDA/P150/1007, *Unknown, probably Devoy, to 'Friend'*, n.d.; Lainer-Vos, *Sinews*, p. 79.

of contacts, Callahan also displayed a lack of diplomacy that, in the tense atmosphere between the FOIF and the Dáil mission, could have been disastrous. This shortcoming was revealed in a clumsily worded leaflet that, in de Valera's words, 'should never have been sent'. The leaflet proposed the establishment of local councils of the ACII, which was construed as a challenge to the FOIF.⁸¹ The Colonel's letter gave credence to a rumour circulating that de Valera planned to set up a rival organisation that would manage not only the bond drive but also his tour and Dáil propaganda.⁸² In order to calm the waters, de Valera had to apologise to Diarmuid Lynch for giving 'legitimate ground for complaint by the existing organisation'.⁸³ As a further step, all city chairmen were urged that an unambiguous title such as 'Irish Bond Drive Committee' be given to the local organisations, and words like 'council', 'branch', 'division' or 'club' be avoided to guard against the impression that a rival organisation was being formed.⁸⁴

De Valera's team quickly came to the conclusion that Callahan was not the right man for the job, and on 6 November 1919 he stepped down.⁸⁵ In his place the Colonel left the journalist Benedict Elder, who was a close friend and fellow Knight of Columbus, but this was not a permanent replacement and *de facto* responsibility fell back to Harry Boland.⁸⁶ 'I fancy we will have to scrap the present plan,' wrote Boland in his diary on 6 November.⁸⁷ Two days later his frustration was clear: '8 Nov. Sat. New York. Bonds by day and by night. Bonds will be all right! Bonds not yet in sight. Talk bonds all day rave bonds all night. I had better stop.'⁸⁸

⁸¹ IE/UCDA/P150/978, *de Valera to Lynch*, 10 Dec. 1919.

⁸² McGeough, *Lynch*, p. 123.

⁸³ Referred to in IE/UCDA/P150/978, *de Valera to Lynch*, 10 Dec. 1919.

⁸⁴ US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13, *Circular from F.P. Walsh to State and City Chairmen*, 20 Dec. 1919.

⁸⁵ Lainer-Vos, *Sinens*, p. 79; Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 144.

⁸⁶ US/ NYPL/MssCol 3212/b.3/5, *J.C. Walsh's reminiscences*, p. 135; Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 144.

⁸⁷ *HBD*, 6 Nov. 1919, cited in Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 144.

⁸⁸ *HBD*, 8 Nov. 1919, cited in *Ibid.*

Enter James O'Mara

The question of who would manage the bond drive was finally resolved at the end of November in the form of James O'Mara, who had been de Valera's first choice from the outset.⁸⁹ 'This month should see the end of indecision,' wrote Boland in his diary, 'O'Mara in command guarantees success.'⁹⁰ Originally from Limerick, O'Mara had lived for 20 years in London as a representative for his family firm. As a politician and member of the IPP, he represented South Kilkenny in Westminster from 1901 to 1907, when he and Winston Churchill were the two youngest members of parliament.⁹¹ He resigned his seat in 1907, complaining that the IPP had given support to the Liberals without anything concrete in return, and returned to Ireland in 1914 to take a greater role in the family business.⁹² While in Ireland, he turned around a struggling bacon factory in Dublin. He contributed £100 to John Redmond for the Irish Volunteers before the split and, although he was in Dublin during the Easter Rising, he did not take part as he was at that time opposed to physical force.⁹³ Like many, however, the executions of the 1916 leaders changed O'Mara's mind and he lent £2,000 to Sinn Féin in early 1918 as the movement was gathering momentum.⁹⁴ His reputation as master organiser was cemented by his success as Sinn Féin's Director of Elections in the 1918 general election. In the same election he was elected for Sinn Féin in his old constituency of South Kilkenny.⁹⁵

With the appointment of O'Mara, de Valera appeared to have found a man agreeable to the FOIF leadership. According to Patrick McCartan, the Irish Americans believed O'Mara to be a millionaire businessman, and consequently held him in very high

⁸⁹ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, pp. 158-9.

⁹⁰ *HBD*, 30 Nov. 1919, cited in *Ibid.*, p. 145.

⁹¹ IE/BMH/WS0690, *M.A. O'Mara*, pp. 1-2.

⁹² Meleady, *Redmond*, p. 109; IE/BMH/WS0690, *M.A. O'Mara*, pp. 1-2.

⁹³ NLI/Ms.21,551(3), *WT Cosgrave to J. O'Mara*, 1 Mar. 1924; IE/BMH/WS0690, *M.A. O'Mara*, pp. 1-2.

⁹⁴ IE/BMH/WS0690, *M.A. O'Mara*, pp. 1-2; NLI/Ms.21,551(3), *Bob Brennan to J. O'Mara*, 12 Mar. 1935.

⁹⁵ NLI/Ms.21,551(3), *WT Cosgrave to J. O'Mara*, 1 Mar. 1924; IE/BMH/WS0690, *M.A. O'Mara*, pp. 1-2.

esteem.⁹⁶ Devoy described him as ‘a very level headed man with a long business experience’.⁹⁷ Meeting these expectations, O’Mara proved himself to be, in his colleague’s words ‘a great organiser and a financial genius’.⁹⁸ The intricacy of O’Mara’s organisation is best captured by his daughter in her biography of him, *A Staunch Sinn Féiner*.

As he had organised the 1918 general elections in Ireland by a wheel of committees and sub-committees flanging out from the hub of headquarters at 6 Harcourt Street, so this method was extended to cover the wide expanse of the USA. The hub, himself at his office, 411 Fifth Avenue, the wheel turning through the length and breadth of the United States, and turning within itself all lesser wheels, cog within cog, keyed to a clock-like precision by the extraordinary simplicity of the instructions issued to organisers.⁹⁹

Once O’Mara was in place, a core team was built around him. Shortly after O’Mara’s arrival, de Valera appointed his secretary Sean Nunan as registrar, to assist with the organisation of the drive.¹⁰⁰ Born in London of Irish descent, Nunan joined the Irish Volunteers in King’s Cross, moved to Ireland ahead of the Easter Rising, and was interned in Frongoch thereafter.¹⁰¹ The finer details of the organisation were the responsibility of Joseph Cyrillus (‘J.C.’) Walsh, a Canadian journalist and former editor of the IPP-supporting *Ireland* newspaper, who had recently attended the Paris Peace Conference as part of the press corps.¹⁰² The triumvirate of O’Mara, Nunan and J.C. Walsh would be the nucleus of the bond drive’s organisation, with Frank P. Walsh’s name being used on all O’Mara’s external communication.

To test the water, J.C. Walsh began by conducting a small-scale experiment with a fundraising drive in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Wisconsin had only a single FOIF branch in February 1919, composed of just 12 members, and had only managed to raise a paltry \$116 for the Victory Fund, so this was almost virgin territory from a fundraising point of

⁹⁶ McCartan, *With de Valera*, p. 144.

⁹⁷ IE/UCDA/P150/1007, *Devoy, to ‘Friend’*, 26 Nov. 1919.

⁹⁸ IE/BMH/WS1744, *Sean Nunan*, p. 22.

⁹⁹ Lavelle, *James O’Mara*, p. 150.

¹⁰⁰ Nunan, ‘President Eamon de Valera’s Mission to U.S.A.’, p. 242.

¹⁰¹ IE/BMH/WS1744, *Sean Nunan*, p. 1.

¹⁰² US/NYPL/MssCol 3211/b.28, *F.P. Walsh to S.T. O’Ceallaigh*, 23 Jan. 1920.

view.¹⁰³ In his experiment, Walsh used a non-Irish organiser in Milwaukee and drew on the talents of the YMCA there.¹⁰⁴ When the Milwaukee organiser submitted his report, Walsh noted the amounts of the subscriptions and made an average as a guide for the whole country.¹⁰⁵ Based on his calculations of estimates for each state, the national total came to about \$6m.¹⁰⁶ A map of America was pinned to the wall in the head office at 411 Fifth Avenue, with the estimates for each state clearly visible, and the task of organising the nationwide drive began.¹⁰⁷

Plan of Action

As argued in Chapter 5, the FOIF's predominant position cast it in the role of gatekeeper for Irish American funds. However, from the Dáil's point of view, it was important to seek diversification in their revenue stream. Rather than relying exclusively on the FOIF, it was decided to organise 'a new machinery' for pursuing the bond drive. This decision was also made for the more concrete aims of 'achieving a more thorough canvas, reaching those Irish-Americans who have lost touch with Ireland, and educating the American people on the Irish situation'.¹⁰⁸ Any such development had to be done carefully, so as not to antagonise the FOIF leadership, which viewed the ACII as a potential rival and was already irritated by de Valera's demand that they close their Victory Fund. With this in mind, O'Mara discreetly approached a number of distinguished Irish-Americans who were not connected with the FOIF, including clergy,

¹⁰³ Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora*, pp. 186 & 191.

¹⁰⁴ US/NYPL/MssCol 3212/b.3/5, J.C. Walsh's *reminiscences*, pp. 143 & 145.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ NLI/Ms.21,547, *Outline of President de Valera's Instructions on Organisation for Irish Bond-Certificate Campaign*, n.d., p. 9.

university professors, and independent businessmen.¹⁰⁹ Although these attempts did not meet with much success, the drive for diversification continued throughout the campaign.¹¹⁰ In the meantime, for the start-up funds necessary to get the campaign going, the immediate focus was securing reliable cooperation from the FOIF.¹¹¹

De Valera addressed the National Council of the FOIF in December 1919, asking for a loan of \$100,000 and a list of potential organisers around the country. Assured by a promise from de Valera that the ACII would not compete with the FOIF, the council agreed to the loan in return for bond certificates of the same value and a circular was sent to all branches urging members to help with the bond drive.¹¹² Diarmuid Lynch handed over a list of the names and addresses of all 70,000 FOIF members across the country, and mailed each of them a set of bond certificate literature, together with a map of Ireland showing the results of the 1918 general election for propaganda purposes.¹¹³

The FOIF was no panacea however; its branch network was heavily biased in favour of the Northeastern states.¹¹⁴ In December 1919, the eve of the bond drive, *ca.* 51% of members resided in Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania.¹¹⁵ This bias is borne out in the results of the Victory Fund, as 63% of the total raised came from these three states.¹¹⁶ Moreover, the FOIF had no branch representation in Alabama, Alaska, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming, and minimal representation (only a single branch) in Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland,

¹⁰⁹ NLI/Ms.21,547, cited in Lainer-Vos, *Sinews*, p. 79; e.g. NLI/Ms.21,547, *J. O'Mara to Treacy*, 22 Dec. 1919; NLI/Ms.21,547, *J. O'Mara to Siedenburg*, 22 Dec. 1919; NLI/Ms.21,547, *J. O'Mara to Belford*, 22 Dec. 1919; NLI/Ms.21,547, *Earls to FP Walsh* 23 Dec. 1919.

¹¹⁰ NLI/Ms.21,547, cited in Lainer-Vos, *Sinews*, p. 79.

¹¹¹ Lainer-Vos, *Sinews*, p. 79.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 80.

¹¹³ McGeough, *Lynch*, p. 120.

¹¹⁴ Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora*, p. 191; Although there are some inconsistencies in Doorley's calculations as the individual state amounts do not add up to the total given.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

¹¹⁶ Calculated from figures in *Ibid.*, p. 191.

Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Vermont and West Virginia.¹¹⁷ As shown by Figure 6.1, the FOIF fundraisers had a number of blind spots, so work was needed to build capacity.¹¹⁸




Figure 6.1. Map of the US: Total funds raised for the Irish Victory Fund (1919), by US state.¹¹⁹

As early as September 1919, Collins sent Harry Boland detailed instructions about how to organise the US bond drive, based on his plans for the organisation of the National Loan.¹²⁰ These plans evolved over the following months, influenced by McSweeney, Callahan and O'Mara. While the plan adopted for the American bond drive bore many similarities to that of the National Loan, the scale of America made the bond

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 189-90.

¹¹⁸ Calculated from figures in *Ibid.*, p. 191.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ IE/UCDA/P150/1125, *Collins to Boland*, 10 Sept. 1919.

drive there a challenge of an entirely different magnitude. Neatly summed up by Sean Nunan, the USA was ‘a hell of a country to organise’.¹²¹

To each state was appointed a Chairman who was responsible for identifying the cities within his state that should be canvassed and, in consultation with headquarters, apportioning quotas for each of the cities identified.¹²² To avoid local factional disputes, the State Chairmen were appointed directly by the ACII.¹²³ In essence, the role of State Chairman was supervisory, and in order not to hamper local initiative they were only to interfere in the city collections ‘when absolutely necessary’. The main responsibilities of the role were to oversee collections within the state, make sure the funds raised were safeguarded and ensure that accounts were kept in order. Reporting directly to the headquarters in New York, the State Chairmen were obliged to write weekly reports on progress.¹²⁴ With an emphasis on maintaining the integrity of the drive, instructions issued to them explicitly requested they guard against ‘haphazard or fraudulent collections by unauthorized persons’.¹²⁵

For each of the cities identified as targets the State Chairman was sanctioned to appoint a City Chairman and to distribute tender forms to him. In contrast to the role of the State Chairman, the City Chairman’s role was more hands-on, and the position in New York was filled by Thomas A. Gannon, who had previous experience fundraising during the Great War.¹²⁶ Reflecting the desire for diversification away from the FOIF, the City Chairmen were advised to summon, as soon as possible, a preliminary meeting with the local heads of the following organisations:¹²⁷

¹²¹ IE/NAI/DE/2/292, *Nunan to Collins*, 17 Sept. 1919.

¹²² NLI/Ms.21,547, *Outline of President de Valera’s Instructions on Organisation for Irish Bond-Certificate Campaign*, n.d. , p. 4.

¹²³ Funchion, *Irish American Voluntary Organizations*, p. 21.

¹²⁴ Every Monday. NLI/Ms.21,547, *Outline of President de Valera’s Instructions on Organisation for Irish Bond-Certificate Campaign*, n.d. , p. 4.

¹²⁵ NLI/Ms.21,547, *Outline of President de Valera’s Instructions on Organisation for Irish Bond-Certificate Campaign*, n.d. , p. 4.

¹²⁶ US/NYPL/MssCol 3212/b.3/5, *J.C. Walsb’s reminiscences*, p. 145.

¹²⁷ NLI/Ms.21,547, *Outline of President de Valera’s Instructions on Organisation for Irish Bond-Certificate Campaign*, n.d. , p. 5.

- Knights of Columbus
- A.O.H. [Ancient Order of Hibernians]
- Ladies Auxiliary A.O.H.
- Other similar organisations
- Clergymen – The several churches (one clergyman of each denomination)

The purpose of these meetings was to form a large committee of ‘prominent citizens, representatives of all parties and creeds, - influential businessmen in the main, if possible’.¹²⁸ This committee was to be responsible for the subdivision of the city into smaller units, for example assembly districts or wards, and to organise publicity and public meetings.¹²⁹ Each of these ‘districts’ would have its own sub-committee of about five members, which would have complete charge of their allotted area without interference from other sub-committees. The sub-committees, which were to meet every night, were responsible for providing themselves with maps, preparing lists, either from precinct lists or lists from previous fundraising efforts, and annotating these lists with probable amounts expected beside individual names.¹³⁰ The districts were further divided into sub-districts, each with its own team of collectors, led by a ‘Captain’.¹³¹

At ground level, the process of collecting for the External Loan was remarkably similar to that of the National Loan. Sample posters were sent out by head office to all City and State Chairmen.¹³² Collections were to be made based on pre-prepared lists, and canvassing was to be done ‘street by street, block by block, house by house’.¹³³ The collectors were given specific territories from which to collect, to avoid potential subscribers being approached twice.¹³⁴ Each canvasser was supplied with a book of tender forms (blank forms to be filled out) and every subscriber was given a receipt by

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² NLI/Ms.21,548(5), *Notebook: Copy of note from J. O’Mara to Liam Pedlar*, 19 Jan. 1920.

¹³³ *New York Tribune*, 19 Jan. 1920, p.18; NLI/Ms.21,547, *Outline of President de Valera’s Instructions on Organisation for Irish Bond-Certificate Campaign*, n.d. , p. 5.

¹³⁴ *New York Tribune*, 19 Jan. 1920, p. 18.

the canvasser before being sent an official bond certificate from head office at a later date.¹³⁵ The teams of collectors were to report every night, handing in signed tender forms and subscriptions received.¹³⁶ Responsibility for the money at this juncture passed from the Captain to the sub-committee, and a receipt was handed to the Captain in exchange for the funds.¹³⁷

At the level of the city, responsibility for receiving and safeguarding all monies received fell to the City Treasurers, who were appointed by the City Chairmen.¹³⁸ Highlighting the importance of the role, it was advised that City Treasurers should if possible be ‘the President or Director of a bank, or prominent business man’.¹³⁹ The City Treasurers were responsible for acknowledging receipt of the monies raised in their city, paying them into an account, and keeping proper accounts, sending abstracts of them to headquarters once a week, every Monday.¹⁴⁰ It was also the City Treasurers’ responsibility to send the completed tender forms to headquarters for processing, and this was done by registered mail.¹⁴¹ As with the National Loan, communication was paramount and, to make this easier, de Valera instructed O’Mara to provide specially pre-prepared ‘acknowledgement forms’ for them to fill out.¹⁴²

For safety of funds, it was decided that a bank account be opened in each city under the name of Éamon de Valera and all proceeds of bond sales were to be lodged in this account. Headquarters sent out specimen signatures to the City Treasurers for this purpose.¹⁴³ The process of opening these bank accounts took longer than expected, but

¹³⁵ *Evening world (New York)*, 17 Jan. 1920; NLI/Ms.21,547, *Outline of President de Valera’s Instructions on Organisation for Irish Bond-Certificate Campaign*, n.d. , p. 8.

¹³⁶ NLI/Ms.21,547, *Outline of President de Valera’s Instructions on Organisation for Irish Bond-Certificate Campaign*, n.d. , p. 10.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹⁴² NLI/Ms.21,547, *de Valera to J. O’Mara*, 3 Dec. 1919.

¹⁴³ NLI/Ms.21,547, *Outline of President de Valera’s Instructions on Organisation for Irish Bond-Certificate Campaign*, n.d. , p. 7.

by 12 April 1920, the bond drive organisation had bank accounts in most of the big towns in almost every state in the union.¹⁴⁴ As for the centralisation of funds, at first the banks in New York were afraid to take the money.¹⁴⁵ Fortunately however, according to J.C. Walsh, there was one bank with an Irish-American among its directors who ‘saw nothing to be afraid of, and he made this clear to his associates’.¹⁴⁶ Again demonstrating his support for the bond drive, Joseph McGarrity played a vital role in finding this solution.¹⁴⁷ As with the National Loan, the amounts lodged were checked at head office, entered into a ledger for the relevant state, and an inscribed bond certificate was posted to the subscriber.¹⁴⁸ The remittance of funds to Ireland, which will be covered in chapter 8, was managed centrally from the head office in New York.

Gradually, local organisations were set up in each city in line with O’Mara’s guidelines.¹⁴⁹ Requests for bond prospectuses and promotional literature came in from around the country, from states as far afield as Ohio and Alaska.¹⁵⁰ In the words of an organiser in Nashville, Tennessee, ‘these little branches all over the country are the links in a great, gold chain which binds the hearts of the Irish in Ireland to the hearts of the Irish in America’.¹⁵¹ Head office distributed a circular entitled ‘Good News’ Bulletin on 12 December 1919 and 1 January 1920, providing each State and City Chairman with a comprehensive report of the organisation’s progress across the country so they could measure their success against the exemplars reported on.¹⁵² Perhaps exaggerating for effect, the New York headquarters of the ACII announced that nearly a million

¹⁴⁴ IE/NAI/DE/2/292, *Nunan to Collins*, 12 Apr. 1920.

¹⁴⁵ J.C. Walsh to Patricia Lavelle, 1954, cited in Lavelle, *James O’Mara*, p. 153.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ McCartan, *With de Valera in America* (Dublin, 1932), p. 142.

¹⁴⁸ Nunan, ‘President Eamon de Valera’s Mission to U.S.A.’, p. 242.

¹⁴⁹ J.C. Walsh to Patricia Lavelle, 1954, cited in Lavelle, *James O’Mara*, p. 154.

¹⁵⁰ US/NYPL/MssCol 1854/b.4/44, *Various branch secretaries to Lynch*, Dec. 1919 – Jan. 1920.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, K.M. Friel to K. Hughes, 12 Feb. 1920.

¹⁵² US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13, ‘*Good News’ Bulletin*, 12 Dec. 1919, ‘*Good News’ Bulletin*, 1 Jan. 1920.

collectors would be out canvassing for the bond drive across the US.¹⁵³ Some 40,000 of the 75,000 collectors for New York State would be operating in New York City.¹⁵⁴ These foot soldiers were drawn mainly from the membership of FOIF and Clan na Gael clubs. More realistically, the State Chairman of Pennsylvania claimed to have *ca.* 3,000 active workers for Philadelphia, at least two for each electoral district in the city.¹⁵⁵ In Chicago, Catholic parish priests directed the teams of collectors in their respective neighbourhoods and, according to the *Chicago Herald Examiner*, ‘Fifty of the prettiest Irish lassies... formed a society known as “The Fifty Molly Pitchers” to help.’¹⁵⁶ With the exception of about a dozen paid organisers, all of these people were volunteers.¹⁵⁷ Rather than money, the organisers relied on other incentives; for example, in Washington DC, a silk Irish Republican flag was offered to the Team Captain who raised the highest amount within a time limit.¹⁵⁸

There was also an attempt to reach out beyond the pre-existing Irish-American organisations. Apart from diluting the drive’s reliance on the FOIF, this also had the advantage of gaining expertise from a wider pool of talent. J.C. Walsh sent the organiser from his Milwaukee experiment to Massachusetts, where he ran the campaign with the help of the YMCA.¹⁵⁹ In Walsh’s words, ‘The Y.M.C.A. boys knew how to get masses in motion’.¹⁶⁰ Like the Knights of Columbus, the YMCA had been heavily involved in raising funds for the US war effort, but as the organisation excluded Catholics, it provided access to an entirely different clientele. Similarly, the organisers in Boston were trained by fundraisers who had learned their craft from the Methodist Church, an

¹⁵³ *New York Herald*, 12 Jan. 1920, p. 8.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ IE/UCDA/P150/962, *Eugene C. Bonnivell to de Valera*, 7 Jan. 1920.

¹⁵⁶ US/NARA/M1085, *FBI case file 202600-695, Newspaper cutting of Chicago Herald Examiner*, 16 Jan. 1920.

¹⁵⁷ Nunan, ‘President Eamon de Valera’s Mission to U.S.A.’, p. 242.

¹⁵⁸ *Washington Times*, 4 Feb. 1920, p. 1. ‘Up to the present Captain Joseph A. Daly leads by several hundred dollars. Capt. A. Gleeson is second and Capt. Rossa F. Downing third.’

¹⁵⁹ US/NYPL/MssCol 3212/b.3/5, *J.C. Walsh’s reminiscences*, p. 145.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

organisation accustomed to raising a large quantity from many small contributions and also transcended the traditional catchment of the FOIF.¹⁶¹ Testament to its fundraising capabilities, at the time of the bond drive the Methodist Church in America was raising a fund of \$150m for reclamation work in post-war Europe.¹⁶² However, as useful as this talent was to the bond campaign, it was no substitute for the organisational infrastructure provided by the FOIF, without which the bond drive would simply not have been possible.

De Valera had succeeded in striking an agreement with the FOIF, gatekeepers of American money, but the strength of that agreement would be tested as the campaign progressed. The fault lines already apparent would test the resilience of the bond drive's organisers and come to dominate the historiography of de Valera's tour of America. It was under these circumstances that the bond drive was finally launched on 17 January 1920, almost five months after the originally proposed launch date. The information contained in Harry Boland's shoe would be spread the length and breadth of the country in a promotional campaign of unprecedented ambition, the details of which are explored in chapter 7.

¹⁶¹ J.C. Walsh to Patricia Lavelle, 1954, Lavelle, *James O'Mara*, p. 154.

¹⁶² O'Doherty, *Assignment*, p. 106.

Chapter 7: Showtime

When de Valera stepped out of the Waldorf Astoria on 17 January 1920, he joined a long tradition of Irish political fundraising in the United States. He did so at a time of unprecedented consumer culture, particularly among the Irish immigrant community, which had a growing appetite for merchandise with an Irish theme.¹ While the stated aim of de Valera's mission to America was to gain recognition from the US government, recognition from the American public was arguably just as important. Although there had never been such a thing as an independent Irish state, the Dáil mission had to occupy that place in the hearts and minds of ordinary Americans, and essentially become synonymous with the brand 'Ireland'. By extension, as leader of the Dáil and its personification in America de Valera needed to monopolise the title 'President of Ireland'. This chapter explores the promotion of the bond drive in the United States and the way it underpinned identification of the Dáil as the legitimate government of Ireland. As will be seen in chapter 8, the monopolisation of this role was crucial in the rivalry between the Dáil mission and the FOIF.²

De Valera's car left the Waldorf at noon, followed by a motorcade festooned with Irish tricolours. He alighted at City Hall, heralded by a pipe band playing 'rousing Irish airs', and was greeted by a throng of people. Among the well-wishers were veterans of the US 69th 'Fighting Irish' Regiment and children from a local school dressed in Irish costumes. On de Valera's arrival, Bourke Cockran, former fundraiser for John Redmond,

¹ D.M. Hotten-Somers, 'Relinquishing and Reclaiming Independence: Irish domestic servants, American middle-class mistresses, and assimilation, 1850-1920', p.227, p.239, in K. Kenny, *New Directions in Irish History* (Madison, Wisconsin, 2003), pp. 227-45.

² Based on Porter's 'Five Forces' concept in M.E. Porter, 'How competitive forces shape strategy', *Harvard Business Review*, 57/2 (1979), p. 137.

presented the 'President of Ireland' to the Mayor of New York.³ In an outdoor ceremony where de Valera was given the freedom of the city, Mayor Hylan very publicly purchased the first bond certificate of the issue.⁴

According to the British consulate, de Valera was welcomed 'not overly cordially' by the Mayor, but the very fact of the reception, not to mention the freedom of the city, was a clear endorsement of de Valera from the New York political establishment.⁵ The symbolism was clear, as ten years earlier John Redmond received the same honour from then Mayor Mitchel.⁶ Undoubtedly this reinforced de Valera's role as the legitimate voice of Ireland, a position occupied by Redmond just a few years earlier.⁷ Reflecting on the publicity from this event, Frank P. Walsh noted how barely any of the newspapers in the city gave de Valera's presidential title in quotation marks.⁸

In a statement combining legalese with the language of statehood, de Valera proceeded to explain the terms of the bond drive to the reporters assembled at City Hall:

It will be distinctly understood by each subscriber to the loan that he is making a free gift of his money. Repayment of the amount subscribed is contingent wholly upon the recognition of the Irish Republic as an independent nation. Each member will receive a certificate of indebtedness of the republic, signed by myself, or my deputy, which certificate is non-negotiable and non-interest bearing. The certificate will be exchangeable on par for gold bonds of the republic upon presentation at the treasury of the republic after freedom is obtained. The gold bonds will bear 5 per cent interest from the date of the recognition of the republic and will be redeemable at par one year from the same date.⁹

³ O'Doherty, *Assignment*, p. 127

⁴ *Evening world (New York)*, 17 Jan. 1920; Hannigan, *De Valera in America*, p. 108

⁵ TNA: FO/115/2599/72, *D. Boyle to R.C. Lindsay*, 23 Jan. 1920

⁶ Meleady, *Redmond*, p. 179. Mayor Mitchel was a descendent of the Young Irelander rebel of the same name.

⁷ D.J. Hickey & J.E. Doherty (eds.), *A New Dictionary of Irish History from 1800*, (Dublin, 2003) pp. 382–5.

⁸ US/NYPL/MssCol 3211/b.28, *F.P. Walsh to S.T. O'Ceallaigh*, 23 Jan. 1920

⁹ Hannigan, *De Valera*, pp. 108-9.

‘Something typically Irish as well as essentially modern’




Figure 7.1. First External Loan: \$10 bond certificate.¹⁰

The use of bond certificates as a means of fundraising was crucial in strengthening the Dáil’s monopoly of the Irish brand and de Valera’s role as President. Notwithstanding the distinction between bonds and bond certificates, the resemblance to genuine government bonds reinforced the Dáil’s position as a legitimate government (Figure 7.1). Moreover, de Valera’s signature on the bond certificates and their prospectus reinforced his position at the head of that government.¹¹ The use of bond certificates also made tangible what would otherwise have been the intangible ‘warm glow’ associated with giving a donation, allowing subscribers to show proof of their patriotism for the old country.¹² The uniformity of the bond certificates also allowed consistency in message, reinforcing the singularity of the Dáil. Importantly in the context of the Dáil’s

¹⁰ NLI/Ms.21,548, *Papers of James O’Mara*

¹¹ This was insisted on by Collins: IE/UCDA/P150/1125, *Collins to Boland*, 10 Sept. 1919.

¹² For ‘warm glow’ concept see Sandler, *Economic Concepts*, p. 103.

relationship with the FOIF, the sale of bond certificates also implied exclusivity, suggesting that any other means of contributing to the Irish cause was in some way counterfeit. Finally, by creating a tangible symbol of the Dáil administration, the bond drive's organisers could make explicit linkages with older, more established institutions and in so doing flesh out the personality of its brand.

In most regards, the terms of the bond drive were very similar to those of the National Loan. Bond certificates were issued in denominations of \$10, \$25, \$50, \$100, \$250, \$500, \$1,000, \$5,000 and \$10,000, the larger amounts designed for propaganda value. Certificates for \$10 were to be paid in cash in a single instalment; certificates of \$25 and over were to be paid 25% on application, 25% in 30 days, 25% in 60 days, and 25% in 90 days.¹³ However, unlike the National Loan, the External Loan accepted certain non-cash payments in exchange for its bond certificates, and this opened up the opportunity of strengthening the Dáil's brand by association with others.

Linking the bond drive to the older tradition of advanced nationalist fundraising in America, the Dáil mission accepted Fenian bonds at par value in exchange for Dáil bonds.¹⁴ By doing this, the Dáil was effectively accepting financial responsibility for bonds issued for \$500,000, but this was clearly a risk it deemed worth taking in return for promotional value achieved.¹⁵ To guard against opportunists, it was made known that receipts for these Fenian bonds were only given once they had been compared to the Fenian records in New York.¹⁶ The intention behind this was clear: to present the Dáil as the successor to the Fenian movement, lending the Dáil historical legitimacy and leveraging the romance with which many Irish-Americans viewed the Fenians. Even the act of checking the Fenian records demonstrated continuity between the generations.

¹³ Carroll, *Money*, p. 20.

¹⁴ NLI/Ms.21,547, *Outline of President de Valera's Instructions on Organisation for Irish Bond-Certificate Campaign*, n.d. , p. 5.

¹⁵ Mitchell, *Revolutionary*, p.113. As remarked privately by de Valera after the decision had been announced, it made the Dáil 'responsible for an accumulated interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum from varying dates during the period 1864-67'. (IE/UCDA/P150/726, *Collins to de Valera*, 6 Oct. 1919).

¹⁶ NLI/Ms.21,547, *Outline of President de Valera's Instructions on Organisation for Irish Bond-Certificate Campaign*, n.d. , p. 5.

Recognition of the Fenian issue was not without its risks however. From its very inception, the Fenian bond issue was viewed with a mixture of suspicion and disdain. On St Patrick's Day, 1866, a tongue-in-cheek article in Philadelphia's *Evening Telegraph* described \$25 of Fenian bonds as being worth 25 cents.¹⁷ In 1893, a criminal was reported as accidentally stealing \$50,000 in Fenian bonds, thinking they were US bonds, and cursing the Irish once she realised her mistake.¹⁸ Perhaps the Fenian bonds' reputation was best described by a reference in Washington DC's *Evening Star*, in 1909, as a byword for worthlessness: 'like those famous Fenian bonds, "good only when Ireland is free"'.¹⁹ Also in 1908, a humorous article in Lincoln Nebraska's *Commoner* newspaper lists Fenian bonds alongside 'Black Hand bonds, guaranteed by the success of future assassinations,' and 'Bottle Redemption Limited bonds, guaranteed by our collection of empty beer bottles'. Harking back to the American Civil War, the article also refers to 'Confederate bonds, guaranteed by the Arkansas revolution against the Criminal Rich association'. In the article, all of these securities held by the 'Clearing House Association of the Chop Suey Keepers'.²⁰

Nevertheless, among the audience targeted by the Dáil's bond drive the Fenian bond was viewed very favourably indeed.²¹ In Chicago one subscriber to the bond drive wrote with pride of a framed Fenian bond bought by his father.²² The *Financial Times* described the Dáil's offer to exchange Fenian bonds for its own as 'something typically Irish as well as essentially modern,' before stating 'a less sentimental and idealistic people would certainly have deemed it wise to forget that 1866 issue'.²³

¹⁷ *Evening Telegraph* (Philadelphia), 17 Mar. 1866, p. 6.

¹⁸ *Arizona Republican*, 8 Jan. 1893, p. 2.

¹⁹ *Evening Star*, 26 Sept. 1909, p. 15.

²⁰ *Commoner*, 12 Jun. 1908, p. 5.

²¹ S. Nunan, 'President Eamon de Valera's Mission to U.S.A.', *Capuchin Annual*, (1970), p. 243.

²² US/NYPL/MssCol 1854/b.4/48, *J.F. Maher to Lynch*, 12 Jan. 1921.

²³ *Financial Times*, 19 Jul. 1919, p. 2.

Perhaps acting as a counterweight to the perceived riskiness of the Fenian bonds, bonds of the US Treasury's Liberty Loans were also accepted at par. This was significant on a number of levels. In theory, this was a very good deal for investors, as \$100 Liberty bonds traded as low as \$82 in 1920.²⁴ Symbolically, it also implied parity of credibility between the Dáil's treasury and the US Federal Reserve, presenting the two bond issues as equally prudent and the two governments as equally legitimate. In a speech promoting the bond drive, Harry Boland explicitly urged those present to loan to the Irish Republic 'with the same assurance of repayment they had of lending to America'.²⁵ On a deeper level, the acceptance of Liberty Loan bonds also linked the bond drive to President Wilson's stated war aim of liberty for small countries. Moreover, the measure also inserted the bond drive into a key point of contention in Anglo-American relations – the question of inter-allied debt. The five 'Liberty Loan' acts passed by the US government during 1917 and 1918 allowed the US Treasury to lend up to \$10bn to its Great War allies. The loans extended to the allies were financed directly *via* the sale of Liberty Loan bonds to the American public and their terms were based directly on those of the Liberty Loan bonds.²⁶ This link between Liberty Loan bonds and inter-allied debt meant that, as noted by the President of the British Board of Trade, no debt renegotiation could take place in an election year without the support of the American public.²⁷ This link was exploited by the Dáil mission, which distributed leaflets linking the Irish question and Britain's war debt to America.²⁸ More explicitly, Harry Boland denounced 'the killing of Irish patriots with bullets bought with American money'.²⁹ 'There can not be a shadow of a doubt,' read an *Irish Press* editorial, 'that the money raised in this country through the

²⁴ Ott, *Wall Street*, p. 269.

²⁵ *Irish Press (IP)*, 14 Feb. 1920, p. 2.

²⁶ R.C. Self, *Britain, America and the war debt controversy* (Oxford, 2006), p. 18.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

²⁸ TNA: FO/115/2598/292, *British Embassy, Washington, to Curzon*, 12 Jul. 1920.

²⁹ *IP*, 24 Apr. 1920, p. 1.

sale of Liberty Bonds is now being used to dragoon, murder and starve the people of Ireland because they insist on ruling themselves – one of the rights that America claimed for all peoples when we entered the war'.³⁰ Directly linking the bond drive with Britain's war debt, the Acting Chairman of the drive in Manhattan claimed that 'The holders of Irish bonds possess much better security than Uncle Sam has for the ten billions of allied loans upon which the interest has already been defaulted'. 'No friend of Great Britain,' he continued 'can point the finger of scorn to the Irish bond until England at least can pay up her interest'.³¹

Irish Loan Week

De Valera's reception at City Hall marked the beginning of 'Irish Loan Week', the ten days from 17 to 26 January 1920, which set in motion a promotional campaign that spanned the country and captured its imagination.³² This launch date was significant for a number of reasons. Although nowhere mentioned in surviving correspondence, 17 January 1920 was also the date when prohibition was given full legal effect in the US.³³ It is unlikely that this was pure coincidence; previous war bond campaigns had highlighted temperance and thrift, and without the competition of alcohol, the bond sellers were selling to a market with newfound disposable income.³⁴ January 17 was also the birthday of Benjamin Franklin, who had spoken publicly in favour of Irish independence. Franklin was regularly invoked by members of the Dáil mission in America, and his visit to Ireland was also explicitly compared to de Valera's tour of America.³⁵ In addition, 17 January 1920 was two days after the local elections in Ireland, the results of which could

³⁰ *IP*, 1 May 1920, p. 6.

³¹ *Wilkes-Barre Record* (Pa.), 9 Feb. 1920, p. 3.

³² NLI/Ms.21,547, *Outline of President de Valera's Instructions on Organisation for Irish Bond-Certificate Campaign*, n.d., p. 3.

³³ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 426.

³⁴ Kang & Rockoff, 'Capitalizing patriotism', p. 69.

³⁵ e.g. *South Bend News-Times*, 15 Jul. 1920, p. 1, also Hannigan, *De Valera*, pp. 58, 73, 83, 95.

be used as proof of the legitimacy of the Dáil.³⁶ Irish Loan Week also contained the anniversary of the Dáil's declaration of independence on 21 January 1918.³⁷ Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 17 January also marked the beginning of the annual 'National Thrift Week'. Sponsored by the American Bankers' Association and the YMCA, National Thrift Week's organisers drew inspiration from the American War Loan drives to encourage saving among the populace. This included the distribution of Liberty Bell home savings banks, as well as the use of boy scouts to solicit pledges and hot-air balloon launches to raise awareness.³⁸ This coincidence, combined with the acceptance of Liberty bonds at par, clearly placed the bond drive as successor to the Liberty Loan in terms of patriotism and thrift and exploited consumer habits established during the Great War.

On Sunday 18 January 1920, the day after his reception at City Hall, de Valera took to the stage of New York's Lexington Theater, with Bourke Cockran presiding.³⁹ Borough campaign chairmen pledged to raise more than \$2.5m, and de Valera was reportedly cheered for nearly five minutes by the almost 3,000 supporters in attendance. The receipt of a cheque from Archbishop Hayes for \$1,000 was announced on stage, and the Archbishop and New York Governor Alfred E. Smith sent strong letters of endorsement of the loan. Rabbi David Klein also spoke, equating the Irish and Jewish struggles. In a moment of pageantry and symbolism, Warren Shaw Fisher, commander in chief of the United American War Veterans, walked on stage in full uniform and presented de Valera with a silk Irish Republican flag.⁴⁰

The first days of the bond drive were intense. While de Valera was accepting the freedom of New York, Frank P. Walsh and Harry Boland were busy promoting the loan

³⁶ NLI/Ms.21,548(1), *de Valera to Griffith*, n.d.

³⁷ As recalled by de Valera: IE/UCDA/P150/1100, *De Valera's Recollections*, 19 Nov. 1962.

³⁸ Ott, *Wall Street*, p. 171.

³⁹ *Sun*, 16 Jan. 1920, p. 11.

⁴⁰ *New York Herald*, 19 Jan. 1920, p. 7.

in Chicago.⁴¹ On Tuesday 20 January 1920 Walsh and Boland addressed an ‘immense’ meeting at the Academy of Music in Philadelphia.⁴² On 21 January 1920, the first anniversary of the Dáil’s declaration of independence, about 12,000 people turned out to welcome de Valera in Albany, where he addressed a session of the New York State legislature.⁴³ The Assembly had passed a unanimous resolution approving of the issue of bond certificates two days earlier, recommending them to the American people.⁴⁴ Staying in New York, the next day de Valera held meetings in Richmond Hill, Jamaica, Flushing and Long Island City.⁴⁵

The drive was also pushed forward on the ground. While de Valera was addressing the Lexington Theater, smaller meetings were held in parish and public schools throughout New York City.⁴⁶ The British consulate in New York observed that ‘Posters appeared in all the principal places in New York advocating the American form of government for Ireland’. Emphasising the Dáil’s democratic legitimacy, these posters showed ‘by large coloured maps, the proportion of Sinn Féin and other parties in the 1918 election’.⁴⁷ Young women sold bond certificates in the lobbies of some of New York’s most prominent hotels, a tactic that also imitated the sale of Liberty Bonds during the Great War.⁴⁸ Perhaps the most vivid description of Irish Loan Week came from Katherine O’Doherty, who was working as de Valera’s personal secretary at the time. Highly evocative of National Thrift Week, she recalled ‘Parades with placards, in which leading figures in the theatrical world took part, cars decorated with the Irish colours and

⁴¹ US/NYPL/MssCol 3211/b.28, *F.P. Walsh to S.T. O’Ceallaigh*, 23 Jan. 1920.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ O’Doherty, *Assignment*, p. 128; IE/NAI/DE/2/292, *Nunan to Collins*, 20 Jan. 1920.

⁴⁴ IE/NAI/DE/2/292, *Nunan to Collins*, 20 Jan. 1920.

⁴⁵ IE/UCDA/P150/737, *Chief’s Diary for 1920*.

⁴⁶ *New York Tribune*, 19 Jan. 1920, p. 18.

⁴⁷ TNA: FO/115/2599/72, *D. Boyle to R.C. Lindsay*, 23 Jan. 1920.

⁴⁸ TNA: FO/115/2599/95, *E.D. Miller to R.C. Lindsay*, 26 Feb. 1920. This was also the practice during the FOIF’s Victory Fund campaign.

bearing slogans about the Irish question, and many novel methods of campaigning were planned.⁴⁹

By 23 January 1920, the drive was underway in New York, Pennsylvania, Chicago, New Jersey and Kansas State.⁵⁰ ‘Things in the loan department are going in good style,’ reported Sean Nunan to Michael Collins, adding, ‘I feel certain that more than ten million will be realised’.⁵¹ New York’s *Evening World* reflected: ‘no matter what your opinions may be of the hopefulness of anything human or the future of such an establishment as an Irish Republic you cannot help but understand the human side of this singularly interesting drive’.⁵²

Around the States

An obvious difference between the National Loan and the External Loan was scale. Although the hurdle of organisation had largely been surmounted by the time of Irish Loan Week, its promotion was another question entirely. As with the National Loan, the bond drive was launched around the country by meetings with speeches by prominent personalities.⁵³ All bond drive meetings were to be under the direct control of James O’Mara and, ensuring consistency of message, speakers were dispatched around the country from 411 Fifth Avenue, enlisting support.⁵⁴ De Valera ‘called a halt’ to holding banquets, which had been a mainstay of the FOIF social calendar, insisting that celebrations of the Irish Republic must take the form of rallies for the bond drive.⁵⁵

⁴⁹ O’Doherty, *Assignment*, p. 123.

⁵⁰ US/NYPL/MssCol 3211/b.28, *F.P. Walsh to S.T. O’Ceallaigh*, 23 Jan. 1920.

⁵¹ IE/NAI/DE/2/292, *S. Nunan to Collins*, 20 Jan. 1920.

⁵² *Evening World*, 17 Jan. 1920, p. 6.

⁵³ Lavelle, *James O’Mara*, p. 154.

⁵⁴ IE/UCDA/P150/1138, *Boland to J. O’Mara*, 16 Dec. 1919.

⁵⁵ *IP*, 7 Feb. 1920, p. 2.

Of course, as ‘President of the Irish Republic’, de Valera was the main attraction, and he spoke at events across the country.⁵⁶ In organising his engagements O’Mara was under strict instructions that the ‘dignity of Chiefs [*sic.*] position is suitably maintained in everything’.⁵⁷ There were initially suggestions that an airplane or airship would be procured for the purpose, but in the end de Valera’s tour was based on the railway network.⁵⁸ His itinerary, based on information on the main centres of Irish population, was drawn up by Charles Wheeler, who had experience accompanying various US Presidents on their election campaigns.⁵⁹ The initial focus of each state was to be the large cities, with the less populated areas to follow.⁶⁰ According to James O’Mara’s widow Agnes, de Valera produced ‘a great effect wherever he went’.⁶¹ For example, an estimated 25,000 people crowded the approaches to Boston’s South Station on de Valera’s arrival.⁶² As recalled by Patrick McCartan, ‘If in any city he visited, no Bond committee had been formed, the enthusiasm created by his visit increased the local sale of the Bonds’.⁶³

These promotional meetings were followed up by canvassing by the local organisers.⁶⁴ Handbooks, promotional literature and letters of advice were sent out from the New York office as a guide for organisers around the country.⁶⁵ Hundreds of copies of de Valera’s ‘Manual of Instructions’ were distributed to the local campaign workers to provide guidance and a sense of purpose.⁶⁶ The promotional material included a map of

⁵⁶ IE/BMH/WS0690, *M.A. O’Mara*, p. 7.

⁵⁷ IE/UCDA/P150/1138, *Boland to J. O’Mara*, 8 Jan. 1920.

⁵⁸ US/NYPL/MssCol.3211/b.28, *Re: Bond Issue of the Irish Republic*, 14 Aug. 1919.

⁵⁹ US/AIHS/DFC/Bx.2/5, *Boland to Cobalan*, 11 Sept. 1919; US/AIHS/DFC/Bx.2/5, *Seamus MacNamara to Boland*, 13 Aug. 1919; US/AIHS/DFC/Bx.2/5, *Boland to Cobalan*, 4 Sept. 1919.

⁶⁰ NLI/Ms.21,547, *Outline of President de Valera’s Instructions on Organisation for Irish Bond-Certificate Campaign*, n.d., p. 3.

⁶¹ IE/BMH/WS0690, *M.A. O’Mara*, p. 7.

⁶² O’Doherty, *Assignment*, p. 47.

⁶³ McCartan, *With de Valera*, p. 145.

⁶⁴ Lavelle, *James O’Mara*, p. 154.

⁶⁵ Carroll, *Money*, p. 20.

⁶⁶ US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13, *F.P. Walsh to Bourke Cockran*, 19 Dec. 1919.

Ireland showing the results of the 1918 general election, an eight-page book ‘containing arguments pertinent to the bond certificate campaign’, and copies of ‘Ireland’s Fight for Freedom’, a book by George Creel.⁶⁷

De Valera launched the bond drive in Washington DC on 30 January 1920 with a speech at Gonzaga Hall. Rossa F. Downing, President of the local branch of the FOIF, presided over the meeting and speeches were made by Senator James A. Reed of Missouri, Representative James A. Mead of New York, the feminist journalist John E. Milholland, and Gen. Isaac R. Sherwood, Member of Congress for Ohio.⁶⁸ In an echo of the tactics used in the National Loan, Downing announced that \$25,000 of the Washington quota had already been subscribed, making the final figure seem more attainable.⁶⁹ Later, on 7 February 1920, a photo of ‘Colleens selling Irish Bonds to Congressmen’ made it to the front page of the *Washington Times* (Figure 7.2). Pictured on the steps of Congress were seven congressmen, named by the newspaper, making clear their endorsement of the drive.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, *ACII circular to state chairmen*, 7 Jan. 1920.

⁶⁸ *Washington Herald*. 29 Jan. 1920, p. 7.

⁶⁹ *Evening Star (Washington DC)*, 31 Jan 1920, p. 3.

⁷⁰ *Washington Times*, 7 Feb. 1920, p. 1.



Figure 7.2. 'Colleens selling Irish Bonds to Congressmen'.⁷¹

The bond drive was launched in New England on 23 February 1920, following a visit by de Valera in which he received the Freedom of the City of Worcester.⁷² Speaking at a rally in Lowell, Massachusetts, de Valera declared that the bond drive was not just a means of raising funds for Ireland, but rather an act of recognition by the people of America that the Irish Republic exists.⁷³ As reported in the *Irish Press*, de Valera defined

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 116.

⁷³ *IP*, 21 Feb. 1920, p. 8.

recognition ‘merely as the right of American people to say what organ they shall look upon as the official mouthpiece of Ireland’.⁷⁴ The example of Kossuth’s bonds was cited by the Boston bond committee, as was a ‘Zionist Loan’ that was currently being floated in England.⁷⁵ According to David Hannigan, 50 cities and towns across Massachusetts took part in an intensive ‘Liberty Week’.⁷⁶ The *Irish Press* painted a vivid picture of the bond drive in Boston:

One of the big features of the Boston campaign was a series of noonday street rallies. Colleens in costume rode in a big decorated auto truck through the principal streets. A piano was carried on the truck and a quartet of male singers entertained, not only with Irish songs, but with popular melodies of the jazz variety.⁷⁷

Local branches of the ‘Young Patriots’, a group similar to the Girl Guides, volunteered as solicitors for the drive.⁷⁸ The towns of Worcester, Lynn, Brookline, Hingham and Howell together raised over \$50,000 in subscriptions on the very first day, despite adverse weather conditions.⁷⁹ ‘Hardly a day passes when there are not half a dozen evening bond rallies [in Boston],’ according to the *Irish Press*. Boston was home to as many as 30 mass meetings on Sundays.⁸⁰ ‘The bond drive is going ahead far greater than our fondest expectations,’ reported Frank P. Walsh on 26 February 1920.⁸¹

As with the National Loan, some innovative approaches are observable in the promotion of the bond drive in America. Some days were branded, for example, as ‘De Valera Day’ or ‘Countess Markievicz Day’.⁸² In Boston, days were named ‘Medical Day’, ‘Bench and Bar Day’, and ‘Public Service Day’, and men and women in those professions

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ TNA: FO/115/2599/133, *Massachusetts ACII circular intercepted by British*, 8 Mar. 1920.

⁷⁶ Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 123.

⁷⁷ *IP*, 3 Apr. 1920, p. 3.

⁷⁸ *Boston Post*, 2 Apr. 1920, p. 3.

⁷⁹ Hannigan, *De Valera*, pp. 123-4.

⁸⁰ *IP*, 3 Apr. 1920, p. 3.

⁸¹ US/NYPL/MssCol 3211/b.28, *F.P. Walsh to S.T. O’Ceallaigh*, 25 Feb. 1920.

⁸² Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 124.

were specifically targeted for subscriptions.⁸³ State and City Chairmen across the country were encouraged to approach local cinema managers and ask them to display notices promoting the bond certificates.⁸⁴ The National Loan film, featuring Collins receiving contributions from Republican dignitaries, was sent to America in January 1920.⁸⁵ There were also plans to sell phonograph recordings of de Valera's speeches.⁸⁶ Some more ambitious proposals were also put forward. A priest in Cleveland, Ohio, described as 'a livewire', took ideas of operas and movies to New York and 'got very disgusted when coldly received'.⁸⁷ The bond drive's head office also received a number of other suggestions from the local branches, including 'buttons, flags, advertising schemes', but the head office rejected these, stating, 'the only proper symbol is the bond-certificate'.⁸⁸

The Dáil mission's focus on the bond certificate, excluding all other symbols, is worthy of note. From a practical point of view, it eliminated competition, maximising the amount of funds that could be raised. From a branding point of view, it also emphasised the bond certificate as the sole icon of the Irish Republic. Since the certificates were directly associated with de Valera and the Dáil, this focus on the bonds strengthened the bargaining position of the Dáil mission against the FOIF.

By March 1920, the ACII was able to call its circular to State and City Chairman the 'Success Bulletin', opening with "Nothing succeeds like success", and the bond certificate drive is already an assured success.' According to the Bulletin, 'many of the great cities have reached their quotas, despite the bad weather and the influenza, and are only awaiting a milder season to add another fifty per cent'. It reported that subscriptions of \$1,000 were commonplace in every campaign of the major cities, 'with many of \$5,000

⁸³ *IP*, 3 Apr. 1920, p. 3.

⁸⁴ US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13, *Circular from F.P. Walsh to State and City Chairmen*, 30 Dec. 1919.

⁸⁵ IE/UCDA/P150/1125, *Collins to Boland*, 5 Jan. 1920, p. 2.

⁸⁶ IE/UCDA/P150/1138, *Boland to J. O'Mara*, 3 Mar. 1920.

⁸⁷ NLI/Ms.21,549(1), *Letter from unknown organiser, Columbus Ohio to J. O'Mara*, 26 Jan. 1921; NLI/Ms.21,549(2), *C. Flanagan to J. O'Mara*, 3 Feb. 1921.

⁸⁸ US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13/2, *ACII Bulletin*, n.d. (Q1 1920).

and some of \$10,000'.⁸⁹ As well as being distributed to organisers across the country, the 'Success Bulletin' was read out at local meetings, reported by the press.⁹⁰ Of course this was propaganda designed to rally the troops and gain column inches in the press, so the general statements must be taken with a pinch of salt, but it does give an indication of what was deemed exceptional and noteworthy by the national organisers. The diary of Harry Boland, perhaps a more reliable source, paints a similar picture: 'We go forward confident in our Cause, having accomplished more in our few months than ever had been dreamed of by our late leaders. \$300,000 to Ireland and ten million in sight and Recognition not impossible.'⁹¹

By 28 February 1920, the total raised in Philadelphia was in the region of \$200,000.⁹² Bond drive organisers in Philadelphia adopted the slogan 'Half a million for de Valera' to encourage their collectors to reach \$500,000 in time for de Valera's visit to Philadelphia on 7 March 1920.⁹³ Meanwhile in San Francisco \$355,245 was raised in a single meeting on 4 March 1920, bringing the city's total close to half a million.⁹⁴ By 6 March 1920, every state in the Union had been organised for the bond drive, with the exception of Florida and South Dakota.⁹⁵ New Jersey had raised *ca.* \$750,000, while Massachusetts was approaching \$1m.⁹⁶

On 15 March 1920, Washington DC's *Evening Star* reported that the sale of bonds in the city had 'gone over the top', having raised \$52,000, which was \$2,000 over their target. According to the *Star*, the news was announced at a meeting of the 'Padraic Pearse' branch of the FOIF, attended by 2,000 members, where there was 'standing and

⁸⁹ US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13/2, *ACII 'Success Bulletin'*, 1 Mar. 1920.

⁹⁰ *Butte Daily Bulletin*, 8 Mar. 1920, p. 4.

⁹¹ IE/UCDA/P150/1170, *HBD*, 29 Feb. 1920.

⁹² *IP*, 6 Mar. 1920, p. 1.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 28 Feb. 1920, p. 1.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 20 Mar. 1920, p. 1.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 6 Mar. 1920, p. 1.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

cheering for seven minutes fully'. Rossa F. Downing presided, and de Valera, Boland and William F. Phelan (chairman of the DC bond committee) made speeches. Daniel O'Connell of Boston also spoke, reporting that Massachusetts had oversubscribed its target of \$1,000,000 by \$600,000.⁹⁷

As the campaign continued it made use of key dates in the Irish calendar. The FOIF directed its branches that all St Patrick's Day celebrations 'should be utilized to the utmost in pushing the Irish Republic Bond-Certificate campaign'.⁹⁸ In Pennsylvania, 40,000 bond certificate application forms were sent out to targeted subscribers, imploring them:

IF YOU HAVE ALREADY SUBSCRIBED, WILL YOU NOT AGAIN SUBSCRIBE AS A ST PATRICK'S DAY DONATION. [*sic.*]

IF YOU HAVE NOT YET SUBSCRIBED, WILL YOU NOT, IN MEMORY OF THE DAY WE ALL CELEBRATE, SIGN AND SEND TODAY THE AMOUNT THAT YOU WOULD LIKE THE WORLD TO FEEL THAT YOU CHEERFULLY GAVE FOR THE SONS OF ST. PATRICK?⁹⁹

Bond drive committees that had already started their campaigns planned to use the week of 12 to 20 March 1920 as a 'clean-up' week, while those that had not yet started their campaigns planned to use the St Patrick's Day celebrations as a launch date.¹⁰⁰ The ACII also ordered state chairmen to pass a resolution urging official recognition of the Irish Republic by the government of the United States, and for these resolutions to be published by the local press.¹⁰¹

De Valera spent St Patrick's Day in New York, where he reviewed the parade from a viewing stand outside St Patrick's Cathedral on Fifth Avenue.¹⁰² Among the estimated 25,000 men and women who passed de Valera in the parade were soldiers of the US army's 69th regiment, a young couple representing 'Uncle Sam' and 'Miss Erin'

⁹⁷ *Evening Star*, 15 Mar. 1920, p. 19.

⁹⁸ US/NYPL/MssCol 3211/b.28, FOIF Branch Letter No. 7, 16 Feb 1920.

⁹⁹ IE/UCDA/P150/962, *Application form circulated by Eugene C. Bonnivell, Pennsylvania*, 17 Mar. 1920.

¹⁰⁰ US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13/2, *ACII Bulletin*, n.d. (Q1 1920).

¹⁰¹ US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13, *F.P. Walsh to W.B. Cockran*, 13 Mar. 1920.

¹⁰² Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 127.

walking hand in hand, and the ‘Friends of Freedom for India’, dressed in turbans and saris.¹⁰³ Flanked by Mayor Hylan on one side and Governor Al Smith and Archbishop Hayes on the other, de Valera’s *de facto* recognition by the New York establishment as leader of the Irish was undeniable.¹⁰⁴ This achievement was all the more remarkable given that de Valera had been virtually unknown in America just five years earlier. This did not happen by accident however. Initially de Valera’s name was omitted from tickets for the St Patrick’s day grandstand, but an intervention from Boland ensured a reprint listing Hon. Éamon de Valera among the dignitaries.¹⁰⁵

Later that week, de Valera travelled to Chicago, where on Sunday 21 March 1920 the Auditorium Theater played host to another rally for the bond drive. De Valera was the main speaker, accompanied by John A. McGarry, a prominent Clan na Gael member who was City Chairman for the bond drive in Chicago.¹⁰⁶ The theatre was filled to capacity with some 16,000 supporters, and an overflow meeting was held in the streets outside.¹⁰⁷ According to the *Irish Press*, so many well-wishers climbed the fire escape that it was ‘torn from its fastenings’ and fell to the ground.¹⁰⁸ Following de Valera’s visit, during Easter Week, there was an intensive campaign for the bond drive in Chicago and Illinois.¹⁰⁹ ‘Nightly meetings were held throughout Chicago and in many cities and towns of the state during the week, at which leading speakers expounded the justice of Ireland’s claim for recognition,’ reported Salt Lake City’s *Broad Ax*.¹¹⁰ As on St Patrick’s Day, the state chairmen were ordered to pass resolutions calling for official recognition of the

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ IE/UCDA/P150/1170, *HBD*, 12-3 Mar. 1920.

¹⁰⁶ O’Doherty, *Assignment*, p. 147.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ *IP*, 27 Mar. 1920, p. 2.

¹⁰⁹ *The Broad Ax (Salt Lake City)*, 17 Apr. 1920, p.1. Easter was 4 April in 1920.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Irish Republic by the US government.¹¹¹ British indebtedness was also invoked; the St Brendan Society in Boston passed a resolution calling for immediate repayment to America of the interest on its war loans to Britain.¹¹² Meanwhile, de Valera spent Easter in New York, where he attended a concert by the famous Irish tenor John McCormack.¹¹³

The Power of the Press

Unlike the National Loan, which had to rely mainly on news reports and posters for its publicity, the promoters of the bond drive in America were able to advertise without restraint. Here was another opportunity for the Dáil mission to frame the brand of the Irish Republic. Allusions to the US Liberty Loans were commonplace, in particular its ‘Lend to Liberty’ motto.¹¹⁴ Advertisements came with slogans such as ‘Give to Ireland and Lend to Liberty’ (Figure 7.3), ‘Rally to the Cause of Human Liberty’, and ‘A Message to Lovers of Liberty’.¹¹⁵ Making a direct link to President Wilson’s policy of self-determination, one advertisement read:

Do you believe in self-determination for every nation, small as well as great?
Do you believe that it is no less glorious to fight for liberty in Ireland than in Belgium?
Do you believe in the American doctrine of “Government of the people, by the people, for the people?”

...Then...

Help the Irish Republic – established by vote of 80% of the Irish people – by buying an Irish Republic bond-certificate.¹¹⁶

¹¹¹ US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13, *F.P. Walsh to W.B. Cokeran*, 2 Apr. 1920.

¹¹² TNA: FO/115/2598/239, *Resolutions Adopted by St Brendan Society*, 11 Apr. 1920.

¹¹³ IE/UCDA/P150/737, *Chief's Diary 1920*.

¹¹⁴ *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 23 Oct. 1917, p. 9.

¹¹⁵ *Chicago Eagle*, 20 Mar. 1920, p. 8; *Irish Standard*, 27 Mar. 1920, p. 7.

¹¹⁶ *Carson City Daily Appeal*, 10 Apr. 1920, p. 4.

Give Your Liberty Bonds for Liberty of Ireland

AMERICAN COMMISSION ON IRISH INDEPENDENCE
FRANK P. WALSH CHAIRMAN

IRISH BOND-CERTIFICATE
DEPARTMENT

New York, Oct. 1st, 1919.

To the American Public:-

Upon request of the President of the Republic of Ireland, Eamon De Valera, I take great pleasure in submitting to you for friendly and careful consideration, a \$10,000,000 Bond-Certificate issue of the Republic of Ireland. Attached hereto, is a letter of President Eamon De Valera to me, describing the issue.

In the name of Liberty, I recommend it to you.

Very truly yours,
Frank P. Walsh, Chairman,
American Commission on Irish Independence.

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
EAMON DE VALERA

September 28th, 1919

Mr. FRANK P. WALSH, Chairman,
AMERICAN COMMISSION ON IRISH INDEPENDENCE,
NEW YORK CITY.

My dear Sir:-

There has been duly authorized by an Act of DAIL EIREANN (Irish Congress) an issue of \$10,000,000, Bond-Certificates of the Republic of Ireland for disposition in America.

The Bond-Certificates will be issued as of December 1st, 1919, in denominations of \$10, \$25, \$50, \$100, \$250, \$500, \$1,000, \$5,000 and \$10,000. They will be non-negotiable and non-interest bearing, but will be exchangeable at par for Gold Bonds of the Republic on presentation at the Treasury of the Republic one month after the Republic has received international recognition and the British Forces have been withdrawn from the territory of the said Republic of Ireland. Six months after date of issue, these latter Gold Bonds will bear interest at the rate of 6% per annum, payable semi-annually, and will be redeemable at par one year thereafter. The Gold Bonds and interest thereon will be a first charge on the Revenues of the Republic.

The Bond-Certificates will be issued on application at 100% of the amount set forth therein and payable as follows:- Certificates for \$10, cash; Certificates of \$25 and over, 25% on application; 25% in thirty days; 25% in sixty days; and 25% in ninety days.

Applications for Certificates may be made to the President of the Republic of Ireland or his duly authorized agents.

Every applicant will be supplied at the time of initial payment with a receipt, in which the total amount of the subscription and the amount paid shall be duly recorded, with space for recording subsequent payments. The receipt will specify the limited liability of the Bond-Certificate as set forth herein.

Sincerely yours,
EAMON DE VALERA.

Subscriptions Can Be Made at 134 East Adams Street, Phoenix, Arizona

Figure 7.3. 'Give Your Liberty Bonds for Irish Liberty'¹¹⁷

In a similar vein, other advertisements contained a map showing the results of the 1918 general election in Ireland, with the headline 'Shall the Majority Rule?' (Figure 7.4).¹¹⁸ Readers were implored to 'Help the Government of the Republic of Ireland Continue to Function', and 'Stand By the Sister Republic of Ireland in Her Struggle for Liberty'.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ *Arizona Republican*, 8 Feb. 1920, p. 8.

¹¹⁸ *Evening World*, 22 Jan. 1920, p. 20.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

Shall the Majority Rule?

Map of the Irish Republic showing result of General Election, Dec., 1918

CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW

The Irish Republic was proclaimed on Dec. 21, 1918, and the new Government was organized on Dec. 22, 1918. The Irish Republic is a free, sovereign, and independent State. It is a member of the League of Nations. It is a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

VOTES CAST

The Irish Republic was elected by a majority of 1,200,000 votes. The Irish Republic is a free, sovereign, and independent State. It is a member of the League of Nations. It is a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

IRISH REPUBLIC

The Irish Republic is a free, sovereign, and independent State. It is a member of the League of Nations. It is a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Help the Government of the Republic of Ireland to Continue to Function

Stand by the Sister Republic of Ireland in Her Struggle for Liberty!

Irish freedom means prosperity and peace and goodwill to all the world. Irish independence means an increased trade with America—to the advantage of both countries. The principle for which the Irish people are struggling was tenaciously defined by President Wilson when, speaking at the first plenary session of the Peace Conference at Paris, January 23, 1918, he said: "We are here to see that every people in the world shall choose its own masters and govern its own destinies, not as we wish, but as they wish."

The people of Ireland have continually asserted, and have never of their own set abandoned, their right to all the attributes of a nation. In every generation they have risen in arms to overthrow the usurper. None of the conditions forced upon them against their will have invalidated their right or altered their purpose.

DAIL EIREANN LOAN.

August 26, 1918, Dail Eireann, the Congress of the Republic of Ireland, authorized the issue of a Loan in the United States, in addition to an internal loan in Ireland, which has already been subscribed.

Men and Women in Ireland Went to Jail for Subscribing to the Bond Certificates of the Irish Republic.

RECOGNITION BY AMERICA HAS ALWAYS MEANT LIBERTY TO OPPRESSED NATIONS. Send in your subscription to the Bond Certificate Loan today. Issued in denominations of \$10—\$25—\$50—\$100—\$200—\$500—\$1,000—\$5,000—\$10,000.

Payable in full or as follows:

First Payment 20% with application	Third Payment 20% April 1, 1920
Second Payment 40% March 1, 1920	Final Payment 20% May 1, 1920

To Eamon de Valera, President of the Irish Republic,
411 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

I, _____ hereby transfer to the Government of the Republic of Ireland the sum of \$..... This sum is voluntarily subscribed by me. Neither the President of the said Republic of Ireland nor the Government of the said Republic nor its agents are under any obligation to repay this sum, nor to pay interest on said sum to me or to my heirs until the said Republic of Ireland is internationally recognized and until the lapse of six months from the date of the freeing from British military control of the territory of the said Republic of Ireland.

Signed: _____ Address: _____ City: _____

Bond Certificates Issued by the American Commission on Irish Independence.
FRANK P. WALSH, Chairman.

Figure 7.4. 'Shall the Majority Rule?'¹²⁰

IRISH BOND CERTIFICATE CAMPAIGN

The Irish Republic Can Pay Its Way

IRELAND HAS MORE PEOPLE THAN MANY OTHER SMALL NATIONS

NORWAY	has a population of	2,396,782
DENMARK	" " " " " " " " " " " "	2,940,990
SWITZERLAND	" " " " " " " " " " " "	3,888,500

Ireland has a population of . . . 4,390,219

IRELAND IS BIGGER THAN MANY OTHER SMALL NATIONS

BELGIUM	has an area of	11,373 square miles
HOLLAND	" " " " " " " " " " " "	12,582 " "
DENMARK	" " " " " " " " " " " "	15,042 " "
SWITZERLAND	" " " " " " " " " " " "	15,976 " "

Ireland has an area of . . . 32,531 sq. miles

GOVERNMENT COST (1918)

SERBIA	\$26,250,000	BULGARIA	\$35,000,000
GREECE	\$27,000,000	NORWAY	\$36,200,000
SWITZERLAND	\$35,000,000	DENMARK	\$47,500,000

while to end of fiscal year, March 31, 1919, England spent \$65,000,000 in Ireland, but collected from

Ireland \$170,000,000

All the Small Powers mentioned have maintained their own Governments, their own armies, and three of them have fleets as well. **IT IS CHEAPER TO BE FREE THAN IN SLAVERY.**

Liberty has cost only \$6 per capita per annum in Greece and Serbia, \$7.50 in Bulgaria, \$9 in Switzerland, \$13 in Sweden, \$14 in Portugal, \$15 in Norway—while in IRELAND British militarism costs about \$40 per capita per annum.

Ireland is large enough, populous enough and rich enough to run her own national business in a business way. The money Ireland paid England last year could have run the governmental business of Bulgaria, Norway, Switzerland and Denmark combined—paying for all their administration charges, their police, ships and guns. Ireland means to spend her own money, for her own people, in her own land, developing her anthracite and bituminous coal, her enormous peat deposits, her marvelous possibilities in the linen and leather and many other industries, as well as in developing her great water powers and using her unrivalled harbors.

IRELAND DOES MORE BUSINESS THAN MANY OTHER SMALL NATIONS—IN 1917

Imports and exports	SERBIA	amounted to	\$47,500,000
" " "	GREECE	" "	\$81,500,000
" " "	BULGARIA	" "	\$75,000,000
" " "	PORTUGAL	" "	\$115,000,000
" " "	ROUMANIA	" "	\$205,000,000
" " "	NORWAY	" "	\$120,000,000
" " "	DENMARK	" "	\$325,000,000
" " "	SWEDEN	" "	\$375,000,000
" " "	While		

Imports and Exports of Ireland amounted to \$820,000,000

but more than 95% of it was done with England.

These figures prove the natural wealth of Ireland. Irish independence means an increased trade with America—to the advantage of both countries.

Irish freedom means prosperity and peace and good will to all the world. A failure to do justice to Ireland means that there will be no just or permanent peace.

Can any friend of Ireland fail to help her if he thinks she shall succeed in securing her independence?

Will he withhold his aid because of doubt?

D. C. O'FLAHERTY,
Chairman for Virginia.
JAMES L. O'KEEFE,
Chairman for Richmond.

Figure 7.5. 'The Irish Republic Can Pay Its Way'.¹²¹

¹²⁰ *Evening World*, 22 Jan. 1920, p. 20.

¹²¹ *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 18 Feb. 1920, p. 11.

Other advertisements took a more practical angle. Proclaiming ‘The Irish Republic Can Pay Its Way’, they compared the country’s population favourably to those of Denmark, Norway and Switzerland and its landmass to those of Belgium and the Netherlands, showing the budgetary surplus of taxes raised in Ireland by the British government less the amount the government spent there (Figure 7.5).¹²² The official uses to which the bond money would be put, as outlined in the bond prospectus, also featured in press advertising. These included financing a consular service, establishing a judicial system, establishing a national civil service, as well as more economic measures, such as encouraging Irish fisheries and industry.¹²³ In more poetic terms, one advertisement read:

Every Bond Certificate You Subscribe For Will Help –
Keep Ireland for the Irish
Re-people the Land
Harness the Rivers
Put the Irish Flag on Every Sea
Start the Looms Spinning
Abolish the Slums
Drain the Bogs
Lift Ireland Up
Turn Her Face to the Rising Sun¹²⁴

While advertising could be paid for, editorial support had to be negotiated. As with the IPP’s fundraising campaigns, the Irish-American press was a vital tool in rallying support for the bond drive. The *Irish World’s* shift from IPP to Sinn Féin was significant, as was John Devoy’s editorship of the *Gaelic American*. Joe McGarrity’s Philadelphia-based *Irish Press* was a consistently strong advocate of the bond drive, and faithfully reported all major functions at which money was collected.¹²⁵ Effectively becoming a weekly eight-page advertisement for the bond drive, it even went as far as listing

¹²² *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 18 Feb. 1920, p. 11.

¹²³ *Evening World*, 20 Jan. 1920, p. 17.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ S. Cronin, *The McGarrity Papers* (Tralee, 1972), p. 75.

subscribers in Philadelphia in order of the size of their pledge, and acted as a point of sale for the bond certificates itself.¹²⁶ Nevertheless, in order for the bond drive to reach its target, it also had to reach beyond the readership of the Irish-American press.

William Randolph Hearst, the media mogul and inspiration behind Orson Welles's *Citizen Kane*, was notable in his support for the Dáil.¹²⁷ In September 1919 Sean Nunan remarked how the Hearst papers were printing de Valera's articles 'with great prominence', and re-printing them in pamphlet form to distribute around the country.¹²⁸ This support was confirmed by a meeting with de Valera and Boland on 24 February 1920, in which Hearst explicitly 'agreed to aid' them.¹²⁹ The support from Hearst was significant, as just ten years earlier his papers had been among John Redmond's strongest allies in the American press.¹³⁰ However, Hearst's support for the Dáil was more a result of his own views on domestic American politics than any affinity with Irish Republicanism.¹³¹ Consequently, his endorsement was both a blessing and a curse. His pro-neutrality 'America First' stance from 1914 to 1917 made him appear Anglophobic and pro-German in the eyes of many Americans, leading one biographer to call him 'the most hated man in America' at that time.¹³² According to another, the Wilson administration saw him as 'an outsider without favour or influence, a critic both unsympathetic and unforgiving, a demagogue proposing unrealistic and impractical solutions'.¹³³ Nevertheless, his support was indispensable in raising awareness of the bond drive.

¹²⁶ *IP*, 31 Jan. 1920, pp. 2 & 4.

¹²⁷ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 137.

¹²⁸ IE/NAI/DE/2/292, *Nunan to Collins*, 17 Sept. 1919.

¹²⁹ IE/UCDA/P150/1170, *HBD*, 24 Feb. 1920.

¹³⁰ NLI/Ms.6,748/459, *Redmond to Dillon*, 3 Oct. 1910, cited in Meleady, *Redmond*, p. 179.

¹³¹ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 200.

¹³² W.A. Swanberg, *Citizen Hearst* (London, 1962), p. 294; cited in B. Proctor, *William Randolph Hearst* (Oxford, 2007) p. 47.

¹³³ Proctor, *William Randolph Hearst*, p. 47.

Beyond the political stances of figures like Hearst, there was also a commercial incentive behind newspapers' treatment of the bond drive. The Dáil mission was proactive in this regard; as early as 28 October 1919, Frank P. Walsh wrote to the editors of a number of newspapers announcing the plans for the bond drive and remarking that it may require the advertising services of the newspapers once the drive was underway.¹³⁴

While the promise of future advertising revenue from the Dáil mission would have given the editors incentive to cover the drive generously, a more compelling incentive was the appeal of the Irish-American readership. The *Boston Post* was the first prominent American newspaper to come out in favour of Sinn Féin. Its editor, Edwin Grozier, had studied the city's census and concluded that for the paper to succeed it needed to court the fast growing Irish population, which was likely to be sympathetic to the movement. In fact, he personally and publicly made large contributions to the nationalist cause.¹³⁵ In the same vein, a representative of the Dáil mission met the son of Adolph Ochs, owner of the *New York Times*, to persuade him of the merits of supporting the Dáil 'as a matter of opportunism' if not sympathy.¹³⁶

In Pennsylvania, the publisher of the *Scranton Times* was directly involved in the bond drive, and personally bought a bond certificate worth \$1,000, while the publisher of the *Pittsburgh Leader* (Alexander Moore) also spoke in favour of the drive.¹³⁷ J.W. Woller, editor of the *Northeast Banner*, although not of Irish heritage, spoke publicly in favour of the bond drive in Philadelphia and personally subscribed \$100.¹³⁸

Pressure from newspapers' readerships could also take a more aggressive form. In the words of one American newspaper editor, 'If you jump on an Englishman, everybody seems to enjoy it and no one objects, but if you jump on an Irishman you

¹³⁴ US/NYPL/MssCol.3211/b.28, *F.P. Walsh to various newspaper editors*, 28 Oct. 1919.

¹³⁵ M. Zuckoff, *Ponzi's Scheme: The true story of a financial legend*, (New York, 2006), p. 43.

¹³⁶ Kathleen Hughes. IE/UCDA/P150/995, *Report of Organization in Chattanooga, Tenn. by K. Hughes*, 12-6 Nov, 1919.

¹³⁷ *IP*, 14 Feb. 1920, pp. 1 & 2.

¹³⁸ *IP*, 3 Apr. 1920, p. 7.

have trouble on your hands at once.’¹³⁹ In Nashville, Tennessee, a ‘committee of prominent men’ was appointed to call on the editor of a local newspaper (the *Banner*) hostile to the Irish cause and persuade him to change his editorial stance.¹⁴⁰

The press attention generated by the bond drive in America also had implications for the National Loan in Ireland. The suppression of the press in Ireland, described in chapter 3, meant that coverage of the bond drive was of use not just in the US but also at home; a fact that was recognised by the British authorities. In the days after the launch of the drive in New York, there was a large-scale seizure of American newspapers at Dublin’s General Post Office and, according to the *Freeman’s Journal*, the seizures were ‘of such dimensions’ that two carts were needed to bring the newspapers to Dublin Castle.¹⁴¹ The *Freeman’s Journal* reported it was impossible to ascertain the motivation for these seizures, but Liam de Róiste was in no doubt; writing in his diary, he concluded that it was ‘to prevent us getting accounts of how the Dáil Loan fared in the States’.¹⁴² These measures did not stop the news getting through to the Irish people however, and the readers of the *Freeman’s Journal*, *Irish Independent*, *Evening Herald*, *Kilkenny People*, *Kerry Weekly Reporter*, *Angle-Celt*, *Liberator*, *Ulster Herald*, *Strabane Chronicle*, and *Fermanagh Herald* were all informed of Irish Loan Week’s pomp and circumstance.¹⁴³ Similarly, the articles generated by upheaval in Ireland also made it to America, as noted by an informant to the British Foreign Office:

¹³⁹ TNA: FO/115/2600/226, *Witherow to Phillips (FO)*, 21 Sept. 1920.

¹⁴⁰ US/NYPL/MssCol 1854/b.4/44, *Katherine Friel to Katherine Hughes*, 12 Feb. 1920.

¹⁴¹ *Freeman’s Journal (FJ)*, 20 Jan. 1920, p. 1.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*; IE/CCCA/U271/A/29, *LDRD*, 7 Feb. 1920.

¹⁴³ *FJ*, 20 Jan. 1920, p. 1, *Irish Independent*, 20 Jan. 1920, p. 1, 21 Jan. 1920, p. 5, 23 Jan. 1920, p. 6, *Evening Herald*, 19 Jan. 1920, p. 1, *Kilkenny People*, 24 Jan. 1920, p. 3, *Kerry Weekly Reporter*, 24 Jan. 1920, p. 7, *Angle-Celt*, 17 Jan. 1920, p. 1, *Liberator*, 22 Jan. 1920, p. 1, *Ulster Herald*, 17 Jan. 1920, p. 4, *Strabane Chronicle*, 17 Jan. 1920, p. 3, 24 Jan. 1920, p. 2, *Fermanagh Herald*, 24 Jan. 1920, p. 3.

...you are victims of a vicious circle. Every act of disloyalty and disturbance is featured in the Sinn Féin newspapers and propaganda in the United States and used for the purpose of selling newspapers and raising money for the interested agitators, part of which is sent back to Ireland to raise more disturbances to featured [sic.] by the propaganda in the United States to raise more money to create more disturbance in Ireland to raise more money in the United States and so on ad infinitum.¹⁴⁴

However, the bond drive was not without its critics in the US media. The *New York Herald*, *Boston Transcript* and Philadelphia's *Public Ledger* were all regarded by the Dáil mission as hostile to the cause.¹⁴⁵ In Pennsylvania, bond drive Chairman Judge Bonniwell complained 'some of the newspapers decided news of the Irish Bond Certificate drive was best left unprinted; others decided that none-too-generous mention was proper'.¹⁴⁶ According to Bonniwell, the newspapers 'failed to support this movement in the way they supported other movements in behalf of people in Europe'.¹⁴⁷ The drive's reception among the Wall Street press in particular exposed a major disadvantage in the strategy of selling bond certificates rather than soliciting donations. The *Wall Street Journal* warned that anyone who purchased the bond certificates could not be guaranteed any return, and this sentiment was repeated in the financial press.¹⁴⁸ In response to a reader's question, the financial editor of the *New York Tribune* advised against exchanging Liberty Bonds for 'so-called Irish bonds', which they described as 'to say the least, one of the most highly speculative "securities" ever offered to the American public'.¹⁴⁹ The reader claimed to have been told by the bond canvasser, a fireman, that the Irish bonds were guaranteed by the Bank of England, something the *New York Tribune* also refuted.¹⁵⁰ The next week the *Tribune* published a letter from Sheamus O'Sheel, bond drive director for Manhattan,

¹⁴⁴ TNA: FO/115/2600/226, *Witherow to Phillips (FO)*, 21 Sept. 1920.

¹⁴⁵ IE/UCDA/P150/1018, *C.E. McGuire to de Valera*, 11 Aug. 1920.

¹⁴⁶ *IP*, 7 Feb. 1920, p. 1.

¹⁴⁷ *IP*, 7 Feb. 1920, p. 1.

¹⁴⁸ F.M. Carroll, *American opinion and the Irish question, 1910-23* (Dublin, 1978), p. 153.

¹⁴⁹ *New York Tribune*, 1 Feb. 1920, p. 5.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

clarifying the status of the bond certificates while ridiculing the idea that the Bank of England would lend on behalf of Ireland.¹⁵¹

Perhaps the most scathing of reactions to the bond drive came from an editorial in the Wall Street publication *The Street*, which was reprinted in the *New York Times* and then picked up by the *Daily Telegraph* in London. Describing the drive as ‘this absurd but dangerous Irish Loan swindle,’ the editorial asserted ‘no intelligent patriotic American will give them the money they wish to shoot British policemen in the back or attempt assassination of British officials in Ireland’.¹⁵²

‘Mite to Murder’: The View from Downing Street

A key player has so far been largely absent from the story of the bond drive, and this absence reflects a stark reality. The delay with which the British responded to the bond drive was remarkable. The protracted efforts of de Valera to broker a coalition with the FOIF gave ample time to build an effective media campaign against Irish fundraising, but this opportunity was missed and the British quickly found themselves on the back foot. The British government had begun dismantling its US wartime propaganda operation in early 1919, despite calls from the embassy in Washington that ‘there was still a need for combatting the anti-British propaganda of Irish extremists’.¹⁵³ As a result, while Dublin Castle was busy suppressing the National Loan in Ireland, the bond drive in America was allowed to develop relatively unhindered.

London’s initial view of the Dáil’s fundraising prospects is best outlined in British intelligence agent Sir William Wiseman’s report of 13 August 1919:

¹⁵¹ *New York Tribune*, 9 Feb. 1920, p. 16

¹⁵² *Daily Telegraph*, 11 Feb. 1920, p. 4

¹⁵³ Walsh, *News*, p. 129.

I venture to think that H.M.G. [His Majesty's Government] has been well advised to make no protest up to now. It is not unlikely that Valera and his Irish victory fund may become somewhat ridiculous. At the moment American people have hardly made up their minds whether to take him seriously or not. And again if in consequence of protest by H.M.G. United States authorities instituted proceedings against Valera and his friends, it would be impossible to find a Jury in United States to convict them and only result of protest and prosecution would be to increase enormously their popularity.¹⁵⁴

As late as 4 February 1920, Sir Hamar Greenwood, British Undersecretary for Home Affairs, stated in the House of Commons that no formal representation had been made to the President of the United States on the matter.¹⁵⁵ At this time the intelligence coming from the British consulate in New York was that the bulk of the money raised was being spent on propaganda in America.¹⁵⁶ The dilemma faced by the British was to risk overreacting, and thereby giving de Valera undue prominence, or risk underreacting, which could be read as acquiescence. The *New York Tribune* headline 'Britain, Aware of Irish Bond Sale Here, Makes No Protest' suggests the result was the latter, and the media vacuum left by British acquiescence allowed the Dáil to frame the bond drive in its own terms.¹⁵⁷

Perhaps the British believed they had bigger fish to fry. Indeed, Foreign Office papers reveal a far greater concern for the role of American business in the bond drive. The Foreign Office noted that Standard Oil was 'giving indirectly considerable assistance to the loan'.¹⁵⁸ The indirect assistance suspected by the British quickly became suspicion of direct involvement, and a later memo from the Ambassador to Curzon claimed Standard Oil was affording 'considerable financial support' to what he called Anti-British Irish agitation.¹⁵⁹ The consulate in New York believed Standard Oil's actions were a ploy to curry favour with Irish-American politicians in Washington in case its monopoly

¹⁵⁴ Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-39, Series 1, Vol. 5, ch. 2, 13 Aug. 1919.

¹⁵⁵ *Sun and New York Herald*, 24 Feb. 1920, p. 1.

¹⁵⁶ TNA: FO/115/2599/84, *G. Armstrong to R.C. Lindsay*, 9 Feb. 1920.

¹⁵⁷ *New York Tribune*, 24 Feb. 1920, p. 5.

¹⁵⁸ TNA: FO/115/2599/88, *G. Armstrong to R.C. Lindsay*, 16 Feb. 1920.

¹⁵⁹ TNA: FO/115/2599/145, *R.C. Lindsay to Curzon*, 27 Mar. 1920.

position or other policies came into question.¹⁶⁰ According to the Ambassador, the alleged actions of Standard Oil were in keeping with the general attitude of American oil interests towards the efforts of the British Empire to secure oilfields of its own.¹⁶¹ On the other hand, it was also speculated that Standard Oil's position might be the result of blackmail from the FOIF.¹⁶² Whatever the motivation, at the heart of the alleged conspiracy was Joseph I.C. Clarke, who was employed 'in a confidential manner' at Standard Oil and was, according to the British ambassador, 'working actively in this matter and in close contact with ex-Senator Bailey'.¹⁶³ An old Fenian, journalist and author, Clarke was working as a publicist for Standard Oil at the time.¹⁶⁴ As a result of this intrigue, there was considerable disquiet in the Consulate General when, in early 1920, the *New York Herald* was acquired by the *New York Sun* by a vehicle led by media mogul Frank Munsey and believed to be backed by both Hearst and Standard Oil.¹⁶⁵

The British consulate in New York also believed, 'on fairly reliable authority', that motor magnate Henry Ford had given a personal guarantee to cover any shortfall to the bond drive's \$10m target.¹⁶⁶ However, although de Valera did indeed meet with Ford while visiting Detroit in October 1919, the meeting was dominated by a three-hour-long argument over the League of Nations and, according Hannigan, 'didn't yield anything concrete'.¹⁶⁷ Considering Ford's exposure to the British market, it is perhaps not surprising that a firm commitment was not forthcoming.

Of course Washington was not oblivious to the potential diplomatic consequences of allowing the Dáil to raise money in its territory, but in an election year it

¹⁶⁰ TNA: FO/115/2599/88, *G. Armstrong to R.C. Lindsay*, 16 Feb. 1920.

¹⁶¹ TNA: FO/115/2599/145, *R.C. Lindsay to Curzon*, 27 Mar. 1920.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ TNA: FO/115/2599/160, *G. Armstrong to Curzon*, 6 Apr. 1920.

¹⁶⁴ J.I.C. Clarke, *My Life and Memories* (New York, 1925), p. 344.

¹⁶⁵ TNA: FO/115/2599/116, *G. Armstrong to R.C. Lindsay*, 9 Mar. 1920.

¹⁶⁶ TNA: FO/115/2599/84, *G. Armstrong to R.C. Lindsay*, 30 Jan. 1920; TNA: FO/115/2599/84, *G. Armstrong to R.C. Lindsay*, 9 Feb. 1920.

¹⁶⁷ IE/UCDA/P150/1170, *HBD*, 19 Oct. 1919; Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 149.

created something for a dilemma for American politicians. As elected representatives, they did not want to alienate Irish-American voters, but at the same time the British were key allies with whom the US was concluding peace talks in Paris. State Department officials advocated a 'firm policy against the sale' of Dáil bonds 'to prevent our territory being used to further rebellion against a friendly nation,' but politicians had to be cognisant of Irish-American voting power.¹⁶⁸ In the opinion of Senator John Sharp Williams, the sale of the Irish bond certificates was clearly illegal and de Valera and the titular leaders of the ACII were 'indictable under the United States statute for "setting on foot missions of military enterprise against dominions of a foreign state at peace with the United States"'.¹⁶⁹ He conceded however that Irish American sentiment meant getting a conviction would be impossible.¹⁷⁰

The main concern in Washington was that the exchange of Liberty Bonds for Irish bond-certificates implied a tacit approval of the Irish issue by the US administration. In February 1920, the newly appointed US Treasury Secretary, David F. Houston, wrote to James O'Mara requesting him 'not to offer any inducements by advertisement or public announcement to part with their Liberty Bonds in exchange for Irish Bond Certificates'.¹⁷¹ Perhaps overestimating the success of the bond drive, Houston also feared that the selling-off of Liberty Loan bonds in exchange for Irish bond certificates would depress the market price of outstanding issues and 'embarrass the financial operations and future borrowings of the Government of the United States'.¹⁷² Frank P. Walsh replied to Houston acceding to his request, and suggested to O'Mara that the state and city chairmen be instructed to destroy any printed matter on

¹⁶⁸ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 143.

¹⁶⁹ Carroll, *American opinion*, p. 153.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ NLI/Ms.21,548(5), *Notebook: Copy of note from J. O'Mara to Numan*, 17 Feb. 1920.

¹⁷² US/NYPL/MssCol 3211/b.28, *D.F. Houston to F.P. Walsh*, 7 Feb 1920.

hand that made reference to the exchange of liberty bonds.¹⁷³ However, as the bond drive had already been launched in the major centres of Irish population, the brand association between the two bond issues had already been secured in the minds of many.

Tacit recognition was also on the minds of British officials, in particular the suggestion that the organisation selling the bond certificates was ‘the government of Ireland’. On 2 March 1920, the British Consul General suggested it might be time to issue an official statement condemning the bond certificates being sold in America and their not being accepted ‘in any shape or form’ by the Irish government.¹⁷⁴ This vying to lend under the name ‘government of Ireland’ was a two-way street however. The same month a move to permit American Savings Bank funds to be invested in securities of the ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland’ allowed de Valera to make a similar statement, ‘denying the existence such an entity as the United Kingdom’.¹⁷⁵ As de Valera explained to his cabinet, ‘I feel it is my duty to put my finger in whenever there is anything being done or said in the name of Ireland.’¹⁷⁶ As noted by Pierre Bourdieu, ‘the struggle for monopoly of legitimacy helps to reinforce the legitimacy in the name of which it is waged.’¹⁷⁷

As the bond drive progressed and its success became manifest the focus of British concerns turned from symbolism to facts. On 31 May 1920, Greenwood told the British Cabinet ‘that these [IRA] are handsomely paid, that the money comes from the USA, and that it is passed through Bishop Fogarty and Arthur Griffith by means of cheques issued to Michael Collins, the Adjutant General of the Irish Republican Army.’

¹⁷³ US/NYPL/MssCol 3211/b.28, *F.P. Walsh to D.F. Houston*, 17 Feb 1920; US/NYPL/MssCol 3211/b.28, *F.P. Walsh to J. O'Mara*, 17 Feb 1920.

¹⁷⁴ TNA: FO/115/2599/94, *G. Armstrong to R.C. Lindsay*, 2 Mar. 1920.

¹⁷⁵ IE/UCDA/P150/727, *de Valera to Cabinet*, 25 Mar. 1920.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ P. Bourdieu, *The rules of art: genesis and structure of the literary field* (1996), p.167, cited in M.G. Malouf, *Transatlantic solidarities* (Virginia, 2009), p. 74.

‘The money,’ he claimed, ‘is paid out to the murderers in public houses’.¹⁷⁸ A British intelligence report submitted to the Irish Situation Committee in the summer of 1920 claimed that, ‘anyone, anywhere in the world who has subscribed to any Sinn Fein funds has given his mite to murder.’¹⁷⁹

De Valera’s Advocates

In his role of ‘President of Ireland’, almost the personification of the Dáil’s brand, de Valera was the main advocate for the bond drive in America. Yet, as noted by modern marketing theorists, external, independent advocates are often just as powerful in communicating a brand’s personality.¹⁸⁰ De Valera was not the only Irishman making speeches in America at the time, nor was he the most famous. W.B. Yeats arrived in the US on 24 January 1920 for a speaking tour, just at the end of Irish Loan Week.¹⁸¹ When asked by an *Evening Sun* journalist for his views on the bond drive, Yeats replied that he had no statement to make on the subject, beyond the observation that it was a matter for the politicians.¹⁸² However, the *Irish Press* headline ‘Gaelic Revival led by Sinn Fein, says Yeats’, surrounded by articles on the bond drive’s promotion, is notable.¹⁸³

While refusing to make any comment on de Valera’s publicity campaign, Yeats was nonetheless forthright with his views. On arrival he declared that Ireland was now ‘a country of oppression’ that was stifled by censorship, and he called for ‘some form of self-government’.¹⁸⁴ Although he found time to endorse the Zionist ‘Palestine Restoration Fund’ committee, there is no evidence that Yeats spoke publicly in favour of

¹⁷⁸ Jones, *Whitehall Diary*, Vol. 3, p.17, cited in Costello, *Irish Revolution*, pp. 75-6

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 77-8

¹⁸⁰ D.A. Aaker & E. Joachimsthaler, *Brand Leadership* (New York, 2000), pp. 77-8.

¹⁸¹ R.F. Foster, *WB Yeats: a life*, Vol.2 (Oxford, 1997), p. 165.

¹⁸² *IP*, 31 Jan. 1920, p. 3.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ Foster, *WB Yeats*, Vol.2, p. 165.

the bond drive.¹⁸⁵ Advised by his agent not to get involved in the imbroglio that was Irish American politics, for the rest of his tour Yeats walked the tightrope of distancing himself from Sinn Féin politics while at the same time equivocating on their use of violence and stressing the mandate they had from the people.¹⁸⁶ An effort was also made to persuade the public intellectual George ‘Æ’ Russell to undertake a lecture tour of the States, but contact was never made with him and he never travelled to the US during the War of Independence.¹⁸⁷ It is also likely that the famous Irish tenor John McCormack was courted as an advocate for the drive. De Valera had dinner at his house on Easter Monday 1920, but there is no evidence of explicit endorsement arising from that encounter.¹⁸⁸

As with the National Loan, the bond drive relied heavily on senior clergy for endorsement, and this endorsement had added significance in America. As well as lending an air of respectability to the bond drive as a project, it also added legitimacy to the Dáil as the government of Ireland. More permanent than the various Irish American societies, the Catholic Church was the closest thing the Irish in America had to a custodian of their national culture. By endorsing the bond drive the clergy were acknowledging the Dáil as government of the nation whose culture they preserved. Clerical endorsement must also be seen in the context of other connotations promoted by the Dáil brand in America, particularly the links with the Fenian Brotherhood. Just as the acceptance of Liberty Loan bonds moderated the financially dubious connotations of the Fenian bonds, the clerical endorsement would have counteracted their morally dubious implications.

¹⁸⁵ *San Francisco Call and Post*, 26 Mar. 1920, cited in K.M. Strand, *W.B. Yeats's American Lecture Tours* (PhD Diss., Northwestern University, 1978), pp. 187-8, cited in Foster, *WB Yeats*, Vol.2, p. 165.

¹⁸⁶ Foster, *WB Yeats*, Vol.2, p. 165.

¹⁸⁷ IE/NAI/DE/1/2, *Minutes of DE Ministry and Cabinet*, 6 Jun. 1920; IE/UCDA/P150/729, *D. O'Hegearty to de Valera*, 8 Jun. 1920; H. Summerfield, *That Myriad Minded Man – AE*, (Buckinghamshire, 1975), pp. 192-208.

¹⁸⁸ IE/UCDA/P150/1170, *HBD*, 5 Apr. 1920.

The most prominent of the drive's clerical cheerleaders was Patrick J. Hayes, the Archbishop of New York. Having met de Valera at his palace just two days before the launch of the bond drive, he subscribed \$1,000 and wrote in glowing terms about de Valera and his mission:¹⁸⁹

After a very satisfactory conference with Mr Eamon de Valera, President of the Irish Republic, I am convinced that his program for agricultural, industrial and commercial development of Ireland is entirely practical and constructive...America will surely not refuse her moral support for Ireland.¹⁹⁰

A valuable endorsement, Hayes's letter was copied and used as promotional material for the drive across the country.¹⁹¹ In a historical perspective it also provides a sharp contrast to a letter written by one of Hayes's predecessors in response to the 1866 Fenian issue. Recorded in the press, Archbishop McCloskey's letter admonished support for the Fenian bonds, forbidding absolution to any member of the Fenian organisation.¹⁹²

The significance of Archbishop Hayes's letter was noted by the British consulate in New York, which was puzzled by his change of stance from 'official neutrality' to open support for Sinn Féin. It concluded that the Archbishop's conversion was mainly down to political expediency, as he had been 'closely associated with the State and Civic authorities' since his appointment and, together with the Governor and Mayor, he could not ignore the pressure from Irish American constituents.¹⁹³ More specifically, the consulate-general in Boston believed that his stance was driven by local politics, as the

¹⁸⁹ IE/UCDA/P150/1095, *Hayes to de Valera*, 7 Jan. 1920; Carroll, *Money*, p. 21.

¹⁹⁰ Carroll, *Money*, p. 21.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹² *Richmond Dispatch*, 7 Mar. 1866, p. 3.

¹⁹³ TNA: FO/115/2599/72, *D. Boyle to R.C. Lindsay*, 23 Jan. 1920. Hayes's secretary (Fr. Dineen), described by the British as 'a rampant Sinn Féiner', was transferred to other work in early 1920, which the British consulate viewed as 'a step in the right direction'. (TNA: FO/115/2599/81, *G. Armstrong to R.C. Lindsay*, 6 Feb. 1920).

Mayor and Aldermen had been holding up ‘appropriations for school and other educational requirements’.¹⁹⁴

The effect of this clerical endorsement, and in particular of Archbishop Hayes, was picked up by *The Times* New York correspondent, who reported the ‘tremendous stimulus’ it had given to the movement:¹⁹⁵ *The Times* also remarked on support for Sinn Féin from clergy further down the hierarchy, emphasising the extent to which they were following their flocks:

Those priests who have hitherto shown no inclination to support the Sinn Fein movement are now being subjected to a partial boycott by parishioners who refuse to contribute to the church collections unless the sale of “Irish Liberty Bonds” is permitted on the church steps or in the porch. The result is that in practically every Roman Catholic church in the country there is added to the routine announcements made at each service the statement that Irish bonds can be obtained at the entrance by those who are interested.¹⁹⁶

Archbishop Hayes’s endorsement was replicated across America. Under the headline ‘Read the List’, the *Kentucky Irish American* listed the following senior clergy along with their subscriptions:¹⁹⁷

- Cardinal O’Connell, Boston \$1,000
- Archbishop Mundelein, Chicago \$1,000
- Archbishop Mannix, Australia \$1,000
- Archbishop Hayes, New York \$1,000
- Archbishop Hanna, San Francisco, \$1,000
- Bishop Hoban, Scranton \$1,000
- Bishop Hallagher, Detroit \$1,000
- Bishop Lenahan, Great Falls \$200
- Bishop O’Dea, Seattle, \$250
- Bishop Schinner, Spokane \$500
- Bishop Schrembs, Toledo, \$100
- Bishop Tihen, Denver \$100
- Bishop Chartrand, Indianapolis \$100

‘There must be very steady pressure behind it all,’ reasoned the British Consulate in New York, ‘for however much they talk of spending the money on a “constructive

¹⁹⁴ TNA: FO/115/2598/214, *British Consulate-General, Boston, to R.C. Lindsay*, 20 Jan. 1920.

¹⁹⁵ *The Times*, 26 Jan. 1920, p. 11.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ *Kentucky Irish American*, 29 May 1920.

programme”, anyone can see that it is actually being poured out like water on the propaganda and advertisement with which New York has recently been flooded’.¹⁹⁸ There were of course exceptions, notably Bishop Gallagher of Detroit but, again, this was for local rather than ideological reasons. Concerned that any competition would harm a diocesan fund he was raising at the time, he did his utmost to dissuade the Dáil mission from proceeding with the bond drive there.¹⁹⁹

This is not to say the clergy were completely mercenary in their motivations; there may also have been an ideological motivation for the clergy’s overt support for Sinn Féin. The initial shift in public opinion following Easter 1916 had largely occurred among working-class Irish Americans, while the better heeled Irish Americans remained loyal to the IPP. With the martyrdom of Marxist-influenced James Connolly, there was a real possibility this shift would take a socialist turn. Against the backdrop of the Bolshevik Revolution, the threat of socialism was a real incentive for the clergy to assert control over the Irish nationalist movement in America.²⁰⁰ This was particularly true of Boston, where local infighting combined with the speed of the shift in opinion presented a leadership vacuum into which the clergy could step.²⁰¹ When in January 1920 the British Consul General met Cardinal O’Connell in Boston, he ‘put a few spokes in as to the growth of socialism in Ireland’ with a view to dissuading the Cardinal from supporting Sinn Féin.²⁰² In light of the dynamic described above, and later press reports that the Cardinal had subscribed \$1,000 to the bond drive, it may have had the opposite effect.²⁰³

¹⁹⁸ TNA: FO/115/2599/72, *D. Boyle to R.C. Lindsay*, 23 Jan. 1920.

¹⁹⁹ IE/UCDA/P150/1100, *De Valera’s Recollections of his American tour*, 19 Nov. 1962.

²⁰⁰ D. Murray, ‘Go Forth as a Missionary to Fight It’: Catholic Antisocialism and Irish American Nationalism in Post-World War I Boston’, *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 28/4 (2009), p. 43.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 47 & 50.

²⁰² TNA: FO/115/2598/214, *British Consulate-General, Boston, to R.C. Lindsay*, 20 Jan. 1920.

²⁰³ *Kentucky Irish American*, 29 May 1920.

The extent of the clerical power-grab is revealed in an observation from the labour leader, C.A. Strickland. “The movies show Mr. De Valera everywhere with a bodyguard of Catholic priests and bishops... Those of us who are interested in the splendid fight that Ireland has made are Quite [*sic*] at sea to know if the Clergy is control of the organisation or not.”²⁰⁴ Although the antisocialist influence of the clergy risked alienating the Dáil’s more left-leaning supporters, it was crucial in paving the way for more affluent Irish Americans to follow, and in this respect their endorsement of the bond drive was invaluable.²⁰⁵

The South

Of course clerical endorsement was not without its drawbacks. This became particularly acute on 8 April 1920 when de Valera began his tour of the American South.²⁰⁶ Beginning in Norfolk, Virginia, his itinerary included visits to North and South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, before finishing back in Virginia at Richmond on 29 April 1920.²⁰⁷ Although the Dáil’s chances for fundraising were slim in the South, as noted by de Valera it was ‘democratic country’. To exploit the Irish voting block in the upcoming US presidential election, it was vital to get the South on board.²⁰⁸ Needless to say, this would be easier said than done. According to Fitzpatrick, many evangelical Protestants believed Irish nationalism to be ‘a cloak for papal aggression, a threat to religious toleration, and therefore inimical to American ideals of liberty’. This belief had particular traction in the South, where a resurgent Ku

²⁰⁴ US/NYPL/MssCol 3211/b.28, *C.A. Strickland to F.P. Walsh*, 20 Aug. 1919.

²⁰⁵ Murray, ““Go Forth as a Missionary to Fight It””, p. 43.

²⁰⁶ *Evening Star (Washington DC)*, 15 Mar. 1920, p. 19.

²⁰⁷ IE/BMH/WS0394, *J.A.H. Irwin*, p. 3.

²⁰⁸ IE/UCDA/P150/727, *de Valera to Cabinet*, 25 Mar. 1920.

Klux Klan (KKK) was stirring anti-Catholic sentiment.²⁰⁹ The bond drive's endorsement by the Catholic clergy would have done nothing to dispel such suspicions. To make matters worse, a delegation of 15 Ulster Unionists had been touring the US since November 1919, preaching against 'popery' and de Valera's vision for Ireland, and in favour of Ulster's right to self-determination.²¹⁰

The danger was not just that Protestants would be dissuaded from subscribing, but that Catholics would be discouraged as well, fearing antagonism from their protestant neighbours.²¹¹ Clearly, in order for the bond drive to succeed in the South the Dáil mission needed to tailor their brand to suit Southern tastes. G.R. Stephens, a Protestant from Dublin, nephew of the Fenian James Stephens and resident of Atlanta Georgia, advised that the only way to make a success of the South would be to send an 'Educated, Gentlemanly, Smooth, Protestant organizer (or rather polisher) who would work specially among the protestant element'.²¹² The Dáil mission's solution came in the form of the 'Protestant Friends of Ireland' (PFI).²¹³

A motley crew, the PFI was led by Lindsay Crawford, editor of the *Toronto Statesman*, a former Ulster Unionist who spoke with 'a northern burr like rusty machinery'.²¹⁴ The PFI's executive secretary was Rev. James Grattan Mythen, Bishop of the Greek Protestant Church and descendent of 18th century Irish politician Henry Grattan.²¹⁵ Known to the US Bureau of Investigation, Mythen was a supporter of the Bolsheviks as recently as August 1919.²¹⁶ Referring to him as 'the gob', the *Washington*

²⁰⁹ M. Silvestri, 'The South needs Encouragement: The Irish Republican Campaign in the American South and Southern Irish American Identity, 1919-20', *Éire-Ireland*, 47/3 (2012), p. 200.

²¹⁰ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, pp. 141-2.

²¹¹ IE/UCDA/P150/995, *Report of Organization Atlanta, Georgia*, by K. Hughes, 18-25 Nov, 1919.

²¹² US/NYPL/MssCol 3211/b.28, G.R. Stephens to P. Ackerman, 28 Jan. 1920.

²¹³ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 142.

²¹⁴ *Washington Herald*, 7 Jan. 1920, p. 12; T.A. FitzGerald, 'American Jottings', *Catholic Bulletin*, 11, p. 410.

²¹⁵ *Washington Herald*, 7 Jan. 1920, p.12; *Washington Times*, 7 Nov. 1920.

²¹⁶ US/NARA/M1085, *FBI case file 378622, W.L. Hurley to J.E. Hoover*, 25 Oct. 1920.

Herald described him as ‘one of the most brilliant orators in the Episcopalian Church’.²¹⁷ A third recruit to the PFI was Rev. James Irwin, a Presbyterian minister from Co. Londonderry and strong supporter of the Irish Republic who just happened to be in America for medical treatment.²¹⁸ An experienced fundraiser in his own right, Irwin had previously toured the US in 1913 to raise funds for a school in his parish.²¹⁹

The British strategy for undermining the bond drive, to the extent that they had a strategy, was largely reliant on emphasising the association of the Dáil with popery, so it was vital that they discredit the members of the PFI.²²⁰ According to the British Consul-General in New Orleans, the L.A. police records showed Mythen had been ‘charged with gross immorality’ while there on some clerical work.²²¹ The embassy tried and failed to find similar information on Irwin, but concluded that he was ‘evidently a liar and a thorough ruffian’.²²² Instead, they had to rely on a press article in which Irwin’s mission was ‘entirely repudiated’ by the Irish Presbyterian Assembly as well as his own presbytery and congregation.²²³ Meanwhile, Michael Collins was using his network of National Loan collectors to gather information on J.M. Coote, leader of the Ulster delegation.²²⁴

Despite the cloak of the PFI, the negative reaction to de Valera in the South was considerable. The most consistent of his opponents was the American Legion, who showed up to protest against his appearance in Columbia, South Carolina on 12 April 1920.²²⁵ The *Irish Press* noted how some members of the American Legion in Scranton, Pennsylvania, supported the bond drive and that a subscription of £100 was made by the

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*

²¹⁸ TNA: FO/115/2599/163, *British Consul-General in New Orleans to R.C. Lindsay*, 31 Mar. 1920; IE/BMH/WS0394, *J.A.H. Irwin*, p. 1.

²¹⁹ IE/BMH/WS0394, *J.A.H. Irwin*, p. 1.

²²⁰ Hogan, *Four Glorious Years*, p. 255.

²²¹ TNA: FO/115/2599/163, *British Consul-General in New Orleans to R.C. Lindsay*, 31 Mar. 1920.

²²² TNA: FO/115/2599/164, *R.H. Hadow to British Consul-General in New Orleans*, 13 Apr. 1920.

²²³ TNA: FO/115/2599/165, *Repudiated! Cable from Ireland*, n.d..

²²⁴ TNA: CO 904/24/3/M/96, *Epitome of documents seized at 5 Mespil Rd*, 1920. Ref. *Collins to Rev. Fr. Maguire, Tyrone*, 17 Feb. 1920.

²²⁵ IE/UCDA/P150/1170, *HBD*, 12 Apr. 1920, 18 Apr. 1920.

Minooka branch of that organisation, but the very fact that the editor thought this worth mentioning suggests it was atypical.²²⁶ Sinn Féin and the FOIF's links with Germany during the Great War were another obstacle to the success of the bond drive in the American South.²²⁷ Indeed, much of the anti-Catholic sentiment promoted by the KKK was bound up in notions of 'hyphenated Americans' with dual allegiances during the War. Attempts were made to counter this impression, including the use of men 'who rendered conspicuous service in the American Army during the war' as speakers.²²⁸ As part of the drive's preparations, a circular from Frank P. Walsh instructed that dedicated local committees be set up to find such men.²²⁹ Speaking at a bond drive rally in Jacksonville, Bishop Curley claimed the Irish had lost 200,000 men in the Great War.²³⁰ No doubt this strategy was complemented by the bond drive's evocation of the Liberty Loan campaign. The British Consul in St Louis, Missouri, reported on 5 March 1920 that windows in the houses of a number of the poorer residential areas of the city were displaying green, white and orange posters with the words 'Subscriber Irish Bond Certificates'.²³¹ As noted by the Consul, this advertising method mimicked those of the Liberty Loan campaign of the Great War.²³² Appealing further to American patriotism, an advertisement in Virginia's *Richmond Times-Dispatch* recalled financial contributions made by Irishmen to Washington's army.²³³

Nevertheless, the bond drive was always going to be a hard sell in the South, and Alabama was particularly hard. The pickets were out for de Valera when he spoke in Mobile, Alabama, on 18 April 1920, and his reception was particularly hostile in

²²⁶ *IP*, 14 Feb. 1920, pp. 1 & 2.

²²⁷ Hopkinson, *Irish War of Independence*, p. 165.

²²⁸ US/NYPL/MssCol 1854/b.4/44, *Katherine Friel to Katherine Hughes*, 12 Feb. 1920.

²²⁹ US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13, *Circular from F.P. Walsh to all State and City Chairmen*, 26 Dec. 1919.

²³⁰ *IP*, 24 Apr. 1920, p. 2.

²³¹ TNA: FO/115/2599/94, *British Consul in St Louis to R.C. Lindsay*, 5 Mar. 1920.

²³² IE/UCDA/P150/1170, *HBD*, 4 May 1920.

²³³ *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 15 Feb. 1920, p. 19.

Birmingham, which he visited against the advice of locals.²³⁴ Sure enough, on 20 April 1920, over 1,000 white residents gathered to denounce the ‘Sinn Fein propagandist’.²³⁵ Although his speech at the Jefferson Theater drew a large crowd, it contained both supporters and detractors, some of whom interrupted the proceedings with shouts of ‘Throw him out’.²³⁶ The local chapter of the American Legion urged the Governor to declare de Valera *persona non grata*, but in the end it had to be satisfied with a strongly worded statement:

The pilgrimage of de Valera and his Sinn Féin propaganda should have long ago received the attention of the State Department... Were I [the] directing official of that department..., I would unhesitatingly order the deportation of de Valera without delay.²³⁷

Massachusetts closed its bond drive on 25 April 1920.²³⁸ The bond drive in Los Angeles also closed on 25 April 1920, having raised over \$200,000 in South California.²³⁹ On 26 April 1920, de Valera took a detour from his Southern tour to close the drive in Chicago with a banquet at the Congress Hotel.²⁴⁰

De Valera returned to New York on 4 May 1920, according to Harry Boland’s diary, ‘thanking God that speech making is over’.²⁴¹ His path finally crossed with Yeats’s when the latter attended an address by de Valera to bond drive workers, and the two of them met later on.²⁴² De Valera tried to enlist Yeats as a public advocate of the Dáil mission in America but Yeats declined, preferring not to get involved in what R.F. Foster

²³⁴ IE/UCDA/P150/1170, *HBD*, 18 Apr. 1920; TNA: FO/115/2599/165, *Repudiated! Cable from Ireland*, n.d.; IE/UCDA/P150/995, *Report of Organization Atlanta, Georgia*, by K. Hughes, 18-25 Nov. 1919.

²³⁵ Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 143.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.145.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

²³⁸ *IP*, 1 May 1920, p. 3.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, 8 May 1920, p. 7.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 15 May 1920, p. 1.

²⁴¹ IE/UCDA/P150/1170, *HBD*, 4 May 1920.

²⁴² Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 149.

describes as the 'Irish-American political cauldron'.²⁴³ Yeats's assessment of de Valera, based on this meeting, was withering:

I was rather disappointed – A living argument rather than a living man, all propaganda, no human life, but not bitter hysterical or unjust... I judged him persistent, being both patient and energetic but he will fail through not having enough human life to judge the human life in others. He will ask too much of everyone & will ask it without charm. He will be pushed aside by others.²⁴⁴

Yeats was wise to avoid the political cauldron, which had been simmering away throughout the bond campaign. As will be seen in chapter 8, the threat that this undercurrent would rise to the surface was constant, with potentially disastrous consequences for the success of the drive. The brand constructed by the Dáil mission in the course of the campaign would be vital in maintaining balance in de Valera's relationship with the FOIF, but it also represented a challenge to the FOIF's leadership of Irish-American opinion in the context of a US Presidential election year. This struggle, along with the pressures of running an organisation on the scale of the bond drive, is the focus of chapter 8.

²⁴³ Foster, *WB Yeats*, Vol.2, p. 168.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

Chapter 8: Behind the Scenes

‘There is a nice healthy scrap on,’ relayed an informant to the US Bureau of Investigation, forerunner to the FBI. This intelligence, part of a growing case file on Irish revolutionary activity in the US, was based on a meeting de Valera held with Cohalan and Devoy on 21 December 1919, just as the final preparations for the bond drive were taking shape. ‘Knowing the temper of the Irish,’ she continued, ‘[I] don’t envy either Cohalan or Devoy’.¹ Regardless of temper, as observed by the informant, the eve of the bond drive was arguably when de Valera was at his weakest in relation to the FOIF. The funds required had not yet been collected and he was almost completely reliant on the FOIF for their collection. ‘They need the money badly,’ in the words of the mole, and ‘have patched up a truce until after the bond drive.’²

The maintenance of this truce and the mitigation of its failings were among the biggest challenges faced by the organisers of the bond drive but, as this chapter will show, they were not the only challenges. Beneath the razzmatazz of speeches and receptions lay an organisation under strain. Some difficulties were simply a function of the scale of the operation and the limited time available to organise. Others were caused by clashes of personalities within the Dáil mission. Others still were simply the result of weather conditions. Nonetheless, the spectre of disunity was present throughout, constantly threatening to derail the entire campaign.

¹ US/NARA/M1085, *FBI case file 202600-695*, ‘E.G.’ to FBI, 21 Dec. 1919.

² *Ibid.*

The Gathering Storm

As noted in chapter 7, the bond drive's launch date had many advantages. The weather, however, was not one of them. Nevertheless, with money urgently required in Dublin and the truce with the FOIF fragile, waiting for spring was simply not an option. The day of the bond drive's launch in New York began with snowfall, and temperatures that day ranged from freezing to -9°C . Temperatures barely rose above freezing in New York for the entirety of Irish Loan week, and on a number of days it plunged as low as -13°C .³ As is clear from Figure 8.1, the most intensive period of the bond drive in New York – the first three months – was mainly conducted in sub-zero temperatures. This had a very tangible impact on the bond drive; its director for New York complained the inclement weather had 'reduced our staff of willing workers quite considerably', while Harry Boland bemoaned the traffic jams caused by heavy snowfall.⁴




Figure 8.1. Mean temperature in New York City, 17 Jan. 1920 - 31 Mar. 1920.⁵

³ *Sun*, 18-27 Jan. 1920.

⁴ NLI/MS.21,548(1), *T.A. Gannon to J. O'Mara*, 26 Jan. 1920; IE/UCDA/P150/1170, *HBD*, 22 Jan. 1920, 4 Feb. 1920.

⁵ *Sun*, 18 Jan.-31 Jan. 1920; *Sun and New York Herald*, 1 Feb.-1 Apr. 1920.

This was not a problem confined to New York. On the day of Frank P. Walsh and Harry Boland's visit to Chicago in Irish Loan Week, temperatures ranged from -18°C to -11°C, while the day of their rally in Philadelphia hit a low of -8°C.⁶ Judge Bonniwell, Chairman of the drive in Pennsylvania, complained of 'the worst weather experienced in this part of the country for years,' although adding 'it wasn't enough to halt us'.⁷

Inclement weather was not the only problem beyond the control of the bond drive organisers. The Spanish 'flu had been spreading through America since the end of the Great War and, having subsided the previous year, rallied again in January and February of 1920.⁸ Cities such as Detroit, Milwaukee, Minneapolis and St Louis were severely affected, and public meetings were prohibited in the Carolinas.⁹ Frank P. Walsh was suffering from the 'flu for all of February and, although characterising it as 'merely a mild flirtation with influenza', had to cancel his attendance at a rally planned to 'ginger up' the bond workers of Manhattan.¹⁰ Judge Cohalan was also invited to speak, but had to decline for the same reason.¹¹ Acting Chairman of the bond drive in Manhattan, John D. Moore, lamented:

...I'm afraid that our audience will be greatly depleted by the same epidemic and the prevailing weather. Everybody at this office and probably half of our canvassers throughout the Borough have fallen victims to the influenza but you can't kill a good Irishman at this critical time and you can't kill the zeal of our people for the cause of the Irish Republic Loan.¹²

⁶ *Sun*, 19 Jan. 1920, 21 Jan. 1920.

⁷ *IP*, 7 Feb. 1920, p. 1.

⁸ A.W. Crosby, *America's Forgotten Pandemic: The influenza of 1918* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 203.

⁹ *Ibid.*; IE/UCDA/P150/995, *Handwritten memo by K. Hughes on the Southern States ahead of de Valera's tour of the South*, n.d., probably Mar. 1920.

¹⁰ US/NYPL/MssCol 3211/b.28, *F.P. Walsh to S.T. O'Ceallaigh*, 25 Feb. 1920 (said he had been suffering from 'flu for the past three or four weeks and on doctor's orders was going to take a vacation for two weeks to recuperate); US/NYPL/MssCol 3211/b.28, *F.P. Walsh to J.D. Moore*, 31 Jan. 1920; US/NYPL/MssCol 3211/b.28, *O'Sheel to F.P. Walsh*, 6 Feb. 1920.

¹¹ US/NYPL/MssCol 3211/b.28, *O'Sheel to F.P. Walsh*, 6 Feb. 1920.

¹² *Ibid.*

Elsewhere, the *Irish World* reported that ‘many of the more earnest workers’ in Scranton, Pennsylvania, were taken ill; ‘Death also decimated the ranks and made the situation dark-hued for a time’.¹³ According to the *World*, the leader of the drive was ‘confined to his room’ due to illness and bad weather, and his wife died ‘in the epidemic that gripped our city’.¹⁴ Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania, was so badly hit by the ‘flu and harsh weather that the bond drive organisers made their canvas by telephone, preparing a script for those members who had telephones to read to potential subscribers.¹⁵ Perhaps the most poignant story of the bond drive came from the *Irish Press*, which reported a man suffering from pneumonia subscribing \$50 to the bond drive on his deathbed, just after the priest had been called.¹⁶

(Dis)organisation

The sub-zero weather was accompanied by a cooling in relations between de Valera’s Dáil mission and the FOIF leadership. Meetings between the FOIF leadership and de Valera at the Waldorf Astoria, which had been a regular occurrence from his arrival in New York in July 1919, ceased in January 1920.¹⁷ Perhaps as a result, the bond drive launch party at the Lexington Theater was planned without any consultation with John Devoy. This move was taken as a slight by Devoy, and ‘a tentative effort to break the organizations here and to initiate the “organization subject to orders”’.¹⁸ This animosity between the FOIF leadership on one side, dominated by Cohalan and Devoy’s Clan na

¹³ *IP*, 14 Feb. 1920, p. 1.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 21 Feb. 1920, p. 2.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 7 Feb. 1920, p. 1.

¹⁷ McGeough, *Lynch*, p. 123.

¹⁸ IE/UCDA/P150/1007, *Devoy, to J Schell*, 20 Feb. 1920.

Gael, and de Valera's Dáil mission on the other, infected the bond drive from top to bottom, with effects that were visible from the start.

In New York, there was a problem with door-to-door collections from the outset. The city's director for the drive, T.A. Gannon, complained that the pro-Cohalan Clan na Gael had already started selling bond certificates before the campaign was launched, making a comprehensive canvas of the city by the official organisation much more difficult.¹⁹ Gannon secured agreement from the city's Clan leaders to cease canvassing *via* their own organisation and turn their canvassers over to the official organisation, but he saw no evidence that this agreement was honoured.²⁰ For example, when a man in the Bronx wanted to subscribe \$1,500, the local Clan na Gael organisation insisted he buy the bond certificate through them and not the official organisation.²¹ This kind of territorialism, in which organisations vied to claim credit for the amount raised, is completely understandable; each organisation needed to justify its existence by showing the results of its labour. However, in the case of the bond drive it was exacerbated by the personal rivalries involved, not least that between Cohalan, Devoy, and de Valera. As the Chairman for the bond drive in the Bronx was appointed not just for his organisational skills, but also because he 'had other reasons of his own for antagonism to Cohalan', it is not surprising that cooperation was less than perfect.²²

Similarly, the choice of Cohalan-loyalist Shaemus O'Sheel as secretary for the drive in Manhattan, against the wishes of James O'Mara, resulted in an enduringly dysfunctional relationship between that borough and head office.²³ 'The services of Mr Seamus Shea [*sic.*] were pressed upon me,' grumbled O'Mara, 'and unless I availed myself

¹⁹ NLI/Ms.21,548(1), *Gannon to J. O'Mara*, 26 Jan 1920.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² US/NYPL/MssCol 3212/b.3/5, *J.C. Walsh's reminiscences*, p. 159.

²³ NLI/Ms.21,548(3), *J. O'Mara to Rev. J.W. Power*, 16 Aug. 1920.

of them the Manhattan Office work would have been suspended'.²⁴ O'Sheel complained that, because of the lack of cooperation from head office, campaign literature was being printed in his borough but then 'shipped off to Utah and Vermont', with the result that Manhattan had to start its campaign with neither advertising material nor tender forms.²⁵ More than a simple lack of cooperation, this dispute was personal; O'Sheel reported to Cohalan 'persistent humiliations upon me, insinuations against my handling of expense funds and denial of funds so that twice I had to sustain our work out of my own pocket'.²⁶

Similar problems were observable in California. Writing to James O'Mara on 24 January 1920, a bond drive organiser complained that just before he left San Francisco the Clan there 'had a meeting and upset all the arrangements' he had made.²⁷ The Clan leaders in the city refused to hand over any bond money collected to the California state chairman or anyone representing him, preferring instead to send it to head office in New York.²⁸ The Gaelic League, GAA and Women's Educational League in San Francisco all took the same position, handing their money to the Clan for them to send direct to New York.²⁹

The same kind of disunity could be seen in Chicago, with Cohalan supporters again in the dock. Mary McWhorter, President of the Ladies Auxiliary AOH (LAAOH) and resident of that city, was particularly critical of how the bond drive was organised there:

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ US/AIHS/DFC/Bx.13/10, *O'Sheel to Cohalan*, 9 Apr. 1920.

²⁶ NLI/Ms.21,548(3), *J. O'Mara to Rev. J.W. Power*, 16 Aug. 1920; US/AIHS/DFC/Bx.13/10, *O'Sheel to Cohalan*, 9 Apr. 1920.

²⁷ NLI/Ms.21,548(1), *T. Walsb to J. O'Mara*, 24 Jan. 1920.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*

The F.O.I.F. and the Hib's [*sic.*] have made possible the amount that has been subscribed to the Dail Erin Loan, the sum falls pitifully short of the quota but that is not the fault of anyone but the short-sighted and narrow-minded city and State Chairmen. None of the men that really counts [*sic.*] for something in the Financial world were ever put on the committee. The same old click that messes up everything Irish here have been in control and if one word of criticism is uttered, well, woe be to the man or woman that utters it, no matter how you work or what you do your only reward is sneers and snubs.³⁰

The 'same old click' was led by Cohalan-loyalist John McGarry as city chairman and R.F. Wolfe as state chairman, and the bond drive committee seems to have been simply carried over from that of the FOIF's Victory Fund.³¹ Excluded from the committee, McWhorter was concerned that the work of the LAAOH would not be recognised, as they 'have never gotten credit for anything'.³² T.A. Gannon was sent in to take control of the drive there after the locals were unable to reach an acceptable compromise, and according to J.C. Walsh, he 'had a hard time of it'.³³ Writing to Cohalan in January 1920, John McGarry expressed misgivings about the Chicago drive's chances under Gannon: 'There is more or less back-firing all the time; confidentially, I greatly fear for the success of the Bond matter, but we will do our very best'. McGarry attributed much of the 'back-firing' to Gannon, who he feared would replace Wolfe as state chairman.³⁴ Beyond factional differences, the record keeping in Chicago also drew criticism from head office, which viewed the methods used there as antiquated. James O'Mara directed J.C. Walsh to go to Chicago and make sure the campaign records there were 'straightened out' but, according to Walsh, the records there were never wholly cleared up.³⁵

Poor organisation was not confined to the big cities. The bond drive in Wisconsin also came in for criticism from 411 Fifth Avenue, but this seems to have been

³⁰ IE/UCDA/P150/975, *McWhorter to Boland*, 17 Nov. 1919.

³¹ IE/UCDA/P150/1170, *HBD*, 26 Oct. 1919; IE/UCDA/P150/973, *Irish Victory Fund committees*.

³² IE/UCDA/P150/975, *McWhorter to Boland*, 17 Nov. 1919.

³³ US/NYPL/MssCol 3212/b.3/5, *J.C. Walsh's reminiscences*, p. 161.

³⁴ US/AIHS/DFC/Bx.13/8, *J. McGarry to Cobalan*, 7 Jan. 1920.

³⁵ US/NYPL/MssCol 3212/b.3/5, *J.C. Walsh's reminiscences*, p. 161.

more a case of apathy than internal division. Nothing had been done there since J.C. Walsh's test run in Milwaukee, so James O'Mara dispatched him with two assistants to get things started again.³⁶ The launch of the bond drive in Cincinnati was delayed for a similar reason. According to J.C. Walsh, 'there was a peculiar situation there among a large number of Irish people who hesitated to boast of the country of their birth'.³⁷ Head office sent an organiser who failed to organise the state effectively so they sent Peter Golden who 'started things a-flying' and 'organized a rattling good committee...with a splendid citizen at the head of the committee'.³⁸ Born in Macroom, Co. Cork, but living in America since 1901, Golden was poet, journalist and actor, who also happened to be a second cousin of Terence MacSwiney.³⁹ Clash of personalities and the rift with the FOIF leadership again were evident in Golden's relationship with Devoy, who described him as 'only good for speech making and writing jingles.'⁴⁰

This kind of infighting presented a real problem in terms of staff retention. In Richmond, Virginia, the chairman resigned due to perceived hostility towards him from sections of the FOIF.⁴¹ The Indianapolis chairman also resigned, less than two weeks after the drive began, and the state chairman of Indiana found it impossible to secure a replacement.⁴² Writing to Peter Golden about those he had asked, 'they all appear to be interested, [but] they refuse to take any active part because so and so is taking an active part'.⁴³ Meanwhile, internal divisions in Detroit meant that as late as 23 July 1920 the drive had not even commenced there.⁴⁴ At head office, too, a New York *World* journalist

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Irish Standard*, 13 Mar. 1920, p. 2.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 246.

⁴⁰ US/AIHS/DFC/Bx.4/5, *Devoy to Cobalan*, 19 Oct. 1920.

⁴¹ NLI/Ms.21,548(1), *J.A. Burke (ACII) to J. O'Mara*, n.d.

⁴² Carroll, *American opinion*, p. 153.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ US/AIHS/DFC/Bx.5/5, *Lynch to Cobalan*, 23 Jul. 1920.

named McNally was fired after just two weeks working for the bond drive, and threatened exposing its shortcomings to the press.⁴⁵

The Cuba Interview

Although considerable, the infighting between de Valera and the FOIF leadership was kept within the organisation for the opening weeks of the bond drive. However, this was not to last. A key catalyst for the escalation of hostility was de Valera's interview with the *Westminster Gazette*, printed in the *New York Globe* on 5 February 1920 and in London the following day.⁴⁶ De Valera's suggestion in this interview that Britain should adopt a similar position to Ireland as the US did to Cuba through the Monroe doctrine was met with fierce opposition by the leadership of the FOIF. De Valera's suggestion, essentially an undertaking that the Irish Republic would not be used by a third power to invade Britain, was seen as a concession that signalled he would settle for something less than complete independence for Ireland.⁴⁷ Such a 'concession' resembled a similar gaffe made by John Redmond ten years earlier when, in an interview with the *New York Tribune*, he drew comparison between Home Rule and the federal system of the United States.⁴⁸ The publication of this interview coincided with de Valera's trip to Boston, which he planned to rally in advance of the formal launch of the bond drive there.⁴⁹ According to Hannigan, this interview resulted in 'almost undoing all of the good achieved to that point in de Valera's visit'.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ IE/UCDA/P150/1007, *Devoy, to 'Friend'*, 28 Feb. 1920.

⁴⁶ Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 116.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p.117.

⁴⁸ Meleady, *Redmond*, p. 181.

⁴⁹ Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 116.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.117.

De Valera's suggestion must be seen in the context of US politics at the time, in particular the lively debate on the League of Nations. The FOIF under Cohalan and Devoy had taken a strong position against the League, and had been using Victory Fund money to campaign against it.⁵¹ In their view, the League of Nations was an attack on national sovereignty and a ploy by the British to maintain their dominance in the world. Moreover, Judge Cohalan fully expected 'the inevitable struggle for the freedom of the seas that must shortly come between America and England,' and reasoned that 'every loyal American will without hesitation take a position unreservedly on the side of America'.⁵² Thus, the forfeit of sovereignty inferred in de Valera's Cuba interview put him directly at odds with the official line of the FOIF. Five days after the interview's publication, Cohalan's secretary deposited new articles of incorporation for the FOIF in the office of the Secretary of State in Albany, New York. This gave Cohalan, Diarmuid Lynch, and five allies, complete legal control of the proceeds of the Victory Fund.⁵³ Three days later, the National Council of the FOIF officially declared its opposition to the League of Nations.⁵⁴

From the Dáil's point of view, the protestations from Cohalan and Devoy were purely territorial. 'It is time for plain speaking now,' wrote de Valera to Arthur Griffith, 'A deadly attempt to ruin our chances for the bonds and for everything we came here to accomplish is being made.'⁵⁵

⁵¹ Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora*, pp. 97-8.

⁵² US/AIHS/ DFC/Bx.4/1, *Cohalan to de Valera*, 22 Feb. 1920.

⁵³ O'Doherty, *Assignment*, p. 43.

⁵⁴ *IP*, 21 Feb. 1920, p. 3.

⁵⁵ T.P. Coogan, *De Valera: Long fellow, long shadow* (London, 1993, 2015), p. 166.

If I am asked for the ulterior motives I can only guess that they are:

1. To drive me home – jealousy, envy, resentment of a rival – some devilish cause I do not know what prompts.
2. To compel me to be a rubber stamp for somebody.

The position I have held (I was rapidly driven to assert it or surrender) is the following:

1. No American has the right to dictate policy to the Irish people.
2. We are here with a definite objective. Americans, banded under the trade name (the word will not be misunderstood) Friends of Irish Freedom, ought to help us to obtain the objective, if they are truly what the name implies.⁵⁶

Devoy was particularly vocal in his criticism of de Valera. Such was his outrage, that he believed the Cuba proposal was a direct result of British infiltration in the Dáil mission. He believed a man named McCann, staff member at the *Globe* and friend of Dr Patrick McCartan was the intermediary for the interview. As McCartan was, in Devoy's view, 'a worshipper of [William] Maloney', and Devoy believed Maloney to be a British spy, he viewed the article in the context of 'the plans laid in the British Embassy two years ago to kill the National Movement and "destroy Cohalan"'.⁵⁷ Confident in the strength of his position, he confided to a co-conspirator that although the damage caused by the 'scandal of a fight' would be considerable, 'all the advantages are on our side, while the disadvantages of having a breakdown are on [de Valera's]'.⁵⁸ This was the point at which the rift between the FOIF leadership and the Dáil mission, which had been bubbling away from the beginning, finally rose to the surface and became a very public war of words. Writing in his newspaper the *Gaelic American*, Devoy claimed that de Valera's proposal 'opens the way for the discussion of compromise or a change in objective, while England has her hands on Ireland's throat. It will be hailed in England as

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ IE/UCDA/P150/1007, *Devoy, to J Schell*, 20 Feb. 1920.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

an offer of surrender'.⁵⁹ Most damaging of all, Devoy's editorial mentioned the bond drive explicitly:

...every dollar subscribed, either to the Irish Victory Fund, or to the Bond Certificates of the Irish Republic, was given on the distinct understanding that the policy announced in Dublin on January 21, 1919...would be firmly adhered to. The Dáil Eireann has the power, but not the right, to change the policy and the objectives because its members were elected on a specified mandate to proclaim an independent Irish Republic, entirely separated from England. This aroused the enthusiasm of the Irish in America and loosened their purse-strings...they would have neither enthusiasm nor money for the so-called free Ireland under an English Monroe doctrine...⁶⁰

Two days later, members of Clan na Gael and the Executive Committee of the FOIF wrote to Cohalan, pledging their support for him and Devoy, reasoning that an Ireland with Dominion status would not be obliged to repay the bond certificates.⁶¹

On 24 February 1920, Boland described de Valera as 'in a rage', and by the next day he was suffering from 'nervous indigestion'.⁶² By 28 February de Valera had been in bed sick for two days. 'This Devoy business has done him no good,' reasoned Boland.⁶³ De Valera surfaced for a dinner with a delegation of Indian nationalists, but on 1 March he was 'far from well'.⁶⁴ According to Cork's *Skibbereen Eagle*, Parnell, Davitt, Redmond and Dillon had all fallen victim to Devoy's pen, so de Valera had reason to be concerned.⁶⁵

Strangely, the *Gaelic American* was the only Irish-American newspaper allowed by the British to circulate in Ireland.⁶⁶ According to Katherine O'Doherty, 100,000 copies of the edition criticising de Valera were mailed for distribution in Ireland.⁶⁷ If true, this is likely to be an exaggeration as the circulation of the *Gaelic American* was only 34,000 at

⁵⁹ *Gaelic American*, 21 Feb. 1920.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ US/AIHS/DFC/Bx.5/5, E.J. O'Reilly, J. O'Sullivan, G. O'Shea, D. Sheehy & P.J. Barrett to Cobalan, 23 Feb. 1920.

⁶² IE/UCDA/P150/1170, HBD, 24 Feb. 1920, 25 Feb. 1920.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 27-8 Feb. 1920.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 28 Feb. 1920, 1 Mar. 1920.

⁶⁵ *Skibbereen Eagle*, 17 Nov. 1917, p. 1.

⁶⁶ O'Doherty, *Assignment*, p. 163.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

this time.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, there is no doubt that similar literature denouncing the actions of de Valera was sent in the post to various people, including Bishop Fogarty.⁶⁹ Perhaps most damagingly from the perspective of the bond drive, Devoy's article was also circulated among the membership of the FOIF.⁷⁰

Joseph McGarrity's *Irish Press* responded to the *Gaelic American* with a defence of de Valera.⁷¹ A front-page headline in the *Press* declared 'De Valera's Quotation of Cuban Treaty Proves his Statesmanship'.⁷² 'No honest man, honestly seeking an honest meaning, can possibly see in President de Valera's words any hint, or suspicion of a hint, of abating Ireland's demand for full independence by so much as a breadth of a hair'.⁷³ The *Irish World*, with its circulation of 60,000, also took de Valera's side in this war of words.⁷⁴ It posed the question of what funds were being used to finance such widespread printing and distribution of the *Gaelic American*, speculating whether it was misuse of the Victory Fund or Clan na Gael expenditure that had not been sanctioned by its members.⁷⁵ The rumoured ease with which the *Gaelic American* circulated in Ireland led the *Irish World* to also insinuate that the circulation of its anti-de Valera message 'could take place only by the connivance or under the direction of the English government'.⁷⁶ Not surprisingly, these claims were refuted in the pages of the *Gaelic American*, with counter claims that the *Irish World* itself was widely available in Ireland. Nevertheless, the insinuation of Devoy's financial malfeasance gained some traction among the Irish-American public. In late February 1920 in a busy New York department store, the

⁶⁸ N. W. Ayer & Son, *American Newspaper Annual and Directory: A Catalogue of American Newspapers, 1920*, Vol.2, p. 1247.

⁶⁹ S. Nunan, 'President Eamon de Valera's Mission to U.S.A.', *Capuchin Annual* (1970), p. 247.

⁷⁰ O'Doherty, *Assignment*, p. 164.

⁷¹ Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 119.

⁷² *IP*, 6 Mar. 1920, p. 1.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁷⁴ N. W. Ayer & Son, *American Newspaper Annual and Directory*, Vol.2, p.1247. No data is available for the circulation of the *IP* in 1920; the nearest estimate is 50,000 in 1922.

⁷⁵ Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 119.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

daughter of a prominent Irish-American told one of Devoy and Cohalan's allies in a loud voice that 'Cohalan and Devoy had made away with the Victory Funds'.⁷⁷

The Cuba interview also affected personal relationships within the movement. A chance encounter on the night of 29 February 1920, when Devoy passed James O'Mara at the Lexington entrance to Grand Central Station without noticing him, was taken as a slight by O'Mara, who asked 'What have I done that you pass me without speaking to me?'⁷⁸ According to Devoy, 'There was a note of sadness in his voice and he looked worried. I explained that I did not see him and he asked me how I was, but never mentioned the trouble'.⁷⁹

O'Mara was keen not to get involved in the rift. Years later he confided in J.C. Walsh that the intemperate manner in which he dealt with everyone was intentional, and was calculated so that he didn't have to be agreeable to Cohalan or Devoy and thus be seen to take sides.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, he made his opinion of them clear in a note to Harry Boland, describing the former as 'vainglorious and selfish, cut[ting] a contemptible figure', and the latter as 'little better than a mental degenerate'.⁸¹

⁷⁷ US/AIHS/DFC/Bx.4/5, *Devoy to Cohalan*, 1 Mar. 1920. Dick Manning's daughter (a 'Mrs. Walsh').

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ US/ NYPL/MssCol 3212/b.3/5, *J.C. Walsh's reminiscences*, p. 141.

⁸¹ IE/UCDA/P150/1138, *J. O'Mara to Boland*, 14 Oct. 1920.

The trials of James O'Mara

Intentional or not, O'Mara's gruff manner was justifiable considering the pressure he was under to keep the bond drive on track. While de Valera, Boland and Frank P. Walsh were speaking on platforms across the country, he stayed behind the scenes as the engine of the bond drive.⁸² Accounts from his contemporaries paint a vivid picture of the man at work.

A strict disciplinarian, O'Mara was just and generous, and soon gained the loyal support of his office staff. Unsparing of himself, he gave all his time and energy to the Bond Drive, and its success was the sole reward he looked for. His manner was sometimes abrupt, but we who worked with him soon got to know the great kindness that lay behind it.⁸³

By 23 February 1920 the head office was already feeling the strain of the response to the bond drive. The volume of correspondence with the various state and city organisations was just too much for an office of that scale and O'Mara had received complaints regarding the speed of replies.⁸⁴ Feeling the burden of what was a highly pressurised job, it is understandable that he, described by his widow as 'a very nervous man', was not in the best of moods during this period.⁸⁵ According to his daughter, 'he was feeling the strain of all this worry. He was irritable and on edge and crotchety.'⁸⁶ Such stress was not new to O'Mara; a letter from him to a constituent in 1904 suggests a dogged determination in his character: '[T]he doctor is not at all sure that I can stand the strain of a double career, but time will tell'.⁸⁷

Among the most fundamental difficulties faced by the bond drive's head office was the printing of the bond certificates. When Joseph McGarrity wrote to the American

⁸² IE/BMH/WS0690, *M.A. O'Mara*, p. 2.

⁸³ McCartan, *With de Valera*, p. 144.

⁸⁴ NLI/Ms.21,548(5), *Notebook: Copy of note from J. O'Mara to J.C. Walsh*, 23 Feb. 1920.

⁸⁵ IE/BMH/WS0690, *M.A. O'Mara*, p. 2.

⁸⁶ Lavelle, *James O'Mara*, p. 151.

⁸⁷ J.R.R. McConnell, *The Irish Parliamentary Party and the Third Home Rule Crisis*, (Dublin, 2013), pp. 195-6.

Bank Note Company inquiring whether they could prepare and issue the bond certificates, the response was decidedly negative:

...inasmuch as it is absolutely contrary to the custom of our Company to execute orders for Governments which have not been recognized by, or have not duly accredited representatives to, the Government of the United States of America, we find it impossible to entertain the proposition you have placed before us.⁸⁸

Interestingly, the American Bank Note Company had no such reservations when it came to printing bonds for the unrecognised Lithuanian Republic the same year.⁸⁹ In the end it was E.A. Wright & Co who won the tender. For the price of \$13,492, they provided \$16.5m in bond certificates.⁹⁰ There was one hiccup however, that McGarrity had misspelled the word ‘acknowledgement’ in his instructions to the printers.⁹¹ This was fixed on 18 February 1920 at a cost of \$190 and two weeks’ delay.⁹² Further complications came in March 1920 when Harry Boland alleged that E.A. Wright & Co was a non-union shop and didn’t employ union labour, and protested to one of their representatives.⁹³ The matter was brought to the attention of the Dáil mission by the International Steel & Copper Plate Printers Union of North America, and highlights the political constraints faced by the bond drive’s organisers.⁹⁴ In the end the union agreed not to enter any protest over the contract, but urged McGarrity to make any subsequent printing contracts with a unionised company.⁹⁵ As a result, it wasn’t until 26 April 1920 that the first of the bond certificates were sent out to subscribers.⁹⁶

The bond drive wasn’t O’Mara’s only concern at this time. He also had to deal with a diverse variety of business ideas coming from the Dáil’s rather argumentative

⁸⁸ NLI/Ms.17,522, *American Bank Note Company to McGarrity*, 12 Dec. 1919.

⁸⁹ J. Skirius, ‘Dėl Lietuvos laisvės paskolos gražinimo JAV lietuviams’ (‘Repayment of Lithuanian Freedom Bonds to Lithuanian-Americans’), *Istorija. Lietuvos aukštųjų mokyklų mokslo darbai*, 2 (2007), p. 29.

⁹⁰ NLI/Ms.17,522, *Agreement between E.A. Wright & Co and McGarrity*, 23 Jan. 1920.

⁹¹ NLI/Ms.21,548(5), *Notebook: Copy of note from J. O’Mara to McGarrity*, 24 Jan. 1920.

⁹² NLI/Ms.17,522, *E.A. Wright & Co to McGarrity*, 18 Feb. 1920.

⁹³ NLI/Ms.17,522, *Ibid.*, 6 Mar. 1920.

⁹⁴ NLI/Ms.17,522, *International Steel & Copper Plate Printers Union of North America to McGarrity*, 18 Mar. 1920.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ *IP*, 1 May 1920, p. 3.

trade counsel in Washington, Diarmuid Fawcett. These ranged from setting up an ‘Irish-Continental Steamship Company’, to the export of sows’ ovaries from Ireland for the American market.⁹⁷ There were also a couple of fraudulent enterprises that sought to exploit the growing value of the Irish Republic’s brand. The ‘Arrowhead patented steamship prospectus’ issued by the ‘Irish-American Safety Steamship Company’ was a case in point, and the Dáil was quick to distance itself from its mastermind, the serial con-artist Captain Sir Mark Golein.⁹⁸ The FOIF’s name, too, was fraudulently used by an agent selling shares in the Shamrock Motion Picture Company.⁹⁹ The Dáil mission had to stamp these out as it jealously guarded its position as government of Ireland. Meanwhile, O’Mara was still overseeing his bacon factory back in Dublin, facing threats of strike action by his employees.¹⁰⁰

Things came to a head on 1 March 1920, when O’Mara tendered to de Valera his resignation as director of the bond drive, trustee of Dáil Éireann and TD for South Kilkenny.¹⁰¹ Describing O’Mara’s resignation as a ‘fearful blow’, Harry Boland reasoned ‘some serious crisis has overtaken Jim’.¹⁰² Replying to O’Mara three days later, de Valera noted how the strain of work had ‘only too clearly’ been affecting his health, but pleaded that he stay on for another couple of months.¹⁰³ De Valera was about to begin his tour of the Southern States, and argued that it would have to be cancelled if O’Mara resigned.¹⁰⁴ De Valera continued, ‘For another reason too the present time is most inopportune.

⁹⁷ NLI/Ms.21,548(1), *Fawsitt to J. O’Mara*, 24 Mar. 1920; NLI/Ms.21,548(3), *Irish Consulate to J. O’Mara*, 13 Sept. 1920.

⁹⁸ NLI/Ms.21,548(2), *Fawsitt to ‘The Editor’*, 23 Jul. 1920.

⁹⁹ IE/UCDA/P150/1135, *Lynch to Boland*, 28 Feb. 1920.

¹⁰⁰ NLI/Ms.21,548(2), *J. Henry & Mrs. Henry to J. O’Mara*, 2 Apr. 1920.

¹⁰¹ NLI/Ms.21,548(2), *J. O’Mara to de Valera*, 1 Mar. 1920.

¹⁰² IE/UCDA/P150/1170, *HBD*, 6 and 7 Mar. 1920.

¹⁰³ NLI/Ms.21,548(2), *de Valera to J. O’Mara*, 4 Mar. 1920.

¹⁰⁴ NLI/Ms.21,552(1), *Draft of P. Lavelle’s book James O’Mara*, Ch. XIV, p. 7.

Your resignation would be misrepresented and misconstrued. Certain persons are, as you know, but waiting for a vantage point to attack'.¹⁰⁵

With friends like these...

The British consul general reported 'considerable friction' between the FOIF leadership and the Dáil mission on 6 March 1920, noting that Cohalan and Devoy were trying to prevent their sympathisers from handing over money collected for the bond drive to the drive's head office at 411 Fifth Avenue.¹⁰⁶ 'It is quite probable,' wrote the consul general, 'that a serious split may take place at any moment'.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, the same day de Valera was able to report to his cabinet that, although 'a good deal of private undermining is going on,' 'The public misrepresentation here has ceased'.¹⁰⁸ The factions were able to present a united front at the New York St Patrick's Day festivities; as the parade's Grand Marshall, Judge Cohalan graciously gave his place on the podium to de Valera and, later in the day, introduced de Valera in glowing terms at the annual Friendly Sons of St Patrick banquet.¹⁰⁹

This façade was not to last however. Just two days later, Cohalan and Devoy summoned 75 influential Irish Americans, including judges, lawyers, politicians and clergy, to a meeting at the Park Avenue Hotel in New York.¹¹⁰ This meeting was planned to denounce de Valera, and unseat him as leader of the Irish in America.¹¹¹ Among the accusations from Cohalan was that de Valera had been misusing the funds from the

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

¹⁰⁶ TNA: FO/115/2599/114, *G. Armstrong to R.C. Lindsay*, 6 Mar. 1920.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ IE/UCDA/P150/727, *de Valera to Cabinet*, 6 Mar. 1920.

¹⁰⁹ Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 130.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 132-7.

bond drive by paying for ‘royal suites in hotels’.¹¹² The practice of issuing cheques in the name of de Valera, while convenient from an organisational point of view, had clearly left him open to such accusations.

The meeting was tense, but an intervention by de Valera, McGarrity, and Boland, producing what they called proof of premeditated malice on the part of Cohalan and Devoy, succeeded in settling the matter, for the time being at least.¹¹³ As summarised by Harry Boland in his diary, ‘Jas. O’Mara cool and calm. Boland crying. deV[alera] shaken. Cohalan and Devoy licked.’¹¹⁴ The meeting was reported to the British Foreign Office by the consul general in remarkable detail. According to the report, there was ‘evidently a strong desire on the part of Cohalan, Devoy and others to persuade De Valera to return home to Ireland, but nothing definite was settled on this point’.¹¹⁵ In the view of the consul general, while the agreement seemed ‘satisfactory to the rank and file...the peace is not likely to last unless De Valera returns home at an early date leaving Judge Cohalan in control’.¹¹⁶

Despite the best efforts of Cohalan and Devoy, de Valera remained in America. The longer he stayed there, the more his reputation grew among Irish Americans. The position occupied by de Valera could not be ignored, nor could his recognition among the general public and the strength of their identification of him with the Irish cause. Writing to Cohalan three days later regarding a request that de Valera make a speech at the Easter week celebrations, Devoy wrote, ‘I don’t see how we can avoid having him’.¹¹⁷ At the same time, with the bond drive still underway, the Dáil mission needed to keep a lid on any disagreements. Writing to the cabinet on 25 March 1920, de Valera warned ‘It

¹¹² McCartan, *With de Valera*, p. 168.

¹¹³ Hannigan, *De Valera*, pp. 136-7.

¹¹⁴ IE/UCDA/P150/1170, *HBD*, 20 Mar. 1920.

¹¹⁵ TNA: FO/115/2599/148, *G. Armstrong to Curzon*, 26 Mar. 1920.

¹¹⁶ TNA: FO/115/2599/160, *G. Armstrong to Curzon*, 6 Apr. 1920.

¹¹⁷ US/AIHS/DFC/Bx.4/5, *Devoy to Cobalan*, 22 Mar. 1920.

is very important that there should not be an open rupture until the Bond Drive were over at any rate.¹¹⁸

Although subdued, the animosity continued to fester, with control of funds the main outlet for its expression. Fortunately, the bond drive funds were lodged in de Valera's name, so control of them was not in question. The main bone of contention was the FOIF's Irish Victory Fund. As mentioned in chapter 6, de Valera's request that the Victory Fund be prematurely halted to make way for the bond drive caused significant irritation among the FOIF leadership. Devoy saw de Valera's attempts to stop the Victory Fund and McGarrity's attempts to send its proceeds to Ireland as an effort to 'deplete our resources for work here...and to cripple us'.¹¹⁹ Moreover, not only did this cut the organisation off from its most important source of revenue, it also curtailed the FOIF's direct engagement in its own right with the Irish American public.¹²⁰ In the words of Daniel Lainer-Vos, the FOIF was 'robbed of its *raison d'être*'.¹²¹

In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that there was some friction between James O'Mara and Diarmuid Lynch, National Secretary of the FOIF, when O'Mara bypassed Lynch and wrote directly to the FOIF's trustees regarding the use of money from the Victory Fund in San Francisco.¹²² O'Mara gave the same instructions to the FOIF's trustees in Chicago, requesting they retain \$19,199 of the Victory Fund in that city to fund the preliminary expenses of the bond drive. This was further compounded by a lack of communication from O'Mara to Lynch.¹²³ A subsequent request from O'Mara for all the addresses of the members of the FOIF's national council so that he could write to them regarding the Victory Fund was denied by the FOIF's national

¹¹⁸ IE/UCDA/P150/727, *de Valera to Cabinet*, 25 Mar. 1920.

¹¹⁹ IE/UCDA/P150/1007, *Devoy, to J. Schell*, 20 Feb. 1920.

¹²⁰ Lainer-Vos, *Sinews*, p. 79.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

¹²² US/AIHS/FOIF/Bx.2/4, *Lynch to J. O'Mara*, 20 Dec. 1920.

¹²³ US/AIHS/FOIF/Bx.6/3, *Minutes of FOIF National Executive*, 9 Feb. 1920.

executive, asserting that all such communications had to go through the FOIF's National Secretary.¹²⁴ On 10 April 1920, James O'Mara wrote to the FOIF requesting a statement of account for the Irish Victory Fund.¹²⁵ When O'Mara and Boland met with Lynch three days later to discuss getting 25% of the Victory Fund, the meeting turned into a 'hell of a row'; according to Harry Boland's diary: O'Mara 'goes off at Lynch in great style'.¹²⁶ Three days later, O'Mara's request was formally refused by the FOIF's National Council, which resolved, 'That the entire balance of the Irish Victory Fund now remaining in the Treasury should be conserved for the original purpose of the fund'.¹²⁷

The US Presidential Election: Who speaks for Ireland?

A key backdrop to the first bond drive was the US Presidential Election of 1920. By and large the Irish vote went to the Democrats in US elections, but the British embassy in Washington rightly expected the Irish-Americans to threaten to change their allegiance to the Republicans in order to secure recognition of an Irish Republic.¹²⁸ 'Republican leaders are not slow to take advantage of this powerful weapon and are making determined bid for Irish support'.¹²⁹

The Dáil representatives were clearly aware of their bargaining position in US politics, and the bureaucracy of the bond drive proved useful in leveraging the Dáil's position. By fundraising *via* bonds and not donations, the Dáil mission was able to compile a list of sympathisers across the country and write to them personally to marshal the Irish vote:

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 12 Apr. 1920.

¹²⁵ McCartan, *With de Valera*, p. 183.

¹²⁶ IE/UCDA/P150/1170, *HBD*, 13 Apr. 1920.

¹²⁷ McCartan, *With de Valera*, p. 183.

¹²⁸ *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939*, Series 1, Vol. 5, Ch. 2, 13 Aug. 1919.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*; confirmed in IE/UCDA/P150/727, *de Valera to Cabinet*, 25 Mar. 1920.

Your subscription to the loan to enable the Elected Government of Ireland to function puts it beyond doubt that you believe that the claim of the republican government is a claim based on justice and on right.

We may ask you, therefore, in confidence, to use your influence with your fellow citizens that they may understand the question as you understand it and realize its bearing on the broader issues for which America fought the war. It is a question not of Ireland's liberty alone but of the future of civilisation.¹³⁰

The note goes on to invoke the bond certificates as physical evidence for support:

...Every time you see your Bond-Certificate, let it remind you that you have, so to speak, enrolled yourself as an apostle of Irish freedom, and that you have at your hand urgent work which you can readily accomplish.

Voice the cause insistently by tongue and pen. Try to make converts of those who are opposed to it. Press it upon those who seek election as your representatives. Get them to declare themselves publicly upon it.

...P.S. – Keep this to read and re-read.¹³¹

This kind of meddling in American politics was a dangerous game, as it was a direct challenge to Judge Cohalan as leader of the Irish in America. Indeed, the British consul general believed Cohalan's main motivation for cultivating this position was to consolidate the Irish and German vote 'for electioneering and propaganda purposes'.¹³² As a result, the Republican presidential convention in Chicago, beginning on 8 June 1920, was another catalyst for reigniting the Cohalan-Devoyn agitation.¹³³ Cohalan and Devoyn believed the attendance of de Valera at the convention would be perceived by Americans as interference in domestic politics, and urged him not to go.¹³⁴ De Valera went anyway, not trusting that Cohalan would put the case for recognition, and brought with him a delegation of his own.¹³⁵ The result was that on 9 June 1920 the Republican Party's Committee on Resolutions received two separate Irish delegations, one from each faction.¹³⁶ De Valera's resolution was defeated, 12 votes to one, while Cohalan's was accepted, seven votes to six, resulting in a position of sympathy for rather than

¹³⁰ NLI/Ms.21,548(2), *Circular from Frank P. Walsh*, 24 Apr. 1920.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² TNA: FO/115/2599/148, *G. Armstrong to Curzon*, 26 Mar. 1920.

¹³³ Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 152.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 152-3.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 153. There are contrasting views on the rationale of the actors in this.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

recognition of the Irish Republic.¹³⁷ However, in the end the divisions between the Irish delegations led the Republican Party to remove the Irish motion from their platform altogether.¹³⁸

Using his mouthpiece the *Gaelic American*, Devoy went public with his anger, invoking the misuse of funds from the bond drive to make his point:

At an expense of fully \$50,000 taken out of the money subscribed for the Irish Republican bonds, and for expenditure in Ireland alone, a nondescript aggregation of individuals was brought to Chicago from many parts of the country to constitute a rival committee to the Friends of Irish Freedom.¹³⁹

Devoy's comments gained a far wider audience the next day when they were quoted in the *New York Times* with a circulation of 367,587, and then the recently merged *Sun and New York Herald*, the antecedents of which had a circulation 198,266 and 109,267 respectively.¹⁴⁰ Again, Philadelphia's *Irish Press* took the opposing side, with a front-page headline 'Irish-American Politicians Defeat Republic's Cause at Convention' and an article pointing the blame squarely at Cohalan.¹⁴¹ So did Chicago's *Irish News and Chicago Citizen*, and New York's *Irish World*, the latter running a headline 'Treason Most Odious'.¹⁴² At a meeting of the FOIF Executive on 20 June 1920, Cohalan and Devoy spoke 'taking the same lines as the *Gaelic American* took,' according to Sean Nunan, arguing that American politics was 'an American question and must be dealt with by Americans, etc.'¹⁴³ Recognising what was at stake, de Valera pushed back, writing in the *New York Times*:

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 156-7.

¹³⁹ *Gaelic American*, 17 Jun. 1920.

¹⁴⁰ *New York Times*, 18 Jun. 1920, *Sun and New York Herald*, 19 Jun. 1920. Circulation figures from N. W. Ayer & Son, *American Newspaper Annual and Directory*, Vol. 2, p. 1179.

¹⁴¹ *IP*, 19 Jun. 1920, p. 1.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 26 Jun. 1920, p. 3.

¹⁴³ NAI/DE/2/292, *Nunan to Collins*, 12 Jun. 1920.

That sum is absolutely exaggerated. We did not spend more than half that sum on expenses at Chicago. When I came to this country, I expected that an effort might be made to control me through the power of the purse and I arranged with the Irish Parliament to vote me appropriations to cover my expenses. That money came out of the Irish Treasury. The bonds were sold with the express understanding that they were for all uses of the Irish Government, and furthering the cause of that Government in this country is a legitimate use of the money.¹⁴⁴

Patrick McCartan weighed in on 21 June 1920 with comments published in the *New York Times*, directly questioning the authority on which Cohalan represented Irish America and challenging his assumed position as monopolist of Irish American opinion:

Justice Cohalan endeavours to monopolize the term 'American' for himself and his adroit political colleagues, just as he monopolized the management of the Irish-American movement in this country, though not elected to any office that would give him the powers he usurped... The Justice's adherents in dissension are not correctly Irish-Americans or Americans. They are Cohalan-Americans.¹⁴⁵

William Randolph Hearst also leapt to de Valera's defence and on 23 June 1920 sent a telegraph to the *Chicago Herald-Examiner* instructing it to reprint an editorial that rebuffed the criticism of him and reasserted his position as head of the Irish nation.¹⁴⁶

Devoy and Cohalan were busy shoring up their support among the FOIF branches and gathering unfavourable information on de Valera's American allies, but cracks in their organisation were beginning to show.¹⁴⁷ A number of FOIF branches openly declared their support for de Valera.¹⁴⁸ On 22 June 1920, a meeting of more than 1,800 members of the Irish Progressive League denounced Cohalan's treatment of de Valera, with epithets of 'faker' and 'traitor' called out at the very mention of Cohalan's name. One speaker, Mgr. James Power, called Cohalan's faction 'vipers and hypocrites', accusing them of treason against the Irish Republic and asserting that of they ever set

¹⁴⁴ *New York Times*, 20 Jun. 1920.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 21 Jun. 1920.

¹⁴⁶ Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 162.

¹⁴⁷ US/AIHS/DFC/Bx.4/5, *Devoy to Cohalan*, 30 Jun. 1920. (Especially Patrick McCartan).

¹⁴⁸ *New York Times*, 21 Jun. 1920.

foot in Ireland ‘their bodies will dangle from the trees’.¹⁴⁹ The FOIF executive responded by revoking the Progressive League’s associate membership status.¹⁵⁰

Despite the controversy, the Dáil mission continued its involvement in the presidential primaries, attending the Democratic presidential convention in San Francisco from 28 June to 6 July 1920.¹⁵¹ On 29 June 1920 the Dáil decided that \$500,000 would be made available for de Valera to spend at his discretion in connection with the US presidential election.¹⁵² The FOIF leadership had already declared their support for the Republican candidate, so did not attend, but de Valera, having taken a neutral stance, led a delegation to San Francisco.¹⁵³ De Valera’s resolution was rejected however. Instead, the Democrats opted instead for a vague and general statement expressing sympathy for the aspirations of self-government ‘within the limitations of the international comity and usage’, without mentioning Ireland specifically.¹⁵⁴

The Dáil’s engagement with the US election was a failure in political terms but, as noted by J.C. Walsh, it did result in a lot of publicity, as the conventions were the focus of the country’s press.¹⁵⁵ This was perhaps best demonstrated by de Valera’s appearance in a *Chicago Tribune* cartoon with the caption ‘De Valera is not really a candidate in this convention’.¹⁵⁶ However, as the private disagreements between the Dáil and the FOIF leadership again became public, this publicity was not entirely positive. The seizure and publication of correspondence between members of the Dáil mission and the Dáil cabinet on 13 July 1920 revealed private accounts of the Republican convention in

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 23 Jul. 1920.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 12 Aug. 1920.

¹⁵¹ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 427.

¹⁵² IE/NAI/DE/2/007, *Letter from the Dáil General Secretariat to the Secretary of Finance*, 16 Jul. 1920.

¹⁵³ Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 163.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 166-7.

¹⁵⁵ US/NYPL/MssCol 3212/b.3/5, *J.C. Walsh’s reminiscences*, p. 153.

¹⁵⁶ *Chicago Tribune*, 11 Jun. 1920, p. 5.

Chicago, painting Cohalan and Devoy in a particularly damning light.¹⁵⁷ The content of the letters was leaked to the British press and was picked up by the London correspondent of the *Philadelphia Ledger*.¹⁵⁸ ‘The conduct of the Cohalan group has reached the climax,’ wrote James O’Mara to Griffith in one of the leaked letters, ‘and I think I am safe in saying that the fight is now on’.¹⁵⁹ Letters from Sean Nunan to Michael Collins and from Peter MacSwiney to his brother Terence were highly critical of FOIF secretary Diarmuid Lynch, suggesting that Lynch’s constituents in Cork Southeast table a vote of confidence in de Valera to undermine their TD.¹⁶⁰ Returning from a trip to Ireland, Harry Boland made it known that he had a letter in his pocket demanding the resignation of Lynch as TD unless he resigned from the FOIF. On 20 July, Lynch chose the FOIF and resigned his seat.¹⁶¹

All the while the war of words continued. On 16 July 1920, having visited 30 towns in two months, FOIF Chairman James K. McGuire reported to Devoy that, ‘wherever I go our people are sick, sore disgusted...they are throwing away their *Gaelic Americans* and *Irish Worlds* in the waste basket’.¹⁶² Citing his experience of ‘three bloody factional fights, which practically destroyed every man connected with them’ in Chicago, St Louis and elsewhere 25 years earlier, McGuire tendered his resignation.¹⁶³ On 18 August 1920, John D. Moore wrote a cease and desist letter to the editors of the *Gaelic American*, *Irish Press*, *Irish World*, and the San Francisco-based *Monitor*, which had also become involved in the war of words.¹⁶⁴ Devoy then withdrew his accusations against de

¹⁵⁷ *New York Times*, 14 Jul. 1920, cited in Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 168.

¹⁵⁸ McGeough, *Lynch*, p. 129.

¹⁵⁹ Cited in *St Louis Star and Times*, 13 Jul. 1920, p. 2.

¹⁶⁰ McGeough, *Lynch*, p. 130.

¹⁶¹ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 427; McGeough, *Lynch*, p. 131.

¹⁶² US/AIHS/DFC/Bx.4/5, *McGuire to Devoy*, 16 Jul. 1920.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ US/VUA/OM/I/1/2/7, *Moore to the editors of the Gaelic American, IP, Irish World, and the Monitor*, 18 Aug. 1920.

Valera, but the spat showed no signs of abating.¹⁶⁵ On 28 August, the *Irish World* republished an article from 1884, accusing Devoy of mishandling the Fenians' Skirmishing Fund. Among other things, they criticised his investing the proceeds in a prototype submarine.¹⁶⁶ By this stage, Devoy's *Gaelic American* was in such 'a bad shape financially' that he could ill afford to sue for libel, but that didn't stop him mounting a case.¹⁶⁷

Tipping point

The bond drive continued despite the factional fighting, and the money continued to roll in. With every dollar collected and lodged in de Valera's name, the FOIF became one dollar less useful to the Dáil mission, slowly eroding Cohalan's bargaining power. But the success of the bond drive brought with it a bureaucratic burden.

As receipts grew more substantial, a more formal structure was needed to manage the funds. De Valera received advice from C.E. McGuire, an employee of the US Treasury Department, regarding the legal structure by which the funds should be held and tax advantages in each case.¹⁶⁸ McGuire later recommended that funds be invested in Colombian gold mines in preparation for issuing an Irish currency after independence, although there is no evidence that this advice was followed.¹⁶⁹ The Dáil mission did however invest its funds in government securities, as these were deemed more 'immune from attack' than cash. On 25 May 1920 the Dáil mission bought Liberty

¹⁶⁵ *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 25 Aug. 1920, p.2.

¹⁶⁶ NLI/Ms.18,114, *Devoy vs. Irish World, Origin and source of the libel*.

¹⁶⁷ US/AIHS/DFC/Bx.4/5, *Devoy to Cobalan*, 24 Sept. 1920; NLI/Ms.18,114, *Devoy Vs. Irish World, Origin and source of the libel*.

¹⁶⁸ NLI/Ms.21,548(1), *C.E. McGuire to de Valera*, 30 Jun. 1920.

¹⁶⁹ IE/UCDA/P150/1018, *C.E. McGuire to de Valera*, 7 Aug. 1920.

Loan bonds with a nominal value of \$150,000.¹⁷⁰ It also acquired a Chicago Railroad bond for \$1,000.¹⁷¹

Meanwhile, back in Dublin, Michael Collins was growing impatient. On 14 August 1920, he complained to Harry Boland about the lack of American funds transferred to Ireland, grumbling, ‘The figures which have now been sent from the U.S.A. are nothing short of being disastrous’.¹⁷² Despite the success of the bond drive, only *ca.* \$300,000 had been to Ireland.¹⁷³ Naturally, this money was transferred covertly, with US firms posting cheques disguised as the proceeds of legacies to Corrigan & Corrigan, previously solicitors for the INAAVDF. These amounts were then legally laundered before being lodged in the DÉDF accounts.¹⁷⁴ Other drafts, typically in the region of £10,000 were drawn directly on banks in Dublin or Cork ‘in favour of certain names’, while some others were drawn on banks in London.¹⁷⁵ In the case of London, to muddy the waters, the Jermyn Court Hotel was used as an address with the names of a variety of ‘guests’ listed as beneficiaries.¹⁷⁶ More riskily, a number of Carmelite priests were used to carry cash across the Atlantic. The British Foreign Office became aware of this however, and requests were sent to the passport office in New York to refuse their visa applications.¹⁷⁷

There were reasons other than subterfuge for the sluggish transfer of funds to Ireland. As explained in chapter 7, the fall in the value of the pound against the dollar increased the cost of servicing Britain’s debt to America.¹⁷⁸ This strengthened America’s

¹⁷⁰ IE/NAI/DE/EXL/Vol.4, *Investment Account*. Investment worth \$147,481.40.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*. Investment worth \$650, bought on 17 Aug. 1920.

¹⁷² IE/UCDA/P150/1125, *Collins to Boland*, 14 Aug. 1920.

¹⁷³ IE/NAI/DE/007.

¹⁷⁴ Hart, *Mick*, p. 195.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ TNA: FO/115/2598/261, *Geddes to Curzon*, 3 Jun. 1920; TNA: FO/115/2598/263, *Illegible to Jeffes (Passport Office)*, 1 Jul. 1920.

¹⁷⁸ *Economist*, 10 Jan. 1920, p. 58.

bargaining power over Britain, a fact evoked in the bond drive's promotional activities linking the Liberty Loan bonds to British activities in Ireland.¹⁷⁹ However, dollar-sterling exchange rate also had a significant effect on the value of the funds raised in the bond drive. As is clear from Figure 8.2, the first two months of the bond drive saw a fall in the value of sterling from a high of \$3.80 in January to a low of \$3.23 in February. The stronger the dollar against the pound, the more valuable the bond money would be when transferred to Ireland and converted to sterling. For example, the transfer of \$200,000 at the end of March 1920 missed the slump in sterling of February that year, and so the DÉDF missed out on as much as £11,414, more than twice the average constituency total for the National Loan. After recovering in March, the pound began to fall again in June, and this trend continued for the rest of 1920. De Valera wanted to take advantage of the low exchange rate in September 1920, but James O'Mara strongly opposed this, expecting sterling would continue to fall against the dollar.¹⁸⁰ Another fear was the safety of funds in Ireland, which Sir Ormond Winter's raid on the Munster & Leinster Bank on Dame Street did nothing to dispel.¹⁸¹ Perhaps as a result, much of the bond drive money was sent to Ireland in the form of arms and munitions; again the Carmelite priests were crucial in managing this supply chain.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹ *IP*, 14 Feb. 1920, p. 2.

¹⁸⁰ NLI/Ms.21,548(3), *de Valera to J. O'Mara*, 24 Sept. 1920; NLI/Ms.21,548(3), *J. O'Mara to de Valera*, 11 Oct. 1920.

¹⁸¹ NLI/Ms.21,548(3), *J. O'Mara to de Valera*, 11 Oct. 1920.

¹⁸² IE/BMH/WS0597, *Edmond O'Brien*, p. 48.




Figure 8.2. Sterling Dollar exchange rate by month, 1920.¹⁸³

Collins was not alone in his exasperation. As the campaign progressed, some subscribers grew impatient to receive their bond certificates.¹⁸⁴ Such impatience was also observable in the US Liberty Loan campaigns, but in the case of the Irish bond drive resources were far more strained.¹⁸⁵ As of 16 August 1920, James O'Mara's office was sending out bond certificates at a rate of 1,500 to 2,000 per day and certificates to the value of *ca.* \$1m had been issued already.¹⁸⁶ Figure 8.3 gives an impression of the crescendo in workload faced by James O'Mara's office. The ACII employed an American accountant whose sole responsibility was to vouch for the money received covering the bond certificates issued, but more help was needed.¹⁸⁷ O'Mara's calls for accountants to be sent over from Ireland were slow to be heeded however, causing significant stress.¹⁸⁸ Although the Dáil Cabinet had agreed back in May to send two 'clerk-accountants' to

¹⁸³ *Statistical abstract of the United States*, 1923.

¹⁸⁴ NLI/Ms.21,548(3), *Rev. J.W. Power to J. O'Mara*, 14 Aug. 1920.

¹⁸⁵ *New York Tribune*, 18 Oct. 1917, p. 2.

¹⁸⁶ NLI/Ms.21,548(3), *J. O'Mara to Rev. J.W. Power*, 16 Aug. 1920.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁸ IE/UCDA/P150/727, *Boland to Cabinet*, 11 Aug. 1920.

New York, no candidates could be found who satisfied both the requirement of an accountancy qualification and the Dáil's ideological insistence that accountants pass an Irish language test.¹⁸⁹




Figure 8.3. Daily cost of postage of bond certificates, 10 Jun. 1920 - 10 Nov. 1920.¹⁹⁰

The impatience of the subscribers also fed the rift between the FOIF and Dáil mission. Diarmuid Lynch received numerous letters from FOIF branch secretaries complaining that they had not yet received their bond certificates.¹⁹¹ One branch organiser in Chicago wrote that the bond certificates and their delay were ‘arguments I meet with everywhere’, while another in Jersey City wrote ‘I have the life pested [*sic.*] out of me about their Bonds’.¹⁹² Diarmuid Lynch told those inquiring that the idea that the FOIF were responsible or to blame for the delay in distributing bond certificates was ‘fostered by some parties who sought to destroy this organisation’.¹⁹³ Nevertheless, when Lynch as Secretary of the FOIF was asked by a branch organiser where to send money

¹⁸⁹ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 171.

¹⁹⁰ IE/UCDA/P150/1177.

¹⁹¹ US/ NYPL/MssCol 1854/b.4/46-8, *Various FOIF branch secretaries and subscribers to FOIF*, 1920-1.

¹⁹² US/ NYPL/MssCol 1854/b.4/46, *J.P. Raftery to Lynch*, 8 Oct. 1920; US/ NYPL/MssCol 1854/b.4/47, *O. Foley to Lynch*, 23 Dec. 1920.

¹⁹³ US/ NYPL/MssCol 1854/b.4/49, *Lynch to Cecile R. Fox*, 10 Aug. 1921.

raised for the bond drive, he advised the organiser to forward it to 411 Fifth Avenue ‘even though we deplore the fact that at the present time some of the proceeds of the Irish Bond-Certificate drive or the bank interest thereon is being used in the present fight against the Friends of Irish Freedom’.¹⁹⁴

By 30 September 1920, \$4,435,249.07 had been collected *via* the bond drive, including \$284,318 in US Liberty Bonds accepted at par. Of this, only \$697,481.40 had been remitted to Dublin, including \$147,481.40 in US Liberty Bonds. Another \$975,127.47 had been spent in the US and the balance of \$2,788,034.61 was held in cash (\$2,503,716.61) and US bonds (\$284,318).¹⁹⁵ With the bond drive drawing to a close and the money collected lodged in de Valera’s name, the Dáil’s reliance on the FOIF leadership was fading fast. At the same time, the FOIF’s membership had reached *ca.* 100,000; with a further 125,728 associate members across the country.¹⁹⁶ While strengthening the FOIF on paper, these new members had no strong personal allegiance to Cohalan or Devoy, and so diluted their support base. Joining at a time when de Valera was the main public face of the Irish in America, the allegiance of the new members would primarily have been to him. This was a fact de Valera sought to exploit. Around the time of the San Francisco Democratic convention, he met with Bishop Gallagher of Detroit, who was about to be appointed national president of the FOIF.¹⁹⁷ De Valera proposed that a new organisational structure be put in place in the FOIF, democratising decision-making and giving more autonomy to the state councils.¹⁹⁸ Crucially, the Cohalan-dominated national executive would be abolished under de Valera’s proposal

¹⁹⁴ US/ NYPL/MssCol 1854/b.4/47, *Lynch to P.J. Sheridan*, 19 Dec. 1920.

¹⁹⁵ NLI/Ms.21,548(3), Cash account to 30 Sep. 1920.

¹⁹⁶ Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora*, p. 188.

¹⁹⁷ IE/UCDA/P150/1100, *De Valera’s recollections*, 19 Nov. 1962, p. 13.

¹⁹⁸ Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora*, p. 132.

and the regular meeting place would be moved from his New York stronghold to the more neutral Detroit.¹⁹⁹

However, according to de Valera, these conversations were completely misrepresented by Gallagher in his speech accepting the FOIF presidency and reported in the *Gaelic American*.²⁰⁰ As a result, Cohalan and Devoy were aware of de Valera's plans, and when the FOIF National Council met on 17 September 1920, they tried to prevent him entering.²⁰¹ Harry Boland had to shoulder his way past the doorman just to get into the room. In the heated atmosphere one Cohalan loyalist shouted 'the Friends of Irish Freedom would not seek dictation from any foreign potentate'.²⁰² De Valera's proposals were rejected, and he staged a walk out.²⁰³

The very next day a meeting was held at the Waldorf Astoria, comprising national councillors of the FOIF, branch officers, 'and other friends of the Irish Republic'. They emphasised their support for de Valera and resolved that unless the FOIF constitution be made more democratic, in line with de Valera's suggestions, they would withhold funds from the national council.²⁰⁴ De Valera announced that a new organisation would be formed to rival the FOIF and that it would act in line with policy decided by the Dáil.²⁰⁵ The next month, on 22 October 1920, Harry Boland publicly severed the IRB's ties with its sister organisation Clan na Gael.²⁰⁶

The bond drive would not have been possible without the support of the FOIF, but the fragility of this alliance was the drive's Achilles heel. De Valera managed to hold the coalition together for the duration of the bond drive, but as the end was approaching

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁰ IE/UCDA/P150/1100, *De Valera's recollections*, 19 Nov. 1962, p. 13.

²⁰¹ Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora*, p. 133.

²⁰² Mayor Grace of Charleston, SC, cited in Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora*, p. 132.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

²⁰⁴ IE/UCDA/P150/989, *Resolutions adopted by meeting*, 18 Sept. 1920.

²⁰⁵ Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora*, p. 134

²⁰⁶ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 427

this pretence was no longer required. As predicted by the Bureau of Investigation informant, the end of the bond drive marked the end of collaboration, and when the end arrived it was decisive and swift. Although the alliance ended in failure, the bond drive did not; whether thanks to the Friends or in spite of them, the results of the drive were impressive. The results of the drive and the subscribers who contributed to it are the focus of chapter 9.

Chapter 9: 'A Roll of Honor of the Irish Race'

Frank P. Walsh described the bond drive subscriber list as 'a Roll of Honor of the Irish Race'.¹ Nevertheless, the identities of the bond drive's subscribers have been entirely absent from the historiography of the Irish War of Independence. Exploiting newly uncovered archival material, this chapter intends to lift the veil on this 'roll of honor' and reveal the identities of its members.² In so doing, it follows in the footsteps of Niall Whelehan in his study of the subscribers to Fenian funds in the 1870s and 1880s.³

The bond drive closed for new subscriptions on 14 October 1920, having raised \$5,151,800 from 276,219 subscribers.⁴ Although the public goal of the bond drive was to raise \$10m, the private expectation was that \$5m would be raised, so this result exceeded expectations.⁵ Indeed, according to Francis Carroll, this was the largest amount ever raised by the Irish movement in America.⁶ Any second instalments or deferred payments were to be made to sub-offices by 31 October or the head office by 30 November.⁷ This was announced on 23 September, and a final push was made in the following weeks.⁸ The State Chairman for Michigan, which had only begun its bond drive in July, pleaded for an extension, but O'Mara held firm, insisting that the state had ample time to collect in the previous nine months and it was the state organisation's own fault that it had started late.⁹

¹ US/NYPL MssCol 582/b.13, *Circular from F.P. Walsh*, 29 Dec. 1919.

² IE/NAI/DE/EXL/Vol.80, *Manhattan subscriber list*.

³ N. Whelehan, *The Dynamiters: Irish Nationalism and Political Violence in the Wider World, 1867-1900* (Cambridge, 2012), p. 191.

⁴ *Circular from F.P. Walsh*, 23 Sept. 1920, NLI, Ms.21,548(3); Carroll, *Money*, p. 23.

⁵ Carroll, *Money*, p. 20.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁷ NLI/Ms.21,548(3), *Circular from F.P. Walsh*, 23 Sept. 1920.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ NLI/Ms.21,548(4), *D.J. Healy to J. O'Mara*, 12 Oct. 1920; NLI/Ms.21,548(4), *J. O'Mara to D.J. Healy*, 18 Oct. 1920.

Nationwide results

Notwithstanding de Valera's attempts to gain subscribers from across the country, there is no doubt that the main centres of Irish population on the east coast dominated (Figure 9.1 and Figure 9.2). Leading the pack was New York, which raised a whopping \$1,453,014, representing 26% of the total. Manhattan alone subscribed over \$600,000.¹⁰ The New York total was followed by \$1,037,896 from Massachusetts, and then Pennsylvania, California, Illinois, which raised \$540,781, \$386,941, and \$381,345 respectively. However, when measured in per capita terms, Massachusetts was by far the biggest contributor, with \$2,692 per 10,000 inhabitants (Figure 9.3). Of course, the amount of subscribers in a state was highly correlated to the size of the Irish population there. When measured in terms of the Irish-born population, the state making the largest contributions are Alabama (\$18 per Irish-born resident), followed by Oregon (\$15), Arizona (\$12), Wyoming (\$12) and Minnesota (\$11). Meanwhile Massachusetts and New York contributed only \$5.66 and \$4.75 per Irish-born resident (Figure 9.4).¹¹

The most efficient state was Arizona, which generated \$120.17 for every \$1 in local expenses.¹² The next most efficient was Pennsylvania, where each \$1 spent resulted in \$55.10 in bond certificates, followed by Louisiana (\$50.97), Washington DC (\$38.34), Connecticut (\$35.96), and New Hampshire (\$31.11).¹³ Of the local expenses, 12% was spent on field men's expenses, 17% on their salaries, 11% on printing, 5% on meetings, 12% on advertising, 22% on clerks' salaries, and 18% on sundries such as rent, telephone bills, and light and heat.¹⁴ Overall, state level bond drive expenses were only \$336,176,

¹⁰ US/AIHS/DFC/Bx.13/10, *S. O'Sheel to Cobalan*, 9 Apr. 1920.

¹¹ IE/NAI/FIN1/2166/643, *Price Waterhouse audit of DE US funds*, 23 Feb. 1923.

¹² IE/NAI/DE/L/2/Case10(75), *Bond Drive Expenses by State*, 1920.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

just 6.45% of the total raised, but of course this does not include the amount spent at national headquarters.

The uneven response to the bond drive was fully expected by its organisers. In August 1919, Victor Herbert, past-President of the FOIF, advised de Valera that ‘Outside of New England, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, Ohio, Illinois, Montana, and California, Irish people are few in numbers, and little can be expected from them in thirty states in the way of money, and the times are very bad for them at present.’¹⁵ The presence of an Irish community did not guarantee success however. The chairmen of the campaigns in Connecticut and Iowa both complained of the lack of interest in the loan among Irish-Americans in their states, the latter stating that he was ‘disappointed and disgusted’ with it.¹⁶ Organisation was also a factor. As noted in chapter 7, the woeful performance of Michigan was caused by the intransigence of Bishop Gallagher of Detroit, who saw the bond drive as a rival to his own fundraising efforts.¹⁷ As a result, Gallagher’s city raised a comically low total of \$10 for the drive.¹⁸ Michigan as a whole raised only \$8,967, compared to \$10,456 in the FOIF Victory Fund, and was the only urbanised state that failed to break even, generating a loss of \$640.06.¹⁹ The other loss-making states were Idaho, \$842.63; Georgia, \$813.92; Mississippi, \$412.35; South Carolina, \$101.68; and South Dakota, \$5.75.²⁰

¹⁵ IE/UCDA/P150, *Victor Herbert to de Valera*, 11 Aug. 1919.

¹⁶ Carroll, *American opinion*, p. 152.

¹⁷ IE/UCDA/P150/1100, *De Valera’s recollections*, 19 Nov. 1962.

¹⁸ IE/NAI/FIN1/2166/643, *Price Waterhouse Audit of DE US funds*, 23 Feb. 1923.

¹⁹ Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora*, p. 191; IE/NAI/DE/L/2/Case10(75), *Bond drive expenses by state*, 1920.

²⁰ IE/NAI/DE/L/2/Case10(75), *Bond drive expenses by state*, 1920.




Figure 9.1. Map of the US: Amounts raised for the bond drive, by US state.²¹




Figure 9.2. Share raised for the bond drive at state level.²²

²¹ IE/NAI/FIN1/2166/643, *Price Waterhouse Audit of DE² US funds*, 23 Feb. 1923. Based on data in Table D.1. (Appendix D).

²² *Ibid.*




Figure 9.3. Map of the US: Amounts raised for the bond drive per 10,000 residents, by US state.²³




Figure 9.4. Map of the US: Amounts raised for the bond drive per Irish-born resident, by US state.²⁴

²³ *Ibid.* ; 1920 US Federal Census.

The Gaelic American

Devoy's *Gaelic American* wasted no time in claiming responsibility for the bond drive's success for the FOIF; neither did it waste the opportunity to castigate the Dáil mission.

The front page of the *Gaelic American* on 30 October 1920 led with the headline 'CLAN-NA-GAEL'S WORK FOR THE BONDS,' with the following sub-headlines:

The Organization Was the Backbone of the Whole Movement, and With the Friends of Irish Freedom and The Hibernians, Organized the Great Receptions for De Valera and Made the Bond Drive a Success – Figures Tell the Splendid Work of the New York Clubs and Refute the Venemous [*sic.*] Falsehoods Circulated in Ireland Against the Clan – Official Receipts Verify the Amounts Turned in For the Greater City – Total over \$627,000 – No Better Work For Ireland Ever Done in Living Memory and Yet Those Who Did It Are Treated as Enemies of Ireland – Record Of Cohalan and Devoy Can Stand the Test.²⁵

The second most prominent headline on the front page read "LORD HIGH EXECUTIONER BOLAND SWINGS HIS AXE ON CLAN-NA-GAEL", referring to the IRB's excommunication of the Clan.²⁶ Testament to the strength of feeling among the Cohalan-Devoy faction, these headlines beat the death of Terence MacSwiney by hunger strike, a landmark event in the War of Independence, into third place.²⁷ The FOIF's circular to all members dated 19 November 1920 struck a similar note, outlining a blow-by-blow account of wrongs done to the FOIF by the Dáil mission in the course of the bond drive. The circular claimed that:

...right from the outset the men sent through the country to organize for the Bond Campaign made a specialty of slandering Judge Cohalan and John Devoy, and belittling the F.O.I.F.; notwithstanding the many other acts which were marked by misrepresentation and general unfriendliness against the leading men of the F.O.I.F., the latter continued their support for Ireland's sake.²⁸

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ NLI/Ms.21,548(4), *Gaelic American*, 30 Oct. 1920, p. 1.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ NLI/Ms.21,548(4), *Circular from FOIF*, 19 Nov. 1920.

There is no doubt that the organisational heft of the FOIF had a strong bearing on the success of the bond drive. In Manhattan, for example, about \$225,000 was secured by the Clan na Gael clubs in the borough, and \$390,000 by the branches of the FOIF.²⁹ Indeed, the amount raised by the bond drive in a state was highly correlated with that raised by the Victory Fund there. Table 9.1 shows the results of using an OLS model to regress the amount raised for the bond drive at state level on the amount raised for the Victory Fund, controlling for the population of the state, and its Irish-born population. Controlling for population, every dollar raised by the Victory Fund predicted \$4.45 would be raised by the bond drive. Of course the success of the Victory Fund was also a function of the size of the Irish community. However, even controlling for a state's Irish-born population, the Victory Fund's success in a state appears to have a significant and positive effect on the performance of the bond drive, with every dollar raised by the Victory Fund predicting \$1.83 for the bond drive.

²⁹ US/AIHS/DFC/Bx.13/10, *O'Sheel to Cobalan*, 9 Apr. 1920.

Table 9.1. Relationship between Victory Fund (1919) and First External Loan (1920).

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Amount raised (US state) for the First External Loan (1920) (\$) (a)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Amount raised (\$), Victory Fund, 1919 (b)	1.831*** (0.361)	4.455*** (0.194)	4.857*** (0.156)
Population (c)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.015*** (0.005)	
Irish born population (c)	3.207*** (0.413)		
Constant	6,047.368 (7,531.627)	-11,035.950 (10,896.160)	12,604.860 (8,465.852)
Observations	49	49	49
R ²	0.984	0.962	0.954
Adjusted R ²	0.982	0.960	0.953
Residual Std. Error	33,654.020 (df = 45)	50,909.510 (df = 46)	55,376.940 (df = 47)
F Statistic	899.198*** (df = 3; 45)	576.249*** (df = 2; 46)	965.925*** (df = 1; 47)
Method of est.	OLS	OLS	OLS

Notes:

* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001

(a) IE/NAI/FIN1/2166/643, *Price Waterhouse Audit of DÉ US funds*, 23 Feb. 1923.

(b) Doorley, *Irish-American diaspora nationalism*, p. 191

(c) *US Federal Census, 1920*

Nevertheless, while the success of the bond drive was certainly built on the shoulders of the Victory Fund, the former achieved a far wider reach than the latter. The bond drive was active in 12 states not covered by the Victory Fund: Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming.³⁰ Even in Alabama, despite the hostile reception received by de Valera, the bond drive raised a respectable \$14,650, compared to the Victory Fund's \$542.³¹

On top of lending the bond drive their organisational infrastructure, some organisations subscribed in their own name, separate from the individual subscriptions of

³⁰ Although there were a number of states where the Victory Fund was active but not the bond drive: Mississippi, South Dakota and South Carolina.

³¹ IE/NAI/FIN1/2166/643, *Price Waterhouse audit of DÉ US funds*, 23 Feb. 1923; Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora*, p. 191.

their members. The FOIF's \$100,000 loan to the bond drive, a source of much rancour between the organisations, was repaid in the form of bond certificates.³² The national board of the AOH subscribed \$10,000, while that of the LAAOH subscribed \$5,000.³³ The bond drive's stalwarts also put their money where their mouths were. Joseph McGarrity personally subscribed \$5,000.³⁴ John Stratton O'Leary, bond drive chairman for the Bronx, also subscribed \$5,000.³⁵ Frank P. Walsh and his family subscribed \$3,000.³⁶ Liam Mellows subscribed \$100 to the bond drive in Manhattan, more than his \$75 per week salary.³⁷ The Irish-American physician and feminist Gertrude Kelly also subscribed \$100.³⁸

Of course the majority of subscribers were not members of the FOIF. Its membership numbered only 70,485 members before the bond drive began, a quarter of the 276,219 subscribers to the bond drive.³⁹ Indeed, Judge Bonniwell, Chairman of the bond drive in Pennsylvania, noted how many attendees at bond drive meetings were completely unknown to the organisers. 'After every meeting the officers, looking over the lists of subscribers, remark: Who's this? Who's this lady? Who's this man?'⁴⁰

³² IE/NAI/FIN1/2166/643, *Price Waterhouse audit of DÉ US funds*, 23 Feb. 1923.

³³ *IP*, 7 Feb. 1920, p. 2.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 21 Feb. 1920, p. 1.

³⁵ *New York Tribune*, 19 Jan. 1920, p. 18.

³⁶ US/NYPL/MssCol 3211/b.28, *F.P. Walsh to J. Martin*, 27 Jan. 1920.

³⁷ IE/NAI/DE/EXL/Vol.80, *Manhattan subscriber list*, p. 12; NLI/Ms.18,111, *Wages of staff of the Dáil Mission to America*, n.d.

³⁸ IE/NAI/DE/EXL/Vol.80, *Manhattan subscriber list*.

³⁹ Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora*, pp. 186-7.

⁴⁰ *IP*, 6 Mar. 1920, p. 1.

'The big money people'

Although the results of the bond drive were impressive, de Valera was disappointed at the lack of subscriptions from wealthy Americans.⁴¹ Their absence from the subscriber list was also noted by Devoy who, writing in his memoirs nine years later, reflected that:

[Sir Roger] Casement's notion that we could obtain money from rich Irishmen in America was of course a delusion. With a few notable exceptions, moneyed Irishmen and Irish Americans were unfortunately not then (1915) interested in the freedom of their motherland, though it is true that five or six years later, the latent race pride of a larger number of them was rekindled by the magnificent sacrifices of the young men and women in Ireland and by the marvellous progress of the movement in America after the race convention in Philadelphia, and as a result more of them opened their purse strings. Even then, the percentage was a miserably small one.⁴²

Senator Bourke Cockran was appointed to raise money from 'the big money people,' according to James O'Mara, who was unimpressed with the Senator's efforts in this regard.⁴³ Writing to Bourke Cockran with a book of tender forms on 20 July 1920, he added rather cattily, 'Perhaps you would be able to get a few of your friends to subscribe as well'.⁴⁴

There were a number of large subscriptions however, and naturally, these received attention in the press. Although the British consul general's suspicions about the involvement of American business were unfounded, some members of this class can be found in the subscriber list. The largest reported individual contribution, for \$20,000, came from John McGinley, Vice President of the West Penn Steel Company.⁴⁵ Another large subscription, for \$10,000, came from Thomas J. Maloney, the Kentucky-born son of Irish parents who was President of the Lorillard Tobacco Company in Jersey City.⁴⁶ Edward L. Doheny, the Californian oil baron who would later provide the inspiration for

⁴¹ Hopkinson, *Irish War of Independence*, p. 171.

⁴² Devoy, *Recollections*, p. 421.

⁴³ US/AIHS/DFC/Bx.13/8, J. O'Mara to Cobalan, 6 Nov. 1919.

⁴⁴ US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13/2, J. O'Mara to Bourke Cockran, 20 Jul. 1920.

⁴⁵ US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13/2, *ACII Bulletin*, Sheet 2, 2 Apr. 1920; *IP*, 13 Mar. 1920, p. 1.

⁴⁶ US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13/2, *ACII Bulletin*, Sheet 2, 2 Apr. 1920; 1920 US Federal Census, New Jersey.

the movie *There Will be Blood*, also bought \$10,000 of bond certificates.⁴⁷ Doheny's subscription was noted by the British consul general in San Francisco, who described him as 'probably the richest man in California' and one who 'is dealing a good deal with the British government'.⁴⁸ The British embassy believed Doheny's Mexican Petroleum Company was shortly to deal with the Admiralty regarding fuel contracts in England. Underscoring the risks involved for businessmen supporting the Dáil, it reported his actions to Curzon in London.⁴⁹

Some large subscriptions also came from the world of American politics. As outlined in chapter 8, the bond drive's organisers were keen not to take sides in American politics. Indeed, a circular from Frank P. Walsh to volunteers for the bond drive explicitly stated that he was seeking a non-partisan approach. 'There need not be any fear of embarrassment on account of the League of Nations Covenant, as our organisation will be broad enough to include...Leaguers and anti-Leaguers'.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the US senatorial elections of 1920 were also reflected in the subscriber lists of the bond drive. William Alexander Julian, then senatorial candidate for the Democrats in Cincinnati, who would later serve as Treasurer of the United States under Franklin D. Roosevelt, subscribed \$1,000 to the bond drive.⁵¹ Thomas J. Noctor, a leading Democrat and liquor broker who was state chairman of the drive in Cincinnati, also subscribed \$1,000.⁵²

⁴⁷ Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 166.

⁴⁸ TNA: FO/115/2599/127, *A.C. Ross to R.C. Lindsay*, 17 Mar. 1920.

⁴⁹ TNA: FO/115/2599/145, *R.C. Lindsay to Curzon*, 27 Mar. 1920.

⁵⁰ US/NYPL/MssCol 3211/b.28, *Circular from F.P. Walsh*, Oct. 1919.

⁵¹ IE/UCDA/P150/969, *Margaret M. Madden to F.P. Walsh*, 19 Jun. 1920.

⁵² *Ibid.*; Z.L. Miller, *Boss Cox's Cincinnati: Urban Politics in the Progressive Era* (Cincinnati, 2000), p. 165.

The Little People

While large subscriptions stole the headlines, the vast majority, 210,190, of the 276,219 bond certificates were purchased in denominations of just \$10, making up \$2,101,900 of the \$5,132,600 total (Table 9.2, Figure 9.5, and Figure 9.6).⁵³ According to Seamus O'Sheel, most of the subscribers to the bond drive in Manhattan were poor people, who 'put their savings of years on the altar of the Irish Republic'.⁵⁴ This is in line with Whelehan's analysis of the Skirmishing Funds of the 1870s, which found subscribers were 'overwhelmingly lower-class immigrants'.⁵⁵ It also echoes reports of the Polish bond drive, also being conducted in the US in 1920. Targeting those of Polish birth or descent in America, the Polish bonds were overwhelmingly bought by 'the laboring class', while richer Poles held aloof.⁵⁶

⁵³ IE/UCDA/P150/962, *Statement issued by D   of receipts and expenditures of First Loan of the Republic of Ireland to 13 Jun. 1921.*

⁵⁴ US/AIHS/DFC/Bx.13/10, *S. O'Sheel to Cobalan*, 9 Apr. 1920.

⁵⁵ Whelehan, *Dynamiters*, p. 197.

⁵⁶ *South Bend News-Times*, 20 Jul. 1920, p. 10.

Table 9.2. Denominations of subscriptions to the First External Loan.⁵⁷

<i>Denomination of subscription to the First External Loan</i>	<i>Amount of subscriptions</i>	<i>Amount raised</i>	<i>Per cent of subscriptions</i>	<i>Per cent of total raised</i>
\$10	210,190	\$2,101,900	76.10	40.96
\$30	39,826	\$995,650	14.42	19.40
\$50	17,795	\$889,750	6.44	17.34
\$100	7,730	\$773,000	2.80	15.06
\$250	266	\$66,500	0.10	1.30
\$500	272	\$135,000	0.10	2.63
\$1,000	135	\$135,000	0.05	2.63
\$5,000	3	\$15,000	0.00	0.29
\$10,000	2	\$20,000	0.00	0.39
TOTAL	276,219	\$5,131,800	100	100




Figure 9.5. Denominations of bond certificates: Share of total subscribers.⁵⁸




Figure 9.6. Denominations of bond certificates: Share of total subscribers amount raised.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ IE/UCDA/P150/962, *Statement issued by D  of receipts and expenditures of First Loan of the Republic of Ireland to 13 Jun. 1921.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* Based on data in Table 9.2.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

To explore further the identities of the subscribers to the bond drive, a recently uncovered document, containing the names and addresses of subscribers in Manhattan, is instructive. Out of a sample of 1,582 subscribers listed (Figure 9.7), 327 were positively identified in the 1920 census of the United States (Figure 9.8). Analysis of the sample backs up the picture described above. The vast majority, 70.6% of Manhattan subscribers were born in Ireland (Figure 9.9). Adding those non-Irish subscribers with two Irish parents, this figure rises to 86%, and including those with one Irish parent increases the number to 88%. Some 10% of Manhattan subscribers reported their mother tongue as Irish. Interestingly, the median year of immigration to America among subscribers was 1904: before the radicalisation of public opinion in Ireland. Considering the significant 'heaping' of immigration years around 1900, the true median immigration year is likely to have been even earlier (Figure 9.10). The median age of bond drive subscribers in Manhattan was just 36 (Figure 9.11), and only 37% were married, the remainder either single (58%) or widowed (5%) (Figure 9.12). The majority were either renters (62%) or boarders (17%), with 18% living with their employers. Only 1.7% of subscribers were homeowners and 1% had mortgages (Figure 9.13). The picture that emerges is of one of young, single immigrants in precarious living conditions; whose income was spent on rent or whose accommodation was dependent on their employer. Despite the precariousness of their position, they chose to spend some of their income on the cause of Irish independence.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ IE/NAI/DE/EXL/Vol.80, *Manhattan subscriber list*, 1920 Federal US Census.




Figure 9.7. Map of Manhattan: Subscribers to the bond drive listed in Manhattan register.⁶¹




Figure 9.8. Map of Manhattan: Subscribers to the bond drive identified in 1920 census.⁶²

⁶¹ IE/NAI/DE/EXL/Vol.80, *Manhattan subscriber list*. Map constructed using ArcGIS, basemap is Esri greyscale.

⁶² *Ibid.*; 1920 Federal US Census.




Figure 9.9. Birthplace of subscribers to the bond drive in Manhattan.⁶³

⁶³ *Ibid.*




Figure 9.10. Immigration dates of subscribers to the bond drive in Manhattan.⁶⁴




Figure 9.11. Age of subscribers to the bond drive in Manhattan.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* Based on data in Table 9.3.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*




Figure 9.12. Marital status of subscribers to the bond drive in Manhattan.⁶⁶




Figure 9.13. Home ownership among subscribers to the bond drive in Manhattan.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

Table 9.3. Summary statistics: Subscribers to the First External Loan in Manhattan.⁶⁸

	Mean	Median	S.D.	Min	Max	Obs.
<i>Demographics</i>						
Age	37.60	36.5	12.28	1	68	326
Female (%)	41.16	0	-	0	1	1,550
Literate (%)	99.07	1	-	0	1	322
<i>Heritage</i>						
Irish born (%)	71.47	1	-	0	1	326
US born (%)	22.70	0	-	0	1	326
Other nationality (%)	6.44	0	-	0	1	326
Mother tongue Irish (%)	10.73	0	-	0	1	326
Immigration date	1902	1904	10.71	1860	1916	244
<i>Marital status</i>						
Single (%)	57.98	1	-	0	1	326
Married (%)	36.50	0	-	0	1	326
Widowed (%)	5.21	0	-	0	1	326
<i>Home ownership</i>						
Boarder (%)	16.77	0	-	0	1	310
Living with employer (%)	18.39	0	-	0	1	310
Renter (%)	62.26	1	-	0	1	310
Mortgage holder (%)	0.97	0	-	0	1	310
Owner (%)	1.61	0	-	0	1	310
<i>Occupation</i>						
Retail (%)	4.90	0	-	0	1	326
Pubs and restaurants (%)	6.75	0	-	0	1	326
Police or Fire Dept. (%)	2.76	0	-	0	1	326
Clerks (%)	11.04	0	-	0	1	326
Domestic Servants (%)	16.87	0	-	0	1	326
Manual workers (%)	27.91	0	-	0	1	326
Drivers (%)	7.67	0	-	0	1	326
Nurses or Doctors (%)	2.45	0	-	0	1	326
Others (%)	17.79	0	-	0	1	326

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

Table 9.4. Summary statistics: Size of subscriptions to the First External Loan in Manhattan.⁶⁹

	Mean	Median	S.D.	Min	Max	Obs.
<i>Demographics</i>						
Female (US\$)	16.80	10	21.81	2	100	638
Literate (US\$)	28.21	10	31.79	2	100	316
<i>Heritage</i>						
Irish born (US\$)	29.88	10	32.60	2	100	234
US born (US\$)	23.89	10	30.13	2	100	73
Other nationality (US\$)	14.14	10	12.51	2	50	21
Mother tongue Irish (US\$)	33.43	10	36.11	10	100	35
<i>Marital status</i>						
Single (US\$)	27.93	10	31.14	2	100	189
Married (US\$)	27.97	10	32.50	2	100	119
Widowed (US\$)	24.06	10	30.23	10	100	17
<i>Home ownership</i>						
Boarder (US\$)	22.73	10	26.45	2	100	52
Living with employer (US\$)	26.93	10	28.86	10	100	57
Renter (US\$)	27.23	10	32.06	2	100	193
Mortgage holder (US\$)	53.33	50	95.09	10	100	3
Owner (US\$)	70.00	100	41.08	25	100	5
<i>Occupation</i>						
Retail (US\$)	17.50	10	22.58	10	100	16
Pubs and restaurants (US\$)	22.05	10	26.98	10	100	22
Police or Fire Dept. (US\$)	41.67	10	44.02	10	100	9
Clerks (US\$)	31.03	10	34.32	2	100	35
Domestic Servants (US\$)	26.82	10	29.13	10	100	55
Manual workers (US\$)	28.09	10	38.09	2	100	91
Drivers (US\$)	15.00	10	19.47	5	100	25
Nurses or Doctors (US\$)	30.00	17.50	31.51	10	100	8
Others (US\$)	34.72	10	36.13	2	100	58

Patriots or dupes?

To the bond drive's organisers, the 276,219 subscribers were patriots to the homeland. In Southern California, for example, a souvenir booklet was prepared, containing a history of the Irish cause and an alphabetical list of subscribers.⁷⁰ The drive's detractors however took a different view entirely. The British Ambassador to Washington believed the bond certificates were bought 'largely by illiterate persons' and, as noted in chapter 7,

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ US/SJSU/Mss.1971.01.01/Bx1/f.16, *Circular from P.F. McCarthy*, 7 Apr. 1920. This was to be sold to subscribers to generate further revenue.

sections of the press made similar characterisations.⁷¹ In its description of the bond drive as a ‘swindle’, *The Street* characterised the subscribers as ‘thousands of credulous, well-meaning but inexperienced people’.⁷² The roots of this portrayal were deep; similar depictions were made of the ‘dupes’ who subscribed to the Fenian Brotherhood in 1881.⁷³ *The Times*, for example, claimed the skirmishing fund ‘had nought for its results, except the enrichment of schemers and the disgrace of the Irish cause’.⁷⁴ Drawing an explicit link with this tradition, Alderman Quinn of New York denounced de Valera for

travelling around the United States, having his expenses paid by appealing to the sweetest sentiment of the most generous race on earth, aided and abetted by a bunch of political bunco steerers [*sic.*] who have been fooling the Irish and Irish descendants in this city for years.⁷⁵

The timing of the bond drive made it particularly vulnerable to accusations of this nature. As noted by Ott, there were scores of financial swindlers in the United States in the years following the Great War.⁷⁶ They courted ‘citizen investors’ and, much like the bond drive, persuaded them to sign over their Liberty bonds in return for shares in ‘uncertain, worthless, or even non-existent enterprises’.⁷⁷ The most famous of these was Charles Ponzi, who was operating a pyramid scheme in Boston at the same time as the bond drive.⁷⁸

This characterisation was clearly a concern for the bond drive’s organisers. Shaemus O’Sheel wrote a letter to the *New York Tribune* emphatically explaining that they were not selling bonds in the financial sense, but bond certificates, which should be

⁷¹ TNA: FO/115/2599/130, R.C. Lindsay to Curzon, 22 Mar. 1920.

⁷² *Daily Telegraph*, 11 Feb. 1920, p. 4.

⁷³ Whelehan, *Dynamiters*, pp. 218-9.

⁷⁴ *The Times*, 27 Oct. 1881, cited in Whelehan, *Dynamiters*, pp. 218-9.

⁷⁵ *Sun*, 19 Jan. 1920, p. 4.

⁷⁶ Ott, *Wall Street*, p. 116.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

treated as ‘a free gift unless and until the Irish republic obtains full independence’.⁷⁹ He also made clear that no subscribers were being misled in this issue, stating, ‘Every solicitor for this loan is explicitly instructed to receive no subscription without first reading to the intending subscriber the wording of the tender-form presented’.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, the accusations persisted.

‘From the pockets of American servant girls’

The *Irish Press* boasted ‘A unique feature of the drive has been the great number of women who have subscribed and the large sums they have paid’.⁸¹ This claim is borne out in the sample of Manhattan subscribers: 41% of the 1,545 subscribers sampled were women (Figure 9.14).⁸² This proportion stays roughly constant when broken down by amount subscribed, with 42.6% of \$10 subscriptions, 41.5% of \$25 subscriptions, 36.2% of \$50 subscriptions, and 39.7% of \$100 subscriptions. A similar picture is painted by a sample of 371 subscribers in Chicago, 36% of whom were women.⁸³ Philadelphia returned a lower female share of subscribers, only 22.9% based on a sample of 671, as did Birmingham, Alabama, where a sample of 429 subscribers was 19.7% female.⁸⁴ Nevertheless, all these figures stand in contrast to the 12% of subscribers to the National Loan who were women.

⁷⁹ *New York Tribune*, 9 Feb. 1920, p. 16.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *IP*, 7 Feb. 1920, p. 2.

⁸² IE/NAI/DE/EXL/Vol.80, *Manhattan subscriber list*.

⁸³ IE/NAI/DE/EXL/Vol.70, *Chicago subscriber list*.

⁸⁴ *IP*, 7 Feb. 1920, p. 7; IE/NAI/DE/EXL/Vol.57, *Alabama subscribers to the First External Loan*, 1920.




Figure 9.14. Gender of subscribers to the bond drive in Manhattan.⁸⁵

Although the high proportion of female subscribers was clearly a source of pride for the *Irish Press*, other, less sympathetic publications took a different view. Contemporary journalists considered women to be particularly susceptible to financial swindles, and the popular caricature of the bond drive's female subscribers fell neatly into this narrative.⁸⁶ The prevailing stereotype of the Irishwoman in America, according to Ely Janis, was that of a 'young, gullible, and newly arrived immigrant domestic' named Bridget.⁸⁷ This is perhaps not surprising, as domestic service was one of the main interfaces between the American middle class and identifiably Irish immigrants. According to Diane Hotten-Somers, by the beginning of the 20th century, the Irish

⁸⁵ IE/NAI/DE/EXL/Vol.80, *Manhattan subscriber list*. Map constructed using ArcGIS, basemap is Esri greyscale. Based on data in Table 9.3.

⁸⁶ G. Robb, *Ladies of the Ticker: Women and Wall Street from the Gilded Age to the Great Depression* (Illinois, 2017), p. 103.

⁸⁷ E.M. Janis, *A Greater Ireland: The Land League and Transatlantic Nationalism in Gilded Age America* (Madison, Wisconsin, 2015), p. 150.

Bridget had become an integral part of the middle-class American home.⁸⁸ There was a stigma attached to domestic service and, apart from African-Americans and Swedish immigrants, the immigrant Irishwomen were the only group willing to do the work.⁸⁹ Widely regarded as uncivilised and ignorant of American middle-class mores, Bridget was an easy target for lampooning and a convenient means of denigrating the bond drive.⁹⁰

Discouraging its readers from investing in the Irish bond drive, the *Wall Street Journal* characterised the subscribers as ‘Irish domestic servants, and others of like or lower standards of intelligence’.⁹¹ Adding an element of menace on the part of the bond drive’s promoters, the *Spectator* claimed the bond certificates were ‘freely forced upon the maid-servants and workmen of the United States’.⁹² Characterisations such as these clearly had traction, and they dogged de Valera’s appeals for recognition of Irish independence at the Democratic presidential convention in San Francisco. Demarest Lloyd, president of the Loyal Coalition, accused him of collecting ‘10,000,000 from the pockets of American servant girls’.⁹³

In the opinion of the *Irish Bulletin*’s Frank Gallagher, this stereotyping of the bond drive’s subscribers as domestic servants was part of an orchestrated plan of attack by the British government.⁹⁴ While this may well have been the case, internal correspondence of the British foreign office suggests a genuine belief among officials of the accuracy of the stereotype. The British consul general in New York informed the Ambassador in Washington that many of the bonds were bought by ‘ignorant and badly

⁸⁸ Hotten-Somers, ‘Relinquishing and Reclaiming Independence’, pp. 227-45.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ Carroll, *American opinion*, p. 153.

⁹² ‘The Essentials of Irish Peace’, *The Spectator*, 8 Oct. 1921, cited in the *Living Age* (American periodical), 19 Nov. 1921, p. 470.

⁹³ Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 165.

⁹⁴ Hogan, *Four Glorious Years*, p. 255.

educated persons, particularly of the servant class,' a description the Ambassador passed on to Lord Curzon in London.⁹⁵

If Gallagher's suspicions were true, the British government would have been tapping into a stereotype that was deeply embedded in American popular culture. Henri Le Caron, a British spy operating within the Fenian Brotherhood, observed in his memoirs that during the 1866 Fenian bond issue there 'came into vogue the sneering reference to the agitation being financed by the servant-girls of New York'.⁹⁶ This fashion filtered down to regional newspapers such as Ohio's *Urbana Union*, which in 1866 reported 'bogus Fenian bonds' being sold to cooks in various kitchens in New York.⁹⁷ Similar claims were made in the *Charleston Daily News* in 1871, when the Fenian Brotherhood's finances were leaked to the public.⁹⁸

Although initially an anti-Fenian trope, the stereotype of the Irish Bridget was also used to smear Parnell following his 'New Departure' alliance with John Devoy. In 1880, a cartoon in the popular New York-based *Harper's Weekly* portrayed him as a tramp begging from an Irish maid on her doorstep (Figure 9.15). Identified as 'Pat Riot', Parnell's caption reads, 'Ah, you innocent Bridget, darlint, sure it's not a starvation of food that troubles us, *but it's money we're afther*.'⁹⁹ The duo of the Fenian swindler and Bridget the dupe was also used to discredit the Fenian Brotherhood's 'Skirmishing Fund' in the 1880s. The front cover of *Puck* on 22 August 1883 showed Fenian leader O'Donovan Rossa spooning nationalist rhetoric into the mouth of a simian Irish maid who was laying eggs containing cash (Figure 9.16). Entitled 'The goose that lays the golden eggs', the caption from Rossa reads 'Begorra, we'll never kill her while her

⁹⁵ TNA: FO/115/2599/94, *G. Armstrong to R.C. Lindsay*, 2 Mar. 1920; TNA: FO/115/2599/130, *R.C. Lindsay to Curzon*, 22 Mar. 1920.

⁹⁶ H. Le Caron, *Twenty-Five Years in the Secret Service: The recollections of a spy* (London, 1893), pp. 27-8, cited in Whelehan, *Dynamiters*, p. 235.

⁹⁷ *Urbana Union*, 25 Apr. 1866, p. 4.

⁹⁸ *Charleston Daily News*, 31 Mar. 1871, p. 2.

⁹⁹ 'Beware of Foreign Tramps', *Harper's Weekly*, 24 Jan. 1880, cited in Janis, *Greater Ireland*, p. 44.

appetite lasts'. As noted by Whelehan, a common thread was Bridget portrayed as an innocent dupe and the fundraiser as a swindler, out for self-enrichment.¹⁰⁰

The Irish maid was not always viewed so sympathetically and was sometimes cast as the villain of the piece. A variation of the Bridget caricature was 'Biddy', 'the older, oafish, and rebellious servant'.¹⁰¹ Far from being a victim, Biddy was seen as a tyrant exerting control over her employer. This 'Biddy' stereotype, and its links with Irish nationalism in America, was perhaps best represented on the cover of *Puck* in 1883 (Figure 9.17). A simian Biddy is shown shaking her fist at her cowering mistress, and the caption reads 'The declaration of Irish independence we are all familiar with'.¹⁰² The stereotype of Biddy still had currency in 1920, as evidenced by accounts from the bond drive's detractors. In an interview with *The Times*, the American writer Owen Wister relayed the story of an acquaintance in Philadelphia being asked by her cook to buy Irish bonds.¹⁰³ When the acquaintance declined, her entire domestic staff announced they were leaving.¹⁰⁴ The British consul general in New York reported similar scenes to the Ambassador in Washington in February 1920. According to the consul general, there was a 'regularly organised plan being carried out by Irish servant girls throughout the country, who approach their masters and mistresses, together or separately, with urgent appeals to subscribe to the bonds of the Irish Republic.'¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁰ Whelehan, *Dynamiters*, pp. 218-9.

¹⁰¹ Janis, *Greater Ireland*, p. 150.

¹⁰² *Puck*, 9 May 1883, p. 1.

¹⁰³ *The Times*, 1 Jan. 1921, p. 11.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ TNA: FO/115/2599/88, *G. Armstrong to R.C. Lindsay*, 16 Feb. 1920.

The image originally presented here cannot be made freely available via ORA because of copyright.

Figure 9.15. 'Beware of Foreign Tramps'¹⁰⁶

The image originally presented here cannot be made freely available via ORA because of copyright.

Figure 9.16. 'The Goose that lays the Golden Eggs'.¹⁰⁷

The image originally presented here cannot be made freely available via ORA because of copyright.

Figure 9.17. 'The Irish Declaration of Independence we are all familiar with'.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ *Harper's Weekly*, 24 Jan. 1880, cited in Janis, *Greater Ireland*, p. 44.

¹⁰⁷ *Puck*, 22 Aug. 1883, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸ *Puck*, 9 May 1883, p. 1.

Even if Gallagher was correct in his allegation that these caricatures were spread by the British government in America, it does not follow that they were baseless. In exploring the veracity of the claims, the Manhattan subscriber list again is instructive. Fifty-two (30%) of the 177 female subscribers identified in the census reported working as domestic servants for a private family. Ten of these were aged 40 and over, so could be characterised as ‘Biddies’, while 37 were 35 years and under, falling into the ‘Bridget’ category. The median subscription of these domestic servants, \$10, was in line with the sample as a whole, but there were a surprising number of high subscriptions. Five of the domestic servants identified subscribed \$100, while another eight subscribed \$50. Four of the five \$100 subscribers were ‘Bridgets’ under 35 years old.¹⁰⁹

This stands in stark contrast to Niall Whelehan’s research on the Fenian Brotherhood’s ‘Skirmishing Fund’ of the 1870s and 1880s. Although Devoy recalled ‘a fairly good portion of the Fenian funds’ came from Irish servant girls, Whelehan’s research suggests otherwise.¹¹⁰ Finding that the vast majority of contributions to the Skirmishing Fund in New York came from men, he concludes that the popular association of the ‘Irish Bridget’ with Fenian fundraising was ‘entirely fabricated’.¹¹¹ This being the case, how can we account for the high proportion of Irish domestic servants in the bond drive subscriber list?

As noted by Whelehan, the reputation of Irish domestic servants for supplying funds was largely borne of their enthusiasm for funding causes promoted by the Catholic Church, which at the time of the Skirmishing Fund was strongly opposed to the Fenian Brotherhood.¹¹² Perhaps the support for the bond drive from senior members of the Catholic clergy, publicised in the press and in parish churches, played a role in attracting

¹⁰⁹ IE/NAI/DE/EXL/Vol.80, *Manhattan subscriber list*, 1920 US Federal Census.

¹¹⁰ Devoy, *Recollections*, p. 355.

¹¹¹ Whelehan, *Dynamiters*, pp. 241-3.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 243.

the subscriptions of such domestic servants.¹¹³ As noted in chapter 7, the roll call of senior Catholic clergy endorsing the bond drive came in sharp contrast to Archbishop McCloskey's denunciation of the 1866 issue.¹¹⁴ The increased participation of Irish-American women in the public sphere must also be taken into account. The extent of female participation in promoting the 1920 bond drive is clear from chapter 7 and it is reasonable to presume that the prominence of female promoters helped encourage female subscriptions. Perhaps the US Liberty Loan campaign, which targeted women as well as men, also had an effect.¹¹⁵ The 'democratisation' of Wall Street that resulted from the Liberty Loans, encouraging non-traditional investors to invest their savings, could well have rubbed off on the Irish domestic servants of America. The bond drive's explicit linkage with the Liberty Loan campaign, accepting Liberty Loan bonds at par and imitating its methods of publicity, would certainly have leveraged this effect. Of course the bond drive was a financial contribution, so economic factors might have also been in play. According to Hotten-Somers, there was a trend in the years leading up to 1920 for domestic servants to 'live out', leaving them less dominated by their mistresses in how they spent their money and more free time in which to spend it. This, coupled with the growth of consumer advertising in Irish-American newspapers, meant that Irish servant girls by 1920 had entered into consumer culture in a way that was 'distinctively Irish-American'.¹¹⁶ In this context, bond certificates were part of a broader consumer landscape, including novels set in the home country and Irish linens, as well as American commodities such as hats, chandeliers and candlesticks.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13/2, *J.D. Moore to Bourke Cockran*, 18 Jan. 1920, *O'Sheel to Bourke Cockran*, 28 Feb. 1920.

¹¹⁴ *Richmond Dispatch*, 7 Mar. 1866, p. 3.

¹¹⁵ Ott, *Wall Street*, p. 90.

¹¹⁶ Hotten-Somers, 'Relinquishing and Reclaiming Independence', pp. 227 & 239.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

As noted by Hotten-Somers, many historians have interpreted employment in domestic service as a liberating experience for Irish female immigrants to the US.¹¹⁸ As such, it would be wrong to portray them as easily persuadable vessels without agency of their own. While the factors listed above may indeed have had an effect, the political agency of the female subscribers to the bond drive must not be overlooked.

Of course the domestic servants made up only a minority of subscribers. Just 51 (17%) of the 294 subscribers for whom occupation could be determined worked for a private family, the remainder holding a plethora of other occupations. Some could be described as sophisticated investors; an English-born stockbroker subscribed \$50 to the bond drive, a New York-born real estate appraiser subscribed \$100, and an auditor subscribed \$200. The New York Police Department was also represented in the Manhattan sample.¹¹⁹ This is not entirely surprising; when de Valera gave a lecture about the 1918 general election, two New York policemen helped him by holding up a large map showing the election results.¹²⁰ The sample also contains four longshoremen, one of whom subscribed \$50. Men such as these were crucial in Harry Boland's efforts to transport arms to Ireland and their 'Irish Patriotic Strike' starting in August 1920, essentially a boycott of British shipping, had a powerful effect on public opinion.¹²¹ There were also a number of subscribers whose occupations were linked to alcohol, even though the bond drive was conducted during prohibition.¹²² This included one liquor dealer, three saloonkeepers, and seven bartenders, two of whom subscribed \$100. The

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.* Hotten-Somers gives as examples H.R. Diner, *Erin's Daughters in America: Irish Immigrant Women in the Nineteenth Century* (Baltimore, 1983), pp. 80-94; and J.A. Nolan, *Ourselves Alone: Women's Emigration from Ireland 1885-1920* (Lexington, 1989), pp. 73-90.

¹¹⁹ IE/NAI/DE/EXL/Vol.80, *Manhattan subscriber list*; 1920 US Federal Census.

¹²⁰ IE/NAI/DE/2/292, *Nunan to Collins*, 11 Dec. 1920.

¹²¹ B. Nelson, *Divided we Stand: American Workers and the Struggle for Black Equality* (Princeton, 2003), p. 26.

¹²² Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 426.

largest occupation category in the sample was manual work (28%), reflecting the working class composition of the bond drive subscriber-list (Figure 9.18).¹²³




Figure 9.18. Occupations of subscribers to the bond drive in Manhattan.¹²⁴

‘Men and women of all creeds and races’

As noted above, the lower the Irish-born population in a state, the higher the amount raised per Irishman or Irishwoman. There are a number of possible explanations for this phenomenon. Perhaps smaller Irish communities had a higher ratio of ‘stalwart’ community leaders, who would be more likely to subscribe in large amounts, to followers who would make up the bulk of the smaller subscriptions. Alternatively, perhaps the smaller Irish communities had to rely more on their non-Irish neighbours in order to meet their quotas. Similarly, perhaps smaller, more isolated Irish communities were by necessity more integrated into the wider community.

¹²³ IE/NAI/DE/EXL/Vol.80, *Manhattan subscriber list*, 1920 US Federal Census.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.* Based on data in Table 9.3.

De Valera was keen to highlight the participation of non-Irish Americans in the bond drive. Fresh from his gruelling tour of the Deep South, he made sure to report the enthusiasm with which non-Irish-Americans had responded to the drive. 'It may be true that Irish blood leads the sympathetic movement in our favour, but we have won to the cause men and women of all creeds and races'.¹²⁵ Dispatches from outside the centres of Irish population also drew attention to the diversity of non-Irish subscriptions. Frank A. Barry was the organiser for Nogales, Arizona, a town of 10,000 inhabitants, where two thirds of the population was Mexican and less than 5% of the remainder of Irish birth or extraction. In February 1920, he was able to report that, thanks to the local Irish women, 'who took complete charge of the drive', they had exceeded their \$3,000 quota with 'the most cosmopolitan list of subscribers that could be imagined'. According to Barry, they had 'Jews, Syrians, Greeks, Chinese, Mexicans, Spaniards, Americans, Germans, Swedes, Italians, Irishmen and even Englishmen' among their subscribers.¹²⁶

The Irish-American press was also eager to emphasise any subscriptions coming from outside the Irish-American community. The *Irish Press* boasted, 'The present success of the bond drive can be attributed to no one class of people. Everyone appears to be interested, rich or poor, Irish or not.'¹²⁷ Unusual examples were given, such as a Persian student at the University of Pennsylvania, who subscribed \$10.¹²⁸ According to the US Federal Census, he was a 29 year-old dentist whose landlady was born to Irish parents. In another article, the *Press* told its readers explicitly:

¹²⁵ *Evening World (New York)*, 8 May 1920, p. 8.

¹²⁶ US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13/2, *ACII 'Success Bulletin'*, 1 Mar. 1920.

¹²⁷ *IP*, 7 Feb. 1920, p. 1.

¹²⁸ *IP*, 14 Feb. 1920, p. 4.

READ THIS CAREFULLY

The following is taken from the list of bond certificate subscribers in the Third Ward [of Philadelphia]:

Samuel W. Salus
Herbert W. Salus
Daniel Rossini
Burk Brothers
Jacob Kolosky
Leonard Ambrozzio
Rocco Demare
Archie Whitsel
Benjamin Globman
Rebort Matteo
They know what freedom means.¹²⁹

According to the census, the Salus brothers were Americans of Bohemian parentage; Jacob Kolosky and Benjamin Globman were Russian-born tailors whose mother tongue was Yiddish; and Archie Whitsel was an African American labourer from South Carolina. While Kolosky had a neighbour with Irish parentage, this was not the case for Globman, Whitsel or the Salus brothers. Another *Irish Press* article reported a ‘Cosmopolitan Gathering’ in support of the bond drive in Philadelphia, with ‘Jewish, negro, Italian, Lithuanian and American voters’ in attendance¹³⁰

The ACII’s ‘Success Bulletins’ also highlighted any subscriptions made by non-Irish Americans. According to one bulletin, in ‘one of the far southern cities it was the head of the Chinese tong who started the campaign with a large subscription.’¹³¹ The particular contribution of the Chinese was singled out by J.C. Walsh while speaking in San Francisco:

In every section of the United States where there were Chinese, Irish Liberty bonds were sold. They bought as many as they could afford. Many influential Chinese, able men in their own country, have told me that the spirit of American liberty was the ideal of their millions of people and that they were natural Sinn Feiners.¹³²

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 21 Feb. 1920, p. 1.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 7 Feb. 1920, p. 1.

¹³¹ US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13/2, *ACII ‘Success Bulletin’*, 1 Mar. 1920.

¹³² *San Francisco Chronicle*, 9 Dec. 1921.

According to the *Irish Press*, ‘At least ten men and women of the colored race’ subscribed to the bond drive in Philadelphia, after the Irish cause was explicitly compared with that of the African American struggle for emancipation.¹³³ At another promotional meeting, the example of African-American subscribers was used to internationalise the cause of Irish independence.

The speaker urged all to throw aside all race prejudice, and he called attention to the fact that negroes in Philadelphia had contributed money for Irish bonds. The laboring man, he said, in America and in Great Britain had the destiny of Ireland in his hands.¹³⁴

This was not the only convergence of Irish nationalist and African-American activism during the war of independence. The Irish Patriotic Strike was notable in the solidarity it inspired from the African-American longshoremen of New York, who traditionally had been rivals of the Irish.¹³⁵ According to the *New York World* the African American longshoremen cried ‘Free Africa’ as they joined the strike.¹³⁶ Key to this solidarity was the role of black activist Marcus Garvey.¹³⁷ Robert A. Hill has noted the significant influence of de Valera’s mission to America on Garvey and his Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA).¹³⁸ At a rally in Madison Square Garden on 1 August 1920, Garvey told the 25,000 delegates in attendance that he had sent a telegram of support to de Valera as President of the Irish Republic.¹³⁹ Later that month, the convention of the UNIA elected Garvey ‘provisional president of Africa’, with a banner asking ‘A President for Ireland, Why Not One for Africa?’¹⁴⁰ Perhaps inspired by the

¹³³ *IP*, 7 Feb. 1920, p. 2.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 14 Feb. 1920, p. 4.

¹³⁵ Nelson, *Divided we Stand*, pp. 30-1.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ R.A. Hill (ed.), *The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association papers*, (Berkeley, CA, 1983) Vol. 1, p. lxxiv.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

Irish bond drive, in November 1920 the Bureau of Investigation observed Garvey selling bonds for a ‘Liberian Liberty Loan’.¹⁴¹

Garvey was not the only diaspora nationalist looking to the Irish for inspiration. Historian Judah Bernstein has noted the admiration with which American Zionists of the time viewed Irish-American nationalists, particularly with regard to their organisational and fundraising skills.¹⁴² Indeed, when the World Zionist Organisation launched the *Keren Hayesod* (Foundation Fund) drive for Palestine, an editorial recommended that its organisers take note of the tactics employed in the bond drive.¹⁴³ While it would be a mistake to conflate Zionist opinion with Jewish opinion, or to presume that either were monolithic points of view, it is worth noting the prominence and frequency of references to the Jewish community in the bond drive campaign. As noted in chapter 7, it was not uncommon for bond drive organisers to equate the Irish national cause with the Jewish, and accounts of Jewish involvement in the bond drive can be found in the Irish-American press. The *Irish Press*, for example, reported a ‘leading Jewish merchant’ in Scranton, Pennsylvania, subscribing \$500 to the bond drive, and a number of other Jewish residents of the city not only subscribing but also collecting for the drive.¹⁴⁴ Indeed, the chairman for the bond drive in the first ward of Philadelphia was Assistant District Attorney Maurice J. Speiser, a Jew married to an Irishwoman:

I come from a so-called foreign part of the city,’ Mr Speiser said on Monday’s meeting. A section peopled by Italians, Poles, Russians and Jews – mostly Jews. I am myself of the latter race, but from those Jews I received this very day over \$750 for Irish Republic Bonds, and they had no ulterior motives either, but just a plain love for human liberty.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴¹ US/NARA/M1085, *FBI case file 202600-667, Report of Agent S-A-I-I on Garvey meeting in Philadelphia, Subject: ‘The Loan’*, 14 Nov. 1920.

¹⁴² J. Bernstein, ‘The two finest nations in the World’: American Zionists and Irish nationalism, 1897-22’, *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 36/3 (2017), p. 6.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 24

¹⁴⁴ *IP*, 14 Feb. 1920, p. 1

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 2

Of course these references came from the bond drive's supporters, who had an interest in emphasising its broad appeal. Indeed, the publicity afforded to these unusual subscriptions could be interpreted as evidence of their exceptional nature. In the case of the localities with smaller Irish communities, the reports could be seen as exemplars for organisers in similar districts to follow. However, references to non-Irish subscriptions to the bond drive also came from the pens of its critics. The New York correspondent of *The Times* reported how the Irish bond sellers of New York canvassed the tenants of flat mansions regardless of their nationality.¹⁴⁶ Reflecting the FOIF's support for Germany in the Great War, the British consulate in New York believed that 'a large proportion' of the bonds were bought by Germans.¹⁴⁷

The prevalence of non-Irish subscribers is also reflected in the Manhattan sample, containing a Belgian actor, a pool attendant from the British West Indies, a Finnish laundress, a Hungarian butcher, a German doctor and baker, a Swedish wholesale salesman and a number of Russian Jews, predominantly employed in the clothing industry. The Jewish subscriptions were made both personally and in the name of Jewish-owned business, and the majority of these subscribers came to the US in the 1890s, during the Russian pogroms of that decade. However, while these exceptions are worthy of note, it is also worth reiterating that the vast majority of subscribers were either Irish or of Irish descent.¹⁴⁸

The 276,219 subscribers to the bond drive in America played an essential role in the Irish War of Independence. Without their dollars and cents, the war in Ireland could have had a completely different outcome. While the National Loan was the lifeblood of the Dáil's fledgling counter-state, the money from America was a vital transfusion. As

¹⁴⁶ *The Times*, 26 Jan. 1920, p. 11.

¹⁴⁷ TNA: FO/115/2599/84, *G. Armstrong to R.C. Lindsay*, 9 Feb. 1920.

¹⁴⁸ IE/NAI/DE/EXL/Vol.80, *Manhattan subscriber list*; 1920 US Federal Census.

the war escalated in 1921, these men and women would be called on again. This is the focus of chapter 10.

Chapter 10: Encore: The Second External Loan

Considering the success of the First External Loan, it is not surprising that there were calls for a second. However, it was not until November 1921, over a year later, that the Second External Loan was finally launched. Much had happened in the intervening year, both in Ireland and in America, making the Second External Loan a distinctly different proposition from the First. The dynamics of diaspora finance persisted throughout however, with consequences that were felt both at home and abroad.

As is clear from chapters 6, 7 and 8, a central theme running through the First External Loan was the Dáil's bargaining position relative to the FOIF. Similar dynamics were apparent with the Second External Loan, but developments in the meantime brought new interlocutors to the surface. The autumn of 1920 and spring of 1921 saw a dramatic escalation in violence in Ireland, establishing the IRA as a powerful force relative to the Dáil. Supply of funds was the Dáil's main means of controlling the gunmen, and defence spending rose dramatically from £6,291 in the period 1 May 1920 to 31 December 1920, 6% of total expenditure, to £39,450 in the first six months of 1921, 38% of the total.¹ The Dáil's access to American funds was crucial in maintaining its supremacy over the IRA, but its dependence on America also brought restrictions in the area of policy. With the signing of the truce in July 1921 and subsequent peace negotiations in autumn of that year, a new interlocutor came into the frame: the British government. The Second External Loan had an important role to play in strengthening the Dáil's bargaining position in the negotiations, providing evidence that the Dáil had

¹ NLI/Ms.17,152(i), *Total outlay from home funds, 1919-1924, Overview*, p. 1. Total expenditure for second quarter of 1920 excludes £200,000 in paid up capital for National Land Bank.

the means to fight if the talks broke down. However, the success of the loan, and hence the negotiations, depended on American public opinion.

American opinion

While the Dáil's increase in defence spending was remarkable, the increase in outlays of the RIC and Dublin Metropolitan Police was even more pronounced. As noted in chapter 4, documents obtained by Collins revealed they were £367,901 and £29,206 respectively for the year to June 1920, but increased by almost a factor of ten (£3,402,253 and £335,250 respectively) the following year.² This step-change coincided with a surge in recruitment for the auxiliary police force known as the Black and Tans, who gained notoriety for their policy of reprisal by burning.³

News began to arrive in America of the destruction of Irish towns and villages.⁴ This encouraged Irish-Americans to send relief funds to the affected areas, and a number of organisations sprang up to cater for that demand. By the end of October 1920, the FOIF had unilaterally issued a circular to its clubs to this end.⁵ The FOIF's National Executive instructed its secretary to issue 100,000 coupon collection books to all branches and to tell branch secretaries to make immediate preparations for collection.⁶

The prospect of independent fundraising by the FOIF, potentially cannibalising the Dáil's fundraising efforts as well as taking control away from it, was cause for concern among the Dáil mission to America. De Valera tried to secure the support of the Knights of Columbus to set up a rival relief fund, but James O'Mara urged him to

² IE/BMH/CD, *IRA General Headquarters Analysis of British Civil Service Expenditures in Ireland through period ending 31 Mar. 1921*, cited in F. Costello, *The Irish Revolution and its Aftermath 1916 – 1923: Years of Revolt* (Dublin, 2003), p. 131.

³ D.M. Leeson, *The Black and Tans: British Police and Auxiliaries in the Irish War of Independence, 1920-1921* (Oxford, 2011), p. 25.

⁴ NLI/Ms.21,548(3), *Boland to de Valera*, 29 Oct. 1920.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ US/AIHS/FOIF/Bx.6/3, *Minutes of FOIF National Executive*, 21 Oct. 1920; US/AIHS/FOIF/Bx.6/3, *Minutes of FOIF National Executive*, 8 Nov. 1920.

postpone any decisions on fundraising for ruined towns, arguing that it might forestall the issue of a second loan.⁷ On the other hand, as noted by Harry Boland, by not collecting funds for relief, the Dáil would be leaving the field free for another organisation:

If we once permit money to be collected indiscriminately as at concerts, balls and public meetings, we will be going back to the old way, and very little of the money will ever reach Ireland. Whereas, with the Bond Drive closed, and with all the machinery and experience of this office, we can make the effort a success by systematic effort along the lines of the Bond Drive.⁸

However, in the middle of a split with the FOIF, the Dáil mission was in no position to mount such an undertaking. It was clear from the events described in chapter 8 that something had to be done to resolve the Dáil mission's organisational problems, but de Valera was reluctant to act before the US Presidential election, 'when a meeting such as this might give rise to friction'.⁹ In the absence of a clear line from de Valera, rumours began to circulate about the formation of a new organisation, the 'Friends of the Irish Republic', to replace the FOIF.¹⁰ The confusion at the centre of the FOIF gave way to centrifugal forces on the periphery and inevitably de Valera's name was drawn into the struggle. In early November 1920, the FOIF's Chicago branches proposed breaking away from the FOIF national headquarters, sending no more money to it, and organising instead on an autonomous state basis.¹¹ This seems to have been motivated as much by a dislike of being 'dictated to by the East' as anything relating specifically to the Devoy-Cohalan faction, but de Valera's name was invoked to justify the move.¹²

Facing the disintegration of the FOIF, it was essential that the Dáil mission exert its authority to maintain the unity of the movement. In November 1920, de Valera sent a

⁷ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 183; NLI/Ms.21,548(3), *J. O'Mara to de Valera*, 15 Oct. 1920.

⁸ NLI/Ms.21,548(3), *Boland to de Valera*, 29 Oct. 1920.

⁹ NLI/Ms.21,551(1), *Draft of Lavelle's biography of J. O'Mara*, Chapt. XVI, Ic.

¹⁰ IE/UCDA/P150/991, *Mary T. O'Donnell to de Valera*, 8 Nov. 1920.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

telegram to 100 Irish-Americans across the country, inviting them to a conference at the Raleigh Hotel in Washington DC.¹³ It was at this conference, on 16 November, that de Valera launched the American Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic (AARIR), a replacement for the FOIF with Edward L. Doheny as president, under the direct control of the Dáil.¹⁴ With the AARIR established, de Valera left the US on 10 December 1920.¹⁵

The AARIR was a phenomenal success, gathering almost half a million members within the first six months.¹⁶ Much of this growth came from the defection of entire FOIF branches to the AARIR, and the FOIF accused the branches of ‘turning their machinery over to the rival association’.¹⁷ According to Mary McWhorter, this was achieved by the same methods Sinn Féin had used to capture anti-conscription meetings in Ireland.¹⁸ The AARIR’s rapid growth presented an organisational challenge, however. In January 1921, an organiser from Columbus Ohio wrote to James O’Mara, ‘...everywhere is the same question, ‘Who is the head of this thing?’... Complaints everywhere of want of direction, no idea how to set to work, etc., etc.’¹⁹ Similar sentiments were expressed by O’Mara himself; writing to de Valera on 22 February 1921, he claimed the AARIR ‘threatens to become a Frankenstein, unless directed and controlled’.²⁰

Organisational capacity was not the only obstacle to the AARIR’s success; infighting continued despite the side-lining of Cohalan. In April 1921, the AARIR President in Rochester, New York, complained that it was ‘practically impossible to

¹³ NLI/Ms.21,551(1), *Draft of Patricia Lavelle’s biography of J. O’Mara*, Chapt. XVI, Ia.

¹⁴ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 427.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 428.

¹⁶ NLI/Ms.21,549(4), *J. O’Mara to S.T. O’Kelly*, 13 Apr. 1921.

¹⁷ US/AIHS/FOIF/Bx.6/3, *Minutes of FOIF National Executive*, 8 Dec. 1920.

¹⁸ IE/UCDA/P150/975, *McWhorter to Boland*, 12 Dec. 1921.

¹⁹ NLI/Ms.21,549(1), *Unknown organiser, Columbus Ohio to J. O’Mara*, 26 Jan. 1921.

²⁰ NLI/Ms.21,549(2), *J. O’Mara to de Valera*, 22 Feb. 1921.

establish a harmonious coordination between the greater New York District and the rest of the State,' claiming 'some of the New York leaders in the movement are not in the movement for the Cause alone'.²¹ 'We have destroyed Cohalanism only to set it up in another form.'²² Vestiges of the Cohalan-Devoy faction remained in Chicago as well, where Cohalan loyalists joined the local AARIR to cause trouble. According to Mary McWhorter, 'instructions have come from N.Y. to "lay low" in both organizations and they can be captured again'.²³ At the same time, the FOIF were making 'strenuous efforts' to revive their defunct branches in the city and even create new ones.²⁴

Arms Fund Levy

Meanwhile, in Ireland, the violence continued to escalate. The conclusion of the US presidential election gave more freedom to Lloyd George in his policy in Ireland, and he gave official support to the British policy of reprisal.²⁵ From the IRA side, in the fourth quarter of 1920, a number of full-time Active Service Units were established in southern and western counties.²⁶ The strain this placed on the IRA's finances was noted by the British government. A Home Office report shared with the US embassy in London, which later came across the desk of J. Edgar Hoover at the US Bureau of Investigation, observed 'indications that all is not well with the finances of the Irish Republican Army'.²⁷

A lack of funds from the Dáil Department of Defence led local IRA units to take matters into their own hands, collecting for the 'Arms Fund Levy' from the end of 1920.

²¹ NLI/Ms.21,549(4), *L.A. MacSweeney to J. O'Mara*, 4 Apr. 1921.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ IE/UCDA/P150/975, *McWhorter to Boland*, 12 Dec. 1921.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Hopkinson, *Irish War of Independence*, p. 165.

²⁶ IE/BMH/WS1699, *William Powell*, p. 12.

²⁷ US/NARA M1085, *Secret Report No.90*, "Revolutionary organisations in the United Kingdom", 27 Jan. 1921 (shared by British Home Office with US embassy, and then from embassy to J Edgar Hoover in the US Bureau of Investigation).

Unlike the National Loan, the Arms Fund Levy was extortion pure and simple.²⁸ Where there was a refusal to pay on the first request, a second request was made later on, with the threat of seizures as a sanction.²⁹ If the second request were met with refusal to pay, IRA Volunteers would seize cattle or stock to the value of the levy imposed.³⁰ Beyond seizure of assets, enforcement could also take a violent character. The RIC County Inspector for Leitrim, for example, reported a Protestant being dragged from his house in the dead of night and shot for not subscribing to the levy, his body later found mutilated.³¹

This kind of fundraising by force had a number of consequences. In the first place, it was inefficient. The time-consuming collection and enforcement of the levy diverted IRA volunteers from their primary role as fighters. Moreover, the compulsory nature of the levy risked alienating the people that had given so willingly to the National Loan a year earlier.³² The threats of confiscation would have been particularly irritating to farmers who, as shown in chapter 4, formed the bulk of subscribers to the loan. The levy also weakened the Dáil's control over the local IRA units, as it made them less reliant on the Dáil for funding. It also precluded the raising of a second National Loan, as the people of Ireland were already overburdened. Compounding this problem, the resultant media portrayal of the IRA as a rabble of brigands undermined the Dáil's ability to raise funds in America, in turn weakening its ability to regain control of the IRA. Finally, by resorting to a forced levy, the IRA appeared desperate in the eyes of the British government, as a depleted force that was ready for surrender.³³ For all of these reasons, the Arms Fund Levy as a method of fundraising was far from ideal. In the long run, the

²⁸ NLI/Ms.31,325, *Jerb. Keane to 'Ned'*, 30 Sept. 1928.

²⁹ IE/BMH/WS1697, *Dan McCarthy*, p. 12.

³⁰ IE/BMH/WS0792, *Tadhg O'Sullivan*, pp. 9-10.

³¹ Laffan, *Resurrection*, p. 294.

³² Townsend, *The Republic*, pp. 321-2.

³³ US/NARA/M1085, *W.L. Hurley to J. Edgar Hoover, Secret Report No.105, "Revolutionary organizations in the United Kingdom"*, 27 May 1921.

optimal arrangement was for the IRA to rely on the Dáil for money. Unable to raise a second National Loan in Ireland, the Dáil's fundraising efforts again turned to America.

Acomri

The Dáil's fundraisers in America were not without competition. While the Dáil mission was preoccupied establishing the AARIR, a rival Irish fundraising organisation had taken root and gained a prominent place in the market for Irish-American donations. Out of a number of charitable organisations formed in response to the news of suffering in Ireland, one had grown to attain dominance. The American Committee for Relief in Ireland, also known as Acomri, was achieving considerable success in raising funds, and had gained endorsement from the mainstream American political establishment that far surpassed anything achieved by the Dáil mission.

The names of many prominent Americans appeared on the council of this organisation, including the Governors of many states, and even the newly elected US President Warren G. Harding sent a message recommending its work.³⁴ Acomri gained 'considerable capital' out of the President's letter according to the British consul general in New York, and it was circulated throughout the press.³⁵ Vice President Coolidge also gave Acomri his support, and other luminaries included Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce and driving force behind US relief efforts in Belgium, and William J. MacAdoo, former Secretary of the Treasury and mastermind of the US Liberty Loans.³⁶ Further endorsement came from the famous Irish tenor John McCormack.³⁷ Through a

³⁴ IE/BMH/WS0264, *Áine Ceannt*, p. 71.

³⁵ TNA: FO/115/2672/211-2, *Armstrong to Foreign Office*, 1 Apr. 1921.

³⁶ A. Ceannt, *Irish White Cross 1920-47: The Story of its Work* (Dublin, ca. 1948), p. 12.

³⁷ IE/BMH/WS0264, *Áine Ceannt*, p. 72.

series of concerts, he managed to raise £35,000 for Acomri's coffers.³⁸ Even Pope Benedict XV sent a subscription, donating £5,149 (100,000 lire) to Acomri's relief fund following a meeting with Archbishop Mannix of Melbourne.³⁹

Acomri began its national appeal on St Patrick's Day, 1921, the beginning of a week of intense canvassing in 30 states across the country.⁴⁰ Full-page ads with the headline 'Help Ireland's Starving Children!' were taken out by Acomri in the *Washington Times* and *Washington Herald*.⁴¹ Pamphlets such as 'A Summons to Service for the Women and Children of Ireland', with dramatic photographs of barefoot children standing in front of burned out cottages, were distributed widely. They contained letters from bishops, seemingly impartial accounts from 'English friends', a map showing the 'devastated towns and villages of Ireland', and on the back page a form to be filled out by prospective donors.⁴²

Acomri's penetration of the market was considerable. In total it raised \$5,223,497 for relief in Ireland, surpassing the bond drive's \$5,132,600.⁴³ Most striking was Acomri's relative success in the Deep South; in Tennessee, Acomri raised \$20,702 to the bond drive's paltry \$50, while there were sevenfold and sixfold increases in Virginia and Florida. Significant increases were also made in Kentucky (335%), Texas (285%), Missouri (236%), Louisiana (217%), Washington DC (178%) and Maryland (175%). States that were absent from the bond drive, such as South Dakota, South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, Arkansas and Alaska, returned respectable totals for Acomri; most notably Georgia, which raised \$18,346. Meanwhile, the stalwarts of the bond drive, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and New York, showed decreases of \$329,983.68 (-61%),

³⁸ Ceannt, *Irish White Cross*, p. 13.

³⁹ IE/BMH/WS0264, *Aine Ceannt*, p. 72; IE/BMH/WS0807, *Patrick J Doyle*, p.28; IE/BMH/WS0687, *M.J. Curran*, p. 535.

⁴⁰ Carroll, *American opinion*, p. 167; *Owosso Times*, 29 Apr. 1921, p. 2.

⁴¹ *Washington Times*, 22 Mar. 1921, p. 7; *Washington Herald*, 24 Mar. 1921, p. 5.

⁴² TNA: FO/115/2761/311-8, *A summons to service*.

⁴³ Carroll, *American opinion*, p. 167; IE/UCDA/P150/962, *Statement issued by DÉ of receipts and expenditures of First Loan of the Republic of Ireland to 13 Jun. 1921*.

\$303,837.75 (-29%) and \$260,411.19 (-18%) respectively (Figure 10.1).⁴⁴ The extent to which this represents a shift in public opinion on the Irish question or simply the difference between support for an apolitical charitable cause and an explicitly pro-Dáil fundraising drive is impossible to say. Beyond public opinion, organisational capacity must also be taken into account. In Michigan, for example, Acomri raised 12 times the amount achieved by the bond drive in that state (\$110,173.99 versus \$8,967) but, as mentioned in chapter 8, the bond drive in Detroit was so riven with infighting that its launch was delayed by at least seven months.⁴⁵




Figure 10.1. Map of the US: Amounts raised for Acomri, by US state.⁴⁶

Considering the extent of Acomri's fundraising operations, Collins and de Valera concluded that the raising of a second external loan would be impracticable for the time

⁴⁴ IE/NAI/DE/2/007, *Self-Determination & Loan Accounts, 1 May 1920 to 31 Dec. 1920; Reports of American Committee for Relief in Ireland* (New York, 1922), pp. 43-4.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*; US/AIHS/DFC/Bx.5/5, *Lynch to Cobalan*, 23 Jul. 1920.

⁴⁶ *Reports of American Committee for Relief in Ireland* (New York, 1922), pp. 43-4.

being.⁴⁷ At the same time, it was important that the Dáil gain some measure of control over Acomri, while keeping a respectful distance in consideration of the ‘apolitical’, charitable stance of the organisation. As a result, the Dáil’s control of Acomri was imposed not in America, but in Ireland. The Dáil cabinet insisted that its Minister for Local Government attend committee meetings of the Irish White Cross, Acomri’s counterpart that was responsible for distributing relief funds in Ireland. This assertion of the Dáil’s supremacy, ‘to watch that funds are expended in accordance with the spirit it [*sic.*] which they were raised’, was further evidence of its monopolisation of the role of Irish state.⁴⁸ While the relief funds were raised by an independent charity, their distribution was to be regulated by the Dáil.

Exit James O’Mara

While Acomri was busy occupying the limelight, James O’Mara was ‘quietly laying down the lines for a new loan’.⁴⁹ Decidedly less quietly, on 18 April 1921 Harry Boland announced the plans for a second loan to 4,100 AARIR delegates in Chicago’s Medinah Temple hall. Taking to the stage of the AARIR’s first national convention, Boland declared that the Irish struggle for independence ‘has resolved itself in a question of money’ and announced what the *Chicago Tribune* described as ‘another huge loan, possibly for \$100,000,000’.⁵⁰ “‘Take our note for part of it now,’” shouted one from the gallery’ according to the *Tribune*. ‘In less than five minutes a resolution providing for the subscription of millions had been unanimously adopted.’⁵¹

⁴⁷ NLI/Ms.21,549(1), *Collins to J. O’Mara*, 28 Jan. 1921.

⁴⁸ IE/NAI/DE/1/3, *Dáil cabinet minutes*, 24 Nov. 1921.

⁴⁹ NLI/Ms.21,549(4), *J. O’Mara to Boland*, 7 Apr. 1921.

⁵⁰ *Chicago Tribune*, 19 Apr. 1921, p. 1.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

All was going well until a cable from de Valera was read out loud to the delegates. Requesting a ‘guarantee of \$1,000,000 yearly for Irish purposes’, de Valera’s cable suggested a \$35 levy on every member. Although this does not seem to have caused much concern among the delegates, it drew sharp criticism from James O’Mara, who was responsible for the Dáil’s finances in America. He had not been consulted on the matter, and objected on the grounds that it would interfere with the planned Second External Loan.⁵² Writing to de Valera on 25 April 1921, he declared ‘It is somewhat unworthy of our country to be always holding out its hat, but to hold out two hats at once is stupid.’⁵³ Venting his frustration with de Valera’s interference, O’Mara continued, ‘I would advise you to promptly send someone to this country, who has your confidence, if such a person exists and having done so, don’t constantly interfere with his work.’⁵⁴

Four days later, O’Mara received instructions from de Valera to take up a much-reduced role in Washington. ‘Jim Furious,’ wrote Mrs O’Mara in her diary, ‘Talked all over during evening and decided this was well thought out – plan to provoke Jim into resignation’.⁵⁵ O’Mara obliged, and in his letter of resignation on 30 April 1921, wrote:

...rather than be responsible for that policy I tender my resignation as the most emphatic protest that I can make against what must be the utter disruption and destruction of organised American aid. The progress of recent months making good your indecision and mistakes of last year leave me the more convinced of your error now.⁵⁶

To make matters worse, O’Mara posted this confidential correspondence to a number of his associates, explaining his reasons for resignation, and inevitably his letters found their way into the press.⁵⁷ Headlines such as ‘\$20,000,000 loan to Ireland lost; de Valera

⁵² NLI/Ms.21,549(4), *J. O’Mara to de Valera*, 25 Apr. 1921.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ NLI/Ms.21,549(4), *Diary of Mrs. J. O’Mara*, 29 Apr. 1921.

⁵⁶ NLI/Ms.21,549(4), *J. O’Mara to de Valera*, 30 Apr. 1921.

⁵⁷ NLI/Ms.21,549(5), *Mary MacSwiney to J. O’Mara*, 5 May 1921; NLI/Ms.21,549(6), *Sean T. O’Kelly to J. O’Mara*, 1 Jun. 1921; NLI/Ms.21,549(6), *M. O’Flanagan to J. O’Mara*, 16 Jun. 1921; *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 29 Jun. 1921, p. 2; *Des Moines Register*, 30 Jun. 1921, p. 5.

blamed,' ensured O'Mara's bridges were well and truly burned.⁵⁸ De Valera was in the house of one of these associates when the letter arrived, and was so incensed by O'Mara's missive that he kicked it into the fireplace. In de Valera's rage, his slipper shot off, hit the ceiling, and rebounded onto the head of his secretary.⁵⁹ A fitting metaphor for the own-goal scored by de Valera; in alienating James O'Mara he had lost his greatest asset in America. 'This blow seems almost insurmountable,' lamented Frank P. Walsh, adding, 'we might as well shut up shop'.⁶⁰

Holding the purse strings, pulling the strings

As the war approached its apogee in the summer of 1921, the dynamics of diaspora finance outlined in chapter 5, and in particular the Dáil's reliance on American opinion, became all the more acute. This was perhaps most graphically demonstrated on 25 May 1921, when for propaganda reasons, the IRA departed from its usual guerrilla tactics and stormed Dublin's iconic Custom House.⁶¹ Although this mission was, predictably, a military failure, resulting in the capture of 80 members of the Dublin IRA and the deaths of five, it succeeded in generating front-page headlines in America.⁶² Indeed, it is a testament to the importance of American public opinion that these volunteers were deemed more valuable as actors for the Dáil's audience in America than soldiers fighting the British in Dublin.

However, the assault on the Custom House was not an absolute success in propaganda terms. The question of American money in Ireland was raised in the House of Commons the following day, allowing the New York *Evening World* to lead its piece on

⁵⁸ *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 29 Jun. 1921, p. 2.

⁵⁹ NLI/Ms.21,552(1), *Draft of P. Lavelle's book James O'Mara*, p. 8xx..

⁶⁰ NLI/Ms.21,549(5), *F.P. Walsh to J. O'Mara*, 4 May 1921.

⁶¹ Mitchell, *Revolutionary*, p. 277.

⁶² *Ibid.*

the Custom House with a headline ‘Parliament asked to prevent sending of money to Ireland’.⁶³ According to the *Evening World*, the damage to the Custom House came to about \$5,000,000, a number no doubt resonant with those who followed the bond drive.⁶⁴ Moreover, it is possible the very audacity of the Custom House spectacle revealed the Dáil’s weakness to its observers in London and Washington. De Valera’s cable to the AARIR convention had already been interpreted by the British consul general as a sign of desperation, and documents seized from raids in Dublin added further weight to this conclusion.⁶⁵ The Dáil was indeed under strain financially. Notwithstanding the \$3m still held in the US, Collins told the cabinet its administration would be running on an internal deficit for the second half of the year.⁶⁶ ‘There is good reason to believe that the supply of funds from America may soon be dried up,’ reported the US Bureau of Investigation’s agent in London, ‘and that the influence of responsible Irish-Americans may be thrown into the scale for peace.’ ‘If this happens,’ he continued, ‘it will be within the next few weeks.’⁶⁷

On 11 July 1921 a truce was declared between the Dáil and the British Government, committing both sides to negotiations over the future of Ireland. The resulting Anglo-Irish peace negotiations in London gave the Dáil’s fundraising in America added importance. Yet, although crucial in determining the Dáil’s bargaining position in London, the impact of American money remains relatively underexplored in the historiography of the negotiations.⁶⁸ A successful fundraising campaign would show that the Dáil was ready to keep fighting if necessary and hence strengthen its hand in the

⁶³ *Evening World*, 26 May 1921, p. 1.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 29 Jun. 1921, p. 2.

⁶⁶ Mitchell, *Revolutionary*, p. 270.

⁶⁷ US/NARA/M1085, *W.L. Hurley to J. Edgar Hoover, Secret Report No.105, “Revolutionary organizations in the United Kingdom*, 27 May 1921.

⁶⁸ One exception is Carroll, *American Opinion*

negotiations.⁶⁹ It would also have implications for the internal dynamics of the Irish republican movement. The nuance required for peace talks had widened the ideological gap between the Dáil leadership and the local IRA Volunteers, and the hard-line republican position espoused by the latter had found a voice in the Dáil cabinet in the persons of Austin Stack and Cathal Brugha.⁷⁰ Funds from America would empower what the Bureau of Investigation's agent called the Dáil's 'civil element, who largely control the money bags from the United States', allowing them to rein in the hardliners for the duration of the talks.⁷¹ Moreover, as a barometer of public opinion in America, a successful fundraising campaign would act as an impetus for increased diplomatic pressure from Washington. On the other hand, a failure to raise funds in America would seriously weaken the Dáil's negotiating hand. As well as revealing financial weakness, it would send a signal to the American government that its Irish community was no longer in support of the Dáil, allowing the Harding administration to moderate its diplomatic pressure on London.

Both the Dáil and the British government were aware of the importance of American opinion, and worked hard to project the public image that best served their agendas. This was perhaps best encapsulated in the Mexican Petroleum scandal that surfaced in August 1921. The scandal broke with a news story in the *New York World* and a number of other papers, claiming that in 1920 de Valera had misappropriated some \$750,000 of bond drive funds to buy shares in Edward Doheny's Mexican Petroleum Corporation.⁷² The company's share price had fallen dramatically since then, prompting speculation that de Valera had incurred considerable personal losses.⁷³ According to the

⁶⁹ Lainer-Vos, *Sinens*, p. 105.

⁷⁰ Walsh, *Bitter Freedom*, p.299; Laffan, *Resurrection*, p. 348.

⁷¹ US/NARA/M1085, *W.L. Hurley to J. Edgar Hoover, Secret Report No.105, "Revolutionary organizations in the United Kingdom*, 27 May 1921.

⁷² TNA: FO/115/2672/292, *Armstrong to Curzon*, 19 Aug. 1921.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

story, a British intelligence agent had discovered de Valera's financial irregularities and brought him before a district attorney in New York. In an agreement to drop the prosecution, de Valera was said to have signed the following letter, published in the *New York World*:

April 19, 1920

To Bishop X.:

I hereby agree to enter into a conference with Premier Lloyd George upon my return to Ireland and conclude a settlement of the Irish question on terms satisfactory to him, all of this conditional upon the dropping of the present investigation.
Your humble servant,

E. de Valera⁷⁴

The reaction of the Dáil mission was predictable. Sean Nunan issued a denial of the story, pointing out that de Valera was in the middle of his tour of the South when the meeting in New York was alleged to have taken place.⁷⁵ Perhaps less predictably, the British consul general also denied the veracity of the story.⁷⁶ This was certainly the most honourable response, as further investigation by the *New York World* proved the story was a hoax and the *New York Tribune* traced it to a serial fabricator based in Dublin.⁷⁷ But it also made sense for the British strategically. From the British point of view, it was important that de Valera was seen to have some legitimacy; otherwise the talks would be meaningless. Moreover, the weak, compromised de Valera of the Mexican Petroleum conspiracy ran contrary to the image of him that was being pushed by the British government in America: that of an intransigent hardliner.

⁷⁴ TNA: FO/115/2672/294, *New York World*, 19 Aug. 1921.

⁷⁵ *Washington Times*, 19 Aug. 1921, p. 17.

⁷⁶ TNA: FO/115/2672/292, *Armstrong to Foreign Office*, 19 Aug. 1921.

⁷⁷ TNA: FO/115/2672/294, *New York World*, 19 Aug. 1921; TNA: FO/115/2672/297, *Armstrong to Curzon*, 26 Aug. 1921.

To this end, on 14 August 1921 the British government published correspondence between de Valera and Lloyd George.⁷⁸ Details of this correspondence, including de Valera's disapproval of Lloyd George's Dominion Home Rule proposal, were reported on the front page of the *New York Herald*, *New York Tribune*, *Washington Herald*, and *Evening Star* the following day.⁷⁹ According to the *New York Tribune*, the contents of the letters differed markedly from what the public had been led to expect.⁸⁰ More headlines were generated two days later, when the Dáil met in Dublin's Mansion House to discuss Lloyd George's proposal and vote on de Valera's response.⁸¹ In a public session open to the world's press, de Valera led the 130 deputies into the debating chamber, notably with Frank P. Walsh by his side.⁸² The Dáil sessions continued on 17 August, and de Valera gained more attention in America by rejecting the Lloyd George proposal and ordering the IRA to prepare for war.⁸³ Meanwhile, the British government ordered all troops that had been on vacation since the truce to return to their barracks in Ireland, adding to speculation that the truce was at breaking point.⁸⁴

'If money can be sent, heaps of it, they will fight,' was the judgement of the Bureau of Investigation's informant, codename 'E.G.', who had been 'watching every move in the Irish case'.⁸⁵ 'If no money is forthcoming,' she continued, "'me brave buckos'" over there will do a graceful little backdown, and get away on what has been offered'.⁸⁶ The AARIR published a cable to de Valera on 19 August 1921, 'representing one million American citizens,' endorsing his statements of the previous week and

⁷⁸ *Evening Star*, 15 Aug. 1921, p. 1.

⁷⁹ *New York Tribune*, 15 Aug. 1921, p. 1; *New York Herald*, 15 Aug. 1921, p. 1; *Washington Herald*, 15 Aug. 1921, p. 1; *Evening Star*, 15 Aug. 1921, p. 1.

⁸⁰ *New York Herald*, 15 Aug. 1921, p. 1.

⁸¹ *Washington Herald*, 15 Aug. 1921, p. 1.

⁸² *Evening World*, 16 Aug. 1921, p. 2.

⁸³ *Washington Times*, 17 Aug. 1921, pp. 1-2.

⁸⁴ *New York Tribune*, 17 Aug. 1921, p. 1.

⁸⁵ US/NARA/M1085, *FBI case file 202600-695*, 'E.G.' to FBI, 20 Aug. 1921.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

‘renew[ing] our pledge for moral and financial support to the limit, in peace and war’.⁸⁷ They sent a similar message to Lloyd George, but the British consul general had a different view of public opinion in America.⁸⁸ Writing to Lord Curzon the same day, he claimed that if de Valera maintained his rejection of Dominion Home Rule in the hope of achieving a Republic, ‘the collection of funds for such a purpose will be impossible for a generation’.⁸⁹

As expected, de Valera’s hard-line stance appeared to have an alienating effect on American opinion. On 26 August, the British consul general reported that ‘a remarkable change’ had taken place in the preceding week.⁹⁰ For the first time in months, open-air meetings in favour of Irish independence began to draw opposition and criticism from the crowds, and in one case the police had to be called to disperse the meeting.⁹¹ Meanwhile, he observed that the Irish question, which for months had been the main talking point in private gatherings in the city, was no longer a topic for discussion. According to the consul general, Americans were ‘now showing a lack of interest in the matter’.⁹² It was in this atmosphere that, the same day, readers of the *Washington Times* read Michael Collins’s calls for the flotation of a loan for \$20,000,000 in the US.⁹³ ‘All the arrangements for making the Loan in the United States have been completed,’ he claimed, ‘All that is needed is the formal word to go ahead’.⁹⁴

⁸⁷ *Chicago Tribune*, 20 Aug. 1921, p. 2.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ TNA: FO/115/2672/292, *Armstrong to Curzon*, 19 Aug 1921.

⁹⁰ TNA: FO/115/2672/297, *Armstrong to Curzon*, 26 Aug. 1921.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ *Washington Times*, 26 Aug. 1921, p. 1. He also announced a loan of \$2,000,000 in Ireland, but this never came to pass.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

The Second External Loan

After his resignation, James O'Mara was replaced by his estranged younger brother, Stephen, the Sinn Féin Mayor of Limerick.⁹⁵ Describing Stephen as 'the pleasantest of all the men who came over from Ireland, and the easiest to get along with', J.C. Walsh concluded, 'in all but ability he was the opposite of his brother'.⁹⁶ James and Stephen O'Mara met in Toronto in May 1921, where they had what turned out to be a foul-tempered discussion. There was no evidence of fraternity in their subsequent correspondence, as Stephen complained of his brother's 'let us call it mildly – rudeness' at their meeting.⁹⁷ 'I made up my mind three years ago that I would never take it from you again,' he railed.⁹⁸ Dismissing James as a 'napoleonic human being,' Stephen vowed, 'With or without you this job is going to go on'.⁹⁹

Stephen O'Mara advised that the appeal for the Second Loan be issued to the general public in the United States, and privately to the AARIR, but not to any other Irish organisation in the US, and 'above all and most certainly not the F.O.I.F.'¹⁰⁰ Writing to de Valera, he counselled: 'There is no use in flirting with the F.O.I.F. even if your affections were reciprocated. The only result that I can foresee would be to reduce the movement in America once again to the position in which you found it.'¹⁰¹ Although Cohalan and Devoy publicly rowed in behind de Valera's position in the peace talks, cabling him to declare support for his approach, support for the bond drive was another matter entirely.¹⁰² Showing that the personal bitterness had far from disappeared, the

⁹⁵ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 205.

⁹⁶ US/NYPL/MssCol 3212/b.3/5, *J.C. Walsh's reminiscences*, p. 235.

⁹⁷ NLI/Ms.21,549(5), *S.M. O'Mara to J. O'Mara*, 17 May 1921.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ IE/NAI/DFA/ES Bx.27/158, *Memo from S. O'Mara to de Valera*, 12 Aug. 1921.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² TNA: FO/115/2672/292, *Armstrong to Curzon*, 19 Aug. 1921.

Gaelic American condemned ‘Lord Harry’s [Harry Boland’s]’ call for a new bond drive.¹⁰³ Instead, the FOIF National Convention initiated a ‘Freedom Fund’ with a target of \$2m.¹⁰⁴ Its aim, reflecting the FOIF’s realignment to domestic American politics, was ‘to combat and defeat the British propaganda which aims to capture and control the United States government’.¹⁰⁵

The problem of unauthorised persons fundraising in the name of the Irish Republic without any authorisation from the Dáil was noted by Stephen O’Mara.¹⁰⁶ Maintaining its monopoly on the brand of the Irish Republic was clearly still a priority for the Dáil mission. The Dáil’s Minister for Publicity, Robert Brennan, told O’Mara that ‘it seems urgent that the matter of regularising collections in the U.S.A should be taken in hands at once’.¹⁰⁷

In order to safeguard our generous friends in U.S. will you please make it known to the American public that the use of Ireland’s name in soliciting funds is unauthorised unless our Representative at Washington has given the fund his formal sanction.¹⁰⁸

However, reflecting the FOIF’s diminished status, there is no evidence that its Freedom Fund enjoyed any success.¹⁰⁹ The split that followed the First External Loan and resultant creation of the AARIR had cannibalised the FOIF’s membership and greatly depleted its numbers. The FOIF’s membership plummeted from 100,000 in 1919 to just 20,000 after the split while, and as of May 1921, the AARIR claimed 965,000 members.¹¹⁰ By July 1921, the *New York World* could run the front-page headline

¹⁰³ Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora*, p. 142.

¹⁰⁴ US/AIHS/FOIF/Bx.20/1, *Freedom Fund Certificate*, 19 Jun. 1922.

¹⁰⁵ Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora*, p. 142.

¹⁰⁶ IE/NAI/DFA/ES/Bx.27 File 158, *Memo from S.M. O’Mara to de Valera*, 12 Aug. 1921.

¹⁰⁷ IE/UCDA/P150/1213, R. Brennan to S.M. O’Mara, 15 Sept. 1921.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ Doorley, *Irish-American Diaspora*, p. 142.

¹¹⁰ Hopkinson, *Irish War of Independence*, pp. 172-3.

‘Cohalan shorn of his leadership and power by rival Irish society’.¹¹¹ According to the *World*, his following had dwindled to just 5,000.¹¹²

Nevertheless, as a new organisation, the AARIR did not have the benefit of the time needed to consolidate, and consequently it was much more loosely organised than the FOIF.¹¹³ Essentially, although the FOIF had been banished, the AARIR was not yet strong enough to take its place.¹¹⁴ This left Stephen O’Mara with an organisational deficit that precluded the kind of nationwide campaign his brother had managed for the First External Loan. Instead, Stephen opted for a state-by-state approach, beginning with Washington DC and Illinois.¹¹⁵ It was planned to extend the drive to California, Oregon and Washington State in early January 1922, before moving on to the mid-west.¹¹⁶ As well as easing the bureaucratic burden, this strategy also strengthened the bargaining power of the Dáil in the London peace talks. It could point to a reserve of untapped Irish-Americans whose money could be raised to continue the fight, while also demonstrating its ability to raise funds through Washington DC and Illinois.

Another point of difference between the two bond drives was the kind of subscribers they targeted. As shown in chapter 9, the First External Loan attracted very few large subscriptions, relying instead on very many smaller ones. However, Stephen O’Mara believed that progress in Ireland and the activities of Acomri had softened the attitudes of the more hesitant members of the wealthy Irish-American community.¹¹⁷ With this in mind, he suggested to de Valera that the bonds be made ‘Bearer Bonds’, and that in each state they secure the cooperation of a bank that would receive and distribute

¹¹¹ TNA: FO/115/2672/262, *World*, 7 Jul. 1921, p. 1.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ Hopkinson, *Irish War of Independence*, p. 172.

¹¹⁴ IE/NAI/DFA/Prov. Govt./IFS/27/158, *S. O’Mara to Brennan*, 14 Sept. 1921, cited in Lainer-Vos, *Sinews*, p. 105.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ IE/NAI/DFA/ES/Bx.27 File 158, *Boland to Robert Brennan*, 30 Nov. 1921.

¹¹⁷ US/NYPL/MssCol.582/b.13/2, *S.M. O’Mara to A.J. Barrett*, 31 Oct. 1921.

the bonds against cash at face value.¹¹⁸ Other banks would then act as ‘Local Banks’, ‘subsidiary to and in conjunction with the ‘State Bank’, simply for the purpose of bringing the Bonds nearer to the purchasers and so securing a quicker delivery of same’.¹¹⁹ To further reduce any perceived risk of subscribing, he planned to offer a different category of bond for those who subscribed \$500 or more.¹²⁰

Under these new bonds, after three years the large subscribers would be given the option of getting their money back without interest, ‘Or in the event of recognition of the Republic... exchange [their bond certificates] for Bonds of the Government of Ireland bearing interest *from the date of subscription*’.¹²¹ The ‘more business-like’ design of these bonds, Stephen argued, would lead to larger subscriptions.¹²² As noted by Lainer-Vos, from the subscribers’ point of view the effect of O’Mara’s plan would be to transform the bond certificates from a gift to an investment.¹²³ It also underlined the Dáil’s position as the legitimate government of an existing republic; coinciding with what historian Charles Townsend termed the ‘radical rebranding’ of the IRA as a legitimate army and the Dáil’s insistence on being treated as a sovereign state in the London peace talks.¹²⁴ It was also at this time that de Valera’s title was formally changed from President of Dáil Éireann to President of the Irish Republic, making official the brand he constructed in America.¹²⁵

To minimise further any perceived risk of subscribing, O’Mara suggested keeping all the funds raised by the Second External Loan as an endowment invested in America,

¹¹⁸ IE/NAI/DFA/ES/Bx.27/158, *S.M. O’Mara to de Valera*, 12 Aug. 1921.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ NAI/DE/5/57/14, *S.M. O’Mara to Collins*, 8 Sept. 1921, cited in Lainer-Vos, *Sinevs*, p. 106.

¹²¹ NAI/DE/5/57/14, *S.M. O’Mara to Collins*, 20 Sept. 1921 (emphasis in original), cited in Lainer-Vos, *Sinevs*, p. 106.

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ Lainer-Vos, *Sinevs*, p. 107.

¹²⁴ Townsend, *Republic*, pp.328-9; TNA: FO/115/2672/262, *Armstrong to Curzon*, 16 Sept. 1921.

¹²⁵ Laffan, *Resurrection*, pp. 347-8.

to be managed by an American trustee with the agreement of Irish representatives.¹²⁶ Under his plan, the principal would stay in America, with only the interest, which he believed would be considerable, being sent to Ireland.¹²⁷ However, perhaps wary of contravening the ‘Blue Sky Laws’, and emphatically opposed to appointing an American as trustee, de Valera and Collins opposed the new plan. Instead, it was decided that the Second External Loan should proceed along the same lines as the first.¹²⁸

Preparation

The plans for a Second External Loan were revealed at a meeting in Washington DC’s Gonzaga Hall on 18 September 1921. Among the 2,000 attendees were agents Crawford and Flournoy of the US Bureau of Intelligence.¹²⁹ As the principal speaker at the event, O’Mara gave ‘a repetition of the well known Irish conditions,’ according to Flournoy, followed by a detailed statement on the receipts and disbursements of the Dáil’s funds.¹³⁰ He then announced his plans for the bond drive, declaring that all other collections for Irish affairs should cease to make way for it.¹³¹

Illinois had been chosen for the quality of its organisation, according to O’Mara, and indeed the state had made significant improvements since its haphazard performance in the first loan.¹³² Under the leadership of Fr. William F. Cahill, an old schoolmate of Mary McWhorter, the AARIR had built up an organisation of 70,000 members and 3,000 workers ready to help with the loan.¹³³ Intriguingly, McWhorter earlier confided to

¹²⁶ NAI/DE/5/57/14, *S.M. O’Mara to Collins*, 20 Sept. 1921, cited in Lainer-Vos, *Sinews*, pp. 106-7.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ NAI/DE/2/244, *De Valera to Collins*, 13 Oct. 1921, cited in Lainer-Vos, *Sinews*, p. 107.

¹²⁹ US/NARA/M1085, *Case number 202600-695-66, report of Agent Flournoy*, 20 Sept. 1921.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ TNA: FO/115/2672/326, *Armstrong to Curzon*, 3 Oct. 1921.

¹³² US/NARA/M1085, *Case number 202600-695-66, report of Agent Flournoy*, 20 Sept. 1921.

¹³³ IE/UCDA/P150/975, *McWhorter to Boland*, 17 Nov. 1919; US /NYPL/MssCol 3212/b.3/5, *J.C. Walsb’s reminiscences*, pp. 241-2.

Boland that Cahill was ‘very close to the big boss on the North Side’.¹³⁴ Whether she was referring to the leading Chicago-Irish bootlegging mob of that name is not entirely clear, but that he could ‘keep the radicals in line’ was not in doubt.¹³⁵ Illinois’s quota was to be \$1.7m, and such was Cahill’s confidence that he staked a \$1,000 bond certificate on the result.¹³⁶

The choice of Washington DC, with a quota of \$100,000, was based more on promotion than organisation. The nation’s capital was to hold an international naval conference from 12 November 1921, and was consequently going to be the focus of the world’s media.¹³⁷ Also known as the Washington Disarmament Conference, the Washington Naval Conference was a summit called by President Harding, regarding naval interests in the Pacific Ocean and East Asia, attended by representatives of the United States, Japan, China, France, Britain, Italy, Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands. It was hoped the bond drive could keep the Irish question alive in the minds of the delegates, and that they could be supplied with pro-Irish literature, a point keenly noted by the British consul general in his report to Lord Curzon.¹³⁸ O’Mara declared to the Gonzaga Hall audience that in his opinion if the question of Irish freedom was not settled during the Washington Conference, then it would not be settled for generations.¹³⁹

Once more we seek your financial assistance. I know how often we have come to you before. How many generations have come and solicited funds from the people of America. But we have never sought this aid in vain.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁴ IE/UCDA/P150/975, *McWhorter to Boland*, 17 Nov. 1919.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 244.

¹³⁷ US/NARA/M1085, *Case number 202600-695-66, report of Agent Flourney*, 20 Sept. 1921.

¹³⁸ IE/NAI/DFA/ES/Bx.27 File 158, *Memo from Boland to Robert Brennan*, 27 Oct. 1921; TNA: FO/115/2672/326, *Armstrong to Curzon*, 3 Oct. 1921.

¹³⁹ US/NARA/M1085, *Case number 202600-695-66, report of Agent Flourney*, 20 Sept. 1921.

¹⁴⁰ *IP*, 1 Oct. 1921, p. 7.

After Stephen's standing ovation, the presiding officer introduced Margaret O'Gorman, the reigning 'Miss Washington', generating a reaction from the audience that, according to agent Flournoy, 'seemed for a time to overshadow the attraction of the principal speaker'.¹⁴¹ After almost five minutes' applause, she pledged her support for the Irish Republic.¹⁴² Next, the presidents of the five local AARIR branches took to the stage to pledge to make their best efforts in the drive, and finally, Sailendra Nath Ghose representing the 'India Republic' made an address on India's support for the Irish republican movement.¹⁴³

The Gonzaga Hall meeting, and the drive's \$20,000,000 target, garnered a few column inches on the front page of the *Washington Herald*, but they were completely dwarfed by reports of the same Miss Washington meeting President Harding.¹⁴⁴ Notwithstanding the newsworthiness of such a meeting, this demonstrated a weakness in the second bond drive's armoury: with de Valera in Ireland, there was a vacancy for the role of figurehead. Initially, Stephen O'Mara wanted to send Mary MacSwiney out to campaign for the bond drive, but she wasn't so enthusiastic.¹⁴⁵ A sister of Terence and powerful personality in her own right, MacSwiney had been touring America since February 1921, making speeches and building up the AARIR.¹⁴⁶ 'Frankly I hate the thought of the Bond Drive,' she told de Valera, 'and doubt my effectiveness at it'.¹⁴⁷

I understand the Americans like to be flattered and I don't flatter them... I hate the meetings where they have those horrid collections with a man walking up and down the platform yelling himself hoarse trying to rouse the people to enthusiasm and generosity. It makes me quite sick. I am not much good as a beggar but I can always talk for Recognition and let them infer the necessity for supplying the sinews of war.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴¹ US/NARA/M1085, *Case number 202600-695-66, report of Agent Flournoy*, 20 Sept. 1921.

¹⁴² *Washington Times*, 19 Sept. 1921, p. 1.

¹⁴³ US/NARA/M1085, *Case number 202600-695-66, report of Agent Flournoy*, 20 Sept. 1921.

¹⁴⁴ *Washington Herald*, 12 Sept. 1921, p. 1.

¹⁴⁵ IE/UCDA/P48A/115, *Mary MacSwiney to de Valera*, 20 Jul. 1921.

¹⁴⁶ NLI/Ms.21,549(1), *M. MacSwiney to J. O'Mara*, 2 Feb. 1921.

¹⁴⁷ IE/UCDA/P48A/115, *Mary MacSwiney to de Valera*, 20 Jul. 1921.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

MacSwiney was recalled to Ireland in August 1921 and, perhaps reflecting the new image he wanted to project for the Second Loan, Stephen O'Mara proposed the services of four other speakers be discontinued as well. He requested de Valera to send out new speakers for promotion of the loan, 'men of education, who have been engaged in active warfare...New blood will be essential'.¹⁴⁹

The Dáil cabinet met on 23 September 1921 to discuss this issue, and a number of names were put forward.¹⁵⁰ The most prominent were Constance Markievicz, the first woman elected to Westminster and veteran of the 1916 Rising; Sean McKeon, leader of the Longford IRA; and Fr. Michael O'Flanagan, Vice President of Sinn Féin. Markievicz refused to travel on a British passport however, and was unable to secure a Polish passport through her husband. Meanwhile de Valera claimed it would be 'impossible to let McKeon go', despite O'Mara's insistence that it would be 'necessary to have a man like McKeown, or his type' for the bond drive to be a success.¹⁵¹ This left Fr. O'Flanagan as the only reinforcement sent out from Dublin, an outcome that drew criticism from Collins, who complained 'Practical men will get the money; the speakers will not'.¹⁵² Perhaps reflecting the difference in approach between the two men, de Valera countered, 'Speakers to draw crowds is part of the practical work'.¹⁵³

A practical man who could also draw a crowd came in the form of Harry Boland, who returned from a trip to Ireland on 10 October 1921.¹⁵⁴ On arrival, he read out the following statement:

¹⁴⁹ IE/NAI/DFA/ES/Bx.27 File 158, *Memo from S.M. O'Mara to de Valera*, 12 Aug. 1921.

¹⁵⁰ Mitchell, *Revolutionary*, p. 308.

¹⁵¹ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 242.

¹⁵² D. Carroll, *They have fooled you again* (Dublin, 1993), p. 136.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ *New York Times*, 11 Oct. 1921, p. 2.

We are here to ask Ireland's friends in America to make a final drive for Irish liberty by exercising their great moral strength to the end that British aggression must cease in Ireland and to subscribe once more to the bonds of the republic of Ireland. When the settlement is reached the first call upon the Irish republic will be the redemption of the bonds.¹⁵⁵

Boland also declared that if the peace talks failed the bond drive proceeds would be used as the sinews of war, a warning noted by the British consul general. The consul general was not overly concerned though, reporting to Curzon that Boland's comments did 'not appear to arouse any great interest, except among his own following,' and he considered it unlikely that the loan would be a success.¹⁵⁶ As far as he was concerned, de Valera's continued hard-line stance would dampen any proposed fundraising, particularly among the wealthier subscribers targeted by Stephen O'Mara. This view was bolstered by a press interview with prominent New York real estate agent Bryan Kennelly, precisely the kind of subscriber in O'Mara's crosshairs. According to Kennelly:

Some of Ireland's largest financial friends in America and most ardent well-wishers feel that if the dominion form of government is not accepted after all efforts to obtain a republic are spent, the Sinn Fein movement need look for no further financial support from them.¹⁵⁷

'Considerable publicity' was given to the content of Kennelly's interview, according to the British consul general.¹⁵⁸ A *New York Times* editorial based on Kennelly's words concluded, 'if all support, particularly financial support, from America is cut off the extremists will have to give up their hopeless agitation for a republic'.¹⁵⁹ As predicted by the Bureau of Investigation, far from strengthening the Dáil's hand relative to the British, it looked like the force of American public opinion would strengthen the Dáil moderates relative to the hardliners.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*; TNA: FO/115/2672/333, *Armstrong to Curzon*, 14 Oct. 1921.

¹⁵⁷ TNA: FO 115/2672/341, *New York Times*, 24 Oct. 1921.

¹⁵⁸ TNA: FO 115/2672/340-1, *Armstrong to Curzon*, 28 Oct. 1921.

¹⁵⁹ TNA: FO 115/2672/341, *New York Times*, 24 Oct. 1921.

Of course, Kennelly's claims had to be challenged, and Frank P. Walsh wrote a letter to the *New York Times* on 24 October 1921. Fighting back, Walsh claimed that contributions from America would be 'ten times as great' as they had been in the past if the Irish delegation found an acceptable settlement was not forthcoming.¹⁶⁰ While he conceded Kennelly's contention that wealthy Irish-American opinion favoured a peace settlement, he pointed out that the vast majority of funds raised in the first bond drive came from small donations from the poorer sections of the community.¹⁶¹ Above all, he stressed the expectation that second bond drive would be a success:

If for any reason the negotiations in Ireland fail, and the Irish army is again called upon to defend the nation against the forces of England, this sum of \$20,000,000 will be increased, and the loan, whatever it may be, will be oversubscribed...If a return to arms is necessary, the American people can and will contribute \$50,000,000.¹⁶²

Action

'Those who have helped us in the past will help us now,' wrote Stephen O'Mara to his bond drive organisers, 'Will others realize that the roll call of Ireland is now sounding for the last time?'¹⁶³ The Second External Loan was finally launched on 14 November 1921, with a rally at the gymnasium of the Catholic University in Washington DC.¹⁶⁴ Fr. O'Flanagan spoke for over an hour, relaying the customary story of the struggle for Irish independence but also giving an overview of the uses to which the proceeds of the first bond drive had been put.¹⁶⁵ Bishop Shahan, rector of the University was seated on the platform, as were a number of other clergymen, along with Harry Boland, J.C. Walsh and several AARIR officials.¹⁶⁶ Telegrams in support of the loan from Governor Edwards

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ NLI/MS. 41,511/1/10, *S.M. O'Mara to organisers*, 6 Nov. 1921.

¹⁶⁴ *IP*, 16, Nov. 1921, p. 1.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

and Archbishop-elect Curley were read out.¹⁶⁷ Providing relief from the preponderance of Catholic clerics, Rabbi Thorner of New Jersey also took to the stage.¹⁶⁸

As with the bond drive of 1920, advertising space was taken out in newspapers, and leaflets and pamphlets were printed and distributed. Notwithstanding objections to Stephen O'Mara's financial innovations, and although retaining some appeals to sentimentality, the promotional literature for the second bond drive was decidedly more business-like than the first (e.g. Figure 10.2). In a letter to potential subscribers, O'Mara emphasised the security and respectability of the Second External Loan by sending financial accounts of the First External Loan.¹⁶⁹ A 12-page pamphlet entitled 'A Brief Survey of Ireland's Resources' was distributed, with the subtitle 'Demonstrating her ability to pay her loans'.¹⁷⁰ The pamphlet compared Ireland's economy and resources with those of a number of other countries, and provided an overview of the functioning of the Dáil government, its ministries and their activities.¹⁷¹ Perhaps as a result of the corporate tone taken, the Secretary of State for Illinois complained to his counterpart in DC that the newspaper adverts contravened the 'Blue Sky' laws, but this didn't stop their dissemination.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁹ US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13/2, *Circular from S.M. O'Mara*, n.d.

¹⁷⁰ US/NYPL/MssCol 582/b.13/2, *A Brief Survey of Ireland's Resources*.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² TNA: FO 115/2674/230-1, *Nugent to Geddes*, 10 Nov. 1921.

Ireland Comes to America

IRELAND is just emerging from her War of the Revolution. She is a land of immense natural riches and resources. In the past Ireland has given America freely of her best—her men and women—brains and brawn that have helped make America great.

Ireland now comes to America for aid.

The government of the republic of Ireland has been deprived of its finances by English militarism. It is now putting an end to this militarism. It needs *money* to insure the successful completion of the longest and greatest fight for *liberty* in the history of the world.



The Dail Eireann

The duly elected Congress of the people of Ireland ask the people of America for a Second External Loan of \$20,000,000. The people of Illinois have pledged to subscribe \$1,720,000 of this amount.

This money will be used to meet the current expenses of the Irish Republic. To repair the ravages of war. To build up Ireland's wonderful potential industries and develop her resources.

The Irish Republic is a *reality*. Lloyd George says it will cost the British Government one billion dollars to crush this Republic. Do you think it would cost that immense sum of money to destroy a *fiction*?

The Irish Republic is potentially one of the best customers in the world for goods of American manufacture.

So that Liberty may not perish from the earth, you are asked to subscribe to this loan. The Loan Certificates are issued in denominations of \$10, \$30, \$50, \$100, \$250, \$500 and \$1000.

How Ireland Can Pay

Ireland is rich enough; big enough and populous enough to be self-supporting and pay all her financial obligations.

Judged by any standard Ireland can repay this loan. For the money she paid in taxes last year, Ireland could run the entire Government business of three free European countries—Switzerland, Portugal and Denmark—paying for all their police, soldiers, ships and guns, while the tribute paid to England, over and above revenue spent in Ireland, was alone *greater* than the *entire* joint revenues of Switzerland, and Chile, each having a population nearly equal to Ireland's.

Ireland has broad harbors, fertile plains, perfect weather conditions, rich mineral deposits, unlimited water power, and an industrious frugal people who will take care of their financial obligations.

The Authorization

REPUBLIC OF IRELAND,
FINANCE DEPARTMENT,
11 FIFTH AVENUE,
NEW YORK.

Dear Friends:

I have to inform you that I have been commissioned by Mr. Michael Collins, Minister of Finance of the Irish Republic, to come to the United States as Financial Agent for the purpose of floating a loan of twenty million dollars. This, the second external loan of the Irish Republic, was duly authorized by Dail Eireann, August 20th, 1921.

Yours with great esteem.

S. M. O'MOHR,
Fiscal Agent.

Dail Eireann

Copy of Resolution of thanks to the American Subscribers to the First Loan of the Irish Republic adopted by DAIL EIREANN on 17th August, 1921.

Resolved: That we, the members of Dail Eireann, the duly elected Parliament of the Irish Republic in public session assembled this 17th day of August, 1921, hereby tender the gratitude of the Irish Nation to the people of the United States of America for the warm support they have always given to the cause of Ireland and particularly for their generous subscription to the First Loan of the Irish Government; and we furthermore declare that each bond Certificate purchased in the United States will be redeemed in due course by the Irish Nation.

Eamon De Valera.

INVEST IN IRELAND'S FUTURE—IT WILL REPAY YOU MANIFOLD

ILLINOIS COMMITTEE

We will send a representative or you can communicate direct with headquarters.

Second External Irish Loan

Headquarters: 127 N. Dearborn St., Chicago
Rev. Wm. F. Cahill, Chairman John M. Flynn, Secretary
Depository
CENTURY TRUST & SAVINGS BANK
State and Adams Streets, Chicago

Full information and literature on this loan will be sent on request.

Figure 10.2. Press advertising for the Second External Loan, 15 Nov. 1921.¹⁷³

¹⁷³ *Chicago Tribune*, 15 Nov. 1921, p. 17. Advert also appeared in the *Dispatch*, 15 Nov. 1921, p. 10; *Mt.-Vernon Register News*, 15 Nov. 1921, p. 4; *Daily Chronicle*, 15 Nov. 1921, p. 6; *Alton Evening Telegraph*, 15 Nov. 1921, p. 4; *Dixon Evening Telegraph*, 15 Nov. 1921, p. 6; and *Journal Gazette*, 15 Nov. 1921, p. 2.

Nevertheless, the loan got off to a shaky start. Stephen O'Mara complained to Robert Brennan that the drive was 'in danger owing to your failure to send right material'.¹⁷⁴ In public however, he was upbeat, declaring at an AARIR meeting in Washington that the enthusiasm in the city was just as strong as he had expected and he expected the quota of \$100,000 would be reached soon.¹⁷⁵ A second mass meeting was held in Washington's Gonzaga Hall on 25 November, and a 'second lap' of campaigning began three days later with an intensive week to reach half the quota.¹⁷⁶ Watching with interest, the British ambassador reported 'Energetic attempts' being made 'to embarrass the administration regarding the [Washington] Conference'.¹⁷⁷ Within two weeks of its launch, the drive in Washington DC had raised \$15,000, while a further \$250,000 had been raised in Illinois.¹⁷⁸

A notable publicity coup was gained on 2 December, when the *Washington Post* reported that the famous Irish tenor John McCormack had subscribed \$1,000, accompanied by a letter of endorsement expressing his devotion to the Irish republican cause.¹⁷⁹ Showing the value of his celebrity, McCormack's subscription was also reported by the *Washington Herald* and *Evening Star*.¹⁸⁰ Another valuable endorsement came four days later, when the *Chicago Tribune* reported that the city's new archbishop George Mundelein would speak in favour of the loan at a rally with Fr. O'Flanagan.¹⁸¹ As with the first bond drive, Joseph McGarrity's *Irish Press* loyally carried news of the drive's

¹⁷⁴ Fitzpatrick, *Boland*, p. 242.

¹⁷⁵ *Washington Post*, 26 Nov. 1921, p. 3.

¹⁷⁶ *Washington Times*, 23 Nov. 1921, p. 1; *Washington Times*, 28 Nov. 1921, p. 1.

¹⁷⁷ TNA: FO/115/2674/240, *Geddes to Curzon*, 29 Nov. 1921.

¹⁷⁸ IE/NAI/DFA/ES/Bx.27/158, *Boland to Brennan*, 30 Nov. 1921.

¹⁷⁹ *Washington Post*, 2 Dec. 1921, p. 8; IE/NAI/DE/EXL/Vol.68, *Washington DC subscribers to Second External Loan, 1921*, Tender No. 8422, p.162 (Address listed as 270 Park Avenue, NY), verified with US Census 1920, Manhattan Assembly District 10, New York; Roll: T625_1204; Page: 8A; Enumeration District: 784.

¹⁸⁰ *Washington Herald*, 2 Dec. 1921, p. 2; *Evening Star*, 3 Dec. 1921, p. 3.

¹⁸¹ *Chicago Tribune*, 6 Dec. 1921, p. 10.

progress, listing a ranking of AARIR branches in order of the amount they had raised and making particular mention of subscriptions by members of the clergy.¹⁸²

With the drive underway in Illinois and Washington DC, J.C. Walsh was dispatched to the west coast to lay the groundwork for the next stage of the loan. After short visits to Seattle and Portland, he set up a headquarters in San Francisco, where Fr. Peter C. Yorke, a cousin of Irish republican hero Seán McBride, was head of the AARIR.¹⁸³ ‘Stand pat;’ cabled Yorke to Michael Collins, ‘the States will supply you with a million dollars monthly. California and the coast will take care of two months of 1922’.¹⁸⁴ However, events in London overtook those in America, as the Anglo-Irish Treaty negotiations came to a sudden end.¹⁸⁵

The Treaty

The British ambassador in Washington reported ‘pronounced’ satisfaction with the Treaty among the representatives of Irish-Americans.¹⁸⁶ Reflecting the power of American money in solving the Irish question, the ambassador reported that Irish-American leaders such as Edward Doheny ‘give the Press to understand that their influence had a good deal to do with the settlement’.¹⁸⁷ Although the more hard-line Irish-American press, along with Devoy and Cohalan, held staunchly behind the calls for a full republic, the British consul general viewed this in somewhat cynical terms:¹⁸⁸

¹⁸² *IP*, 10 Dec. 1921, p. 8.

¹⁸³ US/NYPL/MssCol 3212/b.3/5, *J.C. Walsh’s reminiscences*, p. 243; IE/BMH/WS/1009, *William Buckley*, p. 2.

¹⁸⁴ Reported in *FJ*, 6 Dec. 1921, p. 5.

¹⁸⁵ US/NYPL/MssCol 3212/b.3/5, *J.C. Walsh’s reminiscences*, p. 243.

¹⁸⁶ TNA: FO/115/2674/170, *British embassy, Washington, report no. 791*, 8 Dec. 1921.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁸ TNA: FO/115/2672/359, *Armstrong to Curzon*, 15 Dec. 1921.

...men of this class, who are associated with local political life, realize the final solution of the Irish situation would seriously injure their influence and importance in political affairs in this country.¹⁸⁹

The reaction of the Dáil mission however was somewhat confused. A telegram from de Valera suggested his support for the Treaty, and this was picked up by the press. As a result, on 8 December 1921 Boland endorsed the Treaty before reading its text in detail, declaring that it fulfilled the conditions of the bond drive and that subscribers could exchange bond certificates for bonds 'effective when the British army begins evacuation of Ireland'.¹⁹⁰ Boland's position altered however once he had read the text, and this divergence of opinion became evident at Washington DC's Shoreham Hotel later that day.¹⁹¹ About 100 wealthy Americans had been invited to the Shoreham to raise money for the bond drive, but the meeting turned into a celebration as details of the Anglo-Irish Treaty filtered through.¹⁹² According to the *Washington Times*, Bourke Cochran, Bishop Shahan and Senators Thomas and David Walsh led the rejoicing.¹⁹³ The mood changed, however, when Bourke Cochran gave the floor to Harry Boland, who gave a less than ringing endorsement:

News that an agreement had been reached was perturbing to me, to say the least... In coming here tonight I am placed in a position in which I must choose my words with caution and express them with diplomacy. I have no word from Ireland therefore I cannot express the sentiments of those people whom I represent.¹⁹⁴

Stephen O'Mara, also present at the meeting, took a similar line, although a statement from his office that day confirmed the bond drive would be honoured as long as the Dáil ratified the Free State's constitution.¹⁹⁵ Meanwhile J.C. Walsh, now in San Francisco,

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ Fitzpatrick, *Harry Boland*, p. 257; *New York Herald*, 8 Dec. 1921, p. 2.

¹⁹¹ *Washington Times*, 9 Dec. 1921, p. 1.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁵ *Washington Times*, 9 Dec. 1921, p. 1; *St Louis Star and Times*, 9 Dec. 1921, p. 22.

gave the Treaty his support.¹⁹⁶ A correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* reported Boland's speech the following day and, in Chicago, Fr. O'Flanagan also spoke against the Treaty.¹⁹⁷ This confusion was replicated to some extent down the hierarchy; with bond drive canvassers giving their personal opinions on the likelihood of repayment to local papers.¹⁹⁸

Despite the mixed messages from the Dáil mission, the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty had a profound effect on the way in which the Irish bonds were viewed in America. Boland's declaration that the Treaty fulfilled the conditions of repayment was reported in the *New York Herald*, and the *New York Tribune* gave a vivid account of its effect on subscribers:¹⁹⁹

In New York framed bonds decorating parlors were hastily jerked off walls and put in safer places. Bartenders who had decorated their windows with them as trade assets jerked them unceremoniously from such conspicuous display and stuck them in the cash register.²⁰⁰

As noted by the *Tribune*, the Treaty also vindicated those who held 1866 Fenian bonds, which could now be accepted at face value.²⁰¹ The *Washington Times* also brought up the question of the bonds in its reaction to the signing of the Treaty:

Interesting financial question: *What will happen now to the Irish bonds?*

Patriotic Irish men and women bought ten million dollars' worth of them, and so far as mere cash value is concerned, you could probably have bought them at a low price two weeks ago. Now they are worth par, plus interest, of course, since De Valera guaranteed them.²⁰²

¹⁹⁶ *San Francisco Chronicle*, 9 Dec. 1921.

¹⁹⁷ *Speech by Boland in treaty debate, DÉ Debate*, 7 Jan. 1922, Vol. T No. 15, p. 335; *San Bernardino County Sun*, 10 Dec. 1921, p. 1.

¹⁹⁸ *Baltimore Sun*, 8 Dec. 1921, p. 9; *Montana Standard*, 22 Dec. 1921, p. 8.

¹⁹⁹ *New York Herald*, 8 Dec. 1921, p. 2.

²⁰⁰ *New York Tribune*, 8 Dec. 1921, p. 1.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

²⁰² *Washington Times*, 8 Dec. 1921, p. 1.

According to the *Tribune*, even in Wall Street ‘speculation was rife as to their possible future values, especially for trading purposes’.²⁰³

...it is rumoured that [the Wall Street bankers] give considerable credence to the tale of the Shan Van Vocht, the allegorical poor old woman, and see her rising from her peat fire and coming to Wall Street with her “ould plaid shawl” filled with gold.²⁰⁴

As reported by the *Evening World*, New York bankers Farson, Son & Co. cabled de Valera asking if he would consider a proposition to refund outstanding Irish government obligations in the US. They suggested floating a new issue of Irish securities, the proceeds of which could finance repayment of the First and Second External Loans.²⁰⁵

Elsewhere on Wall Street, on 12 December Harry Boland met a representative of the National City Bank who was ‘anxious to secure bonds of the Free State’.²⁰⁶

The AARIR’s national executive met in Washington on 17 December, and messages of congratulations were sent to the bond drive organisers of Washington DC and Illinois. By this date, Washington had raised \$33,000, compared to the \$39,000 raised in six months for the First External Loan.²⁰⁷ Meanwhile, Illinois had raised \$499,150, a huge improvement on the \$398,000 raised in the first loan.²⁰⁸

The *Belvedere Daily Republican* gave its Illinois readers an assortment of the most emotive subscribers to the loan: a blind old man, led by a one-legged companion, subscribing \$50 to the drive; a janitor ‘whose hands bled from the great chaps in his knuckles’ who also subscribed \$50; a hod carrier who had just lost his job, depositing \$15; and a street-car conductor subscribing \$1,000.²⁰⁹ At first the local AARIR secretary refused the blind man’s subscription, seeing from his clothes that he could ill afford it.

²⁰³ *New York Tribune*, 8 Dec. 1921, p. 1.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²⁰⁵ *Evening World*, 10 Dec. 1921, p. 2.

²⁰⁶ *HBD*, 12 Dec. 1921, cited in Fitzpatrick, *Harry Boland*, p. 244.

²⁰⁷ IE/UCDA/P150/1034, *Minutes of the meeting of the National Executive of the AARIR, Washington D.C.*, 17 Dec. 1921.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁹ *Belvedere Daily Republican*, 6 Dec. 1921, p. 6.

The blind man interrupted, ‘I know what you’d say. I may need but Ireland does need. If I pass out it’s no matter, but if Ireland falls the whole world will be the loser. Take the money. I’ll have more later.’²¹⁰

Regardless of the provenance of these stories, they speak to the sacrifice made by many poor Irish-Americans for the sake of Irish independence. The vast majority (79%) of bond certificates sold in Washington DC were for just \$10, a figure roughly in line with the First External Loan.²¹¹ However, \$10 subscriptions only accounted for 39.5% of the total raised in Washington DC, while 47.5% came from subscriptions of \$50 or more, revealing the extent of the Dáil’s reliance on large subscriptions.²¹²

The closing of the Second External Loan marked the end of the Dáil’s fundraising activities in America during the Irish War of Independence. Although similar efforts were made during the Irish Civil War (1922-3) and the Northern Irish Troubles (1968-98), the War of Independence remained the high watermark of Irish diaspora political fundraising.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹¹ IE/NAI/DE/EXL/Vol.68, *Washington DC subscribers to Second External Loan*, 1921; IE/UCDA/P150/962, *Statement issued by DE of receipts and expenditures of First Loan of the Republic of Ireland to 13 Jun. 1921.*

²¹² IE/NAI/DE/EXL/Vol.68, *Washington DC subscribers to Second External Loan*, 1921.

Chapter 11: Argentina and the Rest of the World

Although the vast majority of the Dáil's external funding came from the US, its fundraising efforts were not confined to that country. This chapter surveys the Dáil's diaspora fundraising beyond the United States. It focuses on Argentina, the only other country targeted by the Dáil with its own dedicated bond drive, but first attends to the countries that escaped the Dáil's specific attention. In so doing, it sheds light on countries that have largely been ignored by the historiography of the Irish War of Independence. It also enhances our understanding of the dynamics of diaspora finance laid out in chapter 5 and developed in chapters 6, 7, 8 and 10.

Just as in the United States, in order to raise funds in other territories the Dáil was obliged to cooperate with local Irish diaspora organisations. However, unlike in the American case, in other territories the diaspora organisations were fragmented, with no single organisation capable of claiming supremacy over the rest. The 'Trans-Atlantic Partnership' outlined in chapter 5 was peculiar to the United States, and was based on the particularly high level of demand for Irish nationalism in that country. This demand was largely absent in the other, less influential Irish diaspora communities, where demonstration of Irish nationalism had a negligible, if not negative, effect on personal advancement. Not benefitting from a high demand for Irish nationalism, Irish diaspora organisations outside the US lacked an incentive to consolidate. As a result, they were disorganised and fragmented. A fragmented market of Irish-American organisations would have strengthened the Dáil's bargaining position during the US bond drive, being a monopoly provider of a product with high demand. However, the absence of such demand in the rest of the diaspora negated any potential benefits to bargaining that a fragmented

market would provide. Essentially, outside the US, the Dáil was a monopoly supplier of a product for which there was little demand.

The Empire

Closest to home was the Irish community in Britain. The Irish in Britain did not have a bond drive of their own but instead were targeted under the auspices of the National Loan. This was coordinated by Art O'Brien, the Dáil's representative in London, through the Irish Self-Determination League (ISDL).¹ By the end of the National Loan campaign, in November 1920, the ISDL had a total membership of *ca.* 26,000.² O'Brien was directly accountable to Michael Collins, and Britain was treated much like a constituency of Ireland. Home to 523,767 Irish-born residents and many more second and third generation Irish, Britain should have been fertile ground for Dáil fundraising.³ However, along with some funds raised in France, the National Loan in Britain raised only £11,719.⁴ This was a vast improvement on the £2,623 raised in Britain for the INAAVDF, but still fell well short of Collins's expectations:⁵

...it is an extraordinary thing how badly the Irish in Great Britain have done in this particular effort. Imagine one remote mountainous constituency [in Ireland] supplying as much money as all the Irish in Great Britain. It is a most eloquent commentary on how they forget.⁶

Although a disappointment to Collins, the result of the loan in Britain is perhaps not surprising. Like in Ireland, Sinn Féin and the Dáil were illegal organisations there, but unlike in Ireland, their sympathisers lacked the critical mass to overcome this obstacle. Beyond the legal constraints, there were also social norms that militated against overt

¹ Carroll, *Money*, p. 6.

² M. Moulton, *Ireland and the Irish in Interwar England* (Cambridge, 2014), p. 105.

³ 1921 Census of England and Wales; 1921 Census of Scotland.

⁴ IE/BMH/CD184.4, *Net amounts received at head office as of 14th September 1920, corrected to 27th September 1920*.

⁵ NLI/MS.23,435.

⁶ IE/UCDA/P7/A10, *Collins to P.*; 9 Apr. 1920, cited in Moulton, *Ireland and the Irish*, p. 102.

support for Irish independence in Britain, as the Irish there were vulnerable to accusations of disloyalty. Moreover, as noted by Mo Moulton, the Irish in Britain were largely poor, working class people, with limited funds with which to express their support.⁷

The Irish diaspora community most conspicuous by its absence from the Dáil's balance sheet was in Australia, where the Irish-born population numbered 105,033.⁸ Like the Irish in America, this was a community with a strong record of Irish nationalist and republican fundraising. In 1913, the IPP's William Archer Redmond, Richard Hazleton and J.T. Donovan returned from a tour of Australasia with £40,000.⁹ Australia and New Zealand managed to raise £27,158 for the INAAVDF in 1916-19, compared to £59,334 from the US.¹⁰ However, when it came to raising funds for the Dáil in the war of independence, the Irish of Australasia were notably quiet.

The DÉDF made early attempts to reach the Irish in Australia. The National Loan prospectus had been sent to Australia by October 1919, and the Dáil cabinet decided to send the National Loan film as well.¹¹ Various Irish-Australian organisations planned to federate, creating an umbrella organisation along the lines of the FOIF, and an 'Irish Race Convention' was held in Melbourne on 3 November 1919 with Archbishop Mannix presiding.¹² The event was not without its luminaries, foremost among them T.J. Ryan, the former Premier of Queensland, whom Mannix introduced as the principal speaker.¹³ Presented to the convention as 'the prospective prime minister of the Commonwealth', Ryan was a rising star in Australian politics. He had met with de Valera earlier that year on a brief visit to Ireland, and left the meeting convinced that he was the leader of the majority

⁷ Moulton, *Ireland and the Irish*, p. 128.

⁸ A. McCarthy, 'The Irish in Australia and New Zealand' in E.F. Biagini & M.E. Daly, *The Cambridge Social History of Modern Ireland* (Cambridge, 2017), pp. 479 & 481.

⁹ Meleady, *John Redmond*, p. 222.

¹⁰ NLI/Ms.23,434.

¹¹ IE/UCDA/P150/726, *Collins to de Valera*, 14 Oct. 1919; IE/NAI/DE/1/2, *Minutes of DÉ Ministry and Cabinet*, 2 Jan. 1920.

¹² IE/NAI/DE 2/269, *DÉ Report on Foreign Affairs presented by Count George Plunkett*, 27 Oct. 1919; D.J. Murphy, *T.J. Ryan: A Political Biography* (Queensland, 1990), pp. 468-9.

¹³ Murphy, *T.J. Ryan*, pp. 468-9.

of people in Ireland.¹⁴ Archbishop Redwood of Wellington, New Zealand, was also present, as were the Archbishops of Sydney, Brisbane, Adelaide and Hobart.¹⁵ Echoing the FOIF's Victory Fund, an 'Australasian-Irish Fund' was set up. Alongside Mannix, the trustees included Hon. John Meagher, a businessman and member of the New South Wales Legislative Council, and Count O'Loughlin, a philanthropist and heir to the O'Loughlin gold-mining fortune.¹⁶ Nevertheless, as of 24 June 1920, the DÉDF had received no more than £175, donations from three supporters based in Western Australia.¹⁷

There are a number of explanations for the Dáil's lack of success in Australia. The most practical one was ignorance. The Dáil's correspondence regarding Australian fundraising reveals a lack of knowledge of the Irish community there; the dynamics of local politics, and the personalities involved.¹⁸ Moreover, just as the Irish Victory Fund in America would have competed with the bond drive had it not been closed in time, once the Australasian-Irish Fund was established, there was a rival to any Dáil bond drive in Australia. A prospective bond drive in Australia also lacked a figurehead. The closest thing would have been Archbishop Mannix but, rising to prominence through his opposition to conscription, he was a highly divisive character in Australia.¹⁹ Moreover, he left Australia for a tour of the US in May 1920.²⁰ Ryan was another candidate for figurehead, but he had domestic politics to consider. Far from helping his career, any association with Sinn Féin was seized upon by his opponents and used to demonise him.²¹ His personal political ambitions aside, Ryan's position was characteristic of the position occupied by Irish-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 412-3.

¹⁵ *Capricornian*, 8 Nov. 1919, p. 21.

¹⁶ B. Pennay, 'Meagher, John (1836–1920)', *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, Vol.10, (MUP), 1986; B. Niall, *The riddle of Father Hackett: a priest in politics in Ireland and Australia* (Canberra, 2009), p. 153; *Advocate (Melbourne)*, 29 Nov. 1919, p. 26.

¹⁷ IE/NAI/DE/2/007, DÉDF of Operations showing receipts and expenditure for the period ending 31 Oct 1919 and the half year ending 30 Apr. 1920, together with a note of further receipts and expenditure as of 24 Jun. 1920, p. 2.

¹⁸ IE/UCDA/P150/726, *Collins to de Valera*, 6 Oct. 1919; IE/UCDA/P150/726, *de Valera to Griffith*, 13 Aug. 1919.

¹⁹ IE/BMH/WS0687, *Rev. Curran*, pp. 237-8.

²⁰ *Daily Standard (Brisbane)*, 21 May 1920, p. 5.

²¹ Murphy, T.J. *Ryan*, pp. 469-70.

Australians more generally. As noted by P. O'Farrell, although the Easter Rising shifted Irish-Australian opinion, the shift resulted in 'alarm and concern for the local implications'.²² Irish-Australians, vulnerable to accusations of disloyalty in the context of the Great War, were reluctant to voice support for the Rising, even if that support existed.²³

There was speculation in the Australian press that Archbishop Mannix would start a bond drive on his return to Australia, but this never materialised.²⁴ The Australian bond drive plans were abandoned and the Self-Determination Fund was promoted instead. The Dáil sent Katherine Hughes to help organise the movement in Australia and, by 19 August 1921, *ca.* £20,000 had been collected for the Fund and was on deposit in Melbourne.²⁵ Nevertheless, overcoming the distance between Ireland and Australia seemed beyond the wit of Collins's interlocutors in Melbourne, who left him exasperated by their unwillingness to wire any funds collected.²⁶

Elsewhere in the British Empire, the Irish community in Canada received remarkably little attention from the Dáil. This is surprising, as the 1921 Census of Canada classified 1,107,817 residents as ethnically Irish.²⁷ This didn't necessarily translate into support for Irish independence however. Canada raised a paltry £343 for the INAAVDF, the majority (£300) coming from Montreal.²⁸ Even the charitable appeal of the Irish White Cross generated no more than £8,659.²⁹ In practice, the Dáil treated Canada much like an annex to the US, and de Valera planned to coordinate activism there from Chicago.³⁰ Much

²² P. O'Farrell, *The Irish in Australia* (Sydney, 2006), p. 263, cited in F. McGarry, 'A Land Beyond the Wave: Transnational Perspectives on Easter 1916', in N. Whelehan (ed.), *Transnational Perspectives on Modern Irish History* (Oxford, 2015) p. 178.

²³ F. McGarry, 'A Land Beyond the Wave', p. 179.

²⁴ *Grafton Argus and Clarence River General Advertiser*, 9 Jun. 1920, p. 3; *Daily News (Perth)*, 9 Jun. 1920, p. 5; *Albury Banner and Wodonga Express*, 11 Jun. 1920, p. 22.

²⁵ IE/NAI/DE/2/287, R. O'Brennan to Collins, 19 Aug. 1921.

²⁶ IE/NAI/DE/2/287, Collins to DE Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, 24 Aug. 1921.

²⁷ 1921 Census of Canada, p. 356.

²⁸ NLI/Ms.23,434.

²⁹ IE/BMH.WS0264, *Aine Ceannt*, p. 72.

³⁰ IE/UCDA/P150/727, *de Valera to Cabinet*, 25 Mar. 1920.

like in Australia, the Irish nationalist organisations in Canada were divided, including the Canadian FOIF and the Irish Canadian National League.³¹ Indicative of Canada's secondary status, de Valera's primary concern seems to have been that the FOIF there would fall under the control of Devoy and Cohalan.³² Under his instructions, these two organisations merged under the banner of the 'Self-determination for Ireland League of Canada'.³³ Nevertheless, the Canadian contribution to the Dáil's coffers was negligible.

The Dáil also considered organising a bond drive in South Africa, and an emissary, Patrick J. Little, was dispatched on 24 March 1921 to raise funds and help with organisation.³⁴ Arriving in Cape Town in April 1921, Little found that an 'Irish Republican Association of South Africa' (IRASA) had already been formed, and he was able to report that 'the ground had been well prepared'.³⁵ The IRASA had a membership of *ca.* 1,000 and published a fortnightly journal called *The Republic*, which had a circulation of 2,300.³⁶ Little estimated that there were 10,000 Irish in South Africa, mainly centred on Johannesburg.³⁷ Encouragingly, funds had already been raised for the Irish White Cross there.³⁸ Travelling through the Transvaal, Orange Free State, and Cape Province, Little found strong support among the Afrikaner community, mainly 'through hatred of England', and the Afrikaner National Party gave organisational assistance.³⁹ Nevertheless, he doubted that a bond drive there would be successful and, in August 1921, he boarded a ship bound for Buenos Aires.⁴⁰

³¹ IE/UCDA/P150/995, *Copy of resolution adopted at general meeting of Michael Davitt branch of FOIF and Padraic Pearse branch of ICNL, Montreal*, 18 May 1920.

³² IE/UCDA/P150/995, *de Valera to K. Hughes*, 24 Jul. 1920.

³³ IE/UCDA/P150/995, *Copy of resolution adopted at general meeting of Michael Davitt branch of FOIF and Padraic Pearse branch of ICNL, Montreal*, 18 May 1920.

³⁴ IE/NAI/DE/2/526, *Report from P.J. Little*, Johannesburg, 20. Apr. 1921; IE/BMH/WS1769, *PJ Little*, p. 65.

³⁵ IE/BMH/WS1769, *P.J. Little*, p. 69; IE/NAI/DE/2/526, *Report from P.[atrick] J. Little*, Cape Town, 14. Apr. 1921.

³⁶ IE/NAI/DE/2/526, *Report from P.J. Little*, Johannesburg, 20. Apr. 1921.

³⁷ IE/NAI/DE/2/526, *Report from P.J. Little*, Cape Town, 14. Apr. 1921.

³⁸ IE/NAI/DE/2/526, *Report from P.J. Little*, Johannesburg, 20. Apr. 1921.

³⁹ IE/BMH/WS1769, *PJ Little*, p. 87; IE/NAI DE 2/526, *Report from P. J. Little*, Cape Town, 14. Apr. 1921; IE/BMH/WS1769, *PJ Little*, p. 85.

⁴⁰ IE/BMH/WS1769, *PJ Little*, p. 85.

Argentina

South America had long been in the sights of the Dáil's fundraisers. De Valera mentioned a 'South America project' to his cabinet on 10 March 1920, and a presidential tour of the continent was actively being considered.⁴¹ De Valera never made the trip, but Dáil fundraisers were nevertheless active in a number of South American countries. Much like the National Loan's implementation in Britain, this was undertaken in part by an extension of the First External Loan beyond US borders. This was the approach taken in the Panama Canal Zone, which certainly punched above its weight. In May 1920, the FOIF branch secretary there sent \$3,515 worth of bond certificate applications, gathered 'from some two hundred friends of the Irish Republic'.⁴² In total, the Canal Zone raised \$4,125 for the bond drive.⁴³ The same approach was taken in Bolivia, where eight subscribers contributed a total of \$1,300 to the First External Loan.⁴⁴ Further south, there was some consideration of organising a bond drive specifically for Chile. This was quickly dismissed however, as the Irish population was deemed insufficient and the strength of British influence too great.⁴⁵ Instead, the focus of the Dáil's South American fundraising turned to Argentina.

The Argentine Loan is the least studied aspect of the Dáil's fundraising in the war of independence. In Francis Carroll's *Money for Ireland*, for example, it was relegated to a single, rather opaque footnote referring to 'various countries in Latin America'.⁴⁶ More recently, Nicholas Ridley devoted no more than half a sentence to 'donations in Argentina

⁴¹ IE/UCDA/P150/727, *de Valera to Dail Cabinet*, 10 Mar. 1920; Hannigan, *De Valera*, p. 159.

⁴² IE/UCDA/P150/982, T.J. Owens to *de Valera*, 18 May 1920.

⁴³ IE/NAI/FIN1/2166/643, *Price Waterhouse Audit of DE US funds*, 23 Feb. 1923.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*; Other sources (NLI/Ms.49,810/7) suggest this was \$1,200; NLI/Ms.49,810/7, *G. Nichols to Ginnell*, 23 Sept. 1921.

⁴⁵ IE/NAI/DFA/ES Box 32 File 16, *Précis of Mr Simpson's report, Chile*, Oct. 1921.

⁴⁶ Carroll, *Money*, p. 20, fn. 31.

to the Dail Loan'.⁴⁷ Indeed, with the sole exception of Dermot Keogh's Spanish-language *La Independencia de Irlanda: La Conexión Argentina*, the role of Argentina the Irish War of Independence has been completely overlooked.⁴⁸ However, as an example of an unsuccessful Dáil bond drive, analysis of the Argentine Loan is instructive. It also exemplifies the scale of the Dáil's ambition, and possibly hubris, as the war of independence progressed.

The Argentine economy had benefitted massively from the First World War. The country's Radical Civic Union government under President Hipólito Yrigoyen had maintained a strict policy of neutrality during the war, while profiting from the increased demand for its exports.⁴⁹ To cater for international demand, from 1914 to 1921 the Argentine cattle stock increased from 26 to 37 million.⁵⁰ Among those who benefitted most from this boom were a hundred or so wealthy Irish-Argentine families, who had prospered through raising cattle and sheep.⁵¹ Tightly knit, the Irish-Argentine community had its own newspaper, the *Southern Cross*, an English-language weekly that recorded the social events, church affairs and hurling matches that bound the community together.⁵²

Although somewhat isolated, the Irish in Argentina had a history of donating to causes in the home country. In 1847, the *British Packet and Argentine News* published a long list of subscribers to the Irish Relief Committee in Dublin.⁵³ In 1867, 47 residents of Mercedes contributed \$4,700 to 'The Poor of Ireland Fund', a cover for the Fenian Prisoners' Fund.⁵⁴ In 1881, \$3,550 was collected in Mercedes for the Land League.⁵⁵ More

⁴⁷ Ridley, *Collins*, p. 124.

⁴⁸ Keogh, *Independencia*.

⁴⁹ A. Graham-Yool, *The Forgotten Colony* (London, 1981), p. 235.

⁵⁰ D. Rock, 'From the First World War to independence', p. 158, in L. Bethell (ed.) *Argentina since independence* (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 139-72.

⁵¹ IE/BMH/WS/1769, P.J. Little, p. 96.

⁵² J.P. Byrne, P. Coleman & J. King (eds.), *Ireland and the Americas: Culture, politics, and history: a multidisciplinary encyclopaedia* (Santa Barbara, 2008) Vol. 2, p. 254; IE/BMH/WS/1765, Sean T. O'Kelly, pp. 98-9.

⁵³ *British Packet and Argentine News*, 22 May 1847, cited in Graham-Yool, *The Forgotten Colony*, p. 156.

⁵⁴ T.C. Murray, *The Story of the Irish in Argentina* (Cork, 2012), p. 174.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

recently, in September 1916, £227 was sent from Buenos Aires to the INAAVDF.⁵⁶ Argentines also had exposure to the idea of war bonds. Although the country remained neutral during the Great War, Argentinians invested more than \$250,000 in the Fourth US Liberty Loan and donated over \$850,000 to the Red Cross.⁵⁷

It was originally planned that the sale of Dáil bonds in Argentina would follow the example of Panama and Bolivia, and ‘naturally come under the U.S.A. flotation’.⁵⁸ In line with this approach, the ‘Irish Republican League of Buenos Ayres’ (IRLBA) subscribed \$1,793 to the First External Loan *via* John Devoy.⁵⁹ However, as the war of independence progressed, the Dáil’s plans grew in their ambition. A series of reports in 1920 convinced de Valera of the greater possibilities of fundraising in Argentina.⁶⁰ One of these, discussed at an Irish Progressive League meeting in New York in August 1920, claimed that between \$150,000 and \$200,000 could be raised there for the cause in just five or six months.⁶¹

Of course to tap these funds the Dáil would need a representative in Argentina. In a report on the Irish community in Argentina, Rev. J.J. Conway recommended to Harry Boland that this person ‘should possess the physique and agreeableness of manner that would make for a social success’.⁶² In fact, the Dáil already had a representative in Buenos Aires in the form of Eamon Bulfin. Born in Argentina to an Irish family, Bulfin was educated in Dublin at Padraig Pearse’s school, St Enda’s.⁶³ He was deported back to Argentina for taking part in the Easter Rising, having gained the distinction of personally

⁵⁶ NLI/Ms.23,435, *Overseas subscriptions to the INAAVDF*, 1916-19.

⁵⁷ J. Bisher, *The Intelligence War in Latin America, 1914–1922* (North Carolina, 2016), p. 193.

⁵⁸ IE/DE/5/21, *Collins to Bulfin*, 24 Sept. 1919, cited in M. Kennedy, “‘Mr Blythe, I think hears from him occasionally’”: The experiences of Irish diplomats in Latin America, 1919-23’, p. 45 in M. Kennedy & J.M. Skelly (eds.) *Irish foreign policy, 1919-66* (Dublin, 2000).

⁵⁹ IE/NAI/FIN 87/3/36, *G. Healy to Leo T. McCauley*, 23 Jun. 1937.

⁶⁰ IE/UCDA/P150/1148, *Rev. Conway to Boland*, 20 Mar. 1921; IE/UCDA/P150/960, *Thomas Murray to de Valera*, 12 Aug. 1920.

⁶¹ IE/UCDA/P150/960, *Thomas Murray to de Valera*, 12 Aug. 1920.

⁶² IE/UCDA/P150/1148, *Rev. Conway to Boland*, 20 Mar. 1921.

⁶³ IE/BMH/WS1769, *P.J. Little*, p. 109.

raising the flag of the Irish Republic over the GPO.⁶⁴ However, despite his republican credentials, Bulfin lacked the stature required of a figurehead to lead a bond drive there. In particular, he was not a member of the Dáil. More practically, having been detained on his return to Argentina for evading military service, he had gained some notoriety with the authorities there.⁶⁵ Until August 1920 there was a possibility that de Valera himself would tour South America, but the on-going tussle with Devoy and Cohalan kept him busy in America.⁶⁶ Another report suggested Father Michael O’Flanagan, Eoin MacNeill or Laurence Ginnell could fill the vacancy.⁶⁷ In the end it was Laurence Ginnell, T.D. for Westmeath, who got the job of ‘Envoy Extraordinary to the Governments and Peoples of South America’.⁶⁸ Ginnell received his credentials from Harry Boland on 4 May 1921 and with his wife, Alice, set sail for Buenos Aires on 2 July 1921.⁶⁹

Something of a firebrand, Ginnell had gained a reputation in the US for strongly anti-British speeches that risked alienating the more ‘conservative’ sections of Irish America. Knowing Ginnell for many years, James O’Mara considered it a waste of time to ask him to temper his language, as he was ‘little likely to be influenced or advised’.⁷⁰ Although not a man to be cowed, O’Mara admitted to Boland that he had ‘been afraid to touch L.G.’.⁷¹ In the words of J.C. Walsh:

He [Ginnell] was one of the few to be met in a lifetime that can without reserve be classed as “intrepid”. Fear seemed not to be in him. Assertive he was, but scholarly, considerate, self-sacrificing. Prison life for Ireland had left him a wreck physically, but with no scars on his spirit. He and O’Mara were alike in being strongly individuals, both knew it, each knew the other’s record, and they kept out of each other’s orbit as much as they could.⁷²

⁶⁴ Byrne *et al*, *Ireland and the Americas*, Vol. 2, p. 134.

⁶⁵ Keogh, *Independencia*, p. 242.

⁶⁶ IE/UCDA/P150/727, *Boland to Cabinet*, 11 Aug. 1920.

⁶⁷ IE/UCDA/P150/960, *Thomas Murray to de Valera*, 12 Aug. 1920.

⁶⁸ IE/BMH/WS0982, *M.A. Ginnell*, p. 28.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ IE/UCDA/P150/1138, *J. O’Mara to Boland*, 23 Feb. 1921.

⁷¹ IE/UCDA/P150/1138, *J. O’Mara to Boland*, 24 Feb. 1921.

⁷² US/NYPL/MssCol 3212/b.3/5, *J.C. Walsh’s reminiscences*, p. 183.

Ginnell, who spoke no Spanish and had no experience of Latin America, was a strange choice for the role. Perhaps, in light of the above, he was transferred to Argentina to prevent him from alienating American conservatives. Perhaps the fact that much of the Irish community in Argentina hailed from the midlands, including Ginnell's own constituency, had something to do with it. Indeed, some of the Irish-Argentines Ginnell encountered claimed to know him from years ago in Westmeath.⁷³ Whatever his qualifications, Ginnell threw himself into the role with a force worthy of the title Envoy Extraordinary.

Laurence Ginnell, Envoy Extraordinary

Laurence and Alice Ginnell arrived in Buenos Aires on 25 July 1921.⁷⁴ As an opening salvo, on 5 August 1921 he laid a wreath on the tomb of San Martin, Argentina's liberator, in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Cathedral.⁷⁵ This caught the attention of the British foreign office, which wasted no time in pouring scorn on Ginnell's mission. Within two days, it issued a statement dismissing him as 'a pseudo-diplomat of a non-existing republic'. Unfazed, in a statement to the press Ginnell simply brushed this off as 'amusing', and continued his charm offensive.⁷⁶ A reception was held in the Buenos Aires Plaza Hotel to welcome him on 10 August 1921, with a guest-list that read like a *Who's Who* of wealthy Irish-Argentines.⁷⁷ Two days later, on 12 August 1921, he attracted more attention attending a *Te Deum* service in the Metropolitan Cathedral, in memory of the capitulation of British troops in Argentina in 1806.⁷⁸ Heartened by the first weeks of his mission and,

⁷³ *Southern Cross*, 23 Sept. 1921, p. 13.

⁷⁴ IE/BMH/WS0982, *Mrs A. Ginnell*, p. 29.

⁷⁵ *Razon*, 4 Aug. 1921, p. 5.

⁷⁶ *Evening Star*, 7 Aug. 1921, p. 6.

⁷⁷ *Nación*, 9 Aug. 1921, p. 6.

⁷⁸ *New York Times*, 16 Aug. 1921, p. 2.

perhaps showing excessive self-confidence, on 15 August 1921, Ginnell cabled de Valera claiming ‘Argentina is practically unanimous for Irish independence, and will support any decision’.⁷⁹ Shared with the press, these comments made headlines in *New York Times*, *Cork Examiner*, and *Freeman’s Journal*.⁸⁰

Ginnell’s overtures to the Argentines continued. The *Associated Press* reported the following day that he had distributed a document entitled ‘A Communication to the National Congress of the Argentine’ to members of the Argentine Chamber, Senate and government.⁸¹ Approved by the Dáil the previous January, the document set out the Irish claim for independence and recounted a history of ‘the struggle against England’.⁸² At the same time, Ginnell sought an official reception from the Argentine government.⁸³ This coincided with the Dáil’s public meeting at the Mansion House in Dublin, so the Irish Republic had never seemed so real.⁸⁴ Unfortunately for Ginnell, he was refused an official meeting but, on 18 August 1921, Foreign Minister Honorio Pueyrredón met him in a private capacity in his house.⁸⁵ Pueyrredón informed Ginnell that Argentina could not be the first country to recognise the Irish Republic.⁸⁶ He also advised that Dáil bonds could not be publicly issued without the consent of congress.⁸⁷ As a result, Ginnell adopted the External Loan strategy of selling ‘bond certificates’ rather than bonds, with the small modification that they would be printed in Spanish.⁸⁸

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*; *Irish Examiner*, 18 Aug. 1921, p. 6; *FJ*, 18 Aug. 1921, p. 6.

⁸¹ *New York Times*, 17 Aug. 1921, p. 2.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Cork Examiner*, 22 Aug. 1921, p. 5.

⁸⁴ *Irish Independent*, 15 Aug. 1921, p. 6.

⁸⁵ *Cork Examiner*, 22 Aug. 1921, p. 5.

⁸⁶ IE/BMH/WS0982, *Mrs. A. Ginnell*, p. 33.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ IE/NAI/DE/2/281, *Ginnell to S. O’Mara*, 1 Sept. 1921.

The following day, Ginnell went to meet leading Irish-Argentine Juan Nelson regarding the launch of an Argentinian bond drive.⁸⁹ Described by Ginnell as ‘a strong Irish Republican’, Nelson at that time was reputed to be the wealthiest man in Argentina.⁹⁰ He was the founder of the Nelson Shipping Company and a cold storage plant, Las Palmas, in Entre Ríos province, north of Buenos Aires. He was also the founder of the *Hiberno-Argentine Review*, a moderately nationalist, strongly clerical, weekly publication.⁹¹ Although, according to Little, Nelson’s ‘social atmosphere was unfriendly’, he was a very well connected man. He was married into the wealthy Irish-Argentine Duggan family, another member of which was married to Lord Curzon.⁹² He had also been a close personal friend of Sir Roger Casement, when the latter was British Consul in Rio de Janeiro and vacationed in Buenos Aires.⁹³

Nelson brought Ginnell to meet another prominent Irish-Argentine, Dr Santiago Gregorio O’Farrell.⁹⁴ A doctor of jurisprudence with a specialism in banking, O’Farrell had served as a national deputy in the Federal Capital from 1896 to 1900 and 1904 to 1906.⁹⁵ As a legislator, he was responsible for introducing life insurance to Argentina in 1898, and also served as President of the San Martín railway.⁹⁶ A pillar of Buenos Aires society, at the time of the meeting he was President of the Buenos Aires Rotary Club.⁹⁷ He also had connections to the British government, as a personal friend of the Welsh mine owner and Liberal MP Lord St Davids who was, in turn, a friend of David Lloyd George.⁹⁸ After

⁸⁹ IE/BMH/WS0982, *Mrs A. Ginnell*, p. 33.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁹¹ Byrne *et al*, *Ireland and the Americas*, Vol.2, p. 776.

⁹² IE/BMH/WS1769, *PJ Little*, p. 107.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ IE/BMH/WS0982, *M.A. Ginnell*, p. 33.

⁹⁵ *Historia de Rotary Club de Buenos Aires*, Vol. 1, 1919-30.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ IE/BMH/WS1769, *PJ Little*, p. 107. Lord St Davids was also Chairman of the Lloyd George Fund, which provided DLG with funds independent of the party (Dictionary of Welsh Biography)/

examining some certificates from the Dáil's bond drive in America, O'Farrell gave his support to Ginnell's endeavour, saying he believed they would sell in Argentina.⁹⁹

Nelson then brought Ginnell to meet Juan Lalor, the man who took care of most of the business of the Irish community in Buenos Aires.¹⁰⁰ Born in Co. Wicklow, Lalor migrated to Argentina in 1880 and worked his way up from shepherd to wealthy businessman. He founded cattle auctioneer business Casa Lalor in Buenos Aires in 1910 and became a founding member of the Argentine chamber of livestock dealers in 1912.¹⁰¹ At first, Lalor thought the idea of a bond drive in Argentina 'was not a business at all', but some persuasion from Nelson brought him round to the idea.¹⁰²

Fortified with the support of these leading Irish-Argentines, on 20 August 1921, Ginnell cabled Chicago, requesting that bond drive clerk Garth Healy be sent to Buenos Aires to help launch an Argentine Loan.¹⁰³ However, reflecting Argentina's peripheral place in the plans of the Dáil, O'Mara wrote back five days later, turning down the request and saying he wasn't even aware of a proposed bond drive in Argentina.¹⁰⁴ Nevertheless, Ginnell pressed on, and on 6 September 1921 held a lunch to discuss the Argentine bond drive with Nelson and Mgr. Santiago Ussher, Fisdale of the Metropolitan Cathedral, and three other leading Irish-Argentines: Patricio Dowling, Tomas Moore, and James Bohen.¹⁰⁵ 'We have so far met with great success,' wrote Ginnell to the Dáil's representative in Chile the following day. 'Please say nothing about it for the present,' he added, perhaps not wishing to tempt fate.¹⁰⁶

⁹⁹ IE/BMH/WS0982, *M.A. Ginnell*, p. 33.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Byrne *et al*, *Ireland and the Americas*, Vol. 2, p. xxix; E.A. Coghlan, *Los Irlandeses en la Argentina: Su Actuación y Descendencia* (Buenos Aires, 1987), p. 582.

¹⁰² IE/BMH/WS0982, *Mrs A. Ginnell*, p. 33.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, *M.A. Ginnell*, p. 35.

¹⁰⁶ NLI/Ms.49,810/8, *Ginnell to F. Egan*, 7 Sept. 1921.

If evidence were needed for the potential of Dáil fundraising in Argentina, it came in abundance later that week. From Friday 9 to Monday 12 September 1921, a ‘festival’ was held in honour of the Ginnells at the Passionist Fathers’ St Paul’s Retreat in Capitán Sarmiento, *ca.* 160km north of Buenos Aires.¹⁰⁷ The Ginnells arrived by train, in scenes reminiscent of de Valera’s tour of America:

When the train reached Sarmiento, at 11 o’clock, the parish priest, the local authorities and, it seemed, all Sarmiento, were there to meet the accredited Envoy of the Irish Government and Nation. From a multitude of motor-cars, the Flags streamed gaily, the Blue and White of young Argentina harmonising with the Green, White and Gold of old Ireland. The Sinn Féin regiment¹⁰⁸ was there as a guard of honour, manly, disciplined, well-drilled lads, and the Carmen band struck up “A Soldier’s Song” and other familiar airs.¹⁰⁹

Speeches were made by Ginnell and Msgr. Copello, the Auxiliary Bishop of La Plata, and an ‘Irish Fair’ was held in the afternoon.¹¹⁰ This was essentially a charity auction, where livestock were sold to the highest bidder and then re-donated for another sale.¹¹¹ One donkey, named ‘Saoirse’, was sold 45 times on the first day and 14 times on the second, raising AR\$700. In total, the auction raised AR\$6,970 ‘for the Republic of Ireland’.¹¹² The evening closed with a short concert.¹¹³

Sunday, 11 September 1921, began with a mass at 7am and another at 10am, before the Bishop left Sarmiento for La Plata; his departing words were ‘Viva la libertad de Irlanda!’¹¹⁴ Sunday closed with another concert, starting with the Argentine national anthem, and including a number of Irish tunes, the Soldier’s Song, and ‘some side-splitting’ farces, which ‘brought the house down’.¹¹⁵ A new song, ‘I.R.A.’, composed specially for the

¹⁰⁷ *Southern Cross*, 23 Sept. 1921, p. 13.

¹⁰⁸ ‘Youngsters with imitation rifles and green caps and a band’, according to IE/BMH/WS0982, *M.A. Ginnell*, p. 36.

¹⁰⁹ *Southern Cross*, 23 Sept. 1921, p. 13.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ *Southern Cross*, 30 Sept. 1921, p. 7.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 23 Sept. 1921, p. 13.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

event, was sung by the boys of St Paul's College.¹¹⁶ Finally, came Ginnell's address, first a few words read out in Spanish, and then a 'thrilling extempore speech' in English.¹¹⁷ Having paid his respects to the Argentine flag and set out the conditions in Ireland, Ginnell closed with a reference to the loan:

Countries which have not been devastated occasionally obtain loans for their enterprises, even when they are not pacific. The Irish Republican Government cannot afford to wait for England to become just. It undertakes the task itself, seeks for a loan for the purpose on the credit of its own resources, and will work hard to repay every centavo of principal and interest. Promoting the success of this loan will be practical help and recognition of the new republic by citizens, in anticipation of official recognition by government. It will also express abhorrence of foreign military rule in any country and the natural desire to see the blessings of liberty extended to every nation.¹¹⁸

Disunited Irishmen, again

Ginnell's party caught the train back to Buenos Aires on Monday afternoon, 12 September 1921, and preparation for the Argentine Loan began in earnest.¹¹⁹ As elsewhere, a key challenge for Ginnell was the creation of an organisation to sell the bonds and, somewhat predictably, the organisational landscape of Irish Argentina was an issue to contend with. According to Bulfin, organisation among the Irish-Argentines was 'at its lowest ebb' in 1921.¹²⁰ At the root of this malaise were 'local differences and animosities' regarding the control of an Irish orphanage, the Colegio Santa Brígida. One faction, the Irish Catholic Association (ICA), tried to take control of the organisation supporting the orphanage and, according to Bulfin, 'thereby constitute themselves leaders of the Irish in the Argentine'.¹²¹ A clique within the ICA gained control of it and 'drove all the decent element from power'.¹²² Although this resulted in alienating the majority of the Irish community, in

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ IE/UCDA/P150/729, *Bulfin to Dail Cabinet*, 18 Mar. 1920.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² *Ibid.*

Bulfin's words, 'no organisation or attempt at organisation is safe from their machinations'.¹²³

The antagonism and mistrust caused by this division goes so deep that the mere rumour of their connection with any movement is sufficient to cast a blight upon it however honest its aims. On the other hand any movement from which they would have to be excluded, to ensure even initial success, would be a challenge to them to disrupt it.¹²⁴

To make matters worse, the clique who caused the disruption were the most avowedly republican in outlook, so any organisation set up to aid the Irish Republic would be regarded by the majority as a manoeuvre by the disrupters.¹²⁵ This was the case with the *Circulo Irlandés*, which was set up to serve the same purpose as the FOIF in the US.¹²⁶ Unfortunately, in the eyes of many, the ICA was behind this organisation, and this was enough to deter the majority from joining.¹²⁷

One option was the Irish-Argentine White Cross, which had been founded in Buenos Aires in March 1921 with Msgr. Ussher as President, Rev. Fr. Tomas O'Grady as secretary, and Rev. Fr. Constantino Bermingham as treasurer.¹²⁸ By the time of Ginnell's reception at Sarmiento, it had raised AR\$50,753, mainly from small donations.¹²⁹ However, according to Bulfin, the collection was 'rottenly organised', 'with the result that not a third of the money that could be got will be collected'.¹³⁰ To complicate matters, both parties in the Irish-Argentine feud were involved in the collection.¹³¹ In the words of Bulfin, 'Fine it

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ IE/UCDA/P150/729, *Bulfin to Dail Cabinet*, 18 Mar. 1920.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ *Nación*, 8 Mar. 1921, p. 7.

¹²⁹ *Southern Cross*, 30 Sept. 1921, p. 13.

¹³⁰ TNA: FO/115/2673/389, *Bulfin to Collins*, 17 Mar. 1921 (captured during raid on 22 Mary's Street, Dublin, 26 May 1921).

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

is not'.¹³² Moreover, according to Bulfin, the White Cross in Argentina was in the control of the clergy so there was 'no chance of sequestering it for our purpose'.¹³³

Essentially, unlike the US, the Irish-Argentines lacked a unifying figure like Judge Cohalan, who could claim to be the undisputed leader of the Irish in that country. Although Cohalan turned out to be a rival to the Dáil in America, he did provide de Valera with a ready-made, consolidated sales network in the form of the FOIF, without which the bond drive would not have been possible. There was no such network in Argentina. Instead, Ginnell was presented with warring factions. While it is true that the FOIF's near-monopoly on Irish republican fundraising in America left de Valera in a weak bargaining position, it does not follow that the fragmentation of the Irish-Argentine community put Ginnell in the a position of strength. On the contrary, the lack of unity in Argentina made cooperation almost impossible.

Ginnell's solution to the Irish-Argentine infighting seems to have been to dilute the support base by including sympathisers from outside the Irish-Argentine community, and thus reduce his reliance on one or other of the factions. On 26 September 1921, Ginnell wrote to the Dáil's representative in Bolivia that 'Certain conditions here make it difficult and perhaps undesirable to start an organization here for the Irish only'.¹³⁴ Fortunately, support for Irish independence in Argentina was not confined to the Irish community there. A *Comité Argentino pro Libertad de Irlanda* had already been established, composed of non-Irish Argentines, mainly students and academics.¹³⁵ Although Ginnell viewed this organisation as 'nominal', he hoped to expand it, 'but that will be for Argentines only'.¹³⁶ Combining Irish-Argentines and Argentine supporters of Ireland, Ginnell planned to

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ NLI/Ms.49,810/7, *Ginnell to Nichols*, 26 Sept. 1921.

¹³⁵ Keogh, *La Independencia de Irlanda*, p. 319.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

establish an umbrella organisation called ‘The Irish Republican Association of the Argentine’, named in line with the Irish Republican Association of South Africa.¹³⁷

Launch

Finally, on 20 September 1921, Michael Collins authorised the launch of a bond drive in Argentina.¹³⁸ The target was £500,000.¹³⁹ Apart from the language and currency, the Argentine bond certificates were identical to those sold in the US, sold in denominations of AR\$10, AR\$25, AR\$50, AR\$100, AR\$1,000, and AR\$5,000 (Figure 11.1).¹⁴⁰ De Valera’s signature was printed alongside that of Eamon Bulfin.¹⁴¹ Collins refused Ginnell’s request for Garth Healy to be sent to Argentina, and instead directed him to appoint Eamon Bulfin as the registrar for the Argentine issue. He also gave Ginnell authority to hire the services of a ‘first class Banking Clerk in Argentine’.¹⁴² An Argentine named Gonzalez Revilla was hired as secretary, and the team was also joined by P.J. Little, whose ship had just arrived from Cape Town.¹⁴³ The centre of operations for the Argentine Loan was in the fashionable art nouveau *Galería Güemes* building on Buenos Aires’s Calle Florida.¹⁴⁴ Much like the US bond drive, although the Argentinian authorities kept the *Galeria* under observation, their interference with the Argentine bond drive seems to have been minimal.¹⁴⁵

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ IE/NAI/DE/2/281, *Collins to Ginnell*, 20 Sept. 1921.

¹³⁹ IE/BMH/WS0982, *M.A. Ginnell*, p. 36.

¹⁴⁰ IE/NAI/FIN 87/3/36, *Sample Argentine Loan bond certificates*.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² IE/NAI/DE/2/281, *Collins to Art O’Brien*, 9 Sept. 1921.

¹⁴³ IE/BMH/WS1769, *PJ Little*, p. 88.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

¹⁴⁵ Keogh, *Independencia*, p. 317.

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Figure 11.1. Argentine Loan: AR\$5,000 bond certificate.¹⁴⁶

Collins suggested the Argentine Loan be launched in November 1921, to coincide with the Second External Loan in America.¹⁴⁷ However, a greater urgency was necessitated by the annual exodus of wealthy Argentines at the end of October, when they left the capital in favour of health resorts around the country, making them practically uncontactable until March.¹⁴⁸ Unlike the US bond drives, which aimed at attracting many small donations, those wealthy Irish estate owners were the principal targets of the Argentine Loan.¹⁴⁹ As a result, the ‘big push’ in promoting the Argentine Loan was brought forward to October, which, together with November, was when the farmers sold their produce.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁶ IE/NAI/FIN/87/3/36

¹⁴⁷ IE/NAI/DE/2/281, *Ginnell to S. O'Mara*, 1 Sept. 1921.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ IE/BMH/WS1769, *P.J. Little*, p. 96.

¹⁵⁰ IE/NAI/DE/5/21, No. 109, *Précis of a report on Argentina by P.J. Little*, Buenos Aires, 4 Oct. 1921.

The first advertisement for the Argentinian bond issue appeared on page 15 of *La Prensa* on 1 October 1921 (Figure 11.2), despite a threat from Harrods Buenos Aires that they would withdraw their advertising from the publication if the bond drive advert went ahead.¹⁵¹ According to the advert, the bonds would be ‘sealed with the official stamp of the Irish Republic’.¹⁵² The advert instructed potential subscribers to deposit their subscriptions in the National Bank of Argentina in the name of the loan’s trustees.¹⁵³ This last point was raised by the British ambassador to Minister Puerrydon, who referred to matter to the Argentine Ministry of Finance and the police. The latter got in touch with the bank, which revealed that no account was held in the name of the *Gobierno de la República de Irlanda*.¹⁵⁴ Based on the Dáil’s practice in the US, it must have been held in the name of a trustee.

Another, more stylistic, advertisement appeared in *La Prensa* the following week (Figure 11.3), also listing the Argentine Loan’s eight trustees and a further 18 members of its ‘Argentine Consultative Council’. The Consultative Council contained no fewer than four members of the Argentine lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, namely Dr Juan J. Frugoni (Capital Federal), Dr Juan Tierney (San Juan), Dr Jose Leon Rodeyro (Capital Federal), and Juan A. O’Farrell (Buenos Aires).¹⁵⁵ With the exception of Tierney, who was a member of the *Concentración Cívica* party, all were members of the governing populist Radical Union. The advert also implored ‘Friends of Liberty’ in Buenos Aires and the capital province to establish councils for the promotion of the loan.¹⁵⁶

La Nación, characterised by Bulfin as an organ ‘mainly of British propaganda’, refused to carry the ad.¹⁵⁷ The same was true for newspapers across the country, according to Little, including the *Buenos Aires Herald*, even though some of the staff in these

¹⁵¹ IE/BMH/WS0982, *M.A. Ginnell*, p. 36.

¹⁵² *Prensa*, 1 Oct. 1921, p. 15/

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ Keogh, *La Independencia de Irlanda*, p. 317.

¹⁵⁵ *Prensa*, 14 Oct. 1921, p. 15.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ IE/UCDA/P150/729, *E. Bulfin to Dail Cabinet*, 18 Mar. 1920; IE/BMH/WS0982, *M.A. Ginnell*, p. 36.

newspapers sympathised with the cause.¹⁵⁸ Papers such as the *Southern Cross* and Juan Nelson's *Hiberno*, targeting the Irish community in Argentina, were the only ones that could be relied upon to publish anything positive about Ireland.¹⁵⁹ The *Southern Cross* published a large English-language advert for the loan every week from 7 October 1921 to 30 December 1921. With the exception of the Christmas issue, each of these adverts was printed on page 3, alongside news from Conradh na Gaeilge (e.g. Figure 11.4).¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ IE/NAI/DE/5/21, No. 109, *Précis of a report on Argentina by P.J. Little, Buenos Aires*, 4 Oct. 1921.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ *Southern Cross*, 7 Oct. – 30 Dec. 1921.

The image originally presented here cannot be made freely available via ORA because of copyright.

Figure 11.2. Press advertising for the Argentine Loan, 1 Oct. 1921.¹⁶¹

¹⁶¹ *La Prensa*, 1 Oct. 1921, p. 15.

The image originally presented here cannot be made freely available via ORA because of copyright.

Figure 11.3. Press advertising for the Argentine Loan, 14 Oct. 1921.¹⁶²

¹⁶² *La Prensa*, 14 Oct. 1921, p. 15.

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Figure 11.4. Press advertising for the Argentine Loan, 11 Nov. 1921.¹⁶³

¹⁶³ *Southern Cross*, 11 Nov. 1921, p. 3

The Ginnells' second trip out of Buenos Aires was to Rosario, the 'second city' of Argentina.¹⁶⁴ They arrived on 1 October 1921, and were welcomed at the railway station with a banner of the *Comité Argentino pro Libertad de Irlanda*.¹⁶⁵ They were well received by the local Irish-Argentine community and, on 2 October, a day of festivities was held in their honour.¹⁶⁶ The visit was covered in great detail by the *Southern Cross*, and even gained some column inches in *La Nación* and *Razon*, an influential evening paper.¹⁶⁷ Ginnell's party was escorted from the train station to the Hotel Italia by a guard of honour.¹⁶⁸ According to the *Southern Cross*, the procession was joined by hundreds of well-wishers, and 'The Irish flag was carried in triumph through the streets of Rosario'.¹⁶⁹ 'It was interesting and amazing to watch the faces of the people on the sidewalks and in the houses, wondering what on earth it was all about,' recalled Eamon Bulfin.¹⁷⁰ By the time the Ginnells reached their destination, several carriages and mounted police had joined the procession.¹⁷¹ A mass was held for Ireland the following morning and various activities were put on at the Irish-Argentine tennis club.¹⁷²

However, at this point a major threat to the Argentine Loan's success was laid bare: the economic influence of Britain. A tennis tournament was planned, but it had to be cancelled as the players who worked in English houses feared they would lose their jobs if they took part.¹⁷³ Irish employees of the British-owned railway companies were also

¹⁶⁴ *Southern Cross*, 7 Oct. 1921, p. 13.

¹⁶⁵ IE/BMH/WS1769, P.J. Little, p. 95.

¹⁶⁶ *Southern Cross*, 7 Oct. 1921, p. 13.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*; *Nación*, 4 Oct. 1921, p. 3; *Razon*, 3 Oct. 1921, p. 4; IE/UCDA/P150/729, E. Bulfin to Dail Cabinet, 18 Mar. 1920.

¹⁶⁸ *Southern Cross*, 7 Oct. 1921, p. 13.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ IE/BMH/WS0982, M.A. Ginnell, p. 37.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² *Southern Cross*, 7 Oct. 1921, p. 13.

¹⁷³ IE/BMH/WS0982, M.A. Ginnell, pp. 37-8.

conspicuous by their absence, and Bulfin suspected they were sent away ‘on business’ to prevent them attending.¹⁷⁴

More chariness was evident that evening, when the local Irish community held a banquet in the stylish ‘Cifre’ bar in Ginnell’s honour.¹⁷⁵ Decorated with the flags of Argentina and Ireland, the menu card listed such delicacies as ‘Flambres a la Pauric Pearse’, ‘Asado a la Dail Eireann’, Filet Pejerrey a la 1916’ and, in recognition of Ginnell’s home constituency, ‘Crema a la Mullingar’.¹⁷⁶ Among the 100 attendees were the Vice Governor of Santa Fe province, the mayor of Rosario, the secretary of the chief of police, two provincial senators, two provincial deputies, several doctors of medicine and law, and five priests.¹⁷⁷ Little set out ‘in clear words’ the plan of action for the bond drive, stressing the need for Irish-Argentine unity and suggesting the formation of local committees across the country.¹⁷⁸ Ginnell then took to the stage. Reading his speech in Spanish, he explained that the bonds could be repaid in a matter of months, based on the tax revenue currently ‘being taken from Ireland to England’.¹⁷⁹ According to Bulfin, the Vice Governor showed visible signs of unease when he realised how official the banquet was.¹⁸⁰ The banquet was followed by a dance, but the Vice Governor and other officials left immediately after Ginnell’s speech.¹⁸¹ In Bulfin’s opinion, this was ‘so that they would not have to speak’.¹⁸²

Back in Buenos Aires, Ginnell’s plan to stimulate activity among the non-Irish Argentines was not going so well. A banquet was organised by Guillermo Lasserre of the *Comité Argentino pro Libertad de Irlanda* on 5 October 1921.¹⁸³ A number of high-profile

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ *Razon*, 3 Oct. 1921, p. 4.

¹⁷⁶ *Southern Cross*, 7 Oct. 1921, p. 13.

¹⁷⁷ IE/BMH/WS0982, *M.A. Ginnell*, p.38; *Southern Cross*, 7 Oct. 1921, pp. 13-4.

¹⁷⁸ *Southern Cross*, 7 Oct. 1921, p. 13.

¹⁷⁹ IE/BMH/WS0982, *M.A. Ginnell*, p. 38; *Southern Cross*, 7 Oct. 1921, p. 13.

¹⁸⁰ IE/BMH/WS0982, *M.A. Ginnell*, p. 38.

¹⁸¹ *Razon*, 3 Oct. 1921, p.4; IE/BMH/WS0982, *M.A. Ginnell*, p. 38.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*; *Ibid.*

¹⁸³ IE/UCDA/P28/4, *Little’s notes from interview with Prof. Kelly*, 6 Oct. 1921.

guests were in attendance, including Jaime Soler O'Connor, President of the Chamber of Deputies of Bolivia, and Oscar Ruis Villneos, the delegate for Rosario.¹⁸⁴ Nevertheless, the banquet was a failure, according to Little.¹⁸⁵ In all, there were only 28 people present and Lasserre was very 'vexed' that night, according to Bulfin.¹⁸⁶ Laurence and Alice Ginnell received their invitation at short notice and considered not going.¹⁸⁷ When the Dáil mission's secretary, Revilla, tried to enter he was turned away.¹⁸⁸ The banquet was also attended by the official representatives of the Basque, Catalan and Galician nations in Buenos Aires, something that risked alienating the largely Castilian Argentine population.¹⁸⁹

The failure of the banquet was perhaps a consequence of an on-going quarrel within the Comité. Lasserre was embroiled in a bitter dispute between the Comité's President Comandante Juan A. Thorne, and another prominent member, Dr Julio A. Quesada. By bringing the non-Irish Argentines into the fold, Ginnell had inadvertently stumbled into another feud. The root cause of this feud is not clear, but it was certainly deeply felt. Back in August 1921 Thorne advised Lasserre to carry a revolver, as Quesada 'was going to shoot him'.¹⁹⁰ Around the same time, the Irish mission received a letter warning them not to work with Lasserre.¹⁹¹

On 6 October 1921 Little sought the advice of Prof Kelly, a 'young, active' Irish-Argentine, who told him Quesada was more important than Thorne or Francisco J. O'Iden (another prominent Comité member). He advised Little to 'get back Quesada' and 'charge against Lasserre'.¹⁹² More gloomily, Msgr. Ussher advised Little that there was 'not much hope from Argentines,' and from the Irish 'not a lot'. As President of the Argentine Irish

¹⁸⁴ *Prensa*, 6 Oct. 1921, p. 11.

¹⁸⁵ IE/UCDA/P28/4, *Little's notes from interview with Prof. Kelly*, 6 Oct. 1921.

¹⁸⁶ IE/BMH/WS0982, *M.A. Ginnell*, p. 39.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁹ *Southern Cross*, 7 Oct. 1921, p. 14.

¹⁹⁰ IE/BMH/WS0982, *M.A. Ginnell*, p. 34.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹² IE/UCDA/P28/4, *Little's notes, interview with Prof. Kelly*, 6 Oct. 1921.

White Cross, Ussher's words carried weight.¹⁹³ Little's notes summarise 'if get £50,000 in total, good. Less than half that, well done'.¹⁹⁴ In his October report to the Dáil, he predicted that no more than £10,000 or £15,000 would be raised.¹⁹⁵ At the root of Little's pessimism was the absence of effective organisation among the Irish in Argentina and the animosities within the Irish-Argentine community.¹⁹⁶

Teatro Coliseo

The Argentinian bond issue was publically launched on 29 October 1921, at a meeting in the palatial Teatro Coliseo.¹⁹⁷ Evoking memories of Daniel O'Connell, the *Southern Cross* ran the headline 'Monster Irish Meeting'.¹⁹⁸ This was to be the grand opening of the Argentine Loan, reminiscent of the US bond drive's Lexington Theater rally. However, unlike the Lexington rally, the Teatro Coliseo event was plagued with setbacks.

Even before the event, the cracks in organisation began to show. 'Every possible obstacle that could have been raised was raised' at a meeting of the bond trustees and executive council on 19 October 1921.¹⁹⁹ Then, a prominent Irish-Argentine named Bohen called to the Dáil's office on 27 October 1921, complaining that the trustees had not been adequately consulted.²⁰⁰ Ominously, Bohen warned the Dáil mission that some of his colleagues were planning on breaking away.²⁰¹ Alice Ginnell shared these complaints with

¹⁹³ *Nación*, 8 Mar. 1921, p. 7.

¹⁹⁴ IE/UCDA/P28/4, *Little's notes, interview with Monsignor Ussher*, 6 Oct. 1921.

¹⁹⁵ IE/NAI/DE/5/21, No. 109, *Précis of a report on Argentina by P.J. Little, Buenos Aires*, 4 Oct. 1921.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ IE/BMH/WS1769, *P.J. Little*, p. 41.

¹⁹⁸ *Southern Cross*, 21 Oct. 1921, p. 13.

¹⁹⁹ IE/BMH/WS0982, *M.A. Ginnell*, p. 40.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

Nelson that evening. He said he would ‘try to put things plainly to them,’ but it wasn’t long before Nelson himself became alienated from the bond drive.²⁰²

To catch the public’s attention a large banner was hung across one of the main streets of Buenos Aires, with a list of Irish who helped Argentina in one column and a list of historical wrongs committed by the British to Argentina in the other.²⁰³ This proved to be a big mistake. The wealthy Irish-Argentines were, according to Little, ‘extremely conservative and with pro-British tendencies, for serious economic reasons’.²⁰⁴ The slump in the cattle market in the autumn of 1921 would only have heightened this sensitivity.²⁰⁵ Moreover, as noted by Little, the wealthy Irish-Argentines were easily ‘offended by statements of a very democratic nature’.²⁰⁶ This was against the backdrop of considerable industrial unrest and, on the morning of the rally, Nelson called Little and associates into his office to protest at what he saw as ‘socialist propaganda’.²⁰⁷ Registering his disapproval, he refused to chair the Teatro Coliseo event.²⁰⁸ Messrs Dowling and Moore also refused to take to the platform, and the alleged socialist undertones of the banner led a Father Flannery to return his booking at the last minute.²⁰⁹

The decision to book the enormous Teatro Coliseo also proved to be a mistake. The event was described as ‘lively and cordial’ by *Razon*, with performances of the Argentine and Irish national anthems generating the greatest animation from the audience.²¹⁰ But the audience was not large enough to fill the Coliseo and, as noted by the

²⁰² IE/BMH/WS0982, *M.A. Ginnell*, p. 41.

²⁰³ IE/BMH/WS1769, *P.J. Little*, pp. 105-6.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

²⁰⁵ IE/NAI/DE/5/21, No. 109, *Précis of a report on Argentina by P.J. Little*, Buenos Aires, 4 Oct. 1921; D. Rock, ‘From the First World War to independence’, p. 158, in L. Bethell (ed.) *Argentina since independence* (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 139-72.

²⁰⁶ IE/BMH/WS/1769, *P.J. Little*, p. 96.

²⁰⁷ L.M. Caterina, *La liga patriótica Argentina: Un grupo de presión frente a las convulsiones sociales de la década del veinte* (Buenos Aires, 1995); IE/BMH/WS1769, *P.J. Little*, p. 106.

²⁰⁸ IE/BMH/WS1769, *P.J. Little*, p. 106.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

²¹⁰ *Razon*, 28 Oct. 1921, p. 10.

Southern Cross, ‘seemed small to the unpractised eye’.²¹¹ Little took Nelson’s place as chairman, and the speakers were Laurence Ginnell (first in Spanish then in English), Dr Quesada, and Guillermo O’Sullivan, a poet who would later become a national deputy for the Radical Party.²¹² Little reported ‘considerable difficulty’ with Quesada, but was deeply impressed by O’Sullivan: ‘He came, dressed in immaculate evening dress, and, when he spoke, he was able to raise the audience to a pitch of enthusiasm, quite beyond the capacity of any Irish orator.’²¹³ Of course factionalism was not far from the surface. When Little suggested forming a new organisation, this was strongly resisted by the five representatives of the *Círculo Irlandés*, who claimed any new organisation would be a challenge to them and that it was up to everyone else to join the *Círculo*.²¹⁴

Despite these setbacks, there was a broad consensus that the event went reasonably well.²¹⁵ Bohen, Dowling and Moore were all present, despite their objections, as was Nelson, although he arrived late.²¹⁶ To close, Oliden read a resolution:

...in view of the fact that the people of the United States of America subscribed the first Irish Loan two years ago, since have largely contributed towards relief and reconstruction, and are now about to raise a second loan, and recognising the Irish Government Loan placed in Argentina is necessary and urgent, we offer the best help in our respective districts in order that it may be an immediate success.²¹⁷

Oliden’s words, however, proved hollow. Just two days later, he wrote to the Dáil mission and returned his receipt book. It seems he had become embroiled in the on-going feud between Thorne and Quesada and had taken a position against the former.²¹⁸ Incidents such as this made it more and more clear that the Dáil’s non-Irish Argentine supporters were more trouble than they were worth. According to Little, they ‘were out for their own

²¹¹ *Southern Cross*, 11 Nov. 1921, p. 13.

²¹² IE/BMH/WS1769, *P.J. Little*, pp. 41-2.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*

²¹⁷ *Southern Cross*, 4 Nov. 1921, p. 13.

²¹⁸ IE/BMH/WS0982, *M.A. Ginnell*, p. 42.

interests, and only caused trouble'.²¹⁹ He urged Ginnell to cease cooperation with the non-Irish Argentines and concentrate purely on Argentines of Irish blood.²²⁰ Writing to Robert Brennan, he lamented, 'After painful experience of non-Irish Argentines who posed as our friends and were mostly out to make what they could out of us, we concentrated on working up feeling amongst the Irish'.²²¹

This new strategy was showcased at the next big rally: the First Convention of the Irish Race in the Argentine, which took place on 29 November 1921 in the Irish Girls' Home.²²² A Standing Committee was formed for the new organisation, consisting of the trustees and Irish members of the Consultative Council, Dáil mission to Argentina, Frs. Victor Carolan and Ephraim O'Connell, Messrs Grehan and Kelly, Mrs Walsh, Mrs Moore, Mrs Bohen, Mrs Mulvihill and Miss O'Doherty.²²³ Representatives were sent from some 50 institutions, including colleges, convents, clubs and associations.²²⁴ Quesada, O'Iden, Thorne and Lasserre were all notable by their absence from the list of delegates.²²⁵ Juan Nelson was also absent, but this was for medical reasons and he telegraphed his best wishes and apologies.²²⁶ As for the loan, it was planned that an organiser would travel around Argentina organising it while at the same time the new federation's executive established new branches across the country.²²⁷ William Morgan, who presided, bought a AR\$500 bond to get the campaign going.²²⁸ 'The meeting on the whole was a great success' according to Little, 'though no one knew anything about organization'.²²⁹

²¹⁹ IE/BMH/WS1769, *P.J. Little*, p. 109.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

²²¹ IE/NAI/DFA/ES Bx. 32 File 216(4), *Little to Brennan*, 4 Dec. 1921.

²²² IE/BMH/WS1769, *P.J. Little*, p. 100.

²²³ *Ibid.*

²²⁴ IE/NAI/DFA/ES Bx. 32 File 216(4), *Little to Brennan*, 4 Dec. 1921.

²²⁵ *Southern Cross*, 2 Dec. 1921, p. 15.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

²²⁷ IE/NAI/DFA/ES Bx. 32 File 216(4), *Little to Brennan*, 4 Dec. 1921.

²²⁸ IE/BMH/WS1769, *P.J. Little*, p. 100.

²²⁹ IE/NAI/DFA/ES Bx. 32 File 216(4), *Little to Brennan*, 4 Dec. 1921.

The new Standing Committee met for the first time on 1 December, but fortune was not on its side.²³⁰ The following day, Bulfin recorded in his diary that Laurence Ginnell was ‘not at all well,’ and on 3 December he and Alice left for San Antonio de Areco ‘for a rest’.²³¹ Around the same time, news was filtering through about the terms of the Anglo-Treaty being negotiated between the Dáil and the British Government.²³² Much like the Second External Loan in the US, the Argentine Loan was overtaken by events in London. When news of the Treaty spread to Argentina, according to Ginnell, ‘no Irish Republican Bond could be sold’.²³³ The Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed on 6 December 1921, and the Argentine Loan was terminated shortly thereafter, killed in its infancy.²³⁴

After an earlier meeting was abandoned for want of a quorum, the loan’s trustees met on 3 February 1922 to discuss the loan’s closure.²³⁵ There were only 20 subscribers to the Argentine Loan, raising a total of just AR\$19,155 (\$14,328).²³⁶ As AR\$11,280 was incurred in expenses, the net proceeds of the loan were just AR\$7,875 (\$5,890).²³⁷ The largest single subscription was AR\$6,750 from the Passionist Fathers of Capitán Sarmiento, presumably the proceeds of their charity auction.²³⁸ The largest personal subscription, for AR\$3,000, came from Señora Margarita Mooney de Morgan, a prolific philanthropist focussed mainly on causes related to the Catholic Church.²³⁹ Juan Nelson subscribed AR\$1,000, as did Juan Lalor, Patricio L. Moore, Tomas P. Moore, Patricio Dowling and Miguel Dowling.²⁴⁰ Expressing their thanks to the 20 subscribers, the trustees decided that

²³⁰ IE/BMH/WS1769, P.J. Little, pp. 100-1.

²³¹ *Ibid.*

²³² *Ibid.*, p. 101.

²³³ Ginnell to Gavan Duffy, 4 Mar. 1922, cited in C. Barry, ‘The First Irish Race Congress in South America’, *Irish migration studies in Latin America*, 2/2 (2004).

²³⁴ IE/NAI/FIN 87/3/36, E. Bulfin to J.J. McElligott, 29 Sept. 1937.

²³⁵ IE/NAI/FIN 87/3/36, *Hiberno-Argentine Review*, 10 Feb. 1922 (press report of Meeting of Trustees, 27 Jan. 1922).

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, Conversion based on 0.748 peso-dollar exchange rate (Dec. 1921), *Statistical abstract of the United States*, 1923, p. 661.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

²³⁸ IE/NAI/FIN 87/3/36, Bulfin to J.J. McElligott, 29 Sept. 1937.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*; Coghlan, *Los Irlandeses*, p. 680.

²⁴⁰ IE/NAI/FIN 87/3/36, Bulfin to J.J. McElligott, 29 Sept. 1937.

the loan's expenses should be paid out of the proceeds and that the balance should stay in Argentina and be put towards the new federation of Irish in that country.²⁴¹

The Dáil's fundraising attempts outside the US and Ireland were clearly less than successful. However, the very fact that they were countenanced reveals the international ambitions of this government in waiting. Indeed, more than the money, the main benefit of these efforts was the raising of awareness and marshalling of international opinion. The challenges faced by the Dáil's fundraisers appealing to diaspora communities outside the US were particular to each case, but the dynamics of diaspora finance held true: ordinarily the bargaining power of the Dáil should have increased as the fragmentation of the diaspora community increased, but only if there was sufficient demand for Irish nationalism. Lacking the high level of demand that was characteristic of the Irish diaspora in America, the Irish in other countries were weak and fragmented, and proved resistant to stimulus from the Dáil's representatives.

²⁴¹ IE/NAI/FIN 87/3/36, *Hiberno-Argentine Review*, 10 Feb. 1922 (press report of Meeting of Trustees, 27 Jan. 1922).

Conclusion

This thesis has sought to make three contributions to the historiography of the Irish War of Independence. First, it has investigated the financing of the Dáil government. Second, it has internationalised the historiography of the Irish War of Independence, including the Irish diaspora in the USA, Argentina, and to a lesser extent the British dominions. Third, it has explored the identities of those men and women who financed the Dáil, yielding fresh insights into the nature of popular support for Irish independence.

In so doing, this thesis has laid the groundwork for further research. While it has explored the financing of the Dáil during the war of independence, more research is needed on the financing of the republican movement more generally. This could include locally organised fundraising such as the IRA's arms fund levy (1921), and charitable fundraising such as the Irish White Cross and Acomri (1921). Although touched upon in this thesis, they merit further study in their own right. A logical sequel to this thesis could be an exploration of fundraising in the Irish Civil War (1922-3). This has been covered in some detail in Francis Carroll's *Money for Ireland*, but recently released source material provides scope for elaboration. This thesis also lays the foundation for comparative study with other political fundraising campaigns. In particular, the sale of bonds by unrecognised states to diaspora communities is a rich seam for further research. Louis Kossuth's 'Hungary Bonds' (1852), the National Loan of Gottfried Kinkel (1852), the bond issues of the Fenian brotherhood (1866), the Lithuanian Republic's liberty loan (1920-23), and Marcus Garvey's Liberia Liberty Loan (1920-21) all fall into this category.

The funds raised by the National Loan and External Loans were crucial in determining the outcome of the Irish War of Independence. As Free State Finance Minister Ernest Blythe remarked in 1923, when proposing their repayment with interest, 'If it had not been for the generosity and the faith of the people who subscribed to the

Loan there would be no Free State to-day'. This thesis has made a significant contribution to recording their sacrifice and ensuring their place in the historiography.

Appendices

Appendix A: Nationwide results of the National Loan, by constituency

Tab. A.1. Amounts raised for the National Loan at constituency level, Leinster.¹

<i>Constituency</i>	<i>£.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>	<i>£, per 10,000 inhabitants</i>
Carlow	3,383	5	0	959.71
Dublin Clontarf	2,204	10	0	687.81
Dublin College Green	2,101	5	0	414.73
Dublin Harbour	1,058	15	0	223.08
Dublin Pembroke	2,580	0	0	674.97
Dublin Rathmines	1,235	0	0	285.37
Dublin St James's	1,455	0	0	410.75
Dublin St Michan's	2,781	15	0	611.37
Dublin St Patrick's	2,161	10	0	453.23
Dublin St Stephen's	2,322	10	0	504.77
Dublin North County	1,370	5	0	277.69
Dublin South County	2,125	10	0	511.58
Kildare North	2,381	10	0	777.51
Kildare South	3,445	0	0	957.02
Kilkenny North	2,912	0	0	765.83
Kilkenny South	5,281	10	0	1,429.83
Longford County	5,802	0	0	1,324.05
Louth County	2,575	5	0	404.50
Meath North	1,902	4	0	575.83
Meath South	2,262	0	0	705.62
Offaly County (King's)	9,198	1	6	1,618.47
Leix & Ossory County (Laois/ Queen's)	10,030	12	6	1,803.16
Westmeath County	4,660	0	0	827.33
Wexford North	3,280	10	0	647.17
Wexford South	4,457	0	0	864.04
Wicklow East	819	4	6	236.98
Wicklow West	3,713	0	0	1,420.37
TOTAL	87,499	2	6	1,691.31

¹ IE/BMH/CD/184/4, *Net amounts received at head office as of 14 Sept. 1920, corrected to 27 Sept. 1920*; 1911 Census of Ireland

Tab. A.2. Amounts raised for the National Loan at constituency level, Ulster.²

<i>Constituency</i>	<i>£.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>	<i>£, per 10,000 inhabitants</i>
Antrim Belfast	2,355	6	6	60.87
Antrim East & North	196	0	0	20.17
Antrim Mid	162	0	0	36.48
Antrim South	427	0	0	NA
Armagh Mid	527	10	0	133.56
Armagh North	322	10	0	70.04
Armagh South	1,665	0	0	479.16
Cavan East	4,227	4	8	956.06
Cavan West	3,211	5	0	683.86
Derry (Londonderry) City	1,376	0	0	337.42
Derry (Londonderry) North	772	10	0	145.87
Derry (Londonderry) South	713	0	0	152.06
Donegal East	1,032	0	0	260.32
Donegal North	855	0	0	208.21
Donegal South	1,333	10	0	321.37
Donegal West	673	0	0	145.23
Down East & Mid	2,672	0	0	333.05
Down South	1,845	10	0	423.49
Down West	199	0	0	47.63
Fermanagh North	1,768	0	0	568.42
Fermanagh South	1,458	0	0	474.42
Monaghan North	2,457	18	0	673.18
Monaghan South	5,705	0	0	1,632.66
Tyrone North East	2,307	10	0	487.25
Tyrone North West	1,466	10	0	310.44
Tyrone South	1,561	0	0	324.76
TOTAL	41,319	4	2	593.18

² *Ibid.*

Tab. A.3. Amounts raised for the National Loan at constituency level, Connaught.³

<i>Constituency</i>	<i>£</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>	<i>£, per 10,000 inhabitants</i>
Galway Connemara	1,564	13	4	279.14
Galway East	4,388	0	0	1,064.14
Galway North	5,019	5	0	1,130.72
Galway South	3,295	10	0	812.80
Leitrim County	5,087	7	2	800.13
Mayo East	5,613	10	0	1,201.29
Mayo North	4,021	5	0	840.32
Mayo South	7,057	0	0	1,441.29
Mayo West	5,073	0	0	992.41
Roscommon North	4,606	0	0	1,033.99
Roscommon South	4,667	0	0	986.64
Sligo North	3,675	0	0	862.78
Sligo South	3,709	9	6	933.65
TOTAL	57,977	0	0	2,029.52

³ *Ibid.*


Tab. A.4. Amounts raised for the National Loan at constituency level, Munster.⁴

<i>Constituency</i>	<i>£.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>	<i>£, per 10,000 inhabitants</i>
Clare East	13,816	14	6	2,645.62
Clare West	7,713	0	0	1,483.07
Cork City	12,067	0	0	1,178.02
Cork East	6,534	15	0	1,510.44
Cork Mid	7,237	2	6	1,755.48
Cork North	6,497	0	0	1,519.98
Cork North East	3,787	10	0	855.51
Cork South	4,876	15	10	1,252.35
Cork South East	2,086	0	0	526.32
Cork West	4,350	0	0	1,098.82
Kerry East	5,154	10	0	1,301.61
Kerry North	9,229	0	0	2,443.02
Kerry South	3,104	2	0	801.26
Kerry West	8,571	15	10	1,967.23
Limerick City	5,991	0	0	1,268.04
Limerick East	32,285	0	0	6,794.84
Limerick West	17,385	0	0	3,598.71
Tipperary East	4,864	10	0	1,174.60
Tipperary Mid	2,961	6	6	773.31
Tipperary North	4,377	0	0	1,195.64
Tipperary South	4,458	0	0	1,234.32
Waterford City	636	5	0	216.91
Waterford County	4,550	0	0	832.81
TOTAL	172,533	6	4	3,753.65

⁴ *Ibid.*


Appendix B: Larger maps, for chapter 4

Fig. B.1. Large map of South Monaghan: Subscribers to the National Loan per 100 inhabitants.¹




¹ OSI, *General map of Ireland, 1:253,440* (Dublin, 1917); IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL register*; 1911 Census of Ireland. Number of subscribers per 100 inhabitants at District Electoral Division level.

Fig. B.2. Large map of South Monaghan: Amount subscribed to the National Loan per 100 inhabitants.²




² *Ibid.* Amount subscribed per 100 inhabitants at District Electoral Division level.

Fig. B.3. Large map of Longford: Subscribers to the National Loan per 100 inhabitants.³




Subscribers per 100 inhabitants



³ OSI, *General map of Ireland, 1:253,440* (Dublin, 1917); IE/MNR/2/A, *East Tipperary NL Register, 1911 Census of Ireland*. Number of subscribers per 100 inhabitants at District Electoral Division level.

Fig. B.4. Large map of Longford: Amount subscribed to the National Loan per 100 inhabitants.⁴



Amount subscribed per 100 inhabitants

£0.00 - £5.38	£9.18 - £13.24	£20.60 - £30.58
£5.39 - £9.17	£13.25 - £20.59	


⁴ *Ibid.* Amount subscribed per 100 inhabitants at District Electoral Division level.

Fig. B.5. Large map of East Tipperary: Subscribers to the National Loan per 100 inhabitants.⁵



⁵ OSI, *General map of Ireland, 1:253,440* (Dublin, 1917); IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL Register*; 1911 Census of Ireland. Number of subscribers per 100 inhabitants at District Electoral Division level.

Fig. B.6. Large map of East Tipperary: Amount subscribed to the National Loan per 100 inhabitants.⁶



Amount subscribed per 100 inhabitants

	£0.12 - £3.09		£7.17 - £13.32		£21.29 - £43.31
	£3.10 - £7.16		£13.33 - £21.28		

⁶ *Ibid.* Amount subscribed per 100 inhabitants at District Electoral Division level.

Appendix C: Probit regressions, for chapter 4

Tab. C.1. The effect of occupation on likelihood of subscribing to the National Loan (probit)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	Whether subscribed to the National Loan (Yes, No)						
	ALL (1)	ALL (2)	ALL (3)	South Monaghan (4)	Co. Longford (5)	East Tipperary (6)	Doneraile (7)
RC Priest	0.843*** (0.142)	0.841*** (0.142)	0.766*** (0.134)	0.666* (0.379)	1.060*** (0.213)	0.881*** (0.245)	-3.235 (89.425)
Shopkeeper	0.427*** (0.053)	0.427*** (0.053)	0.402*** (0.049)	0.191 (0.120)	0.421*** (0.093)	0.560*** (0.079)	0.194 (0.262)
Publican	0.602*** (0.092)	0.604*** (0.092)	0.548*** (0.086)	0.408* (0.209)	1.000*** (0.153)	0.367** (0.157)	0.741* (0.394)
Merchant	0.362*** (0.081)	0.361*** (0.081)	0.323*** (0.074)	0.399*** (0.147)	0.316* (0.162)	0.294** (0.134)	0.673* (0.393)
Craftsman	0.143*** (0.049)	0.142*** (0.049)	0.125*** (0.046)	-0.115 (0.108)	0.209** (0.087)	0.234*** (0.077)	0.044 (0.222)
Teacher	0.518*** (0.103)	0.516*** (0.103)	0.606*** (0.097)	-0.025 (0.228)	0.754*** (0.146)	0.451** (0.219)	0.740 (0.575)
Farmer, Grazier	0.448*** (0.033)	0.447*** (0.033)	0.631*** (0.026)	0.150** (0.065)	0.493*** (0.051)	0.553*** (0.065)	0.727*** (0.129)
Agri. Labourer	-0.284*** (0.047)	-0.281*** (0.047)	-0.159*** (0.041)	-0.583*** (0.100)	-0.177** (0.069)	-0.479*** (0.111)	0.350** (0.176)
Professional	0.210* (0.110)	0.209* (0.110)	0.091 (0.104)	-3.884 (34.446)	0.221 (0.203)	0.422*** (0.138)	0.108 (0.493)
Domestic	-0.084 (0.084)	-0.084 (0.084)	-0.128 (0.079)	-0.371** (0.177)	-0.439* (0.244)	-0.019 (0.119)	0.506** (0.240)
Constant	-4.389*** (0.166)	-4.389*** (0.166)	-4.277*** (0.068)	-4.242*** (0.159)	-4.391*** (0.189)	-4.555*** (0.349)	-4.327*** (0.339)
Religion	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Gender	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Age	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Age squared	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
District FE	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constituency FE	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Observations	127,242	127,242	127,242	31,142	43,745	46,068	6,287
Log Likelihood	-10,762.570	-10,765.140	-11,834.240	-2,817.603	-5,178.839	-2,241.158	-356.393
Akaike Inf. Crit.	21,841.150	21,844.290	23,698.480	5,733.206	10,495.680	4,602.316	756.787
Method of est.	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit

Notes and sources

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL register*; IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL register*; IE/MNR/2/A, *East Tipperary NL register*; IE/CCCA/PR6/70/2/180, *Doneraile NL receipts*; 1911 Census of Ireland

Tab. C.2. The effect of having subscribed to previous nationalist funds on likelihood of subscribing to the National Loan.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Whether subscribed to the National Loan (Yes, No) (a)			
	Home Rule Fund (b)	INAAVDF (c)	HRF and INAAVDF (d)	Anti-Conscription Fund (e)
Home Rule Fund (HRF), 1913	0.472*** (0.081)			
INAAVDF, 1916		0.960*** (0.145)		
Both HRF and INAAVDF			0.503* (0.298)	
Anti-Conscription Fund, 1918				1.668*** (0.119)
Constant	-4.204*** (0.222)	-4.096*** (0.242)	3.360 (1,568.512)	-7.724 (131.019)
Religion	YES	YES	YES	YES
Gender	YES	YES	YES	YES
Age	YES	YES	YES	YES
Age squared	YES	YES	YES	YES
HISCAM	YES	YES	YES	YES
District FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	20,885	12,337	9,072	3,510
Log Likelihood	-2,412.530	-1,213.378	-777.318	-389.968
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,895.059	2,468.757	1,588.636	811.937
Method of est.	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit

Notes and sources

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

- (a) IE/UCDA/P117/68, *South Monaghan NL register*, IE/MNR/1, *Longford NL Register*, 1911 Census of Ireland.
- (b) Refers to the following districts in Co. Longford: Abbeylara, Aghaboy, Ardagh East, Ballymuigh, Breanrisk, Bunlahy, Caldragh, Cashel East, Cloondara, Cloonee, Coolamber, Corboy, Creevy, Crosagstown, Dalystown, Drumlish, Edgeworthstown, Firry, Granard Rural, Granard Urban, Kilcommock, Killow, Knockanbaun, Ledwithstown, Longford Urban, Longford Rural, Moatfarrell, and Newgrove. *Longford Leader*, 26 Jul. 1913, p.1; *Longford Leader*, 27 Dec. 1913, p.6; *Longford Leader*, 6 Dec. 1913, p.1.
- (c) Refers to the following districts in Co. Longford: Ardagh West, Bunlahy, Caldragh, Cloonee, Coolamber, Corboy, Dalystown, Foxhall, Gelshagh, Granard Rural, Granard Urban, Longford Rural, Longford Urban, and Mullanaghta. *Longford Leader*, 5 Aug. 1916, p. 1.
- (d) Refers to the following districts in Co. Longford: Bunlahy, Caldragh, Cloonee, Coolamber, Corboy, Dalystown, Granard Rural, Granard Urban, Longford Rural, Longford Urban. *Longford Leader*, 26 Jul. 1913, p. 1; *Longford Leader*, 27 Dec. 1913, p. 6; *Longford Leader*, 6 Dec. 1913, p. 1; *Longford Leader*, 5 Aug. 1916, p. 1.
- (e) Refers to the following districts in South Monaghan: Caddagh, Carrickaslane, Carrickatee, Castleblayney Rural, Castleblayney Urban, Church Hill, Clontibret, Inniskeen, and Mullyash. NLI/Ms.3,110, *Notes of Vincent McGaban*, 20 Jan. 1943.

Appendix D: Nationwide results of the First External Loan, by US State

Tab. D.1. Amounts raised for the First External Loan, at US state level.¹

<i>US State</i>	<i>Amount raised /\$</i>	<i>US State</i>	<i>Amount raised /\$</i>
Alaska	0	Nebraska	41,939
Alabama	14,650	Nevada	6,853
Arizona	14,078	New Hampshire	70,969
Arkansas	0	New Jersey	297,218
Bolivia	1,300	New Mexico	360
California	385,101	New York	1,351,775
Colorado	29,506	North Carolina	2,175
Connecticut	103,625	North Dakota	2,813
Delaware	23,483	Ohio	144,471
Florida	1,275	Oklahoma	745
Georgia	0	Oregon	62,260
Hawaii	0	Panama Canal Zone	4,125
Idaho	175	Pennsylvania	530,840
Illinois	382,029	Rhode Island	118,065
Indiana	28,350	South Carolina	0
Iowa	24,520	South Dakota	0
Kansas	14,735	Tennessee	50
Kentucky	10,840	Texas	16,168
Louisiana	8,665	Utah	485
Maine	44,412	Vermont	4,653
Maryland	14,677	Virginia	3,475
Massachusetts	1,037,218	Washington	33,805
Michigan	8,967	Washington DC	47,284
Minnesota	113,112	West Virginia	915
Mississippi	0	Wisconsin	68,424
Missouri	57,474	Wyoming	11,030
Montana	74,636		

¹ IE/NAI/FIN1/2166/643, *Price Waterhouse audit of D  US funds*, 23 Feb. 1923.

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