THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

IN IRAQ

by

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THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN IRAQ.

I. Tribal Policy.

The first part of the thesis is concerned with questions arising from the dual society of "tribesmen and Townsmen,"- as the distinction is often briefly but inaccurately described. Nearly two thirds of the rural population and more than half of the total population may be regarded as having their social centre of gravity still in some form or other of tribal organization.

1. British policy towards the tribes, as it shaped at first after the occupation of the country during the last war, stood in contradiction to the axiom which had been common to all the changing patterns of Turkish tribal policy. Far from being intent on destroying tribalism, it favoured its preservation. But the experiment in indirect administration of tribal areas came to an end in 1920. In some districts conditions forbade its introduction, in others its introduction courted failure.

With the establishment of the provisional Arab Government the emphasis shifted back towards the bureaucratic administration of tribal areas. With the assistance of

the British Royal Air Force, the establishment of direct administration in the outlying districts proceeded steadily. After the release from the Mandate, the Iraqi army proved its ability to act efficiently in face of serious tribal opposition.

The ascendancy of the central Government faces tribalism with difficult problems of re-adjustment.

2. While in the case of the settled tribes only the form of social organization is considered outmoded, it is claimed that the basis of the economic as well as the social justification of nomadism has been withdrawn. Because of the revolutionary changes which have taken place in the desert, the bedouin, it is maintained, has been placed in the dilemma of either finally degenerating or of changing from a nomadic to a settled agricultural life before it is too late.

The irretrievable nature of the dislocation of bedouin economics, caused by the liquidation of their quasi autonomous status, can however be exaggerated. The items on the debit side, which include the loss of the traditional income for "services" and a gradual decline of the camel-breeding industry, ought to be more than offset by the

rising demand for sheep and goats, wool and skins, as well as by the new facilities for trade, transport, and the obtaining of veterinary services which pacification of the desert and improved communications are beginning to provide. The new possibilities have, however, not yet, or only insufficiently, been exploited.

The crisis of the Iraqi nomads is, inasmuch as it is caused by the same factors which affect the sedentary tribesmen, only a part of the general crisis of tribal society. Its causes are social to no lesser degree than economic in origin, even though economic disorder may be the most obvious symptom.

It has lately been more widely recognized that a nomad policy has to be firmly placed on both legs. Encouragement and assistance of the nomadic pastoral industry on the one hand and settlement on the land on the other have to be applied according to which alternative in any specific case offers better employment of the country's resources. Both policies require active Government intervention.

3. It is possible to isolate some phenomena of the complex process of tribal disintegration. The great tribal confederations have become functionless in the new

setting . The reduction of the tribe to the size of the effective agricultural unit completed the transformation of tribalism from a political order into an agrarian system. The integration of the tribe into the State and the narrowing of the gulf between town and tribe are proceeding, ~~but~~ though not always on sound lines. The transformation from sheikh to landlord and from tribesman to fellah is gradually assimilating the agrarian order of Lower Iraq to the "feudalism" prevaling in other Arab countries.

As yet, however, the forces of conservatism within Iraq tribalism are still strong. In many districts tribalism continues to serve the interests of the sheikhal class as well as of the rank and file. Tribalism is maintained by the fact that in the South the division in the Sunni and Shi'a branches of Islam coincides roughly with that between town and tribe. The survival of tribalism is acknowledged by the continued application of the Tribal Dispute Regulation.

4. The danger of a rapid spoliation of Arab tribalism through inconsiderate treatment by the authorities, backed by the impatience of an influential sector of the public, emphasizes the urgency of the definition of a

positive tribal policy. So far, according to George Antonius, the Iraq Government's "worst failure" was over the tribal problem."

In view of the conditions prevalent in the country, only a system of direct administration of tribal areas is, it appears, feasible. It is for this reason that in Iraq the tribal policies, as developed in territories under French administration, may be even more instructive than British precedents. The acknowledgement of the disintegration of the political function of the tribes need not involve a denial of their continued value as socio-economic entities. Direct administration too may attach great importance to the tribe as a source of social standards and as providing the sanctions for social behaviour.

A re-orientation of the present tribal policy will be required insofar as it is unwilling to conceive the necessity for a careful guidance of tribalism during its present phase of transition. Whether, however, the tribes will be able to perform any valuable functions during this period, and towards which goal the tutelage has to be directed, can be determined only within the framework of agrarian policy.

II. Land Policy.

1. With Midhat Pasha's introduction of the Ottoman Land Code and the Tapu Tenure in Iraq in 1871, a new era in the agrarian order of the country opened which has not yet come to an end. The Turkish Land Law intended to fill the void left by the decay of feudalism, and was neither designed nor able to deal with a tribalism still in its prime. The new individualist and capitalist notion of the land was a wedge which could only slowly be driven into the resisting fibre of tribal society. The successful introduction of the Tapu Tenure proved beyond the technical and administrative capacity of the Turks. The result was that in most parts of Iraq the co-existence of customary tribal law and statute law - not side by side , but one on top of the other and inextricably mingled - became a perpetual cause of friction and uncertainty.

The bulk of the cultivable lands of Iraq remained "unalienated" Miri land, held in theory in the legal possession as well as ownership of the State.

The definition of the appropriate policy for the State domain lands has remained the crucial issue ever

since. Under the British Civil Administration and in the early years of the Anglo-Iraqi regime the authorities were in favour of preserving the rights of the State to the land and of granting out domain lands on possessory tenure only. Little progress was, however, attained in improving the conditions of the State's discharge of its functions as landlord. The wide divergence between theory and practice in matters of land occupancy remained.

The rapid development of pump irrigation of riverain lands between 1926 and 1929 represented a new offensive of the capitalist mode of land exploitation against the custumary system of tribal land utilization. The policy of the State Domain Department veered round completely. The desire of landowners and sheikhs to lay hands on more land for cultivation or for investment introduced the question of the "alienation" of Miri land from a fresh point of view. ~~approach~~. In 1929, an Alienation Branch was created and the laying open to "alienation" of all uncultivated Miri land was being considered.

The necessity to solve the problem of the riverain tracts more than any other single motive forced the hands of the Government. The Government accepted the necessity

of setting up a sound system of settlement and registration of rights to land and invited Sir Ernest Dowson to advise on these matters.

Sir Ernest Dowson advised against parting prematurely with State ownership. "So long as tribal and other communal divisions remain strong, unrestricted individual freedom to dispose of land would be dangerous to public peace and contentment." His technical recommendations were generally accepted, but his proposals for a solution of what he called "the main problem of tenure" were considerably modified in the land legislation of 1932. The pressure exercised by the different classes, who hoped to obtain a saleable or mortgageable right to land, has overruled what a Political Officer in 1918 called "the general objections of modern economic theory against the alienation of State land."

2. The new land legislation and the land settlement carried out in accordance with it, facilitate the accumulation of land titles in the hands of townsmen, sheikhs and aghas, a process which previously had been checked by the limited amount of Tapu land. The new security of rights and of the effective enforcement withdraws the protection

which the economically weaker occupier often enjoyed against his overlord or mallak. The new "Lazma Tenure" professes to favour the occupying cultivator as did the Tapu tenure, but neither of them provides guarantees for the stability of peasant holdings. Especially in Lower Iraq, tribal systems of land holding are being transformed into pseudo-feudal conditions. The approaching end of traditional limitations to the individual's exercise of land rights stresses the urgency of arriving at a clear definition of the principal issues of land policy.

3. It appears that the arguments brought forward in favour of nationalization of privately owned land in Great Britain apply a fortiori against the "alienation" of State lands in Iraq. It ~~speaks~~ tells against the establishment of a class of independent peasants that, in view of the shortage of agricultural labour, the introduction of mechanized agriculture is desirable; that Iraq's two staple crops, barley and wheat, lend themselves to large-scale mechanized cultivation; and that the unbroken flatness of the alluvial plain provides favourable conditions for it. The tribal cultivator, with his desert background,

is not likely to be successful in overcoming the difficulties which beset independent peasant cultivation to-day, unless co-operation or effective Government assistance are not only loosely attached to the system of peasant farming, but conceived as integral parts of it.

It must, therefore, be asked ~~as to~~ what ~~are~~ the prospects for a successful application in Iraq of the principal systems so far evolved for neutralizing the economic weakness of the small unit (agricultural co-operation) and the social dangers of the large estate (collective farming). If agricultural co-operation has not yet struck roots in Iraq, this is attributable not only to the political framework, but also to difficulties inherent in the agrarian system, ~~which~~ providing a marked hindrance ~~for~~ to a wide-spread and early introduction of credit society. But within recent years co-operative theory and practice has been paying increased attention to the means of bringing the benefits of co-operation within the reach of the backward cultivators.

The possibilities have been explored of using co-operation to adapt ~~the~~ surviving tribal economy to modern requirements. There are no obstacles on institutional grounds against the establishment of collective farms on Miri land.

Less integrated tribes and those raising crops which are more economically produced on small farming units may be more readily fitted into the framework of the co-operative society. The advantages of collective farming may be greater in the case of a settlement of tribes on newly reclaimed lands suitable for grain production.

4. A special land regime for tribal areas rather than separate administration will be required to facilitate a proper integration of the tribes in the State; to preserve the social heritage of Arab tribalism; to avoid the further spread of "feudalism"; and to ensure rising standards of living for the rural masses. To help the tribes over the difficult stages of transition, some machinery on lines similar to that evolved by the French in the Maghreb may be suitable for Iraq, provided that the emphasis is placed on a guided process of adaptation ~~instead of~~ rather than disintegration of tribal society.

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INTRODUCTION.

The year 1932 brought for the people of Iraq the successful consummation of twelve years' passionate struggle for independence. The transference of ultimate political responsibility was effected without seriously interrupting the continuity of the internal régime, and it could scarcely be expected that a new era would immediately open up, in which the newly released energies of the young nation would be free to concentrate on the immense economic and social problems confronting it. Many, however, were dissatisfied at the extent to which political issues continued to preoccupy Iraqi statesmen at the expense of constructive achievements

If the settlement after this war succeeds in clearing the political atmosphere universally, it should also bring to light the real face of the Arab world - a society in the throes of a complex social and economic transformation. It may reveal the danger of postponing any longer an energetic tackling of the social problems of the Arab world, if the already insecure social basis of Islamic society is not to be finally shattered by a disruptive process of "Westernization." (1.

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(1) "The whole of the Near East is to-day hungry," writes Mr. J. van Ess, the former head of the American mission schools

From the Arab's point of view a reform in the agrarian structure of Arab society is indispensible, to ensure a positive response to the challenge of the disintegrating forces of the West. For the world at large it is essential to prevent the Middle East (the importance of which is still increases for reasons of grand strategy, air communications and oil resources (1)) from becoming a centre of social unrest. (2)

(From previous page:
who spent"40 years among the Arabs." "The time is fast approaching when the proletariat of the Near East .. will rise and demand bread. ... Any post-war settlement that fails to consider that aspect will only be productive of future wars. ... You cannot expect people to climb the steep path to self-respect while starving."

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(1) Cf., for instance, Philip Guedalla, addressing the Royal Empire Society: "Access to the oil of Iraq and Persia was as vital to the air-borne Empire of to-day as the Suez Canal had been to its sea-borne predecessor." (The Times, July 14th, 1943.)

(2) "So long as the historical issues .. were those of national self-government, the diplomatic and political centre of gravity lay in the West," said The Times recently, of South-East Europe (May 3rd, 1944). "Now that the issues are rather those of social self-government, the social-political centre of gravity would seem to lie in the East." An improvement in the living standards of the rural masses of the Middle East may be considered as by no means negligible factor in facilitating the smooth functioning of the "Teheran Agreement."

In studying the development of Iraq since the last war, it has always to be borne in mind that the two-river land has, in many respects, been the last of the Arab countries of settled habitation to experience the full impact of the West. Shielded from it as it was, not so much as a province of the Ottoman Empire as by the jealousies which kept that Empire alive, Iraq did not become a prey to German imperial ambitions during the "Bagdad Bahn" period. When, at last, in 1918 the coveted prize fell into British hands, the concept of "self-determination" had reached its zenith, and from the outset a less convinced imperialism on the British side was up against an uncompromising nationalism inside Iraq.

Iraq's early political emancipation, which followed from this set of circumstances, has undoubtedly been paid for by a delay in her economic development. The anticipated "restoration of the Garden of Eden"(1) within a decade, for some time held possible by responsible opinion in England as well as in Germany,(2) may have been an illusion. But the fact that so soon afterwards in many British eyes "the glamour of Mesopotamia had gone,"(3) was not due to the belief that the "Garden

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(1) Sir W. Willcocks, The Garden of Eden and its Restoration, 1911.
(2) Cf, for instance, von Bülow, the Kanzler of the Bagdadbahn period (Erinnerungen, p. 127): "Eine rationelle Bewässerung

of Eden" was, after all, unattainable, but rather to the notion that its revival must primarily be left to the present day heirs of this ancient home of human genius.

The delay in development has spared Iraq the problems of "rural society," which beset the cities of Egypt, and both town and country in Algeria. The country's economic life has not been rendered subservient to the interests of another power, and the development of her potentialities - as well as the risk of wasting them - have been left in Iraq's own hands. In most fields the Iraqi leaders have still to rebuild right from the foundations.The reclamation of the land

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(From previous page:)
der von der Bagdadbahn durchzogenen Landstriche aus diesen wieder das Paradies machen kann, das sie im Altertum waren. "Wenn irgendwo so kann in Mesopotamien von unbegrenzten Möglichkeiten gesprochen werden." Sir Mark Sykes , then the "recognized Mesopotamian expert at the Foreign Office" (A.T. Wilson, Loyalties,Mesopotamia 1914-17, p. 255)) was reported to have said soon after the British entrance in Baghdad that "one does not want to raise false hopes - but there is no doubt that the land is one of the richest in the world." (The Commercial Future of Baghdad, London, 1917)

(3) Sir George Buchanan, The Tragedy of Mesopotamia, 1938, p. 276.

itself from swamp and desert is still in the early stages; an agrarian order has to be shaped for a population which is still preponderantly tribally organized, and a modern system of land-holding designed to replace the loosely defined rights of State land ~~which still~~ apply over the greater part of the cultivable land.

Iraq has unique opportunities of building aright from the beginning. She can learn from the achievements and mistakes of Egypt in matters of irrigation and drainage, from French North Africa in matters of tribal policy, from Turkey in methods of economic development, and in every field from the accumulated experience of a generation which has taught the world much about the inherent dangers of "Western" achievements.

For some time the State has been assuming an increasingly active rôle in the task of social and economic reconstruction. The "laissez-faire" of the Anglo-Iraqi period had already given way to Government intervention in most spheres of economic life even before the present war. The cultivation of "cash-crops" (especially cotton and linseed) is no longer merely"encouraged" by the offer of tax-rebates and the like, but can be enforced; the use of improved seeds is not merely

"recommended," but obligatory; the date and tobacco-growing industries have gradually been transformed into Government monopolies.(1) There are indications that the Government, through the agency of the Industrial Bank, will soon extend its activities (directly or by participation) to industry,(2) which had found little stimulus in the Law for the Encouragement of Industrial Undertakings of 1929.(3)

For some years' "planning" has been a favourite slogan in Iraq, but in fact the various four or five-year capital development schemes, which have been drafted - quite apart from the fact that they never materialised - were exclusively concerned with long-term Government investment, and were not plans

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(1) These questions are fully dealt with in a discussion of agricultural policy (including irrigation) which could not yet, as originally intended, be added as a third part to the present study because, under war conditions, certain essential pieces of information were unavailable.

(2) Cf., for instance, the campaign for an expansion of economic planning to industry in the paper al-Zaman (June 30th, July 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 9th, 1943).

(3) Law No. 14, of 1929.

in the Russian and Turkish sense of the word. Iraq's customs autonomy has been restricted since she joined the League, and undertook to grant "most favoured nation" treatment to all members for a period of ten years. The country's currency is managed by a Currency Board in London, with a majority of British members, and her banking system is still entirely foreign-controlled.(1) But perhaps the most serious obstacle to effective planning has been the perpetual change of Government and the resulting lack of a continuous policy.

The idea of planning has, however, struck roots, and efforts are being made to ensure its being applied successfully.(2) Planning, it is emphasized, should not be confined

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(1) Cf. as for first steps to remedy this position: Law for the Control of Banking No. 61, of 1938; Law for the Government's Participation in the Formation of a National Bank No 27, of 1939.

(2) To forestall the failure which had attended previous attempts at planning the economy of Iraq, al-Zaman (1943, loc. cit.) suggested the establishment of a regular Directory of Economic Organization, staffed at first by a few specialist officials and foreign experts with the function of drawing up plans for submission to an Economic Organization Council composed of the Ministers concerned; the Directory should supervise the execution of the plan by the relevant departments. Iraq should throw off its habit of lethargy and begin early to prepare its plans for after the war.

to purely economic issues, but should embrace social reconstruction as well.(1) It is the purpose of the present study to contribute to the discussion of certain basic socio-economic problems facing the country.

"The traditional structure of government and the diversity of social system," have in a recent paper been singled out as two of the "fundamental factors in the life and development of Western Asia."(2) On the one hand, it is pointed out that government has become "a feudal machine, the exclusive function of the land-owning classes..... in all Arab lands except Arabia."(3) The other "crucial problem" put forward is the fact that "the life and economy of the nomad demand a structure of politics totally different from that of the settled man in town and country,"(4) and that their integration in a modern Arab State will engender "the difficult task of combining within a single government at least two different types of administration."(5)

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(1) Cf., for instance, the initiative taken in 1942 by the Ministry of Social Affairs for setting up a central committee "to prepare a general plan for the economic and social reconstruction of the country in the post-war period." (International Labour Review, July, 1942. p. 58.) Cf. also al-Zaman, June 30, 1943, pointing out (in a discussion of the need for planning) that "in agriculture not only the tools needed to be changed, but also the basis, such as the distribution of land."

(2) H.A.R. Gibb, in The Near East, Lectures on the Harris Foundation, Chicago 1942.

(3) Ibid., p. 81.

(4) Ibid., p. 86.

(5) Ibid. p. 89.

Aspects of these two problems form the subject of this study. The first part is concerned with questions arising from the dual society of "tribesmen and townsmen," as the distinction is often briefly but inaccurately described. I am not inclined to attach prime importance to the division between nomads and settlers for the future of the Northern Arab countries, fascinating and significant as it is. The time has come when, to say the least, the disproportion between the social and political import of the nomads and their actual numbers is rapidly decreasing. In Iraq, however, the crucial division lies between the non-tribal element and the tribesmen, who still constitute the majority of the rural population. The actual gulf separating village-dweller and nomad which concerns us in Syria and Palestine, may be wider (1) than that between tribesman (embracing both nomad and cultivator) and non-tribesman; but whereas the former remains more or less a peripheral phenomenon, the latter exists right in the heart of the country.

A similar division within the native population taxes

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(1) "Le pays bédouin est tout différent du reste de la Syrie." (V. Müller, En Syrie avec les Bédouins, 1931, p. 325.)

the administrative capacity of independent countries such as Afganistan and Iran, and of territories under imperial government such as Baluchistan, Burma and the Maghreb. The policies applied and the ideas underlying ~~[redacted]~~ them differ as widely as the degree of success achieved. In Iraq, according to George Antonius,(1) the Government's "worst failure was over the tribal problem."

In Iraq, as in other independent Eastern countries faced with major tribal problems, the ruling element in the towns is entrusted with the task of looking after the welfare of the backward population - a duty not dissimilar to that falling to imperial powers.)

(The Baghdadi, who disdained the notion of being in need of British tutelage, is slow to admit that the tribes require his sympathetic guidance until they are able to stand by themselves "under the strenuous conditions of the modern world." In dealing with the tribal section of their people the Iraqi leaders have, ~~however,~~ ample opportunity to show that unselfishness and tact, the alleged lack of which in the mandatory power they once so bitterly resented.
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(1) The Arab Awakening, 1938, p. 366.

Part II, a discussion of land policy, deals with the present tendency to assimilate the agrarian system to that so-called "feudalism," which, owing to the survival of tribalism, has not yet achieved a footing in some of the most populous agricultural districts of Iraq. In Iraq it is not too late to avoid the further consolidation and spread of "feudalism," provided the Government formulates and executes a policy replacing tribalism by a better substitute. But without a complete re-orientation of land-policy, "feudalism" is likely to carry the day.

The question of tribal policy and agrarian policy in Iraq overlap to such a degree - the one being unanswerable without the other - that they are best dealt with in conjunction. In both cases the abuse of power by the ruling element within, anxious to reap short-term benefits, may delay or even endanger the healthy development of the nation more seriously than any of the abuses conceivably threatened from without.

In attempting to throw light on these questions, one is up against singular difficulties of insufficient and unreliable material. Few discussions of problems concerning Iraq

~~- official or private -~~ (1) have omitted to dwell on the lack (2) of adequate information.

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(1) "The most conspicuous thing about our knowledge of economic conditions here is what we do not know," said Sir E. Hilton-Young, in 1930 (Report to the Iraqi Government on Economic Conditions and Policy, in Report by His Majesty's Government .. to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Iraq, 1930, appendix p. 166). " .. We have not got even the raw materials which are available in other countries for a rough estimate of the productivity of the country, its annual income, and its capital wealth. ... We do not know the area under cultivation. We have no means of forming even a rough guess of the amount of the harvest in their various kinds.. Theoretically, the figures of the land revenue should throw some light upon this, but owing to the varied and variable basis of this revenue, they are all but useless for the purpose. We do not know the proportion of annual produce exported, as distinguished from that consumed at home. I have seen what may be called enlightened guesses on this matter, based upon various sources of information. The results vary so widely that they convince one only that nobody knows." Until 1940, this state of affairs had not materially improved. Cf., for instance, Mr. Hogg, Adviser to the Ministry of Finance (R.C. Asian Soc., 1940, p. 183): "One of the troubles in Iraq is a lack of essential statistics: we do not know accurately the population, human or animal, nor the area under crop, let alone the area under different crops, nor the total production. Consequently we have little idea whether the yield is rising or falling." - On the lack of land statistics in particular cf. Himadeh, The Economic Organization of Iraq, p. 158.

(2) Just before the outbreak of war, a Principal Bureau of Statistics was to be established with the task of directing and co-ordinating the collection of statistical information by the various Government Departments (Law of Statistics, No. 42, of 1939). Cf. also the Regulations for the Compilation of Agricultural and Animal Statistics (No. 84, of 1940), according to which the Principal Bureau of Statistics was to prepare questionnaires to which the heads of the administrative districts were to obtain replies.

Because of this shortage of available material - the very much wider subject of this thesis, as originally planned, has ultimately had to be narrowed down to its present scope. The draft of a third part on "Agricultural Policy" will be completed as soon as the war-time monopoly for Government departments of all the more detailed information from overseas comes to an end. I should perhaps add that even in writing the study as it stands, it has not always been possible to avoid certain methodological liberties which might perhaps be indefensible in the case of the more fully explored Oriental countries such as Egypt, Palestine or India.

The appendices deal with problems which - though not necessarily peculiar to Iraq - are essential to the argument of the study and have, to my knowledge, not been discussed so far in many publications.

PART I.

Tribal Policy.

INTRODUCTION:

The Desert Background.

1. "Arabization" and "Tribalization."

Rarely has "racial Arabization" succeeded in establishing itself in the wake of "Islamization" far beyond the limits of a geographical zone of some homogeneity, where towns and cultivated lands are in the nature of islands in wide expanses of desert and steppe. Though there may be exceptions elsewhere, Iraq adheres to this rule. In Upper Iraq where the zone ends in which the date palm bears fruit, and where in the hills donkey and pony replace the camel, the Arabs' grip loosens and the Kurds hold their own. But this applies only to the hill region North-East of the Tigris.

Nearly 75% of Iraq's surface is to-day uncultivated and the domain of pastoral nomads.(1) Even in the Middle Ages, when Baghdad was surrounded by the green belt of the Sawad, the proximity of the desert affected its character, as that of all the principal urban centres of Arab civilization.

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(1) Boesch, op. cit., p. 354, estimates steppe and desert to amount to 66% of the total surface, and potential farm land (including some fallow) to 11%. For a recent description of Iraq's Southern and Western desert cf. Capt. J.W. Price, A Desert Survey, The Royal Engineers Journal, vol. 52, 1938, p. 543.

The nomads had always to be reckoned with, living as breeders of animals in and of the steppe. They formed an essential element in the economic structure of the region. For about 1200 years, ever since the Northern Arabs from desert and oases entered the settled regions, their brothers of the desert remained their neighbours. Not the least significant development in these eventful decades for the Arab nation is the fact that the nomad and tribesman is becoming a figure of the past to his Arab contemporaries. To-day we seem about to witness the final chapter of a transformation in Arab history: the Arab is trying to discard the remnants of his desert heritage.

The desert "motif" has sounded even more consistently through the history of Iraq than through that of other countries of sedentary Arab civilization. Owing to the peculiarities of her river system, the border line between desert and cultivated land possesses in Iraq a maximum of elasticity. In "Barbary", mountain ranges have set rigid limits to the encroachment of the desert and its peoples; in Egypt the semi-automatic basin-irrigation gave the Egyptian fellah a chance to survive. In Iraq, it was only the organized power of the inhabitants that kept the wide, open plains fertile and fit for settled life.

When, with the decline of the Caliphate, the vitality of sedentary society showed signs of exhaustion, the advance of the desert set in. Hitherto the settled population had slowly been absorbing and assimilating the tribes; now the reverse process became the rule. "For some centuries prior to the middle of last century, the nomads had steadily encroached on the settled lands, in some regions such as Iraq and Algeria, destroying the works of civilization outside the few walled cities, in all sapping their economic strength and impoverishing their cultural life."(1)

On the other hand, since Iraq possesses a steppe belt, eminently suitable for pastoralism, the nomads in Iraq are, it seems, less usurpers than trespassers beyond their legitimate borders. Algeria may be even richer in pastures, but she lacks Iraq's scope for irrigation; Egypt, which may be about equal to Iraq in irrigational potentialities,(2) is poor in marginal pasture lands. Thus the tribal question still figures so prominently in Iraq to-day, not only because the country, after having been adrift for so long, has been drawn into the mainstream of history later than other Arab countries, but also because the nature of the country itself tends to give the problem a more lasting significance.

(1) H.A.R. Gibb, op. cit., p. 7.
(2) For an instructive comparison in tabularised form of Egyptian developments and Iraq's potentialities cf. Sir Ernest Dowson's Report on Land Tenure and related questions, ~~ibid.~~ p. 73.

Some of the old Mesopotamian cultivator stock may have preserved themselves in face of the advancing desert by taking up a semi-nomadic existence, or by becoming riverain cultivators under tribal protection. In either case they would be drawn into the tribal organization of the desert Arabs and gradually lose their identity. Outside the towns only the Ma'dan in their swampy abodes in the South, and the Yezidis and Kurds in the Northern hills were able to offer effective ethnic resistance against the "tide of racial penetration."(1)

The present high degree of "racial Arabization" was reached only after the great Arab civilization of the Middle Ages had run its course. Iraq witnessed in a manner similar to the Maghreb the two types of Arab invasion which Ibn Khaldun distinguished so clearly. Whereas the Arab conquerors of the 7th century had come to create, the desert Arabs, since the 11th century, came to destroy. The conquest of the 7th century was one of the "rare occasions" when "the energy of the Bedouin has been harnessed by the sagacity of political leaders."(2) The new masters ruled from the towns and founded new urban centres.(3)

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(1) Antonius, op. cit., p. 16.
(2) H.A.R. Gibb, op. cit., p. 6.
(3) Cf. Basra and Wasit, etc.

The Arab genius proved itself by its tolerance alike of existing institutions and populations. The comparatively dense population of Sassanian Iraq, which the new masters had neither the wish nor the means to replace, was recognised as a source of wealth and protected as such. The Arabs did not take readily to agriculture, and land-owning chiefs and dignatories resided in the towns.(1) If, however, "in the Maghreb at this stage the Arabs did not occupy the open country," as Ibn Khaldun reports,(2) the same did not apply in the case of Iraq with the great reservoir of desert tribes so near by. It may be presumed that, as in Egypt, a settlement of Bedouins on the land, usually on their own initiative, sometimes organized by the authorities, was taking place throughout the age of the Caliphs.(3)

But it was not until effective government, together with the Caliphate, began to fall into decay, that the nomads (as Ibn Khaldun relates of the invasion of the Bani Hilal) "came to take up their abode there (in the open country) and to spread tribe-wise in order to camp all over the immense

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(1) See infra p. 226 sq.
(2) Quoted by A. Toynbee, Study of History, vol. III, p. 324.
(3) On the Arabization of Egypt cf. Beiträge zur Geschichte Ägyptens unter dem Islam, by Carl Becker, zweites Heft, 1903, "Die Arabisierung," pp.113-136.

region."(1) It was after this that it was said of the"Arab" that "born of the desert he becomes in turn its creator."(2)

The effective barrier against the desert tribes began to give way in the 9th century,(3) and only since the middle of the last century have any more continual attempts been made to re-erect them. Nearly a thousand years of little controlled infiltration of desert Arabs ended with a final major wave of migration,(4) the successive northwards movements of the Anezeh and Shammar. The Shammar crossed the

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(1) Toynbee, ibid.

(2) Hogarth, Nearer East, op. cit., p. 264; see also, for instance, Jarvis, J.R. Central Asian Soc., 1935, p. 42; "Palmer, who knew the Bedouins so well, did not call them 'sons of the desert' but 'fathers of the desert.'" Ibn Khaldun in Muqaddamat: "Every country that is conquered by Arabs (i.e. nomads) rapidly goes to ruin." (Quoted by Toynbee, ibid., p. 234, note 2.)

(3) Some time before A.D. 900, the Banu Hamdām Arabs made themselves masters of the Abbasid Caliphate's dominion in the Jazirah. In 914, the Carmathians, out of Eastern Arabia, raided the home province of the Caliphate in Iraq itself (Toynbee, op. cit., p. 441). The Bedu from the North Arabian steppe like the Banu'Uqayl, Banu Mazyad, and Mirdasids entered both Upper and Lower Iraq (ibid., p. 445).

(4) The migrations of the 18th century have, according to A. Toynbee's "Climatic Theory," their origin rather in a "climatic push," driving the tribes away from their original abodes in Arabia, than in a "social pull" caused by the weak defences of Mesopotamia. Cf. Toynbee, op. cit., vol. III, Annex 2 and 3 A, p. 395 f.

Euphrates in about A.D. 1800, unsettling again by their arrival the half-nomadic tribes of Upper Mesopotamia. The nomadic flood had ample time to sweep wide and far over the country. Traces of it can to-day be discovered even in the remote agricultural hill districts East of the Tigris.(1) Here tribesmen filled the more exposed towns on the Euphrates,(2) there town people were drawn away into the tribal structure.(3)

The Arab conquest in the 7th century had been a victory

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(1) For instance, the fellahs from North of the 'Adem are known to be fragments of Bedouin tribes who made their way along the Diyala (Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 273).

(2) Two-thirds of the inhabitants of Hit, for instance, are reckoned to be descendants of the Dulaim tribe. Cf. also Gertrude Bell, op. cit., vol. II, p. 444: "It is curious to find how many of the Baghdad notables are tribesmen."

(3) The semi-nomadic, partly Bedouin Sawamara (on the Tigris South of the Jebel Hamrin) are believed to count among their ancestors the former inhabitants of Samarra (Carl Raswan, Tribal Areas and Migration Lines of the North Arabian Bedouins, Geographical Rev. 1930, p. 502. Cf. for instance Admin. Report 1919, Qal'at Sikar District 1919, by Capt. J.L.M. Barrett, p. 109: "So strong is the tribal system in and around Qal'at Sikar that the very town people of Qal'at Sikar in the majority of cases were in the habit of enrolling themselves as members of the nearest tribe, though they were not in any way related to it."

for Islam and for its medium, the Arab language. It was in the centuries when Arab civilization seemed to have spent itself that the infiltration from the desert brought about a victory for the "Arab" race.(1) Whilst the Arab spirit had raised the country to eminent heights of intellectual and material prosperity, the process of ethnic Arabization accentuated its utter degradation. To-day, when we think in terms of Arab revival, we find that the ethnic component of the ancient agricultural riverside population which, it may be assumed, has survived from the days of Sumeria and Babylonia until the late Caliphate, has been, if not wiped out,(2) at least reduced to insignificance.

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(1) The significance of this latter period in the development of the ethnological composition of the rural population of modern Iraq is sometimes overlooked. The leading anthropological monograph on the subject (Kappers, "Introduction," op. cit., 1934, p. 47) speaks of the four semitic migrations to and from the river land, of which the first was the Akkadian and the last the Islamic of the 7th century. On the main waves of desert infiltration cf. Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 24; cf. also D.G. Hogarth, Nearer East, op. cit., p. 259: "Irak Arabi, low, easily accessible from the South-West and bounded on the farther side not by hills but by plain, is wholly semitized."

(2) Whether the Ma'dan may be described as descendants of ancient Babylonian remains undecided. A.T. Clay, in the National Geographical Magazine, February 1916, believes in their Babylonian origin. Niebuhr, 1772, op. cit., p. 389, pointed out that the Ma'dan were "keine echten Araber."

The rural population of Lower Iraq is, it appears, predominantly of desert origin.(1) It is of little significance in itself that, if the desert Arabs represent racially the "purest" Arabs, the alluvial plain of the two rivers (with the exception perhaps of Southern Palestine) is the most thoroughly "arabized" and, indeed, is ethnologically the most completely "Arab"(2) of the major regions of the Arab-speaking world suitable for settled habitation. It is relevant, however, that the Arab country, with the biggest task of agricultural reconstruction before it, and, possibly,

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(1) Too little is known about the numerical strength of the Ma'dan (who have maintained themselves in the marshy regions of the Tigris, whereas the population along the Euphrates swamps, which face the desert, have been arabized) as to enable an estimate to be made of their percentage in the total rural population of the alluvial plain.

(2) I.e. "North Arab." T.K. Mitii, History of the Arabs, 2nd ed., 1940, p. 43, and pp. 240-291; and in The American Historical Review, July 1943, vol. XLVIII, p. 722, recommends to limit the term "Arab" to its linguistic significance, and to reserve the term "Arabian" in its ethnological sense to the people of the Arabian peninsula.

the greatest agricultural potentialities, is to-day inhabited by a people with little agricultural background, whose traditional outlook,whose whole "conditioning" for desert pastoralism, and whose indifference towards,if not disregard for the virtues and arts of the cultivator have, for a long time, added to the desolation of the country.

It is against this background,that we must estimate the full measure of the tribal problem,as it faces us to-day. For on the solution of this depends the reconciliation of a desert past with the demands of an agricultural future.

2. The Present Strength of Tribalism.

The population of Iraq may be estimated to include 25% townsmen,(1) 22% non-tribal cultivators,45% tribal cultivators,(2) and 8% nomads.

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(1) Of towns over 20,000 inhabitants.
(2) Himadeh's figures (Iraq,op. cit., p. 18.)slightly modified to allow for the movement to the towns and for tribal disintegration.(According to Himadeh, urban population 22%; tribal cultivators 48%.)

Nearly two-thirds[1] of the rural population, and more than half of the total population, of Iraq may be regarded as having their social centre of gravity in some form or other of tribal organization.[2]

All nomadic elements are, of course, tribally organized, but tribalism also is maintained throughout the many stages of transition from pastoralism to agriculture, and the largest social body in rural Iraq consists of settled agricultural

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(1) The following figures are based on the data collected by by Sir E. Dowson (Report on Land Tenure, op. cit., 1932) which still provide, especially if reduced to percentages, a valuable guide to the situation. The percentage figures are roughly confirmed by a comparison with such 1935 figures as exist. For Kerbela the nomadic percentage is the same; for Mosul and Basrah the 1935 figures show a slight decrease , for the Muntafiq a small increase. Only in some cases seems the relative strength of the nomads to have altered considerably, notably in the Kirkuk area. There the restoration of order, after Sheikh Mahmud's rising in 1930, and above all the progress of oil development led to an abandonment of nomadic life. A recent estimate places the proportion of tribal society even higher: According to van Ess, Nat. Geogr. Magazine, 1942, p. 419, "five-sixth of Iraq is tribal."

(2) Cf. Table I - III.

tribesmen. The Bedouin proper may comprise to-day not more than about 10% of the rural population.(1)

Tribalism is relatively stronger in Lower Iraq where it affects almost three quarters of the rural population, whereas in Upper Iraq, with its considerable non-Arab minorities, and established rain cultivation, less than 50% are tribesmen.(2) Within the tribal society, however, in Upper Iraq, the nomadic sector is more than twice as strong as it is in Lower Iraq.(3) The tribal cultivator is less characteristic of the North, where in many areas the non-tribal village has become the centre of rural life.

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(1) As to other estimates of the nomadic percentage cf. Boesch, op. cit., p. 344, who places it at 17%. Many of the obviously inflated figures for the nomads result from a loose application of the terms "bedouin," "nomad," and "tribesman," which are sometimes used as synonyms. Cf., for instance, Henri Froidenaux, L'Asie Française, Mars 1934: "Sur les 225,000 bédouins qui vivent en Syrie, environ 100,000 ne sont plus maintenant que des semi-nomades." With full regard to the difficulty of drawing the line between nomads and settled tribesmen, only such terminological confusion can explain the statement of the Report of the Educational Enquiry Commission, Govt. of Iraq, op. cit., p. 24, that "about 55% of the population is nomadic or semi-nomadic in its form of life," or E. Epstein's comment (J. R. Central Asian Soc. 1938, p. 230) that "the nomads constitute about half of the population of Iraq." Uhlig, in Zeitschrift der Ges. für Erd-Kunde zu Berlin, 1917, p. 535, estimated 45% nomads. P. Monroe, in his introduction to Jamali, op. cit., p. VI, speaks of "30% or more."

(2) 44% and 71% respectively.

(3) About 31% compared with 12%.

Nomadism is, of course, strongest where natural conditions favour the shepherd. The three largest of the fourteen livas of Iraq - Dulaim, Diwaniyah and Mosul - , which comprise much of the desert and steppe belt and which together make up more than half of the total area of the country, are those with the highest percentage of nomads. In Mosul and Dulaim nomads still form the majority among the tribal population. In the Dulaim they represent as much as 40% of the total inhabitants. In districts like Hilla and Diyala, on the other hand, where the continuity of irrigation and agriculture has never been interrupted, and similarly in the Ma'dan rice areas of Kut and Amara, there is no room for nomadism. Near the capital and in the date-garden area of the Shat el Arab it is rapidly dying out. In the Muntafiq Ottoman tribal policy has led to an almost complete settlement of the tribes on the land.

But although in these areas nomadism has become more or less extinct, in most of them tribalism has remained the prevalent form of social organization. The proportion of the total rural population formed by the tribal sector falls gradually from a maximum of 93% in the Muntafiq, in the

Amara, Basrah, Hilla, and Diyala areas until it reaches 65% in the Kut liwa. In Lower Iraq, it is only in the Baghdad liwa that less than half of the rural population may be considered free from tribal associations.

These figures suffice to show the extent of the tribal question as it faces us to-day. "Tribal Iraq," says Mr. John van Ess, "is that part of the country which must be known and understood, if we are to have worthwhile post-war reconstruction. Most of the resources of men and material are there, and most of the problems."(1)

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(1) John van Ess, The National Geographical Magazine, September, 1942, p. 419. Appreciations of the importance of the tribal problem for the future development of Iraq are in the modern literature on the country. Cf., however, Report of the Educat. Inquiry Commission, op. cit., p. 13: "From whatever point of view the problems of Iraq are approached, whether political, economic, social or educational it is recognised that the nomadic tribes and the tribal organisation of a greater part of the population constitutes a major problem."

CHAPTER I. The development of Tribal Policy

1. From the Mamluks to the Young Turks: "Tribe breaking" and "Ottomanization".

The character of life outside the towns was determined in Iraq by the tribesman and not by the fellah, as in Egypt.(1) The result was not so much a widening of the gulf separating town and country — which is wide everywhere in the East — but an increase in the apparent tension between both. The fellah, unable to inspire, and often seemingly incapable of feeling, hatred and distrust, has, as a rule, been resigned to his inferiority. In the traditional relations between townsmen and tribesmen, suspicion, fear and arrogant claims to higher status, are known to each party, often long after the disappearance of any factual basis for friction.

Until last century the issue between town and tribe was not so much one of lasting subordination or ascendancy, but of rivalry between equals. The borderline between tribal authority and the Bilad al Mahkumah, the governed lands, always remained fluid.(2) Town and tribes were in the position of warring powers competing for the lion's share of the produce of the long-suffering cultivators.

Tribal policy was conducted by the Governors in Bagdad

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(1) ~~As an illustration,~~ For a comparison between the abject Egyptian fellahs and the war-like Iraqi tribesmen in the eighties of the last century, cf. T.C.Plowden, Fortnightly Review, vol.41 p.190.

(2) Gertrude Bell, Arab of Mesopotamia, op.cit., p.24.

on the lines of "foreign policy", until the development of new weapons and the improvement of communications altered its character. Though it was still the army which served as its agent, the function of the state in maintaining peace and security against the tribes began to take the form of internal administration. Beyond this phase in tribal policy a further stage was gradually reached, where the emphasis was transferred from considerations of security to those of social and economic well-being. An ultimate phase could, however, only be attained when tribal policy merges into and becomes but one special aspect of the social and agricultural policy of the country.

(a) The Mamluks.

Throughout the long centuries, when the river land lay half forgotten, as it were, on the periphery of the world, with a monotonous record of feuds, stagnation and vain endeavours in place of history, the relations between the Pasha in Bagdad and the tribes rarely got beyond the level of a series of alliances and counter-alliances. Both parties were usually in need of allies: the Pasha would be unable to cope with a dangerous tribal rising without tribal support for his regular troops; a tribal confederation would be able to hold its own against its rivals only by being on good

terms with the Pasha.(1)

Through most of the 18th century the 'Ubaid were the supporters of, and were in turn supported by, the Pasha. For about seventy years 'Ubaid Sheikhs succeeded each other in the post of Bab el Arab who functioned as the official intermediary between government and tribes. 'Ubaid irregulars proved their value in the long-drawn wars between the Pasha and the Wahabis. 'Ubaid power grew until it was acknowledged from the Gates of Baghdad to the Khabur and from Tekrit to the Shamiyah and until the Shawazides(2) became too strong for the liking of the Pasha. In 1802, the Shawazide Mohammed Beg was deprived of office and title and the Aghas of the Millis and other Kurdish tribes, but above all, the resourceful Fares of the Shammar, who had just entered Mesopotamia, was called in to assist the Pasha against his former allies.(3) Fares, the founder of the present line of Shammar Sheikhs defeated the 'Ubaid and established Shammar supremacy over the upper Mesopotamian tribes. His rough desert following made him, however, an embarrassing friend for Baghdad, and the new governor, Said Pasha, in alliance with the Muntafiq, attacked and defeated the truculent

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(1) The following pages intend to give a short outline of the main stages in the development of tribal policy. The history of the individual Iraqi tribes is fully dealt with in Oppenheim's work on the Beduins (op.cit.); Iraqi tribal history (including that of the principal sheikhal families and personalities) and its relations to the political history of the country is discussed in S.H.Longrigg's excellent study (Four Centuries of Modern Iraq, (op.cit.)) which is based on valuable original sources. The principal modern work in Arabic, dealing with the tribes in the framework of Iraq history is 'Abbas el 'Azzawi, Ta'ricl et Iraq bain ihtilam.

(2) As the Turks called the sheikhal family of the 'Ubaid.

(3) Oppenheim, op. cit., p.189.

Fares at Lemlum in 1815. The Shammar, under Sefuk, staged a short-lived come-back when they were shrewd enough to help Ali Riza's Turkish regulars against the Bagdad Mamluks. But again the victorious Ali Riza turned to the Anaze (Amarat), rather than trusting the ambitious and too powerful chief of the Shammar.(1)

(b) The early Ottoman Walis.

The Turkish Walis, who, after the end of Mamluk rule in 1831, came to Bagdad, replaced the mediaeval system of administration by an Ottoman version of early 19th century government. Some distant echo of the mild reforming spirit which made itself felt in Istambul under Mahmud II. could now be noticed as far as Bagdad. While the Mamluk Pashas generally accepted the tribes as a troublesome but inevitable part of the Mesopotamian political scene,(2) their Ottoman successors turned instantly against what, from their Anatolian background, appeared to them an anomaly. They felt that to rely on the old manoeuvre of setting tribe against tribe was equal

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(1) Oppenheim, op.cit., p.39; im 1847 Majit Pasha deemed it necessary to have Nefuk murdered, Longrigg, op.cit., p.290; cf. also, Oppenheim Vom Mittelmeer zum Persischen Golf, vol. II, p.57 ff.; Braunlich, Islamica, 1933, p.97 f.

(2) As an illustration of this attitude cf., for instance, C. Niebuhr, 1772, p.389; the Pasha makes one of his frequent military expeditions against the tribes: "Es erfolgt aber niemals etwas weiteres, als dass er etwa ihren vornehmsten Anfuehrern die Koepfe abschlaegt und andere von derselben Familie wieder an ihre Stelle setzt."

to an admission of the Government's inability to create order out of its own strength.

Their attempts, however, to break the power of the tribes not only lacked consistency and clear strategy, but betrayed also an ignorance as to the full difficulty of the task. The Turkish armies, which, in the course of the preceding years,(1) had successfully dealt with the rulers of Mosul and with the Kurdish princes, proved unable to achieve decisive results against their new elusive adversaries. The policy of forcible de-tribalisation by weight of arms, begun by Najid Pasha(2) and continued by his successors,(3) only aggravated the disease. Tribal revenue demands were inbreased and sporadically enforced with ineffective violence. Incessant tribal campaigns resulted in ever fresh tribal risings. After thirty years the new policy had created a tribal situation which was more confused than ever. It had succeeded in driving "the cultivator back to the desert and, at the time when modern communications were first developing, to reduce the country to weakness and misery."(4)

(c) Midhat Pasha.

Midhat Pasha(5) was the first Ottoman pro-Consul who would not allow his belief in reform to be drowned by a brutal

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(1) Cf. Longrigg, p.284 ff.
(2) Governor of Bagdad 1842.
(3) Abdi Pasha and Namiq Pasha, 1852 and 1861 seq. respectively.
(4) Longrigg, p.290.
(5) Wali of Bagdad 1869-1872.

and shortsighted conception of authority. Neither did he take the disturbing presence of the tribes for granted, nor would he believe that force alone could render them more amenable. For the first time in centuries, the government of the town rallied together under this western-trained administrator not only military strength, but sufficient self-confidence in its civilising mission to undertake a systematic attempt at assimilating the tribes.

Midhat Pasha's policy of "Ottomanisation" was, and could only be, addressed to the sheiks and members of sheikhal families. The bestowal of titles and offices was aimed no longer, as under the Mamluks, at winning allies but at producing citizens. Sheiks were nominated, and favours were granted with a view to propagating Ottoman influence. Visits to the capital, town-bred wives, Turkish education for the sons (who might pass from the Ashiret Maktabe in Stambul to the military colleges) were amongst the strongest recommendations for favourable consideration. Hence, an endless struggle raged inside the tribes, in which personal ambitions were inseparable from the political issues dividing the protagonists of desert freedom from the Ottomanised sheiks, willing to tame and settle their tribesmen. The Government, for their part, "vacillated between the lesser resistance of an old school appointment with its retrograde

results and the harder line of maintaining their own man in power."(1)

Midhat Pasha's greatest achievement was, however, his insight into the economic basis of the tribal problem, in the tackling of which he never underestimated the importance of the land itself. His tribal policy assumed the proportions of an agrarian reform. The transformation of the sheiks into land-owning effendis, he foresaw, would entail that of tribesmen into cultivators.

It was a bold policy, attempted under conditions which many an administrator would have called premature, and, as we shall see,(2) it was only partially successful. The reluctance to take to agriculture, with its accompanying toil and accessibility, deterred many a tribal leader from accepting the new status. An apprehension of conscription and of increased liability to taxation reinforced the existing conservatism and inertia.

Nevertheless, the effect on the tribal situation was considerable. Midhat Pasha succeeded in laying a foundation on which his successor could build. In the early years of the present century, the Turkish writ runs farther afield than ever before. "The lawlessness of bandits, a brief

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(1) Longrigg, ibid., p.308.
(2) Cf. below p. 290

defiance by single sections, took the place of great confederacies at war with the Pashas."(1)

(d) The Young Turks.

The Young Turks, however, were no more fortunate in their dealings with the tribes than with their Arab policy in general, and in the years preceding the war 1914/18 a deterioration of the tribal situation could be observed. The Young Turkish policy of centralisation brought them into conflict with the important sheiks. The failure of their policy was less a reflection on its principles than on its application. Multiplying the number of sheiks to a bewildering degree became a practice of the authorities in Bagdad. The Government was generally believed to encourage inter-tribal warfare.(2) It certainly tended with dire results to destroy authority for which it could not yet offer an effective alternative. Unrest, no sooner suppressed on the Euphrates, would raise its head in the Jezirah.(3) In one year all traffic between Bagdad and Basra was arrested;(4) in another the "military activities of the riverain Arabs greatly interfered with the sowing."(5) In 1911, a distinguished

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(1) Longrigg, p.311.
(2) Willcocks, Sixty Years in the East, op.cit., p.240.
(3) Report on the Trade of Basra, 1909, No.4513, op.cit., p.5.
(4) Ibid., 1908, No.4267, p.9.
(5) Ibid., 1909, No.4513, p.5.

Turkish visitor, who studied the situation on the spot, summed up his impression in the words: "Il faut donc assurer l'existence d'un sixième corps d'armée permanente."(1)

2. The British Civil Administration: An experiment in indirect control of tribal areas.

(a) The Tribal System of Administration.

As British policy towards the tribes first began to form, in the wake of the slow northwards advance of the armies, it stood in contradiction to the axiom which had been common to all the changing patterns of Turkish tribal policy.(2)

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(1) Army units had been withdrawn when required in the Balkans and against Italy. Hakki bey Baban Zade, De Stamboul à Bagdad, Revue du Monde Musulman, May 1911, p.185 ff. See, in particular, "Les Causes de l'insécurité", p.268 ff. On a characteristic example of Young Turkish tribal policy (the case of Ibrahim Pasha of the Milli) cf. Gertrude Bell, Arab Bull. 23 Mar. 1917, in "Arab War" op.cit., p.45 ff.; cf. also, Ibid, p.33 ff., Arab Bull., 28 Feb. 1917, for a vivid account of inter-tribal "wars" in Lower Mesopotamia in the years before 1914.

(2) Ottoman rule ~~did~~ in fact never succeed in impressing on the tribes an awareness of the futility of resistance against the government. In Algeria it had taken the French about 80 years to create this indispensable condition of authority on which any effective tribal policy, enlightened or reactionary, must ultimately rest. If comments by British officers on the brutality and unimaginitiveness of Turkish tribal administration, incompetent as it was, seem sometimes to go beyond the limits of objectivity, that was due as much to the inability to appreciate the immensity of the task as to ~~the~~ bias against an enemy in the field, or to the fact that observations were frequently based, not on actual acquaintance with Ottoman administration, but on impressions of the chaos following its breakdown. It lay not only "beyond the conception of the Turk to recognise local domination and yoke it to his service" as Gertrude Bell said (Arab of Mesopotamia, op.cit., p.54), but, above all, beyond his power. Bernard-Lacroix (op.cit., p.292)

Far from being intent on either destroying or disintegrating tribalism, it favoured its preservation. It did not see in it a negation of effective government but conceived the tribes as a "native element of order".(1)

Over the greater part of Lower Iraq this reversal of Turkish tribal policy seemed at the time the most obvious answer to pressing administrative problems. It promised to meet the occupying power's needs for a simple but effective machinery to replace the shattered structure of Ottoman authority. The tribe was the "readiest medium to hand through which to carry on the Administration."(2) At the same time the tribesmen would be safeguarded against interference from Arab townsmen with neither understanding nor good-will for them. Especially in the Muntafiq, where the struggle between the tribes and their urbanised Sa'dun overlords(3) dominated the situation, such a strengthening of tribal society by co-operation with the sheiks seemed to be equitable as well as politic.

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(2) previous page contd.
in their discussion of the Algerian situation define the dilemma which faced tribal policy in difficult territories before the advent of mechanised warfare: "Nous avons détruit les forces qui pouvaient nous résister, mais nous avons détruit même-coup celles sur lesquelles nous pouvons nous appuyer.". Marshal Lyautey defined the two-fold nature of his policy of indirect rule in Morocco as relying on the one hand on "l'administration d'un peuple dans la paix, par ses propres organs de gouvernement, suivant ses libertés, coutumes et ses libertés à lui;" on the other hand, on their awareness "qu'il était prêt à user de la force si la nécessitée s'en imposait." (Quoted in A.Bernard, Le Moroc, 7th ed. 1931, p.395).

(1) Gertrude Bell, "Arab of Mesopotamia", op.cit., p.55; see also p. 93.
(2) Admin. Report, Hillah Division, 1918, p.119.
(3) Cf. ~~above p.~~ ; below p. 282 sq.

Thus, during the years 1917-19, there developed in the Lower and Middle Euphrates area what was referred to as the Tribal System of Administration. The tribal organisms were to be fortified or, if necessary, revived, and to be made to function as smoothly as possible under competent sheiks supervised by British Political Officers. The sheiks were to be agents and official representatives of the government within their area. On the principle that "both the attitude and the action of the tribe depend almost entirely on its most influential chief,"(1) efforts were made to concentrate power in the hands of one sheik selected and supported by the authorities.(2) On the one hand the prestige of the sheiks vis-à-vis the tribe was bolstered up. His position in the tribal majlis was enhanced by the powers invested in him by the Tribal Disputes Regulations; in many cases he exercised magisterial and judicial functions as a quasi-government official.(3) On the other hand, his status was dependent on the government. It was the "subsidy idea", it was pointed out, which was "chiefly responsible for the remarkable

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(1) Provisional Notes on the Tribes, Bagdad, 1920.
(2) His obligations were to collect the revenue after the demand had been put on the tribe by the political officer; to maintain law and order in the tribe; to settle minor disputes among tribesmen; to provide labour (not casual but by tribe) when demand was made on him, etc. (Admin. Report, 1918, Nasiriyah, p.351; ibid., Hillah, p.119.)
(3) Admin. Report, Hillah Div^{n}, 1919, p.1.

state of law and order". The sheik values his subsidy "out of all proportion to its worth and will obey any order rather than lose it."(1)

Soon after the occupation of Amara, Nasiriyah and Suk as-Shuyuk, it was felt that some specific legislation was needed to enable the Political Officer to deal with tribal cases, and the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulations were drawn up on the lines of the Indian Frontier Crimes Regulations,(2) and promulgated in February, 1916. It authorised the Political Officer to invoke a tribal majlis to deal, in accordance with tribal custom, with all cases in which any of the parties concerned was a tribesman. The Political Officer was to confirm the findings of the majlis and he might set aside or add to the sentence imposed. The procedure allowing for the settlement of disputes according to tribal usage long familiar to them, proved congenial to the tribesmen;(3) and, at the same time, took a heavy burden off the shoulders of the Political Officers. Another advantage attributed to it was to raise the position and to increase the responsibility of the sheiks. It was believed to have played an important

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1) Admin. Report, 1918, Nasiriyah Div^{n}, p.351: usually Rs 200 to 300 were paid per month. Cf. also Hillah Div^{n}, 1918, p.132. As to lists of (1) Sa'duns, and (2) Tribal Sheiks drawing subsidies in the Muntafiq, cf. Admin. Report 1914-18, p.411; Report, Muntafiq, 1919, Appendix C and D, p.23 f: The Sa'dun received Rs. 2,320 per mensem; the total allowances in the Muntafiq amounted to Rs 5595 per mensem.
2) The regulations were drawn up by Mr. H.R.C.Dobbs.
3) As to Gertrude Bell's view, cf. Arab Bulletin, Oct. 5th, 1916, in "Arab War", op.cit., p.12.

part in the pacification of the tribes by inculcating in them the will to peaceful arbitration.(1)

For a time it was expected that the tribal system could be developed into a general scheme of administration through local dignitaries. Proposals were prepared for divisional organisations, to be formed of representatives of the towns, municipalities and tribes of divisions and districts.(2) In the beginning they were to be controlled by Political Officers and would fulfil educative rather than administrative functions, but they would constitute a nucleus of a "self-determining administration".(3) "Majlis" of sheiks and town notables were formed, and met intermittently for a year or two, in the Hillah, Hindiyah and Amarah districts.(4)

(b) Unequal Experiences with Administration through the Sheiks.

Administration through the sheiks worked well enough at first in the Muntafiq. The Political Officers in Nasiriyah was satisfied with its "splendid results" which "surpassed all expectations".(5) It has to a very large extent resulted in

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1) Cf. Admin. Report, 1918, Kut Div^{n}, p.384; Shatrah District, p.387; Admin. Report, 1919, Hillah, p.3.
2) In fact, these proposals were derived from Ottoman precedents. In Turkish times there existed at headquarters, at each more important Liwa, an advisory body known as majlis al Liwa or divisional council, consisting of twelve members, tribal sheiks and large landowners. (Review of Civil Administration 1914-18, p.25)
3) Ibid.
4) In Amarah, the sheiks and townsmen were to be represented in the proportion of 5 to 3. (Admin. Report, Amarah, 1919, p.2); in the Hindiyah area the Majlis was specially successful in settling petty disputes. It was hoped that the institution "may form a permanent part of the administrative machinery." (Hillah Report, 1919, p.4).
5) Admin. Report, 1918, Nasiriyah Div^{n}, p.351.

the restoration of the natural tribal tradition of adhesion to the tribal sheiks." The Political Officer noted to his satisfaction the "active support of the sheik himself who stands to carve for himself under the British Government a position steadily denied to him by the Turks and infinitely greater than anything he has enjoyed...for a very large number of years."(1)

In the rice-growing areas on either river, however, this satisfaction was soon qualified by doubts as to whether the system could be accepted as a long term solution. Rice-cultivating tribes, being more dependent on organized labour(2) proved more subject to abuse of the new powers by autocratic sheiks than did the Shitwi-growing tribes,(3) whose rank and file enjoyed greater independence of action and opinion.(4) In some of these more densely populated areas a feudal setting had developed. South of Kufa, where date and fig trees, willows and poplars, adorn the banks of the rivers and canals, every sheik and sayid of importance possessed an imposing "Qasr", situated in gardens with a small permanent settlement round it.(5) In Diwaniyah, misgivings were felt against indefinitely bolstering the paramount sheik at the expense of

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(1) Admin. Report, Muntafiq Div^{n}, 1918, by Capt. A.H.Ditchburn.
(2) Cf. below p.266.
(3) Winter crops, i.e. mainly wheat and barley.
(4) Admin Report, 1918, Shamiyah District, p.67.
(5) Ibid., p.64.

smaller tribes and sub-tribal units. The people were "openly averse to the tyranny of the tribal confederation which placed great powers in the hands of people whom they seldom saw - a power which they usually wielded to fill their own pockets and which, it was realized, they could not have exercised but for the support of the Government."(1) Whereas in the Samawa district nearly all sheiks had been granted allowances, it was decided in 1919 to abstain from any extension of the system to other parts of Diwaniyah.(2)

In Amarah, the sheiks' co-operation was obtained, not by subsidies but by grant of farms under the Muqata system.(3) The farms were so profitable that the sheiks "thought twice before encouraging lawless elements; they would abandon most principles rather than risk losing them."(4) The need, however, was recognized of rendering the monopoly of the holders as little harmful as possible. "One thing is certain: if the sheiks were left to determine themselves, there would be no law, save...the good old law, the simple plam, that he should take who has the power, and he should keep who can."(5)

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(1) Ibid., p.72.
(2) Admin. Report, Diwaniyah Div^{n}, 1919.
(3) On the Muqata system, as it was at the time, cf. especially, Admin. Report, Amarah Div^{n}, 1919, p.12.
(4) Admin. Report, 1919, Amarah Div^{n}, p.2.
(5) Admin. Report, 1918, Amarah Div^{n}, p.317.

The system proved its value in the almost purely tribal Hindiyah area which at the time (with the exception of Tahmasiyah) contained scarcely a single group of huts which could be called a village: the bulk of the inhabitants lived as sheep-breeding semi-nomads in scattered mud huts and - more frequently - reed huts or tents.(1) In the Hillah district, on the other hand, villages were numerous, and represented all stages of evolution:some walled against the tribesmen, others open; some purely tribal, others almost independent of neighbouring tribes; some referring their quarrels willingly to the decision of the local sheikhs, other spurning sheikhal authority. It was recognised that the "tribal system of administration" would arrest the tendency to form independent villages.(2) Yet it was doubted whether tribal disintegration could be long delayed,(3) although the sheikhs were not slow in accepting government support to increase the dignity of their position.(4)

When,however,the hilly region east of the Tigris was reached, the prospects of a successful introduction of a system of administration through the sheikhs declined considerably. In the Dialah area,with its small towns and villages,

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(1)Admin.Report,1919, Hindiyah Divn, p. 176.
(2) do. 1918, Hillah Divn, p. 132.
(3) do. 1919, Hillah Divn, p. 119.
(4) Ibid., p. 120.

such tribes as remained — with the exception of the 'Azzah — were cultivating the land and on the verge of settling down in the life of village communities. Sheiks were often of little influence and the tribesmen were willing to approach the Political Officer directly.(1) In Kifri the population was wholly sedentary, with the exception of the Jaf tribe. Though many villages were owned by sheiks, others belonged to townsmen. "In several parts of the district," reported the Political Officer, "I have managed to maintain the tribal system of responsibility for law and order, but all attempts to maintain it for revenue collection merely led to preposterous delay in its collection or intolerably unfair treatment of the fellah. But in spite of this, the tribal system is worth a good trial."(2)

The villages in Kirkuk and along the main Bagdad-Mosul road were completely settled. Tauq, Taza Khurmati, Kirkuk, Altun Keupri, and most of the intermediate villages, containing elements of Turkomans, Kurds and Arabs, were not tribally organized. "Consequently, no attempt has been made to adopt such tribal scheme of government as has been very acceptable in other places... The feeling of these mongrel villages is all against aping the tribe, and they state a decided preference for an ordinary mudir over an artificial

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(1) Admin. Report, 1918, Ba'quba Div^n, p.13.
(2) do. 1918, Kifri District, p.417.

sheik."[1]

In the Kurdish tribal area east of Kirkuk, on the other hand, an attempt to support the tribal system was considered worth making. "The dangers of the system," ~~according to~~ remarked the A.P.O., S.H.Longrigg," are apparent; its advantages are that it fosters a national feeling in the Kurd which may be an asset later on; that it removes him from the corrupt ways of the professional effendi and reduces to one the possible offenders against justice and liberty."[2]

Again, the area west of Kirkuk was inhabited by Arab tribes of which the sheep-breeding 'Ubaid were the most important. The majority lived in tents, wandering in quest of pasturage between the Zab, Tigris and Adheim. Only along the Zab, where flat land allows for lift irrigation, and on the outskirts of Kirkuk was cultivation more widely practised. These agricultural lands were mainly owned by Kirkuklis "whose ploughs are tended by Arabs whom the example of imported Kurds and Turks has taught a settled life."[3] The beginning of 1919 saw the major part of the Kirkuk Division organised into a system of which the tribal unit - however artificial ~~this might be~~ -[4] was an integral part. Nine sheiks, each

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(1) Admin. Report, 1918, Kirkuk Div^{n}, by S.H.Longrigg, p.431.
(2) Ibid., p.432.
(3) Ibid., p.430.
(4) For details on the Qarah Hasan - a 'tribe' of artificial formation but 'as complete and uniform as the rest', cf. Admin. Report, Kirkuk Div^{n}, 1919, p.3.

with a cluster of villages from five to forty in number were established as "natural leaders". Even in the Kifri District, which had been administered non-tribally from the outset, "official sheiks" were appointed. But in the course of 1919, the system, being recognised as artificial, was abandoned. "The tendency in this rather sophisticated area," it was pointed out, "was for the sheiks and tribes to diminish in status."(1)

In the Sulaimaniyah area the failure of the tribal system of administration was closely linked up with the first rising of the great Kurdish rebel, Sheik Mahmud,(2) who, it appears shrewdly conceived at an early moment the inherent weaknesses of a system of indirect administration in an inaccessible mountainous country. His overweaning ambition was not suspected at first and, "as principal adviser of the Political Officer, he encouraged the revival of the tribal system which in Sulaimaniyah was in fact moribund."(3) The Political Officer was ready to fall in with the suggestions in the belief that the tribal system would best meet the national aspirations and preserve the characteristic features of Kurdistan. Sheik Mahmud saw in it a possibility for more

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(1) Ibid.
(2) On Sheik Mahmud's risings in 1919 and 1930, cf. Special Report op.cit., p.255 and 265; Report 1930, op.cit., p.27 f; Survey of International Affairs op.cit., 1934, p.122 f. As to the idea, brought forward at the time of establishing in the Kurdish area a general system of indirect government, cf. Telegram S/S for India to Political, Bagdad, May 9, 1919, in which the Acting Civil Commissioner was authorised to form 'autonomous Kurdish States under Kurdish chiefs who will be

easily "bribing of threatening the chiefs", for centralizing the control in himself, and for obtaining the position ~~of absolute power in himself, and for obtaining the position~~ of absolute power which was his aim.(1)

Southern Kurdistan was consequently divided into tribal areas under tribal leaders. Petty village headmen were unearthed and discovered as leaders of long dead tribes. Disintegrated sedentary clans in the hot countries of Kifri were told to re-unite and remember that they had been once tribesmen. Revenue was to be paid on the estimation of the chiefs who had been found for them. The people "were given over...to a clique of chiefs empowered to bleed and oppress them."(2)

After Sheik Mahmud's rising in 1919, the Political Officer in Sulaimaniyah expressed on the basis of his experiences sentiments on tribalism and tribal administration very different from the sympathetic comments of his colleagues in the south. "It is axiomatic," he wrote, "that the tribesman is a bad citizen, an unproductive subject and a potential

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advised by British Political Officers." In 1941, in the hope of profiting from the confused state of the country and of the international situation, Sheik Mahmud once again left his residence in Bagdad and tried to establish himself in Sulaimaniyah. When the situation in Bagdad was restored, he complied, however, with the Government's request, and life in Sulaimaniyah returned to normal. (Iraq Times, July 31, 1941.)

(3) Admin. Report, 1919, Sulaimaniyah Divn, by E.B. Sloane.

(1) Ibid., p.2.
(2) Ibid., p.3.

breaker of the peace... Revival of the tribal system was therefore a retrograde movement... The tribal system of administration was an idealistic one," he maintained, "and like so many idealistic schemes broke down when brought into contact with dishonest and mundane human nature."(1)

Late in 1919 a bureaucratic administration was re-established in Southern Kurdistan, constituting in fact a return to the "Turkish system of government properly arranged."(2)

(c) Motives of British Tribal Policy.

By that time it was clearly recognised at Government headquarters in Bagdad, that the tribal system of administration was not suitable for the general application which had been originally advocated. In some districts conditions forbade its introduction, in others its introduction courted failure. Moreover, the original argument of military and administrative expediency lost conviction even in those districts where the system had first proved most useful. Whereas in 1918, in Lower Iraq, government through the sheiks had been considered "necessary and politic",(3) because "no other system of government is practicable",(4) it now became the ambition of the Civil Administration to build up an effective

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(1) Ibid., p.3.
(2) Ibid., p.5.
(3) Admin. Report, 1918, Amarah Div^{n}, p.336.
(4) do. 1918, Hillah Div^{n}, p.134.

bureaucratic machinery.

As in the case of other European governments in tribal areas, the British Civil Administration had at first to administer an extensive area with a small European staff unfamiliar with local native customs. The extent to which it made use of tribal chiefs depended, however, not on expediency, but on decisions of principle, deeply rooted in the British philosophy of rule. The support given to customary institutions accorded with the sentiments of a people to whose sense of trusteeship the tribal rather than the educated Arab made the first appeal. It was a system which had evolved from the wide and varied experiences of ~~the~~ British Administration as enabling backward peoples to adjust themselves to a new environment with the least possible disturbance of their own lives.

The task of establishing administration in the tribal areas fell largely on Mr, H.B.C. Dobbs,(1) who, during his term as Revenue and Judicial Commissioner in Baluchistan, had been in direct contact with the system of indirect tribal control, commonly named after its initiator, Sir Robert Sandeman. It was, according to H.B.C.Dobbs' own testimony(2) "the same system for the management of the tribes" that he originally

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(1) Later, Sir Henry Dobbs, High Commissioner of Iraq, 1923-29.
(2) Journal of the Royal Central Asiatic Society, 1932, p.66.

proceeded to establish in Iraq.(1)

Imperial Policy:

There can be little doubt that an adaptation of the Sandeman system recommended itself for Iraq on grounds that appealed to the imperial outlook of the so-called "Indian School", then predominant among the British officials in Bagdad. Whereas, on the other side of the desert it was the policy of the "Western-Arabian school" to encourage Arab patriotism and to enlist the support of the Arab chiefs against their Turkish overlords, in Mesopotamia, both the political and military authorities consistently abstained from organizing the tribes as a means of winning the war. General Maude considered them unreliable and ineffective in a military sense; the military value of T.E.Lawrence's exploits was belittled;(2) plunder and loot were considered the tribesmen's "clearest and strongest positive influence."(3) Tribal policy in Mesopotamia came to restrict itself to pacifying

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(1) Similar systems have, of course, been developed under similar conditions by various Colonial Administrations. It is known, however, that Sandeman's policy has been studied by Marshal Lyautey and influenced his policy in Morocco. (Cf. also Lyautey's article in Révue des Deux Mondes, Jan.15, 1900.) On the tribal policy introduced into the Sudan by Sir John Maffey (Previously Chief Commissioner of North-West Provinces) during his term as Governor-General Sudan, cf. MacMichael, op.cit., p.250 f.

(2) Ireland, op. cit., p.103.

(3) Note on the Tribes for the General Staff, op. cit., p.2.

the tribes and to incorporating the revitalized tribal organisms into an effective administrative machinery, conceived in terms of an Anglo-Indian pattern. For, to make the tribal leaders the spear-head of Arab nationalist, aspiration might well-nigh involve setting into motion, wilfully and for little purpose, a force which it yet might prove difficult and expensive to control in the future. For similar reasons it was not then recognised as a foremost task of British administration in Iraq to assist in the process of integration of town and tribe.

It is not inconceivable that if on the question of Mesopotamia's political future Sir A.T. Wilson's strong will had, in 1920, not proved unavailing against the more liberal policy of His Majesty's Government, British policy might well have been more insistent in future years, that it could not "afford to ignore the mutual contempt and jealousy that exists between townsmen and tribesmen."(1) Mr. Churchill, who perhaps more than anybody else was instrumental in shaping the more liberal policy, countered the clamour for total evacuation of Mesopotamia, with which he was faced at home, with the warning, that Britain could not "leave the great and historic

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(1) Telegram of Acting Civil Commissioner, Political Bagdad to S/S for India, number 9926, November 16, 1918, where Sir A.T.Wilson uses this argument among others against the idea of granting independence to the Arabs of Mesopotamia.

city of Bagdad and other cities and towns in Mesopotamia to be pillaged by the wild Bedouin." He therewith adopted a favourite argument of the Civil Administration: "Tribal predominance," maintained a report of 1918, "will remain for generations a menace to peace and order... Intelligent Arabs know, what the outer world tends to ignore, that the well-armed and partially civilised tribes of Iraq would have as little restraint in their actions and as little mercy on the towns as the wild tribes on the Indian frontier, if they were not kept in check by the presence of armed forces. National unity is impossible on the basis of tribal confederacy... When the barriers between the tribes are broken and the Arab comes to regard himself no longer as a member of the Muntafiq or the Bani Lam, but as a citizen of Iraq, then and not until then, will the theory of National unity and self-determination become a practical proposition."(1)

"We desire to place on record definitely," said the Bonham-Carter Report, drafted shortly before the rising of 1920,(2) "that in the tribal areas for many years to come control of the British officers in charge of divisions is a sine qua non, since no one else commands the confidence of the people to a degree which will assure obedience to the orders of the Government." After the rising, the Arab Council of Ministers

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(1) Review of Civil Administration, 1914/18, p.71.
(2) Paragraph 4, Section 7.

opposed a special tribal representation in the Assembly, whereas the High Commissioner urged it.(1) The difference of opinion was not entirely due to "the traditional fear of townsmen and landowners of the tribes," but also to the well-known belief of the Residency that it could rely on its long standing influence amongst the paramount sheiks to obtain their support for the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty.(2)

C. The Idea of Indirect Administration.

It would be, however, a distortion of the perspective if the advocacy of the indirect system of tribal administration were understood only as an expression of imperial leanings within the Civil Administration. Gertrude Bell, with her unparalleled knowledge of tribal affairs and her considerable influence on tribal policy, strongly favoured it at first, although few British officials in Mesopotamia at the time held views less influenced than hers by the "Indian" and more akin to the "Western-Arabian School".(3)

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(1) Cf. below p. 160 .

(2) Cf. Ireland, op.cit., p.394. It was the 40 Tribal Representatives on whom the Residency counted as a background of the pro-Treaty group.

(3) Gertrude Bell's memoranda of this period have been published in 1) Arab of Mesopotamia, op.cit., 2) The Arab War, despatches reprinted from the secret "Arab Bulletin" with introduction by Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, 1940. In a letter to her mother, Gertrude Bell held that "there is nothing easier to manage than the tribes if you'll take advantage of ~~their~~ tribal organisation." (Letters, op.cit., vol.2, p.442, Letter dated March 1, 1918.)

It was keenly felt then by numerous British officials that indirect administration as a means of protection and guidance of tribal society was rendered more urgent rather than superfluous by the existence of an educated section of town bred Arabs. As there is scarcely a tribal society with a more profound appeal to the Englishman's affection than the Arab, the regret at its threatening disintegration was particularly strongly felt. Many officials were "deeply and emotionally devoted" to the spirit of desert tribalism.(1) There was a genuine desire to rely on indirect administration, not in order to keep the British in, but in order to keep the townsmen out. It would appear reasonable, it was argued, to bide a while before introducing a completely self-determined form of government. "Otherwise we may soon have to face a spectacle of small political enclaves trying hard to determine...large masses of tribesmen refusing to be determined by men who have no sympathy with them or their customs."(2) Government through the sheiks, according to another Political Officer, was "the only alternative to government by native officials which meant tyranny tempered by assassination." When the tribal system at last "fails from natural causes" he hoped "no low-born Bagdadi will be permitted to dance prematurely and indecently on its grave."(3)

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(1) MacDonald, Euphrates Exile, op.cit., p.40.
(2) Admin. Report, 1919, Amarah Div^{n}, p.3.
(3) do. 1918, Hillah Div^{n}, p.134.

d. The Failure of the Policy:

(d) Social dangers:

It illustrates the complexity of the question that the danger of "tyranny" and abuse of power was at the same time the starting point for the increasing volume of criticism against the tribal system of administration. In the south, it was held at first that the sheikh, as a rule, would be easily kept in his place, and could be expected to conduct himself towards his tribe "in a manner consonant with British ideas of justice."(1) Each sheikh "knows that he stands or falls by the way he treats his people and is liked or mistrusted by them."(2) "It would put the sirkal and the fellah completely in the hands of the sheiks if the sheiks fortunately were not compelled to more or less just treatment by the independence of his fellahs, who, if they do not like a particular individual, can move to the service of another and do so."(3) In the hilly regions, the helplessness of the small cultivator was more apparent. "Possibly the new regime would on a reference to the fellah be rejected" wrote the A.P.O. at Kirkuk in 1918.(4) "It will be easy though not always pleasant to be deaf to small, probably legitimate, cries against our nominees." The Political Officer at Amarah went

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(1) Ibid., p.119.
(2) Admin. Report., 1918, Nasiriyah Div^{n}, p.351.
(3) do. 1918, Amarah Div^{n}, p.320.
(4) Capt. S.H.Longrigg, quoted in Admin. Report Sulaimaniyah Div^{n} 1919, p.3

a step further in his criticism: "One thing seems clear," he said, "the policy of backing up the big sheiks is incompatible with the principle of a wide dispersal of wealth and prosperity."(1)

On the whole the tendency in 1919-20 was away from the "Sandeman policy".(2) But no final decision as to the virtues of indirect or bureaucratic government of tribal areas had been arrived at when the rising of 1920, which involved a considerable proportion of the tribes, took place.(3)

(2) The Rising of 1920:

Without the rising and the ensuing new departure in Anglo-Iraqi political relations, and without the disappointment of many British officials with the attitude adopted by the tribes during the rebellion, the dualism of society in Iraq might possibly, though by no means inevitably, have found a clearer reflection in ultimate administrative structure of the country than it has to-day. Administration might have shaped on lines more parallel to those followed at the same time in Morocco by Marshal Lyautey, the great French Colonial Administrator and student of British imperial methods and ideas.(4)

The rising demonstrated that a system, which, under an

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(1) Admin. Report, 1918, p.336.
(2) A.T.Wilson, Mesopotamia, op.cit., vol.2, p.77.
(3) "The outbreak of 1920 destroyed the edifice" of tribal administration "and the tribes relapsed into a traditional state of anarchy." Report 1920/21, p.18.
(4) Cf. above p. 57 Note / ; on Lyautey's tribal policy, cf. A.Bernard, Le Moroc, 7th ed., 1931, p.395 f.

often deceptively smooth surface, had generated such serious dissatisfaction, contained also imperfections even as a short-term solution. The concentration by the authorities of tribal powers into the hands of "one strong man", where there had been previously "six or seven sheiks of equal standing"(1) had inevitably provoked resentment among those left out.(2) The many minor sheiks, who had previously established a sphere of authority for themselves in their sub-sections, were threatened by a relapse into insignificance.(3) The grant of the Muqatas to a few paramount sheiks had intensified the problem of landless sheiks.(4)

At the critical moment the dissatisfied sheiks and sirkals found willing followers among the tribesmen, who had become restive under a system of tribal government which gave the sheiks, relying on British support, an apparently absolute power in all questions of tribal life. Political agitation found a ready ear and fanned dissatisfaction into open rebellion against both sheiks(5) and the British authority on which they relied.(6)

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(1) Admin. Report, 1918, Nasiriyah Div^{n}, 1918, p.351.
(2) Cf. for instance: when Fahid ibn Hadhadh was appointed Supreme Sheikd of the Amarat, two prominent Amarat Chiefs, together with their tribes, crossed into Syria and pnly in 1925 were persuaded to return. (Oppenheim, op.cit., p.90.)
(3) Review of Civil Admin., 1914/18, p.73.
(4) Cf. Admin. Report, 1918, Amarah Div^{n}, p.336.
(5) Report 1920/21, p.18, quotes as an example of "the powerlessness of the tribal chiefs to stand without the support of the Government," the series of brutal murders in Suq District culminating in the assassination in his own guest house of the Sheikh of the Albu Khalifa.
(6) On the rising of 1920 and its influence on land policy, cf. also below p. 311 sqq.

g. The Policy in Retrospect:

It is rather questionable whether, considered restrospectively, the application of the tribal system of administration can be said to have strengthened tribalism. It appears that, on balance, rather than re-establishing the proper equilibrium of the tribes which the Turks had been so intent on upsetting, the period of "Sandeman policy" in its final effect often accelerated the process of tribal disintegration.

The Sheik who leans for maintenance of his prestige on outside support was too alien to the tribal system to be assimilable without far-reaching repercussions. Even if the sheik refrained from gross abuses of the powers invested in him by extraneous authority, he would inevitably tend to pay more attention to acquiring the confidence of the Government than of his tribesmen. The subsidy, moreover, tended to make tribal economy lop-sided, and its subsequent withdrawal sometimes entailed calamitous consequences.(1)

To some extent these adverse effects may be attributed to the fact that the system of indirect administration of tribal areas had not been able to mature fully in Mesopotamia.

To make deliberate use of the tribal organization was not originally a policy of choice, but was adopted owing to the

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(1) Cf. for instance: Leach, op.cit., p.53. "It seems significant that the Shevâini, who alone had never had to undergo the economic shock of temporary Government support, appeared to be to-day much the most integrated group in the socialogical sense."

lack of facilities for direct official management. It was backed up by a conviction of the inherent values of tribal institutions, but soon questioned by doubts as to its viability or stability to serve as the foundation of anything more than a provisional system of administration. When the stage had been passed, at which the administration's effort was absorbed in secuting the first essentials of law and order, a reconsideration of the type of agency best suited for further advance had revealed the weaknesses of the indirect system under conditions in Mesopotamia.

Thus, the system did not develop beyond an initial stage of crude application, rendering it doubtful, in fact, whether we may rightfully refer to a system of indirect tribal administration having ever been established in any part of the country. The sheiks were sometimes appointed, often removed; ~~and~~ they were always under strict control of the Political Officer and were practically the mere agents of the Central Administration. It is true, judicial power was granted to tribal authorities, but their recognition as administrative organs for the purpose of local government, with their own sources of revenue and a defined sphere of expenditure, was not completed even in the Muntafiq or Amarah.

3. From the Anglo-Iraqi Regime to Independent Iraq: The establishment of bureaucratic control.

With the establishment of the provisional Arab Government late in 1920, the emphasis shifted back towards a bureaucratic administration of the tribal areas wherever and as soon as conditions would permit it. To the mind of the Arab politician a system of administration through the sheiks could not be cleared of the stigma of either constituting an anachronism or of signifying extraneous political control. For the Iraqi Government to rely for its dealings with a numerous and important section of the people, on the services of agents whose standing depended only partially on factors under Government control,(1) was considered incompatible with the concept of the modern state.(2) Gertrude Bell saw the dilemma: "The tribes don't want to form part of a unified state," she wrote, "but the towns can't do without it."(3)

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(1) The double loyalty of a tribal dignitary in government service has raised in the past, and occasionally still raises to-day, specific problems; cf. for instance, as a classic illustration from the 18th century, the case of the Shawizade Hadjdji Sulaiman who had twice served as Deputy Pasha of Bagdad, but who in spite of his urbanization returned, when he fell into disgrace with his tribe the 'Ubaid and organized a campaign against the Government. (Oppenheim, op.cit., p.193).

(2) Sir Henry Dobbs admitted in 1932 that, although he was "a fervent admirer of the "Sandeman policy", he was "afraid that the future does not look very promising for it." (Journal Royal Central Asiatic Society, 1932, p.66). Cf. also Earl Peel (Ibid., 1935, p.276). "Whether or not that system would succeed with more sophisticated races I do not know."

(3) Letter of September 5th, 1920, Letters, op.cit., vol.2 p.497.

During the Anglo-Iraqi period, as a part of the policy of progressive release from the tutelage of the mandate, British assistance was whole-heartedly given to the achievement of the integration of the tribes into the new state. The process of integration may be said to have made its first real progress with the anti-British rising of 1920 in which (even though each tribe rose mainly for its own selfish ends) a common action of tribe and town in a cause transcending the tribal horizon had been achieved; tribal national heroes had arisen and sheiks had been drawn into the orbit of national politics. Yet, for some time afterwards, special demands were liable to be put on the tact of the British representatives when tribes insisted on alluding to their former friendship with Britain. In 1923, a powerful party among the Euphrates tribes opposed the Government and professed a desire for the return of British rule. The adoption of a severe attitude towards the malcontents was alleged to be tantamount to the abandonment of Britain's special adherents, whilst any tenderness towards them was misinterpreted as encouragement of sedition against the Iraq Government, with the object of maintaining British influence in the country.(1)

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(1) Report, 1923/4, p.6. Some Euphrates tribes, together with the people of Basra and the Assyrians, were at the time commonly labelled as pro-British.

(a) The role of the Royal Air-Force:

British assistance was indispensable for the steady extension of government control over the outlying districts. Until the termination of the Mandate, the coercive power of the Royal Air Force stood behind all serious administrative decisions with a bearing on the ability or inability of the Iraqi authorities to widen the area of their influence over the tribes or to consolidate their control.(1) The power of the R.A.F. to cope with serious tribal situations had been accepted ever since, in the autumn of 1923, air action, extending over two days and nights, against Lower Euphrates tribes near Rumaytha decided the issue in a situation which had come to be regarded as a test of the government's power to enforce its authority. British pilots operated against unruly Euphrates tribes, against intruding Nomads from Nejd(2) or Syria,(3) or against Sheik Mahamud's Kurdish tribesmen.(4)

It is the armoured car and aeroplane which, by destroying even the illusion of independence among the tribes, have opened up a new era for tribal society. They have taken out of the nomads hands his weapon of evasiveness and mobility. The open desert, since times immemorial the sanctuary of the

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(1) Cf. the vivid personal account of the part played by the R.A.F. and on problems arising from the co-operation with the Iraqi officials during the last years of the Iraqi regime. (MacDonald, Euphrates Exile, op.cit., p.29 ff.)
(2) Report, 1928, p.30.
(3) On the fighting between the Ruwalla and Saba's section of the 'Aniza, cf. Report, 1929, p.46; 1930, p.38.
(4) Report, 1931, p.17.

nomads, has lost its inaccessibility.

Until the last war, unruly nomads could be coerced into submission only by cutting them off from the markets or by expensive military expeditions into the desert. Both were wasteful methods and rarely productive of decisive results. In the former case, the settled population, deprived of their regular transactions with the nomads, might find their economic life as badly shaken as the nomads themselves, who on their part might be able to move on to alternative markets. In the latter case a sudden "razzia" might at best force a tribe to its knees by depriving it of its herds, but others would take its place.

In an effort to gain control over the main trans-desert routes, the Ottoman had created the Sanjak el-Zor and, using it as their base, had pushed ahead with the construction of military posts in the Upper Euphrates valley.(1) This improved the situation in the area affected but not much outside. The fact remained that the Turks were generally unable to follow the Bedouins more than three or four miles into the desert, the limits fixed by infantry or cavalry through lack of water supply.(2) When post-war Iraq developed its system of desert

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(1) El Zor was captured by Omar Pasha in 1857.

(2) Glubb, "Journal of the Royal Central Asiatic Society", 1935, p.28.

police posts[1] and defensible serais,[2] these were connected by and served as depots for armoured police cars and, above all, they could count on the assistance of the Royal Air Force.

The early recognition by Mr. Churchill of the great possibilities of the air arm in dealing with local and in particular tribal risings at a comparatively low cost in men and money was perhaps the most decisive single factor in shaping the British policy towards Iraq, initiated at Cairo in 1921.[3]

The expectations placed on the air force proved justified. It made possible a highly centralised yet widely understanding intelligence which is the essence of ~~wide~~ economic control. The swiftness of the air arm enabled it to reach at the focus of trouble before the disturbance against which it was directed had time to permeate large areas; it often forestalled trouble that was brewing, since the mere appearance of aeroplanes would suffice to achieve the object; it was unprovocative because it offered the tribes no one to fight nor a camp to raid. The air arm officially employed provided a method of

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(1) Op. cit., p.58.
(2) I.e., H.Q. of Administrative Units. The Government began with their erection in 1924 in such restless or exposed areas as the Middle Euphrates and the Kurdish district. "Their fine appearance greatly impressed the tribesmen and convinced them of the Government's intention to govern." (Special Report, p.136.)
(3) Before the Cairo Conference occurred, the notable success of the R.A.F. in the quelling of the "Mad Mullah's" rising in Somaliland on which Mr. Churchill commented in the House: "The Royal Air Force achieved more than we were able to do in one expedition before the war at an expenditure...that would be six million or seven million pounds of the present currency."

tribal control more effective and less costly in life and suffering for both parties.(1)

(b) The advance of Provincial Administration:

With these improved means of coercion at the disposal of the Government, the pacification of the country, and the establishment of administration in the outlying districts, proceeded steadily. In the early twenties the whole of the lake and swamp area of the Hawizeh Hor could be regarded as the domain of Sheik Salim al-Khaiyun who farmed the more important government taxes and dominated the government representatives, the Mudir of Chabaish. In 1925, after Chabaish had been converted into a Qadah and a qaimaqam had been appointed, the Government registered with satisfaction the steep rise in the

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(1) It appears that the British Government, which was repeatedly attacked by sections of public opinion at home because of its resort to action against primitive peoples, succeeded in establishing the fallacy of these accusations, in so far as it is not the employment of airplanes for policing purposes in accessible areas which is open to criticism, but the methods of employment. Under the Anglo-Iraqi regime the tribes were generally given time to take their families to safe hiding places in the desert and to remove their flocks. (Report, 1923-4, p. 27; 1931, p.14; 1932, p.3). On the controversy, cf. Debate of the House of Commons, June 1933; Letter to "The Times", June 14, 1933, signed by Earl Winterton, Capt. Balfour and others in which it was pointed out that the "efficiency and humanity of the air arm has been testified by all the great political officers who have seen the air arm at work in Iraq and elsewhere, such as Sir Percy Cox, Sir Henry Dobbs and Sir Francis Humphrys." Cf. "Note on the Methods of Employment of the Air Arm in Iraq", 1924, Cmd. 2217. Also, "Information secured from Taha Pasha al Hashimi" regarding the status of the tribes from a military point of view, letter dated March 16, 1931, App. to Jamali, op. cit., p.140.

Revenue Returns from the area, following the substitution of direct government control for that of local sheikhs. In Amarah, whenever one of the great sheikhal lessees lost in prestige, the Government established direct control over the former sub-lessees. The police began to rely less on the assistance of the sheikhs in the maintenance of law and order and the sheikhs began to turn to the police for help. In the Northern area the unlimited authority of the Kurdish Aghas was gradually restricted and the official Mudirs obtained a growing measure of influence.(1)

In the desert districts the maintenance of law and order and the protection of the principal overland routes were gradually taken out of the hands of the sheikhs hitherto engaged for the purpose. In the Northern Desert, the Mosul Camel Corps was at first under the control of Sheik' Ajil al-Yawar;(2) the Southern Desert was loosely controlled through the agency of paramount sheikhs until 1928.(3) In 1925, a regular Dulaim Desert Force was created with forts at Rutbah and Muhaiwar to protect the Aleppo road,(4) for which the chief sheikh of the Dulaim had accepted responsibility.(5) In 1928, a special Southern Desert Force was entrusted with the

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(1) Report, 1925, p.34.
(2) do. 1922-23, p.25
(3) do. 1928, p.43.
(4) do. 1925, p.43.
(5) do. 1924, p. 41.

control of the area from the Trans-Jordan border to Kuwait.(1)

In the mountainous country near the Turkish border, Sheik Ahmad of Barzan exercised effective control until his religious aberrations provoked trouble with neighbouring tribes in 1931. After difficult military operations the Government succeeded in establishing a regular administration throughout the Barzan territory.(2)

The establishment or the maintenance of direct control involved severe clashes between tribes and Government which were invariably decided by the intervention of the R.A.F.. It was the long arm of the R.A.F. which throughout the Anglo-Iraqi period remained a primary guarantee of Government prestige among the tribes. As late as the summer of 1932, when the liquidation of the mandatory regime was imminent, the success of operations against the Kurdish Highlanders of Barzan depended on the assistance of units of the R.A.F.(3)

C. Tribal control after the release from the Mandate:

Would the young Iraqi army and air force be able to shoulder the task without British assistance? Of the military establishments, which were at the time represented in Iraq - namely, the English forces of the British Crown, the Assyrian

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(1) Report, 1928, p.43. Capt. Glubb was placed in charge of the newly-created Southern Desert Province with effect from March 1st., 1928. The Southern Desert Force was equipped with armoured cars, with marchine guns and mobile wireless sets. Capt. Glubb claims that it added much to the efficiency of desert patrols when Bedouins were employed to man the cars and machine guns. (Journal of the R. Central Asian Society, 1935, p.29)
(2) Report, 1931, p.23; 1932, p.22.
(3) do. p.14.

levies in the British Crown's service and the National Army of Iraq – the Iraqi army was the least experienced and the least efficient.(1)

In Britain, the question was repeatedly ventilated,(2) ~~and not without anxiety~~ as to the capacity "of the town-bred Iraqis, from whose ranks all officials are drawn, to manage the Kurdish and Arab tribes." Sir Henry Dobbs feared the "inability of the Iraqi army, unaided by the British Air Force, to conduct tribal warfare." At any moment some administrative blunder might throw the Kurdish border or the Euphrates district into rebellion. If this once happened, it would be "doubtful whether Bagdad could ever restore its authority without foreign aid, and there must always be the danger that the effective administration of Iraq would be reduced to the basin of the Tigris between Basra and Bagdad whilst the rest of the country lapsed into chaos."(3)

Apprehensions of this kind were not peculiar to the British observers but were current throughout Iraq. So general was the lack of confidence in the ability of the Iraqi

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1) Survey of International Affairs, op.cit., 1934, p.181; Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, 1931, vol.255: Speech by Mr. Amery, p.1829; by Sir Samuel Hoare, p.1793.
2) Sir Samuel Hoare in the House of Commons, July 23, 1931 (Official Report, vol.255, p.1788); Sir H. Dobbs, Letter in "The Times", Sept. 29, 1932; Journal of Royal Central Asiatic Society, 1932, p. 668; Survey of International Affairs, 1930, op.cit., p.225.
3) Journal Royal Central Asian Society, 1932, p.668.

Army and Air force to hold together and act efficiently in face of serious tribal opposition, that it seemed inevitable that sooner or later Government and tribes would have to take their measure afresh. The test came with the serious rising of the Euphrates tribes in the spring of 1935.(1) The Army and Air Force under Bekr Sidki Pasha comported themselves creditably, and, in view of the decisive success they achieved, all sections of the population, and particularly the tribes, revised their opinion of the Iraq Government's compulsive ability. Henceforth tribal representatives were not so much suspecting the Government of inability to deal with tribal unrests, but were accusing it of unnecessary brutality in the course of their suppression.(2)

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(1) On the history and the background of the risings, cf. Capt. A.A.MacDonald, Royal Central Asian Society Society, 1936, p.34. Cf. Oriente Moderno, 1935, p.166, 218, 275, 326; "Survey of International Affairs", op.cit., 1934, p.215.

(2) Cf., for instance, in the summer of 1940, after action had been taken to suppress unrest in the Budair tribe, the Government was accused of having shed the "blood of hundres of Iraqis". (cf. Bilad, Nov. 14th, 1940).

B. The Nomads.

1. Nomadic Society

(a) The effect of nomadism on tribal society.

We are infinitely better informed on the ways of life of the Arab nomads[1] than of the settled tribesmen. What traveller or explorer, indeed, of those that have to stay at home who would not be attracted to them by some hidden "aristocratic sympathy in revolt against the restraint of Western Society"?[2] But there are other less "unscientific" reasons which, even in Iraq, where less than a quarter million nomads form but a small minority of tribal society, would justify the student of tribal customs and traditions in focussing his attention first of all on the Bedouin. They provide him with original material, the settled tribes only with secondary. The settled tribesmen, even if these are fellahsen of Bedouin origin, will have forgotten what they once practised or, if they are tribalised fellahsen, will have but half-acquired what they had never fully experienced. But also for us, who are in this connection more concerned with the present and future of tribalism than its past, the nomads possess special significance, because tribalism has not only derived from them, but has also hitherto in some measure been maintained by their pressure.

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(1) As to the Mesopotamian Nomads, cf. especially the bibliographies in Oppenheim, op.cit.
(2) D.S.Hogarth, The Nearer East, p.269.

The great migration of the Shammar from Nejd and their collision with the 'Anaiz[illegible] resulted in the uprooting again of tribes who had been taking up agriculture over hundreds of miles of the Euphrates Valley. The nomads' menacing omnipresence discouraged the cultivators from a lasting attachment to their soil. It forced them into or kept them in the tribal fold, which alone offered them some protection against the nomads' incursions on their crops and herds.(1) In many tribes a nomadic section preserved the allegiance to the tribe among its settled elements, who, otherwise, isolated and fixed as they were, would tend to replace tribal ties by those of neighbourhood.(2) The annual appearance of the black tents in the settled regions kept the memories of a Bedouin past alive,(3) even if it found expression only in shifting and unstable methods of cultivation.

In Iraq, the tribalising effect of the desert nomads extended, as we have seen,(4) deep into the settled areas, and

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(1) "Every year," says, for instance, Admin. Report, 1918, Hindiya Distr., p. 176, "large numbers of the Bedouins of the desert come in with their flocks and herds to pasture in Hindiya district, and nothing but close confederacy can enable the tribes of Hindiya to meet the hordes of the Council Chamber." This, it is pointed out, "is largely responsible for the strong tribal organisation."

(2) Cf., for instance, R. Charles, op. cit., p. 150; on the Agedat, ibid., p. 155: "... La vie nomade, en élargissant l'horizon communautaire, contribue à la solidarité de la confédération."

(3) Long settled Iraq tribes of little importance cling to the memory of their distinguished nomadic past: for instance, the Tai, Bani Tamim, or the Khazraj of pre-Mohammedan fame (cf. E. Bräunlich, op. cit., p. 74 f; Gertrude Bell, Arab

agricultural standards declined utterly, not only because they cultivators were unable to defend themselves, but also because they were not equally indispensible to the nomads as the fellahs of the oases; while the relations between nomads and oasis dwellers, on whose supplies the nomads depend, tend to be formalized by specific terms of custpmary law, those between nomads and the fellahs on the fringes of agricultural zones (1) are more often based on little else than opportunism, although the elastic term of Khuwe may be stretched to cover this kind of relationship as well. (2)

It was under such conditions, where the cultivator lived under the shadow of the nomad - ruling out the development of a symbolic form of side-by-side existence of herder and cultivator on equal terms - that in Iraq tribalism became

From previous page: of Mesopotamia). Cf. also C.H.M. Doughty (in "The Observer", June, 1922) review of Hogarth's "Arabia": The settled tribes are "jealous of their own lineage and maintain even their proper tribal temperament."
(4) Cf. above, p. 21.

(1) In the agricultural areas one village can take the place of another. The nomads' privileges over the cultivators are perpetually questioned and rendered insecure by the central authority. On the causes of the demoralisation of desert society in the desert border region, cf. also de Boucheman (Revue des Etudes Islam, 1934, p. 53): "La région limitrophe de désert est beaucoup plus propice aux troubles, non seulement que les pays sédentaires, mais aussi que la steppe proprement dite. C'est qu'au désert également le coutume des tribus reprime et tout ou moins réglemente le brigandage. En bordure les coupables peuvent, suivant le cas, se réfugier chez les sédentaires ou chez les nomades." On the moral inferiority of the riverain Arab, cf. Grant, Syrian Desert, p. 26.

(2) See, for instance, the village of El Kom in the Dar el Zor district which still in recent years had repeatedly to be abandoned by the villagers because of the bedouin danger. "Malgré les taxes de fraternité on a suffisamment souffert des bédouins pour être bien convaincu - dans le hameau - qu'un Arab peut tuer sans compensation jusqu'à six ou sept villageurs. ... Les sédentaires endurent une telle situation; ils y sont habitués." A. de Boucheman, Une petite Cité Caravinière; Suhre, 1937.

the prevalent system of social organisation outside the towns. (1)

There is no doubt that the decline and ultimate disappearance of nomadic tribalism, though it would not, eo ipso, entail the end of agrarian tribalism, would yet deprive it of a source of strength. What then is the situation of nomadism in Iraq to-day? How, in particular are we to assess the viability it retains under the apparently irresistible impact of a changing environment?

(b) The Status of the Nomads in tribal society.

The exalted status of the Bedouin in tribal society, once resting securely on the acknowledgment of their material and ideological superiority, has been badly shaken. Their

(1) Cf.D.G.Hogarth on the superior type of the nomad in the oasis region, The Nearer East, op. cit., p.258; as to his low opinion of the nomads of Mesopotamia, ibid., p.264. Among the principal Iraqi confederations, the 'Aneze, in particular, are distinguished by a historical background of oasis domination. Cf.Doughty's description of the legal relations between the Arabian 'Aneze, and the cultivators of the Chaibar oasis (Arabia Deserta vol.II p.115) Some 'Aneze sections after their northern migration, managed to continue to base their economic life on the control of oases. The oases Djof and Kaf were lost by them only after the war 1914/18. From Kaf, which was managed by a slave, Sheik Umri received an annual tax of 500 madjidi (Oppenheim, p.105; Musil Rwala, op.cit., p.58) The Amarat 'Aneze still derive (according to Oppenheim, p.72) a large part of their date supply from the Shatita oasis which they own.

On nomad-oasis relations in the Algerian Sahara, cf. Lacroix-Bernard, op.cit., p.92 and 178 f. With an oasis in the Moroccan Sahara deals a monograph by F.de la Chapelle, Une Cité de l'Oud Wra sous le Protectorat des Nomades, Mesrat Hesperis, 1929.

power and their terror is, to all practical extents, a matter of the past. Their code of honour and scale of manly virtues, which, rarely practised by either nomad or settled tribesmen, had yet been setting the standards for both, are steadily losing their binding force.

However, the hierarchy of esteem in tribal society, with the camel-breeding Bedu at the top, still persists. It remains more than a shadow of arrogant claim, as long as cultivating tribes are ready to admit that they rank at the bottom of tribal society, and as long as "ils n'en ont pas moins conscience d'appartenir à cette société."(1) But, generally speaking, the self-confidence of the cultivators is growing, though slowly. Who, indeed, will in the long run acknowledge a superiority unsustained by strength?

The decline in prestige of the contemporary nomads can be well reconciled with the romanticising of a nomadic past. Townsmen still take pride in their alleged desert descent.(2) Urbanised land-owning sheiks continue to attach a symbolic

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(1) De Boucheman, op.cit., p.106; and Rivalite..., op.cit., p.21. Still the river tribes are to the Bedu Ma'dan, a loose denomination which applies generically to the social level below that of the speaker; on the lips of the cultivators the description refers to the buffalo breeders of the marshes; cf. Gertrude Bell, Arab of Mesopotamia, op.cit., p.85. De Boucheman, Revenue des Etud. Islam. 1954, p.16, presents this "hierarchy" in tabularised form.

(2) "They settled down into citizens. But the tribal links are unbroken," Gertrude Bell, Letters, op.cit., Vol.2, p.444. A professional townsman may "reprendre la coutume bedouine pour montrer qu'il s'engorguellit de son origine, même après des siecles de vie sédentaire." A de Boucheman, ~~Reports of a~~ (L'Asie Française, 1954, p.78.)

value to the tradition of the tent.(1) What to-day is still carried on either out of genuine sentiment,or with an eye to a still appreciable tribal clientele,may tend to degenerate into mere snobbery,which may be quite compatible with an utter contempt for the "savages".But the fact of a continued implied admission of the aristocratic status of the Bedouin cannot be overlooked, in considering the issues of nomad policy.

(c)Differentiation inside tribal society.

In the attempt to classify the ever-changing aspect of tribal society,(2) to determine,for instance,the prevalence of.

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(1) 'Ajil al Yawar,the late paramount sheikh of the Iraqi Shammar, one of the greatest landowners of the country,who had travelled in Europe,preferred to live i.. his tent camp near Tel-Afar or at Belad Sindjar.Fa'ur al Fa'ur,the present representative of the dynasty of the Fadl,a large landowner (who in 1935 became a member of the Syria Parliament),used to entertain his guests in an elaborate tent put up in front of his country house.(Oppenheim,p.369)

(2)We do not propose to deal in this connection with the individual tribes.The history and genealogy of the tribes as well as the tribal map has been fairly fully treated,especially (as regards Upper Iraq) in Oppenheim,1939,op.cit. who incorporates most previous publications. (It was impossible to ascertain whether the promised volume,dealing with Lower Iraq has been published during the war).Oppenheim discusses critically the reports of European travellers (of which Longrigg,op.cit., p.331-34o provides a valuable bibliography) 'Abbas el 'Azzawi 'Asha'ir el 'Irak (The Tribes o of Iraq) vol.I,Baghdad 1937 adds (according to Oppenheim,p.385).- Few unknown facts,except points of detail For Lower Iraq ,much valuable,though in some respects,out-of-date information can be found in the various British reports published during and after the last war.Cf.Tribes around the junction of the Euphrates and the Tigris,1917;Arab Tribes of the Baghdad Wilayet,1918.;Capt.C.C.Mylles, Notes on Tribes and Sheikhs of ~~the Shatrah District,1920;Capt.B.S.~~ Capt. B.S.Thomas, Short History of the Shatrah Tribes, 1920 ~~Arab-Albu Kamal District,1919;Major J.J.La~~ Eadie,Note on Nomad Tribes,1919;Capt.C.S.J.Berkeley,Notes on Tribe and Sheikhs of the Shatrah District,1920;Buxton,Marsh Arab of Lower Iraq,1920; Capt.

nomadic or agricultural characteristics in a specific tribal or group, some guidance is offered by an observation of the kind of migrations carried out. Do they proceed by a fixed or changing route? Do they lead far afield and deep into the desert, as in the case of the Shammar, or only a short distance away from the winter quarters along the rivers, as in the case of the ~~Gu-beit~~ Jubaur? Do they extend their migration over the greater part of the year, as the Aneze, or only over a few months, as the Dulaim? Do the tribes migrate annually or, given favourable climatic conditions, are they sedentary in some years, as sections of the Shammar Tega or Bani Tamim? Conclusions on the type of nomadism concerned can be drawn from the composition of the herds and flocks, i.e. from the

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J.L.M.Barrett, Notes on the character of the Tribes and their Sheiks of the Qal'at Sikar District, 1920. — Cf. also, the Tribal Lists attached to the Administrative Reports of this period: The Confederations and tribes in Suq al-Shuyuk and Hammar Districts, showing sheiks, sections and numbers of fighting men. (Muntafiq Report, op.cit., 1918, p.379 ; 1919, p.82 f); Tribes, Sections, Sheiks, Sarkals and number of men of Kabela neighbourhood (Kabela Report, 1918, p.193); Tribes of the Diwaniyah District (Report, 1918, p.198-201); Tribes of the Amarah Div^{n} (Report, 1918, p.315-20); Lists of Tribes and Sheiks of the Kut Div^{n} (Report, 1918, p. 344-46); List of Sheiks, Sarkals, etc. of Shatrah (ibid., p.389-92); List of Sheiks etc of Qal'at Sikar Districts (ibid., p.399-401); Treatment of Muntafiq Tribes, showing approximate number of fighting men (ibid., p.407). List of Nomadic Tribes of the Muntafiq Div^{ns} and their subsections, sheiks and number of rifles, (Muntafiq Report, 1919, App. B. p.22 f); List of Tribes, Sheiks etc of Nasiriyah Div^{n}. (Nasiriyah Report, 1919, p.61 f) ⌒ ⌒ List of the Cultivating Tribes of the Dulaim Div^{n}, (Report 1918, p.212). Cf. also, the tribal map attached to Adm. Report, Muntafiq, 1919; the map of tribes of the Feluja District (Adm. Report, Dulaim Div^{n}, p.224) etc.

relative number of camels, sheep or goats.(1) The prevailing type of the dwelling is, however, an unreliable criterion of the degree of sedentarisation. For although all nomads live under the tent, not all tent dwellers are nomads.(2) There are tribes of which one section dwells under tents, others in huts; tribesmen may live in tents in the summer and in huts in the winter. Besides innumerable stages in the gradual transformation from tent to hut can be found.(3) Though sometimes the mode of life is fairly uniform throughout a tribe, others contain nomadic and sedentary sections side-by-side, as the Dulaim, Zoba, Abbu Muhammed or Bani Tamim.(4)

In spite of the bewildering multitude of forms and combinations of forms which characterise tribal society, there is an essential identity in heart, culture and interest; "their civilisation and politics are universal."(5) Iraq's nomadic

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1) The fluid division between different types of nomads does not diminish the value of the French classifications in "chameliers" and "moutonniers", or of the category of "grand-nomades".
2) "The House of Hair is first sheltered with reeds or brushwood, next, it is walled in by mud, bricks or matting, the roof of hand-woven woollen tenting is next discarded, and finally the tent becomes a mud hut." Peake Report, op.cit., p.237.
3) Cf. de Boucheman, Rivalité, op.cit., p.37, on the Hadidyn: "quasi-sédentaires sous la tente."
4) H.Charles, Tribus Moutonnières, op.cit., p.145, calls the latter (in the case of the Agédat) tribes of "double morphology"; cf. also de Boucheman, Rivalite..., p.32. The Dulaim, for instance, the powerful tribe of the southern Jezirah, include the nomadic Dulaim Koshar and the sedentary Dulaim Falalih (Oppenheim estimates that about one-quarter of the Dulaim are nomads; according to Admin. Report 1919, Dulaim Divn, p.2 f., over 50% (44,000 of a total of 84,000). Other examples: Admin. Rep., ibid., 1919, Zoba: Shepherds 15,000; Cultivators 13,500; 'Agaidat: shepherds 6,000, cultivators 32,000. Of the 'Ubeid who are mainly cultivators between the little Zab and Adhem, one section were

society may be legitimately discussed as one distinct whole, provided the Kurdish hill nomads, the Jaf, Herki and Hamewand are excluded.(1) In Kurdish society, the Agha, who controls the strategically situated defensible village, is the aristocratic, and is not disposed to look up to the chief of the Kurdish nomads. Although this should not be exaggerated into a Kurdish reversal of the Arab order of nomad-cultivator relations,(2) it is a fact that among the Kurds the attitude towards raids, feuds and pillage, and towards martial virtues in general is not the privilege of the nomads to the extent typical of Arab tribal society.(3) Raids and feuds were a socially approved aspect of inter-tribal life, original to the settled communities and not only a nomadic heritage. Folk tales and tradition which celebrate these exploits are at home in the villages.

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(4) still recently camel breeders (Oppenheim, p.191). Cf. also on the Bani Tamim: Jamali, op.cit., Appendix, Information received from Sheik Hassan al Suhail. Sectional groups of the nomadic 'Azzah worked as fellahs in different parts of the Baqubah river (Admin. Report, 1918, p.13 f).

2) Longrigg, op.cit. p.77.

(1) On the Kurdish tribes cf. Mark Sykes, The Kurdish Tribes of the Ottoman Empire, Journal of the Anthropol. Institute, vol. XXXVIII, 1908, (Iraqi Tribes, on p.458 f); Driver, Kurdistan and the Kurds, 1919 (with Tribal Lists, p.55f), and Tribal Maps (on Jazidi Kurds, cf. p.65 f); Notes on Kurdish Tribes on and beyond the border of the Mosul vilayet, compiled in the office of the Civil Commissioner, Bagdad, July 1919, (For official use only).

(2) As is perhaps done by F.W.Chardin, op.cit., p.229: "The nomads are esteemed much as our gipsies in this country." According to Leach, op.cit., p.27, the Kurdish villages keep the nomadic Herki in considerable respect, telling improbable tales of the rigours and privations they can put up with and attaching to them "almost legendary qualities."

(3) Cf. Leach, op.cit., p.24 and 55.

Unlike ~~the~~ Arab tribal society,(1) the settled tribes centered in villages, constitute in Kurdish tribalism the rule, and migratory pastoralism takes ~~as well~~ many the form of 'trans humance'. Following the climatic conditions of the area, they live in villages during five to eight months of the year and in summer after the harvest go to the mountains where they occupy strictly defined areas.(2)

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(1) Where, however, Kurdish tribes penetrated into the plains, be it in the Northern Jezirah, North and North-East of Mosul, or East of the Tigris, the differences between the Arab and Kurdish systems are generally levelled out. Kurdish clans have, for instance, been accepted by the Arab Mawali tribe (de Boucheman, Etudes Islamique, 1934, p.25). On the other hand, the Kurdish Milli Federation contains several smaller Arab tribes (i.e. the Baggarat, Oppenheim, op.cit., p.240; the 'Adwan, Gertrude Bell, Arab Bulletin, 23.3.1917 in Arab War, op.cit., p.46; Oppenheim, op,cit. p.233 f; the Hadidin of the Urfa region,(not those of the Sinjar) Oppenheim, p.266) or tribal fragments (for instance, of the Sherabin tribe, Oppenheim, p.258; even a section of the Shammar, ibid., p.141 and 164). Some of these Arab tribes show strong signs of Kurdish assimilation,(particularly the 'Adwan of Ras el Ain, ibid., p.234), whilst, on the other hand, the sheikal family of the ~~family~~ Milli is largely arabized, ibid., p.60. Cf. also Pierre Rondot, op.cit., p.35; R.Montagne, Quelque Aspects de peuplement de la Haute Djézirè, in Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales, 1932, p.61 f. L.R.Hay reported in 1919, the marriage of a sister of Sheik Hanashi of the Tai with Ibrahim Agha of Dizaï. (Admin. Report, Arbil Div^{n}, 1919, p.5). The Shevdini, a Kurdish semi-nomadic tribe, spend their summer in black tents; the off-partitioned "guest-house" of the Agha follows Arab Bedouin usage (Leach, op.cit., p.29). An inter-tribal policy, before the last war, alliances between Arab and Kurdish tribes against rivals of either race were not uncommon (op.cit., p.139 f., for instance). On the close integration of Arabs and Kurds in the Djezire, cf. R.Montagne, Quelque Aspects de Peuplement de la Haute Djézirè, loc. cit., 1932, vol.II, p.53. An essential condition which facilitated such cases of mutual assimilation is, that the tribal organisation of the Kurds is built on kinship affiliations of the typical semitic pattern (Leach op.cit., p.2, 13 f, 19 f.)quite similar to that of the Arab tribes. Conditions in the Kurdish areas are described as 'feudal' in the ~~same way~~ sense that in a fully

2. The Disintegration of Nomadic Society.

(a) The basic problem of nomad policy.

Since the days of Midhat Pasha[1] the tide has turned again and the nomadic flood has either receded towards the desert or has dried up altogether. The general trend is once more towards sedentarisation.[2] Though the capriciousness of the actual process defies the laying down of definite successive stages through which the nomads pass in the course

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settled environment the Agha's position tends to be more autocratic than patriarchal (Shardin, op.cit., p.230) But in the Kurdish hill areas the Aghas and their tenants are generally of the same kinship group (cf. Leach, op.cit., p.22). In the plains, where the Aghas are mostly of different lineage to their followers (ibid., p.6 and 26; W.R.Hay, Two Years in Kurdistan, p.77) vestiges of Ottoman feudalism have indeed survived.x In contrast to Arab-Kurdish tribal inter-relations stands the isolation of the Jezidi tribes of the Jebel Sinjar which, besides the difference of speech, are non-Moslems and, above all, a minority in an Arab surrounding. On the Jezidis, cf. R.Lescot, Enquête sur les Jézidis de Syria, and the Djebel Sindjar, Memoires de l'Institut Français de Dames, in tom V, and 'Abbas el-'Azzawi, History of the Jezidis, their country and their chiefs, from unpublished documents, Bagdad, 1935

xOn Kurdish Feudalism, 1500-1900, cf. Longrigg, op.cit.

(2) The stages of migration are rigorously fixed (Report 1923/24, p.51) On Kurdish "Nomadism" cf. esp. P.Rondot, Les Tribus Montagnaires de l'Asie Anterieure, Bull. Etudes Orient. t.VI., 1936, p.1 seq; H.Bobek, Forschungen im Zentral-Kurdischen Hochgebirge, Petermann's Mitteilungen . 1938.

(1) On nomads settling on the land in the seventies and eighties of the last century cf. op.cit. vol IV, p.122 (Shammar Togah); vol.III, p.134 (sections of the Zubaid); vol.III p.205 (Sections of the al-Fatlah and Beni Hanan. Cf also Longrigg, op.cit. p.303 etc.

of settling, the gradual replacement of the camel by the sheep; the shortening of the seasonal migrations in time and distance; the increasing care devoted to the raising of crops; the greater permanency and elaboration of the dwellings - all these are distinct milestones on the road, which can be observed in Iraq to-day. The unmistakable tendency has been given widely differing interpretations. It is traditionally welcomed by the authorities. As long as the desert remained the inaccessible sanctuary of the nomads, it could scarcely be doubted that to govern them meant to settle them.(1) That in Iraq they were able to and preferred to remain ungoverned, did not lessen the desire of the townsmen to solve the problem of nomadism by its abolition - "to shoot the camel and force the Bedouins to settle."(2)

When in the 1870's the Blunts put forward their opinion that "a wise Government in Northern Arabia" should "not force its nomads to settle down as villagers,...but to encourage their war-like tribes to give up their wars,"(3) this condemnation

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(2) As to the cycles of nomadic eruptions and ~~sequences~~ throughout history, cf. A.Toynbee, The Causes of the Occasional Eruptions of the Nomads out of their own Domain on the Steppes into the adjoining Domains of the sedentary Societies round about them, Annex A II, p.335-455. A Study of History, vol.III.

(1) "La sédentarisation des tribus nomades du Nord de l'Afrique a été nécessitée par des raisons de politique de domination." (De la Motte-Capron, op.cit., p.360)

(2) As a Bagdad politician put it to MacDonald (op.cit., p.50.)

(3) Blunt, op.cit., Vol.2, p.186.

of nomad settlement was deprecated by the impracticability of the alternative suggested. Although this is no longer impracticable to-day, nomad settlement remains the widely acknowledged remedy. But, whereas it was formerly deemed necessary primarily for the security of the settled population, it is now advocated also as a measure of rescue of a social group, threatened by inevitable doom. In consequence of the revolutionary changes which have taken place in the desert, the Bedouin has been placed "in the dilemma", it is pointed out, "of either degenerating and finally disintegrating, or of changing from a nomadic to a settled agricultural life before it is too late."(1)

The view is shared, not only by the Iraqi townsmen who "like to hear of the settlement of the tribes,"(2) but also, though regretfully, by those to whom the idea of Bedouin settlement is "distasteful";(3) who pray that nomadism "will not be swept away too rapidly".(4) Again, it has been pointed out that it is futile to approach the question in terms of regret or approval since forces beyond the control of government policy are leading to the gradual absorption of the nomad in the agricultural population.(5)

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(1) E.Epstein, 19th Oriental Congress, Rome 1935, p.577.
(2) Special Report, op.cit., p.237.
(3) J.C.A. Johnson, Kurds of Iraq, op.cit., p.51 f.
(4) Macdonald, op.cit., p.50.
(5) Jamali, op.cit., p.100 f.

Behind the belief in the inevitable decay of the desert Arab lies an historical interpretation of nomadism. It is considered either as a stage in the development of human society, or as a specific type of civilisation which has reached the end of a blind alley.(1)

Others, however, are inclined to place a major emphasis on the economic-geographical determination of nomadism.(2) Should not natural conditions, favourable for a nomadic pastoralism be a sufficient 'raison d'être' for the Bedouin? "With vast grazing grounds," says the Special Report to the Mandates Commission(3) "for the use of which he has only cattle tax to pay, and with a steady demand for wool and hides, the nomad has little to gain and much to lose by settling." Which of these contradictory interpretations of nomadism is to be accepted as the basis of nomad policy?

(b) Economic causes of the disintegration of Nomadism.

There is no doubt that traditional nomadism, the spear-head of tribalism, has been first and most seriously blunted, if not broken by the clash with irresistible factors of dis-integration. While, in the case of the settled tribes, only

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(1) Cf. Appendix A.II. below p.423
(2) Cf., for instance, Bernard-Lacroix, Annales de Géographie, 1906, p.154: "C'est une affaire de climat, influencé par l'histoire".
(3) Op.cit., p.237, de Boucheman, Rivalité, points out that there is a general tendency towards sedentarisation "parceque l'évolution économique en fait une nécessité."

the form of social organisation is considered outmoded, it is claimed that the basis of the economic as well as the social justification of nomadism has been withdrawn.

1. The end of the traditional sources of Revenue:

Bedouin economics are, of course, based on the breeding of animals who serve them for a great variety of purposes. But, as befits the primitive concept of the aristocrat, a predatory, parasitic and privileged life added to their rarely affluent standards. Raiding of villages and caravans, but, above all, inter-tribal raiding, was the essence of the Bedouin's existence. Khuwe payments covered anything from blackmail to the rewarding of genuine protection afforded. Exemption from taxation and the disregard of political boundaries were privileges readily claimed from, though rarely granted by, the central authorities. Once the Government had the power to put an end to the semi-autonomous existence of the tribes, a continuance of none of these sources of revenue could be tolerated.

(a) Ghazzu: In 1927, raiding was prohibited by a Special Law,(1) and it could be reported already in 1928 that "desert raiding by Iraq tribes has now virtually ceased."(2) The promptness with which punishment and the restoration of

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(1) The Raiding and Plunder Law (Forbiddance of) Law, No. 47 of 1827.
(2) 1928, p.44; cf. also 1927, p.65, predicting that raiding will disappear sooner than generally thought.

loot is imposed on offenders, makes raiding to-day no longer worth while. The state does not recognise the desert code according to which property gained in Ghazzu passes into the legitimate ownership of the raider.(1) It is nevertheless — at least in the economic sense — unconvincing if the Bedouins to-day assert that they have been ruined by the prevention of inter-tribal raiding.(2) It is true that raiding in times of drought or excessive loss of animals from other causes, was a case of self-help in the absence of Government relief which, to-day, when the traditional emergency valve has been put out of action, is urgently needed to take its place. But the ordinary raiding expedition served the glory rather than the material maintenance of the tribe. On the whole, as in warfare and gamble, there would rarely be any net gain over any length of time.

(b) Khuwe: Previous to the war of 1914/18, Khuwe was still commonly paid by the smaller tribes as well as by nearly all the villages and some townships on the desert border to secure immunity from raiding.(3) Under the Anglo-Iraqi

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(1) Dodd, 1940, op.cit., p.604 ff; Syria Report op.cit., 1931, p.99; 1934: 127 (Djebel Druse) i, 1935, p.106. Ghazzu was prohibited by arrêté of July 11, 1929 (Confiscation of the means of transport used for the expedition) and by arrêté of Jan. 20, 1933 (Ghazzu punishable with imprisonment). Cf. also Convention of Febr, 2nd. 1930, between Syria and Trans-Jordan "relative au règlement des litiges entre les nomades..." (esp. art.6).

(2) Glubb, Jour. Cent. As. Soc. 1935, p.21.

(3) "Ceux-ci préferent devenir les vassaux d'un seul plutôt que d'être les victimes de tous" (de Boucheman, Suhne, op.cit.p.50) "A single ragged Bedouin could ride through a great and prosperous village in Iraq collecting tribute with none to repulse him." (Glubb, op.cit., p.29). Towns of the size of Tekrit paid Khuwe to the Shammar (Oppenheim, op.cit., p.144)

regime this state of affairs was at first difficult to eradicate. The villagers who sent out their sheep to pasture, continued to meet the demands of the Shammar in order to secure the safety of their flocks. The original British policy was to acknowledge Khuwe rights as far as they concerned minor nomadic tribes and not fellahs. Nowadays, though some villages in the outlying districts are still known to pay Khuwe by tacit agreement,(1) the amounts reaching the Bedouins from this source have been reduced to negligible proportions.

(c) Transit Tolls: The income from transit tolls levied on merchants and pilgrims passing through the desert(2) has similarly dwindled away. In the great days of the merchant caravans and caravan cities, the amounts collected from them by the nomads produced a handsome income,(3) and at times raised their prosperity considerably(4) even as late as the 18th century, as long as the volume of overland traffic remained

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(1) Villages in the Djezirah paid Khuwe to the Shammar still in 1932, according to R.Montagne, Quelques Aspects... 1932, p.61. Cf. also: de Boucheman, Etudes Islamiques, 1934, p.24.
(2) The riverain tribes imposed tolls also on river traffic (cf. Chesney Expedition, vol I, p.37; Layard, Adventures p.306)
(3) According to Burckhardt (Quoted by Oppenheim, p.72, Note 4) 3/- per camel load was paid; in the early 20th cent., according to Sachau (quoted by Oppenheim, p.144) 7 piastres.
(4) Cf. Rostovzef, Caravan Cities, op.cit., "Caravan Trade", (chap. I); on the developed trading activities of the nomads, participating in the trade in slaves and animals, cf. M.Weber, Aufsaetze zur Sozial-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, op.cit., p.34 f

large. This revenue was heavily curtailed during the 19th century through the decline of the trans-desert traffic as well as by the efforts of the Turkish Government to revive it by enforcing its authority. The payment of tolls to the nomads remained, however, a regular and not seriously questioned feature until well after the first World War.(1)

After ~~that~~, the unchecked extortions of the nomadic sheiks resulted at first in a general paralysation of trans-desert trade. "Travellers in tribal territory paid passage fees to sheiks who as often as not allowed their tribesmen to rob those who had paid for immunity from robbery."(2) The British High Commissioner of Iraq suggested to his French colleague in Syria that concerted measures be taken on either side of the frontier to control the levy of dues. In the end, the British suggestion, to draw up a scale for the tolls and to enforce its application, gave way to the French point of view that neither Government should recognise the right of any sheik(3) to collect tolls, but that escorts for the protection of caravans should be provided.(4) Even in 1924, however, it was partly owing to the heavy tolls levied by the Shammar that trade with Syria usually proceeded via Bagdad and was disappointing to Mosul.(5) Lacking energetic co-ordinated action

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(1) The Aneze (first the Aneze Fesene) succeeded the Mawali in the right of taxing the caravans on the Basra-Bagdad-Damascus road (Oppenheim, p.91)
(2) Review of Civil Administration 1914-18, p.71.
(3) Originally an exception was made for Sheik Daham al Hadi of the Shammar.
(4) Report, 1922/23, p.42 f.
(5) ibid., 1923/24, p.60.

on the part of the Iraqi, Syrian and Turkish authorities, it was considered doubtful whether the exactions could be stopped.(1)

The tolls levied on the pilgrim caravans had once been similarly recognised. In some cases, the Ottoman Government paid salaries to the Bedouins near the pilgrim routes by way of compensation for their "right" to receive the S u r r e.(2) To-day, the pilgrims travel in the motor cars of Government "approved companies" with escorts provided by the authorities.(3)

Very little indeed remains of the Bedouin "protection", once such an essential feature of desert life. This right of demanding "tribute" is restricted to cases where a definite service is performed, such as escorting flocks of sheep to Syria, or guarding them while grazing in the more remote parts of the Jezirah or protecting the oil pipe line.(4) There can be little doubt that the loss of income from "service items" seriously affects the structure of nomad economics.

Assessing the extent of the loss, it must, however, be remembered that only that part of the tribute payments, collected from the agricultural "protégés", can be counted, if the

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(1) Ibid., p.59.
(2) For centuries the Aneze, particularly the Weld Ali, held the privilege from the Ottoman Government. These amounts appeared in the Ottoman budget: In 1087/1676, i., 7115 "Loewenthaler" were paid. (Oppenheim, p.67 ff.)
(3) Cf. Pilgrim Notification, Official Gaz., 1938, p.17: the pilgrims have the choice between three classes of accommodation.
(4) 'Ağil el Yawar was paid for these services by the Iraq Petroleum Co.

balance of payments of the nomadic society as a whole is considered. The discontinuance of Khuwe payments among nomads, usually by the weaker sheep-rearing to the camel-breeding tribes, may in fact be considered beneficial in so far as it tends to preserve nomadic capital resources where, under present circumstances, they can be more profitably employed. As for the Surre, the day of the great merchant caravans, and of the rich tolls exacted from them, were over long before the imminent end of the Bedouins was foretold.

2. The Enforcement of Taxation:

The nomads were not only deprived of their traditional sources of revenue, they also lost the ability to resist or evade the tax demands made upon them by the Government. The effectiveness of taxation of the tribe increased pari passu with the decline of taxation imposed by the tribes.

Towards the end of Turkish administration, the enforcement of some tax payment or other from the recalcitrant nomads had made considerable though uneven progress. At first, their demands retained the character of feudal tributes rather than of payment of revenue.(1) Up to the end of

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(1) The Chiefs of the Muntafiq paid 70 thoroughbred horses (Cuinet, 1890, op.cit. vol.III, p.299); the sheiks, on the other hand, as a sign of investiture received gifts from the Wali, varying according to their importance. Paramount sheiks of the Muntafiq, for instance, received a pelisse, and a standard, and sword (ibid., p.280).

the Ottoman rule tax collecting remained a hazardous business. Even in the case of the Aneze, who in summer camp within easy reach of Government authority, military assistance could rarely be dispensed with. As for the Dulaim and the Shammar, military expeditions took the place of tax collecting up to the last war.(1) Sometimes the Turks would make an example and publicly execute a sheik for default or fraud in the discharge of the revenue demand. "Moderately successful revenue was collected the following year after which payment again lapsed."(2)

Under the Anglo-Iraqi regime, efforts were made to introduce a more adequate assessment of the Zoda tax which, in theory, was designed as the direct taxation, the tithe of the pastoralists.(3)

Under the Civil Administration, in keeping with the early British policy, the assessment was placed into the hands of the tribal leaders. The sheiks were, however, the largest owners of animals in their districts and the drawbacks of a system which made them virtually responsible for

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(1) Oppenheim, op.cit., p.56.

(2) Cf., for instance, Administrative Report, 1918, Diwaniyah District, p.201: Execution in Diwaniyah of the Sheikh of the al Bahahithah.

(3) Administrative Report, 1919, Sulaimaniyah, p.16.

"collecting taxes from themselves"(1) was used as a practical argument against the indirect administration of tribal areas.(2)

It proved more difficult than originally anticipated to abolish the practice of collecting the animal tax as a lump sum, the wudi, paid by the sheik according to an agreement with the Government, allegedly based on an estimate of the tribal herds and flocks.(3) The actual count required for the proper assessment of the koda tax, which is levied per head of animal, was hampered by the inaccessibility of many

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(1) The ratio legis — if such a concept can be applied to traditions — appears to be that animals directly used for agricultural transport (horses, mules) are to be free of the koda tax which is levied only on sheep, goats, camels and buffaloes. Suggestions made in days of financial stringency to extend the scope in disregard of this tradition were not carried out. Cf. Report of the Financial Mission, 1925, Cmd. 2438, p.15: "We are not satisfied that there is any good reason why the tax should not be levied on horses and cows as well as camels and oxen. The discrimination in their favour appears to be merely an inheritance from Turkish tradition not based on any convincing reasons." Since the only official animal statistics is a by-product of the koda assessment, no figures for cattle and horses are available. In Persia and Afghanistan the tithe principle was not applied to the nomads who, until recently, continued to pay not a poll tax (like the koda), but a grazing tax.

(2) Iraq Directory, op.cit., p.230.

(3) On the koda tax under Turkish and early British administration, cf. E.B.Howell, Koda Report, Bagdad, 1919; Admin. Rep., Nasiriyah Distr. 1919, p.43; Muntafiq Div^{n}, p.113; Sulaimaniyah Div^{n}, p.16.; Oppenheim, op.cit., p.72, Note 5. The Koda Tax Law of 1932 still provided for the possibility of agreement on a lump sum in lieu of assessment by count (Iraq Direct^{y}, op.cit 1936, p.230). In Syria, the wudi was abolished in 1928, when steps were taken to extend application of the animal tax (Aghman) to the nomads (cf. Himadeh, Syria, op.cit., p.268; Syria Report,1929: p.96 (Arrêté of Dec.28, 1928). But the new fiscal régime was only enforced in 1934 (Syria Report, op.cit., p.109)

potential taxpayers and the weakness of govemment control in the desert districts.(1) Even after 1927 the contract system had been generally replaced by direct count,(2) the Shammar continued effectively to resist elaborate schemes to prevent the tax evasions.(3) A technique favoured by them, which was at first difficult to counter, consisted of a series of rapid movements backward and forward across the Syrian frontier.(4) In Samarah the payment of a lump sum continued as part of the Muqata system. Elsewhere, however, tribes began to acquiesce in direct assessment.(5) And the rising yield from taxation of animals signified that the customary de facto tax exemption of the nomads was rapidly becoming a thing of the past.(6)

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(1) Report, 1926, p.78 and 82.
(2) do. 1927, p.107.
(3) do. 1929, p.36.
(4) do. 1928, p.38.
(5) Cf., for instance, in 1927 twelve instances of resistance of sheep-counting parties in the Kut area against three in 1928. (Report, 1928, p.46)
(6) Cf. the proportionately quicker rise of "Pastoral" compared to "agrarian" taxation. But it should be noted that (as the animal statistics themselves are based on koda assessment) it is not possible to distinguish to which extent the rising yield of the taxes due to increasing numbers of animals or to fuller assessment; secondly, a large portion of the koda tax is paid by the settled tribes or non-tribal cultivators.

In 1938, as a concession to tribal demands[1] the Istilakh tax on animals[2] replaced the koda tax, as the Istilakh tax had previously superseded the tithe. Henceforth the tax was to be paid only on animals slaughtered in slaughter houses, live animals exported and all animal produce consumed in or exported outside Iraq.[3]

3. The interference of political frontiers:

Whereas, the idea of revenue to the overlord was not unfamiliar to the nomads, however much they preferred to consider themselves by right taxgatherers rather than the subjects of taxation, the concept of the political frontier, which, forgotten for centuries, was reintroduced into the Syrian desert in 1913, was alien to their very way of life. The frontiers, created by the division of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire into different states, cut across customary migration routes and grazing grounds.

In the beginning, the Shammar, 'Aneze or Tai paid scant attention to these artificial boundaries, except by putting them to good use when convenient to them. Unwanted activity on the part of the Government officials in the collection of

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(1) Cf. Art 7 of the ~~question~~ petition of the sheikhs of the Middle Euphrates to King Ghazi of March, 1935 (Al-~~Liwa~~ Liwa, Damascus, 1.4.35)
(2) Cf. Law No.63 of 1938 and Amending Law No.52 of 1939.
(3) Law No.52 of 1939, Article 2.

tax or in pursuit of criminals, often pointed to the advisability of "seeking pasturage" in the adjacent country, while, if the favour of the Government seemed likely to fall permanently below the low water mark of expectation, there was always the possibility of a change of nationality by the mere shifting of the black tents into a region where those in power might be more generously inclined.(1)

Such practices were at first countered by a stricter control on the part of the authorities who, unwiling to lose them, kept a jealous eye on the migration of "their" tribes. It was clear from the beginning that tribes, crossing the frontier regularly on their migrations, are exempt from customs duties. In order to prevent large-scale smuggling the authorities were, however, anxious to ascertain that the tribes crossed them in pursuance of their customary migrations, and that the flocks neither belonged to the tribes themselves or were in their charge only for the purpose of grazing.(2) Certain restrictions of free movement, which border control entails, have been quoted as serious interferences in the nomads' pastoral pursuits.(3) Even if they were not actually

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(1) Report, 1923-24, p.39; cf. also Kurdish Tribesmen from Turkey seeking refuge in Iraq in 1930, (Report, p.33) Sections of the Shikah Tribe with their Agha crossed into Iraq from Iran in 1926 (Report, p.26); sections of the Avroman Tribe under Ja'far Sultan in 1931 (Report, p.31)

(2) As to the habitual custom-evasions, cf. Syria, Report. op.cit, 1929, p.78.

(3) Cf. Himadeh, Syria, op.cit., p.13; Epstein, 19th International Congress of Orientalists, p.376; H.A.R.Gibb in "The Near East", op.cit., p.85: The desert cannot be split up into sections and separated from another by custom frontiers "without injury to its economic life and, in consequence, to the economic life of Arab Asia as a whole."

prevented from crossing they were hampered by restrictions and formalities,(1) which in seasons of drought, sometimes sufficed to cause grave loss of animals for the tribe affected.

In fact the co-operation of the authorities concerned on either side of the frontier on the problems of border tribes (covering the - for administrative purposes - closely allied questions of trans-frontier raiding) has gradually succeeded in very considerably reducing any threat to the nomads industry from this angle.

1. Desert Nomadism and Political Frontiers.

The Syrian-Iraqi frontier, as well as the frontier with Trans-Jordan, which lie right astride important migration routes have on the whole created least difficulties and have seen few major incidents in connection with nomadic movements, for the good reason that the authorities on either side, for the most part unhampered by an interference of political motives, were anxious to arrive at business-like solutions of any problem as it arose. The British, and later on the Iraqi officials had to deal on the Syrian side with a special administration of French officers responsible to the High

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(1) As to the formalities which the nomads are expected to fulfil before crossing a frontier cf. on the one hand, the cumbersome requirements of the Ankara Protocole "relatif à la surveillance de la frontière...aux régions fiscales applicable aux troupeaux franchissant la frontière et au controle des nomades" of June 29th, 1929: The Sheiks have to provide documents as to the number of their tents, men, arms, animals; as to the point where the frontier is crossed and will be recrossed; as to the situation of the grazing grounds, etc....

Commissioner,[1] the outstanding characteristic of which was sympathy with the nomads and a lively concern for an improvement of their conditions.

Co-operation between the British and French authorities in Iraq and Syria on tribal affairs was initiated in 1924 when on the suggestion of the local British Administrative Inspector and the French Officer in control of Der el Zor a Court of Arbitration was successfully arranged to settle the tribal feuds which had led to a series of cross-frontier raids.[2] In 1926 a visit of Col. Vincent, the French High

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(1) On the other hand, cf. Treaty of Friendship between Trans-Jordan and Saudi Arabia of 27th July 1933. (Text in Report 1934, op.cit., p.300-307) Art. 9: "The tribes of the two parties which habitually frequent both sides of the frontier for purposes of grazing or "musabala" shall be free to move about from place to place in the two countries, unless either of the two governments should find it necessary to restrict this freedom of movement in the interest of public order or for reasons of economic necessity."

(1) The Contrôle Bédouin was under the direct authority of the "Délégué du Haut Commissionaire à Damas"; it consisted of five officers of the "Services Spéciaux du Levant"; each of whom was attached to one of the five "mouvances": Damascus, Homs, Hama, Alleppo, and Deir-el-Zor. (Syria Reports, op.cit. 1929, p.76; 1936, p.99) The experiences and ideas of the French Controle Bedouin are laid down in V.Müller's book, En Syrie avec les Bedouines, 1931. As a result of a British Officer's intimate contact with Trans-jordan tribes, cf. Lieut.-Col. Peake's work on "The Chief Tribes and Clans of Trans-Jordan", Amman 1936, (Stencilled), which was published in Arabic, in Jerusalem in 1935 as Ta'rikh Sharqi l'Urdunn waqaba 'iliha.

(2) Involving the 'Aqaidat, Dulaim and Anizah. Other feuds across the Syrian Iraqi frontier arose between the Tai and Jazidis and between Diham and 'Ajil, the rival sheiks of the Shammar. (Report, 1926, p.22; 1927, p.58). The High Commissioner, welcoming the suggestion, took occasion to observe that tribal disputes could find no satisfactory settlement save by the adjudication by the tribes themselves in accordance with their own customs. General Weygand agreed and the Court was

Commissioner's Chef de Cabinet Militaire, ~~'s visit to Bagdad~~ resulted in the Provisional Agreement for the Regulation of the Affairs of the Frontier Tribes of 1927.(1) In 1927 and in 1929, ~~a number of~~ conferences were arranged between the principal sheiks and Syrian and Iraqi officials, ~~which achieved comprehensive settlements~~.(2) In 1932, arrangements were made for the Iraqi qaimmaqan at 'Ānah to discuss the movement and quarrels of frontier tribes at regular monthly meetings with the French Special Service Officer at Abu Kemal; matters not disposed of should be settled in half-yearly meetings of the Mutasarrif of Ramadi and the French delegue at Der el Zor.(3) In 1934 a conference at Palmyra between Franco-Syrian and Iraqi delegates, which was attended by representatives of the Saudi Government, paved the way for a final agreement.(4)

According to the Agreement of Bon Voysinage between Iraq and Syria(5) of 1937 not only may nomads, semi-nomads and settled

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(contd from previous page)
composed of two tribal representatives on either side, the Mutasarifs of Deir and Dulaim, and French and British officials in advisory capacity (Report, 1923/24, p.41).

(1) Provisional Agreement etc. of April 6th 1927, Report, 1926, p.22; Special Report, p.37.
(2) Report, 1927, p.59, (Meeting at 'Anah); signed a Report, op.cit
(3) do. 1932, p.16; f; Report, Syria, 1932. 1923, pp 12 and 73 (Conference at Hassetche)
(4) Syria Report, op. cit. 1934, p.108.
(5) Chs. I and III; cf. Iraq Government Gazette, 1937, No.34. 6f. also, the parallel Syrian Agreements with Trans-Jordan of Dec.31, 1929; with Palestine: Art.III. Appendix to Frontier Agreement of Feb.3, 1922; with Turkey: Treaty of Ankara, of June 23rd, 1929.

cultivators who enjoy customary rights of watering and pasture in the territory of the neighbouring state, be allowed to cross the frontier without permit in exercise of those rights, but also those who cannot claim customary rights, yet are desirous to cross the border for reasons of seasonal calamity or similar causes, are required to apply for a permit to the authorities of their own state only.

The machinery thus established, even before its latest improvements, was able to cope with the serious emergency of the drought of 1929 when, for want of pasturage practically the whole of the Ruwallah tribe was forced to cross into the Dulaim area. Fighting between them and the Saba'a, another Syrian section of the 'Anizah who followed them, was prevented from spreading by the effective co-operation between the French and the Iraqi authorities. Nor did it produce untoward incidents when, soon afterwards, the Amarat in search of pasture crossed into Syria and camped near Palmyra;[1] or when in 1937 because of abnormal rain conditions the sheep nomads from Aleppo had to cross into Iraq, or when in 1938 the whole of the Dana Moslem tribes had to cross the border in the same direction.[2]

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(1) Report, 1929, p.35. On minor tribal border conflicts on the occasion of Syrian tribes crossing into Iraq in 1935, cf. Oriente Moderno, 1935, p.399.
(2) Syria Report, op.cit., 1937: p.109; 1938, p.107.

The nomads depending on winter grazing in the Southern desert near or across the border of Saudi Arabia had to wait longer for satisfactory arrangements. The Treaty of Muhammarah of 1922 had dealt with the nationality of the principal tribes in question, but the conference at Kuwait in 1924, called under the auspices of H.M.Government to remove the worst causes of inter-tribal raiding, remained inconclusive. The Bakra agreement of the following year was intended to settle outstanding issues concerning the treatment of migrating tribes, crossing the territory from one state into that of the other; it provided for the periodic meeting of a special joint tribunal to fix the responsibility for raids and to assess damages. But in 1928 a series of savage raids into Iraq from Nejd, and the attitude of King Ibn Saud, who opposed the establishment by the Iraq Government of certain police posts in the Southern desert, again destroyed the work so far done with the view to friendly co-operation.

However, the satisfactory state on the Saudi Arabian border since the improvement in the relations between the two countries following the "Lupin meeting" of the Kings in 1930, confirms the belief that the severe raids of the preceding years are to be understood against the political background. The annual migration of Iraqi tribes of the Shamiyah desert from the Euphrates southwards towards the Nejd frontiers in November or December, has since proceeded unhindered on the

whole and without the grievous loss of flocks through raiding which threatened them for many years.(1)

2. The Mountain Nomads and the Political Frontiers.

Developments on the Northern and Eastern borders similarly confirm that the occasional difficulties were due to political rather than administrative causes. During the tension with Turkey in 1927, Kurdish nomads of the Mosul Province, especially the Artushi and Sindi tribes, underwent considerable hardship when the Turkish authorities prevented them from crossing the frontier into their customary grazing grounds. Their forced stay completely disorganised the Iraqi upland pastures.(2) But, on the whole, bigger incidents, to be placed before the Permanent Frontier Commission were avoided.(3) The occasional cross-frontier raids(4) were dealt

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(1) Cf. "The Boundaries of the Nedj", Geographical Review, 1927, p.28 f. On the position of the Iraqi-Nedj frontier, cf. Report, 1923-24, pp.42-51; 1925, p.25; 1927, p.55. Iraqi tribes lost in the "Neutral Zone" in two raids in December 1927, 9,600 sheep and 1,637 donkeys; on Iraqi territory 12,047 sheep and 1,431 donkeys (Report, 1928, p.30). In 1928 an encampment of the Iraqi Zayyad shepherd tribe and another of camel merchants from Iraq, who were situated in the Nejd territory, were attacked by raiders of the Nejdi Ataibah tribe, who looted 10,000 sheep, 6,000 donkeys and 700 camels. (Report, 1929, p.42). A draft Bon Voisinage agreement was initialled in Bagdad in 1930 by representatives of the Hejaz-Nejd and Iraqi Governments (Cf. on the Agreement of April 6th 1940, Oriente Moderno, 1940, p.231)

(2) Report, 1927, p.54.

(3) Set up under the Tripartite Treaty signed at Angora in 1926, (Art. 13).

(4) Involving especially the Kurdish Goyan and Slupi tribes from the Turkish side of the border (Report, 1931, p.30; 1932, p.13)

with in amicable co-operation between Turkish and Iraqi officials.(1)

The absence of close neighbourly relations with Iran, on the other hand, previous to the agreement of 1937,(2) remained not without effect on the Kurdish nomads. Protracted difficulties arose in connection with the Pizdher tribe who, dwelling most of the year in the mountainous country north of Sulaimaniyah, migrates in summer to the Iranian border or crosses it near Sardakat, where the tribe own a number of villages. Although in 1927 an agreement had been reached between the Iranian and Iraqi authorities,(3) friction again arose in the following summer.(4)

The Jaf, a nomadic Kurdish tribe of about 30,000 temts, spend traditionally(5) from four to five months in summer in the upland pastures across the Persian frontier(6) and the rest of the year in Iraq, spread widely over the lower valleys,

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(1) I.e. especially between the Qaimmaqam of Zakho and the Turkish Qaimmaqam of Jazirah Ibn Omar.
(2) Frontier Agreement between Iran and Iraq of July 4th 1937 (cf. Oriente Moderno, 1937, p. 435 f) and Treaty of Friendship of same date (Oriente Moderno, p.437 f).
(3) Report, 1927, p.62.
(4) do. 1928, p.39.
(5) It appears that the Jaf have been making this migration for several hundred years at least. For most of this period involves regular crossing and re-crossing of the frontier between the Ottoman and the Persian Empires. The migration is already mentioned in the Treaty between Persia and Turkey of 1639. The example of the Jaf shows that in the long run political frontiers have, in the case of nomadic movements, not been able to overrule the dictates of geography and commonsense. It shows, moreover, that the existence of nomadic migration routes across frontiers as such cannot be made an argument in favour of political union of the territories concerned. Cf. above p. 95 Note 3.
(6) Lying roughly between Merivan and Banah.

between Halabja and Mifri. In the summer of 1931 the Persian Government raised an official objection to the migration of the Jaf into Persia. The Iraqi Government, realising the great hardship which such an embargo would cause the Jaf, persuaded the Persian Government with some difficulty to agree to admit the tribe. The bulk of the tribe had already crossed the frontier, when they were faced with unexpected demands for taxes and customs dues; they withdraw again to Iraq and made the best of the scanty grazing in the Penjwin area. In the following year, the Persian and Iraqi frontier authorities made arrangements for the control of the annual migration of the Jaf which the tribe had no choice but to carry out, although it imposed on it the obligation to send a representative of each major section to remain at Basra while the tribe was in Persia and to pay a small tax on horses and cattle in addition to the Koda tax.(1)

Before the present war, measures for a full and comprehensive solution of the problem of the nomadic migrations across the frontier were discussed at the Veterinary Congress in Bagdad in 1938, which was attended by the heads of the Veterinary Department of the Turkish, Persian and Syrian Governments. It was resolved that the parties "shall study

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(1) Report, 1931, p.32; 1932, p.14. Also the Herki, another prominent Kurdish nomadic tribe, still migrates annually from its summer seat near lake Urmia in Persia to the Rowanduz foothills (Leach, op.cit., p.7; C.J.Johnson, "Kurds of Iraq", Geographical Mag. 1939-40, p.51.)

as soon as possible the project of a special convention concerning the movement of tribal animals for grazing purposes."(1)

The irretrievable nature of the dislocation of Bedouin economics caused by the liquidation of their quasi-autonomous status can, it appears, be exaggerated. The income from Ghazu was mainly, from Khuwe often, an inter-nomadic transaction; high taxation of nomads may well be made an instrument of a forcible settlement policy, but cannot be put forward as an argument for the inevitable deterioration of nomad economics. The interference of political frontiers with nomadic migrations has been largely removed and may, as far as desert nomadism is concerned, disappear entirely with the Arab countries pulling closer together after the present war.

. <u>The Animal-raising industries</u>:

The nomads have, for all practical purposes, been thrown back on their pastoral industries for a living. "Nomads shorn of their romantic habits are economically sheep and camel farmers."(2) The prospects of nomad economics hinge upon the effects of changing conditions on the animal breeding industries. Have we to assume that "the economic life of the Bedouin, based as it is on the raising of camels and horses and sheep, cannot hold its own any longer against the

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1) Iraq Government Gazette, 1940, p.303. Cf. also Law No.21 of 1940, whereby the Kingdom of Iraq declares its accession to the Veterinary Convention and the Protocol signed at Bagdad on Jan 27th, 1938

2) Glubb, Journal Central Asian Society, 1933, p.455.

inroads of the airplane, the motor car and the railway?"[1]

(a) The decline of camel breeding:

Most exposed to the competition of mechanical locomotion is undoubtedly the camel breeding industry, the mainstay of the traditional existence of the pure Bedu. The desert is to-day regularly and rapidly crossed by motor traffic; the railway system of the Middle East has been, and is again during the present war, extending. The camel caravan is rapidly losing what reduced importance it retained after the opening of the Suez Canal diverted most of the bulk traffic to shipping.[2] The Khans of the villages and oases, where once hundreds of camels would rest, are in ruins or have been refitted as garages.[3]

On the other hand, the competition of the motor car is limited by its expensiveness as is that of the railways by their present restriction to a few trunk lines. It may be some time still before the motor will do to the camels on the desert tracks of Iraq what it did to the horses on the roads of the U.S.A. Still Bedouin migrations are linked with important trade activities with the Nejd tribes whom the

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(1) Epstein, 19th International Congress, p.577.
(2) Cf. for instance, Bertram Thomas, The Arabs, 1937, p.264 f.
(3) De Boucheman, Une Petite Cité, 1937, p.91.

Iraqi nomads supply with wheat and flour.(1) Larger areas under crops, or higher yields, increase the demand for short distance transport animals.

Apart from the requirements for transport purposes,(2) a considerable demand for camels for butchers' meat used to exist, above all, in Egypt. The imports of camels into Egypt have, however, heavily declined since the last war.(3) On the one hand, consumption of camel meat by the Egyptian fellaheen has fallen with the prices for cotton. On the other hand, preferential treatment accorded by the Egyptian Government to animals from the Sudan restricted the demand for camels from Northern Arabia.(4)

Yet increased prosperity at home may stimulate the local demand for camel meat. In a number of districts camels are being used in agriculture, not only for bringing the produce to the market,(1) but for ploughing, hauling, threshing

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(1) When in 1939, on the outbreak of war, export of wheat was prohibited, this traffic (up to a limit of 10,000 tons) was by special amendment exempted. Cf. Regulation No.67 of 1940, Amending for the Fourth Time the Regulation Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods and Products, No.88 of 1939.
(2) The customary loads for camels are 75-100 kilos on each side (Cond. of Trade in Mesopotamia, 1920, p.8)
(3) Average 1899/1912: 41,000 head; 1928-1937: 28,000 head.
(4) In 1931, the Syrian nomads were hit by a 40% drop in prices obtainable for their camels in Palestine and Egypt due to the depreciation of the pound (Syria Report, op.cit., 1931, p.98).
(5) Cf. The Humaid al Arab (East of the Gharraf and Amarah) and the Al Rafiah (in the desert west of the Gharraf) used to send in their camels to transport grain for the riverain tribes. (Admin. Report 1918, Muntafiq Div^{n}, 1919, p.112.

and raising of water.[1] The case of Palestine proves that rapid economic development may up to a point provide fresh uses for camels.[2] That the number of camels in Egypt - which is not only completely agricultural but also has nothing similar to the extensive overland communications between the two rivers - should be more than twice that in Iraq, may even indicate possibilities for an extension of the Iraq camel-breeding industry if it can be properly adapted to changed circumstances.

The available figures, as far as they go, as well as first-hand observations,[3] do not in fact tally with the picture of a rapid and general decay of the camel industry. It appears that unmistakable signs of a tendency have led to an anticipation of its probable results; that experiences of a locally limited development have been applied universally.

Where special factors are at play, (as e.g. in Trans-Jordan[4], the proximity of the rapidly changing Palestine, or in Libya the forcible breaking of the Senussi combined with a

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(1) Musil, Rwala, op.cit., p.348; Glubb, Journal Royal Cent. Asian Soc. 1938, p.449, Note No.3. Cf. also on the usefulness of camels for sheep breeders, de Boucheman, Rivalité, op. cit., p.31. The fact that they possessed appreciable herds of camels made it possible for the Mawali to extend the radius of their migrations and to reach more ample pastures for their flocks of camels.

(2) Large numbers were, for instance, used for carrying sand and other materials for building purposes.

(3) See, e.g., Glubb, Journ Cent. Asian Soc., 1938, p.455.

(4) Palestine absorbed considerable numbers of camels and doubled its camel population between 1924 and 1933.

drastic road building and agricultural settlement policy), the camel statistics of recent years tell an unmistakable tale of rapid decline.(1) But over the Middle Eastern area as a whole the reduction of the camel population is a gradual process.(2) In Iraq, in particular, the downward trend is, it appears, still insignificant.(3) Even if a margin is allowed for inaccuracy of the available figures,(4) they confirm that after the heavy inroads caused by the drought, which coincided with the economic depression of the early thirties,(5) a normal process of recovery has taken place, and that by 1938 the cycle, which is but a usual phenomenon of desert pastoralism, was completed with the 1931 figures nearly attained. An

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(1) In Trans-Jordan the number of camels declined from 26,000 in 1930 to 5,000 in 1938. In Libya only 1,600 camels survived of the 20,000 counted 12 years previously. Cp. O.Schmidt and H.Wilhelmy, Die Faschistische Kolonisation in Nordafrika, 1939, p.74.

(2) Cf. Table VI. p. 466 below.

(3) The only available pre-war statistics are only wild estimates. Foreign Office Handbook, (op.cit., p.79), quotes 500,000 camels in 1890, and 315,000 for pre-war years. (Cf. also Vital Cuinet, La Turquie d'Asie, Vol.IV). Neither can conclusions be drawn from to-day's absolute numbers (i.e. by comparing them with post-war figures) nor can for the period 1891/1910 a specially heavy decline of the camel industry be deduced, since an acceptance of these "statistics" would indicate a similar decline for other animal categories.

(4) Decrease or increase of camels as shown in the figures as well as relative changes in the numbers of camels compared with other animals, may (since they are based on Kida Tax counts) be merely the reflection of variations in the completeness of assessment instead of indications of true tendencies. It is, however, unlikely that a strong decline of camels would not be revealed in the figures.

(5) Department of Overseas Trade 1933, p.12; Syria Report op.cit. 1931: p.98 (losses 30-40% of flocks); 1932, p.99 (losses of 50-80% of flocks); the crisis and adverse climatic conditions coincided similarly in French North Africa, where 1930/31 about 35% of the flocks perished (cf. Werner, op.cit., p.58).

analysis of the number of camels counted in the Liwas during recent years shows a rapid decrease near the capital, a lesser decline in prosperous agricultural districts such as Hillah or Dialah, but a rising tendency in the principal nomadic areas of Dulaim, Mossul, and Dʒiwaniyah.(1) Export figures show a similar development. In 1931, it was stated by the British Administrative Inspector at Mosul that the income from the export of camels had practically ceased.(2) In that year only 790 camels were exported from Iraq of a value of ID 3,000, whereas nearly 7,000 of a value of ID 22,000 were exported in 1935. Though in recent years the numbers exported dropped again, the average prices fetched indicate that camel-breeding is not yet a depressed industry to the extent of rendering it incapable of partaking in the general recovery of prices.(3)

(b) <u>New possibilities of nomadic market production</u>:

Whereas in regard to camel breeding a gradual assertion of long-term factors detrimental to it must be taken into account, sheep and goat raising in the Iraqi Steppe belt is an industry with considerable prospects. In the present context it need only be emphasised that the harmful effects of the

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(1) Cf. Table VII. p. 467 below.
(2) Cf. Letter dated April 7th 1931, in Appendix to Jamali, op. cit., p.136 ff.
(3) On the equally disastrous effect of the 1931/32 season on both camel and sheep, cf. also A.de Boucheman, Note sur la Rivalité... Revue des Etudes Islam., 1934, p.44.

pacification of the desert and the introduction of modern means of communication may be regarded as more than offset by the possibilities opened thereby. To-day, the closer contact with the markets and the greater ease with which animals can be converted into cash begins to lead to a reduction in the size of flocks to more economic limits.(1) Sometimes flocks tended towards maximum rather than optimum proportions either because there was no opportunity to sell, or because the possession of many animals as ~~to~~ the principal measure of wealth demanded it as a matter of social prestige.(2)

The new conditions have brought to an end the quasi-monopoly of the Agaili, and other great desert traders of the old style, whose organisation reached from one end of the desert to the other.(3) As long as the tribesmen were unable to move their animals through other tribal areas without running the risk of being plundered en route, they depended on the Agailis who themselves were protected by the nomad code. To-day, more merchants come out into the desert if the tribesmen does not prefer to lead his animals to the next market himself. "The merchants can even send private telegrams from government police posts far out in the desert and ask the

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(1) Glubb, Journ. Royal Cent. Asian Soc., p.453.
(2) On the same phenomenon in Algeria, cf. Lacroix-Bernard, Nomadisme en Algérie, p.131.
(3) On the Agaili, cf. Doughty, Vol.1, p.11; Musil, Rwala, op. cit., p.278 ff; Gertrude Bell, Letters, Vol.II, p.501: They are "an endless romance"; de Boucheman, Cité Caravanière, p.93, and 100; Grant, Syrian Desert, p.137 ff.

market price of live stock, communicate with their partners in the city or order taxis to come out to meet them."[1] The result is a general adaptation to market requirements and, in particular, a considerable increase in the bargaining position of the nomads.

Pacification of the desert has also broken the restrictive monopolist position of the stronger tribes. The pacification of the Southern desert attracted to the pastures of the Shamiyah tribes from every part of Iraq.[2] We can notice to-day what Colonel Glubb calls "the remarkable and rather unexpected fact that, since public security was established in the desert, nomadism has greatly increased."[3] Whereas formerly only members of sufficiently powerful Bedouin tribes could venture into the desert, it is now almost equally safe for all. No sooner did ~~the~~ fellah~~een~~ realise this than they began in increasing numbers to send their flowks, for which they have little room for grazing in the cultivated zone, into the desert for the winter.[4]

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(1) Glubb, Journ. Royal Cent. Asian Soc., p.453; also Dodd, 1940, p.610.
(2) Including tribes from the Jazirah and sections of the Ruwalla. The influx intensified water and grazing difficulties, but, adds the Report (1928.2.44), "the occurrence is significant and instructive."
(3) Glubb, ibid., p.454.
(4) Ibid., reports that for the past few years fellah flocks have passed right through the Trans-Jordan desert and have wintered in Saudi Arabia.

De Boucheman similarly observed that "Depuis que le désert est sûr, l'élévage est ouvert au fellah et nombreux sont les bergers de très anciens villages qui demeurent sous la tente."(1) "C'est bien le refuge dans la vie pastorale," he points out, "de populations qui ne peuvent plus subsister autrement." Nomadic pastoralism has proved to be "un des rare metiers encore profitable en désert."(2)

We may follow that the calamitous effects of the environmental changes on the purely economic aspects of nomadic life may easily be overrated. The items on the debit side, which includes the loss of the traditional income for "services" and a gradual decline of the camel breeding industry, ought to be more than offset by the rising demand for sheep and goats, wool and skins as well as by the new facilities for trade, transport, and the obtaining of veterinary services which pacification of the desert and improved communications(3) are beginning to provide.

These new possibilities have, however, not yet, or only insufficiently, been exploited. The definition of a long-term nomad policy has to keep in mind that this omission rather than inevitable laws bear the blame for the economic misery of a large section of the nomadic population.

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(1) Cite, op.cit., p.72 and Rivalite, op.cit., p.58. The same phenomenon could be observed in Algeria 40 years ago: "Si paradoxical que celà puisse paraître au premier abord, la sécurité, qui pousse certains tribus a la vie sédentaire, invite au contraire des fractions autrefois sédentaires a passer a la vie nomade." (Lacroix-Bernard, 1906, p.258).

(2) Cite, op.cit., p.71.

(3) Cf. for instance, during the drought of 1932, Bedouin tribesmen came into the settled district between Palmyra and Damascus and hired lorries to carry skins of water out to their thirsty herds. Grant, op.cit., p.25.

g. Social Causes of the Disintegration of Nomadism.

Experience, however, teaches us plainly enough that traditional nomadic societies have never long survived the contact with Western civilization and that, whenever its embrace became close enough, it has proved deadly for them. There can be little doubt that in Iraq, too, traditional bedouin life is in the throes of severe crisis. It appears, however, that its causes are social to no lesser degree than economic in origin, even though economic disorder may be the most obvious symptom.

A primary reason for the disintegration of bedouin society is the establishment of peace and security, "parce que leur organisation sociale n'y est pas préparée."(1) The prevention of the Ghazu is a deadly blow to their customary existence and distinctive qualities; with it their spirit of independence, their chivalry and poetry have lost their inspiration. The sons of the sheikhs, formerly the leaders of tribal raids, tend to become a

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(1) De Boucheman, Cité, p. 98.

problem and often look with dismay at any other form of occupation.(1) A new type of bedouin sheikh who concentrates his attention on the breeding and marketing of his flocks rather than on intertribal animosities takes time to mature. The bedouin who regarded himself primarily a fighter is only tentatively beginning to attach increasing value to other qualities less glorious but more productive than the martial virtues whose employment is denied to him. The bedouin's own point of view about raiding is changing with his environment.(2) "Why should we kill our brothers for ever?" an Iraqi Shammar sheikh is said to have asked.

The superior status of the officials compared with the sheikh, multiple new contacts with alternative ways of life, such are the factors which produce the crisis of bedouin society. In other words, the crisis of the Iraqi nomads is, inasmuch as it is caused by the same factors which affect the sedentary tribesmen, only a part of the general crisis of tribal society.

Nomadic society is beset with the problems arising in consequence of the atrophy of the political function of the tribe. Pacification of the desert allows the individual

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(1) Report, Trans-Jordan 1936, p. 349.

(2) Dodd, ibid., op. cit., p. 611.

tribesman as well as the fellah to move about unmolested, provided he respects the established grazing grounds. But the fellaheen to not revert to the traditional bedouin existence. A non-tribal form of nomadism has entered the picture. They may acquire tents and live under them, yet they usually prefer to establish them individually or in small groups.(1) On the other hand, the effective presence of the arm of the law in the desert has reduced the outward pressure on which tribal cohesion so largely depends. Peace, while encouraging the "nomadization" of non-tribal elements, simultaneously furthers the "detribalization" of the old nomadic society. Large camps of mingled Shammar Anizeh and Dhafir tribes,which had been at enemity for generations, can be found spending the summer together near a water point.(2) On the other hand, grazing conditions in the desert are often more suitable for small or medium sized flocks, and already the larger unit begins to split up; small groups of tents, perhaps representing one family, can be found scattered

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(1) De Boucheman, Cité, op. cit., p. 72.

(2) Report 1928, op. cit., p. 43.

over the steppe.(1)

A definite division of labour within the tribe or the family group begins to evolve. One tribesman may look after the flocks, another may work on the land, a third and fourth may specialize in transport or do some kind of business, whereas formerly each used to be all of these rolled into one, but above all a warrior. The sheep nomads now act more frequently as herdsmen for the flocks of villagers and townsmen(2) and they are above all beginning to entrust their own animals to a few herdsmen from their midst rather than wander with the flocks.

This tendency, should it become general, would ultimately transform traditional nomadism with its seasonal

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(1) Cf. de Boucheman, Etudes Islamiques, 1934, p. 43; and on Algeria Bernard-Lacroix, op. cit., p. 68 f. The splitting up into small groups may, of course, be entirely due to geogrephical reasons. Although the Herki used to scatter into small family groups, spread over a wide area, they possess (according to Leach, op. cit., p. 7) "a high degree of tribal integration."

(2) In Upper Iraq especially this practice is old established. Cf., for instance, the Blunts Report (vol. II, p. 185) according to which the citizens of Mosul entrusted their sheep every winter to Haddadin "and seem contented with the arrangement." Cf. also Murray, Handbook for Travellers, Turkey in Asia, 1878, p. 386. The flocks tended by the tribes on both sides of the Tigris were property of the merchants of Baghdad; E. Sachau, Am Euphrat und Tigris, 1900, p. 47 f.

migration of the whole tribe into a system akin to "transhumance," i.e., in which only the herders accompany the flock, as is done in Spain, Italy, the Provence and also in the Kurdish mountains.(1) Many of the so-called semi-nomadic sheep breeding tribes have, in fact, evolved a system by which cultivation is carried on by the majority of the tribe, while the nomadic fractions look after their own flocks together with those belonging to the sedentary tribesmen.(2)

A transformation of nomadism along these lines is welcome in the interest of maintaining the animal industries, but it is possible only when sedentarization is not enforced by a loss of animals, which the tribe is unable to replace out of its own resources.

Although the long term causes of the crisis of nomadism must be sought for in the decay of traditional tribalism rather than in any organic dislocation of the nomadic industry, it usually takes the form of a progressive impoverish-

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(1) Cf. above p. 5o

(2) De Boucheman, Rivalité, op. cit., p. 32. The Mawali "sont attachés, dans une certaine mesure, au sol par leurs villages, ... mais ils repoussent ... la sédentarisation totale à laquelle ils répugnent pour les nécessités d'élévage."

ment of the tribe which ultimately forces it into settlement. The settlement policy of the Government is, as a rule, concerned with the transfer of whole tribes or tribal sections into agriculture. Thus the more frequent development is not towards "transhumance" which allows for the maintenance of migratory sheep-raising even under conditions of a gradual loosening of tribal ties, but towards sedentarisation which, though, at least at first, preserving tribalism, abandons sheep farming as a major occupation.

If, however, the maintenance of migratory sheep raising is to be encouraged, a number of crucial questions arise in connection with the tribal organization of the nomads. Is it true that their tribalism renders satisfactory methods of stock raising impossible among the nomads? (1)

This is, ~~of course~~ *Lowe.*, but a particular manifestation of the general problem, as to whether tribalism necessarily bars the way to the adoption of progressive methods of production.

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(1) Thus, for instance, Siegfried Hirsch, Sheep and Goats in Palestine, Palestine Economic Soc., vol. VI, 1933, p. 53. At present the qualities of nomadic flocks are often particularly low. On the difficulties witnessed by the nomads in marketing their woll, cf. Aref al-Aref, op. cit., p. 167.

3. Nomad Policy.

a) Settlement on the Land.

The age-old nomad policy of any sufficiently strong Government has, ~~of course,~~ been one of settlement on the land. It was dictated primarily in the interest of peace and effective control. "As chief of an agricultural community, the sheikh would become accessible, because rooted; vulnerable, by reason of the Government's power of water control; taxable, since crops cannot be driven off or wholly concealed; dependent on Government as landlords, whose titles were from the State."[1][2]

To-day, as we have seen, administrative control and revenue collection in nomadic areas no longer meet with the same unsurmountable obstacles, although the nomads are certainly still liable to create administrative difficulties of their own. Nor can settlement be said to constitute the only means of rescue for a section of the population whose economic existence has been irreparably undermined by modern developments. The settlement of nomads as such offers, moreover, no contribution to the problem of tribal

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(1) Cf. on nomad settlement in antiquity and the Middle Ages, A. Poidebare, La Trace de Rome dans le Désert de Syrie, 1934; and Dussaud, Topographie Historique de la Syrie Antique et Médiévale, 1927.
(2) Longrigg, op. cit., p. 307.

disintegration which is basically the same in the case of nomadic and settled tribes. Settlement policy to-day has to be regarded primarily, though by no means exclusively, in the light of it economic and social significance. The essence of settlement is the transfer of a population, engaged in animal raising, to agriculture,-a programme justified much too often by arguments which have little to do with the comparative advantages of the two branches of primary industry. The true purpose of a policy of nomad settlement is the optimal distribution of the available resources of manpower and land between cultivation and animal breeding.

(1) Objects of Settlement.

(a) Optimal Land Utilization.

A determination of the most profitable bounderies between pastoral and arable land depends on economic considerations as much as on geographical data. On economic grounds it may, and has in fact been, argued that a major part of Lower Iraq might be transformed into a vast grazing ground. (1) In estimating the prospects of a policy of mass settlements of nomads we are, however, concerned with the legitimate "minimum area" for the stock breeder, as determined primarily by geographical criteria.

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(1) [illegible]

Freiherr von Oppenheim, who has made the Northern Arabian nomads a life study, attributes the disappearance of the Egyptian nomads to the sterility of the desert on both sides of the Nile, which strikingly contrasts with the relative productivity of the desert and steppe of the Two-River land. In Egypt the borders between the desert and the "Sown" are sudden and immediate; in Upper Mesopotamia a broad belt of marginal land favours the herdsman. These geographical factors encouraged von Oppenheim in the belief that the Mesopotamian nomads will hold their own "for centuries to come."(1) Already the Blunts, who had first hand impressions of the Turkish policy of settlement, pointed out that "the Northern desert might maintain a large and wealthy pastoral population; that it was never intended for any other." They thought it would be an "economic mistake ... to encourage the cultivation of all the lands which could possibly product a crop."(2)

The cultivated area could undoubtedly be extended before it again reached its "natural" limits, and a corresponding shrinkage of nomadic grazing grounds would have to be

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(1) Von Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 26.
(2) Blunt, op. cit., vol. II, p. 185 f.

taken into account. The Shammar of the Jezerah, for instance, are a case of nomadism spreading over potentially agricultural land.(1) But generally speaking, it still holds good that - as a report on the Mesopotamian sheep industry of 1919 pointed out - the ousting of the flocks from the agricultural land is only a gradual process, as intensive agriculture is not and will not for some time be practized in Mesopotamia on a sufficiently large scale.(2) Whereas in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco the interests of nomadism and agriculture clashed over their rival claims for the marginal land,(3) in Iraq the factor of scarcity for some time ahead is manpower.

(b) Optimal Employment of Manpower.

The intense demand for additional manpower for Iraq's agriculture cannot be ignored, and the maximum contribution which the nomadic tribes can render in alleviating the position, may be expected from them, though it must be kept in mind that the demand for cultivators to till the newly-

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(1) Edmond Rabbath, Esquisse sur les populations Syriennes, Revue Internationale de Sociologie, Sept./Oct. 1938, p. 494.

(2) Quoted in Report on The Conditions of Trade in Mesopotamia, 1920, p. 17 f. On the possibilities of a shift towards production of foodstuffs of higher nutritive value in the Middle-East, cf. Bonne, op. cit., 1943, p.27.

(3) As for Algeria, cf. Bernard-Lacroix, 1906, p. 60 f. Annales de Géographie, op. cit., p. 157; as for Morocco, Bernard, Le Moroc, op. cit., 1930, p. 450 f.

reclaimed land would be far from satisfied, even if all the nomads of Iraq were duly settled.(1) Our problem is, however, not so much the actual demand for cultivators as the potential supply which might be obtained by settlement.

Whereas in Algeria predominance has been given to the question as to whether lands of doubtful agricultural value should not better be preserved once and for all for stock raising, in Iraq there is also the question of whether the poor cultivator, which converted nomads usually are, (and especially so under conditions of artificial irrigation) should not better be left to their present occupation.

To the second question, a categorical answer is even more difficult than to the first. The effects on utilization of land following improved methods of irrigation and cultivation are more or less predictable. The employment of people as highly adapted to, and conditioned by, their ways of life as are the Arab nomads, in an occupation which is contrary to their outlook and habits, raises problems of great complexity. It was a major weakness of many settle-

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(1) "If the whole desert came into the riverside the accretion of numbers would still be inconsiderable." (Rev. Circ., op. cit., 1919, p. 79.)

ment schemes to rely on the mistaken assumption that they could be regarded as mechanical and accountable transactions.(1)

The naivité with which earlier Ottoman governors as, for instance, Aslam Pasha, approached the subject, may to-day be regarded as a mere historical curiosity.(2) But more carefully thought-out schemes, as ~~for instance~~ endeavours to tempt nomads into settlement by the promise of attractive model villages or by training them in more specialized forms of cultivation,(3) have often been little more successful or, at best, have shown in different results. In order to succeed, it has been recognized that settlement schemes must be designed in such a way as to offer the nomad not only an improvement on his traditional existence, but - and this is where the difficulty lies - one which he is able to appreciate.

(2) Problem of the Execution or Settlement.

(a) The Adaptation or the Human Material.

It has taken long to realize that the conversion of nomads

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(1) This point has repeatedly been stressed by E. Epstein, for instance, in The Present Condition in the Hauran, J. R. Central. Asian Soc., 1936, p. 607.

(2) Under the superintendance of Turkish soldiers, long rows of mud houses were built by the nomads in various parts of the Euphrates valley because, as they were informed, the Sultan desired them to pursue a more loyal mode of existence as cultivators of the soil. The nomads would make a pretence of living in their mud houses as long as the soldiers kept guard over them. As soon as the troops were required elsewhere the bedouins would return to the desert. (Blunt, op. cit., vol. II, p. 183.)

(3) on next page.

into cultivators is a "most difficult and heartbreaking task."(1) A benevolent administrator of a nomadic area came home with the conviction that, because of "the peculiar mentality of the individuals one wishes to help, big schemes for land settlement would merely defeat themselves."(2)

It may indeed require great daministrative ingenuity to awaken a readiness in the nomads to co-operate. Nomads are highly socialized beings whose personal reactions are determined by loyalties, generally antagonistic to those of the cultivators.(3) They are used to look down on the Shawwiyah,(4) and fellah is to them a term of abasement.(5)

From previous page: (3) On attempts with orchards in Tunis, cf. Merner, op. cit., p. 68; in Sinai, Jarvis, J. R. Central Asian Soc., 1936, p. 588.

(1) Ibid., p. 593.

(2) Ibid., p. 592. Jarvis felt entitled to voice his scepticism of the exaggerated expectations in regard to nomad settlement, "precisely because" he was "in close touch with those peculiar people for so long." It must, however, be remembered that Jarvis spent his eighteen years in the desert in Lybia and Sinai where the nomadic position differs considerably from that in Iraq.

(3) Trans-Jordan Report, 1936, p. 349; Dodd, op. cit., p. 607.

(4) Settled tribes.

(5) Jamali, op. cit., p. 137; Epstein, 19th Congress, op. cit., p. 577; Glubb, Roy. Cen. As. Soc. 1935, p. 17.

The tradition of the desert hierarchy, headed by the nomads, is slow to die. One of the factors which keeps it alive is the experience of settlement as the culmination of a sequence of humiliating circumstances: formerly, the defeat in desert warfare, to-day, usually the loss of flocks. Taking to agriculture still bears the stigma of an admission of poverty.(1) The abandonment of the tent often indicates that the tribal section has lost with its flocks not only the possibility, but the very need for migration,(2) or that the tribal group is unable to keep or to acquire a tent, which ~~as~~ is valuable by comparison ~~compared~~ with a reed or mud hut.(3)

Moreover, the Bedouin is not used to regular work. "His only work and only play was the ghazzu."(4) When he is not with his herds he spends the day in the camp "in a lazy fashion without occupation."(5) Most kinds of manual work

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(1) In the opinion of the tribes - and even of the sheep-breeders - "l'idée de richesse" as well as of "noblesse" is associated with nomadism. To them sedentarization "apparaisse comme une décadence économique et politique" (de Boucheman, Rivalité, op. cit., p. 32).
(2) Bernard-Lacroix, Annales de Géographie, p. 162.
(3) Bernard-Lacroix, Les Nomades, op. cit., p. 135.
(4) Gertrude Bell, Arab Bulletin, 28th February, 1917, reprinted in Arab War, op. cit., p. 34.
(5) Dodds, op. cit., p. 599.

are an anathems to him. He is inclined to consider it bad form to soil his hands with a mattock or shovel.(1) Even fully settled sections, proud of being authentic "Arabs," leave certain manual work to outsiders, though those have nowadays to be paid for it.(2)

With the Wahabis (and, on a much smaller scale, the Senussis) nomad settlement succeeded, at least to a certain degree, the reason being that these could rally religious devotions against the devotion to the traditional ideology.(3) In modern Iraq, where settlement cannot well be demanded as a religious duty, education and a patient and understanding administration are the only means of alleviating the psychological difficulties of the transitional period.

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(1) Jarvis, Journ. R. Central Asian Soc. 1935, p. 38; ibid. 1936, p. 585.

(2) For instance, repairs of the irrigation lifts. Cf. H. Charles, Tribu Moutonnière, op. cit., p. 146. On employment by nomads of fellaheen for heavier manual work, cf. Arab of Mesopotamia, op. cit., p. 92; cf. also Syria Report, op. cit., 1931, p. 98.

(3) On nomad settlement in Nejd under Abdul Aziz, cf. Ameen Rihani, Ibn Sa'aud of Arabia, 1928, p. 191 f. At first the Hijrahs, i.e. emigration (from the desert), tended to become hermitages where the tribesmen, if they were not occupied on ghazzu, prayed but did not work. At last Abdul Aziz sent forth the Motawwas to preach to them to work as required by the tradition that a rich believer was better than a poor believer, and that Abu Bequ did not disdain wealth. It seemed that of late the proper limits of settlement policy have become more fully recognized in Saudi Arabia, too. Cf. also Philby, Arabia, op. cit., p. 224 f.

(b) Improvement of the Standard of Living.

Whether and in what cases settlement can improve the objective standard of living is another equally problematic question. One thing is certain; the answer is entirely dependent on the particular circumstances of each case.

An investigation among some Syrian nomads revealed an improvement of standards of health and hygiene, pari passu with the transition from nomadic to settled life.(1) However we cannot doubt the common observation that, though the nomad is not a very clean person, owing to the preciousness of water, he is healthy "despite body lice and unwashed clothes, because the ground on which he lives is clean and the air that blows through his loosely woven tent is sweet and pure.(2) When the ground on which he has camped becomes foul, he moves on. Once settled, his dirt becomes dangerous and vermin a cause of disease."(3) The nomads

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(1) Cf. Hygienic Status of the Bedouin, by E. Epstein (relating to bedouins of the Hama and Palmyria area), Appendix 7, of A Controlled Experiment in Rural Hygiene in Syria, by C. Dodd, American University of Beyruth, Soc. Science Series No. 7, 1934. The nomads are less afflicted with eye troubles, but their infant mortality is exceptionally high.

(2) Cf. C. Niebuhr, reported in 1772, that the tribesmen cannot comprehend the townsmen, "die doch das Aussehen haben wollen, als liebten sie die Reinlichkeit, und doch in einer so unreinen Luft leben können." (p. 380, op. cit.)

(3) Special Report, op. cit, p. 237.

it is often claimed, have a eugenic and demographic function "as a reservoir of Arab vitality."(1)

In fact, the health standards of both fellaheen and nomads vary so considerably from place to place, as to question the value of any general comparison between them. But it is obvious, that in the irrigation zone the nomad enjoys the great advantage over the fellahs that he is much less afflicted by Bilharzia and similar diseases which (though they have not yet reached the same dimension as in Egypt) are beginning to become a serious problem.(2)

It can also not be argued that the provision of modern medical services, which will raise the health standard of the settled rural population, will remain inaccessible to the nomads. The Contrôle Bédouin in Syria has, if only on a small scale demonstrated, how by means of "équipes sanitaire mobile" medical consultation under the tent could be

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(1) Syrian Report, op. cit., 1930, p. 102; 1931, p. 100. (There were 4"équipes"in 1931.)

(2) It was estimated in 1930 that at least 30% of the entire population of Southern Iraq were infected with bilharzia. Yet the disease rarely figures in dispensary statistics. Blood in the urin is considered normal in many places (Special Report, op. cit., p. 71). On the effect of bilharzia in Egypt cf. Wendell Cleland, The Population Problem in Egypt, 1936, especially p. 83-89.

organised.(1) Similarly, in regard to education, the view that the nomads cannot be reached by organized education is not shared by the experts. Mr. Jamali advocates a system of "peripathetic" schools for the Iraqi nomads.(2) The French "Contrôle Bédouin" in Syria has experimented for a number of years with "écoles ambulantes" without any conclusive results. None of the six schools in existence in 1930 survived the disorganization of desert nomadism during the

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(1) Cf., for instance, recently H.A.R. Gibb, in The Near East, op. cit., p. 88 f: "It is the continual recruitment from fresh nomadic stock ... that has preserved the Arab population of the settled areas in the Middle East from the physical degeneration and decay to which the populationsin its low-land area have been especially liable. ... And though science may do much to mitigate these scourges and to raise the general standard of health ... it would be an act of folly to drain off the reservoirs at this stage." This (as well as the parallel argument in the case of the peasant population in Europe) is an example where common sense and observation refuse - probably rightly - to accept the sometimes contradicting results of the statisticians.

(2) Jamali, op. cit., p. 114.

disastrous years 1931-1933.(1) But there were other specific reasons for the failure. The available teachers were inadequate and unable to accustom themselves to a life under the tent;(2) they did not gain the confidence of the tribesmen, and attendance at the schools was deplorably small.(3) The schools tended to become an appendix to the sheikhal household.(4) In 1936 "écoles saisonnières" were established to function from May to September in various centres of nomadic camps ~~in~~ which, for these months, are situated in the settled zones. The record of these schools is too short to allow for any final conclusions to be drawn.(5) The same applies to the experiment with "desert schools" started on a small scale in 1935/36 by the Trans-Jordan authorities on a

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(1) Syria Report, op. cit., 1930, p. 102; 1934, p. 109; 1935, p. 106
(2) Ibid., 1933, p. 95.
(3) The six schools had a maximum of 108 pupils in 1930 (Syria Report 1930, p. 102).
(4) Cf. the pessimistic reports in Syria Report 1931, p. 101; 1932, p. 101.
(5) There were 11 schools with abour 250 pupils. The success was reported to be unequal. (Syria Report, op. cit., 1935, p. 106; 1936, p. 83. The schools had dwindled to two in 1938. (Report, op. cit., p. 108.)

principle similar to the "écoles saisonnières."(1)

As to the influence of settlement on the social status of the tribesman, it is more than pro-nomadic bias to conjure the picture of "the once free living nomad soon acquiring a status akin to that of serfs and giving cheap labour to their overlords, the sheikhs."(2) Some such preocess is the inevitable consequance of any settlement which - as has been the rule so far - allows the sheikh to assume control of the land. At first the sheikh would perhaps neither desire nor dare to engage his own tribe in cultivation. The rank and file would preserve their nomadic existence while the labourers on the sheikh's estate were recruited from

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(1) Trans-Jordan Report, op. cit., 1938, p. 318.

(2) Special Report, op. cit., p. 327. On the evil effects of "prolétarisation" of settled nomads in French North Africa, cf. de la Motte-Capron, 1939, op. cit., p. 353 f.

smaller dependent tribes.(1) But in the long run the nomads themselves would not escape a conversion into fellaheen.

General statements as to the greater prosperity (or rather "lesser poverty") of the fellahs or nomads are similar inconclusive,(2) as long as a scientific basis of comparison with their former conditions has not been formulated, and no allowance made for the differences of time and place. Sometimes seeming improvements of the economic situation through settlement have proved to be deceptive.

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(1) Examples in Oppenheim, op. cit.,pp. 28, 144 and 183; Epstein, Journ. R. Central Asian Soc., 1938, p. 233. Cf. also Syria Report, op. cit, 1934, p. 109. On the other hand, when tribesmen rather than sheikhs were persuaded to settle by the temptation to gain riches, they proved particularly easily discouraged and, upon failure of their crops, liable to return to the desert. (Report, 1936, Trans-Jordan, p. 349.) The situation would be different, if settlement could be organized on principles of co-operative or collective farming (cf. below p.395,407).

(2) Special Report, op. cit., is of opinion that the Fellaheens' life conditions and poverty are worse than those of the nomads. According to it, the total cash value of a shepherd's annual earnings was about . . I.D. 4.10.0 in 1930, but it is "difficult to estimate." According to van Ess (Asia, Pril, 1942, p. 210) the budget of an Iraqi fellah is 10 I.D. of which I.D. 3 in cash. Glubb, Journ. R. Centr. Asian Soc., 1935, p. 16, estimates that "a poor bedouin family can live nowadays on, say, £ 10 a year." E. Epstein, on the other hand, (op. cit.) believes in the steady deterioration of the nomads' standard of life, which Glubb, op. cit., denies.

Government measures - even Government pressure - directly or indirectly applied by zealous officials - may create apparent difficulties for the nomads from which settlement appears to offer the only way out. Again chance circumstances such as the loss of flocks due to seasonal calamities or epidemics cannot in themselves be treated as sufficient indication of a tribe's "ripeness" for settlement. In the long run it may often prove economically a better proposition to help it to continue its pastoral pursuits.

The greatest difficulty in assessing the intrinsic economic justification of a settlement scheme is, however, that what is advantageous for the sheikh may be harmful for the fellahs. Many a nomad sheikh, effected by the "land fever" of the late '20-s and '30's, saw in agriculture a safe and fast road to fortune and needed little persuasion to try his hand at it.(1) This difficulty in arriving at a

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(1) Cf. on the different attitude of sheikhs and tribesmen on the question of settlement on the land, Syria Report, op. cit., 1931, p. 99; 1932, p. 101; 1934, p. 109; 1937, p. 106, remarks that "the chiefs don't want so much to settle, but to lay hands on land for development."

reliable judgment of the genuineness of a particular case for transfer to agriculture is further enhanced by the array of forces behind an indiscriminate policy of settlement. The old suspicion of the townsmen against the tribe focusses with special intensity on the nomads. The traditional attitude of regarding the nomad's mobility as a danger to peace and order tempts the official class to exaggerate their undoubted administrative "nuisance value," into a threat to the orderly functioning of administration. Landed interests may welcome settlement schemes in the expectation of obtaining labour for their estates. Generally, the interests of the stock-breeding industry are less vocal in the towns and less identical with the interests of the governing class than those of agriculture. There still exists in Iraq, as in other Arab countries, the tendency to look upon the animal industry - particularly if connected with the nomadic way of life - as "un mal inévitable" instead as one of the country's industries "en même titre que l'agriculture."(1)

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(1) Bernard-Lacroix, Algeria, Annales de Géographie, op. cit., p. 157; as to Morocco, cf. Bernard, op. cit., p. 150.

b) Towards a Dual Nomad Policy.

(1) Settling the "Surplus" Nomads.

No comprehensive settlement scheme has so far materialized in Iraq in modern times. The Young Turkish Government paid attention to the question, and the Firman, appointing Djemal Pasha in 1911, instructed the new Wali "to formulate a scheme with the least possible delay for the settlement of the nomads on land."(1) No effort comparable to that undertaken in the Aleppo area had, however, been made in Mesopotamia before the first world war.(2)

Settlement of nomadic tribes under Government control and assistance on lands, reclaimed by irrigation schemes, has remained the aim of the new State's nomad policy ever since the beginning. There has been no lack of forecasts of forthcoming schemes of settlement and of impending legislative or administrative action. In 1927, when a number of Shammar sheikhs in the Jazira showed an interest in cultivation, a "comprehensive and carefully thought out

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(1) Quoted by Ireland, op. cit., p. 91, note 1.

(2) On this rather successful settlement of nomads in Syria cf. V. Müller, op. cit., p. 126 seq.; Latron, op. cit., p. 210 seq.

scheme for settlement" was promised.(1) The Liwa Administration Law(2) of the same year announced that "the settlement and organization of nomadic tribes within Iraq territories shall be regulated by such special laws and regulations as may fit their custom and special conditions."

In the early thirties, on the other hand, attention was called to the question of settlement by the calamitous state of many nomadic tribes after a succession of adverse seasons. It was reported in 1934, that the Government, in view of the regrettable conditions of the nomads, intended to settle them in certain agricultural areas. Three mixed commissions, consisting of Government officials and heads of tribes, would be charged with investigating into the most suitable methods

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(1) It is regrettable that various studies on nomad settlement undertaken since the last war are not available for comparison, but remain hidden in departmental files. Cf., for instance, in Djebel Druze, the problem of sedentarization was the subject of "études approfondies" in 1930 (Syria Report, op. cit., 1930, p. 118). H.A.R. Gibb attaches great importance to the necessity of a co-ordinated nomad policy of the different Arab countries, raising it to the level of an argument in favour of Arab unity. He considers it a "crucial problem" in "the transformation of Western Asia into a homogeneous or at least closely knit organism." (The Near East, op. cit., p. 85.) On the need to compare the experiences gained in the different Arab countries cf. also A.N. Poliak, in Bulletin of the Economic Research Institute of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1942, p. 26.

(2) No. 58, of 1927, art. 6.

for allotting land to the nomads, and for inducing them to devote themselves to cultivation.(1) In 1935, a Directorate for Tribal Affairs was established in the Ministry of Interior,(2) and plans for a first big settlement scheme were elaborated. It aimed at the settlement of 30,000 nomads on the lands newly reclaimed on the Abu Ghuraib Canal.(3)

In the years before the war promises for early action on the nomadic problem featured in most programmes of the ever-changing governments. In 1937, Hikmet Sulaiman referred to the Government intention of settling the tribes "within the shortest time possible.... These tribes constitute a notable part of the population; they have no land and no home; ... their complete and permanent settlement is imperative; they must be given the ownership of the land which they occupy and they will in due course contribute their full share to the development of the country."(4)

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(1) Alif-bā, September 5th, 1934. (2) Or. Moderno,1935,p.326.
(3) Djamal Zadeh, International Labour Revue, op. cit., p. 207; Falasṭīn, June 25th, 1935. The paper pointed out that the nomads deserve the land better than the officials who in recent years have acquired rights in Domain lands for themselves, and sometimes exploit them at the expense of their first duty to serve the State.
(4) Interview given to the correspondent of ~~the~~ Le Temps (Paris), January 6, 1937; cf. also al-Balāgh (Cairo), December 14th, 1936.

The Madfai Cabinet of the same year promised the early and speedy settlement of nomads on uncultivated Miri land.(1) A speech from the throne in 1938 referred to the distribution of land to the nomads in "areas which have been or will shortly be developed"(2) and in 1939 the Government once more affirmed its adherence to the policy.(3)

A legal framework for settlement had meanwhile been created, even though the promise of a comprehensive legislation for the management of the nomads has not so far been fulfilled. The land laws of 1932 and subsequent years(4) provided, by the legal acknowledgment of Lazma rights in tribal lands, the basis for the two principal types of settlement: semi-nomads may be granted the Lazma right in the ordinary course of land settlement, provided their "cultivation of the land according to local practice" bears the interpretation of an usufruct for the last fifteen years.(5) Nomads proper have been

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(1) Oriente Moderno 1937, p. 526.
(2) Iraq Government Gazette 1938, No. 48. The speech refers to the Abu Ghuraib, Ghazraf and Hawija schemes.
(3) It would endeavour "to settle the tribes by finding and distributing to them suitable lands" (Government Gazette, 1939, No. 29).
(4) Cf. below p. 342
(5) Land Settlement Law 1938, art. 11 (a).

given special consideration by the provision that the Council of Ministers may grant Lazma in State lands (Miri Sirf) "exploited for the purpose of settling tribes,"(1) even though these had no previous claim to the land. According to the Land Tax Law of 1936(2) the Council of Ministers may decide to exempt from the tax, lands which are "utilized to settle as cultivators nomadic tribesmen."(3) It figures, moreover, among the objects of the new Agricultural Bank to make advances "on the demand of the Government and subject to its guarantee" for the purpose of "settling tribal folk on agricultural land and ensuring the necessary cultivation by them."(4)

Some instalments of the settlement policy had been carried out already under the Anglo-Iraqi régime. In 1922, about 2,000 tribesmen were settled on the land reclaimed by the Saqlawiyah Canal.(5) A proportion of the lands irrigated by the

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(1) Ibid., art. 11 (e).
(2) No. 73, of 1936.
(3) Art. 5 (4).
(4) Law for the Creation of an Agricultural Bank, No. 18, of 1940.
(5) Drawn from "somewhat unprofitable semi-nomadic elements of the Dulaim confederation." (Report 1921-22, p. 20.)

Yusufiyah Canal system was allotted in small holdings to semi-nomadic tribesmen.(1) Since the release from the Mandate, the principal achievement to be recorded so far is the progress made with the Abu Ghuraib scheme. In 1938, 800 families were estimated to have been settled in the area.(2)

(2) Assisting "Legitimate" Nomadism.

It may turn out to the ultimate benefit of the nomads, as well as of the country as a whole, that nomad policy has not been allowed to be prematurely crystallized in a comprehensive legislation,(3) because only within the last few years preceding the war were there unmistakable indications that - partly under the influence of Bedouin policy as applied in Syria and Trans-Jordan(4) - the onesided reliance on a policy

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(1) Report 1922-23, op. cit., p. 72.
(2) E. Epstein, J. R.C. Asian Soc., 1938, p. 231; Djamal Zadeh, International Labour Review 1937, p. 207.
(3) Which had been forecast 1927 (cf. above p. 137).
(4) The policy of the Contrôle Bédouin was originally sceptical at the idea of settlement and, as its activities show, concentrated on facilitating a continuation of the traditional nomadic life. (Syria Reports, op. cit., 1933, p. 96; 1934, p. 109; 1936, p. 101.) Only in the last years before the war was it admitted that some degree of settlement is an inevitable and not necessarily economically unjustified process (Syria Report, op. cit., 1938, p. 108). In Trans-Jordan, the double aspect of nomad policy was accepted about the same time. (As to J.B. Glubb's devotion to desert nomadism cf. his papers in the J.R.C. Asian Soc., loc. cit.) The Trans-Jordan authorities seem gradually to modify their original policy, which was based on the belief that it is the Government's task rather to create favourable conditions for settlement

of settlement has been replaced by a dual policy for the nomads. Settlement on the land, it is recognized, offers no panacea for the solution of the problem. A settlement policy carried out in the belief that settlement involves, eo ipso, the bestowal of a benefit, is unable to define, on the basis of this assumption, its correct limits. On the other hand, there can be no doubt as to the danger of leaving the nomads to their fate. (1)

A nomad policy has to be firmly planted on both legs. Encouragement and assistance of the nomadic pastoral industry on the one hand, and settlement on the land on the other ~~hand~~, have to be applied, according to which alternative, in any specific case, offers a better employment of the country's resources. Both policies require active Government intervention. To restrict intervention to the promotion of settlement, and to rely on "laissez-faire" in regard to the "legitimate" sector of nomadism would be detrimental, not only as ~~the~~ neglecting an important industry

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(From previous page:)
than to settle." (N. Poliak, in Bulletin of the Ec. Research Inst., op. cit., p. 30.) A good recent definition of nomad policy of the Trans-Jordan Government is given in Trans-Jordan Report, op. cit. 1938, p.318.

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(1) As to the need to reformulate an active nomad policy and to apply the policy decided upon "avec assurance et avec persévérance," cf. Henri Froideneaux, L'Asie Française, Mars 1934, p. 79.

which passes through a phase of difficult re-adjustment, but also of creating those cases of deceptive readiness for settlement which have helped to confuse the true aspect of the nomadic problem, and which may lead to the promotion of uneconomic settlement projects. Encouragement of settlement, combined with a neglect of the interests of nomadic stock-raising would inevitably entail a further deterioration of the nomadic industries. This in turn would be readily interpreted as demonstrating the inevitability of nomadic disintegration, and as confirming settlement as "the only way to save the Bedouin from extinction."(1) As for those cases in which "legitimate" migratory stock-breeding can be accepted,(2) attempts may be made to direct the tribes, wherever conditions are favourable, towards a balanced system of transhumance(3) to thin out the ranks of the migrating members of the tribe

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(1) Jarvis, J.R.C. Asian Soc. 1936, p. 593.

(2) We cannot discuss here the numerous measures which a policy designed to foster migratory pastorism may usefully take in hand. As for improvement of animal breeds, and particularly as regards the prevention of epidemics, good work, though still on an insufficient scale, is being carried out by the Veterinary Department (cf. the statistics on number of animals dying from infectuous diseases; vaccination of animals; animals exported after examination by the veterinary authorities, in section XIII of the Statistical Abstracts, Ministry of Economics, Baghdad, 1941). Little has been done to improve grazing conditions, i.e., through the introduction of grasses of higher nutrative value or of cactus (cf. Hugset, Le Statut des Terres Collectives et la Fixation au Sol des Indigènes, op. cit., p. 277). Very little has been under-

(3) Cfr. above p. 119 and below Appendix A II.

to a healthier proportion to the size of their herds, and thereby set free elements for cultivation. Cultivation, in that case, plays not the part of an alternative, but of an additional occupation, and the loss of skill by interruption of the nomadic traditions can be avoided.

Elsewhere, especially in Algeria and Trans-Jordan, the advantages of such an economy, where all eggs are not in one basket, has repeatedly been pointed out, (1) and they have been confirmed by actual experience. (2) New possibilities for guiding nomadism towards "transhumance" are to-day being actively explored by the Government, which hopes to establish a number of "artificial oases", through the development of Artesian wells in the desert. These oases, it is hoped, might become a social anchorage as well as an econ-

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(From previous page:)
- taken as regards organization and assistance in the marketing of animals and animal products of the nomads, and as regards the provision of cheap credit in cash or kind, especially in the case of loss of animals; the improvement of existing or introduction of new methods of processing of animal products by the primary producers, etc.

(1) Cf., as regards Trans-Jordan, Glubb, Journ. R. Centr. Asian Soc. 1938, p. 455; as regards Algeria, cf. The Reports

-omic assurance. There are many areas where good grazing can be made available in the desert, if water is available.(1) New methods of pasturing could be developed and some sub-sistente gardening might be introduced. Education and hygiene could be brought within easier reach of the nomads.(2)

An impetus to the search for Artesian wells(3) was given by successful borings undertaken by the French authorities

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from the Chellala and Tebessa districts (quoted by Lacroix-Bernard, op. cit., p. 59) "Est-ce transformer en agriculteurs sédentaires tous nos nomades .. ? Non, ... nous pensons qu'il est possible et désirable de développer à la fois et dans les mêmes groupes la vie pastorale et la vie agricole." Bernard-Lacroix rightly emphasizes that it can be decided only according to the circumstances of each individual case whether developments on these lines are feasable.

(2) As to the much stronger position of the semi-nomads at the time of the most serious losses of animals (1930-1933) cf., for instance, Syria Report 1933, op. cit., p. 95.

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(1) Report 1928, op. cit., p. 43.
(2) H. Boesch, Economic Geography, op. cit., p. 351.
(3) Isolated experiments to find water in the desert by deep borings and to collect rainwater in open reservoirs had been undertaken already in 1928 (Report 1928, op. cit., p. 43), but the more systematic efforts date from the years after the great crisis of stock-breeding in the Syrian desert.

in Syria, and by the oil companies, in the course of their construction of the trans-desert pipeline.(1)

To gauge the scope of the possibilities adequately, the Government provided, in its four-year Capital Development Programme of 1935, I.D. 100,000 for the development of Artesian wells and desert pastures.(2)

As for settlement, on the other hand, we may distinguish its minimum task, which consists in catering for those nomadic groups which are genuinely ripe for settlement, and its maximum aim, involving all those elements whose transfer into agriculture may be desired on grounds of national economic policy.(3)

The carrying out of a "dual" nomadic policy may at times amount to a test of administrative ability. It requires

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(1) In Syria, under the auspices of the Contrôle Bédouin, 17 wells were successfully drilled in the desert in 1930, 11 in 1931 (Syria Reports, op. cit., 1932, p. 100; 1930, p. 101; cf. also the somewhat different figures in Report 1931, p. 100). - In Iraq wells have been sunk in various parts of Northern Iraq as well as in the Dlaim and in the el-Widian area (cf. al-Bilad, Baghdad, November 21st and 22nd, 1937; Oriente Moderno 1940, p. 244). It was reported in 1937 that a Swiss company had laid a scheme for the Government according to which it would take charge of the development of Artesian wells and would provide the necessary machinery (al-Bilād, loc. cit.).

(2) The Five-Years Capital Development Works' Scheme of 1936 included a provision of I.D. 24,000 for Artesian wells

(3) In view of the great technical difficulties in the way of successful settlement any doubt about the virtues of a specific settlement scheme may be safely interpreted as a veto on its execution, provided alternative steps can be undertaken to put the afflicted nomadic section on its feet.

simultaneous action[1] aiming on the one hand at replacing nomadism by agricultural settlement and, on the other hand, at enabling nomadism to carry on more efficiently. But these policies, far from being contradictory, are not only compatible but complimentary. By careful absorption into agriculture of the surplus nomads, the nomadic body as a whole can only profit. The different responses to measures of encouragement provide a good method to assess the inate strength of the tendency towards sedentarization of a given tribe. (2)

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(1) In 1936, legislation had been promised with a view to "regulating the nomadic migrations" (al-Balāgh, Cairo, December 14th, 1936). Such legislation would have to balance carefully the interests of cultivator and nomad on the one hand, and of the need for unhampered nomadic migration and of veterinary considerations on the other ~~hand~~. It may easily ~~become more~~ restricted ~~to~~ the nomads' freedom of movement even more than political frontiers. Cf. in this connection the Veterinary Regulations of 1938 (Iraq Government Gazette, 1938, No. 10) Art. 105: "The tribal chief after being permitted by the local authority concerned to move his tribe to another liwa or a to a foreign country for pasture, shall make a demand to the administrative authority at least three weeks before his departure giving full particulars with regard to his place of abode, the number of houses or people accompanying him, the number of animals of each individual separately, the route he intends taking, and the frontier post he intends crossing."... Article 109: "Every chief or tribesman shall take the usual roads wherein customs and veterinary posts are available and every person failing to do so is liable to the penalties under the Law of Contagious and Infectuous Diseases of Animals."

III. Tribal Disintegration.

1) From "Political" to Agrarian Tribalism.

a) The End of the "Political" Function of the Tribe.

The factual basis on which the prestige of the nomads rested has been withdrawn, and the desert orientation of agrarian tribalism may not survive the sanctions which kept it alive hitherto. The increased power of government has improved general conditions of public security, and this has gradually been depriving the tribe of its function as a means of defence against external dangers. Without the threat of the Bedouins and of rival groups the tribes are splitting into their component parts.(1)

The defeat of the 1935 rising in the Middle Euphrates signalled the failure of tribal power to challenge the Government. The final atrophy of those features of the tribal system which serve merely political aims cannot be much longer delayed. The great tribal confederacies have become functionless in the new setting. The process of splitting up has proceeded furthest with the Muntafiq, once central-

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(1) Administrative Report, Hindiyah Division, 1918, p. 177.

ized under the Sa'dum, now divided into about 50 distinct tribes.(1)

The Khaza'il confederation too ~~had~~ was successfully broken up by the Turks.(2) The Aneze, although they preserve a memory of an alleged common genealogy, are in practice divided into a number of large and independent tribes.(3) The Dhlaim were already split into eight main sections after the last war.(4) The confederation of the Iraqi Shammar, however, the latest arrivals from Arabia, ~~on the other hand,~~ still possess some cohesion, the whole body being led by the paramount sheikhs, and the component tribes by members of the sheikhal family.(5)

At first the British policy of government through paramount sheikhs reversed the tendency towards the dissolution of the confederation. But even in those days, a British Political Officer would not have denied that "the disintegration has already begun and reflects the desire of the people themselves who are openly averse to the tyranny

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(1) Arab of Mesopotamia, op. cit., p. 54.
(2) Administrative Report Shamiyah, 1918, p. 66.
(3) Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 109.
(4) Administrative Report Dulaim, 1918, p. 211.
(5) Oppenheim, op. cit. p. 144.

of the tribal confederation." It was admitted that, as a rule, the paramount sheikhs depended on the backing of the central Government, without which they were powerless.(1) It were better "to replace confederations by the smaller tribal or sub-tribal unit" as the accepted body with which the Government should deal.(2)

b) The Rise of the Sarkal.

In Lower Iraq, dealings with the sub-tribal unit brought the authorities into direct contact with the Sarkals,(3) dispensing with intermediary services of the sheikhs. Often the sarkals were originally heads of sheikhal or tribal families to whom the sheikhs alletted Miri lands granted to them by the Turks on condition of their cultivation.(4) The origin and the position of the Sarkals differ, however, from place to place. In some cases, the sheikh was a leader merely in name; in others the sectional leader came rarely into contact with the executive authority.(5) In Basrah, the sheikhs, although sub-letting their land to Sarkals, were still responsible for the payment of revenue, whilst in Baghdad, the Sarkals paid revenue directly.(6)

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(1) Report 1920-22, p. 19.
(2) Administrative Report Shamiyah Division 1918, p. 72.
(3) On the sarkal's rights to the land cf. below p.
(4) Administrative Report Hilla Division 1918, p. 123; Shamiyah Div. 1918, p. 72; A.T. Wilson, op. cit., vol. II, p. 77.
(5) Report 1920-22, p. 19.

The Turkish policy had to favour, wherever possible, the sarkals at the expense of the sheikhs; they had tried to enforce the rule that, unless financed by the sheikhs, they should have no share in the crops produced by the sarkals.(1) Under the early British pro-sheikh policy, the sarkals fared less well, and they "rather chafed at losing their independence."(2)

The most protracted and difficult agrarian conflicts in Lower Iraq did not arise between tribesman and sheikh, but between sarkals on the one hand, and sheikhs or tapu-holders on the other. It was the sarkals who, in the Muntafiq, tried to oust their landlords, with whom the authorities had to contend when dealing with the Sa'dun problem.(3) The fellahs were only concerned with their half-share. But they tended to see in the sarkal the lesser evil. The sarkals organized their labour, provided money to buy seeds in case of necessity, and often kept open house, whereas the absentee Sa'dun landlord "disdained to interest himself in

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(1) Admin. Report Shamiyah Div. 1918, p. 66.
(2) Admin. Report Dulaim Div. 1919, p.
(3) Admin. Report Muntafiq 1919, p. 5.

anything but ... his mallakiyah."(1)

The sarkals discharged indispensible functions in the agrarian system. They were acknowledged to "represent the brain, energy and the capital without which the labour of the fellah would be misapplied or not applied at all."(2) Nowadays the sarkal is often referred to in a purely functional sense, as the person responsible for the cultivation of a piece of land, irrespective of whether the fellahs who work under him are provided by him or recognize his tribal authority.(3) In 1935, a legal definition describes as a sarkal "every person with whom an agreement has been made by a farm owner to take charge of a number of fellahs in the management of cultivation."(4)

He may be a tenant of the tribal sheikh on miri land or of a town-dwelling mallak on tapu land. His position may still be predominantly tribal(5) or it may be adapted to the

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(1) Admin. Report Muntafiq Div. 1919, by Capt. A.H. Ditchburn, p. 4. As to the relations between the sarkal and the mallak, sheikh, etc., cf. also Admin. Report Hilla District 1918, p. 135; Shamiyah Div. 1918, p. 123.

(2) Revenue Circs. Nos. 1-28, 1919, p. 24. Cf. also Revenue Circs. 1914-18, p. 45, where the suggestion is made of encouraging the sarkals with the aim of making them the centre of the agricultural system.

(3) Admin. Report Shamiyah Div. 1918, p. 73.

(4) Law Governing the Rights and Duties of Cultivators, No. 28 of 1933, art. 1. Cf. also as to the duties of the sarkals, art. 6 and 7 ibid.

(5) Jamali, op. cit., p. 84, quoting Fahmi, p. 79, defines sarkal as "official name for smaller sheikh."

employment of individual fellahs. Tribal sarkals, if they succeed in freeing themselves from the obligation of paying a share to the sheikh, would interpret this in tribal terms as a rise from the rank of a chief of a elan under the tribal sheikh to that of a tribal sheikh in his own right. On tapu land the mallak and the sarkal would sometimes form a united front against the sheikh.(1)

Generally speaking the emergence of the sarkals, by multiplying the tribal elements in direct contact with the authorities, and by reducing the size of the effective tribal unit, helped to render also the individual tribesman more approachable, and thereby paved the way for further tribal disintegration. On the other hand, the reduction of the tribe to the size of the effective agricultural unit completed the transformation of tribalism from a political order into an agrarian system, thus helping in fact to preserve tribal cohesion, because once again the tribe was to perform a real function which in many districts it is still able to discharge. The end of the extraneous political function of the

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(1) Cf., for instance, Admin. Report Muntafiq Div. 1919, p. 111.

tribe has either been achieved already ,or else is not far off. Even though the quarrels of neighbouring groups are as yet conceived in tribal terms,(1) and alliances are still being concluded,(2) tribal survival has come to depend mainly on internal forces of cohesion.

2) Integration in the State.

a) Factors of Integration.

Ever since the rising or, as it is known in Arab literature, the Iraqi Revolution, of 1920, the tribes have acquired an interest in issues of national politics, which at times rivals ~~by its~~ intensity their preoccupation with tribal politics. Even when tribes were merely abused as useful tools for some party manoeuvre in Baghdad,(3) some version, however distorted, of the struggle for power into which they had been drawn would reach the tribal rank and file and acquaint them with wider loyalties beyond the tribal compass. Although Iraqi party politics themselves, with their predominance of personal

(1) Oppenheim, p. 109, op. cit.
(2) De Bouchman, Rivalité ... op.cit., p. 54.
(3) As was, generally speaking, the case in the tribal rising of 1935. (Cf. MacDonald, Journ. of R.C.Asian Soc. 1936, loc. cit.)

and sectional interests are often reminiscent enough of the old tribal politics, party propaganda comes before the tribes in the form of resounding and irresistible phrases. In recent years, the Governments in power have begun to acknowledge the existence of a tribal public opinion beyond the sheikhal sphere, which they are anxious to influence and guide. For this reason Bekr Sidqi's Government introduced the wireless as means of speaking directly to the tribal masses.(1)

(1) Tribal Franchise.

Under the Turkish regime the tribes had not taken part in the elections, and no tribal Shiah representatives were returned to the Chamber in Constantinople. In 1924, however, on the occasion of the first general election, his Majesty's Government held "that the very large tribal section of the community, embracing most of the agrarian population, should be duly represented."(2)

The insertion into the Electoral Law of a clause giving the tribes a minority representation of 20, on the analo-

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(1) Broadcast by Hikmet Sulaiman and Jafar abū Timman of the 5th of November, 1936.
(2) Report 1923-24, p. 14.

of the minority representation accorded to the Christian and Jewish communities, was therefore insisted upon by the High Commissioner. Moreover, on a recommendation of the Commissioner, the Council of Ministers decided[1] that, if individual tribal cultivators wished to register as primary voters with the urban population, they were entitled to do so.

This was an important decision, because it was clear that, if the sheikhs took advantage of it, the rural electors would outnumber the urban.[2] This is in fact what happened. The sheikhs registered their tribesmen by thousands and, for the first time, a number of tribal representatives were duly returned. The widespread apprehension among town politicians, the emphatic protests against the registration of the tribesmen on the electoral rolls, and the break-up of the moderate party[3] over the issue, were merely a blind alarm. The presence of the "tribal block" in the assembly did not justify the hopes of the High Commissioner that it might materially

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(1) At the meeting of the Council of the 9th of August, 1923.

(2) As to the high percentage of primary electors from tribal areas, cf., for instance, the following figures of primary electors registered for parliamentary elections in 1924-1925: -

Baghdad	76,000	Muntafiq	107,000
Basrah	95,000	Diwaniyah	92,000
Diyala	34,000	Dulaim	60,000

(3) Hizb al hurr.

facilitate the passing of the Treaty with Britain, nor, (as this British disappointment also made evident) did it confirm Arab anxieties as to its possible disturbance of the political balance.

The most effective check to tribal ascendancy through the ballot was the indirect system of election, based on Turkish precedents, which facilitated a rigid control of the elections by the Government, especially by the careful selection of the candidates for the secondary election. Abolition of the indirect system became one of the foremost political demands of the tribal spokesmen, who attributed to Government interference, open or disguised, in the elections the quite inadequate representation of the tribal districts, and the Shiah majority of the population in the Chamber.(1)

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(1) Cf. Art. 2 of the petition of the sheikhs of the Middle Euphrates, headed by Sheikh Mohammed Husein Āl Kāshif Āl Ghiṭā, to the King Ghazī in 1935 (al-Ayyām (Damascus), 1st of April, 1935) "In order to set at rest the minds of the people and to avoid divisions inside the nation" claimed Art. 1 ibid., "it will be necessary for all to be represented in the Cabinet, the Chamber, and in all official posts just as they are called upon to serve in the army and to pay taxes."

(2) Tribal Conscription.

The recruitment of tribesmen into the Iraqi army,[1] on the other hand, has proved to be a highly effective means of extricating the individual tribesman from his tribal setting, and infusing in him wider loyalties. The reaction on the part of the tribes to the application of so potent a solvent was strong, but not as violent or as lasting as was originally made out in some British statements. The problem of the feasibility of tribal conscription became the last major controversy between the British and the Iraqi Governments in which divergent views on methods of tribal policy were involved.[2] The tribes' familiar apprehension of conscription had shown itself originally in their reluctance - quickly enough overcome - to participate in the elections through fear that the electoral rolls would be used for purposes of conscription.[3] The National

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(1) Military service had been introduced by the Turks in Mosul in 1835 (Longrigg, op. cit., p. 299), and in Baghdad and Basrah by Midhat Pasha. Tribal areas, however, were in practice excluded from recruitment (Cuinet, op. cit., vol. III, p. 217), except for service in the Shabanah, a special force for action in tribal areas, intended to serve as scouts for the regular army, etc. (ibid., p. 297).

(2) As to the British attitude cf., for instance, Mr. Amery (then Secretary of State for Colonies) in a reply to a question in the House of Commons, in April, 1928: "It has been made clear to the Iraq Government that, if disturbances arose as a consequence of the introduction of the measure, we could not contemplate the employment of British troops to enforce its application." As for a typical example of the attitude of the Iraqi nationalists, cf. Yasin Pasha

(Continued on next page.)

Defence Act of 1927 was strongly opposed by the tribal senators and deputies; the Minister of Education who was at that time a Shiah resigned; agitation against conscription was in full swing among the Euphrates as well as the Kurdish mountain tribes.(1) But in subsequent years conscription was gradually and successfully extended to tribesmen, who at present make up a fair proportion of the Iraqi army. Only a few minor instances are known when, in the course of military action against rebellious tribes, tribal loyalties asserted themselves to the detriment of military discipline.

(From previous page.)

> al Hashimi in the Iraqi Chamber (June 1929): "You know what was said in the British Government's Report to the League of Nations, namely, that the Iraqi people had shown their dislike of conscription. ... The Iraqi people have very often evinced their dislike of the mandate, but has anyone done anything about that?"

(3) Al-'Iraq, December 2nd and 4th, 1922.

(1) Report 1927, p. 9; 1928, p. 16.

b) Factors delaying Integration in the State.

The new political consciousness of the sheikhs has not always been brought to bear in the direction of tribal disintegration. The possibilities of voicing their particular viewpoints and influencing decisions in Parliament, in exercising pressure on the authorities outside Parliament, were quickly grasped. On a number of occasions the sheikhs, or groups of sheikhs, attempted by common action to gain advantages for themselves in return for their adherence to the official policy.(1) Already in the national assembly of 1924 a large group of tribal representatives led by Sheikh Salim al Khiyam of the Muntafiq, had declared that they would not agree to the ratification of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty unless the Organic Law guaranteed the sheikhs special privileges.(2) In subsequent years, on the conscrip-

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(1) Report 1923-24, p. 21.
(2) Ireland. op. cit., p. 395.

tion issue, for instance, and in land questions the sheikhs - even though they were primarily concerned with fostering their own position rather than with benefitting the tribes - joined repeatedly in common action as spokesmen for the tribal case. The tribal revolt of 1935 gave a good illustration of the possibility of an ad hoc assertion of a sheikhal class interest. The leaders of the rising stated as principal reason for their dissatisfaction the inadequate number of tribal representatives in Parliament and the manner of the elections. The great meeting of tribal leaders in Baghdad was preceded by the dramatic entrance of the Shiah Sheikhs from the Euphrates, with an armed escort in 86 motor cars (1). A few days later sixty Sunni sheikhs from Upper

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(1) The Times, 5th April, 1935.

Iraq arrived in the capital. But though both groups met in a common conference on the 1st of April and published a joined communiqué expressing their desire for national unity,(1) the opportunity to settle a determined and concerted policy was lost. The Izha Government had no difficulty in establishing its ascendancy over the tribes on its own terms.(2)

The steady day-to-day influences, on which the transformation of tribesmen into citizens mainly depends, falls to the local administration. Progress has been most rapid whenever the tribesmen recognized that the local official, backed by the power of the State, has not only ultimately a greater say than his sheikh, but shows also no less sympathy with his grievances than his traditional chief. In fact, however, State authority presents itself before the tribesmen in the person of town officials, and mutual confidence is often slow to develop.

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(1) Al-Muqattam, Cairo, 11th April, 1935.

(2) Sometimes the sheikhs would apparently extort benefits for themselves by even less scrupulous methods. Yasin Pasha's Government in 1935 seems to have resorted to heavy bribery of the tribal leaders to keep the peace (Ireland, op. cit., p. 427).

3) Reducing the Gulf between Town and Tribe.

(a) Factors of Tribal Disintegration.

(1) Modern Means of Transport.

The new means of communication have multiplied the contacts of town and tribesmen. The tribesmen have greater facilities for going to town, the officials or the merchants for visiting the outlying tribal districts. The availability of modern transport aids the administration not only by allowing it more quickly to assert its authority but also by fostering the tribesmen's inclination to bring their affairs before the officials. A quarrel over water between rival sections, which in past years would have led to blood-shed, might end to-day in nothing more exciting than a motor race to liwa headquarters between the chiefs, each bent on getting in first with his version of the incident.(1) The motor car reduces not only the space between town and tribes, but also the difference in habits. Formerly, a chief from the vicinity of the Persian border, having business at administrative headquarters, would make the two-days

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(1) Cf. the case of the two chiefs of the Dzai tribe (Arbil Liwa) Report 1928, p. 46.

journey accompanied by a large escort of armed horsemen. Following the construction of a pioneer motor road with police posts from Sulaimaniyah to Halabja and Khurmel, a regular taxi service has sprung up. The tribal chief, finding that he can take a seat for little money and perform the journey without fatigue in two hours, ceases to entertain large bodies of expensive armed retainers. In fact, the practice of carrying arms has tended to go out of fashion.(1)

The "urbanization" - formerly known as "Ottomanization" - of the sheikhs, though not a new phenomenon as such, has never before been similarly widespread. Town education and town marriages(2) are becoming ever more common.(3) Tribal leaders sit in Parliament and occupy official positions.

(2) New Forms of Employment.

A comparatively new feature of the greatest importance is the fact that the tribesmen are no longer shut off from direct dealings with the world outside their tribal units.

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(1) Ibid., p. 45. Cf. also (ibid.) on other pioneer roads penetrating the Middle Euphrates marshes, etc.

(2) A son of 'Ajil al Jawar of the Shammar studied at Beyrut university, (Near East College News Letter, March 1931) p. ———→

(3) Cf., for instance, the Sheikh Walaah in the Kurdish hill country arranged for the marriage of his daughter with the leading Rowanduz notable (Leach, op. cit., p. 45).

The tribesmen, discovering that the sarkal, or minor sheikh, has to obey the orders of even minor officials, now bring their grievances and queries direct to the official. The district officials, on their part, begin to deal with them directly also over various matters of general administration. Many tribesmen make their way to the capital as a new expression of their old spirit of adventure. Having grown used, in good years, to "luxuries" like cigarettes, tea sugar and shoes, tribal cultivators, impatient at being thrown back to a bare subsistence level, look for additional sources of cash income which only their individual initiative can open to them. The oil concessionaires,(1) the railways, the public works and irrigation department have each in turn been large-scale employers of unskilled tribal labour. Tribesmen, drifting into the towns, work in the building industry or as porters.(2) Some of the more enterprising grasp at the opportunity of acquiring skill in a

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(1) The manpower for the Kirkuk oilfield is largely supplied by detribalized Kurds from the Sulaimaniyah area.

(2) Cf. information secured from Sheikh Hasan Jawal on the tribe of Al Bu Muhammad, Jamali, op. cit., appendix, p. 134; Leach, op. cit., p. 35. In 1918 about 4,000 Dulaim tribesmen were estimated to work as "coolies" in Baghdad. (Admin. Report Dulaim Div., M 1918, p. 2.)

new trade; the majority, however, are satisfied at earning some ready money.

Among the various reasons for the great number of tribesmen who find their way to the towns, at a rate far beyond the absrptive capacity of the urban labour market, tribal disintegration and the unsatisfactory conditions of the "de-tribalized" fellah figures prominently. If in 1940 there were about 50,000 tribesmen in Baghdad, living in chacks in the most primitive condition, this migration is due as much to a "push" from the country as to a "pull" from the towns and its attractions. It was reported that the sale of land by tribesmen below a certain minimum area should be prohibited in order to prevent their movement to the towns.(1)

Unable to deny the superior wealth and the greater power

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(1) Al-Bilād, Nov. 8th, 1940. According to Al-Bilād of the 20th of Nov., 1940, the Baghdad authorities had issued an order that all cultivators who had migrated to the towns Southern districts were to be sent back. Previously the Health authorities had called attention to the spread of malaria and bilharzia in Baghdad resulting from the presence of large numbers of infected families from tribal areas in Baghdad. The Director-General of Health made urgent representations that they should be returned to their own districts without delay, and that no tribal workers should be permitted to take up permanent residence in Baghdad without medical examination (Iraq Times, November 1st, 1940).

of the urban world, the tribesman's old disdain of the townsman, which gave poise to the poorest tribesman as long as he felt independent and had trust in his rifle, becomes untenable. His feeling of inferiority makes him receptive to the influences of the town and willing to imitate its ways. Tribesmen returning home import to their fellow tribesmen what they have learnt , even if it is only a new disregard for their old tribal code. "They are giving up the Arab customs and are not learning the town customs eit either," complained Sheikh Hassan al Suhail of the Bani Tamim. (1)

b) Factors delaying Tribal Disintegration.

The disintegrating influence of town contacts, however, has not failed to provoke a reaction. One principal focal point for the forces of conservatism is dissatisfaction at the often low standard of the teachers and minor officials available for local employment. Being as they are not seriously concerned with understanding the tribal mentality, (2) and unable to dispel suspicion, they

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(1) Jamali, op. cit., appendix, p. 132.
(2) Special Report, op. cit., p. 238; Monroe Report, op. cit., p. 25 f.

are not the most suitable apostles of the new era. The venality of the junior officials, actual or imagined, is still a real source of Government unpopularity among the tribes.(1) The speedy replacement of unsuitable Government officials from rural areas was persistently claimed by tribal representatives.(2) The Monroe Report on Education, of 1932, stressed the"notably low morale" of the teaching profession which was lower than should be expected from the quality of the individual teachers. One reason for this was that no incentive was offered in the way of promotion or of increase of salary for either excellence or length of service;(3) teachers were also frequently transferred, often as a means of discipline. The commission had many reports alleging immoral habits on the part of the teachers, especially in villages. "The number of disciplin-

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(1) Leach, op. cit., p. 11 f.
(2) Cf. Petition of the Sheikhs of the Middle Euphrates, art. 9, loc. cit.
(3) Monroe Report, op. cit., p. 20; Report 1927, p. 151.

ary cases," it pointed out, "and of cases of teachers dismissed for immorality confirms these reports."(1)

The petition of the sheikhs from the Middle Euphrates contained a demand for a change in the curriculum, allowing not only for more emphasis on religious instruction, but preventing generally the corruption of the morality of the young generation.(2)

Some sheikhs view the situation with serene detachment; "as for modern civilization," said Sheikh Hassam al Suhil of the Bani Tamim, "I approve of it, but not al together because it contains both virtues and evils. I welcome the education of women and their coming out without a veil, but I do not welcome the looseness and the indulgence which go with the freedom."(3) The tribal spokesmen demand the prohibition of prostitution, public sale of alcoholic drinks, and gambling.(4)

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(1) Monroe Report, op. cit., p. 21. Mr. Leach reports that in a Kurdish district visited by him current opinion seemed to be that all Government Education officers are moral perverts. (P. 10.) A Government agricultural instructor was alleged "to corrupt the villagers with alcohol and gambling and attempts to seduce their daughters." (P. 39.) In due course the instructor was found in the high road with two bullets in his body.

(2) Art. 10 of the Petition of the Sheikhs from the Middle Euphrates, of March,1935, loc. cit.

(3) Leach, op. cit., appendix, p. 125.

(4) Cf. art. 10, loc. cit.

The old antagonism between town and tribe, especially as far as the sheikhs are concerned, found a fresh economic basis in the conflict between the farmer on the one hand, and the merchant, banker and money lender on the other. Many sheikhs are deep in debt; some drifted into it after the Government withdrew their subsidies;(1) other bought irrigation pumps on credit, and pumps of insolvent sheikhs;(2) fell into the hands of their creditors.(3) The irrigation pump movement gave the conflict an increasingly sharp turn by emphasizing within the landlord class the difference of interest between the sheikhal landlord's claim for undisputed rights in his tribal land and the demands of the pump-owing townsmen.(4)

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(1) Jamali, op. cit., p. 84; Leach, op. cit., p. 32.

(2) As previously their Na'uras on the Upper Euphrates.

(3) Cf., for instance, on the water wheels of the Agaidat, H. Charles, op. cit., p. 152; on a similar development in the case of water mills, ibid., p. 140 f. "Il n'y avait en 1936 plus qu'une Na'ura qui soit propriété exclusive des Agédats" (p. 143).

(4) Cf. ~~above~~ later p. 241 and 247.

The impression of a narrowing of the gulf between town and tribe, in consequence of tribal disintegration, is to a large extent illusory as long as the transformation of tribesmen into individual fellahs only changes their former aloofness and hostility into a new dependence and servility. The reduction of the basic difference between urban and tribal society to the commoner division of town and country has not been successfully achieved, if the gulf, remaining as wide as before, has merely assumed a new aspect.

4) The New Economic Order.

(a) Factors of Tribal Disintegration.

(1) The Transformation from Sheikhs to Landlord.

The value of land has long been appreciated in Iraq by even the remotest tribes in possession of land.(1) There is nothing new in the fact that the sheikhs are anxious to lay hands on as large a slice of the tribal land as possible. Land has been registered in the name of the

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(1) According to Aref-el-Aref, op. cit., p. 18, the nomads of Beerseba have still recently been selling large tracts of land for a goat or a camel.

sheikhs since the introduction of the tapu tenure. Abdul Hamid presented favoured sheikhs with generous gifts of land and villages.(1) Some sheikhs owned date gardens, others houses in the capital or in provincial centres.(2) (3) But only since the establishment of effective administration has a valid title deed enabled the tapu holder to sell and mortgage his land in accordance with the previsions of Statute law.(4) Wherever the arm of the law reaches, the sheikh can now enforce his will on his tenants and needs no longer to pay the same attention to the good-will of his followers. The title to the land has acquired a new significance in the eyes of the sheikhs and few of them or of the independent sarkals have not been affected by "land fever." Even smaller sheikhs installed oil irrigation

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(1) For instance, all important Aneze sheikhs (Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 73). Ajil al Jawar inherited large estates near Kal'at Shargat and Tekrit which Abdul Hamid had given to his grandfather Ferhan (ibid., p. 150).

(2) For instance, Ali ibn Sulaman al Bekr of the Dulaim (Admiralty Handbook, op. cit., vol. III, p. 95); Oppenheim, p. 188: Ibn Hadhdhal of the Amarat near al Baghdadi (Raswan, op. cit., p. 498; Handbook of Mesopotamia, vol. III, p. 94).

(3) Ajil al Jawar owned houses in Baghdad, Mosul, and Tel-Afar, etc. (Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 150); Ali ibn Sulaman al Bekr in el Ramadi (ibid., p. 188); the family of Ibn Hadhdhal at Karbela and Razaza (Raswan, Geo. Review, 1930, p. 498). The Political Officer Amarah reported in 1919 (Admin. Report, Amarah Div. 1919, p. 13) an increasing inclination among the sheikhs of the district to buy houses and gardens in Amara and the neighbourhood. At the time Sheikh Majid of the Al Bu Muhammad

pumps and were anxious to exploit them on their own account unfettered by tribal considerations. Improved means of transport and better marketing organization raised in the sheikhs of the outlying districts the desire for a larger saleable surplus of crops, which were formerly locally consumed; some sheikhs are trying to reduce the fellahs' share for their own enrichment.

Many sheikhs acquire with the interests of a londowner his outlook and habits. The administration of their estates, their business connections, their litigations, their political ambitions transfer the centre of their influence and activities more and more outside the tribe.(1) The old days of equalitarian and patriarchal relationship between sheikh and tribesman are passing away. Whereas in the past the mode of life of sheikh and tribesman did not differ fundamentally, some sheikhs are beginning to acquire an air of formality foreign to Arab custom.

From previous page: - mad was the largest buyer.

(4) Cf. below p. Part II.

(1) Cf., for instance, Admin. Report 1919, Shamiyah Div. mentioning a sheikh of the Bani Hasan who lived in Kufa and did not maintain a mudhif. The same applies to the Kurdish area. Cf., for instance, Jamil Agha, the paramount chief of the Girdi is described as "a townsman in habit" who "holds himself very much aloof from his followers." (Leach, op. cit., p. 26.)

Sheikhs are becoming strangers who ride in motor cars instead of on horseback.(1) Some sheikhs assume what is, by tribal standards, a luxurious and extravagant life with little concern for the dire poverty of their followers.(2) The economic inequality between sheikh and tribesman is increasing far beyond that measure which, in the eyes of the tribesmen, goes with the sheikhal office.

(2) The Transition from Tribesman to Fellah.

It involves a change in the relations between sheikh and tribesman, especially in Lower Iraq, that tribal groups are gradually settling down into village life. In Kurdish villages the ascendancy of the Aghas over the cultivators was already almost unlimited, when in the South the mobility of the tribesman and the possibility of transferring his allegiance to another tribal group had put a check to sheikhal omnipotence. The early British Reports from most parts of Lower Iraq agree on the point that "the position

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(1) Or - in the case of the rice growers of Amara - instead of the Mashuf.

(2) Cf. Fahmi, op. cit., p. 112, referring to instances in the Fatala and Dulaim tribes.

of the cultivators is a strong one ... until the population bears a much larger proportion to the area of land available for cultivation," and that for this reason their interests will require little protection from above.(1)

It was no exceptional occurrence if, for instance, a sheikh's was deserted by his whole following in favour of his son, on the discover that a number of sheep, levied from the tribe under the pretext of a Government revenue, had been sold by the sheikh to contractors on his own account.(2) To-day when cases of self-help by the tribesmen are becoming rare, the mobility of the fellahs is maintained by the acute scarcity of labour. This applies, however, only to those who have no stake in the land themselves, and it is then the tribal tenant who bears the brunt of the transformation. His new status of dependence on his landlord begins to influence his outlook and his bearing. He frequently no longer thinks of addressing his sheikh by his name; new formal manners of showing him respect have arisen and tribesmen are known to kiss the hands

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(1) Cf., for instance, Admin. Report, 1919, Hilla Div., p.3; Revenue Circular 15, 1919, etc.
(2) Cf. Admin. Report, Amara Div., 1919, p. 21 f. on the Sheikh Ghadhban of the Bani Lam and his son Karim.

of the sheikh on meeting him.(1)

b) Factors delaying Tribal Disintegration.

But again the forces of disintegration do not have it all their own way. There are still effective barriers to overcome and counter-tendencies are not completely lacking.

(1) The Share System.

The share system has produced a complicated structure of vested interests in the crop of almost every parcel of land.(2) There are often more, and rarely less, than three

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(1) Jamali, op. cit., p. 96.

(2) In this connection we are concerned only with the significance of the share system for tribalism. The many variations of the share system in the different parts of Iraq are very fully described in the Admin. Report of the Political Officers 1918-1920 (op. cit.); in the Revenue Circular and Admin. Report of the Revenue Department of the same period (op. cit.). For more recent accounts of the principal systems, cf. Himadeh, Iraq, op. cit., especially pp. 149/50; also pp. 147, 192-193; Patersen in Tropical Agriculture 1931 (loc. cit.); as to the drawbacks of the system A. Bonne, in Monthly Bulletin of Agriculture 1934, (loc. cit.); on the share system in Syria cf. especially A. Latron, op. cit. ibid., p.

participants in the gross output of the land. In addition to the fellah the sarkal and the mallak (usually the State, or sheikhs under Customary law, or tapu holders under Statute law) shares in the crop are claimed by other parties on the basis of inherited rights or of special agreements. The old Uqr rights, which were all acquired before 1870, entitled their owner to a share varying from 2 per cent to 5 per cent, although he is excluded from taking any part in the cultivation or development of the soil. Shares in the crop are promised for all kinds of services of a tribal or family character. This network of vested rights serves as a powerful brake to the forces of change; the share system helped to maintain the musha system in Syria; it contributes a particularly indissoluble element of agrarian tribalism in Iraq. Tribal status and tribal rights have crystallized in claims to a share of the crop. The division of the crop after harvest takes place often according to complicated rules,(1) is an important feature of tribal life. The coffeeman of the sheikh, the man appointed to watch the distribution of the water, and the mullah of the sheikh may all have to be

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(1) For a full description of the division of the crop in an agrarian tribe, cf. H. Charles, op. cit., p. 132 f.

dealt with as separate shares,[1] even though, in reality, they may represent merely a part of the sheikh's portion. The considerable variety in the size of shares held by the principal participants generally have some economic justification[2] in the case of the fellah and sarkal, but are mainly a reflection of personal influence in the case of the sheikh. Whether the fellah's share amounts to a "nusf barid"[3] or 40%, or to one-third of the crop depends sometimes on whether he provides seeds and implements himself or not, sometimes on the quality of the land and the methods of irrigation.[4]

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(1) Ahmad Fahmi, Tiqrir Hawl Al Iraq, Baghdad, 1926, p. 79.
(2) On the different methods for determining the sarkal's share (Sarkaliyah) cf. ibid., Shamiyah Div., p. 72 f; Report of Revenue Department 1919, p. 25; Admin. Report 1919, Kerbela District, p. 189; ibid., Suq al Suyukh and Hammar Districts, p. 362.
(3) Cold half.
(4) Cf., for instance, on this point Admin. Report Diwaniyah 1919, p. 12: "The varying productive value of the soil ... is clearly shown by the multifarious forms of fellahs' engagements. On land which is tired and requires considerable labour on silt clearance, sheikhs frequently make pecuniary advances and sometimes gifts of money outright to attract fellahs. In cases where new land is opened up by fresh excavations, fellahs are usually forthcoming who are willing to do their share for permission to cultivate on the new lands thus irrigated. In cases where the excavation of a new canal is already complete, but the land irrigated therefrom comparatively new (i.e., in the second year of cultivation) fellahs not unfrequently lend money to the sheikhs in return for a grant of land. In some cases a sum is paid to the sheikh out-

Tending, as it does, to stereotype the whole technique of agricultural production, the share system, in its prevailing form, helps to maintain the present emphasis on the cultivation of food crops. The division of food crops, being as a rule performed in natura, delays the full growth of a money economy. The fellah remains a partner in the crop and has not yet become a recipient of cash wages. As for the landless fellahs, the share system alone stands between them and proletarianization; for as long as it is maintained, they retain an interest in their work and the crop in which they are to participate. Their remuneration remains related to the intensity of their efforts; they are less vulnerable to the vagaries of boom and depression of the markets. It is their share in the crop which has often enabled the fellahs to maintain the tribal setting, however weakened or even fictitious, in their relation to each other and to their sarkals, and to preserve a pre-capitalistic outlook.

The pump movement has interfered with the traditional share system to a lesser degree than might have been anti-

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From previous page:
right, known as "mawwat," or dead money not to be returned; in other words, the right to cultivate a given area for a given period is bought. Thus, when Government opens up a new area by fresh canals, the sheikh apart from sarkaliyah or sarkal's share of the produce, derives a considerable sum in cash from the fellahs."

cipated. It is true that in view of the investments involved a more careful calculation of expenses, and of labour expenses in particular, became essential. It was soon recognized that, when capital had to be invested in the land in the form of pumps , or when expensive crops , such as cotton, were grown, the Uqr charge of between 2% and 5% of the gross crop, which had not been a very heavy burden previously, "tended to hold up the development of areas so encumbered."(1) If, in fact, only a small percentage of the capacity of the pumps was utilized for the production of cash crops and intensice cultivation,(2) this cannot be attributed to the conservatism of the actual cultivators alone; the share system survived because it still meets the interests of the average landlord no less than those of the average fellah.(3) One important reason, however, why landlords favour the share system admittedly is its popularity with the cultivators which, under conditions of acute labour scarcity, is a point that cannot be overlooked.

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(1) Report 1927, p. 174.
(2) Cf. below p. 379f
(3) Cf. below p. 368f.

(2) Shortage of Agricultural Labour.

Many landowners do not only believe the share system to be more economical, but find that by maintaining the tribal setting, as it does, it tends to facilitate the problems of labour shortage, since sarkals or sheikhs may usually count on their followers where the tribal ties have not been disrupted.(1) As long as the landowner is recognized as tribal chief, he is less likely to be embarrassed by the mobility of the fellahs and especially of those who are his debtors.

The sense of freedom and independence of the tribal Arab, as compared with the feudal cultivator, has always rested on his freedom of movement and his right to transfer his allegiance to another tribal group. "Indessen," observed already Carsten Niebuhr,(2) "kennen die Araber die Leibeigenschaft der Bauern nicht, sondern ein jeder ... kann sein Glück in anderen Gegenden suchen, wenn es ihm in seinem Vaterlande nicht gefällt." To-day this traditional freedom of movement

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(1) But cf., for instance, Admin. Report, 1918, Amara Div., p. 320 (similarly Admin. Report 1919, Hilla Div., p. 3): "The three or four big heads of the Albu Muhammad tribe compete against each other for fellahs. This competition explains the demand for agricultural loans which are to the sarkals an instrument whereby to attract fellahs in the shape of advances in ready cash."

(2) Beschreibung von Arabien, Copenhagen, 1772, p. 387.

is in danger.

A law passed not long after the release from the Mandate,[1] shows clearly how gradually the agrarian system in Iraq assimilates itself to the "pseudo-feudal" structure of Syria[2] and other Arab countries. A virtually involuntary servitude of the fellahs, growing out of payment in work for debts incurred, has become an essentila feature of Iraq's rural life.

According to the Law Governing the Rights and Duties of Cultivators, an agricultural debt (originating from the supply by the farm owner to the sarkal or fellah of seeds,

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(1) Law Governing the Rights and Duties of Cultivators, No. 28, of 1933.

(2) As to the position in Syria, cf. A. Latron, op. cit., p. 54.

(3) Law No. 28, of 1933, art. 20. An illustration of the main object of the law is the obligation of the sarkal or fellah, who has entered into an annual agreement with the landowner, "not to depart from the farm ... to another farm during the whole period of the agreement."

livestock or implements, or from a loan in cash),(1) shall have preference over other debts after the Government's share has been paid.(2) The sarkal or fellah has to pay his agricultural debt on his departure from the farm,(3) when the farm owner may recover it from his property. "If the sarkal or fellah "undertakes to stay at the farm of the creditor and to perform the duties of "sarkalah" or "felaha" during another agricultural season," allowance shall be made in recovering the agricultural debt from his property "for the requirements of means of subsistence for one person."(4) As this concession may not tempt the sarkal or fellah to remain, it is made difficult for the indebted fellah to find new employment. Any farm owner who employs a sarkal or fellah shall ascertain that he is free from an agricultural debt to another farm owner. Should the new employer be aware of such a debt, but insist

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(1) Article 10 A. Also "if a sarkal or fellah has refused to carry out his duties, the farm owner may employ another sarkal or fellah ... and the reasonable expenses incurred thereon shall be debited against the defaulting sarkal or fellah."(Article 19.)

(2) Article 12.

(3) Article 14. If the Agricultural Sanad, in which the Agricultural Debt is laid down, (Art. 24) has been registered by the authority; (Art. 25 f.) the land owner "may, during the division of the produce, take an amount equal to his debt from the share of the indebted sarkal or fellah regardless of whether or not he has

(continued (also note 4) on next page.)

on the fellah's retention, he shall stand as a sole guarantor for such sarkal or fellah in respect of the debt.(1)

"Government Departments, Municipalities, or Registered Companies shall not employ any person under an agricultural debt. If they subsequently ascertain that he is indebted, they shall pay one-third of his wages or of the benefits assigned to him to the farm owner in satisfaction of the agricultural debt."(2)

When the sarkal or fellah desires to depart after his contract has expired, the farm owner shall give the sarkal or fellah on request a certificate confirming that he is free from agricultural debt.(3) "In the event of a farm owner

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undertaken to stay on the land ... If, however, the Agricultural Debt is not bound by an Agricultural Sanad the debt shall be recovered in accordance with the agreement, or, in the absence of such agreement, according to local custom." ~~[illegible]~~

(4) Art. 13.

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(1) Article 15 A.
(2) Article 15 B.
(3) Article 16.

refusing to give an unindebted sarkal or fellah a clearance certificate and authority to depart from the land despite the fact that he is not indebted and has fulfilled the obligations of his Agricultural Agreement," the sirkal or fellah bears the burden of proof. He "may apply to the nearest Administrative Official in the locality and ask for the said certificate to be given to him."(1)

The development of some form of "peonage" is a typical and common phenomenon in under-populated countries, at a stage when traditional forms of cohesion or coercion have come to an end, and the rights of the creditor , which the law protects, remain the only weapon in the hands of the landowner. The Law of 1933 illustrates the difficulties of the Iraqi land owner who cannot count on tribal loyalties to facilitate his labour problems. It, moreover, gives legal sanction for the benefit of the land owners to practices closely resembling a system of "peonage"which, though widely applied, is condemned by authoritative opinion as

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(1) Article 42 A.

incompatible with the standards of a civilized country.(1)

The sheikhs as well as tribesmen may feel that the tribal setting serves their interests best. The sheikhs may also fear that the establishment of a class of peasant cultivators would take place at their expense, whereas the absentee landlord, who already possesses a legal title to the land, is less apprehensive of such development. From his point of view the fellah may, on the contrary, be preferable to the tribesman, because he is easier to handle. The attitude of the sheikhs has helped tribalism to adapt itself to the new environment and to maintain a tribal setting in a purely economic relationship which bears little resemblance with tribalism in the accepted sense.

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(1) The anti-peonage legislation of the U.S.A. Congress of 1875 became effective only when in 1910 the Supreme Court decided that State Laws, under which peonage was tolerated, were unconstitutional. More recently, the International Labour Conference has done much to throw light on various forms of involuntary servitude. The investigations have given rise to a wide recognition of the principle that forced labour for any private purpose should be prohibited and that even indirect compulsion, the category into which peonage frequently falls, should be forbidden. For Bibliography cf. George McCutchan, McBride, in Enc. of Social Sciences, under "Peonage."

A sheikh may owe his recognition solely to getting a tapu Sanad from a mallak.(1) New tribes may form themselves "made up of several bits of tribes who have come to a Muqata'ah to make a living under a foreign sarkal who may be a tribesman."(2) A purchaser of an estate would settle on his land and would be hailed as a sheikh.(3) The primus inter pares would become the employer; his old solidarity with the tribe would be rationalized into an economic relationship. The tribesmen would fall into the submissiveness of the fellah to their master,(4) but without severing the traditional bonds tying them among themselves and to their sheikh. Often the maintenance of the old names and forms reflects not only the use of the old terminology for new institutions, but some assimilation of the new relationships to the old concepts.

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(1) Admin. Report 1918, Kirkuk District, p. 432; Qu'lat Siker District 1919, p. 109.
(2) Admin. Report 1919, Qu'lat Siker District, p. 109; "These men, however, in Fasl cases, always return to their original tribe to help them pay the blood money."
(3) Admin. Report Kirkuk District, p. 452.
(4) A. Latron, op. cit., p. 430.

5) The Survival of Tribalism.

(a) Shī'ahism.

Tribalism is disintegrating, and in some districts with considerable rapidity; and yet Tribalism in Iraq is alive and its energies unspent. It is maintained and stimulated by the fact that in the South[1] the division in the Sunni and Shī'ah branches of Islam coincides roughly with that between town and tribe. The educated and westernised classes from which the administrative Government officials are drawn are almost invariably Sunni; Shī'ah Iraq is tribal in outlook. The themes of Shī'ahism and tribalism are in fact so closely interwoven that they are to some extent indistinguishable. The Government tends to look upon the periodic Shiah unrests not as sectarian, but as social conflicts, and is inclined to regard any concession towards Shī'ahism as a surrender to the forces of ignorant tribalism. It is the co-existence of the religious and the social division which has helped to keep both alive.

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(1) Up to a line, which may be fixed slightly South of the latitude of Baghdad, the tribes are almost wholly Shī'ah; in the Diyala area and on the Tigris up to Samarra, Shiah and Sunni are mixed; on the Euphrates, above Ramadi, i.e. roughly to the Dulaim border, the tribes are entirely Sunni.

After the last war, hopes were entertained that with the establishment of the new State the old division would lose its former significance. The rapprochement of the two sects (representing, generally speaking, the political and religious aspects respectively of the nationalist movement) drew the Shī'ah tribes into the orbit of national politics. Their fanaticism rose and fell in obedience to the almost unlimited authority of the divines over them.(1) But the opposition of the Mujtahids - who, with few exceptions, were notoriously ignorant of modern statecraft - to the plebescite of 1918-19,(2) their prominent part in the "Iraqi revolution" of 1920,(3) and their boycott of the elections for the Constituent Assembly in 1922(4) were dictated by their belief that the situation was opportune

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(1) Ireland, op. cit., p. 246. After the rising of 1920 the tribes demanded that negeciations with the authorities should be conducted through the agency of the chief Mujtahid, at whose instance only they would lay down arms. Abdul Wahid, Sheikh of the Fatala section of the Bani Hassan and Marzuq of the Humaidat, were amongst the sheikhs who made the demand. (Ireland, op. cit., p. 289.)

(2) Admin. Report 1919, Shamiyah Division, p. 30; A.T. Wilson, Mesopotamia 1917-20, op. cit., appendix III, containing an abridged version of Gertrude Bell's Memorandum on Selfdetermination in Mesopotamia, of February 22nd, 1919.

(3) Cf. Ireland, op. cit., p. 260, sqq.

(4) Report 1923-24, p. 6.

for an attempt to set up a theocratic Moslem regime in Iraq.(1)

At the time nationalism meant to the 'Ulamas the establishment once again of an Islamic State with the priesthood in its rightful dominant position.

However, with the gradual passing of the effective Shīʿah leadership from the divines to less fanatical and more experienced leaders(2) (following the depertation of the leading 'Ulamas in 1923(3) and the transfer of the executive power from British to Arab - largely Sunni - hands) attention was slowly shifted to the social basis of the Shīʿah-Sunni antagonism.

Over minor religious issues the Sunni politicians were generally accomodating to Shīʿah demands and understanding of Shīʿah susceptibilities. To further the religious rapprochement, services known as mauluds, in honour of the birth of

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(1) Report 1923-24, p. 9.

(2) Report 1927, p. 16.

(3) Sheikh Madhi al-Khalisi and his sons Hassan and Ali, all Persian subjects. The deportation was followed by the voluntary departure of other 'Ulamas. In the election campaign of 1930, the Mujtahids wisely refused to be enticed into the political arena.

the Prophet, had been held alternatively in Shīʿah and Shunni Mosques already in 1920. The services, which combined both Sunni and Shīʿah rites, were attended by leading members of both communities. Faisal, in 1921, prayed in the Mosque of Kadhimain, according to the Shīʿah rites. Leaders of both sects have not tired of proclaiming that Shīʿah and Sunni are brethren.(1) Conferences of Shīʿah and Sunni leaders have repeatedly been organized.(2)

But these manifestations of the common cause of Shīʿah and Sunni as Iraqis and loyal subjects of the King(3) could not affect the basic difference in outlook and interests separating town and tribe. It was primarily its persistence which rendered the Sunni-Shīʿah alliance ever insecure. Originally, an agent capable of procuring the support of the tribes or the national cause, the Shiah has become the representative of the tribal cause within the nation. In 1927, the Shīʿah party, Hizb al-Nadhah (party

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(1) Cf., for instance, The Times, April 5th, 1935, on the proclamation of Shi'i sheikhs in favour of the unity of all religions and races in the country. Also Ajil al Jawar's statement to the same effect on the occasion of his visit to Egypt in 1939 (Oriente Moderno, 1939, p.100).

(2) The first great gathering of Sunni and Shīʿah nationalists from all parts of Iraq took place in Karbela, in April, 1922 (Al Dijla, April 16, 1922; Al-Mufid, April 17, 1922.

(3) Cf., for instance, the declaration of the Shīʿah and Sunni sheikhs in 1935 (Al-Muqattam (Cairo), April 11, 1935).

of "uplift") organized its forces to defeat the Government over the National Defence Bill.(1) For a while it seemed to be taking up the demand for a decentralized regime in the Euphrates provinces.(2) The most notable display of the identification of Shī'ah and tribal interests is, however, provided by the rising in the Middle Euphrates in 1935.(3) The petition to the King of March, 1935, from "all sheikhs of the Middle Euphrates" headed by Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Āl Kāshif ēl-Ghitā, contains demands both for a more adequate representation of the Shī'is in all branches of public life,(4) and for tax and land reforms in the interests of the tribes.(5)

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(1) Report 1928, p. 25.
(2) Report 1927, p. 19.
(3) McDonald, J. R. Central Asian Soc., 1936, p. 33.
(4) Art. 2-6: Electoral Reform so as to guarantee a more adequate representation of the Shī'ah majority; adequate Shī'ah representation among the Shariah judges; reform Waqf administration which, it was maintained, used Waqf funds for political and other non-religious purposes, etc.
(5) Art. 7-8: The Keda tax should be replaced by the Istilakh tax; land titles should be given to the occupiers, etc.

It is difficult to say whether the fact that the Shī'ah are still not represented in Government or administration (1) in proportion to their numerical preponderance strengthens or weakens the tribal cause in the long run. The ruling Sunni element fears that increased Shī'ah influence would help to consolidate tribalism. The Shī'īs maintain that their exclusion from an adequate participation in the affairs of the country prevents the proper integration of the Shī'ah tribes into the nation. It may help to clear the issue that, as generally admitted, the original case for the rarity of Shī'ah appointments to responsible offices (2) is losing in strength. In the early years of the new State few trained and experienced Shī'īs were available, as they had habitually boycotted Turkish service and professional schools and had, as consistently been discouraged by the Turks to revise this attitude. To-day the disproportion of suitable candidates for office from the two branches of Islam is constantly declining.

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(1) In 1932, Shī'is were estimated to number 1,615,000 against 1,030,000 Sunnis.

(2) No Shī'ī held a portfolio on the Arab Council of State, formed after the rising in 1920. The appointment of almost exclusively Sunni officials to the higher administrative offices, even in the Shī'ah districts, was prevented only by a firm stand taken on the part of the British High Commissioner.

b) The Tribal Criminal and Civil Dispute Regulation.

The survival of tribalism is acknowledged by the continued application of the Tribal Dispute Regulation (1) in spite of persistent controversy.

It had, under the Angle-Iraqi regime, established for itself a strong position. Considerable attention had been paid to improving the tact and judgment of the Iraqi district officials in applying the Regulation. (2) Their application to certain fully settled tribes, (3) too, had been found to meet legal needs better than resorting to the courts, where frequently the evidence was insufficient for conviction, though the perpetrators of the crime were generally known

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(1) Text of the original version of 1916, in G.O.C. Proclamation No. 2, (1916); the version of July 27th, 1918, as amended December 28th, 1924, in Report 1925, op. cit., appendix p. 144.
(2) Report 1928, p. 45.
(3) The word "tribesman," as used by the Regulation, does not necessarily imply a nomad, but any member of a "generally recognized tribe or tribal section, which has been accustomed to settle its disputes by a recourse to the arbitration of elders or a sheikh and not by recourse to the courts of the land as ordinarily constituted." (Art. 2 b.) Cf. also the definition of the majlis (ibid., art. 2 c.) as meaning "any chief, sheikh, arbitratornominated and appointed by a political officer" under the provision of the Regulation "to settle according to Arab tribal usage any dispute in which a tribesman is involved."

and could be brought to book in the tribal majlis.(1)

In opposition to the continued application of the Regulation it has been contended that two systems of justice should not exist side by side in Iraq, if the tribesmen are to be assimilated by the body politic. There is a streng current of opinion among townsmen and politicians, and especially among lawyers, that the Tribal Dispute Regulation requires drastic amendment, and that, to begin with, all criminal matter should be referred to the courts which, under the Penal Code, have the power to apply tribal custom with the assistance of a tribal council.(2)

Irreconcilable differences over the conception of justice persist, and constitute a major problem in tribal administration.(3) In cases where a woman has been violated or has

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(1) Report 1925, p. 34.
(2) Report 1922, p. 122; E.M. Drower, Judicial Adviser to to the Iraq Government, Journ. Royal Central Asian Soc., 1934, p. 180. That provision was repeated in the Draft Penal Code prepared by the Ministry of Justice.
(3) Cf. Note, Fasl, in Admin. Report 1919, Muntafiq, p. 62 f.

been accused of violating the desert code of morality, death penalty for the offender, demanded in the name of honour, may seem unduly harsh in the eyes of the townsmen. (1)

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(1) On the Tribal Code of Law, cf. Farīq al-Muzhir al-Firʿann, Baghdad 1939. According to tribal law, if a chief kills a tribesman, the case is investigated in camera. If it is found that the victim deserved death, the family is informed that no Diya is due. (Op. cit. introduction by Nuri Shemmadin, p. 23.) If a murder is committed with the intention to obtain the leadership of a tribe, no blood money is due; the murderer is punished with banishment, but is honoured in the place of banishment, because he killed for high purposes (Farīq al-Muzhir, ibid., p. 62). A father who murders his son or daughter is free of punishment (ibid., p. 55). A chief who kills a tribesman in order to get his wife may appease the family of the victim and the woman with gifts and, when they agree, pay the blood money (Ibid., p. 52, note 1). It seems, however, to go too far, if Nuri Shemmadin maintains (introduction, p. 29) that Farīq al-Muzhir's account of the tribal law describes it as it is acknowledged to-day by "almost all Iraqi tribes."

Capital punishment (instead of blood money) in the case of murder may be equally incomprehensible to the tribesmen.(1) It is difficult enough to decide when (if at all) in such cases the Administrative Officer is to override the decisions of the tribal majlis; this problem is aggravated if the regulations are being taken advantage of by men of almost untraceable tribal connections to escape

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(1) Admin. Report Hilla Division 1918, p. 126; Ireland, op. cit., p. 86; Leach, op. cit., p. 55. As to the practice which has been evolved, cf., for instance, the following three murder cases, in either of which the original sentence for penal servitude for life under the Baghdad Penal Code has been commuted, on the proposal of the Minister of Justice, to five years hard labour by Royal Irada. In the first case, Kadhim bin 'Abid had murdered his cousin Rima bint 'Asfur with premeditation for her misconduct. The sentence was commuted because the crime was committed "for removing the stain of dishonour." (Royal Irada, No. 490, of 1940.) - In the second case, it was taken into consideration that the accused had murdered his wife Amina bint Antar "in order to remove the stain of dishonour caused to the criminal as the result of the victim's misconduct and her flight with a stranger." (Irada, No. 461, of 1940.) - In the third case (Irada, No. 378, of 1940) the sentence was commuted for the same reason in the case of a criminal who had murdered "his wife and his cousin Zahra bint Ali with premeditation, as a result of her misconduct by stabbing her with a dagger."

the punishment due to them for revolting crimes.(1)

On the other hand, the Administration, through its power of vetoing or amending the judgments of the majlis, is in a position to influence tribal ideas of justice. In some instances, however, the initiative has come from the tribes themselves. In 1929, for instance, a spontaneous request from the sheikhs of the Dulaim that the Government should abolish the tribal custom of Nahwa,(2) (which had degenerated into a device for making money) paved the way for the subsequent abolishment of the custom in other parts of the country too.(3) Also the settlement of tribal disputes by gifts of women is no longer approved by tribal courts.(4)

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(1) From the beginning the question arose also, how to deal with settled cultivators, often living near the towns, who claimed to be members of far distant tribes (cf., for instance, Admin. Report, Baghdad Division, 1919, p. 1).

(2) I.E. the Right of a first cousin to forbid the marriage of a girl to another than himself.

(3) It was considered doubtful at the time, how far the acceptance of this reform was genuine and how far no more than a paper achievement of zealous officials. (Report 1929, p. 47.)

(4) Special Report, op. cit., p. 240.

The critics of the Regulations suggest also that the favourable view taken of them by officials in the provinces and at Headquarters (the Ministry of Interior) derives from considerations of administrative control rather than of justice. It means an important addition to the authority of a Mutassariff or Mudir to be granted "unlimited tribal powers" or even "limited tribal powers" under the Regulations because they provide him with the possibility of supervising the deliberations of the tribal majlis, not necessarily only when the adjudgment of cases under the Tribal Dispute Regulation is on the agenda. Officials in tribal areas, to lighten their own burden or to shirk their responsibilities, are known to have made use of the tribal majlis as a means of dealing with a variety of questions affecting the tribes.(1)

Whether or not the application of the Regulations serves to keep tribalism alive, depends largely on the attitude

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(1) Report, 1925, p. 34. The Regulations have also proved valuable by giving the authorities power to bind over an individual whose presence in any area may be expedient to live where described.

adopted by the local official in the discharge of his "tribal powers." The view among the tribes themselves, as to the advantages of the system, differ accordingly.(1)

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(1) The Regulations do not play the same part for the Iraqi tribes as the Statut Nomade for the nomadic tribes. The latter considered it a privilege as well as an advantage to come under the special regime for the bedouins (administered by strongly "pro-nomadic" French officers under the High Commissioner, cf. above p.96 f.) Cf. Syria Report, op. cit., 1937, p. 105; 1938, p. 107. Tribes are known to have abstained from settlement, or to have kept up the pretence of regular migrations, in order not to be disqualified for the Statut nomade. (Syria Report, 1936, p. 101.) The Statut Nomade meant a separate administrative status, which included a separate judicial organization. According to the Arrête 1960, of May 26, 1928, tribal customary law was applied in cases between nomads and "sédentaires." According to the Arrête 115, of May 18, 1934, the authority of sheikhal juridiction was limited to crimes committed in the "zone propre ment bédouine" whereas these committed in the "zone cultivée" are brought before the ordinary courts. - In Trans-Jordan, a Tribal Courts Law had been enacted in 1924. It set up mixed courts of officials and tribal sheikhs to deal in the first instance and on appeal. But the law was never effectively operated. In 1929, under the Bedouin Control Law, a Bedouin Control Board was set up with powers to hear actions within the juridiction of the Tribal Courts and to withdraw and deal with any action pending in a tribal court. In 1936, the Tribal Laws were amended (The Tribal Courts Law; The Tribal Court of Appeal Law; and the Bedouin Control Law). The Tribal Courts have juridiction in all cases of whatever nature between members of nomadic tribes with the exception of cases relating to the ownership of land and cases which, in the opinion of the Mutassariff, should be referred to the Civil Courts; They have juridiction also in all cases (not only among nomads) of compensation for blood, honour and horse-partnership.

Where it is used tactfully in accordance with the original intentions of its British authors, it may help to maintain or to restore the authority of the majlis and to preserve a tribal setting and tribal cohesion; it may, on the other hand, be employed as a pretext for meddling in internal tribal affairs, and as a method to speed up the process of disintegration. In ~~h~~ the last resort, however, is is merely an acknowledgment of existing conditions in the tribal areas, if an administration which on the whole does not cherish the idea of lengthening the life of tribalism upholds the Regulation which, when originally designed, was thought of as "one of the propøs of the tribal system."(1)

If the judicial and the general administrative branches of the Government disagree as to the value of the Tribal Dispute Regulation in its present form,(2) their dispute (in spite of certain irresponsible statements in the press and Chamber) is not so much over the application of tribal customary law, but rather over the question whether the tribal majlis which administer it should be fitted into the framework of the ordinary courts under the authority of the Ministr

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(1) Admin. Report, Hills Division 1918, p. 144.
(2) H.A.R. Gibb, Journ. Royal Cen. Asian Soc. 1934, p. 548; Ireland, op. cit., p. 443.

ry of Justice (as happens already in certain criminal cases) or whether these extensive judicial functions (3) must continue to be administered by the Ministry of the Interior.

6) The Passing of Medievalism.

The readjustments involved in the abandonment of tribal life are much more difficult to-day than they were in the past, when Islamic society (transcending the Shī'ah-Sunni division) embraced tribe as well as town, and provided a bridge - however slender - across the gulf separating them. As the differences in economic outlook of East and West diminish at a considerably faster rate in the towns, a new conflict is arising between the "modern" and the "medieval" outlook, over and above the basic environmental difference of town and tribe.

However, the new conception of the place to be assigned to economic values in the life of society which arose in

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(1) The number of cases registered under the Tribal Criminal and Civil Dispute Regulation was 2832 in 1928; 2453 in 1929, and 2515 in 1930 (Report 1929, p. 47; 1930, p. 38).

Europe in the 16th century is now finding a parallel throughout the Iraq countryside. "The isolation of economic aims as a specialised object of concentrated and systematic effort, the erection of economic criteria into an independent and authoritative standard of social expediency"(1) are phenomena which,(2) in their reappearance to-day, are no less revolutionary than the changes which shook England during the industrial revolution.

The revolution in the psychology of land owning caused by the introduction of an individualistic concept of ownership has features in common with that witnessed in Tudor England. The resistance against the replacement of food by cash crops may be looked upon in an expression of the still deeply rooted notion that the emphasis of economic activity lies on consumption rather than on production. The defence of the virtues of the old order by the Shiah divines will be no more effective, than were the attempts of the schoolmen to expound the advantages of an idealized feudalism.

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(1) Tawney, op. cit., p. 278.

(2) These phenomena were, however, not entirely absent in ancient and medieval Mesopotamia.

As before in the West, the changed economic environment begins to enforce a sacrifice of the supreme position of religion in social life.(1) The conception that a moral rule is binding on all Moslem is being superseded by the assertion that no moral rule beyond the letter of the law exists. Still we hear the medievalist speak when Sheikh Hasan Jawad of the Albu Muhammad(2) complains that "adultery is spreading in a terrible fashion among those who go to town," and when he adds "and all of this to gain a livlihood." Still to the old type of tribal Arab the questions of daily life represent themselves not as useful or harmful, but almost exclusively as virtuous or evil.(3) Still many sheikhs employ

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(1) As for an illustration of the still intense preoccupation with religious ideas in the more remote districts of.,for instance, the background of the unrest in the Barzan area which led after hard fighting to the extension of direct Government control over the district in 1931 (cf. above p. 66/). In 1922, Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan declared himself God, and for a short time, until his prophet was murdered, enjoyed the prayers of his people. (Report 1927, op. cit., p. 25) In 1931, he announced his conversion to Christianity and ordered his tribesmen to kill pigs and eat their flesh. The trouble began, when a neighbouring sheikh, Rashid of the Baradost tribe, constituted himself the defender of the true faith. (Report 1931, p. 13.)

(2) Jamali, op. cit., appendix, p. 132.

(3) MacDonald, Euphrates Exile, p. 51.

the devices - once customary in the West too - designed to conceal transactions which, according to the rules of Islam, are disapproved of as usury.

However, the Western tendency to regret the passing of the old order, and of tribalism in particular, misreads the course of history no more grossly than an Eastern inclination to carry the parallel with Western developments too far. It does not follow that, because the vanishing order in the East can be compared to Western medievalism,(1) the process

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(1) The different attitude of medieval Christianity and of Islam to the principal questions concerning the economic life or on the place of the individual in society are not fundamental enough to invalidate a comparison of Western medieval society with the disintegrating Islamic society of to-day. Nor is the picture altered by the fact that in the more purely bedouin tribes Islamic teaching often blended with tribal traditions in repressing excessife economic ambitions and imposing restrictions on an anti-social individualism (cf. below, appendix B III). To account for the greater dynamic power of the West in the past, ethnic, climatic and, above all, historical factors may be considered more important than the greater prominence attributed in Islam to the belief in predestination. Cf., for instance, C.H. Becker, Islam Studien, [illegible] 1924, "Islam und Wirtschaft," p. 54 f.; Max Weber, Religionssoziologie, vol. I, p. 237 f. Cf. also, for instance, L.F. Rushbrook Williams, in India, Oxford pamphlet No. 32, p. 8, pointing out how in India (where Islamstands out in contrast to Hinduism) it becomes evident to what it is "a creed with an essentially Western view of life."

of its disintegration must proceed on similar lines. In the East disintegration is caused by extraneous influences and not by indigenous forces; the new ideas reach the East in a later form when they no longer provide an immediate answer to the needs of a society emerging from mediaevalism. It may well be that Arab society will endeavour to avoid the road towards an extreme economic individualism, for which it seems as yet to lack the spiritual foundation which was laid for it in the West by the Reformation. (1)

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(1) A school of orientalists believes that the disintegration of Islamic society may yet be averted (cf., for instance, H.A.R. Gibb's lecture on Social Change in the Near East, in The Near East, op. cit., p. 38 seq.). It is as essential in the East to preserve the "integrating" social function of religion as it is to revive it in the West. But it seems no more justifiable to anticipate the revival of Islam just because of the desire, sincere endeavours apparent in the writings of some modern Islamic thinkers, than it would be to expect a religious revival in the West, because a legion of authors - theologists, educationalists, and sociologists - proclaim its need. The belief that - at least for the present - a new "integration" might have to be found in the East through a non-religious medium may less under-rate the power of a spiritual élite than the contrary belief under-estimates the effects of a changed material surrounding.

But as yet the forces of conservatism within Iraq tribalism are still strong. Technical inability to effect a change, social obligations, and psychological reluctance continue to act as brakes on the progress of disintegration. Though nobody will refer to tribalism in Iraq in the past tense, the wishful thinking of Arabs in the towns and the theoretical discussions of European observers sometimes tend to ignore that in the world of social phenomena the road from cause to effect is really straight.

Religious fanaticism and devotion to the tribal code are still part of the mental make-up of the mass of the tribesmen. In many districts tribalism continues - as we hav seen - to serve the interests of the sheikhal class as well as of the rank and file. Generally speaking the position of the sheikhs remains respected and enjpys social and political influence. It includes, though to a varying degree, administrative judicial, economic, and social power within the tribal sphere. Only in rare cases has a sheikhal office become unpopular, its function falling to the less respected members of the community, as was,for instance, the case in the Sudan,(1) before British policy gave the office a new lease

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(1) H. MacMichael, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, p. 245.

of life. As a rule, the sheikhs were able to compensate themselves for what they have lost to the authorities in power over the tribesmen, by strengthening their economic hold over them. The tribesmen will continue to conceive in tribal terms the ever present conflicts over land, water, and grazing rights, or over affairs involving women, as long as the membership of a tribe is effective in protecting them against injustices and in helping them to obtain their rights. To the tribesman, neither materially nor intellectually equipped to stand alone, the kin group in its private setting remains the primary reality and the basis of the agrarian order which, in his view, offers the highest degree of security and the benefit of a clearly defined social status.

Emancipation from the tribal background is often enough the result of drift, of personal animosities, or of the attractions of the town, and does not indicate a common yearning among the younger tribal generation for an independent agricultural existence, free from tribal fetters.(1) Though

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(1) As to the parallel phenomenon, which can be observed in village life in Syria, cf. A. Latron, op. cit., especially p. 221 seq. On the general problem involved, though approached from a different angle, cf. E. Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, London 1943.

IV. Conclusion: Tribal Policy.

1) The Need for a Re-Definition of Tribal Policy.

The tribal policy pursued by the Iraq Government - especially ~~since~~ after the death of King Feisal in 1932 - had, broadly speaking, as its objective the acceleration of tribal disintegration, one of the favourite methods being the disregard, whenever feasible, of the tribes' existence.(1) King Feisal, in tribal policy as in other fields, had exercised a valuable moderating influence. The King "alone in Baghdad," it has been said, "understood the tribal mentality and could attempt to bridge the wide gap between townsmen and tribesmen."(2) He adhered consistently to the spirit of conciliation, and to the policy of encouragement of co-operation, with which he approached the sheikhs when he first spoke to them as their prospective ruler. "In the future, when the tribes gather together," he told them in 1921, "we will look into any differences existing between them. I shall call the tribal chiefs and speak to them of the past. ... Moslems are brethren. ... Arab

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(1) For a notable example cf., for instance, below p. 354
(2) Survey of International Affairs, op. cit. 1934, p. 211; Antonius, op. cit., p. 366.

traditions ... will be respected."(1) He repeatedly toured tribal areas to enlist the good-will of the tribesmen by his personal appeal. In June, 1923, he paid a visit to the tribes of the Southern Liwas, to persuade them not to delay the elections. He tried to obliterate from their minds the impression that the Iraq Government was a Government of Effendis, hostile to tribal interests. He paid special attention to the importance of maintaining the system of deciding tribal disputes by tribal arbitration.(2) In the early years of the Anglo-Iraqi régime, on more than one ~~private~~ public occasion and in many private discussions, he made it clear that the British and Iraq Governments were agreed in desiring a full participation of the tribesmen in the Government of the country.(3) Although he continued his efforts to reconcile the sheikhs to the idea of co-operation with the Government, he allowed for a time in subsequent years his feelings as son of the king of the Hejaz "to impinge upon his duties as King of Iraq," and to use the tribes for political ends in his con-

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(1) Al-Dijla, August 1st, 1921.
(2) Report 1923-24, p. 10.
(3) Ibid., p. 14.

-fliet with Ibn Sa'ud.(1) It was not until 1930, after he had made peace with Ibn Sa'ud, that he paid fresh attention to the little improved tribal situation, and first of all to the pacification of the Middle Euphrates region. A tour which he undertook in the marsh areas won the tribes over from a sullen indifference to enthusiastic demonstrations of good-will.(2) "After his death," it has been said, "there was no one left ... who would take the trouble to try to understand the tribes."(3)

The lesson he had taught is that of the possibilities of fostering tribal confidence by tact and sympathetic understanding, as well as by firmness. But he did not succeed in placing tribal policy firmly on a path which could be followed after his death.

The British adviser's interpretation of tribal questions had often differed, in principle as well as in detail, from that of their Iraqi colleagues. In the early years of the Anglo-Iraqi regime the advice given by the High Commissioners

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(1) Antonius, op. cit., p. 368.
(2) Survey of International Affairs, 1934, op. cit., p. 214.
(3) Ibid., p. 215.

to the Iraq Government dealt largely with their appreciation of the tribal situation.(1) Application from the Iraq Government for air action against tribes were carefully scrutinized by the High Commissioner before they were endorsed.(2) The power which lay with the R.A.F. to influence and, ultimately, to veto decisions of the Iraqi administrators, whenever they involved a risk of arousing the indignation of the tribes to the point of violent reaction, was often wielded with the aim of protecting the tribes from the interference of over-sanguine officials.(3)

British grievances against the course of tribal policy pursued by the Iraqi authorities were primarily concerned with the "very great dislike and suspicion of the tribes .., felt by all orientals who have been brought up in the neighbourhood of towns," and who, in their capacity as officials, tend to come into constant friction with the ideals and ideas of the tribesmen because of their "constant hurry to get rid of the old tribal system."(4)

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(1) Report 1923-24, p. 28.
(2) Ibid., p. 27.
(3) Cf. also Sir H. Dobbs, J.R. Central Asian Soc., 1932, p.668;
(4) Sir H. Dobbs, ibid.Cf. also Antonius, op. cit., p. 366, who denounces the tribal policy of the Arab Government in Baghdad as its "worst failure." "Recruited as they were mainly from the urban classes," he points out, "both the politicians and the officials lacked the necessary knowledge of tribal life, understanding of its needs and interest in its welfare."

The danger of a rapid spoliation of Arab tribalism through inconsiderate treatment by the authorities, backed by the impatience of an influential sector of the public, emphasizes the urgency for the definition of a positive tribal policy. Even British policy, as regards the numerous backward communities for which it bears responsibility, may in our harassing and pressing times be hard put to it to continue to exercise its traditional skill in accomodating principles to circumstances, and may have to pay closer attention to definitions of its methods and objectives.

In Iraq the margin for manoeuvering has become too narrow to allow for much more delay in adopting a definite policy. An Attempt may have to be made to prove the compatability of the two requisites of tribal policy: genuine acceptability to the tribes ~~on the one hand~~, and development, rapid enough to keep pace with the changing environment ~~on the other hand~~.

2) Tribalism in the Modern State.

A definition of tribal policy involves first of all an answer to the question of whether or not an intrinsic value is to be accorded to the survival of tribal organisms as instruments of Government.

For Iraq, the answer may be considered as finally given. In view of the conditions prevalent in the country, only a system of direct administration of tribal areas is, it appears, feasible.(1) We have to deal in Iraq with a dual society of townsmen and tribesmen whose complete integration into a unified nation is delayed only by differences in social organization and outlook. In this situation the clearly marked route seems to lie towards a future in which the progress of the tribesmen will be recognized not by the

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(1) John van Ess, Asia, 1942, p. 10, believes that, if a beginning had been made with it early enough, it would have been possible and advisable to divide the country into areas of loyalty, such as a Shammar in the North and the Muntafiq in the South, to be administered for a period of years under tribal law, under the general supervision and protection of a central authority to be agreed on by the heads of these loyalties, and then in the process of time to merge these together into a federation.

creation of local representative institutions, but by a fuller representation in the central government. Tribal policy will continue to maintain a centralizing attitude (1) bound up with assimilationist tendencies. Assimilation of the tribesmen, not necessarily to the outlook of the townsmen, but to a common denominator, the enlightened Iraqi citizen, is to-day the accepted objective of education. It is thought to be in the tribesmen's own interest to leave his traditional "medieval" outlook behind and adapt himself materially and spiritually to the demands of the present age. A system of indirect administration, on the other hand, has by itself no formula to offer as to how to assist the integration of town and country. From its point of view, the townsman appears ~~easily~~ on the same level with other detribalized elements, as a "déraciné", and his superiority over the tribesmen tends to be denied. A policy of indirect administration may try to draw detribalized elements back within the jurisdiction of traditional authorities. Sir Henry Dobbs, though he protests against the insinuation that the "Sandeman policy" wishes

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(1) Cf. the similar methods evolved by the policy of assimilation in French dependencies and of "Ottomanization" (for instance, the preference given to an élite of tribal sheikhs, schools for sheikhs, etc.).

"to crystallize and render absolutely permanent the present system of tribal organization," defines as its aim "to keep it from disintegrating too rapidly until a better system is to take its place."(1) Because it provides in itself no answer as to what the alternative better system is to be, the policy has been accused of unwarrantable conservatism in its application to more sophisticated peoples.

Experience seems to show that direct administration is indicated in areas the character of which is determined by their urban centres, even where, unlike in Iraq, these are seats of a people alien to the tribesmen of the provinces.(2) Similarly it has been felt that the maintenance of indirect administration may become incompatible with the existence of a large educated native population.(3) In a country where,

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(1) J.R.C. Asian Soc. 1932, p. 66.

(2) Cf., as regards South Africa, An African Survey, op. cit., p. 530: "It is admittedly difficult to envisage the day when the Bantu will be admitted to full rights of citizenship in the Union, but that day would certainly not be hastened by the adoption of a system which seeks to give vitality to the customary institutions of the native as being the medium through which his development is to be achieved, and assigns to them in consequence a position of increasing importance in the State organization. Nor is the traditional authority suitable for adoption as an agency for managing the large native populations resident in the urban centres of the Union."

(3) Cf., for instance, the different lines of development pursued by the British Government in the Sudan and in Baluchistan. In the Sudan the tribal sheikhs are represented on the recently established Advisory Council for Northern Sudan, together with other native leaders (The Times, May-

as in Iraq, town and tribe and central government are of one nationality, the exclusion of districts from direct administration or the grant of some measure of local autonomy could, it seems, be justified only on grounds of expediency. (1)

(From previous page:)

> 16th, 1944). For the North-West Frontier Area it is held by responsible British opinion "that the tribesman's reaction to representative institutions would be that they understand their Jirga system, but not 'this council business'." (Sir Olaf Caroe, reported in The Times, April 11th, 1944.)

(1) In Iran and Afganistan conditions are still such that the shape of tribal policy is largely determined by the incomplete control over tribal areas, so far exercised by the central authorities. It is well known that King Amanullah lost his throne mainly because his policy of "enlightment" aroused the indignation of the tribes. Sir H. Dobbs reports that when some time previously he was in Kabul "the chief reproach made by King Amanullah against the British was that they were trying to perpetuate the tribal organization and to give the tribes the blessings of civilization." (J.R.C. Asian Soc., 1932, p. 66.) In Iran even Riza Shah's powerful methods did not succeed in solving the tribal problem. After the British and Russian occupation and the abdication of the Shah, it lies, reported The Times (May 15, 1942) "with the Persian authorities to determine whether the Government should revert to the old policy of virtual non-interference in the tribal areas, or pursue the policy adopted by the former Shah which aimed at disintegrating and disarming the tribesmen. The possibility of pursuing some middle course is being examined, as it is admitted that the former Shah's policy was too drastic, and broke down immediately his own power was withdrawn. It is recognized that it is difficult to leave the tribal areas in Persia, which are one-third of the country, entirely in the hands of the private chiefs, if efforts are made to modernize ... the administration. .. A solution .. may yet be found in a process of gradual pacification, such as has long been the policy on the North-Western Frontier of India."

This conclusion is confirmed by the experience of indirect administration of tribal areas at the time of the Civil,Administration. Having always existed on the fringe of more sophisticated Arab societies, with which, in spite of its exclusiveness, it has freely associated through innumerable contacts, Arab tribalism has almost invariably shown itself not sufficiently remote from extraneous influences to function smoothly under a system which places additional power in the hands of the sheikhs.

It is for this reason that in a country like Iraq, the tribal policies, developed in territories under French administration, may be even more instructive than British precedents. French methods, in dealing with tribal societies, provide ample illustration of the fact that establishment of direct administration over tribal areas is not necessarily bound up with a policy of indiscriminate tribal disintegration. Direct administration too may attach great importance to the tribe as a source of social standards, and as providing the sanction for social behaviour. It may fully appreciate the value of traditional institutions as facilitating the progressive association of tribal society within the national framwork. The necessity to entrust to a central author-

-ity the task of directing the expansion of agriculture, of health, of educational and other social services need not leave the tribe outside the general scheme. The acknowledgment of the ~~disintegration~~ decay of the political fuction of tribes need not involve a denial of their continued strength as socio-economic entities, the premature and unguided disruption of which must be avoided.

Are these considerations to be accepted in the case of Iraq too? The negative answer which so far underlies the general orientation of tribal policy, as it is practical ~~cannot be regard-~~ are not -ed as sufficiently well founded as to be accepted as final. The old axiom that tribalism must be destroyed because it can never be divested of its dangers to peaceful administration is losing ground in face of the changed relation in strength between tribes and central Government. It has been replaced by the idea that tribalism cannot be co-existent with a modern State for any length of time. The latter view is, and must be, accepted even by those who are apt to discern more virtues in the tribal system than in that which ~~may~~ might succeed

it.[1] There can be only two views as regards the future of traditional tribalism in Iraq, if realism is not to be sacrificed: to consider its disappearance desirable as well as inevitable, or to regret its inevitability.

A re-orientation of the present policy will, however, be required inasmuch as it is unwilling to concede the necessity for a careful guidance of tribalism during its present phase of transition and also because it fails to appreciate the intrinsically valuable elements in tribalism which are still worthy and capable of preservation. The dangers of a "laissez-faire" policy have been illustrated in the course of our discussion of tribal disintegration and will be further emphasized in the discussion of land policy.[2]

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(1) In the words of a British Political Officer in 1918, "it is almost certain that the tribal system will not survive the establishment of law and order." (Admin. Report 1918, Hilla Div., p. 120.) Tribal disintegration, said Report 1921-22 (op. cit., p. 20) will proceed "in direct ratio to the general advance of administration throughout the country." Cf. also P. Monroe, Report on Education, op. cit., p. 24.

(2) Cf. above p. 142 and 148 f., and below p. 357 f.

3) The Desirability of a Preservation of Tribal Values.

A few words may, however, be added as to the desirability of maintaining and utilising the social and ideological values of tribalism. These values have been emphasized, for instance, by an American-trained Iraqi who pointed out that "real tribal life ... in an enriched manner" may serve to restrain Arab individualism.(1) An American educationalist who spent a lifetime in Iraq stated that it is "among the tribes alone that you find a sense of corporate loyalty which would have been an invaluable ingredient in the new State."(2) It may be assumed to be still within the power of a well designed and tactfully applied tribal policy to adapt the old social system to new needs, and to transform tribal loyalties into civic virtues.

A re-orientation of the main trend of the present tribal policy may, however, ~~be able to~~ perhaps make ~~a perhaps~~ possible an even greater contribution. Whether a rejuvenated Islam

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(1) Jamali, op. cit., p. 106; little has been published about the tribal policy pursued within recent years by Ibn Sa'ud. His original policy of nomad settlement was, however, to organize them into brotherhoods (Ikhwan), "bodies, part religious, part military and part agricultural." (Rom Landau, in Islam To-day, 1943, p. 43.)

(2) J. van Ess, Asia, 1942, p. 210.

~~will~~ may, as some observers believe, ~~render possible~~ enable a healthy symbiosis of Islamic society and Western civilisation, is unpredictable. Without a new self-assertion of Islam, however, as a religion as well as a culture, which would enable the Arab world to confront the West on equal terms, it may be feared that the Arab Moslems ~~may~~ will succumb to "that characteristic melody of Islamic and of Arabic society" and become Levantines who have "been brought up simultaneously on the edges of more than one civilization and who, in consequence, are at home in none."(1)

Political nationalism, being itself rather a surrender to a Western malaise, cannot stave off the danger. Nevertheless, with the progress of secularization in the Arab world, Arab nationalism may be more than ever indispensible as an integrating force to translate Arab unity into reality. In providing mere nationalism with the flesh of cultural values and a secular system of ethics, and acceptance of the positive aspects of tribalism may play an invaluable part. The traditional tribal scale of virtues,

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(1) Meleager, XH ibid., p. 65 f.

(on the admiration of which rests so much of Western sympathy for the Arabs)[1] may be appreciated as an essential Arab contribution to Moslem civilization. It may be recognized that the rôle of preserver of national traditions and ancestral customs which, in other civilizations, falls to the peasantry,[2] is in Arab society performed by the tribes. The feeling of superiority of the townsmen may be counter-balanced by a new stress on the tribes as the eternal springs of true Arabism. Education, with a bias in favour of tribal values, could pave the way for a healthier relationship between town and tribe. All this might become possible when, but only when, a useful place in the general scheme of national reconstruction can be granted to the tribes. Here may lie a great opportunity for a joining of forces of Arab nationalism with the movement for rural rehabilitation.

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(1) For an extreme yet not untypical example of this attitude cf. the articles of J.B. Glubb, in J.R.C. Asian Soc., especially Arab Civilization and Foreign Culture, 1937, and Arab Chivalry, 1937.

(2) As to the peasants and nationalism, cf. Nationalism, Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939, p. 273 ff.

The tribes in Iraq must be regarded as precious instruments which may, if wisely applied, render valuable assistance in the gradual transition to a new social order and new forms of economic organisation. A machinery designed to prevent spoliation and to allow for the gradual emancipation of the tribesmen has been evolved for Arab tribes by the French in the Maghreb.(1) This machinery of Government-controlled guidance through the different stages of social transformation which tribal disintegration entails, deserves to be closely studied for its adaptibility to conditions in Iraq, even though the machinery has been applied in North Africa only within indifferent success. Whether, however, the tribes will be able to perform any valuable functions during the period of transition, and towards which goal the tutelage has to be directed can be determined only within the framework of agrarian policy.

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(1) Cf. below p. 404 seq.

XXI + 224 leaves.