

Stephen Priest The Problem of Being Someone

Pictures:

Réproduction interdite

Mach's drawing of himself

WHO ARE YOU?

The Problem of Being Someone

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I Existentialism.
II Neuroscience. Phil. (Mind)

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I

BODY

Could you explain yourself?
Are you your brain?
Are you the centre of the universe?

‘The scientific world-picture vouchsafes a very complete understanding of all that happens – it makes it just a little too understandable. It allows you to imagine the total display as that of a mechanical clockwork which, for all that science knows, could go on just the same as it does, without there being consciousness, will, endeavour, pain and delight and responsibility connected with it – though they actually are. And the reason for this disconcerting situation is just this: that, for the purpose of constructing the picture of the external world, we have used the greatly simplifying device of cutting our own personality out, removing it; hence it is gone, it has evaporated, it is ostensibly not needed.’ Erwin Schroedinger (QQ 82)

‘our science – Greek science – is based on objectivation , whereby it has cut itself off from an adequate understanding of the Subject of Cognizance, of the mind.’

Erwin Schroedinger *Mind and Matter* (CUP, Cambridge, 1958) pp. 54-55

‘We might naturally assume that one of the achievements of science would have been to restrict belief in miracle. But it does not seem to do so.’ Max Planck *Where is Science Going?* (Norton, New York, 1932) (QQ 149)

‘[...] every advance in knowledge brings us face to face with the mystery of our own being.’

Max Planck *Where is Science Going?* (Norton, New York, 1932) (QQ 151)

‘Is there something in the nature of man, some inner realm, that science cannot touch? Is it so that when we approach the inner springs of human action science cannot have the last word? Or, to speak more concretely, is there a pint at which the causal line of thought ceases and beyond which science cannot go?’ Max Planck *Where is Science Going?* (Norton, New York, 1932) (QQ 149)

‘The fact is that there is a point, one single point in the immeasurable world of mind and matter, where science and therefore every causal method of research is inapplicable, not only on practical grounds but also on logical grounds, and will always remain inapplicable. This point is the individual ego.’ Max Planck *Where is Science Going?* (Norton, New York, 1932) (QQ 150)

‘[...] the individual ego [...] It is a small point in the universal realm of being, but, in itself, it is a whole world, embracing our emotional life, our will, and our thought. This realm of the ego is, at once, the source of our greatest suffering and, at the same time, of our highest happiness. Over this realm, no outer power of fate can ever have sway, and we lay aside our own control and responsibility over ourselves only with the laying aside of life itself.’ Max Planck *Where is Science Going?* (Norton, New York, 1932) (QQ 150)

‘Science [...] brings us to the threshold of the ego and there leaves us to ourselves’ Max Planck *Where is Science Going?* (Norton, New York, 1932) (QQ 150-1)

‘Every serious and reflective person realizes, I think, that the religious element in its nature must be recognized and cultivated if all the powers of the human soul are to act together in perfect balance and harmony.

Max Planck *Where is Science Going?* (Norton, New York, 1932) (QQ 151)

‘Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery of nature. And that is because, in the last analysis, we ourselves are part of nature and, therefore, part of the mystery we are trying to solve.’

Max Planck *Where is Science Going?* (Norton, New York, 1932) (QQ 153)

‘Let us suppose [...] that [...] science is able to show how from the entities of physics creatures might be formed which are counterparts of ourselves even to the point of being endowed with life. The scientist will perhaps point out the nervous mechanism of the creature, its powers of motion, of growth, of reproduction, and end up by saying “That’s you”.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 179)

‘And if ever the physicist solves the problem of the living body, he should no longer be tempted to point to his result and say “That’s you”. He should say rather “That is the aggregation of symbols which stands for you in my description and explanation of those of your properties which I can observe and measure. If you claim a deeper insight into your own nature by which you can interpret these symbols – a more intimate knowledge of the reality which I can only deal with by symbolism – you can rest assured that I have no rival interpretation to propose.”’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 180)

Mistake:

‘since there is no distinction between myself and others, but on the contrary full symmetry for all intents and purposes, I conclude that I myself also form part of this material world around me. I so to speak put my own sentient self (which had constructed this world as a mental product) back into it – with the pandemonium of disastrous logical consequences that flow from the aforesaid chain of faulty conclusions.’

Erwin Schroedinger *Mind and Matter* (CUP, Cambridge, 1958) p. 38-9

‘You cannot remove the ‘exclusion principle’ by act of parliament as it were. Scientific attitude would have to be rebuilt, science must be made anew. Care is needed.’

Erwin Schroedinger *Mind and Matter* (CUP, Cambridge, 1958) p. 44

‘So we are faced with the following remarkable situation. While the stuff from which our world picture is built is yielded exclusively from the sense organs as organs of the mind, so that every man’s world picture is and always remains a construct of his mind and cannot be proved to have any other existence, yet the conscious mind itself remains a stranger within that construct, it has no living space in it, you can spot it nowhere in space.’

Erwin Schroedinger *Mind and Matter* (CUP, Cambridge, 1958) p. 44

‘We do not usually realize this fact, because we have entirely taken to thinking the personality of a human being, or for that matter that of an animal, as located in the interior of its body. To learn that it cannot really be found there is so amazing that it meets with doubt and hesitation, we are very loath to admit it.’

Erwin Schroedinger *Mind and Matter* (CUP, Cambridge, 1958) p. 44

‘the electric particles widely diffused in primeval chaos have come together to build the complexity of a human being.’

Arthur Stanley Eddington *Science and the Unseen World* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1929) p. 18

‘the whole notion that one is always in some definite ‘place’ is due to the fortunate immobility of most of the objects on the earth’s surface.’

Bertrand Russell *The ABC of Relativity: From Copernicus to Einstein* (George Allen & Unwin, New York, 1969) p. 12

There is one face which you cannot see, no matter how you move or redirect your gaze: *You cannot see your own face*. If we think straight away “I could use a mirror to do that” we have already missed the point. You need a mirror

to see a face *only in your own case*. This 'own-ness' of your own case needs explanation. It is what being you consists in.

It is not right that you cannot see your own face just because of the particular arrangement of the eyeballs. If the optic nerve could extend as a stalk, and the eyeball turn to look at the face, the same problem would arise all over again for the eyeball instead of the whole face: the eye that sees does not see the eye that sees. The eye escapes its own visual field. It is not just because seeing cannot be seen, even though seeing cannot be seen. You cannot see your own eyes because *being* someone is an obstacle to *observing* that person: The eye that sees does not see the eye that sees because the I that sees does not see the I that sees.

Being you prevents your *observing* you. In something's 'being you' we need to know the nature of this 'being' and this 'you'. The 'being-you' of your existence is so close to you that you take it for granted. Because you are you, you are infinitely close to yourself, an absolute proximity which creates a difficulty for self knowledge: Your *being* whatever it is you are prevents your *encountering* it. For example, your partly being your face prevents your being presented with it in the manner of someone else's face; as 'over there' as visible, as an object or a 'side' or 'surface' of an object. This is not an 'obstacle' in the sense of something 'in the way'. (Quite the reverse. We could call the difficulty a *substacle*.) You are too intimate to be readily detected by yourself, too proximal to yourself to be an object. This is an *opposite* of the difficulty of some physical object being too remote to be seen. One opposite is being close enough to be seen. This opposite is being a subject so not an object, too much oneself to be only other.

You *think* of your eyes *as though they were the eyes of another*, objects you have come across and seen before you. These are mistakes. Even though your eyes are visible to others, they are not the eyes of another and not presented to you in that way. You see through them. You do not see them. Many layers of conditioning were necessary for you to habitually think of your eyes *as seen by another*. Thinking of your eyes only *as if they were seen* is a recuperation of the third person and its application to the first person singular. This recuperation is a sophisticated achievement of socialisation into the pragmatic, the 'objective', the scientific (as is the fact that it goes almost wholly unnoticed). Habitually thinking of yourself *as another* hides the stark reality of your own existence: that which grounds your life, that which is intimately you, that which faces death.

Looking down, you can see *one particular* human being's stomach, the fronts of its legs, the tops of its feet, its forearms.

This is not the visual perspective you have on any human being who is *not* you. We see another human being as a delineated whole, even though we do not see the whole of the human being. In just the body of *one particular human being*, you experience sensations. In the mind of *one particular human being* you have thoughts. You have direct access to the psychological interiority of *one particular human being*. You have no direct access to the inner phenomenological space of someone who is not you.

This 'non-reflexivity' might just as easily be physical as mental: *The hammer that hammers does not hammer the hammer that hammers.* (Imagine a purely mechanical hammer.) There could be a hammer with a spring, or flexible section, in the haft so that it would be true of that hammer that it could hammer itself. Then the feature of non-reflexivity shifts to the boss.

Douglas Harding:

'The best day of my life- my rebirthday, so to speak- was when I found I had no head. [...]

It was when I was thirty-three that I made the discovery. Though it certainly came out of the blue, it did so in response to an urgent inquiry; I had for several months been absorbed in the question: WHAT AM I? The fact that I happened to be walking in the Himalayas at the time probably had little to do with it; though in that country unusual states of mind are said to come more easily. [...]

What actually happened was something absurdly simple and unspectacular: just for the moment I stopped thinking. Reason and imagination and all mental chatter died down. For once, words really failed me. I forgot my name, my humanness, my thingness, all that could be called me or mine. Past and future dropped away. It was as if I had been born that instant, brand new, mindless, innocent of all memories. There existed only the Now, that present moment and what was clearly given in it. To look was enough. And what I found was khaki trouser legs terminating downwards in a pair of brown shoes, khaki sleeves terminating sideways in a pair of pink hands, and a khaki shirtfront terminating upwards in - absolutely nothing whatever! Certainly not in a head.

It took me no time at all to notice that this nothing, this hole where a head should have been, was no ordinary vacancy, no mere nothing. On the contrary, it was very much occupied. It was a vast emptiness vastly filled, a nothing that found room for everything - room for grass, trees, shadowy distant hills, and far above them snow-peaks like a row of angular clouds riding the blue sky. I had lost a head and gained a world.

Discussion proved almost invariably quite fruitless. "Naturally I can't see my head," my friends would say. "So what?" And foolishly I would begin to reply: "So everything! So you and the whole world are turned upside down and inside out..." It was no good. I was unable to describe my experience in a way that interested the hearers, or conveyed to them anything of its quality or significance. [...] Here was something perfectly obvious, immensely significant, a revelation of pure and astonished delight - to me and nobody else! When people start seeing things others can't see, eyebrows are raised, doctors sent for. And here was I in much the same condition, except that mine was a case of NOT seeing things. Some loneliness and frustration were inevitable. This is how a real madman must feel (I thought) - cut off, unable to communicate.'

D. E. Harding *On Having No Head: Zen and the Rediscovery of the Obvious* (London, 1961) reprinted in Dennett and Hofstadter

There is one particular human being you cannot (in the normal course of things) *encounter*, the one you take yourself to be. You cannot *come across* yourself as one amongst others in the external world. This, on the other hand, is how we encounter other human beings; as living, speaking, expressive, but as *over there*.

Why can you not meet yourself? The very idea no doubt seems preposterous, nonsensical. But what is the source of this seemingly very strong impossibility? You could, at least theoretically, make the acquaintance of anyone else on the planet. Why are you an exception? Why should you not meet yourself in the street on the way back from the shop? The answer is: because you *are* you (a turn of phrase senseless, or only tautological, to the conditioned mind). *Being* you prevents you from encountering yourself as an object 'over there', in the world. Not being any of the others frees up the possibility of encountering them. But what does it mean for this one to be you?

Out of all the human beings, past, present and future, *you view the world* from just one of them. Only one is you and not anyone else. Why? Who is this you? We do not yet understand this ‘else’s’ in ‘anyone else’. Anyone else is anyone who is not you. Anyone else is over there, not here. But what is this *here*?

Why is reproduction interdite? You cannot see the back of your own head. You can see the back of anyone else’s. The Belgian surrealist painter René Magritte paints the problem in his interesting *Réproduction Interdite*. (*a fortiori*, some philosophical problems can be painted.) Why is your perception of yourself *not* like that in the Magritte painting *Réproduction Interdite*? What is the source of the prohibition in *Réproduction Interdite*?

Anything physical or mental about you could be altered or duplicated. You could be cloned. Nevertheless, in a fundamental sense, you would remain wholly unaltered. The reproduction would not be you. Of course, “no reproduction is *ever* the original” but the problem is much deeper than that: *You would still view the world from the original human being but the reproduction would be in your visual field.* You could *encounter* the reproduction but not the original. The fact that the copy is never numerically identical with the original hides a further barrier: There cannot even be a *copy* of you. (This is not to deny that we could copy your body and even your mind.) The impossibility of reproduction shows that you essentially consist in something that is neither mental nor physical.

“You could *suddenly view the world from the reproduction* and ‘leave the original behind’.” Yes, but the problem would arise all over again. The original human being would then be an object in your visual field but you would ‘be’ the reproduction. We need to know what is true of anything when you are it.

You would remain you so *réproduction is interdite*. Something about you is utterly unchanging and unreproducible. It is not mental or physical. Nevertheless, it is you. *Being you, being essentially unchanging and resisting duplication* are properties ascribed to the soul. If you are only psycho-physical then it is inexplicable why *réproduction is interdite*. If you are a soul then reproduction is necessarily impossible. Being a soul is being the original.

If we were to interview people on the street, with the question “Do you exist?” the answer, perhaps delivered with impatience, would be “Yes: Obviously”. Their answer to *Why do you exist?* would be “Because I was born”. On the other hand, few people are aware of their existence in the

heightened ways just described. Once noticed by you, the fact that you exist is at once obvious and extremely puzzling.

We are brought up to *fundamentally* believe in only what we can see in front of us. Rupert Brooke speaks of our being blinded by our eyes. You are not in front of yourself so you have not previously noticed yourself. The dark night of the soul is the darkness behind your own eyes. There is such a being as you because: You are looking through the eyes of *one particular human being* at this page now.

You are numerically atypical. All other people, past, present and future, are not you: billions of them. It stands in need of explanation that someone is you. It is odd that someone is you. Here you are, viewing the world from one of the human beings right now. It is an irony of the problem of other minds (which is a genuine problem) that other minds are typical mind. That a mind is *one's own* is aberrational and so mysterious. The proximal is too invisible to be raised as a philosophical problem very often.

The following insight of the New York philosopher, Thomas Nagel, has been met with blank incomprehension by contemporary philosophers:

‘One acute problem of subjectivity remains even after points of view and subjective experiences are admitted to the real world – after the world is conceded to be full of people with minds, having thoughts, feelings and perceptions that cannot be completely subdued by the physical conception of objectivity [...] the fact that a particular person in it is himself.

What kind of fact is it – if it is a fact – that I am Thomas Nagel? How can I be a particular person?’ Thomas Nagel *The View From Nowhere* (Oxford, 1986) p. 54

Nagel goes on to ask:

‘[...] how can a particular person be me?’ p54

‘How can I be merely a particular person?’ p.55

I have spoken to many distinguished philosophers about Nagel’s problem. They cannot understand it. Imagine the patience he had to exercise towards people who could not understand this thought.

Why are you not your Doppelganger? Your Doppelganger is the same as you in every respect, except for not *being you*. If you and your Doppelganger exist then there are two human beings not one but, in a completely abstract way, it is not built into this situation *which* is the Doppelganger and *which* you. The view from nowhere, the *vue de nulle parte*, does not show up who is you and who the Doppelganger. No difference is apparent. For example, if we ran a film of you and your Doppelganger who is whom would not show up.

In *the view from now-here* the difference is utterly obvious. Suppose you *meet* your Doppelganger. *You view the Doppelganger from one particular human being. The Doppelganger is an object in your sensory field. You do not view the world from the Doppelganger. You are not an object in one particular human being's visual field. The Doppelganger is a perceptually discriminable item you could tour. One particular human being is not a perceptually discriminable item you could tour.*

In the view from now-here you are never *mixed up* about which human being is you and which your Doppelganger because: You view the world from one particular human being but your Doppelganger is an object in your visual field. Any human being you view the world from is you. No object in your visual field is you. Therefore, you do not mistake yourself for your Doppelganger.

It completely misses the point to state the obvious truth that your Doppelganger views you from *their* human being and you are an object in *their* sensory field. Although true, staying with this truth fails to abdicate the view from nowhere. Within the view from now-here, the Doppelganger *knows that he is not you*. He sees you in front of him. This does not cast doubt on the distinction. It confirms it.

There are special cases where a mix-up is not in principle impossible. For example, you and the Doppelganger play the children's game of intertwining fingers and, momentarily at least, cannot tell whose fingers are whose just by looking at them. Also, by *readopting* the view from nowhere we can be confused: 'Did I do that or my Doppelganger? I can't remember.' In the existential reality of the present, these phenomenological descriptions hold: One particular human being is presented to you as you. The Doppelganger is presented to you as another. You are present to one particular human being as you.

The Doppelganger is present to you as other. You are centred on *one particular human being*. The Doppelganger is not centred on *one particular human being*. The Doppelganger is *there*. You are not there. The Doppelganger is not *here*. You are *here*. You are not visible to yourself in front of yourself. The Doppelganger is visible to you in front of you. You do not present to yourself all those aspects a human being (ordinarily) presents to you. The Doppelganger presents all those aspects you could not (in the ordinary course of things) present to one particular human being. *You are not your Doppelganger because you are you.*

Which one are you? You are the one you view the world from. You are *here*, both: *he-re* (the man-thing, the per-son-al thing, the thing-through-the-son), *her-e* (the female existent, per-sonal existing, the thing-through-the-sound, through the word). You are not just *Hier* but *Hiersein*. To put it starkly: Here is not just where you are but what you are. Here is not just where you happen to be wherever you are but also the space of your own being. Suppose you and your Doppelganger exchange spatio-temporal locations. In the ordinary sense of 'here' each is no longer 'here' but where the other was. Each calls the new place 'here'. At a more profound level, the pervasion of the new 'here' by the space of your own existence makes it here. Without metaphysical meaning there is no scientific meaning, without *Hiersein* no *Hier*.

Which one is not you? You are not the one you view before you in the world. You are not the one *over there*, *the-re*, (the *re*, the thing), [*da*, *dort*]. It misses the point to state the obvious truth that one particular human being is in *one* spatio-temporal location but your Doppelganger in *another*. This is neither here nor there. We need to know of a human being in *any* spatio-temporal location what is true of it if it is you (or the one you are closely associated with).

Two qualitatively identical human beings might face one another and *neither of them* be you. That one of them is you is an *extra fact* about that one, a fact which shows up in phenomenological asymmetries available to the view from now-here.

What if everybody looked the same? They do not, *of course*. If you are impatient with thought-experiments, consider: (a) They are necessary for exposing the cracks in the root paradigms which block further explanation. (b) They might not look like thought-experiments in a million years' time (if

anything looks like anything in a million years time). (c) What is the real source of your impatience? Is it conditioned? Is it because you subscribe to a world view in which the questions cannot be answered, or even posed?

Suppose everybody did look the same. Suppose every other human being had exactly your face, your age, your sex, your clothing and so on. Suppose every human being was identical in every physical respect and every mental respect. *You could still tell who was you and who not you. You still would not mistake yourself for anyone else.* You would not be *mixed up* about who is you and who is not you. You would be the human being you view the world from. Everyone else would be *over there*.

This is not only a phenomenological description. This is not just an epistemological fact. It is an ontological asymmetry: You would still be you and no one else would be you. Other people would still be discriminable objects in the world around *your human being*, presented as at a distance from it. On the other hand, *your human being* would still be presented as at no distance from you or, at least, far less distance.

Indeed: If everyone appeared exactly the same, you could easily mistake any two people for one another *unless one of them is you*.

Your being this one, and not being any of the others, would still be a fact. In the possible world in which there is no physical or mental difference between you and anyone else the difference between you and any other human being still obtains. You 'are' yourself but every other human being 'is' someone else. Our being who we are survives the possible qualitative identity of all the human beings.

What is the difference between you and anyone else?

Whatever being you consists in, it is qualitatively distinct from whatever being anyone else consists in. The difference between you and anyone else is a different kind of difference from the difference between anyone else and anyone else. Although these differences are all differences between one person and another, they are different differences or either no-one would be anyone or someone would be everyone. Everyone is someone, so someone is someone and no-one is everyone so there is a difference between you and anyone else that is not a difference between anyone else and anyone else.

Could I become you? Could you become me?

These are logical and metaphysical possibilities:

(1) We exchange bodies but retain our own minds.

This should be easy to imagine because there are many cases in fiction. I view the world from your body. You view the world from mine.

(2) We exchange minds but retain bodies.

So, either:

(2a) You have thoughts qualitatively identical *in content* to thoughts I have and *vice versa*. You think what I think. I think what you think. We think each other's propositions. (We contingently think any thought content.)

Or:

(2b) You engage in acts of thinking I engage in and *vice versa*. We exchange type attitudes. You have my hopes, fears, wishes etc in a sense which, on the one hand is not their content but on the other hand is not your or my token thinking of them. They are your thought tokens not mine, in the sense that you do the thinking of them.

Or:

(2c) Both (2a) and (2b). We should not take it for granted that (1) and (2) give the identical result. To do that is to assume that there is nothing more to us than body and mind.

It is a presupposition of these thought experiments that you are identical with your mind at the level of *that which thinks*, at the level of *that which has a capacity to think*.

(4) I become you or you become me.

We could draw a distinction between:

(a) a becomes b and remains a

and

(b) a becomes b and thereby ceases to be

I could become you if I ceased to exist and you could become me if you ceased to exist. This becoming would consist in one of us being physically and psychologically continuous with the other. For example, my body gains the physical characteristics of yours while yours disintegrates. Your thoughts cease as I begin to have them. We do not have to suppose that we are spatio-temporally juxtaposed during this psycho-physical change, though your human being becoming mine is consistent with that heuristic.

It is logically and metaphysically impossible that:

(1) We exchange minds at the level of that which thinks.

The obstacle to (1) is that *you are the relatively enduring subject of change which becomes anything it does become.*

Could there be anonymous human beings? An anonymous human being is a human being who is not anyone. This has nothing to do with personality. (We could exchange personalities.) Each of us knows that not all human beings are anonymous because each of us 'is' one of them. DOES THE MIND GO WITH THE SOUL OR NOT?

Is the difference between you and anyone else mental or physical?

Argument that the difference between you and anyone else is not mental or physical.

(1) It is possible that there should be no mental difference between you and anyone else.

(2) It is possible that there should be no physical difference between you and anyone else.

(3) There would still be a difference between you and anyone else.

(4) Therefore there is some difference between you and anyone else that is not a mental or a physical difference.

You have some feature, or you *are* something, that marks you out uniquely as you. If anything scientific is either mental or physical then whatever marks you out as you is not scientific.

Why is the Problem of Being Someone Difficult to Understand? There is a huge gulf between philosophers who can see the problem of being someone and those who cannot. Inability to see the problem of being someone is symptomatic of physicalism, naturalism and the ruling critical secularism. Within anonymous, third-person, or generalized thinking it is barely registered that someone is oneself, even though your own existence is far more real than any scientific or pseudo scientific fact which might be used to try to explain it away.

That you 'are' one particular human being, or pervade it, or are centered on it, or view the world from it, is existentially shocking and scientifically inexplicable.

Why is thinking in generalities an obstacle to understanding your own existence? Thinking in generalities is an obstacle to being brought up sharply by the existential reality of your own being. General thinking has the form 'all as are bs', 'most as are bs' or, even, 'this a is a b'. Thinking of types, or even only thinking of yourself as belonging to a type, does not do justice to the one-off-ness, there here-and-now reality of being you.

Why is thinking in an abstract way an obstacle to understanding your own existence? If you think in an abstract way you are taken away from your existence here and now, not just *in* the here and now but *as* the here and now. The use of the terms 'persons', '*the* mind', '*the* brain' takes thought into an anonymous sphere useless for fundamental philosophical problem solving. Anonymous language blocks progress in the philosophy of mind.

Why is thinking in a third-person way an obstacle to understanding your own existence? Thinking in the third person way revered by science and pseudo-science *leaves you out of the picture*. It is not enough to think of yourself as *just* one person amongst many even though, in a sense, you are one person amongst many. Does the problem of being someone not arise

about everyone? We could raise the question of being someone about anyone but it might then not be understood. We would still be trapped at the level of anonymity. Ideally, you ask: 'Why am I me?' You have to raise the question about yourself. Thinking only about other people or just 'people' hides the question.

We been conditioned to understand the question 'Why are you you?' as admitting only a scientific or social scientific answer. This is to miss its disturbing profundity entirely.

Layer after layer of conditioning was necessary for you think of yourself *as an other*, to be blind to the *stark reality* of your own existence.

In authentic philosophy, existentialism and metaphysics *coincide*. We are, in more than one sense, *lost in thought*. Anonymous truth is not the whole truth. Reality is not anonymous.

Could you be explained by science?

Could 'Why is one particular human being you?' be answered scientifically? Part of our mistake is that we think we already know how to answer the question 'Why is one particular human being you?' For example: We find out when and where you were born. We ask about your parents, early nurturing, what sort of schooling you had, your peer group, your economic constraints and opportunities. We look into your genetic make up and brain states, your unconscious and conscious desires. We deploy the scientific and mathematical methods of the natural and social sciences to conduct these investigations.

I am now going to say something that appears obviously false: *All the well known scientific facts about your genetic make-up, family and educative background, social and economic influences and neurological states contribute nothing whatsoever to answering the question: Why is one particular human being you?* This claim seems outrageous. How can it be?

The answer is that all these well known causal influences, which I fully accept are there, answer this entirely different question: *Why is this particular human being the way it is?* If all the scientific facts are true, the following question has not even been broached: *Why is this particular, socialized, educated, human being who is reading this book now, you?* The fact that you *are* one particular human being or *view the world from* one particular human being, or are centred on it, has not been touched. By 'one particular human being' I mean the being you take yourself to be,

commonsensically and scientifically. Once all the scientific facts about a certain human being are in, not all the facts about you are in.

Are we conditioned? In case there should be any doubt, I fully accept that *we are very conditioned*. We are conditioned by our genes. We are made what we are by at least: formative childhood influences, schooling, peer-group pressure, the unconscious, neurobiology, economic pressures or opportunities, political policies, life chances or the lack of them. Re-iterating these causal factors which we have learned (or at least heard about) is not thinking in new ways.

In fact, the *kinds* of influence constituting a human being are far richer and more varied than those recognized by twenty-first century science and social science. We have yet to develop *a history of perception, a history of envisaged futures, a neuro-phenomenology, a theory of human self-constitution, a theory of human self-destruction, a theory of the person that will stand the strain of translation between grammatically first and third person accounts of the person, a unified physics, a unified science, a unified science and social science*. Anyone who says we know what consciousness is, what matter is, what gravity is, what energy is, is lying or mistaken. We have no idea. Science, far from having everything sown up, has hardly begun.

Could science change and solve the problem of being you? The scientific revolution necessary to explain your own existence would not only be greater than those associated with Galileo, Newton or Einstein: *Science would have to include the opposite of itself*. Of course I do not mean that science would have to give up careful observation, concern for definition and mathematical modelling. There need not be the slightest sacrifice of rigour. Science would still deal in facts which are objective in the sense of being facts. Science would have to change *doctrinally*. Science would have to concede the existence of *subjective subject matter*. Without including its opposite science is powerless to explain why someone is you.

Argument that you cannot be explained scientifically (I)

(1) Science is objective.

(2) You are subjective.

- (3) There is no objective explanation of subjectivity.
- (4) You cannot be explained objectively.
- (5) Therefore, you cannot be explained scientifically

Argument that you cannot be explained scientifically (II)

- (1) Science is deterministic.
- (2) You are free.
- (3) There is no deterministic explanation of freedom.
- (4) You cannot be explained deterministically.
- (5) Therefore, you cannot be explained scientifically

Argument that you cannot be explained scientifically (III)

- (1) Science is general.
- (2) You are most specific.
- (3) There is no explanation of the most specific in general terms.
- (4) You cannot be explained in general terms.
- (5) Therefore, you cannot be explained scientifically

Argument that you cannot be explained scientifically (IV)

- (1) Any scientific explanation of past, present and future is in terms of before, after and simultaneity.

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- (2) You have a past, present and future.
- (3) Past, present and future cannot be explained in terms of before, after and simultaneity.
- (4) You cannot be explained in terms of before, after and simultaneity.
- (5) Therefore, you cannot be explained scientifically.

Argument that you cannot be explained scientifically (V)

- (1) Science is materialistic.
- (2) You are a consciousness.
- (3) There is no materialist explanation of consciousness.
- (4) There is no materialist explanation of you.
- (5) Therefore, you cannot be explained scientifically.

Argument that you cannot be explained scientifically (VI)

- (1) Science is quantitative.
- (2) You are qualitative.
- (3) There is no quantitative explanation of quality.
- (4) There is no quantitative explanation of you.
- (5) Therefore, you cannot be explained scientifically.

Argument that you cannot be explained scientifically (VII)

- (1) Science is anonymous.
- (2) You are you.
- (3) There is no anonymous explanation of being you.
- (4) There is no anonymous explanation of you.
- (5) Therefore, you cannot be explained scientifically.

You are essentially the opposite of what science says there is.

Perhaps the revolution has begun: Some science is indeterministic if those interpretations of quantum mechanics as ontologically indeterminist, rather than merely undecidable, are true. Science, far from entailing materialism, entails no distinctive ontology. Indeed, the conjunction of all the findings of science with idealism or mind-body dualism or theism entails no contradiction. Secular and scientific philosophy is a kind of madness because it denies its own presuppositions. To begin to explain you, science would have to include the opposite of what science now is: Science needs theology to explain its own presuppositions. Science needs theology, to be science. Science needs theology to be complete.

It is false that your viewing the world from one particular human being has been explained by studies of 'the' brain. The brain is billions of atoms moving in empty space. It is false that neuroscience tells us the relationship between consciousness and billions of atoms moving in empty space.

The anonymous 'the' in 'the brain' or 'the person' stops us being brought up sharp by the existential reality of *being this being*. Anonymous language keeps us in a dream: the dream of the abstract, the general, the only third-person; the dream of the machine.

Is the problem of being you phenomenological? Phenomenology clarifies the problem of being someone, and usefully causes people to understand it, but doing phenomenology alone does not solve the problem. Phenomenology begins the disclosure of that existence which is not "objective" but phenomenology remains essentially within the anti-metaphysical paradigm (except *malgré elle*) because it offers only descriptions, not explanations.

Phenomenology usefully describes the psycho-physical *symptoms* of being someone, for example; the peculiar visual perspectives on the body and the fact that you know only one consciousness ‘from the inside’. Nevertheless, these are phenomenological *consequences* of being someone, not what being someone *consists in*. One particular human being is *like* no other and *is* no other. This peculiarity is a peculiar peculiarity, one which, in a way we are very used to but, in another way, is a shocking revelation.

For any true phenomenological description one may ask ‘Why is this true?’ The answer is not straightforwardly scientific because the phenomenological is primordial with regard to the scientific. The phenomenological is more scientific than the scientific (by which I mean phenomenology is more strictly empiricist than the empiricism advocated by the empiricists). A metaphysical phenomenology is needed to exhibit the non-scientific ground of true phenomenological descriptions. Metaphysics is overtly or covertly bracketed by phenomenology. But this is a mistake. Metaphysics is not a set of extravagant postulates but a set of ineliminable presuppositions. Philosophy without metaphysics is shallow.

Are you someone else? If you were someone else you would view the world from a different human being. You do not, so you are not someone else.

Are all persons ultimately the same person? On some quasi-pantheistic views, you are not a substance but a point of view, or perspective, of God. At death, we return to the cosmic spirit like drops of water to the ocean. [Hegel. Brahman. Hegel is a Hindu.] Our individuality is the most difficult fact about us to explain. Construing all human beings as one person obliterates individuality rather than explains it.

Can the problem of other minds be solved? The problem of other minds can be solved by a sensitive empiricism or, perhaps I should say, an extreme empiricism. The holistic *presence* of the other, in face, voice and gesture, precludes the psychological possibility of sincere scepticism. The presence of the other is not reducible to physical ‘behaviour’, even if described with subtlety. It is not observable movement, no matter how small or subliminal. The presence of the other is a presence.

The problem of other minds presupposes that someone is oneself. You are present as (or at, or through, or in) one particular human being you take yourself to be. You are a presence. The kind of presence you are is the kind

of presence crudely hidden but subtly observable in the other. We are left with the problem of what being you consists in even after solving the problem of other minds.

We raise the problem of other minds about other human beings rather than, say, stones. Why? Because human beings have minds and stones do not.

Nevertheless, scientific 'reductionism' is animism *malgre lui*; an unwitting and ironic inflation: Genes are selfish. Cells carry information. The brain processes messages. Understandably, strict scientists do not accept such theses as scientific. [not Dawkins, but Gould] Scientific explanation is essentially metaphorical description. Once we drop the metaphors the materialist's world of atoms remains but the scientific explanations have disappeared. Science is essentially metaphor.

Is something's being you its being unique? Uniqueness is not unique. Uniqueness is not unique because everything is unique. To define 'uniqueness' I distinguish between numerical and qualitative uniqueness:

'Numerical uniqueness' (*def.*) Something's being the one it is, and not any other thing.

'Qualitative uniqueness' (*def.*) Something's being what it is, and not what any other thing is.

'x is numerically unique' means: 'nothing is it' and 'x is qualitatively unique' means 'nothing is exactly like it'. (Could anything exhibit one kind of uniqueness but not the other?)

'uniqueness' (*def.*) Something's either being the one it is, and not any other thing, or its being what it is, and not what any other thing is.

You are unique not just in the sense of not *being* anything else but in the sense of not being exactly *like* anything else.

Argument that something's being you is not just its being unique.

(1) Everything is unique.

(2) You are unique. (From (1))

(2) Uniqueness is not unique. (From (1))

(3) Something marks you out as you.

(4) Therefore, something's being you is not just its being unique.

You are not only unique. You are uniquely unique, not in the sense that you are unique in being unique but in your manner of being unique. Not only is nothing else you: *Nothing else is like you.*

Are you essentially unique? It is a necessary condition for something's being you that it be whatever distinguishes you from whatever you are not. Because nothing scientific or logical distinguishes you from anything else, whatever being you consists in must be qualitatively distinct from whatever being anyone else consists in.

You are not contingently unique. You are essentially unique. (I use 'contingently' here to mean 'accidentally' as well as 'contingently'.) You are essentially unique. There is a sense in which anything is unique but not anything is essentially unique. The you-ness of your being is not like anything else, including anyone else's you-ness. You are in some respect unlike anything else in any possible world in which you exist.

'Someone', 'anyone' captures the unity of the self, a unity that is not emergent from any synthesis. Your unity is an un-it-y. ('Somebody' and 'anybody' express a limited materialist prejudice useful only for picking people out on a scientific level.)

Is something's being you its haecceity?

'Haecceity' (*def.*) Something's haecceity is its being the thing it is.

Haecceity' (*def.*) Haecceity is *thisness*.

There is, in a way, no limit to the extent to which a thing is the thing it is. A thing exudes being the thing it is. For those with eyes to see it, there is the infinite in the finite. Nevertheless, something's being you is an extra fact over and above its *haecceity*.

Argument that something's being you is not its haecceity.

- (1) Every being has *haecceity*.
- (2) Only one being is you.
- (2) That some being has *haecceity* is not a sufficient condition for that being being you. (from (1) and (2))
- (3) Something is sufficient for a being being you.
- (4) Therefore, that which is sufficient for some being being you is not its *haecceity*.

Is being you the holding of any logical property?

Argument that being you does not consist in any logical property holding.

- (1) If being you consisted in some logical property holding then it would consist in either: numerical identity, self-identity or *haecceity*.
- (2) Being you does not consist in any of numerical identity, self-identity or *haecceity*.
- (3) Therefore, being you does not consist in any logical property holding.

What depends on your being you? Your entire conception of the world is based, or grounded, in the fact that you exist here now. You have the view from now-here. Your own existence is *indispensable* to your view of the world: not just in the obvious sense that unless you existed you could have no view, but in the further sense that your being here now makes a difference to what is presented to you and how. Even this is not an obvious scientific claim. The world is presented *as* past, present and future, *as* here and elsewhere, as radiating on every side from the centre that you are.

What is the world?

The world (*def.*) the totality of what is whatever is.

The world is present, pre-sent, present(ed) to you as all around you, all around. (The *Welt* is an *Umwelt*.)

What is the past?

The past (*def.*) what has happened before now.

What is the future?

The future (*def.*) what will happen after now.

Why is this not apparent?

The I that sees does not see the I that sees.

What sort of fact is it that someone is you? That something is you is not an scientific fact. Being you is not just the fact that a particular being exists. Being you is not a logical fact, for example, that a particular being is numerically distinct from all other beings, or that some being is self-identical. Even if some of these facts are necessary for something's being you, none is sufficient, nor are they jointly sufficient. There is always more to something's being you than something's being mental or physical or logical.

Argument that being you is a metaphysical fact:

- (1) All facts are scientific facts or logical facts or metaphysical facts.
- (2) Being you is not a scientific fact.
- (3) Being you is not a logical fact.
- (4) Being you is a fact.
- (5) Therefore, being you is a metaphysical fact.

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It follows in a fairly precise sense that *you are out of this world*.

Argument that that something is you only admits of theological explanation:

(1) Any metaphysical fact admits of a theological explanation or no explanation.

(2) Nothing admits of no explanation.

(3) Metaphysical facts only admit of theological explanation.

(4) Being you is a metaphysical fact.

(5) Being you admits of a theological explanation.

(1) is true because no metaphysical fact admits of scientific explanation. Only God has the attributes necessary to be the cause of non-scientific facts.

(2) is true because if something has no explanation it has no reason to be. If it had no reason to be it would not be. It is, so there is a reason for it to be.

Argument that that something is you only admits of theological explanation:

(1) Being you is a metaphysical fact.

(2) Metaphysical facts only admit of theological explanation

(3) Being you admits of theological explanation.

Are you a miracle?

(1) 'miracle' (def.) a significant and qualitatively unique or unusual event, inexplicable by natural law, and caused by God.

(2) Your own existence is a significant and qualitatively unique or unusual event, inexplicable by natural law, and caused by God.

(3) Therefore, your own existence is a miracle.

Why should this be so? How Come?

Argument that there is a theological explanation of your own existence.

- (1) There is no naturalistic explanation of your own existence.
- (2) There is not no explanation of your own existence.
- (3) There is an ultimate explanation of your own existence.
- (4) Any explanation that is not naturalistic but ultimate is theological.
- (5) Therefore, there is a theological explanation of your own existence.

Argument that your existence is a miracle:

- (1) Your existence is significant.
- (2) Your existing is a qualitatively unique or unusual event.
- (3) Your existence is inexplicable by natural law.
- (4) Your existence was caused by God.
- (5) Therefore, your existence is a miracle.

One's own existence is, in a fairly precise sense, a 'miracle'. It does not violate any laws of nature, but nor is it to be explained in terms of them. The term 'miracle' is reserved for an unusual event, not just one that is naturally inexplicable. That a human being 'is' you is unusual. It is not to be confused with the generalized thought that *there are people*, or even the more insightful thought that *anyone is someone or other*. Only you are you. This essential uniqueness qualifies as a miracle, and should be recognized as such. We need God and the soul to explain why each of us exists and what it is for us to be who we are. The problem of being someone compels us to adopt a theological framework for its solution.

Why are you you? This question is meaningful and profound, even though meaningless to the secular, materialist or conditioned mind. ‘Why are you you?’ means: *Why is whatever is you you?*

Are you this particular human being? Given that this living, breathing, psycho-physical totality exists: Is it you? It might seem completely obvious that you are one particular human being. If you are identical with one particular human being, is this identity necessary or contingent? You are not one particular human being in the way in which a brick is a brick.

The truth of these phenomenological descriptions is inconsistent with you being strictly or necessarily numerically identical with one particular human being: You are *inside* one particular human being looking out of it. You are not only *inside* one particular human being looking out of it. You *pervade* one particular human being.

You are, at least partly, where one particular human being is without being it. You exceed one particular human being. You are *present at* one particular human being. You are *present through* one particular human being. We should not expect prepositions honed in understanding physical objects to readily carry over to descriptions of the relation between you and one particular human being. That the truth of the phenomenological descriptions precludes your being necessarily numerically identical with one particular human being will be challenged, so I present objections and then reasons for accepting that the inconsistencies nevertheless obtain:

[1] You are *inside* one particular human being looking out of it therefore you are not necessarily identical with one particular human being.

“But a set can be a member of itself! The set of sets, for example, is a member of itself. Analogously, might not *a* be inside *b* and nevertheless be *b*?” The relation of set membership is not the relation you bear to one particular human being if you are inside it. Admittedly, this is not the *physical* relation of being inside (which holds if toy soldiers are in a drawer). You are inside one particular human being in the sense of viewing the world from it. Your interiority is an absolute interiority: an inside without an outside. Being this precludes strict numerical identity with one particular human being.

Argument from being inside:

(1) You are *inside* one particular human being looking out of it.

(2) If a is *inside* b then a is not necessarily b .

(3) Therefore you are not necessarily identical with one particular human being.

[2] You are (not only) *inside* one particular human being looking out of it, therefore you are not necessarily identical with one particular human being.

“A set might be a member of itself and belong to some other set. Might not a be *inside* b , be *outside* b and yet be b ?” If there is a distinction between b and that which is not b then that is marked by ‘outside’ in this way: If anything is *outside* b it is not necessarily b . Being *outside* b is therefore a sufficient condition for not being necessarily b so, if a is *outside* b , a is not necessarily b .

Argument from not only being inside:

(1) You are not only *inside* one particular human being looking out of it.

(2) If a is *not only inside* b then a is not necessarily b .

(3) Therefore you are not necessarily identical with one particular human being.

[3] You *pervade* one particular human being therefore you are not necessarily identical with one particular human being.

“Cannot a pervade a ? Cannot a both exude and be the exuding itself? Cannot the exuding exude?” Even if exuding can exude itself, pervading is not exuding. Pervading is *being where something is without being it*.

‘pervades’ (def.) ‘ a pervades b ’ iff ‘ a is where b is but a is not b ’

We are to understand the place as exactly where the pervaded is (so if two objects are in the same room one does not thereby pervade the other). This is what pervading is, so if there is any pervading, and *a* pervades *b*, then *a* is not *b*. If you *pervade* one particular human being, with whom you are so closely associated every day, then you *are* not necessarily one particular human being. (Is contingent identity identity? We do not have to find *two* things.)

Argument from pervading:

(1) You *pervade* one particular human being.

(2) If something *pervades* something then it is not it.

(3) Therefore, you are not identical with one particular human being.

[4] You are, at least partly, where one particular human being is without being it therefore you are not necessarily identical with one particular human being.

“Because physicalism is true, if anything is exactly where something is it is that thing.” If anything is anywhere, anything identical with it is where it is. However, the reverse inference is invalid. You can be where one particular human being is without being it. (Even in the case of physical objects, exact fusion and fission is not logically or theoretically impossible. How many physical objects are exactly *here*? Two. A million. An infinite number.)

Argument from being where something is:

(1) You are where one particular human being is without necessarily being it.

(2) If ‘*a is where b is*’ has more than logical or tautological force then *a* is not necessarily *b*.

(3) ‘*a is where b is*’ has more than logical or tautological force in ‘You are where one particular human being is’.

(4) Therefore you are not necessarily identical with one particular human being.

[5] You exceed one particular human being, therefore you are not necessarily identical with one particular human being. ('where one particular human being is' does not entail 'only where one particular human being is'.)

"Things are constantly changing. The present is eroding the future. In this way, everything exceeds itself. Therefore, *a* can exceed *b* but be *b*. Look at it this way: Perhaps *a* exceeds *b* precisely because *a* is *b* and *a* exceeds itself." The present, in the sense of that which is present, or the content of the present, or what happens in the present, entails the becoming past of the future. Ceasing to be and beginning to be cannot be readily captured by an only atomistic logic: There is the Heraclitean.

However, even in the case where *a* exceeds itself there is a distinction, within *a*, between the aspect of *a* which exceeds and the aspect of *a* which is exceeded. If we reject the thesis that if *a* exceeds *b* then *a* is not *b* then we obliterate the distinction between exceeding and coinciding with. If there is exceeding, then if *a* exceeds *b* then *a* is not, or at least not only, *b*.

Argument from exceeding one particular human being:

(1) You exceed one particular human being.

(2) If *a* exceeds *b* then *a* is not necessarily *b*, or at least not only *b*.

(3) Therefore, you are not necessarily identical with one particular human being.

[6] You are *present at* one particular human being therefore you are not necessarily identical with one particular human being.

"If the Welsh Guards are *present at* the Trooping of the Colour then the Welsh Guards, marching in an appropriate way, carrying the standard in the Queen's presence etc., *are* the trooping of the colour, at least on that occasion." A military ceremony is something a regiment carries out or conducts, not something it is; even if the actions of the troops on a particular occasion are necessary and sufficient for the ceremony taking place. 'a is

necessary and sufficient for b' does not entail 'a is b' (even though the converse entailment holds). The actions of the troops in the presence of Her Majesty *constitute* the ceremony but they are not it.

The relation 'present at' is not typically as close as in the ceremony example. We could be present at a battle without being it or being any part of it.

You are present at one particular human being. *You are present where it is present* but you could exist without it and it could exist without you. One particular human being could have been someone else. You could have been present at a different time and place. You could have pervaded a different human being.

Argument from being present at:

(1) You are *present at* one particular human being.

(2) If *a* is present at *b* then *a* is not *b*.

(3) Therefore you are not identical with one particular human being.

[7] You are *present through* one particular human being therefore you are not identical with one particular human being.

“Anything present is present through itself. If anything is present, that is necessary and sufficient for its presence so anything is only present through itself. This actually rules out a being present through b without being b.”

‘Through’ does not mean ‘because of’ in ‘You are present through one particular human being’. Indeed, the existence of one particular human being is neither necessary nor sufficient for your presence.

‘You are present through one particular human being’ means that you are centred on one particular human being with the rest of existence arranged panoramically around you. That you are centred on *one particular human being* is a contingent fact about you. If a is present through b in this sense then a is not b. If you are centred on one particular human being then you are not it.

Argument from being present through:

- (1) You are *present through* one particular human being.
- (2) If a is present through b then a is not necessarily b.
- (3) Therefore you are not necessarily identical with one particular human being.

You are not *necessarily identical* with one particular human being, this constellation of psycho-physical processes. The everyday human being is not the 'I' you feel yourself to be.

Here the logical presuppositions of phenomenological descriptions have been unpacked to show their metaphysical consequences. Metaphysics makes phenomenology possible.

- (1) The truth of the description 'You are *present as* one particular human being' is inconsistent with your being strictly or necessarily identical with one particular human being.
- (2) You are *present as* one particular human being
- (3) Therefore, you are not strictly or necessarily identical with this human being.

Are you essentially one particular human being?

Argument that you are not essentially one particular human being:

- (1) There are possible worlds in which you exist but *one particular human being* does not exist.
- (2) There are possible worlds in which one particular human being exists but you do not.
- (3) Therefore, you are not essentially one particular human being.

Argument that you are not necessarily one particular human being:

- (1) There are possible worlds in which you exist but *one particular human being* does not exist.
- (2) There are possible worlds in which one particular human being exists but you do not.
- (3) Therefore, you are not necessarily one particular human being.

Are you the centre of the universe?

Scientific progress has not shown that your own existence is not the centre of the universe. It is right that as a system of physical objects or events standing in Einsteinian spatio-temporal relations the universe has no centre. However, this does not refute the fact that the world is present to you as around *one particular human being*. The *Welt* is an *Umwelt*. The universe radiates from your body in every direction. If we drop our conditioning for a moment, and look and see, it is completely obvious that you are the centre of the universe. It is a measure of the success of secular conditioning that this fact is normally hidden from you and we tend to dismiss it. It is a pity that the expression 'centre of the universe' has come to mean "egotistical" or "arrogant". We do not see how directly and literally true it is. *The world is all around you. You are the centre of space.*

You are the centre of time. You are the centre of space-time. If you can notice this, it naturally invites the question 'Why?' What is this centre or centring? Other things are *over there* but you are centred. Objects present surfaces to you but you are *inside out* or *outside in*. The soul is an absolute interiority, an inside without an outside, so if you are a soul we should *expect* you to be the inside of space-time. If you are not a soul, the phenomenology is inexplicable. The phenomenology is explicable, so you are a soul.

In the case of just one human being, this one, you feel yourself to be wholly or largely coextensive with it. In the normal course of things, you go where it goes. If you raise your arm, *one particular human being* raises its arm. Nevertheless, you do not end where your body ends. *You exceed your flesh*. For example, your visual field is not within your body but your visual field is part of you, so you exceed your body. Your visual field is a zone of a wider phenomenological field which includes your olfactory, tactile, auditory and thought fields. These fields are not separate because there are

no boundaries between them. There exist sensory and intellectual uses of one and the same phenomenological field or space.

Argument that you exceed your body:

- (1) Your phenomenological field is either wholly or partly not within your body.
- (2) Your phenomenological field is either you or a part of you.
- (3) Therefore, you exceed your body.

Far harder to accept is the fact that you even exceed one particular human being.

Argument that you exceed one particular human being:

- (1) Your phenomenological field is either wholly or partly not within one particular human being.
- (2) Your phenomenological field is either you or a part of you.
- (3) Therefore, you exceed one particular human being.

But, you object: “This phenomenological field is part of me, *part of one particular human being!*”. The first part of this is right, the second wrong. The phenomenological field is not part of the human being because it survives the *epoché*. To justify premises (1) and (2) we insert the findings of transcendental phenomenology. [Husserl] The human being is a constellation of psycho-physical events. The phenomenological field is the infinite zone in which that they take place. The phenomenological field recedes infinitely in every direction.

Are you one particular human being? Awareness of the phenomenological field requires *epoché* or a switch of attention from perceptual contents to the field or space in which they are presented; a suspension of the natural attitude.

epoché (def.) Suspension of ontological commitment.

epoché (def.) Reduction of what is to what is given.

‘natural attitude’ (def.) Ontological commitment to the scientific world and anything that depends upon it.

Argument that the phenomenological field is part of your essence:

- (1) Any part of you that does not fall by the *epoché* is part of your essence.
- (2) The phenomenological field does not fall by the *epoché*
- (3) Therefore, the phenomenological field is part of your essence.

The phenomenological field has properties of the soul. It is the unchanging condition of the mind and the body in so far as they are someone’s. ‘Being someone’s’ does not mean ‘pertaining to this body’. It means ‘pertaining to someone’.

Argument that your existence is part of your essence:

- (1) Any part of you that does not fall by the *epoché* is part of your essence.
- (2) Your existence does not fall by the *epoché*
- (3) Therefore, your existence is part of your essence.

Argument that your presence is part of your essence:

- (1) Any part of you that does not fall by the *epoché* is part of your essence.
- (2) Your presence does not fall by the *epoché*
- (3) Therefore, the presence of you is part of your essence.

Argument that the you-ness of you is part of your essence:

- (1) Any part of you that does not fall by the *epoché* is part of your essence.
- (2) The you-ness of you does not fall by the *epoché*
- (3) Therefore, the you-ness of you is part of your essence.

Argument that any prerequisites of your own existence are not scientific:

- (1) Everything scientific falls by the *epoché*.
- (2) You do not fall by the *epoché*.
- (3) Therefore, you do not depend upon anything scientific.

Argument that you are not one particular human being.

- (1) One particular human being falls by the *epoché*.
- (2) You do not fall by the *epoché*.
- (3) Therefore, you are not one particular human being.

Phenomenology, which usefully begins the disclosure of existence that is not 'objective', remains essentially within the anti-metaphysical paradigm (except *malgré elle*) because it offers only descriptions, no explanations. A metaphysical phenomenology would exhibit the non-scientific ground of true descriptions. A phenomenological theology would disclose the immanence of God. We can always ask: *Why is this phenomenological description true?* Metaphysics begins where phenomenology ends.

Is something's being you its self-identity? You are self-identical. Being self-identical is an essential property of you because necessary for your being and for your being anything (for your existence and for your essence). Nevertheless, the self-identity of *one particular human being* is not sufficient for its being you. There is no valid inference from:

'One particular human being is self-identical'

to

'You are one particular human being'

That one particular human being is the thing it is, and no other, does not entail that it is you. Something's being you is an extra fact over and above one particular human being being self-identical. Being you is necessary and sufficient for being you but one particular human being being one particular human being is not sufficient for one particular human being being you. Even though the self-identity of whatever it is that you are is necessary and sufficient for its being you, its being necessary and sufficient for being you is not its being you. 'is necessary and sufficient for' does not imply 'is' even though 'is' implies 'is necessary and sufficient for'.

Argument that some human being's being the one you view the world from is not that human being's self-identity.

- (1) Every human being is self-identical.
- (2) You view the world from only one human being.
- (2) That some human being is self-identical is not sufficient for that human being being the one you view the world from. (from (1) and (2))
- (3) There is something sufficient for a human being being the one you view the world from.
- (4) That which is sufficient for some human being being the one you view the world from is not self-identity.

Even the self-identity of *one particular human being* is not what its being the one you view the world from consists in. That there is a view from one particular human being does not logically entail that it is your view, even if you have that view at present. That one particular human being is the one you view the world from is a further fact over and above its being the one

that it is. One particular human being being the one you view the world from is not just its being self-identical.

The problem of other minds rests on the unnoticed distinction between *being oneself* and *not being anyone else*. Epistemology presupposes metaphysics.

Is something's being the one you view the world from its being numerically distinct from anything else?

Something's *being the one you view the world from* is an extra fact over and above something's numerical difference from anything else. There is no valid inference from:

'One particular human being is numerically distinct from anything it is not'

to

'One particular human being is the one you view the world from.'

That one particular human being is numerically distinct from any human being it is not is not sufficient for its being the one you view the world from. Something's being the one you view the world from is an extra fact over and above that thing's not being anything it is not.

Argument that some human being's being the one you view the world from is not its being numerically distinct from anything else.

(1) Every human being is numerically distinct from any other human being.

(2) You only view the world from one human being.

(2) That some human being is numerically distinct from any other is not a sufficient condition for that human being being the one you view the world from. (from (1) and (2))

(3) There is some difference between one human being and any other sufficient for one particular human being being the one you view the world

from.

- (4) Therefore the difference between one human being and any other sufficient for one particular human being being the one you view the world from is not a numerical difference.

Is the numerical difference between two things an essential difference? x can *become* y . That suggests that x and y if distinct are contingently distinct. From the fact that a particular human being exists, and is distinct from every other being, it does not follow that that human being is the one you view the world from. That a human being is the one you view the world from is a metaphysical fact for which no physical, mental or logical fact is sufficient.

Schroedinger draws our attention to

‘A. S. Eddington’s “two writing desks”; one is the familiar old piece of furniture at which he is seated, resting his arms on it, the other is the scientific physical body which not only lacks all and every sensual qualities but in addition is riddled with holes; by far the greatest part of it is empty space, just nothingness, interspersed with innumerable tiny specks of something, the electrons and the nuclei whirling around, but always separated by distances of at least 100,000 times their own size.’

Erwin Schroedinger *Mind and Matter* (CUP, Cambridge, 1958) p. 41

II

MIND

‘It seems to me that there is a fundamental problem with the idea that mentality arises out of physicality – this is something which philosophers worry about for very good reasons.’

Roger Penrose *et. al.* *The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 94

‘The things we talk about in physics are matter, physical things, massive objects, particles, space, time, energy and so on. How could our feelings, our perception of redness, or of happiness have anything to do with physics? I regard that as a mystery.’

Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 94

‘the mystery of the relation of the physical world to the world of mentality.’

Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 96

‘I simply do not see any room for conscious mentality within our present-day physical world-picture – biology and chemistry being part of that world-picture.’

Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 183

‘Would one still want to call a world-view “physics-based” if it contains elements of protomentality at a basic level? This is a matter of terminology, but it is one that I am reasonably happy with for the moment at least.’

Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 183

epoche in reverse:

‘[...] for the purpose of constructing the picture of the external world, we have used the greatly simplifying device of cutting our own personality out, removing it; hence it is gone, it has evaporated, it is ostensibly not needed.

In particular, and most importantly, this is the reason why the scientific worldview contains of itself no ethical values, no aesthetical values, not a word about our own ultimate scope or destination, and no God, if you please. Whence came I, whither go I?’ Erwin Schroedinger (QQ 82)

‘Although I had not explicitly asserted, in either *Emperor* or *Shadows*, the need for mentality to be “ontologically fundamental in the universe”, I think that something of this nature is indeed necessary.’

Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 175-6

Principle of objectivation:

‘We step with our own person back into the part of an onlooker who does not belong to the world, which by this very procedure becomes an objective world.’

Erwin Schroedinger *Mind and Matter* (CUP, Cambridge, 1958) p. 38

‘The sensation of colour cannot be accounted for by the physicist’s objective picture of light-waves.’

Erwin Schroedinger *Mind and Matter* (CUP, Cambridge, 1958) p. 90

‘Could the physiologist account for it, if he had fuller knowledge than he has of the processes in the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the optical nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so.’

Erwin Schroedinger *Mind and Matter* (CUP, Cambridge, 1958) p. 90

‘I mean to say simply this, that we may be sure there is no nervous process whose objective description includes the characteristic ‘yellow colour’ or ‘sweet taste’, just as little as the description of an electro magnetic wave includes either of these characteristics.’

Erwin Schroedinger *Mind and Matter* (CUP, Cambridge, 1958) p. 91

‘neither the physicist’s description, nor that of the physiologist, contains any trait of the sensation of sound.’

Erwin Schroedinger *Mind and Matter* (CUP, Cambridge, 1958) p. 94-5

‘Any description of this kind is bound to end with a sentence like: those nerve impulses are conducted to a certain portion of the brain, where they are registered as a sequence of sounds. [...] But nowhere shall we hit on this ‘registering as sound’, which simply is not contained in our scientific picture, but is only in the mind of the person whose ear and brain we are speaking of.’

Erwin Schroedinger *Mind and Matter* (CUP, Cambridge, 1958) p. 95

‘the astonishment at finding our world picture ‘colourless, cold, mute’. Colour and sound, hot and cold are our immediate sensations; small wonder that they are lacking in a world-model from which we have removed our own mental person.’

Erwin Schroedinger *Mind and Matter* (CUP, Cambridge, 1958) p. 39

You are ineliminable:

‘the observer is never entirely replaced by instruments; for, if he were, he could obviously obtain no knowledge whatsoever.’

Erwin Schroedinger *Mind and Matter* (CUP, Cambridge, 1958) p. 101

‘We all share the strange delusion that a lump of matter is something whose general nature is easily comprehensible whereas the nature of the human spirit is unfathomable. But consider how our supposed acquaintance with the lump of matter is attained. Some influence emanating from it plays on the extremity of a nerve, starting a series of physical and chemical changes which are propagated along the nerve to a brain-cell; there a mystery happens, and an image or sensation arises in the mind which cannot purport to resemble the stimulus which excites it.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 182)

‘The “something to which truth matters” must surely have a place in reality whatever definition of reality we may adopt.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 175)

‘The only subject presented to me for study is the content of my own consciousness.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 176)

Battle of Waterloo with and without consciousness.

‘Science cannot tell us a word about why music delights us, of why and how an old song can move us to tears.

Science, we believe, can, in principle, describe in full detail all that happens in the latter case in our sensorium and “motorium” from the moment the waves of compression and dilation reach our ear to the moment when certain glands secrete a salty fluid that emerges from our eyes. But of

the feelings of delight and sorrow that accompany the process science is completely ignorant – and therefore, reticent.’ Erwin Schroedinger (QQ 82)

‘It seems queer, not to say ridiculous, to think that the contemplating, conscious mind that alone reflects the becoming of the world should have made its appearance only at some time in the course of this “becoming”, should have appeared contingently, associated with a very special biological contraption which, in itself, quite obviously discharges the task of facilitating certain forms of life in maintaining themselves, thus favouring their preservation and propagation’ Erwin Schroedinger (QQ 87)

‘[...] the physical world picture lacks all the sensual qualities that go to make up the Subject of Cognizance. The model is colorless and soundless and unpalpable. In the same way and for the same reason, the world of science lacks, or is deprived of, everything that has a meaning only in relation to the consciously contemplating, perceiving, and feeling subject.’ Erwin Schroedinger (QQ 88)

‘I mean, in the first place, the ethical and aesthetical values, any values of any kind, everything related to the meaning and scope of the whole display. All this is not only absent but it cannot, from the purely scientific point of view, be inserted organically. If one tries to put it in or on, as a child puts color on his uncoloured painting copies, it will not fit. For anything that is made to enter this world-model willy-nilly takes the form of scientific assertion of facts, and as such, it becomes wrong.’ Erwin Schroedinger (QQ 88-9)

‘Most painful is the absolute silence of all our scientific investigations toward our questions concerning the meaning and scope of the whole display. The more attentively we watch it, the more aimless and foolish it appears to be. The show that is going on obviously acquires a meaning only with regard to the mind that contemplates it. But what science tells us about this relationship is patently absurd: as if mind had only been produced by that very display that it is now watching and would pass away with it when the sun finally cools down and the earth has been turned into a desert of ice and snow.’ Erwin Schroedinger (QQ 89)

‘Thought is one of the indisputable facts of the world. I know that I think, with a certainty which I cannot attribute to any of my physical knowledge of the world. More hypothetically, but on fairly plausible evidence, I am convinced that you have minds which think. Here then is a world fact to be investigated. The physicist brings his tools and commences systematic exploration. All that he discovers is a collection of atoms and electrons and fields of force arranged in space and time, apparently similar to those found in inorganic objects. He may trace other physical characteristics, energy, temperature, entropy. None of these is identical with thought. He might set down thought as an illusion – some perverse interpretation of the interplay of the physical entities that he has found. Or, if he sees the folly of calling the most undoubted element of our experience an illusion, he will have to face the tremendous question: How can this collection of ordinary atoms be a thinking machine?’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 171)

‘I find it utterly impossible to form an idea about either how, for example, my own conscious mind (that I feel to be *one*) should have originated be integration of the consciousness of the cells (or some of them) that form my body, or how it should at every moment of my life be, as it were, their resultant.’

Erwin Schroedinger *Mind and Matter* (CUP, Cambridge, 1958) p. 57

‘I venture to call it indestructible since it has a peculiar time-table, namely mind is always *now*.

Erwin Schroedinger *Mind and Matter* (CUP, Cambridge, 1958) p. 62

‘There is really no before and after for mind. There is only a now that includes memories and expectations.’

Erwin Schroedinger *Mind and Matter* (CUP, Cambridge, 1958) p. 62

‘we may, or so I believe, assert that physical theory in its present stage strongly suggests the indestructibility of Mind by Time.’

Erwin Schroedinger *Mind and Matter* (CUP, Cambridge, 1958) p. 87

‘This is the potential that was derived from the interval that was measured by the scale that was made from the matter that Mr. X knows. Next question: What is Mr. X?’

Well, it happens that physics is not at all anxious to pursue the question: What is Mr. X? It is not disposed to admit that its elaborate structure of a physical universe is “The House that Mr. X Built”. It looks upon Mr. X – and more particularly, the part of Mr. X that knows – as a rather troublesome tenant who, at a late stage of the world’s history, has come to inhabit a structure which – and inorganic Nature has, by slow evolutionary progress, contrived to build. And so it turns aside from the avenue leading to Mr. X – and beyond – and closes up its cycle leaving him out in the cold.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 173)

‘From its own point of view, physics is entirely justified [in not pursuing the question: What is Mr. X?]. That matter, in some indirect way, comes within the purview of Mr. X’s mind is not a fact of any utility for a theoretical scheme of physics. We cannot embody it in a differential equation. It is ignored, and the physical properties of matter and other entities are expressed by their linkages in the cycle.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 174)

Physics is self contained. This, together with the existence of consciousness, shows the truth of Cartesian dualism.

‘And you can see how by the ingenious device of the cycle physics secures for itself a self-contained domain for study with no loose ends projecting into the unknown. All other physical definitions have the same kind of interlocking. Electric force is defined as something which causes motion of an electric charge; an electric charge is something which exerts electric force. So that an electric charge is something that exerts something that produces motion of something that exerts something that produces... *ad infinitum*.

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 174)

‘To know what there is about Mr. X which makes him behave in this strange way, we must look not to a physical system of inference, *but to that insight beneath the symbols which, in our minds, we possess*. It is by this insight that we can finally reach and answer to our question: What is Mr. X?’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 174)

‘Physics [...] that its picture omits so much that is obviously significant, there is no suggestion that it is the whole truth about experience. To make such a claim would bring protest not only from the religiously minded, but from all who recognize that Man is not merely a scientific measuring machine.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 174)

Human world.

‘We recognize that the type of knowledge after which physics is striving is much too narrow and specialised to constitute a complete understanding of the environment of the human spirit.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 175)

‘A great many aspects of our ordinary life and activity take us outside the outlook of physics. Any discussion as to whether they are compatible with the truth revealed by physics is purely academic; whatever the outcome of the discussion we are not likely to sacrifice them.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 175)

‘It is [...] somewhat of an anomaly that among the many extraphysical aspects of experience, religion alone should be singled out as specially in need of reconciliation with the knowledge contained in science.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 175)

‘Experience – that is to say, the self *cum* environment – comprises more than can be embraced in the physical world, restricted as it is to a complex of metric symbols.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 178)

‘All I would claim is that *those who in the search for truth start from consciousness as a seat of self-knowledge with interests and responsibilities not confined to the material plane* are just as much facing the hard facts of experience as those who start from consciousness as a device for reading the indications of spectrosopes and micrometers.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 178)

‘What is the ultimate truth about ourselves? Various answers suggest themselves. We are a bit of stellar matter gone wrong. We are physical machinery – puppets that strut and talk and laugh and die as the hand of time pulls the strings beneath. But there is one elementary inescapable answer. *We are that which asks the question.* Whatever else there may be in our nature, responsibility towards truth is one of its attributes. This side of our nature is aloof from the scrutiny of the physicist.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 178)

‘The elements of consciousness are particular thoughts and feelings; the elements of the brain cell are atoms and electrons.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 181)

‘But the two analyses do not run in parallel with one another.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 181)

‘[...] the mental activity of the part of the world constituting ourselves occasions no surprise; it is known to us by direct self-knowledge, and we do not explain it away as something other than we know it to be, - or, rather, it knows itself to be.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 184-5)

‘Our bodies are more mysterious than our minds.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 185)

‘It is as though when my brain says 7 times 8 are 56 its machinery is manufacturing sugar, but when it says 7 times 8 are 65 the machinery has gone wrong and produced chalk. But who says the machinery has gone wrong? As a physical machine, the brain has acted according to the unbreakable laws of physics; so why stigmatise its action?’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 202)

‘This discrimination of chemical products as good or evil has no parallel in chemistry.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 202)

‘We cannot assimilate laws of thought to natural laws.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 202)

“‘Ought’ takes us outside chemistry and physics.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 202)

‘A physical machine cannot esteem or want anything.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 202)

‘D Awareness cannot be explained by physical, computational, or any other scientific terms.’

Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 101

Penrose needs a distinction between science now and future science. He draws this in SM.

‘Somehow, the natural numbers are already “there”, existing somewhere in the Platonic world and we have access to that world through our ability to be aware of things. If we were simply mindless computers, we would not have that ability.’

Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 116

‘I have talked about contact with some sort of Platonic world – what is the nature of this “Platonic contact”? [...] judgement, common sense, insight, aesthetic sensibility, compassion, morality ... These seem to me to be things which are not just features of computation.’

Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 125

‘The modernized version of Whiteheadianism which I tentatively proposed does not use quantum theory as a surrogate for the fundamental ontological status of mentality, but as an intellectual instrument for accounting for the immense gamut of manifestations of mentality in the world, from complete depression of the intrinsic mentality to high-level enhancement of it.’

Abner Shimony ‘On Mentality, Quantum Mechanics and the Actualisation of Potentialities’ in Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 153

‘The appearances of our mental life have no place in a physicalist ontology, and a physicalism governed by quantum rules is still physicalistic.’

Abner Shimony ‘On Mentality, Quantum Mechanics and the Actualisation of Potentialities’ in Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 153

‘Whitehead’s philosophy of organism, by contrast is radically non-physicalistic, since it attributes mentalistic properties to the most primitive entities in the universe, thus conjecturally enriching the physical description of them.’

Abner Shimony ‘On Mentality, Quantum Mechanics and the Actualisation of Potentialities’ in Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 153

‘There are some phenomena that have a ‘quantum flavor’ about them: for example, transitions from peripheral to focal vision; transitions from consciousness to unconsciousness; the pervasiveness of the mind through the body; intentionality; anomalies in temporally locating mental events; and the conflations and ambiguities of Freudian symbolism.’

Abner Shimony ‘On Mentality, Quantum Mechanics and the Actualisation of Potentialities’ in Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 154-5

‘A serious application of quantum theory to the mind must also consider the mathematical structure of the space of states and the set of observables. These are not supplied by the quantum framework.’

Abner Shimony ‘On Mentality, Quantum Mechanics and the Actualisation of Potentialities’ in Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 155

‘Possibly quantum concepts can be applied to psychology, but not with as much geometrical structure as in quantum physics.’

Abner Shimony ‘On Mentality, Quantum Mechanics and the Actualisation of Potentialities’ in Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 155

‘Even if there is such a thing as a space of mental states, can we assume that this space will have the structure of a projective Hilbert space?’

Abner Shimony 'On Mentality, Quantum Mechanics and the Actualisation of Potentialities' in Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 155

NB: Psychological space is the soul. What are the geometrical properties of psychological space? (NB: Augustine: geometry of the soul.)

'Might it not be heuristically valuable to consider a new analogy: classical physics is to quantum physics as classical psychology is to a hypothetical quantum psychology?'

Abner Shimony 'On Mentality, Quantum Mechanics and the Actualisation of Potentialities' in Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 155

'Personally, I get uneasy when people, especially theoretical physicists, talk about consciousness. Consciousness is not a quality one can measure from the outside. If a little green man were to appear on our door step tomorrow, we do not have a way of telling if he was conscious and self-aware or just a robot.'

Stephen Hawking 'The Objections of an Unashamed Reductionist' in Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 171

'it might be possible to have a conscious entity which is not biological at all, in the sense that we use the word 'biology' at the present time.'

Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 178

'We cannot but acknowledge that a human being involves [...] something incommensurable with the kind of entities we have been treating of. I do not mean to say that consciousness has not undergone evolution; presumably its rudiments exist far down the scale of animal life. But it is a constituent or an aspect of reality which our survey of the material world leaves on one side. Hence arises insistently the problem of the dualism of spirit and matter.'

Arthur Stanley Eddington *Science and the Unseen World* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1929) p. 18

'Reasoning leads us from premise to conclusion; it cannot start without premises. The premises for our reasoning about the visible universe, as well

as for our reasoning about the unseen world, are in the self-knowledge of mind.’ Arthur Stanley Eddington *Science and the Unseen World* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1929) p.45

‘to the man who has received the revelation of sight the significant fact is not so much the truth about wave-length as the amazing transformation into a world under the vivifying power of the mind.’

Arthur Stanley Eddington *Science and the Unseen World* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1929) p.48-9

‘The biochemist can teach us about the proteins and carbohydrates that make up a suitable diet, and we may profit by his knowledge; but it is not fitting that a meal should be looked upon entirely from the standpoint of absorbing a specified quantity of calories and food-values.’

Arthur Stanley Eddington *Science and the Unseen World* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1929) p. 51

What is a mind? There is a distinction between *that which thinks*, *what is thought*, and *the thinking of* what is thought by that which thinks. These three are not the same.

A mind (*def.*) whatever has a capacity to think.

A mind (*def.*) a totality of thoughts (propositions).

A mind (*def.*) a totality of thoughts (attitudes)

Are you this mind?

Argument that you are not necessarily ‘this mind’:

(1) This mind is a totality of thoughts.

(2) For any thought, you might not have had that thought.

(3) You only contingently have this mind.

(4) You are not necessarily this mind.

About any thought had by you we may ask: What have you said about *this* thought when you have claimed it is *your* thought? It is correct but inadequate to say "It is one of a set of logically, semantically, and phenomenologically related thoughts in a single mind called 'mine'". This only shifts the problem onto your whole mind, and does not explain what it is for this *entire consciousness* or *set of interrelated thoughts* to be yours. I am not any mental act or content nor set of mental acts or contents. I am that which engages in mental activity with content. I am that which thinks, not any thought nor the thinking of any thought.

Argument that I am something that is not mental:

(1) I am not mental.

(2) I am something rather than nothing.

(3) Therefore I am something that is not mental.

Are you out of your mind?

You are out of your mind.

Are you your body?

Argument that you are not necessarily my body:

(1) There are possible worlds in which this body exists but you do not.

(2) There are possible worlds in which you exist but this body does not.

(2) You are only contingently related to your body.

(3) Your body is not necessarily you.

Are you a Physical Object?

Argument that you are not a necessarily physical object:

(1) There are possible worlds in which physical objects exist but you do not.

(2) There are possible worlds in which you exist but physical objects do not.

(3) You are something rather than nothing.

(4) Therefore you are not a physical object.

Are you your brain? The brain is only billions of atoms moving in empty space. For all its anatomical complexity, the brain is only pieces of matter in motion. No matter how sophisticated our neuroscience, the gap between billions of atoms in empty space and consciousness is completely unbridged.

One atom cannot see. Two atoms cannot see. Billions of atoms whirling in the void cannot see. This is what I mean when I say that science does not have the answers. Nor is science the best method we have. The standards of logical rigour, argument and proof in academic philosophy are far higher than those required in the natural sciences, including physics.

‘The brain’ does not see. You see. We do not know what sees because we do not know what we are. We *do* know that whatever sees is invisible. The seer is not seen. [Nagel: brain] Answering automatically “the brain” is already to abdicate *what is given* and to import a supposedly ‘objective’ but in fact highly conditioned idea.

You might ask: Why cannot the true explanation be in terms of the conditioned? On one level, an scientific level, it is obviously right that I cannot see without a brain and cannot see without eyes. This does nothing to answer ‘What sees?’

Are you contingently identical with one particular human being?

Argument that you are contingently identical with one particular human being:

Stephen Priest The Problem of Being Someone

- (1) You are not necessarily identical with one particular human being.
- (2) If you are identical with one particular human being either you are necessarily identical with one particular human being or you are contingently identical with one particular human being.
- (3) You are identical with one particular human being.
- (4) Therefore, you are contingently identical with one particular human being.

You are directly acquainted with the psychological interiority of only one human being, the one you pervade, but you could in principle have been any human being or none.

A distinction needs to be drawn between:

- (1) This particular human being exists.

and

- (2) *You are* this particular human being that exists.

(2) provides new information not already contained in (1). Understanding this new information helps us understand and answer *Why are you you?* There is a difference between *there being some human being or other* and *your being that human being*, even when that human being is *one particular human being*.

Argument that the relation between you and *one particular human being* is contingent identity:

- (1) There are possible worlds in which you exist but *one particular human being* does not exist.
- (2) You are identical with one particular human being.

- (3) If you are identical with one particular human being then you are contingently or necessarily identical with one particular human being.
- (4) You are contingently identical with one particular human being.

The expression 'one particular human being' is used to refer to the human being you view from the special phenomenological perspectives described above.

Argument that the relation between you and *one particular human being* is contingent identity:

- (1) There are possible worlds in which *one particular human being* exists but you do not exist.
- (2) Therefore, you are not necessarily identical with one particular human being.
- (3) Therefore, if you are identical with one particular human being then you are contingently identical with one particular human being.

Premise (1) in the first argument means: In some of the worlds in which you exist but *one particular human being* does not, you exist but you are a different human being. In others, you exist but are not a human being. You are disembodied or closely associated with a physical or psycho-physical being other than a human being. There are possible worlds in which you exist but no human beings exist. This is 'counter intuitive' only because of the weight of naturalist and secular preconceptions. There is no contradiction in the idea of disembodied existence.

Premise (1) in the second argument means: In worlds in which *one particular human being* exists but you do not, the very human being you in fact view the world from exists but you do not view the world from it. Someone else does. 'Your' human being is simply another member of the public. 'Your' human being is not you. *One particular human being* is not quite *Dasein*. One particular human being includes psychological interiority

but *Dasein* is the *being* of human being. One particular human being exceeds *Dasein*.

Suppose FK is the Master of the Hall. Between:

(1) FK exists.

and

(2) FK is the Master of the Hall.

there is a failure of inference but FK is still the Master of the Hall. The failure of the inference does not prove a lack of identity. However, the identity is contingent. Perhaps 'identity' is the wrong concept here. Of course, that human being, FK, is numerically identical with that human being who is the Master of the Hall. In that sense, it is right to say 'FK is the Master of the Hall' is an identity statement. Nevertheless, FK and the Master of the Hall can *come apart*. Can *a* ever really *be b* if *a* is sometimes not *b*? Can anything not be what it is? Of course, there are changes but this is not what I mean. Can anything not be the thing it is? 'FK is the Master of the Hall' expresses identity in the loose and popular sense only: as though a disguise had been uncovered, or a job taken and left.

If the relation between you and yourself is identity, which might be doubted, it is contingent identity.

In these claims:

(1) You are present as one particular human being.

(2) You are present at one particular human being.

you are the presence, not the human being.

Could one particular human being have existed without you existing? This seems utterly impossible but it is possible. One particular human being who you in fact are might have existed without you existing. That living breathing human being with a psychological interiority who is reading this book now might have existed but you might have had nothing to do with it. One particular human being would then have been *just another member of*

the public. You would not have *occupied the standpoint* of one particular human being. You would then not have *viewed the world from* one particular human being. Perhaps someone else would. The existence of one particular human being would have been much like the existence of all those human beings who, now, are not you. Your human being would be another, or someone else, or no-one.

It is logically and metaphysically possible that one particular human being should have existed if you did not exist. This is sufficient for any putative identity between you and one particular human being to be contingent.

Are you one particular human being? In order to see that one particular human being, the one you in fact are, might have existed, just as it is, except for not being you, suppose the following:

You do not exist.

but

A human being otherwise just like you does exist.

The world in which this holds is the closest world to the actual world that does not contain you. The only difference between this possible world and the actual world is that a certain human being is not you. *This very human being* exists in both worlds.

As a heuristic, imagine someone exactly like you *next to you* now. Now subtract the one who you are. Suppose the other person moves to where you were. The one left over is *not you* but otherwise exactly like you. The only difference between you and the one in your place is you are you and the other one is not you. We need to find out what this difference entails. (It misses the point to state the obvious truth that the one who is not you *came from* the place next to you. The movements here are only a heuristic.)

How is the view from now-here possible? Consider all the human beings of the past, present and future, arranged in a line. You are then thinking of the line of people *from the outside*. Where are you in the line? Which one is you? Which is *yourself*?

What is it to be in the line, not just in the 'objective' sense but *from the inside of the line*, viewing the world from the standpoint of one of the people in the line? It is as though history has been turned inside out. History in its exteriority is seamless (which is not to deny its scientific interruptions and discontinuities). This uniformity of otherness is broken where you burst into or out of history. Here you are now with the world on *every* side. The 'line' of history, from this new point of view, is an idea in your mind.

Spatial metaphor is usually needed to begin metaphysical and theological thinking, because our minds are conditioned to the manipulation of the world of physical objects. Spatial metaphor needs to be discarded or treated with suspicion for the acquisition of spiritual knowledge.

What is missing from the view sub specie aeternitatis? The view *sub specie aeternitatis* is not complete because it omits (*inter alia*) your being inside history, or your emergence into history. Your living history *from the inside* is a further fact over and above your "objective" location in history's chronology. Existentialism replaces, or supplements, the view *sub specie aeternitatis* with the view from now-here.

Why are you in history? It is a puzzling and striking fact that out of all the human beings there have been, are and will be, you yourself 'are' one of them. You are, *inserted into history from the inside* as yourself. Were you inserted? Where did you come from? Why are you here? Being in history needs an explanation: an explanation adequate to own-ness. There is no grafting of subjectivity onto objectivity as some epi-phenomenon. This is the mistake of modernity.

From:

(1) 'There exists the set of all human beings, past present and future.'

and

(2) 'The set of all human beings, past present and future includes *one particular human being*'

we cannot validly derive the conclusion:

(3) 'You are a member of the set of all human beings, past, present and future.'

Notice that there is not just a failure of inference from (1) to (2) but, crucially, from (1) and (2) to (3). There is not just the obvious invalidity of the inference from a set to a putative member of that set. There is also the far less obvious invalidity of the inference from a set of things like you, *including the being you normally take yourself to be*, to your own existence.

Any possible world either contains or does not contain a particular being. Any temporal possible world contains its own history.

Any possible world either contains you or does not contain you. *a fortiori*, any temporal possible world contains or does not contain you in its history.

We need to know:

What is the difference between a possible world in which you exist and one in which you do not exist? Actuality.

Why should it be that out of all these human beings, you are one of them? It is not enough to talk about birth here. The philosophical question 'How come that particular birth gave rise to you?' has still not been touched. Why did it bring you into the world? Why did it not just bring a person or someone else into the world? The answer to this question lies outside the world.

Is the problem of being someone about origins?

Argument that the problem of being someone is not about origins:

(1) There is an infinite number of possible worlds in which you exist but did not begin to be.

(2) The problem of being someone arises in every world in which you exist.

(3) The problem of being someone arises if you exist but did not begin to be.

(4) Therefore, the problem of being someone does not concern origins.

The problem is not about origins because it would still exist *even if this being had always existed*. We may still ask about this being without an origin: What is it for it to be you? You could have had no origin but you would still have been you. You could have had a different origin from the origin you had but you would still have been you. (Premise (1) is consistent with the occurrence of a first event because you are not essentially composed of events.)

Argument that the problem of being someone is not about origins:

- (1) There is an infinite number of possible worlds in which you exist as one particular human being but one particular human being has a different origin.
- (2) The problem of being someone arises in every world in which you exist.
- (3) The problem of being someone arises if one particular human being exists but had a different origin.
- (4) Therefore, problem of being someone does not concern origins.

There is no contradiction in the supposition that, for any being, this very being had a different origin. Your origin is not essentially yours but you are essentially you.

Could everything have had a different origin? Nothing has its (particular or kind of) origin essentially. There is no contradiction in the supposition that *this very being* had a different origin from the origin it had, only falsity.

The problem about being you is not about origins because it would still exist *even if one particular human being had always existed*. We may still ask about one particular human being without an origin: What is it for it to be you? Not only is there a failure of inference from:

- (1) This being exists.

to

- (2) This being is you.

there is a failure of inference from

(1) This being has always existed.

to

(3) This being is you.

and from:

(1) This being began to be at such and such a place and time.

and

(2) This being exists.

to

(3) This being is you.

Are you your body? You are not your body. You are not just in your body. Your body has never been 'alive'. You animate your body. Your body does not animate itself.

If you say about your hand (perhaps looking at your hand and holding it up) 'This is my hand' what exactly have you claimed about this hand? It is true, but not enough, to say 'It is attached to my body'. This only shifts the problem onto your whole body. What have you said about this body when you have said it is yours? It is at least true of your hand that you pervade your hand, but what pervades your hand if you pervade your hand?

What is it for this body to be yours? No set of scientific or psycho-physical facts is sufficient for any human body being your body, not even facts about the body of one particular human being. This body is yours because you pervade it, because you are where it is without being it.

Are you your ego? The ego is the emotion-saturated constellation of images, thoughts and impressions that is your inner self-depiction. It includes more of what you would like one particular human being to be than of what one particular human being is. Nevertheless, if your ego is part of one particular human being, part of its psychology, then thinking of yourself in this way is *partly* being this way.

You are not your ego because a thought presupposes a thinker of that thought otherwise it is not right to speak of 'thought' here. A thought is a thought because it is thought, in the sense of 'subjected to thinking' and only a subject can subject anything to thinking.

Is 'Why is someone you?' an ontological problem?

Argument that 'Why is someone you?' is an ontological problem.

- (1) That someone is you is an ontological fact.
- (2) Why someone is you is a problem.
- (3) Any problem essentially about an ontological fact is an ontological problem.
- (4) Why someone is you is an ontological problem.

Is there an ontological explanation for something's being you?

Argument that there is an ontological explanation of someone's being you:

- (1) That someone is you is an ontological fact.
- (2) There is an explanation of someone's being you.
- (3) Only ontological facts can explain ontological facts.
- (4) Therefore, there is an ontological explanation of someone's being you.

‘Why is someone you?’ is an ontological problem because there is something it consists in to be you and you exist. Therefore whatever it consists in for you to be you exists.

Argument that there is an ontological explanation for someone’s being you:

- (1) Only something that exists can explain something that exists.
- (2) You exist.
- (3) There is an explanation of your existence.
- (4) Your existence is explained by something that exists.

Whatever it is to be you exists. The ontological problem is saying what that is. The problem is ontological because it can only be solved by *the existence of* something non-physical, non-mental and non-modal. We have to think outside these accepted categories to solve it. In your particular case, your being you consists in something you are essentially and that is essentially you.

How can you be this specific human being? The answer is you are not, if ‘are’ means here ‘are strictly (or necessarily, or essentially) numerically identical with’. The answer is theological if ‘are’ means ‘pervade’.

How can you be only this specific human being? You are not. Your being *exceeds* the being of one particular human being. There is a possible world in which you are not that psycho-physical human born in a certain place at a certain time who is reading this book. That very psycho-physical human being exists in that world, but it is someone else. In the actual world, it is an extra fact about that individual that *you are* that individual.

Am I one particular human being in other possible worlds? There is a possible world in which I am not that psycho-physical human being born in a certain place at a certain time in England who authored this book. That very psycho-physical human being exists in that world, but it is someone else. In the actual world, it is an extra fact about that individual that *I am* that individual.

Is the problem of being you the mind-body problem?

Argument that the problem of being you is not the mind-body problem.

(1) The mind-body problem is the problem of stating correctly the relation between the mind and the body.

(2) The problem of being someone is the problem of stating correctly the relation between you and one particular human being.

(3) The problem of stating the relation between the mind and the body is not the problem of stating the relation between you and one particular human being.

(4) Therefore, the problem of being someone is not the mind-body problem.

A human being is a psycho-physical totality. The problem of being someone remains a problem on these solutions to the mind body problem.

Is there a materialist solution to the problem of being someone? If materialism were true, the problem of why someone is you would remain. If a person is only a highly complicated physical object, or set of physical processes, we still need to answer: *What have you said about this physical object when you have claimed that you are it? What have you said about this constellation of atoms moving in empty space when you have said it is you?*

Is there a dualist solution to the problem of being someone? If mind-body dualism is true, no mental event is identical with any physical event but a human being comprises both mental and physical events. We may still ask: *What is it for some mental events and some physical events to be you?*

Is there an idealist solution to the problem of being someone? If idealism is true then, fundamentally, only consciousness exists. We may still ask: *What is true of consciousness if it is your consciousness?*

Is there a neutral monist solution to the problem of being someone? If neutral monism is true, a human being comprises some reality that is

intrinsically neither mental nor physical but which makes that distinction possible. We may still ask: *What is it for some intrinsically neither mental nor physical reality to be you?*

Is there a functionalist solution to the problem of being someone? If functionalism is true, then mental states are effects of sensory inputs and causes of behavioural outputs. We may still ask: *What is it for a cause or an effect to be you?*

How is your knowledge of one particular human being possible? It is clear *a priori* that your access to one particular human being is by reflective awareness of your body and psychological interiority. The epistemological asymmetry between your knowledge of you and your knowledge of everyone else is grounded ontologically. How one particular human being is given to you is a clue to your not being necessarily numerically identical with it.

What does 'am' mean? 'I am one particular human being' said by you is wrong, if 'am' expresses necessary numerical identity here. 'Am' is a word of immense profundity. It is the word of God. It is the word rightly used to express the existential way in which we are made in God's image. In Japanese, we do not say 'I am Stephen' but 'I Stephen', which is suggestive of numerical identity, as in 'I Claudius'. [Hitoshi Nagai] Some concepts are more readily expressed in some languages. Nevertheless, the reality of being subjectivity without objectivity captured by 'am' obtains irrespective of linguistic contingencies.

What is it for one particular human being to be yours? You do not ground one particular human being but you do ground one particular human being's *being yours*. (I use 'ground' in this way: *a* grounds *b* if and only if *a* is necessary for *b*.) You are close to one particular human being. For you, it is infinitely proximal. You are centred on it. You know intuitively that you are not straightforwardly identical with one particular human being. You are a shadow or a ghost which spreads beyond one particular human being. You do not end where your human being ends. If you were only one particular human being you would be inert, lifeless.

One particular human being is alienable. (To resist this thought is to have been persuaded by inductive logic.)

Do you coincide with one particular human being? You do not end where your flesh ends. In both space and time, you *exceed* one particular human being.

Are you another? You are another, another to another. That you think of one particular human being *as* another, that is, as one human being amongst others, is not wrong but inadequate to the facts. It is a metaphysically misleading and comparatively superficial habit of thought, conditioned by generalized and third-person thinking. To think of a person as *only* another is a mistake of science. You are the refutation of scientific materialism.

Why is self-knowledge difficult? We think of ourselves as embedded in history. This picture substitutes for being brought up sharp by the stark reality of being all-here-now. History hides our existence from us.

Practical economy, capitalism and bourgeois individualism, emphasise 'the individual' but, ironically, conceal the perspectival asymmetries between you and others that begin to disclose your profound and true individuality. There is irony in individualism: Individualism is not very individualistic. In individualism, the individuals are all the same.

Is the problem of being you only about the logic of indexicals? The question *Why are you you?* has next to nothing to do with language. You would still be you even if there was no such thing as language. Although language was hugely overrated by twentieth century philosophy, I say something about indexicals because many readers are bound to think the problem of being you linguistic (in both senses of 'bound').

Logically, from no non-indexical description of the world, no matter how complete, may we validly derive the conclusion that you are part of it.

- (1) 'The world exists.'
- (2) 'The world is *F*.....*G*.'
- (3) 'Therefore I am part of the world.'

is an invalid inference.

Even if we specified every atom of that body that is *in fact* yours, the fact of its being yours would not thereby have been mentioned:

- (1) 'One particular human being exists.'
- (2) 'One particular human being is made up of the set of atoms {.....}.'
- (3) 'Therefore I am one particular human being.'

is an invalid inference.

Even if we specified every thought and emotion that *in fact* runs through your mind, the fact of their being yours would not thereby have been mentioned.

- (1) 'One particular human being exists.'
- (2) 'One particular human being includes the sequence of mental states {.....}.'
- (3) 'Therefore I am one particular human being.'

is an invalid inference.

Being you is not any physical, mental or logical fact about you. When all the physical and mental and modal facts are in, not all the facts are in.

Clearly, the logical independence of descriptions is not sufficient for the ontological independence of facts. 'I am in pain' (uttered by you) does not entail and is not entailed by 'That person is in pain' but this does not prove that the fact that you are in pain and the fact that that person is in pain are not identical. If the first person singular pronoun and the demonstrative expression 'that person' are correctly used to refer to the same human being in these contexts then the truth conditions for 'you are in pain' are the truth conditions for 'that person is in pain'.

However, the observation that any inference from the logical independence of descriptions to the ontological independence of entities is fallacious does nothing to dispel the metaphysical mystery of what it consists in for something to be you.

Why have you not previously noticed that this person 'is' you? You are so used to thinking in general, abstract, or third-person ways that you fail to notice that something is yourself.

How can 'I exist' be understood? 'I exist' cannot be understood only intellectually. You have to understand it as here and now. Although you can experience yourself and you do exist, you cannot experience your own existence, because existence is not scientific. Your own existence is present to you in a way which exceeds rationalism and empiricism but is presupposed by both philosophies. You intuit your own existence. Your own existence is not an inference you draw from your thought or experience of yourself, even though any such inference is sound. You are present to yourself. This means, your presence is present to yourself.

*What is true of anything if you are it? Certain asymmetries obtain between what is disclosed by *being* a person, the person who you are, and *observing* a person, any person who you are not. These asymmetries shake the assumption that you are strictly numerically identical with the human being you normally take yourself to be.*

III

SPIRIT

'The scientific picture of the real world around me is very deficient. It gives a lot of factual information, puts all our experience in a magnificently consistent order, but it is ghastly silent about all and sundry that is really near to our heart, that really matters to us. It cannot tell us a word about red and blue, bitter and sweet, physical pain and physical delight; it knows nothing of beautiful and ugly, good or bad, God and eternity. Science sometimes pretends to answer questions in these domains, but the answers are very often so silly that we are not inclined to take them seriously.

So, in brief, we do not belong to this material world that science constructs for us.' Erwin Schroedinger (QQ 81)

‘So, in brief, we do not belong to this material world that science constructs for us. We are not in it; we are outside. We are only spectators. The reason why we believe we are in it, that we belong to the picture, is that our bodies are in the picture.’ Erwin Schroedinger (QQ 81)

‘Our bodies belong to it. Not only my own body, but those of my friends, also of my dog and cat and horse, and of all the other people and animals. And this is my only means of communicating with them.’ Erwin Schroedinger (QQ 81)

‘The space in which man develops as a spiritual being has more dimensions than the single one which it has occupied during the last centuries. This would imply that over longer periods of time, a conscious acceptance of this limitation might well lead to some equilibrium, where man’s knowledge and creative forces will once again find themselves ranged spontaneously about their common center.’ Werner Heisenberg (QQ 72)

‘Whence come I and whither go I? That is the great unfathomable question, the same for every one of us. Science has no answer to it. Erwin Schroedinger (QQ 83)

‘The doctrine of identity can claim that it is clinched by the empirical fact that consciousness is never experienced in the plural, only in the singular. Not only has none of us ever experienced more than one consciousness, but there is also no trace of circumstantial evidence of this every happening anywhere in the world.’

Erwin Schroedinger *Mind and Matter* (CUP, Cambridge, 1958) p. 55

False: the presence of the other.

NB: Schroedinger’s view that there is only one consciousness.

‘It is only to the individual that the soul is given’ Albert Einstein (QQ 107)

‘Mind, for anything perception can compass, goes therefore in our spatial world more ghostly than a ghost. Invisible, intangible, it is a thing not even of outline; it is not a “thing”. It remains without sensual confirmation and remains without it forever.’

Sir Charles Sherrington *Man on his Nature* (CUP, Cambridge, 1940) p. 357

‘If we wanted to construct a basic philosophical attitude from these scientific utterances of Pauli’s, at first we would be inclined to infer from them an extreme rationalism and a fundamentally skeptical point of view. In reality, however, behind this outward display of criticism and skepticism lay concealed a deep philosophical interest even in those dark areas of reality or the human soul which elude the grasp of reason.’

Werner Heisenberg *Across the Frontiers* (Harper and Row, New York, 1974) Chapter 3 ‘Wolfgang Pauli’s Philosophical Outlook’ (QQ 157)

‘And while the power of fascination emanating from Pauli’s analyses of physical problems was admittedly due in some measure to the detailed and penetrating clarity of his formulations, the rest was derived from a constant contact with the field of creative spiritual processes, for which no rational formulation as yet exists.’

Werner Heisenberg *Across the Frontiers* (Harper and Row, New York, 1974) Chapter 3 ‘Wolfgang Pauli’s Philosophical Outlook’ (QQ 157)

‘Very early in his career, Pauli had followed the road of skepticism based on rationalism right to the end, to a skepticism about skepticism, and he then tried to trace out those elements of the cognitive process that precede a rational understanding in depth.’

Werner Heisenberg *Across the Frontiers* (Harper and Row, New York, 1974) Chapter 3 ‘Wolfgang Pauli’s Philosophical Outlook’ (QQ 157)

‘For the physicist, the observer has become a symbol dwelling in a world of symbols. But before we ever handed the problem over to the physicist, we had a glimpse of Man as a spirit in an environment akin to his own spirit.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 174)

‘It is by looking into our own nature that we first discover the failure of the physical universe to be co-extensive with our experience of reality.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 175)

‘[...] any raising of the question of reality in its transcendental sense (whether it emanates from the world of physics or not) leads us to a perspective from which we see man not as a bundle of sensory impressions,

but conscious of purpose and responsibilities to which the external world is subordinate.

From this perspective, we recognise a spiritual world alongside the physical world.'

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 177-8)

'We are that which asks the question. Whatever else there may be in our nature, responsibility towards truth is one of its attributes. This side of our nature is aloof from the scrutiny of the physicist. I do not think it is sufficiently covered by admitting a mental aspect of our being. It has to do with conscience rather than consciousness. Concern with truth is one of those things which make up the spiritual nature of Man.'

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 178)

'The strange association of soul and body – of responsibility toward truth with a particular group of carbon compounds – in a problem in which we naturally feel intense, but it is not an anxious interest, as though the existence of a spiritual significance of experience were hanging in the balance. That significance is to be regarded rather as a datum of the problem; the solution must fit the data; we must not alter the data to fit an alleged solution.'

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 178)

'The interaction of ourselves with our environment is what makes up experience.'

Arthur Stanley Eddington *Science and the Unseen World* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1929) p. 25

'It would be foolish to deny the magnitude of the gulf between our understanding of the most complex form of inorganic matter and the simplest form of life.'

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 178-9)

'The inmost ego, possessing what I have called the inescapable attribute, can never be part of the physical world unless we alter the meaning of the word "physical" so as to be synonymous with "spiritual".'

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 179)

‘My conclusion is that, although for the most part our inquiry into the problem of experience ends in a veil of symbols, there is an immediate knowledge in the minds of conscious beings which lifts the veil in places; what we discern through these openings is of mental and spiritual nature. Elsewhere we see no more than the veil.’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 181)

‘What to the symbols stand for? [...]

Feeling that there must be more behind, we return to our starting point in human consciousness – the one centre where more might become known. There we find other stirrings, other revelations (true or false) than those conditioned by the world of symbols’

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 182)

‘Penetrating as deeply as we can by the methods of physical investigation into the nature of a human being we reach only symbolic description. Far from attempting to dogmatise as to the nature of the reality thus symbolised, physics most strongly insists that its methods do not penetrate behind the symbolism. Surely then that mental and spiritual nature of ourselves, known in our minds by an intimate contact transcending the methods of physics, supplies just that interpretation of the symbols which science is admittedly unable to give.’

Arthur Stanley Eddington *Science and the Unseen World* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1929) p. 24

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 182-3)

‘It is just because we have a real and not merely a symbolic knowledge of our own nature that our nature seems so mysterious.’

Arthur Stanley Eddington *Science and the Unseen World* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1929) p. 24

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 182)

‘In comparing the certainty of things spiritual and things temporal, let us not forget this: mind is the first and most direct thing in our experience; all else is remote inference.’

Arthur Stanley Eddington *Science and the Unseen World* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1929) p. 24

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 183)

In the soul's knowledge of itself, *being and knowing coincide*.

'[...] a real world [...] a background to the symbols – an unknown quantity which the mathematical symbol x stands for. We think we are not wholly cut off from this background. It is to this background that our own personality and consciousness belong, and those spiritual aspects of our nature not to be described by any symbolism or at least not by symbolism of the numerical kind to which mathematical physics has hitherto restricted itself.'

Sir Arthur Eddington (QQ 183)

Arthur Stanley Eddington *Science and the Unseen World* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1929) pp. 24-25

NB: God created the opposite of himself in creating physical creation. God and the soul are qualitative, matter is quantitative, or admits of quantification. Eddington's 'unknown quantity' is not a quantity (numerical symbolism could capture it).

Unity of consciousness:

'If I say that there cannot be more than one consciousness in the same mind, this seems a blunt tautology – we are quite unable to imagine the contrary.'

Erwin Schroedinger *Mind and Matter* (CUP, Cambridge, 1958) p. 55

'Now our skulls are not empty. But what we find there, in spite of the keen interest it arouses, is truly nothing when held against the life and the emotions of the soul.'

Erwin Schroedinger *Mind and Matter* (CUP, Cambridge, 1958) p. 47

'It seems to me that consciousness is something global'

Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 133

'Therefore, any physical process responsible for consciousness would have to be something with an essentially global character. Quantum coherence certainly fits the bill in this respect.'

Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 133

‘There seems to me to be a profound error in this reasoning. When an object characterized by one sensory modality is identified with one characterized by another modality, there is a tacit reference to two causal chains, both having a common terminus in a single object and another common terminus in the theatre of consciousness of the perceiver [...]. When a brain state and a state of consciousness are identified, according to the two-aspect version of physicalism, there is no difficulty in recognising a common object as terminus: it is, in fact, the brain state, since physicalism is committed to the ontological primacy of the physical description. But the other terminus, the theatre of consciousness of the perceiver, is absent. [...] a common theatre is tacitly assumed [...] but, on the other hand, there is no independent status for this theatre if physicalism is correct.’

Abner Shimony ‘On Mentality, Quantum Mechanics and the Actualisation of Potentialities’ in Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 146-7

‘“the phenomenological principle” [...] that is, whatever ontology a coherent philosophy recognises, that ontology must suffice to account for appearances. This principle has the consequence that physicalism is incoherent. [...] In sum, appearances fit nowhere in a physicalist ontology.’
Abner Shimony ‘On Mentality, Quantum Mechanics and the Actualisation of Potentialities’ in Roger Penrose *et. al. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) p. 147

For any knowledge that is not the interpretation of sense impressions:
‘the human spirit must turn to the unseen world to which it itself belongs.’
Arthur Stanley Eddington *Science and the Unseen World* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1929) p. 28

Are you a spiritual being?

‘a being’ (def.) x is a being iff x exists and x is numerically distinct from anything else.

‘spiritual’ (def.) x is spiritual iff x is immaterial, subjective, pervasive of anything it is not, unbounded, a person.

Argument that you are spiritual:

(1) Anything that is a presence is spiritual in the precise sense of being immaterial, subjective, pervasive, unbounded, a person.

(2) You are a presence.

(3) Therefore you are spiritual.

You take your self to be one particular human being: one particular human being, this psycho-physical constellation of projects and projections but that which is present though one particular human being is not one particular human being. You are not this psycho-physical human being but that which pervades it. You are your self or *you*. A spiritual being is a self, so: You are not one particular human being. You are your self.

What is a soul?

‘Soul’ (def.) ‘finite spiritual substance’

So, by the definition of ‘spiritual’ above:

‘Soul’ (def.) x is a soul iff x is a finite substance which is immaterial, subjective, pervasive of anything it is not, unbounded and a person.

By ‘a person’ I mean:

‘person’ (def.) ‘someone’ in the sense of ‘someone’ in ‘being someone’.

‘soul’ (def.) simple immaterial finite presence with absolute interiority.

Stephen Priest The Problem of Being Someone

'soul' (*def.*) Your soul is *essentially you*, so logically necessary and sufficient for your existence.

'soul' (*def.*) The soul is *not intrinsically mental or physical*.

'soul' (*def.*) The soul is not of this world so it is *not a natural entity*.

'soul' (*def.*) The soul is *a kind of presence* and so accounts for your own presence in, or as, one particular human being.

'soul' (*def.*) The soul is immaterial.

'soul' (*def.*) The soul is simple.

'soul' (*def.*) The soul is invisible.

Are you a soul?

Argument that you are a soul (I):

- (1) Something is *essentially you*, so logically necessary and sufficient for your existence.
- (2) That which is essentially you is *neither mental nor physical nor abstract*.
- (3) Anything which exists is either mental, physical, abstract or spiritual.
- (4) You are spiritual.
- (5) You are finite.
- (6) Anything finite and spiritual is a soul.
- (7) Therefore, you are a soul.

Argument that you are a soul (II):

- (1) You are simple.

- (2) You are immaterial.
- (3) You are *a kind of presence*.
- (4) You have absolute interiority.
- (5) Therefore, you are a soul.

You are out of this world so *not a natural entity*.

Has anyone ever seen anyone else? Perhaps surprisingly, *no-one has ever seen anyone else*. We are invisible. We only ever see each other's bodies.

The soul of traditional theism has the properties that being you consists in. You have those properties. Therefore, *you are a soul*.

The idea that you are a soul is anathema to the materialist and scientific thinking that dominates modernity. However, there is no materialist or scientific explanation of a being's being you. Once we understand the metaphysical question we should expect a theological answer.

What exists if and only if you exist? Your soul is what you consist in. The soul is identified with 'innermost being'. 'Inmost' can be read in two ways which are mutually consistent. 'Innermost' means 'essential' or 'necessary', so to say the soul is my innermost being is to say it is what being me consists in. The soul is logically or metaphysically necessary and sufficient for my existence. 'Innermost' also means 'pertaining to my spiritual interiority'.

Your own being is an absolute interiority, an inside without an outside. This interiority is identical with the interiority of the soul. By creating a soul, God has bestowed upon a human being the property of being someone.

What can a man give in exchange for his soul? 'Nothing'. The claim is not *just* that there is nothing more important to the welfare of a human being than the salvation of their soul. *You cannot exchange souls with anyone else*. You and I could, logically, (say, given enough advanced technology) exchange bodies or minds. We could not exchange souls because we *are* our

souls. We could exchange human beings because we pervade these human beings. Philosophical questions: theological answers.

Is there a Sound Autological Argument for the Existence of God? I offer an argument for the existence of God from your own existence. I call this the autological argument. By 'an autological argument' I mean any deductive argument from some premise which is a first person singular existential claim. By 'God' a unique, eternal, infinite, immaterial, omniscient, omnipotent, and benevolent creator of the universe.

The Autological Argument for the existence of God

- (1) I exist.
- (2) I was caused to be.
- (3) There can be no natural cause of my existence.
- (4) There is a non-natural cause of my existence.
- (5) The non-natural cause of my existence is God.
- (6) Therefore God exists.

The argument is valid because it would be contradictory to affirm the premises but deny the conclusion. It is sound because it is valid and all its premises are true. To show that the premises are true it is necessary to show that there is nothing true that is inconsistent with any of them. I consider each premise in turn.

- (1) I exist.

If propositions are individuated by their truth conditions then 'I exist' produced by you expresses a different proposition from 'I exist' produced by me. The autological argument is sound irrespective of which particular first person singular existential claim is expressed by 'I exist'. A sufficient condition for the truth of the proposition expressed by 'I exist' is that the sentence 'I exist' be affirmed or denied. So if, for example, you affirm or

deny 'I exist' then it follows that 'I exist' is true. It does not follow that 'I exist' is a necessary truth. 'I exist' would have been false if the person affirming or denying 'I exist' had not existed, but then that token utterance of 'I exist' would not have existed. The proof of 'I exist' has the status of a transcendental argument: Its truth is a necessary condition for my experience. My experience is sufficient for its truth. Therefore nothing within my experience can refute it, yet, in principle, it could have been false. For example, it's negation does not entail a contradiction and there is an infinite number of possible worlds in which I do not exist.

(2) I was caused to be.

This premise is true only if I began to be. If I exist then either I began to be or I have always existed. By (1) I do exist.

The overwhelming scientific evidence is that I have not always existed but began to be. On third person authority it seems that the human being who I 'am' was conceived by two parents and was born at a specific time and a specific place. From the first person singular point of view of my own memories I cannot remember anything earlier than my early childhood. It does not follow that I existed no earlier than I can remember, but it does follow that I have no memory of having existed earlier than my conception. It would require special evidence to show that I existed before my conception or birth. In the absence of such evidence it is right to conclude that I have not always existed. I have not always existed so I began to be.

There are two ways of denying (2): 1. I did not begin. 2. I was not caused to be, either because I did not begin or because I began without cause.

If I have not always existed I began to be. If I began to be then either I was caused to be or began to be *ex nihilo* and for no reason. It is simpler, and so more likely to be true, that I was caused to be.

It is difficult to disprove the thesis that the soul has always existed. Arguably, all and only those items incapable of ceasing to be are incapable of beginning to be. This is right if ceasing to be is impossible because transitions between being and nothingness are impossible. Then there could be no transition from not being to being, not only no transition from being to not being. Although there is no logical proof that I have not always been, that I began to be is scientifically compelling.

If I have always existed, there is even more need for some non-naturalistic explanation of my existing.

(3) There can be no natural cause of my existence.

By 'a cause' is meant 'a sufficient condition' so this premise entails that there can be no natural sufficient condition of my existence. (Of course, I do not deny that there are natural necessary conditions for my existence if we understand me to 'be' a certain human being.) There is no natural cause of my existence because some existence being my own existence is not a natural fact and a fact that is not a natural fact cannot be caused naturally. To see that that something that exists is me is not a natural feature of that thing consider the following. From no description of a person does it logically follow that that person is me. This is not just the familiar point that from no non-indexical description of someone does it logically follow that that description is a description of a particular person. It is the further point that from the existence of a particular person we cannot logically derive the conclusion that that person is me. This conclusion does not go through even if that person is me. Heuristically, I might not have existed even if Stephen Priest had existed. Once Stephen Priest exists not all the facts about Stephen Priest are in. There remains the extra fact that I am Stephen Priest. You object: "Can something non-natural have a natural cause?" No. Having a natural cause is sufficient for being natural. You object: "Artificial objects (artifacts) have natural necessary conditions and perhaps natural sufficient conditions but are not natural." These count as natural. By 'non-natural' I do not mean 'artificial'. I mean 'supernatural' or 'divine'.

(4) There is a non-natural cause of my existence.

Follows from conjunction of (2) and (3).

(5) The non-natural cause of my existence is God.

Only God is powerful enough to create oneself. God is the soul-maker. The cause of your existence is omniscient because he knows *how* to create oneself. The cause is benevolent because it is good that you exist.

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The cause is infinite because only an infinite cause can cause the infinitude of the soul. The cause is immaterial. Something physical is natural so if the cause is not natural it is immaterial. God is not natural so God is not physical. The cause is spiritual because you are spiritual and only something spiritual can cause something spiritual. NB does the cause have to be like the effect? If so, some properties of God (the cause) may be inferred from properties of the effect (oneself). This is part of the truth that I am made in God's image: God is the macrocosm, you are the microcosm. In you, God has created a finite and limited version of himself. Your being is of the same kind as God's being: Me-ness, subjectivity, are captured by 'am' but inadequately by 'is'.

(6) God exists.

An Autological Argument can be present briefly:

(1) Someone is you.

(2) There is an explanation of *someone's being you*.

(3) Any explanation is scientific, logical or theological.

(4) There is no scientific or logical explanation of *someone's being you*.

(5) There is a theological explanation of *someone's being you*.

(6) If there is a theological explanation of *someone's being you* then God exists.

(7) God exists.

Why are you you? You are you because God made someone you. A philosophical question has a theological answer.

ABOVE LATER(?)

Why are you you? God made one particular human being you by creating an immaterial soul. God has bestowed upon one particular human being the

property of being you. The philosophical question *Why are you you?* has a theological answer.

What is the cause of your existence?

Argument that you were created by God:

- (1) Your existence as a soul has no natural cause.
- (2) Anything with the power to cause your own existence as a soul is rightly called God.
- (3) There is a cause of your existence as a soul.
- (4) Therefore you were created by God.

In so far as there is something that it consists in for something to be you, to be me, and so on, we are God's creation.

Argument from the soul to God:

- (1) By inference to the ultimate explanation, something is only you if it is ultimately you.
- (2) Your soul is ultimately you.
- (3) By inference to the ultimate explanation, your soul exists only if whatever is capable of creating souls exists.
- (4) Only God can create souls.
- (5) Therefore the explanation of your own existence is theological.
- (6) God exists.

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By 'inference to the ultimate explanation', I mean the halting of a chain of necessary conditions by a necessary condition with no necessary condition except itself.

Argument from the Soul to the Existence of God:

- (1) Now is the time it is inside the soul.
- (2) There is no scientific or logical explanation of its being now inside the soul.
- (3) Any explanation is either scientific or logical or theological.
- (4) There is an explanation of its being now inside the soul.
- (5) There is a theological explanation of its being now inside the soul.
- (6) Therefore, God exists.

PERSONAL IDENTITY

What is the problem of personal identity? In one sense, you are a *very different* person from the person you were years ago. You are older, know more, have had more experiences, look different, are a different size and weight. In another sense, you are *the same* person you were years ago. Despite all the changes, it is still you. The problem of personal identity is that of stating what it consists in for a later person to be *the same person as* an earlier person:

What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a person at an earlier time being numerically identical with a person at a later time, despite their qualitative differences?

How can the later person be the same one as the earlier person if they are not the same sort?

It is plausible to assume that if *a* lacks some property possessed by *b*, *a* and *b* cannot be one and the same thing. It is a version of Leibniz's Law that:

a is *b* if and only if *a* and *b* have all and only each other's properties

If this *differs from* that, this is not that, and if this *is* that, this does not differ from that. If this differs from that it is hard to believe the claim that this *is* that.

However, in the case of something changing over time, the earlier and the later object possess different properties. We seem perfectly willing to say the later thing *is* the earlier thing even though there are properties they do not share. The retention of personal identity over time is such a case. The earlier person is numerically identical with a later person but they do not share all and only each other's properties, which is inconsistent with Leibniz's Law. How could this violation of Leibniz's Law be justified?

Here I consider three putative solutions to the problem: Bodily continuity, psychological continuity, and the soul. [continuity works for pos but is not identity]

What is the spatio-temporal continuity of the body criterion for personal identity? If the spatio-temporal continuity of the body is what personal identity consists in then the later person is the earlier person if and only if their body exists at the earlier time, exists at the later time and exists at all intervening times. If the body is a space-time continuant, an earlier and a later person being the same person is their being (or being necessary and sufficient for) slices or portions of that continuant.

The spatio-temporal continuity of the body is neither necessary nor sufficient for the identity of the person over time.

Is the Spatio-temporal Continuity of the Body Sufficient for Personal Identity? The criterion is not sufficient because there is no contradiction in the supposition that numerically distinct subjects of consciousness should occupy the same body over time (where a subject views the world from that body). In that case, the spatio-temporal continuity of the body does not guarantee the identity of the person over time. The inference fails from '...is

the same body as...' to '...is the same person as...'. This failure could be known if, for example, you were to wake up viewing the world from a different body, as, for example, in the Kafka story *Metamorphosis*. [Kafka, other cases from fiction]

Is the spatio-temporal continuity of the body necessary for personal identity? The spatio-temporal continuity of the body is not necessary for personal identity over time because there is no contradiction in the supposition that a human body might wholly cease to exist, but resume existing at some later time.

This might be denied on the ground that, by definition, nothing can have two different points of time at which it starts to exist. However, a distinction is needed between:

(1) Something begins at a time, begins at a later time and persists between those times.

and

(2) Something begins at a time, begins at a later time, and does not persist between those times.

(1) is incoherent because it entails that something both exists and does not exist at a time. Something can only begin if it does not already exist but, *ex hypothesi*, it does exist. Therefore it is both true and false that it exists, which is a contradiction.

However, (2) entails no such contradiction and expresses the theoretical possibility which refutes the claim that the spatio-temporal continuity of the body is necessary for personal identity over time: *Intermittent existence* is theoretically possible.

Argument that the concept of intermittent existence is coherent:

(1) There exists a human body at a time.

(2) That human body does not exist for some stretch of later time.

(3) There exists a human body at a later time than that stretch of time.

(4) The human body at the earlier time is the human body at the later time.

(5) The sentences (1) to (4) form a consistent set.

(5) The concept of intermittent existence is coherent.

In that case, we would be presented with a conceptual choice. We could say:

“This is not the same person, because the spatio-temporal continuity of the body has been broken.”

Or, we could say:

“This is the same person. He acts the same, sounds the same, looks the same, says he is the same one etc. This is a very unusual case: *The spatio-temporal continuity of someone’s body has been interrupted*. However, personal identity has clearly been unaffected.”

We should, I suspect, treat the later person as being the same person as the earlier person, for example, hold them responsible for what they did before their temporary period of non-existence.

We would no doubt be less confident of deciding this way if *more than one* qualitatively identical human being began to exist after the stretch of non-existence. Suppose two or six or 500,000,000 of them appeared, all qualitatively the same. Which, if any, *re*-appeared? Here we need to draw a sharp distinction between ontology and epistemology. The fact that we cannot *find out* which if any is the earlier person does not entail that there is no fact of the matter. For any of the 500,000,000, the following claim is determinately either true or false:

This is the earlier person.

irrespective of whether we can ever know. There is a fact of the matter irrespective of our ability to detect it. (I leave until later the question of whether the claim could be true of *more than one* of the later people, that is, whether an earlier person could be numerically identical with more than one later people.) [logical law] SOUL SETTLES IT. WITHOUT THE SOUL

NONE OF THE LATER PEOPLE IS THE EARLIER PERSON. WITH THE SOUL, JUST ONE LATER PERSON IS THE EARLIER PERSON. SUPPOSE YOU ARE THE PERSON. YOU ARE ONE AND NOT MANY.

How we answer the question 'Which one is the earlier person?' does not depend on whether the person exists during the stretch of time that their body does not exist, whether:

(1) The person wholly ceases to exist for the stretch of time during which their body does not exist.

or

(2) The person continues to exist (as a disembodied subject or as subjectivity without objectivity) for the stretch of time during which their body does not exist.

[The principle of bivalence forces us to accept there is a fact of the matter.] The coherence of intermittent existence is sufficient for the failure of spatio-temporal continuity as a necessary condition for personal identity.

[There is something it consists in for this to be the earlier one.

The soul guarantees this.

Could the soul cease to exist and resume existing? ie does the same problem arise all over again about the soul?

SUPPOSE I AM THE LATER PERSON. MY MEMORIES COULD HAVE COME INTO EXISTENCE FIVE MINUTES AGO. WE DO NOT ASSUME THIS IN THE ORDINARY CASE. IF I DO REMEMBER BEING THE EARLIER PERSON ONE PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION IS THAT I AM THE EARLIER PERSON.]

The falsity of the spatio-temporal continuity solution to the problem of personal identity is a necessary condition for the truth of the doctrine of resurrection. If some resurrection is to be your resurrection then your identity needs to be guaranteed by some reality other than the continuity of the body, which disintegrates at death.

Why does the spatio-temporal continuity solution fail? The spatio-temporal continuity solution fails because it faces the mind-body problem and the problem of being someone.

Argument that the spatio-temporal continuity of the body solution to the problem of personal identity faces the mind body problem:

- (1) The existence of the body is not sufficient for the existence of the mind.
- (2) The *continued* existence of the body is not sufficient for the mind. (from (1))
- (3) Persons have minds essentially.
- (4) Therefore, the spatio-temporal continuity of the body is not sufficient for the identity of the person over time.

Argument that the spatio-temporal continuity of the body solution faces the problem of being someone:

- (1) The spatio-temporal continuity of the body is not sufficient for anyone's being someone.
- (2) Any person is essentially someone.
- (3) Therefore, the continuity of the body is not sufficient for personal identity.

What is the memory criterion for personal identity? If personal identity consists in a memory criterion holding then either:

- (a) If a later person remembers an earlier person then they are that person and if a later person does not remember an earlier person then they are not that person.

so

A later person remembers an earlier person if and only if they are that person.

or

(b) If a later person remembers being an earlier person then they are that person and if a later person does not remember being an earlier person then they are not that person.

so

A later person remembers being an earlier person if and only if they are that person.

In both cases it is assumed that the remembering is veridical. The holding of the memory criterion is neither necessary nor sufficient for personal identity.

Is the memory criterion sufficient for personal identity? (a) is not sufficient because from the fact that I remember someone doing something it does not follow that I am the person who I remember. If this inference were valid, it would be impossible for me to have memories of anyone other than myself. I can remember people other than myself so the inference is not valid. Antony Flew pointed out the implausibility of something like "I remember my brother joining the army. Therefore I am my brother."

Although (b) is sufficient for personal identity it presupposes personal identity in a question-begging way. If I veridically remember being someone then it follows as a matter of logic that I am that person. We still need to know what personal identity consists in; whatever is necessary and sufficient for my identity over time that made that accurate remembering possible.

Is the memory criterion necessary for personal identity? Neither (a) nor (b) is necessary for personal identity because there might be periods of my life or actions of mine that I cannot remember. It does not follow from my inability to remember them that they did not exist. From the fact that I cannot remember a certain person it does not follow that that person was not me. If the inference were valid then *I did not exist for any periods of my life that I am unable to remember and I did not perform any actions that I cannot remember*. I did exist for the whole of my life and did perform

actions during the whole of it so the inference is invalid. Therefore the memory criterion is false, despite the validity of deriving 'I am x' from 'I remember being x'.

Why Do Scientific Solutions to the Problem of Personal Identity Fail? The spatio-temporal continuity theory is an *outer* scientific theory. The memory theory is an *inner* scientific theory. Neither is the solution to the problem of personal identity because *the scientific is inherently changing*.

These solutions fail because they break Leibniz's Law and so do not preserve *identity*. They break Leibniz's Law because they imply change. We rightly think of something losing or gaining properties:

(1) Something is *F* at an earlier time and *not F* at a later time.

We rightly conclude from this that something lasts:

(2) Something exists from the earlier time to the later time.

It is therefore natural to infer that identity over time consists in something *lasting*. Lasting, however, is not the fundamental concept. Lasting over time depends upon identity over time. To see this, ask 'What lasts?' Lasting stands in need of explanation. Lasting is not the explanation of identity. Identity is the explanation of lasting. Identity depends upon *the unchanging*. We are not wrong to ask "What lasts if a person lasts?" but lasting presupposes whatever lasts.

Argument that lasting presupposes the unchanging:

(1) Lasting presupposes identity.

(2) Identity presupposes *the unchanging*.

(3) Therefore, lasting presupposes the unchanging.

Identity over time is:

(a) Something exists at a time, and exists at a later time.

This is sufficient but not necessary for identity over time:

(b) Something exists at a time, exists at a later time, and exists at all intervening times.

It is the *numerical identity* of something between the earlier and the later time which explains how it can be true that something exists at the earlier time and at the later time and at any intervening time.

On empiricist theories of personal identity, the later person is at best *continuous* with the earlier person. If everything about a person changes over time, the later person is at best *continuous* with the earlier person, not identical. Although there is a sense in which the body continues over time, the body changes as cells die and are replaced. No part of the later body is any part of the earlier body. Even if the later person could remember the earlier person systematically, no later thought is any earlier thought. [token]

However, continuity is not sufficient for identity. From

‘Something *continues* between an earlier time and a later time’

we cannot infer

‘Something at an earlier time is *identical with* something at a later time’

(The two occurrences of ‘something’ make it look as though the inference is valid.) However, something at an earlier time does not have the property of being something at a later time and *vice versa*. Leibniz’s Law is broken so identity is not preserved. ‘is’ is used loosely, not in the sense of ‘is numerically identical with’.

Indeed, there is a difficulty in any preservation of Leibniz’s Law in cases of lasting over time. The difficulty is aging. Anything at a later time is *older than* anything at an earlier time. If anything is older than anything it differs from it. If anything differs from anything it is not it. Therefore, the later thing is not the earlier thing. It might be *continuous* with it. We should understand ‘lasts’ as ‘is continuous with’ not as ‘is’.

In order for the later person to *be* the earlier person something essential to the person must *remain utterly changeless* between the earlier person and the later person. Identity over time is only entailed, and so metaphysically guaranteed, if there is something *absolutely unchanging* that being the

person consists in. If the earlier person is the later person then something essential to the later person is *the very same thing as* something essential to the earlier person. What is it that is changeless?

Nothing physical about the person is changeless. All the cells in a person's body are replaced every several years. Nothing mental about a person is changeless. The thoughts and experiences of the later person are numerically and qualitatively distinct from those of the earlier person. The changeless in you is nothing physical, nothing mental and nothing psychophysical.

What is changelessness? On one definition of 'changeless':

- (1) Something is changeless if and only if, if it has a property at an earlier time then it has that property at a later time.

The definition captures one sense of 'changeless' but not one adequate to your own changelessness. Suppose:

- (2) Something is changeless if and only if it exists but not at any time.

Here the intuition is that change entails time, so a non-temporal being is changeless.

That something retains identity through change presupposes an inherently changeless subject of change: that which changes in the sense of that which *undergoes* change. That which changes in this sense is changeless in the sense that it exists before and after the change. You are no exception to this. Throughout your life, something about you has remained utterly unchanging.

III

SPIRIT

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What is Changeless in the Person? The changeless is disclosed phenomenologically.

Argument that the changeless is your own existence.

- (1) One particular human being changes.
- (2) Your existence does not change.
- (3) The changeless is your own existence.

Argument that the changeless is being always now.

- (1) What happens in the present changes.
- (2) The present is unchanging.
- (3) The changeless is being always now.

Argument that the changeless is being saturated with you-ness.

- (1) One particular human being changes.
- (2) The you-ness of being you does not change.
- (3) The changeless is being saturated with you-ness.

Argument that the changeless is absolute interiority.

- (1) Thoughts and emotions change.
- (2) Absolute interiority does not change.
- (3) The changeless is absolute interiority.

Argument that the changeless is being unbounded.

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- (1) The boundaries of one particular human being change.
- (2) The unbounded does not change.
- (3) The changeless is being unbounded.

Argument that the changeless is being being.

- (1) Beings change.
- (2) Being does not change.
- (3) The changeless is being being.

Argument that the changeless is the site of the disclosure of Being to Being.

- (1) Beings change.
- (2) The site of the disclosure of Being to Being does not change.
- (3) The changeless is the site of the disclosure of Being to Being.

Argument that the changeless is the unconditioned.

- (1) The conditioned changes.
- (2) The unconditioned does not change.
- (3) The changeless is the unconditioned.

[WRITE ARGS FOR SECOND PREMISE IN EACH CASE.]

Is the unchanging the soul?

Argument that the unchanging is the soul:

- (1) The unchanging is your existence, always now, saturated with you-ness and the site of the disclosure of Being to Being.

(2) Anything which is the unchanging is your existence, always now, saturated with you-ness and the site of the disclosure of Being to Being is the soul.

(3) The unchanging is the soul.

What is the solution to the problem of personal identity? A person at one time is numerically identical with a person at a different time by having *the same immaterial soul*. The soul is the solution to the problem of personal identity. Because the soul is the unchanging the person at the later time is numerically identical with the person at the earlier time, not merely continuous. The soul is the person (but not, of course, the human being). If a person *is you* at an earlier time, and *is you* at a later time then the earlier person's soul is the later person's soul. A person 'is' someone (where this is *not* a fact about personality in the psychological sense). A person is someone because a person is essentially a soul.

What does the identity of the human being consist in? If we ask what the identity of the human being consists in, in complete abstraction from their being someone, then this identity admits of any number of mental, physical and psycho-physical degrees and so collapses into continuity. There might be brain transplants, part brain transplants, memory implants, split brain operations. Part of one brain might be put in another and vice versa. There are cases of multiple personality. One human being could become another through a process of gradual replacement of physical, mental or psycho-physical parts.

You 'are' a person or you 'are' a human being if your soul is centred on that one. We say you 'are' the human being in whom you are uniquely (or typically) centred during your earthly life. 'Are' here does not express necessary numerical identity.

You could be only partly centred on a human being. You could be off centre. This would be for your point of view on the world not to coincide exactly with the subjective point of view of a certain human body. Then it would make sense to say that you 'partly' are that human being.

There could be anonymous human beings. Even a human being with a personality could be an anonymous human being. Any such anonymous human beings would be continuous but not identical over time.

Often the question 'What makes someone me?' is assimilated to the question What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of the person over time? But these questions are not the same question. I remain me and you remain you irrespective of the existence, non-existence or changes in any human beings. The soul has an absolute or unqualified existence.

In a day to day sense, it makes sense to say the person rather than the soul is conscious or unconscious. This is because we use the body to move, use the brain to think etc. [I **STILL DO NOT THINK THAT THE BRAIN THINKS BECAUSE I COULD THINK THIS WITHOUT HAVING A BRAIN**. I do not claim that the brain thinks. How could it? The brain is only billions of atoms in empty space. You think. I think. Nevertheless: The brain is scientifically necessary for mentality. That we think these conditioned thoughts is, inter alia, due to the brain.]

The soul is the space where ordinary consciousness occurs.

The atheistic mind is a conditioned mind. The theological mind is an unconditioned mind.

Temporary identity. You are one particular human being for a while.

The mind body problem. The brain is only billions of atoms moving in empty space.

What is consciousness?

Consciousness is space.

Mind-body problem is much more difficult than materialists suppose.

Being me and the soul make a difference to the mind.

Instead of consciousness we should talk about the soul. (Talk of consciousness started to come historically as the knowledge that we are souls began to be lost.)

Your soul is your presence in your body. ('in' here is not like 'in' in 'marbles in a box') 'at' your body, ie centred on it.

The continuity of your body is not necessary for your identity because the soul is sufficient. The continuity of the body is not sufficient because the soul is necessary. If one particular human being disappeared the soul would be intrinsically unaffected.

The continuity of your mind is not necessary for your existence because as a soul you could exist without mental states. It is not sufficient because from the continued existence of the mind you are ordinarily associated with does nothing to bring your soul into being.

Is the solution to the problem of personal identity theological? The solution is theological because it is only within the power of God to create souls and it is only within the power of God to make a soul you.

Argument from personal identity to the existence of God

- (1) Any person is numerically identical with some earlier person.
- (2) There is personal identity.
- (3) There is no scientific or logical explanation of personal identity.
- (4) Any explanation is scientific, logical or theological.
- (5) There is an explanation of personal identity.
- (6) There is a theological explanation of personal identity.
- (7) If there is a theological explanation of personal identity then God exists.
- (8) God exists.

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Argument from the existence of the soul to the existence of God

- (1) Any person is numerically identical with some earlier person.
- (2) There is personal identity.
- (3) There is an explanation of personal identity.
- (4) The existence of the soul is what personal identity consists in.
- (5) Only God can create souls.
- (6) If God creates souls then God exists.
- (7) God exists.

Argument from your being a soul to the existence of God

- (1) There is something that your personal identity consists in.
- (2) The existence of your soul is what your personal identity consists in.
- (3) Only God can make a soul you.
- (6) If God makes a soul you then God exists.
- (7) God exists.

You are essentially unchanging. The unchanging is a soul created by God:
Philosophical question: theological answer.

Notes

YOU

- (1) Heidegger should have written 'Hiersein' not 'Dasein', even though, 'da' already carries some connotation of being present in the here and now (See: Michael Inwood A Heidegger Dictionary (Oxford, 1999) p. 42) and 'Dasein'

appropriately suggests *Geworfenheit* (thrownness). 'Hiersein' expresses the existential immediacy of being all-here-now. Benedikt Goecke has suggested 'Jetztsein' as expressing the now-ness of existing.

(2) Sartre and Merleau-Ponty provide descriptions of the body as *l'être pour soi* but because they are engaged in a phenomenology that putatively eschews metaphysics they offer no explanations of the asymmetry between oneself and everyone else. 'One particular human being' presents (roughly) the phenomenological features described by Merleau-Ponty in *Phénoménologie de la perception* and by Sartre in *L'être et le néant*. See Jean-Paul Sartre *L'Être et le Néant* (Paris, 1943), Stephen Priest (ed.) *Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings* (London and New York, 2001) Maurice Merleau-Ponty *Phénoménologie de la Perception* (Paris, 1945), Stephen Priest *Merleau-Ponty* (London and New York, 2001),

(3) Although Heidegger also tries to avoid metaphysics in the pre-Kantian sense, the posing and clarification of the *Seinsfrage* is an inquiry into the presuppositions of phenomenology.

(4) Mach drew himself and included part of the inside of an eye socket and one side of the end of his nose. In a non-objective sense, you are behind your eyes, and you partly are your eyes. See Ernst Mach *The Analysis of Sensations* () p.

I am grateful to my colleague Stephen Mulhall for the expression God as 'soul-maker'.

Ironically, it was the influential materialist J. J. C. Smart who said that if the mind was more than the brain it would be 'something new under the sun', something which would be inexplicable in terms the scientific laws we have discovered. He offered this as grounds for scepticism and naturalism. I redescribe your own existence theologically: You are a portal to God.

What holds Hume's bundle together? The soul holds Hume's bundle together.

This claim is at least consistent with Heidegger's insight that when I feel closest to myself I am furthest.

Heidegger should have written 'Hiersein'.

(6) Merleau-Ponty says the view from nowhere, *vue de nulle parte*, is not a neutral view but a view from above.

(7) If naturalism entails physicalism, Benedikt Goecke has refuted naturalism. See: 'Priest and Nagel on Being Someone: A Refutation of Physicalism'. I use 'refute' with this entailment: If p is refuted then p is false.

(8) We break the hold Kant has over philosophy by identifying the transcendental with the transcendent. We reseal the circle that Kant has broken. We push Kant's Kantianism far beyond Kant's conclusions so that, in the end, critical philosophy and metaphysics coincide. This ending, which would have horrified Kant, is *reasoning to ultimate presuppositions*: presuppositions which are neither only logical (nor only psychological) but theological.

(9) Sartre is one of that minority of philosophers who understands some version of the problem of being someone:

'There is a metaphysical problem concerning birth in that I can be anxious to know how I happen to have been born from that particular embryo'

(Sartre's italics.) Unfortunately, he quickly shies away from it:

'[...] this problem is perhaps insoluble. But it is not an ontological problem [...]' Jean-Paul Sartre *Being and Nothingness* trans. Hazel E. Barnes (Methuen, London, 1972) p. 139

In fairness to Sartre, he says the problem is 'perhaps' insoluble, but he does not try to solve it. When Sartre says the problem is not ontological, he is in the company of those philosophers who reject the thesis that a 'new entity' would solve the problem. (Sartre, 1972: 139, Nagel, 1986, Peacocke, 1979:

177, Blackburn) Nagel and Peacocke think all the same problems arise for any such new entity. The 'new entity' that is the un-namable here is the soul.

Kripke is right to argue that:

'Perhaps in some possible world Mr. and Mrs. Truman had a child who actually became the Queen of England and was even passed off as the child of other parents. This still would not be a situation in which this very woman whom we call 'Elizabeth II' was the child of Mr. and Mrs. Truman, or so it seems to me.' Saul Kripke Naming and Necessity (Blackwell, Oxford, 1972) p. 112-3

but that is because being the Queen of England is not a sufficient condition for being that very woman who is in fact Elizabeth II, rather than because anything has its (kind of) origin essentially. Here Kripke expresses only a biological impossibility, not a logical or a metaphysical impossibility:

'How could a person originating from different parents, from a totally different sperm and egg, be this very woman? [...] It seems to me that anything coming from a different origin would not be this object.' Saul Kripke Naming and Necessity (Blackwell, Oxford, 1972) p. 113.

In these cases, Sartre and Kripke are talking about the origin of a human being. I am talking about what it is for you to be a human being, this one. If the relation between you and one particular human being is identity, which might be doubted, it is at best contingent identity.

(12) Here I assume Nagel is right that there is a view from nowhere. Merleau-Ponty is wrong to say there is no view from nowhere: 'pas de vue de nul point'. The point of view from which you survey the line is perhaps itself imaginary (even though in a sense it is just where you are now, scientifically.)

(13) In answer to two of Nagel's questions: How can you be this specific human being? The answer is you are not, if by 'are' means 'are numerically identical with'. How can you be only this specific human being? You are not. Your being exceeds the being of one particular human being.

Nagel is right to say:

‘[...] the fact that it is possible to give impersonal truth conditions for first-person statements does not enable one to make those statements without using the first person. The crucial question is whether the elimination of this particular first-person thought in favour of its impersonal truth conditions leaves a significant gap in our conception of the world. I think it does.’
Thomas Nagel *The View From Nowhere* (Oxford) p. 59.

I should go further than Nagel. Your entire conception of the world is based or grounded in the fact that you exist here now. The world is presented to you as all around you. The past is what has happened before you now. The future is what will happen after you now. Although few philosophers have been able to grasp the problem Nagel is pointing to, the problem is even more acute than Nagel mentions. Your own existence is indispensable to your view of the world: not just in the obvious sense that unless you existed you could have no view, but in the further sense that your being here now makes a difference to what is presented to you and how. For example, it is presented as past, present and future, as here and elsewhere and from the centre that you are. Why is this not apparent? The I that sees does not see the I that sees.

(14) Sartre thinks the ‘impossible’ human project of being a synthesis of being-for-itself and being-in-itself, the desire to be God, is absurd. Sartre fails to notice that his own account entails that any human being is already a synthesis of *pour-soi* and *en-soi*.

(15) The absurd is a Leitmotif of the philosophical literature of Albert Camus and Samuel Beckett (1906-89) and the ‘Theatre of the Absurd’.

WHAT LASTS FROM THE CRADLE TO THE GRAVE?

(28) The last sentence of this passage from Locke is therefore false:

‘Person, as I take it, is the name for this self. Wherever a man finds what he calls himself, there, I think, another may say is the same person. It is a forensic term appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law, and happiness and misery. This personality extends itself beyond present existence to what is past, only by consciousness ...’ Locke *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Oxford) Book III Ch. 27 p. 198

(29) Modern philosophy has been diverted from any adequate solution to the problem of personal identity by an immensely influential but catastrophically unperceptive passage in Hume:

‘For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death, and could I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he calls himself; though I am certain there is no such principle in me.

But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions ... David Hume *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Oxford) Section VI ‘Of Personal Identity’

Hume misses just about everything significant in introspection: that it is always now, that there is an infinite interiority to phenomenological space,

me-ness, that inner space is an inside without an outside, that inner space is simple in having no parts, that none of this is in the least bit physical or material, that, mysteriously, he can only conduct the introspection in his own case. Clearly, I am one of the ‘metaphysicians’ Hume mentions in his last paragraph. Well, I ‘venture to affirm’ that Hume did not introspect peacefully enough. The introspector completely missed the intro-specter.

Hume is a superficial philosopher of the self but St. Augustine has knowledge of the soul. Hume struggles to construct solutions to philosophical problems out of observations of the scientific world. Augustine is interested in how the scientific world is possible. Augustine does find himself in introspection:

‘And I turned to the nature of the mind, but the false notion which I had of spiritual things, let me not see the truth. Yet the force of truth did of itself flash into mine eyes, and I turned away my panting soul from incorporeal substance to lineaments, and colours, and bulky magnitudes. And not being able to see these in the mind, I thought I could not see my mind. And whereas in virtue I loved peace, and in viciousness I abhorred discord; in the first I observed a unity, but in the other, a sort of division. And in that unity I conceived the rational soul, and the nature of truth and of the chief good to consist ...’

St. Augustine Confessions Book IV

Instructively, Augustine understands the sort of mistake that Hume makes. Someone who understands Hume but not Augustine can only regard Augustine as mad or as duped by wild flights of imagination or in the grip of an eccentric ideology. Augustine is at first distracted by the contents of consciousness (colours etc.) but then, through peace, leaving plurality and division to dissolve, there is disclosed to him the unity which is the soul, the incorporeal substance which he is. Indeed, he has a diagnosis of how one might be misled into type of mistake that Hume makes. It is by having a ‘false notion ... of spiritual things’. It is a mistake to think of the soul as one thing amongst others. Rather, the soul is the unbounded spiritual space in which particular ideas and impressions come and go. It is the now in which thought and perception occur. The soul is the emptiness of the Buddhists. Ironically, Hume in the passage just quoted assumes his introspection is ‘unprejudiced’. Augustine understands only too well that pre-conceptions

gleaned from observation of scientific particulars will not easily disclose the spiritual space in which they are perceived.

An Augustine can always understand the limitations of a Hume. A Hume will never understand the insights of an Augustine. To a Hume, Augustine's philosophy will seem like phantasy, wish fulfilment or ungrounded and extravagant dogma. Nothing could be further from the truth. Your soul is the existential reality of what you are. Your soul is the inner space in which your experiences happen.

fade away as perhaps Kant thinks

Kant makes the same mistake as Hume and certain Buddhists in assimilating you too closely to your life.

(3) The unity of consciousness due to the soul '... our particular perceptions, when I proceed to explain the principle of connexion, which binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity; I am sensible, that my account is very defective, and that nothing but the seeming evidence of the precedent reasonings could have induced me to receive it. If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only feel a connexion or determination of the thought, to pass from one object to another. It follows, therefore, that the thought alone finds personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions, that compose a mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce each other. However extraordinary this conclusion may seem, it need not surprize us. Most philosophers seem inclined to think, that personal identity arises from consciousness; and consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception. The present philosophy, therefore, has so far a promising aspect. But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head.' David Hume A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford) Appendix A

The properties Hume missed in introspection are metaphysical properties of the soul. The soul, as described in the world's great religions, as well as by

Plato and Descartes, is essentially you, immaterial, an unchanging interiority. The changeless is the soul.

(31) Heidegger insightfully suggests that what we ordinarily take ourselves to be in our day to day actions is not what we fundamentally are: 'It could be that the "who" of everyday Dasein just is not the "I myself".' Martin Heidegger *Being and Time* trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Blackwell, Oxford, 1962) I.4. 25 p.150. Heidegger is describing what it is to be someone at the level of being, at the level of Fundamentalontologie, not psychology or psychologistic philosophy: 'Is it obvious a priori that access to Dasein must be gained only by mere reflective awareness of the "I" of actions? What if this kind of "giving itself" on the part of Dasein should lead our existential analytic astray and do so, indeed, in a manner grounded in the being of Dasein itself? Perhaps when Dasein addresses itself in the way which is closest to itself, it always says "I am this entity", and in the long run says this loudest when it is 'not' this entity. Dasein is in each case mine, and this is its constitution; but what if this should be the very reason why, proximally and for the most part, Dasein is not itself?' Martin Heidegger *Being and Time* trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Blackwell, Oxford, 1962) I.4. 25 p.151

(32) 'It must be possible for the I think (Ich denke) to accompany all my representations; otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me.' Kant *Critique of Pure Reason* (Macmillan) trans. Norman Kemp Smith (B 131-2) 'Transcendental Deduction'

(33) 'The proposition of the identity of my Self amidst all the manifold representations of which I am conscious, is likewise a proposition lying in the conceptions themselves, and is consequently analytical. But this identity of the subject, of which I am conscious in all its representations, does not relate to or concern the intuition of the subject, by which it is given as an object. This proposition cannot therefore enounce the identity of the person, by which is understood the consciousness of the identity of its own substance as a thinking being in all change and variation of circumstances. To prove this, we should require not a mere analysis of the proposition, but

synthetical judgements based upon a given intuition.’ Kant Critique of Pure Reason (Macmillan) trans. Norman Kemp Smith ‘Paralogisms’

(34) ‘We have found the definition of ‘person’, namely, ‘an individual substance of a rational nature’ Boethius Contra Eutychem Loeb Classical Library No 74 p. 84

(35) ‘You are no thing, you are simply the person who has to live with things, among things, the person who has to live not any life but a particular life.’ Ortega y Gasset In Search of Goethe from Within p. 118 The explanation of not being a thing is being no-thing-ness or a soul.

(36) ‘What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation etc. are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type.’ P. F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London) p. 102 Merleau-Ponty ‘human predicates’.

(37) ‘There is noncriterial knowledge of the identity (or persistence) of persons, namely that expressed in memory statements. So far as I can see, there is no noncriterial knowledge of the identity of such things as hurricanes.’ Sydney Shoemaker Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity (Ithaca NY) p. 258 So: Am I a physical object? There is no non-criterial knowledge of being a physical object. There is non-criterial knowledge of being me. Therefore, I am not a physical object.

This existence is unchanging, as the physical or psychological changes take place in it. Although shot through with turbulence, you are a zone of stillness.

You are the unchanging space in which the constellation of psycho-physical processes called ‘one particular human being’ takes place.

The properties Hume missed in introspection are metaphysical properties of the soul. The soul, as described in the world’s great religions, as well as by Plato and Descartes, is essentially you, immaterial, an unchanging interiority. The changeless is the soul.

Quotations From Scriptures:

Concept Of Soul In Jain Scriptures

Quotations From UTTARAADHYAYAN SUTRA

According to Jainism, soul is one of the six entities of the universe.

There are infinite number of souls in the universe.

They are independent from each other.

A worldly soul is associated with karmic matter and so it interacts with other entities of the universe.

On shedding all karmic matter through self-endeavor, a worldly soul becomes SIDDHA, a pure soul.

This is the teaching of the religion of self-reliance (SHRAMAN DHARM).

SIDDHAs enjoy the attributes of a pure soul.

They do not interact with any other entity of the universe.

The concepts presented in the following quotations from UTTARAADHYAYAN SUTRA constitute some important and unique features of the Jain religion.

They bring out the differences between the concepts of reality in Jainism and other religions.

Definition of soul:

NAANAM CHA DANSANAM CHEV CHARITTAM CHA TAVO TAHA
|
VEERIYAM UVAOGO YA AEYAM JEEVASSA LAKKHANAM || 28-11
||

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*The defining characteristics of soul are:
knowledge, perception, conduct (activity), austerity,
potency (capability) and cognitive faculty.
(No other entity possesses these qualities.)*

In TATTVAARTH SUTRA, Acharya Umaswati has written: a defining characteristic of soul is cognitive faculty (UPAYOGO LAKSHANAM).

Cognitive faculty is active consciousness - knowledge and perception.

Cognitive faculty initiates activity (conduct).

Having rational perception, knowledge and conduct, an individual practices austerities (TAPAH) and eventually sheds all karmic matter.

This potency (capability) of a worldly soul is called VEERYA.

Thus cognitive faculty, knowledge, perception, conduct, potency and austerity are attributes of soul.

No other entity of the universe, such as matter including energy, space and time, possesses any of these attributes.

Characteristics of soul:

NO INDIYAGGEJH AMUTTABHAAVA AMUTTABHAAVA VI A HOI
INCHCHO |
AJHATHAHEUN NIYAYASSA BANDHO SAMSAARAHEUN CHA
VAYANTI BANDHAM || 14-19 ||

*Soul does not possess qualities of matter,
so it is not apprehensible by senses;
though the soul is not material, it is eternal;
soul's defiled actions result in its worldly cycles.*

Soul is non-material - it does not have any qualities of matter or energy.

Consequently, soul can not be detected through our senses.

Though soul is incorporeal, it is eternal.

Since time immemorial, worldly souls are ensnared in cycles of birth and death on account of their involvement in impure states caused by their interactions with external objects.

Aspects of Soul:

APPA NAI VERAYANI APPA ME KOODASAAMALI |
APPA KAAMADUHAA DHENU APPA ME NANDANAM VANAM ||
20-36 ||
APPA KATTA VIKATTA YA DUHAAN YA SUHAAN YA |
APPA MITTAMAMITTAM CHA DUPPATTHIYA SUPATTHIO || 20-37
||

My own self is the mythical river VAITARNI,

my own self is the legendary SHALMALI tree,

my own self is the fanciful KAAMADHENU,

my own self is the imaginary NANDAN garden.

*My own self is the doer and undoer,
of unpleasant and pleasant experiences;*

my own self, on meritorious path, is my friend,

my own self, engaged in demerit, is my foe.

The mythical VAITARNI river and SHALMALI tree signify the hellish state of our worldly existence, which is full of pain and misery, while the fanciful KAAMADHENU and NANDAN garden represent the heavenly state of prosperity, pleasure and happiness in life.

Thus the import of the present couplets is that physical, vocal and mental activities of an individual are responsible for all desirable and undesirable events in his/her life. Good thoughts and feelings result in our spiritual uplift, while thoughts and feelings, defiled with passions and desires, cause pain and suffering in life.

Thus a person is his/her own beneficial friend or evil enemy.

These couplets emphasize the Jain concept of self-reliance (SHRAMAN religion).

Soul's arch enemy - defilement:

NA TAM ARI KANTHACHHETTA KAREI JAM SE KARE APPANIYA
DURAPPAYA |
SE NAAHIEE MACHCHUMUHAM TU PATTE
PACHCHHAANUTAAVEN DAYAAVIHOONO || 20-48 ||

*A mortal enemy, who cuts one's throat, does not bring
as much misery as do one's own demeritorious acts;
realizing their mistakes, some confess and repent
for their misdeeds at the time of death, when it is too late.*

Whether engaged in the ordinary activities of life or in spiritual pursuit, we are expected to look inward.

We should realize that even a wicked adversary does not cause as much harm as do our own undesirable thoughts, feelings and actions.

An enemy can commit only physical violence, but by having an untoward reaction to other's deeds, we commit self-directed mental violence and, at times, physical violence as well.

Thus it is not proper to assail other's offensive deeds by spiteful and arrogant words and actions.

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In short, we should not commit physical or mental violence in response to other's offensive deeds, because violence can not be amended through violence.

Thoughts and actions involving violence defile our lives.

Some of us do not realize this truth in the early stages of our lives and indulge in arrogance and contempt for fellow beings.

But realizing and repenting for our misdeeds at the time of death is too little and too late.

We should practice nonviolence throughout our lives.

Nonviolence is a virtue which brings us closer to spiritualism.

Path to eternal bliss:

APPA CHEV DAMEYAVVO APPA HU KHALU DUDDAMO |
APPA DANTO SUHI HOI ASSIM LOE PARATTHA YA || 1-15 ||

*One should restrain none other than the self;
the self is formidable, difficult to restrain;
by subduing the self, one attains happiness,
in the present life as well as in the future.*

We should realize that our undesirable thoughts and feelings are our insistent enemies.

Further, it is very difficult to restrain the self.

Therefore, we should religiously cultivate self-restraint and discipline.

We can improve our lives by practicing virtues like nonviolence, truth and contentment.

This is an effective way of achieving happiness and peace in this life and in the future.

Conquering the self:

VARAM ME APPA DANTO SANJAMEN TAVEN YA |
MAAHAM PAREHIM DAMMANTO BANDHANEHIM VAHEHI YA ||
1-16 ||

*It is most auspicious to control the self
through restraint and penance;
rather than calling for punishment
from others, confinement or the end of life.*

Our first priority should be to limit our desires and perform penance.

When we become slaves of our passions and indulge in immoral deeds, we invite punishment of various kinds.

The society and the laws of the land restrict our activities.

We lose our independence and our lives become miserable.

Thus it is best to control the self rather than be controlled by other segments of society.

Ultimate victory:

JO SAHASSAM SAHASSAANAM SANGAAME DUJAE JINE |
AEGAM JINIJA APPAANAM AES SE PARAMO JAO || 9-34 ||

*Victory over thousands of external enemies
in the battlefield is insignificant, (it is of no avail)
compared to the victory over one's inner enemies;
vanquishing one's passions is an unparalleled conquest.*

Jainism is the religion of JINs - the victors, who have conquered their inner enemies such as anger, pride, intrigue and greed.

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Our passions are responsible for our karmic bondage, and so they are our mortal enemies.

Therefore, controlling our passions is the ultimate victory.

How to attain ultimate victory?

APPAAN MEV JUJJHAAHI KIM TE JUJJHEN BAJJHAO |
APPAANA CHEVAMAPPAANAM JAITTA SUHAMEHAE || 9-35 ||

*One should fight one's inner enemies - passions,
attachment, aversion, desires and the like.
What is the purpose of fighting the external enemies?
Conquering the self through self-reliance leads to happiness.*

All conflicts in life arise by our indulgence in attachment, aversion, anger, pride, deceit, greed and desires of various kinds.

They are the root cause of violence and unrest in our lives.

So fighting external enemies is of no avail.

Thus we should resist our inner enemies and control the self.

Such discipline, which is cultivated through self-reliance, is the key to genuine happiness.

Inner enemies to be vanquished:

PANCHINDIYAANI KOHAM MAANAM MAAYAM TAHEV LOHAM
CHA |
DUJJAYAM CHEV APPAANAM SAVVAMAPPE JIAE JIYAM || 9-36 ||

**Most difficult to conquer is self;
but by conquering the five senses, and the
passions of anger, pride, intrigue and greed
the self stands propitiously conquered.**

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To conquer the self, we have to give up indulgence in the pleasures of the five senses.

We have to avoid the passions of anger, ego, deceit and greed.

When desires and passions are vanquished, the self enjoys contentment, happiness and serenity.

Crossing the ocean of worldly existence:

SAREERAMAAHU NAAV TTI JEEVO VUCHCHAI NAAVIO |
SAMSAARO ANNAVO VUTTO JAM TARANTI MAHESINO || 23-73 ||

This body may be viewed as a boat,
the soul is its worthy sailor,
the ocean is the cycles of worldly existence,
which is traversed by illustrious beings.

This is a beautiful and expressive metaphor depicting our worldly existence and the process of liberation.

We, the worldly beings, have to face the ocean of innumerable cycles of birth and death.

Our bodies can be compared to the boats floating in the ocean and our souls serve as skillful sailors, who can take the boats across the ocean of worldly miseries.

We Jains do not believe that some superhuman entity helps us in achieving salvation.

We have to liberate ourselves through self-endeavor.

Thus we Jains are self-reliant (SHRAMAN).

This is a unique feature of the Jain religion.

One who is truly devoted to one's soul, lives only for the uplift of one's soul and does not indulge in the attachment of non-soul, is a Jain. The rest are non-Jains.

- Kaka Kalelkar

‘What is the meaning of human life, or, for that matter, of the life of any creature? To know an answer to this question means to be religious. You ask: Does it make any sense, then, to pose this question? I answer: The man who regards his own life as that of his fellow creatures as meaningless is not merely unhappy but hardly fit for life.’

Albert Einstein ‘Mein Weltbild’ in *Ideas and Opinions* (Crown, New York, 1954) p. 11

‘The true value of a human being is determined primarily by the measure and the sense in which he has attained liberation from the self.’

Albert Einstein ‘Mein Weltbild’ in *Ideas and Opinions* (Crown, New York, 1954) p. 12